CAR_Public/190619.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Wednesday, June 19, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 122

                            Headlines

3M COMPANY: Duhl Sues over Defective Combat Arms Earplugs
A+ HOME: Chapman Seeks Overtime Pay for Home Health Aide
ADDUS HEALTHCARE: Court Sets Briefing Schedule in Moore Suit
ADVANCED MICRO: Court Enlarges Trial Deadlines in T. Dickey Suit
ALLSATE IDEMNITY: Brasher Files Suit in Utah

ALNYLAM PHARMA: Bernstein Liebhard to Lead in Securities Suit
AMAZON.COM INC: Andrews et al. Sue over Background Checks
AMERICAN FAMILY CARE: Arnold et al. Allege Discrimination at Work
APPLIED ANALYSIS: Boes Seeks Conditional Class Certification
AT&T MOBILITY: Ayala Seeks to Certify Class and Subclasses

ATLANTIC RECOVERY: Miller Sues Over Illegal Collection Practices
BANKERS LIFE: Court Awards $370K Attorney's Fees in David Suit
BERKS COUNTY, PA: Victory et al. Seek to Certify Class
BLACKROCK INSTITUTIONAL: Baird et al. Seek to Certify Classes
BLINDS TO GO: Delacruz Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

BLOOM ENERGY: Evans Hits Share Drop Over Deployment Deficit
BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY: Rogers Suit Removed to N.D. Ill.
BOB'S DISCOUNT FURNITURE: Faces Klune Labor Suit in California
BOSTON INTERIORS: Sullivan Seeks Overtime Pay for Sales Staff
BRIDGETON LANDFILL: Appeals Ruling in Kitchin Suit to 8th Circuit

BRIGADOON FITNESS: Gorss Motels Seeks to Certify TCPA Class
BRITISH STANDARDS: Williams-Bell Seeks FLSA Collective Class
BROWARD COLLEGE: Brough Sues Over FCCPA Violation
C & L TRUCKING: Gonzalez Files Class Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
CAPITAL ACCOUNTS: Edmonds Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. Pa.

CAPITAL COLLECTION: Tessler Files FDCPA Suit in D. New Jersey
CAREER HORIZONS: Charles Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
CAROLINA FRESH: Stafford Seeks Overtime Pay for Installers
CHECKERS DRIVE-IN: Cotter Sues Over Failure to Secure PII
CHESAPEAKE OPERATING: Court Disallows Amendment to L. West's TAC

COCA-COLA CO: Garcia Appeals Ruling in Nelson Suit to 9th Circuit
COMENITY BANK: Wilson Sues over Robocalls, Debt Collection Tactics
CORBUS PHARMACEUTICAL: Court Appoints Rosen Law as Lead Counsel
CVS PHARMACY: Stinson Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
DAIRYAMERICA INC: $40MM Settlement in Carlin Suit Has Final OK

DCD CONSTRUCTION: Brown Seeks OT Pay for Construction Laborers
DENSO CORP: Sued for Valve Timing Control Device Price-fixing
ENGLAND TRADING: Olsen Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
EQUINOX COLLECTION: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Hargis FDCPA Suit
FIOS INC: DiCarlo Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website

FIRST AMERICAN FINANCIAL: Resendiz Files Class Suit in C.D. Calif.
FIRST CLASS: Fails to Pay OT & Minimum Wages, Verma et al. Say
FISHER-PRICE INC: Barton Sues over Sale of Rock 'n Play Sleeper
FLORIDA: DOC Secretary Appeals Ruling in Hoffer Suit to 11th Cir.
G4S SECURE: Snell Files FCRA Suit in E.D. California

GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE: Russell Suit Removed to S.D. Florida
GENERATIONS HEALTHCARE: Court Dismisses D. Smith FLSA Suit
GEORGIA DIAGNOSTIC: Settlement in Gumm Suit Gets Final Approval
GNP MANAGEMENT: Brown Sues Over Unreasonable Fees
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES: Rosenberg Files Suit in S.D. Florida

HECLA MINING: Batters Sue over Securities Fraud
HOLLOWAY CREDIT: Muse Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
HYUNDAI MOTOR: 9th Cir. Affirms $140MM Deal in Fuel Economy Suit
J.R. SIMPLOT: L. Arroyo Suit Remanded to Calif. Superior Court
JM SMUCKER: Court Narrows Claims in 1st Amended Robinson Suit

JOSEPH WILDCAT: Jones Files FCRA Suit in E.D. Pa.
JPMORGAN CHASE: Removes Osella Class Suit to C.D. California
KEEFE COMMISSARY: Reichert Wash. Subclass Conditionally Certified
KIA MOTORS: Defective Vehicles Suit Transferred to C.D. Cal.
LAKES VENTURE: Marcum Seeks to Certify FLSA Collective Class

LASER SPINE: Embry Seeks to Certify Class of Terminated Workers
LASER SPINE: Higdon Seeks to Certify Class of Terminated Workers
LEX34 FRUIT & VEGETABLE: Bonilla Sues Over Unpaid Wages
LYFT INC: A. Oliver Suit Transferred to S.D. Ga.
MAXIM INTERNATIONAL: Wang Seeks Unpaid Minimum & OT Wages

MERIT RECOVERY: Default Judgment Bid in Muldowney FDCPA Suit Okayed
MICHIGAN STATE: Coleman-Weathersbee Sues Over Overdraft Fees
MICHIGAN: Driver's-License Suspension Law Enforcement Order Flipped
MIDLAND CREDIT: Accetta FDCPA Class Suit Removed to E.D. New York
MIDLAND CREDIT: Alarimo Suit Moved From Suffolk to E.D. New York

MONSANTO COMPANY: Barr Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Bichler Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Combs Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Holeman Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Poiriez Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup

MONSANTO COMPANY: Vejil Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Young Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MOVING SOLUTIONS: Court Rejects Settlement in Middle Rider Case
NATIONAL RECOVERY: Second Circuit Appeal Filed in Pettaway Suit
NILKANTH MAHADEV: Delacruz Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

NPSG GLOBAL: Court Denies Proposed Discovery Plan in Reese Suit
OS RESTAURANT: Briggs Seeks to Certify Class & Subclass
OVERHILL FARMS: Aguilar Files Suit for Breach of Contract
PNS STORES: Wellons Appeals S.D. California Ruling to 9th Circuit
PRIME LEADS: Boger Sues Over Intrusive Telemarketing Practices

PROCTER & GAMBLE: Marsh Seeks to Certify 2 Classes
QUEST DIAGNOSTICS: Carbonneau Sues Over Data Breach
REPUBLIC PARKING: Abrar et al. Suit Transferred to Mass. Cmmw.
SAEJ ENTERPRISES: McMillan Seeks Overtime Wages for Operators
SCELZI ENTERPRISES: Court Extends Murray Responsive Pleading Filing

SCHNEIDER LOGISTICS: Parsittie Labor Suit Removed to C.D. Cal.
SECOND ROUND: Thompson-Bailey Sues over Debt Collection Practices
SINGING RIVER: Court Grants Arbitration Bid in B. Baria Suit
SPERIAN ENERGY: Brady Suit Transferred From N.D. to C.D. Illinois
TAMPA BAY: Hanley Seeks to Certify TCPA Class

TYSON FOODS: Ranchers Cattlemen Suit Asserts Cattle Price-fixing
UNITED HEALTHCARE: Caldwell Sues over Denial of Insurance Claims
WELLS FARGO: Court Narrows Claims in A. Hernandez Suit
WESTERN OILFIELDS: Errecart Files Class Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.

                            *********

3M COMPANY: Duhl Sues over Defective Combat Arms Earplugs
---------------------------------------------------------
The case, DARREN KAY DUHL, the Plaintiff, vs. 3M COMPANY, AEARO
HOLDINGS, LLC, AEARO INTERMEDIATE, LLC, AEARO, LLC and AEARO
TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-01623-MCR-EMT
(N.D. Fla., June 3, 2019), seeks to hold 3M liable for hearing loss
or damage Plaintiff allegedly suffered while serving variously in
the U.S. military, including during foreign conflicts. The
Plaintiff contends that Combat Arms TM Earplugs, Version 2
("CAEv2") manufactured and sold by Aearo were defectively designed
and failed to provide adequate hearing protection. 3M denies these
allegations.

CAEv2, designed by Aearo in close collaboration with the U.S.
military, represented a revolutionary breakthrough in hearing
protection for service members. CAEv2 helped servicemembers better
maintain situational awareness (e.g., to hear nearby voice
commands) while also maintaining some protection from gunfire and
other higher decibel sounds. CAEv2 met the U.S. military's
specifications and helped the military provide hearing protection
to service members.

Despite knowing of the dangerous defects in its earplugs, Defendant
sold the Dual-ended Combat ArmsTM earplugs to the branches of the
U.S. military for more than a decade without providing the U.S.
military and/or Plaintiff with any warning of said defects, causing
Plaintiff and other service members similar permanent injuries,
such as hearing loss.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Michael W. Gaines, esq.
          Tim L. Bowden, esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TIM BOWDEN
          306 Northcreek Blvd., Suite 200
          Goodlettsville, TN 37072
          Telephone: (615) 859-1996
          Facsimile: (615) 859-1921
          E-mail: mwgaines01@gmail.com
                  bowden_law@bellsouth.net

A+ HOME: Chapman Seeks Overtime Pay for Home Health Aide
--------------------------------------------------------
NICOLE CHAPMAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. A+ HOME CARE, the Defendant, Case
2:19-cv-02234-CDJ (E.D. Pa., May 22, 2019), contends that Defendant
has unlawfully failed to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated
individuals employed in the position of Home Health Aide overtime
compensation pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act.

According to the complaint, Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs
regularly worked more than 40 hours per week, but were not properly
compensated for their work in that Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs
were not paid an overtime premium at 1.5 times their regular rate
of pay for each hour worked in excess of 40 hours in a
workweek.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Michael Murphy, Esq.
          Michael Groh, Esq.
          Edmund C. Celiesius, Esq.
          MURPHY LAW GROUP LLC
          Eight Penn Center, Suite 2000
          1628 John F. Kennedy Blvd.
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (267) 273 1054
          Facsimile: (215) 525 0210
          E-mail: murphy@phillyemploymentlawyer.com
                  mgroh@phillyemploymentlawyer.com
                  ea@phillyemploymentlawyer.com

ADDUS HEALTHCARE: Court Sets Briefing Schedule in Moore Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, Oakland Division, issued an Order regarding Briefing
Schedule on Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Portions of the
Defendants' Amended Answer in the case captioned MARY MOORE,
ALEXANDRIA ENCINIAS, individually, and on behalf of other members
of the general public similarly situated; Plaintiffs, v. ADDUS
HEALTHCARE, INC., an unknown business entity; ADDUS HOMECARE, INC.,
an unknown business entity; and DOES 2 through 100, inclusive,
Defendants. Case No. 4:19-CV-01519-HSG. (N.D. Cal.).

The parties previously filed a stipulation on May 17, 2019, seeking
an extension of time to file their respective briefs to provide the
parties with an opportunity to meet and confer regarding Defendants
amending their answer to Plaintiffs' first amended complaint in
order to address the concerns raised in Plaintiffs' motion.

On May 20, 2019, the Court approved the stipulation and extended
the deadlines for Defendants' opposition and for Plaintiffs' reply
to Plaintiffs' motion to strike, to May 31, 2019, and June 7, 2019,
respectively.

The parties now seek an additional extension of time to file their
respective briefs to allow the parties to continue the meet and
confer process regarding Defendants amending their answer in order
to resolve the concerns raised in Plaintiffs' motion.

The parties propose a seven (7) day extension of Defendants' time
to file their opposition and for Plaintiffs' to file their reply to
Plaintiffs' motion to strike, to June 7, 2019 and June 14, 2019,
respectively.

The requested extension of time for each side to respond does not
impact any other dates in this action, including the August 29,
2019 hearing date for Plaintiffs' motion.

The deadline for Defendants' opposition to Plaintiffs' motion to
strike portions of Defendants' amended answer to Plaintiffs' first
amended complaint is continued seven (7) days and is to be filed by
June 7, 2019.

The deadline for Plaintiffs' reply to Defendants' opposition to
Plaintiffs' motion to strike portions of Defendants' amended answer
to Plaintiffs' first amended complaint is continued seven (7) days
and is to be filed by June 14, 2019.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yyk3xvg2 from Leagle.com.

Mary Moore, individually and on behalf of other members of the
general public similarly situated & Alexandria Encinias,
individually and on behalf of other members of the general public
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Edwin Aiwazian --
edwin@lfjpc.com -- Lawyers for Justice, PC, Stanley Donald Saltzman
-- ssaltzman@marlinsaltzman.com -- Marlin & Saltzman & Tara Zabehi
-- tara@lfjpc.com -- Lawyers for Justice, PC.

Addus Healthcare, Inc., an unknown business entity & Addus HomeCare
Corporation, an unknown business entity, Defendants, represented by
Gary Matthew McLaughlin -- gmclaughlin@akingump.com -- Akin Gump
Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, Gregory William Knopp --
gknopp@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP & Victor
A. Salcedo -- vsalcedo@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer Feld
LLP.


ADVANCED MICRO: Court Enlarges Trial Deadlines in T. Dickey Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, Oakland Division, issued an Order enlarging all
Pre-Trial and Trial Deadlines in the case captioned TONY DICKEY,
and PAUL PARMER individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES, INC., a Delaware
corporation, Defendant. Case No. 4:15-cv-04922 HSG. (N.D. Cal.).

The parties participated in a mediation session before the
Honorable James F. Holderman (Ret.) of JAMS in May 2019, and as a
result, have reached an agreement in principle to settle this case
on a class-wide basis, subject to the Court's preliminary and final
approval of the terms of settlement.

The Plaintiffs anticipate needing approximately 30 days to prepare
and file a motion for preliminary approval of class settlement.

The parties have conferred and agreed, subject to the Court's
approval, to enlarge all current pre-trial and trial deadlines by
60 days to allow for the preparation of a formal settlement
agreement and papers in support of the Plaintiffs' anticipated
motion for preliminary approval of class settlement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2khneef from Leagle.com.

Tony Dickey & Paul Parmer, Plaintiffs, represented by Lily E. Hough
-- lhough@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, Benjamin Scott Thomassen --
bthomassen@edelson.com -- Edelson P.C., Brandt Silver-Korn --
bsilverkorn@edelson.com -- Gregory Scott Dovel -- greg@dovel.com --
Dovel and Luner, Rafey Sarkis Balabanian -- rbalabanian@edelson.com
-- Edelson PC, Simon Carlo Franzini -- simon@dovel.com -- Dovel and
Luner & Todd M. Logan -- tlogan@edelson.com -- Edelson PC.

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., Defendant, represented by Matthew
David Powers -- mpowers@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Edmundo
Clay Marquez -- cmarquez@omm.com -- O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP & Kelsey
M. Larson -- klarson@omm.com -- O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP


ALLSATE IDEMNITY: Brasher Files Suit in Utah
--------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Allstate Indemnity.
The case is styled as Donald Brasher individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Allstate Indemnity,
Defendant, Case No. 2:19-mc-00395-CW (D. Utah, June 7, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Statutory Actions.

Allstate Indemnity Company provides property and casualty insurance
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Paul Wesley Evans, Esq.
     BEASLEY ALLEN CROW METHVIN PORTIS & MILES PC
     PO BOX 4160
     MONTGOMERY, AL 36103
     Phone: (334) 269-2343

The Defendant is represented by:

     Daniel K. Brough, Esq.
     BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE PC
     3165 E MILLROCK DR 5TH FL
     SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84121
     Phone: (801) 438-2000
     Email: dbrough@btjd.com

          - and -

     Roger D. Higgins, Esq.
     THOMPSON COE COUSINS & IRONS LLP
     400 N PEARL ST 25TH FL
     DALLAS, TX 75201-2832
     Phone: (214) 871-8229


ALNYLAM PHARMA: Bernstein Liebhard to Lead in Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CARYL HULL LEAVITT, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ALNYLAM PHARMACEUTICALS,
INC., JOHN M. MARAGANORE and MANMEET S. SONI, Defendants, TUNC
TOKER, FREDERICK EDWARDS and CHARLES IAPPINI, Movants, Civil Action
No. 18-12433-NMG (D. Mass.), Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts appointed Tunc
Toker as the Lead Plaintiff and approved his selected Lead Counsel
and Liaison Counsel.

Alnylam is a biopharmaceutical company incorporated in Delaware
with its principal place of business in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
The Company develops and commercializes treatments for hereditary
ATTR amyloidosis which is a gene mutation that causes the build-up
of certain proteins in the body's nerves and organs.

The putative securities fraud class action is brought by Leavitt on
behalf of herself and other similarly situated investors against
Alnylam, its CEO and its CFO in September 2018 in the U.S. States
District Court for the Southern District of New York.   

Leavitt alleges that the Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements regarding the efficacy and marketability of its
therapeutic injection for the treatment of hereditary ATTR
amyloidosis during the class period.  She brings the putative class
action pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
("the PSLRA").  That statute establishes a specific procedure for
the appointment and approval of the lead plaintiff and the lead
counsel in a private securities class action.

In late November, 2018, the case was transferred to the Court.  A
few days later, putative class members Toker, Leavitt, Edwards and
Iappini filed their respective motions to be appointed the Lead
Plaintiff pursuant to the PSLRA.  In December, 2018, Toker and
Edwards filed oppositions to the motions of the other putative
class members.  Iappini filed a notice in support of Toker as
presumptively the most adequate plaintiff under the PSLRA and in
opposition to Edwards' motion for appointment as the Lead
Plaintiff.  Leavitt filed no opposition to the motions of the other
putative class members, thereby ostensibly conceding that she is
not presumptively the most adequate plaintiff under the PSLRA.
Judge Gorton therefore analyzes only whether Toker or Edwards
should be appointed as the Lead Plaintiff in the matter.

After reviewing the financial figures and calculations of both
Toker and Edwards, the Judge finds that all the relevant sales of
Toker's stock occurred after the disclosure date and thus the
amount of approximate recoverable losses he declares ($89,700)
appears to be accurate.  Even the largest amount of Edwards' losses
(as attributed by Toker) is less than the apparent losses suffered
by Toker.  Toker therefore has the largest financial interest in
the relief sought by the class.

Aside from having incurred the greatest approximate losses, the
Judge finds that Toker also appears to have the largest financial
interest.  Toker submits that he paid $761,700 more for stock than
he realized from the sale of such stock during the Class Period
while Edwards' differential during the same time frame was only
$3,100.  Again, Edwards does not contest any of Toker's
calculations.

Toker otherwise satisfies the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
First, his claims are typical of those of the other class members
because he has suffered the same injuries as a result of the same
course of conduct by the Defendants.  Second, Toker is an adequate
lead plaintiff because 1) he and the other class members have the
same interest in maximizing the recovery from defendants for the
alleged fraud, 2) he has a substantial financial stake in the
litigation that will ensure his vigorous prosecution of the claims
and 3) he has chosen qualified and experienced counsel.  Toker is
therefore presumptively the most adequate Plaintiff and will be
appointed as the Lead Plaintiff unless one of the other movants
timely demonstrates that he is inadequate.

Edwards has not attempted to show that Toker is either unable to
protect, fairly and adequately, the interests of the class or is
subject to unique defenses that render him incapable of adequately
representing the class.  Furthermore, Iappini has conceded that
Toker is the most adequate plaintiff and Leavitt has submitted no
opposition to Toker's appointment as the Lead Plaintiff in the
case.  Toker is will therefore be appointed as the Lead Plaintiff
and the competing motions will be denied.

The Judge will approve Toker's selection of Berstein Liebhard as
the Lead Counsel and Berman Tabacco as the liaison counsel for the
purported class.  Both firms appear to have extensive experience in
the area of securities class actions and have secured favorable
dispositions for their respective clients.  There is no apparent
reason why both firms cannot adequately represent the class
together, particularly if Berman Tabacco is serving in a largely
administrative role and an arrangement is made to avoid the
incurrence of duplicate fees.  Moreover, none of the other movants
opposes Toker's choice of counsel.  Accordingly, Toker's motion to
approve his selection of the Lead Counsel and the Liaison Counsel
will be allowed.

For these reasons, Judge Gorton allowed the motion to appoint Tunc
Toker as the Lead Plaintiff and to approve his selection of the
Lead Counsel and the Liaison Counsel.  He denied (i) the motion to
appoint Caryl Hull Leavitt as the Lead Plaintiff and to approve her
selection of the Lead Counsel and the Liaison Counsel; (ii) the
motion to appoint Frederick Edwards as the Lead Plaintiff and to
approve his selection of the Lead Counsel; and (iii) the motion to
appoint Charles Iappini as the Lead Plaintiff and to approve his
selection of the Lead Counsel.

Upon good cause shown, the Judge granted the Motion of Tunc Toker
for Appointment as Lead Plaintiff and Approval of Counsel.  Tunc
Toker is appointed as Lead Plaintiff, Bernstein Liebhard LLP as the
Lead Counsel, and Berman Tabacco as the Liaison Counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 8, 2019 Memorandum and Order is
available at https://is.gd/sF454q from Leagle.com.

Caryl Hull Leavitt, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Daryl DeValerio
Andrews, Andrews DeValerio, Joseph Alexander Hood, II --
ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP & Jeremy A. Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.

Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, Inc., John M. Maraganore & Manmeet S.
Soni, Defendants, represented by James R. Carroll, Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Michael S. Hines, Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom LLP, Scott D. Musoff -- smusoff@skadden.com --
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Alisha Quintana Nanda --
Alisha.Nanda@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
LLP & Marley Ann Brumme -- marley.brumme@skadden.com -- Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP.

Tunc Toker, Movant, represented by Laurence Jesse Hasson, Bernstein
Liebhard LLP, pro hac vice & Leslie R. Stern, Berman Tabacco.

Frederick Edwards, Movant, represented by Joshua Baker, The Rosen
Law Firm, P.A.

Charles Iappini, Movant, represented by Shannon L. Hopkins, Levi
Korsinsky LLP.


AMAZON.COM INC: Andrews et al. Sue over Background Checks
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Amazon.com, Inc.
for the alleged violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The case is captioned DEXTER ANDREWS, RAYMOND DUNN, NUNO
GOMES, TITUS ROYAL, MATTHEW SOLER, and NICHOLAS YOUNG, Plaintiffs
v. AMAZON.COM, INC., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-11182 (D. Mass.,
May 24, 2019).

The Plaintiffs are Black and Latino delivery drivers who were
summarily terminated as a result of Amazon's racially
discriminatory background check policy and practice. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs call on Amazon to adopt a fair and nondiscriminatory
background screening policy.

Amazon.com, Inc. is a foreign corporation based in Seattle. It
sells and delivers a wide range of goods and products throughout
the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Stephen Churchill, Esq.
     FAIR WORK, P.C.
     192 South Street, Suite 450
     Boston, MA 02111
     Telephone: (617) 607-3260
     E-mail: steve@fairworklaw.com

             - and -

     Oren Sellstrom, Esq.
     Sophia Hall, Esq.
     LAWYERS FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
     61 Batterymarch Street, 5th Floor
     Boston, MA 02110
     Telephone: (617) 482-1145
     E-mail: osellstrom@lawyersforcivilrights.org
             shall@lawyersforcivilrights.org


AMERICAN FAMILY CARE: Arnold et al. Allege Discrimination at Work
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against American Family
Care, Inc. for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and 42 U.S.C.
Section 1981. The case is captioned CLARISA ARNOLD, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, v. AMERICAN FAMILY CARE, INC., Defendant, Case No.
6:19-cv-00791-LSC (N.D. Ala., May 24, 2019). Plaintiffs assert that
the Defendant willfully violated Title VII by subjecting them and
other similarly situated African-American clinic managers and/or
clinic managers of color to unequal compensation and promotion
opportunities compared to white, non-African-American clinic
managers.

American Family Care, Inc. provides urgent care, primary care,
family medicine, and occupational health services for various acute
conditions, non-life threatening illness, and injuries. The company
has more than 160 clinics and 500 in-network physicians caring for
more than 2 million patients a year. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Robert J. Camp, Esq.
     WIGGINS, CHILDS, PANTAZIS, FISHER & GOLDFARB, L.L.C.
     The Kress Building
     301 19th Street North
     Birmingham, AL 35203
     Telephone: (205) 314-0500


APPLIED ANALYSIS: Boes Seeks Conditional Class Certification
------------------------------------------------------------
In a class action lawsuit, DOUGLAS C. BOES, individually and on
behalf of other similarly situated employees, the Plaintiff, v.
APPLIED ANALYSIS CORPORATION, the Defendant, Case No.
5:19-cv-00505-JLS (E.D. Pa.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an
order:

   1. granting conditional certification and court-authorized
      notice to Putative Class Members;

   2. conditionally certifying the action for purposes of notice
      and discovery;

   3. directing that judicial notice be sent to all putative class

      members ("Straight Time for Overtime Workers");

   4. approving notice and consent form;

   5. directing mailing and e-mailing of notice, along with a
      reminder notice;

   6. permitting Class Counsel to contact Straight Time for
      Overtime Workers by telephone, if they are former employees,
      or the mailed or emailed Notice and Consent Forms are
      returned as undeliverable;

   7. directing that Applied Analysis Corporation to produce to
      Class Counsel the contact information for each of the Day
      Rate Workers within 10 days of the Court's order; and

   8. authorizing a 60-day notice period for the Day Rate Workers
      to join the case.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Richard M. Schreiber, Esq.
          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP, LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: 713 352 1100
          Facsimile: 713 352 3300
          E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  rschreiber@mybackwages.com
                  adunlap@mybackwages.com

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH, PLLC
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: 713 877-8788
          Facsimile: 713 877 8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com

               - and -

          Eric H. Weitz, Esq.
          THE WEITZ LAW FIRM, LLC
          1528 Walnut Street, 4 th Floor
          Philadelphia, PA 19102
          Telephone: 267-587-6240
          Facsimile: 215-689-0875
          E-mail: eric.weitz@theweitzfirm.com

AT&T MOBILITY: Ayala Seeks to Certify Class and Subclasses
----------------------------------------------------------
In a class action lawsuit, NATASHA AYALA, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. AT&T MOBILITY
SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company; and DOES 1
THROUGH 100, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No.
2:18-cv-08809-SVW-MRW (C.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff will move the
Court for an order on July 1, 2019:

   1. certifying a Class and several Subclasses:

      The Class:

      "all current and former hourly non-exempt employees of
      Defendant who, at any time from August 22, 2014 through the
      date of class certification, worked at Call Centers located
      in California and received commission payments";

      Wage Statement Sub-Class:

      "all current and former hourly non-exempt employees of
      Defendant who, at any time during the period of August 22,
      2017 through the date of class certification, worked at Call

      Centers located in California and received commission
      payments and were provided at least one wage statement
      containing the "OT TRUE-UP ADD'L COMP" description;

      "Regular Rate" Sub-Class

      "all current and former hourly non-exempt employees of
      Defendant who, at any time during the period of August 22,
      2014 through the date of class certification, worked at Call

      Centers located in California and received nonhourly
      compensation and worked more than eight (8) hours in a
      workday or 40 hours in a workweek";

      "Meal Period Pay Computation" Sub-Class

      "all current and former hourly non-exempt employees of
      Defendant who, at any time during the period of August 22,
      2014 through the date of class certification, worked at Call

      Centers located in California and received commission
      payments and received at least one meal period premium
      payment during the same period that commissions were
earned";

      "Waiting Time Penalties" Sub-Class:

      "all former hourly non-exempt employees of Defendant who, at

      any time during the period of August 22, 2015 through the
      date of class certification, worked at Call Centers located
      in California and received commission payments and is a
      member of Regular Rate Sub-Class and/or Meal Period
      Computation Sub-Class";

   2. finding Plaintiff to be an adequate representative of the
      class members and certifying her as the class
representative;

   3. finding Plaintiff's counsel, David P. Myers, Robert M.
      Kitson, Jason Hatcher, and Morgan B. Good, of The Myers Law
      Group, A.P.C., as adequate class counsel and certifying them

      as class counsel; and

   4. authorizing Plaintiff's Counsel to send Class Notice pursuant

      to Rule 23 (in a form to be approved by the Court after a
      conference with counsel for the Defendant). The Notice shall

      permit class members to opt-out of the class if they so
      desire within 30 days of the mailing of the notice by sending

      a written request signed by the class member which lists the

      class member's full name, address, telephone number, and last

      four digits of the class member's social security number.
      Notice shall be provided to the class via U.S. Mail to the
      last known address reflected on Defendant's records.
      Defendant shall cooperate with Class Counsel in preparing a
      computerized mailing list as required.[CC]

Attorneys for Plaintiff Natasha Ayala and all other similarly
situated:

          David P. Myers, Esq.
          Robert M. Kitson, Esq.
          Jason Hatcher, Esq.
          Morgan Good, Esq.
          THE MYERS LAW GROUP, A.P.C.
          9327 Fairway View Place, Suite 100
          Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91730
          Telephone: (909) 919-2027
          Facsimile: (888) 375-2102
          E-mail: dmyers@myerslawgroup.com
                  rkitson@myerslawgroup.com
                  jhatcher@myerslawgroup.com
                  mgood@myerslawgroup.com

ATLANTIC RECOVERY: Miller Sues Over Illegal Collection Practices
----------------------------------------------------------------
Colleen Miller, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Atlantic Recovery Solutions, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-03988, (C.D. Cal., May 9, 2019) seeks
statutory damages and appropriate injunctive relief for violations
of the Fair Debt Collection Act.

Atlantic Recovery Solutions, LLC --
https://www.atlanticrecoverysolutions.com/ -- is a nationally
licensed, insured, bonded debt recovery agency. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Nicholas J. Bontrager, Esq.
      George Thomas Martin, III
      MARTIN AND BONTRAGER APC
      6464 West Sunset Boulevard, Suite 960
      Los Angeles, CA 90028
      Tel: (323) 940-1697
      Fax: (323) 328-8095
      Email: nick@mblawapc.com
             tom@mblawapc.com

             - and -

      Matthew A. Rosenthal, Esq.
      WESTGATE LAW
      16444 Paramount Boulevard, Suite 205
      Paramout, CA 90723
      Tel: (818) 200-1497
      Fax: (818) 869-2208
      Email: matt@westgatelaw.com


BANKERS LIFE: Court Awards $370K Attorney's Fees in David Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, issued an Order granting Parties' Stipulated
Motion for Preliminary Approval of a Class Action Settlement in the
case captioned CHRISTINE DAVID and RODNEY CLURE, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BANKERS
LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Defendant. No.
14-cv-00766-RSL. (W.D. Wash.).

The Proposed Settlement Class Satisfies Fed. R. Civ. P. 23

To be certified under Rule 23, the Plaintiffs and the proposed
Settlement Class must satisfy all the requirements of Rule 23(a):
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable (numerosity) (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class (commonality) (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class (typicality) and (4) the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class (adequacy).

In addition, the proposed Settlement Class must satisfy the
requirements of superiority and predominance under Rule 23(b)(3).
Predominance is similar to the inquiry on commonality, but focuses
on whether the proposed class is sufficiently cohesive to warrant
adjudication by representation. Superiority requires that a class
action be superior to other available methods for adjudication.

Numerosity

Here, the Settlement Class's size is sufficiently numerous to meet
the requirement of numerosity. There are over 200 class members. As
a general rule a potential class of 40 members is considered
impractical to join.  

Commonality

Rule 23(a)(2) requires that the claims of the proposed class depend
upon a common contention of such a nature that it is capable of
classwide resolution. The rule does not require that every question
of law or fact be common to every member, nor does it require that
class members be identically situated or have suffered the same
degree of injury.

Here, common legal and factual issues bind the Settlement Classes,
namely whether Bankers had a practice of treating new agents under
Al Hawks' management as employees rather than independent
contractors. In prior briefing, Bankers did not dispute that common
evidence existed on most (4 of 6) of the relevant factors on the
economic dependence test  even as applied to a larger and more
diverse class of agents. A common legal and factual question also
exists as to whether Bankers can rely on the outside sales
exemption to avoid overtime obligations even if the Agents were
misclassified.

The Court therefore finds that the claims of the Settlement Class
Members are bound by sufficient common threads of fact and law to
satisfy Rule 23(a)(2).

Typicality

Typicality is satisfied if the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are reasonably co-extensive of the claims of
absent class members. This factor closely resembles that of
commonality and requires that the representative be part of the
class and `possess the same interest and suffer the same injury' as
the class members.

Here, Plaintiffs challenge their classification and, as such, their
claims are typical of and co-extensive with those of the Settlement
Class. And again, this factor was not at issue in the Court's prior
ruling on class certification.  

Adequacy.

The proposed Class Representatives and their counsel will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the Settlement Class.
Plaintiffs have no antagonistic or conflicting interests with
absent Settlement Class members and Class counsel are experienced
in employment litigation and class action practice.

Superiority and Predominance.

Finally, on the elements of superiority and predominance, the Court
is satisfied that both requirements are met. While the Court
expressed previous concerns over manageability of this case if it
were to proceed as a class action at trial, such concerns are no
longer present.  The parties' proposed settlement provides a
superior method to address Bankers' alleged violations of
Washington wage laws than individual claims. The Court has not been
presented with any evidence that any class members have ever
instituted any other lawsuits on the issues raised in this case or
shown any interest in individual control of this litigation even
after decertification. As such, rejecting the parties' proposed
settlement in this case would lead not to alternative methods of
adjudicating this dispute for other Agents, but to a denial of
relief to them altogether.

The Court finds that the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) are
satisfied.

The Court Preliminarily Approves the Proposed Settlement as Fair
and Reasonable

Based on the Court's review of the instant motion and the parties'
Settlement Agreement (Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Lindsay L.
Halm) together with its knowledge of the claims and defenses at
issue in the case and the proceedings to date, the Court concludes
that the terms of the parties' proposed settlement appear fair,
reasonable, and adequate.
  
The Court approves notifying the Settlement Class of Plaintiffs'
request for $370,000 in attorneys' fees and costs, subject to final
approval at the Final Fairness Hearing. payments of $10,000 each
for the Class Representatives in recognition of their role in this
case and service to the Settlement Class, subject to final approval
at the Final Fairness Hearing.

The Court directs Class Counsel to submit a motion for final
approval of the settlement, along with a proposed order approving
the settlement and awarding Class Counsel's fees/costs and
incentive payments for Class Representatives no later than fifteen
(15) calendar days prior to the date of the Final Fairness Hearing.
Such papers shall also inform the Court whether the mailing to
Settlement Class Members was completed in accordance with the
requirements of this Order, and provide information concerning any
optouts or objections received as a result of such mailing.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3v3ufz5 from Leagle.com.

Christine David & Rodney Clure, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Adam J.
Berger -- berger@sgb-law.com -- SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER,
Lindsay Halm -- halm@sgb-law.com -- SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER,
Martin S. Garfinkel, SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER & Jamal N.
Whitehead -- whitehead@sgb-law.com -- SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER.

Bankers Life and Casualty Company, a foreign corporation,
Defendant, represented by Ryan Paul Hammond -- rhammond@littler.com
-- LITTLER MENDELSON, Breanne Sheetz Martell --
bsmartell@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON & Daniel L. Thieme --
dthieme@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON.


BERKS COUNTY, PA: Victory et al. Seek to Certify Class
------------------------------------------------------
In a class action lawsuit, THERESA VICTORY, ALICE VELAZQUEZ-DIAZ,
and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. BERKS COUNTY,
et al., the Defendants, Case No. 5:18-cv-05170-MAK (E.D. Pa.), the
Plaintiffs move the Court for an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all current and future female inmates committed to the
Berks
      County Jail System who have the Trusty custody-level
      classification and/or Work Release status but have been
      denied assignment to the Community Reentry Center ("CRC") and

      denied access to the privileges, services, and programs
      available to men assigned to the CRC"; and

   2. designating Theresa Victory and Alice Velazquez-Diaz as the
      class representatives.

There are currently approximately 5 to 11 women committed to the
Berks County Jail System at any time who satisfy the criteria for
class membership. Between 43 to 75 women enter the facility
throughout the year who satisfy the criteria for class membership,
the lawsuit says.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiffs and Proposed Class Members:

          Matthew A. Feldman, Esq.
          Su Ming Yeh, Esq.
          Angus R. Love, Esq.
          Jim Davy, Esq.
          PENNSYLVANIA INSTITUTIONAL LAW PROJECT
          718 Arch St., Suite 304S
          Philadelphia, PA 19106
          Telephone: 215 925 2966
          E-mail: mfeldman@pailp.org

Attorneys for the Defendant:

          Matthew J. Connell, Esq.
          Samantha Ryan, Esq.
          MACMAIN LAW GROUP
          433 W. Market Street, Suite 200
          West Chester, PA 19382
          E-mail: mconnell@macmainlaw.com

BLACKROCK INSTITUTIONAL: Baird et al. Seek to Certify Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
In a class action lawsuit against BlackRock, Inc., and several
entities, the Plaintiffs will move the Court for an order on August
8, 2019:

   1. certifying CTI Class and the BlackRock Plan Class pursuant
to
      Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(1)(A) and (B), or alternatively, Rule
      23(b)(3):

      CTI Plan Class:

      "all participants (and their beneficiaries) whose employee
      benefit plans were governed by Title I of ERISA and invested

      directly or indirectly in the BlackRock CTIs during the Class

      Period"

      BlackRock Plan Class:

      "all participants (and their beneficiaries) in the BlackRock

      Retirement Savings Plan during the Class Period";

   2. appointing Plaintiffs as Class representatives; and

   3. appointing Class Counsel pursuant to Rule 23(g).

The case is captioned as Charles Baird and Lauren Slayton, as
individuals, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and on
behalf of the BlackRock Retirement Savings Plan, Plaintiffs, vs.
BlackRock Institutional Trust Company, N.A.; BlackRock, Inc.; The
BlackRock, Inc. Retirement Committee; The Investment Committee of
the Retirement Committee; The Administrative Committee of the
Retirement Committee; The Management Development & Compensation
Committee, Catherine Bolz, Chip Castille, Paige Dickow, Daniel A.
Dunay, Jeffrey A. Smith; Anne Ackerley, Amy Engel, Nancy Everett,
Joseph Feliciani Jr., Ann Marie Petach, Michael Fredericks, Corin
Frost, Daniel Gamba, Kevin Holt, Chris Jones, Philippe Matsumoto,
John Perlowski, Andy Phillips, Kurt Schansinger, Tom Skrobe;
Kathleen Nedl, Marc Comerchero, Joel Davies, John Davis, Milan
Lint, Laraine McKinnon, (collectively, "BlackRock Defendants") and
Mercer Investment Consulting, the Defendants, Case No.
4:17:cv-01892-HSG/KAW (N.D. Cal.).[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Michelle C. Yau, Esq.
          Mary J. Bortscheller, Esq.
          Daniel R. Sutter, Esq.
          COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC
          1100 New York Ave. NW Fifth Floor
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 408-4600
          Facsimile: (202) 408-4699

               - and -

          Todd Jackson, Esq.
          Nina Wasow, Esq.
          FEINBERG, JACKSON, WORTHMAN &
          WASOW, LLP
          2030 Addison St. Suite 500
          Berkeley, CA 94704
          Telephone: (510) 269-7998
          Facsimile: (510) 269-7994

Attorneys for the Defendants:

          Mary J. Bortscheller, Esq.
          E-mail: mbortscheller@cohenmilstein.com
          COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC
          1100 New York Ave., NW, Suite 500
          Washington, D.C. 20005
          Telephone: (202) 408-4600
          Facsimile: (202) 408-4699

BLINDS TO GO: Delacruz Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Blinds To Go (U.S.)
Inc. The case is styled as Emanuel Delacruz And On Behalf of All
Other Persons Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. Blinds To Go (U.S.)
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-05384 (S.D. N.Y., June 7, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Blinds To Go (U.S.) Inc. manufactures home improvement products.
The Company offers drapery hardware, blinds, and shades. Blinds To
Go serves clients in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
     150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
     New York, NY 10003
     Phone: (212) 228-9795
     Fax: (212) 982-6284
     Email: nyjg@aol.com


BLOOM ENERGY: Evans Hits Share Drop Over Deployment Deficit
-----------------------------------------------------------
David L. Evans, Theodor Gillebaard, and Florinel Marica,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
Bloom Energy Corporation, KR Sridhar, Randy Furr, L. John Doerr,
Scott Sandell, Eddy Zervigon, Colin L. Powell, Peter Teti, Mary K.
Bush, Kelly A. Ayotte, John T. Chambers, J.P. Morgan Securities
LLC, Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC,
Keybanc Capital Markets Inc., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
Incorporated, Robert W. Baird & Co., Incorporated, Cowen And
Company, LLC, HSBC Securities (USA) Inc., Oppenheimer & Co. Inc.,
Raymond James & Associates, Inc. and Does 1-25, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 19CV347262 (Cal. Super., May 7, 2019), seeks
to recover damages as a result of violations of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

Bloom Energy provides distributed electronic power generation
solutions based on its proprietary solid oxide fuel cell
technology. Its main product, Bloom Energy Servers, are on-site
stationary power generators fueled with natural gas, offering
customers clean, uninterrupted, off-the-grid energy.

On June 12, 2018, Bloom Energy made its initial public offering of
shares of its common stock and sold 20,700,000 shares of Class A
common stock at $15.00 per share, netting cash proceeds of $282.3
million.

However, the Offering Materials omitted to disclose that Bloom
Energy' deployments of Bloom Energy servers for the quarter fell
below target due to construction delays which resulted in
significantly lower deployments. As a result, Bloom Energy stock
plummeted to under $10 per share, or $5 below the IPO price.

Plaintiffs purchased or otherwise acquired Bloom Energy common
stock pursuant or traceable during its Initial Public Offering.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      David J. Stone, Esq.
      BRAGAR EAGEL & SQUIRE P.C.
      885 Third Avenue, Suite 3040
      New York, NY 10022
      Telephone: (212) 308-5858
      Email: stone@bespc.com

             - and -

      Marion C. Passmore, Esq.
      Melissa A. Fortunato, Esq.
      BRAGAR EAGEL & SQUIRE P.C.
      885 Third Avenue, Suite 3040
      New York, NY 10022
      Telephone: (212) 308-5858
      Facsimile: (212) 486-0462
      Email: fortunato@bespc.com
             passmore@bespc.com


BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY: Rogers Suit Removed to N.D. Ill.
------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Richard Rogers, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BNSF Railway Company,
Defendant, Case No. 2019-CH-0439 (Cook County Circuit Court,
Chancery Division, April 16, 2019), was removed to the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on May
7, 2019 under Case No. 19-cv-03083. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      David L. Gerbie, Esq.
      MCGUIRE LAW, P.C.
      55 W. Wacker Drive, 9th Floor
      Chicago, IL 60601
      Tel: (312) 893-7002
      Fax: (312) 275-7895
      Email: dgerbie@mcgpc.com

BNSF Railway Company is represented by:

      Elizabeth Brooke Herrington, Esq.
      MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
      77 West Wacker Drive, Suite 500
      Chicago, IL 60601
      Tel: (312) 324-1000
      Email: beth.herrington@morganlewis.com

             - and -

      Alex David Berger, Esq.
      MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
      77 W. Wacker Drive
      Fifth Floor
      Chicago, IL 60601
      Tel: (312) 324-1745
      Email: alex.berger@morganlewis.com

             - and

      Tyler Zachary Zmick, Esq.
      MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
      77 W. Wacker Dr., Fifth Floor
      Chicago, IL 60601
      Tel: (312) 324-1188
      Email: tyler.zmick@morganlewis.com


BOB'S DISCOUNT FURNITURE: Faces Klune Labor Suit in California
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Bob's Discount
Furniture, LLC for violations of the California Labor Code and the
applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders. The case is
captioned BOZENA KLUNE, an individual, on behalf of herself and
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, vs. BOB'S DISCOUNT FURNITURE,
LLC, a Massachusetts limited liability company; and DOES 1 through
50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 19STCV17964 (Cal. Super., Los
Angeles Cty., May 23, 2019).

According to the complaint, Defendants have had a consistent policy
of failing to pay all wages due to aggrieved employees during the
course of employment and timely upon separation from employment.
Specifically, Defendants required Plaintiff and the aggrieved
employees to work off the clock and failed to record accurate time
worked by these employees. Defendants also failed to provide
aggrieved employees with meal and rest periods, because they were
not provided with the opportunity to take full, uninterrupted, and
duty-free rest periods and meal breaks as required by the Labor
Code. In the event Defendants paid employees meal or rest premiums
for any missed meal or rest breaks, they failed to accurately
calculate the "regular rate of pay" by omitting the weekly earned
commissions in the computation. Furthermore, Defendants failed to
provide employees with accurately itemized wage statements, which
prevented them from learning of their unlawful pay practices.
Finally, Defendants failed to provide signed, written commission
contracts, and to reimburse necessary business expenses to its
California employees.

Bob's Discount Furniture, LLC is a Massachusetts limited liability
company that operates discount furniture stores. The company sells
furniture and bedding products through physical stores and online
channels throughout the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     David Yeremian, Esq.
     DAVID YEREMIAN & ASSOCIATES, INC.
     535 N. Brand Blvd., Suite 705
     Glendale, CA 91203
     Telephone: (818) 230-8380
     Facsimile: (818) 230-0308
     E-mail: david@yeremianlaw.com

             - and -

     Emil Davtyan, Esq.
     DAVTYAN PROFESSIONAL LAW CORP.
     5959 Topanga Canyon Blvd., Suite 130
     Woodland Hills, CA 91367
     Telephone: (818) 875-2008
     E-mail: emil@davtyanlaw.com


BOSTON INTERIORS: Sullivan Seeks Overtime Pay for Sales Staff
-------------------------------------------------------------
SANDRA SULLIVAN, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. BOSTON INTERIORS FURNISHINGS, LLC, the
Defendant, Case No. 19-1527 (Mass. Super., May 31, 2019), seeks to
recover overtime pay under Massachusetts General Law.

Ms. Sullivan, a resident of Methuen, Massachusetts, worked as a
sales associate for Defendant's Burlington retail store. She
routinely worked more than 40 hours per week in a given week for
Defendant. Indeed, in Ms. Sullivan's experience, the Defendant
routinely scheduled its inside sales employees for over 40 hours of
work in a week.

The Defendant failed to pay Ms. Sullivan and the Class members an
hourly rate equal to one and one half limes their regular rate for
each hour that they worked for. As a direct result of the failure
by Defendant to fully and timely compensate Ms. Sullivan and all
Class members for all of the hours that they worked on Sundays when
the wages for those hours were due and payable under M.G.L.  Ms.
Sullivan and all Class members have lost wages and suffered damages
in an amount to be proven at trial, including treble damages,
interest costs, reasonable attorneys' fees and further
consequential damages.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          John Regan, Esq.
          EMPLOYEE RIGHTS GROUP, LLC
          43 Bowdoin Street, Ste. A
          Boston, MA 02114
          Telephone: (857) 277-0902
          Facsimile: (857) 401-3023
          E-mail: jay@maemployeerights.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey S. Strom, Esq.
          OFFICE OF JEFFREY S. STROM
          P.O. Box 916
          Boylston, MA 01505
          Telephone: (508) 925-5525
          E-mail: lawofficeofjeffreystrom@gmail.com

BRIDGETON LANDFILL: Appeals Ruling in Kitchin Suit to 8th Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Allied Services, Bridgeton Landfill LLC and Republic
Services, Inc., filed an appeal from a Court ruling in the lawsuit
styled John Kitchin, et al. v. Bridgeton Landfill LLC, et al., Case
No. 4:18-cv-000672-CDP, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri - St. Louis.

The appellate case is captioned as John Kitchin, et al. v.
Bridgeton Landfill LLC, et al., Case No. 19-8010, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Respondents John C. Kitchin, North West Auto Body and
Mary Menke, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, are represented by:

          Celeste Brustowicz, Esq.
          Victor T. Cobb, Esq.
          Barry J. Cooper, Jr., Esq.
          COOPER LAW FIRM
          1525 Religious Street
          New Orleans, LA 70130
          Telephone: (504) 399-0009
          E-mail: cbrustowicz@sch-llc.com
                  victortcobb@gmail.com
                  bcooper@sch-llc.com

               - and -

          Nathaniel R. Carroll, Esq.
          Ryan A. Keane, Esq.
          KEANE LAW, LLC
          7777 Bonhomme
          Clayton, MO 63105
          Telephone: (314) 391-4700
          Facsimile: (314) 244-3778
          E-mail: nathaniel@keanelawllc.com
                  ryan@keanelawllc.com

               - and -

          Anthony D. Gray, Esq.
          JOHNSON GRAY LLC
          7710 Carondelet
          Clayton, MO 63105
          Telephone: (314) 385-9500
          E-mail: agray@johnsongraylaw.com

               - and -

          Kimberly Starr Morr, Esq.
          THE DRISCOLL FIRM
          211 N. Broadway, 40th Floor
          Saint Louis, MO 63102-0000
          Telephone: (314) 932-3232

               - and -

          Ron A. Rustin, Esq.
          920 Fourth Street
          Gretna, LA 70053
          Telephone: (504) 227-8100

Defendants-Petitioners Bridgeton Landfill, LLC, Republic Services,
Inc. and Allied Services are represented by:

          William Garland Beck, Esq.
          Allyson Elisabeth Cunningham, Esq.
          Peter Flint Daniel, Esq.
          LATHROP GAGE LLP
          2345 Grand Boulevard, Suite 2800
          Kansas City, MO 64108
          Telephone: (816) 292-2000
          Telecopier: (816) 292-2001
          E-mail: wbeck@lathropgage.com
                  acunningham@lathropgage.com
                  pdaniel@lathropgage.com

               - and -

          Patricia L. Silva, Esq.
          LATHROP GAGE LLP
          7701 Forsyth Boulevard, Suite 500
          Saint Louis, MO 63105
          Telephone: (314) 613-2800
          Telecopier: (314) 613-2801
          E-mail: psilva@lathropgage.com


BRIGADOON FITNESS: Gorss Motels Seeks to Certify TCPA Class
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit, GORSS MOTELS, INC., individually and
on behalf of a class of similarly-situated persons, the Plaintiff,
v. BRIGADOON FITNESS, INC., BRIGADOON FINANCIAL, INC., and JOHN
DOES 1-5, the Defendants, Case No. 1:16-cv-00330-HAB-SLC (N.D.
Ind.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to:

   1. certify a class of:

      "all persons or entities whose fax numbers were obtained
from
      the Wyndham Fax List who were successfully sent a Fax on
      April 17, 2013 stating, "ANY 2 CARDIO = FREE SANITATION
      STATION," listing "Hotel Fitness A Brigadoon Fitness Company"

      as the vendor, and containing the phrase "Let Us Help You
      Design Your Fitness Room! 800.291.0403. Call today to talk to

      one or our trained experts";

   2. appoint Plaintiff as Class representative; and

   3. appoint Plaintiff's counsel as class counsel.

The case is a putative class action brought by Plaintiff Gorss
Motels, Inc. pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991, as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, regarding
an unsolicited fax advertisement sent by or on behalf of Defendants
Brigadoon Fitness, Inc., and Brigadoon Financial, Inc.

On May 20, 2019, the Court denied Plaintiff's motion for class
certification based on its finding that individual issues of
permission predominated as to the proposed class. In its Order, the
Court stated the April 2013 Fax List included fax numbers obtained
through Brigadoon's status as a Wyndham approved supplier, and that
had all the fax numbers been obtained through this same method,
answering whether that method constitutes express invitation or
permission would not require a case by case determination.

On June 3, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the Order
and supporting memorandum. The Plaintiff filed this amended motion
for class certification as an alternative to the motion to
reconsider, and is based on the Court's statement as to the
"Wyndham" franchisees.[BN]

Attorneys for Gorss Motels, Inc., individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly-situated persons:

          Ryan M. Kelly, Esq.
          Brian J. Wanca, Esq.
          ANDERSON + WANCA
          3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 500
          Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
          Telephone: (847) 368-1500
          Facsimile: (847) 368-1501

BRITISH STANDARDS: Williams-Bell Seeks FLSA Collective Class
------------------------------------------------------------
In a class action lawsuit MARIA WILLIAMS-BELL, on behalf of
herself, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. BRITISH STANDARDS INSTITUTION, INC.,
the Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05386 (N.D. Ill.), the Plaintiff
asks the Court for an order:

   1. conditional certifying the action as a representative
      collective action pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act,
      on behalf of the collective class of:

      "all persons who worked for BSI Group as Client Managers or
      other similarly titled positions during the applicable
      statute of limitations period, and who were classified as
      exempt and were not paid overtime compensation for time
      worked in excess of 40 hours in given workweeks";

   2. directing the Defendant to produce to Plaintiff, within 10
      days of its Order, a computer-readable data file containing
      the names, addresses, email addresses, telephone numbers,
      dates of employment, social security numbers, and dates of
      birth for the members of the FLSA Collective Class;

   3. directing court-facilitated notice of this collective action

      to the FLSA Class; and

   4. authorizing the Plaintiff to send the Notice, at her expense,

      by first-class U.S. Mail and email to all members of the FLSA

      Collective Class to inform them of their right to opt-in to
      this lawsuit and a reminder notice 20 days before the end of

      the opt-in period.[CC]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Haley R. Jenkins, Esq.
          Ryan F. Stephan, Esq.
          STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP
          100 North Riverside Plaza, Suite 2150
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 233-1550
          E-mail: rstephan@stephanzouras.com
                  hjenkins@stephanzouras.com

BROWARD COLLEGE: Brough Sues Over FCCPA Violation
-------------------------------------------------
MATTHEW ALEXANDER BROUGH, individually and on behalf of all those
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. BROWARD COLLEGE, Defendants, Case
No. 0:19-cv-61413-BB (S.D. Fla., June 6, 2019) is a class action
against Defendant for violation of the Florida Consumer Collection
Practices Act ("FCCPA").

The debt at issue is a financial obligation Plaintiff incurred
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. In
particular, the debt at issue (the "Consumer Debt") represents an
allegedly outstanding amount Plaintiff incurred to obtain
educational services and/or benefits from Defendant. Defendant sent
a collection letter dated June 12, 2017, to Plaintiff in an attempt
to collect the Consumer Debt. The Collection Letter states that
"Broward College will assess an additional collection fee up to 33%
of the outstanding balance for collection of this debt".

The complaint asserts that the Defendant does not have any
statutory or contractual right to "assess an additional collection
fee up to 33% of the outstanding balance" for the collection of the
debt referenced in the Collection Letter, i.e., the Consumer Debt.
Yet, Plaintiff paid money to Defendant for collection costs and/or
fees that were unlawfully assessed by Defendant, adds the
complaint.

Plaintiff is a natural person, and a citizen of the State of
Florida, residing in Broward County, Florida.

Defendant is a four-year college receives Federal financial
assistance and is an entity governed by the FCCPA.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     JIBRAEL S. HINDI, ESQ.
     THOMAS J. PATTI, ESQ.
     The Law Offices of Jibrael S. Hindi
     110 SE 6th Street, Suite 1744
     Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
     Phone: 954-907-1136
     Fax: 855-529-9540
     Email: jibrael@jibraellaw.com
            tom@jibraellaw.com


C & L TRUCKING: Gonzalez Files Class Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against C & L TRUCKING
ENTERPRISES, INC. The case is styled as GERALDINE GONZALEZ, ON
BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AND ON BEHALF
OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC AS PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, Plaintiff v.
JUAN BEDOLLA, C & L TRUCKING ENTERPRISES, INC., A CALIFORNIA
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION, Defendants, Case No. BCV-19-101592 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Kern Cty., June 7, 2019).

The case type is stated as "Other Employment - Civil Unlimited".

Mr. John W. Lake serves as the Chief Executive Officer and
President of C & L Trucking Enterprise Inc.

C & L Trucking Enterprise Inc. is a licensed and bonded freight
shipping and trucking company running freight hauling business from
Shafter, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by RONALD L. ZAMBRANO, ESQ.


CAPITAL ACCOUNTS: Edmonds Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. Pa.
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against CAPITAL ACCOUNTS,
LLC. The case is styled as JENNIFER EDMONDS on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CAPITAL ACCOUNTS,
LLC, John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-02490-HB (E.D.
Pa., June 7, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Capital Accounts, LLC is a debt collection agency located in
Brentwood, Tennessee.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     ROBERT P. COCCO, ESQ.
     LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT P. COCCO PC
     1500 WALNUT ST., STE 900
     PHILADELPHIA, PA 19102
     Phone: (215) 351-0200
     Fax: (215) 922-3874
     Email: rcocco@rcn.com


CAPITAL COLLECTION: Tessler Files FDCPA Suit in D. New Jersey
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against CAPITAL COLLECTION
SERVICES. The case is styled as BARUCH TESSLER individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CAPITAL
COLLECTION SERVICES, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-13500-NLH-JS (D.
N.J., June 7, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Capital Collections, LLC provides debt collection services. It
caters to commercial, retail, medical, municipal government,
transportation, and agricultural sectors.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     ARI HILLEL MARCUS, ESQ.
     YITZCHAK ZELMAN, ESQ.
     MARCUS ZELMAN LLC
     701 COOKMAN AVENUE, SUITE 300
     ASBURY PARK, NJ 07712
     Phone: (732) 695-3282
     Fax: (732) 298-6256
     Email: ari@marcuszelman.com
            yzelman@marcuszelman.com


CAREER HORIZONS: Charles Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTINA CHARLES, individually and on behalf of all similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. CAREER HORIZONS, INC. d/b/a TSD
GLOBAL, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-02260-RLY-MJD (S.D. Ind., June
6, 2019) seeks to recover for Defendant's willful violation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), alleged contractual obligations
(or unjust enrichment if no contract is found), and other
appropriate rules, regulations, statutes, and ordinances.

Plaintiff, and those similarly situated, were subjected to
Defendant's policy and practice of failing to compensate its call
center employees for their necessary pre-shift activities, which
resulted in the failure to properly compensate them as required
under applicable federal and state laws. Plaintiff seeks a
declaration that her rights, and the rights of the putative FLSA
Collective Class, were violated; and seeks to recover an award of
unpaid wages and overtime premiums, liquidated damages, penalties,
injunctive and declaratory relief, attorneys' fees and costs, pre-
and post-judgment interest, and any other remedies to which they
may be entitled, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as an hourly employee from
approximately November 2018 through April 2019 as a Customer
Service Representative ("CSR").

CAREER HORIZONS, INC., d/b/a TSD GLOBAL provide sales, customer
service and back-office services to our clients as an extension of
their businesses, providing value, integrity, and expertise offer
transportation customer service solutions that includes, but is not
limited to, telephone calls, email, and chat services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Robert T. Dassow, Esq.
     HOVDE DASSOW & DEETS, LLC
     10201 N. Illinois Street, Suite 500
     Indianapolis, IN 46290
     Phone: (317) 818-3100
     Facsimile: (317) 818-3111

          - and -

     Jacob R. Rusch, Esq.
     JOHNSON BECKER, PLLC
     444 Cedar Street, Suite 1800
     Saint Paul, MN 55101
     Phone: (612) 436-1800
     Fax: (612) 436-1801
     Email: jrusch@johnsonbecker.com


CAROLINA FRESH: Stafford Seeks Overtime Pay for Installers
----------------------------------------------------------
JEREMY S. STAFFORD, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. CAROLINA FRESH WATER, LLC,
the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00562 (M.D.N.C., May 31, 2019),
contends that Defendant violated the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, by knowingly suffering and/or permitting Stafford and the
putative Collective members to work in excess of 40 hours per week
without properly compensating them at an overtime premium rate for
these overtime hours.

According to the complaint, Stafford and others similarly situated
are individuals who have worked for Defendant as Installers. They
all shared similar job titles, training, job descriptions and job
tasks. Importantly, they were all paid a base salary, plus a fixed
amount for each installation he performed.

In addition to performing installations, Stafford was required to
troubleshoot and service existing customers' water purification
systems, perform data entry for each task he performed, and track
and organize inventory in Defendant's warehouse. Stafford worked
seven days per week and was required to be on call 24 hours per
day, seven days per week.

The Defendant paid all Installers a weekly salary, plus a fixed
amount for each installation performed. Stafford estimates that
during his tenure with Defendant, he worked between 60-80 hours
each week, depending on the needs of Defendant. Based on Stafford's
observations and discussions with other Installers, Stafford has
personal knowledge that Defendant's Installers also work in excess
of 40 hours each workweek. Despite the fact that the Stafford and
the other Plaintiffs did not meet any test for exemption, the
Defendant failed to pay them the requisite overtime rate of 1-1⁄2
times their regular rate for all hours worked more than 40 hours
per week, the lawsuit says.

Stafford is a resident of Rock Hill, South Carolina and worked for
Defendant as an Installer. Stafford's primary job duty was
installing and servicing water purification systems in residential
homes. The Defendant is in the business of selling, installing and
servicing water purification systems, primarily to residential
customers. Defendant's principal place of business is located in
Greensboro, North Carolina. Defendant's service area includes North
Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plainintiff:

          Philip J. Gibbons, Jr., Esq.
          Craig L. Leis, Esq.
          Jason S. Chestnut, Esq.
          GIBBONS LEIS, PLLC
          14045 Ballantyne Corporate Place, Ste. 325
          Charlotte, NC 28277
          Telephone: 704-612-0038
          E-mail: phil@philgibbonslaw.com
                  craig@gibbonsleis.com
                  jason@gibbonsleis.com

CHECKERS DRIVE-IN: Cotter Sues Over Failure to Secure PII
---------------------------------------------------------
BREANDAN COTTER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. CHECKERS DRIVE-IN RESTAURANTS, INC., a
Delaware corporation, Defendant, Case No. 8:19-cv-01386 (M.D. Fla.,
June 6, 2019) is a class action against Defendant for its failure
to secure and safeguard its customers' credit and debit card
numbers and other payment card data ("PCD"), personally
identifiable information such as the cardholder's names, payment
card number, card verification code, expiration date, and other
personal information ("PII") (collectively, "Private Information"),
and for failing to provide timely and adequate notice to Plaintiff
and other Class members that their Private Information had been
stolen and precisely what types of information were stolen.

Dating back to September 2016, hackers utilizing malicious
software, accessed the point-of-sale ("POS") systems at Defendant's
Checkers & Rally's restaurants ("Checkers") throughout the United
States and stole copies of Defendant's customers' Private
Information (the "Data Breach"). According to Defendant, the
hackers maintained operation of the malware in Defendant's POS
devices at 102 Checkers locations. Dates vary by location, however,
upon information and belief, the malware at issue remained on
Defendant's POS devises through April 2019. On May 29, 2019,
Defendant confirmed that it had allowed a massive breach of its
customers' Private Information to occur, stating that the malware
was "designed to collect information stored on the magnetic stripe
of payment cards, including cardholder name, payment card number,
card verification code and expiration date". The Defendant's
security protocols were so deficient that the Data Breach continued
for years while Defendant failed to even detect it—this despite
widespread knowledge of the malicious software (or malware) used to
perpetrate the Data Breach.

The Defendant disregarded Plaintiff's and Class members' rights by
intentionally, willfully, recklessly, or negligently failing to
take adequate and reasonable measures to ensure its data systems
were protected, failing to take available steps to prevent and stop
the breach from ever happening, and failing to disclose to its
customers the material facts that it did not have adequate computer
systems and security practices to safeguard customers' Private
Information, says the complaint.

Plaintiff purchased the products and services of Defendant at
multiple Checkers location.

Defendant operates approximately 860 restaurants in 29 states and
the District of Columbia.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     PATRICK A. BARTHLE II, ESQ.
     RYAN J. MCGEE, ESQ.
     MORGAN & MORGAN COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP
     201 N. Franklin Street, 7th Floor
     Tampa, FL 33602
     Phone: (813) 223-5505
     Facsimile: (813) 223-5402
     Email: pbarthle@ForThePeople.com
            rmcgee@ForThePeople.com

          - and -

     JEAN SUTTON MARTIN, ESQ.
     MORGAN & MORGAN COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP
     2018 Eastwood Road Suite 225
     Wilmington, NC 28403
     Phone: (813) 559-4908
     Facsimile: (888) 316-3489
     Email: jeanmartin@forthepeople.com

          - and -

     TINA WOLFSON, ESQ.
     AHDOOT & WOLFSON, PC
     10728 Lindbrook Drive
     Los Angeles, CA 90024
     Phone: (310) 474-9111
     Facsimile: (310) 474-8585
     Email: twolfson@ahdootwolfson.com


CHESAPEAKE OPERATING: Court Disallows Amendment to L. West's TAC
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma issued an Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Third
Amended Complaint in the case captioned LISA WEST, STORMY HOPSON,
AUBURN & DOUGLAS CLOYES, DELL LIVSEY, JULIA & DALE WHITE,
individually, Plaintiffs, v. CHESAPEAKE OPERATING, LLC, EASTOK
PIPELINE, LLC, EQUAL ENERGY U.S., INC., FAIRFIELD OIL & GAS CORP.,
NEW DOMINION, LLC, PHOENIX OIL & GAS, INC., TRANSPRO ENERGY, LLC,
AND WHITE STAR PETROLEUM, LLC f/d/b/a AMERICAN ENERGY WOODFORD,
LLC, Defendants. Case No. CIV-16-264-F. (W.D. Okla.).

Lisa West and Stormy Hopson, individually and on behalf of a
proposed plaintiff class of Oklahoma property owners, commenced
this action in the District Court of Pottawatomie County, State of
Oklahoma. The action was brought against fifteen defendants and a
proposed defendant class of companies operating wells injecting
wastewater into the Arbuckle formation. The proposed class area
included Pottawatomie County and seven surrounding counties.
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants' injection of wastewater had
induced or triggered earthquakes and would continue to do so, even
if injection of wastewater was immediately stopped. According to
plaintiffs' petition, three earthquakes of 5.0 to 5.7 magnitude had
occurred in and around Prague, Oklahoma in November of 2011.  

In their motion for leave to file a third amended complaint, the
plaintiffs seek to add ten new plaintiffs, Carol Fadaiepour, Vali
Fadaiepour, Julie A. Holbrook-Frias, Carol Jensen, Chris Leavitt,
Teri Newby, Cole Newby, Carl Searcy, Joe Sochor and Teresa Lynn
Sochor. They also seek to add over 40 defendants, including Devon
and Oklahoma Oil and Gas Management, Inc. who were previously
dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). In their proposed third
amended complaint, plaintiffs include allegations based upon newly
identified earthquakes occurring in 2017, 2018 and 2019 and allege
claims relating to the Edmond earthquake swarm and the Crescent
earthquake swarm. Plaintiffs also include class allegations for a
proposed plaintiff class and a defendant class.

According to the plaintiffs, the new defendants are necessary in
view of Rule 19, Fed. R. Civ. P. Plaintiffs claim that the proposed
amended pleading is consistent with the court's order addressing
the second amended complaint and state that they do not reassert
any claims against the bankrupt defendants, Sandridge and
Chaparral, or any claims relating to the Fairview/Cherokee swarm.
They allege in their proposed pleading that the class allegations
are included to provide notice of their intent to reassert class
claims if justified after the exchange of expert reports.

Defendants, White Star, Equal Energy, U.S., Inc., and Fairfield Oil
& Gas Corp., oppose the motion. They contend that the newly named
defendants are not necessary parties that must be joined under Rule
19. They assert that the claims against these defendants are futile
because they are barred by the statute of limitations. Defendants
also argue that the proposed amended pleading is highly prejudicial
to them and is unduly delayed. At some point, defendants argue, the
pleading cycle must end, to allow discovery to commence and the
merits of the claims alleged against the current defendants to be
addressed.

Because the plaintiffs have twice amended their complaint, Rule 15
instructs that the plaintiffs may amend their pleading only with
the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. It also
instructs that the court should freely give leave when justice so
requires. However, whether to grant leave to amend is within the
discretion of the court. The court may deny leave to amend upon a
showing of undue delay, undue prejudice to the opposing party, bad
faith or dilatory motive, failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed, or futility of amendment.

New Defendants

The Plaintiffs seek to add over 40 new defendants, claiming that
they are necessary in view of Rule 19, Fed. R. Civ. P. However,
contrary to plaintiffs' arguments, the new defendants are not
necessary parties to this action. Even if the proposed new
defendants are potential joint tortfeasors, it has long been the
rule that it is not necessary for all joint tortfeasors to be named
as defendants in a single lawsuit. The court thus rejects
plaintiffs' argument that the addition of the new defendants is
required under Rule 19.

Next, the plaintiffs contend that the new defendants should be
added in further view of the fact that the putative defendant class
was stricken. However, the court notes that even though plaintiffs
were aware that the court had stricken the putative defendant
class, plaintiffs did not request leave to add defendants when
making their alternative request in the motion to remand. They only
requested leave to add plaintiffs.  Further, at the remand hearing,
they represented to the court that they would only be seeking to
add plaintiffs. Without any further explanation in the motion,
plaintiffs now maintain that the new defendants, including Devon
and Oklahoma Oil and Gas Management, Inc., who were previously
dismissed, should be added to the lawsuit.

The court finds that the addition of the new defendants would be
unduly prejudicial to the current defendants. Their addition would
clearly affect the course of this action.  The court therefore
declines to exercise its discretion to allow the addition of the
new defendants by the filing of a third amended complaint. This
includes Devon and Oklahoma Oil and Gas Management, Inc.

New Plaintiffs

Holbrook-Frias, Leavitt, Newbys and Sochors

The Plaintiffs seek leave to add Julia A. Holbrook-Frias, Chris
Leavitt, Teri Newby, Cole Newby, Joe Sochor and Teresa Lynn Sochor
as additional plaintiffs. These proposed plaintiffs reside in
Edmond or Guthrie. Plaintiffs seek to join them to allege claims
based upon the Edmond earthquake swarm or the Crescent earthquake
swarm. As previously discussed, no claims relating to the Edmond
earthquake swarm and the Crescent earthquake swarm are currently
pending in this action, due to the court's August 13, 2018 order.
All claims involving those swarms were dismissed by the court
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The claims based on the Edmond and
Crescent earthquake swarms were the only claims alleged against
Devon and Oklahoma Oil and Gas Management, Inc. and those companies
were dismissed completely from the lawsuit. The court, as
discussed, is not permitting plaintiffs to add any of the new
proposed defendants, including Devon and Oklahoma Oil and Gas
Management, Inc.

Therefore, the addition of the new plaintiffs' claims based upon
the Edmond and Crescent earthquake swarms would be futile.

Searcy

The Plaintiffs also seek to add Carl Searcy (Searcy) as a new
plaintiff. Searcy resides in Ponca City, Oklahoma. According to the
proposed third amended complaint, Searcy felt the 5.8 Pawnee
earthquake on September 3, 2016 and suffered damage to the interior
of his home and the outside patio area. Consequently, plaintiffs
seek to add Mr. Searcy to allege claims based upon the Pawnee
earthquake swarm.

The court concludes that plaintiffs should not be permitted to add
Searcy as a plaintiff. As discussed, the court has not granted
leave to add any new defendants. Therefore, the only defendants
sued with respect to the Pawnee earthquake swarm are EastOK
Pipeline, LLC and White Star. Like White Star, EastOK Pipeline, LLC
is involved in Chapter 11 proceedings. Doc. no. 329. Plaintiffs'
action against both companies is also stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
Section 362. Allowing Searcy to allege claims against those
companies would violate the automatic stay of Section 362.

Thus, the court declines to permit plaintiffs to add Searcy as a
new plaintiff to this action.

Fadaiepours

In addition, the plaintiffs seek to add Carol Fadaiepour and Vali
Fadaiepour (the Fadaiepours) as new plaintiffs. The Fadaiepours
reside in Edmond, Oklahoma. The proposed third amended complaint
alleges that the Fadaiepours felt the 4.5 Edmond earthquake on
December 7, 2013, an unidentified 4.3 earthquake on December 29,
2015, the 5.0 Cushing earthquake on November 7, 2016 and the 4.5
Crescent earthquake on July 27, 2015. From the allegations, it
appears that the Fadaiepours are added to allege claims based upon
the Edmond, Cushing and Crescent earthquake swarms.

The court concludes that the Fadaiepours should not be permitted to
be added as new plaintiffs. For the reasons previously discussed,
the court concludes that plaintiffs should not be permitted to add
the Fadaiepours to allege claims based upon the Edmond and Crescent
earthquake swarms.

Jensen

Lasty, the plaintiffs seek to add Carol Jensen as a plaintiff.
Jensen resides in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The proposed third
amended complaint alleges that Jensen felt the 3.1 Edmond
earthquake on December 7, 2013, the 5.7 Prague earthquake on
November 6, 2011 and the 5.8 Pawnee earthquake on September 3,
2016. Hence, plaintiffs seek to add Jensen to allege claims based
upon the Edmond earthquake swarm, the Prague earthquake swarm and
the Pawnee earthquake swarm.

For these reasons, the court concludes that plaintiffs should not
be permitted to add Jensen to allege claims based upon the Edmond
and Pawnee earthquake swarms. As to adding Jensen to allege claims
based upon the 2011 Prague earthquake swarm, the court notes that,
due to the Section 362 stay, Jensen cannot assert any claims
against White Star. As to any claims against Equal Energy US, Inc.,
Fairfield Oil & Gas Corp. or New Dominion, LLC, plaintiffs, in
their motion to amend, have not proffered any explanation why
Jensen could not have been added at the time of the second amended
complaint.  

The court concludes that the addition of Jensen is unduly delayed.


A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yyypl4e7 from Leagle.com.

Lisa West, Individually, Lisa West, as Class Representative, Stormy
Hopson, Individually, Stormy Hopson, as Class Representative,
Auburn Cloyes, Individually, Auburn Cloyes, as Class
Representative, Douglas Cloyes, Individually, Douglas Cloyes, as
Class Representative, Del Livsey, Individually, Del Livsey, as
Class Representative, Julia White, Individually, Julia White, as
Class Representative, Dale White, Individually & Dale White, as
Class Representative, Plaintiffs, represented by Edward L. White,
Edward L. White PC, 829 E. 33rd StreetEdmond, OK 73013, Glendell D.
Nix, Maples Nix & Diesselhorst, 15401 North May Avenue, Edmond, OK
73013, Kerry D. Green, Edward L. White PC, 829 E. 33rd
StreetEdmond, OK 73013, L. Ray Maples, II, Maples & Associates,
15401 North May Avenue, Edmond, OK  73013, April B. Eberle --
aeberle@munsonmcmillin.com -- Munson & McMillin & Nicole R.
Snapp-Holloway, Maples Nix & Diesselhorst,15401 North May Avenue,
Edmond, OK  73013,

Chesapeake Operating LLC, Defendant, represented by J. Todd Woolery
-- todd.woolery@mcafeetaft.com -- McAfee & Taft, Patrick L. Stein
-- patrick.stein@mcafeetaft.com -- McAfee & Taft & Timothy J.
Bomhoff -- tim.bomhoff@mcafeetaft.com -- McAfee & Taft.

Eastok Pipeline LLC, Defendant, represented by Leah T. Rudnicki,
Rudnicki PLLC & Sharon T. Thomas, The Rudnicki Firm. 6305 Waterford
Blvd, Suite 325, Oklahoma City, OK  73118
White Star Petroleum LLC, formerly doing business as American
Energy Woodford LLC, Defendant, represented by Bradley Ward Welsh,
Gable & Gotwals, 1100 Oneok Plaza, 100 W 5th St Ste 1100, Tulsa, OK
74103-4217, David L. Kearney, Durbin Larimore & Bialick, E. Edd
Pritchett, Jr., Durbin Larimore & Bialick, Katherine Taylor Loy,
Durbin Larimore & Bialick, Lane R. Neal, Durbin Larimore & Bialick,
920 North Valley Avenue, Oklahoma City, OK 73107,  Lewis T.
LeNaire, Gable & Gotwals, Tammy D. Barrett, Gable & Gotwals 1100
Oneok Plaza, 100 W 5th St Ste 1100, Tulsa, OK 74103-4217,& William
H. Doyle, The Doyle Firm PC, 1313 E. Osborn Road, Suite 220,
Phoenix, AZ 85014, pro hac vice.


COCA-COLA CO: Garcia Appeals Ruling in Nelson Suit to 9th Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Intervenor Ernesto Garcia filed an appeal from a Court
ruling in the lawsuit titled Karen Nelson v. The Coca-Cola Company,
Case No. 3:18-cv-02225-GPC-MSB, in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California, San Diego.

The appellate case is captioned as Karen Nelson v. The Coca-Cola
Company, Case No. 19-55572, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Proposed
Intervenor Ernesto Garcia filed an appeal from the District Court's
ruling in the lawsuit.  That appellate case is entitled Karen
Nelson v. The Coca-Cola Company, Case No. 19-55355.

The lawsuit was filed on September 25, 2018.  The nature of suit is
stated as Tort Product Liability.

The Coca-Cola Company is an American corporation, and manufacturer,
retailer, and marketer of nonalcoholic beverage concentrates and
syrups.  The Company is best known for its flagship product
Coca-Cola, invented in 1886 by pharmacist John Stith Pemberton in
Atlanta, Georgia.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appellant Ernesto Garcia's opening brief is due on July 16,
      2019;

   -- Appellees Karen Nelson and The Coca-Cola Company's
      answering brief is due on August 16, 2019; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.

Movant-Appellant ERNESTO GARCIA, Proposed Intervenor, of Miami,
Florida, appears pro se.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee KAREN NELSON, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Timothy G. Blood, Esq.
          BLOOD HURST & O'REARDON, LLP
          501 West Broadway, Suite 1490
          San Diego, CA 92101  
          Telephone: (619) 338-1100
          Facsimile: (619) 338-1101
          E-mail: tblood@bholaw.com

Defendant-Appellee THE COCA-COLA COMPANY is represented by:

          Michelle Waller Cohen, Esq.
          Jane Metcalf, Esq.
          Steven A. Zalesin, Esq.
          PATTERSON BELKNAP WEBB & TYLER LLP
          1133 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (212) 336-2000
          E-mail: mcohen@pbwt.com
                  jmetcalf@pbwt.com
                  sazalesin@pbwt.com


COMENITY BANK: Wilson Sues over Robocalls, Debt Collection Tactics
------------------------------------------------------------------
CARA WILSON, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. COMENITY BANK, the Defendant, Case No.
8:19-cv-01317-CEH-TGW (M.D. Fla., May 31, 2019), asserts that
Comenity Bank "robocalled" Plaintiff repeatedly in violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, and Invasion of Privacy.

According to the complaint, Comenity has a corporate policy of
repeatedly contacting family and friends of debtors to leave
supposedly "urgent messages" for the alleged debtor, using this as
a tool to humiliate and embarrass alleged debtors as well as to
intentionally cause aggravation and annoyance to their relatives
and friends. Harassment of family members and friends is not a
novel form of debt collection abuse by any means, but Comenity adds
a new twist to this old tactic by using overseas call centers to do
so, presumably at an extremely low cost. It also uses autodialers
to further economize this mass harassment. The calls are made by
Comenity are deceptive as to more than just their supposed
"urgency." As evidenced by an April 23, 2019 message, Comenity knew
full well it was calling merely "someone who knows" the alleged
debtor. However, the very next day on April 24 and three days later
on April 27, Comenity left deceptive messages pretending as if it
were calling the alleged debtor.

Indeed, Comenity is notable for having established an entire
department set up to "skip trace" or otherwise track down family
members and friends of alleged debtors, just so it can illegally
roboblast abusive and deceptive calls to them.

Comenity's alleged illegal tactics are another reason why robocalls
continue to be the No. 1 complaint in America. Comenity is actively
participating in the robocalling plague infecting America. Not only
is Comenity known as a prolific robobully, it is also, as clearly
illustrated today, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff:

          William "Billy" Peerce Howard, Esq.
          THE CONSUMER PROTECTION FIRM
          4030 Henderson Boulevard
          Tampa, FL 33629
          Telephone: (813) 500-1500
          Facsimile: (813) 435-2369
          E-mail: Billy@TheConsumerProtectionFirm.com

CORBUS PHARMACEUTICAL: Court Appoints Rosen Law as Lead Counsel
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
issued an Order granting Plaintiff Marie Berner's Motion for an
Order Appointing Her as Lead Plaintiff in the case captioned MARIE
BERNER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. CORBUS PHARMACEUTICAL HOLDINGS, INC.; YUVAL
COHEN; and SEANMORAN, Defendants. Civil Action No. 19-cv-10457-FDS.
(D. Mass.).

This is a class action filed against defendants Corbus
Pharmaceutical Holdings, Inc. and certain of its officers and
directors alleging violations of the federal securities laws.

Pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA), a notice was issued on March 12, 2019, to potential class
members of the action informing them of their right to move to
serve as lead plaintiff by May 13, 2019, that is, within 60 days of
the date of the issuance of the notice.

On May 13, 2019, plaintiff Marie Berner moved for an order
appointing her as lead plaintiff and approving the selection of The
Rosen Law Firm, P.A. as lead counsel.  No opposition to the motion
has been filed.

The PSLRA provides, among other things, that the most adequate
plaintiff to serve as lead plaintiff is the person or group of
persons that has either filed a complaint or has made a motion in
response to a notice and has the largest financial interest in the
relief sought by the class and satisfies the requirements of Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B).

The court finds that Berner has the largest financial interest in
this action and prima facie satisfies the typicality and adequacy
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.  

Marie Berner is appointed as lead plaintiff for the class, as she
appears to have the largest financial interest in this litigation
and otherwise appears to satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23.

The Rosen Law Firm, P.A. is appointed as lead counsel.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y5r7hxgy from Leagle.com.

Carmen Kempf, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey C. Block
jeff@blockesq.com -- Block & Leviton LLP & Jacob A. Walker --
jake@blockesq.com -- Block & Leviton LLP.

Corbus Pharmaceutical Holdings, Inc, Yuval Cohen & Sean Moran,
Defendants, represented by Katherine L. Dacey --
kseib@goodwinprocter.com -- Goodwin Procter LLP, pro hac vice,
Caroline H. Bullerjahn -- cbullerjahn@goodwinlaw.com -- Goodwin
Procter, LLP & Deborah S. Birnbach -- dbirnbach@goodwinlaw.com --
Goodwin Procter, LLP.

Marie Berner, Movant, represented by Joshua Baker --
jbaker@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A..


CVS PHARMACY: Stinson Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against CVS Pharmacy, Inc.
The case is styled as Stinson, Jay Joel OBO: herself and all other
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., CVS RX
Services, Inc., Garfield Beach CVS, L.L.C., Defendant, Case No.
SCV-264567 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sonoma Cty., June 6, 2019).

The case type is stated as "Unlimited Other Employment".

CVS Pharmacy is a subsidiary of the American retail and health care
company CVS Health, headquartered in Woonsocket, Rhode Island and
operates pharmacy and drug stores in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by Joshua H. Haffner, Esq.



DAIRYAMERICA INC: $40MM Settlement in Carlin Suit Has Final OK
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GERALD CARLIN, JOHN RAHM, PAUL ROZWADOWSKI and DIANA
WOLFE, individually and on behalf of themselves and all other
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. DAIRYAMERICA, INC., and
CALIFORNIA DAIRIES, INC., Defendants, Case No. 1:09-CV-0430 AWI-EPG
(E.D. Cal.), Judge Anthony W. Ishii of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of California granted the Parties' Motion for
Finall Approval of Settlement and Request for Attorney Fees.

In 2009, the Plaintiffs, as purported class representatives,
brought claims against Defendants DairyAmerica and California
Dairies concerning the misreporting of milk prices.  In September
2018, the parties notified the Court of their intent to settle.

The Plaintiffs now move for final approval of the class action
settlement, asserting the $40 million settlement fund -- for the
benefit of almost 26,000 dairy-farmer claimants -- is fair,
reasonable, and adequate.  They also move for attorney fees, costs,
and service awards.  The Defendants do not oppose.

Judge Ishii is convinced that the settlement is fair, adequate, and
free of collusion.  He also finds a 33.3% award from the common
fund of $40 million to be a reasonable percentage, given the
complexity of the case, its lengthy procedural history, and the
extraordinary results achieved for the class.  He further finds
that the Class Counsel's requested reimbursement in the amount of
$823,904.04 is reasonable.  Finally, the Judge finds that a $90,000
service award for each the four current named Plaintiffs goes
beyond ratios described by the Ninth Circuit, given that the
average recovery of unnamed class members is just over $1,000.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Ishii granted final approval of the
Settlement Class defined as all dairy farmers located in the United
States who sold raw milk that was priced according to a Federal
Milk Marketing Order during the period Jan. 1, 2002 through April
30, 2007.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, he
finally approved in all respects the Settlement set forth in the
Settlement Agreement.  The parties are hereby directed to implement
and consummate the Settlement according to its terms and provisions
of the Settlement Agreement.

He approved the Distribution Plan of the Settlement Fund as
described in the Settlement Agreement.  The Net Settlement Funds
will be distributed on a pro rata basis.  An approved Claimant's
pro rata share of the settlement will be determined by dividing (i)
the volume of the Claimant's total raw Grade A milk produced and
pooled on a Federal Milk Marketing Order during the period Jan.y 1,
2002 to April 30, 2007, by (ii) the total volume of raw Grade A
milk produced and pooled on Federal Milk Marketing Orders during
the period Jan. 1, 2002 to April 30, 2007 by all members of the
Settlement Class.

To determine the volume of each Claimant's total raw Grade A milk
produced and pooled on a Federal Milk Marketing Order during the
period Jan. 1, 2002 to April 30, 2007, the Claims Administrator
will apply the following procedures: (a) if a Claimant accepted the
preprinted volume on the Claim Form, that volume will be used; (b)
if a Claimant rejected the preprinted volume on the Claim Form and
supplied documentation that substantiates an alternate volume that
was provided by the Claimant, that alternate volume will be used;
(c) if a Claimant produced and pooled raw Grade A milk on Federal
Milk Marketing Order other than Federal Milk Marketing Order 30
during the Class Period, and rejected the pre-printed volume on the
Claim Form but failed to supply documentation substantiating an
alternate volume, the pre-printed volume on the Claim Form will be
used; (d) if a Claimant produced and pooled raw Grade A milk on
Federal Milk Marketing Order 30 during the Class Period, rejected
the pre-printed volume on the Claim Form and provided an alternate
volume that is not greater than twice the value of the preprinted
volume, the alternate volume will be used; (e) if a Claimant
produced and pooled raw Grade A milk on Federal Milk Marketing
Order 30 during the Class Period, rejected the pre-printed volume
on the Claim Form and provided an alternate volume that is more
than twice the value of the pre-printed volume but failed to supply
documentation substantiating that alternate volume, the Claims
Administrator will contact the Claimant in order to obtain
substantiating documentation, and if the Claimant fails to provide
such documentation, a volume equal to twice the pre-printed volume
will be used.

Judge Ishii granted as modified by the Order the Plaintiffs' Motion
for Attorney Fees, Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses, and
Service Awards for the Named Plaintiffs and Former Plaintiffs.  The
Class Counsel is awarded 33.3% of the total Settlement Fund, which
amount equals $13,333,333, plus any interest that has already
accrued or will accrue.  The Class Counsel is also awarded
litigation expenses in the amount of $823,904.04, to be paid from
the Settlement Fund.  The awards of attorney fees and expenses will
be allocated among the Class Counsel by Cohen Milstein Sellers &
Toll PLLC in a manner that, in the firm's good-faith judgment,
reflects the Class Counsel's contributions of time and money to the
institution, prosecution and resolution of the litigation.

The Class Counsel and their designees are authorized to expend
funds from the Escrow Account to pay Taxes, Tax Expenses and notice
and administration costs, as set forth in the Settlement Agreement.
The Class Counsel and their designees are specifically authorized
to expend a total of $418,000 from the Escrow Account to compensate
the Claims Administrator for notice and claims administration
costs, of which $118,000 remains outstanding due to the initial
$300,000 payment made at the end of 2018.  The Court retains
continuing jurisdiction over any issues regarding the formation or
administration of the Escrow Account.

Each of the four current named Plaintiffs, Paul Rozwadowski, Gerald
Carlin, John Rahm, and Diana Wolfe, is awarded a service award in
the amount of $45,000, in addition to any distributions as part of
the Settlement Fund to which they may be entitled, to compensate
them for their time and efforts in leading the case for the benefit
of all Settlement Class Members.

Each of the four former named Plaintiffs, James Rehberg, Ron Hayek,
Michael Schugg, and Tim Rawlings, is awarded a service award in the
amount of $5,000, in addition to any distributions as part of the
Settlement Fund to which they may be entitled, to compensate them
for their time and efforts in assisting the case for the benefit of
all Settlement Class Members.

The case is dismissed as to DairyAmerica and California Dairies
with prejudice and without costs to any party.  Furthermore,
finding no just reason for delay, the Judge entered a final
judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as to all claims asserted in the case against
DairyAmerica and California Dairies.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 8, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/F1gpjw from Leagle.com.

Gerald Carlin, individually and on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, John Rahm, individually and on behalf
of
themselves and all others similarly situated & Paul Rozwadowski,
individually and on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, represented by A. Chowning Poppler --
apoppler@bermantabacco.com -- Berman Tabacco, Anthony David
Phillips -- aphillips@bermandevalerio.com -- Berman DeValerio,
Benjamin Doyle Brown -- bbrown@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein
Sellers & Toll PLLC, Brent W. Johnson, Cohen Milstein Hausfeld and
Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Cari C. Laufenberg --
claufenberg@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac
vice, Christopher Heffelfinger -- cheffelfinger@bermantabacco.com
-- Berman Tabacco, George F. Farah, Cohen Milstein Hausfeld and
Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Juli E. Farris --
jfarris@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback LLP, Justin N. Saif
-- jsaif@bermandevalerio.com -- Berman DeValerio, pro hac vice,
Leslie M. Kroeger, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac
vice
& Ryan McDevitt -- rmcdevitt@kellerrohrback.com, -- Keller
Rohrback
L.L.P., pro hac vice.

Diana Wolfe, Plaintiff, represented by A. Chowning Poppler, Berman
Tabacco, Anthony David Phillips, Berman DeValerio, Benjamin Doyle
Brown, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Brent W. Johnson, Cohen
Milstein Hausfeld and Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Cari C. Laufenberg,
Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac vice, Christopher Heffelfinger,
Berman Tabacco, George F. Farah, Cohen Milstein Hausfeld and Toll
PLLC, pro hac vice, Juli E. Farris, Keller Rohrback LLP, Justin N.
Saif, Berman DeValerio, pro hac vice & Ryan McDevitt, Keller
Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac vice.

DairyAmerica, Inc., Defendant, represented by Charles M. English,
Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, pro hac vice, E. John Steren --
esteren@ebglaw.com -- Ober Kaler, pro hac vice, Joseph Michael
Marchini -- jmm@bmj-law.com -- Baker, Manock & Jensen, Wendy M.
Yoviene -- wyoviene@bakerdonelson -- Ober Kaler, pro hac vice,
Allison Ann Davis -- allisondavis@dwt.com -- Davis Wright Tremaine
LLP, Joy G. Kim -- joykim@dwt.com -- Davis Wright Tremaine LLP &
Sanjay Mohan Nangia -- sanjaynangia@dwt.com -- Davis Wright
Tremaine LLP.

California Dairies, Inc., Defendant, represented by by Lawrence
Michael Cirelli -- lcirelli@hansonbridgett.com -- Hanson Bridgett,
Shannon Marie Nessier, Hanson Bridgett LLP & Megan Oliver
Thompson,
Hanson Bridgett LLP.

Bimemiller Candice, Non-Party Candice Bimemiller, Unknown,
represented by Edward Zusman, Markun Zusman Freniere & Compton
LLP.

James Rehberg & Ronald Hayek, ThirdParty Plaintiffs, represented
by
J. Barton Goplerud, Hudson Law Firm, pro hac vice & Jon A.
Tostrud,
Tostrud Law Group, P.C.

Michael K. Schugg, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by J. Barton
Goplerud, Hudson Law Firm, pro hac vice & Juli E. Farris, Keller
Rohrback LLP.

Timothy L. Rawlings, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by J.
Barton
Goplerud, Hudson Law Firm, pro hac vice, Juli E. Farris, Keller
Rohrback LLP, Mark A. Griffin, Keller Rohrback LLP, pro hac vice &
Raymond J. Farrow, Keller Rohrback LLP, pro hac vice.

Land O' Lakes, Inc., Amicus, represented by Gregory M. Schweizer --

gschweizer@eimerstahl.com -- Eimer Stahl LLP, pro hac vice, Scott
C. Solberg --ssolberg@eimerstahl.com -- Eimer Stahl LLP, pro hac
vice & Seth D. Hilton -- sethhilton@stoel.com -- Stoel Rives LLP.

California Farmers Union & California Dairy Campaign, Amicuss,
represented by Daniel Bennett Harris.

Lani Ellingsworth, Movant, represented by Darin M. Dalmat --
dmdalmat@jamhoff.com -- James & Hoffman, P.C. & Glenn Rothner,
Rothner, Segall & Greenstone.


DCD CONSTRUCTION: Brown Seeks OT Pay for Construction Laborers
--------------------------------------------------------------
An employment-related class action complaint has been filed against
DCD Construction, LLC, Dennis Portaev, Aleksei Karpov, and Evgeny
Makarin for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and
the New York Labor Law (NYLL). The case is captioned KURELL BROWN,
on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff,
-against- DCD CONSTRUCTION, LLC., DENIS PORTAEV, ALEKSEI KARPOV,
and EVGENY MAKARIN, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-04892 (S.D.N.Y.,
May 24, 2019).

Plaintiff Kurell Brown alleges that the Defendants operated their
businesses with a policy of not paying Plaintiff and similarly
situated individuals' wages for the hours worked over 40 hours in a
week at the overtime wage rate. Brown also claims that the
Defendants willfully disregarded and purposefully evaded
recordkeeping requirements of the FLSA and the NYLL by failing to
maintain accurate and complete timesheets and payroll records.
Accordingly, Brown seeks to recover from the Defendants: (1) unpaid
wages; (2) unpaid wages at the overtime wage rate; (3) statutory
penalties; (4) liquidated damages; (5) prejudgment and
post-judgment interest; and (6) attorneys' fees and costs.

DCD Construction, LLC is a domestic business corporation, organized
and existing under the laws of the state of Delaware, with a place
of business located at 240 Riverside Blvd, New York, New York.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     James F. Sullivan, Esq.
     Lawrence Spasojevich, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF JAMES F. SULLIVAN, P.C.
     52 Duane Street, 7th Floor
     New York, NY 10007
     Telephone: (212) 374-0009
     Facsimile: (212) 374-9931


DENSO CORP: Sued for Valve Timing Control Device Price-fixing
-------------------------------------------------------------
All European Auto Supply, Inc., individually and on behalf of a
class of all others similarly situated v. Denso Corporation, Denso
International America, Inc., Denso Korea Corporation, and Denso
Automotive Deutschland GmbH, Case No. 2:19-cv-10980 (E.D. Mich.,
April 03, 2019), is brought against the Defendants for violation of
the Sherman Antitrust Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants' unlawful and
anticompetitive conduct of being a part of a conspiracy to rig
bids, fix, raise, maintain, and stabilize prices of Valve Timing
Control Devices that resulted to artificially inflated price to
direct purchasers such as the Plaintiff, violates the Sherman Act.

The Plaintiff is a Michigan corporation with its principal place of
business in Royal Oak, Michigan. The Plaintiff purchased Valve
Timing Control Devices directly from one or more of the
Defendants.

The Defendants manufactured, marketed, and sold Valve Timing
Control Devices that were purchased throughout the United States.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      David H. Fink, Esq.
      Darryl Bressack, Esq.
      Nathan J. Fink, Esq.
      FINK BRESSACK
      38500 Woodward Ave; Suite 350
      Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304
      Tel: (248) 971-2500

ENGLAND TRADING: Olsen Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against England Trading
Company, LLC. The case is styled as Thomas J. Olsen, individually
and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
England Trading Company, LLC doing business as: Industry West,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-03376 (E.D. N.Y., June 6, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

England Trading Company, LLC (trade name Industry West) is in the
Factory Furniture and Fixtures business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
     Lipsky Lowe LLP
     630 Third Avenue
     New York, NY 10017-6705
     Phone: (212) 392-4772
     Fax: (212) 444-1030
     Email: chris@lipskylowe.com


EQUINOX COLLECTION: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Hargis FDCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Oklahoma issued an Opinion and Order denying Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the case captioned MICHAEL HARGIS, Plaintiff, v. EQUINOX
COLLECTION SERVICES, INC., Defendant. Case No. 17-cv-410-JED-FHM.
(N.D. Okla.).

Plaintiff Michael Hargis has brought this putative class action
against Equinox Collection Services, Inc. (Equinox), a debt
collector, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA). Plaintiff alleges that Equinox, in
attempting to collect on a disputed medical bill on behalf of its
client, Dr. ZZZ's Sleep Center, Inc. (Dr. ZZZ's), sent Plaintiff a
collection letter that violated certain provisions under 15 U.S.C.
Section 1692g(a).

Equinox asserts that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the
injuryin-fact demands of Article III standing.

In his complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that Equinox violated
Section 1692g(a)(2), (3), and (5).  

First, the Plaintiff alleges that Equinox failed to properly
identify the name of the creditor to whom the debt was owed. He
points to language in the collection letter identifying D. ZZZ's as
the original creditor and asserts that the least sophisticated
consumer would reasonably believe that the medical debt had been
sold or assigned to a subsequent creditor when, in fact, it had
not.  

The alleged Section 1692g(a)(3) violation stems from a statement in
the letter that Equinox will assume this debt to be valid unless
Equinox is notified in writing within thirty days that the consumer
disputes the debt. The Plaintiff asserts that this statement
violates Section 1692g(a)(3) by requiring consumers to notify
Equinox of a debt dispute in writing.

Lastly, the Plaintiff asserts that the collection letter violates
Section 1692g(a)(5) by not requiring requests for the name and
address of the original creditor, if different from the current
creditor, to be made in writing.

In its 12(b)(1) motion, Equinox challenges the concreteness of the
Plaintiff's alleged harm. In regard to the alleged violation of
Section 1692g(a)(2), Equinox argues that the Plaintiff suffered no
concrete injury because his deposition testimony demonstrates that
he correctly understood that Dr. ZZZ's was the current creditor.  

As to the alleged violation of Section 1692g(a)(3), Equinox insists
the Plaintiff has no standing because Equinox accepted Plaintiff's
multiple verbal disputes of the debt despite the collection
letter's language requiring that such disputes be made in writing.


Equinox further argues that the Plaintiff lacks standing because he
suffered no emotional or economic damages.

In passing the FDCPA, Congress found that there was abundant
evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt
collection practices by many debt collectors and that such
practices contributed to the number of personal bankruptcies, to
marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of
individual privacy. Thus, the purpose of the FDCPA was to eliminate
abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure
that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt
collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to
promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt
collection abuses.

Assuming, arguendo, that Equinox's identification of Dr. ZZZ's as
the Original Creditor constitutes a violation of Section
1692g(a)(2), the failure to clearly identify the name of the
creditor to whom the debt is owed poses a real risk of harm.
Specifically, a recipient might find himself confused and obliged
to guess who currently owned the debt in question.

Although Equinox points to evidence that Plaintiff did not himself
experience confusion over the identity of the current creditor, the
undersigned finds that Plaintiff need not prove that the alleged
violation of Section 1692g(a)(2) caused him confusion in order to
have standing. Instead, a violation of this particular procedural
right is sufficient in and of itself to constitute concrete injury
in fact because Congress conferred the procedural right to protect
a plaintiff's concrete interests and the procedural violation
presents a material risk of real harm to that concrete interest.

In regard to Section 1692g(a)(3), the Plaintiff alleges that
Equinox added an in-writing requirement for debt disputes when a
number of courts have held that Section 1692g(a)(3) does not impose
such a requirement.  

Assuming, arguendo, that Equinox's collection letter violated
Section 1692g(a)(3), the Court finds that such a violation presents
a material risk of harm to the concrete interests Congress intended
to protect. As noted by the Second Circuit in Hooks v. Forman,
Holt, Eliades & Ravin, LLC, the right to dispute a debt is the most
fundamental of those set forth in Section 1692g(a). Once a debt has
been disputed, a debt collector cannot communicate the debtor
consumer's credit information to others without disclosing the
dispute.

A dispute also triggers Section 1692h, which precludes debt
collectors from applying any single payment by the consumer to a
disputed debt if the consumer owes multiple debts. A dispute made
in writing triggers the additional protection of requiring the debt
collector to cease collection of the debt until it complies with
certain conditions relating to the verification of the debt. Thus,
a failure to provide accurate information concerning how to dispute
a debt entails a significant risk that consumers will forego
disputing a debt altogether and lose important consumer protections
even if the debt collector, in practice, handles disputes
differently and more generously than is suggested by the collection
letter itself.

Lastly, the alleged violation of Section 1692g(a)(5) is that
Equinox failed to include the in-writing requirement for consumers
seeking to validate the name and address of the original creditor.
Thus, the Court finds that Equinox's alleged failure to properly
disclose information concerning requests for the identity of the
original creditor entailed sufficient risk to satisfy the
concreteness prong of the injury-in-fact requirement without
Plaintiff needing to allege or prove additional harm.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has standing under Article III
to bring his claims under the FDCPA. Accordingly, Defendant
Equinox's Motion to Dismiss is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2vhg4w3 from
Leagle.com.

Michael Hargis, an individual, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Robert William
Murphy, 1212 SE 2nd Ave, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316 & Victor R.
Wandres, Paramount Law, 4835 S. Peoria Ave. Tulsa, OK, 74105

Equinox Collection Services, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation,
Defendant, represented by Dennis J. Barton, III, Barton Law Group
LLC, 17600 Chesterfield Airport Rd, Ste 201, Chesterfield, MO
63005-1246 & Kurt Geoffrey Arras, 9 E. 4th St., 9th Floor, Tulsa,
OK 7410


FIOS INC: DiCarlo Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website
------------------------------------------------------
DAVID DICARLO, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. FIOS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 155652/2019
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. New York Cty., June 6, 2019) seeks to put an end to
systemic civil rights violations committed by Defendant FIOS, INC
against the blind in New York State.

The Defendant is denying blind individuals throughout New York
State equal access to the goods and services that FIOS, INC.
provides to their non-disabled customers through
https://fios.verizon.com (hereafter the "Website"). The Website
provides to the public a wide array of the goods, services,
testimonials, and other programs offered by FIOS, INC. Yet, the
Website contains numerous access barriers that make it difficult if
not impossible for blind customers to use the website to its full
capacity, says the complaint.

Plaintiff DICARLO is legally blind individual.

Defendant operates a commercial website that offers products and
services that are available by FIOS, INC.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     C.K. Lee, Esq.
     LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
     148 West 24th Street, 8th Floor
     New York, NY 10011
     Phone: 212-465-1180
     Fax: 212-465-1181


FIRST AMERICAN FINANCIAL: Resendiz Files Class Suit in C.D. Calif.
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against First American
Financial Corporation. The case is styled as Jesus Resendiz
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. First American Financial Corporation, First American
Title Insurance Company, Defendants, Case No. 8:19-cv-01137-JVS-JDE
(C.D. Cal., June 7, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract.

First American Financial Corporation is a United States financial
services company and is a leading provider of title insurance and
settlement services to the real estate and mortgage
industries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jason M Frank, Esq.
     Frank Sims and Stolper LLP
     19800 MacArthur Boulevard Suite 855
     Irvine, CA 92612
     Phone: (949) 201-2400
     Fax: (949) 201-2405
     Email: jfrank@lawfss.com


FIRST CLASS: Fails to Pay OT & Minimum Wages, Verma et al. Say
--------------------------------------------------------------
A case, DENNIS VERMA, LUIS GONZALEZ, CHRISTOPHER GOODRIDGE and
WILLIAM MALDONADO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. FIRST CLASS VALET INC. and
STEPHEN VAN EYCK, individually and in his official capacity, the
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-03251 (E.D.N.Y., May 31, 2019), seeks
to recover unpaid overtime pay, unpaid minimum wage, unpaid minimum
wage, unpaid spread-of-hours wages, unpaid uniform reimbursement,
and unpaid uniform maintenance pay in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the New York.

The Plaintiffs' claims under the FLSA are brought as a collective
action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. section 216(b), on behalf of
themselves and on behalf of all other similarly situated persons
who were/are employed by Defendants as valet attendants and/or
other similar positions who were/are not paid overtime at a rate of
one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours
worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek for the period of three
years prior to the date of the filing of the complaint to the date
of the final disposition of the action, the lawsuit says.

The Members of the FLSA Collective are similarly situated because
they were all subject to Defendants' common policy and/or practice
that resulted in not paying overtime at a rate of one and one-half
times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of
40 hours per workweek during the FLSA Collective Period.

First Class Valet specializes in serving residential, commercial
and business parking needs.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Laura R. Reznick, Esq.
          BELL LAW GROUP, PLLC
          100 Quentin Roosevelt Boulevard, Suite 208
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: 516 280-3008
          Facsimile: 212 656-1845
          E-mail: lr@belllg.com

FISHER-PRICE INC: Barton Sues over Sale of Rock 'n Play Sleeper
---------------------------------------------------------------
EMILY BARTON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. FISHER-PRICE, INC.; and MATTEL, INC.,
the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00670-GWC (W.D.N.Y., May 22,
2019), alleges that the Fisher-Price Rock 'n Play Sleeper is
inherently unsafe as a sleeper and unfit for its intended use. Its
use poses a number of serious safety risks that have led to many
documented instances of infant deaths and injuries.

The Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, as permitted by equity,
including directing Defendants to identify, with Court supervision,
the victims of their misconduct and pay them restitution and
disgorgement of all monies acquired by Defendants by means of any
act or practice declared by the Court to be unlawful, and ordering
Defendants to engage in a corrective advertising campaign of Rock
'n Play Sleeper to place victims of their misconduct on notice of
the availability of a full refund.

The Rock 'n Play Sleeper is an inclined infant "sleeper" that
Defendants, until April 12, 2019, marketed as suitable for all
night or prolonged sleep.  According to the complaint, the
Defendants' marketing of this product as appropriate for prolonged
sleep was intentional and overt. Not only is "Sleeper" in the name
of the product, but the boxes in which the Rock 'n Play Sleepers
were sold, and other materials used to promote them, prominently
exclaim, "Baby can sleep at a comfortable incline all night long!"
and make similar statements about its fitness for prolonged and
nighttime sleep. This marketing was dangerously false and
misleading, as the product is not safe for all-night or prolonged
sleep for infants.

By positioning an infant at a 30-degree incline, the Rock 'n Play
Sleeper significantly increases the risk that the infant's head
will slip into a dangerous position, tilt to constrict the windpipe
and/or cause the infant's face to become pressed against the padded
fabric in the sleeper and block airflow, which the infant may be
unable to correct. This increases the risk of death by
asphyxiation. In addition, because Defendants advise parents to
keep babies strapped in restraints overnight while sleeping on an
incline, the Rock 'n Play Sleeper increases the infant's risk of
developing flat head (plagiocephaly) and twisted neck (torticollis)
syndromes, conditions that often require babies to wear expensive
head-molding helmets and undergo physical therapy.

Despite knowing that the Rock 'n Play Sleeper is unsafe for
overnight or prolonged sleep for infants, Defendants marketed and
sold the product as a sleeper, leading parents to reasonably
believe that the product is safe for its stated purpose. The words
"sleeper" and "sleep" appear no fewer than five times on the
package, which depicts pictures of a mom blissfully sleeping or
about to fall asleep with the baby in the Rock 'n Play Sleeper.

The Rock 'n Play Sleeper is extremely popular with parents because
it rocks the baby, and various models have other soothing features
such as lullabies and vibrations. Because of these characteristics,
the Rock 'n Play Sleeper is one of the best-selling "sleepers".
Had parents been aware of the potentially fatal dangers posed by
the Rock 'n Play Sleeper, or the serious risks of injury such as
flat head and twisted neck syndrome, they would not have purchased
and/or used the product. Defendants' false and misleading marketing
of this dangerous product, and knowing failure to disclose the
grave risks of its use as a sleeper for overnight or prolonged
sleep, allowed Defendants to reap vast profits at the expense of
consumers who erroneously believed they were obtaining a safe place
for their babies to sleep.

Mattel, until April 12, 2019, directly and/or through Fisher-Price,
designed, marketed, distributed and sold Rock 'n Play Sleepers
throughout the United States, including in Oklahoma. Mattel shares
overall responsibility for the safety of Fisher-Price products,
including the Rock 'n Play Sleeper. All recall and safety alerts
for both Fisher-Price and Mattel products, as well as customer
service for both Fisher-Price and Mattel products, are found on the
Mattel website.

As initially reported in a November 26, 2018 Wall Street Journal
article entitled "Infant Deaths Prompt Questions Over Safety of
Inclined Sleepers," at least 30 infant deaths and more than 700
injuries associated with these inclined sleepers -- including,
predominantly, the Rock 'n Play Sleeper -- have been reported to
the Consumer Product Safety Commission since 2005.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class:

          Terrence M. Connors, Esq.
          Caitlin M. Higgins, Esq.
          Katherine G. Howard, Esq.
          CONNORS LLP
          1000 Liberty Building
          Buffalo, NY 14202
          Telephone: (716) 852-5533
          E-mail: tmc@connorsllp.com
                  cmh@connorsllp.com
                  kgh@connorsllp.com

               - and -

          Demet Basar, Esq
          Daniel Tepper, Esq.
          Kate McGuire, Esq.
          WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER
             FREEMAN & HERZ LLP
          270 Madison Avenue
          New York, New York 10016
          Telephone: (212) 545-4600
          Facsimile: (212) 545-4653
          E-mail: basar@whafh.com
                  tepper@whafh.com
                  mcguire@whafh.com

FLORIDA: DOC Secretary Appeals Ruling in Hoffer Suit to 11th Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections filed an
appeal from a Court ruling in the lawsuit entitled Carl Hoffer, et
al. v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Case No.
4:17-cv-00214-MW-CAS, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Florida.

The appellate case is styled Carl Hoffer, et al. v. Secretary,
Florida Department of Corrections, Case No. 19-11921, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, interested
party Sidney Marts filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit.  That appellate case is captioned as Carl Hoffer v. Sidney
Marts, et al., Case No. 18-12571.  Sidney Marts is an inmate at the
Taylor Work Camp, in Perry, Florida.

The lawsuit arises from alleged prison condition.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees CARL HOFFER, Individually and on behalf of a
class of persons similarly situated; RONALD MCPHERSON, Individually
and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated; and ROLAND
MOLINA, Individually and on behalf of a class of persons similarly
situated, are represented by:

          Erica A. Selig, Esq.
          Raymond J. Taseff, Esq.
          Dante Pasquale Trevisani, Esq.
          FLORIDA JUSTICE INSTITUTE
          3750 Miami Tower
          100 SE 2nd St.
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 342-6918
          E-mail: eselig@floridajusticeinstitute.org
                  rtaseff@floridajusticeinstitute.org
                  dtrevisani@floridajusticeinstitute.org

Defendant-Appellant SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
is represented by:

          Albert J. Bowden, III, Esq.
          Karen Ann Brodeen, Esq.
          Ashley Moody, Esq.
          ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
          PL-01 The Capitol
          Tallahassee, FL 32399
          Telephone: (850) 414-3300
          E-mail: al.bowden@myfloridalegal.com
                  karen.brodeen@myfloridalegal.com
                  ashley.moody@myfloridalegal.com


G4S SECURE: Snell Files FCRA Suit in E.D. California
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against G4S Secure Solutions
(USA) Inc. The case is styled as James Snell an individual, on
behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. G4S
Secure Solutions (USA) Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-00802-LJO-SAB (E.D. Cal., June 6, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

G4S Secure Solutions (USA) is a United States/British-based
security services company, and a subsidiary of G4S plc.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Eric Bryce Kingsley, Esq.
     Kelsey Szamet, Esq.
     Kingsley & Kingsley APC
     16133 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 1200
     Encino, CA 91436
     Phone: (818) 990-3800
     Fax: (818) 990-2903
     Email: eric@kingsleykingsley.com
            kelsey@kingsleykingsley.com

          - and -

     Walter L. Haines, Esq.
     United Employees Law Group, PC
     5500 Bolsa Ave., Suite 201
     Huntington Beach, CA 92649
     Phone: (562) 256-1047
     Fax: (562) 256-1006
     Email: whaines@uelglaw.com


GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE: Russell Suit Removed to S.D. Florida
-------------------------------------------------------------
The class action styled as Randy Rosenberg, D.C., P.A. a/a/o
Danielle Russell, on behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. GEICO General Insurance Company, Defendant,
was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Florida on June 6, 2019, and assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-22335-XXXX.

The nature of suit is stated as Insurance.

GEICO General Insurance Company, Inc. provides personal automobile
insurance products.[BN]

The Defendant is represented by:

     Peter David Weinstein, Esq.
     Cole Scott Kissane PA
     600 N Pine Island Road, Suite 500
     Plantation, FL 33324
     Phone: (954) 343-3929
     Fax: (954) 474-7979
     Email: peter.weinstein@csklegal.com


GENERATIONS HEALTHCARE: Court Dismisses D. Smith FLSA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio,
Eastern Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution in the case captioned
DEANGELA SMITH, Plaintiff, v. GENERATIONS HEALTHCARE SERVICES,
LLC., et al. Defendants. Case No. 2:16-CV-0807. (S.D. Ohio).

Plaintiff Smith filed this suit as a collective action under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and a class action for violation of
several similar state provisions.

The Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs Jessica Climer and
Charles Hollins from this suit. This Court may dismiss plaintiffs
for failure to prosecute their claims, failure to comply with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or failure to comply with a court
order. But dismissal of a claim for failure to prosecute is a harsh
sanction which the court should order only in extreme situations
showing a clear record of contumacious conduct by the plaintiff.
Whether to dismiss a claim is informed by four factors: (1) whether
the party's failure is due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault (2)
whether the adversary was prejudiced by the dismissed party's
conduct (3) whether the dismissed party was warned that failure to
cooperate could lead to dismissal and (4) whether less drastic
sanctions were imposed or considered before dismissal was ordered.

Whether the party was given notice is a key consideration. This
Court previously denied the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss because
it was not clear that Ms. Climer and Mr. Hollins had adequate
notice of the importance of participating in discovery and the
possible consequences if they did not.

The Court is now satisfied, on Mr. Cash's declaration, that Ms.
Climer and Mr. Hollins had more than adequate notice of the need to
participate in discovery and the possibility that their claims
could ultimately be dismissed. Mr. Cash made numerous attempts to
contact Ms. Climer and Mr. Hollins, and Defense counsel has been
willing to accommodate them for scheduling depositions.

The other factors also support dismissing Ms. Climer and Mr.
Hollins. Climer's and Hollins's failure is due, at least, to fault
for failing to maintain contact with their attorney so that they
could stay informed regarding their case. Additionally, Ms. Climer
and Mr. Hollins were warned by counsel several times that their
claims could be dismissed. This Court has already considered less
drastic sanctions by denying the Defendants' previous Motion to
Dismiss. Given the unresponsiveness of Ms. Climer and Mr. Hollins,
dismissal, rather than some other sanction, is the appropriate
remedy. This record is sufficient to find that the opt-in
plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed with prejudice for failure
to prosecute.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxep87jw from
Leagle.com.

DeAngela Smith, Plaintiff, represented by William Franklin Cash,
III, Levin Papantonio Thomas Mitchell et al., 316 South Baylen
StreetPensacola, FL 32502 & Jacob R. Rusch, 444 Cedar St., Suite
1800, St. Paul, MN 55101,  pro hac vice.

Generations Healthcare Services LLC & Generations Too, LLC.,
Defendants, represented by Renny Joe Tyson, Renny J. Tyson Co.,
LPA, 1465 East Broad Street, Columbus, Ohio 43205


GEORGIA DIAGNOSTIC: Settlement in Gumm Suit Gets Final Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TIMOTHY GUMM, ROBERT WATKINS, Plaintiffs, v. BENJAMIN
FORD et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 5:15-CV-41 (MTT) (M.D.
Ga.), Judge Marc T. Treadwell of the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Georgia, Macon Division, granted final approval
of the settlement.

Plaintiff Gumm brought the action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
challenging conditions and practices at the Special Management Unit
("SMU") at Georgia Diagnostic & Classification Prison ("GDCP").
The Court appointed attorney Sarah Geraghty of the Southern Center
for Human Rights to represent Plaintiff Gumm.

After the parties engaged in several months of discovery, Plaintiff
Gumm filed an amended complaint in March 2017, asserting claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of a putative class of
all prisoners who are or will be held in the SMU.  The class claims
were brought under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
and Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.

The complaint alleged that confinement in the SMU created a
substantial risk of serious harm to prisoners and that prisoners
were held in the SMU for years without meaningful procedural
safeguards.  It sought classwide injunctive relief to remedy
unconstitutional review procedures and conditions of confinement in
the SMU.

In May 2018, Gumm filed a further amended complaint, naming SMU
prisoners Robert Watkins and Johnny Mack Brown as additional
Plaintiffs and class representatives.  Plaintiff Watkins is
presently assigned to the SMU.  Plaintiff Brown was subsequently
transferred to the GDCP STEP Unit and has been voluntarily
dismissed from the action.

The parties engaged in a lengthy discovery process, as well as
settlement discussions over the course of approximately 18 months.
The negotiations were conducted at arm's length by parties and
attorneys familiar with the evidence.  In December 2018, the
parties reached an agreement to certify a settlement class and
settle the injunctive and declaratory relief claims raised in the
case.  The agreement provides SMU prisoners four hours per day of
out-of-cell time, improved conditions, guidelines for prisoners
with mental illness, more robust procedural safeguards, and limits
on who may be assigned to the SMU and the duration that they may be
held there.

In weighing final approval of a class settlement, Judge Treadwell
holds that the Court's role is to determine whether the settlement,
taken as a whole, is fair, adequate and reasonable and not the
product of collusion between the parties.  All but one of these
factors -- opposition to the settlement -- were addressed in the
Court's preliminary approval order.  However, he expand on the
Court's previous discussion of six issues relevant to the propriety
of approval: (1) the Settlement Agreement's compliance with the
requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act; (2) the adequacy
of notice to class members; (3) the objections and comments
submitted by class members; (4) the views of class counsel; (5) the
proposed attorneys' fee award, see Rule 23(e)(2)(C)(iii), and
agreements required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3), see Rule
23(e)(2)(C)(iv); and finally, (6) the views of the Court.

He also concludes that the settlement class preliminarily certified
should be finally certified for settlement purposes under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), for the reasons set forth in the
Court's preliminary approval order.  The class is defined as all
persons who are or in the future will be assigned to the facility
currently known as the Special Management Unit at Georgia
Diagnostic & Classification Prison, or who are or in the future
will be assigned to the Tier III Program.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Treadwell granted final approval
of the settlement and incorporateed it as an Order of the Court.

The settlement class is certified, consisting of all persons who
are or in the future will be assigned to the facility currently
known as the Special Management Unit at Georgia Diagnostic &
Classification Prison, or who are or in the future will be assigned
to the Tier III Program, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
23(a) and (b)(2).  

The Judge overruled the objections to the proposed settlement filed
by class members in response to the notice to the class.  He
granted the parties' request to adopt the Settlement Agreement.
The Settlement Agreement will expire, in accordance with its terms,
three years from the date of entry of the Order.

The Defendants in their official capacities, their officers,
agents, servants, and employees, and those persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction by personal service or otherwise, are each enjoined from
failing to comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

In order to provide class members with notice of the final
disposition of the lawsuit, Judge further ordered that, within 14
days from the date of the Order, the Defendants will cause to be
provided to the class members notice of the final disposition of
the lawsuit by delivering to each class member the Order and
Permanent Injunction and the Court's Judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 7, 2019 Final Order and
Permanent Injunction is available at https://is.gd/MoAt8p from
Leagle.com.

TIMOTHY DENVER GUMM, Plaintiff, represented by CHRIS WILLIAM HAAF,
RYAN PRIMERANO, SARAH ELISABETH GERAGHTY -- sgeraghty@schr.org --
AARON MICHAEL LITTMAN, C. ALLEN GARRETT, Jr. --
agarrett@kilpatricktownsend.com -- JAMES F. BOGAN, III & TAMARA
SERWER CALDAS.

ROBERT JORDAN WATKINS, Plaintiff, represented by AARON MICHAEL
LITTMAN & RYAN PRIMERANO.

RICK JACOBS, Field Operations Manager, GDCP, Warden BRUCE CHAPMAN,
GDCP, RODNEY MCCLOUD, Superintendent, GDCP, WILLIAM POWELL, Deputy
Warden of Security, GDCP, JUNE BISHOP, RUFUS LOGAN, MARGARET
WASHINGTON, TIMOTHY WARD, RICKY MYRICK, STEVE UPTON, RANDY TILLMAN,
ERIC SELLERS & MICHAEL CANNON, Defendants, represented by ELIZABETH
McRARY CROWDER, LAURA LOUISE LONES, SUSAN ELIZABETH TEASTER, JOHN
Clay DEMOULPIED -- jdemoulpied@carlockcopeland.com -- Carlock
Copeland & Stair, LLP & ROBERT B. SHAPIRO --
rshapiro@carltonfields.com.

DWAIN WILLIAMS, GEORGE BALL & THOMAS SUMPTER, Defendants,
represented by ELIZABETH McRARY CROWDER, SUSAN ELIZABETH TEASTER &
ROBERT B. SHAPIRO.

HJALMAR RODRIGUEZ, JR, Movant, pro se.

JEFFREY BOURASSA, Movant, pro se.

PABLO F MALDONADO, Movant, pro se.


GNP MANAGEMENT: Brown Sues Over Unreasonable Fees
-------------------------------------------------
SUE BROWN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. GNP MANAGEMENT GROUP, an Illinois Limited
Liability Company, Defendant, Case No. 2019CH06868 (Circuit Ct.
Cook Cty., Ill., June 6, 2019) seeks to recover the unreasonable
fees paid which GNP Management unlawfully charged Plaintiff and
other similarly situated sellers in violation of the Illinois
Condominium Property Act (the "Condo Act" or "Act").

Condominium sellers are statutorily required to obtain disclosure
documents from their Condo Association Board of Managers or its
managing agent, which, in this case is GNP Management, by paying
them a reasonable fee for the actual costs of providing the
documents. Condo sellers must then provide the documents to the
prospective buyer. Condo sellers are thus beholden to property
management companies who have complete control over disclosure
documents by virtue of their management contracts or agreements
with Condo Associations. GNP Management allegedly uses its position
of entrustment with disclosure documents as leverage to abuse condo
sellers who are often involved in time-sensitive real estate
transactions and have no other reasonable option but to pay
whatever fee GNP Management chooses to charge, or risk their own
potential liability under the Condo Act by not providing the
documents to prospective buyers at all, or providing deficient
disclosure documents, notes the complaint.

By virtue of their management contracts or agreements Association,
GNP Management exercises dominion and control over the
Association's disclosure documents and does not disclose their
"actual cost" of providing the documents to condo sellers, the
complaint asserts. Thus, on information and belief, GNP Management
is only able to provide disclosure documents to condo sellers
precisely because it is an Agent of the Association. For the most
part, GNP Management can provide disclosure documents immediately
to the unit seller because they are stored in an electronic
database managed and controlled by GNP Management. GNP Management
sets pre-determined fees for "each" 22.1 disclosure item,
regardless of the length of the document or method of delivery. GNP
Management does not state the basis for how it determined the
amount charged for these documents.

GNP Management's predatory practice of price gouging captive condo
sellers with unreasonable fees to obtain access to disclosure
documents they are required by statute to provide prospective
buyers to close on the sale of their unit or risk legal liability
for noncompliance with their duty under the statute, gives rise to
Plaintiff and the Class' claims, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Brown was the owner of a condominium unit in the
Shoemaker Lofts for several years until March 3, 2017.

GNP Management is the property management agent for the Shoemaker
Lofts Condominium Association ("Shoemaker Lofts" or "the
Association").[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Terrie C. Sullivan, Esq.
     Jeffrey C. Blumenthal, Esq.
     Michael D. Richman, Esq.
     JEFFREY C. BLUMENTHAL CHARTERED
     2970 Maria Avenue, Suite #223
     Northbrook, IL 60062
     Phone: (847) 498-3220
     Fax: (847) 498-3221
     Email: Terrie@jcblawyer.com
            Jeffreyl@.jcblawyer.com
            kfelbinger@gmail.com

          - and -

     Charles R. Franklin, Esq.
     Allie K. Haling, Esq.
     FRANKLIN LAW GROUP
     181 Waukegan Rd., Suite 205
     Northfield, IL 60093-2700
     Phone: (847) 716-2380
     Fax: (847) 716-2390
     Email: cfranklin@charlesfranklinlaw.com
            ahaling@charlesfranklinlaw.com


GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES: Rosenberg Files Suit in S.D. Florida
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Government Employees
Insurance Company et al. The case is styled as Randy Rosenberg,
Randy, D.C., P.A. a/a/o Dorothy Johnson and Tina Scott, on behalf
of itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Government Employees Insurance Company, GEICO Indemnity Company,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-22332-XXXX (S.D. Fla., June 6, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Insurance.

The Government Employees Insurance Company is an American auto
insurance company with headquarters in Chevy Chase, Maryland. It is
the second largest auto insurer in the United States, after State
Farm.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Peter David Weinstein, Esq.
     Cole Scott Kissane PA
     600 N Pine Island Road, Suite 500
     Plantation, FL 33324
     Phone: (954) 343-3929
     Fax: (954) 474-7979
     Email: peter.weinstein@csklegal.com


HECLA MINING: Batters Sue over Securities Fraud
-----------------------------------------------
A securities fraud action complaint has been filed against Hecla
Mining Company and its executives for violations of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. The case is captioned JEFFREY H. BATTER and
CHERYL BATTER, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, vs. HECLA MINING COMPANY, PHILLIPS S. BAKER,
JR., LINDSAY A. HALL, and LAWRENCE P. RADFORD, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-04883 (S.D.N.Y., May 24, 2019).

Plaintiffs Jeffrey H. Batter and Cheryl Batter allege that the
Defendants falsely and misleadingly represented that the Nevada
operations would be accretive and cash flow positive, or at the
very least self-funding. On May 9, 2019, Hecla shocked investors by
its admission that the Nevada operations suffered from negative
cash flow and other negative operating metrics and were subject to
a comprehensive review. Following the disclosure, the price of
Hecla's common stock declined by 23.5% over two trading days, from
a closing price of $2.04 per share on May 8, 2019, to close at
$1.56 per share on May 10, 2019. The stock price has not recovered
and on May 23, 2019 closed at $1.38 per share. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit as a class action pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of a class of
all persons and entities who purchased the publicly traded common
stock of Hecla during the class period. They seek to recover
damages, reasonable attorneys' fees, and any other relief as the
court may deem proper.

Hecla is headquartered in Coeur D'Alene, Idaho. Hecla's common
stock trades on the NYSE under the symbol "HL". Founded in 1891,
Hecla purports to discover, acquire, develop, and produce silver,
gold, lead and zinc. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Jeffrey P. Campisi, Esq.
     Robert N. Kaplan, Esq.
     Pamela A. Mayer, Esq.
     KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP
     850 Third Avenue, 14th Floor
     New York, NY 10022
     Telephone: (212) 687-1980
     Facsimile: (212) 687-7714
     E-mail: jcampisi@kaplanfox.com
             rkaplan@kaplanfox.com
             pmayer@kaplanfox.com


HOLLOWAY CREDIT: Muse Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against HOLLOWAY CREDIT
SOLUTIONS, LLC. The case is styled as JUANITA MUSE individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. HOLLOWAY
CREDIT SOLUTIONS, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-02499-CMR (E.D.
Pa., June 7, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Holloway Credit Solutions, LLC provides debt collection and
management services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     NICHOLAS J. LINKER, ESQ.
     ZEMEL LAW LLC
     1373 Broad St., SUITE 203-C
     Clifton, NJ 07013
     Phone: (862) 227-3106
     Email: nl@zemellawllc.com


HYUNDAI MOTOR: 9th Cir. Affirms $140MM Deal in Fuel Economy Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit issued an Opinion
affirming the Judgment of the District Court Nationwide Settlement
Class in the case captioned IN RE HYUNDAI AND KIA FUEL ECONOMY
LITIGATION, KEHLIE R. ESPINOSA; NICOLE MARIE HUNTER; JEREMY WILTON;
KAYLENE P. BRADY; GUNTHER KRAUTH; ERIC GRAEWINGHOLT; REECE PHILIP
THOMSON; ALEX MATURANI; NILUFAR REZAI; JACK ROTTNER; LYDIA KIEVIT;
REBECCA SANDERS; BOBBY BRANDON ARMSTRONG; SERGIO TORRES; RICHARD
WOODRUFF; MARSHALL LAWRENCE GORDON; JOEL A. LIPMAN; JAMES GUDGALIS;
MARY P. HOESSLER; STEPHEN M. HAYES; BRIAN REEVES; SAM HAMMOND; MARK
LEGGETT; EDWIN NAYTHONS; MICHAEL WASHBURN; IRA D. DUNST; BRIAN
WEBER; KAMNEEL MAHARAJ; KIM IOCOVOZZI; HERBERT J. YOUNG; LINDA
HASPER; LESLIE BAYARD; TRICIA FELLERS; ORLANDO ELLIOTT; JAMES
BONSIGNORE; MARGARET SETSER; GUILLERMO QUIROZ; DOUGLAS KURASH;
ANDRES CARULLO; LAURA S. SUTTA; GEORGIA L. THOMAS; ERIC J. OLSON;
JENNIFER MYERS; TOM WOODWARD; JEROLD TERHOST; CAMERON JOHN CESTARO;
DONALD BROWN; MARIA FIGUEROA; CONSTANCE MARTYN; THOMAS GANIM;
DANIEL BALDESCHI; LILLIAN E. LEVOFF; GIUSEPPINA ROBERTO; ROBERT
TRADER; SEAN GOLDSBERRY; CYNTHIA NAVARRO; OWEN CHAPMAN; MICHAEL
BREIN; TRAVIS BRISSEY; RONALD BURKARD; ADAM CLOUTIER; STEVEN CRAIG;
JOHN J. DIXSON; ERIN L. FANTHORPE; ERIC HADESH; MICHAEL P. KEETH;
JOHN KIRK MacDONALD; MICHAEL MANDAHL; NICHOLAS McDANIEL; MARY J.
MORAN-SPICUZZA; GARY PINCAS; BRANDON POTTER; THOMAS PURDY; ROCCO
RENGHINI; MICHELLE SINGLTEON; KEN SMILEY; GREGORY M. SONSTEIN;
ROMAN STARNO; GAYLE A. STEPHENSON; ANDRES VILLICANA; RICHARD
WILLIAMS; BRADFORD L. HIRSCH; ASHLEY CEPHAS; DAVID E. HILL; CHAD
McKINNEY; MORDECHAI SCHIFFER; LISA SANDS; DONALD KENDIG; KEVIN
GOBEL; ERIC LARSON; LIN McKINNEY; RYAN CROSS; PHILLIP HOFFMAN;
DEBRA SIMMONS; ABELARDO MORALES; PETER BLUMER; CAROLYN HAMMOND;
MELISSA LEGGETT; KELLY MOFFETT; EVAN GROGAN; CARLOS MEDINA; ALBERTO
DOMINGUEZ; CATHERINE BERNARD; MICHAEL BREIEN; LAURA GILL; THOMAS
SCHILLE; JUDITH STANTON; RANDY RICKERT; BRYAN ZIRKEL; JAMES
KUNDRAT; ROBERT SMITH; MARIA KOTOVA; JOSIPA CASEY; LUAN SNYDER; BEN
BAKER; BRIAN NGUYEN; HATTIE WILLIAMS; BILL HOLVEY; LOURDES VARGAS;
KENDALL SNYDER; NOMER MEDINA; SAMERIA GOFF; URSULA PYLAND; MARCELL
CHAPMAN; KAYE KURASH; HOLLY AMROMIN; JOHN CHAPMAN; MARY D'ANGELO;
GEORGE RUDY; AYMAN MOUSA; SHELLY HENDERSON; JEFFREY HATHAWAY;
DENNIS J. MURPHY; DOUGLAS A. PATTERSON; JOHN GENTRY; LINDA RUTH
SCOTT; DANIELLE KAY GILLELAND; JOSEPH BOWE; MICHAEL DESOUTO,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, GREG DIRENZO, Petitioner-Appellee, HYUNDAI
MOTOR AMERICA; KIA MOTORS AMERICA; KIA MOTORS CORPORATION;
GROSSINGER AUTOPLEX, INC., FKA Grossinger Hyundai; JOHN KRAFCIK;
HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY; SARAH KUNDRAT, Defendants-Appellees, v.
CAITLIN AHEARN; ANDREW YORK, Objectors-Appellants. IN RE HYUNDAI
AND KIA FUEL ECONOMY LITIGATION, KEHLIE R. ESPINOSA; NICOLE MARIE
HUNTER; JEREMY WILTON; KAYLENE P. BRADY; GUNTHER KRAUTH; ERIC
GRAEWINGHOLT; REECE PHILIP THOMSON; ALEX MATURANI; NILUFAR REZAI;
JACK ROTTNER; LYDIA KIEVIT; REBECCA SANDERS; BOBBY BRANDON
ARMSTRONG; SERGIO TORRES; RICHARD WOODRUFF; MARSHALL LAWRENCE
GORDON; JOEL A. LIPMAN; JAMES GUDGALIS; MARY P. HOESSLER; STEPHEN
M. HAYES; BRIAN REEVES; SAM HAMMOND; MARK LEGGETT; EDWIN NAYTHONS;
MICHAEL WASHBURN; IRA D. DUNST; BRIAN WEBER; KAMNEEL MAHARAJ; KIM
IOCOVOZZI; HERBERT J. YOUNG; LINDA HASPER; LESLIE BAYARD; TRICIA
FELLERS; ORLANDO ELLIOTT; JAMES BONSIGNORE; MARGARET SETSER;
GUILLERMO QUIROZ; DOUGLAS KURASH; ANDRES CARULLO; LAURA S. SUTTA;
GEORGIA L. THOMAS; ERIC J. OLSON; JENNIFER MYERS; TOM WOODWARD;
JEROLD TERHOST; CAMERON JOHN CESTARO; DONALD BROWN; MARIA FIGUEROA;
CONSTANCE MARTYN; THOMAS GANIM; DANIEL BALDESCHI; LILLIAN E.
LEVOFF; GIUSEPPINA ROBERTO; ROBERT TRADER; SEAN GOLDSBERRY; CYNTHIA
NAVARRO; OWEN CHAPMAN; MICHAEL BREIN; TRAVIS BRISSEY; RONALD
BURKARD; ADAM CLOUTIER; STEVEN CRAIG; JOHN J. DIXSON; ERIN L.
FANTHORPE; ERIC HADESH; MICHAEL P. KEETH; JOHN KIRK MacDONALD;
MICHAEL MANDAHL; NICHOLAS McDANIEL; MARY J. MORAN-SPICUZZA; GARY
PINCAS; BRANDON POTTER; THOMAS PURDY; ROCCO RENGHINI; MICHELLE
SINGLTEON; KEN SMILEY; GREGORY M. SONSTEIN; ROMAN STARNO; GAYLE A.
STEPHENSON; ANDRES VILLICANA; RICHARD WILLIAMS; BRADFORD L. HIRSCH;
ASHLEY CEPHAS; DAVID E. HILL; CHAD McKINNEY; MORDECHAI SCHIFFER;
LISA SANDS; DONALD KENDIG; KEVIN GOBEL; ERIC LARSON; LIN McKINNEY;
RYAN CROSS; PHILLIP HOFFMAN; DEBRA SIMMONS; ABELARDO MORALES; PETER
BLUMER; CAROLYN HAMMOND; MELISSA LEGGETT; KELLY MOFFETT; EVAN
GROGAN; CARLOS MEDINA; ALBERTO DOMINGUEZ; CATHERINE BERNARD;
MICHAEL BREIEN; LAURA GILL; THOMAS SCHILLE; JUDITH STANTON; RANDY
RICKERT; BRYAN ZIRKEL; JAMES KUNDRAT; ROBERT SMITH; MARIA KOTOVA;
JOSIPA CASEY; LUAN SNYDER; BEN BAKER; BRIAN NGUYEN; HATTIE
WILLIAMS; BILL HOLVEY; LOURDES VARGAS; KENDALL SNYDER; NOMER
MEDINA; SAMERIA GOFF; URSULA PYLAND; MARCELL CHAPMAN; KAYE KURASH;
HOLLY AMROMIN; JOHN CHAPMAN; MARY D'ANGELO; GEORGE RUDY; AYMAN
MOUSA; SHELLY HENDERSON; JEFFREY HATHAWAY; DENNIS J. MURPHY;
DOUGLAS A. PATTERSON; JOHN GENTRY; LINDA RUTH SCOTT; DANIELLE KAY
GILLELAND; JOSEPH BOWE; MICHAEL DESOUTO, Plaintiffs-Appellees, GREG
DIRENZO, Petitioner-Appellee, HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA; KIA MOTORS
AMERICA; KIA MOTORS CORPORATION; GROSSINGER AUTOPLEX, INC., FKA
Grossinger Hyundai; JOHN KRAFCIK; HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY; SARAH
KUNDRAT, Defendants-Appellees, v. ANTONIO SBERNA,
Objector-Appellant. IN RE HYUNDAI AND KIA FUEL ECONOMY LITIGATION,
KEHLIE R. ESPINOSA; NICOLE MARIE HUNTER; JEREMY WILTON; KAYLENE P.
BRADY; GUNTHER KRAUTH; ERIC GRAEWINGHOLT; REECE PHILIP THOMSON;
ALEX MATURANI; NILUFAR REZAI; JACK ROTTNER; LYDIA KIEVIT; REBECCA
SANDERS; BOBBY BRANDON ARMSTRONG; SERGIO TORRES; RICHARD WOODRUFF;
MARSHALL LAWRENCE GORDON; JOEL A. LIPMAN; JAMES GUDGALIS; MARY P.
HOESSLER; STEPHEN M. HAYES; BRIAN REEVES; SAM HAMMOND; MARK
LEGGETT; EDWIN NAYTHONS; MICHAEL WASHBURN; IRA D. DUNST; BRIAN
WEBER; KAMNEEL MAHARAJ; KIM IOCOVOZZI; HERBERT J. YOUNG; LINDA
HASPER; LESLIE BAYARD; TRICIA FELLERS; ORLANDO ELLIOTT; JAMES
BONSIGNORE; MARGARET SETSER; GUILLERMO QUIROZ; DOUGLAS KURASH;
ANDRES CARULLO; LAURA S. SUTTA; GEORGIA L. THOMAS; ERIC J. OLSON;
JENNIFER MYERS; TOM WOODWARD; JEROLD TERHOST; CAMERON JOHN CESTARO;
DONALD BROWN; MARIA FIGUEROA; CONSTANCE MARTYN; THOMAS GANIM;
DANIEL BALDESCHI; LILLIAN E. LEVOFF; GIUSEPPINA ROBERTO; ROBERT
TRADER; SEAN GOLDSBERRY; CYNTHIA NAVARRO; OWEN CHAPMAN; MICHAEL
BREIN; TRAVIS BRISSEY; RONALD BURKARD; ADAM CLOUTIER; STEVEN CRAIG;
JOHN J. DIXSON; ERIN L. FANTHORPE; ERIC HADESH; MICHAEL P. KEETH;
JOHN KIRK MacDONALD; MICHAEL MANDAHL; NICHOLAS McDANIEL; MARY J.
MORAN-SPICUZZA; GARY PINCAS; BRANDON POTTER; THOMAS PURDY; ROCCO
RENGHINI; MICHELLE SINGLTEON; KEN SMILEY; GREGORY M. SONSTEIN;
ROMAN STARNO; GAYLE A. STEPHENSON; ANDRES VILLICANA; RICHARD
WILLIAMS; BRADFORD L. HIRSCH; ASHLEY CEPHAS; DAVID E. HILL; CHAD
McKINNEY; MORDECHAI SCHIFFER; LISA SANDS; DONALD KENDIG; KEVIN
GOBEL; ERIC LARSON; LIN McKINNEY; RYAN CROSS; PHILLIP HOFFMAN;
DEBRA SIMMONS; ABELARDO MORALES; PETER BLUMER; CAROLYN HAMMOND;
MELISSA LEGGETT; KELLY MOFFETT; EVAN GROGAN; CARLOS MEDINA; ALBERTO
DOMINGUEZ; CATHERINE BERNARD; MICHAEL BREIEN; LAURA GILL; THOMAS
SCHILLE; JUDITH STANTON; RANDY RICKERT; BRYAN ZIRKEL; JAMES
KUNDRAT; ROBERT SMITH; MARIA KOTOVA; JOSIPA CASEY; LUAN SNYDER; BEN
BAKER; BRIAN NGUYEN; HATTIE WILLIAMS; BILL HOLVEY; LOURDES VARGAS;
KENDALL SNYDER; NOMER MEDINA; SAMERIA GOFF; URSULA PYLAND; MARCELL
CHAPMAN; KAYE KURASH; HOLLY AMROMIN; JOHN CHAPMAN; MARY D'ANGELO;
GEORGE RUDY; AYMAN MOUSA; SHELLY HENDERSON; JEFFREY HATHAWAY;
DENNIS J. MURPHY; DOUGLAS A. PATTERSON; JOHN GENTRY; LINDA RUTH
SCOTT; DANIELLE KAY GILLELAND; JOSEPH BOWE; MICHAEL DESOUTO,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, GREG DIRENZO, Petitioner-Appellee, HYUNDAI
MOTOR AMERICA; KIA MOTORS AMERICA; KIA MOTORS CORPORATION;
GROSSINGER AUTOPLEX, INC., FKA Grossinger Hyundai; JOHN KRAFCIK;
HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY; SARAH KUNDRAT, Defendants-Appellees, v. PERI
FETSCH, Objector-Appellant. IN RE HYUNDAI AND KIA FUEL ECONOMY
LITIGATION, KEHLIE R. ESPINOSA; NICOLE MARIE HUNTER; JEREMY WILTON;
KAYLENE P. BRADY; GUNTHER KRAUTH; ERIC GRAEWINGHOLT; REECE PHILIP
THOMSON; ALEX MATURANI; NILUFAR REZAI; JACK ROTTNER; LYDIA KIEVIT;
REBECCA SANDERS; BOBBY BRANDON ARMSTRONG; SERGIO TORRES; RICHARD
WOODRUFF; MARSHALL LAWRENCE GORDON; JOEL A. LIPMAN; JAMES GUDGALIS;
MARY P. HOESSLER; STEPHEN M. HAYES; BRIAN REEVES; SAM HAMMOND; MARK
LEGGETT; EDWIN NAYTHONS; MICHAEL WASHBURN; IRA D. DUNST; BRIAN
WEBER; KAMNEEL MAHARAJ; KIM IOCOVOZZI; HERBERT J. YOUNG; LINDA
HASPER; LESLIE BAYARD; TRICIA FELLERS; ORLANDO ELLIOTT; JAMES
BONSIGNORE; MARGARET SETSER; GUILLERMO QUIROZ; DOUGLAS KURASH;
ANDRES CARULLO; LAURA S. SUTTA; GEORGIA L. THOMAS; ERIC J. OLSON;
JENNIFER MYERS; TOM WOODWARD; JEROLD TERHOST; CAMERON JOHN CESTARO;
DONALD BROWN; MARIA FIGUEROA; CONSTANCE MARTYN; THOMAS GANIM;
DANIEL BALDESCHI; LILLIAN E. LEVOFF; GIUSEPPINA ROBERTO; ROBERT
TRADER; SEAN GOLDSBERRY; CYNTHIA NAVARRO; OWEN CHAPMAN; MICHAEL
BREIN; TRAVIS BRISSEY; RONALD BURKARD; ADAM CLOUTIER; STEVEN CRAIG;
JOHN J. DIXSON; ERIN L. FANTHORPE; ERIC HADESH; MICHAEL P. KEETH;
JOHN KIRK MacDONALD; MICHAEL MANDAHL; NICHOLAS McDANIEL; MARY J.
MORAN-SPICUZZA; GARY PINCAS; BRANDON POTTER; THOMAS PURDY; ROCCO
RENGHINI; MICHELLE SINGLTEON; KEN SMILEY; GREGORY M. SONSTEIN;
ROMAN STARNO; GAYLE A. STEPHENSON; ANDRES VILLICANA; RICHARD
WILLIAMS; BRADFORD L. HIRSCH; ASHLEY CEPHAS; DAVID E. HILL; CHAD
McKINNEY; MORDECHAI SCHIFFER; LISA SANDS; DONALD KENDIG; KEVIN
GOBEL; ERIC LARSON; LIN McKINNEY; RYAN CROSS; PHILLIP HOFFMAN;
DEBRA SIMMONS; ABELARDO MORALES; PETER BLUMER; CAROLYN HAMMOND;
MELISSA LEGGETT; KELLY MOFFETT; EVAN GROGAN; CARLOS MEDINA; ALBERTO
DOMINGUEZ; CATHERINE BERNARD; MICHAEL BREIEN; LAURA GILL; THOMAS
SCHILLE; JUDITH STANTON; RANDY RICKERT; BRYAN ZIRKEL; JAMES
KUNDRAT; ROBERT SMITH; MARIA KOTOVA; JOSIPA CASEY; LUAN SNYDER; BEN
BAKER; BRIAN NGUYEN; HATTIE WILLIAMS; BILL HOLVEY; LOURDES VARGAS;
KENDALL SNYDER; NOMER MEDINA; SAMERIA GOFF; URSULA PYLAND; MARCELL
CHAPMAN; KAYE KURASH; HOLLY AMROMIN; JOHN CHAPMAN; MARY D'ANGELO;
GEORGE RUDY; AYMAN MOUSA; SHELLY HENDERSON; JEFFREY HATHAWAY;
DENNIS J. MURPHY; DOUGLAS A. PATTERSON; JOHN GENTRY; LINDA RUTH
SCOTT; DANIELLE KAY GILLELAND; JOSEPH BOWE; MICHAEL DESOUTO,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, GREG DIRENZO, Petitioner-Appellee, HYUNDAI
MOTOR AMERICA; KIA MOTORS AMERICA; KIA MOTORS CORPORATION;
GROSSINGER AUTOPLEX, INC., FKA Grossinger Hyundai; JOHN KRAFCIK;
HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY; SARAH KUNDRAT, Defendants-Appellees, v. DANA
ROLAND, Objector-Appellant. IN RE HYUNDAI AND KIA FUEL ECONOMY
LITIGATION, KEHLIE R. ESPINOSA; NICOLE MARIE HUNTER; JEREMY WILTON;
KAYLENE P. BRADY; GUNTHER KRAUTH; ERIC GRAEWINGHOLT; REECE PHILIP
THOMSON; ALEX MATURANI; NILUFAR REZAI; JACK ROTTNER; LYDIA KIEVIT;
REBECCA SANDERS; BOBBY BRANDON ARMSTRONG; SERGIO TORRES; RICHARD
WOODRUFF; MARSHALL LAWRENCE GORDON; JOEL A. LIPMAN; JAMES GUDGALIS;
MARY P. HOESSLER; STEPHEN M. HAYES; BRIAN REEVES; SAM HAMMOND; MARK
LEGGETT; EDWIN NAYTHONS; MICHAEL WASHBURN; IRA D. DUNST; BRIAN
WEBER; KAMNEEL MAHARAJ; KIM IOCOVOZZI; HERBERT J. YOUNG; LINDA
HASPER; LESLIE BAYARD; TRICIA FELLERS; ORLANDO ELLIOTT; JAMES
BONSIGNORE; MARGARET SETSER; GUILLERMO QUIROZ; DOUGLAS KURASH;
ANDRES CARULLO; LAURA S. SUTTA; GEORGIA L. THOMAS; ERIC J. OLSON;
JENNIFER MYERS; TOM WOODWARD; JEROLD TERHOST; CAMERON JOHN CESTARO;
DONALD BROWN; MARIA FIGUEROA; CONSTANCE MARTYN; THOMAS GANIM;
DANIEL BALDESCHI; LILLIAN E. LEVOFF; GIUSEPPINA ROBERTO; ROBERT
TRADER; SEAN GOLDSBERRY; CYNTHIA NAVARRO; OWEN CHAPMAN; MICHAEL
BREIN; TRAVIS BRISSEY; RONALD BURKARD; ADAM CLOUTIER; STEVEN CRAIG;
JOHN J. DIXSON; ERIN L. FANTHORPE; ERIC HADESH; MICHAEL P. KEETH;
JOHN KIRK MacDONALD; MICHAEL MANDAHL; NICHOLAS McDANIEL; MARY J.
MORAN-SPICUZZA; GARY PINCAS; BRANDON POTTER; THOMAS PURDY; ROCCO
RENGHINI; MICHELLE SINGLTEON; KEN SMILEY; GREGORY M. SONSTEIN;
ROMAN STARNO; GAYLE A. STEPHENSON; ANDRES VILLICANA; RICHARD
WILLIAMS; BRADFORD L. HIRSCH; ASHLEY CEPHAS; DAVID E. HILL; CHAD
McKINNEY; MORDECHAI SCHIFFER; LISA SANDS; DONALD KENDIG; KEVIN
GOBEL; ERIC LARSON; LIN McKINNEY; RYAN CROSS; PHILLIP HOFFMAN;
DEBRA SIMMONS; ABELARDO MORALES; PETER BLUMER; CAROLYN HAMMOND;
MELISSA LEGGETT; KELLY MOFFETT; EVAN GROGAN; CARLOS MEDINA; ALBERTO
DOMINGUEZ; CATHERINE BERNARD; MICHAEL BREIEN; LAURA GILL; THOMAS
SCHILLE; JUDITH STANTON; RANDY RICKERT; BRYAN ZIRKEL; JAMES
KUNDRAT; ROBERT SMITH; MARIA KOTOVA; JOSIPA CASEY; LUAN SNYDER; BEN
BAKER; BRIAN NGUYEN; HATTIE WILLIAMS; BILL HOLVEY; LOURDES VARGAS;
KENDALL SNYDER; NOMER MEDINA; SAMERIA GOFF; URSULA PYLAND; MARCELL
CHAPMAN; KAYE KURASH; HOLLY AMROMIN; JOHN CHAPMAN; MARY D'ANGELO;
GEORGE RUDY; AYMAN MOUSA; SHELLY HENDERSON; JEFFREY HATHAWAY;
DENNIS J. MURPHY; DOUGLAS A. PATTERSON; JOHN GENTRY; DANIELLE KAY
GILLELAND; JOSEPH BOWE; MICHAEL DESOUTO, Plaintiffs-Appellees, GREG
DIRENZO, Petitioner-Appellee, HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA; KIA MOTORS
AMERICA; KIA MOTORS CORPORATION; GROSSINGER AUTOPLEX, INC., FKA
Grossinger Hyundai; JOHN KRAFCIK; HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY; SARAH
KUNDRAT, Defendants-Appellees. v. LINDA RUTH SCOTT,
Objector-Appellant. IN RE HYUNDAI AND KIA FUEL ECONOMY LITIGATION,
JOHN GENTRY; LINDA RUTH SCOTT; DANIELLE KAY GILLELAND; JOSEPH BOWE;
MICHAEL DESOUTO, Plaintiffs, and JAMES BEN FEINMAN, Appellant, v.
HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA; KIA MOTORS AMERICA; KIA MOTORS CORPORATION;
GROSSINGER AUTOPLEX, INC., FKA GROSSINGER HYUNDAI; JOHN KRAFCIK;
HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY; SARAH KUNDRAT, Defendants-Appellees. Nos.
15-56014, 15-56025, 15-56059, 15-56061, 15-56064, 15-56067. (9th
Cir.).

The Court reviews five consolidated appeals from the district
court's orders and judgment certifying a nationwide settlement
class, approving a settlement, and awarding attorney's fees in a
multidistrict litigation brought against defendants Hyundai Motor
America and Kia Motors America (automakers) regarding alleged
misrepresentations about their vehicles' fuel economy.

The Espinosa plaintiffs brought claims against Hyundai under
California consumer protection statutes and theories of common law
fraud and negligent misrepresentation. They alleged that Hyundai
misled consumers throughout the United States by advertising
inflated fuel economy standards for the Hyundai Elantra and Sonata
vehicle model years 2011-12 based on inaccurate estimates that
Hyundai provided to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

Class members could receive compensation for relinquishing any
claims they might have by choosing one of four options:

   1. a lump sum payment via a debit card, determined by vehicle
type and model year, with the cash value approximating the
additional fuel cost over a 4.75-year period associated with the
revised fuel economy estimates;

   2. a dealer service debit card worth 150% of the value of their
lump sum payment for use at Hyundai or Kia dealers;

   3. a new car purchase certificate worth 200% of their lump sum
payment for use in the purchase of a new Hyundai or Kia vehicle by
a class member or their immediate family; or

   4. enrollment in the Reimbursement. Program, which was extended
as a result of the settlement from December 31, 2013, to July 6,
2015.

By the end of March 2015, with more than three months to go before
the July 6, 2015, claims deadline, the automakers reported to the
district court that the total compensation they had paid or
expected to pay to the class members, based on the claims
submitted, was more than $140 million. The Reimbursement Program
accounted for more than $97 million of this compensation. By May
31, 2015, more than a month before the claims deadline, the
participation rate had grown to 23.0%, reflecting 200,013 claims.
And when the court included class members' participation in the
Reimbursement Program in the analysis, the participation rate
jumped to 64.5%.

The district court expressed concern with the request by
McCuneWright for a 3.0 lodestar multiplier. On June 1, 2015, after
supplemental briefing and an additional hearing, the court awarded
McCuneWright $2,850,000 in attorney's fees and $93,550.02 in costs
based on a reduced multiplier of 1.5521. On August 5, 2015, the
court awarded Hagens Berman, class counsel in Hunter and Brady,
$2,700,000 in attorney's fees based on a lodestar multiplier of
1.22, and $250,000 in costs. In addition, the court awarded fees
and costs to 26 other firms that reflected lodestar reductions of
27 to 80 percent, including an award of $1,257,000 in fees and
$66,000 in costs to liaison counsel Girard Gibbs LLP.

Jurisdiction and Standards of Review.

The reviews for abuse of discretion the district court's decision
to certify a class for settlement purposes, limiting our review to
whether the district court correctly selected. and applied Rule
23's criteria. Likewise, the Court reviews for abuse of discretion
the district court's award of attorney's fees and costs to class
counsel as well as its method of calculating the fees.

Predominance

The predominance inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3) tests whether proposed
classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by
representation. It presumes that the existence of common issues of
fact or law have been established pursuant to Rule 23(a)(2), and
focuses on whether the common questions present a significant
aspect of the case and they can be resolved for all members of the
class in a single adjudication if so, there is clear justification
for handling the dispute on a representative rather than on an
individual basis.

Predominance is not, however, a matter of nosecounting. Rather,
more important questions apt to drive the resolution of the
litigation are given more weight in the predominance analysis over
individualized questions which are of considerably less
significance to the claims of the class. Therefore, even if just
one common question predominates, the action may be considered
proper under Rule 23(b)(3) even though other important matters will
have to be tried separately.

The Inclusion of Used Car Purchasers in the Class Does Not Defeat
Predominance

Fetsch and Roland argue that used car purchasers may not have seen
the automakers' fuel efficiency representations, because only new
cars are required to display the Monroney stickers, and that
including used car purchasers in the class creates a factual issue
precluding predominance.

Their argument ignores the district court's finding that the
alleged misrepresentations were made uniformly not only on the
Monroney stickers, but also in nationwide advertising.When
misrepresentations are made as part of a nationwide, concerted
marketing effort, it makes no difference to the predominance
analysis whether consumers encounter them in different guises.  

Similarly, even if, as the automakers' expert opined, used car
buyers are in a somewhat different market than new car buyers and
would require a different damages analysis, the district court did
not abuse its discretion by finding that common issues of fact
predominated. The mere fact that there might be differences in
damage calculations is not sufficient to defeat class
certification.  

Nor is it clear why the damages here would need to be calculated
based on each consumer's willingness to pay for higher fuel
efficiency. Fraud damages do not normally correlate with the degree
of reliance. If a consumer were to establish the threshold level of
reliance, the automaker would be liable for the consumer's entire
loss from higher-thanexpected fuel costs an amount that can easily
be calculated on an individual basis, as it was in the
Reimbursement Program.

Variations in State Law Do Not Defeat Predominance

Fetsch and Roland also argue that the district court failed to
address variations in state law affecting claims by used car
purchasers and that it was required to do so under Mazza v.American
Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012). They are incorrect.

Subject to constitutional limitations and the forum state's
choice-of-law rules, a court adjudicating a multistate class action
is free to apply the substantive law of a single state to the
entire class. Here, no party argued that California's choiceof-law
rules should not apply to this class settlement arising from an MDL
in a California court. By default, California courts apply
California law unless a party litigant timely invokes the law of a
foreign state, in which case it is the foreign law proponent who
must shoulder the burden of demonstrating that foreign law, rather
than California law, should apply to class claims.

To meet their burden, the objectors must satisfy the three-step
governmental interest test. Under that test, the objectors must
prove that (1) the law of the foreign state materially differs from
the law of California,  meaning that the law differs with regard to
the particular issue in question  (2) a true conflict exists,
meaning that each state has an interest in the application of its
own law to the circumstances of the particular case and (3) the
foreign state's interest would be more impaired than California's
interest if California law were applied.  If the objectors fail to
meet their burden at any step in the analysis, the district court
may properly find California law applicable without proceeding" to
the rest of the analysis.  

Objectors Failed to Meet Their Burden of Showing That California
Law Does Not Apply
Fetsch and Roland do not suggest that application of California law
gives rise to constitutional problems. And before the district
court, no objector presented an adequate choice-of-law analysis or
explained how, under the facts of this case, the governmental
interest test's three elements were met. Further, no objector
argued that differences between the consumer protection laws of all
fifty states precluded certification of a settlement class.
Consequently, neither the district court nor class counsel were
obligated to address choice-of-law issues beyond those raised by
the objectors, and we will not decertify a class action for lack of
such analysis.

Application of California Law Satisfies Due Process

Objector Linda Ruth Scott, a lead plaintiff in a Virginia class
action that was transferred to California as part of the MDL,
argues that application of California law violates her due process
rights. She asserts that Virginia, unlike most jurisdictions, does
not provide cross-jurisdictional tolling of the statutes of
limitations on her claims notwithstanding that her case was stayed
upon transfer and remained pending in Virginia at the time of
certification. Thus, she argues, certification of a nationwide
class left Virginia class members with no real opportunity to opt
out because their claims would otherwise be dismissed as
time-barred.

But Scott does not dispute that she, like all class members, had
the right to opt out. Rather, she contends that as a practical
matter, she and other Virginia class members could not opt out of
this nationwide class action settlement because the District Court
refused to certify a Virginia subclass with recognized class
representatives asserting Virginia causes of action.

Attorney Feinman, however, acknowledged that he filed a class
action along with two other mass actions in Virginia after the
creation of the MDL to toll the statute of limitations there,
preserving claims for Virginia plaintiffs who decided to opt out of
the MDL settlement. Indeed, a handful of Virginia plaintiffs did
opt out of the settlement and continued their litigation in
Virginia, along with plaintiffs who purchased subject vehicles
after November 2, 2012, without any statute of limitations issues.
  

Ultimately, the Virginia courts dismissed two out of the three
actions for pleading deficiencies. The sole remaining action
survived the pleading stage with only one lemon law claim regarding
the onboard mileage calculator, not the fuel economy
misrepresentations at issue in the MDL. The statute of limitations
issue raised here did not feature in the district court's or Fourth
Circuit's decisions.

Even assuming that the statute of limitations would have barred the
claims of Virginia plaintiffs who opted out of the settlement,
Hanlon forecloses Scott's requested relief. In Hanlon, as here,
multiple class actions were filed and then consolidated in
California following a federal agency's investigation, with the
defendant announcing a remedial plan and entering into a settlement
only after the class moved for certification. 150 F.3d at 1018.
Like Scott, an objector in Hanlon filed a late class action in
another state and sought to litigate it in contravention of the
district court's orders.  The Court explained that while the
objector was free to opt out of the class by filing the
out-of-state action, he had no right to do so on behalf of anyone
else.

Scott claims that the statute of limitations issue and due process
require that the Virginia subclass as a whole be remanded. But what
she seeks to do here is exactly what Hanlon held was forbidden opt
out a state subclass.

In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that common issues predominated.

Adequacy

Separate from the predominance analysis, due process requires that
the named plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests
of the absent class members. This adequacy requirement, formalized
in Rule 23(a)(4), serves to uncover conflicts of interest between
named parties and the class they seek to represent as well as the
competency and conflicts of class counsel.

To determine legal adequacy, the Court resolves two questions: (1)
do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of
interest with other class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs
and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the
class?
Scott contends that class counsel were inadequate because they
failed to protect the rights of absent Virginia class members to
opt out of the settlement. Since class counsel did in fact protect
Virginians' right to opt out, this argument is meritless.

Scott also argues that class counsel Hagens Berman, the firm
representing the Brady and Hunter plaintiffs, now has a potential
conflict with the class. She asserts that more than two years after
the settlement was signed, Hagens Berman and the firm representing
Hyundai jointly represented consumers in a putative class action
suit against Volkswagen for alleged fraud regarding vehicle
emissions. Scott identifies no authority establishing that a
co-counsel relationship between class counsel and defense counsel
in a future, unrelated case presents a conflict.

Settlement Approval

A binding settlement must provide notice to the class in a
reasonable manner and otherwise be fair, reasonable, and adequate.
Various objectors allege inadequacies in the notice and claim forms
and purported collusion between class counsel and the automakers.
None of their claims have merit.

The Notice to Class Members Provided Sufficient Information

Before the district court approves a class settlement under Rule
23(e), it is critical that class members receive adequate notice.

To satisfy Rule 23(e)(1), settlement notices must present
information about a proposed settlement neutrally, simply, and
understandably. Notice is satisfactory if it `generally describes
the terms of the settlement in sufficient detail to alert those
with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come forward and be
heard.

Fetsch and Roland argue that class members who were already
participating in the automakers' voluntary Reimbursement Program
likely were unaware that additional compensation could be received
by remaining in the program because this information was buried on
page 11 of the long form notice and was omitted from the short form
and email notices. In fact, the very first page of the long form
notice informed class members: If you previously received money
under the Reimbursement Program, you may still be able to receive a
payment from the Settlement.

As for the short form notice, it was designed to be, as the name
suggests, short. Its primary purpose was to alert class members to
the settlement, provide a high-level overview of the process,
including critical dates, and explain where class members could
obtain additional information, such as eligibility information and
claim forms. In addition, after outlining some of the potential
compensation, it informed class members that other settlement
benefits exist" and invited them to use an online calculator to
estimate their individual benefit under each of the various
compensation options based on a host of personalized factors. The
short form notice highly recommended that class members use this
reimbursement calculator to evaluate their options based on their
own circumstances before submitting a claim.

This notice was more than adequate.

The Claim Forms Were Not Overly Burdensome

Objectors Ahearn and York argue that no claim forms were necessary
at all and that the automakers should have automatically made lump
sum payments to class members who did not request another form of
compensation. They cite no evidence that this was possible. The
district court found that the automakers did not have complete
records of resales of the class vehicles and Ahearn and York fail
to explain how the automakers could have identified subsequent
purchasers who were also part of the class.

They do not dispute that it was reasonable for the settlement to
provide class members with different monetary recovery options
based on miles driven and ownership status information also not in
the automakers' possession. Given that the automakers lacked
complete information to determine the identities of all class
members and the amounts of their claims, the district court
properly exercised its discretion in finding that some sort of
claims process is necessary in order to verify that the claimant is
a current owner, former owner, or current or former lessee of a
qualifying vehicle.

Ahearn, York, Fetsch, and Roland contend that the claim forms
required too much documentation, such as proof of a class member's
current address and proof of sale or ownership, and that this
documentation burden is reflected in low claim participation rates.
However, class members could easily avoid most documentation
requirements by submitting an online claim form, which
pre-populated information after class members entered their vehicle
identification number and the unique class member identification
number provided by their notices. Fetsch and Roland cite no
evidence that any claims submitted on the paper claim form were, as
they speculate, denied because one box was not checked or one piece
of documentation was not turned in.

There Is No Evidence of Collusion Between Class Counsel and the
Automakers

Rule 23(e) ensures that unnamed class members are protected from
unjust or unfair settlements affecting their rights. When the
district court determines that a proposed settlement is
fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable, our review is
extremely limited. The Court considers the overall fairness of the
settlement taken as a whole, rather than the individual component
parts, because neither the district court nor this court has the
ability to delete, modify or substitute certain provisions.

The objectors argue that the settlement reached here was a
sweetheart deal. To the contrary, the settlement bears none of the
typical signs of collusion between class counsel and defendants,
such as when class counsel receive a disproportionate distribution
of the settlement, the agreement contains a clear sailing provision
for attorney's fees separate and apart from class funds, or
unawarded fees revert to the defendants rather than to the class.


It is true, as Fetsch and Roland point out, that class action
defendants are generally indifferent to the allocation of
settlement funds between class and counsel, which can encourage a
settlement that is overly generous to counsel at the expense of the
class. But here such concerns are out of place. No objector
disputes the district court's finding that the settlement provides
substantial relief, including a substantial cash payout, ranging
from $240 to $1,420 per class member. The settling parties agreed
on the amount of class compensation more than six months before
negotiating, over multiple mediation sessions with a respected and
experienced mediator, the reasonable attorney's fees provided in
the settlement agreement.  

Here, the district court properly exercised its discretion in
calculating the fee award using the lodestar method. As the
district court found, the automakers will pay attorneys fees
separately from the amount allocated to those covered by the class.


Ahearn and York argue that the district court erred by not
confirming that attorney's fees were 25% or less of the
settlement's value. However, the district court in fact
crosschecked the lodestar amount and specifically found that the
total amount of attorney's fees awarded in this case is far lower
than the 25% of the settlement figure used as a benchmark in many
class action cases in the Ninth Circuit. The Court had affirmed fee
awards totaling a far greater percentage of the class recovery than
the fees here.  

Ahearn and York also object to the district court's use of a
lodestar multiplier. The district court, which had ably managed
this complex litigation for several years and observed various
counsel's performance during numerous hearings and through
extensive briefing, was in the best position to evaluate each
firm's contributions. The record shows that the district court
carefully made this assessment in determining the appropriate
amount of attorney's fees and explained the basis of its ruling.
The district court applied downward multipliers of 27 to 80 percent
to the lodestars for the non-settling parties' counsel because they
had a more minor role in the MDL and did not participate in
negotiating the primary settlement.

The court applied a multiplier of 1.22 to the fee award for class
counsel Hagens Berman due to the complexity and volume of work that
counsel engaged in in order to diligently pursue this case and
develop its primary theory of liability, finding the multiplier in
line with others in comparable complex and multi-year multidistrict
litigations. And the court applied a multiplier of 1.5521 to the
fees for class counsel McCuneWright because they assumed more risk
than other firms" by being one of the first firms to take up this
cause, having filed Espinosa nearly 10 months before the automakers
announced the fuel efficiency revisions.

These multipliers are modest or in-line with others we have
affirmed.  
Denial of Attorney's Fees to Feinman

Last, Scott and her counsel Feinman challenge the district court's
ruling that Feinman was not entitled to attorney's fees because he
conferred no benefit on the class. W]here objectors do not add any
new legal argument or expertise, and do not participate
constructively in the litigation or confer a benefit on the class,
they are not entitled to an award premised on equitable
principles.

The district court denied Feinman's $800,172.79 fee request because
he did not meaningfully contribute to the class settlement. Feinman
sought fees on the theory that his due process arguments, which
were rejected below and the Court rejects here, were somehow
beneficial to the class. However, these arguments are not only
baseless, but also detrimental to the class; if adopted, they would
permit Scott to hold hostage any class recovery under the
settlement until she received the unique benefit of being certified
to represent a Virginia subclass. Furthermore, Feinman does not
dispute that he engaged in obstructive conduct throughout the
litigation, including moving for discovery despite a stay and
moving to remand despite an ongoing MDL.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying fees.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's June 6, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yxfshfl9 from Leagle.com.

James B. Feinman, 1003 Church St, Lynchburg, VA 24504, (argued),
James B. Feinman & Associates, Lynchburg, Virginia, for Appellants
James Ben Feinman, John Gentry, Linda Ruth Scott, Danielle Kay
Gilleland, Joseph Bowe, Michael Desouto.

George W. Cochran, 1385 Russell Dr, Streetsboro, OH 44241-8369,
(argued), Streetsboro, Ohio; Edward W. Cochran --
edwardcochran@wowway.com -- Shaker Heights, Ohio;John J. Pentz, 19
Widow Rites Lane, Sudbury, MA 01776; for Appellants Caitlin Ahearn
and Andrew York.

Steve A. Miller -- sampc01@gmail.com -- Steve A. Miller P.C.,
Denver, Colorado, for Appellant Antonio Sberna.

Matthew Kurilich, 17321 Irvine Blvd., Ste. 115, Tustin, CA, for
Appellant Peri Fetsch.
Dennis D. Gibson, Gibson Law Firm, 4925 Greenville Ave Ste 200,
Dallas, TX 75206-0500, for Appellant Dana Roland.

Elaine S. Kusel (argued), Basking Ridge; Richard D. McCune,
McCuneWright LLP, 3281 E. Guasti Road, Suite 100, Ontario, CA
91761; for Appellees Kehlie R. Espinosa, Lilian E. Levoff, Thomas
Ganim, and Daniel Baldeschi.

Benjamin W. Jeffers  -- bjeffers@hhbjlaw.com -- Dommond E. Lonnie
-dlonnie@dykema.com -- James S. Azadian -- jazadian@dykema.com --
and Brian H. Newman -- bnewman@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett LLC,
Los Angeles, California, for Appellees Kia Motors America Inc. and
Kia Motors Corp.

Shon Morgan -- shonmorgan@quinnemanuel.com -- (argued) and Joseph
R. Ashby -- shonmorgan@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &
Sullivan LLP, Los Angeles, California;

Karin Kramer -- karinkramer300@gmail.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart
& Sullivan LLP, San Francisco, California; Dean Hansell --
dean.hansell@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells LLP, Los Angeles,
California; for Appellees Hyundai Motor America and Hyundai Motor
Co.


J.R. SIMPLOT: L. Arroyo Suit Remanded to Calif. Superior Court
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, issued an Order granting Plaintiffs'
Motion to Remand in the case captioned LUIS ARROYO, Plaintiff, v.
J.R. SIMPLOT COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 18-CV-07187-LHK. (N.D.
Cal.).

Plaintiff Luis Arroyo brings a putative class action against his
former employer, Defendant J.R. Simplot Co., for violations of
federal and California credit reporting statutes and for wage and
hour violations.

The Defendant removed the case to federal court on the grounds of
federal question jurisdiction. Specifically, the Defendant stated
in its notice of removal that the Court has federal question
jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's FCRA claims, which arise under
the laws of the United States.

The instant motion to remand presents a single question: whether
the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's FCRA
claims.

The Plaintiff argues that the Court must remand the case to state
court because Plaintiff lacks Article III standing to assert his
FCRA claims.  

The Ninth Circuit has held that in FCRA cases, a plaintiff has
standing only if the plaintiff alleges more than a procedural
violation of the FCRA. A plaintiff may not show an injury-in-fact
merely by pointing to a statutory cause of action.

Rather, a plaintiff must allege how the specific procedural
violations alleged in this case actually harm, or present a
material risk of harm to the interests protected by the FCRA.  

The Ninth Circuit has also addressed the interests protected by the
specific FCRA disclosure requirements at issue in this case. Syed
v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492 (9th Cir. 2017). In Syed, the Ninth
Circuit stated that the FCRA's disclosure requirements create a
right to privacy by enabling applicants to withhold permission to
obtain the report from the prospective employer, and a concrete
injury when applicants are deprived of their ability to
meaningfully authorize the credit check.

The plaintiff in Syed alleged such an injury because the plaintiff
alleged that he was confused by the inclusion of the liability
waiver with the disclosure and would not have signed it had it
contained a sufficiently clear disclosure, as required by the
statute.

By contrast, the Plaintiff has made no such allegations of
confusion or that Defendant disseminated inaccurate information
about the Plaintiff. Instead, the Plaintiff has conclusorily
alleged only that due to the Defendant's violation of the FCRA's
disclosure requirements, the Plaintiff and other class members have
been injured, including but not limited to, having their privacy
and statutory rights invaded in violation of the FCRA.

The Defendant is unable to point to any decision in which a court
held that conclusory allegations of harm to privacy and statutory
rights resulting from a failure to comply with the FCRA's
disclosure requirements suffice to allege Article III standing.
Instead, the Defendant argues only that the FCRA cases the
Plaintiff cites all involve a defendant seeking dismissal for lack
of a concrete injury, rather than, as here, a plaintiff seeking
remand based on lack of standing.  However, the Defendant's
argument is contradicted by a case that the Defendant itself
cites.

Therefore, consistent with the Plaintiff's own concession, the
Plaintiff lacks standing to bring his FCRA causes of action in
federal court. The Defendant removed this case solely on the basis
of federal question jurisdiction arising from the Plaintiff's FCRA
causes of action, and does not contend that the Court otherwise may
exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's
complaint. When the Court determines that it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over an action that has been removed to federal court,
the Court must remand the case to state court. Thus, the Court must
remand Plaintiff's complaint to state court.

Accordingly, the Court grants the Plaintiff's motion to remand and
remands the instant case to California Superior Court for the
County of Santa Clara.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yym3jbkt from Leagle.com.

Luis Arroyo, on behalf of himself, all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Chaim Shaun Setareh --
shaun@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group, Farrah Grant --
farrah@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group & Thomas Alistair Segal
-- thomas@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group.

J.R. Simplot Company, a Nevada corporation, Defendant, represented
by Elizabeth A. Falcone -- elizabeth.falcone@ogletree.com --
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Jason Phillip Brown
-- jason.brown@ogletreedeakins.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash,
Smoak & Stewart, P.C. & Michael J. Nader --
michael.nader@ogletree.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &
Stewart, P.C..


JM SMUCKER: Court Narrows Claims in 1st Amended Robinson Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHELLY ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. J.M. SMUCKER COMPANY,
Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-04654-HSG (N.D. Cal.), Judge Haywood S.
Gilliam, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's
motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint.

Robinson brought the putative class action complaint against the
Defendant, alleging that its Crisco 100% Extra Virgin Olive Oil
No-Stick Spray does not, despite its name, contain 100% extra
virgin olive oil.  The Defendant manufactures, markets, and sells
olive oil labeled as Crisco EVOO.  Robinson lives in Brentwood,
California.  She purchased Crisco EVOO for personal consumption at
a Wal-Mart in Antioch, California, and other places during the past
four years.  

In 2017 and 2018, the Plaintiff purchased Crisco EVOO in reliance
on the Defendant's advertising and labeling of the product as extra
virgin olive oil.  But Crisco EVOO is not Extra Virgin Olive Oil,
meaning that Defendant's advertising is false and misleading.
Rather, extensive clinical testing conducted by a leading
laboratory conclusively establishes that Crisco EVOO is not Extra
Virgin Olive Oil.  

The Plaintiff and the members of the putative class would not have
paid as much, if at all, for Crisco EVOO but for the Defendant's
misrepresentations.  The Plaintiff and the members of the putative
class are unable to rely on the product's advertising so long as it
continues to claim that it is extra virgin olive oil.  They will
not purchase the Crisco EVOO product in the future, although they
would like to do so, unless and until Defendant takes corrective
action.

The Plaintiff filed her initial complaint on Aug. 2, 2018.  After
the Defendant moved to dismiss, the Plaintiff filed the FAC on
October 24.  The Defendant filed a revised motion to dismiss on
November 7.  The Plaintiff opposed on November 21, and tge
Defendant replied on December 5.

Judge Gilliam granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's
motion to dismiss the FAC.  He dismissed the Plaintiff's UCL, FAL,
and negligent misrepresentation causes of action, as well as the
prayer for punitive damages.  Among other things, the Judge finds
that (i) the Plaintiff has sufficiently pled claims providing for
damages, she has an adequate remedy at law and is therefore barred
from seeking equitable relief; (ii) each of the Plaintiff's UCL
theories "lacks merit"; (iii) the Plaintiff does not plead any
facts to support an award of punitive damages because she does not
allege that any individual committed willful and malicious conduct;
and (iv) the negligent misrepresentation claim barred is by the
economic loss rule because the Plaintiff has not pled any personal
liability.

The Judge finds that amendment would be futile as to the UCL and
FAL claims because no factual allegations could negate the adequate
remedy at law, and thus denied the request for leave to amend as to
these claims.  However, the Judge cannot say that amendment would
be futile as to the negligent misrepresentation cause of action or
request for punitive damages; therefore, he granted leave to amend
on these issues.   Should the Plaintiff wish to amend her complaint
to plead additional facts to support these theories, she must do so
by May 22, 2019.

In addition, the Judge set a case management conference for May 28,
2019 at 2:00 p.m. to discuss a plan and schedule for a prompt
resolution for the case.  The parties will file a joint case
management statement by May 22, 2019.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 8, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/sDdlt9 from Leagle.com.

Shelly Robinson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by David W. Reid, Pacific Trial
Attorneys, APC & Scott J. Ferrell --
sferrell@pacifictrialattorneys.com -- Pacific Trial Attorneys.

J.M. Smucker Company, an Ohio corporation, Defendant, represented
by Ronald Y. Rothstein -- dreid@pacifictrialattorneys.com --
Winston and Strawn LLP, pro hac vice, Crista N. Welch --
cwelch@coblentzlaw.com -- Winston and Strawn LLP & Megan Lee Whipp
-- mwhipp@winston.com -- Winston and Strawn LLP.


JOSEPH WILDCAT: Jones Files FCRA Suit in E.D. Pa.
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against CAPITAL ACCOUNTS,
LLC. The case is styled as ISIAH A. JONES, III FOR HIMSELF AND
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff v. JOSEPH WILDCAT, SR., NICOLE
CHAPMAN-REYNOLDS, EDMUND PETERSON, CHRIS SOULIER, PATRICIA MARQUEZ,
PHILLIP CHAPMAN, JR., DAROLD LONDO, RANDY SOULIER, MELISSA DOUD,
JESSI PHILLIPS LORENZO, JUANITA HUGULEY also known as: JUANITA
GEORGE-HUGULEY ALL DEFENDANTS NAMED SOLELY IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL
CAPACITY, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-02493-JS (E.D. Pa., June 7,
2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

Joseph Wildcat, Sr. have been President of the Lac du Flambeau Band
of Lake Superior Chippewa since 2016.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     ROBERT F. SALVIN, ESQ.
     PHILA DEBT CLINIC & CONSUMER LAW CENTER
     TWO BALA PLAZA SUITE 300
     BALA CYNWYD, PA 19004-1573
     Phone: (215) 300-2388
     Email: rfsalvin@hotmail.com


JPMORGAN CHASE: Removes Osella Class Suit to C.D. California
------------------------------------------------------------
The Defendants removed on May 17, 2019, class action lawsuit
entitled Eva Osella, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al., Case No.
19STCV13525, from the Superior Court of the State of California for
the County of Los Angeles to the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California (Los Angeles).

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-04318 to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Real Property: Other.[BN]

Defendants JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., and J.P. Morgan Chase Custody
Services, Inc., are represented by:

          Stephen J. Newman, Esq.
          STROOCK AND STROOCK AND LAVAN LLP
          2029 Century Park East, Suite 1800
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-3086
          Telephone: (310) 556-5800
          Facsimile: (310) 556-5959
          E-mail: snewman@stroock.com


KEEFE COMMISSARY: Reichert Wash. Subclass Conditionally Certified
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JEFFREY REICHERT, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. KEEFE COMMISSARY NETWORK,
L.L.C., d/b/a ACCESS CORRECTIONS; RAPID INVESTMENTS, INC., d/b/a
RAPID FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS, d/b/a ACCESS FREDOM; and CACHE VALLEY
BANK, Defendant, Case No. 3:17-cv-05848-RBL (W.D. Wash.), Judge
Ronald B. Leighton of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington, Tacoma, (i) granted the Plaintiff's Motion
for Class Certification with respect to the Washington subclass on
the condition that Reichert add another named Plaintiff who
received a cardholder agreement with their release card; and (ii)
reserved certification of the national class and necessary joinder
under Rule 19.

The matter is before the Court on Reichert's Motion for Class
Certification.  The class action lawsuit challenges the use of
prepaid "release cards" for reimbursing confiscated cash to inmates
as they are released from incarceration.  Many government
facilities have opted to use these cards instead of redistributing
funds via cash or a check.  However, unlike those other methods,
release cards carry hefty fees that start depleting inmates' funds
within hours of release.  The contracts with government agencies to
provide release cards, which are managed by Defendant Rapid
Investments, Inc., and issued by Cache Valley Bank.

Reichert moves to certify both a national class, asserting claims
under the Electronic Funds Transfer Act ("EFTA"), and a Washington
subclass, asserting claims under EFTA, the Takings Clause, and the
Washington Consumer Protection Act ("WCPA"), as well as for
conversion and unjust enrichment.

The national class definition is defined as all persons in the
United States who, at any time since Oct. 20, 2016, were: (1) taken
into custody at a jail, correctional facility, detainment center,
or any other law enforcement facility, (2) entitled to the return
of money either confiscated from them or remaining in their inmate
accounts when they were released from the facility, (3) issued a
prepaid debit card from Keefe Commissary Network, LLC, Rapid
Investments, Inc., and/or Cache Valley Bank that was subject to
fees, charges, and restrictions and (4) not offered an alternative
method for the return of their money.

For the Washington subclass, Reichert defined it as all persons
who, at any time since Oct. 20, 2013, were: (1) taken into custody
at a jail, correctional facility, detainment center, or any other
law enforcement facility located in the state of Washington, (2)
entitled to the return coil money either confiscated from them or
remaining in their inmate accounts when they were released from the
facility, (3) issued a prepaid debit card from Keefe Commissary
Network, LT.C, Rapid Investments, Inc., and/or Cache Valley Bank
that was subject to fees, charges, and restrictions and (4) not
offered an alternative method for the return of their money.

In his Reply, Reichert also wishes to amend the class definitions
to include only inmates who were not offered a choice between
receiving a release card or some other form of reimbursement.

Reichert argues that class certification is appropriate because
Rule 23(a)'s four requirements of numerosity, typicality,
commonality, and adequacy are satisfied.  He also contends that
Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement is met because the central
questions in this case focus on the practice of providing inmates
with activated, fee-laden cards instead of a check or cash.
Finally, Reichert argues that a class action is the superior method
of bringing these claims because individual actions would not be
financially feasible and the class definitions are based on
objective criteria.

The Defendants contest certification on a number of bases but
primarily focus on typicality and predominance.  They argue that
Reichert is not typical of all class members because many
facilities provide inmates with a copy of Rapid's cardholder
agreement when they are released, creating potential contractual
defenses.  The Defendants contend that the possibility that some
class members formed contracts upon release will raise numerous
questions about the circumstances of each inmates' release, which
would vary according to the procedures at each facility.  They also
argue that a national class would be unmanageable in light of the
vast amount of evidence and witnesses in other states.  Finally,
the Defendants assert that the government entities that contract
with Defendants are necessary parties under Rule 19 but that they
cannot be feasibly joined because the Court lacks personal
jurisdiction over agencies in other states.

Judge Leighton conditionally granted in part Reicheit's Motion for
Class Certification.  He granted Reichert's Motion with respect to
the Washington subclass on the condition that Reichert add another
named Plaintiff who received a cardholder agreement with their
release card.  Certification of the national class and necessary
joinder under Rule 19 are reserved.  

Among other things, the Judge finds that it is appropriate to allow
Reichert to redefine the class. The modification would not add a
"wholly different group of people" to the case.  Instead, it would
actually narrow the class definition by excluding inmates who were
offered a choice between methods of reimbursement.  To the extent
the narrowed class definition would require discovery about which
facilities offer inmates a choice, the Defendants have already
refused to respond to discovery requests on this subject.
Reichert's is permitted to amend the class definition.

He also finds that it would be a waste of time to certify the
national class only to decertify it because there are indispensable
parties that cannot feasibly be joined.  The Judge has concerns
about leaving Kitsap County and other government entities out of
the case for other reasons.  If the Defendants' clients
independently decide whether inmates are given a choice between
release cards and other forms of reimbursement, the Court may be
unable to fashion adequate injunctive relief in their absence.  It
is also possible that an injunction would impose inconsistent
obligations on Defendants, who would be ordered to reform their
practices while still contractually bound to provide the same
services to government clients.  He therefore reserves the issue of
Rule 19 joinder and have the parties address it at oral argument.


Oral argument will be set for May 23, at 1:30 p.m.  The parties
should be prepared to discuss (1) whether the law of different
states regarding contract formation and duress is sufficiently
consistent to allow certification of the national class, and (2)
whether joinder of absent government entities is necessary under
Rule 19 to ensure that the Court can accord complete relief and
avoid imposing inconsistent obligations.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 8, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/I9siG7 from Leagle.com.

Jeffrey Reichert, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Laura R. Gerber --
lgerber@kellerrohrback.com -- KELLER ROHRBACK, Mark Adam Griffin
-- mgriffin@kellerrohrback.com -- KELLER ROHRBACK, Daniel
Marshall, HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER, pro hac vice, Lisa Faye
Petak -- lpetak@kellerrohrback.com -- KELLER ROHRBACK LLP, pro
hac vice, Masimba Mutamba, HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER, pro hac
vice & Sabarish Neelakanta, HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER, pro hac
vice.

Keefe Commissary Network LLC, doing business as Access
Corrections, Defendant, represented by Sylvia Karen Bamberger --
kbamberger@bpmlaw.com -- BETTS PATTERSON & MINES, Russell S.
Ponessa -- rponessa@hinshawlaw.com -- HINSHAW & CULBERTSON, pro
hac vice & Suzanne L. Jones -- sjones@hinshawlaw.com -- HINSHAW &
CULBERTSON, pro hac vice.

Rapid Investments Inc, doing business as Rapid Financial
Solutions doing business as Access Freedom & Cache Valley Bank,
Defendants, represented by Emily J. Harris --
eharris@corrcronin.com -- CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG
& MOORE LLP, George F. Verschelden --
george.verschelden@stinson.com -- STINSON LEONARD STREET LLP, pro
hac vice & Kristina Markosova -- kmarkosova@corrcronin.com --
CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP.


KIA MOTORS: Defective Vehicles Suit Transferred to C.D. Cal.
------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Michael Chieco, April Achord, Jennifer Everett,
Josh Keener, Donna Hunborg, Daniel Reilley, Terri Sackos, Kimberle
Zimmerman and Barbara Myers, on behalf of themselves and similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. KIA Motors America, Corporation
and Hyundai Motor Company, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-16215, (D.
N.J., November 16, 2018), was transferred to the Central District
of California on May 7, 2019 under Case No. 19-cv-00854.

Plaintiffs are owners of 2011-14 KIA Optima, 2011–13 KIA
Sportage, Hyundai 2011–14 Santa Fe and Sonata vehicle models that
use the Hyundai 2.0 liter and 2.4 liter engines. They seek
injunctive and declaratory relief, compensatory, punitive,
statutory damages and reasonable attorney fees and costs resulting
from vehicle defects arising from metal debris left over from the
manufacturing process that mixes with engine oil and creates oil
sludge which clogs oil ports and prevents lubrication of the
engine's moving parts. [BN]

Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Shmuel Klein, Esq.
     LAW OFFICE OF SHMUEL KLEIN PA
     113 Cedarhill Ave.
     Mahwah, NJ 07430
     Tel: (845) 425-2510

Defendants are represented by:

     Jaclyn Palmerson
     QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART AND SULLIVAN LLP
     51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor
     New York, NY 10010
     Tel: (212) 849-7104
     Fax: (212) 849-7100
     Email: jaclynpalmerson@quinnemanuel.com


LAKES VENTURE: Marcum Seeks to Certify FLSA Collective Class
------------------------------------------------------------
In a class action lawsuit DONNA MARCUM, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. LAKES VENTURE,
LLC, d/b/a FRESH THYME FARMERS MARKET LLC, the Defendant, Case No.
3:19-cv-00231-DJH (W.D. Ky.), the Plaintiff moves the Court
pursuant to Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act for entry
of an order:

   1. conditionally certifying proposed collective FLSA class:

   2. implementing a procedure whereby Court-approved Notice of
      Plaintiff's FLSA claims is sent (via U.S. Mail and e-mail)
      to:

      "all current and former hourly employees of Defendant who
      worked over 40 hours in any workweek and were not fully
      compensated for all hours worked because they were unable to

      take an uninterrupted meal break of 30 minutes";

   3. requiring Defendant to, within 14 days of this Court's order,

      identify all potential opt-in plaintiffs by providing a list

      in electronic and importable format, of the names, job
      titles, work locations, last known address, telephone
      number(s), e-mail address(es), and dates of employment of all

      potential opt-in plaintiffs who worked for Defendant at any
      time from three years preceding the Court's granting of the
      instant Motion.[CC]

Attorneys for Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated

          Matthew J.P. Coffman, Esq.
          COFFMAN LEGAL, LLC
          1550 Old Henderson Road, Suite 126
          Columbus, OH 43220
          Telephone: 614-949-1181
          Facsimile: 614-386-9964
          E-mail: mcoffman@mcoffmanlegal.com

               - and -

          Daniel I. Bryant, Esq.
          BRYANT LEGAL, LLC
          1550 Old Henderson Road, Suite 126
          Columbus, OH 43220
          Telephone: 614-704-0546
          Facsimile: 614-573-9826
          E-mail: dbryant@bryantlegalllc.com

               - and -

          Robi J. Baishnab, Esq.
          NILGES DRAHER LLC
          34 N. High St., Ste. 502
          Columbus, OH 43215
          Telephone: (614) 824-5770
          Facsimile: (330) 754-1430
          E-mail: rbaishnab@ohlaborlaw.com

               - and -

          Hans A. Nilges, Esq.
          Shannon M. Draher, Esq.
          NILGES DRAHER LLC
          7266 Portage Street, NW, Suite D
          Massillon, OH 44646
          Telephone: (330) 470-4428
          Facsimile: (330) 754-1430
          E-mail: hans@ohlaborlaw.com
                  sdraher@ohlaborlaw.com

LASER SPINE: Embry Seeks to Certify Class of Terminated Workers
---------------------------------------------------------------
In a class action lawsuit HEATHER EMBRY, on behalf of herself and a
class of those others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. LASER
SPINE INSTITUTE, LLC, LSI HOLDCO, LLC and LSI MANAGEMENT COMPANY,
LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 8:19-cv-00539-SDM-AAS (M.D. Fla.),
the Plaintiff moves the Court for an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      all Laser Spine Institute employees throughout the United
      States who were not given a minimum of 60 days' written
      notice of termination and whose employment was terminated on

      or about March 1, 2019, as a result of a "mass layoff” or
      "plant closing" as defined by the Workers Adjustment and
      Retraining Notification Act of 1988, excluding the directors

      and officers of Laser Spine Institute";

   2. appointing Heather Embry as Class Representative;

   3. appointing Counsel and their firms and members thereof as
      class counsel; and

   4. allowing Plaintiff's comnsel to notify the Class members.

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Ryan D. Barack, Esq.
          Michelle Erin Nadeau, Esq.
          KWALL BARACK NADEAU PLLC
          304 S. Belcher Road, Suite C
          Clearwater, FL 33765
          Telephone: (727) 441-4947
          Facsimile: (727) 447-3158
          E-mail: rbarack@employeerights.com
                  jackie@employeerights.com
                  mnadeau@employeerights.com
                  jackie@employeerights.com

LASER SPINE: Higdon Seeks to Certify Class of Terminated Workers
----------------------------------------------------------------
In a class action lawsuit DUANE HIGDON, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. LASER SPINE
INSTITUTE, LLC, LSI HOLDCO, LLC and LSI MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC,
the Defendants, Case No. 8:19-cv-00547-MSS-TGW (M.D. Fla.), the
Plaintiff moves the Court for an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "any employee employed by Defendant LASER SPINE INSTITUTE,
      LLC, LSI HOLDCO, LLC, and LSI MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC, who
      was not given a minimum of 60-days advance written notice of

      termination and whose employment was terminated as a result
      of a "mass layoff" or "plant closing" as defined in 20 C.F.R.

      section 639.3 and 29 U.S.C. section 2101 under the Worker
      Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988. The class

      does not include part-time employees as defined under 29
      U.S.C. section 2101(a)(8).";

   2. appointing him as class representative;

   3. appointing the law firm of Florin Gray Bouzas Owens, LLC as
      class counsel; and

   4. authorizing notice to all class members.

The Plaintiff's termination, and the termination of all similarly
situated employees, was caused by a mass layoff or plant closing as
defined by the WARN Act. However, Defendants failed to provide
Plaintiff and the other class members at least 60-days' advance
written notice of their termination. Nor was Plaintiff and the
putative class members paid or provided benefits during the 60-day
period. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the other class members are
entitled to recover their respective wages, benefits, and other
permissible damages for the 60-day period pursuant to the Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Miguel Bouzas, Esq.
          Wolfgang M. Florin, Esq.
          FLORIN, GRAY, BOUZAS, OWENS, LLC
          16524 Pointe Village Drive, Suite 100
          Lutz, FL 33558
          Telephone (727) 254-5255
          Facsimile (727) 483-7942
          E-mail: miguel@fgbolaw.com
                  gina@fgbolaw.com
                  wolfgang@fgbolaw.com

LEX34 FRUIT & VEGETABLE: Bonilla Sues Over Unpaid Wages
-------------------------------------------------------
Angel Bonilla (a/k/a Victor), Guillermo Garcia Garcia, Jesus
Ramales, Jose Alfredo Vargas Arellano, Martin Gonzalez, and Odilon
Gonzalez, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. Lex34 Fruit & Vegetable Corp. (d/b/a Merci Market),
350-42 Fruit & Vegetable Corp. (d/b/a Merci Market), James Cho,
Mike Cho, Nicole Cho, and Mike Chong, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-05327 (S.D. N.Y., June 6, 2019) is an action on behalf of
herself, and other similarly situated individuals, for unpaid
minimum and overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 ("FLSA"), and for violations of the N.Y. Labor Law (the
"NYLL"), and the "spread of hours" and overtime wage orders of the
New York Commissioner of Labor, including applicable liquidated
damages, interest, attorneys' fees and costs.

Plaintiffs have worked for Defendants in excess of 40 hours per
week, without appropriate minimum wage, overtime, and spread of
hours compensation for the hours that they have worked. Moreover,
Defendants have failed to maintain accurate recordkeeping of the
hours worked and have failed to pay Plaintiffs appropriately for
any hours worked, either at the straight rate of pay or for any
additional overtime premium, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs have been employed as deli workers, stock persons, and
ostensibly as a delivery worker at the Defendants' delis.

Defendants own, operate, or control two delis, located at 1413
Sixth Avenue, New York, New York 10019 and at 350 West 42nd Street,
New York, New York 10003 (hereinafter "the West 42nd Street
location") both under the name "Merci Market".[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Michael Faillace, Esq.
     MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
     60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
     New York, NY 10165
     Phone: (212) 317-1200
     Facsimile: (212) 317-1620


LYFT INC: A. Oliver Suit Transferred to S.D. Ga.
------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued on Order granting Defendant's Motion to Transfer
Venue in the case captioned ANTHONY OLIVER, Plaintiff, v. LYFT,
INC., Defendant. No. C 19-01488 WHA. (N.D. Cal.) to the Southern
District of Georgia.

Venue Would Have Been Proper in Georgia.

This order finds that venue would have been proper in the Southern
District of Georgia because this is where plaintiff executed Lyft's
Terms of Service and allegedly received the unauthorized texts.

At least two times during these proceedings, the plaintiff presents
inconsistent statements pertaining to the location where he
received the texts. In his complaint, the plaintiff states that the
acts giving rise to the claims alleged herein were committed in
Georgia. Two paragraphs later, however, the plaintiff contradicts
himself, stating that he received the allegedly unauthorized texts
in this district.

The Plaintiff contradicts himself yet again in a self-serving
declaration, attached to his opposition. In this declaration,
plaintiff states that he exclusively received the unauthorized
texts while he was on vacation in Los Angeles. This order finds it
unnecessary to decide which of plaintiff's three equally
conflicting statements is true. It is sufficient that plaintiff, in
his own complaint, states that the "acts giving rise to the claims
alleged herein were committed in Georgia.

In light of this, this order finds that venue is proper in the
Southern District of Georgia.

Relevant Convenience Factors Favors Transfer

(1) Plaintiff's Choice of Forum

Ordinarily, a plaintiff's choice of forum weighs heavily against a
defendant seeking to transfer under Section 1404(a). When the
chosen forum is not the plaintiff's home forum, however, the
presumption in the plaintiff's favor `applies with less force, for
the assumption that the chosen forum is appropriate is in such
cases less reasonable.

As a resident of Chatham County, the plaintiff's home forum is the
Southern District of Georgia. Contrary to plaintiff's assertion,
his choice of forum is not accorded the same deference that it
typically receives. Though defendant is based in this district,
plaintiff worked for Lyft, executed Lyft's Terms of Service, and
received the allegedly unlawful texts in Chatham County.

This case belongs in Georgia.

(2) Convenience of the Parties

The Plaintiff is currently being held without bond at the Chatham
County Jail, absent a court date. Denying defendant's motion to
transfer from this district wholly deprives plaintiff of the
ability to participate in all aspects of the proceedings and as a
potential witness. Transferring the case obviates some of these
issues. The transfer is convenient for defendant as well. Defendant
is embroiled in another matter with plaintiff in the Southern
District of Georgia and has since obtained counsel in Georgia.

Because transfer to the Southern District of Georgia is more
convenient for both parties, this factor strongly weighs in favor
of transfer.

(3) Convenience of Witnesses

At this point, neither party has identified any witnesses that they
wish to call upon. Plaintiff declares that there are no witnesses
in the Southern District of Georgia but fails to states where any
witnesses reside. Plaintiff, however, is presumably a witness and
is currently incarcerated in Georgia.

Thus, this factor weighs in favor of transfer.

(4) Ease of Access to the Evidence

As with the issue of witnesses, it remains unclear what evidence
will be brought forth by either party. Plaintiff's complaint
suggests that the bulk of his evidence is in his phone, which is
presumably in Georgia, in an evidence locker at the jail.
Meanwhile, defendant asserts that any evidence they have is
electronic and can be easily transmitted to Georgia.

Because the phone contains important evidence and is not easily
accessible to this district, this factor weighs in favor of
transfer.

(5) Forum's Familiarity With the Applicable Law

TCPA is a federal statute. Both this district and the Southern
District of Georgia are equally familiar with the law. Neither
venue is more convenient on this basis. This factor is thus
neutral.

(6) Feasibility of Consolidation With Other Claims.

Neither party identifies any actions in either district that would
be consolidated with this claim. Accordingly, this factor is not
weighed when considering defendant's motion to transfer.

(7) Local Interest in the Controversy.

Plaintiff is a resident of Georgia. As a resident of Georgia, this
order presumes that he received the texts in Georgia. In addition,
plaintiff executed Lyft's Terms of Service, effectively consenting
to communications from Lyft while in Georgia. Accordingly, Georgia
has a local interest in resolution of this matter. Although
California also has an interest in defendant's business practices,
given the unusual circumstances under which this controversy
arises, Georgia ultimately has a greater interest in resolution of
this claim.

Thus, this factor weighs in favor of transfer.

(8) Judicial Efficiency

The Southern District of Georgia has a significantly smaller
caseload, allowing the parties to move through the judicial process
more quickly. This will likely result in more cost efficient
litigation and a more timely decision, quickening the
administration of justice to both parties. In addition, there is
one other pending case between plaintiff and defendant in the
Southern District of Georgia. Therefore, this factor weighs in
favor of transfer.

This order finds that transfer to the Southern District of Georgia
is proper. The motion to transfer is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y63fbfmy from Leagle.com.

Anthony A. Oliver, Plaintiff, pro se.

Lyft, Inc., Defendant, represented by Daniel Paul Hart --
dhart@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP & Kerry McCoy Friedrichs --
kfriedrichs@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP.


MAXIM INTERNATIONAL: Wang Seeks Unpaid Minimum & OT Wages
---------------------------------------------------------
The case, YATAO WANG, on his own behalf and on behalf of others
similarly situated the Plaintiff, v. MAXIM INTERNATIONAL GROUP INC.
d/b/a Shanghai Broadway Restaurant, d/b/a I Noodles Modern Ramen
Restaurant and d/b/a Zen Ramen and Sushi; and ZEN RAMEN AND SUSHI,
INC. d/b/a I Noodles Modern Ramen Restaurant and d/b/a Zen Ramen
and Sushi; YA YAN RUAN a/k/a Yayan Ruan, CELINA LIN, ZHE LIN a/k/a
Zheping Lin, JESSICA "DOE", and SAM "DOE", the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-05168 (S.D.N.Y., June 2, 2019), alleges the Defendants have
willfully and intentionally committed widespread violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law by engaging in
pattern and practice of failing to pay its employees, including
Plaintiff, minimum wage for each hour worked and overtime
compensation for all hours worked over 40 each workweek.

The Plaintiff alleges pursuant to the FLSA, that he is entitled to
recover from the Defendants: unpaid minimum wage and unpaid
overtime wages, out of pocket expenses to delivery experts on the
road, liquidated damages, prejudgment and post-judgement interest;
and or attorney's fees and cost.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff, proposed FLSA Collective and potential
Rule 23 Class

          John Troy, Esq.
          TROY LAW, PLLC
          41-25 Kissena Boulevard Suite 119
          Flushing, NY 11355
          Telephone: (718) 762-1324

MERIT RECOVERY: Default Judgment Bid in Muldowney FDCPA Suit Okayed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MATTHEW MULDOWNEY, individually and on behalf of all
those similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MERIT RECOVERY SYSTEMS,
INC., Defendant, Case No. 5:18-CV-1057 (N.D. N.Y.), Judge David N.
Hurd of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New
York granted the Plaintiff's motion for default judgment.

On Feb. 12, 2018, Muldowney, individually and on behalf of all
those similarly situated, filed the putative class action against
Merit, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act ("FDCPA").  The claims in the Plaintiff's complaint arise out
of the Defendant's written attempt to collect a debt owed by the
Plaintiff.  

The debt Muldowney incurred was primarily for personal medical
services.  Sometime after he incurred the debt, he fell behind on
payments owed.  Thereafter, the debt was assigned or otherwise
transferred to Merit.  In an effort to collect the debt, the
Defendant contacted the Plaintiff by letters dated March 26, 2018
and April 18, 2018.  

The March 26, 2018 letter listed an amount of $70 due to Crouse
Hospital, and included "Debtor #: 124400."  It included a space
where the debtor could fill out his or her credit card information
to make payment.  The April 18, 2018 letter was identical; it
listed an amount of $70.00 due to Crouse Hospital, included "Debtor
#: 124400," and contained the same language as the March 26, 2018
letter.  Neither letter provided a date of service nor itemization
of the balance.

Muldowney alleges the Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g
because its collection letter was confusing from the perspective of
the least sophisticated consumer.  The Plaintiff also contends
Merit violated 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e when it used false,
deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection
with attempting to collect his debt.

The Plaintiff commenced the action on Sept. 4, 2018 seeking to
recover for violations of the FDCPA.  A summon was issued as to the
Defendant on Sept. 5, 2018.  The summon was returned executed on
Nov. 6, 2018, indicating service had been completed on Oct. 29,
2018.  The Defendant's answer was due on Nov. 18, 2018, but it
failed to appear or answer.  A Clerk's Certificate of Default was
requested on Nov. 27, 2018 and issued Nov. 29, 2018.

The Plaintiff then moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 55 seeking a judgment as to liability, statutory damages,
and costs and attorney's fees.

Judge Hurd will grant the Plaintiff's motion for a default judgment
on the first and second causes of action.  He finds that the
Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a violation of 15 U.S.C. Section
1692e by alleging that the least sophisticated consumer would be
confused by the Defendant's two letters.  Muldowney has also
sufficiently alleged a violation of 15 U.S.C. Section1692(g) by
alleging that from the least sophisticated consumer's perspective,
the letters are reasonably susceptible to have two or more
meanings, one of which is inaccurate.  Therefore, these
allegations, if true, establish that the Defendant violated 15
U.S.C. Section 1692(g).

The Plaintiff seeks "additional damages," also referred to as
statutory damages, in the amount of $1,000.00, the maximum amount a
court may award under § 1692k(a)(2)(A).  He alleges Merit sent two
confusing debt collection letters.  As this is a motion for a
default judgment, the Judge finds that the Defendant is deemed to
have admitted these allegations.  However, two confusing letters
sent a little over three weeks apart with no other identified
communications or conduct certainly do not demonstrate persistent
or frequent noncompliance with the FDCPA.  Applying the relevant
factors to the facts the Plaintiff alleges, an award of statutory
damages in the amount of $500 is more than appropriate.

With regard to the costs that the Plaintiff seeks -- $400 for the
cost of filing this action and $75 for the service of the summons
and complaint -- it is found that the Plaintiff is entitled to an
award of $475 in costs.

With regard to attorney's fees, Muldowney seeks attorney's fees for
9.9 hours of legal work that Attorney Craig B. Sanders performed
and 6.3 hours of legal work that Attorney David M. Barshay
performed.  The Judge will award the Plaintiff a total of $3,870 in
attorney's fees, comprised of $2,295 for Attorney Sanders' 9 hours
of legal work as an attorney ($250/hour) and 0.09 hours of work as
a paralegal ($50/hour) and $1,575 for Attorney Barshay's 6.3 hours
of legal work as an attorney ($250/hour).

After carefully reviewing the Plaintiff's submissions and the
applicable law, and for the reasons stated, Judge Hurd concludes
that the Plaintiff has established his entitlement to default
judgment for a sum certain.  Therefore, he granted the Plaintiff's
motion for default judgment.

Damages are awarded $4,845 in the following amount: (i) statutory
damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section 1692k(a)(2)(A) - $500; (ii)
costs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section 1692k(a)(3) - $475; (iii)
attorney's fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section 1692k(a)(3) -
$3,870.

The Plaintiff will personally serve a copy of the
Memorandum-Decision and Order on the Defendant at its following
place of business: Merit Recovery Systems, Inc. Basile Rowe Suite
6501-A East Syracuse, New York 13057

The Plaintiff will file an Affidavit of Service indicating that
personal service of the Memorandum-Decision and Order on the
Defendant was effected.

The Clerk enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 8, 2019 Memorandum Decision and
Order is available at https://is.gd/3mCCdn from Leagle.com.

Matthew Muldowney, individually and on behalf of all those similary
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Craig B. Sanders, Barshay
Sanders, PLLC & David Michael Barshay -- dbarshay@sbglawny.com --
Barshay Sanders, PLLC.


MICHIGAN STATE: Coleman-Weathersbee Sues Over Overdraft Fees
------------------------------------------------------------
TIFFANY K. COLEMAN-WEATHERSBEE, individually, and on behalf of
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
FEDERAL CREDIT UNION and DOES 1 through 100, Defendants, Case No.
5:19-cv-11674-JEL-DRG (W.D. Mich., June 6, 2019) seeks monetary
damages, restitution, and injunctive relief due to, inter alia,
MSUFCU's policy and practice of assessing an overdraft fee or NSF
fee on transactions when there was enough money in the checking
account to cover (pay for) the transactions presented for payment.

The Defendant MSUFCU wrongfully charged Plaintiff and the Class
Members overdraft fees and Non-Sufficient Funds fees. The charging
of such overdraft fees breaches MSUFCU's contracts with its
members, who include Plaintiff and the members of the Class. This
class action seeks monetary damages, restitution, and injunctive
relief due to MSUFCU's policy and practice of charging multiple
Non-Sufficient Funds Fees ("NSF fees") on the same electronic
transaction, a practice which also violates MSUFCU's contracts with
its members, who include Plaintiff and the members of the class.
Because MSUFCU failed to describe its actual overdraft service in
its Opt-In Contract by, inter alia, failing to describe accurately
in its Opt-In Contract the actual method by which MSUFCU calculates
its overdraft fees, and because, alternatively, MSUFCU also
violated or did not fulfill other prerequisites of Regulation E of
the Electronic Fund Transfer Act before being allowed to charge
overdraft fees, it prohibited MSUFCU from assessing overdraft fees
for automated teller machine (ATM) and non-recurring debit card
transactions, but MSUFCU did so anyway, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is a resident of Warren, Michigan and was a member of
MSUFCU at all times relevant to the class action allegations.

MSUFCU is a credit union with approximately 19 branches in Michigan
with over 271,000 members, and holding approximately $4.3 billion
in assets. MSUFCU offers its consumer banking customers a checking
account.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Philip J. Goodman, Esq.
     Hubbard Snitchler & Parzianello, PLC
     801 W. Ann Arbor Trail, Ste 240
     Plymouth, MI 48170
     Phone: 248-760-2996
     Email: PJGoodman1@aol.com

          - and -

     Taras Kick, Esq.
     THE KICK LAW FIRM, APC
     815 Moraga Drive
     Los Angeles, CA 90049
     Phone: (310) 395-2988
     Facsimile: (310) 395-2088
     Email: Taras@Kicklawfirm.com


MICHIGAN: Driver's-License Suspension Law Enforcement Order Flipped
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ADRIAN FOWLER; KITIA HARRIS, on behalf of themselves
and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. JOCELYN
BENSON, Michigan Secretary of State, in her official capacity,
Defendant-Appellant, Case Nos. 17-2504/18-1089 (6th Cir.), Judge
Alice M. Batchelder of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reserved the district court's order granting the
Plaintiffs' motion to enjoin Michigan's Secretary of State from
enforcing Michigan's driver's-license suspension law.

The case is about the constitutionality of Michigan's
driver's-license suspension scheme, as applied to indigent drivers.
The Plaintiffs are Michigan residents who claim that their
driver's licenses were suspended due to their inability to pay
court debt.

The Plaintiffs claim that the Michigan Secretary of State's
suspension of an indigent person's driver's license, on the basis
of unpaid court debt, violates the Fourteenth Amendment.  They
contend that suspending the driver's licenses of the poor is
irrational because license suspension makes their commuting to and
from work, for instance, much harder, and therefore reduces the
chances that they will pay the debt.

The Plaintiffs brought a putative class action under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983 against Secretary Benson for unlawfully suspending
their driver's licenses.  They sought injunctive relief, claiming
that Secretary Benson's suspension of the driver's licenses of the
indigent who are unable to make payments violates the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution.

The district court found only one of the Plaintiffs' constitutional
claims likely to succeed on the merits --  the Plaintiffs'
procedural due process claim that they were constitutionally
entitled to an "ability to pay" hearing prior to the deprivation of
their driver's licenses.  

The current version of the preliminary injunction order issued by
the district court is as follows: The Defendant is enjoined from
suspending any further driver's licenses of individuals because of
nonpayment of any fine, cost, fee or assessment under Michigan
Compiled Laws Section 257.321a unless and until Defendant or
another entity: (1) offers drivers the option to request a hearing
where they have the opportunity to demonstrate their inability to
pay a fine, cost, fee and/or assessment; (2) provides a hearing
when requested; (3) provides reasonable notice to drivers of the
hearing opportunity; and (4) institutes alternatives to full
payment for those unable to pay (e.g. realistic payment plans or
volunteer service).

As they have held before, Judge Batchelder holds that because the
district court committed an error of law -- on the all-important
likelihood-of-success factor, no less -- it abused its discretion
in granting a preliminary injunction.  The district court erred in
finding the Plaintiffs likely to succeed on the merits and
therefore abused its discretion in granting their requested
preliminary injunction.  

Whatever merit the Plaintiffs' argument might have as a matter of
policy, its merit as a constitutional argument is diminished by the
fact that the review of state legislative choices in this arena is
markedly deferential.  Because the Plaintiffs have not shown that
Michigan's legal scheme is devoid of a rational basis, the Judge
declines the Plaintiffs' invitation to etch their preferred
driver's-license policy into constitutional bedrock.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Batchelder reversed the judgment of
the district court, and remanded for proceedings consistent with
her Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 8, 2019 Opinion is available at
https://is.gd/Ir3BzA from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: John G. Fedynsky -- fedynskyj@michigan.gov -- OFFICE OF THE
MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant.

Phil Telfeyan, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW, Washington, D.C., for
Appellees.

ON BRIEF: John G. Fedynsky, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY
GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant.

Phil Telfeyan -- ptelfeyan@equaljusticeunderlaw.org -- Rebecca
Ramaswamy, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW, Washington, D.C., John C. Philo
-- jphilo@sugarlaw.org -- MAURICE & JANE SUGAR LAW CENTER FOR
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL JUSTICE, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellees.


MIDLAND CREDIT: Accetta FDCPA Class Suit Removed to E.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled Angela Accetta, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated v. Midland Credit
Management, Inc., Case No. 625094/2018, was removed on May 17,
2019, from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, to the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of New York (Central Islip).

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-02938 to the
proceeding.

The lawsuit alleges violations of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.[BN]

Defendant Midland Credit Management, Inc., is represented by:

          Dana Brett Briganti, Esq.
          HINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP
          800 Third Avenue, 13th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 471-6200
          Facsimile: (212) 935-1166
          E-mail: dbriganti@hinshawlaw.com


MIDLAND CREDIT: Alarimo Suit Moved From Suffolk to E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Joseph Alarimo, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Midland Credit
Management, Inc., Case No. 625087/2018, was removed on May 17,
2019, from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, to the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of New York (Central Islip).

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-02935 to the
proceeding.

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.[BN]

Defendant Midland Credit Management, Inc., is represented by:

          Matthew B. Corwin, Esq.
          HINSHAW & CULBERTSON, LLP
          800 Third Avenue, 13th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 471-6200
          Facsimile: (212) 935-1166
          E-mail: mcorwin@hinshawlaw.com


MONSANTO COMPANY: Barr Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
----------------------------------------------------------
John Barr, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant, Case
No. 4:19-cv-01551 (E.D. Mo., June 3, 2019), seeks to recover
damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result
of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection
with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging,
promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or
sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active
ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Kirk J. Goza, Esq.
          GOZA & HONNOLD LLC
          9500 Nall Ave. Suite 400
          Overland Park, KS 66207
          Telephone: (913) 451-3433
          Facsimile: (913) 839-0567
          E-mail: kgoza@gohonlaw.com



MONSANTO COMPANY: Bichler Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-------------------------------------------------------------
John Bichler, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant,
Case No. 4:19-cv-01550 (E.D. Mo., June 3, 2019), seeks to recover
damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result
of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection
with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging,
promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or
sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active
ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Kirk J. Goza, Esq.
          GOZA & HONNOLD LLC
          9500 Nall Ave. Suite 400
          Overland Park, KS 66207
          Telephone: (913) 451-3433
          Facsimile: (913) 839-0567
          E-mail: kgoza@gohonlaw.com



MONSANTO COMPANY: Combs Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-----------------------------------------------------------
ANGELA COMBS, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant,
Case No. 3:19-cv-02826-VC (E.D. Mo., April 25, 2019), seeks to
recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and
proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct
in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Holeman Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-------------------------------------------------------------
TERRY HOLEMAN, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant,
Case No. 3:19-cv-02821-VC (E.D. Mo., April 24, 2019), seeks to
recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and
proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct
in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Poiriez Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-------------------------------------------------------------
Bradley Ray Poiriez, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the
Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-01043-BEN-LL (S.D. Cal., June 3, 2019),
seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and
proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct
in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Gerald Singleton, Esq.
          Mark F. Fleming, Esq.
          John C. Lemon, Esq.
          Erika L. Vasquez, Esq.
          SINGLETON LAW FIRM, APC
          450 A Street, 5th Floor
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 771-3473
          Facsimile: (619) 255-1515
          E-mail: gerald@slffirm.com
                  mark@slffirm.com
                  john@slffirm.com
                  erika@slffirm.com

               - and -

          Timothy A. Scott, Esq.
          Nicolas O. Jimenez, Esq.
          SCOTT TRIAL LAWYERS, APC
          1350 Columbia Street, Suite 600
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 794-0451
          Facsimile: (619) 652-9964
          E-mail: tas@scotttriallawyers.com
                  noj@scotttriallawyers.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Vejil Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-----------------------------------------------------------
Virginia Vejil, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant,
Case No. 4:19-cv-01546 (E.D. Mo., June 3, 2019), seeks to recover
damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result
of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection
with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging,
promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or
sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active
ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Kirk J. Goza, Esq.
          GOZA & HONNOLD LLC
          9500 Nall Ave. Suite 400
          Overland Park, KS 66207
          Telephone: (913) 451-3433
          Facsimile: (913) 839-0567
          E-mail: kgoza@gohonlaw.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Young Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-----------------------------------------------------------
Wendall Young, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant,
Case No. 4:19-cv-01641 (E.D. Mo., June 6, 2019), seeks to recover
damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result
of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection
with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging,
promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or
sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active
ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Kirk J. Goza, Esq.
          GOZA & HONNOLD LLC
          9500 Nall Ave. Suite 400
          Overland Park, KS 66207
          Telephone: (913) 451-3433
          Facsimile: (913) 839-0567
          E-mail: kgoza@gohonlaw.com

MOVING SOLUTIONS: Court Rejects Settlement in Middle Rider Case
----------------------------------------------------------------
BARBARA MIDDLE RIDER, et al., the Plaintiffs, vs. MOVING SOLUTIONS,
INC., et al., the Defendants, Case 5:17-cv-04015-LHK (N.D. Cal.),
the Hon. Judge Lucy H. Koh entered an order on June 3, 2019,
denying Plaintiff's motion for preliminary approval without
prejudice.

The Court said, "On March 8, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their motion
for preliminary approval and their proposed Class Notice and Claim
Form. At the May 23, 2019, preliminary approval hearing, the Court
found the proposed Class Notice and Claim Form inadequate and
instructed the parties to amend the proposed Class Notice and Claim
Form by May 30, 2019. The Court warned that if the parties failed
to file an adequate amended Class Notice or an adequate amended
Claim Form, the Court would deny the motion for preliminary
approval without prejudice. On May 30, 2019, the parties filed
their amended Class Notice and amended Claim Form. The Court finds
the amended Class Notice inadequate. As an initial matter, the
amended Class Notice does not clearly identify the causes of action
and the relief available for each cause of action. Moreover, some
of the information in the amended Class Notice is incomplete,
inaccurate or contradictory."

This is a class action complaint filed on behalf of nonexempt
movers against the Defendants.  As reported by the Class Action
Reporter, the Plaintiffs moved for preliminary approval of a class
action settlement.  After a full day of mediation, the Parties
agreed to settle this case for $470,000 to be paid by the
Defendants.  The Settlement Sum includes attorney's fees, costs and
expenses directly related to the case.  The Settlement
Administration costs are estimated to be $16,000.

Under the deal, Class Representatives Barbara Middle Rider, Robert
Garza, Albert Arellano, and Jose Don Coronado shall receive Service
Awards of $5,000 each.  Subject to Court approval, Class Counsel
will be paid up to $117,500 for attorneys' fees, and an additional
amount for reasonable litigation costs not to exceed $8,500.

The members of the class shall recover damages based upon the
number of work weeks they worked during the class period.  The net
settlement is an estimated $290,183.  If every potential claimant
returns a claim form, then a total of approximately 17,225 work
weeks will be paid.  In that case each claimant shall be paid
approximately $16.85 for every week they worked for the
Defendants.

A Further Case Management Conference is now for July 3, 2019 at
2:00 p.m. in San Jose, Courtroom 8, 4th Floor.  A Joint Case
Management Statement is due 7 days prior, by June 26, 2019.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          James Dal Bon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF JAMES DAL BON
          606 N. 1st St.
          San Jose, CA 95112
          Telephone: (408) 466-5845
          Facsimile: (408) 286-7111
          E-mail: jdb@wagedefenders.com

               - and -

          Victoria L.H. Booke, Esq.
          BOOKE & AJLOUNY
          606 North First Street
          San Jose, CA 95112
          Telephone: (408) 286-7000
          Facsimile: (408) 286-7111
          E-mail: vbooke@bookelaw.com

NATIONAL RECOVERY: Second Circuit Appeal Filed in Pettaway Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Jean M. Pettaway filed an appeal from the District
Court's order and judgment, both entered on May 20, 2019, in the
lawsuit titled Pettaway v. National Recovery Solutions LLC, et al.,
Case No. 19-cv-1328, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York (New York City).

The nature of suit is stated as consumer credit.

The appellate case is captioned as Pettaway v. National Recovery
Solutions LLC, et al., Case No. 19-1453, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant Jean M. Pettaway, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Andrew T. Thomasson, Esq.
          STERN THOMASSON LLP
          150 Morris Avenue
          Springfield, NJ 07081
          Telephone: (973) 379-7500
          E-mail: Andrew@sternthomasson.com

Defendants-Appellees National Recovery Solutions, LLC and US Asset
Management Inc. are represented by:

          Brian D. Gwitt, Esq.
          WOODS OVIATT GILMAN, LLP
          350 Main Street
          1900 Main Place Tower
          Buffalo, NY 14202
          Telephone: (716) 248-3213
          E-mail: bgwitt@woodsoviatt.com


NILKANTH MAHADEV: Delacruz Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Nilkanth Mahadev LLC.
The case is styled as Emanuel Delacruz And On Behalf of All Other
Persons Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. Nilkanth Mahadev LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-05377 (S.D. N.Y., June 7, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Nilkanth Mahadev Llc is a company located at 370 4Th Ave, Brooklyn,
registered as a domestic limited liability company in Kings
county.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
     150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
     New York, NY 10003
     Phone: (212) 228-9795
     Fax: (212) 982-6284
     Email: nyjg@aol.com


NPSG GLOBAL: Court Denies Proposed Discovery Plan in Reese Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada issued
an Order denying Parties' Proposed Discovery Plan in the case
captioned DEVONTE REESE, Plaintiff(s), v. NPSG GLOBAL, LLC,
Defendant(s). Case No. 2:19-cv-00209-JCM-NJK. (D. Nev.).

This case involves putative collective action and class action
claims. The proposed discovery plan does not include any provisions
regarding those aspects of the case.

Accordingly, it is denied without prejudice. An amended proposed
discovery plan that discusses certification shall be filed by June
10, 2019.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/y3yo2cfg from Leagle.com.

DeVonte' Reese, Plaintiff, represented by Marta D. Kurshumova --
mkurshumova@hkm.com -- HKM Employment Attorneys & Jenny L. Foley --
jfoley@hkm.com -- HKM EMPLOYMENT ATTORNEYS LLP.

NPSG Global, LLC., Defendant, represented by Kirsten Ann Milton --
Kirsten.Milton@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis PC, pro hac vice,
Daniel Aquino -- Daniel.Aquino@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis
P.C. & Lisa A. McClane -- Lisa.McClane@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson
Lewis P.C..


OS RESTAURANT: Briggs Seeks to Certify Class & Subclass
-------------------------------------------------------
In a class action lawsuit, LLOYD T. BRIGGS III, on behalf of
himself, all other aggrieved employees pursuant to the California
Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. OS RESTAURANT SERVICES, LLC,
a Florida limited liability company; BLOOMIN' BRANDS, INC., a
Florida corporation; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-08457-JAK-AFM (C.D. Cal., Aug, 22,
2018), the Plaintiff will move the Court for an order on July 22,
2019:

   1. approving class certification as to Plaintiff's First
through
      Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Claims on behalf of the following
      class and subclasses:

      Class:

      "all persons employed by Defendants at their Fleming's
      restaurants in California as non-exempt employees from August

      22, 2014 through the date of the Order granting class
      certification";

      Wage Statement Penalty Subclass:

      "all persons employed by Defendants from August 16, 2017
      through the date of the Order granting class certification";

      Waiting Time Penalty Subclass:

      "all members of the Class whose employment 17 with Defendants

      has ended";

   2. appointing Felahy Employment Lawyers and all members of the
      Class who were Yash Law Group as class counsel;

   3. appointing Plaintiff as the representative of the Class; and

   4. directing to class members the best notice that is
      practicable under the circumstances.

The Plaintiff moves for certification of claims on behalf of 6
himself and other Class members, comprised of former and current
employees at Defendants' restaurants, who were subjected to, and
harmed by, Defendants' wage-and-hour policies and practices that
violated the California Labor Code and the California Unfair
Competition Law. The policies and practices had a common
detrimental impact on Class members and, in particular, deprived
them of wages and reimbursements. Resolution of class-wide
liability against Defendants for their wage-and-hour violations is
susceptible to common proof, such as employee time records, pay
stubs, and Defendants' written policies.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Allen Felahy, Esq.
          FELAHY EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS
          550 South Hope Street, Suite 2655
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (323) 645-5197
          Facsimile: (323) 645-5198
          E-mail: afelahy@felahylaw.com

               - and -

          Yashdeep Singh, Esq.
          YASH LAW GROUP
          550 South Hope Street, Suite 2655
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (714) 494-6244
          Facsimile: (714) 406-2722
          E-mail: ysingh@yashlaw.com

OVERHILL FARMS: Aguilar Files Suit for Breach of Contract
---------------------------------------------------------
Armando Aguilar and Julia Cumberland, on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. USAA General Indemnity Co. and United
States Automobile Association, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-00866
(M.D. Fla., May 15, 2019), is a breach of contract suit over
insurance issues.

USAA General Indemnity Company operates as an insurance firm while
United Services Automobile Association is a Texas-based diversified
financial services company. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Andrew John Shamis
      Shamis & Gentile, PA
      Suite 1205, 14 NE 1st Ave.
      Miami, FL 33132
      Tel: (305) 479-2299
      Fax: (786) 623-0915
      Email: ashamis@sflinjuryattorneys.com

             - and -

      Christopher J. Lynch
      CHRISTOPHER J. LYNCH, P.A
      6915 SW 57 Avenue, Suite 208
      South Miami, FL 33143
      Tel: (305) 443-6200
      Email: clynch@hunterlynchlaw.com

             - and -

      Jacob Lawrence Phillips, Esq.
      Normand Law PLLC
      62 West Colonial Street, Suite 209
      Orlando, FL 32814
      Tel: (407) 603-6031
      Email: jacob.phillips@normandpllc.com

             - and -

      Scott Adam Edelsberg
      EDELSBERG LAW, PA
      2875 NE 191st Street, Suite 703
      Aventura, FL 33180
      Tel: (305) 975-3320
      Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com

             - and -

      Edmund A. Normand, Esq.
      NORMAND PLLC
      3165 McCrory Place, Suite 175
      Orlando, FL 32803
      Tel: (407) 603-6031
      Email: ed@ednormand.com


PNS STORES: Wellons Appeals S.D. California Ruling to 9th Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs S. Wellons, et al., filed an appeal from a Court ruling
in their lawsuit entitled S. Wellons, et al. v. PNS Stores, Inc.,
et al., Case No. 3:18-cv-02913-DMS-WVG, in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of California, San Diego.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the class
action lawsuit alleges violations of labor laws.  The lawsuit was
originally filed in the Superior Court of the State of California
for the County of San Diego (assigned Case No. 37-02018
00015587-CU-OE-CTL) and was removed to the District Court on
December 31, 2018.  Judge Dana M. Sabraw and Magistrate Judge
William V. Gallo are assigned to the case.

PNS Stores operates as a community retailer.

The appellate case is captioned as S. Wellons, et al. v. PNS
Stores, Inc., et al., Case No. 19-80063, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Petitioners S. WELLONS, et al., are represented by:

          David J. Gallo, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF DAVID J. GALLO
          12702 Via Cortina, Suite 500
          Del Mar, CA 92014-3769
          Telephone: (619) 509-3652
Defendants-Respondent PNS STORES, INC., a California corporation,
and BIG LOTS STORES, INC., an Ohio Corporation, are represented
by:

          Michael Jacob Ball, Esq.
          Mark A. Knueve, Esq.
          VORYS, SATER, SEYMOUR AND PEASE LLP
          52 East Gay Street
          Columbus, OH 43215
          Telephone: (614) 464-5625
          E-mail: mjball@vorys.com
                  maknueve@vorys.com


PRIME LEADS: Boger Sues Over Intrusive Telemarketing Practices
--------------------------------------------------------------
DAN BOGER on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. PRIME LEADS NETWORK, LLC, THE DEVINE GROUP, JOSEPH
GIGUERE INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., and ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY
Defendants, Case No. 8:19-cv-01681-GJH (D. Md., June 7, 2019) is an
action enforcing the consumer-privacy provisions of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act, a federal statute enacted in 1991 in
response to widespread public outrage about the proliferation of
intrusive, nuisance telemarketing practices.

Allstate Insurance Company, through their exclusive agents Joseph
Giguere Insurance Agency, Inc. and The Devine Group, hired the
co-defendant, Prime Leads Network, who made multiple telemarketing
calls to a cellular telephone number of Mr. Boger for the purposes
of advertising Allstate Insurance Company goods and services using
an automated dialing system, which is prohibited by the TCPA. Prime
Leads made telemarketing calls to Mr. Boger even after he contacted
Allstate and Prime Leads and requested that his cellular telephone
number be placed on their Internal Do Not Call List. Plaintiff
never consented to receive the calls, which were placed to him for
telemarketing purposes, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Dan Boger is a resident of the state of Maryland.

Allstate Insurance Company provides various insurance services to
its customers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Stephen H. Ring, Esq.
     STEPHEN H. RING, PC
     9901 Belward Campus Drive, Suite 175
     Rockville, MD 20850
     Phone: (301) 563-9249
     Email: shr@ringlaw.us


PROCTER & GAMBLE: Marsh Seeks to Certify 2 Classes
--------------------------------------------------
In a class action lawsuit, CASSIDY MARSH, on behalf of himself, and
all others similarly situated, and as an "aggrieved employee" on
behalf of other "aggrieved employees" under the Labor Code Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004, the Plaintiff, v. THE PROCTER &
GAMBLE PAPER PRODUCTS COMPANY, an Ohio corporation; and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive, Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-04944-R-E (C.D.
Cal.), the Plaintiff will move the Court for an order on July 1,
2019:

   1. finally approving a Stipulation and Class Action
      Settlement Agreement;

   2. confirming the certification of the Classes solely for
      settlement purposes pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
      Procedure 23;

   3. confirming the appointment of David Spivak of The Spivak Law

      Firm and Walter Haines of the United Employees Law Group as
      Class Counsel;

   4. confirming the appointment of Plaintiff as class
      representative;

   5. granting final approval to a Service Award of $15,000 to
      Plaintiff in recognition of his services as class
      representative;

   6. granting final approval to a Fees Award in the amount of
      $216,666 for attorneys’ fees to Class Counsel;

   7. granting final approval to a Costs Award of $9,992.44 in
      actual litigation costs to Class Counsel;

   8. granting final approval to a payment of $7,000 to Simpluris,

      Inc. for its services as the Settlement Administrator;

   9. granting final approval to an allocation of $20,000 to PAGA
      claims for civil penalties under the Labor Code Private
      Attorneys General act of 2004, Labor Code sections 2698, et
      seq. 19 ("PAGA Award"), of which $15,000 will be paid to the

      Labor and Workforce Development agency ("LWDA") and $5,000 of

      which will be included within the Net Distribution Fund to be

      made available for distribution to Class Members; and

   10. directing that [Proposed] Final Approval Order and Final
      Judgment submitted be entered as called for under the
      Settlement.

The "Class Members" are those current and former employees who
comprise 8 Hour Class and/or the 12 Hour Class and who do not opt
out of 3 the Settlement:

The 8 Hour Class is defined as:

   "all current and former hourly, non-exempt employees who were
   employed by The Procter & Gamble Paper Products Company in
   California at any time from April 10, 2014 through February 1,
   2019, who were regularly scheduled to work 8 hour shifts."

The 12 Hour Class is defined as:

   "all current and former hourly, non-exempt employees who were
   employed by The Procter & Gamble Paper Products Company in
   California at any time from April 10, 2014 through February 1,
   2019, who were regularly scheduled to work rotating 12 hour
   night/day shifts."

A member of one of these Classes may also be a member of the other
Class. To the extent putative Class Members are members of both the
8 Hour Class and the 12 Hour Class, their proportionate payout will
depend on the number of weeks worked in each Class.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and all others similarly situated

          David G. Spivak, Esq.
          Caroline Tahmassian, Esq.
          THE SPIVAK LAW FIRM
          16530 Ventura Blvd., Ste 203
          Encino, CA 91436
          Telephone (818) 582-3086
          Facsimile (818) 582-2561
          E-mail: david@spivaklaw.com
                  caroline@spivaklaw.com

               - and -

          Walter Haines, Esq.
          UNITED EMPLOYEES LAW GROUP
          5500 Bolsa Ave., Suite 201
          Huntington Beach, CA 92649
          Telephone: (562) 256-1047
          Facsimile: (562) 256-1006
          E-mail: walter@uelglaw.com

QUEST DIAGNOSTICS: Carbonneau Sues Over Data Breach
---------------------------------------------------
FRANCIS CARBONNEAU, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. QUEST DIAGNOSTICS INCORPORATED, AMERICAN
MEDICAL COLLECTION AGENCY, INC., and OPTUM360, LLC, Defendants,
Case No. 2:19-cv-13472 (D. N.J., June 6, 2019) is a class action
lawsuit on behalf of a Nationwide Class and a Massachusetts
Sub-Class  to address Defendants' inadequate safeguarding of class
members' Sensitive Information.

This is a data breach class action on behalf of 11.9 million
patients whose sensitive personal information was accessed by
computer hackers in a cyber-attack. Information compromised in the
Data Breach includes Social Security numbers, financial information
(e.g., credit card numbers and bank account information), medical
information, other protected health information as defined by the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
("HIPAA"), and additional personal information (collectively,
"Sensitive Information"). The Defendant AMCA failed to properly
safeguard class members' Sensitive Information, allowing hackers to
access their Sensitive Information for eight months. AMCA also
failed to properly monitor its systems. Had it properly monitored
its systems, it would have discovered the intrusion much sooner
than eight months after the breach began.

As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff and class members have
been exposed to a heightened and imminent risk of fraud and
identity theft. Plaintiffs and class members must now and in the
future closely monitor their financial accounts to guard against
identity theft. Plaintiff and class members may also incur out of
pocket costs for, e.g., purchasing credit monitoring services,
credit freezes, credit reports, or other protective measures to
deter and detect identity theft. Plaintiff seeks to remedy these
harms on behalf of himself and all similarly-situated individuals
whose Sensitive Information was accessed during the Data Breach,
says the complaint.

Plaintiff Francis Carbonneau is an individual residing in
Massachusetts and has been a patient of Quest within the past
year.

Quest is the world's leading provider of medical diagnostic testing
services. It performs medical tests that aid in the diagnosis or
detection of diseases, and that measure the progress of or recovery
from a disease.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Peter S. Pearlman, Esq.
     COHN LIFLAND PEARLMAN HERRMANN & KNOPF LLP
     Park 80 West - Plaza One
     250 Pehle Avenue, Suite 401
     Saddle Brook, NJ 07663
     Phone: (201) 845-9600
     Fax: (201) 845-9423
     Email: psp@njlawfirm.com

          - and -

     Sherrie Savett, Esq.
     Shanon Carson, Esq.
     Jon Lambiras, Esq.
     BERGER MONTAGUE, PC
     1818 Market Street, Suite 3600
     Philadelphia, PA 19103
     Phone: (215) 875-3000
     Fax: (215) 875-4604
     Email: ssavett@bm.net
            scarson@bm.net
            jlambiras@bm.net


REPUBLIC PARKING: Abrar et al. Suit Transferred to Mass. Cmmw.
--------------------------------------------------------------
The case, MOHAMED ABRAR, HUSSEIN HUSSEIN AND SHIFERAW AWLACHEW, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. REPUBLIC PARKING SYSTEM, LLC and SCOTT TITMUS, Defendants, Case
No. 1981-CV-00991 (Filed on April 16, 2019), was transferred from
the Middlesex County Superior Court to the Trial Court of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts on May 24, 2019. In the complaint,
Plaintiffs Mohamed Abrar, Hussein Hussein and Shiferaw Awlachew
allege that the Defendants habitually refused to pay them and other
employees for hourly wages worked, overtime and travel time. The
Trial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-11183-GAO to the proceeding.

Republic Parking is a limited liability company which provides
parking and transportation services at airports and urban markets
throughout Massachusetts. Scott Titmus serves as the president and
registered manager of Republic Parking. [BN]

Attorneys for Defendant:

     Robert A. Fisher, Esq.
     Hillary J. Massey, Esq.
     SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
     Seaport East
     Two Seaport Lane, Suite 300
     Boston, MA 02210-2028
     Telephone: (617) 946-4800
     Facsimile: (617) 946-4801


SAEJ ENTERPRISES: McMillan Seeks Overtime Wages for Operators
-------------------------------------------------------------
RYAN McMILLAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. SAEJ ENTERPRISES, L.L.C. d/b/a SAEJ
ENTERPRISES, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00091-DLH-CRH (D.N.D.,
May 31, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages and other
damages from Saej Enterprises, L.L.C. under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the North Dakota Wage Laws.

According to the complaint, McMillan and the other workers like him
were typically scheduled for 12-hour shifts, 7 days a week, for
weeks at a time. McMillan and these workers often worked even more
than that, but never received an overtime premium for hours worked
in excess of 40 hours in a single workweek.

Saej employs pump/lease operators to perform its oilfield support
work. Many of these individuals worked for Saej performing the same
or substantially similar job duties as McMillan and were
misclassified by Saej as so-called independent contractors in
connection with Saej's oilfield operations. While exact job titles
and job duties may slightly differ, McMillan and the Putative Class
Members were subjected to the same or similar illegal pay practices
for similar work. Instead of paying overtime as required by the
FLSA, Seaj paid these workers the same hourly rate for all hours
worked and improperly classified them as independent contractors,
the lawsuit says.

Saej is an oilfield services company.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Matthew S. Parmet, Esq.
          PARMET PC
          PO Box 540907
          800 Sawyer St.
          Houston, TX 77254
          Telephone: 713 999 5228
          Facsimile: 713 999 1187
          E-mail: matt@parmet.law

               - and -

          Edmond S. Moreland, Jr., Esq.
          MORELAND VERRETT, P.C.
          700 West Summit Dr.
          Wimberley, TX 78676
          Telephone: 512 782 0567
          Facsimile: 512 782 0605
          E-mail: edmond@morelandlaw.com

SCELZI ENTERPRISES: Court Extends Murray Responsive Pleading Filing
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order extending the Filing of Responsive
Pleading on Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint in the case
captioned RODERICK MURRAY, an individual, on behalf of the State of
California, as a private attorney general, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated; Plaintiff, v. SCELZI ENTERPRISES, INC.,
a California corporation, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,
Defendant(s). Case No. 1:18-CV-01492-LJO-SKO. (E.D. Cal.).

On or about January 31, 2019, pursuant to Rule 15(a)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff filed a First Amended
Complaint  in response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, rendering
Defendant's Motion moot.

Thereafter the Parties, through their counsel of record at that
time, met and conferred regarding the issues raised in the action
and agreed to participate in private mediation with wage and hour
class action mediator Lisa Klerman in attempt to resolve the
action.

On or about February 5, 2019, Plaintiff and Defendant submitted a
Joint Stipulation  by which, among other things, Defendant was to
file a responsive pleading to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint
not later than June 1, 2019.

On or about April 8, 2019, Defendant filed a proposed Consent Order
by which Defendant substituted in the law firm of Sutton Hague Law
Corporation as its counsel of record in this matter.

The Plaintiff and the Defendant and their counsel of record
participated in a full-day mediation session with Ms. Klerman on
May 28, 2019.

The Parties did not reach a resolution of the case during the May
28, 2019 mediation session, but desire to continue in negotiations
over the coming days with the assistance of Ms. Klerman and, if
possible to avoid the need for anticipated motion practice that
would be entailed in Defendant's filing of a responsive pleading.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3b36b7w from Leagle.com.

Roderick Murray, an individual, on behalf of the State of
California, as a private attorney general, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jonathan
Melmed -- jm@melmedlaw.com -- Melmed Law Group P.C. & Craig Justin
Ackermann -- cja@ackermanntilajef.com -- Ackermann & Tilajef, PC.

Scelzi Enterprises, Inc., a California corporation, Defendant,
represented by S. Brett Sutton -- brett@suttonhague.com -- Sutton
Hague Law Corporation, P.C..


SCHNEIDER LOGISTICS: Parsittie Labor Suit Removed to C.D. Cal.
--------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Rick Parsittie, on behalf of himself, all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Schneider Logistics, Inc.,
Schneider Logistics Transportation, Inc., Schneider Logistics
Transloading and Distribution, Inc., Connect Staffing, Inc. and
Does 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 18CV335339 (Cal.
Super., September 21, 2018), was removed to the United States
District Court for the Central District of California on May 17,
2019 under Case No. 19-cv-03981.

Parsittie seeks compensatory damages, economic and/or special
damages, penalties, restitution, unpaid wages and benefits,
attorneys' fees, costs and interest pursuant to the California
Labor Code.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Shaun Setareh, Esq.
      Alexandra R. McIntosh, Esq.
      William M. Pao, Esq.
      SETAREH LAW GROUP
      9454 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 907
      Beverly Hills, CA 90212
      Telephone: (310) 888-7771
      Facsimile: (310) 888-0109
      Email: shaun@setarehlaw.com
             alex@setearehlaw.com
             william@setarehlaw.com

Schneider Logistics is represented by:

      Matthew C. Kane, Esq.
      Sabrina A. Beldner, Esq.
      Sean M. Sullivan, Esq.
      MCGUIREWOODS LLP
      1800 Century Park East, 8th Floor
      Los Angeles, CA 90067-1501
      Tel: (310) 315-8200
      Fax: (310) 315-8210
      Email: mkane@mcguirewoods.com
             sbeldner@mcguirewoods.com
             ssulivan@mcguirewoods.com

             - and -

      Sylvia J. Kim, Esq.
      MCGUIREWOODS LLP
      2 Embarcadero Center, Suite 1300
      San Francisco, CA 94111
      Telephone: (415) 844-9944
      Facsimile: (415) 844-9922
      Email: skim@mcguirewoods.com


SECOND ROUND: Thompson-Bailey Sues over Debt Collection Practices
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ANEITA THOMPSON-BAILEY, individually and on behalf of all those
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. SECOND ROUND SUB, LLC, the
Defendants, Case No. 0:19-cv-61377-XXXX (S.D. Fla., June 2, 2019),
alleges that Defendant violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant is engaged in the
business of collecting consumer debts. The Defendant regularly
collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed
or due or asserted to be owed or due another.

The Defendant began attempting collect a consumer debts from
Plaintiff. The Defendant mailed a collection letter, dated January
29, 2019. The Defendant has never registered, or otherwise been
licensed, to collect consumer debts from Florida consumers in
accordance with Fla. Stat. Section 559.553. The Defendant cannot
legally collect, or attempt to collect, the Consumer Debt from
Plaintiff without first registering, and thereafter maintaining, a
valid consumer collection agency license in accordance with Fla.
Stat. Sections 559.553(1) and (2), the lawsuit says.

The Defendant's collection activities against Plaintiff constitute
a criminal misdemeanor under Florida law. The Plaintiff paid money
to Defendant for a debt allegedly which Defendant sought to collect
from Plaintiff. The Defendant received the payment and did not
return it to Plaintiff despite the fact the payment made to
Defendant included amounts which Defendant did not have the legal
authority to assess or otherwise collect from Plaintiff.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff:

          Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
          Thomas J. Patti, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI
          110 SE 6th Street, Suite 1744
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: 954-907-1136
          Facsimile: 855-529-9540
          E-mail: jibrael@jibraellaw.com
                  tom@jibraellaw.com

SINGING RIVER: Court Grants Arbitration Bid in B. Baria Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi, Southern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and
Order granting Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration in the case
captioned BARRETT BARIA; et al., Plaintiffs, v. SINGING RIVER
ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE also known as Singing River Electric Power
Association, Defendant. Cause No. 1:19cv248-LG-JCG. (S.D. Miss.).

The Singing River Electric Cooperative (Singing River) is a rural
electric cooperative providing electricity to tens of thousands of
Mississippi residents and businesses. In this putative class-action
lawsuit, Plaintiffs who are ratepaying members of Singing River
allege that Singing River has wrongfully withheld and continues to
wrongfully withhold patronage capital from current and former
members that, under Mississippi law, should have been disbursed to
the Cooperative's members.  

Singing River argues throughout its briefing on both motions that
(1) its bylaws establish the terms and conditions upon which it
renders electrical service to members (2) the bylaws contain a
valid arbitration agreement and (3) the arbitration agreement
contains a valid delegation clause.

The Plaintiffs agree that Singing River's bylaws establish terms
and conditions of service. However, because the bylaws were simply
incorporated by reference in the single page application for
electricity  which is the only contractual document the Plaintiffs
signed and did not, itself, contain an arbitration provision
Plaintiffs contend that neither the arbitration agreement nor its
delegation clause are valid.

Section 11.05 of Singing River's bylaws provides in pertinent
part,

UNLESS OTHERWISE PROHIBITED BY LAW, ANY

CONTROVERSY OR CLAIM ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO THESE BYLAWS, OR
THE BREACH THEREOF, OR ANY CONTROVERSY OR CLAIM ARISING OUT OF OR
RELATING TO PATRONAGE CAPITAL SHALL BE RESOLVED BY BINDING
ARBITRATION ADMINISTERED BY THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION IN
ACCORDANCE WITH ITS ARBITRATION RULES AFTER ALL CONDITIONS
PRECEDENT AS SET FORTH IN ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 8.01, IF
APPLICABLE, HAVE BEEN MET. THIS AGREEMENT INVOLVES INTERSTATE
COMMERCE SUCH THAT THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT, 9 U.S.C. Section 1,
ET SEQ. SHALL GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THIS
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT. THE ARBITRATION SHALL BE HELD IN THE STATE
OF MISSISSIPPI AT A LOCATION TO BE DESIGNATED BY THE PARTY NOT
MAKING THE INITIAL DEMAND FOR ARBITRATION. A JUDGMENT ON THE AWARD
RENDERED BY THE ARBITRATOR SHALL BE ENTERED IN ANY COURT HAVING
JURISDICTION THEREOF. EACH PARTY AGREES TO PAY ITS OWN ATTORNEYS'
FEES AND COSTS, AND EACH PARTY AGREES TO SHARE EQUALLY IN THE COST
OF THE ARBITRATOR.

On its face, this appears to be a valid arbitration agreement
between the Plaintiffs and Singing River. Notwithstanding, the
Plaintiffs contend that they did not agree to arbitrate their
claims. They say the only document presented to them at the time
they signed up for service with Singing River was a one-page
application devoid of any reference to arbitration. They also
assert that, if the arbitration clause was added to the bylaws
subsequent to commencing service, they never received notice of the
Board's intent to make this amendment. Essentially, the Plaintiffs
contend that they could not have assented to this arbitration
clause because they were unaware of the provision both when they
applied for service and during the pendency of their service
contract.

Thus, say the Plaintiffs, they never entered into an agreement to
arbitrate.

Parties are free to delegate threshold questions to the arbitrator
under the FAA. The Fifth Circuit has held that, generally,
stipulating that the American Arbitration Association (AAA) Rules
will govern the arbitration of disputes constitutes clear and
unmistakable' evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate
threshold questions.   

Section 11.05 of Singing River's bylaws plainly stipulate that the
AAA Rules will govern arbitration. Plaintiffs argue to the contrary
by rehashing their arguments challenging the enforceability of the
arbitration provision and affixing the additional contention that
the delegation clause cannot be valid because the underlying
arbitration agreement is invalid.
Again, for present purposes, the Court is concerned with whether
the parties manifested intent to arbitrate threshold questions, not
whether Plaintiffs' agreement to incorporate the AAA rules was
valid.Section 11.05 of the bylaws expressly incorporates the AAA
rules. The parties have therefore clearly and unmistakably
demonstrated their intent to delegate.

The Plaintiffs do not specifically challenge the validity of the
delegation clause. Rather, their arguments contend that the
arbitration provision as a whole is unenforceable under Mississippi
law. Because the Plaintiffs' challenge is not specific to the
delegation clause, they must present it to an arbitrator.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yysvtjn6 from
Leagle.com.

Barrett Baria, Edward Zielinski & Lorraine Zielinski, as named
Plaintiffs representing a class of Mississippi citizens,
Plaintiffs, represented by Brannon L. Berry --
brannon.berry@cs-law.com -- COSMICH, SIMMONS & BROWN, PLLC & Justin
R. Glenn -- jglenn@cs-law.com -- COSMICH, SIMMONS & BROWN, PLLC.

Singing River Electric Cooperative, also known as Singing River
Electric Power Association, Defendant, represented by Robert M.
Gore -- RGore@RobinsKaplan.com -- HOLLAND & KNIGHT, LLP, pro hac
vice.


SPERIAN ENERGY: Brady Suit Transferred From N.D. to C.D. Illinois
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned INTIRA BRADY, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. SPERIAN ENERGY
CORPORATION, Case No. 1:18-cv-06968, was transferred on May 17,
2019, from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
Illinois (Springfield).

The Central District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:19-cv-03128-SEM-TSH to the proceeding.

The action seeks to redress the Defendant's alleged deceptive
conduct and bad faith pricing practices that have caused thousands
of Illinois consumers to pay considerably more for their
electricity than they should otherwise have paid.

The Plaintiff alleges that Sperian has exploited the deregulation
of the retail electricity market in Illinois by luring consumers
into switching energy suppliers using a bait-and-switch scheme
designed to deceive reasonable consumers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Richard J. Burke, Esq.
          Jamie E. Weiss, Esq.
          Zachary A. Jacobs, Esq.
          QUANTUM LEGAL LLC
          513 Central Avenue, Suite 300
          Highland Park, IL 60035
          Telephone: (847) 433-4500
          E-mail: rich@qulegal.com
                  jamie@qulegal.com
                  zachary@qulegal.com

               - and -

          Jonathan Shub, Esq.
          Kevin Laukaitis, Esq.
          KOHN SWIFT & GRAF, P.C.
          1600 Market Street, Suite 2500
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 238-1700
          E-mail: jshub@kohnswift.com
                  klaukaitis@kohnswift.com

               - and -

          Charles E. Schaffer, Esq.
          Daniel C. Levin, Esq.
          LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN LLP
          510 Walnut Street, Suite 500
          Philadelphia, PA 19106
          Telephone: (215) 592-1500
          E-mail: CSchaffer@lfsblaw.com
                  DLevin@lfsblaw.com

Defendant Sperian Energy Corporation is represented by:

          Todd Philip Stelter, Esq.
          HINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP
          151 N. Franklin Street, Suite 2500
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 704-3000
          E-mail: tstelter@hinshawlaw.com


TAMPA BAY: Hanley Seeks to Certify TCPA Class
---------------------------------------------
In a class action lawsuit, BRYAN HANLEY, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TAMPA BAY SPORTS
AND ENTERTAINMENT LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, the
Defendant, Case No. 8:19-cv-00550-CEH-CPT (M.D. Fla.), the
Plaintiff moves the Court for an order:

   1. certifying the case as a class action on behalf of:

      "all persons who were sent a text message from or on behalf
      of the Defendant Tampa Bay Sports and Entertainment, LLC or
      an affiliate, subsidiary, or agent thereof from the shortcode

      telephone number 61873"; and

   2. appointing his attorneys as class counsel.

The class excludes the Defendant, any entity in which Defendant has
a controlling interest or which has a controlling interest in the
Defendant, and any of Defendant's legal representatives, assigns,
or successors, as well as the Judge presiding over this case and
any member of the Judge's immediate family.

The Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, filed this putative class action lawsuit in response to
Defendant Tampa Bay Sports and Entertainment, LLC's practice of
sending advertisement and telemarketing text messages to
Plaintiff's cell phone, and the cell phones of many others, from a
single shortcode telephonenumber, without their prior express
written consent in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act.[CC]

Counsel for Bryan Hanley:

          Ruben Conitzer, Esq.
          David P. Milian, Esq.
          Juan J. Rodriguez, Esq.
          CAREY RODRIGUEZ MILIAN GONYA
          1395 Brickell Avenue, Suite 700
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 372-7474
          Facsimile: (305) 372-7475
          E-mail: dmilian@careyrodriguez.com
                  mmartucci@careyrodriguez.com
                  jrodriguez.@careyrodriguez.com
                  cperez@careyrodriguez.com
                  rconitzer@careyrodriguez.com
                  ecf@careyrodriguez.com

TYSON FOODS: Ranchers Cattlemen Suit Asserts Cattle Price-fixing
----------------------------------------------------------------
Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers Of
America, Weinreis Brothers Partnership, Minatare Feedlot Inc,
Charles Weinreis, Eric Nelson, James Jensen and Richard Chambers as
Trustee of the Richard C. Chambers Living Trust on behalf of
themselves and all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Tyson
Foods, Inc., Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., JBS S.A., JBS USA Food
Company, Swift Beef Company, JBS Packerland, Inc., Cargill,
Incorporated, Cargill Meat Solutions Corporation, Marfrig Global
Foods S.A., National Beef Packing Company, LLC and John Does 1-10,
Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-01222 (D. Minn., May 7, 2019), bring
claims under the Sherman Antitrust Act and Clayton Antitrust Act.

According to the complaint, Defendants are in conspiracy to
suppress the price of fed cattle, slashing their respective
slaughter volumes and curtailing their purchases of fed cattle in
the cash cattle market, which precipitated in an unprecedented
collapse in fed cattle, steers and heifers raised and fed for the
production and sale of beef products.

Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of America
is a cattle producer membership trade organization. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      David R. Scott, Esq.
      Peter A. Barile III, Esq.
      Amanda F. Lawrence, Esq.
      Anjali Bhat, Esq.
      SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
      The Helmsley Building
      230 Park Avenue, 17th Floor
      New York, NY 10169
      Telephone: (212) 223-6444
      Facsimile: (212) 223-6334
      Email: david.scott@scott-scott.com
             abhat@scott-scott.com
             pbarile@scott-scott.com
             alawrence@scott-scott.com

             - and -

      Anthony F. Fata, Esq.
      Brian O'Connell, Esq.
      CAFFERTY CLOBES MERIWETHER & SPRENGEL LLP
      150 S. Wacker, Suite 3000
      Chicago, IL 60606
      Tel: (312) 782-4880
      Fax: (312) 782-4485
      Email: afata@caffertyclobes.com
             boconnell@caffertyclobes.com

             - and -

      Christopher M. Burke, Esq.
      SCOTT+SCOTT, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, LLP
      707 Broadway, Suite 1000
      San Diego, CA 92101
      Telephone: 619-233-4565
      Facsimile: 619-233-0508
      Email: cburke@scott-scott.com

             - and -

      Ellen Meriwether, Esq.
      CAFFERTY CLOBES MERIWETHER & SPRENGEL LLP
      205 N. Monroe St.
      Media, PA 19063
      Tel: (215) 864-2800
      Fax: (215) 864-2810
      Email: emeriwether@caffertyclobes.com

             - and -

      Thomas J. Undlin, Esq.
      Stacey P. Slaughter, Esq.
      K. Craig Wildfang, Esq.
      ROBINS KAPLAN LLP
      800 LaSalle Avenue, Suite 2800
      Minneapolis, MN 55402
      Telephone: (612) 349-8500
      Facsimile: (612) 339-4181
      Email: tundlin@robinskaplan.com
             sslaughter@robinskaplan.com
             kcwildfang@robinskaplan.com

             - and -

      Hollis Salzman, Esq.
      Kellie Lerner, Esq.
      ROBINS KAPLAN LLP
      399 Park Avenue, Suite 3600
      New York, NY 10022
      Telephone: (212) 980-7400
      Facsimile: (212) 980-7499
      Email: hsalzman@robinskaplan.com
             klerner@robinskaplan.com


UNITED HEALTHCARE: Caldwell Sues over Denial of Insurance Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against United Healthcare
Insurance Company and United HealthCare Services, Inc. for breach
of fiduciary duty under Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA). The case is captioned MARY CALDWELL, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
UNITEDHEALTHCARE INSURANCE COMPANY; UNITED HEALTHCARE SERVICES,
INC., Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-02861-SK (N.D. Cal., May 23,
2019).  Plaintiff Mary Caldwell brings this action to address
United's practice of improperly denying claims for surgical
treatment of lipedema made by patients under health insurance plans
regulated and governed by ERISA.

United is a corporation with its principal place of business in
Minneapolis, Minnesota. The company administers and makes benefit
determinations related to ERISA health care plans around the
country. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Robert S. Gianelli, Esq.
     Joshua S. Davis, Esq.
     Adrian J. Barrio, Esq.
     GIANELLI & MORRIS, A LAW CORPORATION
     550 South Hope Street, Suite 1645
     Los Angeles, CA 90071
     Telephone: (213) 489-1600
     Facsimile: (213) 489-1611
     E-mail: rob.gianelli@gmlawyers.com
             joshua.davis@gmlawyers.com
             adrian.barrio@gmlawyers.com


WELLS FARGO: Court Narrows Claims in A. Hernandez Suit
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the negligence and
wrongful-foreclosure case captioned ALICIA HERNANDEZ, EMMA WHITE,
KEITH LINDNER, TROY FRYE, COSZETTA TEAGUE, IESHA BROWN, RUSSELL and
BRENDA SIMONEAUX, JOHN and YVONNE DEMARTINO, ROSE WILSON, TIFFANIE
HOOD, GEORGE and CYNDI FLOYD, DEBORA GRANJA, and DIANA TREVINO,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. WELLS FARGO & COMPANY, and WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
Defendants. No. C 18-07354 WHA. (N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs all had their mortgage loans serviced by defendant
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., when they faced various financial hardships
and defaulted on their loans. Although they sought loan
modifications from Wells Fargo, those applications were denied.
Plaintiff Alicia Hernandez filed this putative nationwide class
action, asserting claims for negligence, conversion, violations of
California's Unfair Competition Law, and violations of the New
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.

A complaint must plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when its
factual allegations, rather than mere conclusory statements, create
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.  

STANDING TO BRING STATE LAW CLAIMS BASED ON APPLICATIONS FOR HAMP
MODIFICATION

The Treasury Department in 2009 launched the Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP) program to incentivize banks to
refinance mortgages of distressed homeowners so they could stay in
their homes. Under the program, home-loan servicers, including
Wells Fargo, signed servicer participation agreements that entitled
them to $1,000 for each permanent modification they made but
required them to follow Treasury guidelines and procedures.  

HAMP did not create a federal right of action for borrowers against
lenders. Wells Fargo argues that plaintiffs' state-law claims,
which are based in part on allegations that Wells Fargo failed to
offer plaintiffs a loan modification as required by HAMP, fail as a
matter of law because plaintiffs lack standing to enforce HAMP's
requirements. For the reasons now explained, this order disagrees
and concludes that HAMP's lack of a private federal right of action
does not automatically preclude state-law claims that refer to or
incorporate Wells Fargo's failures in meeting HAMP's requirements.

STANDING TO ENFORCE OCC CONSENT ORDER

Wells Fargo also argues that the complaint must be dismissed
because plaintiffs' claims are premised on Wells Fargo's failure to
comply with its obligations under the 2011 consent order it entered
into with the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) , a
consent order to which plaintiffs are not a party. Plaintiffs agree
that Wells Fargo's alleged violation of the consent order "is a
matter for the federal government to enforce. Wells Fargo fails to
explain, however, why plaintiffs' inability to enforce the OCC
consent order necessarily dooms all of plaintiffs' claims, each of
which relies on Wells Fargo's alleged violations of the consent
order to a varying extent. Wells Fargo does not dispute, for
example, that the existence of the consent order is relevant to
show Wells Fargo's knowledge of deficiencies in oversight or
controls concerning its loan modification and foreclosure
processes. This order therefore analyzes on a claim-by-claim basis
the extent to which the claim is an impermissible attempt to
enforce the OCC consent decree.

CALIFORNIA'S HOMEOWNERS BILL OF RIGHTS.

Plaintiffs Debora Granja and Keith Lindner assert a claim under
California's Homeowners Bill of Rights, Section 2924.17 of the
California Civil Code, which provides that before recording or
filing a notice of default, a notice of sale, and other specified
documents, a mortgage servicer shall ensure that it has reviewed
competent and reliable evidence to substantiate the borrower's
default and the right to foreclose, including the borrower's loan
status and loan information.

Wells Fargo argues that Section 2924.17 only protects against
robo-signing, which occurs when persons sign a document without
personal knowledge of the content attested to therein and/or sign
the documents without the requisite authority to do so. Because the
complaint does not allege robo-signing, Wells Fargo argues,
plaintiffs' claim fails as a matter of law. This order declines to
read Section 2924.17's protections in such a limited way.

The purpose of the Homeowners Bill of Rights is to ensure that
borrowers are considered for, and have a meaningful opportunity to
obtain, available loss mitigation options, if any, offered by or
through the borrower's mortgage servicer, such as loan
modifications or other alternatives to foreclosure. Other courts in
this district have upheld Section 2924.17 claims outside of the
robo-signing context. Indeed, Wells Fargo's own authorities explain
that Section 2924.17 prohibits robo-signing, or executing
foreclosure documents without substantiating the borrower's default
and the right to foreclose. That Section 2924.17's prohibitions
arose from national media attention to robosigning, does not mean
that the statute was designed to solve this problem alone.

Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Section 2924.17 claim
is accordingly denied.

SECTION 17200

To state a claim for unfair competition under Section 17200 of
California Business and Professions Code, a plaintiff must allege
that a defendant engaged in an unlawful, unfair or fraudulent
business act or practice. The statute is violated where a
defendant's conduct violates any of the foregoing prongs.   

Here, the plaintiffs assert a Section 17200 claim based on the
unlawful and unfair prongs.
The conduct alleged in the complaint satisfies the unfairness prong
under either test. In allegedly failing to properly test and
monitor its mortgage modification software, Wells Fargo undermined
the legislatively-declared policy of California's Homeowners Bill
of Rights to ensure that, as part of the nonjudicial foreclosure
process, borrowers are considered for, and have a meaningful
opportunity to obtain, available loss mitigation options, if any,
offered by or through the borrower's mortgage servicer, such as
loan modifications or other alternatives to foreclosure.  

Moreover, in prioritizing profits over adequate oversight, despite
being on notice of deficiencies in its foreclosure practices, and
causing hundreds of unnecessary foreclosures, Wells Fargo plausibly
engaged in unscrupulous behavior.

As to the unlawful prong, plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo
engaged in unlawful practices by denying mortgage modifications in
violation of HAMP and other governmental requirements. Wells Fargo
argues that HAMP cannot serve as the predicate for a Section 17200
claim because HAMP does not create a private right of action.
Contrary to Wells Fargo, California law allows parties to challenge
unlawful business practices under Section 17200 even where the
underlying conduct violates a law that does not provide a private
right of action.  

Wells Fargo's authorities to the contrary are unconvincing. In both
Aleem v. Bank of America,No. 09-cv-01812, 2010 WL 532330, at *3
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010) (Judge Virginia Phillips), and Bunce v.
Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 13-cv-00976, 2013 WL 3773950, at *7
(E.D. Cal. July 17, 2013) (Judge William Shubb), the district court
dismissed a Section 17200 claim premised on a violation of HAMP
because HAMP does not provide a private right of action. Both Bunce
and Aleem, however, ultimately relied on Summit Technology, Inc. v.
High-Line Medical Instruments Co., Inc., 922 F.Supp. 299, 316 (C.D.
Cal. 1996) (Judge Audrey Collins), for the proposition that Section
17200 cannot create a private right of action where none exists
under the federal statute. Summit Technology, however, predates the
California Supreme Court's decision in Zhang and, as discussed
above, misstates current California law.

The motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Section 17200 claim is
accordingly denied.

STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION CLAIMS

In the event that plaintiffs' Section 17200 claim is not applied on
a nationwide basis, plaintiffs bring a claim for relief under the
consumer protection statutes of five other states: the Illinois
Consumer Fraud Act, the Maryland Consumer Protection Act and
Consumer Debt Collection Act, the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act,
Section 349(a) of New York's General Business Law, and the
Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law.

This claim is based on the same allegations regarding wrongful HAMP
denials and purported audit and testing failures  and Wells Fargo
once again moves to dismiss these claims on the theory that
plaintiffs cannot assert state-law claims premised on violations of
HAMP. For the reasons already explained, this order disagrees that
HAMP precludes state-law claims. Plaintiffs also allege more than a
stand-alone HAMP violation. Rather, the complaint points to unfair
and misleading business practices in connection with Wells Fargo's
reckless failure to verify and audit its automated software and its
misrepresentations regarding mortgagors' eligibility for loan
modifications.

Wells Fargo also argues, and plaintiffs agree, that for purposes of
Maryland law, a lender who complies with the terms of the parties'
mortgage contract does not violate the Maryland Consumer Debt
Collection Act or Maryland Consumer Protection Act even if the
lender failed to abide by HAMP guidelines.

As discussed below, plaintiffs have failed to allege that Wells
Fargo breached their mortgage contracts. As to plaintiffs' Maryland
claims only, the motion to dismiss plaintiffs' state consumer
protection claims is granted.  The motion to dismiss these claims
is otherwise denied.


INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress are: (1) outrageous conduct (2) an intent to cause or a
reckless disregard of the possibility of causing emotional distress
(3) severe or extreme emotional distress and (4) actual and
proximate cause of the emotional distress by the outrageous
conduct. Wells Fargo cites a multitude of decisions in which courts
have concluded that the denial of a loan modification resulting in
foreclosure does not give rise to a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Here, however, plaintiffs allege
much more than that.

The complaint alleges that Wells Fargo repeatedly failed to test
the automated decision-making tool it used to determine borrowers'
eligibility for mortgage modifications, even in the face of a
consent decree which put Wells Fargo on notice that it needed to
implement such testing. Moreover, as alleged in the complaint,
Wells Fargo went so far as to conceal its discovery of systemic
errors from regulators and borrowers for several years. Plaintiffs
allege that Wells Fargo knowingly and repeatedly refused to address
these problems, deliberately deciding to put profits and growth
over compliance. As a result, plaintiffs and hundreds of other
borrowers lost their homes and suffered severe emotional distress.


Wells Fargo was happy to receive HAMP money but when it came time
to actually deliver on loan modifications, it systematically turned
homeowners out into the streets through an alleged pattern of
reckless and heartless errors and cover-ups. This order cannot say
as a matter of law that Wells Fargo's conduct, as currently pled,
could not be deemed outrageous. That issue will need to be
considered after the facts are developed in discovery.

In the meantime, the borrower-plaintiffs have stated a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and the motion to
dismiss their claim is denied.

By comparison, plaintiff Iesha Brown's intentional infliction of
emotion distress claim goes too far. According to the complaint,
Brown lived with her mother, plaintiff Coszetta Teague, who
purchased a home in Illinois for herself and her family through a
mortgage loan from Wells Fargo.

After Wells Fargo denied Teague's request for a loan modification,
the entire family, including Brown, was forced to live in their car
for roughly three years. This experience emotionally devastated
Brown, who became depressed and had suicidal ideations.

While the extent to which the borrower-plaintiffs may bring their
claims on behalf of putative non-borrower class members will be
resolved at class certification, this order concludes that
plaintiff Brown has failed to state a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.

The parties agree that Brown's claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress is governed by Illinois law. Unlike California
law, which requires that a defendant have known that particular
plaintiffs would be affected by its conduct,  to state a claim in
Illinois, a plaintiff need only allege that the actor knew "that
there is at least a high probability that his conduct will cause
severe emotional distress.

Here, not only does the complaint fail to allege facts plausibly
suggesting that Wells Fargo knew of Brown's presence in the home,
the complaint fails to plausibly allege that Wells Fargo had reason
to believe that anyone other than the borrower would be impacted by
foreclosure. Even taking the complaint's allegations and reasonable
inferences therefrom as true, Brown has not alleged that Wells
Fargo acted recklessly as to anyone other than the homeowners with
whom Wells Fargo dealt.

Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss Brown's claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress is granted.


NEGLIGENCE

To state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the
defendant's legal duty of care to the plaintiff (2) breach of that
duty (3) causation and (4) resulting injury to the plaintiff.  

Here, California plaintiffs Debora Granja and Keith Lindner allege
that Wells Fargo failed to use reasonable care in determining
whether they were eligible for a mortgage modification.

Courts are divided on whether accepting documents for a loan
modification is within the scope of a lender's conventional role as
a mere lender of money or whether it can instead give rise to a
duty of care with respect to the processing of a loan modification
application. While some courts have followed Lueras v. BAC Home
Loans Servicing, LP, 221 Cal.App.4th 49 (2013), in deciding that
under the Biakanja factors the loan servicer does not owe a
borrower a common law duty of care in processing a loan
modification application, others have followed Alvarez v. BAC Home
Loans Servicing, L.P., 228 Cal.App.4th 941 (2014), to conclude that
a common law duty of care in the loan modification process does
arise under California law.

Because the undersigned has previously held that merely engaging in
the loan modification process is insufficient to give rise to a
duty of care, and because our court of appeals has consistently
followed Lueras (albeit in non-binding decisions), this order
concludes that plaintiffs have not alleged a duty of care in
connection with their requests for loan modifications.

Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' negligence claim is
granted.  This order does not reach Wells Fargo's argument that the
economic loss rule also bars plaintiffs' negligence claims.

BREACH OF CONTRACT

To allege a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must allege:
(1) the contract (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for
nonperformance (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting
damages to plaintiff.

Plaintiffs contend that Wells Fargo breached the requirement to
notify them of the action required to cure the default by
accelerating payments and commencing foreclosure without first
notifying them that they could cure their default and avoid
acceleration and foreclosure by accepting a mortgage modification.

This order disagrees that plaintiffs have alleged a breach of
contract claim. Nothing in this provision (or any other provision
in the contract) supports plaintiffs' proposed interpretation. The
secured-loan instrument does not mention mortgage modification at
all. Instead, it gives the bank the absolute right to foreclose in
the event of an uncured default. The alleged requirement to offer
plaintiffs a loan modification comes only from HAMP or related
programs, none of which are referenced in the contract that Wells
Fargo purportedly breached.

Plaintiffs point to nothing in the complaint to suggest that a
government-mandated mortgage modification" even existed at the time
they entered into their contracts with Wells Fargo. Accordingly,
the phrase the action required to cure the default is susceptible
to only one reasonable interpretation under the circumstances
alleged  payment of the amount required to bring the loan current.
While Wells Fargo's failure to offer plaintiffs loan modifications
may have violated HAMP for which there is no private right of
action, that failure did not amount to a breach of plaintiffs'
secured-loan instruments.

Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss this claim is granted.

WRONGFUL FORECLOSURE

Plaintiffs also assert a claim for wrongful foreclosure under
California and Georgia law.
Under California law, the basic elements of the tort of wrongful
foreclosure are as follows: (1) the defendant causes an illegal,
fraudulent or willfully oppressive sale of real property pursuant
to a power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust (2) the plaintiff
was prejudiced or harmed and (3) the mortgagor tendered the amount
of the secured indebtedness or was excused from tendering.  Georgia
law similarly permits a wrongful foreclosure claim when a creditor
forecloses on property without the legal right to do so, in
violation of the terms of the deed.

As with their breach of contract claim, plaintiffs' wrongful
foreclosure claim is premised on the allegation that "the
foreclosure was unlawful and/or unfair because Wells Fargo did not
first notify Plaintiffs that they could cure their default by
accepting a mortgage modification  As set forth above, however,
nothing in plaintiffs' secured-loan instruments required Wells
Fargo to modify their loans or notify them of the potential to cure
their default through a loan modification. Accordingly, because
plaintiffs' wrongful foreclosure claim is based on the theory that
Wells Fargo illegally foreclosed on plaintiffs' properties by
failing to comply with the terms of plaintiffs' secured-loan
instruments, their claim fails and must be dismissed.

Plaintiffs summarily argue that they have stated a wrongful
foreclosure claim under California law, separate and apart from any
breach of their secured-loan instruments, because California also
permits wrongful foreclosure claims to be premised on unfair
business practices. Even assuming plaintiffs' statement of the law
is correct, they wholly fail to explain why the business practices
at issue are sufficiently unfair to be considered fraudulent or
willfully oppressive so as to state a claim for wrongful
foreclosure. The motion to dismiss plaintiffs' wrongful foreclosure
claim is accordingly GRANTED.

Accordingly, Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss is granted in part and
denied in part.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/y68rogyn from Leagle.com.

Alicia Hernandez, Plaintiff, represented by Richard M. Paul, III,
Paul LLP, pro hac vice, Ashlea Gayle Schwarz, Paul LLP, pro hac
vice, Laura Catherine Fellows, Paul LLP, 601 Walnut Street, Suite
300, Kansas City, MO 64106, pro hac vice, Linda Pham Lam --
Llam@lewisfeinberg.com -- Lewis Feinberg Lee & Jackson, P.C. &
Michael Lawrence Schrag  -- mls@classlawgroup.com -- Gibbs Law
Group LLP.

Diana Trevino, Coszetta Teague, Yvonne Demartino, Iesha Brown,
George Floyd, Troy Frye, Russell Simoneaux, Tiffanie Hood, Rose
Wilson, Emma White, Cyndi Floyd, John Demartino, Keith Lindner,
Brenda Simoneaux & Debora Granja, Plaintiffs, represented by Laura
Catherine Fellows, Paul LLP, pro hac vice, Linda Pham Lam, Lewis
Feinberg Lee & Jackson, P.C. & Michael Lawrence Schrag, Gibbs Law
Group LLP.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Defendant, represented by Amanda L. Groves
-- agroves@winston.com -- Winston & Strawn LLP, pro hac vice, Kobi
Kennedy Brinson -- kbrinson@winston.com -- Winston and Strawn, LLP,
pro hac vice, Stacie Corbett Knight – sknight@winston.com --
Winston and Strawn LLP, pro hac vice & Morgan E. Stewart --
mstewart@winston.com -- Winston and Strawn LLP.

Wells Fargo & Company, Defendant, represented by Amanda L. Groves,
Winston & Strawn LLP, pro hac vice & Morgan E. Stewart, Winston and
Strawn LLP.


WESTERN OILFIELDS: Errecart Files Class Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against JOHN LAKE and WESTERN
OILFIELDS SUPPLY COMPANY. The case is styled as DEBORAH ERRECART,
INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC
SIMILARLY SITUATED, AND AS AN AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEE PURSUANT TO THE
LABOR CODE PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL ACT ("PAGA"), Plaintiff v.
JOHN LAKE, WESTERN OILFIELDS SUPPLY COMPANY, A DELAWARE
CORPORATION, Defendants, Case No. BCV-19-101594 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Kern Cty., June 7, 2019).

The case type is stated as "Other Employment - Civil Unlimited".

Mr. John W. Lake serves as the Chief Executive Officer and
President of Western Oilfields Supply Company, Inc.

Western Oilfields Supply Company, Inc., doing business as Rain For
Rent, Inc., provides temporary liquid handling solutions on rent
and for sale.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by TRAVIS E. HODGKINS, ESQ.
    


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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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