CAR_Public/190725.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Thursday, July 25, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 148

                            Headlines

250 EAST HOUSTON: Fischler Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
ACCIDENT FUND: Bid to Dismiss 2nd Amended Beatty ICFA Suit Nixed
ACER THERAPEUTICS: Howard G. Smith Files Securities Fraud Suit
ALAMEDA HEALTH: Court Rules on Reconsideration Bid in Soman Suit
ALDI INC: Removes Lacey-Salas Labor Suit to S.D. California

ALLSCRIPTS HEALTHCARE: Court Dismisses Surfside Suit w/o Prejudice
APRIA HEALTHCARE: Peterson Suit Alleges TCPA Violation
ASCENA RETAIL: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Fraud Suit
BAYADA HOME: To Provide Discovery of Contact Info for Reed Class
BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD: 6th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Sutton Suit

BOKF NA: Court Grants Dismissal of B. Walker Suit
BULLROCK LLC: Chapman Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
CAFE RIVIERA: Faces Marcos Suit Alleging Violations of FLSA, NYLL
CALIFORNIA: Court Dismisses Perryman Prisoner Suit
CANADA: To Compensate 718 Gay-Purge Victims in Settlement

CANNTRUST HOLDINGS: Robbins Arroyo Files Securities Fraud Suit
CASH AMERICA: Ohio Court Strikes Class Claims in Smith Suit
CAVALRY PORTFOLIO: Deutsch Sues Over FDCPA Violation
CBA: Faces 2 Shareholder Class Actions, July 26 Hearing
CENTRAL CALIFORNIA: Must Reply to Interrogatory Number 2 in Urena

CLIENT SERVICES: Court Certifies Class in Vandehey FDCPA Suit
DEFENDERS INC: Cox Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
DELOITTE & TOUCHE: Ciuffitelli Settlement Has Prelim Court Approval
DELTA HEALTHCARE: Accused by Mathis of Sending Unsolicited Texts
DESJARDINS GROUP: MP Says Data Breach Puts Bill C-59 to the Test

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Dismissal of Alston-Ajakaiye Claims Affirmed
DYNAMIC RECOVERY: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Smith FDCPA Suit
DYNAMIC RECOVERY: Reece Asserts Breach of FDCPA in Tennessee
EMIL FRANC: Graniero Seeks OT Pay
EXP REALTY: Court Denies Bid to Stay Wright TCPA Suit

EXPRESS PIPE: Judgment in Mortley Job Discrimination Suit Entered
FACEBOOK INC: Madrid Court Accepts Consumers Class Action
FORD MOTOR: Bleichmar Files Suit Over Fuel Economy Ratings
FORD MOTOR: Focus Vehicle Owner Alleges Transmission Defects
FORD MOTOR: Launched Vehicles in 2011 with Transmission Defects

FYRE MEDIA: Ja Rule Averts Fyre Festival Class Action Charges
GEORGE WASHINGTON: Court OKs Dismissal of Stanley ERISA Suit
GLOBAL RADAR: Sanders Settlement Has Preliminary Court Approval
HANSON AGGREGATES: 9th Cir. Affirms Class Decertification in NEI
HBS MANAGEMENT: Barrett Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages

HEALTHMARKETS: Declements Sues Over Unsolicited Text Messages
HYATT HOTELS: Brower Suit Asserts Unfair Collection of Resort Fees
ILLINOIS: Court Narrows M. Winger's Pro Se Rights Claims
ILLINOIS: Court Partly Grants Bid to Seal in Monroe Prisoners Suit
INSULATION DISTRIBUTORS: Removes Maker Suit to N.D. California

JEFFERSON EDUCATION BOARD: Duncan Suit Transferred to W.D. Ky.
JOHNSON MARK: Dismissal/Judgment on Pleadings Bids in Merrill OK'd
KIIP INC: Oct. 18 Class Action Settlement Approval Hearing Set
KONICA MINOLTA: Nunez Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
KOREA: Skadowski Sues over Botched Deal, Cites Abuse of Power

LASALLE COUNTY, IL: Court Dismisses Mayo Civil Rights Suit
LUCKY BRAND DUNGAREES: Gabriyelian Sues over Inaccessibile Website
LYFT INC: Pyron Suit Alleges Securities Act Breach
MADISON AVENUE: 7th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Casillas FDCPA Suit
MAMMOTH ENERGY: Pomerantz Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit

MARTIAL VIVOT: Nisbett Suit Alleges ADA Violation
MASSAGE ENVY: Settlement in McKinney-Drobnis Has Prelim Approval
MAZDA: Faces Class Action in California Over Water Pump Defects
MERRILL LYNCH: Alishaev Sues Over Futures Contracts Price-fixing
MIDDLE VILLAGE: Bid to Dismiss Parker-Leon Bullying Suit Denied

MONEY STORE: California Court Dismisses Asberry Suit w/ Prejudice
MOTT'S LLP: Court Issues Protective Order in Morris Suit
NCAA: Rembert Sues over Student-Athletes' Health & Safety
NEW AGE DISTRIBUTING: Christman Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
NEW JERSEY: Turnpike Authority Ordered to Prove E-ZPass Fines

NEW ZEALAND: Council of Licensed Firearms Owners Mulls Class Suit
NORTH AMERICAN: Pa. Court Dismisses Correa FDCPA Suit
NY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION: Faces Suit over IDEA Violations
OHIO NATIONAL: Objects to Ruling in Trail Commission Lawsuits
OREGON: Shortened School Day Case Faces Motion to Dismiss

OUTLAW LABORATORIES: Court Denies Bid for Judgment on Pleadings
PADULA BENNARDO LEVINE: Essen Sues over Unlawful Debt Collection
PAYLOCITY CORPORATION: Diebold Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
PDR VOICE: Court Dismisses Engelman Sexual Assault/Harassment Suit
PERFORMANCE FOOD: Settlement in Perez FCRA Suit Has Final Approval

PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Eckert & Tipton Sue over Debt Collection
POSITIVE ENERGY: Naiman Suit Alleges TCPA Violation
PREMERA BLUE CROSS: Pays $10MM to 30 States Over Data Breach
PREMERA BLUE: Settles HIPAA Violations with 30 States for $10.4MM
PURDUE PHARMA: County of Kauai Suit Removed to D. Hawaii

PYXUS INT'L: Rosen Law Files Securities Fraud Class Suit
RICHARDSON GMP: Lenczner Slaght Attorneys Discuss Court Ruling
ROCHESTER, NY: N.N. Files Civil Rights Class Action
SEFCU: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Story Suit Under EFTA
SEIDBERG LAW: $15K Attorneys' Fees Awarded in Akins FDCA Suit

SETTON FARMS: To Settles Workers' Wage Class Action
SIAM SMP INTER: Isidoro Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
SMARTPAY LEASING: STOP Text Message Class in Esparza Suit Certified
STATE FARM: Court Grants Bid to Stay Gregory Haskin Suit
STRATEGIC DELIVERY: Summary Judgment Dismissing Colon Suit Vacated

SUNSHINE PAYROLL: Fails to Pay Final Wages, Lara Says
T.J. MAXX: Bemmerly Suit Removed to C.D. California
TARGET CORP: Garcia Labor Suit Transferred to E.D. California
TAX EASE: 6th Cir. Affirms Summary Judgment in Brown Suit
TGI FRIDAYS: NJ Class Action Over Drink Prices Can Proceed

TRACTOR SUPPLY: Can Compel Arbitration in Sweeney Suit
TRANSAMERICA LIFE: Court Issues Protective Order in Thompson Suit
UBS SECURITIES: Court Grants Bid to Compel Arbitration in Zoller
UNITED BEHAVIORAL: Ct. Stays Mental Health Suit Pending Wit Ruling
UNITED STATES: Bids to Seal Docs in Alexander Suit Partly Granted

UNITED STATES: Carter et al. Sue over Camp Lejeune Water Pollution
UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA: Faces Class Action Over Alumni Data Issue
VORTEN: Nov. 2020 Settlement Claims Filing Deadline
WAITR HOLDINGS: Banks Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
WAYFAIR INC: Can Compel Arbitration in Gorny Suit

WV UNIVERSITY: Court Grants Writ of Prohibition in Thomack Suit
XCLUSIVE STAFFING: Court Denies $1.52MM Settlement Approval
[*] Opioid Negotiation Class Action Under Court Consideration
[*] Rule Amendment Paves Way for Corporate Class Action in India
[*] Scotland Mulls Adoption of US-Style Opt-Out Class Actions

[*] Sugar Companies Face Class Action Over Sugarcane Burning

                            *********

250 EAST HOUSTON: Fischler Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
-------------------------------------------------------------
250 East Houston Street Associates, L.P. is facing a class action
lawsuit filed pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The
case is styled as Brian Fischler, individually and on behalf of all
other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. 250 East Houston
Street Associates, L.P., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-06630 (S.D.
N.Y., July 16, 2019).

250 East Houston Street Associates, L.P. is a corporation
registered with the New York State Department of State.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   630 Third Avenue
   New York, NY 10017-6705
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: chris@lipskylowe.com

ACCIDENT FUND: Bid to Dismiss 2nd Amended Beatty ICFA Suit Nixed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL E. BEATTY, M.D., d/b/a THE SOUTHWESTERN
ILLINOIS PLASTIC & HAND SURGERY ASSOCIATES, individually and as the
Representative of a class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff,
v. ACCIDENT FUND GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Defendants,
Case No. 3:17-CV-1001-NJR-GCS (S.D. Ill.), Judge Nancy J.
Rosenstengel of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Illinois (i) denied Defendants' Omnibus Partial Motion to
Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint Based on the Statute of
Limitations; (ii) denied motions for summary judgment filed by
Country Mutual Insurance Co., Federated Mutual Insurance Co.,
Cannon Cochran Management Services, Inc.; and (iii) granted the
Plaintiff's motions to deny or defer considering those motions for
summary judgment under Rule 56(d).

Plaintiff Michael Beatty, M.D., filed the putative class action
pursuant to the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act ("ICFA"), alleging the Defendants have failed to pay
statutory interest on unpaid medical bills owed to Illinois
physicians who render services to patients covered under the
Illinois Workers' Compensation Act.  In part, Beatty claims the
Defendants -- since 2006 -- have fraudulently concealed their
failure to pay statutory interest to prevent him and other health
care providers from discovering the existence, nature, or extent of
their injuries, who caused the injuries, or that the injuries were
wrongfully caused.  As a result, he contends, the three-year
statute of limitations imposed by the ICFA has been tolled or has
not begun to run.

In July 2018, the Court granted, in part, the Defendants' first
motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations because
Beatty failed to plead his fraudulent concealment claim with the
level of particularity required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure,  The Court noted that when a plaintiff seeks
tolling of the statute of limitations, the complaint must state
what the fraud actually was and when the plaintiff discovered it,
so that the Court may evaluate whether he could have discovered it
through the exercise of due diligence.  Furthermore, the complaint
must inform each defendant of the nature of his alleged
participation in the fraud.  Beatty's complaint, however, lumped
all the Defendants' actions together and failed to explain how any
specific Defendant engaged in allegedly fraudulent activities or
when the fraudulent actions occurred.  Although the Court found
these deficiencies required dismissal of the fraudulent concealment
claims, it granted Beatty leave to amend his complaint.

On Aug. 2, 2018, Beatty filed his Second Amended Complaint.  The
Defendants again jointly move for partial dismissal of the
complaint, arguing Beatty has not -- and cannot -- plead fraud with
particularity.  Certain Defendants also have moved for summary
judgment on the claims against them on the basis of the statute of
limitations.

In the motion to dismiss, the Defendants jointly argue that
Beatty's Second Amended Complaint does not cure the pleading
deficiencies noted by the Court in its Order of July 2, 2018, as he
still does not plead fraud with particularity as to each specific
Defendant.  Moreover, for some Defendants, there is no basis even
alleged by Beatty under which the statute of limitations would be
tolled. Because further amendment would be futile, the Defendants
ask the Court to strike the Plaintiff's fraudulent concealment
claims in the Second Amended Complaint and bar all claims accruing
before Sept. 19, 2014, pursuant to the ICFA's three-year statute of
limitations.

In response, Beatty argues that dismissal on statute of limitations
grounds would still be premature, as discovery is ongoing.  Beatty
also asserts he cured the defects in his complaint by inserting
paragraphs 127 through 175, which state when specific Defendants
engaged in specific fraudulent activities, and that he should be
held to a less stringent pleading standard when the conduct alleged
involves numerous instances.  He asserts his allegations give
Defendants adequate notice of the particularities of the alleged
fraud and Defendants, through their own documents, should be aware
of other instances of similar conduct.  Even if every example were
time barred, he argues, because he also seeks injunctive relief,
dismissal of any Defendant is improper.

Accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and
drawing all reasonable inferences in Beatty's favor, Judge
Rosenstengel finds that that Beatty has sufficiently pleaded
fraudulent concealment under Rule 9(b).  The Second Amended
Complaint contains detailed allegations regarding the Defendants'
alleged concealment of their failure to pay statutory interest.
And as the Court previously stated in its July 2018 Order, through
discovery, Dr. Beatty may uncover additional evidence to further
develop his fraudulent concealment claims.  Again, the Judge finds
that dismissal on statute of limitations grounds would be premature
-- even for those Defendants not named in any of Beatty's examples
of concealment.  Any arguments on the statute of limitations would
be better suited for the summary judgment stage.

That brings the Judge to the pending motions for summary judgment
filed by Country Mutual, Federated Mutual, Cannon Cochran, and the
motions to deny or defer considering those motions for summary
judgment under Rule 56(d) filed by Beatty.  As noted by Beatty, the
Court ordered the parties to engage in discovery before it would
make a determination on the Defendants' statute of limitations
defenses.  Instead, these Defendants filed motions for summary
judgment based on the examples listed in the original Complaint. No
depositions had been taken at the time the motions were filed, the
Defendants had failed to produce certain documents at that time,
and some of the documents that were produced uncovered new patients
not referenced in the moving Defendants' motions.  Accordingly, the
Judge grants Beatty's Rule 56(d) motions and denies the motions for
summary judgment without The Defendants are free to refile their
motions for summary judgment after discovery has concluded.

For these reasons, Judge Rosenstengel denied the Defendants'
Omnibus Partial Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint
Based on the Statute of Limitations.  She denied the motions for
summary judgment filed by Country Mutual, Federated Mutual, and
Cannon Cochran without prejudice.  She granted the Plaintiff's
motions to deny or defer considering the Defendants' motions for
summary judgment under Rule 56(d).

A full-text copy of the Court's June 7, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/n0Rbf7 from Leagle.com.

Michael Beatty, Plaintiff, represented by John G. Simon --
jsimon@simonlawpc.com -- Simon Law Firm PC, Benjamin R. Askew --
baskew@simonlawpc.com -- Simon Law Firm PC, Robert H. Wendt --
rwendt@wendtlawfirm.com -- Wendt Law Firm & Kevin M. Carnie, Jr.
-- kcarnie@simonlawpc.com -- Simon Law Firm PC.

Accident Fund General Insurance Company, Accident Fund Insurance
Company of America & Accident Fund National Insurance Company,
Defendants, represented by John Sandberg --
jsandberg@sandbergphoenix.com -- Sandberg, Phoenix et al.,
Anthony L. Martin -- amartin@sandbergphoenix.com -- Sandberg,
Phoenix et al. & Natalie J. Kussart --
nkussart@sandbergphoenix.com -- Sandberg, Phoenix et al.

Acuity, A Mutual Insurance American Compensation Insurance
Company, Defendant, represented by Glenn F. Fencl --
fenclg@jbltd.com -- Johnson & Bell LTD., Amber N. Lukowicz --
lukowicza@jbltd.com -- Johnson & Bell, Ltd. & Genevieve M.
LeFevour -- lefevourg@jbltd.com -- Johnson & Bell, Ltd.

American Zurich Insurance Company & Zurich American Insurance
Company, Defendants, represented by Bruce M. Engel --
bengel@freeborn.com -- Freeborn & Peters LLP, Patrick C. Frye --
pfrye@freeborn.com -- Freeborn & Peters LLP & Robert M. Baratta,
Jr. -- bbaratta@freeborn.com -- Freeborn & Peters LLP.

Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company & Auto Owners Insurance
Company, Defendants, represented by Lori A. McAllister --
lmcallister@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett PLLC.

Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Insurance Company, Defendant,
represented by Wendy N. Enerson -- wenerson@cozen.com -- Cozen
O'Connor & Thaddeus C. Baria -- tbaria@cozen.com -- Cozen
O'Connor.

Broadspire Services Inc. & Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by Richard B. Polony --
rpolony@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson & Kyle C. Oehmke -
- koehmke@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP.

Cannon Cochran Management Services, Inc., Defendant, represented
by Edward S. Bott, Jr. -- esb@greensfelder.com -- Greensfelder,
Hemker & Gale, PC & Robert Duckels -- rld@greensfelder.com --
Greensfelder, Hemker & Gale, PC.

Constitution State Services, LLC & Travelers Property & Casualty
Company of America, Defendants, represented by Raja S. Gaddipati,
DLA Piper US LLP & Joseph Anton Roselius --
joseph.roselius@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper LLP.

Chubb Indemnity Insurance Company, ESIS, Inc. & Indemnity
Insurance Company of North America, Defendants, represented by
Mark D. Bauman -- mbauman@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson,
David M. Schultz -- dschultz@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw &
Culbertson & James M. Brodzik -- jbrodzik@hinshawlaw.com --
Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP.

Commerce and Industry Insurance Company, Inc., Illinois National
Insurance Company, Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania
& New Hampshire Insurance Company, Defendants, represented by
Shane W. Blackstone -- sblackstone@winston.com -- Winston &
Strawn, Adam J. Kaiser -- adam.kaiser@alston.com -- Alston & Bird
LLP & Steven Robert Campbell -- steven.campbell@alston.com --
Alston & Bird LLP.


ACER THERAPEUTICS: Howard G. Smith Files Securities Fraud Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Law Offices of Howard G. Smith reminds investors of the upcoming
August 30, 2019 deadline to file a lead plaintiff motion in the
class action filed on behalf of investors who purchased Acer
Therapeutics Inc. (NASDAQ: ACER) securities between September 25,
2017 and June 24, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period").

Investors suffering losses on their Acer investments are encouraged
to contact the Law Offices of Howard G. Smith to discuss their
legal rights in this class action at 888-638-4847 or by email to
howardsmith@howardsmithlaw.com.

On June 25, 2019, the Company revealed a Complete Response Letter
("CRL") from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration regarding its
marketing application for EDSIVO, a medication for the treatment of
Ehlers-Danlos syndrome.  According to the CRL, "an adequate and
well-controlled trial" was required to determine whether EDSIVO
"reduces the risk of clinical events" in patients with vascular
Ehlers-Danlos syndrome.

On this news, the Company's share price fell $15.16, or nearly 79%,
to close at $4.12 on June 25, 2019, thereby injuring investors.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects.  Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) Acer lacked sufficient data to support filing
EDSIVO's NDA with the FDA for the treatment of vEDS; (2) the Ong
Trial was an inadequate and ill-controlled clinical study by FDA
standards, and was comprised of an insufficiently small group size
to support EDSIVO's NDA; (3) consequently, the FDA would likely
reject EDSIVO's NDA; and (4) that, as a result of the foregoing,
Defendants' positive statements about the Company's business,
operations, and prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked
a reasonable basis.

If you purchased shares of Acer during the Class Period you may
move the Court no later than August 30, 2019 to ask the Court to
appoint you as lead plaintiff if you meet certain legal
requirements.  To be a member of the class action you need not take
any action at this time; you may retain counsel of your choice or
take no action and remain an absent member of the class action. If
you wish to learn more about this class action, or if you have any
questions concerning this announcement or your rights or interests
with respect to these matters please contact:

         Howard G. Smith, Esq.
         Law Offices of Howard G. Smith
         3070 Bristol Pike, Suite 112,
         Bensalem, Pennsylvania 19020
         Website: www.howardsmithlaw.com
         Phone: 215-638-4847
         Toll free: 888-638-4847
         Email: howardsmith@howardsmithlaw.com [GN]



ALAMEDA HEALTH: Court Rules on Reconsideration Bid in Soman Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAS SOMAN, Plaintiff, v. ALAMEDA HEALTH SYSTEM,
Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-06076-JD (N.D. Cal.), Judge James Donato
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
has issued an order on motion for relief from judgment.

In the putative class action, Soman alleged claims against her
former employer, Defendant Alameda Health System ("AHS"), under the
Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") and the California Investigative
Consumer Reporting Agencies Act ("ICRAA").  The thrust of the
second amended complaint was that AHS violated the statutes by
combining the disclosures they require with boxes highlighting
certain related rights under California, New York, Minnesota, and
Oklahoma law.

The Court dismissed the second amended complaint with prejudice on
Dec. 3, 2018, on the grounds that the state law references were
closely tied to the legislative goals of the FCRA and ICRAA, and
could not be said to be confusing, misleading or otherwise
improper.  Soman filed a notice of appeal on Dec. 11, 2018.

A few weeks later, on Jan. 29, 2019, the Ninth Circuit published an
opinion reaching a different result.  In Gilberg v. California
Check Cashing Stores, LLC, the circuit reversed summary judgement
for the Defendant on FCRA and ICRAA claims that challenged the
inclusion of additional state law disclosure rights in the FCRA
disclosure document. The court determined that the word "solely" in
the FCRA and ICRAA meant just that, and the inclusion of any other
terms, even if "closely related" to the purposes of these statutes,
was not permitted.  The circuit remanded the matter for further
proceedings in light of these conclusions.

The disclosures in Gilberg are substantively identical to the ones
Soman challenges.  Consequently, the Court invited the parties to
bring a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal with prejudice.
Soman accepted the invitation and filed a motion under Rule
60(b).

While it is of course true that the Court cannot enter a
reconsideration order while the appeal is pending, the Court may
indicate whether it would grant such a motion as an aid to the
circuit court.  Judge Donato holds that Gilberg leaves no doubt
that the second amended complaint states a plausible claim, and so
he would grant the motion if the matter were remanded.  In the
interests of judicial efficiency and economy, the Judge directed
Soman to advise the court of appeals of his order within seven days
of the date of filing.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 5, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/t5IERu from Leagle.com.

Jas Soman, Plaintiff, represented by Chaim Shaun Setareh -- o
shaun@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group, Thomas Alistair Segal
--
thomas@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group & Howard Scott Leviant
-- scott@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group.

Alameda Health System, Defendant, represented by Fletcher C.
Alford
-- falford@grsm.com -- Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, Edward
Romero -- eromero@grsm.com -- Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP &
Kevin Liu -- kliu@grsm.com -- Gordon & Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP.


ALDI INC: Removes Lacey-Salas Labor Suit to S.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Defendants removed on July 10, 2019, the purported class action
lawsuit entitled JENNIFER LACEY-SALAS, an individual, on behalf of
herself and on behalf of all persons similarly situated v. ALDI
INC., a California corporation; AI CALIFORNIA LLC, an unknown
business entity; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Case No.
37-2019-00029288-CU-OECTL, from the Superior Court of the State of
California for the County of San Diego to the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of California.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:19-cv-01269-MMA-MDD to
the proceeding.

Plaintiff Jennifer Lacey-Salas filed this class action complaint on
June 7, 2019.  The Complaint asserts eight causes of action for:
(1) Unfair Competition in Violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
Sections 17200, et seq., (2) Failure to Pay Overtime Wages, (3)
Failure to Provide Required Meal Periods, (4) Failure to Provide
Required Rest Periods, (5) Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized
Statements, (6) Failure to Reimburse Employees for Required
Expenses, (7) Failure to Provide Wages When Due, and (8) Violation
of the Private Attorneys General Act.[BN]

Defendants ALDI INC. and AI CALIFORNIA LLC are represented by:

          Laura Wilson Shelby, Esq.
          Leo Q. Li, Esq.
          Jennifer R. Nunez, Esq.
          SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
          2029 Century Park East, Suite 3500
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-3021
          Telephone: (310) 277-7200
          Facsimile: (310) 201-5219
          E-mail: lshelby@seyfarth.com
                  lli@seyfarth.com
                  jnunez@seyfarth.com


ALLSCRIPTS HEALTHCARE: Court Dismisses Surfside Suit w/o Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SURFSIDE NON-SURGICAL ORTHOPEDICS P.A., individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
ALLSCRIPTS HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 18 C 566
(N.D. Ill.), Judge Sara L. Ellis of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted Allscripts
Healthcare Solutions, Inc. ("INC")'s motion to dismiss for lack of
standing.

In January 2018, a strain of ransomware called "SamSam" infected
2,100 of Allscripts Health Care Solutions, LLC ("LLC")'s servers in
North Carolina.  LLC is a healthcare information technology ("IT")
company.  Ransomware is a type of malware that encrypts data on the
victim's computer and demands payment in exchange for unlocking it.
The attack temporarily prevented Surfside from accessing EHR and
e-prescribing medication to patients.  The attack temporarily
disrupted service to customers, including Plaintiff Surfside.

Surfside consequently brought a putative class action against
Defendant INC, the parent company to LLC, alleging negligence,
breach of contract, unjust enrichment, as well as violations of the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, and
the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.  

INC moves to dismiss Surfside's claims on the grounds that Surfside
lacks standing to sue and has failed to adequately plead its
claims.

Judge Ellis finds that while LLC may have carelessly used INC's
name in some documents, that is not a sufficient basis to allow the
Court to find that INC qualifies as a direct participant in the
incident.   The majority of the evidence shows that INC's behavior
was consistent with normal parent-subsidiary behavior.  It further
demonstrates that INC was a mere holding company that had no part
in the security failure that led to the ransomware attack.  As
such, Surfside has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence
that its injury is fairly traceable to INC, and therefore INC is
not the proper Defendant in the case.

Surfside asks the Court for monetary compensation and equitable
relief compelling Allscripts to utilize appropriate methods and
policies with respect to ransomware protection.  But if the
Plaintiff has sued the wrong defendant, the Judge cannot redress
its injury.  The evidence shows that INC is non-operational,
whereas LLC (1) budgets for cybersecurity activities, (2) drafts
the security policies, (3) owns and copyrights the security
policies, (4) implements the security policies, (5) owns and
operates the servers that were affected by the ransomware attack,
and (6) is responsible for responding to security breaches.  As
such, it would be futile for the Court to order INC to implement
appropriate security measures. Nor can the Court order damages from
the wrong defendant.

Because Surfside has not shown that INC caused the injury of which
it complains, Judge Ellis dismissed without prejudice the complaint
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The case is terminated.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 4, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/ZulNK6 from Leagle.com.

Surfside Non-Surgical Orthopedics, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by John A.
Yanchunis -- jyanchunis@ForThePeople.com -- Morgan & Morgan,
Complex Litigation Group, Robert A. Clifford -- rac@cliffordlaw.com
-- Clifford Law Offices, P.C., Shannon Marie McNulty --
smm@cliffordlaw.com -- Clifford Law Offices, Brittany R. Ford,
Abbott Law Group, P.A., pro hac vice, Joel R. Rhine --
jrr@rhinelawfirm.com -- Rhine Martin Law Firm, P.C. & Steven W.
Teppler -- teppler@abbottlawpa.com -- Mandelbaum Salsburg, P.C.

Allscripts Healthcare Solutions, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Livia McCammon Kiser -- lkiser@kslaw.com -- King and Spalding LLP,
Jade R. Lambert -- jlambert@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding LLP &
Michael B. Shortnacy -- mshortnacy@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding
LLP.


APRIA HEALTHCARE: Peterson Suit Alleges TCPA Violation
------------------------------------------------------
Scott Peterson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Apria Healthcare Group, Inc., Case No. 6:19-cv-00856
(M.D. Fla., May 6, 2019), is brought against the Defendant for
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Defendant violated TCPA by willfully placing calls and sending
text messages to the cellular telephones of the Plaintiff and
putative Class Members for non-emergency purposes, using an
automatic telephone-dialing system without their prior express
consent.

The Plaintiff is a citizen of the state of Florida and is one of
the many recipients of the Defendant's calls.

The Defendant is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business located at 26220 Enterprise Court Lake Forest, California.
The Defendant provides home healthcare products and services and
conducts business throughout the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      John A. Yanchunis, Esq.
      Jonathan B. Cohen, Esq.
      MORGAN & MORGAN COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP
      201 N. Franklin St., 7th Floor
      Tampa, FL 33602
      Tel: (813) 223-5505
      Fax: (813) 222-2434
      E-mail: jyanchunis@forthepeople.com
              jcohen@forthepeople.com


ASCENA RETAIL: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Fraud Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, reminds
purchasers of the securities of Ascena Retail Group, Inc. from
September 16, 2015 through June 8, 2017, inclusive (the "Class
Period"), of the important August 6, 2019 lead plaintiff deadline
in the securities class action. The lawsuit seeks to recover
damages for Ascena investors under the federal securities laws.

To join the Ascena class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1601.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Ascena's acquisition of ANN, Inc., the parent company of
Ann Taylor and LOFT, was a complete disaster for the Company as
ANN's operations were in far worse condition than had been
represented to the public; (2) to mask the true condition of ANN,
defendants improperly delayed recognizing an impairment charge to
the value of ANN's goodwill and, as a result, Ascena's reported
income and assets were materially overstated and the Company's
financial results were not prepared in conformity with GAAP; (3)
many of the brands acquired in the ANN acquisition were in steep
decline and were also materially overvalued on Ascena's Class
Period financial statement; and (4) as a result, defendants'
positive statements about Ascena's business, operations, and
prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable
basis. When the true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims
that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than August 6,
2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf
of other class members in directing the litigation. If you wish to
join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1601.htmlor to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com.

Contact:

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
         New York, NY 10016
         Phone: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Website: www.rosenlegal.com
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com
                cases@rosenlegal.com [GN]


BAYADA HOME: To Provide Discovery of Contact Info for Reed Class
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LATISHA REED AND NADEEM PIERRE, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON
BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, v. BAYADA HOME HEALTH
CARE, INC., Appellant, Case No. 3129 EDA 2018 (Pa. Super.), Judge
Mary D. Colins of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania quashed the
Appellants' appeal from the order of Sept. 26, 2018, (i) granting
the motion to compel discovery of Appellees, Latisha Reed and
Nadeem Pierre, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, and (ii) overruling the Appellant's objections to the
Appellees' first set of requests for production of documents.

On Aug. 3, 2016, the Appellees commenced the action by filing a
class action suit, alleging violation of Pennsylvania wage and hour
statutes on behalf of themselves and similarly situated nurses who
constituted the suit's potential class members.  On Sept. 15, 2016,
the Appellees issued their first set of requests for production of
documents ("First RFP") to the Appellant, requesting contact
information and wage and hour data for all potential class members
in Pennsylvania.  After the Appellant failed to respond, on Feb.
24, 2017, the Appellees filed a motion to compel discovery.

On March 17, 2017, the parties filed an "Unopposed/Joint Motion for
Protective Order" with a Stipulated Confidentiality Agreement.  In
the ad damnum clause of the Unopposed/Joint Motion for Protective
Order, the Parties moved the trial Court to enter the accompanying
Order making the Stipulated Confidentiality Agreement an order of
court.  However, no executed order appears in the certified
record.

On April 20, 2017, the Appellant informed the Appellees that it
would be willing to produce the wage and hour data from one of its
116 Pennsylvania offices.  On May 16, 2017, in a letter to the
Appellant's counsel, the Appellees offered to limit their discovery
request to wage and hour data from 10 to 20 of the Appellant's
offices in Pennsylvania from Aug. 3, 2013, until the present.  The
Appellant rejected the Appellees' offer.

Following a status conference on May 31, 2017, the trial court
ordered parties to file briefs on the outstanding motion to compel
discovery.  On June 12, 2017, the Appellant filed its brief.  The
next day, the Appellees filed a second motion to compel. After the
Appellant filed its response to the second motion to compel and
Appellees filed their reply memorandum of law, the Appellees wrote
a letter to the trial court, asserting that they would limit their
requests to the names, addresses, emails and phone numbers for the
class members.

On Sept. 26, 2018, the trial court entered an order granting the
Appellees' motion to compel discovery and overruled the Appellant's
objections to the Appellees' First RFP.  The September 26th Order
stated that the Appellant must produce the names, addresses, phone
numbers and email addresses of the Class members in Pennsylvania
within 20 days of the date of the docketing of the Order.  The
Appellant was not ordered to produce personnel files, wage and hour
data, or anything beyond the potential class members' contact
information.

The Appellant did not seek clarification from the trial court as to
whether the September 26th Order compelled production of complete
personnel files and/or wage and hour data of every potential class
member nor did it move for reconsideration of the order.  On Oct.
16, 2018, the Appellant filed the appeal.

On Dec. 27, 2018, the Appellees moved to quash the appeal.  On Feb.
8, 2019, the Court denied the motion without prejudice to the
Appellees to raise the issue again in their appellate brief, which
they did.

On Jan. 29, 2019, the trial court issued a responsive opinion
recommending that the Court quashes the Appellant's interlocutory
appeal and reiterating that its September 26th Order ordered the
Appellant to produce the names, addresses, phone numbers, and email
addresses of the class members in Pennsylvania within 20 days.

Judge Colins concludes that the Appellant failed to assert a
constitutional or statutory privacy interest or a specific
privilege.  Its generalized concerns about privacy and privilege
are inadequate to satisfy the requirement of Pa.R.A.P. 313(b) that
the right involved is too important to be denied review.
Consequently, the Appellant has failed to satisfy the second prong
of the test for the appealability of collateral orders as it
relates to the September 26th Order.

Accordingly, she quashed the appeal.  The September 26th Order thus
stands, and the Appellant must provide discovery of all personal
contact information for all current and former employees who could
constitute the class members in Pennsylvania within 20 days of the
date of this memorandum.  By a plain reading of the September 26th
Order, the Appellant is not required to provide personnel files to
Appellees at this time.  

To the extent that any of the information provided is actually
confidential as the Appellant has alleged, the Appellant may mark
it as such, and it will be protected pursuant to the Stipulated
Confidentiality Agreement; the Judge hence advised the trial court
to execute the order attached to the Unopposed/Joint Motion for
Protective Order and may add any additional language thereto that
it deems necessary to preclude the Appellees' counsel from
releasing any of the contact information provided by the Appellant
to any third parties.  The trial court will order any additional
relief or clarification that it deems fit.

Appeal quashed.  Oral argument cancelled.  Case remanded.
Jurisdiction relinquished.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 7, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/FgMpZ0 from Leagle.com.

Thomas G. Collins -- thomas.collins@bipc.com -- Buchanan Ingersoll
& Rooney P.C., Holly Lechliter Cline -- holly.cline@bipc.com --
Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney P.C., for Appellant, Bayada Home Health
Care, Inc.

Michael D. Shaffer -- mshaffer@shaffergaier.com -- Shaffer & Gaier,
LLC, James Craig Shah -- ishah@sfmslaw.com -- Shepherd, Finkelman,
Miller & Shah, L.L.P., for Appellee, Latisha Reed, et al.


BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD: 6th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Sutton Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN DOE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD
OF TENNESSEE, INC., Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 18-5897 (6th
Cir.), Judge Jeffrey Sutton of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's order (i) granting
BlueCross's motion to dismiss the complaint and (ii) denying Doe
leave to amend.

John Doe is HIV-positive and takes Genvoya to keep his condition
under control.  While advances in HIV/AIDS research continue to
improve treatment for the disease, the most effective medicines can
be expensive.  Doe receives health insurance from BlueCross.
Happily for him, the plan covers Genvoya.

Unhappily for him, BlueCross imposes requirements on where
individuals obtain the medication.  Doe originally bought Genvoya
from his local pharmacy.  But after February 2017, the pharmacy
told him that BlueCross wouldn't pay for the medication there any
longer.  BlueCross requires beneficiaries to obtain specialty
medicines -- usually high-cost medicines for chronic and serious
diseases -- from a specialty pharmacy network if they want to pay
in-network (read lower) prices.  That meant Doe could fill the HIV
prescription only through mail order or by picking it up at certain
brick-and-mortar pharmacies.  So long as Doe used the specialty
pharmacy network, his co-pay for each monthly batch of Genvoya
would be $120.  But if Doe continued to get the medicine at his
local pharmacy, BlueCross wouldn't cover it at all, leaving him to
pay full freight at thousands of dollars per batch.

This development bothered Doe.  He liked interacting with his
regular pharmacists, who knew his medical history and who could
spot the effects of harmful drug interactions.  He also worried
that medicine deliveries to his house might compromise his privacy
or risk heat damage to the medicine.  Doe asked BlueCross for
permission to opt out of the specialty medications program.
BlueCross declined.

Doe filed the putative class action against BlueCross, alleging
that it discriminated against him and other HIV-positive
beneficiaries in violation of the Affordable Care Act as well as
the Americans with Disabilities Act and that it breached their
insurance contract.  The district court granted BlueCross's motion
to dismiss the complaint and denied Doe leave to amend.

Judge Sutton finds that BlueCross did not exclude Doe from
participating in the plan or deny him benefits covered by it, as he
seems to concede.  And contrary to his argument, the plan's
specialty medications program did not discriminate against him
based on disability.  Doe cannot show that BlueCross intentionally
discriminated against him.  The plan's specialty medications list
is neutral on its face.  The common trait linking the listed drugs
is cost, not the disabled status of their users.  Because the
specialty medications program does not distinguish based on
disability, much less "solely" so, it does not convey any
discriminatory intent.  The truth of the matter is that Doe targets
BlueCross's operation of his health care plan, not its control over
his pharmacy. And Doe's health plan simply does not qualify as a
public accommodation.

Doe alleges that BlueCross breached its contract with him by
violating its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Tennessee law, it is true, imposes a duty of good faith in the
performance of contracts.  But as Doe seems to concede, the failure
of his Affordable Care Act and Americans with Disabilities Act
claims dooms his argument that BlueCross violated its duty of good
faith by inadequately covering his Genvoya.  Doe's contract claim
does not get off the ground.

Doe ends by arguing that the district court should have let him
amend his complaint a second time.  But in his request for leave to
amend, Doe did not explain to the district court how he intended to
patch up his complaint.  On appeal, he has provided a few hints
about amendments he would like to make, but they would still leave
his complaint inadequate.  A court need not grant leave to amend
when doing so would be futile.

In light of the foregoing, Judge Sutton affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 4, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/eJEq9E from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Jerry Flanagan -- jerry@consumerwatchdog.org -- CONSUMER
WATCHDOG, Los Angeles, California, for Appellant.

Todd Kim -- tskim@reedsmith.com -- REED SMITH LLP, Washington,
D.C., for Appellee.

ON BRIEF: Jerry Flanagan, CONSUMER WATCHDOG, Los Angeles,
California, Edith M. Kallas, WHATLEY KALLAS, LLP, New York, New
York, Alan M. Mansfield -- alan@clgca.com -- WHATLEY KALLAS, LLP,
San Diego, California, Jerry Martin -- jmartin@barrettjohnston.com
-- Seth M. Hyatt -- shyatt@barrettjohnston.com -- BARRETT JOHNSTON
MARTIN & GARRISON, LLC, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant.

Todd Kim, REED SMITH LLP, Washington, D.C., Bryan M. Webster --
bwebster@reedsmith.com -- Abraham Judson Souza --
asouza@reedsmith.com -- REED SMITH LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for
Appellee.


BOKF NA: Court Grants Dismissal of B. Walker Suit
-------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss in the case captioned BERKLEY V. WALKER, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BOKF,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION d/b/a BANK OF ALBUQUERQUE, N.A., Defendant.
No. 1:18-cv-00810-JCH-JHR. (D.N.M.).

The Plaintiff filed a putative class action on behalf of himself
and others similarly situated. Plaitiff asserted only one claim,
alleging that the extended overdraft fees in BOKF's standardized
deposit account agreement are interest and that the interest rate
violates the National Bank Act ("NBA"). The Plaintiff contends that
Defendant is effectively charging an annulaized interest rate of
between 501% and 2,464%, or 83 times what the Defendant may legally
charge under the NBA.  

The Defendant filed the Motion to Dismiss, arguing extended
overdraft fees are not interest under the NBA. In support, the
Defendant asserts that there is a long history of case law where
courts held that both initial and extended overdraft fees are not
interest under the NBA, although there is no Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision that directly resolves this issue.  

The Defendant further asserts the interpretation of the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") of overdraft fees places
extended overdraft fees as an element of deposit account services
rather than interest.  

In response, the Plaintiff urges the Court to adopt the reasoning
outlined in Farrell v. Bank of Am. N.A., 224 F.Supp.3d 1016 (S.D.
Cal. Dec. 19, 2016), which is the only court to find that extended
overdraft fees are interest rates under the NBA.

First, the Plaintiff argues that initial overdraft fees and
extended overdraft fees are entirely separate and triggered at
different times and for different reasons. Although initial
overdraft fees are deposit account services, extended overdraft
fees cannot be considered connected to the same banking services
banks provide to their depositors.  

Therefore, the Plaintiff contends that extended overdraft fees
should be subjected to the usurious interest rate regulations of
the NBA.  

LEGAL STANDARD

The Defendant moves to dismiss the only only cause of action uder
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To establish a claim for relief, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Though a
complaint need not provide detailed factual allegations, it must
give enough factual detail to provide fair notice of what the claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests. A recitation of the
elements of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory
statements do not count as a well pleaded facts when determining
plausibility.  

Extended overdraft fees are not interest under the NBA

The Plaintiff does not dispute the initial overdraft fee, only the
extended overdraft fees. Thus, the only issue before the Court is
whether extended overdraft fees are considered interest under the
NBA. If the extended overdraft fees are interest, the percentage
value exceeds the limit in the NBA, and the Plaintiff has
established a claim upon which relief can be granted. However, if
the extended overdraft fees are not interest, but rather some other
charge, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss must be granted due to the
Plaintiff's failure to state a claim.

The Plaintiff argues the Interpretative Letter 1082 is silent and
gives no definite guidance on collecting extended overdraft fees.
However, the overdraft fee system considered and determined to be
valid under the NBA included both initial and extended overdraft
fees. There is nothing in the relevant OCC regulations or the
Letter to indicate any inclination on OCC's part to treat extended
overdraft fees differently than intial overdraft fees when
determining if the fee is considered interest. OCC's conclusion
that the overdraft fee system in question was lawful, that it did
not violate the NBA, and that overdraft fees are not considered
interest therefore extends to both the initial and extended
overdraft fees.

Part of the Plaintiff's argument is that overdraft fees in general
reverse the relationship between the bank and the account holder.
Plaintiff does not challenge the initial $34.50 overdraft fee that
Defendant assessed on his account. Rather, Plaintiff challenges
only the extended overdraft fees, saying that they are functionally
interest under the NBA.  Plaintiff argues that when a bank advances
funds to an over-drafted depositor, the bank creates a debt on
which the consumer pays interest. Plaintiff notes that the intial
overdraft fee is charged when the account first becomes overdrawn,
whereas the extended overdraft fee is charged when the deposit
account remains negative after five business days. The extended
overdraft charge is therefore related to the passage of time from
failure to pay back the initial overdraft fee, rather than the
overdraft itself. As such, Plaintiff argues that the extended
overdraft fees are not related to deposit account services and
therefore extended overdraft fees are better characterized as
interest on the initial overdraft fees.

However, the Plaintiff's arguments have been roundly rejected by
all courts other than the Farrell court. The Farrell court did not
consider or cite to Interpretive Letter 1082 in its reasoning,
which one court has said squarely contradicts Plaintiff's and
Farrell's view of the relationship between the account holder and
the bank. In re TD Bank, 2018 WL 1101360 at *10. In the Letter, OCC
plainly held that processing and recovering overdraft fees are not
exercises in a bank's right to collect a debt.  

Farrell aside, federal courts have routinely deferred to the OCC's
view and held that overdraft fees are not interest under the NBA.


The Plaintiff's attempt to draw a distinction between intial and
overdraft fees fails because, aside from Farrell, courts have
consistently held that both initial and extended overdraft fees are
contingent upon a customer overdrawing their account.  

Courts have found further reasons to hold extended overdraft fees
are better characterized as non-interest charges. The First Circuit
in Fawcett recently listed a few it believed were the most
persuasive. First, the extended overdraft fees are from the terms
of a bank's deposit account agreement with its customers.  Even
without considering the Letter, courts have found this information
relevant when classifying charges as deposit account charges and
non-interest.  

Second, extended overdraft fees lack the hallmarks of credit
extensions because the overdraft does not involve a customer
reaching out to the bank to borrow money.  Lastly, extended
overdraft fees do not operate like interest because the amount is a
flat flee applied to any overdrawn balance, not a percentage
applied to a specific principal. Id. Extended overdraft fees bear
none of the normal characteristics of interest or credit. Instead,
extended overdraft fees are more similar in purpose and application
to initial overdraft fees, a non-interest deposit account charge.
Therefore, this Court declines to follow the reasoning in Farrell,
and instead joins other courts in holding extended overdraft fees
are not interest under the NBA.

Lastly, the Plaintiff argues that the covering of an overdraft
account is a loan by the bank to the account depositor. Plaintiff
relies partly on the Joint Guidance on Overdraft Protection
Programs, which states when overdrafts are paid, credit is
extended, for the contention that covering an overdrawn account is
essentially loaning credit to the account holder.  

However, previous courts that considered the Joint Guidance hold it
to be inapplicable to the question at hand. The Joint Guidance is
not an interpretation of the OCC with regards to the NBA, nor does
it purport to be. Rather, the Joint Guidance predates Interpretive
Letter 1082, and thus is not OCC's last word on overdraft programs
including both initial and extended overdraft fees.

Finally the statement when overdrafts are paid, credit is extended,
in context refers to a credit risk to the institution from charging
off the negative balance from other sources if a bank decides to
honor an overdrawn account. In this scenario, the bank does not
become a creditor to the account holder if the account becomes
overdrawn, which is a typical feature of a creditor-debtor
relationship.

Here, the Plaintiff did not borrow money or obtain a line of credit
from Defendant. Plaintiff is not charged for the use of money, but
rather for overdrawing their account and then failing to timely
remedy the overdraft. Therefore, this Court joins the numerous
courts in holding a bank does not loan money in the event an
account becomes overdrawn.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 15, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6b7jgl9 from
Leagle.com.

Berkley V Walker, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin H. Richman --
brichman@edelson.com -- Edelson PC & Micheal W. Ovca --
movca@edelson.com -- Edelson PC.

BOKF, National Association, doing business as Bank of Albuquerque,
N.A., Defendant, represented by Benjamin F. Feuchter, HInkle
Shanor, LLP, 400 Pennsylvania, Suite 640, Roswell, NM 88201, J.
Michael Medina, Frederic Dorwart Lawyers PLLC, pro hac vice & Sarah
Poston, Frederic Dorwart Lawyers PLLC, 124 E 4th St, Tulsa, OK
74103-5027, pro hac vice.


BULLROCK LLC: Chapman Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------
HARLEY CHAPMAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. BULLROCK, LLC, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-00141-CRH (D. N.D., July 12, 2019) is a lawsuit to recover
unpaid overtime wages and other damages from Defendant Bullrock,
LLC under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").

Plaintiff Chapman and the other workers like him regularly worked
for Bullrock in excess of forty hours each week. But these workers
never received overtime for hours worked in excess of forty hours
in a single week. Instead of paying overtime as required under the
FLSA, Bullrock improperly classified Chapman and those similarly
situated workers as independent contractors and paid them a
day-rate with no overtime compensation. This collective action
seeks to recover the unpaid overtime wages and other damages owed
to these workers, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Chapman was employed by Bullrock in 2017 and 2018 as a
water disposal operator.

Bullrock is an oil and gas service provider operating across the
United States, including North Dakota.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
     Andrew Dunlap, Esq.
     JOSEPHSON DUNLAP
     11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
     Houston, TX 77046
     Phone: 713-352-1100
     Facsimile: 713-352-3300
     Email: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
            adunlap@mybackwages.com

          - and -

     Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
     BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
     8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
     Houston, TX 77046
     Phone: (713) 877-8788
     Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
     Email: dmoulton@brucknerburch.com


CAFE RIVIERA: Faces Marcos Suit Alleging Violations of FLSA, NYLL
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ISMAEL HERNANDEZ MARCOS, On Behalf of Himself and All Others
Similarly Situated v. CAFE RIVIERA INC., MALGORZATA TOKARSKA and
EVA TOKARSKA, Case No. 1:19-cv-03981 (E.D.N.Y., July 10, 2019),
arises from the Defendants' alleged flagrant and willful violations
of the Plaintiff's rights guaranteed to him by:

     (i) the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
         Acts;

    (ii) the FLSA's minimum wage provisions;

   (iii) the overtime provisions of the New York Labor Law;

    (iv) the NYLL's minimum wage provisions;

     (v) the NYLL's requirement that employers provide on each
         payday proper wage statements to their employees
         containing specific categories of accurate information;

    (vi) the requirement that employers furnish employees with a
         wage notice at the time of hiring and/or on an annual
         basis containing specific categories of information; and

   (vii) the requirement that employers pay spread of hours
         premiums under the N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs.

Cafe Riviera is a domestic business corporation with its principal
place of business located at 830 Manhattan Avenue, in Brooklyn, New
York.  The Individual Defendants are officers, owners or day-to-day
overseers of Cafe Riviera.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Amit Kumar, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF WILLIAM CAFARO
          108 West 39th Street, Suite 602
          New York, NY 10018
          Telephone: (212) 583-7400
          E-mail: AKumar@Cafaroesq.com


CALIFORNIA: Court Dismisses Perryman Prisoner Suit
--------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Carolyn K. Delaney of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of California dismissed the case, DAVID
PERRYMAN, Plaintiff, v. GAVIN NEWSOM, et al., Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-0071-CKD-P (E.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in the civil
rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.  He is a
mentally ill inmate incarcerated at California State
Prison-Sacramento at all times relevant to the allegations in the
complaint.  He suffers from schizophrenia, ADHD, and paranoia and
generally alleges that he was removed from the Enhanced Outpatient
Program because he is high-functioning and smart.  The Plaintiff
also alleges that several Defendants wrote false reports about him
and included these in his medical records.  By way of relief, the
Plaintiff seeks class action certification, the appointment of a
guardian ad litem/attorney, and monetary damages.

The Plaintiff requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis.  Since
he has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by
28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a), his request will be granted. The
Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350 for
the action.  By separate order, Judge Delaney will direct the
appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from
the Plaintiff's trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the
Court.  Thereafter, the Plaintiff will be obligated for monthly
payments of 20% of the preceding month's income credited to his
prison trust account.  These payments will be forwarded by the
appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount
in his account exceeds $10, until the filing fee is paid in full.

Judge Delaney finds the allegations in the Plaintiff's complaint so
vague and conclusory that it fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.  Although the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give
fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and
succinctly.  The Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of
particularity over acts which the efendants engaged in that support
his claims.

The Plaintiff contends that he should be the class representative
for an alleged class action suit.  However, he cannot bring the
suit as a class action.  The Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and
lacks authority to appear as an attorney for anyone other than
himself. Thus, the Judge will not consider the Plaintiff's class
action allegations.

The Judge notes that the Plaintiff brings the action against the
Defendants in both their official and individual capacities and
names the CDCR as well as the CDCR's Mental Health Department as
Defendants.  However, he finds that the Plaintiff may not bring a
suit for damages against the Defendants in their official
capacities.  Therefore, the Plaintiff fails to state a claim for
damages against the Defendants in their official capacities since
he is not seeking declaratory or injunctive relief.

With respect to the named Defendants who are the Warden, the Chief
Psychiatrist of CDCR, the Chief Psychologist of CDCR, the Directors
of the P.S.U and E.O.P Programs, and other unknown supervisory
personnel, these individuals are generally not liable under Section
1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of
respondeat superior.  The Plaintiff's allegations against all of
these Defendants fail to allege a sufficient causal link to any
constitutional violation based on their supervisory authority.

The Plaintiff's allegations concerning his level of mental health
care are insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim against
any Defendant for their deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs.  He is cautioned that, in applying the deliberate
indifference standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it
can be said that a prisoner's civil rights have been abridged, the
indifference to his medical needs must be substantial.

The Plaintiff's allegations fail to state a separate cognizable
claim against any Defendant in regard to the issuance of false
reports.  The Judge finds that as long as a prisoner is afforded
procedural due process in the disciplinary hearing, allegations of
a fabricated charge generally fail to state a claim under section
1983.  The Plaintiff does not allege a cognizable claim against
defendants Schmidt, Haynes, Alicea, and Pham who allegedly wrote
false reports about the Plaintiff because there is no allegation
that they were written in retaliation for his prior grievances or
other protected conduct.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff fails to state
a cognizable claim based on the issuance of false reports.

For the foregoing reasons, the Judge will dismiss the Plaintiff's
complaint.  He will, however, grant leave to file an amended
complaint.  If the Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, he
must demonstrate how the conditions complained of have resulted in
a deprivation of his constitutional rights.  Also, in his amended
complaint, he must allege in specific terms how each named
Defendant is involved.  There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection
between a defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation.
Furthermore, vague and conclusory allegations of official
participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient.

Finally, the Plaintiff is informed that the Court cannot refer to a
prior pleading in order to make his amended complaint complete.
Once he files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer
serves any function in the case.  Therefore, in an amended
complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the
involvement of each Defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

As part of his complaint, the laintiff requests the appointment of
counsel to assist him in the suit.  Having considered the factors
under Palmer v. Valdez, the Judge finds that the Plaintiff has
failed to meet his burden of demonstrating exceptional
circumstances warranting the appointment of counsel at this time.
He will therefore deny the Plaintiff's request for the appointment
of counsel without prejudice.

The Judge has reviewed the allegations in the complaint and
concluded that it does not state a claim against any of the named
Defendants.  However, these problems may be fixable the Plaintiff
is being given the chance to file an amended complaint within 30
days from the date of the order.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Delaney granted the Plaintiff's
request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.  The Plaintiff is
obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350 for the action.
All fees will be collected and paid in accordance with the Court's
order to the Director of the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith.

The Judge dismissed the Plaintiff's complaint.  She granted the
Plaintiff 30 days from the date of service of the Order to file an
amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil
Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local
Rules of Practice.  The amended complaint must bear the docket
number assigned the case and must be labeled "Amended Complaint."
Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with the Order
will result in a recommendation that the action be dismissed.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 5, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/d7OcFJ from Leagle.com.

David Perryman, Plaintiff, pro se.


CANADA: To Compensate 718 Gay-Purge Victims in Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------
Coast Mountain News reports that the settlement was a cornerstone
of a sweeping federal apology delivered in November 2017.

Some victims of the federal government's gay purge were so
devastated by the experience that even decades later they needed
the help of a therapist to fill out forms to receive financial
compensation, says the lawyer who led a successful class action.

Several claimants were still so mistrustful of the government after
being investigated or fired for their sexual orientation that they
worried the compensation process was an elaborate ruse to elicit
information that would be used to punish them again, said Doug
Elliott, who had to coax eligible people to sign on.

A total of 718 people -- fewer than Elliott had anticipated --
filed the necessary paperwork for compensation by last month's
deadline under a historic settlement that was finalized in 2018.

It includes at least $50 million and up to $110 million in overall
compensation, with eligible people each expected to receive between
$5,000 and $175,000, depending on the gravity of their cases. Some
have already received their cheques.

The settlement was a cornerstone of a sweeping federal apology
delivered in November 2017 for decades of discrimination against
members of the LGBTQ community.

Under policies that took root in the 1950s and continued into the
early '90s, federal agencies investigated, sanctioned and sometimes
fired lesbian and gay members of the Canadian Armed Forces, the
RCMP and the public service because they were deemed unsuitable.

Many who kept their jobs were demoted or overlooked for promotions
or had security clearances rescinded.

The campaign was driven by the notion that the "character weakness"
of homosexual employees would make them susceptible to blackmail in
the tense climate of the Cold War.

"This thinking was prejudiced and flawed. And sadly, what resulted
was nothing short of a witch-hunt," Prime Minister Justin Trudeau
said in the apology in the House of Commons on behalf of the
government.

When a judge approved the settlement in June 2018, Lt.-Col.
Catherine Potts felt vindicated after the years of persecution she
endured. "It's truly a human-rights victory for all of us."

The 718 claimants include 628 people who served in the Armed
Forces, 78 public servants and 12 RCMP officers.

The group is disproportionately female, reflecting the fact
considerable numbers of men died from AIDS and that men generally
tend not to live as long as women do. The oldest claimant, who was
kicked out of the Air Force in the early 1960s, is now 92.

Elliott had anticipated between 750 and 1,000 people would step
forward.

However, some eligible candidates, including older people who were
not active in the gay community, had not heard about the case.

But there was a bigger obstacle.

"The main problem was that people who were aware of the settlement
were having tremendous psychological difficulties filing their
claims," Elliott said in an interview.

"We had to go to some extraordinary effort to encourage people to
file and to support them through the filing process. Some people
had to sit down with their therapists and complete the form in
therapy sessions . . . That was a reasonably common experience for
our claimants."

Many were wary of the entire process.

"It's hard to overstate the level of paranoia. A lot of people felt
that it was all a trick and a trap, and they were going to lay bare
their souls to the government, and the government was going to
refuse to pay them and was going to use the information against
them somehow," Elliott said.

"These people are very damaged by their experience, and very
mistrustful. Even the very well-adjusted ones live in a state of
barely contained anxiety that something terrible is about to happen
to them, particularly in the employment context. A lot of them fear
that they're going to show up at work, and they're going to be
suddenly fired."

Many lost their jobs at young ages and had not come out to family
about their sexuality, making it very difficult to explain what had
happened to them.

Most of those purged did manage to get back on their feet
eventually, Elliott said. But many went through prolonged periods
of unemployment and suffered mental-health problems, addiction or
homelessness.

One former Mountie burned his red serge.

Some never recovered from being shunned by the country they'd once
taken pride in serving, Elliott said. "They've gone from one
precarious job to another or simply been unable to work at all,
because they were so shattered by the experience that they
basically became unemployable."

The settlement includes millions of dollars for reconciliation and
remembrance measures, including a national monument to be built in
Ottawa, a Canadian Museum for Human Rights exhibition in Winnipeg
and declassification of archival records documenting the dark
chapter.

Social gatherings are also being organized so purge survivors can
meet directors of the commemoration fund. At a recent event in
Vancouver, Elliott thanked those present for their service to the
country. A woman came up to him afterwards in tears.

"She said that that was the first time anyone had said that to
her," he recalled.

"I cannot tell you the number of class members who have said, 'I
can't believe someone's finally listening to me.' [GN]


CANNTRUST HOLDINGS: Robbins Arroyo Files Securities Fraud Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Shareholder rights law firm Robbins Arroyo LLP announces that a
purchaser of CannTrust Holdings Inc. (NYSE: CTST) filed a class
action complaint for alleged violations of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 between November 14, 2018 and July 5, 2019. CannTrust
produces and distributes medical and recreational cannabis in
Canada.

According to the complaint, in December 2018, CannTrust disclosed
its expansion plans in Pelham, Ontario. By April 2019, CannTrust
announced that its greenhouse in Pelham, Ontario was fully
licensed, stating that it was confident "[its] processes meet and
exceed regulatory standards" and touting that this expansion would
meet its plan to reach 50,000kg of capacity in its harvest.
However, these statements were deliberately misleading as they
omitted the material adverse facts that CannTrust was growing
cannabis in its Pelham greenhouse while its application for
regulatory approval was still pending. In July 2019, CannTrust
revealed that its Pelham greenhouse was determined non-compliant
with regulations and that it had been growing cannabis in
unlicensed rooms, which led to a hold on inventory by Health Canada
causing product shortages for CannTrust's customers and patients.
On this news, the stock fell $1.11, more than 22%, to close at
$3.83. The stock has yet to recover.

Concerned shareholders who would like more information about their
rights and potential remedies can contact:         

         Leo Kandinov, Esq.
         Robbins Arroyo LLP
         5040 Shoreham Place
         San Diego, CA 92122
         Phone: (619) 525-3990
         Toll Free: (800) 350-6003
         Website: www.robbinsarroyo.com
         Email: LKandinov@robbinsarroyo.com [GN]


CASH AMERICA: Ohio Court Strikes Class Claims in Smith Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BLANCHE T. SMITH, Plaintiff, v. CASH AMERICA
INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant, Case No. 1:15-CV-00760-MRB (S.D.
Ohio), Judge Michael R. Barrett of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, granted the
Defendant's Motion to Strike Class Allegations.

On Aug. 11, 2015, the Plaintiff visited a Cash America location in
Bond Hill, Hamilton County, Ohio.  She was interested in obtaining
a "pawn loan" on a sterling silver metal cross with diamonds.  The
Plaintiff had previously pawned items at the Defendant's store.
The Defendant requested and the Plaintiff acquiesced to allow it to
inspect the pendant.  The Defendant removed the pendant from the
Plaintiff's line of sight and inspected it.  It then returned the
pendant to the Plaintiff, advising her that it would not make a
"pawn loan" on her piece of jewelry.  The Plaintiff did not sign
any paperwork or otherwise provide any information to the
Defendant.

After leaving the store, the Plaintiff discovered that the pendant
had been cut and some form of acid poured over the pendant.  She
has had no further contact with the Defendant.  She believes it
would cost approximately $40-$45 to fix the pendant.

The Plaintiff brought the action on behalf of herself and a
putative National class and Ohio subclass, asserting the following
claims: 1) Trespass to Chattels; 2) Fraudulent
Concealment/Nondisclosure; 3) Breach of Bailment; 4) Violation of
Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices Act; 5) Violation of the Ohio
Consumer Sales Practices Act ("OCSPA"); and 6) Declaratory
Judgment/Injunctive Relief.

The Court dismissed Count IV (Violation of Ohio Deceptive Trade
Practices Act), but the other claims remain pending.

Thie matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to
Strike.  After the Plaintiff opposed and the Defendant replied, the
Court held the Motion to Strike in abeyance while the Parties
conducted targeted discovery on five discrete issues: (i) the
Defendant's pawn loan business, practices, policies and procedures;
(ii) the Defendant's jewelry authentication process, including
practices, policies and procedures; (iii) the Defendant's policies
and procedures specific to its Bond Hill store in 2015; (iv) the
Defendant's recordkeeping systems, policies, procedures, and
retention policies; and (v) the Defendant's employee training
practices, policies, and procedures for jewelry authentication.

The Parties have fully briefed the Motion to Strike, and submitted
supplemental memoranda after conducting the referenced discovery.
The issue before the Court now is whether the Plaintiff's claims
asserted on behalf of the putative class should stand, or be
stricken prior to the completion of discovery.

The Plaintiff's Ohio and National classes are defined as consumers
who had jewelry appraised and inspected by Cash America.  As an
overarching theme, the Defendant asserts that, even assuming the
Plaintiff's allegations are true, no class can be certified based
on the inspection process because liability and injury turn upon
individual issues such as reliance, consent, waiver, proximate
cause, and assumption of risk that are elements of the Plaintiff's
claims or Defendant's affirmative defenses.  

According to the Defendant, the class allegations should be
stricken for the following reasons: (1) the class is not
ascertainable, and includes persons who lack standing; (2) the
Plaintiff's proposed class lacks predominance; (3) the Plaintiff's
claims are not typical of the putative class; (4) the Plaintiff's
proposed class lacks commonality; (5) the Plaintiff is not entitled
to injunctive relief; (6) the Plaintiff's National Class must be
stricken; and (7) the Plaintiff lacks standing to assert claims on
behalf of class members from states other than Ohio.

There is some disagreement in the district regarding who bears the
burden at the motion to strike phase.  Judge Barrett will assume
without deciding that the Defendant bears the burden of
establishing that the Plaintiff will be unable to demonstrate facts
supporting certification.

He finds that (i) the Plaintiff's proposed class (including the
sub-class) fails because the proposed class includes individuals
who are not ascertainable or have no standing; (ii) individual
issues outweigh common issues; (iii) the Plaintiff cannot satisfy
typicality under Rule 23(a)(3); (iv) built into the Plaintiff's
allegations are numerous factual issues that relate to consent; (v)
the Plaintiff's failure with respect to typicality alone is fatal
to any hope of certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) class; and (vi)
regardless of the Plaintiff's standing, the National class suffers
from the same defects as her Ohio subclass, and will be stricken.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Barrett granted the Defendant's
Motion to Strike.  The Plaintiff may pursue her individual claim
against the Defendant. However, the matter is remanded to the Clerk
for the Court of Common Pleas for Hamilton County, Ohio because the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, given the diminished
amount in controversy in the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/g6jHHn from Leagle.com.

Blanche T Smith, Plaintiff, represented by Brian T. Giles --
Brian@GilesLenox.com -- Bryce A. Lenox -- Bryce@GilesLenox.com --
at Giles & Lenox LLC

Cash America International, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Anthony M. Sharett -- asharett@bakerlaw.com -- Caroline Dettmer
Slye -- cdettmerslye@bakerlaw.com -- Keesha N. Warmsby --
kwarmsby@bakerlaw.com -- Rand L. McClellan --
rmcclellan@bakerlaw.com -- at Baker & Hostetler LLP


CAVALRY PORTFOLIO: Deutsch Sues Over FDCPA Violation
----------------------------------------------------
Rachel Deutsch and Eliezer Smaia, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Cavalry Portfolio
Services, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-04035-BMC (E.D. N.Y.,
July 12, 2019) seeks to recover for violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").

In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendant contacted
Plaintiffs by letter dated January 3, 2019 and February 26, 2019.
The Plaintiffs' Letters fails to state whether the payment must be
sent by the consumer, or received by the Defendant, by the stated
deadline. The Letters can be interpreted by the least sophisticated
consumer, to mean that such payment must be mailed to the
Defendant, by the stated deadline. The Letters can also be
interpreted by the least sophisticated consumer, to mean that such
payment must be received by Defendant, by the stated deadline. As a
result of the foregoing, in the eyes of the least sophisticated
consumer, the Letters is open to more than one reasonable
interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate, says the
complaint.

Plaintiffs are individuals who are natural persons allegedly
obligated to pay a debt.

Defendant is regularly engaged, for profit, in the collection of
debts allegedly owed by consumers.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     BARSHAY SANDERS, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 706-5055
     Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com


CBA: Faces 2 Shareholder Class Actions, July 26 Hearing
-------------------------------------------------------
Grace Ormsby and Eliot Hastie, writing for InvestorDaily, report
that despite protests from CBA, two law firms have been granted
permission to work together to bring two separate class actions
against the major bank without combining their proceedings.

CBA is facing two separate class actions on behalf of shareholders,
both in regard to the bank's failure to alert the market about
money laundering through its deposit machines.

Both Phi Finney McDonald and Maurice Blackburn had launched class
actions against CBA off the back of an AUSTRAC case back in 2018,
which the bank had tried to be merged into one class action.

The major bank argued that the reasoning for the abandonment of the
consolidation proposal in face of a cooperative case was down to an
opportunity in the interest of the lawyers, and not who they
represented.

However, the Supreme Court's Honourable Justice Yates disagreed and
made a cooperative case order, which will allow both firms to work
on behalf of their clients in their own class actions but with one
set of counsel to represent applicants and group members in
proceedings.

The class actions stem from a 2018 AUSTRAC court case where the
bank settled with AUSTRAC due to 53,700 contraventions of the
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006
(AML/CTF Act) for failing to carry out AML/CTF financing risk
assessments prior to rolling out intelligence deposit machines
(IDMs), which facilitate anonymous cash deposits.

The Phi Finney McDonald claim was brought on behalf of investors
who acquired CBA shares between 16 June 2014 to 3 August
(inclusive) 2014, but was also noted as being limited to those that
executed litigation funding agreements with Therium Australia Ltd
prior to commencement, a statement from Phi Finney McDonald said.

The Maurice Blackburn class action, filed in 2017, was filed on
behalf of investors who suffered losses due to the share price fall
following AUSTRAC's institution of legal proceedings against the
CBA, and is open to purchasers of ordinary CBA shares during the
period from 1 July 2015 to 3 August 2017 and still held some or all
of those shares until after 1pm on that end date.

The cooperative case management order also aims to ensure that
applicants "use their best endeavours to ensure that all
correspondence and other communication from the applicants'
solicitors to the respondent's solicitors shall be sent or made
jointly on behalf of the applicants by only Maurice Blackburn Pty
Ltd or Phi Finney McDonald Pty Ltd" where proceedings are common,
the judgment explained.

In coming to his decision, Justice Yates had required the firms to
prepare a cooperative litigation protocol that would govern joint
activity under any proposed cooperative case management orders,
with CBA submitting that it had "considerable concerns" with the
protocol.  

CBA had argued that Maurice Blackburn and Phi Finney McDonald's
reasoning for abandonment of an original consolidation proposal in
favour of cooperative case management orders "can only be seen as
an opportunity to advance the interests of the 'service providers'
(the two litigation funders and the two firms of solicitors), not
the group members".

It also submitted that the regime proposed by the cooperative case
management orders relied heavily on true cooperation between "the
funders, lawyers and the applicants", which, according to CBA, "is
unlikely to be realised if the conduct of the two proceedings to
date is an indicator of the extent of future cooperation", the
judgment noted.

Justice Yates did say one possibility for the best management of
the two proceedings could be to consolidate the pair, but was
reluctant to order consolidation "when no party advances it (or
supports it) and where, as presently advised, I see no real
advantage in taking that step".

He added that absent any cooperation between the applicants in the
conduct of the two proceedings, such as it was proposed by the
plaintiff firms, "there will inevitably be a large amount of
duplicated work undertaken in respect of the management of the two
proceedings, and in preparing and presenting the two cases at
trial".

"Much of this duplication can be avoided if the work required is
undertaken cooperatively on a joint basis. And if the duplication
of work and resources can be avoided as is now proposed, it can be
expected that overall costs will be correspondingly reduced," he
explained.

"This outcome would be to the advantage of all parties, in
particular CBA."

Justice Yates also accepted that while cooperative case management
orders and the litigation protocol "have the potential to add to
overall costs and, possibly, to produce some delay", the bank
"greatly overstates that potential".

"What is abundantly clear is that, whatever potential might exist
for increased costs or some possible delay, that potential is far
outweighed by the benefits that the cooperative case management
orders and litigation protocol will almost certainly bring to the
proceedings," he continued.

A case management hearing for both proceedings will take place on
July 26, 2019. [GN]


CENTRAL CALIFORNIA: Must Reply to Interrogatory Number 2 in Urena
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSE URENA, an individual, on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CENTRAL CALIFORNIA ALMOND
GROWERS ASSN. and DOES 1-10., Defendants, Case No.
1:18-cv-00517-LJO-EPG (E.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Erica P.
Grosjean of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
California granted the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel.

Urena, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,
brings the instant class action suit against Defendant Central
California Almond Growers Association, asserting a variety of
causes of action under California and Federal Law generally
concerning wages and meal and rest periods.  The Plaintiff, on
behalf of himself and others similarly situated, filed the wage and
hour class action on April 13, 2018 alleging that Defendant Central
California Almond Growers Association failed to provide required
meal and rest periods, failed to maintain records of meal periods,
failed to issue accurate itemized wage statements, failed to
properly compensate for all hours worked, failed to pay all wages
due at the end of employment, and engaged in unlawful and unfair
business practices in violation of the California Labor Code and
applicable IWC Wage Orders, and that such alleged actions also
violate the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker protection
Act.

On Aug. 6, 2018, the Plaintiff amended his complaint adding a
derivative claim under California's Private Attorneys General Act.
The putative class includes non-exempt hourly agricultural
employees of the Defendant from April 13, 2018, until the present.

At issue in the instant discovery dispute is the Plaintiff's
Interrogatory Number 2, which instructs the Defendant to identify
each and every putative class member employed by it during the
relevant time period.  

On Dec. 21, 2018, the Defendant served objections to interrogatory
number 2, which provided, in pertinent part, that: The Defendant
has agreed to provide certain information, including a sampling of
payroll records and time keeping records in advance of the
mediation while redacting names and contact information subject to
an appropriate tracking number.  It agrees to meet and confer with
the Plaintiff to engage in a Bel-Aire notice process regarding the
disclosure of non-parties' identities.

The Defendant now contends that it should only be required to
produce the names and last known contact information for the
proposed class members who did not sign arbitration agreements.  It
has apparently agreed to produce the contact information for the
putative class members who have not signed arbitration agreements.

On April 4, 2019, the Court held an informal discovery dispute
conference with the parties and gave the Plaintiff permission to
file a motion to compel regarding the production of the putative
class list.  On May 3, 2019, the Plaintiff filed the instant motion
to compel the putative class list.  The Defendant filed an
opposition on May 10, 2019; the Plaintiff filed a reply on May 17,
2019.  The Court heard oral argument on May 24, 2019.

The Defendants primarily argue that the Plaintiff cannot make a
prima facie showing under Rule 23, therefore rendering discovery as
to the potential class improper.  The impetus for its argument is
that the Plaintiff, unlike many members of the proposed class, did
not sign an arbitration agreement.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff's
claims are not typical of the putative class members who signed
arbitration agreements; nor is he an adequate representative of the
class, as those who signed the arbitration agreement might have
unique defenses that the Plaintiff would be unable to argue on
their behalf.

Regarding the Defendant's argument that the Plaintiff cannot make a
prima facie showing that class certification is appropriate under
Rule 23, without deciding the issue, Magistrate Judge Grosjean
notes that such a showing is not necessarily required before
authorizing pre-certification discovery.  The Defendant has not
pointed to any case limiting discovery before class certification
to the putative class members who are not parties to an arbitration
agreement.

In considering whether discovery of all putative class members is
appropriate, the Magistrate looks to whether the Plaintiff sets
forth a colorable argument that the arbitration agreements are not
enforceable and that the enforceability of the arbitration
agreements will be in dispute during the class certification stage.
She finds that the Plaintiff has made a colorable argument that
the arbitration provisions are not enforceable.  The Court does not
decide that the Gentry factors weigh in favor of striking the
pre-litigation arbitration agreement, only that that the Plaintiff
makes a colorable argument against the agreement's enforceability.

She also finds that the Plaintiff makes a colorable argument that
the post-litigation agreements are impermissible: to the extent the
post litigation arbitration agreements do not provide notice of the
present suit or otherwise accurately apprise the putative class
members of their rights in the suit, the Plaintiff contends that
they arguably amount to misleading/and or coercive communications
to the putative class members.  For these reasons, fiscovery as to
the contact information for the entire putative class is therefore
appropriate.

Finally, the Defendant asks the Court to limit production to a
sample of the putative class members who signed the arbitration
agreement.  The Magistrate is not persuaded that a sampling is
appropriate because the putative class -- at least 286 employees --
is relatively small.  Indeed, courts routinely order samples that
outnumber the likely size of the actual class in the matter.

In sum, for the foregoing reasons, Magistrate Judge Grosjean
granted the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel to Compel Production of
Class List.  She ordered the Defendant to respond to the
Plaintiff's Interrogatory Number 2 with the identity and contact
information of all putative class members from 2014 to 2019,
whether or not those class members signed an arbitration agreement.
Within 14 days of the issuance of the Order, the Parties will
provide a proposed schedule for class certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 5, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/oDh71K from Leagle.com.

Jose Urena, as individual, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Emil Davtyan --
EDavtyan@lacare.org -- Davtyan Professional Law Corporation, Eric
Bryce Kingsley -- eric@kingsleykingsley.com -- Kingsley & Kingsley
APC & Kelsey M. Peterson-More, Kingsley & Kingsley.

Central California Almond Growers Assn., Defendant, represented by
Paul J. Bauer -- paul@sw2law.com -- Sagaser Watkins & Wieland, PC.


CLIENT SERVICES: Court Certifies Class in Vandehey FDCPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JACQUELYN A. VANDEHEY, on her own behalf and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CLIENT SERVICES,
INC., a Missouri Corporation, and JOHN DOES, Defendants, Case No.
18-C-1669 (E.D. Wis.), Judge William C. Griesbach of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted the
Plaintiff's motion for class certification.

Plaintiff Vandehey alleges Defendant Client Services violated the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") by sending her a debt
collection letter that was materially false, deceptive, and
misleading to an unsophisticated consumer.  The Plaintiff's
allegations stem from a letter she received from the Defendant
dated Oct. 30, 2017.  She alleges that this letter was a "form
letter" and that it was sent to collect debts from Wisconsin
residents.  The letter indicates that the Plaintiff defaulted on a
debt owed to Capital One Bank, and that, at some point, that debt
was transferred to Defendant for collection.

The Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of the itemized charges,
the balance being described as "current," and the statement on the
second page of the letter, the Defendant has falsely implied to the
unsophisticated consumer that interest and other charges could be
added to the charged-off debt.  She claims, therefore, that the
letter is materially false, deceptive, and misleading to an
unsophisticated consumer.

The Plaintiff further claims that the letter created a false sense
of urgency because the letter misled unsophisticated consumers into
thinking that they needed to promptly pay the debt, or face a
substantial increase in the amount owed.  As a result of these
alleged violations, the Plaintiff seeks statutory damages for
herself and the proposed class; a reward to the Plaintiff for
services on behalf of the class; attorneys' fees, litigation
expenses, and costs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section 1692k(a)(3); and
other relief that may be deemed just and proper.

The Plaintiff filed a motion for class certification on April 12,
2019.  She roposes to represent a class consisting of all natural
persons to whom the Defendant mailed a written communication in the
form of Exhibit A to an address in the State of Wisconsin on a
charged-off Capital One credit card account during the Class Period
which begins on Oct. 19, 2017 and ends on Nov. 9, 2018.

Judge Griesbach finds that the Plaintiff has fulfilled the
requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.  Therefore, he granted the Plaintiff's motion
for class certification.  The Clerk is directed to schedule the
matter for further proceedings to address the form of notice to the
members of the class.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 7, 2019 Decision and Order is
available at https://is.gd/XE8pBE from Leagle.com.

Jacquelyn A Vandehey, on her own behalf and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew T. Thomasson
-- Andrew@SternThomasson.com -- Stern Thomasson LLP, Philip D.
Stern -- Philip@SternThomasson.com -- Stern Thomasson LLP & Francis
R. Greene -- Francis@SternThomasson.com -- Stern Thomasson LLP.

Client Services Inc, Defendant, represented by Patrick A. Watts --
pat.watts@wattslawfirmpa.com -- Watts Law Group LLC & Robbie L.
Malone -- rmalone@mamlaw.com -- Malone Frost Martin PLLC.


DEFENDERS INC: Cox Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
-------------------------------------------------
STEVEN COX, an individual, FRANK MATA, an individual, OSCAR
SEPULVEDA, an individual, for themselves and on behalf of others
similarly situated Plaintiffs, v. DEFENDERS, INC., a corporation,
and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 19CV02559
(Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Barbara Cty., July 12, 2019) is an action
is brought by Plaintiffs and the Class under the Labor Code, which
provides that any employee receiving less than the legal minimum
wage is entitled to recover the unpaid balance of the full amount
of this minimum wage compensation in a civil action plus an
additional equal amount as liquidated damages, interest thereon,
reasonable attorney's fees, and costs of suit.

During their employment with Defenders, Plaintiffs and other
Security Advisors in California were paid a base hourly wage plus a
percentage of their production, which Defenders called a bonus but
which was considered a "piece-rate" plan under California law. The
piece-rate was calculated under a complicated formula which had the
effect of transferring certain of Defender's costs of doing
business to the Security Advisors in California in violation of
California law. Defenders also had and applied a policy where
certain travel and other work-related time were not paid at their
regular hourly rate or any rate, thereby resulting in a pay rate of
zero dollars per hour, below the California statutory minimum wage,
for Plaintiffs and other Security Advisors in California, says the
complaint.

Plaintiffs were employed by Defenders as Security Advisors.

DEFENDERS, INC. is a corporation which resided and did business in
and around the City of Santa Maria, County of Santa Barbara, State
of California as a security company.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     James H. Cordes, Esq.
     Angelica J. Caro, Esq.
     James H. Cordes and Associates
     831 State Street, Suite 205
     Santa Barbara, CA 93101
     Phone: (805) 965-6800
     Facsimile: (805) 965-5556


DELOITTE & TOUCHE: Ciuffitelli Settlement Has Prelim Court Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon,
Portland Division, issued a Finding and Recommendation granting
Tonkon Torp LLP's Motion for Settlement Agreement Preliminary
Approval in the case captioned LAWRENCE P. CIUFFITELLI, for himself
and as Trustee of CIUFFITELLI REVOCABLE TRUST, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP; EISNERAMPER LLP; SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP;
TONKON TORP LLP; TD AMERITRADE, INC.; INTEGRITY BANK & TRUST; and
DUFF & PHELPS, LLC, Defendants. Case No. 3:16-cv-00580-AC. (D.
Or.).

Plaintiffs Lawrence P. Ciuffitelli  and Defendant Tonkon Torp LLP
(Tonkon) have entered into a Stipulation and Agreement of
Compromise, Settlement, and Release.

The Class Representatives have moved, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(e), for an order preliminarily approving the
Settlement (Motion).

The Court, having read and considered the Stipulation, submissions
made relating to the Settlement, the Motion, the pleadings, and
other papers on file in this action, and statements of counsel.

The Motion should be GRANTED and that this Preliminary Approval
Order should be entered.   

Preliminary Approval of Settlement

The Court finds that: a) the Stipulation resulted from
non-collusive, good faith, arm's-length negotiations; and b) the
Stipulation is sufficiently fair, reasonable, and adequate to the
Class Members to warrant providing notice of the Settlement to the
Class Members and holding a Settlement Hearing. Accordingly, the
terms of the Settlement are hereby approved on a preliminary
basis.

Provisional Certification of the Settlement Class

The Court finds that, with respect to the proposed settlement Class
(Class): a) the Class is so numerous thatjoinder is impracticable
b) numerous common issues exist; c) the Class Representatives'
claims are typical of the claims of the other Class Members d) the
Class Representatives and their counsel adequately represent the
Class e) common questions of fact and law predominate in this
Action and f) this class action is the superior method of
adjudicating this dispute.

Accordingly, the Class is provisionally approved and defined as:

     All persons who purchased any Covered Aequitas Securities on
or after June 9, 2010 and who had an account balance related to any
Covered Aequitas Securities as of March 31, 2016.Covered Aequitas
Securities means any security issued by the following entities: 1)
Aequitas Commercial Finance, LLC (ACF)  2) Aequitas Income
Opportunity Fund, LLC (AIOF) 3) Aequitas Income Opportunity Fund
II, LLC (AIOF-II) 4) Aequitas Capital Opportunities Fund, LP (ACOF)
5) Aequitas Income Protection Fund, LLC (AIPF); 6) Aequitas
Enhanced Income Fund, LLC (AEIF) 7) Aequitas ETC Founders Fund, LLC
(AETC) and 8) MotoLease Financial, LLC (AMLF).

This provisional settlement Class certification, and the ultimate
certification of a settlement Class against Tonkon (if any), shall
not have any bearing on, and shall not be admissible in connection
with, future motions to certify a class or classes against the
Non-Settling Defendants.

The provisional settlement Class certification shall have no
bearing on, and shall not be admissible in connection with the
issue of whether any class should be certified in a non-settlement
context.

Preliminary Approval of Plan of Allocation

The Court finds that the Plan of Allocation is rationally based on
legitimate considerations and treats all Class Members (including
the Class Representatives) fairly and equally. Accordingly, the
Plan of Allocation is hereby approved on a preliminary basis.

Approval of Claims Administrator

The Court appoints Epiq Class Action & Claim Solutions, Inc. (Epiq)
as the Claims Administrator to supervise and administer the notice
procedure as well as the processing of claims, as described below.

All reasonable expenses incurred in identifying and notifying Class
Members, as well as in administering the Settlement, including
payment of any taxes, shall be paid as set forth in the
Stipulation.

Approval of Form and Manner of Class Notice

The Court finds that the proposed form and methods of notifying
Class Members of the Settlement and its terms and conditions meet
the requirements of due process and Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, constitute the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, and constitute due and sufficient notice to all
persons entitled thereto. Accordingly, the Court approves, as to
form and content, the Notice of Pendency and Proposed Settlement of
Class Action (Notice) and the summary notice (Summary Notice)
attached to the Order Preliminarily Approving Global Settlement and
Providing for Notice previously entered herein.

Motion for Final Approval of Settlement

The Class Representatives' motion for final approval of the
Settlement, and all supporting briefing and exhibits in support of
the Settlement, the Plan of Allocation, and Class Counsel's
application for attorneys' fees and expenses, shall be filed and
served not later than forty-two (42) days prior to the Settlement
Hearing. Any response papers shall be filed and served no later
than twenty-eight (28) days prior to the Settlement Hearing. Any
reply papers shall be filed and served no later than fourteen (14)
days prior to the Settlement Hearing.

Appearance of Class Members

Any Class Member may enter an appearance in the Action, at their
own expense, individually or through counsel of their own choice,
in which case such counsel must file with the Clerk of the Court a
notice of such appearance. Absent entry of an appearance by
counsel, Class Members will be represented by Class Counsel.

Objections to Settlement

Any Class Member may appear and object that: i) the proposed
Settlement should not be approved as fair, reasonable, and
adequate; ii) the Plan of Allocation should not be approved; or
iii) attorneys' fees and reimbursement of expenses should not be
awarded to Class Counsel. However, any such objection will be valid
only if it is filed with the Clerk of the United States District
Court for the District of Oregon at least twenty-eight (28) days
prior to the Settlement Hearing, and copies of any such objections
are provided to counsel identified in the Notice on or before such
date. Any Class Member who does not make an objection in this
manner shall be deemed to have waived such objection and shall
forever be foreclosed from making any such objection, unless
otherwise ordered by the Court.

N. Tonkon's Lack of Admissions and Ability to Terminate the
Settlement

Neither the Stipulation, nor any of its terms or provisions, nor
any of the negotiations or proceedings connected with it, shall be
construed as an admission or concession by Tonkon, or any of the
Tonkon Released Parties, of the truth of any of the allegations in
the Action, or of any liability, fault, or wrongdoing of any kind
and shall not be construed as, or deemed to be evidence of or an
admission or concession that the Class Representatives or any Class
Members have suffered any damages, harm, or loss. Further, neither
the Stipulation, nor any of its terms or provisions, nor any of the
negotiations or proceedings connected with it, nor this Order shall
be construed as an admission or concession by the Class
Representatives of the validity of any factual or legal defense or
of any infirmity in any of the claims or facts alleged in this
Action.

Tonkon may elect to terminate the Settlement only as provided in
the Stipulation. In such event, or in the event the Settlement does
not become effective in accordance with the terms of the
Stipulation or the Effective Date does not occur, then the
Stipulation and this Order (including any amendment(s) thereof, and
except as expressly provided in the Stipulation or by order of the
Court) shall be rendered null and void, of no further force or
effect, and without prejudice to any Settling Party, and may not be
introduced as evidence or used in any action or proceeding by any
person against the Settling Parties or the Released Parties, and
each shall be restored to his, her, or its respective litigation
positions as they existed prior to the execution of the
Stipulation.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 15, 2019 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/y3vxv43h from Leagle.com.

Lawrence P. Ciuffitelli, for himself and as Trustee of Cuiffitelli
Revocable Trust, Plaintiff, represented by Catherine Y.N. Gannon,
1918 Eighth Avenue, Suite 3300 Seattle, WA 98101, Hagens Berman
Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice, Dawn Cornelius, Hagens Berman
Sobol Shapiro LLP, 1918 Eighth Avenue, Suite 3300 Seattle, WA
98101, pro hac vice, Jeniphr A.E. Breckenridge, Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP, 1918 Eighth Avenue, Suite 3300 Seattle, WA 98101, pro
hac vice, Karl Phillips Barth -- karlb@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman
Sobol Shapiro, LLP, pro hac vice, Keith A. Ketterling  --
kketterling@stollberne.com -- Stoll Stoll Berne Lotking &
Shlachter, Nadia H. Dahab -- ndahab@stollberne.com, Stoll Stoll
Berne Lokting & Shlachter P.C., Steve W. Berman -steveb@hbsslaw.com
-- Hagens Berman Sobol Sharpio LLP, pro hac vice, Jennifer S.
Wagner  -- jwagner@stollberne.com -- Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting &
Shlachter, Lydia Anderson-Dana -- jwagner@stollberne.com -- Stoll
Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlachter P.C., Robert S. Banks, Jr., Banks
Law Office, PC ,1001 SW 5th Avenue #1100, Portland, Oregon 97204  &
Timothy S. DeJong -- tdejong@stollberne.com -- Stoll Stoll Berne
Lokting & Shlachter, PC.

Deloitte & Touche LLP, Defendant, represented by Gary I. Grenley --
ggrenley@gsblaw.com -- Garvey Schubert Barer, Gavin M. Masuda --
gavin.masuda@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice, Marcy C.
Priedeman -marcy.priedeman@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac
vice, Nicholas J. Siciliano -- nicholas.siciliano@lw.com -- Latham
& Watkins LLP, pro hac vice, Nicole C. Valco -- nicole.valco@lw.com
-- Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice, Peter A. Wald --
peter.wald@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel L.
Keppler -- dkeppler@gsblaw.com -- Garvey Schubert Barer, Eryn K.
Hoerster ehoerster@gsblaw.com -- Garvey Schubert Barer, Paul H.
Trinchero -- ptrinchero@gsblaw.com -- Garvey Schubert Barer &
Robert C. Weaver, Jr. -- rweaver@gsblaw.com -- Garvey Schubert
Barer.


DELTA HEALTHCARE: Accused by Mathis of Sending Unsolicited Texts
----------------------------------------------------------------
JENNIFER MATHIS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. DELTA HEALTHCARE PLACEMENT, LLC, a Texas Limited
Liability Company, Case No. 2:19-cv-14233-XXXX (S.D. Fla., July 10,
2019), accuses the Defendant of sending unsolicited telemarketing
text messages, in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act.

Delta Healthcare is a Texas company whose principal office is
located in Coppell, Texas.

The Defendant is a healthcare staffing agency that provides both
temporary and permanent employment placement nationwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 1205
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (305) 479-2299
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
                  gberg@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          Jordan D. Utanski, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, PA
          19495 Biscayne Blvd., #607
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (305) 975-3320
          E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com
                  utanski@edelsberglaw.com


DESJARDINS GROUP: MP Says Data Breach Puts Bill C-59 to the Test
----------------------------------------------------------------
Rachel Browne, writing for Global News, reports that ahead of
Monday's emergency meeting of the House of Common's public safety
and national security committee on the massive Desjardins Group
data beach, committee chair John McKay says the matter will test
Bill C-59, the newly implemented federal national security
legislation.

"This is, if you will, almost a classic example, a working example,
of whether the various interfaces that have been set up under C-59
can be stood up and can work," McKay, who also serves as the
Liberal MP for Scarborough-Guildwood, told The West Block's Eric
Sorensen on July 14.

McKay said that representatives from Desjardins and the RCMP are
among witnesses set to appear before the committee's meeting in
Ottawa to probe the breach that has affected nearly three million
individuals and business members.

The Liberals' National Security Act, Bill C-59, received royal
assent in June, two years after it was first introduced. The law,
which civil liberties advocates have criticized for endorsing mass
surveillance, revamps Canada's national security regime, including
tasking a new intelligence commissioner with overseeing activities
of espionage.

As for what the public safety and national security committee can
do to address these kinds of data breaches, McKay said he would
"like to hear the evidence first and then make the recommendations
afterwards."

"I take some comfort in the fact that, under C-59, the government
has set up an entity called Cyber Security or Cyber Security Task
Force and it is to do the interface between industry, financial
services and the Government of Canada," said McKay. "No entity no
matter how large . . . can do its own cyber security on its own."

Desjardins, the Quebec-based financial institution, said last month
that a Laval police investigation traced the data breach to a lone
"ill-intentioned" employee. Personal information including social
insurance numbers, names, addresses were leaked.

The ex-employee is suspected to have sold at least a portion of
that data to criminal organizations, the Journal de Montreal
reported on July 12, citing police sources.

"On the face of it, it's a rogue employee. However, there may well
be further implications beyond it simply being a rogue employee,"
said McKay.

In response to the breach, Desjardins said it has implemented
"additional security measures have been put in place to ensure all
our members' personal and financial data remains protected."

Two privacy watchdogs, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner and
the Quebec Access to Information Commission, launched a joint
investigation into the breach and to determine whether Desjardins
had adhered to provincial and federal regulations that protect
personal information.

A pair of proposed class action lawsuits against the financial
institution was filed in Quebec Superior Court last month, alleging
that Desjardins was negligent in protecting personal and financial
information.

Conservative leader Andrew Scheer urged his MP Pierre Paul-Hus,
vice-president of the committee, to discuss to whether it would be
possible to issue new social insurance numbers for victims of the
breach. More than 80,000 people have signed a petition calling on
the federal government to replace those SIN numbers.

McKay said that replacing SIN numbers would a "very formidable
undertaking" and would be "something to be considered, but it also
may be a response which is not well considered."

Around the time that news broke of the Desjardins breach, the
committee released a report entitled "Cybersecurity in the
financial sector as a national security issue." The report includes
nine recommendations such as encouraging Canadians to adopt "sounds
cyber hygiene habits" and that the federal government prompts
individuals and companies to report all instances of cybercrime.
[GN]


DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Dismissal of Alston-Ajakaiye Claims Affirmed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RONDA L. DAVIS, ET AL., Appellants, v. DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA, Appellee, Case No. 17-7071 (D.C. App.), Judge Cornelia
Pillard of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit (i) reversed the district court's entry of summary judgment
for the District as to the Plaintiffs' disparate impact challenge
to the firings under both Title VII and the District of Columbia
Human Rights Act, and the associated denial of the motion for class
certification; (ii) affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment on the remaining Title VII and District of Columbia Human
Rights Act claims; and (iii) affirmed the district court's
dismissal of all claims by Plaintiffs Alston and Ajakaiye on
judicial estoppel grounds.

The Plaintiffs are 47 former longtime employees, mostly African
American, of the District of Columbia Child and Family Services
Agency, many of whom successfully served the Agency for decades.
They numbered among the employees terminated as part of a
large-scale reduction in force at the Agency following budget cuts.
The Plaintiffs alleged that their firings were unlawfully
discriminatory on the basis of age and race.  

The Plaintiffs brought both disparate treatment and disparate
impact challenges to (1) the Agency's choice to respond to
budgetary constraints by eliminating two job categories in which
African American employees were most concentrated, and by using a
putatively individualized and at least partially subjective process
to cull the remaining job categories; and (2) the Agency's
imposition of a bachelor's degree requirement on the new FSW
position, the duties of which were a close match with the work the
SSAs had long performed successfully without a college degree.

The district court granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss the
disparate treatment claim against the firings, allowing the named
Plaintiffs to proceed with the companion claim of disparate racial
impact, and both the impact and treatment claims against the degree
requirement.

The court bifurcated discovery and pretrial motions, limiting the
first stage to the existence and statistical validity of
group-based disparities caused by the practices challenged on
disparate-impact grounds, as well as to several procedural matters
including administrative exhaustion and class certification.  
Within the constraints of the bifurcated discovery order, each side
retained an expert as to the alleged disparate impact of the
challenged practices. The experts framed the issues differently and
reached contrary conclusions.

The Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Paige Munro, found that the Agency's
implementation of the layoffs resulted in a termination rate of
15.5% for African Americans, in contrast to a 5.6% rate for
non-African Americans.  The racial disparities were even more
dramatic, according to Dr. Munro, once she analyzed a new dataset
provided by the District, which included more focused and detailed
demographic information about the Agency's workforce: The effective
termination rate jumped from 277% greater for African Americans
than non-African Americans to 444% greater for African Americans as
compared to Caucasians.

The District's expert, Dr. Stephen Bronars, found no
disproportionate adverse racial impact.  Dr. Bronars concluded that
the Agency's wholesale elimination of the SSA and SWA positions did
not contribute to the statistical significance calculation for
adverse impact because the District terminated every employee in
those job categories.  As a consequence, he reasoned, those cuts
involved no "excess" termination of African American employees.
Dr. Bronars' statistical significance calculation also excluded any
layoffs from job categories occupied exclusively by African
American employees, again reasoning that there could be no "excess"
termination of African Americans from those categories.  Setting
aside all of those layoffs of African American employees, Dr.
Bronars applied his job-category-specific methodology to find no
statistically significant racial impact resulting from cuts within
the remaining categories.

Following the close of phase I discovery, the Plaintiffs moved for
class certification and the District moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted summary judgment for the Agency on all
issues.  Without reaching the statistical evidence in the competing
expert reports, the district court granted summary judgment to the
Agency on the threshold ground that the Plaintiffs have failed to
identify a specific employment practice actionable under a
disparate-impact theory.  

The court also ruled in favor of the District on issues pertaining
only to certain Plaintiffs.  It held that two Plaintiffs lacked
standing to challenge the FSW's bachelor's degree requirement
because they hold such degrees, and that the two plaintiffs -- one
of those with a bachelor's degree, plus a third -- were judicially
estopped from participating in the lawsuit by their failures to
disclose their discrimination claims among their assets in their
personal bankruptcy cases.  In the absence of any surviving claim,
the district court denied as moot the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification.

The Plaintiffs appealed.  They limit their appeal to the district
court's grant of summary judgment on the race discrimination class
claims, plus the individual standing and estoppel issues.

The District of Columbia Human Rights Act tracks Title VII in all
respects relevant to the case.  Judge Pillard therefore treats the
Plaintiffs' claims under District of Columbia law as coextensive
with their federal claims.  She first addressed the Plaintiffs'
claim that the particular practices by which the District carried
out its reduction in force had a racially disparate impact in
violation of Title VII.  She then turns to their challenge to the
degree requirement attached to the new FSW position.  Finally, she
addressed the district court's dismissal of three individual
Plaintiffs' claims.

Because the Plaintiffs have leveled their disparate impact
challenge against the particular target of the Agency's process for
cutting and culling job categories, the Jduge reversed the district
court's decision to the contrary, and the accompanying denial on
mootness grounds of the motion for class certification, and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with her Opinion.  She
finds that the Agency's expert, Dr. Bronars, presumed operational
justification for (and therefore excluded from analysis) the
Agency's selection of certain offices for downsizing and its
wholesale elimination of the SSA and SWA jobs.  The premise of Dr.
Bronars's statistics, the Agency conceded at oral argument, put the
"cart before the horse" by assuming the very facts that a
successful statistical showing by plaintiffs would next require the
Agency to show: that the reason the Agency targeted certain
positions for elimination was justified by business necessity.  If
on remand plaintiffs clear the statistical hurdle, the parties will
have an opportunity after appropriate discovery to address whether
the Agency's execution of the reduction in force was justified by
business necessity.  Justification supporting elimination or
downsizing of certain offices might at that point be seen to
respond to the relevant statistical showing.

Next, the Judge finds that the district court correctly concluded
that the Plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue.  The district
court granted summary judgment in the Agency's favor on the
Plaintiffs' disparate impact and disparate treatment challenges to
the bachelor's degree requirement associated with the Family
Support Worker position.  She finds that (i) the Plaintiffs failed
to identify the qualified applicant pool; and (ii) the Plaintiffs
failed to present a "significant" pattern of discrimination
unexplainable on grounds other than race.

Finally, the Judge finds that there is no dispute that the
Plaintiffs failed to disclose their potential Title VII claims in
their bankruptcy petitions.  Ajakaiye filed his bankruptcy petition
on July 2, 2010.  Two weeks later, on July 16, 2010, he filed the
EEOC charge that, on Sept. 16, 2010, germinated into the complaint
in the case.  The bankruptcy court discharged Ajakaiye's debts on
Oct. 14, 2010, without Ajakaiye's ever having disclosed the EEOC
proceeding or the ensuing suit.  Alston, for her part, filed her
bankruptcy petition on May 21, 2013, three years after the
Plaintiffs filed suit in the case; she also failed to disclose the
circumstances of her potential claim before her debts were
discharged in bankruptcy.

Given the absence of any evidentiary submissions to support the
assertion of mistaken nondisclosure, the district court did not
abuse its broad discretion in holding that, on this record, the
Plaintiffs failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact
defeating estoppel.  She will therefore affirm the district court's
dismissal of these Plaintiffs' claims on estoppel grounds.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Pillard reversed the district court's
entry of summary judgment for the District as to the Plaintiffs'
disparate impact challenge to the firings under both Title VII and
the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, and the associated
denial of the motion for class certification, and remanded for
further proceedings consistent with her Opinion.  She affirmed the
district court's grant of summary judgment on the remaining Title
VII and District of Columbia Human Rights Act claims.  She also
affirmed the district court's dismissal of all claims by Plaintiffs
Alston and Ajakaiye on judicial estoppel grounds.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 7, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/OuffRe from Leagle.com.

Rachel Smith, Student Counsel, argued the cause for appellants. On
the briefs were Andrew Mendrala -- amendrala@cohenmilstein.com --
and Aderson B. Francois. Charly Gilfoil, Student Counsel, entered
an appearance.

Holly M. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the
Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause for
appellee District of Columbia. With her on the briefs were Karl A.
Racine, Attorney General, Loren L. AliKhan -- loren.alikhan@dc.gov
-- Solicitor General, and Stacy L. Anderson, Acting Deputy
Solicitor General at the time the brief was filed. Todd S. Kim,
Solicitor General at the time the brief was filed, entered an
appearance.


DYNAMIC RECOVERY: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Smith FDCPA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BELICIA SMITH, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. DYNAMIC RECOVERY SOLUTIONS
LLC, LVNV FUNDING LLC, and JOHN DOES 1-25, Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-00135-DCN (D. S.C.), Judge David C. Norton of the U.S.
District Court for the District of South Carolina, Charleston
Division, granted Dynamic Recovery and LVNV's joint motion to
dismiss.

Smith allegedly incurred a debt to Regional Finance Corporation of
South Carolina ("RFC") some time prior to Jan. 16, 2018.  Smith
alleges that RFC issued funds to her on credit, and she was unable
to make the required payments due to financial constraints.  As a
result, the debt, totaling $960.68, went into default.  LVNV then
allegedly purchased the debt and contracted with Dynamic Recovery
to collect the debt.

Smith received a letter from Dynamic Recovery dated Jan. 16, 2018
seeking to collect the debt.  The Letter offers Smith several
repayment options.  The first option permits Smith to resolve her
account in full if she makes a payment of $384.27 by March 2, 2018.
The second option offers full resolution of the account with a
total amount due of $432.31, made in two payments of $216.16 each.
The third option offers Smith to resolve her account in full with
four payments of $120.09 each.  The Letter states that the total
amount due under this final option is $480.34; however, the sum of
four payments of $120.09 is actually $480.36.  Smith argues that
this difference is an attempt to collect an amount greater than
allowed under the proposed offer and is confusing and misleading.
In addition, at the bottom of the Letter, there is language that
states the law limits how long one can be sued on a debt.

As a result, Smith filed a proposed class action complaint alleging
violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act ("FDCPA")
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Sections 1692e and 1692f.

The Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss on March 19, 2019.
First, they argue that the statute of limitations disclosure
language at the end of the Letter does not violate the FDCPA.
Smith alleges that stating that LVNV "will not sue" is deceiving
when LVNV cannot sue due to the statue of limitations because "will
not sue" implies that LVNV or subsequent creditors could change its
mind and decide to sue if the debt is not repaid.

Judge Norton finds that Smith only alleges that the "will not sue"
language is deceptive and misleading.  Moreover, while the
Defendants address this allegation in their motion to dismiss,
Smith does not respond to the Defendants' argument on the issue.
Regardless, even assuming that Smith alleges that the disclaimer is
misleading because it is silent as to Dynamic Recovery's rights,
the Judge finds that this allegation is insufficient to state a
claim for a FDCPA violation.  The Judge also has not found nor has
Smith provided any case law to support the argument that lack of
discussion about a debt collector's rights in a collection letter
is misleading under the FDCPA.  Therefore, he finds that Smith's
FDCPA claim as to the statute of limitations disclosure language
should be dismissed.

Next, the Defendants argue that the discrepancy in the third
payment option between the total stated amount for which Smith
could resolve her account and the sum of the individual payment
amounts is a de minimis rounding error and therefore does not
violate the FDCPA.  The Judge holds that the overstatement of the
total amount Smith would owe under the third payment option was two
cents.  Considering the amount that Smith would owe absent the
overstatement, $480.34, the misstatement was 0.00004164% of the
amount owed.  This clearly is not material to the least
sophisticated customer, as it is substantially less than a 1%
misstatement.  Therefore, the discrepancy in the payment amount
does not violate the FDCPA.  As such, Smith has failed to state a
claim for an FDCPA violation based on this discrepancy.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Norton granted the the motion to
dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 5, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/qw29A7 from Leagle.com.

Belicia Smith, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Kenneth Edward Norsworthy, Jr.
-- kenorsworthy@me.com -- Norsworthy Law Ltd Co.

Dynamic Recovery Solutions LLC & LVNV Funding LLC, Defendants,
represented by Chad Vinson Echols -- chad.echols@theecholsfirm.com
-- Echols Firm & David Anthony Grassi, Jr. --
david.grassi@theecholsfirm.com -- Echols Firm.


DYNAMIC RECOVERY: Reece Asserts Breach of FDCPA in Tennessee
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Dynamic Recovery
Solutions, LLC. The case is styled as Annette Reece, a/k/a Annette
Baird, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Dynamic Recovery Solutions, LLC, Cavalry SPV I, LLC
and John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00122 (E.D. Tenn.,
July 16, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Act.

Dynamic Recovery Solutions, LLC is a full-service collection agency
based in South Carolina.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Yaakov Saks, Esq.
   Stein Saks, PLLC
   285 Passaic Street
   Hackensack, NJ 07601
   Tel: (201) 282-6500
   Email: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com



EMIL FRANC: Graniero Seeks OT Pay
---------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Emil Franc, Inc.,
Hector Reglero and Paola Gaudelli for alleged violations of the
overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The case is
captioned FRANCESCO GRANIERO, and other similarly situated
individuals, Plaintiff(s), v. EMIL FRANC, INC. d/b/a Cafe Ragazzi,
HECTOR REGLERO and PAOLA GAUDELLI, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-22771-XXXX (S.D. Fla., July 5, 2019).

Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants did not properly compensate
him for hours that he worked in excess of 40 per week. In addition,
the Defendants have allegedly misclassified Plaintiff as an
independent contractor. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks to recover
unpaid overtime wages accumulated from the date of hire and/or from
three years back from the date of the filing of this complaint.

Emil Franc, Inc. is a Florida company having its main place of
business in Miami-Dade County, Florida. The company  specializes in
pizza making. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     R. Martin Saenz, Esq.
     SAENZ & ANDERSON, PLLC
     20900 NE 30th Avenue, Ste. 800
     Aventura, FL 33180
     Telephone: (305) 503-5131
     Facsimile: (888) 270-5549
     E-mail: msaenz@saenzanderson.com


EXP REALTY: Court Denies Bid to Stay Wright TCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRUCE WRIGHT, JORGE VALDES and EDWIN DIAZ, Plaintiffs,
v. EXP REALTY, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 6:18-cv-1851-Orl-40TBS
(M.D. Fla.), Magistrate Judge Thomas B. Smith of the U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division, denied
eXP Realty's Motion to Stay Proceedings.

Plaintiffs Wright, Valdes, and Diaz claim that the Defendant, eXp
Realty violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") by
making unsolicited telephone calls with an automatic telephone
dialing system ("ATDS") or prerecorded voice and by calling phone
numbers registered on the National Do Not Call Registry ("DNC
Registry").  The Plaintiffs allege they had no relationship with
eXp Realty, and each received unwanted calls from eXp Realty
agents.

They seek to certify the following nationwide classes:

     a. Prerecorded No Consent Class: All persons in the United
States who from four years prior to the filing of the action (1)
the Defendant (or an agent acting on behalf of the Defendant)
called (2) using a prerecorded voice message, and (3) for whom the
Defendant (a) claims it obtained prior express written consent in
the same manner as the Defendant claims it obtained prior express
written consent to call Plaintiff Diaz, or (b) does not claim it
obtained prior express written consent.

     b. Autodialed No Consent Class: All persons in the United
States who from four years prior to the filing of the action (1)
the Defendant (or an agent acting on behalf of the Defendant)
called, (2) on the person's cellular telephone, (3) using a dialer
substantially similar to the dialer used to call the Plaintiffs,
and (4) for whom the Defendant (a) claims it obtained prior express
written consent in the same manner as the Defendant claims it
obtained prior express written consent to call the Plaintiffs, or
(b) does not claim it obtained prior express written consent.

     c. Do Not Call Registry Class: All persons in the United
States who from four years prior to the filing of the action (1)
the Defendant (or an agent acting on behalf of Defendant)
called/texted more than one time, (2) within any 12-month period,
(3) where the person's telephone number had been listed on the DNC
for at least 30 days, (4) for substantially the same reason the
Defendant called Plaintiffs Valdes and Diaz, and (5) for whom the
Defendant (a) claims it obtained prior express written consent in
the same manner as the Defendant claims it obtained prior express
written consent to call Plaintiffs Valdes and Diaz, or (b) does not
claim it obtained prior express written consent.

The Plaintiffs bring three claims under the TCPA: Count I (on
behalf of Diaz and the Prerecorded No Consent Class) -- for calls
made with prerecorded voice message without prior express written
consent; Count II (on behalf of all Plaintiffs and the Autodialed
No Consent Class) -- for calls made with an autodialer without
prior consent; and Count III (on behalf of Plaintiff Valdes,
Plaintiff Diaz and the Do Not Call Registry Class) -- for calls
made to phone numbers on the DNC Registry.  The Defendant has filed
its Answer and Affirmative Defenses and mediation is scheduled for
June 21, 2019.

The Defendant asks for a stay "pending the forthcoming ruling from
the FCC regarding the definition of an automatic telephone dialing
system under the TCPA.  It argues that the FCC is currently
considering what constitutes an ATDS and, as the Plaintiffs' second
proposed class definition turns on the use of an ATDS, a stay is
warranted under the primary jurisdiction doctrine and the Court's
inherent authority to issue a stay.

Magistrate Judge Smith agrees that a stay is not warranted by the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.  A stay will unduly delay and
therefore prejudice the Plaintiffs with respect to the majority of
their claims.  While a stay might eventually simplify the issues
with respect to one aspect of the case, it would not reduce the
burden of litigation on the parties or the Court as the other
claims are due to proceed regardless of any eventual FCC ruling on
the ATDS issue.  Accordingly, he denied the motion for stay.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 7, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/TqH7VZ from Leagle.com.

Bruce Wright, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Avi Robert Kaufman --
kaufman@kaufmanpa.com -- Kaufman P.A. & Stefan Coleman, Law
Offices
of Stefan Coleman, PLLC,1072 Madison Ave # 1, Lakewood, NJ 08701

Jorge Valdes, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & Edwin Diaz, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Avi Robert Kaufman,
Kaufman P.A.

EXP Realty, LLC, a Washington limited liability company,
Defendant,
represented by Jason Daniel Joffe -- jason.joffe@squirepb.com --
Squire Patton Boggs US, LLP.


EXPRESS PIPE: Judgment in Mortley Job Discrimination Suit Entered
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Josephine L. Staton of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California entered judgment in the case, JAMES
MORTLEY, individually, and on behalf of other members of the
general public similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. EXPRESS PIPE &
SUPPLY CO., LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; MORRISON
SUPPLY COMPANY, LLC, a Texas limited liability company; and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 8:17-cv-01938-JLS-JDE
(C.D. Cal.).

Pursuant to the Order (1) Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Final
Approval of Class Action Settlement and (2) Granting in Part
Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs, the Judge entered
judgment in the matter in accordance with, and incorporated by
reference the findings of, the Court's Order and the Parties' Joint
Stipulation of Class Action Settlement and Release and amendments.


She accordingly awarded (i) a total of $250,000 in attorneys' fees
and $15,780 in costs and expenses; and (ii) a Class Representative
Enhancement Payment of $5,000 to Mortley.  She approved settlement
administration costs and expenses in the amount of $15,000 to Rust
Consulting, Inc.

With the exception of Harry Huss, who submitted a timely Request
for Exclusion from the Settlement Class, all the Class Members are
bound by the Judgment and are barred from pursuing, or seeking to
reopen, any of the Released Claims, as defined in the Settlement
Agreement.  Without affecting the finality of the Judgment, the
Court will retain exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the
action and the parties, including all the Class Members, for
purposes of enforcing the terms of the Judgment entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 5, 2019 Judgment is available
at https://is.gd/YQOerh from Leagle.com.

James Mortley, individually, and on behalf of other members of the
general public similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Arnab
Banerjee -- arnab.banerjee@capstonelawyers.com -- Capstone Lawyers
APC, Brandon Kyle Brouillette --
brandon.brouillette@capstonelawyers.com -- Halunen Law, Eduardo
Santos, Capstone Law APC, Raul Perez, Capstone Law APC & Ruhandy
Glezakos, Capstone Law APC.

Express Pipe and Supply Co., LLC, a Delaware limited liablity
company & Morrison Supply Company, LLC, a Texas limited liablity
company, Defendants, represented by Keith A. Jacoby --
kjacoby@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC & Rachael Sarah Lavi --
rlavi@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC.


FACEBOOK INC: Madrid Court Accepts Consumers Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
Telecompaper reports that Spanish consumer group OCU announced that
its data breach claim against Facebook has been accepted for
hearing by a commercial court in Madrid. The class-action suit
represents consumers who may have had their data protection rights
breached in the Cambridge Analytica scandal.

OCU first filed the suit last October, claiming Facebook had
violated the data protection law, among other regulations, for
sharing user data without express consent or knowledge of the
users. The consumer group wants the court to order Facebook to pay
each of the Spanish users of the social network compensation of at
least EUR 200 for the violations. [GN]


FORD MOTOR: Bleichmar Files Suit Over Fuel Economy Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------
Jay Traugott, writing for CarBuzzs, reports that a couple of months
ago a class-action lawsuit was filed by angry Ford Ranger owners
against the American automaker over supposedly deceptive fuel
economy ratings.  The lawsuit stated Ford "deliberately
miscalculated and misrepresented factors used in vehicle
certification testing." Although we don't have an update on that
lawsuit's status, Yahoo! News has reported about another class
action lawsuit, only this time it was filed on behalf of both
Ranger and certain F-150 owners.

A law firm called Bleichmar Fonti & Auld LLP (BFA) filed the suit
against Ford alleging, once again, that the company overstated fuel
economy ratings for those trucks from model years 2017 to 2019.
Generally speaking, it sounds nearly the same as the first
class-action lawsuit in that it accuses Ford of manipulating fuel
economy testing to procure higher fuel economy results.

Customers bought these trucks based on, at least in part, those
figures. BFA claims they ended up paying higher fuel costs than the
miles per gallon disclosed by Ford at the point of sale. But how
exactly would Ford go about "manipulating" testing parameters?
That's not entirely clear but the lawsuit alleges Ford
miscalculated the "road load" used in fuel economy testing. Those
numbers were between 3 percent and 19 percent higher than the
actual fuel economy the trucks achieve.

The law firm also points out that Ford is under a criminal
investigation by the US Department of Justice over emissions and
fuel economy certification procedures. [GN]


FORD MOTOR: Focus Vehicle Owner Alleges Transmission Defects
------------------------------------------------------------
Kelly Fisher, writing for Nashville Tennessean, reports that Carrie
Armstrong bought her 2015 Ford Focus hatchback in June 2015.

Since then, she's had to take it back to the dealership "at least"
three times a year to fix transmission issues, beginning about two
months after she purchased the car.

Most recently, Armstrong repaired her car about a month ago, she
said. Though she said she hasn't experienced problems with it
since, "that's not to say that it won't happen again."

"I do expect it to," she said. "It's just a matter of time."

Armstrong, of Hendersonville, is one of many nationwide who have
experienced problems with their Ford vehicles.

An investigation by the Detroit Free Press, a USA TODAY Network
publication, found that Ford Motor Co. sold cars with defective
DPS6 dual-clutch transmissions in Focus and Fiesta models. The
company continued to sell them despite widespread complaints and
repairs, and about 1.5 million are still on the roads since
2010-11, the Free Press investigation found.

The publication reviewed hundreds of pages of internal documents,
emails, court filings, consumer complaints and more to understand
what happened. Reporters also spoke with dozens of Ford owners
experiencing problems.

"What is it going to take? Does someone have to die before they get
these cars fixed?" Armstrong wondered when she shared her
experiences with the Free Press. "When I am on the interstate and
almost get hit by a diesel truck just because my car will not
accelerate and get into gear? I put my life in danger every day I
get behind the wheel of this car just to go to work."

In an interview with The Tennessean, Armstrong further explained
her story, noting that she repeatedly could not accelerate on the
highway. Simply getting to and from work every day turned into an
issue, and she worries when she has one of her four kids and four
"grand babies" -- all age 2 and younger -- in the malfunctioning
hatchback.

She spoke with The Tennessean after work, before her commute home
and ahead of a road trip to Virginia where she's visiting her
newborn grandchild.

"I would be on the interstate and take the chance of getting hit by
another vehicle," Armstrong said, holding a stack of some of her
Ford receipts.

"It would be OK for a couple months -- I would say four to five
months -- and then it would start doing it again. So, I would have
to take it back again, get another rental car and have it fixed all
over again.

"There were a few times that they were not able to fix it because
it didn't meet the requirement at the time, but then when it kept
not accelerating and slipping from first to second gear, I had to
go ahead and take it back in again, and I was like, 'Look, you're
going to have to fix it,'" she recounted.

Dropping off her car time and time again means taking time away
from work and driving a rental car for about a week at a time.

The longest Armstrong has driven a rental car is two weeks. One
time, she didn't even make it out of the parking lot before she
noticed the same problems with her car and had to drop it off for a
second week, she said.

She believes Ford should repay customers who have experienced
similar, continuous problems with their vehicles, or allow them to
trade it in without payment. Armstrong said the company suggested
she trade in her car, but it's almost paid off.

"I don't want to start all over on a new car note," she said.

"It's frustrating to know that the dealership in general -- Ford in
general, I should say -- is allowing these cars to be sold knowing
they have these defects," Armstrong said.

"For me, I felt like, I put my trust in the company and I was
betrayed. I've done everything I could do to try to either get a
new vehicle or have them fix the issues. Granted, they're fixing
the issues, but it's not being fixed to where it's not happening
again…

"I've offered some suggestions with Ford consumer affairs and
they're not willing to work with me."

Ford's response
Ford Motor Co. issued a statement to the Detroit Free Press in
response to the publication's investigation.

"We acted quickly and determinedly to investigate the problems,
alert dealers, recommend and pay for repairs, and extend
warranties," the statement reads in part. "While we eventually
resolved the quality issues, the solutions were more complex and
took longer than we expected. We regret the inconvenience and
frustration that caused some consumers."

Hoping for 'reliability'
Armstrong has been a loyal Ford driver for years and has "never
really had an issue" with other vehicles. A late 1990s Ford Escort
station wagon "ran like a dream" with more than 300,000 miles on
it.

But after her transmission problems with the 2015 Focus, Armstrong
said she would likely go to another dealership for her next car.

"Reliability of the transportation is what I was actually hoping
for, something that I could have paid off and not have a car note,
to be able to get back and forth to where I need to go when I need
to get there, and that's been an issue for me," Armstrong said.
"I'm very (curious)to see what they're going to do at this point,
with all of the vehicles that are having issues like this and all
the other customers."

Armstrong said she's interested in either adding her name to an
existing class action lawsuit or filing her own.

"Be careful with who you buy a car from and do your research," she
urged other drivers.

"I feel like Ford needed to let the consumers know, 'hey, this is
an issue,' and took it off the market.

"I never would've sold a car to somebody like that." [GN]


FORD MOTOR: Launched Vehicles in 2011 with Transmission Defects
---------------------------------------------------------------
According to CarScoops' Brad Anderson, a comprehensive report
published by The Detroit Free Press alleges that Ford knowingly
launched Focus and Fiesta models in 2011 with defective
transmissions.

The American car manufacturer has been hit with thousands of
complaints relating to the PowerShift dual-clutch transmission of
the Focus and Fiesta models, but declined to make an expensive
change in order to resolve the issue.

The report reveals that some of the problems stemmed from the fact
that Ford only decided to use a dual-clutch transmission late in
the design of the two models and hadn't previously offered such a
gearbox in the U.S. market.

Engineers repeatedly warned Ford that the transmission was not
ready, but the company pushed through with releasing the cars,
knowing full well that issues persisted with the dual-clutch.
Shortly after the cars launched, the complaints started to flood
into the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).

The Detroit Free Press reports that no less than 4,300 complaints
were made, many related to issues which saw the vehicles slip into
neutral unexpectedly. For the following five years, the Blue Oval
said it was trying to find a fix but refused to issue a recall and
told dealerships to inform customers that the cars operated
normally.

On March 24, 2017, a class-action lawsuit was filed against Ford
addressing the complaints of 1.9 million current or former owners
of 2012-2016 Focus and 2011-2016 Fiesta models built with Ford's
DCT. The automaker offered a settlement deal of $35 million, but in
May, it was revealed that that settlement would be appealed because
it was considered too favorable to Ford. [GN]


FYRE MEDIA: Ja Rule Averts Fyre Festival Class Action Charges
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jared Richards, writing for Junkee, reports that a US federal court
has dismissed a class-action lawsuit against Fyre Festival
co-founder Ja Rule which claimed the rapper falsely promoted the
disaster festival.

The lawsuit alleged that Jar Rule and Fyre's Chief Marketing
Officer Grant Margolin had wilfully made false claims via social
media advertising about the festival's luxury amenities, catering,
and performances.

The 2017 event was promoted by a fleet of Instagram influencers and
models, and was announced via a video starring the likes of Kendall
Jenner, Bella Hadid, Emily Ratajkowski and Hailey Bieber which made
the festival look like a chance to party up-and-close with them.

In reality, it was an utter disaster, with bands cancelling
last-minute and lack of proper food or water or amenities, as
documented both live on social media and in two documentaries by
Netflix and Hulu. The scenes were akin to a frat boy remake of Lord
Of The Flies, with the earliest attendees being fed alcohol for as
long as possible to postpone the inevitable clusterfuck, which saw
patrons scramble to find bed, shelter and food for the night.

Despite this, the US District Court for the Southern Court of New
York has rules that Ja Rule and Margolin weren't aware of how it'd
go down.

"Atkins and Margolin were participants in organising or promoting a
large-scale event," the judge wrote (via CNet). "There is no
assertion that the Festival when first conceived or introduced to
the public was intended not to go forward or that defendants
intended not to perform by organising the advertised amenities and
accommodation."

Part of the ruling determined that the lawsuit hadn't specified
which promotions where false, ruling that the language Fyre used
was too vague to have a tangible expectation.

"The Court agrees that the subjective qualifiers of 'FOMO-inducing'
and 'Coachella x1000' are too 'exaggerated, blustering, and
boasting' for a reasonable consumer to rely on," the judge ruled,
discussing Ja Rule's tweets, which reference "fear of missing out"
and the annual Coachella music festival.

Ja Rule has repeatedly denied culpability for the festival, saying
he "too was hustled, scammed, bamboozled, hook-winked [and] lead
astray" by co-founder Billy MacFarland.

MacFarland is currently serving a six-year prison sentence after
pleading guilty to two counts of wire fraud, and paid US $26
million.

The US Securities and Exchange Commission has also banned McFarland
from ever holding a director/officer position, and subjected
Margolin and Fyre Festival contractor Daniel Simon to seven- and
three-year bans, respectively. It now seems like Margolin is
working as a 'business tutor'.

Ja Rule has not been charged yet, but still faces several ongoing
lawsuits. For a refresher on the festival, revisit our recap of
Netflix's documentary. A fortnight ago, a German hip-hop festival
tried its hardest to out-disaster Fyre by cancelling last-minute,
as people lined-up to enter. It didn't go down well. [GN]


GEORGE WASHINGTON: Court OKs Dismissal of Stanley ERISA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, District of Columbia issued a
Memorandum Opinion granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the
case captioned MELISSA STANLEY, individually and as representative
of a class of participants and beneficiaries on behalf of The
George Washington University Retirement Plan for Faculty and Staff
and The George Washington University Supplemental Retirement Plan,
Plaintiff, v. THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action No. 18-878 (JDB). (D.D.C.).

Melissa Stanley brings this putative class action against her
former employer, The George Washington University, alleging
breaches of fiduciary duty in violation of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).

GW argues that Stanley lacks standing to sue because she signed a
general release of claims against the University. Stanley responds
that her claims fall into an express exclusion in the general
release preserving claims for vested benefits under her retirement
plan.

GW argues that the broad language releasing all claims alleging
violations of any federal statute plainly covers Stanley's
fiduciary breach claims under ERISA sections 502(a)(2) and (a)(3).
And the exclusion in the release preserving claims for vested
benefits under employee benefit plans does not apply, GW says,
because that language refers to section 502(a)(1)(B) claims for
vested benefits arising under the terms of Stanley's ERISA-governed
plans claims that Stanley concedes she does not bring here.   

Stanley responds first that the clause generally releasing federal
claims does not cover ERISA claims because it does not expressly
mention. Moreover, Stanley continues, the carveout for claims for
vested benefits plainly preserves fiduciary breach claims brought
under ERISA sections 502(a)(2) and (a)(3).  

The Court finds that Stanley has released her claims under the
Agreement and thus lacks standing to sue. As an initial matter,
Stanley's ERISA claims plainly fall within the language releasing
any and all claims for violation of any federal statute. Agreement
at 4 (emphases added). ERISA is, of course, a federal statute. And,
as noted above, Stanley here brings actions under ERISA sections
502(a)(2) and (a)(3) alleging various violations of the duties set
forth in ERISA Section 409(a).

Stanley's rejoinder that the release lists numerous federal
statutes but does not include ERISA  unpersuasive. The Agreement
expressly releases all claims for violations of federal statutes
including but not limited to violations of the listed statutes. And
in the very next clause, the release goes on to say that it is
expressly understood that this is a GENERAL RELEASE, and is
intended to release claims to the fullest extent permitted by law.
The law is clear that a broad and hence, the Court rejects
Stanley's contention that the Agreement is distinguishable, in any
relevant sense, from one that expressly released all violations of
ERISA.

Because the language releasing all federal claims unambiguously
covers Stanley's ERISA claims, one thing is clear: unless the
exclusion set forth in the release applies to her claims  then the
language barring claims that arise under ERISA disposes of the
present case. As noted above, Stanley reads the exclusion as
preserving section 502(a)(2) claims alleging a broad array of
fiduciary misconduct, including offering underperforming investment
options, levying unreasonable recordkeeping fees, and other
purportedly imprudent choices. She also reads the exclusion to
permit equitable relief under section 502(a)(3) in connection with
those alleged fiduciary breaches  including the restoration of all
losses to the Plans, removing fiduciaries found to have breached
their duties, and other equitable remedies.

The exclusion cannot be read so expansively. By its terms, the
release carves out only claims for benefits under employee benefit
plans. The common legal usage of the term under is pursuant to, in
accordance with, or as authorized or provided by. Here, then, the
phrase claims under employee benefit plans refers to claims brought
pursuant to, or by the authority of, the participant's employee
benefit plan.

Understood in the context of ERISA, such claims plainly refer to
contractual, or plan-based, claims of the kind that typically are
brought pursuant to ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B). Indeed, in at least
two cases involving similar general releases, a carve-out for
claims under the plan was interpreted as saving contractual, but
not fiduciary breach, claims.
  
Confirming this reading, the language under employee benefit plans
in the carve-out closely parallels ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B),
which provides that participants may bring contractual claims for
benefits under the terms of [their employee benefit] plans. The
carve-out also mirrors ERISA's provision setting forth claims
procedures for contractual benefits claims. Moreover, when
referring to contractual claims brought pursuant to section
502(a)(1)(B), courts generally refer to claims brought under the
plan, or some similar variation thereof.  

Here, of course, Stanley has expressly conceded that she does not
bring claims for benefits under her employee benefit plans.
Instead, as she puts it, her claims are statutory, and seek to
enforce ERISA's substantive guarantees. Because Stanley's fiduciary
breach claims concededly arise under rights conferred by ERISA, not
under her employee benefit plans,  they fall outside the plain
language of the exclusion in the General Release.

Acknowledging this, Stanley urges the Court to resolve any tension
between the release language and an expansive reading of the
exclusion in her favor, relying on the canon of construction
providing that specific terms and exact terms are given greater
weight than general language. But that canon does not apply. The
rule of construction providing that specific clauses prevail over
general clauses presumes that the clauses stand irreconcilably in
conflict. Where both the specific and general provisions may be
given reasonable effect, however, both are to be etained.

Here, there is no necessary conflict or ambiguity. Reading the
general provisions in the release as broadly releasing claims for
violations of ERISA, and the exclusion as carving out only
contractual claims asserted pursuant to the relevant benefit plan,
gives both clauses reasonable effect.

Hence, the Court finds that Stanley's claims fall within the
general provisions in the release, are not saved by the exclusion
for benefits claims brought under employee benefit plans, and are
therefore waived.

The Court will grant GW's motion and dismiss the complaint for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.
  
A full-text copy of the District Court's July 15, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2yocyf2 from
Leagle.com.

MELISSA STANLEY, individually and as representative of a class of
participants and beneficiaries on behalf of The George Washington
University Retirement Plan for Faculty and Staff and The George
Washington University Supplemental Retirement Plan, Plaintiff,
represented by Andrew W. Ferich -- AWF@chimicles.com -- CHIMICLES
SCHWARTZ KRINER & DONALDSON-SMITH LLP, Jason Samuel Rathod --
jrathod@classlawdc.com -- MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD LLP, Nicholas A.
Migliaccio -- nmigliaccio@classlawdc.com -- MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD
LLP, Franklin D. Azar, AZAR & ASSOCIATES, pro hac vice, Paul R.
Wood, AZAR & ASSOCIATES, 5536 Library Ln, Colorado Springs,
Colorado 80918, pro hac vice & Steven A. Schwartz, CHIMICLES
SCHWARTZ KRINER & DONALDSON-SMITH LLP, 361 W. Lancaster Avenue
Haverford, PA 19041, pro hac vice.

GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY BOARD OF
TRUSTEES & GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY PLAN ADMINISTRATION
COMMITTEE, Defendants, represented by Brian D. Netter --
bnetter@mayerbrown.com -- MAYER BROWN LLP, Matthew Allyn Waring --
mwaring@mayerbrown.com -- MAYER BROWN LLP, Michelle Nicole Webster
-- mwebster@mayerbrown.com -- MAYER BROWN PLLC & Nancy G. Ross --
nross@mayerbrown.com -- MAYER BROWN LLP, pro hac vice.


GLOBAL RADAR: Sanders Settlement Has Preliminary Court Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Fort Myers Division, issued an Order granting Plaintiffs'
Consent Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement and Notices
to the Settlement Class in the case captioned SHAWANA SANDERS, on
their own and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals and
KENYATTA WILLIAMS, on their own and on behalf of all similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. GLOBAL RADAR ACQUISTION, LLC,
Defendant. Case No. 2:18-cv-555-FtM-99NPM. (M.D. Fla.).

The Settlement Agreement entered into by and among the Settling
Parties has been negotiated at arm's-length and is approved on a
preliminary basis as fair, reasonable, and adequate.

Settlement Class Definition and Relief. The proposed Settlement
Class Relief to the Settlement Class Members, as identified in
Section 2.2 of the Settlement Agreement, is approved on a
preliminary basis as fair, reasonable, and adequate. The Settlement
Class shall consist of:

     All natural persons residing in the United States, any U.S.
territory, the District of Columbia, or Puerto Rico who were the
subject of a consumer report furnished by Global HR for employment
purposes to a client of A1 HR, Continuum, or Accesspoint between
July 11, 2013 and January 11, 2019.

The parties expressly agree to this Settlement Class definition for
settlement purposes. The Settlement Class consists of approximately
20,878 individuals.

The Court finds that certification of the Settlement Class is
appropriate for settlement only, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and
(b)(3) because (a) The Settlement Class is so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable (c) There are questions of law or
fact common to the members of the Settlement Class (d) The claims
of Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the other members of the
Settlement Class (e) Plaintiffs and are capable of fairly and
adequately protecting the interests of the members of the
Settlement Class in connection with the Settlement Agreement (f)
Common questions of law and fact predominate over questions
affecting only individual members of the Settlement Class (g) The
Settlement Class is ascertainable  (h) Resolution of the claims in
this Litigation by way of Settlement is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient resolution of the claims of the
Settlement Class Members.

The Court approves the Class Notice in the Settlement Agreement,
including the Long-Form Notice to be electronically mailed to all
Settlement Class Members attached as Exhibit B to the Settlement
Agreement and the manner of providing mail notice to Settlement
Class Members described in Section 4 of the Settlement Agreement.
The Court finds that this is the best practicable notice under the
circumstances and is reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise the Settlement Class Members of the
pendency of this Action, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, and
their right to object to the Settlement Agreement or exclude
themselves from the Settlement Class. The Court further finds that
mail notice and the other forms of Class Notice in the Settlement
Agreement are reasonable, constitute due, adequate, and sufficient
notice to all persons entitled to receive notice, and meet the
requirements of due process.

A Settlement Class Member who desires to opt out must take timely
affirmative written action pursuant to this Order and the
Settlement Agreement, even if the Settlement Class Member desiring
to opt out of the Class (i) files or has filed a separate action
against any of the Released Persons (as defined in the Settlement
Agreement), or (ii) is, or becomes, a putative class member in any
other class action filed against any of the Released Persons.

Except for those Settlement Class Members who timely and properly
file a request for exclusion, all other Settlement Class Members
will be deemed to be Settlement Class Members for all purposes
under the Agreement, and upon the Settlement Effective Date (as
defined in the Settlement Agreement), will be bound by its terms,
including, but not limited to, the Releases in Section 3 of the
Settlement Agreement.

If the proposed Settlement is finally approved, any Settlement
Class Member who has not submitted a timely, written request for
exclusion or to opt-out from the Settlement Class shall be bound by
all subsequent proceedings, orders, and judgments in this Action,
even if he or she has pending, or subsequently initiates,
litigation against Global or any of the Released Parties relating
to any of the Released Claims.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 15, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yye87scj from Leagle.com.

Shawana Sanders, on their own and on behalf of all similarly
situated individuals & Kenyatta Williams, on their own and on
behalf of all similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs,
represented by Andrew Ross Frisch -- afrisch@forthepeople.com --
Morgan & Morgan, PA, C. Ryan Morgan -- rmorgan@forthepeople.com --
Morgan & Morgan, PA, Craig C. Marchiando -- craig@clalegal.com --
Consumer Litigation Associates P.C. & Marc Reed Edelman, Morgan &
Morgan, PA, 201 N Franklin St Tampa, FL 33602-5157.

Global Radar Acquistion, LLC, doing business as Global HR Research
formerly known as Radar Post-Closing Holding Company, Inc. formerly
known as Global HR Research, Inc., Defendant, represented by John
Drury, Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, Pamela Q. Devata, Seyfarth Shaw, LLP,
131 South Dearborn Street, Suite 2400 Chicago, Illinois 60603, pro
hac vice & Richard Barton Akin, II -- richard.akin@henlaw.com --
Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, PA.


HANSON AGGREGATES: 9th Cir. Affirms Class Decertification in NEI
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NEI CONTRACTING AND ENGINEERING, INC., on Behalf of
Itself and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
HANSON AGGREGATES PACIFIC SOUTHWEST, INC., a Delaware Corporation;
HANSON AGGREGATES, INC.; LEHIGH HANSON, CO., Defendants-Appellees,
Case No. 16-56498 (9th Cir.), Judge Sharon L. Gleason of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

NEI was a longtime customer of concrete supplier Hanson.  Like
Hanson's other customers, NEI placed orders for Hanson's products
by calling into a dedicated telephone order line.  The order line
connected callers to a call directory system that allowed customers
to route their call. Two of the potential routes were Hanson's
"Ready Mix Dispatch" line and its "Aggregate Dispatch" line.
Hanson recorded all customer calls that were directed to these two
dispatch lines.

On July 15, 2009, Hanson began using an "Oaisys Talkument" phone
system.  When this system was in place, callers to the two dispatch
lines heard a pre-recorded verbal admonition stating that calls
"may be monitored for quality assurance."  It did not inform the
caller that the call was being recorded.

In 2011 and 2012, NEI and Hanson litigated a billing dispute
arising from orders NEI had placed using the dispatch lines.
During that litigation, Hanson produced recordings of calls that
NEI had placed to the dispatch lines.  The litigation settled in
May 2012 in Hanson's favor.

On July 6, 2012, NEI initiated the suit against Hanson under
California's Invasion of Privacy Act ("CIPA").  Its initial
complaint alleged that Hanson had violated California Penal Code
Section 632, which prohibits the unauthorized connection to or
recording of confidential communications.

On Oct. 29, 2013, NEI filed a Second Amended Complaint ("SAC").
The SAC abandoned the Section 632 claim and instead brought a claim
for relief under Section 632.7, alleging that Hanson had recorded
NEI's cell phone calls without its consent.  The SAC alleged that
Hansen had recorded at least 45 cell phone calls that NEI had
placed to the dispatch lines. NEI sought $5,000 in statutory
damages for each violation of the statute, injunctive relief, and
class certification.

On Dec. 23, 2013, Hanson changed the recorded admonition on its
dispatch lines.  The updated recording stated that calls "may be
monitored or recorded for quality assurance purposes."  Following
that change, NEI defined its proposed class as: All persons who
called the Defendant with a cellular telephone and selected the
Aggregate or Ready Mix Dispatch lines through the Defendant's
telephone system, whose calls were recorded by the Defendant,
during the time period beginning July 15, 2009, and continuing
through Dec. 23, 2013.

Hanson opposed certification, asserting that the proposed class
would not meet Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)'s
predominance requirement because there would need to be
individualized determinations made as to whether each class member
had consented to being recorded.  The district court initially
concluded that the predominance requirement was not satisfied, and
denied class certification.
NEI moved for reconsideration and provided new evidence regarding
the timing of certain recorded conversations.  Based on this
information, the court certified the class.  Following
certification, however, Hanson identified nine customers who had
actual knowledge of Hanson's recording practice during the class
period and continued to place orders with Hanson.

Hanson moved to decertify the class, citing these nine customers as
evidence that Rule 23's "commonality" and "predominance"
requirements were not satisfied.  Concluding that the predominance
requirement had not been satisfied, the district court decertified
the class on May 6, 2016.

Following decertification, NEI proceeded towards a bench trial on
its individual claim with respect to 44 cell phone calls.  Shortly
before trial, the district court granted Hanson's motion in limine
to preclude NEI's corporate representative from testifying about
employees' knowledge of call recording as inadmissible hearsay.  On
the morning of trial, NEI informed the court that it would only be
pursuing claims based on a single call.

On Sept. 15, 2016, the district court ruled against NEI on its
statutory damages claim.  The court also concluded that NEI lacked
standing to seek damages on its individual claim or injunctive
relief.

NEI appeals the class decertification order.  It does not appeal
the judgment in Hanson's favor as to NEI's individual claim.  NEI's
appeal focuses primarily on whether the district court's
predominance analysis constituted an abuse of discretion.  But more
fundamentally, the case presents a threshold question: whether a
class must be decertified when the class representative is found to
lack standing as to its individual claims.

NEI maintains it has standing to appeal the decertification order
notwithstanding the adverse judgment against it on the merits.  It
cites to two exceptions to the mootness doctrine that may permit a
class representative to appeal a decertification decision even if
the representative's individual claims have been mooted.  First, it
is well settled that a class representative whose individual claim
has been mooted but who retains a "personal stake" in class
certification may appeal a certification decision.  Second, when
the claim on the merits is 'capable of repetition, yet evading
review,' the named plaintiff may litigate the class certification
issue despite loss of his personal stake in the outcome of the
litigation.

Judge Gleason finds that neither of these mootness principles can
remedy or excuse a lack of standing as to the representative's
individual claims.  As to the first exception, the Court's decision
in Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. is instructive.  It
noted there that if Lierboe initially had a viable stacking claim
that later became moot, then our law in an appropriate case would
permit substituting proper class representatives to allow the suit
to proceed.  But because Lierboe "had no stacking claim from the
outset of her litigation, the Court held that the district court's
certification of the class "must be vacated."  

Similarly, in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services (TOC), Inc., the Supreme Court discussed the relationship
between the second mootness exception and the doctrine of standing:
If mootness were simply standing set in a time frame, the exception
to mootness for acts that are capable of repetition, yet evading
review could not exist. Standing admits of no similar exception; if
a plaintiff lacks standing at the time the action commences, the
fact that the dispute is capable of repetition yet evading review
will not entitle the complainant to a federal judicial forum.  

Accordingly, neither mootness exception stands for the proposition
that a class can be certified if the class representative lacked
standing as to its individual claim.

The district court concluded that NEI lacked standing and NEI has
waived any argument to the contrary.  Given the class
representative's lack of standing, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in decertifying the class.  Judge Gleason affirmed
the district court's decertification order on this basis.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 5, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/d6rIRn from Leagle.com.

Janice R. Mazur (argued) -- appealslawyer@aol.com -- Mazur & Mazur,
El Cajon, California; Douglas J. Campion -- doug@djcampion.com --
Law Offices of Douglas J. Campion APC, San Diego, California;
Richard E. Grey -- Rick.Gray@graybecker.com -- Grey Law Group APC,
El Cajon, California; for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Fred R. Puglisi (argued) -- fpuglisi@sheppardmullin.com -- Jay T.
Ramsey -- jramsey@sheppardmullin.com -- and Valerie E. Alter --
valter@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP,
Los Angeles, California; for Defendants-Appellees.


HBS MANAGEMENT: Barrett Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------
MELISSA BARRETT AND MIKAILAH LOVE, on behalf of themselves and all
other plaintiffs similarly situated, known and unknown, Plaintiffs,
v. HBS MANAGEMENT CORP., AN ILLINOIS CORPORATION d/b/a HEAVENLY
BODIES FANTASY SPORTS BAR, AND MICHAEL WELLECK, INDIVIDUALLY,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-04710 (N.D. Ill., July 12, 2019) is an
action brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act,  the Illinois
Minimum Wage Law, the Cook County Minimum Wage Ordinance of the
Municipal Code of Cook County and the Illinois Wage Payment and
Collection Act ("IWPCA").

Plaintiffs worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek without pay
at a rate of time and one half their regular hourly rates of pay.
The Defendants paid all wages in cash in order to avoid the
overtime provisions of the FLSA and IMWL and decreasing the amount
taxes paid by Defendants to the United States Treasury and
depriving the named Plaintiffs and members of the Plaintiff Class
of contributions to Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, says
the complaint.

Plaintiffs were former employees of Defendants who, were employed
by Defendants as dancers.

HEAVENLY BODIES FANTASY SPORTS BAR, is a bar, restaurant and adult
club located at 1300 S Elmhurst Road, Elk Grove Village, IL.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     John William Billhorn, Esq.
     BILLHORN LAW FIRM
     53 West Jackson Blvd., Suite 401
     Chicago, IL 60604
     Phone: (312) 853-1450


HEALTHMARKETS: Declements Sues Over Unsolicited Text Messages
-------------------------------------------------------------
Daniel Declements, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. HealthMarkets Insurance Agency,
Inc., a Texas corporation, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-04710-GMS
(D. Ariz., July 14, 2019) is a Class Action Complaint and Demand
for Jury Trial against the Defendant to stop HealthMarkets from
violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by placing unwanted
solicitation calls, sending unsolicited, autodialed text messages
to consumers without their consent, including calls and texts to
consumers registered on the National Do Not Call registry (DNC),
and to otherwise obtain injunctive and monetary relief for all
persons injured by HealthMarkets's conduct.

HealthMarkets provides its agents with leads, which the agents then
solicit in order to sell Healthmarkets's insurance packages. Agents
are instructed to engage in cold calling in order to generate
insurance sales. When soliciting business, HealthMarkets agents use
an autodialer through which they place autodialed solicitation
calls. In addition, the agents also send autodialed text messages
to consumers. However, HealthMarkets is calling and texting
consumers using an autodialer without procuring the necessary
express prior written consent that is required for these
communications. To make matters worse, HealthMarkets is also
contacting consumers that have their phone numbers registered with
the DNC.

In response to these text messages and calls, Plaintiff files this
class action lawsuit seeking injunctive relief, requiring Defendant
to cease from placing calls using an autodialer, sending
unsolicited text messages to consumers' cellular telephone numbers
using an autodialer, and otherwise calling telephone numbers
registered on the DNC, as well as an award of statutory damages to
the members of the Classes, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Declements is a Rio Verde, Arizona resident.

HealthMarkets provides health insurance for individuals, families,
and small businesses.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Nathan Brown, Esq.
     Brown Patent Law
     15100 N 78th Way Suite 203
     Scottsdale, AZ 85260
     Phone: 602-529-3474
     Email: Nathan.Brown@BrownPatentLaw.com

          - and -

     Stefan Coleman, Esq.
     Law Offices of Stefan Coleman, P.A.
     201 s. Biscayne Blvd, 28th Floor
     Miami, FL 33131
     Phone: (877) 333-9427
     Fascimile: (888) 498-8946
     Email: law@StefanColeman.com

          - and -

     Avi R. Kaufman, Esq.
     Kaufman P.A.
     400 NW 26th Street
     Miami, FL 33127
     Phone: (305) 469-5881
     Email: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com


HYATT HOTELS: Brower Suit Asserts Unfair Collection of Resort Fees
------------------------------------------------------------------
HAROLD BROWER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. HYATT HOTELS CORP., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-04724 (N.D. Ill., July 12, 2019) is a civil action seeking
monetary damages, restitution and declaratory relief from Defendant
Hyatt, arising from the unfair and unconscionable assessment and
collection of "resort fees." Plaintiff also seeks to force Hyatt to
advertise up front to consumers the true total prices of its hotel
rooms, including resort fees.

According to the complaint, Hyatt uses an unlawful trade practice
called "drip pricing" in advertising the price for its hotel rooms
whereby it initially hides a portion of a hotel room's daily rate
from consumers. Hyatt calls this hidden portion of the room rate a
"resort fee." One key effect of this price deception is that
consumers shopping for a hotel room are misled into believing a
Hyatt room is cheaper than it actually is. Hyatt's motive in
continuing this deceptive practice is profit. It has reaped
hundreds of millions of dollars from deceptive "drip pricing", says
the complaint.

Plaintiff Harold Brower has stayed at several Hyatt properties in
the last two or more years, including the Hyatt Palm Springs and
Hyatt House at Anaheim.

Hyatt is a global hospitality company that controls 13 premier
hotel brands, including 739 properties in 57 countries. Hyatt
controls a substantial percentage of all hotel room inventory in
the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Frederick J. Klorczyk III, Esq.
     Joel D. Smith, Esq.
     BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
     1990 North California Blvd., Suite 940
     Walnut Creek, CA 94596
     Phone: (925) 300-4455
     Facsimile: (925) 407-2700
     Email: fklorczyk@bursor.com
            jsmith@bursor.com

          - and -

     Michael J. McMorrow, Esq.
     MCMORROW LAW, P.C.
     118 North Clinton St., Suite 108
     Chicago, IL 60661
     Phone: 312.265.0708
     Email: mike@mjmcmorrow.com


ILLINOIS: Court Narrows M. Winger's Pro Se Rights Claims
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois issued a Memorandum and Order dismissing in part and
surviving in part Plaintiffs' Pro Se Claims in the case captioned
MARK WINGER, K-97120, Plaintiff, v. JOHN/JANE DOE 3, DR. DIEBOLD,
J.B. PRITZKER, BRUCE RAUNER, JOHN BALDWIN, and LOUIS SHICKER,
Defendants. Case No. 19-cv-00236-NJR. (S.D. Ill.).

The First Amended Complaint is now before the Court for preliminary
review under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915A.

Plaintiff Mark Winger filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. Section 1983 for federal and state law deprivations that
allegedly occurred during his incarceration in the Illinois
Department of Corrections (IDOC). This case focuses on a fifth
incident involving the denial of dental care for Plaintiff's loose
crown at Menard Correctional Center (Menard) in 2018.  

Section 1915A requires the Court to screen prisoner complaints and
filter out non-meritorious claims.  Any portion of a complaint that
is legally frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for
relief, or requests money damages from an immune defendant must be
dismissed.  

First Amended Complaint

Based on the allegations in the First Amended Complaint, the Court
finds it convenient to divide the pro se action into the following
two (2) counts:

   Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
State Defendants (Pritzker, Rauner, Baldwin, and Shicker) for
allowing inadequate staffing, leadership vacancies, and
insufficient sick call procedures that caused the delay and/or
denial of dental care for Plaintiff's loose crown at Menard in
2018.Count

   Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Individual Defendants (Dr. Diebold and John/Jane Doe 3) for
delaying or denying dental care for Plaintiff's loose crown at
Menard in 2018.

Preliminary Dismissals

Claims Against Non-Parties

Throughout the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff refers to
individuals who are not named as defendants, such as Dr. Shah, Dr.
Asselmeier, Dr. Siddiqui, Ron Skidmore, and Wexford. Plaintiff
cannot bring a claim against these, or any other, non-parties. All
claims against non-parties should be considered dismissed without
prejudice.

Class Certification

The Plaintiff seeks permission to bring a class action. But he is
proceeding pro se in this matter, and a prisoner bringing a pro se
action cannot represent a class of plaintiffs. Even if he was
represented by counsel, the Plaintiff did not file a separate
motion for class certification or name anyone else as a
co-plaintiff. And until certification there is no class action but
merely the prospect of one.

Both claims are governed by the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, which imposes a duty on government officials
to provide medical care to inmates. The United States Supreme Court
has recognized that prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment
when they exhibit deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
of prisoners. The denial of proper dental care for a serious dental
condition also violates the Eighth Amendment.  

To state a claim, the allegations must suggest that each defendant
responded to the Plaintiff's serious dental condition with
deliberate indifference. The allegations support a deliberate
indifference claim at this stage against Dr. Diebold and John/Jane
Doe 3. In addition, they suggest that systemic deficiencies in
medical and dental care at Menard caused by inadequate staffing,
vacant leadership positions, and insufficient sick call procedures
delayed the Plaintiff's access to necessary dental treatment in
2018.

The allegations therefore support a claim against those IDOC
officials who were allegedly responsible for these policies or
practices, including IDOC Director Baldwin and IDOC Medical
Director Shicker. Plaintiff cannot proceed with either claim
against the former or current governor, however, because neither
governor is implicated in any decisions regarding Plaintiff's
dental care or the policies he now challenges.

Accordingly, Count 1 shall receive further review against IDOC
Director Baldwin and Medical Director Shicker, and Count 2 shall
proceed against Dr. Diebold and John/Jane Doe 3. These claims shall
be dismissed without prejudice against all other defendants.

Identification of Unknown Defendant

The Warden of Menard Correctional Center will be added as a
defendant, in his or her official capacity only, for purposes of
responding to discovery aimed at identifying the unknown defendant,
John/Jane Doe 3. Guidelines for discovery will be set by the
undersigned judge. Once the name of the unknown defendant is
discovered, Plaintiff shall file a motion to substitute the newly
identified defendant in place of the generic designations in the
case caption and throughout the First Amended Complaint.

The First Amended Complaint survives screening pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Section 1915A, as follows: COUNT 1 will proceed against
Defendants JOHN BALDWIN and LOUIS SHICKER, and COUNT 2 will proceed
against Defendants DR. DIEBOLD and JOHN/JANE DOE 3.These claims are
DISMISSED without prejudice against all other defendants for
failure to state a claim. Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244,
Defendants need only respond to the issues stated in this Merits
Review Order.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 15, 2019 Memorandum
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxd2sjz9 from
Leagle.com.

Mark Winger, Plaintiff, pro se.


ILLINOIS: Court Partly Grants Bid to Seal in Monroe Prisoners Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JANIAH MONROE, MARILYN MELENDEZ, EBONY STAMPS, LYDIA
HELENA VISION, SORA KUYKENDALL, and SASHA REED, Plaintiffs, v. JOHN
BALDWIN, STEVE MEEKS, and MELVIN HINTON, Defendants, Case No.
18-CV-156-NJR-MAB (S.D. Ill.), Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois granted
in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' Motion to Seal.

The Plaintiffs are inmates of the Illinois Department of
Corrections ("IDOC").  They bring the putative class action against
Baldwin, Meeks, and Hinton for inadequate medical treatment of
gender dysphoria, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  They filed
a Motion for Preliminary Injunction and a Motion to Certify, and
move the Court to permit them to file certain exhibits to those
motions under seal.

The Plaintiffs seek leave to file Exhibits 1-3 of the class
certification motion and Exhibits 11-15 of the preliminary
injunction motion under seal.  Exhibits 1-3 are lists of all
transgender inmates in IDOC in May, June, and July 2018.  The lists
include the inmates' names, IDOC numbers, dates of birth, races,
confirmation statuses, the facilities where they were incarcerated,
their housing assignments, whether they were in restrictive
housing, whether they were receiving hormones and, if so, the date
on which hormone therapy began.  The bulk of this information
personally identifies parties and non-parties, pertains to
individuals' medical histories, and/or is not central to the
Plaintiffs' claims.  

Because the public has no real interest in the sensitive
information contained in these documents, and the documents raise
compelling privacy concerns, the Judge granted the Motion to Seal
as to Exhibits 1-3.

Exhibits 11-15 contain reports from the IDOC Gender Identification
Placement Committee and include medical summaries related to
Plaintiffs Monroe, Kuykendall, Reed, and Melendez.  Although the
documents contain personal information, the Plaintiffs already
divulged virtually all of the sensitive details from the exhibits
when they filed the Complaint.  The Motion to Seal does not specify
the remaining information in Exhibits 11-15 that should be sealed,
and the Plaintiffs' broad assertions of privacy are insufficient to
justify concealment.

When a plaintiff initiates litigation, she "must accept the
openness that goes with subsidized dispute resolution by public
(and publicly accountable) officials.  Judicial proceedings are
public rather than private property.  Because the Plaintiffs have
not demonstrated good cause for contravening these principles, the
Motion to Seal is denied as to Exhibits 11-15.

In sum, Judge Rosenstengel granted in part and denied in part the
Motion to Seal.  The motion is granted as to Exhibits 1-3 of the
Motion to Certify Class.  It is denied as to Exhibits 11-15 of the
Motion for Preliminary Injunction.  The Clerk of Court is directed
to replace Exhibits 11-15 to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction
with those filed under seal at Doc. 126 (omitting the first page of
each sealed exhibit).  The exhibits to the Motion to Certify Class
will remain sealed at Doc 127.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 7, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/HEnMhz from Leagle.com.

JJaniah Monroe, Marilyn Melendez, Ebony Stamps, Lydia Helena
Vision,
Sora Kuykendall & Sasha Reed, Plaintiffs, represented by John A.
Knight, Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc., Austin B.
Stephenson -- austin.stephenson@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis
LLP, Catherine L. Fitzpatrick --
catherine.fitzpatrick@kirkland.com
-- Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Erica B. Zolner --
erica.zolner@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Ghirlandi
Guidetti, Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc., Megan M. New --
megan.new@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Sarah Jane Hunt ,
Law Office of Thomas Kennedy, III, L.C., Scott H. Lerner --
scott.lerner@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Sydney L.
Schneider -- sydney.schneider@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis
LLP,
Thomas E. Kennedy, III , Law Offices of Thomas E. Kennedy, III,
L.C. & Jordan M. Heinz -- jordan.heinz@kirkland.com -- Kirkland &
Ellis LLP.

John Baldwin, Steve Meeks & Melvin Hinton, Defendants, represented
by Christopher L. Higgerson, Illinois Attorney General's Office,
Joseph E. Okon, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Kyle
Rockershousen, Office of the Attorney General & Lisa A. Cook,
Office of the Attorney General.


INSULATION DISTRIBUTORS: Removes Maker Suit to N.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Defendant removed on July 10, 2019, the putative class action
lawsuit styled RASHID MAKER, individually and as a representative
of other similarly situated aggrieved employees v. INSULATION
DISTRIBUTORS, INC., Case No. RG19022044, from the Superior Court of
the State of California for the County of Alameda to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:19-cv-03963 to the
proceeding.

On June 7, 2019, Plaintiff Rashid Maker, a former employee of the
Defendant, commenced this action by filing an unverified civil
complaint in the Superior Court.

In the State Court Action, the Plaintiff alleges individual claims
for: (1) Failure to Pay Overtime Wages; (2) Failure to Provide
Off-Duty Meals Periods; (3) Failure to Pay Earned Wages on the
Designated Regular Paydays; (4) Failure to Pay Earned Wages Upon
Discharge; (5) Failure to Furnish Timely and Accurate Wage
Statements; (6) Unlawful and/or Unfair Business Practices; and (7)
civil penalties on behalf of himself and other alleged "aggrieved
employees" under the California Private Attorney General Act of
2004.[BN]

Defendant INSULATION DISTRIBUTORS, INC., is represented by:

          Michael N. Westheimer, Esq.
          Sean M. Kramer, Esq.
          OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
          Steuart Tower, Suite 1300
          One Market Plaza
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 442-4810
          Facsimile: (415) 442-4870
          E-mail: michael.westheimer@ogletree.com
                  sean.kramer@ogletree.com


JEFFERSON EDUCATION BOARD: Duncan Suit Transferred to W.D. Ky.
--------------------------------------------------------------
The case, TROY DUNCAN, Individually, and as the representative of a
class of similarly situated persons, v. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF
EDUCATION DEFENDANTS d/b/a JEFFERSON COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS et al,
Case No. 19-CI-003498 (Filed on June 6, 2019), was transferred from
the Jefferson Circuit Court to the United States District Court for
the Western District of Kentucky on July 5, 2019. This employment
discrimination lawsuit is assigned to Hon. Judge Joseph H.
McKinley, Jr. The United States District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky opened Case No. 3:19-cv-00495-JHM-RSE for
further proceedings.

In this complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants have
violated the Enforcement Act of 1871, the Kentucky Civil Rights Act
of 1966, and the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Among
other things, Plaintiffs, who are African Americans, have been
subjected to unwelcome harassment was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter their conditions of employment and create an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. In
addition, Plaintiffs were allegedly not hired for/promoted to a
position that they were otherwise qualified for because of their
African American race.

Jefferson County Public Schools (JCPS) is a public school district
located in Jefferson County, Kentucky. JCPS operates 150 schools
with more than 101,000 students, making it the 27th largest school
district in the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Teddy B. Gordon, Esq.
     807 West Market Street
     Louisville, KY 40202
     Telephone: (502) 585-4534
     Facsimile: (502) 585-3539
     E-mail: Tbearaty@aol.com

             - and -

     Andrew E. Mize, Esq.
     807 West Market Street
     Louisville, KY 40202
     Telephone: (502) 445-0804
     Facsimile: (502) 585-3539
     E-mail: MizeEsq@Gmail.com

             - and -

     Peter J. Jannace, Esq.
     807 West Market Street
     Louisville, KY 40202
     Telephone: (646) 783-9810
     Facsimile: (502) 585-3539
     E-mail: Peter.Jannace@Gmail.com


JOHNSON MARK: Dismissal/Judgment on Pleadings Bids in Merrill OK'd
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHAKARA MERRILL, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. JOHNSON MARK, LLC, MIDLAND
FUNDING, LLC, and JOHN DOES 1-25, Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-18-DB (D. Utah), Judge Dee Benson of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Utah granted (i) Defendant Midland's
Motion to Dismiss, and (ii) Defendant Johnson Mark's Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings.

The case is a Fair Debt Collections Practices Act ("FDCPA") action
arising from the Defendants' efforts to collect an outstanding debt
owed by the Plaintiff.  Some time prior to Jan. 9, 2018, the
Plaintiff incurred a credit card debt with Credit One Bank, N.A.
Credit One later sold or assigned the debt to Midland.  Midland
then contracted with Johnson Mark to collect the debt.

In a letter dated Jan. 9, 2018, Johnson Mark wrote to the Plaintiff
in an attempt to collect on the Credit One debt that had been
assigned to Midland.  The letter explained that Johnson Mark had
been retained to collect the debt and identified the original
creditor as Credit One.  At the top of the letter, the "Account
Balance" and "Total Amount Due" were each identified as $572.54.

The letter invited the Plaintiff to pay the debt or contact Johnson
Mark for payment arrangements.  It stated that if she failed to pay
the debt, Midland may be entitled to file a lawsuit or take further
action to collect the debt.  The letter also notified the Plaintiff
of her right to seek verification of the debt.  The letter further
stated that the law firm would suspend collection efforts during
the 30-day verification period.

On the basis of the letter, the Plaintiff filed a putative class
action against Midland and Johnson Mark, alleging a violation of
the FDCPA.  The Defendants then filed a Motion to Dismiss and
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, respectively.

The Plaintiff argues that the letter violated the FDCPA in two
ways: 1) by inviting the Plaintiff to contact the law firm for her
current amount due, the letter falsely implied that interest and/or
fees were being added to the total balance; and 2) by omitting the
statutory language that she has a right to a copy of the judgment
against her, the letter failed to comply with the statutory
requirements for such a notice, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section
1692g(a).

With respect to the Plaintiff's first contention, Judge Benson
finds that the Plaintiff has failed to plead a false representation
in violation of the FDCPA.  The Defendants' letter did not falsely
represent the nature or amount of the Plaintiff's debt.  The letter
did not threaten that interest or fees may be or were being added
to that amount.  Nor did the Defendants' invitation to contact the
firm for a current amount due falsely imply that interest and fees
would be added.  Rather, the statement merely alerted the Plaintiff
that the amount due was accurate as of the date of the letter.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff has failed to plead a false
representation in violation of the FDCPA.

Second, the Plaintiff argued that the letter did not comply with
the statutory requirements for a notice under FDCPA.  The Judge
holds that the Defendants' notice complied with the requirements
set forth in Section 1692g.  The Plaintiff did not allege that
there was a judgment against her, so any language regarding a
judgment would have been inapplicable and possibly misleading.
Furthermore, as a whole, the letter conveys the information
required by Section 1692g.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff's
allegations regarding an informational injury are unfounded.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Benson granted the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 5, 2019 Memorandum Decision
and Order is available at https://is.gd/DJ9s0r from Leagle.com.

Shakara Merrill, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Brett D. Cragun --
brett@brettcragun.com -- CRAGUN & CRAGUN & Yaavok Saks --
info@steinsakslegal.com -- STEIN SAKS PLLC.

Johnson Mark LLC, Defendant, represented by Gregory M.
Constantino.

Midland Funding, Defendant, represented by Scott C. Sandberg --
ssandberg@spencerfane.com -- SPENCER FANE LLP.


KIIP INC: Oct. 18 Class Action Settlement Approval Hearing Set
--------------------------------------------------------------
Illinois Circuit Court of Cook County on July 15 disclosed that a
settlement has been reached in a class action lawsuit involving
claims that Kiip, Inc. ("Kiip") violated the law by using its
advertising platform to collect, intercept, or transmit consumers'
personal information through a software application without first
getting permission from those consumers. The case is called Farag
et al. v. Kiip, Inc., Case No. 2019 CH 01695 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook
Cnty.). The proposed settlement is not an admission of wrongdoing
by Kiip. Kiip strenuously denies any wrongdoing and the court has
not decided who is right or wrong. Rather, the parties have reached
a compromise to end the lawsuit and avoid the uncertainties and
costs associated with further litigation.

Individuals are members of the settlement class if, between January
1, 2010 and June 13, 2019, they used a software application
integrated with Kiip's advertising platform. Members of this class
may file a claim to request a share of the settlement funds.

The proposed settlement provides for a fund totaling $1,000,000,
which will be used to make payments to the class members with valid
claims after first making deductions for notice and administration
costs, incentive awards to the class representatives, and
attorneys' fees for class counsel. If the court finally approves
the settlement, each settlement class member who timely submits a
valid claim form will be eligible to receive an equal payment from
the Settlement Fund. The exact amount of each settlement class
member's payment is unknown at this time; the final amount of each
payment will depend on the number of claims submitted and the
amount available in the settlement fund after the deductions.

To make a claim for a cash payment, class members must submit a
completed claim form online at www.KiipSettlement.com by September
11, 2019. Alternatively, class members can exclude themselves from
the settlement by September 11, 2019 if they do not want to be
bound by it, but will not be able to receive a payment from the
fund. Class members who file a claim or otherwise choose not to
exclude themselves will release any claims they may have against
Kiip, as more fully described in the Settlement Agreement,
available at www.KiipSettlement.com. Class members may also object
to the settlement by September 18, 2019. The detailed notice
available on the website explains how to file a claim, exclude
oneself, or object.

The Court will hold a Hearing on October 18, 2019 to consider
whether to approve the settlement and a request by class counsel
for attorneys' fees of up to 40% of the Settlement Fund, plus their
costs for their work in the case. The court will also consider
incentive award payments in an amount up to $5,000 to the class
representatives. Class members can appear at the hearing, but do
not have to. Class members can also hire their own attorney, at
their own expense, to appear or speak for them at the hearing. For
more information, visit www.KiipSettlement.com. [GN]


KONICA MINOLTA: Nunez Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
-------------------------------------------------
Hector Nunez, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated v.
Konica Minolta Business Solutions U.S.A. Inc., Case No.
1:19-cv-21804 (S.D. Fla., May 6, 2019), is brought against the
Defendant for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Defendant violated the FLSA by intentionally and knowingly
failing to pay overtime and by not paying its employees all
compensation owed. Additionally, the Defendant failed to pay
certain payroll taxes.

The Plaintiff is a citizen of the State of Florida residing in
Hialeah, Florida. The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant in
September 2014 to August 2017.

The Defendant is a New York corporation with its principal place of
business in Ramsey, New Jersey. The Defendant provides printing,
imaging, IT, and consulting services for customers in the United
States, including Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Gregory W. Lineberry, Esq.
      William J. Cantrell, Esq.
      CANTRELL, PLLC
      111 2nd Ave NE, Ste. 1100
      St Petersburg, FL 33701
      Tel: (813) 867-0115
      E-mail: glineberry@cantrellpllc.com
              wcantrell@cantrellpllc.com


KOREA: Skadowski Sues over Botched Deal, Cites Abuse of Power
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been against the Republic of Korea,
FIU Administration Government Entity (FIUAGE), Kim Hyo Shin, and
Jung Wan Ky for violations of the Federal Tort Claims Act and the
California Government Tort Claims Act. The case is captioned JAMES
SKADOWSKI, Plaintiff vs. REPUBLIC OF KOREA'S; FIU ADMINISTRATION
GOVERNMENT ENTITY; KIM HYO SHIN; JUNG WAN KY; JOHN DOE, FIU Service
Agent in his official capacity; DOES 1-10, inclusive, Defendants,
Case No. 2:19-cv-05357-JFW-JPR (C.D. Cal., June 19, 2019).

Plaintiff's company owned Data Streams and/or Big Data Solution &
Consulting for the past 17 years. In a July 7, 2017 bidding, Data
Streams and Republic of Korea's FIU Administration Government
Entity have agreed to have a consortium called Datamation (Emerging
Enterprise Tech Analysis and Products). After the evaluation of the
technical capability of the proposal and the bid examination, the
Datamation was selected as the preferred bidder. On Aug. 7, 2017,
Defendants Kim and FIUAGE admitted that Datamation products are as
good as Cubrid Co Ltd.'s products. FIUGAE even said that Datamation
is better than Cubrid. However, Defendants Republic of Korea,
FIUAGE, Kim, without giving specific and reasonable reasons,
suddenly refused to sign a contract unless the database management
system for PC will be changed to the Cubrid Company products in
just three hours before the end of the final technology negotiation
of the case business. Plaintiff has no choice but to agree with the
demand of the Republic of Korea.

Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, namely all other individuals who
have injury by all Defendants. Plaintiffs suffered interference by
Defendants' abuse of power, business interrupt, abuse of authority,
dereliction of duty and their due to the intentional wrongful
conduct, Plaintiffs' Data Streams have suffer and monetary damages
in the amount of $400,000 caused by Defendants.[BN]

The Plaintiff, based in Los Angeles, California, appears pro se.

LASALLE COUNTY, IL: Court Dismisses Mayo Civil Rights Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern of District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned
NEHEMIAH MAYO and DAKOTA BURT, Plaintiffs, v. LASALLE COUNTY, BRIAN
TOWNE, and Unknown State's Attorney Felony Enforcement Unit
Officers, Defendants. No. 18 CV 01342. (N.D.Ill.).

Plaintiffs Nehemiah Mayo and Dakota Burt allege that officers
working for an investigative unit formed by former LaSalle County
State's Attorney Brian Towne violated their constitutional rights
and various state laws by stopping and searching their car without
probable cause and using that unlawful stop as a basis to detain
them pending trial.

The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the complaint is
barred by the statute of limitations and that, in any case, Mayo
and Burt failed to state a claim entitling them to relief.

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim is facially plausible when the
complaint's factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
The Court assumes the truth of all factual allegations and
construes all inferences in favor of the plaintiff when evaluating
a motion to dismiss.

The plaintiffs' complaint sets forth 47 paragraphs of factual
allegations spanning three major claims or sets of facts: the
plaintiffs' initial seizure and search, their subsequent arrest and
pretrial detention, and their eventual release on bond. It then
sets forth various legal theories about those events in eight
overlapping counts.

The first four counts deal with alleged constitutional violations:
Counts I and II allege that the stop, search, arrest, and detention
violated the Fourth Amendment. Count III alleges that the
plaintiffs' pretrial detention and subsequent release on bond
violated their constitutional right to travel freely.

Count IV seeks to hold LaSalle County responsible for these alleged
constitutional violations under a Monell theory of liability. As
for state law causes of action, Count V alleges that defendant
Towne abused the legal process by effectuating a baseless arrest
and pressuring the plaintiffs to agree to forfeiture in order to
fund the department and pay for personal expenses, and Count VI
alleges that Towne maliciously prosecuted the plaintiffs. The
remaining counts do not assert additional causes of action but seek
restitution for unjust enrichment (Count VII) and indemnification
on the part of LaSalle County for violations committed by Towne and
the unnamed SAFE Unit officers (Count VIII).

Pretrial Detention: Fourth Amendment (Count II)

Mayo and Burt argue that they were arrested and detained pending
trial in violation of their Fourth Amendment right to remain free
of unreasonable governmental seizures because the SAFE Unit
officers lacked probable cause to arrest them and the judge was
misled as to probable cause at their pretrial detention hearing.

The defendants argue that the claim is time barred and, in any
case, fails to adequately allege facts demonstrating that the
plaintiffs are entitled to relief. The Court agrees with the
defendants in both respects.

Statute of Limitations

Dismissal on statute of limitations grounds under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is warranted if the complaint contains
everything necessary to establish that the claim is untimely. Mayo
and Burt's complaint invokes 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, which makes
state actors liable for actions taken under the color of law that
violate the Constitution or other federal law. The statute of
limitations for Section 1983 actions is governed by state law.  

In Manuel v. City of Joliet (Manuel I) the Supreme Court held that
the Fourth Amendment governs a claim for unlawful pretrial
detention even beyond the start of legal process. 137 S.Ct. 911,
920 (2017). The Court then remanded the case back to the Seventh
Circuit to decide when a pretrial detention claim accrues. The
Seventh Circuit subsequently explained that because the wrong is
the detention rather than the existence of criminal charges, the
period of limitations also should depend on the dates of the
detention. Manuel v. City of Joliet (Manuel II), 903 F.3d 667, 670
(2018).  The problem is the wrongful custody. There is no such
thing as a constitutional right not to be prosecuted without
probable cause. But there is a constitutional right not to be held
in custody without probable cause. Accordingly, the court held that
the plaintiff's pretrial detention claim accrued on the date he was
released from custody.  

That is the case with respect to the plaintiffs' unlawful detention
claim. A suit challenging the lawfulness of the plaintiffs'
pretrial detention would not be inherently inconsistent with the
prosecution of, or conviction on, the drug trafficking charges that
were brought against them. Success on a challenge to the lawfulness
of their detention would require a determination that there was no
probable cause for the detention, and such a finding would imply
the invalidity of the state court order authorizing the detention.
But a suit challenging the lawfulness of the detention under the
Fourth Amendment does not necessarily impugn the propriety of
continuing to prosecute the charges that remain pending. Even in a
case where it was discovered that probable cause to detain had been
lacking, there might otherwise have been developed evidence
sufficient to establish probable cause to support the charges going
forward. But more fundamentally, as the Seventh Circuit has
repeatedly held, lack of probable cause does not preclude a
prosecution from going forward: there is no such thing as a
constitutional right not to be prosecuted without probable cause.

For that reason, the Seventh Circuit expressly rejected Manuel's
contention that a Fourth Amendment pretrial detention claim accrues
only when the plaintiff's position regarding the charges has been
vindicated. The wrong addressed by a Fourth Amendment claim is
wrongful detention; a Fourth Amendment claim therefore accrues when
the wrongful detention ends, even if the prosecution continues.

Accordingly, the clock on Mayo and Burt's pretrial detention claim
started running when they were released from physical custody in
June 2015.

Larson

Perhaps anticipating this outcome, the plaintiffs also contend that
the filing of Larson v. LaSalle,No. 17-cv-04210, 2018 WL 1156204
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2018), a purported class action asserting §
1983 claims against LaSalle County and SAFE Unit officers for
unreasonable searches and seizures, tolled the statute of
limitations on their pretrial detention claims. Larson was filed on
June 2, 2017, nine days before Mayo and Burt's pretrial detention
claim expired; it was dismissed on March 5, 2018, approximately two
weeks after Mayo and Burt filed this suit. In support, the
plaintiffs point to American Pipe & Construction Company v. Utah,
414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974), in which the Supreme Court held that the
commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of
limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have
been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class
action.

First, Mayo and Burt's pretrial detention claim was not encompassed
by the Larson class action because the plaintiff in Larson
challenged only her traffic stop and vehicle search she did not
allege that she was subject to any period of unlawful detention
beyond the initial seizure of the traffic stop. And second, Larson
itself was dismissed as untimely. The defendants contend that the
American Pipe tolling rule applies only to timely filed class
actions and therefore forecloses reliance on Larson. None of the
parties cite any cases which discuss the tolling effect of a
would-be class action that is dismissed as untimely, and the Court
has not located any, but the policy considerations discussed in
American Pipe support the defendants' argument.

There, the Court explained that when a class representative files
suit within the period set by the statute of limitations, the
defendants are put on notice of the subject matter and size of the
prospective litigation such that there is no resulting unfairness
when an otherwise untimely individual suit is filed after class
status is lost. But here, the initial class complaint was itself
untimely. The policies of ensuring essential fairness to defendants
and of barring a plaintiff who has slept on his rights" are not
furthered by allowing one plaintiff, whose claims are already
time-barred, to extend the limitations period on the claims of
untold numbers of other putative class members.

Because Larson did not toll the statute of limitations for the
plaintiffs' pretrial detention claim, their filing of the complaint
more than two years after they were released from custody rendered
the claim untimely.

Failure to State a Claim

Putting to one side these timeliness issues, the Court also
concludes that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for
unlawful pretrial detention. As the Seventh Circuit explained in
Manuel II, there is a constitutional right to not be held in
custody without probable cause that is governed by the Fourth
Amendment. Of course, the existence of probable cause is an
absolute defense to Section 1983 claims alleging unreasonable
seizures. Mayo and Burt's complaint establishes the existence of
probable cause for their arrest and detention, so their claim must
be dismissed.  

Although the complaint attempts to artfully avoid an admission that
there was marijuana in the trunk of the car which would, of course,
establish probable cause for the plaintiffs' arrest and pretrial
detention, the allegations effectively establish the point. First,
the plaintiffs allege that when the officers searched the trunk of
their vehicle, they claimed to find what they believed to be
marijuana, despite being unable to see the contents of the trunk.

Neither the complaint nor the plaintiffs' brief, however, explains
why the officers could not see the contents of the trunk while
searching it. Nor do they allege that the officers in fact found
something other than marijuana, as they claimed, or that the trunk
was empty. Further, the plaintiffs argue that the defendants
falsely told the judge at the pretrial detention hearing that they
had cause to stop the Plaintiffs and that a trained dog signaled
the presence of narcotics, but they do not argue that the
defendants misled the judge about the results of the search.

The complaint, in other words, alleges that the officers claimed to
have found marijuana in the trunk and alleges no facts that
plausibly suggest that this claim was false. Because the defendants
had probable cause for the initial arrest, Mayo and Burt cannot
state a claim for unreasonable pretrial detention or release on
bond.

Pretrial Detention and Release on Bond: Right to Travel (Count
III)

In addition to their Fourth Amendment theory, Mayo and Burt allege
that they were denied their constitutional right to interstate
travel by the imposition of conditions on their pretrial release.
The right to travel encompasses, among other things, the right of a
citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State. The
defendants argue that this theory is also time barred.

Although not from within this circuit, Norwood v. City of
Mendenhall, No. 3:13cv580-HSO-RHW, 2015 WL 11112504, *6 (S.D. Miss.
2015), aff'd 630 Fed. Appx. 245 (5th Cir. 2015) is instructive
here. There, the court found that the plaintiffs' right to travel
claim accrued at the same time their Fourth Amendment claim accrued
when they were released from custody with no further restrictions.


As Mayo and Burt note, however, the Norwood court found nothing in
the record to suggest that the Norwood plaintiffs were subject to
travel restrictions after they were released from detention.

In contrast, the complaint at issue here alleges that the
infringement on the plaintiffs' right to travel continued until the
charges were dropped. But as already discussed, the bond
restrictions placed on Mayo and Burt permitted them to leave the
state of Illinois immediately and imposed no travel restrictions.

The plaintiffs' constitutional claims may not proceed under any of
the legal theories they have advanced. And because there can be no
municipal liability based on an official policy under Monell if the
policy did not result in a violation of a plaintiff's
constitutional rights, the plaintiffs' Monell theory of liability
also fails.

State Law Claims

The Court turns next to the plaintiffs' state law claims, over
which it has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1332. In Count V, Mayo and Burt advance an Illinois abuse of
process theory alleging that the defendants used the legal process
to extort and intimidate them. In Illinois, the statute of
limitations for civil suits against local governmental entities and
their employees is one year, and begins to run in abuse of process
actions from the date that the last act giving rise to the cause of
action has accrued. Although Mayo and Burt argue that the abuse of
process continued until the charges against them were dismissed,
they do not allege in their complaint any improper acts taken by
the defendants after they ensured that the plaintiffs would be
unable to post bond and used the jail conditions to pressure them
into pleading guilty. The face of the complaint therefore
establishes that, at the very latest, Mayo and Burt's abuse of
process claim accrued when they were released from detention, at
which time their bond was reduced to $0. Because they filed this
action more than a year later, it is too late.

Count VI advances a state law malicious prosecution theory.
Malicious prosecution claims do not accrue until the criminal
proceedings are terminated in the plaintiff's favor,  but this
theory nevertheless fails for the same reason that the plaintiffs
failed to state a claim for unlawful pretrial detention: the
complaint establishes that the defendants had probable cause to
initiate criminal proceedings. Accordingly, all that remains in the
complaint is the plaintiffs' unjust enrichment and indemnification
theories. Unjust enrichment is not a separate cause of action in
Illinois, and indemnification, like Monell liability, is merely a
way to hold the city liable for the actions of its employees.
Because all the underlying claims against the defendants have been
dismissed, there is no need to address those theories here.

The Court concludes that Mayo and Burt have failed to adequately
state a claim against the defendants. The complaint is therefore
dismissed. Further, because prevailing Circuit precedent dooms
their Fourth Amendment claims, repleading the claims would be
futile.

The dismissal, therefore, is with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 15, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxmdk79z from
Leagle.com.

Nehemiah Mayo & Dakota Burt, Plaintiffs, represented by Christopher
W. Carmichael -- ccarmichael@henderson-parks.com -- Henderson
Parks, LLC & Victor P. Henderson, Henderson Parks, LLC, 140 South
Dearborn Street, Suite 1020 Chicago, IL 60603

LaSalle County, Defendant, represented by Kevin Mark Casey --
kcasey@pjmchicago.com -- Peterson, Johnson & Murray Chicago LLC &
Shantel Iris Perez -- sperez@pjmchicago.com -- Peterson, Johnson &
Murray-chicago, Llc.

Brian Towne, Defendant, represented by Jason Edward DeVore, DeVore
Radunsky LLC, 53 W. Jackson Blvd.

Suite 1305, Chicago, IL, 60604-3556, Andrew Christopher Clott --
aclott@ralaw.com -- Roetzel & Andress & Troy S. Radunsky, DeVore
Radunsky LLC, 53 W. Jackson Blvd. Suite 1305, Chicago, IL, 60604


LUCKY BRAND DUNGAREES: Gabriyelian Sues over Inaccessibile Website
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Lucky Brand
Dungarees, LLC et al for alleged violations of the American with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and California's Unruh Civil Rights
Act (UCRA). The case is captioned SEDRAK GABRIYELIAN, Individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, vs.
LUCKY BRAND DUNGAREES, L.L.C.; and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-05826 (C.D. Cal., July 7, 2019).

In this complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants have
violated the ADA and UCRA by their failure to operate, construct,
design, publish, and maintain its website to be fully and equally
accessible to, and independently usable by, Plaintiff and other
blind or visually-impaired people. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks a
permanent injunction to cause a change in Defendant's corporate
policies, practices, and procedures so that Defendant's website
will become and remain accessible to blind and visually-impaired
consumers.

Lucky Brand is a Delaware corporation, with its headquarters in
California. Defendant conducts a large amount of its business in
California, and the United States as a whole, and is registered
with the Secretary of State of the State of California. Its
website, https://www.luckybrand.com/, provides consumers with
access to an array of goods and services including store locations,
access to discounts, access to holiday specials, access to
promotions, information about products, gift cards, special events,
access to apply for credit, and other products and services which
are available online and in retail stores for purchase.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jason Christopher Martinez, Esq.
     RM LAW GROUP, LLP
     3200 E Guasti Rd Ste 100
     Ontario, CA 91761-8661
     Telephone: (909) 345-5645
     Facsimile: (866) 494-2073
     E-mail: ADA@rmlawgroupllp.com


LYFT INC: Pyron Suit Alleges Securities Act Breach
--------------------------------------------------
Nathaniel Pyron, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Lyft, Inc., et al., Case No. CGC-19-575728 (Cal. Super.
Ct., San Francisco Cty., May 6, 2019), is brought against the
Defendants for violation of the Securities Act of 1933.

This is a class action on behalf of persons and entities who
purchased or otherwise acquired the common stock of Lyft pursuant
and traceable to the Company's initial public offering.

The claims in this action arise from the materially false and
misleading Registration Statement and Prospectus issued in
connection with the Offering.

The Plaintiff purchased Lyft common stock pursuant to the
Registration Statement issued in connection with the Company's IPO.
Plaintiff is a citizen of California.

The Defendant Lyft based in San Francisco, California, provides a
peer to-peer marketplace for on-demand ridesharing and other
related transportation services. The Defendants Green, Zimmer,
Roberts, et. al. are its directors. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Takeo A. Kellar, Esq.
      ABRAHAM, FRUCHTER & TWERSKY, LLP
      11622 El Camino Real, Suite 100
      San Diego CA 92130
      Tel: (858) 764-2580
      Fax: (858) 764-2582
      E-mail: tkellar@aftlaw.com


MADISON AVENUE: 7th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Casillas FDCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Amy Coney Barrett of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
case, PAULA CASILLAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MADISON AVENUE
ASSOCIATES, INC., an Indiana corporation, Defendant-Appellee, Case
No. 17-3162 (7th Cir.).

Casillas allegedly owed a debt to Harvester Financial Credit Union.
Presumably acting as an agent of the credit union, Madison sent
Casillas a letter demanding payment.  The Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act ("FDCPA") requires a debt collector to give a written
notice to a consumer within five days of its initial communication.
That notice must include, among other things, a description of two
mechanisms that the debtor can use to verify her debt.  

First, a consumer can notify the debt collector "in writing" that
she disputes all or part of the debt, which obligates the debt
collector to obtain verification of the debt and mail a copy to the
debtor.  A failure to dispute the debt within 30 days means that
the debt collector will assume that the debt is valid.  Second, a
consumer can make a "written request" that the debt collector
provides her with the name and address of the original creditor,
which the debt collector must do if a diferent creditor currently
holds the debt. Madison's notice conveyed all of that information,
except that it neglected to specify that Casillas' notification or
request under those provisions must be in writing.

Casillas filed a class action against Madison because of that
omission.  She did not allege that she tried -- or even planned to
try -- to dispute the debt or verify that Harvester was actually
her creditor.  But the Act renders a debt collector liable for
failing to comply with any provision of the Act, and by neglecting
to notify Casillas of the writing requirement, Madison failed to
comply with a provision of the Act.  That, Casillas alleged,
constituted a material/concrete breach of her rights under the
Act.

She sought to recover a $1000 statutory penalty for herself and a
$5000 statutory penalty for the unnamed class members, along with
attorneys' fees and costs.  The parties eventually entered a joint
motion for class certification and preliminary approval of a class
settlement.

While that motion was pending, the Court decided Groshek v. Time
Warner Cable, Inc. There, following the Supreme Court's decision in
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, it held that a plaintiff cannot satisfy the
injury-in-fact element of standing simply by alleging that the
defendant violated a disclosure provision of a consumer-protection
statute.  The district court held that Groshek required it to
dismiss Casillas' complaint.  Casillas had not alleged that
Madison's omission afected her in any way.  And absent an
allegation that Madison's violation had caused her harm or put her
at an appreciable risk of harm, the district court said, Casillas
lacked standing to sue.

Casillas' appeal involves the injury-in-fact requirement, which the
Supreme Court has described as the "first and foremost" element of
standing.  An "injury in fact" is "an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b)
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical."  An alleged
harm need not be tangible to be "concrete," but it must be "real,
and not abstract."  The question now is whether Casillas has
alleged that she suffered -- or faced a real risk of suffering -- a
concrete harm.

Judge Barrett concludes that Madison made a mistake.  The FDCPA
requires debt collectors to notify consumers about the process that
the statute provides for verifying a debt.  Madison sent Casillas a
debt-collection letter that described the process, but it neglected
to specify that she had to communicate in writing to trigger the
statutory protections.  Casillas noticed the omission and filed a
class action against Madison.

The only harm that Casillas claimed to have suffered, however, was
the receipt of an incomplete letter -- and that is insufficient to
establish federal jurisdiction.  As the Supreme Court emphasized in
Spokeo, Casillas cannot claim a bare procedural violation, divorced
from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement
of Article III.  Article III grants federal courts the power to
redress harms that defendants cause plaintiffs, not a freewheeling
power to hold defendants accountable for legal infractions.
Because Madison's violation of the statute did not harm Casillas,
there is no injury for a federal court to redress.

For these reasons, Judge Barrett affirmed the district court's
judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 4, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/VLogkV from Leagle.com.

James R. Branit -- Branit@LitchfieldCavo.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

David J. Philipps, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

John G. Albanese -- jalbanese@bm.net -- for Plaintiff-Appellant.


MAMMOTH ENERGY: Pomerantz Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP announces that a class action lawsuit has been filed
against Mammoth Energy Services, Inc. ("Mammoth" or the "Company")
(NASDAQ:  TUSK) and certain of its officers.   The class action,
filed in United States District Court, for the Western District of
Oklahoma, and indexed under 19-cv-00560, is on behalf of a class
consisting of all persons and entities other than Defendants who
purchased or otherwise acquired publicly traded Mammoth securities
from October 19, 2017 through June 5, 2019, inclusive (the "Class
Period"). Plaintiff seeks to recover compensable damages caused by
Defendants' violations of the federal securities laws under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act").

If you are a shareholder who purchased Mammoth securities during
the class period, you have until August 6, 2019, to ask the Court
to appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of the
Complaint can be obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com.  To discuss this
action, contact Robert S. Willoughby at rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or
888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who
inquire by e-mail are encouraged to include their mailing address,
telephone number, and the number of shares purchased.

Mammoth purports to operate as an oilfield service company
operating in three segments: Infrastructure Services, Pressure
Pumping Services, and Natural Sand Proppant Services. The Company
serves government-funded utilities, private and public
investor-owned utilities, co-operative utilities, independent oil
and natural gas producers and land-based drilling contractors in
North America.

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operational and compliance policies.
Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that:  (1) Mammoth's subsidiary, Cobra
Acquisitions LLC, improperly obtained two infrastructure contracts
with Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority that totaled over $1.8
billion; (2) specifically, the contracts were awarded as the result
of improper steering and not a competitive Request For Proposal
process; and (3) as a result, the defendants' statements about
Mammoth's business, operations and prospects were materially false
and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant
times.

On May 24, 2019, the Wall Street Journal published an article
entitled "FEMA Official Probed Over Puerto Rico Power Restoration,"
stating that the Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA")
Deputy Regional Administrator, who oversaw FEMA's response to the
damage wrought by Hurricane Maria, was under investigation by the
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), relieved of her duties and
placed on administrative leave over allegations that she steered
work to Cobra.

On this news, the Company's shares fell $1.25 per share or over 10%
over the next three trading days on unusually high volume to close
at $10.99 per share on May 29, 2019, damaging investors.

Then, on June 5, 2019, while the market was open, the Wall Street
Journal published an article entitled Puerto Rico Grid Contractor
Caught Up in Federal Probes, stating that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation had "opened a related criminal inquiry" into the
origin of Cobra's contracts with PREPA.

On this news, the Company's shares fell $5.09 per share or over 45%
over the next two trading days to close at $6.11 per share on June
6, 2019, further damaging investors.

Contact:

         Robert S. Willoughby, Esq.
         Pomerantz LLP
         Phone: 888-476-6529 ext. 9980
         Website: www.pomerantzlaw.com
         Email: rswilloughby@pomlaw.com [GN]


MARTIAL VIVOT: Nisbett Suit Alleges ADA Violation
-------------------------------------------------
Kareem Nisbett, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated v. Martial Vivot, LLC, Case No. 1:19-cv-04012
(S.D. N.Y., May 6, 2019), is brought against the Defendant for
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the New York
State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law.

The Defendant violated the ADA by failing to design, construct,
maintain and operate its website, www.martialvivot.com, to be fully
accessible and independently usable by the Plaintiff and other
blind or visually impaired people.

The Plaintiff is a resident of the Bronx, New York, Bronx County
and is a visually-impaired person.

The Defendant is a hair salon for men with two locations in New
York City. At the salon, one can receive a haircut, shave, and
beard trim and similar services. The Defendant's website is heavily
integrated with Defendant’s hair salons, serving as a gateway to
them. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Douglas B. Lipsky, Esq.
      Christopher H. Lowe, Esq.
      LIPSKY LOWE LLP
      630 Third Avenue, Fifth Floor
      New York, NY 10017-6705
      Tel: (212) 392-4772
      E-mail: doug@lipskylowe.com
              chris@lipskylowe.com


MASSAGE ENVY: Settlement in McKinney-Drobnis Has Prelim Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Baerbel McKinney-Drobnis, Joseph B. Piccola, and
Camille Berlese, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. MASSAGE ENVY FRANCHISING, LLC, a Delaware
Limited Liability Company, Defendants, Case No. 3:16-CV-6450-MMC
(N.D. Cal.), Judge Maxime M. Chesney of the U.S. District Court for
the Northen District of California granted the Class
Representatives' Motion for Preliminary Approval of a Class Action
Settlement and Proposed Settlement Class.

The Class Representatives' Motion and the Parties' Joint Motion for
Vacatur were heard on May 31, 2019.  In connection with the Motion
and the Joint Motion, the Judge has considered the proposed class
action Settlement Agreement, the submissions of counsel, and all
other papers filed in this action.

Having been submitted, and good cause appearing, she preliminarily
approved the provisions of the Agreement.  

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3),
and for purposes of, and solely in connection with, the Settlement,
she conditionally certified the class comprised of all Members of
an MEF location since Nov. 4, 2006, whose monthly membership fee
has been increased above the amount stated in their Membership
Agreement (Fee Increase) prior to date of the Preliminary Approval
Order.

The Judge appointed and designated (i) Baerbel McKinney-Drobnis,
Camille Berlese, and Joseph Piccola as the Class representatives;
(ii) Finkelstein & Krinsk LLP as the class counsel; and (iii)
Hilsoft Notifications as the Settlement Administrator.

She approved, as to form and content, the proposed Class Notice,
filed June 5, 2019, including the procedure for the class membders
to object to or request exclusion from the Settlement, to submit a
voucher request, and to file a Notice of Intent to Appear at the
Final APproval Hearing, and, accordingly, directed that the Class
Notice be given in the form and manner consistent therewith and the
Preliminary Approval Order.

The new membership agreement expressly entitles any Massage Envy
Spa who uses this or a similar membership agreement to increase the
member's stated monthly membership fee following the initial
membership term only by providing at least 45 days' advance written
notice to the member's email address on record with the member's
Massage Envy Spa and that such notice will be effective on the date
sent.

The Judge directed the Settlment Administrator to provide the
approved Class Notice to the Class in accordance with the schedule
set forth and using the procedures set forth in the Agreement.

In accordance with the schedule set forth be the Settlement
Administrator is directed to establish a website at
www.massagefeesettlement.com to provide information regarding the
Settlement including requesting exclusion from or objecting to the
Settlement, submitting a voucher request consistent with the
Agreement, the date of the Final Approval Hearing, and other
information related to the Settlement.

MEF will pay the Settlement Administrator's reasonable costs
associated with the administration of the Settlement, distribution
of Class Notice pursuant to the Agreement, and any other tasks
assigned to the Settlment Administrator by the Agreement, by MEF's
and the Class Representatives' mutual written agreement, or as the
Court may order.

Before any voucher may be issued, each class member must submit a
valid voucher request in accordance with the instructions set forth
in the Agreement and Class Notice.

Any class memver may may choose to object to the Settlement by
serving on the Settlment Administrator an objection to the
Settlementin accordance with the instructions set forth in the
Agreement and the Class notice.  The class members who fail to
serve timely objections upon the Settlment Administrator will be
deemed to have waived any objections and will forever be foreclosed
from making any objection (whether by appeal or otherwise) to the
Settlement.

Any class member may choose to be excluded from the Settlement as
provided in the Agreement and the Class Notice.

The Judge ordered the following schedule as set forth in the
Agreement:

a. No later than June 14, 2019, the Settlement Administrator will
launch the Settlement website.

     b. No later than April 25, 2019, the Settlement Administrator
will serve the notices required to be served pursuant to CAFA.

     c. No later than July 8, 2019, MEF will provide the Settlement
Administrator with an electronic list or database that includes the
following information with respect to each former member from the
Millennium Central Office Database (or any successor point of sale
database) as of the date of the Preliminary Approval Order: (i)
first and last name; (ii) last known mailing address; (iii) email
address, if available; (iv) phone number, if available; (v) a
UNIQUE ID CODE; (vi) a UNIQUE ID CODE for each membership held by
the former member; (vii) the date the former member's membership
was terminated, cancelled, suspended, or not renewed; (viii) each
date on which the former member paid a monthly membership fee that
was higher than the prior month; and (ix) the total amount of feee
increasses the former member paid through the date the former
member's membership was terminated, cancelled, suspended, or not
renewed or the former member's last EFT payment, whichever is
later.

     d. No later than July 8, 2019, MEF will provide the Settlement
Administrator with an electronic list or database that includes the
following information with respect to each L from the Millennium
Central Office Database (or any successor point of sale database)
as of the date of the Preliminary Approval Order: (i) first and
last name; (ii) last known mailing address; (iii) email address, if
available; (iv) phone number, if available; (v) unique id code;
(vi) unique id code for each membership held by the current member;
(vii) each date on which the current member paid a monthly
membership fee that was higher than the prior month; and (viii) the
total amount of fee increases the current member paid through the
date of this preliminary approval order.

     e. No later than Aug. 16, 2019, the Class Counsel will file
with the clerk and cause to be posted on the settlement website a
motion requesting an incentive fee award for the Class
Representatives and a fee and expense award.

     f. No later than July 22, 2019, the Settlement Administrator
will complete the initial Class Notice to all persons shown by the
data from the Millennium Central Office Database (or any successor
point of sale database) to be Class Members, via email for those
Class Members for whom an email address is available and via First
Class U.S. Mail to all other Class Members.

     g. All voucher requests must be submitted online on the
Settlement website or emailed, faxed, or mailed to the Settlement
Administrator postmarked on Sept. 20, 2019.

     h. All objections must be mailed to the Settlement
Administrator on Sept. 20, 2019.

     i. All requests for exclusion must be emailed or mailed by
First Class U.S. Mail to the Settlement Administrator postmarked on
Sept. 20, 2019.

     j. No later than Oct. 7, 2019, the Settlement Administrator
will provide to the Class Counsel and MEF's counsel a list of Class
members who submitted valid and timely exclusion requests.

     k. No later than Oct. 7, 2019, the Class Counsel will file
with the COURT and serve upon MEF's counsel any written objections
received by the Settlement Administrator from Class Memnders.

     l. No later than Oct. 7, 2019, the Settlement Administrator
will provide the Class Counsel and MEF's counsel with a Declaration
of Compliance to be filed with the Court in connection with the
Final Approval Motion.

No later than Oct. 18, 2019, the class counsel will file the Class
Representatives' Motion for Final Approval.

A Final Approval Hearing will be held before the COURT on Nov. 1,
2019, at 9:00 a.m.  Any objecting Class Member may appear, in
person or by counsel, at the Final Approval hearing.  To appear in
person or by counsel, the objecting Class Membder must file with
the Court and serve upon all counsel designated in the Class
Notice, a Notice of Intention to Appear by Oct. 18, 2019.  The
Notice of Intention to Appear must include the required information
in accordance with the Agreement, the Class Notice, and the
Settlement website.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 7, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/cB4M7g from Leagle.com.

Baerbel McKinney-Drobnis, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Trenton Ross Kashima
-- trk@classactionlaw.com -- Finkelstein Krink LLP.

Joseph B. Piccola, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated & Camille Berlese, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Trenton
Ross Kashima, Finkelstein Krink LLP.

Massage Envy Franchising, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability
Company, Defendant, represented by Luanne Sacks --
lsacks@srclaw.com -- Sacks, Ricketts & Case, LLP, Cynthia A.
Ricketts -- cricketts@srclaw.com -- Sacks, Ricketts & Case LLP, pro
hac vice, Kahn Abrahm Scolnick -- kscolnick@gibsondunn.com --
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, Robert Brett Bader --
rbader@srclaw.com -- Sacks, Ricketts & Case LLP & Theodore J.
Boutrous, Jr. -- tboutrous@gibsondunn.com -- Attorney at Law.

David Lapa, Interested Party, represented by Jack Fitzgerald, The
Law Office of Jack Fitzgerald, PC.


MAZDA: Faces Class Action in California Over Water Pump Defects
---------------------------------------------------------------
David A. Wood, writing for CarComplaints.com, reports that a Mazda
water pump lawsuit alleges 2007-2016 Mazda CX-9 and 2009-2013
Mazda6 vehicles are equipped with pumps that suddenly fail and
cause catastrophic engine failures.

The proposed class action lawsuit alleges the vehicles lose engine
power and fail to accelerate and maintain speed. The vehicles also
allegedly can't readily control steering and cannot fully engage
the brakes.

The plaintiffs claim the vehicles are at risk of serious crashes
because Mazda has failed to disclose the alleged water pump
defects.

Michigan resident Terry Sonneveldt, one of 15 named plaintiffs,
purchased a used 2012 Mazda CX-9 in October 2018, but in April 2019
his vehicle suffered catastrophic engine failure without warning.
The plaintiff says the engine problem was caused by the water pump,
something that cost him more than $5,000 to repair.

The Mazda CX-9 and Mazda6 vehicles are equipped with MZI Cyclone
engines introduced by Mazda in 2007. According to the lawsuit, the
Cyclone engine has an internal chain-driven water pump which means
the timing chain is connected to the water pump and provides the
power the water pump needs to circulate coolant through the
engine.

According to the water pump lawsuit, the Cyclone engines are
installed in hundreds of thousands of Mazda CX-9 and Mazda6
vehicles, all at risk of coolant leaking into the timing chains,
crankcases and oil pans.

The water pump inside the engine is located behind the timing chain
cover and allegedly hidden from the view of mechanics servicing the
vehicles.

The plaintiffs say even though people may not be able to see it,
coolant can leak from the water pump into the oil pan and other
engine components and mix with engine oil. This mixture of oil and
coolant then circulates through the engine, causing the engine
failures referenced by the plaintiffs.

The Mazda water pump lawsuit also alleges the automaker worked with
Ford concerning the design, engineering and testing of the Cyclone
engines which are known as Duratec engines installed in millions of
Ford vehicles. The plaintiffs claim Mazda must have known about the
water pump problems Ford customers experienced in their vehicles.

However, Mazda still refuses to recall the affected vehicles or
create permanent repairs for vehicle owners. In addition, Mazda
hasn't compensated customers for water pump and engine
replacements.

Mazda allegedly should have known the water pumps would likely fail
outside the warranty periods and leave customers no choice but to
pay thousands of dollars for repairs. Because of the location of
the water pump, the lawsuit alleges just replacing the part can
cost more than $1,500, but replacing a damaged engine can cost more
than $10,000.

Just to replace the water pump the job involves removal of the
timing chain, guides and cover, a job that can take 12 to 14 hours
to complete.

The plaintiffs claim Mazda tells technicians to remove the oil pan
drain plug and line the cylinder block with plastic sheeting to
prevent coolant from penetrating or accumulating in the oil pan.

According to the plaintiffs, the owner's manual wrongly indicates
the water pump doesn't need serviced or replaced during at least
the first 120,000 miles driving.

The Mazda water pump class action lawsuit was filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California - Sonneveldt,
et al. v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., et al.

The plaintiffs are represented by Kiesel Law, Kessler Topaz Meltzer
& Check, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, The Miller Law Firm, Keil &
Goodson, and the Edwards Firm.

Read complaints sent to CarComplaints.com about the Mazda vehicles
named in the water pump lawsuit.

Mazda CX-9 - 2007 / 2008 / 2009 / 2010 / 2011 / 2012 / 2013 / 2014
/ 2015 / 2016

Mazda6 - 2009 / 2010 / 2011 / 2012 / 2013 [GN]


MERRILL LYNCH: Alishaev Sues Over Futures Contracts Price-fixing
----------------------------------------------------------------
YURI ALISHAEV, ABRAHAM JEREMIAS, and MORRIS JEREMIAS, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
MERRILL LYNCH COMMODITIES, INC., BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION,
MORGAN STANLEY & CO. LLC, EDWARD BASES, JOHN PACILIO, and JOHN DOES
1 – 18, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-06488 (S.D. N.Y., July 12,
2019) is an action arising from Defendants' intentional
manipulation of COMEX gold and silver, and NYMEX platinum and
palladium futures contracts, and options on those futures contracts
(collectively, "precious metals futures contracts") traded on the
New York Mercantile Exchange ("NYMEX") and the Commodities
Exchange, Inc. ("COMEX"), during the period of at least January 1,
2008, through December 31, 2014, in violation of the Commodity
Exchange Act, ("CEA"), and the common law.

The complaint says Defendants manipulated the prices of these
precious metals futures contracts through "spoofing," placing
orders they never intended to execute and then cancelling those
orders before execution. During the Class Period, Defendants'
misconduct artificially skewed the prices of precious metals
futures contracts to financially benefit their trading positions at
the expense of other investors, like Plaintiffs and the Class. Some
of the Defendants have entered into a NPA with the DOJ admitting to
what is in essence commodities fraud, spoofing, and conspiracy to
commit same. On June 25, 2019, Defendants MLCI and BAC entered into
a non-prosecution agreement with the DOJ, admitting involvement in
a "multiyear scheme by MLCI precious metals traders to mislead the
market for precious metals futures contracts" traded on COMEX.
Defendant BAC also agreed to cooperate with the DOJ, and Defendants
MLCI and BAC have agreed to improve their compliance programs and
internal controls. Defendant MLCI will also pay $25 million in
criminal fines, restitution and forfeiture of profits.

The Defendant MLCI has admitted that it is responsible for the acts
of its officers, directors, employees and agents for the misconduct
alleged herein, and admitted that such misconduct constitutes a
violation of the law, specifically, commodities fraud, in violation
of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1348(1). On the same day,
the CFTC settled with Defendant MLCI, who agreed to cooperate with
the CFTC in matters relating to the action, and comply with its
corporate compliance program and reporting requirements. As a
result, Defendant MLCI must pay the CFTC an $11.5 million fine. The
CFTC Order states that, through its traders, MLCI engaged in market
manipulation of the precious metals futures market in order to
manipulate and cause artificial prices in those markets.

Plaintiffs seek damages for themselves and the Class for
Defendants' illegal and manipulative misconduct.

Plaintiffs transacted in COMEX gold and silver, and NYMEX platinum
and palladium futures contracts and options on those futures
contracts throughout the Class Period.

Defendant MLCI is a Delaware corporation with its principal place
of business in Houston, Texas. MLCI employs hundreds of traders
worldwide and has offices in New York.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Mark D. Smilow, Esq.
     WEISSLAW LLP
     1500 Broadway, Suite 1601
     New York, NY 10036
     Phone: (212) 682-3025
     Fax: (212) 682-3010
     Email: msmilow@weisslawllp.com


MIDDLE VILLAGE: Bid to Dismiss Parker-Leon Bullying Suit Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York denied the Defendant's motion to
dismiss the case, COLLEEN PARKER-LEON and STEVEN LEON, on behalf of
their minor son J.L., Plaintiffs, v. MIDDLE VILLAGE PREPARATORY
CHARTER SCHOOL, Defendant, Case No. 17-CV-4548 (NGG) (RML) (E.D.
N.Y.).

Plaintiffs Parker-Leon and Leon bring the action on behalf of their
minor son, J.L., against Defendant Middle Village Preparatory
Charter School ("MVP") alleging various common law causes of action
and statutory violations under 29 U.S.C. Section 701 ("Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act") and 42 U.S.C. Section 12132 ("Americans
with Disabilities Act" or "ADA").  Th Plaintiffs maintain that J.L.
was subjected to ongoing and pervasive bullying and harassment at
MVP.  J.L. was diagnosed with ADHD and social anxiety and
participated in an Individualized Education Program ("IEP") while
attending MVP during the 2016-17 school year.

The Plaintiffs allege that although J.L. initially enjoyed
attending MVP, he started to complain about bullying within the
first month of the school year.  They maintain that they contacted
MVP, including the Board of Trustees, multiple times from October
2016 through March 2017 regarding their son's complaints about
bullying, but the school failed to respond and/or take remedial
action.  They allege that they notified the Board of MVP, and state
that six and a half months after their first complaint they
received a response that the Board found no evidence of bullying
and would take no further action.  

The Plaintiffs contend that J.L. suffered significant emotional
distress as a result of MVP's alleged failure to address the
bullying.  They further allege that as a result of the bullying,
J.L. stopped attending after-school programs and, therefore, no
longer received assistance with his homework.

The Plaintiffs filed their complaint with the Court on Aug. 2,
2017.  The Defendant answered the Plaintiffs' complaint on Aug. 29,
2017.  It then requested a pre-motion conference in anticipation of
their motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.  The Court granted the Defendant's leave to move to
dismiss the complaint.  On Oct. 26, 2018, the Defendant filed the
fully briefed motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction of subject
matter.

The Plaintiffs bring claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1983 and the ADA, alleging that the Defendant failed to
protect J.L. from the repeated and frequent bullying which occurred
because of his disability on the schools' premises ("Count One" and
"Count Two," respectively).  They also bring a variety of
common-law claims, including negligence, negligent infliction of
emotional distress, and negligent hiring and supervision ("Count
Three," "Count Four," and "Count Five," respectively).

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs must first exhaust their
administrative remedies with respect to any disability claim
pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA") prior to bringing the suit.  The Plaintiffs, by contrast,
contend that exhaustion of their claims is not necessary because
their claims do not pertain to access to a free appropriate public
education ("FAPE"), a right guaranteed by IDEA.

Judge Garaufis finds that the Plaintiffs' ADA/Rehabilitation Act
claims primarily concern the discriminatory harassment of their son
and the school's alleged failure to prevent such conduct, and
therefore are not subject to the IDEA's exhaustion requirement.
The Defendant has not raised any other arguments supporting
dismissal of the Plaintiff's ADA/Rehabilitation Act Claims.  Thus,
in light of of his finding that thePlaintiffs' ADA/Rehabilitation
Act claims are not subject to exhaustion and the Defendant's
failure to brief the merits of these claims, the Defendant's motion
to dismiss is denied and the Judge need not address arguments
pertaining to exceptions to the IDEA exhaustion requirement.

The only argument the Defendant raises with regard to the
Plaintiffs' state law claims is that they should be dismissed
because the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
their federal claims.  Because he has denied the Defendant's motion
to dismiss the Plaintiff's federal claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, the Judge declines to dismiss the Plaintiff's
state law claims.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Garaufis denied the Defendant's
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 4, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/WcLjP8 from Leagle.com.

Colleen Parker-Leon, On behalf of minor son J.L. & Steven Leon, On
behalf of minor son J.L., Plaintiffs, represented by Seth Asher
Nadler -- seth@lawicm.com -- ImbesiLaw, P.C. & Brittany Weiner --
brittany@lawicm.com -- Imbesi Law PC.

Middle Village Preparatory Charter School, Defendant, represented
by Raphaella Poteau -- rpoteau@bglaw.com -- Barton Gilman, LLP, pro
hac vice & Paul T. O'Neill, Barton Gilman LLP.


MONEY STORE: California Court Dismisses Asberry Suit w/ Prejudice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DARRELL ASBERRY, MICHAEL F. CORDES, SHIRLEY PIATT, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. THE MONEY STORE, TMS MORTGAGE, INC., HOMEQ SERVICING CORP.,
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-01291-ODW
(PLAx) (C.D. Cal.), Judge Otis D. Wright, II of the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California granted the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Class
Action Complaint, with prejudice.

On Oct. 5, 2018, the Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss.
Having considered the papers submitted in support of and in
opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, along with the pleadings in
the action, the Judge granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, with
prejudice, for the reasons set forth in the Court's May 28, 2019
Order.

Having granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and good cause
appearing therefore, the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Class Action
Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.  The Plaintiffs will take
nothing by way of their Second Amended Class Action Complaint in
the action.  The action is dismissed in its entirety.

Judgment is entered in favor of the Defendants and against the
Plaintiffs.  The Defendants will recover their costs of suit from
the Plaintiffs, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54.
The Clerk of the Court will close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 7, 2019 Judgment is available
at https://is.gd/HzEmKr from Leagle.com.

Shirley Piatt, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Darrell Asberry, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated & Michael Cordes, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Robert
J.
Girard, II, Girard Bengali APC, Paul S. Grobman, The Law Offices
of
Paul Grobman, pro hac vice & Omar H. Bengali --
obengali@girardbengali.com -- Girard Bengali APC.

The Money Store, TMS Mortgage Inc, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. & HomEq
Servicing Corporation, Defendants, represented by Amy P. Williams
-- amy.williams@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders LLP, pro hac vice
& Jessica Rose Ellis Lohr -- jessica.lohr@troutmansanders.com --
Troutman Sanders LLP.


MOTT'S LLP: Court Issues Protective Order in Morris Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Autumn D. Spaeth of the U.S. District Court of the
Central District of California has issued a protective order in the
case, ADRIENNE MORRIS and NIKKI COOK, individually, and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, and the general public,
Plaintiffs, v. MOTT'S LLP., a Delaware Partnership, Defendant, Case
No. 8:18-cv-01799-AG-ADS (C.D. Cal.).

Discovery in the action is likely to involve production of
confidential, proprietary, or private information for which special
protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose
other than prosecuting thes litigation may be warranted.  It is the
intent of the parties that information will not be designated as
confidential for tactical reasons and that nothing be so designated
without a good faith belief that it has been maintained in a
confidential, non-public manner, and there is good cause why it
should not be part of the public record of the case.

The protections conferred by the Stipulation and Order cover not
only Protected Material, but also (1) any information copied or
extracted from Protected Material; (2) all copies, excerpts,
summaries, or compilations of Protected Material; and (3) any
testimony, conversations, or presentations by Parties or their
Counsel that might reveal Protected Material.  Any use of Protected
Material at trial will be governed by the orders of the trial
judge.

Even after final disposition of the litigation, the confidentiality
obligations imposed by the Order will remain in effect until a
Designating Party agrees otherwise in writing or a court order
otherwise directs.  Final disposition will be deemed to be the
later of (1) dismissal of all claims and defenses in the action,
with or without prejudice; and (2) final judgment herein after the
completion and exhaustion of all appeals, rehearings, remands,
trials, or reviews of the action, including the time limits for
filing any motions or applications for extension of time pursuant
to applicable law.

Any party or Non-Party may challenge a designation of
confidentiality at any time that is consistent with the Court's
Scheduling Order.

After the final disposition of the Action, as defined in Section V,
within 60 days of a written request by the Designating Party, each
Receiving Party must return all Protected Material to the Producing
Party or destroy such material.  Any violation of the Order may be
punished by any and all appropriate measures including, without
limitation, contempt proceedings and/or monetary sanctions.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 7, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/gqQPx8 from Leagle.com.

Adrienne Morris, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Michael T. Houchin --
ron@consumersadvocates.com -- Ronald A Marron Law Offices, Scott J.
Ferrell, Pacific Trial Attorneys APC, Lilach Halperin, Law Offices
of Ronald A Marron APLC & Ronald A. Marron --
ron@consumersadvocates.com -- Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron
APLC.

Nikki Cook, Plaintiff, represented by Lilach Halperin, Law Offices
of Ronald A Marron APLC & Ronald A. Marron, Law Offices of Ronald
A. Marron APLC.

Motts LLP, a Delaware partnership, Defendant, represented by
Charles C. Sipos -- CSipos@perkinscoie.com -- Perkins Coie LLP, pro
hac vice, David T. Biderman -- DBiderman@perkinscoie.com -- Perkins
Coie LLP, Lauren W. Staniar -- LStaniar@perkinscoie.com -- Perkins
Coie LLP, pro hac vice & Steven Kichong Hwang --
skhwang@perkinscoie.com -- Perkins Coie LLP.


NCAA: Rembert Sues over Student-Athletes' Health & Safety
---------------------------------------------------------
REGINALD REMBERT, the Plaintiff, vs. THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, AND MOUNTAIN WEST CONFERENCE, the Defendants,
Case No. 1:19-cv-02815-JPH-TAB (S.D. Ind., July 9, 2019), seeks
redress for injuries sustained a result of Defendant's reckless
disregard for the health and safety of generations of
student-athletes.

According to the complaint, nearly 100,000 student-athletes sign up
to compete in college football each year, and it's no surprise why.
Football is America's sport and Plaintiff and a Class of football
players were raised to live and breathe the game. During football
season, there are entire days of the week that millions of
Americans dedicate to watching the game. On game days, hundreds of
thousands of fans fill stadium seats and even more watch around the
world. Before each game, these players -- often mere teenagers --
are riled up and told to do whatever it takes to win and, when
playing, are motivated to do whatever it takes to keep going.

But up until 2010, NCAA kept players and the public in the dark
about an epidemic that was slowly killing college athletes. During
the course of a college football season, athletes absorb more than
1,000 impacts greater than 10 Gs (gravitational force) and, worse
yet, the majority of football-related hits to the head exceed 20
Gs, with some approaching 100 Gs. To put this in perspective, if
you drove your car into a wall at 25 miles per hour and weren't
wearing a seatbelt, the force of you hitting the windshield would
be around 100 Gs. Thus, each season these 18, 19, 20, and
21-year-old student-athletes are subjected to repeated car
accidents.

Over time, the repetitive and violent impacts to players' heads led
to repeated concussions that severely increased their risks of
long-term brain injuries, including memory loss, dementia,
depression, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy ("CTE"), Parkinson's
disease, and other related symptoms. Meaning, long after they
played their last game, they are left with a series of neurological
events that could slowly strangle their brains. For decades, NCAA
knew about the debilitating long-term dangers of concussions,
concussion-related injuries, and sub-concussive injuries (referred
to as "traumatic brain injuries" or "TBIs") that resulted from
playing college football, but recklessly disregarded this
information to protect the very profitable business of "amateur"
college football.

Football players were under Defendant's care. Unfortunately,
Defendant did not care about the off-field consequences that would
haunt students for the rest of their lives. Despite knowing for
decades of a vast body of scientific research describing the danger
of traumatic brain injuries like those Plaintiff experienced,
Defendant failed to implement adequate procedures to protect
Plaintiff and other football players from the long-term dangers
associated with them. They did so knowingly and for profit.

As a direct result of Defendant's acts and omissions, Plaintiff and
countless football players suffered brain and other neurocognitive
injuries from playing NCAA football. As such, Plaintiff brings this
Class Action Complaint in order to vindicate those players' rights
and hold the NCAA accountable, the lawsuit says.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Vincent P. Circelli, Esq.
          George Parker Young, Esq.
          Kelli L. Walter, Esq.
          CIRCELLI , WALTER & YOUNG, PLLC
          Tindall Square Warehouse
          500 E. 4th Street, Suite 250
          Fort Worth, TX 76102
          Telephone: (817) 697-4942
          E-mail: gpy@cwylaw.com
                  vinny@cwylaw.com
                  kelli@cwylaw.com

NEW AGE DISTRIBUTING: Christman Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------------------------
Aaron Christman and Emanuel Savage, Individually and on behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs v. NEW AGE DISTRIBUTING,
INC., Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-00488-BRW (W.D. Ark., July 12,
2019) is a collective action brought by Plaintiffs, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, against Defendant
for violations of the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (the "FLSA"), and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act (the
"AMWA").

Plaintiffs and other merchandisers worked more than 40 hours per
week on a regular, typical basis while working for Defendant.
Plaintiffs and other merchandisers were paid a salary for all hours
worked, with no overtime premium for hours worked in excess of 40
hours per week. The Defendant did not pay Plaintiffs and other
merchandisers one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for
all hours worked over 40 per week. The Defendant knew or showed
reckless disregard for whether the way it paid Plaintiffs and other
merchandisers violated the FLSA, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs work for Defendant as Merchandisers.

Defendant is a for-profit, domestic corporation, created and
existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Arkansas,
providing business-to-business beverage distribution services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Sean Short, Esq.
     Josh Sanford, Esq.
     SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
     One Financial Center
     650 South Shackleford Road, Suite 411
     Little Rock, AR 72211
     Phone: (501) 221-0088
     Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
     Email: sean@sanfordlawfirm.com
            josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


NEW JERSEY: Turnpike Authority Ordered to Prove E-ZPass Fines
-------------------------------------------------------------
David Matthau, writing for New Jersey 101.5, reports that an
appellate court panel has demanded that the New Jersey Turnpike
Authority provide evidence that it needs to charge a $50 violation
fee for every missed toll.

The fee is at the heart of a proposed class-action lawsuit against
the Authority over its E-ZPass fines.

State law prohibits the authority from profiting off violation
fees. The fine is supposed to make up the cost of the missed toll
as well as the effort in sending out the notices.

The lawsuit claims the existing fine is excessive and
unreasonable.

Matthew Faranda Diedrich -- mfd@rccblaw.com -- an attorney with the
Philadelphia firm Royer Cooper Cohen Braunfeld, has been leading
the charge against the E-ZPass fee.

"For years we've been saying that the fee itself is not a fee
really — it's an invalid fine, and it's unauthorized and it's an
unconstitutional tax on innocent motorists."

In 2011 the Turnpike Authority raised the fee for E-ZPass violation
from $25 to $50.

"It's clearly just a money-making endeavor by the Turnpike, and
indirectly by the state," Diedrich said. "We believe that when the
evidence actually comes out, it'll show that it is an exorbitant
fine that bears no relation to the actual cost of processing and
collecting the tolls."

The lawsuit had been put on hold earlier this year so that the
state's courts could determine whether the fine is legal. A hearing
has been scheduled for late October to review the evidence the
Court has requested.

Diedrich says the ruling is a positive development "because these
individuals who have been hit with this fine are the people who use
the toll roads in New Jersey for their livelihood and as an
essential part of their daily lives."

He stressed many drivers who have been told they have to pay these
$50 fees are getting fleeced.

"They expect to pay tolls to use the roads but what they don't
expect is to pay an exorbitant fee that bears no relation to the
actual cost of processing and collecting tolls."

He pointed out the $50 fee is charged for all sorts of reasons
where drivers have done nothing wrong, including "malfunctioning
transponders, forgetting to link a new credit card to a new vehicle
for an E-ZPass account, or simply system error which happens as
well, outside of the users control."

The federal lawsuit says that if the cost of the Turnpike
Authority's violation-processing contract was divided by the number
of violations they collected in a year, the amount of the fine
should be $18.37. If the cost were to be divided by all 10 million
annual violations, including those who never pay, the fine would be
$3.41.

The Authority, on the other hand, has argued that they should be
able to charge up to $91 if they were to take all the costs of
processing the violations into account.

Diedrich said it is not known when the court will render a
decision.

He said that any E-ZPass customer who got a New Jersey violation
notice who wants to join the federal class action suit, if and when
it re-starts, can contact his firm's intake specialist, Megan Ruth,
by calling 484-362-2630, or by emailing her at mruth@rccblaw.com

A spokesman for the Turnpike Authority declined to comment on the
case because it is still pending in court. [GN]


NEW ZEALAND: Council of Licensed Firearms Owners Mulls Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
L.A. Luebbert, writing for America's First Freedom, reports that
those who think banning guns is a miracle cure to all that ails a
nation should take a lesson from New Zealand for a reality check.

You remember how New Zealand's anti-gun leaders received high
praise after their knee-jerk reaction in the wake of a mosque
shooting that left dozens dead? Well, nearly four months after the
attack in Christchurch, the Kiwi gun-control folks are finding out
just how hard confiscation is to enforce. The amnesty period for
selling guns to the government runs from June 20 to Dec. 20. But it
seems gun owners didn't just roll over and cede to the government's
call for people to turn in all so-called "assault-style rifles" --
something officials defined broadly enough to include all
center-fire semi-automatic rifles -- and even some semi-automatic
or pump-action shotguns if they are capable of holding more than
five rounds.

What did they expect? One hurdle in the country's so-called
"buyback" plan (though how can the government buy back something it
never owned?) uses 95 percent of the projected base price for a new
gun for the benchmark amount to offer people. While that might look
good on paper, it kind of harkens to the days of auto commercials
where they'd scream out the "base" price for a stripped down model.
Of course, buying something with all the features you want adds to
the bottom line. Besides that, they use 95 percent as a starting
point -- working downward for things like age and condition of the
firearm.

Then there's the matter of logistics. The gun owner has to go to a
collection site, stand in line and fight crowds, etc. Well, maybe
the crowds aren't so much of a problem. But if the buyback fairs
are run like the Division of Motor Vehicles here, you can bet it
would amount to hours of wasted time.

The sure-to-be paltry cash offerings and time efforts aside, gun
owners have raised their hackles at the very notion of the
government's move, and threats of lawsuits are swirling as surely
as colorful marine life forms populate the snorkeling waters the
country is noted for. Indeed, Nicole McKee, secretary of the
Council of Licensed Firearms Owners, has said her group plans a
class-action legal challenge and some individuals, including
competitive shooter David Craze Sr., are also considering
lawsuits.

Against such a backdrop, it should come as no surprise that three
weeks into the buyback, only 700 guns -- of the estimated 1.2 to
1.5 million firearms in the country -- have been voluntarily
surrendered. Of course, maybe that speaks to the fact that gun
owners aren't afraid to stand up for their rights. As for fiduciary
responsibility, some project that it would cost New Zealand about
twice as much as the government budgeted if every now-prohibited
gun were turned in.

Kiwi officials are bemoaning the difficulties with the confiscation
plan, saying that since they don't have a firearm registry for most
rifles and shotguns, it will be darn near impossible to even find
out who owns one or more of the now-illegal guns.

Of course, what that means is that in December, otherwise
law-abiding citizens -- who bought their firearms legally and have
not committed any crimes -- will be closet criminals.

The situation in New Zealand reinforces a couple of concepts that
the NRA has long advocated. First, it proves that the lack of a
firearm registry has served as a buffer against confiscation. Had
New Zealand already required registration of every long gun, you've
got to wonder if they'd be knocking on doors -- or knocking them
down -- to get their hands on every rifle they know about.

Second, it shows that every time you give an inch to the gun
control crowd, they always want more. The prospect of turning
thousands of everyday citizens into felons overnight hasn't stopped
Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern from calling for more restrictions on
gun ownership. Indeed, a national gun registry has been mentioned,
as has the notion of further complicating the process of even
trying to buy a firearm, effectively hoping to frustrate people so
much that they give up on the idea of owning a gun.

What's happening in New Zealand not only shows the fallacy of
confiscation as a gun control measure. It also underscores why it's
imperative for law-abiding gun owners in America to make their
voices heard when it comes to talk of further infringing on our
ability to exercise our constitutional right to keep and bear arms.
[GN]


NORTH AMERICAN: Pa. Court Dismisses Correa FDCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case, JENNIFER CORREA, Plaintiff, v. NORTH AMERICAN
RECOVERY, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 18-1375 (E.D. Pa.),
Judge Chad F. Kenney of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania granted Defendant, North American
Recovery's, Renewed Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Strike
Plaintiffs Class Action Claims Under Fed R. Civ. P. 12(f).  He
dismissed the Plaintiffs' Complaint.  The Clerk of Court is
directed to close the matter.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 7, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/WN5nEf from Leagle.com.

JENNIFER CORREA, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiff, represented by ARI H. MARCUS --
ari@marcuszelman.com -- MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC & BENJAMIN J. WOLF,
JONES WOLF & KAPASI LLC.

NORTH AMERICAN RECOVERY, also known as N.A.R., Defendant,
represented by MONICA M. LITTMAN -- mlittman@finemanlawfirm.com --
FINEMAN KREKSTEIN & HARRIS PC & RICHARD J. PERR --
rperr@finemanlawfirm.com -- FINEMAN KREKSTEIN & HARRIS, P.C..


NY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION: Faces Suit over IDEA Violations
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed on behalf of I.C. and A.G.,
pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),
20 U.S.C. Section 1400, et seq., the Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. Section 794
("Section 504"), the New York State Constitution, New York State
Education Law Sections 3202, 3203, and 4401 et seq., and the
regulations that were promulgated. The case is captioned I.C. on
behalf of herself and her child, A.G., and A.G. on behalf of
himself, Plaintiffs, vs. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; NEW
YORK CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION; RICHARD CARRANZA, in his official
capacity as Chancellor of the New York City School District,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05926-PAE (S.D.N.Y., June 24, 2019).

In this complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants failed to
offer any school program consistent with the Individualized
Education Program and failed to provide a Free Appropriate Public
Education to students with disabilities as required by the IDEA.
A.G. and his mother, I.C., have pursued administrative relief under
the IDEA by filing a Due Process Complaint with the Defendant, New
York City Department of Education seeking an impartial hearing
under the IDEA.  The Impartial Hearing Officer presiding over that
case issued his Findings of Fact and Decision on April 3, 2019,
ruling for Plaintiff I.C. on several issues, denying her relief on
other issues and dismissing some of her claims. I.C. has pursued a
partial administrative appeal to the New York State Review Officer,
the second tier of administrative relief under the IDEA. The
Defendants have cross-appealed. However, the appeal is still
pending and A.G. faces immediate, irreparable harm that requires
injunctive relief.

Richard Carranza is the Chancellor of the New York City School
District and, as such, is entrusted with the specific powers and
duties set forth in New York Education Law. The New York City Board
of Education is the official body charged with the responsibility
of developing policies with respect to the administration and
operation of the public schools in the City of New York. It is a
recipient of federal financial assistance.  The New York City
Department of Education develops policies with respect to the
administration and operation of the public schools in the City of
New York, including programs and services for students with
disabilities. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Elisa Hyman, Esq.
     THE LAW OFFICE OF ELISA HYMAN, P.C.
     1115 Broadway, 12th Floor
     New York, NY 10010
     Telephone: 646-572-9064
     E-mail: elisahyman@gmail.com


OHIO NATIONAL: Objects to Ruling in Trail Commission Lawsuits
-------------------------------------------------------------
Mrinalini Krishna, writing for Financial Advisor IQ, reports that
Cincinnati-based insurer Ohio National Life Insurance Company filed
objections on July 12 to a U.S. magistrate judge's June 28 rulings
against it in a civil case against a number of advisors who sold
its variable annuities.

As reported, the rulings recommended denying Ohio National's bid to
quash two lawsuits against the defendants and consolidation of two
cases. Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Bowman also recommended Ohio
National Financial Services be dismissed as party from the case.
Named defendants were Ohio National-related entities Ohio National
Life Assurance Corporation, Ohio National Equities and Ohio
National's parent Ohio National Financial Services.

The lawsuits pertain to Ohio National's 2018 decision to terminate
its variable annuities selling agreements with broker-dealers and
to stop paying trail commissions.

The two lawsuits in question have been filed by Lance Browning, an
LPL Financial advisor and Stephen Cook, a Triad Advisors
representative.

Browning's case was filed as a class action in November 2018 but
was amended in January as a case by Browning individually and on
behalf of 'similarly situated' LPL advisors.

Cook's lawsuit is a class action case on behalf of all advisors who
sold these Ohio National products.

The Ohio National entities have objected to the judge's report and
recommendation on multiple grounds. According to the objection
filed before the court, the defendants say their motion to dismiss
the lawsuits was denied "in contravention of clear Ohio Law."

The defendants further state in their objection that the research
and recommendation "incorrectly concludes" that the individual
advisors had "standing as a third-party beneficiary of the selling
agreement at issue."

Ohio National has previously argued the selling agreement was
between the insurer and the broker-dealer and that the advisors
were not party to it. Any payments to individual reps were to be
governed by a separate agreement between the reps and their
broker-dealer.

In the objections, Ohio National entities say the agreement makes
clear "it was entered neither directly nor primarily" for the
individual rep's benefit as is required by Ohio law and therefore
the FAs lack legal standing.

One of the factors in Magistrate Judge Bowman's determination that
advisors have a right to sue Ohio National was an April 2019
federal court ruling in Massachusetts that went in favor of
Commonwealth Equity Services advisor Margaret Benison.

The Court in that case ruled that Benison had the right to compel
arbitration against Ohio National for stopping trails for variable
annuities.

In their objection, the Ohio National entities claim Magistrate
Judge Bowman's conclusion was derived from decisions contained in a
footnote in the Massachusetts order. "Such dictum from a district
court in another circuit is clearly irrelevant and should be
rejected as a basis for denying dismissal of the Complaint here,"
the firms state in the objection.

The firms also presented several other arguments in support of this
contention.

The advisors have previously argued that the broker-dealers would
not have been able to carry out the terms of the agreement with
Ohio National without the reps. In their objection, Ohio National
entities state that the fact that the broker-dealer can only act
through its agents "affords plaintiff with no basis for avoiding
dismissal" of the complaint.

The objections state that Magistrate Judge Bowman's report and
recommendation "repeatedly runs afoul of Ohio law" and that the
firms' motion to dismiss should be granted.

Both the lawsuits are before Judge Susan J. Dlott of the U.S.
District Court of the Southern District of Ohio. Judge Dlott will
make a decision on the report and recommendation after the
objections and counterobjections have been filed.

This is not the only matter pertaining to Ohio National trail
commissions before Judge Dlott. Ohio National's motion for summary
judgment in a class action lawsuit filed by Veritas Independent
Partners, an Arkansas-based broker-dealer, is scheduled to be heard
on July 23. [GN]


OREGON: Shortened School Day Case Faces Motion to Dismiss
---------------------------------------------------------
Jessica Pollard, writing for East Oregonian, reports that an oral
argument took place on July 10, 2019, for a class action lawsuit
that could affect the educational future of children with
disabilities facing shortened school days, following a state-issued
motion to dismiss the case this April.

District Judge Ann Aiken will issue an opinion out of Eugene
District Court within 60 days.

Seth Galanter of the National Center for Youth Law ---99000 one of
the law groups that filed the case -- said the judge showed little
sign of dismissing it. Either way, the plaintiffs are hoping to
hear an opinion from the court before the start of the  school
year.

The lawsuit, filed in January, seeks to ensure the state provides
more oversight for special education programs in Oregon, and helps
provide support for students to experience full school days.

Students like Aidin Schell, 9, attended three schools in Pendleton
School District for a few years.

His mother, Jennifer, who spoke with the East Oregonian in January,
said he had been receiving shortened school days against her
wishes. She said she'd requested switching classrooms, and
one-on-one support, but that the district told her they lacked the
resources to support her son attending school for full days.

He eventually attended a program at Lifeways.

Schell said she was told that after he completed the program, he
could receive full days at school. She said this didn't happen.

Today, Aidin is home-schooled. He is working through the fourth
grade.

"He loves working independently, he doesn't have distractions,"
Schell said. "But on the social engagement side of things, he is at
a disadvantage."

Schell said her son is involved in Special Olympics, and that they
are part of a parent support group but that getting that key
socialization in is still difficult.

"A child with autism already feels isolated and different," Schell
said.

Schell and Disability Rights Oregon filed an Oregon Department of
Education administrative complaint against the district in March,
but it wasn't very successful.

Schell said she knows of several other families in the Pendleton
area with similar struggles.

"I have the utmost confidence in our staff and administrative
team," said Pendleton School District Superintendent Chris Fritsch.
"I believe we're following the state and federal laws."

Julie Smith, Director of Special Programs at Pendleton School
District, stated that PSD follows the Individuals with Disabilities
in Education Act and Oregon SB 263 regarding abbreviated school
days.

SB 263, passed in 2017, limits school districts from imposing
shortened school days on students who could manage full school days
with the proper support.

Fritsch said the district could not comment on the class action
lawsuit, because it is pending litigation.

Across the state

The lawsuit, which Schell was not a part of, emphasizes that
shortened school days are a problem in smaller school districts. In
these areas, districts might be strapped to find people with the
necessary behavioral expertise to support some children through
full school days.

"It particularly impacts small and rural school districts, many of
which are located in Northeastern Oregon," said Joel Greenberg of
DRO. "We've had complaints from that part of the state."

But the class action lawsuit stretches beyond this corner of
Oregon.

"The reason we're filing a class action suit is because we believe
there are at least hundreds of students across the state who are
affected by shortened school days," said Greenberg. "[But] the
state doesn't collect any data."

Under SB 263, districts do record students with shortened school
days, but don't have to report the information to the state.

The lawsuit lists four boys as plaintiffs, by initials rather than
full names, who attend or have attended public schools in Oregon
and qualify for special education through the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act. They represent the much larger class,
according to the complaint.

FACT Oregon, an organization that advocates for families who
experience disability, also operates a help line for Oregon
parents. The organization reported that they received 280 calls
about shortened school days between September 2016 and December
2018.

In the motion to dismiss, the state, comprised of the ODE, ODE
Director Colt Gill and Gov. Kate Brown — who also serves as the
Superintendent for Public Instruction in Oregon — argues it is
not their responsibility to prevent schools from violating the
public statutes which prevent inappropriate use of shortened school
days, and that the plaintiffs' arguments are not supported by
existing legal precedent.

The motion also argues that because the four plaintiffs are not
currently receiving unlawful shortened school days, the complaint
lacks standing.

At the time the case was filed, one child was actively receiving
shortened school days.

Another child, 7 years old, hadn't experienced a full school day
till this past school year. His mother frequently received calls
from the school to pick him up early from his two-hour school day.

Currently, the ODE does have a complaint process where parents who
feel their children are being placed in unlawful abbreviated school
day programs can report, which, according to the motion to dismiss,
has "achieved a resolution" for three of the plaintiffs and over 30
students in general.

Communications Director for General Attorney Ellen Rosenblum,
Kristina Edmunson, said the Oregon Department of Justice typically
does not comment on pending litigation.During the oral argument on
July 10, Judge Aiken recommended the state consider some sort of
mediated settlement, to spare time and costs for litigation."We
were really pleased that the court was taking seriously the plight
of the kids of Oregon who aren't getting full school days,"
Galanter said. "We're certainly very optimistic." [GN]


OUTLAW LABORATORIES: Court Denies Bid for Judgment on Pleadings
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE OUTLAW LABORATORIES, LP LITIGATION, Case No.
3:18-cv-840-GPC-BGS, Consolidated with 3:18-cv-1882-GPC-BGS (S.D.
Cal.), Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern Distric of California denied Outlaw's motion for judgment
on the pleadings on Defendant/Counterclaimant Roma Mikha, Inc., and
Third-Party Plaintiffs NMRM, Inc. and Skyline Market, Inc.'s
Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint.

Outlaw is a Texas-based manufacturer of male-enhancement products
called "TriSteel" and "TriSteel 8 hour."  Its products are made in
the United States, and, at least as alleged by Outlaw, are
distributed for sale in all 50 states.  

Sometime starting in 2017 and continuing through 2018, Outlaw,
through its attorneys at Tauler Smith LLP, began mailing demand
letters to proprietors of gas stations, liquor stores, and corner
stores in California, and beyond.  Those recipients allegedly sold
male-enhancement pills designated by the word "Rhino," which Outlaw
alleges contain undisclosed sildenafil, a prescription
pharmaceutical regulated by the Federal Drug Administration.

Outlaw's demand letters warned recipients that they were selling
illegal sexual enhancement drugs, which subject their company to
legal action for racketeering under Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organizations ("RICO") and the Federal Lanham Act and obligate the
recipients to pay to Outlaw profits from the sale of Illicit
Products dating back four years, Attorney's fees, Punitive damages,
Triple damages.  The letters estimate the recipients' liabilities
at "over $100,000" but states that Outlaw is willing to settle all
claims in exchange for a one-time settlement agreement $9,765, in
the sample demand letter and their agreement to stop selling the
Illicit Products.

After issuing the initial demand letter, Outlaw follows up with
additional offers to settle, usually for increasingly smaller
amounts.  A few weeks later, Outlaw communicated a reduced
settlement offer of just $2,800.  Some recipients, like Third-Party
Plaintiff Skyline Market, Inc., acquiesced to Outlaw's demands and
settled.  Others, like Defendants Roma and NMRM resisted.

The present litigation arises out of two complaints filed by Outlaw
in 3:18-cv-840-GPC-BGS, and 3:18-cv-1882-GPC-BGS, which have been
consolidated before the Court.

On May 2, 2018, Outlaw filed its federal complaint in
3:18-cv-840-GPC-BGS, naming a high volume of defendants, all of
whom it had previously mailed a demand letter.  Thereafter, Outlaw
filed a similar complaint on Aug. 12, 2018 in state court, which
was later removed by Defendant Roma in 3:18-cv-1882-GPC-BGS.  Both
the complaints allege that the Defendants are engaged in a scheme
to distribute and sell unlawful Rhino products.  They further claim
that laboratory testing and public announcements by the FDA, have
revealed that Rhino products contain hidden drug ingredients like
sildenafil (a prescription drug found in Viagra), desmethyl
carbodenafil (an analogue of sildenafil), dapoxetine (an
anti-depressant drug), and tadalafil (a prescription drug found in
Cialis).

Outlaw's complaint in 3:18-cv-840-GPC-BGS alleges that, by selling
the Rhino products, the implicated stores disseminate the false
statements on Rhino products stating that they are "all natural,"
contain "no harmful synthetic chemicals," "no prescription
necessary," and have limited side effects.  Outlaw further asserts
that the defendants' schemes have diverted sales away from its
legitimate "TriSteel" male enhancement products, in violation of
California Business and Profession Code Section 17200 (prohibiting
unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts), Section 17500
(prohibiting false and misleading advertising), and Section
43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act (prohibiting false advertising).

Notably, unlike the lawsuit portended by Outlaw's demand letters,
the actual lawsuits filed by Outlaw do not state a claim for RICO
conspiracy.

On Aug. 24, 2018, Roma, NMRM, and Skyline., through their attorneys
at Gaw | Poe LLP, filed a Third Party Complaint ("Original
Cross-Complaint") against Outlaw.  The Original Cross-Complaint
alleged a class action against Outlaw for (1) a civil RICO
violation, (2) RICO conspiracy,, and (3) rescission of any
settlement agreements like the one entered into by Skyline Market.


The Counterclaimants' putative class action was brought on behalf
of an overarching "Store Class," comprised of all business entities
in the United States that received a demand letter substantially
similar to the letter received by the class representatives, and
subdivided into three subclasses.  The "Sued Stores" would include
those stores, like Roma, that were subsequently named as defendants
in state or federal litigation brought by Outlaw; the "Threatened
Stores," like NMRM, which would include stores who received a
demand letter but were not targeted for litigation; and a "Payment
Class," which would encompass those like Skyline, which
subsequently paid or agreed to pay money to Tauler Smith LLP,
Outlaw Laboratory, or an agent of either.

The Court addressed Outlaw's motion to dismiss the original
Cross-Complaint in an Order dated Nov. 27, 2018.  Because the
Counterclaimants' allegations of sham litigation were but
cursorily-stated, the Court held that Counterdefendants failed to
plead sufficient facts demonstrating that Outlaw's demand letters
were so objectively baseless that no reasonable litigant could
realistically expect success on the merits.  It granted leave to
amend so that Counterclaimants could attempt to overcome this
deficiency.

On Nov. 30, 2018, the Counterclaimants timely filed their Amended
Cross-Complaint.  When Outlaw challenged the sufficiency of the
Amended Cross-Complaint by way of another motion to dismiss, the
Court denied that motion, finding that the Counterclaimants had
adequately pleaded facts demonstrating that RICO claims threatened
in Outlaw's demand letters were not objectively reasonable and
therefore might fall within the sham exception and outside of the
scope of Noerr-Pennington immunity.

On April 15, 2019, Outlaw filed the instant motion for judgment on
the pleadings, which in actuality encompasses two separate motions.
The first part of the motion is a true Rule 12(c) motion for
judgment on the pleadings, which argues that the sham litigation
exception cannot apply as a matter of law because Outlaw could not
have known at the time of its demand letters that a RICO claim
against the stores might be characterized as objectively baseless.
The second part of the motion is better construed as a motion to
preemptively deny class certification before the start of any
formal discovery.

Judge Curiel finds Outlaw's argument unconvincing on three levels.
First, Outlaw has conflated the first inquiry in PRE II (whether
the threatened lawsuit is objectively baseless) with the second
inquiry (whether the Plaintiff, in engaging in prelitigation
conduct, was subjectively motivated by an improper purpose).
Second, as a matter of logic, Outlaw's experience in the CNV
litigation does not make its demand letters prior to CNV any more
objectively justifiable.  Third and finally, to the extent that
Outlaw contends it lacked an improper subjective purpose in issuing
the RICO demand letters, that argument is belied by the
Counterclaimants' pleadings to the contrary, which have pointed to
other actions indicating an attempt to use governmental process
improperly.  

The Judge holds that as the Court has previously recognized, the
Counterclaimants have alleged sufficient facts to frustrate
Noerr-Pennington immunity on the subjective motivation prong.  The
judgment on the pleadings is therefore inappropriate.  Outlaw's
motion to for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the
Noerr-Pennington defense is accordingly denied.

In the second part of its motion, Outlaw contends that the
Counterclaimants' proposed class action cannot be certified as a
matter of law.  It argues that the class and subclasses identified
in the Amended Cross-Complaint are improper, that there is no
predominance of common questions of fact, that the class is
unascertainable, and that the class counsel is inadequate.  The
Counterclaimants oppose Outlaw's motion, arguing that their suit
may be able to proceed as a class action, and that class
certification cannot be determined before formal class-based
discovery.

The Judge finds that the Counterclaimants represent that the
putative class had not thus far had any opportunity to take formal
discovery.  Given this, Outlaw's request for denial of class
certification must be denied as premature.  Notwithstanding the
Court's determination that determining class certification
preemptively is improper, there are additional reasons why Outlaw's
arguments against certification are unavailing.  As the
Counterclaimants persuasively point out, the very essence of
Outlaw's alleged RICO scheme relies on the collective action
failure of individual stores to resist their demands, and the Court
has previously sustained Counterclaimants' contention that any
settlement agreements might be subject to rescission under the
doctrine of economic duress.

Finally, the Judge finds that there is little danger that the
putative class would encompass an amorphous or open-ended group of
defendants, and finds no prohibitive conflicts of interest
warranting premature disqualification at this juncture, though
Outlaw is welcome to press the issue subsequent to class-action
discovery.

In light of the above, Judge Curiel denied Outlaw's motion for
judgment on the pleadings in its entirety.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/cDpgVc from Leagle.com.

Outlaw Laboratory, LP, a Texas Limited Partnership, Plaintiff,
represented by Matthew J. Smith --
msmith@insurancelawservices.com.

Roma Mikha, Inc., a California Corporation, Defendant, represented
by Mark Poe -- mpoe@gawpoe.com -- Gaw & Poe LLP, Randolph Gaw, Gaw
Poe LLP, Samuel Song -- ssong@gawpoe.com -- Gaw & Poe LLP & Victor
Meng -- vmeng@gawpoe.com -- Gaw & Poe LLP.

Midway M3, Inc., a California Corporation, Defendant, represented
by Mark Poe, Gaw & Poe LLP.

Eagle's Nest Property Management, LLC, a California Limited
Liability Company, Defendant, represented by Robert Charles
Mardian, III -- rmardian@smalawsd.com -- Sullivan, McGibbons &
Associates LLP.

NMRM, Inc. & Skyline Market, Inc., ThirdParty Plaintiffs,
represented by Mark Poe , Gaw & Poe LLP, Randolph Gaw, Gaw Poe
LLP,
Samuel Song, Gaw & Poe LLP & Victor Meng, Gaw & Poe LLP.

Roma Mikha, Inc., a California Corporation, ThirdParty Plaintiff,
represented by Mark Poe, Gaw & Poe LLP, Randolph Gaw, Gaw Poe LLP
&
Victor Meng, Gaw & Poe LLP.

Outlaw Laboratory, LP, a Texas Limited Partnership, ThirdParty
Defendant, represented by Matthew J. Smith.

Roma Mikha, Inc., a California Corporation, Counter Claimant,
represented by Mark Poe, Gaw & Poe LLP, Randolph Gaw, Gaw Poe LLP,
Samuel Song, Gaw & Poe LLP & Victor Meng, Gaw & Poe LLP.

Outlaw Laboratory, LP, a Texas Limited Partnership, Counter
Defendant, represented by Matthew J. Smith & Robert Tauler, Tauler
Smith LLP.


PADULA BENNARDO LEVINE: Essen Sues over Unlawful Debt Collection
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Padula Bennardo
Levine, LLP for alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA). The case is captioned DONOVAN ESSEN, individually and on
behalf of all those similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PADULA
BENNARDO LEVINE, LLP, Defendant, Case No. 0:19-cv-61667 (S.D. Fla.,
July 7, 2019). In this complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendant has violated the FDCPA through its collection letter that
unlawfully overshadows and/or is otherwise inconsistent with the
least sophisticated consumer's right to dispute the underlying debt
within 30 days of receiving the letter.

Padula Bennardo Levine, LLP is a Florida corporation, with its
principal place of business located at 3837 NW Boca Raton
Boulevard, Suite 200, Boca Raton, Florida 33431. It is engaged in
the collection of consumer debts. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
     Thomas J. Patti, Esq.
     THE LAW OFFICES OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI
     110 SE 6th Street, Suite 1744
     Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
     Telephone: 954-907-1136
     Facsimile: 855-529-9540
     E-mail: jibrael@jibraellaw.com
             tom@jibraellaw.com


PAYLOCITY CORPORATION: Diebold Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
KATHERINE DIEBOLD, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PAYLOCITY CORPORATION, Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-04716 (N.D. Ill., July 12, 2019) is a case brought
against Paylocity to recover unpaid overtime wages, liquidated
damages, and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs under the Federal
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, (hereinafter, "FLSA"); unpaid
overtime wages, interest, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs
under Illinois Minimum Wage Law (hereinafter, "IMWL").

Plaintiff and Defendant's other Implementation Consultants IIs
should have received overtime ("time-and a-half") wages each week
they worked over 40 hours. However, they were denied overtime wages
altogether. The Defendant willfully misclassified Plaintiff and
other Implementation Consultant IIs as salaried employees to avoid
paying them overtime wages. Plaintiff and other level II
Consultants were not exempt from the overtime provisions of the
FLSA or the IMWL. The Defendant was aware that Plaintiff and other
Implementation Consultant IIs had to work over 40 hours each week
in order to complete their assigned tasks. The Defendant was aware
that the nature of the tasks performed by Plaintiff and other
Implementation Consultant IIs entitled them to overtime wages. In
bad faith, Defendant suffered, permitted and/or required Plaintiff
and other level II Consultants to work these overtime hours without
being compensated, says the complaint.

Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a Sales Administrator,
Implementation Consultant I and Implementation Consultant II.

Defendant is an online payroll company headquartered in Schaumburg,
Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Benjamin L. Davis, III, Esq.
     Kelly A. Burgy, Esq.
     THE LAW OFFICES OF PETER T. NICHOLL
     36 South Charles Street, Suite 1700
     Baltimore, MD 21201
     Phone: (410) 244-7005
     Email: bdavis@nicholllaw.com
            kaburgy@nicholllaw.com

          - and -

     Douglas M. Werman, Esq.
     Maureen A. Salas, Esq.
     WERMAN SALAS P.C.
     77 West Washington, Suite 1402
     Chicago, IL 60602
     Phone: (312) 419-1008
     Email: dwerman@flsalaw.com
            msalas@flsalaw.com


PDR VOICE: Court Dismisses Engelman Sexual Assault/Harassment Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LUCY ENGELMAN, BRIDGET DOLAN, TARA BRUNO, ANGELA
JOACHIN, J.J., MARIA ELENA ARMIJO, DANIELLE ORNELAS, CINDY SPTIKO,
I.R., TRACY PARKER and HEATHER BLASKO, on behalf of themselves and
on behalf of other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v.
PETER ROFE and PDR VOICE, INC., Defendants, Docket No. 152072/2018
(N.Y. Sup.), Judge Cynthia Victoria St. George of the Supreme
Court, New York County granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss
the amended complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), (5) and (7).

The Plaintiffs are 11 women claiming sexual assault and harassment
by Rofe, seeking to bring their claims, first commenced in March
2018, as a class action on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, pursuant to CPLR article 9.  They allege four
causes of action: negligence, negligent infliction of emotional
distress, negligent hiring and supervision, and violation of Title
8, chapter 9 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York,
known as the Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence protection Act
("GMVA").  They seek compensatory, and punitive and exemplary
damages.

According to the allegations of the collective and class action
amended complaint, the Plaintiffs were individual clients of Rofe,
a well-known voice-over coach and the owner of PDR Voice, who
forcibly attacked each of them individually between the summer of
2011 and July 13, 2016, during recordings of voice-over demo reels,
or private voice-over sessions.  Rofe allegedly made unwanted
sexual advances, including forcing himself on the women, touching,
kissing, and/or groping and in certain instances exposing or
rubbing his penis against the woman's body.  Many of the Plaintiffs
allege that Rofe intimated or stated that his actions were
necessary to improve their work.

The first cause of action alleges that the Defendants were
negligent because they owed each Plaintiff a duty of care to keep
her safe from the kind of harms to which they were subjected; the
Defendants knew or should have known that Rofe had previously
committed sexual assaults and was likely to do so again; and
because of his acts, the Plaintiffs suffered personal injuries,
emotional distress, conscious pain and suffering, embarrassment,
humiliation, nightmares, mental anguish, and other losses.

The second cause of action alleges that the Defendants knew or
should have known that Rofe's "battery, assault, and improper
conduct" would result in physical and emotional distress to the
Plaintiffs, and although the Defendants had the authority and duty
to stop such improper conduct, they failed to act to stop, prevent
or prohibit it, causing negligent infliction of emotional
distress.

The third cause of action alleges that PDR Voice had a duty to
supervise and prevent known risks of harm, and that the Defendants
were negligent in hiring and supervising their personnel, including
but not limited to Peter Rofe.

The fourth cause of action, brought under the Victims of GMVA,
alleges that Rofe's "barbaric acts," whether or not they resulted
in criminal charges, were crimes of violence motivated by or
committed at least in part, by animus based on each Plaintiff's
gender, and caused physical, psychological and emotional damage to
the Plaintiffs.

In moving to dismiss the complaint, the Defendants argue that the
first cause of action, although sounding in negligence, alleges
intentional rather than negligent conduct and is therefore
controlled by the one-year statute of limitations, rendering the
claims untimely.  They argue the second cause of action, negligent
infliction of emotional distress, is duplicative of the first and
third causes of action, and at best alleges negligent supervision
by PDR Voice, and assault and battery as to Rofe, and is time
barred as well as legally invalid.  The third claim of negligent
hiring and supervision should be dismissed, they argue, because it
fails to state a cognizable legal claim in that Rofe is not an
"employee" of his S-Corporation, PDR Voice; as to Plaintiffs Dolan,
Bruno, Armijo and Sptiko, the complaint is also untimely, given the
three-year statute of limitations.   Similarly, the fourth cause of
action under the GMVA is also time-barred, the Defendants argue,
despite its seven-year statute of limitations, as the doctrine of
preemption forbids using the New York City regulation to extend the
one-year statute of limitations mandated by the legislature for
intentional tort claims.  Additionally, the Defendants argue that
the claim for a class action should be dismissed as the Plaintiffs
have not pleaded any viable or timely causes of action.

In opposition, the Plaintiffs argue that the allegations in the
complaint indicate something more than the intentional conduct
committed by the Defendant.  They assert their claims are
well-established, legally recognized claims of negligence,
negligent infliction of emotional distress and negligent
supervision and negligent hiring, and not, as the efendants would
characterize them, creative labeling.  They argue that the third
cause of action of negligent hiring and supervision is viable
because an entity can be found negligent for acts of its employees,
and PDR Voice was on notice of Rofe's abusive conduct.  As to the
fourth cause of action brought under the GMVA, the Plaintiffs argue
that there is no preemption issue; the GMVA distinguishes it from
claims of assault and battery, the statute of limitations of which
is controlled by CPLR 215.  Finally, they dispute the necessity of
dismissing the claim for a class action, on the basis that their
claims are viable and should go forward.

Judge St. George finds that allegations that the Plaintiff was
assaulted, struck, grabbed, battered, beaten, punched, thrown, and
seriously injured by the Defendant's employee, asserted a claim not
of negligence, but of the intentional tort of assault.  Once it has
been established that there was intentional offensive contact by
the Defendant, he or she is liable for assault, not negligence.  As
the one-year statute of limitations has run, the first cause of
action is dismissed as untimely.

The problem with the second cause of action alleging that PDR Voice
and Rofe negligently inflicted emotional distress because they
reasonably should have known that their failure to prevent Rofe's
assaults would proximately result in physical and emotional
distress to the Plaintiffs -- is that, like the first cause of
action, it derives from Rofe's intentional conduct, although framed
as negligence.  There is no such claim as negligent assault,
because once intentional offensive contact has been established,
the actor is liable for assault and not negligence.  Moreover, a
cause of action for infliction of emotional distress is not allowed
if essentially duplicative of tort or contract causes of action.
Although the Plaintiffs here claim negligent infliction of
emotional distress, the complaint's allegations pertain to claims
of negligent hiring and retention by PDR Voice, and assault by Rofe
and are duplicative of the first and third causes of action.
Accordingly, the second cause of action must be dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action.

As the Plaintiffs cannot make out a cognizable claim of negligent
hiring and retention, the Judge dismissed the third cause of
action.  She finds that the argument that PDR Voice can be held
liable because Rofe was allegedly not the only employee of the
corporation, is of little persuasion.  PDR Voice has no separate
corporate structure which could make decisions independently of its
sole shareholder and owner.  As argued by the Defendant, Rofe
functions as owner, manager, employer and employee, and whether
there is more than one employee is of no matter, because an
individual cannot be alleged to have hired or supervised himself.

Finally, the Plaintiffs raise important issues concerning crimes of
sexual assault and their short statutes of limitations, an issue
the New York City Council sought to address with the GMVA.  But the
Court is constrained to find that the GMVA's statute of limitations
is inconsistent with and preempted by that in CPLR 215.  As stated
in McCarthy v Volkswagen of Am., statutes of limitation are
essentially arbitrary time limitations barring the commencement of
an action, and they reflect the legislative judgment that
individuals should be protected from stale claims.  They are aptly
described as statutes of repose.  Therefore, it is up to the New
York State Legislature, rather than the Court, to reexamine the
statute of limitations pertaining to assaults, including sexual
assaults, and potentially further expand the time frames within
which to commence actions for damages sustained in sexual assaults
where no criminal charges were brought.

Accordingly, Judge St. George granted the Defendants' motion to
dismis.  The complaint is dismissed with costs and disbursements to
the Defendants as taxed by the Clerk upon the submission of an
appropriate bill of costs.  The Clerk is directed to enter judgment
accordingly.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 5, 2019 Decision/Order is
available at https://is.gd/JO2dpt from Leagle.com.


PERFORMANCE FOOD: Settlement in Perez FCRA Suit Has Final Approval
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JORGE A. PEREZ, on behalf himself, all others
similarly situated, and the general public, Plaintiff, v.
PERFORMANCE FOOD GROUP, INC., a Colorado corporation; VISTAR
TRANSPORTATION, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; ROMA
FOOD ENTERPRISES, INC., a California corporation; and DOES 1-50,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:17-CV-7128-MWF (JPRx) (C.D.
Cal.), Judge Michael W. Fitzgerald of the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California granted the Plaintiff's Motion
for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement; Award of Attorney
Fees and Expenses; Class Representative Service Award; Award of
Settlement Administrator Expenses.

The Plaintiff's Motion came regularly for hearing before the Court
on June 3, 2019.  After consideration of all the papers filed in
connection therewith, the arguments of counsel, and all other
matters presented to the Court, and good cause appearing therefore,
Judge granted the Motion.  The Settlement Agreement is finally
approved.

The Judge ordered that the class is finally certified for
settlement purposes.

He also ordered an award of $5,000 to be paid out of the Settlement
Fund to Jorge Perez.  He awarded to the Class Counsel attorney's
fees in the amount of $498,750 to be paid out of the Settlement
Fund, and litigation expenses in the amount of $6,550.61.  He also
awarded the Settlement Administrator KCC settlement administration
expenses in the amount of $62,898.49.

The action is dismissed with prejudice and judgment is entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 7, 2019 Judgment is available
at https://is.gd/hIXZOf from Leagle.com.

Jorge Perez, Plaintiff, represented by Chaim Shaun Setareh, Esq. --
shaun@setarehlaw.com -- and Thomas Alistair Segal, Esq. --
thomas@setarehlaw.com -- SETAREH LAW GROUP

Performance Food Group, Inc., et al. are represented by Sabrina
Alexis Beldner, Esq. -- sbeldner@mcguirewoods.com -- Sylvia Jihae
Kim, Esq. -- skim@mcguirewoods.com -- and Matthew C. Kane, Esq. --
mkane@mcguirewoods.com -- MCGUIREWOODS LLP

PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Eckert & Tipton Sue over Debt Collection
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Portfolio Recovery
Associates, LLC for alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, the Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act, Chapter 63
of the Consumer Credit Code (CCC), and the Unfair Trade Practices
and Consumer Protection Law. The case is captioned ANDREW ECKERT
and STEVEN TIPTON, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-00794-PLD (W.D. Pa., July 3,
2019).

In February 2018, Defendant sued Plaintiffs in an Allegheny County
and an Indiana County Magisterial District Court, claiming that it
purchased credit card accounts previously issued to Plaintiffs. In
this complaint, Plaintiffs contend that the Defendant lacked
authority to initiate process against them because it never sent
them a right to cure notice (RCN) before initiating legal process.
They also argue that the Defendant is required to send an RCN
because the credit card accounts were "closed-end credit
agreements" or "open-end credit agreements" under the Consumer
Credit Code, the original creditor was a seller, finance company,
or holder under the CCC, and Defendant was a holder under the CCC.
Among other things, Defendant's collection lawsuit misrepresented
its ability to sue Plaintiffs and collect on the credit card
accounts through legal process, and unfairly subjected Plaintiffs
to the legal system.

Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC is a Delaware limited liability
corporation with its principal place of business located in
Norfolk, Virginia. The company's sole business is the purchasing of
defaulted consumer debt with the purpose of collecting on that debt
for profit. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Kevin Abramowicz, Esq.
     BCJ LAW LLC
     186 42nd Street
     PO Box 40127
     Pittsburgh, PA 15201
     Telephone: (412) 223-5740
     E-mail: kevina@bcjlawyer.com

             - and -

     Gary Lynch, Esq.
     Edwin Kilpela, Esq.
     CARLSON LYNCH LLP
     1133 Penn Avenue 5th Floor
     Pittsburgh, PA 15222
     Telephone: (412) 322-9243
     E-mail: glynch@carlsonlynch.com
             ekilpela@carlsonlynch.com

POSITIVE ENERGY: Naiman Suit Alleges TCPA Violation
---------------------------------------------------
Sidney Naiman, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Positive Energy Solutions, LLC, Case No. 3:19-cv-02446
(N.D. Calif., May 6, 2019), is brought against the Defendant for
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Defendant violated the TCPA by contacting the Plaintiff using
an automatic telephone dialing system to solicit its services,
without prior express consent. Additionally, the call was placed on
a telephone number that incur charges for incoming calls.

The Plaintiff is a natural person residing in San Ramon,
California.

The Defendant is an energy procurement company. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
      Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
      LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
      21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
      Woodland Hills, CA 91367
      Tel: (323) 306-4234
      Fax: (866) 633-0228
      E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
              abacon@toddflaw.com


PREMERA BLUE CROSS: Pays $10MM to 30 States Over Data Breach
------------------------------------------------------------
Gene Johnson, writing for The Register-Guard, reports that Premera
Blue Cross, the largest health insurer in the Pacific Northwest,
has agreed to pay $10 million to 30 states following an
investigation into a data breach that exposed confidential
information on more than 10 million people across the country.

The settlement, negotiated with the Washington attorney general's
office and filed in state court on July 11, comes several weeks
after Premera said it would spend $74 million to settle a federal
class-action lawsuit on behalf of affected customers.

The states said auditors had alerted Premera to the vulnerabilities
in its system, including that it was slow to install software
updates and security patches, but it failed to fix them. They
accused Premera of failing to meet its obligations to protect the
data under the federal Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act, known as HIPAA, and Washington's Consumer
Protection Act.

"Premera knew they had a problem," said Washington Attorney General
Bob Ferguson. "Their own experts told them. They chose to ignore
the advice of their own experts."

During the breach, which lasted from May 2014 to March 2015,
hackers had access to sensitive data -- including medical records,
bank account information and Social Security numbers -- for 10.4
million people, the majority of them in Washington.

Premera is based in Mountlake Terrace, a north Seattle suburb.
Those whose data was exposed include all Premera Blue Cross
subscribers from 2002 through early 2015, as well as patients
insured through other Blue Cross companies who sought treatment in
Washington or Alaska.

Under the settlement, Premera will pay $5.4 million to Washington
and the rest to the other states, and it will implement data
security controls to protect personal health information, review
its security practices yearly and provide data security reports to
the attorney general's office.

"The commitments we have agreed to are consistent with our ongoing
focus on protecting personal customer information," Premera
spokeswoman Dani Chung said in an emailed statement. "Premera takes
the security of its data and the personal information of its
customers seriously and has worked closely with state attorneys
general, regulators and their information security experts, since
the attack was made public in 2015."

Chung said independent experts had not made a finding that any
customer information was removed from Premera's systems, but the
federal class-action case alleged that hackers used the private
information to open fraudulent accounts, file fraudulent tax
returns and steal identities.

The settlement in the federal class-action, which still requires
the approval of a judge in Oregon, requires Premera to pay for two
years of credit monitoring on behalf of its customers. It also
offers them up to $50-$100 for subscribers in California -- plus
reimbursement of documented out-of-pocket expenses related to the
breach. [GN]


PREMERA BLUE: Settles HIPAA Violations with 30 States for $10.4MM
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Elizabeth Newman, writing for McKnight's Long-Term Care News,
reports that Premera Blue Cross, the largest health insurer in the
Pacific Northwest, will pay $10.4 million to 30 states to resolve
HIPAA violations.

For close to a year, a hacker accessed the Premera network to
collect sensitive personal information, including health
information, Social Security numbers, dates of birth and more.
Starting in May 2014, the hacker created an email that appeared to
be from the company's IT department and then asked the employee to
enter user credentials. Despite misspelling the company's domain
name and making other errors, the hacker persuaded the employee to
take part. That allowed malware onto the network, which gave the
hacker to access data for nearly 10 million people.

"In today's day and age, hackers are going after people instead of
the technology directly," Anahi Santiago, chief information
security officer at Christiana Care Health System in Wilmington,
DE, told Medical Economics earlier this year. "And the breaches
that happen as the result of these attacks not only give hackers
access to protected patient data but also the ability to disable
networks which, essentially, can disable providers and
organizations from being able to effectively care for their
patients."

Premera, which is based near Seattle, will pay $5.4 million to
Washington. It promised to, among other steps, implement data
security controls, provide security reports to the Washington
attorney general office and to review practices annually.

The health insurer also settled a class action lawsuit for $74
million earlier this year. [GN]


PURDUE PHARMA: County of Kauai Suit Removed to D. Hawaii
--------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned COUNTY OF KAUA'I, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE
STATE OF HAWAI'I, for themselves individually, and on behalf of all
similarly situated persons, and on behalf of the general public, as
a class, Plaintiffs, v. PURDUE PHARMA L.P.; PURDUE PHARMA INC.;
PURDUE FREDERICK COMPANY, INC.; PURDUE PHARMACEUTICALS L.P.; TEVA
PHARMACEUTICAL USA, INC.; CEPHALON, INC.; JOHNSON & JOHNSON;
JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICA, INC.; N/K/A
JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; ORTHO MCNEIL-JANSSEN
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. N/K/A JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; ENDO
HEALTH SOLUTIONS INC.; ENDO PHARMACEUTICALS INC.; ALLERGAN PLC
F/K/A ACTAVIS PLC; ACTAVIS, INC. F/K/A WATSON PHARMACEUTICALS,
INC.; WATSON LABORATORIES,
INC.; ACTAVIS LLC; ACTAVIS PHARMA, INC. F/K/A WATSON PHARMA, INC.;
INSYS THERAPEUTICS, INC.; CARDINAL HEALTH, INC.; AMERISOURCE DRUG
CORPORATION; AMERICAN MEDICAL DISTRIBTORS, INC.; BELLCO DRUG CORP.;
BLENHEIM PHARMACAL, INC.; EVEREADY WHOLESALE DRUGS LTD.; KINRAY,
LLC; PSS WORLD MEDICAL, INC.; ROCHESTER DRUG COOPERATIVE, INC.;
DARBY GROUP COPANIES, INC.; RAYMOND SACKLER FAMILY; MORTIMER
SACKLER FAMILY; RICHARD S. SACKLER; JONATHAN D. SACKLER; MORTIMER
D.A. SACKLER; KATHE A. SACKLER; ILENE SACKLER LEFCOURT; BEVERLY
SACKLER; THERESA SACKLER; DAVID A. SACKLER; RHODES TECHNOLOGIES;
RHODES TECHNOLOGIES INC.; RHODES PHARMACEUTICALS L.P.; RHODES
PHARMACEUTICALS INC.; TRUST FOR THE BENEFIT OF MEMBERS OF THE
RAYMOND SACKLER FAMILY; THE P.F. LABORATORIES, INC.; STUART D.
BAKER; PAR PHARMACEUTICAL, INC.; PAR PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES,
INC.; MALLINCKRODT PLC; MALLINCKRODT LLC; SPECGX LLC; MYLAN
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; SANDOZ, INC.; WEST-WARD PHARMACEUTICALS
CORP. N/K/A HIKMA PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; AMNEAL PHAMRMACEUTICALS,
INC.; NORAMCO, INC.; JOHN N. KAPOOR; ADNA, INC.; DISCOUNT DRUG
MART, INC.; HBC SERVICE COMPANY; MORRIS & DICKSON CO., LLC; PUBLIX
SUPERMARKETS, INC.; SAJ DISTRIBUTORS; VALUE DRUG COMPANY; SMITH
DRUG COMPANY; CVS HEALTH CORPORATION; RITE AID OF MARYLAND, INC.,
D/B/A RITE AID MID-ATLANTIC CUSTOMER SUPPORT CENTER, INC.; RITE AID
CORP.; WALGREENS BOOTS ALLIANCE, INC.; WALGREEN EASTERN CO.;
WALGREEN, CO.; WAL-MART INC.; MIAMI-LUKEN, INC.; THE KROGER CO.;
HENRY SCHEIN, INC.; AND HENRY SCHEIN MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC. and
HAROLD CHARLES SPEARS, M.D., RUDOLPH B. PUANA, M.D., BIG ISLAND
PAIN CENTER LLC, AND PUANA PAIN, LLC, Defendants, Case No.
19-1-0075-RGBV was removed from the Circuit Court of the Fifth
Circuit Court, State of Hawai'i, to the United States District
Court for the District of Hawaii on July 12, 2019, and assigned
Case No. 1:19-cv-00377-LEK-KJM.

On May 17, 2019, Plaintiff County of Kauai filed a Petition in the
Circuit Court for the Fifth Circuit of the State of Hawaii for
claims relating to prescription opioid medications. This action is
one of more than 2,000 opioid lawsuits filed by political
subdivisions against manufacturers, distributors, and dispensers of
prescription opioid medications. Plaintiffs in these cases contend
that Defendants are liable for economic and non-economic harms they
alleged were caused by the abuse of opioid medications. The County
of Kauai's Complaint asserts claims for violation of Hawaii's
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practice Act and Unfair or Deceptive Trade
Practice Act, false advertising, public nuisance, fraud, unjust
enrichment, negligence, and civil conspiracy.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

     JEFFREY S. PORTNOY, ESQ.
     LISA K. SWARTZFAGER, ESQ.
     Cades Schutte Building
     1000 Bishop Street, Suite 1200
     Honolulu, HI 96813-4212
     Phone: (808) 521-9200
     Fax: (808) 521-9210
     Email: jportnoy@cades.com
            lswartzfager@cades.com


PYXUS INT'L: Rosen Law Files Securities Fraud Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announces the
filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Pyxus International, Inc. (PYX) from June 7, 2018
through November 8, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The
lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Pyxus investors under the
federal securities laws.

To join the Pyxus class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1595.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) the Company was experiencing longer shipping cycles; (2)
as a result, the Company's financial results would be materially
affected; (3) the Company lacked adequate internal control over
financial reporting; (4) the Company's accounting policies were
reasonably likely to lead to regulatory scrutiny; and (5)
defendants' positive statements about Pyxus' business, operations,
and prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable
basis. When the true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims
that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than August 6,
2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf
of other class members in directing the litigation. If you wish to
join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1595.htmlor to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com

Contact:

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
         New York, NY 10016
         Phone: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Website: www.rosenlegal.com
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com
                cases@rosenlegal.com [GN]


RICHARDSON GMP: Lenczner Slaght Attorneys Discuss Court Ruling
--------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Parley, Esq. -- aparley@litigate.com -- and Paul-Erik Veel,
Esq. -- pveel@litigate.com -- of Lenczner Slaght LLP, in an article
for Mondaq, report that class actions are common in the financial
services sector. The relatively low bar for certification of such
claims as class proceedings means that many such claims are
certified. Yet certification is by no means automatic: where the
litigation will not be significantly advanced through the
resolution of common issues, courts will typically be reluctant to
certify an action as a class proceeding.

Consistent with those general principles, plaintiffs have typically
been relatively successful in certifying class proceedings against
financial institutions where proceedings contain broad-based claims
that an organization adopted an inappropriate policy that
detrimentally affected class members in a uniform manner. By
contrast, claims relating to negligent provision of individualized
advice or services, such as negligence claims against investment
brokers, will seldom be amenable to certification. The recent
decision of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench in Fisher v
Richardson GMP Limited shows the difficulty of certifying class
actions against investment advisors, even when there is some
element of commonality in the advisor's alleged negligence.

By way of background, Fisher v Richardson GMP Limited was a
proposed class proceeding brought by two sets of plaintiffs against
Richardson GMP, Adam Woodward (a former investment advisor with
Richardson GMP Limited), and Blair Pytak (the branch manager at the
branch where Mr. Woodward worked).

The claim at its core was a negligence claim against Woodward.
Woodward was an investment adviser who worked at the Richardson GMP
branch in its Calgary office from November 2013 until December
2015. He provided financial and wealth management advisor services
to 526 households, consisting of 724 individual clients.

After Woodward left Richardson GMP, the Investment Industry
Regulatory Organization of Canada ("IIROC") issued a Notice of
Hearing to Woodward in November 2017. IIROC had received complaints
from 58 individual clients, and it ultimately proceeded against
Woodward on seven of those 58. An IIROC hearing was held, and
Woodward did not contest the allegations. The IIROC hearing panel
found that Woodward had failed to use due diligence to learn
essential facts about his clients in breach of his 'KYC'
obligations, failed to provide suitable investment recommendations,
and failed to ensure that these seven clients qualified for certain
exemptions under securities law. The hearing panel also held that
Woodward had applied a uniform investment strategy described as a
"one size fits all strategy" to all seven clients without regard to
any relevant factors.

The proposed representative plaintiffs then brought a proposed
class proceeding against the defendants. The proposed consisted of
all clients of Richardson GMP, excluding the named defendants,
whose investments accounts were under the management and direction
of Woodward during some or all of the period from July 30, 2012 up
to and including May 20, 2016. The Statement of Claim advanced
claims in negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract,
and vicarious liability.

Justice Campbell of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench ultimately
dismissed the motion to certify the action as a class proceeding.
While the Court held that the pleadings disclosed a cause of action
and that there were 17 common issues, the Court held that there
were two key impediments to certification of the action as a class
proceeding. First, the court held that there was not an
identifiable class of two or more persons within the meaning of s
5(1)(d) of the Class Proceedings Act. Second, the Court held that
the class action was not a preferable procedure under s 5(1)(d) of
the Class Proceedings Act.

With respect to the requirement that there be a viable class of two
or more persons, the court held that the class definition was
inappropriate. The court held that the high degree of variability
among the members of the proposed class precluded the existence of
a uniform identifiable class:

[52] Different clients likely would have had differing risk
tolerances, objectives, and time horizons depending on their
personal circumstances and the composition of their investment
portfolios. In addition, some clients may have purchased or sold
securities based on information or advice received from sources
other than Woodward and the WAM Advisors.

[53] These facts are essential to the nature, scope, and extent of
the duty each Defendant owed to members of the Proposed Class. The
result is that the suitability claims are personal to each client
and this factual matrix makes identification of the class
complicated and problematic.

[54] The Proposed Class is a highly variable group of individuals
with different factual circumstances and backgrounds who may be
owed different duties and who may have suffered different losses
for different reasons. For example, the duty to advise, inform and
warn that applies to an inexperienced investor is considerably
higher than that applicable to a more sophisticated investor. Thus,
the underlying facts for each of the Proposed Class will be
critical.

[55] In summary, the claims of the Proposed Class involve diverse
experiences that cannot be meaningfully reconciled in a unifying
class definition that would give rise to a common duty and standard
of care. The Plaintiffs' Proposed Class definition fails to relate
to a single, uniform experience. The mere fact that the proposed
class definition identifies a group of individuals or involves the
same defendant is not enough. The Action alleges many different
causes of action that affect many clients in varying degrees and in
substantively different ways. As such, the requisite duty and
standard of care owed in the circumstances and any breach of that
duty or contract cannot be resolved on a class basis.

The Court also held that the preferable procedure requirement was
not met. The Court held that although the plaintiffs had identified
a number of common issues, the common issues that would have been
certified would not have meaningfully advanced the litigation.
Rather, the most significant issues in the litigation were whether
the defendants breached their respective duties to the plaintiffs,
and whether damages were caused by the defendants' breach. The
court held that these were individual issues that could not be
resolved in a common issues trial. Central to the Court's
conclusion on this was the notion that the content of the standard
of care for an investment advisor was an individual issue that
depend on the circumstances of the particular client:

[74] The applicable standard of care, which determines the scope of
a duty and the expected conduct flowing therefrom, would require
individual determination and perhaps expert evidence. As such, a
detailed fact-finding examination of each client's purchase of a
security in the context of their individual circumstances and
dealings with Woodward and the WAM Advisors would be necessary. The
same holds true with respect to any duty to warn or inform, as the
scope and content of such a duty is defined with reference to the
nature of the personal relationship between the investment advisor
and client and to that client's personal circumstances.

[75] Numerous cases confirm that determining the appropriate
standard of care in investment advice litigation depends on
individual circumstances and requires a detailed examination of the
relationship between the client and the investment advisor, the
facts at the time the advice was given and the nature and type of
investment product purchased or sold: Young Estate v RBC Dominion
Securities, [2008] OJ No 5418 at para 182; Transpacific Sales Ltd v
Sprott Securities Ltd, 2003 CanLII 27136 (ON CA), [2003] 67 OR (3d)
368 (CA) at para 33. The relationship between a broker and a client
is on a spectrum that ranges from the broker acting as a mere agent
or "order-taker" who simply executes the client's instructions to a
full trust or fiduciary relationship in which the broker purchases
and sells securities on behalf of the client in a discretionary
account: Junko v Canaccord Capital, 2012 ONSC 6966 (CanLII) at para
50. This results in a spectrum of applicable duties, from
relatively minimal obligations to execute orders and act honestly
up to fiduciary obligations: Vipond v AGF Private Investment
Management, 2012 ONSC 7068 (CanLII) at para 184. The standard of
care applicable to an investment advisor-client relationship is a
question of fact and the scope of the duties owed flows not from
the relationship in the abstract, but from the facts of each
individual case.

Interestingly, the Court held that a class action would not be the
preferable procedure, despite having rejected the alternative
resolution mechanisms that were suggested by the defendants.
Specifically, the defendants argued that one or both of Richardson
GMP's internal complaints process, as well as complaints to the
Ombudsman Banking Services and Investments (OBSI) would be
preferable procedures. While the court considered each of these
processes, it rejected each of them as a preferable procedure.

With respect to Richardson GMP's complaint process, the Court held
that while the system promoted judicial economy, it would not
promote access to justice or behaviour modification. The Court
noted that the complaint process provided limited procedural
protection to investors who had suffered a loss. The Court further
noted that there was no obligation to conclude that process through
an offer of financial compensation. Finally, Richardson GMP's
complaint process did not encourage behaviour modification as it
was meant to encourage private settlement.

With respect to OBSI, the Court held that OSBI had limited powers
and financial jurisdiction with no ability to compel a brokerage to
comply with its recommendations. In particular, OBSI's remedies
were limited to naming and shaming, with no ability to provide
restitution to affected individuals.

The certification decision in Fisher v Richardson GMP Limited is
informative in a number of respects.

First, the Court's decision confirms that cases against investment
advisors for the provision of allegedly negligent investment advice
will generally not be amenable to certification as class
proceedings. This is so even where, as here, the gravamen of the
alleged wrong is that the investment advisor adopted a uniform
investment strategy for all clients without consideration of their
individual circumstances. While such a uniform approach by the
advisor might appear at first glance to yield a common issue, the
difficulty for plaintiffs in such cases is that they still require
consideration as to the individual circumstances to decide whether
that uniform approach fell below the standard of care in light of
each particular client's circumstances.

Second, and more generally, the decision reaffirms the principle
that claims involving professional advice and services that are
intended to be tailored to particular clients will typically be
difficult to certify. While in some cases, a particular style of
advice may be clearly wrong in all circumstances, the suitability
of the particular advice will generally depend upon the client
being advised. Where the suitability of even uniform advice varies
from individual to individual within the class, it will be
difficult for plaintiffs to persuade courts to certify such actions
as class proceedings.

Finally, this decision is a good reminder of the principle that in
order to successfully oppose certification on preferable procedure
grounds, the defendant need not show that there is another, better
procedure for resolution of the common issues. Rather, if the
resolution on the common issues will leave class members in
essentially the same spot they were in before the resolution of the
common issues, this is sufficient to find that a procedure is not a
preferable procedure. [GN]


ROCHESTER, NY: N.N. Files Civil Rights Class Action
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Rochester City
School District. The case is styled as N. N. by his parent, A.N.,
T. G. by her parent, P.G., A. H. by her parent, S.H., T. W. by her
parent, H.M.  and Y. R. by her parent, E.R.; on behalf of
themselves and all persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. The
Rochester City School District and The Rochester City Board of
Education, Defendants, Case No. 6:19-cv-06526 (W.D. N.Y., July 16,
2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Civil Rights:
Education filed pursuant to the Civil Rights of Handicapped Child.

The Rochester City School District is a public school district that
serves approximately 26,000 students in the city of Rochester, New
York.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

   Carolyn G. Nussbaum, Esq.
   Nixon Peabody LLP
   1300 Clinton Square
   Rochester, NY 14604
   Tel: (585) 263-1558
   Fax: (866) 947-0625
   Email: cnussbaum@nixonpeabody.com



SEFCU: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Story Suit Under EFTA
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, AMY STORY, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, as a class, Plaintiff, v. SEFCU and DOES 1-100,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-CV-764 (MAD/DJS) (N.D. N.Y.), Judge Mae
D'Agostino of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
New York (i) denied Defendant SEFCU's motion to dismiss the
Complaint for lack of standing; and (ii) granted the Plaintiff's
letter request to file a Motion to Consolidate the Case with
Christopher M. Sotir, et al. v. SEFCU, No. 1:19-CV-00147 (N.D.N.Y.
2019).

The Plaintiff seeks to bring a class action lawsuit alleging that
SEFCU improperly charges overdraft fees to its customers even when
their accounts contain enough funds to cover the transactions
presented for payment.  According to the Plaintiff, this practice
violates SEFCU's contracts with its customers, Regulation E of the
Electronic Fund Transfer Act ("Regulation E"), and Section 349 of
New York General Business Law, which prohibits deceptive trade
practices.

SEFCU is a federally chartered credit union operating 46 branches
in upstate New York, and is a "financial institution" within the
meaning of Regulation E.  Defendants Does 1-100 are agents,
partners, joint ventures, subsidiaries, and/or affiliates of SEFCU,
and those persons who own and/or operate SEFCU branch locations.
Like many financial institutions, SEFCU charges its customers an
overdraft fee when it determines that a customer's account has been
overdrawn.  In order to comply with Regulation E, SEFCU uses a form
that allows customers to opt-in to the overdraft protection
program.

According to the Plaintiff, SEFCU improperly uses an artificial
balance to determine whether enough funds exist in an account for a
transaction to clear.  The artificial balance is calculated by
subtracting "anticipated future debits (debits that may or may not
occur) and deposit holds" from the actual amount of money in the
customer's account.  As a result, the customer may be charged an
overdraft fee even if the account has enough funds to cover the
transaction.

The Plaintiff alleges that by calculating fees this way, SEFCU has
breached its promise to its customers in the Opt-In Contract that
SEFCU will only charge overdraft fees when the account does not
have enough money to cover the transaction, and only for ATM and
non-recurring debit transactions where the customer has opted in to
the overdraft program.  The Opt-In Contract, in the Plaintiff's
opinion, does not explain that SEFCU will use holds placed on
pending debit card transactions to create a different artificial
balance other than the money in the account in determining whether
to assess a fee.

Additionally, the Plaintiff alleges that SEFCU's Opt-In Contract
violates Regulation E because (1) it does not accurately describe
SEFCU's overdraft program, (2) it is included on SEFCU's website
and has not been segregated from other disclosures and
acknowledgments, (3) it fails to state the daily maximum number of
fees that may be charged, or that no such limit exists, and (4) it
includes a box, preselected as "yes," as the mechanism for
acceptance.

The Plaintiff initiated the action by filing a Class Action
Complaint on June 28, 2018.  SEFCU moved to dismiss the Complaint
on Nov. 7, 2018 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

On Feb. 5, 2019, the Plaintiff's counsel commenced a new proposed
class action with different named Plaintiffs, alleging many of the
same claims against the same Defendants.  Although the Plaintiff
initially sought permission to file a motion to consolidate the two
cases, the parties have now requested that the Court resolve the
pending Motion to Dismiss before they move to amend the pleading or
consolidate the cases.

After careful review, Judge D'Agostino holds that the Plaintiff has
sufficiently alleged standing.  Among other things, she finds that

(i) the Plaintiff has alleged facts that affirmatively and
plausibly suggest that she has standing to bring the claims based
on the Opt-In Contract; (ii) the Plaintiff has alleged an injury in
fact -- that she was wrongfully charged overdraft fees -- to
support her unjust enrichment claim; (iii) the Plaintiff has
alleged that the fee on her account statement relates to the debit
card transaction, and SEFCU has not provided the Court with
anything to suggest otherwise; and (iv) because the Plaintiff has
alleged that she was harmed by the Defendants' unlawful business
practice of improperly charging overdraft fees, the Plaintiff has
standing to bring the New York General Business Law Section 349
claim.

Judge D'Agostino denied SEFCU's Motion to Dismiss in its entirety.
She granted the Plaintiff's letter request to file a Motion to
Consolidate this Case with Christopher M. Sotir, et al. v. SEFCU.
The Clerk of the Court will serve a copy of the Memorandum-Decision
and Order on all parties in accordance with the Local Rules.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 5, 2019 Memorandum Decision
and Order is available at https://is.gd/9NrONW from Leagle.com.

Amy Story, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, as a class, Plaintiff, represented by J. Patrick Lannon
-- plannon@cherundololawfirm.com -- Cherundolo Law Firm, PLLC,
Richard Dale McCune, Jr. -- rdm@mccunewright.com -- McCune Wright
Arevalo, LLP & Taras Kick -- Taras@kicklawfirm.com -- The Kick Law
Firm.

SEFCU, Defendant, represented by Andrew J. Demko --
andrew.demko@kattenlaw.com -- Katten, Muchin Law Firm - Los Angeles
Office, Craig Convissar -- craig.convissar@kattenlaw.com -- Katten
Muchin Rosenman & Stuart M. Richter -- stuart.richter@kattenlaw.com
-- Katten, Muchin Law Firm.


SEIDBERG LAW: $15K Attorneys' Fees Awarded in Akins FDCA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Aaleon Akins, Plaintiff, v. Seidberg Law Offices PC,
Defendant, Case No. CV-18-00954-PHX-DJH (D. Ariz.), Judge Diane J.
Humetewa of the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona
granted the Class Counsel's Unopposed Motion for Attorney's Fees
and Costs.

In connection with the class action settlement granted final
approval by the Court on May 21, 2019, the Thompson Consumer Law
Group, PLLC, the Class Counsel, seeks an award of attorneys' fee in
the amount of $15,000 to be paid by the Defendant.  The Settlement
Agreement provided that the Defendant would pay the Class Members'
reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses in an amount not to exceed
$15,000.  However, the Court has an independent obligation to
ensure that the award, like the settlement itself, is reasonable,
even if the parties have already agreed to an amount.

Judge Humetewa finds that the Class Counsel is entitled to an award
of reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses in connection with the
approved settlement.  She has reviewed the Motion, and all
documents submitted in support thereof, including the Class
Counsel's itemized time sheets and expenses and its affidavit
regarding the attorneys for whom the motion seeks reimbursement.
She further finds that the 50.5 hours of work performed by
attorneys and the 12.2 hours by paralegals were reasonably spent on
the matter.

Additionally, given that the Class Counsel has been appointed in
numerous class actions, including FDCPA cases; courts have awarded
them exactly the same rates requested here in previous cases; and
courts in this District found similar rates appropriate in FDCPA
cases, the Judge finds that the Class Counsel's requested rates are
reasonable.

Applying the lodestar calculation, the presumptive reasonable
attorneys' fees award is $20,415.  However, the Settlement
Agreement only provided for an attorneys' fee award of $15,000 and
the Class Counsel only requests an award of $15,000.  Thus, the
requested attorneys' fee award, inclusive of costs, is less than
the lodestar amount.  Therefore, she finds that the requested
attorneys' fee award is reasonable.

Accordingly, Judge Humetewa granted the Class Counsel's Unopposed
Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs.  The Defendant will pay
$15,000 in attorneys' fees and costs to the Thompson Consumer Law
Group, PLLC.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 5, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/QvkNnJ from Leagle.com.

Aaleon Akins, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by David Neal McDevitt, Thompson
Consumer Law Group PLLC, Joseph Michael Panvini, Thompson Consumer
Law Group PLLC & Russell Snow Thompson, IV, Thompson Consumer Law
Group PLLC, 5235 E Southern Ave, D106-618, Mesa, AZ, 85206

Seidberg Law Offices PC, Defendant, represented by Kenneth William
Seidberg, Seidberg Law Offices PC, PO Box 7290, Phoenix, AZ,
85011-7290 & Manuel Harry Newburger -- mnewburger@bn-lawyers.com
--
Barron & Newburger PC.


SETTON FARMS: To Settles Workers' Wage Class Action
---------------------------------------------------
Alex Tavlian, writing for The Sun, reports that Terra Bella-based
Setton Farms announced on
July 11 it would settle a class-action wage lawsuit directly with
its current and former hourly workers.

The suit alleges that Setton -- America's second-largest pistachio
grower-processor -- failed to pay hourly workers for up to three
minutes each workday while employees walked from the front gate of
their plant to the timeclock.

The company, in its statement, denies the allegations and said it
paid its employees fairly.

Citing the high fees taken by class-action attorneys and wishing to
maximize the payment to the employees, Setton Farms opted to
provide direct, cash settlements to employees.

"[We] want to maximize funds to our employees by settling directly
with them," the company announced in a release.

Employees covered under the offer must have worked between April
27, 2012 and March 1, 2019.

The company estimates that the settlement amounts to roughly 50
cents per workday. For some employees, the amount could translate
to as much as $1,000.

Workers have the option of accepting the settlement offer or rather
than participate in the class-action suit, which will take
considerable time and may yield a lower payment amount.

Current and former Setton Farms workers covered by the settlement
offer can sign the agreement by visiting the company's human
resources department at its Terra Bella office. [GN]


SIAM SMP INTER: Isidoro Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
Abraham Cervantes Isidoro, Javier Nexticapan Lopez, and Efrain
Soliman Lopez, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. SIAM SMP INTER, INC. (D/B/A TO BE THAI),
MANIT YOTMANEE, and CHERRI YOTMANEE, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-04054 (E.D. N.Y., July 12, 2019) is an action on behalf of
themselves, and other similarly situated individuals, for unpaid
minimum and overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 ("FLSA"), and for violations of the N.Y. Labor Law (the
"NYLL"), and the "spread of hours" and overtime wage orders of the
New York Commissioner of Labor (herein the "Spread of Hours Wage
Order"), including applicable liquidated damages, interest,
attorneys' fees and costs.

The Defendants employed the policy and practice of disguising
Plaintiffs' actual duties in payroll records by designating them as
delivery workers instead of non-tipped employees. This allowed
Defendants to avoid paying Plaintiffs at the minimum wage rate and
enabled them to pay them at the tip-credit rate (which they still
failed to do). In addition, Defendants maintained a policy and
practice of unlawfully appropriating Plaintiffs' and other tipped
employees' tips and made unlawful deductions from these Plaintiffs'
and other tipped employees' wages. The Defendants maintained a
policy and practice of requiring Plaintiffs and other employees to
work in excess of hours per week without providing the minimum wage
and overtime compensation required by federal and state law and
regulations, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs were employed as delivery workers, dishwashers, and food
preparers at the Defendants' restaurant.

Defendants own, operate, or control a Thai restaurant, located at
126 Beverley Rd, Brooklyn, NY 11218 under the name "To Be
Thai".[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Michael Faillace, Esq.
     MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
     60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
     New York, NY 10165
     Phone: (212) 317-1200
     Facsimile: (212) 317-1620


SMARTPAY LEASING: STOP Text Message Class in Esparza Suit Certified
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHAWN ESPARZA, on behalf of herself, and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SMARTPAY LEASING, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. C 17-03421 WHA (N.D. Cal.), Judge William Alsup
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification.

Esparza brings the putative class action against the Defendant,
asserting two claims for negligent and willful violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").  The Plaintiff alleges
that after she terminated her lease of a mobile phone from
SmartPay, she continued to receive promotional text messages on a
completely different phone.  As part of its efforts to retain
customers, SmartPay allegedly sent text messages to inactive
customers such as the Plaintiff to encourage them to enter into a
new lease.  These messages continued even after the Plaintiff
requested that SmartPay stop sending them.  SmartPay later learned
that a coding error in its platform prevented individuals from
opting out of receiving SmartPay's texts (Lai Depo. 153:16-22,
203:16-204:9).  

Based on these allegations, the Plaintiff seeks to certify two
classes pursuant to FRCP 23(b)(3):

     a. Re-Engagement Text Message Class: All persons within the
United States (i) to whose cellular telephone number (ii) SmartPay
Leasing, Inc. sent a text message (iii) using its vendor Twilio,
Inc.'s platform, (iv) from Sept. 29, 2015 to the date of class
certification, (v) where the text message began with content
stating Congrats.  You're pre-qualified for a SmartPay lease (the
Re-Engagement Text Message).

     b. STOP Text Message Class: All persons within the United
States (i) to whose cellular telephone number (ii) SmartPay
Leasing, Inc. sent a text message (iii) using its vendor Twilio,
Inc.'s platform (iv) from Sept. 29, 2015 to June 13, 2017, (v)
after texting the word STOP.

SmartPay opposes class certification.  Following full briefing and
oral argument on the instant motion, an order stayed the action
pending resolution of SmartPay's appeal of an October 2017 order
denying its motion to compel arbitration.  The court of appeals has
since resolved SmartPay's appeal and affirmed the denial of
SmartPay's motion.  The stay in thes action is accordingly lifted.

The Plaintiff seeks to certify two classes which differ from the
putative class alleged in her complaint.  In contrast to the
above-defined classes, in her complaint, the Plaintiff purported to
represent the following individuals: All persons within the United
States who received any unsolicited, promotional text message from
Defendant or its agents on their cellular telephones through the
use of any automatic telephone dialing system as set forth in 47
U.S.C. Section 227(b)(1)(A)(3), which text messages by Defendant or
its agents were not made for emergency purposes or with the
recipients' prior express consent, within four years prior to the
filing of the Complaint through the date of final approval.

Judge Alsup finds that the Plaintiff's amendments to the proposed
class definition do not expand the class alleged in the complaint.
Nor has SmartPay articulated any prejudice resulting from the
proposed change.

He also finds that the Plaintiff's claims are not typical of the
Re-Engagement Text Message Class.  Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance
requirement necessitates a narrowing of the Plaintiff's proposed
class to include only those individuals who signed up for
SmartPay's services online.  As to those individuals, the
Plaintiff's theory of liability is that SmartPay's form of consent
is not clear and conspicuous because its terms of use are presented
via a hyperlink during the enrollment process.  The Plaintiff
herself, however, claims that she never received SmartPay's
disclosures because the sales associate failed to have her review
the terms of use as required under SmartPay's policy.

For these reasons, Judge Alsup granted in part and denied in part
the Plaintiff's motion for class certification.

He certified the STOP Text Message Class, under FRCP 23(b)(3),
defined as all persons within the United States (i) to whose
cellular telephone number (ii) SmartPay Leasing, Inc. sent a text
message (iii) using its vendor Twilio, Inc.'s platform (iv) from
Sept. 29, 2015 to June 13, 2017, (v) after texting the word STOP.
The class definition will apply for all purposes, including
settlement.

The Judge appointed Esparza as the class representative; and her
counsel Ronald Marron, Alexis Wood, and Kas Gallucci of the Law
Offices of Ronald A. Marron as the class counsel.  By June 21, 2019
at noon, the counsel will submit an agreed-on form of class notice
and a plan of dissemination, including by first-class mail.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 5, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/RlKnVS from Leagle.com.

Shawn Esparza, Plaintiff, represented by Ronald A. Marron --
on@consumersadvocates.com -- Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron,
APLC, Alexis Marie Wood -- alexis@consumersadvocates.com --
Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron, APLC & Kas Larene Gallucci
-- kas@consumersadvocates.com -- Law
Offices of Ronald A. Marron.

Smartpay Leasing, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jeffrey A. Topor
-- jtopor@snllp.com -- Simmonds & Narita LLP & Liana Mayilyan --
Liana@snllp.com -- Simmonds and Narita LLP.


STATE FARM: Court Grants Bid to Stay Gregory Haskin Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Gregory Haskin Chiropractic Clinics, Inc., v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Defendant, Civil Action
No. 18-63160-Civ-Scola (S.D. Fla.), Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr. of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida
granted the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, or alternatively, Motion
to Stay.

Plaintiff Gregory Haskin Chiropractic Clinics, Inc. filed its
Amended Class Action Complaint against Defendant State Farm for
declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and breach of contract.
Its allegations center around the Defendant's improper application
of the Plaintiff's deductible to its medical bills under Florida's
no-fault personal injury protection ("PIP") statute.

On Dec. 28, 2018, the Florida Supreme Court clarified Florida law
regarding the issue of the proper timing for an insurer to apply an
insured's deductible to medical bills for PIP benefits.  Florida
Hospital held that when calculating the amount of PIP benefits due,
the insured's deductible is to be subtracted from the total medical
charges before applying the statutory reimbursement limits in the
PIP statute.  The Plaintiff's complaint alleges that the Defendant
has been misapplying the deductible and under-paying its insureds,
including the Plaintiff and all those similarly situated.

Also relevant to the Court's order is a lawsuit pending in the
Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County.  On Oct. 23,
2014, Progressive Health Services, Inc. filed its Amended Class
Action Complaint against State Farm seeking declaratory relief and
damages for breach of contract.  The Plaintiff in the state court
complaint and in the instant action seek the same declaratory
relief regarding the Defendant's PIP reimbursement practices.  The
two complaints also seek contract damages based on State Farm's
under-payment of no-fault benefits under Florida law.  There is
currently a motion for class certification pending in the state
court action.

The Defendant now moves to dismiss the complaint on three separate
grounds: (1) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because
the Plaintiff failed to allege the jurisdictional amount in
controversy required by the Class Action Fairness Act; (2) the
equitable claims should be dismissed because the Plaintiff has an
adequate remedy at law; or alternatively (3) the case should be
stayed pending the outcome of a related state court case.

Because Judge Scola finds that he should decline to exercise
jurisdiction over the case, he only addressed the Defendant's last
argument only.

The Defendant argues that the case should be dismissed or stayed
under Ameritas Variable Life Ins. Co. v. Roach.  Under Ameritas,
the Eleventh Circuit held that a federal court should decline to
hear a declaratory judgment action where "another suit is pending
in a state court presenting the same issues, not governed by
federal law, between the same parties."  Because the state court
action will determine the same legal issues against the same
defendant, State Farm believes the case should be stayed or
dismissed pending the outcome of the state court case.

In Ameritas, the Eleventh Circuit explained that the"Declaratory
Judgment Act is an enabling Act, which confers a discretion on
courts rather than an absolute right upon the litigant.  It only
gives the federal courts competence to make a declaration of
rights; it does not impose a duty to do so.  The Eleventh Circuit
put forth a nine-part test to aid district courts in balancing
state and federal interests.

Under this test, the district court should consider: (1) the
strength of the state's interest in having the issues raised in the
federal declaratory action decided in the state courts; (2) whether
the judgment in the federal declaratory action would settle the
controversy; (3) whether the federal declaratory action would serve
a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at issue; (4)
whether the declaratory remedy is being used merely for the purpose
of procedural fencing -- that is, to provide an arena for a race
for res judicata or to achieve a federal hearing in a case
otherwise not removable; (5) whether the use of a declaratory
action would increase the friction between our federal and state
courts and improperly encroach on state jurisdiction; (6) whether
there is an alternative remedy that is better or more effective;
(7) whether the underlying factual issues are important to an
informed resolution of the case; (8) whether the state trial court
is in a better position to evaluate those factual issues than is
the federal court; and (9) whether there is a close nexus between
the underlying factual and legal issues and state law and/or public
policy, or whether federal common or statutory law dictates a
resolution of the declaratory judgment action.

The first factor concerns the strength of the state's interest in
having the issues raised in the federal declaratory action decided
in state court.  The Florida state courts have a substantial
interest in deciding how insurance companies should apply Florida
statutes regarding reimbursements and deductibles to the claims of
Florida residents.  This factor points towards abstention.

The second factor looks to whether the judgment in the federal
action would settle the controversy.  A decision in the case would
not.  This is one of many lawsuits in which a provider or insured
seeks a declaration of its right under Florida's PIP statute.  A
ruling in the action adverse to the Plaintiff would not moot the
issue in the state court lawsuit.  Indeed, if both lawsuits are
allowed to proceed there is the possibility of inconsistent
verdicts on the same issue against the same defendant.  Therefore,
this factor also favors abstention.

The third factor asks whether the federal action would serve a
useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at issue.
Although a decision by the Court in the case would indeed clarify
the legal relations of the parties, it could lead to inconsistent
verdicts if allowed to proceed.  This factor weighs weakly in favor
of abstention.

The fourth factor considers whether the declaratory remedy is being
used as a race for res judicata or to achieve a federal hearing in
a case otherwise not removable.  The Defendants argue that there is
no reason for the Plaintiff to maintain the suit unless the
Plaintiff is trying use the declaratory remedy for purpose of
beating the prior class action pending in state court.  The Judge
agrees and finds this factor weighs in favor of abstention.

The fifth factor looks at whether the use of a declaratory action
would increase the friction between the federal and state courts
and improperly encroach on state jurisdiction.  The Judge finds
that it would.  The case creates the potential for friction
inherent in having double-tracked, near-identical litigation
pending in both federal and state courts, such that the first
court's ruling on a particular issue may have res judicata effect
on the second court's ability to hear and decide the same issue,
even if the second court disagrees with the first court's
determinations.

The sixth factor considers whether there is an alternative remedy
that is better or more effective.  There is nothing to suggest that
the state court remedy is "better" or "more effective" as both
forums could address the declaratory judgment issues before the
Court. However, the state court is more appropriately suited to
handle the purely state law issues presented by the Plaintiff's
case.  Therefore, this factor weighs weakly in favor of
abstention.

Factors seven and eight are whether the underlying factual issues
are important to an informed resolution of the case and whether the
state trial court is in a better position to evaluate those factual
issues than is the federal court.  The issues in the case involve
the interpretation of a Florida statute and an insurance contract
under Florida law.  Again, a state court is better situated to
analyze these Florida law issues than a federal court.  These
factors also weigh in favor of abstention.

The last Ameritas factor asks whether there is a close nexus
between the underlying factual and legal issues and state law or
whether the federal common or statutory law dictates resolution of
the issues.  This factor unambiguously weighs in favor of
abstention.  The Plaintiff's complaint raises exclusively Florida
law issues related to the interpretation of the Florida PIP statute
and the interpretation of an insurance contract under state law.

After weighing each of the Ameritas factors, the Judge concludes
that it should decline to exercise jurisdiction over the
Plaintiff's claims and stay the case in favor of the state court
case.  Based on the foregoing, he granted the Defendant's motion to
stay.  The case is stayed until the conclusion of the parallel
state court proceeding.  The parties will provide the Court with a
status report of the state court case every 90 days from the date
of the Order.  The Clerk is directed to administratively close the
case.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 7, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/IfKiOr from Leagle.com.

Gregory Haskin Chiropractic Clinics, Inc., a Florida corporation,
Plaintiff, represented by Joel Stephen Perwin, Alfred I. Dupont
Building, Alaina R. Fotiu-Wojtowicz, Brodksy Fotiu-Wojtowicz, PLLC,
Barbara Perez -- bp@aronovitzlaw.com -- Aronovitz Law, Joshua Eli
Truppman, Brodsky Fotiu-Wojtowicz, PLLC, Theophilos George
Poulopoulos, Corredor, Husseini and Snedaker, P.A. & Tod N.
Aronovitz -- ta@aonovitzlaw.com -- Aronovitz Law.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Defendant,
represented by Benjamine Reid -- breid@carltonfields.com -- Carlton
Fields Jorden Burt, D. Matthew Allen -- mallen@carltonfields.com --
Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A., Marcy Levine Aldrich, Akerman
LLP, Ross Elliot Linzer, Akerman LLP & Ari Gerstin --
ari.gerstin@akerman.com -- Akerman LLP.


STRATEGIC DELIVERY: Summary Judgment Dismissing Colon Suit Vacated
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GLORIA COLON, DIANA MEJIA and FREDDY DIAZ, on behalf
of themselves and all other similarly situated persons,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STRATEGIC DELIVERY SOLUTIONS, LLC, and
MYRIAM BARRETO, Defendants-Respondents, Docket No. A-2378-17T4
(N.J. Super. App. Div.), Judge Karen L. Suter of the Superior Court
of New Jersey, Appellate Division, vacated the trial court's Jan.
2, 2018 summary judgment order that dismissed the class action
complaint and jury demand.

SDS is licensed by the United States Department of Transportation
as a freight forwarder and freight broker.  It arranges for the
local delivery of pharmaceutical products and general merchandise
to its customers.  The Plaintiffs each signed identical Independent
Vendor Agreements for Transportation Services with SDS in which
they said they owned and operated a business that provided
transportation services.  They agreed to provide transportation
services as independent contractors for SDS' customers.  The
agreements covered various issues: transportation needs, rate of
compensation, payment, fringe benefits, vehicles, signage,
uniforms, badges, tools, equipment, insurance, indemnification, and
termination of the agreements.

Paragraph 19 of the agreement provided that the law of the state of
residence of the "vendor" would apply, meaning that for these
Plaintiffs, New Jersey law governed the agreement.  Paragraph 20
addressed arbitration and the waiver of class actions.

The Plaintiffs alleged they worked out of SDS' facility in
Elizabeth from February 2015 to March 2016 performing truck driving
and delivery functions.  They claimed SDS made "unlawful
deductions" from their compensation in violation of the New Jersey
Wage Payment Law ("WPL").  They contended they were misclassified
by SDS as independent contractors and should have been classified
as employees.  The Plaintiffs alleged they should have been paid
one-and-a-half their hourly rate for work in excess of 40 hours per
week and SDS'failure to do so violated the New Jersey Wage and Hour
Law ("WHL").

In December 2016, the Plaintiffs filed suit against the Defendants
on behalf of themselves and as a class action on behalf of other
"similarly situated persons," for violation of the WHL and WPL, and
demanded a jury trial.  The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint and to compel the Plaintiffs to arbitrate these
claims on an individual basis, not as a class.  The Defendants
relied on paragraphs 19 and 20 of the agreement, arguing that the
Plaintiffs agreed to waive a jury trial, to proceed on an
individual (non-class) basis, and to have their claims heard in
binding arbitration.  The Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing
they were exempt from arbitration under the FAA, and that they had
not waived their right to a jury trial or class action relief under
the WHL or WPL.

The trial court granted the Defendants' motion, treating it as a
summary judgment motion, because the parties relied on materials
not referenced in the complaint.  It concluded in its Statement of
Reasons that the Plaintiffs waived their right to a jury trial in
paragraph 20 of the agreement, comparing the language there to
"analogous" language in Martindale v. Sandvik Inc.  The court found
that the Plaintiffs' agreement to arbitrate was "clear and
unambiguous" and constituted a valid and enforceable arbitration
agreement.  Similarly, the waiver to join a class provision was
clear and unambiguous valid and enforceable.  The trial court's
order required the Plaintiffs to adjudicate their WHL and WPL
claims through arbitration.  The court did not expressly address
the Plaintiffs' claims against Barreto.

The Plaintiffs appeal the order that required mandatory binding
arbitration on an individual basis of their wage and hour claims
against the Defendants.

Judge Suter finds that if the Plaintiffs are not engaged in
interstate commerce, then the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")'s
section one exemption would not apply (assuming they are providing
transportation services), and the Plaintiffs would be required to
arbitrate their claims under the FAA.  If they are engaged in
interstate commerce and exempt under the FAA, the issue is whether
that exemption preempts application of the New Jersey Arbitration
Act ("NJAA").  The Judge holds that it does not. The trial court
must determine in the first instance if the FAA applies.  The Judge
is constrained to reinstate the complaint and remand that issue to
the trial court.  However, if the Plaintiffs were engaged in
transportation services in interstate commerce, meaning that they
are exempt under the FAA, she will enforce the arbitration
provision under the NJAA.

The Plaintiffs argue that the court erred by dismissing their
complaint because they did not waive their right to a jury trial on
the wage and payment claims and did not waive the ability to pursue
these claims on a class action basis.  The Judge agrees with the
Defendants that the Plaintiffs waived both of these rights.  She
finds that the Plaintiffs clearly and unambiguously waived any
right to a trial by jury in any suit in paragraph 19(b) of their
agreement and agreed to adjudicate any dispute pursuant to
paragraph 20.  Because the Plaintiffs are required to arbitrate
under the FAA or NJAA, the Judge holds that the Plaintiffs waived
their right to a jury trial on the wage and payment law issues.

The trial court ordered "mandatory binding arbitration on an
individual basis."  The Plaintiffs argue they did not waive their
ability to pursue their claims as a class.  The Judge agrees with
the Defendants that the Plaintiffs' waiver was "clear and
unambiguous."  In contrast to the jury trial waiver provision, the
class-action waiver was not linked to the arbitration requirement;
it was a separate subsection under paragraph 20.  Also, it made
clear that the class action waiver applied to any type of remedy --
"arbitration, suit, or other legal proceeding."  The Judge affirms
the court's order that required the Plaintiffs to arbitrate their
WHL and WPL claims on an individual (non-class) basis.

The Plaintiffs contend the court should not have dismissed its
claims against Defendant Barreto.  The complaint alleges that
Barreto was the Plaintiffs' employer as that term is defined by the
WHL and WPL.  The court's Statement of Reasons did not provide any
analysis for its order that apparently dismissed Barreto or explain
why claims against her were subject to binding arbitration under
the agreements.  Rule 1:7-4(a) requires the court to find the facts
and state its conclusions of law on every motion decided by a
written order that is appealable as of right.  It did not supply
its reasoning; the Judge is constrained to remand the issue.

After careful review of the record and legal principles, she
concludes that the Plaintiffs' further arguments are without
sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.  

Based on the foregoing, Judge Suter vacated the order of dismissal,
and reinstated the complaint for the trial court to determine
whether the Plaintiffs were engaged in transportation services in
interstate commerce and thus, exempt under the FAA.  If the FAA
does not apply to the Plaintiffs, the Judge holds that the NJAA
pplies and requires arbitration of their claims.  She also holds
that the Plaintiffs waived a trial by jury and the ability to
proceed as a class action under their agreements with SDS.  The
Court does not retain jurisdiction.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 4, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/7NnsnS from Leagle.com.

Ravi Sattiraju -- rsattiraju@sattirajulawfirm.com -- argued the
cause for appellants (The Sattiraju Law Firm, PC, attorneys; Ravi
Sattiraju, of counsel and on the brief; Carole Lynn Nowicki --
Carole@KSBraniganLaw.com -- on the brief).

Patrick W. McGovern -- pmcgovern@genovaburns.com -- argued the
cause for respondents (Genova Burns, LLC, attorneys; Patrick W.
McGovern, of counsel and on the brief; Shawn M. Lopez, on the
brief).


SUNSHINE PAYROLL: Fails to Pay Final Wages, Lara Says
-----------------------------------------------------
ARTURO LARA, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, and on behalf of the general public, the Plaintiff, vs.
SUNSHINE PAYROLL PROCESSING, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability
Company and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, the Defendant, Case No.
19CECG02301 (Cal. Super. Ct., July 3, 2019), alleges that
Defendants have had a consistent policy of failing to:

     -- pay all final wages due at termination or within 72 hours
after separation to all employees in California, and

     -- provide employees with accurately itemized wage
statements.

The Defendants also failed to pay premium wages and provide
Plaintiff and all other aggrieved employees with the wage
statements in compliance with the California Labor Code.

The Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as a non-exempt, hourly
employee in California, including in and around the city of Clovis,
County of Fresno.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff is:

          Roman Otkupman, Esq.
          Meghan Maertz, Esq.
          OTKUPMAN LAW FIRM
          28632 Roadside Dr., Suite 203
          Agoura Hills, CA, 91301
          Telephone: (818) 293-5623
          Facsimile: (888) 850-1310
          E-mail: Roman@OLFLA.com
                  Meghan@OLFLA.com

T.J. MAXX: Bemmerly Suit Removed to C.D. California
---------------------------------------------------
The case captioned BRITTANY BEMMERLY, an individual, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. T.J. MAXX
OF CA, LLC; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendant, Case No.
RIC1903016 was removed from the Superior Court of the State of
California, County of Riverside, to the United States District
Court, Central District of California on July 12, 2019, and
assigned Case No. 5:19-cv-01284.

The Complaint asserts the following causes of action: (a) Failure
to Pay Minimum Wages; (b) Failure to Pay Overtime Wages; (c)
Failure to Provide Rest Breaks; (d) Failure to Provide Meal Breaks;
(e) Failure to Furnish Timely and Accurate Wage Statements; (f)
Failure to Pay All Wages Upon Separation; and (g) Violation of
California's Unfair Competition Act. The allegations in Plaintiff's
Complaint are incorporated into this Notice of Removal by reference
without admitting the truth of any of them.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

     AMY TODD-GHER, ESQ.
     MATTHEW B. RILEY, ESQ.
     LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
     501 W. Broadway, Suite 900
     San Diego, Ca 92101.3577
     Phone: 619.232.0441
     Facsimile: 619.232.4302
     Email: atodd-gher@littler.com
            mriley@littler.com


TARGET CORP: Garcia Labor Suit Transferred to E.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------------
The case, SERGIO GARCIA, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, vs. TARGET CORPORATION, a Minnesota
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
34-2019-00254638-CU-OE-GDS (Filed on April 17, 2019), was
transferred from the Sacramento County Superior Court to the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of California on
July 5, 2019. The Complaint asserts seven claims for relief for:
(1) failure to pay lawful wages; (2) failure to provide lawful meal
periods or compensation in lieu thereof; (3) failure to provide
lawful rest periods or compensation in lieu thereof; (4) failure to
reimburse employee expenses; (5) failure to timely pay wages; (6)
knowing and intentional failure to comply with itemized employee
wage statement provisions; and (7) violations of the unfair
competition law. The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of California assigned Case No. 2:19-at-00574 to the
proceeding.

Moreover, the removal of this class action is pursuant to the
amended rules for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005, which amended 28 U.S.C. Section 1332
to provide that a putative class action is removable to federal
court if (a) any member of a class of plaintiff is a citizen of a
state different from any defendant; (b) the proposed class members
number at least 100; and (c) the amount in controversy exceeds
$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs. Each of these
requirements is met in this class action.

Headquartered in Minneapolis, Target Corporation is considered as
the eighth largest retailer in the United States. As of May 2019,
the company operates 1,851 stores throughout the country. [BN]

Attorneys for Defendant:

     Jeffrey D. Wohl, Esq.
     Ryan D. Derry, Esq.
     Anna M. Skaggs, Esq.
     PAUL HASTINGS LLP
     101 California Street, 48th Floor
     San Francisco, CA 94111
     Telephone: (415) 856-7000
     Facsimile: (415) 856-7100
     E-mail: jeffwohl@paulhastings.com
             ryanderry@paulhastings.com
             annaskaggs@paulhastings.com

TAX EASE: 6th Cir. Affirms Summary Judgment in Brown Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMES BROWN; PHILIP LEIGH; DENISE PUCKETT, Executrix
of Theresa Cambron, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated; LAURA BRANSON; THIRD CENTURY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TAX EASE LIEN SERVICING,
LLC; TAX EASE LIEN INVESTMENTS 1, LLC; BLUE GRASS ABSTRACT, LLC;
LIEN DATA SERVICES, LLC; PHIL MIGICOVSKY; RICHARD ERIC CRAIG;
SHERROW, SUTHERLAND & ASSOCIATES, PSC; BILLY W. SHERROW; TAX EASE
HOLDINGS, LLC, fka Tax Ease L.P.; TAX EASE FUNDING TWO, LLC;
BLUESHINE, LLC; TREY GULLEDGE, Defendants-Appellees, Case No.
18-5909 (6th Cir.), Judge Joan Larsen of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit (i) affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment to Tax Ease; and (ii) reversed the district
court's denial of the Plaintiffs' motion for expert witness fees
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(E).

To combat the effect of property-tax delinquencies on government
coffers, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted a system in which
long-delinquent tax bills, represented by certificates of
delinquency, may be sold to third-party purchasers.  The government
gets its money, and the third-party purchasers collect on the
certificates, which function as liens on the subject properties.
The purchasers are entitled by statute to collect the amount paid
for the certificates plus interest, prelitigation attorney's fees,
attorney's fees associated with litigation, and administrative
fees.  The Defendants have profited from this process.  

The Plaintiffs are individuals and companies who failed to pay
their property taxes.  Tax Ease Lien Investments 1 ("TELI") and Tax
Ease Lien Servicing ("TELS") purchased the certificates of
delinquency for all the Plaintiffs' outstanding tax bills.  Once
TELI and TELS purchased the certificates, they were required by law
to send a 50-day notice -- a letter advising the property owner
that the certificate constitutes a lien of record against the
property, bears interest at a prescribed rate and, if not paid, is
subject to collection as provided by law.  For one year after
purchasing the certificate, the law limited TELI and TELS to
prelitigation collection efforts; they could not institute an
action to collect on the certificate or enforce the lien.

Tax Ease eventually identified an additional source of revenue.
During the foreclosure process, attorneys would often farm out
title searches to third parties because there were not enough
attorneys to handle the work.  So Tax Ease created a title company,
Blue Grass Abstract ("BGA"), to assist.  BGA would do the title
work for the foreclosing attorneys, such as Sherrow and Eric Craig,
who would then pass on the cost to Tax Ease.  Tax Ease would pay
the attorneys and then bill the property owners in the form of
litigation fees. Tax Ease charged all the named plaintiffs either
$300 or $400 for BGA's role in the process.

The Plaintiffs, tax-delinquent property owners who are members of
the putative class action, contend that Tax Ease has committed
fraud by assessing fabricated and unreasonable attorney's fees and
costs in connection with its collection efforts.  The Plaintiffs
focused on two sets of fees: (1) prelitigation fees for the work
done by Sherrow and Lien Data Services ("LDS") in relation to the
notices sent to property owners; and (2) fees and costs related to
the title-report work done by BGA.

Tax Ease moved for summary judgment, arguing that while the
specific elements of the Plaintiffs' causes of action differ, each
is premised on the allegation that any fees attributable to vendors
such as LDS and BGA are not real fees.  Because the fees charged
were actually incurred and reasonable, said Tax Ease, the
Plaintiffs' claims failed.  The district court agreed with Tax Ease
that all fees were "actual and reasonable"; granted summary
judgment to Tax Ease on all claims; and dismissed the action.

The Plaintiffs then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment,
arguing that the district court had overlooked evidence, including
expert witness evidence, and that the court had failed to rule on
their motion to compel Tax Ease to pay expert witness fees pursuant
to Rule 26(b)(4)(E).  The district court denied the motion.  It
explained that, while the Plaintiffs had mustered some facts in
support of their contention that the Defendants' business practices
constituted fraud and racketeering, those facts, taken in the light
most favorable to the Plaintiffs, were not material facts inasmuch
as they did not controvert the Defendants' evidence.  As to their
expert testimony, the court noted that the Plaintiffs had proffered
that evidence too late.  The court did not address the Plaintiffs'
motion for expert witness fees.

The Plaintiffs appeal.  They also challenge the district court's
implicit denial of its motion for expert witness fees pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(E).

Judge Larsen concludes that the prelitigation fees were actual
fees.  She cannot say that an attorney performs no legal work
simply because he deploys a form letter or even a letter drafted by
the client.  Sherrow vouched for the letters and sent them on his
letterhead, thereby taking professional responsibility for them.
And in attacking Sherrow's relationship with LDS, the Plaintiffs
lose sight of the fact that LDS worked on Sherrow's behalf.  As the
district court noted, and as the Plaintiffs do not meaningfully
dispute, an attorney may rely on nonlegal vendors to perform
nonlegal work, so long as the attorney is "ultimately responsible
for rendering competent legal services.  The Plaintiffs have
produced no material evidence that Sherrow, though assisted by LDS,
performed no actual work in relation to the notices.  The Judge
further concludes that the Plaintiffs have failed to show a genuine
issue of material fact regarding the prelitigation fees.

Turning to the title-report fees and costs, the Plaintiffs
challenge whether the fees and costs charged by Tax Ease for BGA's
title-report work were actual and reasonable. As to the
reasonableness of the fee itself (either $300 or $400 for the named
Plaintiffs), the Judge concludes that Tax Ease was entitled to
summary judgment in this respect as well.  In any event, given the
other record evidence, the Plaintiffs have not shown that a genuine
issue of material fact remains as to whether the title-report fees
and costs were actual and reasonable.

The Plaintiffs finally argue that the district court erred by not
granting its motion to compel Tax Ease to pay their expert witness
fees pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(E).  The district court had not
explained why it had denied the motion for expert witness fees.
The is reluctant to resurrect the case, given its labyrinthine
procedural history, the underlying claims' lack of merit, and the
district court's able handling of the motion for summary judgment.
But she believes it appropriate to remand for the district court to
exercise its discretion in resolving the multiple arguments raised
for and against the motion for expert witness fees.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Larsen affirmed the award of summary
judgment in favor of Tax Ease, but reversd the implicit denial of
the Plaintiffs' motion for expert witness fees, and remanded for
further proceedings as to that motion only.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/29HENL from Leagle.com.


TGI FRIDAYS: NJ Class Action Over Drink Prices Can Proceed
----------------------------------------------------------
Christian Hetrick, writing for The Philadelphia Inquirer, reports
that Robert Cameron was apparently a thirsty man when he went to a
TGI Fridays on a long-ago Wednesday.

In August 2012, the Pemberton Township man ordered a water, a beer,
and a soda, plus his meal at the Toms River restaurant, according
to a lawsuit he filed against the eatery. He believed that all of
this, plus tip, would cost about $20. But he said he was "shocked"
when he got the bill that charged him more than $5 for a
"mass-produced beer" and almost $3 for the soda.

It later dawned on him that the menu did not list the drink prices,
according to his complaint. Had he known how much he would be
charged, Cameron claims, he never would have ordered the soda and
would have asked for a cheaper beer.

Cameron's 2014 suit over the restaurant's alleged failure to
disclose drink prices can now proceed as a class action, a New
Jersey appeals court ruled, 2-1, on July 11. The decision reverses
a judge's ruling in state Superior Court in Burlington County that
denied Cameron's motion to certify a class of the restaurant
owner's customers who ordered from menus missing prices. The owner,
South Jersey Pubs Inc., also runs a TGI Fridays franchise in
Manahawkin, according to court filings.

Cameron claims that South Jersey Pubs intentionally withheld
beverage prices because market studies showed it could charge
patrons more when prices were not disclosed. His suit alleges that
the practice violates New Jersey laws requiring prices to be
disclosed for most goods.

A lawyer for South Jersey Pubs and the TGI Fridays in Toms River
did not return requests for comment. In court filings, the company
denied it violated state consumer protection laws and said it has
had drink prices on its menus since August 2017.

"We allege that a TGI Fridays restaurant owned by a franchisee
selectively withheld prices from otherwise comprehensively priced
menus as part of a carefully researched scheme to charge higher
prices than the fully informed market could sustain," West
Berlin-based lawyer Sander Friedman, who represents Cameron, said
in a statement.

Unlike other class actions that seek damages for the entire class,
Cameron's lawyers are asking only for their client to be
compensated. They have asked a judge for an order requiring the
restaurant owner to disclose drink prices on its menus, arguing it
would correct an illegal practice without imposing "devastating
damages" on the business or providing lawyers with "windfall
fees."

By certifying a class, customers could enforce the order without
filing their own suit, said Wesley Hanna, another lawyer for
Cameron.

In reversing the lower court's ruling, appellate Judges Garry
Rothstadt and Arnold Natali wrote that such a court order would
provide relief to the entire class, if the eatery's omission of
menu prices is found to violate state laws.

The allegedly overpriced "mass-produced beer" was a Stella Artois,
Friedman said. [GN]


TRACTOR SUPPLY: Can Compel Arbitration in Sweeney Suit
------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DEBRA SWEENEY, Plaintiff, v. TRACTOR SUPPLY COMPANY,
Defendant, Case No. 5:18-cv-04848-EJD (N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward J.
Davila of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, (i) granted TSC's Motion to Compel
Arbitration, and (ii) granted in part and denied in part its Motion
to Dismiss.

Sweeney filed a class action complaint against TSC, her former
employer, in Santa Clara Superior Court, and TSC subsequently
removed the litigation to federal court.  Sweeney seeks to
represent a class of similarly situated individuals harmed by TSC's
alleged failure include their nondiscretionary bonuses in its
calculation of their overtime pay.

Sweeney worked as an hourly, non-exempt employee at a TSC store in
Santa Clara County from around early April 2017 until late June
2018.  TSC is a retailer of farm and ranch equipment, livestock and
pet products, home improvement tools, and sporting goods.  She,
like other non-exempt employees, routinely received
nondiscretionary remuneration, including Store Bonuses, in addition
to her hourly wage.  She alleges that her overtime rate of pay did
not include her Store Bonuses with her hourly wage in its
calculations, and that her wage statements inaccurately identified
her overtime pay rate, and gross and net wages. The omission of the
Store Bonuses, she alleges, deprived her of the actual rate of
overtime pay due to her.  She further alleges that when her
employment ended, TSC failed to pay her overtime wage that it owed
her.

When Sweeney began working at TSC, she completed its onboarding
process, which included filling out and executing a number of forms
through a computerized, interactive system.  Sweeney, like other
new hires, was able to pause the onboarding process by logging out
and then logging back in to resume the process at a later time.
This process included reviewing and agreeing to TSC's California
Arbitration Agreement.  The Agreement was a mandatory term of
continued employment, i.e., she had to accept the Agreement to work
for TSC.  The onboarding system did not allow prospective
employees, like Sweeney, to comment on or negotiate the terms of
the Agreement.  On March 11, 2017, Sweeney assented to the
Agreement by clicking "I Agree," and entering her name, the last
four digits of her Social Security Number and the date.  Sweeney
does not dispute that she executed the Agreement.

The Agreement provides that any and all claims or disputes between
TSC and its employees are subject to arbitration.  Arbitration
under the Agreement will be administered by an agency agreed upon
by the parties, or, if they cannot agree, then by National
Arbitration and Mediation ("NAM"), and it will be governed by NAM's
Employment Rules and Procedures.  Under the Agreement, the
Arbitrator will be an attorney or former judge with substantial
experience in deciding employment disputes.  The arbitrator is able
to award any type of legal or equitable relief that would be
available in court, including punitive damages if/when appropriate.
The decision and award are subject to "confirmation, correction,
or vacation" as per the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA").  TSC
agrees to pay the costs of the arbitration.

Presently before the Court is a Motion to Compel Arbitration and to
Dismiss filed by TSC.  Sweeney does not contest that she signed the
Agreement or that her claims lay within the scope of the Agreement.
Rather, she challenges the Agreement itself, contending that (1)
it is not valid because TSC did not sign it, (2) that it is
procedurally unconscionable, and (3) that it is substantively
unconscionable because it is ambiguous as to the rules that govern
discovery, it does not provide for sufficient discovery and it is
not bilateral.

Judge Davila finds that Sweeney's first argument, that the
Agreement is not enforceable because TSC did not sign it, lacks
merit.  Sweeney provides no legal authority supporting her
position.  The Agreement sufficiently indicates TSC's intent to be
bound.  The Agreement is provided to job applicants through an
email from the address "Tractor Supply Company Talent Acquisition."
It is part of the onboarding process for TSC's new employees.
Courts that have considered similar arbitration contracts have
found that the lack of the employer's written signature does not
render the contract unenforceable.

The Judge also finds that the Agreement is not so unconscionable as
to make it unenforceable.  The Agreement has a low degree of
procedural unconscionability and that a single clause that is
substantively unconscionable.  This clause, though, is easily
severed from the remainder of the Agreement.  There is no other
indication of oppression or surprise, the degree of procedural
unconscionability of an adhesion agreement is low and the agreement
will be enforceable unless the degree of substantive
unconscionability is high.  The Agreement is not permeated with
unconscionability.  The Judge will sever the unconscionable
provision concerning modification and enforce the remainder of the
Agreement.

Finally, the Judge finds that the class action waiver to be valid,
and compels Sweeney to arbitrate her claims on an individual basis.
While TSC persuasively argues that the Court could dismiss the
individual claims, TSC does not show why the Court should.  The
Judge sees no reason to depart from the plain language of the FAA.
He denied TSC's motion to dismiss all of Sweeney's claims and
stayed the action pending arbitration instead.


For the foregoing reasons, Judge Davila granted TSC's motion to
dismiss Sweeney's class claims and (ii) motion to compel
arbitration.  Sweeney will arbitrate her claims on an individual
basis.  The modification provision of the Agreement is severed from
the Agreement because it is unconscionable.  The Judge denied TSC's
motion to dismiss Sweeney's remaining claims.  The action is stayed
pending resolution of the arbitration.  The Parties will file with
the Court a Joint Status Report within seven days of the resolution
of arbitration or every 120 days, whichever is sooner.  The clerk
will administratively close this file. This is an internal
administrative procedure that does not affect the rights of the
parties.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 5, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/VVpRuy from Leagle.com.

Debra Sweeney, Plaintiff, represented by Larry W. Lee --
lwlee@diversitylaw.com -- Diversity Law Group, P.C., Kristen
Michelle Agnew -- kagnew@diversitylaw.com -- Diversity Law Group,
APC, Nicholas Rosenthal -- nrosenthal@diversitylaw.com -- Diversity
Law Group & William Lucas Marder -- bill@polarislawgroup.com --
Polaris Law Group, LLP.

Tractor Supply Company, Defendant, represented by Mazen I. Khatib
-- mazen.khatib@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak and
Stewart PC & Christopher William Decker --
christopher.decker@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak &
Stewart PC.


TRANSAMERICA LIFE: Court Issues Protective Order in Thompson Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Gail J. Standish of the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California has issued protective order in
the case, GAIL THOMPSON, individually and on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TRANSAMERICA LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-05422-CAS-GJSx (C.D.
Cal.).

Discovery in the action is likely to involve production of
confidential and proprietary actuarial, business, technical, and
financial information of Defendant Transamerica Life Insurance Co.
as well as private information of Plaintiffs Thompson, individually
and as Power of Attorney for Lois Thompson, for which special
protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose
other than prosecuting the litigation may be warranted.  It is the
intent of the parties that information will not be designated as
confidential for tactical reasons and that nothing be so designated
without a good faith belief that it has been maintained in a
confidential, non-public manner, and there is good cause why it
should not be part of the public record of the case.

The protections conferred by the Order cover not only Protected
Material, but also (1) any information copied or extracted from
Protected Material; (2) all copies, excerpts, summaries, or
compilations of Protected Material; and (3) any testimony,
conversations, or presentations by Parties or their Counsel or
their Experts that reveals Protected Material.  Any use of
Protected Material at trial will be governed by the orders of the
trial judge.  The Order does not govern the use of Protected
Material at trial.

Once a case proceeds to trial, information that was designated as
Confidential, highly Confidential-Attorneys' Eyes Only, or
maintained pursuant to the protective order used or introduced as
an exhibit at trial becomes public and will be presumptively
available to all members of the public, including the press, unless
compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings to
proceed otherwise are made to the trial judge in advance of the
trial.  Accordingly, the terms of the protective order do not
extend beyond the commencement of the trial.

Any Party or Non-Party may challenge a designation of
confidentiality at any time that is consistent with the Court's
Scheduling Order.

A Receiving Party may use Protected Material that is disclosed or
produced by another Party or by a Non-Party in connection with this
Action only for prosecuting, defending or attempting to settle the
Action.  Such Protected Material may be disclosed only to the
categories of persons and under the conditions described in the
Order

After the final disposition of the Action, as defined in Section 4
(Duration), within 60 days of a written request by the Designating
Party, each Receiving Party must return all Protected Material to
the Producing Party or destroy such material.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 5, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/eRZpUD from Leagle.com.

Gail Thompson, individually and as Power of Attorney for Lois
Thompson, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Catherine S. Wicker --
catherine@pattersonlawgroup.com -- Patterson Law Group, Harvey
Rosenfield -- harvey@consumerwatchdog.org -- Consumer Watchdog,
Adam M. Moskowitz -- adam@moskowitz-law.com -- The Moskowitz Law
Firm PLLC, pro hac vice, Adam A. Schwartzbaum --
adams@moskowitz-law.com -- The Moskowitz Law Firm PLLC, pro hac
vice, Allison Hughes Goddard -- ali@pattersonlawgroup.com --
Patterson Law Group APC, Andrew S. Friedman -- afriedman@bffb.com
-- Bonnett Fairbourn Friedman and Balint PC, pro hac vice, Francis
J. Balint, Jr. -- fbalint@bffb.com -- Bonnett Fairbourn Friedman
and Balint PC, pro hac vice, Gerald Sinclair Flanagan --
jerry@consumerwatchdog.org -- Consumer Watchdog, Howard M. Bushman
-- howard@moskowitz-law.com -- The Moskowitz Law Firm PLLC, pro hac
vice, James Richard Patterson -- jim@pattersonlawgroup.com --
Patterson Law Group APC, Mark R. Rosen -- mrosen@barrack.com --
Barrack Rodos and Bacine, Samuel M. Ward -- sward@barrack.com --
Barrack Rodos and Bacine & Stephen R. Basser -- sbasser@barrack.com
-- Barrack Rodos and Bacine.

Trustee Hans Sunder, SUNDER IRREVOCABLE TRUST, Diana Lewis, Trustee
Marc Soble, MARILYN B. SOBLE IRREVOCABLE TRUST DATED 11/19/1997,
Michael H. Stephens, Trustee Belinda Bucci, NANCY AND CHARLES
BARCELONA IRREVOCABLE TRUST, Kathleen Swift, Debra Lewis & Trustee
Sandra Rosner, ROSNER 1998 IRREVOCABLE TRUST DATED 5/19/98,
Plaintiffs, represented by Andrew S. Friedman, Bonnett Fairbourn
Friedman and Balint PC.

Transamerica Life Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by
Chakameh Ganji -- cganji@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw and Culbertson
LLP, Erin E. Bennett -- erin.bennett@mhllp.com -- McDowell
Hetherington LLP, pro hac vice, Hutson B. Smelley, McDowell
Hetheringon LLP, pro hac vice, Jarrette E. Ganer, McDowell
Hetherington LLP, pro hac vice, Thomas F.A. Hetherington, McDowell
Hetherington LLP, pro hac vice & Vivian I. Orlando --
vorlando@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw and Culbertson LLP.


UBS SECURITIES: Court Grants Bid to Compel Arbitration in Zoller
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Matthew F. Kennelly of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted the
Defendants' motion to compel arbitration in the case, SHANNON
ZOLLER and ALEXANDER BEIGELMAN, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. UBS SECURITIES LLC, UBS
FINANCIAL SERVICES INC., and UBS AMERICAS INC., Defendants, Case
No. 16 C 11277 (N.D. Ill.).

Zoller and Beigelman are former employees of UBS.  They brought a
putative class action against UBS, alleging that the company
unlawfully fired employees before it had to pay out their promised
bonuses.

Previously, the Court has denied the Defendants' motions to compel
arbitration of Zoller's claims and to dismiss Beigelman's claims
for improper venue.  UBS appealed that decision to the Seventh
Circuit.  While UBS' appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, in which it reversed the Seventh
Circuit's holding that section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act rendered unenforceable an arbitration provision that barred
employees from bringing class, collective, or representative
proceedings.  In light of the Supreme Court's decision, the Seventh
Circuit panel reviewing UBS' appeal vacated the Court's ruling and
remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Court has ordered the Plaintiffs to show cause why the Court
should not grant the Defendants' motion to compel arbitration.

The Plaintiffs do not dispute that their claims fall within the
scope of their arbitration agreements or that those agreements are
enforceable under Epic Systems.  Instead, they contend that the
arbitration organization -- the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority ("FINRA") -- is not a suitable forum because it does not
permit the effective vindication of their rights.  

The Plaintiffs contend that FINRA arbitration is not a suitable
forum in which to bring their claims.  They make three arguments:
first, that FINRA lacks appropriate standards for hiring and
training its arbitrators; second, that it lacks a system for
ensuring that the arbitral panel receives the parties' filings; and
third, that FINRA's arbitrator pool and selection process leads to
systemic bias.

They also argue that UBS is judicially estopped from moving to
compel arbitration of Beigelman's claim under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA").

Regardless of whether UBS' argument is construed in terms of
forfeiture or waiver, Judge Kennelly concludes that the Plaintiffs'
failure to raise their suitability arguments in response to the
motion to compel precludes them from making them for the first time
now.  Epic Systems therefore did not change the legal framework in
any way relevant to the Plaintiffs' new arguments.  Because he
concludes that the Plaintiffs have forfeited their new arguments
concerning FINRA's suitability as an arbitral forum, the Judge
holds he need not reach the merits of those arguments.

The Plaintiffs next argue that UBS is judicially estopped from
moving to compel arbitration of Beigelman's ADEA claim.  They argue
that UBS knowingly chose not to proceed with the arbitration of
Beigelman's ADEA claim and that judicial estoppel bars them from
reversing their position.

The Judge finds that the Plaintiffs' judicial estoppel argument is
without merit.  The Plaintiffs argue that UBS' alleged admissions
during arbitration show that it knowingly chose not to arbitrate
Beigelman's ADEA claim, but this mischaracterizes the context of
UBS' statements.  Beigelman himself initiated the arbitration
proceeding and elected not to include his ADEA claim in that suit.
It is apparent that UBS was not selecting one forum over another
but rather describing which issues were in the case at that time.
It does not follow that in so doing UBS disclaimed its intent to
pursue arbitration of a hypothetical ADEA claim that Beigelman had
not yet raised.  The Judge therefore concludes that UBS, in moving
to compel arbitration of all the claims in this case, has not taken
"clearly inconsistent" positions that would warrant applying
judicial estoppel.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Kennelly granted the Defendants'
motion to compel arbitration.  Because the Plaintiffs' claims will
proceed, if at all, in arbitration, the Judge directed the Clerk to
administratively terminate the case as a pending case.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 5, 2019 Memorandum Opinion and
Order is available at https://is.gd/pFmEAB from Leagle.com.

Shannon Zoller & Alexander Beigelman, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Matthew
Jason Singer, Stowell & Friedman, Ltd. & Linda Debra Friedman,
Stowell & Friedman, Ltd,. 303 W Madison St Ste 2600. Chicago, IL,
60606-3395

UBS Securities LLC, UBS Financial Services Inc. & UBS Americas
Inc., Defendants, represented by Eugene Scalia --
escalia@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher Llp, pro hac
vice, James L. Komie -- jkomie@howardandhoward.com -- Howard and
Howard Attorneys PLLC, Laurie Amber Perez --
lperez@howardandhoward.com, Perkins Coie LLP, Michael F. Braun --
mbraun@howardandhoward.com -- Howard & Howard PLLC & Molly T.
Senger -- msenger@gibsondunn.com --
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher Llp, pro hac vice.


UNITED BEHAVIORAL: Ct. Stays Mental Health Suit Pending Wit Ruling
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an order staying the case captioned RICHARD K., JULIE
K., individually and as guardians of K.K., a minor, Plaintiffs,: v.
UNITED BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, OXFORD HEALTH INSURANCE OF NEW YORK/PPO,
Defendants. No. 1:18-cv-6318-GHW. (S.D.N.Y).

Magistrate Judge Moses issued a Report and Recommendation
recommending that the Court stay this action until the earlier of a
final judgment in a class action entitled Wit v. United Behavioral
Health, No. 3:14-cv-02346-JCS (N.D. Cal.), in which K.K. is a
member of a certified plaintiff class, or an order from the Wit
court either decertifying the plaintiff class or excluding K.K.
from the class.

The Court has reviewed the Report and Recommendation for clear
error and finds none. Accordingly, the Court accepts and adopts the
thorough and well-reasoned Report and Recommendation in its
entirety. Accordingly, this case is stayed until the earlier of:
(i) final judgment in Wit or (ii) an order from the Wit court
either decertifying the plaintiff class or excluding K.K. from the
certified plaintiff class. Pursuant to the Report and
Recommendation, the parties are directed to file a status letter
every six months as well as a letter within fourteen days of the
occurrence of either of those events updating the Court on the Wit
proceedings and informing the Court of the parties' respective
positions on whether and how this action should proceed.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 15, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y6rvrr5u from Leagle.com.

Richard K., individually, Julie K., individually, Richard K., as
guardian of K.K., a minor & Julie K., as guardian of K.K., a minor,
Plaintiffs, represented by Brian Smith King, Brian S. King,
Attorney At Law, 336 South 300 EastSuite 200Salt Lake City, UT
84111 & Robert Lawrence Liebross, Law Office of Robert L. Liebross,
39 Broadway Suite 1620, New York, NY, 10006

United Behavioral Health & Oxford Health Insurance of New York /
PPO, Defendants, represented by Michael H. Bernstein --
mbernstein@rc.com -- Robinson & Cole LLP & Jovana Vujovic --
jvujovic@rc.com -- Robinson & Cole LLP.


UNITED STATES: Bids to Seal Docs in Alexander Suit Partly Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTINA ALEXANDER, et al., Plaintiffs, No. v.
ALEXANDER M. AZAR, II, Secretary of Health and Human Services,
Defendant, Case No. 3:11-cv-1703 (MPS) (D. Conn.), Judge Michael P.
Shea of the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut (1)
denied the Secretary's limited motion for clarification and
reconsideration; (2) denied the parties' supplemental briefing on
the need to further subdivide the class; and (3) granted in part
and denied in part the four motions to seal documents filed in
opposition to the Secretary's motion for summary judgment.

On March 27, 2019, the Judge denied the Secretary's motion to
dismiss for lack of standing, motion to decertify the class, and
motion for summary judgment.  In ruling on the Secretary's motions
for summary judgment and class decertification, he explained that,
given the age of the case and its tortuous procedural history, he
would not consider further argument at this point on the merits of
class certification in general or on the issues addressed in the
summary judgment ruling, and the parties are not authorized to file
further briefs on these issues.  He warned that the time for motion
practice is over, and scheduled a status conference to choose a
trial date.  Seven days later, the Secretary filed a motion for
reconsideration and clarification.

The Secretary first moves for reconsideration of the Judge ruling
on class decertification.  The Secretary asserts that the Judge
overlooked the fact there is no evidence that every Medicare
beneficiary who spent at least three days as an inpatient, during
the relevant time period required or even was recommended for
post-hospitalization SNF care.  Thus, he argues, the present class
includes individuals who lack a cognizable injury for purposes of
standing.

Judge Shea finds that the motion does not meet the strict standard
for granting a motion for reconsideration, which requires that the
movant point to controlling decisions or data that the court
overlooked—matters, in other words, that might reasonably be
expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court. The motion
offers a different gloss on the same arguments that the Secretary
already presented, and it cites only cases and data that the Judge
considered in his original ruling.  The motion for reconsideration
is therefore denied.

The Secretary next requests clarification of a portion of the
Judge's ruling on summary judgment.  Specifically, the Judge held
that the evidence in the record was sufficient to allow a
reasonable factfinder to conclude that the Two Midnight Rule, as
implemented, meaningfully channels the discretion of doctors and
hospitals in deciding whether to admit a beneficiary as an
inpatient.  Thus, there is a material dispute of fact about whether
the Plaintiffs have a protected property interest in being admitted
as inpatients rather than treated as outpatients on observation
status.

The Secretary requests elaboration of (1) the criteria established
by the Two Midnight Rule that give rise to a protected property
interest; (2) the evidence in the record showing that CMS has
established such criteria; and (3) the legal framework the Court
applied to determine that those criteria establish a protected
property interest.  The Secretary does not seek clarification to
comply with an order, but requests that the Court provides further
explanation of an earlier ruling "so that he can make sure he
prepares and presents the most appropriate evidence at trial,
tailors his presentation to the Court's rulings, and presents
evidence in the most efficient and helpful manner for the Court.

The Judge holds that the Court's role on summary judgment is to
determine whether the movant has shown that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.  Its role is not to provide the
parties with a roadmap for the trial.  The Judge has twice denied
summary judgment in the case and written lengthy opinions each
time, which goes beyond the requirements of Rule 56.  He declines
to expound upon his reasoning further.  The motion for
clarification is denied.

In ruling on the Secretary's motion to decertify the class, the
Judge adopted the following modified class definition:  All
Medicare beneficiaries who, on or after Jan. 1, 2009: (1) have
received or will have received observation services as an
outpatient during a hospitalization; (2) have received or will have
received an initial determination or Medicare Outpatient
Observation Notice ("MOON") indicating that the observation
services are not covered under Medicare Part A; and (3) either (a)
were not enrolled in Part B coverage at the time of their
hospitalization; or (b) stayed at the hospital for three or more
consecutive days but were designated as inpatients for fewer than
three days.  

Medicare beneficiaries who meet the requirements of the foregoing
sentence but who pursued an administrative appeal and received a
final decision of the Secretary before Sept. 4, 2011, are excluded
from this definition.  The Judge noted, however, that it might be
necessary to subdivide the class.

The current class includes two arguably-distinct groups: (1)
Medicare beneficiaries hospitalized before October 2013 who assert
a property interest based on the use of commercial screening tools;
and (2) Medicare beneficiaries hospitalized after October 2013 who
assert a property interest under the Two Midnight Rule.

Having reviewed the parties' supplemental briefs, the Judge now
finds that there is no "fundamental conflict" between the
pre-October 2013 and post-October 2013 Plaintiffs, and that neither
formal nor informal subdivision of the class is required.

As required by the protective order in the case, the Plaintiffs
filed under seal all documents obtained from third-party producers
marked by the third-party producers as confidential.  The
Plaintiffs also filed motions to continue maintaining those
documents under seal, and to redact the portions of their memoranda
that describe the documents.  The Plaintiffs' motions did not state
with particularity the need to maintain the documents under seal
but requested that the Court permits the third-party producers to
file memoranda explaining why they should not be disclosed
publicly.

The Plaintiffs' motions seek to seal the following documents filed
in support of their memorandum in opposition to summary judgment,
as well as the portions of their memorandum and Local Rule 56(a)
statement describing the documents: Exhibits 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
15, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35,
36, 37, 45, 46, and 48.  They also request to seal Exhibits 1 and 5
(and related portions of their memorandum and Local Rule 56(a)
statement) filed in support of their supplemental summary judgment
brief.   The documents fall into three categories: (1) documents
produced by Quality Improvement Organizations ("QIOs"); (2)
documents produced by hospitals or other providers participating in
Medicare; and (3) documents produced by the Department of Health
and Human Services or CMS.

Given the modest public interest in reviewing these documents at
this stage of case, KEPRO and Livanta have provided an adequate
basis to seal the following documents: the Plaintiffs' Exhibit
Numbers 20-24, 27, 28, 30-37, and the Plaintiffs' Supplemental
Exhibit 5.

The Plaintiffs also filed excerpts from the transcript of the
deposition of a representative of Mercy Hospital, an exhibit
related to that deposition, and excerpts from the transcript of the
deposition of Dr. Julia Kyle.  The Judge finds that it does not
appear that sealing is necessary to protect the unnamed patient's
privacy.  As a result, the Plaintiffs' motions are denied to the
extent that they request to maintain the foregoing documents under
seal.

The Plaintiffs filed several documents produced by CMS and the
Department of Health and Human Services -- the Plaintiffs' Exhibits
2, 3, 5-9, and 15.  The Secretary does not seek to maintain any of
these documents under seal.  KEPRO requests to seal four of the
documents because they "contain minutes of meetings that include
the KEPRO Medical Directors.  These individuals are practicing
physicians and serve as peer reviewers for KEPRO.  But the
identities of KEPRO's Medical Directors are readily available on
the organization's website.  The Judge will not order these
documents sealed when the information that purportedly requires
sealing is so easily accessible elsewhere.

The Plaintiffs lastly request to seal the portions of their Local
Rule 56(a)2 statements and memoranda of law that describe or
reference any of the foregoing material.  The Judge finds that
there is little or no risk that the organizations would face a
competitive disadvantage if the material from the Plaintiffs' Local
Rule statements and memoranda were disclosed.  The Plaintiffs'
motion is therefore denied to the extent that it seeks to redact
portions of the Plaintiffs' memoranda in opposition to summary
judgment or Local Rule 56(a)2 Statements.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Shea grantd in part and denied in
part the motions to seal.  The following documents may remain under
seal: the Plaintiffs' Exhibits 20-24, 27, 28, 30-37, and
Supplemental Exhibit 5.  The Clerk is directed to unseal the
following documents: the Plaintiffs' Motion to Seal; the
Plaintiffs' Unredacted Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Summary
Judgment; the Plaintiffs' Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement; the
Plaintiffs' Exhibits 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 15, 25, 26, 45, 46, 48,
and Supplemental Exhibit 1; the Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum
of Law in Opposition to Summary Judgment; the Plaintiffs'
Supplemental Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement; and Livanta's memoranda
in support of continued sealing.  KEPRO may file a redacted version
of the Plaintiffs' Exhibit 29 within 14 days.  If KEPRO does not
file a redacted version, the Court will direct the Clerk to unseal
the document.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 4, 2019 Memorandum of Decision
is available at https://is.gd/ADI72r from Leagle.com.

Michael Savage, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Lee Barrows, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, George Renshaw, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Shirley Burton, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated & Denise Rugman, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Alice
Bers, Center for Medicare Advocacy, David J. Berger --
DBerger@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Dylan G.
Savage -- dsavage@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, pro
hac vice, Eric Matthew Carlson, National Senior Citizens Law
Center, pro hac vice, Jason B. Mollick -- jmollick@wsgr.com --
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, pro hac vice, Judith A. Stein,
Center for Medicare Advocacy, Inc, Luke A. Liss -- lliss@wsgr.com
-- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati P.C., pro hac vice, Regan
Bailey, Justice in Aging, pro hac vice, Alexander Kenneth Brehnan
-- abrehnan@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Carol
Wong, Justice in Aging, Lindsey Edwards, Steven D. Guggenheim --
SGuggenheim@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati & Gill W.
Deford , Center for Medicare Advocacy.

Ann Pelow, Executor of Estate of Richard Bagnall, Plaintiff,
represented by Alice Bers , Center for Medicare Advocacy, David J.
Berger , Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Dylan G. Savage , Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, pro hac vice, Jason B. Mollick , Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, pro hac vice, Luke A. Liss , Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati P.C., pro hac vice, Regan Bailey ,
Justice in Aging, pro hac vice, Alexander Kenneth Brehnan , Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Carol Wong , Justice in Aging, Lindsey
Edwards , Steven D. Guggenheim , Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati &
Gill W. Deford , Center for Medicare Advocacy.

James Mulcahy, Executor of the Estate of Sarah Mulcahy, Plaintiff,
represented by Alexander Kenneth Brehnan , Wilson Sonsini Goodrich
& Rosati, Alice Bers , Center for Medicare Advocacy, Carol Wong ,
Justice in Aging, Gill W. Deford , Center for Medicare Advocacy,
Lindsey Edwards & Steven D. Guggenheim , Wilson Sonsini Goodrich &
Rosati.

Christina Alexander, Represenative of Estate of Bernice Morse,
Intervenor Plaintiff, represented by David J. Berger , Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Dylan G. Savage , Wilson Sonsini
Goodrich & Rosati, pro hac vice, Jason B. Mollick , Wilson Sonsini
Goodrich & Rosati, Luke A. Liss , Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati
P.C., Alexander Kenneth Brehnan , Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati,
Alice Bers , Center for Medicare Advocacy, Carol Wong , Justice in
Aging, Lindsey Edwards , Steven D. Guggenheim , Wilson Sonsini
Goodrich & Rosati, Wey-Wey Kwok , Center for Medicare Advocacy &
Gill W. Deford , Center for Medicare Advocacy.

Mary Smith, Representative of the Estate of Martha Leyanna, Peggy
Leider, for Irma Becker & Peter Zavidniak, for Louis Dziadzia,
Intervenor Plaintiffs, represented by David J. Berger , Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Regan Bailey , Justice in Aging, pro hac
vice, Alexander Kenneth Brehnan , Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati,
Alice Bers , Center for Medicare Advocacy, Carol Wong , Justice in
Aging, Gill W. Deford , Center for Medicare Advocacy, Lindsey
Edwards & Steven D. Guggenheim , Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati.

Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services,
Defendant, represented by Carolyn Aiko Ikari, U.S. Attorney's
Office, Justin M. Sandberg, U.S. Department of Justice-Civ. Div.,
Elizabeth Tulis, DOJ-Civ U.S. Department of Justice, Civil
Division, Garrett Coyle, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil
Division, Federal Programs, Jason Lee, DOJ-Civ, Kelley Hauser,
DOJ-Civ U.S Attorney's Office & Kieran Gavin Gostin, U.S.
Department of Justice.

Holy Name Medical Center, Movant, represented by Rodman E. Honecker
-- rhonecker@windelsmarx.com -- Windels Marx Lane & Mittendorf,
LLP.

Keystone Peer Review Organization, Inc., Interested Party,
represented by Andrew M. Zeitlin -- azeitlin@goodwin.com -- Shipman
& Goodwin.

The American Hospital Association, Amicus, represented by Eric J.
Lobenfeld -- eric.lobenfeld@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US
LLP.


UNITED STATES: Carter et al. Sue over Camp Lejeune Water Pollution
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against the United States of
America. The suit alleges that Defendant failed to non-negligently
construct the water wells and water supply and distribution system
at Camp Lejeune so as to eliminate or prevent contamination or
pollution of the water supplied.

The Defendant owned, controlled and or operated a military base
located at and known as Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

The Defendant's liability for the damages caused to Plaintiffs and
Class Members, includes negligence, statutory strict liability,
private nuisance, failure to warn, and the claim for medical
monitoring, the lawsuit says.

The Plaintiffs are citizens of the United States of America and
have submitted administrative claims pursuant to the Federal Tort
Claims Act whose administrative claims have been denied and or have
been pending for more than six months.

The U.S. is a country of 50 states covering a vast swath of North
America, with Alaska in the northwest and Hawaii extending the
nation's presence into the Pacific Ocean.

The case is captioned as DEBRA CARTER, MICHAEL DORE, ERIC R. TERRY,
JOHN C. DORE III, MICHAEL DORE, LINDA MASHBURN, ROBERT MASHBURN SR,
ROBERT MASHBURN JR, FERNANZA L FAVORS, LAWRENCE SINGER, MICHAEL
TARRINGER, LAWRENCE SINGER, VICTORIA KEALY, JENNIFER HOLSTROM,
DENNIS DAVIDSON, JANEY LYNN DAVIDSON, PATRICIA MARSHALL DAVIDSON,
RUSSELL JAY DAVIDSON, TIMOTHY MICHAEL DAVIDSON, MARK MONROE SHELOR,
CHISA B HUTCHINSON, PAMELA WALDOCH, BEVERLE ANN WALDOCH, DANIEL
WALDOCH, KIMBERLY S BRYANT, ALONZO E BRYANT JR, KAYLAN A BRYANT,
AMENA MITCHELL, MARIE E. CHAMBERS, JOHN C. DORE II, ALANA E.
CONLEY, MICHELE J HENNESSY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF LHA,
A MINOR, AND OF THA, A MINOR, AND JOHN DOE AS REPRESENTATIVE OF
ESTATE OF BILL THOMPSON (DECEASED), the Plaintiffs, v. UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-02787-CAP (N.D.
Ga., July 3, 2019).[BN]

The Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Donald D.J. Stack, Esq.
          STACK & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          260 Peachtree Street, N.W., Suite 1200
          Atlanta, GA 30303
          Telephone: (404) 525-9205
          Facsimile: (404) 522-0275
          E-mail: dstack@stackenv.com

               - and -

          Robert Jackson, Esq.
          ROBERT B. JACKSON, IV, LLC
          260 Peachtree Street, N.W., Suite 2200
          Atlanta, GA 30303
          Telephone: (404) 313-2039
          E-mail: rbj4law@gmail.com

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA: Faces Class Action Over Alumni Data Issue
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The College Fix reports that the University of Oklahoma has now
shelled out over $1.5 million for investigations into sexual
harassment allegations against a former college president, and the
falsification of alumni donation data.

According to The Oklahoman, records show OU paid the law firm of
Jones Day (which has looked into both matters) $489,367 in July.

The allegations against former OU President David Boren came to
light in February, but there remain few specific details. Boren
"emphatically denies any inappropriate behavior or unlawful
activity," and his lawyer called the investigation a "fishing
expedition."

Regarding the alumni data issue, the university is dealing with a
class action lawsuit. OU was ditched by U.S. News and World
Report's prestigious college rankings after it was revealed 20
years worth of university alumni donor information was bogus. [GN]


VORTEN: Nov. 2020 Settlement Claims Filing Deadline
---------------------------------------------------
Owners of Vortens(TM) Toilet Tank Models 3412 and 3464 made in 2011
can make a Claim now for a payment under a class action
settlement.

The settlement covers individuals who own (or owned) a Vortens(TM)
toilet tank model 3412 or 3464 manufactured between January 1, 2011
and December 31, 2011. A description (including photos) of how to
determine whether someone owns an affected tank is included on the
website www.VortensSettlement.com.

Under the Settlement, Class Members who make a Valid Claim in the
Settlement and provide proof of tank ownership and expenses
incurred in replacement and/or installation, will receive
reimbursement up to $300 per toilet tank. Class Members may also
make a claim without receipts, but only with a declaration sworn
under oath upon penalty of perjury, and recovery is capped at $150
per affected tank.

Replacement tanks will be supplied to distributors in Texas,
California, Louisiana, and Florida, where the largest numbers of
tank model #3412 and #3464 were distributed in 2011.  Replacement
product will be continued to be provided as needed through the
conclusion of the claim period.

Settlement Class Members that have experienced property damage as a
result of a cracked toilet tank, can make a Valid Claim in the
Settlement for documented (with receipts), unreimbursed
out-of-pocket expenses of up to $4,000 incurred as a result of the
cracked tank. Class Members may also make a claim for reimbursement
of proper damage expenses without receipts, but only with a
declaration sworn under oath upon penalty of perjury, and recovery
is capped at $150 per affected tank. An unreimbursed insurance
deductible is an eligible out-of-pocket expense.

To get a payment, Class Members can visit the Settlement Website
www.VortensSettlement.com and file a Claim online, or download a
paper Claim Form and file by mail.  The deadline to file a Claim is
November 16, 2020.

For further information, please visit www.VortensSettlement.com.
Class Members may also contact the Settlement Administrator at
1-855-424-0783 or by writing to Vortens Settlement, P.O. Box 4540,
Portland, OR 97208-4540.  Class Members may also contact Class
Counsel at Carpenter & Schumacher, P.C. and/or access the court
docket on PACER available at https://ecf.txed.uscourts.gov [GN]


WAITR HOLDINGS: Banks Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------
JANNA M. BANKS, on behalf of all other similarly situated
employees, Plaintiff v. WAITR HOLDINGS, INC., Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-00898 (W.D. La., July 12, 2019) seeks for all unpaid
overtime wages and for an additional equal amount as liquidated
damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), and for
Plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees and expenses under FLSA.

Plaintiff and similarly situated employees customarily and
regularly worked more than 40 hours in a work week. The Defendant
failed to pay Plaintiff and similarly situated employees at a rate
of not less than one and one half times the employee's regular
hourly rate for each hour of work in excess of 40 in a work week,
as required by the FLSA. The Defendant's FLSA violations were
willful because the employer knew or should have known its conduct
was prohibited by the FLSA and showed reckless disregard for the
law's requirements, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a "Mobile Restaurant Success
Manager" (MRSM) from October 5, 2018 to the date of this
Complaint.

WAITR is in the business of providing restaurant meal ordering
services to customers by means of a mobile phone app, and
restaurant food delivery service to customers using Delivery
Drivers employed by WAITR.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Christopher L. Zaunbrecher, Esq.
     BRINEY FORET CORRY, LLP
     413 Travis Street, Suite 200
     Post Office Drawer 51367
     Lafayette, LA 70505-1367
     Phone: (337) 456-9835
     Facsimile: (337) 233-8719
     Email: zaunbrecher@brineyforet.com


WAYFAIR INC: Can Compel Arbitration in Gorny Suit
-------------------------------------------------
In the case, RONALD GORNY, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. WAYFAIR INC. and WAYFAIR LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 18 C 8259 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Matthew F.
Kennelly of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, granted Wayfair's motion to compel
arbitration.

Ronald Gorny filed the putative class action against Wayfair Inc.
and Wayfair LLC, alleging violations of Illinois contract and tort
law arising from his purchase of a headboard from Wayfair.com.  In
early July 2018, Gorny accessed Wayfair.com and purchased an
upholstered headboard for his bed.  This was not Gorny's first time
on the website.  

A couple of days after he ordered it, Gorny received the headboard
and installed it in his home.  He says he soon discovered a large
number of small insects, which turned out to be bedbugs, infesting
the headboard's upholstery.  According to Gorny, he promptly
complained to Wayfair about the problem.  Wayfair, for its part,
says that its records indicate no such complaint was ever made
directly to its customer service department.  Rather, Gorny
apparently indicated the bedbug infestation exclusively in a
comment box at the end of a consumer satisfaction survey he
completed some 55 days after he received the headboard.

Wayfair contends that the dispute does not belong in court.
Initially, Wayfair contends that it is unlikely that the headboard
became infested before it got to Gorny.  More importantly, though,
Wayfair contends that, irrespective of the source of the bedbugs,
the dispute falls within the scope of a binding agreement to
arbitrate that it contends Gorny assented to when he used
Wayfair.com and when he ordered the headboard.

Wayfair notes that a hyperlink to the terms of use, which included
the relevant provision, appeared on each of the more than 13,000
pages Gorny visited on Wayfair.com and that Gorny was specifically
admonished on several occasions that by continuing to the site, you
agree to the updated Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.  Moreover,
Gorny was specifically notified before ordering the headboard --
and before making his two previous orders -- that, by placing an
order, he is agreeing to their Privacy Policy and Terms of Use.
The message appeared immediately below the large purple "Place Your
Order" button that Gorny had to press in order to initiate his
order.

After Gorny fired off his scathing consumer survey, Wayfair
responded with an apology and a coupon.  A couple months later
Gorny filed the suit on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated.  He contends that he is one of many customers who have
received products from Wayfair that were infested with bedbugs; he
also contends that Wayfair has ignored the problem.  In his
nine-count complaint, Gorny alleges breach of contract and warranty
(counts 1, 6, and 7), negligence (count 2), and consumer fraud and
deceptive trade practices under Illinois and several other states'
laws (counts 3, 4, 5, and 8).  He also alleges that Wayfair was
unjustly enriched (count 9).

Wayfair has moved to compel arbitration under the dispute
resolution provision of its terms of use.

Gorny presents three arguments.  First, he contends that, even
assuming that the arbitration clause from the terms of use is valid
and enforceable, his claims fall outside the scope of the
provision.  Second, Gorny argues that no binding agreement was ever
formed between the parties.  Third, he argues that even if the
Court finds that his claims fall within the scope of a binding
arbitration clause, that clause should be found enforceable only
with respect to his claims against Wayfair LLC and not those
against its parent company, Wayfair, Inc.

As to Gorny's first argument, Judge Kennelly concludes that, under
the terms of the contract and directly controlling Seventh Circuit
authority, Gorny's claims arise out of or relate to the
relationships which result from the [] Terms of Use, and are
therefore within the scope of the arbitration clause.  Contrary to
Gorny's narrow characterization, the Wayfair terms of use include
numerous provisions governing the purchase and sale of goods, such
as those regarding warranties and product complaints.  As a result,
the terms of use shape the contours of a contractual buyer-seller
relationship.  That is unsurprising, given that the "use" of a
retail website like Wayfair.com typically involves purchasing
products.  A dispute related to the purchase of goods through
Wayfair.com necessarily implicates this buyer-seller relationship
and thus unambiguously arises out of the website's terms of use
and/or a relationship governed by them.

Having concluded that Gorny's claims are covered if the arbitration
clause is binding, the Judge next steps back to assess whether the
parties have a binding contract.  He concludes that the web pages
presented to Gorny adequately communicated all the terms and
conditions of the agreement and that the circumstances support the
inference that he received reasonable notice of those terms.
Unlike the cases Gorny cites in which website owners sought to
enforce their terms of use without ever requiring any manifestation
of acceptance, undisputed evidence establishes that Gorny accessed
Wayfair.com repeatedly and made purchases using forms that, like
those in Hubbert, expressly notified the buyer of the existence of
terms that would govern the purchase.  Gorny's complaints that he
did not actually read the terms are of no consequence.   Because
the parties had an enforceable contract that, included an
arbitration provision encompassing Gorny's claims, the Judg must
grant the motion to compel arbitration.

The only question that remains is whether this conclusion applies
to both the Defendants.  Gorny argues that any arbitration
agreement exists only between him and Wayfair LLC, and that Wayfair
Inc., Wayfair LLC's parent company, was not a party to the
agreement.  Wayfair counters that the relevant provision is broad
enough to capture the claims against both the Defendants.

The Judge holds that Wayfair is clearly correct.  Wayfair Inc. is
Wayfair LLC's parent company and is therefore covered by the
arbitration agreement.  It may thus enforce the arbitration
provision in relation to the claims against it.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Kenneylly granted the Defendant's
motion to stay these proceedings and to compel arbitration.
Because the case will be pending before an arbitrator for the
foreseeable future, the Clerk is directed to administratively
terminate the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 7, 2019 Memorandum Opinion and
Order is available at https://is.gd/9vN2at from Leagle.com.

Ronald Gorny, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Kyle Alan Shamberg, Lite
DePalma Greenberg, LLC, Nicholas Rudolph Lange, Lite DePalma
Greenberg, LLC & Katrina Carroll -- kcarroll@carlsonlynch.com --
Carlson Lynch, LLP.

Wayfair, Inc. & Wayfair, LLC, Defendants, represented by Adrianne
Katrine Jakola -- katie.jakola@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis LLP
& Robert Burkart Ellis -- robert.ellis@kirkland.com -- Kirkland &
Ellis LLP.


WV UNIVERSITY: Court Grants Writ of Prohibition in Thomack Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex rel. WEST VIRGINIA
UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS, INC., AND WEST VIRGINIA UNITED HEALTH SYSTEM,
INC., Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE PHILLIP D. GAUJOT, JUDGE OF THE
CIRCUIT COURT OF MONONGALIA COUNTY, CHRISTOPHER THOMACK, AND JOSEPH
MICHAEL JENKINS, Respondents, Case No. 18-0841 (W. Va. Sup. App.),
Judge Tim Armstead of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
(i) granted the writ of prohibition as moulded, and (ii) vacated
the circuit court's order denying the Hospitals' motion to
decertify the class.

In 2012, Mr. Thomack and Mr. Jenkins were injured in separate
accidents.  They were treated at Ruby Memorial Hospital.  Each
hired an attorney to seek damages for his injuries, and each
attorney requested copies of his client's medical records.  Mr.
Thomack alleges that WVUHS charged his attorney $514.40 for his
medical records.  Mr. Jenkins says that WVUHS charged his attorney
$656.80.  WVUHS arrived at these fees by charging "40 cents per
page" plus an additional $10.00 fee for "processing."  WVUHS
charged by the page, though it provided the records as images on a
computer disc.

Mr. Thomack and Mr. Jenkins believe that these fees were illegal.
On Jan. 18, 2013, Mr. Thomack sued WVUH in the Circuit Court of
Monongalia County.  Later, on June 27, 2013, Mr. Jenkins sued
WVUHS2 in the Circuit Court of Harrison County.  Each Plaintiff
sued individually and as the (would be) representative of a class
of similarly situated persons.  Their cases were subsequently
consolidated in the Circuit Court of Monongalia County.

On Jan. 9, 2014, after consolidation, Mr. Thomack and Mr. Jenkins
filed a consolidated and amended class action complaint against the
Hospitals in the Circuit Court of Monongalia County.  The
consolidated complaint's central allegation is that the Hospitals
violated W. Va. Code Section 16-29-2(a) 1999 by charging them $0.40
'per page' for copies of their already existing medical records.

In October 2013—before consolidation -- Mr. Thomack moved for
class certification under Rule 23.  The Hospitals opposed the
motion.

On April 16, 2014, the circuit court entered an order certifying a
class of all individuals who have requested copies of their medical
records from the Hospitals, and their related entities, at any time
during the five years preceding the filing of the lawsuit, and who
paid the fees charged by the Hospitals, and their related entities,
to obtain their medical records.

The circuit court revised the class definition in a subsequent
order entered on Nov. 12, 2015.  It clarified that the term
"individuals" included both "individual patients" and a
representative requesting records on behalf of the patient, if the
patient could ultimately be held responsible to pay the cost.

The Hospitals moved to decertify the class, advancing a new
argument that Mr. Jenkins lacked standing because he had yet to
reimburse his attorney for the cost of obtaining his medical
records.  They also renewed their attack on commonality, arguing
that establishing liability under W. Va. Code Section 16-29-2
would] require an individualized analysis of the amount WVUH
charged each class member versus the amount WVUH actually expended
to compile the class member's records.

The circuit court denied the Hospitals' motion to decertify the
class in an order entered on Feb. 23, 2018.  It did, however,
determine that the class definition should be further modified to
include attorneys who have requested and paid for medical records
on behalf of their patient clients.  Pursuant to this
determination, it entered a further order on July 5, 2018 that
identified the class as follows: Any person who, from Jan. 18, 2008
until June 5, 2014, (1) requested in writing copies of patient
medical records from [WVUH], including the individual patient and
any person who was an authorized agent or authorized representative
of the patient through legal representation; and (2) paid the fees
charged by [WVUH] to obtain such requested medical records.

The Hospitals filed this petition for a writ of prohibition on Oct.
1, 2018, challenging the circuit court's Feb. 23, 2018 order
refusing to decertify the class.  Mr. Thomack and Mr. Jenkins filed
a "summary response" on Oct. 31, 2018.  Respondent Phillip D.
Gaujot, Judge of the Circuit Court of Monongalia County, certified
a class action against the Petitioners.  The Hospitals believe that
Judge Gaujot erred, and they ask the Court to prohibit him from
conducting any further proceedings until he has vacated his order
denying their motion to decertify the class.

Judge Armstead concludes that the circuit court has exceeded its
legitimate powers by certifying the class while failing to conduct
a sufficiently thorough analysis of the case to determine whether
the commonality required for class certification under Rule 23 of
the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure is present.  Upon
remand, he urges the circuit court to determine whether the
requirements of Rule 23, particularly as they relate to
commonality, have been met and, if so, to craft a class definition
consistent with such findings.16

Accordingly, Judge Armstead (i) granted the Hospitals' writ of
prohibition as moulded, (ii) vacated the circuit court's order
denying the Hospitals' motion to decertify the class, and (iii)
remanded the case for further actions consistent with his Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 5, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/AGjOX4 from Leagle.com.

Marc E. Williams, Esq. -- marc.williams@nelsonmullins.com --
Alexander L. Turner, Esq., Christopher D. Smith, Esq. --
christopher.smith@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough LLP, Huntington, West Virginia.

Christine S. Vaglienti, Esq., West Virginia University Hospitals,
Inc., Morgantown, West Virginia, Counsel for the Petitioners.

David E. Goddard, Esq., Edmund L. Wagoner, Esq., Goddard & Wagoner,
Clarksburg, West Virginia.

Christopher J. Regan, Esq., Laura P. Pollard, Esq., Bordas & Bordas
PLLC, Wheeling, West Virginia.

David J. Romano, Esq., Jennifer L. Finch, Esq. --
jfinch@krigelandkrigel.com -- Romano Law Offices, Clarksburg, West
Virginia, Counsel for Christopher Thomack and Joseph Michael
Jenkins, on their own behalf and on behalf of all similarly
situated persons consisting of a class of aggrieved persons.


XCLUSIVE STAFFING: Court Denies $1.52MM Settlement Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
issued an Order denying Plaintiff (excepting Plaintiff Simon)'s
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Proposed Class and Collective
Action Settlement Agreement in the case captioned ISABEL VALVERDE;
MARIA SONIA MICOL SIMON; and those similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. XCLUSIVE STAFFING, INC., XCLUSIVE MANAGEMENT, LLC D.B.A.
XCLUSIVE STAFFING; XCLUSIVE STAFFING OF COLORADO, LLC; DIANE
ASTLEY; OMNI INTERLOCKEN COMPANY, L.L.C.; OMNI HOTELS MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION; JMIR DTC OPERATOR LLC; and MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL,
INC. Defendants. JOSE TREJO; MARISOL TREJO; OBDULIA JULIE CORTES;
VILMA DE JESUS ALVARENGA CARRANZA; and those similarly situated
Plaintiffs, v. XCLUSIVE STAFFING, INC.; XCLUSIVE MANAGEMENT, LLC
D.B.A. XCLUSIVE STAFFING; XCLUSIVE STAFFING OF COLORADO, LLC; DIANE
ASTLEY; and WESTIN DIA OPERATOR, LLC, Defendants. Civil Action No.
16-cv-00671-RM-NRN, Consolidated with Civil Case No.
17-cv-01602-RM-NRN for Settlement Approval, Civil Case No.
17-cv-01602-RM-NRN. (D. Colo.).

Defendants Xclusive Staffing, Inc. and Xclusive Staffing of
Colorado, LLC (Xclusive) are staffing agencies based in Colorado
which are owned and controlled by Defendant Diane Astley. Defendant
Xclusive Management, LLC is an affiliate of Xclusive. Xclusive
provides low-wage workers for their clients which are mostly hotels
like Defendants Omni, JMIR (Hyatt), Marriott, and Westin.
Plaintiffs allegedly work or worked at one or more of Xclusive's
client locations in Colorado providing various services such as
being a cook or server at banquets.

The Plaintiffs allege Xclusive maintains various policies and
practices which violate state and federal wage and hour laws. As
relevant here, they consist allegedly of: (1) the $3.00 deduction
as an administrative charge per paycheck policy (2) the automatic
30-minute break deduction policy, regardless of whether the
employee was given or took a break and (3) the failure to provide a
10-minute break policy, as required under Colorado law.
LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 23 Class Certification

A party seeking class certification must show first show the
existence of the four threshold requirements of Rule 23(a). These
requirements are: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.

FLSA Conditional Collective Action Certification

The FLSA permits collective actions where the allegedly aggrieved
employees are similarly situated. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Under
Thiessen v. Gen. Electric Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1105 (10th
Cir. 2001), a district court may apply a two-stage ad hoc process
to determine whether putative collective action members were
similarly situated for purposes of Section 216(b). At the initial
notice stage, this Court requires nothing more than substantial
allegations that the putative class members were together the
victims of a single decision, policy, or plan. If a movant meets
this burden, the district court has discretion to facilitate notice
to potential plaintiffs, such as ordering the employer to provide
the names and addresses of current and former employees who may be
eligible to participate in the collective action and authorizing
court approved notice and consent documents be sent to such
employees.  

THE PROPOSED CLASSES

The Movants and the Defendants have agreed to the following
collective or class action "classes" and subclass definitions:

   (1) The Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 Class (the Rule 23 Class): ALL
CURRENT AND FORMER HOURLY EMPLOYEES OF XCLUSIVE STAFFING, INC.,
XCLUSIVE STAFFING OF COLORADO, LLC, OR ANY OF THEIR AFFILIATES, WHO
WORKED AT ONE OF THEIR CLIENTS' COLORADO LOCATIONS (EXCEPT SKY
RIDGE MEDICAL CENTER HCA-HEALTHONE LLC) AND WERE EMPLOYED ON OR
AFTER MARCH 22, 2013 AND UP TO AND INCLUDING FEBRUARY 3, 2019

   (2) The Rule 23 $3 Deduction Subclass (the $3 Subclass): ALL
CURRENT AND FORMER HOURLY EMPLOYEES OF XCLUSIVE STAFFING, INC.,
XCLUSIVE STAFFING OF COLORADO, LLC, OR ANY OF THEIR AFFILIATES, WHO
WORKED AT ONE OF THEIR CLIENTS' COLORADO LOCATIONS (EXCEPT SKY
RIDGE MEDICAL CENTER HCA-HEALTHONE LLC) AND WERE EMPLOYED ON OR
AFTER MARCH 22, 2013 AND UP TO AND INCLUDING JULY 1, 2016.

   (3) The FLSA Class: ALL CURRENT AND FORMER HOURLY EMPLOYEES OF
XCLUSIVE STAFFING, INC., XCLUSIVE STAFFING OF COLORADO, LLC, OR ANY
OF THEIR AFFILIATES, WHO WORKED AT ONE OF THEIR CLIENTS' COLORADO
LOCATIONS (EXCEPT SKY RIDGE MEDICAL CENTER HCA-HEALTHONE LLC) AND
WERE EMPLOYED ON OR AFTER MARCH 22, 2013 AND UP TO AND INCLUDING
FEBRUARY 3, 2019.

Rule 23 Certification

Rule 23(a) Threshold Requirements

Numerosity. Movants advise that, based on the payroll and billing
data, there are 9,981 workers currently or formerly employed by
Xclusive who are members of the proposed classes. This is
sufficient to satisfy Rule 23(a)(1)'s numerosity requirement.

Commonality. A finding of commonality requires only a single
question of law or fact common to the entire class. Here, Movants
and Defendants do not dispute the proposed classes satisfy the
commonality requirement. The common questions include those related
to the alleged pay policies, such as whether Xclusive deducted
$3.00 from every paycheck and whether 30-minute breaks were
deducted from workers' paychecks even though they did not take or
receive them.

Accordingly, Rule 23(a)(2)'s requirement is also met.

Typicality. To show typicality, the movant must demonstrate the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class. Differing fact situations of class
members do not defeat typicality so long as the claims of the class
representative and class members are based on the same legal or
remedial theory.  

Here, the Movants claim all class members worked under the same
alleged policies, such as $3.00 per paycheck deduction policy;
thus, the claims of Plaintiffs and proposed class members are based
on the same legal theories. Such common contentions are capable of
classwide resolution. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claims satisfy the
typicality requirement under Rule 23(a)(3).

Adequacy of Representation. Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class." This requires the resolution of two
questions:  (1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any
conflicts of interest with other class members and (2) will the
named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously
on behalf of the class? Movants assert there are no conflicts with
other class members and counsel is experienced in wage and hour
class claims and will competently pursue this litigation.

As the case currently stands, there is at least ostensibly a
conflict between Plaintiff Simon, a named plaintiff, and Movants as
well as their attorneys who were also formerly counsel for
Plaintiff Simon. The Court finds, however, that any unidentified
and undeveloped objection by Plaintiff Simon to the proposed
settlement is insufficient to find Movants and their counsel have
conflicts with the proposed class or that they will not adequately
represent them. On the contrary, the Court's review of the record
shows otherwise. Accordingly, the Court finds Movants have shown
this requirement is also met.

Rule 23(b)(3) Requirements

Under Rule 23(b)(3), a class action may be maintained if the court
finds questions of law or fact common to class members predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members and a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

Four matters relevant to the court's findings are: A) the class
members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against
class members (C) the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.

As previously stated, Rule 23(b)(3)(D) is not relevant where the
matter is before the court for settlement purposes only.

Preliminary Approval of the Proposed Settlement

The Movants seek preliminary approval of the Settlement. The
Movants rely on the probable cause standard but recent changes to
Rule 23 governing settlements provide that the court should give
notice if the parties' showing allows the court to determine it
would likely be able to 1) approve the proposed settlement under
Rule 23(e)(2), and 2) certify the class for the purpose of entry of
a judgment on the proposal.  

Under Rule 23(e)(2), the court may approve a proposal which binds
class members only if it finds the proposal fair, reasonable, and
adequate after considering four factors. Those four factors are
whether (A) the class representatives and class counsel have
adequately represented the class (B) the proposal was negotiated at
arm's length (C) the relief provided for the class is adequate,
taking into account: (i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and
appeal (ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of
distributing relief to the class, including the method of
processing class-member claims (iii) the terms of any proposed
award of attorney's fees, including timing of payment; and (iv) any
agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); and (D)
the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other.


Here, however, Movants fail to address whether the Court is likely
be able to"5 approve the proposal under all6 of the factors to be
considered. Any renewed request must address the relevant factors
for the Court's review. Such review at this stage, of course, is
not as stringent as [that] applied for final approval.

Although the requisite factors were not addressed, the Court has
reviewed the Settlement and finds some concerns. First, the
Settlement provides for payment of $1,520,000 into a settlement
fund from which all other payments will be made, including
attorney's fees and costs, the administrative costs of handling the
notices, and service awards. But, the anticipated amounts of such
expenses are not disclosed. The fact that attorney's fees are
referenced in the proposed notice to be sent as 1/4 of the class
fund or that counsel proposes to publicly file any motion for fees
prior to any final approval hearing is insufficient.  

Similarly, although the Settlement discloses the payment of
Participation Bonuses (service awards) for all Plaintiffs it is
only the Motion which discloses the proposed amounts of $10,000 to
$30,000.7 And, even then, it does not disclose how much for each
Plaintiff. The same holds true for the estimated administration
expenses: the fact of such expenses is disclosed but not their
estimated amount. Absent such information, a worker would not be
able to make an informed decision of whether to opt-in, opt-out, or
object.

Concomitantly, the Court is unable to determine the proposed
Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.

Second, there is the issue of Unclaimed Funds. According to the
Motion, if the amount of unclaimed funds exceed $175,000 (approx.
11.5% of $1,520,000), the parties will return to the Court with
proposals for distributing additional amounts to class members (as
opposed to distributed cy pres).

Ultimately, any residual which cannot be distributed may be divided
equally among (1) Centro Humanitario Para Los Trabajadores and (2)
the Boulder Jewish Community Center. The Settlement, however,
contains no provision for coming back to Court and does not
disclose such proposal.  

FLSA Preliminary Collective Action Certification

The proposed Settlement, and related notice and claim documents,
all presupposes the resolution of the FLSA claim as a collective
action and the Court's preliminary approval of such documents. How
is that to be if there is no operative order by which that may be
had? Thus, some order is required. But, the FLSA Order
conditionally certified different classes (as requested by
Plaintiffs then9) than that sought in this Motion. Thus, upon
review, the Court finds a new order preliminarily certifying an
FLSA collective action for purposes of settlement and for Colorado
workers only should be had and the FLSA Order should be stayed. For
the essentially the same reasons stated in the FLSA Order, the
Court finds that preliminary certification of an FLSA collective
action for the proposed FLSA class may be appropriate.

However, in the event the Court does not approve any proposed
settlement, and the two actions resume, the stay of the FLSA Order
will be lifted and the parties may proceed with these two actions.
Thus, the Court may issue such order as appropriate in the event it
finds the requirements for preliminary approval are otherwise met
upon any renewed papers which the parties may file.

The Settlement

The Court addressed the issue of the Settlement above in the
context of Rule 23 which Plaintiffs raised. However, the Court has
concerns about the Settlement under the FLSA as well. Under the
terms of the Settlement, it appears that unless a Settlement Class
Member opts-out, the member is in. But, under the FLSA, a person
becomes a party and may be bound by matters in the action only if
that person takes affirmative action to opt-in. Further, as
discussed below in addressing the proposed notice to be sent,
contrary to the FLSA, if a member does nothing, he gets nothing but
waives everything. Such matters need to be addressed in any renewed
papers.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of
Proposed Class and Collective Action Settlement Agreement is denied
without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 15, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2atlavz from Leagle.com.

Isabel Valverde, and those similarly situated, Plaintiff,
represented by David Hollis Seligman, Towards Justice & Alexander
Neville Hood, Towards Justice,1410 N High St Ste 300, Denver, CO
80218-2609.

Maria Sonia Micol Simon, and those similarly situated, Plaintiff,
pro se.

Jose Trejo, Marisol Trejo, Obdulia Julie Cortes & Vilma De Jesus
Alvarenga Carranza, Consol Plaintiffs, represented by David Hollis
Seligman, Towards Justice & Alexander Neville Hood, Towards
Justice.

Xclusive Staffing, Inc., Xclusive Management, LLC, doing business
as Xclusive Staffing, Xclusive Staffing of Colorado, LLC, Diane
Astley, Omni Interlocken Company, L.L.C., Omni Hotels Management
Corporation, Marriott International, Inc. & JMIR DTC Operator LLC,
Defendants, represented by James Stephen Korte --
jkorte@shermanhoward.com -- Sherman & Howard, L.L.C., Jonathon
Michael Watson -- jwatson@shermanhoward.com -- Sherman & Howard,
L.L.C. & Matthew M. Morrison -- mmorrison@shermanhoward.com --
Sherman & Howard, L.L.C.

Westin DIA Operator, LLC, Consol Defendant, represented by Jonathon
Michael Watson, Sherman & Howard, L.L.C. & Matthew M. Morrison,
Sherman & Howard, L.L.C.

Alexander Neville Hood, Movant, pro se.


[*] Opioid Negotiation Class Action Under Court Consideration
-------------------------------------------------------------
Perry Zinn Rowthorn and George Jepsen, in an Opinion article posted
at Cleveland.com, stated that a novel "negotiation class action" is
being hyped as the key to unlocking legal settlements between
cities and counties and opioid companies accused of marketing
misconduct. In reality, it is a trap for unwary local governments,
tying their hands and ceding their authority to private class
action trial lawyers. The proposal, which is currently under
consideration in federal court in Cleveland, should be rejected
outright or fundamentally revised.

Under the proposal, a group of trial lawyers would be appointed to
negotiate for all cities and counties, even though the overwhelming
majority of local governments have not sued and have no
relationship with the lawyers. Each locality would be given only
one chance to opt out of the proposed class, and it would have to
exercise its choice before any settlement is reached. If it opts
out, it forever forfeits the opportunity to benefit from a future
deal, no matter how good it is. If it does nothing -- passively
opts in -- it is locked in no matter how bad the terms of
settlement prove to be.

Typically, class members in damages cases are told the precise
amount of payment they would receive in settlement before deciding
whether to opt out of a deal.

Under this plan, localities would have almost no information on
which to base opt-out decisions. They would be directed to a
website showing only the pro-rata percentage share -- not the
amount -- that each county would receive under any future deal, and
nothing at all about what localities within counties would be paid.
They wouldn't know the total value of any deal, how many claimants
would share in it, or even the approximate amount of their own
payments.

Any future settlement would require approval of 75 percent of the
class. That may seem like a high threshold, but there's a doozy of
a devil in the voting details. Only a supermajority of actual votes
cast is necessary for a deal to become operative.

Class action notices of all kinds are typically ignored, with
response rates often in the single-digit percentages. Here, a deal
could become effective on the affirmative votes of a small minority
of local governments. A majority of American communities could get
locked into a deal of enormous consequence without a single
affirmative act or expression of consent, losing all their
litigation rights in the process.

Tellingly, proponents have pitched this plan, in part, as
disempowering objectors.

Ironically, many communities hit hard by the opioids crisis will
likely be most prejudiced under this approach — small, mainly
rural, resource-strapped communities, lacking meaningful access to
legal counsel to help navigate an unorthodox and confusing
process.

Proponents say this plan is necessary to permit formation of a
unified group of localities with whom the defendant companies can
negotiate, but no special process is necessary to form such a
group. The real effect of the plan would be to pre-bind class
members to a settlement in a way that no court has ever tolerated.
And, the proposal would ensure that the architects of the plan
would reap rich benefits of any deal -- at least 10 percent of
settlement proceeds, potentially hundreds of millions of dollars or
more, while locked-in cities and towns may realize pennies on the
dollars they hoped to recover in litigation.

There are two ways to reform the proposal to protect local
governments, neither likely to be popular with class action
lawyers.

First, class members should be given a second opt-out option once
the terms of any deal are known. Courts have the discretion to
order second opt-outs, and the American Law Institute has
recommended this approach be broadly used in class action
litigation.

Second, a settlement should require express consent of at least a
simple majority of all eligible local governments, not just those
who vote. After all, government bodies make public policy for their
constituencies -- which an opioid settlement would clearly do -- by
affirmative voting.

It is clear from the reactions of many opioid companies that they
view the negotiation class concept as too legally flawed to entrust
resolutions to it. Fortunately, there exists a more viable and
fairer settlement approach. State attorneys general are themselves
litigating and negotiating with opioid manufacturers and
distributors. Attorneys general have clear authority to negotiate
comprehensive settlements that allow cities and counties the option
to take part. Under such an approach, local governments could make
fully informed decisions to either participate or continue to take
their chances in court. [GN]


[*] Rule Amendment Paves Way for Corporate Class Action in India
----------------------------------------------------------------
Sajid Mohamed, Managing Partner of Agrud Partners, in an article
for LiveMint, reports that May 8 Notification by the Corporate
Affairs Ministry amending the requisite rules for identifying the
class threshold for a corporate class action is a welcome and
awaited announcement and should pave the way for the prosecution of
delinquent management and the co-conspiring or fraudulent
consultants. The changes touch both listed and non-listed
companies. Banks remain excluded. For listed companies, lesser of
2% of the issued share capital; 100 shareholders; or 5% of the
total number of shareholders, would form a threshold for the
'class'. The law was already in place in the form of S. 245 of the
Companies Act, only this threshold was awaited. The powers of the
forum of adjudication, the NCLT, in deciding such claims are wide
and the causes for which reliefs can be sought are exhaustive.

There are several Aunt Sallies who will be soon, hopefully, and
deservedly, receiving the class action dispatch post this
government enabler. A self-step forward and advice for all engaging
so collectively is to appoint for themselves a leader and not only
a mere representative. This is to avoid the tragedy of the commons.
As there is no direction towards this in the notification or in the
Companies Act, it may be judicious to bring this about by a viable
self-governing mechanism before approaching the NCLT.
Additionally,such actions invariably face what in economics is
known as the free-rider problem, it cannot usually be overcome and
to the extent possible must be discounted.

This notification would likely usher in three new possibilities,
one, a positive change in the corporate governance – class
actions have the ability to bring about a positive change in the
corporate attitudes; two, the real prospect of the suitors getting
some real compensation and not just a satisfactory regulatory
retribution against the wrongdoers; three, it may be a tenable
boost for the third party funders of litigation, who may get a
viable and clean headway. Indian legal fraternity, for the reasons
of champerty, can only fancy the large morsels that they often
witness their international counterparts shovel down and should
expect a good nip and not more. A successful class action would
likely be followed with criminal prosecutions based on the findings
in a positive order, which may also be the real clincher against
the delinquents unlike in other jurisdictions where it climaxes
with an award of damages.

Along however may come a spider frightening little miss Muffet.
There have been accompanying reports that the class action
proceedings may get active encouragement and financial assistance
from the government. These reports quote the government on such
plans who have interspersed their reason for such assistance on the
lack of means with the class action suitors and on the lack of
strong prosecutorial infrastructure to meet the demand of timely,
strong and effective prosecution. This may be a step in the wrong
direction. For the reason most apparently of conflict of interests,
this vigour for providing assistance by the government, should it
be formally notified, may not meet the imprimatur of the courts.

It is only therefore appropriate that the shareholders find their
ways and means to take up the prosecution by themselves and not be
assisted by a giant conflicted and interested party like the
government in such proceedings, especially, when S.
125(3)(d)provides for reimbursement of legal expenses incurred by
the suitors from the coffers of the Investor Education and
Protection Fund as may be sanctioned by the NCLT. The government
is, more often than not, likely to be running investigations and
prosecutions against such delinquents, parallelly, and as indicated
above, in the event of a positive outcome, also be the
post-decision de-jure complainant or the primary prosecutor. In its
core, a class action prosecution under the instant provision, is
nothing but a private dispute prosecution and in these inter-se
disputes, no active role may be sought from such third parties --
read government -- other than their investigation reports on the
delinquent's conduct, investigated separately, being placed on
record as an aid for Adjudication.

Another issue, which is unattended is on the extent of monetary
liability that may be fall on the delinquents and thereby the
consequent rewards for the suitors by way of damages. There is no
criterion or parameter fixed for determining the quantum of
damages. Hopefully, S. 125(3)(d) would not act as the limit. NCLT
members are not full-fledged judges - even judges in our context
award damages in quantum which are only notional, damaging the very
concept. This may hamper the immediate fruiting of the
possibilities kindled by the notification and it may, therefore, be
some time before this becomes a weapon of credible enforcement of
rights in terms of compensation and not merely a corporate
arm-twister in the hands of pressure groups. However, the stage is
now set for corporate class actions in India. [GN]


[*] Scotland Mulls Adoption of US-Style Opt-Out Class Actions
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Scotsman reports that Scotland's is considering the adoption of
US-style 'opt-out' class actions, thereby increasing the threat
claims pose to businesses, writes Graeme MacLeod.

The recent announcement by the Information Commissioner's Office
(ICO) of its intention to impose record fines of GBP183m on British
Airways and £99m on Marriott International highlights one of the
potential consequences for business of a data breach.

There are other consequences. The ICO's announcement has been
followed by news that law firms are gearing up to pursue class
actions for damages caused by those breaches. This is a growing
trend in the UK.

Class action law suits, a long-established feature of US
litigation, have been gaining traction in recent years,
particularly following the introduction of Group Litigation Orders
in England and Wales. In Scotland, a more radical US-style
"opt-out" option for class actions is being considered. It would
enable far larger numbers of claims to be included in class
actions, meaning the financial fall-out for business from data
breaches could be even greater.

There is a growing appetite for data breach class actions, which
allow individual claimants to claim damages more easily through
collective processes. Last year the UK saw its first successful
class action arising from a mass data breach, in a claim against
Morrisons Supermarkets. Meanwhile in April, a class action was
launched against Ticketmaster following a 2018 data breach.

The case against Morrisons came after a member of its IT staff
stole personal data, including salary and bank details, of nearly
100,000 colleagues. The employee, who was imprisoned for eight
years, subsequently uploaded these details on to a file sharing
site. The High Court and Court of Appeal both held that Morrisons
was vicariously liable for the employee's actions and ordered the
supermarket to pay compensation to the 5,000 claimants. The case is
subject to an appeal to the Supreme Court.

The Ticketmaster claim was launched after personal and financial
data of around 40,000 UK customers was stolen through malicious
malware on third party software. There are 650 claimants.

The Morrisons and Ticketmaster cases both involved the use of
"opt-in" procedures available in the English courts, requiring
individual claimants to proactively opt in to a claim if they wish
to be part of it. This accounts for the relatively low number of
claimants compared with the numbers of individuals actually
affected by the breach in each case. Opt-in procedures clearly have
limitations in terms of their ability to allow all affected
consumers to get the benefit of any damages award that is made or
settlement which is reached. Only those who actively participate
get the benefit.

By contrast, the Scottish legislation -- the Civil Litigation
(Expenses and Group Proceedings)(Scotland) Act 2018 -- makes
provision for both opt-in and opt-out processes to be adopted by
Scottish courts. The detailed rules are still to be produced but
should a decision be made to proceed with opt-out actions, this
will potentially increase the scope of class actions
significantly.

An opt-out class action would automatically include all
Scottish-based claimants in the designated class who had not
actively opted out of proceedings and would also allow claimants
from other jurisdictions to opt in. The scope of a data breach
opt-out class action would therefore be exponentially wider than
the data breach claims so far brought in the English courts,
considerably amplifying the potential threat.

In an era where businesses are operating under a strict GDPR regime
with sizeable regulatory fines, and where cyber security breaches
are a virtual inevitability, class actions arising from data
breaches are a growing risk and likely to get bigger in size and
stature. The potential for Scotland to introduce an opt-out system
for class actions will only heighten this threat.

Businesses must be aware of the full potential consequences of a
data breach, take steps to minimise the chances of one occurring,
and make plans to minimise the potential impact if one happens.
They should seek to mitigate risks, including having adequate
insurance cover in place for the potentially large exposures
arising from class action claims.

Class action lawsuits have long been available to American
claimants and are becoming more common in the UK. Should Scotland
decide to implement the more radical opt-out process for mass
claims, it will be more crucial than ever for businesses to invest
so that they are suitably insulated from the pending storm. [GN]


[*] Sugar Companies Face Class Action Over Sugarcane Burning
------------------------------------------------------------
Nano Riley, writing for 10 Years Civil Eats, reports that they call
it "black snow" when the ash from the burning sugar cane rains down
on the small communities dotting the south shore of Florida's Lake
Okeechobee. From October to April, ash and soot fall from the sky
and settle on everything, blackening yards and blowing in open
windows. Asthma, chronic bronchitis, and sinus problems plague area
residents during the burning season, and local doctors usually ask
patients how close they live to the cane fields.

Fred Brockman remembers the day in 2008, when 14 students at
Rosenwald Elementary School in South Bay were treated for
respiratory problems after exposure to smoke; five with asthma were
hospitalized. Brockman spent six years working at Rosenwald,
surrounded on three sides by cane fields pressing right up to the
fence and said the school was "smoked," often.

"We had smoke every time the wind blew our way during a burn,"
Brockman said. "It would get dark and smoky . . . . lots of the
kids had breathing problems."

Compounding the residents' health woes is a widespread belief that
Florida's sugar companies only burn around lower-income communities
of color. At the same time, advocates believe that the companies
practice "green harvest" -- a method that both protects air quality
and residents' health -- around wealthier, whiter communities and
near commercial districts. This process creates additional economic
benefits by repurposing field waste that would otherwise get
burned.

In early June, a high-profile group of plaintiffs and lawyers filed
a federal class action lawsuit on behalf of more than 40,000
residents living by the sugar cane fields near Lake Okeechobee. The
suit names a dozen sugar growers as defendants and blames them for
health risks and lowered property values as a result of burning
sugar cane fields. Residents say the decades-old practice of
pre-harvest burning by sugar companies has caused unprecedented
levels of respiratory illnesses and other problems from toxic smoke
exposure.

Sugar industry representatives did not respond to requests for
comment, but according to Tim O'Connor, a state health department
spokesman, air pollutants do spike during the actual burning, but
it dissipates and the sugar cane burning doesn't violate federal
air quality standards,.

A Tale of Two Cities

The small, lakeside towns of Belle Glade, Pahokee, and South Bay,
referred to as the Tri-Cities, are designated by the State of
Florida as a Rural Area of Critical Economic Concern. Belle Glade's
motto is "Her Soil is Her Fortune." But the fortune doesn't trickle
down: The working-class residents, many of whom are agricultural
workers, have an average income of about $37,000. Many are Haitians
and Jamaicans who came to the U.S. to cut the cane before the big
sugar companies moved to mechanical harvesters.

There's a saying in Belle Glade that the lakeside town has two
exports: sugar cane and wide receivers. Football is leading many of
these low-income families out of their limited lives, because if a
local player gets into the NFL, they bring a lot of people with
them.

"Muck City," as sportscasters call Belle Glade and Pahokee, has
contributed nearly 60 players to the NFL over the years. In fact,
there's a tale that local football players hone their skills by
chasing rabbits escaping from the burning fields.

One of the lawsuit's plaintiffs is Fred Taylor, who was a star at
Glades Central High School before an 11-year NFL career. Taylor
said he and many of the people he grew up with experienced
respiratory challenges and related health problems.

"If nothing more, [the sugar companies] need to promote awareness
and get down to the bottom of these health issues because the
community is dying," Taylor said at the press conference announcing
the suit. He wants the sugar companies to take responsibility for
the problems he believes are caused by burning. "The black snow
that comes from the sky, people are breathing that stuff in.
They're getting sicker and sicker every day," he said.

Taylor and others in Belle Glade anti-burn advocacy groups want the
sugar industry to stop burning the fields and switch to green
harvest to spare local residents. They point to the burn
restrictions in place if prevailing winds would blow smoke toward
Wellington, an upscale development 30 miles east of Belle Glade on
the way to Palm Beach. Filled with multi-million dollar estates for
the affluent and famous, Bill Gates has a home in Wellington, as do
Bruce Springsteen and other luminaries.

Communities like Wellington are seldom subjected to smoke from
sugarcane burning. The Florida Forestry Service began issuing
permits for cane growers to burn in the 1990s, when they received
complaints about smoke and haze drifting east toward Wellington and
Palm Beach. Now they cannot burn if winds blow in that direction.
Tri-Cities residents want those same protections.

'Green Harvest,' an Alternative to Burning

The lawsuit aims to require Florida sugar companies to harvest
sugarcane without burning it—a technique called "green harvest,"
which is practiced in sugar-growing regions around the world.
Thailand wants to phase out cane burning over the next three years,
and Brazil, the world's largest producer of sugar, mandated an end
to burning in 2017.

"[Sugar companies] burn the cane to remove the outer leaves before
harvest," said Patrick Ferguson, an organizer at environmental
group Sierra Club. "But companies around the world use green
harvest technology, and in many countries burning is banned." While
Sierra Club is not part of the class-action lawsuit, the group has
been conducting a "Stop the Burn" campaign in Florida since 2015.

After the sugarcane leaves or "trash" is burned off, the cane is
milled to extract the sweet syrup. The remaining fiber is called
bagasse. With a green harvest, machines with cutting blades remove
the outer foliage, which can then be collected to make biochar,
mulch, and ethanol.

Green harvest is often employed to reduce smog in cities, but
advocates say it brings a number of economic and health benefits as
well. Brazil has built a thriving industry using sugarcane trash to
produce electricity, fuel pellets, ethanol and jet fuels,
commercial mulch, and tree-free paper products, along with
bagasse.

Ferguson recently returned from a trip to Brazil to study industry
practices there, and calls the country the "most advanced
cane-growing nation."

"In Brazil, they utilize the whole plant with green harvest," he
explained, adding that the the sugar trash gets used as mulch, can
is also mixed with bagasse to generate electricity and ethanol at
sugar mills.

In Australia, the Rocky Point Company started green harvesting
sugarcane in 1993, baling the leaf for cattle feed and garden mulch
instead of burning it. Rocky Point's Sugar Cane Mulch sells
millions of bags every year by refining raw products from nearby
farms.

Closer to home, U.S., paper products company Emerald Brand
processes agricultural trash into tree-free paper, cardboard, and
bio-plastics. They note that "burning and wasting this valuable
material takes time and energy away from farmers when processed
trash can be made into paper, cardboard, and bio-plastics."

Advocates say that green harvest is not only cleaner and healthier,
it also creates jobs, and in the Glades communities that would be
an asset. And yet Glades sugar farmers claim advocates are trying
to eliminate jobs by going to green harvest.

"This attack is simply another of their efforts to put the sugar
industry out of business," said Judy Sanchez, a spokesperson for
U.S. Sugar Corp, adding stopping the burning "would significantly
impact our business and take jobs away."

But the Florida sugar industry is already working to benefit from
bagasse. In March 2018, Tellus -- a company jointly owned by the
Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of Florida and Florida Crystals
Corporation -- opened a $75 million, state-of-the art manufacturing
facility in Belle Glade offering biodegradable products such as
plates and take-out containers made from bagasse. The facility is
located by the sugar mill, powered by solar and renewable biomass
from the mill, and according to Tellus officials, employed 50
people at launch, with a goal of hiring a total of 100 employees,
90 percent of whom will be local.

The Tellus facility is a rare exception for businesses seeking to
locate in Belle Glade, residents say, because who wants to have to
wash soot off cars every day? Some residents say this has caused a
job shortage. One compared the practice of burning to hazardous
dirty coal jobs, and said the cane industry needs something similar
to programs that have trained coal workers for clean-energy jobs
that pay better and support families.

What's Next?

With the hot summer slowing everything down, everyone in this
community is waiting to see what happens next with the lawsuit. In
the meantime, burning season won't start again until October.

Kina Phillips is a lifelong resident of Belle Glades, and seven
generations of her family have grown up here. Most of her family
members have suffered from respiratory ailments, and attended
Rosenwald Elementary in nearby South Bay.

"My grandson is five and he has to use a breathing machine
sometimes, especially during burning season," said Phillips, 44,
who runs the front office for a heart specialist in Belle Glade and
says she sees people suffering from the effects of the cane smoke
all the time. Phillips says she wants to fight the cane burning so
her kids won't have to, so she decided to speak out to join the
Stop the Burn campaign. She has not yet joined the suit, but she's
"looking into it."

"This is my battle, and they can't stop me," she said. "They could
go to green harvest and stop burning," she said. "Our lives are
worth that." [GN]



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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