CAR_Public/190704.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Thursday, July 4, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 133

                            Headlines

103W77 PARTNERS: Underpays Bartenders & Servers, Lemma et al. Say
90 SOMERS: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Cao Suit Alleges
AB INBEV: City of Sterling Heights Sues over Securities Fraud
AEGLE NUTRITION: Atamian Sues over Mislabeled Vitamin B Products
AFFORDABLE AUTOMOTIVE: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Smith Claims

ALL ISLAND: Underpays Construction Workers, Amador et al. Claim
ALLY BANK: Faces Coleman Suit over Improper Bank Fees
ALLY GROUP: Fails to Pay Minimum Wage, Paynes et al. Claim
AMC DETROIT: Bid for Conditional Class Certification Denied
APPLE, INC: 3rd Class Cert. Bid in iPhone 6 Suit Denied

BRISTOL COMPRESSORS: Court Certifies Three Subclasses
C&C SECURITY PATROL: Underpays Security Guards, Nevarez Claims
CARNAY MAN+AGEMENT: Underpays Salesman, Shumrak Alleges
CENTRAL FREIGHT: Court Narrows Claims in Truck Drivers' Suit
COMENITY BANK: Dmytriw Sues over Autodialed Calls

CONSOLIDATED TRAVEL: Has Made Unsolicited Class, Bakov et al. Say
CSC SERVICE: Administrative Fee "Improper", Condo Association Says
DHI MORTGAGE: Removes Ahlstrom Suit to N.D. California
DRACO PAINTING: Furfari, Berrios Seek OT Premium Pay
DUCHESNAY USA: Removes Arcare Suit to E.D. Pennsylvania

E-ROCK GROUP: Johnson Sues over Marketing Text Messages
ERIE INSURANCE: Oglesby Seeks Reimbursement of Housing Repair Cost
EXP REALTY: Ct. Refuses to Strike Class Allegations in Wright Suit
FIRST SOLAR: Petition for Writ of Certiorari in Smilovits Denied
G4S SECURE SOLUTIONS: Carty Seeks OT Pay for Site Supervisors

GENERAL MILLS: Court Narrows Claims in B. Reed's WCPA Suit
GL STAFFING: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Barbieri Suit Claims
H&R BLOCK: Benson Suit Transferred to Western District of Missouri
HFF INC: Faces Strenger Class Action over Merger Deal
HMR FOODS: Court Dismisses G. Cruz's WARN Act Suit

HOMEFED CORP: Plaintiff Counsel Agrees to Dismiss Merger Suits
KEURIG DR. PEPPER: Water Contaminated by Arsenic, Pels Claims
KRONOS INC: Tharrington Sues over Unlawful Biometric Data Storage
LATHEM TIME: Removes Bay Suit to Central District of Illinois
LIBERTY MUTUAL: Court Denies Dismissal Bid in T. Mosley Suit

LYFT INC: Pension Fund Sues over Drop in Share Price
MDL 2724: Generic Drug Pricing Litig. vs. Taro Ongoing
MDL 2741: Chasco v. Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
MDL 2741: Courtier v. Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
MDL 2741: Drexler v. Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated

MDL 2741: Feehan v. Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
MDL 2741: Gibson v. Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
MEDTRONIC PLC: Class Suit Against Sprint Fidelis Concluded
MEDTRONIC PLC: St. Paul Teachers' Retirement Fund Suit Concluded
METRO ONE LOSS: Underpays Security Guards, Nevarez Alleges

MG ELECTRIC: Underpays Electrical Journeymans, Seijas Alleges
MICHAEL W FRERICHS: Renewed Bid for Class Certification Granted
MICRON TECHNOLOGY: Faces Manning Class Action over Bonuses
MICRON TECHNOLOGY: New York Class Actions Consolidated
MONSANTO COMPANY: Benzels Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup

MONSANTO COMPANY: Buchert Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Fehling Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Frantz Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: James Shelton Sues over Sale of Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Kilburns Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup

MONSANTO COMPANY: Lane Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Lisa Shelton Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Moodys Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Novaks Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Rosenberg Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup

MOSAIC BAYBROOK: Tex. App. Flips Appeal Denial in P. Simien Suit
NATIONAL CREDIT CARE CORP: Cumming Sues over Autodialed Phone Calls
NESTLE USA: Duncan-Watts Seeks OT Pay for Production Workers
NEXMO INC: Removes Giannini Suit to N.D. California
NOMURA HOLDINGS: Units Still Face Antitrust Class Suits in N.Y.

NORTHROP GRUMMAN: Court Denies Dismissal Bid in Romano Suit
ORACLE CORP: Bid to Dismiss Stockholder Class Suit Pending
PARAMOUNT RESIDENTIAL: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Casey Claims
PATTERSON COS: Continues to Defend Kramer Class Suit
PATTERSON COS: Hatchett Class Action Ongoing in S.D. Illinois

PATTERSON COS: Plymouth County Retirement Suit Ongoing
PATTERSON COS: Settlement in Dental Supplies Suit Finally Approved
PRODUCERS SERVICES: Underpays Oilfield Operators, Andrews Claims
PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN: Hernandez, Amaro Sue over Vehicle Insurance
PURDUE PHARMA: Brumbarger Sues over Side Effects of Opioid Drugs

QUEST DIAGNOSTICS: Faces Marler Suit over Data Breach
R.A. ROGERS: Court Dismisses M. Salinas FDCPA Suit
RALPH LAUREN: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Tripicchio Alleges
RECEIVE REVENUE RECOVERY: Croymans Sues over Debt Collection
REVENUE FRONTIER: Court Certifies Class in "Clough" Suit

ROADRUNNER TRANSPORTATION: Sept. 23 Settlement Fairness Hearing
ROSSINI NORTH: Underpays Machine Operators, Howell Alleges
SARBANAND FARMS: Court Narrows Claims in Farm Labor Suit
SONRISE AT 50: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Bonanno Alleges
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: 7th Cir. Remands J. Miller's BIPA Suit

SPANCRETE INC: Dokey Seeks Proper Overtime Pay
SPIRIT AIRLINES: Roman et al. Sue over "Shortcut Security" Option
ST. RENATUS LLC: Walsh et al. Sue over Apollonia Merger Deal
STATER BROS: Removes Biggers Suit to C.D. California
STEELCASE INC: Web Site Not Accessible to Blind, Burbon Claims

STONE MOUNTAIN: Misrepresents Synthetic Brand Handbags as Leather
STONE POINT: Spinner Sues over Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Estate Charges
SUN TAN: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Caraboolad Suit Alleges
TARO PHARMA: Continues to Defend Speakes Class Action
TEMPLE PLAZA HOTEL: Doe, Coleman Seek Minimum Wage, OT Pay

TEVA PHARMA: ADS Price Artificially Inflated, Pension Fund Says
TINDER INC: Faces Troia Suit in Eastern District of Missouri
TOTAL FIRE: Troia Sues over Gender & Race Discrimination
TOUGH MUDDER: Court Dismisses L. Pazol's Suit
TOYOTA MOTORS: Still Defends Suit Over Defective Takata Airbags

TRAVELERS COMPANIES: R-Devie et al. Sue over Insurance Payment
UNITED STATES: Attorney General Faces Soto Suit in M.D. Georgia
UNITED STATES: USCIS Faces Class Action Over Immigration Files
UNITED STEEL: Asarco Suit Transferred to District of Arizona
VERIZON: Court Stays J. Gillespie Wage & Hour Suit

WELLS FARGO: Faces Davis Suit over Violation of RESPA
ZALE DELAWARE: Court Denies Dismissal of G. Lovette's CLRA Suit
ZULEMA CORDERO: Guereca Seeks Overtime Wages for Cleaning Techs

                            *********

103W77 PARTNERS: Underpays Bartenders & Servers, Lemma et al. Say
-----------------------------------------------------------------
BROOK LEMMA; and MATTHIEU HUBERT, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. 103W77 PARTNERS LLC;
SMOKIN' JFRASER INC.; JOHN FRASER; and LEWIS PELL, Defendants, Case
No. 513125/2019 (N.Y. Sup., Kings Cty., June 13, 2019) is an action
against the Defendants' failure to pay the Plaintiff and the class
overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per
week.

The Plaintiff Lemma was employed by the Defendants as bartenders.
Mr. Hubert was employed as server.

103W77 Partners LLC is engaged in the restaurant business. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian S. Schaffer, Esq.
          Dana M. Cimera, Esq.
          FITAPELLI & SCHAFFER, LLP
          28 Liberty Street, 30th Floor
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 300-0375


90 SOMERS: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Cao Suit Alleges
-------------------------------------------------------
STEVEN CAO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. 90 SOMERS POINTS/MAYS LANDING ROAD II, LLC
d/b/a GREAT BAY RACQUET & FITNESS, Defendant, Case No.
0:19-cv-61521-xxxx (S.D. Fla., June 18, 2019) seeks to stop the
Defendant's practice of making unsolicited calls.

90 Somers Points/Mays Landing Road II, LLLC D/B/A Great Bay Racquet
& Fitness owns and operates fitness clubs. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
          Thomas J. Patti, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI
          110 SE 6th Street, Suite 1744
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 907-1136
          Facsimile: (855) 529-9540
          E-mail: jibrael@jibraellaw.com
                  tom@jibraellaw.com


AB INBEV: City of Sterling Heights Sues over Securities Fraud
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Anheuser-Busch
InBev SA/NV and its executives for alleged violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The case is captioned CITY OF
STERLING HEIGHTS GENERAL EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, vs.
ANHEUSER-BUSCH INBEV SA/NV, CARLOS BRITO, FELIPE DUTRA, and JOHN
BLOOD, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05854 (S.D.N.Y., June 21,
2019).

Plaintiff alleges that the Anheuser-Busch is engaged in fraudulent
scheme and course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit on
purchasers of Anheuser-Busch ADS by disseminating materially false
and misleading statements and/or concealing material adverse facts.
The scheme deceived the investing public regarding Anheuser-Busch's
business, operations, liquidity, markets, deleveraging efforts,
management, and present and future business prospects, and the
intrinsic value of Anheuser-Busch ADS. The scheme also caused
Plaintiff and the Class to purchase Anheuser-Busch publicly-traded
ADS at artificially inflated prices.

Anheuser-Busch is engaged in the production, distribution, and sale
of beer, alcoholic beverages, and soft drinks worldwide. The
Company maintains its headquarters in Leuven, Belgium and its ADS
trade on the NYSE under the ticker symbol "BUD." [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Samuel H. Rudman, Esq.
     ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
     58 South Service Road, Suite 200
     Melville, NY 11747
     Telephone: (631) 367-7100
     Facsimile: (631) 367-1173
     E-mail: srudman@rgrdlaw.com

             - and -

     Thomas C. Michaud, Esq.
     VANOVERBEKE MICHAUD & TIMMONY, P.C.
     79 Alfred Street
     Detroit, MI 48201
     Telephone: (313) 578-1200
     Facsimile: (313) 578-1201
     E-mail: tmichaud@vmtlaw.com


AEGLE NUTRITION: Atamian Sues over Mislabeled Vitamin B Products
----------------------------------------------------------------
MIRAY ATAMIAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. AEGLE NUTRITION, LLC d/b/a TROPICAL OASIS,
Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-05247 (C.D. Cal., June 14, 2019)
alleges that the Defendant engaged in false and misleading
promotion of its consumable liquid B vitamin supplements.

According to the complaint, the Defendant advertised its products
as containing B12 in Methylcobalamin form until the expiration date
of May, 2019, and being "Made In The USA." However, The Defendant's
main ingredient Vitamin B12 in Methylcobalamin ("MeCO") form is
scientifically proven by its very nature to rapidly degrade when
suspended in water and exposed to oxygen. This degradation becomes
substantially more rapid after opening. Thus, the Defendant's
Product cannot last until the advertised expiration date, but
instead loses its potency much earlier.

The Defendant's Product's main ingredients, Methylcobalamin and
Agave, are also imported from a foreign country, thus not "Made In
The USA" as claimed.

Aegle Nutrition, LLC was founded in 2013. The company's line of
business includes the manufacturing, fabricating, or processing of
drugs in pharmaceutical preparations for human or veterinary use.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.
          Jason A. Ibey, Esq.
          Nick Barthel, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
          245 Fischer Avenue, Unit D1
          Costa Mesa, CA 92626
          Telephone: (800) 400-6808
          Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
          E-mail: ak@kazlg.com
                  jason@kazlg.com
                  nicholas@kazlg.com


AFFORDABLE AUTOMOTIVE: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Smith Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
REGAN SMITH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated Plaintiff v. AFFORDABLE AUTOMOTIVE SOLUTION; SUNPATH
LIMITED; NORTHCOAST WARRANTY SERVICES, INC., Defendants, Case No.
8:19-cv-00259 (D. Neb., June 14, 2019) seeks to stop the
Defendants' practice of making unsolicited calls.

Affordable Automotive Solution provides automotive maintenance and
repair services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark L. Javitch, Esq.
          JAVITCH LAW OFFICE
          210 S. Ellsworth Ave., Suite 486
          San Mateo CA 94401
          Telephone: (402) 301-5544
          Facsimile: (402) 396-7131


ALL ISLAND: Underpays Construction Workers, Amador et al. Claim
---------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE AMADOR; MARIO SANTOS; EVER SERRANO; ANGEL MORA; MARCOS
MARTINEZ; HENRI CHAVEZ; JOSE ALFARO; KEISSON VILLANUEVA; GORGI
SANTELLI; NICHOLAS CALLEGARI; KATIE PERALTA; JOSE RIVERA; JENNIFER
CHIVITA; individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. STEVEN LIDONNICI; ANDREW SPINARIS; TANIA
SERPAS; ALL ISLAND COUNTER TOPS & MILLWORK, INC.; ALL ISLAND MICA
DESIGNS, INC.; and ABC CORP. d/b/a ALL ISLAND, Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-03538 (E.D.N.Y., June 14, 2019) seeks to recover from the
Defendants unpaid wages and overtime compensation, interest,
liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as construction
workers.

ABC Corporation manufactures and markets housekeeping, janitorial,
and engineering products for the cleaning industry. It offers
building janitorial products, such as disinfectant, health care,
equipment, housekeeping, floor and carpet care, indoor air quality,
food service, restroom aids, HACCP-touch-less systems, and stone
care and wood care products. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Marcus Monteiro, Esq.
          MONTEIRO & FISHMAN LLP
          91 N. Franklin Street, Suite 108
          Hempstead, NY 11550
          Telephone: (516) 280-4600
          Facsimile: (516) 280-4530
          E-mail: mmonteiro@mflawny.com


ALLY BANK: Faces Coleman Suit over Improper Bank Fees
-----------------------------------------------------
CHRISTOPHER COLEMAN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ALLY BANK, Defendant, Case No.
2:19-CV-00406-DBP (D. Utah, June 13, 2019) is an action against the
Defendant arising from its unfair and unconscionable assessment and
collection of Non-Sufficient Funds Fees ("NSF Fees"), which it
charges when it returns certain checking account Automated Clearing
House ("ACH") debit requests unpaid.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the Defendant
unlawfully assesses multiple NSF Fees on a single item. In
violation of its contract and reasonable consumer understanding,
the Defendant often charges more than one NSF Fee on the same item,
even though the contract states, and reasonable consumers
understand, that the same item can only incur a single NSF Fee.
These double, triple, and even higher penalties crush
accountholders already struggling to make ends meet.

The Defendant's improper scheme to extract funds from
accountholders already struggling to make ends meet has victimized
the Plaintiff and thousands of other accountholders. Unless
enjoined, the Defendant will continue to engage in this scheme and
cause substantial injury to accountholders.

Ally Bank operates as a full-service bank. The Bank provides
personal and commercial banking, home loans, investment services,
deposits, debit and credit cards, makes loans, and other related
services. Ally Bank serves customers in the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David M. Wahlquist, Esq.
          Adam D. Wahlquist, Esq.
          KIRTON McCONKIE
          2600 W. Executive Parkway, Suite 400
          Lehi, UT 84043
          Telephone: (801) 426-2100
          Facsimile: (801) 426-2101
          E-mail: dwahlqui@kmclaw.com
                  awahlquist@kmclaw.com


ALLY GROUP: Fails to Pay Minimum Wage, Paynes et al. Claim
----------------------------------------------------------
The case, DIENESIA PAYNES and O'NEIL HURSEFIELD, on behalf of
themselves and other similarly situated individuals, the
Plaintiffs, vs. ALLY GROUP, LLC D/B/A MARIETTA LUXURY MOTORS; ALM
KENNESAW LLC D/B/A ATLANTA LUXURY MOTORS KENNESAW;  HUSHWANT
BHATIA, the Defendants. Case No. 1:19-cv-02327 (N.D. Ga., May 23,
2019), contends that the Department of Labor investigated
Defendants' pay practices, found violations, and requested
Defendant to pay back wages.  Because Defendants refused to
voluntarily comply, the Plaintiffs bring this action to recover
unpaid minimum wage compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys'
fees, and costs pursuant to Section 6(b) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs were car salesman at
Atlanta Luxury Motors' Marietta and Kennesaw locations. Atlanta
Luxury Motors is a used car dealership that operates a number of
locations throughout the metro-Atlanta area. Mr. Bhatia owns all of
the Atlanta Luxury Motors locations and personally instituted a
company-wide policy to only pay its car sales employees a
commission and to fail to pay minimum wage.  The Defendants'
commission-only pay structure applies even when the employee earns
a commission that is less than minimum wage. Because of Defendants'
policy, Plaintiffs were paid less than minimum wage.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Douglas R. Kertscher, Esq.
          Julie H. Burke, Esq.
          HILL, KERTSCHER & WHARTON, LLP
          3350 Riverwood Parkway, Suite 800
          Atlanta, GA 30339
          Telephone: (770) 953-0995
          Facsimile: (770) 953-1358

AMC DETROIT: Bid for Conditional Class Certification Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit MONIQUE CROSS and AMERICA THOMAS,on
behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated,
known and unknown, the Plaintiffs, vs. AMC DETROIT INC., the
Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-11968-NGE-DRG (E.D. Mich.), the Hon.
Judge Nancy G. Edmunds denied Plaintiffs' motion for conditional
class certification.

The Court said,"Because the Plaintiffs fail to satisfy their modest
burden to produce evidence of similarity situated employees and
have failed to "advance the ball down the field" with respect to
their claims in any meaningful way, the Plaintiff's motion for
conditional certification is denied. The motion, however, is denied
without prejudice. If the Plaintiffs obtain sufficient evidence in
discovery with respect to their own claims that would support
conditional certification at that time.

The Plaintiffs seek unpaid wages brought under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and filed as a putative class action. The Plaintiffs
are bartenders at the Bufallo Wild Wings restaurant located at 1218
Randolph Street, Detroit Michigan 48226. Each BWW is independently
owned or locally operated. The Defendant AMC Detroit is the owner
of the particular Bufallo Wild Wings.[CC]

APPLE, INC: 3rd Class Cert. Bid in iPhone 6 Suit Denied
-------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit THOMAS DAVIDSON, et al., the
Plaintiffs, vs. APPLE, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
5:16-cv-04942-LHK (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Lucy H. Koh entered
an order:

   1. denying Plaintiffs' third motion to certify a class
      consisting of:

      "any person residing in Colorado, Florida, Illinois,
      Washington, or Texas who purchased an Apple iPhone 6 or
      iPhone 6 Plus from Apple or an Apple Authorized Service
      Provider that was manufactured without underfill under the
      U2402 (Meson) integrated circuit chip."

  2. denying as moot Apple's motion to exclude Stefan Boedeker
     as expert and the Second Boedeker Report.

The Court said, "Nevertheless, under Ninth Circuit law, Apple's
arguments that the format of the survey and its interpretation
render it misleading go to the weight of the Second Boedeker Report
rather than its inadmissibility. See Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v.
Victoria's Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1036
(9th Cir. 2010) (holding that challenges to a survey relating to
"the format of the questions or the manner in which it was taken
bear on the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility")
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Moreover, even if
the Court considers the Second Boedeker Report, Plaintiffs' damages
model again fails to satisfy Comcast. The Court therefore denies as
moot Apple's motion to exclude Boedeker and the opinions in the
Second Boedeker Report under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and
Daubert. Finally, the Court need not consider Apple's various
objections to the Supplemental 23 Declaration of Stefan Boedeker,
which Plaintiffs submitted with their reply brief in support of
their third motion for class certification. Even if considered, the
statements in the Supplemental Boedeker Declaration do not rectify
the deficiencies in Boedeker's second survey or the Second Boedeker
Report, which fail to provide a Comcast-compliant damages model."

The Plaintiffs bring this putative class action against Apple, Inc.
based on Apple's alleged failure to disclose an alleged defect with
the iPhone 6 and iPhone 6 Plus.[CC]

BRISTOL COMPRESSORS: Court Certifies Three Subclasses
-----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit TONY A. MESSER, ET AL., the Plaintiffs,
v. BRISTOL COMPRESSORS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, ET AL., the Defendants,
Case No. 1:18-cv-00040-JPJ-PMS (W.D. Va.), the Hon. Judge James P.
Jones entered an order:

   1. granting motion for class certification and certifying
      action a class action pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3)
      of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

   2. certifying these subclasses:

      Subclass One:

      "all those persons employed at Bristol Compressors
      International, LLC's Bristol, Virginia, manufacturing
      facility full time and who were terminated without cause on
      their part between July 31, 2018, and August 31, 2018, as
      part of, or as the reasonably foreseeable consequences of
      the plant closing ordered on July 31, 2018, who do not file
      a timely request to opt out of the class";

      Subclass Two:

      "all those persons employed at Bristol Compressors
      International, LLC's Bristol, Virginia, manufacturing
      facility full time and who were terminated without cause on
      their part after August 31, 2018, as part of, or as the
      reasonably foreseeable consequences of the plant closing
      ordered by Defendants on July 31, 2018, who signed a Stay
      Bonus Letter, and who do not file a timely request to opt
      out of the class"; and

      Subclass Three:

      "all those persons employed at Bristol Compressors
      International, LLC's Bristol, Virginia, manufacturing
      facility full time and who were terminated without cause on
      their part after August 31, 2018, as part of, or as the
      reasonably foreseeable consequences of the plant closing
      ordered by Defendants on July 31, 2018, who did not sign a
      Stay Bonus Letter Agreement, and who do not file a timely
      request to opt out of the class";

   3. finding that administrative efficiency purposes a limited
      number of class representatives is needed for each subclass,

      the plaintiffs must designate one class representative for
      each subclass, and class counsel must advise the court within

      14 days of such selections and the qualifications as class
      representative of each such person selected, for approval and

      designation by the court;

   4. a ppointing Mary Lynn Tate of Tate Law PC as class counsel
      for all subclasses; and

   5. directing Class counsel to submit to the court for its
      approval within 14 days a proposed written Notice to the
      class members and a Plan for achieving the best notice
      practicable under the circumstances to the class members,
      which Plan must include individual notice to all class
      members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The

      defendants may file a response to the proposed Notice and
      Plan, provided it is filed within 7 days thereafter.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Mary Lynn Tate, Esq.
          TATE LAW PC
          16006 Porterfield Hwy
          Abingdon, VA 24210
          Telephone: 1 877-938-0894
          E-mail: tate.marylynn@gmail.com

Attorneys for Bristol Compressors International, LLC are:

          W. Bradford Stallard, Esq.
          PENN, STUART & ESKRIDGE
          208 E Main St.
          Abingdon, VA 24210
          Telephone: 276-628-5151

               - and -

          Alexander A. Ayar, Esq.
          MCDONALD HOPKINS, LLC
          39533 Woodward Avenue Suite 318
          Bloomfield Hills, MI, 48304
          Telephone: 248 220 1353
          E-mail: aayar@mcdonaldhopkins.com

Attorneys for Garrison Investment Group, L.P. are:

          Mark H. Churchill, Esq.
          HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP
          Tysons, VA
          Telephone: 703 720 8094
          E-mail: Mark.Churchill@hklaw.com

C&C SECURITY PATROL: Underpays Security Guards, Nevarez Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE NEVAREZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. C&C SECURITY PATROL, INC.; and DOES 1
THROUGH 10, INCLUSIVE, Defendants, Case No. CGC-19-576475 (Cal.
Super., San Francisco Cty., June 5, 2019) is an action against the
Defendants for failure to pay minimum wages, overtime compensation,
authorize and permit meal and rest periods, provide accurate wage
statements, and reimburse necessary business expenses.

Mr. Nevarez was employed by the Defendants as security guard.

C&C Security Patrol, Inc. provides security guard services and
security systems. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kevin F. Woodall, Esq.
          WOODALL LAW OFFICES
          100 Pine Street, Suite 1250
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 413-4629
          Facsimile: (866) 937-4109
          E-mail: kevin@woodalllaw.com


CARNAY MAN+AGEMENT: Underpays Salesman, Shumrak Alleges
-------------------------------------------------------
PETER SHUMRAK, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CARNEY MANAGEMENT CO. INC. D/B/A BERNARDI
AUTO GROUP; BERNARDI'S INC. D/B/A BERNARDI HONDA; and JAMES P.
CARNEY, Defendants, Case No. 19-1622 (Mass. Super., Middlesex Cty.,
June 6, 2019) seeks to recover from the Defendants unpaid wages and
overtime compensation, interest, liquidated damages, attorneys'
fees, and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Mr. Shumrak was employed by the Defendants as salesman.

Carney Management Co, Inc. operates as a dealer for new cars in
England. It operates showrooms that offer a line of vehicles,
including cars, sport utilities, vans, and accessories of various
manufactures in the Greater Boston/Metro West area. The company
also provides a selection of used cars and trucks, as well as
vehicle rental services. Carney Management Co, Inc. was founded in
1984 and is based in Framingham, Massachusetts with additional
locations in Natick, Framingham, and Brighton, Massachusetts. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

           Brook S. Lanc, Esq.
           Stephen Churchill, Esq.
           FAIRWORK, P.C.
           192 South Street, Suite 450
           Boston, MA 02111
           Telephone: (617) 607-3260
           E-mail: brook@fairworklaw.com
                   steve@fairworklaw.com

               - and -

          Thomas R. Beauvais, Esq.
          PO Box 120693
          Boston, MA 02112
          Telephone: (781) 462-1669
          E-mail: thomas@beauvaislegal.com

               -and -

          Lou Saban, Esq.
          8 Garrison Street No. 211
          Boston, MA 02116
          Telephone: (617) 784-2017
          E-mail: sabanlou@gmail.com


CENTRAL FREIGHT: Court Narrows Claims in Truck Drivers' Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned
RICKEY HENRY, an individual, on behalf of himself, and on behalf of
all persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CENTRAL FREIGHT
LINES, INC., a Corporation, and DOES 1 through 50, Inclusive,
Defendants. No. 2:16-cv-00280-JAM-EFB. (E.D. Cal.).

Rickey Henry (Henry) worked for Central Freight Lines, Inc. (CFL)
as a truck driver.. Henry alleges CFL intentionally and illegally
misclassified him, and other putative class member-truck drivers,
as independent contractors to deny them statutory benefits owed
under the California Labor Code.

CFL contends that Henry, and the putative class members, were
properly classified as independent contractors and therefore not
entitled to certain protections and benefits under the California
Labor Code.

Dynamex ABC Test

In 2018 the California Supreme Court clarified that the ABC test is
the applicable standard to determine whether a worker is an
employee or an independent contractor for purposes of applying
California wage orders. Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court, 4
Cal. 5th 903 (Cal. 2018), reh'g denied (June 20, 2018).

Primarily, CFL argues this Court should determine Henry's
employment classification under the long-used standard described in
S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep't of Indus. Relations, 48 Cal.3d
341 (Cal. 1989) (Borello), as opposed to the newly-announced
Dynamex ABC test.
  
In turn, CFL contends the ABC test should not be applied
retroactively to Henry's claims. CFL further argues that even if
Henry were considered an employee under the ABC test, such a
determination only applies to claims brought under California wage
orders.

Retroactivity of the ABC Test

The Ninth Circuit recently held that Dynamex applies retroactively.
Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int'l, Inc., 923 F.3d 575, 586-90
(9th Cir. 2019). In Vazquez, the Ninth Circuit addressed the
retroactive application of the ABC test under California law and
with respect to due process concerns of fairness and reliance
interests, the same arguments CFL raises here. This Court follows
the reasoning and holding of Vazquez and thus applies the ABC test
discussed in Dynamex to Henry's claims brought under California
wage orders.

Preemption of the ABC Test by FAAAA

The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA)
provides that states may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or
other provision having the force and effect of law related to a
price, route, or service of any motor carrier. While Congress
intended this related to preemption to be broad, the FAAAA does not
preempt state laws that affect a carrier's prices, routes, or
services in only a tenuous, remote, or peripheral manner with no
significant impact on Congress's deregulatory objectives. The FAAAA
will not preempt a generally applicable background regulation in an
area of traditional state power that has no significant impact on a
carrier's prices, routes, or services.

CFL contends that the FAAAA fully preempts the Dynamex ABC test,
or, at a minimum, preempts Part B of the test. While the Ninth
Circuit has yet to rule on the issue, it has stated, in dicta, the
ABC test may effectively compel a motor carrier to use employees
for certain services because, under the ABC test, a worker
providing a service within an employer's usual course of business
will never be considered an independent contractor.

This Court finds that the FAAAA does not preempt the application of
the Dynamex ABC test to claims arising under California wage
orders. The Dynamex ABC test is a general classification test that
does not apply to motor carriers specifically and does not, by its
terms, compel a carrier to use an employee or an independent
contractor. The test does not set prices, mandate or prohibit
certain routes, or tell motor carriers what services they may or
may not provide, either directly or indirectly. Nor does it bind
motor carriers to specific prices, routes, or services. The Dynamex
ABC test merely requires employers to classify employees
appropriately and comply with generally applicable wage orders.

CFL has failed to demonstrate how the Dynamex ABC test
significantly affects its prices, routes, or services to warrant
preemption.

Thus, this Court finds the Dynamex ABC test is not preempted by the
FAAAA.

Scope of Determination Under the ABC Test

The California Supreme Court explicitly limited its adoption of the
ABC test to one specific context, determining whether workers
should be classified as employees or as independent contractors for
purposes of California wage orders.

Dynamex involved alleged violations of both Industrial Welfare
Commission Wage Order No. 9 and the California Labor Code. The term
employ in IWC wage orders means not only to exercise control over
the wages, hours or working conditions, but also to suffer or
permit to work. This distinction was central to the reasoning of
the DynamexCourt, which found the suffer or permit to work
definition embodied the broad remedial purpose of the wage orders
and thus determined the ABC test was the appropriate standard for
claims arising under the wage orders, rather than the common-law
control test described in Borello.. This Court declines to expand
the application of the Dynamex ABC test beyond the one specific
context endorsed by the California Supreme Court.

This Court agrees with CFL that Henry's claims for reimbursement,
unlawful deductions, waiting time penalties, wage statement
penalties, and violations of PAGA are not grounded in the wage
orders, but rather in the California Labor Code, and must therefore
be decided based on Henry's classification under the Borello
standard. Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Mgmt., Inc., 203 Cal.App.4th
1112, 1132 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)  

Application of ABC Test

The ABC test presumptively considers all workers to be employees,
and permits workers to be classified as independent contractors
only if the hiring business demonstrates that the worker in
question satisfies each of three conditions: (a) that the worker is
free from the control and direction of the hiring entity in
connection with the performance of the work, both under the
contract for the performance of such work and in fact; and (b) that
the worker performs work that is outside the usual course of the
hiring entity's business; and (c) that the worker is customarily
engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or
business of the same nature as the work performed. Application of
Prongs A and C is most likely to trigger the need for further
factual development, because the considerations relevant to those
prongs are the most factually oriented. But the ABC test is
conjunctive, so a finding of any prong against the hiring entity
directs a finding of an employer-employee relationship. Prong B may
be the most susceptible to summary judgment on the record already
developed.

Despite the substantial factual disagreements presented on this
motion, Henry has compelling arguments that his employment by CFL
fails Prong B of the ABC test, making Henry an employee. Indeed,
Henry moved this Court to determine the ABC test applies and that
he was CFL's employee under the test. However, this Court, as
discussed supra, finds, except as to his PAGA claim which rests on
the Borello standard, Henry's cross-motion to be improper as
violating the one-way intervention rule. CFL did not move for a
determination that Henry was properly classified as an independent
contractor under the ABC test; rather CFL only presented arguments
limiting the applicability of the ABC test to Henry's claims, which
are addressed above.  

This Court therefore does not reach the merits of whether CFL
properly classified Henry as an independent contractor under the
ABC test.

Borello Standard

CFL argues Henry's claims for violations of the California Labor
Code fail because, under the Borellostandard, Henry is properly
classified as an independent contractor, not an employee.  

Borello is the seminal California decision providing the standard
for determining whether to classify a worker as an employee or
independent contractor.  Under the Borello standard, the most
significant factor in this determination is the right of the
principal to control the manner and means of accomplishing the
result desired.  

Nevertheless, in Borello, the California Supreme Court also
explained that additional, secondary factors may be relevant in
making the classification determination, including: (a) whether the
one performing services is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business (b) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in
the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the
principal or by a specialist without supervision (c) the skill
required in the particular occupation (d) whether the principal or
the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of
work for the person doing the work (e) the length of time for which
the services are to be performed; (f) the method of payment,
whether by the time or by the job (g) whether or not the work is
part of the regular business of the principal and (h) whether or
not the parties believe they are creating the relationship of
employer-employee.. These factors generally cannot be applied
mechanically as separate tests; they are intertwined and their
weight depends often on particular combinations.

On this record, there are factual disputes regarding control over
Henry's working condition, including required adherence to certain
CFL policies and procedures; possession of and leasing of his
truck; his ability to accept or decline loads and do so without
reprisal; his ability to choose his route; his ability to hire
other drivers to assist him;   the circumstances of his hiring and
training; his pay and his post-CFL work.

Given the numerous factual disputes having a bearing on the
multi-factored Borello standard, this Court cannot, as a matter of
law, grant summary judgment to either party. There exist sufficient
indicia of both an employer-employee and principal-independent
contractor relationship between Henry and CFL such that a
reasonable jury could find the existence of either such
relationship.
Accordingly, this Court denies CFL's motion for summary judgment as
to Henry's remaining claims arising under the California Labor
Code, and denies Henry's motion for summary judgment on his PAGA
claim.

Accordingly, the Court grants in part and denies in part the
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES Plaintiff's
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

CFL's motion is:

   -- Granted as to Henry's claims alleging violations of
California's meal and rest break rules under California Labor Code
sections 226.7 and 512, which are hereby dismissed;

   -- Denied as to Henry's claims alleging violations of California
wage orders, for which Henry's employment classification will be
determined under the Dynamex ABC test, which applies retroactively
and is not preempted by the FAAAA;

   -- Denied as to Henry's claims for reimbursement of lease
payments; and

   -- Denied as to Henry's remaining claims under the California
Labor Code, for which Henry's employment classification will be
determined under by the Borello standard, and which are not barred
by the dormant Commerce Clause or preempted by federal TIL
regulations.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 13, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yy93ds9q from Leagle.com

Rickey Henry, Plaintiff, represented by Aparajit Bhowmik --
aj@bamlawlj.com -- Blumenthal, Nordrehaug & Bhowmik, Jeffrey S.
Herman -- JEFF@BAMLAWCA.COM -- Blumenthal Nordrehaug Bhowmik De
Blouw LLP, Kyle R. Nordrehaug -- KYLE@BAMLAWCA.COM -- Blumenthal
Nordrehaug and Bhowmik, Norman Blumenthal -- NORM@BAMLAWCA.COM --
Blumenthal Nordrehaug & Bhowmik, LLP, Ruchira Piya Mukherjee --
piya@bamlawlj.com -- Blumenthal, Nordrehaug & Bhowmik &Victoria
Bree Rivapalacio -- victoria@bamlawca.com -- Blumenthal, Nordrehaug
& Bhowmik.

Central Freight Lines, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jesse C.
Ferrantella -- jesse.ferrantella@ogletreedeakins.com -- Ogletree
Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Clint Seil Engleson --
clint.engleson@ogletreedeakins.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak &
Stewart, PC, Timothy L. Johnson -- tim.johnson@ogletreedeakins.com
-- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, PC & Spencer C. Skeen --
spencer.skeen@ogletreedeakins.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak
& Stewart PC.


COMENITY BANK: Dmytriw Sues over Autodialed Calls
-------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Comenity Bank for
alleged violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).
The case is captioned CHRISTOPHER DMYTRIW, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. COMENITY
BANK, Defendant, Case No. 8:19-cv-01505 (M.D. Fla., June 21, 2019).
Plaintiff Christopher Dmytriw alleges that Comenity has blasted
Plaintiff's cellular telephone with over 379 calls by the use of an
automatic telephone dialing system or a pre-recorded or artificial
voice in the span of two months. Plaintiff has asked Comenity to
stop calling on three different occasions yet none of the
revocations appeared in Defendant's account notes.

Comenity is a corporation with its principal place of business in
Columbus, Ohio, and conducts business in the State of Florida and
across the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     William "Billy" Peerce Howard, Esq.
     Amanda J. Allen, Esq.
     THE CONSUMER PROTECTION FIRM
     4030 Henderson Boulevard
     Tampa, FL 33629
     Telephone: (813) 500-1500
     Facsimile: (813) 435-2369
     E-mail: Billy@TheConsumerProtectionFirm.com
             Amanda@TheConsumerProtectionFirm.com


CONSOLIDATED TRAVEL: Has Made Unsolicited Class, Bakov et al. Say
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ANGEL BAKOV; and KINAYA HEWLETT, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. CONSOLIDATED TRAVEL
HOLDINGS GROUP, INC.; JAMES H. VERRILLO; DANIEL E. LAMBERT;
JENNIFER POOLE; DONNA HIGGINS; THE MARKETING SOURCE, INC.; VANCE L.
VOGEL; SUN BRIDGE SYSTEMS, LLC; and CLIFFORD ALBRIGHT, Defendants,
Case No. 0:19-cv-61509-XXXX (S.D. Fla., June 17, 2019) seeks to
stop the Defendants' practice of making unsolicited calls.

Consolidated Travel Holdings Group, Inc. provides travel services.
[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Scott A. Bursor, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          2665 S. Bayshore Drive, Suite 220
          Miami, FL 33133
          Telephone: (305) 330-5512
          Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
          E-mail: scott@bursor.com

               - and -

          Yitzchak Kopel, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          888 Seventh Avenue
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (646) 837-7150
          Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
          E-mail: ykopel@bursor.com

               - and -

          Joseph DePalma, Esq.
          Jeremy Nash, Esq.
          LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG, LLC
          570 Broad Street, Suite 1201
          Newark, NJ 07102
          Telephone: (973) 623-3000
          E-mail: jdepalma@litedepalma.com
                  jnash@litedepalma.com

               - and -

          Katrina Carroll, Esq.
          Kyle A. Shamberg (To Be Admitted PHV)
          CARLSON LYNCH LLP
          111 W. Washington Street, Suite 1240
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 750-1265
          E-mail: kcarroll@carlsonlynch.com
                  kshamberg@carlsonlynch.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey Grant Brown, Esq.
          JEFFREY GRANT BROWN, P.C.
          221 North LaSalle Street, Suite 1414
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 789-9700
          E-mail: jeff@jgbrownlaw.com


CSC SERVICE: Administrative Fee "Improper", Condo Association Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
1050 W COLUMBIA CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CSC SERVICE WORKS,
INC., Defendant, Case No. 2019CH07319 (Ill. Cir., Cook Cty., June
18, 2019) is an action against the Defendant for breach of
contract, and for violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant announced that it was
imposing a 9.75% administrative fee calculated from gross
collections. The Defendant stated that the administrative fee
covered three categories: Administrative Costs and Fees, Taxes and
Vandalism Fee, and directed the Plaintiff members to its website
for further explanation. The page explaining the administrative fee
has since been removed, but before its removal the Defendant
admitted that the administrative fee covered its own cost such as
processes of billing, refund processing, website maintenance,
clothing claim possession, and commission check processing.

The administrative fee includes items the Defendant is not allowed
to deduct from the Plaintiff's rent. At most, the Plaintiff's
contract with the Defendant allow the Defendant to deduct expenses
attributable to vandalism only.

The Defendant's administrative fee is extra-contractual and not
bargained for, and the Defendant's unilateral conduct to reduce
payments under its revenue-sharing contracts have cost the
Plaintiff and the class injury and damages.

CSC Serviceworks, Inc. provides laundry equipment services. The
Company leases coin and debit card operated laundry machines for
multi-family apartment buildings, university residence halls, and
related residential complexes. CSC Serviceworks serves customers
throughout the United States, Canada, and Europe. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by;

          Michael R. Karnuth, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL R. KARNUTH
          55 East Monroe St., 60603
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 391-0203
          E-mail: karnuth@gmail.com

               - and -

          Edward M. Burnes, Esq.
          125 S. Wacker Dr., Suite 1380
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 419-1100
          E-mail: edburnes@outlook.com


DHI MORTGAGE: Removes Ahlstrom Suit to N.D. California
------------------------------------------------------
The Defendant in the case of ROBERT W. AHLSTROM, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. DHI
MORTGAGE COMPANY, LTD., L.P.; and DOES 1 to 50, inclusive,
Defendants, filed a notice to remove the lawsuit from the Superior
Court of the State of California, County of Alameda (Case No.
RG19012495) to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California on June 17, 2019. The clerk of court for the Northern
District of California assigned Case No. 3:19-cv-03435. The case is
assigned to Judge Thomas S Hixson.

DHI Mortgage Company, Ltd. provides home finance solutions for
homebuyers in the United States. DHI Mortgage Company, Ltd.
operates as a subsidiary of D.R. Horton, Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shaun Setareh, Esq.
          Thomas Segal, Esq.
          Farrah Grant, Esq.
          SETAREH LAW GROUP
          315 South Beverly Drive, Suite 315
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Telephone: (310) 888-7771
          Facsimile: (310) 888-0109
          E-mail: shaun@setarehlaw.com
                  Thomas@setarehlaw.com
                  farrah@setarehlaw.com


DRACO PAINTING: Furfari, Berrios Seek OT Premium Pay
----------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Draco Painting Corp
and Gustavo Iglesias for alleged violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. The case is captioned GUSTAVO A. FURFARI, MARIA T.
BERRIOS, and other similarly-situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v.
DRACO PAINTING CORP and GUSTAVO IGLESIAS, individually, Defendants,
Case No. 1:19-cv-22583-XXXX (S.D. Fla., June 21, 2019). Plaintiffs
Gustavo A. Furfari and Maria T. Berrios allege that the Defendants
failed to pay overtime hours at the rate of time and a half her
regular rate, for every hour that they worked in excess of 40.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek to recover money damages for unpaid
regular and overtime wages.

Draco Painting Corp is a Florida corporation, having corporate
offices at 10840 SW 36 ST Miami, Florida, and performing business
in the area of Dade and other Counties. This construction company
is dedicated to commercial, residential, and industrial new
construction and remodeling. It is specialized in plastering and
painting projects. Gustavo Iglesias owns and manages Draco. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Zandro E. Palma, Esq.
     ZANDRO E. PALMA, P.A.
     9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
     Miami, FL 33156
     Telephone: (305) 446-1500
     Facsimile: (305) 446-1502
     E-mail: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com


DUCHESNAY USA: Removes Arcare Suit to E.D. Pennsylvania
-------------------------------------------------------
The Defendant in the case of ARCARE, INC., individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. DUCHESNAY
USA, Defendant, filed a notice to remove the lawsuit from the Court
of Common Pleas of the State of Pennsylvania, County of Montgomery
(Case No. 19-06950) to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania on June 14, 2019. The clerk of court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania assigned Case No.
2:19-cv-02593-JS. The case is assigned to Juan R. Sanchez.

Duchesnay USA Inc operates as a vibrant pharmaceutical company. The
Company focuses on safeguarding the health and wellbeing of
expectant women and their unborn babies. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ezra D. Church, Esq.
          Kristin M. Hadgis, Esq.
          MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          1701 Market Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 963-5000
          Facsimile: (215) 963-5001
          E-mail: ezra.church@morganlewis.com
                  kristin.hadgis@morganlewis.com


E-ROCK GROUP: Johnson Sues over Marketing Text Messages
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against E-Rock Group, LLC
and TRE Marketing and Consulting, LLC for alleged violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The case is captioned
ROBERT JOHNSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. EROCK GROUP, LLC, and TRE MARKETING AND
CONSULTING, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 0:19-cv-61565-XXXX (S.D.
Fla., June 23, 2019). In efforts to drum-up business, and to
otherwise promote, the "Utopia" event/festival at the Jacob K.
Javits Convention Center of New York, Defendants uniformly sent
marketing text messages to hundreds, if not thousands, of consumers
at a time and provided different types of offers and savings for
future events, services, and festivals. These messages were sent
using mass-automated technology through a third-party company hired
by Defendants to send marketing text messages on Defendants' behalf
en masse. In sum, Defendants knowingly and willfully violated the
TCPA, causing injuries to Plaintiff and members of the putative
class, including invasion of their privacy, aggravation, annoyance,
intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Accordingly,
Plaintiff Robert Johnson seeks injunctive relief to halt
Defendants' illegal conduct. He also seeks statutory damages on
behalf of himself and members of the class, and any other available
legal or equitable remedies resulting from the illegal actions of
Defendants.

E-Rock and TRE manage, market, host, and/or otherwise promote
musical, dance, and other social festivals in, among other places,
New York and New Jersey. E-Rock is a New Jersey corporation, with a
principal office located at 225 Route 46, West Totowa, New Jersey.
TRE is a New Jersey corporation, with a principal office located at
225 Route 46, Suite 9, Totowa, New Jersey. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
     Thomas J. Patti, Esq.
     THE LAW OFFICES OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI
     110 SE 6th Street, Suite 1744
     Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
     Telephone: (954) 907-1136
     Facsimile: (855) 529-9540
     E-mail: jibrael@jibraellaw.com
             tom@jibraellaw.com


ERIE INSURANCE: Oglesby Seeks Reimbursement of Housing Repair Cost
------------------------------------------------------------------
DEIRDRE OGLESBY; and RICHARD OGLESBY, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ERIE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-02361-TLP-CGC (W.D. Teen., June 5,
2019) is an action against Defendant for underpayment of insurance
reimbursements.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs were the insured
pursuant to an insurance contract whereby the Defendant agreed to
insure, the Plaintiffs' dwelling and structures located on the
Insured Premises against property damage. On February 19, 2019, the
Plaintiffs' dwelling located on the Insured Premises suffered
accidental direct physical loss by wind or hail-related
circumstances. The Defendant calculated its actual cash value
("ACV") payment obligation to the Plaintiffs by first estimating
the cost to repair or replace the damage with new materials
(replacement cost value, or "RCV"), then subtracted depreciation.

The Defendant's practice of withholding labor costs as depreciation
is inconsistent with the universally accepted premise that the
fundamental purpose of property insurance is to provide indemnity
to policyholders. To indemnify means to put the insured back in the
position he or she enjoyed before the loss—no better and no
worse. A policy, like the Defendant's policy, that provides for
payment of the ACV of a covered loss is an indemnity contract
because the purpose of an ACV payment is to make the insured whole
after the loss that occurred.

The Defendant materially breached its duty to indemnify the
Plaintiffs by withholding labor costs associated with repairing or
replacing the Plaintiffs' property in its ACV payment as
depreciation, thereby paying the Plaintiffs less than they were
entitled to receive under the terms of the Policy.

Erie Insurance Company, Inc. provides property and casualty
insurance services. The company was incorporated in 1972 and is
based in Erie, Pennsylvania. As of December 31, 2010, Erie
Insurance Company, Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Erie Insurance
Exchange Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          J. Brandon McWherter, Esq.
          Jonathan L. Bobbitt, Esq.
          Emily S. Alcorn, Esq.
          GILBERT McWHERTER
          SCOTT BOBBITT PLC
          341 Cool Springs Blvd, Suite 230
          Franklin, TN 37067
          Telephone: (615) 354-1144
          E-mail: bmcwherter@gilbertfirm.com
                  jbobbitt@gilbertfirm.com
                  ealcorn@gilbertfirm.com


EXP REALTY: Ct. Refuses to Strike Class Allegations in Wright Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Orlando Division, issued an Order denying Defendant's
Motion to Strike Class Allegations in the case captioned BRUCE
WRIGHT, JORGE VALDES and EDWIN DIAZ, Plaintiffs, v. EXP REALTY,
LLC, Defendant. Case No. 6:18-cv-1851-Orl-40TBS. (M.D. Fla.).

This is a putative class action brought under the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). Plaintiffs Bruce Wright, Jorges
Valdes, and Edwin Diaz allege that Defendant, eXp Realty, a real
estate brokerage, violated the TCPA by making unsolicited telephone
calls with an ATDS (automated telephone dialing system) or
prerecorded voice and by calling phone numbers registered on the
National Do Not Call Registry (DNC Registry).  

A class action under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) is appropriate only if
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class  (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.  

The Defendant argues that the class definitions are facially
uncertifiable because the complaint fails to allege acts that apply
generally to the class and therefore, common issues of fact cannot
predominate.

The Defendant contends that the individual issues predominate
across the putative classes because the Plaintiffs base their class
definitions on issues of consent that will vary between class
members. But this argument is premature. In a recently filed Joint
Stipulation, the parties represented that, as part of discovery,
the Defendant provided to the Plaintiffs the names and addresses
for the five eXp Realty realtors who called Plaintiffs but to date,
the Plaintiffs have been able to serve subpoenas on only two of the
five realtors.

The parties jointly asked for an extension of dates relating to the
class certification issue, explaining: As a result of the inability
to date to serve the remaining three subpoenas, the parties do not
have the information regarding how and to whom calls were made to
necessary to engage in meaningful settlement discussions, obtain
expert opinions, and brief class certification.

The Court granted the motion and entered an Amended Case Management
and Scheduling Order, allowing additional time to obtain the
information and move for class certification.  

The Defendant acknowledges in its motion that in some instances,
discovery may be needed to aid in the determination of whether a
class action is appropriate. Here, the parties have jointly
represented that more information is needed to brief class
certification. It follows that Defendant's motion should be, and it
is denied as premature.

This Order does not preclude the Defendant from making its Rule 23
arguments at the appropriate time.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 13, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y25u3gyw from Leagle.com.

Bruce Wright, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Avi Robert Kaufman --
kaufman@kaufmanpa.com -- Kaufman P.A. & Stefan Coleman, Law Offices
of Stefan Coleman, PLLC,1072 Madison Ave # 1, Lakewood, NJ 08701

Jorge Valdes, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & Edwin Diaz, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Avi Robert Kaufman,
Kaufman P.A.

EXP Realty, LLC, a Washington limited liability company, Defendant,
represented by Jason Daniel Joffe -- jason.joffe@squirepb.com --
Squire Patton Boggs US, LLP.


FIRST SOLAR: Petition for Writ of Certiorari in Smilovits Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
First Solar, Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission filed on June 24, 2019, that the
U.S. Supreme Court has denied the petition for writ of certiorari
in the class action suit entitled, Smilovits v. First Solar, Inc.,
et al., Case No. 2:12-cv-00555-DGC

On March 15, 2012, a purported class action lawsuit titled
Smilovits v. First Solar, Inc., et al., Case No. 2:12-cv-00555-DGC,
was filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Arizona (the "Arizona District Court") against the Company and
certain of its current and former directors and officers (the
"Defendants"). The complaint was filed on behalf of persons who
purchased or otherwise acquired the Company's publicly traded
securities between April 30, 2008 and February 28, 2012 (the "Class
Action").

The complaint generally alleges that the Defendants violated
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by
making false and misleading statements regarding the Company's
financial performance and prospects.

The action includes claims for damages, including interest, and an
award of reasonable costs and attorneys' fees to the putative
class.

On August 11, 2015, the Arizona District Court granted Defendants'
motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part, and
certified an issue for immediate appeal to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (the "Ninth Circuit").

On January 31, 2018, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion affirming
the order of the Arizona District Court. On August 6, 2018,
Defendants filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S.
Supreme Court.

On November 14, 2018, the Arizona District Court vacated the
previously scheduled trial date until the outcome of the certiorari
petition is clear. On June 24, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court denied
the petition. As of June 24, 2019, the Arizona District Court has
not scheduled a new trial date.

First Solar, Inc. provides photovoltaic (PV) solar energy solutions
in the United States and internationally. It operates in two
segments, Modules and Systems. The company was formerly known as
First Solar Holdings, Inc. and changed its name to First Solar,
Inc. in 2006. First Solar, Inc. was founded in 1999 and is
headquartered in Tempe, Arizona.


G4S SECURE SOLUTIONS: Carty Seeks OT Pay for Site Supervisors
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against G4S Secure
Solutions (USA) Inc. for alleged violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act
(OMFWSA). The case is captioned PAT CARTY, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, vs. G4S SECURE SOLUTIONS
(USA) INC., Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-02650-MHW-CMV (S.D. Ohio,
June 21, 2019). As site supervisors, Defendant required Plaintiff
Pat Carty and other similarly situated employees to respond to
telephone calls while they were off-duty. These calls generally
involved discussions about staffing, scheduling, and other
work-related issues. However, Defendant did not pay Plaintiff and
other similarly situated employees for time they spent responding
to work-related telephone calls while off-duty. In addition,
Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees, as full-time
employees, regularly worked over 40 hours per workweek in the three
years but were not paid overtime compensation.

G4S Secure Solutions (USA) Inc. is a for-profit Florida corporation
that is registered as a foreign corporation in Ohio.  The company
describes itself as the world's leading integrated security
solutions company. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeffrey J. Moyle, Esq.
     614 West Superior Avenue, Suite 1148
     Cleveland, OH 44113
     Telephone: 216-230-2955
     Facsimile: 330-754-1430
     E-mail: jmoyle@ohlaborlaw.com

             - and -

     Shannon M. Draher, Esq.
     Hans A. Nilges, Esq.
     7266 Portage St., N.W., Suite D
     Massillon, OH 44646
     Telephone: (330) 470-4428
     Facsimile: (330) 754-1430
     E-mail: sdraher@ohlaborlaw.com
             hans@ohlaborlaw.com


GENERAL MILLS: Court Narrows Claims in B. Reed's WCPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, issued an Order denying Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss in the case captioned BRUCH REED, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
GENERAL MILLS, INC., et al., Defendants. Case No. C19-0005-JCC.
(W.D. Wash.).

This is a putative class action where the Plaintiffs are consumers
from across the nation who purchased certain Cascadian Farms
products (Products) from a variety of retailers. The Plaintiffs
allege that the Defendants marketed and sold the Products in a
fashion that caused the Plaintiffs to believe that the Products
were produced on a farm in Washington, when in fact they were not.
If not for this incorrect belief, the Plaintiffs allege that they
either would not have purchased, or paid for less for, the
Defendants' Products.  

The Plaintiffs bring claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
violations of Washington's Consumer Protection Act and Similar Laws
Throughout the United States and unjust enrichment. The Defendants
move to dismiss all of the Plaintiffs' claims for failure to state
a claim, on the basis that no reasonable consumer would be deceived
by the Products' packaging.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

The Court may dismiss a complaint that fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.  A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.  

Judicial Notice

Generally, the Court may not consider material outside of the
pleadings when assessing the sufficiency of a complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
  
There are two exceptions to this rule. First,
incorporation-by-reference allows the Court to treat certain
documents as though they are part of the complaint itself.   

Second, the Court is permitted to take judicial notice of facts
that are not subject to reasonable dispute because they can be
accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned.

Exhibits A, D, E, and L

The Defendants argue that judicial notice of Exhibits A, D, E, and
L is appropriate because the Plaintiffs mention these Products in
their complaint; therefore, the Court should be privy to the entire
packaging (and entire ingredient list), and not just the portions
supportive of the Plaintiffs' argument. The Plaintiffs argue that
judicial notice is inappropriate here because the Defendants have
not authenticated that these specific packages were used during the
relevant class period and because factual disputes remain
surrounding what disclosures appeared on the labels at the time of
the Plaintiffs' purchases.  

The Court's review of such evidence at this stage is inappropriate
it is a way for the Defendants to insert helpful facts into the
record without the Plaintiffs' approval of the authenticity of the
packaging. And even if the Court were to conclude that Exhibits A,
D, E, and L are subject to judicial notice, the exhibits would not
give rise to proper grounds for dismissal.

Because the authenticity of Exhibits A, D, E, and L is reasonably
questioned by Plaintiffs, the Court DENIES Defendants' request for
judicial notice.

Exhibit B

The Defendants argue that judicial notice of Exhibit B is
appropriate because it is incorporated by reference -- the
complaint references a webpage, which in turn references Exhibit B.


First, the webpage is not central to Plaintiff's claim. Second,
this is again an improper attempt by Defendants to create a defense
to the well-pled allegations in the complaint. Plaintiffs'
complaint says nothing about Exhibit B and does not allege that it
is a defective product.   

The Defendants' request for judicial notice of Exhibit B is
DENIED.

Exhibit C, H, and I

The Defendants argue that judicial notice of Exhibits C, H, and I
is appropriate because the Plaintiffs put the websites at issue, so
the entirety of the websites and social media pages should be
subject to judicial notice under the incorporation-by-reference
doctrine. The webpages in Exhibit C promote and market the product
in Exhibit B.  

The Defendants' request is inappropriate as to Exhibit B, it is
inappropriate as to Exhibit C. Moreover, with regard to all three
exhibits, Plaintiffs reference to a social media page or website in
their complaint does not put that page at issue, so as to make the
entirety of the website subject to judicial notice. In order for
incorporation by reference to be applicable, Plaintiffs' reference
to the webpages must serve as the basis of Plaintiffs' complaint,
which it does not.

The Defendants' request for judicial notice of Exhibits C, H, and I
is DENIED.

Exhibits F and G

The Defendants argue that Exhibits F and G are subject to judicial
notice because they were obtained from a government website and
their accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. The Court agrees
that trademark registrations downloaded from government websites
are subject to judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence
201(b). Defendants' request for judicial notice of Exhibits F and G
is GRANTED.

Exhibit J

The Defendants argue that Exhibit J is subject to judicial notice
because it is a chart of facts compiled from a government website
and as such, the facts' accuracy is not subject to reasonable
dispute. Exhibit J only indicates the seasonality of crops in
Washington when the harvest or flavor of the food is at its peak
and not a definitive chart of when crops are or can be grown.

Because the seasonality of these crops is not subject to reasonable
dispute, Defendants' request for judicial notice of Exhibit J is
GRANTED.

Exhibit K

The Defendants argue that Exhibit K is subject to judicial notice
because it is census data summarized in a list format, and census
data is not subject to reasonable dispute. Census data is often
subject to judicial notice. Therefore, the Defendants' request for
judicial notice of Exhibit K is GRANTED.

Reasonable Consumer

The Defendants assert three theories why the Plaintiffs' claims
cannot survive the reasonable consumer standard (1) no reasonable
consumer could believe that all 81 Products, and all 131 of those
Products' ingredients, came from the same small farm in Washington
(2) no feature of the packaging whether the Skagit Valley emblem,
the Cascadian Farm brand name, or the picturesque background is
itself actionable as a misrepresentation and (3) even if a
reasonable consumer could be confused by the Products' packaging,
disclaimers and other information on the packaging resolves any
ambiguity.  

All 81 Products Coming from the Same Farm

The Plaintiffs allege that 81 different Products deceive reasonable
consumers because the packaging misrepresents that the Products, or
a substantial portion of their ingredients, are produced in
Washington. Defendants argue that this allegation is unbelievable
no reasonable consumer could believe that all 81 of these Products,
made up of 131 different ingredients, were made on the same small
farm in Washington. Defendants misconstrue Plaintiffs' allegations.
Plaintiffs do not allege that each or any of the individual
Plaintiffs were led to believe that all 81 Products came from the
same farm. Instead, they allege that specific Plaintiffs purchased
one or a few different Products and believed that those came from a
small Washington farm. If a specific Plaintiff is only aware of and
only buys a few Products, that Plaintiff may reasonably believe
that those few Products, or a substantial portion of their
ingredients, are produced in Washington.

Therefore, Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims based
on this theory is DENIED.

Individual Features of Products' Packaging

The Defendants argue that no individual feature of the Products'
packaging could lead a reasonable consumer to believe that the
Products are produced in Washington. Defendants highlight three
distinct features of the packaging the Skagit Valley emblem, the
Cascadian Farm brand name, and the picturesque background and argue
that none of these features in isolation is an actionable
misrepresentation. As a preliminary matter, the Court is skeptical
that each allegedly deceptive feature should be analyzed in
isolation. Plaintiffs' claim is that the packaging as a whole is
deceptive.  

Regardless, there are portions of the Products' packaging that may
be actionable misrepresentations. It was not because the alleged
deceptive feature was a brand name that the court found no
liability the court found no liability because it was unreasonable
for a consumer to believe that the sugar product was entirely raw
and unprocessed. Here, it is not implausible that a consumer could
believe the Products came from a Cascadian farm because of the
Cascadian Farm brand name, particularly in light of the
corresponding Skagit Valley emblem.

The Skagit Valley emblem is much more akin to the packaging in
Broomfield than the packaging in Dumas. Although it varies slightly
between Products, generally the Skagit Valley emblem includes the
following phrases: VISIT OUR HOME FARM, SKAGIT VALLEY, WA, and
SINCE 1972. These phrases indicate a specific place that the
Product is produced and that the consumer can visit, not a feeling
that the Product is similar to or evokes the spirit of Washington.
Therefore, because the individual features of the Products'
packaging are not, as a matter of law, nonactionable, Defendants'
motion to dismiss based on this theory is DENIED.

Disclaimers Resolve Ambiguity

The Defendants' final overarching theory of dismissal is that even
if the Products' packaging is ambiguous about the Products' place
of production, other labels on the Products resolve any ambiguity.


Where a plaintiff contends that certain aspects of a product's
packaging are misleading in isolation, but an ingredient label or
other disclaimer would dispel any confusion, the crucial issue is
whether the misleading content is ambiguous; if so, context can
cure the ambiguity and defeat the claim, but if not, then context
will not cure the deception and the claim may proceed.

Assuming arguendo that the Court granted judicial notice of Exhibit
A, Defendants point to a disclaimer that appears on most (but not
all) of the Products to argue that the disclaimer resolves any
ambiguity. To begin with, Defendants' argument presumes that the
Products' packaging does not contain affirmative
misrepresentations, and is thus not deceptive. In order for a
disclaimer to be sufficient to defeat Plaintiffs' claims, the Court
must first find that the Products' packaging is ambiguous, instead
of an affirmative misrepresentation. As explained, a reasonable
consumer could find that the Products' packaging is an affirmative
misrepresentation, and not just ambiguous.  And even if a
reasonable consumer determined that the packaging is only
ambiguous, whether the disclaimer is sufficient to resolve any
ambiguity is a question of fact.

Therefore, because a reasonable consumer could find both that the
front packaging contains affirmative misrepresentations, and that
any disclaimer does not resolve ambiguity, Defendants' motion to
dismiss based on this theory is DENIED.

Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to dismiss and motion to stay
discovery are DENIED.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 13, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y34sj6ch from Leagle.com.

Bruch Reed, on behalf of themselves, the general public, and those
similarly situated, Erik Dayton, on behalf of themselves, the
general public, and those similarly situated, Leah Bogert, on
behalf of themselves, the general public, and those similarly
situated, Tiffany Martin, on behalf of themselves, the general
public, and those similarly situated, Heather Carson, on behalf of
themselves, the general public, and those similarly situated, Joel
Hagans, on behalf of themselves, the general public, and those
similarly situated, Florin Carlin, on behalf of themselves, the
general public, and those similarly situated, Max Elliott, on
behalf of themselves, the general public, and those similarly
situated, Lisa Schmid, on behalf of themselves, the general public,
and those similarly situated & June Cole, on behalf of themselves,
the general public, and those similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Marie A. McCrary -- marie@gutridesafier.com --
GUTRIDE SAFIER LLP, pro hac vice, Rajiv V. Thairani --
rajiv@gutridesafier.com -- GUTRIDE SAFIER LLP, pro hac vice, Seth
Safier -- seth@gutridesafier.com -- GUTRIDE SAFIER LLP, pro hac
vice & Stephen M. Raab -- stephen@gutridesafier.com -- GUTRIDE
SAFIER LLP.

General Mills Inc & Small Planet Foods Inc, Defendants, represented
by Charles Christian Sipos   PERKINS COIE,  Lauren Watts Staniar,
PERKINS COIE & Mica D. Klein, PERKINS COIE,1201 Third Avenue, Suite
4800, Seattle, WA, 98101-3266


GL STAFFING: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Barbieri Suit Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
ADRIANA BARBIERI, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. GL STAFFING SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 0:19cv61520 (S.D. Fla., June 18, 2019) seeks to
stop the Defendant's practice of making unsolicited calls.

GL Staffing, Inc. provides employment services. The Company offers
employee screening, safety training, compliance, human resource,
and recruiting services for various sectors. GL Staffing operates
in the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
          Thomas J. Patti, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI
          110 SE 6th Street, Suite 1744
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 907-1136
          Facsimile: (855) 529-9540
          E-mail: jibrael@jibraellaw.com
                  tom@jibraellaw.com


H&R BLOCK: Benson Suit Transferred to Western District of Missouri
------------------------------------------------------------------
The case, PERRY L. BENSON, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. H&R BLOCK, INC., and H&R
BLOCK TAX SERVICES L.L.C., the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01376
(Filed Feb. 25, 2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, to the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Missouri (Kansas City) on June 20,
2019. The Western District of Missouri Court Clerk assigned Case
No. 4:19-cv-00477-HFS to the proceeding. The case is assigned to
the Hon. District Judge Howard F. Sachs.

The case challenges Defendants' anticompetitive No Poach agreements
for corporate and franchise employees in violation of Sections 1
and 3 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. sections 1, 3.

H&R Block, Inc. is an American tax preparation company operating in
North America, Australia, and India. The company was founded in
1955 by brothers Henry W. Bloch and Richard Bloch. As of 2018, H&R
Block operates approximately 12,000 retail tax offices staffed by
tax professionals worldwide.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Lee Albert, Esq.
          GLANCY BINKOW & GOLDBERG, LLP
          122 East 42nd Street, Suite 2920
          New York, NY 10168
          Telephone: (212) 682-5340
          E-mail: lalbert@glancylaw.com

               - and -

          Kasif Khowaja, Esq.
          THE KHOWAJA LAW, LLC
          70 East Lake St., Suite 1220
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 356-3200
          E-mail: kasif@khowajalaw.com

Attorneys for the Defendants:

          David Jason Lender, Esq.
          Eric S. Hochstadt, Esq.
          WEIL GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP
          767 Fifth Avenue
          New York, NY 10153-0119
          Telephone: (212) 833-3012
          E-mail: david.lender@weil.com
                  eric.hochstadt@weil.com

               - and -

          Michael I. Rothstein, Esq.
          Timothy A. Hudson, Esq.
          Uriel B. Abt, Esq.
          TABET DIVITO & ROTHSTEIN, LLC
          The Rookery Building
          209 South LaSalle Street, Seventh Floor
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Telephone: (312) 762-9450
          E-mail: mrothstein@tdrlawfirm.com
                  thudson@tdrlawfirm.com
                  uabt@tdrlawfirm.com

HFF INC: Faces Strenger Class Action over Merger Deal
-----------------------------------------------------
Jones Lang LaSalle Incorporated said in its Form 8-K filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission dated June 20, 2019,
that HFF, Inc. has been named as a defendant in a class action suit
entitled, Stuart Strenger v. HFF, Inc., et al, No. 1:19-cv-05404

On March 18, 2019, Jones Lang LaSalle Incorporated ("JLL") entered
into an Agreement and Plan of Merger (the "Merger Agreement") with
HFF, Inc. ("HFF"), JLL CM, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of JLL
("Merger Sub"), and JLL CMG, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of JLL
("Merger LLC"), pursuant to which, among other things, on the terms
and subject to the conditions set forth therein, Merger Sub will
merge with and into HFF, with HFF surviving the Merger as a wholly
owned subsidiary of JLL (the "Merger").

The Merger Agreement also provides that, immediately following the
effective time of the Merger, HFF, as the surviving corporation in
the Merger, will merge with and into Merger LLC with Merger LLC
surviving the subsequent merger (the "Subsequent Merger", and,
together with the Merger, the "Mergers").

In connection with the Merger, on April 29, 2019, JLL filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") a
registration statement on Form S-4, as amended on May 30, 2019 (the
"Proxy Statement/Prospectus"), containing a proxy statement of HFF
that also constitutes a prospectus of JLL.

A complaint styled as a putative class action captioned Stuart
Strenger v. HFF, Inc., et al, No. 1:19-cv-05404 was filed in the
United States District Court of the Southern District of New York
naming members of the HFF board of directors as defendants.

This complaint alleges that the Proxy Statement/Prospectus
contained materially incomplete and misleading information in
violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"), concerning the
valuation analyses performed by and financial projections utilized
by HFF's financial advisor, Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC ("Morgan
Stanley") and the fees to be paid to Morgan Stanley.

JLL believes that this action is without merit, and that no further
disclosure is required under applicable law.

Nonetheless, to specifically moot the plaintiff's claims, to avoid
the risk of the litigation delaying or adversely affecting the
Mergers and to minimize the expense of defending the Strenger
matter, JLL and HFF are making supplemental disclosures (the
"litigation-related supplemental disclosures") related to the
Mergers, as set forth herein.

A copy of the supplemental disclosure is available at
https://urlzs.com/Hfk4r.

Jones Lang LaSalle Incorporated, a professional services company,
provides commercial real estate and investment management services
worldwide. Jones Lang LaSalle Incorporated was founded in 1997 and
is headquartered in Chicago, Illinois.


HMR FOODS: Court Dismisses G. Cruz's WARN Act Suit
--------------------------------------------------
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware
issued an Opinion granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the
case captioned In re: HMR FOODS HOLDING, LP, et al., Chapter 7,
Debtors. GONZALO CRUZ, et al., on behalf of himself and all other
persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. HMR FOODS HOLDING, LP, et
al., Defendants. Case No. 16-11540 (KJC), (Jointly Administered)
(D. Del.).

Defendants Arlon Group, LLC (Arlon) and Arlon Food and Agriculture
Partners, LP (AFAP) move to dismiss the claims asserted against
them in the Second Amended Class Action Adversary Proceeding
Complaint filed by Gonzalo Cruz and other similarly situated
employees (Plaintiffs).

The Plaintiffs allege that HMR and the Arlon Defendants closed
HMR's facilities without prior notice to employees in violation of
the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act)
and the California WARN Act.

The Arlon Defendants assert that the Second Amended Complaint does
not adequately allege facts to support the theory that they should
be held liable as a single employer with HMR.

The Second Amended Complaint does not contain sufficient facts to
allege a plausible claim for single employer liability.

To assist in a single employer analysis, the Third Circuit adopted
the five-factor balancing test promulgated in a Department of Labor
(DOL) regulation. A court should consider: (1) common ownership (2)
common directors and/or officers (3) a unity of personnel policies
emanating from a common source (4) dependency of operations, and
(5) de facto exercise of control. These factors are not exhaustive
and as with any balancing test, a number of circumstances not
specifically enumerated may be relevant.

The Arlon Defendants do not dispute that the first two factors,
common ownership and common directors and/or officers, are met
here. However, the first two factors alone do not establish that
the related entities acted as a single employer.

Plaintiffs Did Not Plausibly Allege that the Arlon Defendants
Shared a Unity of Personnel Policies with HMR.

In analyzing whether HMR and the Arlon Defendants shared a unity of
personnel policies, the Court considers the following factual
allegations made in the Complaint:

The HMR Directors handpicked and hired HMR's CEO, Lewis McLeod,67
and then replaced McLeod with a new CEO, Joe Rainert, approximately
one month before the mass layoff(s), without first seeking prior
approval from HMR's Board.68 Rainert had a long-standing employment
relationship with Arlon prior to being hired, and viewed Dutton as
his boss.

Arlon and AFAP, through the HMR Directors, controlled and set terms
and conditions of employment and compensation for management
employees of HMR. One such HMR management employee indicated that
he was happy to join the Arlon Team after negotiating his HMR
executive employment terms with one of the HMR Directors. In
describing his employment terms, the same HMR management employee
stated that Arlon had offered him a severance as a quid pro quo for
agreement not to compete against HMR. Another prospective HMR
management employee in 2016 could not be provided her proposed
compensation package until Arlon calculated and approved what it
should be.

Here, the allegations about the Arlon Defendants' hiring, firing
and negotiating terms of employment for HMR's executive management
positions do not demonstrate a unity of personnel policies
regarding HMR's day-to-day operations.

The Second Amended Complaint also contains the following
allegations about personnel practices: "Upon the loss of business
from HMR's primary client, the HMR Directors advised HMR's CEO that
the best path forward was the reduction of personnel. The HMR
Directors instructed HMR's CEO to conduct mass layoffs following
their failure to repair the relationship with HMR's primary
client."

The preceding two allegations, accepted as true for purposes of the
motion to dismiss, concern discrete employment issues in a special,
or even crisis, situation. They do not allege facts concerning
HMR's day-to-day operations.

The unity of personnel policies factor weighs against allowing a
single employer liability claim against the Arlon Defendants.

Plaintiffs Did Not Plausibly Allege that HMR Had a Dependency of
Operations with the Arlon Defendants

The Plaintiffs here allege that the Arlon Defendants' engaged in
weekly, if not daily control of HMR. But the specific activities
described such as advising about regulatory duties, reviewing
financial information on a weekly basis, visiting facilities, and
negotiating executive management compensation) are consistent with
the HMR Directors' duties as board members, and the Arlon
Defendants' ordinary powers of ownership. A dependency of
operations does not arise through supervising the debtor's
activities or placing representatives on the debtor's board of
directors.

Instead, there must be a high degree of integration so that the
debtor relies on the lender or related corporation for the ordinary
operation of its day-to-day business.

Here, there are no allegations that the Arlon Defendants and HMR
shared administrative or purchasing services, interchanged
employees or equipment, or commingled bank accounts or finances.

The Plaintiffs here also allege that HMR was financially dependent
on Arlon because HMR could not continue its operations without
release of the full cash infusion that was approved by Arlon's
investment committee.  There are no allegations of irregularities
regarding Arlon's agreement to provide a cash infusion to HMR.
Arlon's decision not to release all of the funds to HMR does not,
on its own, plausibly allege financial dependency.

The Plaintiffs have not alleged facts that would plausibly support
a claim of dependency of operations between HMR and the Arlon
Defendants. This factor also weighs against single employer
liability.

Plaintiffs Did Not Sufficiently Allege the Arlon Defendants' De
Facto Exercise of Control over HMR.

Here, the Plaintiffs' allegations do not provide enough facts to
support a plausible claim of de facto control. For example, the
Plaintiffs make the following conclusory allegations that the Arlon
Defendants, acting through the HMR Directors, made decisions or
controlled HMR while wearing their Arlon hats and did not act in
the best interests of HMR:

At all relevant times, the HMR Directors composed a controlling
majority of the board of directors of HMR. At all relevant times,
and specifically with regard to the WARN Act violation alleged
herein, the HMR Directors consistently acted in their roles as
principals or officers of Arlon and in the interest of and on
behalf of Arlon, AFAP, and, their parent, Continental Grain
Company, in managing HMR rather than acting through their roles as
directors of HMR and rather than acting in the interests of HMR.  

On or about May 1, 2016, Arlon and AFAP, through the HMR Directors,
instructed Rainert to conduct a mass layoff or shutdown at each of
the Facilities following the HMR Directors' failed attempt to
repair the long-damaged relationship with HMR's primary client.

The presence of the Brooks, Dutton and Weiner on HMR's board of
directors does not, on its own, demonstrate that the Arlon
Defendants exerted de facto control over HMR. Nor can I correlate
the decision to close the Facilities with the Arlon Defendants
simply because of the HMR Directors' board membership. It is
hornbook law that  the exercise of the  control which stock
ownership gives to stockholders  will not create liability beyond
the assets of the subsidiary. That `control  includes the election
of directors, the making of by-laws and the doing of all other acts
incident to the legal status of stockholders.

Conclusion on the Issue of Single Employer Liability under the WARN
Act.

Although there was common ownership and overlap of officers and
directors between HMR and the Arlon Defendants, the Second Amended
Complaint fails to allege specific facts demonstrating the  (i)
unity of personnel policies (ii) dependency of operations and (iii)
de facto control.  

The Court grants the motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint,
with leave to amend. However, the allegations in the Second Amended
Complaint continue to lack sufficient specificity to support a
plausible claim for single employer liability.

The Second Amended Complaint does not contain sufficient facts to
allege a plausible claim for employer liability under the
California WARN Act

The California WARN Act defines employer as follows: "Employer
means any person, who directly or indirectly owns and operates a
covered establishment. A parent corporation is an employer as to
any covered establishment directly owned and operated by its
corporate subsidiary."

The Plaintiffs argue that the Arlon Defendants are liable for HMR's
violations of the California WARN Act because they are HMR's parent
corporations. The Arlon Defendants argue that the California WARN
Act does not impose strict liability upon parent corporations due
to a subsidiary's violation of the Act. The Court concludez that
the Second Amended Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to
allow claims against the Arlon Defendants under the California WARN
Act for two reasons.

The Court notes that the Second Amended Complaint does not allege
that Arlon is a parent corporation of HMR. The term parent
corporation is not defined in the California WARN Act, but it is
generally recognized that parent company is a company that has a
controlling ownership interest in another company. There are no
allegations that Arlon has any ownership interest in HMR.  

Assuming AFAP is a parent corporation for purposes of this motion,
the Court have already determined that the Second Amended Complaint
does not adequately allege facts to show that AFAP ordered the
Facilities' closings. Instead, the Complaint alleges that the HMR
Directors and CEO decided to close the Facilities.

Accordingly, the Arlon Defendants' motion to dismiss the California
WARN Act claims will be granted.

A full-text copy of the Bankruptcy Court's June 13, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y468glnb from Leagle.com.

Gonzalo Cruz, on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Sam Heldman --
sheldman@gmail.com -- The Gardner Firm PC, James E. Huggett --
jhuggett@margolisedelstein.com -- Margolis Edelstein & Mary E.
Olsen -- molsen@thegardnerfirm.com -- The Gardner Firm, P.C.

HMR Foods Holding, LP, Defendant, pro se.

Arlon Group LLC and Arlon Food and Agriculture Partners LP,
Defendant, represented by James P. Gillespie --
james.gillespie@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis LLP & Matthew O.
Talmo -- mtalmo@mnat.com -- Morris, Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP.

Alfred Thomas Giuliano, Trustee, represented by Learon John Bird,
Stoel Rives, LLP, 760 SW Ninth Avenue Suite 3000. Portland, OR
97205, Steven K. Ludwig -- sludwig@foxrothschild.com -- Fox
Rothschild LLP, Jason C. Manfrey -- jmanfrey@foxrothschild.com --
Fox Rothschild LLP, Michael G. Menkowitz --
mmenkowitz@foxrothschild.com -- Fox Rothschild LLP & Seth A.
Niederman -- sniederman@foxrothschild.com -- Fox Rothschild LLP.


HOMEFED CORP: Plaintiff Counsel Agrees to Dismiss Merger Suits
--------------------------------------------------------------
HomeFed Corporation said in its Form 8-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission filed on June 21, 2019, that
counsel for plaintiffs in the Anderson, Wolf, and Francl actions
each agreed that immediately following the issuance of supplemental
information they would, subject to client approval, file
appropriate notices of voluntary dismissal in their respective
actions with prejudice as to plaintiffs' individual claims and
without prejudice to class claims.

On April 12, 2019, HomeFed's Board of Directors (the "Board" or
"Individual Defendants") caused the Company to enter into an
agreement and plan of merger with Jefferies, which was amended on
May 2, 2019 (the "Merger Agreement"). Pursuant to the terms of the
Merger Agreement, Jefferies will issue two shares of Jefferies
common stock for each share of HomeFed common stock to be acquired
by Jefferies. On May 17, 2019, defendants filed a registration
statement (the "Registration Statement") with the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") in connection with
the Proposed Transaction, which scheduled a stockholder vote on the
Proposed Transaction for June 28, 2019.

On June 3, 2019, a putative class action lawsuit, captioned
Anderson v. HomeFed Corp., et al., Case No. 3:19-cv-01040-GPC-BLM,
was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of California in connection with the Merger.

The complaint names the Company and the members of the board of
directors of the Company (the "Board") as defendants.

The complaint generally alleges that the defendants caused the
Company to file a materially incomplete and misleading definitive
proxy statement relating to the Merger in violation of Sections
14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act.

The complaint seeks, among other things, injunctive relief.

On June 4, 2019, a second putative class action lawsuit, captioned
Wolf v. HomeFed Corp., et al., Case No: 1:19-cv-01039-LPS, was
filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware in connection with the Merger.

The complaint names the Company, the members of the Board,
Jefferies, and Merger Sub as defendants. The complaint generally
alleges that the defendants caused the Company to file a materially
incomplete and misleading Amendment No. 1 to Registration Statement
on Form S-4 filed with the SEC on May 17, 2019 relating to the
Merger in violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange
Act.

The complaint seeks, among other things, injunctive relief.

On June 13, 2019, a third putative class action lawsuit, captioned
Francl v. Borden, et al, Case No. 37-2019-00030374-CU-BT-NC, was
filed in connection with the Merger in California Superior Court,
San Diego County.

The complaint names the members of the Board, Jefferies, Merger
Sub, and Does 1 through 25 as defendants.

The complaint generally alleges that the defendants breached their
fiduciary duties in connection with the Merger and caused the
Company to file a materially incomplete and misleading Registration
Statement on Form S-4 filed with the SEC on May 9, 2019 relating to
the Merger in violation of Delaware law.

The complaint seeks, among other things, injunctive relief.

On June 20, 2019, counsel for plaintiffs in the Anderson, Wolf, and
Francl actions each agreed that immediately following the issuance
of the supplemental information set forth in this Form 8-K, they
would, subject to client approval, file appropriate notices of
voluntary dismissal in their respective actions with prejudice as
to plaintiffs' individual claims and without prejudice to class
claims.

HomeFed Corporation, together with its subsidiaries, invests in and
develops residential and commercial real estate properties in
California, Virginia, South Carolina, Florida, Maine, and New York.
HomeFed Corporation was incorporated in 1988 and is headquartered
in Carlsbad, California. HomeFed Corporation operates as a
subsidiary of Jefferies Financial Group Inc.


KEURIG DR. PEPPER: Water Contaminated by Arsenic, Pels Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN PELS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. KEURIG DR. PEPPER. INC., Defendants, Case
No. 4:19-cv-03052-DMR (N.D. Cal., June 3, 2019) seeks restitution
and injunctive relief under the Unfair Competition Law, the False
Advertising Law, and the Consumer Legal Remedies Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant's Penafiel Mineral Spring
Water has been contaminated by toxic levels of arsenic for many
years. The Defendant disregarded the danger, and did not shut down
operations at its Penafiel plant in Mexico, did not undertake
remedial measures until recently, and to this day has failed to
issue a recall. The Defendant has concealed that thousands of its
customers have ingested bottled water which contains unsafe levels
of arsenic, a known poison.

Keurig Dr Pepper Inc. operates as a beverage company in the United
States and internationally. It distributes its products through
retail channels, including supermarkets, fountains, mass
merchandisers, club stores, vending machines, convenience stores,
gas stations, small groceries, drug chains, and dollar stores. The
company was founded in 1981 and is headquartered in Burlington,
Massachusetts. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David N. Lake, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF DAVID N. LAKE
          A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
          16130 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 650
          Encino, CA 91436
          Telephone: (818) 788-5100
          Facsimile: (818) 479-9990
          E-mail: david@lakelawpc.com


KRONOS INC: Tharrington Sues over Unlawful Biometric Data Storage
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Kronos,
Incorporated for alleged violations of the Biometric Information
Privacy Act (BIPA). The case is captioned CHRIS THARRINGTON,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. KRONOS, INCORPORATED, Defendant, Case No. 2019CH07480
(Ill. Cir., Cook Cty., June 21, 2019). Plaintiff Chris alleges that
Kronos is engaged in unlawful collection, use, storage, and
disclosure of his sensitive and proprietary biometric data. In
addition, Plaintiff Tharrington asserts that Kronos failed to
provide a publicly available retention schedule and guidelines for
permanently destroying the biometric identifiers, including
handprint geometry, as required by BIPA.

Kronos is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Kronos is in the business of
providing human resource management software and services, which
are best known for helping hundreds of thousands of businesses
track employee time and process payroll, including within Illinois.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Ryan F. Stephan, Esq.
     James B. Zouras, Esq.
     Andrew C. Ficzko, Esq.
     Haley R. Jenkins, Esq.
     STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP
     100 N. Riverside Plaza Suite 2150
     Chicago, IL 60606
     Telephone: (312) 233-1550
     Facsimile: (312) 233-1560
     E-mail: rstephan@stephanzouras.com
             jzouras@stephanzouras.com
             aficzko@stephanzouras.com
             hjenkins@stephanzouras.com


LATHEM TIME: Removes Bay Suit to Central District of Illinois
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Defendant in the case of BRET BAY, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. LATHEM TIME CO.,
filed a notice to remove the lawsuit from the Circuit Court of the
State of Illinois, County of Montgomery (Case No. 2019L8) to the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois on June
18, 2019. The clerk of court for the Central District of Illinois
assigned Case No. 3:19-cv-03157. The case is assigned to Richard
Mills and referred to Magistrate Tom Schanzle-Haskins.

Lathem Time Corporation designs and develops cloud-based time and
attendance software. Lathem Time Corporation was founded in 1919
and is based in Atlanta, Georgia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Haley R. Jenkins, Esq.
          Ryan F. Stephan, Esq.
          STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP.
          100 N. Riverside Plaza, Suite 2150
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 233-1550
          Facsimile: (312) 233-1560
          E-mail: rstephan@stephanzouras.com
                  hjenkins@stephanzouras.com

               - and -

          Brandon M. Wise, Esq.
          PUFFER WOLF CARR & KANE, APLC
          818 Lafayette Avenue, Floor 2
          St. Louis, MO 63104
          Telephone: (314) 833-4826
          E-mail: bwise@pwcklegal.com


LIBERTY MUTUAL: Court Denies Dismissal Bid in T. Mosley Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas,
Marshall Division, issued an Order denying Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss in the case captioned TYREL MOSLEY, Plaintiff, v. LIBERTY
MUTUAL FIRE INS. CO., Defendant. Case No. 2:18-CV-00269-JRG-RSP.
(E.D. Tex.)

Before the Court is Liberty Mutual's motion to dismiss.

In this action, Defendant Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co.
(Liberty Mutual) moved to dismiss Plaintiff Tyrel Mosley's First
Amended Class Action Complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, arguing that this Court lacked justiciability
regarding standing and ripeness.

Liberty Mutual argues that the Report and Recommendation analyzes
Liberty Mutual's factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction
under the facial attack standard, and thus Magistrate Judge Payne
gave undue credence to Mosley's allegations.  Liberty Mutual
contends that the Report and Recommendation's conclusions are based
solely on Mosley's unsupported allegations.  

When a factual attack is made, the plaintiff, as the party seeking
to invoke jurisdiction must submit facts through some evidentiary
method and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the trial
court does have subject matter jurisdiction.

In analyzing this case, Magistrate Judge Payne made the correct
observation that this lawsuit is not a question of whether
underinsured motorist coverage is in place if Liberty Mutual's
rejection form is invalid. If the form is invalid, coverage is
automatically in place. Liberty Mutual appears to argue that even
if coverage is in place, Mosley's damages for alleged past injuries
do not exceed the alleged underinsured motorist's insurance policy
limit because Mosley only incurred $515 in medical expenses so far.
Thus, according to Liberty Mutual, Mosley has not suffered an
injury-in-fact and therefore lack standing.

Liberty Mutual simply points to the fact that Mosley has returned
to work and only incurred $515 in medical. As Magistrate Judge
Payne specifically noted, Liberty Mutual points to medical bills
that Mosley has produced so far without accounting for other bills
Mosley may produce and ignores Mosley's other alleged expenses
physical therapy, counseling, and lost wages.

Indeed, in its motion, Liberty Mutual expressly acknowledge that it
has not been provided, as of the date of [the] Motion, any billing
records for Plaintiff's physical therapy sessions between May 24
and June 25, 2018. Mosley attached a declaration to his response
detailing his lost earnings as $3,030.55 and charges for physical
therapy as exceeding $11,000.  Mosley also noted that he received
treatment at Longview Occupational Medicine Clinic and saw a
counselor. In weighing the evidence, the Court finds that Liberty
Mutual's evidence is insufficient to show that Mosley lacks
standing and that Mosley's complaint and declaration show that he
has suffered an injury-in-fact.

In the same vein, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Payne's
conclusions regarding Liberty Mutual's ripeness and disclaimer
arguments these arguments are unavailing and do not comport with
established Texas law.

Liberty Mutual's motion to dismiss is therefore denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 13, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2nwg5du from Leagle.com.

Tyrel Mosley, Plaintiff, represented by James Andrew Holmes, The
Law Office of James Holmes, PC, 212 South Marshall, Henderson,
Texas 75654

Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., Defendant, represented by David T.
Moran -- dmoran@jw.com -- Jackson Walker LLP, Christopher Andrew
Thompson -- cthompson@jw.com -- Jackson Walker LLP & David Folsom
-- dfolsom@jw.com -- Jackson Walker LLP.


LYFT INC: Pension Fund Sues over Drop in Share Price
----------------------------------------------------
GREATER PENNSYLVANIA CARPENTERS' PENSION FUND, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. LYFT, INC.;
LOGAN GREEN; JOHN ZIMMER; BRIAN ROBERTS; PRASHANT (SEAN) AGGARWAL;
BEN HOROWITZ; VALERIE JARRETT; DAVID LAWEE; HIROSHI MIKIT ANI; ANN
MIURA-KO; MARY AGNES (MAGGIE) WILDEROTTER; J.P, MORGAN SECURITIES
LLC; CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (USA) LLC; JEFFERIES LLC; UBS
SECURITIES LLC; STIFEL, NICOLAUS & COMPANY, INCORPORATED; RBC
CAPITAL MARKETS, LLC; KEYBANC CAPITAL MARKETS INC.; COWEN AND
COMPANY, LLC; RAYMOND JAMES & ASSOCIATES, INC.; CANACCORD GENUITY
LLC; EVERCORE GROUP L.L.C.; PIPER JAFFRAY & CO.; JMP SECURITIES
LLC; WELLS FARGO SECURITIES, LLC; KKR CAPITAL MARKETS LLC; ACADEMY
SECURITIES, INC.; BLAYLOCK VAN. LLC, Defendants, Case No.
CGC-19-576502 (Cal. Super., San Francisco Cty., June 6, 2019)
alleges violation of the Securities Act of 1933.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the Registration
Statement and the Prospectus, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on March 29, 2019, contained materially
incorrect or misleading statements or omitted material information
that was required by law to be disclosed.

According to the Registration Statement and the Prospectus, Lyft
estimated that its ridesharing marketplace is available to over 95%
of the U.S. population, as well as in select cities in Canada. Lyft
also asserted that its U.S. ridesharing market share was 39% in
December 2018, up from 22% in December 2016.

The Registration Statement and the Prospectus failed to disclose
that: (i) 3,000 of the bicycles in the Lyft's rideshare program
suffered from safety issues that would lead to their recall; and
(ii) Lyft's claimed ridesharing market position was overstated.

In the wake of the IPO, the Company's share have sharply fallen
below the IPO price.

Lyft, Inc. provides online ridesharing services. The Company offers
ride booking, payment processing, and car transportation services.
Lyft serves customers in the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James I. Jaconette, Esq.
          655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 231-1058
          Facsimile: (619) 231-7423
          E-mail: jamesj@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          Christopher J. Keller, Esq.
          Eric J. Belfi, Esq.
          Francis P. McConville, Esq.
          Alfred L. Fatalle III, Esq.
          LABATON SUCHAROW LLP
          140 Broadway
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 907-0700
          Facsimile: (212)818-0477
          E-mail: ckeller@labaton.com
                  ebelfi@labaton.com
                  fmcconville@labaton.com
                  afatale@labaton.com


MDL 2724: Generic Drug Pricing Litig. vs. Taro Ongoing
------------------------------------------------------
Taro Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. said in its Form 20-F report
filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on June 20,
2019, for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2019, that the company
and Taro U.S.A. continue to defend a class action suit entitled, In
re: Generic Drug Pricing Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 2724.

The Company and Taro U.S.A. have been named as defendants in
numerous putative class action lawsuits and additional lawsuits
brought by purchasers and payors of several generic pharmaceutical
products, including Clobetasol, Clomipramine, Desonide, Econazole,
and Fluocinonide.  

The lawsuits allege that the Company and/or Taro U.S.A. have
conspired with competitors to fix prices, rig bids, or allocate
customers as to these products, and also allege an industry-wide
conspiracy as to all generic pharmaceutical products.  

Each of these cases has been transferred to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for
coordinated proceedings under the caption In re: Generic Drug
Pricing Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 2724.  

The Court has sequenced the lawsuits into separate groups for
purposes of briefing motions to dismiss. Defendants filed motions
to dismiss complaints in the first group.

On October 16, 2018, the Court denied the motions with respect to
the federal law claims.

On February 15, 2019, the Court granted in part and denied in part
the motions with respect to the state law claims.

Taro Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., a science-based pharmaceutical
company, engages in the development, manufacture, and marketing of
pharmaceutical products in the United States, Canada, Israel, and
internationally. The company was founded in 1959 and is based in
Haifa Bay, Israel. Taro Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. is a
subsidiary of Alkaloida Chemical Company Zrt.


MDL 2741: Chasco v. Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
------------------------------------------------------------
ERIC M. CHASCO and KRISTINA CHASCO, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, the Defendant, was transferred
from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri,
Case No. 4:19-cv-00688 (Filed March 28, 2019) to the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California (San Francisco) on
June 20, 2019. The Northern District of California Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 3:19-cv-03513-VC to the proceeding.

The suit seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, as a
direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Eric M.
Chasco's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.

The Chasco Case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. The
Plaintiffs allege that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. The Plaintiff also alleges that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MDL 2741: Courtier v. Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
--------------------------------------------------------------
CARY J. COURTIER and DERORAH L. COURTIER, the Plaintiffs, v.
MONSANTO COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, the Defendant, was
transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Missouri, Case No. 4:19-cv-00689 (Filed March 28, 2019) to the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (San
Francisco) on June 20, 2019. The Northern District of California
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:19-cv-03514-VC to the proceeding.

The suit seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, as a
direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Cary J.
Courtier's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.

The Courtier Case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re:
Roundup Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order
of the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on
October 3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions
arising out of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide,
particularly its active ingredient, glyphosate, causes
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. The Plaintiffs allege that they or their
decedents developed non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over
the course of several or more years. The Plaintiff also alleges
that the use of glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients,
in particular the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA),
renders Roundup even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues
concerning general causation, the background science, and
regulatory history will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MDL 2741: Drexler v. Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
-------------------------------------------------------------
LILLIAN DREXLER, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, a Delaware
Corporation, the Defendant, was transferred from the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Case No. 4:19-cv-00691
(Filed March 28, 2019) to the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California (San Francisco) on June 20, 2019. The
Northern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:19-cv-03515-VC to the proceeding.

The suit seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a
direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.

The Drexler Case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. The
Plaintiffs allege that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. The Plaintiff also alleges that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MDL 2741: Feehan v. Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
------------------------------------------------------------
THOMAS E. FEEHAN and VICKI FEEHAN, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, the Defendant, was transferred
from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri,
Case No. 4:19-cv-00692 (Filed March 28, 2019) to the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California (San Francisco) on
June 20, 2019. The Northern District of California Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 3:19-cv-03516-VC to the proceeding.

The suit seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, as a
direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Thomas E.
Feehan's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.

The Feehan Case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. The
Plaintiffs allege that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. The Plaintiff also alleges that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MDL 2741: Gibson v. Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
------------------------------------------------------------
ROSEMARLYN GIBSON and ALVIN GIBSON, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, the Defendant, was transferred
from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri,
Case No. 4702:19-cv-00 (Filed March 28, 2019) to the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California (San Francisco) on
June 20, 2019. The Northern District of California Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 3:19-cv-03517-VC to the proceeding.

The suit seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, as a
direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Rosemarlyn
Gibson's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.

The Gibson Case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. The
Plaintiffs allege that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. The Plaintiff also alleges that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MEDTRONIC PLC: Class Suit Against Sprint Fidelis Concluded
----------------------------------------------------------
Medtronic plc said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on June 21, 2019, for the fiscal
year ended March 31, 2019, that the Sprint Fidelis related class
action suit in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Canada has
been concluded.

In 2007, a putative class action was filed in the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice in Canada seeking damages for personal injuries
allegedly related to the Company's Sprint Fidelis family of
defibrillation leads.

On October 20, 2009, the court certified a class proceeding but
denied class certification on plaintiffs' claim for punitive
damages.

The Company has recognized an expense for probable and estimable
damages related to this matter, and during the fourth quarter of
fiscal year 2019 the Company paid out previously accrued settlement
amounts with no admission of liability, bringing this matter to a
conclusion.

Medtronic plc develops, manufactures, distributes, and sells
device-based medical therapies to hospitals, physicians,
clinicians, and patients worldwide. It operates through four
segments: Cardiac and Vascular Group, Minimally Invasive Therapies
Group, Restorative Therapies Group, and Diabetes Group. The company
was founded in 1949 and is headquartered in Dublin, Ireland.


MEDTRONIC PLC: St. Paul Teachers' Retirement Fund Suit Concluded
----------------------------------------------------------------
Medtronic plc said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on June 21, 2019, for the fiscal
year ended March 31, 2019, that the class action suit initiated by
St. Paul Teachers' Retirement Fund Association has been concluded

On January 22, 2016, the St. Paul Teachers' Retirement Fund
Association filed a putative class action complaint (the
"Complaint") in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York against HeartWare on behalf of all persons and
entities who purchased or otherwise acquired shares of HeartWare
from June 10, 2014 through January 11, 2016 (the "Class Period").

The Complaint was amended on June 29, 2016 and claims HeartWare and
one of its executives violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by making false and misleading
statements about, among other things, HeartWare's response to a
June 2014 U.S. FDA warning letter, the development of the
Miniaturized Ventricular Assist Device (MVAD) System and the
proposed acquisition of Valtech Cardio Ltd.

The Complaint seeks to recover damages on behalf of all purchasers
or acquirers of HeartWare's stock during the Class Period.

In August of 2016, the Company acquired HeartWare.

In October of 2018, the parties reached an agreement to settle this
matter, and in January 2019, the settlement amount was deposited
into a qualified settlement fund to be distributed following final
court approval.

In the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2019, the court approved the
settlement, bringing this matter to a conclusion.

Medtronic plc develops, manufactures, distributes, and sells
device-based medical therapies to hospitals, physicians,
clinicians, and patients worldwide. It operates through four
segments: Cardiac and Vascular Group, Minimally Invasive Therapies
Group, Restorative Therapies Group, and Diabetes Group. The company
was founded in 1949 and is headquartered in Dublin, Ireland.


METRO ONE LOSS: Underpays Security Guards, Nevarez Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------
JOSE NEVAREZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. METRO ONE LOSS PREVENTION SERVICES GROUP
(WEST COAST), INC.; and DOES 1 THROUGH 10, INCLUSIVE, Defendants,
Case No. CGC-19-576474 (Cal. Super., San Francisco Cty., June 5,
2019) is an action against the Defendants for failure to pay
minimum wages, overtime compensation, authorize and permit meal and
rest periods, provide accurate wage statements, and reimburse
necessary business expenses.

Mr. Nevarez was employed by the Defendants as security guard.

Metro One Loss Prevention Services Group, Inc. provides loss
prevention services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kevin F. Woodall, Esq.
          WOODALL LAW OFFICES
          100 Pine Street, Suite 1250
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 413-4629
          Facsimile: (866) 937-4109
          E-mail: kevin@woodalllaw.com


MG ELECTRIC: Underpays Electrical Journeymans, Seijas Alleges
-------------------------------------------------------------
ANDY SEIJAS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MG ELECTRIC, INC.; and DOES 1 through 20,
Defendants, Case No. 19STCV20903 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty.,
June 17, 2019) is an action against the Defendants for unpaid
regular hours, overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for missed meal
and rest periods.

Mr. Seijas was employed by the Defendants as electrical
journeyman.

MG Electric, Inc. provides electric work and services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Sahag Majarian II, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF SAHAG MAJARIAN II
          18250 Ventura Boulevard
          Tarzana, CA 91356
          Telephone: (818) 609-0807
          Facsimile: (818) 609-0892
          E-mail: sahagii@aol.com

               - and -

          Ruben Limonjyan, Esq.
          LIMONJYAN LAW GROUP, APC
          263 West Olive Avenue
          Burbank, CA 91502
          Telephone: (213) 277-7444
          Facsimile: (213) 270-9374
          E-mail: rlimonjyan@lawgroupla.com


MICHAEL W FRERICHS: Renewed Bid for Class Certification Granted
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit Anthony D. Kolton, et al., the
Plaintiffs, v. Michael W. Frerichs, the Defendant, Case No.
1:16-cv-03792 (N.D. Ill.), the Hon. Judge Charles P. Kocoras
entered an order granting Plaintiffs' renewed motion for class
certification.

According to the docket made by the Clerk on June 20, 2019, status
hearing is set for July 9, 2019 at 9:30 a.m.[CC]

MICRON TECHNOLOGY: Faces Manning Class Action over Bonuses
----------------------------------------------------------
Micron Technology, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on June 26, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended May 30, 2019, that  the company has been
named as a defendant in a putative class action suit initiated by
Chris Manning.

On June 13, 2019, current Micron employee Chris Manning filed a
putative class action lawsuit on behalf of Micron employees subject
to the Idaho Claim Act who earned a performance-based bonus after
the conclusion of fiscal year 2018 whose performance rating was
calculated based upon a mandatory percentage distribution range of
performance ratings.

On behalf of himself and the putative class, Manning asserts claims
for violation of the Idaho Wage Claim Act, breach of contract,
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud.

Micron Technology, Inc., through its subsidiaries, manufactures and
markets dynamic random access memory chips (DRAMs), static random
access memory chips (SRAMs), flash memory, semiconductor
components, and memory modules. The company is based in Boise,
Idaho.


MICRON TECHNOLOGY: New York Class Actions Consolidated
-------------------------------------------------------
Micron Technology, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on June 26, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended May 30, 2019, that the three class action
suits filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York have been consolidated and a consolidated amended
complaint has been filed.  

On January 23, 2019, a complaint was filed against Micron and two
of its officers, Sanjay Mehrotra and David Zinsner, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York.

The lawsuit purports to be brought on behalf of a class of
purchasers of our stock during the period from June 22, 2018
through November 19, 2018.

Subsequently two substantially similar cases were filed in the same
court adding one of the company's former officers, Ernie Maddock,
as a defendant and alleging a class action period from September
26, 2017 through November 19, 2018.

The separate cases were joined, and a consolidated amended
complaint was filed on June 15, 2019.

The consolidated amended complaint alleges that defendants
committed securities fraud through misrepresentations and omissions
about purported anticompetitive behavior in the DRAM industry and
seek compensatory and punitive damages, fees, interest, costs, and
other appropriate relief.

Micron Technology, Inc., through its subsidiaries, manufactures and
markets dynamic random access memory chips (DRAMs), static random
access memory chips (SRAMs), flash memory, semiconductor
components, and memory modules. The company is based in Boise,
Idaho.


MONSANTO COMPANY: Benzels Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
------------------------------------------------------------
THOMAS JAY BENZEL and TRACY ANN BENZEL, husband and wife and their
marital community, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the
Defendants, Case No.3:19-cv-03462-VC (E.D. Wash., May 22, 2019),
seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, as a direct
and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful
conduct in connection with the design, development, manufacture,
testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Thomas Jay
Benzel's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Corrie J. Yackulic, Esq.
          CORRIE YACKULIC LAW FIRM PLLC
          110 Prefontaine Place South, Suite 304
          Seattle, WA 98104
          Telephone: 206.787.1915
          Facsimile. 206.299.9725
          E-mail: Corrie@cjylaw.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Buchert Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-------------------------------------------------------------
KENNETH BUCHERT, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant,
Case No. 3:19-cv-03560-VC (E.D. Mo., May 29, 2019), seeks to
recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and
proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct
in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Fehling Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-------------------------------------------------------------
JAMES FEHLING, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant,
Case No. 4:19-cv-01762 (E.D. Mo., June 20, 2019), seeks to recover
damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result
of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection
with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging,
promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or
sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active
ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph R. Riegerix, Esq.
          ANDRUS WAGSTAFF, P.C.
          7171 W. Alaska Dr, Lakewood, CO 80226
          Telephone: 720-208-9404
          Facsimile: 303-376-6361
          E-mail: joseph.riegerix@andruswagstaff.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Frantz Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
------------------------------------------------------------
JONI M. FRANTZ, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant,
Case No. 2:19-cv-11289 (E.D. La., June 20, 2019), seeks to recover
damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result
of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection
with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging,
promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or
sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active
ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Betsy J. Barnes, Esq.
          Richard L. Root, Esq.
          MORRIS BART LLC
          601 Poydras Street, 24 th Floor
          New Orleans LA 70130
          Telephone: (504) 525-8000
          Facsimile: (833) 277-4214
          E-mail: bbarnes@morrisbart.com
                  rroot@morrisbart.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: James Shelton Sues over Sale of Roundup
---------------------------------------------------------
JAMES SHELTON and JEANETTE SHELTON, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO
COMPANY, the Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-03559-VC (E.D. Mo., May
29, 2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, as
a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. James
Shelton's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Kilburns Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-------------------------------------------------------------
LEON KILBURN and DOROTHY KILBURN,, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO
COMPANY, the Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-03561-VC (E.D. Mo., May
29, 2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, as
a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Leon
Kilburn's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Lane Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
----------------------------------------------------------
MIRACLE C. LANE, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant,
Case No. 3:19-cv-00404-JWD-EWD (M.D. La., Jun 19, 2019), seeks to
recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and
proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct
in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Betsy Barnes, Esq.
          Richard L. Root, Esq.
          MORRIS BART LLC
          601 Poydras Street, 24 th Floor
          New Orleans LA 70130
          Telephone: (504) 525-8000
          Facsimile: (833) 277-4214
          E-mail: bbarnes@morrisbart.com
                  rroot@morrisbart.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Lisa Shelton Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
------------------------------------------------------------------
LISA SHELTON and KENNETH SHELTON, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO
COMPANY, the Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-03562-VC (E.D. Mo., May
29, 2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, as
a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Lisa
Shelton's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Moodys Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-----------------------------------------------------------
DONALD MOODY and REBECCA MOODY, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO
COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00496 (W.D. Mich., June
20, 2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, as
a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Donald
Moody's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Adam J. Brody, Esq.
          Brion B. Doyle, Esq.
          Seth B. Arthur, Esq.
          VARNUM LLP
          Bridgewater Place, P.O. Box 352
          Grand Rapids, MI 49501-0352
          Telephone: (616) 336-6000
          E-mail: ajbrody@varnumlaw.com
                  bbdoyle@varnumlaw.com
                  sbarthur@varnumlaw.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Novaks Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-----------------------------------------------------------
JOANN NOVAK and JOHN NOVAK,, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO COMPANY,
the Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-03565-VC (E.D. Mo., May 29, 2019),
seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, as a direct
and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful
conduct in connection with the design, development, manufacture,
testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Joann Novak's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Rosenberg Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
---------------------------------------------------------------
ELLEN R. ROSENBERG, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00612 (M.D. La., Jun 19, 2019), seeks
to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and
proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct
in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lynne M. Holtkamp, Esq.
          HOLTKAMP LAW FIRM, PLLC
          Post Office Box 1029
          127 West King Street
          Hillsborough, NC 27278
          Telephone: (919) 960-6840

               - and -

          Paul D. Rheingold, Esq.
          RHEINGOLD GIUFFRA
          RUFFO & PLOTKIN LLP
          551 Fifth Avenue, 29 th Floor
          New York, NY 10176
          Telephone: (212) 684-1880

MOSAIC BAYBROOK: Tex. App. Flips Appeal Denial in P. Simien Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Texas, First District, Houston, issued an
Opinion reconsidering En Banc Reconsideration denying Permission to
Appeal in the case captioned MOSAIC BAYBROOK ONE, L.P. AND MOSAIC
BAYBROOK TWO, L.P., Appellants, v. PAUL SIMIEN, Appellee. No.
01-18-00995-CV. (Tex. App.).

Mosaic filed a motion for en banc reconsideration of this Court's
denial of permission to appeal.

Appellee Paul Simien is the representative plaintiff in a class
action brought by apartment tenants against appellant apartment
building owners, Mosaic Baybrook One, L.P. and Mosaic Baybrook Two,
L.P. (Mosaic), seeking damages for Mosaic's collection of a
surcharge on the tenants' water bills.

By a per curiam memorandum opinion issued, a panel of this Court
denied, without explanation, Mosaic's petition for permission to
appeal the controlling question of law in the trial court's summary
judgment in favor of Simien the proper construction of the
applicable sections of the Water Code on which Mosaic's liability
to the class depends.  

To be entitled to a permissive appeal from an interlocutory order
that would not otherwise be appealable, the requesting party must
establish that (1) the order to be appealed involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for
difference of opinion and (2) an immediate appeal from the order
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

Here, the petition for permissive appeal satisfies both
requirements of Rule of Appellate Procedure 28.3(e)(4). The
question of law certified to this Court by the trial court is the
proper construction of the sections of the Water Code upon which
Mosaic's liability to the class depends; and it makes no sense to
hear the companion interlocutory appeal of class certification
without determining whether the class is viable.

In its first issue seeking en banc reconsideration, Mosaic argues
that in Sabre Travel Int'l, Ltd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 567
S.W.3d 725 (Tex. 2019), the Texas Supreme Court urged lower courts
to grant permissive appeals in light of the legislative policies
behind Section 51.014(d), and Mosaic argues that this case furthers
those policies and that denial of permissive appeal undermines the
purpose of the statute authorizing such appeals.

The Court agrees.

Sabre Travel is strikingly similar to this case. In Sabre Travel,
Deutsche Lufthansa brought a declaratory judgment action against
Sabre Travel, a ticket seller and intermediary in the travel
industry. Sabre Travel connects airlines with consumers by
aggregating travel offerings of multiple airlines by use of a
computerized system known as a Global Distribution System (GDS) to
enable comparison shopping by travel agents.   

Lufthansa sought a declaration that its surcharge on certain
tickets did not violate its contract with Sabre Travel, as Sabre
had alleged, and it also sued Sabre Travel for breach of contract.

Sabre Travel countered with its own breach of contract claim, which
Lufthansa, in turn, countered with a tortious interference claim
based on its allegation that Sabre Travel was inducing travel
agents to breach their contracts with Lufthansa.

Sabre Travel moved to dismiss Lufthansa's tortious interference
claim against it on the ground that it was preempted by the Airline
Deregulation Act, which preempts state laws that relate to the
airline's prices, routes, or services. The trial court denied Sabre
Travel's motion to dismiss, but it certified the legal question
under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(d)
providing for permissive interlocutory appeals. As here, the court
of appeals denied the permissive appeal in a one-sentence
memorandum opinion without explanation, noting in a footnote only
that courts strictly construe the interlocutory appeals statute.

Sabre Travel petitioned the Texas Supreme Court for review.

The supreme court stated that there are cases where the issue is so
important that an answer should not wait until the case concludes.
The court acknowledged that Texas courts of appeals have discretion
to accept or deny permissive interlocutory appeals certified under
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(d), just as
federal circuit courts do.  The court then stated, The pure legal
question at issue here is precisely the sort of question section
51.014(d) was enacted for allowing an early resolution when the
interlocutory order meets the Legislature's threshold for an
exception to the final judgment rule. Aptly here, the supreme court
likened the proper use of permissive appeals to decide a
controlling question of law to the proper use of an appeal from a
trial court's interlocutory order that certifies or refuses to
certify a class in a suit brought under Rule 42 of the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure.

Mosaic's petition for permissive appeal is analogous to that in
Sabre Travel.

The Court would find that, here, denial of permission of appeal the
controlling question of law upon which the viability of the class
action depends contravenes the very purpose of Rule 28.3, providing
for permissive appeals and is an abuse of discretion. Accordingly,
the Court would sustain Mosaic's first issue and would grant
permission to appeal.

Second Issue: Efficiency and Jurisdictional Requirements

Mosaic also argues that en banc reconsideration is necessary
because it could render moot the companion appeal of the class
certification order and any potential remand, as well as an appeal
of a final judgment; and the panel opinion incorrectly denied the
application for permissive appeal since all of the jurisdictional
requirements under Section 51.014(d) were met, as a matter of law.
The Court agrees.

The Court would hold that Mosaic has met all of the requirements
for permissive appeal of the controlling issue of law described by
the trial court in its order granting permission for interlocutory
appeal under Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 52.014(d).
Accordingly, denial of permissive appeal is made without reference
to any guiding rules and principles and is an abuse of discretion.


By denying en banc reconsideration of the panel opinion denying the
permissive appeal sought in this case, this Court contravenes (1)
the instruction of Sabre Travel regarding accepting permissive
appeals (2) the purpose of section 51.014(d), providing for
permissive appeals of cases presenting a controlling question of
law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion, as acknowledged by the sponsor of the bill enacting
section 51.014(d) and (3) the objective of the rules of civil
procedure. The "extraordinary circumstances" of this case clearly
satisfy the criteria of en banc reconsideration under Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 42.1.

The Court would grant Mosaic Baybrook One, L.P. and Mosaic Baybrook
Two, L.P.'s motion for en banc reconsideration of this Court's
February 19, 2019 per curiam memorandum opinion, and the Court
would grant the petition for permissive appeal.

A full-text copy of the Tex. App.'s June 13, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2o458kq from Leagle.com.

Dylan Benjamen Russell, 5051 Westheimer Rd Ste 1200, Galleria Tower
II, Houston, TX 77056-5839 for Mosaic Baybrook One, L.P. and Mosaic
Baybrook Two, L.P., Appellant.

Britton D. Monts PO Box 164287, Austin, TX 78716-4287, Ronald
Martin Weber, Jr. -- mweber@crowleynorman.com -- Richard E. Norman
-- rnorman@crowleynorman.com -- Martin Samuel Schexnayder --
schexnayder@wssllp.com -- Alexander Price, Jason Snell --
jsnell@snellfirm.com -- Russell S. Post, 1221 McKinney Street,
Suite 4500, Houston, Texas 77010 for Paul Simien, Appellee.

Dylan Benjamen Russell, Martin Samuel Schexnayder, Alexander Price,
for Mosaic Residential Inc., Appellant.


NATIONAL CREDIT CARE CORP: Cumming Sues over Autodialed Phone Calls
-------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against National Credit
Care Corporation for alleged violations of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act (TCPA). The case is captioned MICHAEL CUMMINGS
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL CREDIT CARE CORPORATION, a Colorado
corporation, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-11818-LVP-RSW (E.D. Mich.,
June 19, 2019). Plaintiff Michael Cummings alleges that National
Credit Care Corporation has violated TCPA by placing autodialed
phone calls to consumers without consent, including unsolicited
phone calls to phone numbers registered on the National Do Not Call
registry. Accordingly, Plaintiff Cummings seeks injunctive relief
for Defendant's conduct as well as an award of statutory damages to
the members of the class and costs.

National Credit Care Corporation is a Colorado corporation
headquartered in Westminster, Colorado. The company provides credit
repair and restoration services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Stefan Coleman, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF STEFAN COLEMAN, P.A.
     201 S. Biscayne Blvd, 28th Floor
     Miami, FL 33131
     Telephone: (877) 333-9427
     Facsimile: (888) 498-8946
     E-mail: law@stefancoleman.com

             - and -

     Avi R. Kaufman, Esq.
     KAUFMAN P.A.
     400 NW 26th Street
     Miami, FL 33127
     Telephone: (305) 469-5881
     E-mail: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com

             - and -

     George T. Blackmore, Esq.
     BLACKMORE LAW PC
     21411 Civic Center Drive, Suite 200
     Southfield, MI 48076
     Telephone: (248) 845-8594
     Facsimile: (855) 744-4419
     E-Mail:george@blackmorelawplc.com


NESTLE USA: Duncan-Watts Seeks OT Pay for Production Workers
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Nestle USA, Inc.
and Nestle Prepared Foods Company for alleged violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards
Act. The case is captioned ARNETTA DUNCAN-WATTS, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, vs. NESTLE
USA, INC. and NESTLE PREPARED FOODS COMPANY, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-01437 (N.D. Ohio, June 21, 2019). Plaintiff was employed by
Defendants for approximately 18 years in their manufacturing
facility in Solon, Ohio, as a production employee, until her
separation in 2018. As full-time employees, Plaintiff and other
similarly situated employees regularly worked over 40 hours in a
workweek in the three years preceding the filing of this class
action, including the time for donning and doffing of their
sanitary clothing, and personal protective equipment. As a result
of Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees not being paid
for all ours worked, Plaintiff and other similarly situated
employees were not paid overtime compensation for all of the hours
they worked in excess of 40 each workweek.

Nestle USA, Inc. is a for-profit Delaware corporation that is
registered as a foreign corporation in Ohio. Nestle Prepared Foods
Company is a for-profit Pennsylvania corporation that is registered
as a foreign corporation in Ohio. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeffrey J. Moyle, Esq.
     Christopher J. Lalak, Esq.
     NILGES DRAHER LLC
     614 West Superior Avenue, Suite 1148
     Cleveland, OH 44113
     Telephone: (216) 230-2955
     Facsimile: (330) 754-1430
     E-mail: jmoyle@ohlaborlaw.com
             clalak@ohlaborlaw.com
          
             - and -

     Shannon M. Draher, Esq.
     Hans A. Nilges, Esq.
     NILGES DRAHER LLC
     7266 Portage St., N.W., Suite D
     Massillon, OH 44646
     Telephone: (330) 470-4428
     Facsimile: (330) 754-1430
     E-mail: sdraher@ohlaborlaw.com
             hans@ohlaborlaw.com


NEXMO INC: Removes Giannini Suit to N.D. California
---------------------------------------------------
The Defendant in the case of ERIC GIANNINI, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. NEXMO INC.;
and VONAGE HOLDINGS CORP., Defendants, filed a notice to remove the
lawsuit from the Superior Court of the State of California, County
of San Francisco (Case No. CGC-19-574951) to the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California on June 5, 2019. The
clerk of court for the Northern District of California assigned
Case No. 3:19-cv-03127-EMC. The case is assigned to Judge Judge
Edward M. Chen.

Nexmo Inc develops and publishes a cloud-based short message
service (SMS) application process instruction (API). The Company
offers an SMS API that anables users to send and receive high
volumes of messages at wholesale prices without any intermediation
to reach the final carrier. Nexmo markets its products and services
worldwide. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin Lo, Esq.
          WORK LAWYERS PC
          22939 Hawthorne Blvd. Suite 202
          Torrance, CA 90505
          Telephone: 424-355-8335
          E-mail: justin@worklawyers.com
                  kyle@worklawyers.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Britney N. Torres, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          1255 Treat Boulevard, Suite 600
          Walnut Creek, CA 94597
          Telephone: (925) 932-2468
          Facsimile: (925) 946-9809
          E-mail: btorres@littler.com

               - and -

          Kai-Ching Cha, Esq.
          Cheryl A Kinoshita, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          333 Bush Street, 34th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 433-1940
          Facsimile: (415) 399-8490
          E-mail: kcha@littler.com
                  ckinoshita@littler.com


NOMURA HOLDINGS: Units Still Face Antitrust Class Suits in N.Y.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Nomura Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 20-F report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on June 25, 2019, for the
fiscal year ended April 30, 2019, that the company's subsidiary
Nomura International plc ("NIP") and other entities in the Nomura
Group are defending themselves against several class action suits
in New York related to alleged antitrust law breaches.

Various authorities continue to conduct investigations concerning
the activities of Nomura International plc (NIP), other entities in
the Nomura Group and other parties in respect of government,
supranational, sub-sovereign and agency debt securities trading.

These investigations relate to various matters including certain
activities of NIP in Europe for which NIP and the Company have
received a Statement of Objections from the European Commission
("Commission") which reflects the Commission's initial views around
certain historical conduct.

NIP and another entity in the Nomura Group are also defendants to
class action complaints filed in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York alleging violations of U.S.
antitrust law.

The class actions cover the same subject matter and relate to the
alleged manipulation of the secondary trading market for
supranational, sub-sovereign and agency bonds.

The Company, NIP and Nomura Securities International, Inc. (NSI)
have been served with a similar class action complaint filed in the
Toronto Registry Office of the Federal Court of Canada alleging
violations of Canadian competition law.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Nomura Holdings, Inc. provides various financial services to
individuals, corporations, financial institutions, governments, and
governmental agencies worldwide. It operates through three
segments: Retail, Asset Management, and Wholesale. The company was
formerly known as The Nomura Securities Co., Ltd. and changed its
name to Nomura Holdings, Inc. in October 2001. Nomura Holdings,
Inc. was founded in 1925 and is headquartered in Tokyo, Japan.


NORTHROP GRUMMAN: Court Denies Dismissal Bid in Romano Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York issued a Memorandum and Order denying Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss in the case captioned ROSALIE ROMANO, PATRICIA GLUECKERT,
Individually and on behalf of the Estate of WILLIAM P. GLUECKERT,
WILLIAM P. GLUECKERT, FRANCISCO PASTOLERO and MARIA SPICER, JAYNE
MANN, DENISE FLORIO, ROSS MEADOW and ARLENE MEADOW, JACOB KHOLODNY
and BELLA KHOLODNY, FLO RAUCCI, individually and on behalf of the
Estate of SALVATORE RAUCCI, DANIEL GALLANTE and JENNIFER GALLANTE,
and TERESA MEADE, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, and MARYANN HERBERT, CHRISTINA ANDREWS-SALES,
CHRISTOPHER CAGNA, JACKIE LIEBERMAN, CATHERINE LEWONKA, EUGENE
CONNOLLY; VIVIIANE BLICKENDERFER, DANA BLICKENSDERFER, GLENN FALINO
and MARCIA FALINO, and MICHAEL FALINO, individually, Plaintiffs, v.
NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORPORATION, NORTHROP GRUMMAN SYSTEMS CORPORATION,
and TOWN OF OYSTER BAY, Defendants. No. 16-CV-5760 (DRH)(ARL).
(E.D.N.Y.).

Presently before the Court are Defendants' motions, pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), to dismiss the claims in the Second
Amended Complaint as time-barred.

This putative class action is brought on behalf of current and
former residents and property owners of Bethpage, New York
asserting various state law causes of action against defendants
Northrop Grumman Corporation (NG), Northrop Grumman Systems
Corporation (NGSC) (Northrop Grumman) and the Town of Oyster Bay
(Oyster Bay) (Defendants) for injuries and damages allegedly
suffered as a result of the release of hazardous substances from
Northrup Grumman's former site of approximately 635 acres in
East-Central Nassau County, formerly known as the
Grumman-Aerospace-Bethpage Facility Site (Site), as well as 18
acres of land donated by Grumman Corporation (Grumman) to the Town
of Oyster Bay.

As relevant here, the FRCD means the date the plaintiff knew or
reasonably should have known that the personal injury or property
damages referred to in subsection (a)(1) of this section were
caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance or pollutant or
contaminant concerned. Thus, under § 9658 the FRCD preempts state
law accrual rules if, under those rules, accrual would occur
earlier than the date on which the cause of the personal injury or
property damage was, or reasonably should have been known to be the
hazardous substance.

The FRCD's reasonably should have known prong is an objective test,
not subjective. Nonetheless, because different plaintiffs may have
become aware, or should have become aware, of the existence of
their claims at different times, the FRCD must be fixed separately
on a plaintiff-by plaintiff basis.

Accordingly, CPLR 214-c, as modified by the FRCD, requires that
toxic tort claims for injury to persons or property may be brought
(1) either three years from the date of discovery of the injury by
the plaintiff or from the date when through the exercise of
reasonable diligence such injury could have been discovered by the
plaintiff or (2) one year from the date the plaintiff knew or
reasonably should have known that the personal injury or property
damages were caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance;
which is later.  

The Parties' Contentions

The Defendants argue that the public investigation and remediation
put the Plaintiffs on inquiry notice no later than March 2013
barring both their property damage and personal injury claims and
that the 2016 soil tests conducted at Plaintiffs' behest could not
have put them on notice as they do not show contamination. Further,
the non-resident plaintiffs' claims are untimely as they were filed
more than a year after the original complaint in this case.

In response, the Plaintiffs argue that the law of the case is that
the claims are timely in view of the decision of the court in the
Notice of Claim Proceeding allowing the filing of the late notice
of claim. They maintain that when each of the plaintiffs' claims
accrued is an individualized factual inquiry that requires
discovery and determinations by the trier of fact and the evidence
will show that some of the plaintiffs' personal injuries and
wrongful death claims occurred within three years of the filing of
the complaint in this action in September 2016, or subsequently.

Further, the 2016 test results supporting their claims are only one
component of a factual inquiry and for some plaintiffs, the
two-injury rule applies. Finally, they argue that the class action
tolls the claims of all plaintiffs, making the claims of the
non-residents timely.

The Law of the Case Doctrine Does Not Apply

Preliminarily, the Court will address the Plaintiff's argument that
in view of the court's holding in the Notice of Claim Proceeding,
it is the law of the case that Plaintiffs' claims did not accrue
until April 2016.

The Notice of Claim Proceeding is not the same case as this, it was
a distinct proceeding. Moreover, Northrup Grumman was not a party
to that proceeding. The law of the case only applies in following
stages of the same case or to different lawsuits between the same
parties and therefore is inapplicable to this matter. It is also
noteworthy that a motion for reconsideration of the decision in the
Notice of Claim Proceeding was made and neither party has informed
the Court of a ruling thereon.

Whether Public Investigations and Remediation Put Plaintiffs on
Inquiry Notice

The Defendants' argument conflates the claims for diminution in
real property values as a result of the stigma of the property's
proximity to the Bethpage Site with the claims (e.g. for diminution
in value, injury to real property, and personal injuries) resulting
from actual contamination of their real property. As Plaintiffs
point out, there are various questions with respect to the property
claims such as when the toxic substances from the spreading plume
may have reached each of plaintiff's property, when the
contamination was discovered, when the diminution of value was or
reasonably could have been ascertained and when stigma damages
began to be manifested.

Here, the Defendants point to the concerns raised by citizen as to
whether the contamination affected their property or posed a health
threat. But these concerns are nothing more than suspicions. The
case law is clear that a plaintiff's mere suspicion that he or she
incurred damages because of defendant's contamination is inadequate
to satisfy the reasonably should have known standard. Indeed, the
FRCD focuses on knowledge, actual or imputed, not on suspicion.
Mere suspicion, whatever its reasonableness, cannot be equated with
knowledge.

The Defendants do not point to any particular portion of the
various RODs that would lead each of the Plaintiffs to believe that
contaminants had invaded their property. While the NYS Cancer Study
did examine a residential area adjacent to the Bethpage Site where
measurements had shown elevated levels from the site in the air
inside some of the homes, the Court has no way of determining based
on the allegations in the SAC which, if any, of the Plaintiffs may
have resided in that area.

Similarly, while the ROD for OU-3 reports that soil samples from
private properties located to the south of the Grumman Access Road
AOC have identified several properties with PCB levels greater that
1 ppm in surface and subsurface soil, the Court cannot determine
whether any of the private properties referenced belong to any of
the Plaintiffs.

It is also noteworthy that the various RODs also contain
information that those in areas surrounding the Grumman Site need
not be concerned with contamination. For example, the ROD for OU-3,
states that with respect to soil vapor based on the sampling
results from the Grumman Access Road, Sycamore Avenue and adjacent
numbered streets no site-related contamination of concern was
identified in the off-site areas evaluated, and impacts to indoor
air are not occurring. Therefore, no further action was necessary
for off-site residential properties.

With respect to the claims for personal injuries, in addition to
the foregoing it is sufficient to note that absent from the SAC are
the dates on which the plaintiffs received their diagnoses, which
is just one of the pieces of information needed to determine when
these claims may have accrued. This observation applies not only to
the original Plaintiffs, but also to the nonresident Plaintiffs.

In sum, the Court cannot conclude that as a matter of law the
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

Accordingly, the Defendants' motions to dismiss the claims asserted
in the Second Amended Complaint as time-barred are denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 13, 2019 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y4kmsd4u from
Leagle.com.

Rosalie Romano, Patricia Glueckert, Individually and on behalf of
the Estate of William G. Glueckert, William P. Glueckert, Francisco
Pastolero, Maria Spicer, Jayne Mann, Denise Florio, Ross Meadow,
Arlene Meadow, Bella Kholodny, Flo Raucci, Individually and on
behalf of the Estate of Salvatore Raucci, Daniel Gallante, Jennifer
Gallante & Jacob Kholodny, Plaintiffs, represented by Brittany
Weiner -- brittany@lawicm.com -- Imbesi Law PC, Hunter Jay
Shkolnik, Napoli Shkolnik PLLC, Lilia Factor, Napli Shkolnik PLLC,
Paul J. Napoli, Napoli Shkolnik PLLC, Robert Gitelman, Napoli
Shkolnik PLLC & Tate J. Kunkle, Napoli Shkolnik PLLC, 360 Lexington
Avenue, 11th Floor New York, NY 10017

Michael Falino, Individually, Maryann Herbert, Eugene Connolly,
Christina Andrews-Sales, Glenn Falino, Teresa Meade, Individually
and on bebahlf of all others similarly situated, Christopher Cagna,
Dana Blickensderfer, Viviiane Blickensderfer, Marcia Falino,
Catherine Lewonka & Jackie Lieberman, Plaintiffs, represented by
Lilia Factor, Napli Shkolnik PLLC &Hunter Jay Shkolnik, Napoli
Shkolnik PLLC.

Northrop Grumman Corporation & Northrop Grumman Systems
Corporation, Defendants, represented by Grant Joseph Esposito --
gesposito@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster LLP, Katie Louise
Viggiani -- kviggiani@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster LLP, Frank
Leone -- fleone@hollingsworthllp.com -- Hollingsworth LLP, pro hac
vice, Jessica Kaufman -- jkaufman@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster &
Mark A. Miller -- mmiller@hollingsworthllp.com -- Hollingsworth
LLP, pro hac vice.

Town of Oyster Bay, Defendant, represented by Peter Seiden --
pseident@milbermakris.com -- milber makris plousadis & seiden, LLP,
Matthew M. Rozea, Office of the Town Attorney, 54 Audrey Ave,
Oyster Bay, NY 11771-1504 & Peter F. Tamigi, Burns, Russo, Tamigi &
Reardon, LLP. 390 Old Country RoadGarden City, NY 11530


ORACLE CORP: Bid to Dismiss Stockholder Class Suit Pending
----------------------------------------------------------
Oracle Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on June 21, 2019, for the fiscal
year ended March 31, 2019, that the motion to dismiss the putative
class action suit initiated by a stockholder of the company remains
pending.

On August 10, 2018, a putative class action, brought by an alleged
stockholder of Oracle, was filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California against the company, its Chief
Technology Officer, its two Chief Executive Officers, two other
Oracle executives, and one former Oracle executive.

On December 21, 2018, the court granted plaintiff's motion that it
be appointed lead plaintiff and approving its selection of lead
plaintiff's counsel. On March 8, 2019, plaintiff filed an amended
complaint.

Plaintiff alleges that the defendants made or are responsible for
false and misleading statements regarding Oracle's cloud business.
Plaintiff further alleges that the former Oracle executive engaged
in insider trading. Plaintiff seeks a ruling that this case may
proceed as a class action, and seeks damages, attorneys' fees and
costs, and unspecified declaratory/injunctive relief.

On April 19, 2019, defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's amended
complaint, and on May 31, 2019, plaintiff filed an opposition.

Oracle said, "We believe that we have meritorious defenses against
this action, and we will continue to vigorously defend it."

Oracle Corporation develops, manufactures, markets, sells, hosts,
and supports application, platform, and infrastructure solutions
for information technology (IT) environments worldwide. The company
provides services in three layers of the cloud: Software as a
Service, Platform as a Service, and Infrastructure as a Service.
The company was founded in 1977 and is headquartered in Redwood
City, California.


PARAMOUNT RESIDENTIAL: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Casey Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
SEAN CASEY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. PARAMOUNT RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE GROUP, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-22473-RNS (S.D. Fla., June 13, 2019)
seeks to stop the Defendants' practice of making unsolicited
calls.

Paramount Residential Mortgage Group, Inc. provides mortgage
banking and residential home lending services in the United States.
The company also offers retail and wholesale lending services. The
company was founded in 2001 and is based in Corona, California.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 1205
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (305) 479-2299
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
                  gberg@shamisgentile.com

              - and -

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          Jordan D. Utanski, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, PA
          19495 Biscayne Blvd #607
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (305) 975-3320
          E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com
                  utanski@edelsberglaw.com


PATTERSON COS: Continues to Defend Kramer Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------
Patterson Companies, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on June 26, 2019, for
the fiscal year ended April 27, 2019, that the company remains a
defendant in a class action suit initiated by Nathaniel Kramer.

On October 9, 2018, Nathaniel Kramer filed indirect purchaser
litigation against Patterson Companies, Inc., Henry Schein, Inc.
and Benco Dental Supply Company in the United States District Court
for the District of Northern District of California.

The purported class action complaint asserts violations of the
California Cartwright Act and the California Unfair Competition Act
based on an alleged agreement between Schein, Benco, and Patterson
(and unnamed co-conspirators) not to compete as to price and
margins. Plaintiff alleges that the agreement allowed the
defendants to charge higher prices to dental practices for dental
supplies and that the dental practices passed on all, or part of,
the increased prices to the consumers of dental services.

Subject to certain exclusions, the complaint defines the class as
all persons residing in California purchasing and/or reimbursing
for dental services from California dental practices.

The complaint seeks a permanent injunction, actual damages to be
determined at trial, trebled, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs,
and pre- and post-judgment interest.

On December 7, 2018, an amended complaint was filed asserting the
same claims against the same parties.

Patterson Companies said, "While the outcome of litigation is
inherently uncertain, we believe that the indirect purchaser action
is without merit, and we intend to vigorously defend ourselves in
this litigation."

Patterson Companies, Inc. distributes and sells dental and animal
health products in the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Canada. It operates through Dental and Animal Health segments. The
company was formerly known as Patterson Dental Company and changed
its name to Patterson Companies, Inc. in June 2004. Patterson
Companies, Inc. was founded in 1877 and is headquartered in St.
Paul, Minnesota.


PATTERSON COS: Hatchett Class Action Ongoing in S.D. Illinois
-------------------------------------------------------------
Patterson Companies, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on June 26, 2019, for
the fiscal year ended April 27, 2019, that the company continues to
defend a purported class action complaint filed by R. Lawrence
Hatchett, M.D.

On January 29, 2019, a purported class action complaint was filed
by R. Lawrence Hatchett, M.D. against Patterson Companies, Inc.,
Henry Schein, Inc., Benco Dental Supply Company, and unnamed
co-conspirators in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Illinois.  

The complaint alleges that members of the proposed class suffered
antitrust injury due to an unlawful boycott, price-fixing or
otherwise anticompetitive conspiracy among Schein, Benco and
Patterson.

The complaint alleges that the alleged conspiracy overcharged
Illinois dental practices, orthodontic practices and dental
laboratories on their purchase of dental supplies, which in turn
passed on some or all of such overcharges to members of the class.


Subject to certain exclusions, the complaint defines the class as
all persons residing in Illinois purchasing and/or reimbursing for
dental care provided by independent Illinois dental practices
purchasing dental supplies from the defendants, or purchasing from
buying groups purchasing these supplies from the defendants, on or
after January 29, 2015.

The complaint alleges violations of the Illinois Antitrust Act, 740
Ill. Comp. Stat. Sections 10/3(2), 10/7(2), and seeks a permanent
injunction, actual damages to be determined at trial, trebled,
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, and pre- and post-judgment
interest.

Patterson Companies  said, "While the outcome of litigation is
inherently uncertain, we believe that the indirect purchaser action
is without merit, and we intend to vigorously defend ourselves in
this litigation."

Patterson Companies, Inc. distributes and sells dental and animal
health products in the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Canada. It operates through Dental and Animal Health segments. The
company was formerly known as Patterson Dental Company and changed
its name to Patterson Companies, Inc. in June 2004. Patterson
Companies, Inc. was founded in 1877 and is headquartered in St.
Paul, Minnesota.


PATTERSON COS: Plymouth County Retirement Suit Ongoing
------------------------------------------------------
Patterson Companies, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on June 26, 2019, for
the fiscal year ended April 27, 2019, that the company continues to
defend a class action suit entitled, Plymouth County Retirement
System v. Patterson Companies, Inc., Scott P. Anderson and Ann B.
Gugino, Case No. 0:18-cv-00871 MJD/SER.

On March 28, 2018, Plymouth County Retirement System ("Plymouth")
filed a federal securities class action complaint against Patterson
Companies, Inc. and its former CEO Scott P. Anderson and former CFO
Ann B. Gugino in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Minnesota in a case captioned Plymouth County Retirement System v.
Patterson Companies, Inc., Scott P. Anderson and Ann B. Gugino,
Case No. 0:18-cv-00871 MJD/SER.

On November 9, 2018, the complaint was amended to add former CEO
James W. Wiltz and former CFO R. Stephen Armstrong as individual
defendants.

Under the amended complaint, on behalf of all persons or entities
that purchased or otherwise acquired Patterson's common stock
between June 26, 2013 and February 28, 2018, Plymouth alleges that
Patterson violated federal securities laws by failing to disclose
that Patterson's revenue and earnings were "artificially inflated
by Defendants' illicit, anti-competitive scheme with its purported
competitors, Benco and Schein, to prevent the formation of buying
groups that would allow its customers who were office-based
practitioners to take advantage of pricing arrangements identical
or comparable to those enjoyed by large-group customers."

In its class action complaint, Plymouth asserts one count against
Patterson for violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder and a second,
related count against the individual defendants for violating
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.  

Plymouth seeks compensatory damages, pre- and post-judgment
interest and reasonable attorneys' fees and experts' witness fees
and costs. On August 30, 2018, Gwinnett County Public Employees
Retirement System and Plymouth County Retirement System, Pembroke
Pines Pension Fund for Firefighters and Police Officers, Central
Laborers Pension Fund were appointed lead plaintiffs.  

Patterson Companies said,. "While the outcome of litigation is
inherently uncertain, we believe that the class action complaint is
without merit, and we are vigorously defending ourselves in this
litigation. We do not anticipate that this matter will have a
material adverse effect on our financial statements. Patterson has
also received, and responded to, requests under Minnesota Business
Corporation Act Section 302A.461 to inspect corporate books and
records relating to the issues raised in the securities class
action and the antitrust matters."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Patterson Companies, Inc. distributes and sells dental and animal
health products in the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Canada. It operates through Dental and Animal Health segments. The
company was formerly known as Patterson Dental Company and changed
its name to Patterson Companies, Inc. in June 2004. Patterson
Companies, Inc. was founded in 1877 and is headquartered in St.
Paul, Minnesota.


PATTERSON COS: Settlement in Dental Supplies Suit Finally Approved
------------------------------------------------------------------
Patterson Companies, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on June 26, 2019, for
the fiscal year ended April 27, 2019, that the settlement in the
class action suit entitled, In re Dental Supplies Antitrust
Litigation, Civil Action No. 1:16-CV-00696-BMC-GRB, has been
finally approved.

Beginning in January 2016, purported antitrust class action
complaints were filed against defendants Henry Schein, Inc., Benco
Dental Supply Company and Patterson Companies, Inc.

Although there were factual and legal variations among these
complaints, each alleged that defendants conspired to foreclose and
exclude competitors by boycotting manufacturers, state dental
associations, and others that deal with defendants’ competitors.


On February 9, 2016, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York ordered all of these actions, and all other
actions filed thereafter asserting substantially similar claims
against defendants, consolidated for pre-trial purposes.

On February 26, 2016, a consolidated class action complaint was
filed by Arnell Prato, D.D.S., P.L.L.C., d/b/a Down to Earth
Dental, Evolution Dental Sciences, LLC, Howard M. May, DDS, P.C.,
Casey Nelson, D.D.S., Jim Peck, D.D.S., Bernard W. Kurek, D.M.D.,
Larchmont Dental Associates, P.C., and Keith Schwartz, D.M.D., P.A.
(collectively, "putative class representatives") in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, entitled In re
Dental Supplies Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action No.
1:16-CV-00696-BMC-GRB.

Subject to certain exclusions, the putative class representatives
seek to represent all private dental practices and laboratories who
purchased dental supplies or equipment in the U.S. directly from
any of the defendants, during the period beginning August 31, 2008
until March 31, 2016.

In the consolidated class action complaint, putative class
representatives allege a nationwide agreement among Henry Schein,
Benco, Patterson and non-party Burkhart Dental Supply Company, Inc.
not to compete on price.

The consolidated class action complaint asserts a single count
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and seeks equitable relief,
compensatory and treble damages, jointly and severally, interest,
and reasonable costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees and
expert fees.

On September 28, 2018, the parties executed a settlement agreement
that proposes, subject to court approval, a full and final
settlement of the lawsuit on a class-wide basis.

Subject to certain exceptions, the settlement class consists of all
persons or entities that purchased dental products directly from
Henry Schein, Patterson, Benco and Burkhart, or any combination
thereof, during the period August 31, 2008 through and including
March 31, 2016.

In September 2018, the company signed an agreement to settle the
litigation. Under the terms of the settlement, the company paid
$28.3 million into escrow upon preliminary court approval.

Such funds are to be released to the settlement fund administrator
upon final court approval of the settlement, which was granted at
the fairness hearing held on June 24, 2019.

Patterson Companies said, "We recorded a pre-tax reserve of $28.3
million in our first quarter 2019 results in our Corporate segment
to account for the settlement of this matter."

Patterson Companies, Inc. distributes and sells dental and animal
health products in the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Canada. It operates through Dental and Animal Health segments. The
company was formerly known as Patterson Dental Company and changed
its name to Patterson Companies, Inc. in June 2004. Patterson
Companies, Inc. was founded in 1877 and is headquartered in St.
Paul, Minnesota.


PRODUCERS SERVICES: Underpays Oilfield Operators, Andrews Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
NATHAN ANDREWS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. PRODUCERS SERVICES CORPORATION, Defendant,
Case No. 2:19-cv-02514-GCS-CMV (S.D. Ohio., June 17, 2019) is an
action against the Defendants for failure to pay overtime and
minimum wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Plaintiff Nathan Andrews worked for Defendant as oilfield
operations employee.

Producers Service Corporation provides hydraulic fracturing and
acidizing services to the oilfield industry in Ohio, Pennsylvania,
and West Virginia. It also offers high volume water pumping
services. The company was founded in 1981 and is based in
Zanesville, Ohio. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          One Financial Center
          650 S. Shackleford Road, Suite 411
          Little Rock, AK 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040

                - and -

          Robert E. DeRose, Esq.
          Jessica R. Doogan, Esq.
          BARKAN MEIZLISH DEROSE
             WENTZ MCINERNEY PEIFER, LLP
          250 East Broad Street, 10th Floor
          Columbus, OH 43215
          Telephone: (614) 221-4221
          Facsimile:  (614) 744-2300
          E-mail: bderose@barkanmeizlish.com
                  jdoogan@barkanmeizlish.com


PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN: Hernandez, Amaro Sue over Vehicle Insurance
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ROLANDO HERNANDEZ; and VICTOR DAVALOS AMARO, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. PROGRESSIVE
AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY; and PROGRESSIVE EXPRESS INSURANCE
COMPANY, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-22300-FAM (S.D. Fla., June 3,
2019) is an action against the Defendants' refusal to abide by the
contractual promise to pay the Actual Cash Value of the Plaintiffs'
vehicles.

According to the complaint, on October 23, 2017, Mr. Hernandez's
vehicle was involved in an accident after which the vehicle was
declared to be a total loss. As a result of said accident, Mr.
Hernandez filed a claim for property damage.

On November 9, 2018, Mr. Davalos Amaro was involved in a motor
vehicle accident after which the vehicle was declared to be a total
loss. As a result of said accident, Mr. Davalos Amaro filed a claim
for property damage.

The Defendants' policy is to charge the same insurance premium
irrespective of whether the Plaintiffs' vehicles are owned/financed
or leased, making absolutely no distinction in the Policy between
owned/financed and leased vehicles, such that the promise regarding
coverage is the same for both. And yet, when it comes time to
actually provide coverage, the Defendants, for the first time,
distinguish between owned/financed vehicles and leased vehicles and
provide less coverage to leased vehicles despite making precisely
the same promise. In both cases, the coverage provided is less than
what insured contract for in the Policy.

The Defendants' promise to pay the Actual Cash Value of the insured
vehicle includes costs reasonably likely to be incurred upon
property replacement. Nevertheless, the Defendants decline to
actually include such charges in making Actual Cash Value payment
to total-loss insureds, such as the Plaintiffs, thereby breaching
the contracts with insured.

Progressive American Insurance Company offers car insurance, home
insurance, renters insurance, condo insurance, insurance bundles,
motorcycle insurance, boat insurance, RV insurance, life insurance,
pet insurance, and commercial insurance. The company was founded in
1937 and is based in Mayfield Village, Ohio. Progressive American
Insurance Company operates as a subsidiary of Drive Insurance
Holdings, Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jeff Ostrow, Esq.
          Jonathan Streisfeld, Esq.
          Joshua Levine, Esq.
          KOPELOWITZ OSTROW
          FERGUSON WEISELBERG GILBERT
          One West Las Olas, Suite 500
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 525-4100
          Facsimile: (954) 525-4300
          E-mail: ostrow@kolawyers.com
                  streisfeld@kolawyers.com
                  levine@kolawyers.com

               - and -

          Jacob Phillips, Esq.
          Ed Normand, Esq.
          NORMAND PLLC
          3165 McCrory Place, Suite 175
          Orlando, FL 32803
          Telephone: 407-603-6031
          E-mail: jacob.phillips@normandpllc.com
                  ed@ednormand.com

               - and -

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          Jordan D. Utanski, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, PA
          19495 Biscayne Blvd. #607
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (305) 975-3320
          E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com
                  utanski@edelsberglaw.com

               - and -

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 400
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (305) 479-2299
          Facsimile: (786) 623-0915
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com


PURDUE PHARMA: Brumbarger Sues over Side Effects of Opioid Drugs
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action by Brandi Brumbarger alleges that Purdue Pharma and
other defendants misleadingly promoted OxyContin as being unique
among opioids in providing 12 continuous hours of pain relief with
one dose. In fact, OxyContin does not last for 12 hours -- a fact
that Purdue has known at all relevant times. According to Purdue's
own research, OxyContin wears off in under six hours in one quarter
of patients and in under 10 hours in more than half. This is
because OxyContin tablets release approximately 40% of their active
medicine immediately, after which release tapers. This triggers a
powerful initial response, but provides little or no pain relief at
the end of the dosing period, when less medicine is released. This
phenomenon is known as "end of dose" failure, and the FDA found in
2008 that a "substantial number" of chronic pain patients taking
OxyContin experience it. This not only renders Purdue's promise of
12 hours of relief false and negligent, it also makes OxyContin
more dangerous because the declining pain relief patients
experience toward the end of each dosing period drives them to take
more OxyContin before the next dosing period begins, quickly
increasing the amount of drug they are taking and spurring growing
dependence.

The Defendants' negligent marketing scheme caused and continues to
cause doctors to prescribe opioids to patients, including pregnant
mothers, for chronic pain conditions such as back pain, headaches,
arthritis, and fibromyalgia. Absent these Defendants' negligent
marketing scheme, these doctors would not have prescribed as many
opioids. These Defendants' negligent marketing scheme also caused
and continues to cause patients, including pregnant mothers, to
purchase and use opioids for their chronic pain believing they are
safe and effective.

Purdue Pharma L.P. engages in research, development, production,
and distribution of prescription and over-the-counter prescription
and non-prescription medicines and healthcare products. Purdue
Pharma L.P. was formerly known as The Purdue Frederick Company and
changed its name to Purdue Pharma L.P. in January, 1991. The
company was founded in 1892 and is based in Stamford, Connecticut.

The case is captioned as, BRANDI BRUMBARGER, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. PURDUE PHARMA
L.P.; PURDUE PHARMA, INC.; THE PURDUE FREDERICK COMPANY, INC.;
MCKESSON CORPORATION;  CARDINAL HEALTH, INC.;  AMERISOURCEBERGEN
CORPORATION; TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES, LTD.; TEVA
PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.; CEPHALON, INC.; JOHNSON & JOHNSON;
JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; ORTHO-MCNEIL-JANSSEN
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. n/k/a JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; JANSSEN
PHARMACEUTICA INC. n/k/a JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; ENDO HEALTH
SOLUTIONS INC.; ENDO PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; ALLERGAN PLC f/k/a
ACTAVIS PLC; WATSON PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. n/k/a ACTAVIS, INC.;
WATSON LABORATORIES, INC.; ACTAVIS LLC; and ACTAVIS PHARMA, INC.
f/k/a WATSON PHARMA, INC., DEPOMED, INC.; MALLINCKRODT LLC;
MALLINCKRODT PLC; SPECGX LLC; PAR PHARMACEUTICAL, INC.; PAR
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES, INC.; NORAMCO, INC.; INDIVIOR, INC.; CVS
HEALTH CORPORATION; RITE AID OF MARYLAND, INC.; RITE AID CORP.;
WALGREENS BOOTS ALLIANCE, INC.; WALGREEN EASTERN CO.; WALGREEN CO.;
WAL-MART INC. f/k/a WALMART STORES, INC.; MIAMI-LUKEN, INC.; COSTCO
WHOLESALE CORPORATION; THE KROGER CO.; H.D. SMITH, LLC; H.D. SMITH
HOLDINGS, LLC; H.D. SMITH HOLDING COMPANY; ANDA, INC.; RICHARD S.
SACKLER; JONATHON D. SACKLER; MORTIMER D.A. SACKLER; KATHE A.
SACKLER; ILENE SACKLER LEFCOURT; BEVERLY SACKLER; THERESA SACKLER;
DAVID A. SACKLER; RHODES TECHNOLOGIES; RHODES TECHNOLOGIES INC.;
RHODES PHARACEUTICALS L.P.; RHODES PHARMACEUTICALS INC.; TRUST FOR
THE BENEFIT OF MEMBERS OF THE RAYMOND SACKLER FAMILY; and THE P.F.
LABORATORIES, INC., Defendants, Case No. 1:19-op-45469-DAP (N.D.
Ohio, June 14, 2019).[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Celeste Brustowicz, Esq.
          Stephen Wussow, Esq.
          COOPER LAW FIRM
          1525 Religious Street
          New Orleans, LA 70130
          Telephone: (504) 399-0009
          Facsimile: (504) 309-6989
          E-mail: cbrustowicz@sch-llc.com

               - and -

          Kevin Thompson, Esq.
          David R. Barney, Jr., Esq.
          THOMPSON BARNEY LAW FIRM
          2030 Kanawha Boulevard, East
          Charleston, WV 25311
          Telephone: (304) 343-4401
          Facsimile: (304) 343-4405
          E-mail: kwthompson@gmail.com

               - and -

          Donald E. Creadore, Esq.
          CREADORE LAW FIRM
          450 Seventh Avenue, Suite 1408
          New York, NY 10123
          Telephone: 212-355-7200
          E-mail: donald@creadorelawfirm.com

               - and -

          Scott R. Bickford, Esq.
          Spencer R. Doody, Esq.
          MARTZELL BICKFORD & CENTOLA
          338 Lafayette Street
          New Orleans, LA 70130
          Telephone: (504) 581-9065
          Facsimile: (504) 581-7635
          E-mail: srb@mbfirm.com

               - and -

          Kent Harrison Robbins, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF KENT
          HARRISON ROBBINS, P.A.
          242 Northeast 27 th Street
          Miami, FL 33137
          Telephone: (305) 532-0500
          Facsimile: (305) 531-0150
          Email: khr@khrlawoffices.com
                 ereyes@khrlawoffices.com
                 assistant@khrlawoffices.com


QUEST DIAGNOSTICS: Faces Marler Suit over Data Breach
-----------------------------------------------------
MISTY MARLER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. QUEST DIAGNOSTICS, INC.; OPTUM360 SERVICES,
INC.; AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLECTION AGENCY; QUEST TECHNOLOGY
MANAGEMENT; and DOES 1 through 100, Defendants, Case No.
8:19-cv-01091 (C.D. Cal., June 3, 2019) is a class action lawsuit
against the Defendants' unlawful disclosure of the confidential
information of the Plaintiff and the class, and the millions of
patients' financial information, medical information, personal
information, and other protected health information.

According to the complaint, in its SEC filing relating to the Data
Breach, Quest Diagnostics announced that unauthorized parties
accessed between August 1, 2018 and March 30, 2019 American
Medical's system, which contained the Plaintiff's and Class
members' personally identifiably information ("PII") and protected
health information ("PHI").

Despite unauthorized parties having access to the American
Medical's system for more than six months, American Medical only
learned of the Data Breach as a result of receiving information
from a security compliance firm that works with credit card
companies.

Given American Medical's relationship to Question Diagnostics,
American Medical's provides services to Optum360, which in turn
provides payment services to Quest Diagnostics, the Plaintiff and
Class members were blindsided by the Data Breach announcement given
most have never heard of American Medical or Optum360 and were
unaware that their information would be shared with these entities,
causing additional emotional harm.

American Medical first learned of the Data Breach on or around
March 30, 2019 but waited more than three months to notify the
Plaintiff and Class members of the Data Breach.

Quest Diagnostics Incorporated provides diagnostic testing,
information, and services in the United States and internationally.
The company also offers risk assessment services for the life
insurance industry; and health information technology solutions for
healthcare organizations and clinicians. Quest Diagnostics
Incorporated was founded in 1967 and is headquartered in Secaucus,
New Jersey. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel S. Robinson, Esq.
          Wesley K. Polischuk, Esq.
          Michael W. Olson, Esq.
          ROBINSON CALCAGNIE,INC.
          19 Corporate Plaza Dr.
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (949) 720-1288
          Facsimile: (949) 720-1292
          E-mail: drobinson@robinsonfirm.com
                  wpolischuk@robinsonfirm.com
                  molson@robinsonfirm.com


R.A. ROGERS: Court Dismisses M. Salinas FDCPA Suit
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas,
San Antonio Division, issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment in the case captioned MARCO SALINAS,
individually and on behalf of similarly situated consumers,
Plaintiff, v. R.A. ROGERS, INC., Defendant. Civil Action No.
SA-18-CV-733-XR. (W.D. Tex.).

This case stems from Defendant R.A. Rogers's attempt to collect a
debt owed by Plaintiff Marco Salinas for a loan from Security
Service Federal Credit Union (SSFCU). SSFCU turned over collection
of this debt to Defendant.Defendant's letter states, in the event
there is interest or other charges accruing on your account, the
amount due may be greater than the amount shown above after the
date of this notice. Plaintiff alleges that this language is false,
deceptive, and misleading in violation of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA) because Defendant does not collect interest
or other charges related to SSFCU and the agreement between
Plaintiff and SSFCU does not allow for interest to accrue or other
charges to be added.  

The Defendant now moves for summary judgment on the basis that no
reasonable fact finder could find the statement at issue in the
2017 letter violates 15 U.S.C. Section 1692 because it is accurate
and thus not false, deceptive, or misleading. Defendant agrees that
it does not collect interest or other charges on debts referred to
it for collection by SSFCU and that the agreement between Plaintiff
and SSFCU is silent as to whether interest or other charges could
accrue.
  
The Defendant does not agree that this renders the statement false,
deceptive, or misleading because of the conditional language used.


The Plaintiff's FDCPA claim alleges that the Defendant's letter
used deceptive language that falsely implied that the balance would
increase if the Plaintiff failed to make immediate payment. The
language at issue states, in the event there is interest or other
charges accruing on your account, the amount due may be greater
than the amount shown above after the date of this notice. For
Plaintiff to survive summary judgment, the Court must determine
that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to one of the
following: whether an unsophisticated consumer (1) would have been
led to believe something untrue (2) that would have had a material
effect on their decision-making.

To find for the Defendant, the Court must find that reasonable
minds cannot differ as to whether the collection letter is false,
deceptive, or misleading.

False, Deceptive, or Misleading

The Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that the
letter is not false, deceptive, or misleading under Section 1692e
because the letter as a whole is accurate and Plaintiff has not
presented sufficient evidence to indicate otherwise. First,
Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not provide the loan agreement
between him and SSFCU that supposedly prohibits interest or other
charges or point out any statute or regulation that would prohibit
such interest or other charges.  

Therefore, there is no evidence in the record that SSFCU could not
apply interest or other charges to the loan following default.

Second, the Defendant admits that R.A. Rogers does not collect
interest or other charges on debts related to SSFCU, but that fact
does not render the statement false, deceptive, or misleading under
Section 1692e.  

Third, the letter states that the amount due may be greater, not
that the account is accruing interest and other charges or that the
amount due will be greater.

The Defendant further argues that the conditional modifier at the
beginning of the sentence, in the event, in combination with the
reference to the amount shown above, which does not show any
interest or fees on the account, demonstrates that Plaintiff's
interpretation of the letter is unreasonable. Thus, there is only
one reasonable interpretation of the letter that the amount may be
greater after the date of the letter in the event that the creditor
charges interest or other charges.

A plaintiff's mere claim of confusion is not enough to withstand a
motion for summary judgment. Rather a plaintiff must demonstrate
that the letter's language unacceptably increases the level of
confusion. A plaintiff can demonstrate a triable issue of fact if
the collection letter is confusing or unclear on its face or
through objective evidence of confusion such as surveys that
attempt to measure the level of consumer understanding" of the
letter.  

The Court will first determine whether the language in the
collection letter is confusing or unclear on its face such that it
could lead an unsophisticated consumer to believe something untrue.
Based on a review of other circuit court opinions dealing with the
effect of conditional language on whether a debt collection letter
is false, deceptive, or misleading, this Court finds that
Defendant's interpretation of the letter is the only reasonable
one.

Thus, the conditional language in the letter is not confusing or
unclear on its face because the collection letter accurately
conveys the possibility that the original creditor may elect to
charge the debtor interest on a defaulted loan, which is
permissible on a defaulted loan under Texas law.

Therefore, in order for the Plaintiff to survive Defendant's motion
for summary judgment, the Plaintiff must present some objective
evidence of confusion. The Plaintiff not only fails to submit any
objective evidence of confusion, but also fails to produce any
evidence of subjective confusion on the part of the Plaintiff. The
Plaintiff has thus failed to demonstrate that the language of the
collection letter unacceptably increases the level of confusion or
even increases the level of confusion to any degree. As a result,
it is unnecessary to reach the issue of materiality because there
is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the letter is
false, deceptive, or misleading under Section 1692e.

The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted because the
letter is not confusing or unclear on its face and there is no
objective evidence in the record of an unacceptable level of
confusion. There is insufficient evidence in the record to create a
triable issue of fact as to whether Defendant's debt collection
letter is false, deceptive, or misleading. The Plaintiff's request
for class certification is denied for the same reasons.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 13, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y65faovu from Leagle.com.

Marco Salinas, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Zemel, Zemel Law
LLC, 70 Clinton AvenueNewark, NJ 07114- 2012

R.A. Rogers, Inc., Defendant, represented by Kevin T. Crocker --
kcrocker@bn-lawyers.com -- Barron & Newburger, P.C..


RALPH LAUREN: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Tripicchio Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------
VINCE TRIPICCHIO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. RALPH LAUREN CORPORATION; RALPH
LAUREN RETAIN, INC.; VIBES MEDIA LLC; and JOHN DOES 1-20,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05269 (S.D.N.Y., June 5, 2019) seeks
to stop the Defendants' practice of making unsolicited calls.

Ralph Lauren Corporation designs, markets, and distributes
lifestyle products in North America, Europe, Asia, and
internationally. Ralph Lauren Corporation was founded in 1967 and
is based in New York, New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ross H. Schmierer, Esq.
          Stephen P. DeNittis, Esq.
          DeNITTIS OSEFCHEN PRINCE, P.C.
          525 Route 73 North, Suite 410
          Marlton, NJ 08053
          Telephone: (856) 797-9951


RECEIVE REVENUE RECOVERY: Croymans Sues over Debt Collection
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Receive Revenue
Recovery, a/k/a SSI Group, LLC, for alleged violations of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The case is captioned
Samantha Croymans, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Receive Revenue Recovery, a/k/a SSI Group,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-02531-JPH-TAB (S.D. Ind., June 21,
2019). On June 22, 2019, Plaintiff Samantha Croymans allegedly
received a false and misleading dunning letter, which stated that
certain outcomes might befall a delinquent debtor. However, the
dunning letter failed to state how much the late charges are and it
failed to state what other charges may apply. Plaintiff Croymans
also asserts that the debt in this matter is not subject to late
charges and that the late charges threat stated in the dunning
letter constitutes a violation of FDCPA.

Receive Revenue Recovery, a/k/a SSI Group, LLC, is a debt
collection agency and/or debt purchaser operating from an address
at 1251 N. Eddy Street, Suite 201, South Bend, Indiana. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Richard J. Shea, Esq.
     SAWIN & SHEA, LLC.
     6100 N. Keystone Avenue, Suite 620
     Indianapolis, IN 46220
     Telephone: (317) 255-2600
     Facsimile: (317) 255-2905
     E-mail: rshea@sawinlaw.com


REVENUE FRONTIER: Court Certifies Class in "Clough" Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit Robert W. Clough, II  on behalf of
himself and other similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Revenue
Frontier, LLC et al., the Defendant, the Hon. Judge Paul Barbadoro
entered an order:

   1. granting Clough's motion for class certification; and

      "(1) all persons in the United States who are the users or
      subscribers of the approximately 18,937 cellular telephones
      identified in Anya Verkovshkaya's report (2) to which
      cellular telephone numbers a text message was sent [(3)]
      using the SDC Messaging Application, employing the Sendroid
      software [(4)] within four years of the filing of the
      complaint"; and

   2. appointing Clough as lead plaintiff and his counsel as lead
      counsel.

Judge Barbadoro says, "The Defendants produced no evidence of
consent for any proposed class member in response to Clough's
discovery requests. To the extent the defendants suggest that the
contents of the text messages are relevant because they may show
that some class members provided prior consent, such "speculation
and surmise [cannot] tip the decisional scales in a class
certification ruling." The Defendants also argue that the four law
firms representing Clough are not adequate to serve as class
counsel. Their principal argument is that Clough’s attorneys have
not been diligent in prosecuting the case, citing their failure to
take depositions as an example. The discovery period is still open,
however, and I have no reason to doubt Clough's counsel's
contention that they will diligently pursue all necessary discovery
in the remaining time. Accordingly, I grant theirrequest to serve
as class counsel."[CC]

ROADRUNNER TRANSPORTATION: Sept. 23 Settlement Fairness Hearing
---------------------------------------------------------------
UNITED SATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
MILWAUKEE DIVISION

Civil No. 2:17-cv-00893-PP
(Consolidated)

DERIVATIVE ACTION

JESSE KENT, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, and Derivatively on Behalf of ROADRUNNER TRANSPORTATION
SYSTEMS, INC.

Plaintiff,

vs.

CURTIS W. STOELTING, et al.,
Defendants,
-- and --
ROADRUNNER TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware corporation,
Nominal Defendant.

SUMMARY NOTICE OF PROPOSED DERIVATIVE SETTLEMENT

TO: ALL RECORD HOLDERS AND BENEFICIAL OWNERS OF THE COMMON STOCK OF
ROADRUNNER TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS, INC. ("ROADRUNNER" OR THE
"COMPANY") AS OF MARCH 27, 2019 (THE "RECORD DATE")

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the above-captioned consolidated derivative
actions (the "Consolidated Actions") is being settled on the terms
set forth in a Stipulation of Settlement, dated March 27, 2019 (the
"Stipulation" or "Settlement").  Under the terms of the
Stipulation, as a part of the proposed Settlement, Roadrunner's
directors and officers insurance carriers shall pay $6.9 million,
of which $4.8 million will be used to resolve the related
securities class action and Roadrunner will adopt certain corporate
governance enhancements.  These reforms are designed to address the
claims asserted in the Consolidated Action and enhance Roadrunner's
internal controls over accounting, incentive compensation and
compliance with applicable laws, rules and regulations regarding
financial reporting.

The full Board reviewed the derivative settlement parameters, and
exercising its business judgment and mindful of its duties to
stockholders, approved the settlement.  The Settling Defendants
agree and acknowledge that the $6.9 million payment that will be
used to resolve the related securities class action and the
corporate governance enhancements confer substantial benefits upon
Roadrunner and its stockholders.

In light of the substantial benefits conferred upon Roadrunner by
Plaintiffs' Counsel's efforts, the Company, by and through its
Board of Directors, in exercising its business judgment, has agreed
to pay Plaintiff's Counsel $2.1 million in attorneys' fees and
expenses, subject to Court approval.

IF YOU WERE A RECORD OR BENEFICIAL OWNER OF ROADRUNNER COMMON STOCK
AS OF MARCH 27, 2019, PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY AND IN ITS
ENTIRETY AS YOUR RIGHTS MAY BE AFFECTED BY PROCEEDINGS IN THE
ABOVE-REFERENCED LITIGATION.

On September 23, 2019, at 11:00 a.m., a hearing (the "Settlement
Hearing") will be held at the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin, 517 East Wisconsin Avenue,
Milwaukee, WI 53202, before the Honorable Lynn Adelman, to
determine: (1) whether the terms of the proposed Settlement,
including the separately negotiated attorneys' fees and expenses,
should be approved as fair, reasonable and adequate; and (2)
whether the Consolidated Action should be dismissed on the merits
and with prejudice on the terms set forth in the Stipulation.

Any Roadrunner stockholder that objects to the Settlement shall
have a right to appear and to be heard at the Settlement Hearing,
provided that he, she or it was a stockholder of record or
beneficial owner as March 27, 2019.  Any Roadrunner stockholder who
satisfies this requirement may enter an appearance through counsel
of such stockholder's own choosing and at such stockholder's own
expense, or may appear on their own.  However, no stockholder of
Roadrunner shall be heard at the Settlement Hearing unless, no
later than September 3, 2019, such stockholder has filed with the
Court, a written notice of objection containing the following
information:

   1. Your name, legal address, and telephone number;

   2. The case name and number (Kent v. Stoelting, et al., Civil
No. 2:17-cv-00893-PP);

   3. Proof of being a Roadrunner stockholder as of the Record
Date;

   4. The date(s) you acquired your Roadrunner shares;

   5. A statement of your position with respect to the matters to
be heard at the Settlement Hearing, including a statement of each
objection being made;

   6. Notice of whether you intend to appear at the Settlement
Hearing (this is not required if you have lodged your objection
with the Court); and

   7. Copies of any papers you intend to submit to the Court, along
with the names of any witness(es) you intend to call to testify at
the Settlement Hearing and the subject(s) of their testimony.

Only stockholders who have filed and delivered valid and timely
written notices of objection will be entitled to be heard at the
Settlement Hearing unless the Court orders otherwise.

If you wish to object to the proposed Settlement, you must file the
written objection described above with the Court on or before
September 3, 2019.

Any Roadrunner stockholder as of March 27, 2019, who does not make
his, her or its objection in the manner provided herein shall be
deemed to have waived such objection and shall be forever
foreclosed from making any objection to the fairness,
reasonableness or adequacy of the Settlement as incorporated in the
Stipulation and/or to the separately negotiated attorneys' fees and
expenses to Plaintiffs' Counsel, unless otherwise ordered by the
Court, but shall otherwise be bound by the Judgment to be entered
and the releases to be given.

Inquiries may be made to Plaintiffs' Counsel: Rick Nelson, c/o
Shareholder Relations, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, 655 West
Broadway, Suite 1900, San Diego, CA 92101; telephone
1-800-449-4900.

PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT REGARDING THIS NOTICE

Dated: June 19, 2019

BY ORDER OF THE COURT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

1 This notice should be read in conjunction with, and is qualified
in its entirety by reference to, the text of the Stipulation, which
has been filed with the United State District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin. A link to the Form 8-K filed with the SEC
containing the text of the Stipulation may be found on the
Company's website at the Investor Relations page at
http://rrts.com/investors.All capitalized terms herein have the
same meanings as set forth in the Stipulation.


ROSSINI NORTH: Underpays Machine Operators, Howell Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------
JOHN HOWELL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ROSSINI NORTH AMERICA, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-02540-ELR (N.D. Ga., June 3, 2019) seeks to recover
from the Defendant unpaid wages and overtime compensation,
interest, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

Mr. Howell was employed by the Defendant as machine operator.

Rossini North America, LLC produces and distributes printer rollers
and sleeves. The Company offers air sleeve mandrels, rubber and
base sleeves, carrier systems, thicker-walled sleeves, compressible
sleeves, injected-molded urethane thicker-walled sleeves, rubber
coverings, thermo polymer sleeves, and composite rollers. Rossini
North America serves customers worldwide. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. Mills, Esq.
          MICHAEL A. MILLS, P.C.
          1349 W. Peachtree Street, NW, Suite 1995
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone: (404) 815-9220
          Facsimile: (678) 317-0956
          E-mail: mike@millslegal.net

               - and -

          Robert W. Cowan, Esq.
          BAILEY COWAN HECKAMAN PLLC
          5555 San Felipe St., Suite 900
          Houston, TX 77056
          Telephone: (713) 425-7100
          Facsimile: (713) 425-7101
          E-mail: rcowan@bchlaw.com


SARBANAND FARMS: Court Narrows Claims in Farm Labor Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle issued an Order granting in part and denying in
part Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment in the captioned
BARBARO ROSAS and GUADALUPE TAPIA, as individuals and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. SARBANAND FARMS, LLC,
MUNGER BROS., LLC, NIDIA PEREZ, and CSI VISA PROCESSING S.C.,
Defendants. Case No. C18-0112-JCC. (W.D. Wash.).

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' motion for
partial summary judgment on their claims arising under the Farm
Labor Contractors Act (FLCA).

The Court certified the class on Plaintiffs' claims that Defendant
CSI Visa Processing S.C. (CSI) violated the FLCA and for Defendants
Sarbanand Farms, LLC and Munger Bros., LLC (Growers) resultant
liability.

FLCA

CSI makes two preliminary challenges to the Plaintiffs' FLCA
claims: (1) that the Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to bring
their FLCA claims and (2) that the FLCA does not apply to entities
operating outside of Washington. The Plaintiffs move for summary
judgment on the issues of CSI's status as a farm labor contractor,
CSI's violations of the FLCA, and Growers' joint and several
liability for CSI's violations.  

Standing

CSI contends that the Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their FLCA
claims.  

To establish standing under Article III of the United States
Constitution, a plaintiff must allege an injury in fact: (1) that
is both concrete and particularized and actual or imminent (2) that
is fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct
and (3) which will likely be redressed by a favorable decision of
the court.

The Plaintiffs allege that CSI violated their rights under the FLCA
by failing to carry a farm labor contractor's license and
exhibiting it to Plaintiffs, failing to obtain a bond and disclose
its existence and amount to Plaintiffs, and failing to make
required disclosures as to the terms and conditions of Plaintiffs'
employment. The FLCA's requirement that a farm labor contractor
must hold a license ensures that the contractor has been vetted and
meets certain requirements, such as carrying insurance and a surety
bond.
  
In addition, a duly-licensed contractor must deposit a surety bond
to ensure both the contractor's compliance with the FLCA's
provisions and the contractor's payment of sums contractually owed
to agricultural workers. And requiring a contractor to both exhibit
its license and accurately disclose the value of its bond and the
terms and conditions of employment ensures that prospective
employees are provided with sufficient information to make an
informed decision about whether to pursue the employment
opportunity. Thus, CSI's alleged failure to comply with these
requirements deprived Washington of a chance to evaluate CSI's
fitness as a farm labor contractor and Plaintiffs of an opportunity
to properly evaluate the offered employment opportunity, while also
excusing CSI from guaranteeing Plaintiffs' legal rights.

Therefore, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have standing to sue
for alleged violations of the FLCA, as their alleged harms are
sufficiently concrete and particularized, are traceable to CSI's
alleged violations of the FLCA, and would be redressed by the
Court's award of statutory damages to Plaintiffs.  

Application of FLCA to Foreign Entities

CSI contends that the FLCA does not apply to it because the statute
only applies to entities doing business in Washington. CSI relies
on legislative history materials and federal case law analyzing the
scope of the federal Agricultural Workers Protection Act. But CSI
has not cited any provision in the FLCA limiting its application to
entities that operate in Washington.

Rather, the FLCA defines farm labor contractors as those that
engage in farm labor contracting activity, broadly defined as
recruiting, soliciting, employing, supplying, transporting, or
hiring agricultural employees. Johnson testified that CSI was
required to comply with the FLCA if it engaged in farm labor
contractor activity regardless of where it was physically located.
Johnson stated that the focus of the inquiry is whether CSI
received a fee from a Washington agricultural employer for either
recruiting or supplying workers to that agricultural employer.
Thus, CSI's citation to legislative history materials and federal
case law is insufficient to establish that it was exempt from
complying with the FLCA because its activities were not conducted
in Washington.

CSI also argues that it sought in good faith to understand and
comply with Washington regulatory requirements, as it was told by
Soeteber that it did not need to (and could not) register under the
FLCA because it was located in Mexico.  Johnson has testified that
Soeteber's advice was incorrect, and that she has acknowledged that
her advice was not based on the FLCA or a recognized policy of L&I;
rather, she believed that L&I would not be able to collect against
a company outside the United States.

According to Johnson, the correct advice is if CSI were doing a
farm labor contractor activity that would have them in the state of
Washington, specifically conducting one of these activities for a
fee with a Washington grower, that they would need an FLC license,
even if those activities took place in a foreign country but
resulted in workers being supplied to a Washington farmer. CSI has
not argued that its reliance on mistaken advice from L&I is
sufficient to excuse it from complying with the FLCA.  

Thus, CSI's reliance on Soeteber's advice does not establish that
the FLCA did not apply to CSI despite it qualifying as a farm labor
contractor under the statute.

CSI's Status as Farm Labor Contractor

Under the FLCA, a farm labor contractor is any person, or his or
her agent or subcontractor, who, for a fee, performs any farm labor
contracting activity. Farm labor contracting activity includes
recruiting, soliciting, employing, supplying, transporting, or
hiring agricultural employees. An entity that qualifies as a farm
labor contractor under the FLCA must comply with the statute's
requirements, including holding a license and depositing a surety
bond.

CSI's actions as to the H-2A workers sent directly to Washington
fall within the broad definition of farm labor contracting activity
under the FLCA. CSI arguably acted as a recruiter when it located
and contacted the workers preselected by Growers prior to assisting
them with the H-2A visa application process. CSI's maintenance of a
web platform through which prospective workers submit applications
for H-2A visa work in the United States is a means of recruiting,
albeit a passive one.  

But regardless of how the workers sent directly to Washington were
recruited, CSI's assistance with the H-2A visa application process
constituted supplying workers to Washington. CSI assisted with the
application process to broadly enable H-2A visa workers to work in
the United States. Under its contract with Defendant Sarbanand
Farms, CSI's assistance with the application process specifically
resulted in the workers going directly to Washington to work for
Defendant Sarbanand Farms.  And CSI received a fee of $85 for each
worker sent to work in Washington.

Thus, CSI engaged in farm labor contracting activity when it was
paid a fee for recruiting and supplying workers to Defendant
Sarbanand Farms for work in Washington pursuant to the contract
between CSI and Defendant Sarbanand Farms. Thus, there is no
genuine dispute that CSI acted as a farm labor contractor as
defined by the FLCA as to the workers sent directly to Washington
to work for Defendant Sarbanand Farms.

Therefore, the Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment is
granted as to these workers.

But the same cannot be said of the workers who were initially sent
to California to work for Crowne Cold Storage and Defendant Munger
Bros. before being transferred to Washington to work for Defendant
Sarbanand Farms. In order for CSI's actions toward the
approximately 500 workers who were transferred from California to
Washington by Growers to be subject to the FLCA, CSI had to receive
an additional fee for the transfer; CSI's receipt of a fee to
process the workers' visa applications prior to their working
elsewhere in the United States is insufficient. CSI did not receive
an additional fee when the workers initially sent to California
were transferred to Washington. Rather, CSI recruited and supplied
workers to California pursuant to contracts with California
entities and only received fees for its services from those
California entities.
  
Therefore, there is no genuine dispute that CSI did not engage in
farm labor contracting activity or receive a fee when these workers
were sent to Washington, and thus did not fall within the scope of
the FLCA. Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED
as to these workers.

CSI requests that summary judgment be granted in its favor on this
latter issue, as there is no genuine dispute that CSI did not
receive a fee for Growers' transfer of workers from California to
Washington, and thus Plaintiffs' FLCA claims as to these class
members must fail.  Plaintiffs have had an adequate opportunity to
establish that there is a genuine dispute of material fact on this
issue but have not offered contravening evidence or established
that such evidence may be produced in the future.  

Therefore, summary judgment is granted in favor of CSI on this
issue, and the Plaintiffs' FLCA claims are dismissed as to class
members who were initially sent to California and later transferred
to Washington, for whose transfer CSI did not receive a fee.

Violations of FLCA and Damages

The Plaintiffs allege that CSI committed three violations of the
FLCA as to each class member. CSI does not dispute that it
committed the alleged violations.

First, the Plaintiffs allege that CSI failed to obtain a farm labor
contractor's license and exhibit it to class members in 2017. CSI
admits that it did not register with L&I as a farm labor
contractor, that it did not have a farm labor contractor license in
2017, and that it did not show a farm labor contractor license to
the named Plaintiffs when they were recruited in Mexico.   

Therefore, there is no genuine dispute that CSI failed to obtain a
farm labor contractor's license and exhibit it to class members in
2017, in violation of Wash. Rev. Code Section 19.30.110(1).

Second, the Plaintiffs argue that CSI failed to provide class
members with the form prescribed by L&I containing required
employment information and disclosures. Both named Plaintiffs state
that CSI did not provide them with a document explaining the terms
and conditions of their upcoming employment. Therefore, there is no
genuine dispute that CSI failed to provide the form prescribed by
L&I to class members, in violation of Wash. Rev. Code Section
19.30.110(7).

Third, the Plaintiffs argue that CSI failed to obtain a surety
bond, to disclose the amount of its bond, and to disclose the
existence and amount of any claims against the bond. CSI admits
that it did not obtain a bond in 2017 and failed to disclose the
amount of the bond and the existence and amount of any claims
against it. Therefore, there is no genuine dispute that CSI did not
obtain a surety bond or make required disclosures to class members,
in violation of Wash. Rev. Code Section 19.30.040, 19.30.110(2).

Thus, the Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment is
GRANTED on Plaintiffs' claims that CSI committed three violations
of the FLCA per qualifying class member.

Growers' Joint and Several Liability

Under the FLCA, any person who knowingly uses the services of an
unlicensed farm labor contractor is jointly and severally liable
with the farm labor contractor to the same extent and in the same
manner as provided by the FLCA. The FLCA provides a safe harbor
provision, under which any user may rely upon either the license
issued by L&I to the farm labor contractor under  representation
that such contractor is licensed as required by this chapter.

Growers do not assert that they inspected CSI's license or obtained
L&I's representation that CSI properly held a license under the
FLCA. Rather, they argue that there is a genuine dispute as to
whether they knowingly used the services of an unlicensed farm
labor contractor, as CSI reasonably believed that it did not have
to register and the parties' relevant contracts required CSI to
maintain all necessary documentation and licensure.

Growers' efforts to determine whether CSI was properly licensed
under the FLCA are insufficient as a matter of law, and Growers'
attempts to distinguish the present case from Saucedo are
unavailing. Therefore, there is no genuine dispute about whether
Growers are jointly and severally liable for CSI's violations of
the FLCA pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code Section 19.30.200, and
Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED on this
ground.

The Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on their claims
arising under the FLCA is granted in part and denied in part.

The Plaintiffs' motion is granted as to CSI and Growers' liability
for statutory damages based on three violations of the FLCA per
class member sent directly to Washington to work for Defendant
Sarbanand Farms pursuant to a contract between Defendant Sarbanand
Farms and CSI, and for whom CSI received a fee. The Plaintiffs'
motion is denied as to CSI and Growers' liability under the FLCA
for class members who were initially sent to California pursuant to
a contract between CSI and Defendant Munger Bros. or Crowne Cold
Storage and later transferred by Growers to Washington, and for
whose transfer CSI did not receive an additional fee.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' FLCA claims as to these latter class
members are dismissed.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 13, 2019 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/yyljm5vm from Leagle.com.

Barbaro Rosas & Guadalupe Tapia, Plaintiffs, represented by Adam J.
Berger -- berger@sgb-law.com -- SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER,
Joachim Morrison, COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES, Andrea L. Schmitt,
COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES, Bonnie A. Linville, COLUMBIA LEGAL
SERVICES, 101 Yesler Way, Suite 300, Seattle, WA 98104, Lindsay
Halm -- halm@sgb-law.com -- SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER, Lori
Isley, COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES & Tony Gonzalez, COLUMBIA LEGAL
SERVICES, 101 Yesler Way, Suite 300, Seattle, WA 98104.

Sarbanand Farms LLC, Munger Bros LLC & Nidia Perez, Defendants,
represented by Theodore William Hoppe -- tad@hoppe-law.com -- HOPPE
LAW GROUP, pro hac vice, Christopher E. Hawk -- chawk@grsm.com --
GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI & Derek Allan Bishop --
dbishop@grsm.com -- GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI LLP.

CSI Visa Processing, S.C., Defendant, represented by Adam S.
Belzberg -- adam.belzberg@stoel.com -- STOEL RIVES & Christopher T.
Wall -- christopher.wall@stoel.com -- STOEL RIVES.

Washington State Employment Security Department, Interested Party,
represented by Mary Maureen Tennyson, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE.


SONRISE AT 50: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Bonanno Alleges
---------------------------------------------------------
An employment-related class action lawsuit has been filed against
Sonrise at 50 Inc. The case is captioned as JORDAN BONANNO,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. SONRISE AT 50 INC. and DOES 1-50, Defendants, Case No.
34-2019-00257842-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super., Sacramento Cty., June 5,
2019).

Sonrise at 50 Inc. is an corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the State of California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

         Eric B. Kingsley, Esq.
         KINGSLEY & KINGSLEY, APC
         16133 Ventura Blvd., Suite 1200
         Encino, CA 91436
         Telephone: (818) 990-8300
         Facsimile: (818) 990-2903
         E-mail: eric@kingsleykingsley.com


SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: 7th Cir. Remands J. Miller's BIPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, issued an
Opinion remanding to the District Court the case captioned JENNIFER
MILLER, SCOTT POOLE, and KEVIN ENGLUND, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO., Defendant-Appellee, DAVID JOHNSON,
individually and on behalf of a class, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
UNITED AIRLINES, INC., and UNITED CONTINENTAL HOLDINGS, INC.,
Defendants-Appellants. Nos. 18-3476, 19-1785. (7th Cir.).

The Seventh Circuit has consolidated two appeals that pose a common
question: whether persons who contend that air carriers have
violated state law by using biometric identification in the
workplace must present these contentions to an adjustment board
under the Railway Labor Act (RLA), which applies to air carriers as
well as railroads.  

The claims in each suit arise under the Biometric Information
Privacy Act (BIPA), which Illinois adopted in 2008. This law
applies to all biometric identifiers, which the statute defines to
include fingerprints.   

Before obtaining any fingerprint, a private entity must inform the
subject or the subject's legally authorized representative in
writing about several things, such as the purpose of collecting the
data and how long they will be kept, and obtain the consent of the
subject or authorized representative. The private entity also must
establish and make available to the public a protocol for retaining
and handling biometric data, which must be destroyed when the
initial purpose for collecting or obtaining such identifiers or
information has been satisfied or within 3 years of the
individual's last interaction with the private entity, whichever
occurs first.

Both Southwest Airlines and United Airlines maintain timekeeping
systems that require workers to clock in and out with their
fingerprints.

The Plaintiffs contend that the air carriers implemented these
systems without their consent, failed to publish protocols, and use
third-party vendors to implement the systems, which plaintiffs call
a forbidden disclosure.

Southwest and United contend that the plaintiffs' unions have
consented ither expressly or through the collective bargaining
agreements' management-rights clausesand that any required notice
has been provided to the unions.  

Judge Aspen found that the plaintiffs have standing under Article
III but dismissed the suit against Southwest Airlines for improper
venue. The Court made clear, however, that the suit did not belong
in state court or some other federal district court; he held,
rather, that it belongs to an adjustment board under the Railway
Labor Act and that any attempt by Illinois to give workers rights
to bypass their union and deal directly with an air carrier is
preempted by federal law. Thus dismissal has nothing to do with
venue.  

Dismissal should have been labeled either as a judgment on the
pleadings, or a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,
as this circuit's decisions suggest.It is unnecessary to do so
here, for either a substantive or a jurisdictional label ends the
litigation between these parties and forecloses its continuation in
any other judicial forum.

The suit against United Airlines was filed in state court and
removed to federal court on two theories: federal-question
jurisdiction under the Railway Labor Act plus removal jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1453, part of the Class Action Fairness Act
(CAFA).

The class, which wants to litigate in state court, protested,
observing that if there is no federal jurisdiction then the suit
must be remanded.  Judge Kendall agreed.  

The remand of a suit removed under the Class Action Fairness Act is
appealable with judicial permission, 28 U.S.C. Section1453(c)(1),
and United asked us to accept its appeal.

The statute makes appellate authority turn on removal under the
Class Action Fairness Act, not on whether the appeal presents an
issue about the interpretation of that statute.  

A class action as defined in 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(1) may be
removed from state to federal court. Section 1332(d) creates
federal jurisdiction if a class suit has an amount in controversy
exceeding $5 million and at least one member of the class has a
citizenship different from that of the defendants. Given the size
of the class, more than 4,000 workers in Illinois alone use
fingerprints to clock in and out and the penalties provided by
state law, the controversy exceeds $5 million.   

United is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in Illinois, so if even one person who works for United in
Illinois, uses fingerprints to clock in and out, and is a citizen
of any state other than Delaware or Illinois, the requirement of
minimal diversity is met. It seems likely to us that at least one
person domiciled in southern Wisconsin or northwest Indiana works
for United at O'Hare Airport, which is in commuting distance from
both states. But, for reasons that United has not explained, its
notice of removal does not assert this. Surely United knows where
its workers live, and it may even know their domicile which is not
always the state of residence, but it did not put that information
in its notice of removal, which is therefore deficient.

The class representative tells us that he wants the class limited
to citizens of Illinois. It is far from clear that this is
appropriate. The state law applies to private entities that collect
biometric data in Illinois; the statute does not purport to exclude
people who work in Illinois, provide biometric data in Illinois,
but are domiciled in other states. Nor is it clear that the class
was so limited on the date of removal and post-removal amendments
to a complaint or other papers do not eliminate jurisdiction proper
at the time of removal. Still, the shortcoming in United's
allegations of citizenship remains as a potential obstacle.

After these problems were pointed out at oral argument, United
filed a jurisdictional supplement, invoking 28 U.S.C. Section 1653.
In addition to wrongly supposing that the suit challenges its
employment practices nationwide which is not possible, as the state
statute is limited to Illinois the supplemental filing continues to
refer to the residence rather than the citizenship of United's
Illinois workforce.

Given the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that the federal-question
jurisdiction supports removal, the Court needs not remand for the
district court to explore the question whether, on the date the
case was removed, one class member was a citizen of Wisconsin or
Indiana, or conceivably some third state other than Illinois or
Delaware say, a citizen of California temporarily detailed to work
at O'Hare.

In Miller v. Southwest Airlines, No. 18-3476, the judgment of the
district court is affirmed. In Johnson v. United Airlines, No.
19-1785, the judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded with
instructions to refer the parties' dispute to an adjustment board.

A full-text copy of the Seventh Circuit's June 13, 2019 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y2jmr9y9from Leagle.com.

Melissa A. Siebert -- masiebert@shb.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

Steven Alan Hart -- shart@hmelegal.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Matthew C. Wolfe -- mwolfe@shb.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

Jonathon Studer -- jstuder@shb.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

John Shannon Marrese, 22 W Washington St Ste 1600, Chicago, IL,
60602-1615, for Plaintiff-Appellant.


SPANCRETE INC: Dokey Seeks Proper Overtime Pay
----------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Spancrete, Inc. for
alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the
Wisconsin's Wage Payment and Collection Laws. The case is captioned
DANIEL DOKEY, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. SPANCRETE, INC, Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-00921-NJ (E.D. Wis., June 24, 2019). Plaintiff Daniel Dokey
alleges that Spancrete, Inc. has operated an unlawful compensation
system that deprived current and former hourly-paid, non-exempt
employees of their wages earned for all compensable work performed
each workweek, including at an overtime rate of pay for each hour
worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. Specifically,
Spancrete's unlawful compensation system failed to include all
forms of non-discretionary compensation, such as monetary bonuses,
commissions, incentives, awards, and/or other rewards, in all
current and former hourly-paid, non-exempt employees' regular rates
of pay for overtime calculation purposes.

Spancrete, Inc. is a Wisconsin entity with a principal address of
N16 W23415 Stoneridge Drive, Waukesha, Wisconsin. It owns,
operates, and manages manufacturing facilities and locations in the
states of Florida, Illinois, and Wisconsin. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     James A. Walcheske, Esq.
     Scott S. Luzi, Esq.
     Matthew J. Tobin, Esq.
     WALCHESKE & LUZI, LLC
     15850 W. Bluemound Rd., Suite 304
     Brookfield, WI 53005
     Telephone: (262) 780-1953
     Facsimile: (262) 565-6469
     E-mail: jwalcheske@walcheskeluzi.com
             sluzi@walcheskeluzi.com
             mtobin@walcheskeluzi.com


SPIRIT AIRLINES: Roman et al. Sue over "Shortcut Security" Option
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Spirit Airlines,
Inc. for unjust enrichment, breach of contract and for violation of
the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. The case is
captioned YARINELL ROMAN, PAUL ROBERTS II, and JOAQUIN RIVERA on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. SPIRIT AIRLINES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 0:19-cv-61461-RAR
(S.D. Fla., June 12, 2019).

Spirit has offered its customers the unique opportunity to enter
into a contract to skip the general population airport security
line by purchasing Spirit's "Shortcut Security" option for $6 at
designated airports in the United States. Plaintiffs purchased
"Shortcut Security" option at a Spirit electronic kiosk and at the
Spirit agent staffed desk at the Orlando International Airport.
However, Plaintiffs learned that there is no Spirit "Shortcut
Security" line available at the Orlando International Airport when
they attempted to use their "Shortcut Security" access at the
terminal designated for Spirit flights.

In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Spirit's conduct
constitutes breach of contract, unfair methods of competition,
unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices because there was no designated Shortcut Security line at
the Orlando International Airport or other airports serviced by
Spirit.

Headquartered in Florida, Spirit Airlines is a budget airline that
offers very low basic fares. To make up for lost profits, the
airline offers consumers the opportunity to contract for further
amenities or services. Bag fees, seat selection, and food and
beverage fees are just a few of the ways that Spirit uses add on
fees to increase its profit margin. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Brian W. Warwick, Esq.
     Janet R. Varnell, Esq.
     VARNELL & WARWICK, P.A.
     P.O. Box 1870
     Lady Lake, FL 32158
     Telephone: (352) 753-8600
     Facsimile: (352) 504-3301
     E-mail: bwarwick@varnellandwarwick.com

             - and -

     Gregory P. Smith, Esq.
     OLDHAM & SMITH
     P.O. Box 1012
     Tavares, FL 32778
     Telephone: (352) 343-4090
     Facsimile: (352) 742-4900
     E-mail: greg@oldhamsmith.com
             joy@oldhamsmith.com


ST. RENATUS LLC: Walsh et al. Sue over Apollonia Merger Deal
------------------------------------------------------------
TIM WALSH; JULIE WALSH; GREGORY KETCHUM; PATRICIA KETCHUM; PETER
MURPHY; CARY BASNAR; and FRANC BACA, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CLIFFORD M. BUCHHOLZ;
MICHAEL J. HEROLD; RYANA . MARTORANO; MICK A. OCCHIATO; FRANK R.
RAMIREZ; BRENT M. T. KEELE; STEPHEN D. TEBO; JERRY MORGENSEN; JAMES
L. PARKE, JOSEPH D. SCHOFIELD, III; ST. RENATUS, LLC; and SR
MERGERSUB, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 27-cv-19-9418 (D. Minn., June
3, 2019) is a class action brought by the Plaintiffs on behalf of
holders of common units of Apollonia, LLC against St. Renatus, LLC,
SR Merger Sub, LLC, the directors, managers and governors of St.
Renatus, arising out of the agreement to sell Apollonia to St.
Renatus at an unfair price of 200,00 common units of St. Renatus.

According to the complaint, St. Renatus is engaged in a scheme to
eliminate royalty obligations by acquiring Apollonia at a depressed
value. The plan was made possible through the Defendants'
successful efforts to eliminate the significant voting and equity
interest held by Apllonia founders, including Mark D. Kollar,
through threats of lawsuits and other unsavory tactics, which
cleared the way for Apollonia's Board of Governors and unitholder
approval of the Merger. St. Renatus' proposal, which was
rubber-stamped by a complicit Apollonia Board, called for Apollonia
unitholders collectively to receive 200,000 of St. Renatus units.

On March 29, 2019, Apollonia solicited votes from its unitholders
on the approval of the Merger via the Proxy. The Proxy contained
materially misleading information and failed to disclose additional
material information. The Proxy failed to disclose material
information pertaining: (i) conflicts of interest among members of
Apollonia's Board; (ii) financial analyses performed by Palladian
Valuation, LLC, in support of its fairness opinion; (iii) St.
Renatus forecasts Palladian relied upon for its analyses; and (iv)
the process that led to the Meger. The Merger is designed to
unlawfully divest Apollonia unitholders of Appollonia's valuable
assets for grossly inadequate consideration.

St. Renatus, LLC develops manufactures needle-free dental
anesthetic products. It offers Kovanaze, a dental anesthetic nasal
spray. The company was incorporated in 2006 and is based in Fort
Collins, Colorado. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Daniel C. Hedlund, Esq.
          David A. Goodwin, Esq.
          GUSTAFSON GLUEK PLLC
          120 South Sixth Street, Suite 2600
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 333-8844
          E-mail: dhedlund@gustafsongluek.com
                  dgoodwin@gustafsongluek.com


STATER BROS: Removes Biggers Suit to C.D. California
----------------------------------------------------
The Defendant in the case of KATRINA BIGGERS, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. STATER BROS.
MARKETS; and DOES 1-50, Defendants, filed a notice to remove the
lawsuit from the Superior Court of the State of California, County
of San Bernardino (Case No. CIVDS1914074) to the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California on June 13, 2019. The
clerk of court for the Central District of California assigned Case
No. 5:19-cv-01097. The case is assigned to Judge S James Otero and
referred to Magistrate Kenly Kiya Kato.

Stater Bros. Markets, Inc. owns and operates a chain of
supermarkets. The company was founded in 1936 and is based in San
Bernardino, California. Stater Bros. Markets, Inc. operates as a
subsidiary of Stater Bros. Holdings Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

         Brendan W. Brandt, Esq.
         Jeff T. Olsen, Esq.
         John M. Soliman, Esq.
         Ankit H. Bhakta, Esq.
         VARNER & BRANDT LLP
         3750 University Avenue, Suite 610
         Riverside, CA 92501
         Telephone: (951) 274-7777
         Facsimile: (951) 274-7770
         E-mail: Brendan.Brandt@varnerbrandt.com
                 Jeff.Olsen@varnerbrandt.com
                 John.Soliman@varnerbrandt.com
                 Ankit.Bhakta@varnerbrandt.com


STEELCASE INC: Web Site Not Accessible to Blind, Burbon Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Steelcase, Inc. for
alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
the New York Human Rights Law (NYHRL), and the New York City Human
Rights Law (NYCHRL). The case is captioned LUC BURBON AND ON BEHALF
OF ALL OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs, v. STEELCASE
INC. Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-05877 (S.D.N.Y., June 21, 2019).
Plaintiff Luc Burbon alleges that Steelcase, Inc. has violated the
ADA, the NYHRL, and the NYCHRL by failing to design, construct,
maintain, and operate its website to be fully accessible to and
independently usable by Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired people.

Steelcase, Inc. operates its website across the United States, and
also owns and operates its showroom location in New York City. Its
website provides consumers with access to an array of goods and
services including its retail store locations, the ability to
search and access furniture images, register an online account,
find an authorized dealer, view design resources and other media,
shop for brands and merchandise in online store, complete contact
form, subscribe to receive details about sales and new products,
participate in other social interactive experiences and to learn
about other important information. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Avi A. Naveh, Esq.
     LAW OFFICE OF AVI A. NAVEH, ESQ.
     175 Varick Street, 3rd Floor
     New York, NY 10014
     Telephone: (646) 881-4471
     Facsimile: (661) 430-4471
     E-mail: avi@navehlaw.com

             - and -

     Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
     Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
     GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
     150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
     New York, NY 10003
     Telephone: (212) 228-9795
     Facsimile: (212) 982-6284
     E-mail: nyjg@aol.com
             danalgottlieb@aol.com


STONE MOUNTAIN: Misrepresents Synthetic Brand Handbags as Leather
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case, Thomas Paciorkowski, individually and on behalf of those
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Stone Mountain USA, Corp.,
Stone Mountain USA, LLC., Sam's West, Inc., Sam's East, Inc., and
Walmart, Inc., the Defendants, Case No. HUD-L-002281-19 (N.J.
Super., June 6, 2019), alleges that the Defendants sell Stone
Mountain brand handbags as leather that were actually 100%
synthetic.  The complaint alleges causes of action based on
Defendants' misrepresentations and seeks relief for a class that
purchased those handbags.

On April 25, 2017, the Plaintiff received an unsolicited email from
Sam's Club, advertising selected merchandise as "Shocking Values."
One of those "Shocking Values" was a "Stone Mountain Talia Leather
Bag in a Bag Tote" advertised at only $16.88.

After the Plaintiff clicked on the link in the email, the Plaintiff
was directed to a Sam's Club web page to place an order. The
Plaintiff then placed an order for one of the Stone Mountain Bags.
the Plaintiff's credit card was charged $18.04 - $16.88 for the
item and $1.16 for tax.

When the order arrived at the Plaintiff's home, the Stone Mountain
Bag had two tags attached. One of the tags contained a UPC code
848297064790 and the words "LEATHER / CUIR" at the bottom. CUIR in
French means "leather."

The same tag contained a Suggested Retail price of $169.00,
reinforcing the belief that the Plaintiff received a "Shocking
Value" by paying only 1/10th the value of the Bag.  The Plaintiff
gave the Bag to his wife. After she used the Bag for only a few
months, the strap broke and the Bag was no longer usable.

After the strap broke, the Plaintiff had the Bag analyzed by the
Leather Research Laboratory at the University of Cincinnati in
Cincinnati, Ohio.

The Leather Research Laboratory analyzed the material the Bag was
constructed of and found it was not leather, but rather – 100%
synthetic.

The Leather Research Laboratory tested different parts of the Bag,
including the front, the back, the shoulder strap, and even the
snap/clasp. The Bag contained no leather, the lawsuit says.

Stone Mountain USA Corp and Stone Mountain USA LLC operate jointly
designing, manufacturing, and selling, leather handbags. Stone
Mountain has its distribution facility in South Brunswick, New
Jersey.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the Class are:

          Dean R. Maglione, Esq.
          THE MAGLIONE FIRM, P.C.
          186 Clinton Ave.
          Newark, N.J. 07108
          Telephone: (973) 645-0777
          E-mail: dean@themaglionefirm.com

STONE POINT: Spinner Sues over Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Estate Charges
------------------------------------------------------------------
SPINNER CONSULTING LLC, the Plaintiff, v. STONE POINT CAPITAL LLC,
the Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-13471 (D.N.J., June 6, 2019),
alleges that Stone Point, an affiliate of Bankruptcy Management
Solutions, Inc. ("BMS"), has participated in a conspiracy with BMS
and BMS's two largest competitors -- Epiq and TrusteSolutions -- to
fix the manner of charging Chapter 7 bankruptcy estates for
bankruptcy support services, in violation of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. section 1.

The conspiracy, which one bankruptcy trustee has termed "a train
robbery," has unlawfully reduced competition and extracted
excessive, if not exorbitant, fees from the Estates. Spinner is
bringing this action as a class action, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23, on behalf of itself and a class of persons
similarly situated.

BMS has only limited competition in the national market for
bankruptcy support services. Aas measured by the number of Trustees
in the United States, BMS has about a 50 percent share, Epiq has
about a 35 percent share and TrusteSolutions has about a 15 percent
share of the national market for bankruptcy support services. BMS
requires Trustees who use its services to deposit the funds of the
Estates that they administer at a partner bank of BMS.  According
to the complaint, Spinner, as a successor in interest to the Robert
Fusari Estate. No one is any closer to the damage that the
conspiracy caused to the Fusari Estate than Spinner. Spinner will
efficiently enforce the antitrust law. No other person has a
greater incentive and ability to enforce the antitrust law with
respect to this violation.

As a proximate result of the anti-competitive activities of Stone
Point in violation of 15 U.S.C. section 1, Spinner has sustained
damages to its business and property in an amount to be determined
by the trier of fact in this action.

Spinner has not suffered any injury asserted in this action based
upon any (I) conduct of the government, (ii) conduct of any
conspirator that the government compels, or (iii) conduct of any
conspirator in petitioning the government. Spinner seeks to recover
compensatory damages, prejudgment interest, treble damages, costs
and reasonable attorneys' fees.

Spinner, a limited liability company organized and existing under
the laws of the State of New Jersey, acquired the property that had
vested in Fusari pursuant to an agreement with Fusari dated as of
July 27, 2018.  In general terms, the Estate consists of the
property of the debtor at the time of the filing of the petition
and the property resulting from it.

Upon the filing of such a petition, the Office of the United States
Trustee, a Division of the United States Department of Justice
("U.S. Trustee"), appoints a Trustee from the private sector to
administer the Estate. The Estate compensates the Trustee for this
service, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Ronald. D. Coleman, Esq.
          MANDELBAUM SALSBURG P.C.
          3 Becker Farm Road
          Roseland, NJ 07068
          Telephone: (973) 295-4600

               - and -

          Laura Scileppi, Esq.
          DUNNEGAN & SCILEPPI LLC
          350 Fifth Avenue
          New York, NY 10118
          Telephone: (212) 332-8300



SUN TAN: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Caraboolad Suit Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------
RYAN CARABOOLAD, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SUN TAN CITY, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 3:19-cv-00444-CRS (W.D. Ky., June 18, 2019) seeks to stop the
Defendant's practice of making unsolicited calls.

Sun Tan City, LLC owns and operates a chain of tanning salons in
the United States. It offers moisturizers, facial and sunless
tanning lotions, tan extenders, and sun and sunless tanning
services. The company was founded in 1999 and is based in
Louisville, Kentucky. It has locations in Georgia, Idaho, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, New York,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Larry Ashlock, Esq.
          ASHLOCK LAW GROUP, PLLC
          236 W. Dixie Ave.
          Elizabethtown, KY 42701
          Telephone (270) 360-0470
          E-mail: Larry@AshlockLawGroup.com

               - and -

          Stefan Coleman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF STEFAN COLEMAN, P.A.
          201 S. Biscayne Blvd, 28th Fl
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (877) 333-9427
          Facsimile: (888) 498-8946
          E-mail: law@stefancoleman.com

               - and -

          Avi R. Kaufman, Esq.
          KAUFMAN P.A.
          400 NW 26 th Street
          Miami, FL 33127
          Telephone: (305) 469-5881
          E-mail: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com


TARO PHARMA: Continues to Defend Speakes Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------
Taro Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. said in its Form 20-F report
filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on June 20,
2019, for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2019, that the company
continues to defend a class action suit entitled, Speakes v. Taro
Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd.

The Company and two of its former officers are named as defendants
in a putative shareholder class action entitled Speakes v. Taro
Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd., filed October 25, 2016, which is
now pending in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York and asserts claims under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") against all
defendants and Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act against the
individual defendants.  

It generally alleges that the defendants made material
misstatements and omissions in connection with an alleged
conspiracy to fix drug prices.  

On September 24, 2018, the Court granted in part and denied in part
the Company's motion to dismiss.

Taro Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., a science-based pharmaceutical
company, engages in the development, manufacture, and marketing of
pharmaceutical products in the United States, Canada, Israel, and
internationally. The company was founded in 1959 and is based in
Haifa Bay, Israel. Taro Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. is a
subsidiary of Alkaloida Chemical Company Zrt.


TEMPLE PLAZA HOTEL: Doe, Coleman Seek Minimum Wage, OT Pay
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Temple Plaza Hotel,
Inc. d/b/a Bouzouki Club Famous Door II, Inc., and Dennis
Kefallinos for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 (FLSA). The case is captioned JANE DOE, and AMI COLEMAN, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. TEMPLE PLAZA HOTEL, INC., d/b/a BOUZOUKI CLUB FAMOUS DOOR II,
INC., and DENNIS KEFALLINOS, Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-11854-VAR-EAS (E.D. Mich., June 24, 2019). Plaintiffs
allege that the Defendants violated the FLSA by failing to pay them
and the Class members for all hours worked, by utilizing an
improper tip-pooling arrangement, by failing to pay minimum wage
for hours worked up to 40 per week, and by failing to pay one and
one-half times minimum wage for hours worked in excess of 40 per
week.

Temple Plaza Hotel, Inc., d/b/a Bouzouki Club, is a domestic profit
corporation with its place of business in Detroit, Michigan.
Kefallinos is the resident agent, owner, officer, and principal
shareholder of Bouzouki's, and is responsible for managing
Bouzouki's day-to-day operations and setting Bouzouki's
compensation policies. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Maia Johnson Braun, Esq.
     David A. Hardesty, Esq.
     GOLD STAR LAW, P.C.
     2701 Troy Center Dr., Ste. 400
     Troy, MI 48084
     Telephone: (248) 275-5200
     E-mail: mjohnson@goldstarlaw.com
             dhardesty@goldstarlaw.com


TEVA PHARMA: ADS Price Artificially Inflated, Pension Fund Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Teva Pharmaceutical
Industries Ltd and certain of the Company's executive officers for
alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The case
is captioned EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF THE CITY OF ST.
PETERSBURG, FLORIDA, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, vs. TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES
LTD., KARE SCHULTZ, and MICHAEL MCCLELLAN, Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-02711-CMR (E.D. Pa., June 21, 2019).

Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of all persons or entities
who purchased or otherwise acquired shares of Teva American
Depositary Shares (ADS) between Aug. 4, 2017 and May 10, 2019,
inclusive (Class period). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants engaged
in a fraudulent scheme to artificially inflate the company's share
price. As a result of the fraud, the company has lost a substantial
portion of its value and its investors have incurred substantial
losses.  

This case arises from Teva's consistent of having engaged in any
anticompetitive practices, including colluding and conspiring with
competitors in the U.S. generic drug industry to allocate market
share and to raise, fix, and maintain the prices of over 100
generic drugs. Teva's public denials were materially false and
misleading. Unbeknownst to investors during the Class period, Teva
was not only extensively involved, but the central participant, in
a massive price-fixing scheme in the generic drug industry. The
full extent of Teva's years-long lies and extensive involvement in
the price-fixing conspiracy was not fully revealed until May 10,
2019, when a coalition of 44 states filed a massive, 524-page
complaint detailing how Teva was a central and "consistent
participant" in a conspiracy among nearly twenty pharmaceutical
companies to allocate market share and raise, fix, and maintain the
prices of hundreds of generic drugs. As a result of the new
information disclosed in the May 2019 State Attorneys General
complaint, the price of Teva ADS declined by nearly 15%, falling
from a closing price of $14.36 per share on May 10, 2019, to $12.23
per share on May 13, 2019. Due to the Defendants' wrongful acts,
false and misleading statements and omissions, and the sharp
decline in the market value of the company's ADS during the Class
period, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered significant
losses and damages.

Founded in 1901 and headquartered in Israel, Teva develops,
manufactures, markets, and distributes generic drugs. Its US
subsidiary, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., is incorporated in
Delaware and maintains its executive offices at 1090 Horsham Road,
North Wales, Pennsylvania. Teva ADS are listed on the New York
Stock Exchange under the ticker "TEVA." [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     David M. Promisloff, Esq.
     PROMISLOFF LAW, P.C.
     5 Great Valley Parkway, Suite 210
     Malvern, PA 19355
     Telephone: (215) 259-5156
     Facsimile: (215) 600-2642
     E-mail: David@prolawpa.com

             - and -

     Joseph E. White III, Esq.
     Lester R. Hooker, Esq.
     SAXENA WHITE P.A.
     150 East Palmetto Park Road, Suite 600
     Boca Raton, FL 33432
     Telephone: (561) 394-3399
     Facsimile: (561) 394-3382
     E-mail: jwhite@saxenawhite.com
             lhooker@saxenawhite.com

             - and -

     David R. Kaplan, Esq.
     12750 High Bluff Drive, Suite 475
     San Diego, CA 92130
     Telephone: (858) 997-0860
     Facsimile: (858) 369-0096
     E-mail: dkaplan@saxenawhite.com


TINDER INC: Faces Troia Suit in Eastern District of Missouri
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Tinder, Inc. The case
is captioned as VINNY TROIA, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. TINDER, INC.; MATCH GROUP,
LLC; MATCH GROUP, INC.; and DOES 1-10, Defendants, Case No.
4:19-cv01647-RLW (E.D. Mo., June 6, 2019). The case is assigned to
District Judge Ronnie L. White.

Tinder is a matchmaking mobile app, which connects with users'
Facebook profiles to provide pictures and ages for other users to
view. Using GPS technology, users can set a specific radius, and
they will have the option to match with anyone that is within that
distance. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel F. Harvath, Esq.
          HARVATH LAW GROUP, LLC
          75 W. Lockwood, Suite 1
          St. Louis, MO 63119
          Telephone: (314) 550-3717
          E-mail: dharvath@harvathlawgroup.com


TOTAL FIRE: Troia Sues over Gender & Race Discrimination
--------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL TROIA, the Plaintiff, v. TFP1 INC. D/B/A TOTAL FIRE
PROTECTION, ROBERT CATALANO individually and in his official
capacity, ANTONIO BIONDI individually and in his official capacity,
and FABIO MIGLIACCIO individually and in his official capacity, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-03400 (E.D.N.Y., June 7, 2019),
contends that the Plaintiff suffered as a result of being exposed
to a sex/gender discrimination, race discrimination, national
origin discrimination, sexual harassment, hostile work environment,
retaliation, and wrongful termination, pursuant to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Executive Law, and the
New York City Human Rights Law.

Beginning in or around April 2018, the Plaintiff began making
complaints to Defendant's Human Resources Department that he was
being discriminated against by Defendant on the basis of his
gender. Due to the fact that Biondi, one of his harassers, was the
head of the Human Resources Department of Total Fire, Troia
understood that all of his complaints to Human Resources were
futile.

On or around May 4, 2018, Migliaccio called Plaintiff Troia to
harass him about a contract that was created for a client. Total
Fire never properly trained Troia to generate contracts for
clients. When Troia tried to explain this to Migliaccio via
telephone, Migliaccio began screaming at Troia and using
profanities.

Due to the ongoing harassment and Total Fire's obvious intent to
stop the continuing harassment of Troia, Troia became extremely
emotionally distressed and saddened by Migliaccio's verbal attack.

Troia decided to step out of the office for his fifteen-minute
break to cool down after he was berated by Defendant Migliaccio
over the phone. The Plaintiff immediately contacted one of the
company's owners, Catalano to inform him that he had been harassed
by the Defendants.

Another reason Plaintiff took his 15-minute break was so that he
could call Catalano outside of the office environment where it was
safer for him to voice his complaints without his harassers notice
and to avoid his coworkers from hearing the conversation, the
lawsuit says.

The Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all persons similarly
situated, claims a continuous practice of discrimination and claims
a continuing violations and makes all claims under the continuing
violations doctrine. The Plaintiff claims that Defendants
discriminated against and terminated Plaintiff because of his race,
gender, national origin, and because he complained or opposed the
unlawful conduct of Defendants related to the protected classes. As
a result of Defendants' continued harassment of Plaintiff, he
suffered numerous injuries including physical, economic, and
emotional damages.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Kelly L. O'Connell, Esq.
          DEREK SMITH LAW GROUP, PLLC
          701 Brickell Avenue, Suite 1310
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: 305-946-1884
          E-mail: kelly@dereksmithlaw.com

TOUGH MUDDER: Court Dismisses L. Pazol's Suit
---------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case
captioned LISA C. PAZOL, MARIA C. NEWMAN, LISA RUSS, and AUDREY J.
BENNET, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. TOUGH MUDDER INCORPORATED, TOUGH MUDDER, LLC, and BK
BRIDGE EVENTS, LLC, Defendants. Civil Action No. 19-40010-TSH. (D.
Mass.).

Tough Mudder now moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for breach of
contract (Count I), breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing (Count II), unjust enrichment (Count (III), violations of
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A (Counts IV and VII), and declaratory
judgment (Count VIII).

Lisa C. Pazol, Maria A. Newman, Lisa Russ, and Audrey J. Bennet
(Plaintiffs) bring this action asserting several claims against
Tough Mudder Inc. (Tough Mudder) resulting from its failure to hold
an event in the advertised location and the subsequent mediation of
those claims, which resulted in a settlement.

Counts I, II, III, & IV

Counts I, II, III, and IV are premised on Tough Mudder's conduct in
the underlying dispute which was referred to mediation. As noted
above, that mediation resulted in a Settlement Agreement. Tough
Mudder agreed to pay Plaintiffs $225,000  and the parties agreed
the settlement completely resolved any claims and disputes
regarding the Event. Tough Mudder concedes that it breached the
Settlement Agreement, but the parties disagree about the proper
remedy. Tough Mudder believes that Plaintiffs' remedy is simply to
enforce the Settlement Agreement. Plaintiffs argue that Tough
Mudder forfeited its right to enforce the arbitration agreement
because it failed to satisfy the necessary precondition to mediate
in good faith and that they should therefore be allowed to pursue
the underlying claims in court as a class.

Under Massachusetts law, every contract implies good faith and fair
dealing between the parties to it.

There is no evidence to suggest that Tough Mudder did not mediate
in good faith. The parties reached a mutually acceptable agreement,
which indicates that the parties mediated in good faith.

The Plaintiffs argue that Tough Mudder's conduct since mediation
has been uncooperative and constitutes bad faith. Assuming, for the
sake of argument, that Tough Mudder's conduct after mediation has
been improper, there is no evidence that Tough Mudder entered the
settlement agreement without the intention to pay or that its
motive for failing to pay evidenced bad faith. Instead, Tough
Mudder has assured this Court that it will not dissipate assets to
avoid payment and agreed to pay Plaintiffs the settlement amount
plus statutory interest.  

The Plaintiffs may not attempt to relitigate their claims that were
already resolved in mediation. Instead, their remedy is to enforce
the Settlement Agreement. Consequently, Counts I, II, III, and IV
are dismissed.

Count VIII

The Plaintiffs seek declaratory judgment that they may proceed with
Counts I, II, III, and IV in court as a class rather than
individually in arbitration. This Court has already upheld the
arbitration agreement. As noted above, because there is no evidence
that Tough Mudder pursued mediation in bad faith, there is no need
to reexamine whether the arbitration agreement is enforceable.

Count VII

Massachusetts law protects consumers from unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce. Plaintiffs
argue that Tough Mudder's conduct during and after mediation,
coupled with its failure to pay the settlement agreement,
constitutes a violation of Chapter 93A.

The Plaintiffs have alleged no facts from which the Court can infer
that Tough Mudder's breach had the requisite extortionate quality
to give rise to a Chapter 93A claim. Instead, after the breach,
Tough Mudder offered to pay the settlement amount plus statutory
interest, which is the appropriate remedy here.

Tough Mudder's motion is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 13, 2019 Order and
Memorandum is available at https://tinyurl.com/yx923h8z from
Leagle.com.

Lisa C. Pazol, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, Maria C. Newman, on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, Lisa Russ, on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated & Audrey J. Bennett, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Barry M.
Altman, Altman & Altman, 404 Main Street, Wilmington, MA, 01887,
James L. O'Connor, Jr., Nickless & Phillips PC & Patrick J.
Osborne, Nickless Phillips & O'Connor, 625 Main Street, Fitchburg,
MA 01420

Tough Mudder Incorporated, Tough Mudder, LLC & BK Bridge Events,
LLC, Defendants, represented by Michael J. Tuteur --
mtuteur@foley.com -- Foley & Lardner, LLP, Michael Thompson --
mxthompson@foley.com -- Foley & Lardner LLP & Olivia B. Luckett --
oluckett@foley.com -- Foley & Lardner LLP.


TOYOTA MOTORS: Still Defends Suit Over Defective Takata Airbags
---------------------------------------------------------------
Toyota Motor Corporation said in its Form 20-F report filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on June 21, 2019, for
the fiscal year ended March 31, 2019, that class actions related to
Takata's defective airbags in Mexico, Canada, Australia, Israel and
Brazil, as well as some other actions by states or territories of
the United States remain pending.

Toyota has been named as a defendant in 33 economic loss class
action lawsuits in the United States, which, together with similar
lawsuits against Takata and other automakers, have been made part
of a multi-district litigation proceeding in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, arising out of
allegations that airbag inflators manufactured by Takata are
defective.

Toyota has reached a settlement with the plaintiffs in the United
States economic loss class actions. The court approved the
settlement on October 31, 2017, and the subsequent appeals have
been withdrawn, making the settlement final.

The economic loss class action lawsuits against Toyota have been
dismissed. Toyota and other automakers have also been named in
certain class actions filed in Mexico, Canada, Australia, Israel
and Brazil, as well as some other actions by states or territories
of the United States.

Those actions have not been settled and are being litigated.

Toyota Motor Corporation designs, manufactures, assembles, and
sells passenger vehicles, minivans and commercial vehicles, and
related parts and accessories. It operates through Automotive,
Financial Services, and All Other segments. The company was founded
in 1933 and is headquartered in Toyota, Japan.


TRAVELERS COMPANIES: R-Devie et al. Sue over Insurance Payment
--------------------------------------------------------------
R-DEVIE, INC.; and JACQUELINE MITCHELL, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. THE TRAVELERS
COMPANIES INC.; TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF CONNECTICUT; THE
STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY; TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY; THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY; PHOENIX
INSURANCE COMPANY; CHARTER OAK FIRE INSURANCE; TRAVELERS PROPERTY
CASUALTY COMPANY OF AMERICA; THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF
AMERICA; and TRAVELERS CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA,
Defendants, Case No. 6:19-CV-01050-CEM-LRH (M.D. Fla., June 6,
2019) is an action against the Defendants' practice of refusing to
pay full Actual Cash Value or full total loss payment to first
party total loss insured under physical damage policies containing
comprehensive and collision coverages.

The Travelers Companies, Inc., through its subsidiaries, provides a
range of commercial and personal property, and casualty insurance
products and services to businesses, government units,
associations, and individuals in the United states and
internationally. The company distributes its products primarily
through independent agencies and brokers. The Travelers Companies,
Inc. was founded in 1853 and is based in New York, New York. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Ed Normand, Esq.
          Jake Phillips, Esq.
          NORMAND PLLC
          3165 McCrory Place, Ste. 175
          Orlando, FL 32803
          Telephone: (407) 603-6031
          E-mail: jacob.phillips@normandpllc.com
                  ed@ednormand.com
                  service@normandpllc.com

               - and -

          Christopher J. Lynch, Esq.
          HUNTER LYNCH LAW
          6915 Red Road, Suite 208
          Coral Gables, FL 33143
          Telephone: (312) 967-3653
          E-mail: clynch@hunterlynchlaw.com
                  lmartinez@hunterlynchlaw.com

               - and -

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE
          14 NE 1ST Avenue, Suite 1205
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (305) 479-2299
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, P.A.
          19495 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 607
          Aventura, FL 33180
          E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com


UNITED STATES: Attorney General Faces Soto Suit in M.D. Georgia
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against William Barr, the
Attorney General of the United States. The case is captioned as
JOSE TORRES SOTO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. WILLIAM BARR, Attorney General of
the United States; JAMES MCHENRY, Director of the Executive Office
of Immigration Review; KEVIN K MCALEENAN, Acting Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security; MARK A MORGAN, Acting Director of
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement; SEAN GALLAGHER, Director of
the ICE Atlanta Field Office; and PHIL BICKHAM, Warden of Irwin
County Detention Center, Defendants, Case No. 7:19-cv-00082-HL
(M.D. Ga., June 6, 2019).

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ivy Wang, Esq.
          201 St Charles Ave., Ste 2000
          New Orleans, LA 70170
          Telephone: (504) 486-8982
          Facsimile: (504) 486-8947
          E-mail: ivy.wang@splcenter.org

               - and -

          Michael Tan, Esq.
          125 Broad St., 18th Fl
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 519-7848
          E-mail: mtan@aclu.org

               - and -

          Daniel Werner, Esq.
          150 E Ponce De Leon Ave., Ste. 340
          Decatur, GA 30030
          Telephone: (404) 521-6700
          E-mail: daniel.werner@splcenter.org


UNITED STATES: USCIS Faces Class Action Over Immigration Files
--------------------------------------------------------------
Three immigration attorneys and two immigrants filed a class action
lawsuit on June 19 in federal court in San Francisco challenging
the Department of Homeland Security and its component agencies'
nationwide practice of failing to timely respond to requests for
immigration files under the Freedom of Information Act.  The
lawsuit seeks to afford immigrants and their lawyers with
expeditious access to the information contained in their or their
clients' immigration files, which is often critical to assessing
immigration options in the United States and potential defenses
against deportation.

When individuals request their immigration files (known as "A
files") under FOIA with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,
a component of DHS, the agency must make a determination on the
request within 20 business days.  USCIS routinely fails to provide
requested documents within 20 days, and instead can take months to
respond.  USCIS exacerbates these delays by referring certain
documents in the immigration files to another DHS component, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement for further review; ICE also
routinely fails to make timely determinations on these requests.

USCIS' backlog of FOIA requests more than doubled between FY 2015
and FY 2017.  By the end of FY 2018, USCIS reported a backlog of
41,329 pending requests; a number exceeding, by a significant
margin, the backlog of any other DHS component.  Despite growing
backlogs, neither DHS, USCIS, or ICE has allocated the resources
necessary to comply with the FOIA.

The complaint in Nightingale v. USCIS alleges that routine and
excessive delays cause unnecessary emotional and financial hardship
for noncitizens left in legal limbo while they wait to obtain
records that hold the key to assessing their immigration options in
the United States.

Lawyers for the plaintiffs are asking the Court to issue a
nationwide injunction ordering USCIS and ICE to make a
determination on all pending FOIA requests within 60 business days
of the Court's order and to respond to future FOIA requests within
the statutory period.

"USCIS and ICE must be accountable to individuals who file FOIA
requests for their own immigration case files.  These individuals
need to have a complete and accurate picture of their immigration
history to assess their options and make decisions that often have
life-long consequences for themselves and family members," stated
Claudia Valenzuela, FOIA attorney at the American Immigration
Council.

"The delays prevent our clients from obtaining information they
need to move forward with their immigration applications.  We are
asking the court to enforce the law, which requires timely
responses," said Matt Adams, legal director at the Northwest
Immigrant Rights Project.

A copy of the complaint is available at https://is.gd/ozOEzD


UNITED STEEL: Asarco Suit Transferred to District of Arizona
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit by Asarco against the United Steelworkers
and other unions was transferred from the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Texas, to the U.S. District Court for the
District of Arizona (Phoenix Division) on June 6, 2019. The
District of Arizona Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-04393-SRB
to the proceeding.  The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Susan
R. Bolton.

ASARCO seeks declaratory relief pursuant to the Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. sections 2201-2202. ASARCO requests a
declaration from the Court that it has the right to modify, up to
and including terminating, medical and prescription drug benefits
provided to certain retired employees, who retired on or after
January 1, 2007, under the terms of the January 1, 2007 Basic Labor
Agreement between ASARCO and the Unions.

The case is captioned as ASARCO LLC, the Plaintiff, vs. UNITED
STEEL, PAPER AND FORESTRY, RUBBER, MANUFACTURING, ENERGY, ALLIED
INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO, CLC;
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCALS 518, 570,
AND 602; INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE
WORKERS, LOCAL 2181; INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF BOILERMAKERS,
IRON SHIPBUILDERS, BLACKSMITH, FORGERS AND HELPERS, LOCAL 627;
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN,
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 104; INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING
ENGINEERS, LOCAL 428; MILLWRIGHTS, LOCAL 1914; UNITED ASSOCIATION
OF JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES OF THE PLUMBING AND PIPEFITTING
INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, LOCAL 741; and BRENDA
FRAZIER; the Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-02813 (Filed Oct. 23,
2018).[BN]

VERIZON: Court Stays J. Gillespie Wage & Hour Suit
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California, Sacramento Division, issued an Order further staying
action in the case captioned JESSICA GILLESPIE, individually and on
behalf of all those similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. VERIZON, an
unknown corporate entity; CELLCO PARTNERSHIP, an unknown corporate
entity; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants. Case No.
2:18-cv-02429-TLN-DB. (E.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff and Cellco stipulate and jointly request that the Court
issue an order of a further stay of these proceedings in their
entirety while the parties continue to pursue mediation and
settlement discussions.

The Complaint alleges a single cause of action for violation of
California Labor Code Section 226 based on allegations that Cellco
failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements to certain of
its non-exempt employees. Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint
adding a claim for penalties under the Private Attorneys General
Act, California Labor Code Section 2698 (PAGA).

The Court entered an order staying this action and vacating all
deadlines, pursuant to the stipulation of Plaintiff and Cellco. The
Parties stipulated that good cause existed to stay all proceedings
in this action to avoid potentially unnecessary litigation efforts
and expenses given that this action alleged class definitions and
claims that overlapped those in a similar action, Farid Harchegani
and Mohamed Elhosainy, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated v. Cellco Partnership, Inc. dba Verizon
Wireless, a Delaware Partnership; AirTouch Cellular, Inc. dba
Verizon Wireless, a California Corporation; and DOES 1-20,
inclusive, Case No. 37-2017-000199977-CU-OE-CTL (Harchegani
Action).

This action is stayed unless extended by the Court.  The stay is
without prejudice to the parties' rights to seek a further stay at
that time on any applicable grounds, including the overlap between
this action and the Harchegani Action pending in state court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 13, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3pqngaz from Leagle.com.

Jessica Gillespie, Plaintiff, represented by Dennis Hyun  --
dhyun@hyunlegal.com -- Hyun Legal, APC, Larry W. Lee --
lwlee@diversitylaw.com -- Diversity Law Group, William Lucas Marder
-- bill@polarislawgroup.com -- Polaris Law Group, LLP & Kwanporn
Tulyathan -- ktulyathan@diversitylaw.com -- Diversity Law Group.

Cellco Partnership, Defendant, represented by Allison Elizabeth
Crow -- acrow@jonesday.com -- Jones Day & Steven M. Zadravecz --
szadravecz@jonesday.com -- Jones Day.


WELLS FARGO: Faces Davis Suit over Violation of RESPA
-----------------------------------------------------
PATRICIA DAVIS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Defendant, Case No.
3:19-cv-00656-TJC-PDB (M.D. Fla., June 3, 2019) alleges violation
of the Real Estate Settlement Procedure Act. The case is assigned
to Judge Timothy J. Corrigan and referred to Magistrate Judge
Patricia D. Barksdale.

Wells Fargo Bank, National Association operates as a bank. The Bank
offers online and mobile banking, home mortgage, loans and credit,
investment and retirement, wealth management, and insurance
services. Wells Fargo Bank serves commercial, retail, and
institutional customers in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Austin James Griffin, Esq.
          328 2nd Avenue North, Suite 100
          Jacksonville Beach, FL 32250
          Telephone: (904) 372-4109
          E-mail: austin@storylawgroup.com

              - and -

          Max H. Story, Esq.
          328 2nd Avenue North, Suite 100
          Jacksonville Beach, FL 32250
          Telephone: (904) 372-4109
          Facsimile: (904) 758-5333
          E-mail: max@storylawgroup.com


ZALE DELAWARE: Court Denies Dismissal of G. Lovette's CLRA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in
the case captioned GORDON HENRY LOVETTE, Plaintiff, v. ZALE
DELAWARE, INC. Defendants. Case No. 3:18-cv-02727-L-RBB. (S.D.
Cal.).

In this putative consumer class action alleging false advertising
through a deceptive warranty agreement, the Defendant filed a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
  
According to the First Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff purchased a
diamond ring from the Defendant. The Defendant represented that the
ring came with a Zales Lifetime Diamond Commitment (Warranty) for
repair and replacement of the diamond, so long as the Plaintiff
brought the ring to the Defendant for semi-annual inspections.  The
Plaintiff purchased the ring in reliance on these representations.
At his last semi-annual inspection, the Plaintiff requested a free
repair under the Warranty because the setting became loose.  The
Defendant refused, responding that loose settings were only covered
under an extended warranty plan.  

In the operative complaint, the Plaintiff alleges violations of the
California Unfair Competition Law, California False Advertising Law
(FAL), and California Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ..
(CLRA).   

Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint

A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the
complaint. Dismissal is warranted where the complaint lacks a
cognizable legal theory. Alternatively, a complaint may be
dismissed where it presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to
plead essential facts under that theory.

Sufficiency of the Allegations

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff has not sufficiently
alleged a UCL, FAL or CLRA violation because the Warranty clearly
states that failure to make necessary repairs voids the Warranty.

The Court disagrees.

The Defendant does not dispute1 that the false advertising standard
under the UCL, FAL and CLRA is the same.  

To determine this, the Court considers whether the advertising
would mislead a reasonable consumer who is neither the most
vigilant and suspicious of advertising claims nor the most unwary
and unsophisticated, but instead is" an ordinary consumer acting
reasonably under the circumstances.  

A false advertising claim may be dismissed when it is clear from
the pleadings that a reasonable consumer would not be deceived as a
matter of law.  

In arguing that the Warranty is not deceptive as a matter of law,
Defendant requests the Court to take judicial notice of three
documents Defendant contends constitute the Warranty, a warranty
posted on its website, Plaintiff's supposed specific warranty, and
Plaintiff's semi-annual inspection slip. These documents are
neither attached nor specifically referenced in the complaint.

Generally, the Court cannot consider material outside the complaint
when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.   

However, the Court may consider evidence that is unattached to the
complaint, but on which the complaint necessarily relies' if: (1)
the complaint refers to the document (2) the document is central to
the plaintiff's claim; and (3) no party questions the authenticity
of the document. Even so, the Court may not, on the basis of
evidence outside of the Complaint, take judicial notice of facts
favorable to Defendants that could be reasonably disputed. Indeed,
the Court may consider the existence of such documents identified
by Defendant; however, the Court may not, based on those documents,
draw inferences or recognize the contents of those documents.  

The Plaintiff's claims are based on the contention that he was
deceived because material terms of the Warranty were not disclosed
at the time of purchase.  

For purposes of the Defendant's motion, the Court will consider the
sufficiency of the Plaintiff's claims based on the allegations in
the operative complaint.  

The Defendant next argues that the Plaintiff's allegations lack
specificity. The level of specificity at the pleading stage is
defined by the notice pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2). It requires only a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order
to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.

The Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that the Defendant did
not disclose the relevant terms of the Warranty at the time of
purchase but made misleading representations instead. The Defendant
represented that the Warranty covered repair and replacement of the
diamond so long as the Plaintiff complied with the semi-annual
inspection requirement.  The Plaintiff relied on the Defendant's
representations in deciding to purchase the ring.  The Defendant
did not disclose that, even if the customer complied, if the
diamond became loose in its setting, the Warranty would be voided
unless the customer immediately paid the Defendant to repair the
setting. When the setting on the Plaintiff's ring became loose, the
Defendant refused to repair it under the Warranty and refused to
sign off on the semi-annual inspection  

The Plaintiff stated sufficient facts to plausibly allege that the
Defendant's representations at the time of purchase were likely to
mislead a reasonable consumer.

Remedies Under the FAL and UCL

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff has not stated a claim
which would entitle him to restitution or injunctive relief under
the FAL or UCL. The Defendant argues the Plaintiff has not stated a
claim for injunctive relief because he has not adequately alleged
deception. This argument is rejected. The Defendant further
contends that the Plaintiff was not damaged because he did not pay
any additional money for the Warranty, and therefore is not
entitled to restitution.

The Plaintiff alleges he bought the ring from defendant over other
competitors because of the Warranty, that he would not have made
the purchase without the Warranty, and that he paid a premium for
the ring because of the Warranty.   

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 13, 2019 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/yycty554 from Leagle.com.

Gordon Henry Lovette, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Todd M. Friedman --
tfriedman@toddflaw.com -- Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C.

Zale Delaware, Inc., Defendant, represented by Dhruv Mohan Sharma
-- dsharma@mcglinchey.com -- McGlinchey Stafford.


ZULEMA CORDERO: Guereca Seeks Overtime Wages for Cleaning Techs
---------------------------------------------------------------
KIMBERLY GUERECA, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. ZULEMA CORDERO AND EDUARDO
LARA, INDIVIDUALLY, the Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00568 (D.N.M.,
June 20, 2019), alleges that Defendants violated the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the New Mexico Wage Act by failing to pay
cleaning techs who are non-exempt under the FLSA or the NM Wage Act
overtime wages as required by federal and New Mexico law.

According to the complaint, the Defendants' non-exempt cleaning
techs, including Plaintiff, worked more than 40 hours per week but
were not paid at one and one-half times their regular rates of pay
for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek.

The Plaintiff was a non-exempt employee for Defendants in Hobbs,
New Mexico during the second quarter of 2019. In the performance of
their work, the Plaintiffs handle tools, equipment, cleaning
supplies, and other materials that were manufactured or produced
outside of New Mexico, the lawsuit says.

The Defendants operate a residential and commercial cleaning
service in Hobbs, New Mexico.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiffs are:

          Douglas B. Welmaker, Esq.
          MORELAND VERRETT, P.C.
          700 West Summit Drive
          Wimberley, TX 78676
          Telephone: (512) 782-0567
          Facsimile: (512) 782-0605
          E-mail: doug@morelandlaw.com


                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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