CAR_Public/190617.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, June 17, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 120

                            Headlines

ADIEN PLC: Thornton Law Firm Appointed Co-Lead Counsel
ALL NATION HOME: Stevens Suit Asserts Ohio Wage Law Violations
AMERICAN MEDICAL: Worthey Files Suit in S.D. New York
AMERIGAS PARTNERS: Scarantino Files Suit Over UGI Merger Deal
AQUA METALS: Awaits Court OK to Dismiss Securities Class Suit

BARILLA AMERICA: Settlement in Slack Fill Suit Has Final Approval
BAYER AG: Sydney Firms Probe Cancers Linked to Roundup
BEAZER HOMES: Strougo Hits Share Price Drop
BLOOM ENERGY: Pomerantz Files Securities Fraud Class Suit
BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD: Kirby et al Suit Transferred to N.D. Ga.

BLUE SKY: ASIC Drops Inquiry, Class Action Still Likely
BOULDER BRANDS: Calif. Judge Dismisses Slack-Fill Class Action
BUMBLE BEE: Faces Class Action Over "Dolphin-Safe" Label
BUTTERFIELD MARKET: Faces Gambell Suit in S.D. New York
CALIFORNIA: Class Action Filed on Behalf of Disabled Children

CBL & ASSOCIATES: Pomerantz Law Firm Probing Investors' Claims
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Ruling Illustrates Impact of Arbitration
COMPETITIVE EDGE: Sanchez Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
CONAGRA: Faces 6 Lawsuits Over Exploding Pam Cooking Spray Cans
DEJA VU CONSULTING: 6th Cir. Affirms $6.55MM Exotic Dancers' Deal

DIAL CORP: Arizona AG Challenges $7.4MM Class Action Settlement
DMS OILFIELD: McMillan Seeks OT Pay for Wellsite Consultants
DYNAGAS LNG: Faces Securities Class Action in New York
ENDO INTERNATIONAL: Bid to Dismiss Pelletier Suit Underway
ENDO INTERNATIONAL: Continues to Defend Opioid-Related Lawsuits

ENDO INTERNATIONAL: Discovery Ongoing in Bier Class Action
ENDO INTERNATIONAL: Dismissal of Friedman Suit Affirmed
ENDO INTERNATIONAL: Generic Drug Pricing Litigation Ongoing
ENDO INTERNATIONAL: Statement of Claim in Makris Suit Amended
ERNESLI CORPORATION: Lamarre Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages

EXPRESS DELIVERY: Romig Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
FACEBOOK INC: D.C. Suit Over Privacy Practices OK'd to Proceed
FINANCE CAPITAL: Shanahan Sues Over Unsolicited Automated Calls
FISHER-PRICE: Fieker Sues over Sale of Rock 'n Play Sleeper
FLOOR & DECOR: Thornton Law Firm Files Securities Fraud Suit

GENERAL ATOMICS: Green Sues Over Unpaid Wages
GILEAD: Faces Class Action Over Alleged Generics Collusion
GLEN MILLS SCHOOLS: El-Khashab Sues over Civil Rights Violations
GOPRO INC: Sept. 10 Class Action Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
GRUBHUB: Philadelphia Restaurateur Files $5MM Class Action

HAIYING REN: Does not Properly Pay Workers, Wang Suit Says
HAN DYNASTY: Pan Sues Over Failure to Pay Overtime Wages
HARDCORE DISPATCH: Medina Sues Over Unsolicited Marketing
HRO INNOVATION: Moreno Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages Under FLSA
HYTTO LTD: Judge Allows Lush Vibrator Class Action to Proceed

INT'L PAPER: 11th Cir. Affirms Judgment in Nevalski Suit
INTERSECT ENT: Glancy Prongay Files Securities Class Action
INTUIT INC: Kessler Topaz Files TurboTax Class Action in Calif.
JAN-PRO FRANCHISING: Duanne Morris Attorney Discusses Ruling
KANSAS: Lomax Must Show Cause Why Suit Shouldn't be Dismissed

KBP INVESTMENTS: Simon Seeks Unpaid Wages, Damages
KENNY G & COMPANY: Peterson Sues over Wrongful Termination
LAREDO EMERGENCY: Santos Seeks to Recover Underpaid Overtime Wages
LYNAS CORP: Faces Class Action Over Delays During Establishment
MADISON REED: Duncan Assertss Violation under Disabilities Act

MARYLAND STATE EDUC: Akers Appeals Dist. Ct. Ruling to 4th Cir.
MASTERCARD INC: Buddle Findlay Attorneys Discuss Court Ruling
MBJ CAFETERIA: Garcia Seeks Unpaid Overtime Compensation
MCGEE MOTOR-CARS: Does Not Pay Proper Overtime Wages, Gloss Says
MDL 2325: Endo Continues to Defend Vaginal Mesh-Related Suits

MDL 2836: Plaintiffs Seek to Amend Complaint in Zetia(R) Litig.
MEDEQUITIES REALTY: Bushansky Suit over Merger Deal Pending
MEDEQUITIES REALTY: Continues to Defend Russell Class Suit
MEDEQUITIES REALTY: Scarantino Class Suit Underway in Baltimore
MEDLEY OPPORTUNITY: 3rd Cir. Appeal Filed in Williams RICO Suit

MEGA ENERGY: Moore Sues Over Intrusive Telemarketing Practices
MERCEDES BENZ: Faces Class Action Over Defective Wood Trim
MONSANTO CO: Bayer Vows to Appeal $2-Bil. Roundup Verdict
MONSANTO COMPANY: Brunton Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Ruth Estate Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup

MONSANTO COMPANY: Schuetz Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MOWI: Beacon Fisheries Files Price-Fixing Class Action
MUELLER WATER: Schall Law Firm Invites Investors to Join Suit
NABRIVA THERAPEUTICS: Pomerantz Files Securities Fraud Suit
NCAA: Kelly Sues Over Disregard for Student-Athletes' Safety

NEW ENGLAND FAT LOSS: Gaffin Sues over Telemarketing Calls
NEW SOUTH WALES: Class Action Likely Against Education Dept.
NEWTON, MA: McKay Suit Seeks Proper Wages
OHM SPA: Duncan Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act in New York
OLIPHANT FINANCIAL: Frankenreiter's Bid to Certify Class Stayed

PAPO'S EXPRESS: Umana Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
PAYMENT MANAGEMENT: Parthemer Files PI Class Action in California
PEACE LOVE: Gottlieb Sues over Unwanted Telemarketing Text Messages
PERRIGO CO: Bid to Dismiss NY Securities Suit Pending
PERRIGO CO: Drugs Price Fixing-Related Suits Ongoing

PERRIGO CO: Israel Elec. Corp. Employees' Suit Still Stayed
PERRIGO CO: Roofers' Pension Fund Suit Underway
PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN: Hernandez Files Class Suit in Florida
RAYONIER ADVANCED: City of Warren General Employees Suit Concluded
RELIANT CAPITAL: Final Approval of Etienne FDCPA Suit Deal Denied

RESCUE SPA: Duncan Alleges Breach of Disabilities Act
RIO TINTO: Court Dismisses A. Colbert's Securities Suit
SAGINAW, MI: "Chalking" Class Action Remanded to District Court
SCRIPPS HEALTH: Hasson Sues Over Unpaid Compensation
SOLANTIC CORP: Wood Atter Files Suit Over Medical Record Fees

SPRINT CORPORATION: Solomon Files Securities Class Action in NY
SS BODY ARMOR: Court Affirms $34.9MM Securities Suit Settlement
SYNEOS HEALTH: Bid to Dismiss Vaitkuviene Class Suit Pending
TECHNIPFMC PLC: Continues to Defend Prause Class Suit in Texas
TESORO REFINING: 1st Amended Garcia Suit Filing Granted in Part

TRACTOR SUPPLY: Johnson Suit Remanded to Wash. State Court
UNITED STATES: Court Lambasts VA Over Medical Reimbursements
UNIVERSITY OF ANTELOPE: Fermin Files Class Action in California
VISALUS INC: Plaintiffs' Lawyers Seek $185MM in Enhanced Damages
VIVINT SOLAR: Continues to Defend TCPA Class Suit in D.C.

VIVINT SOLAR: Wage and Hour Class Action Still Ongoing
WALKER CONSTRUCTION: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Sullivan Suit
WESTERN DIGITAL: Settles Sex Discrimination Class Action
WESTFIELD INSURANCE: Court Dismisses C. Greene's Suit
WISCONSIN: ACLU of Wis. Files Class Action Over Parole System

WONDERFUL COMPANY: Calzadillas Arbitration Held in Abeyance
ZEIGLER CHEVROLET-SCHAUMBURG: Swan Suit Asserts TCPA Violation
ZILLOW GROUP: Bid to Dismiss 2nd Amended Complaint Denied
[*] Department of Justice Objects to Class Action Settlements
[*] Settlement Class Can Contain Non-Domestic Purchasers, Sellers

[] Florida Supreme Court Rejects Proposed Cy Pres Rule

                            *********

ADIEN PLC: Thornton Law Firm Appointed Co-Lead Counsel
------------------------------------------------------
Thornton Law Firm has been appointed co-Lead Counsel in a federal
securities class action pending against the seat manufacturing
company Adient plc, its former CEO, and its CFO. The case is In re
Adient plc Securities Litigation., No. 18-cv-9116. The lawsuit is
pending in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York. Thornton Law Firm will aggressively seek to
recover investment losses suffered by Adient investors as a result
of the Adient defendants' material misstatements and omissions
concerning the Company's operations and finances. The investigation
and lawsuit focuses on misstatements and omissions during the
October 2016 to June 2018 time period.

The Thornton Law Firm team litigating this class action is led by
attorney Guillaume Buell, who co-chairs the Firm's securities
litigation practice and has an established track record of
obtaining favorable results in securities class action. In remarks
after the Court's appointment of Bristol County as Lead Plaintiff
and Thornton Law Firm as co-Lead Counsel, Mr. Buell stated: "We
look forward to working tirelessly on behalf of the putative class
of Adient shareholders the Complaint seeks relief for. Our team is
ready to roll up our sleeves and get to work for Adient's
shareholders." The sentiment was echoed by Thornton Managing
Partner Garrett Bradley: "Our Firm is dedicated to investing the
resources necessary to investigate this alleged misconduct."

Thornton Law Firm, based in Boston, Massachusetts and with its
second office in Beverly Hills, California, is the preeminent
plaintiffs' law firm in New England. For over four decades, it has
tirelessly fought on behalf of injured consumers and shareholders.
Its securities litigation team has a proven track record of success
in securities litigation. Anyone with questions regarding this
litigation, or any other securities or consumer litigation matter,
is encouraged to contact the Firm's class action practice at (617)
720-1333 or shareholder@tenlaw.com The Firm is presently
prosecuting a range of lawsuits arising under the federal
securities laws in state and federal courts across the country. For
more, visit us at www.tenlaw.com/securities-litigation [GN]


ALL NATION HOME: Stevens Suit Asserts Ohio Wage Law Violations
--------------------------------------------------------------
DENIQUIA STEVENS, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. ALL NATION HOME HEALTHCARE, LLC, LINDA
MALOBA, and ABDIRAHMAN JAMA, Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-02364-JLG-KAJ (S.D. Ohio, June 5, 2019) is a class and
collective action complaint against Defendants for their failure to
pay employees overtime wages seeking all available relief under the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), the Ohio Minimum Fair
Wage Standards Act, ("OMFWSA"); and the Ohio Prompt Pay Act
("OPPA").

Plaintiff and others similarly situated frequently worked more than
40 hours per workweek. In fact, Plaintiff regularly works more than
60 hours per workweek. Even though Plaintiff and others similarly
situated frequently worked more than 40 hours per workweek,
Defendants did not pay Plaintiff and others similarly situated
overtime compensation equal to one and one-half times their regular
rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek.
Defendants knowingly and willfully engaged in the violations of the
FLSA and the Ohio Wage Law, asserts the complaint.

Plaintiff Stevens has been jointly employed by Defendants as a Home
Health Aid.

Defendants are in the business of providing home health care.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Hans A. Nilges, Esq.
     Shannon M. Draher, Esq.
     Nilges Draher LLC
     7266 Portage Street, N.W., Suite D
     Massillon, OH 44646
     Phone: 330.470.4428
     Email: hans@ohlaborlaw.com
            sdraher@ohlaborlaw.com

          - and -

     Christopher J. Lalak, Esq.
     NILGES DRAHER LLC
     614 W. Superior Ave., Suite 1148
     Cleveland, OH 44113
     Phone: 216.230.2955
     Email: clalak@ohlaborlaw.com


AMERICAN MEDICAL: Worthey Files Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against American Medical
Collection Agency, Inc. The case is styled as Paula Worthey,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. American Medical Collection Agency, Inc., Optum360
Services, Inc., Quest Diagnostics Incorporated and Does 1-10,
Defendants, Case No. 7:19-cv-05210 (S.D. N.Y., June 3, 2019).

The case type is stated as Diversity-(Citizenship).

American Medical Collection Agency, Inc. is a collection agency in
Baltimore, MD.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Russell Marc Yankwitt, Esq.
   Yankwitt LLP
   140 Grand Street, Suite 705
   White Plains, NY 10601
   Tel: (914) 686-1500
   Fax: (914) 801-5930
   Email: russell@yankwitt.com




AMERIGAS PARTNERS: Scarantino Files Suit Over UGI Merger Deal
-------------------------------------------------------------
RICHARD SCARANTINO, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. AMERIGAS PARTNERS, L.P., JOHN L.
WALSH, HUGH J. GALLAGHER, BRIAN R. FORD, JOHN R. HARTMAN, FRANK S.
HERMANCE, WILLIAM J. MARRAZZO, ROGER PERREAULT, ANNE POL, PEDRO A.
RAMOS, MARVIN O. SCHLANGER, K. RICHARD TURNER, UGI CORPORATION,
AMERIGAS PROPANE HOLDINGS, INC., AMERIGAS PROPANE HOLDINGS LLC, and
AMERIGAS PROPANE, INC., Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01045-UNA (D.
Del., June 5, 2019) is an action stemming from a proposed
transaction announced on April 2, 2019, pursuant to which AmeriGas
Partners, L.P. will be acquired by UGI Corporation.

On April 1, 2019, the Board of Directors of AmeriGas Propane, Inc.,
which manages AmeriGas, caused AmeriGas to enter into an agreement
and plan of merger with UGI, AmeriGas Propane Holdings, Inc.,
AmeriGas Propane Holdings LLC ("Merger Sub"), and General Partner.
Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, AmeriGas unitholders
will receive 0.50 shares of UGI stock and $7.63 in cash for each
AmeriGas common unit they own. On May 6, 2019, defendants filed a
registration statement with the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission in connection with the Proposed Transaction.

The complaint asserts that the Registration Statement omits
material information with respect to the Proposed Transaction,
which renders the Registration Statement false and misleading.
Accordingly, plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with the Registration
Statement.

Plaintiff is the owner of AmeriGas common units.

AmeriGas is the largest retail propane distributor in the United
States based on the volume of propane gallons distributed
annually.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
     RM LAW, P.C.
     1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
     Berwyn, PA 19312
     Phone: (484) 324-6800
     Facsimile: (484) 631-1305
     Email: rm@maniskas.com

          - and -

     Brian D. Long, Esq.
     Gina M. Serra, Esq.
     RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
     300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
     Wilmington, DE 19801
     Phone: (302) 295-5310
     Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
     Email: bdl@rl-legal.com
            gms@rl-legal.com


AQUA METALS: Awaits Court OK to Dismiss Securities Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Aqua Metals, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the parties in the case
entitled, In Re: Aqua Metals, Inc. Securities Litigation Case No
3:17-cv-7142, are awaiting the court's decision on the defendants'
motion to dismiss.

Beginning on December 15, 2017, three purported class action
lawsuits were filed in the United Stated District Court for the
Northern District California against the Company, Stephen Clarke,
Thomas Murphy and Mark Weinswig.

On March 23, 2018, the cases were consolidated under the caption In
Re: Aqua Metals, Inc. Securities Litigation Case No 3:17-cv-7142.
On May 23, 2018, the Court appointed lead plaintiffs and approved
counsel for the lead plaintiffs.

On July 20, 2018, the lead plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended
complaint ("Amended Complaint"), on behalf of a class of persons
who purchased the Company's securities between May 19, 2016 and
November 9, 2017, against the Company, Stephen Clarke, Thomas
Murphy and Selwyn Mould.

The Amended Complaint alleges the defendants made false and
misleading statements concerning the Company's lead recycling
operations in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.
The Amended Complaint seeks to hold the individual defendants as
control persons pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.

The Amended Complaint also alleges a violation of Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") based on alleged false
and misleading statements concerning the Company's lead recycling
operations contained in, or incorporated by reference in, the
Company's Registration Statement on Form S-3 filed in connection
with its November 2016 public offering.

That claim is asserted on behalf of a class of persons who
purchased shares pursuant to, or that are traceable to, that
Registration Statement. The Amended Complaint seeks to hold the
individual defendants liable as control persons pursuant to Section
15 of the Securities Act. The Amended Complaint seeks unspecified
damages and plaintiffs’ attorneys' fees and costs.

On September 18, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
Amended Complaint in its entirety and the plaintiff subsequently
filed its opposition to the motion.

In January 2019, the court notified the parties that it will rule
on the motion to dismiss without a hearing.

Aqua Metals said, "The Company denies that the claims in the
Amended Complaint have any merit and it intends to vigorously
defend the action."

Aqua Metals, Inc. engages in the recycling of lead primarily in the
United States. It produces and sells hard lead, lead compounds, and
plastics. The company was founded in 2014 and is headquartered in
McCarran, Nevada.


BARILLA AMERICA: Settlement in Slack Fill Suit Has Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York issued a Memorandum Order granting Parties' Motion for Final
Settlement Approval in the case captioned ALESSANDRO BERNI,
GIUISEPPE SANTOCHIRICO, MASSIMO SIMIOLI, and DOMENICO SALVATI, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. BARILLA G. e R. FRATELLI, S.p.A., and BARILLA AMERICA INC. d/b/a
BARILLA USA, Defendants. No. 16-CV-4196(ST)(E.D.N.Y.).

This case is about the allegedly misleading empty space or slack
fill in certain of Defendant Barilla America Inc.'s (Barilla)
specialty pasta products.  The Plaintiffs, who purchased these
products, claim that this slack fill misleads consumers into
believing that they are receiving more pasta than they actually
are.  The Plaintiffs claim that Barilla's use of slack fill in its
specialty pasta boxes constitutes a deceptive business practice in
violation of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law Section 349(a). They also claim,
apparently in equity, that Barilla's sale of these products led to
the company's unjust enrichment.

The Settlement Agreement

The parties' proposed settlement agreement defines the class as:

     All consumers in the United States and all U.S. territories
(including, but not limited to, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana
Islands, and the other territories and possessions of the United
States), who purchased one or more of the Products from July 28,
2010 until the date of the preliminary approval of the settlement
of this litigation [June 12, 2018]. Excluded from the Class are
persons who timely and properly exclude themselves from the Class
as provided in the Settlement Agreement.

The settlement agreement provides no damages to the class members.
Instead, it provides that Barilla will modify the packaging of the
specialty pastas to include a minimum fill line and a disclaimer
noting that there is empty space in the box.

Numerosity

Numerosity is presumed at a level of 40 members. Plaintiffs have
not provided an exact figure or an estimate of the number of
purchasers of Barilla's specialty pastas, but they note that the
Products are ubiquitous, heavily-marketed, and available
nationwide. Although these border on bare allegations, the Court
finds impossible, as a matter of common sense, that fewer than
forty people purchased these Barilla products during the relevant
period. Thus, numerosity is satisfied.

Commonality and Typicality

The commonality and typicality requirements are also met. A class
may only be certified if there are questions of law or fact common
to the class. Commonality demands that the class's claims depend
upon a common contention capable of classwide resolution such that
its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the
validity of each one of the claims m one stroke. What matters is
the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers
apt to drive the resolution of the litigation. Commonality may be
found were the plaintiffs' alleged injuries derive from a unitary
course of conduct by a single system.

The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to
merge such that similar considerations inform the analysis for both
prerequisites.  Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the claims or defenses
of the representative parties are typical of those of the class.
The typicality requirement is satisfied when each class member's
claim arises from the same course of events and each class member
makes similar legal arguments to prove the defendant's liability.
Minor variations in the fact patterns underlying [the] individual
claims" do not preclude a finding of typicality.  

Here, the common question of law and fact in this case is whether
Defendants' packaging of the Products would be misleading to a
reasonable consumer. That is sufficient to satisfy commonality.  

In addition, the named Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the class.
They bought Barilla's allegedly misleading pasta boxes. This is
sufficient to satisfy Rule 23(a)(3).  

Adequacy of Representation

In order to show adequate representation of the class's interests,
Plaintiffs must demonstrate that: (1) the class representatives do
not have conflicting interests with other class members; and, (2)
class counsel is qualified, experienced and generally able to
conduct the litigation. To satisfy the first prong, courts in this
Circuit have required that plaintiffs show that no fundamental
conflicts exist" between the class's representatives and its
members.  

The Court has already concluded that the relief provided by the
settlement does not negate the adequacy of the representation
provided by class counsel and the lead Plaintiffs. See Section
B(1), supra. The Court finds no other indication that there is a
conflict between class counsel or the lead Plaintiffs and the class
in any other respect, or that counsel's representation has been
deficient. The Court therefore concludes that Rule 23(a)(4) is
satisfied.

Requirements of 23(b)(2)

The Court has determined that the class meets the requirements of
Rule 23(b)(2). As such, the Court certifies the settlement class.

The Notice Provisions of the Settlement Are Appropriate

Notice of a class action settlement must be reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections. The district court is given broad discretion as
to method and manner of notice, so long it is consistent with the
standards of reasonableness imposed by the due process clause.  

The Plaintiffs contracted with Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC
(KCC) to develop and implement the notice plan in this case. KCC
purchased approximately 14,925,000 internet impressions to be
distributed over the Google Display Network, Facebook, and
Pinterest. KCC also maintained an informational website
(www.barillaclassaction.com) and a toll-free telephone helpline.
The notice plan commenced shortly after the settlement was
preliminarily approved in June 2018 meaning class members were
given several months until the November 19, 2018 objection deadline
to object to the settlement or opt out of the class. This provided
sufficient time to object to or opt out of the settlement. The
notice provided class members with relevant details about the
action and the settlement.  

The notice plainly indicated the time and place of the hearing to
consider approval of the settlement and the method for objecting to
or opting out of the settlement. The notice also detailed the
provisions for payment of attorney's fees and expenses and case
contribution awards to the class representatives, and provided
contact information for class counsel. Although class members did
not individually receive notice of the action, individualized
notice is generally not required for classes certified under Rule
23(b)(2).  

The Court finds that the targeted web-based advertisements
described in the Notice Plan provided sufficient notice of the
action to absent class members.

The complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation

The complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation
favor the proposed settlement. This case involves the claims of a
large number of consumers and purchases.  Plaintiffs would have to
establish the effect of the alleged slack fill in more than a dozen
separate products. Throughout the time period which Plaintiffs
challenge Defendant's labeling practices, the packaging of the
Products has varied, and each of these various packages may present
separate issues.  Some of the products have been sold in multiple
sizes. Moreover, the legal question at issue is whether a
reasonable consumer would be materially misled by the slack fill in
the packaging of the Products.

These fact-intensive standards would likely require significant
discovery, including expert witness practice, to resolve fully.

The reaction of the class to the settlement

If only a small number of objections are received, that fact can be
viewed as indicative of the adequacy of the settlement.

Here, notice of the proposed settlement was advertised nationally
through roughly 15,000,000 targeted online advertisements. Only one
objection to the settlement was lodged, albeit a substantive one.
Considering the likely size of the proposed class, the receipt of
only one objection to the settlement indicates a favorable reaction
to the settlement.

The stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed

While the parties need not have engaged in extensive discovery a
sufficient factual investigation must have been conducted to afford
the Court the opportunity to intelligently make an appraisal' of
the Settlement. In addition, the pretrial negotiations and
discovery must be sufficiently adversarial that they are not
designed to justify a settlement, but an aggressive effort to
ferret out facts helpful to the prosecution of the suit.

The parties have not engaged in formal discovery. Nevertheless,
Plaintiffs retained an expert witness and received sales
information from Barilla about its specialty pasta products. The
parties attended three settlement conferences before the Court, as
well as the Fairness Conference. The parties displayed a meaningful
understanding of the facts underlying the litigation at these
conferences.

Moreover, the parties took clearly adversarial positions in the
litigation prior to settlement. At the time the parties entered
into settlement, Defendant's motion to dismiss, remained pending
with the Court. The settlement conferences before the Court also
reflected that the parties reached the settlement only after
staking genuinely adversarial positions. This factor favors
approval of the settlement.

The risks of establishing liability

In considering this factor, the Court need not adjudicate the
disputed issues or decide unsettled questions; rather, "the Court
need only assess the risks of litigation against the certainty of
recovery under the proposed settlement.

The Plaintiffs would face substantial risks in establishing
liability. They would have to establish an exception to the
significant adverse decisions regarding the general validity of
slack fill claims in our Circuit. This factor favors approval of
the settlement.

The risks of establishing damages

The Plaintiffs would also face major risks in establishing damages.
Determining the number of purchasers of the Products to a
reasonable degree of certainty would be exceedingly difficult
considering the vast scope of Defendant's sales. Determining the
value of each allegedly deceptive sale of the Products, not to
mention the value of Plaintiffs' claims in the aggregate, would
also be subject to significant contention.

This factor favors approval of the settlement.

The risks of maintaining the class action through trial

Defendant would likely oppose certification of a litigation class
and may have meaningful arguments for this opposition. This factor
favors approval of the settlement.

The ability of the defendant to withstand a greater judgment

This factor stands for the proposition that if a defendant could
not withstand a greater judgment than what is provided for in the
settlement, then the settlement is more likely to be reasonable,
fair, and adequate. However, it does not follow that a defendant's
ability to withstand a greater judgment militates against approval
of the settlement. .

Here, the Defendant could withstand a greater judgment, but this
does not detract from the fairness of the settlement.

The range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the
best possible recovery and in light of all of the attendant risks
of litigation

The Court has addressed these factors in its discussion of Mr.
Schulman's Objection. The limited potential recovery under
Plaintiffs' claims and the value of the injunctive relief provided
by the settlement as a remedy for their complained-of wrong favor
approval of the settlement.

As such, the Court's consideration of the Grinnell factors supports
a finding that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.

The Court certifies the proposed settlement class and finds the
terms of the Settlement Agreement to be fair, reasonable, and
adequate. Accordingly, the Motion for Final Approval of the
Settlement is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2pyy68u from
Leagle.com.

Alessandro Berni, Giuseppe Santochirico, Massimo Simioli & Domenico
Salvati, Plaintiffs, represented by Benjamin Isaac Sachs-Michaels
-- bsachsmichaels@hfesq.com -- Harwood Feffer LLP, Daniella Quitt
-- dquitt@hfesq.com -- Harwood Feffer LLP, Joseph Gentile --
joseph@sarrafgentile.com -- Sarraf Gentile LLP, Ronen Sarraf --
ronen@sarrafgentile.com -- Sarraf Gentile LLP & Robert Ira Harwood
-- rharwood@hfesq.com -- Harwood Feffer LLP.

Barilla S.p.A., Barilla America, Inc. & Barilla USA, Defendants,
represented by Michael Tremonte -- mtremonte@shertremonte.com --
Sher Tremonte LLP, Steven Paul Blonder -- sblonder@muchlaw.com --
Much Shelist, P.C., pro hac vice, Jonathan D. Sherman --
jsherman@muchlaw.com -- Much Shelist, P.C., Justin J. Gunnell --
jgunnell@shertremonte.com -- Sher Tremonte LLP & Marissa L. Downs
-- mdowns@muchshelist.com -- Much Shelist, pro hac vice.


BAYER AG: Sydney Firms Probe Cancers Linked to Roundup
------------------------------------------------------
Carrie Fellner and Peter Hannam, writing for The Sydney Morning
Herald, report that Australian law firms are investigating legal
action on behalf of people suffering from cancers linked to
exposure to weedkiller Roundup, as Sydney councils move to ban
themselves from using the chemical.

The looming class action threatens to open the floodgates to
millions of dollars worth of claims against the manufacturer of the
popular weedkiller.

In a landmark US court verdict last month a couple were awarded a
record $US2 billion ($2.9 billion) after a jury agreed Roundup
caused their non-Hodgkin lymphoma.

The verdict has sparked concern on home soil, especially among
councils in Sydney that are heavy users of the weedkiller in parks,
playgrounds and on roadsides.

Fairfield City Council has phased out Roundup and Georges River
Council has told The Sun-Herald that its use would be abandoned.
Eight other Sydney councils, including Willoughby, Ku-ring-gai,
Sutherland Shire and Waverley, are conducting reviews.

Another 18 councils, including InnerWest, Lane Cove and Mosman,
continue to use Roundup, arguing they are following the advice of
the national pesticides regulator.

How Sydney councils are dealing with Roundup

A spokesman for the Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines
Authority said "we remain satisfied that APVMA-approved products
containing glyphosate [the key ingredient in Roundup] can continue
to be used safely according to label directions".

The NSW Environment Protection Agency follows this advice. However,
the Victorian state government has launched its own review of
glyphosate "as a matter of precaution".

Asked whether NSW would follow Victoria's lead at a press
conference on on June 2, Better Regulation Minister Matt Kean said
the Berejiklian government would be "closely monitoring" Victoria's
findings.

Opponents of Roundup have seized on science linking glyphosate with
several diseases including non-Hodgkin lymphoma, pancreatic cancer
and leukemia.

Sydney firm LHD lawyers is now considering a class action against
Bayer, and personal injury firm Maurice Blackburn is evaluating
individual cases.

Principal at Maurice Blackburn, Jonathan Walsh, Esq. said the firm
had fielded hundreds of inquiries over Roundup in recent months,
mainly over workplace exposures.

"We're actively investigating a small number," he said, adding the
first would be a "test case" under Australian law.

Jason Reynolds, a science lecturer at Western Sydney University,
said the risks were likely to centre on people whose work resulted
in extensive exposure, such as council employees.

The manufacturer of Roundup, Bayer, has lost three major US court
battles against people suffering cancer in just 12 months. It
described the latest $US2 billion verdict as "excessive and
unjustifiable".

A Bayer spokesperson said the jury verdicts conflicted with a
recent interim decision of the US Environmental Protection Agency,
which found glyphosate was not a carcinogen and there were no risks
to public health where it was used in accordance with label
instructions.

While the company had "great sympathy" for the plaintiffs, the
Bayer spokesperson said there was a consensus among health
regulators worldwide that glyphosate is not carcinogenic, following
40 years of extensive scientific research

LHD Lawyers special counsel Michael Hyland, Esq. --
mhgroup@lhd.com.au -- said his firm was "most interested" in
progressing its investigations into the potential class action in
Australia.

But any case was likely to hinge on the issue of medical causation,
he said, with the judge to decide whether it was "more probable
that not" that the plaintiff's cancer was caused by Roundup.

The Victorian review will examine glyphosate is being stored and
handled, and whether risks "are being controlled so far as
reasonably practicable".

Four years ago, the World Health Organisation's International
Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) declared glyphosate "probably
carcinogenic to humans".

Joanna Immig, co-ordinator of the National Toxics Network, warned
about 600 products in Australia carry glyphosate as the active
ingredient.

"Numerous studies now show glyphosate residues in everything from
breast milk to beer," Ms Immig said.

"With the recent court cases you'd think the national regulator
would be taking a closer look at the top selling herbicide that's
used to grow our food . . . we're all being exposed".

Sutherland Shire Council commissioned an urgent review of its
Roundup use after it was presented with a petition from concerned
local residents in April.

In a letter to the council, industry lobby group CropLife Australia
argued the scientific evidence supporting glyphosate's safety was
"clear and overwhelming" and it would be "irresponsible ... to make
decisions on misleading and incorrect media reporting".

But councillor Barry Collier, who raised the matter, was "in no
doubt" a review was necessary.

"I'm sorry for being sceptical but this kind of response is
reminiscent of the cigarette and fibro manufacturers who, for
decades, kept assuring us that their products were safe," he said.

Other big users include authorities managing drinking water
catchment areas, where signs alerting visitors of Roundup use are
not uncommon.

Wingecarribee Reservoir, which supplies water to towns in the
Southern Highlands, is one dam known to have "massive weed issues
around its shoreline", according to Ian Wright, also a lecturer at
Western Sydney University.

WaterNSW, which manages the catchments, said it "stores, handles
and applies chemicals in line with strict internal procedures",
consistent with the advice given by APVMA.

Sydney Water says it collaborates with WaterNSW to monitor drinking
water for chemicals such as glyphosate. "Sydney Water has never
detected glyphosate near or above the limits set in the Australian
Drinking Water Guidelines," a spokeswoman said.

The biggest users of glyphosate outside government are farmers.
National Farmers' Federation president Fiona Simson said any ban of
the chemical would result in a "monumental" cost to the industry,
because glyphosate enables farmers to control weeds from above the
ground, doing away with the need to plough.

"Currently, there is no product approved for use in Australia that
is as safe or as effective as glyphosate for weed control," Ms
Simson said.

"The productivity of, especially grain growers but also graziers,
would decline dramatically, with a key tool in the weed management
tool box gone."[GN]


BEAZER HOMES: Strougo Hits Share Price Drop
-------------------------------------------
ROBERT STROUGO, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. BEAZER HOMES USA, INC., ALLAN P. MERRILL,
and ROBERT L. SALOMON, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05301 (S.D.
N.Y., June 5, 2019) is a federal securities class action on behalf
of a class consisting of all persons other than Defendants who
purchased or otherwise acquired Beazer Homes securities between
August 1, 2014 and May 2, 2019, both dates inclusive (the "Class
Period"), seeking to recover damages caused by Defendants'
violations of the federal securities laws and to pursue remedies
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against the Company and
certain of its top officials.

On May 2, 2019, Beazer Homes issued a press release announcing its
financial and operating results for the second quarter of 2019.
Among other issues, Beazer Homes announced a net loss from
continuing operations of $100.8 million for the quarter, reflecting
a $147.6 million impairment on certain California assets the
Company had acquired before 2007. According to Defendants, all of
the assets at issue were either currently or previously classified
as land held for future development. On this news, Beazer Homes'
stock price fell $1.73 per share, or 12.15%, to close at $12.51 per
share on May 3, 2019. As a result of Defendants' wrongful acts and
omissions, and the precipitous decline in the market value of the
Company's securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have
suffered significant losses and damages.

According to the complaint, the Defendants made materially false
and misleading statements regarding the Company's business,
operational and compliance policies. Specifically, Defendants made
false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that:
(i) Beazer Homes' California assets classified as land held for
future development were deteriorating in value or improperly
valuated; (ii) the foregoing created a foreseeable risk of an
eventual substantial impairment that would negatively impact the
profitability of the Company; and (iii) as a result, the Company's
public statements were materially false and misleading at all
relevant times.

Plaintiff acquired Beazer Homes' securities at artificially
inflated prices during the Class Period.

Beazer Homes designs, constructs, and sells single-family and
multi-family homes for entry-level, move-up, or retirement-oriented
home buyers under the Beazer Homes, Gatherings, and Choice Plans
names.[BN]


The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
     J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
     Gustavo F. Bruckner
     Jonathan Lindenfeld, Esq.
     POMERANTZ LLP
     600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
     New York, NY 10016
     Phone: (212) 661-1100
     Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
     Email: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
            gfbruckner@pomlaw.com
            ahood@pomlaw.com
            jlindenfeld@pomlaw.com

          - and -

     Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
     POMERANTZ LLP
     10 South La Salle Street, Suite 3505
     Chicago, IL 60603
     Phone: (312) 377-1181
     Facsimile: (312) 377-1184
     Email: pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com



BLOOM ENERGY: Pomerantz Files Securities Fraud Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP announces that a class action lawsuit has been filed
against Bloom Energy Corporation (BE) and certain of its officers.
The class action, filed in United States District Court, for the
Northern District of California, and indexed under 19-cv-02935, is
on behalf of a class consisting of all persons and entities who
purchased or otherwise acquired Bloom Energy common stock pursuant
or traceable to the Form S-1 Registration Statement and Prospectus
(collectively, the "Registration Statement") issued in connection
with Bloom Energy's July 2018 initial public stock offering (the
"IPO" or "Offering").

This action asserts non-fraud strict liability claims under
Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act")
against Bloom Energy and certain Bloom Energy officers and
directors (collectively, the "Defendants").

If you are a shareholder who purchased Bloom Energy securities
pursuant or traceable to the IPO, you have until July 29, 2019 to
ask the Court to appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the class. A
copy of the Complaint can be obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com. To
discuss this action, contact Robert S. Willoughby at
rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or 888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW),
toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who inquire by e-mail are encouraged to
include their mailing address, telephone number, and the number of
shares purchased.

Bloom Energy is a San Jose, California-based corporation that
designs, manufactures, and sells solid-oxide fuel cell systems.

In July 2018, Bloom Energy commenced the IPO, issuing approximately
18 million shares of its common stock to the investing public at
$15.00 per share, all pursuant to the Registration Statement.

The complaint alleges that the Registration Statement was
materially misleading as it failed to disclose known events and
trends that were severely affecting the Company's business and that
made investment in Bloom Energy significantly riskier than
presented in the Registration Statement. In particular, the
Registration Statement failed to disclose that the Company was
experiencing material construction delays. These construction
delays would cause system deployments (or "acceptances" as
Defendants referred to them) to fall significantly below even the
low end of the Company's previously announced guidance.

While the Registration Statement purported to warn of risks that
"may arise," which could materially affect the Company, in
actuality these material negative events were already occurring. As
a result, the representations and purported risk disclosures were
false and misleading because, by the time of the IPO, construction
delays had already impacted or would soon impact Bloom Energy's
ability to deliver acceptances in line with its guidance.

On Monday, November 5, 2018, Bloom Energy shocked the market when
it announced its disappointing acceptances for the third quarter of
fiscal year 2018 results and provided acceptance guidance for the
fourth quarter significantly below analysts' expectations. In
particular, the Company reported that it only achieved 206
acceptances, materially below its guidance number of 215 to 235
acceptances. In addition, the Company announced guidance for the
fourth quarter of acceptances between 225 and 275. In contrast,
analysts at JP Morgan had estimated 333 acceptances in the fourth
quarter.

The price of Bloom Energy stock fell precipitously, closing as low
as $9.21 per share, almost 40% below the IPO price and remains
below the IPO price to this date. All told, investors suffered
millions of dollars in losses.

Contact:

         Robert S. Willoughby, Esq.
         Pomerantz LLP
         Phone: 888-476-6529 ext. 9980
         Website: www.pomerantzlaw.com
         Email: rswilloughby@pomlaw.com [GN]


BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD: Kirby et al Suit Transferred to N.D. Ga.
----------------------------------------------------------------
The case, Kirby et al v. Marks et al, Case No. 19102689 (Filed on
April 12, 2019), was transferred from the Superior Court of Cobb
County to the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia on May 15, 2019. This insurance-related lawsuit
against Defendants John David Marks and Blue Cross Blue Shield
Healthcare Plan of Georgia, Inc. is assigned to Hon. Judge Eleanor
L. Ross. The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-02212-ELR to the proceeding.

Blue Cross Blue Shield Healthcare Plan of Georgia, Inc. is a health
insurance plan provider. The company was founded in 1937 and is
based in Atlanta, Georgia. [BN]

Attorneys for Defendant:

     James L. Hollis, Esq.
     BALCH & BINGHAM
     Suite 700
     30 Ivan Allen Jr., Blvd NW
     Atlanta, GA 30308
     Telephone: (404) 261-6020
     E-mail: jhollis@balch.com

             - and -

     T. Joshua Archer, Esq.
     BALCH & BINGHAM LLP-ATL
     Suite 700
     30 Ivan Allen Jr. Blvd., N.W.
     Atlanta, GA 30308-3036
     Telephone: (404) 261-6020
     E-mail: jarcher@balch.com


BLUE SKY: ASIC Drops Inquiry, Class Action Still Likely
-------------------------------------------------------
Liam Walsh, writing for Australia Financial Review, reports that
the corporate watchdog has dropped an investigation into bloodied
fund manager Blue Sky, but class-action lawyers say the regulator's
step does not kill off any shareholder lawsuits.

Brisbane-based Blue Sky Alternative Investments had been facing an
inquiry by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission
since last year.

It followed the company losing more than $800 million in market
capitalisation after short-sellers dumped suspicion on Blue Sky's
financial performance and valuations of fund assets such as a
childcare chain.

Blue Sky defended its numbers, but ASIC still issued section 33
notices, requiring documents to be handed over, in an investigation
into the fund manager's adherence to continuous disclosure
obligations.

"The company has received confirmation from ASIC that it does not
propose to take any further action in respect of the section 33
notice," Blue Sky told investors on May 15. "ASIC has reserved its
rights to take further action if further information concerning the
matter comes to ASIC's attention."

The only other matters involving ASIC that Blue Sky had disclosed
were breaches of its financial services licence, which the company
said in April had been resolved. ASIC declined to comment on May
15.

Class-action firms last year also started rallying shareholders for
potential lawsuits, arguing that they were investigating issues
such as any overstatement of earnings or misleading the market.

While Blue Sky has rejected any wrongdoing and no lawsuit has yet
been filed, law firms said on May 15 an action remained possible
despite ASIC's move to drop the inquiry.

"We are continuing to conduct our investigation into a potential
class action against Blue Sky," a spokesman for law firm Piper
Alderman said.

Shine Lawyers similarly was pushing ahead, pointing to precedents
such a class action being settled for tens of millions of dollars
against OZ Minerals even after ASIC had ceased its investigations.

Different factors could affect any ASIC investigation, even one
considering civil action against company directors, Shine Lawyers
special counsel Craig Allsopp said.

"They . . . have a higher burden of proof," he said.

Mr Allsopp, who worked in enforcement at ASIC, agreed that the
watchdog pursuing any case would be an indicator of wrongdoing.

Yet he also argued: "It certainly doesn't mean that shareholders
don't have a [claim] for compensation."

Mr Allsopp said the time taken before filing any class-action
lawsuit reflected factors such as lawyers and litigation funders
conducting adequate due diligence.

"Quite often there's a long time before a proceeding has been
filed," he said.

Still, sources with knowledge of class actions said hurdles loomed
in any case against Blue Sky. One such hurdle could be in proving
whether misstatements were enough to have contributed to a
shareholder loss. Another question surrounded how much money could
be recovered for the costs involved.

Blue Sky itself is in trouble, having posted a $26 million loss for
the half year and recently breaching a covenant on a $50 million
loan with its secured lender Oaktree Capital.

While class-action lawsuits can target a company's insurance
policies, the sued business might have capped its policy at a
relatively low level. Sources said company limits could vary
between the low tens of millions of dollars to hundreds of
millions, but the risk was this cap would not be known until a
lawsuit was initiated.

Blue Sky declined to reveal its insurance cap.

The fund manager has been fighting other fires too, including on
May 10 abruptly cancelling talks with Wilson Asset Management about
handing over control of its sharemarket-listed Blue Sky
Alternatives Access Fund.

The sharemarket-listed fund, which has backed the Wilson proposal,
on May 14 said it had ordered Blue Sky to cease deploying any more
of the fund's money. It was considering options including
dissolving the management agreement with Blue Sky or winding down
the fund. [GN]


BOULDER BRANDS: Calif. Judge Dismisses Slack-Fill Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Bety Javidzad, Esq., and Avedis Bekhloyan, Esq., of Dentons, in an
article for Mondaq, report that the Hon. Philip S. Gutierrez of the
Central District of California recently dismissed a class-action
complaint filed against Boulder Brands USA, Inc. (Defendant). Mark
Cordes (Plaintiff) filed the action under California's Consumer
Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), Cal. Civ. Code Sec.Sec. 1750, et seq.,
alleging that the amount of "slack-fill" (the empty space inside a
product's container) in Defendant's Glutino Gluten Free Fudge
Covered Pretzels (the Product) deceives consumers into believing
the opaque packages contain more pretzels than they actually do.
Plaintiff initially alleged that up to 40 percent of the product's
packaging was slack-fill and subsequently sought to amend his
complaint to increase that number to 80 percent.

In a previous order, the court held that Plaintiff lacked standing
for two reasons: first, because he did not allege that he intended
to purchase the Product in the future; and second, because he did
not explain why, if he did make future purchases, he would be
unable to determine beforehand the number of pretzels in the
Product's packaging. After failing to cure these defects in his
amended complaint, the court once again found that Plaintiff lacked
standing and dismissed his claim for prospective injunctive
relief.

Plaintiff also made claims in his initial complaint that were based
on products he did not purchase. Plaintiff sought to represent a
class of purchasers of all varieties of Defendant's gluten-free
pretzel products. The "prevailing view" in the Ninth Circuit is
that class action plaintiffs may bring claims for products they did
not purchase only so long as the products and alleged
misrepresentations are substantially similar. In re 5-Hour ENERGY
Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. MDL 13-2438 PSG (PLAx), at *7
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2014). Just as with Plaintiff's initial
complaint, the court found that his amended complaint did not
contain anything that would indicate that all varieties of
Defendant's pretzels have similar slack-fill in their packaging. As
a result, the court held that Plaintiff lacked standing to sue on
behalf of the putative class and products he did not purchase.

The court also found that Plaintiff failed to adequately plead that
the slack-fill at issue is "nonfunctional" under the CLRA.
Specifically, the court dismissed Plaintiff's CLRA claim after
finding that Plaintiff's conclusory allegations did not raise a
plausible inference that the first (i.e., protection of the
contents of the package) or third (unavoidable product settling
during shipping and handling) safe harbor provisions of the
applicable statute, providing for functional bases for slack-fill,
did not apply.

Finally, the court found that all of the "new" facts Plaintiff
sought to add to his amended complaint could have been learned by a
simple trip to the grocery store even before he filed his first
amended complaint.

For all of the above reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss was
granted without leave to amend. [GN]


BUMBLE BEE: Faces Class Action Over "Dolphin-Safe" Label
--------------------------------------------------------
Christine Blank, writing for SeafoodSource, reports that in the
midst of dealing with numerous price-fixing lawsuits, Bumble Bee
Foods, Chicken of the Sea, and StarKist now face class-action
complaints over the "Dolphin-Safe" claims on their tuna products.

While Lion Capital-owned Bumble Bee, Thai Union-owned Chicken of
the Sea, and Downgon Industries-owned Starkist claim that their
products are "Dolphin-Safe," that is not the case, according to the
racketeering and fraud complaints filed in United States District
Court in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

The "Dolphin-Safe" label signifies that no dolphins were killed or
seriously injured as a result of the catching of the tuna contained
in their products. But the suppliers' tuna fishing practices "kill
or harm substantial numbers of dolphins each year," the lawsuit
against StarKist stated.

"And, because defendant does not adequately trace or otherwise
identify the tuna that is not 'Dolphin-Safe' and physically
segregate and store it separately from any tuna that may be
'Dolphin-Safe,' defendant may not label any of its products as
'Dolphin-Safe,'" the StarKist complaint said.

While StarKist "does not comment on pending legal matters",
Michelle Faist, senior manager of corporate affairs for StarKist
Co., told SeafoodSource, the supplier "will not purchase any tuna
caught in association with dolphins."

"StarKist Co. is committed to protecting the dolphins and was the
first company to adopt a dolphin-safe policy in April 1990," Faist
said.

The policy states that: "StarKist will not purchase any tuna caught
in association with dolphins. StarKist continues its practice of
refusing to purchase tuna caught with gill or drift nets, which are
known to be dangerous to many forms of marine life. StarKist
condemns the use of these indiscriminate fishing methods that trap
dolphins, whales, and other marine life along with the intended
catch of fish."

StarKist "remains committed to this policy and require
certification that all tuna we purchase is dolphin-safe," Faist
said. "Our dolphin-safe policy includes StarKist tuna, as well as
all of our branded and private label products. StarKist tuna is
labeled with a special 'Dolphin-Safe' logo."

The complaints against Bumble Bee and Chicken of the Sea are
similarly-worded.  

"By expressing a commitment to sustainability, labeling its tuna
products as dolphin-safe, labeling its tuna pouches as [Marine
Stewardship Council]-certified, not tracking and reporting the
number of dolphins killed and harmed in capturing its tuna, and not
separating tuna that is not dolphin-safe from tuna caught where no
dolphins were harmed (if any), [Chicken of the Sea] is able to sell
its . . . tuna products in several major retail stores to which it
would otherwise be denied entry," the complaint stated.

A representative for Bumble Bee Foods did not respond to
SeafoodSource's request for comment. A statement from Chicken of
the Sea said the company "is committed to supporting the
conservation of all marine species and ensures all our products are
certified 'Dolphin Safe.'"

"Chicken of the Sea is currently certified by the Earth Island
Institute and adheres to the guidelines set forth in the
Institute's 'Dolphin Safe' standard," the statement said.

While several tuna suppliers -- including Safe Catch, Trader Joe's,
Whole Foods Market, Ocean Naturals, and Wild Planet, use
pole-and-line and trolling methods to catch tuna, StarKist and
Bumble Bee (with the exception of Bumble Bee's Wild Selections
line) do not.

"Rather, the fishing vessels that supply StarKist's tuna use
indiscriminate fishing methods that kill and harm substantial
numbers of dolphins," the complaint said.

For the last four years, StarKist sourced much of its tuna from
vessels operated by Imperial Shipping Logistic Co. Ltd., according
to the complaint.

"Those vessels routinely used longlines -- which consist of a 40-
to 80-mile-long main line to which many smaller branch lines with
baited hooks are attached -- to catch tuna. Longlines are highly
indiscriminate fishing gear as they attract large numbers of target
and non- target fish, as well as dolphins, that get snagged on the
hooks by their mouth or other body parts when they go after the
bait and then remain on the line for extended periods of time as
the lines are drawn in to the vessel and the catch is obtained,"
the complaint said.

Even when dolphins are mistakenly caught by the longlines, they are
often not released, according to the complaint.

"Rather, the fishermen that catch these dolphins often kill them
onboard and have been photographed posing with their catch,
mutilating the dolphins and removing their teeth, which can be used
as currency. Because of the harm caused to non-target fish,
longlines have been condemned by environmental groups like the
World Wildlife Foundation as an unsustainable fishing practice,"
the StarKist complaint said.

StarKist also uses vessels owned by its parent company, Dongwon
Industries Co. Ltd., to catch tuna in the waters around a dozen or
so Western Pacific Island nations and more recently in the
Atlantic.

"These vessels employ modern purse-seine fishing techniques that
also harm substantial numbers of dolphins," the complaint said.

StarKist conspired to hide the truth about its fishing prices with
other companies, including SCASA, Tri Marine, and STP, which store
its products, according to the complaint. [GN]


BUTTERFIELD MARKET: Faces Gambell Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Butterfield Market
and Catering. The case is captioned KRISTIN GAMBELL, RAMON ANGELES,
and RICK ZAMBRANO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. BUTTERFIELD MARKET AND
CATERING, ALAN OBSATZ, EVAN OBSATZ, and JOELLE OBSATZ, the
Defendants, Case 1:19-cv-05058 (S.D.N.Y., May 30, 2019).

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Christopher Q. Davis, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF CHRISTOPHER Q. DAVIS, PLLC
          225 Broadway, Suite 1803
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (646) 430 7930

CALIFORNIA: Class Action Filed on Behalf of Disabled Children
-------------------------------------------------------------
Four elementary school children with disabilities and their parents
and guardians filed a class action lawsuit on May 13 against the
California Department of Education (CDE), directors of the Contra
Costa County Office of Education, and staff at Floyd I. Marchus
School to challenge the illegal and abusive use of restraints and
seclusion in non-emergency situations.

The children assert that these abuses are the direct consequence of
the state of California and the CDE's failure to meet their
constitutional responsibility for public education by their lack of
oversight, intervention, and enforcement of these dangerous
interventions.

"No child -- particularly ones with disabilities -- should be
restrained and secluded by their school, as it traumatizes them,"
said Michael Steinberg, a partner at the law firm of Sullivan &
Cromwell LLP that is representing the students and families pro
bono. "This lawsuit is about stopping illegal and abusive
restraints and seclusion in our schools and to hold accountable
those who permit the practices to occur."

This class action, the first of its kind in California state court,
is brought by current and former Marchus students on behalf of
themselves and a class of similarly situated students and their
guardians.

While attending Marchus, the elementary-age Plaintiffs were
repeatedly subjected to abusive, dangerous, and trauma-inducing
restraints and seclusion in non-emergency situations, including
being thrown against the wall, pressed into the floor, and
routinely subjected to inappropriate and punitive segregation. The
use of extreme behavioral interventions and dishonest record
keeping at Marchus has resulted in these young students suffering
from physical harm, severe emotional distress, developmental
disruption, educational deprivation, and reputational
consequences.

"My daughter was picked up and thrown against a wall with her legs
pulled apart and her head bent towards the floor for throwing a
half-empty water bottle in the general direction of a Marchus staff
member," said Elyse K., parent of two of the representative
Plaintiffs. "This reality is not only horrifying, but unmistakably
present and heartbreakingly real at Marchus. There are so many
parents who do not even know that schools like Marchus are still
using what is essentially corporal punishment. I plead for all
parents to think about their children and demand more from our
state to end this abuse now."

"Our Plaintiffs have been segregated in a school that promises to
correct student behaviors, but instead subjects them to
controlling, punitive restraints that set students back further,"
reminds Arlene B. Mayerson, Directing Attorney of Disability Rights
Education and Defense Fund (DREDF). "Attempting to control behavior
through restraint, seclusion and fear is dangerous, ineffective and
counterproductive. It must be exposed and stopped. DREDF's work
over four decades, advocating for disabled children and their
families, has never been more critical to ensure that disabled
students receive equal educational opportunities."

This lawsuit asks the court to hold the Defendants accountable for
allowing these young students to be subjected to these practices,
and to ensure that these students receive the education to which
they are entitled, in the least restrictive environment appropriate
to their needs, free from the threat of assault, battery, and
trauma.

"There should be no safer place in the world for children than
their school. But in California, for all too many children with
disabilities, their schools are chambers of pain and terror, where
unregulated practices of restraints and seclusion do grave physical
and traumatic harm," said Mark Rosenbaum, Director of Opportunity
Under Law, the impact litigation team at Public Counsel. "The state
of California lacks any program of oversight, intervention and
enforcement to effectively detect and stop such practices,
resulting in not just denial of equal educational opportunities,
but the endangering of the lives and well-being of children who all
too often internalize the barbaric acts against them as statements
from adults that they are deserving of the abuse to which they are
subjected. Our suit is filed to rid all California schools of these
brutal practices that place children in physical or psychological
fear."

Physicians, educators, and government officials have long condemned
the use of restraints and seclusion on children, identifying them
as ineffective and warning against their traumatizing and dangerous
effects. A 2009 report from the United States Government
Accountability Office documented hundreds of cases of the use of
abusive restraints and found that at least twenty of these cases
resulted in the victim's death. Further, these restraints
disproportionately affect students with disabilities. According to
a 2014 report from the U.S. Department of Education, students with
disabilities represented just 12 percent of the national student
population, but accounted for 58 percent of those placed in
seclusion and 75 percent of those subjected to physical restraint.

Recently, the U.S. Department of Education announced that the
Office for Civil Rights (OCR), in partnership with the Office of
Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), will provide
technical assistance and support to schools and their districts to
oversee any inappropriate use of restraint and seclusion in
schools.

The complaint is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3v8dyrm

  About the Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund (DREDF)

Founded in 1979, DREDF -- http://www.dredf.org-- is a leading
national civil rights law and policy center directed by individuals
with disabilities and parents who have children with disabilities
that works to advance the civil and human rights of people with
disabilities through legal advocacy, training, education, and
public policy and legislative development.

                      About Public Counsel

Public Counsel -- http://www.publiccounsel.org-- is the nation's
largest pro bono law firm – advancing impact litigation, pursuing
legislative change, and providing direct legal services that reach
more than 30,000 people every year in California and across the
nation. Founded in 1970, Public Counsel strives to achieve three
main goals: protect the legal rights of disadvantaged children;
represent immigrants who have been the victims of torture,
persecution, domestic violence, trafficking, and other crimes; and
foster economic justice by providing individuals and institutions
in underserved communities with access to quality legal
representation. [GN]


CBL & ASSOCIATES: Pomerantz Law Firm Probing Investors' Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP is investigating claims on behalf of investors of CBL
& Associates Properties, Inc. (CBL). Such investors are advised to
contact Robert S. Willoughby at rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or
888-476-6529, ext. 9980.

The investigation concerns whether CBL and certain of its officers
and/or directors have engaged in securities fraud or other unlawful
business practices.

On March 1, 2019, CBL disclosed in its Annual Report that on
January 7, 2019, class certification was granted in "a putative
class action in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida . . . based on allegations that the Company and
certain affiliated entities overcharged tenants at bulk metered
malls for electricity" and that the action had been set "for the
trial term starting on April 1, 2019." CBL further advised
investors that "[w]e have not recorded an accrual relating to this
matter at this time as a loss has not been determined to be
probable. Further, we do not have sufficient information to
reasonably estimate the amount or range of reasonably possible loss
at this time." On this news, CBL's stock price fell $0.16 per
share, or roughly 7.5%, to close at $1.98 per share on March 1,
2019.

Then, on March 26, 2019, CBL disclosed that it had settled the
foregoing litigation and that the Company would be required "to set
aside a common fund with a monetary and non-monetary value of $90
million". On this news, CBL's stock price fell $0.47 per share, or
24.61%, to close at $1.44 per share on March 27, 2019.

Contact:

         Robert S. Willoughby, Esq.
         Pomerantz LLP
         Phone: 888-476-6529 ext. 9980
         Website: www.pomerantzlaw.com
         Email: rswilloughby@pomlaw.com [GN]


CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Ruling Illustrates Impact of Arbitration
----------------------------------------------------------------
Brooke Patterson, Esq. -- bpatterson@carltonfields.com -- of
Carlton Fields, in an article for The National Law Review, reports
that a recent decision by a Wisconsin district court illustrates
the impact of an arbitration agreement on class actions. The
plaintiffs alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) and state wage and overtime laws, claiming that employees
were not compensated for 15 minutes of activity at the start of
every workday and that actual pay was understated for purposes of
calculating overtime. The defendants moved to compel arbitration on
an individual basis.

The parties' arbitration agreements provided that any covered
employment disputes -- including wage and hour claims -- must be
resolved through arbitration. The defendants established an
arbitration program for resolving covered employment-related
disputes, announced it to employees via email, and stated that, by
participating in the program, employees, as well as the employers,
were waiving their right to court litigation. Unless they actively
opted out, employees were automatically enrolled in the program.

The plaintiffs argued that the arbitration agreements were both
procedurally and substantively unconscionable because: (1) they did
not voluntarily or knowingly waive their rights; (2) the remedies
available were inadequate; (3) conflicting terms in the agreements
created ambiguity; and (4) the agreements were improperly one-sided
in favor of the defendants.

The court rejected all of these arguments. First, while the
plaintiffs did not remember receiving notice, the record
established that they did. Second, the plaintiffs appeared to be
contesting arbitration as a reasonable resolution, an argument
other courts had rejected, most recently the Supreme Court in Lamps
Plus. Third, there were no conflicting terms in the agreement that
created ambiguity. Finally, the agreement bound both employees and
the employer to arbitration; therefore, the agreements were not
one-sided.

Because the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden, the court
granted the defendants' motion to compel arbitration. By granting
the motion, the plaintiffs could not pursue their claims in court
as a class action, but were required to pursue their claims
individually in arbitration.  Moorman v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc.,
No. 3:18-cv-00820, 2019 WL 1930116 (W.D. Wis. May 1, 2019) [GN]


COMPETITIVE EDGE: Sanchez Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE SANCHEZ, Plaintiff, v. COMPETITIVE EDGE GROUP, INC., d/b/a
COMPETITIVE EDGE LANDSCAPING, a Florida Profit Corporation, and
FRED R. BOOTHBY, individually, Defendants, Case No. 6:19-cv-01034
(S.D. Fla., June 4, 2019) is an action arising under the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"), to recover all wages owed to Plaintiff, and
those similarly situated to Plaintiff, during the course of their
employment.

The Defendants have unlawfully deprived Plaintiff, and all other
employees similarly situated, of minimum wage and overtime
compensation during the course of their employment. During all
periods of Plaintiff's employment with Defendants, Defendants
refused to compensate Plaintiff at the proper overtime rate of
time-and-one-half, as required by the FLSA, for all hours worked in
excess of 40 during the relevant time period, says the complaint

Plaintiff began working for Defendants in November 2014 and
continued to do so until May 2018.

COMPETITIVE EDGE, provides landscaping services in the State of
Florida, and has done so since at least 2014.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     JORDAN RICHARDS, ESQ.
     MELISSA SCOTT, ESQ.
     USA EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS-JORDAN
      RICHARDS, PLLC
     805 E. Broward Blvd. Suite 301
     Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
     Phone: (954) 871-0050
     Email: Jordan@jordanrichardspllc.com
            Melissa@jordanrichardspllc.com
            Stephanie@jordanrichardspllc.com
            Mike@usaemploymentlawyers.com
            Jill@jordanrichardspllc.com


CONAGRA: Faces 6 Lawsuits Over Exploding Pam Cooking Spray Cans
---------------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Bronstad, writing for Law.com, reports that Connecticut
attorney J. Craig Smith (Koskoff Koskoff & Bieder) filed six
lawsuits alleging that Pam cooking spray cans exploded, causing
injuries. Smith, along with Joseph Lyon (The Lyon Firm) and Peter
Flowers and Frank Cesarone (Meyers & Flowers), filed the cases in
federal court in Chicago, where defendant Conagra is based. [GN]


DEJA VU CONSULTING: 6th Cir. Affirms $6.55MM Exotic Dancers' Deal
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court's judgment granting Approval
on Settlement Agreement in the case captioned JANE DOES 1-2,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, EVA CABRERA and BRITTNEY HALVERSON (17-1801);
B.D. (17-1802); C.T. (17-1827), Objectors-Appellants, v. Deja VU
CONSULTING, INC., dba Deja Vu of Saginaw, Inc., nka Deja Vu
Services, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellees. Nos. 17-1801,
17-1802, 17-1827. (6th Cir.).

The district court approved the settlement over the objections of
four class members who now appeal, arguing that the settlement was
fundamentally unfair and failed to comport with procedural
requirements for class action settlements.

After a class of 28,177 exotic dancers alleged that Deja Vu dance
clubs violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and state wage-and-hour
laws, Deja Vu and the class of dancers entered into a settlement
agreement.

With respect to monetary relief, the Settlement Agreement divides a
total award of $6.55 million into three primary categories: $1
million toward the Net Cash Payment Settlement Fund (cash pool),
$4.5 million toward Secondary Pool Remuneration (secondary pool),
and $900,000 in attorneys' fees.

The district court approved the Settlement Agreement. In finding
that the parties satisfied their burden to show that the Settlement
Agreement was fair, the district court turned to International
Union, UAW, et al. v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.3d 615, 631 (6th
Cir. 2007) (UAW), which established a set of factors to determine
the fairness of class action settlements.

In particular, the court stressed the first factor the comparison
between the relief offered in the Settlement Agreement and the
Dancers' likelihood of success on the merits against Deja Vu. The
court emphasized the high risk of continued litigation and the
uncertain likelihood of success on the merits for the Dancers,
finding that without the Settlement Agreement, the vast majority of
class members would recover nothing.

The court also found that the Settlement Agreement offers value to
the class in the form of cash, rent-credit or dance-fee payments,
and long-term structural changes to Defendants' business practices,
all of which directly benefit class members. After analyzing the
remaining UAW factors, the court concluded that the Settlement
Agreement is the result of a bona-fide dispute, and the terms
established in the settlement are a fair, reasonable, and adequate
resolution of the claims.

Four members of the class, Eva Cabrera, Brittney Halverson, B.D.,
and C.T. (Objectors) objected to the settlement. The district court
overruled their objections, and they now appeal the approval of the
Settlement Agreement. The Objectors' arguments fall into two broad
categories.

First, the Objectors argue that the district court abused its
discretion by failing to properly apply the factors that ensure the
fairness of settlement agreements, especially with respect to the
district court's attempt to calculate the value of the Dancers'
claims.

Second, the Objectors argue that the settlement violates the
procedural requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
given the breadth of the class release and the notice afforded to
the unnamed class members.

The Court reviews a district court's approval of a class action
settlement for abuse of discretion.  

UAW Fairness Factors

In UAW, the Court established a seven-factor test to assess whether
or not a class action settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e).  
Those factors include: (1) the "risk of fraud or collusion (2) the
complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation (3) the
amount of discovery engaged in by the parties (4) the likelihood of
success on the merits (5) the opinions of class counsel and class
representatives (6) the reaction of absent class members and (7)
the public interest.

Of the UAW factors, the most important of the factors to be
considered in reviewing a settlement is the probability of success
on the merits. Thus, we address the most important factor first
before proceeding to the remaining factors.

Likelihood of Success on the Merits

A court cannot judge the fairness of a proposed compromise without
weighing the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits
against the amount and form of the relief offered in the
settlement.

For this reason, all class action settlements involve a balancing
of competing interests. When extinguishing the claims of a large
class of people some of whom may not even be aware that a pending
lawsuit affects their rights courts are required to closely analyze
whether the claims that the unnamed class members are giving up are
worth the benefits they may receive. Balancing those interests is
difficult in cases involving industries rife with turnover, fear of
retaliation, and unequal bargaining interests between the class and
the defendants. The district court appropriately gave a great deal
of consideration to this factor.

After evaluating a damages model based on records from Jane Doe 1
and one other class member, as well as the high risks inherent in
litigation and the potential impact of the mandatory arbitration
clause on the Dancers' claims, the district court found that the
direct benefits provided by the Settlement Agreement outweighed the
value of the Dancers' claims. The Court affirms, as the district
court did not abuse its discretion in valuing the Dancers' claims
or the Settlement Agreement.

Value of the Dancer's Claims

The Objectors' primary claim is that the district court abused its
discretion by improperly calculating the value of the FLSA and
state wage-and-hour claims that the Dancers were relinquishing in
the Settlement Agreement. As a result of limited discovery and the
absence of a class-wide damages model, the Objectors contend that
the Settlement Agreement undercompensates the class. By estimating
the number of dancers working at a club per shift, the length of
their shifts, and multiplying it by the federal minimum wage, the
Objectors estimate that if the class action proceeded to trial,
with 64 clubs, the plaintiffs could receive up to $141 million
dollars.

Alternatively, the Objectors point to other dancer disputes as a
basis for comparison, identifying over a dozen jury trials and
settlements that provide dancers with higher awards than the
Settlement Agreement. Thus, the Objectors argue that the Settlement
Agreement's cash pool pales in comparison to the damages that the
Dancers could receive if they went to trial, and the Settlement
Agreement is inadequate to justify releasing the Dancers' claims
against Deja Vu.

In evaluating settlements, courts are not required "to reach any
ultimate conclusions on the contested issues of fact and law which
underlie the merits of the dispute, for it is the very uncertainty
of outcome in litigation and avoidance of wasteful and expensive
litigation that induce consensual settlements. That sentiment is
reinforced here, where Deja Vu and the Dancers argue that complete,
accurate class-wide models can be impossible to construct in exotic
dancer cases, because clubs do not maintain adequate records or
payroll data needed to prepare common FLSA damage modeling.

But that is not to say that the court can avoid carefully
scrutinizing litigation risks in complex class actions. The Court
have found that it can be an abuse of discretion for a district
court to merely recite the respective arguments of the objectors
and parties, and then offer up platitudes about the risks of
litigation generally. Instead, the district court must specifically
examine what the unnamed class members would give up in the
proposed settlement, and then explain why given their likelihood of
success on the merits the trade-off embodied in the settlement is
fair to unnamed members of the class.

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that the benefits of the Settlement Agreement outweigh
the value of the Dancers' claims. The district court specifically
examined what the class members were giving up based upon the
available records used to calculate the damages model. The damages
model showed the awards that a dancer could receive based on full
or reduced minimum wage, as well as with or without offsetting the
fees that dancers received during their time at Deja Vu. By
accounting for each of these factors and presenting the district
court with an array of awards potentially available to the Dancers,
the model offered some insight into the variation in recovery under
different states' laws. Thus, although the court acknowledged that
the damages model was imperfect based on the lack of records for
many class members, it still found that the model was "useful to
determine class members' range of possible recovery.

Additionally, in light of the precedent directing courts to look to
the risks faced by the parties at hand rather than the general
risks of litigation, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that the model was more helpful than the
Objectors' comparisons to sums awarded in other class actions as
the court found,  the key question is not Plaintiffs' likelihood of
success against the defendants in the cases cited by the objectors,
but their likelihood of success against Defendants here.

Value of the Settlement Agreement

The district court also did not abuse its discretion in evaluating
the benefits provided by the Settlement Agreement's injunctive and
monetary relief. The Court rejects the Objectors' contention that
the credits available through the secondary pool function as
coupons that cannot be counted toward the total value of the
Settlement Agreement under the Class Action Fairness Act. Because
the Dancers can choose to receive compensation from the cash pool
regardless of whether they continued working at Deja Vu, the
Settlement Agreement cannot be understood to require the Dancers to
reengage in the same activity that they believe led to their
injury.

When compared against the risks involved in litigating or
arbitrating the Dancers' claims, the value of the Settlement
Agreement is significant. The injunctive relief mandates extensive
changes to Deja Vu's business practices, and both the $1 million
cash pool and the $4.5 million secondary pool are available to
provide financial compensation to the Dancers in the form that best
suits each individual dancer's circumstances. The Court finds that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the
tangible benefits afforded to class members as a result of the
Settlement Agreement outweigh the value of the volatile claims that
the Dancers released.

Remaining UAW Factors

UAW also instructs courts to consider the risk of fraud or
collusion. The Objectors argue that the Settlement Agreement
promotes collusion between the Dancers' counsel and Deja Vu's
counsel. Specifically, the Objectors take issue with the Settlement
Agreement's clear-sailing clause, which provides that Deja Vu
agrees not to object to a request for up to $900,000 of direct
attorneys' fees and up to $300,000 of indirect attorneys' fees.
The Objectors argue that the attorneys' fees sought by Class
Counsel dwarf the recovery of the Class.

The district court correctly rejected this argument. Not every
clear sailing provision demonstrates collusion. Additionally, the
fee award is not disproportionate to the recovery of the class. On
one hand, assuming that the Dancers fully deplete the secondary
pool and class counsel receive the full amount of indirect fees,
the attorneys' fees would represent only 23% of the total
settlement award, even without including the value of injunctive
relief. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that this factor weighs in favor of
approval.

The next UAW factor is the amount of discovery engaged in by the
parties as a factor in approving settlements. The Objectors argue
that the district court abused its discretion by approving the
settlement without requiring the parties to engage in discovery,
which led to class counsel undervaluing the class's claims and
creating a financial windfall for class counsel. But courts have
held that settlements are permissible where, notwithstanding the
status of discovery, plaintiffs' negotiators had access to a
plethora of information regarding the facts of their case.

Two UAW factors focus on the class's response to the proposed
settlement: courts are required to consider the opinions of class
counsel and class representatives, as well as the reactions of
absent class members.  Jane Doe 1, the named representative, is not
among the Objectors in this case she has a favorable view of the
settlement. And both Deja Vu and the Dancers agreed that the
counsel representing both parties had extensive experience, which
supports the district court's finding that counsels' positive
outlook toward the fairness of the settlement weighed in favor of
approving the Settlement Agreement.  Thus, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in finding that the level of support and
participation from the class supported approval of the Settlement
Agreement.

The final UAW factor is the public interest. Courts have held that
there is a strong public interest in encouraging settlement of
complex litigation and class action suits because they are
notoriously difficult and unpredictable' and settlement conserves
judicial resources. At the same time, courts have also found that
the enforcing the FLSA furthers an important interest in
encouraging employees and others to ensure that employers comply
with laws governing employment.

The district court concluded that this Settlement Agreement
achieves both purposes: the settlement puts an end to potentially
long and protracted litigation and it also mandates long-term
structural changes to Defendants' business practices designed to
ensure workers are accurately classified and employees receive
appropriate wages and legal protections.

The Court agrees. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that this factor weighed in favor of
approving the Settlement Agreement as well.

Rule 23 Procedural Requirements

The Objectors also argue that the settlement violates the
procedural requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
because the class release is impermissibly broad and the class
notice failed to adequately apprise the class members of their
rights.  

Breadth of Class Release

The Objectors claim that a class release of this breadth cannot
satisfy the identical factual predicate doctrine outlined by the
Second Circuit in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., which
limits class releases to claims that share the same integral facts
as settled claims, provided that the released claims are adequately
represented prior to settlement. 396 F.3d 96, 106 (2d Cir. 2005).
As with the remainder of the district court's approval of the
Settlement Agreement, we review the district court's determination
on this issue for abuse of discretion.  

This court has held that the question is not whether the definition
of the claim in the complaint and the definition of the claim in
the release overlap perfectly; it is whether the released claims
share a factual predicate' with the claims pled in the complaint.
The claims released in the Settlement Agreement share that factual
predicate, as the release specifically cabins the categories of
relinquished claims to those based upon or reasonably related to
the pleadings and claims asserted in the Settlement Agreement.

Therefore, the Objectors' argument that the release covers claims
completely unrelated to the lawsuit lacks merit.

Adequacy of Notice to Class Members

Finally, the Objectors claim that the class notice was inadequate
to apprise the class members of their rights. Rule 23(c)(2)(b)
requires the class to provide notice of the nature of the action;
the definition of the class certified.

First, the Objectors contend that the notice mischaracterized the
scope of the release. This argument fails. The notice stated that,
by staying in the class, a dancer would give up the right to sue
Deja Vu on any state law claims later, and that all class members
will have released all Defendants, including all of the Deja
Vu-Affiliated Nightclubs, from any further claims related to the
matters raised in this lawsuit such that class members cannot ever
sue any of the Defendants about these issues based upon conduct
that occurred prior to the Effective Date of the settlement.

The class notice accurately captured the scope of the release.  

Second, the Objectors argue that the notice provided was unclear
with respect to how the settlement would be split among the
Dancers. But the Objectors cite no authority that requires a notice
to state how much money each class member would receive, nor do
they explain how the notice could have accurately stated the amount
each dancer was eligible to receive from the cash pool before
knowing the total number of dancers who opted to participate in the
cash pool. The notice appropriately details the two forms of
monetary relief, including the total cash pool amount and the
structure and value of the secondary pool credits, which is
reasonable under the circumstances.

Third, the Objectors claim that the notice was deficient because it
failed to list the 10 prior-filed class and collective actions
against some of these clubs in which class members could have
pursued their claims as an alternative to joining this action.
Here, where the Settlement Agreement provides some monetary relief
to every class member and compels Deja Vu to change its business
practices through injunctive relief, failure to provide notice of
other pending suits does not render the class notice unreasonable.
For those reasons, the notice comports with the requirements of due
process.

The Court affirms the judgment of the district court.

A full-text copy of the Sixth Circuit's June 3, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y23p2fyp from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Harold L. Lichten -- hlichten@llrlaw.com -- LICHTEN &
LISS-RIORDAN, P.C., Boston, Massachusetts, for all Appellants.

Jason J. Thompson -- jthompson@sommerspc.com -- SOMERS SCHWARTZ,
P.C., Southfield, Michigan, for Jane Doe Appellees.

Bradley J. Shafer, SHAFER & ASSOCIATES, P.C., 3800 Capitol City
Blvd Ste 2
Lansing, MI, 48906-2177, for Deja Vu Appellees.

ON BRIEF: Harold L. Lichten, Shannon Liss-Riordan --
sliss@llrlaw.com -- Matthew Thomson --
mthomson@llrlaw.com -- LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C., Boston,
Massachusetts, for Appellants in 17-1801.

Bradley J. Shafer, Matthew J. Hoffer, SHAFER & ASSOCIATES, P.C., .,
3800 Capitol City Blvd Ste 2, Lansing, MI, 48906-2177, for Deja Vu
Appellees.

Charles P. Yezbak, III, Daniel Eduardo Arciniegas, YEZBAK LAW
OFFICES, 2002 Richard Jones Rd
Ste B200, Nashville, TN 37215-2892, for Appellant in 17-1802.

W. Allen McDonald, LACY, PRICE & WAGNER, P.C., 249 Peters Rd.,
Knoxville, TN 37923, for Appellant in 17-1827.

Beth M. Rivers -- brivers@pittlawpc.com -- PITT MCGEHEE PALMER &
RIVERS, P.C., Royal Oak, Michigan, for Jane Doe Appellees.


DIAL CORP: Arizona AG Challenges $7.4MM Class Action Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------------
Angela Gonzales, writing for Phoenix Business Journal, reports that
Dial Corp.'s $7.4 million class action settlement involving the
effectiveness of its liquid hand soap will give $4.4 million to
attorneys and only $2.3 million to consumers.

This inequity has led Arizona Attorney General Mark Brnovich to
spearhead a bipartisan coalition of 12 state attorneys general to
urge a New Hampshire federal court to reject the proposed class
action settlement that leans in favor of 60 percent of the cash to
attorneys and only 40 percent to consumers.

This settlement is based on Dial's promise to stop including
triclosan in its soap. Triclosan originally was registered as a
pesticide in 1969 and is still used in some pesticide products. By
1972, it was being marketed as an antibacterial agent in numerous
consumer products, including soaps, body washes, toothpaste, and
even furniture, clothing and toys.

Since 2001, triclosan has been mentioned in nearly 7,500
applications filed with the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office.

By 2013, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration relented to a
consumer push to rid the market of triclosan. By then, Dial Corp.
had been bought by the Germany-based Henkel Corp., and was
investigated by the FDA for its use of triclosan. It had operated
Henkel Consumer Goods Inc. in Scottsdale, where it employed 375
people.

Eventually, the FDA barred Henkel and others from using triclosan
in its products, and Henkel began working out new formulas for its
soaps.

By 2016, Henkel closed its Scottsdale facility and moved those
operations to Connecticut.

Brnovich is asking the court to recognize the settlement as fatally
imbalanced and to send the parties back to negotiate a proper
division of the proceeds, ensuring class members receive the
appropriate percentage of what is already on the table. Joining him
are attorneys general from Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Indiana,
Louisiana, Oklahoma, Michigan, Missouri, Rhode Island, Tennessee
and Texas. [GN]


DMS OILFIELD: McMillan Seeks OT Pay for Wellsite Consultants
------------------------------------------------------------
RYAN McMILLAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. DMS OILFIELD SERVICES, LLC and DMS
OPERATING, LLC, Case No. 1:19-cv-00090-CRH (D.N.D., May 31, 2019),
seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages and other damages under the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the North Dakota Wage Laws.

According to the complaint, McMillan and the other workers like him
were typically scheduled for 12-hour shifts, 7 days a week, and
their hitches routinely lasted for weeks at a time. McMillan and
those similarly situated often worked even more than that, but they
were not paid overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a
single workweek.

Instead of paying overtime as required by the FLSA and ND Wage
Laws, DMS paid these workers a single day rate for all hours worked
and improperly classified them as independent contractors, the
lawsuit says.

DMS is an oilfield services company. DMS employs wellsite
consultants to perform its oilfield support work.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Matthew S. Parmet, Esq.
          PARMET PC
          PO Box 540907
          800 Sawyer St. (77007)
          Houston, TX 77254
          Telephone: 713 999 5228
          Facsimile: 713 999 1187
          E-mail: matt@parmet.law

               - and -

          Edmond S. Moreland, Jr., Esq.
          MORELAND VERRETT, P.C.
          700 West Summit Dr.
          Wimberley, TX 78676
          Telephone: 512 782 0567
          Facsimile: 512 782 0605
          E-mail: edmond@morelandlaw.com

DYNAGAS LNG: Faces Securities Class Action in New York
------------------------------------------------------
Will Owen, writing for LNG Industry, reports that Dynagas LNG
Partners is facing a class action lawsuit and multiple
investigations on behalf of all investors that purchased DLNG
securities between 16 February 2018 and 21 March 2019.

Lawsuit

Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C., and Entwistle & Cappucci LLP, have
both independently announced that a class action lawsuit has been
filed on behalf of all investors that purchased Dynagas LNG
Partners LP securities between 16 February 2018 and 21 March 2019.

The case was filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, Case No.1:19-cv-04512, against
Dynagas, certain associated entities and certain of the company's
senior executives.

The class action asserts claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The complaint alleges that,
during the Class Period, the Defendants made materially false and
misleading statements and omitted material adverse facts to conceal
the unfavorable terms of the Company's long-term contracts on its
liquid natural gas ships, Arctic Aurora and Ob River, and its
resulting inability to sustain its quarterly distributions. As a
result of the Defendants' false and misleading statements and
omissions, Dynagas securities traded at artificially inflated
prices during the Class Period. Such inflation was removed when it
was revealed that the Arctic Aurora and the Ob River were
commencing employment under new extended charter contracts which
were at lower rates compared to the previous charter contracts,
thereby undermining the company's ability to make future
distributions. The complaint seeks an award of damages, and
interest thereon, to plaintiff and other class members.

Investors have until 16 July 2019 to apply to the court to be
appointed as lead plaintiff in the lawsuit.

Investigations into possible violations of securities laws

Several law firms have begun investigations into claims regarding
possible violations of securities laws on behalf of either Dynagas'
shareholders or Dynagas. Those investigating on behalf of the
shareholders include: Levi & Korsinsky, LLP; Rosen Law Firm; Schall
Law Firm; Howard G. Smith; and Glancy Prongay & Murray, LLP.

The investigation focuses on whether the company issued false
and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose information
pertinent to investors. The following events are at the core of the
investigations:

   -- On 15 November 2018, Dynagas issued a press release
disclosing that two of its vessels entered extended charter
contracts at "lower rates compared with the previous charter
contracts." On this news, shares of Dynagas fell US$1.07 or over
13.7% to close at US$6.69 per share on 16 November 2018.

   -- On 25 January 2019, Dynagas announced that it would be
cutting its quarterly distribution by 75% as it was "necessary in
order to retain more of the cash generated from the partnership's
long-term contracts to maintain a steady cash balance." On this
news, shares of Dynagas fell US$1.11 or over 27.6% to close at
US$2.91 per share on 28 January 2019.

The above-mentioned firms are all inviting contact from anyone that
purchased Dynagas securities, has information relating to the
claims or lawsuit, or would like more information. [GN]


ENDO INTERNATIONAL: Bid to Dismiss Pelletier Suit Underway
----------------------------------------------------------
Endo International plc said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the motion to dismiss
in the Pelletier v. Endo International plc, Rajiv Kanishka
Liyanaarchchie De Silva, Suketu P. Upadhyay and Paul V. Campanelli,
is still pending.

Oral argument is set for June 19, 2019 at 2:30 p.m. in courtroom
17b before the Hon. John R. Padova.

In November 2017, a putative class action entitled Pelletier v.
Endo International plc, Rajiv Kanishka Liyanaarchchie De Silva,
Suketu P. Upadhyay and Paul V. Campanelli was filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by an
individual shareholder on behalf of himself and all similarly
situated shareholders.

The lawsuit alleges violations of Section 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act relating to the pricing of various generic
pharmaceutical products.

In June 2018, the court appointed Park Employees' Annuity and
Benefit Fund of Chicago lead plaintiff in the action.

In August 2018, the lead plaintiff filed an amended complaint. In
September 2018, the defendants moved to dismiss the amended
complaint.

That motion remains pending.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Endo International plc manufactures and sells generic and branded
pharmaceuticals in the United States, Canada, and internationally.
The company was founded in 1920 and is headquartered in Dublin,
Ireland.


ENDO INTERNATIONAL: Continues to Defend Opioid-Related Lawsuits
---------------------------------------------------------------
Endo International plc said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the company continues
to defend itself from various complaints, including class action
lawsuits, related to Opioid.

Since 2014, multiple U.S. states, counties, other governmental
persons or entities and private plaintiffs have filed suit against
the company and/or certain of its subsidiaries, including Endo
Health Solutions Inc. (EHSI), Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. (EPI), Par
Pharmaceutical, Inc. (PPI), Par Pharmaceutical Companies, Inc.
(PPCI), Vintage Pharmaceuticals, LLC, Generics Bidco I, LLC and
DAVA Pharmaceuticals, LLC, as well as various other manufacturers,
distributors and/or others, asserting claims relating to
defendants' alleged sales, marketing and/or distribution practices
with respect to prescription opioid medications, including certain
of our products.

As of May 2, 2019, the cases of which the company was aware
include, but are not limited to, approximately 13 cases filed by or
on behalf of states; approximately 1,925 cases filed by counties,
cities, Native American tribes and/or other government-related
persons or entities; approximately 136 cases filed by hospitals,
health systems, unions, health and welfare funds or other
third-party payers and approximately 59 cases filed by individuals.
Certain of the cases have been filed as putative class actions.

In addition to the litigation in the U.S., in August 2018, an
action against Paladin Labs Inc., EPI, the Company and various
other manufacturers and distributors was commenced in British
Columbia on behalf of all federal, provincial and territorial
governments and agencies in Canada that paid healthcare,
pharmaceutical and treatment costs related to opioids.

Many of the U.S. cases have been coordinated in a federal MDL
pending in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio (MDL No. 2804).

In March 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a
statement of interest in the case, and in April 2018 it filed a
motion to participate in settlement discussions as a friend of the
court, which the MDL court granted.

The MDL court has issued a series of case management orders
permitting motions to dismiss addressing threshold legal issues in
certain cases (and has issued orders granting in part and denying
in part some of those motions), setting a trial date in October
2019 for the claims of two Ohio counties, allowing certain
discovery and establishing certain other deadlines and procedures,
among other things.

Other cases remain pending in various state courts. In some
jurisdictions, such as Connecticut, Illinois, New York,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Texas, certain state court cases
have been transferred to a single court within their respective
state court systems for coordinated pretrial proceedings. The state
cases are generally at the pleading and/or discovery stage with
certain of these cases scheduled for trial beginning in 2020.

The complaints in the cases assert a variety of claims including,
but not limited to, claims for alleged violations of public
nuisance, consumer protection, unfair trade practices,
racketeering, Medicaid fraud and/or drug dealer liability statutes
and/or common law claims for public nuisance,
fraud/misrepresentation, strict liability, negligence and/or unjust
enrichment.

The claims are generally based on alleged misrepresentations and/or
omissions in connection with the sale and marketing of prescription
opioid medications and/or an alleged failure to take adequate steps
to prevent abuse and diversion. Plaintiffs generally seek
declaratory and/or injunctive relief; compensatory, punitive and/or
treble damages; restitution, disgorgement, civil penalties,
abatement, attorneys' fees, costs and/or other relief.

Endo said, "We will continue to vigorously defend the foregoing
matters and to explore other options as appropriate in our best
interests. Similar matters may be brought by others or the
foregoing matters may be expanded. We are unable to predict the
outcome of these matters or to estimate the possible range of any
losses that could be incurred. Such matters could have a material
adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows."

Endo International plc manufactures and sells generic and branded
pharmaceuticals in the United States, Canada, and internationally.
The company was founded in 1920 and is headquartered in Dublin,
Ireland.


ENDO INTERNATIONAL: Discovery Ongoing in Bier Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Endo International plc said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the class action suit
entitled, Bier v. Endo International plc, et al., is currently in
discovery.

In August 2017, a putative class action entitled Bier v. Endo
International plc, et al. was filed in the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by an individual shareholder
on behalf of himself and all similarly situated shareholders.

The original complaint alleged violations of Section 10(b) and
20(a) of the Exchange Act against Endo and four current and former
directors and officers, based on the Company's decision to remove
reformulated OPANA(R) ER from the market.

In December 2017, the court appointed SEB Investment Management AB
lead plaintiff in the action. In February 2018, the lead plaintiff
filed an amended complaint, which added claims alleging violations
of Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act in connection with the
June 2015 offering. The amended complaint named the Company, EHSI
and 20 current and former directors, officers and employees of Endo
as defendants. In April 2018, the defendants moved to dismiss the
amended complaint. In December 2018, the court dismissed the
plaintiff's claims against four individual defendants, but
otherwise denied the motion to dismiss.

The case is currently in discovery.

Endo International plc manufactures and sells generic and branded
pharmaceuticals in the United States, Canada, and internationally.
The company was founded in 1920 and is headquartered in Dublin,
Ireland.


ENDO INTERNATIONAL: Dismissal of Friedman Suit Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------------
Endo International plc said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit has affirmed the District Court's decision
granting the company's motion to dismiss the case entitled, Craig
Friedman v. Endo International plc, Rajiv Kanishka Liyanaarchchie
de Silva and Suketu P. Upadhyay.

In May 2016, a putative class action entitled Craig Friedman v.
Endo International plc, Rajiv Kanishka Liyanaarchchie de Silva and
Suketu P. Upadhyay was filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York by an individual shareholder on
behalf of himself and all similarly situated shareholders.

In August 2016, the court appointed Steamfitters' Industry Pension
Fund and Steamfitters' Industry Security Benefit Fund as lead
plaintiffs in the action.

In October 2016, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint that,
among other things, added Paul Campanelli as a defendant, and the
company filed a motion to dismiss.

In response, and without resolving the motion, the court permitted
lead plaintiffs to file a third amended complaint. The amended
complaint alleged violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act based on the Company's revision of its 2016 earnings
guidance and certain disclosures about its generics business, the
integration of Par Pharmaceutical Holdings, Inc. and its
subsidiaries, certain other alleged business issues and the receipt
of a CID from the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District
of New York regarding contracts with pharmacy benefit managers
concerning FROVA(R).

Lead plaintiffs sought class certification, damages in an
unspecified amount and attorneys' fees and costs.

The company filed a motion to dismiss the third amended complaint
in December 2016. In January 2018, the court granted the company's
motion and dismissed the case with prejudice.

In February 2018, lead plaintiffs filed a motion for relief from
the judgment and leave to file a fourth amended complaint; the
court denied this motion in April 2018. Lead plaintiffs appealed to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In April 2019,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision in
full.

Endo International plc manufactures and sells generic and branded
pharmaceuticals in the United States, Canada, and internationally.
The company was founded in 1920 and is headquartered in Dublin,
Ireland.


ENDO INTERNATIONAL: Generic Drug Pricing Litigation Ongoing
-----------------------------------------------------------
Endo International plc said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the company and its
subsidiaries continue to defend themselves from several lawsuits
over generic drug pricing.

In December 2014, the company received a grand jury subpoena from
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued by
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
addressed to Par Pharmaceuticals. The subpoena requested documents
and information focused primarily on product and pricing
information relating to the authorized generic version of Lanoxin
(digoxin) oral tablets and generic doxycycline products, and on
communications with competitors and others regarding those
products. The company is cooperating with the investigation.

In May 2018, the company and its subsidiary Par Pharmaceutical
Companies, Inc. (PPCI) each received a civil investigative demands
(CID) from the DOJ in relation to a False Claims Act investigation
concerning whether generic pharmaceutical manufacturers engaged in
price-fixing and market allocation agreements, paid illegal
remuneration and caused the submission of false claims. The company
is cooperating with the investigation.

Similar investigations may be brought by others or the foregoing
matters may be expanded or result in litigation. The company is
unable to predict the outcome of these matters or to estimate the
possible range of any losses that could be incurred.

Since March 2016, various private plaintiffs and state attorneys
general have filed cases against the company's  subsidiary  Par
Pharmaceutical, Inc. (PPI) and/or, in some instances, the Company,
Generics Bidco I, LLC, DAVA Pharmaceuticals, LLC and/or Par
Pharmaceutical Companies, Inc. (PPCI), as well as other
pharmaceutical manufacturers and, in some instances, other
corporate and/or individual defendants, alleging price-fixing and
other anticompetitive conduct with respect to generic
pharmaceutical products.

These cases, which include proposed class actions filed on behalf
of direct purchasers, end-payers and indirect purchaser resellers,
as well as non-class action suits, have been consolidated and/or
coordinated for pretrial proceedings in a federal MDL pending in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
under the caption In re Generic Pharmaceuticals Pricing Antitrust
Litigation (MDL No. 2724).

The various complaints and amended complaints generally assert
claims under federal and/or state antitrust law, state consumer
protection statutes and/or state common law, and seek damages,
treble damages, civil penalties, disgorgement, declaratory and
injunctive relief, costs and attorneys' fees.

Some claims are based on alleged product-specific conspiracies.

With respect to the company's subsidiaries, the allegations in the
various complaints focus on amitriptyline, baclofen, digoxin,
divalproex ER, doxycycline hyclate, doxycycline monohydrate,
nystatin, propranolol and/or zoledronic acid.

Other claims allege broader, multiple-product conspiracies
involving various combinations of these and/or other products.
Under these overarching conspiracy theories, plaintiffs seek to
hold all alleged participants in a particular conspiracy jointly
and severally liable for all harms caused by the alleged
conspiracy, not just harms related to the products manufactured
and/or sold by a particular defendant.

In October 2018, the MDL court denied defendants' motions to
dismiss federal antitrust claims relating to digoxin, divalproex ER
and doxycycline hyclate, among other products.

In February 2019, the MDL court dismissed certain state law claims
relating to these same products, but allowed other state law claims
relating to those products to proceed. In February 2019, the
defendants moved to dismiss plaintifffs' overarching conspiracy
claims; that motion remains pending. The MDL court has also allowed
certain discovery.

In May 2019, the company's subsidiary PPCI received written notice
from certain state attorneys general that they intend to assert
federal and/or state antitrust and/or consumer protection law
claims with respect to additional generic pharmaceutical products.
The company do not know when or against whom such claims will be
filed or the substance of such claims.

Endo said, "We will continue to vigorously defend the foregoing
matters and to explore other options as appropriate in our best
interests. Similar matters may be brought by others or the
foregoing matters may be expanded. We are unable to predict the
outcome of these matters or to estimate the possible range of any
losses that could be incurred."

Endo International plc manufactures and sells generic and branded
pharmaceuticals in the United States, Canada, and internationally.
The company was founded in 1920 and is headquartered in Dublin,
Ireland.


ENDO INTERNATIONAL: Statement of Claim in Makris Suit Amended
-------------------------------------------------------------
Endo International plc said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that Phaedra A. Makris has
amended her statement of claim to add a claim on behalf of herself
and similarly-situated Canadian investors who purchased Endo's
securities between January 11, 2016 and June 8, 2017.  

In April 2017, a putative class action entitled Phaedra A. Makris
v. Endo International plc, Rajiv Kanishka Liyanaarchchie de Silva
and Suketu P. Upadhyay was filed in the Superior Court of Justice
in Ontario, Canada by an individual shareholder on behalf of
herself and similarly-situated Canadian-based investors who
purchased Endo's securities between January 11 and May 5, 2016.

The statement of claim generally seeks class certification,
declaratory relief, damages, interest and costs based on alleged
violations of the Ontario Securities Act. The statement of claim
alleges negligent misrepresentations concerning the Company's
revenues, profit margins and earnings per share; its receipt of a
subpoena from the state of Connecticut regarding doxycycline
hyclate, amitriptyline hydrochloride, doxazosin mesylate,
methotrexate sodium and oxybutynin chloride; and the erosion of the
Company's U.S. generic pharmaceuticals business.

In January 2019, plaintiff amended her statement of claim to add a
claim on behalf of herself and similarly-situated Canadian
investors who purchased Endo's securities between January 11, 2016
and June 8, 2017.

This new claim is based on the Company's decision to remove
reformulated OPANA(R) ER from the market.

Endo International plc manufactures and sells generic and branded
pharmaceuticals in the United States, Canada, and internationally.
The company was founded in 1920 and is headquartered in Dublin,
Ireland.


ERNESLI CORPORATION: Lamarre Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------------
EDENS LAMARRE, and all others similarly situated Plaintiff, v.
ERNESLI CORPORATION d/b/a ZUBI SUPERMARKET a/d/b/a ZUBI FISH HOUSE,
a Florida Corporation, and ERNESTO PEREZ, individually, Defendants,
Case No. 1:19-cv-22253-XXXX (S.D. Fla., June 3, 2019) seeks to
recover monetary damages, liquidated damages, interests, costs and
attorney's fees for willful violations of overtime wages under the
laws of the United States, the Fair Labor Standards Act ("the
FLSA").

The complaint says the Plaintiff was not paid overtime wages when
he worked more than 40 hours per week. Accordingly, Plaintiff
claims the halftime rate for each hour worked over 40 hours
weekly.

The Defendants knew and/or showed reckless disregard of the
provisions of the FLSA concerning the payment of overtime wages as
required by the Fair Labor Standards Act. Defendants were aware of
Plaintiff's work schedule and further aware that Plaintiff was
working more than 40 hours per week, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a non-exempt dishwasher
and assistant food preparer who performed his duties within South
Florida.

ERNESLI operated a supermarket and restaurant.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Daniel T. Feld, Esq.
     Law Office of Daniel T. Feld, P.A.
     2847 Hollywood Blvd.
     Hollywood, FL 33020
     Phone: (954) 361-8383
     Email: DanielFeld.Esq@gmail.com

          - and -

     Isaac Mamane, Esq.
     Mamane Law LLC
     10800 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 350A
     Miami, FL 33161
     Phone (305) 773 - 6661
     Email: mamane@gmail.com


EXPRESS DELIVERY: Romig Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------------
Blake Romig, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Express Delivery, Inc. d/b/a Delivery, Inc.
d/b/a Express Delivery Spartanburg, Inc.; and Steven Carmichael,
Defendants, Case No. 7:19-cv-01625-BHH (D. S.C., June 5, 2019)
seeks to recover for Defendants' violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, and the South Carolina Wages Act.

Throughout the entire duration of Plaintiff's employment, the
Defendants did not pay Plaintiff at a rate of time and one-half his
regular rate for hours worked over 40 hours a week. This
demonstrates a clear violation of the FLSA overtime requirements,
says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant from September 2017 to
March 2019 to perform hourly non-exempt delivery driving for FedEx
Ground contracted service areas.

Express Delivery, Inc. d/b/a Delivery, Inc. d/b/a Express Delivery
Spartanburg, Inc. are South Carolina Corporations operating in
Spartanburg and doing business at the exact same location in
Spartanburg.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     John G. Reckenbeil, Esq.
     LAW OFFICE OF JOHN RECKENBEIL, LLC
     Post Office Box 314
     Mauldin, SC 29662
     Phone: (864) 248-0436
     Fax: (864) 326-5940
     Email: john@johnreckenbeillaw.com


FACEBOOK INC: D.C. Suit Over Privacy Practices OK'd to Proceed
--------------------------------------------------------------
Tony Romm, writing for Washington Post, reports that Facebook
suffered an early defeat in a D.C. court on May 31, 2019, after a
judge rejected the social-networking giant's request to quash a
case brought by the D.C. attorney general challenging the company's
privacy practices.

The ruling by D.C. Superior Court Judge Fern Flanagan Saddler paves
the way for D.C. Attorney General Karl A. Racine to begin
"obtaining all of the evidence proving that Facebook broke District
law and did not follow its own policies to protect the privacy of
more than 340,000 Facebook users who reside in the District," he
said in a statement on June 1.

Racine filed suit against Facebook in December, chiefly in response
to the company's entanglement with Cambridge Analytica, a political
consultancy that improperly accessed social-site data on 87 million
users. The incident combined with other privacy mishaps illustrated
that Facebook had violated the District's consumer-protection laws,
the attorney general alleged, resulting in hundreds of thousands of
local residents having their personal data mishandled.

Facebook has long contested Racine's charges. Lawyers for the
company argue that it never misled users about the privacy
protections afforded to their personal data, and that news reports
about the Cambridge Analytica incident amounted to sufficient
disclosure to consumers about the mishap.

Over roughly an hour of oral arguments in March, Facebook also said
that the District lacked jurisdiction over the tech giant, which is
headquartered in California.

Absent a total dismissal, Facebook asked the judge to stay the
matter pending a class-action case in another court -- and a
conclusion of the investigation by the Federal Trade Commission.
The agency is expected to issue a fine into the billions of
dollars, as well as other penalties against Facebook in the coming
weeks.

But the attorney general persuaded the judge that the District had
ample jurisdiction over Facebook, given local residents' "repeated
exchange of personal information through Facebook's online social
networking service," Saddler wrote in her ruling. In doing so, she
cited evidence submitted by the attorney general's office showing
Facebook had generated roughly $10 million in revenue in the final
three months of 2018.

In rejecting Facebook's request for a stay, Saddler also noted the
class-action case involves complaints from users, not governments,
while the FTC probe focuses on whether the tech giant violated a
2011 agreement with the government to improve its privacy
practices.

The ruling marks an important early victory for the District, which
at times has suggested it already has documents that could create
major headaches for Facebook. In a March filing with the court,
government lawyers referred to an "email chain that shows Facebook
employees based in Washington D.C. . . . played a leading role in
responding to how third-party applications sold consumer data to
Cambridge Analytica." Facebook has sought to keep such documents
under seal.

On June 1, Facebook stressed in a statement it does not believe
"this lawsuit has any merit and will continue to defend ourselves
vigorously."

"Protecting people's information and privacy is a top priority for
us at Facebook, and we've taken a hard look at the information apps
can use when you connect them to Facebook, as well as other data
practices," the company said. "We know we have more work to
do."[GN]


FINANCE CAPITAL: Shanahan Sues Over Unsolicited Automated Calls
---------------------------------------------------------------
CATHERINE SHANAHAN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated Plaintiff, v. FINANCE CAPITAL GROUP, an unknown
business entity, ROYAL ADMINISTRATION SERVICES, INC., a
Massachusetts limited liability company, PAYLINK PAYMENT PLANS, LLC
Defendants, Case No. 8:19-cv-01106 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2019) is a
Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial against Defendants
to stop their illegal practice of making unauthorized calls that
play prerecorded voice messages to the cellular telephones of
consumers nationwide, and to obtain redress for all persons.

As a primary part of marketing their products and services,
Defendants and their agents placed thousands of automated calls
employing a prerecorded voice message to consumers' cell phones
nationwide. Unfortunately, Defendants did not obtain prior express
written consent to place these calls and, therefore, are in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), says
the complaint.

Plaintiff Catherine Shanahan is a natural person and is a citizen
of the Northern District of Illinois.

Defendants sell and provide aftermarket extended auto
insurance.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Mark L. Javitch, Esq.
     Javitch Law Office
     480 S. Ellsworth Ave
     San Mateo, CA 94401
     Phone: 650-781-8000
     Facsimile: 650-648-0705
     Email: mark@javitchlawoffice.com


FISHER-PRICE: Fieker Sues over Sale of Rock 'n Play Sleeper
-----------------------------------------------------------
MEGAN FIEKER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. FISHER-PRICE, INC.; and MATTEL, INC.,
the Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-00295-TCK-JFJ (N.D. Okla., May 30,
2019), contends that the Fisher-Price Rock 'n Play Sleeper is
inherently unsafe as a sleeper and unfit for its intended use.  Its
use poses a number of serious safety risks that have led to many
documented instances of infant deaths and injuries.

The Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, as permitted by equity,
including directing Defendants to identify, with Court supervision,
the victims of their misconduct and pay them restitution and
disgorgement of all monies acquired by Defendants by means of any
act or practice declared by the Court to be unlawful, and ordering
Defendants to engage in a corrective advertising campaign of Rock
'n Play Sleeper to place victims of their misconduct on notice of
the availability of a full refund.

The Fisher-Price Rock 'n Play Sleeper ("Rock 'n Play Sleeper") is
an inclined infant "sleeper" that Defendants, until April 12, 2019,
marketed as suitable for all night or prolonged sleep.

THe Defendants' marketing of this product as appropriate for
prolonged sleep was intentional and overt. Not only is "Sleeper" in
the name of the product, but the boxes in which the Rock 'n Play
Sleepers were sold, and other materials used to promote them,
prominently exclaim, "Baby can sleep at a comfortable incline all
night long!" and make similar statements about its fitness for
prolonged and nighttime sleep. This marketing was dangerously false
and misleading, as the product is not safe for all-night or
prolonged sleep for infants.

According to the complaint, by positioning an infant at a 30-degree
incline, the Rock 'n Play Sleeper significantly increases the risk
that the infant's head will slip into a dangerous position, tilt to
constrict the windpipe and/or cause the infant's face to become
pressed against the padded fabric in the sleeper and block airflow,
which the infant may be unable to correct. This increases the risk
of death by asphyxiation. In addition, because Defendants advise
parents to keep babies strapped in restraints overnight while
sleeping on an incline, the Rock 'n Play Sleeper increases the
infant's risk of developing flat head (plagiocephaly) and twisted
neck (torticollis) syndromes, conditions that often require babies
to wear expensive head-molding helmets and undergo physical
therapy.

Despite knowing that the Rock 'n Play Sleeper is unsafe for
overnight or prolonged sleep for infants, Defendants marketed and
sold the product as a sleeper, leading parents to reasonably
believe that the product is safe for its stated purpose. The words
"sleeper" and "sleep" appear no fewer than five times on the
package, which depicts pictures of a mom blissfully sleeping or
about to fall asleep with the baby in the Rock 'n Play Sleeper.

The Rock 'n Play Sleeper is extremely popular with parents because
it rocks the baby, and various models have other soothing features
such as lullabies and vibrations. Because of these characteristics,
the Rock 'n Play Sleeper is one of the best-selling "sleepers".

Had parents like Plaintiff Ms. Fieker been aware of the potentially
fatal dangers posed by the Rock 'n Play Sleeper, or the serious
risks of injury such as flat head and twisted neck syndrome, they
would not have purchased and/or used the product. Defendants' false
and misleading marketing of this dangerous product, and knowing
failure to disclose the grave risks of its use as a sleeper for
overnight or prolonged sleep, allowed Defendants to reap vast
profits at the expense of consumers who erroneously believed they
were obtaining a safe place for their babies to sleep.

Mattel, until April 12, 2019, directly and/or through Fisher-Price,
designed, marketed, distributed and sold Rock 'n Play Sleepers
throughout the United States, including in Oklahoma. Mattel shares
overall responsibility for the safety of Fisher-Price products,
including the Rock 'n Play Sleeper. All recall and safety alerts
for both Fisher-Price and Mattel products, as well as customer
service for both Fisher-Price and Mattel products, are found on the
Mattel website.

Inclined sleepers such as the Rock 'n Play Sleeper are sleeping
products that are inclined upwards on one end to raise a baby's
head and torso up to approximately 30 degrees. As initially
reported in a November 26, 2018 Wall Street Journal article
entitled Infant Deaths Prompt Questions Over Safety of Inclined
Sleepers, at least 30 infant deaths and more than 700 injuries
associated with these inclined sleepers -- including,
predominantly, the Rock 'n Play Sleeper -- have been reported to
the Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSC") since 2005.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Daniel E. Smolen, Esq.
          Lauren Lambright, Esq.
          SMOLEN & ROYTMAN
          701 S. Cincinnati Ave.
          Tulsa, OK 74119
          Telephone: (918) 585-2267
          Facsimile: (918) 585-2669
          E-mail: danielsmolen@ssrok.com
                  laurenlambright@ssrok.com

               - and -

          Dennis A. Caruso, Esq.
          Mark A. Smith, Esq.
          CARUSO LAW FIRM, P.C.
          1325 East Fifteenth Street, Suite 201
          Tulsa, OK 74120
          Telephone: (918) 583-5900
          Facsimile: (918) 583-5902
          E-mail: dcaruso@carusolawfirm.com
                  msmith@carusolawfirm.com

FLOOR & DECOR: Thornton Law Firm Files Securities Fraud Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed on behalf of investors of
Floor & Decor Holdings, Inc. (FND).  Shareholders who purchased at
least 1,000 shares of FND stock between May 23, 2018 and August 1,
2018, and are interested in learning about participating as a lead
plaintiff in the lawsuit, are encouraged to contact the Thornton
Law Firm at shareholder@tenlaw.com, or call 617-531-3917 to discuss
their rights.

Investors interested in serving as a lead plaintiff have until July
19, 2019 to apply. The lawsuit alleges violations of the federal
securities laws, and the class has not yet been certified. Until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

According to the lawsuit, Floor & Decor made false and misleading
statements, and omissions, regarding its business and prospects. It
is alleged that statements in a Registration Statement filed with
the SEC regarding the current financial condition of the Company
were materially false and misleading because, prior to the May 24
Secondary Offering, Defendants knew, but failed to disclose, that
the Company had already begun to experience declining sales trends
that would ultimately result in the reduction of its fiscal 2018
sales and adjusted earnings per share guidance, which had been
increased as recently as May 2018.

If you purchased at least 1,000 shares of Floor & Decor stock (FND)
between May 23, 2018 and August 1, 2018, and are interested in
learning about serving as a lead plaintiff please:

Contact:

         Thornton Law Firm
         Phone: 617-531-3917
         Email: shareholder@tenlaw.com [GN]


GENERAL ATOMICS: Green Sues Over Unpaid Wages
---------------------------------------------
TRACY GREEN, as an individual and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. GENERAL ATOMICS, a California corporation;
and DOES 1through50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
37-2019-00028571-CU-OE-CTL (Cal. Super. Ct., San Diego Cty., June
4, 2019) is a Class Action Complaint against Defendants on behalf
of Plaintiff and a class of all other similarly situated current
and former employees of Defendants for penalties for violations of
the California Labor Code, including without limitation, failure to
provide employees with accurate itemized wage statements.

Throughout her employment with Defendants, Plaintiff was not
provided proper and accurate itemized wage statements.
Specifically, the wage statements failed to identify the correct
rate of pay for overtime wages, showing 0.5 times the regular rate
of pay rather than 1.5. Plaintiff is informed and believes that
Defendants, jointly and severally, have acted intentionally and
with deliberate indifference and conscious disregard to the rights
of all employees in Defendants' failure to provide accurate payroll
records, says the complaint.

Plaintiff began employment with Defendants in or about May 2010 as
a non-exempt employee. Plaintiff is employed in the Accounts
Receivable.

General Atomics is and was a California corporation, licensed to do
business and actually doing business in the State of
California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Larry W. Lee, Esq.
     Max W. Gavron, Esq.
     DIVERSITY LAW GROUP, P.C.
     515 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 1250
     Los Angeles, CA 90071
     Phone: (213) 488-6555
     Facsimile: (213) 488-6554

          - and -

     William L. Marder, Esq.
     Polaris Law Group LLP
     501 San Benito Street, Suite 200
     Hollister, CA 95023
     Phone: (831) 531-4214
     Fax: (831) 634-0333


GILEAD: Faces Class Action Over Alleged Generics Collusion
----------------------------------------------------------
Spencer Parts, writing for Global Competition Review, reports that
several activists and two employee benefit funds have sued Gilead
and three other drugmakers for allegedly colluding to limit generic
competition for treatment of human immunodeficiency virus. [GN]


GLEN MILLS SCHOOLS: El-Khashab Sues over Civil Rights Violations
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Glen Mills School
for alleged violations of the Civil Rights Act. The case is
captioned EL-KHASHAB v. THE GLEN MILLS SCHOOL et al, Case No.
2:19-cv-02224-HB (E.D. Pa., May 15, 2019). Plaintiff Sameena
El-Khashab demands trial by jury.

Founded in 1826, the Glen Mills Schools is a residential
educational facility for juvenile delinquents. The facility is
located at 185 Glen Mills Road Glen Mills, Pennsylvania. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Robert J. Mongeluzzi, Esq.
     SALTZ, MONGELUZZI, BARRETT & BENDESKY, P.C.
     1650 Market Street
     One Liberty Place, 52nd Fl.
     Philadelphia, PA 19103
     E-mail: rjmongeluzzi@smbb.com


GOPRO INC: Sept. 10 Class Action Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
----------------------------------------------------------------
The following statement is being issued by Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP
regarding the GoPro, Inc. Securities Litigation.

TO: ALL PERSONS AND ENTITIES WHO PURCHASED THE COMMON STOCK OF
GOPRO, INC. ("GOPRO") (NASDAQ: GPRO) BETWEEN SEPTEMBER 19, 2016 AND
NOVEMBER 8, 2016, INCLUSIVE ("CLASS").

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to an Order of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, that a
hearing will be held on September 10, 2019 at 2:30 p.m., before the
Honorable Claudia Wilken, at the Ronald V. Dellums Federal Building
& United States Courthouse, 1301 Clay Street, Courtroom 6—2nd
Floor, Oakland, CA 94612, for the purpose of determining: (1)
whether the proposed settlement as set forth in the Stipulation of
Settlement dated February 14, 2019 ("Stipulation") of the
above-captioned action ("Litigation") for the principal amount of
$6,750,000 for the Class should be approved by the Court as fair,
just, reasonable, and adequate; (2) whether a Final Judgment should
be entered by the Court dismissing the Litigation with prejudice;
(3) whether the Plan of Allocation is fair, reasonable, and
adequate and should be approved; and (4) whether the application of
Lead Counsel for the payment of attorneys' fees in the amount of
25% of the Settlement Fund, and an award to the Lead Plaintiff not
to exceed $10,000, and expenses not to exceed $250,000 should be
approved.

IF YOU PURCHASED GOPRO COMMON STOCK BETWEEN SEPTEMBER 19, 2016 AND
NOVEMBER 8, 2016, INCLUSIVE, YOUR RIGHTS MAY BE AFFECTED BY THE
SETTLEMENT OF THIS LITIGATION.  You may obtain copies of a detailed
Notice of Pendency and Settlement of Class Action ("Notice") and
Proof of Claim and Release form ("Proof of Claim and Release") by
writing to GoPro Securities Litigation, c/o Claims Administrator,
P.O. Box. 4259, Portland, OR 97208-4259, visiting the website
www.GoProSecuritiesLitigation.com, e-mailing the Claims
Administrator at Info@GoProSecuritiesLitigation.com, or calling the
Claims Administrator toll free at 1-888-595-6496.  Inquiries other
than requests for the above-referenced documents may also be made
to Plaintiff's Lead Counsel:

         Richard W. Gonnello
         FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
         685 Third Avenue
         26th Floor
         New York, NY 10017

If you are a Class Member, in order to share in the distribution of
the Settlement Fund, you must submit a Proof of Claim and Release
postmarked or submitted electronically no later than August 20,
2019, establishing that you are entitled to recovery.  NOTE THAT NO
CLAIMS LESS THAN $10.00 WILL BE PROCESSED OR PAID.  Your failure to
timely submit your Proof of Claim and Release will subject your
claim to possible rejection and may preclude you from receiving any
of the recovery in connection with the settlement of this
Litigation.

To exclude yourself from the Class, you must submit a written
request for exclusion in accordance with the instructions set forth
in the Notice such that it is received no later than
August 20, 2019.  All Members of the Class who have not requested
exclusion from the Class will be bound by the settlement entered in
the Litigation even if they do not submit a timely Proof of Claim
and Release.

Any objection to the settlement, the Plan of Allocation of
settlement proceeds, or the fee and expense application must be
submitted to the Court either by mailing them to the Class Action
Clerk, United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, Ronald V. Dellums Federal Building & United States
Courthouse, 1301 Clay Street, Oakland, CA 94612, or by filing them
in person at any location of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California.  Your objection must be
received on or before August 20, 2019.

PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT OR THE CLERK'S OFFICE REGARDING
THIS NOTICE, THIS SETTLEMENT, OR THIS CLAIMS PROCESS.   If you have
any questions about the Settlement, you may contact Lead Counsel at
the address listed above.

DATED: May 14, 2019

BY ORDER OF THE COURT [GN]


GRUBHUB: Philadelphia Restaurateur Files $5MM Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Peter Schacknow, writing for CNBC, reports that GrubHub was sued by
a Philadelphia restaurateur, seeking $5 million in damages and
class action status for the suit. The New York Post reports the
delivery service is accused of charging restaurants for phone calls
even if no order was made. GrubHub said it disputes the claims and
that the suit is without merit. [GN]


HAIYING REN: Does not Properly Pay Workers, Wang Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
MING EN WANG, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. HAIYING REN a/k/a Michael Chen a/k/a Michael Ren,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-05310 (S.D. N.Y., June 5, 2019) is an
action brought by the Plaintiff on behalf of himself as well as
other employees similarly situated, against the Defendants for
alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, ("FLSA") and
New York Labor Law ("NYLL"), arising from Defendants' various
willful and unlawful employment policies, patterns and practices.

The Defendants have committed widespread violations of the FLSA and
NYLL by engaging in pattern and practice of failing to pay its
employees, including Plaintiff, minimum wage for each hour worked
and overtime compensation for all hours worked over 40 each
workweek, asserts the complaint.

Plaintiff Ming En Wang was employed by Defendant to work as a
deliveryman at Spice Saigon, a restaurant located at 1237 First
Avenue, New York, NY 10065.

The Defendant is an officer, director, manager and/or majority
shareholder or owners of Yong Lee Inc d/b/a Spice Saigon.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     John Troy, Esq.
     TROY LAW, PLLC
     41-25 Kissena Boulevard Suite 119
     Flushing, NY 11355
     Phone: (718) 762-1324


HAN DYNASTY: Pan Sues Over Failure to Pay Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------
JUNYOU PAN and MAISHENG individually and on behalf of all other
employees similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. HAN DYNASTY OF
UNIVERSITY CITY INC. d/b/s "Han Dynasty", NEW HAN DYNASTY d/b/a
"Han Dynasty", MINHAN JIANG, JING ZHANG and Angel Doe (Last Name
unknown), Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-02411-GAM (E.D. Pa., June 3,
2019) contends that Defendants failed to pay overtime compensation
to their employees, who work in Defendants' restaurant in
Pennsylvania, pursuant to the overtime requirements of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act, and have
failed to comply with the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection
Law, and violated Pennsylvania common law.

During their employment with Defendants, when Plaintiffs and all
similarly situated employees worked more than forty 40 hours per
week, they were not properly compensated for their overtime hours
pursuant to the FLSA and the PMWA, says the complaint. As a result,
Plaintiffs and all similarly situated employees suffered damages.

Plaintiffs were employed by Defendants as a cook and a kitchen
helper at Defendant's Restaurant.

Han Dynasty of University City Inc. is incorporated and is
registered to transact business in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Jiajing Fan, Esq.
     HANG & ASSOCIATES, PLLC.
     136-20 38th Ave., Suite 10G
     Flushing, NY 11354
     Phone: 718.353.8588
     Email: jfan@hanglaw.com


HARDCORE DISPATCH: Medina Sues Over Unsolicited Marketing
---------------------------------------------------------
JORGE MEDINA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. HARDCORE DISPATCH SERVICES, LLC, a Texas
Limited Liability Company, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-22269-JEM
(S.D. Fla., June 3, 2019) seeks to secure redress for violations of
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").

To promote its services, Defendant engages in unsolicited
marketing, harming thousands of consumers in the process. Through
this action, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt Defendant's
illegal conduct, which has resulted in the invasion of privacy,
harassment, aggravation, and disruption of the daily life of
thousands of individuals. Plaintiff also seeks statutory damages on
behalf of himself and members of the class, and any other available
legal or equitable remedies.

Plaintiff is a natural person who, at all times relevant to this
action, was a resident of Miami-Dade County, Florida.

Defendant is a freight truck dispatch provider that sells its
services to individuals and businesses.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
     Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
     SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
     14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 400
     Miami, FL 33132
     Phone: 305-479-2299
     Email: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
            gberg@shamisgentile.com

          - and -

     Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
     EDELSBERG LAW, P.A.
     19495 Biscayne Blvd #607
     Aventura, FL 33180
     Phone: 305-975-3320
     Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com



HRO INNOVATION: Moreno Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE E. MORENO and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. HRO
INNOVATION CONSTRUCTION INC., HENRY ORTIZ, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-22276-XXXX (S.D. Fla., June 3, 2019) is an action arising
under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").

Plaintiff worked an average of 55 hours a week for Defendants and
was paid an average of $20 per hour but was not paid for the hours
worked over 40 hours in a week as required by the Fair Labor
Standards Act, says the complaint. The Defendants willfully and
intentionally refused to pay Plaintiff's overtime wages as required
by the FLSA as Defendants knew of the overtime requirements of the
FLSA and recklessly failed to investigate whether Defendants'
payroll practices were in accordance with the FLSA. Defendants
remain owing Plaintiff these wages since the commencement of
Plaintiff's employment with Defendants for the time period.

Plaintiff worked for Defendants as a construction worker from July
20, 2018 through May 30, 2019.

HRO INNOVATION CONSTRUCTION INC., is a corporation that regularly
transacts business within the Southern District of Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     J.H. Zidell, Esq.
     J.H. Zidell, P.A.
     300 71st Street, Suite 605
     Miami Beach, FL 33141
     Phone: (305) 865-6766
     Fax: (305) 865-7167
     Email: ZABOGADO@AOL.COM


HYTTO LTD: Judge Allows Lush Vibrator Class Action to Proceed
-------------------------------------------------------------
Helen Christoph, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that
a federal judge advanced the bulk of a class action lawsuit on May
15 accusing a Chinese sex technology company of using customers'
cellphones to harvest intimate details about how they use its
remote-controlled vibrators.

In a 17-page order, U.S. District Judge Jeffrey White rejected Hong
Kong-based Hytto Ltd.'s contention it can't be sued in the United
States over allegations it intercepts and stores data via a mobile
app about when, how and how often long-distance couples in the
United States use its Bluetooth-enabled Lush vibrators, finding the
company's conduct had exposed it to scrutiny by U.S. courts.

Hytto uses several California-based companies to advertise and
distribute the Lush toy and sells it in brick and mortar stores,
according to the January 2018 complaint.

"Hytto was aware of its significant American customer base," White
ruled on May 15 in Oakland. "By intercepting the transmissions of
Body Chat app users, Hytto targeted its wrongful conduct at
customers, some of whom Hytto knew, at least constructively, were
residents of the U.S."

Long distance couples can connect their Lush devices to their
cellphones via Bluetooth using Hytto's Body Chat app. When two
people use the app together, either partner can select and transmit
the vibration intensity for the paired device.

But according to the anonymously filed lawsuit, Body Chat collects
users' personal information, including the frequency, date, time
and intensity of use, and stores it along with their email
addresses on Hytto's servers without telling them.

The complaint claims this violates the federal Wiretap Act, which
prohibits "interception" of the "contents" of an "electronic
communication."

Hytto, however, says that Bluetooth transmissions like those made
by its Lush devices don't constitute electronic communications
under the Wiretap Act. And it insists the data transmitted doesn't
constitute "content" under the statute.

The Wiretap Act defines "content" as "any information concerning
the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication." The law
excludes "record" information -- data automatically generated when
a communication is sent, such as the origin or length of a phone
call.

Partly siding with Hytto on May 15, Judge White held that date and
time of usage data constitutes record data under the Wiretap Act
because it is automatically generated. But vibration intensity data
sent from app to app and then to the Lush device constitutes
content because users enter "desired strength of touch" into the
app.

"Individuals, of course, communicate by touch all the time," White
wrote. "This desired strength, or vibration intensity, is not
'incidental' to the communication occurring between the apps and,
by extension, between the humans operating each app; it is the very
essence of this particular type of touch-based communication."

The judge also kept alive state-law claims for intrusion upon
seclusion and unjust enrichment. He gave the plaintiff, identified
in the complaint as S.D., permission to amend the Wiretap Act claim
for time and date usage by June 14.

S.D. purchased the Lush toy in late 2016 and paired it with the
internet applications, without knowing her information would be
collected, according to the complaint.

Lily Hough of Edelson PC in San Francisco represents S.D., and
Jui-Ting Anna Hsia of ZwillGen Law, also in San Francisco,
represents Hytto. Neither attorney could be reached for comment on
May 15.

The Hytto lawsuit is not the first related to sex toys, technology
and spying.

In March 2017, another vibrator production company, We-Vibe, paid
$3.5 million in a settlement with a class that claimed it was using
technology apps to track users' activities unbeknownst to them.
[GN]


INT'L PAPER: 11th Cir. Affirms Judgment in Nevalski Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN NAVELSKI, LINDA NAVELSKI, RICHARD BULLARD,
BEVERLY BULLARD, ERICK ALEXANDER, JACOB HUTCHINS, AMBER HUTCHINS,
JEANNE HENDERLY, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. INTERNATIONAL PAPER
COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 18-12432 (11th Cir.), the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial
court's grant of judgment as a matter of law for IP on the strict
liability claim.

IP operates a paper mill in Escambia County, Florida.  It
constructed the Kingsfield Road Dam to manage the flow of water
into a nearby creek.  After a major storm, the dam overflowed,
releasing millions of gallons of water into a nearby creek.  Homes
downstream from the creek and dam flooded, and the homeowners sued
IP in a class action for negligence and strict liability for an
abnormally dangerous activity.  A unanimous jury found that IP was
not negligent in its design, maintenance, and operation of the dam.
The trial court granted judgment as a matter of law for IP on the
strict liability claim.

On appeal, the homeowners argue that the district court (1) abused
its discretion in denying their motion for a new trial because the
jury's negligence verdict was against the great weight of the
evidence, (2) abused its discretion in admitting a portion of
Escambia County's application for a FEMA grant, and (3) erred in
granting IP's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the strict
liability claim.

After careful review and with the benefit of oral argument, the
Court finds that the district court did not err in determining that
IP's use of the dam was not an abnormally dangerous activity under
Florida law.  To be abnormally dangerous, an activity must pose a
specific danger of a "certain magnitude and nature."  In its
judgment, the operation of a dam on a creek typically poses neither
a high risk of harm that cannot be eliminated by the use of care
nor an overly abnormal danger to the community.  Because it finds
find no reversible error, the Court affirmed the judgment of the
district court.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 7, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/mGF7Cb from Leagle.com.

Charles Franklin Beall, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.

George Roderick Mead, II -- emead@mhw-law.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Thomas Larry Hill -- thomas.hill@pillsburylaw.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Daniel W. Nelson -- dnelson@gibsondunn.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Amir Cameron Tayrani -- atayrani@gibsondunn.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Jeremiah Joseph Talbott -- jj@talbottlawfirm.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Tillman J. Breckenridge -- tjb@piercebainbridge.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

James Lawrence Kauffman, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Brian A. Glasser -- bglasser@baileyglasser.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.


INTERSECT ENT: Glancy Prongay Files Securities Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP disclosed that it has filed a class
action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California, captioned Yaron v. Intersect ENT, Inc. et
al., (Case No. 3:19-cv-02647), on behalf of persons and entities
that purchased or otherwise acquired Intersect ENT, Inc. (NASDAQ:
XENT ) ("Intersect ENT" or the "Company") securities between August
1, 2018 and May 6, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"). Plaintiff
pursues claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act").

Investors are hereby notified that they have 60 days from May 16,
2019, the date of this notice to move the Court to serve as lead
plaintiff in this action.

On August 1, 2018, the Company disclosed that it faced certain
challenges with the launch of INUVA, which had negatively impacted
the Company's second quarter 2018 financial results.

On this news, the Company's share price fell $6.30, nearly 20%, to
close at $26.05 per share on August 1, 2018, on unusually heavy
trading volume.

Then, on May 6, 2019, the Company disclosed a first quarter 2019
loss of $10.8 million and lowered guidance for the remainder of
2019. The Company also reported that Earnhardt, the Company's CEO
of 11 years, resigned.

On this news, the Company's share price fell $8.05, or more than
25%, to close at $25.10 per share on May 7, 2019, thereby injuring
investors further.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) that the Company lacked adequate reimbursement
representatives to ensure physicians had access to SINUVA; (2)
that, as a result, the Company's sales force would focus on
ensuring reimbursement; (3) that, as a result, the Company's sales
representatives were less focused on driving sales; (4) that
physicians were less likely to adopt the Company's SINUVA due to
transaction costs associated with seeking reimbursement; (5) that
the Company would increase staffing to address these issues; and
(6) that, as a result of the foregoing, Defendants' positive
statements about the Company's business, operations, and prospects
were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

If you purchased Intersect ENT securities during the Class Period,
you may move the Court no later than 60 days from May 16, 2019, the
date of this notice to ask the Court to appoint you as lead
plaintiff. To be a member of the Class you need not take any action
at this time; you may retain counsel of your choice or take no
action and remain an absent member of the Class. If you wish to
learn more about this action, or if you have any questions
concerning this announcement or your rights or interests with
respect to these matters, please contact Lesley Portnoy, Esquire,
of GPM, 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100, Los Angeles, California
90067 at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, by email to
shareholders@glancylaw.com or visit our website at
www.glancylaw.com If you inquire by email please include your
mailing address, telephone number and number of shares purchased.
[GN]


INTUIT INC: Kessler Topaz Files TurboTax Class Action in Calif.
---------------------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP on May 15
disclosed that it has filed a class action lawsuit against Intuit
Inc. ("Intuit") in the Northern District of California (San Jose
Division), captioned Allwein v. Intuit Inc., Case No. 5:19-cv-2567,
on behalf of all Free File Program-eligible persons or entities in
the United States who paid to use a TurboTax product to file an
online tax return for the 2002 through 2018 tax filing years.

Individuals who paid for TurboTax products for tax filing years
2002 through 2018, and: (i) have an adjusted gross income of
$34,000 or less; or (ii) are eligible for the Earned Income Tax
Credit; or (iii) are on active military duty and have an adjusted
gross income of $66,000 or less, are encouraged to contact Kessler
Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP (James Maro, Esq. or Adrienne Bell,
Esq.) to discuss their legal rights or interests at (888) 299-7706
or (610) 667-7706, or via e-mail at info@ktmc.com. For additional
information please visit https://tinyurl.com/y3lobbx3

Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP is also investigating H&R Block,
Inc. for similar misconduct as that alleged in the Intuit lawsuit.
Individuals who paid for H&R Block for tax filing years 2002
through 2018, and: (i) have an adjusted gross income of $66,000 or
less AND are between 17 and 51 years old; or (ii) are eligible for
the Earned Income Tax Credit; or (iii) are on active military duty
and have an adjusted gross income of $66,000 or less, are also
encouraged to contact Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP. Please
click on the link above for additional information.

As set forth in the complaint, in 2002, Intuit and a group of
electronic tax preparation and filing companies agreed to provide a
free version of their commercial products to lower-income
Americans. In exchange, the IRS agreed to not compete with Intuit
and the other companies in providing free, online tax return
preparation and filing services (the "Free File Program"). Despite
the institution of the Free File Program, only a small percentage
of American taxpayers file their taxes for free. For fiscal year
2018, less than 2.5 million of the 100 million eligible taxpayers,
or less than 2.5%, participated in the Free File Program.

Intuit offers a free online tax preparation and filing product
called TurboTax "Freedom Edition" that is a part of the IRS Free
File Program. Anyone who (i) has an adjusted gross income of
$34,000 or less, (ii) is eligible for the Earned Income Tax Credit,
or (iii) is on active military duty and has an adjusted gross
income of $66,000 or less is eligible to use TurboTax Freedom
Edition.

Intuit, however, has taken deliberate efforts to hide its
fully-functional TurboTax Freedom Edition, while at the same time
aggressively marketing as "free" its TurboTax Free Edition, which
is a version of its software with limited functionality that is
useless to all but those with the simplest of tax returns. For
example, Intuit has ensured that TurboTax Freedom Edition is not
available through TurboTax's homepage website. Only TurboTax Free
Edition and its three other paid products can be accessed directly
from the TurboTax Homepage.

Intuit's deceptive conduct directly contradicts the IRS's stated
objective of providing free online preparation and filing for
lower-income individuals. By falsely convincing Free File
Program-eligible filers that they were unable to prepare and file
their taxes for free, despite the existence of Freedom Edition,
Intuit charged individuals for paid TurboTax products when it
should have provided Freedom Edition for free pursuant to the Free
File Program. As a result of the foregoing, plaintiff and members
of the class have suffered harm as a result of Intuit's false
advertising, fraudulent conduct, and unfair, unlawful and deceptive
trade practices.

Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP -- http://www.ktmc.com--
prosecutes class actions in state and federal courts throughout the
country. Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP is a driving force
behind corporate governance reform, and has recovered billions of
dollars on behalf of institutional and individual investors from
the United States and around the world. The firm represents
investors, consumers and whistleblowers (private citizens who
report fraudulent practices against the government and share in the
recovery of government dollars). [GN]


JAN-PRO FRANCHISING: Duanne Morris Attorney Discusses Ruling
------------------------------------------------------------
Sheila Raftery Wiggins, Esq. -- SRWiggins@duanemorris.com -- of
Duane Morris LLP, in an article for Mondaq, reports that in Vazquez
v. Jan-Pro Franchising International, Inc., a decade-old proposed
class action against a franchisor, the Ninth Circuit ruled on May
2, 2019, that the recent California Supreme Court case Dynamex Ops.
W. Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018)
applies retroactively.

Dynamex: (1) embraces the standard presuming that all workers are
employees rather than contractors and (2) places on any entity
classifying an individual as an independent contractor the burden
of establishing that such classification is proper under the newly
adopted "ABC test." The test requires the hiring entity to
establish three elements to disprove employment status: (A) that
the worker is free from the control of the hiring entity in
connection with work performance -- both under the performance
contract and in fact; (B) that the worker performs work outside the
hiring entity's usual business; and (C) that the worker is
customarily engaged in an independent business of the same nature
as the work performed.

In Vazquez, the Ninth Circuit analyzed Jan-Pro's two-tiered
business model when analyzing whether franchisees are employees,
rather than independent contractors, of the franchisor.

For the first-tier of the business model, Jan-Pro contracts with
"master owners" to whom it sells exclusive rights to the use of the
"Jan-Pro" logo, which is trademarked. As of 2017, there were 91
different master owners. Jan-Pro retains the right to inspect any
premises serviced by a master owner or any of the master owner's
franchisees to ensure that Jan-Pro standards are being maintained.
Jan-Pro also has contractual requirements regarding how the
businesses are to be conducted. The franchise agreement requires
the master owners to pay Jan-Pro: (1) 10 percent of the franchisee
fee paid to them by unit franchisees; and (2) 4 percent of the
revenues that they collect from unit franchisees' customers for
their cleaning services.

For the second-tier of the business model, the master owner then
sells business plans to unit franchisees, without needing approval
from Jan-Pro. However, Jan-Pro requires that the master owner state
in their contracts with the unit franchisees that Jan-Pro is a
third-party beneficiary of those contracts. The master owner has
its own business structure and is responsible for their own
marketing, accounting and general operations. The master owner does
not typically perform any cleaning services. The master owner
provides the unit franchisees with an initial book of business,
startup equipment, training programs, customer assistance relations
and billing/invoices services. The agreement states that a unit
franchisee is an independent contractor solely in business for
itself and thus may hire its own employees, set wages and decide
whether to pursue certain business opportunities. Thus, Jan-Pro's
business model is two-tiered with: (1) Jan-Pro acting as
franchisor, and the master owner acting as franchisee; and (2) the
master owner acting as franchisor to the unit franchisee.

This California federal class action is a decade old because, in
part, related class action claims were addressed in Massachusetts
and California federal district and appellate courts and in Georgia
state trial and appellate courts. The Ninth Circuit addressed
whether to retroactively apply the independent contractor ABC test,
which was recently adopted in California in the 2018 Dynamex
ruling. The Ninth Circuit relied on California's general tradition
of judicial pronouncements having retroactive effect. The Ninth
Circuit rejected Jan-Pro's assertions regarding fairness, stability
and reliance on a ruling that had not existed when business
decisions were made years earlier. The court focused on the
practical realities of the relationships such as, for example: (1)
Jan-Pro reserved the power to make site visits and inspect books
and records, but rarely did so; and (2) master owners hold
themselves out as "Jan-Pro International" on websites. The Ninth
Circuit remanded to the District Court to consider the merits of
the case in light of Dynamex.

Vazquez is a warning for franchises and other businesses that use
independent contractors to practically analyze their business
models using the ABC test and consider whether amendments to
contracts or changes to their business models are needed so that
contractors and workers are not deemed to be employees. Companies
should also consider their document retention policy to defend
against lawsuits in which the ABC test is retroactively applied to
their business activities that occurred years ago. Further,
companies should consider their insurance coverage and whether to
obtain claims-made policies. [GN]


KANSAS: Lomax Must Show Cause Why Suit Shouldn't be Dismissed
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Sam A. Crow of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Kansas ordered the Plaintiff to show good cause why the case,
VINCENT LOMAX, Plaintiff, v. DEREK SCHMIDT, et al., Defendants,
Case No. 18-3263-SAC (D. Kan.), should not be dismissed due to the
deficiencies in his Complaint.

The Plaintiff brings the pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. Section 1983.  At the time of filing, he was housed at the
Crawford County Jail in Girard, Kansas.  He alleges a conspiracy
and a violation of his civil rights arising out of the illegal
restraint and false imprisonment of the Plaintiff(s) by the
Defendants.  He alleges presumptive violations of the Plaintiff(s)
probationary sentences that occurred after said probations had
expired.  The Plaintiff alleges he was incarcerated for probation
violations after his probation had expired.  He also references
"Plaintiff[s]" throughout his Complaint and seeks class
certification.

The Plaintiff names as the Defendants: Derek Schmidt, Kansas
Attorney General; Stephen Phillips, Assistant Attorney General;
Crawford County, Kansas; Michael Gayoso, Jr, Crawford County
Attorney; Reina Probert, Deputy Crawford County Attorney; Kurtis
Loy, Crawford County District Judge; Beth Emmert, Probation
Officer; Tresa Miller, Probation Officer; and (fnu) Doe 1-20.  He
sues all the Defendants in their official capacity.  He seeks class
certification, $100 million in damages, $900 million in punitive
damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief.

Judge Crow holds that official capacity claims against the state
officials for monetary damages are barred by sovereign immunity.
Furthermore, state officers acting in their official capacity are
not considered "persons" against whom a claim for damages can be
brought under Section 1983.

The Judge also finds that the Plaintiff alleges no facts whatsoever
to suggest that the Defendant judge acted outside of his judicial
capacity.  The Plaintiff's claims against the state and county
prosecutors fail on the ground of prosecutorial immunity.
Prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for damages in
actions asserted against them for actions taken "in initiating a
prosecution and in presenting the State's case.  The Plaintiff's
claims concerning his criminal case fall squarely within the
prosecutorial function.  He is directed to show cause why his
claims against the state and county prosecutors should not be
dismissed based on prosecutorial immunity.

The Judge further finds that the Plaintiff has failed to allege how
any of the Defendants personally participated in the deprivation of
his constitutional rights.  Mere supervisory status is insufficient
to create personal liability.

As to class certification, the Judge finds that pro se Plaintiff
cannot adequately represent a class.  Any request to certify a
class is denied.

The Plaintiff is required to show good cause why his Complaint
should not be dismissed for the reasons stated.  He is also given
the opportunity to file a complete and proper amended complaint
upon court-approved forms that cures all the deficiencies.  He is
given time to file a complete and proper amended complaint in which
he (1) shows he has exhausted administrative remedies for all
claims alleged; (2) raises only properly joined claims and
defendants; (3) alleges sufficient facts to state a claim for a
federal constitutional violation and show a cause of action in
federal court; and (4) alleges sufficient facts to show personal
participation by each named Defendant.  If the Plaintiff does not
file an amended complaint within the prescribed time that cures all
the deficiencies, the matter will be decided based upon the current
deficient Complaint.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Crow granted the Plaintiff until May
31, 2019 to show good cause why his Complaint should not be
dismissed for the reasons stated.  He is also granted until May 31,
2019, in which to file a complete and proper amended complaint to
cure all the deficiencie.  The clerk is directed to send Section
1983 forms and instructions to the Plaintiff.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 7, 2019 Memorandum and Order is
available at https://is.gd/CIRDHj from Leagle.com.


KBP INVESTMENTS: Simon Seeks Unpaid Wages, Damages
--------------------------------------------------
Latoya Simon, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. KBP Investments, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
5:19-cv-00192-BRW (E.D. Ark., June 5, 2019) is a class and
collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and
the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act ("AMWA"), for declaratory judgment,
monetary damages, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, and
costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, as a result of
Defendant's failure to pay Plaintiff and other hourly-paid shift
managers lawful overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of
40 hours per week.

The Defendant routinely scheduled Plaintiff and other shift
managers to work more than 40 hours in a single workweek. It was
Defendant's commonly applied practice to not pay Plaintiff and
other shift managers for all of the hours during which they were
performing labor for Defendant, says the complaint. Specifically,
the Defendant had a practice of not paying Plaintiff and other
shift managers one and one-half times their regular rate for all
hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. The Defendant knew
or showed reckless disregard for whether the way it paid Plaintiff
and all others similarly situated violated the FLSA and the AMWA,
it adds.

Defendant owns and operates several KFC and Long John Silvers
restaurants throughout Arkansas and the surrounding states.
Plaintiff was employed by Defendant at Defendant's eateries in Pine
Bluff.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Chris Burks, Esq.
     Brandon M. Haubert, Esq.
     WH LAW, PLLC
     1 Riverfront Pl. - Suite 745
     North Little Rock, AR 72114
     Phone: (501) 891-6000
     Email: chris@whlawoffices.com
            brandon@whlawoffices.com


KENNY G & COMPANY: Peterson Sues over Wrongful Termination
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Kenny G & Company
Fine Jewelers LLC for wrongful termination. The case is captioned
Stacie Peterson vs. Kenny G & Company Fine Jewelers LLC, Case No.
34-2019-00256636-CU-WT-GDS (Cal. Super., Sacramento Cty., May 15,
2019).

Founded in 1997, Kenny G & Company Fine Jewelers LLC is a
family-owned business that operates three jewelry stores in
Sacramento area and one store in Reno, Nevada. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Ronald W. Makarem, Esq.
     MAKAREM & ASSOCIATES
     11601 Wilshire Blvd., Ste 2440
     Los Angeles, CA, 90025
     Telephone: (310) 312-0299
     Facsimile: (310) 312-0296
     E-mail: makarem@law-rm.com


LAREDO EMERGENCY: Santos Seeks to Recover Underpaid Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------------------
DEBRA L. SANTOS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. LAREDO EMERGENCY CENTER, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 5:19-cv-00075 (S.D. Tex., June 5, 2019) seeks to recover
unpaid and/or underpaid overtime wages, other wages, and other
damages owed to Plaintiff and to other similarly situated employees
and former employees at the Laredo Emergency Center, LLC ("LEC"),
as required by  the Fair Labor and Standards Act ("FLSA").

Notwithstanding the FLSA requirements, Defendant would pay its
employees overtime for hours worked over 80 hours during each
two-week pay period, instead of hours worked over 40 hours during a
one-week period. In addition, Defendant would pay its employees 1.5
times the employee's base hourly rate. There was no regard for
differential pay, such as a night differential rate of pay, for
overtime calculations. The Defendant was aware of the FLSA's
overtime requirements, but its pay policy and practice were
willfully noncompliant, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as an ER Technician from August
2015 to June 6, 2017.

The LEC is a freestanding emergency medical care facility
comparable to a hospital emergency room.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Doanh "Zone" T. Nguyen, Esq.
     6909 Springfield Avenue, Suite 104
     Laredo, TX 78041
     Phone: (956) 568-0990
     Facsimile: (833) 790-4023
     Email: zone.t.nguyen@gmail.com


LYNAS CORP: Faces Class Action Over Delays During Establishment
---------------------------------------------------------------
Colin Kruger, writing for The Sydney Morning Herald, reports that
Lynas Corp's controversial processing plant in Malaysia, which
faces closure this September over environmental concerns, was the
subject of a potential class action being pursued by Maurice
Blackburn over delays during its establishment.

The law firm was investigating whether Lynas may have breached the
Corporations Act by "becoming aware of the likelihood of delay but
failing immediately to disclose that to the market" the law firm
said in correspondence in 2016 seen by the Sydney Morning Herald
and The Age.

In 2010, Lynas told investors that the plant would be completed in
the December quarter of 2011. It was not until June 2011 that the
company announced that company conceded there would be delays.

The potential class action was discontinued in April 2016 after
Maurice Blackburn failed to reach an agreement with a litigation
funder "to provide financial assistance for prosecuting claims
against Lynas and indemnification against any adverse costs order
in the event an action were unsuccessful", the law firm said in the
2016 email.

"We do not see any prospect of securing the necessary funding and
will not be able to institute class action proceedings.
Accordingly, we are discontinuing our investigation."

Lynas declined to comment on the matter. Maurice Blackburn
confirmed that it was considering the action but declined to
comment further.

On May 21, Lynas chief executive Amanda Lacaze was due to give an
investor update on its plans to set up a second processing plant in
Western Australia to reduce the sovereign risk the company faces at
its current operation in Malaysia.

While defending itself against what was seen as an opportunistic
$1.5 billion bid by Wesfarmers in April, Lynas emphasised the
intellectual property it developed and its expertise in resolving
"many technical and operational problems in the ramp up phase of
the plant".

The fully operational plant is now imperilled by 450,000 tonnes of
radioactive waste which must be removed from Malaysia in order for
its licence to be renewed in September.

Lynas, and its estranged suitor Wesfarmers, both welcomed comments
in April from Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad that
appeared to give a green light to Lynas continuing its operations
if it agreed to extract the problematic radioactive residue before
the ore was shipped to Malaysia.

While still seeking further clarification from the government on
his comments, it was suggested that the radioactive waste no longer
needs to be exported.

Lynas later revealed plans for expansion in Western Australia that
is now likely to include cracking and leaching operations which
will remove the radioactive elements before shipping it to
Malaysia.

"Our objective in developing these plans is to add to, not replace,
our current operations. We believe this is still an achievable
path," the company said in a letter to investors. [GN]


MADISON REED: Duncan Assertss Violation under Disabilities Act
--------------------------------------------------------------
Madison Reed Color Bar, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Eugene Duncan and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Madison Reed Color Bar, LLC and Madison Reed
Color Bar II, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05187 (S.D. N.Y., June
3, 2019).

Based in San Francisco, Madison Reed is a beauty company
revolutionizing the way women color their hair.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
   The Marks Law Firm PC
   175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
   New York, NY 10014
   Tel: (646) 770-3775
   Fax: (646) 867-2639
   Email: bmarkslaw@gmail.com


MARYLAND STATE EDUC: Akers Appeals Dist. Ct. Ruling to 4th Cir.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Ruth Akers and Sharon Moesel filed an appeal from a
Court ruling in their lawsuit styled Ruth Akers, et al. v. Maryland
State Education Association, et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-01797-RDB, in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland at Baltimore.

The nature of suit is stated as constitutionality of state
statutes.

The appellate case is captioned as Ruth Akers, et al. v. Maryland
State Education Association, et al., Case No. 19-1524, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant RUTH AKERS, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, is represented by:

          Shannon Conway, Esq.
          Talcott J. Franklin, Esq.
          TALCOTT FRANKLIN PC
          1920 McKinney Avenue
          Dallas, TX 75201
          Telephone: (214) 736-8730
          E-mail: sconway@talcottfranklin.com

               - and -

          Jonathan Franklin Mitchell, Esq.
          MITCHELL LAW PLLC
          111 Congress Avenue
          Austin, TX 78701
          Telephone: (512) 686-3940

Plaintiffs-Appellants RUTH AKERS, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, and SHARON MOESEL are represented by:

          Rada Machin, Esq.
          MACHIN LAW FIRM, LLC
          1 Research Court
          Rockville, MD 20850
          Telephone: (301) 731-2000
          E-mail: rada@machinlawfirm.com

Defendants-Appellees MARYLAND STATE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION OF BALTIMORE COUNTY, and NATIONAL EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION are represented by:

          Lubna A. Alam, Esq.
          NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
          Office of General Counsel
          1201 16th Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20036-0000
          Telephone: (202) 833-4000

               - and -

          Leon Dayan, Esq.
          Jacob Karabell, Esq.
          Bruce R. Lerner, Esq.
          John Miller West, Esq.
          BREDHOFF & KAISER, PLLC
          805 15th Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20005-0000
          Telephone: (202) 842-2600
          Facsimile: (202) 842-1888
          E-mail: ldayan@bredhoff.com
                  jkarabell@bredhoff.com
                  blerner@bredhoff.com
                  jwest@bredhoff.com

Defendants-Appellees MARYLAND STATE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION OF BALTIMORE COUNTY, TEACHERS ASSOCIATION OF
ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, INC., and NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION are
represented by:

          Kristy K. Anderson, Esq.
          MARYLAND STATE TEACHER'S ASSOCIATION
          140 Main Street
          Annapolis, MD 21401-2020
          Telephone: (443) 433-3665
          E-mail: kanderson@mseanea.org

               - and -

          Adam Bellotti, Esq.
          GEORGETOWN LAW APPELLATE COURTS IMMERSION CLINIC
          600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20001-0000
          Telephone: (202) 842-2600

Defendant-Appellee BALTIMORE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, as
representative of the class of all school districts in Maryland, is
represented by:

          Margaret-Ann Frances Howie, Esq.
          BALTIMORE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS
          6901 Charles Street
          Towson, MD 21204
          Telephone: (443) 380-4060
          E-mail: mhowie@bcps.org

               - and -

          Edmund J. O'Meally, Esq.
          PESSIN KATZ LAW, P.A.
          901 Dulaney Valley Road
          Towson, MD 21204-0000
          Telephone: (410) 339-6757
          E-mail: eomeally@pklaw.com

Defendants-Appellees LARRY HOGAN, in his official capacity as
governor of Maryland; BRIAN E. FROSH, in his official capacity as
Attorney General of Maryland; ELIZABETH MOLINA MORGAN, each in
their official capacities as members of the Maryland Public School
Labor Relations Board; ROBERT I. CHANIN, each in their official
capacities as members of the Maryland Public School Labor Relations
Board; JOHN A. HAYDEN, III, each in their official capacities as
members of the Maryland Public School Labor Relations Board; DONALD
W. HARMON, each in their official capacities as members of the
Maryland Public School Labor Relations Board; and RONALD S. BOOZER,
each in their official capacities as members of the Maryland Public
School Labor Relations Board, are represented by:

          Ryan Robert Dietrich, Esq.
          Adam Dean Snyder, Esq.
          OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND
          200 St. Paul Place
          Baltimore, MD 21202
          Telephone: (410) 576-7648
          E-mail: ryandietrichesq@gmail.com
                  asnyder@oag.state.md.us


MASTERCARD INC: Buddle Findlay Attorneys Discuss Court Ruling
-------------------------------------------------------------
Scott Barker, Esq., Seb Bisley, Esq., Willie Palmer, Esq., Susan
Rowe, Esq., David Broadmore, Esq., Kelly Paterson, Esq., Bridgette
White, Esq., Peter Niven, Esq., Anita Birkinshaw, Esq., Bridie
McKinnon, Esq., Oliver Gascoigne, Esq., and Olly Peers, Esq., of
Buddle Findlay, in an article for Lexology, report that in a
landmark decision, the UK Court of Appeal has recently overturned
the Competition Appeal Tribunal's decision refusing certification
in MasterCard's £14 billion collective action claim: Merricks v
MasterCard Inc [2019] EWCA Civ 674.  The claim by Walter Merricks,
a former Financial Services Ombudsman, seeks damages arising from
Mastercard's alleged breach of competition law in respect of the
level of fees charged to retailers for using its cards, which were
allegedly anticompetitive and passed on to end consumers.  The
proposed class is immense: almost all consumers who had made
purchases in the UK over a 16 year period.

The claim was brought under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 which
introduced an opt-out class action regime into English law in 2015
for damages arising from breaches of UK or EU competition law.  The
new regime permits a claimant representative to bring an opt-out
collective action on behalf of a class of individuals.
Importantly, claimants who fall within the defined class (and are
domiciled within the UK) are automatically included in the claim
unless they opt out.  Jurisdiction to hear such cases was given
exclusively to the UK's specialist Competition Appeal Tribunal
(CAT).  The first stage of any such claim is for the Tribunal to
authorise the representative to bring the collective proceeding by
making a collective proceedings order.  The Tribunal must consider
whether the claims raise the 'same, similar or related' issues of
fact or law and are suitable to be brought in collective
proceedings, and whether it is 'just and reasonable' for the
representative to act on behalf of the class.  Once granted, the
substantive claim can proceed.

In 2017, the Tribunal declined the application to certify the
proceedings, accepting Mastercard's arguments that the claims were
not suitable to be brought collectively for two principal reasons:

   -- First, the application provided inadequate data to support
the proposed methodology to calculate the level of overcharge
passed on to consumers

   -- Second, there was no plausible way of calculating the loss
suffered by each individual claimant at the distribution stage.

In relation to the first reason, the Court of Appeal considered
that the Tribunal had set the bar too high in assessing whether the
claim should proceed.  In relation to damages, the Court of Appeal
also clarified that difficulties in assessing individual losses
suffered by each represented person did not preclude the making of
an aggregate award of damages in collective proceedings.  The Court
proceeds at the certification stage, as in Canada, on the basis
that a calculation of the level of pass-on to the class as a whole
will be a common issue for all individual claimants.  On that
approach it satisfies the test of commonality of issue necessary
for certification.

The case is to be remitted to the CAT for certification to be
considered again.  However, it is understood that Mastercard is
considering appealing to the Supreme Court. [GN]


MBJ CAFETERIA: Garcia Seeks Unpaid Overtime Compensation
--------------------------------------------------------
RAUL GARCIA, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
the Plaintiff, vs. MBJ CAFETERIA CORP., MBJ LIC CORP., MBJ SOUTH
INC., JOAQUIN VASQUES, MICHAEL GELLER, RICHARD HALEM, and CHANTEY
WHITE, the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-03225 (E.D.N.Y., May 30,
2019), seeks to recover unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated
damages, prejudgment and post-judgment interest; and attorneys'
fees and costs pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New
York Labor Law.

The Plaintiff was employed by Defendants to work as a non-exempt
cook, food preparer/kitchen helper, porter/cleaner, stock person,
and food delivery person for MBJ. The Defendants knowingly and
willfully failed to pay Plaintiff his lawfully earned overtime
compensation in direct contravention of the FLSA and New York Labor
Law, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Justin Cilenti, Esq.
          Peter H. Cooper, Esq.
          CILENTI & COOPER, PLLC
          10 Grand Central
          155 East 44th Street- 6 1 h Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 209-3933
          Facsimile: (212) 209-7102
          E-mail: info@jcpclaw.com

MCGEE MOTOR-CARS: Does Not Pay Proper Overtime Wages, Gloss Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
PAT RICK GLOSS; on behalf of himself and all those similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MCGEE MOTOR-CARS, INC.; MCGEE BIJICK CMC,
INC.; ROBERT M. MCGEE, JR., individually; ROBERT M. MCGEE, SR.,
individually; JAMES V. MCKAY, JR., individually, Defendants, Case
No. 19-1566 (Mass. Commonwealth, June 3, 2019) is a complaint on
behalf of Plaintiff and all other individuals whom Defendants
employed as sales employees and were not paid proper
compensations.

The Defendants had a company-wide policy to pay Plaintiff and their
other similarly situated sales employees at the Dealerships a
weekly base salary plus commissions and other forms of incentive
pay. Plaintiff and Defendants' other similarly situated sales
employees at the Dealerships received their full salary during any
week in which they performed any work, regardless of the days or
number of hours that they worked. At no point did Defendants, or
any agent of Defendants, ever inform Plaintiff or their other
similarly situated sales employees at the Dealerships, in writing
or otherwise, that Defendants would pay them overtime wages using a
fluctuating work week method of calculation to determine the amount
of overtime compensation that they were entitled to receive for
hours that they worked in excess of 40 or on Sundays during one or
more workweeks, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendants from October 2017 until June
2018 as an inside salesman in Charlton, Massachusetts.

McGee Motorcars, Inc. operates a chain of automobile dealerships
known as "The McGee Family of Dealerships".[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Brook S. Lane, Esq.
     Stephen Churchill, Esq.
     FAIR WORK, P.C.
     192 South Street, Suite 450
     Boston, MA 02111
     Phone: 617-607-3260
     Email: brook@fairworklaw.com
            steve@fairworklaw.com


MDL 2325: Endo Continues to Defend Vaginal Mesh-Related Suits
-------------------------------------------------------------
Endo International plc said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the company continues
to defend vaginal mesh-related suits.

Since 2008, the company and certain of its subsidiaries, including
American Medical Systems Holdings, Inc. (subsequently converted to
Astora Women's Health Holding LLC and merged into Astora Women's
Health LLC and referred to herein as AMS) and/or Astora, have been
named as defendants in multiple lawsuits in various state and
federal courts in the U.S. (including a federal multidistrict
litigation (MDL) pending in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia (MDL No. 2325)), and in Canada
and other countries, alleging personal injury resulting from the
use of transvaginal surgical mesh products designed to treat pelvic
organ prolapse (POP) and stress urinary incontinence (SUI).

In January 2018, a representative proceeding (class action) was
filed in the Federal Court of Australia against American Medical
Systems, LLC. In the various class action and individual
complaints, plaintiffs claim a variety of personal injuries,
including chronic pain, incontinence, inability to control bowel
function and permanent deformities, and seek compensatory and
punitive damages, where available.

The company and certain plaintiffs' counsel representing
mesh-related product liability claimants have entered into various
Master Settlement Agreements (MSAs) and other agreements to resolve
up to approximately 71,000 filed and unfiled mesh claims handled or
controlled by the participating counsel.

These MSAs and other agreements were entered into at various times
between June 2013 and the present, were solely by way of compromise
and settlement and were not in any way an admission of liability or
fault by us or any of our subsidiaries.

All MSAs are subject to a process that includes guidelines and
procedures for administering the settlements and the release of
funds. In certain cases, the MSAs provide for the creation of
qualified settlement funds (QSFs) into which funds may be deposited
pursuant to certain schedules set forth in those agreements. All
MSAs have participation requirements regarding the claims
represented by each law firm party to the MSA.

In addition, one agreement gives us a unilateral right of approval
regarding which claims may be eligible to participate under that
settlement. To the extent fewer claims than are authorized under an
agreement participate, the total settlement payment under that
agreement will be reduced by an agreed-upon amount for each such
non-participating claim. Funds deposited in QSFs are considered
restricted cash and/or restricted cash equivalents.

Distribution of funds to any individual claimant is conditioned
upon the receipt of documentation substantiating the validity of
the claim, a full release and dismissal of the entire action or
claim as to all AMS parties and affiliates. Prior to receiving
funds, an individual claimant is required to represent and warrant
that liens, assignment rights or other claims identified in the
claims administration process have been or will be satisfied by the
individual claimant.

Confidentiality provisions apply to the amount of settlement awards
to participating claimants, the claims evaluation process and
procedures used in conjunction with award distributions, and the
negotiations leading to the settlements.

In June 2017, the MDL court entered a case management order which,
among other things, requires plaintiffs in newly-filed MDL cases to
provide expert disclosures on specific causation within 120 days of
filing a claim (the Order). Under the Order, a plaintiff's failure
to meet the foregoing deadline may be grounds for the entry of
judgment against such plaintiff. In July 2017, a similar order was
entered in Minnesota state court.

In June 2018, at the request of the MDL court, the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation entered a minute order suspending the
transfer of cases into the MDL. Subsequently, the MDL court issued
a pretrial order discontinuing the direct filing of claims in MDL
No. 2325. The MDL court also issued similar orders in other MDLs
involving claims against other mesh manufacturers.

Endo said, "Although the Company believes it has appropriately
estimated the probable total amount of loss associated with all
mesh-related matters as of the date of this report, fact and expert
discovery is ongoing in certain cases that have not settled, and it
is reasonably possible that further claims may be filed or asserted
and that adjustments to our liability accrual may be required. This
could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows."

Endo International plc manufactures and sells generic and branded
pharmaceuticals in the United States, Canada, and internationally.
The company was founded in 1920 and is headquartered in Dublin,
Ireland.


MDL 2836: Plaintiffs Seek to Amend Complaint in Zetia(R) Litig.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Endo International plc said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the direct purchaser
plaintiffs in the class action suit related to Zetia(R), filed a
motion seeking leave of court to file an amended consolidated class
complaint adding PPI as a defendant in the direct purchaser
actions.

Beginning in February 2018, several alleged indirect purchasers
filed proposed class actions against the company's subsidiary Par
Pharmaceutical, Inc. (PPI) and others alleging a conspiracy to
delay generic competition and monopolize the market for Zetia(R)
(ezetimibe) and its generic equivalents. The complaints generally
asserted claims under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, various
state antitrust and consumer protection statutes and state common
law and seek injunctive relief, damages, treble damages, attorneys'
fees and costs.

In June 2018, these and other cases, including proposed direct
purchaser class actions in which PPI was not named as a defendant,
were consolidated and/or coordinated for pretrial proceedings in a
federal MDL pending in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia (MDL No. 2836).

In May 2019, the direct purchaser plaintiffs filed a motion seeking
leave of court to file an amended consolidated class complaint
adding PPI as a defendant in the direct purchaser actions.

Endo International plc manufactures and sells generic and branded
pharmaceuticals in the United States, Canada, and internationally.
The company was founded in 1920 and is headquartered in Dublin,
Ireland.


MEDEQUITIES REALTY: Bushansky Suit over Merger Deal Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------
MedEquities Realty Trust, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the company continues
to defend a class action suit entitled, Bushansky v. MedEquities
Realty Trust, Inc., et al.

On January 2, 2019, the Company entered into an Agreement and Plan
of Merger (as amended, the "Merger Agreement") with Omega
Healthcare Investors, Inc. ("Omega"). Pursuant to the terms of the
Merger Agreement, the Company will merge with and into Omega, with
Omega continuing as the surviving company in the merger.

On March 17, 2019, a purported stockholder of MedEquities filed a
class action lawsuit against MedEquities and the MedEquities Board
in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee, entitled Bushansky v. MedEquities Realty Trust, Inc., et
al., Case 3:19-cv-00231.

The complaint alleges, among other things, that MedEquities and the
MedEquities Board violated Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act by
making materially incomplete and misleading statements in, and/or
omitting certain information that is material to stockholders from,
the Form S-4.

The complaint seeks, among other things, an injunction preventing
the consummation of the merger and, in the event the merger is
consummated, rescission of the merger or damages, plus attorneys'
fees and costs.

MedEquities Realty Trust, Inc. operates as a real estate investment
trust. The Company focuses on investment in a diversified mix of
healthcare properties and healthcare related real estate debt
investments. MedEquities Realty Trust owns, develops, operates,
leases, and disposes healthcare properties and portfolios. The
company is based in Nashville, Tennessee.


MEDEQUITIES REALTY: Continues to Defend Russell Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
MedEquities Realty Trust, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the company is
defending against a class action suit entitled, Russell v.
MedEquities Realty Trust, Inc., et al.

On March 29, 2019, a purported stockholder of MedEquities filed a
class action lawsuit against MedEquities and the MedEquities Board
in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Maryland, entitled
Russell v. MedEquities Realty Trust, Inc., et al., Case No.
C-03-CV-19-000721.

The complaint alleges, among other things, that MedEquities and the
MedEquities Board breached their fiduciary duties by: (i) failing
to fulfill their fiduciary oversight function; (ii) authorizing the
filing of a materially incomplete and misleading proxy
statement/prospectus; and (iii) authorizing in the company's
Amended and Restated Bylaws the enactment of an exclusive venue
designation whereby the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland
is the sole and exclusive forum for certain litigation against the
company, or if that court does not have jurisdiction, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland, Baltimore Division
(the "Exclusive Venue Bylaw").

The complaint seeks, among other things, an injunction preventing
the special meeting of MedEquities stockholders to vote on the
transaction and, in the event the transaction is implemented,
rescission of the transaction or damages, a declaration that the
Exclusive Venue Bylaw is invalid, an injunction preventing the
enforcement of the Exclusive Venue Bylaw, and attorneys' fees and
costs.

MedEquities Realty Trust, Inc. operates as a real estate investment
trust. The Company focuses on investment in a diversified mix of
healthcare properties and healthcare related real estate debt
investments. MedEquities Realty Trust owns, develops, operates,
leases, and disposes healthcare properties and portfolios. The
company is based in Nashville, Tennessee.


MEDEQUITIES REALTY: Scarantino Class Suit Underway in Baltimore
---------------------------------------------------------------
MedEquities Realty Trust, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the company continues
to defend a class action suit entitled, Scarantino v. McRoberts et
al.

On January 2, 2019, the Company entered into an Agreement and Plan
of Merger (as amended, the "Merger Agreement") with Omega
Healthcare Investors, Inc. ("Omega"). Pursuant to the terms of the
Merger Agreement, the Company will merge with and into Omega, with
Omega continuing as the surviving company in the merger.

On February 22, 2019, a purported stockholder of the Company filed
a derivative and class action lawsuit against the Company, its
board of directors and Omega in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City, entitled Scarantino v. McRoberts et al.

The complaint alleges, among other things, violations of fiduciary
duties by the Company's board of directors in connection with its
approval of the Company's proposed merger with Omega and the
omission from the Form S-4 of certain information that is material
to stockholders.

The complaint seeks, among other things, an injunction preventing
the parties from filing an amendment to the Form S-4, an injunction
preventing the consummation of the merger and, in the event the
merger is consummated, rescission of the merger or damages, plus
attorneys' fees and costs.

MedEquities Realty Trust, Inc. operates as a real estate investment
trust. The Company focuses on investment in a diversified mix of
healthcare properties and healthcare related real estate debt
investments. MedEquities Realty Trust owns, develops, operates,
leases, and disposes healthcare properties and portfolios. The
company is based in Nashville, Tennessee.


MEDLEY OPPORTUNITY: 3rd Cir. Appeal Filed in Williams RICO Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Mark Curry, Brian McGowan and Vincent Ney filed an
appeal from a Court ruling in the lawsuit entitled Christina
Williams, et al. v. Medley Opportunity Fund II, LP, et al., Case
No. 2-18-cv-02747, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on April 26, 2019, the
Plaintiffs allege claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, and various other claims arising out of the
alleged payday lending activities of American Web Loan.

The appellate case is captioned as Christina Williams, et al. v.
Medley Opportunity Fund II, LP, et al., Case No. 19-2082, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees CHRISTINA WILLIAMS and MICHAEL STERMEL, On
Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, are
represented by:

          Michael J. Quirk, Esq.
          BEREZOFSKY LAW GROUP
          40 West Evergreen Avenue, Suite 104
          Philadelphia, PA 19118
          Telephone: (856) 667-0500
          E-mail: mquirk@eblawllc.com

               - and -

          Matthew W.H. Wessler, Esq.
          GUPTA WESSLER
          1900 L Street, N.W., Suite 312
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 888-1741
          E-mail: matt@guptawessler.com

Defendant-Appellee MEDLEY OPPORTUNITY FUND II, LP, is represented
by:

          Michael R. Hackett, Esq.
          PROSKAUER ROSE LLP
          One International Place
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (617) 526-9723
          E-mail: mhackett@proskauer.com

               - and -

          Christopher E. Ondeck, Esq.
          PROSKAUER ROSE LLP
          1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
          Suite 600 South
          Washington, DC 20004
          Telephone: (202) 416-5865
          E-mail: condeck@proskauer.com

Defendant-Appellant MARK CURRY is represented by:

          Ellen C. Brotman, Esq.
          BROTMANLAW
          One South Broad Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19107
          Telephone: (215) 609-3247
          E-mail: ebrotman@ellenbrotmanlaw.com

               - and -

          Craig D. Singer, Esq.
          WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP
          725 12th Street, N.W.
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 434-5000
          E-mail: csinger@wc.com

Defendants-Appellants BRIAN MCGOWAN and VINCENT NEY are represented
by:

          Jonathan P. Boughrum, Esq.
          David F. Herman, Esq.
          Richard L. Scheff, Esq.
          ARMSTRONG TEASDALE LLP
          One Commerce Square
          2005 Market Street, 29th Floor
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (267) 780-2012
          E-mail: jboughrum@armstrongteasdale.com
                  dherman@armstrongteasdale.com
                  rlscheff@armstrongteasdale.com

Defendant-Appellee RED STONE INC., As Successor In Interest to
MacFarlane Group Inc., is represented by:

          Tamara S. Grimm, Esq.
          O'HAGAN MEYER
          100 North 18th Street
          Two Logan Square, Suite 700
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (267) 386-4353
          E-mail: TGrimm@ohaganlaw.com

               - and -

          Charles K. Seyfarth, Esq.
          O'HAGAN MEYER
          411 East Franklin Street, Suite 500
          Richmond, VA 23219
          Telephone: (804) 403-7137
          E-mail: cseyfarth@ohaganmeyer.com


MEGA ENERGY: Moore Sues Over Intrusive Telemarketing Practices
--------------------------------------------------------------
GEORGE MOORE, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. MEGA ENERGY, LP, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-03703
(N.D. Ill., June 3, 2019) brought this action to enforce the
consumer- privacy provisions of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act ("TCPA"), a federal statute enacted in 1991 in response to
widespread public outrage about the proliferation of intrusive,
nuisance telemarketing practices.

The Defendant made repeated, nonconsensual autodialed and
prerecorded-voice telemarketing calls to the cellular telephone
numbers of Plaintiff and others to promote its residential energy
services in violation of the TCPA. The calls were also made to some
individuals despite their phone number's presence on the National
Do Not Call Registry, such as Plaintiff. Plaintiff never consented
to receive the calls. The Defendant also made telemarketing calls
to individuals in the absence of any "do not call" policy or
training, as well as to individuals who previously indicated that
they no longer wanted to be contacted, says the complaint.

Plaintiff George Moore is a resident of Illinois in this District.

Mega Energy provides energy services to residents in the State of
Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Alexander H. Burke, Esq.
     Daniel J. Marovitch, Esq.
     BURKE LAW OFFICES, LLC
     155 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 9020
     Chicago, IL 60601
     Phone: (312) 729-5288
     Email: aburke@burkelawllc.com
            dmarovitch@burkelawllc.com

          - and -

     Anthony I. Paronich, Esq.
     PARONICH LAW, P.C.
     350 Lincoln Street, Suite 2400
     Hingham, MA 02043
     Phone: (617) 485-0018
     Email: anthony@paronichlaw.com


MERCEDES BENZ: Faces Class Action Over Defective Wood Trim
----------------------------------------------------------
A new class action lawsuit out of Georgia alleges that Mercedes
Benz USA, LLC and Daimler AG knowingly sold hundreds of thousands
of Mercedes E-Series with a defective wood trim that becomes
discolored and fades when exposed to sunlight. The suit claims
Mercedes knew about problems with the walnut wood trim as early as
2009 but instead of addressing the defects, allegedly told
dealerships to hide the problem. Attorneys from Heninger Garrison
Davis, LLC's class action group filed the class action complaint on
behalf of Plaintiff Teri Callen.

Callen purchased a 2014 Mercedes-Benz E350 with 11,000 miles that
came with a Mercedes certified pre-owned warranty as well as the
remaining standard warranty. The car was equipped with the burl
walnut wood trim and a mechanic first pointed out the fading to
Callen in November of 2018. The burl walnut wood trim was located
on the center console, each door, and the dashboard and had become
faded, discolored and cloudy in appearance. When Callen contacted
the Mercedes dealer, she was allegedly told that the pre-owned
warranty did not cover the trim. Callen says that Mercedes refused
to replace the walnut trim in her Mercedes even though they had
issued multiple technical service bulletins describing the
identical problem with the burl walnut wood trim. Plaintiff further
alleges that dealers charge between $3000 to $5000 to replace the
wood trim.

In 2010, Mercedes issued the first technical service bulletin
L168.10-P-505 to dealers that addressed the discoloration and
fading of the burl wood trim. The bulletin warned dealers and
technicians about the wood trim fading from "inadequate UV (ultra
violet) ray protection." The suit also alleges that rather than
replacing the trim, Mercedes instructed technicians to remove the
the SRS (airbag) label as well as any other label or protection
material from the wood panel to an area on the instrument panel or
lower control panel so that the fading would be less obvious.
Several subsequent versions of the second Technical Service
Bulletins were issued by Mercedes and stated all 2010-2016 E-Series
vehicles were affected with the fading and discoloration issues of
the burl walnut trim. Plaintiff Callen says Mercedes refused to
replace the walnut trim even though the automaker issued technical
service bulletins about identical fading and discoloration
problems.

The Mercedes burl walnut wood trim lawsuit was filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta
Division - Teri Callen, et al., v. Daimler AG and Mercedes-Benz
USA, LLC.

Heninger Garrison Davis, LLC, is a national law firm and our
attorneys defend valuable rights for our clients. To determine if
you should file suit, consult one of our qualified lawyers as soon
as possible to understand your options.  We do not charge any fees
upfront. In fact, we will only charge attorney's fees if we obtain
a financial settlement for you. If you do not win, we get nothing.
Call us today for your free case evaluation:

         Jim McDonough, Esq.
         Tel: (404) 996-0869
         Email: jmcdonough@hgdlawfirm.com

No representation is made that the quality of the legal services to
be performed is greater than the quality of legal services
performed by other lawyers. [GN]


MONSANTO CO: Bayer Vows to Appeal $2-Bil. Roundup Verdict
---------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Bronstad, writing for Law.com, reports that $2,055,206,172.
That's how much an Oakland, California, jury on May 13 awarded an
elderly couple who claimed Roundup caused both of them to get
non-Hodgkin lymphoma.

It's the third, and largest, verdict against Monsanto Co., now
owned by Bayer AG, over its herbicide. Here's my Q&A with Brent
Wisner (Baum Hedlund), who lead the trial team for plaintiffs Alva
and Alberta Pilliod.

Bayer vowed to appeal, despite mounting pressure to settle more
than 13,000 lawsuits over Roundup. Monsanto faces several more
trials, the first of which is Aug. 19 in Missouri.

Here's a round-up of thoughts on the verdict:

Jean Eggen (Widener University Delaware Law School): "This case,
the Pilliod case, will directly impact the other cases as they go
to trial. Plaintiffs' attorneys, I'm sure, will be looking very
closely at what the plaintiffs' attorneys did in this case, and
strengthen their cases along the lines of what appealed to the jury
and the judge."

Carl Tobias (University of Richmond School of Law): "The critical
question is when Bayer realizes that its strategy for trying the
cases is not working and/or it loses enough cases with big verdicts
that it seriously considers settlement. Now it seems to be doubling
down on the strategy that EPA and hundreds of studies can't be
wrong and appealing the punitive damage awards, which judges are
likely to lower in light of SCOTUS guidance on punitive damages."

Micah Dortch (Potts Law Firm): "This outcome should make Monsanto
realize the seriousness of these claims and how a jury perceives
the evidence. The company has got to come to the table with a
viable plan to resolve these cases, or the losses are going to
mount." [GN]


MONSANTO COMPANY: Brunton Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-------------------------------------------------------------
Randy Brunton, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant,
Case No. 4:19-cv-01533 (E.D. Mo., May 31, 2019), seeks to recover
damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result
of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection
with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging,
promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or
sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active
ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Kirk J. Goza, Esq.
          GOZA & HONNOLD LLC
          9500 Nall Ave. Suite 400
          Overland Park, KS 66207
          Telephone: (913) 451-3433
          Facsimile: (913) 839-0567
          E-mail: kgoza@gohonlaw.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Ruth Estate Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ESTATE OF JOHN GEORGE RUTH, by and through his representative David
Ruth, and DAVID RUTH, surviving spouse of John George Ruth on
behalf of all legal heirs of John George Ruth, the Plaintiff, v.
MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-01536 (E.D. Mo.,
May 31, 2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff,
as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. John George
Ruth's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Kirk J. Goza, Esq.
          GOZA & HONNOLD LLC
          9500 Nall Ave. Suite 400
          Overland Park, KS 66207
          Telephone: (913) 451-3433
          Facsimile: (913) 839-0567
          E-mail: kgoza@gohonlaw.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Schuetz Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-------------------------------------------------------------
JEROME BERNARD SCHUETZ, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the
Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-00365-JES-UAM (S.D. Fla., May 31,
2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a
direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Andrew T. Kagan, Esq.
          Elizabeth P. Kagan, Esq.
          KAGAN LEGAL GROUP
          295 Palmas Inn Way, Suite 6 Palmanova Plaza
          Humacao, PR 00791
          Telephone: (939) 220-2424
          Facsimile: (939) 220-2477
          E-mail: andrew@kaganlegalgroup.com
                  liz@kagan-law.com

               - and -

          Jennifer A. Moore, Esq.
          MOORE LAW GROUP, PLLC
          1473 South 4th Street
          Louisville, KY 40208
          Telephone: (502) 717-4080
          Facsimile: (502) 717-4086
          E-mail: jennifer@moorelawgroup.com

MOWI: Beacon Fisheries Files Price-Fixing Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
IntrasFish reports that Beacon Fisheries is the latest US firm to
file a lawsuit in ongoing price-fixing case.

Florida foodservice distributor Beacon Fisheries is the latest
company to file a class-action lawsuit against Norwegian salmon
giants Mowi, Grieg Seafood, Leroy and SalMar. [GN]


MUELLER WATER: Schall Law Firm Invites Investors to Join Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
announces the filing of a class action lawsuit against Mueller
Water Products, Inc. (NYSE: MWA) for violations of §§10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.

Investors who purchased the Company's shares between May 9, 2016,
and August 6, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period"), are encouraged
to contact the firm before June 10, 2019.

We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall, or Sherin Mahdavian,
of the Schall Law Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los
Angeles, CA 90067, at 424-303-1964, to discuss your rights free of
charge. You can also reach us through the firm's website at
www.schallfirm.com, or by email at brian@schallfirm.com.

The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. Mueller lacked the ability to adequately
test its product quality. Some products contained radio components
prone to early failure. Based on this quality defect, the Company
was likely to suffer from increased costs such as warranty costs.
These costs were likely to impact Mueller's financial performance.
At the same time, the Company failed to maintain proper internal
controls on warranty estimates and costs. Based on these facts, the
Company's public statements were false and materially misleading
throughout the class period. When the market learned the truth
about Mueller, investors suffered damages.

Join the case to recover your losses.

Contact:

         Brian Schall, Esq.
         Sherin Mahdavian, Esq.
         The Schall Law Firm
         1880 Century Park East
         Suite 404, Los Angeles
         CA 90067
         Phone:
         Office: 310-301-3335
         Cell: 424-303-1964
         Website: www.schallfirm.com
         Email: info@schallfirm.com
                brian@schallfirm.com [GN]


NABRIVA THERAPEUTICS: Pomerantz Files Securities Fraud Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP announces that a class action lawsuit has been filed
against Nabriva Therapeutics plc (NBRV) and certain of its
officers. The class action, filed in United States District Court,
for the Southern District of New York, and indexed under
19-cv-04713, is on behalf of a class consisting of all persons and
entities who purchased or otherwise acquired Nabriva securities
between November 1, 2018 and April 30, 2019, inclusive (the "Class
Period"). Plaintiff pursues claims against the Defendants under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act").

If you are a shareholder who purchased Nabriva securities during
the class period, you have until July 8, 2019, to ask the Court to
appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the class. A copy of the
Complaint can be obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com. To discuss this
action, contact Robert S. Willoughby at rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or
888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who
inquire by e-mail are encouraged to include their mailing address,
telephone number, and the number of shares purchased.

Nabriva is a biopharmaceutical company that purports to develop
novel anti-infective agents to treat serious infections. One of the
Company's product candidates is CONTEPO, an epoxide antibiotic
developed by Zavante Therapeutics ("Zavante"), which the Company
acquired in July 2018.

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operational and compliance policies.
Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) the Company's manufacturers
failed to meet good manufacturing practices; (ii) these
manufacturers would be subject to inspections by the FDA in
connection with the Company's NDA; (iii) as a result of the
manufacturing deficiencies, the Company's NDA for CONTEPO was
unlikely to be approved by the FDA; and (iv) as a result of the
foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects, were materially misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

On April 30, 2019, the Company revealed that the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") would not approve its New Drug Application
("NDA") for CONTEPO due to "issues related to facility inspections
and manufacturing deficiencies at one of Nabriva's contract
manufacturers."

On this news, the Company's share price fell $0.82 per share, or
over 27%, to close at $2.17 per share on May 1, 2019, on unusually
high trading volume.

Contact:

         Robert S. Willoughby, Esq.
         Pomerantz LLP
         Phone: 888-476-6529 ext. 9980
         Website: www.pomerantzlaw.com
         Email: rswilloughby@pomlaw.com [GN]


NCAA: Kelly Sues Over Disregard for Student-Athletes' Safety
------------------------------------------------------------
Corey Kelley, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-03623 (S.D. Ind., June 3, 2019) seeks
to obtain redress for injuries sustained a result of Defendant's
reckless disregard for the health and safety of generations of
University of Central Missouri (formerly known as Central Missouri
State University) ("UCM") student-athletes.

Despite knowing for decades of a vast body of scientific research
describing the danger of traumatic brain injuries ("TBIs") like
those Plaintiff experienced, Defendant failed to implement adequate
procedures to protect Plaintiff and other UCM football players from
the long-term dangers associated with them. They did so knowingly
and for profit, says the complaint.

As a direct result of Defendant's acts and omissions, Plaintiff and
countless former UCM football players suffered brain and other
neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA football. As such,
Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in order to vindicate
those players' rights and hold the NCAA accountable.

Plaintiff Corey Kelley is a natural person and citizen of the State
of Texas.

The NCAA is the governing body of collegiate athletics that
oversees twenty-three college sports and over 400,000 students who
participate in intercollegiate athletics, including the football
program at Hampton.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Jeff Raizner, Esq.
     RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
     2402 Dunlavy Street
     Houston, TX 77006
     Phone: 713.554.9099
     Fax: 713.554.9098
     Email: efile@raiznerlaw.com

          - and -

     Jay Edelson, Esq.
     Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
     EDELSON PC
     350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
     Chicago, IL 60654
     Phone: 312.589.6370
     Fax: 312.589.6378
     Email: jedelson@edelson.com
            brichman@edelson.com

          - and -

     Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
     EDELSON PC
     123 Townsend Street, Suite 100
     San Francisco, CA 94107
     Phone: 415.212.9300
     Fax: 415.373.9435
     Email: rbalabanian@edelson.com


NEW ENGLAND FAT LOSS: Gaffin Sues over Telemarketing Calls
----------------------------------------------------------
DAVID GAFFIN and CHRISTIAN LOPEZ on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. NEW ENGLAND FAT LOSS 2,
INC., the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-11215 (D. Mass., May 31,
2019), contends that the Defendant sent automated text message
calls to cellular telephone numbers, including the Plaintiffs,
which is prohibited by the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.  The
calls were also made to some individuals despite their presence on
the National Do Not Call Registry, such as the Plaintiff Gaffin.

The Plaintiffs never consented to receive the calls, which were
placed to them for telemarketing purposes. Because telemarketing
campaigns generally place calls to hundreds of thousands or even
millions of potential customers en masse, the Plaintiffs bring this
action on behalf of a proposed nationwide class of other persons
who received illegal telemarketing calls from or on behalf of
Defendant, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Anthony I. Paronich. Esq.
          PARONICH LAW, P.C.
          350 Lincoln Street, Suite 2400
          Hingham, MA 02043
          Telephone: (508) 221-1510
          E-mail: anthony@paronichlaw.com

               - and -

          Alex M. Washkowitz, Esq.
          Jeremy Cohen, Esq.
          CW LAW GROUP, P.C.
          PO Box 1029
          Durham, NC 27702

NEW SOUTH WALES: Class Action Likely Against Education Dept.
------------------------------------------------------------
Carla Mascarenhas, writing for The Canberra Times, reports that
Margaret had almost finished her final year at Port Macquarie High
School in 1980 when a male teacher began to greet her as she walked
to class.

"He would smile and raise his eyebrows but for the most part I
ignored him."

She said she was already vulnerable because of long-term sexual
harassment and sexual assault at a part-time job that had started
when she was 14.

She used alcohol to "self-medicate" and numb her feelings and when
out socialising with other students one night she said the teacher
approached her while she was heavily intoxicated and initiated
sexual contact.

The teacher later arranged to see her again one night at a rural
hotel where they were less likely to be recognised.

They returned to the teacher's house, where sexual relations
continued while the teacher's wife was at work.

"He kept asking me on several occasions if I had sex with anyone
before so my adult understanding is that he fetishised young
virgins, who he would then discard when he got what he wanted," she
said.

Margaret said shortly after finishing school a second teacher from
the school approached her when she was alone and heavily
intoxicated at a Port Macquarie nightclub.

"At this stage the only reason that I wouldn't have told him to
bugger off was because he was a teacher," she said.

"I felt there was a degree of trust."

The interaction later resulted in sex in a car.

Margaret said the two male teachers took advantage of her
vulnerability.

Margaret's story is not unique with similar claims by other women
spanning 20 years.

A Facebook group called Teacher's Pet Released was started in
relation to Port Macquarie High School and allegations around
teacher-student relations. Up to 42 women have made contact with
the page's administrator to share their stories.

The Facebook page followed a podcast, Teacher's Pet by the
Australian newspaper, around the disappearance of Lynette Dawson.

Lawyer Steve Kerin told the Port News they were "acting on behalf
of a number of mature women, all previous students of Port
Macquarie High School during the years 1970s to 1990s".

"We are investigating, on their behalf, a number of serious
allegations in relation to sexual interference whilst they were
students at the school. The NSW Education Department owe each and
every student a duty of care not to expose them to a risk of harm
which they knew or ought to have known about," Mr Kerin said.

"A breach of that duty of care will give rise to causes of action
upon each of these women.

"The matters are serious and complex and may result in civil
proceedings against the NSW Education Department the scope of which
is yet to be fully established.

"The NSW Education Department cannot deflect people to the police
on the basis of some sort of criminal action when in fact there may
well be breaches of the civil law obligations to their students.

"At this stage there are multiple possible individual actions which
may result in a class action."

There are no criminal proceedings being pursued.

The Port News has spoken to three other women who say they were
targeted, groomed and seduced by male teachers in the 70s and 80s.

All felt the power dynamic of a teacher-student relationship left
them vulnerable to the teachers sexual advances.

Brisbane woman Debra Hood was in the year following Ms Emerton.

She also claims she was targeted and groomed by a male teacher.

The teacher made friends with her family and later gave her keys to
his flat in Port Macquarie.

"Other teachers were aware of this occurring but did nothing to
stop it or intervene, it was like they were working in a pack and
covered up for each other," she said.

"I felt so ashamed and humiliated but I believed somehow that I was
to blame and responsible for his actions," Ms Hood said.

"I finally got the guts to say 'no more' to **** and then watched
with dismay when he began making identical moves on a younger girl
at school.

"Unable to resettle at school and feeling dirty, humiliated and
profoundly sad and depressed I continued wagging all my classes."

Ms Hood said the abuse mapped out her whole life.

"The immediate damage to me as a teen from grooming and sexual
assault by a teacher was the complete and overwhelming loneliness,
isolation and self-hatred," she said.

"From this time, I became very self destructive by self-harming,
suicide attempt leading to hospitalization, severe alcohol abuse
and relationship sabotage due to having very deep issues with trust
and self-worth.

"These behaviours went on for decades until, in a desperate state,
I went to rehab for alcoholism in 2006 and finally received help
and gained some level of understanding.

"I have been 100 per cent sober now for 13 years - always to be a
work in progress in self acceptance and healing."

Another student Cindi told the Port News that as a 15-year-old she
was also targeted by one of her teachers in 1979.

Out socialising with friends she was approached by the teacher who
struck up a conversation.

"He started to get more intimate in his talk and asked me personal
questions leading through to talk about various sexual acts and
what I did and didn't know to do," Cindi said.

"After buying me drinks, despite my instincts talking to me that
something was not right he coerced me into his car.

"We went to his car and as soon as he started kissing me and
touching my breasts I felt sick I told him to stop, I did not want
to do this.

"He grabbed my wrists but I managed to get away from him and back
to my friends.

"The next lesson I had with him at school was horrible. I told him
I couldn't do a task he set for us and in front of the whole class
he mocked me for not doing "a lot of things like I said I would".

Cindi said her life changed from that moment.

Former student Nicole said she felt "lonely, depressed and
emotionally vulnerable" when she was approached by a teacher at a
nightclub on a Friday night in her final year in 1981.

"He showed up in my life as a caring, interested older man giving
me attention that I was so desperate for," Nicole said.

"My step-father was distant, my own father absent and there were no
strong male role models in my life."

He regularly initiated the sexual contact which continued
throughout her final year at school, she said.

"It was sex in his office and sex in his car, on the way home from
school and after being out at night on the weekend where he
supplied me with alcohol. Many of these sexual interactions were
while I was very drunk, and I felt obligated to go along with it
because he told me to -- he was a teacher. It was solely for his
sexual gratification."

One evening when they were out together Nicole noticed he spoke to
another young woman.

"I asked him who she was, and he explained that she was 'last
year's girl' -- that I was not the first of his school girl lovers,
that he took a new one every year."

After the teacher's interest in Nicole dwindled she went down a
path of self-destructive behaviour.

"I started acting out sexually and engaging in one night stands
with strange men who were at the nightclub, many were highly
regarded businessmen in the town.

"I put myself in risky situations and was invited to sex parties
organised by these older men, involving other school girls who were
also sexually exploited. I felt confused and totally lacking any
self-worth.

The Port News has been told a complaint was made against the
alleged perpetrator of Nicole in 1980, a year before she was
targeted and no action was taken.

Nancy Haglund, whose daughter was in her final year at Port
Macquarie High School, was one of two parents who made the
complaint.

A meeting was arranged and she met with two representatives of the
NSW Education Department.

Ms Haglund said she was outraged by the inaction and the
implication that the complaint would ruin the teacher's career.

A spokesperson for the Department of Education told the Port News
the department has a responsibility to ensure that every single
allegation of abuse involving a student or any member of the school
community is fully investigated by police.

"In relation to historical offences, the Department encourages
survivors to contact the NSW Police Force who have the means to
investigate these historical claims with the dignity and respect
these survivors deserve," the Department spokesperson said.

The Department said any past or present student who feels they have
been a victim of abuse, can approach the Department of Education
who will support them in taking their claims to the NSW Police.

Meaghan Cook, principal of Hastings Secondary College Port
Macquarie campus (formerly known as Port Macquarie High School),
supported the Department's stance on allegations of abuse.

"Our campus completely supports the Department Of Education's
statement and is focused on all of our students, past and present.
I would encourage anyone who feels they may have been a victim of
abuse to make use of the Department's extensive support and
services," she said. [GN]


NEWTON, MA: McKay Suit Seeks Proper Wages
-----------------------------------------
MICHAEL MCKAY, JASON PISANO, PERRY CACCIOLA, JR., NORMAN
SEMENTELLI, RICHARD CINCOTTA, ANTHONY DETHOMASIS, LIVIO CENCE,
MICHAEL OVASKA, ROBERT CLER SULLIVAN, CHRISTOPHER CASTO, MICHAEL
ARPINO, and all those similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. CITY OF
NEWTON, Defendant, Case No. 19-1567 (Mass. Commonwealth, June 3,
2019) is a putative Rule 23 class action pursuant to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

According to the complaint, Newton agreed to pay Plaintiffs a
weekly salary for a 40-hour workweek, consisting of the hours
between 7 a.m. and 3 p.m.  Newton also agreed that it would pay
Plaintiffs at least their "straight time" hourly wages for all work
they performed, with their straight time rate to be calculated by
dividing their weekly salary by their 40-hour workweek; and to pay
Plaintiffs 1.5 times their regular hourly rate of pay for all work
they performed in excess of 40 hours of work. Despite this, Newton
still did not pay Plaintiffs for all the hours they worked, says
the complaint.

Plaintiffs were employed by Defendant in the general classification
of "Foreman".

City of Newton is an independent body politic located in Middlesex
County, Commonwealth of Massachusetts.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Daniel W. Rice, Esq.
     Glynn, Landry & Rice, LLP
     25 Braintree Hill Office Park, Suite 408
     Braintree, MA 02184
     Phone: (781) 964-8377
     Email: daniel.rice@glhrlaw.com


OHM SPA: Duncan Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act in New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
OHM Spa LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to the
Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Eugene
Duncan and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. OHM Spa LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-05184  (S.D.
N.Y., June 3, 2019).

OHM Spa LLC is a small, intimate spa focusing primarily on
massages, facials and nail services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
   The Marks Law Firm PC
   175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
   New York, NY 10014
   Tel: (646) 770-3775
   Fax: (646) 867-2639
   Email: bmarkslaw@gmail.com

OLIPHANT FINANCIAL: Frankenreiter's Bid to Certify Class Stayed
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. William E. Duffin stayed further proceedings on the
Plaintiff's motion for class certification in the lawsuit titled
RUDOLPH FRANKENREITER v. OLIPHANT FINANCIAL, LLC, Case No.
2:19-cv-00724-WED (E.D. Wisc.).

On May 14, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a class action complaint.  At
the same time, the Plaintiff filed what the Court commonly refers
to as a "protective" motion for class certification.  In this
motion, the Plaintiff moved to certify the class described in the
complaint but also moved the court to stay further proceedings on
that motion.

In Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2011),
the court suggested that class‐action plaintiffs "move to certify
the class at the same time that they file their complaint."  "The
pendency of that motion protects a putative class from attempts to
buy off the named plaintiffs."  However, because parties are
generally unprepared to proceed with a motion for class
certification at the beginning of a case, the Damasco court
suggested that the parties "ask the district court to delay its
ruling to provide time for additional discovery or investigation."

Accordingly, Judge Duffin granted the Plaintiff's motion to stay
further proceedings on the motion for class certification.  The
parties are relieved from the automatic briefing schedule set forth
in Civil Local Rule 7(b) and (c).  Moreover, for administrative
purposes, Judge Duffin notes that it is necessary that the Clerk
terminate the Plaintiff's motion for class certification.  However,
this motion will be regarded as pending to serve its protective
purpose under Damasco.[CC]


PAPO'S EXPRESS: Umana Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
------------------------------------------------------------
ELMER ERNESTO UMANA, Individually and on Behalf of All Those
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. PAPO'S EXPRESS, INC., PAPO'S
EXPRESS 2, INC., PAPO'S HOLDINGS, LLC, PAPO'S RE HOLDING, LLC,
PAPO'S 2, LLC and JOE STONE, Jointly and Severally, Defendants,
Case No. 1:19-cv-03741 (N.D. Ill. June 4, 2019) seeks to recover
unpaid overtime premium pay owed  pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"), and supporting regulations.

Plaintiff worked 66 hours per week on average. Plaintiff was paid
straight-time for all hours worked, despite working in excess of 40
hours per week throughout his employment, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed as a car wash attendant for Defendants.

Defendants operate a car wash business called Papo's Express,
located at 207 West Rollins Road, Round Lake Beach, Illinois
60073.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Brandon A. Thomas, Esq.
     The Law Offices of Brandon A. Thomas, PC
     1 Glenlake Parkway, N.E., Suite 650
     Atlanta, GA 30328
     Phone: (678) 330-2909
     Fax: (678) 638-6201
     Email: brandon@overtimeclaimslawyer.com


PAYMENT MANAGEMENT: Parthemer Files PI Class Action in California
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit for personal injury has been filed against
Payment Management Services USA, LLC. The case is styled Samuel
Parthemer, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Payment Management Services USA, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-01034-H-NLS (S.D. Cal., June 3, 2019).

Payment Management Services USA, LLC is a human resource consulting
in New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joshua B. Swigart, Esq.
   Hyde & Swigart
   2221 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 101
   San Diego, CA 92108
   Tel: (619) 233-7770
   Fax: (619) 297-1022
   Email: josh@westcoastlitigation.com


PEACE LOVE: Gottlieb Sues over Unwanted Telemarketing Text Messages
-------------------------------------------------------------------
SYDNEE GOTTLIEB, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. PEACE LOVE MED AESTHETIC REJUVENATION,
LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company, the Defendant, Case No.
9:19-cv-80706-XXXX (S.D. Fla., May 30, 2019), alleges that the
Defendant, a medical treatment center and spa specializing in
aesthetic procedures, engages in unsolicited marketing, harming
thousands of consumers to promote its services.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt Defendant's illegal
conduct, which has resulted in the invasion of privacy, harassment,
aggravation, and disruption of the daily life of thousands of
individuals. The Plaintiff also seeks statutory damages on behalf
of herself and members of the class, and any other available legal
or equitable remedies.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Class:

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 1205
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: 305-479-2299
          ashamis@shamisgentile.com
          gberg@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          EDELSBERG LAW, PA
          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          19495 Biscayne Blvd #607
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: 305-975-3320
          E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com

PERRIGO CO: Bid to Dismiss NY Securities Suit Pending
-----------------------------------------------------
Perrigo Company plc said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the defendants' motion
to dismiss the class action suit entitled, In re Perrigo Company
plc Sec. Litigation, is pending.

On January 3, 2019, a shareholder filed a complaint against the
Company, its CEO Murray Kessler, and its CFO Ronald Winowiecki in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
(Masih v. Perrigo Company, et al.).

Plaintiff purports to represent a class of shareholders for the
period November 8, 2018 through December 20, 2018, inclusive.

The complaint alleges violations of Securities Exchange Act section
10(b) (and Rule 10b‑5) against all defendants and section 20(a)
control person liability against the individual defendants.

In general the allegations contend that the Company, in its Form
10‑Q filed November 8, 2018, disclosed information about an
October 31, 2018 audit finding letter received from Irish tax
authorities but failed to disclose enough material information
about that letter until December 20, 2018, when the company filed a
current report on Form 8‑K about Irish tax matters. The plaintiff
does not provide an estimate of class damages.

The Court has selected lead plaintiffs and changed the name of the
case to In re Perrigo Company plc Sec. Litig.

The lead plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on April 12, 2019,
which names the same defendants, asserts the same class period, and
invokes the same Exchange Act sections.

The amended complaint generally repeats the allegations of the
original complaint with a few additional details and adds that the
defendants also failed to timely disclose the Irish tax
authorities' Notice of Amended Assessment received on November 29,
2018. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on May 3, 2019.

Perrigo said, "We intend to defend the lawsuit vigorously."

Perrigo Company plc, a healthcare company, manufactures and
supplies over-the-counter (OTC) healthcare products, infant
formulas, branded OTC products, and generic pharmaceutical
products. The company operates through Consumer Healthcare
Americas, Consumer Healthcare International, and Prescription
Pharmaceuticals segments. Perrigo Company plc was founded in 1887
and is headquartered in Dublin, Ireland.


PERRIGO CO: Drugs Price Fixing-Related Suits Ongoing
----------------------------------------------------
Perrigo Company plc said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the company continues
to defend multiple suits related to alleged price-fixing of drugs.


The company been named as a co-defendant with certain other generic
pharmaceutical manufacturers in a number of class actions alleging
that the company and other manufacturers of the same product
engaged in anti-competitive behavior to fix or raise the prices of
certain drugs and/or allocate customers starting, in some
instances, as early as June 2013.

The class actions were filed on behalf of putative classes of (a)
direct purchasers, (b) end payors, and (c) indirect resellers. The
products in question are Clobetasol gel, Desonide, and Econazole.

The same class plaintiffs have filed complaints naming the company
as a co-defendant, along with 27 other manufacturers, alleging an
overarching conspiracy to fix or raise the prices of 15 generic
prescription pharmaceutical products starting in 2011.

Perrigo manufactures only two of the products at issue, Nystatin
cream and Nystatin ointment.

The company has also been named a co-defendant along with 35 other
manufacturers in a complaint filed by three supermarket chains
alleging that defendants conspired to fix prices of 31 generic
prescription pharmaceutical products starting in 2013. The only
allegations specific to the company relates to Clobetasol,
Desonide, Econazole, and Nystatin.

On August 3, 2018, a large managed care organization filed a
complaint against the company alleging price-fixing and customer
allocation concerning 17 different products among 27 manufacturers
including Perrigo. The only allegations specific to us concern
Clobetasol, Desonide, Econazole, and Nystatin cream/ointment.

Most recently, on January 16, 2019, a similar suit was brought by a
health insurance carrier in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Minnesota alleging a conspiracy to fix prices of 30
products among 30 defendants. The only allegations specific to us
concern Clobetasol, Desonide, Econazole, and Nystatin
cream/ointment.

Certain complaints listed above were amended in December 2017,
January 2018, and April 2019.

All of the above complaints have been consolidated for pretrial
proceedings, along with complaints filed against other companies
alleging price fixing with respect to more than two dozen other
drugs, as part of a case captioned In re Generic Pharmaceuticals
Pricing Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 2724 in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Pursuant to the court's schedule staging various cases in phases,
the company moved to dismiss the complaints relating to Clobetasol
and Econazole. The court issued a decision denying the motions in
part in October 2018 and issued a second decision in February 2019
dismissing various state law claims, but allowing other state law
claims to proceed. The company filed answers to the Clobetasol
complaints on December 31, 2018. The company filed answers to the
Desonide and Econazole complaints on March 15, 2019.

Motions to dismiss certain other complaints listed above were filed
on February 21, 2019. Plaintiffs' oppositions are due on May 2,
2019.

Deposition discovery is currently stayed for all cases, but
documentary discovery is proceeding.

Perrigo said, "At this stage, we cannot reasonably predict the
outcome of the liability, if any, associated with these claims."

Perrigo Company plc, a healthcare company, manufactures and
supplies over-the-counter (OTC) healthcare products, infant
formulas, branded OTC products, and generic pharmaceutical
products. The company operates through Consumer Healthcare
Americas, Consumer Healthcare International, and Prescription
Pharmaceuticals segments. Perrigo Company plc was founded in 1887
and is headquartered in Dublin, Ireland.


PERRIGO CO: Israel Elec. Corp. Employees' Suit Still Stayed
-----------------------------------------------------------
Perrigo Company plc said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the case entitled,
Israel Elec. Corp. Employees' Educ. Fund v. Perrigo Company plc, et
al., is still stayed.

On June 28, 2017, a plaintiff filed a complaint in Tel Aviv
District Court styled Israel Elec. Corp. Employees' Educ. Fund v.
Perrigo Company plc, et al.

The lead plaintiff seeks to represent a class of shareholders who
purchased Perrigo stock on the Tel Aviv exchange during the period
April 24, 2015 through May 3, 2017 and also a claim for those that
owned shares on the final day of the Mylan tender offer (November
13, 2015).

The amended complaint names as defendants the Company, Ernst &
Young LLP ("EY") (the Company's auditor), and 11 current or former
directors and officers of Perrigo (Mses. Judy Brown, Laurie Brlas,
Jacqualyn Fouse, Ellen Hoffing, and Messrs. Joe Papa, Marc Coucke,
Gary Cohen, Michael Jandernoa, Gerald Kunkle, Herman Morris, and
Donal O'Connor).

The complaint alleges violations under U.S. securities laws of
Securities Exchange Act sections 10(b) (and Rule 10b‑5) and 14(e)
against all defendants and 20(a) control person liability against
the 11 individuals or, in the alternative, under Israeli securities
laws.

In general, the allegations concern the actions taken by us and our
former executives to defend against the unsolicited takeover bid by
Mylan in the period from April 21, 2015 through November 13, 2015
and the allegedly inadequate disclosure concerning purported
integration problems related to the Omega acquisition, alleges
incorrect reporting of organic growth at the Company, alleges price
fixing activities with respect to six generic prescription
pharmaceuticals, and alleges improper accounting for the Tysabri(R)
royalty stream.

The plaintiff indicates an initial, preliminary class damages
estimate of 2.7 billion NIS (approximately $760.0 million at 1 NIS
= 0.28 cents). After the other two cases filed in Israel were
voluntarily dismissed, the plaintiff in this case agreed to stay
this case pending the outcome of the Roofers' Pension Fund case in
the United States. The Israeli court approved the stay, and this
case is now stayed.

Perrigo said, "We intend to defend the lawsuit vigorously."

Perrigo Company plc, a healthcare company, manufactures and
supplies over-the-counter (OTC) healthcare products, infant
formulas, branded OTC products, and generic pharmaceutical
products. The company operates through Consumer Healthcare
Americas, Consumer Healthcare International, and Prescription
Pharmaceuticals segments. Perrigo Company plc was founded in 1887
and is headquartered in Dublin, Ireland.


PERRIGO CO: Roofers' Pension Fund Suit Underway
-----------------------------------------------
Perrigo Company plc said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the company continues
to defend the consolidated securities class action suit entitled,
Roofers' Pension Fund v. Papa, et al.

On May 18, 2016, a shareholder filed a securities case against the
company and its former CEO, Joseph Papa, in the U.S. District Court
for the District of New Jersey (Roofers' Pension Fund v. Papa, et
al.).

The plaintiff purported to represent a class of shareholders for
the period from April 21, 2015 through May 11, 2016, inclusive. The
original complaint alleged violations of Securities Exchange Act
sections 10(b) (and Rule 10b‑5) and 14(e) against both defendants
and 20(a) control person liability against Mr. Papa.

In general, the allegations concerned the actions taken by the
company and the former executive to defend against the unsolicited
takeover bid by Mylan in the period from April 21, 2015 through
November 13, 2015. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendants
provided inadequate disclosure concerning alleged integration
problems related to the Omega acquisition in the period from April
21, 2015 through May 11, 2016.

On July 19, 2016, a different shareholder filed a securities class
action against the company and its former CEO, Joseph Papa, also in
the District of New Jersey (Wilson v. Papa, et al.).

The plaintiff purported to represent a class of persons who sold
put options on the company shares between April 21, 2015 and May
11, 2016. In general, the allegations and the claims were the same
as those made in the original complaint filed in the Roofers'
Pension Fund case described above.

On December 8, 2016, the court consolidated the Roofers' Pension
Fund case and the Wilson case under the Roofers' Pension Fund case
number. In February 2017, the court selected the lead plaintiffs
for the consolidated case and the lead counsel to the putative
class. In March 2017, the court entered a scheduling order.

On June 21, 2017, the court-appointed lead plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint that superseded the original complaints in the
Roofers' Pension Fund case and the Wilson case.

In the amended complaint, the lead plaintiffs seek to represent
three classes of shareholders - shareholders who purchased shares
during the period April 21, 2015 through May 3, 2017 on the U.S.
exchanges; shareholders who purchased shares during the same period
on the Tel Aviv exchange; and shareholders who owned shares on
November 12, 2015 and held such stock through at least 8:00 a.m. on
November 13, 2015 (the final day of the Mylan tender offer)
regardless of whether the shareholders tendered their shares.

The amended complaint names as defendants the company and 11
current or former directors and officers of Perrigo (Mses. Judy
Brown, Laurie Brlas, Jacqualyn Fouse, Ellen Hoffing, and Messrs.
Joe Papa, Marc Coucke, Gary Cohen, Michael Jandernoa, Gerald
Kunkle, Herman Morris, and Donal O'Connor).

The amended complaint alleges violations of Securities Exchange Act
sections 10(b) (and Rule 10b‑5) and 14(e) against all defendants
and 20(a) control person liability against the 11 individuals.

In general, the allegations concern the actions taken by the
company and the former executives to defend against the unsolicited
takeover bid by Mylan in the period from April 21, 2015 through
November 13, 2015 and the allegedly inadequate disclosure
throughout the entire class period related to purported integration
problems related to the Omega acquisition, alleges incorrect
reporting of organic growth at the Company and at Omega, alleges
price fixing activities with respect to six generic prescription
pharmaceuticals, and alleges improper accounting for the Tysabri(R)
royalty stream. The amended complaint does not include an estimate
of damages.

During 2017, the defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the
plaintiffs opposed. On July 27, 2018, the court issued an opinion
and order granting the defendants' motions to dismiss in part and
denying the motions to dismiss in part.

The court dismissed without prejudice defendants Laurie Brlas,
Jacqualyn Fouse, Ellen Hoffing, Gary Cohen, Michael Jandernoa,
Gerald Kunkle, Herman Morris, Donal O'Connor, and Marc Coucke.

The court also dismissed without prejudice claims arising from the
Tysabri(R) accounting issue described above and claims alleging
incorrect disclosure of organic growth described above. The
defendants who were not dismissed are Perrigo Company plc, Joe
Papa, and Judy Brown.

The claims that were not dismissed relate to the integration issues
regarding the Omega acquisition and the alleged price fixing
activities with respect to six generic prescription
pharmaceuticals.

The defendants who remain in the case (the Company, Mr. Papa, and
Ms. Brown) have filed answers denying liability, and the discovery
stage of litigation has begun.

Perrigo said, "We intend to defend the lawsuit vigorously."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Perrigo Company plc, a healthcare company, manufactures and
supplies over-the-counter (OTC) healthcare products, infant
formulas, branded OTC products, and generic pharmaceutical
products. The company operates through Consumer Healthcare
Americas, Consumer Healthcare International, and Prescription
Pharmaceuticals segments. Perrigo Company plc was founded in 1887
and is headquartered in Dublin, Ireland.


PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN: Hernandez Files Class Suit in Florida
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Progressive American
Insurance Company. The case is styled as Rolando Hernandez and
Victor Davalos Amaro, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Progressive American Insurance
Company and Progressive Express Insurance Company, Defendants, Case
No. 0:19-cv-61378-FAM (S.D. Fla., June 3, 2019).

The lawsuit arose over Breach of Contract.

Progressive American Insurance Company offers car insurance, home
insurance, renters insurance, condo insurance, insurance bundles,
motorcycle insurance, boat insurance, RV insurance, life insurance,
pet insurance, and commercial insurance. The company was founded in
1937 and is based in Mayfield Village, Ohio. Progressive American
Insurance Company operates as a subsidiary of Drive Insurance
Holdings, Inc.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Andrew John Shamis, Esq.
   14 NE 1st Ave STE 1205
   Miami, FL 33131
   Tel: (404) 797-9696
   Email: ashamis@sflinjuryattorneys.com

      - and -

   Edmund Alonso Normand, Esq.
   Normand PLLC
   3165 McCrory Place, Ste. 175
   Orlando, FL 32803
   Tel: (407) 603-6031
   Email: Ed@ednormand.com

      - and -

   Jacob Lawrence Phillips, Esq.
   Normand PLLC
   3165 McCrory Place, Ste. 175
   Orlando, FL 32803
   Tel: (407) 603-6031
   Email: jacob@ednormand.com

      - and -

   Jonathan Marc Streisfeld, Esq.
   KopelowitzOstrow
   One West Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 500
   Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
   Tel: (954) 525-4100
   Fax: (954) 525-4300
   Email: streisfeld@kolawyers.com

      - and –

   Jordan David Utanski, Esq.
   Edelsberg Law P.A.
   19495 Biscayne Blvd.
   #607
   Aventura, FL 33180
   Tel: (305) 773-6732
   Email: utanski@edelsberglaw.com

      - and –

   Joshua Robert Levine, Esq.
   KopelowitzOstrow Ferguson Weiselberg Gilbert
   1 W. Las Olas Blvd.
   Suite 500
   Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
   Tel: (954) 525-4100
   Fax: (954) 525-4300
   Email: levine@kolawyers.com

      - and –

   Scott Adam Edelsberg, Esq.
   Edelsberg Law PA
   19495 Biscayne Blvd
   607
   Aventura, FL 33180
   Tel: (305) 975-3320
   Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com

      - and –

   Jeffrey Miles Ostrow, Esq.
   KopelowitzOstrow PA
   1 W. Las Olas Blvd.
   Suite 500
   Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301-4216
   Tel: (954) 525-4100
   Fax: (954) 525-4300
   Email: ostrow@kolawyers.com



RAYONIER ADVANCED: City of Warren General Employees Suit Concluded
------------------------------------------------------------------
Rayonier Advanced Materials Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 30, 2019, that the class action suit
initiated by the City of Warren General Employees' Retirement
System has been concluded.

On August 17, 2017, the City of Warren General Employees'
Retirement System filed a putative class action complaint against
the Company, Paul Boynton, its CEO, and Frank Ruperto, its CFO, in
the United States District Court, Middle District of Tennessee,
Nashville Division.

The plaintiffs allege the Company made false statements in filings
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and other
public statements related to certain litigation with Eastman
Chemical, a customer of the Company, in third quarter and fourth
quarter 2015, in violation of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, causing unspecified damages to
stockholders of the Company who purchased stock in the Company
between October 29, 2014 and August 19, 2015.

The applicable Eastman litigation was resolved via settlement in
2015. The Company was served with the complaint on August 28, 2017.
On November 13, 2017, the Court appointed the Michigan
Carpenters’ Pension Fund and Local 295 IBT Employer Group Pension
Trust Fund as lead plaintiff, and a law firm to act as lead
counsel.

On January 10, 2018, the Company and the individual defendants
filed a motion to dismiss the case for improper venue or, in the
alternative, asked the court to transfer it to the U. S. District
Court for the Middle District of Florida. Per the court scheduling
order, the lead plaintiff filed a consolidated amended complaint
(the "CAC") on January 12, 2018. The CAC added Benson Woo, former
CFO of the Company, as an additional defendant.

On June 15, 2018, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District
of Tennessee granted the Company's motion to transfer the case to
the Middle District of Florida, and on July 16, 2018 the Company
filed a motion to dismiss the case.

On March 29, 2019, the Court issued an order of judgment and
dismissal, with prejudice, of the plaintiffs' complaint. Plaintiffs
and their counsel have elected not to appeal the dismissal and this
matter is now concluded.

Rayonier Advanced Materials Inc. operates as a performance fibers
business. The Company produces specialty cellulose fibers using
proprietary cellulose chemistry knowledge and manufacturing
processes. The company is based in Jacksonville, Florida.


RELIANT CAPITAL: Final Approval of Etienne FDCPA Suit Deal Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ESTHER ETIENNE, Plaintiff, v. RELIANT CAPITAL
SOLUTIONS, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 16-CV-2359 (WFK) (JO) (E.D.
N.Y.), Judge William F. Kuntz, II of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of New York denied the Plaintiffs' motions for
certification of a settlement class, final approval of a proposed
class-wide settlement, and an award of attorneys' fees and costs.

Etienne, purporting to act on behalf of a class, brings the action
against the Defendant, alleging violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").  The Plaintiff alleges Reliant,
in seeking to collect a debt it asserted she owed to Touro College,
had sent her a collection letter disclosing the "Total Balance"
Plaintiff owed "As Of" the letter's date.  She alleged the Letter
violated the FDCPA by failing to state explicitly the continuing
accrual of interest of other charges might cause a future increase
in the balance and therefore would lead "any least sophisticated
consumer" to conclude mistakenly the stated balance would remain
the same until paid.

On Dec. 27, 2016, the parties reported they had reached a
settlement in the case on a class-wide basis.  Magistrate Judge
Orenstein granted preliminary approval on July 7, 2017.

In October 2017, the parties filed a joint motion seeking
certification of a settlement class for final approval and a motion
requesting an award of attorneys' fees and costs.  The proposed
settlement included: class settlement fund of $11,500.50,
representing statutory damages of $174.25 for each of 66 class
members; Plaintiff was to receive $1,000 (maximum individual
statutory damages) and $500 in recognition of her services to the
Settlement Class; the Defendant was to pay the Plaintiff's counsel
$14,000 to cover all attorneys' fees and costs; the Defendant would
be released from all possible claims by the Plaintiff and all
claims that any class member who does not opt out could assert
under the FDCPA.

Magistrate Judge Orenstein held a fairness hearing on Oct. 19,
2017, at which no members of the putative class appeared.  The
parties mailed a notice describing the proposed settlement to 66
putative class members, and none responded before the fairness
hearing.  At the hearing, Magistrate Judge Orenstein instructed the
counsel to provide supplemental papers addressing his expressed
concerns regarding the proposed class settlement.  The Plaintiff
filed supplemental briefing on Nov. 2, 2017.

On Sept. 25, 2018, Magistrate Judge Orenstein filed a Report and
Recommendation recommending the Court denies the Plaintiff's
motions in their entirety.  Specifically, he determined the parties
failed to establish: (1) the settlement class was fair, reasonable,
and adequate -- in both procedure and substance -- as required
under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) the
Plaintiffs representation was adequate under Rule 23(a); and (3)
the class form is superior to individual litigation under Rule

Because Magistrate Judge Orenstein recommended denying the motion
to certify a settlement class and approve the proposed settlement,
he also recommended the Court denies as premature the Plaintiff's
motion to award attorneys' fees.  On Oct. 9, 2018, the Plaintiff
filed objections to Magistrate Judge Orenstein's Report and
Recommendation.

In her objections, the Plaintiff argues: (1) the proposed class
settlement is substantively fair; (2) she is an adequate class
representative; and (3) a class action is superior to individual
litigation in this action. Pl.'s Objections.

Judge Kuntz has conducted a de novo review of the relevant portions
of the Report and Recommendations to which the Plaintiff objects
and concludes the objections are without merit.  Magistrate Judge
Orenstein thoroughly considered all factors and determined that
none of the factors, considered individually or together, favor
approval of the proposed class-wide settlement.  Because FDCPA
claims usually settle and do not last long, the parties will likely
resolve this non-complex case quickly and with minimal expense,
despite Plaintiff's arguments to the contrary.  The Judge is
satisfied that the putative class members and the parties are
entering into the instant settlement with sufficient information.
The settlement fund needlessly limits the putative class members'
recovery to a fraction of what they could likely recover,
regardless of whether the litigation proceeded as a class action or
as several individual ones.

Because her interests "materially diverge" from the interests of
the putative class, the Judge holds that the Plaintiff is not an
adequate class representative, and her objections are overruled.
And, the Plaintiff's argument that no other putative class member
filed suit does not establish superiority.

Upon a careful review of Magistrate Judge Orenstein's Report and
Recommendation, and the objections filed thereto, Judge Kuntz
affirmed and adopted the Report and Recommendation in its entirety.
He denied the Plaintiff's motions for approval of class
certification, settlement approval, and attorneys' fees.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 7, 2019 Decision and Order is
available at https://is.gd/kTM0fZ from Leagle.com.

Esther Etienne, as assignee of individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Ari Hillel
Marcus -- Ari@MarcusZelman.com -- Marcus & Zelman LLC & Yitzchak
Zelman -- yzelman@marcuszelman.com -- Marcus Zelman LLC.

Reliant Capital Solutions, LLC, Defendant, represented by Arthur
Sanders -- asanders@bn-lawyers.com --  Barron & Newburger, P.C..


RESCUE SPA: Duncan Alleges Breach of Disabilities Act
-----------------------------------------------------
Rescue Spa New York LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Eugene Duncan, on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Rescue Spa New York LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-05185 (S.D. N.Y., June 3, 2019).

Rescue Spa is a premier day spa destination in New York City.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
   The Marks Law Firm PC
   175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
   New York, NY 10014
   Tel: (646) 770-3775
   Fax: (646) 867-2639
   Email: bmarkslaw@gmail.com


RIO TINTO: Court Dismisses A. Colbert's Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Order granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the
case captioned ANTON COLBERT, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. RIO TINTO PLC, RIO TINTO
LIMITED, THOMAS ALBANESE, and GUY ROBERT ELLIOTT, Defendants. No.
17 Civ. 8169 (AT) (DCF). (S.D.N.Y.).

The Plaintiff brought this putative class action against Defendants
Rio Tinto plc and Rio Tinto Limited (Rio Tinto), Thomas Albanese,
and Guy Robert Elliott (Individual Defendants), alleging violations
of (1) Section 10(b) the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act), 15 U.S.C. Section 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. Section
240.10b-5, against all Defendants; and (2) Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 78t, against the Individual
Defendants.

Section 1658(b)'s Statute of Repose

A private action alleging fraud under the Exchange Act may be
brought not later than the earlier of (1) 2 years after the
discovery of the facts constituting the violation or (2) 5 years
after such violation. Section 1658(b) is not a statute of
limitations, but is instead a statute of repose, which is not a
limitation of a plaintiff's remedy, but rather defines the right
involved in terms of the time allowed to bring suit.

In accordance with Section 1658(b), therefore, the Plaintiff may
only bring suit for alleged violations of the Exchange Act that
occurred on or after October 23, 2012, five years before bringing
his complaint.

Nevertheless, the Plaintiff alleges a number of misstatements and
omissions before October 23, 2012.  The Plaintiff advances two
grounds in support of his argument that these misstatements and
omissions should not be dismissed as a result of Section 1658(b).

First, the Plaintiff argues that, although the statements were made
before October 23, 2012, the Defendants had a duty to correct or
update their statements which continued after October 23, 2012, but
that they failed to do so. This argument is nonsensical. If the
Plaintiff were correct, then Section 1658(b) would be a nullity and
unless and until a misstatement was corrected, the five-year
deadline would not even begin running on the claim.

The Plaintiff's second argument is that the five-year period set by
the statute of repose does not begin with each misrepresentation or
omission, but instead begins with plaintiff class members'
class-period purchases of the Company's securities in reliance on
the asserted false statement. Because this action is brought on
behalf of investors who purchased Rio Tinto securities between
October 23, 2012 and March 15, 2013.

The Plaintiff argues that Section 1658(b) does not bar his suit. In
support of this proposition, the Plaintiff cites Arnold v. KPMG
LLP, in which the Second Circuit stated that the statute of repose
for securities law claims starts to run on the date the parties
have committed themselves to complete the purchase or sale
transaction. 334 F. App'x 349, 351 (2d Cir. 2009).  Since Arnold,
however, the Second Circuit has dismissed a complaint that failed
to allege that the defendants made any misrepresentations within
five years of the filing of the complaint.
  
The Court, therefore, dismisses all claims predicated on
misrepresentations or omissions that occurred before October 23,
2012.

Statements Made After October 23, 2012

Count One of the complaint is brought against all the Defendants
for violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
Section 78j(b), and Rule 10b-Section, 17 C.F.R. Section 240.10b-5.


To state a claim for relief under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
plaintiffs must allege that defendants (1) made misstatements or
omissions of material fact (2) with scienter (3) in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities (4) upon which plaintiffs relied
and (5) that plaintiffs' reliance was the proximate cause of their
injury.

In their opening brief, the Defendants argue for the dismissal of
all alleged misstatements or omissions in the complaint. In his
opposition brief, however, the Plaintiff opposes the dismissal of
only four statements made on or after October 23, 2012. The
Plaintiff has, therefore, abandoned his claims with respect to
other statements made on or after October 23, 2012.

The Plaintiff opposes dismissal of claims predicated on the
following four statements made after October 23, 2012: (1) the
statement in Rio Tinto's November 2, 2012 Form 6-K that during the
past quarter, production at the Benga mine in the Moatize Basin in
Mozambique continued to ramp up and that work is progressing to
expand capacity on the Sena railway line, which remains the system
bottleneck, without disclosing the adverse developments at RTCM (2)
the use of a slide titled Our presence in Africa is growing at a
November 6-8, 2012 Metal Bulletin African Iron Ore Conference  that
identified RTCM as a Rio Tinto project  (3) Albanese's answer at a
November 2012 conference to an investor's question about barging
and (4) Rio Tinto's filing of a Form 8-A on February 5, 2013 to
raise $3 billion in notes pursuant to an amended prospectus filed
on March 16, 2012, that in turn incorporated the 2011 Annual
Report.

The Court dismisses the claim premised on the first and second
statements for failure to allege scienter, the claim premised on
the third statement for failure to allege falsity, and the claim
premised on the fourth statement for failure to allege both falsity
and materiality.

November 2012 Form 6-K and Metal Bulletin African Iron Ore
Conference

Pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
the Plaintiff must state with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state
of mind, which is to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.

The requisite scienter can be established by alleging facts to show
either (1) that defendants had the motive and opportunity to commit
fraud or (2) strong circumstantial evidence of conscious
misbehavior or recklessness. In order for scienter to be imputed to
a corporation, Plaintiff must allege that an agent of the
corporation committed a culpable act with the requisite scienter.

With respect to the statement in Rio Tinto's November 2012 Form
6-K, the Plaintiff argues that the Defendants were aware by
November of 2012 that there was no longer any profitable way for
[Rio Tinto] to exploit the mine, which renders statements in the
Form 6-K reckless at the least.

With respect to the statement at the November 2012 conference, the
Plaintiff argues that the complaint sets out ample basis for the
Court to draw the inference that the statement regarding growth
was, minimally, reckless given that Rio Tinto's executive
management was aware at the time that growth of RTCM was
permanently stymied by the inability to cheaply transport coal from
the mine. Both of these arguments fall far short of alleging that
an agent of the corporation committed a culpable act with the
requisite scienter. Indeed, Plaintiff does not allege the
Individual Defendants' involvement with these statements at all, or
the involvement of anyone else who could have possessed the
requisite scienter.  

The Section 10(b) claims predicated on these statements are
dismissed.

Albanese's November 2012 Statement About Barging

The third statement which the Plaintiff argues violated Section
10(b) was Albanese's response to an investor's question about
barging in November 2012. An investor stated, in the past,
certainly in Riversdale and then subsequently, you have talked
about barging coal down the Zambezi River and then asked, Is that
still on the agenda or has that been given up on?

Albanese responded, "I think that what we would need to look at
would be all the transportation options, but realistically
continued upgrades of the Beira line and then looking at a
transportation corridor of probably the highest probability, a sort
of pathway for expansions, but again I think we need to keep in
mind that any of the options should always be looked at, at
different times."

The Plaintiff argues that this was misleading because Albanese was
being asked about one specific option, the option that was
essential to the success of the operation, but discussed other
transportation options in his answer. The Court disagrees. In
context, Albanese did not mislead the investor into thinking that
barging was a practical or realistic option at that point, and
instead discussed rail transportation, which was still under
consideration.

The Plaintiff has not adequately alleged the falsity of this
statement, and his Section 10(b) claim predicated on it is
dismissed.

February 2013 Form 8-A

The only remaining allegation is that Rio Tinto filed a Form 8-A on
February 5, 2013 to raise $3 billion in notes pursuant to an
amended prospectus filed on March 16, 2012, that in turn
incorporated the 2011 Annual Report and its approximately $3.7
billion valuation of RTCM.  As a preliminary matter, the Court
finds that Plaintiff has not alleged that the approximately $3.7
billion valuation of RTCM in the 2011 Annual Report was false when
made for the reasons set forth in the SEC Opinion.

Moreover, here, the Plaintiff alleges that the statement
incorporating the allegedly false valuation was made in February
2013 weeks after Rio Tinto announced that it expected to impair
RTCM's value by approximately $3 billion in its 2012 annual
results. Therefore, even if the incorporation of the $3.7 billion
valuation was a misrepresentation, it was immaterial.
  
The Plaintiff's claim predicated on this statement is dismissed.

Section 20(a) Claims

Count Two is brought against the Individual Defendants for
violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. Pursuant to
Section 20(a), every person who, directly or indirectly, controls
any person liable under any provision of the Exchange Act shall
also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as
such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person
is liable, with an exception not relevant here.  

Where a plaintiff fails to state a claim under Section 10(b),
however, its Section 20(a) claim must also fail for want of a
primary violation. Accordingly, because Plaintiff has not
adequately alleged a claim under Section 10(b), his Section 20(a)
claim is DISMISSED.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yyungkzt from Leagle.com.

Anton Colbert, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Lead Plaintiff, represented by Reed R. Kathrein --
reed@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice.

Rio Tinto PLC, Defendant, represented by Lawrence Jay Zweifach --
lzweifach@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, Alexander
W. Mooney -- amooney@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP,
Avi Weitzman -- aweitzman@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher, LLP, Jennifer Laurie Conn -- jconn@gibsondunn.com --
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, Kellam Conover --
kconover@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Mark Adam
Kirsch -- mkirsch@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP &
Richard W. Grime -- rgrime@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP.

Rio Tinto Limited, Defendant, represented by Lawrence Jay Zweifach,
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, Alexander W. Mooney, Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, Avi Weitzman, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, Jennifer
Laurie Conn, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, Kellam Conover, Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher LLP & Mark Adam Kirsch, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher,
LLP.

Thomas Albanese, Defendant, represented by David Ronald Woodcock --
dwoodcock@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, Kristen Allyssa Lejnieks --
kalejnieks@jonesday.com --  Jones Day & Peter J. Romatowski  --
pjromatowski@jonesday.com -- Jones Day.


SAGINAW, MI: "Chalking" Class Action Remanded to District Court
---------------------------------------------------------------
New Jersey Law Journal reports that In Taylor v. City of Saginaw,
the Sixth Circuit held that the common parking enforcement practice
known as "chalking" was unconstitutional and required a search
warrant to be effectuated. It remanded the matter to the district
court where the plaintiff was seeking a class action to obtain
refunds for other "chalkees."

Saginaw parking enforcement officers chalked the tires of parked
vehicles to determine how long they had been parked; the area did
not have parking meters to enforce time limits. A citation was then
issued if the officer returned after the posted time for parking
had passed and the incriminating chalk mark was still present,
indicating the vehicle had not moved and over-utilized the allotted
time. Alison Taylor had received 15 such parking tickets for
exceeding the two-hour limit from the same officer, with an initial
fine of $15. She sued the city and the officer, under 42 U.S.C.
Sec., 1983, claiming that the chalking violated her Fourth
Amendment right of freedom from unreasonable search because she had
not consented and the city had not obtained a valid search warrant.
The district court granted the city's motion, finding that although
there was a search, it was reasonable because there is a lesser
expectation of privacy in automobiles and the search was subject to
the community caretaker exception. The Sixth Circuit, however,
found this procedure was a regulatory exercise as opposed to a
community-caretaking function, and reversed.

The Sixth Circuit first found that the chalking does constitute a
search under the Fourth Amendment. It found that under Katz v.
United States, a search occurs when a government official invades a
zone in which "a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable
expectation of privacy." The court also held that under United
States v. Jones, a case where agents had installed a GPS tracking
device on the undercarriage of a vehicle to track its movements,
Justice Scalia had emphasized that the Katz standard, focusing on
reasonable expectation of privacy, had "been added to, not
substituted for, the common-law trespassory test." According to
Scalia, the government physically intruded into private property by
installing the GPS for the purpose of obtaining information, and
the action would have been a "search" at the time when the Fourth
Amendment had been adopted.

Applying Jones to the facts, the Sixth Circuit asked whether the
chalking represented a common-law trespass upon a constitutionally
protected area. Relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, it
found that it did. It then proceeded to the next question: Was
there an attempt to obtain information? Although low-tech in
nature, it held the chalking was an investigative technique used to
provide information as to whether a parked vehicle exceeded the
allotted time.

The court then turned to reasonableness and found that the marking
was not. It held that although there is "reduced expectation [] of
privacy" due to "ready mobility," as set forth in California v.
Carney, the search of Taylor's vehicle was not reasonable as there
was no "probable cause to believe that the vehicle contain[ed]
evidence of a crime." When the vehicle was chalked, it was
presumably parked legally.

The court rejected the city's community caretaker exception
defense, finding that a warrant is not necessary only if a "delay
is reasonably likely to result in injury or ongoing harm to the
community at large." This exception is applied narrowly and only
where public safety is at risk. In Taylor, the city could not prove
any relation to public safety as the vehicle was not creating a
"hazard," and delaying the search would not harm the community. The
purpose of targeting legally parked cars was for raising revenue
and not to protect the public. Maintenance of an efficient and
orderly parking system is important, but it must be conducted
constitutionally. There might be other factors that would justify a
warrantless search of a lawfully parked vehicle, but the Sixth
Circuit insisted that the record did not sustain such conclusion.

Taylor takes the trespass rationale of the Jones majority and
applies it to a trivial case. The car is in plain view on a public
street. Using modern technology, a parking enforcement officer
could exercise the same surveillance by time-stamped electronic
photo. A tablet could be programmed to ticket by comparing two
photos of the same vehicle in the same space. For that matter, the
officer could use the old-fashioned device of writing license plate
numbers in a notebook. Those methods would generate the same
parking tickets without the technical trespass of chalk on the
tire. The real issue is not search but scrutiny—when is the
government allowed to systematically collect, record and retain
openly available information about someone not known to have
violated any law to retain as evidence in case they violate it in
the future. Traditional Fourth Amendment concepts based on property
law and analogies to it do not address the permissible threshold of
scrutiny. The combination of cheap electronic memory, search and
retrieval, video recording, and image recognition is making
universal surveillance of public spaces possible, and the right to
be lost and forgotten in the crowd will not depend on chalk. [GN]


SCRIPPS HEALTH: Hasson Sues Over Unpaid Compensation
----------------------------------------------------
WAEL HASSON, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SCRIPPS HEALTH, a California corporation;
and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
37-2019-00028603-CU-OE-CTL (Cal. Super. Ct., San Diego Cty., June
4, 2019) is an action on behalf of Plaintiff and all other
"Supervising Nurses" who were classified as exempt employees of
Defendants who worked in California at any time during the four
years preceding the filing of this action through the time the time
of trial ("Class Period").

Plaintiff and each Plaintiff Class Member were misclassified as
exempt employees, although they were covered under one or more
Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) Wage Orders. The Defendants'
misclassification of proposed class members as exempt resulted in
non-payment of overtime compensation, meal periods not provided,
rest periods not authorized, all timely wages not paid at
separation, and inaccurate itemized wage statements, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as a "Supervising Nurse" from
about 2012 through January 2019 at their hospital located in San
Diego, California.

Scripps is a private, nonprofit, integrated health system in San
Diego, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Isam C. Khoury, Esq.
     Jeff Geraci, Esq.
     COHELAN KHOURY & SINGER
     605 C Street, Suite 200
     San Diego, CA 92101
     Phone: (619) 595-3001
     Facsimile: (619) 595-3000
     Email: ikhoury@ckslaw.com
            jgeraci@ckslaw.com

          - and -

     Gary D. Garcia, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF GARY D. GARCIA
     3333 Midway Drive, Suite 208
     San Diego, CA 92110
     Phone: (619) 795-6580
     Facsimile: (619) 795-6582
     Email: gdgarcia619@gmail.com


SOLANTIC CORP: Wood Atter Files Suit Over Medical Record Fees
-------------------------------------------------------------
WOOD, ATTER & WOLF, P.A., on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SOLANTIC CORPORATION d/b/a
CARESPOT EXPRESS HEALTHCARE, a Delaware Company, Defendant, Case
No. 3:19-cv-00665-MMH-PDB filed in the 4th Judicial Circuit Court
of Florida, Duval County, on June 5, 2019, is a class action
challenging the business practices of CARESPOT, a medical services
and records company, in uniformly charging and collecting from
Plaintiff and the Class unlawful amounts for electronically stored
medical records in violation of the HITECH ACT.

In 2009, Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
to help stimulate the ailing economy. The Reinvestment Act included
a section known as the Health Information Technology for Economic
and Clinical Health Act ("HITECH ACT"). The HITECH Act was intended
to reduce the costs of sharing and obtaining medical records for
both patients and medical care providers. In 2016, the United
States Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") was asked to
provide guidance on copy charges for medical records under the
HITECH Act.

HHS determined and advised all covered entities and their business
associates that the maximum they can charge to provide an
electronic copy of all their medical records (regardless of number
of pages or size of the file) is $6.50 (inclusive of all labor,
supplies, and postage), unless the covered entities individually
track and calculate the actual allowable costs to fulfill each
request; or develop a schedule of costs based on average allowable
costs (labor, supplies, postage) to fulfill standard requests. In
other words, if a covered entity does not individually track and
calculate its actual or average costs for producing electronic
records, the lightest amount it can charge is $6.50.

CARESPOT does not keep records of its actual or average (by
developing a schedule) costs associated with producing electronic
copies of medical records. Therefore, pursuant to the 2016 HHS
opinion and the HITECH Act, the most CARESPOT can charge
individuals is $6.50. Instead of following this guideline, CARESPOT
uniformly, routinely, and systematically charges amounts in excess
of $6.50, in violation of the HITECH Act which constitutes
violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act
(FDUTPA), and the Florida Consumer Collections Practice Act
(FCCPA), says the complaint.

Plaintiff, WOOD, ATTER & WOLF, P.A., is a Florida Professional
Association doing business in Duval County, Florida.

SOLANTIC CORPORATION d/b/a CARESPOT EXPRESS HEALTHCARE provides
urgent care medical services and billing throughout the United
States, with multiple locations in Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Brian W. Warwick, Esq.
     Janet R. Varnell, Esq.
     Varnell & Warwick, P.A.
     P.O. Box 1870
     Lady Lake, FL 32158
     Phone: (352) 753-8600
     Email: bwarwick@varnellandwarwick.com
            jvarnell@varnellandwarwick.com
            kstroly@varnellandwarwick.com

          - and -

     William J. Scott, Esq.
     The Law Office of William J. Scott, P.A.
     2716 Herschel Street
     Jacksonville, FL 32205
     Phone: (904) 398-9995
     Facsimile: (904) 358-4007
     Email: wjscott.service@wjscottlaw.com


SPRINT CORPORATION: Solomon Files Securities Class Action in NY
----------------------------------------------------------------
ISAAC SOLOMON, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. SPRINT CORPORATION, MICHEL COMBES, and
ANDREW DAVIES, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05272 (S.D. N.Y., June
5, 2019) is a federal securities class action on behalf of all
investors who purchased or otherwise acquired Defendant Sprint
Corporation securities between January 31, 2019 and April 16, 2019,
inclusive (the "Class Period"). This action is brought on behalf of
the Class for violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

During the Class Period, and unbeknownst to investors, Sprint
misled investors by highlighting that it had 309,000 total postpaid
net additions, a widely-watched metric by Wall Street analysts,
while failing to disclose that these additions were not new
customers, but instead driven by free lines offered to Sprint
customers and the inclusion of less valuable tablet and other
non-phone devices, as well as pre- to post-paid migrations that do
not represent new Sprint customers, says the complaint.

Plaintiff purchased Sprint securities at artificially inflated
prices during the Class Period.

Sprint is a communications company offering a comprehensive range
of wireless and wireline communications products and services that
are designed to meet the needs of individual consumers, businesses,
government subscribers and resellers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
     J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
     Jonathan Lindenfeld, Esq.
     POMERANTZ LLP
     600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
     New York, NY 10016
     Phone: (212) 661-1100
     Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
     Email: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
            ahood@pomlaw.com
            jlindenfeld@pomlaw.com

          - and -

     Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
     POMERANTZ LLP
     10 South La Salle Street, Suite 3505
     Chicago, IL 60603
     Phone: (312) 377-1181
     Facsimile: (312) 377-1184
     Email: pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com


SS BODY ARMOR: Court Affirms $34.9MM Securities Suit Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Delaware
issued a Memorandum Opinion affirming the Settlement Agreement and
Cohen Fee Award in the appeals cases captioned D. DAVID COHEN,
Appellant, v. SS BODY ARMOR I, INC., et al., Appellee, CARTER
LEDYARD & MILBURN LLP, Appellant, v. SS BODY ARMOR I, INC., et al.,
Appellee. Civ. Nos. 15-633-MN, 15-1154-MN, 18-349-MN, 18-634-MN (D.
Del.).

Before the Court are related appeals of D. David Cohen (Cohen) and
the law firm of Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP (CLM and together with
Cohen, Appellants) from several related decisions entered in the
Chapter 11 case of post-confirmation debtor S.S. Body Armor I, Inc.
f/k/aPoint Blank Solutions, Inc. f/k/a DHB Industries, Inc.
(Debtor). Cohen, a Point Blank shareholder, has appealed the
Bankruptcy Court's July 9, 2015 Order (B.D.I. 3109) (Settlement
Order) approving the settlement agreement (Settlement Agreement)
underlying the Debtor's confirmed plan (Plan).

Cohen has also appealed the Bankruptcy Court's December 3, 2015
Orders (i) granting Cohen a fee award for his work in preserving a
claim under section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX),to be paid
in the event that funds are received on account of the SOX Section
304 Claim, and in an amount to be determined by the Bankruptcy
Court (B.D.I. 3624) (Cohen Fee Order) (Civ. No. 15-1154-MN), and
(ii) approving the payment of fees to counsel appointed in a
consolidated derivative action against certain of the Company's
officers and directors in the amount of $300,000 (B.D.I. 3623)
(Derivative Counsel Fee Order) (Fee Appeals).

In the fall of 2005, DHB Industries, Inc.'s (DHB) stock plummeted
following revelations that the body armor manufactured by the
company contained an inferior material prone to rapid
deterioration. Numerous derivative and class action lawsuits were
subsequently filed against DHB and its former officers and
directors, including Brooks.

In January 2006, prior to the commencement of the Chapter 11 cases,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York (EDNY Court) consolidated the derivative and class actions as
follows: (1) a consolidated securities class action filed on behalf
of purchasers of Point Blank's publicly traded securities against
Point Blank and certain of its officers and directors, including
Brooks, In re DHB Industries, Inc. Class Action Litigation, Civ.
No. 05-4296 (JS) (Class Action); and (2) a consolidated derivative
action filed on behalf of Point Blank against certain of its
officers and directors, including Brooks, for (among other things)
breach of fiduciary duty, gross mismanagement, and waste of
corporate assets, In re DHB Industries, Inc. Derivative
Litigation,Civ. No. 05-4345 (JS) (Derivative Action).

In 2006, the parties to the Class Action and Derivative Action
entered into a settlement (EDNY Stipulation). The monetary terms of
the EDNY Stipulation were as follows: the Class Action would be
settled for $34,900,000 in cash, plus 3,184,713 shares of Point
Blank common stock; and the Derivative Action would be settled
through Point Blank's adoption of certain corporate governance
policies and a payment of $300,000 for the fees and expenses of
counsel appointed in the Derivative Action (Derivative Counsel).
The cash portions of the settlements, in the total combined amount
of $35,200,000, were placed in escrow with Class Counsel in 2006
(Escrowed Funds).  

Cohen Fee Order

Cohen and CLM's joint application sought the immediate payment of
$1.86 million (Fee Claim) on account of their work in the
Derivative Action. Appellants claimed to have incurred actual fees
and expenses of $1,509,213.42 ($1,388,556.66 of fees and
$120,656.76 of expenses). In support of the Fee Claim, Appellants
cited a litany of common fund cases awarding fees and expenses to
successful objectors in class action settlements.

Debtor objected to the Fee Claim (B.D.I. 3367) on multiple bases.
Debtor argued that the common fund theory was inapplicable because
the $186 million asset Appellants claimed to have preserved is a
litigation claim controlled exclusively by the SEC, the pursuit of
which was uncertain and may never generate funds for the estate.

According to Debtor, it was firmly established under case law that,
to recover fees from a common fund, an attorney must first create a
common fund, and until there is an actual recovery on the basis of
the SOX Section 304 Claim, fees cannot be awarded on that basis.

Following a November 10, 2015 hearing on the Fee Claim, the
Bankruptcy Court found that:

Mr. Cohen and his counsel are entitled to a fee based on their
preservation of the Sarbanes-Oxley claim of approximately $186
million. However, since no funds have been received by the debtors
in connection with that claim, I am not going to determine at this
time the proper amount of that claim or order that the claim be
paid. If and when the debtors receive funds that are derived from a
Sarbanes-Oxley award, I will entertain an application at that time
for a fee. And the only issue will be the proper amount of that
fee.

The Bankruptcy Court entered a corresponding order that provided:

Cohen and CLM are awarded a fee for their efforts in preserving the
SOX 304 Claim, in an amount to be determined by this Court, with
such award to be paid solely from funds received by the Debtors or
their successors-in-interest on account of the SOX 304 Claim, if
any. For the avoidance of doubt, if the Debtors do not receive any
funds on account of the SOX 304 Claim, no fee shall be payable.

Settlement Order

Cohen's remaining arguments on appeal of the Settlement Order
challenge the Bankruptcy Court's rulings on Cohen's application for
payment of his attorneys' fees (addressed below in section III.B)
and Cohen's objections to fees paid to the counterparties to the
Settlement Agreement or their counsel.

According to Debtor, Cohen seeks to unravel the Settlement
Agreement (and thus the Plan it funded), not because Cohen
challenges the merits of the Settlement Agreement or the
outstanding result it allowed Point Blank to achieve, but because
Cohen is dissatisfied with his inability to immediately recover
attorneys' fees to which he believes he is entitled.  

Cohen Fee Order

Based on the status of the SEC Action, which was stayed at the
time, Appellant sought payment of fees incurred in the Derivative
Action under various theories.

The Appellants argued that they were entitled to an award under
class action cases awarding fees from a common fund.  

The Appellants further directed the Bankruptcy Court to cases in
which objectors were awarded a fee in class action cases,
regardless of the settlement achieved, based on non-economic
benefits.  Appellants argued in the alternative that fees should be
awarded as a substantial contribution under the Bankruptcy Code.  

The transcript reflects the Bankruptcy Court's finding that Mr.
Cohen and his counsel are entitled to a fee award based on their
preservation of the Sarbanes-Oxley claim of approximately $186
million. However, since no funds have been received by the debtors
in connection with that claim, the Court will not going to
determine at this time the proper amount of that claim or order
that the claim be paid. If and when the debtors receive funds that
are derived from a Sarbanes-Oxley award, the Court will entertain
an application at that time for a fee. And the only issue would be
the proper amount of that fee.

Underlying these appeals is (i) Appellants' contention that the
language of the Cohen Fee Order is inconsistent with case law
requiring a common fund and limits the relief available to
Appellants; and (ii) Appellees' contention that Appellants are
entitled to no Fee Award because Appellants' efforts have not
created or contributed, in any amount, to  a common fund.

As set forth below, the Court disagrees with both contentions and
finds no error or abuse of discretion in the Bankruptcy Court's
careful decisions to date.

Common Fund Cases

The Fee Claim sought an award of legal fees based on the common
fund doctrine, which is applicable in class actions. In a common
fund suit, attorneys' fees come out of the amount of damages
awarded to the class.  However, Appellants' successful appeal was
with respect to the pre-petition non-monetary settlement in the
Derivative Action.

In assessing attorneys' fees, courts typically employ either the
percentage of recovery method or the lodestar method. In the
lodestar method, the court multiplies the number of hours that lead
counsel reasonably worked by the reasonable hourly rate for that
work to determine the counsel's lodestar, which may be multiplied
by a factor intended to compensate the attorneys for the risks they
faced and any other special circumstances.

The second method, now dominant in common fund cases, is the
percentage-of-recovery approach. Under this method, counsel are
awarded a fee that is a percentage of the class's total recovery.
In making that determination, the court applies the seven-factor
test set out in Gunter: (1) the size of the fund created and the
number of persons benefitted (2) the presence or absence of
substantial objections by members of the class to the settlement
terms and/or fees requested by counsel (3) the skill and efficacy
of the attorneys involved (4) the complexity and duration of the
litigation (5) the risk of non-payment (6) the amount of time
devoted to the case by plaintiff's counsel; and (7) the awards in
similar cases.

Common Fund Requirement and Contingency

The Cohen Fee Order provides that Appellants were awarded a fee
award for their efforts in preserving the SOX Section 304 Claim to
be paid solely from funds received by the Debtors or their
successors-in-interest on account of the SOX 304 claim.

The Appellants argue on appeal that the Bankruptcy Court erred in
(1) granting the Cohen Fee Order on a contingent basis and (2) only
in the event that the SOX Section 304 Claim itself creates a common
fund.

The Appellants argue that the Bankruptcy Court made payment of
Cohen's fee award contingent because it believed Cohen's efforts
did not create a common fund and that this is not the law relating
to compensation of objectors as objectors do not need to create a
common fund.

First, the Appellants certainly relied on common fund cases in
support of their Fee Claim (B66-60-62) and continue to assert that
a common fund has been created by virtue of their efforts in
appealing the EDNY Stipulation and preserving the SOX Section 304
Claim. Setting aside Appellants' own assertions, while the term
common fund is mentioned in transcripts, the Cohen Fee Order does
not require that Appellants create a common fund solely from the
outcome of the SOX Section 304 Claim or use any language that would
foreclose relief under the circumstances of the Global Settlement.

In the transcript of the November 10, 2015 hearing on the Fee Claim
and Plan Confirmation, the Bankruptcy Court discusses the SOX
Section 304 Claim and indicates that whatever fee award is allowed
to Appellants, it will be paid out of that fund:

Mr. Cohen and his counsel are entitled to a fee based on their
preservation of the Sarbanes-Oxley claim of approximately $186
million. However, since no funds have been received by the debtors
in connection with that claim, the Court said it is not going to
determine at this time the proper amount of that claim or order
that the claim be paid. If and when the debtors receive funds that
are derived from a Sarbanes-Oxley award, the Court will entertain
an application at that time for a fee. And the only issue would be
the proper amount of that fee.

And in considering Appellants' request for a $25 million fee
reserve, the Bankruptcy Court considered whether to set a reserve
to ensure there are funds available to pay CLM or the Court to
ultimately determine that a common fund has been created. The
Bankruptcy Court was clear, however, that its ruling did not
consider whether a common fund has been created or not, nor did it
consider whatever that award should be in the event that a common
fund has been created.

The Court finds no basis for Appellants' contention that the
Bankruptcy Court required Appellants to create a common fund solely
from the SOX Section 304 Claim. The Bankruptcy Court has merely
required that some funds be received on account of or derived from,
or attributable to the SOX Section 304 Claim.  

Nor did the Bankruptcy Court abuse its discretion in granting the
Cohen Fee Order on a contingent basis; rather, the Bankruptcy
Court's ruling is consistent with Third Circuit guidance on fee
requests, including whether the award is appropriate based on the
circumstances of the case. The Cohen Fee Order was entered in
bankruptcy proceedings and at a time when it was unclear whether
the SEC would even bring the SOX Section 304 Claim, let alone
whether there would be a recovery.

The SOX Section 304 Claim was stayed for years pending the outcome
of other litigation. A determination of the appropriate amount of
the Cohen Fee Award could not be made by the Bankruptcy Court in a
vacuum, where any recovery on the SOX Section 304 Claim was
ultimately speculative, as Appellants conceded.  The Court finds no
abuse of discretion in the Bankruptcy Court's determination to
award fees on a contingent basis, essentially reserving judgment on
the amount of the award, if any, until the outcome of the SEC
Action was known.

Awards to Objectors

The Appellants further argue that the Bankruptcy Court was wrong to
rely on cases that deal with awards to lead counsel, not to
objectors. Appellants argue that the Second Circuit and Third
Circuit have each recognized the important role that objectors play
by giving courts access to information on the settlement's merits.


The Appellants argue that a contingent award of fees was contrary
to the law in this circuit and the Second Circuit. the Appellants
argue that objectors to derivative and class actions are entitled
to fee awards where their objections improve the settlement or
otherwise serve the public interest, thus the Bankruptcy Court's
decision to enter the Cohen Fee Order on a contingent basis cannot
stand. Appellants argue that there is no doubt that CLM's efforts
improved the settlement: if they had not, the Second Circuit would
have affirmed the judgment approving the settlement in 2010.
Conversely, Debtor argues that, unlike this case, in each of the
percentage-of-recovery cases cited by Appellants, the objector
contributed to an identifiable increase in the settlement and was
awarded a percentage of that increase.20

The Court agrees that none of these cases relied upon by Appellants
is analogous to the case at bar. The cases cited by Appellants do
not concern awards made in the context of a global bankruptcy
settlement like the Settlement Agreement at issue here. These
cases, while instructive, do not have direct application under
these circumstances, where the amount of the Global Settlement that
may be derived from the SOX Section 304 Claim has not been
determined. Unlike those cases, the settlement funds here are the
restrained assets, which are  and always were subject to valid
competing claims, including those of the Debtor, Class Plaintiffs,
Brooks' family members, and the SEC, pending in multiple
jurisdictions.

The Court finds no abuse of discretion in the Bankruptcy Court's
determination that a percentage-of-recovery award to Appellants, as
successful objectors, could not be awarded at this stage of the
proceedings and under these circumstances.

Substantial Contribution Award

Finally, Appellants argue that the Bankruptcy Court erred in
failing to award payment of Appellants' fees and expenses on the
basis of their substantial contribution to the Debtor's estate
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 503(b).  

Section 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in relevant part,
for the allowance as an administrative expense of reasonable
compensation for attorneys for a creditor or an equity security
holder in making a substantial contribution in a case under chapter
9 or 11 of this title.

Cohen argues that he provided a substantial contribution to the
estate and its creditors by objecting to, and appealing the
approval of, the EDNY Stipulation, and that his work was supported
by evidence of the legal fees and expenses he incurred over seven
years.

According to Cohen, his efforts unquestionably preserved a $186
million asset or, viewed another way, eliminated a $186 million
liability for the Debtor and the Debtor has admitted that Cohen's
appeal resulted in "substantial benefits to the estate by
preventing the EDNY Stipulation from becoming effective.

Thus, Cohen argues, the Bankruptcy Court erred in not granting the
Fee Claim on this alternative basis. Conversely, Debtor argues that
Cohen was not entitled to a substantial contribution award because
under the statute, the expenses must be incurred in a case under
chapter 11.

The Court agrees with the Debtor.

Here, the expenses Cohen argues made a substantial contribution
were incurred prosecuting an appeal that was commenced in July
2008, over a year and a half before the bankruptcy cases were
commenced. Oral argument in the appeal was held on January 15,
2010, four months before the April 14, 2010 petition date. The fees
Cohen incurred were for services that were, on their face, designed
primarily to serve Cohen's own interests and which, accordingly,
would have been undertaken absent an expectation of reimbursement
from the estate.

The Court's conclusion is supported by Lebron, Lebron v. Mechem
Fin. Inc., 27 F.3d 937 (3d Cir. 1994). In that case, a former
officer and director, James Scott, suspecting fraudulent activity,
undertook litigation to appoint a custodian, obtain an accounting
of assets, and obtain an injunction against transfers of trust
funds. Three days after Scott obtained an order compelling
disclosures, the company filed a chapter 11 petition.  

Scott immediately filed a motion for appointment of a trustee,
which was granted, and gave the trustee all of the information that
he had gathered. The bankruptcy court found that this information
contributed to the trustee's report of investigation filed promptly
with the Court on April 24, 1990 identifying various assets and
summarizing the history of questionable financial transactions
between Mechem and Copple and affiliates and corporations under
Copple's control. The bankruptcy court included in its substantial
contribution award certain pre-petition fees that it found were
critical to the immediate determination to appoint a trustee.
Scott's earlier litigation efforts, however, were not reimbursable.


Lebron is clearly analogous. The Court finds no error in the
Bankruptcy Court's decision not to grant the Fee Claim on the basis
of substantial contribution.

After a careful review of the language of the orders on appeal and
transcripts of the underlying bench rulings, the Court further
finds no basis to disturb any of the Bankruptcy Court's careful
decisions to date, including its decision to approve the Settlement
Order or delay ruling on the proper amount of the Cohen Fee Award
pending the outcome of the SEC Action.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3mk7b9y from Leagle.com.

Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP, Appellant, represented by Michael
Busenkell -- mbusenkell@gsbblaw.com -- Gellert Scali Busenkell &
Brown, LLC.

S.S. Body Armor I, Inc., Post-confirmation debtor, Appellee,
represented by Laura Davis Jones -- ljones@pszjlaw.com --
Pachulski, Stang, Ziehl & Jones, LLP & James E. O'Neill, III --
joneill@pszjlaw.com -- Pachulski, Stang, Ziehl & Jones, LLP.

Recovery Trustee, Appellee, represented by Frederick Brian Rosner
-- rosner@teamrosner.com -- The Rosner Law Group LLC, Jason Anthony
Gibson -- gibson@teamrosner.com -- The Rosner Law Group LLC & Scott
James Leonhardt -- leonhardt@teamrosner.com -- The Rosner Law Group
LLC.


SYNEOS HEALTH: Bid to Dismiss Vaitkuviene Class Suit Pending
------------------------------------------------------------
Syneos Health, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the motion to dismiss
the plaintiffs' amended complaint in Vaitkuviene v. Syneos Health,
Inc., et al, is pending.

On December 1, 2017, the first of two virtually identical actions
alleging federal securities law claims was filed against the
Company and certain of its officers on behalf of a putative class
of its shareholders.

The first action, captioned Bermudez v. INC Research, Inc., et al,
No. 17-09457 (S.D.N.Y.), names as defendants the Company, Michael
Bell, Alistair MacDonald, Michael Gilbertini, and Gregory S. Rush
(the "Bermudez action"), and the second action, Vaitkuviene v.
Syneos Health, Inc., et al, No. 18-0029 (E.D.N.C.), filed on
January 25, 2018, names as defendants the Company, Alistair
MacDonald, and Gregory S. Rush (the "Vaitkuviene action").

Both complaints allege similar claims under Section 10(b) and
Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 on behalf of a
putative class of purchasers of the Company's common stock between
May 10, 2017 and November 8, 2017 and November 9, 2017.

The complaints allege that the Company published inaccurate or
incomplete information regarding, among other things, the financial
performance and business outlook for inVentiv's business prior to
the Merger and with respect to the combined company following the
Merger.

On January 30, 2018, two alleged shareholders separately filed
motions seeking to be appointed lead plaintiff and approving the
selection of lead counsel. These motions remain pending.

On March 30, 2018, Plaintiff Bermudez filed a notice of voluntary
dismissal of the Bermudez action, without prejudice, and as to all
defendants.

On May 29, 2018, the Court in the Vaitkuviene action appointed the
San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund and El Paso Firemen &
Policemen’s Pension Fund as Lead Plaintiffs and, on June 7, 2018,
the Court entered a schedule providing for, among other things,
Lead Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint by July 23, 2018
(later extended to July 30, 2018).

Lead Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint on July 30, 2018,
which also includes a claim against the same defendants listed
above, as well as each member of the board of directors at the time
of the INC Research - inVentiv Health merger vote in July 2017,
contending that the inVentiv merger proxy was misleading under
Section 14(a) of the Act.

Lead Plaintiffs seek, among other things, orders (i) declaring that
the lawsuit is a proper class action and (ii) awarding compensatory
damages in an amount to be proven at trial, including interest
thereon, and reasonable costs and expenses incurred in this action,
including attorneys' fees and expert fees, to Lead Plaintiffs and
other class members.

Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint
on September 20, 2018. Lead Plaintiffs filed a Response in
Opposition to such motion on November 21, 2018, and Defendants
filed a Reply to such response on December 5, 2018.

Syneos said, "The Company and the other defendants deny the
allegations in these complaints and intend to defend vigorously
against these claims. In the Company's opinion, the ultimate
outcome of this matter is not expected to have a material adverse
effect on the Company's financial position, results of operations,
or cash flows."

Syneos Health, Inc. operates as an integrated biopharmaceutical
solutions company in North America, Europe, the Middle East,
Africa, the Asia-Pacific, and Latin America. It operates through
two segments, Clinical Solutions and Commercial Solutions. The
company was formerly known as INC Research Holdings, Inc. and
changed its name to Syneos Health, Inc. in January 2018. Syneos
Health, Inc. was incorporated in 2010 and is headquartered in
Morrisville, North Carolina.


TECHNIPFMC PLC: Continues to Defend Prause Class Suit in Texas
--------------------------------------------------------------
TechnipFMC plc said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the company remains a
defendant in a shareholder class action suit entitled, Prause v.
TechnipFMC, et al., No. 4:17-cv-02368.

A purported shareholder class action filed in 2017 and amended in
January 2018 and captioned Prause v. TechnipFMC, et al., No.
4:17-cv-02368 (S.D. Texas) is pending in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Texas against the Company and certain
current and former officers and employees of the Company.

The suit alleged violations of the federal securities laws in
connection with the Company's restatement of its first quarter 2017
financial results and a material weakness in our internal control
over financial reporting announced on July 24, 2017.

On January 18, 2019, the District Court dismissed claims under
Section 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended, and Section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended
("Securities Act").

A remaining claim for alleged violation of Section 11 of the
Securities Act in connection with the reporting of certain
financial results in the Company's Form S-4 Registration Statement
filed in 2016 is pending and seeks unspecified damages.

The Company is vigorously contesting the litigation and cannot
predict its duration or outcome.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

TechnipFMC plc engages in the oil and gas projects, technologies,
and systems and services businesses. It operates through three
segments: Subsea, Onshore/Offshore, and Surface Technologies. The
company was formerly known as Technip SA and changed its name to
TechnipFMC plc in January 2017. TechnipFMC plc was founded in 1958
and is headquartered in London, the United Kingdom.


TESORO REFINING: 1st Amended Garcia Suit Filing Granted in Part
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANTONIO GARCIA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TESORO REFINING
& MARKETING COMPANY LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No.
17-cv-00123-JST (N.D. Cal.), Judge John S. Tigar of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California granted in
part the Parties' Stipulation for Leave to File a First Amended
Consolidated Class Action Complaint.

The Plaintiffs are granted leave to file a First Amended
Consolidated Class Action Complaint.  It must be filed as a
separate docket entry no later than May 8, 2019.  It will be deemed
served upon filing on the Court's docket.  The Defendants'
obligation to file an answer to the First Amended Consolidated
Class Action Complaint is stayed pending the Preliminary Approval
hearing and Final Fairness/Final Approval Hearing, and will be
mooted by Final Approval of the Agreement and entry of the Final
Approval Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 7, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/H5ZQlh from Leagle.com.

Antonio Garcia, Eileen Foster, Samantha West, individually and on
behalf of all similarly situated current and former employees & Jon
Valliere, Plaintiffs, represented by Cornelia Dai, Hadsell Stormer
& Renick, LLP, Randy R. Renick, Hadsell Stormer & Renick LLP, Jay
Edward Smith -- js@gslaw.org -- Gilbert & Sackman, A Law
Corporation & Joshua Finley Young -- jyoung@gslaw.org -- Gilbert &
Sackman, A Law Corporation.

Jinetra Bonner, individually, on behalf herself and all others
similarly situated, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Kristina A. De
La Rosa, Cohelan Khoury & Singer, Michael David Singer, Cohelan
Khoury & Singer, Randy R. Renick, Hadsell Stormer & Renick LLP,
Cornelia Dai, Hadsell Stormer & Renick, LLP, Diana Marie Khoury,
Cohelan Khoury & Singer, James Jason Hill, Cohelan Khoury & Singer
& Timothy Douglas Cohelan, Cohelan Khoury & Singer.

Tesoro Refining & Marketing Company LLC & Tesoro Logistics GP, LLC,
Defendants, represented by Mary Deanna Manesis --
mmanesis@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Timothy Michael Rusche
-- trusche@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP & William James
Dritsas -- wdritsas@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP.


TRACTOR SUPPLY: Johnson Suit Remanded to Wash. State Court
----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Robert J. Bryan of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington, Tacoma, remanded the case, TAMMY JOHNSON
and VANESSA DETTWILER, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TRACTOR SUPPLY COMPANY, a
Delaware Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-0270 (W.D. Wash.),
to the King County Superior Court.

On Dec. 12, 2017, the Plaintiffs commenced a prior action with the
Court, Johnson & Dettwiler v. Tractor Supply Co., Case No. 17-6039
("Johnson I"). After an unsuccessful mediation, the Plaintiffs
sought leave to dismiss that action voluntarily without prejudice
for the declared purpose of re-filing their state laws claims in
Washington state court.  Leave was granted and the action was
dismissed without prejudice on Dec. 26, 2018.

On Jan. 18, 2019, the Plaintiffs commenced the instant action in
King County Superior Court, Johnson, et al. v. Tractor Supply Co.,
Case No. 19-2-01975-1 KNT.  On Feb. 25, 2019, the Defendant removed
the case from King County Superior Court.

The Plaintiffs brought the case as a class action for all
individuals who have worked in one of the Defendant's stores in
Washington in a position the Defendant classified as non-exempt, at
any time between Dec. 12, 2014, and the date of final disposition
of the action.

They allege that the Defendant is engaging in a systematic scheme
of wage and hour violations.  They assert three claims against the
Defendant: Violations of (1) RCW 49.12.020 and WAC 296-126-092
(failure to provide proper rest and meal periods); (2) RCW
49.46.130 (failure to pay proper overtime wages); and (3) RCW
49.52.050 (willful refusal to pay wages).  These claims are similar
to the state law claims in Johnson I, except that, in Johnson I,
the Plaintiffs also claimed that the Defendant miscalculated the
Plaintiffs' pay under 29 U.S.C. Section 207.

In its Notice of Removal, the Defendant asserts that the
Plaintiffs' claims as alleged in the Complaint are removable under
the Class Action Fairness Act.  It argues that removal is
appropriate under the CAFA, in part, because the combined claims of
all the Class Members exceed $5 million, exclusive of interest and
costs.

The Plaintiffs' complaint does not allege a specific amount in
controversy.  Nevertheless, theDefendant asserts that, based on the
Plaintiffs' allegations in the Complaint and other evidence
collected by Defendant, the aggregate value of the claims of all
proposed Plaintiff classes exceeds the $5 million threshold needed
to establish federal jurisdiction under the CAFA.

In its calculation of the amount in controversy, Defendant
apparently assumes a 100% violation rate, applies treble damages,
and adds an estimate of the Plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees
as 25% of the unpaid wages and penalties sought.  In its Notice of
Removal, Defendant's calculation of the amount in controversy
appears as follows: (i) $1,228,875.73 for failure to provide meal
periods; trebled to $3,686,627; (ii) $627,498.26 for failure to
provide rest periods; trebled to $1,882,494.78; and (iii)
$1,392,280.49 for attorney's fees.  The total is $6,961,402.27
($5,569,121.97 (unpaid wages and penalties) + $1,392.280.49
(fees)).

On March 27, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion for
Remand.  They argue that TSC's amount in controversy calculation
depends on three fundamental errors:

     (1) TSC used a 100% violation rate for meal and rest breaks.
TSC's own timekeeping data show the meal break violation rate for
Class members during the Class period was only about 30%.

     (2) TSC assumed the Plaintiffs and the Class could obtain
treble wage damages if they prevailed even though Washington law
legally entitles them to recover at most only double their lost
wages; and

     (3) TSC added a 25% attorneys' fee on top of the Class'
potential recovery despite the well-established law that common
fund percentage fees come out of the total recovery.  The true
amount in controversy is far less than $5 million.

On April 15, 2019, the Defendant filed a response in opposition to
the Plaintiffs' Motion for Remand.  On April 26, 2019, the
Plaintiffs replied in support of its Motion for Remand.

Judge Bryan first discusses the Plaintiffs' Motion for Remand.
Second, he discusses the Plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees.
Third, he briefly discusses the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Time-barred Claims.

He holds that Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand should be granted
because the Defendant has not shown that the jurisdictional amount
has been met.  The amount in controversy is, more likely than not,
no more than $4,640,934.97.  Because the amount in controversy is
less than the $5 million jurisdictional amount under the CAFA, the
Judge should grant the Plaintiffs' Motion for Remand and remande
the case to King County Superior Court.

The Judge declines to award attorney's fees to the Plaintiffs.
There was some indicia that the amount in controversy could exceed
$5 million, including statements apparently made by the Plaintiffs
regarding the instant case and Johnson I.  Thus, there appears to
have been some objectively reasonable basis for removal.

Because he will grant the Plaintiffs' Motion for, the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss Time-barred Claims need not be decided.
Therefore, the Judge will not reach the merits of the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss Time-barred Claims.

Therefore, Judge Bryan granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Remand.
He remanded the case to the King County Superior Court in the State
of Washington.  The Defendant may renote its Motion to Dismiss
Time-barred Claims, if it so chooses, for consideration in King
County Superior Court upon remand.

The Clerk is directed to send uncertified copies of the Order to
all the counsel of record and to any party appearing pro se at said
party's last known address.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 7, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/eS8WNW from Leagle.com.

Tammy Johnson, individually and on behalf of the Proposed Class &
Vanessa Dettwiler, individually and on behalf of the Proposed
Class, Plaintiffs, represented by Michael C. Subit --
msubit@frankfreed.com -- FRANK FREED SUBIT & THOMAS, Michael Malk
-- mm@malklawfirm.com -- MALK LAW FIRM, pro hac vice & Marc C. Cote
-- mcote@frankfreed.com -- FRANK FREED SUBIT & THOMAS.

Tractor Supply Company, Defendant, represented by Adam T. Pankratz
-- adam.pankratz@ogletree.com -- OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK &
STEWART, Christopher W. Decker -- christopher.decker@ogletree.com
-- OGLETREE DEAKINS, pro hac vice & Kyle Nelson --
kyle.nelson@ogletree.com -- OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK & STEWART.


UNITED STATES: Court Lambasts VA Over Medical Reimbursements
------------------------------------------------------------
RJ Vogt, writing for Law360, reports that in a hearing over what
could become the first ever certified class action at the Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims, a panel of three judges lambasted the
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs for "doing everything it could"
to limit emergency medical care reimbursements to veterans.

Judge William S. Greenberg in particular skewered the
administration for failing to comply with the Emergency Care
Fairness Act, a 2010 law that expanded veteran eligibility for
emergency medical care reimbursements at non-VA hospitals.

Two years after the law took effect, the government began denying
any reimbursements to veterans if their third-party insurance
covered part of the care. But a precedential 2016 court decision
struck down that practice by interpreting the law to mean, as Judge
Greenberg said on May 14, "if you go to the emergency room, you're
entitled to reimbursement . . . no exceptions."

Government counsel Christopher Bader responded that the ECFA
actually did have one exception: the 2010 law states that the VA
"may not reimburse a veteran . . . for any co-payment or similar
payment."

When he was VA secretary, Robert Shulkin interpreted the phrase
"similar payment" to include reimbursements for coinsurance and
deductibles, inserting new regulatory language after the April 2016
ruling known as Staab v. Shulkin.

That change will push "billions of dollars in medical expenses"
onto veterans simply because they have health insurance, according
to the suit at issue in the hearing.

As Bader attempted to explain that the VA added coinsurance and
deductibles into the "cost-share exclusion" because both are
"qualitatively" similar to copayments, Judge Greenberg cut him off
and cited the letter of the law.

"[It says] the 'co-payment.' Not this 'co-insurance,'" the judge
said angrily, pointing out that coinsurance tends to be much more
expensive than copayments. "Congress didn't add co-insurance.
'Co-payment' -- $20, not $20,000, or $48,000!

"This is an important concept," he went on, his voice rising.
"Congress didn't put that in, you people put it in!"

The vitriol seemed to signal good news for Amanda Wolfe, the Coast
Guard veteran who sued the VA in October after it denied
reimbursing $2,559 in coinsurance and deductibles incurred by an
emergency appendectomy that her third-party insurance mostly
covered.

She appealed the denial, but according to her petition, the VA
responded by saying it "anticipated an unspecified delay" due to
its volume of other appeals. The backlog partly stems from the VA's
decision, after the 2016 ruling, to hold hundreds of thousands of
reimbursement claims in limbo while drafting the new regulatory
language, which took effect in January 2018.

As a result, Wolfe alleges it could be five years -- the average
wait time for a Board of Veterans Appeals decision -- before she
gets reimbursed, and that's only if the BVA agrees.

To leapfrog the bureaucratic hurdles, Wolfe's petition seeks a
special order called a writ of mandamus from the court to the VA
that would strike down the new regulation and open the door to
reimbursement for her and "hundreds of thousands" of others.

The class action aspect of the suit is new to the Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims, which has refused to handle collective actions
for most of its 30-year history due to a long-held belief that
statutory constraints limited it to reviewing appeals on an
individual basis. However, the Federal Circuit ruled in 2017 that
Congress included class protection for veterans when it created the
court.

About a dozen proposed class actions have been filed in the wake of
that ruling, but Bart Stichman, executive director and co-founder
of the National Legal Services Program and Wolfe's attorney, told
Law360 that none have yet been certified to proceed as class rather
than individual lawsuits.

He added that the May 14 hearing suggested Wolfe has a good shot at
becoming lead plaintiff of a first-ever class.

"Nothing guarantees we're going to win," he said, "But I think the
judges asked good questions and indicated a willingness to
entertain a class action in this circumstance. I like our
chances."

One such question came from Judge Michael P. Allen when he grilled
Bader on why the VA secretary added an exception for reimbursements
after the court had clarified the underlying statute.

"So the [VA] took the opportunity to do everything it could to make
the payment to veterans as low as possible?" he said. "By adding
coinsurance, you will have to agree that simply as a matter of
insurance math, the payment to veterans will be dramatically
less."

While Bader acknowledged at the hearing that "coinsurance can often
represent a very large figure," he maintained that this regulation
really only affects reimbursements for a narrow group of people:
insured people who needed emergency care for non-service connected
conditions at non-VA hospitals.

"But Congress said they get that!" Judge Allen retorted.

Also at issue in the hearing was the status of veterans like Peter
Boerschinger, a 79-year-old sailor who sought reimbursement for
$1,340 incurred from an emergency congestive heart failure
treatment that Medicare partly covered.

In November, the VA sent him a denial letter, saying that
reimbursement required that "the veteran has no coverage under a
health plan."

Boerschinger joined Wolfe's suit weeks later, alleging that denying
his claim because Medicare covered some of the treatment was a
direct violation of the appeals court's 2016 decision.

In March, the VA admitted in a court filing that it had misled tens
of thousands of veterans with denial letters similar to
Boerschinger's. During the hearing, VA attorney Debra Bernal said
that new letters have been drafted with correct language that takes
into the Staab decision into account.

By the end of May, Bernal said the VA will have mailed 42,000 such
letters to people like Boerschinger who were wrongly denied due to
third-party insurance. She did not have a deadline by which nearly
570,000 corrected letters would be mailed to those who were also
told third-party insurance would bar reimbursement but ultimately
denied for other reasons.

She added that the new letters should take care of the controversy
Boerschinger raised and moot his class claim, but Mark Blocker, a
Sidley Austin LLP attorney who argued on behalf of Wolfe and
Boerschinger, said certifying the class would enable closer court
supervision of the VA.

"There's no deadline on when the letters must be sent by," he
pointed out. "We really don't know anything about the efforts being
made. We don't know what the new letters look like."

Attorneys for the VA declined to comment after the hearing. [GN]


UNIVERSITY OF ANTELOPE: Fermin Files Class Action in California
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against University of
Antelope Valley, Inc., a California corporation. The case is styled
Shawna Fermin, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. University of Antelope Valley, Inc., a
California corporation, Defendant, Case No. BCV-19-101530 (Cal.
Super. Ct., June 3, 2019).

The University of Antelope Valley is a regionally accredited
private, for-profit university in Lancaster, California. It offers
a variety of masters, bachelors, associate degrees, and certificate
programs, as well as continuing education courses.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Alex P. Katofsky, Esq.
   27200 Agoura Road, Suite 101
   Calabasas, CA 91301   
   Tel: (818) 703-8985
   Fax  (818) 703-8984
   Email: alex@n9b.d81.myftpupload.com



VISALUS INC: Plaintiffs' Lawyers Seek $185MM in Enhanced Damages
----------------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Bronstad, writing for Law.com, reports that plaintiffs'
attorneys who won a record $925 million jury verdict against a
marketing firm under the U.S. Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(TCPA) are asking a federal judge in Oregon for $185 million more
in enhanced damages. Lawyers filed May 10 briefs on whether ViSalus
Inc., which sells weight loss products, made 1.85 million
unsolicited calls to class members "willfully and knowingly" in
violation of the TCPA. Simon Franzini (Dovel & Luner) and Rafey
Balabanian (Edelson) represent the plaintiff, Lori Wakefield, and
the attorney for ViSalus is John O'Neal (Quarles & Brady). [GN]


VIVINT SOLAR: Continues to Defend TCPA Class Suit in D.C.
---------------------------------------------------------
Vivint Solar, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the company continues
to defend a putative class action suit in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia over alleged violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

In July 2018, an individual filed a putative class action lawsuit
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,
purportedly on behalf of himself and other persons who received
certain telephone calls.

The lawsuit alleges that the Company violated the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act and some of its implementing regulations.

The complaint seeks statutory penalties for each alleged violation.


Vivint said, "The Company disputes the allegations in the
complaint, has retained counsel and intends to vigorously defend
itself in the litigation. The Company is unable to estimate the
amount or range of potential loss, if any, at this time."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Vivint Solar, Inc. provides distributed solar energy primarily to
residential customers in the United States. It owns and installs
solar energy systems through long-term customer contracts. The
company was formerly known as V Solar Holdings, Inc. and changed
its name to Vivint Solar, Inc. in April 2014. Vivint Solar, Inc.
was founded in 2011 and is headquartered in Lehi, Utah.


VIVINT SOLAR: Wage and Hour Class Action Still Ongoing
------------------------------------------------------
Vivint Solar, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the company continues
to defend a purported class action lawsuit involving employee wage
and hour violation.

In February 2018, two former employees, on behalf of themselves and
a purported class, named the Company in a putative class action
alleging that the Company misclassified those employees and
violated other wage and hour laws.

The complaint seeks unspecified damages and statutory penalties for
the alleged violations.

The Company disputes the allegations and has retained counsel to
defend it in the litigation.

Vivint said, "If an unfavorable outcome were to occur in this case,
it is possible that the impact could be material to the Company's
results of operations in the period or periods in which any such
outcome becomes probable and estimable."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Vivint Solar, Inc. provides distributed solar energy primarily to
residential customers in the United States. It owns and installs
solar energy systems through long-term customer contracts. The
company was formerly known as V Solar Holdings, Inc. and changed
its name to Vivint Solar, Inc. in April 2014. Vivint Solar, Inc.
was founded in 2011 and is headquartered in Lehi, Utah.


WALKER CONSTRUCTION: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Sullivan Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Alison J. Nathan of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss the
complaint in the case, Phillip Sullivan, Jr., individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Walker
Construction, Inc. Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-09870 (AJN) (S.D.
N.Y.).

Plaintiff Sullivan currently lives in New York City, and is a deaf
individual.  The Defendant is a corporation organized under the
laws of the State of Washington.  It operates a website where it
provides information about its various architectural designs and
construction projects.

The Plaintiff browsed and intended to watch the video about the
Defendant on the 'Who We Are' page of its website, but was unable
to do so, as the website did not have the requisite accommodations
for deaf individuals.  The Plaintiff brings the class action
against the Defendant for failing to design, construct, and/or own
or operate a website that is fully accessible to deaf and hard of
hearing people.

The Plaintiff brings several causes of action: (1) violation of 42
U.S.C. Section 12181, et seq. - Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act; (2) violation of New York State Human Rights Law;
(3) violation of New York State Civil Rights Law; (4) violation of
New York City Human Rights Law; and (5) declaratory relief.  He
brings the case as a putative class action.

The Plaintiff filed his complaint on Oct. 25, 2018.  On Jan. 18,
2019, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2)
for lack of personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction.
The Court issued an Order explaining to the Plaintiff that he was
on notice that declining to amend his pleadings to timely respond
to arguments in the Defendants' motion to dismiss may constitute a
waiver of his right to use the amendment process to cure any
defects that had been made apparent by the Defendants' motion.  The
Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint.

On Feb. 12, 2019, the Plaintiff filed an opposition to the
Defendant's motion.  On Feb. 14, 2019, the Defendant filed a reply
memorandum of law in further support of its motion.  On March 19,
2019, the Plaintiff filed a letter stating that notwithstanding
their Opposition to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdiction.  The Plaintiff has agreed to transfer the case to the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington.  The
Defendant filed a response explaining that it did not consent to a
transfer.

Judge Nathan finds no allegation that the Defendant transacts any
business in New York.  The Defendant has also affirmed that it
conducts no business in New York, and only performs general
contracting services in Washington, Idaho, and Oregon.
Accordingly, there is no personal jurisdiction over the Defendant
pursuant to Section 302(a)(1).

Next, she finds that the Plaintiff points to no case law where
simply having a website is sufficient to confer jurisdiction under
the provision of the long-arm statute.  The Judge cannot conclude
that the Defendant would have reasonably expected its website to
have consequences in New York.  Accordingly, there is no personal
jurisdiction over the Defendant pursuant to Section 302(a)(3)(ii).

Finally, the Judge finds that the Plaintiff has failed to make a
sufficient start towards establishing jurisdiction or explained how
discovery could cure the issues identified by the Court.  To
warrant jurisdictional discovery, a plaintiff must make a
sufficient start' toward establishing jurisdiction.  Therefore, if
the Plaintiff's allegations are too conclusory, nonspecific, or
otherwise inadequate, they will not merit jurisdiction-related
discovery.  Accordingly, the Judge will not permit jurisdictional
discovery in the case.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Nathan granted the Defendant's
motion to dismiss.  The Order resolves Docket Numbers 12, 14, and
19.  The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close the case.


A full-text copy of the Court's May 7, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/OLbjSb from Leagle.com.

Phillip Sullivan, Jr., on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Anne Melissa Seelig
-- anne@leelitigation.com -- Lee Litigation Group, PLLC & C.K. Lee
-- cklee@leelitigation.com -- Lee Litigation Group, PLLC.

Walker Construction, Inc., Defendant, represented by Sana Suhail --
Sana.Suhail@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith
LLP.


WESTERN DIGITAL: Settles Sex Discrimination Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Jay-Anne B. Casuga and Patrick Dorrian, writing for Bloomberg News
report that Western Digital Corp. has agreed to pay $7.75 million
to resolve a worker's allegations that it discriminated against
more 1,300 women in its workforce.

Former employee Yunghui Chen, who filed a class action against the
company May 14, submitted the unopposed settlement proposal on the
same day to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California.

Chen alleged that the tech giant's male-dominated corporate culture
and management led to sex discrimination in pay, promotions, and
job placements. [GN]


WESTFIELD INSURANCE: Court Dismisses C. Greene's Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, South Bend Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting
Defendant Westfield Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment
in the case captioned CARMINE GREENE, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
KENNETH R. WILL, et al., Defendants, and WESTFIELD INSURANCE
COMPANY, Garnishee Defendant. No. 3:09CV510-PPS. (N.D. Ind.).

The judgment against the VIM Defendants came about when a group of
nearby homeowners decided that they had had enough of VIM's
polluting behavior and brought this class action to recover damages
for environmental violations, nuisance and negligence based on the
impact of the waste facility on their homes and property. The case
ended in a default judgment against VIM Recycling and K.C.
Industries for $50,568,750.00, plus an award of $273,339.85 in
attorney's fees against all three VIM Defendants.

Unfortunately, the VIM Defendants are judgment-proof, or so it
seems. So the Class turned to the VIM Defendants' liability
insurer, Westfield Insurance Company, in these proceedings
supplemental, hoping to collect on their monumental judgment as
covered under any or all of four annual commercial general
liability insurance policies.

Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. A party opposing summary judgment
may not rely on allegations or denials in her own pleading, but
rather must marshal and present the court with the evidence she
contends will prove her case.

Westfield's motion raises six separate arguments in support of its
contention that there is no coverage under the Westfield policies
for the default judgment and award of attorney's fees against the
VIM Defendants.

In summary, here are the six arguments: (1) there is no coverage
because the VIM Defendants breached the policies' requirements to
provide Westfield notice of the Federal Action (2) there is no
coverage because the conduct at issue was not accidental (3) there
is no coverage because the damage arose from professional errors
and omissions (4) there is no coverage because the policy excludes
damages for expected or intended injury (5) there is no coverage
because this was a known claim at the time the policies were
purchased and (6) there is no coverage because there is a pollution
exclusion in the policies of insurance.

Some of the arguments have no merit and need not be discussed. But
because the Courts finds that Westfield is correct on arguments
(1), (4) and (5) noted above, summary judgment will be granted in
favor of Westfield and against the Class.

Insured's Compliance with Notice Requirement

The summary judgment record before me now fills in those gaps of
evidence and argument.

Westfield's first argument is that the complete failure of its
insureds to notify Westfield of this Federal Action breached the
notice provision of the liability policies, caused prejudice to
Westfield, and relieved the insurer of any coverage obligation.  

Plaintiffs respond that: Westfield's policies do not contain a
requirement that its insured tender the defense of any lawsuit to
it, nor is any such tender requirement imposed by Indiana law.
Instead, cases hold that a policy's notice requirement is met and
an insurer's duty to defend is triggered when the insurer receives
from any source the foundational information designated in the
policy's notice provision.

First, the Court recap the relevant facts. When first sued in this
Federal Action in October 2009, the VIM Defendants hired their own
counsel, who remained in the case until after its trip to the Court
of Appeals and back. After the remand of the action to this court
in May 2011, the VIM Defendants took no action to notify Westfield
of the pendency of the case.

Even after their retained counsel withdrew in December 2011, the
Clerk entered defaults in March 2012  and January 2013 and default
judgment was sought in March 2015, for reasons that are entirely
unclear, the VIM Defendants did not turn to Westfield for a
defense. When Westfield finally learned of the Federal Action on
October 14, 2010, it was not from the VIM Defendants, but from an
attorney whom Westfield had contacted to serve as outside coverage
counsel in connection with the investigation into coverage for the
State Action.  

Now to the governing law. In Indiana, the notice requirement of an
insurance policy is material, and of the essence of the contract.
Without notice, the insurance company has no liability to the
insured. Although for breach of a liability policy's cooperation
clause, the insurer must show actual prejudice to avoid liability,
the burdens are different for a breach of the notice provision. The
insured's duty to notify is a condition precedent to the insurance
company's liability to its insured. Prejudice is presumed by an
unreasonable delay in notifying the company about the accident or
about the filing of the lawsuit. If prejudice is presumed based on
a belated notice from the insured, the presumption is all the more
appropriate where the insureds never provide notice to the insurer,
as is the case here.  

Realizing what it's up against, the Class attempts a lame argument
that Westfield's policies do not contain a requirement that its
insured tender the defense of any lawsuit to it, nor is any such
tender requirement imposed by Indiana law. But the argument is
scuttled by the Class's failure to dispute that the policies
expressly imposed duties of notice to Westfield in the event of an
occurrence, offense, claim or suit, and that fulfillment of the
duty was a condition to coverage.

Because the Class can't argue that the VIM Defendants provided
timely notice, the Class next argues that the information Westfield
received on October 14, 2010, when the Federal Action was on
appeal, was sufficient notice to trigger a duty to defend as of
that point in time.  That principle would eviscerate the concept of
prompt notice, and the Class cites no authority that supports it.
In any event, Westfield cites cases in support of its response that
this sort of second-hand information does not satisfy the VIM
Defendants' obligation to provide notice of the action to its
insurers.  

The Court readily find that as the underlying insureds, the VIM
Defendants breached their duty to provide Westfield prompt notice
of the Federal Action. Under Indiana law, this creates a rebuttable
presumption of prejudice to the insurance company.

In addition, Westfield argues that it was in fact prejudiced by the
lack of notice from the VIM Defendants. Westfield points out, by
way of contrast, that after the VIM Defendants formally tendered a
claim for coverage against the State Action, Westfield took various
steps that it was unable to take here in the Federal Action. These
included assigning counsel to defend under reservation of rights
pending an investigation, declining coverage upon the conclusion of
that investigation, and seeking a declaratory judgment that
Westfield did not owe defense or indemnity.  

Given that the VIM Defendants acted to seek a defense and coverage
for the State Action but not the Federal Action, Westfield contends
that it was left to conclude, correctly, that the VIM Defendants
were not seeking coverage for this lawsuit.

In addition, the Indiana Court of Appeals has found that an insured
that failed to give timely notice to its insurer further compounded
the prejudice by voluntarily undertaking the defense of the action
against it, which violated the insurer's right to promptly
investigate a claim or to control the defense of a lawsuit with
which it might be subjected to liability. The same is true here.
The second-hand notice of a Federal Action that had been pending
for a year, had gone through preliminary injunction proceedings, a
motion to dismiss, and a reversal on appeal was clearly not in time
to permit Westfield to promptly take all the steps in defense of
the action that it would have wanted to take. The fact that
Westfield now defends itself against a default judgment of more
than $50 million demonstrates the potential for prejudice compared
to the actions it took with the State Action to defend under
reservation of rights and then successfully seek a declaratory
judgment of no coverage.

The Class makes no attempt to offer evidence, or anything more than
an unsupported conclusion, that Westfield suffered no prejudice
from the failure of its insureds to provide notice as required
under the policies. The position is plainly insufficient in light
of both Indiana law and the facts of the case. As the Indiana Court
of Appeals has held, when an insured made a strategic decision to
attempt to obtain a dismissal of the lawsuit on its own accord
without eliciting the insurer for assistance and only turned to the
insurer for a defense after the effort failed, the insured had
breached the notice provision of policy and failed to allow the
insurer to exercise its right to investigate or defend the claim.

As a matter of law, for the failure of its insureds to give
Westfield timely notice of the Federal Action, the Court concludes
that Westfield owed no duties of defense or indemnification of the
VIM Defendants in this case. Neither can Westfield be held liable
in these proceedings supplemental for the whopping default judgment
entered against the VIM Defendants.

Expected-Intended Injury Exclusions

There is another reason why Westfield must prevail on the coverage
question. Both the CGL Coverage Form and Umbrella Coverage Form
expressly disclaim coverage for property damage expected or
intended from the standpoint of the insured.

Under Indiana law, this language is considered an exception rather
than an exclusion and the insured bears the burden of proving that
the property damage was neither expected nor intended. The expected
prong is the one at issue here, and it applies when the insured
acted even though he was consciously aware that harm was
practically certain to occur from his actions. This practically
certain standard is higher than merely should have anticipated or a
reckless disregard for safety.  

The undisputed facts support the policy exception for intended
injury, by demonstrating VIM's continued operations despite
awareness of resulting property damage complaints, without any
mitigating response. The VIM Defendants agreed to a Fugitive Dust
Control Plan in July 2000, which was intended to control fugitive
particulate matter emissions from the outdoor grinding and
screening of recently live wood. Agreed Orders entered into by IDEM
and Will on behalf of the VIM Defendants evidence the insureds'
awareness of their fugitive dust violations and handling of solid
waste in a manner that created a threat to human health or the
environment, and a pollution hazard.  These orders demonstrate that
the VIM Defendants were consciously aware that those types of
environmental harm had occurred and were practically certain to
continue to occur from their operations of the facility during the
time period of their CGL policies with Westfield.

The Class does not dispute that after multiple inspections in
August 2003, the VIM Defendants received an enforcement letter from
IDEM dated October 8, 2003, documenting observed violations of the
facility's Fugitive Dust Control Plan, VIM's operating permit and
Indiana environmental rules.  During an IDEM site inspection in
January 2004, VIM's Vice President was told that numerous residents
had complained regarding fugitive dust in recent months. Also
undisputed is that on January 22, 2004, an IDEM agent spoke with
defendant Will to discuss the fugitive dust problem and the VIM
Defendant's plans for an indoor grinding operation and dust
collection system.  

Also alleged and admitted is that IDEM inspected the Elkhart
facility in August 2005 in response to neighbors' complaints, and
IDEM determined that the outdoor storage of waste was a threat to
human health or the environment, and created a fire hazard, vector
attraction, air or water pollution or other contamination. Despite
IDEM's findings and directive to cease storing any additional C
grade material at the site, defendant Will ignored the directive
and by January 2006 had dumped nearly 50% more waste on the pile.


This voluminous record of undisputed facts is sufficient to
establish that the VIM Defendants knew of the neighbors complaints
that damage was occurring. For the plaintiff Class to now argue
that the VIM Defendants didn't know their polluting conduct was
affecting anyone when the Class complained for years and caused VIM
to incur dozens of environmental violations is unpersuasive.

The exception for injury expected from the VIM Defendants'
standpoint precludes coverage for the judgment in the underlying
case, because given the history of the Elkhart facility's
operation, the VIM Defendants were consciously aware that harm was
practically certain to occur but continued operations in the same
way.

Known Claim Exclusion

There is a final basis for summary judgment in favor of Westfield.
Coverage is unavailable for a known claim. What this means is that
an insured can't cause a loss then go get the insurance for it. To
allow this would turn the insurance business on its head. What
rational insurance company would cover a claim after it already
occurred? To protect against this, insurance companies include a
known claim exclusion in insurance polices to make sure that they
are not covering a risk that has already materialized.

The policies in this case are no different: coverage under the CGL
policies applies to property damage only if it occurs during the
policy period and prior to the policy period, no insured knew that
the property damage' had occurred, in whole or in part.

In other words, where the insured had that prior knowledge, any
continuation, change or resumption of the property damage during
the policy period is deemed to have been known prior to the policy
period. The same language appears in the policies' Umbrella
Coverage Form. The policies define the insured's knowledge to
include the earliest time at which the insured, or any employee
authorized to give or receive notice of an occurrence or claim,
becomes aware by any means that property damage has occurred or has
begun to occur.  Property damage is defined to include not only
physical injury to tangible property, but also loss of use of
tangible property that is not physically injured. This type of
exclusion expresses the common law fortuity or known loss
principle, that one may not obtain coverage for a loss that has
already taken place.

The series of four liability policies with Westfield began in
January 2004. The question, therefore, is whether the undisputed
evidence shows VIM's awareness of property damage from its
operations prior to 2004? It most certainly does. The evidence of
this knowledge starts in July of 2000, when the VIM Defendants
agreed to the Fugitive Dust Control Plan. On September 29, 2000,
IDEM made a field inspection of the Elkhart facility prompted by
complaints of fugitive dust from outdoor grinding operations
visible in the air crossing a county road adjacent to the facility.
  

Based on the inspection, IDEM concluded that the VIM defendants
were grinding scrap lumber outside in violation of the Fugitive
Dust Control Plan and not watering sufficiently to prevent visible
emissions of fugitive dust.  These findings were communicated to
defendant Will by telephone on September 29, 2000 and by certified
mail dated November 13, 2000. An Agreed Order signed by Will on
July 14, 2001 reiterated these findings.  

The Class relies on Will's June 25, 2018 affidavit, which includes
his attestation that at no time prior to January 1, 2007 was he
aware that bodily injury or property damage within the meaning of
the Westfield Policies had occurred in whole or in part as a result
of the operations or other conduct of VIM or K.C. or conditions at
the Site. The repeated use of quotations marks around property
damage within Will's affidavit signifies that he uses the
expression as a term of art limited to the policy definition.  

There is another problem with Will's affidavit. Its use of legal
terms and conclusions runs afoul of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4)'s
requirement that an affidavit used to oppose a motion "set out
facts that would be admissible in evidence." Legal arguments and
legal conclusions in summary judgment affidavits are not
recitations of fact and can be disregarded.  

On the undisputed facts, the Court concludes as a matter of law
that defendant Will, and therefore the VIM Defendants, had become
aware, prior to January 2004, that property damage resulting from
fugitive dust had occurred or begun to occur.  

Pollution Exclusion

There is also a pollution exclusion in the policy that is worth
discussing, although the Court not relying on it in my disposition
of the case. The CGL policies contain a pollution exclusion
applicable to property damage which would not have occurred in
whole or part but for the actual, alleged or threatened discharge,
dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants' at
any time.

Pollutants are defined as any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal
irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes,
acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste and waste includes materials to
be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.  

Westfield acknowledges that Indiana courts construe pollution
exclusions narrowly, but still contends that the record here
including the Class's own allegations and environmental expert
support the application of the pollution exclusions. In 2012, the
Indiana Supreme Court addressed a liability policy with the same
definition of pollutants as is present in the Westfield policies,
and noted that it had interpreted this or similar language on no
fewer than three occasions, reaching the same result each time.  

Despite the weight of this unfavorable precedent, Westfield relies
on West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 598 F.3d
918 (7th Cir. 2010), in which the Seventh Circuit, applying Indiana
law, affirmed summary judgment in favor of an insurer, finding that
the pollution exclusion applied against claims that the insured's
gas station contaminated groundwater in a residential neighborhood.


A number of cases contain language that might support that
conclusion.  In the context of this case, a determination that the
definition of pollutants renders the exclusion unenforceable might
also be bolstered by the inherent ambiguity of the terms waste,
chemicals and fumes. In any event, the scope of the pollution
exclusion has been an evolving area of the law, subject to
differing interpretations. Given that uncertainty, and because the
Court had otherwise found three separate bases on which to grant
Westfield's motion for summary judgment, the Court declines to
undertake any further analysis of the applicability of the
pollution exclusion on the facts of this case.

Accordingly, Garnishee Defendant Westfield Insurance Company's
motion for summary judgment is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y5kl3z6w from
Leagle.com.

Carmine Greene, Rob Pedzinski, Robin Pedzinski, Jim Pendergrass,
Barbara Stutsman & Wayne Stutsman, Plaintiffs, represented by Kim
E. Ferraro, Hoosier Environmental Council, 3951 N. Meridian Suite
100, Indianapolis, IN 46208, Richard C. Richmond, III --
rrichmond@taftlaw.com -- Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Amelia J.
Vohs, Hoosier Environmental Council, 3951 N. Meridian Suite 100,
Indianapolis, IN 46208, Donald C. Biggs -- dbiggs@taftlaw.com --
Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP & Frank J. Deveau --
fdeveau@taftlaw.com -- Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP.

Kenneth R Will, Defendant, pro se.

Westfield Insurance Company, ThirdParty Defendant, represented by
James Christian Clark -- ciclark@foxrothschild.com -- Fox
Rothschild LLP, pro hac vice, John J. Haggerty --
jhaggerty@foxrothschild.com -- Fox Rothschild LLP & Stephen C.
Wheeler, Smith Fisher Maas Howard & Lloyd PC, 7209 Shadeland Ave,
Indianapolis, IN 46250


WISCONSIN: ACLU of Wis. Files Class Action Over Parole System
-------------------------------------------------------------
Milwaukee Independent reports that the ACLU of Wisconsin and
attorneys Issa Kohler-Hausmann and Avery Gilbert, with pro-bono
assistance from Wisconsin law firms Quarles & Brady LLP and Foley &
Lardner LLP, filed a class-action lawsuit in federal court in
Madison on April 30. The effort seeks to halt unconstitutional
refusals to release parole-eligible people sentenced to life
imprisonment for crimes they committed while they were children.

The United States Supreme Court has held that states must give most
juveniles sentenced to life in prison a chance to earn parole
release based on a standard of rehabilitation and reform. The suit
reveals that the current parole system, which gives parole
commissioners unchecked discretion to deny release, fails to
provide a meaningful second chance of freedom for people who
committed crimes as children.

"Wisconsin's parole system unnecessarily keeps people behind bars
who are no longer the impulsive children who committed serious
crimes, but are mature, reformed adults with real contributions to
make to their families and their communities" said Larry Dupuis,
legal director, ACLU of Wisconsin. "The constitution requires that
they be given a chance at redemption in the free world."

Recent Supreme Court cases have recognized a substantial volume of
neuroscience evidence that children and adolescents have not yet
formed their identities and are more impulsive, subject to peer
pressure, less able to extricate themselves from circumstances
conducive to crime, and less able to appreciate the effects of
their actions than adults.

They are less culpable for their crimes and more likely to
fundamentally change as they grow older. As a consequence, the
Court has ruled that the Eighth Amendment's ban on disproportionate
punishment of children means that punishments for juveniles must
reflect this reality by ensuring a second chance at freedom for
those young incarcerated individuals who mature into responsible
adults.

"In the wake of recent Supreme Court rulings requiring states to
give redeemable juvenile lifers a meaningful opportunity for parole
release, states across the country have revisited their parole
systems to bring them into compliance with constitutional
requirements," said co-counsels Avery Gilbert and Issa
Kohler-Hausmann. "Wisconsin has not, and it must now recognize it
is out of step with national trends and the constitution."

The named plaintiffs include people who were convicted of crimes
when they were as young as 14 years old. All committed serious
crimes that resulted in loss of life or serious injury and
devastated families, but all have also profoundly changed and
deserve a shot at showing they are capable of redemption.

Despite clear evidence of maturation and rehabilitation by the
plaintiffs, the parole commission has denied their release, often
repeatedly, well after the dates, they were made eligible for
parole by the sentencing judges under Wisconsin law. The Parole
Commission systematically denies release to juvenile lifers, even
though, in many cases, parole commissioners explicitly recognize
that the plaintiffs have reformed.

"The State of Wisconsin's failure to fulfill its constitutional
duty to give juvenile lifers a meaningful opportunity for release
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation is evidenced by
the fact that fewer than six out of more than 120 eligible juvenile
lifers have been released by the parole commission over the past 15
years," said Tim Muth, staff attorney, ACLU of Wisconsin.

One example is Carlos King who has been in prison for a crime he
committed when he was 16. Now, 22 years later, as a 38-year-old,
Carlos has matured from the impulsive and desperate teenager he
once was.

"I feel incredible sadness for the loss of life that I caused and
the suffering to my victims and their families," said King. He is
pursuing a bachelor's degree in theology through Trinity College
with a GPA of nearly 4.0, and has an institutional record that
demonstrates the development of impulse control, foresight, and
interpersonal empathy. Despite this impeccable record, he has been
denied release to parole supervision four times.

The lawsuit seeks an order that one hundred-plus incarcerated
individuals should be entitled to release upon demonstrated
rehabilitation and maturation, and that the procedures used to
evaluate parole applications of these "juvenile lifers" provide
adequate protections against arbitrary and erroneous denials. The
lawsuit argues that the process should focus on rehabilitation and
maturity, rather than the nature of a crime that was committed by a
child long ago. [GN]


WONDERFUL COMPANY: Calzadillas Arbitration Held in Abeyance
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order holding in Abeyance Defendants's Motion
to Compel Arbitration in the case captioned SALVADOR CALZADILLAS,
on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
THE WONDERFUL COMPANY, LLC, and DOES 1-25, Defendants. No.
1:19-cv-00172-DAD-JLT. (E.D. Cal.).

This matter is before the court on defendant The Wonderful
Company's motion to compel arbitration and to stay or dismiss this
action.  

Soon after that motion was filed, plaintiff Salvador Calzadillas
filed an ex parte application to continue the hearing date,
contending that resolution of defendant's motion required discovery
and time to conduct that discovery.  

The Plaintiffs are seasonal agricultural workers within the meaning
of the Agricultural Worker Protection Act (AWPA). The Plaintiffs
are, and have been throughout the relevant period, non-exempt
employees within the meaning of California Labor Code and the rules
and regulations of California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage
Order No. 14-2001 (IWC Wage Order 14). Defendant is the world's
largest grower of tree nuts and America's largest citrus grower.

The Plaintiffs are employed to work in defendant's fields, and are
either employed directly or through various Farm Labor Contractors
(FLCs).  

Under the parties' working arrangement, defendant is required to
pay plaintiffs their agreed-upon wages for all hours worked, to pay
workers for required rest periods, to provide meal periods, and to
abide in all respects with IWC Wage Order 14.  

The complaint alleges, however, that the plaintiffs have not been
compensated by defendant for all time worked.  Specifically, it
alleges that plaintiffs work on a piece-rate basis, picking
mandarins in the morning.  After this first pick, workers then
switch to non-piece rate work in the late morning or afternoon,
doing work such as picking up fruit off the ground, doing a second
or third pass through, or picking la china, but workers are not
compensated for this work.  

A written provision in any contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle a dispute by arbitration is subject to
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).  Any doubts concerning the scope
of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration,
whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract
language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like
defense to arbitrability. Because waiver of the right to
arbitration is disfavored, any party arguing waiver of arbitration
bears a heavy burden of proof. Therefore, an arbitration agreement
may only be invalidated by `generally applicable contract defenses,
such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,' but not by defenses
that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from
the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.

Whether This Court May Resolve the Question of Arbitrability

The first issue is whether this court may properly decide the
threshold question of arbitrability. Defendant argues the question
of whether this dispute must be resolved through arbitration must
itself be resolved by an arbitrator, rather than by this court,

The facts of this case amply demonstrate the wisdom of this
approach. Plaintiff Calzadillas and the putative class members are
seasonal agricultural workers who, according to the allegations of
the complaint, have performed their employment for less than
minimum wage.  It is unclear what level of education each has
attained, but it is certainly a reasonable assumption that
plaintiff and the putative class members are untrained in the
practice of law. Defendant, by contrast, is a corporation worth
roughly $4 billion, and is the largest grower of tree nuts in the
world. Defendant, and other entities associated with it, employs
thousands of seasonal agricultural workers in pre-harvest and
harvesting operations, and contracts with various FLCs to establish
employment relationships with each of them.

On these facts, the court has no difficulty concluding that
plaintiff and the putative class members are far less sophisticated
than defendant in terms of their understanding of the legal
documents at issue here. Defendant has, moreover, conceded that the
named plaintiff in this case is unsophisticated for purposes of
this motion.

Accordingly, because the court finds that the issue of
arbitrability was not clearly and unmistakably delegated to the
arbitrator, the court proceeds to consider plaintiffs' remaining
arguments opposing arbitration.

Whether Defendant Possesses Standing to Enforce the Agreement

Next, plaintiffs oppose the motion to compel arbitration on the
ground that defendant is not a signatory to the Agreement.  As
such, plaintiffs argue that defendant lacks standing to enforce
it.

General contract and agency principles apply in determining the
enforcement of an arbitration agreement by or against
non-signatories. In particular, a litigant who is not a party to an
arbitration agreement may invoke arbitration under the FAA if the
relevant state contract law allows the litigant to enforce the
agreement. Accordingly, and in the absence of any suggestion by the
parties to the contrary, the court will examine California law to
determine whether defendant can enforce the Agreement. Plaintiffs
raise two arguments with respect to why defendant lacks standing to
enforce the Agreement, which the court addresses in turn below.

Whether Defendant is a Third-Party Beneficiary

First, the court addresses whether defendant, although a
nonsignatory to the Agreement, is nonetheless an intended
third-party beneficiary. Defendant argues that it is under the
plain language of the Agreement.  

The Agreement in this case states that Wonderful Citrus Packing LLC
and you voluntarily agree that any claim, dispute, or controversy
arising out of or relating to your employment with any entity or
person retained to perform services for the Company, your alleged
employment with the Company, or the separation of employment shall
be submitted to final and binding arbitration.  

In that declaration Mr. Cooper avers that defendant is a privately
held company located in Los Angeles, California, of which Wonderful
Citrus Packing LLC is an affiliate.  

The Plaintiffs have not come forward with any competing evidence
with respect to the relationship between defendant and Wonderful
Citrus Packing LLC. But this is hardly surprising in light of the
fact that no discovery has yet taken place in this action. Despite
the broad scope of discovery normally permitted in civil actions
under the Federal Rules, discovery in connection with a motion to
compel arbitration is limited under the FAA. In this regard, the
Ninth Circuit has explained that the FAA provides for discovery in
connection with a motion to compel arbitration only if the making
of the arbitration agreement be in issue. Thus, here, because the
FAA only permits limited discovery when a motion to compel
arbitration is pending, Plaintiffs' discovery must be narrowly
tailored to determining whether the arbitration clause is
enforceable under California law.

The Plaintiffs have requested limited discovery in order to
determine whether the arbitration agreement is applicable to
Defendant even though it is a nonparty to the agreement. As the
court understands this request, any such discovery would not go to
the merits of plaintiffs' claims, but would instead be limited to
the threshold question of whether the Agreement may be enforced by
defendant. The court concludes that such limited discovery is
permissible.  

Thus, the court will reserve judgment on the issue of whether
defendant may enforce the Agreement as an intended third-party
beneficiary pending limited discovery on that question.

Whether Defendant May Enforce the Agreement Under the Doctrine of
Equitable Estoppel

The court first examines whether plaintiffs' claims against
defendant are intimately founded in and intertwined with the
underlying contract. Here, however, defendant has not provided the
court with any contract other than the Agreement itself, which is
devoted exclusively to issues concerning arbitration. The causes of
action asserted in plaintiffs' complaint make no mention of the
Agreement, and the court fails to grasp how those causes of action,
which generally allege violations of wage and hour laws, could be
intimately founded in and intertwined with" the Agreement here.

In sum, the only plausible basis by which defendant may enforce the
Agreement is as an intended third-party beneficiary. Because the
court finds plaintiff is entitled to limited discovery before that
question is resolved, the court will reserve ruling on that point.
However, assuming that defendant does possess standing as an
intended third-party beneficiary, the court proceeds to consider
below plaintiffs' argument that the Agreement should not be
enforced because it is both procedurally and substantively
unconscionable.

Whether the Agreement is Unconscionable

Next, plaintiffs attempt to defeat the motion to compel arbitration
by arguing that the Agreement is both procedurally and
substantively unconscionable. Plaintiffs indicated at the hearing
on the pending motions that they do not seek discovery with respect
to unconscionability. Rather, they contend that unconscionability
may be found based on the facts already before the court. The court
addresses each of plaintiffs' arguments in turn.

The FAA provides that arbitration agreements shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. This
provision, known as the savings clause of the FAA, permits
agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by 'generally applicable
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,'
but not by defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive
their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at
issue. Any doubts about the scope of arbitrable issues, including
applicable contract defenses, are to be resolved in favor of
arbitration.

To establish the defense of unconscionability under California law,
the party opposing arbitration must demonstrate that the contract
as a whole or a specific clause in the contract is both
procedurally and substantively unconscionable.
  
Whether the Agreement is Procedurally Unconscionable

Procedural unconscionability concerns the manner in which the
contract was negotiated and the respective circumstances of the
parties at that time, focusing on the level of oppression and
surprise involved in the agreement. Unconscionability analysis
begins with an inquiry into whether the contract is one of
adhesion. The term contract of adhesion signifies a standardized
contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior
bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the
opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.

In support of plaintiffs' argument that the parties' agreement is
procedurally unconscionable, plaintiffs have submitted the
declaration of named plaintiff Salvador Calzadillas. In it,
plaintiff Calzadillas avers that when he began his employment for
the 2016 season, he and his coworkers were given a bunch of
documents and told they had to sign them if they wanted to work at
Wonderful. They were further instructed by their foremen just to
sign them because there was no time to read them, and that they
were on work time and had to get to work and were rushed to sign
and turn the papers in. As an adhesion contract, the Agreement
bears all the hallmarks of procedural unconscionability, a point
which defense counsel did not dispute at the hearing on the pending
motions.  

Whether the Agreement is Substantively Unconscionable

The next question is whether the relevant Agreement is also
substantively unconscionable. Plaintiffs argue that the Agreement
is substantively unconscionable in two respects: (1) the JAMS
Rules, which were incorporated by reference into the Agreement,
were not physically attached to it; and (2) the language of the
Agreement impermissibly compels arbitration of PAGA claims.

The substantive element of unconscionability pertains to the
fairness of an agreement's actual terms and to assessments of
whether they are overly harsh or one-sided. At bottom, an agreement
is substantively unconscionable where its enforcement would work a
substantial degree of unfairness beyond a simple old-fashioned bad
bargain. Thus, substantive unconscionability typically is found in
the employment context when the arbitration agreement is one-sided
in favor of the employer without sufficient justification, for
example, when the employee's claims against the employer, but not
the employer's claims against the employee, are subject to
arbitration.

The plaintiffs first argue that the agreement is substantively
unconscionable because defendant failed to attach the JAMS Rules
referenced in the agreement to the actual agreement, because of
which Mr. Calzadillas would be required to go to another source in
order to learn the full ramifications of the arbitration
agreement.

However, whether the failure to attach additional arbitration rules
which are incorporated by reference into the arbitration agreement
amounts to unconscionability is a procedural question, not a
substantive one. However, the court is aware of no case standing
for the proposition that such a failure can constitute both
procedural and substantive unconscionability.

The Plaintiffs next argue that the Agreement is substantively
unconscionable because, by its terms, it compels arbitration of
representative PAGA claims.  

The Plaintiffs are correct that under California law, an employment
agreement that compels the waiver of representative claims under
the PAGA is contrary to public policy and unenforceable as a matter
of state law.

Nonetheless, it does not necessarily follow that the Agreement is
substantively unconscionable.  Moreover, even if this provision
would be substantively unconscionable as applied to representative
PAGA claims, the court need not automatically nullify the
Agreement.

Because the court has rejected plaintiffs' argument that the
failure to attach the JAMS Rules renders the Agreement
substantively unconscionable, the sole basis for finding such
unconscionability rests with the arbitrability of the
representative PAGA claims. In light of this, the court is
reluctant to strike down the Agreement altogether. Where, as here,
there is at most one unconscionable provision identified by
plaintiffs, the proper remedy is to construe the offending
provision so as to avoid any unconscionable result. The court
cannot conclude on the facts of this case that the Agreement is
permeated with substantive unconscionability, and accordingly
declines plaintiffs' request to strike it down entirely. Instead,
the court will limit is application with respect to any
representative PAGA claims plaintiffs ultimately wish to bring.

In sum, the court finds no basis to void the Agreement on the basis
of unconscionability.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' ex parte application to conduct
discovery is granted. The Defendant's motion to compel arbitration
will be held in abeyance pending the limited discovery contemplated
by this order and the filing of the supplemental briefing.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y4jm6js7 from Leagle.com.

Salvador Calzadillas, Plaintiff, represented by Edgar Ivan
Aguilasocho -- eaguilasocho@farmworkerlaw.com -- Martinez,
Aguilasocho & Lynch APLC, Liane Katzenstein Ly --  
liane@kingsleykingsley.com -- Kingsley & Kingsley, APC, Mario
Martinez --  mmartinez@farmworkerlaw.com -- Martinez Aguilasocho &
Lynch, APLC & Eric Bryce Kingsley --  eric@kingsleykingsley.com --
Kingsley & Kingsley APC.

The Wonderful Company, LLC, Defendant, represented by Lisa Ann
Stilson --  lisa.stilson@roll.com -- Roll Law Group, P.C. & Brooke
S. Hammond -- brooke.hammond@roll.com --  Roll Law Group P.C..


ZEIGLER CHEVROLET-SCHAUMBURG: Swan Suit Asserts TCPA Violation
--------------------------------------------------------------
ARELLA SWAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. ZEIGLER CHEVROLET-SCHAUMBURG, LLC, a
Michigan Limited Liability Company, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-03758 (N.D. Ill., June 5, 2019) seeks to secure redress for
violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").

To promote its services, Defendant engages in unsolicited
marketing, harming thousands of consumers in the process, asserts
the complaint.

Through this action, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt
Defendant's illegal conduct, which has resulted in the invasion of
privacy, harassment, aggravation, and disruption of the daily life
of thousands of individuals. Plaintiff also seeks statutory damages
on behalf of herself and members of the class, and any other
available legal or equitable remedies.

Plaintiff is a natural person who was a resident of Cook County,
Illinois.

Defendant is an automotive dealership that sells vehicles for
individuals and businesses.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Gary M. Klinger, Esq.
     KOZONIS & KLINGER, LTD.
     4849 N. Milwaukee Ave., Ste. 300
     Chicago, IL 60630
     Phone: 312.283.3814
     Email: gklinger@kozonislaw.com

          - and -

     John T. Spragens, Esq.
     SPRAGENS LAW PLC
     1200 16th Ave. S.
     Nashville, TN 37212
     Phone: (615) 983-8900
     Facsimile: (615) 682-8533
     Email: john@spragenslaw.com

          - and -

     Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
     SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
     14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 400
     Miami, FL 33132
     Phone: 305-479-2299
     Email: ashamis@shamisgentile.com


ZILLOW GROUP: Bid to Dismiss 2nd Amended Complaint Denied
---------------------------------------------------------
Zillow Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the company's motion to
dismiss the second consolidated amended complaint has been denied.

In August and September 2017, two purported class action lawsuits
were filed against us and certain of our executive officers,
alleging, among other things, violations of federal securities laws
on behalf of a class of those who purchased our common stock
between February 12, 2016 and August 8, 2017.

One of those purported class actions, captioned Vargosko v. Zillow
Group, Inc. et al, was brought in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California.

The other purported class action lawsuit, captioned Shotwell v.
Zillow Group, Inc. et al, was brought in the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Washington.

The complaints allege, among other things, that during the period
between February 12, 2016 and August 8, 2017, the company issued
materially false and misleading statements regarding our business
practices.

The complaints seek to recover, among other things, alleged damages
sustained by the purported class members as a result of the alleged
misconduct.

In November 2017, an amended complaint was filed against the
company and certain of its  executive officers in the Shotwell v.
Zillow Group class action lawsuit, extending the beginning of the
class period to November 17, 2014.

In January 2018, the Vargosko v. Zillow Group purported class
action lawsuit was transferred to the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington and consolidated with the Shotwell
v. Zillow Group purported class action lawsuit.

In February 2018, the plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended
complaint, and in April 2018, we filed our motion to dismiss the
consolidated amended complaint.

In May 2018, the plaintiffs filed their opposition to the company's
motion to dismiss the consolidated amended complaint. In June 2018,
the company filed its reply in support of its motion to dismiss the
consolidated amended complaint.

In October 2018, the company's motion to dismiss was granted
without prejudice, and the plaintiffs were given 45 days file a
second consolidated amended complaint and attempt to cure the
defects in their consolidated amended complaint.

In November 2018, the plaintiffs filed a second consolidated
amended complaint, which the company moved to dismiss in December
2018. In January 2019, the plaintiffs filed their opposition to the
company's motion to dismiss the second consolidated amended
complaint.

In February 2019, the company filed its reply in support of its
motion to dismiss the second consolidated amended complaint. On
April 19, 2019, the company's motion to dismiss the second
consolidated amended complaint was denied, and the company filed
its answer to the second amended complaint on May 3, 2019.

The company has denied the allegations of wrongdoing and intend to
vigorously defend the claims in this lawsuit.

The company has not recorded an accrual related to this lawsuit as
of March 31, 2019 and December 31, 2018, as the company do not
believe a loss is probable.

Zillow Group, Inc. operates real estate and home-related brands on
mobile and the Web in the United States. Zillow Group, Inc. was
incorporated in 2004 and is headquartered in Seattle, Washington.


[*] Department of Justice Objects to Class Action Settlements
-------------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Bronstad, writing for Law.com, reports that the U.S.
Department of Justice has objected to settlements this year as part
of its growing interest to make sure class actions are fair to
consumers.

In February: The DOJ filed a statement of interest in a case before
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit involving Tristar
pressure cookers. Later that month, it did the same thing in a case
in Illinois involving the ingredient labels on Lenny & Larry's
cookies.

Lawyers in the cookie case reached a new deal that a judge approved
in May. But, on May 10, the DOJ filed another statement of
interest, this time in a settlement involving the health claims of
Dial's antibacterial soap.

So what do government lawyers have their eyes on? Plaintiffs'
attorney fees, for one. But the DOJ also has a particular focus on
what consumers are getting -- or, more accurately, what they're not
getting -- in the settlements. In the cases so far, that's free
cookies and discount coupons instead of cash.

Burt Rublin (Ballard Spahr), who is following these cases, said
"The increasingly proactive role taken by the DOJ in opposing class
settlements that involve either coupons or monetary relief for
class members that is minor in comparison to the attorneys' fees
sought by class counsel represents a clear shot across the bow of
the plaintiffs' class action bar. While the very recent amendments
to Rule 23 discouraging 'professional' class action objectors may
have otherwise emboldened certain plaintiffs' lawyers to enter into
'sweetheart' class settlements with defendants that are better for
the plaintiffs' lawyers than the class, the objections by DOJ
should give serious pause to any lawyers contemplating such deals,
including defense counsel."  [GN]


[*] Settlement Class Can Contain Non-Domestic Purchasers, Sellers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
John C. Coffee Jr., writing for New York Law Journal, reports that
everyone knows that Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 561 U.S.
247 (2010), ended the ability of those who purchased or sold
securities outside the United States to participate in U.S. class
actions. Everyone knows this -- and therefore, unsurprisingly, it
turns out to be not quite true. As usual, people miss the
exceptions to generalizations that they think are universal rules.
In fact, there are at least two routes that permit a foreign
purchaser to participate in a U.S. class action. Neither has been
much exploited to date, but both may be pushed aggressively in the
near future.

First, although a litigation class cannot be certified unless it
can be shown (without an individual inquiry into each class member)
that only domestic purchasers or sellers are covered, a settlement
class can be broader and can contain non-domestic purchasers or
sellers. This was shown last year in In re Petrobras Securities
Litigation, 317 F. Supp. 3d 858 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), when Judge Rakoff
certified the class and approved a $3 billion settlement against
Petrobras, the Brazilian oil company, even though the Second
Circuit had earlier reversed his certification of the class because
the "domesticity" of various bond purchasers was in doubt. See In
re Petrobras Secs. Litig., 862 F.3d 250 (2d Cir. 2017). Because
determination of the domesticity of the bond purchasers seemed to
require an individualized inquiry, the Second Circuit had
overturned Judge Rakoff's certification of the class, finding that
it flunked the "predominance" requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (which requires common questions
of law and fact to "predominate" over individual questions).

But then how could Judge Rakoff subsequently certify the class for
settlement purposes? The answer lies in an aspect of Morrison that
not everyone notices. Morrison said that Rule 10b-5 applies only in
the cases of domestic transactions, but that this issue of
domesticity was a "merits" issue and not an issue of subject matter
jurisdiction. That means that, at settlement, the defendant can
waive this issue (and Petrobras did). As Judge Rakoff explained,
even a hopelessly non-meritorious case can be settled if the
defendant is willing to waive "merits" issues.

This idea that settlement classes can be broader than litigation
classes opens up a world of possibilities. Suppose for example that
a Canadian issuer trades 80% in New York on the NYSE and 20% in
Canada on the Toronto Stock Exchange. Next, assume that a
settlement is reached of the U.S. portion of this dispute. The
defendant might wish to settle the Canadian purchasers' claims as
well in one global settlement, for any of several reasons,
including: (1) it wants global peace and an end to costly
litigation (where its own attorneys may cost as much as the
settlement); (2) if the dispute were to settle instead in
overlapping, parallel class actions in the United States and
Canada, the defendant might have to overpay because it would be
uncertain where claimants will file and many claimants would wait
to see which settlement is higher (and some claimants will try to
obtain recoveries in both); or (3) the defendant may feel it can
overreach the Canadian plaintiffs through collusion by using a
friendly plaintiff's attorney to include them within the global
settlement at a price below what they would receive in Canada.

Can a U.S. judge certify and approve such a settlement when a
significant percentage of those covered are foreign purchasers?
Although Judge Rakoff said that defendants can waive the merits and
settle as they want, the Petrobras case he approved did not really
test this principle, as it was only unclear where the Petrobras
bonds had traded. Going even a step further, consider next an
extreme case where a foreign defendant's stock trades 90% in
London, while its American Depository Receipts (ADRs) trade only in
the United States and account for the other 10% of the trading. Can
a settlement of the claims held by ADRs holders in the United
States be used as a vehicle for a global settlement of all claims
based on the defendant's waiver of the domesticity issue? Even if
subclassing and separate counsel are used, this outcome seemingly
renders Morrison a nullity in the settlement class context.
International comity may also be threatened, as this procedure
arguably is an end run around U.K. law, which does not recognize a
securities class action.

Another legal route to this same end is also possible, but no less
controversial. Under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367, federal courts can hear a
case over which they would lack subject matter jurisdiction, but
only if the case shares the same nucleus of operative facts as a
case before the court over which the court does have jurisdiction.
The purpose of conferring such "supplemental jurisdiction" is to
encourage integrated resolution of sprawling cases and avoid more
costly piecemeal resolution. Its core requirement that there be a
common set of shared facts will often (and probably generally) be
true with respect to securities litigation, where the key factual
issues in both actions are likely to be: (1) the presence or
absence of a material misstatement or omission, or (2) the presence
or absence of scienter by the defendant. Assume now that a
litigation class is brought in the same U.S./Canadian dispute
discussed above, and a class of Canadian purchasers seeks to
intervene in the U.S. action, based on supplemental jurisdiction,
but asserting Canadian law claims. Of course, under §1367(c), the
court need not accept a case that presents "novel or complex
issues," but most Canadian class actions will not present "novel or
complex" issues. In truth, a Canadian class action (in which
scienter and reliance do not have to be shown under Canadian law)
is really a simpler version of the U.S. litigation.

Does this attempt offend the principles underlying Morrison? At its
core, Morrison seemed most concerned about U.S. law seeking to
dominate the world, thereby riding roughshod over principles of
international comity. But the Canadian action would be applying
Canadian law so there would not be any extraterritorial application
of U.S. law.

To date, securities classes of foreign purchasers have met a mixed
response from U.S. courts. (I cover these cases in a recent
article. See John C. Coffee, Global Settlements: Promise and Peril
(April 9, 2019). Those courts that have refused to permit a foreign
class to be appended to a domestic U.S. class action have chiefly
raised the issue of comity. In addition, they have doubted that the
United States has any interest in providing a forum for foreign
shareholders to resolve their claims in a U.S. court. For example,
in 2018 in In re Mylan N.V. Secs. Litig., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
52084 (S.D.N.Y. March 28, 2018), the court observed that the United
States has only a "minimal interest, if any, in providing a forum
to litigate the claims of foreign stockholders under foreign
securities laws."

That seems true enough in the case of a foreign corporation that is
merely traded on a U.S. exchange. But what if the corporation is a
U.S. company that trades 80% in the United States and 20% on some
foreign exchange (such as Canada). In the case of a settlement
class, this U.S. company has a clear interest in resolving all the
litigation against it expeditiously (both to reduce costs and to
place the matter behind it). Thus, if a global settlement can be
negotiated, it seems entirely consistent with the purpose of
supplemental jurisdiction to allow that foreign purchaser class to
join in the settlement before the U.S. court. Principles of comity
are also seldom implicated by a settlement class.

Suppose instead that the corporation is defending a litigation
class and a class of shareholders who purchased outside the United
States wishes to join the fray. Now, there is both an issue as to
comity and as to whether the United States has any "interest" in
permitting foreign purchasers to use its courts. But such an
"interest" may be discoverable. One possible such interest is that
asserted by Judge Henry Friendly when he first announced the
"conduct" test that long prevailed in U.S. courts prior to
Morrison. He posited that the United States had an interest in not
allowing itself to be used as a "base for fraud." See Bersch v.
Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975); I.T.T. v.
Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975). Even though that
consideration has been rejected by Morrison as a basis for the
extraterritorial extension of U.S. law, we are here considering the
very different question of what factors should motivate a U.S.
court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Morrison's concern
about U.S. law being read to rule the world is simply not
applicable here because the foreign purchasers will be suing based
on foreign law. Thus, a claim that the alleged fraud was planned or
implemented in the United States arguably could justify permitting
a class of foreign purchasers to join a class of domestic
purchasers. In contrast, however, if U.S. domestic purchasers
brought suit in the United States against a German corporation
listed on the NYSE, a class of foreign purchasers should not be
permitted to join this litigation, at least absent some showing
that the fraud was planned in the United States.

Supplemental jurisdiction is likely to receive increasing judicial
attention in the near future. One basis for this prediction is the
2018 decision of the Israeli Supreme Court in Cohen v. Tower
Semiconductor that, in the case of a dual listed stock, the law of
the foreign jurisdiction will govern. Thus, even in a suit in
Israel by purchasers in Israel against an Israel company that is
jointly listed on U.S. and Tel Aviv stock exchanges, the U.S.
securities laws will govern. Israel has a large number of companies
cross-listed in both the United States and Israel. Because most of
the trading in these dual listed stocks occurs in the United
States, it would be simpler and more efficient to resolve this
litigation in the U.S. courts, rather than to have parallel suits
be litigated in the United States and Israel. Certainly, there is
no comity problem here because Israel has elected to apply U.S.
law, and thus supplemental jurisdiction would not impose foreign
law on them. Indeed, if the U.S. litigation eventually settles, it
seems predictable that the parties might want to add the claims of
Israeli foreign purchasers to the settlement. This could be done
either under the Petrobras theory that the defendant can waive a
"merits" issue or pursuant to supplemental jurisdiction.

That settlement classes covering a subclass of foreign purchasers
may be coming to U.S. courts is not necessarily a good thing that
should be accepted routinely. Settlement classes have a long
history of being designed to shortchange class members. See Ortiz
v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999). A class of foreign
purchasers seems particularly vulnerable (as notice may not reach
many of the foreign class members). At a minimum, subclassing and
separate counsel should be mandatory.

All in all, for nearly a decade, Morrison has sealed off foreign
purchasers in securities cases from access to U.S. courts. But
nature abhors a vacuum, and those foreign purchasers seem about to
appear on the doorstep of U.S. courts.

John C. Coffee Jr. is the Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law at
Columbia University Law School and Director of its Center on
Corporate Governance. [GN]


[] Florida Supreme Court Rejects Proposed Cy Pres Rule
------------------------------------------------------
Emma Cueto, writing for Law360, reports that the Florida Supreme
Court has rejected a rule proposed by the state bar association
that would have encouraged courts to distribute unclaimed funds
from class action settlements to nonprofit legal services
organizations.

The court's decision on May 16 did not provide a reason why it
rejected the policy, known as cy pres, though arguments presented
to the court against the change cited the fact that the state bar
would have been eligible for the funds, creating a conflict of
interest in its recommendation.

"The court . . . takes this opportunity to thank the [Florida
Bar's] Access Commission for its efforts in identifying possible
funding sources for nonprofit legal aid organizations and commends
the commission for its continued work to address the civil legal
needs of low-income and moderate-income Floridians," the decision
said.

"However," it continued, "after thoroughly considering the [bar]
committees' joint report, the Rules Committee's majority and
minority positions on the proposed cy pres rule, and the comment
filed, and having heard oral argument, the court declines to adopt
the proposed rule."

The state bar formally proposed the rule to the high court in July
2018. The change would have allowed the courts to distribute
unclaimed and residual funds from class action settlements to the
Florida Bar and other legal nonprofits, with the goal being to
increase access to justice and help with the functioning of the
legal system.

A minority of the Rules Committee, however, maintained that the
rule was not something the courts could implement on their own and
would require the state Legislature to pass a law.

Retired lawyer Leza S. Tellam also formally objected to the
proposed rule, suggesting that the Florida Bar was attempting to
funnel money to itself.

She argued that many class actions provide little benefit to the
class, with attorneys deriving most of the benefit through
litigation fees, and accused the bar of looking to take its own cut
of such awards.

She also argued that legal nonprofits were not the only suitable
organizations that might be appropriate places to donate unclaimed
funds. For example, she said, in a suit about opioids it might be
appropriate to give any extra money to drug treatment and education
programs.

These types of cy pres arrangements have become increasingly common
for many courts, though some have challenged whether they are
constitutional.

The U.S. Supreme Court recently took up a case involving cy pres
but sent it back to the Ninth Circuit in March without ruling on
whether the arrangements should be allowed, though some justices
seemed skeptical of them.

The Florida Bar declined to comment on May 17.

A full-text copy of the Decision is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y52e4nk5 from Leagle.com.

Scott Michael Dimond, Chair, Civil Procedure Rules Committee,
Miami, Florida; Honorable Vance Edwin Salter, Co-Chair, Pro Bono
Legal Services Committee, Miami, Florida; Kathleen Schin McLeroy,
Co-Chair, Pro Bono Legal Services Committee, Tampa, Florida;
Dominic C. MacKenzie, Pro Bono Legal Services - The Florida Bar
Foundation, Maitland, Florida; and Joshua E. Doyle, Executive
Director, and Mikalla Andies Davis, Staff Liaison, The Florida Bar,
Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner.

Leza S. Tellam, Winter Park, Florida; [GN]



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact
Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.

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