CAR_Public/190724.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Wednesday, July 24, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 147

                            Headlines

1-800 CONTACTS: Thompson Seeks Okay of $5.9MM Deal With Luxottica
3M COMPANY: Jones Sues over Defective Combat Arms Earplugs
880 DRY CLEANERS: Rodriguez Files FLSA Suit in S.D. New York
ADVIA CREDIT: Approval of Class Action Settlement Sought
AETNA LIFE: Winston Seeks OT Pay for Care Management Employees

AIR LINE PILOTS: Pilot Instructor Class in Bishop Suit Certified
ALABAMA LAW: Motley Seeks to Certify Class of Drivers
ALLSTATE INSURANCE: McCleery Class Certification Denial Affirmed
ALTA OPERATIONS: Court Approves $40K Settlement in Macancela Suit
AMAZON.COM: Ortiz Seeks to Certify Class of Level 4 Shift Managers

ARBITRATION FORUMS: Court Refuses to Strike White Knight's TAC
BILL HAMILTON: Court Enters Protective Order in Lizarraga FLSA Suit
BOEING COMPANY: Pilot Y Alleges Aircraft Design Flaw Cover-Up
BOEING COMPANY: Pilot Z Alleges Aircraft Design Flaw Cover-Up
CAPE REORTS GROUP: Fischler Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

CARMAX AUTO: McElhannon Suit Remanded to Calif. State Court
CAVALRY PORTFOLIO: Walker Asserts Breach of FCDPA
CENTENE CORP: Pension Fund Derivative Suit Temporarily Stayed
CENTO FINE: Court Enlarges Dismissal Bid Deadlines in Snarr
CENTRAL PORTFOLIO: Wilkins Files Class Suit Under FDCPA

CHEERS HEALTH: Lashbrook Files Suit in S.D. Florida
CHICAGO, IL: Court Denies Bid for Class Certification in Smith Suit
CIRCLE K: Rodriguez Wage & Hour Suit Remanded to State Court
CLINICA SIERRA: Torres Files Class Suit in California
CREATIVE SUPPORTS: Webb Seeks Overtime Pay for In-Home Caretakers

CREDIT SUISSE: Court Stays C. Laver Suit Pending 9th Cir. Ruling
DEJA VU SERVICES: Roe Suit Moved to Northern Dist. of California
DELTA AIR LINES: McGarry Appeals C.D. Cal. Order to Ninth Circuit
DIGNITY HEALTH: Ct. Extends Settlement Documents Deadline in Klatt
DR PEPPER/SEVEN UP: Villanueva Sues over Biometric Data Storage

DYNAMIC RECOVERY: Reece Alleges Violation under FDCPA
EAST WISCONSIN SAVINGS: Doberstein Moves for Class Certification
EQUIFAX INC: Dawson Alleges Violation under ADA
EQUILON ENTERPRISES: Dimercurto Suit Removed to N.D. California
EVERYDAY BEAUTY: Court Denies Class Certification in Lin

EVERYDAY BEAUTY: Lin's Retail Sales Workers Class Not Certified
FCA US: Kingston Files Suit in C.D. California
FEIN & SUCH: Faces Stabile Suit in District of New Jersey
FORD MOTOR: K. Heslop Suit Remanded to Calif. Superior Court
FOREVER LIVING: Dawson Alleges Violation under ADA

FORSTER & GARBUS: Deutsch Files FDCPA Suit in New York
FORT MYERS, FL: Miller Seeks to Certify Class in Sludge Dump Suit
FOUR SEASONS: Intervenors' Bid to Remove Zyda as Class Rep Denied
GASSEN COMPANY: Johnson Files Class Suit in Minnesota
GATES CORPORATION: Class of Workers Certified in Lundine Suit

GATES CORPORATION: Court OKs Conditional Certification in Lundine
GENERAL MOTORS: Ramirez Sues Over Defective Steering System
HANDS ON NURSING: Pa. Court Dismisses Jackson FLSA Suit
HAT WORLD: Court Extends Time to File Discovery Plan in Harris
HAYNEEDLE INC: Dawson Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act

HERSHEY CO: Court Denies Bid for Summary Judgment in Clark Suit
HOME DEPOT: Summary Judgment Denied in Utne Wage & Hour Suit
HONDA: Faces Class Action Over Defective Infotainment Systems
HSBC BANK: HSBC USA Dismissed from Vasquez WCM777 Ponzi Scheme Suit
HYUNDAI: Proskauer Rose Attorneys Discuss 9th Cir. Ruling

IDEAL COLLECTION: Daddieco Files Class Suit under FDCPA
IGOURMET LLC: Conner Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
JANI-KING OF CALIFORNIA: Juarez Seeks to Certify Franchisee Class
JENNINGS GATE: Revised Settlement Agreement Filed in Bueso Suit
JUUL LABS: Must Face Class Action Over Addictive E-Cigarettes

KNAUF GIPS: Bid to Certify Builder Class Denied
KOHLBERG KRAVIS: Pruchnicki Suit Removed to District of Nevada
LABORATORY CORPORATION: Mohamad Files Class Suit in North Carolina
LG ELECTRONICS: Stangl et al. Sue over Defective Compressors
LLR INC: Court Narrows Claims in M. Hill's MCPA Suit

LOGISTICARE SOLUTIONS: Bunton Seeks to Certify Class Under FLSA
LOS TRES MAGUEYES: Pontones Seeks to Certify FLSA Class
MANNA PRO: Filing of Bid for Hale Deal Prelim Approval Due Aug. 30
MERIT RECOVERY: Court Denies Default Judgment Bid in Muldowney
MIDLAND CREDIT: Roman-Negron Suit Moved to E.D. New York

MONSANTO COMPANY: Myerses Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
NATIONAL BEVERAGE: Court Denies Sanction in L. Rice Suit
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Fails to Protect Student-Athletes, Redd Says
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Has Sacrificed Player Safety, Oubre Alleges
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Sued by Rangel for Sacrificing Player Safety

NECESSARY CLOTHING: Pilikyan Sues Over Illegal Marketing Texts
NEW MEXICO: 10th Cir. Dismisses Amaro COA Petition
NEW MOOSEJAW: Dawson Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
ONE WORLD: Rouze Sues over Defective Chemical Sprayer
OTG MANAGEMENT: Ernest et al Seek Minimum Wage, OT Pay

OZARK PIZZA: Willcutt Seeks Minimum Wage for Delivery Ddrivers
PACIFIC MERITAGE: Faces Velasquez Suit in California Super. Court
PAPA MURPHY'S: Cottle Moves to Certify Class of Store Managers
PHL VARIABLE: Susman Named Fan-Kenney/Advanced Trust Suits Counsel
POWERCOMM CONSTRUCTION: $177K Atty's Fees in Randolph Reversed

PRESTIGE COSMETICS: Dawson Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
QUEENS COUNTY, NY: Court Dismisses H. Best's Suit
QUEST DIAGNOSTICS: Woods Sues over Data Breach
QUOGUE CLUB: Fischler Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
RBC CAPITAL: Court Dismisses Luis Couple's Securities Suit

RHODE-NYC LLC: Slade Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
RICKART COLLECTION: Simmons Files FDCPA Suit in New Jersey
SMURFIT KAPPA: Court Narrows Class Claims in Chavez Suit
SOUTH JERSEY: Class Certification Denial in Cameron Suit Flipped
SPEEDY CASH: Seeks Ninth Circuit Review of Ruling in Delisle Suit

STARBUCKS: George et al Suit Transferred to S.D.N.Y.
STATION SPORTS: Ruggeiro Seeks Unpaid Overtime Compensation
STEMGENEX MEDICAL: Appeals Decision in Moorer Suit to 9th Circuit
SUMMIT APPAREL: Dawson Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
SUN COMMUNITIES: Asbury Seeks to Certify Mobile Homeowners Class

SUNEDISON SEMICONDUCTOR: Dismissal of Usenko ERISA Suit Affirmed
THIRTY-ONE GIFTS: Dawson Alleges Violation under ADA
TRANS WORLD: Rovinelli Suit Goes to Massachusetts Federal Court
TREVENA INC: Block & Leviton Named Lead Counsel in Securities Suit
UNITED FEDERAL: Settlement in Gunter Suit Has Final Approval

UNITED STATES: Court Defers Ruling in Banos Final Order Relief Bid
UNITED STATES: Lohmann Sues Over Unlawful Denial of Per Diem
VILLAS PAPILLON: Class Certification Order in Fernandez Vacated
WAL-MART: Alston, et al. Sue for Equal Pay for Female Staff
WELLS FARGO: Loughran Moves to Certify Classes and Subclasses

WISCONSIN: 8th Amendment & Due Process Claims in King May Proceed

                            *********

1-800 CONTACTS: Thompson Seeks Okay of $5.9MM Deal With Luxottica
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit styled J THOMPSON, et al.,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v.
1-800 CONTACTS, INC., et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-01183-TC-DBP (D.
Utah), ask the Court to enter the Preliminary Approval Order, to
grant the Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement
Agreement with Luxottica and to certify the Settlement Class.

Plaintiffs J Thompson, Iysha Abed, Daniel J. Bartolucci, Alexa
Bean, William P. Duncanson, Tyler Nance, Leia Pinto, Jill Schulson,
and Edward Ungvarsky, move the Court for entry of an order: (i)
granting preliminary approval of the Stipulation and Agreement of
Settlement, dated July 5, 2019, between the Plaintiffs and
Defendant Luxottica of America, Inc.; and (ii) certifying the
Settlement Class.

After extensive arm's-length negotiations by experienced counsel,
the Plaintiffs have reached a settlement consisting of: (i) a
substantial monetary component; and (ii) cooperation from Luxottica
that will assist the Plaintiffs in the continued prosecution of
this action against the non-settling defendants.

On November 8, 2017, this Court preliminarily approved a proposed
settlement with Arlington Contact Lens Service, Inc. and National
Vision, Inc. providing for a payment of $7 million to a class of
online contact lens purchasers.

The Plaintiffs have reached a second settlement -- this time with
Defendant Luxottica -- providing for a cash payment of $5.9 million
to a class of online contact lens purchasers.  In addition to the
cash payment, which brings the total recovery thus far to $12.9
million, the Agreement provides for cooperation that will assist
the Plaintiffs in the continued prosecution of this action against
the non-settling defendants.

The settlement class definition for the Luxottica agreement differs
from the settlement class definition of the AC Lens agreement
because it conforms to the time period covered by Luxottica's
agreement with 1-800.  1-800 and Luxottica entered into a sourcing
and services agreement that prohibited the parties from bidding in
certain search advertising auctions, and obligated the parties to
implement certain negative keywords, on December 23, 2013.  Thus,
the Settlement Class begins on that day.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Heather M. Sneddon, Esq.
          Jared Scott, Esq.
          ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
          50 West Broadway, Suite 700
          Salt Lake City, UT 84101
          Telephone: (801) 534-1700
          Facsimile: (801) 364-7697
          E-mail: hsneddon@aklawfirm.com
                  jscott@aklawfirm.com

               - and -

          David W. Mitchell, Esq.
          Brian O. O'mara, Esq.
          Steven M. Jodlowski, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 231-1058
          Facsimile: (619) 231-7423
          E-mail: DavidM@rgrdlaw.com
                  bomara@rgrdlaw.com
                  sjodlowski@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          Scott E. Gant, Esq.
          Melissa F. Zappala, Esq.
          BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
          1401 New York Ave., NW
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 237-2727
          Facsimile: (202) 237-6131
          E-mail: sgant@bsfllp.com
                  mfelder@bsfllp.com

               - and -

          Carl Goldfarb, Esq.
          BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
          401 East Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 356-0011
          Facsimile: (954) 356-0022
          E-mail: cgoldfarb@bsfllp.com


3M COMPANY: Jones Sues over Defective Combat Arms Earplugs
----------------------------------------------------------
The case, CAROL JONES, the Plaintiff, vs. 3M COMPANY, AEARO
HOLDINGS, LLC, AEARO INTERMEDIATE, LLC, AEARO, LLC and AEARO
TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-02062-MCR-GRJ
(D. Conn., June 21, 2019), seeks to hold 3M liable for hearing loss
or damage Plaintiff allegedly suffered while serving variously in
the U.S. military, including during foreign conflicts. The
Plaintiff contends that Combat Arms TM Earplugs, Version 2
("CAEv2") manufactured and sold by Aearo were defectively designed
and failed to provide adequate hearing protection. 3M denies these
allegations.

CAEv2, designed by Aearo in close collaboration with the U.S.
military, represented a revolutionary breakthrough in hearing
protection for service members. CAEv2 helped servicemembers better
maintain situational awareness (e.g., to hear nearby voice
commands) while also maintaining some protection from gunfire and
other higher decibel sounds. CAEv2 met the U.S. military's
specifications and helped the military provide hearing protection
to service members.

Despite knowing of the dangerous defects in its earplugs, Defendant
sold the Dual-ended Combat ArmsTM earplugs to the branches of the
U.S. military for more than a decade without providing the U.S.
military and/or Plaintiff with any warning of said defects, causing
Plaintiff and other service members similar permanent injuries,
such as hearing loss.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff is:

          Robert I. Reardon, Jr., Esq.
          THE REARDON LAW FIRM, P.C.
          160 Hempstead St.
          P.O. Drawer 1430
          New London, CT 06320
          Telephone: 860-442-0444
          Facsimile: 860-444-6445
          E-mail: rreardon@reardonlaw.com

880 DRY CLEANERS: Rodriguez Files FLSA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against 880 Dry Cleaners,
Inc. The case is styled as Arturo Ponce Rodriguez individually, on
behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. 880 Dry Cleaners,
Inc. doing business as: Merit Cleaners, 880 Merit Cleaners, Inc.
doing business as: Merit Cleaners, Lex 880 Dry Cleaners, LLC doing
business as: Merit Cleaners, Green Dry Cleaners Holding Co., Inc.
doing business as: Merit Cleaners, Kwang Ho Choi also known as:
Charlie Choi, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-06499 (S.D. N.Y., July
12, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Merit Cleaners has been providing builders/contract cleaning
services since 1998 and is well known in the industry as a quality
commercial cleaning company with many clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


ADVIA CREDIT: Approval of Class Action Settlement Sought
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit BECKY PINGSTON-POLING, individually,
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
ADVIA CREDIT UNION, the Defendant, Case 1:15-cv-01208-GJQ-RSK ECF
(W.D. Mich.), the Plaintiff moves the Court for entry of an Order:

   1. preliminarily approving a class action Settlement;

   2. approving a proposed plan of notice to the Class;

   3. appointing Epiq to provide the notice and administration
      program outlined in the Settlement Agreement; and

   4. setting a schedule of dates for further action on this
      Settlement Agreement, including a hearing pursuant to Rule
      23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to determine
      whether the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, and
      adequate and should be finally approved.[CC]

Counsel for Becky Pingston-Poling and the Putative Class are:

          Richard D. McCune, Esq.
          McCune | Wright | Arevalo LLP
          3281 East Guasti Road, Suite 100
          Ontario, CA 91761
          Telephone: (909) 557-1250
          Facsimile: (909) 557-1275
          E-mail: rdm@mccunewright.com

               - and -

          Taras Kick, Esq.
          THE KICK LAW FIRM, APC
          815 Moraga Drive
          Los Angeles, CA 90401
          Telephone: (310) 395-2988
          Facsimile: (310) 395-2088
          E-mail: Taras@kicklawfirm.com

               - and -

          Philip J. Goodman, Esq.
          Michael B. Serling, Esq.
          Denise J. Grass, Esq.
          E-mail: pgoodman1@aol.com
                  mserlinglaw@aol.com
                  dgrass@serlinglaw.com

AETNA LIFE: Winston Seeks OT Pay for Care Management Employees
--------------------------------------------------------------
Mildred Winston, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, known and unknown, the Plaintiff, vs. Aetna Life
Insurance Company, a Connecticut corporation; and Aetna Inc., a
Pennsylvania corporation, the Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-04703-JJT (D. Ariz., July 12, 2019), alleges that
Defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by failing to pay
them overtime when Care Management Employees worked over 40 hours
in individual workweeks.

According to complaint, the Defendants partner with health care
providers and health insurance plans to improve the quality and
cost of medical care. The Defendants employed Plaintiff and other
non-management employees to perform utilization review and care
coordination functions to reduce the costs of medical care under
various "job titles" in Defendants' "Clinical – Nursing Job
Family" that include one or more of the following terms or
variations of those terms: (1) Registered Nurse/RN; (2) Case/Care
Manager; (3) Case/Care Management; and/or (4) Utilization
Review/Management (collectively, "Care Management Employees").

Defendants' Care Management Employees regularly worked over 40
hours per work week. The Defendants classified Care Management
Employees as exempt from state and federal overtime laws and did
not pay them overtime when they worked over 40 hours in individual
workweeks, the lawsuit says.

Aetna Inc. is an American managed health care company that sells
traditional and consumer directed health care insurance and related
services, such as medical, pharmaceutical, dental, and behavioral
health.[BN]

Attorney for the PlaiHntiff is:

          Clifford P. Bendau, II, Esq.
          Bendau & Bendau PLLC
          P.O. Box 97066
          Facsimile: (480) 304-3805
          Telephone: (480) 382-5176
          E-mail: cliffordbendau@bendaulaw.com

AIR LINE PILOTS: Pilot Instructor Class in Bishop Suit Certified
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVID BISHOP and ERIC LISH, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. AIR LINE PILOTS
ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL, Defendant, Case No. 13 C 6243 (N.D.
Ill.), Judge Gary Feinerman of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, (i) denied Air
Line Pilots Association, International ("ALPA")'s motion to strike
the complaint's pilot instructor class allegations; and (ii)
granted the Plaintiffs' renewed motion for certification of a pilot
instructor class.

Five United Airlines pilots brought the putative class action
against ALPA, alleging that it breached its duty of fair
representation under the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), by unfairly
allocating $225 million in retroactive pay among different pilot
groups.

The Plaintiffs moved to certify two subclasses, one for management
pilots and the other for pilot instructors, and ALPA moved under
Civil Rule 12(c) for judgment on the pleadings.  As to the
management pilots, the Court denied ALPA's Rule 12(c) motion and
granted the Plaintiffs' class certification motion, but as to the
pilot instructors, the Court granted ALPA's motion and denied the
Plaintiffs' motion as moot.  The management pilots settled, and the
Court entered judgment against the two pilot instructor Plaintiffs,
David Bishop and Eric Lish, on Feb. 9, 2017.

Bishop and Lish appealed, and the Seventh Circuit reversed and
remanded, with the mandate issuing on Sept. 4, 2018.  ALPA now
moves to strike the complaint's pilot instructor class allegations
on the ground that the statute of limitations for the absent class
members' claims expired while the case was on appeal, and Bishop
and Lish renew their motion for certification of a pilot instructor
class.

Accordingly, Judge Feinerman finds that no absent member of the
putative pilot instructor class has attempted to intervene or to
file her own individual suit or class action.  Rather, all absent
class members have continued to prosecute their claims as part of
this timely filed class action suit.  If the pilot instructor class
is certified, that timely filing will satisfy the statute of
limitations for the absent class members' claims.  In that event,
it will not matter whether any absent class member can demonstrate
that her claims were tolled, for tolling is irrelevant where the
suit was timely filed.  It is therefore inappropriate to strike the
class allegations on limitations grounds.  Accordingly, Judge
Feinerman denied ALPA's motion to strike the complaint's pilot
instructor class allegations on limitations grounds.

ALPA opposes the Plaintiffs' motion to certify a pilot instructor
class on the sole ground that all absent class members' claims are
time-barred, thereby reducing the number of putative class members
to two (Bishop and Lish) -- far too few to satisfy Rule 23(a)(1)'s
numerosity requirement.  As he explained, the Judge finds that the
absent class members' claims are not time-barred, so ALPA's
argument fails.  And because the proposed pilot instructor class
satisfies Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3) and is ascertainable, the class
certification is appropriate.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Feinerman denied ALPA's motion to
strike class allegations, and granted thePlaintiffs' motion for
class certification.  The class is defined as all United pilots
who, during any part of the period from Jan. 1, 2010 through Dec.
18, 2012, worked as a United pilot instructor.

The claim to be tried is whether ALPA breached its duty of fair
representation to the pilot instructors in its allocation of the
$225 million of retroactive pay provided to United pilots.  Bishop
and Lish are appointed as the Class Representatives.  Pursuant to
Rule 23(g), Myron M. Cherry and Jacie C. Zolna of Myron M. Cherry &
Associates, LLC, are appointed as the class counsel.  The parties
will confer regarding class notice and will file a status report
with their joint proposal or competing proposals by June 12, 2019.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2019 Memorandum Opinion and
Order is available at https://is.gd/mIyS4e from Leagle.com.

David Bishop & Eric Lish, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Myron Milton Cherry
-- mcherry@cherry-law.com -- Myron M. Cherry & Associates.

Air Line Pilots Association, International, Defendant, represented
by Stephen B. Moldof -- info@cwsny.com -- Cohen, Weiss and Simon,
Andrew L. Goldman -- agoldman@goldmanismail.com -- Goldman Ismail
Tomaselli Brennan & Baum LLP, Jonathan A. Cohen, Air Line Pilots
Association, International, pro hac vice, Joshua J. Ellison ,
Cohen, Weiss and Simon LLP, pro hac vice, Marcus C. Migliore, Air
Line Pilots Association, International, pro hac vice, Rami N.
Fakhouri -- rfakhouri@goldmanismail.com -- Goldman Ismail Tomaselli
Brennan & Baum LLP & Thomas N. Ciantra, Air Line Pilots
Association, International Legal Department.



ALABAMA LAW: Motley Seeks to Certify Class of Drivers
-----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SHARON MOTLEY, on behalf
of heself and those similarily situated, the Plaintiff, v. HAL
TAYLOR, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Alabama Law
Enforcement Agency, the Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-00478-WKW-SRW
(M.D. Ala.), the Plaintiff moves the Court to certify a class of:

   "all individuals whose driver's licenses are suspended for
   nonpayment of traffic tickets."

The class includes thousands of individuals who are spread across
the state, are low-income, and would not have the ability to
litigate their claims individually/

The legal and factual issues causing injury to the Class derive
from courts suspending driver's licenses pursuant to Alabama Rule
of Criminal Procedure for failure to pay a fine, penalty, and/or
court costs without any meaningful notice, pre-deprivation hearing,
or determination of ability to pay, as well as ALEA's enforcement
of the suspension, the lawsuit says.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Micah West, Esq.
          Sara Zampierin, Esq.
          Danielle Davis, Esq.
          SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER
          400 Washington Avenue
          Montgomery, AL 36104
          Telephone: (334) 956-8200
          Facsimile: (334) 956-8481
          E-mail: micah.west@splcenter.org
                  sara.zampierin@splcenter.org
                  danielle.davis@splcenter.org

ALLSTATE INSURANCE: McCleery Class Certification Denial Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, Second District, Division One,
issued an Opinion affirming the District Court's Order denying
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned
TIMOTHY McCLEERY et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. ALLSTATE
INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Defendants and Respondents.No. B282851.
(Cal. App.).

In this putative class action, property inspectors allege they were
engaged by three service companies to perform inspections for two
major insurers. The inspectors allege they were in fact employees
of the insurers and service companies jointly, and were entitled to
but deprived of minimum wages, overtime, meal and rest breaks,
reimbursement of expenses, and accurate wage statements.

The inspectors moved for class certification, supported by their
expert's declaration that liability could be determined and damages
calculated classwide by way of statistical analyses of results
obtained from an anonymous, double-blind survey of a sampling of
class members.
The trial court summarily rejected the expert's plan and denied
certification on the ground that the inspectors had failed to show
that their status as employees as opposed to independent
contractors could be established on predominately common proof.

The Plaintiffs appeal, contending the trial court applied improper
criteria and made incorrect legal assumptions.

Standard of Review

Code of Civil Procedure section 382 authorizes a suit to be tried
as a class action when the question is one of a common or general
interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it
is impracticable to bring them all before the court. Class
certification requires demonstration of an ascertainable and
sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest,
and the superiority of proceeding as a class.  

The community of interest requirement has three factors: (1)
predominant common questions of law or fact (2) class
representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class and
(3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.

In reviewing a trial court's denial of class certification the
Court examines whether the operative legal principles, as applied
to the facts of the case, render the claims susceptible to
resolution on a common basis. A class action may be certified even
if it is unlikely the class will eventually prevail on the merits,
as certification in such a situation allows a defendant to obtain a
favorable judgment binding all class members.

It is far better from a fairness perspective to determine class
certification independent of threshold questions disposing of the
merits, and thus permit defendants who prevail on those merits,
equally with those who lose on the merits, to obtain the preclusive
benefits of such victories against an entire class and not just a
named plaintiff.

Although predominance of common issues is often a major factor in a
certification analysis, it is not the only consideration. In
certifying a class action, the court must also conclude that
litigation of individual issues, including those arising from
affirmative defenses, can be managed fairly and efficiently.
Whether in a given case affirmative defenses should lead a court to
approve or reject certification will hinge on the manageability of
any individual issues.  

In wage and hour cases where a party seeks class certification
based on allegations that the employer consistently imposed a
uniform policy or de facto practice on class members, the party
must still demonstrate that the illegal effects of this conduct can
be proven efficiently and manageably within a class setting.
Individual issues do not render class certification inappropriate
so long as such issues may effectively be managed. Trial courts
must pay careful attention to manageability when deciding whether
to certify a class action. In considering whether a class action is
a superior device for resolving a controversy, the manageability of
individual issues is just as important as the existence of common
questions uniting the proposed class. If the court makes a
reasoned, informed decision about manageability at the
certification stage, the litigants can plan accordingly and the
court will have less need to intervene later to control the
proceedings.

Thee review the trial court's ruling for abuse of discretion and
generally will not disturb it, unless (1) it is unsupported by
substantial evidence (2) it rests on improper criteria or (3) it
rests on erroneous legal assumptions. If the court's reasons for
granting or denying certification are erroneous, we must reverse,
whether or not other reasons could have been] relied upon to
support the ruling. In this respect, appellate review of orders
denying class certification differs from ordinary appellate review.
Under ordinary appellate review, the Court do not address the trial
court's reasoning and consider only whether the result was correct.


But when denying class certification, the trial court must state
its reasons, and we must review those reasons for correctness. The
may only consider the reasons stated by the trial court and must
ignore any unexpressed reason that might support the ruling. In
other words, the Court review only the reasons given by the trial
court for denial of class certification, and ignore any other
grounds that might support denial.

Because trial courts are ideally situated to evaluate the
efficiencies and practicalities of permitting group action,' they
are afforded great discretion in evaluating the relevant factors
and ruling on a class certification motion.

Plaintiffs' Trial Plan is Inadequate and Unfair

Here, the trial court's only statement about predominance of common
issues favored plaintiffs. The court stated that defendants' status
as employers could be established by common factors showing the
degree of control they reserved over the inspectors' work. Although
the court discussed disparate individual issues at several points
in its order, it did so only from the perspective of manageability,
and made no finding that individual issues predominated over common
ones. The court denied certification notwithstanding its finding
(at least impliedly) that a community of interest existed, because
it found litigation of individual issues, including those arising
from affirmative defenses, could not be managed fairly and
efficiently using only Dr. Krosnick's survey.

The Plaintiffs defend Dr. Krosnick's survey at length, arguing it
was methodologically correct and scientifically valid, captured all
pertinent variations in hours worked among inspectors, eschewed
irrelevant questions, and produced reliable and accurate results.
But this misses the point, as the trial court apparently agreed
with these propositions, finding the survey was carefully crafted
to verify appropriate respondents and accuracy in the responses.

The problem is not that Dr. Krosnick's survey fails as a scientific
measurement procedure, but that it fails as a trial plan.

Here, the trial court reasonably concluded the plaintiffs' trial
plan failed to address how they could fairly establish the
defendants' liability on a classwide basis as to any claim.

With respect to overtime and meal and rest breaks, simply having
the status of an employee does not make the employer liable for a
claim for overtime compensation or denial of breaks. An individual
employee establishes liability by proving actual overtime hours
worked without overtime pay, or by proving that he or she was
denied rest or meal breaks.

Here, Dr. Krosnick admitted in his deposition that his survey asked
no question identifying for which insurer class members performed
inspections. It is thus unclear how plaintiffs could establish the
liability of Farmers, for example, without considering whether any
inspector worked for Farmers more than eight hours in a day or 40
in a week. Nor could the information be extrapolated from Farmers'
records of inspections actually performed, because nothing in those
records indicated the dates on which they were performed (only the
upload date was known), which inspectors performed them (inspectors
sometimes had subcontractors perform them), how long they took or
would typically take, or whether the inspector did other work on
that day for nonparties.

The Plaintiffs' plan similarly failed with respect to their minimum
wage claim , as the inspectors were paid a piece rate for each
inspection performed, and plaintiffs offered no explanation how
they could establish, by their survey alone, the number of
inspections performed for Farmers, how long they took, or what
Farmers paid for them.

Regarding meal and rest period claims, inspectors performed
inspections for a number of insurance companies, including
nonparties, often in the same day, but Dr. Krosnick's survey failed
to ask if anyone ever worked long enough in a day for either
Farmers or Allstate to be entitled to a meal or rest period from
that insurer or any of its three co-employers.

The Plaintiffs argue the mere fact that defendants failed to adopt
affirmative meal or rest period policies suffices to establish
their liability, with damages to be calculated only as a measure of
restitution under the unfair competition law. Our Supreme Court has
not yet ruled on this point of law.
  
The Plaintiffs argue damages need not be apportioned separately for
any insurer defendant because both Farmers and Allstate are
vicariously liable as coconspirators for the misconduct of the
service companies, which undeniably employed the inspectors. But
this ignores the fact that inspectors also worked for nonparties.
No authority of which we are aware would make Farmers liable to an
inspector who worked as a joint employee of CIS and a nonparty
insurer.

And because the plaintiffs made no effort to explain how they could
establish through common proof what expenses, if any, inspectors
incurred for any particular insurer, or how they were deprived of
wage statements, the trial court could reasonably conclude these
claims were unmanageable as well under the trial plan.

The trial court also reasonably concluded that by anonymizing
responses plaintiffs unfairly insulated their survey from any
meaningful examination. Even Dr. Krosnick, their only witness
regarding the survey, did not know who the survey respondents were
or why any class member had chosen not to participate. (Dr.
Krosnick's analysis of nonresponse bias did not consider whether
any class members may have declined to participate due to their
personal lack of any claim.) He declared respondents should not be
thought of as witnesses, and he testified he had no opinion as to
their reliability.

In fact, the plaintiffs expressly admit they intend to answer the
ultimate question in this case based solely on expert testimony
testimony founded on multiple hearsay that defendants could never
challenge. As Dr. Krosnick declared, Respondents are not testifying
witnesses. Instead it is the expert who will offer opinions and the
expert can be cross-examined. But although an expert 'may rely on
inadmissible hearsay in forming his or her opinion and may state on
direct examination the matters on which he or she relied, the
expert may not testify as to the details of those matters if they
are otherwise inadmissible.'

The Plaintiffs argue defendants need no access to Dr. Krosnick's
data, as they are free to conduct their own survey and present
contrary conclusions to the jury. This again misses the point.
Defendants have the right to defend against plaintiffs' claims by
impeaching the evidence supporting them.

A class  may establish liability by proving a uniform policy or
practice by the employer that has the effect on the group of making
it likely that group members will work overtime hours without
overtime pay, or to miss rest/meal breaks. And California courts
and others have in a wide variety of contexts considered pattern
and practice evidence, statistical evidence, sampling evidence,
expert testimony, and other indicators of a defendant's centralized
practices in order to evaluate whether common behavior towards
similarly situated plaintiffs makes class certification
appropriate. But no case of which we are aware, and plaintiffs
refer us to none, suggests a trial may be conducted solely on the
evidence of an expert witness relying on an anonymous double-blind
survey, no matter how scientific the survey may be.

The Court concludes the trial court acted within its discretion in
denying class certification.

The order denying certification is affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Cal. App.'s July 15, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y5s2cnyz from Leagle.com.

Shenoi Koes, Allan A. Shenoi -- ashenoi@shenoikoes.com, Daniel J.
Koes -- dkoes@shenoikoes.com Nneka Egbujiobi --
negbujiobi@shenoikoes.com -- The Law Offices of Stephen M. Benardo,
Stephen M. Benardo -- steve@benardolaw.com -- Appell Shapiro, Barry
Appell -- barry@asattorney.com --  and Scott E. Shapiro, 15233
Ventura Blvd. Suite 420. Sherman Oaks, CA 91403, for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.

Seyfarth Shaw, Andrew M. Paley -- apaley@seyfarth.com -- James M.
Harris, Sheryl L. Skibbe, Joshua A. Rodine and Kiran Aftab Seldon
2029 Century Park East, Suite 3500 Los Angeles, California
90067-3021, for Defendant and Respondent Allstate Insurance
Company.

Bononi Law Group, Michael J. Bononi and Christy W. Granieri, 301
North Lake Avenue
Suite 820, Pasadena, CA, 91101, for Defendant and Respondent
Capital Personnel Services, Inc.

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough and Cory E. Manning, 1320 Main
Street, 17th Floor, Columbia, SC 29201, for Defendant and
Respondent Advanced Field Services, Inc.

Epstein Becker & Green, Michael S. Kun -- mkun@ebglaw.com -- and
Kevin D. Sullivan -- ksullivan@ebglaw.com -- for Defendant and
Respondent Farmers Group, Inc.

Robie & Matthai and Kyle Kveton  -- kkveton@romalaw.com -- for
Defendants and Respondents CIS Group LLC and North American Compass
Insurance Services Group LLC.


ALTA OPERATIONS: Court Approves $40K Settlement in Macancela Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Parties' Motion
for Approval of Settlement Agreement in the case captioned BRYAN
MACANCELA, EDISON MACANCELA, FILIBERTO VILLALBA, JOSE ABREGO, LUIS
ROMEL CURCHI, MILTON QUIZHPILEMA, ALEXANDER COSTA, VICTOR
PASTUIZACA, and JOHNNY PASTUIZACA, Plaintiffs, v. ALTA OPERATIONS
LLC, ALTA OPERATIONS EAST LLC, and SVITLANA FLOM, Defendants. No.
19-CV-1003 (RA). (S.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiffs Bryan Macancela, Edison Macancela, Filiberto Villalba,
Jose Abrego, Luis Romel Curchi, Milton Quizhpilema, Alexander
Costa, Victor Pastuizaca, and Johnny Pastuizaca bring this action
against Defendants Alta Operations LLC, Alta Operations East LLC,
Allan Basaran, and Svitlana Flom for alleged violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the New York Labor Law (NYLL).

Under the terms of the proposed settlement agreement, the
Defendants agree to pay the Plaintiffs a total of $40,000 in
exchange for the relinquishment of their wage and hour claims.

After attorney's fees and costs are subtracted, the remaining sum
will be distributed as follows to each plaintiff: $3,658.45 to
Plaintiff Bryan Macancela; $3,300.00 to Plaintiff Edison Macancela;
$3,000.00 to Plaintiff Filiberto Villalba; $2,500.00 to Plaintiff
Jose A. Abrego; $3,100.00 to Plaintiff Luis Romel Curchi; $3,000.00
to Plaintiff Milton Quizhpilema; $600.00 to Plaintiff Alexander
Costa; $4,500.00 to Plaintiff Johnny Pastuizaca; and $6,600.00 to
Plaintiff Victor Pastuizaca. These sums reflect payment in full for
all unpaid hours and overtime compensation Plaintiffs claim in the
Amended Complaint. The total amount is therefore reasonable.

The Court also approves the attorney's fees and costs set forth in
the fairness letter. Here, the fee is approximately one-third of
the award, and when using a percentage of the fund approach, courts
regularly approve attorney's fees of one-third of the settlement
amount in FLSA cases.

According to the letter, the Plaintiffs' attorney will receive
$9,741.55. After costs are subtracted, the attorney's fee award is
approximately one-third of the net settlement amount. The
Plaintiffs' attorney has also submitted contemporaneous billing
records, which reflect diligent expenditures of time and effort on
this case. The amount of the fee is therefore reasonable as a fair
percentage of the net award.

The Plaintiffs' release of claims is fair and reasonable.  The
release provision at issue here is far more limited than those
routinely rejected. The release is limited to all actions, causes
of action, or claims for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
and/or the New York Labor Law, and it expressly does not affect
claims that might arise after the execution of the agreement.

Thus, the Court finds that the release in the proposed settlement
agreement is fair and reasonable.

The Court approves the parties' settlement agreement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 11, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxjv4rfp from
Leagle.com.

Bryan Macancela, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Edison Macancela, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Filiberto Villalba, Milton Quizhpilema,
Alexanda Costa, Jose Abrego, Victor Pastuizaca, Luis Curchi, Johnny
Pastuizaca, Jose A Abrego, Edison Macancela, Luis Romel Curchi &
Bryan Macancela, Plaintiffs, represented by John J.P. Howley, Law
Offices of John Howley, 350 Fifth Avenue, 59th Floor New York, NY
10118.


AMAZON.COM: Ortiz Seeks to Certify Class of Level 4 Shift Managers
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit MICHAEL ORTIZ, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
AMAZON.COM LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company; and GOLDEN
STATE FC LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, the Defendants,
Case No. 4:17-cv-03820-JSW (N.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff will move on
August 23, 2019, the Court to enter an Order certifying a class
of:

   "similarly situated overtime exempt Level 4 Shift Managers
   employed by Defendants Amazon.com LLC and Golden State FC, LLC
   at all their California Delivery Centers under Federal Rules
   of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)."

Amazon has become the premier retailer of almost all imaginable
items, from books to electronics to egg slicers, and has surpassed
any other retailer in terms of inventory, sales, and
customers.[CC]

Attorney for the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class are:

          Scott Edward Cole, Esq.
          Laura Grace Van Note, Esq.
          SCOTT COLE & ASSOCIATES, APC
          555 12th Street, Suite 1725
          Oakland, CA 94607
          Telephone: (510) 891-9800
          Facsimile: (510) 891-7030
          E-mail: scole@scalaw.com
                  lvannote@scalaw.com

ARBITRATION FORUMS: Court Refuses to Strike White Knight's TAC
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum and Order denying
Defendant's Motion to Strike Third Amended Complaint in the case
captioned WHITE KNIGHT DINER, LLC, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
ARBITRATION FORUMS, INC., et al., Defendants. No. 4:17-CV-02406
JAR. (E.D. Mo.).

The Plaintiffs filed a separate pleading titled Complaint. The
Complaint removed certain plaintiffs and defendants but included
the same Counts and allegations from the previous class action
complaint. Owners moved to dismiss with prejudice Counts III
through VI of Plaintiff's Complaint.  

Owners moves to strike the Third Amended Complaint on the grounds
that it was filed without consent or leave of the court and in
response to a motion to dismiss in an effort to delay these
proceedings. In their opposition to Owners' motion to strike,

The Plaintiffs maintain that their complaint constitutes a new
pleading which they would have the opportunity to amend more
substantively under Rule 15.

The Court notes it was the agreement and intent of the parties to
proceed in this case with the filing of a separate complaint
against Owners. Although Plaintiffs have not complied with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in order to effect the parties'
agreement and intent, the Court will allow and consider Plaintiffs'
Third Amended Complaint.

Accordingly, the Defendant's Motion to Strike Third Amended
Complaint is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 11, 2019 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y5tftshu from
Leagle.com.

White Knight Diner, LLC, Larry Lee Hinds & Karen Freiner,
Plaintiffs, represented by Anthony G. Simon, THE SIMON LAW FIRM,
P.C., 800 Market St., Suite 1700, St. Louis, MO 63101, Gonzalo A.
Fernandez, DEVEREAUX AND STOKES, James P. Leonard, DEVEREAUX AND
STOKES, 133 South 11th Street, Suite 350, St. Louis, MO 63102, John
G. Simon, THE SIMON LAW FIRM, P.C., 800 Market St., Suite 1700, St.
Louis, MO 63101, Michael D. Stokes, DEVEREAUX STOKES NOLAN
FERNANDEZ & LEONARD, 133 South 11th Street, Suite 350, St. Louis,
MO 63102, Anthony R. Friedman, THE SIMON LAW FIRM, P.C. & Benjamin
R. Askew, THE SIMON LAW FIRM, P.C., 800 Market St., Suite 1700, St.
Louis, MO 63101

Owners Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by Timothy J. Wolf
-- twolf@bjpc.com -- BROWN AND JAMES, P.C., David Russell McCourt
-- dmccourt@bjpc.com -- BROWN AND JAMES, P.C. & Joseph Michael
Morris -- jmorris@bjpc.com -- BROWN AND JAMES, P.C.

Owners Insurance Company, Counter Claimant, represented by Timothy
J. Wolf, BROWN AND JAMES, P.C., David Russell McCourt, BROWN AND
JAMES, P.C. & Joseph Michael Morris, BROWN AND JAMES, P.C.

Karen Freiner, Larry Lee Hinds & White Knight Diner, LLC, Counter
Defendants, represented byAnthony G. Simon, THE SIMON LAW FIRM,
P.C., Gonzalo A. Fernandez, DEVEREAUX AND STOKES, James P. Leonard,
DEVEREAUX AND STOKES, John G. Simon, THE SIMON LAW FIRM, P.C.,
Michael D. Stokes, DEVEREAUX STOKES NOLAN FERNANDEZ & LEONARD,
Anthony R. Friedman, THE SIMON LAW FIRM, P.C. & Benjamin R. Askew,
THE SIMON LAW FIRM, P.C.


BILL HAMILTON: Court Enters Protective Order in Lizarraga FLSA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Susan van Keulen of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California has entered a stipulate
protective order in the case, ERIBERTO LIZARRAGA, an individual,
JUAN PADILLA, an individual, PLAINTIFFS AND CLASS ACTION
PLAINTIFFS, Plaintiffs, v. BILL HAMILTON, an individual BILL
HAMILTON ROOFING, INC., a California Corporation, Defendants, Case
No. 18-CV-03845-SVK (N.D. Cal.).

Disclosure and discovery activity in the action are likely to
involve production of confidential, proprietary, or private
information for which special protection from public disclosure and
from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may
be warranted.  Accordingly, the parties stipulated to and
petitioned the Court to enter their Stipulated Protective Order.

The protections conferred by the Stipulation and Order cover not
only Protected Material, but also (1) any information copied or
extracted from Protected Material; (2) all copies, excerpts,
summaries, or compilations of Protected Material; and (3) any
testimony, conversations, or presentations by Parties or their
Counsel that might reveal Protected Material.  Any use of Protected
Material at trial will be governed by a separate agreement or
order.

Even after final disposition of the litigation, the confidentiality
obligations imposed by the Order will remain in effect until a
Designating Party agrees otherwise in writing or a court order
otherwise directs.  Final disposition will be deemed to be the
later of (1) dismissal of all claims and defenses in the action,
with or without prejudice; and (2) final judgment therein after the
completion and exhaustion of all appeals, rehearings, remands,
trials, or reviews of the action, including the time limits for
filing any motions or applications for extension of time pursuant
to applicable law.

Any Party or Non-Party may challenge a designation of
confidentiality at any time.  Unless a prompt challenge to a
Designating Party's confidentiality designation is necessary to
avoid foreseeable, substantial unfairness, unnecessary economic
burdens, or a significant disruption or delay of the litigation, a
Party does not waive its right to challenge a confidentiality
designation by electing not to mount a challenge promptly after the
original designation is disclosed.

A Receiving Party may use Protected Material that is disclosed or
produced by another Party or by a Non-Party in connection with the
case only for prosecuting, defending, or attempting to settle the
litigation.  Such Protected Material may be disclosed only to the
categories of persons and under the conditions described in the
Order.  Protected Material must be stored and maintained by a
Receiving Party at a location and in a secure manner that ensures
that access is limited to the persons authorized under the Order.

Within 60 days after the final disposition of the action, each
Receiving Party must return all Protected Material to the Producing
Party or destroy such material.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2019 Stipulated Protective
Order is available at https://is.gd/WagR2v from Leagle.com.

Eriberto Lizarraga, an individual & Juan Padilla, an individual,
Plaintiffs, represented by Victoria L.H. Booke --
vbooke@bookelaw.com -- Law Offices of Booke & Ajlouny, LLP & James
Dal Bon -- jdb@wagedefenders.com -- Law Offices of James Dal Bon.

Bill Hamilton Roofing, Inc. & Bill Hamilton, Defendants,
represented by Kurt Edward Wilson -- kwilson@smwb.com -- Sweeney
Mason Wilson & Bosomworth A Professional Corporation.


BOEING COMPANY: Pilot Y Alleges Aircraft Design Flaw Cover-Up
-------------------------------------------------------------
PILOT Y, individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. THE BOEING COMPANY, a Delaware
corporation, the Defendant, Case No. 2019CH08031 (Ill. Cir., July
5, 2019), seeks compensation on behalf of the Plaintiff and more
than 100 pilots qualified to fly the Boeing 737 MAX series of
aircraft (the "MAX") as employees of an international airline
("Airline X"), whose professional and personal lives were harmfully
impacted when BOEING and the Federal Aviation Administration
engaged in an unprecedented cover-up of the known design flaws of
the MAX, which predictably resulted in the crashes of two MAX
aircraft and subsequent grounding of all MAX aircraft worldwide.

The Plaintiff says he relied on BOEING's representations that the
MAX was safe when qualifying to fly the MAX, and thus suffered --
and continues to suffer -- significant lost wages, among other
economic and non-economic damages, since the MAX was grounded.

Additionally, the Plaintiff says he suffered severe emotional and
mental stress when they were effectively forced to fly the MAX --
and required to place their own life and the lives of their crew
and passengers in clanger -- despite the growing awareness of the
dangerous nature of the previously concealed software on board the
MAX and other problems, the lawsuit says.

Boeing Company is an American multinational corporation that
designs, manufactures, and sells airplanes, rotorcraft, rockets,
satellites, comms gear and missiles worldwide.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the proposed Class are:

          Patrick M. Jones, Esq.
          Sarah M. Beaujour, Esq.
          PMJ PLLC
          100 South State Street
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 255-7976
          E-mail: pmj@patjonespllc.com
                  smb@patjonespllc.com

               - and -

          Joseph C. Wheeler, Esq.
          IALPG PTY LTD
          (t/as International Aerospace Law & Policy Group)
          ID, 7/139 Junction Road
          Clay field
          Queensland, Australia 4011
          Telephone: 617 3040 1099
          E-mail: jwheeler@ialpg.com

BOEING COMPANY: Pilot Z Alleges Aircraft Design Flaw Cover-Up
-------------------------------------------------------------
PILOT Z, individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. THE BOEING COMPANY, a Delaware
corporation, the Defendant, Case No. 2019CH08045 (Ill. Cir., July
5, 2019), seeks compensation on behalf of the Plaintiff and more
than 100 pilots qualified to fly the Boeing 737 MAX series of
aircraft (the "MAX") as employees of an international airline
("Airline X"), whose professional and personal lives were harmfully
impacted when BOEING and the Federal Aviation Administration
engaged in an unprecedented cover-up of the known design flaws of
the MAX, which predictably resulted in the crashes of two MAX
aircraft and subsequent grounding of all MAX aircraft worldwide.

The Plaintiff says he relied on BOEING's representations that the
MAX was safe when qualifying to fly the MAX, and thus suffered --
and continues to suffer -- significant lost wages, among other
economic and non-economic damages, since the MAX was grounded.

Additionally, the Plaintiff says he suffered severe emotional and
mental stress when they were effectively forced to fly the MAX --
and required to place their own life and the lives of their crew
and passengers in clanger -- despite the growing awareness of the
dangerous nature of the previously concealed software on board the
MAX and other problems, the lawsuit says.

Boeing Company is an American multinational corporation that
designs, manufactures, and sells airplanes, rotorcraft, rockets,
satellites, comms gear and missiles worldwide.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the proposed Class are:

          Patrick M. Jones, Esq.
          Sarah M. Beaujour, Esq.
          PMJ PLLC
          100 South State Street
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 255-7976
          E-mail: pmj@patjonespllc.com
                  smb@patjonespllc.com

               - and -

          Joseph C. Wheeler, Esq.
          IALPG PTY LTD
          (t/as International Aerospace Law & Policy Group)
          ID, 7/139 Junction Road
          Clay field
          Queensland, Australia 4011
          Telephone: 617 3040 1099
          E-mail: jwheeler@ialpg.com

CAPE REORTS GROUP: Fischler Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Cape Resorts Group -
SAG, LLC. The case is styled as Brian Fischler Individually and on
behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Cape
Resorts Group - SAG, LLC doing business as: Barons Cove, Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-06517 (S.D. N.Y., July 13, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Baron's Cove is the Hampton's preeminent All-American resort
destination.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
     Lipsky Lowe LLP
     630 Third Avenue
     Fifth Floor
     New York, NY 10017
     Phone: (212) 392-4772
     Fax: (212) 444-1030
     Email: chris@lipskylowe.com


CARMAX AUTO: McElhannon Suit Remanded to Calif. State Court
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DEREK McELHANNON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CARMAX AUTO
SUPERSTORES WEST COAST, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No.
3:19-cv-00586-WHO (N.D. Cal.), Judge William H. Orrick of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California remanded the
case to the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda.

Plaintiffs McElhannon, Aleena Iqbal, Christopher Syharath, Ruben
Santiago, and Emil Milisci originally filed a class action
complaint on Nov. 21, 2018 in Alameda County Superior Court
alleging that Defendants Carmax Auto Superstores West Coast, Inc.
and Carmax Auto Superstores California, LLC violated numerous
provisions of the California Labor Code.  They filed the first
amended complaint on Jan. 31, 2019, but the parties dispute when
the Plaintiffs served it on Carmax.

In Feb. 1, 2019, Carmax removed the case to the Court pursuant to
the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA") and promptly filed a motion
to compel arbitration as required by the Dispute Resolution
Agreement ("DRA") it says each Plaintiff signed.  On March 6,
Carmax filed a motion to compel arbitration, dismiss class claims,
and stay California's Private Attorney General Act ("PAGA") of 2004
claims.

Without opposing Carmax's motion, the Plaintiffs filed a second
amended complaint ("SAC") listing only Iqbal and Milisci and
bringing only a representative action under PAGA.  They indicate
that the other Plaintiffs will submit to arbitration as Carmax
demands, and Iqbal and Milisci will forego their remaining claims
in order to pursue only the PAGA claims.  Carmax then filed a
motion to strike the SAC.

Before the Court are three motions: (1) Carmax moves to compel
arbitration, dismiss the Plaintiffs' class claims, and stay the
Plaintiffs' PAGA claims; (2) the Plaintiffs move to remand the
action to state court given the changes in the SAC; and (3) Carmax
moves to strike the SAC as improperly filed.

In order to address the issues on the merits in the most efficient
and least expensive way, Judge Orrick will remand the case because
there is no basis for federal jurisdiction under the SAC.  The
unique posture hin the case, namely, the fact that the only the
Plaintiffs who wish to remain in the case are pursuing only PAGA
claims, counsels a different approach.  According to the Ninth
Circuit, PAGA is not sufficiently similar to Rule 23 to establish
the original jurisdiction of a federal court under CAFA.  The SAC
pleads only a representative action under PAGA.  Although Carmax
properly removed the case to federal court, under the SAC the basis
for federal jurisdiction no longer exists.  Accordingly, the Judge
must remand the case.  

Judge Orrick remanded to the Superior Court of California, County
of Alameda.  He vacated the June 12, 2019 hearing on the motions.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/IQne4t from Leagle.com.

Derek McElhannon, Aleena Iqbal, Christopher Syharath, Ruben
Santiago & Emil Milisci, each individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Jacob N.
Whitehead, Whitehead Employment Law, Christina Ann Humphrey --
christina@chumphreylaw.com -- Christina Humphrey Law, PC & Patrick
McNicholas, McNicholas & McNicholasLLP.

Carmax Auto Superstores West Coast, Inc., a Virginia corporation &
Carmax Auto Superstores California, LLC, a Virginia limited
liability company, Defendants, represented by Jack Steven Sholkoff
-- jack.sholkoff@ogletree.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &
Stewart, P.C. & Jennifer Lindsay Katz -- Jennifer.katz@ogletree.com
-- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart PC.


CAVALRY PORTFOLIO: Walker Asserts Breach of FCDPA
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Cavalry Portfolio
Services, LLC. The case is styled as Hazel Walker, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Cavalry
Portfolio Services, LLC, Cavalry SPV II, LLC and John Does 1-25,
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-02453-JTF-tmp (W.D. Tenn., July 16,
2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Act.

Cavalry Portfolio Services LLC is a debt collection agency located
in Oklahoma.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Yaakov Saks, Esq.
   Stein Saks, PLLC
   285 Passaic Street
   Hackensack, NJ 07601
   Tel: (201) 282-6500
   Email: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com



CENTENE CORP: Pension Fund Derivative Suit Temporarily Stayed
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum and Order granting
in part and denying in part Defendant's Motion to Stay in the case
captioned CARPENTERS PENSION FUND OF ILLINOIS, et al., derivatively
and on behalf of the nominal defendant Centene Corporation,
Plaintiffs, v. MICHAEL F. NEIDORFF, et al., Defendants, and CENTENE
CORPORATION, Nominal Defendant. No. 4:18 CV 113 CDP. (E.D. Mo.).

Nominal defendant Centene Corporation moves to stay this
shareholder derivative action pending resolution of a separate, yet
related, securities class action over which another judge in this
district presides.  

This shareholder derivative action is brought by
plaintiff-shareholders of nominal defendant Centene Corporation, in
which plaintiffs allege that certain members of Centene's board of
directors and certain of its officers violated federal securities
laws, breached their fiduciary duties, engaged in insider trading,
and were unjustly enriched by and in relation to their alleged
false and misleading statements regarding the extent of liabilities
inherited by Centene in a March 2016 merger with Health Net, Inc.,
resulting in millions of dollars in damages to Centene.  

In determining Centene's motion to stay, the parties agree that I
should consider the following factors: 1) potential prejudice to
the nonmoving party 2) hardship and inequity to the moving party if
the action is not stayed and 3) the judicial resources that would
be saved by avoiding duplicative litigation.  

First, the Court agrees with plaintiffs that an indefinite stay
runs the risk of potential loss of evidence, especially as to the
memories of witnesses in this undoubtedly fact-intensive
litigation. Although there will certainly be significant overlap in
witnesses in both cases, not all witnesses will necessarily be the
same and those witnesses that are the same may not be asked
questions during discovery in the securities action that plaintiffs
here may want answered.

Additionally, the documentary evidence sought in the securities
action may not encompass all of the documentary evidence sought by
plaintiffs here. Because an indefinite delay in discovery in this
action could potentially harm the nonmoving parties, this factor
weighs against an indefinite stay.

Both cases are pending in this district court and both are in early
procedural stages such that discovery in the two cases going
forward can be coordinated, thus conserving Centene's resources.

If this case is stayed and discovery progresses in the securities
action, Centene could be subject to duplicative discovery, possibly
years down the road, which would be a greater drain on its
managerial and financial resources.  

Beyond this formalistic construct, the Court cannot ascertain any
direct conflict between the shareholders seeking damages from the
corporation based on the wrongdoing of its Officers and Directors
in the securities class action, and the shareholder seeking to
protect the corporation's rights against the wrongdoing of its
Officers and Directors in [the derivative] action. Centene has thus
failed to show a genuine conflict between its defense in the
securities action and its interest in this derivative action.

Finally, judicial resources are best used by granting a temporary
stay of this action instead of an indefinite one. Duplicative
discovery efforts and disputes can be avoided through appropriate
case management between the two cases. Resolution of similar issues
in the securities action can inform this Court in the present
instead of being made to wait ad infinitum, with such delay being
exacerbated by the halt of discovery in this case. Appropriate case
management with informed scheduling between the two cases can also
minimize the risk of inconsistent judicial rulings.

Centene Corporation's Motion to Stay this Action Pending Resolution
of Sanchez, et al. v. Centene Corp., et al. is granted in part and
denied in part. The Court will deny the motion to stay this action
indefinitely but will impose a temporary stay pending resolution of
the motion to dismiss in the securities action.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 11, 2019 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y5kpngyv from
Leagle.com.

Carpenters Pension Fund of Illinois & Iron Workers Local 11 Pension
Fund, Plaintiffs, represented by Carol Valerie Gilden --
cgilden@cohenmilstein.com -- COHEN AND MILSTEIN PLLC, Eric Steven
Berelovich -- eberelovich@cohenmilstein.com -- COHEN AND MILSTEIN
PLLC, Geoffrey M. Johnson -- GJOHNSON@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM -- SCOTT AND
SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP, Jamie L. Reyes-Jones --
GJOHNSON@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM -- HARTNETT REYES-JONES, L.L.C., Richard
A. Speirs -- rspeirs@cohenmilstein.com -- COHEN AND MILSTEIN PLLC,
pro hac vice & Scott R. Jacobsen -- SJACOBSEN@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM --
SCOTT AND SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP.

Peoria Police Pension Fund & Laura Wood, Plaintiffs, represented by
Geoffrey M. Johnson, SCOTT AND SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP, Jamie L.
Reyes-Jones, HARTNETT REYES-JONES, L.L.C., Scott R. Jacobsen, SCOTT
AND SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP & Greg G. Gutzler --
ggutler@dicellolevitt.com -- DICELLO AND LEVITT, LLC.

Harkishan Parekh, derivatively on behalf of Centene Corporation,
Plaintiff, represented by Geoffrey M. Johnson, SCOTT AND SCOTT
ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP, Jamie L. Reyes-Jones, HARTNETT REYES-JONES,
L.L.C., Scott R. Jacobsen, SCOTT AND SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP,
Stephen J. Oddo -- soddo@robbinsarroyo.com -- ROBBINS ARROYO LLP &
Joseph V. Neill.

Michael F. Neidorff, Jeffrey A. Schwaneke, Robert K. Ditmore, David
L. Steward, John R. Roberts, Tommy G. Thompson, Frederick H.
Eppinger, Richard A. Gephardt, Orlando Ayala, Vicki B. Escarra, K.
Rone Baldwin, Carol E. Goldman & Centene Corporation, a Delaware
corporation, Defendants, represented by Christopher A. Smith --
chris.smith@huschblackwell.com -- HUSCH BLACKWELL, LLP, Joseph P.
Conran -- joe.conran@huschblackwell.com -- HUSCH BLACKWELL, LLP,
Peter B. Morrison -- peter.morrison@skadden.com -- SKADDEN ARPS,
LLP, pro hac vice & Winston P. Hsiao -- winston.hsiao@skadden.com
-- SKADDEN AND ARPS, pro hac vice.

Laura Wood & Peoria Police Pension Fund, Movants, represented by
Greg G. Gutzler, DICELLO AND LEVITT, LLC.


CENTO FINE: Court Enlarges Dismissal Bid Deadlines in Snarr
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, Oakland Division, issued an Order enlarging Deadlines
Relating to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned
DEREK SNARR, J. MICHAEL DUCA, and CANDACE GOULETTE, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
CENTO FINE FOODS INC., a Pennsylvania corporation, and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive, Defendant. Case No. 4:19-cv-2627-HSG. (N.D.
Cal.).

The Plaintiffs will file their Response to the Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss on July 22, 2019.

The Defendant's Reply in Support of its Motion to Dismiss is due
July 29, 2019.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 11, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y5hm3tuf from Leagle.com.

Derek Snarr, J. Michael Duca & Candace Goulette, Plaintiffs,
represented by Edwin John Kilpela, Jr. -- ekilpela@carlsonlynch.com
-- Carlson Lynch, LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph C. Bourne --
jbourne@pswlaw.com -- Pearson, Simon & Warshaw, LLP, Melissa S.
Weiner -- mweiner@pswlaw.com -- PEARSON SIMON & WARSHAW, LLP, pro
hac vice & Daniel L. Warshaw -- dwarshaw@pswlaw.com -- Pearson,
Simon & Warshaw, LLP.

Cento Fine Foods Inc., Defendant, represented by Daniel S. Tyler
-- daniel@amintalati.com -- Amin Talati Wasserman, LLP, pro hac
vice, Matthew Ryan Orr -- MORR@CALLJENSEN.COM -- Call & Jensen A
Professional Corporation, William Paul Cole -- WCOLE@CALLJENSEN.COM
-- Call and Jensen & Sanjay Satish Karnik -- sanjay@amintalati.com
-- Amin Talati and Upadhye LLC, pro hac vice.


CENTRAL PORTFOLIO: Wilkins Files Class Suit Under FDCPA
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Central Portfolio
Control, Inc. The case is styled as Craig Wilkins, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Central
Portfolio Control, Inc. and John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-04117 (E.D. N.Y., July 16, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Act.

Central Portfolio Control, Inc. is a loan agency in Minnetonka,
Minnesota.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph Karl Jones, Esq.
   Jones, Wolf & Kapasi, LLC
   One Grand Central Place
   60 East 42nd. Street, 46th Floor
   New York, NY 10165
   Tel: (646) 459-7971
   Fax: (646) 459-7973
   Email: jkj@legaljones.com


CHEERS HEALTH: Lashbrook Files Suit in S.D. Florida
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Cheers Health, Inc.
The case is styled as Caroline Lashbrook individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Cheers Health, Inc.
formerly known as: THRIVEPLUS a Delaware Corporation, Defendant,
Case No. 0:19-cv-61730-UU (S.D. Fla., July 12, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Statutes: Administrative
Procedures Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision.

Cheers is a brand of products designed to reduce alcohol's negative
effects.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Seth Michael Lehrman, Esq.
     Edwards Pottinger LLC
     425 N. Andrews Ave., Suite 2
     Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
     Phone: (954) 524-2820
     Fax: (954) 524-2822
     Email: seth@epllc.com



CHICAGO, IL: Court Denies Bid for Class Certification in Smith Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DARNELL SMITH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF CHICAGO,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 15-cv-03467 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Andrea
R. Wood of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, denied the Plaintiffs' motion for Rule
23(b)(3) class certification.

In the putative class action, Plaintiff Smith and 18 other
individuals have sued Defendants City of Chicago, Chicago Police
Superintendent Gary McCarthy, and approximately 60 named and
unnamed Chicago Police Department ("CPD") officers for alleged
violations of their rights pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, as set forth in the Supreme Court's
decision in Terry v. Ohio.  Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege
that the CPD has a policy and practice of conducting
unconstitutional investigatory stops.  Each of the named Plaintiffs
claims that because of that policy and practice, one or more CPD
officers subjected him to a non-consensual investigatory stop
without reasonable suspicion.

In their Sixth Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that the
Defendants have implemented, applied, and continued to enforce a
policy or custom of unconstitutional stops and frisks of Chicago
residents by the CPD, which have been conducted without the
reasonable articulable suspicion required by the Fourth Amendment.
The Plaintiffs are 19 individuals who allege that they reside in or
visit neighborhoods where the CPD has conducted these
unconstitutional stops and frisks, and some of them claim to be
victims themselves.

Now before the Court is the Plaintiffs' motion to certify a class
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).  

Based on the CPD's contact-cards system, the Plaintiffs seek to
represent two putative classes:

     (1) Fourth Amendment Class: All persons subjected to an
investigatory stop by the Chicago Police Department at any time
since April 20, 2013, which resulted in the creation of a contact
card; and

     (2) All African-Americans and Hispanics subjected to an
investigatory stop by the Chicago Police Department at any time
since April 20, 2013, which resulted in the creation of a contact
card.

Alternately, they request certification of four narrower classes:

     (3) Fourth Amendment Class: All persons who were encountered
by the Chicago Police Department for enforcement of the Gang and
Narcotics Loitering Ordinance at any time since April 20, 2013,
which resulted in the creation of a contact card;

     (4) All African-Americans and Hispanics who were encountered
by the Chicago Police Department for enforcement of the Gang and
Narcotics Loitering Ordinance at any time since April 20, 2013,
which resulted in the creation of a contact card;

     (5) All persons subjected to an investigatory stop by the
Chicago Police Department at any time since April 20, 2013, which
resulted in the creation of a contact card that contains no
narrative; and
     
     (6) All African-Americans and Hispanics who were subjected to
an investigatory stop by the Chicago Police Department at any time
since April 20, 2013, which resulted in the creation of a contact
card that contains no narrative.

On behalf of the proposed classes, the Plaintiffs seek compensatory
and punitive damages.  

As another alternative, the Plaintiffs seek certification of
particular issues under Rule 23(c)(4), including whether the CPD's
General Order on racial profiling and/or Special Order on gang and
narcotics loitering are unconstitutional, whether CPD's policies
and practices for investigatory stops were intended to target
minorities, and whether CPD policymakers were deliberately
indifferent to the known or obvious consequences of their actions
in the context of investigatory stops.

As a preliminary matter, Judge Wood first addresses the Defendants'
motion for leave to file a surreply to the Plaintiffs' motion for
class certification and the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a
sur-surreply.  She finds that the Plaintiffs proposed the four
narrower classes and sought certification of particular issues
under Rule 23(c)(4) for the first time in their reply brief.
Therefore, in her discretion previously granted the Defendants
leave to file a surreply to respond to the Plaintiffs' proposals.

In their own request for leave to file what would essentially be a
sur-surreply, the Plaintiffs contend that the City's arguments in
its surreply are largely regurgitations of the same arguments in
its response brief while simultaneously claiming that there are
representations in the City's brief that the Plaintiffs would need
to address, with no further explanation.  The Plaintiffs also
assert that as the moving party, they should have the final world.
The Judge finds thae Plaintiffs' position unpersuasive and, in its
discretion, denies the Plaintiffs' request to file yet another
brief in response to the Defendants' surreply.  As the  Plaintiffs
themselves recognize, the Court has more than enough briefing on
the matter to fully and fairly adjudicate the issue, and at some
point, briefing must end.

The Judge now turns to the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification.  As to proposed Classes 1 and 2 -- persons with a
contact card -- she finds that the Plaintiffs have not met their
burden of offering significant proof that the CPD had a general
policy that caused its officers to conduct unconstitutional
investigatory stops.  As to proposed Classes 3 and 4 -- persons
whose contact cards reflect enforcement of the gang and narcotics
loitering ordinance -- the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs have
failed to show that the Loitering Special Order functioned as a
general policy that caused individual CPD officers to violate
individuals' constitutional rights.  Finally, the Plaintiffs' fifth
and sixth proposed classes consist of subsets of individuals whose
encounters with the police resulted in contact cards with no
narratives, the Judge finds that because the Plaintiffs cannot
satisfy the commonality requirement for their first, third, and
fifth proposed Fourth Amendment classes, they also cannot do so for
the accompanying Fourteenth Amendment classes.  

Having determined that the Plaintiffs failed to prove commonality
for any of their six proposed classes, the Judge need not inquire
into the remaining Rule 23(a) issues of typicality and adequacy,
nor whether a class action is the superior method of adjudicating
this dispute.  Certification as a Rule 23(b)(3) class is therefore
not appropriate.  Therefore, she denies the Plaintiffs' motion for
Rule 23(b)(3) class certification.

Finally, the Plaintiffs request as an alternative to Rule 23(b)(3)
certification that a class be certified as to certain issues
pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4).  They contend that common issues related
to the CPD's policies and practices are appropriate for class-wide
resolution because these policies and practices caused each class
members' individual damages.  

The Judge denies the Plaintiffs' request to certify a class for
particular issues under Rule 23(c)(4).  She finds that the
Plaintiffs cannot prove an unconstitutional seizure without
individualized inquiries into the totality of circumstances
surrounding the creation of each contact card -- they cannot simply
point to certain CPD policies and practices.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Woof denied the Plaintiffs' motion
for Rule 23(b)(3) class certification.  In so ruling, however, the
Judge expresses no view on whether the shortcomings of the
Plaintiffs' proposed Rule 23(b)(3) class would similarly preclude
certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2019 Memorandum Opinion and
Order is available at https://is.gd/6PIQYo from Leagle.com.

Darnell Smith, Darren Nathan, Gregory Davis, Hector Fantanez,
Marcell Davis, Anthony Polk, Carl N. McCord, Timothy Thigpen,
MarkNevilles, Melvin Thompson, Steve McAbee, Herbert Dyer, Jr.,
Shantay Johnson, Arthur Moton, Edgar Marshall, Michael Sanders,
Rashawn Lindsey, Sidney Bell & Calvin Jackson, Plaintiffs,
represented by Martin D. Gould -- mgould@rblaw.net -- Romanucci &
Blandin Llc, Antonio Maurizio Romanucci -- aromanucci@rblaw.net --
Romanucci & Blandin, LLC, Brian H. Eldridge --
beldridge@hmelegal.com -- Hart McLaughlin & Eldridge, LLC, Bryce
Thomas Hensley, Romanucci & Blandin, Llc, Christina Maria Flores,
Hart Mclaughlin & Eldridge, Llc, John Jack Backes Prior --
jprior@hmelegal.com -- Hart McLaughlin & Eldridge, LLC, Kyle Pozan
-- kpozan@hmelegal.com -- Hart McLaughlin & Eldridge, LLC,
Nicolette A. Ward, Romanucci & Blandin, Llc, Rodney G. Gregory --
rod@gregorylawfirm.net -- The Gregory Law Firm & Steven Alan Hart
-- shart@hmelegal.com -- Hart McLaughlin & Eldridge, LLC.

Rebecca Sanders, as Parent and Next Friend of Steve McAbee, a minor
& Araceli Fantanez, as Parent and Next Friend of Hector Fantanez, a
minor, Plaintiffs, represented by Bryce Thomas Hensley , Romanucci
& Blandin, Llc, Christina Maria Flores , Hart Mclaughlin &
Eldridge, Llc, Nicolette A. Ward , Romanucci & Blandin, Llc, Rodney
G. Gregory , The Gregory Law Firm, Antonio Maurizio Romanucci ,
Romanucci & Blandin, LLC, Martin D. Gould , Romanucci & Blandin Llc
& Steven Alan Hart , Hart McLaughlin & Eldridge, LLC.

The City of Chicago, a municipal corporation, Garry McCarthy,
Chicago Police Superintendent, in his individual and official
capacity, Michael Callahan, Roy Mazzanti, Adolfo Garcia, Kris
Stipanov, Mario Cruz, Nicholas Cordova, Thomas Laurin, Patrick
Kelly, Daniel Schmit, Anthony Rosen & Gerardo Vega, Defendants,
represented by Allan T. Slagel -- aslagel@taftlaw.com -- Taft
Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Allison Emma Czerniak --
aczerniak@taftlaw.com -- Taft Stettinius & Hollister Llp, Barton
James O'Brien -- obrien@taftlaw.com -- Taft Stettinius & Hollister
LLP, Brian Weinthal -- bweinthal@taftlaw.com -- Taft Stettinius &
Hollister LLP, Elizabeth Erin Babbitt, Taft Stettinius & Hollister
LLC, Jeffrey M. Schieber, Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Michael
P. Sheehan -- msheehan@taftlaw.com -- Taft Stettinius & Hollister
LLP & Richard Yao-yuan Hu -- rhu@taftlaw.com -- Taft Stettinius &
Hollister LLP.

John Does, Officers 1-14, Unknown Chicago Police Officers,
Commander Glenn Evans, Unknown Chicago Police Officers, John Doe
Officers 1-110, Kimberly Valenti, Pablo Vasquez & Dana Hillard,
Defendants, represented by Brian Weinthal , Taft Stettinius &
Hollister LLP.

Anthony Gemignani, Defendant, represented by Allan T. Slagel , Taft
Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Allison Emma Czerniak , Taft Stettinius
& Hollister Llp, Barton James O'Brien , Taft Stettinius & Hollister
LLP, Brian Weinthal , Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Elizabeth
Erin Babbitt , Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLC, Jeffrey M. Schieber
, Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Michael P. Sheehan , Taft
Stettinius & Hollister LLP & Richard Yao-yuan Hu , Taft Stettinius
& Hollister LLP.


CIRCLE K: Rodriguez Wage & Hour Suit Remanded to State Court
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiff's Motion to Remand
Action to State Court in the case captioned TIFFANY RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff, v. CIRCLE K STORES INC., Defendant. Case No. ED CV
19-0469 FMO (SPx). (C.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Tiffany Rodriguez filed a complaint in the Riverside
County Superior Court against defendant Circle K Stores Inc.
Plaintiff brought suit on behalf of herself and all individuals who
are or previously were employed by defendant in California and
classified as non-exempt employees for a period spanning four years
prior to the complaint's filing date.

Plaintiff asserts six causes of action for: (1) unlawful business
practices, in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Sections 17200,
et seq. (2) failure to pay overtime compensation, in violation of
Cal. Lab. Code Sections 204, 510, 1194 & 1198  (3) failure to
provide meal period premium pay, in violation of Cal. Lab. Code
Sections 226.7 & 512; (4) failure to provide rest breaks, in
violation of Cal. Lab. Code Sections 226.7 & 512 (5) failure to
provide accurate itemized wage statements, in violation of Cal.
Lab. Code Section 226; and (6) failure to pay wages when due, in
violation of Cal. Lab. Code Sections 201-03.  

Removal of a civil action from the state court where it was filed
is proper if the action might have originally been brought in
federal court Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) provides expanded
original diversity jurisdiction for class actions meeting the
amount in controversy and minimal diversity and numerosity
requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(2). Under CAFA,
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class
action in which any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of
a State different from any defendant.

AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY

The Plaintiff argues that defendant has failed to show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that more than $5 million is at
stake in this litigation.
   
For the reasons set forth below, the court agrees.

Timely Payment of Wages

In attempting to meet its burden of showing that more than $5
million is at issue, defendant first focuses on plaintiff's claim
that defendant failed to make a timely payment of wages owed to
terminated employees. Under California Labor Code Section 203(a),
if an employer willfully fails to pay, without abatement or
reduction, in accordance with Sections 201, 201.3, 201.5, 201.9,
202, and 205.5, any wages of an employee who is discharged or who
quits, the wages of the employee shall continue as a penalty from
the due date thereof at the same rate until paid or until an action
therefor is commenced; but the wages shall not continue for more
than 30 days.

In other words, an employer that willfully fails to pay wages due
an employee who is discharged or quits is obligated to pay the
employee, in addition to the unpaid wages, an amount equal to the
employee's daily wages for each day, not exceeding 30 days.

The Defendant contends that, over the course of the class period,
3,536 non-exempt employees in California saw their employment come
to an end. These employees had an average wage of $10.80 per hour,
and worked an average of 7.5 hours per day. Thus, according to
defendant, the purported failure to timely pay wages owed to
outgoing employees exposed it to damages of 10.8 (average hourly
rate) x 7.5 (average hours worked per day) x 3,536 (number of
outgoing employees) x 30, or $8,592,480.  

But there is a serious problem with defendant's damages estimate.
Namely, defendant assumes a violation rate of 100%. That is,
defendant assumes that it will be found liable for failing to pay
wages to each and every one of the 3,536 non-exempt employees who
left their jobs over the relevant time period.  

Meal and Rest Break Claims

The Plaintiff alleges that class members were from time to time
unable to take off duty meal breaks and were not fully relieved of
duty for meal periods, that they "were required to perform work as
ordered by defendant for more than five hours without receiving a
meal break, and that defendant failed to furnish second meal breaks
from time to time" for employees who worked ten or more hours in a
shift.  

The Defendant estimates that there were 324,084 work weeks during
the class period.   With an average hourly wage of $10.92,
defendant assumes a rest break violation rate of one per work week,
and calculates damages of $3,538,997. Applying the same math to
plaintiff's meal break claims, defendant calculates a separate
damages amount of $3,538,997.

The court agrees with plaintiff that the fundamental assumption
underlying defendant's meal and rest break damages calculation,
i.e., that there was one violation per work week, is unwarranted.
Indeed, defendant seems to have pulled this assumption out of thin
air.

In Munoz v. Central Parking Sys., Inc., 2010 WL 3432239, *2 (C.D.
Cal. 2010), the court noted that a series of damages-related
assumptions, including one that plaintiffs missed one meal period
per week were unsupported. The court reached this conclusion
because the defendant failed to provide any evidentiary support,
and also because the defendant's calculations were made using the
average hourly wage for all employees, when the real amount in
controversy could be much lower depending on which employees were
experiencing violations and their actual hourly wage.

Here, the defendant's assumption of one violation per work week is
even more attenuated given the Complaint's equivocal language
regarding the frequency of meal and rest break violations.  

The Defendant argues that its one violation per week assumption is
conservative given the allegations in the Complaint. Nevertheless,
mere speculation and conjecture is not enough to establish removal
jurisdiction. In short, the court will not give weight to
defendant's damages estimate regarding the meal and rest break
claims, because it rests upon an assumption devoid of any
evidentiary support.

Wage Statements

California law requires employers to furnish accurate itemized wage
statements in writing showing various pieces of information.  An
employee suffering injury as a result of a knowing and intentional
failure by an employer to comply with" this legal requirement is
entitled to recover the greater of all actual damages or fifty
dollars ($50) for the initial pay period in which a violation
occurs and one hundred dollars ($100) per employee for each
violation in a subsequent pay period, not to exceed an aggregate
penalty of four thousand dollars ($4,000). Plaintiff alleges that
defendant's failure to properly calculate overtime wages, combined
with missed meal and rest breaks, resulted in a failure to comply
with California Labor Code Section 226.

The Defendant asserts that it issued approximately 30,669 wage
statements to putative class members between February 11, 2018, and
October 15, 2018.  Applying the penalty of $50 for initial
inaccurate wage statements and $100 for subsequent inaccurate wage
statements, defendant estimates potential damages of at least
$2,923,900. Again, defendant's calculation is problematic. As with
the timely-payment claim, defendant assumes, without any
evidentiary support, a 100% violation rate. And defendant's claimed
violation rate once again is not supported by the allegations in
the Complaint, which simply alleges that defendant supplied
deficient wage statements "from time to time rather than as a
matter of course

Overtime

In its opposition brief, defendant raises a new ground for removal,
claiming that $5,257,980 of damages are at issue with respect to
plaintiff's overtime claim. However, defendant did not raise this
ground in its NOR. Defendant furnishes no authority suggesting that
it can invoke, in a brief, damages not raised in the NOR.  

The Defendant suggests that its overtime damages estimate could be
treated as an amendment to the removal notice.  A defendant seeking
to remove a case to federal court must do so within thirty days of
being served with the complaint. A defendant may amend the Notice
of Removal after the thirty day window has closed to correct a
defective allegation of jurisdiction. However, the NOR cannot be
amended to add a separate basis for removal jurisdiction after the
thirty day period.

Accordingly, because defendant raises a new argument for removal in
its opposition to the Motion to Remand, and inappropriately
suggests that the court should allow it to amend the NOR to add new
bases for removal after the thirty day removal period has run,the
court declines to consider the overtime damages estimate defendant
proffers.

Attorney's Fees

Finally, the NOR notes that plaintiff seeks attorney's fees.  The
Defendant estimates an attorney's fees rate of 25% is reasonable
and, in light of defendant's previous amount-in-controversy
estimate of $18,594,374, calculates attorney's fees of $4,648,593.

However, the court agrees with plaintiff that this calculation is
inherently flawed because it rests upon defendant's other,
inadequately supported damages calculations.

In other words, since defendant did not meet its burden to
establish the amount in controversy with respect to any of
plaintiff's claims by a preponderance of the evidence, it follows
that the court cannot rely on plaintiff's request for attorney's
fees, especially where defendant bases its claim on a percentage of
the alleged total amount in controversy.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 11, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y5aqbgky from Leagle.com.

Tiffany Rodriguez, an individual, on behalf of herself and on
behalf of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by
Shani O. Zakay -- shani@zakaylaw.com -- Zakay Law Group APC,
Aparajit Bhowmik -- aj@bamlawlj.com -- Blumenthal Nordrehaug
Bhowmik De Blouw LLP, Kyle R. Nordrehaug -- KYLE@BAMLAWCA.COM --
Blumenthal Nordrehaug Bhowmik De Blouw LLP & Norman B. Blumenthal
-- norm@bamlawca.com -- Blumenthal Nordrehaug Bhowmik De Blouw
LLP.

Circle K Stores Inc., a Corporation, Defendant, represented by
Graham Michael Hoerauf -- graham.hoerauf@ogletree.com -- Ogletree
Deakins Nash Smoak and Stewart PC, Mark Franklin Lovell --
mark.lovell@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak and Stewart
PC & Patricia Ann Matias -- patricia.matias@ogletreedeakins.com --
Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak and Stewart PC.


CLINICA SIERRA: Torres Files Class Suit in California
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Clinica Sierra Vista.
The case is styled as Maritza Torres, individually, and on behalf
of other members of the general public similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Clinica Sierra Vista, a California Corporation,
Defendant, Case No. BCV-19-101966 (Cal. Super. Ct., Kern County,
July 16, 2019).

The case type is stated as Other Employment - Civil Unlimited.

Clinica Sierra Vista is a primary-care medical home providing
affordable care for those in Kern, Fresno & Inyo counties.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Edwin Aiwazian, Esq.
   Lawyers for Justice, PC
   410 Arden Ave Ste 203
   Glendale, CA 91203
   Tel: (818) 265-1020
   Fax: (818) 265-1021
   Email: edwin@lfjpc.com


CREATIVE SUPPORTS: Webb Seeks Overtime Pay for In-Home Caretakers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
FRANCES WEBB, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
the Plaintiff, v. CREATIVE SUPPORTS OF KANSAS CITY, LLC, JAMES
GUYER, and LAUREN S. GUYER, the Defendants, Case No. 4:19-CV-549
(W.D. Mo., July 12, 2019), alleges that Defendants violated the
Fair Labor Standards Act by forcing their employees to work a
substantial amount of overtime without properly paying all
compensation due, thus depriving them of rightful compensation for
their work that Defendants are legally obligated to pay.

According to the complaint, Webb worked for Defendants as a Direct
Support Professional (DSP) or in-home caretaker in the greater
Kansas City, Missouri area and was damaged by Defendants' illegal
policy or practice. The Plaintiff was denied the compensation she
is due under the FLSA.

Creative Supports is a caregiving service company that provides
services in and around the Kansas City, Missouri.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plainitff are:

          Eric L. Dirks, Esq.
          WILLIAMS DIRKS DAMERON LLC
          1100 Main Street, Suite 2600
          Kansas City, MO 64105
          Telephone: (816) 945-7110
          Facsimile: (816) 945-7118
          E-mail: dirks@williamsdirks.com

               - and -

          Robert W. Cowan, Esq.
          BAILEY COWAN HECKAMAN PLLC
          5555 San Felipe Street, Suite 900
          Houston, TX 77056
          Telephone: (713) 425-7100
          Facsimile: (713) 425-7101
          E-mail: rcowan@bchlaw.com

CREDIT SUISSE: Court Stays C. Laver Suit Pending 9th Cir. Ruling
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (USA) LLC, Petitioner, v.
CHRISTOPHER M. LAVER, Respondent, Case No. 18 Civ. 2920 (AT) (S.D.
N.Y.), Judge Analisa Torres of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York granted Laver's motion to stay the
action pending a ruling from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.

Laver is a former Credit Suisse employee.  He received a monthly
salary and other compensation that was deferred and subject to
certain vesting requirements.  Laver alleges that he was damaged as
a result of the automatic cancellation of his unvested contingent
deferred awards upon his Dec. 4, 2015 resignation from Credit
Suisse.  As an employee, Laver agreed to comply with the Employment
Dispute Resolution Program ("EDRP"), which requires arbitration of
any Employment-Related Claims against Credit Suisse.

On Feb. 7, 2018, Laver filed a putative class action in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California on behalf of
himself and other similarly situated former Credit Suisse financial
advisers terminated between Oct. 20, 2015 and March 31, 2016 and
who at the time their employment with Credit Suisse terminated had
unvested Credit Suisse deferred compensation awards pursuant to one
or more Share Plan.

On March 30, 2018, Credit Suisse filed two motions in that action.
First, it moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, to stay the case
arguing that the complaint should be dismissed in favor of
arbitration.  Its second motion sought to transfer the case to the
Court.   On April 3, 2018, Credit Suisse commenced the present
action by filing a petition to compel arbitration.
On June 21, 2018, Judge William H. Orrick granted Credit Suisse's
motion to dismiss the California Action because Laver agreed to
mediate and then arbitrate any claims regarding his employment with
and compensation from Credit Suisse under the terms of the EDRP.
Judge Orrick also denied the motion to transfer as moot.

On July 17, 2018, Laver appealed that order, which appeal is
currently pending before the Ninth Circuit.  On Sept. 20, 2018,
Laver filed the present motion to dismiss without prejudice or, in
the alternative, to stay the action pending resolution of the
appeal in the Ninth Circuit.

In deciding whether to stay proceedings, courts in the Circuit
examine the following five factors: (1) the private interests of
the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously with the civil
litigation as balanced against the prejudice to the plaintiffs if
delayed; (2) the private interests of and burden on the defendants;
(3) the interests of the courts; (4) the interests of persons not
parties to the civil litigation; and (5) the public interest.

Beginning with the first factor, although Credit Suisse has an
interest in proceeding expeditiously, Judge Torres finds no serious
prejudice to Credit Suisse if resolution of the action is delayed.
With respect to the second factor, Laver, who has moved for the
stay, will not be burdened by it.  This factor is, therefore,
neutral.  The third factor, which examines the interests of the
courts, weighs heavily in favor of a stay.  Staying the action will
best serve the interests of the courts by promoting judicial
efficiency and minimizing the possibility of conflicts between
different courts.  With respect to the fourth factor, the interests
of nonparties are inconsequential here for the same reasons that
the prejudice of any delay to Credit Suisse is minimal.  The fifth
factor, the interest of the public, weighs slightly towards
granting the stay because, although the public has an interest in
the speedy resolution of every case, the public is also not served
by any wasting of judicial resources.  Accordingly, after balancing
all the factors, the Judge finds that a stay is appropriate.  

For the reasons stated, Judge Torres granted Laver's motion to
dismiss the complaint, or in the alternative, to stay the case
insofar as it seeks a stay, and terminated without prejudice in all
other respects.  The action is stayed pending the Ninth Circuit's
decision.  Within three days of any ruling on the appeal pending in
Laver v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, No. 18-16328 (9th Cir.
July 17, 2018), the parties will notify the Court by filing a joint
letter on the docket.

The Clerk of Court is directed to stay the action and terminate the
motion at ECF No. 30.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/EOm6Kl from Leagle.com.

Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, Petitioner, represented by
Stephen M. Kramarsky -- skramarsky@dpklaw.com -- Dewey, Pegno &
Kramarsky, LLP.

Christopher M. Laver, Respondent, represented by Jeffrey K. Riffer
-- jriffer@elkinskalt.com -- Elkins Kalt Weintraub Reuben Gartside
LLP, pro hac vice, Julie Z. Kimball -- jkimball@elkinskalt.com --
Elkins Kalt Weintraub Reuben Gartside LLP, Rachel Geman, Lieff
Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP & Roger Norton Heller --
rheller@lchb.com -- Leiff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein LLP.


DEJA VU SERVICES: Roe Suit Moved to Northern Dist. of California
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit against Deja Vu Services, Inc. et al., was
transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of California, to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California (San Francisco) on July 11, 2019. The Northern
District of California Court Clerk assinged Case No.
3:19-cv-03960-LB to the proceeding. The suit alleges violation of
Fair LaborStandards Act. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge
Laurel Beeler.

The Plaintiffs contend that all class members were denied their
fundamental rights under applicable federal and state wage and hour
laws, causing financial loss and injury. Specifically, the
Plaintiffs complain that Defendants misclassified Plaintiffs and
all other members of the Class as independent contractors, as
opposed to employees, at all times in which they worked as dancers
at Defendants' adult nightclubs located throughout California. The
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and all
other members of the Class the minimum and overtime wages and other
benefits to which they were entitled under applicable federal and
California state laws.

The case is captioned as Jane Roe No. 1 and 2. individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, and Elana
Pera, Penny Nunez, Sarah Murphy, Poohrawn Mehraban, Nicole Hughes,
Angelynn Hermes, Gypsy Vidal, and Rashele Hamren, Intervenor
Plaintiffs, vs. Deja Vu Services, Inc.; Harry Mohney; DOES 1-200,
jointly and severally; Bijou-Century, LLC d/b/a New Century
Theater; BT California, LLC d/b/a The Penthouse Club & Steakhouse;
Chowderhouse, Inc., d/b/a Hungry I Deja Vu-San Francisco, LLC d/b/a
Centerforlds Deja Vu Showgirls of San Francisco, LLC d/b/a Little
Darlings of San Francisco; Gold Club-SF, LLC d/b/a Gold Club;
S.A.W. Entertainment, Ltd., d/b/a Hustler San Francisco and the
Condor Club; San Francisco Garden of Eden, LLC d/b/a Garden of
Eden; San Francisco Roaring 20's, LLC d/b/a Roaring 20's; SFBSC
Management, LLC; Grapevine Entertainment, Inc., doing business as:
Deja Vu Showgirls; Nite Life East, LLC, doing business as: Little
Darlings; SP Start Enterprise, Inc., doing business as: Deja Vu
Coldwater, LLC, doing business as: Deja Vu Showgirls 3610 Barnett
Ave., LLC, doing business as: Adult Superstore Jolar Cinema of San
Diego, Ltd., doing business as: Jolar Cinema Showgirls; and
Showgirls of San Diego, Inc., doing business as: Deja Vu Showgirls
Stockton Enterprises, LLC, doing business as: Deja Vu Show, the
Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-00196 (S.D. Cal.).[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Jeffrey R. Krinsk, Esq.
          FINKELSTEIN & KRINSK LLP
          550 West C Street, Suite 1760
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 238-1333
          Facsimile: (619) 238-5425
          E-mail: jrk@classactionlaw.com

Attorneys for the Intervenors:

          Shannon Liss-Riordan, Esq.
          LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
          729 Boylston Street, Suite 2000
          Boston, MA 02116
          Telephone: (617) 994-5800
          Facsimile: (617) 994-5801
          E-mail: sliss@llrlaw.com

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          Tammara N. Bokmuller, Esq.
          BOWMAN AND BROOKE LLP
          750 B Street, Suite 1740
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 376-2500
          Facsimile: (619) 376-2501
          E-mail: Tammy.Bokmuller@bowmanandbrooke.com

               - and -

          Shane Michael Cahill, Esq.
          LONG & LEVIT, LLP
          465 California Street, 5th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 438-4594
          E-mail: scahill@longlevit.com

DELTA AIR LINES: McGarry Appeals C.D. Cal. Order to Ninth Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Teresa J. McGarry filed an appeal from a Court ruling in
the lawsuit titled Teresa McGarry v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., et al.,
Case No. 2:18-cv-09827-MWF-E, in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California, Los Angeles.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the class
action lawsuit (assigned Case No. 1:18-cv-02794) was transferred
from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
on November 21, 2018.

Delta Air Lines, Inc. provides scheduled air transportation for
passengers and cargo in the United States and internationally.
Delta Air Lines, Inc. was founded in 1924 and is headquartered in
Atlanta, Georgia.

The appellate case is captioned as Teresa McGarry v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., et al., Case No. 19-55790, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by August 8, 2019;

   -- Transcript is due on September 9, 2019;

   -- Appellant Teresa J. McGarry's opening brief is due on
      October 17, 2019;

   -- Appellees Delta Air Lines, Inc. and [24]7.AI, Inc.'s
      answering brief is due on November 18, 2019; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant TERESA J. MCGARRY, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Denis F. Sheils, Esq.
          KOHN SWIFT & GRAF, P.C.
          1600 Market Street, Suite 2500
          Philadelphia, PA 19103-7225
          Telephone: (215) 238-1700
          E-mail: dsheils@kohnswift.com

               - and -

          Demet Basar, Esq.
          WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ LLP
          270 Madison Avenue
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 545-4600
          E-mail: basar@whafh.com

               - and -

          Jon Anders Tostrud, Esq.
          TOSTRUD LAW GROUP, P.C.
          1901 Avenue of the Stars
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 278-2600
          E-mail: jtostrud@tostrudlaw.com

Defendant-Appellee DELTA AIR LINES, INC., is represented by:

          Joseph Nicholas Akrotirianakis, Esq.
          KING AND SPALDING LLP
          633 W. 5th Street, Suite 1600
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 443-4355
          Facsimile: (213) 443-4310
          E-mail: jakro@kslaw.com

               - and -

          David L. Balser, Esq.
          KING & SPALDING LLP
          1180 Peachtree Street NE
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone: (404) 572-2782
          E-mail: dbalser@kslaw.com

Defendant-Appellee [24]7.AI, INC. is represented by:

          Teresa Carey Chow, Esq.
          BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP
          11601 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Los Angeles, CA 90025-0509
          Telephone: (310) 820-8800
          E-mail: tchow@bakerlaw.com

               - and -

          Casie D. Collignon, Esq.
          Paul G. Karlsgodt, Esq.
          BAKER HOSTETLER LLP
          1801 California Street
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 861-0600
          E-mail: ccollignon@bakerlaw.com
                  pkarlsgodt@bakerlaw.com


DIGNITY HEALTH: Ct. Extends Settlement Documents Deadline in Klatt
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada issued
an Order to Continue Settlement Documents Deadline in the case
captioned MEGAN KLATT, an individual, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. DIGNITY HEALTH, a
California corporation; DOES 1-50, unknown individuals; and ROE
COMPANIES 1-50, unknown business entities, Defendants. Case No.
2:17-cv-02425-RFB-BNW. (D. Nev.).

The Parties participated in a mediation and subsequently reached a
settlement in principal. The Parties submitted a Stipulation and
Order to Suspend Dispositive Motion Deadlines Pending Settlement
(Stipulation to Suspend), requesting that the dispositive motion
deadlines be suspended while the Parties worked diligently to draft
and agree upon the requisite settlement documents.

The Court issued an Order granting the Stipulation to Suspend and
directed the Parties to file a stipulation to dismiss or
dispositive motions.

Since the last extension was granted, the Parties have continued to
work diligently to finalize the settlement papers and have
discussed additional changes to the settlement papers, but have
been unable to finalize the documents in light of the Fourth of
July holiday. As such, the Parties request an additional nine (9)
days, through and including July 19, 2019, to complete the
documents and submit the papers for Court approval.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 11, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y66qjlxb from Leagle.com.

Megan E. Klatt, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher D. Kircher --
cdk@skrlawyers.com -- Semenza Kircher Rickard,Jarrod L. Rickard --
jlr@skrlawyers.com -- Semenza Kircher Rickard & Lawrence J.
Semenza, III -- ljs@skrlawyers.com -- Semenza Kircher Rickard.

Dignity Health, Defendant, represented by Kirsten Ann Milton --
Kirsten.Milton@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis PC, pro hac vice &
Daniel Aquino -- Daniel.Aquino@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis
P.C..


DR PEPPER/SEVEN UP: Villanueva Sues over Biometric Data Storage
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Dr. Pepper/Seven
Up, Inc. for alleged violations of Illinois' Biometric Information
Privacy Act (BIPA). The case is captioned GIO VILLANUEVA,
INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Plaintiff, v. DR. PEPPER/SEVEN UP, INC., Defendant, Case No.
2019CH07934 (Ill. Cir., Cook Cty., July 2, 2019).

Plaintiff brings this class action complaint to stop Defendant's
unlawful collection, use, and storage of Plaintiffs and the
proposed Class' sensitive, private, and personal biometric data.
The Defendant has allegedly exposed its employees, including
Plaintiff, to serious and irreversible privacy risks by requiring
them to have their fingerprints scanned by a biometric timekeeping
device and by failing to destroy their biometric data when the
initial purpose for collecting or obtaining such data has been
satisfied or within three years of employees' last interactions
with the company.

In addition, this class action complaint alleges that the Defendant
has violated the BIPA by failing to properly inform Plaintiff and
others similarly situated in writing of the specific purpose and
length of time for which their fingerprints were being collected,
stored, disseminated and used. It also asserts that the Defendant
did not provide a publicly available retention schedule and
guidelines for permanently destroying the fingerprints and did not
receive a written release from Plaintiff and others similarly
situated to collect, store, disseminate or otherwise use their
fingerprints.

The Defendant is a soft-drink manufacturing company.  It is a
Delaware corporation that does business in Illinois. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Brandon M. Wise, Esq.
     Paul A. Lesko, Esq.
     PEIFFER WOLF CARR & KANE, APLC
     818 Lafayette Ave., Floor 2
     St. Louis, MO 63104
     Telephone: (314) 833-4825
     E-mail: bwise@pwcklegal.com
             plesko@pwcklegal.com


DYNAMIC RECOVERY: Reece Alleges Violation under FDCPA
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Dynamic Recovery
Solutions, LLC. The case is styled as Annette Reece, a/k/a Annette
Baird, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Dynamic Recovery Solutions, LLC and Cavalry SPV I,
LLC, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00121 (E.D. Tenn., July 16,
2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Act.

Dynamic Recovery Solutions, LLC is a full-service collection agency
based in South Carolina.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.



EAST WISCONSIN SAVINGS: Doberstein Moves for Class Certification
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit titled TIFFANY DOBERSTEIN on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated v. EAST WISCONSIN SAVINGS
BANK, Case No. 1:18-cv-01931-WCG (E.D. Wisc.), moves for
certification of a class action against the Defendant:

     All hourly-paid, non-exempt employees who are or have been
     employed by Defendant within two (2) years immediately prior
     to the filing of the Complaint (ECF No. 1) and who received
     non-discretionary forms of compensation in addition to
     regular wages that were not included in their regular rates
     of pay for overtime calculation purposes, are entitled to
     judgment as a matter of law.

Between December 7, 2016, and December 7, 2018, all of the
Defendant's hourly-paid, non-exempt employees ("Member Relations
Representatives"), including the Plaintiff, were compensated with
-- in addition to their regular, hourly rates of pay --
non-discretionary bonuses, each quarter, pursuant to the
Defendant's incentive program, according to the Motion.  These
quarterly bonuses were made pursuant to the Defendant's known
performance or productivity formula and were announced and/or known
to the Defendant's Member Relations Representatives, including Ms.
Doberstein, in order to encourage and/or reward their steady,
productive, consistent, and efficient work performance and
attendance.

Ms. Doberstein contends that the Defendant failed to include these
non-discretionary bonuses in Member Relations Representatives'
regular rates of pay, including her regular rate of pay, when
determining overtime compensation due to them during workweeks in
which they worked more than 40 hours during the representative
three month time period for which the non-discretionary bonuses
covered in violation of Wis. Stat. Section 103.025(1)(c) and Wis.
Admin Code Section DWD 274.03.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James A. Walcheske, Esq.
          Scott S. Luzi, Esq.
          David M. Potteiger, Esq.
          WALCHESKE & LUZI, LLC
          15850 W. Bluemound Rd., Suite 304
          Brookfield, WI 53005
          Telephone: (262) 780-1953
          Facsimile: (262) 565-6469
          E-mail: jwalcheske@walcheskeluzi.com
                  sluzi@walcheskeluzi.com
                  dpotteiger@walcheskeluzi.com


EQUIFAX INC: Dawson Alleges Violation under ADA
-----------------------------------------------
Equifax, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to
the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Leshawn
Dawson, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Equifax, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-06615 (S.D.
N.Y., July 16, 2019).

Equifax Inc. is a data analytics and technology company that
assists organizations and individuals in making informed business
and personal decisions. Headquartered in Atlanta, Ga., Equifax
operates or has investments in 24 countries in North America,
Central and South America, Europe and the Asia Pacific region.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (929) 575-4175
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal



EQUILON ENTERPRISES: Dimercurto Suit Removed to N.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned MARCO DIMERCURTO, CHARLES GAETH, JOHN LANGLITZ,
and MALCOLM SYNIGAL on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. EQUILON ENTERPRISES LLC DBA SHELL OIL
PRODUCTS US, and DOES 1 THROUGH AND INCLUDING 25, Defendants, Case
No. C19-01144 was removed from the Superior Court of the State of
California, County of Contra Costa, to the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California on July 12, 2019, and
assigned Case No. 3:19-cv-04029.

Plaintiffs allege that an Equilon "standby shift policy" gives rise
to their claims for unpaid wages.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

     GARY T. LAFAYETTE, ESQ.
     BRIAN H. CHUN, ESQ.
     BARBARA L. LYONS, ESQ.
     LAFAYETTE & KUMAGAI LLP
     1300 Clay Street, Ste. 810
     Oakland, CA 94612
     Phone: (415) 357-4600
     Fax: (415) 357-4605
     Email: glafayette@lkclaw.com
            bchun@lkclaw.com
            blyons@lkclaw.com


EVERYDAY BEAUTY: Court Denies Class Certification in Lin
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York issued a Memorandum Decision and Order denying Plaintiffs’
Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned  LANQING LIN,
et al., Plaintiffs, v. EVERYDAY BEAUTY AMORE INC., et al.,
Defendants. No. 18-cv-729 (BMC). (E.D.N.Y.).

The Plaintiffs are former retail sales employees of beauty supply
stores in the Everyday Beauty chain. The Plaintiffs are proceeding
in a collective action on their Fair Labor Standards Act claims.

The Plaintiffs' proposed class is as follows:

     All individuals who were employed by Defendants as sales
representatives or store managers during the six years immediately
preceding the initiation of this action up to September 18, 2016.

To be eligible for class certification, plaintiffs must demonstrate
that the four requirements of Rule 23(a) are met. Those
requirements are: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable (numerosity) (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class (commonality) (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class (typicality) and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class (adequacy).  

With respect to numerosity, the plaintiffs claim that there are
approximately 350 members in the proposed class, based on
reasonable inferences from available facts. In the Second Circuit,
"numerosity is presumed at a level of 40 members."

The Plaintiffs have seemingly arrived at this 350 number for the
six-year class period by roughly doubling the number of employees
that the defendants identified as having worked at their stores
during the approximately three-year collective period. That, of
course, simply assumes the truth of the plaintiffs' theory of the
case, that every single Everyday Beauty employee is subject to the
NYLL and was not treated in compliance its strictures during their
employment. Moreover, the plaintiffs' leap from the identified 166
employees to the approximated 350 employees is based on pure
speculation. But, if their theory of the case is correct, then
plaintiffs have established numerosity at either amount because 166
employees certainly satisfies the numerosity prong.

That begs the question, however, of whether the plaintiffs have
established that their class action theory is viable. It is their
burden at class certification to advance enough facts to support
the existence of the purported class. They must come forward with
evidence to show that the inference they seek to draw that 350
employees experienced similar violations of the NYLL during their
employment at Everyday Beauty is correct.

In other words, the plaintiffs must show typicality and
commonality: that what happened to them also happened to others.  

Judge Mann's conclusion was also based on the Supreme Court's
indication in Wal-Mart, 654 U.S. at 354, that the evidentiary
standards for admissibility of expert testimony established in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993),
applies at the class certification stage.

There is no logical reason to apply only some of the Rules of
Evidence to class certification motions. They should either apply
in full, or not at all. I therefore agree with Judge Mann's
conclusion that the evidence proffered in support of a motion for
class certification must be admissible. The clear implication from
the quoted dicta is that the proof that Rule 23's requirements are
satisfied must come in the form of competent, admissible evidence.

Once the hearsay is set aside in the supporting affidavits,
plaintiffs are only left with themselves. There are five
individuals, each of whom are named in this lawsuit, who have come
forward and attested to facts that suggest they were treated in
violation of the NYLL. That does not say anything about what the
other 345 employees experienced when they were employed at Everyday
Beauty.

Even assuming, however, that these hearsay statements could be
considered in support of plaintiffs' motion for class
certification, plaintiffs would still fail to show commonality and
typicality. Once the allegations in the affidavits are
de-duplicated for any mention of the same individuals and are
narrowed to those allegations which are remotely grounded in the
affiants' actual experiences, plaintiffs have identified a total of
23 employees, including themselves, who were allegedly subjected to
unlawful practices under the NYLL.

Otherwise, the plaintiffs simply conclude that everyone knows that
all employees in each Everyday Beauty store are paid the same,
because it was common knowledge that that is defendants' policy or
that everyone who worked at my store was treated the same because I
saw certain identified employees' pay stubs, so it must also be
true that other stores followed suit.

The Court rules that the Plaintiffs cannot certify a class on mere
speculation. There is simply no evidence in the record that
plaintiffs' allegations are common or typical of all or any other
Everyday Beauty employees. Neither five nor 23 employees'
experiences, standing alone, serves as the basis for certifying a
class.  

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is
denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 11, 2019 Memorandum
Decision and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y45fap8m
from Leagle.com.

Lingmin Yang, Lanqing Lin, Yong Shan Su, Lixian Qian & En Lin Xiao,
individually and on behalf of all other employees similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Aaron Schweitzer, Troy Law,
PLLC & John Troy, Troy & Associates, PLLC, 4125 Kissena Blvd Ste
119, Flushing, NY, 11355-3150, Mei Hui Jiang & Huanhuan Ke,
Plaintiffs, represented by John Troy, Troy & Associates, PLLC.

Everyday Beauty Amore Inc., Beauty Aritaum Corp., Xiu Qing Su,
Everyday Amore LLC & Everyday Beauty Missha Corp., Defendants,
represented by Felice B. Ekelman -- Felice.Ekelman@jacksonlewis.com
-- Jackson Lewis, P.C., Christine Lee Hogan -- clhogan@littler.com
-- Littler Mendelson, P.C., Douglas J. Klein --
Douglas.Klein@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis LLP & Kevin K. Yam
-- kyam@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson P.C.

Xin Lin & Mei Hui Jiang, Defendants, represented by Felice B.
Ekelman, Jackson Lewis, P.C.


EVERYDAY BEAUTY: Lin's Retail Sales Workers Class Not Certified
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Brian M. Cogan denied the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification in the lawsuit captioned LANQING LIN, et al. v.
EVERYDAY BEAUTY AMORE INC., et al., Case No. 18-cv-729 (BMC)
(E.D.N.Y.).

The Plaintiffs are former retail sales employees of beauty supply
stores in the "Everyday Beauty" chain.  The Plaintiffs are
proceeding in a collective action on their Fair Labor Standards Act
claims.

The Plaintiffs' proposed class is as follows:

     All individuals who were employed by Defendants as sales
     representatives or store managers during the six years
     immediately preceding the initiation of this action up to
     September 18, 2016.

According to the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order, the
Plaintiffs stated that this proposed class essentially consists of
all of the Defendants' employees during the relevant six-year
period.  They estimate that this will include approximately 350
individuals.

Judge Cogan notes that by claiming that all employees were paid the
same as the affiants, the Plaintiffs mean to indicate that other
employees -- both identified and unidentified -- also were not paid
overtime.  But the Plaintiffs only arrive there by conclusory
statements, and they do not back up their conclusions with real
facts, not to mention any facts about all of the Defendant's stores
(or even a majority of them), Judge Cogan says.

"Plaintiffs cannot certify a class on mere speculation.  There is
simply no evidence in the record that plaintiffs' allegations are
common or typical of all (or any) other Everyday Beauty employees.
Neither five nor 23 employees' experiences, standing alone, serves
as the basis for certifying a class," Judge Cogan opines.[CC]


FCA US: Kingston Files Suit in C.D. California
----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against FCA US, LLC. The case
is styled as Kelly Kingston individually and on behalf of similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff v. FCA US LLC a Delaware limited
liability corporation, Defendant, Case No. 8:19-cv-01365 (C.D.
Cal., July 12, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract.

FCA US LLC, together with its subsidiaries, designs, engineers,
manufactures, distributes, and sells vehicles primarily in the
United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Robert Ahdoot, Esq.
     Ahdoot and Wolfson PC
     10728 Lindbrook Drive
     Los Angeles, CA 90024
     Phone: (310) 474-9111
     Fax: (310) 474-8585
     Email: rahdoot@ahdootwolfson.com


FEIN & SUCH: Faces Stabile Suit in District of New Jersey
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Fein, Such, Kahn &
Shepard, P.C. The case is captioned as SALVATORE STABILE
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. FEIN, SUCH, KAHN & SHEPARD, P.C., the Defendant,
Case No. 2:19-cv-14644-WHW-CLW (D.N.J., July 2, 2019). The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge William H. Walls. The suit alleges
violation of Fair Debt Collection Act.

The Defendant provides legal services to clients in the practice
areas of Business Law, Creditors' Rights, Litigation, Real Estate,
and Tax.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          Ari Hillel Marcus, Esq.
          MARCUS ZELMAN, LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Telephone: (347) 526-4093
          Facsimile: (732) 298-6256
          E-mail: yzelman@marcuszelman.com
                  ari@marcuszelman.com

FORD MOTOR: K. Heslop Suit Remanded to Calif. Superior Court
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, issued an Order granting Plaintiffs'
Motion to Remand in the case captioned KELLY HESLOP, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, et al., Defendants. Case No.
19-CV-01422-LHK. (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiffs Kelly Heslop and Garin Heslop bring this lawsuit against
Defendants Ford Motor Company (Ford) and Lake Elsinore Ford for
claims arising from Ford's sale of an allegedly defective vehicle.


The Plaintiffs' complaint includes six causes of action: (1)
violation of California Civil Code Section 1793.2(d) against
Defendant Ford (2) violation of California Civil Code Section
1793.2(b) against Defendant Ford (3) violation of California Civil
Code Section 1793.2(a)(3) against Defendant Ford (4) breach of
express written warranty in violation of California Civil Code
Sections 1791.2(a), 1794 against Defendant Ford (5) breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability in violation of California
Civil Code Sections 1791.1, 1794 against both Defendants and (6)
fraud by omission against Defendant Ford.

The Defendants removed the Plaintiffs' complaint to federal court.
The Defendants' notice of removal states that the Court has
diversity jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' complaint. Although the
Plaintiffs and Defendant Lake Elsinore are all citizens of
California, the Defendants state that the Plaintiffs fraudulently
joined Defendant Lake Elsinore, such that diversity jurisdiction is
not defeated.

The Plaintiffs' motion to remand argues that the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' complaint because
both the Plaintiffs and Defendant Lake Elsinore are citizens of
California. The Defendants argue that the Court has diversity
jurisdiction because the Plaintiffs fraudulently joined Defendant
Lithia.   

For the reasons explained below, the Court agrees with the
Plaintiffs.

For the Court to have diversity jurisdiction, complete diversity of
parties is required: In a case with multiple plaintiffs and
multiple defendants, the presence in the action of a single
plaintiff from the same State as a single defendant deprives the
district court of original diversity jurisdiction over the entire
action. However, fraudulently joined defendants who destroy
diversity do not defeat removal.  

As this Court has previously explained, there is a general
presumption against fraudulent joinder' and the defendant's burden
of demonstrating that a joinder is fraudulent is a heavy' one.
Joinder is fraudulent only when it is obvious according to the
settled rules of the state that a plaintiff has failed to state a
claim against a joined defendant.

This standard imposes a very high bar on removing defendants. The
Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that if there is a possibility
that a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of
action against any of the resident defendants, the federal court
must find that the joinder was proper and remand the case to the
state court. To resolve fraudulent joinder claims, the Court may
look beyond the pleadings to evidence proffered by the parties.  

In this case, the Plaintiffs allege against Defendant Lake Elsinore
a claim for violation of the implied warranty of merchantability
under the Song-Beverly Act.  Thus, the question is whether it is
obvious under settled California law that Plaintiffs cannot state
an implied warranty claim against Defendant Lake Elsinore.
Defendants' only argument for why Plaintiffs cannot state an
implied warranty claim against Defendant Lake Elsinore is that the
statute of limitations bars Plaintiffs' implied warranty claim.
   
However, because it is possible under California law that
Plaintiffs could allege tolling of the statute of limitations for
his implied warranty claim, the Court concludes that Defendants
have not met their heavy burden to show that Plaintiffs' inclusion
of Defendant Lake Elsinore constitutes fraudulent joinder.

The statute of limitations for an implied warranty claim is four
years from the delivery of the vehicle. Plaintiffs alleges that
they purchased the Vehicle on February 6, 2013. Thus, Defendants
argue that the four-year statute of limitations expired in February
2017, two years before Plaintiffs filed their complaint on February
6, 2019.
  
In cases where Defendant Ford raised the same fraudulent joinder
arguments as in this case, courts including this Court have
concluded that because fraudulent concealment tolling mayapply to
implied warranty claims against a dealership defendant, remand was
warranted.  

Here, although the Plaintiffs' complaint does not specify how
fraudulent concealment tolling applies in the Plaintiffs' case, the
Plaintiffs contend in their motion to remand that fraudulent
concealment tolling applies because the Defendants failed to
disclose a material defect to the Plaintiffs. The Defendants argue
that the Plaintiffs' complaint does not allege any facts that give
rise to a fraudulent concealment claim, but the Defendants misstate
the question before the Court. At this stage, the question is not
whether the Plaintiffs' complaint states a claim against Defendant
Lake Elsinore, but only whether there is a possibility that
Plaintiffs can allege fraudulent concealment tolling and state a
claim against Defendant Lake Elsinore.
  
At this point, the Court cannot conclude that it is impossible for
Plaintiff to allege a timely implied warranty claim. Accordingly,
the Court concludes that Plaintiffs' inclusion of Defendant Lake
Elsinore was not fraudulent joinder and that the Court must remand
the case to state for lack of jurisdiction.

However, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to sever
Defendant Lake Elsinore. Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Ford
and Defendant Lake Elsinore arise from the same series of
transactions or occurrences. Plaintiffs bring their implied
warranty of merchantability claim against both Defendants. The
claim involves the same Vehicle and same defects as to both
Defendants, such that judicial efficiency weighs against severing
Defendant Lake Elsinore.  

Thus, the Court declines to sever Defendant Lake Elsinore under
Rule 21.

Accordingly, the Court grants the Plaintiffs' motion to remand and
remands the instant case to California Superior Court for the
County of Santa Clara.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 11, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y4ldtc9y from Leagle.com.

Kelly Heslop & Garin Heslop, Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel
Chung-Kwang Tai -- dtai@slpattorney.com -- Strategic Legal
Practices, Tionna Grace Dolin -- tdolin@slpattorney.com --
Startegic Legal Practices, APC & Anh X. Nguyen --
anguyen@regallawoffice.com -- Strategic Legal Practices, APC.

Ford Motor Company & Lake Elsinore Ford, Defendants, represented by
Charles Frederick Harlow, Jr. -- charlow@schnader.com -- Schnader
Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP.


FOREVER LIVING: Dawson Alleges Violation under ADA
--------------------------------------------------
Forever Living.com, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Leshawn Dawson, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Forever Living.com, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-06617 (S.D. N.Y., July 16, 2019).

Forever Living Products International, Inc. is an American
privately held multi-level marketing company based in Scottsdale,
Arizona, which manufactures and markets aloe vera-based drinks and
bee-derived cosmetics, dietary supplements, and personal care
products. The company was founded in 1978 by CEO Rex Maughan.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (929) 575-4175
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal



FORSTER & GARBUS: Deutsch Files FDCPA Suit in New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Forster & Garbus LLP.
The case is styled as Naftela Deutsch and Shimon Deutsch,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. Forster & Garbus LLP, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-04116 (E.D. N.Y., July 16, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Act.

Forster & Garbus LLP is a full service New York Law Firm
concentrating on creditor's rights law since 1970.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David M. Barshay, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 706-5055
   Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com

     - and -

   Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 281-7601
   Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com




FORT MYERS, FL: Miller Seeks to Certify Class in Sludge Dump Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as DERETHA MILLER, WILLIE LANKS,
and TAMBITHA BLANKS, individually, and on behalf of a class of
persons similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. THE CITY OF FORT
MYERS, et al., the Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-00195-SPC-UAM (M.D.
Fla.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to certify a Property Class
consisting of:

   "all natural persons, including any person claiming by,
   through or under a Class Member, who, as of the time of filing
   the original complaint, have interests in residential real
   property within a five block radius of the City's arsenic
   Sludge Dump."

The lawsuit contends that the Defendants negligently created and
maintained a sludge dump for arsenic contaminated lime sludge in an
African-American neighborhood in Fort Myers for over fifty years
causing property damages to surrounding property owners.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          James S. Whitlock, Esq.
          Gary A. Davis, Esq.
          DAVIS & WHITLOCK, P.C.
          Battery Park Ave., Suite 206
          Asheville, NC 28801
          Telephone: (828) 622-0044
          Facsimile: (828) 398-0435
          E-mail: gadavis@enviroattorney.com
                  jwhitlock@enviroattorney.com

               - and -

          Ralf Brookes, Esq.
          RALF BROOKES ATTORNEY
          1217 E Cape Coral Parkway No. 107
          Cape Coral, FL 33904
          Telephone: (239) 910-5464
          Facsimile: (866) 341-6086
          E-mail: Ralf@RalfBrookesAttorney.com
                  RalfBrookes@gmail.com

FOUR SEASONS: Intervenors' Bid to Remove Zyda as Class Rep Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTOPHER ZYDA, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs, v. FOUR SEASONS HOTELS AND RESORTS,
FOUR SEASONS HOLDINGS, INC., FOUR SEASONS HUALALAI RESORT, HUALALAI
RESIDENTIAL, LLC, (DBA HUALALAI REALTY); HUALALAI INVESTORS, LLC,
KAUPULEHU MAKAI VENTURE, HUALALAI DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, HUALALAI
VILLAS & HOMES, HUALALAI INVESTORS, LLC, HUALALAI RENTAL
MANAGEMENT, LLC, DOES 1-100, Defendants, Civ. No. 16-00591 LEK-RT
(D. Haw.), Judge Leslie E. Kobayashi of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Hawaii denied the Motion to Remove Christopher Zyda
as Class Representative, or in the Alternative, to Prohibit Mr.
Zyda from Encouraging Other Class Members to Personally Harass
Intervenors filed by Intervenors James R. Mahoney, Ann Marie
Mahoney, Judith Runstad, H. Jon Runstad, Jonathan Seybold, Patricia
Seybold, David Keyes, Doreen Keyes, Julie Wrigley, Kevin Reedy,
Lynn Reedy, Bradley Chipps, and J. Orin Edson on Feb. 28, 2019.

There is a history of various disputes between the Defendants and
certain homeowners at the Hualalai Resort.  However, the focus of
the claims and issues in the instant case is the Resort's policy
change regarding the daily fees for renters and unaccompanied
guests ("Daily Resort Guest Fees" or "DRGFs") that was announced in
2015 and took effect in 2016.  The operative pleading in the case
is the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Class Action Complaint for
Damages, Declaratory, and Injunctive Relief, filed on April 30,
2018.

Zyda filed the first two versions of the complaint in state court,
and the state court certified the Class.  The Defendants removed
the case based on diversity jurisdiction, pursuant to the Class
Action Fairness Act.

The Intervenors are Resort homeowners and members of the Hualalai
Club, i.e., they are members of the Class.  However, they support
the DRGFs that the Plaintiffs are challenging in the action.  In
the instant Motion, the Intervenors ask the Court to remove Zyda as
a Class representative or, in the alternative, to issue an order
requiring Zyda to 1) stop sending e-mails to his hui inviting them
to personally approach the Intervenors; and 2) retract the Feb. 21,
2019 email he sent to his "hui."  The matter came on for hearing on
May 3, 2019.

Judge Kobayashi has carefully considered all of the parties'
submissions related to the Motion, but does not find that Zyda's
conduct related to the case warrants his removal as a Class
representative.  However, she cautioned Zyda that, if he continues
to engage in the type of conduct described in the Motion, that
analysis may change.  Such conduct, if it continues after the
instant Order, may warrant sanctions when it is viewed in the
context of the case as a whole and in light of the admonition in
the Order.  At a minimum, the Court will issue an order to show
cause, requiring Zyda to appear in person before the Court to
explain his actions.  The potential sanctions may ultimately
include removing Zyda as a Class representative and requiring the
Plaintiffs to identify a new representative, who must also meet the
requirements of Rule 23(a)(4).

Meyer is still listed as a Plaintiff in the action and the
Intervenors argue that she could continue to serve as the Class
representative if Zyda were removed.  However, the Plaintiffs have
represented that Meyer was only named for purposes of the claim
under the Condominium Property Act, Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 514B
("Count I"), and her participation is no longer required in light
of the disposition of Count I.  Thus, if Zyda were to be removed as
the Class representative, a new representative -- who has not
previously participated in the case as a named plaintiff -- would
have to be identified.  The identification of such a person would
likely delay the trial in the case, which is currently scheduled to
begin on Sept. 3, 2019.  Zyda is therefore encouraged to conduct
himself in an appropriate manner so as to avoid such a delay.

On the basis of the foregoing, Judge Kobayashi denied the
Intervenors' Motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Y9r3Lc from Leagle.com.

Christopher Zyda, on behalf of himself and all other similarly
situated & Carol Meyer, (Class Plaintiffs) On Behalf of Themselves
and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, represented by
Patrick Kyle Smith, Law Offices of Ian Mattoch, 737 Bishop St.,
Pacific Guardian Ctr., Mauka Twr., Honolulu, HI, 96813-3201 &
Terrance M. Revere -- terry@revereandassociates.com -- Revere &
Associates, LLLC.

Four Seasons Hotels and Resorts, Four Seasons Hualalai Resort &
Hualalai Development Company, Defendants, represented by William
Meheula, Sullivan Meheula Lee LLLP, Topa Finacial Center Fort St.
Tower745 Fort StSuite 800Honolulu, HI 96813

Four Seasons Holdings, Inc., Hualalai Residential, LLC, doing
business as Hualalai Realty, Hualalai Investors, LLC, Hualalai
Rental Management, LLC & Four Seasons Hotels Limited, Defendants,
represented by Barry A. Sullivan, Sullivan Meheula Lee LLLP,
Pacific Guardian Center, Makai Tower, Suite 2900, 733 Bishop
Street, Honolulu, HI 96813, Brett R. Tobin -- btobin@goodsill.com
-- Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel LLLP, Donald M. Falk --
dfalk@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac vice, Natasha
L.N.
Baldauf, Sullivan Meheula Lee LLLP & William Meheula, Sullivan
Meheula Lee LLLP, Pacific Guardian Center, Makai Tower, Suite
2900,
733 Bishop Street, Honolulu, HI 96813

James R. Mahoney, Ann Marie Mahoney, Judith Runstad, H. Jon
Runstad, Jonathan Seybold, Patricia Seybold, David Keyes, Doreen
Keyes, Julie Wrigley, Kevin Reedy, Bradley Chipps, J. Orin Edson &
Lynn Reedy, Intervenors, represented by Nickolas A. Kacprowski --
nickolas.kacprowski@dentons.com -- Dentons US LLP.


GASSEN COMPANY: Johnson Files Class Suit in Minnesota
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Gassen Company Inc.
The case is styled as Lance J Johnson on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Gassen Company Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 0:19-cv-01831 (D. Minn., July 12, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Electronic Fund Transfer
Act.

Gassen Company offers homeowner association management and property
management.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Thomas John Lyons, Jr., Esq.
     Consumer Justice Center, P.A.
     367 Commerce Court
     Vadnais Heights, MN 55127
     Phone: (651) 770-9707
     Email: tommy@consumerjusticecenter.com


GATES CORPORATION: Class of Workers Certified in Lundine Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Eric F. Melgren grants the Plaintiff's Motion for
Conditional Class Certification in the lawsuit titled PEGGY
LUNDINE, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated v.
GATES CORPORATION, Case No. 6:18-cv-01235-EFM-JPO (D. Kan.).

The Court defines the class as: "All current and former nonexempt
hourly manufacturing employees who were employed by Gates from July
11th, 2016, to the present."

According to the Court's Memorandum and Order, the parties should
ensure that this class definition is included in the final notice
and is consistent throughout.

Ms. Lundine brings this collective class action lawsuit under
Section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act on behalf of all
similarly situated nonexempt manufacturing employees working at
Defendant Gates Corporation's 14 manufacturing facilities in 11
states.

Judge Melgren ruled that within 14 days of this order, Gates
provide Ms. Lundine with names, addresses, telephone numbers, and
email addresses of each of the class members in an easily malleable
format, such as Microsoft Excel; and that Gates provide Lundine
with the last four digits of the social security numbers only for
class members whose mail notices are returned undeliverable, so Ms.
Lundine can locate a viable mailing address.

Judge Melgren ordered the parties to negotiate a notice consistent
with the Court's ruling regarding the issues addressed above; and
that Gates post the agreed-upon notice in both English and Spanish
in conspicuous locations where it employs hourly, nonexempt
manufacturing employees at its Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia,
Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Texas,
and Kansas facilities.

Ms. Lundine is approved as the class representative and that her
counsel is approved as class counsel in this matter.[CC]


GATES CORPORATION: Court OKs Conditional Certification in Lundine
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas issued
a Memorandum and Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional
Class Certification in the case captioned PEGGY LUNDINE, on behalf
of herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. GATES
CORPORATION, Defendant. Case No. 18-1235-EFM. (D. Kan.).

Lundine brings this collective class action lawsuit under Section
216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) on behalf of all
similarly situated nonexempt manufacturing employees working at
Defendant Gates Corporation's 14 manufacturing facilities in 11
states. Lundine asserts that Gates failed to compensate her and
other similarly situated employees for overtime work. Lundine
alleges that Gates regularly required her to work before and after
her scheduled shift while prohibiting her from reporting the
overtime work. She alleges that by this policy and practice, Gates
routinely denied overtime compensation to many hourly, nonexempt
manufacturing employees across Gates's various nationwide
facilities.  

She now moves for conditional class certification under the FLSA to
proceed with the lawsuit on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated.

First, in the initial notice stage, the court determines whether a
collective action should be certified for purposes of sending
notice of the action to potential class members. The notice stage
requires nothing more than substantial allegations that the
putative class members were together the victims of a single
decision, policy, or plan. The standard for conditional
certification at the notice stage is lenient and typically results
in certification for the purpose of notifying potential
plaintiffs.

The second step of the ad hoc approach occurs after discovery. At
this stage, the district court applies a stricter standard and
reviews the following factors to determine whether the opt-in
plaintiffs are similarly situated: (1) the disparate factual and
employment conditions of the individual plaintiffs, (2) defenses
available to the defendant that are individual to each plaintiff,
and (3) other fairness and procedural conditions.

Lundine has made Substantial Allegations that the Putative Class
Members were together Victims of a Gates's Policy or Plan.

The standard for certification at the notice stage is lenient and
typically permits conditional certification of a representative
class.  This is, at least in part, due to the fact that the Court
has minimal evidence at this stage. The Court may choose to
consider only pleadings and affidavits filed by the Plaintiff to
evaluate whether the Plaintiffs have made substantial allegations,
because it is not yet at the evidence-weighing stage.

The Court concludes that Lundine has made substantial allegations
to support conditional class certification. Lundine alleges that
Gates required her to work overtime without pay. She attaches
affidavits from 12 other employees alleging the same thing. Using
herself and the other 12 employees as examples, Lundine alleges
that Gates has a policy or plan that violates the FLSA. At this
stage in the proceedings, Lundine has presented more than enough
substance to satisfy the lenient standard for conditional
certification.

The Court therefore grants conditional class certification.

Class Definition

Lundine asks the Court to adopt the following class definition: All
current and former nonexempt hourly manufacturing employees who
were employed from ___ to the present.

Gates objects to this definition, arguing that it is overly broad.
Gates asks the Court to limit the definition to include only the
locations and positions of the employees who submitted sworn
affidavits accompanying Lundine's complaint.

In defense of its position, Gates relies on Stubbs v. McDonald's
Corp.,  227 F.R.D. 661 (D. Kan. 2004), which rejected conditional
class certification because the plaintiff failed to allege any
similarity between its job duties and those of the other putative
class members. In that case, the plaintiff sought to certify a
class whose members would consist of first and second assistant
managers.

The court held that the plaintiff, a second assistant manager
lacked standing to represent first assistant managers since the
plaintiff had never held the position of first assistant manager.
Importantly, the cause of action was for improperly classifying
plaintiff and the putative class as `exempt' employees rather than
`non-exempt' and thereby failing to pay plaintiff and the putative
class compensation for overtime hours worked.

Here, the duration of employees' work is what matters most. While
Lundine and the putative class members may occupy diverse roles
within Gates's manufacturing process, their claims are common in
that they allege Gates required them to work beyond their scheduled
hours while depriving them of the statutorily mandated overtime
pay. The breadth of job positions in the putative class, and the
diversity of duties in those positions, is not as relevant to this
cause of action as it was in Stubbs.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 11, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y22o6f8x from Leagle.com.

Peggy Lynn Lundine, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, John Stronghoner, Jim Aikens, Jeanne L. Carson, Andrew
DeSpain, Shawn W. Tubbs, Hannah Arnold, Elizabeth Lydy, Mary Von
Kannon-Marchand, Anthony Rogers, Ethan Hammock, Tyler Chamberlain,
Jeremey Chamblee, Courtney Belue, Zachary Tehee, Ellis Wooten,
Harlon D. Farr, Jr., Christopher Thorton & Leslie Thomason,
Plaintiffs, represented by Brendan J. Donelon, Donelon, PC & Daniel
W. Craig, Donelon, PC., 4600 Madison, Suite 810, Kansas City, MO
64112

Gates Corporation, Defendant, represented by Christopher J. Eby --
christopher.eby@akerman.com -- Akerman, LLP, pro hac vice,
Christopher S. Shank -- chris@shankmoore.com -- Shank & Moore, LLC,
Colin L. Barnacle -- colin.barnacle@akerman.com -- Akerman, LLP,
pro hac vice & David Lee Heinemann -davidh@shankmoore.com -- Shank
& Moore, LLC.


GENERAL MOTORS: Ramirez Sues Over Defective Steering System
-----------------------------------------------------------
MARTIN RAMIREZ and LIZETH RAMIREZ, Plaintiffs, v. GENERAL MOTORS
LLC; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
19STCV24183 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., July 11, 2019) is
an action seeking to redress KMA's violations of California
consumer fraud statutes, and also seeks recovery for Defendant's
breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and common law fraud.

General Motors was engaged in the business of designing,
manufacturing, constructing, assembling, marketing, distributing,
and selling automobiles and other motor vehicles and motor vehicle
components in Los Angeles County. Plaintiffs purchased a 2011 GMC
Acadia, vehicle identification number 1GKKRPED9BJ381366, (hereafter
"Subject Vehicle"), from Woodland Motors Corp., which was
manufactured and or distributed by Defendant on or about August 16,
2011,.

Plaintiff received an express written warranty, including, the
3-year/36,000 mile basic bumper-to-bumper warranty, a
5-year/100,000 mile powertrain warranty which covers, inter alia,
the engine and transmission, and subsequently received a
10-year/150,000 mile extended service coverage adjustment (e.g.
extended warranty) which covers power steering system and/or
related components. Defendant undertook to preserve or maintain the
utility or performance of the Subject Vehicle or to provide
compensation if there is a failure in utility or performance for a
specified period of time. The warranty provided, in relevant part,
that in the event a defect developed with the Subject Vehicle
during the warranty period, Plaintiffs could deliver the Subject
Vehicle for repair services to Defendant's representative and the
Subject Vehicle would be repaired.

During the warranty period, the Subject Vehicle contained or
developed defects Said defects substantially impair the use, value,
or safety of the Subject Vehicle. GM knew since 2010, if not
earlier, that the 2009-2012 GMC Acadia vehicles, including the 2011
GMC Acadia, contained one or more design  and/or manufacturing
defects in their integral steering system that could cause it to
intermittently and drastically fail while the car is in motion (the
"Steering Defect"), thus creating a serious safety risk.

Specifically, GM knew (or should have known) that the steering
system had one or more defects, including but not limited to, those
causing the premature bleeding of the power steering system,
defects causing the power steering to make abnormal noises such as
whining, and/or defects causing the need to prematurely replace the
steering gear, and/or any other similar concern identified in the
repair history for the Vehicle. The Steering Defect can have
serious consequences on the handling, maneuvering and stability of
the subject vehicle while in operations, thereby contributing to
car accidents, which can cause personal injury or death, says the
complaint.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Tionna Dolin, Esq.
     Daniel Tai, Esq.
     Strategic Legal Practices
     A Professional Corporation
     1840 Century Park East, Suite 430
     Los Angeles, CA 90067
     Phone: (310) 929-4900
     Facsimile: (310) 943-3838
     Email: tdolin@slpattorney.com
            dtai@slpattorney.com


HANDS ON NURSING: Pa. Court Dismisses Jackson FLSA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STACEY JACKSON, KEYSHA SCOTT, And SHEENA WARREN,
Plaintiffs, v. HANDS ON NURSING, INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-2442 (M.D. Pa.), Judge John E. Jones of the U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint.

Plaintiffs Jackson, Scott, and Warren, bring the collective and
class action claiming that the Defendant failed to pay its direct
care workers required overtime pay pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"), Pennsylvania's Minimum Wage Law ("PMWL"),
and Pennsylvania's Wage Payment and Collection Law ("PWPCL").

The Defendant, a corporation also headquartered in Lebanon,
Pennsylvania, provides direct-care services, including
companionship, personal care and domestic assistance to individuals
with disabilities and the elderly in their homes.  Jackson worked
for Defendant from October 2013 to June 11, 2018.  Scott worked for
Defendant from August 2015 to March 2017.  Warren, who began
working for Defendant in June 2012, continues her employment.

As direct-care workers, the Plaintiffs provided the Defendant's
clients with companionship, personal care and domestic assistance
services.  The Defendant maintained an overtime policy which
entitled employees to overtime pay, consisting of one and a half
times their regular hourly rate, for time worked in excess of 80
hours in a 14-day period with the same client.  It did not
calculate overtime by totaling all hours worked but, instead,
considered only hours worked with a single client and excluded time
spent traveling from one client to the next.  Even where more than
40 hours of work for a single client was performed in a given week,
the Defendant did not pay overtime rates.

The Plaintiffs filed the present Complaint on Dec. 27, 2018.  On
Feb. 27, 2019, the Defendant sent the Plaintiffs checks
representing "an unconditional payment of complete relief" that
included back overtime pay due, liquidated damages, and an
additional 10%.  The Plaintiffs did not cash or deposit the checks.


On March 1, 2019, the Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  On March
26, 2019, it issued new checks to the Plaintiffs that corrected the
application of wage taxes and withholdings.  The Plaintiffs, again,
did not cash or deposit this checks initially.  The case proceeded
to mandatory mediation on May 15, 2019, which ultimately was
unsuccessful.  Although the Motion was fully briefed prior to
mediation, the Defendant supplemented the factual record after
mediation to present additional exhibits to the Court showing that
the Plaintiffs deposited the March 26, 2019, checks they received
from the Defendant shortly before the mediation.

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs no longer have standing to
bring their claims because it tendered them the full amount of back
overtime pay due, plus liquidated damages, plus an additional 10
percent.  At the time of the parties' briefing, the Plaintiffs had
not cashed or deposited the checks; thus, a central focus of the
arguments on both sides was whether an unconditional, but
unaccepted, settlement offer could moot the Plaintiffs' claims.  

However, Judge Jones finds that the Defendant has provided copies
of canceled checks showing that the Plaintiffs have now deposited
the checks.  The Plaintiffs have provided no evidence, whether
through supplemental affidavits or a motion to file a surreply
brief, contradicting the Defendant's assertion that the payments
constitute complete relief, despite having opportunities to do so.
By all appearances, therefore, the Plaintiffs have accepted the
Defendant's payment in satisfaction of, and mooting, their
individual claims.  What remains before the Court is whether the
action should continue for the benefit of the putative class
members.

The Judge holds that although Rule 23 "opt-out" class actions
operate differently, the Rule 23 class claims are based on
Pennsylvania statutes, and the Court would exercise only
supplemental jurisdiction over them.  While it may exercise
supplemental jurisdiction, the Court retains the right to decline
such jurisdiction if it has dismissed all claims over which it had
original jurisdiction, as it has in the case.  In this case, the
Judge will decline further supplemental jurisdiction.  To do
otherwise would be absurd, as the Courte would continue to permit a
federal class action between non-diverse parties for violating
Pennsylvania law.

For these reasons, Judge Jones dismissed the Plaintiff's FLSA
claims for lack of standing and declined to further exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over their state claims.  An order in
accordance with the memorandum will separately issue.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 4, 2019 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/DXHBY3 from Leagle.com.

Stacey Jackson, Keysha Scott & Sheena Warren, Plaintiffs,
represented by Peggy M. Morcom -- Morcom@buzgondavis.com -- Buzgon
Davis.

Hands-On-Nursing, Inc., doing business as Hands-On-Nursing,
Defendant, represented by Anthony T. Bowser, Krevsky Bowser LLC.


HAT WORLD: Court Extends Time to File Discovery Plan in Harris
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada issued
an Order extending Time to File Proposed Discovery Plan in the case
captioned ALEXIS HARRIS, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. HAT WORLD, INC. d/b/a and a/k/a
LIDS LOCKER ROOM; DOES 1 through 50; inclusive, Defendant(s). Case
No. 2:19-cv-00882-JAD-GWF. (D. Nev.).

The parties proposed discovery plan is currently due on July 15,
2019.
  
The Defendant's counsel presented to the Plaintiff's counsel a
courtesy copy of the purported arbitration agreement upon which the
Defendant intends to move to compel arbitration.

The Plaintiff's counsel is currently reviewing the purported
arbitration agreement. Following such review, the parties will meet
and confer in good faith to explore the possibility of mutually
submitting to arbitration, the status of the matter, and any other
potential threshold issues.

The parties request a period of twenty-one additional days up to
and including August 5, 2019 to file a proposed discovery plan and
scheduling order should the parties not achieve agreement on
whether this matter should be submitted to arbitration.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully request a period of twenty-one
additional days up to and including August 5, 2019 to file a
proposed discovery plan and scheduling order should the parties not
achieve agreement on whether this matter should be submitted to
arbitration.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 11, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y6bd5xlp from Leagle.com.

Alexis Harris, Plaintiff, represented by Christian James Gabroy --
christian@gabroy.com -- Gabroy Law Offices, Joshua D. Buck --
josh@thiermanbuck.com -- Thierman Buck, LLP, Kaine M. Messer --
kmesser@gabroy.com -- Gabroy Law Offices & Mark R. Thierman --
mark@thiermanbuck.com -Thierman Buck, LLP.

Hat World, Inc., also known as LIDS LOCKER ROOM, doing business as
LIDS LOCKER ROOM, Defendant, represented by Cheryl A. Sabnis --
csabnis@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding LLP, pro hac vice, Joni A.
Jamison -- ijamison@kcnvlaw.com -- Kaempfer Crowell & Robert R.
McCoy rrnccoy@kcnvlaw.com -- Kaempfer Crowell.


HAYNEEDLE INC: Dawson Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
--------------------------------------------------------------
Hayneedle, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to
the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Leshawn
Dawson, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Hayneedle, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-06624
(S.D. N.Y., July 16, 2019).

Hayneedle is an online retail company based in Omaha, Nebraska with
a focus on furnishings and decor. In 2016, Hayneedle was acquired
by Jet.com, which later became a subsidiary of Walmart.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (929) 575-4175
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal



HERSHEY CO: Court Denies Bid for Summary Judgment in Clark Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HOWARD CLARK, TODD HALL, ANGELA PIRRONE, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. THE
HERSHEY COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Defendant, Case No.
18-cv-06113 WHA (N.D. Cal.), Judge William Alsup of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California denied
Hershey's motion for summary judgment.

In the food case, a previous order converted Hershey's Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and
allowed immediate discovery.

The action challenges the purported use of an ingredient, malic
acid.  In Hershey's Brookside Dark Chocolate product line,
chocolate-covered candy balls filled with fruit-flavored gel,
Hershey claims that malic acid was used as a pH balancer to
properly gel the fruit center of the candies, but plaintiffs allege
malic acid was used as an artificial flavoring agent.  These
chocolate balls are sold in bag-shaped packaging, some of which
have banners across the top of the front stating "No Artificial
Flavors, No Artificial Colors."

The Plaintiffs claim that Brookside Dark Chocolate candy products
violate California, New York, and federal statutes because each of
the products contain malic acid as an additional flavoring
ingredient that simulates and reinforces the characterizing flavor,
and that the front label should disclose that malic acid serves the
function of adding flavor rather than misleadingly suggesting that
the product is flavored only by natural fruit juices.

In the putative class action, the Plaintiffs allege 12 claims,
including (1) fraud by omission, (2) negligent misrepresentation,
(3) violation of California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act
("CLRA"), (4) violation of California's Unfair Competition Law, (5)
violation of California's False Advertising Law, (6) breach of
express and implied warranties, (7) violations of Sections 349 and
350 of New York General Business Laws, and (8) claims for breach of
express and implied warranties under New York U.C.C. Sections 2-313
and 2-314.

Under FDA regulations, malic acid has three prescribed uses in
food: as a flavor, as a flavor enhancer, or to help control pH. 21
C.F.R. Section 184.1069(c).  Hershey argues that (1) malic acid is
used with pectin in order to balance the pH and therefore to
properly gel the fruit flavors at the center of the candy, (2)
malic acid is not used as a flavor, and (3) only the Brookside Dark
Chocolates with gelled fruit centers have malic acid in their
ingredient list.  Hershey states that it properly disclosed malic
acid on its nutrition list of ingredients because Hershey used
malic acid for an FDA-approved function, pH balancing, and not as a
flavor or flavor enhancer.

Given the importance of this factual dispute, Hershey's motion to
dismiss was treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 12(d).
Immediate discovery into the issue of the functional use of malic
acid was allowed and the parties were given reasonable opportunity
to present all material pertinent to the motion.

The Plaintiffs' burden is to provide specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.  They present two items
elicited via discovery from Hershey that they claim support their
material fact issue that malic acid is used as a flavor in the
Brookside products.  Together, these two items are sufficient such
that the record, taken as a whole, could support a rational trier
of fact in finding for the nonmoving party on that issue.

First, the Plaintiffs present a chart provided in discovery of an
ingredient list for "Crunchy Clusters - Berry Medley Flavors," one
of the products sued on.  This ingredient list looks at each
ingredient and "explains" why that ingredient is used in the
product. Second, also provided in discovery, the Plaintiffs present
an email from former Hershey scientist Joe McLeod that shows a
chart that discusses replacing malic acid with another acid in the
Brookside Blueberry-Acai product.  The email specifically noted
"Malic Acid is thought to be important to the flavor profile and
for increasing the 'setting time' to prevent pre-gelling during
depositing."

Though manufacturers must make many balancing decisions when taking
products to market, in the matter, the Court is only addressing the
issue of whether there is a triable material fact issue.  Although
Hershey states that their use of malic acid only has an ancillary
effect of adding a sour taste, as does any acid, Hershey's own
documents discuss the use of malic acid in a flavor context and
this creates a genuine factual dispute as to the function of malic
acid in the Brookside products.

The Judge concludes that there is a genuine dispute as to whether
malic acid acts as a flavoring agent in the Brookside products,
elicited from evidence provided by Hershey in discovery.  It would
be inappropriate to grant a summary judgment motion when a genuine
factual dispute exists.  For the reasons stated, he denied
Hershey's motion for summary judgment.  The parties will continue
to pursue discovery pursuant to the case management schedule.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/T1cbk9 from Leagle.com.

Howard Clark, individually, on behalf of all others similarly
situated, and the general public, Todd Hall, individually, on
behalf of all others similarly situated, and the general public &
Angela Pirrone, individually, on behalf of all others similarly
situated, and the general public, Plaintiffs, represented by David
W. Reid, Pacific Trial Attorneys, APC, Lilach Halperin, Law Offices
of Ronald A. Marron, Michael Houchin -- mike@consumersadvocates.com
-- Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron & Ronald A. Marron --
ron@consumersadvocates.com -- Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron,
APLC.

The Hershey Company, a Delaware corporation, Defendant, represented
by Brian H. Chun -- bchun@lkclaw.com -- Lafayette & Kumagai LLP,
Gabriela Bersuder, pro hac vice, Gary T. Lafayette --
glafayette@lkclaw.com -- Lafayette & Kumagai LLP, Jane Marie
Metcalf -- jmetcalf@pbwt.com -- Patterson Belknap Webb and Tyler
LLP, pro hac vice, Michael Sochynsky -- msochynsky@pbwt.com --
Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP & Steven A. Zalesin --
sazalesin@pbwt.com -- Patterson Belknap Webb and Tyler LLP, pro hac
vice.


HOME DEPOT: Summary Judgment Denied in Utne Wage & Hour Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order denying Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment in the case captioned JOHN UTNE, Plaintiff, v.
HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC., Defendant. Case No. 16-cv-01854-RS. (N.D.
Cal.).

This class action labor dispute arises from the alleged failure of
defendant Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (Home Depot) to pay its store
employees, including named plaintiff John Utne, for the full amount
of time worked.

The operative Third Amended Complaint advances five claims under
California Law for (1) failure to pay hourly wages, (2) failure to
provide accurate written wage statements, (3) failure timely to pay
all wages at the termination of employment, (4) violation of
California's Unfair Competition Law, and (5) civil penalties
arising from Home Depot's alleged violation of various provisions
of the state labor code.

The Plaintiffs allege that Home Depot is liable (1) to the Lock-In
Class for employee time spent waiting to be let out of the store
after clocking out and (2) to the Hourly Employee Class for time
spent walking to the back of the store and donning the required
orange work aprons before clocking in.

Liability to Hourly Employee Class

The Plaintiffs seek a partial summary judgment finding that Home
Depot is liable to the Hourly Employee Class for time spent walking
to the back of the store and donning the required orange work
aprons before clocking in. Home Depot seeks partial summary
judgment that the company is not liable for failure to pay
employees for this time, or for the waiting time and wage statement
claims that derive therefrom.  

First Claim: Failure to Pay for Pre-Shift Time

The Plaintiffs argue Home Depot's policy prohibited employees from
remaining in the store unless they are working or shopping,
combined with its policy instructing employees to put on their
aprons before clocking in shows employees are subject to Home
Depot's control immediately upon entering the store.

In Home Depot's view, however, the fact that numerous employees
engaged in personal activity before starting their shifts
definitively shows employees were notsubject to Home Depot's
control during this pre-shift time. Accordingly, Home Depot argues,
it is not liable for failure to pay for this time, or for the
waiting time and wage penalty claims which derive from this alleged
failure to pay.

Both parties' arguments are unavailing.

First, there is a factual dispute regarding whether Home Depot's
policy prohibiting employees from remaining in the store applied to
the beginning of the workday. Pennington's testimony on this point
is ambiguous. That class members admit to spending time on personal
activity on Home Depot's premises while waiting to begin their
shifts further suggests this policy may indeed have applied
exclusively to the end of the work day. Ultimately, however, this
question of fact is reasonably subject to dispute.

If indeed employees were prohibited from arriving early and
engaging in leisure activity while waiting to begin work, or
prohibited from using their cell phones in the store, this would
weigh in favor of a finding that they are subject to Home Depot's
control immediately upon their arrival. By contrast, if this policy
applied exclusively to the end of the day, a reasonable jury could
conclude Plaintiffs were not subject to Home Depot's control
immediately upon entering the store.

While the Plaintiffs try to characterize any time class members may
have spent on personal activities as a damages issue, this personal
activity sheds light on whether Home Depot actually exercised
control over employees as soon as they entered the store.
Furthermore, standing on its own, Home Depot's written policy
requiring employees to put on their aprons just before clocking in
does not necessarily render class members' subject to the company's
control as soon as they enter the store.

The Plaintiffs' final argument is that Home Depot must compensate
employees for this time because otherwise workers could be required
to walk 20 uncompensated minutes daily to a time clock in the back
of the warehouse. This argument is similarly unavailing.

A district court in this district has held that employees who were
subject to a security inspection upon leaving their place of work
could not receive compensation for the time spent packing up and
travel[ing] to the front of the store after clocking out" because
the employees were free to engage in personal activities during
this time such as shopping, using the bathroom, or calling for
transportation and would have to pack up and leave regardless of
whether they were subject to search at the exit. This is not to say
an employee could never be deemed under the control of an employer
while crossing the employer's premises to clock in, simply that
additional evidence of control may be necessary. As explained
above, the additional indicia of control in this case are subject
to dispute. Accordingly, both motions for summary judgment
regarding Home Depot's liability to pay for pre-shift time are
denied.

Third Claim: Waiting Time Penalties

Section 203 of the California Labor code provides for penalties
where an employer wilfully failed to pay wages at the time an
employee is terminated.  The California Department of Industrial
Relations defines the term willful as used in Section 203 to mean
the absence of a good faith dispute. A good faith dispute exists
where an employer presents a defense, based in law or fact which,
if successful, would preclude any recovery on the part of the
employee.  By contrast, defenses that are unsupported by any
evidence, are unreasonable, or are presented in bad faith do not
present a good faith dispute.  

Home Depot argues persuasively that Plaintiffs cannot recover under
Sections 203 because a good faith dispute exists with respect to
the compensability of the pre-shift time at issue.  There is a
material dispute regarding whether members of the Hourly Employee
Class were in fact subject to Home Depot's control from the time
they entered the store to the time they clocked in. Although
Plaintiffs raise the specter of bad faith conduct on Home Depot's
part, they point to no evidence of bad faith aside from the
parties' conflicting interpretations of Home Depot's policy
regarding employees remaining in the store outside of work hours.
This is insufficient to support a finding of bad faith.  

Second Claim: Wage Statement Penalties

While both parties agree the good faith defense applies to claims
arising under Section 203, they disagree about the applicability of
this defense to Section 226. This section provides for penalties
where the plaintiff establishes an employer's knowing and
intentional failure to provide accurate wage statements. The
statute clarifies that the existence of a knowing and intentional
failure does not include an isolated and unintentional payroll
error due to a clerical or inadvertent mistake and may depend in
part on whether the employer has adopted a set of policies,
procedures, and practices that fully comply with this section.

Accordingly, a good faith defense regarding the amount of wages
owed precludes a finding of liability under Section 226 based an
employer's failure to include the disputed wages in the wage
statement. Such an omission is not a knowing and intentional
failure to provide an accurate wage statement.

Liability to Lock-In Class

The Plaintiffs alone move for partial summary judgment with respect
to the Lock-In Class. They specifically seek a finding that Home
Depot is liable to the class for employee time spent waiting to be
let out of the store after clocking out. Home Depot's security
policy requires the doors of the store to be locked to the public
after closing, allegedly resulting in employees having to wait to
be let out of the store after clocking out.

In the Plaintiffs' view, this time is compensable because employees
remain under Home Depot's control until they are released from the
building. Home Depot responds that disputes of fact exist as to (1)
whether members of the Lock-In Class in fact had to wait to be
released and (2) whether Home Depot knew, or should have known,
employees were waiting without compensation. Home Depot's argument
is ultimately the more persuasive.

The Plaintiffs argue conflicting testimony regarding whether class
members were forced to wait to be let out of the store does not
defeat their motion because they are merely seeking a threshold
determination of whether Home Depot's policy is unlawful. Here,
however, the lawfulness of the policy turns upon the degree to
which it resulted in class members being forced to wait without
pay. In other words, Plaintiffs' theory of liability rests upon
factual findings about the practical effect of Home Depot's lock-in
policy rather than upon a facial analysis of the policy.

Even if the Plaintiffs could show the Lock-In Class was forced to
wait without pay, they fail to show Home Depot knew, or should have
known, employees were not being compensated for any wait time. Some
employees were able to clock out at the front of the stores
immediately before leaving, whereas others submitted time
adjustment forms when their wait time was not captured by the
timeclock. The Plaintiffs point to testimony that certain class
members were not informed they could be paid for this time as
evidence that Home Depot should have known this time was not being
properly captured. Accordingly, the question whether Home Depot
should have known that, despite these alternative time capture
methods, employees were not being compensated for their wait time
cannot be definitively resolved at this stage.

The de minimis exception simply has no bearing on the present
analysis. Home Depot's time adjustment process is relevant only to
the extent it helps establish whether Home Depot knew or should
have known employee wait time was not being properly compensated.
As explained above, this is a disputed factual question that must
be resolved at trial. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment with respect to the Lock-In Class is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 11, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yx9fvd5g from Leagle.com.

John Utne, on behalf of himself, all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Thomas Alistair Segal --
thomas@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group, Ashley N. Batiste --
ashley@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group, Chaim Shaun Setareh --
shaun@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group & Farrah Grant --
Farrah@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group.

Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant,
represented by Donna Marie Mezias -- dmezias@akingump.com -- Akin
Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Ashley J. Keapproth, Akin Gump
Strauss Hauer Feld LLP, pro hac vice, Nathan J. Oleson --
noleson@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer and Feld LLP, pro
hac vice, Robert G. Lian, Jr.  -- blian@akingump.com -- Akin Gump
Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, pro hac vice & Liz Kathryn Bertko --
lbertko@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer and Feld LLP.


HONDA: Faces Class Action Over Defective Infotainment Systems
-------------------------------------------------------------
Honda was hit with an expanded, amended class-action lawsuit
detailing a severe widespread defect affecting the infotainment
systems in 2018-2019 Honda Odyssey and 2019 Honda Pilot vehicles,
according to Hagens Berman.

The suit states that the infotainment system -- an integrated
in-vehicle communication, navigation and entertainment system --
behaves erratically, malfunctioning, freezing, and creating a
safety hazard and distraction. The malfunctions have occurred
almost immediately after plaintiffs purchased affected vehicles.

The defect can cause safety-related systems -- including backup
camera functions -- to fail, and can cause the entire center
console to go black or blue while the vehicle is in motion.
Navigation and other dashboard features are also reportedly
affected, shutting down completely while in use.

Honda agents, dealers and other representatives continue to fail to
disclose the defect.

If you purchased or leased a fifth generation, 2018-2019 Honda
Odyssey or 2019 Honda Pilot, find out more about the lawsuit and
your rights.

The new filing on June 10, 2019 in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California names vehicle owners from 15 states,
including Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia and Washington.

"Many of our plaintiffs have made repeated visits to dealerships to
have extensive work done on their cars, only to be told there's
nothing else to be done, when the defect inevitably persists," said
Steve Berman, managing partner of Hagens Berman and attorney
representing Honda owners in the class action. "Others have been
told for months that an update or fix is forthcoming, to no
avail."

"We think Honda owners deserve more than lip service," Berman
added.

Since Hagens Berman filed its lawsuit, one owner sent video footage
of the defect, showing the dashboard cutting out while he was
operating the vehicle.

Attorneys say Honda still has not acknowledged the defect's
severity or scope. The lawsuit states, "Honda has not found a
solution to the infotainment system defect. Instead, Honda simply
replaces defective parts with equally defective parts, thereby
leaving consumers caught in a cycle of use, malfunction, and
replacement. Honda has acknowledged in communications to its dealer
network that a defect in the infotainment systems exists and that
Honda does not yet have a fix."

According to the lawsuit, Honda admitted to screen freezing and
other software malfunctions in a 2019 Tech Line Summary Article,
which acknowledges one manifestation of the defect and concedes
there is no known fix.

The article states that an error message appears on the
infotainment screen, and "[a]t the same time, the overhead screen
freezes, but the audio keeps playing. So far, we know it's software
related, so don't replace any components . . ."

Reports to NHTSA call the affected model "obviously flawed," and
cite instances of the entire dash turning off while driving,
including the speedometer. "As soon as I drove off the lot, the car
gave me an error," another report to NHTSA reads.

The lawsuit against Honda seeks both monetary reimbursement for
those who purchased or leased an affected Honda Odyssey or Pilot,
and also seeks action from the court barring Honda from continuing
to sell vehicles with the defective infotainment system.

Find out more about the class-action lawsuit against Honda at
https://is.gd/HBqXX3

                     About Hagens Berman

Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP -- http://www.hbsslaw.com-- is a
consumer-rights class-action law firm with nine offices across the
country. The firm's tenacious drive for plaintiffs' rights has
earned it numerous national accolades, awards and titles of "Most
Feared Plaintiff's Firm," and MVPs and Trailblazers of class-action
law. [GN]


HSBC BANK: HSBC USA Dismissed from Vasquez WCM777 Ponzi Scheme Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RIGOBERTO VASQUEZ and EVA GARCIA on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. HONG
KONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION LTD., a foreign company, HSBC
BANK USA, N.A., a national banking association, and DOES 1 THROUGH
100, Defendants, Case No. 18 Civ. 1876 (PAE) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge
Paul A. Engelmayer of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted HSBC USA, N.A.'s motion to dismiss the
claims against it.

Vasquez and Garcia bring the putative class action against Hong
Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd. ("HSBC Hong Kong"), HSBC
Bank USA, and Does 1 to 100.  The Plaintiffs allege that the HSBC
Defendants and unnamed others facilitated the international bank
transfers required to perpetrate a Ponzi scheme which violated the
federal racketeering statute 18 U.S.C. Section 1961 et seq.
("RICO").  They also bring, under state law, three common law
claims for aiding and abetting, with the underlying conduct of
fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion.

The Plaintiffs allege that the HSBC Defendants facilitated the
perpetration of a Ponzi scheme they call "WCM777."  The
perpetrators of WCM777 maintained accounts with HSBC Hong Kong and
advised prospective investors to wire money to these accounts.  The
bulk of these transfers went through a correspondent bank account
held by HSBC Hong Kong at HSBC USA in New York.

The Plaintiffs allege that HSBC USA became aware that WCM777 was a
Ponzi scheme at least by Sept. 30, 2013, and shared this discovery
with HSBC Hong Kong.  However, the banks continued transferring
more than $30 million worth of transactions afterwards until a
federal court shut down the scheme in March 27, 2014.

Vasquez and Garcia bring the action on behalf of a purported class
of all individuals or entities who invested and lost money with any
of the WCM777 entities by transferring or having their money
transferred to one of the WCM777 accounts at HSBC Hong Kong through
the HSBC USA correspondent account from the Period June 1, 2013
through May 31, 2014.  Vasquez and Garcia each reside in
California.

Vasquez transferred $100,000 to the WCM Ltd. account at HSBC Hong
Kong on Oct. 21, 2013 and lost all this money.  Garcia transferred
$2,000 to WCM777 in HSBC Hong Kong through HSBC USA on Oct. 11,
2013, and again on Oct. 15, 2013.  She lost this $4,000.

HSBC Hong Kong now moves to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction.  In addition, the HSBC Defendants move collectively
and individually to dismiss all claims on a variety of grounds
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and to strike the
Plaintiffs' class allegations.

Judge Engelmayer addresses HSBC Hong Kong's motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction before turning to the Defendants'
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  At the threshold,
however, the Judge considers the Plaintiffs' motion asking the
Court to take judicial notice, on these motions, of certain
documents.

The Plaintiffs ask the Court to take judicial notice of six
documents.  The HSBC Defendants object to only two.  The four
unobjected-to documents are orders and public filings from the
California action.  The Judge accordingly takes judicial notice of
them.  As to the remaining two documents, the first is a Consent
Order filed in a separate matter, In re HSBC Bank USA, N.A.,
McLean, Virginia, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, No. AA-EC-10-98 (Oct. 6, 2010).  As there's no
present occasion for the Court to take judicial notice of the
document, the Judge Court accordingly denies the request for
judicial notice as unripe.

The second document is a Deferred Prosecution Agreement filed in
United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12 Cr. 763, Dkt. 3-2
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2012).  The Judge grants the Plaintiffs' request
to take judicial notice of the DPA, but solely for the fact of its
filing, not the truth of its contents.  He does not find the DPA
relevant to HSBC Hong Kong's personal jurisdiction motion, but does
briefly examine it in addressing HSBC USA's Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

As to HSBC Hong Kong's motion to dismiss, the Judge concludes that
jurisdictional discovery is required to enable the Court reliably
to determine whether there is personal jurisdiction under the first
prong of Sectio 302(a)(1), insofar as the requirement there that
the Defendant have transacted business within the state has been
held to require purposeful availment by the Defendant.  He
accordingly directs that the parties promptly undertake
jurisdictional discovery aimed at the issue of purposeful
availment.  He expects that such discovery can be completed within
two months of the decision and that counsel will then expeditiously
brief anew the issue of personal jurisdiction.  In light of the
potential impact of this discovery on ensuing questions in the
personal jurisdiction inquiry (e.g., whether the second prong of Se
ctio302(a)(1) is met and whether constitutional due process is
satisfied), the Judge invites the counsel, on rebriefing, to
address those questions as well.

Because the Court has not yet determined that it has personal
jurisdiction over HSBC Hong Kong, the Judge considers only HSBC
USA's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).  HSBC USA moves to
dismiss all claims in the FAC against it.  It argues the FAC fails
to state claims under RICO or state law; that its state law claims
are displaced by the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"); and that all
claims against it are time-barred.

Judge Engelmayer holds that the FAC fails to state either a RICO
claim or a claim under state law.  He therefore does not address
HSBC USA's arguments based on timeliness or the UCC.  He finds that
(i) the FAC does not plead sufficient facts to allege the RICO
element of "participation," and grants HSBC USA's motion to dismiss
the FAC's RICO claim; (ii) the pled facts sufficient to allege that
HSBC USA had, under the conscious avoidance doctrine, actual
knowledge of WCM777's fraudulent Ponzi scheme; and (iii) the FAC
fails -- by a good margin -- to allege that HSBC USA substantially
assisted WCM777's fraudulent activity.   Accordingly, he dismisses
the FAC's claims against HSBC USA for aiding and abetting breach of
fiduciary duty, fraud, and conversion.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Engelmayer, as to HSBC USA,
granted the motion to dismiss the claims against it.  The dismissal
is with prejudice.  As to HSBC Hong Kong, however, he granted
plaintiffs' request for jurisdictional discovery as to the issue of
personal jurisdiction, so as to enable the Court to resolve HSBC
Hong Kong's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2).  He directed
HSBC Hong Kong and plaintiffs to file, by June 10, 2019, a joint
letter proposing a discovery schedule to be completed within
approximately two months of today.  

The Judge denied, without prejudice, HSBC Hong Kong's motions to
dismiss and to strike class allegations, without prejudice to the
right of HSBC Hong Kong to renew such motions if the motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is denied.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to terminate the
motions pending at Dkts. 48, 54, 56, and 58, and to terminate HSBC
USA as a Defendant in the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/NRMZxN from Leagle.com.

Rigoberto Vasquez, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated & Eva Garcia, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Julio Joaquin Ramos
-- ramoslawgroup@yahoo.com -- Law Offices of Julio J. Ramos.

Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Ltd., a foreign
company, Defendant, represented by Craig Andrew Convissar --
craig.convissar@kattenlaw.com -- Katten Muchin Rosenman, LLP,
Gregory S. Korman -- greg.korman@kattenlaw.com -- Katten Muchin
Rosenman LLP & Stuart M. Richter -- stuart.richter@kattenlaw.com --
Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP.


HYUNDAI: Proskauer Rose Attorneys Discuss 9th Cir. Ruling
---------------------------------------------------------
Steven D Hurd, Esq. -- shurd@proskauer.com -- and Andrew A. Smith,
Esq. -- asmith@proskauer.com -- of Proskauer Rose LLP, in an
article for The National Law Review, report that the Ninth Circuit
went a long way towards answering that question in an en banc
decision. The key takeaway is that a district court certifying a
class for settlement purposes does not have to conduct the same
"rigorous analysis" of manageability considerations required when
certifying a class for litigation. The decision has major
implications, not only for class action settlements but also for
cases where class certification is contested.

The In re Hyundai and Kia Fuel Economy Litigation decision was the
latest turn in a lengthy settlement approval process. The two car
makers had settled in early 2013 with a nationwide class of car
buyers who claimed they were misled by inflated representations
about the miles per gallon they could expect from their vehicles.
The opinion describes in great detail the district court's
exhaustive analysis of the settlement before approving it nearly
three years later.

Last year, a divided Ninth Circuit panel reversed, holding that the
district court, at the urging of objectors to the settlement,
should have analyzed differences among state consumer protection
laws before certifying a nationwide settlement class based on
California law.

The full Ninth Circuit disagreed. Among the principles it
articulated are:

A district court certifying a litigation class "must be concerned
with manageability at trial," but "manageability is not a concern
in certifying a settlement class where, by definition, there will
be no trial."

As a result, "[a] class that is certifiable for settlement may not
be certifiable for litigation if the settlement obviates the need
to litigate individualized issues that would make a trial
unmanageable."

Rather than strict "predominance" (whether questions common to
class members' claims are a significant aspect of the case that can
be resolved at the same time), a district court asked to approve a
class settlement should focus on "unity" (whether class members
suffered the same harm in the same way).

Applying those principles, the court endorsed the district court's
certification of a nationwide class of car buyers. The supposed
"variations" in state law were not an obstacle to certification, as
the earlier panel had concluded. The settlement objectors, the
court noted, had not demonstrated how California's choice-of-law
test (applicable because California was the forum state) required
application of another state's law. Absent that showing, and absent
any constitutional problems created by applying California law to
all class members' claims, the district court properly certified
the class for settlement.

Other courts, including the Supreme Court in Amchem Products, Inc.
v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), have recognized that certifying a
class for settlement is different and potentially less onerous than
certifying it for litigation. The real innovation from the Ninth
Circuit's decision is treating individualized issues that could
defeat predominance as factors that might create "intractable
management problems" at trial. Amchem authorizes courts to ignore
those "when settlement-only certification is requested."

The decision clears the way for district courts, at least in the
Ninth Circuit, to take a practical approach to class settlements.
If the parties litigate class certification, individualized issues
may very well prevent the district court from certifying a class
because of the "rigorous analysis" required at that stage. But if
the parties opt for settlement, the same issues may be no obstacle
at all—precisely because they won't be litigated. [GN]


IDEAL COLLECTION: Daddieco Files Class Suit under FDCPA
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ideal Collection
Servoices, Inc. The case is styled as Yvonne-Wright Daddieco, aslso
known as: Yvonne Wright individually and o/b/o all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Ideal Collection Servoices, Inc. and John
Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No. 8:19-cv-01711-JSM-SPF (M.D. Fla.,
July 16, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Act.

Ideal Collection Servoices, Inc. is a debt collection agency in the
Greater Northdale, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Justin Zeig, Esq.
   Zeig Law Firm, LLC
   3475 Sheridan Street,  Suite 310
   Hollywood, FL 33024
   Tel: (754) 217-3084
   Fax: (754) 217-3084
   Email: justin@zeiglawfirm.com


IGOURMET LLC: Conner Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
-------------------------------------------------------
iGourmet LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to the
Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Mary Conner,
individually and as the representative of a class of similarly
situated persons, Plaintiff v. iGourmet LLC and Innovative Food
Holdings, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-04118 (E.D. N.Y., July
16, 2019).

igourmet, LLC, doing business as igourmet.com LLC, retails gourmet
foods and gifts online. igourmet, LLC was founded in 1997 and is
based in West Pittston, Pennsylvania.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Dan Shaked, Esq.
   Shaked Law Group, P.C.
   14 Harwood Court, Suite 415
   Scarsdale, NY 10583
   Tel: (917) 373-9128
   Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com




JANI-KING OF CALIFORNIA: Juarez Seeks to Certify Franchisee Class
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit captioned ALEJANDRO JUAREZ, et al. v.
JANI-KING OF CALIFORNIA, INC., a Texas Corporation, et al., Case
No. 4:09-cv-03495-YGR (N.D. Cal.), seek to certify this class:

     All persons who have purchased Jani-King franchises and have
     performed janitorial and cleaning work for Jani-King within
     the State of California at any time from June 22, 2006
     (three years preceding the filing of the original complaint
     in this action) through the date class notice is issued.

The Defendants have misclassified their cleaning workers as
independent contractors rather than employees and, as a result,
have violated various provisions of California Wage Order 5-2001
and the California Labor Code, the Plaintiffs allege.  The
Plaintiffs add that the Defendants have also failed to pay class
members overtime for hours worked beyond eight per day or 40 per
week in violation of the California Labor Code.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint them as Class
representatives, and to appoint their counsel as Class counsel.

The Court will commence a hearing on October 22, 2019, at 2:00
p.m., to consider the Motion.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Monique Olivier, Esq.
          Christian Schreiber, Esq.
          Miguel Zavala, Esq.
          OLIVIER SCHREIBER & CHAO LLP
          201 Filbert Street, Suite 201
          San Francisco, CA 94133
          Telephone: (415) 484-0980
          E-mail: monique@osclegal.com
                  christian@osclegal.com
                  miguel@osclegal.com

               - and -

          Shannon Liss-Riordan, Esq.
          Adelaide Pagano, Esq.
          LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
          729 Boylston Street, Suite 2000
          Boston, MA 02116
          Telephone: (617) 994-5800
          Facsimile: (617) 994-5801
          E-mail: sliss@llrlaw.com
                  apagano@llrlaw.com

               - and -

          James C. Sturdevant, Esq.
          THE STURDEVANT LAW FIRM
          4040 Civic Center Drive, Suite 200
          San Rafael, CA 94903
          Telephone: (415) 477-2410
          Facsimile: (415) 492-2810
          E-mail: jsturdevant@sturdevantlaw.com


JENNINGS GATE: Revised Settlement Agreement Filed in Bueso Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs' counsel filed with the Court certain documents as
instructed during a conference call in the lawsuit titled Bueso, et
al. v. Jennings Gate Rest, Inc., et al., Case No. 18-CV-0380
(E.D.N.Y.).

In compliance with Chief Magistrate Judge Roanne L. Mann's
instruction during the conference call held on July 1, 2019, the
Plaintiff's counsel submits these documents:

   1.) Proposed Notice of Class Action settlement with the
       corrections requested;

   2.) the Settlement Agreement with the revisions sought; and

   3.) the Proposed Order.

The temporal scope of the class is from January 19, 2012, through
December 26, 2018, the date Plaintiffs provided a list with a
damages calculation to the Defendants.

In order to avoid confusion, the Plaintiffs will refile all the
documents associated with the motion for preliminary approval,
including the memorandum of law seeking preliminary approval of a
class action settlement.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Delvis Melendez, Esq.
          THE Law OFFICE OF DELVIS MELENDEZ
          90 Bradley Street
          Brentwood, NY 11717
          Telephone: (631) 434-1443

The Defendants are represented by:

          C.C. Adam Guttell, Esq.
          JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
          58 South Service Rd.
          Melville, NY 11747
          Telephone: (631) 247-4675
          E-mail: Adam.Guttell@jacksonlewis.com


JUUL LABS: Must Face Class Action Over Addictive E-Cigarettes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Helen Christophi, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported
that a federal judge said on June 12 he would advance a class
action accusing e-cigarette maker Juul Labs of building a
multimillion-dollar electronic-cigarette empire by secretly
designing a highly addictive product and hooking teens with "cool"
ads and candy-like flavors.

In a hearing in San Francisco, U.S. District Judge William Orrick
III said the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that Juul's
advertising campaign had helped the company capture the $3 billion
e-cigarette market in the United States in a stunning two years,
beating out established competitors like cigarette behemoth Philip
Morris.

Orrick tentatively blessed almost all of the claims brought by a
nationwide class of adult Juul users and a subclass of users who
were minors when they purchased Juul's products.

He said the case will proceed regardless of whether he later
reverses on individual claims.

"I don't know what the evidence is going to show," Orrick said.
"But the case will proceed."

Twelve adult and minor Juul users sued the San Francisco-based
company in April 2018 for concealing the addictiveness of its
products. According to the complaint, the products contain triple
the legal limit of nicotine allowed in the European Union.

One study found Juulpods -- prefilled cartridges of nicotine
solution -- contained 6.2% nicotine salts instead of the advertised
5%, and the plaintiffs claim Juul's devices deliver this outsize
amount of nicotine to the bloodstream faster than traditional
cigarettes. They say the "intense dosage" of nicotine increased
their nicotine addictions and their Juulpod consumption and made
quitting harder, and that Juul chose to not warn them of these
risks.

According to an amended complaint, Juul targeted both teens and
adults using a "two-prong" marketing approach.

The first prong targeted teens with candy-flavored Juulpods and
"multimillion dollar ad campaigns and social media blitzes using
alluring imagery," such as attractive young models "going out for a
night on the town."

The campaign resulted in more than 700% growth in 2017 alone, the
classes allege.

Juul meanwhile targeted adults trying to quit smoking and those
wary of the health risks associated with traditional cigarettes by
claiming its products contained less nicotine and were less
addictive than cigarettes, the plaintiffs claim.

On June 12, Juul's attorney Austin Schwing, of Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, sought to counter those claims by arguing
restrictions on commercial speech must be narrowly tailored to
achieve the desired objective. He said outlawing speech about
lawful products that appeal to adults because it may also appeal to
teens is not narrowly tailored to preventing teen usage.

And he invoked the separation of powers doctrine to argue judicial
review was akin to legislating a ban on Juul products because it is
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration that Congress had tasked with
regulating e-cigarettes, not the judicial branch.

Class counsel and Gutride Safier LLP attorney Matt McCrary
countered Juul had provided no authority for abstaining from
judicial review.

"I'm not thinking of abstaining," Orrick replied.

Orrick did not ask questions of either party during their
arguments, indicating his final written order likely won't deviate
from his tentative ruling.

He tentatively granted Juul's motion to dismiss claims for
negligent marketing, negligence per se and breach of express
warranty. But he said he will probably advance the remaining claims
for false advertising, fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
deceptive trade practices, design and manufacturing defect and
failure to warn, adding none of these are pre-empted by federal
laws.

He said the minors' sub-class had plausibly alleged Juul's
advertising campaign had "targeted them."

He kept alive named plaintiff Bradley Colgate's failure-to-warn
claims and dismissed them for three other plaintiffs with leave to
amend.

And he said he would probably also deny Juul's motion to send five
of the named plaintiffs to arbitration.

Orrick took the arguments under submission and did not indicate
when he would rule. [GN]


KNAUF GIPS: Bid to Certify Builder Class Denied
-----------------------------------------------
A Louisiana court has denied a request for class certification in
the case captioned as Mitchell Company Inc., the Plaintiff, v.
Knauf Gips KG, et al., the Defendants, Case No.
2:09-md-02047-EEF-JCW (E.D. La.).  The case is part of the class
action lawsuit RE: CHINESE-MANUFACTURED DRYWALL PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION.

The Court entered an order on July 8, 2019, denying Mitchell
Company's motion for certification of a builder class consisting
of:

   "all persons and entities in the States of Alabama,
   Mississippi, Louisiana, Georgia, Texas, and Florida that used
   drywall manufactured by Taishan Gypsum Co., Ltd., for the
   construction, repair, or remodeling of any improvement to real
   property and who incurred any expenses associated with (1)
   repair or replacement of all or part of the defective drywall,
   and/or (2) repair or replacement of other property damaged by
   the defective drywall, and/or (3) attorneys' fees and costs in
   defense of claims by affected homeowners, and/or (4) other
   expenses that were or incurred as part of the remediation of
   the defective drywall, including, without limitation, the cost
   of investigation and expert analysis of the defect, and cost
   of relocating customers displaced by the presence of defective
   drywall."

   Excluded from the proposed Class are any owners, landlords, or
   residents of real properties located in the United States
   containing defective Chinese drywall manufactured, sold,
   distributed, supplied, marketed, inspected, imported, or
   delivered by Taishan Gypsum Co. Ltd.; Defendant Taishan, its
   legal representatives, officers, directors, assigns, and
   successors, or any entity in which the Defendant has a
   controlling interest; the judge to whom this action is
   assigned and members of the judge's immediate family; claims
   for personal injury, wrongful death, and/or emotional
   distress; and all persons or entities who properly execute and
   timely file a request for exclusion from the class.[CC]


KOHLBERG KRAVIS: Pruchnicki Suit Removed to District of Nevada
--------------------------------------------------------------
The putative class action lawsuit titled PEGGY PRUCHNICKI, and all
similarly situated individuals v. KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS, d/b/a
ENVISION HEALTHCARE, Case No. A-19-795141-C, was removed on July 9,
2019, from the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County,
Nevada, to the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-01193-JCM-BNW to
the proceeding.

Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, doing business as Envision Healthcare
Services, is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in New York.  KKR, through Envision, does business in the
state of Nevada.  Envision in turn operates in part through its
affiliate companies, including but not limited to EmCare, Inc. (a
Delaware corporation doing business in the State of Nevada) and
Sheridan Healthcorp, Inc. ("Sheridan") (a Florida corporation,
which on information and belief does business in the State of
Nevada).

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and all putative Class
members formerly supplied their personal and/or financial data
("Personal Data") to Envision in connection with transactions with
Envision.  In or about July 2018, Envision's systems were breached
by an unidentified third party ("Data Breach").  The third party
accessed several Envision e-mail accounts, from which it procured
Plaintiff and Class members' personal data, which included name,
date of birth, social security number, driver's license number, and
unidentified "financial information."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew I. Knepper, Esq.
          Miles N. Clark, Esq.
          KNEPPER & CLARK LLC
          10040 W. Cheyenne Ave., Suite 170-109
          Las Vegas, NV 89129
          Telephone: (702) 825-6060
          Facsimile: (702) 447-8048
          E-mail: matthew.knepper@knepperclark.com
                  miles.clark@knepperclark.com

               - and -

          David H. Krieger, Esq.
          HAINES & KRIEGER, LLC
          8985 S. Eastern Ave., Suite 350
          Henderson, NV 89123
          Telephone: (702) 880-5554
          Facsimile: (702) 385-5518
          E-mail: dkrieger@hainesandkrieger.com


LABORATORY CORPORATION: Mohamad Files Class Suit in North Carolina
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Laboratory
Corporation of America Holdings. The case is styled as Mohamad
Mohamad, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00702 (M.D. N.C., July 16, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Contract - Other.

Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings, more commonly known as
LabCorp, is an American S&P 500 company headquartered in
Burlington, North Carolina. It operates one of the largest clinical
laboratory networks in the world, with a United States network of
36 primary laboratories.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   William Marc Graham, Esq.
   Wallace and Graham, P.A.
   525 N. Main St.
   Salisbury, NC 28144
   Tel: (704) 633-5244
   Fax: (704) 633-9434
   Email: bgraham@wallacegraham.com


LG ELECTRONICS: Stangl et al. Sue over Defective Compressors
------------------------------------------------------------
EDWARD STANGL, ANN MARIE STANGL, AND MELISSA CUPP, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. LG
ELECTRONICS U.S.A., INC., the Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-15185
(D.N.J., July 11, 2019), alleges that LG concealed a known defect
from its customers in the United States who purchased refrigerators
manufactured by LG equipped with linear compressors on or after
January 30, 2014.

The action arises from LG's failure, despite its longstanding
knowledge, to disclose to Plaintiffs and similarly situated
customers that the LG Refrigerators have defective compressors that
fail to function in a reliable manner as expected.

According to the complaint, LG knew of this critical defect at the
time of sale of the LG Refrigerators, but sold them anyway, without
disclosing the defect to Plaintiffs and Class members. Moreover, LG
has routinely failed to repair the LG Refrigerators without charge
when customers report failures arising from the Compressor Defect.

Over four years ago, LG settled a class action in which the
plaintiffs alleged that LG's refrigerators were defective. See
Order Granting Final Approval of Settlement and Request for Entry
of Judgment, Clark v. LG Elecs. USA, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-485-JM
(JMA). The claims released by the judgment in that case, however,
are limited to those involving refrigerators purchased before
January 29, 2014, which marks the beginning of the class period in
this case, the lawsuit says.

LG Electronics of USA manufactures and distributes consumer
electronic products. The Company offers light emission diode
televisions, mobile phones, monitors, refrigerators, washing
machines, dryers, air conditioners, and projectors.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiffs and the Class are:

           Shanon J. Carson, Esq.
           Lawrence Deutsch, Esq.
           Jacob M. Polakoff, Esq.
           Amey J. Park, Esq.
           BERGER MONTAGUE PC
           1818 Market Street, Suite 3600
           Philadelphia, PA 19103
           Telephone: (215) 875-3000
           Facsimile: (215) 875-4604
           E-mail: scarson@bm.net
                    ldeutsch@bm.net
                    jpolakoff@bm.net
                    apark@bm.net

                - and -

           E. Michelle Drake, Esq.
           BERGER MONTAGUE PC
           43 SE Main Street, Suite 505
           Minneapolis, MN 55414
           Telephone: (612) 594-5999
           Facsimile: (612) 584-4470
           E-mail: emdrake@bm.net

LLR INC: Court Narrows Claims in M. Hill's MCPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Montana, Great
Falls Division, issued an Order granting in part and denying in
part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned MELISSA
HILL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. LLR, INC. d/b/a LuLaRoe, and LULAROE, INC.,
Defendants. No. CV-18-120-GF-BMM. (D. Mont.).

LLR contends (1) that the Court should enforce the MCPA's
prohibition on class action lawsuits (2) that Hill does not possess
Article III standing (3) that Hill also does not possess standing
under the MCPA and (4) that Judge Johnston should have specified in
his Findings and Recommendations that LLR's motion to strike be
denied without prejudice.  

MCPA's Prohibition on Class Action Lawsuits

LLR argued in its motion to dismiss that Hill's Montana Consumer
Protection Act (MCPA), claim should be dismissed as the MCPA
expressly prohibits class actions. LLR recognized that this Court
had concluded previously that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
preempted the MCPA's class action ban in Wittman v. CB1, Inc., 2016
WL 3093427. LLR nonetheless requested that this Court abandon its
conclusion in Wittman insofar as it applies to the instant action
in light of both the different procedural posture of the instant
matter and the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Makaeff v. Trump
Univ., LLC, 736 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2013).  

LLR's objection as to Judge Lynch's Findings and Recommendations on
whether Rule 23 preempts the MCPA's class action ban largely
amounts to a rehashing of the same arguments presented to Judge
Lynch necessitating clear error review.

De Novo Review of Shady Grove Conflict

LLR argues that the Court should apply Justice Steven's concurring
opinion in Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 396, to determine whether Rule
23 violates the Rules Enabling Act in a class action suit based on
a claim under the MCPA.   

Shady Grove Opinions

The Supreme Court in Shady Grove faced the question of whether a
New York state law that prohibits class actions in suits seeking
penalties or statutory minimum damages precludes a federal district
court sitting in diversity from entertaining a class action under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The Supreme Court answered no.
Supreme Court's decision in Shady Grove, however, consisted of a
four-justice plurality, a lone-justice concurrence, and a
four-justice dissent. The Court briefly will address, in turn, each
of these opinions.

Four-Justice Plurality Opinion

The four-justice plurality in Shady Grove employed a two-prong
analysis in determining whether the New York statute or Rule 23
governed whether the plaintiffs could litigate a class action
lawsuit in a federal district court sitting in diversity. First,
the Supreme Court determined whether Rule 23 answers the question
in dispute. The Supreme Court concluded that Rule 23 provides a
one-size-fits-all formula for deciding the class-action question.
The New York statute also answered the question in dispute. The New
York statute, because of the relief it seeks, however, fails to
apply in diversity suits unless Rule 23 is ultra vires.

Justice Steven's Concurrence

Justice Steven's agreed with the four-justice plurality, that Rule
23, rather than the New York statute, applied in the case at bar.
Justice Stevens equally agreed with the four-justice dissent,
however, that there exist "some state procedural rules that federal
courts must apply in diversity cases because they function as a
part of the State's definition of substantive rights and remedies.

Justice Stevens agreed that the two-step framework, as used by the
four-justice plurality, proved applicable to the instant issue in
dispute. Justice Stevens nonetheless disagreed on what application
of prong two entails. Upon satisfaction of prong one, the court
must decide whether application of the federal rule represents a
valid exercise of the rulemaking authority bestowed on this Court
by the Rules Enabling Act. As noted by the four-justice plurality,
the Rules Enabling Act mandates that federal rules not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right.

Justice Ginsburg's Dissent

Justice Ginsburg, along with Justice Kennedy, Justice Breyer, and
Justice Alito, dissented from the plurality's opinion. Justice
Ginsburg explains that a federal rule applies in diversity suits if
the rule controls an issue and directly conflicts with state law
and remains consonant with the Rules Enabling Act. The Rules of
Decision Act controls where there exists no federal rule or statute
that governs the issue in dispute.  

Justice Ginsburg reasons that the legislative history of the New
Statute at issue supports that the statute fails to collide with
Rule 23. Rule 23 describes a method of enforcing a claim for
relief, while Section 901(b) defines the dimensions of the claim
itself. The inquiry then becomes whether application of the state
rule would have so important an effect upon the fortunes of one or
both of the litigants that failure to apply it would be likely to
cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court. The dissent
concludes that the New York statute's "limitation on the recovery
of statutory damages applies in this case.

MCPA and Rule 23 Conflict

Justice Stevens's concurrence similarly fails to constitute logical
subset of the dissenting opinion. Justice Stevens agreed with
Justice Ginsburg's reasoning that there exists state procedural
rules that function as part of a state's defined substantive rights
and remedies that would require a federal court sitting in
diversity to apply the state law in lieu of the federal procedural
law. Justice Stevens's agreement with the plurality, and the
differing prong one inquiry than the inquiry proposed by the
dissent, logically lead the Court to conclude that the dissent does
not subsume Justice Stevens's concurrence.

The Court, unless, and until, the Ninth Circuit address the
conflict between MCPA and Rule 23, will continue to apply the
portion of Shady Grove to which a majority of justices agreed. This
approach translates to the Court applying Rule 23, instead of the
MCPA, to determine whether a MCPA claim may be brought as a class
action.  

Article III Standing

Judge Lynch determined that Hill's alleged loss of interest, which
may have been as little as $7.29, is a cognizable injury in fact
for purposes of standing. LLR contends that Judge Lynch's
determination runs contrary to the clear majority of cases that
conclude that a consumer, whose money has been refunded fully
before an action commences does not possess Article III standing by
virtue of claimed lost interest on the refunded money. LLR's
objection largely amounts to a rehashing of the argument it made
before Judge Lynch in LLR's Motion to Dismiss. The Court will
review the pertinent portion of Judge Lynch's Findings and
Recommendations for clear error.  

The Court finds no error.  

Standing Under the MCPA

Judge Lynch reasoned that assuming LLR retained the $291.70 in
sales tax for three months and the applicable interest rate is 10%,
Hill has lost only $7.29 in unpaid interest. Judge Lynch determined
that Hill alleged sufficiently that she suffered an ascertainable
loss for purposes of establishing standing under the MCPA.

LLR argues that Judge Lynch's determination proves problematic as
Hill has failed to allege that "she actually lost interest during
the four-month period LLR took to refund her money in addition to
Hill alleging that she possessed a right to that interest as a
legal remedy."
Absent these allegations, LLR contends that Hill has not alleged
an ascertainable loss as Judge Lynch concluded.

LLR asserted in its Motion to Dismiss that Hill has failed to
allege that she suffered an ascertainable loss sufficient enough to
confer her standing under the MCPA.  LLR's argument in its
objection resembles the argument made in its Motion to Dismiss. The
Court will review Judge Lynch's discussion, and conclusion, in the
MCPA standing portion of his Findings and Recommendations for clear
error.   The Court finds no error.

Accordingly, LLR's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is granted in part and
denied in part.  LLR's motion is granted with respect to Hill's
claim for injunctive relief. LLR's motion is denied with respect to
Hill's claims for violations of the MCPA and conversion and
deceit.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 11, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3c4fywm from Leagle.com.

Melissa Hill, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Domenic A. Cossi, WESTERN
JUSTICE ASSOCIATES, 303 W Mendenhall St, Bozeman, MT 59715, Kelly
Iverson, Carlson Lynch LLP, 303 W Mendenhall St, Bozeman, MT 59715,
pro hac vice, Kevin Tucker, Carlson Lynch LLP, 1133 Penn Avenue,
5th Floor Pittsburgh, PA 15222, pro hac vice, Maxwell E. Kirchhoff,
WESTERN JUSTICE ASSOCIATES, 303 W Mendenhall St, Bozeman, MT 59715
& R. Bruce Carlson, Carlson Lynch LLP, 303 W Mendenhall St,
Bozeman, MT 59715, pro hac vice.

LLR, Inc., d/b/a LuLaRoe & LULAROE, LLC, Defendants, represented by
Randolph T. Moore -- rmoore@swlaw.com SNELL & WILMER, pro hac vice,
Steven T. Graham -- sgraham@swlaw.com -- SNELL & WILMER, pro hac
vice, Jeffery J. Oven -- joven@crowleyfleck.com -- CROWLEY FLECK
PLLP & Jeffrey M. Roth -- jroth@crowleyfleck.com -- CROWLEY FLECK
PLLP.


LOGISTICARE SOLUTIONS: Bunton Seeks to Certify Class Under FLSA
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit entitled SHANIQUA BUNTON, Individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. LOGISTICARE
SOLUTIONS, LLC, Case No. 1:19-cv-00372-LY (W.D. Tex.), seeks
conditional certification of a collective action consisting of:

    "All Hourly Call-Center Employees Who Worked For Logisticare
     Solutions LLC, Anywhere In The United States, At Any Time In
     The Past Three Years Through The Final Disposition of This
     Matter."

In order to facilitate the purposes of the Fair Labor Standards
Act's collective action provisions, the Plaintiff asks that the
Court grant this Motion and: (1) conditionally certify this action
for purposes of notice and discovery; (2) order that
judicially-approved notice be sent to all Putative Class Members;
(3) approve the form and content of the Plaintiff's proposed
judicial notice and reminder notice; (4) order Logisticare to
produce to the Plaintiff's counsel the contact information
(including the names, address, telephone number and e-mail address)
for each Putative Class Member in a usable electronic format; (5)
authorize a 60-day notice period for Putative Class Members to join
the case; and (6) authorize notice to be sent via First Class Mail,
e-mail, and text-message to the Putative Class Members.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Clif Alexander, Esq.
          Lauren E. Braddy, Esq.
          Alan Clifton Gordon, Esq.
          Carter T. Hastings, Esq.
          ANDERSON ALEXANDER, PLLC
          819 N. Upper Broadway
          Corpus Christi, TX 78401
          Telephone: (361) 452-1279
          Facsimile: (361) 452-1284
          E-mail: clif@a2xlaw.com
                  lauren@a2xlaw.com
                  cgordon@a2xlaw.com
                  carter@a2xlaw.com


LOS TRES MAGUEYES: Pontones Seeks to Certify FLSA Class
-------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as LAURA PONTONES, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. LOS
TRES MAGUEYES, INC., AYOTLAN, INC., TEQUILA INC., ELIBORIO NAVARRO,
IGNACIO NAVARRO, FRANCISCO SANCHEZ, AND JORGE MEZA, the Defendants,
Case No. 5:18-cv-00087-H (E.D.N.C.) , the Plaintiff asks the Court
to enter an order:

   1. granting conditional certification of the action as a
      representative collective action under the Fair Labor
      Standards Act and certification of theaction as a class
      action under Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) pursuant to the North
      Carolina Wage and Hour Act;

   2. approving proposed FLSA/R.23 NCHWA notice of the action and
      the consent form in both English and Spanish;

   3. producing names, last known mailing addresses, alternate
      addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses, and dates of
      employment of all putative class members;

   4. sending email and/or text message the proposed Notice,
      along with utilizing regular U.S. Mail, Spanish radio
      announcements, and posting the Notice at all locations in
      English and Spanish over a 90 day period, in addition to
      sending a reminder notice within 45 days, following the
      initial mailing of notice; and

   5. appointing Laura Pontones as class representative, and the
      Law Offices of Gilda A. Hernandez, PLLC as class counsel.
      [CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Gilda Adriana Hernandez, Esq.
          Charlotte Smith, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF GILDA A.
          HERNANDEZ, PLLC
          1020 Southhill Dr., Ste. 130
          Cary, NC 27513
          Telephone: (919) 741-8693
          Facsimile: (919) 869-1853
          E-mail: ghernandez@gildahernandezlaw.com
                  csmith@gildahernandezlaw.com

Attorney for Defendants is:

          James E. Hairston, Jr., Esq.
          HAIRSTON LANE, P.A.
          434 Fayetteville St., Suite 2350
          Raleigh, NC 27601
          Telephone: (919)-838-5295
          Facsimile: (888) 510-1160
          E-mail: jhairston@hairstonlane.com

MANNA PRO: Filing of Bid for Hale Deal Prelim Approval Due Aug. 30
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ASHLEY HALE individually, and on behalf of other
members of the general public similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
MANNA PRO PRODUCTS, LLC; DOES 1-10, INCLUSIVE, Defendant, Case No.
2:18-cv-00209-KJM-DB (E.D. Cal.), Judge Kimberly J. Mueller of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California has
issued an order on notice of settlement.  Pursuant to the Notice of
Settlement, the Judge vacated all pending hearing dates and
deadlines.  The Parties will have 90 days to finalize the
settlement documents and file preliminary approval papers.  The
Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement will be filed no later than Aug. 30, 2019.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/aD2Q4g from Leagle.com.

Ashley Hale, Plaintiff, represented by Adrian R. Bacon --
abacon@toddflaw.com -- Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C.,
Kelsey L. Kuberka, Law Offices Of Todd Friedman, Meghan George --
mgeorge@toddflaw.com -- Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, PC & Todd
M. Friedman -- tfriedman@toddflaw.com -- Law Offices of Todd M.
Friedman, P.C.

Manna Pro Products, LLC, Defendant, represented by Jennifer E.
Hoekel -- jhoekel@armstrongteasdale.com -- Armstrong Teasdale, LLP,
pro hac vice, Jennifer C. Martin Wang -- jwang@troygould.com --
TroyGould PC, Laura A. Bentele -- lbentele@armstrongteasdale.com --
Armstrong Teasdale LLP, pro hac vice & Russell I. Glazer --
rglazer@troygould.com -- TroyGould PC.


MERIT RECOVERY: Court Denies Default Judgment Bid in Muldowney
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of New
York issued a Memorandum Decision and Order denying Plaintiffs'
Default Judgment in the case captioned KAREN MULDOWNEY,
individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. MERIT RECOVERY SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant. No.
5:18-cv-01061 (MAD/ATB). (N.D.N.Y).

According to the complaint, the Defendant claims that the Plaintiff
owes a debt and that she fell behind on payments for the debt
related to personal medical services (Debt). In an attempt to
collect that Debt, the Defendant sent the Plaintiff a letter, an
initial communication as defined by 15 U.S.C. Section 1692a(2). The
letter listed an amount of $65.00 due to Crouse Hospital, and
included a debtor number.

After the Defendant failed to respond to the complaint, the
Plaintiff filed a Request for Clerk's Certificate of Entry of
Default.  Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a), the
Clerk entered a default against the Defendant for failure to plead,
answer, or otherwise defend. The Plaintiff now seeks default
judgment individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated.  

Standard of Review

Generally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 provides a two-step
process that the Court must follow before it may enter a default
judgment against a defendant.  Under Rule 55(a), when a party fails
to plead or otherwise defend the clerk must enter the party's
default, upon request of the plaintiff, a default judgment may be
entered by the clerk when (1) the plaintiff's claim against the
defendant is for a sum certain, (2) the plaintiff has submitted an
affidavit of the amount due and (3) the defendant has been
defaulted for failure to appear.

In the present matter, the Court finds that the Plaintiff complied
with the procedural requirements necessary for the Court to grant
the motion for default judgment. Specifically, the Plaintiff
affirmed that the Defendant is not an infant or an incompetent
person and that he is not in military service. Further, the
Defendant was properly served in accordance with Rule 4(e)(2)(A) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  

Application

To permit a court to enter default judgment there must be a
sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment entered.
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section 1692, et
seq., contending that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. Section
1692g(a)(5) by failing to communicate certain information as
required by FDCPA. The question of whether a communication complies
with the FDCPA is determined from the perspective of the least
sophisticated consumer.

The FDCPA requires, among other things, that within five days after
the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the
collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the
following information is contained in the initial communication or
the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice
containing a statement that, upon the consumer's written request
within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the
consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if
different from the current creditor.

As an initial matter, it is noted that the Plaintiff's submissions
are of little assistance. The majority of the argument provided is
directed largely to the reasons why the Plaintiff's counsel should
be awarded attorneys' fees at an hourly rate higher than those
usually awarded in the Northern District. While the Plaintiff has
parroted the statutory language and alleged that the letter at
issue was confusing and constitutes a violation of the FDCPA, she
has not provided any caselaw supporting her position.

In the present matter, the Court shares the concerns identified by
Judge Hurd, in what is undoubtedly an even weaker case than he was
presented with. For instance, in the matter before Judge Hurd, the
plaintiff was sent identical letters on March 26 and April 18,
2018, both alleging a debt of $70.00 owed to Crouse Hospital.   

In his first cause of action, the plaintiff alleges that the
letters violated 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g because its collection
letter was confusing from the perspective of the least
sophisticated consumer. The plaintiff claimed that due to the
language in both letters coupled with the lack of date of service
and lack of itemization, he was unable to determine what the
alleged debts represented. He further alleged that he was unsure
whether the letters concerned a single debt or multiple debts, that
he was confused and uncertain as to what the letters represented,
that he was unable to determine the amount of the debts, he was
unable to identify the debts or the actual amount of the debt.  

In his second cause of action, the plaintiff alleged that the
letters violated 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e, in that they were
reasonably susceptible to have two or more meanings, one of which
is inaccurate. Finally, similar to the present action, the
plaintiff in the case before Judge Hurd also brought suit on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated which is ironic
considering this action.

In the complaint in the present matter, the Plaintiff fails to
adequately allege a violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g. In fact,
the Plaintiff's complaint fails to set forth a single cause of
action. Rather, in the ALLEGATIONS section of the complaint, the
Plaintiff simply alleges that the following line from the letter
violates section 1692g(a)(5): "We will also provide you with the
name and address of the original creditor if different from the
current creditor."  The Plaintiff provides no explanation as to why
this statement would confuse the least sophisticated consumer.

Attorneys' Fees

What the Court finds troubling is in counsel's time records. For
example, in both cases, counsel indicates that they spent 1.5 hours
on July 23, 2018, performing the following task: Received new
client contact regarding an FDCPA matter; met with client and
discussed law and possibility of them having a case.Then, in both
cases, albeit on separate listed dates, counsel indicates that it
reviewed the letter from the debt collector, researched in
Westlaw/Pacer for prior decisions against defendant; reviewed all
recent and relevant decisions on point; reviewed internally for
other client with similar letters in our system; drafted complaint.
Counsel indicates that these tasks, which were performed in Judge
Hurd's case on August 23, 2018, and in the present matter on
September 4, 2018, took exactly 4.5 hours in each case. These cases
involved the same parties and identically worded letters from the
Defendant.

As such, the Court struggles to understand how counsel could
possibly need to repeat the exact same tasks, for the exact same
amount of time.

Assuming that the Plaintiff is capable of showing cause why this
action should not be dismissed, counsel is now on notice that the
Court, in its discretion, will likely decline to award attorneys'
fees or award only nominal fees representing the time it took to
change the name in the caption. Undoubtedly, when counsel met with
his clients, it would have been made immediately clear that these
cases should have been filed as a single case, thereby
substantially reducing costs and fees.

Although the Second Circuit has generally viewed the FDCPA's
attorneys' fees provision as mandatory, Plaintiff's counsel has
already been paid for its time prosecuting this case through the
attorneys' fees awarded by Judge Hurd.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment is
denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 11, 2019 Memorandum
Decision and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y5jj2vxd
from Leagle.com.

Karen Muldowney, individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Craig B. Sanders --
csanders@barshaysanders.com -- Barshay Sanders, PLLC & David
Michael Barshay -- dbarshay@sbglawny.com -- Barshay Sanders, PLLC.


MIDLAND CREDIT: Roman-Negron Suit Moved to E.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled as Lourdes Roman-Negron on behalf
of herself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
Midland Credit Management, Inc., the Defendant, Case No.
603233/2019, was removed from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, to
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York
(Central Islip) on July 12, 2019. The Eastern District of New York
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-04020. The suit alleges
violation of the Fair Debt Collection Act demanding $501,000 worth
of damages.

Midland Credit Management, Inc. was founded in 1953. The company's
line of business includes extending credit to business enterprises
for relatively short periods.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

Attorneys for the Defendant are:

          Ellen Beth Silverman, Esq.
          Matthew B Corwin, Esq.
          HINSHAW & CULLERTSON
          800 Third Avenue, 13th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 471-6229
          Facsimile: (212) 935-1166
          E-mail: esilverman@hinshawlaw.com
                  mcorwin@hinshawlaw.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Myerses Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
------------------------------------------------------------
ELLYN MYERS, and ARTHUR MYERS, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO COMPANY
and John Does 1-50, the Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-04033
(E.D.N.Y., July 12, 2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the
Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's
negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the design,
development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing,
advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide
Roundup (TM), containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Ellyn Myers'
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Wendy R. Fleishman, Esq.
          Kelly McNabb, Esq.
          LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
          250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor
          New York, NY 10013-1413
          Telephone: (212) 355-9500
          Facsimile: (212) 355-9592
          E-mail: wfleishman@lchb.com
                  kmcnabb@lchb.com

               - and -

          Jennifer A. Moore, Esq.
          Ashton Rose Smith, Esq.
          MOORE LAW GROUP, PLLC
          1473 South 4th Street
          Louisville, KY 40208
          Telephone: (502) 717-4080
          Facsimile: (502) 717-4086
          E-mail: jennifer@moorelawgroup.com
                  ashton@moorelawgroup.com

NATIONAL BEVERAGE: Court Denies Sanction in L. Rice Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
denying Defendant's Motion for Sanction in the case captioned
LENORA RICE, on behalf of herself and other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. NATIONAL BEVERAGE CORP. d/b/a LaCROIX
SPARKLING WATERS, Defendants. Case No. 18 CV 7151. (N.D. Ill.).

The Plaintiff brought state law claims for breach of warranty,
unjust enrichment, and violating the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act. The complaint summarized the case
as a challenge to the defendant's practice of mislabeling their
signature product, LaCroix Water, as all-natural. LaCroix Water is
manufactured using non-natural flavorings and synthetic compounds,
and Defendant continues to mislead consumers into believing that
their product is natural when it is not.

Defendant National Beverage Corp., doing business as LaCroix
Sparkling Waters, asks the court to sanction plaintiff Lenora Rice
and her counsel under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 11 for
plaintiff's frivolous lawsuit,  claiming that LaCroix Sparkling
Water contains synthetic rather than natural ingredients. Defendant
also accuses plaintiff of a public smear campaign that defendant
claims is malicious and equivalent to financial terrorism.

Rule 11 Does Not Apply to Pre-Removal Action Taken in State Court

The defendant seeks Rule 11 sanctions.2 Initially, the court is
concerned that defendant points to no federal conduct to which Rule
11 applies.

The central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings in
[federal] district court and thus streamline the administration and
procedure of the federal courts. Under Rule 11(b), a lawyer or
party certifies four things by presenting a pleading, like a
complaint, to a federal district court whether by signing, filing,
submitting, or later advocating it.

Among other things, the signer certifies that the paper is not
being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation,
that the legal claims are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law and that the factual contentions have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation.

The Defendant incorrectly asserts that Rule 11 obligated plaintiff
to dismiss the complaint immediately upon the case's removal to
federal court. Rule 11 does not authorize a federal court to
sanction a party for signing and filing a complaint in state court
prior to removal. Rule 11 also does not require a plaintiff to
update or amend a state court complaint after removal.  

Nor does Rule 11 reach the other activity discussed by defendant in
its briefing: (1) statements in plaintiff's initial disclosures
(2) statements made during the November 30, 2018, phone call to
make a discovery plan (3) plaintiff's failure to withdraw the
complaint after defendant provided, during discovery, a report
defendant claims conclusively refutes plaintiff's allegations and
(4) plaintiff's opposition to the motion for sanctions.  The
exclusion in Rule 11(d) covers items (1)-(3), which are discovery
communications. This court therefore declines to decide defendant's
sanctions motion on these grounds alone.

Rule 11 Analysis

The Defendant argues generally that the complaint fails to set
forth any basis for its primary and central claim that the four
compounds identified therein are synthetic. But the complaint need
not do so. The issue before the court is whether plaintiff
conducted a sufficient pre-suit inquiry and whether the complaint
was filed for an improper purpose. Whether counsel did an
appropriate amount of pre-filing investigation, and whether a legal
position is far enough off the mark to be frivolous are fact-bound
and fact-intensive questions. The court must determine whether the
lawyer's pre-filing inquiry was objectively reasonable under the
circumstances. Whether a party acted for an improper purpose is
also determined objectively.

The parties cite no Seventh Circuit case adopting a burden-shifting
framework, and this court sees no need to resolve this issue today,
particularly as the parties have not thoroughly briefed this rather
complex issue. Regardless who must establish that sanctionable
conduct occurred, this court finds that Rule 11 sanctions are
unwarranted, primarily because defendant has failed to substantiate
the key factual and legal claims made in its Rule 11 motion.  
Defendant's arguments are grouped as follows: legal and factual
contentions about what makes a substance natural; attacks on the
adequacy of plaintiff's pre-suit testing; and the allegedly
nefarious purpose revealed by the press release sent by plaintiff's
attorneys.

"Natural" And "Synthetic" Substances

There are numerous arrows in defendant's quiver, but perhaps the
most important one is its claim, argued first and repeatedly, that
plaintiff bases its suit on an incorrect, nonsensical
interpretation of an FDA regulation, an interpretation of the law
so misguided and so unreasonable that it can only be the product of
bad faith.

The court, however, sees nothing obviously misguided and
unreasonable about plaintiff's view of what the regulation asserts,
that two substances used in defendant's sparkling water, limonene
and linalool, are synthetic. Plaintiff alleges that defendant's
sparkling water contains four synthetic substances: ethyl
butanoate, limonene, linalool and linalool propionate. Two of those
substances, limonene and linalool, are listed in Title 21 CFR
Section182.60, under the following heading: "Synthetic flavoring
substances and adjuvants that are generally recognized as safe for
their intended use are as follows: Limonene and Linalool."

Disregarding the various listed forms of these substances (which
defendant has not attempted to explain to the court), the court
sees nothing obviously misguided and unreasonable about plaintiff's
view that the regulation indicates that limonene and linalool are
synthetic.

The Defendant argues that the regulation refers only to the
synthetic versions of these substances and not to their natural
counterparts. But how is the court to know, at this early stage of
the litigation, that there are natural counterparts? Or that the
limonene and linalool found in defendant's water are invariably in
a natural form? Before examining whether plaintiff's counsel should
have known that the regulation means what defendant says it means,
defendant should give the court some basis for believing that
plaintiff's interpretation is unreasonable. Just saying so, even if
repeatedly, does not do so.

The Defendant points out that the FDA list does not include the two
other substances identified in defendant's product, linalool
propionate and ethyl butanoate. Defendant has not provided the
court with evidence as to the nature of these substances,
apparently assuming that the court will conduct its own internet
analysis. It has done so, but it will not decide this motion based
on such an off-the-record private search. In any event, this is
what Wikipedia says about ethyl butanoate: "Ethyl butyrate, also
known as ethyl butanoate, or butyric ether, is an ester with the
chemical formula CH3CH2CH2COOCH2CH3. It is soluble in propylene
glycol, paraffin oil, and kerosene. It has a fruity odor, similar
to pineapple and is a key ingredient used as a flavor enhancer in
processed orange juices. Not being a biologist and having no expert
assistance, the court has no idea what this means as to the
question of whether ethyl butyrate is natural or synthetic."

The court has found nothing comparable describing linalool
propionate, nor has defendant explained what it is.

Pre-Suit Testing

The next argument defendant asserts is that plaintiff and her
counsel filed this lawsuit based upon the testing of only a single
flavor of defendant's water. The court is hard-pressed to know what
to make of this argument, particularly given that neither party
makes any legal argument concerning it. Defendant does not indicate
whether the substances listed in  paragraph 18 of the complaint are
found in other LaCroix Water flavors, and perhaps it need not do
so.

Does the complaint violate Rule 11 if only one of defendant's
flavors advertised as all natural contains synthetic ingredients?
Perhaps such an argument could be made, but at this preliminary
stage in the litigation and lacking legal argument, the court has
not been presented with any argument as to what it should do with a
complaint that is well-grounded but only in part.  

The Defendant also argues that the form and type of testing
performed by Plaintiff and her counsel on a single flavor would not
even detect if LaCroix sparkling water contains synthetic
ingredients.

The Defendant asserts that it is impossible to `reverse engineer'
an already-carbonated beverage to divine its original,
pre-carbonation ingredients. If defendant is right, then its call
for more pre-suit testing would not yield any useful information,
and discovery would be required.

The Defendant further argues that plaintiff's laboratory analysis
was inadequate because it did not include either a gas
chromatography or mass spectrometry analysis of the ingredients
identified. But defendant fails to tell the court whether gas
chromatography and mass spectrometry are essential to the
identification of these four substances or whether they would
answer the question of whether the substances are natural or
synthetic. The court has no idea. Defendant has provided an
exhibit, Ex. B to its motion, which indicates that plaintiff's
laboratory conducted gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS)
and excluded the presence of various substances in defendant's
water.  

The Plaintiff has not alleged the contrary.

Press Release

The Defendant complains, perhaps justifiably, that plaintiff issued
a press release that claimed that substances in defendant's
beverage appear in other non-consumable products, associated with
insecticides, tumors, and cancer, causing significant damage to
defendant and to its shareholders. Defendant has not suggested that
these claims are untrue, nor has it provided the court with any
authority suggesting what action it can take at this point for
press releases issued before removal.  

The Plaintiff argues that it is common in cases attempting to
demonstrate the synthetic nature of food additives to refer to
their non-food uses. It appears that plaintiff's counsel, probably
as defendant asserts to increase the settlement value of the case,
has made true statements about non-consumable uses of the
ingredients its laboratory identified in defendant's product. The
press release might provide some evidence of a motive to shock the
public and thus enhance the settlement value of the case, but
without any indication that the statements were not true or that
the complaint is without a reasonable basis, it is hard to know
what to do if a plaintiff's lawyer makes true statements to
maximize the value of his case. If there is a basis for doing
anything, defendant has left it entirely to the court to try to
figure out what it is. This is not the court's job.  

Because the defendant has failed to substantiate the key legal and
factual claims made in its Rule 11 motion, the motion is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 11, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3dyasyy from
Leagle.com/

Lenora Rice, on behalf of herself and other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Roberto Luis Costales, Beaumont
Costales, Jonathan Mille Kirkland, Beaumont Costales LLC, & William
Henry Beaumont, Beaumont Costales LLC. 3801 Canal St 207, New
Orleans, LA 70119.

National Beverage Corp., doing business as, LaCroix Sparkling
Waters Defendant, represented by April Lynn Boyer --
april.boyer@klgates.com -- K&l Gates LLP, pro hac vice, Desiree F.
Moore -- desiree.moore@klgates.com -- K&L Gates LLP, Matthew Gordon
Ball -- matthew.ball@klgates.com -- K&L Gates LLP, pro hac vice,
Eric Corey Edison -- eedison@waldmanlawfirm.com -- Waldman
Trigoboff Hildebrandt & Calnan, P.A., pro hac vice, Glenn Waldman
-- gwaldman@waldmanlawfirm.com -- Waldman Trigoboff Hildebrandt &
Calnan, P.A., pro hac vice & Matthew Allen Alvis --
matt.alvis@klgates.com -- K&l Gates LLP.


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Fails to Protect Student-Athletes, Redd Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ROBERT EARLY REDD v. THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION,
AND SOUTHWESTERN ATHLETIC CONFERENCE, Case No.
1:19-cv-02814-JPH-DML (S.D. Ind., July 9, 2019), is brought
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated alleging
that the Defendants failed to meet their legal responsibility to
safeguard student-athletes.

Mr. Redd alleges that despite the NCAA's and member conferences'
assumption of this responsibility for player safety, the Defendants
were negligent and failed to carry out this duty in that they
failed to implement and enforce regulations that would properly
protect student-athletes from the risks associated with concussions
and/or manage those risks to properly respond to the medically
proven fact that repetitive concussions would lead to brain
injuries in many football players, including the Plaintiff and the
Class.

National Collegiate Athletic Association is an unincorporated
association that acts as the governing body of college sports with
its principal office located in Indianapolis, Indiana.  NCAA is not
organized under the laws of any State, but is registered as a
tax-exempt organization with the Internal Revenue Service.

Southwestern Athletic Conference is a corporation organized under
the laws of the state of Alabama, with its headquarters and
principal place of business located in Alabama.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          George Parker Young, Esq.
          Vincent P. Circelli, Esq.
          Kelli L. Walter, Esq.
          CIRCELLI, WALTER & YOUNG, PLLC
          Tindall Square Warehouse
          500 E. 4th Street, Suite 250
          Fort Worth, TX 76102
          Telephone: (817) 697-4942
          E-mail: gpy@cwylaw.com
                  vinny@cwylaw.com
                  kelli@cwylaw.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Has Sacrificed Player Safety, Oubre Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
LOUIS B. OUBRE, III v. THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION, Case No. 1:19-cv-02812-RLY-MJD (S.D. Ind., July 9,
2019), is brought on behalf of the Plaintiff and other similarly
situated putative class members alleging that the Defendant
sacrificed player safety -- including the Plaintiff's and the
Class' long-term health and well-being -- in favor of profits and
self-promotion.

As the governing body of college football, the NCAA held and holds
itself out as the "guardian" of, and ultimate authority on player
safety, the Plaintiff asserts.  He contends that player safety is
supposed to be safeguarded with rules, information, and best
practices that protect the athletes as much as possible from
short-term and long-term health risks.  But they did not, because
for the past several decades the NCAA and its member conferences
placed profits far ahead of player safety, he alleges.

National Collegiate Athletic Association is an unincorporated
association that acts as the governing body of college sports with
its principal office located in Indianapolis, Indiana.  NCAA is not
organized under the laws of any State, but is registered as a
tax-exempt organization with the Internal Revenue Service.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          George Parker Young, Esq.
          Vincent P. Circelli, Esq.
          Kelli L. Walter, Esq.
          CIRCELLI, WALTER & YOUNG, PLLC
          Tindall Square Warehouse
          500 E. 4th Street, Suite 250
          Fort Worth, TX 76102
          Telephone: (817) 697-4942
          E-mail: gpy@cwylaw.com
                  vinny@cwylaw.com
                  kelli@cwylaw.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Sued by Rangel for Sacrificing Player Safety
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JONATHAN RANGEL v. THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION,
AND THE LONE STAR CONFERENCE, Case No. 1:19-cv-02813-JPH-MJD (S.D.
Ind., July 9, 2019), is brought individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated accusing the Defendants of sacrificing
player safety.

Despite the NCAA's and member conferences' assumption of this
responsibility for player safety, the Defendants were negligent and
failed to carry out this duty in that they failed to implement and
enforce regulations that would properly protect student-athletes
from the risks associated with concussions and/or manage those
risks to properly respond to the medically proven fact that
repetitive concussions would lead to brain injuries in many
football players, including the Plaintiff and the Class, according
to the complaint.

National Collegiate Athletic Association is an unincorporated
association that acts as the governing body of college sports with
its principal office located in Indianapolis, Indiana.  NCAA is not
organized under the laws of any State, but is registered as a
tax-exempt organization with the Internal Revenue Service.

Lone Star Conference is an unincorporated association with its
principal place of business located in Richardson, Texas.  Lone
Star Conference is not organized under the laws of any state, but
is registered as a tax-exempt organization with Internal Revenue
Service.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          George Parker Young, Esq.
          Vincent P. Circelli, Esq.
          Kelli L. Walter, Esq.
          CIRCELLI, WALTER & YOUNG, PLLC
          Tindall Square Warehouse
          500 E. 4th Street, Suite 250
          Fort Worth, TX 76102
          Telephone: (817) 697-4942
          E-mail: gpy@cwylaw.com
                  vinny@cwylaw.com
                  kelli@cwylaw.com


NECESSARY CLOTHING: Pilikyan Sues Over Illegal Marketing Texts
--------------------------------------------------------------
DONNA PILIKYAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. NECESSARY CLOTHING, INC., a New York Corporation, Case
No. 9:19-cv-80894-RAR (S.D. Fla., July 9, 2019), arises from the
Defendant's alleged violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act in connection with its telemarketing text messages sent to the
Plaintiff's cellular telephone number.

Necessary Clothing is a New York corporation whose principal office
is located at 470 Broadway, in New York City.  The Company directs,
markets, and provides its business activities throughout the state
of Florida.

The Defendant is an online clothing store.  To promote its
services, the Defendant engages in unsolicited marketing, harming
thousands of consumers in the process.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 1205
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (305) 479-2299
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
                  gberg@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          Jordan D. Utanski, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, PA
          19495 Biscayne Blvd #607
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (305) 975-3320
          E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com
                  utanski@edelsberglaw.com


NEW MEXICO: 10th Cir. Dismisses Amaro COA Petition
--------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, issued an
Opinion denying Plaintiff's Motion Seeking Certificate of
Appealability in the case captioned PEDRO J. "PETE" AMARO,
Petitioner-Appellant, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NEW
MEXICO; R.C. SMITH, Warden, Respondents-Appellees. No. 19-2064.
(10th Cir.).

Mr. Pedro Amaro, proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of
appealability (COA) to appeal the district court's denial of his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under Section 2254 of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).

Mr. Amaro was convicted of various crimes in New Mexico state
court. After an appeal to the New Mexico Supreme Court, his
conviction became final in November 2005. Other than filing two
motions for records and transcripts from the state criminal
proceedings, Mr. Amaro took no action to challenge his conviction
until he filed a state post-conviction petition in April 2015. That
petition was denied later that same month, and his petition for a
writ of certiorari to the New Mexico Supreme Court was denied in
2017. In August 2017, Mr. Amaro filed a § 2254 petition in federal
court.

The district court dismissed Mr. Amaro's class claims because a pro
se litigant cannot represented or act on behalf of others and
ordered Mr. Amaro show cause why his Section 2254 petition should
not be dismissed as untimely. After receiving Mr. Amaro's response,
the district court dismissed his petition as untimely and denied
him a COA. Mr. Amaro filed a motion to reconsider, but that too was
denied.

Mr. Amaro timely appealed and now seeks a COA.

Mr. Amaro argues that both the district court's rulings dismissing
his class claims because he is proceeding pro se and dismissing his
individual claims and Section 2254 petition as untimely are wrong.


The district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds,
the petitioner may obtain a COA by showing, at least, that jurists
of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a
valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district
court was correct in its procedural ruling. Mr. Amaro cannot
satisfy this standard.

Class Claims

Mr. Amaro claims the district court erred and violated his due
process rights when it dismissed the class action claims on grounds
that a pro se litigant cannot represent or act on behalf of others.
But Mr. Amaro bases his argument on the rules that govern AEDPA,
not on due process.

He contends that Habeas Rule 2(e) clearly allows an individual,
advocate, and/or advocacy organization to submit a habeas petition
on behalf of a person or person whose rights have been denied. But
Rule 2(e) says no such thing. Rather, it says only that a
petitioner who seeks relief from judgments of more than one state
court must file a separate petition covering the judgment or
judgments of each court. Nevertheless, the habeas rules are
relevant here. Rule 12 provides that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, to the extent that they are not inconsistent with any
statutory provisions or these rules, may be applied to a proceeding
under these rules.

So the question is whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
which governs class actions in federal court, permits Mr. Amaro to
bring these class action claims. The district court held it did
not.

Because Mr. Amaro is proceeding pro se, he cannot adequately
represent the interests of the putative class. Rule 23 thus
forecloses him from bringing an action on the class's behalf. The
district court held as much, and that holding is beyond debate.

Timeliness

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a
writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court.  Relevant here, the one-year limitation
period runs from the latest of the date on which the judgment
became final, or the date on which the factual predicate of the
claim presented could have been discovered through the exercise of
due diligence.

Although Mr. Amaro's conviction became final in November 2005, he
argues his petition was still timely because the underlying cause
of action [for Mr. Amaro's stated claims was not discoverable until
the Supreme Court of New Mexico issued its decision in De Leon v.
Harley, 316 P.3d 896 (N.M. 2013). Pet'r's Br. at 23. There the
court held that an indictment must be quashed where a district
attorney, rather than the trial judge, was permitted to excuse
grand jurors.
   
This argument is unavailing.

As the district court noted, Section 2244(d)(1)(D) tolls the
limitation period until the date on which the factual predicate of
the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence. The factual predicate of any claim of irregularities in
the grand jury process that Mr. Amaro might bring could have been
discovered as early as when Mr. Amaro was indicted.  

Mr. Amaro makes one final timeliness argument: actual innocence. A
credible showing of actual innocence may allow a prisoner to pursue
his constitutional claims on the merits notwithstanding the
one-year limitations period.  Only when a petitioner supports his
allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence that
was not presented at trial will he be allowed to pass through the
gateway of timeliness and argue the merits of his underlying
claims.

Before the district court, Mr. Amaro attempted to support his
actual innocence claim by addressing the legal sufficiency of his
convictions,  but he offered no new evidence that was not presented
to the jury.Mr. Amaro does no better on appeal. Although he makes a
number of disturbing allegations, all of them address the legal
issues or are facts known at the time of trial. These allegations
do not establish Mr. Amaro's actual innocence.

The Court denies Mr. Amaro a COA and dismisses his appeal.

A full-text copy of the Tenth Circuit's July 11, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2bj4o2r from Leagle.com.


NEW MOOSEJAW: Dawson Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
-------------------------------------------------------
New Moosejaw, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant
to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as
Leshawn Dawson, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. New Moosejaw, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-06625 (S.D. N.Y., July 16, 2019).

New Moosejaw LLC is a DOT registered motor carrier located in
Madison Heights, MI.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (929) 575-4175
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal



ONE WORLD: Rouze Sues over Defective Chemical Sprayer
-----------------------------------------------------
RICHARD ROUZE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. ONE WORLD TECHNOLOGIES, INC. d/b/a
RYOBI OUTDOOR PRODUCTS, the Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-01291-TLN-DB (E.D. Cal., July 11, 2019), targets
Defendant's manufacture, marketing, and sale of defective Ryobi
Cordless Backpack Chemical Sprayer.

According to the complaint, the sprayer wand can easily become
detached from the hose causing weed killer and other dangerous
chemicals to spray the user. The defect renders the Sprayer
dangerous and unsuitable for its principal and intended purpose.

The Plaintiff brings claims against Defendant individually and on
behalf of a class of all other similarly situated purchasers of the
Sprayer for fraud; unjust enrichment; violation of California's
Consumers Legal Remedies Act; violation of California's Unfair
Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof.; and breach of implied warranty
of fitness, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          L. Timothy Fisher, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          1990 North California Blvd., Suite 940
          Walnut Creek, CA 94596
          Telephone: (925) 300-4455
          Facsimile: (925) 407-2700
          E-mail: ltfisher@bursor.com

OTG MANAGEMENT: Ernest et al Seek Minimum Wage, OT Pay
------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against OTG Management, LLC
for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the
New York Labor Law, and the supporting New York State Department of
Labor Regulations. The case is captioned RAQUEL ERNEST and CHANTEL
LYNCH on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, -against- OTG Management, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-03834 (E.D.N.Y., July 7, 2019). Plaintiffs allege that OTG
Management failed and refused to pay them at the legally required
minimum wage for all hours worked and one-and-one-half times this
rate for work in excess of 40 hours per workweek, required tipped
workers to engage in dual job duties and side work for more than
twenty percent of their time at work, and failed to provide proper
notice that they would be paid a subminimum wage. They assert that
OTG Management also required them to work off-the-clock and without
compensation in violation of the FLSA.

OTG Management, LLC is a privately-owned company that owns and
operates hundreds of restaurants, bars, and retail stores in
airport terminals across North America, including Newark Liberty
Airport in Newark, New Jersey and LaGuardia Airport and John F.
Kennedy Airport in New York. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Molly A. Brooks, Esq.
     Jalise R. Burt, Esq.
     OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
     685 Third Ave., 25th Floor
     New York, NY 10017
     Telephone: (212) 245-1000

OZARK PIZZA: Willcutt Seeks Minimum Wage for Delivery Ddrivers
--------------------------------------------------------------
ALLISON WILLCUTT, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. OZARK PIZZA COMPANY, LLC,
the DEFENDANT, Case No. 4:19-cv-00487-BRW (E.D. Ark., July 12,
2019), seeks to recover declaratory judgment, monetary damages,
liquidated damages, prejudgment interest,and costs, including
reasonable attorneys' fees as a result of Defendant's failure to
pay Plaintiff and all others similarly situated as delivery drivers
the legal minimum hourly wage for all hours that Plaintiff and all
others similarly situated worked, under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant does not reimburse
delivery drivers at a reasonable approximation of the drivers'
actual expenses. As a result of the automobile and other
job-related expenses incurred by Plaintiff and other similarly
situated delivery drivers, the drivers were deprived of minimum
wages guaranteed to them by the FLSA and AMWA.

The Defendant has applied the same pay policies, practices, and
procedures to all delivery drivers at their stores. Defendant's
method of reimbursing delivery drivers' expenses has resulted in an
unreasonable underestimation of delivery drivers' automobile
expenses throughout the three years preceding the filing of
Plaintiffs Original Complaint, causing systematic violations of the
minimum wage laws, the lawsuit says.

The Defendant owns and operates the Papa John's pizza franchise
located at 700 West Main Street in Russellville.

          Joshua West, Esq.
          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          One Financial Center
          650 South Shackleford Road, Suite 411
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221 0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787 2040
          E-mail: west@sanfordlawfirm.com
                  josh@sanfordlawfirm.com

PACIFIC MERITAGE: Faces Velasquez Suit in California Super. Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Pacific Meritage,
LLC, et al. The case is captioned as Samuel Velasquez, on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Pacific Meritage,
LLC and Does 1-50, the Defendants, Case No.
34-2019-00259781-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super., July 2, 2019). The suit
alleges employment related violation.

Attorney for the Plaintiff is:

          William L. Marder, Esq.
          MARDER EMPLOYMENT LAW
          6200 Stoneridge Mall Rd., Ste 300
          Pleasanton, CA 94588
          Telephone: 925 399 6227
          Website: marderemploymentlaw.com

PAPA MURPHY'S: Cottle Moves to Certify Class of Store Managers
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit entitled AMANDA COTTLE, Individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. PAPA MURPHY'S
COMPANY STORES, INC., a foreign Corporation, Case No.
3:19-cv-00045-HES-MCR (M.D. Fla.), ask the Court to enter an order
conditionally certifying a nationwide Fair Labor Standards Act
Collective of Store Managers.

On January 8, 2019, Plaintiff Amanda Cottle filed this lawsuit
alleging violations of the FLSA on behalf of Plaintiffs and all
other similarly situated SMs.  To date 14 additional Opt-In
Plaintiffs have joined the case by filing Consents to Join.  The
Plaintiffs all allege that due to the Defendant's unlawful policy
of misclassifying them as employees exempt from overtime wages, the
Defendant failed to pay them and other SMs overtime wages they are
owed for the hours they worked over 40 in a workweek.

Amanda Cottle and 14 Opt-In Plaintiffs also move for an order:

   (a) requiring the Defendant to produce in an electronic or
       computer-readable format the full name, address(es), work
       and personal telephone number(s), and e-mail address(es)
       (including personal email addresses to the extent they are
       available) for FLSA Collective members;

   (b) authorizing notice with a form of Consent to Join to the
       FLSA Collective members, disseminated by U.S. Mail,
       e-mail, text message and via website (returnable via mail,
       e-mail, fax, or via Web site);

   (c) authorizing reminder notices halfway through the 60-day
       notice period; and

   (d) requiring posting of the notice at a conspicuous location
       in each of its stores.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Gregg I. Shavitz, Esq.
          Logan A. Pardell, Esq.
          SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A.
          951 Yamato Road, Suite 285
          Boca Raton, FL 33431
          Telephone: (561) 447-8888
          Facsimile: (561) 447-8831
          E-mail: gshavitz@shavitzlaw.com
                  lpardell@shavitzlaw.com

               - and -

          Michael J. Palitz, Esq.
          SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A.
          800 3rd Avenue, Suite 2800
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (800) 616-4000
          Facsimile: (561) 447-8831
          E-mail: mpalitz@shavitzlaw.com

               - and -

          Richard Celler, Esq.
          CELLER LEGAL, P.A.
          7450 Griffin Road, Suite 230
          Davie, FL 33314
          Telephone: (954) 903-7475
          E-mail: Richard@floridaovertimelawyer.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Samuel Horovitz, Esq.
          ROGERS TOWERS, P.A.
          1301 Riverplace Boulevard, Suite 1500
          Jacksonville, FL 32207
          Telephone: (904) 346-5774
          E-mail: shorovitz@rtlaw.com

               - and -

          Edwin Harnden, Esq.
          Paula Barran, Esq.
          Richard Hunt, Esq.
          BARRAN LIEBMAN LLP
          601 SW 2nd Avenue, Suite 2300
          Portland, OR 97204
          Telephone: (503) 276-2101
          E-mail: eharnden@barran.com
                  pbarran@barran.com
                  rhunt@barran.com


PHL VARIABLE: Susman Named Fan-Kenney/Advanced Trust Suits Counsel
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, DEREK FAN, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. PHL VARIABLE LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, Defendant. ADVANCE TRUST & LIFE ESCROW SERVICES, LTA AS
NOMINEE OF LIFE PARTNERS POSITION HOLDER TRUST, and JAMES KENNEY,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. PHL VARIABLE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case
Nos. 18 Civ. 1288 (PAC), 18 Civ. 3444 (PAC) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Paul
A. Crotty of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York (i) consolidated the Fan and Kenney/Advanced Trust Actions
pursuant to FRCP 42(a); and (ii) appointed Susman Godfrey L.L.P. as
the sole interim class counsel for both actions.

Both of these class actions challenge the legality of a cost of
insurance ("COI") adjustment announced by PH in 2017.  This is not,
however, the first time PHL's COI increase has been challenged
through class action litigation.  Two lawsuits challenged the
legality of PHL's 2010 and 2011 COI increases, Fleisher, et al. v.
Phoenix Life Ins. Co., 11 Civ. 8405 (CM) and SPRR LLC v. PHL
Variable Ins. Co., Case No. 14 Civ. 8714 (CM) (S.D.N.Y), and
settled in 2015 for monetary and non-monetary relief of over $130
million.  PHL agreed as part of the Fleischer/SPRR settlement not
to raise COI rates on members of the settlement class until at
least Dec. 31, 2020.

The named Plaintiff in the Fan Action, Fan, is a PHL life insurance
policy owner whose policy is already subject to the 2017 COI
Increase, and he seeks certification of a class of PHL
policyholders subject to the 2017 COI increase, but not subject to
Fleisher/SPRR settlement.  One of the named Plaintiffs in the
Kenney/Advance Trust action, however, is an institutional
policyholder whose policies are subject to the Fleisher/SPRR
settlement, and who consequently will not have to pay the 2017 COI
Increase until at least 2020.  The Plaintiffs in the Kenney/Advance
Trust Action seek to certify a class comprised of any PHL
policyholder who received notice of the 2017 COI Increase,
regardless of whether their policies are also subject to the
Fleisher/SPRR settlement.

The Plaintiff in the Fan Action is represented by Squitieri &
Fearon, L.L.P.; Plaintiffs in the Kenney/Advance Trust Action are
represented by Susman Godfrey L.L.P.  Both firms prevailed on PHL's
motions to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction, which the
Court denied on March 12, 2019.  The instant motions for interim
class counsel appointment followed.

The Plaintiffs in these two related actions move to appoint interim
class counsel to handle pre-class certification discovery and other
pretrial matters.  The Plaintiffs in the Kenney/Advanced Trust
Action seek the appointment of Susman Godfrey L.L.P. as the sole
interim class counsel, while Fan asks the Court to appoint
Squitieri & Fearon, L.L.P. as either sole interim class counsel; or
co-interim class counsel with Susman Godfrey L.L.P.  Defendant PHL
takes no position on these motions but asks that the two actions be
coordinated for discovery purposes.

Judge Crotty finds that although neither party has expressly moved
for consolidation of the Fan and Kenney/Advanced Trust Actions, the
need for consolidation is obvious.  In both actions, the Plaintiffs
challenge the same 2017 COI Increase implemented by the same
Defendant, and the proposed class in the Kenney/Advanced Trust
Action encompasses all the Plaintiffs encompassed in the proposed
class in Fan.  As PHL noted at the pretrial conference on April 24,
2019, if these cases are not consolidated, PHL will have to respond
to two different sets of discovery requests largely about the same
issue, resulting in needless duplication of effort and
inefficiencies.  Accordingly, absent an objection from any party,
the Judge consolidates Fan and Kenney/Advanced Trust Actions
pursuant to FRCP 42(a).

Co-interim counsel is not a good fit for these cases.  Judging from
the brief litigation history of these cases, the Judget finds that
a forced coupling of these two firms is unlikely to result in
enhanced efficiency or better advocacy for the proposed class.  The
parties have been unable to reach consensus on issues as small as a
briefing schedule for the instant motion, or whether the Plaintiffs
in the Kenney/Advanced Trust action should be permitted to amend
their Complaint -- a request unopposed by the only actual adversary
of both the Plaintiffs in the action, Defendant PHL.  

Further, there is no demonstrable need for more than one firm.
Because the proposed class in the Kenney/Advanced Trust encompasses
all members of the Fan Action, and merely adds to it policyholders
whose policies are subject to the Fleischer/SPRR settlement, the
interests of both classes are not, at least at this preliminary
stage, in conflict.  There is no persuasive reason why one firm
cannot advocate for the needs of all the class members
simultaneously.

Since the Judge will not appoint both Squitieri and Susman as the
interim class counsel, Susman is the obvious choice under FRCP
23(g)(1)(A).  He concludes that the law firm Susman Godfrey L.L.P.
can best serve the interests of the proposed class members in both
actions for purposes of pre-class certification discovery.
Accordingly, he appoints Susman Godfrey L.L.P. the sole interim
class counsel in both actions.

In light of the foregoing, Judge Crotty consolidated the Fan and
Kenney/Advanced Trust Actions pursuant to FRCP 42(a).  The motion
to appoint Susman Godfrey L.L.P. as the sole interim class counsel
for both actions is granted, and the motion to appoint Squitieri &
Fearon, L.L.P. as the sole interim class counsel, or, in the
alternate, as co-interim class counsel is denied.  A separate order
confirming the appointment and outlining Susman's responsibilities
will follow.

The Clerk of the Court is instructed to close the motions at Dkts.
69, 74 & 75 on 18-cv-3444 and the motion at Dkt. 69 on 18-cv-1288.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/CUaZTg from Leagle.com.

Derek Fan, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated & Robert Putz, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Paul Vincent Sweeny
-- paul@sfclasslaw.com -- Squitieri & Fearon, LLP, James Stuart
Notis, Gardy & Notis, LLP, Jennifer Sarnelli --
jsarnelli@gardylaw.com -- Gardy & Notis, LLP & Stephen John Fearon,
Jr. -- stephen@sfclasslaw.com -- Squitieri & Fearon LLP.

PHL Variable Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by Jarrett
Earl Ganer -- jarrett.ganer@mhllp.com -- McDowell Hetherington LLP,
Thomas F.A. Hetherington -- tom.hetherington@mhllp.com -- McDowell
Hetherington LLP, pro hac vice, Michael Quinn Eagan, Law Offices of
Michael Q. Eagan, LLP & Randy J. Duncan -- randy.duncan@mhllp.com
-- McDowell Hetherington LLP.


POWERCOMM CONSTRUCTION: $177K Atty's Fees in Randolph Reversed
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, issued an
Opinion reversing the District Court's Order granting Plaintiffs'
Motion for Attorney's Fees in the case caption GREGORY RANDOLPH, on
his own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated; DANA
BROWN; TWANDA BANISTER; GREGORY EUBANKS; ARTHUR HINNANT; EZRA
CHARLES CALLOWAY; RHASAAN DARK; RODNEY WILLIAMS; KENNETH JACKSON;
GEORGE MILES; JAMAL DREW; KENNETH SEARLES; DEXTER ANDERSON; BERNARD
BROWN; NATESHIA DECHE BEASLEY; EUNICE MELTON; ROBIN MELTON; EARNEST
LEE ALLEN, JR.; SHANINA WASHINGTON; MELVIN L. WEBB-BEY; SYLVIOUS
WILLIAMS; FASIL ALEMAYEHU; AMISHA BENNETT; EDWARD ROBINSON;
DANIELLE SMITH; RONALD WALL; ROY BENNETT; MELQUIN GAINO; LESLIE
GROSS; ANTONIO WALL; LAMONT NEWTON; ANTHONY WILLS; LAMARR YOUNG;
MICHELLE BENNETT; RODNEY BROOKS; LARRY JEFFERSON; LENARD PRINGLE;
JUSTIN FOSTER; EDDIE PERKINS; SEAN E. PITTMAN; JIMMIE MISSOURI;
KEVIN SORRELL; TERENCE BROWN; TERRANCE DOVE; ERIC SHEFFEY; TERRELL
TWITTY; JEFF JORDAN; SAMUEL HEGWOOD; JOHNNY BOYKIN; BERNARD
BENNETT; LAVELLE GANT; DONALD RAY JONES; CORNELIUS REDFEARN;
DARNELL MADDOX; RONALD YOUNG; CALVIN GORHAM, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
and VAN EUBANKS; DAVID PETERSON; JACQUELINE RIDLEY; RALEIGH WALL;
MICHAEL ALLEN; ANDRE ADAMS; REGINA FREEMAN; ALONZO E. MUDD; ROBERT
L. WALL, JR.; WILLIAM HOLLAND, Plaintiffs, v. POWERCOMM
CONSTRUCTION, INC.; DAVID KWASNIK, SR., Defendants-Appellants. No.
18-1728. (4th Cir.).

PowerComm Construction, Inc., and its owner, David Kwasnik, Sr.,
appeal the district court's order awarding Appellants' employees or
former employees  the plaintiffs below $177,756.50 in attorney's
fees.

Gregory Randolph initiated this lawsuit by filing a proposed class
action in the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland pursuant to the Maryland Wage and Hour Law (MWHL) and the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Randolph alleged that Appellants,
his former employers, failed to appropriately pay its employees for
overtime work. In the complaint, Randolph sought relief in the form
of unpaid overtime wages with interest, liquidated damages,
attorney's fees, and a declaration that Appellants had violated
both the MWHL and the FLSA.

The Court reviews an award of attorney's fees for abuse of
discretion. The Court must show enough deference to a primary
decision-maker's judgment that the court does not reverse merely
because it would have come to a different result in the first
instance.

The Appellants make two arguments in this second appeal. First,
they assert that the district court failed to properly reduce the
fee award in light of the ten plaintiffs dismissed at summary
judgment.

Second, the Appellants argue the district court failed to properly
assess the Appellees' degree of success, given the disparity
between the damages requested at the outset of litigation and the
ultimate amount recovered in the settlement.

In light of these asserted errors, Appellants request the Court
vacates the district court's fee award and, rather than remanding a
second time for another round of fee litigation, order that an
appropriate fee be awarded.

Pursuant to the FLSA, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to an
award of reasonable attorney's fees. To properly calculate an
attorney's fees award, courts undertake a three-step process: (1)
determine a lodestar figure (2) subtract fees for hours spent on
unsuccessful claims unrelated to successful ones and (3) evaluate
the degree of success of the plaintiffs.

The Court concludes the district court abused its discretion at
step three.

Lodestar

The Court begins at step one by determining the lodestar figure by
multiplying the number of reasonable hours expended times a
reasonable rate. This figure is presumptively reasonable except in
those rare circumstances in which the lodestar does not adequately
take into account a factor that may properly be considered in
determining a reasonable fee. The district court concluded that the
lodestar figure in this case was $183,764.00.  The Court  has no
quarrel with this figure.

Unsuccessful Plaintiffs

At the second step, the court must subtract fees for hours spent on
unsuccessful claims unrelated to successful ones. But, where all
claims involve a common core of facts much of counsel's time will
be devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, making it
difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis.


Here, on this second appeal, after subtracting unspecified billing
entries, the district court reduced the lodestar figure by
approximately $6,000; a mere 3% of the lodestar figure  to account
for hours spent that were expressly billed to the ten unsuccessful
plaintiffs (who represented 15% of the class). The district court
concluded that the remainder of the time was intertwined with the
litigation as a whole and was not appropriately subtracted. While
we may not have reached the same outcome in the first instance, we
nonetheless conclude the district court did not abuse its
discretion at step two.

Degree of Success

At step three, after determining the lodestar amount and
subtracting for fees related to unsuccessful claims, the court
should award some percentage of the remaining amount, depending on
the degree of success enjoyed by the plaintiff.  Here, the district
court wholly failed to account for both the utterly unsuccessful
plaintiffs and the meager victories. Thus, the Court concludes the
district court failed to properly calculate the degree of success
enjoyed by Appellees.

Taking into account all of these factors, we conclude the district
court abused its discretion when it erroneously failed to consider
the ten dismissed plaintiffs and Appellees' limited degree of
litigation success. There were ten plaintiffs 15% of the collective
class who were entirely unsuccessful, and the district court failed
to account for their dismissal in its step three analysis. While
the district court did make a $6,007.50 reduction at step two (a
mere 3% of the lodestar figure) to account for billing entries
explicitly associated with the ten plaintiffs, it failed to
incorporate the ten dismissed plaintiffs in its calculation of the
degree of overall success at step three.

In doing so, the district court effectively found 97%6 of the fees
to be too "intertwined" to be deducted when it considered the
overall success of the litigation. As a result, the district court
excluded the ten dismissed plaintiffs (again, 15% of the
plaintiffs) from consideration after step two, rather than properly
deducting the billing entries associated with the unsuccessful
plaintiffs and then considering the overall degree of success in
light of the litigation as a whole  including the dismissed
plaintiffs.  

Here, Appellees were categorically unsuccessful in their recovery.
At the outset of the litigation, Appellees sought far more than
just unpaid overtime wages. Appellees also sought liquidated
damages and a declaration that Appellants violated the FLSA and
MWHL. It is indisputable that the 55 remaining plaintiffs after the
ten plaintiffs were dismissed recovered only a single category of
the damages sought  unpaid overtime wages. Appellees failed to
obtain liquidated damages or a declaration that Appellants had
violated either the FLSA or the MWHL.  

Next, the district court abused its discretion by overstating
Appellees' degree of success. Specifically, when comparing the
relief sought to that recovered, it is clear the district court
abused its discretion when it deemed Appellees to be sufficiently
successful. The total settlement  for all 55 remaining plaintiffs
was $100,000.00. Each plaintiff  except Dana Brown and Gregory
Randolph  received only 38% of their claimed unpaid overtime wages.
And, in total, Appellees recovered only 6% of the damages sought at
the outset of litigation and only 13% of that sought in their
amended Rule 26(a) disclosures.

The mere fact that, if the case proceeded to trial, Appellees were
unlikely to recover more than the settlement amount does not
automatically render the outcome categorically successful
particularly given that the likelihood of a lower recovery was
openly attributed to a lack of evidence supporting Appellees'
damages. The Court do plaintiffs no service by rewarding their
counsel for pursuing weak claims from the outset.

Whereas the district court expressed concern that it did not wish
to disincentivize plaintiffs' counsel from reaching reasonable
settlements by reducing their attorney's fees awards in cases of
more moderate amounts, the flip side is also of concern. That is,
plaintiffs' counsel should not be incentivized to solicit clients
with promises of riches when they do not have sufficient proof to
support the claims.

Finally, by failing to consider the degree of success and, rather,
considering only whether Appellees achieved sufficient success the
district court overstated Appellees' degree of success and erred in
not making an attorney's fee award that would properly reflect
their success in this case. Accordingly, the Court concludes the
district court abused its discretion and vacate the award.

Appropriate Award

It is well accepted that a request for attorney's fees should not
result in a second major litigation. Given that this case has now
been before us twice for calculation of the attorney's fees award,
the Court now vacates the attorney's fees award and direct that it
be reduced by an appropriate amount in order to avoid further
expense and the nonessential use of judicial resources associated
with remand proceedings and other appeals. As such, the Court
concludes a reduction of 25% of the district court's award
($177,756.50) is appropriate in this case and direct that an
attorney's fees award of $133,317.38, exclusive of costs, be
awarded.

The Court concludes that the district court abused its discretion.
Accordingly, we vacate the attorney's fees award and direct that an
award of $133,317.38, exclusive of costs, be entered by the
district court on remand.

A full-text copy of the Fourth Circuit's July 11, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yy6fz4fu from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Geoffrey M. Bohn, BOHN & BATTEY, PLC, 2007 15th Street
North Arlington, VA 22201, Virginia, for Appellants.

Nicholas Woodfield, EMPLOYMENT LAW GROUP, P.C., 888 17th Street, NW
9th Floor. Washington, DC, 20006,, for Appellees.

ON BRIEF: Robert A. Battey, BOHN & BATTEY, PLC, Arlington,
Virginia, for Appellants.

R. Scott Oswald, THE EMPLOYMENT LAW GROUP, P.C., 888 17th Street,
NW 9th Floor. Washington, DC, 20006, for Appellees.


PRESTIGE COSMETICS: Dawson Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
-------------------------------------------------------------
Prestige Cosmetics LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Leshawn Dawson, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Prestige Cosmetics LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-06626 (S.D. N.Y., July 16, 2019).

Prestige Cosmetics, LLC is in the Cosmetics business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (929) 575-4175
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


QUEENS COUNTY, NY: Court Dismisses H. Best's Suit
-------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York issued a Memorandum and Order dismissing the Pro Se Complaint
in the case captioned HILARY A. BEST AND ALL PERSONS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiffs, v. RICHARD A. BROWN, His Estate and
Successors in Office; THE QUEENS COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS OFFICE,
Defendants. No. 19-CV-3724 (WFK) (LB). (E.D.N.Y.).

Phe pro se plaintiff, Hilary A. Best, purportedly on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, filed this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the Office of the Queens
County District Attorney, and the recently-deceased Queens County
District Attorney, Richard A. Brown. He alleges the deprivation of
his constitutional rights and seeks damages.

The complaint alleges: the Defendants have practiced a policy of
depriving the Plaintiffs of liberty without due process of law in
violation of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution,
by subjecting the Plaintiffs to indictment upon felony complaint
without a preliminary hearing or waiver thereof, in violation of
CPL secs. 100.05, 180.10 through 180.80, and 190.55(2)(a), and
minimum due process of law requiring a hearing when a person faces
a mass deprivation of liberty, as without bail pursuant to CPL
530.20.

The Plaintiff does not make any personal claims. He provides no
information about whether, when or with what crime he was charged
and/or convicted, or of what type of preliminary hearing he was
deprived. He seeks to bring this claim on behalf of persons who
were indicted by the Office of the Queens County District Attorney
because, he alleges, the office has been violating the cited
provisions since 1991.

Claims on Behalf of Others

The Plaintiff is a non-attorney proceeding pro se purporting to
represent other similarly situated persons. The Plaintiff may not
bring this complaint on behalf of others without a lawyer.  Thus,
the complaint as to other plaintiffs is dismissed without
prejudice. His class action certification request, to the degree he
expresses one, is denied as moot.

Defendants are Immune from this Action

The Plaintiff's claim for damages against the Office of the
District Attorney, Queens County and Richard Brown, District
Attorney Queens County (Brown) in his official capacity are barred
by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. Stated
as simply as possible, the Eleventh Amendment means that, as a
general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court
unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or
unless Congress has abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity when acting pursuant to its authority under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.

To the extent plaintiff seeks to sue Brown for damages in his
individual capacity, he has failed to allege any facts in support
of his conclusion that Brown personally violated his constitutional
rights. If Best seeks damages for Brown's decision to prosecute
him, Brown would be entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. It
is well-settled that prosecutors performing prosecutorial
activities that are "intimately associated" with the judicial phase
of the criminal process are entitled to absolute immunity from an
action for damages under Section 1983.A prosecutor thus has
absolute immunity in connection with the decision whether to
commence a prosecution.  

The complaint is dismissed as frivolous because the defendants are
absolutely immune from suit.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 11, 2019 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y5todaqe from
Leagle.com.

Hilary A. Best, Plaintiff, pro se.


QUEST DIAGNOSTICS: Woods Sues over Data Breach
----------------------------------------------
The case captioned as MARK WOODS, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. QUEST DIAGNOSTICS
INCORPORATED, OPTUM360, LLC and AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLECTION AGENCY,
INC., the Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-13446 (D.N.J., June 5,
2019), alleges that Defendants failed to properly secure and
safeguard protected health information, as defined by the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"), medical
information, and other personally identifiable information
(collectively, "PII"); failed to provide timely, accurate, and
adequate notice to Plaintiff and other Class Members that the
integrity of their PII had been compromised; and failed to provide
timely, accurate, and adequate notice to Plaintiff and other Class
Members of the nature and scope of the PII that was exposed.

On June 3, 2019, Quest publicly announced that approximately two
weeks earlier on May 14, its billing collections vendor AMCA
advised Quest of "unauthorized activity on AMCA's web payment page"
which compromised the PII of approximately 11.9 million Quest
patients. The exposed PII included "financial information (e.g.,
credit card numbers and bank account information), medical
information and other personal information (e.g., Social Security 3
Numbers)". Quest further revealed that the exposure occurred
between August 1, 2018, and March 30, 2019.

Despite the breadth and sensitivity of the PII that was exposed and
the attendant consequences to patients as a result thereof, the
Defendants failed to disclose the Data Breach for nearly two months
from the time it was first discovered, further exacerbating harm to
patients. Moreover, to date, Defendants have not disclosed the full
extent and nature of the Data Breach, nor offered anything to its
patients to address and compensate the harm they have suffered.

The Data Breach was a direct result of Defendants' failure to
implement adequate and reasonable cyber-security procedures and
protocols necessary to protect Patient PII. The Defendants
disregarded the rights of Plaintiff and Class Members by:
intentionally, willfully, recklessly, or negligently failing to
take adequate and reasonable measures to ensure its data systems
were protected against unauthorized intrusions; failing to disclose
that it did not have adequately robust computer systems and
security practices to safeguard Patient PII; failing to take 16
standard and reasonably available steps to prevent the Data Breach;
failing to monitor and timely detect the Data Breach; and failing
to provide Plaintiff and Class Members prompt and accurate notice
of the Data Breach.

As a result of Defendants' failure to implement and follow basic
security procedures, Patient PII is now in the hands of thieves.
Plaintiff and Class Members have had to spend, and will continue to
spend, significant amounts of time and money in an effort to
protect themselves from the adverse ramifications of the Data
Breach and will forever be at a heightened risk of identity theft
and fraud, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Bobby Saadian, Esq.
          Justin F. Marquez, Esq.
          Thiago M. Coelho, Esq.
          Robert J. Dart, Esq.
          Patty W. Chen, Esq
          WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
          3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 381-9988
          Facsimile: (213) 381-9989
          E-mail: bobby@wilshirelawfirm.com
                  justin@wilshirelawfirm.com
                  thiago@wilshirelawfirm.com
                  rdart@wilshirelawfirm.com
                  patty@wilshirelawfirm.com

QUOGUE CLUB: Fischler Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Quogue Club LLC
et al. The case is styled as Brian Fischler Individually and on
behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. The
Quogue Club LLC, Hallock House of Quogue LLC, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-04058 (E.D. N.Y., July 13, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

The Quogue Club at Hallock House in Quogue, NY, is a luxury
boutique hotel at the gateway to the Hamptons and the east end of
Long Island.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
     Lipsky Lowe LLP
     630 Third Avenue
     Fifth Floor
     New York, NY 10017
     Phone: (212) 392-4772
     Fax: (212) 444-1030
     Email: chris@lipskylowe.com


RBC CAPITAL: Court Dismisses Luis Couple's Securities Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in
the case captioned Gary and Caryl Luis, Gary A. Mentz, and Case
Michael and Merri Vitse, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. RBC Capital Markets, LLC,
Defendant. No. 16-cv-3873 (SRN/DTS). (D. Minn.).

The Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of certain individuals who
invested in reverse convertible notes (RCNs) and who lost money as
a result of that investment.  In their initial complaint, the
Plaintiffs asserted claims of common law fraud, fraudulent
concealment, two violations of the Minnesota Securities Act, common
law negligence, breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract.
The seven claims all centered around the same allegations, namely,
that RBC engaged in a series of actions designed to hide the true
risk of RCNs from investors, while pushing them on individuals who
had expressly indicated an unwillingness to partake in options
trading or other risky investment strategies.

RBC moved for summary judgment with respect to the named
Plaintiffs. Specifically, RBC contended, the Plaintiffs' revised
theory of the case failed to state an actionable breach of contract
claim because (1) a party to a contract cannot use a provision like
the Applicable Laws and Regulations paragraph to convert a
statutory or regulatory violation into a breach of contract claim
(2) even if that contractual provision did allow regulatory
violations to be converted into a breach of contract claim, RBC did
not violate any relevant FINRA rules, which, unlike the NTMs, are
actually considered a law or regulation governed by the contractual
provision), (3) even if the NTMs were treated as binding law or
regulations, enforceable through the contract, RBC did not violate
the NTMs, and, finally, (4) even if a reasonable juror could find
that RBC violated the rules and guidance at issue, Plaintiffs'
current breach claim more closely resembles their Luis I complaint
than their Luis II complaint, and is therefore precluded under
SLUSA.

Here, the Court will solely discuss RBC's first proposed basis for
summary judgment that a party to a contract cannot use a provision
like the Applicable Laws and Regulations paragraph to convert a
statutory or regulatory violation into a breach of contract claim
because it is RBC's strongest argument, and because it
single-handedly supports a grant of summary judgment here.

Under Minnesota law, a breach of contract claim has four elements:
(1) formation of a contract; (2) performance by plaintiff of any
conditions precedent (3) a material breach of the contract by
defendant; and (4) damages.

Laws and Regulations provision of the Client Account Agreement
required RBC to comply with certain Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA) rules and guidance, such that RBC could be held
liable for breach of contract if it failed to comply with those
rules and guidance.

This law compels summary judgment in favor of RBC, for two
different reasons.

First, although the parties present starkly differing
interpretations of the Applicable Laws and Regulations paragraph,
the provision can only be read in the manner RBC proposes, that is,
as an acknowledgement by the client that the transactions executed
through their account will be subject to a complex legal framework.


Under this reading of the contract, which the Court may reach as a
matter of law, RBC was not under a duty to comply with FINRA rules
and guidance, and, consequently, RBC cannot be held liable for
breaching that non-existent contractual duty.  

Second, to the extent there is any doubt as to this first reason,
the separation-of-powers concern noted above confirms that
Plaintiffs cannot enforce FINRA rules and guidance through the
Applicable Laws and Regulations paragraph, and that, consequently,
Plaintiffs cannot advance a breach claim here.

The Court will address each argument in turn, and will also address
Plaintiffs' relevant counterarguments along the way.

The Court will first focus on the plain and ordinary meaning of the
Applicable Laws and Regulations provision,  and on how other courts
have interpreted similar language. For ease of reference, the Court
will again set forth, in full, the provision's language:

In consideration of RBC continuing to or now and hereafter opening
an account or accounts (collectively, the Account) for the purchase
and sale of securities and commodities for me, or in my name, I
agree that all transactions with respect to any such Account shall
be subject to the following terms.  Applicable Laws and
RegulationsAll transactions in my Account shall be subject to all
applicable laws and the rules and regulations of all federal, state
and self-regulatory agencies, including, but not limited to, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., (NYSE), FINRA, the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the
constitution, rules, and customs of the exchange or market (and the
related clearing facility or entity) where executed, as the same
may be amended or supplemented from time to time.

As is evident, this provision is written in the first person, from
the vantage point of the client, e.g., All transactions in my
Account, and is included in a list of terms the client is agreeing
to, in consideration of RBC opening a securities trading account on
their behalf. In other words, there is no indication in this
provision that the broker, RBC, is agreeing to do anything on the
client's behalf.

Of course, the Plaintiffs offer a different interpretation of the
Applicable Laws and Regulations provision. That is, in the
Plaintiffs' view, the plain language of the Applicable Laws and
Regulations provision should be interpreted as a promise from RBC
to its clients that 'all transactions' in the [client's account]
would comply with 'all applicable laws and regulations.' And if RBC
made such a promise in its contract with the Plaintiffs, the
argument goes, the Plaintiffs should be able to enforce FINRA
regulations and rules by way of that contract.

The Court acknowledges that there is some very limited legal
support for this position.

However, the problem with applying this argument here is that the
Applicable Laws and Regulations provision does not contain any such
promissory language; the words promise, will comply with, and shall
act in accordance with, do not appear in the contract. Rather, the
contract says, the Plaintiffs' transactions shall be subject to all
applicable laws and regulations. And, this phrase merely
memorializes the Plaintiffs' acknowledgment that their trades are
subject to applicable rules and regulations and therefore cannot
support a breach claim.  

The Plaintiffs primarily contend that the Applicable Laws and
Regulations paragraph here does not state that what is to come is
given in consideration of RBC's handling of the account; it does
not memorialize the duty of the client, but rather states what a
client can expect from RBC. This is not correct. The Applicable
Laws and Regulations paragraph is a term agreed to by the client in
consideration of RBC opening an investment account on the client's
behalf. The paragraph is not offering assurances regarding what a
client can expect from RBC.  

For these reasons, the unambiguous language of the Applicable Laws
and Regulations provision favors RBC. That is, in contracting with
the Plaintiffs, RBC did not promise to abide by the at-issue
financial industry regulations, and, consequently, the Plaintiffs
cannot base a breach of contract claim on RBC's failure to comply
with those regulations.

Second, to the extent there is any doubt about the contract's plain
language, RBC is also entitled to summary judgment because allowing
Plaintiffs to enforce FINRA rules and guidance through this breach
action would vitiate Congress's intent not to allow private rights
of action for violations of those rules and guidance, and would
accordingly run against basic separation of powers principles.
Indeed, almost every court cited in the prior section also made
note of this separation of powers concern in the course of its
ruling.  

Palmer v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. Palmer, 555 F.3d at 1084-85, which
the Court mentioned in passing above, is instructive on this point,
too. There, a class of insureds sued their auto insurance companies
for failing to provide a discount for cars that have anti-theft
devices, as required by Minnesota statute. Because their contracts
with the insurers provided that the insurer will calculate a
premium based on information the insurer has received from the
insured or other sources, or from information in the insurer's
possession and because the insurers possessed information that the
insureds had anti-theft devices in their car, the insureds argued
that failure to comply with the statutory anti-theft discount
constituted a breach of contract.  

The Eighth Circuit rejected this argument as a matter of law.
Because breach of contract claims relying on regulatory violations
must  be considered in the context of the comprehensive regulatory
scheme and the historical deference courts have afforded the
government] in enforcing the law in this area and because
Minnesota's automobile insurance regulatory scheme clearly favored
government enforcement over private rights of action, the Eighth
Circuit declined to intervene in the administrative scheme of
enforcement and create a contractual duty distinct from the
statutory mandate.

These principles apply with equal force here. The alleged
eligibility/suitability violations occurred within the context of a
comprehensive regulatory scheme, where courts have historically
deferred to FINRA's internal enforcement mechanisms. Indeed, the
consent decrees discussed in Plaintiffs' briefing show that FINRA
and, to some extent, the SEC) are actively involved in enforcing
the specific suitability rules and regulations at issue here. It is
also notable that, although Congress has not provided investors a
private cause of action by which to enforce FINRA rules and
regulations, FINRA provides investors a specialized arbitration
forum by which they can enforce such rules or regulations; this
forum remains available to the putative class members here.  

The Court finds the Plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary are not
persuasive.

First, the Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Palmer by emphasizing
that that case centered around Minnesota state insurance
regulations, as opposed to the federal financial regulations at
issue here. But, because Palmer, along with all the other cases
cited above, addressed a fundamental separation of powers concern,
and not a concern tethered solely to state law, this distinction is
immaterial.

Second, the Plaintiffs also cite a number of cases for the
proposition that, even if FINRA rules and guidance cannot be
enforced by way of a private cause of action, courts may rely on
such regulations for the applicable standards to determine the
propriety of financial firms' conduct as an element of a common law
claim. The problem, however, is that all of Plaintiffs' cited cases
are negligence actions, and accordingly have no applicability to a
contract action like this one.  

The Court grants RBC summary judgment.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 11, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2p3cunq from Leagle.com.

Gary Luis, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Caryl Luis, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Gary A. Mentz, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Michael J. Vitse, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated & Merri L. Vitse,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel E. Gustafson --
dgustafson@gustafsongluek.com -- Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Daniel C.
Hedlund -- dhedlund@gustafsongluek.com -- Gustafson Gluek PLLC,
David A. Goodwin, Gustafson Gluek PLLC, 650 Northstar East, 445
Minnesota Street, 608 Second Avenue, South Suite 900, Minneapolis,
Minnesota 55402, Eric S. Taubel -- etaubel@gustafsongluek.com --
Gustafson Gluek PLLC -- Gregg Martin Fishbein --
gmfishbein@locklaw.com -- Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP, Scott D.
Hirsch, Scarlett & Hirsch, P.A., 7301 W. Palmetto Park Road, Suite
207A, Boca Raton, FL, 33433, pro hac vice &Vernon J. Vander Weide
-- vjvanderweide@locklaw.com -- Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP.    

RBC Capital Markets, LLC, Defendant, represented by James K.
Langdon -- langdon.jim@dorsey.com -- Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Kirsten
E. Schubert -- schubert.kirsten@dorsey.com -- Dorsey & Whitney LLP
& Michael E. Rowe -- rowe.michael@dorsey.com -- Dorsey & Whitney
LLP.


RHODE-NYC LLC: Slade Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
-------------------------------------------------------------
Rhode-NYC, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to
the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Linda
Slade, individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. Rhode-NYC, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-06627 (S.D. N.Y., July 16, 2019).

Rhode-NYC, LLC is a feminine womenswear collection in vibrant
prints, sophisticated colors & effortless shapes.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Dan Shaked, Esq.
   Shaked Law Group, P.C.
   14 Harwood Court, Suite 415
   Scarsdale, NY 10583
   Tel: (917) 373-9128
   Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com


RICKART COLLECTION: Simmons Files FDCPA Suit in New Jersey
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against RICKART COLLECTION
SYSTEMS INC.  The case is styled as KATANYA SIMMONS Individually
and on Behalf of all Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v.
RICKART COLLECTION SYSTEMS INC, John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case
No. 3:19-cv-15253 (D. N.J., July 12, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Rickart Collection Systems (RCS) is a debt collection agency
located in North Brunswick Township, New Jersey.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Yaakov Saks, Esq.
     Stein Saks, PLLC
     285 Passaic Street
     Hackensack, NJ 07601
     Phone: (201) 282-6500 ext 101
     Fax: (201) 282-6501
     Email: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com


SMURFIT KAPPA: Court Narrows Class Claims in Chavez Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as Eduardo Chavez, the
Plaintiff, v. Smurfit Kappa North America LLC et al., the
Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-05106-SVW-SK (C.D. Cal.), the Court
entered an order on July 5, 2019:

   1. granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff's motion for
      class certification comprising 5 subclasses:

      "all current and former hourly-paid or non-exempt employees
      who worked for [Smurfit Kappa] within the State of
      California at any time during the period from April 19,
      2014 up to the deadline, to be determined by the Court at a
      later date";

      a. granting the Rounding Subclass defined as:

         "all members of the class who were subject to Smurfit
         Kappa's rounding policy during the Class Period"; and

      b. granting the Meal Premium Subclass defined as:

         "all members of the class who were issued a meal period
         premium at any time during the Class Period;

      c. denying the Expense Reimbursement Subclass defined as:

         "all members of the class who purchased protective
         footwear during the Class Period to comply with Smurfit
         Kappa's dress code policy and who were not reimbursed
         for the full amount of the protective footwear";

      d. denying the Meal Period Subclass defined as:

         "all members of the class who were issued a meal period
         premium at any time during the Class Period";

      e. denying the Rest Period Subclass defined as:

         "all members of the class who worked at least one shift
         of three and one-half hours or more at any time during
         the Class Period".

   2. appointing Plaintiff as the class representative; and

   3. appointing Edwin Aiwazian, Arby Aiwazian, and Jill J.
      Parker of Lawyers for Justice, PC as class counsel.

As to the Rounding Subclass and Meal Premium Subclass, the Court
held that Smurfit Kappa does not engage in a standard Rule 23(a)
analysis. The Court nevertheless does so and concludes that both
subclasses satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a).

As to the Expense Reimbursement Subclass, the Court said class
certification is not proper under Plaintiff's reimbursement claim
pursuant to California Labor Code section 2800, either. California
Labor Code section 2800 provides that an "employer shall in all
cases indemnify his employee for losses caused by the employer's
want of ordinary care." Neither party discusses this issue, but in
any event it is clear that determining whether Smurfit Kappa caused
losses for putative class members due to its "want of ordinary
care" would occur predominantly on an individualized basis. Thus,
class certification on this issue is precluded.

As to the Meal Period Subclass, the Court explained that factual
difference between the failed rest period subclass and the proposed
meal period subclass is that there are timesheet data for meal
periods. However, this distinction is ultimately not helpful to
Plaintiff. Timesheets can explain only when putative class members
missed or took shortened meal breaks.  They cannot explain why they
did so, and so do not bear on the question of whether Smurfit Kappa
"provided" lawful meal periods as required by Brinker, 53 Cal. 4th
at 1017, to all of the putative class members. Thus, timesheets do
not resolve the significant manageability problems. The Plaintiff
claims that it is "not relevant that different versions of the
sheets contained different language." To the contrary, the Court
continued, it is highly relevant given that Plaintiff is relying on
the language in its cited Sheet as evidence of an unlawful and
uniform policy. Individual inquiries predominate as to the meal
period claim, precluding class certification on this issue.

As to the Rest Period Subclass, the Court said that similar
manageability problems arise in this case. Beyond arguing that the
rest break policy is facially unlawful -- which may or may not be
correct -- Plaintiff offers little to suggest that a common
question predominates or that class resolution of the issue is the
superior method. In his moving papers, Plaintiff refers to a bell
system for rest periods but, as noted by Smurfit Kappa, not all of
the facilities used a bell system. Furthermore, some employees who
worked at the City of Industry facility, which did use a bell
system, ignored the bell, staggered their breaks, or otherwise
coordinated their breaks with other employees. Thus, despite the
presence of an apparently uniform rest break policy, class
certification on this issue is inappropriate because individualized
questions -- who took rest breaks, when they did so (or not), and
(most importantly) why they did so (or not) -- predominate over
common questions.

A jury trial on the certified issues will take place on October 29,
2019 at 9 a.m., with a pre-trial conference on October 21 at 3
p.m.[CC]


SOUTH JERSEY: Class Certification Denial in Cameron Suit Flipped
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, issued an
Opinion reversing the District Court's Order denying Plaintiffs'
Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned ROBERT CAMERON
on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOUTH JERSEY PUBS, INC., d/b/a TGI
FRIDAY'S, INC., Defendant-Respondent. Docket No. A-5177-17T2. (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div).

The Defendant is a franchisee of TGIF and owns and operates two
TGIF restaurants, one in Toms River and the other in Manahawkin.
The Plaintiff went to the defendant's restaurant in Toms River. He
was given a menu, initially ordered a water, then his meal, and a
beer, and then added a soda. He believed that all of this, plus
tip, would cost about $20. After finishing his meal, the plaintiff
was presented with the bill and was shocked to see that he had been
billed over $5 for a mass produced beer and close to $3 for a soda.
On his way out, the plaintiff looked at a menu and noticed that the
drink prices were not listed. The Plaintiff stated that he never
would have ordered the drinks if the prices were listed.

In the amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
violated the CFA and the TCCWNA based on its failure to list
certain beverage prices on its menu.

The Plaintiff's motion for class certification under Rule
4:32-1(b)(2) claiming similarity to those considered by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 231 N.J.
24(2017). In Dugan, the Court held that class certification under
Rule 4:32-1(b)(3) was not appropriate based on a price-inflation
theory.  The Dugan plaintiffs argued that TGI Friday's, Inc.
(TGIF), the restaurant chain, violated the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA)
and the Truth in Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act
(TCCWNA), by failing to disclose the prices it charged for
beverages on its menus.

The motion judge heard argument and afterward denied plaintiff's
(b)(2) class certification motion, placing his reasons on the
record that day. Initially, the judge opined that the CFA
violations here were not clearly established, which would warrant
injunctive relief, but that was not dispositive. He also observed
that the CFA was not all about a litigant being able to pursue
comprehensive injunctive proceedings brought on behalf of thousands
of individuals who are now being told they don't have to worry
about whether they've been damaged.

On appeal, plaintiff contends that the motion judge erred and
abused his discretion in not certifying the class based upon the
judge's consideration of whether plaintiff is entitled to the
relief demanded in his complaint, the ultimate merits of the case
and the judge's perception that injunctive relief was not necessary
because defendant alleged it voluntarily agreed to disclose
beverage prices on its menus going forward. Moreover, plaintiff
asserts that the judge incorrectly believed that in order to
certify the class, plaintiff was bound to come forward with
evidence that all putative class members sustained an ascertainable
loss under the CFA. Finally, plaintiff argues that the motion judge
conflateed cohesion and predominance.

The Defendant contends that the motion judge correctly denied class
certification. The thrust of the defendant's response is that
proposed class members may have decided to purchase beverages from
the defendant on any given date for reasons totally unrelated to
the lack of menu pricing. According to the defendant, even if one
assumes that patrons viewed the same menus, there is simply no way
of knowing which individuals ordered beverages without knowing the
prices in advance, and what information about prices they had even
in the absence of menu pricing.

When considering a motion by plaintiff for class certification, a
court is required to examine the claims, defenses, relevant facts,
and applicable substantive law. It must accept as true all of the
allegations in the complaint and consider the remaining pleadings,
discovery and any other pertinent evidence in a light favorable to
the plaintiff.

To certify a class action, the putative class plaintiff must first
establish the requirements in Rule4:32-1(a). This Rule states: (1)
the class is so numerous that joiner of all members is
impracticable (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.

Here, it is obvious that the putative class meets the Rule's
requirements. The members of the class are far too numerous for
individual joinder.

The class members' claims arise from the same events, practice, or
conduct, and are based on the same legal theory, as those of other
class members. The unlawful conduct alleged here is a violation of
the CFA and the TCCWNA arising from the failure to list beverage
prices on menus given to plaintiff and the putative class members.
Finally, plaintiff can adequately represent the class even if his
interests are not identical to all class members, as he doesnot
have interests antagonistic to those of the class.

Turning first to his CFA claim, plaintiff alleges that defendant
knowingly and/or intentionally failed to disclose the prices of
various beverages it offers for sale, thereby engaging in a knowing
omission in violation of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.2's prohibition against
bait and switch advertising, and N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5's requirement
for merchandise to be price marked at the point of purchase. As
stated previously, plaintiff seeks injunctive relief for the class
compelling disclosure of beverage prices and declaratory relief
confirming that the failure to do so is an unlawful commercial
practice under the CFA.

In addition to demonstrating that a defendant engaged in an
unlawful practice, a private plaintiff asserting a claim under the
CFA must also allege that he or she suffered an ascertainable loss,
and a causal relationship between the unlawful conduct and the
ascertainable loss. An `ascertainable loss' is one that is
quantifiable or measurable and not hypothetical or illusory.

Applying these guiding principles to the motion judge's decision,
it is evident that he conflated various concepts regarding
plaintiff's CFA claim. First, he questioned plaintiff's ability to
maintain a CFA action for injunctive relief as compared to the
Attorney General's. As discussed, that concern had no legal basis
because plaintiff pled a viable claim that he suffered such a loss.


Second, the judge misconstrued the requirement for cohesiveness to
include a requirement that plaintiff had to prove that the class
members could all establish damages or an ascertainable loss. This
consideration too has no place in determining (b)(2) class
certification.  Likewise, the judge's consideration of plaintiff's
ultimate success on the merits of his class claim for a permanent
injunction was not appropriate.  

Also, contrary to the motion judge's conclusion, Dugan does not bar
plaintiff's CFA claims for injunctive relief. In Dugan, the Court
also addressed claims for injunctive relief made in the companion
case that it decided, Bozzi v. OSI Restaurant Partners LLC,
(A-93-15).  

Addressing Dugan's claims, the Court held that under (b)(3), the
plaintiff failed to establish the predominance with respect to
their CFA claims, because our CFA class action jurisprudence
rejects price-inflation theories for a class numbering in the
millions, where plaintiff claimed that TGIF charged each member of
the class $1.72 more than the fair or reasonable prices that it
would have charged had it disclosed its beverage prices on the
menu.

As the Court stated, it reached a different conclusion in Bozzi. It
explained that for the (b)(3) predominance requirement to be met, a
more limited class was required. It stated the following: "Although
Bozzi asserts general claims that the defendant's restaurants
failed to disclose prices, his allegations focus primarily on a
specific pricing practice. He alleges that the defendant's
restaurants violated the CFA by increasing the price charged to a
customer for the same brand, type, and volume of beverage in the
course of the customer's visit to the restaurant, without notifying
the customer of the change. Bozzi's counsel represents that this
price-shifting claim is supported by claimant-specific receipts
showing that each customer making this claim was charged different
prices for the same brand, type, and volume of beverage in the
course of a single visit to one of the defendant's restaurants. We
hold that if the Bozzi class is redefined to include only customers
who make that specific CFA claim, and the claim is limited
accordingly, plaintiff Bozzi has met the requirements of Rule
4:32-1 and may attempt to prove that claim on behalf of the
class."

The Court directed that on remand, the trial court should certify
the class solely for the purpose of pursuing CFA claims based upon
the defendant restaurants' alleged practice of charging a customer
different prices for beverages of the same brand, type, and volume
during the same restaurant visit.  Although the Court also vacated
the injunctive relief that the trial court granted in Bozzi
compelling the defendant to list beverage prices, it did so only
because the injunction applied to too broad of a class and because
Bozzi offered no argument in support of the trial court's
injunctive relief.  However, it specifically preserved Bozzi's
claim for injunctive relief under the CFA, directing the trial
court to consider the application anew after the certification of
the more limited class. The fact that Bozzi did not satisfy the
(b)(3) predominance requirement did not therefore persuade the
Court that injunctive relief could not be granted.

The Court concludes that the plaintiff's CFA claim was appropriate
for class certification and raised the precise type of claim that,
if proven, was amenable to a single injunction that would afford
relief to the entire class, as contemplated by (b)(2). For that
reason, the Court reverses the motion judge's determination as to
plaintiff's CFA claim.

The Court reaches a similar conclusion regarding plaintiff's other
(b)(2) claim that defendant violated the TCCWNA, which is intended
'to prevent deceptive practices in consumer contracts.'
Under the TCCWNA, a plaintiff must establish:

First, that the defendant was a seller, lessor, creditor, lender or
bailee or assignee of any of the aforesaid; second, that the
defendant offered or entered into a written consumer contract or
gave or displayed any written consumer warranty, notice or sign;
third, that at the time that the written consumer contract is
signed or the written consumer warranty, notice or sign is
displayed, that writing contains a provision that violates any
clearly established legal right of a consumer or responsibility of
a seller, lessor, creditor, lender or bailee as established by
State or Federal law; and finally, that the plaintiff is an
aggrieved consumer.

Under the TCCWNA, there must be a written consumer contract,
notice, or sign and the statute does not apply when a defendant
fails to provide the consumer with a required writing. However,
when a consumer contract contains language prohibited by a
regulation, that alone may constitute a violation of a clearly
established legal right of a consumer or responsibility of a seller
under N.J.S.A. 56:12-15, and thus may provide a basis for relief
under the TCCWNA.

Indulging plaintiff's contentions here with a liberal construction,
a menu is at least an offer to contract. Moreover, while the TCCWNA
speaks to inclusion of a prohibited clause or provision, it clearly
applies where the offer to contract intentionally omits information
that is at least in this case, alleged to be required under the
law.

To be an aggrieved consumer under the TCCWNA, a consumer must have
suffered some form of harm as a result of the defendant's conduct.
The harm is not limited to injury compensable by monetary
damages..

In Dugan, the Court did not determine whether a defendant
restaurant's presentation of a menu that omits beverage prices
gives rise to a TCCWNA claim. Rather, it determined that the Dugan
and Bozzi plaintiffs could not satisfy the predominance requirement
for (b)(3) certification. It found that the plaintiffs could not be
aggrieved consumers without proof that they each actually received
menus from defendant because the TCCWNA addresses contracts,
warranties, notices and signs and does not apply when a defendant
fails to provide the consumer with a required writing.

The Court also rejected plaintiff's claim under the TCCWNA because
there was no evidence, as required by the Act, that the failure to
post beverage prices on a menu violated a clearly established legal
right. It observed that there were no published opinions or actions
taken by the Attorney General that established the failure to list
beverage prices on a menu violated N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5 as alleged by
the plaintiffs.  

Finally, the Court concluded that the Legislature did not intend
that the TCCWNA's civil penalties should be imposed as the
plaintiffs suggested. It stated that nothing in the legislative
history of the TCCWNA, which focuses on sellers' inclusion of
legally invalid or unenforceable provisions in consumer contracts,
suggests that when the Legislature enacted the statute, it intended
to impose billion-dollar penalties on restaurants that serve
unpriced food and beverages to customers.
The concerns raised in Dugan regarding the TCCWNA claims do not
come in to play in plaintiff's case here.

First, as noted, the Court did not address the TCCWNA claim for
(b)(2) certification, which does not require a focus on each
purported class member's individual dining experience. By
definition, as plaintiff identified the class, plaintiff and each
member of the class received a menu and ordered a beverage.

Second, the granting of (b)(2) class certification here does not
raise concerns about the Legislature's intention to not impose
extreme financial hardship for TCCWNA violations. The focus is
rather on whether a single injunction and declaratory relief, if
either is warranted, can provide a remedy to the entire class or
none of them in order to compel the inclusion of beverage prices on
menus, if their omission gives rise to a violation of law.
Moreover, if required, the cost of altering menus for the two
restaurants is minimal compared to the costs of the penalties
addressed by the Dugan Court.

Third, although we agree that the Dugan Court correctly observed
that there is no case law or Attorney General opinions declaring
the failure to include beverage prices on a menu to be a violation
of the TCCWNA or any other law, we note that there is no legal
authority that holds to the contrary that the omission is in fact
lawful. Finally, plaintiff's class is narrowly drawn to include
only those who ordered off menus without beverage prices.

Whether one or all members of the class did so is of no moment if
defendant was required to include the price in order to not violate
the law. If a court were to find that the failure to disclose
prices on a menu given to plaintiff and the class members was a
violation of the TCCWNA because a required provision to a consumer
contract was not included, we cannot envision any circumstances
where declaratory and injunctive relief would not be valid remedies
to consider, if necessary, to secure future compliance with the
law. To hold otherwise, would allow a merchant to intentionally
violate the law without being subjected to any action brought under
(b)(2) or (b)(3) seeking to enforce the CFA and the TCCWNA.

Accordingly, the Court is reversed and remanded for entry of an
order vacating the denial of class certification and ordering
(b)(2) class certification.

A full-text copy of the N.J. App. Div.'s July 11, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2p3cunq from Leagle.com.

Wesley G. Hanna  125 N Route 73, Law Ofc Sander D Friedman Llc,
West Berlin, NJ, 08091-9225, argued the cause for appellant (Law
Office of Sander D. Friedman, LLC, attorneys; Sander D. Friedman,
125 N Route 73, Law Ofc Sander D Friedman Llc, West Berlin, NJ,
08091-9225 and Wesley G. Hanna, of counsel and on the briefs).

Joseph A. Gallo -- jgallo@mkclaw.us.com -- argued the cause for
respondent (McGivney, Kluger & Cook, PC, attorneys; Joseph A. Gallo
and William D. Sanders -- wsanders@mkclaw.us.com -- of counsel and
on the brief).


SPEEDY CASH: Seeks Ninth Circuit Review of Ruling in Delisle Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Speedy Cash filed an appeal from a Court ruling in the
lawsuit entitled Cindy Delisle, et al. v. Speedy Cash, Case No.
3:18-cv-02042-GPC-RBB, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California, San Diego.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on July 1, 2019, the
District Court issued an Order denying the Defendant's Motion for
Arbitration.

Speedy Cash offers loans through its physical stores, as well as
through online loan portals.  Plaintiffs Cindy Delisle and Robert
Dougherty (Plaintiffs) filed a First Amended Complaint alleging a
putative class action against Defendant Speedy Cash on behalf of
themselves and all others similar situated.  The Plaintiffs assert
claims under California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and
California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA).

The appellate case is captioned as Cindy Delisle, et al. v. Speedy
Cash, Case No. 19-55794, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appellant Speedy Cash's opening brief is due on
      September 9, 2019;

   -- Appellees Cindy Delisle and Robert Dougherty's answering
      brief is due on October 9, 2019; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees CINDY DELISLE and ROBERT DOUGHERTY,
Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, are
represented by:

          Jason Ibey, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
          169 W 2710 S Circle, Suite 204F
          St. George, UT 84790
          E-mail: jason@kazlg.com

               - and -

          Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
          245 Fischer Avenue
          Costa Mesa, CA 92626
          Telephone: (800) 400-6808
          E-mail: ak@kazlg.com

               - and -

          Joshua Swigart, Esq.
          HYDE & SWIGART
          2221 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 101
          San Diego, CA 92108
          Telephone: (619) 233-7770
          E-mail: josh@westcoastlitigation.com

               - and -

          Ahren A. Tiller, Esq.
          BLC LAW CENTER, APC
          1230 Columbia St., Suite 1100
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 894-8831
          E-mail: ahren.tiller@blc-sd.com

Defendant-Appellant SPEEDY CASH is represented by:

          Paul L. Gale, Esq.
          TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP
          5 Park Plaza, Suite 1400
          Irvine, CA 92614-2545
          Telephone: (949) 622-2700
          E-mail: paul.gale@troutman.com


STARBUCKS: George et al Suit Transferred to S.D.N.Y.
----------------------------------------------------
The case, CHRISTOPHER GEORGE, JESSICA CHANDRA, LISA JAME, CHELSEA
MALEY, APRIL BODDIE, MICKAEL LOUIS, EDUARDO LEACH, JOSH FOLAN,
LOGAN VAIRO, and BASMA ATTIEH, on behalf of themselves and a class
of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. STARBUCKS
CORPORATION d/b/a STARBUCKS COFFEE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No.
653015/2019 (Filed on May 21, 2019), was transferred from the New
York Supreme Court to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York on July 2, 2019. It is now assigned
to Hon. Judge Alison J. Nathan. The United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-06185 to the proceeding.

In this complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant has
violated the New York General Business Law by engaging in false
advertising and deceptive customer-oriented conduct in connection
with its representations to the public that it provides clean,
comfortable stores that are a safe environment for its customers.
Plaintiffs also contend that the Defendant's statements about its
so-called premium products were knowingly false and misleading
because it allowed its employees to use a poisonous pesticide in
its stores knowing Dichlorvos (2,2-dichlorovinyl dimethyl phosphate
or DDVP), an active ingredient in the product sold under the name
"Hot Shot No-Pest 2" strips, is highly poisonous and completely
unfit for use in proximity to food, beverages and people.

Starbucks is a foreign business corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the state of Washington with a principal place of
business at 2401 Utah Avenue South, Seattle, Washington 98134. The
company owns and operates a global chain of coffee shops,
comprising over 13,000 stores in more than 70 countries. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Douglas H. Wigdor, Esq.
     David E. Gottlieb, Esq.
     Renan F. Varghese, Esq.
     WIGDOR LLP
     85 Fifth Avenue
     New York, NY 10003
     Telephone: (212) 257-6800
     Facsimile: (212) 257-6845
     E-mail: dwigdor@wigdorlaw.com
             dgottlieb@wigdorlaw.com
             rvarghese@wigdorlaw.com

STATION SPORTS: Ruggeiro Seeks Unpaid Overtime Compensation
-----------------------------------------------------------
FRANCIS E. RUGGEIRO, on behalf of himself, FLSA Collective
Plaintiffs and the Class Members, the Plaintiffs, vs. THE STATION
SPORTS BAR AND LOUNGE CORP. d/b/a MR. P'S SOUTHERN SKILLET &
ANTHONY PALLINO, the Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-04010 (E.D.N.Y.,
July 11, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid overtime compensation,
liquidated damages, prejudgment and post-judgment interest, and
attorneys' fees and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the New York Labor Law.

According to the complaint, the Defendant knowingly and willfully
failed to pay the Plaintiff wages and his lawfully earned overtime
compensation in direct contravention of the FLSA and NYLL.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Anneeba Rehman, Esq.
          Nadia M. Perez, Esq.
          PERVEZ & REHMAN, P.C.
          68 South Service Road, Suite 100
          Melville, NY 11747
          Telephone: (631) 427 0700
          E-mail: arehman@pervezrehman.com

STEMGENEX MEDICAL: Appeals Decision in Moorer Suit to 9th Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Stem Cell Research Centre, Inc., Stemgenex Medical
Group, Inc. and Stemgenex, Inc., filed an appeal from a Court
ruling in the lawsuit styled Selena Moorer, et al. v. Stemgenex
Medical Group, Inc., et al., Case No. 3:16-cv-02816-AJB-NLS, in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, San
Diego.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the class
action lawsuit (assigned Case No. 37-02016-00028994-CU-NP-CTL) was
removed from the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego,
to the District Court.

The Defendants operate a medical center in San Diego, California.

The appellate case is captioned as Selena Moorer, et al. v.
Stemgenex Medical Group, Inc., et al., Case No. 19-80083, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Respondents SELENA MOORER, JENNIFER BREWER, REBECCA KING
and ALEXANDRA GARDNER, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, are represented by:

          Stephanie Reynolds, Esq.
          Timothy Garr Williams, Esq.
          POPE, BERGER, WILLIAMS & REYNOLDS, LLP
          401 B Street, Suite 2000
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 595-1366
          E-mail: reynolds@popeberger.com
                  williams@popeberger.com

Intervenor-Pending ANDRE P. LALLANDE is represented by:

          Matthew Levinson, Esq.
          COLE PEDROZA LLP
          2295 Huntington Drive
          San Marino, CA 91108
          Telephone: (626) 431-2787
          E-mail: mlevinson@colepedroza.com

Defendants-Petitioners STEMGENEX MEDICAL GROUP, INC., a California
Corporation; STEMGENEX, INC., a California Corporation; RITA
ALEXANDER, an individual; and STEM CELL RESEARCH CENTRE, INC., a
California Corporation, are represented by:

          Christina Lucio , Esq.
          JAMES HAWKINS APLC
          9880 Research Drive
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Telephone: (909) 908-3059
          E-mail: christina@jameshawkinsaplc.com


SUMMIT APPAREL: Dawson Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
---------------------------------------------------------------
Summit Apparel, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Leshawn Dawson, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Summit Apparel, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-06613 (S.D. N.Y., July 16, 2019).

Summit Apparel, Inc., doing business as Royal Apparel, manufactures
knit apparel. The Company offers knitting, art design, heat
transfer, embroidery, sewing, printing, welding, and cutting
services. Royal Apparel operates in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (929) 575-4175
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


SUN COMMUNITIES: Asbury Seeks to Certify Mobile Homeowners Class
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit styled Gene Asbury, James LeMonnier,
Bonnie Lohmeyer, Fred Osier, Harry Rush, Laurie Skemp, and Royal
Palm Village Residents, Inc., on behalf of themselves, the class of
current and former mobile homeowners in the Park and all others
similarly situated v. Monica Slider, Sheri Woodworth, Belinda
Lawson, Sun Communities, Inc., Royal Palm Village, LLC, American
Land Lease, Inc., Asset Investors Operating Partnership, L.P.,
Richard Lee, and Lutz, Bobo & Telfair, P.A., d/b/a Lutz, Bobo,
Telfair, Eastman & Lee, f/k/a Lutz, Webb & Bobo, P.A., Case No.
8:19-cv-00874-CEH-SPF (M.D. Fla.), seek class certification under
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Plaintiffs' proposed class definition is:

     ". . . [A]ll persons who are or were mobile home owners in
     the Park from 2009 to the present and were victimized by the
     fraudulent and conspiratorial acts of Defendants Monica
     Slider, Sheri Woodworth, Belinda Lawson, Sun Communities,
     Royal Palm Village, American Land Lease, and Asset Investors
     Partnership since 2015 to illegally and unreasonably deceive
     over 400 elderly mobile home owners and the Royal Palm HOA
     that their mobile home park was lawfully purchased by the
     Defendants Sun Communities and Royal Palm Village.
     Subsequently, the Defendants Monica Slider, Sheri Woodworth,
     Belinda Lawson, Sun Communities, Royal Palm Village,
     American Land Lease, and Asset Investors Partnership acted
     and conspired to circumvent statutory regulations under the
     Florida Mobile Home Act and engaged in further deceit as
     alleged in the Background and Statement of Facts, supra.

Gene Asbury, et al., also ask the Court that they should be
permitted to circulate a class action notice to all putative class
members.  The Plaintiffs request that the Court order the
Defendants to produce a complete and accurate list of all mobile
homeowners (including contact information: names, address, e-mail,
and phone number) who have owned a home in the Park during the ten
years preceding this action up until the date this Court decides
this Motion.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Daniel W. Perry, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL W. PERRY
          4767 New Broad St., #1007
          Orlando, FL 32814-6405
          Telephone: (407) 894-9003
          E-mail: dan@danielperry.com


SUNEDISON SEMICONDUCTOR: Dismissal of Usenko ERISA Suit Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Alexander Y. Usenko, Derivatively on Behalf of the
SunEdison Semiconductor Ltd. Retirement Savings Plan,
Plaintiff-Appellant v. MEMC LLC; The Investment Committee of the
SunEdison Semiconductor Ltd. Retirement Savings Plan, Hemant
Kapadia; Penny Cutrell; Steve Edens; Karen Steiner; Cheng Yang; Ben
Llorico, Defendants-Appellees, John Does 1-10, Defendants, Case No.
18-1626 (8th Cir.), Judge Jane L. Kelly of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the
district court dismissing Usenko's complaint, without leave to
amend.

Usenko is a former employee of SunEdison Semiconductor, LLC
("Semi").  Semi, once a wholly owned subsidiary of SunEdison, Inc.,
made a defined-contribution retirement savings plan available to
its employees, including Usenko, that offered SunEdison stock as a
retirement investment option.  On April 21, 2016, SunEdison filed
for bankruptcy.

In August 2017, Usenko brought suit derivatively on behalf of the
plan and, in the alternative, as a putative class action on behalf
of plan participants.  Usenko claims that Semi, the investment
committee of Semi's retirement savings plan, and the members of the
investment committee breached their fiduciary duties under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").  Usenko
alleges that between July 20, 2015, and April 21, 2016, the
Defendants knew or should have known that SunEdison was in poor
financial condition and faced poor long-term prospects and
therefore should have removed SunEdison stock from the plan's
assets.

The district court dismissed Usenko's complaint as to all the
Defendants for failure to state a claim -- other than Penny Cutrell
and Karen Steiner, who were dismissed for lack of timely service --
and denied Usenko leave to amend his complaint.  

Usenko appeals the dismissal for failure to state a claim and the
denial of leave to amend.

Judge Kelly finds that Usenko, like the Plaintiffs in Fifth Third
Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, alleges that the Defendants breached their
fiduciary duties because they failed to outperform the market based
solely on their analysis of publicly available information and to
conclude that, because SunEdison stock was excessively risky, the
plan should divest from SunEdison.  As explained by the Supreme
Court in Dudenhoeffer, as well as several of the sister circuits
examining similar claims, such allegations are insufficient to
plausibly allege that ERISA fiduciaries breached the duty of
prudence.  Accordingly, Usenko fails to plausibly allege that the
defendants breached the duty of prudence and dismissal for failure
to state a claim is proper.

Usenko's attempts to evade Dudenhoeffer are unavailing.  The Judge
rejects Usenko's argument that Tibble v. Edison International,
saves his deficient duty-of-prudence allegations.  The Supreme
Court's acknowledgment in Tibble that an ERISA fiduciary has a
continuing duty to monitor trust investments and remove imprudent
ones, does not exempt Usenko's complaint from meeting
Dudenhoeffer's pleading requirements.  And Usenko cannot
distinguish Dudenhoeffer on the basis that it only applies to
duty-of-prudence claims in the context of employer securities.  The
Court in Dudenhoeffer explicitly rejected the contention that
fiduciaries of employee stock ownership plans are entitled to a
special presumption of prudence.  As such, the Judge sees no
indication that the Court intended to limit Dudenhoeffer to
employer securities.

Finally, the Judge will affirm the denial of Usenko's motion for
leave to amend his complaint because he failed to submit a proposed
amended complaint with his motion.

Accordingly, Judge Kelly affirmed the judgment of the district
court.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/2pMvP9 from Leagle.com.

Glenn Eugene Davis -- Glenndavislaw@aol.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Don R. Lolli -- dlolli@DysartTaylor.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Thomas James McKenna -- tjmckenna@gme-law.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Mark Bruce Blocker -- MBLOCKER@SIDLEY.COM -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Gregory Michael Egleston -- gegleston@gme-law.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Chris K. Meyer -- CMEYER@SIDLEY.COM -- for Defendant-Appellee.

Robert I. Harwood -- rharwood@hfesq.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Daniella Quitt -- dquitt@hfesq.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Charles Noah Insler -- cinsler@heplerbroom.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Sarah A. Hemmendinger -- SHEMMENDINGER@SIDLEY.COM -- for
Defendant-Appellee.


THIRTY-ONE GIFTS: Dawson Alleges Violation under ADA
----------------------------------------------------
Thirty-One Gifts LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Leshawn Dawson, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Thirty-One Gifts LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-06621 (S.D. N.Y., July 16, 2019).

Thirty-One Gifts, LLC, is a direct-selling organization offering
purses, wallets, totes, accessories, home decor and organizing
solutions, thermal bags, jewelry most of which can be personalized,
that are sold through Independent Sales Consultants in the
U.S.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (929) 575-4175
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


TRANS WORLD: Rovinelli Suit Goes to Massachusetts Federal Court
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case, Adam Rovinelli and Jennifer Carlos, individually and on
behalf of all other persons similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs.
Trans World Entertainment Corporation, the Defendant, Case No.
1979cv00331, was removed from the Hampden County Superior Court to
the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts
(Springfield) on June 12, 2019. The District of Massachusetts Court
Clerk assigned Case No. 3:19-cv-11304-DPW to the proceeding. The
suit seeks $5,000,000,000. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge
Douglas P. Woodlock.

Trans World Entertainment Corporation is an American company which
operates entertainment media retail stores across the United States
of America. As of August 2018 it operated 240 freestanding and
shopping mall-based stores under several brand names, down from
about 540 in August 2010.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Angela M. Edwards, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF ANGELA EDWARDS
          72 Canterbury Circle
          East Longmeadow, MA 01028
          Telephone: (413) 525-3820
          E-mail: angelaedwards@charter.net

               - and -

          Mark J. Albano, Esq.
          ALBANO LAW, LLC
          One Monarch Place
          1414 Main Street, Suite 1150
          Springfield, MA 01144-1150
          Telephone: (413) 736-6971
          Facsimile: (413) 746-9224
          E-mail: mark@albanolawllc.com

Attorneys for Trans World Entertainment Corporation are:

          Christopher J. Marino, Esq.
          DAVIS, MALM & D'AGOSTINE, P.C.
          One Boston Place, 37th Floor
          Boston, MA 02108
          Telephone: (617) 589-3833
          Facsimile: (617) 305-3114
          E-mail: cmarino@davismalm.com

TREVENA INC: Block & Leviton Named Lead Counsel in Securities Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DR. WILLIAM TOMASZEWSKI, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. TREVENA, INC., MAXINE
GOWEN and ROBERTO CUCA, Defendants, Civil Action No. 18-4378 (E.D.
Pa.), Judge Cynthia M. Rufe of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania appointed Trevena Group as the
Lead Plaintiff for the class, and approved its selection of Block &
Leviton LLP as its choice of Lead Counsel and Kaufman Coren & Ress,
P.C. as Liaison Counsel.

The case is a federal securities class action brought on behalf of
investors against Trevena and its former executives for violations
of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
as amended by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
("PSLRA"), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.  

Trevena is a clinical stage biopharmaceutical company that
discovers, develops, and seeks to commercialize therapeutics by
utilizing a novel approach to treating moderate to severe acute
pain intravenously.  Trevena allegedly issued a press release on
May 2, 2016, announcing that it had reached a general agreement
with the FDA on key elements of its clinical development program
for one of its products, Olinvo (oliceridine).  Based on those
statements and omissions as to the strength of the program, the
design of its Phase III trial, and its prospects for obtaining FDA
approval, the price of Trevena's stock began to increase.

On Oct. 9, 2018, however, two days before the FDA would meet with
Trevena to determine whether Olinvo would be granted approval, the
FDA publicized a briefing document which contained minutes from its
2016 meeting with Trevena that it previously criticized the design
of the Phase III trial and that the FDA's Advisory Committee was
recommending rejection of Olinvo's new drug application.  As a
result, the price of Trevena's stock dropped 64% by the time the
market closed on October 9.  The Plaintiffs are comprised of
investors who purchased Trevena common stock between May 2, 2016
and Oct. 8, 2018.

As a Lead Plaintiff and a Lead Counsel must be appointed pursuant
to 15 U.S.C. Section 78u-4, Plaintiffs Huseyin Erenoglu, a group of
five individual members ("Trevena Group"), and Lanphie Ping have
each moved for such appointment and for approval of their choice of
lead counsel.  The Court has previously consolidated the three
separate lawsuits against Trevena and its former executives, and
now must decide whether Erenoglu, Trevena Group, or Ping will serve
as the Lead Plaintiff.

A hearing was held on Feb. 20, 2019, after which the Court required
Erenoglu to produce his trade confirmations from the Class Period
to the Court and to the other Moving Plaintiffs, and permitted
further briefing upon receipt of the trade confirmations.

As the investor with the largest financial loss, Erenoglu asserts
that his similar interests with those of the class in recovering a
maximum amount of damages, his lack of conflict in his adequacy to
represent the class, and his choice of counsel render him the
prevailing Lead Plaintiff.  The other Moving Plaintiffs argue that
there are errors in Erenoglu's sworn certifications and
declarations when compared to his trade confirmations, and that
although Erenoglu's certification and declaration accurately
reflect the number of shares purchased and sold, they do not
accurately reflect the number of trades and the price per share.

Judge Rufe agrees with the other Moving Plaintiffs that the errors
in Erenoglu's sworn statements amount to a substantial degree of
carelessness and raise doubt as to whether he will fairly and
adequately represent the best interests of the class.  Sworn
declarations are integral to the PSLRA process, as they assure
district courts that the proposed Plaintiff (1) has suffered
financial harm; (2) is not a serial litigant; and (3) is interested
and able to serve as the Lead Plaintiff.  Although Erenoglu submits
that his errors are minor or inadvertent mistakes in absolute
terms, they nonetheless speak to a level of carelessness especially
where the errors were repeated.  Particularly given that these
errors were made at the outset of the case, the causes the Court to
doubt whether Erenoglu possesses the necessary adequacy and
sophistication to be the Lead Plaintiff.

Trevena Group comprises five individuals who lost a substantial
amount of monetary funds, and who have indicated a willingness to
serve the role of lead plaintiff.  Because the PSLRA expressly
permits groups to serve as the Lead Plaintiff,  Trevena Group
argues that it is entitled to do so in the case. Trevena Group has
selected Block & Leviton to serve as the Lead Counsel, and Kaufman
Coren & Ress, P.C. to serve as the Liaison Counsel, both with
sufficient experience in securities litigation.  The other Moving
Plaintiffs attempt to rebut Trevena Group's presumptive lead
plaintiff status by contending that the group is too large, and
that the lack of knowledge as to its members' pre-existing
relationships raises doubt in terms of whether Trevena Group is
lawyer-driven or whether its members can function cohesively and
collectively as a group.  

The Judge finds that the other Moving Plaintiffs have produced no
evidence, as opposed to merely speculation, that Trevena Group
would not be able to function as a cohesive and independent group,
or that it will not able to fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.

Having reviewed the submissions from Trevena Group as to its
selection of Block & Leviton LLP as its choice of lead counsel and
Kaufman Coren & Ress, P.C. as liaison counsel, the Judge finds that
there is no basis to interfere with the strong presumption in favor
of approving counsel.  Both of these law firms have extensive and
substantial experience in class action securities litigation, as
reflected in their firm biographies which highlight their numerous
successful prosecutions of such cases.  Accordingly, she approves
Trevena Group's selection of counsel.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Rufe appointed Trevena Group as
the Lead Plaintiff for the class, and approved its selection of
Block & Leviton LLP as its choice of Lead Counsel and Kaufman Coren
& Ress, P.C. as Liaison Counsel.  An appropriate order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2019 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/X9x3rb from Leagle.com.

TREVENA GROUP, COMPRISED OF ALBERT KOCH, WHITTIER PIERCE,
CHRISTOPHER BEYERS, KEVIN WALSH AND PETER PALMER, Lead Plaintiff,
represented by DEBORAH R. GROSS -- dgross@kcr-law.com -- KAUFMAN,
COREN & RESS, PC, JACOB A. WALKER -- jake@blockesq.com -- BLOCK &
LEVITON LLP & JEFFREY C. BLOCK -- jeff@blockesq.com -- BLOCK &
LEVITON LLP.

DR. WILLIAM TOMASZEWSKI, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff, represented by DEBORAH R. GROSS,
KAUFMAN, COREN & RESS, PC, LAURENCE J. HASSON, BERNSTEIN LIEBHARD
LLP, CHRISTOPHER L. NELSON, THE WEISER LAW FIRM, P.C., DAVID SEAMUS
KASKELA , KASKELA LAW LLC, JACOB A. GOLDBERG, THE ROSEN LAW FIRM,
MICHAEL J. HYNES, HYNES KELLER & HERNANDEZ & PHILLIP C. KIM, THE
ROSEN LAW FIRM, PA.

TREVENA, INC., Defendant, represented by ANDREW W. STERN --
ASTERN@SIDLEY.COM -- SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, CHARLOTTE K. NEWELL --
CNEWELL@SIDLEY.COM -- SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, HILLE R. SHEPPARD --
HSHEPPARD@SIDLEY.COM -- SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, JACOB A. WALKER, BLOCK &
LEVITON LLP & JEFFREY C. BLOCK, BLOCK & LEVITON LLP.

MAXINE GOWEN & ROBERTO CUCA, Defendants, represented by ANDREW W.
STERN, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, CHARLOTTE K. NEWELL, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP &
HILLE R. SHEPPARD, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP.

DAVID A. LEWEIN, Movant, represented by JONATHAN F. NEUMANN,
KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK & NAUMON A. AMJED, KESSLER TOPAZ
MELTZER & CHECK, LLP.


UNITED FEDERAL: Settlement in Gunter Suit Has Final Approval
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TONYA GUNTER, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. UNITED FEDERAL CREDIT
UNION, DOES 1-5, inclusive, and ROE CORPORATIONS 6-10 inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 3:15-cv-00483-MMD-WGC (D. Nev.), Judge Miranda
M. Du of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada granted
final approval of the Settlement Agreement and Release.

The Court granted preliminary approval of the Settlement on Feb.
14, 2019.  It previously found on Sept. 25, 2017, on a contested
motion for class certification, that the Classes meet all of the
requirements for certification under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and applicable case law and certified the following
classes:

     a. Sufficient Funds class, which is comprised of those members
of the Defendant whose accounts were on the Miser System, and who
received an overdraft fee on a transaction which resulted in a
positive ledger balance between Oct. 3, 2011 and Sept. 30, 2018.

     b. The Regulation E class, which is comprised of those members
of the Defendant who opted in to the overdraft program, whose
accounts were on the Miser System, and who were charged an
overdraft fee on a debit transaction between Aug. 15, 2010 and
Sept. 30, 2018.

However, for purposes of the proposed settlement and the release
which the Defendant is to receive from the settlement and for
purposes of final approval, for the "Regulation E" class, the
release and class definition are narrowed only to include Oct. 3,
2011 through Sept. 30, 2018.  No Regulation E claims prior to Oct.
3, 2011, are being released.

Judge Du (i) appointed Named Plaintiff Tonya Gunter as the Class
Representative; (ii) approved Richard McCune of McCune Wright
Arevalo LLP and Taras Kick of The Kick Law Firm, APC, as the Class
Counsel; and (iii) appointed Kurtzman Carson Consultants, LLC
("KCC") as the Claims Administrator.

The Judge overruled the objection of the single objector Timothy
Walker as the objection itself does not specify any way in which
the class relief is inadequate, and does not suggest a higher
monetary number for which the case should have settled.

She granted final approval of the terms set forth in the Settlement
and finds that the Settlement is, in all respects, fair, adequate,
and reasonable, and directs the parties to effectuate the
Settlement according to its terms.  

The Judge finds the requested attorneys' fees of $833,000 to be
reasonable.  The requested fees are approved and this amount to be
paid to the Class Counsel from the Settlement Fund by the deadline
specified in the Settlement.

She further finds that the request for reimbursement of litigation
costs in the amount of $86,500, as set forth and detailed in the
declarations of the Class Counsel, is reasonable based on the work
necessary to achieve this favorable class settlement, and is to be
paid to the Class Counsel from the Settlement Fund by the deadline
specified in the Settlement Agreement.

The Judge also finds that Named Plaintiff Tonya Gunter assisted
with the prosecution and litigation of the case, including
producing documents, responding to written discovery, sitting for
deposition, and having been willing to testify at trial.  She
therefore awarded a service award in the amount of $10,000 to be
paid to Named Plaintiff Tonya Gunter from the Settlement Fund by
the deadline specified in the Settlement Agreement.

She approved Public Citizen as the cy pres recipient of any residue
in the Settlement Fund.  

She also approved payment of the Claims Administrator's fees and
costs of up to $70,000 to be paid to the Claims Administrator from
the Settlement Fund by the deadline specified in the Settlement
Agreement.

Within 10 days of the date of this order, Defendant United Federal
Credit Union will distribute the Settlement Fund to the Claims
Administrator, less amounts advanced to the Claims Administrator
and less the total amount that will be credited to the Class
Members by the Defendant as provided in the Settlement Agreement.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/uGjfol from Leagle.com.

Tonya Gunter, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jae Eddie K. Kim --
jkk@mccunewright.com -- McCune Wright Arevalo LLP, pro hac vice,
James Strenio -- James@kicklawfirm.com -- The Kick Law Firm, APC,
Richard D. McCune- rdm@mccunewright.com -- McCune Wright Arevalo
LLP, pro hac vice, Robert James Dart -- robert@kicklawfirm.com --
The Kick Law Firm, APC, Taras Kick -- Taras@kicklawfirm.com -- pro
hac vice, Thomas A. Segal -- Thomas@kicklawfirm.com -- The Kick
Law
Firm, APC, pro hac vice & Gregory G. Gordon, Glen Lerner Injury
Attorneys.

United Federal Credit Union, Defendant, represented by James A.
Kohl, Howard & Howard Attorneys, PLLC, Robert W. Hernquist, Howard
& Howard Attorneys PLLC, Stephen Paul Dunn, Howard & Howard
Attorneys PLLC, pro hac vice & Brandon J. Wilson, Howard & Howard.


UNITED STATES: Court Defers Ruling in Banos Final Order Relief Bid
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ARTURO MARTINEZ BAÑOS, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Petitioners, v. ELIZABETH GODFREY, et al.,
Defendants-Respondents, Case No. C16-1454 JLR (W.D. Wash.), Judge
James L. Robart of the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Washington, Seattle, deferred ruling on Defendants-Respondents
Elizabeth Godfrey, Lowell Clark, Thomas D. Homan, James McHenry,
William Barr, and Kevin McAleenan ("Government")'s Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60 motion for relief from the Court's final order.


On Sept. 14, 2016, the Petitioners filed a habeas corpus petition
and class action complaint on behalf of themselves and other
similarly-situated detained noncitizens in withholding of removal
only proceedings under 8 C.F.R. Section 1208.31(e), challenging the
Government's refusal to provide them with custody redetermination
hearings.  

On Dec. 11, 2017, the Court certified a class comprising of all
individuals who (1) were placed in withholding only proceedings
under 8 C.F.R. Section 1208.31(e) in the Western District of
Washington after having a removal order reinstated, and (2) have
been detained for 180 days (a) without a custody hearing or (b)
since receiving a custody hearing.

On Jan. 23, 2018, Magistrate Judge Brian A. Tsuchida issued a
report and recommendation concluding that the Plaintiffs were
entitled to summary judgment on their statutory claim that the
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") provides class members with
custody redetermination hearings before an immigration judge after
six months of detention.  A proposed order, declaring that the
Government violated 8 U.S.C. Section 1231(a)(6) by failing to
provide custody hearings to class members, accompanied the report
and recommendation.

The proposed order required the Government to (1) provide custody
hearings to each class member as soon as the individual's detention
reaches 180 days; (2) provide periodic custody hearings to the
class members at every 180-day mark of their detention; (3) provide
simultaneous notice of the class members' custody hearings to both
the class members and the class counsel; and (4) notify the class
members in the event the Government determines that an individual
is not a class member even though the individual meets the criteria
outlined by the class definition.  The proposed order did not
contain an end date or time limit for these requirements.  On Feb.
7, 2018, the Government filed its objections to the report and
recommendation but did not object to any specific aspect of the
proposed order.

On April 4, 2018, the Court adopted the Jan. 23, 2018, report and
recommendation "in its entirety," including the proposed order.
The parties filed a stipulated motion to extend to the deadlines
for the Government to begin conducting bond hearings pursuant to
the order, which the court granted.  Since May 23, 2018, the
Government has emailed the class counsel once a week notifying the
class counsel of the bond hearings provided to the class members,
if any, pursuant to the court's order.  There is no allegation that
the Government has not fully complied with the Court's April 4,
2018, order.

On May 30, 2018, the Government appealed the Court's judgment to
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.  The Government now seeks
relief from the Court under Rule 60 from the reporting requirements
under paragraphs 13 and 14 of its final order.

Judge Robart finds that the Government fails to demonstrate that
termination should occur prior to the completion of its Ninth
Circuit appeal.  Indeed, the Government provided no evidence to
support its allegations of "exceptional burden" when it initially
filed its motion.  The descriptions in its declarations do not
support the conclusion that the final order's reporting
requirements create an undue or excessive burden.

DOJ refers to itself as "the world's largest law office, employing
more than 10,000 attorneys nationwide."  Given these vast DOJ
resources, the Judge declines to find that the minimal resources
that the Government devotes to the final order's reporting
requirements are unduly burdensome.  As a result, he declines the
Government's invitation to alter the injunction while the
Government's appeal is pending.  Instead, he defers until the
Government's appeal is complete.  Following the Ninth Circuit's
ruling or other termination of the Government's appeal, the
Government may renote its motion for the Court's consideration if
appropriate at that time.

Based on the foregoing analysis, Judge Robart deferred ruling on
the Government's motion.  He further directed the clerk to
terminate the motion.  Following completion of the Government's
appeal, the Government may renote its motion for the Court's
consideration if appropriate at that time.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/SJvjre from Leagle.com.

Edwin Flores Tejada & German Ventura Hernandez, on behalf of
themselves as individuals and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Petitioners, represented by Matt Adams, NORTHWEST
IMMIGRANT RIGHTS PROJECT, Glenda Melinda Aldana Madrid, NORTHWEST
IMMIGRANT RIGHTS PROJECT & Leila Kang, NORTHWEST IMMIGRANT RIGHTS
PROJECT.

Nathalie Asher, Field Office Director, Thomas D Homan, Acting
Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, John F
Kelly, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; Lowell
Clark, Warden, James McHenry, Director of Executive Office for
Immigration Review & Jefferson B. Sessions, Acting Attorney
General of the United States, Respondents, represented by Gladys
M. Steffens Guzman, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CIVIL DIVISION & Sairah
G. Saeed, US DEPT. OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIGATION.


UNITED STATES: Lohmann Sues Over Unlawful Denial of Per Diem
------------------------------------------------------------
PAUL LOHMANNN, DAVID CARPENTER, JOE DUCKWORTH, JOSEPH FIELDS,
MIGUEL A. LOPEZ, NANCY PATRICK, MILES SAMUEL, THOMAS VAUGHN, MARIO
VILLEGAS, and MARK WILLIFORD on behalf of themselves and all other
individuals similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00994-LAS filed on July 11,
2019 in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, is a case arising from
the unlawful decision of the United States Department of the Army
to deny a significant subset of its Soldiers their authorized meals
and lodging reimbursement (hereinafter "per diem") (Travel and
Transportation Allowances).

Plaintiffs were all released from active duty and ordered to return
to their home of record (HOR) at the conclusion of every temporary
tour of duty. All of the Plaintiffs served on Temporary Change of
Station (hereinafter "TCS") orders that authorized them per diem at
a rate of 55% of the locality rate. Plaintiffs submitted claims for
per diem payment and such claims were wrongfully denied. The Army
based its denial of Plaintiffs' per diem on a rule erroneously
propounded in an Army Audit Agency report that required that
Soldiers must have a multi-day break (sometimes claimed to be
30-days other times claimed to be 90-days) between two duty
assignments at the same installation, even where that installation
was not the Soldier's HOR, in order to be authorized per diem.

This rule had no statutory or regulatory basis—in fact, it was in
direct contravention to applicable statute and regulation. This
denial forced hundreds of RC soldiers to maintain two households
with only one entitlement, i.e.: 1) their homes from which they
were activated and to which they returned annually when they were
released from active duty; and 2) their residence where they were
assigned on temporary active duty. The Army's unlawful denial of
per diem entitlements amounts to thousands of dollars improperly
refused to each of these Soldiers, in fact exceeding six figures
for most, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs were all reserve component (hereinafter "RC") Soldiers
who were temporarily mobilized from the RC to active duty and
assigned to Fort Hood, Texas for multiple, temporary tours of duty
between fiscal years (hereinafter "FY") 2014 and 2017.

Defendant is the United States of America, acting by and through
the Department of the Army and IMCOM, both of which are United
States Government Agencies.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Michael E. Silverman, Esq.
     HAFEMANN, MAGEE & THOMAS, LLC
     21 W. Park Avenue
     Savannah, Georgia 31401
     Phone: (912) 221-4441
     Email: mike@hhm.law

          - and -

     Jeremy S. McKenzie, Esq.
     C. Dorian Britt, Esq.
     KARSMAN, MCKENZIE & HART
     21 W. Park Avenue
     Savannah, GA 31401
     Phone: (912) 335-4977
     Email: Jeremy@kmtrial.com
            Dorian@kmtrial.com


VILLAS PAPILLON: Class Certification Order in Fernandez Vacated
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, VICTOR FERNANDEZ et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v. VILLAS PAPILLON, LLC, Defendant and Appellant, Case No. A151765
(Cal. App.), Judge Sandra Margulies of the Court of Appeals of
California for the First District, Division One, vacated the trial
court's judgment, including the order voiding the release
agreements, and the class certification order.

Plaintiffs Fernandez and Aburas filed a putative class action
complaint on behalf of current and former tenants against Villas
Papillon, alleging unlawful rent increases.  Villas Papillon is the
owner of a residential apartment complex located in Fremont,
California.  In 1997, the City of Fremont enacted a "Residential
Rent Increase Dispute Resolution Ordinance" (ordinance), which
requires landlords to comply with certain notice requirements when
imposing rent increases.  Since enactment of the ordinance, Villas
Papillon has increased rents by issuing notices of change of terms
to its tenants (rent increase notices).  The parties do not appear
to dispute the rent increase notices omitted certain language
required by the ordinance.

In 2013, the Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint alleging
Villas Papillon collected unlawful rent increases from its tenants.
After the complaint was filed, Villas Papillon presented release
agreements to its tenants.  The release agreements provided a rent
reduction and one-time rent concession in full and final settlement
of any and all claims by the Tenant against the Landlord relating
to the Notices of Change of Terms and any issues associated with
the Notice of Change of Terms.  The release agreements also
contained a broad release, which released Villas Papillon from any
and all actions, causes of actions, claims, demands, rights,
injuries, debts, obligations, liabilities, contracts, duties,
damages, costs, attorneys' fees, expenses or losses of every kind,
nature, character, or description whatsoever, that accrued at any
time prior to execution of the Agreement, whether known or unknown,
anticipated or unanticipated.  Additionally, the release agreements
contained a Civil Code section 1542 waiver of unknown claims.  Of
approximately 61 households, 47 executed release agreements.  The
Plaintiffs, however, did not execute release agreements.

The Plaintiffs subsequently filed an amended class action
complaint. In addition to the allegations contained in the original
complaint, the amended complaint asserted Villas Papillon attempted
to enforce the illegal rent increases by offering to return
portions of those illegal rent increases via the release
agreements, and that Villas Papillon separately violated the
ordinance by doing so.

In 2014, the Plaintiffs filed their motion for class certification.
Villas Papillon opposed the motion, arguing in part the proposed
class is not "sufficiently numerous," and the Plaintiffs could not
establish a community of interest.  Specifically, Villas Papillon
argued tenants who signed a release agreement would have distinct
factual and legal issues -- namely, the enforceability of those
release agreements -- from the Plaintiffs who did not sign such
agreements.

The trial court continued the hearing for class certification in
order to solicit additional briefing as to whether the validity of
the release agreements raised common legal and factual issues.
Following supplemental briefing, the trial court subsequently
granted in part the motion for class certification.  It restated
its prior holding, including its conclusion that the Plaintiffs'
claims were typical of the class.  The court found the validity of
the release agreements could be tried on a class basis, apart from
the Plaintiffs' theory that the release agreements were
unconscionable.

The parties submitted a stipulation to bifurcate trial, which was
granted by the court.  Pursuant to that stipulation, the
enforceability of the release agreements was tried in the first
phase.  Following a bench trial, the court held the release
agreements constituted a rent increase as defined in the ordinance,
and the release agreements did not have a lawful object and
violated public policy.  Phase II subsequently awarded damages to
the class members.  The court entered judgment in favor of the
Plaintiffs and the class.  

Villas Papillon timely appealed.  It asserts the trial court
erroneously certified the class because the Plaintiffs cannot
demonstrate their claims or defenses are typical of the class.

Judge Margulies agrees.  She opines that the Plaintiffs fail to
demonstrate their claims are typical of the class and thus have not
established such claims are appropriate for class treatment.  On
remand, the trial court should consider how the Plaintiffs' lack of
typicality impacts the class certification analysis, particularly
the question of numerosity.  The Judge further notes at oral
argument the Plaintiffs' counsel represented that only three of the
14 tenants who did not sign release agreements still reside at the
premises.  While no set number is required as a matter of law for
the maintenance of a class action, the trial court should consider
the size of the class as well as the nature of the action, the size
of the individual claims, the inconvenience of trying individual
suits, and any other factor relevant to the practicability of
joining all the putative class members.

The Plaintiffs request an order directing the trial court to grant
leave to amend to add new class representatives.  In response,
Villas Papillon argues the Plaintiffs should not be allowed to
amend because they are misusing discovery to locate a new class
representative, there is no evidence a releasor would want to serve
in such a capacity, and the statute of limitations has run on such
claims.

The Judge declines to resolve this dispute.  Leave to amend a
complaint is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court.
More importantly, the discretion to be exercised is that of the
trial court, not that of the reviewing court.  Accordingly, the
trial court should determine in the first instance whether the
circumstances of the case warrant granting the Plaintiffs leave to
amend.

For these reasons, Judge Margulies vacated the judgment of the
trial court, including the order voiding the release agreements,
and the order granting class certification.  She remanded the
matter for the trial court to reconsider the Plaintiffs' request
for leave to amend and their motion for class certification
consistent with the Opinion.  Villas Papillon may recover its costs
on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/b1CWf3 from Leagle.com.


WAL-MART: Alston, et al. Sue for Equal Pay for Female Staff
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
alleging that the retailer has engaged in, and continues to engage
in, unlawful gender discrimination by denying female employees
equal pay for hourly retail store positions and denying female
employees equal pay for certain salaried management positions. The
case is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
seeking to correct unlawful employment practices that discriminate
on the basis of gender and to provide appropriate relief to female
employees who were adversely affected by such practices.

The action springs from Dukes v. Wal-Mart, the national class
action filed more than 10 years ago. In Dukes, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California certified a
national class of female Wal-Mart and Sam's Club employees
challenging Wal-Mart's retail store pay policies as discriminatory
against women. On June 20, 2011, the United States Supreme Court
reversed that class certification order, imposing new guidelines
for class actions in Title VII employment discrimination cases.

All damages which the Plaintiffs have sustained as a result of
Wal-Mart's conduct, including back pay, front pay, compensatory
damages, and damages for lost compensation and job benefits that
they would have received but for the discriminatory practices
of Wal-Mart, the lawsuit says.

Wal-Mart is an American multinational retail corporation that
operates a chain of hypermarkets, discount department stores, and
grocery stores, headquartered in Bentonville, Arkansas.

The case is captioned JEWEL PRICE, CARLA ALSTON, KIMBERLY
AUSTIN-JOHNSON, NANCY BAISDEN, CYNTHIA BOSS, BILLIE BRENDLINGER,
LATONYA BRISCO-THOMPSON, MYRA BROWN, TONI BURTON, RENEE CHILES,
MARY-KAY DOBBS, MARYELLEN DUNNE, LIOUDMILA DYER, FAWN EHRENREICH,
RHONDA GALLIPOLI, CONNIE GAMARRA, ZOMORA GRANT, MARGARET HAMMELL,
DEBORAH HOLLOWAY, CAROLYN HOLMES, CATHERINE JACOBSON, SUSAN
JEFFERS, LUCILLE KLINE, FRANCES LIVINGSTON, CINDY LYMAN, GLORIA
MAIMONE, IRIS CASSETT MARCHAND, TANISHA MATTHEWS-WRIGHT, TAMIKO
MCNURLAN, LYNN MILLER, MARGO OWENS-WOOTEN, PAMELA PECK, LUCY
GIACOBBI SOTOMAYOR RAY, RACHEL RAY, CATHY REUSS, SHERRY RICHARDSON,
BARBARA SOLOMON, ANGEL STUMP-WOLFE, BARBARA SYMANSKI, RONDA
THOMSON-SPEARS, MONICA URBAN-KLOHN, TIFFANY WELCH, DONNA WILLIAMS,
and COLLEEN WOOL, the Plaintiffs, vs. WAL-MART STORES, INC., the
Defendant, Case No. 9:19-cv-80923-RNS (S.D. Fla., July 15,
2019).[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Cathleen Scott, Esq.
          Lindsey Wagner, Esq.
          SCOTT WAGNER AND ASSOCIATES, P.A.
          Jupiter Gardens
          250 South Central Boulevard, Suite 104
          Jupiter, FL 33458
          Telephone: (561) 653-0008
          Facsimile: (561) 653-0020
          E-mail: Cscott@scottwagnerlaw.com
                  lwagner@scottwagnerlaw.com

               - and -

          Leslie M. Kroeger, Esq.
          Diana L. Martin, Esq.
          Joseph M. Sellers, Esq.
          Christine E. Webber, Esq.
          COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL, PLLC
          2925 PGA Boulevard, Suite 200
          Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410
          Telephone: (561) 515-1400
          Facsimile: (561) 515-1401
          E-mail: lkroeger@cohenmilstein.com
                  dmartin@cohenmilstein.com
                  JSellers@cohenmilstein.com
                  Cwebber@cohenmilstein.com

WELLS FARGO: Loughran Moves to Certify Classes and Subclasses
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs move the Court to enter an order certifying the
lawsuit styled DANIEL LOUGHRAN & MARGARET LOUGHRAN, On their own
behalf and on behalf Of all others similarly situated v. WELLS
FARGO & COMPANY, WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. d/b/a WELLS FARGO HOME
MORTGAGE, MCCALLA RAYMER LIEBERT PIERCE, LLC, Individually and as
Successor in interest to Pierce & Associates, PIERCE & ASSOCIATES,
P.C., MAYER BROWN LLP, John Does 1-100, Case No. 1:19-cv-04023
(N.D. Ill.), as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The classes are defined as:

   1. Foreclosure Class:

      All Consumer Homeowners in the United States who, (i) after
      implementation of HAMP, (ii) were sued in a judicial
      foreclosure action (iii) by Plaintiffs identified in
      caption as "Trustee" for Wells Fargo Asset Securities
      Corporation Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, or a
      Pooling and Servicing Agreement for any Wells Fargo [Asset
      Securities Corporation] Mortgage-backed securities Trust,
      (iv) where the "Trustee" was not also the "Custodian," and
      (v) Wells Fargo was the "Custodian," (vi) Wells Fargo was
      Originator or Seller or Depositor or Guarantor or Sponsor
      or Securitization Trustee or Securities Underwriter for the
      Trust, and (vi) Wells Fargo had a right to "repurchase" the
      underlying promissory notes at any specified time after a
      foreclosure action was filed, including but not limited to
      a potential sub-class of cases in which (vii) Wells Fargo's
      foreclosure attorneys filed with the courts affidavits
      falsely claiming that the "Trustee" had possession of the
      original promissory note and/or filed with the courts or
      local county land records (Recorders') offices "assignments
      of mortgage" that failed to assign the promissory note,
      and/or (viii) were subjected to the same conduct
      ("predicate acts" of mail fraud and wire fraud) of the
      Enterprise described in the Amended Complaint at Paragraphs
      508-509 and Counts VI & VII;

      * Illinois Foreclosure Subclass:

        All individuals in the Foreclosure Class who reside in
        the State of Illinois;

   2. HAMP Class:

      All Consumer Homeowners in the United States who, (i) after
      implementation of HAMP, (ii) applied for a HAMP affordable
      modification through Wells Fargo Bank or Wells Fargo Home
      Mortgage ("Wells Fargo"); (iii) who were told by Wells
      Fargo that Wells Fargo serviced the Consumer Homeowners'
      loan for "your investor" or something conveying the same
      idea (the homeowners' investor); (iv) for the "Trustee" for
      "WFMBS" or "Wells Fargo Asset Securities Corporation" or a
      trust created by Wells Fargo as Depositor or Originator or
      similar; (v) with any series of certificates; and (iv) who
      were told they were denied a HAMP modification because
      Wells Fargo does not have contractual authority to modify
      the loan due to limitations in Wells Fargo's servicing
      agreement

      * Illinois HAMP Subclass:

        All individuals in the HAMP Class who reside in the State
        of Illinois; and

   3. "Software Error" Class:

      All Consumers who (i) were identified by Wells Fargo in
      August, 2018, (ii) as having been improperly denied a HAMP
      modification and/or improperly foreclosed on and/or lost
      their homes (iii) because of the so-called "software error"
      and (iv) were sent a check for any monetary amount based on
      having been so identified; and

      * Illinois "Software Error" Subclass:

        All individuals in the "Software Error" Class who reside
        in the State of Illinois.

These people are excluded from the Classes: (1) any Judge or
Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their
families; (2) Defendants, Defendants' subsidiaries, parents,
successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendant or
its parents have a controlling interest and its current or former
employees, officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute
and file a timely request for exclusion from the Classes; (4)
persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated
on the merits or otherwise released (other than those who may have
signed a release based on "software error" and/or are members of
"Software Error" Class); (5) Plaintiff's counsel and Defendant's
counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns
of any excluded persons.

Daniel Loughran and Margaret Loughran also ask the Court to appoint
them as representative of the Class and to appoint their counsel as
class counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          John Smith, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF JOHN SMITH
          5062 Rockrose Court, Suite 4
          Roscoe, IL 61073
          Telephone: (815) 552-0031
          E-mail: john@johnsmithlawyer.com


WISCONSIN: 8th Amendment & Due Process Claims in King May Proceed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CARLOS KING, THADDEUS KAROW, JAMES PRICE, CRAIG ALAN
SUSSEK, and VICTORIANO HEREDIA, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. STEVEN LANDREMAN, Acting
Chairperson and Commissioner of the Wisconsin Parole Commission;
DANIELLE LACOST, Commissioner of the Wisconsin Parole Commission;
DOUGLAS DRANKIEWICZ, Commissioner of the Wisconsin Parole
Commission, KEVIN CARR, Secretary-Designee of the Wisconsin
Department of Corrections; and MARK HEISE, Director of the Bureau
of Classification and Movement, in their official capacities,
Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-338-jdp (W.D. Wis.), Judge James D.
Peterson of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin granted the Plaintiffs leave to proceed on their Eighth
Amendment and due process claims.

Plaintiffs King, Karow, Price, Sussek, and Heredia have filed a
proposed class action on behalf of themselves and other similarly
situated Wisconsin prisoners who committed crimes as juveniles and
were sentenced to life in prison before 2000.  The Plaintiffs
allege that they have all reached their parole eligibility date,
but state officials have denied them a meaningful opportunity to
obtain release, in violation of their right to due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment, their right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, and their right to a
jury trial under the Sixth Amendment.  They allege that the
Defendants are Wisconsin officials who have input into parole
decisions and procedures.

Because the Plaintiffs are prisoners, Judge Peterson must screen
the complaint to determine whether it states a claim upon which
relief may be granted.  He will allow them to proceed on claims
under the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment.  But the
Plaintiffs must more fully explain the basis for their claim under
the Sixth Amendment.

As a threshold matter, the Judge finds that it does not appear that
the Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the rule in Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477, which prohibits prisoners from challenging the
validity of their confinement in the context of a federal civil
action.  In the case, the Plaintiffs are seeking to be reevaluated
for parole consideration under different criteria, which is not
barred by Heck.

The Plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claim relies on Montgomery v.
Louisiana, Miller v. Alabama, and Graham v. Florida, which, taken
together, hold that it is cruel and unusual under most
circumstances to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole on those who were under the age of 18 at the
time they committed their crimes.  They cite the statement in
Graham that the state must provide "some meaningful opportunity to
obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,"
and they allege that the Defendants have failed to provide that
meaningful opportunity by failing to consider the factors required
by the Supreme Court.  That is sufficient to state a claim under
the Eighth Amendment, the Judge finds.

The Plaintiffs' due process claim relies on the same case law.
Although the Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause
does not apply to discretionary parole decisions, the Plaintiffs
contend that the Supreme Court has narrowed the Defendants'
discretion by requiring them to provide a meaningful opportunity
for them to obtain release if they have demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation.  Other courts have accepted that contention.
Because the Plaintiffs allege that Wisconsin's procedures do not
provide them a meaningful opportunity to make the necessary
showing, the Judge concludes that the Plaintiffs have stated a
plausible claim under the Due Process Clause.

The Plaintiffs' claim under the Sixth Amendment relies on a line of
cases beginning with Apprendi v. New Jersey.  Those cases stand for
the proposition that the Sixth Amendment reserves to juries the
determination of any fact, other than the fact of a prior
conviction, that increases a criminal defendant's maximum potential
sentence.  The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants have denied
them parole based on facts about their crimes that were not found
by a jury or established by a guilty plea.  But all of the cases
the Plaintiffs cite are challenges to a prisoner's sentence, not to
a parole decision.  Accordingly, the Judge will direct the
Plaintiffs to show cause why their claim under the Sixth Amendment
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Peterson granted the Plaintiffs leave
to proceed on the following claims: (1) the Defendants have failed
to provide them a meaningful opportunity for release, in violation
of the Eighth Amendment; and (2) the Defendants' procedures for
making parole decisions are not sufficient to give the Plaintiffs a
meaningful opportunity to obtain release, in violation of the Due
Process Clause.

The Plaintiffs may have until June 18, 2019, to show cause why
their claim under the Sixth Amendment should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  The
Court will defer service until it makes a decision on whether the
Plaintiffs may proceed on their Sixth Amendment claim.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 4, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/RItuvI from Leagle.com.

Carlos King, On behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Thaddeus Karow, On behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, James Price, On behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Craig Alan Sussek & Victoriano Heredia,
On behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Asma Imtiazali Kadri -- akadri@aclu-wi.org --
American Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin Foundation, Avery
Gilbert -- avery@agilbertlaw.com -- Carly S. Conway --
carly.levin@quarles.co -- Quarles & Brady LLP, Emma Smith
Shakeshaft -- eshakeshaft@aclu-wi.org -- ACLU of Wisconsin
Foundation, Inc., Gregory T. Everts -- greg.everts@quarles.com --
Quarles & Brady, Heather Holden Brooks -- hbrooks@foley.com --
Foley & Lardner LLP, Issa Kohler-Hausmann --
issa.kohler-hausmann@yale.edu -- Yale Law School, Joseph R.
Santeler -- Joseph.Santeler@quarles.com -- Quarles & Brady,
Laurence J. Dupuis -- ldupuis@aclu-wi.org -- Aclu of Wisconsin
Foundation, Inc., Maria Lyon -- mlyon@foley.com -- Foley & Lardner,
Martha Jahn Snyder -- mjahn@quarles.com -- Quarles & Brady, Patrick
John Proctor-Brown -- patrick.proctor-brown@quarles.com -- Quarles
& Brady LLP & R. Timothy Muth -- tmuth@aclu-wi.org -- Aclu of
Wisconsin Foundation, Inc..



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