CAR_Public/190717.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Wednesday, July 17, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 142

                            Headlines

157 MATANZA: Sued by Ortiz Over Unpaid Minimum and Overtime Wages
3M COMPANY: Butterfield Sues over Defective Combat Arms Earplugs
3M COMPANY: Coley Sues over Defective Combat Arms Earplugs
3M COMPANY: Green Sues over Defective Combat Arms Earplugs
3M COMPANY: Lester Sues over Defective Combat Arms Earplugs

3M COMPANY: Lewis Sues over Defective Combat Arms Earplugs
3M COMPANY: Sanford Sues over Defective Combat Arms Earplugs
500 ENTERPRISES: Fail to Pay Proper Overtime, Campos Suit Claims
ABBVIE INC: To Pay $16.8MM in Fraud Suit Settlement
ABC PHONES: O'Bryant Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Under FLSA

ABERCOMBIE CUSTOM: Rodriguez Seeks Unpaid Wages Under FLSA
ABSOLUTE BONDING: Court Closes M. Starace Individual Suit
ACARA SOLUTIONS: Court Denies Dismissal of S. Gerrard's TCPA Suit
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE: Saleh Suit Asserts FDCPA Violation
ADVANCED CAPITAL: Vargoshe Suit Asserts FDCPA Violation

AIRCO MECHANICAL: Faces McMahon Suit in California Superior Court
ALDI INC: Blumenthal Nordrehaug Files Class Action Lawsuit
ALTA DENA: Padilla Labor Class Suit Removed to C.D. California
AMAZON.COM: Sherman Suit Removed to C.D. California
AMERISAVE MORTGAGE: Tiefenthaler Sues over Automated Text Messages

ANHEUSER-BUSCH: Court OKs Form of Judgment in Knowlton
APPLE INC: Family Sharing Ads "Deceptive," Peters Claims
ARIZONA: Ryan Appeals Ruling in Jensen Prisoner Suit to 9th Cir.
ARTISAN AND TRUCKERS: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Peterson Suit
ASCENA RETAIL: Michaella Corp. Balks at ANN Inc. Merger

BEAZER HOMES: Aug. 5 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
BELCAMPO MEAT: Website Not Accessible to Blind, Duncan Alleges
BIOGEN INC: 1st Cir. Affirms PSLRA Suit Dismissal
BMW AMERICA: Court Grants Dismissal of G. Rickman's RICO Suit
BOEING CO: Sued By More Than 400 Pilots Over 737 MAX

BOX INC: Aug. 5 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
CALIFORNIA: McLaughlin Appeals C.D. Calif. Ruling to 9th Circuit
CAPITAL ONE: Seeks 4th Circuit Review of Ruling in McFarland Suit
CBL & ASSOCIATES: Merelles Alleges Securities Law Violation
CGJC HOLDINGS: Medina Sues Over Unpaid Minimum and Overtime Wages

CHAMBERS HOTEL: Olsen Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
CIOX HEALTH: Ortiz Appeals S.D.N.Y. Order & Judgment to 2nd Cir.
CLOUDERA INC: Faces Lazard Class Suit Over Hortonworks Merger
COCA-COLA COMPANY: 2nd Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Diet Coke Suit
COMPLIANCE ADVANTAGE: Appeals Cir. Ct. Judgment in Criswell Suit

CRAY INC: Kent Files Suit Over Hewlett Packard Merger Deal
CURADEN AG: Court Denies Bid to Stay Lyngaas Suit Pending Appeal
CVS HEALTH: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in Kroessler's Class Suit
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION: Blanchette Sues over APA Violations
DESOCIO & FUCCIO: Woodley Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York

DIGNITY HEALTH: Liang Suit Asserts FCRA Violation
DUYWASHMAN LLC: Sent Unsolicited Text Messages, Januska Suit Says
EDDIE BAUER: Harbers Suit Removed to W.D. Washington
ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICE: Jimenez Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, OT Wages
EQUITY RESIDENTIAL: Bid to Decertify Baker Classes Partly OK'd

EROS INTERNATIONAL: Montesano Files Securities Class Action in N.J.
EUGENE N. GORDON: Faces Collier's Employment Lawsuit
FCA US LLC: Shamamyan Suit Transferred to C.D. Cal.
FIRST AMERICAN: Seiwert, et al. Sue over Data Security
FIRST DATA: Dance Seeks OT Premium Pay for Account Managers

FORD MOTOR: Napier Sues Over False Fuel Economy Ratings
FOWLER PACKING: Court Sets Deposition Time Limit in Aldapa Suit
FREEDOM MORTGAGE: Franceski Stayed Pending E.D. Va. Decision
FUTURE PLASTERING: Faces Aroyo Suit in California Superior Court
GALLERY NORTH: Velez Sues Over Sales Associates' Unpaid Overtime

GOLDEN STATE: Loses Bid to Stay 3 Cases Pending Saldana Ruling
GRAND AMERICA HOTEL: Descanzo Files RICO Class Suit in Utah
GREATER BAY: Faces Dodson Suit in California Superior Court
HERON THERAPEUTICS: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
HOMELAND SECURITY: Faces Monterroza Suit over Immigration Prisons

ILLINOIS: Court Orders Payment of Filing Fee in Felton Suit
IMPERIAL, L.L.C.: Melvin Sues over Race Bias, Misclassification
INSTAFF INC: Cal. App. Affirms Arbitration Denial in Pelaez Suit
J G MOUSSE: Valdez-Padilla et al. Seek Minimum Wage, OT Pay
JEFFERSON CAPITAL: Hovanec Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York

JEFFERSON CAPITAL: Tupou Files FDCPA Suit in W.D. Washington
KENAN ADVANTAGE: Leonte Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
L'OREAL USA: Certification of UCL Class Sought in Borchenko Suit
LEE ENTERPRISES: Goldsmith Suit Transferred to E.D. Missouri
LEPAGE BAKERIES: Underpays Distributors, Bissonnette et al. Say

LEXINGTON LAW: Court Favors Arbitration in M. Starace Suit
LOVED ONES: Class of Home Health Aides Certified in Mayhew Suit
LYFT, INC: Person & Hossfeld Sue over Telemarketing Calls
MALEN & ASSOCIATES: Salamon Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
MAR PIZZA: Underpays Delivery Drivers, Beattle Suit Alleges

MARRIOTT EMPLOYEES: Payne Moves to Certify MEFCU Borrowers Class
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL: Johnson Suit Asserts TCPA Breach
MDL 2672: Castellucci's Bid to Remand Clean Diesel Suit Granted
MERCHANT EXCHANGE: Cal. App. Flips Demurrer in O'Grady Suit
METROPOLITAN LIFE: Perry Alleges ERISA Violation

MICHAEL A. DEMAYO: Hatch et al. Seek Class Certification
MONSANTO COMPANY: Armstrongs Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Ballantines Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Bradley et al Suit Transferred to N.D. Cal.
MONSANTO COMPANY: Bumpus Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup

MUREX PROPERTIES: Schalamar Complaint Dismissed Without Prejudice
NATIONAL GENERAL: Hobbs Sues Over Prerecorded Telemarketing Call
NBTY INC: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in Alvarez Consumer Suit
NEW ENGLAND COFFEE: Certification of Class Sought in Fahey Suit
NEW YORK: 2nd Cir. Appeal v. Delancer Initiated in Gulino Suit

NEW YORK: 2nd Cir. Appeal v. Gonzalez Commenced in Gulino Suit
NEW YORK: 2nd Cir. Appeal v. Marcus Filed in Gulino Class Suit
NEW YORK: 2nd Cir. Appeal v. Noble Filed in Gulino Racial Bias Suit
NEW YORK: 2nd Cir. Appeal v. Rivera Commenced in Gulino Suit
NEW YORK: 2nd Circuit Appeal v. Desire Commenced in Gulino Suit

NEW YORK: 2nd Circuit Appeal v. McCaskill Filed in Gulino Suit
NEW YORK: 2nd Circuit Appeal v. Paulino Initiated in Gulino Suit
NEW YORK: Board of Educ. Files Appeal v. Davis in Gulino Suit
NEW YORK: Educ. Board Appeals Judgment for Brito in Gulino Suit
NEW YORK: Educ. Board Appeals Judgment v. Morrison in Gulino Suit

NEW YORK: Educ. Board Appeals Judgment v. Russell in Gulino Suit
NEW YORK: Educ. Board Appeals Judgment v. Sena in Gulino Suit
NEW YORK: Educ. Board Appeals Order v. Purdue in Gulino Class Suit
NEW YORK: Educ. Board Appeals Ruling v. Mills in Gulino Suit
NEW YORK: Second Cir. Appeal v. Bouzaglou Filed in Gulino Suit

NEW YORK: Second Circuit Appeal v. Anderson Filed in Gulino Suit
NEW-TECHNOLOGY PEST: StarNet Files Suit in South Carolina
NIO INC: Gorjizadeh Calls IPO Documents "Misleading"
NOLAN TRANS: Mitchell et al. Seek OT Pay for Low-Level Staff
NUTANIX INC: Court Continues Case Management Conference in Scheller

OMNI HOTELS: Court Denies Class Certification in Lindsley Suit
PACIFIC FERTILITY: Court Refuses to Stay Litigation Pending Appeal
PAYCHEX INC: Mercier Seeks to Recoup Unpaid Wages, Damages
PENSKE MEDIA: Jones Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
PET SUPERMARKET: Faces Lezcano, et al. ADA Suit in S.D Florida

PHILIPS NORTH AMERICA: Lawrence T. Ryan Sues Over Unsolicited Fax
PIVOTAL SOFTWARE: Kleinman Sues Over Misleading Reports
PIVOTAL SOFTWARE: Rosen Law Firm Securities Class Action Suit
PORT DRAGO: Macancela Seeks Lawful Minimum Wage Under FLSA, NYLL
PORTAGE COUNTY, WI: Court Denies Class Certification in Lieberman

PROSPER TRADING: Sent Illegal Automated Texts, Perrong Claims
PROVIDENT TRUST: Court Extends Briefing Schedule in Murray
PVH CORP: Tripicchio Sues over Alleged Fraud
RECORDQUEST LLC: Smith Appeals E.D. Wiscconsin Ruling to 7th Cir.
RELIN GOLDSTEIN: Smith Files FDCPA Suit in W.D. New York

RIVERSIDE, CA: Phillips et al. Seek OT Pay for Social Workers
ROMULUS INC: Accused by Mack of Not Paying Assistant Managers' OT
SAN DIEGO: Cadena et al Sue over Asbestos Exposure
SEALED AIR: Gibbs Probes Potential Securities Law Violations
SENTRY ELECTRICAL: Lewis Moves for Certification of FLSA Class

SERVICE EMPLOYEES: Court Refuses to Vacate Arbitration Award
SOBE CLUB: Does not Pay Proper Overtime Wages, Tocco Says
SPECIALTY COMMODITIES: Court Denies Prelim OK of Quiruz Settlement
ST. HILDA'S: Violates Family and Medical Leave Act, Oehler Say
STATE FARM: F. Palmer Suit Remains in N.M. District Court

STEARNS LENDING: Bid to Certify Class Denied; Olachea Suit Nixed
STEELMASTER INDUSTRIES: Wooton's Bid to Certify FLSA Class Denied
STEIN MART: Faces Equal Access Suit in Middle District of Florida
STEWARD MELBOURNE: Hauser Suit Removed to M.D. Florida
SUNRISE CREDIT: Alvarado Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York

TEXAS ROADHOUSE: Mullen Sues over ADA Violations
TREL RESTAURANT: Fischler Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
UNIFUND CCR: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Connor FDCPA Suit
US HEALTHWORKS: Rodriguez Appeals N.D. Cal. Ruling to 9th Circuit
WAL-MART ASSOCIATES: Appeals Ruling in Magadia Suit to 9th Cir.

WAL-MART STORES: Seeks 9th Circuit Review of Ruling in Mays Suit
WAYFARE, LP: Faces Aldana & Najarro Wage-and-Hour Suit
WELSPUN INDIA: Court Stays Brower Suit Pending Settlement
WILL CTY, ILL: Lee Files Prisoner Rights Class Action
WYETH INC: Bid to Limit Recovery Up to $590.2MM in Krueger Granted

ZANKER ROAD: Faces Vazquez Suit in California Superior Court
ZUORA INC: Howard G. Smith Files Securities Fraud Class Suit

                            *********

157 MATANZA: Sued by Ortiz Over Unpaid Minimum and Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JUAN ERNESTO MEDINA ORTIZ, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated v. 157 MATANZA DELI GROCERY INC. (D/B/A 157
MATANZA DELI GROCERY), LUIS MELO, JOSE MIGUEL ORTIZ, and JUAN
CARLOS ORTIZ, Case No. 1:19-cv-05405 (S.D.N.Y., June 10, 2019),
alleges that the Plaintiff worked for the Defendants in excess of
40 hours per week, without appropriate minimum wage, overtime, and
spread of hours compensation for the hours that he worked.

157 Matanza Deli Grocery Inc., doing business as 157 Matanza Deli
Grocery, is a domestic corporation organized and existing under the
laws of the state of New York.  The Company maintains its principal
place of business in Bronx, New York.  The Individual Defendants
serve or served as owners, managers, principals, or agents of the
Defendant Corporation.

The Defendants owned, operated, or controlled a deli, located at
155 W 169th Street, in Bronx, New York, under the name "157 Matanza
Deli Grocery."  The deli located in the Highbridge section in the
Bronx.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: Michael@Faillacelaw.com


3M COMPANY: Butterfield Sues over Defective Combat Arms Earplugs
----------------------------------------------------------------
The case, ROBERT BUTTERFIELD, the Plaintiff, vs. 3M COMPANY, AEARO
HOLDINGS, LLC, AEARO INTERMEDIATE, LLC, AEARO, LLC and AEARO
TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00127-MW-GRJ
(N.D. Fla., July 2, 2019), seeks to hold 3M liable for hearing loss
or damage Plaintiff allegedly suffered while serving variously in
the U.S. military, including during foreign conflicts. The
Plaintiff contends that Combat Arms TM Earplugs, Version 2
("CAEv2") manufactured and sold by Aearo were defectively designed
and failed to provide adequate hearing protection. 3M denies these
allegations.

CAEv2, designed by Aearo in close collaboration with the U.S.
military, represented a revolutionary breakthrough in hearing
protection for service members. CAEv2 helped servicemembers better
maintain situational awareness (e.g., to hear nearby voice
commands) while also maintaining some protection from gunfire and
other higher decibel sounds. CAEv2 met the U.S. military's
specifications and helped the military provide hearing protection
to service members.

Despite knowing of the dangerous defects in its earplugs, Defendant
sold the Dual-ended Combat ArmsTM earplugs to the branches of the
U.S. military for more than a decade without providing the U.S.
military and/or Plaintiff with any warning of said defects, causing
Plaintiff and other service members similar permanent injuries,
such as hearing loss.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff is:

          Dennis G. Pantazis, Jr., Esq.
          Evan Pantazis, Esq.
          WIGGINS, CHILDS, PANTAZIS,
             FISHER, & GOLDFARB, LLC
          The Kress Building
          301 Nineteenth Street North
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Telephone: (205) 314-0530
          Facsimile: (205) 254-1500
          E-mail: dgpjr@wigginschilds.com

3M COMPANY: Coley Sues over Defective Combat Arms Earplugs
----------------------------------------------------------
The case, YVETTE COLEY, the Plaintiff, vs. 3M COMPANY, AEARO
HOLDINGS, LLC, AEARO INTERMEDIATE, LLC, AEARO, LLC and AEARO
TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-01939-MCR-HTC
(N.D. Fla., July 2, 2019), seeks to hold 3M liable for hearing loss
or damage Plaintiff allegedly suffered while serving variously in
the U.S. military, including during foreign conflicts. The
Plaintiff contends that Combat Arms TM Earplugs, Version 2
("CAEv2") manufactured and sold by Aearo were defectively designed
and failed to provide adequate hearing protection. 3M denies these
allegations.

CAEv2, designed by Aearo in close collaboration with the U.S.
military, represented a revolutionary breakthrough in hearing
protection for service members. CAEv2 helped servicemembers better
maintain situational awareness (e.g., to hear nearby voice
commands) while also maintaining some protection from gunfire and
other higher decibel sounds. CAEv2 met the U.S. military's
specifications and helped the military provide hearing protection
to service members.

Despite knowing of the dangerous defects in its earplugs, Defendant
sold the Dual-ended Combat ArmsTM earplugs to the branches of the
U.S. military for more than a decade without providing the U.S.
military and/or Plaintiff with any warning of said defects, causing
Plaintiff and other service members similar permanent injuries,
such as hearing loss.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff is:

          Dennis G. Pantazis, Jr., Esq.
          Evan Pantazis, Esq.
          WIGGINS, CHILDS, PANTAZIS,
             FISHER, & GOLDFARB, LLC
          The Kress Building
          301 Nineteenth Street North
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Telephone: (205) 314-0530
          Facsimile: (205) 254-1500
          E-mail: dgpjr@wigginschilds.com

3M COMPANY: Green Sues over Defective Combat Arms Earplugs
----------------------------------------------------------
The case, CHRISTOPHER GREEN, the Plaintiff, vs. 3M COMPANY, AEARO
HOLDINGS, LLC, AEARO INTERMEDIATE, LLC, AEARO, LLC and AEARO
TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00126-MW-GRJ
(N.D. Fla., July 2, 2019), seeks to hold 3M liable for hearing loss
or damage Plaintiff allegedly suffered while serving variously in
the U.S. military, including during foreign conflicts. The
Plaintiff contends that Combat Arms TM Earplugs, Version 2
("CAEv2") manufactured and sold by Aearo were defectively designed
and failed to provide adequate hearing protection. 3M denies these
allegations.

CAEv2, designed by Aearo in close collaboration with the U.S.
military, represented a revolutionary breakthrough in hearing
protection for service members. CAEv2 helped servicemembers better
maintain situational awareness (e.g., to hear nearby voice
commands) while also maintaining some protection from gunfire and
other higher decibel sounds. CAEv2 met the U.S. military's
specifications and helped the military provide hearing protection
to service members.

Despite knowing of the dangerous defects in its earplugs, Defendant
sold the Dual-ended Combat ArmsTM earplugs to the branches of the
U.S. military for more than a decade without providing the U.S.
military and/or Plaintiff with any warning of said defects, causing
Plaintiff and other service members similar permanent injuries,
such as hearing loss.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff is:

          Dennis G. Pantazis, Jr., Esq.
          Evan Pantazis, Esq.
          WIGGINS, CHILDS, PANTAZIS,
             FISHER, & GOLDFARB, LLC
          The Kress Building
          301 Nineteenth Street North
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Telephone: (205) 314-0530
          Facsimile: (205) 254-1500
          E-mail: dgpjr@wigginschilds.com

3M COMPANY: Lester Sues over Defective Combat Arms Earplugs
-----------------------------------------------------------
The case, ANTONIO LESTER, the Plaintiff, vs. 3M COMPANY, AEARO
HOLDINGS, LLC, AEARO INTERMEDIATE, LLC, AEARO, LLC and AEARO
TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00125-MW-GRJ
(N.D. Fla., July 2, 2019), seeks to hold 3M liable for hearing loss
or damage Plaintiff allegedly suffered while serving variously in
the U.S. military, including during foreign conflicts. The
Plaintiff contends that Combat Arms TM Earplugs, Version 2
("CAEv2") manufactured and sold by Aearo were defectively designed
and failed to provide adequate hearing protection. 3M denies these
allegations.

CAEv2, designed by Aearo in close collaboration with the U.S.
military, represented a revolutionary breakthrough in hearing
protection for service members. CAEv2 helped servicemembers better
maintain situational awareness (e.g., to hear nearby voice
commands) while also maintaining some protection from gunfire and
other higher decibel sounds. CAEv2 met the U.S. military's
specifications and helped the military provide hearing protection
to service members.

Despite knowing of the dangerous defects in its earplugs, Defendant
sold the Dual-ended Combat ArmsTM earplugs to the branches of the
U.S. military for more than a decade without providing the U.S.
military and/or Plaintiff with any warning of said defects, causing
Plaintiff and other service members similar permanent injuries,
such as hearing loss.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff is:

          Dennis G. Pantazis, Jr., Esq.
          Evan Pantazis, Esq.
          WIGGINS, CHILDS, PANTAZIS,
             FISHER, & GOLDFARB, LLC
          The Kress Building
          301 Nineteenth Street North
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Telephone: (205) 314-0530
          Facsimile: (205) 254-1500
          E-mail: dgpjr@wigginschilds.com

3M COMPANY: Lewis Sues over Defective Combat Arms Earplugs
----------------------------------------------------------
The case, Emmauel Lewis, the Plaintiff, vs. 3M COMPANY, AEARO
HOLDINGS, LLC, AEARO INTERMEDIATE, LLC, AEARO, LLC and AEARO
TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-01950-MCR-GR
(N.D. Fla., July 2, 2019), seeks to hold 3M liable for hearing loss
or damage Plaintiff allegedly suffered while serving variously in
the U.S. military, including during foreign conflicts. The
Plaintiff contends that Combat Arms TM Earplugs, Version 2
("CAEv2") manufactured and sold by Aearo were defectively designed
and failed to provide adequate hearing protection. 3M denies these
allegations.

CAEv2, designed by Aearo in close collaboration with the U.S.
military, represented a revolutionary breakthrough in hearing
protection for service members. CAEv2 helped servicemembers better
maintain situational awareness (e.g., to hear nearby voice
commands) while also maintaining some protection from gunfire and
other higher decibel sounds. CAEv2 met the U.S. military's
specifications and helped the military provide hearing protection
to service members.

Despite knowing of the dangerous defects in its earplugs, Defendant
sold the Dual-ended Combat ArmsTM earplugs to the branches of the
U.S. military for more than a decade without providing the U.S.
military and/or Plaintiff with any warning of said defects, causing
Plaintiff and other service members similar permanent injuries,
such as hearing loss.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff is:

          Dennis G. Pantazis, Jr., Esq.
          Evan Pantazis, Esq.
          WIGGINS, CHILDS, PANTAZIS,
             FISHER, & GOLDFARB, LLC
          The Kress Building
          301 Nineteenth Street North
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Telephone: (205) 314-0530
          Facsimile: (205) 254-1500
          E-mail: dgpjr@wigginschilds.com

3M COMPANY: Sanford Sues over Defective Combat Arms Earplugs
------------------------------------------------------------
The case, DE'CASSALYN SANFORD, the Plaintiff, vs. 3M COMPANY, AEARO
HOLDINGS, LLC, AEARO INTERMEDIATE, LLC, AEARO, LLC and AEARO
TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-01947-MCR-HTC
(N.D. Fla., July 2, 2019), seeks to hold 3M liable for hearing loss
or damage Plaintiff allegedly suffered while serving variously in
the U.S. military, including during foreign conflicts. The
Plaintiff contends that Combat Arms TM Earplugs, Version 2
("CAEv2") manufactured and sold by Aearo were defectively designed
and failed to provide adequate hearing protection. 3M denies these
allegations.

CAEv2, designed by Aearo in close collaboration with the U.S.
military, represented a revolutionary breakthrough in hearing
protection for service members. CAEv2 helped servicemembers better
maintain situational awareness (e.g., to hear nearby voice
commands) while also maintaining some protection from gunfire and
other higher decibel sounds. CAEv2 met the U.S. military's
specifications and helped the military provide hearing protection
to service members.

Despite knowing of the dangerous defects in its earplugs, Defendant
sold the Dual-ended Combat ArmsTM earplugs to the branches of the
U.S. military for more than a decade without providing the U.S.
military and/or Plaintiff with any warning of said defects, causing
Plaintiff and other service members similar permanent injuries,
such as hearing loss.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff is:

          Dennis G. Pantazis, Jr., Esq.
          Evan Pantazis, Esq.
          WIGGINS, CHILDS, PANTAZIS,
             FISHER, & GOLDFARB, LLC
          The Kress Building
          301 Nineteenth Street North
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Telephone: (205) 314-0530
          Facsimile: (205) 254-1500
          E-mail: dgpjr@wigginschilds.com

500 ENTERPRISES: Fail to Pay Proper Overtime, Campos Suit Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
JULIE CAMPOS, individually and on behalf herself and all others
similarly situated v. 500 ENTERPRISES, INC., d/b/a HERB CONNOLLY
ACURA, ADAM D. CONNOLLY and CHRISTOPHER F. CONNOLLY, JR., Case No.
19-1630 (Mass. Super., Middlesex Cty., June 7, 2019), accuses the
Defendants of not paying proper overtime wages to their sales
associates.

500 Enterprises is a corporation duly incorporated under the laws
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts with its principal place of
business located in Framingham, Middlesex County, Massachusetts.
The Individual Defendants are officers of 500 Enterprises.

500 Enterprises operates retail vehicle dealership(s) throughout
the Commonwealth at which the Defendants' employees sell vehicles
to customers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward C. Cumbo, Esq.
          Robert Richardson, Esq.
          RICHARDSON & CUMBO, LLP
          225 Franklin Street, 26th Floor
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (617) 217-2779
          E-mail: e.cumbo@rc-llp.com
                  r.richardson@rc-llp.com


ABBVIE INC: To Pay $16.8MM in Fraud Suit Settlement
---------------------------------------------------
Dan Churney, writing for Cook County Record, reports that
plaintiffs' attorneys stand to make $5 million from the proposed
$16.75 million settlement of a class action suit by investors
against North Chicago-based drugmaker AbbVie, which alleged the
company hid information that led investors to lose money after
AbbVie backed out of a merger with a European company.

A group of hedge funds and other investors sued AbbVie several
years ago in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois in the aftermath of AbbVie's abortive merger with Irish
pharmaceutical company Shire PLC. The investors alleged AbbVie
pulled out of the $54 billion deal, which would have cut AbbVie's
taxes by allowing it to become a foreign corporation, after the
U.S. government announced it was going to forbid such tax
maneuvers.

AbbVie never disclosed it might not go through with the merger if
its taxes were not going to be lowered, investors alleged.
Specifically, AbbVie's CEO and chairman, Richard Gonzalez, publicly
said one week after the government stated it was curtailing the tax
cuts, he was "more energized" and "more confident than ever" about
the pending acquisition, according to the suit. Plaintiffs said
they took Gonzalez' statement as a sign the deal was moving
forward. However, three weeks later the merger was canceled.

Investors said they would not have continued putting money into
Shire if they had known of such possibility, and as a consequence
they took a bath when Shire's stock prices plunged 30 percent in
the two days after the proposed merger fell apart.

Plaintiffs include Elliott International, the Liverpool
Partnership, Tyrus Capital Event Master Fund and Tyrus Capital
Opportunities Master Funds. Plaintiffs sued AbbVie for fraud in
November 2014, alleging AbbVie breached the U.S. Securities
Exchange Act.

On June 19, plaintiffs presented a preliminary settlement agreement
to U.S. District Judge Robert Dow Jr. for his approval.

The proposal would set up a $16.75 million fund, from which lead
attorneys collect about $5 million, plus no more than $750,000 in
costs. The lead attorneys said the settlement "does not grant
excessive compensation to Lead Counsel," and is in line with other
similar settlements.

Class members would be anyone who acquired shares, bought call
options or sold put options of Shire between Sept. 29 and Oct. 14,
2014. The settlement recognizes a loss amount of $50.69 per
acquired share and notes more than 40 million shares were tradable
during the period. The dates in question mark when Gonzalez made
his statement of confidence in the Shire purchase and when AbbVie
announced it might not make the purchase. Members would collect
payouts on a pro rata basis. Notice of the pending settlement would
be mailed to 1,350 brokers.

The lead plaintiff, Dawn Bradley, would receive about $10,000 on
top of her cut of the settlement.

Any money left after it is no longer cost effective to distribute
among class members, would be given to Public Justice, a nonprofit
legal advocacy group based in Washington, D.C.

The proposed settlement was reached after mediation by retired
lawyer David Murphy, Esq. of Phillips ADR, a California-based
arbitration and mediation firm.

In agreeing to settle, the lead plaintiff expressed confidence in
the suit, but recognized the uncertainty of the legal process.

"Plaintiff acknowledges there were substantial risks in further
prosecution of this Action. While she believes she would have
prevailed, such an outcome is far from certain," the plaintiffs'
lawyers wrote in a memorandum explaining the proposed settlement
deal.

AbbVie is represented by the Chicago firm of Jones Day.

Lead counsel for plaintiffs are Gardy & Notis, of New York, and the
Chicago and New York offices of Wolf, Haldenstein, Adler, Freeman &
Herz. [GN]


ABC PHONES: O'Bryant Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Under FLSA
----------------------------------------------------------------
JACOB O'BRYANT and MARK BRANDON BAKER, Individually, and on behalf
of themselves and other similarly situated current and former
employees v. ABC PHONES OF NORTH CAROLINA, INC., d/b/a VICTRA,
f/d/b/a A Wireless, a North Carolina Corporation, Case No.
2:19-cv-02378 (W.D. Tenn., June 10, 2019), is brought under the
Fair Labor Standards Act to recover alleged unpaid overtime
compensation and other damages owed to the Plaintiffs and other
employees.

ABC Phones of North Carolina, Inc., doing business as VICTRA, is a
privately-owned company headquartered in Raleigh, North Carolina.
ABC is a North Carolina corporation and is registered with the
Tennessee Secretary of State, with the assumed name of VICTRA.

VICTRA is a company that sells Verizon compatible phones, Verizon
data plans, and cell phone accessories through its VICTRA branded
locations, which formerly did business as several entities
including A Wireless and Diamond Wireless.  VICTRA is an authorized
Verizon franchisee.  VICTRA operates over 1,100 retail locations
nationwide.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Gordon E. Jackson, Esq.
          J. Russ Bryant, Esq.
          Robert E. Turner, IV, Esq.
          Nathaniel A. Bishop, Esq.
          JACKSON, SHIELDS, YEISER & HOLT, ATTORNEYS AT LAW
          262 German Oak Drive
          Memphis, TN 38018
          Telephone: (901) 754-8001
          Facsimile: (901) 759-1745
          E-mail: gjackson@jsyc.com
                  rbryant@jsyc.com
                  rturner@jsyc.com
                  nbishop@jsyc.com


ABERCOMBIE CUSTOM: Rodriguez Seeks Unpaid Wages Under FLSA
----------------------------------------------------------
Luis Rodriguez, Plaintiff, v. Abercrombie Custom Homes, L.P. and
Andy Abercrombie, Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-02435 (S.D. Tex.,
July 6, 2019) is a collective action complaint brought by Plaintiff
as a Fair Labor Standards Act suit against the Defendants .

The complaint says Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the
putative Class Members in accordance with the FLSA. Specifically,
Plaintiff and the putative Class Members were paid as independent
contractors instead of as employees. As a result, Defendant failed
to pay Plaintiff and the putative Class Members at time and one
half their regular rate of pay for hours worked in a workweek in
excess of forty hours.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as an hourly-paid construction
laborer.

Abercrombie Custom Homes, L.P. is an entity engaged in commerce or
the production of goods for commerce.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Chris R. Miltenberger, Esq.
     The Law Office of Chris R. Miltenberger, PLLC
     1360 N. White Chapel, Suite 200
     Southlake, TX 76092-4322
     Phone: 817-416-5060
     Fax: 817-416-5062
     Email: chris@crmlawpractice.com


ABSOLUTE BONDING: Court Closes M. Starace Individual Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order closing the case captioned MARTIN
STARACE, Plaintiff, v. ABSOLUTE BONDING CORPORATION, Defendant.
Case No. 1:19-cv-00202-LJO-SAB. (E.D. Cal.).

The parties filed a stipulation dismissing this action with
prejudice as to the Plaintiff's individual action, but without
prejudice as to any class action claims asserted in the action, and
with each party to bear their own costs and fees.  

In light of the stipulation of the parties, this action has been
terminated, Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii); Wilson v. City of San
Jose, 111 F.3d 688, 692 (9th Cir. 1997), and has been dismissed
with prejudice as to the Plaintiff's individual action, but without
prejudice as to any class action claims asserted in the action, and
without an award of costs or attorney's fees.

Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is ordered to close the file in
this case and adjust the docket to reflect voluntary dismissal of
this action pursuant to Rule 41(a).

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 27, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yxbbr85r from Leagle.com.

Martin Starace, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Adrian R. Bacon --
abacon@toddflaw.com -- Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C. & Todd
M. Friedman -- tfriedman@toddflaw.com -- Law Offices of Todd M.
Friedman, P.C.

Absolute Bonding Corporation, Defendant, represented by Charles
Robert Messer -- messerc@cmtlaw.com -- Carlson & Messer LLP &
Martin Schannong -- schannom@cmtlaw.com -- Carlson & Messer LLP.


ACARA SOLUTIONS: Court Denies Dismissal of S. Gerrard's TCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of New
York issued a Decision and Order denying Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss in the case captioned SAMANTHA GERRARD, Plaintiff, v. ACARA
SOLUTIONS INC., Defendant. No. 18-CV-1041V(F). (W.D.N.Y.).

The Plaintiff's complaint alleges a class action pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2) based on the Defendant's violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA). The Plaintiff
seeks statutory damages and injunctive relief on behalf of two
nation-wide classes, the first constituting persons receiving
Defendant's text messages on their cellular telephones without
their consent, the second constituting persons who also received
such messages after requesting Defendant cease sending the
messages.

Plaintiff's TCPA Claim

The Defendant asserts two grounds in support of the Defendant's
motion to dismiss: (A) the Plaintiff's allegations demonstrate the
subject of the Defendant's text messages concerned an informational
employment opportunity, not telemarketing or a commercial
advertisement, and therefore cannot constitute a violation of the
TCPA and (B) the Plaintiff's allegations, including those based on
the press release, do not support an inference the Defendant's text
messages were sent to the Plaintiff using an ATDS.  

Defendant's Recruitment Messages

The Court finds that the Defendant cites to no caselaw within the
Second Circuit supporting the Defendant's contention that job
recruiting or employment opportunity calls such as those at issue
in this case are exempt from the requirements of the TCPA, and the
court's research reveals none to date.  

Significantly, the only FCC regulations authorized by the TCPA to
exempt certain non-commercial calls from the TCPA are limited to
calls made to a residential telephone line using prerecorded voice
to deliver messages prohibited by Section 227(b)(1)(B). The FCC has
implemented this provision by promulgating 47 C.F.R. Section
64.1200(a)(3) which exempts calls to a residential line using an
artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the
prior express written consent of the called party, unless the call
is not for a commercial purpose, or if for a commercial purpose,
does not include any advertisement or constitute telemarketing.

By definition, a residential telephone line is not a cellular
telephone allegedly used by Plaintiff in this case and, as such,
Section 64.1200(a)(3) is irrelevant to the merits of Defendant's
motion to dismiss. Thus, the potential exemptions for commercial
phone calls including telemarketing or advertising, which could
conceivably include job opportunity information such as those sent
by Defendant, pertains solely to calls to residential telephone
numbers, not to cell phones as alleged in this case, and are
limited to artificial or prerecorded voice messages, not text
messages as alleged in this case.

The Defendant's further reliance, on Gary v. TrueBlue Inc., 2018 WL
3647046, at *9 (E.D.Mich. Aug. 1, 2018) (Gary), as also supporting
Defendant's contention that employment opportunity messages are
generally not actionable under the TCPA is based on a
misunderstanding of the court's decision in Gary as a careful
reading of the court's decision shows the court in Gary did not so
state.  That, contrary to Defendant's contention, the Gary court's
holding does not hold or imply there exists under the TCPA a
general exemption for job recruitment text messages to cell phones,
like those at issue in this case, is underscored by the Gary
court's careful analysis of whether the plaintiff's prior consent
precluded TCPA liability in that case. Moreover, as is also clear
from the court's discussion in Gary, had it found, as Defendant
mistakenly believes, that such non-telemarketing text messages,
i.e., for employment recruitment, were not subject to the TCPA, any
issue regarding the nature of one receiving party's consent would
have been irrelevant.

The Defendant's reliance on the other cases cited by Defendant in
support of Defendant's contention that as job recruitment related
communications Defendant's text messages are exempt from TCPA
liability, is equally unavailing. However, the term telephone
solicitation, as it appears in Section 1200(f)(14), relates only to
the FCC's rule-making authority, granted by the TCPA, to protect
residential telephone subscribers' privacy rights to avoid
receiving telephone solicitation to which they object. As such,
this term has no relevance to a TCPA claim involving calls to
mobile cellular phone arising under Section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) as
alleged in this case.  

The other cases relied upon by Defendant, for Defendant's erroneous
proposition that the Defendant's job recruitment messages are not
subject to the TCPA are consistent with the court's foregoing
analysis and accordingly provide no support to Defendant's motion
to dismiss. In sum, none of the cases relied on by Defendant
supports the proposition, advanced by Defendant, that assuming the
Defendant's text messages are solely in the nature of job
recruitment, and not some form of commercial advertising or
telemarketing, they are exempt from liability under the TCPA.

Nor is there any merit in Defendant's contention, propounded as a
rebuttal to Plaintiff's analysis of this issue, required to avoid
TCPA liability), that the Complaint fails to introduce the issue of
consent and, therefore, notwithstanding Plaintiff's opposition, on
this basis the Complaint fails to plausibly state a claim. In this
circuit, to prove that a defendant violated the TCPA in a case
involving a cell phone, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the
defendant called his or her cell phone and (2) the defendant did so
using an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice.

Here, the Plaintiff has alleged the disputed text messages were
sent by Defendant without the Plaintiff's consent and despite
Plaintiff's requests to stop. Although Plaintiff alleged,
unnecessarily, the text messages were sent without Plaintiff's
prior express consent,  Plaintiff has not included sufficient facts
in support of such allegations permitting the court to consider the
merits of Plaintiff's allegations.

Here, the Plaintiff's bare allegations, that Defendant, prior to
sending the messages, did not obtain Plaintiff's prior express
consent, do not provide a sufficient basis upon which, absent
discovery as to actual facts and circumstances of Defendant's
failure to obtain such prior consent, the court cannot properly
determine the merits of such potential defense based on the
generalized allegations set forth on the face of the Complaint.   

Accordingly, Defendant's contention that dismissal is required
because the messages at issue are not telemarketing or advertising,
as defined in the TCPA and applicable FCC regulations and thus
outside the scope of Section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), is without merit.

ATDS

The court thus turns to whether Plaintiff has plausibly pleaded
that the text messages were sent to Plaintiff's cell phone by an
ATDS as required by Section 227(b)(1)(A). Defendant contends
Plaintiff has failed to do so because the content and context of
the alleged messages support only one plausible inference: direct
targeting of Plaintiff following human intervention. More
specifically, according to Defendant, the press release as
referenced and relied on by Plaintiff in the Complaint, and thus
constitutes a document that may be considered by the court on
Defendant's motion to dismiss,  was utilized by Defendant in
sending Plaintiff the text message as Plaintiff alleges, has, in
addition to its other functionalities as described in the press
release, the capacity to also function as an ATDS as that term is
defined by the TCPA, or that it was actually used by Defendant as
an autodialer in sending the alleged text messages to Plaintiff.  

First, Defendant asserts the press release shows that the
Defendant's use of the SmartSearch platform resulted in the text
messages sent to Plaintiff that were individually and manually
inputted into the SmartSearch platform by a Superior employee.
Defendant therefore contends that the press release's description
of SmartSearch and its alleged use by Defendant demonstrates the
text messages were not generic in content, a characteristic of an
unwanted text message which is accepted by courts as an indication
of use of an ATDS, but were uniquely targeted because of
Plaintiff's location, credentials, and job seeking status.

Based on the court's review of the press release, while it is
possible that SmartSearch includes an autodialer function that can
be used by Defendant to communicate the job possibility at issue,
in a text message prepared by Defendant, to the job-seeker
recipient of the message, once the SmartSearch platform has
identified the potential job-seeker, as Plaintiff alleges occurred
with respect to the job opportunity described in the screenshots,
such possibility is not apparent on the face of the press release.


Rather, the press release's description of Defendant's involvement
with SmartSearch suggests SmartSearch enables Defendant to
efficiently survey Internet postings by job seekers as to their
work experience or training, and the geographic proximity of the
putative job opportunity to the job seeker's residence as Defendant
asserts occurred as to Plaintiff. Nor does the press release
support Defendant's assertion, that Superior personnel individually
and manually inputted into the SmartSearch platform the telephone
number to which the employment opportunity messages are to be
sent.

Instead, the press release indicates the platform allows the flow
of critical information from SmartSearch into Superior's SAP, which
could be used to compile a list of cell numbers to be contacted by
Defendant. In sum, the court finds the description of the
SmartSearch platform allegedly utilized by Defendant in connection
with sending the messages to Plaintiff neither establishes nor
necessarily excludes the possibility it has the capability to
function as an autodialer.  

In answering this question, courts require plaintiffs to allege
facts that would allow for a reasonable inference that an ATDS was
used including that text messages were sent from a short code phone
number of generic impersonal content and the volume or timing of
the calls or messages.

Here, several allegations in the Complaint are relevant to whether
Plaintiff has demonstrated a reasonable, i.e., plausible, inference
that the text messages were sent via an autodialer as required by
the TCPA. First, the substance of the messages describing a
material handler/production operator job in a specific location,
Buffalo Grove, contradicts the idea that the messages represent a
personalized, as asserted by Defendant,  rather than a generic or
scripted message as Plaintiff contends.

Here, the message is not addressed to any person and certainly not
to Plaintiff as indicated by the absence in the first message's
salutation, "Hi," to Plaintiff's name, such as "Hi Samantha." Thus,
on its face, the text could easily have been sent to a wide range
of individuals whom Defendant had identified, through SmartSearch's
search of outside on-line job sites, to solicit with some proximity
to the potential job. Significantly, Plaintiff's allegations,
particularly that Plaintiff received in excess of 240 text messages
since the beginning of 2018, over a six-month period, regarding the
Buffalo Grove job, with 210 being received in one day, July 10,
2018, despite Plaintiff's sending to Defendant two text messages
requesting Defendant stop, a likely futile response given that, as
Plaintiff alleges, Defendant had then designated the only response
number, the 844 number, Defendant imposed a text only restriction
as to use of this line, preventing Defendant from receiving
Plaintiff's requests to cease sending her the messages, that
Plaintiff continued to receive the same message, now including an
additional, specific telephone number for Ms. Jones at Superior to
call should Plaintiff have an interest, are also consistent with
use of an autodialer and a basis upon which to reasonably infer
Defendant's use of an autodialer.   

That, as Plaintiff also alleged, the calls continued in large
numbers over the course of the day, July 11, 2018, is a further
indication of use of an autodialer based on the regularity and
persistence of such calls.  Defendant's effort to establish that
the job opportunity which was the subject of the text messages was
tailored to Plaintiff's purported skill set and within her
geographic location, as well as Defendant's assertion, that
Plaintiff uploaded a copy of her resume, with her phone number, to
www.careerbuilder.com, are all factual assertions not including in
the Complaint, and thus outside the scope of the court's review of
Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.  

Common sense also supports a reasonable inference that if
Defendant's system did not include use of an autodialer, a Superior
employee responsible for making the calls, upon receiving (assuming
Defendant's 844 number could even receive an in-coming text message
from Plaintiff) Plaintiff's negative response and requests to stop
sending, as alleged, the messages through the SmartSource telephone
number provided by Defendant, would have stopped sending the
messages rather than to incur Plaintiff's displeasure prompting
Plaintiff to invoke the TCPA. In this case, that such termination
of the calls to Plaintiff did not occur, allegations the court is
required on Defendant's motion to dismiss to treat as true,  is
another plausible indicator that an autodialer was employed by
Defendant in effecting transmission of the multiple messages to
Plaintiff.

Another indicator supporting an inference of an autodialer use is
that the sender's phone number, this one associated with
SmartSearch as Plaintiff alleges,, is a so-called short-code.
Although autodialed messages are more typically sent using
short-code numbers, a long-code telephone line number can also
support use of an autodialer. Thus, text messages from an
autodialer can also be sent using a long-code, and Plaintiff's
allegation,  that the 844 phone number, a 10-digit long-code number
associated with SmartSearch, was then used by Defendant as an
exclusive line for sending, i.e., outgoing, text messages to
Plaintiff, sufficiently alleges Defendant's use of the 844
long-code number is consistent with use of an autodialer.

Thus, while use of a short-code is more closely correlated with use
of an ATDS, given the nature of Defendant's business, which seeks
to induce the recipient of Defendant's job-related text messages to
contact Defendant, it is plausible that to avoid creating an
adverse impression upon a recipient of Defendant's text message
that Defendant's calls came from an autodialer anonymously seeking
out recipients to apply for a specific job, Superior elected to use
the long-code, the 844 number, instead of a short-code number that
would be more indicative to the recipient of use of autodialer, one
nevertheless technically capable of transmitting calls by an
autodialer.

Therefore, in the context of Defendant's business of sending
recruitment messages, it is a reasonable inference, as Plaintiff
alleges, that the long-code number associated with an out-going
text messaging only line was used by Defendant to support the use
of an autodialer, despite the absence of an alleged use of a
short-code number, a factor more typically aligned with use of an
ATDS.

The Defendant's unsupported assertion that the multiple unwanted
messages received by Plaintiff after Plaintiff requested they cease
could be attributed to carrier error or other technical defect, or
was likely the result of her own phone carrier issue, is a matter
for an affirmative defense, and thus irrelevant to the
consideration of Defendant's motion to dismiss which limits the
scope of the court's consideration to the allegations of the
Complaint. Moreover, whether the carrier's or Defendant's message
logs reveal the voluminous calls received by Plaintiff resulted
from a technical error by Plaintiff's carrier, as Defendant claims,
or not, is a question that should be left to pretrial discovery.
Thus, Plaintiff's allegations support a reasonable inference that
the voluminous, non-personal text messages for Defendant's
recruitment business sent repeatedly and persistently over a
single-day, and prior thereto, to Plaintiff, using a long-code
telephone number for outgoing text messages only, despite
Plaintiff's attempts to get Defendant to stop them, plausibly
demonstrates Defendant's use of ATDS in violation of the TCPA.

The Defendant's argument, that individual targeting of a message
recipient negates any inference that an ATDS was used by Defendant
is also without merit. Defendant's reliance for this proposition on
Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 2016 WL 1169365, at **4-5 (N.D.Cal. Mar.
24, 2016) (Duguid I),  is misplaced.

In DuguidI, the court found that where the content and context of
the message indicate the message, which notified recipients,
including plaintiff, of a login to their respective Facebook
accounts, was the result of defendant's individual or direct
targeting, of the plaintiff, or, as Defendant asserts, suggesting
targeted or customized messages, plaintiff's allegation that the
message was sent by an ADTS was found insufficient and accordingly
the court dismissed the complaint.  

Nor is there any merit to Defendant's contention that in this case
human intervention negates any reasonable inference that Defendant
sent the messages to Plaintiff using an ATDS. This contention fails
for several reasons. First, in its 2015 Order, the FCC while
adhering to its past definition of an autodialer, also explained,
how the human intervention element applies to a particular piece of
equipment is specific to each individual piece of equipment, based
on how the equipment functions and depends on human intervention,
and is therefore a case-by-case determination.

The Defendant's argument, predicated on a demonstration of
so-called human intervention in the process of effectuating
unconsented text messages alleged by Plaintiff, thus ignores the
fact that such a detailed functional understanding as to the
technical operation of exactly how Defendant's equipment used to
communicate with Plaintiff functions in relation to any required
human intervention is not presently available to either Plaintiff
or the court at this stage in the case as the Plaintiff has not had
any opportunity for discovery directed to this issue.

Second, Defendant's assertion that the press release's description
of the SmartSearch platform indicates that the text messages may be
sent by Defendant to cellular telephone numbers that are
individually and manually inputted into the SmartSearch platform by
a Superior employee or human user, is not supported by an affidavit
by a person with personal knowledge of the actual facts regarding
the design and operational characteristics of the SmartSearch
platform,  nor does a fair reading of the press release itself
support Defendant's assertion of the extent of human intervention
in the sending of the text messages to Plaintiff.   

How Defendant's messages to a job prospect such as those sent to
Plaintiff using a dedicated cell telephone line as Plaintiff
alleges which Defendant does not dispute were actually sent by
Defendant to Plaintiff is simply not explained in the press
release. Although an autodialing capability may be a feature of the
SmartSearch platform, a colorable possibility suggested by the fact
that the 845 number is one associated with SmartSearch, as
Plaintiff alleges, it is equally possible that an autodialer
function software package also is available in Defendant's computer
system apart from Defendant's use of SmartSearch.

Interestingly, Defendant's assertion in opposition states that cell
numbers of prospective job candidates are manually inputted into
the SmartSearch platform by Defendant's employees, thereby
indicating the recipient's cell numbers are, at such point, not
manually dialed by Defendant's employee to send through human
intervention Plaintiff text messages, but are inputted, as
Defendant describes its process, into a computer program,
SmartSearch, used by Defendant, one capable of functioning as an
autodialer either independently or in conjunction with a
combination of autodialer software and hardware available in
Defendant's computer system.

Thus, although Plaintiff's reliance on the press release for
description of the functionality of the SmartSearch platform does
not itself support an inference of Defendant's use of an ATDS, it
also does not, contrary to Defendant's contention, negate such
plausible use by Defendant to send Plaintiff the offending messages
sufficient to support Defendant's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff's
plausible allegation of Defendant's use of an autodialer also
renders Defendant's contention, that Defendant's messages were not
sent en masse as Plaintiff alleged, without merit as use of an
autodialer by definition implies the messages were sent en masse.


The caselaw on which Defendant relies  to support its contention
that where human intervention is required to (1) select a cell
number to be called (2) draft the message to be sent (3) select the
time to send the message, and (4) initiate the actual transmittal
of the message, the alleged use of an autodialer is thereby
defeated, like Defendant's other authorities, are inapposite.
Although the TCPA refers only to the making of a call, not the
preparation of the underlying message or selection of the target
cell number, as the Act prohibits.

In this case, the question before the court concerning the
Complaint's sufficiency is raised by Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, without discovery, which prevents the court from assessing
whether the sending of the message in fact resulted from an ATDS as
Plaintiff alleges, or human, not machine, intervention, as
Defendant asserts. In contrast, the present case as noted, is
before the court on Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion without the
benefit of discovery into the technical details of Defendant's
computer system including how the text messages at issue were
formulated and sent by Defendant via cell phone text message calls.


The Defendant's contention that the press release shows that the
messages were formulated and sent by one of Defendant's employees
without any use of an ATDS accordingly stretches credulity beyond
the breaking point. It is simply implausible that Defendant
directed its assigned employee, Amy Jones, to manually dial
Plaintiff over 200 times during a single work day, July 8, 2018,
during business hours as Plaintiff alleges as documented by
Plaintiff's screenshots which strongly infer that the voluminous
calls were made by use of an autodialer albeit using a long-code
telephone number. To the contrary, Plaintiff's allegations, as well
as Defendant's asserted facts describing how the messages were in
fact generated, are substantially consistent with Plaintiff's
allegation of the plausible use by Defendants of an ATDS.  

Finally, Defendant contends that Plaintiff's allegations fail to
show that the number of calls to Plaintiff's cell phone were
sufficiently large to plausibly support Defendant's use of an ATDS.
There is, however, no minimum number of unwanted calls required by
the TCPA necessary to sustain a plaintiff's alleged use of an
autodialer as plausible and Defendant cites no authority in support
of this further proposition.  

Accordingly, Defendant's contention that Plaintiff has failed to
plausibly allege use of an autodialer is also without merit.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 27, 2019 Decision and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3rmdjar from
Leagle.com.

Samantha Gerrard, Plaintiff, represented by Stefan Louis Coleman,
Law Offices of Stefan Coleman, P.A., South Biscayne Blvd., 28 Th Fl
Miami, FL 33131 & Avi R. Kaufman, Kaufman P.A.,  400 Northwest 26th
Street, Miami, FL 33127, pro hac vice.

Acara Solutions Inc., Defendant, represented by Jennifer A.
Beckage, Beckage PLLC & Myriah Valentina Jaworski, Beckage PLLC,
125 Main St; Buffalo, New York 14203


ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE: Saleh Suit Asserts FDCPA Violation
-------------------------------------------------------
BYAN SALEH, individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
D/B/A FIRST CREDIT SERVICES, INC., Defendant, Case No.
0:19-cv-61665-XXXX (S.D. Fla., July 6, 2019) is a class action
complaint seeking injunctive relief and statutory damages for the
Defendant's violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act.

The Defendant mailed a collection letter, dated June 03, 2019, to
Plaintiff in an attempt to collect a debt. In the Collection
Letter, Defendant directs Plaintiff to Defendant's website to make
a payment towards the Consumer Debt. The Defendant does not have
contractual or statutory authority to charge, or otherwise assess,
additional fees or amounts to credit card payments made towards the
Consumer Debt. Yet, the Defendant unlawfully assesses additional
fees and/or amounts to payments made towards Consumer Debt if said
payment is made via, among other things, a credit card, as well as
unlawfully assesses the same to all other Florida consumers that
attempt to make a payment via a credit card towards a debt that
Defendant sought to collect from said consumer by and through a
collection letter, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is a natural person, and a citizen of the State of
Florida, residing in Broward County, Florida.

Defendant engages in interstate commerce by regularly using
telephone and mail in a business whose principal purpose is the
collection of debts.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     JIBRAEL S. HINDI, ESQ.
     THOMAS J. PATTI, ESQ.
     The Law Offices of Jibrael S. Hindi
     110 SE 6th Street, Suite 1744
     Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
     Phone: 954-907-1136
     Fax: 855-529-9540
     Email: jibrael@jibraellaw.com
            tom@jibraellaw.com


ADVANCED CAPITAL: Vargoshe Suit Asserts FDCPA Violation
-------------------------------------------------------
JOHN VARGOSHE, Plaintiff, v. ADVANCED CAPITAL SOLUTIONS, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 9:19-cv-80880-XXXX (S.D. Fla., July 5, 2019) is
class action Complaint against the Defendant for damages and other
relief pursuant to the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

The alleged debt the Defendant attempted to collect from the
Plaintiff is due to, owed to, and owned by another. The debt is not
due to, owed to, or owned by, the Defendant. The alleged debt the
Defendant attempted to collect from the Plaintiff was in default at
the time the Defendant received the debt from the original creditor
for purposes of collecting the debt. The Defendant used interstate
telephone services and facilities in their attempt to collect the
alleged debt from the Plaintiff by calling the Plaintiff for the
purpose of collection to the State of Florida from another state.
The Defendant made misrepresentations that are substantial and
material and have resulted in direct harm to the Plaintiff, says
the complaint.

Plaintiff is a resident of this district in Palm Beach County,
Florida and is a natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to
pay a consumer debt.

Defendant is a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     John J.R. Skrandel, Esq.
     Jerome F. Skrandel, PL
     P.O. Box 14759
     North Palm Beach, FL 33408
     Phone: (561) 863-1605
     Email: JFSPA@MSN.COM


AIRCO MECHANICAL: Faces McMahon Suit in California Superior Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Airco Mechanical Inc.
The case is captioned as Blake McMahon on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Airco Mechanical Inc. and
Does 1-100, the Defendants, Case No. 34-2019-00259269-CU-OE-GDS
(Cal. Super., June 25, 2019). The suit alleges employment-related
violation.

Airco Mechanical operates as a mechanical contracting company. The
Company designs and installs mechanical systems, including heating,
ventilation and air conditioning, plumbing, process piping, and
environmental control systems.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Galen Tadashi Shimoda, Esq.
          SHIMODA LAW CORP.
          9401 E Stockton Blvd Ste 200
          Elk Grove, CA 95624
          Telephone: (916) 525-0716
          Facsimile: (916) 760-3733
          E-mail: attorney@shimodalaw.com

ALDI INC: Blumenthal Nordrehaug Files Class Action Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------------
The San Diego labor law attorneys at Blumenthal Nordrehaug Bhowmik
De Blouw LLP, filed a class action lawsuit against Aldi Inc., and
AI California LLC, alleging that the companies failed to correctly
pay their employee's the correct amount of overtime compensation.
Furthermore, the complaint alleges that Aldi Inc., and AI
California LLC, fails to provide mandatory meal and rest breaks to
their employees. The Aldi Inc., lawsuit, Case No.
37-2019-00029288-CU-OE-CTL, is currently pending in the San Diego
County Superior Court for the State of California.

The class action complaint alleges that Aldi Inc., failed to
accurately pay PLAINTIFF and other members of the CALIFORNIA LABOR
SUB-CLASS overtime wages for the time they worked which was in
excess of the maximum hours permissible by law as required by Cal.
Lab. Code §§ 510, 1194& 1198. Cal. Lab. Code § 510 further
provides that employees in California shall not be employed more
than eight (8) hours per workday and/or more than forty (40) hours
per workweek unless they receive additional compensation beyond
their regular wages in amounts specified by law.

According to the class action complaint, the companies non-exempt
employees were also allegedly unable to take off duty meal breaks
due to their rigorous work schedules. California labor laws require
an employer to provide an employee required to perform work for
more than five (5) hours during a shift with, a thirty (30) minute
uninterrupted meal break prior to the end of the employee's fifth
(5th) hour of work. The complaint alleges that the company did not
provide their employees who forfeited meal breaks additional
compensation.

If you think your company is violating the California Labor Code
and would like to know if you qualify to make a claim please
contact:

      Nicholas De Blouw, Esq.
      Blumenthal Nordrehaug Bhowmik De Blouw LLP
      Phone: 1-(800) 568-8020
      Email: DeBlouw@bamlawca.com [GN]


ALTA DENA: Padilla Labor Class Suit Removed to C.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Dean Foods Company and Alta Dena Certified Dairy, LLC,
removed on June 10, 2019, the class action lawsuit styled BALBINA
PADILLA v. ALTA DENA CERTIFIED DAIRY, LLC, DEAN FOODS COMPANY, and
DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No. 19STCV10846, from the
Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los
Angeles to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-05020 to the
proceeding.

The lawsuit arises from the Defendants' alleged failure to, among
other things, pay all wages, including overtime wages, and failure
to provide meal periods in violation of the California Labor
Code.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kevin Mahoney, Esq.
          Edward Kim, Esq.
          Berkeh Alemzadeh, Esq.
          MAHONEY LAW GROUP
          249 East Ocean Boulevard, Suite 814
          Long Beach, CA 90802
          Telephone: (562) 590-5550
          Facsimile: (562) 590-8400
          E-mail: kmahoney@mahoney-law.net
                  ekim@mahoney-law.net
                  balem@mahoney-law.net


AMAZON.COM: Sherman Suit Removed to C.D. California
---------------------------------------------------
The case captioned TREVION SHERMAN, MONIQUE CARPENTER, CHRISTOPHER
BOOKER, SHELBY VIZIO, KRISTY SLAYDON, JESSLYN WAITER, CARLA LOPEZ,
MICHAEL TIIMAN, RICHARD BARBER, JUSTIN WILLIAMS, IVAN URBINA,
ALLYSON MOTLEY, JACOB MINYARD, GUILLERMO MARTINEZ, CORY ADAMS,
RUSSEL CRUME, EDUARDO SANDOVAL, ANDY DIONISIO, BRIAN MENDEZ, STORM
CARFANGNIA, SYLVIA BAUTISTA, EDUARDO CASTILLO, DARREN DELIZO, JANET
VACA, JANICA LACH, TRAVIS WEBB and SEAN WAITER, each individually
on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES, INC., a Delaware Corporation;
and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendant, Case No.
30-2019-01074574-CU-OE-CXC was removed from the Superior Court of
the State of California, County of Orange to the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California on July 5, 2019, and
assigned Case No. 8:19-cv-01329.

The ten claims alleged are: (1) Failure to Pay Reporting Time Pay
in violation of IWC Wage Order No. 9, Section 5; (2) Failure to
Timely Pay All Wages Within the Time Specified By Law in violation
of Labor Code section 204; (3) Failure to Provide Rest Breaks in
violation of IWC Wage Order No. 9-2001; (4) Failure to Provide
Suitable Resting Facilities in violation of IWC Wage Order No.
9-2001, section 13(B); (5) Failure to Pay Overtime Wages in
violation of Labor Code sections 510 and 1198 and IWC Wage Order
No. 9-2001; (6) Failure to Pay Wages for Each Hour Worked in
violation of Labor Code section 1194; (7) Failure to Provide
Accurate Wage Statements in violation of Labor Code section 226;
(8) Failure to Maintain Record of Hours Worked in violation of
Labor Code section 1174(d); (9) Failure to Timely Pay All Wages Due
Upon Termination in violation of Labor Code sections 201, 202, and
203; and (10) Unlawful, Unfair, and Fraudulent Business Practices
in violation of California Business and Professions Code section
17200.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

     MICHELE L. MARYOTT, ESQ.
     GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
     3161 Michelson Drive
     Irvine, CA 92612-4412
     Phone: 949.451.3800
     Facsimile: 949.451.4220
     Email: mmaryott@gibsondunn.com

          - and -

     KATHERINE V.A. SMITH, ESQ.
     GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
     333 South Grand Avenue
     Los Angeles, CA 90071-3197
     Phone: 213.229.7000
     Facsimile: 213.229.7520
     Email: ksmith@gibsondunn.com



AMERISAVE MORTGAGE: Tiefenthaler Sues over Automated Text Messages
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against AmeriSave Mortgage
Corp. for alleged violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act (TCPA). The case is captioned HANS TIEFENTHALER, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AMERISAVE
MORTGAGE CORP., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-02862-AT (N.D. Ga.,
June 21, 2019).

Plaintiff Hans Tiefenthaler alleges that Defendant AmeriSave
Mortgage Corp has violated the TCPA by using automated text
messages and pre-recorded messages to market its products and
services. Further, Plaintiff claims that AmeriSave violated the
TCPA and the Regulations by making, or having its agent make, two
or more telemarketing calls and/or text messages within a 12-month
period on AmeriSave's behalf to Plaintiff and the members of the
National Do Not Call Registry Class while those persons' phone
numbers were registered on the National Do Not Call Registry.

AmeriSave Mortgage Corporation is a corporation incorporated under
the laws of the State of Georgia, with its principal place of
business at 3525 Piedmont Road NE, 8 Piedmont Center - Suite 600,
Atlanta, GA 30305. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jason Doss, Esq.
     THE DOSS FIRM, LLC
     The Brumby Building
     127 Church Street, Suite 220
     Marietta, GA 30060
     Telephone: (770) 578-1314
     Facsimile: (770) 578-1302
     E-mail: jasondoss@dossfirm.com
     
             - and -

     Jonathan D. Selbin, Esq.
     LIEFF, CABRASER, HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
     250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor
     New York, NY 10013
     Telephone: (212) 355-9500
     Facsimile: (212) 355-9592
     E-mail: jselbin@lchb.com

             - and –

     Daniel M. Hutchinson, Esq.
     LIEFF, CABRASER, HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
     275 Battery Street, 29th Floor
     San Francisco, CA 94111-3339
     Telephone: (415) 956-1000
     Facsimile: (415) 956-1008
     E-mail: dhutchinson@lchb.com

             - and –

     Anthony Paronich, Esq.
     PARONICH LAW, P.C.
     350 Lincoln Street, Suite 2400
     Hingham, MA 02043
     Telephone: (617) 485-0018
     Facsimile: (508) 318-8100
     E-mail: anthony@paronichlaw.com

             - and –

     Matthew R. Wilson, Esq.
     Michael J. Boyle, Jr., Esq.
     MEYER WILSON CO., LPA
     1320 Dublin Road, Suite 100
     Columbus, OH 43215
     Telephone: (614) 224-6000
     Facsimile: (614) 224-6066
     E-mail: mboyle@meyerwilson.com


ANHEUSER-BUSCH: Court OKs Form of Judgment in Knowlton
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum and Order granting
Defendants' Motion for Approval of Form of Judgment in the case
captioned BRIAN KNOWLTON, et al., individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ANHEUSER-BUSCH
COMPANIES, LLC, et al., Defendants. Consolidated Case No.
4:13-cv-210 SNLJ. (E.D. Mo.).

Nearly four years ago, this Court granted judgment on the pleadings
to the plaintiffs, who claimed that, as salaried participants in
the Anheuser-Busch Companies Pension Plan (Pension Plan), they were
entitled to certain enhanced retirement benefits under Section
19.11(f) of the Plan.

The Defendants responded that the plaintiffs never sought to
resolve the motion without the Court's involvement, as required by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and represent that they have
now provide the information in question. Moreover, the plaintiffs
filed no reply to argue otherwise.
  
The Defendants ask this Court to approve a form of the judgment
they anticipate providing. The judgment would have five attached
schedules. Four schedules would provide calculation of benefits for
four categories of Group A class members whose benefits can be
calculated. The Fifth Schedule would identify members of Group B,
who have not yet elected or commenced a benefit, and thus do not
have a provable benefits calculation at this time.

For those Group B class members, the Plan will apply the enhanced
pension benefit of Section 19.11(f) to calculate payments as
required by the benefit ultimately selected by the participant.
Those Group B class members will not receive a remedial back
payment because they are not owed remedial back payments.

The plaintiffs object to defendants' proposal on several grounds.
First, they insist that the Court must make the necessary damages
calculations, not the Plan. This Court understands the Eighth
Circuit to require that the judgment includes the amount of the
damages awards for the class. But nothing prevents the Plan from
performing the calculations, as it is equipped to do and providing
that information for the Court's review and approval. Moreover, it
appears that the plaintiffs' actuary has already approved the
calculations as they were run the first time. There is no reason
that the parties cannot confer on the damages awards before the
schedules are submitted to the Court for final judgment.

Next, plaintiffs articulate that they do object to the defendants'
calculations in that the defendants do not plan to provide a
benefits calculation for the Group B class members. But Group B
members have not elected benefits, and they have not been damaged.
When they do elect benefits, they will receive the enhanced pension
benefit of Section 19.11(f) pursuant to the judgment in this case.
Plaintiffs argue that the Group B members' future pension benefits
should be calculated as of the date on which each member would
first be eligible to elect to receive full retirement benefits.

The amount of Group B's future benefits and the assumed relevant
dates should, plaintiffs insist, be included as part of the
judgment. But those pension benefits are entirely speculative
because it is uncertain when those persons will retire or whether
they'll receive full retirement benefits. Although plaintiffs'
counsel may wish to have those hypothetical numbers included in the
judgment to bolster their own request for attorneys' fees, the
Eighth Circuit directed this Court to include the benefit
calculations to the extent requested and provable. No one can prove
Group B's pension benefits yet because they have not elected to
receive a pension.

In addition, plaintiffs appear to agree with the defendants'
initial calculations for Group A. Although a second set of
calculations is required, the plaintiffs will have an opportunity
to review the calculations for accuracy. The defendants will file
payment schedules and evidence to support the schedules as part of
their proposed final judgment, and the Court will review and adopt
the judgment if appropriate. Plaintiffs' concerns about providing
notice to class members are unfounded. Although this Court could
order notice provided to all the class members before payments are
made, the class was certified under Rule 23(b)(2) at plaintiffs'
request. Rule 23 provides no opportunity for (b)(1) or (b)(2) class
members to opt out, and does not even oblige the District Court to
afford them notice of the action. No notice is required because a
Rule 23(b)(2) class is mandatory.

As for Group B, as stated above, the Court holds that damages for
those class members is not currently provable. The only issue for
Group B is identification of those class members—and plaintiffs
have not indicated that they have any quibble with the defendants'
apparent ability to identify those individuals. Group B class
members will be advised of the declaratory effect of this class
action. Then, when those class members elect a pension benefit, the
defendants will be bound to apply Section 19.11(f) as required by
the judgment in this case. There has been no settlement, as
plaintiffs argue, so Rule 23(e) does not apply to either Group A or
Group B.

The Court will therefore grant the defendants' motion for approval
of the form of judgment and for establishing a timeframe to
finalize judgment.

Accordingly, the Defendants' motion for approval of form of
judgment and for establishing timeframe to finalize judgment is
granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 27, 2019 Memorandum
and Order is available at  https://tinyurl.com/y2f8orjq from
Leagle.com.

Brian Knowlton, individually, and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Servais --
aservais@wingertlaw.com -Wingert Grebing Brubaker and Juskie LLP,
Charles R. Grebing -- cgrebing@wingertlaw.com -- Wingert Grebing
Brubaker & Juskie LLP, Christine M. Snyder --
Christine.snyder@tuckerellis.com -- TUCKER ELLIS LLP, Joe D.
Jacobson -- Jacobson@ArchCityLawyers.com -- JACOBSON PRESS, P.C.,
Karl A. Bekeny -- karl.bekeny@tuckereillis.com -- TUCKER ELLIS LLP,
Scott J. Stitt -- scott.stitt@tuckerellis.com -- TUCKER ELLIS LLP,
pro hac vice & Joseph R. Dulle, STONE AND LEYTON, 7733 Forsyth
Boulevard, Suite 500, St. Louis, Missouri 63105

Anheuser-Busch Companies Pension Plan, Anheuser-Busch Companies,
LLC, Anheuser-Busch Companies Pension Plan Appeals Committee &
Anheuser-Busch Companies Pension Plan Administrative Committee,
Defendants, represented by James F. Bennett --
jbennett@dowdbennett.com -- DOWD BENNETT, LLP, Jennifer L.
Aspinall, DOWD BENNETT, LLP, Peter B. Morrison --
peter.morrison@skadden.com -- SKADDEN ARPS, LLP, Albert L. Hogan --
al.hogan@skadden.com -- III, SKADDEN AND ARPS, pro hac vice, David
R. Pehlke, SKADDEN ARPS, LLP, 155 N. Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606
& Jessica Anne Frogge -- jessica.frogge@skadden.com -- SKADDEN
ARPS, LLP.


APPLE INC: Family Sharing Ads "Deceptive," Peters Claims
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Apple, Inc. for
misrepresentation, negligence, and for violations of the Lanham
Act, California False Advertising Law, the Consumers Legal Remedies
Act, and the Unfair Competition Law in connection with its
advertisement on App Store's Apple Family Sharing feature. The case
is captioned WALTER PETERS, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, vs. APPLE INC., a California
corporation, DOES 1 to 100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
19STCV21787 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty., June 21, 2019).

According to the complaint, Apple's advertisement says "Supports
Family Sharing" on all or virtually all of the available apps'
landing pages from the time at which Family Sharing was first
initiated through Jan. 30, 2019. However, not all apps supported
Family Sharing during that time period. Specifically, the vast
majority of subscription-based apps, which is a growing percentage
of Apple apps, cannot be shared with designated family members. As
a result of Apple's deceptive and misleading practices, Plaintiff
and the class members were induced to purchase subscription-based
apps for which Apple receives hefty fees, believing that those apps
could be shared with up to six family members when in fact they
were available only to the single user who set up the
subscription.

Apple, Inc. is a California corporation headquartered in
Cupertino, California, that designs, develops, and sells consumer
electronics, computer software, and online services. Apple's online
services include the iOS App Store, a digital distribution platform
for mobile software applications, which allows users to browse and
download apps developed with Apple's iOS software development kit.
Through the App Store, consumers can download apps onto the iPhone
smartphone, the iPod Touch handheld computer, or the iPad tablet
computer. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Bobby Saadian, Esq.
     Justin F. Marquez, Esq.
     Thiago Coelho, Esq.
     Robert Dart, Esq.
     Patty W. Chen, Esq.
     WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC
     3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor
     Los Angeles, CA 90010
     Telephone: (213) 381-9988
     Facsimile: (213) 381-9989
     E-mail: bobbv@wilshirelawfirm.com
             justin@wilshirelawfrnn.com
             thiago@wilshirelawfirm.com
             RDart@wilshirelawfirm.com
             patty@wilshirelawfum.com

ARIZONA: Ryan Appeals Ruling in Jensen Prisoner Suit to 9th Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Richard Pratt and Charles L. Ryan filed an appeal from a
Court ruling in the lawsuit styled Shawn Jensen, et al. v. Charles
Ryan, et al., Case No. 2:12-cv-00601-ROS, in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Arizona, Phoenix.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Ninth
Circuit issued an Opinion reversing the District Court's Order to
Develop General Staffing Plan in the cases titled VICTOR ANTONIO
PARSONS; SHAWN JENSEN; STEPHEN SWARTZ; SONIA RODRIGUEZ; CHRISTINA
VERDUZCO; JACKIE THOMAS; JEREMY SMITH; ROBERT CARRASCO GAMEZ, JR.;
MARYANNE CHISHOLM; DESIREE LICCI; JOSEPH HEFNER; JOSHUA POLSON;
CHARLOTTE WELLS; ARIZONA CENTER FOR DISABILITY LAW,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CHARLES L. RYAN, Warden, Director, Arizona
Department of Corrections; RICHARD PRATT, Interim Division
Director, Division of Health Services, Arizona Department of
Corrections, Defendants-Appellants. VICTOR ANTONIO PARSONS; SHAWN
JENSEN; STEPHEN SWARTZ; SONIA RODRIGUEZ; CHRISTINA VERDUZCO; JACKIE
THOMAS; JEREMY SMITH; ROBERT CARRASCO GAMEZ, JR.; MARYANNE
CHISHOLM; DESIREE LICCI; JOSEPH HEFNER; JOSHUA POLSON; CHARLOTTE
WELLS; and ARIZONA CENTER FOR DISABILITY LAW,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHARLES L. RYAN, Warden, Director,
Arizona Department of Corrections; RICHARD PRATT, Interim Division
Director, Division of Health Services, Arizona Department of
Corrections, Defendants-Appellees, Case Nos. 16-17282, 17-15352,
17-15302 (9th Cir.).

The appeal involves the Plaintiffs' challenge to the District
Court's ruling that the Stipulation precludes the court from
ordering the Defendants to develop a general staffing plan as a
remedy for the Defendants' non-compliance.

Prisoners in the custody of the Arizona Department of Corrections
(ADC), together with the Arizona Center for Disability Law, brought
a civil rights class action against senior ADC officials alleging
systemic Eighth Amendment violations in Arizona's prison system.
The inmates alleged that ADC's policies and practices governing
health care delivery in ADC prisons and conditions of confinement
in ADC isolation units expose them to a substantial risk of serious
harm to which Defendants are deliberately indifferent.

On the eve of trial, the parties signed a settlement agreement
(Stipulation) by which the Defendants agreed to comply with more
than 100 performance measures designed to improve the ADC health
care system and reduce the harmful effects of prisoner isolation.
Since the action settled, the parties have engaged in several
disputes over the Defendants' alleged noncompliance with the
performance measures, which has required the assigned magistrate
judge to issue various rulings interpreting and enforcing the
Stipulation.

The appellate case is captioned as Shawn Jensen, et al. v. Charles
Ryan, et al., Case No. 19-16128, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by July 1, 2019;

   -- Transcript is due on July 30, 2019;

   -- Appellants Richard Pratt and Charles L. Ryan's opening
      brief is due on September 9, 2019;

   -- Appellees Arizona Center For Disability Law, Maryanne
      Chisholm, Robert Carrasco Gamez Jr., Joseph Hefner, Shawn
      Jensen, Desiree Licci, Joshua Polson, Sonia Rodriguez,
      Jeremy Smith, Stephen Swartz, Jackie Thomas, Christina
      Verduzco and Charlotte Wells' answering brief is due on
      October 8, 2019; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees SHAWN JENSEN, STEPHEN SWARTZ, SONIA RODRIGUEZ,
CHRISTINA VERDUZCO, JACKIE THOMAS, JEREMY SMITH, ROBERT CARRASCO
GAMEZ, Jr., MARYANNE CHISHOLM, DESIREE LICCI, JOSEPH HEFNER, JOSHUA
POLSON and CHARLOTTE WELLS, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, are represented by:

          Daniel Clayton Barr, Esq.
          Amelia M. Gerlicher, Esq.
          John H. Gray, Esq.
          PERKINS COIE LLP
          2901 North Central Avenue, Suite 2000
          Phoenix, AZ 85012-2788
          Telephone: (602) 351-8085
          E-mail: Dbarr@perkinscoie.com
                  AGerlicher@perkinscoie.com
                  jhgray@perkinscoie.com

               - and -

          Kathleen Erin Brody, Esq.
          ACLU OF ARIZONA
          3707 N. 7th Street
          Phoenix, AZ 85014
          Telephone: (602) 773-6011
          E-mail: kbrody@acluaz.org

               - and -

          David Cyrus Fathi, Esq.
          Amy Fettig, Esq.
          NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT-AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
          915 15th St., NW
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 393-4930
          E-mail: dfathi@aclu.org
                  afettig@npp-aclu.org

               - and -

          Alison Hardy, Esq.
          Corene Thaedra Kendrick, Esq.
          Rita Katherine Lomio, Esq.
          Sara Norman, Esq.
          PRISON LAW OFFICE
          1917 Fifth Street
          Berkeley, CA 94710-1916
          Telephone: (510) 280-2621
          E-mail: ahardy@prisonlaw.com
                  ckendrick@prisonlaw.com
                  rlomio@prisonlaw.com
                  snorman@prisonlaw.com

Plaintiff-Appellee ARIZONA CENTER FOR DISABILITY LAW is represented
by:

          Maya Abela, Esq.
          Rose Ann Daly-Rooney, Esq.
          Jose de Jesus Valdez Rico, Esq.
          ARIZONA CENTER FOR DISABILITY LAW
          177 North Church Avenue, Suite 800
          Tucson, AZ 85701
          Telephone: (520) 327-9547
          E-mail: mabela@azdisabilitylaw.org
                  rdalyrooney@azdisabilitylaw.org
                  jrico@azdisabilitylaw.org

Defendants-Appellants CHARLES L. RYAN, Director, Arizona Department
of Corrections, and RICHARD PRATT, Interim Division Director,
Division of Health Services, Arizona Department of Corrections, are
represented by:

          Nicholas D. Acedo, Esq.
          Rachel Love, Esq.
          Daniel Patrick Struck, Esq.
          STRUCK LOVE BOJANOWSKI & ACEDO PLC
          3100 W. Ray Road, Suite 300
          Chandler, AZ 85226
          Telephone: (480) 420-1600
          E-mail: nacedo@swlfirm.com
                  rlove@strucklove.com
                  dstruck@strucklove.com

               - and -

          Michael E. Gottfried, Esq.
          ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
          2005 N. Central Avenue
          Phoenix, AZ 85004
          Telephone: (602) 542-7693
          E-mail: Michael.Gottfried@azag.gov


ARTISAN AND TRUCKERS: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Peterson Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin issued an Opinion and Order granting Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss in the case captioned IZAAC PETERSON, Plaintiff, v.
ARTISAN AND TRUCKERS CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant. No.
19-cv-102-wmc. (W.D. Wis.).

In this putative class action, plaintiff Izaac Peterson claims that
defendant Artisan and Truckers Casualty Company disclosed his
driver's license number on a form filed with the St. Croix County
Circuit Court in violation of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act
(DPPA), albeit as part of an otherwise good faith effort to collect
on a judgment against Peterson arising from a motor vehicle
accident.

This case pursues the same legal theory for a violation of DPPA
rejected by this court in the Kresal, Kresal v. Secura Insurance
Holdings, Inc., No. 17-cv-766wmc, 2018 WL 2899694 (W.D. Wis. June
11, 2018), a fact obviously well known to Attorney Crandall since
he was also plaintiff's counsel in that case. As defendant detailed
in a table in its reply brief in support of its motion to dismiss,
the allegations in Kresal were virtually the same.  

Moreover, plaintiff's opposition brief to defendant's motion to
dismiss is a copy-paste job of the opposition submitted in the
Kresal case, with a simple addition, citing Kresal as contra
authority in a footnote. In fairness, plaintiff adds citations to
two, out-of-circuit district court cases, but provides neither
specific pincites nor explanation of how these cases support his
position, which is unsurprising since, from the court's review,
these cases do not address the origin of the personal information
at issue, which the Seventh Circuit has deemed crucial.

Moreover, plaintiff's opposition brief to defendant's motion to
dismiss is a copy-paste job of the opposition submitted in the
Kresal case, with a simple addition, citing Kresal as contra
authority in a footnote.  In fairness, plaintiff adds citations to
two, out-of-circuit district court cases, but provides neither
specific pincites nor explanation of how these cases support his
position, which is unsurprising since, from the court's review,
these cases do not address the origin of the personal information
at issue, which the Seventh Circuit has deemed crucial.
  
In light of plaintiff's failure to address the court's ruling in
Kresal, otherwise develop any new arguments, or direct the court to
other relevant cases, the court will not regurgitate its prior
analysis. Instead, for the reasons explained at length in Kresal,
the court concludes that Peterson's affirmative allegation that
personal information contained in the accident report was obtained
from plaintiff at the scene of the accident forecloses a finding
that the disclosed information was obtained from a motor vehicle
record as a matter of law.

As such, the court will grant defendant's motion to dismiss.

Accordingly, Defendant Artisan and Truckers Casualty Company's
motion to dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 27, 2019 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2jma9m5 from
Leagle.com.

Izaac Peterson, Plaintiff, represented by Eric Leighton Crandall,
Crandall Law Firm, SC, PO Box 27, New Richmond, WI, 54017

Artisan and Truckers Casualty Company, Defendant, represented by
Gregory T. Everts -- gregory.everts@quarles.com -- Quarles & Brady,
Marisa Berlinger -- marisa.berlinger@quarles.com -- Quarles & Brady
& Sydney VanBerg, Quarles & Brady, 33 East Main Street, Suite 900,
Madison, WI 53703.


ASCENA RETAIL: Michaella Corp. Balks at ANN Inc. Merger
-------------------------------------------------------
MICHAELLA CORPORATION, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. ASCENA RETAIL GROUP, INC., DAVID
R. JAFFE and ROBERT GIAMMATTEO, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-14652
(D. N.J., July 2, 2019) is a federal securities class action on
behalf of all purchasers of Ascena securities between September 16,
2015 and June 8, 2017, inclusive (the "Class Period"), seeking to
pursue remedies under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

On May 18, 2015, Ascena issued a press release announcing that it
had entered into a definitive merger agreement with ANN Inc.
("ANN"), pursuant to which Ascena will acquire ANN for a
combination of cash and stock (the "ANN Acquisition"). ANN is the
parent company of Ann Taylor and LOFT and as of January 31, 2015,
operated 1,030 Ann Taylor, Ann Taylor Factory, LOFT Outlet, and
other stores in forty-seven states, the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, and Canada. On September 19, 2016, Ascena filed a Form
10-K for the fiscal year ended July 30, 2016 with the SEC. The Form
10-K reported goodwill related to ANN in the amount of $733.9
million, a reduction of $225.7 million. Upon the revelation that
the ANN Acquisition was experiencing significant problems, Ascena's
stock price fell $2.43 per share, or 29.93%, to close at $5.69 per
share on September 20, 2016.

The Defendants made materially false and misleading statements
regarding the Company's business, operational and compliance
policies. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) the ANN Acquisition
was a complete disaster for the Company as ANN's operations were in
far worse condition than had been represented to the public; (ii)
to mask the true condition of ANN, Defendants improperly delayed
recognizing an impairment charge to the value of ANN's goodwill
and, as a result, Ascena's reported income and assets were
materially overstated and the Company's financial results were not
prepared in conformity with Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles ("GAAP"); (iii) many of the brands acquired in the ANN
Acquisition were in steep decline and were also materially
overvalued on Ascena's Class Period financial statements; and (iv)
as a result, the Company's public statements were materially false
and misleading at all relevant times.

During the 22 days between when the Company's announcement of its
intention to take the impairment charge and after it announced the
amount of the impairment, the price of Ascena stock fell another
35.46%, or $1.00 per share, before it closed on June 8, 2017 at
$1.82 per share. As a result of Defendants' wrongful acts and
omissions, and the precipitous decline in the market value of the
Company's securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have
suffered significant losses and damages, says the complaint.

Plaintiff purchased Ascena securities during the Class Period.

Ascena is a national specialty retailer of apparel for women and
tween girls. Ascena operates its business in four operating
segments: Premium Fashion, Value Fashion, Plus Fashion, and Kids
Fashion.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
     J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
     Jonathan D. Lindenfeld, Esq.
     POMERANTZ LLP
     600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
     New York, NY 10016
     Phone: (212) 661-1100
     Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
     Email: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
            ahood@pomlaw.com
            jlindenfeld@pomlaw.com

          - and -

     Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
     POMERANTZ LLP
     10 South La Salle Street, Suite 3505
     Chicago, IL 60603
     Phone: (312) 377-1181
     Facsimile: (312) 377-1184
     Email: pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com

          - and -

     Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
     BRONSTEIN, GEWIRTZ & GROSSMAN, LLC
     60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4600
     New York, NY 10165
     Phone: (212) 697-6484
     Facsimile: (212) 697-7296
     Email: peretz@bgandg.com


BEAZER HOMES: Aug. 5 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
------------------------------------------------
Law Offices of Howard G. Smith reminds investors of the upcoming
August 5, 2019 deadline to file a lead plaintiff motion in the
class action filed on behalf of investors who purchased Beazer
Homes USA, Inc. (NYSE: BZH) securities between August 1, 2014 and
May 2, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period").

Investors suffering losses on their Beazer Homes investments are
encouraged to contact the Law Offices of Howard G. Smith to discuss
their legal rights in this class action at 888-638-4847 or by email
to howardsmith@howardsmithlaw.com.

On May 2, 2019, the Company issued a press release regarding its
financial and operating results for the second quarter of 2019,
reporting a net loss from continuing operations of $100.8 million
for the quarter reflective of a $147.6 million impairment on
certain California assets acquired by the Company before 2007. The
assets in question were currently and previously reported by the
Company as land held for future development.

On this news, the Company's share price fell $1.73, or nearly 12%,
to close at $12.51 on May 3, 2019, thereby injuring investors.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) Beazer Homes California assets classified as land
held for future development were deteriorating in value or
improperly valuated; (2) the foregoing created a foreseeable risk
of an eventual substantial impairment that would negatively impact
the profitability of the Company; and (3) that, as a result of the
foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects were materially misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

If you purchased shares of Beazer Homes during the Class Period you
may move the Court no later than August 5, 2019 to ask the Court to
appoint you as lead plaintiff if you meet certain legal
requirements. To be a member of the class action you need not take
any action at this time; you may retain counsel of your choice or
take no action and remain an absent member of the class action. If
you wish to learn more about this class action, or if you have any
questions concerning this announcement or your rights or interests
with respect to these matters please contact:

         Howard G. Smith, Esq.
         Law Offices of Howard G. Smith
         3070 Bristol Pike, Suite 112,
         Bensalem, Pennsylvania 19020
         Website: www.howardsmithlaw.com
         Phone: 215-638-4847
         Toll free: 888-638-4847
         Email: howardsmith@howardsmithlaw.com [GN]


BELCAMPO MEAT: Website Not Accessible to Blind, Duncan Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------------
EUGENE DUNCAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. BELCAMPO MEAT COMPANY EAST LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-05810 (S.D.N.Y., June 20, 2019) is an action
against the Defendant for its failure to design, construct,
maintain, and operate its website to be fully accessible to and
independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired people.

The Defendant alleges in the complaint that its website
WWW.BELCAMPO.COM is not equally accessible to blind and
visually-impaired consumers. The Plaintiff is being deterred from
patronizing the Defendant's physical locations due to Defendant's
discrimination by failing to maintain access to the Website for
visually-impaired consumers in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Belcampo Meat Company East LLC owns and manages farms, restaurants
and butcher shops. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          THE MARKS LAW FIRM, PC
          Bradly G. Marks
          175 Varick St., 3 rd Floor
          New York, New York 10014
          Tel: (646) 770-3775
          Fax: (646) 867-2639
          E-mail: brad@markslawpc.com

               - and –

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Telephone: (212) 228-9795
          Facsimile: (212) 982-6284
          E-mail: nyjg@aol.com
                  danalgottlieb@aol.com


BIOGEN INC: 1st Cir. Affirms PSLRA Suit Dismissal
-------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court'S judgment granting
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned METZLER ASSET
MANAGEMENT GMBH, on behalf of itself and all other similarly
situated parties; ERSTE-SPARINVEST KAPITALANANLAGEGESELLSCHAFT MBH,
on behalf of itself and all other similarly situated parties,
Plaintiffs, Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. STUART A. KINGSLEY;
GEORGE A. SCANGOS; PAUL J. CLANCY; BIOGEN INC., Defendants,
Appellees/Cross-Appellants. Nos. 18-1369, 18-1472. (1st Cir.).

Metzler Asset Management GmbH (Metzler) and Erste-Sparinvest
Kapitalanlagegesellschaft mbH (Erste-Sparinvest) have been
designated the lead plaintiffs, pursuant to the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), in a federal securities class action
that they brought against Biogen Inc. and three Biogen executives
(Biogen). The suit alleges that Biogen and its executives committed
fraud, in violation of regulations promulgated by the Securities
and Exchange Commission pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act, by
falsely stating that Biogen's product, Tecfidera, was both safer
and more widely used than it was.  

The defendants moved to dismiss the suit on claim preclusion
grounds, based on this Court's earlier decision in In re Biogen
Inc. Securities Litigation, 857 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2017) (Biogen I),
and for failing to plead facts giving rise to a strong inference of
scienter,  as the PSLRA requires that a complaint alleging fraud
must in order for it to survive such a motion. The District Court
rejected the defendants' claim preclusion argument but dismissed
the suit under the PSLRA for failing to adequately plead scienter.


To establish claim preclusion, the defendant must show that (1) the
earlier suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits (2) the
causes of action asserted in the earlier and later suits are
sufficiently identical or related, and (3) the parties in the two
suits are sufficiently identical or closely related.  

The District Court rejected the contention that GBR, as lead
plaintiff under the PSLRA in Biogen I, could adequate[ly represent
the class in Biogen II, such that the plaintiffs in the two actions
may be deemed to be sufficiently identical, as they must be for
claim preclusion to apply.  

The District Court explained that the putative class in Biogen I
was not certified through Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and
thus remained merely a proposed class action. For that reason, the
District Court ruled, GBR could not, by virtue of its role as the
lead plaintiff under the PSLRA in Biogen I, be deemed to have
adequately represented the putative class in Biogen II.

In reaching this conclusion about whether the members of the
putative class in Biogen II were adequately represented by GBR in
Biogen I, the District Court relied on the Supreme Court's ruling
in Smith. There, the Supreme Court held that a consumer's motion
for class certification was not precluded by a previous decision
denying a similar motion for class certification to a different
party. Smith, 564 U.S. at 304-05.  

Biogen argues that the District Court erred in this aspect of its
claim preclusion analysis. Biogen contends that the PSLRA's process
for appointing a lead plaintiff sufficed to ensure that GBR, in its
role as lead plaintiff of the putative class in Biogen I, did
adequately represent the interests of the putative class in Biogen
II, even though the class in Biogen I had not been certified at the
time of the dismissal of that action. Thus, Biogen contends that
the dismissal in Biogen I could be preclusive of the claims brought
by the putative class in Biogen II, even though GBR is not the lead
plaintiff for that putative class.

To state a claim under Section 10(b)3 of the Securities Exchange
Act, plaintiffs must adequately plead (1) a material
misrepresentation or omission (2) scienter; (3) a connection with
the purchase or sale of a security (4) reliance (5) economic loss
and (6) loss causation. Scienter is defined as either the
intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud
investors or a high degree of recklessness.

Under the PSLRA, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, plaintiffs must state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with
scienter.

The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit in Biogen II
after determining that none of the statements that the plaintiffs
allege that the individual Biogen executive defendants made were of
a kind that could give rise to the strong inference of scienter
that the PSLRA requires. On that basis, the District Court
concluded that the claims against each of these executives
individually, as well as the claims against Biogen itself, must be
dismissed.  

To make their case on appeal, the plaintiffs focus on six
statements in their complaint that the District Court held, in
making its scienter ruling, were at least plausibly misleading.
These statements fall into two general categories: (1) those that
pertain to Tecfidera's safety profile, and (2) those that pertain
to Tecfidera's usage rate.  

The first category of statements on which the plaintiffs in this
appeal rely with respect to the claims against the individual
defendants concerns Tecfidera's safety profile. The plaintiffs
point to two such statements, the first of which was made on
September 11 by Sandrock. According to the complaint, Sandrock
stated at that time that Tecfidera continues to provide patients
with effective oral treatment for MS that is supported by a growing
body of data reinforcing its benefits and favorable safety
profile.

The complaint alleges that Sandrock made this statement before
Biogen's October announcement of the PML-related death, and the
plaintiffs do not contend that any of the individual defendants
knew about that death before Sandrock made this statement. The
plaintiffs nevertheless contend that the District Court erred in
concluding that the complaint failed adequately to allege that
Sandrock made the statement with the intentional or willful design
to deceive investors.

To make this case, the plaintiffs point out that, in August and
September of 2014, Dr. Ben Thrower, the medical director at the
Shepherd Center in Atlanta, notified Keith Ferguson, the company's
senior sales director, and Eric Hall, the medical science liaison
for Biogen, that his research showed that patients who were taking
Tecfidera had a higher risk of developing low lymphocyte counts
than Biogen had originally disclosed. The complaint further alleges
that, for this reason, Dr. Thrower chose to discontinue Tecfidera
prescriptions for approximately 200 of his patients and to stop
issuing new prescriptions for the drug. The complaint also alleges
that he told Ferguson and Hall about this development.

The only other plausibly misleading statement that concerns the
drug's safety profile to which the plaintiffs point is one that,
according to the complaint, Williams made in April of 2015. In it,
Williams allegedly stated that there's no real change in the
benefit/risk profile of the drug for patients with MS. So it's
pretty much status quo at the moment.

The Court turns, then, to the four plausibly misleading statements
that pertain to Tecfidera's usage rates. All four statements were
allegedly made by Kingsley, who is an individual defendant. But,
the Court finds no basis for concluding that any of these
statements permit us to infer the necessary intent to deceive that
could suffice to create the strong inference of scienter that the
PSLRA requires. And, even the cumulative weight of these statements
and the CW evidence discussed below would not suffice.

The Court first address the January 29, 2015 statement by Kingsley
that Tecfidera was on track to become the most prescribed therapy
for MS worldwide. The plaintiffs argue that this statement was
misleading and creates the "strong inference" of scienter on
Kingsley's part, because at the time of the statement, Kingsley
knew about both the PML death and about Tecfidera's declining sales
and discontinuation rates.

At the time that Kingsley made the statement, however, Biogen had
already disclosed to the public the news of the PML death, had
already changed the drug's label, had already publicized that it
expected the drug's growth rate to slow, and had already disclosed
that the drug's discontinuation rates were higher than expected.
Given these disclosures pointing against sales growth, it is hard
to characterize Kingsley's statement that he believed Tecfidera
would become the most-prescribed therapy for MS worldwide as
anything other than misguided optimism.  Accordingly, we fail to
see how one could characterize Kingsley as having had the requisite
intent to deceive when he made this statement, such that one could
draw the strong inference of scienter required by the PSLRA.

The Court, turns, then, to three statements of Kingsley's from
January 29, 2015, to February 25, 2015, in which, according to the
complaint, he stated that there had not been any meaningful change
in Tecfidera's discontinuation rates and that those rates were
consistent with historical averages.

As previously mentioned, at the time that Kingsley made these
statements, the company had already disclosed to investors that
Tecfidera's discontinuation rate was higher than Biogen would have
hoped but that the company aimed to get better performance in the
discontinuation rates over a longer period of time. The Court do
not see how Kingsley's early 2015 refrain that the company had not
seen meaningful change in the drug's discontinuation rate and that
the rates were consistent with historical averages may fairly be
characterized as having been made with the intent to deceive.

In Biogen I, our Court found that none of the CWs' statements
included in that complaint were probative of the defendants'
scienter because they were imprecise, did not contain information
that was directly communicated to the individual defendants, or
concerned events that occurred after the individual defendants made
the plausibly misleading statements at issue in that case.  

As to the additional statements not included in the Biogen I
complaint, the District Court similarly rejected them as not
probative of the defendants' scienter because they failed to set
forth specific facts" that directly conflicted with the six
plausibly misleading statements that the District Court
highlighted.  

On appeal, the plaintiffs do reference the statements of one CW in
particular, CW 13. According to the plaintiffs, CW 13 explained
that everyone in leadership had access to reporting metrics and
that leadership frequently monitored the new start rates for
Tecfidera as part of the process for producing their sales
projections.

But, the fact that Biogen's leadership monitored Tecfidera's
reporting metrics does not in and of itself suffice to create the
strong inference that Kingsley made his four statements about
Tecfidera's discontinuation rates with the requisite intent to
deceive. We would expect responsible management to engage in such
monitoring. As a result, before one could infer what plaintiffs
ask, one would need to know what Kingsley learned from such
monitoring, and whether what he learned was at odds with any of his
plausibly misleading" statements. Yet, the complaint alleges no
facts that are illuminating in that regard.

As to the statements concerning safety, the plaintiffs do not
dispute that Biogen disclosed the PML death to investors and the
public. Moreover, nothing in CW 1's alleged statement reveals that
what Sandrock and Williams actually said publicly about the drug's
safety was known by them to be misleading.

The plaintiffs do separately argue that they can meet their burden
to allege that Biogen had the requisite scienter under a theory of
corporate scienter. Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that, if
the complaint plausibly alleges that one of the company's employees
made a misleading statement to investors without scienterand an
individual within Biogen's management team knew or had access to
information that showed that this misleading statement was not
true, then Biogen can be found to have had the requisite scienter
on a corporate scienter theory. The plaintiffs then proceed to
contend that the record provides support for finding a strong
inference of scienter on this basis, in light of the six plausibly
misleading statements in the complaint that we have just reviewed,
the company's failure to correct them, and the allegations that the
complaint sets forth regarding what persons within the company knew
or what the company may itself be charged with having known. And,
the plaintiffs further contend, the District Court erred by failing
even to address this basis for finding scienter vis à vis the
claims against Biogen.

The plaintiffs attempt to make the case for their showing of
corporate scienter as follows. They allege that Ferguson and Hall
knew, due to their conversation with Dr. Thrower, that Tecfidera
was less safe than the company stated publicly when Sandrock said
that Tecfidera continues to provide patients with effective oral
treatment for MS that is supported by a growing body of data
reinforcing its benefits and favorable safety profile," and when
Williams said that there's no real change in the benefit/risk
profile of the drug for patients with MS. So it's pretty much
status quo at the moment. The plaintiffs argue that Ferguson and
Hall may be understood to have had this knowledge because, as the
complaint alleges, Dr. Thrower discussed with Ferguson and Hall his
research that Tecfidera could cause lower lymphocyte counts than
the company originally disclosed.

But, the fact that Dr. Thrower and researchers like Dr. Zamvil
concluded on the basis of their own research that Tecfidera could
cause lower lymphocyte counts than was originally understood does
not, in and of itself, suffice to contradict the assertions that
Tecfidera was effective at treating MS and that this fact was
supported by a growing body of research. For that reason, even if
the Court was to assume that the statement was plausibly misleading
and that Hall's and Ferguson's knowledge of Dr. Thrower's research
or any of the other research cited by the plaintiffs  could be
imputed to the company as a whole, that knowledge would still fail
to create the strong inference of scienter on Biogen's part. That
is so, the Court emphasizes, even if the Court is to accept the
plaintiffs' theory of corporate scienter.

The plaintiffs also point to statements made by the confidential
witnesses to support their contention that the complaint adequately
alleges that employees in the company knew that the statements by
Kingsley that the District Court found to be plausibly misleading
were untrue. They then proceed to argue from that contention that
the complaint's allegations suffice to create a strong inference of
scienter on the company's part, in consequence of Kingsley's
plausibly misleading statements regarding the drug's usage. But,
the alleged statements at issue either were not made with
sufficient particularity,  

Moreover, the few confidential witness statements alleged in the
complaint that were particularized and appropriately timed
concerned narrow slices of the market for the sale of the drug. For
example, CW 17 an Executive Territory Business Manager  reported
that his Tecfidera sales dropped 25% after the PML death. But, the
fact that his individual sales experienced a decline does not
indicate that he knew that Kingsley's generalized assessments of
the magnitude of the change in discontinuation rates nationally for
the company were untrue.

Finally, the Court addresses the plaintiffs additional scienter
arguments. Here, the plaintiffs argue that the District Court did
not properly credit their allegations that the defendants knew or
should have known that the public statements that had been made by
Kingsley regarding Tecfidera were misleading because Tecfidera was
part of the company's core operations; many of the plausibly
misleading statements were repeated and specific and Biogen
operates in a highly regulated industry.

The Court disagrees.

In pressing the core operations theory, the plaintiffs contend
that, when facts critical to a business's core operations or an
important transaction generally are so apparent, knowledge [of
those facts] may be attributed to the company and its key officers,
even if those officers did not, in actuality, know the critical
information.  But, as the Court had explained, the plaintiffs fail
to identify any allegations in the complaint that show that anyone
in the company had knowledge regarding the drug's safety profile
and sales that contradicted the company's public representations.
So, the core operations theory also does little to aid the
plaintiffs' case.  

The plaintiffs' highly regulated industry theory suffers from the
same defect. According to the plaintiffs, because Biogen operates
in the heavily regulated pharmaceuticals industry, one can infer
that the Individual Defendants were acutely aware of safety-related
concerns related to Tecfidera. But, if by safety concerns the
plaintiffs mean the alleged statements from Dr. Thrower to Ferguson
and Hall regarding Dr. Thrower's research on Tecfidera, then the
Court have already explained the problem with this theory. Even if
the Court is to assume that the individual defendants were aware of
Dr. Thrower's comments to Ferguson and Hall, none of the six
plausibly misleading statements so clearly conflicts with Dr.
Thrower's assessment of the drug especially given the other safety
disclosures the company made prior to those statements that there
exists a strong inference that any of those six statements were
made with the intent to deceive.

Nor can the plaintiffs succeed in pressing their case on appeal
based on their contention that the defendants' repeated specific
statements about the drug show that they knew that their public
disclosures were misleading when made and thus that there is a
strong inference of scienter not only as to them but also as to
Biogen. The Court may assume that a plausibly misleading statement
was made publicly more than once. But nothing in the complaint
alleges facts that indicate that anyone in Biogen's management had
knowledge that was sufficiently in conflict with any of the six
plausibly misleading public statements to permit the conclusion
that the company had the requisite intent to deceive in permitting
those statements to have been made and in not having corrected them
in some respect.

A full-text copy of the First Circuit's June 27, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yy5uy64a from Leagle.com.

Gregg S. Levin , with whom Christopher F. Moriarity --
cmoriarty@motleyrice.com -- William H. Narwold --
bnarwold@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice LLC,Jonathan Gardner --
jgardner@labaton.com -- Labaton Sucharow LLP, Robert M. Rothman --
RRothman@rgrdlaw.com -- Mark T. Millkey -- mmillkey@rgrdlaw.com --
Susan K. Alexander -- salexander@rgrdlaw.com -- Andrew S. Love --
alove@rgrdlaw.com -- and Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, were on
brief, for appellants/cross-appellees.

James R. Carroll -- james.carroll@skadden.com -- with whom Michael
S. Hines -- michael.hines@skadden.com -- Sara J. van Vliet, and
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, were on brief, for
appellees/cross-appellants.


BMW AMERICA: Court Grants Dismissal of G. Rickman's RICO Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the
case captioned GARNER RICKMAN, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, et
al., Defendants. Civil Action No. 18-4363. (D.N.J.).

This putative class action alleges that the diesel engines of two
BMW models, the 2009-2013 BMW X5 xDrive35d (X5) and the 2009-2011
335d (335d) (Subject Vehicles), emit nitrogen oxides (NOx at levels
in excess of federal and state emissions standards. Plaintiffs
assert that Defendants BMW of North America (BMW USA) and
Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft (BMW AG) (BMW) colluded
with Defendants Robert Bosch GmbH and Robert Bosch LLC (Bosch) to
market the cars as clean diesel while they knew that the Subject
Vehicles discharged emissions at impermissible levels. The true
level of emissions was allegedly masked during laboratory testing
by deceptive technology (defeat device) that Defendants developed
and employed.

The Complaint brings counts under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and various state consumer
protection laws.

The Defendants maintain that the Plaintiffs fail to plead factually
that their Subject Vehicles contained a defeat device, which is the
source of the alleged injury. Without a cognizable injury, the
Defendants contend, the Plaintiffs lack standing and, for that
matter, have failed to state a claim.  

Specifically, the Defendants contend, inter alia, that the fact
that one BMW X5 flunked the Plaintiffs' testing does not raise a
plausible inference that all 2009-2013 BMW X5 and 2009-2011 BMW
335d vehicles contain illegal defeat devices.

The Plaintiffs counter that they provide copious detail about the
existence of the defeat device in their vehicles, how it was
detected, and its effect on the vehicles. The Court finds that the
Plaintiffs have not alleged enough to merit a plausible inference
that there is a defeat device in their vehicles, and therefore have
not sufficiently alleged that they possess an injury in fact
sufficient to confer standing.

Sufficiency of Defeat-Device Allegations

The Court finds inadequate the allegation that the Plaintiffs'
vehicles contain a defeat device for two primary reasons. First, it
depends on testing of a single vehicle which revealed discrepancies
between laboratory and on-road emissions results, from which
plaintiffs somewhat speculatively infer that the vehicle contained
a defeat device. Second, it relies on a further inference that the
tested vehicle is a valid exemplar, i.e., that because it contained
a defeat device, then the Plaintiffs' vehicles, too, must have
contained such a device.

The Defendants rely heavily on Bledsoe v. FCA US LLC, 307 F.Supp.3d
646 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (Bledsoe I). Like the Plaintiffs here, the
Bledsoe I plaintiffs alleged that Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA)
installed in two diesel truck models a defeat device that enabled
the vehicles to pass emissions testing, but switched off or limited
the emissions reduction system during normal driving conditions.  

To support this allegation, the Bledsoe I plaintiffs performed PEMS
testing on a single truck, the results of which allegedly showed
that the vehicle emitted emissions at amounts greater than those
permitted by federal and state regulations, and higher than levels
set for vehicles to obtain certificates of compliance. As general
support, the Bledsoe I plaintiffs pointed to a worldwide emissions
scandal including Volkswagen, unrelated EPA regulatory enforcement
actions directed at other vehicles manufactured by FCA, and a prior
regulatory enforcement action involving defeat devices brought
against Cummins, a defendant in Bledsoe I and the engine
manufacturer for the trucks at issue.  

The Bledsoe I court determined that the plaintiffs' allegations
were not plausible and dismissed the complaint without prejudice
for lack of Article III standing. Specifically, the court
determined that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege the
existence of a defeat device for the entire vehicle class based on
the PEMS testing of one used vehicle. Beyond their own test
results, the plaintiffs failed to adduce sufficient corroborating
allegations that would contribute to the inference that the
defendants engaged in a scheme to implement a defeat device,
deceive regulators, and mislead consumers.

In some respects, the allegations in this case exceed those of
Bledsoe I. Here, the Plaintiffs have conducted comparative chassis
dynamometer testing in addition to PEMS testing. Such allegations
are significant because the results during PEMS road testing are
allegedly irreconcilable with the results from the chassis
dynamometer testing.  

Here, the Plaintiffs only tested one X5 model, and have
extrapolated from this minuscule sample an inference that one or
more defeat devices exist in all of the Subject Vehicles. Although
the Complaint alleges that the general engine structure is similar
for these models, that does not say much about whether a defeat
device was installed across the board, as alleged.

Moreover, the Plaintiffs have not by analogy to the plaintiffs in
Mercedes I or Counts, cited independent entities that have levied
defeat-device accusations against BMW for the particular engines at
issue. Rather, Plaintiffs allege more generally that "kin Europe,
watchdog groups, NGOs, and government agencies" have cited
virtually every manufacturer, including BMW, for violating the
lower European emissions standards. There is no allegation that
pinpoints any particular European governmental agency's citation of
BMW with respect to its diesel cars in general, or the Subject
Vehicles in particular.

Rather, the Plaintiffs allege (1) that a non-profit organization
called Transportation and Environment accused many diesel vehicles
of employing defeat devices, including certain BMW models and
engines, but did not cite the Subject Vehicles at issue here and
(2) that a group called the International Council on Clean
Transportation (ICCT) released a report analyzing the real world
versus lab testing emissions of many manufacturers' vehicles and
found a different BMW model, not any of the Subject Vehicles) to
have polluted above the European standard.  The Plaintiffs do not
allege that these different BMW models have the same engines or use
the same deceptive technology as the Subject Vehicles.

The Plaintiffs fail to pinpoint whether the Subject Vehicles
contain one defeat device or more, or state how each one functions
in particular. Instead, the Plaintiffs lay out suspect test
results, state in conclusory terms that a defeat device must exist,
and leave the court to fill in the details. Plaintiffs have not
alleged that any governmental organization has accused BMW of
evading regulators with defeat devices in their diesel cars.
Plaintiffs also have not alleged that the Defendants admitted any
wrongdoing.
  
Ultimately, without sufficient corroborating allegations, the Court
is persuaded to dismiss the Complaint because the Plaintiffs have
presented little beyond emissions test results for a single vehicle
one used 2012 X5.  

Having found the allegations that the Plaintiff's automobiles
contain a defeat device insufficient, I consider whether the
Plaintiffs have alleged an injury in fact.

Injury in Fact

The Plaintiffs allege that they suffered a financial injury in fact
because the Defendants affirmatively concealed information from
regulators, conspired to cheat government agencies during tests,
and distributed marketing materials to intentionally mislead
consumers. The strength of those knock-on inferences, however, is
dependent on the strength of the inference that the defeat device
was present in the Plaintiffs' vehicles.

Here, Plaintiffs allege three categories of economic injury in
their Complaint: (1) overpayment of the Subject Vehicles because
Plaintiffs would not have purchased their cars or would have paid
less for them had they known of the alleged defeat device (2) the
payment of a diesel premium for which the Plaintiffs did not
receive value and (3) additional expenses for repairs and fuel
costs related to the allegedly deficient emissions system.

As the Defendants accurately point out, all of these alleged
injuries are contingent upon an inference that the Subject Vehicles
had some type of defeat device to evade regulators in the test
environment but permit greater emissions during normal driving
conditions.

The same can be said for the Plaintiffs' allegations with respect
to misleading marketing materials and their consumer fraud claims.
The alleged marketing misrepresentations fall into three
subcategories: (1) the Subject Vehicles meet federal or state
emission standards; (2) the Subject Vehicles have less emissions
than other BMW cars; and (3) the Subject Vehicles are generally
environmentally friendly and actively help to protect the
environment.  

For the first subcategory, the alleged noncompliance with federal
and state regulatory standards necessarily stems from the inference
that the Subject Vehicles' apparent compliance with regulatory
standards was an artifact of the operation of the defeat device.
Plaintiffs are not basing their state law claims directly on the
contravention of EPA and state regulations but instead on general
deception aimed at consumers. This alleged deception, however,
depends on the allegations regarding the defeat device.

The second subcategory is inherently comparative, i.e., the Subject
Vehicles release emissions at lesser levels than do other BMW
vehicles. However, the Complaint is devoid of any allegations about
how other BMW models perform with respect to emissions. Those
earlier BMW models could have emitted more, less, or the same level
of emissions as the Subject Vehicles; the Complaint does not say.

The final subcategory, it could be argued, is not entirely
dependent upon a defeat-device allegation. It is based on alleged
representations that the Subject Vehicles are environmentally
friendly, despite the well-known environmental and health effects
of diesel emissions. Defendants' advertisements go so far as to say
that the purchaser would be helping to protect the environment
every day. Whether or not it complies with a particular regulatory
standard, a diesel vehicle may nevertheless fail to help protect
the environment. Plaintiffs, however, have specifically disavowed
any theory that relies upon general harm to the environment.
Factoring out that theory, we are again left with the plausibility
of the defeat-device allegation, which sets forth the essential
wrongful conduct that allegedly caused injury.

Without a sufficiently pled injury that is traceable to the
Defendants' allegedly wrongful conduct, Plaintiffs do not have
Article III standing to assert claims on behalf of themselves or
the class.  

The Court will therefore dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1) for failure to allege standing in the sense of injury in
fact.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 27, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y58fftnq from Leagle.com.

GARNER RICKMAN, ZIWEN LI & GARY REISING, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by
CHRISTOPHER A. SEEGER -- cseeger@seegerweiss.com -- SEEGER WEISS
LLP, MICHAEL ANDREW INNES -- michael.innes@gmail.com -- CARELLA
BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY AGNELLO, P.C., CAROLINE F. BARTLETT,
CARELLA BYRNE, 5 Becker Farm RoadRoseland, NJ 07068. SCOTT A.
GEORGE -- sgeorge@seegerweiss.com -- SEEGER WEISS, LLP & JAMES E.
CECCHI, CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C., 5
Becker Farm RoadRoseland, NJ 07068.

BMW OF NORTH AMERICA LLC, a Delaware corporation, Defendant,
represented by KEVIN M. MCDONOUGH -- Ekevin.mcdonough@lw.com --
LATHAM & WATKINS LLP.

ROBERT BOSCH LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, Defendant,
represented by AMY DANIELLE LURIA -- aluria@critchleylaw.com --
CRITCHLEY KINUM & DENOIA LLC, JEFFREY A. ROSENTHAL --
jrosenthal@cgsh.com -- CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP &
MICHAEL D. CRITCHLEY -- mcritchley@critchleylaw.com -- Critchley,
Kinum & DeNoia, LLC.


BOEING CO: Sued By More Than 400 Pilots Over 737 MAX
----------------------------------------------------
Alan Weedon, writing for ABC News, reports that more than 400
pilots have joined a class action against American plane
manufacturer Boeing, seeking damages in the millions over what they
allege was the company's "unprecedented cover-up" of the "known
design flaws" of the latest edition of its top-selling jet, the 737
MAX.

Boeing's 737 MAX series— first announced in 2011 and put to
service in 2017 — is the fourth generation of its 737 aircraft, a
widely popular narrow-body aircraft model that has been a mainstay
of short-haul aircraft routes across the globe.

By March 2019, the entire global fleet was suspended by a US
presidential decree, following the second fatal crash involving a
737 MAX that killed 157 people in Ethiopia.

The first crash involving the 737 MAX jet happened off the coast of
Indonesia in October 2018, killing 189 people.

In the time since the two fatal crashes, some of the families of
the 346 people killed have sought compensation, while aircraft
carriers -- such as Norwegian Air -- have sought compensation from
the American manufacturer for lost revenue as a result of the
plane's global ban.

This latest lawsuit filed against Boeing marks the first class
action lodged by pilots qualified to fly the 737 MAX series, who
have alleged that Boeing's decisions have caused them to suffer
from monetary loss and mental distress since the jet's suspension.

Boeing's newest version of its most popular plane, the 737 MAX, is
again in the spotlight after another deadly crash minutes after
take-off.

The originating plaintiff, known as Pilot X -- who has chosen to
remain anonymous for "fear of reprisal from Boeing and
discrimination from Boeing customers" -- lodged the statement of
claim on June 21, which seeks damages for them and more than 400
colleagues who work for the same airline.

In court documents seen by the ABC, the claim alleges that Boeing
"engaged in an unprecedented cover-up of the known design flaws of
the MAX, which predictably resulted in the crashes of two MAX
aircraft and subsequent grounding of all MAX aircraft worldwide."

They argue that they "suffer and continue to suffer significant
lost wages, among other economic and non-economic damages" since
the fleet's global grounding.

The class action will be heard in a Chicago court, with a hearing
date set for October 21, 2019.

The claim brought against Boeing hinges on the controversial
addition of an automated piece of software known as the Maneuvering
Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS).

Pilot X claimed that this gave the aircraft "inherently dangerous
aerodynamic handling defects".

The reason for this handling quirk was by design, as Boeing made
the decision to retrofit newer, large fuel-efficient engines onto
an existing 737 model's fuselage, in order to create the MAX.

The larger engines caused a change in aerodynamics which made the
plane prone to pitching up during flight, so much so, that it
risked a crash as a result of an aerodynamic stall.

To stop this from happening, Boeing introduced MCAS software to the
MAX, which automatically tilted the plane down if the software
detected that the plane's nose was pointing at too steep of an
angle, known as a high Angle of Attack (AOA).

But in light of the MAX's two fatal crashes, questions were raised
about the software's capacity to determine the AOA correctly, as
the MCAS system only relies on two AOA sensors.

Critics of this design choice said this made the plane vulnerable
to faulty or mismatched readings, and Boeing made a cockpit display
alerting mismatched AOA readings to MAX pilots an optional extra.

The MAX's competitor, the Airbus A320neo, relies on three sensors
as a fail-safe.

These concerns were also noted in Pilot X's claim:

"Boeing's defective design causes the MCAS to activate based on the
single input of a failed AOA sensor without cross-checking its data
with another properly functioning AOA sensor."

Pilots allege that Boeing kept them in the dark about MCAS

The MCAS function was not made explicit to pilots.

In a rush to bring the plane to customers, Boeing did not alert
pilots to the software in a bid to prevent "any new training that
required a simulator" — a decision that was also designed to save
MAX customers money.

Pilot X, alleges that Boeing "decided not to tell MAX pilots about
the MCAS or to require MAX pilots to undergo any MCAS training" so
that its customers could deploy pilots on "revenue-generating
routes as quickly as possible".

In March, a report from the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC)
found that the system was only mentioned once in the aircraft
manual, which was in the glossary, explaining the MCAS acronym --
an omission Boeing did not deny in response to the CBC.

When contacted by the ABC in April, a Boeing spokesperson said that
MCAS's function was referenced in the MAX's flight crew operations
manual, where it outlined what the plane would do "in the rare
event that the airplane reaches a high angle of attack".

But this is disputed by Pilot X:

"Boeing decided not to provide MAX pilots with information or
knowledge that the MCAS was incorporated into the airplane."

Pilot X hopes profits won't trump safety ever again

By seeking damages for monetary and mental distress, the pilots
lodging the class action said they hoped to "deter Boeing and other
airplane manufacturers from placing corporate profits ahead of the
lives of the pilots, crews, and general public they service".

Spokespeople for the pilots' legal team -- Queensland's
International Aerospace Law and Policy Group (IALPG) and Chicago's
PMJ PLLC -- told the ABC that they would never like to see a case
like theirs come before a court again.

"Success would have meant that no similar action is required in the
future, as Boeing would never have permitted profits to displace
proper safe design," a spokesperson said.

They also told the ABC that Pilot X would serve an administrative
claim -- an out-of-court claim seeking compensatory damages --
against the FAA.

Presently, the Boeing 737 MAX fleet remains grounded around the
world as the company proceeds with a software update.

The last Boeing press statement on certification progress in May
said that the MAX has flown "with updated MCAS software for more
than 360 hours on 207 flights".

So far the FAA has not committed to a timetable for the jet's
return.

Boeing declined to comment on the class action. [GN]


BOX INC: Aug. 5 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
-------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announces the
filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Box, Inc. (BOX) from November 28, 2018 through June
3, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The lawsuit seeks to
recover damages for Box investors under the federal securities
laws.

To join the Box class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1594.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Box was unable to close large deals within the quarter;
(2) Box's revenue would be materially impacted; and (3) defendants'
positive statements about Box's business, operations, and prospects
were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis. When
the true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that
investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than August 5,
2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf
of other class members in directing the litigation. If you wish to
join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1594.htmlor to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com

Contact:

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
         New York, NY 10016
         Phone: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Website: www.rosenlegal.com
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com
                cases@rosenlegal.com [GN]


CALIFORNIA: McLaughlin Appeals C.D. Calif. Ruling to 9th Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Matthew Gregory McLaughlin filed an appeal from a Court
ruling in the lawsuit entitled Matthew McLaughlin v. Kamala Harris,
et al., Case No. 8:18-cv-00546-JLS-KES, in the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California, Santa Ana.

The appellate case is captioned as MATTHEW GREGORY MCLAUGHLIN, for
himself and those similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant v. KAMALA
D. HARRIS, Attorney General, in her individual capacity; XAVIER
BECERRA, in his individual and official capacity as Attorney
General of California; TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE, in her official
capacities as Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court and as
Chair of the Judicial Council of California, Defendants-Appellees,
and CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT; STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Defendants, Case
No. 19-55667, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- August 9, 2019 -- Appellant's opening brief and excerpts of
      record shall be served and filed pursuant to FRAP 31 and
      9th Cir. R. 31-2.1;

   -- September 9, 2019 -- Appellees' answering brief and
      excerpts of record shall be served and filed pursuant to
      FRAP 31 and 9th Cir. R. 31-2.1; and

   -- The optional appellant's reply brief shall be filed and
      served within 21 days of service of the appellees' brief,
      pursuant to FRAP 31 and 9th Cir. R. 31-2.1.[BN]


CAPITAL ONE: Seeks 4th Circuit Review of Ruling in McFarland Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Capital One N.A. filed an appeal from a Court ruling in
the lawsuit styled McFarland v. Capital One N.A., Case No.
8:18-cv-02148-TDC, in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland at Greenbelt.

The appellate case is captioned as Capital One, N.A. v. Anthony
McFarland, Case No. 19-249, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Respondent ANTHONY MCFARLAND, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          David M. Trojanowski, Esq.
          Cory Lev Zajdel, Esq.
          Z LAW, LLC
          2345 York Road
          Timonium, MD 21093
          Telephone: (443) 213-1977
          E-mail: dmt@zlawmaryland.com
                  clz@zlawmaryland.com

Defendant-Petitioner CAPITAL ONE N.A., d/b/a Capital One Auto
Finance, is represented by:

          Sarah Warren Howlett, Esq.
          Jonathan S. Hubbard, Esq.
          TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP
          1001 Haxall Point
          Richmond, VA 23219
          Telephone: (804) 697-1208
          E-mail: sarahwarren.howlett@troutman.com
                  jon.hubbard@troutman.com

               - and -

          Syed Mohsin Reza, Esq.
          TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP
          401 9th Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20004-2134
          Telephone: (202) 274-1932
          E-mail: mohsin.reza@troutman.com


CBL & ASSOCIATES: Merelles Alleges Securities Law Violation
-----------------------------------------------------------
ALBERTO MERELLES, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. CBL & ASSOCIATES PROPERTIES,
INC., STEPHEN D. LEBOVITZ, CHARLES B. LEBOVITZ, FARZANA KHALEEL and
A. LARRY CHAPMAN, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00193 (E.D. Tenn.,
July 2, 2019) is a securities class action brought on behalf of all
purchasers of CBL securities from July 29, 2014 through March 26,
2019 (the "Class Period") against CBL and certain of the Company's
executive officers and/or directors seeking to pursue remedies
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act").

The vast majority of CBL's revenue is derived from leases with
retail tenants.  The leases generally include fixed minimum rents
and percentage rents based on tenants' sales volumes, as well as
reimbursements from tenants for expenditures related to utilities,
real estate taxes, insurance, common area maintenance and other
recoverable operating expenses. Between fiscal year 2014 ("FY14")
and fiscal year 2018 ("FY18"), tenant reimbursements made up as
much as 27% of CBL's revenue on an annual basis. Beginning in 2005
or 2006, defendants commenced a scheme to inflate CBL's tenant
reimbursements and revenues by unlawfully overcharging the
Company's retail tenants for electricity.

Notwithstanding these lease provisions, CBL conspired with a
third-party company, Valquest Systems, Inc., to inflate CBL's
tenants' electricity usage and to charge those tenants more for
that usage than CBL actually paid. Both CBL and Valquest knew this
scheme exposed the Company to legal liabilities and reputational
damage and attempted to avoid discovery of their scheme by not
making too high a profit, which would have aroused tenants'
suspicions. In total, CBL overcharged its tenants for more than 190
million kilowatt hours ("kWh") of electricity, reaping tens of
millions of dollars in illicit revenues from its unlawful scheme.

At the same time, defendants made materially false and misleading
statements and omissions to investors on a periodic basis
throughout the Class Period by: (i) overstating the Company's
tenant reimbursements, revenues and income by including unlawfully
obtained profits from defendants' overbilling scheme in violation
of generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") and SEC
reporting requirements; (ii) claiming that CBL received
reimbursement from tenants for operating expenses, "as provided in
the lease agreements," when in fact CBL was violating these lease
agreements by systematically overcharging its tenants; and (iii)
failing to disclose the material liability and reputational harm it
faced as a result of this scheme. The Defendants' fraud caused tens
of millions of dollars in harm to CBL shareholders, who relied on
the accuracy of defendants' statements as reflected in the market
price for CBL securities and suffered damages when the truth began
to be revealed. This action seeks to recover for those losses, says
the complaint.

Plaintiff Alberto Merelles purchased CBL securities during the
Class Period.

CBL is organized as a real estate investment trust ("REIT") through
its subsidiaries. The Company owns, develops, acquires, leases,
manages and operates regional shopping malls, open-air centers,
outlet centers, community centers and office properties.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Christopher M. Wood, Esq.
     ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
     414 Union Street, Suite 900
     Nashville, TN 37219
     Phone: 615/244-2203
     Fax: 615/252-3798
     Email: cwood@rgrdlaw.com


CGJC HOLDINGS: Medina Sues Over Unpaid Minimum and Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
FABIO MEDINA On Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated
v. CGJC HOLDINGS LLC d/b/a JOE & PAT'S PIZZERIA & RESTAURANT, CIRO
PAPPALARDO, JOHN ROBERT PISCOPO, GENNARO A. PAPPALARDO And CASEY A.
PAPPALARDO, Case No. 1:19-cv-05416 (S.D.N.Y., June 10, 2019),
arises from the Defendants' alleged flagrant and willful violations
of the Plaintiff's rights guaranteed to him by the minimum wage and
overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New
York Labor Law.

CGJC Holdings LLC, doing business as Joe & Pat's Pizzeria &
Restaurant, is a domestic business corporation with its principal
place of business located at 168 1st Avenue, in New York City.  The
Individual Defendants are owners or officers of the Company.

The Defendants own and operate an Italian restaurant in
Manhattan.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Amit Kumar, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF WILLIAM CAFARO
          108 West 39th Street, Suite 602
          New York, NY 10018
          Telephone: (212) 583-7400
          E-mail: AKumar@Cafaroesq.com


CHAMBERS HOTEL: Olsen Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Chambers Hotel
Corporation. The case is styled as Thomas J. Olsen, individually
and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Chambers Hotel Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-05928 (S.D.
N.Y., June 25, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Chambers Hotel Corporation is a Luxury Hotel in NYC with an ideal
Midtown Manhattan location adjacent to Central Park and Fifth
Avenue shopping with spacious and stylish guest rooms.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
     Lipsky Lowe LLP
     630 Third Avenue
     New York, NY 10017-6705
     Phone: (212) 392-4772
     Fax: (212) 444-1030
     Email: chris@lipskylowe.com


CIOX HEALTH: Ortiz Appeals S.D.N.Y. Order & Judgment to 2nd Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Hector Ortiz filed an appeal from the District Court's
Opinion and Order, and judgment, both dated May 7, 2019, in his
lawsuit entitled Ortiz v. IOD Inc., et al., Case No. 17-cv-4039, in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (New
York City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 18,
2019, Judge Denise Cote granted the Defendants' Oct. 31, 2018
motions for judgment on the pleadings.

Mr. Ortiz brings the proposed class action against CIOX and the New
York and Presbyterian Hospital ("NYPH").  He seeks damages and
injunctive relief arising out of the Defendants' alleged violations
of New York Public Health Law Section 18, which prohibits health
care providers from charging qualified persons more than $0.75 per
page for copies of their medical records.

The appellate case is captioned as Ortiz v. IOD Inc., et al., Case
No. 19-1649, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant Hector Ortiz, in his capacity of Temporary
Administrator of the Estate of Vicky Ortiz, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Michael Reese, Esq.
          REESE LLP
          100 West 93rd Street
          New York, NY 10025
          Telephone: (212) 594-5300
          E-mail: mreese@reesellp.com

Defendant-Appellee Ciox Health LLC, successor in interest IOD Inc.,
is represented by:

          Jodyann Galvin, Esq.
          HODGSON RUSS LLP
          The Guaranty Building
          140 Pearl Street
          Buffalo, NY 14202
          Telephone: (716) 848-1520
          E-mail: jgalvin@hodgsonruss.com

Defendant-Appellee New York Presbyterian Hospital is represented
by:

          John Houston Pope, Esq.
          EPSTEIN BECKER & GREEN, P.C.
          250 Park Avenue
          New York, NY 10177
          Telephone: (212) 351-4500
          E-mail: jhpope@ebglaw.com


CLOUDERA INC: Faces Lazard Class Suit Over Hortonworks Merger
-------------------------------------------------------------
SIDNEY LAZARD, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. CLOUDERA, INC., et al., Case No. 19CV348674 (Cal.
Super., Santa Clara Cty., June 7, 2019), is brought on behalf of
the Plaintiff and other shareholders, acquired Cloudera common
stock pursuant or traceable to the S-4 registration statement and
prospectus issued in connection with the January 2019 merger of
Cloudera and Hortonworks Inc.

The Plaintiff alleges that in violation of the Securities Act of
1933, the Registration Statement contained untrue statements of
material fact and omitted material facts.  The Plaintiff contends
that the Registration Statement failed to disclose that, at least
since the announcement of the Merger in October 2018 (several
months before the Merger closed) the Company was experiencing
increased competition from, and less of customers and market share
to, public cloud vendor competitors, such as Amazon Web Services,
Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute Cloud, whose new cloud products
and technologies surpassed Cloudera's outdated Hadoop offerings.
The Plaintiff adds that when the truth of the Defendants'
misrepresentations and omissions became known, the price of
Cloudera shares suffered sharp declines.

Cloudera is an enterprise data cloud company headquartered in Palo
Alto, California.  The Individual Defendants are directors and
officers of Cloudera.

Hortonworks is a cloud data company headquartered in Santa Clara,
California.  Through the Merger, Hortonworks was merged into
Cloudera.

Intel Corporation is a semiconductor technology company
headquartered in Santa Clara, California.  At the time of the
Merger (and after), Intel was a controlling shareholder of
Cloudera.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David W. Hall, Esq.
          HEDIN HALL LLP
          Four Embarcadero Center, Suite 1400
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 766 3534
          Facsimile: {415} 402-0058
          E-mail: dhall@hedinhall.com

               - and -

          David Bricker, Esq.
          Guillaume Buell, Esq.
          THORNTON LAW FIRM LLP
          9430 West Olympic Boulevard, Suite 400
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Telephone: (310) 282-8676
          Facsimile: (310) 388-5316
          E-mail: dbricker@tenlaw.com
                  gbuell@tenlaw.com

               - and -

          Brian Schall, Esq.
          Rina Restaino, Esq.
          THE SCHALL LAW FIRM
          1880 Century Park East, Suite 404
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 301-3335
          Facsimile: (310) 388-0192
          E-mail: brian@schallfirm.com
                  rina@schallfirm.com


COCA-COLA COMPANY: 2nd Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Diet Coke Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court's judgment granting
Defendants' Motion for Dismiss in the case captioned EVAN GEFFNER
AND IVAN BABSIN, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES, ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE
COCA-COLA COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. No. 18-3548-cv. (2nd Cir.).

The Plaintiffs appeal the District Court's dismissal of all claims
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Plaintiffs-Appellants Evan Geffner and Ivan Babsin, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, brought a purported class
action against Defendant-Appellee The Coca-Cola Company (Coca-Cola)
alleging that Coca-Cola violated several provisions of New York
State law through misleading naming and marketing of its soft drink
Diet Coke.

The District Court dismissed all of the Plaintiffs' claims,
concluding that Diet Coke's marketing conveyed only an assertion of
reduced calories (rather than a promise of weight loss or weight
management) and that Plaintiffs' cited studies do not show a causal
link between aspartame contained in Diet Coke and weight gain.

The Court reviews de novo a district court's grant of a motion to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). To survive
a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.

Each of the Plaintiffs' claims requires that they establish that
Coca-Cola marketed Diet Coke by means of false or misleading
statements or conduct.

The Court finds the Plaintiffs' allegations of such false
statements or conduct implausible on their face.

First, the Court rejects any claims based on Coca-Cola's
advertising. The use of physically fit and attractive models using
and enjoying advertised products is so ubiquitous that it cannot be
reasonably understood to convey any specific meaning at all.
Similarly, the statement that Diet Coke will not go to your waist
is so vague and non-specific a representation that, at most, it
amounts to inactionable puffery.

As for Coca-Cola's statement that Diet Coke is suitable for
carbohydrate and calorie-reduced diets, Plaintiffs allege no facts
to suggest that this statement is false. On the contrary,
Plaintiffs themselves acknowledge that Diet Coke does not contain
sugar or calories in their First Amended Complaint.

The Court turns then to the Plaintiffs' primary theory, i.e., that
the diet label itself constitutes a misleading statement.

As the Court had previously observed, in determining whether a
reasonable consumer would have been misled by a particular
advertisement, context is crucial. The dictionary defines diet in
the soft drink context as meaning reduced in or free from calories.
Consistent with that plain meaning, federal law has long authorized
the use of the term diet on soft drink labels, where, among other
things, it contained low or reduced calories.

There is no dispute that Diet Coke meets the federal requirements
to be labelled diet. While we need not decide whether federal law
preempts the state-law claims asserted here, that long-standing
federal regulation is persuasive evidence of the meaning of the
label diet in the diet-soda context.

The Court therefore concludes that, in the context of soft drink
marketing, the term diet carries a clear meaning. First, the diet
label refers specifically to the drink's low caloric content; it
does not convey a more general weight loss promise.

Second, the Court concludes that, when applied to soft drinks, the
label diet carries a primarily relative rather than absolute
meaning. In other words, it connotes simply that the diet version
of the drink is lower in calories than the non-diet version of the
drink.

Here, the Plaintiffs do not dispute that Diet Coke is lower in
calories than regular Coke. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have failed
plausibly to allege that the diet label is misleading.

Because the Plaintiffs have failed plausibly to allege a misleading
statement, each of their proposed causes-of-action lacks a
necessary element. Dismissal was therefore proper.

Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirms the judgment of the
District Court.

A full-text copy of the Second Circuit's June 27, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y43du76q from Leagle.com.

JOHN K. WESTON, 1845 Walnut Street Suite, 1600 Philadelphia, PA
19103 (Abraham Z. Melamed --  abe@dereksmithlaw.com -- Derek Smith
Law Group, PLLC, New York, NY; Jack Fitzgerald --
jack@jackfitzgeraldlaw.com -- Trevor M. Flynn --
trevor@jackfitzgeraldlaw.com -- Melanie Persinger --
melanie@jackfitzgeraldlaw.com -- The Law Office of Jack Fitzgerald,
PC, San Diego, CA, on the brief) Sacks Weston Diamond LLC,
Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

JANE METCALF- jmetcalf@pbwt.com -- (Steven A. Zalesin --
sazalesin@pbwt.com -- Catherine A. Williams -- cawilliams@pbwt.com
-- Michael Sochynsky -- msochynsky@pbwt.com -- on the brief),
Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP, New York, NY, for
Defendant-Appellee.


COMPLIANCE ADVANTAGE: Appeals Cir. Ct. Judgment in Criswell Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Compliance Advantage, LLC, et al., filed an appeal from
a judgment in the lawsuit styled Heather Criswell and Jade Maddox,
on behalf of herself and all other employees and business victims
similarly situated v. Compliance Advantage, LLC, et al., Case No.
17-CI-00296, in the Kentucky Circuit Court.

The appellate case is captioned as COMPLIANCE ADVANTAGE, LLC (D/B/A
C.A.L. LABORATORY SERVICES) v. HEATHER CRISWELL (ON BEHALF OF
HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED), Case No.
2019-CA-000872, in the Kentucky Court of Appeals.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees HEATHER CRISWELL ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, and JADE MADDOX ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND
ALL OTHER EMPLOYEES AND BUSINESS, are represented by:

      Thomas K. Herren, Esq.
      HERREN & ADAMS
      148 N. Broadway
      Lexington, KY 40507
      Telephone: (859) 254-0024
      Facsimile: (859) 254-5991
      E-mail: tom.herren@herrenadams.com

Defendants-Appellants COMPLIANCE ADVANTAGE, LLC D/B/A C.A.L.
LABORATORY SERVICES; CAL LEASING, LLC; and RELIABLE LAB are
represented by:

          Tonya S. Rager, Esq.
          David Andrew Trevey, Esq.
          KINKEAD & STILZ, PLLC
          301 East Main Street, Suite 800
          Lexington, KY 40507
          Telephone: (859) 296-2300
          E-mail: trager@ksattorneys.com
                  dtrevey@ksattorneys.com

               - and -

          Joshua James Leckrone, Esq.
          Tamara Jean Patterson, Esq.
          WALTERS, MEADOWS, RICHARDSON, PLLC
          771 Corporate Drive, Suite 900
          Lexington, KY 40503
          Telephone: (859) 219-9090
          E-mail: josh@wmrdefense.com


CRAY INC: Kent Files Suit Over Hewlett Packard Merger Deal
----------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL KENT, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. CRAY INC., PRITHVIRAJ BANERJEE, CATRIONA M.
FALLON, STEPHEN E. GOLD, STEPHEN C. KIELY, SALLY G. NARODICK,
DANIEL C. REGIS, MAX L. SCHIRESON, BRIAN V. TURNER, PETER J.
UNGARO, HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISE COMPANY, and CANOPY MERGER SUB,
INC., Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01157-UNA (D. Del., June 21,
2019) is an action stemming from a proposed transaction announced
on May 17, 2019, pursuant to which Cray Inc. will be acquired by
Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company, a Delaware corporation, and
Canopy Merger Sub, Inc.

On May 16, 2019, Cray's Board of Director caused the Company to
enter into an agreement and plan of merger with HPE. Pursuant to
the terms of the Merger Agreement, shareholders of Cray will
receive $35.00 in cash for each share of Cray they own. On June 12,
2019, defendants filed a proxy statement with the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with the Proposed
Transaction. However, the Proxy Statement omits material
information with respect to the Proposed Transaction, which renders
the Proxy Statement false and misleading, says the complaint.

Accordingly, Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with the Proxy
Statement.

Plaintiff is the owner of Cray common stock.

Cray, with more than forty-five years of experience, develops
advanced supercomputers. The Company offers a comprehensive
portfolio of supercomputers, high-performance storage, data
analytics, and artificial intelligence solutions.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Brian D. Long, Esq.
     Gina M. Serra, Esq.
     RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
     300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
     Wilmington, DE 19801
     Phone: (302) 295-5310
     Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
     Email: bdl@rl-legal.com
            gms@rl-legal.com

          - and -

     Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
     RM LAW, P.C.
     1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
     Berwyn, PA 19312
     Phone: (484) 324-6800
     Facsimile: (484) 631-1305
     Email: rm@maniskas.com


CURADEN AG: Court Denies Bid to Stay Lyngaas Suit Pending Appeal
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, issued an Opinion and Order denying
Defendants' Motion to Stay in the case captioned BRIAN LYNGAAS,
D.D.S., individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly situated persons, Plaintiff, v. CURADEN AG, et al.,
Defendants. Case No. 17-cv-10910. (E.D. Mich.).

Defendants Curaden AG and Curaden USA have appealed this ruling
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), and now ask the
Court to stay this case while the appeal is pending.  

Likelihood of success on the merits

Turning first to the Defendants' likelihood of success on the
merits, the Court finds that this factor weighs against issuing a
stay. Defendants' burden with respect to showing a likelihood of
success on the merits is two-fold: they must show that it is likely
that their Rule 23(f) petition will be granted, and that they will
prevail on the merits of their petition

The Court finds it unlikely that the Sixth Circuit would hear the
appeal on the theory that this Court's decision would be a
death-knell for the litigation. In Delta, the Sixth Circuit
explained that a defendant who contends that the costs of
continuing litigation would present such a barrier that later
review would be hampered must go beyond a general assertion and
provide the court insight into potential expenses and liabilities.
Defendants' petition, attached as an exhibit to the motion to stay,
stresses that damages in this case possibly exceed $30 million, but
does not provide any further detail regarding Defendants' inability
to continue this case without review of the class certification
order.   

This does not provide the insight the Sixth Circuit requires.

The Court also finds it unlikely that the Sixth Circuit would grant
Defendants' petition on the grounds of a strong likelihood of
success on the merits. The Court carefully considered the arguments
raised by Defendants in connection with the motion for class
certification, and Defendants have offered no new substantive
arguments that would lead this Court to reconsider its conclusions.
For the reasons set forth in this Court's May 23, 2019 Opinion, the
Court cannot conclude that Defendants have a strong likelihood of
succeeding on the merits.

Irreparable harm to Defendants

The second factor for this Court to consider is whether Defendants
would be irreparably harmed, absent a stay. A showing of
irreparable harm requires more than a reference to litigation costs
associated with continued district court proceedings, or to
settlement pressures. As with the petition itself, Defendants offer
general statements regarding finances, but fail to provide any
specific information. They simply assert that they are small
businesses and could be forced to settle because they are not the
kind of large companies that could withstand an enormous class
action verdict. The Court is unwilling to find, based on these
vague assertions, that Defendants would suffer irreparable harm if
the case were to continue during the pendency of Defendants'
appeal.

This factor weighs against staying the proceedings.

Injury to other interested parties

The Defendants argue that Lyngaas has an interest in staying the
case, as a stay will avoid unnecessary expense. As Lyngaas points
out, however, it is always the case that a stay would, at least
temporarily, relieve the parties and the Court of the costs of
continued litigation. And the Court has already determined that
Defendants are unlikely to succeed on appeal, meaning that Lyngaas
will eventually face these costs.

The Defendants fail to show that this factor weighs in favor of
staying the proceedings.

Public interest

Lastly, the Defendants argue that the public interest weighs in
favor of entering a stay, as class members will receive notice of
the class proceedings and may rely upon this notice. If the Sixth
Circuit decertifies the class, the Defendants argue, the parties
will have to send out another round of notices to class members.

The Defendants point to Powell v. Tosh, No. 09-121, 2012 WL 1202289
(W.D. Ky. Apr. 10, 2012), where the district court found that the
potential for the court to need to issue a corrective notice if its
order regarding certification was reversed could create significant
confusion among the potential class members and stayed the
proceedings.  

It is unclear what confusion might result from class members
receiving a corrective notice regarding class certification. Class
members would initially receive a notice informing them that they
are part of a class action unless they decide to opt out; should
the Sixth Circuit decertify the class, the class member would later
be told that he or she is no longer part of a class action.

The Court sees no reason to assume that the class members are
incapable of understanding any notice that is sent to them. As for
any reliance that a class member would place on receiving the
initial class notice, there would be no prejudice to the class
member, as the filing of a class action complaint tolls the statute
of limitations for all putative class members until class
certification is denied.

The Court finds that the balance of considerations weighs against
staying the case pending the Defendants' Rule 23(f) appeal.

The Court denies Defendants' motion to stay.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 27, 2019  Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxnnvne7 from
Leagle.com.

Brian Lyngaas, D.D.S., Plaintiff, represented by David M. Oppenheim
-- david@classlawyers.com -- Bock, Hatch, Lewis, & Oppenheim, LLC,
Richard Shenkan, Shenkan Injury Lawyers, LLC, 6550 Lakeshore
Street

West Bloomfield, MI, 48323, Tod A. Lewis -- tod@classlawyers.com --
Bock Law Firm, LLC dba Bock, Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC &
Phillip A. Bock  -- phil@classlawyers.com -- Bock Law Firm, LLC dba
Bock, Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC.

Curaden AG & Curaden USA Inc., Defendants, represented by Brian S.
Sullivan --  brian.sullivan@dinsmore.com -- Dinsmore & Shohl &
Jason M. Renner -- jason.renner@dinsmore.com -- Dinsmore & Shohl
LLP.


CVS HEALTH: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in Kroessler's Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff James Kroessler filed an appeal from a Court ruling in
the lawsuit titled James Kroessler v. CVS Health Corporation, Case
No. 3:19-cv-00277-CAB-JLB, in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California, San Diego.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 4,
2019, the District Court issued an Order granting Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss the case.

Plaintiff James Kroessler filed a putative consumer class action
complaint against Defendant CVS Health Corporation alleging false
and misleading advertising of Defendant's CVS Health glucosamine
joint health products.  The complaint alleges violations of
California's Unfair Competition Law, California Business &
Professions Code Section (UCL); California's Consumer Legal
Remedies Act, California Civil Code Section 1750, et. seq. (CLRA);
and Breach of Express Warranty.

The appellate case is captioned as James Kroessler v. CVS Health
Corporation, Case No. 19-55671, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appellant James Kroessler's opening brief is due on
     August 12, 2019;

   -- Appellee CVS Health Corporation's answering brief is due on
      September 10, 2019;

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant JAMES KROESSLER, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Timothy G. Blood, Esq.
          BLOOD HURST & O'REARDON LLP
          501 West Broadway
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 338-1100
          E-mail: tblood@bholaw.com

Defendant-Appellee CVS HEALTH CORPORATION is represented by:

          Amy Pesapane Lally, Esq.
          SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
          1999 Avenue of the Stars, 17th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 595-9500
          E-mail: alally@sidley.com


DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION: Blanchette Sues over APA Violations
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Elisabeth DeVos and
the United States Department of Education for alleged violations of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The case is captioned
TAMARA BLANCHETTE, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. DEVOS et al, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-01775-RC (D.D.C., June 18, 2019). It is assigned to Hon.
Judge Rudolph Contreras.

Elisabeth DeVos is the 11th and the current Secretary of the United
States Department of Education, a government agency tasked to
establish policy for, administer and coordinate most federal
assistance to education, collect data on US schools, and to enforce
federal educational laws regarding privacy and civil rights. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Robyn K. Bitner, Esq.
     NATIONAL STUDENT LEGAL DEFENSE NETWORK
     1015 15th Street NW Suite 600
     Washington, DC 20005
     Telephone: (202) 734-7495
     E-mail: robyn@nsldn.org


DESOCIO & FUCCIO: Woodley Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against DeSocio & Fuccio,
P.C.  The case is styled as Debbie Woodley on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. DeSocio & Fuccio, P.C.,
Jerald J Desocio, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-03891 (E.D. N.Y.,
July 5, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

DeSocio & Fuccio engages in both litigation and transactional law.
The law firm of DeSocio & Fuccio, P.C. offers full service in the
areas of Real Estate Law.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


DIGNITY HEALTH: Liang Suit Asserts FCRA Violation
-------------------------------------------------
SHIRLEY LIANG, an individual on behalf of herself and on behalf of
all persons similarly situated; Plaintiff, v. DIGNITY HEALTH, a
California corporation, and DOES 1 to 10, Defendant, Case No.
4:19-cv-03627-KAW (N.D. Cal., June 21, 2019) is a class action on
behalf of all persons similarly affected by Defendant's violations
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and California's Unfair
Competition Law.

Plaintiff applied for, and was hired by Defendant to work at a
facility in Los Angeles, California. As part of her application
process, Plaintiff was provided several documents, including
disclosures related to background investigations, as well as other
notices. Some of the documents were multi-page documents, and
others were stand-alone documents. Plaintiff alleges Defendants
provide the same, or substantially similar, documents to other
applicants and employees. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant
routinely obtain credit and background reports on applicants,
including Plaintiff, as part of the hiring process. Prior to
obtaining credit and background reports, employers must comply with
specific federal and state requirements. Plaintiff alleges
Defendant did not meet its statutory requirements, and consequently
and as a direct result of this failure, Plaintiff and other class
members were not provided proper disclosure, and have been injured
by the violation of their privacy and statutory rights, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff Shirley Liang is currently employed by Dignity Health as
a Senior Financial Analyst, and began her employment in January
2018 at Defendant's facility.

Defendant owns and operates hospitals in numerous separate
geographic locations within California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     David R. Markham, Esq.
     Maggie Realin, Esq.
     Michael Morphew, Esq.
     Lisa Brevard, Esq.
     THE MARKHAM LAW FIRM
     750 B Street, Suite 1950
     San Diego, CA 92101
     Phone: 619.399.3995
     Fax: 619.615.2067
     Email: dmarkham@markham-law.com
            mrealin@markham-law.com
            mmorphew@markham-law.com
            lbrevard@markham-law.com

          - and -

     Walter Haines, Esq.
     UNITED EMPLOYEES LAW GROUP
     5500 Bolsa Avenue, Suite 201
     Huntington Beach, CA 92649
     Phone: 888.474.7242
     Fax: 562.256.1006
     Email: walterhaines@yahoo.com


DUYWASHMAN LLC: Sent Unsolicited Text Messages, Januska Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
STANLEY JANUSKA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. DUYWASHMAN LLC, a Florida Limited Liability
Company, GULU WASH, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company, d/b/a
4Ever Young, Defendants, Case No. 0:19-cv-61552-XXXX (S.D. Fla.,
June 21, 2019) is a Class Action Complaint for damages, injunctive
relief, and any other available legal or equitable remedies,
resulting from the illegal actions of Defendants in negligently or
willfully contacting Plaintiff on Plaintiff's cellular telephone,
in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, thereby
invading Plaintiff's privacy.

The Defendants sent text messages to Plaintiff and to Class Members
for the purpose of promoting anti-aging services, such as "cosmetic
services and skin care" and "whole body wellness services" and
products, including "supplements" that are sold by 4Ever Young. The
text messages which Defendants sent to Plaintiff were unsolicited
advertisements because they failed to obtain prior express written
consent from Plaintiff before the subject text messages were sent,
the complaint says.

Plaintiff's domicile is in Broward County, Florida. Plaintiff is a
citizen of the state of Florida.

Defendants jointly operate 4Ever Young, a "preventative health
facility".[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Seth M. Lehrman, Esq.
     EDWARDS POTTINGER LLC
     425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2
     Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
     Phone: 954-524-2820
     Facsimile: 954-524-2822
     Email: seth@epllc.com


EDDIE BAUER: Harbers Suit Removed to W.D. Washington
----------------------------------------------------
The case captioned JENNIFER HARBERS, for Herself, as a Private
Attorney General, and/or On Behalf Of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. EDDIE BAUER, LLC, and DOES 1-20, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 19-2-13499-2 SEA was removed from the King
County Superior Court to the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington on June 21, 2019, and assigned Case
No. 2:19-cv-00968.

The Complaint, which is styled as a class action, purports to bring
claims under Washington's Consumer Protection Act ("CPA"), RCW
Chapter 19.86 and Washington's Commercial Electronic Mail Act
("CEMA"), RCW Chapter 19.190. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that
Eddie Bauer has violated CEMA, and in turn CPA, by sending
marketing emails with deceptive subject lines.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

     Marc C. Levy, Esq.
     Thomas A. Shewmake, Esq.
     SEED IP Law Group LLP
     701 Fifth Ave., Suite 5400
     Seattle, WA 98104
     Phone: 206-622-4900
     Facsimile: 206-682-6031
     Email: marcl@seedip.com
            tomshewmake@seedip.com

          - and -

     Stephanie A. Sheridan, Esq.
     Anthony J. Anscombe, Esq.
     Meegan B. Brooks, Esq.
     STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP
     One Market Street
     Steuart Tower, Suite 1800
     San Francisco, CA 94105
     Phone: 415-365-6700
     Facsimile: 415-365-6699
     Email: ssheridan@steptoe.com
            aanscombe@steptoe.com
            mbrooks@steptoe.com


ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICE: Jimenez Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, OT Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE DOMINGO JIMENEZ, SOCORRO PERALES and JORGE PINEDA, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly Class Action situated v.
ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICE PARTNERS, INC. and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Case
No. CGC-19-576544 (Cal. Super., San Francisco Cty., June 7, 2019),
arises from the Defendants' alleged failure to pay minimum and
overtime wages, and other benefits.

ESP has been a corporation organized under the law of the state of
California with a principal place of business in Hayward,
California.  The Plaintiffs are ignorant of the true name,
capacity, relationship and extent of participation of each of the
Doe Defendants.

ESP offers a full array of services, including building
maintenance, day and night janitorial services, recycling services,
emergency services and supplies.  ESP supplies employees to work on
the premises of its clients.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Gregory N. Karasik, Esq.
          KARASIK LAW FIRM
          11835 W. Olympic Blvd., Ste. 1275
          Los Angeles, CA 90064
          Telephone: (310) 312-6800
          Facsimile: (310) 943-2582
          E-mail: greg@karasiklawfirm.com

               - and -

          Santos Gomez, Esq.
          Maria Esmeralda Vizzusi, Esq.
          Dawson Morton, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF SANTOS GOMEZ
          1003 Freedom Boulevard
          Watsonville, CA 95076
          Telephone: (831) 228-1560
          Facsimile: (831) 228-1542
          E-mail: santos@lawofficesofsantosgomez.com
                  esmeralda@lawofficesofsantosgomez.com
                  dawson@lawofficesofsantosgomez.com


EQUITY RESIDENTIAL: Bid to Decertify Baker Classes Partly OK'd
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
issued a Memorandum and Order granting in part and denying in part
Defendant's Motion to Decertify the Classes in the case captioned
RACHELLE BAKER and JASON DITTMANN, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. EQUITY RESIDENTIAL
MANAGEMENT, L.L.C., and EQR-WALDEN PARK, LLC, Defendants. Civil
Action No. 18-11175-PBS. (D. Mass.).

Equity moves to decertify these classes for failure to satisfy
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)'s predominance
requirement.

Plaintiffs Rachelle Baker and Jason Dittmann bring this class
action lawsuit against the owner and manager of their former
apartment complex (Walden Park), Defendants Equity Residential
Management, L.L.C. and EQR-Walden Park, LLC (Equity). They claim
Equity failed to provide adequate heat and hot water systems and
undertook an unnecessarily disruptive construction project to
attempt to fix the systems. On behalf of other tenants in the
apartment complex, they allege that Equity breached the implied
covenant of quiet enjoyment and implied warranty of habitability,
was unjustly enriched, and violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A.

Before Equity removed the case to federal court, the state court
certified two classes.
Equity moves to decertify both the Conversion Class and the
Admitted Outage Class for failure to satisfy the predominance
requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). Plaintiffs
propose modifying the Conversion Class to a new Riser Replacement
Class and oppose decertification of the Admitted Outage Class.  

Riser Replacement Class

The Plaintiffs' modified Riser Replacement Class consists of all
persons who were tenants at Walden Park during the period of the
Riser Replacement Project, which was July 7, 2014 through September
30, 2014.

The Plaintiffs contend that the Riser Replacement Project caused
intrusion, confusion, noise, dirt, and dust that violated the
implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. They plan to prove liability
on a classwide basis via the following common evidence: 1) email
notices from Equity to all tenants that explained the duration,
nature, and extent of the work to be done in each apartment 2)
testimony from Peter McGing from Equity that the project involved
replacing two pipes in each apartment  3) more than thirty
complaints submitted by tenants about disturbances resulting from
the construction and 4) testimony from Cara Anne Miller, another
Equity employee, that Equity failed to comply with its agreement to
reduce the disturbances.

This common evidence is insufficient on its own to prove classwide
liability for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. The email
notices and McGing's testimony are common evidence that Equity
replaced two pipes in the walls of each apartment over five to
seven nonconsecutive days. While the purpose and timing of the
construction in each apartment may have been identical, this common
evidence does not show that the construction constituted a serious
interference with each tenant's quiet enjoyment of his or her
apartment.  

The Plaintiffs contend that the set of thirty tenant complaints
about the project serves as common proof that the project
constituted a serious disruption for all class members. But the
varied nature of the complaints confirms that the effect of the
construction in each apartment is an individual question. One
tenant complained that the contractors left her apartment dirty
multiple times, locked her out, and interfered with her infant's
sleeping schedule. Another mentioned the thick layer of dust,
exposed nails, cracked baseboards, and cockroaches in her
apartment. In contrast, a third tenant complained that the
contractors twice left his air conditioning unit on after finishing
work in his apartment.  

To the extent the Plaintiffs seek to certify the Riser Replacement
Class for their three other causes of action, certification is not
warranted for the same reasons. Given the variety of complaints
about the project, Plaintiffs cannot show via common proof that the
project caused uninhabitable conditions in each apartment for their
habitability claim. While a thick layer of dust, exposed nails,
cracked baseboards, and cockroaches may render an apartment
uninhabitable, leaving the air conditioning running does not.
Whether Equity was unjustly enriched by a tenant's rent payments
also depends on the specific conditions in his or her apartment.
The Chapter 93A claim relies on an underlying quiet enjoyment or
habitability violation, which they cannot prove via common
evidence.

The Court cannot certify the Riser Replacement Class for any cause
of action because it fails to meet the predominance requirement of
Rule 23(b)(3).

Admitted Outage Class

As certified by the state court, the Admitted Outage Class consists
of all persons who were tenants in either building on any of the 27
dates for which [Equity has] admitted outages, and all persons who
were tenants in 225 Walden Street on any of the 19 dates for which
Equity has admitted outages in that building only.

In its decertification motion, Equity emphasizes that Plaintiffs
cannot prove the conditions in each apartment during each outage,
and thus breaches of quiet enjoyment or habitability, using common
evidence. Equity also argues that calculating damages requires an
individualized assessment that would either compensate uninjured
tenants or require individual proof for each tenant.

Admitted Outage Date Theory

As Equity points out, the forty-six email notices that define the
Admitted Outage Class describe a range of outages. Some provide
notice of a day-long outage, others of a brief outage.  Some
explain that an outage may occur, others that an outage already
occurred. Given the variety of admitted outages that define the
class, the Plaintiffs cannot rely on common evidence to prove a
quiet enjoyment violation for each tenant on each admitted outage
date. Where Equity notified its tenants that an outage might occur,
some tenants may have suffered from a loss of heat or hot water
while others may not have. For any outage of a few hours or less,
an apartment's location in the building, proximity to the boiler
systems, the timing of the outage, and other unique factors may
affect the heat conditions in the unit. The Court cannot reasonably
assume that each outage affected the quiet enjoyment of each tenant
similarly. Individual questions about the impact on each tenant
would overwhelm common questions.

Although Plaintiffs may not proceed with the Admitted Outage Class
as currently defined, the Court need not jettison entirely their
theory of liability based on the admitted outage dates. The
predominance issue disappears for the habitability claim if the
class is modified to include only tenants who resided at Walden
Park on a day with a not insubstantial outage of heat or hot water
in violation of the Sanitary Code. Such an outage likely affected
the conditions in each apartment similarly. Because a habitability
claim asks only about the conditions in an apartment, not about the
tenant's use of the apartment, Plaintiffs can make their case for
breach of the implied warranty of habitability for substantial
outages using common proof.

The Admitted Outage Class does not satisfy predominance for the
quiet enjoyment claim, however. Because a quiet enjoyment claim
focuses on a tenant's use and enjoyment of his or her apartment,
not just on the conditions in the apartment, even a substantial
outage would not affect all tenants similarly. Plaintiffs would
need to present important individual proof concerning each tenant's
use of his or her apartment on the day in question, which would
overwhelm any common questions.

Systemic Outage Theory

The Plaintiffs emphasize that they can prove liability by
demonstrating that Equity systematically failed to provide and
maintain workable heat and hot water systems in the two Walden Park
buildings over a long period of time. This theory of liability
represents a cognizable quiet enjoyment claim. A tenant who loses
heat and hot water frequently because of faulty systems has
suffered a serious interference with his or her use of the
apartment.  

This theory of systemic failure to provide heat and hot water is
also actionable as a material breach of the Sanitary Code and thus
the implied warranty of habitability.

This theory of liability raises common questions because it focuses
on Equity's provision and maintenance of its systems instead of the
effect of the outages on conditions in individual apartments.
Plaintiffs have numerous complaints from tenants over the course of
two years about heat and hot water problems, emails from Equity
with notice of heat or hot water outages, testimony from Baker and
Dittmann about their experience at Walden Park, and testimony from
Equity employees about the failed attempts to fix the systems.
Plaintiffs do not need to demonstrate the individual conditions in
each apartment if they show that outages were sufficiently frequent
to render any apartment uninhabitable or interfere with any
tenant's use and enjoyment of his or her apartment.

Equity's fault, which is relevant for the quiet enjoyment claim, is
also a question for which Plaintiffs can use common proof of
Equity's knowledge of the heat and hot water problems and its
attempts to fix the systems.

Common questions therefore predominate over individual questions
for this systemic theory of liability for both the quiet enjoyment
and habitability claims.

The Court therefore modifies the class to include only tenants who
lived at Walden Park for the entire period between April 12, 2012
to April 24, 2014 (Systemic Outage Class).

Unjust Enrichment and Chapter 93A Claims

Neither party discusses whether continued class certification is
appropriate for the unjust enrichment and Chapter 93A claims. The
state court expressly certified the Conversion Class and Admitted
Outage Class for the Chapter 93A claim but was silent about the
unjust enrichment claim.

Determining whether Equity received unjust rent payments from its
tenants because it provided apartments that were worth less than
the contract rental amount relies, like the habitability claim, on
the conditions in each apartment and the value of each apartment in
its defective condition. However, because unjust enrichment is only
an alternative theory of liability where there is an inadequate
remedy at law and the Admitted Outage Class is certified for the
habitability claim, the unjust enrichment claim is not viable.

The Plaintiffs' theory of liability under Chapter 93A rests on both
their quiet enjoyment and habitability claims. If the Plaintiffs
can prove liability for the underlying quiet enjoyment or
habitability claim using common proof, they can do so for the
Chapter 93A claim as well.

The Court decertifies the Conversion Class and declines to modify
the class definition to include the Riser Replacement Class. The
Court modifies the Admitted Outage Class to the following two
classes:

     Admitted Outage Class: all persons who were tenants at Walden
Park on a day between April 12, 2012 to April 24, 2014 in which
there was a heat or hot water outage.

     Systemic Outage Class: all persons who were tenants at Walden
Park in either building for the period between April 12, 2012 to
April 24, 2014.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 1, 2019 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6kwmxub from
Leagle.com.

Rachelle Baker, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & Jason Dittmann, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Joshua N. Garick,
Law Offices of Joshua N. Garick, P.C., 34 Salem St Suite 202,
Reading, MA 01867& David Pastor, Pastor Law Office, LLP, 63
Atlantic Ave Ste 3, Boston, MA, 02110-3752

Equity Residential Management, L.L.C. & EQR-Walden Park, L.L.C.,
Defendants, represented by Craig M. White -- cwhite@bakerlaw.com --
Baker & Hostetler LLLP, pro hac vice, Thomas H. Wintner --
TWintner@mintz.com -- Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and
Popeo, PC & Mathilda McGee-Tubb -- MSMcGee-Tubb@mintz.com -- Mintz,
Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, PC.


EROS INTERNATIONAL: Montesano Files Securities Class Action in N.J.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
PAUL MONTESANO, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. EROS INTERNATIONAL PLC, KISHORE LULLA, PREM
PARAMESWARAN, and JYOTI DESHPANDE, Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-14125 (D. N.J., June 21, 2019) is a class action on behalf
of persons or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired publicly
traded Eros securities between July 28, 2017 and June 5, 2019,
inclusive. Plaintiff seeks to recover compensable damages caused by
Defendants' violations of the federal securities laws under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

On July 28, 2017, the Company issued a press release containing its
financial results for the fiscal year 2017, ended March 31, 2017.
On August 1, 2017, the Company issued another press release
announcing that it had filed its Annual Report on Form 20-F for the
2017 fiscal year, ended March 31, 2017 with the SEC. The 2017 20-F
confirmed the financial results from the July 28, 2017 Press
Release and was signed by Defendant Deshpande. Additionally, the
2017 20-F Contained certifications signed by Defendants Deshpande
and Parameswaran pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
attesting to the accuracy of the Company's financial reporting.

However, the Plaintiff asserts that the statements were materially
false and/or misleading because they misrepresented and failed to
disclose adverse facts pertaining to the Company's business,
operations and prospects, which were known to Defendants or
recklessly disregarded by them. Specifically, Defendants made false
and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1)
Eros and its executives engaged in a scheme to use related-party
transactions to fabricate receivables that they reported in Eros's
public financial disclosures; (2) because of this scheme, Eros's
financial position was weaker than what the Company disclosed; (3)
consequently, the Company's Indian subsidiary, Eros International
Media Ltd ("EIML"), missed loan payments and had its credit
downgraded; and (4) due to the foregoing, Defendants' statements
about Eros's receivables, business, operations, and prospects, were
materially false and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at
all relevant times.

Plaintiff purchased Eros securities during the Class Period.

Defendant Eros purports to be a leading company in the Indian film
entertainment industry and to co-produce, acquire and distribute
Indian language films in multiple formats worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
     THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
     355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2450
     Los Angeles, CA 90071
     Phone: (213) 785-2610
     Facsimile: (213) 226-4684
     Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com


EUGENE N. GORDON: Faces Collier's Employment Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------
An employment-related class action complaint has been filed against
Eugene N. Gordon, Inc. The case is captioned Venita Collier, on
behalf of all others similarly situated, vs. Eugene N. Gordon,
Inc., Case No. 34-2019-00259069-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super., Sacramento
Cty., June 21, 2019).

Founded in 1994, Eugene N. Gordon, Inc. engages in retail sale of
household furniture. The company is based in Roseville, California.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     William L. Marder, Esq.
     MARDER EMPLOYMENT LAW
     501 San Benito St. Suite 200
     Hollister, CA 95023
     Telephone: (888) 796-4010

FCA US LLC: Shamamyan Suit Transferred to C.D. Cal.
---------------------------------------------------
The case, Armen Shamamyan, an individual on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, and the general public, Plaintiff,
v. et al, Case No. 19STCV18050 (Filed on May 24, 2019), was
transferred from the Superior Court of California of the County of
Los Angeles to the United District Court for the Central District
of California on June 21, 2019. This contract product liability
case is assigned to Hon. Judge Dolly M. Gee. The United District
Court for the Central District of California assigned Case No.
2:19-cv-05422-DMG-FFM to the proceeding.

Based in Auburn Hills, Michigan, FCA US LLC is a Delaware limited
liability company that designs, manufactures, and sells or
distributes vehicles under the Chrysler, Dodge, Jeep, Ram, FIAT and
Alfa Romeo brands, as well as the SRT performance designation.
[BN]

Attorneys for Defendants:

     Ryan E. Cosgrove, Esq.
     NELSON MULLINS RILEY AND SCARBOROUGH LLP
     19191 South Vermont Avenue Suite 900
     Torrance, CA 90502
     Telephone: (424) 221-7400
     Facsimile: (424) 221-7499
     E-mail: ryan.cosgrove@nelsonmullins.com

             - and -

     Kathy A. Wisniewski, Esq.
     E-mail: kwisniewski@thompsoncoburn.com
     Stephen A. D'Aunoy, Esq.
     E-mail: sdaunoy@thompsoncoburn.com
     Thomas L. Azar, Esq.
     E-mail: tazar@thompsoncoburn.com
     THOMPSON COBURN LLP
     One US Bank Plaza
     St. Louis, MO 63101
     Telephone: (314) 552-6000
     Facsimile: (314) 552-7000

FIRST AMERICAN: Seiwert, et al. Sue over Data Security
------------------------------------------------------
SCOTT SEIWERT, and 7809 TIMBER HILL LLC, a Washington limited
liability company, the Plaintiffs, vs. FIRST AMERICAN FINANCIAL
CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, and FIRST AMERICAN TITLE
COMPANY, a California corporation, the Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-00988-RSL (W.D. Wash., June 25, 2019), contends that
Plaintiffs' data was compromised by FATCO woefully insufficient
data security mechanisms and seeks compensation for their increased
risk of harm, for overpayment for FATCO's services (which did not
include the promised level of privacy, security, or 13
confidentiality), and equitable relief such as reforms to FATCO's
data security.

According to the complaint, the Defendants are the largest
parent/subsidiary title insurance company in the United States.
They explicitly promised its customers that it would utilize robust
data security measures as part of the high cost of its title
services.

In reality, and contrary to this promise, FATCO actually allowed
anyone to access the sensitive personal information of millions of
its customers. And many, if not all, of these files were actually
-- and repeatedly -- accessed both before and after FATCO was
warned about this breach.

FATCO's non-existent data security made it possible for even the
most novice of computer users to discover and access any
customer’s private information contained in their transaction
documents, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiffs and all similarly situated persons and
entities are:

          Kim D. Stephens, Esq.
          Jason T. Dennett, Esq.
          Rebecca L. Solomon, Esq.
          TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS PLLC
          1700 Seventh Avenue, Suite 2200
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 682-5600
          Facsimile: (206) 682-2992
          E-mail: kstephens@tousley.com
                  jdennett@tousley.com
                  rsolomon@tousley.com

FIRST DATA: Dance Seeks OT Premium Pay for Account Managers
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against First Data
Corporation for alleged violation of the overtime provision of the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The case is captioned FELICIA
DANCE, on behalf of herself and those similarly situated,
Plaintiff, Case No. vs. FIRST DATA CORPORATION, a Foreign Profit
Corporation, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-02860-JPB (N.D. Ga., June
21, 2019).

In October 2017, Defendant hired Plaintiff to work as a non-exempt
account manager to assists its clients with payroll issues.
However, Defendant allegedly failed to compensate Plaintiff at rate
of one and one-half times her regular rate for all hours worked in
excess of 40 hours in a single work week. In addition, Defendant
also failed to maintain proper time records as mandated by the
FLSA.

First Data Corporation is a financial services company located at
5565 Glenridge Connection, #2000, Atlanta, GA 30342.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Andrew R. Frisch, Esq.
     MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
     8151 Peters Road, Suite 4000
     Plantation, FL 33324
     Telephone: (954) WORKERS
     Facsimile: (954) 3273013
     E-mail: AFrisch@forthepeople.com

FORD MOTOR: Napier Sues Over False Fuel Economy Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------
MARK NAPIER, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-14639 (D. N.J., July 2, 2019) is a class action brought by
Plaintiff on behalf of himself and a class of current and former
owners or lessees of model year 2017 through 2019 Ford automobiles,
including the 2017 Ford Expedition, that were marketed and sold
with false fuel economy ratings.

Ford represented to Plaintiff and Class members that the Class
Vehicles had achieved specific miles-per-gallon estimates. Ford
concealed that its Environmental Protection Agency fuel economy
testing was inadequate, which resulted in Class Vehicles with
overstated MPG fuel economy ratings. On February 21, 2019, Ford
announced that EPA fuel economy testing results were not accurate
and, as a result, that the Class Vehicles' fuel economy are
overstated. Fuel economy is measured under controlled conditions in
a laboratory using a series of tests specified by federal law.
Manufacturers test their own vehicles and report the results to the
EPA. Ford's fuel economy testing was insufficient and flawed and
not in compliance with federal regulations. Ford's testing resulted
in inaccurate fuel economy ratings. Ford itself has admitted that
its U.S. emissions certification process is a cause for concern.

EPA numbers are a vital tool that enable consumers to compare
vehicles when making leasing or purchasing decisions. Specifically,
the EPA fuel economy ratings are one of the most important factors
in new-car buyers' purchase decisions. Ford's advertising
statements related to its EPA fuel economy ratings materially
misrepresented the fuel economy numbers that the required testing
would have actually produced. Ford's misstatements as to the EPA
fuel economy ratings are material. Ford knows that consumers are
concerned with rising fuel prices, and Ford markets its inflated
fuel economy claims to attempt to entice consumers to acquire Ford
vehicles over its competitors.

Ford knew or should have known facts indicating the inaccuracies in
its promised MPG of the Class Vehicles. Ford recklessly or
consciously disregarded facts that indicated the fuel economy
ratings for the Class Vehicles were erroneous and overstated.
Ford's warranties, advertising, and other statements about the
promised MPG of the Class Vehicles are false and misleading. Ford
has not corrected its misstatements and omissions or disclosed to
consumers the true fuel economy ratings of the Class Vehicles.
Through its misrepresentations, Ford induced Plaintiff and Class
members to purchase or lease the Class Vehicles, which do not
perform as represented. Plaintiff and Class members paid more for
their Class Vehicles than they otherwise would have and have had to
pay higher fuel costs than they would have paid had the Class
Vehicles performed as advertised. Plaintiff and Class members would
not have purchased or leased the Class Vehicles had they known the
truth of Defendant's fraudulent scheme, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Mark Napier purchased a new 2017 Ford Expedition from
Holman Ford Lincoln, an authorized Ford dealership, located in
Maple Shade, New Jersey, on or about September 22, 2016.

Defendant Ford engaged in the business of designing, manufacturing,
marketing, warranting, distributing, selling, and leasing
automobiles, including the Class Vehicles, throughout the United
States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joseph J. DePalma, Esq.
     Bruce D. Greenberg
     Susana Cruz Hodge, Esq.
     LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG, LLC
     570 Broad Street, Suite 1201
     Newark, NJ 07102
     Phone: (973) 623-3000
     Facsimile: (973) 623-0858
     Email: jdepalma@litedepalma.com
            bgreenberg@litedepalma.com
            scruzhodge@litedepalma.com



FOWLER PACKING: Court Sets Deposition Time Limit in Aldapa Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for Eastern District of California
issued an Order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs'
Motion for Reconsideration BEATRIZ ALDAPA AND ELMER AVALOS, on
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
FOWLER PACKING COMPANY, INC., a California Corporation; AG FORCE
LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; FOWLER MARKETING
INTERNAL LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive, Defendants. No. 1:15-cv-00420-DAD-SAB. (E.D.
Cal.).

This matter is before the court on the plaintiffs' request for
reconsideration of the assigned magistrate judge's order granting
in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion for a protective
order.

This lawsuit involves a variety of alleged state and federal labor
law violations by defendants, who employ seasonal workers for a
wide array of tasks necessary in commercial agricultural
operations. Some of the farms on which the agricultural workers are
employed are owned by defendants, while others are owned by
third-party growers who contract with defendants to provide a labor
force.

In their FAC, the plaintiffs allege twelve separate claims: (1)
violations of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker
Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 1801, et seq. for failing to pay
all wages due or provide necessary tools (2) failure to compensate
for rest breaks in accordance with California Labor Code Section
226.7 and Wage Order 14 (3) failure to pay all wages due under the
employment contract by requiring off-the-clock work and allowing
the use of ghost workers (4) failure to pay overtime, as required
by state law (5) failure to pay the minimum wage, in violation of
Labor Code Section 1194; (6) failure to pay waiting time penalties
in violation of Labor Code Section 203 (7) failure to provide
necessary tools or reimburse for tools in violation of Labor Code
Section 2802 (8) violations of California Business and Professions
Code Section 17200 by underpaying workers, failing to provide rest
periods and retaining the benefits of the labor without reasonable
compensation (9) violations of Labor Code Section 226 by failing to
keep accurate records or provide accurate statements to the
employees (10) failure to record and/or pay for travel time and
wait time, in violation of Labor Code Section 1194 and 29 U.S.C.
Section 1801, et seq. (11) failure to reimburse for vehicle
expense, in violation of Labor Code Section 2802; and (12) failure
to provide meal periods and keep accurate records of meal periods,
in violation of Wage Order 14 and 29 U.S.C. Section 1801, et seq.

In their pending motion for reconsideration, the plaintiffs argue
that the magistrate judge misapplied the relevant legal standard
for conducting discovery aimed at absent class members.
Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that the magistrate judge's
discovery order should be overturned because it employed the
erroneous legal standard set forth in Arredondo v. Delano Farms
Co., No. 1:09-CV-01247 MJS, 2014 WL 5106401, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct.
10, 2014) in determining whether such discovery should be permitted
in this case.

In addition, the plaintiffs argue that even if the court concludes
that the defendants here are entitled to some limited discovery
from absent class members, it should impose limitations on the
number, length, and subject matter of any depositions and quash
defendants' requests for production of documents.  

Legal Standard Applicable to Discovery Aimed at Absent Class
Members

It has been recognized that discovery from absent class members is
ordinarily not permitted. Whether prior to class certification or
after, discovery, except in the rarest of cases, should be
conducted on a class wide level joinder of all parties is
impracticable, propounding discovery like interrogatories,
depositions, and requests to produce on an individual basis is even
more impracticable.

Factors Considered

Necessity of the Discovery

First, the magistrate judge found that defendants' proposed
depositions of absent class members were reasonably necessary to
addressing the claims and defenses in this matter, particularly
given the fact that the proposed deponents are pulled from the
forty-four absent class members who provided declarations in
support of Plaintiffs' class certification motion, and thereby
injected themselves into the litigation.

The Plaintiffs disagree with this conclusion, arguing that the
proposed depositions are not necessary because the information
sought by defendants is readily obtainable from other sources in a
less intrusive way.  

Courts have held that discovery from absent class members is
permitted when it is not readily obtainable from the representative
parties or other sources. Given the intended efficiencies of class
action litigation and the burden that depositions impose on absent
class members, the question of whether the information sought by
defendants is more easily obtained from other sources is a clearly
relevant consideration.

The Defendants argue that the evidence they seek here can only be
obtained through the depositions of absent class members. According
to defendants, such depositions are necessary to test the factual
assertions that these class members made in the sworn declarations
submitted in support of plaintiffs' class certification motion.
Defendants contend that these depositions will shed light on
plaintiffs' liability arguments in support of the certified tool
reimbursement subclass, in that defendants will be asking class
members why they believed certain tools were necessary to perform
their assigned work.

The court remains somewhat skeptical of defendants' claimed need
for the deposition testimony of absent class members, given that
plaintiffs largely intend to prove liability with class-wide
evidence. Moreover, it would seem that most of the information
defendants seek could be obtained through their own supervisors or
other employees, who can provide statements and testimony regarding
what tools were necessary for particular work, whether class
members performed off-the-clock work, and the variations in the
practices of different work crews. Nonetheless, the undersigned
must also acknowledge that its order granting class certification
was based, at least in part, on the declarations of these absent
class members submitted by plaintiffs' counsel.

Here, the magistrate judge's order permitted defendants to depose
only fifteen of the forty-four absent class members who submitted
declarations in support of the motion for class certification.

Moreover, at the hearing on the pending motion for reconsideration,
plaintiffs' counsel acknowledged that they intend to call absent
class members as witnesses at trial, though they have not yet
identified the specific individuals to be called. Under the
circumstances presented here, the court concludes that defendants
have made a sufficient showing of necessity in support of the
limited discovery they seek from absent class members.

Improper Purpose

The magistrate judge next analyzed whether defendants had an
improper purpose for deposing the absent class members. The
magistrate judge concluded that it was not improper for defendants
to seek this discovery to gain a better understanding of
plaintiffs' trial strategy, nor was it improper for defendants to
seek out evidence in support of a potential motion for class
decertification.  

The Plaintiffs argue that defendants' true purpose in seeking to
take the depositions of absent class members is to gain improper
information about a potential trial plan, reduce the size of the
class, and to take undue advantage of class members, all of which
are improper reasons for discovery.

The Plaintiffs first argue that defendants are trying to depose the
absent class members to discover plaintiffs' trial plan. Plaintiffs
contend that this is not a proper basis for conducting discovery at
this stage of the proceedings, especially since the court has twice
denied defendants' attempts to compel plaintiffs to submit a trial
plan.  

It is true that in its order granting class certification, the
court advised defendants that future motions for a trial plan prior
to the close of merits-phase discovery will likely result in the
award of sanctions, absent a showing that the requested trial plan
is required by law. At this time, the court does not view
defendants' seeking of discovery as an attempt to circumvent the
court's prior orders regarding a trial plan and, therefore, does
not find it to be an improper purpose for undertaking discovery.

The Plaintiffs have not cited to any authority supporting the
proposition that discovery designed to uncover evidence in
anticipation of a motion for decertification is categorically for
an improper purpose. Instead, plaintiffs argue that the timing of
this discovery is inappropriate because the court has already
granted class certification.  

The Plaintiffs also contend that defendants should have sought to
depose absent class members who submitted declarations in support
of the motion for class certification at the time those
declarations were submitted, so that any deposition testimony could
be offered in support of their opposition to plaintiff's class
certification motion. The court finds plaintiffs' arguments in this
regard to be unpersuasive.

The court has found no authority for the proposition that discovery
designed to uncover evidence in anticipation of a motion for
decertification is improper.6 Generally, decertification is
appropriate in light of changes in the law, subsequent developments
in the litigation, and evidence not available at the time of
certification and does not provide a defendant with the opportunity
to challenge class certification on its own schedule.

Here, however, prior to class certification the court expressed the
view that taking the deposition of [absent class members] before it
is known whether they will even execute declarations would be of
highly questionable relevance. Moreover, deposition of non-parties
prior to class certification is rarely sought, let alone permitted.
Therefore, because such evidence was likely not available at the
time of class certification, the court does not find that the
purpose of the discovery which defendants now seek is improper.

Unduly Burdensome

The Plaintiffs argue that the magistrate judge did not consider
that depositions of absent class members would require the
assistance of counsel and may result in chilling the absent class
members' willingness to continue participating in this litigation.


The court finds these arguments not to be compelling for the
reasons stated by the magistrate judge. Moreover, the identities of
these potential deponents have been known to the defendants since
the motion for class certification was filed in February of 2017,
and those individuals should not have a heightened risk of
retaliation, given defendants' representations which have been
noted above. Though plaintiffs suggest that defendants should be
restricted to less burdensome methods such as questionnaires that
would not require the assistance of counsel required to prepare and
sit through depositions with class members, the court is of the
view that completion of questionnaires of the proposed nature
(including translating questions and answers) could well require
more time from plaintiffs' counsel than short depositions. For all
of these reasons, the court concludes that defendants' discovery
requests are not unduly burdensome.

However, as suggested at the hearing on the pending motion, the
court does not believe that a full-day of depositions is necessary
to thoroughly question the absent class members about the substance
of their declarations, which are relatively short and
straightforward. In allowing depositions of absent class members,
other courts have often limited their length. At the hearing on the
pending motion for reconsideration, defendants' counsel agreed that
four hours for each deposition would be sufficient, absent any
unforeseen issues pertaining to interpreters. Therefore, each of
the fifteen depositions of absent class members will be limited to
no more than four hours in length.

The Plaintiffs' request for reconsideration of the magistrate
judge's ruling is granted in part and denied in part 2. The
Defendants are limited to four hours for each deposition of the
fifteen absent class members.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 27, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yxnkqdta from Leagle.com.

Beatriz Aldapa & Elmer Avalos, Plaintiffs, represented by Dexter
Flood Rappleye -- drappleye@bushgottlieb.com -- Bush Gottlieb, ALC,
Erica Deutsch -- edeutsch@bushgottlieb.com -- Bush Gottlieb, Mario
Martinez -- mmartinez@farmworkerlaw.com -- Martinez Aguilasocho &
Lynch, APLC & Ira L. Gottlieb -- igottlieb@bushgottlieb.com -- Bush
Gottlieb, A Law Corporation.

Fowler Packing Company Inc., a California Corporation, AG Force
LLC, a California Limited Liability Company & Fowler Marketing
International LLC, a California Limited Liability Company,
Defendants, represented by Howard A. Sagaser -- has@sw2law.com --
Sagaser, Watkins & Wieland, PC, Tiffany X. Phan --
tphan@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn and Crutcher LLP, Bradley
Joseph Hamburger -- bhamburger@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn
&Crutcher LLP, Ian Blade Wieland -- ian@sw2law.com -- Sagaser,
Watkins & Wieland, PC & Theane Diana Evangelis Kapur --
tevangelis@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher.


FREEDOM MORTGAGE: Franceski Stayed Pending E.D. Va. Decision
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion granting, in part, Defendant's Motion to Transfer
and stay the action styled BARBARA FRANCESKI, Plaintiff, v. FREEDOM
MORTGAGE CORPORATION and NYCB MORTGAGE COMPANY, LLC, Defendants.
Civil No. 18-13945 (NLH/JS)(D.N.J.) pending the decision of the
Eastern District of Virginia.

This case concerns an alleged violation of the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA) and a breach of contract
by the Defendants in relation to payment of property taxes.
Alexandria City property taxes are paid in two installments, with
the first installment due by June 15 and the second due by November
15. NYCB timely paid the first installment from the escrow account.
NYCB transferred the loan and servicing of the loan to FMC. NYCB
did not pay the second installment that was due by November 15.

Rodney Harrell filed a class action complaint against FMC in the
Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division (Harrell Action),
which can be found at docket number 1:18-cv-00275-AJT-TCB.

The Harrell Action asserts allegations nearly identical to those
asserted in the instant case. Mr. Harrell filing a Motion to
Certify the Class on April 30, 2018 and FMC filing a Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Failure to State a
Claim. The Harrell Action was dismissed by the Honorable Anthony J.
Trenga. Importantly, Judge Trenga dismissed the case for failure to
state a claim, and did not address the merits of the class
certification motion nor the merits of the personal jurisdiction
arguments asserted by FMC.

Mr. Harrell filed a motion for reconsideration.1 On the same day,
Stacey Chittick filed a class action complaint against FMC and NYCB
in the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division (Chittick
Action), which can be found at docket number 1:18-cv-01034-AJT-MSN.
Again, the Chittick Action asserts allegations nearly identical to
those asserted in the instant case.

In the Chittick Action, Ms. Chittick's mortgage was transferred
from NYCB , NYCB paid the June Alexandria City tax installment, and
FMC failed to pay the November Alexandria City tax installment
which caused a penalty to be assessed and Ms. Chittick to pay more
in federal taxes. The Chittick Action includes two counts: (1)
violation of RESPA and (2) breach of contract.

Like the Harrell and ChittickActions, Plaintiff's complaint alleges
FMC's failure to pay the Alexandria City property tax is (1) a
violation of RESPA and (2) a breach of contract.

The Chittick Action was stayed pending the decision on the Motion
for Reconsideration in the Harrell Action The Harrell Action is
currently on appeal before the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.

As a result of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration in the
Harrell Action, additional relevant filings were made in the
Chittick Action. Ms. Chittick filed a Motion to Transfer the
Chittick Action to the District of New Jersey. FMC opposed the
motion and Judge Trenga denied Ms. Chittick's Motion to Transfer.
The details of this decision and its contents will be discussed as
relevant, infra. Currently pending before Judge Trenga in the
Chittick Action is FMC's Motion to Stay pending the appeal in the
Harrell Action.

Motion to Transfer Standard

FMC has not filed a motion to transfer under any federal statute,
but instead moves for transfer based on the first-to-file or
first-filed rule. The rule is grounded in comity, promoting respect
among federal courts of equal rank, avoiding duplication of effort
and inconsistent judgments, and promoting judicial economy through
the sound use of judicial resources.  

To determine whether the first-filed rule is applicable, in
addition to the above considerations, a court may consider a host
of factors, which are found under 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a).  

Ultimately, the decision of whether to apply the first-filed rule
and, therefore, whether to dismiss, stay, or transfer an action  is
solely within a court's discretion.  

Defendant FMC's Motion to Transfer

Defendant FMC's Motion to Transfer asserts one argument: this
action should be transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia
pursuant to the first-filed rule. FMC argues that because the other
two actions were filed first, the defendants in those actions are
identical or nearly identical to the ones in this action, and the
allegations and legal issues are nearly identical, this action
should be transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia.

While Plaintiff does not argue FMC is incorrect in its
characterization of the Harrell and ChittickActions, it presents
three reasons why transfer is inappropriate: (1) a personal
jurisdiction argument asserted by FMC in the Harrell Action is
inconsistent with the pending Motion to Transfer here (2) the
statutory text of 12 U.S.C. Section 2614 permits multiple class
actions; and (3) the 28 U.S.C. Section 1404 public and private
factors do not support transfer.

Whether the First-Filed Rule is Applicable

The Court must first determine whether the first-filed rule applies
to this action. FMC asserts it does apply and it appears Plaintiff
does not disagree, as nowhere in her opposition brief does
Plaintiff assert the first-filed rule is inapplicable. Instead,
Plaintiff only argues that transfer is inappropriate. Those
arguments will be decided, infra.

The Court finds the first-filed rule is applicable. This action,
the Harrell Action, and the ChittickAction were all filed in
federal district court. Thus, this issue concerns concurrent,
federal jurisdiction. This action was filed after both the Harrell
and Chittick Actions had been filed. The parties are nearly
identical, with all three including FMC as a defendant and two of
the three including NYCB as a defendant. All three contain
indistinguishable class and sub-class definitions, which must be
considered in a class action as the parties rather than the class
representatives. All three actions contain nearly identical factual
allegations and all three include the same RESPA and breach of
contract claims.

As the first-filed rule only requires substantial overlap and this
case is nearly identical to the Eastern District of Virginia
actions, the Court finds the first-filed rule is applicable.

Whether Dismissal, Transfer, or a Stay is Appropriate

The Court finds it need not address the Section 1404 factors for
multiple reasons. First, the case law within the Third Circuit, as
cited supra, clearly states those factors need not be considered.

Second, this Court's action is contingent on the Eastern District
of Virginia's decision on personal jurisdiction. In other words,
the central issue here is not the Section 1404 factors, but what
action by this Court is most sensible in the absence of a ruling by
the Eastern District of Virginia on the personal jurisdiction
issue. Accordingly, this Court will not consider the Section 1404
factors.

First, the Court examines FMC's personal jurisdiction argument. In
the Harrell Action, as Plaintiff points out, FMC argued the Eastern
District of Virginia did not have personal jurisdiction over the
nationwide class action because the decision in Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S.Ct. 1773 (2017)
held that a nationwide class action may only be brought in federal
court in a defendant's state of citizenship. If the claim is
brought where specific jurisdiction may only be asserted, then
personal jurisdiction is limited to just those claims properly
within a federal court's specific personal jurisdiction.

FMC argued in the Harrell Action that those claims should be
limited to those arising in Virginia.

Next, the Court examines the policy basis for the first-filed rule.
As discussed in Catanese, the first-filed rule's policy basis is to
encourage sound judicial administration that promotes comity among
federal courts of equal rank avoid burdening the federal judiciary
and prevent the judicial embarrassment of conflicting judgments.
Thus, the touchstones of the first-filed rule that the Court must
consider are comity between federal courts of equal rank, judicial
economy, or the avoidance of duplication of effort, and prevention
of conflicting judgments.

To not transfer the action and to continue pursuing active
litigation could put this Court into conflict with the Eastern
District of Virginia or the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Either
of those situations sows confusion, could lead to inconsistent
judgments, and creates duplication of effort. Obviously, proceeding
would serve none of the policy reasons undergirding the first-filed
rule.

Based on the arguments in the Harrell Action, the case law appears
to foreclose dismissal of the action. If the first-filed action is
vulnerable to dismissal on jurisdictional grounds, the court in the
second-filed action should stay or transfer said action rather than
dismiss it outright.

As the Court has already determined that transferring the action,
proceeding with the action, and dismissing the action are all
inappropriate here, the only other option is to stay the action. It
is also the wisest course. Staying this action serves the purposes
of comity, preservation of judicial resources, and prevention of
inconsistent judgments. Unlike transfer, a stay allows the Eastern
District of Virginia case to proceed without the possibility that
the statute of limitations blocks this action at a later date, even
though it had been timely and properly filed. Unlike proceeding
with the action here, staying the action allows the Eastern
District of Virginia to proceed to a decision on personal
jurisdiction or the merits without fear of an inconsistent judgment
in this District.

At its core, this Court's action is contingent on the Eastern
District of Virginia's decision on personal jurisdiction. A stay
allows for simple disposition of this case once the personal
jurisdiction question is decided. If the Eastern District of
Virginia decides this question in favor of Plaintiff, then there
are various ways in which this case may be terminated or
transferred to join the Harrell and Chittick Actions. If the
Eastern District of Virginia decides this question in favor of FMC,
then the parties may reopen the case here and proceed with
litigation without fear of the statute of limitations barring the
case. If the Eastern District of Virginia and the Fourth Circuit
decide the Harrell and Chittick Actions have no merit, this case
may be similarly dismissed based on preclusion grounds or on a
simple stipulation of dismissal, signed by all parties' counsel.

This Court will stay this action pending decision in the Harrell
and Chittick Actions.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 27, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yy9dgm6m from Leagle.com.

BARBARA FRANCESKI, Plaintiff, represented by ROBERT A. FAGELLA,
ZAZZALI, FAGELLA & NOWAK, KLEINBAUM & FRIEDMAN, PC, 570 Broad St
Ste 1400, Newark, NJ 07102-4518.

FREEDOM MORTGAGE CORPORATION, Defendant, represented by DAVID G.
MURPHY -- dmurphy@reedsmith.com -- REED SMITH LLP.

NYCB MORTGAGE COMPANY, LLC, Defendant, represented by ANTHONY C.
VALENZIANO, SHERMAN WELLS SYLVESTER & STAMELMAN LLP & CRAIG L.
STEINFELD, SHERMAN WELLS SYLVESTER & STAMELMAN LLP, 210 Park
Avenue, 2nd Floor, Florham Park, NJ 07932.


FUTURE PLASTERING: Faces Aroyo Suit in California Superior Court
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Future Plastering
Inc. The case is captiond as Victorino Cruz Aroyo, on behalf of
other persons similarly situated, the Plaintiff,vs. Future
Plastering Inc., James E. Morris Sr, Melinda M. Morris, and Does
1-50, the Defendants, Case No. 34-2019-00259256-CU-OE-GDS (Cal.
Super., June 25, 2019). The suit alleges employment related
violation.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff is:

          Kenneth Alan Goldman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF KENNETH A. GOLDMAN
          10100 Santa Monica Blvd, Suite 300
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 772-2207
          Facsimile: (310) 772-2206
          E-mail: kgoldman@kaglegal.com

GALLERY NORTH: Velez Sues Over Sales Associates' Unpaid Overtime
----------------------------------------------------------------
KEVIN VELEZ, PHILLIP GELLER, JULIE CAMPOS, individually and on
behalf themselves and all others similarly situated v. GALLERY
NORTH, INC. d/b/a HONDA GALLERY and GORDON CHU, Case No. 19-1631
(Mass. Super., Middlesex Cty., June 7, 2019), is brought for the
Defendants' alleged failure to pay proper overtime to their sales
associates.

GNI is a Massachusetts foreign corporation duly incorporated under
the laws of Delaware with its principal place of business located
in in Wilmington, Delaware.  GNI has conducted business in the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.  Gordon Chu has been the President
of GNI.

GNI operates/operated an automobile dealership located at 88
Walkers Brook Drive, in Reading, Middlesex County, Massachusetts.
GNI operates/operated retail vehicle dealership(s) throughout the
Commonwealth at which the Defendants' employees sell vehicles to
customers.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Edward C. Cumbo, Esq.
          Robert Richardson, Esq.
          RICHARDSON & CUMBO, LLP
          225 Franklin Street, 26th Floor
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (617) 217-2779
          E-mail: e.cumbo@rc-llp.com
                  r.richardson@rc-llp.com


GOLDEN STATE: Loses Bid to Stay 3 Cases Pending Saldana Ruling
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order denying Defendants' Motion to Stay Three
Cases in the case captioned JUAN TREVINO, CHRISTOPHER WARD, LINDA
QUINTEROS, ROMEO PALMA, BRITTANY HAGMAN, ALBERTO GIANINI, and JUAN
C. AVALOS, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. GOLDEN STATE FC, LLC, a Delaware
Corporation; AMAZON.COM INC., a Delaware Corporation; AMAZON
FULFILLMENT SERVICES, INC., a Delaware Corporation; and DOES 1
through 100, inclusive, Defendants. Lead Case No.
1:18-cv-00120-DAD-BAM (Trevino) (E.D. Cal.).

This matter is before the court on defendants' motions to stay in
three cases: (1) Trevino v. Golden State FC LLC,
1:18-cv-00120-DAD-BAM, Doc. No. 40-1 (Trevino), (2) Avalos
v.Amazon.com LLC and Golden State FC LLC, 1:18-cv-00567-DAD-BAM
(Avalos), (3) Hagman et al v. Amazon Fulfillment Services, Inc., et
al, 1:18-cv-01176-DAD-BAM (Hagman).

Allison Action

Ten former warehouse employees filed a class action lawsuit,
Allison v. Amazon.com, Inc., W.D. Wash. Case No. 13-cv-01612-RSL
(Allison), alleging that defendants Amazon.com, Inc. and Integrity
Staffing Solutions, Inc. violated federal and state law by failing
to compensate workers at Amazon fulfillment centers for time spent
in security screening. The Allison plaintiffs brought claims based
on defendants' alleged violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), asserting that defendants did not compensate their hourly
warehouse workers for time spent passing through a security
checkpoint before taking lunch and again at the end of each shift.


Saldana Action

Four additional former warehouse employees filed a similar class
action lawsuit in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, Saldana v.
Amazon.com, LLC, Case No. 14-cv-01545-R-VBK (Saldana), which was
subsequently removed to the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California. As in Allison, the Saldana plaintiffs
allege that defendants Amazon.com, LLC; Golden State FC LLC; SMX,
LLC; and Staff Management, LLC violated California law by requiring
employees at California fulfilment centers to submit to individual
security searches when clocking out for meal periods and at the end
of the day.  The Saldana plaintiffs allege that this practice
prevented warehouse workers from being paid for all the hours that
they worked.

The Saldana plaintiffs asserted eight causes of action under
California law: 1) failure to pay hourly wages or, alternatively
minimum wages; 2) failure to pay overtime wages; 3) failure to
provide meal periods or compensation in lieu thereof; 4) failure to
provide rest periods or compensation in lieu thereof; 5) failure to
timely pay wages due at termination; 6) failure to provide itemized
employee wage statements; 7) violation of the Unfair Competition
Law; 8) violation of the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004
(PAGA).

The Instant Action

Initially, this Consolidated Action began as five separate putative
class actions.All five cases involve similar and related
allegations that defendants failed to comply with provisions of the
California Labor Code and the applicable Wage Order in connection
with employment at Amazon.com fulfillment centers in California. In
particular, the complaints in Trevino, Avalos, and Hagman all
included allegations that plaintiffs were not compensated for the
time that they spent in security screening lines at fulfillment
centers. Defendants filed motions with the J.P.M.L. to transfer the
Hagman and Trevino actions to the Amazon Security Screening MDL,
but the J.P.M.L denied the motions on August 1, 2018 on the ground
that the majority of the prior transferred actions had concluded
and, therefore, transfer of additional actions to the MDL would not
be efficient.

The Defendants have filed essentially the same motion to stay in
all three cases. In all three motions, the defendants argue that
this court should stay the plaintiffs' security screening claims in
Trevino, Avalos, and Hagman actions pending the Sixth Circuit's
decision in Saldana, based on either the first-to-file rule or
pursuant to the court's inherent discretion to stay claims pending
completion of parallel litigation.

All the plaintiffs submitted separate oppositions to defendants'
motion to stay. The Trevino plaintiffs argue that because the MDL
court granted summary judgment in Saldana prior to class
certification, the appeal only involves individual claims, and thus
resolution of the case pending before the Sixth Circuit will have
no preclusive effect on this Consolidated Action. The Trevino
plaintiffs also argue that their claims are broader than those
asserted in Saldana.
   
The Avalos plaintiffs argue that the two actions are not
substantially similar so as to justify a stay under the
first-to-file rule or under the court's inherent authority and, in
the alternative, that any stay that is granted should be limited in
scope to the plaintiffs' security screening based allegations.  

The Hagman plaintiffs argue that there is no preclusive effect to
the Sixth Circuit's decision in Saldana and that any overlap in the
various cases is insufficient to order a stay.

After the motions for stay were taken under submission, the parties
stipulated to plaintiffs filing a first amended consolidated class
action complaint, which encompasses Hagman, Trevino, and Avalos, as
well as the Palma and Ward. The parties have not indicated that
supplementing or updating of their briefing on the pending motion
is necessary following consolidation. Therefore, the court will
evaluate defendants' arguments as applied to the Consolidated
Complaint.

First-to-File Rule

The first-to-file rule may be invoked when a complaint involving
the same parties and issues has already been filed in another
district. In applying the first-to-file rule, a court looks to
three threshold factors: (1) the chronology of the two actions; (2)
the similarity of the parties, and (3) the similarity of the
issues. If the action meets all three threshold requirements, the
court may exercise its discretion to transfer, stay, or dismiss the
action

Chronology

Where duplicative actions are filed in courts of concurrent
jurisdiction, the court which first acquired jurisdiction generally
should proceed with the litigation.

Here, the chronology of the actions permits application of the
first-to-file rule. The Saldana action was filed on December 19,
2013 and transferred to the Amazon Security Screening MDL on April
1, 2014.  All the actions in the consolidated action pending before
this court were filed thereafter, with the earliest filed being
Ward, which was initiated in the Stanislaus County Superior Court
on August 1, 2017 and removed to this federal court on September
28, 2017. None of the plaintiffs dispute that their respective
actions were filed after the Saldana action was initiated.
Therefore, the first factor of the first-to-file rule is met and
permits granting a stay here.

Similarity of the Parties

Regarding similarity of the parties, courts have held that the
first-to-file rule does not require exact identity of the parties.
Substantial similarity between the parties is sufficient.
Generally, in class actions, the proper comparison is between the
classes, rather than the class representatives.  

Here, the parties agree that the defendants in the Consolidated
Action and Saldana are substantially similar. The Consolidated
Complaint names as defendants Amazon.com and Golden State FC, LLC.
The complaint in Saldana names Amazon.com, LLC and Golden State as
defendants. Generally, in both complaints, plaintiffs allege that
the defendants acted as joint employers of plaintiffs and the other
class members, and that Golden State was created to build and
operate the fulfilment centers for Amazon.com.  

Therefore, the court concludes that there are substantial
similarities between the parties that permits granting a stay.

Similarity of the Issues

Finally, the similarity of the issues presented between Saldana and
the consolidated action also permits granting a stay. To determine
whether two suits involve substantially similar issues, the Court
looks at whether there is substantial overlap between the two
suits. The issues in both cases need not be identical, only
substantially similar.

Here, there is significant overlap between the claims asserted in
the Consolidated Complaint and the Saldana action that is on appeal
before the Sixth Circuit. Of the seven causes of action in the
Consolidated Complaint, the first three are based on the impact of
defendants' security procedures and how those procedures affect
whether: defendants paid the wages paid for the hours worked,
including overtime (claim 1) defendants provided lawful meal
periods (claim 2) defendants provided lawful rest periods (claim
3).  

In general, plaintiffs allege in the Consolidated Complaint that
they were not compensated for the time spent going through the
necessary security procedures required at defendants' fulfillment
centers. Due to the size of the fulfillment centers and the
security procedures necessary to enter and exit those centers,
plaintiffs allege that they were unable to leave the area from
their work station in the time allotted to have rest breaks and/or
meal periods.  

The court acknowledges that plaintiffs' Consolidated Complaint
includes allegations of additional facts and claims other than
those related to the size of the Amazon fulfillment center and the
necessary security screening procedures. However, defendants are
only seeking a stay of the claims which are based on the security
screening procedures. Therefore, the similarity of the issues in
the Saldana action and the Consolidated Action also permits
granting a stay on the security screening procedures claims.

Judicial Efficiency and Fundamental Fairness

Even assuming the three requirements of the first-to-file rule are
satisfied here, it does not follow that application of the rule is
appropriate. Fairness considerations and equitable concerns can bar
application of the rule and in any event inform the court's
decision.

Even though the three threshold factors of the first-to-file rule
have arguably been met in this case, the court cannot conclude that
application of the rule here would promote efficiency and alleviate
the likelihood of inconsistent judgments. In this regard, the court
is unpersuaded by defendants' argument that a stay pending
resolution of the Saldana appeal would promote efficiency and
judicial economy by allowing both the Courts and the parties to
benefit from the consideration and resolution of that appeal
regardless of the outcome. The decision of the Sixth Circuit in
Saldana will not be binding authority in this case.  

The court is also not persuaded that a stay would promote judicial
efficiency. If the Sixth Circuit affirms the granting of summary
judgment in Saldana, it will resolve only the claims of the
individual plaintiff in that case, while at the most providing this
court with persuasive authority. Further, it is unclear whether the
decision in Saldana will be instructive for resolving the
Consolidated Action, since much of the district court's analysis
was based on facts specific to the plaintiff in Saldana and the
security screenings at the Amazon facility where she worked, which
could differ from the facts as alleged in the Consolidated
Complaint before this court.

This court will exercise its discretion to deny defendants' motion
to stay the Consolidated Action pending the Sixth Circuit's
decision in Saldana.

Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to stay the security screening
claims in this action (Trevino, 18-cv-00120-DAD-BAM, Avalos,
18-cv-00567-DAD-BAM, Hagman, 18-cv-01176-DAD-BAM, D are denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 27, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2qmbztd from Leagle.com.

Juan Trevino, Plaintiff, represented by Lonnie C. Blanchard, III --
lonnieblanchard@gmail.com -- The Blanchard Law Group, APC,Peter R.
Dion-Kindem -- peter@dion-kindemlaw.com -- Peter R. Dion-Kindem,
P.C. & James Ross Hawkins -- James@jameshawkinsaplc.com -- James
Hawkins APLC.

Romeo Palma, Plaintiff, represented by Graham Lambert --
gl@haffnerlawyers.com -- Haffner Law PC, Joshua H. Haffner --
jhh@haffnerlawyers.com -- Haffner Law, PC & James Ross Hawkins,
James Hawkins APLC.  

Golden State FC LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company &
Amazon.com Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Defendants, represented by
Helen Ofelia Avunjian -- havunjian@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn
and Crutcher LLP, Jason C. Schwartz -- jschwartz@gibsondunn.com --
Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, pro hac vice, Katherine V.A. Smith --
ksmith@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP & Michele Leigh
Maryott -- mmaryott@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP.

Amazon Fulfillment Services, Inc., a Delaware corporation,
Defendant, represented by Helen Ofelia Avunjian, Gibson Dunn and
Crutcher LLP, Jason C. Schwartz, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, pro
hac vice, Katherine V.A. Smith -- ksmith@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson
Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Michele Leigh Maryott, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
LLP & Roberta Harting Kuehne, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP.


GRAND AMERICA HOTEL: Descanzo Files RICO Class Suit in Utah
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Grand America Hotel &
Resorts. The case is styled as Jann Descanzo, Veronica Bondoc, Glen
Segundino, Marianne Ponio, and those similarly situated, Plaintiffs
v. Grand America Hotel & Resorts, Sinclair Service, Defendants,
Case No. 2:19-cv-00443-CMR (D. Utah, June 25, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act.

Grand America Hotels & Resorts (formerly known as Little America)
is a chain of eight hotels and resorts in the Western United
States.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     P. Alex McBean, Esq.
     ALEX MCBEAN LAW OFFICE PLLC
     PO BOX 1726
     BOUNTIFUL, UT 84011
     Phone: (385) 319-1137
     Email: mcbean04@gmail.com


GREATER BAY: Faces Dodson Suit in California Superior Court
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Greater Bay
Protective Services Inc. The case is captioned as Stacey Dodson, on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Greater
Bay Protective Services In. and Does 1-10, the Defendants, Case No.
34-2019-00259283-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super., June 25, 2019). The suit
alleges employment-related violation.

Greater Bay provides uniformed security personnel, executive
protection, and many other security services.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff is:

          Alex Paul Katofsky, Esq.
          GAINES & GAINES, APLC
          27200 Agoura Rd Ste 101
          Agoura Hills, CA 91301-5126
          Telephone: (818) 703-8985
          Facsimile: (818) 703-8984
          E-mail: alex@gaineslawfirm.com

HERON THERAPEUTICS: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announces the
filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Heron Therapeutics, Inc. (NASDAQ: HRTX) from October
31, 2018 through April 30, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period").
The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Heron investors under the
federal securities laws.

To join the Heron class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1589.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Heron had failed to include adequate Chemistry,
Manufacturing, and Controls and non-clinical information in its New
Drug Application ("NDA") with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") for HTX-011; (2) the foregoing increased the likelihood
that the FDA would not approve Heron's NDA for HTX-011; and (3) as
a result, Heron's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times. When the true details entered the
market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than August 5,
2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf
of other class members in directing the litigation. If you wish to
join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1589.html

Contact:

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
         New York, NY 10016
         Phone: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Website: www.rosenlegal.com
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com
                cases@rosenlegal.com [GN]


HOMELAND SECURITY: Faces Monterroza Suit over Immigration Prisons
------------------------------------------------------------------
The case, Javier Ernesto Giron Monterroza, on his own behalf and on
behalf of all those similarly situated, through his next friend,
his sister, Marlene Giron v. McAleenan et al., Case No.
1:19-cv-00103 (S.D. Tex., June 17, 2019), asks the United District
Court for the Southern District of Texas to issue a writ of habeas
corpus on behalf of alien detainees. The case is assigned to Hon.
Judge Rolando Olvera.

The Trump administration has been the subject of lawsuits for
denying release to hundreds of people who are languishing in
immigration prisons after seeking asylum in the United States.

An American attorney, Kevin McAleenan is a government official
serving as the Acting Secretary of Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), whose functions includes customs, border, and immigration
enforcement, emergency response to natural and manmade disasters,
anti-terrorism work and cybersecurity. [BN]

Attorneys for Petitioners:

     Elisabeth Lisa S Brodyaga, Esq.
     17891 Landrum Park Rd
     San Benito, TX 78586-7197
     Telephone: (956) 421-3226
     Facsimile: (956) 421-3423
     E-mail: lisabrodyaga@aol.com

             - and -

     Jaime M Diez, Esq.
     Jones Crane, Esq.
     PO Box 3070
     Brownsville, TX 78523
     Telephone: (956) 544-3565
     E-mail: JaimeMDiez1@gmail.com

             - and -

     Manuel E Solis, Esq.
     6657 Navigation Dr
     Houston, TX 77011
     Telephone: (713) 844-2700
     E-mail: lawofficemanuelsolis@yahoo.com

             - and -

     Thelma Odilia Garcia, Esq.
     301 E Madison St
     Harlingen, TX 78550
     Telephone: (956) 425-3701
     Facsimile: (956) 428-3731
     E-mail: lawofctog@yahoo.com


ILLINOIS: Court Orders Payment of Filing Fee in Felton Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois issued a Memorandum and Order directing payment of Filing
Fee in the case captioned TROY F. FELTON, #0926198242, DAVID A.
KIFER, #1002196075, TYLER NEAL JOHNSON, #201391 Plaintiff, v.
SHERIFF, DAVID WEDDING, BRUCE UNGETHEIM, CHERYL A. MUSGRAVE, BEN
SHOULDERS, and JOHN/JANE DOE, Defendants. Case No. 19-cv-00662-JPG.
(S.D. Ill.).

Plaintiffs Troy Felton, David Kifer, and Tyler Neal Johnson, who
are currently held at the Jefferson County Justice Center, bring
this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for the
alleged illegal transfer of inmates from Vanderburgh County Jail in
Indiana to Jefferson County Justice Center in Illinois, which has
resulted in inadequate amount of food and legal materials, as well
as unreasonable prices for medical services and commissary items
and poison being sprayed in the cell blocks for pest control.  

Signatures

As an initial matter, it is unclear whether Plaintiffs intend to
bring their claims jointly. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)
requires every pleading, written motion, and other paper to be
signed by a party personally if the party is unrepresented. A
non-attorney cannot file papers for another litigant. There are
three plaintiffs in this case, Felton, Kifer, and Johnson, but only
Felton has signed the Complaint.
  
The Court also notes that the Complaint states that this is a class
action, but no motion for class certification has been filed.  

Group Litigation by Multiple Prisoners

Plaintiffs may bring their claims jointly in a single lawsuit if
they so desire. However, the Court must advise them of the
consequences of proceeding in this manner, including their filing
fee obligations, and give them an opportunity to withdraw from the
case or sever their claims into individual actions.

The Seventh Circuit addressed the difficulties in administering
group prisoner Complaints in Boriboune v. Berge, 391 F.3d 852 (7th
Cir. 2004). District courts are required to accept joint Complaints
filed by multiple prisoners if the criteria of permissive joinder
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 are satisfied. Rule 20
permits plaintiffs to join together in one lawsuit if they assert
claims arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series
of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact
common to these persons will arise in the action.

Additionally, in reconciling the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act
with Rule 20, the Seventh Circuit determined that joint litigation
does not relieve any prisoner of the duties imposed upon him under
the Act, including the duty to pay the full amount of the filing
fees, either in installments or in full if the circumstances
require it. In other words, each prisoner in a joint action is
required to pay a full civil filing fee, just as if he had filed
the suit individually.

There are at least two other reasons a prisoner may wish to avoid
group litigation. First, group litigation creates countervailing
costs. Each submission to the Court must be served on every other
plaintiff and the opposing parties pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 5. This means that if there are two plaintiffs, the
plaintiffs' postage and copying costs for filing motions, briefs,
or other papers will be twice as much as that of a single
plaintiff.

Second, a prisoner litigating on his own behalf takes the risk that
one or more of his claims may be deemed sanctionable under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11. On the other hand, a prisoner
litigating jointly assumes those risks for all of the claims in the
group Complaint, whether or not they concern him personally.  

Because not every prisoner is likely to be aware of the potential
negative consequences of joining group litigation in federal
courts, the Seventh Circuit suggested in Boriboune that district
courts alert prisoners to the individual payment requirement, as
well as the other risks prisoner pro se litigants face in joint pro
se litigation, and give them an opportunity to drop out In keeping
with this suggestion, the Court offers Plaintiffs Kifer and Johnson
an opportunity to withdraw from this  litigation before the case
progresses further.

The Plaintiffs are warned that future group motions or pleadings
that do not comply with this requirement shall be stricken pursuant
to Rule 11(a).

Plaintiffs Kifer and Johnson must advise the Court in writing on or
before July 25, 2019, whether he wishes to continue as a plaintiff
in this group action. If, by that deadline, Plaintiff Kifer or
Johnson advises the Court that he does not wish to participate in
this action, he will be dismissed from the lawsuit and will not be
charged a filing fee. This is the onlyway to avoid the obligation
to pay the filing fee.

If Plaintiffs Kifer or Johnson chooses to continue as a plaintiff
in this group action, he must submit a copy of the Complaint
bearing his signature, on or before July 25, 2019. To enable the
Plaintiffs to comply with this Order, the CLERK is DIRECTED to
return a copy of the Complaint to Kifer and Johnson.

The Plaintiffs are ADVISED that the Complaint is currently awaiting
preliminary review by the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1915A, and it has not yet been served on the Defendants. Further
action by Plaintiffs is required before the Court can complete its
preliminary review of this matter under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915A.
When this review is completed, a copy of the Court's screening
order will be forwarded to each Plaintiff who remains in the
action.

The Plaintiffs are further ADVISED that each of them is under a
continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of Court and each opposing
party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate a Plaintiff's whereabouts. This shall be
done in writing and not later than 7 days after a transfer or other
change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result
in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 27, 2019 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6x8x3y7 from
Leagle.com.

Troy F. Felton, Plaintiff, pro se.

David A. Kifer, Plaintiff, pro se.

Tyler Neal Johnson, Plaintiff, pro se.


IMPERIAL, L.L.C.: Melvin Sues over Race Bias, Misclassification
----------------------------------------------------------------
ALAN MELVIN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. IMPERIAL, L.L.C., the Defendant, Case
No. CJ-2019-3546 (Okla. Dist. Ct., June 25, 2019), targets
Defendant's race discrimination and retaliation in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, including differential treatment
based upon race and wrongful termination of employement.

Additionally, the Plaintiff seeks compensation for Defendant's
intentional misclassification of employees as exempt in violation
of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Further, the Plaintiff seeks unpaid wages for Defendant's
intentional violation of the Oklahoma Protection of Labor Act.

The Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant from approximately
August 2, 2016 until his termination on or around May 31, 2017, as
a route sales delivery driver. He and all others similarly situated
regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek but were not
paid overtime for hours worked in exess of 40 hours.

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          D. Colby Addison, Esq.
          Leah M. Roper, Esq.
          LAIRD HAMMONS LAIRD, PLLC
          1332 S.W. 89th Street
          Oklahoma City, OK 73159
          Telephone: (405) 703 4567
          Facsimile: (405) 703 4067
          E-mail: colby@lhllaw.com
                  leah@lhllaw.com

INSTAFF INC: Cal. App. Affirms Arbitration Denial in Pelaez Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division
Three, issued an Opinion affirming the Trial Court's Order denying
Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration in the case captioned
CESAR PELAEZ etc., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. INSTAFF, INC., et
al., Defendants and Appellants. No. G056341. (Cal. App.).

The Defendants appeal the trial court's order denying their
petition to compel arbitration of plaintiff's statutory wage and
hour claims in a putative class action.

Cesar Pelaez, a journeyman carpenter and member of the United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (Union), filed a
class action complaint on behalf of himself and similarly situated
workers against his employers, Cruz Modular, Inc. (Cruz) and
Instaff, Inc. (Instaff). Cruz is in the business of installing
modular furniture for customers at the customers' job sites, and
Instaff is Cruz's agent for provision of skilled labor to fulfill
installation contracts. The CBA signed by Cruz and the Union set
the terms of Pelaez's and the putative class members' employment
with Cruz and Instaff, (Employers).

The first seven causes of action in the complaint alleged the
Employers violated certain provisions of California Industrial
Welfare Commission Wage Order 16-2001 (Wage Order 16) and
corresponding sections of the California Labor Code regulating
overtime, meal and rest periods, wage statements, reimbursement of
necessary business expenses, and related topics. The eighth cause
of action sought civil penalties under the Labor Code Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004, based on the statutory violations
alleged in the first seven causes of action.

The Trial Court Properly Found Pelaez's Statutory Claims Not
Subject to Arbitration

The Employers contend the trial court erred in denying their
petition to compel arbitration. They argue the CBA contains a clear
and unmistakable agreement to resolve the alleged Wage Order 16
violations through a grievance procedure, rather than in a judicial
forum. Complicating the Employers' task of proving that requisite
clear and unmistakable agreement, however, is the fact the CBA
consists of two separate documents which conflict on the
arbitrability of Wage Order 16 claims.

The trial court properly concluded these separate but interrelated
documents, read together, exclude Wage Order 16 claims from the
reach of the CBA's general arbitration provision. Consequently, the
appeal lacks merit.

The Relevant Provisions of the CBA

The CBA consists of two interrelated labor agreements. The first of
these, the Master Agreement, is a 150-page document covering all
manner of construction projects and carpentry specialties that
details every aspect of the wages, hours and working conditions for
employees, as well as compliance with applicable laws, rules, and
regulations, specifically including Wage Order 16. It is the Master
Agreement which contains an explicit agreement to arbitrate Wage
Order 16 claims. Three Articles" in the Master Agreement, Articles
IV, VI, and IX, are relevant to finding that explicit agreement to
arbitrate.

Article IV of the Master Agreement states that the Contractor and
Union intend that all grievances or disputes arising between them
over the interpretation or application of the terms of this Masterp
Agreement shall be settled by the procedures set forth in Article
VI.
  
Article VI is entitled Grievance and Arbitration and sets forth in
general terms an agreement to arbitrate all disputes concerning the
interpretation or application of the Master Agreement.  

The end result is that the CBA contains no explicit, clear and
unmistakable agreement to arbitrate Wage Order 16 claims.
Consequently, these statutory claims are not subject to mandatory
arbitration.

The Employers' Arguments for a Contrary Interpretation of the CBA
Lack Merit

The Employers argue the trial court misinterpreted the CBA as
lacking an explicit, clear agreement to arbitrate the Wage Order 16
claims. They contend the Master Agreement's Article IX, section 904
provision requiring arbitration of these statutory wage claims was
in fact incorporated into the Memorandum Agreement. Consequently,
they argue, the court erred in denying their petition to compel
arbitration.

The argument lacks merit.

There are two steps to the Employers' argument the trial court
erred in concluding the Memorandum Agreement's Paragraph 4 excluded
the Master Agreement's Article IX, section 904 Wage Order 16
arbitration provision. The first step concerns the interplay
between Paragraphs 3b and 4 of the Memorandum Agreement.

The Employers begin by citing Paragraph 3b's directive that except
as specifically excluded, modified or superseded, all provisions of
the Master Agreement are specifically incorporated by reference and
made a part of this Memorandum Agreement.

They next assert that Paragraph 4 does not mention or refer to
Article IX or section 904 in any way. Consequently, the Employers
conclude, the default rule of incorporation applies because
Paragraph 4 did not specifically exclude, modify or supersede the
arbitration agreement in Article IX, section 904; hence, section
904 is incorporated into the CBA, not excluded from it.

In another attempt to denude the relating to language of its
obvious meaning, the Employers assert, While the phrase relating to
can be considered in the abstract to be inclusive and broad-based
citation, courts will not give unlimited effect to such language if
doing so would lead to a result clearly not intended by the
parties.   

In a similar vein, the Employers argue the court should not apply
an uncritical literalism' to the relating to language in Paragraph
4 in order to create an implied exclusion which the parties to the
CBA did not intend.

In a crucial mischaracterization of the Memorandum Agreement's
arbitration provisions, the Employers contend the arbitration
agreements in both documents are virtually identical, asserting the
grievance and arbitration procedures in Paragaph 9 of the
Memorandum Agreement were carried forward almost word for word from
the Article VI of the Master Agreement.

The trial court recognized the fallacy in this argument. The court
noted that the arbitration agreements in both documents are not the
same. The court compared the arbitration provisions in each
agreement, observing that in the Master Agreement the Union agreed
to the arbitration of statutory claims provided that the
arbitration took place pursuant to the provisions and procedures
set forth in Article VI.  In contrast, The grievance and
arbitration provision in the Memorandum Agreement is not what the
parties bargained for in Article IX of the Master Agreement. Beyond
the fact that there is no statement in Article IX that allows for
arbitration pursuant to the provisions of another CBA  allows the
parties to establish their own grievance and arbitration
procedures, including, presumably, a methodology for selecting
arbitrators and time limits for the processing of grievances.

The trial court concluded as follows: The bottom line is this, if
the parties to the CBA wanted to ensure that claims brought
pursuant to Wage Order 16 were subject to arbitration under the
Memorandum Agreement, then they easily could have said so. Instead,
they chose to eliminate the requirement that such disputes be
arbitrated pursuant to Article VI while at the same time not
explicitly stating that Wage Order 16 claims would be arbitrated
pursuant to Section 9. In light of this uncertainty and given the
pronouncements of the Supreme Court and various other courts that
any such waiver be `clear and unmistakable.

The Defendants' petition must be denied.

The Court agrees. The trial court properly denied the petition to
compel arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Cal. App.'s June 27, 2019 Opinion is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/y3owbq9g from Leagle.com.

Harker, Campbell & Belfield, James G. Harker --
jharker@harkerlaw.com -- and Carol L. Belfield --
cbelfield@harkerlaw.com -- for Defendants and Appellants.

Mahoney Law Group, Kevin Mahoney -- kmahoney@mahoney-law.net -- and
Dionisios Aliazis -- daliazis@mahoney-law.net -- for Plaintiff and
Respondent.


J G MOUSSE: Valdez-Padilla et al. Seek Minimum Wage, OT Pay
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against J G Mousse, Inc.
d/b/a Roma Pizza and Pasta for alleged violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) and the New York Labor Law (NYLL). The case is
captioned FAUSTO VALDEZ-PADILLA and FELICIANO SUSANO ZAMORA,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, -against- J G MOUSSE, INC d/b/a ROMA PIZZA AND PASTA,
and JALEH MOUSSAPOU, as an individual, Defendants, Case No. CV
19-3594 (E.D.N.Y., June 19, 2019). Although Plaintiff Fausto
Valdez-Padilla worked approximately 72 hours and Plaintiff
Feliciano Susano Zamora worked approximately 60 hours per week
during their employment, Defendants did not pay Plaintiff time and
a half for hours worked over 40, a blatant violation of the
overtime provisions contained in the FLSA and NYLL. In their
complaint, Plaintiffs Valdez-Padilla and Zamora also alleges that
the Defendants did not pay them an extra hour at the legally
prescribed minimum wage for each day worked over 10 hours, a
blatant violation of the spread of hours provisions contained in
the NYLL.

J G Mousse, Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws of New
York with a principal executive office at l0-01 36th Avenue,
Astoria, New York 11106. Jaleh Moussapou owns and/or operates J G
Mousse, Inc., which offers New York style pizza, sandwiches, fresh
baked bread, salads, and pastas. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
     HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
     80-02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
     Kew Gardens, NY 11415
     Telephone: (718) 263-9591
     Facsimile: (718) 263-9598


JEFFERSON CAPITAL: Hovanec Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Jefferson Capital
Systems, LLC. The case is styled as Randy Hovanec individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Jefferson
Capital Systems, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-03691 (E.D. N.Y.,
June 25, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC provides payment rewards, bankruptcy
collection, and debt collection services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     David M. Barshay, Esq.
     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     Barshay Sanders, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 281-7601
     Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com
            csanders@barshaysanders.com


JEFFERSON CAPITAL: Tupou Files FDCPA Suit in W.D. Washington
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Jefferson Capital
Systems, LLC. The case is styled as Averill Tupou individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Jefferson
Capital Systems, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-00982 (W.D.
Wash., June 25, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC provides payment rewards, bankruptcy
collection, and debt collection services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     Barshay Sanders, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 281-7601
     Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com


KENAN ADVANTAGE: Leonte Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL LEONTE, On Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiffs, v. THE KENAN ADVANTAGE GROUP, INC.; and PETRO
CHEMICAL TRANSPORT, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-01471-S (N.D.
Tex., June 21, 2019) is a civil action brought by Plaintiff
pursuant to the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, and the federal
Portal-to Portal Pay Act, for Defendant's failure to pay Plaintiff
time and one-half his regular rate of pay for all hours worked over
40 during each seven-day workweek.

Defendant KAG is a tank truck transporter with operations in
numerous states, including Texas through its subsidiary PCT.
Plaintiff was hired by KAG to work as a dispatcher.

Plaintiff files this lawsuit individually and as a FLSA collective
action on behalf of all other similarly situated current and/or
former employees of Defendants who work(ed) as dispatchers and,
like Plaintiff, are not/were not paid time and one-half their
respective regular rates of pay for all hours worked over 40 in
each seven day workweek in the time period relevant to this
lawsuit.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Ben K. DuBose, Esq.
     Greg W. Lisemby, Esq.
     DuBose Law Firm, PLLC
     4310 North Central Expressway
     Dallas, TX 75206
     Phone: (214) 389-8199
     Fax: (214) 389-8399
     Email: bdubose@duboselawfirm.com
            glisemby@duboselawfirm.com


L'OREAL USA: Certification of UCL Class Sought in Borchenko Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit titled NATALIYA BORCHENKO, On Behalf
of Herself and All Others Similarly Situated v. L'OREAL USA, INC.,
a Delaware corporation, Case No. 2:19-cv-01427-R-AS (C.D. Cal.),
moves for an order certifying the Unfair Competition Law ("UCL")
California-Only Class:

     All California consumers who within the applicable statute
     of limitations period until the date notice is disseminated,
     purchased the Products.

Ms. Borchenko also moves for an order appointing her as class
representative and the law firm of Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman &
Balint, P.C. as Class Counsel.

The Court will commence a hearing on November 4, 2019, at 10:00
a.m., to consider the Motion.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Patricia N. Syverson, Esq.
          Manfred P. Muecke, Esq.
          BONNETT, FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C.
          600 W. Broadway, Suite 900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 798-4593
          E-mail: psyverson@bffb.com
                  mmuecke@bffb.com

               - and -

          Elaine A. Ryan, Esq.
          Carrie A. Laliberte, Esq.
          BONNETT, FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C.
          2325 E. Camelback Rd., Suite 300
          Phoenix, AZ 85016
          Telephone: (602) 274-1100
          E-mail: eryan@bffb.com
                  claliberte@bffb.com

               - and -

          David N. Lake, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF DAVID N. LAKE
          A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
          16130 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 650
          Encino, CA 91436
          Telephone: (818) 788-5100
          Facsimile: (818) 479-9990
          E-mail: david@lakelawpc.com


LEE ENTERPRISES: Goldsmith Suit Transferred to E.D. Missouri
------------------------------------------------------------
The case, STEVEN GOLDSMITH, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. LEE ENTERPRISES, INC., LEE
ENTERPRISES MISSOURI, INC., ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH LLC, PULITZER
INC., d/b/a St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Defendants, Case No.
19SL-CC001967 (Filed on May 14, 2019), was transferred from the
Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Missouri, Twenty-First Judicial
Circuit to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri, Eastern Division on June 21, 2019. This
breach of contract case is now assigned to Hon. Judge Henry Edward
Autrey. The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Missouri assigned Case No. 4:19-cv-01772-HEA to the proceeding.

The jurisdictional requirements under Class Action Fairness Act of
2005 are satisfied: this is a class action composed of more than
100 putative class members, there is at least minimal diversity
between the alleged plaintiff class and Defendants, and the amount
in controversy on a class-wide basis, exclusive of interest and
costs, exceeds $5,000,000. Accordingly, at least minimal diversity
exists under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(2)(A) because Plaintiff
Steven Goldsmith, a member of the plaintiff class, is alleged to be
a citizen of Missouri, a state that is different from Delaware and
Iowa, the states of which Defendants are all citizens.

In the complaint, Plaintiff asserts several causes of action
against Defendants. These include breach of contract; breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; unjust enrichment;
and a violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act.
Plaintiff claims that he and other subscribers to the Post-Dispatch
were "double-billed" for certain subscriptions to the paper based
on alleged overlapping days in consecutive or separate bills.

Lee Enterprises, Incorporated is a citizen of Delaware and Iowa
because it is a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware
and has its principal place of business in Davenport, Iowa.
Pulitzer Inc. is a citizen of Delaware and Iowa because it is a
corporation organized under the laws of Delaware and has its
principal place of business in Davenport, Iowa. St. Louis
Post-Dispatch LLC is a likewise a citizen of Delaware and Iowa
under the Class Action Fairness Act because it is a limited
liability company organized under the laws of Delaware and has its
principal place of business in Davenport, Iowa. [BN]

Attorneys for Defendants:

     John M. Hessel, Esq.
     Joseph E. Martineau, Esq.
     Edward T. Pivin, Esq.
     LEWIS RICE LLC
     600 Washington Avenue, Suite 2500
     St. Louis, MO 63101
     Telephone: (314) 444-7600
     Facsimile: (314) 612-2042
     E-mail: jhessel@lewisrice.com
             jmartineau@lewisrice.com
             epivin@lewisrice.com

             - and –

     Roger Myers, Esq.
     BRYAN CAVE LEIGHTON PAISNER LLP
     Three Embarcadero Center, 7th Floor
     San Francisco, CA 94111
     Telephone: (415) 268-1955
     E-mail: roger.myers@bclplaw.com

LEPAGE BAKERIES: Underpays Distributors, Bissonnette et al. Say
---------------------------------------------------------------
NEAL BISSONNETTE; and TYLER WOJNAROWSKI, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. LEPAGE BAKERIES
PARK ST., LLC; C.K. SALES CO., LLC; and FLOWERS FOODS, INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-00965 (D. Conn., June 20, 2019) is an
action against the Defendant's failure to pay the Plaintiff and the
class overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours
per week.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as distributors.

Lepage Bakeries Park St., LLC manufactures of fresh or frozen bread
and bread-type rolls, cakes, pies, and other perishable bakery
products. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

         Harold Lichten, Esq.
         Matthew W. Thomson, Esq.
         Zachary L. Rubin, Esq.
         LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
         729 Boylston St., Suite 2000
         Boston, MA 02116
         Telephone: (617) 994-5800
         Facsimile: (617) 994-5801
         E-mail: hlichten@llrlaw.com
                 mthomson@llrlaw.com
                 zrubin@llrlaw.com


LEXINGTON LAW: Court Favors Arbitration in M. Starace Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order granting Defendants' Motion to Compel
Arbitration in the case captioned MARTIN STARACE, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. LEXINGTON
LAW FIRM and DOES 1-10, Defendants. No. 1:18-cv-01596-DAD-SKO.
(E.D. Cal.).

Defendant Lexington Law Firm (Lexington) is a debt collection
company. At some point in 2018, the plaintiff contacted Lexington
in an attempt to repair his credit. Lexington required his debit
card information in order to provide its services.

After the plaintiff provided Lexington with the information,
Lexington without the Plaintiff's knowledge or consent continued to
deduct funds from his account multiple times on a reoccurring
basis, without providing him a written authorization to do so. The
Plaintiff alleges that he ever provided Defendant with any
authorization to deduct these sums of money on a regular basis from
his banking account.

Lexington filed the instant motion to compel arbitration and
dismiss this action, contending that the plaintiff executed an
Engagement Agreement (Agreement) with Lexington in which he
unmistakably agreed to arbitrate any claims between him and
Lexington Law on an individual basis.   

Lexington argues that, by assenting to the terms of the Agreement,
the plaintiff also agreed to the arbitration clause, which provides
in relevant part: "You agree to arbitrate all disputes and claims
between you and Lexington on an individual basis only and not as
part of any class. You agree that, by entering into this Contract,
you are waiving the right to a trial by jury and you are waiving
all rights to participate in a class action law suit or class
action arbitration. . . . Lexington will reimburse you up to $300
of your arbitration filing fee. The rules of the American
Arbitration Association shall govern the arbitration and can be
viewed online at www.adr.org or by calling 1-800-778-7879."

Lexington argues that the court must compel arbitration and dismiss
this putative class action because: (1) plaintiff agreed to
individually arbitrate his claims against Lexington; and (2)
neither the Agreement nor its arbitration clause are
unconscionable.  

The Plaintiff counters that the court cannot compel arbitration
because Lexington has not established the existence of a valid
agreement between the parties.  The Plaintiff further contends
that, even if the parties entered into an agreement containing an
arbitration clause, the court should deny Lexington's motion
because the Agreement and/or the arbitration clause are
unconscionable.  

Whether the Parties Entered into an Agreement

The Plaintiff argues that Lexington has failed to meet its burden
and introduce evidence showing the existence of an agreement to
arbitrate. The Plaintiff also contends that there was no mutual
assent because the Plaintiff was never told about the arbitration
clause or presented with the Agreement at any time. Lexington
counters that it has established the existence of an agreement to
arbitrate and that plaintiff assented to the Agreement's terms.  

Attached to the defendant's pending motion to compel arbitration is
the declaration of Gavin Shea, a Senior Manager of Database
Marketing at Progrexion Marketing, Inc. (Progrexion), a firm that
provides marketing and administrative services for Lexington.
  
Shea declares that: (1) on February 22, 2018, plaintiff contacted
Lexington via phone to engage its services (2) on that same day,
Lexington sent plaintiff the Agreement via text message (3) on that
same day, at approximately 7:56 p.m., plaintiff replied to that
text message by typing the word Agree and (4) Lexington thereafter
inserted plaintiff's electronic signature into the Agreement at the
time he electronically agreed to the Agreement. Shea avers that the
Agreement has not been altered since that time.

The Plaintiff contends that Shea's declaration is an objectionable
declaration and inadmissible hearsay.

The court disagrees.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), business records are
excepted from the rule against hearsay. For the records to be
admissible, the following foundational facts must be established
through the custodian of the records or another qualified witness:
(1) the records must have been made or transmitted by a person with
knowledge at or near the time of the incident recorded and (2) the
record must have been kept in the course of a regularly conducted
business activity.

Here, Shea declares that he has direct access to and regularly
utilizes clients' records that Progrexion and Lexington Law keep in
the ordinary course of business, including records pertaining to
Lexington Law's rendering of services to Martin Starace at issue in
this litigation. Moreover, Shea states that he is authorized to
make the declaration on behalf of Lexington Law.

The court is satisfied that Shea is a qualified witness, that the
records his declaration relies upon were made at the time of the
incident recorded, and that the records were kept in the course of
a regularly-conducted business activity. Thus, the court will
consider the Shea declaration and the Agreement attached to it.

Next, plaintiff contends that there was no mutual assent by him to
be bound by the arbitration clause [because] Defendant never even
presented the Agreement to him.

This argument is also unavailing. First, the Shea declaration
establishes that plaintiff was provided the Agreement via text
message on February 22, 2018. Second, the Shea declaration
establishes that plaintiff accepted the Agreement by replying Agree
via text message and that Lexington thereafter inserted his
electronic signature into the Agreement at the time that he
electronically agreed to the Agreement.

Having found none of plaintiff's arguments to be persuasive, the
court concludes that, based on the record before it, plaintiff
assented to the Agreement.

Whether the Agreement is Unconscionable

The Plaintiff attempts to defeat the pending motion by arguing that
the Agreement and/or the arbitration clause are procedurally and
substantively unconscionable. Specifically, plaintiff contends
that: (1) the Agreement is a contract of adhesion and therefore
unconscionable and (2) the language you agree to arbitrate all
disputes and claims between you and Lexington is so broad as to be
unconscionable.

The FAA provides that arbitration agreements shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

To establish the defense of unconscionability under California law,
the party opposing arbitration must demonstrate that the contract
as a whole or a specific clause in the contract is both
procedurally and substantively unconscionable.  

Whether the Agreement is Procedurally Unconscionable

Procedural unconscionability concerns the manner in which the
contract was negotiated and the respective circumstances of the
parties at that time, focusing on the level of oppression and
surprise involved in the agreement. Oppression addresses the weaker
party's absence of choice and unequal bargaining power that results
in no real negotiation, while surprise involves the extent to which
the contract clearly discloses its terms as well as the reasonable
expectations of the weaker party.

The Plaintiff argues that the Agreement is procedurally
unconscionable because it is a contract of adhesion. Lexington does
not dispute that it presented plaintiff with a standardized
contract that was drafted by its agents. The court also concludes
that Lexington was the party of superior bargaining strength.
However, it does not follow from these facts that the Agreement is
procedurally unconscionable to such an extent to be unenforceable.


Here, with respect to procedural unconscionability, plaintiff does
not allege anything more than the fact that the Agreement was a
contract of adhesion. Moreover, the court finds that, while the
adhesive nature of the Agreement suggests that it is oppressive,
the Agreement itself clearly disclosed its terms, including the
arbitration clause. Accordingly, the court finds that the adhesive
nature of the Agreement "demonstrates only a slight degree of
procedural unconscionability.

Whether the Agreement is Substantively Unconscionable

Having found that the Agreement is only minimally procedurally
unconscionable, the court must next find that the Agreement is
substantively unconscionable to a much greater degree in order to
conclude that it as a whole is unconscionable. Plaintiff argues
that the Agreement is substantively unconscionable because the
arbitration clause is so incredibly broad as to cover any dispute.

The substantive element of unconscionability pertains to the
fairness of an agreement's actual terms and to assessments of
whether they are overly harsh or one-sided.

In support of his argument that the arbitration clause at issue
here is substantively unconscionable, plaintiff directs the court's
attention to the decision in In re Jiffy Lube International, Inc.,
Text Spam Litigation, 847 F.Supp.2d 1253 (S.D. Cal. 2012). There,
the plaintiffs sought to assert a class action claim under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) against a Jiffy Lube
franchisee after they received unauthorized text messages offering
a discount on Jiffy Lube's oil-change services. One plaintiff had
previously signed an agreement containing an arbitration clause
when he visited the franchisee for an oil change that provided that
any and all disputes, controversies or claims between the parties
was to be resolved by mandatory arbitration.
   
The court found this language to be incredibly broad  and that,
without a limiting clause, the language could lead to absurd
results. For example, the court noted that a suit by plaintiffs
regarding a tort action arising from a completely separate incident
could not be forced into arbitration such a clause would clearly be
unconscionable. The court declined to read into the arbitration
clause limiting language such as any and all disputes,
controversies or claims arising out of or relating to the agreement
because the court: (1) was unclear as to whether it had the
authority to do so; and (2) was doubtful whether that limiting]
language would encompass the TCPA claims because the fact that the
unauthorized text message offered membership in a club that would
provide discounts on an oil change does not establish that the text
message was related to the contract governing plaintiff's oil
change.

Relying on In re Jiffy Lube, plaintiff argues that the arbitration
clause at issue here is impermissibly broad and therefore
unconscionable. For a number of reasons, however, the court is
unpersuaded by plaintiff's argument. First, of course, the decision
in In re Jiffy Lube is not binding on this court. Second, that
decision did not apply California law and cited no binding
authority that supported its analysis and instead relied on a
Seventh Circuit opinion in finding the arbitration provision before
it was overly broad. Third and most importantly, In re Jiffy Lube
is inapposite because unlike in that case there is no doubt here
that plaintiff's claims against Lexington are related to the
Agreement.  

The court therefore declines to find that the broad scope of the
arbitration clause at issue in this case renders it substantively
unconscionable. Instead, the court will analyze whether the actual
terms of the arbitration clause are overly harsh, unduly
oppressive, or one-sided. Here, a review of arbitration clause
reveals that its scope applies equally to any claims that Lexington
may wish to bring against plaintiff; thus, the scope cannot be
deemed overly harsh, unduly oppressive or, unreasonably one-sided
so as to shock the conscience. While the arbitration clause
prevents plaintiff from asserting his claims on a class-wide basis,
the court concludes that there is no substantial degree of
unfairness in that beyond a simple old-fashioned bad bargain.

In sum, the court finds no basis to void the Agreement on the basis
of unconscionability.

Whether Dismissal of this Action is Appropriate

Having determined that a valid arbitration agreement exists between
the parties and that plaintiff's EFTA claim is within the scope of
the arbitration agreement, the Court must dismiss the action or
compel the action to arbitration and stay the proceedings. Here,
the court concludes that dismissal of this action is appropriate
because plaintiff's sole claim is subject to the Agreement's
enforceable arbitration clause.

Having found that plaintiff assented to the Agreement and having
further found that the Agreement is valid and enforceable, the
court hereby grants defendant's motion to compel arbitration based
on the arbitration clause in the Agreement and dismiss this
action.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 27, 2019 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/yxb2zeok from Leagle.com.

Martin Starace, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Meghan George --
mgeorge@toddflaw.com -- Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, PC, Todd
M. Friedman -- tfriedman@toddflaw.com -- Law Offices of Todd M.
Friedman, P.C. & Adrian R. Bacon -abacon@toddflaw.com -- Law
Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C.

Lexington Law Firm, Defendant, represented by Chad R. Fuller --
chad.fuller@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders LLP & Jessica Rose
Ellis Lohr -- jessica.lohr@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders LLP.


LOVED ONES: Class of Home Health Aides Certified in Mayhew Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. John T. Copenhaver, Jr., granted the Plaintiffs' motion
for final collective action certification under the Fair Labor
Standards Act in the lawsuit captioned PAMELA MAYHEW, BETSY
FARNSWORTH, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated
v. LOVED ONES IN HOME CARE, LLC, and DONNA SKEEN, Case No.
2:17-cv-03844 (S.D.W. Va.).

The class consists of current and former Loved Ones home health
aides who worked in both the private care program and the Medicaid
waiver program ("hybrid aides") during the same pay period at any
time between July 28, 2014, and May 31, 2017.

The Clerk is directed to transmit copes of this order to all
counsel of record.[CC]


LYFT, INC: Person & Hossfeld Sue over Telemarketing Calls
---------------------------------------------------------
ELCINDA PERSON and ROBERT HOSSFELD, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. LYFT, INC., and
YODEL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, the Defendants , Case No.
1:19-cv-02914-TWT (N.D. Ga., June 25, 2019), contends that the
Defendants promote and market merchandise, in part, by sending
automated and pre-recorded telemarketing calls, in violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Lyft, Inc. is a transportation network company based in San
Francisco, California and operating in 640 cities in the United
States and nine cities in Canada.[BN]

The Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated are:

          Steven H. Koval, Esq.
          3575 Piedmont Road
          Building 15, Suite 120
          Atlanta, GA 30305
          Telephone: (404) 513-6651
          Facsimile: (404) 549-4654
          E-mail: shkoval@aol.com

               - and -

          Keith J. Keogh, Esq.
          Timothy J. Sostrin, Esq.
          KEOGH LAW, LTD.
          55 West Monroe Street, Suite 3390
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 726-1092
          E-mail: keith@keoghlaw.com

               - and -

          Anthony I. Paronich, Esq.
          PARONICH LAW, P.C.
          350 Lincoln Street, Suite 2400
          Hingham, MA 02043
          Telephone: (617) 485-0018
          Facsimile: (508) 318-8100
          E-mail: anthony@paronichlaw.com

MALEN & ASSOCIATES: Salamon Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Malen & Associates,
P.C. The case is styled as Sarah Salamon individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Malen & Associates,
P.C., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-03701 (E.D. N.Y., June 25,
2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Malen & Associates, P.C. is a law firm with its practice limited to
Creditor's Rights, Collections, Bankruptcy, Foreclosure and Real
Estate Closings.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     David M. Barshay, Esq.
     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     Barshay Sanders, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 281-7601
     Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com
            csanders@barshaysanders.com


MAR PIZZA: Underpays Delivery Drivers, Beattle Suit Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------
DONNA BEATTIE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MAR PIZZA, INC. d/b/a DOMINO'S PIZZA; MARR
CHICAGO PIZZA, INC., d/b/a DOMINO'S PIZZA; and ANTHONY MANOS,
Defendants, Case No. 6:19-cv-01763-HMH (D.S.C., June 20, 2019) is
an action against the Defendants for failure to pay minimum wages,
overtime compensation, authorize and permit meal and rest periods,
provide accurate wage statements, and reimburse necessary business
expenses.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as delivery driver.

MAR Pizza, Inc., doing business as Domino's Pizza, provides
beverages. The Company offers pizza, garlic bread, coke, pasta, and
desserts. Domino's Pizza serves customers worldwide. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jacob J. Modla, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF JASON E. TAYLOR P.C.
          454 S. Anderson Rd., Suite 303
          Rock Hill, SC 29730
          Telephone: (803) 328-0898
          E-mail: jmodla@jasonetaylor.com

               - and -

          Jay Forester, Esq.
          FORESTER HAYNIE PLLC
          1701 N. Market Street, Suite 210
          Dallas, TX 75202
          Telephone: (214) 210-2100
          Facsimile: (214) 346-5909
          E-mail: jay@foresterhaynie.com


MARRIOTT EMPLOYEES: Payne Moves to Certify MEFCU Borrowers Class
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit titled KATHERINE PAYNE and ARTHUR
COATES, Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of other similarly
situated persons v. MARRIOTT EMPLOYEES FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, Case
No. 2:18-cv-04009-WB (E.D. Pa.), move for class certification under
Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The proposed class covers persons, who have not provided the
disclosures mandated by the Truth in Lending Act in connection with
"mini-loans" sold by the Defendant and is defined as follows:

     All persons in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania who (i)
     borrowed money from MEFCU in the one-year before the
     commencement of this action through its miniloan product and
     (ii) were given a Federal Truth in Lending Disclosure
     Statement which incorrectly set forth the APR to be charged
     on the loan or did not disclose that MEFCU would acquire a
     security interest in the person's other property.

The Plaintiffs contend that the proposed class meets all of the
requirements of Rule 23 necessary to certify classes that will
allow Pennsylvania citizens to recover the statutory damages
allowed by the Truth in Lending Act.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Robert P. Cocco, Esq.
          ROBERT P. COCCO, P.C.
          1500 Walnut St., Suite 900
          Philadelphia, PA 19102
          Telephone: (215) 351-0200
          E-mail: rcocco@rcn.com

               - and -

          Phillip R. Robinson, Esq.
          CONSUMER LAW CENTER LLC
          8737 Colesville Road, Suite 308
          Silver Spring, MD 20910
          Telephone: (301) 448-1304
          E-mail: phillip@marylandconsumer.com

               - and -

          Scott C. Borison, Esq.
          LEGG LAW FIRM, LLP
          1900 S. Norfolk St., Suite 350
          San Mateo, CA 94403
          Telephone: (301) 620-1016
          Facsimile: (301) 620-1018
          E-mail: borison@legglaw.com


MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL: Johnson Suit Asserts TCPA Breach
--------------------------------------------------------
ROBERT JOHNSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., SCOTT HAUSER
EVENTS, IVAN POLJAK, JAKE RESNICOW, AND SCOTT HAUSER, Defendants,
Case No. 0:19-cv-61564-XXXX (S.D. Fla., June 22, 2019) is a
putative class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

In efforts to drum-up business, Defendants would often send
marketing text messages providing different types of promotional
offers without first obtaining express written consent to send such
marketing text messages as required to do so under the TCPA, notes
the complaint. These messages were sent using mass-automated
technology through a third-party company hired by Defendants to
send marketing text messages on Defendants' behalf en masse.
Accordingly, Defendants knowingly and willfully violated the TCPA,
causing injuries to Plaintiff and members of the putative class,
including invasion of their privacy, aggravation, annoyance,
intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff is a natural person who was a resident of Broward County,
Florida.

Defendants own, operate, market and/or are involved in the
promotion of the Miami Beach EDITION Hotel, located at 2901 Collins
Ave, Miami Beach, FL 33140.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     JIBRAEL S. HINDI, ESQ.
     THOMAS J. PATTI, ESQ.
     The Law Offices of Jibrael S. Hindi
     110 SE 6th Street, Suite 1744
     Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
     Phone: 954-907-1136
     Fax: 855-529-9540
     Email: jibrael@jibraellaw.com
            tom@jibraellaw.com


MDL 2672: Castellucci's Bid to Remand Clean Diesel Suit Granted
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Carlos Castellucci's Motion to
Remand in the case captioned IN RE: VOLKSWAGEN "CLEAN DIESEL"
MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. This
Order Relates To: Castellucci, No. 3:18-cv-6149-CRB. MDL No. 2672
CRB (JSC). (N.D. Cal.).

In a pending motion, Mr. Castellucci argues that jurisdiction is
lacking and that the Court should remand his case to Virginia state
court.

Volkswagen Beetle driver Carlos Castellucci filed a clean diesel
related action against Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. (VWGoA) in
Virginia state court. VWGoA removed the case to Virginia federal
court based on federal-question jurisdiction, and the case was then
transferred to this Court as part of the above-captioned MDL.  

The complaint includes six claims, all under state law. VWGoA
argues that at least one of those claims, a Florida RICO claim,
will necessarily raise a federal issue because the RICO predicate
acts include federal wire fraud and conspiracy. If those were the
only predicate acts, VWGoA could be correct. But the complaint also
identifies alternative predicate acts, including violations of
Florida's false advertising and computer crime laws.

The Court will not consider VWGoA's argument that the RICO claim,
when based on the state law predicates, is not well pled.  VWGoA
has not convinced the Court that the RICO claim, when based on the
state law predicates, is frivolous.

VWGoA argues that whether Mr. Castellucci's car was street legal is
a different federal issue that will arise. As previously noted in
this MDL, the street legal issue will not necessarily need to be
resolved.  The "street legal" issue does not give rise to
federal-question jurisdiction.

It is a special and small category of cases that only raise
state-law claims but that support federal-question jurisdiction.
Mr. Castellucci's case does not come within that category. The
Court therefore GRANTS his motion to remand.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 1, 2019 Decision and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y5pjn9au from
Leagle.com.

Robert B. Carey -- rcarey@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice, Steve W. Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com --
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice & Thomas Eric Loeser
-- toml@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac
vice.

Nadine Bonda, Plaintiff, represented by Adam M. Stewart --
astewart@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP & Thomas G. Shapiro
-- tshapiro@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.
Brian Connelly, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas G. Shapiro ,
Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.

Nicholas Allen, Daniel Carroll, Giancarlo Ceci, Dominic Troffer,
Paul Linnee, Sarah Hayden, Dario Medina, Shanice Boyette, Isaac
Hoover, John Mazur & Forrest Tinsler, Plaintiffs, represented by
Caleb Marker -- caleb.marker@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman Reed LLP,
pro hac vice & Charles S. Zimmerman --
charles.zimmerman@zimmreed.com --  Zimmerman Reed, PLLP, pro hac
vice.

Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Amie Adelia Vague --
avague@lightfootlaw.com -- Lightfoot Franklin & White, Casey Erin
Lucier -- clucier@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, Charles J.
Baker, III -- cbaker@wcsr.com -- Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice,
Colin Hampton Tucker -- ctucker@rhodesokla.com -- Rhodes Hieronymus
Jones Tucker & Gable, Dana Woodrum Lang, Womble Carlyle Sandridge
and Rice, David M. Eisenberg -- eisenberg@bscr-law.com -- Baker,
Sterchi, Cowden & Rice, LLC, Henry Buist Smythe, Jr. --
hsmythe@wcsr.com -- Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, Howard
Feller -- hfeller@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, William R.
Scherer, Conrad and Scherer, LLP, 633 S Federal Hwy, Suite 800,
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301, J. Randolph Bibb, Jr. --
rbibb@lewisthomason.com -- Lewis, Thomason, King, Krieg & Waldrop,
P.C., James K. Toohey -- tooheyj@jbltd.com -- Johns & Bell LTD,
Jeffrey Lance Chase -- JChase@herzfeld-rubin.com --  Herzfeld &
Rubin PC.


MERCHANT EXCHANGE: Cal. App. Flips Demurrer in O'Grady Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, First District, Division Two,
issued an Opinion granting Defendant's Denmurrer in the case
captioned LAUREN O'GRADY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MERCHANT
EXCHANGE PRODUCTIONS, INC., Defendant and Respondent. No. A148513.
(Cal. App.).

The Plaintiffs appeals the District Court's judgment granting the
Defendant's general demurrer.   

Plaintiff Lauren O'Grady describes herself in her complaint as a
banquet server and bartender at the Julia Morgan Ballroom in San
Francisco that is owned and operated by defendant Merchant Exchange
Productions, Inc . Plaintiff brought this putative class action for
herself and on behalf of all others similarly situated, namely all
other non-managerial food and beverage banquet service employees
who have worked at the Julia Morgan Ballroom.

The issue presented here is whether the service charge may be a
gratuity that Labor Code section 3511 requires to go to the
non-managerial employees involved with the actual serving of the
food and beverages.

The Nature Of Gratuity Under Section 351

Gratuity is statutorily defined to include any tip, gratuity,
money, or part thereof that has been paid or given to or left for
an employee by a patron of a business over and above the actual
amount due the business for services rendered or for goods, food,
drink, or articles sold or served to the patron.

Section 351 provides: No employer or agent shall collect, take, or
receive any gratuity or a part thereof that is paid, given to, or
left for an employee by a patron, or deduct any amount from wages
due an employee on account of a gratuity, or require an employee to
credit the amount, or any part thereof, of a gratuity against and
as a part of the wages due the employee from the employer.

Every gratuity is hereby declared to be the sole property of the
employee or employees to whom it was paid, given, or left for. An
employer that permits patrons to pay gratuities by credit card
shall pay the employees the full amount of the gratuity that the
patron indicated on the credit card slip, without any deductions
for any credit card payment processing fees or costs that may be
charged to the employer by the credit card company. Payment of
gratuities made by patrons using credit cards shall be made to the
employees not later than the next regular payday following the date
the patron authorized the credit card payment.

The purpose of section 351 is to prevent employers from using any
gratuity-related practice which reduces an employee's wages, or
diverts monies belonging to employees, practices which are
condemned as a fraud upon the public.

The Indefinite Nature of A Service Charge

The terms tip, gratuity,service charge are commonly used as if they
are interchangeable synonyms.  

In the context of public utilities, a service charge is a fee
charged for commencing, maintaining, or discontinuing gas,
electricity, water, etc. In this context, the service charge would
appear to represent a labor cost.

California pays particular attention to use of service charges to
evade statutory commands or duties. For example, A lender is not
prohibited from charging an extra and reasonable amount for
incidental services, expenses or risk additional to the lawful
interest other than for the loan of money. He may make a reasonable
charge for investigating, arranging, negotiating, brokering,
making, servicing, collecting and enforcing his obligation, so long
as the service charge is not a subterfuge for evading usury
limits.

In short, simply calling something a service charge hardly ever
explains what it is or why it is being imposed.

Given that the context here also involves the provision of food and
drink, the restaurant tip pool decisions are an obvious point of
reference. At this point it is appropriate to consider the two
decisions deemed controlling by the trial court, both of which
involved tipping, compulsion, and service charges.

Searle And Garcia

In Searle, a San Diego hotel imposed a service charge of 17% to
every room service order. The bill presented with each room service
order set out the amount of the order itself; the 17% service
charge; a $3 room delivery charge, and a blank line for a tip or
gratuity. According to Searle, the hotel's room service billing
practice is deceptive because guests are not advised the service
charge is in fact a gratuity paid to the server. Searle also
contends the service charge is unfair because it compels guests to
pay a gratuity, which Searle believes should be entirely voluntary.
Thus Searle alleged the hotel's room service practices violate the
unfair competition law (UCL). Searle, supra, at pp. 1330-1331.)

Section 351 does not feature prominently in Searle. The Court of
Appeal concluded the hotel's billing practice was not an unfair
one: Other than Labor Code section 351, we are not aware of any
express regulation of tipping on room service billing. Because the
hotel's practice is alleged to cause servers to receive more in the
way of tips than would otherwise occur, it plainly does not violate
the spirit or letter of Labor Code section 351.

The court explained: Anyone who has debated with a small child
about the temptations presented by an in-room minibar stocked with
$3 candy bars and $2 sodas will recognize that a hotel has many
means of generating revenue from its guests. What a hotel does with
the revenue it earns from either the minibar, in-room movies or its
room service charges is of no direct concern to hotel guests. The
minibar patron, like the room service patron, is given both clear
notice the service being offered comes at a hefty premium and the
freedom to decline the service. Just as the hotel patron has no
legitimate interest in what the hotel does with the large premium
it earns from its minibar snacks, the patron has no legitimate
interest in what the hotel does with the service charge. The hotel
is free to retain for itself the large premium, as well as the
service charge, or to remit all or some of the revenue to its
employees. Because the service charge is mandatory and because the
hotel is free to do with the charge as it pleases, the service
charge is simply not a gratuity which is subject to the discretion
of the individual patron.

The plaintiffs in Garcia were service workers employed by hotels in
Los Angeles. A city ordinance in plain effect directed hotel
employers to treat mandatory service charges as owed to workers who
render the services for which the charges have been collected.

The Court of Appeal rejected the hotels' contention that the
ordinance was preempted by section 351:

The Labor Code mandates that all gratuities are employees'
property. A gratuity is any tip, gratuity, money, or part thereof
that has been paid or given to or left for an employee by a patron
of a business over and above the actual amount due the business for
services rendered or for goods, food, drink, or articles sold or
served to the patron. A gratuity is not a service charge. A service
charge is a separately designated amount collected by a hotel from
patrons that is part of the amount due the hotel for services
rendered, rather than something `over and above the amount due.
Thus, a service charge by definition is not a gratuity. The
Legislature has made clear that amounts due for services (which
include service charges) are not gratuities. This interpretation is
confirmed by a recent amendment to the definition of gratuity
carving out an exception for dancing services.  

Searle and Garcia do involve service charges imposed in the context
of selling food and drink to the public, charges that were intended
to function as gratuities. However, there are crucial
distinguishing features that prevent these decisions from being
controlling precedent.
In Searle, the bill presented to the room service customer clearly
differentiated between the service charge and the gratuity the
customer could choose to add. The service charge used by the
employer as the source of internally-assigned gratuities was not
disclosed to the customer. The purpose of section 351 being to
ensure that all of a tip goes to the employee, there was no problem
when the hotel's practice was alleged to cause servers to receive
more in the way of tips than the person ordering room service may
have intended: the practice did not violate the spirit or letter of
the statute.

Here, the plaintiff alleges that precisely the opposite is
occurring. The ordinance in Garcia clearly treated service charges
as gratuities and, like sections 350 and 351, mandated that they go
only to employees performing the service, not management. In Searle
the mandatory service charge was imposed by the employer.

In Garcia what the employer might call a service charge was
legislatively reclassified as a gratuity. The voluntary nature of a
gratuity discussed in Searle is thus incompatible with the actual
results in Searle and Garcia, namely, allowing a mandatory gratuity
to stand. In light of these differences, neither Searle nor Garcia
are controlling. Neither, or both together, should be read, as
defendant does, as categorially establishing that a service charge
even a mandatory one can never qualify as a gratuity.

Accordingly, the plaintiff's cause of action, for statutory
gratuity violation is not foreclosed by Searle and Garcia, as the
trial court believed, and is sufficient to survive a general
demurrer.

Accordingly, the Order Granting Defendant Merchant Exchange
Productions, Inc.'s Demurrer to Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint
is amended by adding a paragraph dismissing the complaint. As so
modified, the order/judgment is reversed. Plaintiff shall recover
her costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Cal. App.'s June 27, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yxsq7gvd from Leagle.com.


METROPOLITAN LIFE: Perry Alleges ERISA Violation
------------------------------------------------
SHARYEL PERRY, individually, and on behalf of and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-00106-CDL (M.D. Ga., July 2,
2019) is a class action complaint seeks legal and equitable damages
arising from and relating to Defendant's actions under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), fiduciary and
corresponding administration of group long-term disability
insurance policies.

ERISA plan fiduciaries have an obligation to administer welfare
benefit plans consistently, treating all plan participants and
beneficiaries in similar fashion. This fiduciary obligation extends
to the administration of ERISA group long-term disability ("LTD")
insurance benefits. Plaintiff and the putative class contend
Defendant failed to fulfill this fiduciary obligation.

While insured participants, Plaintiff and the putative class
applied for and were approved for the LTD insurance policy
benefits. The insurance policy provides that LTD insurance policy
benefits may be subject to reduction should a participant receive
"Other Income", including but not limited to Social Security
Disability. Upon a participant's receipt of "Other Income",
Defendant aggressively seeks to recover the alleged resulting
overpayment. Generally, Defendant convinces participants to sign
over their retroactive Social Security disability benefits to
satisfy the alleged overpayment. When this approach is
unsuccessful, Defendant employs self-help and withholds the
participant's monthly LTD benefits. In either scenario, Defendant
seeks to recover 100% of the alleged overpayment.

As an ERISA fiduciary, Defendant is required to maintain
"administrative processes and safeguards to ensure" that the LTD
plan provisions "have been applied consistently with respect to
similarly situated claimants." This fiduciary obligation
encompassed Defendant's administration of alleged LTD benefit
overpayments based on the receipt of "Other Income." Plaintiff and
the putative class have learned that Defendant's administrative
processes and safeguards for consistent administration include
standardized and national "policies and procedures concerning
overpayment claims" and "requests for waiver or forgiving any
overpayments" affecting all ERISA LTD plans insured by Defendant.
The Defendant has refused to provide Plaintiff and the putative
class with these same standardized and national ERISA
administrative processes and procedures -- depriving them of the
right to seek and to receive the same waiver and forgiveness of any
alleged overpayments. Having exhausted the ERISA administrative
process, Plaintiff and the putative class now seek all available
relief from this Court, including but not limited to receiving the
same requisite waiver and forgiveness of any alleged overpayments,
says the complaint.

Plaintiff and the putative class are (or were) participants under
LTD insurance policies issued by Defendant to ERISA plans.

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company is a corporation organized
under the laws of the State of New York and licensed as an insurer
in the State of Georgia.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Heather K. Karrh, Esq.
     Rogers, Hofrichter & Karrh, LLC
     225 S. Glynn Street, Suite A
     Fayetteville, GA 30214
     Phone: (770) 460-1118
     Email: hkarrh@rhkpc.com

          - and -

     Michael D. Grabhorn, Esq.
     Andrew M. Grabhorn, Esq.
     Grabhorn Law | Insured Rights
     2525 Nelson Miller Parkway, Suite 107
     Louisville, KY 40223
     Phone: (502) 244-9331
     Email: m.grabhorn@grabhornlaw.com
            a.grabhorn@grabhornlaw.com


MICHAEL A. DEMAYO: Hatch et al. Seek Class Certification
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit, JOHNATHAN HATCH, MARK DVORSKY and
SHATERIKA NICHOLSON, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. MICHAEL A. DEMAYO, individually, THE
LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL A. DEMAYO, P.C., LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL A.
DEMAYO, L.L.P., JASON E. TAYLOR, individually, LAW OFFICES OF JASON
E. TAYLOR, P.C., BENJAMIN T. COCHRAN, individually, HARDISON &
COCHRAN, PLLC, CARL B. NAGLE, individually, NAGLE & ASSOCIATES,
P.A., JOHN J. GELSHENEN, individually, DAVIS & GELSHENEN LLP, MARK
I. FARBMAN, individually, MARK FARBMAN, P.A., TED A. GREVE,
individually, TED A. GREVE & ASSOCIATES, P.A., CHRISTOPHER T. MAY,
individually and ESTWANIK AND MAY, P.L.L.C., the Defendants, Case
No.: 1:16 –cv-00925-LCB-LPA (MDNC), Johnathan Hatch and Mark
Dvorsky move the Court for an order under Rule 23(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure certifying this proceeding as a Rule
23(b)(2) and/or 23(b)(3) class action on behalf of a class
comprised of the Plaintiffs and all other persons similarly
situated.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          John F. Bloss, Esq.
          Frederick L. Berry, Esq.
          HIGGINS BENJAMIN, PLLC
          301 North Elm Street, Ste. 800
          Greensboro, NC 27401
          Telephone: 336-273-1600
          Facsimile: 336-274-4650
          E-mail: jbloss@greensborolaw.com
                  fberry@greensborolaw.com

               - and -

          Andrew H. Brown, Esq.
          James R. Faucher, Esq.
          BENSON, BROWN & FAUCHER PLLC
          822 N. Elm Street Suite 200
          Greensboro, NC 27401
          Telephone (336) 478-6000
          E-mail: drew@greensborolawcenter.com
                  jfaucher@bbflaw.com

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          Reid C. Adams, Jr., Esq.
          Jonathan R. Reich, Esq.
          WONBLE BOND DICKENSON
          Winston-Salem, NC
          Telephone: 336 721 3674
          E-mail: cal.adams@wbd-us.com
                  jonathan.reich@wbd-us.com

               - and -

          Bradley M. Risinger, Esq.
          Matthew Nis Leerberg, Esq.
          SMITH MOORE LEATHERWOOD LLP
          300 N. Greene St., Suite 1400
          Greensboro NC 27401-2171
          Telephone: 336.378.5200
          Facsimile: 336.378.5400
          E-mail: brad.risinger@smithmoorelaw.com
                  matt.leerberg@smithmoorelaw.com

               - and -

          C. Amanda Martin, Esq.
          STEVENS MARTIN VAUGHN & TADYCH PLLC
          Historic Pilot Mill
          1101 Haynes St.
          Building C, Suite 100
          Raleigh, NC 27604
          Telephone: (919) 582-2300
          Facsimile: (866) 593-7695
          E-mail: amartin@smvt.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Armstrongs Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
---------------------------------------------------------------
JACK ARMSTRONG AND JARETTA ARMSTRONG, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO
COMPANY, the Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-01826-JMB (E.D. Mo., June
25, 2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, as
a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Jack
Armstrong's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359

MONSANTO COMPANY: Ballantines Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
----------------------------------------------------------------
JERRY BALLANTINE AND DEBORAH BALLANTINE, the Plaintiffs, v.
MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-01825-SPM (E.D.
Mo., June 25, 2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the
Plaintiffs, as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's
negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the design,
development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing,
advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide
Roundup (TM), containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Jerry
Ballantine's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359

MONSANTO COMPANY: Bradley et al Suit Transferred to N.D. Cal.
-------------------------------------------------------------
The case, HARLEY R. BRADLEY and BETTY BRADLEY (h/w), LENA G.
BRADSHAW and ROBERT E. BRADSHAW (h/w), HUGH C. BROWN, MELANIE L.
CLAWSON-ROBERTS and JOHN E. ROBERTS (h/w), MARK CLINKER and B.
GAYLE CLINKER (h/w), MITCHELL B. COOPER and ADRIEN LAVOIE (h/h),
MIKE R. FROST, KENNETH W. JOHNSON and CHRISTINA JOHNSON (h/w),
RANDY E. MAY and DEANNA MAY (h/w), JAMES S. OLSEN and ROBIN OLSEN
(h/w), LILLIAN J. RADANOVICH and behalf of the estate of DANIEL
RADANOVICH, BARBARA SIPICH and DAVID SIPICH (h/w), RONALD W. STEEN
and JOAN STEEN (h/w), CARL B. TANNER and LILLIAN J. TANNER (h/w),
and GLENN YETTER and NICOLE YETTER (h/w), Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO
COMPANY, Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-00989-JMB (Filed on April 25,
2019), was transferred from the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri. The transfer is pursuant to the
Conditional Transfer Order (CTO-133) regarding MDL NO. 2741 IN RE:
ROUNDUP PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. Furthermore, this product
liability lawsuit is assigned to Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The
United States District Court for the Northern District of
California assigned Case No. 3:19-cv-03523-VC to the proceeding.

In this complaint, Plaintiffs seek redress for the damages they
suffered as a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligent
and wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup,
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

Monsanto Company is a Delaware corporation, Missouri Secretary of
State Charter No. F00488018, with a principal place of business in
St. Louis, Missouri. It is a multinational agricultural
biotechnology corporation that is regarded as the world's leading
producer of glyphosate. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Chris Schneiders, Esq.
     NAPOLI SHKOLNIK, PLLC
     6731 West 121st Street, Suite 201
     Overland Park, KS 66209
     Telephone: 212-397-1000

MONSANTO COMPANY: Bumpus Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
------------------------------------------------------------
ESTATE OF BOBBY C. BUMPUS, by and through Peggy Bumpus, as
Executrix, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendants, Case
No. 1:19-cv-00087-GNS (W.D. Ky., July 2, 2019), seeks to recover
damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result
of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection
with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging,
promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or
sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active
ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Mr. Bumpus's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jennifer A. Moore, Esq.
          Ashton Rose Smith, Esq.
          MOORE LAW GROUP, PLLC
          1473 South 4 th Street
          Louisville, KY 40208
          Telephone: (502) 717-4080
          Facsimile: (502) 717-4086
          E-mail: jennifer@moorelawgroup.com
                  ashton@moorelawgroup.com

MUREX PROPERTIES: Schalamar Complaint Dismissed Without Prejudice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. James S. Moody, Jr., grants the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss the lawsuit styled SCHALAMAR CREEK MOBILE HOMEOWNER'S
ASSOCIATION, INC. v. STEVEN ADLER, LORRAINE DEMARCO, R. SCOTT
PROVOST, CHARLES CROOK, MARTI NEWKIRK, MUREX PROPERTIES, L.L.C.,
THE NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, RANDALL KNAPP,
JULIE JENNINGS, J & J SANITATION SERVICES, INC., OSPREY LINKS, LLC,
SCHALAMAR GP, INC, RICHARD LEE, DAVID EASTMAN, LUTZ, BOBO &
TELFAIR, P.A. and FLORIDA MANUFACTURED HOUSING ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Case No. 8:19-cv-00291-JSM-AEP (M.D. Fla.).

Judge Moody also ruled that:

   1. Defendant Florida Manufactured Housing Association Inc.'s
      Motion to Dismiss is granted;

   2. Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed, without prejudice;

   3. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within twenty-one
      (21) days from the date of this order.  Failure to file an
      amended complaint may result in dismissal of Plaintiff's
      case;

   4. Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Notice of
      Supplemental Authority is denied; and

   5. Plaintiff's Motion to Certify Class is denied without
      prejudice.

Plaintiff Schalamar Creek Mobile Home Association, Inc. is a mobile
homeowners association suing on behalf of a class of 1,000 elderly
current and former mobile home owners in Shalamar Creek Golf Mobile
Home Park.  According to the Plaintiff, a number of individuals and
entities fraudulently induced the Park's mobile home owners to sign
a new prospectus which altered their lot rents and their resale
rights, among other things.

As it stands, the Plaintiff's entire Complaint is due to be
dismissed.  Judge Moody opined that the Plaintiff failed to state a
claim for its causes of actions, and as alleged, the Plaintiff
lacks standing to bring many of its claims.

Though there are other reasons supporting dismissal, the Court also
notes that the Plaintiff's Complaint falls short of a "short and
plain statement."  The 95-page Complaint contains a table of
contents, lengthy text summarizing statutes not directly relevant
to the Plaintiff's causes of actions, and anecdotal scenarios of
Park homeowners.  None of these are appropriate for a Complaint,
Judge Moody noted.

The Court will allow Plaintiff to file an amended complaint to cure
the deficiencies described in this Order to the extent Plaintiff is
able to do so.[CC]


NATIONAL GENERAL: Hobbs Sues Over Prerecorded Telemarketing Call
----------------------------------------------------------------
KEITH HOBBS, a Georgia resident, individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly-situated persons, Plaintiff,
v. NATIONAL GENERAL HOLDINGS CORP., DIRECT GENERAL CORPORATION dba
DIRECT AUTO & LIFE INSURANCE, and LOWER INSURANCE RATES,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05849 (S.D. N.Y., June 21, 2019) is an
action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Defendants made at least one automated and prerecorded
telemarketing call to Plaintiff using equipment prohibited by the
TCPA, even though Plaintiff did not give prior express written
consent to receive an autodialed prerecorded phone call on his
cellular phone from any of the Defendants. This case challenges
Defendants' practice of initiating autodialed and artificial voice
telemarketing calls to cellular telephones without the prior
express written consent of the called parties as required by the
TCPA, says the complaint.

Plaintiff, Keith Hobbs, is an individual and a citizen of Columbus,
Georgia.

National General Holdings Corp. is a Delaware corporation and an
insurance holding company headquartered at 59 Maiden Lane 38th
Floor, New York, NY.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jonathan B. Piper, Esq.
     Tod A. Lewis, Esq.
     Mara A. Baltabols, Esq.
     BOCK, HATCH, LEWIS & OPPENHEIM, LLC
     134 N. La Salle St., Ste. 1000
     Chicago, IL 60602
     Phone: (312) 658-5500
     Fax: (312) 658-5555
     Email: service@classlawyers.com


NBTY INC: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in Alvarez Consumer Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Rosa Alvarez filed an appeal from the District Court's
order denying class certification in the lawsuit styled ROSA
ALVAREZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. NBTY, INC. and NATURE'S BOUNTY, INC., Case No.
3:17-cv-00567-BAS-BGS, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California, San Diego.

The appellate case is captioned as Rosa Alvarez, et al. v. NBTY,
Inc., et al., Case No. 19-80071, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The Plaintiff wants the Ninth Circuit to determine whether the (i)
District Court committed manifest error in denying class
certification, and (ii) District Court's denial of class
certification constitutes a death knell such that the Ninth Circuit
should review the decision.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Plaintiffs
Rosa Alvarez and Colleen Lesher are individual consumers who
purchased biotin vitamin supplements ("Biotin Product") distributed
by the Defendants, nutritional supplement manufacturing companies.
They allege that the representations on the Products' labels, which
state that these products support healthy hair, skin, and nails and
energy, constitute false advertising and violate California and
Illinois consumer protection laws.

Specifically, their First Amended Complaint ("FAC") alleges
violations of the California's Unfair Competition Law, Business &
Professions Code Sections 17200 ("UCL"); the Consumer Legal
Remedies Act ("CLRA"); and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Business
Practices Act ("ICFA").[BN]

Plaintiff-Petitioner ROSA ALVAREZ, On Behalf of Herself and All
Others Similarly Situated, is represented by:

          Manfred P. Muecke, Esq.
          Patricia N. Syverson, Esq.
          BONNETT FAIRBOURN FRIEDMAN & BALINT PC
          600 West Broadway, Suite 900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 756-6978
          E-mail: mmuecke@bffb.com
                  psyverson@bffb.com

               - and -

          Elaine A. Ryan, Esq.
          Carrie A. Laliberte, Esq.
          BONNETT FAIRBOURN FRIEDMAN & BALINT, PC
          2325 E. Camelback Road, Suite 300
          Phoenix, AZ 85016
          Telephone: (602) 274-1100
          E-mail: eryan@bffb.com
                  claliberte@bffb.com

               - and -

          Stewart M. Weltman, Esq.
          Michael Chang, Esq.
          SIPRUT, PC
          17 North State Street, Suite 1600
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 236-0000
          E-mail: sweltman@siprut.com
                  mchang@siprut.com

Defendants-Respondents NBTY, INC., a Delaware corporation, and
NATURE'S BOUNTY, INC., a Delaware corporation, are represented by:

          Amanda L. Groves, Esq.
          WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
          300 South Tryon Street, 16th Floor
          Charlotte, NC 28202
          Telephone: (704) 350-7745
          E-mail: agroves@winston.com

               - and -

          Shawn R. Obi, Esq.
          WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
          333 South Grand Avenue
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-1543
          Telephone: (213) 615-1700
          Facsimile: (213) 615-1750
          E-mail: sobi@winston.com


NEW ENGLAND COFFEE: Certification of Class Sought in Fahey Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Kevin Fahey moves for class certification under Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the lawsuit styled Kevin
Fahey, et al. v. New England Coffee, et al., Case No.
1:19-cv-00950-RDM (D.D.C.).[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Thomas C. Willcox, Esq.
          1701 16th Street, NW, No. 211
          Washington, DC
          Telephone: (202) 338-0818
          E-mail: Tcw19law@gmail.com


NEW YORK: 2nd Cir. Appeal v. Delancer Initiated in Gulino Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
issued on April 24, 2019, in the lawsuit styled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 14,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1505, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Ramon Delancer is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: 2nd Cir. Appeal v. Gonzalez Commenced in Gulino Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
issued on April 25, 2019, in the lawsuit styled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 14,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1512, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Esther Gonzalez is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: 2nd Cir. Appeal v. Marcus Filed in Gulino Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit
styled Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al., Case No.
96-cv-8414, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York (New York City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 14,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1536, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Kim Marcus is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: 2nd Cir. Appeal v. Noble Filed in Gulino Racial Bias Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on April 25, 2019, in the lawsuit titled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 14,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1518, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Christine Noble is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: 2nd Cir. Appeal v. Rivera Commenced in Gulino Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
issued on April 24, 2019, in the lawsuit styled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 14,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1515, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Jenny Rivera is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: 2nd Circuit Appeal v. Desire Commenced in Gulino Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
issued on April 25, 2019, in the lawsuit titled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 14,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1489, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Florence Desire is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: 2nd Circuit Appeal v. McCaskill Filed in Gulino Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit
titled Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al., Case No.
96-cv-8414, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York (New York City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 14,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1539, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Sabrina Cynthia McCaskill is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: 2nd Circuit Appeal v. Paulino Initiated in Gulino Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
issued on April 25, 2019, in the lawsuit entitled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 14,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1501, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Rosa Paulino is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Board of Educ. Files Appeal v. Davis in Gulino Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on May 30, 2019, in the lawsuit titled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 24,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1930, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Diana Elizabeth Davis is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Educ. Board Appeals Judgment for Brito in Gulino Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
issued on April 25, 2019, in the lawsuit styled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 14,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1495, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Marlene Romero Brito is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Educ. Board Appeals Judgment v. Morrison in Gulino Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
issued on April 24, 2019, in the lawsuit titled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 14,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1516, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Noel Morrison is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Educ. Board Appeals Judgment v. Russell in Gulino Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
issued on April 24, 2019, in the lawsuit entitled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 14,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1517, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Michelle Russell is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Educ. Board Appeals Judgment v. Sena in Gulino Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
issued on April 24, 2019, in the lawsuit styled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 14,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1593, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Dierde Sena is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Educ. Board Appeals Order v. Purdue in Gulino Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit
styled Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al., Case No.
96-cv-8414, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York (New York City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 14,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1548, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Eunice Purdue is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Educ. Board Appeals Ruling v. Mills in Gulino Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit
entitled Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al., Case No.
96-cv-8414, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York (New York City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 14,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1541, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Denise Yvonne Mills is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Second Cir. Appeal v. Bouzaglou Filed in Gulino Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on April 24, 2019, in the lawsuit titled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 14,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1507, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Lamina Bouzaglou is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Second Circuit Appeal v. Anderson Filed in Gulino Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
issued on April 24, 2019, in the lawsuit titled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 14,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1503, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Elmer Anderson is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW-TECHNOLOGY PEST: StarNet Files Suit in South Carolina
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against New-Technology Pest
Management Inc. et al. The case is styled as StarNet Insurance
Company, Plaintiff v. New-Technology Pest Management Inc. Daniel's
Landing Homeowners' Association, Hayden Jennings, Albert Bione
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-01803-DCN (D. S.C., June 25, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Insurance.

New Tech Pest was established in 1980 and is a family owned
business offering service residential, commercial and industrial
accounts. It is the Billerica's oldest family owned pest control
company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Shelley S Montague, Esq.
     Gallivan White and Boyd
     PO Box 7368
     1201 Main Street, Suite 1200
     Columbia, SC 29202
     Phone: (803) 779-1833
     Email: smontague@GWBlawfirm.com


NIO INC: Gorjizadeh Calls IPO Documents "Misleading"
----------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against NIO Inc., certain
of its executive officers, directors, controlling shareholders, and
its underwriters and underwriter representatives for the September
12, 2018 initial public offering (IPO) for alleged violations of
the Securities Act of 1933. The case is captioned NIMA GORJIZADEH,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff, vs. NIO INC., BIN LI, LOUIS T. HSIEH, LIHONG QIN,
PADMASREE WARRIOR, TIAN CHENG, XIANG LI, LIANG LI, HAI WU, YAQIN
ZHANG, XIANGPING ZHONG, ZHAOHUI LI, DENNY TING BUN LEE, JAMES
GORDON MITCHELL, MORGAN STANLEY & CO. LLC, GOLDMAN SACHS (ASIA)
L.L.C., J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES LLC, MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER &
SMITH INCORPORATED, DEUTSCHE BANK SECURITIES INC., CITIGROUP GLOBAL
MARKETS INC., CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (USA) LLC and UBS SECURITIES
LLC, Defendants, Case No. 653610/2019 (N.Y. Sup., June 20, 2019).

Plaintiff Nima Gorjizadeh brings this class action behalf of all
persons or entities who purchased NIO American Depositary Shares
ADS) in or traceable to the company's September 12, 2018 IPO
seeking to pursue remedies under the Securities Act of 1933.
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants negligently prepared the
Registration Statement for the IPO by inserting untrue and
misleading statements and by failing to make adequate disclosures
required under the rules and regulations governing the preparation
of such documents. Among other things, Plaintiff alleges that the
Registration Statement failed to disclose that the ES8 was
suffering from quality-control defects in the production and design
of the vehicles, including operating system malfunctions and
driving ranges that were up to 30% lower than those advertised.

NIO is an electric vehicle company based in Shanghai, China. It
conducted the IPO in New York and the ADSs sold in the IPO trade on
the NYSE under the ticker symbol NIO. Bin Li, NIO's co-founder, was
NIO's CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors at the time of the
IPO. He is often portrayed in media as the "Elon Musk of China" for
his role in developing the premium electric car industry in that
country. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     W. Scott Holeman, Esq.
     JOHNSON FISTEL, LLP
     99 Madison Avenue, 5th Floor
     New York, NY 10016
     Telephone: (212) 802-1486
     Facsimile: (212) 602-1592
     E-mail: scotth@johnsonfistel.com

NOLAN TRANS: Mitchell et al. Seek OT Pay for Low-Level Staff
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Nolan
Transportation Group, LLC for alleged violations of the Federal
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the Michigan Workforce
Opportunity Wage Act (MWOWA). The case is captioned BRYSON
MITCHELL, ROBERT RAGANS, TYLER WINTERS, and KIRK HEILMAN,
Individually and on Behalf of All Similarly Situated Employees
Plaintiffs, vs. NOLAN TRANSPORTATION GROUP, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-02812-AT (N.D. Ga., June 19, 2019).

Plaintiffs were among Nolan's low-level employees. They were all
employed as account managers, tracking specialists and operations
coordinators. Although their tasks were clerical in nature, Nolan
allegedly refused to pay Plaintiffs and its other lower-level,
employees overtime wages. Defendant's account managers, tracking
specialists and operations coordinators failed to receive time and
a half their regular rate of pay for all hours worked over 40 in a
workweek. In their complaint, Plaintiffs assert that the duties
assigned to them did not satisfy the duties tests contained within
the exemptions specified in the FLSA or MWOWA. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs seek to recover unpaid wages, liquidated damages,
interest, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs under Section 16(b)
of the FLSA and under the MWOWA.

Headquartered in Roswell, Georgia, Nolan Transportation Group, LLC
is a third-party logistics and freight brokerage company that
operates nationwide. The company's business centers on connecting
its clients with independent trucking companies who are able to
transport their products. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Mitchell D. Benjamin, Esq.
     Matthew W. Herrington, Esq.
     DELONG, CALDWELL, BRIDGERS, FITZPATRICK & BENJAMIN, LLC
     3100 Centennial Tower
     101 Marietta Street
     Atlanta, GA 30303
     Telephone: (404) 979-3150
     Facsimile: (404) 979-3170
     E-mail: benjamin@dcbflegal.com
             matthew.herrington@dcbflegal.com

             - and -

     Benjamin L. Davis, III, Esq.
     Michael A. Brown, Esq.
     THE LAW OFFICES OF PETER T. NICHOLL
     36 South Charles Street, Suite 1700
     Baltimore, MD 21201
     Telephone: (410) 244-7005
     E-mail: bdavis@nicholllaw.com
             mbrown@nicholllaw.com


NUTANIX INC: Court Continues Case Management Conference in Scheller
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Francisco Division, issued an Order continuing Case
Management Conference in the case captioned RYAN SCHELLER,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff, v. NUTANIX, INC., DHEERAJ PANDEY, and DUSTON M.
WILLIAMS, Defendants. Case No. 3:19-cv-01651-WHO (N.D. Calif.).

Plaintiff Ryan Scheller, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, filed a Class Action Complaint for Violations
of the Federal Securities Laws against Nutanix, Inc. (Nutanix) and
certain of its current executives, Dheeraj Pandey and Duston M.
Williams (Defendants).

Plaintiff Ryan Scheller and Defendants filed a stipulation and
proposed order agreeing to defer setting a schedule for the filing
of an amended complaint or designation of an operative complaint
and a briefing schedule for Defendants' anticipated motion(s) to
dismiss until after a lead plaintiff was appointed. The Court
ordered lead plaintiff and Defendants to submit a joint stipulation
with a proposed schedule no later than ten (10) business days
following the appointment of lead plaintiff.

The initial case management conference was re-set to July 10, 2019,
the same date as the motions to consolidate, appoint lead plaintiff
and approval of lead plaintiff's selection of counsel  Both the
case management conference and the hearing on the motions are set
for 9:00 a.m. and Counsel for Plaintiff Ryan Scheller and counsel
for Defendants agree that efficiency dictates that the initial case
management conference and dates related to it should be deferred
until after the cases are consolidated and a lead plaintiff and
lead counsel are appointed.

The initial case management conference currently set for July 10,
2019 at 9:00 a.m. is continued to a date after the cases are
consolidated and a lead plaintiff is appointed pursuant to 15
U.S.C. Section 78u-4(a)(3)(B).

The court-appointed lead plaintiff and Defendants will meet and
confer about (a) the timing of the initial case management
conference; (b) the schedule for filing a consolidated complaint or
designating an operative complaint; and (c) the briefing schedule
for Defendants' anticipated motion(s) to dismiss.

The parties' joint stipulation with a proposed schedule that will
be filed no later than ten (10) business days following the
appointment of lead plaintiff, in accordance with the Court's prior
order dated May 31, 2019 will also address the timing of the
initial case management conference.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 27, 2019 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y4qjob5x from
Leagle.com.

Ryan Scheller, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Nicole Catherine Lavallee --
nlavallee@bermantabacco.com -- Berman Tabacco & Aidan Chowning
Poppler -- cpoppler@bermantabacco.com -- Berman Tabacco.

Bristol County Retirement System & Joseph S. Maroun, Plaintiffs,
represented by Francis P. McConville -- fmcconville@labaton.com --
Labaton Sucharow LLP, pro hac vice & James Matthew Wagstaffe --
wagstaffe@wvbrlaw.com -- Wagstaffe, von Loewenfeldt, Busch &
Radwick LLP.

Nutanix, Inc., Dheeraj Pandey & Duston M. Williams, Defendants,
represented by Ignacio Evaristo Salceda -- ISalceda@wsgr.com --
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati A Professional Corporation & Boris
Feldman -- boris.feldman@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich &
Rosati Professional Corporation.

David Panczner, Movant, represented by Lesley F. Portnoy --
lportnoy@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP.

City of Birmingham Relief and Retirement System, Movant,
represented by John T. Jasnoch -- jjasnoch@scott-scott.com --
ScottScott Attorneys at Law LLP.


OMNI HOTELS: Court Denies Class Certification in Lindsley Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, Dallas Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the captioned
SARAH LINDSLEY, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. OMNI HOTELS MANAGEMENT CORP. and TRT
HOLDINGS, INC., Defendants. Civil Action No. 3:17-CV-2942-B. (N.D.
Tex.).

Plaintiff Sarah Lindsley on behalf of herself and other women
employed by Defendants Omni Hotels Management Corp. (Omni) and TRT
Holdings, Inc. (TRT)1 filed suit against Defendants alleging that
they discriminated against her and other women in pay and promotion
decisions during the course of their employment.

As the party seeking certification, Lindsley bears the burden of
meeting Rule 23's requirements. Because the Court finds that
Lindsley has not satisfied either Rule 23(a)(2)'s commonality
requirement or Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement, the Court
denies Lindsley's motion.

Commonality Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2)

Lindsley asserts that the commonality requirement for all four of
her proposed classes is met because: (1) the two Pay Plaintiff
classes were subjected to a pattern and practice of employment
discrimination by being paid less than their similarly situated
male coworkers on the basis of their sex (2) the two Promotion
Plaintiff classes were deprived of promotional opportunities that
similarly situated male coworkers were provided on the basis of
their sex; and (3) all four proposed classes suffered from sex
discrimination because of the same corporate policy of maintaining
a boys' club, which perpetuated pay and promotional disparities
from the highest level.  

Lindsley further argues that all proposed class members have in
common the same corporate HR department that implemented the
discriminatory polices and the same VP of Food and Beverage, David
Morgan.  

The Defendants respond that Lindsley has not satisfied commonality
as the Supreme Court has required in an employment-discrimination
case like this one. Specifically, the Defendants argue that
Lindsley has produced no evidence showing: (1) that the Defendants
used some companywide testing procedure or other evaluation method
that can be charged with bias or (2) that Defendants operated under
a general policy of discrimination.

To start, the Court notes that the parties strenuously debate
whether Lindsley's class allegations are foreclosed by Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011), so the Court takes a
brief detour to discuss that case and determine its applicability
here. In Dukes, 564 U.S. at 342, the Supreme Court considered Rule
23 certification of one of the most expansive class actions ever.
The district court in that case certified a class of about 1.5
million current and former female employees of Wal-Mart, who
alleged they were discriminated against in pay and promotion
decisions because of their sex.  

Similar to this case, the Dukes plaintiffs alleged that the
discrimination to which they have been subjected is common to all
Wal-Mart's female employees because of a strong and uniform
corporate culture of gender bias. While no express corporate policy
of discrimination was alleged, the plaintiffs claimed that their
local managers' discretion over pay and promotion decisions was
exercised disproportionately in favor of men, leading to an
unlawful disparate impact on female employees under Title VII.
Wal-Mart's awareness of this effect and refusal to rectify it, the
plaintiffs argued, was evidence of disparate treatment. The Supreme
Court had to decide whether the certification of the plaintiff
class was consistent with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a)
and (b)(2).

With respect to Rule 23(a), the Court stated that the crux of this
case is commonality the rule requiring a plaintiff to show that
`there are questions of law or fact common to the class. The Court
went on: Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
class members have suffered the same injury. This means, the Court
explained, that the common contention must be of such a nature that
it is capable of classwide resolution which means that
determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is
central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.

In analyzing commonality in the context of an
employment-discrimination case, the Court applied the framework
from one of its earlier cases in this area, General Telephone Co.
of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982). In Falcon, the Court
reversed the certification of a class of employees who claimed
racial discrimination in promotion practices because the district
court erred in finding that the commonality and typicality
requirements had been met.
In its holding, the Court explained: "Conceptually, there is a wide
gap between (a) an individual's claim that he has been denied a
promotion or higher pay on discriminatory grounds and his otherwise
unsupported allegation that the company has a policy of
discrimination and (b) the existence of a class of persons who have
suffered the same injury as that individual, such that the
individual's claim and the class claim will share common questions
of law or fact and that the individual's claim will be typical of
the class claims."

The Falcon Court provided two ways in which this
commonality/typicality gap might be bridged: (1) if applicants or
employees were prejudiced by an employer's biased testing procedure
or (2) if there is significant proof that an employer had a general
policy of discrimination that manifested itself in hiring and
promotion practices in the same general fashion, such as through
entirely subjective decisionmaking processes.

Applying these principles, the Dukes Court determined that only the
second method of bridging the gap was relevant because Wal-Mart had
no testing procedure or other companywide evaluation method. As for
the second method—significant proof of a general policy of
discrimination the Court held that was entirely absent from the
case. The plaintiffs' only evidence of a general policy of
discrimination was testimony from their sociological expert, who
testified that Wal-Mart's corporate culture made it vulnerable to
gender bias.  

However, the Supreme Court held this testimony does nothing to
advance the plaintiffs' case because the expert could not testify
with any certainty as to the percentage of employment decisions
that were affected by gender bias at Wal-Mart. The Court went on to
explain how Wal-Mart's policy of allowing local supervisors to have
discretion over employment matters was not a general policy of
discrimination. While one lower-level supervisor's discretion may
form the basis of a Title VII claim for some employees in the
company, its mere existence does not lead to the conclusion that
every employee in a company using a system of discretion has such a
claim in common.

The Court reasoned that demonstrating the invalidity of one
manager's use of discretion will do nothing to demonstrate the
invalidity of another's.

The Court also discounted the plaintiffs' statistical evidence of
regional and national data that revealed statistically significant
disparities between men and women at Wal-Mart. The Court held that
a regional pay disparity was not sufficient to establish a uniform
theory of disparity across every Wal-Mart store, and thus the
plaintiffs' theory of commonality failed. Further, and more
relevant to this case, the Court held that without identifying a
specific employment practice, just showing a sex-based disparity in
pay or promotions based on a policy of discretion is not enough to
certify a class.  

Finally, with respect to the plaintiffs' anecdotal evidence of
discrimination, 120 affidavits detailing their experiences of
discrimination the Court held that this was "too weak to raise any
inference that all the individual, discretionary personnel
decisions are discriminatory. The Court noted that these 120
affidavits accounted for only about 1 in every 12,500 class
members. The Court continued: even if every single one of these
accounts is true, that would not demonstrate that the entire
company operates under a general policy of discrimination, which is
what plaintiffs must show to certify a companywide class.

Lindsley argues that Defendants' employment decisions are glued
together in three ways. First, every proposed class member is or
was subject to the same corporate HR department.  Second, every
proposed class member has or had David Morgan as their VP of Food
and Beverage. Id. And third, every proposed class member is or was
the victim of the same boys' club corporate culture.  

First, Defendants' corporate HR department Lindsley argues that
every class member was subject to the same compensation and salary
guidelines. Omni's compensation and promotion guidelines are
discussed at length above. Salary ranges were set according to a
uniform corporate policy.

Employees were evaluated based on a form designed and distributed
by corporate. Further, the corporate HR department was, in some
way, involved in deciding promotions for director-level positions
in the Food and Beverage Department. It was also involved in
compensation decisions. Finally, Lindsley argues that corporate HR
had a dotted line connection with the HR leaders at each individual
Omni property.

The Defendants dispute Lindsley's argument that this evidence is
significant proof of a general policy of discrimination. They first
note that Omni has an express policy that prohibits gender
discrimination. The official policy states that Omni prohibits
unwelcome or offensive conduct of a discriminatory nature that
affects an individual's employment opportunities or that creates an
intimidating or hostile work environment. Defendants note that Omni
encourages employees with discrimination or harassment complaints
to come forward so that Omni's HR department can investigate these
complaints.  

The Court finds that Defendants have the better side of this
argument. The first concern the Court has is that Lindsley's
proposed classes do not differentiate between the various levels of
supervisory employees at Omni. Approval for compensation and
promotion decisions varies greatly based on the specific
supervisory or managerial role.  So, each compensation or promotion
decision for the purported class members would involve different
inputs and approvals depending on the role. The fact that most
employment decisions for lower-level supervisory positions are made
by the employee's respective hotel and at the discretion of that
hotel's general manager militates against finding that a general
policy of discrimination pervaded these decisions.

In sum, like in Dukes, because Lindsley has failed to provide
convincing proof of a companywide discriminatory pay and promotion
policy, this Court finds that she has not established the existence
of any common question as Rule 23(a) requires.

Predominance Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)

While the Court has already decided that Lindsley's classes should
not be certified for failing to meet the commonality requirement,
the Court also finds that Lindsley necessarily fails to meet the
predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).

Rule 23(b)(3) allows a class action to be maintained if the court
finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.  

However, even if the Court had found that Lindsley had sufficiently
proved commonality, the Court would not hold that common issues
predominate. As stated above, predominance is far more strict than
commonality; it requires not just that common issues exist, but
that they predominate over individual ones. Thus, the predominance
inquiry requires courts to carefully scrutinize the relationship
between common questions and individual questions.

With respect to her two Pay Classes, Lindsley argues that the
common question of whether Defendants implemented a discriminatory
policy of paying female supervisory employees less than similarly
situated males predominates over all individualized questions. She
makes the same argument for the Promotion Classes, only
substituting promotional opportunities for pay. Id. The only
evidence she cites in support of these two arguments is the
statistical evidence discussed above. Defendants, relying on
Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998),
respond that the question of whether any class member was subject
to pay or promotional discrimination would necessarily have to be
answered by examining each member's individual situation.

The Court finds that Lindsley has failed to show that common issues
will predominate over individual ones. Lindsley relies on evidence
of her own individual experience and unverified statistical
evidence, and argues that this evidence points towards company-wide
de facto policies of the Food & Beverage department that
discriminate against women in pay and promotion as the predominant
liability issues in the case.

To conclude, the Court holds that individual issues predominate, by
far, over common issues of the proposed class members in this case.
Lindsley has therefore not met Rule 23(b)(3) predominance
requirements.

Accordingly, the Court denies Lindsley's motion.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 1, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y36r2np3 from
Leagle.com.

Sarah Lindsley, Plaintiff, represented by Jay D. Ellwanger,
Ellwanger Law LLLP, Holt Major Lackey, Ellwanger Law LLLP, 400
South Zang Boulevard, Suite 1015, Dallas, Texas 75208, James
Vagnini -- jvagnini@vkvlawyers.com -- Valli Kane & Vagnini LLP &
Monica Hincken -- mhincken@vkvlawyers.com -- Valli Kane & Vagnini
LLP.

TRT Holdings Inc & Omni Hotels Management Corporation, Defendants,
represented by Marc D. Katz -- marc.katz@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper
LLP, Britney J.P. Prince -- britney.prince@dlapiper.com -- DLA
Piper LLP, Micala Rae Bernardo -- micala.bernardo@dlapiper.com --
DLA Piper LLP &R. Clay Hoblit, Hoblit Darling Ralls Hernandez &
Hudlow LLP, 2000 Frost Bank Plaza, 802 North Carancahua, Corpus
Christi, TX 78470.


PACIFIC FERTILITY: Court Refuses to Stay Litigation Pending Appeal
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order denying Defendants' Motion to Stay in
the case captioned IN RE PACIFIC FERTILITY CENTER LITIGATION. Case
No.18-cv-01586-JSC. (N.D. Cal.).

Pacific Fertility markets and sells egg and embryo cryopreservation
services. First Amended Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint
(FAC). Cryopreservation involves preservation of tissue using
cooling techniques. Plaintiffs engaged Pacific Fertility's services
to cryopreserve their eggs and embryos between 2010 and 2016, and
in doing so, signed Informed Consent Agreements containing
arbitration clauses.  In 2017, unbeknownst to Plaintiffs, Prelude
took over operation of Pacific Fertility's egg and embryo storage
facilities through its operating subsidiary Pacific MSO.

Prelude operates a national network of egg and embryo long-term
freezer storage facilities.  On March 4, 2018, Prelude discovered
that the liquid nitrogen levels in a tank known as Tank 4 had
dropped to an unsafe level for an undetermined period of time,
destroying or jeopardizing the eggs and embryos stored in the tank,
including those belonging to Plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs filed this putative class action, which was later
consolidated with two other actions pending in the Northern
District of California: Bauer, et al. v. Pacific Fertility Center,
et al., No. 3:18-cv-01634  and A.B., et al. v. Pacific Fertility
Center, et al., No. 3:18-cv-02298. These actions are now known as
the In re: Pacific Fertility Litigation.

The Court issued its Order granting Pacific Fertility's motion to
compel arbitration, but denying Prelude, Pacific Fertility MSO, and
Chart's joinders, as well as their motions to stay proceedings
pending arbitration of the claims against Pacific Fertility. The
Court also lifted the stay of discovery and is presently actively
engaged in overseeing discovery.

Prelude and Chart advance similar arguments in favor of a stay.
Both insist that their appeals raise serious legal issues and that
they would face irreparable harm if proceedings were to continue in
this Court while their appeals are heard.

Serious Legal Issues/Substantial Case on the Merits

The Defendants here do not argue a likelihood of success on the
merits and instead focus on whether their appeals present a
substantial case on the merits or raise serious legal issues.
Neither Prelude nor Chart argue that their appeals present an issue
of first impression, a constitutional question, or seek to resolve
a split of authority. Instead, they both dispute the Court's
application of well-settled California and Ninth Circuit law to the
facts of this case. In particular, both Prelude and Chart insist
that the Court erred in finding that they were not entitled to
enforce the arbitration agreements Plaintiff signed with Pacific
Fertility under a theory of equitable estoppel.  

The Defendants' rehash of arguments the Court previously considered
and rejected at length fails to raise a serious legal question;
otherwise, every time a party disagreed with a court's ruling, a
serious question would exist.  

Accordingly, neither Prelude nor Chart have shown that their
appeals raise a substantial case on the merits or a serious legal
issue. The first Nken, Nken, 556 U.S. at 435,  factor thus weighs
against a stay.

Irreparable Harm and Balance of Hardships

The moving party's burden with regard to irreparable harm is higher
than it is on the likelihood of success prong, as she must show
that an irreparable injury is the more probable or likely outcome.


As the Supreme Court has explained, the key word in this
consideration is irreparable. Mere injuries, however substantial,
in terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in the
absence of a stay, are not enough.

Here, Prelude and Chart insist that they will be irreparably harmed
if proceedings continue while their appeals are heard. Prelude
argues that if a stay is denied they will irrevocably lose the
chance to reap the advantages of arbitration and Chart insists that
the potential advantages of arbitration will be lost should
litigation continue pending appeal.

In making this argument, they rely on cases in which the appealing
party had an arbitration agreement which the trial court had
refused to enforce notwithstanding the presumption in favor of
arbitration. These circumstances are not present here; rather, the
Court rejected Defendants' attempt to take advantage of an
arbitration agreement to which they are not parties. There is no
presumption in favor of arbitration in this context.  

The cases the Defendants rely on are thus inapposite. In Wuest v.
Comcast Cable Commc'ns Mgmt., LLC, No. 17-CV-04063-JSW, 2017 WL
5569819, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2017), the court granted a stay
after denying the defendant's motion to compel arbitration pursuant
to its own arbitration agreement. The court's reasoning that there
was irreparable harm where a party is denied the opportunity to
arbitrate and is required to incur the expense and delay of trial
before being able to appeal,  the advantages of arbitration speed
and economy are lost forever does not apply here where neither
Prelude nor Chart are parties to the arbitration agreement.   

Prelude and Chart cannot argue that they are not getting the
benefit of the bargained for exchange there was no bargain, no
exchange. Indeed, Prelude had no relationship with Pacific
Fertility at the time Plaintiffs entered into the arbitration
agreements with Pacific Fertility.

Further, in Britton, the Ninth Circuit rejected the notion of an
automatic stay pending appeal of the denial of a motion to compel
arbitration. Britton v. Co-op Banking Grp., 916 F.2d 1405, 1412
(9th Cir. 1990), rejecting the suggestion that an appeal regarding
arbitrability could always put a case on hold because it would
allow a defendant to stall a trial simply by bringing a frivolous
motion to compel arbitration.

The Defendants must show some particular harm to them if a stay is
not granted. In considering the irreparable harm factor in the
context of a motion for a stay of removal in an immigration case,
the Ninth Circuit in Leiva-Perez, Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at 968,
held that the noncitizen must show that there is a reason specific
to his or her case, as opposed to a reason that would apply equally
well to all aliens and all cases, that removal would inflict
irreparable harm.

In contrast, the Plaintiffs face real harm absent a stay. Unlike
the Defendants, the harm to the Plaintiffs is not economic it is
time and information. Information regarding the viability of their
eggs and embryos and a finite period of time in which they can make
reproductive related decisions based on that information.
Defendants hold that information and a delay of proceedings here
while the Ninth Circuit considers their appeals will harm
Plaintiffs' ability to make these decisions.

The Defendants have thus failed to show that irreparable injury is
the more probable or likely outcome if proceedings are not stayed
pending appeal and the balance of hardships tips sharply in
Plaintiffs' favor. The second and third Nken factors therefore
weigh against as stay as well.

The Public Interest

The first two factors in the traditional stay test are the most
important. Indeed, a court need not consider the remaining factors
unless it concludes that the moving party has made an adequate
showing on the first two. Because neither Prelude nor Chart have
met the first three Nken factors, the Court need not go on to
consider the public interest.

Accordingly, the Defendants' motions for stay pending appeal are
denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 27, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y69o59nd from Leagle.com.

R. E., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Eric H. Gibbs -- ehg@classlawgroup.com --
Gibbs Law Group LLP, Amy Marie Zeman -- amz@classlawgroup.com --
Gibbs Law Group LLP, Daniel C. Girard -- dcg@girardgibbs.com --
Girard Sharp LLP, Dylan Hughes -- dsh@classlawgroup.com -- Gibbs
Law Group LLP, Jordan S. Elias -- jelias@girardsharp.com -- Girard
Sharp LLP, Joseph G. Sauder -- jgs@sstriallawyers.com -- Sauder
Schelkopf LLC, pro hac vice, Sarah Robin London, Lieff Cabraser
Heimann & Bernstein LLP, 275 Battery Street, 29th Floor San
Francisco, CA 94111-3339, Steven M. Tindall --
smt@classlawgroup.com -- Gibbs Law Group LLP, Tiseme Gabriella
Zegeye, Lieff Cabraser Heimann and Bernstein, LLP, 275 Battery
Street, 29th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111-3339 & Adam E. Polk --
aep@girardgibbs.com -- Girard Sharp LLP.

Pacific Fertility Center, Defendant, represented by Joseph Spalding
Picchi -- jpicchi@glattys.com -- Galloway, Lucchese, Everson &
Picchi A Professional Corporation & Aaron Thomas Schultz --
aschultz@glattys.com -- Galloway, Lucchese, Everson & Picchi.

Prelude Fertility, Inc. & Pacific MSO, LLC, Defendants, represented
by Erin McCalmon Bosman -EBosman@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster
LLP, Benjamin Scott Kagel -- bkagel@mofo.com -- Morrison Foerster,
David Frank McDowell -- dmcdowell@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster
LLP, Julie Yongsun Park -- juliepark@mofo.com -- Morrison &
Foerster LLP & William Francis Tarantino -wtarantino@mofo.com --
Morrison & Foerster LLP.


PAYCHEX INC: Mercier Seeks to Recoup Unpaid Wages, Damages
----------------------------------------------------------
SCOTT MERCIER Individually and on Behalf of All Similarly Situated
Employees, Plaintiff, v. PAYCHEX, INC., Defendant, Case No.
6:19-cv-06452 (W.D. N.Y., June 21, 2019) is a Complaint against
Defendant, to recover unpaid wages, liquidated damages, interest,
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs under the Federal Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938; unpaid wages, liquidated damages, interest,
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs under the New York Minimum
Wage Act and the New York Wage Payment Act.

The Defendant failed to properly compensate Plaintiff and other
Implementation Coordinators for all hours worked, the complaint
asserts. Defendant completed this illegal act by failing to pay
Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees for the work they
performed during their lunch breaks. The Defendant also failed to
compensate its Implementation Coordinators for the work they
performed before and after their shifts, as well as on weekends.
Because Plaintiff and others similarly situated were full-time
employees, working through their breaks and outside of their
scheduled hours caused them to consistently work over 40 hours a
week. Because they were not credited for this time worked, they
were regularly denied overtime wages, the complaint says.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as an Implementation
Coordinator from approximately June 2008 to January 2018.

Defendant is a human resources services company headquartered in
Rochester, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Kelly A. Burgy, Esq.
     Benjamin L. Davis, III, Esq.
     THE LAW OFFICES OF PETER T. NICHOLL
     36 South Charles Street, Suite 1700
     Baltimore, MD 21201
     Phone: (410) 244-7005
     Email: bdavis@nicholllaw.com
            kaburgy@nicholllaw.com


PENSKE MEDIA: Jones Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Penske Media
Corporation. The case is styled as Kahlimah Jones, Individually and
as the representative of a class of similarly situated persons,
Plaintiff v. Penske Media Corporation, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-03901 (E.D. N.Y., July 6, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Penske Media Corporation is an American digital media, publishing,
and information services company based in Los Angeles and New York
City. It publishes more than 20 digital and print brands, including
Variety, Rolling Stone, WWD, Deadline Hollywood, BGR, and
others.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Dan Shaked, Esq.
     Shaked Law Group, P.C.
     44 Court Street, Suite 1217
     Brooklyn, NY 11217
     Phone: (917) 373-9128
     Fax: (718) 504-7555
     Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com


PET SUPERMARKET: Faces Lezcano, et al. ADA Suit in S.D Florida
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Pet Supermarket Inc.
The case is captioned as Anneth Lezcano, Jack Kang, and Equal
Access Action Network, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. Pet Supermarket Inc., the
Defendant, Case No. 0:19-cv-61593-BB (S.D. Fla., June 25, 2019).
The suit alleges Americans with Disabilities Act violation. The
case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Beth Bloom.

Pet Supermarket owns and operates a chain of pet products
stores.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Yvette J. Harrell, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF YJ HARRELL, PLLC
          156 Frow Avenue
          Coral Gables, FL 33133
          Telephone: (954) 990-7328
          Facsimile: (888) 355-0982
          E-mail: counsel@yhlegal.com

PHILIPS NORTH AMERICA: Lawrence T. Ryan Sues Over Unsolicited Fax
-----------------------------------------------------------------
LAWRENCE T. RYAN, D.D.S., P.C., individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PHILIPS NORTH AMERICA,
LLC; KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N.V., Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-11982-VAR-RSW (E.D. Mich., July 2, 2019) is an action
against Defendant on behalf of a class of all persons or entities
that Defendant sent one or more telephone facsimile messages
promoting its property, goods, or services, seeking statutory
damages for each violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act, trebling of the statutory damages if the Court determines
Defendant's violations were knowing or willful, injunctive relief,
compensation and attorney fees (under the conversion count), and
all other relief the Court deems appropriate under the
circumstances.

Defendant sent Plaintiff at least two advertisements by facsimile
and in violation of the TCPA.  Plaintiff did not grant Defendant
prior express invitation or permission to send any advertisement to
Plaintiff by facsimile. Moreover, Defendant's faxes do not contain
an opt-out notice, making any "established business relationship"
irrelevant in this case.  Defendant's unsolicited faxes damaged
Plaintiff and the other class members. Unsolicited faxes tie up the
telephone lines, prevent fax machines from receiving authorized
faxes, prevent their use for authorized outgoing faxes, cause undue
wear and tear on the recipients' fax machines, and require
additional labor to attempt to discern the source and purpose of
the unsolicited message, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is a medical provider of dental healthcare services.

Defendants are for-profit providers of electronics and other goods,
including oral health care goods for dental health providers and
consumers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Phillip A. Bock, Esq.
     Tod A. Lewis, Esq.
     David M. Oppenheim, Esq.
     Mara A. Baltabols, Esq.
     Bock, Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC
     134 N. La Salle Street, Suite 1000
     Chicago, IL 60602
     Phone: (312) 658-5500
     Email: service@classlawyers.com


PIVOTAL SOFTWARE: Kleinman Sues Over Misleading Reports
--------------------------------------------------------
PETER KLEINMAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiff, v. PIVOTAL SOFTWARE, INC.; ROBERT MEE; CYNTHIA
GAYLOR; PAUL MARITZ; MICHAEL S. DELL; ZANE ROWE; EGON DURBAN;
WILLIAM D. GREEN; MARCY S. KLEVORN; KHOZEMA Z. SHIPCHANDLER; MORGAN
STANLEY & CO. LLC; GOLDMAN SACHS & CO. LLC; CITIGROUP GLOBAL
MARKETS INC.; MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH INCORPORATED.;
BARCLAYS CAPITAL INC.; CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (USA) LLC; RBC
CAPITAL MARKETS, LLC; UBS SECURITIES LLC; WELLS FARGO SECURITIES,
LLC; KEYBANC CAPITAL MARKETS INC.; WILLIAM BLAIR & COMPANY, L.L.C.;
MISCHLER FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.; SAMUEL A. RAMIREZ & COMPANY, INC.;
SIEBERT CISNEROS SHANK & CO., L.L.C.; and WILLIAMS CAPITAL GROUP,
L.P., Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-03605 (N.D. Cal., June 21, 2019)
is a federal securities class action on behalf of all persons and
entities, other than Defendants, who purchased Pivotal securities
pursuant and/or traceable to the Company's registration statement
and prospectus issued in connection with the Company's initial
public offering in April 2018, seeking to recover compensable
damages caused by Defendants' violations of the Securities Act of
1933.

On December 15, 2017, Defendants filed with the SEC a confidential
draft Registration Statement on Form S-1, which, following a series
of amendments in response to SEC comments, including comments from
the SEC emphasizing the importance of adequately disclosing
material trends and risk factors, as required by Items 303 and 503,
would be used for the IPO. On April 18, 2018, Defendants filed a
final amendment to the Registration Statement, which registered
over 37 million Pivotal common stock shares for public sale, or
42,550,000 if the Underwriter Defendants exercised their
over-allotment option. The SEC declared the Registration Statement
effective on April 19, 2018. On April 20, 2018, Defendants filed
the final prospectus for the IPO, which forms part of the
Registration Statement. On April 24, 2018, the Company completed
the IPO, which, upon the underwriters exercising their full
overallotment option to purchase additional shares, issued a total
of 42,550,000 shares priced to the public at $15.00 per share,
generating over $638 million for Defendants.

The complaint asserts that the Registration Statement contained
untrue statements of material facts and omitted to state material
facts both required by governing regulations and necessary to make
the statements made therein not misleading. Foremost, the
Registration Statement failed to disclose that Pivotal was already
experiencing deferred sales, lengthening sales cycles, and
consequently diminished growth as customers and industry sentiment
shifted away from Pivotal's principal, yet outdated, Pivotal
Application Service ("PAS") offering because it was incompatible
with the industry-standard Kubemetes platform. At the same time,
Pivotal's alternate Kubemetes-compatible Pivotal Container Service
("PKS") offering was severely limited and could not be applied to
the full scope of large enterprise customers' needs.

This disjointed product mix--on the one hand, an outdated primary
PAS offering, incompatible with the industry standard; on the
other, a limited secondary PKS add on that, although compatible
with the industry standard, could only handle a narrow subset of
enterprise customer's needs--hamstrung Pivotal sales force
responding to customers who were demanding a versatile,
Kubemetes-compatible platform. It also rendered Pivotal's primary
PAS offering increasingly obsolete, for Pivotal would be forced to
reengineer its flagship PAS product from the ground up to be
compatible with Kubemetes and thus competitive against large public
cloud providers like Amazon, Microsoft, and Google. These
undisclosed negative events, trends, and uncertainties rendered
false and misleading Pivotal's reported financial and operational
statements incorporated in the Registration Statement, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff purchased Pivotal securities at artificially inflated
prices pursuant and/or traceable to the Company's IPO and was
damaged thereby.

Pivotal is a cloud based platform technology company. The Company
is a Delaware corporation with principal executive offices located
at 875 Howard Street, Fifth Floor, San Francisco, California
94103.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
     THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
     355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2450
     Los Angeles, CA 90071
     Phone: (213) 785-2610
     Facsimile: (213) 226-4684
     Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com


PIVOTAL SOFTWARE: Rosen Law Firm Securities Class Action Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announces the
filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Pivotal Software, Inc. (NYSE: PVTL): (1) pursuant
and/or traceable to the registration statement and prospectus (the
"Registration Statement") issued in connection with Pivotal's April
2018 initial public offering (the "IPO"); and/or (2) between April
24, 2018 and June 4, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The
lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Pivotal investors under the
federal securities laws.

To join the Pivotal class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1591.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Pivotal was facing major problems with its sales
execution and a complex technology landscape; (2) the foregoing
headwinds resulted in deferred sales, lengthening sales cycles, and
diminished growth as its customers and the industry's sentiment
shifted away from Pivotal's principal products because the
Company's products were outdated, inadequate, and incompatible with
the industry-standard platform; and (3) Pivotal's public statements
were materially false and misleading at all relevant times. When
the true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that
investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than August 19,
2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf
of other class members in directing the litigation. If you wish to
join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1591.html

Contact:

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
         New York, NY 10016
         Phone: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Website: www.rosenlegal.com
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com
                cases@rosenlegal.com [GN]


PORT DRAGO: Macancela Seeks Lawful Minimum Wage Under FLSA, NYLL
----------------------------------------------------------------
EDUARDO MACANCELA, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. PORT DRAGO CORP. d/b/a DRAGO SHOE REPAIR
and CHARLES DRAGO, individually, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05856
(S.D. N.Y., June 21, 2019) is a class action brought on behalf of
Plaintiff and all similarly situated individuals who are employed
by Defendants as shoe shiners and shoe repairers to recover unpaid
minimum wages, spread of hours and overtime compensation under the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law against
Defendants.

According to the complaint, by paying Plaintiff such a low flat
daily rate, Defendants failed to pay him the lawful minimum wage in
violation of the FLSA and NYLL. The Defendants attempted to "cover
their tracks" with respect to the unlawful manner they paid
Plaintiff and the class. Even though Plaintiff was paid in cash and
not in compliance with the FLSA and the NYLL, Defendants provided
Plaintiff with inaccurate paystubs. On information and belief, not
a single paystub listed Plaintiff as ever having worked a single
hour of overtime. Instead, the paystubs routinely listed Plaintiff
as having worked between 15-35 hours a week, says the complaint.

Plaintiff worked at Defendants' Penn Station location that was
owned and operated by C. Drago as a shoe shiner for Defendants From
1998 until June 2019.

Defendant Drago Corp. is a domestic limited liability company in
the shoe shining and repair industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Bruce E. Menken, Esq.
     BERANBAUM MENKEN LLP
     New York, NY

          - and -

     Jacob Aronauer, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF JACOB ARONAUER
     New York, NY



PORTAGE COUNTY, WI: Court Denies Class Certification in Lieberman
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin issued an Opinion and Order denying Plaintiff's Motion
for Class Certification in the case captioned BRETT LIEBERMAN,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. PORTAGE COUNTY, MIKE LUKAS, CORY NELSON, DALE
BOETTCHER, JOHN DOE PORTAGE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE PERSONNEL, and
JOHN DOE PORTAGE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE PERSONNEL,
Defendants, WISCONSIN COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CORPORATION,
Intervenor-Defendant. No. 18-cv-450-jdp. (W.D. Wis.).

Plaintiff Brett Lieberman was detained at the Portage County jail
from August 2014 to January 2016. He is proceeding on claims that
defendants violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment, the
Sixth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Wisconsin
Constitution and the Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Act by
recording privileged communication he had with his lawyer and then
sharing those recordings with prosecutors, who used the recordings
in court proceedings against him.

The requirements for class certification under Rule 23 are well
established: (1) the scope of the class as to both its members and
the asserted claims must be defined clearly using objective
criteria  (2) the class must be sufficiently numerous, include
common questions of law or fact, and be adequately represented by
plaintiffs (and counsel) who have claims typical of the class and
(3) the class must meet the requirements of at least one of the
types of class actions listed in Rule 23(b).

Lieberman seeks to represent the following two classes:

     (1) All Jail detainees whose phone calls to attorneys were
recorded, transmitted, or used from June 12, 2012 until the Jail's
distribution of the Inmate Orientation Booklet dated November 24,
2015.

     (2) All Jail detainees whose phone calls to attorneys were
recorded, transmitted, or used after the Jail's distribution of the
Inmate Orientation Booklet dated November 24, 2015.

First, the court cannot allow Lieberman to proceed on claims that
defendants transmitted and used recordings of attorney phone calls.
The court has concluded that Lieberman did not exhaust his
administrative remedies for those claims, and Lieberman cannot
serve as class representative on a claim that he doesn't have the
right to bring himself.  Because Lieberman didn't ask the court to
add another class representative in the event the court found that
Lieberman couldn't serve, the court doesn't consider that issue.
This makes it unnecessary to consider defendants' objections about
the transmission and use claims.

Second, Lieberman doesn't allege in his complaint or his motion for
class certification that defendants continued recording him after
November 2015.

This leaves the following proposed class: All Jail detainees whose
phone calls to attorneys were recorded from June 12, 2012 until the
Jail's distribution of the Inmate Orientation Booklet dated
November 24, 2015.

Rule 23(a) factors

Numerosity

The Defendants say that Lieberman can't satisfy this requirement
because he hasn't adduced evidence regarding the specific number of
calls that were recorded during the class period. But a class can
be certified without determination of its size, so long as it's
reasonable to believe it large enough to make joinder impracticable
and thus justify a class action suit.

That standard is met in this case.

The Defendants say that there may be fewer than 90 class members
because some of the calls at issue were with lawyers who did not
make an appearance in court for the prisoner and other calls lasted
less than a minute. But the court already addressed this issue in
the context of discussing the class definition. At this point,
defendants haven't shown that those inmates should be excluded from
the class. And even if the court were to exclude inmates that
defendants say aren't protected by the attorney-client privilege,
it would still leave more than 60 inmates, which is sufficiently
numerous to make joinder impractical.

Commonality

An issue of fact or law is common under Rule 23 if it is capable of
class-wide resolution. In this case, the key common question is
whether the defendants had a policy of recording inmate phone calls
with attorneys that violated the inmates' rights.. Because
defendants do not deny that there are common questions, the court
need not discuss this factor further.

Typicality

The named plaintiff's claims are typical of the class if they have
the same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at
large. Defendants raise multiple objections to class certification
on this ground.

First, defendants say that Lieberman's claims are not typical of
the class because Lieberman alleges that he filed an administrative
grievance and a notice of claim, but he doesn't identify any other
class member who did. A representative might be inadequate if he is
subject to a substantial defense unique to him.

The Defendants' argument isn't persuasive. As for the issue of
exhaustion, the court has already held in the context of
defendants' motion for summary judgment that inmates didn't need to
file a grievance to challenge the recording policy, so it makes no
difference whether other class members filed grievances. As for the
notice of claim requirement, defendants have already stated that
they plan on seeking dismissal of all the class members' claims on
the ground that they didn't comply with the notice of claim
requirement,so this is not a unique defense. The common question
will be whether the notice that Lieberman filed is adequate for all
class members.

The Defendants' second argument is more convoluted. It goes
something like this: (1) Lieberman testified during his deposition
that he didn't believe that jail officials were recording his
attorney phone calls, despite warnings in the inmate handbook that
all calls were recorded (2) this testimony suggests that Lieberman
intends to argue that his belief means that he didn't consent to
his attorney calls being recorded (3) Lieberman hasn't cited
testimony from any other proposed class members that they had a
similar belief (4) Lieberman's claims aren't typical of the class
because he is the only one relying on a subjective belief to
support his claim.

This argument fails. Lieberman hasn't contended that he plans to
make his personal beliefs part of the basis for his claims. More
important, neither side cites any authority for the view that an
inmate's personal belief is an element of any of those claims.
Although the parties agree that the issue of inmate consent is
important to Lieberman's Fourth Amendment claim, consent under the
Fourth Amendment is determined through a review of objective facts.


The court concludes that Lieberman's recording claim is typical of
the class's claims.

Adequacy

Adequacy has two components, one that relates to the named
plaintiffs and one that relates to class counsel. The named
plaintiff must show that his claims are not in conflict with the
claims of the proposed class and that he has a sufficient interest
in the outcome of the case.. Rule 23(g)(1) sets forth four factors
that a court must consider before appointing class counsel: the
quality of counsel's work in the case; counsel's experience in
handling similar cases; counsel's knowledge of the law; and the
resources that counsel can devote to the case.

As for Lieberman's adequacy, defendants raise one issue that
relates to Lieberman's request to serve as the representative for a
class under Rule 23(b)(2) for declaratory or injunctive relief.

The court will discuss that issue in the next section. Defendants
raise no objections to Lieberman's adequacy to serve as a
representative under Rule 23(b)(3) for a class of inmates whose
attorney phone calls were recorded between June 12, 2012, and
November 24, 2015. Because Lieberman alleges that defendants
repeatedly recorded his attorney phone calls during that period, he
has a sufficient interest in the outcome of that claim to serve as
a representative for that claim.
Defendants have identified no conflicts of interest and the court
isn't aware of any.

But the court cannot approve counsel's request to represent the
class because they haven't supported the request. They say in their
brief that they meet all of the requirements under Rule 23(g)(1),
but they didn't submit any evidence to support those conclusions.
Although the court can determine from the record in this case
whether counsel are competent and knowledgeable of the law, counsel
must also show that they have the experience and resources
necessary to litigate a class action. So the court will defer a
decision on whether to appoint class counsel to give counsel an
opportunity to make that showing.

Rule 23(b)(3): damages class

Rule 23(b)(3) applies when the questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.Among the factors that the court may consider are: (A)
the class members' interests in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions (B) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun
by or against class members (C) the desirability or undesirability
of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular
forum and(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.

The Defendants contend that certification is improper under Rule
23(b)(3) for the following reasons: (1) neither Lieberman nor any
class member is entitled to damages for mental or emotional injury
under 42 U.S.C. Section 1997e(e) because none of them suffered a
physical injury (2) the issue of consent requires an individualized
inquiry into each class member's state of mind and (3) it is too
difficult to identify the members of the class.

The Defendants' first two objections don't require extended
discussion. As for the objection under Section 1997e(e), Lieberman
isn't seeking damages for mental or emotional injury, so the
objection is simply irrelevant. And even if Lieberman were seeking
such damages, defendants do not identify any reason why Section
1997e(e) would apply differently to different class members. As for
the objection about consent, the court has already rejected
defendants' argument in the context of the discussion about
typicality. Again, the court is not persuaded that determining the
issue of consent will require an inquiry into each class member's
mental state.

The Defendants' third objection is a challenge to Lieberman's
proposed method of identifying class members, which relates to the
question of the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
Lieberman says that he has generated a list of possible class
members by using the jail's call detail records, which identify
inmates calls by inmate name, the number called, the date and time
of the call, the length of the call, and whether the call was
recorded. Lieberman has matched phone numbers with lawyers using
Google searches to generate a list of inmates during the class
period whose calls with attorneys were recorded.  

The Defendants say that Lieberman's method is inadequate because it
is common for inmates to use each other's PIN numbers to make
calls, which renders the call logs unreliable. Defendants cite
testimony from both Lieberman and defendant Cory Nelson, but
neither party's testimony supports defendants' contention. Nelson
answered correct when he was asked whether there are some occasions
where an inmate may use someone else's PIN number, right?

Lieberman answered, "I think that did happen. Yes," in response to
a question whether inmates used another inmate's PIN to make phone
calls. Lieberman later said it was probably a fairly common
practice, but he immediately qualified that statement by saying,
that's speculation. Neither witness provided any foundation for his
opinion. And defendants have not cited evidence that a single
inmate during the class period or otherwise used another inmate's
PIN to call an attorney.  

If later acquired evidence shows that jail officials did not record
attorney phone calls of some of the individuals who receive class
notice, defendants may move to exclude those individuals from the
class at that time. But at this point, the court declines to deny
class certification on the basis of speculation.  

The ultimate question in a Rule 23(b)(3) class is whether judicial
economy from consolidation of separate claims outweighs any concern
with possible inaccuracies from their being lumped together in a
single proceeding for decision by a single judge or jury. Lieberman
has met that standard. He has identified a jail policy that was
applied the same way to inmates at the prison over the course of
multiple years. Under these circumstances, it makes sense to allow
the claims of the proposed class to be resolved in one fell swoop
rather than in piecemeal fashion.  

In sum, the court concludes that Lieberman has satisfied the
requirements for a Rule 23(b)(3) class, with one exception, which
is the adequacy of the proposed class counsel. The court will give
Lieberman an opportunity to submit supplemental materials showing
that his counsel satisfy the requirements under Rule 23(g)(1).

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's motion for class certification is
denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 27, 2019 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y4ph7a7j from
Leagle.com.

Brett Lieberman, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Brian Howard Eldridge --
beldridge@hmelegal.com -- Hart McLaughlin & Eldridge, LLC, John
Shannon Marrese, Hart McLaughlin & Eldridge, LLC & Steven Alan
Hart, Hart McLaughlin & Eldridge, LLC, 22 W Washington St, Ste
1600, Chicago, IL 60602-1615

Portage County, Mike Lukas, Cory Nelson & Dale Boettcher,
Defendants, represented by Garrett Anthony Soberalski --
gas@mtfn.com -- Meissner Tierney Fisher & Nichols, S.C., Lori Marie
Lubinsky -- llubinsky@axley.com -- Axley Brynelson, LLP, Michael J.
Cohen -- mjc@mtfn.com -- Meissner Tierney Fisher & Nichols SC,
Michael J. Modl -- mmodl@axley.com -- Axley Brynelson, LLP & Morgan
Kathleen Stippel -- mstippel@axley.com -- Axley Brynelson, LLP.

John Doe Portage County District Attorney's Office Personnel,
Defendant, represented by David C. Rice, Wisconsin Department of
Justice.

Wisconsin County Mutual Insurance Corporation, Intervenor,
represented by Thomas J. Donnelly -- tjd@ghnlawyers.com -- Grady,
Hayes & Neary, LLC.


PROSPER TRADING: Sent Illegal Automated Texts, Perrong Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
ANDREW PERRONG on behalf of himself and others similarly situated
v. PROSPER TRADING ACADEMY, LLC, and SCOTT BAUER, Case No.
1:19-cv-03871 (N.D. Ill., June 10, 2019), alleges that Prosper
Trading sent automated text message calls to consumers' cellular
telephone numbers, including the Plaintiff's, which is prohibited
by the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Prosper Trading Academy, LLC is a Delaware limited liability
company with its principal place of business located in Chicago,
Illinois.  Scott Bauer is the Chief Executive Officer of Prosper
Trading Academy.  

According to its Web site -- https://www.prospertrading.com/about/
-- "Prosper Trading Academy was founded to elevate your trading
success with real education from qualified coaches, with a personal
touch.  Our expert traders and coaches have 75+ years of experience
helping traders maximize their returns and meet their investment
goals."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Alan W. Nicgorski, Esq.
          HANSEN REYNOLDS LLC
          150 S. Wacker Drive, Suite 2400
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 265-2252
          Facsimile: (414) 273-8476
          E-mail: anicgorski@hansenreynolds.com

               - and -

          Michael C. Lueder, Esq.
          301 N. Broadway, Suite 400
          Milwaukee, WI 53202
          Telephone: (414) 273-7676
          Facsimile: (414) 273-8476
          E-mail: mlueder@hansenreynolds.com

               - and -

          Anthony Paronich, Esq.
          PARONICH LAW, P.C.
          350 Lincoln Street, Suite 2400
          Hingham, MA 02043
          Telephone: (617) 485-0018
          Facsimile: (508) 318-8100
          E-mail: anthony@paronichlaw.com


PROVIDENT TRUST: Court Extends Briefing Schedule in Murray
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court of District of Nevada issued an
Order extending Briefing Schedule on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
in the case captioned NOEL C. MURRAY and DR. SWARNA PERERA, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. PROVIDENT TRUST GROUP, LLC, Defendant. Case No.
2:18-cv-01382-MMD-GWF. (D. Nev.).

Plaintiffs Noel C. Murray, Dr. Swarna Perera, and Joyce E. Friedman
(Plaintiffs), by and through their counsel of record, the Law
Office of Hayes & Welsh, the Law Office of Christopher J. Gray,
P.C., and the Law Offices of Joshua B. Kons, LLC, and Defendant
Provident Trust Group, LLC, by and through its counsel of record,
Greenberg Traurig, LLP, hereby stipulate and request that the Court
extend the time by which Plaintiffs must file papers in opposition
to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended
Complaint.

The Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Class Action Complaint on
May 8, 2019, in which they allege Defendant breached contractual
duties as custodian of Plaintiffs' Individual Retirement Accounts.
Plaintiffs seek certification to represent a class of similarly
situated individuals across the country.
  
The Defendant filed the Motion to Dismiss on June 21, 2019 and the
Plaintiffs' opposition papers are currently due on July 5, 2019.

Counsel for the Plaintiffs has requested additional time to
evaluate the Motion to Dismiss and prepare a response, taking into
account the exercise of due diligence. Counsel for Defendant has
agreed to this request.

In light of this, the parties agree that Plaintiffs shall have up
to, and including, July 26, 2019, to respond to the Motion to
Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 27, 2019 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/yxptqede from Leagle.com.

Noel C. Murray & Swarna Perera, Dr., Plaintiffs, represented by
Christopher J. Gray, Law Office of Christopher J. Gray, P.C., 460
Park Avenue, 21st Floor, New York, NY 10022, pro hac vice, Joshua
B. Kons, Law Offices of Joshua B. Kons, LLC, 939 West North Avenue,
Suite 750. Chicago, IL 60642, pro hac vice, Michael James
Giarrusso, Law Office of Christopher J. Gray, P.C., 460 Park
Avenue, 21st Floor, New York, NY 10022, pro hac vice & Martin L.
Welsh, Law Office of Hayes & Welsh, 199 N Arroyo Grande Blvd,
Henderson, NV 89074

Joyce E. Friedman, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher J. Gray,
Law Office of Christopher J. Gray, P.C., pro hac vice, Joshua B.
Kons, Law Offices of Joshua B. Kons, LLC, pro hac vice &Martin L.
Welsh, Law Office of Hayes & Welsh.

Provident Trust Group, LLC, 1AC, Defendant, represented by Michael
James Slocum -- slocumm@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig LLP, pro hac
vice, Robert Harris Bernstein -- bernsteinrob@gtlaw.com --
Greenberg Traurig LLP, pro hac vice, Jason Hicks -hicksja@gtlaw.com
-- Greenberg Traurig, LLP & Mark E. Ferrario -- ferrariom@gtlaw.com
-- Greenberg Traurig.


PVH CORP: Tripicchio Sues over Alleged Fraud
--------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed by Vincent Tripicchio
against PVH Corporation for alleged fraud. The case is captioned
Tripicchio v. PVH Corporation, Case No. 1:19-cv-05729-ER (S.D.N.Y.,
June 19, 2019). It is assigned to Hon. Judge Edgardo Ramos.

Headquartered in New York City, PVH Corporation is one of the most
admired fashion and lifestyle companies in the world. The company's
brand portfolio includes the iconic Calvin Klein, Tommy Hilfiger,
Van Heusen, IZOD, Arrow, Speedo, Warner's, Olga and Geoffrey Beene
brands, as well as the digital-centric True & Co. intimates' brand.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Ross Howard Schmierer, Esq.
     DENITTIS OSEFCHEN PRINCE PC
     315 Madison Avenue 3rd Floor
     New York, NY 10017
     Telephone: (646) 979-3642
     Facsimile: (856) 797-9978
     E-mail: rschmierer@denittislaw.com


RECORDQUEST LLC: Smith Appeals E.D. Wiscconsin Ruling to 7th Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Daphne Smith filed an appeal from a Court ruling in the
lawsuit entitled Daphne Smith v. RecordQuest LLC, Case No.
2:19-cv-00025-LA, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin.

The nature of suit is stated as other personal property damage.

The appellate case is captioned as Daphne Smith v. RecordQuest LLC,
Case No. 19-2084, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that the
Appellant's brief is due on or before July 17, 2019, for Daphne
Smith.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant DAPHNE SMITH, individually and on behalf of a
class of others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Robert J. Welcenbach, Esq.
          WELCENBACH LAW OFFICES
          933 N. Mayfair Road
          Milwaukee, WI 53226
          Telephone: (414) 774-7330
          E-mail: robert@welcenbachlaw.com

Defendant-Appellee RECORDQUEST LLC, A South Carolina Corporation,
is represented by:

          Ronald I. Raether, Jr., Esq.
          TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP
          5 Park Plaza
          Irvine, CA 92614
          Telephone: (949) 622-2722
          E-mail: ron.raether@troutman.com


RELIN GOLDSTEIN: Smith Files FDCPA Suit in W.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Relin, Goldstein &
Crane, LLP. The case is styled as Ryan Smith individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Relin,
Goldstein & Crane, LLP, Defendant, Case No. 6:19-cv-06508 (W.D.
N.Y., July 5, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Relin, Goldstein & Crane LLP is a Rochester, NY law firm
concentrating its practice in commercial & retail collections, real
estate, & foreclosure matters.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     David M. Barshay, Esq.
     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     Barshay Sanders, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 281-7601
     Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com
            csanders@barshaysanders.com


RIVERSIDE, CA: Phillips et al. Seek OT Pay for Social Workers
-------------------------------------------------------------
KARRENE PHILLIPS, WAYNE SHEPPERD and CLARENCE WOODS, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, a legal subdivision of the State of
California, and DOES 1–10, inclusive. Defendants, Case No.
5:19-cv-01231 (C.D. Cal., July 2, 2019) is an action, on their own
behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, under the
United States Fair Labor Standards Act, for remedies arising out of
Defendants' non-payment of overtime.

Plaintiffs were employed as non-exempt social workers by Defendant
in the Children's Services Division of the Department of Public
Social Services.  The CSD Social Workers employed by Defendant,
including Plaintiffs, are entitled to be compensated for all of the
hours they work for Defendant, as well as time and one-half of
their regular pay rate for each hour worked in excess of 40 hours
per week. The Defendants frequently required, suffered, and/or
permitted CSD Social Workers, including Plaintiffs, to work more
than 40 hours per week without paying them all of the overtime
compensation. The Defendants' unlawful conduct has been repeated
and consistent throughout Plaintiffs' entire period of employment
as CSD Social Workers. The Defendants were aware that CSD Social
Workers, including Plaintiffs, performed work that could not be
completed in 40 hours per week and required them to work overtime,
says the complaint.

Riverside is a legal subdivision of the State of California.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Megan A. Richmond, Esq.
     MEGAN A. RICHMOND, APC
     655 West Broadway, Suite 1700
     San Diego, CA 92101
     Phone: (619) 577-4253
     Facsimile: (619) 577-4250
     Email: megan@therichmondfirm.com

          - and -

     C. Brooks Cutter, Esq.
     CUTTER LAW P.C.
     401 Watt Ave., Suite 100
     Sacramento, CA 95864
     Phone: (916) 290-9400
     Facsimile: (916) 588-9330
     Email: bcutter@cutterlaw.com

          - and -

     Alexander E. Papaefthimiou, Esq.
     PAPAEFTHIMIOU APC
     1601 Carmen Drive, Suite 212D
     Camarillo, CA 93010
     Phone: (805) 366-3909
     Facsimile: (805) 585-5410
     Email: alex@aplitigation.com



ROMULUS INC: Accused by Mack of Not Paying Assistant Managers' OT
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DEVIN MACK and LEANNA RANDALL, on behalf of themselves and
similarly situated employees v. ROMULUS INC., Case No.
3:19-cv-00992-ARC (M.D. Pa., June 7, 2019), alleges that Defendant
has not paid the Plaintiffs and other Assistant Managers overtime
premium compensation for hours worked over 40 per week, in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Pennsylvania
Minimum Wage Act.

Romulus Inc. is a corporation headquartered in Phoenix, Arizona.
Doing business under the trade name "Romulus Restaurant Group," the
Defendant operates over 100 IHOP restaurants in 11 states.  In
Pennsylvania, for example, the Defendant operates restaurants in
Allentown, Wilkes-Barre, White Haven, and Wyomissing.

IHOP is an American multinational pancake house restaurant chain
that specializes in breakfast foods.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Peter Winebrake, Esq.
          R. Andrew Santillo, Esq.
          Mark J. Gottesfeld, Esq.
          WINEBRAKE & SANTILLO, LLC
          715 Twining Road, Suite 211
          Dresher, PA 19025
          Telephone: (215) 884-2491
          E-mail: pwinebrake@winebrakelaw.com
                  asantillo@winebrakelaw.com
                  mgottesfeld@winebrakelaw.com


SAN DIEGO: Cadena et al Sue over Asbestos Exposure
--------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against the City of San
Diego and Ronald Villa for alleged fraudulent concealment of injury
and intentional infliction of emotional distress to the City
employees who were housed at the Executive Complex building located
at 1010 Second Avenue, San Diego, California. The case is captioned
ALINA CADENA, BRYAN MONAGHAN, CHARLES BUTLER, CHRISTOPHER PENMAN,
DEANNA NAVARRO, DEANNA WALKER, DEBORAH ROWLEY, EDITH GUTIERREZ,
GRACIELA HERNANDEZ, JORGE ALFONSO, LYNETTE NORMAN, MARCI GARCIA,
MARICELA BARBA, MICHAEL GOMEZ, MICHEAL BOX, OLLIE SHEPHERD, PAMELA
THOMAS, SHARON SUMLIN, STEPHANIE TEEL, THELMA GUTIERREZ and TONY
TOSCA, as individuals, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, a municipal
corporation; RONALD VILLA, in his official capacity as Assistant
Chief Operating Officer of the City of San Diego, and DOES 1
through 100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
37-2019-00032076-CU-MC-CTL (Cal. Super., San Diego Cty., June 21,
2019).

Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to California Code of Civil
Procedure 382 on behalf of all City employees housed at the
Executive Complex during the construction of that property in and
around 2017 to early 2018, the period during which toxins and
asbestos were exposed. They allege that the Defendants
intentionally exposed and then fraudulently concealed their extent
of exposure to asbestos and other toxic materials. In addition, the
City allegedly concealed its actions when the City hired a
well-casted group of professionals to misinform and mislead City
employees in believing the employees' exposure to asbestos and
other toxins did not present any health risks.

The City government of San Diego provides citywide services such as
law enforcement, tax collection, public health, and social
services. It also maintains libraries, parks and recreation areas.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Michael J. Aguirre, Esq.
     Maria C. Severson, Esq.
     AGUIRRE & SEVERSON, LLP
     501 West Broadway, Suite 1050
     San Diego, CA 92101
     Telephone: (619) 876-5364
     Facsimile: (619) 876-5368

SEALED AIR: Gibbs Probes Potential Securities Law Violations
------------------------------------------------------------
Sealed Air shares declined sharply after the company revealed that
it would immediately terminate its CFO following an internal review
in connection with an SEC investigation. Gibbs Law Group is
investigating a potential Sealed Air Class Action Lawsuit on behalf
of investors who lost money in Sealed Air (SEE) stock.

On June 20, 2019, Sealed Air announced it was terminating its CFO
William G. Stiehl for cause, after an internal review by the
company's Audit Committee in connection with a previously disclosed
SEC investigation. This came after Sealed Air received an
additional subpoena from the SEC earlier this year regarding the
company's audit firm and the selection process for the firm.

According to the Wall Street Journal, "[T]he SEC's latest subpoena
related to the independence of Sealed Air's audit firm as well as
the process the company used to select the audit firm in 2015." The
article notes that Sealed Air switched auditors to Ernst & Young
LLP in 2015, per regulatory filings.

On this news, Sealed Air's stock price fell sharply on June 21,
2019, causing harm to investors.

If you invested in Sealed Air Corporation and would like to speak
privately with a securities attorney to learn more about our
investigation and your legal rights, visit our website or contact
our securities team directly at (888) 410-2925. Our investigation
concerns whether Sealed Air Corporation and certain of its officers
and/or directors have violated federal securities laws.

Contact:

         Gibbs Law Group
         Eric Gibbs, Esq.
         Phone: (888) 410-2925
                (510) 350-9710
         Email: ehg@classlawgroup.com [GN]


SENTRY ELECTRICAL: Lewis Moves for Certification of FLSA Class
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit titled JOHN LEWIS, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. SENTRY ELECTRICAL
GROUP, INC., Case No. 1:19-cv-00178-WOB (S.D. Ohio), moves the
Court to enter an order pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act:

   (a) conditionally certifying this case as a FLSA collective
       action under Section 216(b) against Defendant Sentry
       Electrical Group, Inc. on behalf of the Plaintiff and
       others similarly situated;

   (b) directing that notice be sent by United States mail and by
       e-mail to all of the Defendant's current or former hourly
       employees who traveled to jobsites in which an overnight
       stay was required but for whom such travel time was
       neither paid nor counted as hours worked by the Defendant
       for any workweek in which such travel time resulted in
       hours worked in excess of 40 in the same workweek at any
       time during the three-years preceding the filing of the
       Complaint to the present;

   (c) directing the parties to jointly submit within 14 days a
       proposed Notice informing such present and former
       employees of the pendency of this collective action and
       permitting them to opt into the case by signing and
       submitting a Consent to Join Form;

   (d) directing the Defendant to provide within 14 days a Roster
       of such present and former employees that includes their
       full names, their dates of employment, their last known
       home and e-mail addresses, and their last known telephone
       numbers;

   (e) directing that the Notice, in the form approved by the
       Court, be sent to such present and former employees within
       30 days using the home and email addresses listed in the
       Roster; and

   (f) providing that duplicate copies of the Notice may be sent
       in the event new, updated, or corrected e-mail or mailing
       addresses are found for one or more of such present or
       former employees.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey J. Moyle, Esq.
          NILGES DRAHER LLC
          614 W. Superior Avenue, Suite 1148
          Cleveland, OH 44113
          Telephone: (216) 230-2955
          Facsimile: (330) 754-1430
          E-mail: jmoyle@ohlaborlaw.com

               - and -

          Shannon M. Draher, Esq.
          Hans A. Nilges, Esq.
          NILGES DRAHER LLC
          7266 Portage Street, NW, Suite D
          Massillon, OH 44646
          Telephone: (330) 470-4428
          Facsimile: (330) 754-1430
          E-mail: hans@ohlaborlaw.com
                  sdraher@ohlaborlaw.com


SERVICE EMPLOYEES: Court Refuses to Vacate Arbitration Award
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Plaintiff's Motion to
Vacate an Arbitration Award in the case captioned ABM Industry
Groups, LLC, Plaintiff, v. Service Employees International Union,
Local 26, Defendant. Civ. No. 18-2846 (MJD/TNL)(D. Minn.).

Plaintiff ABM Industry Groups, LLC (ABM) is a janitorial services
company that is headquartered in Golden Valley, Minnesota.  ABM
employs approximately 1,300 janitors under a Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) with Defendant Service Employees International
Union Local 26 (Union). In the parties' predecessor CBA, sick days
were available for full-time employees only, depending on length of
service. One paid sick day was provided to employees with at least
one year of service, two paid sick days for those with at least
three years of service and three paid sick days for employees with
five years of service.

The Union made specific proposals regarding sick leave policy,
focusing on ensuring that employees in the covered area of a sick
leave statute or ordinance would receive the better benefits. ABM
rejected these proposals.  

The Union filed a grievance which alleged that ABM violated the CBA
by failing to implement Municipal Sick and Safe Time Ordinance  and
forcing employee's use of vacation and Floating Holidays for
purposes other than its intended use. The grievance alleged
violations of Articles 10, 11 and 20 of the CBA. As a remedy, the
Union requested that all employees working within corporate city
limits of Minneapolis and St. Paul receive 80 hours sick time on
January 1st of each year, beginning in 2018.  

An arbitration hearing took place on the Union's grievance. The
Arbitrator issued his Award in which he denied the Union's
grievance in part and sustained it in part. The Arbitrator found
that ABM did not violate the CBA by requiring employees to use
holiday or vacation time for sick leave, but that it did violate
the CBA by failing to apply the sick leave ordinances implemented
by the City of St. Paul and the City of Minneapolis pursuant to
Article 20.9 of the CBA.  

To determine whether ABM was subject to the Minneapolis Sick Leave
Ordinance, the Arbitrator discussed the Minnesota state court
decision and its analysis of the extraterritorial impact on
companies located outside of Minneapolis whose employees materially
benefit from the Minneapolis Ordinance. The Arbitrator also
considered dictionary definitions of resident in his analysis as to
whether ABM was subject to the Minneapolis Ordinance.  

Whether Grievance was Procedurally Defective

ABM argues that vacatur is appropriate because the Arbitrator
ignored or disregarded the plain language of the CBA that set forth
the requirements of a grievance.  ABM argues that Article 23 does
not create a procedure for future or anticipated contract
violations.

In addition, ABM asserts that the grievance did not provide enough
information for it to fully investigate and respond as the
grievance does not name any aggrieved employees as required under
Article 23.2(b).

A written grievance filed under this section must include
sufficient information that the Company may investigate and respond
to the grievance. The grievance must include the name(s) of the
aggrieved employee(s) or the aggrieved employee class
representatives if any employee(s) are seeking a remedy via the
grievance.

An arbitration award will be confirmed if it draws its essence from
the CBA and the record demonstrates that the Arbitrator arguably
construed the CBA, even if the Court were convinced the Arbitrator
made an error. The record is clear that the Arbitrator applied
Article 23 of the CBA to decide the procedural arguments against
the Union's grievance. The Arbitrator found the Union timely filed
its grievance in relation to when the Ordinances incorporated by
the CBA went into effect; the grievance included sufficient
information to allow ABM to investigate and respond, as
demonstrated by ABM's lengthy written response to the grievance
shortly after receiving it; and the Union provided an illustrative
list of the class members harmed by the classwide grievance.

The Court finds that in deciding the procedural defect argument,
the Arbitrator construed the relevant article of the CBA, and the
award need not be vacated on this ground.

Whether the Award Draws its Essence From the CBA

Pursuant to Article 20.9(c), ABM agreed to grant sick days mandated
by ordinance or statute within the jurisdiction/application of such
ordinance. Based on such language, ABM argues that the Arbitrator
should have analyzed the following key terms: sick day,
jurisdiction and application.

In addition, ABM argues the Arbitrator ignored evidence of the
parties' intent. ABM introduced bargaining history and past
practice evidence to show Article 20.9 was not designed to impose
additional obligations on the employer.  

Pursuant to the applicable standard of review, the Arbitration
Award will be confirmed where the Arbitrator arguably construed the
CBA in reaching his decision on the parties' dispute as to whether
Article 20.9 requires ABM to provide covered employees with sick
time in accordance with the Minneapolis and St. Paul sick time
ordinances, and whether the award draws its essence from the CBA.
Based on the record herein, the Court finds that the Arbitrator
appropriately construed Article 20.9, and that his decision on this
issue draws its essence from the CBA.  

The Arbitrator had the authority and the obligation to interpret
the Minneapolis and St. Paul Sick Leave Ordinances when deciding
the merits of the grievance. The controlling provision, Article
20.9(c), explicitly incorporates the Ordinances: Employers will
grant sick days mandated by ordinance or statute within the
jurisdiction/application of such ordinance or statute. To determine
whether ABM violated this provision required the Arbitrator to look
to the ordinances to determine the scope of jurisdiction and
application of each ordinance.

ABM's argument that the Arbitrator ignored its evidence concerning
the parties' intent and past practices is not supported by the
record. The Award specifically included ABM's position on the
merits of the dispute, including its position that union employees
will be treated as non-union employees with respect to the sick
leave ordinances. Regardless, the issue is whether the Arbitrator
arguably construed the CBA in reaching his decision.

Here, the Court finds the Arbitrator did construe the relevant
provisions of the CBA and that his award draws its essence from the
CBA by directing ABM to provide paid sick leave pursuant to Article
20.9(c), which incorporates the Minneapolis and St. Paul Sick Leave
Ordinances. The fact that the Arbitrator did not specifically
discuss ABM's arguments concerning past practices and intent is not
a basis upon which to vacate.

Whether the Award Exceeds Arbitrator's Authority Because It Imposes
New Terms and Conditions of Employment in Violation of Section 23.9
and Nullifies 21.2.

Article 23.9 provides: "The arbitrator shall have the authority to
apply the provisions of this Agreement and to render a decision of
any grievance properly coming before him/her, but he/she shall not
have the authority to amend or modify this Agreement or to
establish any terms or conditions of this Agreement The arbitrator
shall have the authority to decide questions of statutory rights
that are incorporated in this Agreement."

ABM argues that by ordering ABM to create a new benefit for
employees namely the Safe and Sick time for all employees working
in St. Paul and Minneapolis, the Arbitrator exceeded his
authority.

The Court finds that this argument has no merit. The Arbitrator
interpreted Article 20.9 as incorporating both the Minneapolis and
St. Paul Sick Leave Ordinances and pursuant to that interpretation,
found that ABM was obligated to grant sick days as mandated by
those Ordinances.

Accordingly, the Arbitrator did not impose a new term or condition
of employment that nullified Article 21.2.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate an Arbitration Award
is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 27, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y624ef4c from
Leagle.com.

ABM Industry Groups, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Grant T.
Collins -- gcollins@felhaber.com -- Felhaber Larson.

Service Employees International Union, Local 26, Defendant,
represented by Justin D. Cummins -- justin@cummins-law.com --
Cummins & Cummins, PLLP.

Service Employees International Union, Local 26, Counter Claimant,
represented by Justin D. Cummins, Cummins & Cummins, PLLP.

ABM Industry Groups, LLC, Counter Defendant, represented by Grant
T. Collins --  gcollins@felhaber.com -- Felhaber Larson.


SOBE CLUB: Does not Pay Proper Overtime Wages, Tocco Says
---------------------------------------------------------
CHAD TOCCO, DANIELA GONZALEZ, ADRIAN REYES, and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. SOBE CLUB 323 LLC, a Florida
limited liability corporation, d/b/a TREEHOUSE, and JEREMY WAKS,
individually, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-22772-XXXX (S.D. Fla.,
July 5, 2019) is an action by Plaintiffs against their former
employers for unpaid wages and overtime wages pursuant to the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs would, from time to time, work over 40 hours a week
during the relevant period. However, Treehouse never compensated
Plaintiffs at one-and-a-half times their regular rate of pay for
all hours worked over 40 in a given workweek. The Defendants have
failed to compensate similarly situated employees in accordance
with the FLSA by depriving them of the FLSA's required overtime
premium and minimum wage payments, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs worked as Bartenders during their tenure at Treehouse.

Defendants operate a popular nightclub in Miami-Beach Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     J. Freddy Perera, Esq.
     Valerie Barnhart, Esq.
     Brody Shulman, Esq.
     PERERA BARNHART, P.A.
     12555 Orange Drive, Suite 268
     Davie, FL 33330
     Phone: 786.485.5232
     Email: freddy@pererabarnhart.com
            valerie@pererabarnhart.com
            brody@pererabarnhart.com


SPECIALTY COMMODITIES: Court Denies Prelim OK of Quiruz Settlement
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for Northern District California,
San Jose Division, issued an Order denying Plaintiff's Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement in the case
captioned ANDREW QUIRUZ, Plaintiff, v. SPECIALTY COMMODITIES, INC.,
et al., Defendants. Case No. 17-cv-03300-BLF. (N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement is denied for the reasons stated at the hearing on June
27, 2019. Of particular concern to the Court, the settlement is
intended to release a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act
which has not yet been pled, although Plaintiff has indicated that
a second amended complaint adding such a claim will be filed.

The Court has not been provided with a copy of the signed
settlement agreement. The Plaintiff's counsel stated at the hearing
that these and the other deficiencies in the motion will be
rectified in a renewed motion for preliminary approval.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 27, 2019 Order is
available at   https://tinyurl.com/y3by6nsh from Leagle.com.

Andrew Quiruz, Plaintiff, represented by Alexandra Rochelle
McIntosh, Setareh Law Group, Chaim Shaun Setareh, Setareh Law Group
& William Matthew Pao, Setareh Law Group, 2214 Faraday Ave,
Carlsbad, CA 92008

Specialty Commodities, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jonathan
David Lotsoff -- JLOTSOFF@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac
vice, Abigail Kimball Woodruff --
mwoodruff@divorcelegalservices.com -- Sidley Austin LLP, Jinyung
Lee, Sidley Austin LLP, Katherine Ann Roberts --
kate.roberts@sidley.com -- Sidley Austin LLP & Wendy M. Lazerson
--wlazerson@sidley.com -- Sidley Austin LLP.

Archer-Daniels-Midland Company, Defendant, represented by Jonathan
David Lotsoff, Sidley Austin LLP, Abigail Kimball Woodruff, Sidley
Austin LLP, Jinyung Lee, Sidley Austin LLP,Katherine Ann Roberts,
Sidley Austin LLP & Wendy M. Lazerson, Sidley Austin LLP.


ST. HILDA'S: Violates Family and Medical Leave Act, Oehler Say
--------------------------------------------------------------
JAMES OEHLER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. ST. HILDA'S & ST. HUGH'S SCHOOL,
VIRGINIA CONNOR, PETER GANZENMULLER, and AUSTIN & CO., INC., the
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05612 (S.D.N.Y., June 14, 2019),
challenges the School's class-wide interference with Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) rights,  saying the Defendants failed to
provide written FMLA statutory rights and responsibilities notice
required by 29 C.F.R. section 825.300(c) and written FMLA
designation notice required by 29 C.F.R. section 825.300(d). The
action also seeks on behalf of Plaintiff, and all similarly
situated FMLA-eligible employees of the School, class-wide
declaratory relief, class-wide injunctive relief, and attorney's
fees and costs concerning the School's class-wide failure to
provide the written FMLA notices required by 29 C.F.R. section
825.30.

The Plaintiff alleges individual claims of:

     (1) interference in violation of the FMLA, including from the
failure to provide the written FMLA notices required by 29 C.F.R.
section 825.300(c) and 29 C.F.R. section 825.300(d);

     (2) retaliation in violation of the FMLA;

     (3) gender discrimination, "gender plus" male caregiver
discrimination, caregiver and/or male caregiver-based harassment
and hostile work environment, relationship or association
disability discrimination, aiding and abetting, retaliation, and
interference in violation of the New York City Human Rights Law
(NYCHRL); and

     (4) sex discrimination, "sex plus" male caregiver
discrimination, associational disability discrimination, and
retaliation in violation of Title VII.

The Plaintiff worked as a Greenhouse Keeper at the School from
approximately July 2013 until February 7, 2018, when Connor, as
Head of School, terminated his employment.  Connor describes the
School's faculty as "an extended family."

The School's rhetoric, however, was not matched by its treatment of
its FMLA-eligible employees, FMLA-eligible male employees, and/or
FMLA-eligible male caregiver employees.

Founded in 1950, the School describes itself as an independent,
episcopal school for boys and girls from age two through the eighth
grade.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Cyrus E. Dugger, Esq.
          THE DUGGER LAW FIRM, PLLC
          154 Grand St.
          New York, NY 10013
          Telephone: (646) 560-3208

STATE FARM: F. Palmer Suit Remains in N.M. District Court
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion to
Remand in the case captioned FREEMAN J. PALMER, Plaintiff, v. STATE
FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, STATE FARM FIRE AND
CASUALTY COMPANY, and STATE FARM GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY
Defendants. No. 1:19-cv-00301-WJ-SCY. (D.N.M.).

This putative class action arises out of a dispute over
underinsured motorist coverage in an automobile policy.  The
Plaintiff alleges that underinsured motorist coverage provided by
the Defendants is illusory or misleading, as the insured will
receive either no coverage or substantially reduced coverage once
the statutory offset above is applied.  

In this case, the Plaintiff purchased uninsured and underinsured
motorist coverage in the minimum amount available at $25,0000 per
person and $50,000 per occurrence. The Defendants collected a
premium of $70.88 for the uninsured and underinsured motorist
coverage for a six-month period beginning in 2014 and ending June
2015. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants misled him and
other putative class members, and they did not understand that if
they purchase minimal limits underinsured motorist coverage.

The Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) gives federal courts
jurisdiction over certain class actions, defined in Section
1332(d)(1), if the class has more than 100 members, the parties are
minimally diverse, and the amount in controversy exceeds $5
million. Plaintiff argues that this case should be remanded because
Defendants failed to carry their evidentiary burden as to the
amount in controversy.

The Court disagrees.

The amount in controversy is an estimate of the amount that will be
put at issue in the course of the litigation. Federal jurisdiction
is proper if a defendant proves jurisdictional facts by a
preponderance of the evidence such that the amount in controversy
may exceed $5,000,000. Once a defendant meets this burden, remand
is appropriate only if the plaintiff can establish that it is
legally impossible to recover more than $5,000,000.

Plaintiff's procedural objections are overruled

Initially, the Plaintiff argues that this case should be remanded
because Defendants failed to prove jurisdiction in their notice of
removal or provide evidence that the amount in controversy was more
than $5,000,000. However, since Dart Cherokee, Defendants need not
provide proof of the amount in controversy in the removal notice.
Rather, a defendant's notice of removal need include only a
plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the
jurisdictional threshold. Evidence establishing the amount is
required by Section 1446(c)(2)(B) only when the plaintiff contests,
or the court questions, the defendant's allegation. Dart Cherokee
Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 135 S.Ct. 547, 554,
(2014).

Here, the Defendants' notice of removal states a plausible
allegation that the amount in controversy is more than $5,000,000.

Defendants carried their evidentiary burden by a preponderance of
the evidence.

The Plaintiff seeks unspecified compensatory damages and treble
damages pursuant to NMSA Section 57-12-10(B). This includes payment
of premiums for coverage that had no value, lost benefits of
underinsured motorist coverage, and out of pocket expenses.  The
Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages and attorney fees. The
Plaintiff represents he paid $70.88 for six months of U coverage
(combined uninsured and underinsured coverage) at the minimum
level.

Here, the Defendants satisfied their burden of presenting evidence
that the damages put at issue may by more than $5,000,000, through
an affidavit and exhibits attached to their response to the motion
to remand. The Defendants represented they charge a single premium
for uninsured and underinsured coverage, called U Coverage. The
Defendants collect approximately $40 million each year in premiums
for combined uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage. Over the
last five years, that amounts to over $200 million. It appears that
the class will go back at least five years. Moreover, Defendants
issue approximately 250,000 policies each year in New Mexico
containing underinsured motorist coverage. They also presented
evidence that 40% of their U Coverage claim payments are for bodily
injury under the underinsured motorist coverage.

Moreover, if a mere 200 class members were in accidents and
entitled to receive the additional payments under the reformed
underinsured motorist coverage ($25,000 per policy), the amount in
controversy would be satisfied.  

Based on this evidence, if any damages are awarded, it is unclear
how the damages figure could be below $5,000,000. When these
figures are considered along with the requested treble damages,
punitive damages, and attorney fees, there is no doubt that more
than $5,000,000 is at play in this case. Therefore, the Court
concludes that Defendants submitted sufficient evidence to show it
is possible that more than $5,000,000 is at issue in this case.

The Plaintiff requests that the Defendants set out how much of the
combined U Coverage premium is for underinsured motorist coverage.
But those figures do not exist, as Defendants charge a single
premium for combined uninsured and underinsured coverage. However,
40% of U Coverage claim payments are for underinsured motorist
coverage. The Court concludes Plaintiff's request is unnecessary,
because Defendants have clearly shown by other evidence that more
than $5,000,000 is at issue in this case.

The Plaintiff also requests that the Defendants break down
indemnity payments for underinsured motorist coverage at minimum
limits and at above-minimum limits. The Plaintiff also requests
that the Defendants calculate the premium for the illusory portion
of the underinsured motorist coverage. However, Plaintiff broadly
defined the class to include everyone who bought underinsured
motorist coverage, including in above-minimum amounts. Plaintiff
alleges that the Defendants mislead the putative class about the
nature of underinsured motorist coverage as to everyone who
purchased that coverage.

Therefore, any distinction between minimum and above-minimum
policies is unnecessary, because the Plaintiff alleges that
underinsured motorist coverage is misleading at all levels. For
example, Plaintiff asserts that he and other putative class members
were misled into thinking they would receive the full amount of
coverage, when in fact the first $25,000 of underinsured motorist
coverage is generally not accessible. In other words, Plaintiff
requests that each underinsured motorist policy be increased by
$25,000.

Now that the Defendant has produced evidence that it is possible
that more than $5,000,000 is at issue in this case, Plaintiff has
the burden of showing it is legally certain that no more than
$5,000,000 is at issue in this case. Plaintiff failed to carry this
burden and does not even argue that the damages could be less than
$5,000,000.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 27, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3wbd4rv from
Leagle.com.

Freeman J Palmer, individually and on behalf of other similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff, represented by Corbin Hildebrandt,
Corbin Hildebrandt, P.C., 1400 CentralSEAlbuquerque, NM 87106 &
Kedar Bhasker, Law Office of Kedar Bhasker, LLC, 1400 Central Ave
SE Ste. 2000, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87106

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Defendant,
represented by Elizabeth M. Piazza, Guebert Bruckner PC, Terry R.
Guebert, Guebert Bruckner P.C., 6801 Jefferson Street, NE, Suite
400, Albuquerque, NM 87109, James Gaughan -- jgaughan@rshc-law.com
-- Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph A.
Cancila, Jr. -- jcancila@rshc-law.com -- Riley Safer Holmes &
Cancila, LLP, pro hac vice & Mariangela Seale --
mseale@rshc-law.com -- Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila LLP, pro hac
vice.

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company & State Farm General Insurance
Company, Defendants, represented by Elizabeth M. Piazza, Guebert
Bruckner PC & Terry R. Guebert, Guebert Bruckner P.C.


STEARNS LENDING: Bid to Certify Class Denied; Olachea Suit Nixed
----------------------------------------------------------------
James V. Selna issued a ruling in the lawsuit captioned Renee
Olachea v. Stearns Lending, LLC, Case No. 8:17-cv-01741-JVS-KES
(C.D. Cal.):

   -- denying Plaintiff Lori Solarski's motion for class
      certification;

   -- granting Stearns' motion for summary judgment for lack of
      standing;

   -- denying as moot Ms. Solarski's motion for summary judgment;
      and

   -- dismissing the action.

The Proposed Class is defined as "all persons who had an
FHA-Insured Loan secured by real property in California that was
originated between June 1, 1996 and January 20, 2015, where (i)
Stearns was the mortgagee as of the date the total amount due on
the FHA-Insured Loan was brought to zero, (ii) Stearns collected
Post-Payment Interest on the FHA-Insured Loan during the applicable
Limitations Period, and (iii) the borrower made a prepayment
inquiry, request for payoff figures, or tender of prepayment but
did not receive a Payoff Statement containing the verbatim
Post-Payment Interest disclosure language in Housing Handbook,
4330.1 REV-5 Appendix 8(c) or the verbatim language contained in
the "Payoff Disclosure" referenced in the Housing Handbook 4000.1.
Excluded from the Class are Stearns, all officers, directors, and
employees of Stearns, and their legal representatives, heirs, or
assigns, and any Judges to whom the Action is assigned, their
staffs, and their immediate families."

Ms. Solarski filed a motion under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to certify a class of California borrowers
asserting a claim under the unlawful prong of California's Uniform
Competition Law.

Judge Selna opined that Ms. Solarski fails to meet the
prerequisites for class certification under Rule 23(a).  Stearns is
entitled to summary judgment because Ms. Solarski, the sole
remaining Plaintiff, lacks standing, Judge Selna said.  Because Ms.
Solarski never had standing in the first instance, the Plaintiff's
counsel is not granted leave to substitute a new class
representative, Judge Selna added.[CC]


STEELMASTER INDUSTRIES: Wooton's Bid to Certify FLSA Class Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Roy B. Dalton, Jr., denied the Plaintiff's Motion to
Conditionally Certify Collective Action and Facilitate Notice to
Potential Class Members in the lawsuit titled TOM WOOTON v.
STEELMASTER INDUSTRIES, INC., Case No. 6:19-cv-00419-RBD-GJK (M.D.
Fla.).

Judge Dalton opines that the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate
that "there are other employees . . . who desire to 'opt-in' and
who are 'similarly situated' with respect to their job requirements
and with regard to their pay provisions."

Plaintiff Tom Wooton sues his former employer Defendant Steelmaster
Industries, Inc. ("Steelmaster") under the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA") for unpaid overtime compensation on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated.  He seeks conditional certification
and notice to this proposed class:

     All persons employed as hourly paid laborers for Defendant
     for the past three years (plus any applicable tolling) from
     the date of the Complaint to the present who worked more
     than forty (40) hours in one or more workweeks, who were not
     paid full and proper overtime compensation for all hours
     worked due to Defendant's timekeeping practices.[CC]


STEIN MART: Faces Equal Access Suit in Middle District of Florida
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Stein Mart, Inc. The
case is captioned as Equal Access Action Network, Jack Kang, and
Anneth Lezcano, individually, and on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. Stein Mart, Inc.,
the Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-00768-TJC-MCR (M.D. Fla., June 25,
2019). The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Timothy J. Corrigan.
The suit alleges Americans with Disabilities Act violation.

Stein Mart is an American discount men and women's department store
chain based in Jacksonville, Florida. The company reported a profit
of $25.6 million in 2013 with operation of 260 stores in 29 states.
Stein Mart has locations primarily in the Southeast, Texas and
California.h

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Yvette J. Harrell, Esq.
          LEGAL JUSTICE ADVOCATES, LLP
          1629 K Street NW, Suite 300
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 290-6671
          E-mail: counsel@yhlegal.com

STEWARD MELBOURNE: Hauser Suit Removed to M.D. Florida
------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned LAWRENCE HAUSER, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. STEWARD MELBOURNE
HOSPITAL, INC., a Delaware Corporation; and STEWARD HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, Defendants, Case
No. 2019-CA-029553-XXXX-XX was removed from the Circuit Court of
the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Brevard County, Florida
to the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Orlando Division on June 21, 2019, and assigned Case No.
6:19-cv-01150-CEM-TBS.

The Complaint alleges that Defendants improperly charged emergency
room facility fees to individuals who were provided emergency care
after presenting at an emergency room facility operated by
Defendants or one of their affiliates since May 1, 2017.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jared Michael Lee, Esq.
     JACKSON LEE PA
     1991 Longwood Lake Mary Road
     Longwood, FL 32750
     Phone: 407.477.4401
     Fax: 407.477.4949
     Email: jared@jacksonleepa.com
            service@jacksonleepa.com

The Defendants are represented by:

     Kamal Sleiman, Esq.
     MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP
     333 SE 2nd Avenue, Suite 4500
     Miami, FL 33131-4336
     Phone: 305.329.4420
     Fax: 305.675.8403
     Email: ksleiman@mwe.com


SUNRISE CREDIT: Alvarado Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Sunrise Credit
Services, Inc. The case is styled as Maritza Alvarado individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Sunrise Credit Services, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-03895
(E.D. N.Y., July 5, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Sunrise Credit Services Inc is a debt collection agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     David M. Barshay, Esq.
     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     Barshay Sanders, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 281-7601
     Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com
            csanders@barshaysanders.com

TEXAS ROADHOUSE: Mullen Sues over ADA Violations
------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Texas Roadhouse,
Inc. for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (ADA). The case is captioned BARTLEY M. MULLEN, JR.,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, vs.
TEXAS ROADHOUSE, INC., Case No. 2:19-cv-00738-PJP (W.D. Pa., June
21, 2019). This civil rights-related suit is assigned to Hon. Judge
Peter J. Phipps.

Headquartered in Louisville, Kentucky, Texas Roadhouse is an
American chain restaurant that specialize in steaks. [BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:

     R. Bruce Carlson, Esq.
     CARLSON LYNCH, LLP
     1133 Penn Avenue 5th Floor
     Pittsburgh, PA 15222
     Telephone: (412) 322-9243
     E-mail: bcarlson@carlsonlynch.com

TREL RESTAURANT: Fischler Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Trel Restaurant Inc.
The case is styled as Brian Fischler Individually and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Trel Restaurant
Inc.
doing business as: Manhattan Manor, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-06266 (S.D. N.Y., July 6, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Trel Restaurant Inc was founded in 1981. The Company's line of
business includes operating of bars, night clubs, and other
locations that sell alcoholic drinks.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
     Lipsky Lowe LLP
     630 Third Avenue
     Fifth Floor
     New York, NY 10017
     Phone: (212) 392-4772
     Fax: (212) 444-1030
     Email: chris@lipskylowe.com



UNIFUND CCR: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Connor FDCPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum denying Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss in the case captioned VERONICA CONNOR, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. UNIFUND CCR, LLCCivil
Action No. 19-1375. (E.D. Pa.).

This putative class action involves alleged violations of the Fair
Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA), by Defendant Unifund CCR,
LLC in sending a debt collection letter containing misleading and
deceptive language to Plaintiff Veronica Connor and members of the
putative class.  

Connor alleges that she was harmed as a result of receiving the
Letter because Unifund did not clearly advise her that she must
dispute any alleged debt in writing, as required by the FDCPA.
Connor further alleges that Unifund's actions are part of a pattern
and practice used to collect consumer debts.

Section 1692g (Governing Proper Validation Notices)

Connor asserts that the language of the Letter fails to inform the
least sophisticated debtor that she may only effectively dispute
the validity of the debt in writing. The use of the word if in the
Validation Notice, particularly following Unifund's invitation to
contact its office via telephone to address this matter, allegedly
frames written communication as a sufficient rather than necessary
condition of a valid dispute, thus implying that such disputes may
be made verbally as well.

The governing statute, 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g, was enacted to
ensure debtors would receive adequate notice of their rights under
the FDCPA, which broadly protects consumers from abusive debt
collection practices. Under Section 1692g(a)(3), debt collectors
must provide consumers, either in the initial communication or
within five days afterwards, with a written notice stating that the
collector will assume the debt is valid unless the consumer
disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof within
thirty days.  

Whether language in a collection letter violates the FDCPA is a
question of law, interpreted from the perspective of the least
sophisticated debtor. This standard is lower than ordinary
reasonableness but still demands a quotient of reasonableness, a
basic level of understanding, and a willingness to read with care.
Accordingly, a consumer's interpretation may invoke Sewction
1692g's protection so long as it is not bizarre or idiosyncratic.

District court judges within this Circuit have disagreed on whether
the language of Section 1692g(a)(3)-(5) is susceptible to
misinterpretation by the least sophisticated debtor.
  
In the absence of binding precedent from the Third Circuit on the
subject, this Court declines to hold that Connor's claim must fail
as a matter of law. In addition to the fact that the statutory
language alone may not effectively convey the proper method of
dispute to the least sophisticated debtor, Unifund precedes this
language with an invitation to call the office to address this
matter. The Third Circuit has previously held that an invitation to
call may impermissibly overshadow a subsequent validation notice
mirroring the language of Section 1692g.  

Unlike Caprio, Caprio, 709 F.3d at 152, Unifund's invitation to
call is neither bolded nor in the same sentence as the invitation
to dispute the debt in writing. However, its immediate proximity to
the validation notice may overshadow the statutory language so as
to confuse a least sophisticated debtor, who could interpret this
matter to encompass the validity of the alleged debt. Such
overshadowing violates Section 1692g.  

This Court declines to dismiss Connor's Section 1692g claim at this
stage. The Motion is therefore denied as to Count II.

Section 1692e (Prohibiting False, Misleading, and Deceptive
Statements)

Connor further alleges that Unifund's Letter, by including language
suggesting a debtor may validly raise a dispute via telephone,
makes a false and misleading representation in violation of Section
1692e. This section prohibits debt collectors from using any false,
deceptive, or misleading representation in connection with the
collection of any debt. Unifund argues that nothing in Unifund's
collection letter is false or misleading because the Letter
included, without overshadowing, the language required by Section
1692g.   

Unifund also argues, and Connor does not dispute, that analysis of
the Section 1692g claim is dispositive of the Section 1692e claim
because the two claims are based on the same factual allegations,
i.e. the same language in Unifund's Letter. This Court has
previously noted the Third Circuit's recognition of the close
relationship between the two statutory sections.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 27, 2019 Memorandum
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2s9qxuq from Leagle.com.

VERONICA CONNOR, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiff, represented by ARI H. MARCUS --
Ari@MarcusZelman.com -- MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC.

UNIFUND CCR, LLC, Defendant, represented by MICHAEL A. HYNUM, HYNUM
LAW, 2608 North Third Street Harrisburg, PA 17110.


US HEALTHWORKS: Rodriguez Appeals N.D. Cal. Ruling to 9th Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Catrina R. Rodriguez filed an appeal from a Court ruling
in the lawsuit titled Catrina Rodriguez v. U.S. Healthworks, Inc.,
et al., Case No. 4:17-cv-06924-KAW, in the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California, Oakland.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 27,
2019, Magistrate Judge Kandis A. Westmore (i) denied the
Plaintiff's motion to remand, and (ii) granted the Defendants'
motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff Rodriguez filed the instant putative class action against
Defendants U.S. Healthworks, Inc. and U.S. Healthworks Medical
Group, asserting violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
("FCRA") and similar California laws.  On July 16, 2013, the
Plaintiff applied for employment with Defendants through an online
employment application.  The online application system includes
several stand-alone pages.

The appellate case is captioned as Catrina Rodriguez v. U.S.
Healthworks, Inc., et al., Case No. 19-16199, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by July 12, 2019;

   -- Transcript is due on August 12, 2019;

   -- Appellant Catrina R. Rodriguez's opening brief is due on
      September 20, 2019;

   -- Appellees U.S. Healthworks Medical Group, PC and U.S.
      Healthworks, Inc.'s answering brief is due on October 21,
      2019; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant CATRINA R. RODRIGUEZ, on behalf of herself, all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Chaim Shaun Setareh, Esq.
          SETAREH LAW GROUP
          315 S. Beverly Drive, Suite 315
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Telephone: (310) 888-7771
          E-mail: shaun@setarehlaw.com

Defendants-Appellee U.S. HEALTHWORKS, INC., a Delaware corporation,
and U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP, PC, A Delaware corporation, are
represented by:

          Fraser A. McAlpine, Esq.
          JACKSON LEWIS PC
          50 California Street
          San Francisco, CA 94111-4615
          Telephone: (415) 394-9400
          E-mail: Fraser.McAlpine@jacksonlewis.com


WAL-MART ASSOCIATES: Appeals Ruling in Magadia Suit to 9th Cir.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Wal-Mart Associates, Inc., and Walmart Inc. filed an
appeal from a Court ruling in the lawsuit titled RODERICK MAGADIA,
individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated v.
WAL-MART ASSOCIATES, INC., a Delaware corporation; WALMART INC., a
Delaware corporation, Case No. 5:17-cv-00062-LHK, in the U.S.
District Court for Northern District of California, San Jose.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, in December
2016, Plaintiff Roderick Magadia filed a putative class action in
state court against Wal-Mart alleging four causes of action,
including failure to provide accurate wage statements under
California Labor Code Section 226(a)(9) related to an overtime wage
payment identified as "OVERTIME/INCT" on wage statements issued to
the putative class.  The Plaintiff specifically alleged that the
wage statements violated Section 226(a)(9) because they failed to
include the hourly rate and hours worked applicable to the
OVERTIME/INCT item of pay.

Wal-Mart removed the case to the District Court pursuant to the
Class Action Fairness Ac.  The District Court granted class
certification on January 9, 2018, certifying a class consisting of
all current and former California non-exempt employees of Wal-Mart
who received 'OVERTIME/INCT,' at any time between Dec. 2, 2015,
through the present.

The appellate case is captioned as Roderick Magadia v. Wal-Mart
Associates, Inc., et al., Case No. 19-16184, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- July 11, 2019 -- Transcript shall be ordered;

   -- August 12, 2019 -- Transcript shall be filed by court
      reporter;

   -- September 19, 2019 -- Appellants' opening brief and
      excerpts of record shall be served and filed pursuant to
      FRAP 31 and 9th Cir. R. 31-2.1;

   -- October 21, 2019 -- Appellee's answering brief and excerpts
      of record shall be served and filed pursuant to FRAP 31 and
      9th Cir. R. 31-2.1; and

   -- The optional appellants' reply brief shall be filed and
      served within 21 days of service of the appellee's brief,
      pursuant to FRAP 31 and 9th Cir. R. 31-2.1.[BN]


WAL-MART STORES: Seeks 9th Circuit Review of Ruling in Mays Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., filed an appeal from a Court
ruling in the lawsuit titled Lerna Mays v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
Case No. 2:18-cv-02318-AB-KK, in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California, Los Angeles.

The appellate case is captioned as Lerna Mays v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., Case No. 19-55627, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiff
appealed a ruling in the lawsuit.  That appellate case is entitled
Lerna Mays v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Case No. 19-55318.

The Hon. Judge Hon. Andre Birotte Jr. previously entered an order:

   1. denying Plaintiff's motion to certify Final Wage
      Statement Subclass;

   2. directing parties to meet and confer and submit a joint
      proposed class notice within 14 days of the date of the
      Order, along with a proposed order approving the notice

   3. certifying a Wage Statement Class of:

      "all Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. California workers who received
      one or more wage payments during the period from Friday,
      December 16, 2016 to January 31, 2018.

   4. appointing Lerna Mays as Class Representative; and

   5. appointing Harris & Ruble as Class Counsel.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by July 1, 2019;

   -- Transcript is due on July 30, 2019;

   -- Appellant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.'s opening brief is due on
      September 9, 2019;

   -- Appellee Lerna Mays' answering brief is due on October 9,
      2019; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee LERNA MAYS, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Dale Alan Harris, Esq.
          Priya Mohan, Esq.
          HARRIS & RUBLE
          4771 Cromwell Avenue
          Los Angeles, CA 90027
          Telephone: (323) 962-3777
          Facsimile: (323) 962-3004
          E-mail: aharris@harrisandruble.com
                  pmohan@harrisandruble.com

Defendant-Appellant WAL-MART STORES, INC., a Delaware corporation,
is represented by:

          Susan Eileen Coleman, Esq.
          Cheryl Johnson-Hartwell, Esq.
          Paloma Peracchio, Esq.
          Mitchell Aaron Wrosch, Esq.
          BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP
          444 South Flower Street, Suite 2400
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 236-0600
          E-mail: scoleman@bwslaw.com
                  cjohnson-hartwell@bwslaw.com
                  pperacchio@bwslaw.com
                  mwrosch@bwslaw.com

               - and -

          Theane Evangelis, Esq.
          GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
          333 South Grand Avenue
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-3197
          Telephone: (213) 229-7726
          Facsimile: (213) 229-6726
          E-mail: tevangelis@gibsondunn.com


WAYFARE, LP: Faces Aldana & Najarro Wage-and-Hour Suit
------------------------------------------------------
MARTHA G. ALDANA and JOSE NAJARRO, as individuals and on behalf of
others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. WAYFARE, LP dba
WAYFARE TAVERN, WAYFARE MANAGER, LLC dba WAYFARE TAVERN, and DOES 1
through 10, the Defendants, Case No. CGC-79-576943 (Cal. Super.,
June 25, 2019), contends that Defendant violated the California
Labor Code by creating and maintaining policies, practices and
customs that knowingly deny employees compensation for
improper/inadequate meal periods, compensation for denied proper
rest breaks, and accurate and compliant itemized wage statements.

According to the complaint, the Defendants have acted intentionally
and with deliberate indifference and conscious disregard to the
rights of all employees in receiving all wages and other benefits
due and minimally required of every employer under California law.

Wayfare Inc. produces and sells dairy-free products to its
customers.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Arlo Garcia Uriarte, Esq.
          Un Kei Wu, Esq.
          LIBERATIONLAWGROUP,P.C.
          2760 Mission Street
          San Francisco, CA 94110
          Telephone: (415) 695-1000
          Facsimile: (415) 695-1006

WELSPUN INDIA: Court Stays Brower Suit Pending Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order staying the Action in the case captioned
HAROLD BROWER, ASHLEY MISTLER and JUDI TALILI, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
WELSPUN INDIA, LTD., Defendant. Case No. 2:19-cv-00956-WBS-DB.
(E.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs are parties to a related federal class action
pending in the Southern District of New York, captioned In re
Welspun Litigation, S.D.N.Y. Case No. 16-cv-06782-VB (SDNY
Action).

Welspun India Ltd. (Welspun) also is a defendant in Hansen-Mitchell
et al. v. Welspun USA, Inc. et al., Case No. 19-L-391 (Cir. Ct. of
Ill., 20th Judicial Circuit, St. Clair County, Ill.)
(Hansen-Mitchell Action), another related case where the parties
entered into a class action settlement.

The parties in this Action, the SDNY Action, and the
Hansen-Mitchell Action desire a global resolution of all pending
and future disputes and proceedings related to the claims against
Welspun, and have executed the Agreement to Resolve Pending and
Future Disputes attached as Exhibit 1 (Agreement).

Pursuant to the Agreement: (1) the plaintiffs in the
Hansen-Mitchell Action will file an amended motion for preliminary
approval of class settlement on or before July 1, 2019 (2) the
parties in this Action agreed the Plaintiffs would stipulate that
all activity and deadlines in this Action would be stayed pending
approval of the settlement in the Hansen-Mitchell Action and (3) if
settlement is approved in the Hansen-Mitchell Action, Plaintiffs
agreed to dismiss this Action with prejudice upon the Effective
Date of the settlement.

Pursuant to the parties' Agreement, the Plaintiffs stipulate to
stay all activity and deadlines in this Action at least until the
Effective Date of the Hansen-Mitchell settlement agreement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 27, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y5kx8tl6 from Leagle.com.

Harold Brower, Ashley Mistler & Judi Talili, Plaintiffs,
represented by Joel Dashiell Smith -- jsmith@bursor.com -- Bursor &
Fisher, P.A. & Scott A. Bursor -- scott@bursor.com -- Bursor &
Fisher PA.


WILL CTY, ILL: Lee Files Prisoner Rights Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against County of Will and
its officials. The case is styled as Simon A. Lee individually and
on behalf of all similarly situated inmates at the Will County
Adult Detention Facility, Plaintiff v. County of Will,
President/Commissioner of Will County Board, Mike Kelly Sheriff,
Dan Santerelli Warden, Unknown Named Lieutenants, Unknown Named
Sargent(s), Unknown Named Sheriff Police and Sheriff Deputies,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-04244 (N.D. Ill., June 25, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Prisoner Civil Rights.

Will County is a county in the northeastern part of the state of
Illinois. According to the 2010 census, it had a population of
677,560, which is an increase of 34.9% from 502,266 in 2000, making
it the fourth-most populous county in Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


WYETH INC: Bid to Limit Recovery Up to $590.2MM in Krueger Granted
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned APRIL KRUEGER,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. WYETH, INC. f/k/a AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS, a
Pennsylvania corporation; WYETH PHARMACEUTICALS f/k/a WYETH-AYERST
PHARMACEUTICALS, a Pennsylvania corporation; and DOES 1 through 100
Inclusive, Defendants. Case No. 3:03-cv-2496-JAH (MDD). (S.D.
Cal.).

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Wyeth, Inc. and
Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc.'s (collectively Wyeth) motion for
summary judgment, or in the alternative, partial summary judgment
pursuant to Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(Fed. R. Civ. P.)

The Defendants manufacture a variety of hormone replacement therapy
(HRT) products, including the drugs known as Prempro, Premarin and
Premphase. Wyeth employed a standardized pervasive marketing
campaign in California, and throughout the United States, aimed at
rebalancing consumer and prescriber perceptions about the risks and
benefits of Wyeth's HRT drugs. This representative action arises
from Plaintiff April Krueger's (Krueger) allegation that Defendants
violated California consumer protection laws. The gravamen of
Plaintiff's claims is that Defendants misrepresented the health
risks associated with their HRT drugs during a long term,
nationwide, marketing campaign, conducted in violation of (1)
California's Unfair Competition Laws (UCL) and (2) the California
Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA).

Wyeth moves for summary judgment challenging the sufficiency of
Plaintiff's evidence: first as to damages after moving to exclude
Plaintiff's expert opinion; and second as to injury and reliance on
the alleged misrepresentations and omissions by absent class
members. Because the latter raises an issue as to Article III
standing and the jurisdiction of this Court over unnamed class
members, the Court addresses these issues in reverse order.

Evidence of Injury and Reliance

Wyeth contends it is entitled to summary judgment against absent
class members because the Plaintiff has not produced evidence of
injury or reliance by class members on the alleged
misrepresentations and omissions. Defendants emphasize that at the
summary judgment phase, it is not enough to allege that class
members were likely to be deceived and injured by the Defendants'
actions. Instead, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiff must
produce competent evidence that class members actually relied on
the alleged misrepresentations and were injured as a result.

Quoting the March 30, 2011 order granting in part and denying in
part class certification, the Plaintiff relies on this Court's
ruling that under the UCL, the injury in fact requirement is
limited to the named representative, not the putative class as a
whole.  

Indeed, as the Ninth Circuit has explained: "Unlike common-law
fraud claims that focus on the victim's reliance or damages, the
UCL focuses on the perpetrator's behaviour, to state a claim under
either the UCL or the false advertising law, it is necessary only
to show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.
Actual falsehood, the perpetrator's knowledge of falsity, and
perhaps most importantly, the victim's reliance on the false
statements each of which are elements of common-law fraud claims
are not required to show a violation of California's UCL."

Nonetheless, Article III standing requires the injury-in-fact to be
fairly traceable to defendant's misconduct.

Article III Standing

Since the issuance of this Court's 2011 order certifying the class,
various courts have discussed how to evaluate Article III standing
for the purposes of class certification. In In re Deepwater
Horizon, the Fifth Circuit discusses in moderate detail the two
different approaches courts have followed: (1) focusing exclusively
on individual standing of the named plaintiffs or class
representatives and ignoring absent class members entirely, and (2)
examining the class definition to ensure absent class members
possess Article III standing.  

The traditional doctrine of standing ensures that federal courts do
not exceed their authority and imposes limitations on the category
of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to
seek redress for a legal wrong.  Such litigants include passive
class members. Thus, the Court must engage in a two-step analysis:
(1) ensuring that individual standing of the named plaintiff is
supported by competent evidence and (2) examining the class
definition to ensure that anyone within it would have standing.

Evidence of Named Plaintiff's Individual Standing

The Plaintiff contends that she would not have purchased
Defendants' HRT products but for the Defendants' minimization and
omission of information regarding serious health risks and
misrepresentation of health benefits. The Plaintiff must therefore
produce evidence that she was relieved of each dollar she spent
because of Wyeth's deceptive conduct.  

The evidence indicates that the Plaintiff stopped purchasing the
Defendants' HRT and all hormone therapy products as a result of
learning of the new information regarding increased risk of
disease. There is sufficient evidence by which a fact-finder could
conclude that the Plaintiff would not have purchased Defendants'
HRT products in the first instance had all the information been
available to her or her physician at the time of purchase.
Therefore, the Court finds, for standing purposes, Plaintiff has
offered evidence of an injury-in fact that is "fairly traceable to
the challenged conduct." Despite the Defendants' evidence to the
contrary, the Court need only find evidence exists on which the
fact-finder could reasonably find for the plaintiff.

The Plaintiff has met that burden.

Reexamination of the Class Definition

The certified class is defined as follows:

     All California consumers who purchased Wyeth's Hormone
Replacement Therapy products, Premarin, Prempro, and/or Premphase,
for personal consumption between January 1995 and January 2003, and
who do not seek personal injury damages resulting therefrom.

The Defendants' alleged unlawful conduct consists of a combination
of misrepresentations and omissions regarding the health risks and
benefits of Wyeth's HRT products, including increased risks of
breast cancer, strokes, heart attacks, cardiovascular disease,
Alzheimer's disease, and dementia.

The Plaintiff offers evidence consisting of deposition testimony,
prior trial testimony, the Defendants' internal documents, medical
studies, and scientific journals which indicate that between 1995
and 2002, Wyeth hired authors to craft topic papers, and articles
touting only the benefits of HRT products in medical journals which
targeted doctors treating women suffering with certain
post-menopausal symptoms. The Plaintiff offers evidence to prove
Wyeth aggressively suppressed the impact of key findings in studies
linking HRT to an increased risk of breast cancer by hiring doctors
to write articles in medical literature rebutting those scientific
studies.  

The alleged omissions here, supported by competent evidence, fit
this description. Accordingly, the Court presumes and infers from
the evidence a causal connection exists between the Defendants'
unlawful conduct and the purchase of the Defendants' products by
class members specifically those purchases during the period when
the Defendants allegedly failed to disclose material facts
pertaining to the extent of health risks involved. Although
district courts have broad discretion to revisit class
certification throughout the legal proceedings before the court,
the Court finds it unnecessary to do so here. The class definition
is sufficiently defined to ensure members within it have standing,
and narrow enough to avoid encompassing a large number of members
who could not have been harmed. Further, the Court finds the class
definition conforms with the Plaintiff's prevailing theory of
liability.  

The Defendants' motion for summary judgment against absent class
members on the grounds that the Plaintiff has not produced evidence
of injury or reliance by the class is denied.

Evidence of Damages and Restitution

First, the Defendants argue the calculations offered by the
Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Rosenthal, are non-compliant with
controlling law and therefore inadmissible for failure to apply the
appropriate legal formula. The Defendants conclude that the
Plaintiff fails to present a means by which a fact-finder could
determine actual damages under the CLRA or restitution under the
UCL and therefore Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law.

Alternatively, Wyeth moves for partial summary judgment to
foreclose recovery by the class of the full retail price of HRT
products, and to limit damages and restitution, if any, to
out-of-pocket costs paid by Plaintiff and class members.

CLRA Remedies

The CLRA provides, in pertinent part,

Any consumer who suffers any damage as a result of the use or
employment by any person of a method, act, or practice declared to
be unlawful by Section 1770 may bring an action to recover (1)
Actual damages, but in no case shall the total award of damages in
a class action be less than one thousand dollars ($1,000). (2) An
order enjoining the methods, acts, or practices (3) Restitution of
property (4) Punitive damages.(5) Any other relief that the court
deems proper.

The Plaintiff's prayer for relief includes class refund damages
under the CLRA.  Krueger intends to introduce Dr. Rosenthal's full
prescription price or, in the alternative, out-of-pocket
calculations to illustrate the amount paid by the class for Wyeth's
HRT products.

Wyeth first asserts that Dr. Rosenthal's damages calculations
supporting Krueger's CLRA claims should be excluded for failure to
account for the value received from the HRT products.  
Neither party disputes that actual damages under the CLRA are a
separate and distinct remedy from that of restitution under either
the CLRA or the UCL. Actual damage pursuant to the CLRA is the
difference between the actual value of that with which the
defrauded person parted and the actual value of that which he
received.

Although the Plaintiff argues that she would not have purchased HRT
but for Wyeth's deceptive conduct, when calculating actual damages,
the Court must look to what actually occurred, taking into
consideration that which the Plaintiff did, in fact, receive and
the market value of the product both with and without the
misrepresentation.  

The Plaintiff provides no evidence to support the market value of
the alleged riskier and less beneficial HRT product she received in
comparison to what she paid10; nor does she provide evidence of the
market value of the HRT product if the false representations had
been true. Plaintiff offers no evidence of the monetary effect of
the alleged misrepresentations or omissions on the market price of
Defendants' products. Although it is likely that a consumer would
be induced to pay more for a product asserted to have numerous
health benefits and minimal risk than a similar product advertised
as having less health benefits and serious risks,  such evidence
has not been presented to the Court. Because the Court has no facts
from which it can determine actual retail prices or the retail
price differential between Wyeth's HRT products and similar HRT
products sold in California during the same time period, the
statutory minimum is the appropriate award of damages.  

The Court finds that there is an absence of evidence to support
Plaintiff's claim for actual damages under the CLRA and therefore
GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to actual
damages.

UCL Remedies

The UCL prohibits unlawful and unfair business practices. Pursuant
to the statute, remedies for violations of the UCL are limited
Under the UCL, prevailing plaintiffs are generally limited to
injunctive relief and restitution. Restitution is broadly designed
to restore the status quo by returning to the plaintiff funds in
which he or she has an ownership interest.

Krueger requests restitution under the UCL and asserts that Dr.
Rosenthal's figures are properly calculated under Plaintiff's
theory of liability. While both parties agree that restitution is
an appropriate remedy for a UCL violation, they disagree on the
method of calculation.  Krueger offers two alternative measures of
restitution: (i) the full-refund models and (ii) the disgorgement
of profit model.

Full-Refund Models of Restitution

The Plaintiff offers two potential refund models in support of a
restitutionary measure of damages derived from Rosenthal's
calculations of the full prescription price, on one hand, and the
out-of-pocket cost on the other. Rosenthal calculated the full
prescription cost paid by all class members by multiplying the
number of prescriptions filled in California minus those
Californians claiming personal injury by the average retail price
of Defendants' HRT products.

She calculated the total out-of-pocket cost of all class members by
adding the full prescription price for uninsured California
consumers, with the average amount of copay or coinsurance paid by
insured California consumers.

The Defendants argue that for Plaintiff to proceed on a full refund
theory of restitution, Plaintiff must present sufficient evidence
the HRT products were worthless. Plaintiff does not contend that
Defendant's drugs were valueless or worthless or that she did not
receive any benefit. In fact, Plaintiff testified that Wyeth's HRT
alleviated hot flashes, reduced symptoms of insomnia, and improved
memory and everyday functioning.

The Defendants highlight that Plaintiff's own expert, Dr. Graham
Colditz, has opined that hormone therapy confers significant
benefits, including: (i) temporary decreases in hot flashes and
night sweats (ii) decreased bone fractures and (iii) increased
libido.

However, Krueger's theory of liability does not rest on the
assertion that she did not receive any benefit for her bargain, but
instead, on the contention that she would not have purchased the
hormone replacement therapy, despite its benefits, had it been
marketed accurately. Plaintiff filed a UCL class action lawsuit
against Kohl's Department Store alleging that Kohls had induced
plaintiff to purchase merchandise at a purportedly marked down sale
price by making false claims that each of its products had
previously sold at a significantly higher retail price.

In doing so, plaintiff alleged that the misrepresentation as to the
nature and amount of price discounts induced consumers to purchase
merchandise which they otherwise would not have purchased.  

Here, however, both parties have produced evidence to support their
positions. Plaintiff's theory is that but for Defendant's alleged
misrepresentations and omissions, Plaintiff would not have
purchased the HRT product and therefore Plaintiff would have paid
nothing. Plaintiff must point to evidence in the record that every
dollar spent was based, at least in part, on either: (1)
Defendants' alleged misrepresentations that the HRT reduced the
risk of various diseases or (2) Defendants' alleged failure to warn
women of the increased risk of diseases that accompanied the use of
their hormone replacement therapy.   

As such, at the summary judgment phase, it is not enough for
Plaintiff to simply allege facts. She must also produce sufficient
evidence to support entitlement to one of the alternative measures.
Plaintiff must "go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits,
or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, designate specific facts.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not presented evidence that
class members would not have purchased Defendants' HRT products but
for the alleged misrepresentations and omissions; and contend that
the undisputed facts establish the opposite.

In response, Plaintiff asserts that she has put forth sufficient
evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact.
Plaintiff's response in opposition and contemporaneously filed
declaration contain evidence that the National Institute of Health
abruptly terminated the estrogen-progestin hormone therapy (EPHT)
sections of the nationwide HRT clinical trial after study
participants displayed an increased risk of disease, including
breast cancer, dementia, Alzheimer's, stoke, and venous thrombosis.


In determining whether a triable issue of material fact exists, the
Court's role is not to weigh the credibility of purportedly
conflicting evidence. Rather, all inferences to be drawn from the
evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Accordingly, the Court finds that the evidence
presented is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether a reasonable consumer would have purchased
Defendants' products had she known all the information and whether
Defendants' alleged misrepresentations and omissions were a
determining factor in Plaintiff's decision to purchase. If the
fact-finder finds in favor of Plaintiff, restitution, amounting to
a full refund would be an appropriate remedy under the law.

Therefore, Defendants' motion to exclude Dr. Rosenthal's opinion as
to restitution based upon a full-refund is DENIED.

Restitutionary v. Non-Restitutionary Disgorgement

Defendants contend that when a product bestows some value to the
consumer, any award based on a sum of profit would equate to
non-restitutionary disgorgement, which is unavailable to Plaintiff
under the UCL However, it is not always necessary for a
restitutionary award to account for the benefit received. As the
California Supreme Court has explained:

The distinction between restitutionary and non-restitutionary
disgorgement turns on whether the money plaintiff seeks was
obtained by the defendant from the plaintiff in the first place. If
so, disgorgement is restitutionary.

A disgorgement of profits earned by defendants as result of
allegedly unfair practices is available under the UCL to extent
that it is restitutionary. Defendant argues that that
restitutionary disgorgement must follow ordinary restitutionary
principles, limiting any award to the amount necessary to restore
the status quo. Defendants' point has merit, as courts have
recognized that the defendant's benefit and the plaintiff's loss
are typically the same.
  
Defendants argue Plaintiff's actual loss, if any, would be capped
at the class members' out-of-pocket costs which Dr. Rosenthal has
calculated at $590.2 million. According to Plaintiff's expert, this
$590.2 million loss (by the class) was transformed into a $771.6
million gain by defendants. Dr. Rosenthal's calculations began with
the data provided by Defendants' profit and loss statement. She
then allocated annual figures on a quarterly basis.   

The ratio of California prescriptions to national prescriptions was
then multiplied to Wyeth's national profits to determine the
percentage of Wyeth's profits derived from the sale of HRT products
to Californians. Finally, in order to exclude personal injury
claimants, she used the ratio of personal injury claimant
prescriptions to total California prescriptions and multiplied that
percentage with Wyeth's California profits to obtain a total unjust
enrichment of $771.6 million. However, this amount includes all
California profits earned as a result of the unfair business
practice regardless of whether those profits were paid to Wyeth by
class members or a third-party source.

A restitution award under the UCL must be supported by substantial
evidence, however the law requires only that some reasonable basis
of computation be used. Dr. Rosenthal's calculations, specifically
the out-of-pocket refund model and Wyeth Profit model, provide a
reasonable basis and constitute a suitable method under Plaintiff's
theory of liability by which to calculate restitutionary
disgorgement.

Accordingly, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment with
respect to Plaintiff's claims for restitution under the UCL is
denied.  The Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment
limiting recovery to the amount actually paid by Plaintiff and
class members, up to $590.2 million, is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 1, 2019 Decision and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3qpbsn5 from
Leagle.com.

April Krueger, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony D. Birchfield, Jr.
-- Birchfield@BeasleyAllen.com -- Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin,
Portis & Miles, PC, Breean Walas, Walas Law Firm, PLLC, 708 W 2nd
St; Little Rock, Arkansas 72201, pro hac vice, David B. Byrne, III,
David B Byrne III, 218 Commerce St., Montgomery, AL 36104-2540, pro
hac vice, Eileen L. McGeever, Rushall and McGeever, 6100 Innovation
Way Carlsbad, California 92009, P. Leigh O'Dell, Beasley Allen Crow
Methvin Portis & Miles PC, 218 Commerce Street, Montgomery, AL
36104 & William Gary Holt, Gary Holt & Associates PA, 708 West
Second Street, P.O. Box 3887Little Rock, AR 72201, pro hac vice.

Wyeth Inc, a Pennsylvania corporation, Defendant, represented by
Alexandra Walsh -- awalsh@wilkinsonwalsh.com -- Wilkinson Walsh +
Eskovitz LLP, Bert L. Slonim -- bert.slonim@arnoldporter.com --
Kaye Scholer LLP, pro hac vice, Bert L. Wolff, Skadden Arps Slate
Meagher & Flom LLP, 1096 Avenue of the Americas. New York, NY
10036, pro hac vice, Beth A. Wilkinson --
bwilkinson@wilkinsonwalsh.com -- Wilkinson Walsh + Eskovitz LLP,
pro hac vice, Christopher M. Young --
christopher.young@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper US, David C. Bonnin,
DLA Piper LLP, pro hac vice, Grace Lee elee@shb.com -- Shook Hardy
& Bacon LLP, Hayden A. Coleman, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom
LLP, 4 Times Square Floor 24, New York, NY, 10036, pro hac vice,
Jennifer L. Saulino, Wilkinson Walsh + Eskovitz LLP, 900 M. Street
NW, Suite 800. Washington, DC 20036, pro hac vice.


ZANKER ROAD: Faces Vazquez Suit in California Superior Court
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Zanker Road Resource
Management Ltd. The case is styled as Luz M. Godinez Vazquez, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff,
vs. Zanker Road Resource Management Ltd., and Does 1-50, the
Defendants, Case No. 34-2019-00259276-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super., June
25, 2019). The suit alleges employment-related violation.

Zanker Road Resource Management Ltd provides waste management
services. The Company offers recycling, construction, dumpsters,
demolition, and other waste services to achieve green goal. Zanker
Road Resource Management serves customers in the State of
California.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff is:

          Nazo Leon Koulloukian, Esq.
          KOUL LAW FIRM
          3435 Wilshire Blvd, Ste 1710
          Los Angeles, CA 90010-2003
          Telephone: (213) 761-5484
          Facsimile: (818) 561-3938
          E-mail: nazo@koullaw.com

ZUORA INC: Howard G. Smith Files Securities Fraud Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Law Offices of Howard G. Smith reminds investors of the upcoming
August 13, 2019 deadline to file a lead plaintiff motion in the
class action filed on behalf of investors who purchased Zuora, Inc.
("Zuora" or the "Company") (NYSE: ZUO) securities between April 12,
2018 and May 30, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period").

Investors suffering losses on their Zuora investments are
encouraged to contact the Law Offices of Howard G. Smith to discuss
their legal rights in this class action at 888-638-4847 or by email
to howardsmith@howardsmithlaw.com

On May 30, 2019, the Company lowered its fiscal 2020 revenue
guidance to a range of $268 million to $278 million, from prior
guidance of $289 million to $293.5 million, citing problems
integrating RevPro, as well as sales execution problems.

On this news, the Company's share price fell $5.91, or nearly 30%,
to close at $13.99 on May 31, 2019, thereby injuring investors.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) that the Company would focus on implementing RevPro
for new customers ahead of the deadline to comply with accounting
standard ASC 606; (2) that, as a result, the Company lacked
adequate resources to integrate RevPro with the core business; (3)
that the Company would focus on RevPro integration a year after the
acquisition closed; (4) that delays in integrating RevPro would
materially impact the business; (5) that the market for RevPro was
limited to customers seeking to implement new accounting standards
such as ASC 606; (6) that, after the deadline for ASC 606
compliance passed, demand for RevPro was reasonably likely to
decline; and (7) that, as a result of the foregoing, Defendants'
positive statements about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable
basis.

If you purchased shares of Zuora during the Class Period you may
move the Court no later than August 13, 2019 to ask the Court to
appoint you as lead plaintiff if you meet certain legal
requirements. To be a member of the class action you need not take
any action at this time; you may retain counsel of your choice or
take no action and remain an absent member of the class action. If
you wish to learn more about this class action, or if you have any
questions concerning this announcement or your rights or interests
with respect to these matters please contact:

         Howard G. Smith, Esq.
         Law Offices of Howard G. Smith
         3070 Bristol Pike, Suite 112,
         Bensalem, Pennsylvania 19020
         Website: www.howardsmithlaw.com
         Phone: 215-638-4847
         Toll free: 888-638-4847
         Email: howardsmith@howardsmithlaw.com [GN]



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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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