CAR_Public/190806.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Tuesday, August 6, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 156

                            Headlines

54 BELOW LLC: Conner Sues Over Blind-inaccessible Website
AEQUITAS MANAGEMENT: Deloitte, Sidley Settle for $220MM
AFL-CIO DISTRICT 37: Solomon Sues over Collection of Agency Fees
ALPHA CARE LTD: Campbell Seeks Pay for Missed Breaks
ANGEL EYES: Maslin Appeals N.D.N.Y. Order & Judgment to 2nd Cir.

BANK OF AMERICA: Lopez Appeals N.D. Cal. Ruling to Ninth Circuit
BARONHR WEST: Accused by Valencia Suit of Not Paying Overtime Wages
BOEING COMPANY: Pilot F Alleges Aircraft Design Flaw Cover-Up
BREEZY POINT: Cordova Suit to Recoup Unpaid Overtime Wages, Damages
BRENTWOOD VILLAGE: Court OKs Sanctions in A. Borum Suit

CAL ENTERPRISE: Medina Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
CHESAPEAKE OPERATING: 10th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Meier Suit
CLASSIC DINING: Amos Files FLSA Suit in S.D. Indiana
COOK COUNTY, IL: Class Certification Bid in Alicea et al. Pending
CORDISH COS: Maryland Court Dismisses Marketti Unpaid Wages Suit

CSAA INSURANCE: Young Seeks Minimum Wage & Overtime Compensation
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL: Arunga Alleges Denial of Due Process Rights
DENTAL SUPPLIES: Roe Appeals Judgment and Order in Antitrust Suit
EAGLE BANCORP: Stein Says Financial Statement Misleading
EMAN INVESTMENTS: Hires Hoff Law Offices as Counsel

EXPEDIA GROUP: Officers Face Investor Suit in Chancery Court
FCA US: Court Partially OKs Motion in Limine in J. Flores Suit
FIRST AMERICAN: Sindaghatta Files Suit in C.D. California
FITBIT, INC: Removes Willis Suit to S.D. California
FMR LLC: Sills et al. Allege 401(K) Plan Kickback Payments

FORD: Fencl Sues over Overstated Fuel Economy Ratings
GLOBAL CREDIT: Court OKs Bid to Stay Wojcieski Suit
GOOGLE LLC: Google Assistant Unlawfully Records Info, Suit Claims
GOOGLE LLC: Not Compelled to Show Privileged Materials in AdTrader
GOYA FOODS: Mejias Hits Truck Drivers' Misclassification

GREENWAY CHRYSLER-JEEP-DODGE: Claims in Picton TCPA Suit Narrowed
HAPPY ANGEL: Seeks 2nd Circuit Review of Judgment in Moreno Suit
HEMPSTEAD, NY: Bid to Disqualify A. Bisceglie as Counsel Denied
HERTZ CORPORATION: Court Strikes Class Allegation in Tillman
INFORMATION RESOURCES: Aug. 22 Bakhtiar Settlement Approval Hearing

INTEREXCHANGE INC: Court OKs $65.5MM Settlement in Beltran Suit
JOEL W. BLACK: Cabral Seeks Overtime Pay for Off-the-Clock Work
KABBALAH CENTRE: Underpays Spiritual Workers, Greene Alleges
KNIGHT ADJUSTMENT: Bullock Sues Over Additional Service Charge
L BRANDS: Misleading Reports Inflate Stock Price, Walker Says

LEAP EDUCATION: Halawani Sues Over Illegal SMS Ads
LEXINGTON LAW: Starace Appeals E.D. Cal. Ruling to Ninth Circuit
LME INC: Sacked Workers Without 60-Day Closure Notice, Says Suit
LOUIS VUITTON: Website Not Accessible, Farr Suit Alleges
MCKESSON CORP: Removes Sarkis Opioid-Related Suit to C.D. Cal.

MOHAN PALACE: Valencia Seeks Minimum & Overtime Wages
MOJITO CLUB: Valdes Seeks Overtime Wages
MONGER ENTERTAINMENT: Bowden Suit Transferred to N.D. Georgia
MONSANTO COMPANY: Davis Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Dietz Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup

MONSANTO COMPANY: Ellis Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Neff Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Sterner Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Weatherses Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Westrichs Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup

MONSANTO COMPANY: Youngs Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
NATIONAL CREDIT: Time to File Dispositional Papers in Cortes Cont'd
NATIONAL GENERAL: North Miami Police Officers Plan Hits Share Drop
NETWORK RECOVERY: Tannenbaum Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. New York
NEW YORK: A. White Suite Consolidated to Butler Suit

NEW YORK: Sonaike Seeks Minimum & Overtime Wages
NILI LOTAN INC: Olsen Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
NUTRITIOUS LIFESTYLES: Urbas Seeks Overtime Compensation
OAKTREE CAPITAL: Ganeles Balks at Brookfield Merger
OX CAR: Pastore Sues over Unsolicited Telephone Calls

PAO PAO INC: Estrada Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
PENN CREDIT: Adler Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. New York
PERFECT 10: Vargas Files FLSA Suit in W.D. Texas
PIVOTAL SOFTWARE: Bernstein Liebhard Files Securities Fraud Suit
POST FOODS LLC: Worker Seeks Pay for Off-the-Clock Work

PREMIER BANKCARD: Class Discovery in Rodriguez Can Partly Proceed
PRIME MOTOR GROUP: March et al Seek OT Pay, Sunday Premium
PRIMEFLIGHT: Velez et al Seek Wages for Aircraft Cleaning Crew
PROGRESSIVE DIRECT: Bid to Certify Class in Kleinsasser Suit Denied
QUEENS LAND: Huang Seeks Work Accommodations

QUEST DIAGNOSTICS: Jacobson Files Suit Over Data Breach
RADER MANAGEMENT: Spicer Seeks Overtime Wages
RADIUS GLOBAL: Weiss Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. New York
REALOGY HOLDINGS: Bragar Eagel Files Securities Class Action Suit
REALOGY HOLDINGS: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action

REALOGY HOLDINGS: Zhang Investor Files Securities Class Action Suit
RED ROBIN: Geraci TCPA Suit Moved to District of Colorado
RUTHERFORD, TN: Certification Bid in Juvie Suit Held in Abeyance
RYANAIR DAC: Test-Achats Starts EUR16M Class Action Suit
SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC: Tousignant Settlement Has Preliminary Approval

SHERLOQ REVENUE: Weiss Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. New York
SHON AND KARAH BROWN: Hernandez Suit Seeks to Recover Overtime Pay
SMITH MEDICAL: Arkin Sues Over Unsolicited Faxed Ads
SOCIAL SECURITY: Courts Transfer Michener Suit to N.D. Cal.
STEPHEN EINSTEIN: Weber Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York

STEVE NASH: Hit With Class Suit From Employees
STRALEY & OTTO: Hickey Seeks Refund of Unauthorized Payments
SULLIVAN UNIVERSITY: Court Vacates Class Cert. in McCann FLSA Suit
SWIFT TRANSPORTATION: Court Consolidates McNutt & Woeck Labor Suits
SYSCO CORPORATION: $500K Settlement in Martin Suit Has Prelim OK

T-MOBILE: Says Customers Can't Joint Class Action Suit
TARGET CORPORATION: Hearing on Bid to Junk Greenberg Set for Aug.22
TATTLETALES TOO: Brunson Hits Misclassification, Unpaid Wages
TINDER INC: Court OKs Elansari's Bid to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
TINDER INC: Judgment in Kim Suit Over Age Discrimination Entered

TOYOTA MOTOR: Faces Aquino Suit Over Faulty Airbag Control Units
TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS: Polatsek Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. New York
TRUE HEARTS OF CARE: Askew Seeks to Recoup Unpaid Overtime Wages
TRUEACCORD: Ct. Denies Bid to Compel Discovery Responses in Zuniga
UNITED ASSOCIATION: Court Narrows Claims in Adams Suit

VSL PHARMA: Starr et al. Allege Inferior VSL No. 3 Version
WAL-MART STORES: Evans Seek to Certify 4 FLSA Classes
WALMART INC: Settlement in Famuliner Suit Has Prelim Approval
ZF TRW AUTOMOTIVE: Berry Sues Over Defective Airbag Control Units

                            *********

54 BELOW LLC: Conner Sues Over Blind-inaccessible Website
---------------------------------------------------------
MARY CONNER AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED
v. 54 BELOW LLC D/B/A FEINSTEIN'S/54 BELOW, Case No. 1:19-cv-04162
(S.D.N.Y., July 18, 2019), arises from the Defendant's alleged
failure to design, construct, maintain, and operate its Web
site--http://www.54below.com/--tobe fully accessible to and
independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired people.

54 Below LLC, doing business as Feinstein's/54 Below, is a domestic
limited liability company registered to do business in the State of
New York with its principal executive office in New York City
York.

The Defendant operates Feinstein's/54 Below venue and restaurant,
as well as Feinstein's/54 Below's Web site and advertises, markets,
distributes, and/or sells food and other products at its location
in the state of New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Darryn G. Solotoff, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF DARRYN SOLOTOFF
          100 Quentin Roosevelt Blvd., #208
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 695-0052
          Facsimile: (212) 656-1845
          E-mail: ds@lawsolo.net

               - and -

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Telephone: (212) 228-9795
          Facsimile: (212) 982-6284
          E-mail: nyjg@aol.com
                  Jeffrey@gottlieb.legal


AEQUITAS MANAGEMENT: Deloitte, Sidley Settle for $220MM
-------------------------------------------------------
Debra Cassens, writing for Weiss Aba Journal, reports that Sidley
Austin and Deloitte are among five professional firms agreeing to
pay $220 million to settle claims for aiding securities sales by a
now-defunct investment firm accused of operating as a Ponzi
scheme.

None of the defendants were charged with any wrongdoing, according
to the proposed settlement filed in Oregon federal court July 9.
Rather, they are accused of statutory liability under Oregon law
for aiding Aequitas Management in its sale of the securities that
caused investor losses.

When deals with two other defendants are added to the total, the
total settlement amount is $234.6 million, report Law360, Bloomberg
Law and a press release.

The lawsuit had claimed that Sidley provided advice for Aequitas
securities offerings, while Deloitte prepared audited statements
for the investment firm. The amount each defendant will pay is
governed by a confidential allocation agreement, according to a
separate stipulation filed July 9.

The Securities and Exchange Commission had alleged in a separate
action that Aequitas raised money from investors by issuing
promissory notes with high rates of return. Much of the money was
invested in student loan receivables and for-profit education
provider Corinthian Colleges, which filed for bankruptcy in 2015.
More money raised from investors was used in a last-ditch effort to
save the firm and to pay earlier investors, the SEC said.

Bloomberg cited a Sidley statement that said the lawsuit would end
"costly" and "burdensome" litigation.

"The plaintiffs did not allege that Sidley or the other six
defendants knew about or were involved in the alleged fraudulent
scheme perpetrated by Aequitas," the statement said. "Two senior
Aequitas executives pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate federal
law in operating the funds and admitted to intentionally misleading
investors and withholding information about the financial condition
and business activities of Aequitas from their outside accounting
and law firms."

Deloitte told Law360 that it stands by its work, and it is
participating in the settlement "to avoid the ongoing cost,
distraction and uncertainty of extended litigation."

The investors were represented by Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro and
Stoll Berne. [GN]

The case is Securities and Exchange Commission v. Aequitas
Management, LLC et al., 3:16-cv-00438 (D. Ore.).


AFL-CIO DISTRICT 37: Solomon Sues over Collection of Agency Fees
----------------------------------------------------------------
SCOTT SOLOMON, the Plaintiff, vs. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE,
COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, DISTRICT COUNCIL 37, AFL-CIO, the
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-06823-GBD (S.D.N.Y., July 24, 2019),
sues for the return of agency fee-payers' wrongfully-seized money
by the Defendant.

The lawsuit contends the U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that
unions acted unconstitutionally when they deducted tens of millions
of dollars from public-sector employees who were not members of a
union, but were required to pay agency fees to the union against
their will. See Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).

District Council 37 is the exclusive representative for classified
employees of the mayoral agencies, the Health and Hospitals
Corporation, the Off-Track Betting Corporation, the City Housing
Authority, the Comptroller, the District Attorneys, the Borough
Presidents, the Public Administrators, and any museum, library,
zoological garden, or other cultural institution whose salary is
paid in whole from the City Treasury, as recognized by the
collective bargaining agreement between District Council 37 and the
City of New York.

The collective bargaining agreement between District Council 37 and
the City of New York initially covered January 1, 1995 to June 30,
2001, but continues in force to today with supplemental Memoranda
of Agreement, the most recent of which was signed June 25, 2018.

Mr. Scott Solomon served as a city planner in the Queens office of
the New York City Department of City Planning from October 2014 to
July 2018 and resides in Ronkonkoma, New York.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Jeffrey M. Schwab, Esq.
          Daniel R. Suhr, Esq.
          LIBERTY JUSTICE CENTER
          190 South La Salle Street, Suite 1500
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 263 7668
          Facsimile: (312) 263 7702
          E-mail: jschwab@libertyjusticecenter.org
                  dsuhr@libertyjusticecenter.org

               - and -

          William Messenger, Esq.
          NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK
          LEGAL DEFENSE FOUNDATION
          8001 Braddock Rd., Suite 600
          Springfield, VA 22160
          Telephone: 703 321 8510
          Facsimile: 703 321 9319
          E-mail: wlm@nrtw.org

ALPHA CARE LTD: Campbell Seeks Pay for Missed Breaks
----------------------------------------------------
BRUCE CAMPBELL, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. ALPHA CARE LTD., and TODD W. ROBY,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01699-SO (N.D. Ohio, July 25, 2019)
seeks to recover unpaid wages and overtime pay, based upon
Defendants' violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").

Plaintiff alleges on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated that Defendants unlawfully required, and continue to
require him to work during his meal breaks, without compensation,
and which resulted in his working in excess of 40 hours per week,
without legally required overtime pay, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Bruce Campbell has worked as a staff member at Alpha
Care's adult day care facility in Lorain County since approximately
February 2017.

Alpha Care LTD is a domestic limited liability company, registered
with the Ohio Secretary of State, which operates adult daycare
facilities in Columbiana, Cuyahoga, and Lorain counties.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Stuart Torch, Esq.
     Christina M. Royer, Esq.
     ELFVIN, KLINGSHIRN, ROYER & TORCH, LLC
     4700 Rockside Rd., Suite 530
     Independence, OH 44131
     Voice: 216.382.2500
     Facsimile: 216.381.0250
     Email: stuart@ekrtlaw.com
            chris@ekrtlaw.com


ANGEL EYES: Maslin Appeals N.D.N.Y. Order & Judgment to 2nd Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Masbro LLC, Andy Eugene Maslin, Brooks Alan Washburn and
Waslin LLC filed an appeal from the District Court's Memorandum and
Order, and Judgment, both dated June 17, 2019, in their lawsuit
styled Maslin, et al. v. Angel Eyes Produce, Inc., et al., Case No.
18-cv-1309, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
New York (Syracuse).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
seeks to recover for infringement of a certain patent belonging to
the Plaintiffs and AEP, including seeking injunctive relief to
prevent additional acts of infringement.

The Plaintiffs also seek declaratory judgments regarding the
ownership of the said patent; the validity or invalidity of certain
purported assignments of said patent; the effectiveness of Massa's
termination as CEO of AEP and legitimacy of acts undertaken by
Massa purportedly as CEO of AEP after his termination; and claims
for unjust enrichment and conversion in connection with the
fraudulent inducement of a purported assignment of said patent.
All monetary damages are sought as against the Defendants James P.
Massa and Sustainable Essential Enterprises LLC only.

Plaintiffs Maslin and Washburn developed a certain container-based
plant husbandry apparatus and horticultural environment designed to
optimize growth of plants.  The Plaintiffs applied to the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office for a patent with respect to the
Invention, and on or about February 14, 2012 the PTO granted a
patent, number 8,112,936, to the Plaintiffs with respect to the
Invention.

The Plaintiffs are shareholders of Angel Eyes Produce.

Defendant Angel Eyes Produce, Inc. is in the business of growing
and selling organic produce.

The appellate case is captioned as Maslin, et al. v. Angel Eyes
Produce, Inc., et al., Case No. 19-2178, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants Andy Eugene Maslin, individually and as a
shareholder of Angel Eyes Produce, Inc. on behalf of himself and
all other shareholders of Angel Eyes Produce, Inc. similarly
situated, and in the right of Angle Eyes Produce, Inc., AKA Andy
Eugene Maslin, III; Brooks Alan Washburn, individually and as a
shareholder of Angel Eyes Produce, Inc. on behalf of himself and
all other shareholders of Angel Eyes Produce, Inc. similarly
situated, and in the right of Angel Eyes Produce, Inc.; Masbro LLC;
and Waslin LLC are represented by:

          Kimberly A. Steele, Esq.
          THE STEELE LAW FIRM, P.C.
          949 County Route 53
          Oswego, NY 13126
          Telephone: (315) 216-4721
          Facsimile: (315) 216-6065
          E-mail: ksteele@thesteelelawfirm.com

Defendants-Appellees Angel Eyes Produce, Inc., James P.
Massachusetts and Sustainable Essentials Enterprises LLC are
represented by:

          Jason J. Rebhun, Esq.
          JASON J. REBHUN, P.C.
          225 Broadway
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (646) 201-9392
          E-mail: Jason@jasonrebhun.com


BANK OF AMERICA: Lopez Appeals N.D. Cal. Ruling to Ninth Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Laura Lopez and Sam Willis filed an appeal from a Court
ruling in their lawsuit titled Laura Lopez, et al. v. Bank of
America, N.A., Case No. 3:18-cv-02346-VC, in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on July 15, 2019, the Hon.
Vince Chhabria denied on predominance grounds the Plaintiffs'
motion for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

The evidence, including some of the Plaintiffs' own evidence, shows
that some of Bank of America's small business bankers spend over
half of their workdays inside the office, while some do not, Judge
Chhabria says.  California has chosen to use this metric as the
primary determinant of whether a salesperson is exempt from the
state's overtime laws.  Therefore, Judge Chhabria notes, some small
business bankers are properly classified as exempt, and some are
not.  And the only way to determine who falls into which camp is to
conduct an employee-by-employee assessment, an individual
undertaking that precludes class certification, Judge Chhabria
opines.

The appellate case is captioned as Laura Lopez, et al. v. Bank of
America, N.A., Case No. 19-80093, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Petitioners LAURA LOPEZ and SAM WILLIS, individually and
on behalf of others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Edward Wynne, Esq.
          WYNNE LAW FIRM
          80 E. Sir Francis Drake Boulevard, Suite 3G
          Larkspur, CA 94939
          Telephone: (415) 461-6400
          Facsimile: (415) 461-3900
          E-mail: ewynne@wynnelawfirm.com

               - and -

          George Nemiroff, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF KENNETH C. ABSALOM
          220 Montgomery Street, Suite 905
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 392-5040
          E-mail: gnemiroff@wynnelawfirm.com

Defendant-Respondent BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. is represented by:

          Matthew Kane, Esq.
          Michael D. Mandel, Esq.
          MCGUIREWOODS LLP
          1800 Century Park East, 8th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 315-8200
          E-mail: mkane@mcguirewoods.com
                  mmandel@mcguirewoods.com

               - and -

          Sylvia Kim, Esq.
          MCGUIREWOODS LLP
          Two Embarcadero Center, Suite 1300
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 844-9944
          E-mail: skim@mcguirewoods.com


BARONHR WEST: Accused by Valencia Suit of Not Paying Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------------
AMELIA VALENCIA and MARIA MARTINEZ, on their own behalf and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. BARONHR WEST, INC.,
ERIKA RECORDS, INC.; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Case No.
19STCV24908 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty., July 18, 2019), accuses
the Defendants of, among other things, failure to pay wages and/or
overtime, in violation of the California Labor Code.

Baronhr West, Inc. is a Delaware Corporation doing business in the
state of California.  The Defendant's corporate address is in
Anaheim Hills, California.  Baronhr West is a staffing company.

ERIKA RECORDS, INC. is a California Corporation doing business in
the State of California.  The Defendant's corporate address is in
Buena Park, California.  The Plaintiffs do not know the true names
or capacities of the Doe Defendants.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Marcus J. Bradley, Esq.
          Kiley L. Grombacher, Esq.
          Taylor L. Emerson, Esq.
          BRADLEY/GROMBACHER, LLP
          2815 Townsgate Road, Suite 130
          Westlake Village, CA 91361
          Telephone: (805) 270-7100
          Facsimile: (805) 270-7589
          E-mail: mbradley@bradleygrombacher.com
                  kgrombacher@bradleygrombacher.com
                  temerson@bradleygrombacher.com

               - and -

          Sahag Majarian, II, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF SAHAG MAJARIAN II
          18250 Ventura Boulevard
          Tarzana, CA 91356
          Telephone: (818) 609-0807
          Facsimile: (818) 609-0892
          E-mail: sahagii@aol.com


BOEING COMPANY: Pilot F Alleges Aircraft Design Flaw Cover-Up
-------------------------------------------------------------
Pilot F, individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. THE BOEING COMPANY, a Delaware
corporation, the Defendant, Case No. 2019CH08661 (Ill. Cir., July
24, 2019), seeks compensation on behalf of the Plaintiff and more
than 100 pilots qualified to fly the Boeing 737 MAX series of
aircraft (the "MAX") as employees of an international airline
("Airline X"), whose professional and personal lives were harmfully
impacted when BOEING and the Federal Aviation Administration
engaged in an unprecedented cover-up of the known design flaws of
the MAX, which predictably resulted in the crashes of two MAX
aircraft and subsequent grounding of all MAX aircraft worldwide.

The Plaintiff says he relied on BOEING's representations that the
MAX was safe when qualifying to fly the MAX, and thus suffered --
and continues to suffer -- significant lost wages, among other
economic and non-economic damages, since the MAX was grounded.

Additionally, the Plaintiff says he suffered severe emotional and
mental stress when they were effectively forced to fly the MAX --
and required to place their own life and the lives of their crew
and passengers in clanger -- despite the growing awareness of the
dangerous nature of the previously concealed software on board the
MAX and other problems, the lawsuit says.

Boeing Company is an American multinational corporation that
designs, manufactures, and sells airplanes, rotorcraft, rockets,
satellites, comms gear and missiles worldwide.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the proposed Class are:

          Patrick M. Jones, Esq.
          Sarah M. Beaujour, Esq.
          PAT JONES PLLC
          100 South State Street
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 255-7976
          E-mail: pmj@patjonespllc.com
                  smb@patjonespllc.com

               - and -

          Joseph C. Wheeler
          IALPG PTY LTD
          ID, 7/139 Junction Road
          Clayfield, Queensland
          Australia 4011
          Telephone: 617 3040 1099
          E-mail: jwheeler@ialpg.com

BREEZY POINT: Cordova Suit to Recoup Unpaid Overtime Wages, Damages
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Byron Cordova, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Breezy Point Inc., Michael Chrone and
Mohammed Hussein, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-15442 (D. N.J., July
16, 2019), seeks to recover overtime wages due, liquidated damages,
and all reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law and the New
Jersey Wage Payment Act.

Defendants operate "Chrone's Tavern," a restaurant that serves
Italian cuisine located at 906 Mountain Avenue, Mountainside, New
Jersey, where Cordova worked as a pizza maker and cook. He claims
to have worked in excess of 40 hours per week without being paid
overtime premiums. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Nicole Grunfeld, Esq.
      KATZ MELINGER PLLC
      280 Madison Avenue, Suite 600
      New York, NY 10016
      Tel: (212) 460-0047
      Email: ndgrunfeld@katzmelinger.com


BRENTWOOD VILLAGE: Court OKs Sanctions in A. Borum Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, District of Columbia issued a
Memorandum Opinion granting in part Defendants' Motion for Sanction
in the case captioned ADRIANN BORUM, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
BRENTWOOD VILLAGE, LLC, et al., Defendants. Civil Action No.:
16-1723 (RC), Re Document No.: 94, 94-2. (D.D.C.).

One DC, a community organization, joined a class action by
residents of the Brookland Manor apartment complex (Brookland
Manor) against Defendants Brentwood Associates, L.P., Mid-City
Financial Corporation, and Edgewood Management Corporation, for
violations of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and D.C. Human Rights Act
(DCHRA). Plaintiffs alleged that the planned redevelopment of the
complex by Defendants was discriminatory and would force certain
residents out of their homes.  

Mrabet's E-mails Were ESI that Should Have Been Preserved

First, the Court addresses whether the deleted e-mails were ESI
that should have been preserved. The parties agree that Mrabet's
e-mails constitute ESI. The Court thus considers whether and when a
duty to preserve arose, and whether Mrabet's e-mails were covered
under that duty.

Once a party anticipates litigation, it must preserve potentially
relevant evidence that might be useful to an adversary.  At the
very least, the duty begins no later than the date the lawsuit is
filed.  

Here, the Court readily finds that One DC was under a duty to
preserve Mrabet's e-mails regarding her work on the Brookland Manor
project. Plaintiffs filed their complaint on and One DC's duty to
preserve thus began at the latest on that day. Certainly, her
e-mails could have helped Defendants assess the work that One DC
did at Brookland Manor and the resources that One DC allocated to
the project. Importantly, the e-mails might have helped establish
whether such resources were diverted from One DC's typical work or
whether Mrabet would have conducted the work regardless of
Defendants' conduct.

One DC Failed to Take Reasonable Steps to Preserve Mrabet's
E-mails

Next, the Court addresses whether One DC took reasonable steps to
preserve Mrabet's e-mails. In doing so, it considers whether One DC
adhered to the expected norms that govern record preservation
during litigation. The Court concludes that One DC completely
failed to comply with those expected norms.

A party must put in place a litigation hold' to ensure the
preservation of relevant documents when it reasonably anticipates
litigation. Failure to do so can result in spoliation of evidence,
which is defined as the destruction or material alteration of
evidence or the failure to preserve property for another's use as
evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.

One DC issued a written litigation hold on May 30, 2018 and
activated a vault system for permanent backup to archive data and
prevent individual employees from permanently deleting files in
July 2018. Prior to that date, employees could delete company
e-mails, with only a limited 25-day recovery window. One DC also
claims to have issued an oral litigation hold during a staff
meeting at the outset of litigation.  

Even if the Court were to assume that One DC issued an oral
litigation hold at the outset of litigation, it is well recognized
that an oral litigation hold is insufficient to reasonably protect
against the spoliation of evidence. Here, One DC implemented a
backup system and issued a written litigation hold only after two
employees deleted their e-mails. For almost two years after the
litigation began, the entirety of One DC's efforts to protect
against the loss of evidence consisted of, at most, an oral warning
that might have been mentioned at a staff meeting. Not only were
One DC's preservation efforts, or lack thereof, unreasonable, they
were also completely incongruous to the expected norms that govern
a party's duty to preserve evidence during litigation. The Court
thus concludes that One DC did not take reasonable steps to
preserve Mrabet's e-mails.

Mrabet's E-mails Are Irremediably Lost

Here, Mrabet's e-mails are irremediably lost because they cannot be
restored or replaced through additional discovery. The e-mails
could only be recovered from one source, and One DC has already
attempted, and failed, to fully recover them. In addition, while
One DC argues that it has identified alternate copies and produced
a substantial number of Mrabet's deleted e-mails, the organization
acknowledges that at least some responsive e-mails were likely
irremediably lost, presumably because Mrabet did not copy another
employee on every single e-mail she sent while working at One DC.
Because One DC was unable to fully recover Mrabet's e-mails, no
amount of discovery will confirm the extent to which information
was lost. The Court thus finds that One DC irremediably lost ESI
that should have been preserved.

Only Sanctions Under Rule 37(e)(1) Are Warranted

Having determined that the threshold requirements of Rule 37(e) are
satisfied, the Court evaluates whether (e)(1) or (e)(2) applies.
Each subsection carries different requirements and available
sanctions. Under Rule 37(e)(1), the Court may impose proportional
sanctions upon the finding of prejudice. Under Rule 37(e)(2), the
Court may impose more severe sanctions upon finding that the party
that lost the information acted with the intent to deprive another
party of the information's use in the litigation. The Court finds
that sanctions are warranted under Rule 37(e)(1) but not 37(e)(2).

Defendants Have Suffered Prejudice from One DC's Failure to
Preserve ESI

The Court first analyzes whether Defendants are entitled to
sanctions under Rule 37(e)(1), and finds that they are. Sanctions
under Rule 37(e)(1) are only warranted if Defendants suffered
prejudice from the loss of Mrabet's e-mails.  

Defendants argue that they have been prejudiced by One DC's
spoliation because they are forever barred from testing the
allegations in One DC's complaint. According to Defendants, the
deleted e-mails would have revealed how Mrabet was spending her
time, and whether her efforts were directed towards organizing for
and supporting this lawsuit. Defendants argue that the e-mails
might have conclusively shown whether One DC has Article III
standing in this case. And Defendants also argue that they have
been prejudiced by One DC's spoliation because they have spent
additional resources to attempt to resolve this critical factual
dispute.  

The Court agrees with Defendants only in part. Based on the record
and arguments before it, the Court does not agree that Defendants
are altogether barred from testing One DC's standing allegations
simply because Mrabet deleted her e-mails. Although only a limited
number of Mrabet's e-mails from February and March 2018 were
restored, One DC produced these responsive documents, along with
1,308 responsive e-mails either to, from, or copying Mrabet, given
her practice of copying other staff members on e-mails.

Nonetheless, the Court readily finds that the e-mail deletion
created at least some prejudice for Defendants' ability to defend
the claims in this suit. Not only have Defendants spent additional
time, money, and resources deposing One DC employees, they have
also lost potentially valuable information regarding One DC's
standing in the case. Given that Defendants have obtained some, but
not all relevant evidence regarding One DC's involvement in this
lawsuit and asserted injury, the Court concludes that One DC's loss
of ESI has prejudiced Defendants, but not to the extent that
Defendants allege.

One DC Did Not Act with the Intent to Deprive Defendants of ESI

Next, the Court reviews whether sanctions would be warranted under
Rule 37(e)(2), which reserves the harshest discovery sanctions for
cases in which the court can find that the spoliating party acted
with intent to deprive another party of the ESI's use in the
litigation. If such a finding is made, no separate showing of
prejudice is required because the finding of intent can support an
inference that the opposing party was prejudiced by the loss of
information.

As an initial matter, Defendants mistakenly argue that the clear
and convincing evidence of One DC's gross negligence provides the
culpable state of mind required for the sanction of dismissal. On
the contrary, Rule 37(e)(2)] rejects cases such as Residential
Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Financial Corp., 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir.
2002), that authorize the giving of (e)(2) sanctions on a finding
of negligence or gross negligence.Although the Court does conclude
that One DC was negligent in preserving Mrabet's e-mails,
negligence itself does not support a finding of intent.  

Defendants also argue that the Court may infer an intent to deprive
from One DC's actions in this matter. Here, Mrabet testified that
she had used her One DC e-mail for personal communications, that
she did not want One DC to access those communications, that she
realized it was too time-consuming to delete personal
communications one-by-one, and that she ultimately decided to just
delete the whole thing. Unlike the employee in GN Netcom,Mrabet
deleted her e-mails for personal reasons, and there is no evidence
of intent to protect One DC. In fact, Mrabet deleted her e-mails
amid an unrelated internal dispute concerning another One DC
employee.

Defendants have established the gross negligence of One DC. But
they have not pointed to anything beyond that. Without more, the
Court is unwilling to infer intent from the record before it.
Because the Court finds that One DC did not act with the requisite
intent, it concludes that sanctions under Rule 37(e)(2) are not
appropriate here.

Monetary Sanctions Are Warranted Under Rule 37(e)(1)

Under Rule 37(e)(1), once a finding of prejudice is made, the court
has broad discretion to impose sanctions but may order measures no
greater than necessary to cure the prejudice. The remedy should fit
the wrong to be redressed. Having determined that some sanction is
appropriate in this case, the Court must now decide whether the
specific sanctions sought by Defendants are warranted. The Court
concludes that while some monetary sanctions are appropriate,
outright dismissal of One DC from this case is not.

First, the Court finds that dismissal is inappropriate here.
Contrary to Defendants' position that the sanction of dismissal
based on prejudice is appropriate, the sanctions available
following a finding of intent under Rule 37(e)(2) are not available
under Rule 37(e)(1).  Accordingly, this Court will not dismiss One
DC's claims.

As explained above, upon finding prejudice to another party from
the loss of ESI, the court may order measures "no greater than
necessary to cure the prejudice. In ordering these measures, much
is entrusted to the court's discretion. Here, the prejudice to
Defendants primarily consists of the additional time and efforts it
incurred in obtaining information relevant to its standing defense,
and litigating the spoliation issue. The Court concludes that this
prejudice may be cured by monetary sanctions. In the exercise of
its discretion, the Court will therefore direct One DC to reimburse
Defendants for the reasonable attorneys' fees and costs Defendants
incurred in (a) preparing for and conducting the portions of the
depositions of One DC's corporate representative and Yasmina Mrabet
relevant to the spoliation issues, and (b) litigating the instant
motion for sanctions.

Accordingly, the Defendants' motion for sanctions is granted in
part and denied in part.
The Defendants' motion for leave to file under seal is granted.
Sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure shall be imposed on Plaintiff One DC.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 18, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y48h8mo6 from
Leagle.com.

MARITA MOORE, Plaintiff, represented by Nooree Lee -- nlee@cov.com
-- COVINGTON & BURLING LLP.

ADRIANN BORUM & ORGANIZING NEIGHBORHOOD EQUITY IN SHAW AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Plaintiffs, represented by Hannah E.M.
Lieberman, WASHINGTON LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, 700 14th
St NW, Washington, DC 20005, Kaetochi Okemgbo, COVINGTON & BURLING
LLP,  850 10th St NW, Washington, District of Columbia 20001,
Maureen Frances Browne -- mbrowne@cov.com -- COVINGTON & BURLING
LLP, Amber M. Charles -- acharles@cov.com -- COVINGTON & BURLING
LLP, Brian E. Foster -- bfoster@cov.com -- COVINGTON & BURLING LLP,
Brook Allarick Hill, WASHINGTON LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
& URBAN AFFAIRS,  Catherine Cone, WASHINGTON LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS & URBAN AFFAIRS, 700 14th St NW, Washington, DC 20005,
Nooree Lee -- bfoster@cov.com -- COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, Samuel F.
Adriance -- sadriance@cov.com -- COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, pro hac
vice & Stephen Petkis -- spetkis@cov.com -- COVINGTON & BURLING
LLP.

BRENTWOOD ASSOCIATES, L.P., EDGEWOOD MANAGEMENT CORPORATION &
MID-CITY FINANCIAL CORPORATION, Defendants, represented by Lisa
Schapira -- lisa.schapira@nortonrosefulbright.com -- NORTON ROSE
FULBRIGHT US LLP, pro hac vice, Michael James Edney --
michael.edney@nortonrosefulbright.com -- NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US
LLP,Anne M. Rogers -- anne.rogers@nortonrosefulbright.com -- NORTON
ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP, Gerry Lowry, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP &
John Joseph Byron -- john.byron@nortonrosefulbright.com -- NORTON
ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP, pro hac vice.


CAL ENTERPRISE: Medina Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against CAL ENTERPRISE LABOR
SOLUTIONS INC. The case is styled as OSCAR FRANCO MEDINA, AS AN
INDIVIDUAL AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Plaintiff v. CAL ENTERPRISE LABOR SOLUTIONS INC., A CALIFORNIA
CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. BCV-19-102112 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Kern Cty., July 30, 2019).

The case type is stated as "Other Employment - Civil Unlimited".

CAL Enterprise Labor Solutions, Inc. is an active Californian
business entity incorporated 23rd June 2015.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by SCOTT M. LIDMAN, ESQ.
   


CHESAPEAKE OPERATING: 10th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Meier Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Matt Meier; Sheryl Meier; KAI Bach, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHESAPEAKE OPERATING L.L.C.; DEVON ENERGY
PRODUCTION COMPANY, LP; MIDSTATES PETROLEUM COMPANY LLC; NEW
DOMINION, LLC; RANGE PRODUCTION COMPANY, LLC; SPECIAL ENERGY
CORPORATION; WHITE STAR PETROLEUM, LLC, Defendants-Appellees, Case
No. 18-6152 (10th Cir.), Judge Carolyn B. McHugh of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the lawsuit, and declined to certify the question to
the Oklahoma Supreme Court.

Several Oklahoma homeowners brought a class-action lawsuit against
operators of wastewater disposal wells for hydraulic fracturing
operations, alleging the injection wells were significantly
increasing seismic activity across large portions of Oklahoma.  The
only damages the homeowners sought were the increased costs of
obtaining and maintaining earthquake insurance.

Plaintiffs Meier, Meier, and Bach all own homes and property in
Oklahoma.  The Defendants are seven oil and gas companies whose
hydraulic fracturing operations in Oklahoma involve the injection
of wastewater deep into the ground. The homeowners allege that by
injecting millions of barrels of wastewater below the Arbuckle, the
Defendants have directly caused an unprecedented rise in Oklahoma
earthquake activity.  They claim that multiple scientific studies
have established a causal link between the injection of production
wastewater into the Arbuckle via disposal wells, and they cite
several studies indicating that the number of earthquakes in
Oklahoma has increased exponentially after 2008.  This increase in
earthquake activity, they allege, has caused some earthquake
insurance companies to hike their premiums by as much as 260% in
the last three years alone, and many companies have ceased writing
new insurance policies. They claim that as a direct and foreseeable
result of Defendants' conduct, Oklahomans have been forced to
purchase earthquake insurance to protect their homes and property,
and that because of the Defendants' activities, such insurance
costs significantly more than it previously did.

The homeowners do not claim this increased seismic activity has
caused any actual damage to their homes or properties.  Rather,
they simply seek to recover the value of premiums paid to obtain
earthquake insurance coverage; and/or the excess amount required to
maintain earthquake insurance coverage after 2009, as well as
punitive damages.

The homeowners originally filed their complaint in Oklahoma state
court in the District Court of Payne County, asserting class
allegations and alleging public nuisance, private nuisance,
ultrahazardous activities, and negligence.  They sought to
represent a class defined (in relevant part) as all citizens in
Oklahoma who purchased or maintained earthquake insurance for their
homes or property from 2008 through the time the class is
certified.

The Defendants removed the case to the federal district court for
the Western District of Oklahoma pursuant to the Class Action
Fairness Act.  All of the named Defendants then moved to dismiss
the homeowners' complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing the homeowners lacked standing to
bring their suit and had failed to state a claim for relief.

The district court held the homeowners did have standing to sue,
but it dismissed their suit for failure to state a claim,
predicting that the Oklahoma Supreme Court, if confronted with the
issue, would find the relief requested by the Plaintiffs not
legally cognizable under the circumstances present in the case at
bar.  Reviewing case law from Oklahoma and other states, the court
found no authority supporting an award of insurance premiums under
the circumstances presented.  

The homeowners timely appealed.  On appeal, the homeowners argue
the district court dismissed the lawsuit based on an erroneous Erie
guess of Oklahoma tort law, and, in the alternative, they request
that this court certify the question to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.


Judge McHugh first considers the homeowners' request that she
certifies the question presented to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
Declining the invitation to certify the question, she then analyzes
how the Oklahoma Supreme Court would answer the question.

The question presented is clearly "determinative of the case at
hand," since it is the ground on which the district court granted
the Defendants' 12(b)(6) motion and the sole substantive question
on appeal.  Because the question is not sufficiently novel that the
Judge feels uncomfortable attempting to decide it without further
guidance, and because the homeowners did not seek certification
until after they were unsuccessful in the district court, she
declines to certify the question.  Instead, she now proceeds to the
merits and consider whether, under Oklahoma law, a homeowner can
sue for increased insurance premiums absent any actual damage to
property.

The district court dismissed the homeowners' lawsuit for failure to
state a claim, reasoning that Oklahoma law does not recognize a
claim for increased insurance premiums based on a risk that "has
not materialized" -- that is, where the Plaintiffs have suffered no
damage to their homes or their persons.

The Judge finds that Oklahoma courts have repeatedly recognized
that where it is shown that some damage has resulted from a
defendant's wrongful act, uncertainty as to the exact amount is no
reason for denying damages altogether.  But that principle is
inapposite in the matter, where the homeowners have failed to plead
any legally cognizable harm.  The question presented is not simply
what damages the homeowners are entitled to, but, rather, whether
the sole "relief" they request in their complaint is legally
cognizable.  Because the homeowners pleaded no legally cognizable
claim for relief, the district court properly dismissed their
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).

For these reasons, Judge McHugh declined to certify the question to
the Oklahoma Supreme Court, and affirmed the district court.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 21, 2019 Order and Judgment is
available at https://is.gd/SLmosg from Leagle.com.


CLASSIC DINING: Amos Files FLSA Suit in S.D. Indiana
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against CLASSIC DINING GROUP,
LLC. The case is styled as CONSTANCE AMOS on behalf of herself and
all other persons similarly situated, known and unknown, Plaintiff
v. CLASSIC DINING GROUP, LLC an Indiana corporation, CLASSIC DINING
KENTUCKY AVE., INC. an Indiana Corporation, CLASSIC DINING
KEYSTONE, INC. an Indiana Corporation, CLASSIC DINING MANAGEMENT
COMPANY, INC. an Indiana Corporation, CLASSIC DINING MICHIGAN ROAD,
INC. an Indiana Corporation, CLASSIC DINING OF BLOOMINGTON, INC. an
Indiana Corporation, CLASSIC DINING OF CASTLETON, INC. an Indiana
Corporation, CLASSIC DINING OF COLUMBUS, INC. an Indiana
Corporation, CLASSIC DINING OF CRAWFORDSVILLE, INC. an Indiana
Corporation, CLASSIC DINING OF DALEVILLE, LLC an Indiana
Corporation, CLASSIC DINING OF GREENWOOD MALL, INC. an Indiana
Corporation, CLASSIC DINING OF GREENWOOD, INC. an Indiana
Corporation, CLASSIC DINING OF LAFAYETTE, INC. an Indiana
Corporation, CLASSIC DINING OF LEBANON, INC. an Indiana
Corporation, CLASSIC DINING OF MERRILLVILLE, INC. an Indiana
Corporation, CLASSIC DINING OF PORTAGE, INC. an Indiana
Corporation, CLASSIC DINING OF ROCKFORD, INC. an Illinois
Corporation, CLASSIC DINING OF SHELBYVILLE, INC. an Indiana
Corporation, CLASSIC DINING OF POST ROAD, INC. an Indiana
Corporation, KEN KILBERGER, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-03193-JRS-DLP (S.D. Ind., July 30, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Classic Dining is a multi-state restaurant group specializing in
franchise concepts.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


COOK COUNTY, IL: Class Certification Bid in Alicea et al. Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as Elizabeth Alicea, Michelle
Urrutia, Katina Ramos, and Jack Artinian, individually and on
behalf of others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. County of
Cook, and Thomas J. Dart, individually and in his official capacity
as Sheriff of Cook County, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-05381
(N.D. Ill.), the Hon. Judge Ronald A. Guzman entered an order on
July 24, 2019, continuing Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification pending further briefing as directed.

Plaintiffs' brief is due 21 days from the date of entry of the
order.  The Defendants may file a response within 14 days
thereafter. The Defendants are encouraged not to simply rebut and
dismiss Plaintiffs' proposals, but to acknowledge any strengths in
Plaintiffs' proffered solution(s) and supplement them with their
own ideas as to how difficulties in managing a putative class,
assuming arguendo it is certified, might best be addressed, the
Court Says.

The Plaintiffs seek certification of a class defined as:

   "all persons who used the toilet in a holding cell in a
   courthouse in Cook County, Illinois since August 8, 2016,
   wherein any part of the toilet is visible in the camera feed
   monitoring the cell."[CC]

CORDISH COS: Maryland Court Dismisses Marketti Unpaid Wages Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TESSA MARKETTI, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE CORDISH
COMPANIES, INC., et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. ADC-19-0904
(D. Md.), Magistrate Judge A. David Copperthite of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland granted the Defendants'
Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss the Litigation.

The lawsuit arises out of the Plaintiffs' allegations of improper
wage payment by Defendants in violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA"), Internal Revenue Code ("IRC"), Maryland Wage and Hour
Law ("MWHL"), and Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law
("MWPCL").  

The Cordish Companies, Inc. owns and operates a series of
entertainment districts nationwide, including Power Plant Live! in
Baltimore, Maryland.  Power Plant Live! is comprised of several
bars and restaurants, including Luckie's Baltimore, LLC which
operates under the name Luckie's Tavern.  The Plaintiffs are former
bartenders that were employed at Luckie's Tavern or one of the
other bars operated by Defendants at Power Plant Live! for various
periods of time between 2015 and 2019.

Upon commencing employment with the Defendants, the Plaintiffs
entered into a Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate
.  The Plaintiffs also agreed to waive their right to pursue any
class action or collective action as well as their right to a jury
trial.

During their respective periods of employment, the Plaintiffs
allege that Defendants: (1) required the Plaintiffs to perform
non-tipped work that was "wholly unrelated" to their occupation and
failed to pay them the applicable minimum wage for such work; (2)
required the Plaintiffs to perform non-tipped work that exceeded
twenty percent of their time each week and failed to pay them the
applicable minimum wage for such work; (3) failed to pay the
Plaintiffs the correct amount of overtime; and (4) operated an
illegal tip sharing arrangement and, as a result, knowingly filed
fraudulent W-2 forms to the IRS.

On March 27, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed suit in the Court,
proposing a FLSA collective action on behalf of themselves and
other similarly situated bartenders as well as class action claims
for violations of the IRC, MWHL, and MWPCL pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of themselves and other current and
former bartenders employed with the Defendants.

On May 2, 2019, the Defendants filed the Motion to Compel.  The
Plaintiffs filed an opposition on May 16, 2019.  The matter is now
fully briefed, and the Court has reviewed the Defendants' Motion to
Compel, as well as the responses thereto.

Magistrate Judge Copperthite finds that although Section 3 of the
FAA requires a district court to stay judicial proceedings
involving issues covered by written arbitration agreements, the
Fourth Circuit has held that a stay is not the sole remedy
available.  In Choice Hotels Intern., Inc., the Fourth Circuit
recognized that, notwithstanding the terms of Section 3 of the FAA,
dismissal is a proper remedy when all of the issues presented in a
lawsuit are arbitrable.

The Magistrate finds that because all of the Plaintiffs' claims are
subject to arbitration pursuant to the Agreement, he finds that no
useful purpose will be served by staying the pertinent proceedings
pending arbitration and that dismissal is the appropriate remedy.
For these reasons, he granted the Defendants' Motion to Compel.  A
separate Order will follow.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 21, 2019 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/Z1Y3gl from Leagle.com.

Tessa Marketti, Steven Ortiz, Angela Boughner & Kelsey Schultz,
Plaintiffs, represented by Benjamin L. Davis, III --
bdavis@nicholllaw.com -- Law Offices of Peter T. Nicholl & Michael
Arthur Brown -- mbrown@nicholllaw.com -- Law Office of Peter T.
Nicholl.

April Gischel, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin L. Davis, III,
Law Offices of Peter T. Nicholl.

The Cordish Companies, Inc. & Luckies' Baltimore, LLC, Defendants,
represented by Brooks R. Amiot -- Brooks.Amiot@jacksonlewis.com --
Jackson Lewis P.C. & Mary Margaret McCudden --
Mary.McCudden@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis P.C..


CSAA INSURANCE: Young Seeks Minimum Wage & Overtime Compensation
----------------------------------------------------------------
GABRIELLE YOUNG, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. CSAA INSURANCE SERVICES, INC., a
California corporation, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-02118 (D.
Colo., July 23, 2019), seeks to recover minimum wage for all hours
worked, and overtime compensation for all hours worked over 40 in
any single workweek, under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.

The case is brought on behalf of all hourly claims service
adjusters, claims specialists, and individuals holding comparable
positions with different titles employed by CSAA Insurance
Services, Inc. within the United States within the last three
years, plus any period of tolling. The Plaintiff has been employed
by Defendant in its Colorado office as a Claims Adjuster from in or
around June 2018 through the present.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Paul F. Lewis, Esq.
          Michael D. Kuhn, Esq.
          Andrew E. Swan, Esq.
          620 North Tejon Street, Suite 101
          Colorado Springs, CO 80903
          Telephone: (719) 694-3000
          Facsimile: (866) 515-8628
          E-mail: plewis@lks.law
                  mkuhn@lks.law
                  aswan@lks.law

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL: Arunga Alleges Denial of Due Process Rights
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against the Democratic
National Committee (DNC), Michael McShane, and many others for
trespassing and assault and for claims for their personal and
property rights in Shamrock MB Village property. The case is
captioned JAMES AGGREY-KWEGGYIRR ARUNGA, HENRY ALLEN SMITH/SMITH'S
FAMILY AND ALL OTHER PLAINTIFF-VICTIMS, SIMILARLY, SITUATED –
Plaintiffs, v. DNC-CULT OCHLORCRACY; DNC-"CRAZY DEMOCRATS";
DNC-CULT OCHLOCRACY OF DNC "CRAZY DEMOCRATS" BARACK HUSSEIN OBAMA,
JOSEPH BIDEN, RUTH GINSBURG, ACLU, MICHAEL MCSHANE, ANN AIKEN,
WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, HILLARY RODHAM/HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON:
NANCY PELOSI, CHUCK SCHUMER; LONA BRYSON, SANDY ALEXANDER, JOHN
ALEXANDER, ET AL – Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00999-JHE (N.D.
Ala., June 26, 2019).

On March 24, May 25, and June 3, 2019, the Defendants allegedly
trespassed and assaulted Plaintiffs' properties at Shamrock
Village, 4531 Franklin Blvd., Eugene, Oregon, denying Plaintiffs
their claims for their personal and property benefits-use and
dwellings rights. In addition, Defendants also physically injured
and hatefully slurred at Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs further allege that
the Defendants have issued heinous hateful obstruction-of-justice
final decisions denying their claims for (i) due process benefits;
and (ii) malicious damages and retribution benefits in the amount
of over $5.5 million, on March 18 and June 3, 2019, respectively.

Created during the Democratic National Convention of 1848, DNC
governs the United States Democratic Party. It harmonizes strategy
to support party's candidates throughout the country for local,
state, and national office.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear pro se.

DENTAL SUPPLIES: Roe Appeals Judgment and Order in Antitrust Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. William Roe filed an appeal from a District Court Judgment and
Order, dated June 24, 2019, in the lawsuit titled In re: Dental
Supplies Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 16-cv-696, in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Brooklyn).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, District Court
Judge Brian M. Cogan granted Defendant Burkhart's motion to dismiss
the Plaintiffs' Second Consolidated Class Action Complaint.

The Plaintiffs are a group of dental practices and dentists.
Defendants Henry Schein, Benco, and Patterson are the three largest
distributors of dental supplies and equipment in the United States,
collectively controlling roughly 85% of the market, while Defendant
Burkhart is a minor distributor.

The Complaint broadly alleges that the Defendants have engaged in
conduct that has led to higher prices for dental supplies and
eliminated competition between defendants, thereby keeping their
profit margins artificially high.  The Complaint alleges a per se
illegal agreement not to compete on price, and this agreement was
implemented through three separate mechanisms: margin- and price-
fixing, anti-poaching agreements, and group boycotts.  Through
these mechanisms, all four Defendants blocked entry into the market
for new competitors who would have charged lower prices for dental
supplies and taken market share from them.

The appellate case is captioned as In re: Dental Supplies Antitrust
Litigation, Case No. 19-2193, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees Comfort Care Family Dental, P.C., on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated; Rossman Endodontics,
on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated; Keith
Schwartz; Howard M. May; Evolution Dental Science, LLC; Casey
Nelson; Jim Peck; Arnell Prato, FKA Arnell N Prato, DBA Down to
Earth Dental; D.M.D. Bernard W. Kurek; and Larchmont Dental
Associates, P.C., are represented by:

          Eric Leon Cramer, Esq.
          BERGER MONTAGUE PC
          1818 Market Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 875-3009
          E-mail: ecramer@bm.net

Plaintiffs-Appellees Robert W. Grodner, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated; Stanford Dresnin; Bauer Dental Arts,
on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated; Dr. Robert
Corwin; Dr. Stephen M. Grussmark; Bemus Point Dental, LLC; Paul
Bermudez, on behalf of himself and all others simlarly situated;
Kottemann Orthodontics, P.L.L.C.; Naghmeh Yadegar, DBA New Age
Dental; Peter Bence; Kanellos & Kotts; Indianola Family Dentistry,
P.L.C.; PJCC Dental PC; West LA Dental Health Care Center; Omid
Farahmand; Mojdeh Shaystehfar, on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, DBA Linden Dental Care; Dennis M. Winter;
Thomas Caspers; Dr. Joseph Styger, individually and on behalf of
all others similar situated; Anthony J. Peppy; Samuel J. Peppy,
Jr.; and Cornerstone Dentistry, P.C., are represented by:

          Kenneth Bruce Pickle, Jr., Esq.
          RADICE LAW FIRM
          34 Sunset Boulevard
          Long Beach, NJ 08008
          Telephone: (646) 245-8502
          E-mail: jradice@radicelawfirm.com

Plaintiff-Appellee Dr. Joshua Wolgin, individually and on behalf of
all those similarly situated, is represented by:

          Laurie Rubinow, Esq.
          SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN, MILLER & SHAH, LLP
          65 Main Street
          Chester, CT 06412
          Telephone: (860) 526-1100
          E-mail: lrubinow@sfmslaw.com

Plaintiff-Appellee Dr. Nicholas Johnnidis, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Brian Murray, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          122 East 42nd Street
          New York, NY 10168
          Telephone: (212) 682-5340
          E-mail: bmurray@glancylaw.com

Plaintiff-Appellee Rittenhouse Smiles, P.C., is represented by:

          Jeremy Nash, Esq.
          LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG, LLC
          570 Broad Street
          Newark, NJ 07102
          Telephone: (973) 623-3000
          E-mail: jnash@litedepalma.com

Plaintiff-Appellee Alexander Greenberg is represented by:

          Jeffrey Squire, Esq.
          BRAGAR EAGEL & SQUIRE, PC
          885 3rd Avenue
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 308-5858
          E-mail: jeffrey_squire@yahoo.com

Plaintiff-Appellee Scott T. Ozaki is represented by:

          Patrick J. Coughlin, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          655 West Broadway
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 231-1058
          E-mail: patc@rgrdlaw.com

Plaintiff-Appellee Ronald A. Moreno is represented by:

          Mark Adam Griffin, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK, L.L.P.
          1201 3rd Avenue
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 623-1900
          E-mail: mgriffin@kellerrohrback.com

Plaintiff-Appellee IQ Dental Supply, Inc., is represented by:

          Amy Christine Gross, Esq.
          DUANE MORRIS LLP
          1540 Broadway
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (212) 692-1000
          E-mail: acgross@duanemorris.com

Plaintiff-Appellee Burkhard Dental Supply Company is represented
by:

          Richard Silberberg, Esq.
          DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP
          51 West 52nd Street
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (212) 415-9200
          E-mail: silberberg.richard@dorsey.com

Appellant Dr. William Roe is represented by:

          Kearney Dee Hutsler, Esq.
          HUTSLER LAW FIRM
          2700 Highway 280
          Birmingham, AL 35223
          Telephone: (205) 414-9979

Defendant-Appellee Henry Schein, Inc. is represented by:

          Bradley I. Ruskin, Esq.
          PROSKAUER ROSE LLP
          11 Times Square
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (212) 969-3465
          E-mail: bruskin@proskauer.com

Defendant-Appellee Patterson Companies, Inc. is represented by:

          Michael B. Miller, Esq.
          MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
          250 West 55th Street
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (212) 468-8000
          E-mail: mbmiller@mofo.com

Defendant-Appellee Benco Dental Supply Company is represented by:

          Howard D. Scher, Esq.
          BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC
          2 Liberty Place, 50 South 16th Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19102
          Telephone: (215) 665-3920
          E-mail: howard.scher@bipc.com


EAGLE BANCORP: Stein Says Financial Statement Misleading
--------------------------------------------------------
SHIVA STEIN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. EAGLE BANCORP, INC., SUSAN G. RIEL,
RONALD D. PAUL, CHARLES D. LEVINGSTON, and JAMES H. LANGMEAD, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-06873 (S.D.N.Y., July 24, 2019), seeks
to recover damages caused by Defendants' violations of the federal
securities laws and to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The case is a federal securities class action on behalf of a class
consisting of all persons other than Defendants who purchased or
otherwise acquired Eagle Bancorp securities between March 2, 2015
and July 17, 2019, both dates inclusive.

Eagle Bancorp was founded in 1997 and is headquartered in Bethesda,
Maryland. Eagle Bancorp operates as the bank holding company for
EagleBank, Inc., which provides commercial and consumer banking
services primarily in the United States.

Throughout the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and
misleading statements regarding the Company's business, operational
and compliance policies. Specifically, the Defendants made false
and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i)
Eagle Bancorp's internal controls and procedures and compliance
policies were inadequate; (ii) the foregoing shortcoming created a
foreseeable risk of heightened regulatory scrutiny and the need for
the Company undertake its own internal investigations; and (iii) as
a result, the Company's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

On July 17, 2019, Eagle Bancorp disclosed rising legal costs
stemming from ongoing internal and government investigations of the
Company's identification, classification and disclosure of related
party transactions; the retirement of certain former officers and
directors; and the relationship of the Company and certain of its
former officers and directors with a local public official.

On this news, Eagle Bancorp's stock price fell $14.30 per share, or
26.75%, to close at $39.15 per share on July 18, 2019. As a result
of Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the precipitous
decline in the market value of the Company's securities, Plaintiff
and other Class members have suffered significant losses and
damages.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          Gustavo F. Bruckner, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
          Jonathan Lindenfeld, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
          E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  gfbruckner@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com
                  jlindenfeld@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          10 South La Salle Street, Suite 3505
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 377-1181
          Facsimile: (312) 377-1184
          E-mail: pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com

EMAN INVESTMENTS: Hires Hoff Law Offices as Counsel
---------------------------------------------------
Eman Investments, LLC, seeks authority from the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of Texas to employ Hoff Law
Offices, P.C., as counsel to the Debtor.

Compression Generation requires Hoff Law Offices to represent and
provide legal services to the Debtor in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceedings

Hoff Law Offices will be paid at these hourly rates:

     Attorneys               $300
     Legal Assistants         $75

Hoff Law Offices will also be reimbursed for reasonable
out-of-pocket expenses incurred.

Jessica L. Hoff, a partner at Hoff Law Offices, assured the Court
that the firm is a "disinterested person" as the term is defined in
Section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code and does not represent any
interest adverse to the Debtor and its estates.

Hoff Law Offices can be reached at:

     Jessica L. Hoff, Esq.
     HOFF LAW OFFICES, P.C.
     1322 Space Park Drive Suite B-128
     Houston, TX 77058
     Tel: (832) 975-0366
     E-mail: jhoff@hofflawoffices.com

                    About Eman Investments

Eman Investments, LLC, owns and operates a truck stop business in
Waller, Texas.

Eman Investments sought Chapter 11 protection (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
Case No. 19-33728) on July 1, 2019.  In the petition signed by Ali
Z. Dadwani, vice president, the Debtor disclosed $2,800,000 in
assets and $1,940,000 in liabilities.  The Hon. Jeffrey P. Norman
oversees the case.  Jessica L. Hoff, Esq., at Hoff Law Offices,
P.C., serves as bankruptcy counsel to the Debtor.

EXPEDIA GROUP: Officers Face Investor Suit in Chancery Court
------------------------------------------------------------
A verified stockholder class action complaint has been filed
against Bary Diller, et al. The case is captioned as TOVA PLAUT, on
Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff,
vs. BARRY DILLER, PETER M. KERN, SUSAN C. ATHEY, A. GEORGE BATTLE,
COURTNEE CHUN, CHELSEA CLINTON, PAMELA L. COE, JONATHAN L. DOLGEN,
CRAIG A. JACOBSON, VICTOR KAUFMAN, DARA KHOSROWSHAHI, MARK
OKERSTROM, SCOTT RUDIN, CHRISTOPHER W. SHEAN, ALEXANDER VON
FURSTENBERG, and EXPEDIA GROUP, INC., the Defendants, Case No.
2019-0568 (Del. Ch., July 24, 2019).

Expedia Group is an American global travel technology company. Its
websites, which are primarily travel fare aggregators and travel
metasearch engines, include CarRentals.com, CheapTickets,
Expedia.com, HomeAway, Hotels.com, Hotwire.com, Orbitz,
Travelocity, trivago, and Venere.com.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff are:

          Eric L. Zagar, Esq.
          Michael C. Wagner, Esq
          Christopher M. Windover, Esq
          Grant D. Goodhart III
          KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP
          280 King of Prussia Road
          Radnor, PA 19087
          Telephone: (610) 667-7706
          Facsimile: (267) 948-2512

               - and -

          Jeremy S. Friedman, Esq.
          David F.E. Tejtel, Esq.
          FRIEDMAN OSTER & TEJTEL PLLC
          493 Bedford Center Road, Suite 2D
          Bedford Hills, NY 10507

               - and -

          Shaye Fuchs, Esq.
          37 Arrowhead Lane
          Lawrence, NY 11559
          Telephone: (516) 509-8755

               - and -

          Michael Hanrahan, Esq.
          Kevin H. Davenport, Esq.
          Samuel L. Closic, Esq.
          Mary S. Thomas, Esq.
          PRICKETT, JONES & ELLIOTT, P.A.
          1310 N. King Street
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 888-6500

               - and -

          Peter B. Andrews, Esq.
          Craig J. Springer, Esq.
          David Sborz, Esq.
          ANDREWS & SPRINGER LLC
          3801 Kennett Pike
          Building C, Suite 305
          Wilmington, DE 19807

FCA US: Court Partially OKs Motion in Limine in J. Flores Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
Parties' Motion in Limine in the case captioned JULIAN III FLORES,
et al., Plaintiffs, v. FCA US LLC, Defendant. Case No.
1:17-cv-00427 JLT. (E.D. Cal.).

The Flores' purchased a 2012 Dodge Ram 1500 on September 4, 2011,
which they contend had serious defects and nonconformities to
warranty. Plaintiffs contend FCA UC LLC manufactured the vehicle
and is liable for violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty
Act and fraudulent inducement under California law. The defendant
denies these claims.

Plaintiffs' Motions in Limine

Plaintiffs' motion in limine No. 1  

Plaintiffs seek to exclude evidence that they did not make use of
the Better Business Bureau's arbitration service. They argue that
whether they took steps to resolve the dispute or make sufficient
effort to seek repurchase is irrelevant because California law has
no such requirement. Consequently, the plaintiffs assert that any
argument or evidence suggesting he failed to act reasonably in this
regard is irrelevant or misleading.

Nevertheless, the plaintiffs argue that FCA's refusal to repurchase
or replace the defective vehicle is relevant to his prayer for
civil penalties. Song-Beverly provides for civil penalties where a
plaintiff establishes that a defendant's failure to comply with an
obligation of that statute was willful. A jury can find that a
violation was willful where a manufacturer refused a refund or
replacement on the ground a reasonable number of repair attempts
had not been made, without making any effort to gather the
available information on repair history.

The plaintiffs also seek to preclude FCA from examining them about
why they did not do more to obtain a buy-back prior to filing a
lawsuit" because Song-Beverly places the burden on the manufacturer
to monitor warranty repair attempts and does not require consumers
to take any affirmative steps to secure relief for the failure of a
manufacturer to service or repair a vehicle to conform to
applicable warranties-other than, of course, permitting the
manufacturer a reasonable opportunity to repair the vehicle, even
though, as a practical matter, most consumers likely will make such
a request.

The Court agrees that though the plaintiffs are not required to
affirmatively request repurchase, if he chooses to testify that he
requested repurchase, the defense is entitled to question him about
this action. Whether he sought arbitration through the BBB,
however, is irrelevant and may not be admitted. Whether FCA
maintains an informal dispute solution program is pertinent to the
penalties the plaintiffs seek and is admissible. Thus, the motion
is GRANTED IN PART.

Plaintiffs' motion in limine No. 2

The plaintiffs seek to exclude expert testimony from FCA's person
most knowledgeable. The plaintiffs assert they noticed and took the
deposition of FCA's person most knowledgeable and that FCA produced
Michael McDowell.  

FCA counters that the plaintiffs did not notice a PMK deposition,
did not take such a deposition and that FCA did not offer Mr.
McDowell as the PMK. FCA notes also that Ms. Dietrich its intended
coroporate witness Is a long-time employee who, due to this
experience working for FCA, has personal knowledge about various
topics including the Customer Assistance Inquiry Records. FCA
clarifies that it has no intention of seeking testimony that is
beyond Ms. Dietrich's personal knowledge and which strays into
expert testimony. At this point, the Court lacks sufficient
information to determine whether FCA complied with Fed.R.Civ.P 26.


Thus, it RESERVES ruling on this issue. If plaintiffs produce a
deposition notice for FCA's PMK and produces a transcript of the
deposition which would support their claims that FCA has switched
their corporate witness the Court will entertain the motion on this
basis. Failing that, the Court will presume the motion is
withdrawn, on this basis.

If the plaintiffs intend to ask questions of Ms. Dietrich as to
whether FCA's conduct conformed to FCA's policies and other such
questions that requires Ms. Dietrich to offer lay opinions, FCA is
entitled to question Ms. Dietrich similarly. In any event, FCA is
entitled to call this witness, assuming she can offer relevant and
admissible testimony. Neither party is entitled to ask Ms. Dietrich
any questions that would urge her to stray into expert territory
and she is not permitted to offer an expert opinion.

Consequently, the motion is DENIED IN PART and RESERVED IN PART.
Defendant's Motions in Limine

Defendant's motion in limine No. 1  
The defendant seeks to exclude the testimony or Dr. Barbara Luna.
The plaintiffs report that Dr. Luna will testify, as to matters
including, but not limited to, corporate business culture,
corporate customs and practices, and corporate standards of
concealing or omitting material information. Ultimately, Dr. Luna's
testimony will likely center around issues pertaining to whether
Chrysler's business practices were deceptive and being performed in
compliance with Chrysler's various disclosure obligations and its
own code of conduct.

Under Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 702, an expert witness may
testify as to his opinions if: (a) the expert's specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue (b) the testimony is based on
sufficient facts or data (c) the testimony is the product of
reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. The
Court is obligated to serve in a gatekeeping function.  

The trial court must make an initial assessment of the proposed
expert testimony to ensure that it rests on a reliable foundation
and is relevant to the task at hand. In other words, the trial
court must consider (1) whether the reasoning or methodology
underlying the expert testimony is valid (the reliability prong)
and (2) whether the reasoning or methodology can be applied to the
facts in issue (the relevancy prong).  

To determine the reliability of expert testimony, the Supreme Court
has identified four factors that a trial court may consider: (1)
whether the scientific knowledge can be and has been tested' (2)
whether `the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review
and publication'; (3) `the known or potential rate of error' and
(4) `general acceptance.

These factors, however, are not exclusive.  The Supreme Court has
explained that expert testimony is relevant if it assists the trier
of fact in understanding evidence or determining a fact in issue in
the case.  

Dr. Luna is a forensic accountant and damages and valuation expert.
She authored an expert report in this case which has not been
provided. Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Luna has a reliable basis in
the knowledge and experience of the relevant discipline because she
has thirteen certifications and accreditations regarding his
analysis of business dealings, including a license as a Certified
Fraud Examiner and has over 30 years of experience as a forensic
accountant as well as experience analyzing damages and valuation of
corporate business dealings. The plaintiffs argue that Dr.

Luna's testimony falls outside the ordinary knowledge of the jury
and that her expertise concerning business practices and whether
Chrysler acted in compliance with its various disclosure
obligations and its own code of conduct will be helpful to the
jury.  

The Court agrees that Dr. Luna's lack of firsthand automotive
engineering knowledge does not render all of her testimony
inadmissible. Expert opinions may find a basis in part on what a
different expert believes on the basis of expert knowledge not
possessed by the first expert and this is in fact common in
technical fields. An expert may not merely act as a conduit for
another expert's testimony or simply vouch for another expert but
may rely on another expert's opinion in formulating her own opinion
does not on its own run afoul of Rule 702. Nor does the fact that
Dr. Luna was provided internal FCA documents from counsel or that
she read about certain allegations in the Complaint render her
testimony unreliable.
  
In short, it appears many of Dr. Luna's assumptions, which
constitute the bases for the conclusions she had formed by the time
she wrote her report and sat for her deposition, are based on no
evidence at all. Because her opinions related to the defectiveness
of the TIPM system at issue or when the defendant first learned of
the defective nature of the TIPM system at issue, are only as good
as the evidence upon which they are based, it does not appear that
her opinions in this regard would assist the trier of fact.3 An
expert's obligation is not to form her opinions first and then
later be apprised of evidence that may support them; she must first
be apprised of the evidence and then form her opinions. She must
include all of her opinions and the bases for them in her Rule 26
report and must be prepared to be fully examined on the topics upon
which she has opined, including the underpinnings for her opinions.
That did not occur here.

Likewise, the Court disagrees that Chrysler's code of conduct has
any bearing on any liability or damage questions in this case,
including the defendant's intent, and, it appears, using it is
intended only to inflame the jury. It is, therefore, excluded under
Rule 403.

The motion is GRANTED in PART.

Defendant's motions in limine No. 2  

In its motion in limine No. 2, the defendant seeks to exclude
exhibits 101, 103-11, 115-116 and 138. The defendant argues that
these documents are National Highway Transportation Safety
Administration documents or Technical Service Bulletins for
vehicles other than the 2012 Dodge Ram. The defendant argues the
recalls discussed in the NHTSA documents will not identify any of
the alleged defects of the plaintiffs' 2012 Dodge Ram.   

The defense argues further that the Technical Service
Bulletins—which are advisory documents sent to Chrysler
dealerships to alert them to potential mechanical issues—did not
apply to the 2012 Dodge Ram 1500 and there is no evidence the
plaintiffs' vehicle suffered from any of these complaints.

The defendant also seeks to exclude exhibits 112-113, 117, 119-126,
129 and 139-143 in its motion in limine No. 3.   These documents
are emails that reference the TIPM-7, though they do not refer
either to the 2012 Dodge Ram 1500 or problems noted in the 2012
Dodge Ram 1500. The defense also argues that the plaintiffs and,
presumably, their witnesses lack personal knowledge of the contents
of the documents.

The plaintiffs argue that the TIPM-7 which was installed on many
makes and models of Chrysler vehicles suffered from various defects
as evidenced by the exhibits at issue. The plaintiffs' expert will
opine that these documents placed FCA on notice that the TIPM-7
should have been scrapped and reengineered, rather than making
corrections that constitute band-aids covering the systemic problem
of the TIPM-7.  

It appears that plaintiffs contend that problems with the TIPM-7
can manifest themselves in so many different ways as to permit
introduction of documents related to any purported manifestation
regardless of whether plaintiffs' specific vehicle or the 2012
Dodge Ram 1500 pickups as a whole, experienced these problems. The
Court disagrees.

Though the plaintiffs have not shown the documents to be relevant,
even if they are relevant, they have the significant potential of
prejudice to the defense because they would suggest to the jury
that the myriad of problems demonstrated by other types of vehicles
with a TIPM even if the TIPM at issue was not the same version as
in the plaintiffs' vehicle must mean that the problems with
plaintiffs' car must have been caused by the TIPM-7. There is no
showing that this me too evidence should be allowed here. Evidence
concerning problems not experienced by or not directly related to
plaintiffs' type of vehicle is irrelevant, confusing and unduly
prejudicial under Rules 401 and 403 and are excluded. Consequently,
the motions are GRANTED in PART.

Defendant's motions in limine No. 5

The defense seeks to exclude exhibit 63, which is an order issued
in a class action case which complained of TIPM issues. The defense
explains that this order does not relate to the 2012 Dodge Ram 1500
and so it is irrelevant. The plaintiffs do not oppose this motion.

The Court notes that it is obligated to instruct the jury on the
law. The Court has not been shown that the jury should be guided by
what the court decided in Velasco. Likewise, due to the failure to
oppose the motion, the Court has no information at all that there
exists a reasoned and legal basis for the document to be
introduced. Thus, the motion is GRANTED.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 18, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y29qjz2d from Leagle.com.

Julian III Flores & Alejandra Flores, Plaintiffs, represented by
Sepehr Daghighian -- sepehr@daghighian.com -- Hackler Daghighian
Martino & Novak, P.C., Steve Mikhov, Knight Law Group, LLP,
Mitchell E. Rosensweig, Knight Law Group, LLP & Russell W. Higgins,
Knight Law Group LLP, 10250 Constellation Blvd, Suite 2500, Los
Angeles, CA 90067

FCA US LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, Defendant,
represented by Jeanette Catuira Suarez, Nixon Peabody, Jeffery
Fadeff -- jfadeff@behblaw.com -- Nixon Peabody LLP, Kristi
Livedalen, Nixon Peabody, LLP 300 S Grand Ave Ste 4100, Los
Angeles, CA 90071-3151 & Scott Steven Shepardson --
sshepardson@ongaropc.com -- Ongaro PC.


FIRST AMERICAN: Sindaghatta Files Suit in C.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against First American
Financial Corporation. The case is styled as Shreyas Sindaghatta,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff v. First American Financial Corporation, First American
Title Insurance Company, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-06576-CAS-KS
(C.D. Cal., July 30, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract.

First American Financial Corporation is a United States financial
services company and is a provider of title insurance and
settlement services to the real estate and mortgage
industries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Amber Lee Eck, Esq.
     Haeggquist & Eck, LLP
     225 Broadway, Suite 2050
     San Diego, CA 92101
     Phone: (619) 342-8000
     Fax: (619) 342-7878
     Email: ambere@haelaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

     Robert Anthony Cocchia, Esq.
     Paul M Kakuske, Esq.
     Dentons US LLP
     601 Figueroa Street Suite 2500
     Los Angeles, CA 90017
     Phone: (213) 623-9300
     Fax: (213) 623-9924
     Email: robert.cocchia@dentons.com
            paul.kakuske@dentons.com


FITBIT, INC: Removes Willis Suit to S.D. California
---------------------------------------------------
Fitbit, Inc. removed the lawsuit styled as BARON WILLIS,
individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. FITBIT, INC., a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No.
37-2019-00031494-CU-BT-CTL (Filed June 18, 2019), from the San
Diego County Superior Court, to the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California on July 23, 2019. The
Southern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:19-cv-01377-DMS-WVG to the proceeding.

The complaint alleges that, for years, Fitbit was on notice of a
design defect that caused some of its products' bands to "regularly
pop off the consumer's wrists," and "yet failed to correct [the
defect] and continued to sell [defective products] to consumers,
without providing them with notice of the defect."

The complaint seeks recovery of the purchase price paid by all of
the class members for the relevant Fitbit products, restitution of
all amounts obtained by Fitbit as a result of its alleged
misconduct (plus interest), other compensatory damages, punitive
damages, costs of suit, attorneys' fees, and an injunction,
pursuant to the California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act, the
California's Unfair Competition Law, the California's False
Advertising Law, breach of Express Warranty, breach of Implied
Warranty, and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

Fitbit, Inc. is an American company headquartered in San Francisco,
California. Its products are activity trackers, wireless-enabled
wearable technology devices that measure data such as the number of
steps walked, heart rate, quality of sleep, steps climbed, and
other personal metrics involved in fitness.[BN]

Attorney for the Defendant is:

          David F. McDowell, Esq.
          MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
          707 Wilshire Boulevard
          Los Angeles, CA 90017-3543
          Telephone: 213.892.5200
          E-mail: DMcDowell@mofo.com

FMR LLC: Sills et al. Allege 401(K) Plan Kickback Payments
-----------------------------------------------------------
Participant in the T-Mobile USA, Inc. 401(k) Retirement Savings
Plan and Trust commenced a class action lawsuit against FMR LLC,
Fidelity and other entities alleging that Fidelity received
kickback payments in connection with the investments of Plaintiff
and the Plan.  Fidelity acted as a service provider for, a
party-in-interest with respect to and a fiduciary of the Plan.

The Plaintiffs seek relief on behalf of the T-Mobile Plan and all
other similarly situated Plans pursuant to Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974's civil enforcement remedies with
respect to fiduciaries and other interested parties and,
specifically 29 U.S.C. sections 1109 and 1132.

Personal savings accounts in the form of 401(k) and other defined
contribution plans have become the primary method for employees in
the United States to save for retirement in recent years. The
importance of defined contribution plans to the United States
retirement system has become increasingly pronounced as
employer-provided defined benefit plans have become increasingly
rare as an offered and meaningful employee benefit.

Beginning in or about 2016, Fidelity began requiring various mutual
funds, affiliates of mutual funds, mutual fund advisors,
sub-advisors, investment funds, including collective trusts, and
other investment advisors, instruments or vehicles that are offered
to the Plans through Fidelity's FundNetwork, to make secret
payments to Fidelity for its own benefit in the guise of
"infrastructure” payments or so-called relationship-level fees in
violation of, inter alia, the prohibited transaction rules of the
ERISA.

The kickback payments at issue are part of a pay-to-play scheme in
which Fidelity receives these payments from mutual funds in the
event that otherwise disclosed 12b-1 fees, administration fees,
service fees, sub-transfer agent fees and/or similar fees fall
below a certain level and Fidelity requires payment of these
kickbacks in return for providing the mutual funds with access to
its retirement plan customers, including
its 401(k) plan customers like Plaintiffs.

Although Fidelity attempts to categorize these secret kickback
payments as flat dollar payments, the payments are, in fact,
calculated based upon the assets that the mutual funds maintain
under management, including the Plans' assets invested in the
mutual funds, and are offset by the amount, if any, of revenue
sharing payments generated by the assets for which Fidelity
provides record-keeping and related services, including such
services that are provided by Fidelity to the Plans.

Fidelity has conducted its retirement business and the retirement
business of all other Fidelity affiliates. Fidelity acts as a
recordkeeper, "service provider," a party-in-interest, and a
fiduciary of thousands of 401(k) plans and similar defined
contribution retirement plans in the United States. Fidelity offers
the Plans the opportunity to invest in third-party mutual funds and
similar investment vehicles through its "FundsNetwork," which
Fidelity launched in 1989.

The lawsuit is styled as TYLER W. SILLS, REGINA CRYSTAL ROBINSON
and CATEENIA D. JOHNSON, On Behalf of the T-MOBILE USA, INC. 401(K)
RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLAN AND TRUST and On Behalf Of All Other
Similarly Situated Employee Benefit Plans, the Plaintiffs, vs. FMR
LLC; FIDELITY MANAGEMENT & RESEARCH COMPANY; FIDELITY MANAGEMENT
TRUST COMPANY; FIDELITY BROKERAGE SERVICES LLC; NATIONAL FINANCIAL
SERVICES LLC; FIDELITY INVESTMENTS INSTUTIONAL OPERATIONS COMPANY,
INC. AND JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-10, the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-11595 (D. Mass., July 23, 2019).[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Gregory K. McGillivary, Esq.
          Megan K. Mechak, Esq.
          Michael R. Keefe, Esq.
          McGILLIVARY STEELE ELKIN LLP
          1101 Vermont Ave., N.W., Suite 1000
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 833-8855
          Facsimile: (202) 452-1090
          E-mail: gkm@mselaborlaw.com
                  mkm@mselaborlaw.com
                  mrk@mselaborlaw.com

               - and -

          Charles P. Yezbak, III, Esq.
          YEZBAK LAW OFFICES
          292002 Richard Jones Road, Suite B-200
          Nashville, TN 37215
          Telephone: (615) 250-2000
          E-mail: yezbak@yezbaklaw.com

FORD: Fencl Sues over Overstated Fuel Economy Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Ford Motor Company
for negligent misrepresentation, breach of warranty, breach of
implied warranty, breach of express warranty, unjust enrichment,
and for violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and the New
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. The case is captioned KEITH FENCL,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-14714
(D.N.J., July 3, 2019).

This is a class action brought by Plaintiff Keith Fencl on behalf
of himself and a class of current and former owners or lessees of
model year 2017 through 2019 Ford automobiles, including the 2018
Ford F-150, that were marketed and sold with false fuel economy
ratings. Ford represented to Plaintiff and Class members that the
Class Vehicles had achieved specific miles-per-gallon (MPG)
estimates. Ford concealed that its Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) fuel economy testing was inadequate, which resulted in Class
Vehicles with overstated MPG fuel economy ratings. On Feb. 21,
2019, Ford announced that EPA fuel economy testing results were not
accurate and, as a result, that the Class Vehicles' fuel economy
are overstated. Ford's warranties, advertising, and other
statements about the promised MPG of the Class Vehicles are false
and misleading. Through its misrepresentations, Ford induced
Plaintiff and Class members to purchase or lease the Class
Vehicles, which do not perform as represented. Plaintiff and Class
members paid more for their Class Vehicles than they otherwise
would have and have had to pay higher fuel costs than they would
have paid had the Class Vehicles performed as advertised. Plaintiff
and Class members would not have purchased or leased the Class
Vehicles had they known the truth of Defendant's fraudulent scheme.


Accordingly, this class action complaint seeks relief for the
injuries sustained as the result of the inaccurate testing methods
used by Ford to ascertain the fuel economy ratings of its vehicles
and Ford's material misstatements regarding those ratings that Ford
used in the marketing and sales of Class Vehicles in the United
States. Plaintiff seeks relief in this action individually and as a
class action on behalf of all purchasers or lessees of Ford models
with inflated fuel economy ratings for violations of federal and
state consumer protection statutes, breach of warranty and breach
of contract.

Ford Motor Company is a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business at One American Road in Dearborn, Michigan. The
company is engaged in the business of designing, manufacturing,
marketing, warranting, distributing, selling, and leasing
automobiles, including the
Class Vehicles, throughout the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joseph J. DePalma, Esq.
     Bruce D. Greenberg, Esq.
     Susana Cruz Hodge, Esq.
     LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG, LLC
     570 Broad Street, Suite 1201
     Newark, NJ 07102
     Telephone: (973) 623-3000
     Facsimile: (973) 623-0858
     E-mail: jdepalma@litedepalma.com
             bgreenberg@litedepalma.com
             scruzhodge@litedepalma.com

             - and -

     Kimberly A. Justice, Esq.
     Jonathan M. Jagher, Esq.
     FREED KANNER LONDON & MILLEN LLC
     923 Fayette Street
     Conshohocken, PA 19428
     Telephone: (610) 234-6487
     E-mail: kjustice@fklmlaw.com
             jjagher@fklmlaw.com

             - and -

     Steven A. Kanner, Esq.
     William H. London, Esq.
     Douglas A. Millen, Esq.
     Michael E. Moskovitz, Esq.
     Brian M. Hogan, Esq.
     FREED KANNER LONDON & MILLEN LLC
     2201 Waukegan Road, Suite 130
     Bannockburn, IL 60015
     Telephone: (224) 632-4500
     E-mail: skanner@fklmlaw.com
             blondon@fklmlaw.com
             dmillen@fklmlaw.com
             mmoskovitz@fklmlaw.com
             bhogan@fklmlaw.com

             - and -

     Karen Hanson Riebel, Esq.
     Brian D. Clark, Esq.
     LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL & NAUEN P.L.L.P.
     100 Washington Avenue South, Suite 2200
     Minneapolis, MN 55401
     Telephone: (612) 339-6900
     E-mail: khriebel@locklaw.com
             bdclark@locklaw.com

             - and -

     Katrina Carroll, Esq.
     CARLSON LYNCH LLP
     111 W. Washington Street, Suite 1240
     Chicago, IL 60602
     Telephone: (312) 750-1265
     E-mail: kcarroll@carlsonlynch.com

             - and -

     Gary F. Lynch, Esq.
     CARLSON LYNCH LLP
     1133 Penn Ave., 5th Floor
     Pittsburgh, PA 15222
     Telephone: (412) 322-9243
     E-mail: glynch@carlsonlynch.com

             - and -

     Guido Saveri, Esq.
     R. Alexander Saveri, Esq.
     SAVERI & SAVERI, INC.
     706 Sansome Street
     San Francisco, CA 94111
     Telephone: (415) 217-6810
     E-mail: guido@saveri.com
             rick@saveri.com

             - and -

     Eugene A. Spector, Esq.
     Jeffrey J. Corrigan, Esq.
     William G. Caldes, Esq.
     Jeffrey L. Spector, Esq.
     SPECTOR ROSEMAN & KODROFF. P.C.
     2001 Market Street, Suite 3420
     Philadelphia, PA 19103
     Telephone: (215) 496-0300
     E-mail: espector@srkattorneys.com
             jcorrigan@srkattorneys.com
             bcaldes@srkattorneys.com
             jspector@srkattorneys.com

             - and -

     Bradford L. Geyer, Esq.
     GEYERGOREY LLP
     2006 Berwick Drive
     Cinnaminson, NJ 08077
     Telephone: (856) 607-5708
     E-mail: Bradford.geyer@geyergorey.com

             - and -

     David P. McLafferty, Esq.
     MCLAFFERTY LAW FIRM, P.C.
     923 Fayette Street
     Conshohocken, PA 19428
     Telephone: (610) 940-4000 ext. 12
     E-mail: dmclafferty@mclaffertylaw.com


GLOBAL CREDIT: Court OKs Bid to Stay Wojcieski Suit
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay
Further Proceedings in the case captioned JENNIFER WOJCIESKI, ET
AL., Plaintiffs, v. GLOBAL CREDIT COLLECTION CORPORATION,
Defendant. Case No. 19-CV-1023. (E.D. Wis.).

The plaintiff filed a class action complaint. In this motion the
plaintiff moved to certify the class described in the complaint but
also moved the court to stay further proceedings on that motion.

In Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2011),
the court suggested that class-action plaintiffs move to certify
the class at the same time that they file their complaint. The
pendency of that motion protects a putative class from attempts to
buy off the named plaintiffs.

However, because parties are generally unprepared to proceed with a
motion for class certification at the beginning of a case, the
Damasco court suggested that the parties ask the district court to
delay its ruling to provide time for additional discovery or
investigation.

Accordingly, the plaintiff's motion to stay further proceedings on
the motion for class certification is granted.
  
A full-text copy of the District Court's July 18, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y4v34ep8 from Leagle.com.

Jennifer Wojcieski, Donna Kijek & Barbara Mollberg, Plaintiffs,
represented by Ben J. Slatky, Ademi & O'Reilly LLP, Jesse Fruchter,
Ademi & O'Reilly LLP, John D. Blythin, Ademi & O'Reilly LLP & Mark
A. Eldridge, Ademi & O'Reilly LLP.


GOOGLE LLC: Google Assistant Unlawfully Records Info, Suit Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ASIF KUMANDAN; MELISSA SPURR; and MELISSA SPURR, as guardian of
B.S., a minor, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. GOOGLE LLC; and ALPHABET INC., Defendants,
Case No. 5:19-cv-04286 (N.D. Cal., July 25, 2019) is an action
arises from the Defendants' unlawful and intentional recording of
individuals' confidential communications without their consent from
approximately May 18, 2016 to the present, in violation of the
California Invasion of Privacy Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants developed the Google
Assistant which is a voice-recognition software program that allows
individuals to use their voice to ask questions and receive answers
based on information available on the internet. Google preloads
Google Assistant on devices, including its own smart home speakers,
Google Home and Google Home Mini, and its Pixel smartphones. Google
Assistant also comes pre-installed on most smartphones running
Google's Android operating system and many other electronics
manufactured by third parties ("Google Assistant Enabled
Devices").

Google Assistant Enabled Devices are only supposed to record
conversations preceded by the utterance "Okay, Google" or "Hey,
Google" ("hot word(s)") or the pressing of a button on the device.
California law prohibits the recording of oral communications
without the consent of all parties to the communication.
California's privacy laws recognize the unique privacy interest
implicated by the recording of someone's voice. That privacy
interest has been heightened by companies exploiting consumers'
private data.

Individuals who have purchased or used Google Assistant Enabled
Devices and interacted with Google Assistant have not consented to
Google recording conversations where "Okay, Google" or "Hey,
Google" were not uttered or where no button has been pressed.
Similarly, minors with no Google account who did not set up Google
Assistant Enabled Devices have not consented to these recordings.

On July 10, 2019, Belgian news outlet VRT NWS reported that Google
was using Google Assistant Enabled Devices to record millions of
individuals, including minors, without their consent. According to
the VRT NWS report, Google Assistant Enabled Devices record
individuals' conversations where no hot word had been uttered or no
button had been pressed and hires people to listen to them to
improve the functionality of Google Assistant. Each recording is a
violation of California law.

Google LLC is a global technology company specializes in
internet-related services and products. The Company is primarily
focused on web-based search and display advertising tools, search
engine, cloud computing, software, and hardware. Google serves
customers worldwide. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

           Mark N. Todzo, Esq.
           Eric S. Somers, Esq.
           LEXINGTON LAW GROUP
           503 Divisadero Street
           San Francisco, CA 94117
           Telephone: (415) 913-7800
           Facsimile: (415) 759-4112
           E-mail: mtodzo@lexlawgroup.com

                - and -

          Vincent Briganti, Esq.
          Christian Levis, Esq.
          Ian Sloss, Esq.
          LOWEY DANNENBERG, P.C.
          44 South Broadway, Suite 1100
          White Plains, NY 10601
          Telephone: (914) 997-0500
          Facsimile: (914) 997-0035
          E-mail: vbriganti@lowey.com
                  clevis@lowey.com
                  isloss@lowey.com

               - and -

          Joseph P. Guglielmo, Esq.
          Erin Green Comite, Esq.
          SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
          The Helmsley Building
          230 Park Avenue, 17th Floor
          New York, NY 10169-1820
          Telephone: (212) 223-6444
          Facsimile: (212) 223-6334
          E-mail: jguglielmo@scott-scott.com
                  ecomite@scott-scott.com


GOOGLE LLC: Not Compelled to Show Privileged Materials in AdTrader
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ADTRADER, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. GOOGLE LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-07082-BLF (VKD) (N.D. Cal.), Magistrate
Judge Virginia K. DeMarchi of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, San Jose, denied without
prejudice. AdTrader's motion to compel production of material
withheld as privileged, or to preclude Google's use of certain
evidence.

The dispute arises in the context of AdTrader's anticipated motion
for attorneys' fees, and Google's anticipated response to that
motion.

Google recently advised the Court that it intends to issue certain
DBM advertisers (including members of the putative class) credits
or cash refunds for previously uncredited invalid advertising
activity detected between 2012 and late 2017.  AdTrader intends to
file a motion for attorneys' fees in connection with those credits
or refunds in which it will argue that this lawsuit was a catalyst
for Google's decision to issue those credits or refunds.  Citing
remarks of Google's counsel before Judge Freeman, AdTrader says it
expects Google to argue that the lawsuit was not a catalyst for the
decision to issue credits/refunds to the DBM advertiers.

AdTrader says that Google has produced some documents that
reportedly show its employees' efforts to calculate unrefunded
invalid advertising traffic charged to its DBM advertisers, as well
as discussions regarding possible credits or refunds to those
advertisers.  According to AdTrader, many of the documents were
partially redacted and others were withheld entirely based on the
attorney-client privilege.  Based on the context of the unredacted
portions of the documents, AdTrader suspects that Google's
privilege redactions conceal evidence that the lawsuit was, in
fact, a catalyst for the decision to issue DBM advertiser credits
or refunds.

While the dispute, as framed by the parties, raises several
interesting and substantial questions about the intersection of
California law and federal law regarding the attorney-client
privilege, implied waiver, the rule of completeness, and fairness,
Magistrate Judge Demarchi is not persuaded that the dispute is ripe
for decision at this time.  AdTrader has not filed its motion for
attorneys fees, and Google has not responded to the motion with any
evidence or argument, let alone evidence or argument that
implicates the concerns AdTrader flags in its motion.  For this
reason, it is not yet clear which documents, if any, give rise to
the concerns AdTrader has described.

Moreover, as discussed at the hearing, the attorney-client
privilege protects only privileged communications; it does not
protect facts.  AdTrader acknowledges that it has served discovery
on Google seeking information about facts bearing on its fees
motion.  That discovery may obviate the need for the Court to
consider whether particular redactions of privileged communications
from documents in Google's production conceal facts that are
relevant and material to AdTrader's position, as AdTrader may learn
those facts through other discovery means.

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge denied without prejudice
AdTrader's motion to compel production of material withheld as
privileged, or to preclude Google's use of certain evidence.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 21, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/bNkDo1 from Leagle.com.

AdTrader, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Flora F. Vigo, Esq. --
fvigo@gawpoe.com -- Gaw Poe LLP, Mark Weylin Poe, Esq. --
mpoe@gawpoe.com -- Gaw & Poe LLP, Samuel S. Song, Esq. --
ssong@gawpoe.com -- Gaw & Poe LLP, Victor Meng, Esq. --
vmeng@gawpoe.com -- Gaw & Poe LLP & Randolph Gaw, Gaw & Poe LLP.

Specialized Collections Bureau, Inc., Classic and Food EOOD, LML
CONSULT Ltd., Fresh Break Ltd. & Ad Crunch Ltd., Plaintiffs,
represented by Flora F. Vigo, Gaw Poe LLP, Samuel S. Song, Gaw &
Poe LLP & Randolph Gaw, Gaw & Poe LLP.

Google LLC, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey Gutkin, Esq. --
jgutkin@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Michael Graham Rhodes, Esq. --
rhodesmg@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Audrey Jane Mott-Smith, Esq. --
amottsmith@cooley.com -- cwong@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP & Kyle
Christopher Wong, Cooley LLP.


GOYA FOODS: Mejias Hits Truck Drivers' Misclassification
--------------------------------------------------------
ANIBAL MEJIAS, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated v.
GOYA FOODS, INC., ROBERT I. UNANUE, FRANCISCO R. UNANUE, JOSEPH
PEREZ, PETER UNANUE, DAVID KINKELA, REBECCA RODRIGUEZ, CARLOS G.
ORTIZ, MIGUEL A LUGO, JR., CONRAD COLON, JOHN DOES 1 - 10 (said
names being fictitious, real names unknown), ABC COMPANIES 1 - 10
(said names being fictitious, real names unknown), Case No.
MER-L-001401-19 (N.J. Super., Mercer Cty., July 18, 2019), is
brought to redress the Defendants' alleged violations of the New
Jersey Wage Payment Act, the New Jersey Civil RICO Act, and the
common law of New Jersey.

The Defendants unlawfully withheld wages from the Plaintiff and
those similarly situated by deducting costs and fees associated
with truck drivers' leasing of vehicles, for fuel and maintenance
costs, insurance, trailer rentals and other equipment,
administrative fees, returned and damaged products, and other
deductions not allowed by governing law, the Plaintiff alleges.  He
adds that the Defendants misclassified him and all those similarly
situated truck drivers as independent contractors instead of
employees under the standard articulated pursuant to the New Jersey
Wage Payment Law.

Goya is a company doing business in New Jersey and throughout the
United States manufacturing and selling and delivering food
products under the Goya brand name.  Headquartered in Jersey City,
New Jersey, Goya has multiple facilities throughout the United
States.  The Individual Defendants are officers of Goya.  Defendant
ABC Companies 1-10 are all unknown business entities associated
with Goya.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David E. Cassidy, Esq.
          John M. Vlasac, Jr., Esq.
          VLASAC & SHMARUK, LLC
          485 B Route 1 South, Suite 120
          Iselin, NJ 08830
          Telephone: (732) 494-3600
          E-mail: jvlasac@vslaws.com


GREENWAY CHRYSLER-JEEP-DODGE: Claims in Picton TCPA Suit Narrowed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CLIFTON PICTON, Plaintiff, v. GREENWAY
CHRYSLER-JEEP-DODGE, INC., Defendant, Case No.
6:19-cv-196-Orl-31DCI (M.D. Fla.), Judge Gregory A. Presnell of the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Orlando
Division, granted in part and denied in part Greenway's Motion to
Dismiss.

So-called "ringless" voicemail technology allows advertisers to
transmit recorded messages via the Internet directly to the
voicemail box associated with a cellular telephone without causing
the phone itself to ring.  According to the allegations of the
Amended Complaint in the putative class action, Greenway used the
technology to contact Picton on two occasions in February 2018,
leaving messages in his voicemail box promoting an "inventory
elimination" sale at its dealership.  Picton contends that ringless
voicemails are subject to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991 ("TCPA") and because Greenway did not have his express consent
to contact him, the two voicemails violated that act.

The matter comes before the Court without a hearing on Greenway's
Motion to Dismiss.  In the prayers for relief of both counts of the
Amended Complaint, Picton seeks, inter alia, a declaration that
Greenway's practices violate the TCPA and an injunction prohibiting
it from committing such violations in the future.  Greenway
contends that Picton lacks standing to obtain declaratory or
injunctive relief because the allegations of the Amended Complaint
do not establish a sufficient likelihood that Greenway will cause
additional ringless voicemails to be transmitted to his voicemail
box.  Picton responds that (1) that the proper way to attack a
prayer for relief is via a motion to strike rather than a motion to
dismiss, and (2) that it is not necessary that a pleading establish
entitlement to injunctive relief, when such entitlement would be
subject to a subsequent motion.

Judge Presnell holds that Greenway is correct.  In the circuit, at
the motion to dismiss stage, a prayer for injunctive and
declaratory relief requires an assessment of whether the plaintiff
has sufficiently shown a real and immediate threat of future harm.
Picton does not even attempt to demonstrate that he has alleged a
real and immediate threat of receiving additional voicemails from
Greenway.  His requests for injunctive and declaratory relief will
therefore be dismissed.

In the second of his two counts of the Amended Complaint, Picton
seeks to recover such trebled damages.  Greenway complains that
Picton has not provided sufficient allegations to show entitlement
to the trebled damage.  Greenway also argues that Count II fails
for another reason -- because it is solely a request for treble
damages.

In this, the Judge finds that Greenway is correct.  In Count I,
Picton sets forth a claim for violations of 47 U.S.C. Section
227(b)(1)(A)(iii).  In Count II, Picton sets forth the same claim
but adds that Greenway knew or should have known that its conduct
violated" the TCPA and asks the Court to treble the amount of
damages otherwise available.  But the possibility of treble damages
under 47 U.S.C. Section 227(b)(3) is not a separate cause of
action; it is simply an enhancement of the damages available for a
violation of 47 U.S.C. Section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) -- which is what
Picton has already alleged in Count I.  Accordingly, Count II will
be dismissed.

In consideration of the foregoing, Judge Presnell granted in part
and denied in  part the Motion to Dismiss.  The Plaintiff's request
for declaratory and injunctive relief is dismissed.  Counse II is
also dismissed.  In all other respects, the motion is denied.  By
July 5, 2019, the Plaintiff may file an amended pleading that adds
a request for treble damages to the prayer for relief in Count I.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 21, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/qtYf37 from Leagle.com.

Clifton Picton, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew John Shamis --
ashamis@shamisgentile.com -- Shamis & Gentile, PA, Ignacio Hiraldo
-- ijhiraldo@ijhlaw.com -- IJH Law, Michael Eisenband --
MEisenband@Eisenbandlaw.com -- Eisenband Law, P.A., Scott Adam
Edelsberg -- scott@edelsberglaw.com -- Edelsberg Law, PA & Manuel
Santiago Hiraldo -- mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com -- Hiraldo PA.

Greenway Chrysler-Jeep- Dodge, Inc., doing business as Greenway
Dodge Chrysler Jeep, Defendant, represented by George Brock
Magruder, III -- brock.magruder@gray-robinson.com -- GrayRobinson,
PA, Jason Alec Zimmerman -- jason.zimmerman@gray-robinson.com --
GrayRobinson, PA & Jeffrey Michael Aaron --
jeff.aaron@gray-robinson.com -- GrayRobinson, PA.


HAPPY ANGEL: Seeks 2nd Circuit Review of Judgment in Moreno Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Wang Dong and Happy Angel Nail Spa Inc. filed an appeal
from the District Court's judgment issued on July 1, 2019, in the
lawsuit styled De La Cruz Moreno, et al. v. Happy Angel Nail Spa
Inc., et al., Case No. 15-cv-10078, in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York (New York City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit is
brought against the Defendants for failure to minimum and overtime
wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standard Act.

The Defendants own and operate a nail salon doing business as Happy
Angel, located at 2632 Broadway, in New York City.

The appellate case is captioned as De La Cruz Moreno, et al. v.
Happy Angel Nail Spa Inc., et al., Case No. 19-2192, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees Guadalupe De La Cruz Moreno, individually and
on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, and Rosa Toledo
Cabrera, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, are represented by:

      Brandon D. Sherr, Esq.
      LAW OFFICE OF JUSTIN A. ZELLER, P.C.
      277 Broadway, Suite 408
      New York, N.Y. 10007-2036
      Telephone: (212) 229-2249
      Facsimile: (212) 229-2246
      E-mail: bsherr@zellerlegal.com

Defendants-Appellants Happy Angel Nail Spa Inc., jointly and
severally, and Wang Dong, jointly and severally, are represented
by:

          Keli Liu, Esq.
          HANG AND ASSOCIATES, PLLC
          136-20 38th Avenue
          Flushing, NY 11354
          Telephone: (718) 353-8588
          E-mail: kliu@hanglaw.com


HEMPSTEAD, NY: Bid to Disqualify A. Bisceglie as Counsel Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GB, a pseudonym; NP, a pseudonym; MA, a pseudonym, as
Legal Guardian of BA, a pseudonym; PM, a pseudonym, as Parent and
Natural Guardian of JM, a pseudonym; JF, a pseudonym, as parent and
Natural Guardian of BF, a pseudonym; HK, a pseudonym; MV, a
pseudonym, as Parent and Natural Guardian of RD, a pseudonym, on
behalf of themselves individually and all other similarly situated
individuals, Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF HEMPSTEAD, ANTHONY SANTINO,
WILLIAM MULLER III, DIANA BIANCULLI-MULLER, NASRIN G. AHMAD,
MICHAEL ZAPPOLO, CITIZENS FOR SANTINO, JOHN/JANE DOE REPUBLICAN
ORGANIZATIONS, AND JOHN/JANE DOE OTHER ENTITIES, Defendants, Case
No. 2:17-cv-06625 (ADS)(ARL) (E.D. N.Y.), Judge Arthur D. Spatt of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied
the Plaintiffs' motion to disqualify Angelo Bisceglie from
representing any of the Defendants in the litigation.

On Nov. 13, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed the putative civil rights
class action against the Defendants.  On Jan. 30, 2018, the
Plaintiffs filed their motion to disqualify.

On Sept. 26, 2018 the Court referred the Plaintiffs' motion to U.S.
Magistrate Judge Arlene R. Lindsay for a report and recommendation
as to whether the motion should be granted, and if so, what if any
relief should be given.  On May 1, 2019, Judge Lindsay issued a
Report and Recommendation ("R&R") that the Court denies the
Plaintiffs' motion to disqualify.

Presently before the Court are the Plaintiff's objections to the
R&R.  In the R&R, Judge Lindsay found no actual conflict exists
because the Defendants have yet to take inconsistent, no less
adverse, positions with respect to their liability to the
Plaintiffs.  With regard to any potential conflict, Judge Lindsay
noted that the Town authorized the indemnification of Defendants
Santino, Ahmad and Zappolo, who signed a consent to join the
representation by Mr. Bisceglie.  The remaining individual
Defendants who have made appearances, Muller and Bianculli-Muller,
now both represented by Muller, a licensed attorney, indicated they
did not believe any conflict existed between them and Mr. Bisceglie
and further expressly waived any conflict to the extent that one
existed.  Judge Lindsay provided an extremely thorough recitation
of case law illustrating that it would be improper to deny the
parties represented by Mr. Bisceglie their choice of counsel under
the circumstances.

The Plaintiffs raised their objections because they claim the R&R
appears to be based on an incomplete set of facts.  According to
them, Judge Lindsay failed to consider that: (1) Citizens for
Santino filed an answer rather than a motion to dismiss; (2) Muller
and Bianculli-Muller are entitled to have their defense fees paid
pursuant to Town Code Section 11-2(A), notwithstanding their
representation by Muller; and (3) Mr. Bisceglie volunteered to
accept service on behalf of defendants Amorini, Coleman, and Ra.

Judge Spatt finds the Plaintiffs' objections speculative and
conclusory.  They cite no pertinent case law.  And they fail to
address any of the rationale supporting the findings in the R&R.
Such objections are only entitled to review for clear error, of
which the Court finds none.  Assuming he applied de novo review,
the Judge sees no justification for departing from Judge Lindsay's
persuasive and well-reasoned determinations.  Therefore, he
overrules the Plaintiffs' objections and concurs with the R&R.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Spatt adopted the R&R in its
entirety, and denied the motion to disqualify.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 21, 2019 Memoranum of Decision
and Order is available at https://is.gd/KdbVD9 from Leagle.com.

GB, a pseudonym, NP, a pseudonym, MA, a pseudonym, as Legal
Guardian of BA, a pseudonym, PM, a pseudonym, as Parent and Natural
Guardian of JM, a pseudonym, JF, a pseudonym, as parent and Natural
Guardian of BF, a pseudonym, HK, a pseudonym & MV, a pseudonym, as
Parent and Natural Guardian of RD, a pseudonym, on behalf of
themselves individually and all other similarly situated
individuals, Plaintiffs, represented by Christopher J. Benes --
info@goldbenes.com -- Gold Benes LLP, Cynthia A. Kouril, Kouril
Office PC, Jeffrey B. Gold, Gold Benes LLP, Karen C. Higgins, Gold
Benes LLP & Melissa Beth Levine, Gold Benes LLP.

Town of Hempstead, Anthony Santino, Nasrin G. Ahmad & Michael
Zappolo, Defendants, represented by Angelo R. Bisceglie, Jr.,
Bisceglie & Associates PC.

William Muller III & Diana Bianculli-Muller, Defendants,
represented by William Muller.

Citizens for Santino, Defendant, represented by John E. Ryan --
email@jryan@rbdllp.net -- Ryan Brennan & Donnelly LLP.


HERTZ CORPORATION: Court Strikes Class Allegation in Tillman
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Class Allegations
in the case captioned RICO TILLMAN, Plaintiff, v. THE HERTZ
CORPORATION, d/b/a HERTZ RENT-A-CAR, Defendant. Case No. 16 C 4242.
(N.D. Ill.).

Plaintiff Rico Tillman has filed a putative class action amended
complaint against defendant The Hertz Corporation, alleging that
defendant violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA),
by placing unsolicited automated calls to a cellular telephone used
by plaintiff.

Apparently in light of that observation by the court, plaintiff
sought and was given leave to file an amended complaint, in which
he revised the definition of the putative class as:

All noncustomers whose cellphone Hertz or some other vender on its
behalf called on or after April 12, 2012, using a prerecorded voice
and/or dialing equipment of the type used to call plaintiff, where
such call was placed after a request to stop calling that phone
number.

By altering the definition of the class as stated above, plaintiff
claims that the individual issues identified by the court as
precluding class certification have been rectified. The court
disagrees.

A motion to strike class allegations is analyzed under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23. The standard for evaluating whether class allegations should
be stricken is the same as for class certification, and the burden
is on plaintiff to demonstrate that class certification is
appropriate.  

Whether class certification is appropriate requires a two-step
analysis. First, plaintiff must satisfy all four requirements of
Rule 23(a): (1) numerosity (2) commonality (3) typicality; and (4)
adequacy of representation.  Second, plaintiff must satisfy one of
the conditions of Rule 23(b). In this case, plaintiff relies on
Rule 23(b)(3), which requires him to show that the questions of law
or fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy.

Numerous contested facts peculiar to this case destroy any notion
of adequacy and typicality. Those contested facts include the type
of contract executed by Sanders and thus the type of consent she
gave, the type of calls defendant made to the 6075 number (whether
they used a prerecorded voice or instead were live calls to
determine where the car rented by Sanders was and to avoid having
to report it as stolen), and whether and how plaintiff revoked the
consent given by his mother (which was conceded by defendant only
for purposes of the motion for summary judgment. These contested
facts raise unique defenses peculiar to plaintiff's case, thus
making him an atypical and inadequate class representative.

The lack of predominance of common questions of fact is yet another
reason to grant defendant's motion. The putative class includes all
noncustomers that defendant called after a request to stop calling
the noncustomer's phone number. Whether a request to stop calling
was made is a question of fact that will need to be litigated with
respect to each member of the class. Common questions of fact thus
would not predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and the necessity of conducting mini-trials for each class
member destroys any notion that a class action is superior to other
available methods for efficiently resolving the controversy. As
defendant correctly points out, plaintiff has cited no case in this
district certifying a revocation class like that proposed by
plaintiff, nor any case denying a motion to strike such a class.

The court grants defendant's motion to strike plaintiff's class
allegations.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 18, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yyytkret from
Leagle.com.

Rico Tillman, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander Holmes Burke,
Burke Law Offices, LLC, David M. Marco, SmithMarco, P.C., Daniel J.
Marovitch, Burke Law Offices, LLC & Larry Paul Smith, SmithMarco,
P.C.

The Hertz Corporation, doing business as Hertz Rent-A-Car,
Defendant, represented by David Charles Layden, Jenner & Block LLP
& Katharine Rachel Ciliberti, Jenner & Block.


INFORMATION RESOURCES: Aug. 22 Bakhtiar Settlement Approval Hearing
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order continuing Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion
for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement in the case
captioned IRAM BAKHTIAR, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. INFORMATION RESOURCES, INC., and
DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants. Case No.
3:17-cv-04559-JST. (N.D. Cal.).

The hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval is
currently scheduled for August 8, 2019 at 2:00 p.m.

The Plaintiff now has a scheduling conflict on August 8, 2019.

Whereas Defendant has no objection to holding the hearing on August
22, 2019 at 2:00 p.m.
The hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval will
take place on August 22, 2019 at 2:00 p.m.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 18, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y4w2syac from Leagle.com.

Iram Bakhtiar, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Logan McMillan Starr, Bryan
Schwartz Law, Bryan Jeffrey Schwartz, Bryan Schwartz Law &Samuel L.
Goldsmith, Bryan Schwartz Law.

Information Resources, Inc., Defendant, represented by Janelle Jad
Sahouria, Jackson Lewis P.C.,Fraser Angus McAlpine, Jackson Lewis
P.C. & Mitchell F. Boomer, Jackson Lewis P.C.


INTEREXCHANGE INC: Court OKs $65.5MM Settlement in Beltran Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of
Class and Collective Action Settlement in the case captioned JOHANA
PAOLA BELTRAN, LUSAPHO HLATSHANENI, BEAUDETTE DEETLEFS, ALEXANDRA
IVETTE GONZALEZ, JULIANE HARNING, NICOLE MAPLEDORAM, LAURA MEJIA
JIMENEZ, SARAH CAROLINE AZUELA RASCON, CAMILA GABRIELA PEREZ REYES,
CATHY CARAMELO, LINDA ELIZABETH, And those similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. INTEREXCHANGE, INC., USAUPAIR, INC., GREATAUPAIR,
LLC, EXPERT GROUP INTERNATIONAL INC., d/b/a Expert AuPair,
EURAUPAIR INTERCULTURAL CHILD CARE PROGRAMS, CULTURAL HOMESTAY
INTERNATIONAL, CULTURAL CARE, INC., d/b/a Cultural Care Au Pair,
AUPAIRCARE INC., AU PAIR INTERNATIONAL, INC., APF GLOBAL EXCHANGE,
NFP, d/b/a/Aupair Foundation, AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN STUDY,
d/b/a Au Pair in America, AMERICAN CULTURAL EXCHANGE, LLC, d/b/a
GoAuPair, AGENT AU PAIR, A.P.E.X. AMERICAN PROFESSIONAL EXCHANGE,
LLC, d/b/a ProAuPair, 20/20 CARE EXCHANGE, INC., d/b/a The
International Au Pair Exchange, ASSOCIATES IN CULTURAL EXCHANGE,
d/b/a GoAuPair, and GOAUPAIR OPERATIONS, LLC, d/b/a GoAuPair,
Defendants. Civil Action No. 14-cv-03074-CMA-KMT (D. Colo.).

The Court finally approves the class and collective action
settlement. This Court also finally certifies the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) classes that were conditionally certified in
this action.  

This Court approves the terms of the Settlement Agreement, and the
Plan of Allocation, the material terms of which include, but are
not limited to:

   a. Class Counsel will establish a Qualified Settlement Fund
(QSF);

   b. Defendants will pay their respective shares of the settlement
amount, which totals $65,500,000, into the QSF;

   c. Within thirty (30) days after the Effective Date, and going
forward, Defendants (and their agents, where applicable) will
provide a statement to host families and au pairs to the effect
that the weekly au pair stipend is a minimum payment requirement
and host families and au pairs are free to agree to compensation
higher than the legally applicable minimum.

   d. From the QSF, Class Counsel will receive attorneys' fees of
$22,925,000, representing 35% of the QSF;1 each of the eleven class
representatives will receive a service award of $5,000; each of the
FLSA deponents will receive a service award of $1,000 (unless they
are a class representative); and each FLSA opt-in plaintiff will
receive $100 (unless they were deposed). The awards to class
representatives, FLSA deponents, and FLSA opt-ins shall be in
addition to any funds they receive as members of the Rule 23 Class
Action;

   e. Class Counsel's litigation expenses, as well as Expenses for
administration of the settlement and sending of notice pursuant to
28 U.S.C.  Section 1715 will be deducted from the QSF;

   f. $536 shall be taxed from the QSF in favor of the United
States and payable into the Court to repay the filing and service
costs the Court previously waived;

   g. The remainder of the QSF will be distributed to Class
Members, as detailed in the Plan of Allocation;

   h. The Institute of International Education's Au Pair
Scholarship Program is named as the cy pres recipient contemplated
by Settlement Agreement, pursuant to the conditions set forth in
the Declaration of Joshua L. Libling Regarding Cy Pres and

   i. Class Members who did not exclude themselves are bound by the
terms of the Settlement Agreement, including all releases therein,
and their claims are dismissed with prejudice.

5. This Court additionally finds that:

   a. The Settlement Notice, and the distribution thereof,
satisfied the requirements of due process under the Constitution
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), that it was the best
practicable under the circumstances, and that it constitutes due
and sufficient notice to all persons entitled to notice of class
action settlement.  

   b. The Settlement Notice was adequate and gave all Settlement
Class Members sufficient information to enable them to make
informed decisions as to the parties' proposed settlement, and the
right to object to, or opt-out of it where applicable.

   c. This Court additionally finds that the parties' settlement,
on the terms and conditions set forth in their Settlement
Agreement, is in all respects fundamentally fair, reasonable,
adequate, and in the best interests of the Settlement Class
Members.

   d. Moreover, this standard substantially overlaps with the
standard that courts apply in deciding whether to approve
settlements under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Sections 201, et seq. As
such, the Court also finds that the parties' settlement is fair and
reasonable under the FLSA.

   e. This Court further finds that the Settlement Class Members
were given a fair and reasonable opportunity to object to the
settlement. Six Settlement Class Members objected to the
settlement. And the class members who made valid and timely
requests for exclusion are excluded from the class and settlement
and are not bound by this order. There are 1,284 such persons.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 18, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y25h4ufg from Leagle.com.

Johana Paola Beltran, Lusapho Hlatshaneni, Beaudette Deetlefs &
Alexandra Ivette Gonzalez, and those similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Byron Pacheco, Boies Schiller Flexner
LLP,Dawn L. Smalls, Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, Joshua J. Libling,
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP,Matthew L. Schwartz, Boies Schiller
Flexner LLP, Peter M. Skinner, Boies Schiller Flexner LLP,Sabria A.
McElroy, Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, Sean Phillips Rodriguez, Boies
Schiller Flexner LLP, Sigrid S. McCawley, Boies Schiller Flexner
LLP & Alexander Neville Hood, Towards Justice.

Juliane Harning, Nicole Mapledoram, and those similarly situated,
Laura Mejia Jimenez & Sarah Carolina Azuela Rascon, Plaintiffs,
represented by Byron Pacheco, Boies Schiller Flexner LLP,Dawn L.
Smalls, Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, Joshua J. Libling, Boies
Schiller Flexner LLP,Matthew L. Schwartz, Boies Schiller Flexner
LLP, Peter M. Skinner, Boies Schiller Flexner LLP,Sean Phillips
Rodriguez, Boies Schiller Flexner LLP & Alexander Neville Hood,
Towards Justice.

Camila Gabriela Perez Reyes, Cathy Caramelo & Linda Elizabeth,
Plaintiffs, represented by Byron Pacheco, Boies Schiller Flexner
LLP, Joshua J. Libling, Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, Peter M.
Skinner, Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, Sean Phillips Rodriguez, Boies
Schiller Flexner LLP,Alexander Neville Hood, Towards Justice & Dawn
L. Smalls, Boies Schiller Flexner LLP.

InterExchange, Inc., Defendant, represented by Brooke A. Colaizzi,
Sherman & Howard, L.L.C.,Raymond Myles Deeny, Sherman & Howard,
L.L.C., Alyssa Lauren Levy, Sherman & Howard, L.L.C., Heather Fox
Vickles, Sherman & Howard LLC & Joseph H. Hunt, Sherman & Howard,
L.L.C.

USAuPair, INC, Defendant, represented by Chanda Marie Feldkamp,
Kelly & Walker LLC &William James Kelly, III, Kelly & Walker LLC.


JOEL W. BLACK: Cabral Seeks Overtime Pay for Off-the-Clock Work
---------------------------------------------------------------
Josie Cabral, on behalf of herself and all those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Law Offices of Joel W. Black, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-04735, (D. Ariz., July 16, 2019), seeks
to recover unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages,
including interest thereon, statutory penalties, reasonable
attorneys' fees and litigation costs under the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 and Arizona Wage statutes.

Law Offices of Joel W. Black, LLC represents clients who have been
injured in personal injury accidents in Phoenix, Arizona, and
throughout the surrounding Arizona communities. Cabral was employed
by the Black Law Office as a Legal Assistant/Paralegal. She claims
that employees were required to work off-the-clock but were not
paid the premium overtime rate of one and one half their regular
hourly rate of pay for hours worked over 40 in a workweek. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Ty D. Frankel, Esq.
      BONNETT, FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C.
      2325 E. Camelback Road, Suite 300
      Phoenix, AZ 85016
      Tel: (602) 274-1100
      Email: tfrankel@bffb.com

             - and -

      Patricia N. Syverson, Esq.
      BONNETT, FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C.
      600 W. Broadway, Suite 900
      San Diego, CA 92101
      Tel: (619) 756-7748
      Email: psyverson@bffb.com


KABBALAH CENTRE: Underpays Spiritual Workers, Greene Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------
JAMES GREENE; JENNIFER SHAAL; OFER SHAAL; JAKE STONE; GUY SHOSHAN;
EINAT EZRA MICHAELI; and YIFAT SHMILOVICH, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. KABBALAH
CENTRE INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED; KABBALAH CENTRES OF THE UNITED
STATES, INCORPORATED; KABBALAH CENTRE OF NEW YORK, INCORPORATED;
THE KABBALAH CENTRE OF FLORIDA, INC.; KABBALAH CHILDREN'S ACADEMY;
KABBALAH ENTERPRISES, INCORPORATED; KAF INVESTMENTS, LLC; 501 N. LA
CIENEGA, LLC; SPIRITUALITY FOR KIDS INTERNATIONAL, INC.; and KAREN
BERG, YEHUDA BERG, and MICHAEL BERG, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-04304 (E.D.N.Y., July 25, 2019) seeks to recover from the
Defendant unpaid wages and overtime compensation, interest,
liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as spiritual
workers.

The Kabbalah Centre International is a non-profit organization
located in Los Angeles, California that provides courses on the
Zohar and Kabbalistic teachings online as well as through its
regional and city-based centers and study groups worldwide. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

           Deborah H. Renner, Esq.
           Shira Lauren Feldman, Esq.
           Claiborne R. Hane, Esq.
           Abbye R. Klamann Ognibene, Esq.
           PIERCE BAINBRIDGE BECK PRICE & HECHT LLP
           277 Park Avenue, 45th Floor
           New York, NY 10172
           Telephone: (212) 484-9866
           E-mail: drenner@piercebainbridge.com
                   sfeldman@piercebainbridge.com
                   chane@piercebainbridge.com
                   aognibene@piercebainbridge.com


KNIGHT ADJUSTMENT: Bullock Sues Over Additional Service Charge
--------------------------------------------------------------
Heather Bullock, individually and on behalf on all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Knight Adjustment Bureau, Defendant, Case
No. 19-cv-00074 (D. Utah, July 16, 2018), seeks injunctive relief,
statutory damages and any other available legal or equitable
remedies for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Defendant was a collection agency tasked with collecting Bullock's
financial obligations to University Credit Union which she
allegedly fell behind in the payments after disputing its
validity.

In December 27, 2018, Knight Adjustment sent Bullock a collection
letter stating that she may now pay her debt to Knight Adjustment
Bureau at its office, by mail or "for an additional service charge,
by logging on to knightadj.com and clicking the Pay my bill online
link."

Bullock contests that this "additional service charge" charged by
Knight is not authorized by any law nor by any agreement between
them. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Theron D. Morrison, Esq.
      MORRISON LAW GROUP
      290 25th Street, Suite #102
      Ogden, UT 84401
      Telephone: (801) 392-9324
      Facsimile: (801) 337-2087
      Email: theron@morlg.com

             - and -

      Ryan L. McBride, Esq.
      KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
      2633 E. Indian School Road, Suite 460
      Phoenix, AZ 85016
      Telephone: (602) 900-1288
      Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
      Email: ryan@kazlg.com


L BRANDS: Misleading Reports Inflate Stock Price, Walker Says
-------------------------------------------------------------
RICKEY R. WALKER, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. L BRANDS, INC., LESLIE H.
WEXNER, and STUART B. BURGDOERFER, the Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-03186-SDM-CMV (S.D. Ohio., July 23, 2019), seeks to pursue
remedies under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The case is a
federal securities class action brought on behalf of all purchasers
of L Brands common stock between May 31, 2018 and November 19,
2018, inclusive.

According to the complaint, each Defendant is liable as a
participant in a fraudulent scheme and course of business that
operated as a fraud or deceit on purchasers of L Brands common
stock by disseminating materially false and misleading statements
and/or concealing material adverse facts.

The scheme (i) deceived the investing public regarding L Brands'
business, operations, products, markets, management, controls,
liquidity, demands, and present and future business prospects, and
the intrinsic value of L Brands common stock; and (ii) caused
Plaintiff and the Class to purchase L Brands publicly-traded common
stock at artificially inflated prices.

During the Class Period, L Brands falsely and misleadingly
represented in its Forms 10-Q that its disclosure controls were
operating effectively when they were not.  During the Class Period,
these materially false and misleading representations were
certified by Defendants Wexner and Burgdoerfer.

After the market closed on November 19, 2018, L Brands issued a
press release announcing its financial results for the 2018 third
quarter, the period ended November 3, 2018. The press release also
announced that L Brands intended to reduce its annual ordinary
dividend to $1.20 from $2.40 beginning with the quarterly dividend
to be paid in March 2019 in order to deleverage Company's balance
sheet over time. In response to this news, the price of L Brands
common stock declined approximately 18% on extremely heavy trading
volume, from $34.55 per share on November 19, 2018 to $28.43 per
share on November 20, 2018, the lawsuit says.

L Brands, Inc. is an American fashion retailer based in Columbus,
Ohio. Its flagship brands include Victoria's Secret and Bath & Body
Works. L Brands posted $12.63 billion in revenue in 2017, and was
listed as 231 on the 2018 Fortune 500 list of largest United States
companies by revenue.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          David M. Scott, Esq.
          Krista D. Warren, Esq.
          BRENNAN, MANNA & DIAMOND, LLC
          250 Civic Center Drive, Suite 300
          Columbus, OH 43215
          Telephone: 614 246-7514
          Facsimile: 614 246-7515

               - and -

          Samuel H. Rudman, esq.
          David A. Rosenfeld, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          58 South Service Road, Suite 200
          Melville, NY 11747
          Telephone: 631 367-7100
          Facsimile: 631 367-1173

LEAP EDUCATION: Halawani Sues Over Illegal SMS Ads
--------------------------------------------------
Shlomy Halawani, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Leap Education, Defendant, Case No.
19-cv-61785, (S.D. Fla., July 16, 2019) seeks statutory damages and
injunctive relief for violations of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

Leap is a real estate licensing institution that provides
educational programs to businesses and consumers nationwide.
Halawani claims to have received multiple telemarketing texts by
use of an automatic telephone dialing system without permission.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
      Thomas J. Patti, Esq.
      THE LAW OFFICE OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI, PLLC
      110 SE 6th Street
      Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
      Telephone: (954) 907-1136
      Facsimile: (855) 529-9540
      Email: jibrael@jibraellaw.com
             tom@jibraellaw.com


LEXINGTON LAW: Starace Appeals E.D. Cal. Ruling to Ninth Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Martin Starace filed an appeal from a Court ruling in the
lawsuit entitled Martin Starace v. Lexington Law Firm, Case No.
1:18-cv-01596-DAD-SKO, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California, Fresno.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on July 17, 2019, the
District Court issued an Order granting the Defendants' Motion to
Compel Arbitration.

Defendant Lexington Law Firm (Lexington) is a debt collection
company.  At some point in 2018, the Plaintiff contacted Lexington
in an attempt to repair his credit.  Lexington required his debit
card information in order to provide its services.

After the Plaintiff provided Lexington with the information,
Lexington without the Plaintiff's knowledge or consent continued to
deduct funds from his account multiple times on a reoccurring
basis, without providing him a written authorization to do so.  The
Plaintiff alleges that he never provided Defendant with any
authorization to deduct these sums of money on a regular basis from
his banking account.

The appellate case is captioned as Martin Starace v. Lexington Law
Firm, Case No. 19-16418, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by August 14, 2019;

   -- Transcript is due on September 13, 2019;

   -- Appellant Martin Starace's opening brief is due on
      October 23, 2019;

   -- Appellee Lexington Law Firm's answering brief is due on
      November 25, 2019; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant MARTIN STARACE, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Adrian Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD FRIEDMAN PC
          21550 Oxnard Street, Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (877) 206-4741
          E-mail: abacon@toddflaw.com

               - and -

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN
          324 S. Beverly Drive
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Telephone: (877) 206-4741
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com

Defendant-Appellee LEXINGTON LAW FIRM is represented by:

          Chad R. Fuller, Esq.
          Jessica Rose Ellis Lohr, Esq.
          TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP
          11682 El Camino Real, Suite 400
          San Diego, CA 92130
          Telephone: (858) 509-6000
          E-mail: chad.fuller@troutman.com
                  jessica.lohr@troutman.com


LME INC: Sacked Workers Without 60-Day Closure Notice, Says Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Brian Arnold, Robert Beck, Bobby Brockhouse, William "Keith"
Calicott, Lhoucine Chal, Christopher Curtis, Sheyenne Curtis,
Christian Dawson, Ines Garza, Daniel Gregory, Bonnie Gustason,
Ronald Gustason, Timothy Holt, David Messbarger, Kirk Raymond,
Andrew Richardson, Julie Snead, Giovanni Vargas, Darian Waller and
James West, individually and as class representatives for all
similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. LME Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 19-cv-00555 (W.D. Mo., July 16, 2019), seeks recovery of
compensation and benefit plans, actual payroll checks for payment
of wages/salary, vacation benefits, deferred compensation and
bonuses, including incentive bonuses, severance and retention
bonuses as required by the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act.

LME, Inc., announced on July 11, 2019, that it was closing
approximately thirty terminals across the country.
Plaintiffs were laid off by Defendants.  Plaintiffs claim that they
were not provided the mandatory 60 days advance written notice of
their termination as required by the WARN Act. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Joshua P. Wunderlich, Esq.
      Ryan M. Paulus, Esq.
      CORNERSTONE LAW FIRM
      8350 N. St. Clair Ave., Ste. 225
      Kansas City, MO 64151
      Telephone (816) 581-4040
      Facsimile (816) 741-8889
      Email: r.paulus@cornerstonefirm.com
             j.wunderlich@cornerstonefirm.com


LOUIS VUITTON: Website Not Accessible, Farr Suit Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------
JAMES FARR, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. LOUIS VUITTON USA, INC.; and DOES 1 to 10,
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-06442-CJC-KS (C.D. Cal., July 25,
2019) alleges violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the Defendants failed
to design, construct, maintain, and operate its website
https://us.louisvuitton.com/eng-us/ to be fully and equally
accessible to and independently usable by the Plaintiff and other
blind or visually-impaired people.

The Defendants' denial of full and equal access to the website, and
therefore denial of its products and services offered thereby and
in conjunction with its physical locations, is a violation of the
Plaintiffs' rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Louis Vuitton North America, Inc. was founded in 1999. The
company's line of business includes the retail sale of luggage,
trunks, and leather goods. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bobby Saadian, Esq.
          Thiago Coelho, Esq,
          WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
          3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 381-9988
          Facsimile: (213) 381-9989


MCKESSON CORP: Removes Sarkis Opioid-Related Suit to C.D. Cal.
--------------------------------------------------------------
McKesson Corporation removed the case captioned as BRIAN SARKIS,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, v. MCKESSON CORPORATION, the Defendant, Case No.
19STCV21224 (Filed June 18, 2019), from the Superior Court of the
State of California for the County of Los Angeles to the United
States District Court for the Central District of California on
July 24, 2019. The Central District of California Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-06436 to the proceeding.

The action is one of more than 2,000 opioid-related lawsuits filed
by various plaintiffs against McKesson and other distributors of
prescription opioid medications.

On December 5, 2017, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
(JPML) formed a multidistrict litigation (MDL) in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. To date, most of
the more than 2,000 opioid-related actions pending nationwide are
in the MDL. McKesson intends to tag this case immediately for
transfer to the MDL.

The Plaintiff asserts causes of action for violations of
California’s Unfair Competition Law, public nuisance, unjust
enrichment, negligence, and negligent interference with prospective
economic advantage.[BN]

Attorneys for the Defendant are:

          Nathan E. Shafroth, Esq.
          Raymond G. Lu, Esq.
          COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
          415 Mission Street, Suite 5400
          San Francisco, CA 94105-2533
          Telephone: + 1 (415) 591-6000
          Facsimile: + 1 (415) 591-6091
          E-mail: nshafroth@cov.com
                  rlu@cov.com

MOHAN PALACE: Valencia Seeks Minimum & Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------
Manuel Valencia, on behalf of himself and all other persons
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Mohan Palace, Inc. d/b/a
Minar Indian Restaurant, Inder Singh, and John Does No. 1-10, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-06861 (S.D.N.Y., July 23, 2019), seeks
to recover compensation for wages paid at less than the statutory
minimum wage, and unpaid wages for overtime work pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards and the New York Labor Law.

Before October 2017, Mr. Valencia worked six shifts per week that
lasted in excess of ten hours from start to finish, and after
October 2017 he worked one such shift per week, yet Defendants
willfully failed to pay him one additional hour's pay at the
minimum wage for each such day, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated are:

          David Stein, Esq.
          SAMUEL & STEIN
          38 West 32nd Street. Suite 1110
          New York, NY 10001
          Telephone: (212) 563-9884
          E-mail: dstein@samuelandstein.com

MOJITO CLUB: Valdes Seeks Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------
YULIAN VALDES, and other similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiff(s), v. MOJITO CLUB, L.L.C., a Florida Limited Liability
Company, and HENRY A LEACE, individually, the Defendant(s), Case
No. 93026909 (11th Fla. Cir., Miami-Dade County, July 23, 2019),
seeks to recover damages exceeding $15,000 excluding attorneys'
fees or costs for unpaid wages and retaliation under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Plaintiff performed work for Defendants as a non-exempt
employee from on or about 2013 to on or about February 2019. The
Plaintiff worked in excess of 40 hours per week. The Defendants
were on notice of and/or had full knowledge of all hours worked by
Plaintiff, including those hours worked by Plaintiff in excess of
40 in a given work week, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Anthony M. Georges-Pierre, Esq.
          Max L. Horowitz, Esq.
          REMER & GEORGES-PIERRE, PLLC
          44 West Flagler Street, Suite 2200
          Miami, FL 33130
          Telephone: (305) 416-5000
          Facsimile: (305) 416-5005
          E-mail: agp@rgpattorneys.com
                  mhorowitz@rgpattorneys.com

MONGER ENTERTAINMENT: Bowden Suit Transferred to N.D. Georgia
-------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled as CHANEL BOWDEN, on behalf of
herself and those similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. MONGER
ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INC. d/b/a BARNACLES SPORTS BAR & GRILL, a
Georgia Corporation, SAMPSON B. MONGER, Individually, and BERNICE
P. MONGER, Individually, the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00123
(Filed July 19, 2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia, to U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia (Atlanta) on July 23, 2019. The
Northern District of Georgia Court Clerk assinged Case No.
1:19-cv-03335-TCB to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Timothy C. Batten, Sr.

Mr. Bowden seeks to recover unpaid minimum wage compensation,
liquidated damages, and other relief under the Fair Labor Standards
Act. The  action is intended to include each and every employee who
was subject to the Defendants' tip credit pay scheme within the
past three years, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Carlos V. Leach, Esq.
          THE LEACH FIRM, P.A.
          1950 Lee Road, Suite 213
          Winter Park, FL 32789
          Telephone: (321) 287-6021
          Facsimile: (407) 960-4789
          E-mail: cleach@theleachfirm.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Davis Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-----------------------------------------------------------
THOMAS A. DAVIS, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the
Defendants, Case No. 8:19-cv-02030-MDL (D.S.C., July 19, 2019),
seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and
proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct
in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          T. David Hoyle, Esq.
          W. Taylor Lacy, Esq.
          MOTLEY RICE, LLC
          28 Bridgeside Boulevard
          Mt. Pleasant, SC 29464
          Telephone: 843-216-9000
          Facsimile: 843-216-9440
          E-mail: dhoyle@motleyrice.com
                  wlacy@motleyrice.com

               - and -

          Thomas E. Hite III, Esq.
          HITE & STONE, ATTORNEYS AT LAW
          P.O. Box 805
          100 East Pickens
          Abbeville, SC 29620
          Telephone: 864 366-5400
          Facsimile: 864 366-2638
          E-mail: t3@hiteandstone.com


MONSANTO COMPANY: Dietz Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-----------------------------------------------------------
STEVEN DIETZ, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of
LARRY DIETZ, deceased, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the
Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-02036 (E.D. Mo., July 19, 2019), seeks
to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and
proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct
in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Larry Dietz's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Stephen Cady, Esq.
          Ken Moll, Esq.
          MOLL LAW GROUP
          22 W Washington Street, 15 th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 462-1700
          Facsimile: (312) 756-0045
          E-mail: scady@molllawgroup.com
                  kmoll@molllawgroup.com


MONSANTO COMPANY: Ellis Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-----------------------------------------------------------
SCOTT ELLIS, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendants,
Case No. 4:19-cv-02038 (E.D. Mo., July 19, 2019), seeks to recover
damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result
of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection
with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging,
promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or
sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active
ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Stephen Cady, Esq.
          Ken Moll, Esq.
          MOLL LAW GROUP
          22 W Washington Street, 15 th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 462-1700
          Facsimile: (312) 756-0045
          E-mail: scady@molllawgroup.com
                  kmoll@molllawgroup.com


MONSANTO COMPANY: Neff Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
----------------------------------------------------------
JERRY NEFF, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendants,
Case No. 4:19-cv-02041 (E.D. Mo., July 19, 2019), seeks to recover
damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result
of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection
with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging,
promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or
sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active
ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Emily J. Kirk, Esq.
          Kristy M. Arevalo, Esq.
          MC CUNE WRIGHT AREVALO, LLP
          3281 East Guasti Road, Suite 100
          Ontario, California 91761
          Telephone: (909) 557-1250
          Facsimile: (909) 557-1275
          E-mail: ejk@mccunewright.com
                  kma@mccunewright.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Sterner Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-------------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL STERNER, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant,
Case No. 4:19-cv-02123 (E.D. Mo., July 23, 2019), seeks to recover
damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result
of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection
with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging,
promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or
sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active
ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. The
Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel R. Seidman, Esq.
          SEIDMAN MARGUIS & FAIRMAN, LLP
          10805 Sunset Office Dr., Ste. 300
          Sunset Hills, MO 63127
          Telephone: (314) 238-1342
          Facsimile: (224) 603-8345
          E-mail: dseidman@seidmanlaw.net

MONSANTO COMPANY: Weatherses Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
---------------------------------------------------------------
CINDY WEATHERS, and LAWSON WEATHERS, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO
COMPANY, the Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-06241 (C.D. Cal., July
19, 2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, as
a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Cindy
Weathers's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jennifer A. Moore, Esq.
          MOORE LAW GROUP, PLLC
          1473 South 4 th Street
          Louisville, KY 40208
          Telephone: (502) 717-4080
          Facsimile: (502) 717-4086
          E-mail: jennifer@moorelawgroup.com

               - and -

          Andrew T. Kagan, Esq.
          KAGAN LEGAL GROUP
          295 Palmas Inn Way, Suite 6 Palmanova Plaza
          Humacao, PR 0791
          Telephone: (939) 220-2424
          Facsimile: (939) 220-2477
          E-mail: andrew@kaganlegalgroup.com

               - and -

          Elizabeth P. Kagan, Esq.
          KAGAN LAW FIRM
          8191 College Pkwy., Suite 303
          Fort Myers, FL 33919
          Telephone: (239) 466-1161
          Facsimile: (239) 466-7226
          E-mail: liz@kagan-law.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Westrichs Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
--------------------------------------------------------------
JANET WESTRICH and ANDREW WESTRICH, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO
COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-02118-AGF (E.D. Mo., July
23, 2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, as
a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Janet
Westrich's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Youngs Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-----------------------------------------------------------
RANDEL YOUNG and JOSEPHINE YOUNG, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO
COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-02131 (E.D. Mo., July 23,
2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, as a
direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Randel
Young's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

NATIONAL CREDIT: Time to File Dispositional Papers in Cortes Cont'd
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order continuing Deadline to File
Dispositional Papers in the case captioned MIKE CORTES, on Behalf
of Himself and all Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v.
NATIONAL CREDIT ADJUSTERS, L.L.C., Defendant. Case No.
2:16-cv-00823-MCE-EFB. (E.D. Cal.).

The Parties executed a binding Term Sheet setting out an agreement
to settle all claims in this action on a class basis.

Upon stipulation of the Parties and notice of the settlement, the
Court vacated all remaining pretrial deadlines and ordered the
Parties to file dispositional papers pursuant to Local Rule 160 by
February 28, 2019.

Upon stipulation of the Parties, the Court extended the Parties'
deadline to file dispositional papers pursuant to Local Rule 160 to
June 28, 2019.

When Parties have made significant progress but need more time to
finalize the full class settlement agreement along with all of the
relevant exhibits thereto, i.e., long form and short-form notice
documents, proposed final approval and judgment orders, etc.

Once the full class settlement agreement is executed, Plaintiff
intends to file a motion for preliminary approval of the settlement
and provide the Court with a copy of the executed class settlement
agreement at that time.

Due to the extensive time needed to draft (and negotiate) the full
class action settlement agreement and the motion for preliminary
approval, the Parties anticipate that they will be able to execute
the class action settlement agreement and that Plaintiff will be
able to file a motion for preliminary approval by August 9, 2019.

Accordingly, the parties' deadline to file dispositional papers
pursuant to Local Rule 160 shall be extended to August 9, 2019.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 18, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y6es5vod from Leagle.com.

Mike Cortes, Plaintiff, represented by Yeremey Olegovich Krivoshey,
Bursor & Fisher, P.A.

National Credit Adjusters, L.L.C., Defendant, represented by Debbie
P. Kirkpatrick, Sesions Fishman Nathan & Israel, LLP & James Kevin
Schultz, Sessions Fishman Nathan & Israel, LLP.


NATIONAL GENERAL: North Miami Police Officers Plan Hits Share Drop
-------------------------------------------------------------------
CITY OF NORTH MIAMI BEACH POLICE OFFICERS' AND FIREFIGHTERS'
RETIREMENT PLAN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL GENERAL HOLDINGS CORP., BARRY
KARFUNKEL and MICHAEL WEINER, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-06468
(C.D. Cal., July 25, 2019) is a securities class action on behalf
of all purchasers of National General common stock between August
6, 2015 and August 9, 2017, against National General and certain of
its officers and/or directors seeking to pursue remedies under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act").

The complaint alleges that National General and its predecessors,
in coordination with Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Wells Fargo &
Company, engaged in a massive insurance scheme to bilk Wells Fargo
customers out of millions of dollars. Through this scheme, National
General forced thousands of customers to pay for auto
insurance--commonly known as Collateral Protection Insurance
("CPI")--that they did not need or want. National General served as
Wells Fargo's CPI vendor for all aspects of the program from July
2015 until the program was discreetly terminated in September 2016,
including, inter alia, insurance tracking, borrower identification,
policy placement, and underwriting the force-placed CPI. Defendants
possessed information showing that these customers already had
their own insurance, but forced them to be subject to redundant,
unnecessary and overly expensive CPI policies anyway.

The Defendants unlawfully generated profits by force-placing
unnecessary CPI on unsuspecting customers and then collected
payments for insurance premiums, interest, and other fees, while
also providing undisclosed kickbacks to Wells Fargo in the form of
unearned commissions and other compensation, thereby increasing the
costs paid by every individual that defendants saddled with the
policies. Although defendants had long known that the CPI scheme
harmed customers, it was only ended in September 2016 after Wells
Fargo internally recognized that maintaining the CPI scheme "could
lead to reputational risk and potential legal exposure." However,
even after the forced placement of new CPI policies ended, Wells
Fargo still continued to pay tracking fees to National General for
the CPI policies that National General had underwritten, says the
complaint.

On July 27, 2017, The New York Times published an article that
revealed for the first time the CPI forced-placed insurance scheme.
In the days that followed, attention increasingly turned to
National General and its role in the scheme. The Company faced
numerous regulatory investigations, congressional scrutiny, and
civil lawsuits that caused a decline in the price of National
General shares. Between July 26, 2017, before the story broke, and
August 10, 2017, after the launch of a congressional inquiry into
the scandal, the price of National General common stock fell more
than 15%. As a result, Plaintiff and other members of the Class
that purchased National General common stock at artificially
inflated prices suffered significant losses and damages, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff City of North Miami Beach Police Officers' and
Firefighters' Retirement Plan purchased National General common
stock during the Class Period.

National General is a specialty lines insurance holding
company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     DAVID C. WALTON, ESQ.
     BRIAN E. COCHRAN, ESQ.
     ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
     655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
     San Diego, CA 92101
     Phone: 619/231-1058
     Fax: 619/231-7423
     Email: davew@rgrdlaw.com
            bcochran@rgrdlaw.com


NETWORK RECOVERY: Tannenbaum Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Network Recovery
Services, Inc. The case is styled as Rivka Tannenbaum individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Network Recovery Services, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 7:19-cv-07085
(S.D. N.Y., July 30, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Network Recovery Services, Inc. operates as a non-profit
organization. The Organization offers insurance services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     David Michael Barshay, Esq.
     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     Barshay Sanders, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 281-7601
     Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com
            csanders@barshaysanders.com


NEW YORK: A. White Suite Consolidated to Butler Suit
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York issued an order consolidating the case captioned ANTHONY WHITE
SR., Plaintiff, v. RIVERHEAD CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, VINCENT F.
DEMARCO, Defendants. No. 19-CV-3497 (JS) (GRB). (E.D.N.Y.), with
Butler, et al. v. DeMarco, et al., No. 11-CV-2602 (JS) (GRB).

Pursuant to the Court's January 23, 2012 Order of Consolidation in
Butler, et al. v. DeMarco, et al., No. 11-CV-2602 (JS) (GRB) (the
Consolidated Action), the Court has reviewed the instant Complaint
and finds that it relates to the subject matter of the Consolidated
Action. Accordingly, this action shall be consolidated with the
Consolidated Action. This affects Plaintiff in the following ways:

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 18, 2019  Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y6fokvm3 from Leagle.com.

Anthony White Sr, Plaintiff, pro se.


NEW YORK: Sonaike Seeks Minimum & Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------
SUSAN SONAIKE, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NEW YORK FOUNDLING, the Defendant,
Case No. 157216/2019 (N.Y. Sup., July 24, 2019), alleges that
Defendant has engaged and continues to engage in illegal and
improper wage practices under the New York Labor Law. These
practices include: requiring Case Managers to perform work without
compensation before the scheduled start of their shift; requiring
Case Managers to perform work without compensation after the
scheduled end of their shift; failing to pay Case Managers overtime
of time and one-half their regular rate of pay for all hours worked
over 40 in a week; and failing to provide accurate wage
statements.

The New York Foundling, founded in 1869 by the Roman Catholic
Sisters of Charity, is one of New York City's oldest and largest
child welfare agencies. The Foundling operates programs in the five
boroughs of New York City, Rockland County, and Puerto Rico.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the putative New York Class are:

          Louis Ginsberg, Esq.
          THE LAW FIRM OF
          LOUIS GINSBERG, P.C.
          1613 Northern Boulevard
          Roslyn, N.Y. 11576
          Telephone: (516) 625-0105

NILI LOTAN INC: Olsen Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Nili Lotan, Inc. The
case is styled as Thomas J. Olsen, individually and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Nili Lotan,
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-07090 (S.D. N.Y., July 30,
2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Nili Lotan is an Israeli-American fashion designer best known as
the founder of the Nili Lotan Design Studio, a designer clothing
company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
     Lipsky Lowe LLP
     630 Third Avenue
     New York, NY 10017-6705
     Phone: (212) 392-4772
     Fax: (212) 444-1030
     Email: chris@lipskylowe.com


NUTRITIOUS LIFESTYLES: Urbas Seeks Overtime Compensation
--------------------------------------------------------
LESLIE URBAS, on behalf of herself and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NUTRITIOUS LIFESTYLES, INC.,
and JANET MCKEE, an individual, the Defendant, Case No.
3:19-cv-00855 (M.D. Fla., July 23, 2019), alleges that Defendant
failed to pay overtime compensation and willfully failed to keep
accurate time records in violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants pay Plaintiff and other
employees on an hourly basis and classify them as "non-exempt"
under the FLSA. The majority of Defendant's workers are full-time
employees scheduled to work 40 hours per week. The Defendant
implemented a policy that no employee is allowed to work overtime.


However, the Plaintiff and the employees are required to work off
the clock to attend meetings, answer emails, and perform works
tasks to meet the job requirements. Consequently, Plaintiff and all
similarly situated were and continue to be denied compensation for
all hours worked, the lawsuit says.

Nutritious Lifestyles provides Registered Dietitian services
nationwide, providing Temp and permanent Dietitian consultants for
Healthcare organizations.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Brandon J. Hill, Esq.
          Luis A. Cabassa, Esq.
          WENZEL FENTON CABASSA, P.A.
          1110 North Florida Ave., Suite 300
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: 813-337-7992
          Facsimile: 813-229-8712
          E-mail: bhill@wfclaw.com
                  jcornell@wfclaw.com
                  rcooke@wfclaw.com
                  lcabassa@wfclaw.com
                  gnichols@wfclaw.com
                  tsoriano@wfclaw.com

               - and -

          Chad A. Justice, Esq.
          JUSTICE FOR JUSTICE LLC
          1205 N Franklin St., Suite 326
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: 813 566 0550
          Facsimile: 813 566 0770
          E-mail: chad@getjusticeforjustice.com

OAKTREE CAPITAL: Ganeles Balks at Brookfield Merger
---------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Oaktree Capital
Group, LLC and its Board of Directors for alleged violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The case is captioned DAVID
GANELES, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. OAKTREE CAPITAL GROUP, LLC, JAY WINTROB,
HOWARD MARKS, BRUCE KARSH, JOHN FRANK, SHELDON STONE, ROBERT
DENHAM, STEVEN GILBERT, LARRY KEELE, D. RICHARD MASSON, WAYNE
PIERSON, MARNA WHITTINGTON, and DANIEL LEVIN, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-06231 (S.D.N.Y., July 3, 2019).

Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of the public
unitholders of Oaktree in connection with the proposed merger of
the company with Brookfield Asset Management, Inc.

The deal, originally announced on March 13, 2019, will see
Brookfield acquiring approximately 62% of the Oaktree business. As
part of the transaction, Brookfield will acquire all outstanding
Oaktree Class A units for, at the election of Oaktree Class A
unitholders, either $49.00 in cash or 1.0770 Class A shares of
Brookfield per unit (subject to pro-ration). This represents a
premium of 12.4% per Oaktree Class A unit, based on the closing
price of Oaktree Class A units and Brookfield Class A Shares on
March 12, 2019 and a 15.9% premium based on the 30-day
Volume-Weighted Average Price of Oaktree Class A units. The Oaktree
Board of Directors, acting on the recommendation of a special
committee, composed of non-executive, independent directors, has
unanimously recommended that Oaktree unitholders approve the
transaction.

Both Brookfield and Oaktree will continue to operate their
respective businesses independently, partnering to leverage their
strengths -- with each remaining under its current brand and led by
its existing management and investment teams. Howard Marks will
continue as Co-Chairman of Oaktree, Bruce Karsh as Co‑Chairman
and Chief Investment Officer, and Jay Wintrob as Chief Executive
Officer. Howard Marks and Bruce Karsh will continue to have
operating control of Oaktree as an independent entity for the
foreseeable future. In addition, Howard Marks will join
Brookfield's board of directors.

On June 20, 2019 in order to convince Oaktree's unitholders to vote
in favor of the proposed merger, the Board authorized the filing of
a materially incomplete and misleading proxy statement on Form
DEFM14A with the Securities and Exchange Commission.  Plaintiff
alleges that the proxy statement failed to disclose the material
line items for: (i) fee related earnings; (ii) carried interest;
(iii) free cash flow; and (iv) unlevered free cash flow.

Oaktree is a California corporation with its principal executive
offices located at 333 South Grand Ave, Los Angeles, CA 90071. The
company's units are traded on the NYSE under the symbol OAK.
Oaktree is an American global asset management firm specializing in
alternative investment strategies. It is the largest distressed
securities investor in the world, as well as one of the largest
credit investors in the world. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joshua M. Lifshitz, Esq.
     LIFSHITZ & MILLER LLP
     821 Franklin Avenue, Suite 209
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Telephone: (516) 493-9780
     Facsimile: (516) 280-7376
     E-mail: jml@jlclasslaw.com

OX CAR: Pastore Sues over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
-----------------------------------------------------
JON PASTORE, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. OX CAR CARE, INC., the Defendant, Case
No. 8:19-cv-01427 (C.D. Cal., July 24, 2019), contends that the
Defendant promotes and markets its merchandise, in part, by sending
unsolicited telephone calls to phone users, in violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The Plaintiff seeks damages and
any other available legal or equitable remedies resulting from the
illegal actions.

According to the complaint, beginning in or around January/February
of 2019, Defendant and/or its agents began placing autodialed
telephone calls to Plaintiff's cellular telephone number ending in
6666 with the intent of soliciting Plaintiff into purchasing one of
Defendant's secondary market auto warranties.

In sum, Defendant has placed upwards of 20 such autodialed
solicitation calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone throughout
the course of 2019, the lawsuit says.

Headquartered in Irvine, California, the Defendant is engaged in
the business of secondary market consumer auto warranties.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          L. Paul Mankin, IV, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF L. PAUL MANKIN
          4655 Cass St., Ste. 410
          San Diego, CA 92109
          Telephone: (800) 219-3577
          Facsimile: (323) 207-3855
          E-mail: Pmankin@paulmankin.com

               - and -

          G. Thomas Martin, III, Esq.
          Nicholas J. Bontrager, Esq.
          MARTIN & BONTRAGER, APC
          6464 W. Sunset Blvd., Ste. 960
          Los Angeles, CA 90028
          Telephone: (323) 940-1700
          Facsimile: (323) 238-8095
          E-mail: Tom@mblawapc.com
                  Nick@mblawapc.com

PAO PAO INC: Estrada Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------
ISMAEL VICTORIANO RAMIREZ ESTRADA, an individual, and MYNOR MARTIN
CARRETO PAZ, an individual, on behalf of themselves and all other
plaintiffs similarly situated, known and unknown, Plaintiffs, v.
PAO PAO, INC., an Illinois corporation d/b/a GREAT SEA RESTAURANT,
J.P. ENVIRONMENTAL PRODUCTS CORPORATION, an Illinois corporation,
formerly d/b/a GREAT SEA CHINESE RESTAURANT, FRANK S. WANG, an
individual, and HSIANG Y. LIU, an individual, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-05006 (N.D. Ill., July 25, 2019) is a lawsuit arising under
the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, and
the Chicago Minimum Wage Ordinance, for Defendants' failure to pay
Plaintiffs, and other similarly situated employees, their overtime
compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek.

Plaintiffs and others similarly situated worked more than 40 hours
in individual workweeks and received no overtime compensation for
hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek due to unlawful salary
arrangements, asserts the complaint.

Plaintiffs are current and former food preparers, dishwashers and
other kitchen staff employees of Defendants' Great Sea Chinese
Restaurant and Great Sea Restaurant.

Pao Pao, Inc. owns and operates the Great Sea Restaurant located at
3253 West Lawrence Avenue in Chicago, Illinois and is engaged in
selling and serving prepared food and beverages to customers for
consumption on and off its premises as was sold by Defendant, J.P.
Environmental doing business as the Great Sea Chinese
Restaurant.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Timothy M. Nolan, Esq.
     NOLAN LAW OFFICE
     53 W. Jackson Blvd., Ste. 1137
     Chicago, IL 60604
     Phone: (312) 322-1100
     Fax: (312) 322-1106
     Email: tnolan@nolanwagelaw.com


PENN CREDIT: Adler Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Penn Credit
Corporation. The case is styled as Menachem Adler individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Penn
Credit Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 7:19-cv-07084 (S.D. N.Y.,
July 30, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Penn Credit is a nationwide accounts receivables management
firm.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     David Michael Barshay, Esq.
     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     Barshay Sanders, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 281-7601
     Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com
            csanders@barshaysanders.com


PERFECT 10: Vargas Files FLSA Suit in W.D. Texas
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against L.L.C., Inc. d/b/a
Perfect 10 Men's Club et al. The case is styled as Alexys Vargas,
Candice Desrosiers on Behalf of themselves and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs v. L.L.C., Inc. doing
business as: Perfect 10 Men's Club, Glenn Williams, William Cox,
Teresa Thompson, Defendant, Case No. 5:19-cv-00910-FB (W.D. Tex.,
July 30, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Perfect 10 is an Austin strip club with a VIP nightclub, cabaret,
and restaurant.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Gabriel A. Assaad, Esq.
     Kennedy Hodges LLP
     711 W. Alabama St.
     Houston, TX 77006
     Phone: (713) 523-0001
     Fax: (713) 523-1116
     Email: gassaad@kennedyhodges.com


PIVOTAL SOFTWARE: Bernstein Liebhard Files Securities Fraud Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard LLP, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law
firm, announces that approximately one month remains to make a
motion for lead plaintiff in a securities class action lawsuit on
behalf of those who acquired Pivotal Software, Inc. shares (NYSE:
PVTL) between April 24, 2018 and June 4, 2019, inclusive (the
"Class Period").  The lawsuit was filed in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California to recover
damages for Pivotal investors under the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

If you purchased Pivotal securities, and/or would like to discuss
your legal rights and options please visit Pivotal Software Inc.
PVTL Class Action Lawsuit or contact Matthew E. Guarnero toll free
at (877) 779-1414 or MGuarnero@bernlieb.com

According to the lawsuit, throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (i) Pivotal was facing major problems with its sales
execution and a complex technology landscape; (ii) the foregoing
headwinds resulted in deferred sales, lengthening sales cycles, and
diminished growth as its customers and the industry's sentiment
shifted away from Pivotal's principal products because the
Company's products were outdated, inadequate, and incompatible with
the industry-standard platform; and (iii) as a result, the
Company's public statements were materially false and misleading at
all relevant times.

On June 4, 2019, post-market, Pivotal reported its financial and
operating results for the first quarter of fiscal year 2020,
advising investors that "Sales execution and a complex technology
landscape impacted the quarter."  Wedbush Securities analyst Daniel
Ives called the quarter a "train wreck" and characterized the
Company's operating results as "disastrous," asserting that
Pivotal's "management team does not have a handle on the underlying
issues negatively impacting its sales cycle and the activity in the
field which gives us concern that this quarter will be the start of
some 'dark days ahead' for Pivotal (and its investors)."

On this news, Pivotal's stock price fell $7.65 per share, or over
40%, to close at $10.89 per share on June 5, 2019, far below the
initial public offering price of $15 per share.  

If you purchased PVTL securities, and/or would like to discuss your
legal rights and options please visit https://tinyurl.com/yyytvaa7
or contact Matthew E. Guarnero toll free at (877) 779-1414 or
MGuarnero@bernlieb.com

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff in the class action, you
must move the court no later than August 19, 2019. A lead plaintiff
is a representative party acting on behalf of other class members
in directing the litigation. Your ability to share in any recovery
doesn't require that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you take no
action, you may remain an absent class member.

Since 1993, Bernstein Liebhard LLP has recovered over $3.5 billion
for its clients. In addition to representing individual investors,
the Firm has been retained by some of the largest public and
private pension funds in the country to monitor their assets and
pursue litigation on their behalf. As a result of its success
litigating hundreds of lawsuits and class actions, the Firm has
been named to The National Law Journal's "Plaintiffs' Hot List"
thirteen times and listed in The Legal 500 for ten consecutive
years.

         Contact Information:
         Matthew E. Guarnero, Esq.
         Bernstein Liebhard LLP
         Website: http://www.bernlieb.com   
         Tel.No.: (877) 779-1414
         Email: MGuarnero@bernlieb.com [GN]


POST FOODS LLC: Worker Seeks Pay for Off-the-Clock Work
-------------------------------------------------------
Keith Howard, Archie Smith, Stephanie Banks, Kevin Jackson, Jerry
Pancyzk, Marianne Heikkila, Terry Greenfield, and Autumn
Tendzieloski, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Post Foods, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
19-cv-04733, (D. Ariz., May 16, 2019), seeks to recover
compensation for pre-shift work under the Fair Labor Standards Act
and the Michigan Workforce Opportunity Wage Act.

Post Foods is a cereal manufacturer in Battle Creek where
Plaintiffs worked as factory workers.

After a plant restructuring, the amount of time an employee spends
in preparing for their shift before clocking increased
significantly. Employees are required to put on hair nets, ear
plugs, and sanitize any equipment they are carrying and travel to
their respective work areas in various buildings in order to clock
in, notes the complaint.[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Gordon A. Gregory, Esq.
      Richard M. Olszewski, Esq.
      GREGORY, MOORE, BROOKS & CLARK, P.C.
      65 Cadillac Square, Suite 3727
      Detroit, MI 48226
      Tel: (313) 964-5600


PREMIER BANKCARD: Class Discovery in Rodriguez Can Partly Proceed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Adrena Rodriguez, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Premier
Bankcard, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:16CV2541 (N.D. Ohio),
Judge James G. Carr, Sr. of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, denied in part the
Plaintiffs' motion to proceed with class discovery and
certification insofar as the claims between the named Plaintiffs
and the Defendant are moot.

The case arises under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.
Plaintiffs Rodriguez and William Hodge allege that Defendants
Premier Bankcard and First Premier Bank repeatedly called their
cell phones using an automated dialing system without prior express
consent.  They raise similar claims on behalf of a putative class,
which has not been certified.

The Plaintiffs, who are married, maintain a joint cell phone
account.  Each spouse has his or her own cell phone with a separate
phone number.  In July, 2014 and March, 2016, Hodge applied for and
received two credit cards from First Premier in his name only.
Premier issued a credit card agreement to Hodge for each card.
Each agreement contained a "consent-to-call" provision, whereby
Hodge agreed and expressly consented that Premier and its
affiliates may call or contact him at any cellular, telephone
number that he provided or used to contact Premier.  Over the life
of the credit card accounts, Hodge gave the Defendants both his and
Rodriguez's cell phone numbers.  

Shortly after Hodge opened his second account in 2016, he fell
behind on his credit card payments.  Premier began collection
efforts, using an automated dialing system to call both Hodge's and
Rodriguez's phone numbers.

By July 12, 2016, Hodge and Rodriguez each had asked Premier to
stop autodialing their cell phones.  But the calls continued,
apparently because a Premier employee failed to "flag" Hodge's
account. Finally, on Aug. 17, 2016, Hodge again asked that Premier
stop calling, and the calls to both the Plaintiffs ended.

The Plaintiffs filed suit on Oct. 18, 201.  During the class
discovery period, but before the Plaintiffs filed a motion for
class certification, Premier offered judgment on the Plaintiffs'
individual claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 68.  The Plaintiffs
accepted.

Thereafter, the Plaintiffs filed the pending motion to proceed with
class discovery and certification.  Premier opposes the motion,
arguing that the offer of judgment moots the case.  Premier argues
that the case became moot when the Plaintiffs accepted the offer of
judgment.  The Plaintiffs assert that the case is not moot and,
alternatively, ask that the Court allows them to resume class
discovery, so the counsel may identify putative class members and
send them notice of the settlement.

Judge Carr agrees with Premier.  Generally, a class action becomes
moot if the individual plaintiffs, like the Plaintiffs in the case,
accept an offer of judgment providing full relief on their
individual claims and there is no certified class or pending motion
to certify.  The Plaintiffs maintain that Rule 68's cost-shifting
mechanism forced them to accept.  But the workings of the judicial
system are irrelevant in this context.  Accordingly, the Plaintiffs
fail to demonstrate that Premier compelled their acceptance, and
the offer of judgment moots their claims.

On reply, the Plaintiffs argue that the "inherently transitory"
exception to mootness also applies.  The Judge disagrees.  The
inherently transitory exception enables individual plaintiffs to
continue pursuing their cases where the controversy is such that
the case becomes moot as to them before the district court can
reasonably be expected to rule on a certification motion.  The
exception requires that the plaintiffs show: (1) that the injury be
so transitory that it would likely evade review by becoming moot
before the district court can rule on class certification, and (2)
that it is certain other class members are suffering the injury.

The Judge finds that the Sixth Circuit in Wilson v. Gordon made
clear that a claim is not inherently transitory simply because a
defendant offers judgment.  Therefore, the offer of judgment does
not warrant applying the exception.  The second element of the
inherently transitory exception also fails.  The inherently
transitory exception requires the Plaintiffs to show others are
suffering the complained-of injury.  Their attempt to shift their
burden to defendants to show that theputative class members are not
suffering that harm falls short of the test.

Though the case is moot, the Plaintiffs ask that the Court allows
them to resume class discovery to identify putative class members,
send notice to the class, and appoint a new class representative.
The Defendants argue that notice to the class is improper, and,
therefore, the Court should bar further discovery.

The Judge holds that the parties have not supplied evidence
sufficient for him to resolve the issue.  Accordingly, he will
direct the clerk to set thie matter for a telephone
status/scheduling conference to discuss, inter alia, a timetable
for further proceedings, including, if needed, an evidentiary or
other hearing and/or additional briefing.  Specifically, the
counsel will address whether the Court should modify the protective
order to enable the Plaintiffs' counsel to contact the 16persons
whom, as the Defendant acknowledges, the Defendant's
representatives called despite a do not call request.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Carr denied in part the Plaintiffs'
motion to proceed with class discovery and certification insofar as
the claims between the named Plaintiffs and Defendant are moot.
The clerk will forthwith schedule a telephone conference as
provided.  The Plaintiffs' motion, insofar as it seeks discovery
for class notice, is held in abeyance pending further proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 21, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/3OWVBk from Leagle.com.

Adrena Rodriguez, individually and on behalf of a class of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander H. Burke --
aburke@burkelawllc.com -- Burke Law Offices, James M. Feagle ,
Skaar & Feagle, Justin T. Holcombe , Skaar & Feagle, Kris K. Skaar,
Skaar & Feagle & Gregory S. Reichenbach --
greg@reichenbachlaw.com.

William Hodge, individually and on behalf of a class of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander H. Burke,
Burke Law Offices, James M. Feagle, Skaar & Feagle, Justin T.
Holcombe, Skaar & Feagle, Kris K. Skaar, Skaar & Feagle, pro hac
vice & Gregory S. Reichenbach.

Premier Bankcard, LLC & First Premier Bank, Defendants, represented
by Matthew B. Howard -- howardm@ballardspahr.com -- Ballard Spahr,
Daniel L. Delnero, Ballard Spahr, John B. Pinney --
jpinney@graydon.law -- Graydon, Head & Ritchey, Kara A. Czanik,
Dinsmore & Shohl & Stefanie H. Jackman -- JACKMANSBALLARDSPAHR.COM
-- Ballard Spahr.


PRIME MOTOR GROUP: March et al Seek OT Pay, Sunday Premium
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Prime Motor Group,
Inc. and David Rosenberg for alleged violations of the
Massachusetts General Laws. The case is captioned Nathan March,
Thomas McNamara, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. PRIME MOTOR GROUP, INC., DAVID ROSENBERG,
Defendants, Case No. 19-0900 (Mass. Cmmw., July 15, 2019).

Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants failed to pay overtime and
Sunday pay premium. During the course of their employment with the
Defendants, Plaintiffs worked hours in excess of 40 during a seven
day work week without receiving an overtime premium. In addition,
the Plaintiffs and others were obligated to work on Sundays without
receiving Sunday premium pay. Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek to
recover compensation for these Wage Act violations, statutory
trebling of wage related damages, and attorney's fees and costs as
provided for by law.

Prime Motor Group, Inc. is a Massachusetts Corporation located in
Westwood, Massachusetts.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     James W. Simpson, Jr., Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF JAMES W. SIMPSON, JR. PC
     100 Concord Street, Suite 3B
     Framingham, MA 01702
     Telephone: (508) 872-0002


PRIMEFLIGHT: Velez et al Seek Wages for Aircraft Cleaning Crew
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lionel Velez and Vanessa Guadalupe, On behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs v. Primeflight Aviation
Services, Inc., the Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-01056-JPS (E.D.
Wisc., July 24, 2019), seeks redress for Primeflight's failure to
pay to Plaintiffs compensation required by the Fair Labor Standards
Act and Wisconsin law.

The Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees are current and
former supervisors, leadmen, and members of aircraft cleaning crew
employed by the Defendant.

The Plaintiffs, just like the other members of the aircraft
cleaning crews, would begin performing work at their assigned start
times, if not earlier on days when they arrived to their work
stations before their assigned start times.

Specifically, Velez has not received any compensation from
Primeflight for his hours worked during the final Monday to Sunday
workweek that he worked for Primeflight, while Guadelupe has not
received any compensation from Primeflight for her hours worked
during the final two Monday to Sunday workweeks that she worked for
Primeflight, the lawsuit says.

Primeflight performs aircraft support services, including aircraft
cleaning services, at more than 40 airports throughout the United
States, including Michell Airport in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Yingtao Ho, Esq.
          The Previant Law Firm S.C.
          310 W. Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 100MW
          Milwaukee, WI 53203
          Telephone: 414 271-4500
          Facsimile: 414 271-6308
          E-mail: vh@previant.com

PROGRESSIVE DIRECT: Bid to Certify Class in Kleinsasser Suit Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARK D. KLEINSASSER, Plaintiff, v. PROGRESSIVE DIRECT
INSURANCE COMPANY and PROGRESSIVE MAX INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants, Case No. C17-5499 BHS (W.D. Wash.), Judge Benjamin H.
Settle of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Tacoma, denied (a) the Plaintiff's motion to certify
class, and (b) denied as moot without prejudice Progressive's (i)
motion to exclude expert testimony of Bernard Siskin, and (ii)
motion to exclude expert testimony of Angelo Toglia.

On April 1, 2016, the Plaintiff filed a class action complaint
against Progressive in Pierce County Superior Court for the State
of Washington.  He seeks to recover diminished value on a
class-wide basis and individual loss of use damages under the
Underinsured Motorists Property Damage ("UIMPD" or "UMPD")
provision of his insurance contract with Direct.

On Sept. 18, 2015, an uninsured driver hit the Plaintiff's vehicle
causing significant damage.  The Plaintiff had purchased insurance
coverage with Direct.  The vehicle was towed to a repair shop, and
the Plaintiff submitted a claim to Direct.  He was without the use
of his vehicle until Nov. 24, 2015, and, on two separate occasions,
he returned the vehicle to the repair shop for additional repairs.
On an individual basis, the Plaintiff alleges that Direct failed to
provide him with a rental car or otherwise reimburse him for the
loss of use of his vehicle.

Regarding the class claim, the Plaintiff alleges that Progressive's
failure to compensate its insureds for diminished value has been
"systematic and continuous" and has affected a large number of
insureds over time. As such, he eeks certification of a class as
follows: All insured of Progressive Direct Insurance Co. and
Progressive Max Insurance Co. with Washington policies issued in
Washington State, who presented a claim for vehicle damage covered
under Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist (UIM) coverage from April 1,
2010, through the date of the Court's certification order; and (1)
the repair estimates on the vehicle (including any supplements)
totaled at least $1,000; (2) the vehicle was no more than six years
old (model year plus five years) and had less than 90,000 miles on
it at the time of the accident; and (3) the vehicle suffered
structural (frame) damage and/or deformed sheet metal and/or
required body or paint work.

In the Plaintiff's motion, he asserts that Direct and Max are
"Juridically linked and alter egos."  The Court, however, is unable
to locate the cited evidence in the record.

On June 28, 2017, Progressive removed the matter to federal court
asserting that the Court has jurisdiction under the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA").

On Oct. 1, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion to certify class.  On
Dec. 10, 2018, Progressive responded, and filed the motions to
exclude.  

On Oct. 3, 2018, the Plaintiff filed that motion to seal, but
failed to comply with the local rule permiting the party to file
the document under seal without prior court approval pending the
court's ruling on the motion to seal.  On Nov. 13, 2018, the Court
denied the motion to seal, and it appears that the Plaintiff failed
to file an unsealed version of the document in question.

The Plaintiff did file a second declaration with six exhibits
attached, but none of those exhibits appear to be the document in
question.  Moreover, he fails to cite any additional evidence in
support of this position in his reply.  Therefore, the Plaintiff's
position is based on allegations in the complaint and unsupported
assertions in his briefs.

Judge Settle holds that the Plaintiff argues in a footnote without
supporting documentation in the record that the Court should
certify a bilateral class of private party defendants under the
juridical link exception to binding precedent.  He finds that the
Plaintiff has failed to meet the typicality requirement of Rule
23(a) by failing to submit contracts between Direct and Max that
establish a binding relationship that rises to the level of a
national master freight agreement, a collective bargaining
agreement, or something similar.

Even if those contracts were in the record, it seems highly
unlikely that the Plaintiff will have established that Direct and
Max qualify for the juridical link exception to La Mar as private
parties with at most a common course of business practices.  In
other words, thePlaintiff has failed to affirmatively demonstrate
his compliance with Rule 23.  As such, the Plaintiff has failed to
establish that the proposed class should be certified.

Therefore, Judge Settle denied (a) the Plaintiff's motion to
certify class, and (b) denied as moot without prejudice
Progressive's (i) motion to exclude expert testimony of Bernard
Siskin, and (ii) motion to exclude expert testimony of Angelo
Toglia.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 21, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/l4Rz8c from Leagle.com.

Mark D Kleinsasser, individually and as the representative of all
persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Stephen M.
Hansen -- steve@stephenmhansenlaw.com -- LAW OFFICES OF STEPHEN M.
HANSEN & Scott P. Nealey -- snealey@nealeylaw.com -- NEALEY LAW,
pro hac vice.

Progressive Direct Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by J.
Matthew Donohue -- Matt.Donohue@hklaw.com -- HOLLAND & KNIGHT,
Kristin Mariko Asai, HOLLAND & KNIGHT, Kymberly Kochis, EVERSHEDS
SUTHERLAND (US) LLP, pro hac vice, Michael R. Nelson, EVERSHEDS
SUTHERLAND (US) LLP, pro hac vice, Robert Leslie Christie, CHRISTIE
LAW GROUP PLLC & Shannon Lea Armstrong --
shannon.armstrong@hklaw.com -- HOLLAND & KNIGHT.

Progressive Max Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by
Kristin Mariko Asai, HOLLAND & KNIGHT, Kymberly Kochis, EVERSHEDS
SUTHERLAND (US) LLP, pro hac vice, Michael R. Nelson, EVERSHEDS
SUTHERLAND (US) LLP, pro hac vice, Robert Leslie Christie, CHRISTIE
LAW GROUP PLLC & Shannon Lea Armstrong, HOLLAND & KNIGHT.


QUEENS LAND: Huang Seeks Work Accommodations
--------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as RONGBO HUANG, an individual,
the Plaintiff, v. QUEENS LAND BUILDER, INC., a California
Corporation, and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, the Defendants,
Case No. 19STCV22749 (Cal. Super., June 27, 2019), Plaintiff seeks
to recover damages from Defendants for discrimination, failure to
accommodate, failure to engage in interactive process, failure to
prevent discrimination, wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy, failure to pay wages timely, failure to pay overtime, and
unfair competition under the California Labor Code.

The Plaintiff was employed by Queens from on or about January 30,
2018 until April 15, 2019.  Huang worked as a financial analyst.
The Plaintiff suffered from a physical disability arising from an
incident at work which occurred on March 1, 2019, the result of
which caused him to miss work and require accommodations.

Between the date of his injury and April 15, 2019, Huang was
capable of working with accommodations. Because Queens was
unwilling to offer reasonable accommodations, or engage in a good
faith interactive process to determine reasonable accommodations,
the lawsuit says.

Despite his employer's knowledge of his disability and his need for
and his need for reasonable accommodations, which Huang had
requested, Queens failed to accommodate Huang's disability. As the
result of the Defendants' and each of their actions and omissions,
Huang has suffered severe emotional distress and economic
damages.[bn]

Attorneys for Plaintiff are:

          Michael A. DesJardins, Esq.
          DESJARDINS & PANITZ, LLP
          210 West Birch Street, Suite 202
          Brea, CA 92821
          Telephone: (714) 265-2100
          Facsimile: (714) 494-8215
          E-mail: md@desiardinslaw.com

QUEST DIAGNOSTICS: Jacobson Files Suit Over Data Breach
-------------------------------------------------------
CHARLES JACOBSON, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. QUEST DIAGNOSTICS INCORPORATED,
Defendant, Case No. CAM-L-002997-19 (N.J. Super. Ct., Camden Cty.,
July 25, 2019) is a class action on behalf of all New Jersey
consumers whose information was compromised in a data breach.

Quest required Plaintiff and class members to surrender their
personal, financial and medical data (e.g., social security
numbers, protected health information, bank account information and
credit card numbers) in order to receive diagnostic and laboratory
services. Quest failed to adequately safeguard Plaintiff and class
members' personal, financial and medical data, allowing it to be
accessed by unauthorized users over an eight-month period between
August 1, 2018 and March 30, 2019. Despite discovering the breach
on May 14, 2019, Quest waited until June 3, 2019 to disclose the
breach in a Form 8-K filing, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is an adult individual who resides in Burlington County,
New Jersey.

Quest is a public company that provides medical diagnostic testing
and laboratory services to consumers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeremy E. Abay, Esq.
     John K. Weston, Esq.
     SACKS WESTON DIAMOND, LLC
     1845 Walnut Street, Suite 1600
     Philadelphia, PA 19103
     Phone: 215-925-8200
     Fax: 267-639-5422
     Email: jabay@sackslaw.com
            jweston@sackslaw.com


RADER MANAGEMENT: Spicer Seeks Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------
LIDIA SPICER, the Plaintiff, vs. RADER MANAGEMENT, CORP., JOG
DONUTS, INC., JOHN RADER, individually, and GLORIA RADER,
individually, the Defendants, Case No. 0:19-cv-61847-XXXX (S.D.
Fla., July 23, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act

The Plaintiff began working for Defendants in 2010/2011.
Plaintiff's employment ended on or about June 26, 2017. The
Plaintiff performed work as a housekeeper/nanny for Defendants and
was paid her regular wages through Rader Management and Jog
Donuts.

The Plaintiff frequently worked over 40 hours a week. Defendants
had knowledge of Plaintiff's overtime hours, but purposefully
failed to provide her complete and adequate overtime pay in
violation of the FLSA, the lawsuit says.

Th Defendants operate a Dunkin' Donuts store.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff are:

          J. Freddy Perera, Esq.
          Valerie Barnhart, Esq.
          Brody M. Shulman, Esq.
          Waynice A. Green, Esq.
          PERERA BARNHART, P.A.
          12555 Orange Drive, Second Floor
          Davie, FL 33330
          Telephone: 786-485-5232
          E-mail: freddy@pererabarnhart.com
                  valerie@pererabarnhart.com
                  brody@pererabarnhart.com
                  waynice@pererabarnhart.com

RADIUS GLOBAL: Weiss Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Radius Global
Solutions, LLC. The case is styled as Mendel Weiss individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Radius
Global Solutions, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 7:19-cv-07088 (S.D.
N.Y., July 30, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Radius Global Solutions is a provider of account recovery and debt
collection, customer relationship management and healthcare revenue
cycle management solutions.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     David Michael Barshay, Esq.
     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     Barshay Sanders, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 281-7601
     Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com
            csanders@barshaysanders.com


REALOGY HOLDINGS: Bragar Eagel Files Securities Class Action Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C., announces that a class action lawsuit
has been filed in the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey on behalf of all investors that purchased Realogy
Holdings Corp. (NYSE: RLGY) securities between February 24, 2019
and May 22, 2019 (the "Class Period").  Investors have until
September 9, 2019 to apply to the Court to be appointed as lead
plaintiff in the lawsuit.

The complaint filed on July 11, 2019 alleges that throughout the
Class Period defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (1) Realogy was engaged in
anticompetitive behavior by requiring property sellers to pay the
commissions of a buyer's broker at an inflated rate; (2) Realogy's
anticompetitive actions would prompt the U.S. Department of Justice
to open an antitrust investigation into the real estate industry's
practices regarding brokers' commissions; and (3) as a result,
defendants' statements about the Realogy's business, operations and
prospects were materially false and misleading and/or lacked a
reasonable basis at all relevant times. When the true details
entered the market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered
damages.

If you purchased Realogy shares during the Class Period, have
information, would like to learn more about these claims, or have
any questions concerning this announcement or your rights or
interests with respect to these matters, please contact Brandon
Walker or Melissa Fortunato by email at investigations@bespc.com,
or telephone at (212) 355-4648, or by filling out this contact
form.  There is no cost or obligation to you.

Contact:

         Brandon Walker, Esq.
         Melissa Fortunato, Esq.
         Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.
         Phone: (212) 355-4648
         Website: www.bespc.com
         Email: investigations@bespc.com
                fortunato@bespc.com
                walker@bespc.com [GN]


REALOGY HOLDINGS: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announces it has
filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Realogy Holdings Corp. (NYSE: RLGY) from February 24,
2017 through May 22, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The
lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Realogy investors under the
federal securities laws.

To join the Realogy class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1600.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Realogy was engaged in anticompetitive behavior by
requiring property sellers to pay the commissions of a buyer's
broker at an inflated rate; (2) Realogy's anticompetitive actions
would prompt the U.S. Department of Justice to open an antitrust
investigation into the real estate industry's practices regarding
brokers' commissions; and (3) as a result, defendants' statements
about the Realogy's business, operations and prospects were
materially false and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at
all relevant times. When the true details entered the market, the
lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than September
9, 2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If you
wish to join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1600.htmlor to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com

Contact:

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34thFloor
         New York, NY 10016
         Phone: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Website: www.rosenlegal.com
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com
                cases@rosenlegal.com [GN]


REALOGY HOLDINGS: Zhang Investor Files Securities Class Action Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Zhang Investor Law announces a class action lawsuit on behalf of
shareholders who bought shares of Realogy Holdings Corp. (NYSE:
RLGY) from February 24, 2017 through May 22, 2019, inclusive.  The
lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Realogy investors under the
federal securities laws.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than September 9, 2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Your ability to obtain a recovery is not dependent upon
being a lead plaintiff. If you wish to join the class action at
https://tinyurl.com/yyfh6zfh or to discuss your rights or interests
regarding this class action, please contact Sophie Zhang, Esq. or
Spencer Lee toll-free at 800-991-3756 or email
info@zhanginvestorlaw.com, slee@zhanginvestorlaw.com for
information on the class action.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Realogy was engaged in anticompetitive behavior by
requiring property sellers to pay the commissions of a buyer's
broker at an inflated rate; (2) Realogy's anticompetitive actions
would prompt the U.S. Department of Justice to open an antitrust
investigation into the real estate industry's practices regarding
brokers' commissions; and (3) as a result, defendants' statements
about the Realogy's business, operations and prospects were
materially false and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at
all relevant times. When the true details entered the market, the
lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

A class has not been certified.  You may retain counsel of your
choice.  You may take no action at this time and be an absent class
member. Your ability to obtain a recovery is not dependent upon
being a lead plaintiff.

         Zhang Investor Law P.C.
         99 Wall Street, Suite 232
         New York, New York 10005
         info@zhanginvestorlaw.com
         tel: (800) 991-3756
         email: info@zhanginvestorlaw.com [GN]


RED ROBIN: Geraci TCPA Suit Moved to District of Colorado
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN GERACI, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. RED ROBIN INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Defendant, Civil No. 1:18-cv-15542-RMB (D. N.J.), Judge Renee Marie
Bumb of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey,
Camden Vicinage, granted the Defendant's motion to transfer venue
to the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a).

On Nov. 1, 2018, Plaintiff Geraci filed a putative class action in
the Court against Red Robin, alleging that Red Robin sent
unauthorized telemarketing text messages to his cellular phone in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.  The Plaintiff
brings the action pursuant Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
purportedly on behalf of all persons who (1) on or after four years
prior to Nov. 1, 2018 (2) were sent Red Robin Royalty text messages
after (3) texting the Defendant 'Stop' or (4) where the Defendant
did not possess prior express written consent.

On Feb. 15, 2019, the Defendant filed the instant motion,
requesting that the action be transferred to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Colorado.  The Defendant contends that
the parties cannot dispute that the Plaintiff might have brought
the case in the District of Colorado and it appears the Plaintiff
does not argue otherwise.  

Judge Bumb granted the Defendant's Motion to Transfer Venue.  She
finds that (i) the Defendant is headquartered in Colorado, thus,
venue is proper in the District of Colorado; and (ii) the location
of the Defendant, resources, and witnesses around Colorado and the
spread of the Plaintiff-class throughout the country tilt the
majority of the factors in favor of transfer.  An appropriate order
follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 21, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/9NOe33 from Leagle.com.


RUTHERFORD, TN: Certification Bid in Juvie Suit Held in Abeyance
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee, Nashville Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and
Order holding in abeyance Plaintiffs' Amended Rule 23 Motion to
Certify Class in the case captioned K.W., ex rel. KANISA DAVIS, et
al., Plaintiffs, v. RUTHERFORD COUNTY, TENNESEE Defendant. No.
3:17-cv-01014. (M.D. Tenn.).

The Plaintiffs alleged that Rutherford maintained a de facto policy
of incarcerating juveniles at the RJDC before trial whenever RJDC
staff subjectively determined that incarceration was in the best
intersts of the child, regardless of state law restrictions making
it illegal to incarcerate children outside of certain narrowly
prescribed circumstances.  Accordingly, Rutherford's use of the
Filter System resulted in rampant, en masse violations of
potentially thousands of children's substantive and procedural due
process rights.

Plaintiffs initially set forth the following class definitions:

   1. Illegal Custodial Arrest Classes (Subclass A: The Injunctive
Arrest Class)All juveniles who may, because of Rutherford County's
policies or de facto practices, be illegally taken into custody by
Rutherford County Sheriff's deputies for a status or misdemeanor
delinquent charge where such juveniles have a Tennessee state law
right to be released with a summons or citation in lieu of
custodial arrest because (a) no law enforcement officer personally
witnesses the offense, (b) the alleged offense is not one of the
few named misdemeanors for which a warrantless arrest is
specifically authorized even if the offense occurs outside the
presence of an officer, (c) the offense is not one of the
categorical exceptions to T.C.A. Section 40-7-118's mandatory cite
and release requirement, and (d) no court orders has issued an
arrest order prior to the custodial arrest being conducted.

   2. Subclass B: The Damages Arrest ClassAll persons1 who have
been taken into custody as juveniles by Rutherford County Sheriff's
deputies for unruly or misdemeanor delinquent charges where such
juveniles had a Tennessee state law right to be released with a
summons or citation in lieu of a custodial arrest because (a) no
law enforcement officer personally witnessed the alleged offense,
(b) the alleged offense was not one of a few named misdemeanors for
which a warrantless arrest is specifically authorized even if the
offense occurred outside the officer's presence, (c) the alleged
offense was not one of the categorical exceptions to T.C.A. Section
40-7-118's mandatory cite and release requirement, and (d) the
arrest was not made pursuant to a previously-issued court arrest
order.

   3. Detention Class (Subclass C: The Injunctive Detention
Class)All juveniles who may, because of Rutherford County's
policies or de facto practices, be securely detained pretrial as a
juvenile in circumstances that do not meet the perquisites for
secure detention under T.C.A. Section 37-1-114(c) and the United
States Constitution.

   4. Detention Class (Subclass D: The Damages Detention Class)All
persons (subject to the statute of limitations) who have, because
of Rutherford County's policies or de facto practices, been
securely detained pretrial as a juvenile in circumstanes that did
not satisfy any of the categorical prerequisites for secure
detention listed in T.C.A. Section 37-1-114(c)(1)-(6).

Plaintiffs' Class Certification Arguments and Rutherford's
Response

The Plaintiffs assert that their proposed class satisfies Rule
23(a)'s prerequisites because: (1) the proposed class includes
hundreds of children, satisfying numerosity (2) there are common
questions of law and fact, as the central factual questions are the
nature, scope, and application of Rutherford's challenged policies
and the relevant law consists of the Tennessee state statutes that
Rutherford allegedly violated (3) the named plaintiffs are typical
of the class because they experienced either the Always Arrest
policy or Filter System policy and (4) the named plaintiffs
interests are coextensive with, and not adverse to, the other
potential class members.

Rutherford responds in opposition, first arguing that Plaintiffs'
proposed class is not ascertainable. Rutherford argues that the
proposed class is a fail-safe class because it is one that includes
only those who are entitled to relief, and such classes are
prohibited because they allow class members to seek a remedy but
not be bound by an adverse judgment.  

Second, Rutherford contends that the class members cannot be
identified without extensive and individualized fact-finding,
making class certification inappropriate.  Rutherford maintains
that because membership in the proposed classes is dependent on
whether a juvenile's rights were violated, which, in turn, requires
an analysis of the totality of circumstances of the arrest,
individual issues would overwhelm the class.  

Third, Rutherford argues that, in certain circumstances, juvenile
arrests and detentions are non-violative if probable cause exists,
which again requires a totality of the circumstances analysis that
destroys commonality. Rutherford also asserts that these required
probable cause analyses prevent Plaintiffs from establishing
typicality.   

Further, Rutherford maintains that the speculative nature of the
class definition prevents a finding of numerosity and that named
plaintiffs have interests that are adverse to the proposed class.


At the outset, the Court acknowledges that Plaintiffs' pending
request for amendment of the class definition comes rather late in
the game. The parties had conducted discovery, fully briefed the
issues, and the Court stood ready to make a dispositive ruling.
Plaintiffs' actions come dangerously close to eleventh-hour
brinkmanship that has no place in this Court.

Nevertheless, this Court is imbued with sound discretion to
determine whether justice requires permission to amend a pleading.
However, here, the Court cannot make such a determination as
Plaintiffs have not provided the Court with any justification for
doing so. Plaintiffs sur-reply response does not reference their
obligations under Rule 15, but, rather, assumes that the Court will
simply take their new proposed definition as a given. Such an
approach would be contrary to the law and manifestly unfair to
Rutherford.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs shall file a Motion to Amend setting out
their arguments for amending the class definition on or before July
26, 2019. Rutherford shall file its response on or before August 2,
2019. No reply shall be necessary. Depending on the outcome of
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend, new briefing will be required on the
new class definitions.

The Court will therefore holds in abeyance the Plaintiffs' pending
Amended Rule 23 Motion to Certify Class.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 18, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y5wjdezk from
Leagle.com.

Dylan J. Geerts, Plaintiff, represented by Kyle F. Mothershead, The
Law Office of Kyle Mothershead, Mark J. Downton, Brazil Clark, PLLC
& Wesley B. Clark, Brazil Clark, PLLC.

A. B., J. B., Sandra Brien, Jacqueline Brinkley, Kanisa Davis & K.
W., Consol Plaintiffs, represented by Kyle F. Mothershead, The Law
Office of Kyle Mothershead, 414 Union St, Ste 900, Nashville,
Tennessee 37219, Mark J. Downton, Brazil Clark, PLLC & Wesley B.
Clark, Brazil Clark, PLLC, 2706 Larmon Avenue, Nashville, TN 37204

Rutherford County, Tennessee, Defendant, represented by David
Randall Mantooth, Leitner, Williams, Dooley, and Napolitan, 414
Union Street, Suite 1900. Nashville, TN 37219-1782
Tennessee Department of Children's Services, Interested Party,
represented by Jeffrey D. Ridner, Tennessee Attorney General's
Office.


RYANAIR DAC: Test-Achats Starts EUR16M Class Action Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
Alan Hope, writing for The Brussels Times, reports that consumer
organisation Test-Achats has filed a class action lawsuit against
the Irish budget airline Ryanair, claiming EUR16 million in
damages.

The motive for the suit is a series of strikes last summer
affecting some 40,000 passengers. According to EU law, the
organisation argues, passengers booked on cancelled flights are
entitled to compensation of 250 to 600 euros, depending on the
distance covered by the flight. Ryanair has already reimbursed
ticket prices or allowed passengers affected by the strikes to book
on another flight without additional cost.

Test-Achats calculates the total bill for compensating all
passengers will come to 16 million euros. The strikes in question
took place on July 25 and 26, Aug. 10 and Sept. 28 and caused the
cancellation or delay to 170 flights into and out of Zaventem and
Charleroi.

Ryanair in turn argues that the strikes were outside the power of
the company to prevent.

"Passengers have a right to compensation, because this was a strike
of [Ryanair's] own staff," said Test-Achats spokesperson Simon
November. "There is European jurisprudence that supports us, and in
fact says that even a wildcat strike cannot be considered force
majeure."

Staff at Ryanair were protesting at company policy to employ staff
in Ireland, where labour laws are slacker, even though the staff
member in question had never set foot in the country. They also
called for union recognition.

Immediately after the strikes, Test-Achats filed some 40 cases with
courts in Zaventem and Charleroi. However the judge in Zaventem
declared the case outside of his responsibility, while the case in
Charleroi has still not produced a result. The new action, which is
expected to take a year, will first have to decide if individual
passengers have to opt into the action, or whether they can be
represented simply by declining to opt out.

Class actions -- where a large number of people with the same
complaint can join their lawsuits together -- have been possible in
Belgium since 2014. Since then, Test-Achats has represented
consumers in eight cases, including this one. Other actions were
filed against Facebook, Groupon and Volkswagen.

Test-Achats has created a website for passengers who were affected
by the strikes. [GN]


SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC: Tousignant Settlement Has Preliminary Approval
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
Settlement Approval in the case captioned JOSHUA TOUSIGNANT and
HEATHER WELSCH, individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC USA, INC., Defendant.
Civ. A. No. 1:18-cv-10439-RGS. (D. Mass.).

The Plaintiffs have filed an assented-to motion for preliminary
settlement approval pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(e).  

The Court preliminarily finds, solely for purposes of settlement,
that the Litigation may be maintained as a class action on behalf
of the Class because: (a) the Class is so numerous that joinder of
all Class Members is impracticable; (b) there are questions of law
and fact common to the Class Members that predominate over
individual questions; (c) Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the
claims of the Class; (d) Plaintiffs and their counsel will fairly
and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class;
and (e) settlement on a class basis is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the Litigation.

The Court finds that the Agreement is fair, reasonable, and
adequate, and within the range of possible approval, subject to
further consideration at a final fairness hearing.

Accordingly, the Court grants preliminary approval of the
settlement.

The Court finds that the Notice satisfies the requirements of due
process, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and constitutes the
best notice practicable under the circumstances. The Court approves
the form and content of the Notice and authorizes the Parties to
issue Notice in the manner set forth in the Agreement.

The final fairness and approval hearing shall take place before the
Honorable Richard G. Stearns on November 22, 2019, at 2:00 p.m. at
the United States District Court, District of Massachusetts,
Courtroom 21, located at 1 Courthouse Way in Boston, Massachusetts
02210. At that hearing, the Court shall determine whether the
proposed settlement of the Litigation on the terms and conditions
provided for in the Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate as
to the Class Members and should be approved; whether the Litigation
should be dismissed with prejudice on the terms provided for in the
Agreement; the amount of fees and costs that should be awarded to
Plaintiffs' Counsel; and the amount of the incentive award that
should be awarded, as provided for in the Agreement. The Court will
also hear and consider any properly lodged objections at that
time.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 18, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3vgpcr7 from Leagle.com.

Joshua Tousignant, individually and on behalf of all those
similarly situated & Heather Welsch, individually and on behalf of
all those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Hillary A.
Schwab -- hillary@fairworklaw.com -- Fair Work, P.C., Sergei
Lemberg, Lemberg Law, L.L.C., 43 Danbury Rd, Wilton, Connecticut
06897 & Brant Casavant -- brant@fairworklaw.com --  Fair Work P.C.

Schneider Electric USA, Inc., Defendant, represented by Cheryl B.
Pinarchick -- cpinarchick@fisherphillips.com -- Fisher Phillips,
Kathleen M. Caminiti -- kcaminiti@fisherphillips.com -- Fisher &
Phillips LLP, pro hac vice & Joshua D. Nadreau --
jnadreau@fisherphillips.com -- Fisher & Phillips, LLP.


SHERLOQ REVENUE: Weiss Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Sherloq Revenue
Solutions, Inc. The case is styled as Ignatz Weiss, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Sherloq Revenue Solutions, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 7:19-cv-07103
(S.D. N.Y., July 30, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

SHERLOQ specializes in extended business office and revenue
recovery solutions for hospitals and utilities.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     Barshay Sanders, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 281-7601
     Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com


SHON AND KARAH BROWN: Hernandez Suit Seeks to Recover Overtime Pay
------------------------------------------------------------------
Antonio Hernandez, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PGA Holdings, LLC, Maesag
Properties, LLC, Bellum Manor Apartments, LLC, BMA Holdings, LLC,
Villas at Montebella, LLC, Spa Holdings, LLC, Court Holdings, LLC,
Shon Brown and Karah Brown, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-04733, (D.
Ariz., May 16, 2019), seeks unpaid wages for overtime compensation
due, liquidated damages, reasonable attorney's fees, costs and
expenses of this action and such other relief under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Defendants are multiple hospitality businesses in Arizona owned by
Shon Brown and Karah Brown and have jointly employed Hernandez as a
maintenance technician. He claims to be denied overtime for time
worked in excess of 40 hours in any given workweek.[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Clifford P. Bendau, II, Esq.
      Christopher J. Bendau, Esq.
      THE BENDAU LAW FIRM PLLC
      P.O. Box 97066
      Phoenix, AZ 85018
      Telephone: (480) 382-5176
      Facsimile: (602) 956-1409
      Email: cliffordbendau@bendaulaw.com
             chris@bendaulaw.com


SMITH MEDICAL: Arkin Sues Over Unsolicited Faxed Ads
----------------------------------------------------
Dr. Steven Arkin, individually and as the representative of a class
of similarly-situated persons, Plaintiff, v. Smith Medical
Partners, Llc, H.D. Smith, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-01723
(M.D. Fla., July 16, 2019), seeks injunctive relief and statutory
damages for violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991, as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005.

Defendants are specialty distribution service providers for
healthcare providers who have sent unsolicited faxed ads to Arkin
offering their products and services without consent[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Ross M. Good, Esq.
     Ryan M. Kelly, Esq.
     ANDERSON + WANCA
     3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 500
     Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
     Telephone: (847) 368-1500
     Fax: (847) 368-1501
     Email: rkelly@andersonwanca.com


SOCIAL SECURITY: Courts Transfer Michener Suit to N.D. Cal.
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, District of Columbia, issued a
Memorandum Opinion granting in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned FRANCES MICHENER, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW SAUL and
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendants. Civil Action No.
18-1657 (RC). (D.D.C.), and transferred the case to the Northern
District of California.

The Social Security Administration applies a provision of federal
law to reduce the Social Security benefits of individuals who also
receive pension benefits from a foreign government. For years,
Steven Rosell and Frances Michener were among those affected by
this reduction. Believing it to be unlawful, they brought this
putative class action against the agency and its Commissioner on
behalf of individuals whose benefits have been similarly lowered.


By brief way of background, Title II of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. Section 401-34, provides old-age, survivor, and disability
benefits to insured individuals irrespective of financial need
Certain jobs are exempt from Social Security taxes, however. This
non-covered employment is often federal employment that, prior to
1984, was exempt from Social Security taxes because federal
employees contributed to the federal civil service pension which
was designed to take the place both of social security and a
private pension plan for workers who remained in federal employment
throughout their careers.

Given the existence of non-covered employment, the Social Security
Act contains a windfall elimination provision (WEP), which seeks to
preserve the progressive nature of the Social Security system by
ensuring that the formula the Social Security Administration] uses
to calculate benefits does not advantage high-income workers who
split their careers between covered and non-covered employment over
those who paid Social Security taxes for their entire careers.

Plaintiff Frances Michener originally brought the case with her
husband, Steven Rosell, but after Rosell passed away, she was
substituted as the sole Plaintiff, proceeding both in her
individual capacity and as executor of her late husband's estate.
Rosell worked in Canada from 1976 to 1990 and in the United States
from 1990 to 2012, so from 2013 until his death, he received
benefits from both the Canada Pension Plan and the U.S. Social
Security system. Michener, meanwhile, received a spousal benefit
based on her husband's Social Security entitlement.  

The Social Security Administration, however, consistently reduced
Rosell's and Michener's benefit awards under the WEP to account for
Rosell's Canadian pension.  

Michener's complaint raises three challenges to those reductions.
Count One alleges that the reductions violate the terms of the WEP
itself.

Count Two claims that the reductions violate the Social Security
Administration's implementing regulations; and Count Three claims
that the reductions violate a bilateral agreement between the
United States and Canada that governs the payment of pension
benefits.  

Michener also asks that the Court certify a class of all
individuals whose Social Security benefits or spousal benefits have
been similarly reduced under the WEP based on receipt of pension
benefits from another country with which the United States has
entered into a bilateral agreement like the one with Canada.  

The Social Security Administration's response is that Michener's
complaint should be dismissed for improper venue. This objection is
grounded in two provisions of the Social Security Act. The first,
42 U.S.C. Section 405(h), states that no action against the United
States, the Commissioner of Social Security, or any officer or
employee thereof shall be brought under 28 U.S.C. Sections 1331 or
1346 to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter. This
provision thus precludes federal-question jurisdiction in an action
challenging the denial of claimed [Social Security] benefits. And
it means that the sole avenue for judicial review in such a case is
the Social Security Act's specific judicial review provision, 42
U.S.C. Section 405(g).  

For present purposes, there is no dispute that Rosell and Michener
complied with the exhaustion requirement. The venue requirement,
however, poses a potential problem. The law is clear that in
determining whether venue for a putative class action is proper,
courts are to look only at the allegations pertaining to the named
representatives. And here, Michener resides in San Rafael,
California. For venue to be proper in this Court, then, Michener
must identify some reason that Section 405(g) and Section 405(h) do
not apply to her claims.

Michener is unable to do that. The Supreme Court has construed
Section 405(h) quite broadly to include any claims in which `both
the standing and the substantive basis for the presentation' of the
claims is the Social Security Act. Michener's claims easily fall
within that category. As already noted, Count One is grounded
entirely in the WEP, which is contained within the Social Security
Act. Count Two claims a violation of agency regulations, which were
promulgated under authority granted by the Act. And even Count
Three, the one based on the bilateral agreement with Canada, falls
within Section 405(h)'s scope because such international agreements
are themselves products of the Act.  

Nonetheless, Michener contends that she is not bound by Section
405(g)'s venue requirement because she says that these claims are
collateral to any individual benefits determination. Citing Vencor
Nursing Centers, L.P. v. Shalala, 63 F.Supp.2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1999),
she argues that such collateral claims are governed by the general
venue statute.

But the Court respectfully disagrees with Vencor Nursing. Critical
to that case's venue holding was its conclusion that § 405(g) did
not apply to collateral claims at all and that jurisdiction over
such claims was instead authorized by the federal-question statute.
This reasoning is irreconcilable with the Supreme Court's decision
in Mathews v. Eldridge, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 327
(1976), though, which makes clear that the collateral nature of a
claim has relevance only for determining whether the
non-jurisdictional component of Section 405(g)'s exhaustion
requirement should be waived.

Assuming for the sake of argument, then, that Michener's claims
here are properly considered collateral, that fact is irrelevant to
the issue of jurisdiction or venue. As the Court already explained,
the claims still arise under the Social Security Act within the
meaning of Section 405(h), which means that jurisdiction is proper
under § 405(g), not Section 1331. And when Section 405(g) provides
jurisdiction, there is no basis for ignoring that provision's
specific venue requirement. It states, without qualification, that
such action shall be brought in the district court of the United
States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides, or
has his principal place of business.

Here, Michener resides in the Northern District of California, and
there is no allegation that she has a principal place of business
elsewhere. Venue is therefore improper in the District of
Columbia.

The Court does not, however, believe that dismissal is warranted
under these circumstances. Nothing in Section 405(g) mandates
dismissal when a case is initiated in the incorrect forum, and 28
U.S.C. Section 1406(a) authorizes district courts to transfer cases
to the correct forum in the interest of justice. Indeed, transfer
is generally preferred to dismissal, unless the claims have obvious
substantive problems.  

In this case, the Social Security Administration has not identified
any such problem, and no problem is immediately apparent to the
Court. The Court will accordingly transfer the case to the Northern
District of California.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 18, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y29cu5jc from
Leagle.com.

FRANCES MICHENER, Plaintiff, represented by Aaron M. Bernay, FROST
BROWN TODD LLC, pro hac vice, Darren A. Craig, FROST BROWN TODD
LLC, pro hac vice, Joseph J. Dehner, FROST BROWN TODD LLC, pro hac
vice & Jonathan Mark Bruce, LAW OFFICE OF JONATHAN BRUCE, LLC.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, in her official capacity as Acting Commissioner
of the Social Security Administration & SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, Defendants, represented by Johnny Hillary Walker,
III, U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.


STEPHEN EINSTEIN: Weber Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Stephen Einstein &
Associates, P.C. The case is styled as Raizy Weber, Eliezer Smaia
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. Stephen Einstein & Associates, P.C., Cavalry SPV I,
LLC, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-04373 (E.D. N.Y., July 30,
2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Stephen Einstein & Associates, P.C. was established in 1989 as a
law firm focused on creditor rights, collections, litigation and
real estate.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     David M. Barshay, Esq.
     Barshay Sanders, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 281-7601
     Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com


STEVE NASH: Hit With Class Suit From Employees
----------------------------------------------
Neetu Garcha, writing for Globalnews.ca, reports that the struggle
employees can face when it comes to fair and proper payment is
being highlighted through a class-action lawsuit against Steve Nash
Fitness World (SNFW).

The lawsuit alleges, among other things, that there is a systemic
failure to properly pay employees as a method of increasing
profits.

"My goal by pursuing this is to show people that we do have a right
to speak up, that we shouldn't be muzzled by an employer or
anybody," plaintiff Sharon Freeman said in an exclusive interview
with Global News.

SNFW denies the allegations, which have not been proven in court,
and the company has not yet filed a response to the notice of civil
claim filed in July.

The new lawsuit comes about a year after a $7.5-million settlement
in a class action against Goodlife Fitness.

"Gyms, or the fitness industry overall, are hotbeds for
exploitation because they contain both of those things: a lack of
information [for employees] and miss-classification," Vancouver
employment lawyer Lia Moody, Esq. -- lia.moody@stlawyers.ca -- told
Global news.

"Big class-action lawsuits are probably the most important, not
because of the payout, but because of how they get people talking .
. . . class actions lead to more awareness being raised and people
understanding they have rights too," she added.

Moody, who is not involved in either case and is speaking generally
about the multibillion-dollar gym and fitness club industry, said
employees are often falsely classified as contractors, which can
result in wage-related labour violations.

"For years, this industry operated on the basis that recruitment
and consultation and prep time were things that you just didn't get
paid for, it was the cost of doing business," Brock University
Labour Studies professor Larry Savage said.

"It's quite clear, according to employment standards acts across
the country that these are work functions and they need to be
paid," he added.

Savage said nearly three-quarters of the respondents in his recent
Ontario-based study, which surveyed workers in the gym and fitness
club industry, reported regularly engaging in unpaid work.

"In terms of tackling the problem, it really requires strong
proactive enforcement by the employment standards branches in the
ministry of labour," Savage said.

Experts say it's a problem plaguing several sectors, where wages
are low and fear of losing a job is high.

In B.C., recent labour code changes -- the first in nearly two
decades -- added protections for workers but still fall short
according to the B.C. Federation of Labour (BCFED).

"What we've asked for is $26 million to be invested in employment
standards, particularly for officers to help with this so when
people have complaints, they have someone who can help them with
that process," BCFED secretary-treasurer Sussanne Skidmore said.

Skidmore applauds the removal of "self-help" kits that forced many
employees to navigate the employment standards complaint process on
their own; but Skidmore says other problems persist, including
challenges in joining a union.

Goodlife Fitness locations in three Ontario cities ratified what is
billed the first-ever union contract in the North American fitness
industry, in part because of employee complaints about labour
violations.

Freeman said she hopes her own lawsuit will help lead to systemic
change so she and her colleagues can focus on carrying weights at
the gym, rather than carrying the burden of having to work for free
to meet their job requirements.

"People who are ESL, or maybe not quite adept to understanding,
those people really get taken advantage of and it's a shame. Shame
on employers that do that," Freeman said.

The Ministry of Labour advises any non-unionized worker with a
complaint to visit the Employment Standards Branch website or call
at 1-800-663-3316, or visit one of their head office locations to
file a formal complaint.

WorkSafeBC also offers a toll-free line (1-888-621-7233) to call
and report incidents of bullying and harassment. [GN]


STRALEY & OTTO: Hickey Seeks Refund of Unauthorized Payments
------------------------------------------------------------
Elliot Hickey, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Straley & Otto, P.A., Defendant, Case No.
19-cv-61785, (S.D. Fla., July 16, 2019) seeks statutory damages and
injunctive relief for violations of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act.

Straley & Otto is consumer collection agency who attempted to
collect a consumer debt allegedly incurred by Hickey. Hickey claims
to have paid money to the Defendant who did not return it despite
the fact the payment made included amounts which it did not have
the legal authority to assess or otherwise collect. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
      Thomas J. Patti, Esq.
      THE LAW OFFICE OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI, PLLC
      110 SE 6th Street
      Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
      Telephone: (954) 907-1136
      Facsimile: (855) 529-9540
      Email: jibrael@jibraellaw.com
             tom@jibraellaw.com


SULLIVAN UNIVERSITY: Court Vacates Class Cert. in McCann FLSA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge James H. Lambert of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky vacated
Jefferson Circuit Court's grant of class certification in the case,
THE SULLIVAN UNIVERSITY SYSTEM, INC., Appellant, v. MARY E. McCANN,
INDIVIDUALLY; and MARY E. McCANN, ON BEHALF OF OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Appellees, Case No. 2018-CA-001140-ME (Ky. App.).

Sullivan appeals from the Jefferson Circuit Court's determination
that the Appellees' claims can proceed as a class action under
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 23.  Sullivan hired Mary
McCann as an admissions officer in March 2006 at its Fort Knox
Campus.  In May 2007, it transferred McCann to its Spencerian
College campus in Louisville.  In April 2008, Sullivan terminated
McCann's employment.

Following her termination, McCann filed an action in Jefferson
Circuit Court.  Sullivan removed McCann's action to federal court
after the U.S. Department of Labor filed a complaint against
Sullivan under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act.  Sullivan
disputed the Department of Labor's allegations, but as part of that
settlement, agreed to treat its admissions officers as non-exempt
employees, to pay overtime wages, and to pay back wages to certain
admissions officers.  By agreed order, the federal district court
dismissed McCann's federal FLSA claims against Sullivan and
remanded the remaining state law claims to Jefferson Circuit
Court.

When McCann moved to certify a class, the Jefferson Circuit Court
denied the motion on purely legal grounds.  In its order denying
class certification, the trial court relied upon dicta in an
unpublished Court of Appeals' opinion, Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky,
Inc. v. Kelley.  The Court of Appeals in Kelley did not reach the
merits of whether a class action is available for claims brought
under KRS 337.385.  Yet, the panel opined that if it were to reach
that question, it would conclude that a class action is not
available for claims brought under KRS 337.385.  McCann appealed
the trial court's judgment to the Court of Appeals.

In the instant case -- unlike in Kelley -- the Court of Appeals did
reach the question whether a class action is available for claims
brought under KRS 337.385.  It ultimately held that KRS 337.385
does not authorize class actions.  The court reasoned this
provision constitutes a special statutory proceeding that displaces
our Rules of Civil Procedure. It also noted that the statutory
provision does not explicitly authorize class actions.

Judge Lambert must determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in
its reading of this provision.  Determining the correct reading of
a statute is a question of law that the Court reviews de novo
without affording deference to lower courts.

CR 23 remains an available procedural mechanism applicable to
McCann's cause of action brought under KRS 337.385.  Because the
trial court denied the motion to certify a class as a matter of
law, the Court need not determine whether McCann's class meets the
requirements set forth by the Court in CR 23. The trial court must
make that determination upon remand.

On remand, the parties briefed the issues, and the matter was
argued before the circuit court.  On July 17, 2018, the circuit
court entered its order granting McCann's motion to certify the
class and appointing counsel.  The interlocutory appeal was filed
by Sullivan pursuant to CR 23.06.

The only question that is before the Court is wether the trial
court's decision to certify the class in the case was arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.

However, in the instant case, Judge Lambert finds that the circuit
court's order lacks any analysis whatsoever, thus making it
impossible for us to determine whether the decision to certify the
class was an abuse of discretion.  The circuit court's order merely
states it finds that the Plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements
for numerosity, commonality, typicality and representativeness.
The Judge further finds that the counsel for the Plaintiffs are
well versed in these matter and competent counsel to represent the
class.

To conduct meaningful review of the issues, the Judge must vacate
the order and remand the matter to the circuit court so that he
might be satisfied that the trial court did 'probe behind the
pleadings' and perform a 'rigorous analysis' in the case, and that
its findings are supported by the record.  On remand the trial
court should enter detailed factual findings and legal conclusions
resolving the motion to certify a class.  Should the trial court
elect to certify a class on remand, its order must address the four
prerequisites of CR 23.01.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Lambert vacated the grant of class
certification and remanded the matter with instructions for the
Jefferson Circuit Court to conduct the required analysis for
maintainability under CR 23.01 and 23.02.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 21, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/f0KbR0 from Leagle.com.

Grover C. Potts, Jr. -- gpotts@wyattfirm.com -- Michelle D. Wyrick
-- michellewyrick@wyattfirm.com -- Louisville, Kentucky, BRIEFS FOR
APPELLANT.

Garry R. Adams -- garry@justiceky.com -- Theodore W. Walton --
ted@justiceky.com -- Abigail V. Lewis, Louisville, Kentucky BRIEF
FOR APPELLEE.


SWIFT TRANSPORTATION: Court Consolidates McNutt & Woeck Labor Suits
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARY McNUTT, an individual, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SWIFT TRANSPORTATION
CO. OF ARIZONA, LLC; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendant.
RICHARD D. WOECK JR., an individual, Plaintiff, v. SWIFT
TRANSPORTATION CO. OF ARIZONA, LLC; and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive, Defendant, Case Nos. 3:18-cv-05668-BHS,
3:19-cv-05342-BHS (W.D. Wash.), Judge Banjamin H. Settle of the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington,
Seattle, has entered an order on the parties' stipulated motion to
consolidate the cases and stipulated briefing schedule.

The Plaintiffs in the McNutt Action and the Woeck Action,
respectively, and Defendant Swift, the Defendant in both actions,
stipulated to the consolidation of the matters.  Additionally, as
required by Local Rule 42(b), the parties have met and conferred
regarding scheduling for the consolidated action, and agreed and
stipulated as follows: (1) the consolidated action will follow the
schedule of the Woeck Action, which the parties request the Court
to set at a Case Management Conference after the pleadings for the
consolidated action are settled; and (2) the schedule currently set
in the McNutt Action be vacated.

The central allegation in both actions is that Defendant Swift
fails to pay minimum wage for all hour worked because the
Plaintiffs are paid by the mile and thus are not compensated for
onduty time other than driving.  Both the Plaintiffs were employee
truck drivers for Swift and their respective lawsuits involve a
significant (if not near total) overlap of legal and factual
questions.  Thus, consolidation will avoid duplicate filings of the
same or similar papers, including class certification proceedings,
which will save the Court and the parties significant resources.

Second, consolidation will avoid duplicative discovery.  Given the
overlap in the factual allegations and the legal issues, relevant
evidence in both actions -- e.g., the applicable per-mile
compensation scheme, the Plaintiff's job duties and functions, the
uncompensated on-duty time will only have to be produced once.
This will save the parties significant resources, and save Court
time and resources in the event of discovery disputes.

Third, the motion to consolidate is timely, as both actions are at
an early and similar stage of litigation.  The First Amended
Complaint in the McNutt Action was filed June 3, 2019 and the
Complaint in the Woeck Action was filed on April 25, 2019.  Both
actions are in the same district and before the same judge, and
minimal discovery has been conducted so far.  There is not
currently an operative answer on file in either action.

Based on the foregoing, the parties request that McNutt and Woeck
Actions be consolidated.

Ahead of filing the motion, the parties met and conferred regarding
case schedule pursuant to Local Rule 42(b).  They stipulates and
agrees that the case schedule previously laid out in McNutt should
be vacated and the following schedule be implemented: (i) the
Defendant's Responsive Pleading due by July 2, 2019; (ii) FRCP
26(f) Conference Deadline of Aug. 5, 2019; (iii) Initial Disclosure
Deadline of Aug. 14, 2019; (iv) Joint Status Report due by Aug. 23,
2019; and (v) Case Management Conference to be set by the Court
thereafter.

The parties respectfully request that the Court grants their Joint
Stipulated Motion and: (1) consolidates the McNutt and Woeck Action
with the McNutt Action, the latter which will be the lead case (as
the earlier filed), (2) the Court vacates the previous case
schedule in McNutt and adopts the case management schedule set
forth.

Judge Settle so ordered.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 21, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/pmpKSP from Leagle.com.

Mary McNutt, an individual, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Graham G. Lambert,
HAFFNER LAW PC, pro hac vice & Joshua H. Haffner --
jhh@haffnerlawyers.com -- HAFFNER LAW PC.

Richard D Woek, Jr, an individual, Plaintiff, represented by
Joshua H. Haffner, HAFFNER LAW PC.

Swift Transportation Co of Arizona, LLC, Defendant, represented by
Babak G. Yousefzadeh -- byousefzadeh@sheppardmullin.com --
SHEPPARD
MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON, pro hac vice, Darin M. Sands --
sandsd@lanepowell.com -- LANE POWELL, John David Ellis --
jellis@sheppardmullin.com -- SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON,
pro
hac vice & Paul Cowie -- pcowie@sheppardmullin.com -- SHEPPARD
MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON, pro hac vice.


SYSCO CORPORATION: $500K Settlement in Martin Suit Has Prelim OK
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement in the case
captioned JOHN MARTIN, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SYSCO CORPORATION and SYSCO CLASS
CENTRAL CALIFORNIA, INC., Defendants. No. 1:16-cv-00990-DAD-SAB.
(E.D. Cal.).

This is an employment class action brought by plaintiff John Martin
on behalf of himself and the class members all of whom are employed
as truck drivers for defendants alleging that they were not
provided meal and rest breaks in accordance with California law.

The court has already evaluated the standards for class
certification in its prior order granting in part plaintiff's
motion for class certification and finds no basis to revisit any of
the analysis contained in that order. Accordingly, the court
proceeds directly to consideration of whether the settlement is
appropriate under Rule 23(e). This requires that: (1) notice be
sent to all class members (2) the court hold a hearing and make a
finding that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate (3)
the parties seeking approval file a statement identifying the
settlement agreement; and (4) class members be given an opportunity
to object.

Notice to the Class

Here, plaintiff provides a notice form that describes the terms of
the settlement, informs the class of the attorneys' fee amount,
provides information concerning the time, place, and date of the
final approval hearing, and informs absent class members that they
may enter an appearance through counsel. The court finds that this
notice is sufficient to apprise the absent class members of the
material terms of the Agreement and inform them of their rights and
obligations under it.

Adequacy of the Settlement

Strength of Plaintiff's Case

The Plaintiff argues that defendants' policies were contained in
defendants' employee handbook, and that these policies are facially
unlawful. As an example, plaintiff points to the route manifests
given to the class members, which map out a driver's perfect route
for the day. According to plaintiff, this perfect route does not
provide for timely meal and rest periods, because of which the
policy violates California law.

At bottom, this action is likely to reduce to a question of which
evidence a jury finds more persuasive. Plaintiff contends that he
would call numerous drivers as witnesses at trial who would testify
in support of plaintiff's interpretation of defendants' policies.
For their part, defendants would likely present evidence that the
drivers themselves agreed in writing that they had taken
appropriate meal breaks, and would also produce additional policies
not found in the employee handbook. The court cannot say with any
degree of certainty that plaintiff would prevail on his claims on
behalf of the class. This factor therefore weighs in favor of
preliminary approval of the proposed settlement.

Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further
Litigation

Settlement between parties is generally preferred to expensive and
time-consuming litigation. Here, although plaintiff has
successfully navigated class certification, the parties will still
be required to litigate this case extensively in order for
plaintiff to obtain any monetary judgment. This case has been
litigated for roughly three years already, and were the case to
proceed to a jury trial, that timeline would be extended even
further. Further litigation would be costly and, as hinted at
above, plaintiff is not guaranteed any recovery. This factor
accordingly weighs in favor of preliminary approval.

Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status Throughout Trial

The court has already certified the class, and the parties have not
directed the court to anything that would call that order into
question. Because the court finds that there is little to no risk
of maintaining class action status throughout trial, this factor
does not weigh in favor of preliminary approval.

Amount Offered in Settlement

In determining whether the amount offered in settlement is fair, a
court is to compare the settlement amount to the parties' estimates
of the maximum amount of damages recoverable in a successful
litigation. While the amount awarded under the terms of a
settlement agreement is certainly relevant to the ultimate
determination of whether the agreement as a whole is fair,
reasonable, and adequate, it is well-settled law that a cash
settlement amounting to only a fraction of the potential recovery
will not per se render the settlement inadequate or unfair.

The Agreement provides for a gross settlement amount of
$500,000.00. This amount is roughly 11% of the total value of the
claims as set forth in plaintiff's motion. It is also an amount on
the low end of class settlement agreements previously approved by
this court.

Nonetheless, the court expresses some concern regarding whether the
amount to be awarded under the terms of the Agreement amounts to
fair, reasonable, and adequate disposition of this case.

Nonetheless, the court does not presently have material before it
sufficient to make a reasoned determination of whether the
settlement amount proposed in the Agreement is adequate. Rather
than denying preliminary approval of the Agreement in its entirety,
however, the court finds that the most prudent course is to raise
the issue for the parties' awareness and invite them to provide
additional argument and evidence in preparation for the final
fairness hearing. It may well be that in light of the serious
litigation risks faced by plaintiff and the class, settlement at
such a dollar amount is warranted in this case. At present,
however, the court is not convinced that consideration of this
factor weighs in favor of approval of the Agreement.

Extent of Discovery Completed and Stage of the Proceedings

The amount of discovery completed affects approval of a stipulated
settlement because it indicates whether the parties have had an
adequate opportunity to assess the pros and cons of settlement and
further litigation.

As evidence of the amount of discovery completed, plaintiff's
counsel David Mara has submitted a declaration in support of the
motion for preliminary approval of the class settlement. The Mara
Declaration states that plaintiff served one set of interrogatories
and one set of requests for production on both defendants, and that
defendant Sysco Central California Inc. served the same on
plaintiff. The parties engaged in a discovery dispute regarding the
contact information for various drivers, and defendants ultimately
produced over 10,000 pages of documents. Finally, plaintiff took
the deposition of defendant Sysco Central California, Inc.'s
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) witness. Under these
circumstances, the court is satisfied that the parties possess
sufficient information to make an informed decision as to the
merits of the case. This factor therefore weighs in favor of
preliminary approval.

Experience and Views of Counsel

Great weight is accorded to the recommendation of counsel, who are
most closely acquainted with the facts of the underlying
litigation. The Mara Declaration, referenced in the preceding
section, states that attorney Mara he has been practicing law in
California since 2004, and frequently handles employment law cases
alleging violations of the California Labor Code and Industrial
Welfare Commission Wage Orders.  After listing several employment
law cases in which he is involved, attorney Mara avers that the
agreement was reached after a daylong mediation session. Of some
concern, however, the Mara Declaration expresses no view about the
adequacy of the Agreement, rendering it of only limited value.
While the court recognizes attorney Mara's subject-matter expertise
in the area of employment law, consideration of this factor
provides little support for plaintiff's motion.

Presence of a Governmental Participant

There is no governmental participant in this action, so this factor
is not at issue.

Reaction of Class Members

Because notice has not yet been sent to the class members, this
factor is not at issue.

In sum, while the court has some uncertainty whether the settlement
amount is fair and reasonable in light of the total value of the
claims, the court nonetheless finds that preliminary approval is
warranted. At the final fairness hearing, the parties will be
expected to provide a more robust explanation on whether the
Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.

Filing of the Settlement Agreement

The Agreement has been filed on the court's docket. This
requirement under Rule 23(e)(3) is therefore satisfied.

Opportunity to Object

Rule 23(e)(4) requires that a settlement afford absent class
members an opportunity to be excluded from the class, even if they
were previously afforded such an opportunity at the certification
stage and declined to exercise that option. As discussed above, the
proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement contains explicit
instructions to absent class members regarding how to object.

Specifically, it states that a class member may submit an objection
to the settlement administrator, what the contents of the objection
should be, and what evidence the objector intends to present at a
hearing. The court finds that this adequately advises absent class
members of the manner in which they may submit objections.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 18, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y5wfz2c5 from Leagle.com.

John Martin, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, and on behalf of the general public, Plaintiff,
represented by David Thomas Mara -- dmara@maralawfirm.com -- Mara
Law Firm PC, Jessica Renee Corrales -- jcorrales@turleylawfirm.com
-- Turley Law Firm, APLC, Jill Marie Vecchi --
jvecchi@maralawfirm.com -- Mara Law Firm, Matthew Evan Crawford ,
Mara Law Firm, PC, William Turley -- bturley@turleylawfirm.com --
Turley & Mara Law Firm, APLC & Gwendolyne Nicole Ousdahl --
ntrenner@maralawfirm.com -- Mara Law Firm.

Sysco Corporation & SYSCO Central California, Inc., Defendants,
represented by Diamond M. Hicks -dhicks@bakerlaw.com -- Baker &
Hostetler LLP, Margaret Rosenthal -- mrosenthal@bakerlaw.com --
Baker & Hostetler LLP, Nicholas D. Poper -- npoper@bakerlaw.com --
Baker & Hostetler LLP & Sabrina Layne Shadi -- sshadi@bakerlaw.com
-- Baker and Hostetler LLP.


T-MOBILE: Says Customers Can't Joint Class Action Suit
------------------------------------------------------
AJ Dellinger, writing for Mic, reports that if you're a T-Mobile
customer, you might be rightly pissed off that the company -- along
with other major telecom companies -- collected and sold your
geolocation data without your permission for years prior to
discontinuing the practice earlier this year. In fact, you might be
upset enough about the whole situation that you want to sue
T-Mobile for the infraction.  You aren't alone.

T-Mobile is already facing a class-action lawsuit that's making its
way through the court system to hold the company accountable for
its behavior. There's just one problem: the mobile carrier says
that if its subscribers try to join the legal challenge against the
company, they are violating the terms of service.

Buried deep in T-Mobile's terms and conditions agreement, which
clocks in at just north of 8,500 words and would take the average
person more than half an hour to read in full, is a section called
"Dispute Resolution." In it, T-Mobile subjects customers to what is
known as a forced arbitration clause. In it, the company claims
that its customers waive the right to a trial by jury. This keeps
disputes behind closed doors, preventing fact-finding from the case
being made public.

The company also includes a class action waiver within its terms,
which prevents T-Mobile subscribers from joining any sort of larger
action, like, for instance, a lawsuit that holds the company
accountable for collecting and selling location data to bounty
hunters and other third parties.

These forced arbitration clauses are becoming increasingly common.
Amazon implemented a similar policy that users are required to
agree to before using the Alexa app, which is needed in order to
make use of the company's smart speakers. Other major mobile
carriers including AT&T, Verizon, and Sprint have similar clauses
in their contracts that have been used, rather successfully, to
avoid potentially costly lawsuits.

The Center for Democracy and Justice has documented a number of
cases in which companies have gotten out of potential penalty
because of the hidden agreements. Sprint has managed to avoid
lawsuits that accused the company of charging undeserved late
charges, misrepresenting its monthly rates, and charging roaming
fees on calls within its service area — all because of the fine
print within its contract.

It's not as though these practices haven't come under fire before,
either. In 2017, U.S. senators called into question AT&T's use of
forced arbitration to keep customers from seeking justice for
predatory and potential illegal practices. They cited a CBS News
investigation that found more than 4,000 complaints made against
the company for overcharging, but noted that subscribers weren't
able to take any sort of organized legal action to combat what
appeared to be a widespread practice.

AT&T responded to the scrutiny by saying that its requirement that
customers go through arbitration rather than jury trials or
class-action lawsuits wasn't actually forced because consumers
could simply choose to do business with a different company. That
recommendation might work if not for the fact that every major
competitor that provides similar services as AT&T also make use of
similar clauses.

Forced arbitration is an anti-consumer practice, both in concept
and in practice. When people actually do go through the arbitration
process, they typically lose. A report from Public Citizen looked
at disputes between consumers and credit card companies, another
industry that often uses forced arbitration clauses to stay out of
public court.

It found that arbitration firms ruled against consumers in 94
percent of cases. Former Labor Secretary Robert Reich has called
forced arbitration "a rigged system that helps companies evade
responsibility for violating antidiscrimination, consumer
protection, and public health laws."

As the National Association of Consumer Advocates point out,
consumers always have the right to enter arbitration to settle
disputes. They do not need an agreement for arbitration in a
contract with a company. However, when arbitration fails, legal
action through the courts is the next step for holding companies
accountable for their actions. That is why corporations often try
to get consumers to surrender that right.

Arbitration is also something that most consumers aren't willing to
go through. The New York Times looked into arbitration cases and
found that only 505 consumers went through the process between 2010
and 2014. Meanwhile, during the same time frame, the number of
times that companies have tried to get court cases dismissed by
using a "motion to compel arbitration" increased significantly,
doubling the rate that it was used in the five years prior.

This is largely because arbitration is a time-consuming process
that puts considerably more burden on a consumer than a corporation
that has a team of lawyers ready to handle any potential dispute.

As an example, AT&T lays out all the steps required to file a claim
for arbitration with the company. It requires the consumer to mail
a notice to the company's legal department, wait a month while the
company decides if it can resolve the issue without arbitration,
complete a demand for arbitration form, make four copies, send a
copy to AT&T, send two copies to the American Arbitration
Association that will oversee the dispute, get a case manager
assigned, wait 10 days for AT&T to respond to the demand, get
appointed an arbiter, wait a week for any objections, choose a type
of hearing, go through the hearing, wait two weeks for a decision,
and then wait for AT&T to comply.

All of that carries the potential threat that the arbiter rules
against you, at which point you might be required to pay $200 for
the process.

That is the same method that T-Mobile is currently using to try to
squash a class-action suit over its practice of selling customer
location data (which it has supposedly stopped doing now). Instead
of facing a court battle in which it could be held accountable for
selling data for as many as 50 million subscribers, T-Mobile wants
to force its customers to deal with it on an individual basis out
of the public eye.

T-Mobile does at least deserve a little credit for offering
customers the ability to opt out of its forced arbitration clause.
Other carriers do not offer any such option. The only problem is
that T-Mobile's opt-out is only available to new customers for 30
days after they sign up for the company's services. Any attempt to
get out of the agreement after that first month is considered to be
invalid. And, of course, consumers have to actually be aware of the
option, which is similarly buried within the company's
novella-length terms and conditions agreement.

If you are a new T-Mobile subscriber or are planning to switch to
the carrier, you can opt out of the company's arbitration
requirements by calling 1-866-323-4405 or by visiting
www.T-Mobiledisputeresolution.com. If you're already outside of the
30-day window, you're out of luck. Keep your fingers crossed that
courts finally determine that forced arbitration is a shady,
unfair, anti-consumer practice that needs to be done away with.
[GN]


TARGET CORPORATION: Hearing on Bid to Junk Greenberg Set for Aug.22
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order rescheduling Hearing on Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned TODD GREENBERG, On Behalf
of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. TARGET
CORPORATION, a Minnesota Corporation, INTERNATIONAL VITAMIN
CORPORATION, a New Jersey Corporation, and PERRIGO COMPANY OF SOUTH
CAROLINA, INC., Defendants. Case No. 17-cv-01862-LB-RS. (N.D.
Cal.).

The Plaintiff's counsel met and conferred with defense regarding
previously scheduled conflicts that Plaintiff's counsel have with
the August 8, 2019 hearing date. In order to accommodate
Plaintiff's counsel, defense agreed to extend the hearing date for
the MSJ from August 8, 2019 to August 22, 2019. The Parties further
agreed that the deadline for Defendants' reply brief in support of
summary judgment be due on August 6, 2019 (instead of July 23, 2019
as currently scheduled.

The Parties further believe that it is in the interests of both the
Parties and the Court, and furthers the interests of judicial
efficiency, to reschedule the hearing on Defendants' MSJ from
August 8, 2019 to August 22, 2019 so that it may be heard at the
same time as Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification;

The parties have previously stipulated to extend the time
Corporation to respond to Plaintiff's Complaint, First Amended
Complaint and Second Amended Complaint; to allow Plaintiff to file
a Second Amended Complaint and Corrected Second Amended Complaint;
to continue the case management conference to reschedule the
hearing on Defendant Target Corporation's Motion to Dismiss and to
modify the class certification briefing schedule.

The requested modification will not affect the class certification
briefing schedule or have any other significant effect on the
schedule of the case.

The Defendants' reply brief in support of their Motion for Summary
Judgment or, Alternatively, Partial Summary Judgment is due on
August 6, 2019 and the hearing on Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment or, Alternatively, Partial Summary Judgment is rescheduled
from August 8, 2019 to August 22, 2019 at 1:30 p.m.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 18, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yxamodvl from Leagle.com.

Todd Greenberg, On Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Patricia Nicole Syverson --
psyverson@bffb.com -- Bonnett Fairbourn Friedman & Balint, P.C.,
Carrie Ann Laliberte -- claliberte@bffb.com -- Bonnett Fairbourn
Friedman & Balint, PC, Elaine A. Ryan -- eryan@bffb.com -- Bonnett
Fairbourn Friedman & Balint, PC, Manfred Patrick Muecke --
mmuecke@bffb.com -- Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman, & Balint, P.C.,
Michael Matthew Chang -- mchang@siprut.com -- Siprut PC, pro hac
vice & Stewart M. Weltman -- sweltman@siprut.com -- Siprut PC.

Target Corporation, a Minnesota Corporation, Defendant, represented
by Matthew Ryan Orr -- morr@calljensen.com -- Call & Jensen A
Professional Corporation, Samuel Gary Brooks --
sbrooks@calljensen.com -- Call & Jensen A Professional Corporation,
William Paul Cole  -- wcole@calljensen.com -- Call and Jensen,
Emily Weissenberger -- emily.weissenberger@sedgwicklaw.com --
Sedgwick LLP & Jennifer O'Sullivan, Sedgwick LLP.


TATTLETALES TOO: Brunson Hits Misclassification, Unpaid Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------
JABRIA BRUNSON, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. TATTLETALES TOO, INC. D/B/A TATTLETALES
GENTLEMEN'S CLUB; JAY RICH, CHRISTOPHER MORTON, and JOHN CRAWFORD;
Individually, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-03253-AB (E.D. Pa., July
25, 2019) is a collective action seeking to recover the minimum
wages owed to Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all other
similarly situated current and former  employees of Defendants.

Defendants operate an adult entertainment club in Lev1ttown,
Pennsylvania under the name of "Tattletales Gentlemen's Club".
Plaintiff was employed as an exotic dancer at Defendants' adult
entertainment club from approximately October2016 until September
2018.

According to the complaint, the Defendants refused to compensate
Plaintiff at the applicable minimum wage. Plaintiff's only
compensation was in the form of tips from club patrons. Moreover,
Plaintiff was required to divide her tips with Defendants and other
employees who do not customarily receive tips.

The Defendants misclassify dancers as independent contractors and
therefore, have failed to compensate Plaintiff at the
federally-mandated minimum wage rate. The Defendants' conduct
violates the Fair Labor Standards Act minimum wage provision, and
the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act which similarly requires the
payment for all hours worked in a workweek, says the
complaint.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Gabriel A. Assaad, Esq.
     KENNEDY HODGES, L.L.P.
     4409 Montrose Blvd., Suite 200
     Houston, TX 77006
     Phone: (713) 523-0001
     Facsimile: (713) 523-1116
     Email: gassaad@kennedyhodges.com

TINDER INC: Court OKs Elansari's Bid to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum granting Plaintiff's Motion for
Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis in the case captioned AMRO
ELANSARI, Plaintiff, v. TINDER, INC., et al., Defendants. Civil
Action No. 19-CV-3003. (E,D. Pa.).

Plaintiff Amro Elansari, a litigant who is representing himself
(proceeding pro se) filed this purported class action against
Tinder, based on allegations of fraud.  Elansari's Complaint is
brief. He alleges that Tinder, the dating application, sends you
notifications saying 7 people like you subscribe for $15 to see who
to find out. However, Elansari suggests that the notifications are
all fake 3000 miles away.

The Court will grant Elansari leave to proceed in forma pauperis
because it appears that he is not capable of paying the fees to
commence this civil action. Accordingly, Elansari's Complaint is
subject to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which requires the
Court to dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether
a complaint fails to state a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which requires the
Court to determine whether the complaint contains sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.

The Court understands Elansari to be bringing this case pursuant to
the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). However, although an
individual may represent herself or himself pro se, a non-attorney
may not represent other parties in federal court. Accordingly,
Elansari, a pro se litigant who is not an attorney, may not proceed
with this case as a class action because he may not represent the
interests of other litigants.  

To the extent Elansari brings a fraud claim against Tinder in his
own right under Pennsylvania law, he has not established a basis
for subject matter jurisdiction over that claim. The only
independent basis for jurisdiction over such a claim is 28 U.S.C.
Section 1332(a), which grants a district court jurisdiction over a
case in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens
of different States. Section 1332(a) requires complete diversity
between all plaintiffs and all defendants, even though only minimal
diversity is constitutionally required. This means that, unless
there is some other basis for jurisdiction, no plaintiff may be a
citizen of the same state as any defendant.

Elansari alleges that he is a citizen of Pennsylvania and that
Tinder is a citizen of Texas, which indicates that the parties are
completely diverse. However, the amount in controversy requirement
is not met. Liberally construing the Complaint, the Court
understands Elansari to be claiming that he subscribed to Tinder
during the months of January through July of 2018, and April
through May of 2019. At a rate of $15 per month, Elansari's damages
for those nine months would be $135. Even if Elansari were entitled
to an award of punitive damages, it is clear to a legal certainty
that the amount in controversy does not exceed the jurisdictional
threshold.

Accordingly, there is no basis for subject matter jurisdiction over
Elansari's fraud claim.

The Court will grant Elansari leave to proceed in forma pauperis
and dismiss his Complaint without prejudice.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 18, 2019 Memorandum
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y5nw4u6l from Leagle.com.

AMRO ELANSARI, Plaintiff, pro se.


TINDER INC: Judgment in Kim Suit Over Age Discrimination Entered
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge John F. Walter of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California has entered Judgment in the case, LISA KIM,
individually on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. TINDER, INC., a Delaware corporation; MATCH
GROUP, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; MATCH GROUP,
INC., a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and
each of them, Defendants, Case No. 2-18-cv-03093-JFW-AS (C.D.
Cal.).

On Jan. 20, 2019, the Plaintiff sought preliminary approval of a
proposed class action settlement and filed with the Court the Class
Action Settlement Agreement.  After full consideration of the
papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion for
preliminary approval, the Court issued its Order Granting
Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement and Certification of Settlement Class.

Pursuant to the Preliminary Approval Order, the Court, among other
things: (i) preliminarily certified (for settlement purposes only)
a class of Plaintiffs (Class Members) with respect to the claims in
the Litigation; (ii) preliminarily approved the proposed
settlement; (iii) appointed the Plaintiff as the Class
Representative; (iv) appointed Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman,
P.C. and Kristensen Weisberg, LLP as the Class Counsel; and (v) set
the date and time for the Final Approval hearing for June 17, 2019
at 1:30 p.m.

On April 22, 2019, the Class Counsel timely filed their Class
Counsel's Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Incentive Awards.
On May 13, 2019, they timely filed their Motion for Final Approval
of Class Settlement, requesting final certification of the
settlement class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and
(b)(3) and final approval of the class action settlement.

On June 17, 2019, a Final Approval Hearing was held.  The Court
read and considered the Agreement, the Motion for Attorneys' Fees
and all papers filed in support and in opposition thereto, the
Motion for Final Approval and all papers filed in support and in
opposition thereto, including the Objections filed, and the
complete record in this Litigation.  On June 19, 2019, the Court
issued Orders granting the Motion for Attorneys' Fees and the
Motion for Final Approval, good cause appearing therefor.

For purposes of approval of the Settlement and Final Approval
Order, Judge Walter certified the Settlement Class, which consists
of every person in California who subscribed to Tinder Plus or
Tinder Gold during the period between March 2, 2015 and March 1,
2019 and at the time of the subscription was at least 29 years old
and was charged a higher rate than younger subscribers.

For the purpose of Settlement, he certified as the Class Counsel
Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C. and Kristensen Weisberg,
LLP.

The Judge Court finds that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and
adequate.  He therefore finally approved the Settlement.

For the reasons stated in the Court's Order Granting Motion for
Attorneys' Fees, Costs and Incentive Award, including that the
hourly rates sought by the Class Counsel are reasonable and the
costs and expenses were reasonably incurred, in recognition of the
Plaintiff's efforts and risks taken on behalf of the Settlement
Class, and in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, the
following amounts will be paid by the Defendants: (i) Attorneys'
Fees to the Class Counsel in the total amount of $1.2 million; (ii)
costs and expenses to Class Counsel in the total amount of
$12,137.51; and (iii) Incentive Award to the Plaintiff in the total
amount of $5,000.

Judgment will be entered with respect to all individual and class
claims.  The Judgment is intended to be a final judgment disposing
of the action in its entirety.

Without further order of the Court, the Parties may agree to
reasonable extensions of time to carry out any provisions of the
Agreement.  23. There is no just reason for delay in the entry of
the Judgment, and immediate entry by the Clerk of Court is
expressly directed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(b).

A full-text copy of the Court's June 21, 2019 Judgment is available
at https://is.gd/mD7nVV from Leagle.com.

Lisa Kim, individually on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by John P. Kristensen --
john@kristensenlaw.com -- Kristenen Weisberg LLP, Adrian Robert
Bacon -- abacon@attorneysforconsumers.com -- Law Offices of Todd M
Friedman PC, Christina M. Le -- christina@kristensenlaw.com --
Kristensen Weisberg LLP, David Levi Weisberg --
david@kristensenlaw.com -- Kristensen Weisberg LLP & Todd M.
Friedman -- tfriedman@attorneysforconsumers.com -- Law Office of
Todd M Friedman PC.

Tinder, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Match Group, LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company & Match Group, Inc., a Delaware
corporation, Defendants, represented by Alexandra Hill, Manatt
Phelps and Phillips LLP, Donald R. Brown -- dbrown@manatt.com --
Manatt Phelps and Phillips LLP & Robert H. Platt --
rplatt@manatt.com -- Manatt Phelps and Phillips LLP.

Allan Candelore, Objector, represented by Danielle Evelyn Leonard,
Altshuler Berzon LLP.

Rich Allison & Steve Frye, Objectors, represented by Alfred G.
Rava, Rava Law Firm, Danielle Evelyn Leonard, Altshuler Berzon LLP
& Kimberly A. Kralowec, Kralowec Law, P.C.

Jay Rodriguez, Sabrina Johnson, Luis Pena & Richard Mojica,
Objectors, represented by Andrew Pearce Wheeler-Berliner, Davis and
Norris LLP & Brittany G. McClintick, Davis and Norris LLP.


TOYOTA MOTOR: Faces Aquino Suit Over Faulty Airbag Control Units
----------------------------------------------------------------
MATTHEW AQUINO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC., a California
corporation; ZF TRW AUTOMOTIVE HOLDINGS CORP., a Delaware
corporation, Case No. 2:19-cv-06200 (C.D. Cal., July 18, 2019),
arises from vehicle manufacturers' concealment of a defect in
vehicles' airbag control unit ("ACU") manufactured by ZF TRW that,
due to excess electrical energy, becomes "over stressed" and seizes
up at the moment of impact, failing to deploy the airbags and lock
the seatbelts during a crash.

Toyota designed, manufactured, distributed, marketed, sold, and
leased the following vehicles with the Defect: Toyota Avalon (model
years 2012-2018), Toyota Avalon Hybrid (model years 2013-2018),
Toyota Corolla (model years 2011-2019), Toyota Corolla IM (model
years 2017-2018), Toyota Corolla Matrix (model years 2011-2013),
Toyota Sequoia (model years 2012-2017), Toyota Tacoma (model years
2012-2019), and Toyota Tundra (model years 2012-2017.

Toyota is a California corporation, with its corporate headquarters
located in Plano, Texas.  Toyota, through its various entities,
designs, manufactures, markets, distributes, and sells its vehicles
in this District and multiple other locations in the United States
and worldwide.  Toyota and/or its agents designed, manufactured,
and installed the defective ACU manufactured by ZF TRW in the Class
Vehicles.

ZF TRW is a Delaware corporation, with its corporate headquarters
located in Livonia, Michigan.  ZF TRW designs, manufactures, and
sells automotive systems, modules, and components, including airbag
systems, to automotive original equipment manufacturers.  ZF TRW
markets, leases, warrants, and oversees regulatory compliance and
warranty servicing of ZF TRW products from its headquarters.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert Ahdoot, Esq.
          Tina Wolfson, Esq.
          Theodore W. Maya, Esq.
          Bradley K. King, Esq.
          AHDOOT & WOLFSON, PC
          10728 Lindbrook Drive
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (310) 474-9111
          Facsimile: (310) 474-8585
          E-mail: rahdoot@ahdootwolfson.com
                  twolfson@ahdootwolfson.com
                  tmaya@ahdootwolfson.com
                  bking@ahdootwolfson.com


TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS: Polatsek Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Transworld Systems,
Inc. The case is styled as Gitty Polatsek individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Transworld
Systems, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 7:19-cv-07125 (S.D. N.Y., July
30, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Transworld Systems Inc. provides accounts receivable, debt
recovery, and past due accounts services for businesses, medical
companies, dental companies, education facilities, Fortune 500
companies, and small businesses in the United States and
internationally.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     David Michael Barshay, Esq.
     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     Barshay Sanders, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 281-7601
     Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com
            csanders@barshaysanders.com


TRUE HEARTS OF CARE: Askew Seeks to Recoup Unpaid Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Chantel Askew, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. True Hearts of Care, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 19-cv-01619 (N.D. Ohio, July 16, 2019), seeks overtime
compensation at the rate of one and one-half times their regular
rates of pay for the hours they worked over 40 each workweek
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Ohio Minimum Fair
Wage Standards Act.

True Hearts provides direct care services and transportation to
individuals with developmental disabilities where Askew was
employed in a direct care position between June 2017 and June 2019.
She claims overtime compensation for work in excess of 40 hours per
work week and says she was not provided detailed wage statements.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Anthony J. Lazzaro, Esq.
      Chastity L. Christy, Esq.
      Lori M. Griffin, Esq.
      THE LAZZARO LAW FIRM, LLC
      920 Rockefeller Building
      614 W. Superior Avenue
      Cleveland, OH 44113
      Tel: (216) 696-5000
      Fax: (216) 696-7005
      Email: anthony@lazzarolawfirm.com
             chastity@lazzarolawfirm.com
             lori@lazzarolawfirm.com


TRUEACCORD: Ct. Denies Bid to Compel Discovery Responses in Zuniga
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
issued an Order denying Defendant's Motion to Compel in the case
captioned MARISA ZUNIGA, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TRUEACCORD, Defendant. No.
2:18-cv-00683-KG-KRS (D.N.M.).

The parties reached an impasse over whether: (1) Plaintiff must
provide an itemization of and answer questions directed at actual
damages; and (2) Plaintiff must produce her retainer agreement with
counsel to Defendant to assist in determining Plaintiff's adequacy
to serve as class representative. The Court has considered the
parties' submissions along with the record available. Having done
so, the Court denies Defendant's motion without prejudice.

At the outset, the Court observes that the parties dispute whether
they adequately met and conferred on the issues presented to the
Court. Rather than attempt to distinguish whose version of events
rings most true, the Court will deny the motion without prejudice
and return the matter to the parties.
  
In meeting and conferring, the attorneys shall by phone or in a
face-to-face meeting discuss all issues germane to this dispute,
including: (a) whether Plaintiff is willing to stipulate to an
order that she is seeking only statutory damages (b) whether, if
certified, all class members will elect the same remedy (b)
whether, if unwilling to stipulate, Plaintiff would rather amend
her complaint to remove references to actual damages, or Defendant
would prefer to file a motion for partial summary judgment on
damages (c) whether Defendant would oppose amendment, or
alternatively, the Plaintiff would oppose a motion for partial
summary judgment on damages (d) whether something short of
Plaintiff's entire retainer agreement with counsel would satisfy
Defendant's need to explore adequacy and (e) whether the motion to
compel is premature given the pending dispositive motions.

Accordingly, the Defendant's motion to compel is denied without
prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 18, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yyvyrw9k from Leagle.com.

Marisa Zuniga, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Yitzchak Zelman, Marcus &
Zelman, LLC.

TrueAccord, Defendant, represented by Jennifer G. Anderson, Modrall
Sperling Roehl Harris & Sisk PA & Luke W. Holmen, Modrall,
Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, PA.


UNITED ASSOCIATION: Court Narrows Claims in Adams Suit
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Louisiana issued a Ruling and Order granting in part and denying in
part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned
CHARLES ADAMS, ET AL. v. UNITED ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN AND
APPRENTICES OF THE PLUMBING AND PIPEFITTING INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA, AFLCIO, LOCAL 198, ET AL. Civil Action No.
98-400-JWD-RLB. (M. D. La.).

The proposed class of Plaintiffs are all African Americans who: are
or have been members of the Local 198; have sought and been denied
membership in the Local 198; have been or are currently enrolled in
the Local 198's apprenticeship program; or have sought admittance
and been denied admission to the Local 198 apprenticeship training
program.

This case arises out of alleged violations of: (1) the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1981 (2) Louisiana state law for
acts of racial discrimination pursuant to La. Rev. Stat.
23:332(C)(1) and (2) and (D) (3) Louisiana state law for acts of
negligence, gross negligence and/or willful and wanton negligence
and (4) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pursuant to 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e.

Defendant's Memorandum in Support  

The Defendant's motion is limited in scope to the sole issue of
timeliness of Plaintiffs' claims. Defendant argues that: the
alleged discriminatory acts occurred outside of the relevant time
period to render the Plaintiffs' filing timely.

With respect to Plaintiffs' state law and Section 1981 claims of
racial discrimination, Defendant argues that the one-year statute
of limitations applies. As such, Plaintiffs' complaints must have
arisen or occurred within the year preceding the complaint filing
date in which that Plaintiff is named.  

Additionally, Defendant argues that some of the Plaintiffs were not
members of Local 198 or applying for membership to Local 198 during
the relevant time period. Defendant further argues that the
continuing violation exception does not apply because (1) this
exception cannot apply to give a claim to an individual who was not
a member or applying to be a member of the union and (2) if the
alleged discriminatory acts did not occur within one year of filing
suit, then the continuing violation did not continue into the
relevant time period and the exception does not revive the stale
claim.

Defendant also argues, with regard to the state law claims and
Section 1981 claims, that some Plaintiffs did not respond to any
discovery in any form and are simply named in a complaint.

Therefore, Defendant argues, these Plaintiffs can not make a prima
facie case, and their claims should be dismissed.  

As to the racial discrimination claims under Title VII, Defendant
argues that Plaintiffs' action is time-barred because no alleged
discrimination occurred in the 300 days before Plaintiffs filed the
EEOC charge. Further, Defendant argues that only 17 of the
Plaintiffs produced notices of EEOC charges and right to sue
letters. Therefore, Defendant argues that all but the 17 charging
Plaintiffs should be dismissed, and for those charging Plaintiffs,
their claims should be dismissed because the alleged discrimination
did not occur within 300 days of filing the charge.  

Plaintiffs' Oppositions  

Due to representation by varying counsel, Plaintiffs responded to
Defendant's motion in groups. One group, represented by Mr. Wilson,
responded by first providing a list of Plaintiffs who do not oppose
the motion. Plaintiffs represented by Mr. Wilson then argued that
Defendant's motion is limited solely to timeliness; therefore,
Defendant's argument that Plaintiffs cannot make a prima facie case
at this stage of discovery and motion practice is mis-placed.  
Finally, Plaintiffs represented by Mr. Wilson argue that the few
remaining Wilson plaintiffs require more discovery before
proceeding.

A second group of Plaintiffs, represented by Ms. Grodner, argues
the continuing tort exception. Plaintiffs argue that they alleged
actions of the Defendant that was a part of its custom, policy,
pattern and practice and was a series of actions that violated
Plaintiffs' rights. Plaintiffs argue that the alleged
discriminatory practice occurred before and through the time of
filing suit as evidenced by the affidavits of James Miles, Charles
Adams and Rayfield Goings. Plaintiffs argue that all putative class
members joined this lawsuit and enjoy the interruptions of
prescription through this suit.  

Defendant's Reply  

In reply, Defendant summarizes Plaintiffs' arguments and argues
that plaintiffs never offered a shred of evidence that Local 198
applied the call-back provisions in a discriminatory manner; the
affidavits offered do not meet the standards of Rule 56 and should
be stricken; the continuous tort rule does not apply unless the
plaintiff can point to an act that has taken place within the
limitation period; and the piggyback rule is inapplicable here
where class certification was denied. Defendant also argues that
discovery has closed, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden;
and 42 Plaintiffs remain unaddressed by Plaintiffs.

Claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1981

The Defendant argues that the applicable prescriptive time period
to Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 is one
year. Plaintiffs offer no argument or disagreement with this time
period. However, this is incorrect.

Section 1981 does not contain a statute of limitations. When a
federal statute does not contain a statute of limitations, courts
should apply the most appropriate or analogous state statute of
limitations. Under Louisiana law, a section 1981 claim is best
characterized as a tort and is, therefore, governed by the one-year
prescriptive period for delictual actions dictated by Louisiana
Civil Code article 3492. However, for actions arising under federal
statutes enacted after December 1, 1990, courts must apply a
catchall four-year statute of limitations.

Here, Plaintiffs are claiming racial discrimination based on
alleged conduct that occurred during their apprenticeship or
membership with Local 198; therefore, Plaintiffs' claims arose
under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the federal four-year
statute of limitations applies.  

Claims of Racial Discrimination under Title VII

The sole question presented by Defendant's motion is whether
Plaintiffs' claims of racial discrimination under state and federal
law are timely.  

Vernon Ashford

Ashford is named in the original complaint filed on May 1, 1998.
Defendant, in support of its motion, directs the Court to summary
judgment evidence reflecting that Ashford was enrolled in the Local
198 apprenticeship program in 1976; he testified that he had not
been a member for eight to ten years prior to his 2002 deposition,
which computes to 1992-1994; he testified that he filed an EEOC
charge, yet one has not been produced or located; his last job
referral by Local 198 was in 1996; Ashford last paid dues in
February 1997, which was effective until August 1997.

In order for Ashford's state law claims to be timely, he must show
through competent summary judgment evidence that some allegedly
discriminatory act occurred within one year of May 1, 1998.  

Ashford must also make some showing of his relationship with Local
198 within the relevant time period. Again, Ashford simply relies
upon Fox's Charge of Discrimination which is directed to Local 198.
Defendant offered evidence that Ashford's membership lasted until
August 1997.

Ashford's claims under Section 1981 are subject to a four-year
prescriptive period. Since Ashford filed suit on May 1, 1998, the
evidence must show that the last alleged act of discrimination
occurred between May 1, 1994 and May 1, 1998. Based upon Fox's EEOC
charge, January 1, 1998 falls within this time period; however, it
does not appear that Ashford was a member of Local 198 at this
time.

Regarding Ashford's claims of racial discrimination under Title
VII, there is no evidence that Ashford filed an EEOC charge.
Ashford has not made a showing that he is similarly situated to
Fox.

Based on the foregoing, all claims by Vernon Ashford are dismissed
with prejudice based on untimeliness.

Kenny Bell

Bell is named as a plaintiff in the original complaint filed on May
1, 1998.He has not given his deposition, responded to written
discovery or filed an EEOC charge. Defendant's basis for moving for
summary judgment on the untimeliness of Bell's claims is that
Plaintiff cannot meet his burden to make a prima facie case.

The Plaintiffs responded, generally, by arguing, The summary
judgment at this time is limited to prescription and exhaustion.
The Local 198 has gone beyond that with several claims including
Kenny Bell. In supplemental opposition, Plaintiffs argue, The
summary judgment at this time is limited to prescription and
exhaustion

While Plaintiffs are correct that the subject motion is limited
solely to prescription and exhaustion, Defendant has shown an
absence of evidence to support the timeliness of Plaintiff's
claims. The burden then shifts to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have
failed in their burden to show that there is any genuine issue of
material fact for trial regarding the timeliness of these claims.
For these reasons, all claims by Kenny Bell are dismissed with
prejudice.

Gary Bennett

The same analysis as is applied immediately above for Bell, applies
to Bennett. Bennett is named as a plaintiff in the amending
complaint filed on December 3, 2001. He has not given his
deposition, responded to written discovery or filed an EEOC charge.
Defendant's basis for moving for summary judgment on the
untimeliness of Bennett's claims is that Plaintiff cannot meet his
burden to make a prima facie case.  

Plaintiffs responded, generally, by arguing, The summary judgment
at this time is limited to prescription and exhaustion. The Local
198 has gone beyond that with several claims including Gary
Bennett. In supplemental opposition, Plaintiffs argue, The summary
judgment at this time is limited to prescription and exhaustion.
The Local 198 has gone beyond that with several claims including
Gary Bennett  This is the full extent of Plaintiffs' opposition on
behalf of Gary Bennett.

Kenny Bell, all claims by Gary Bennett are dismissed with
prejudice.

Willie Brown

The same analysis as is applied above for Bell and Bennett, applies
to Brown. Brown is named as a plaintiff in the amending complaint
filed on November 4, 2002. He has not given his deposition,
responded to written discovery or filed an EEOC charge. Defendant's
basis for moving for summary judgment on the untimeliness of
Brown's claims is that Plaintiff cannot meet his burden to make a
prima facie case.  

Plaintiffs responded, generally, by arguing, The summary judgment
at this time is limited to prescription and exhaustion. The Local
198 has gone beyond that with several claims includingWillie Brown.
The same is stated in the supplemental opposition. This is the
full extent of Plaintiffs' opposition on behalf of Willie Brown.

Bell and Bennett, all claims by Willie Brown are dismissed with
prejudice.

Edward Buggage

Buggage is named in the first amending complaint filed on July 27,
2001.  Buggage did not oppose this motion in Plaintiffs' first
opposition and is listed on Mr. Wilson's statement of Plaintiffs
with no opposition to the motion.   Ms. Grodner submitted a
supplemental opposition on behalf of Buggage and stated that
Buggage has no opposition to this motion. However, in the revised
chart, Buggage remains listed as opposing the motion. Given the
contradiction, this issue was raised at the telephone conference
with the Court and all counsel on May 31, 2019. Ms. Grodner agreed
to look into this and advise the Court. On June 5, 2019, by letter
to the Court, Ms. Grodner confirmed that Edward Buggage does not
oppose the instant motion.  

Edward Buggage does not oppose Defendant's motion, the Court finds
that Defendant's motion has merit and Edward Buggage's claims are
dismissed with prejudice.

Frank Cage

Cage is a named Plaintiff in the original complaint filed on May 1,
1998. It is undisputed that Cage was a member of Local 198 at the
time of his 2002 deposition; however, Cage testified that his
complaints of racial discrimination occurred in the 1980's.Cage has
not filed an EEOC charge.

In order for Cage's state law claims to be timely, he must show
through competent summary judgment evidence that some allegedly
discriminatory act occurred within one year of May 1, 1998. The
summary judgment evidence reflects that alleged discriminatory acts
occurred in the 1980's and in 1996. Significantly, Cage states in
his questionnaire that he does not have any proof that Local 198
has a general practice of discrimination at and that he does not
claim to have been subjected to a hostile workplace environment.
The Court recognizes that Plaintiffs generally argue a continuous,
unabated practice of racial discrimination before and after the
filing of suit on May 1, 1998, however, Cage offers evidence and
complaints in different timeframes specific to him, and he denies
evidence of a general practice of discrimination or hostile work
environment.

Cage's claims under Section 1981 are subject to a four-year
prescriptive period. Since Cage filed suit on May 1, 1998, the
evidence must show that the last alleged act of discrimination
occurred between May 1, 1994 and May 1, 1998. Cage specifically
alleges discrimination in job assignments in 1996, which falls
within this time period, and it is possible that Cage was a member
of Local 198 at this time.

Regarding Cage's claims of racial discrimination under Title VII,
it is undisputed that Cage did not file a charge with the EEOC.
Rather, Cage attempts to prove exhaustion of administrative
remedies and timely filing of suit by piggybacking upon charges
filed by others. Cage's argument does not specifically argue upon
which charge Cage attempts to piggyback, however, the opposition
memoranda generally argue piggybacking on Fox's Charge of
Discrimination and Earnest Ford's Charge of Discrimination.  

Based on the foregoing, Frank Cage's claims pursuant to state law
are dismissed with prejudice based on untimeliness. There are
genuine issues of material fact as to whether Frank Cage's claims
under Section 1981 and Title VII are timely; therefore, Defendant's
motion with regard to these claims brought by Frank Cage is
denied.

Yvonne Catherine (1 of 3 heirs of Joseph Catherine)

Catherine is a named Plaintiff in the original complaint filed on
May 1, 1998. It is undisputed that Catherine was a member of Local
198 at the time of his 2002 deposition. Catherine has not filed an
EEOC charge. Defendant argues that the evidence reflects
Catherine's complaints that Borden Chemical delayed payment to him
six to seven years before his 2002 deposition, computing to
1995-1996; that Turner Industries applied its blood pressure policy
in an unequal fashion in 1999-2000; that discriminatory practices
occurred during his apprenticeship in 1985-89, and recalls were
distributed in a discriminatory fashion.  

Plaintiffs opposed Defendant's motion and argued that Catherine is
entitled to use the piggy-back rule on exhaustion and his claim was
not prescribed under any scenario.

In his supplemental opposition, Catherine offered his member
biographic information produced by Defendant in discovery
purporting to indicate that he was a member of Local 198 in 1999,
2000, and 2001, and his original initiation date was 1989.
Catherine further argues his questionnaire, dated February 21,
1998, reflects complaints of systemic race discrimination" and
racial discrimination in job assignments and job referrals. No time
period is provided.

Catherine's claims under Section 1981 are subject to a four-year
prescriptive period. Since Catherine filed suit on May 1, 1998, the
evidence must show that the last alleged act of discrimination
occurred between May 1, 1994 and May 1, 1998. Catherine
specifically alleges discrimination in delayed payment in
1995-1996, which falls within this time period, and it is possible
that Catherine was a member of Local 198 at this time.

Regarding Catherine's claims of racial discrimination under Title
VII, it is undisputed that Catherine did not file a charge with the
EEOC. Rather, Catherine attempts to prove exhaustion of
administrative remedies and timely filing of suit by piggybacking
upon charges filed by others. Catherine's argument does not
specifically argue upon which charge Catherine attempts to
piggyback, however, the opposition memoranda generally argue
piggybacking on Fox's Charge of Discrimination and Earnest Ford's
Charge of Discrimination.  

The Court denies Defendant's motion with regard to the claims of
Joseph Catherine brought on his behalf by his three heirs.

Umeca O'Conner (2 of 3 heirs of Joseph Catherine)

Based on the analysis immediately above for Yvonne Catherine, one
of the three heirs of Joseph Catherine, the Court denies
Defendant's motion with regard to the claims of Joseph Catherine
brought on his behalf by his three heirs, including Umeca
O'Conner.

Corey Catherine (3 of 3 heirs of Joseph Catherine)

Based on the analysis immediately above for Yvonne Catherine, one
of the three heirs of Joseph Catherine, the Court denies
Defendant's motion with regard to the claims of Joseph Catherine
brought on his behalf by his three heirs, including Corey
Catherine.

Joseph Collins

Collins is a named Plaintiff in the first amending complaint filed
on July 27, 2001. Collins has not given his deposition. He
completed a questionnaire, dated October 26, 1998, and he responded
no to every question regarding potential claims of discriminatory
acts related to Local 198. However, Collins confirmed that he was a
member of Local 198, that he was the second black man to join Local
198,  that he believes employers (not Local 198) were responsible
for the alleged discrimination.
Plaintiffs opposed Defendant's motion and argued that Defendant
should not be able to argue that Collins has not provided any dates
when Defendant is in control of membership information.

In order for Collins' state law claims to be timely, he must show
through competent summary judgment evidence that some allegedly
discriminatory act occurred within one year of July 27, 2001. The
record offered on summary judgment does not reflect any specific
dates of alleged discriminatory acts. The Court notes that Collins'
questionnaire is dated October 26, 1998; therefore, the alleged
acts presumably occurred before that date. Significantly, Collins
states in his questionnaire that he does not have any proof that
Local 198 has a general practice of discrimination and that he does
not claim to have been subjected to a hostile workplace
environment.  

Based on the foregoing, all claims under state law by Joseph
Collins are dismissed with prejudicebased on untimeliness. There
are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Joseph Collins
claims under Section 1981 and Title VII are timely; therefore,
Defendant's motion with regard to these claims brought by Joseph
Collins is denied.

Leo Davis

Davis is a named Plaintiff in the original complaint filed on May
1, 1998. Defendant states that Davis has not been deposed but
responded to the questionnaire, dated November 29, 2001. Davis
represents the following in his questionnaire: that Local 198 has a
general policy of discrimination, that he was denied employment for
discriminatory reasons,  that he was denied a job referral for
discriminatory reasons,  that he was denied training or testing for
discriminatory reasons, that he was denied a job assignment for
discriminatory reasons; that he was harassed for discriminatory
reasons, that he was retaliated against for discriminatory reasons,
that Local 198 failed to defend him for discriminatory reasons,
that he was subjected to a hostile work environment.

Plaintiffs opposed Defendant's motion and argued that Davis was a
member of Local 198 for eight to ten years and never got a recall
and many other racial discriminatory practices covering many
years.

In his supplemental opposition, Davis offered his member biographic
information produced by Defendant in discovery purporting to
indicate that he was a member of Local 198 in 2000, and his
original initiation date was 2000.  

Davis' claims under Section 1981 are subject to a four-year
prescriptive period. Since Davis filed suit on May 1, 1998, the
evidence must show that an alleged act of discrimination occurred
between May 1, 1994 and May 1, 1998. Davis generally alleges acts
of discrimination in his questionnaire that may have occurred in
this time period, and it is possible that Davis was a member of
Local 198 at this time.

Regarding Davis' claims of racial discrimination under Title VII,
it is undisputed that Davis did not file a charge with the EEOC.
Rather, Davis attempts to prove exhaustion of administrative
remedies and timely filing of suit by piggybacking upon charges
filed by others. Davis' argument does not specifically argue upon
which charge Davis attempts to piggyback, however, the opposition
memoranda generally argue piggybacking on Fox's Charge of
Discrimination and Earnest Ford's Charge of Discrimination.  

Defendant's motion with regard to the claims of Leo Davis is
denied.

Earnest Ford, Sr.

Ford is a named Plaintiff in the first amending complaint filed on
July 27, 2001. Defendant argues that Ford was never a member of
Local 198.  Defendant asserts that Ford's claims of discrimination
are related to being denied a job in 1994 after which Local 198
filed a charge against him for working non-union He filed a charge
with the National Labor Relations Board and received compensation.
He then filed an EEOC charge of discrimination on August 15, 2001,
based on the same incident, claims Defendant.  

In opposition, Ford relies upon his EEOC charge and questionnaire
and argues the continuous tort exception.  

Ford filed an EEOC Charge of Discrimination on August 15, 2001. He
claimed racial discrimination from January 1, 1998 to May 24, 2001.
He claimed that he has been continuously subjected to unequal terms
and conditions of employment with regard to call-outs' and
call-backs' due to race.

In order for Ford's state law claims to be timely, he must show
through competent summary judgment evidence that some allegedly
discriminatory act occurred within one year of July 27, 2001.  The
record offered on summary judgment reflects specific allegations of
alleged discriminatory acts in 1982-1994 and 1998-2001 and both
specific and general allegations of discriminatory acts from 1982,
1992, and January 1998-May 2001. Therefore, there are specific
allegations of alleged discriminatory acts before Ford filed suit
and general allegations of acts continuing into the year prior to
suit being filed.

Ford's claims under Section 1981 are subject to a four-year
prescriptive period. Since Ford filed suit on July 27, 2001, the
evidence must show that an alleged act of discrimination occurred
between July 27, 1997 and July 27, 2001. Ford generally alleges
acts of discrimination in his EEOC charge that may have occurred in
this time period, and it is unknown whether Ford was a member of
Local 198 at this time.

Regarding Ford's claims of racial discrimination under Title VII,
it is undisputed that Ford filed a charge with the EEOC on August
15, 2001.  While the discriminatory acts specifically detailed in
Ford's questionnaire took place up to 1994, Ford's EEOC charge
provides a discriminatory time period of 1998 to May 2001.
Therefore, the charge appears to be timely filed within 300 days of
the alleged acts. Further, the law is clear that a plaintiff must
exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking relief from the
court.  

Here, Ford filed his EEOC charge less than one month after filing
suit. Ford is prohibited from piggy-backing on another Plaintiff's
EEOC charge to salvage his complaint with the Court of racial
discrimination, because he filed his own EEOC charge. However,
Ford's questionnaire, dated December 1998, informed the EEOC of the
identity of the parties and described alleged discriminatory
conduct. As the questionnaire was dated December of 1998, it was
completed within 300 days of alleged discriminatory actions.There
is a genuine issue of material fact as to the timeliness of Ford's
claims under Title VII.

Defendant's motion with regard to Earnest Ford's claims is denied.

Lee Fox

Fox is a named Plaintiff in the original complaint filed on May 1,
1998. Defendant argues that: Fox pulled his travel card from Local
198 and worked in Ohio from late 1996 until early 1997,  Fox had
worked elsewhere for one year and five days after returning from
Ohio as of January 12, 1999, Fox does not claim any discrimination
after late 1996, and all claims of discrimination pre-date his work
in Ohio and Fox alleges discrimination with regard to recalls
performed by the contractors.

In response, Plaintiffs argue that the questionnaire was dated
October 1998, but the EEOC charge indicates the discrimination of
which he complained occurred beginning January 1, 1998.  Plaintiffs
also argue Fox's allegations regarding a general, continuous
practice of race discrimination. Plaintiffs also rely upon Fox's
affidavit.  

In order for Fox's state law claims to be timely, he must show
through competent summary judgment evidence that some allegedly
discriminatory act occurred within one year of May 1, 1998. The
record offered on summary judgment reflects specific allegations of
alleged discriminatory acts in 1974-1998 and 2000. Therefore, there
are specific allegations of alleged discriminatory acts before Fox
filed suit and allegations of acts continuing into the year prior
to suit being filed.

Fox's claims under Section 1981 are subject to a four-year
prescriptive period. Since Fox filed suit on May 1, 1998, the
evidence must show that an alleged act of discrimination occurred
between May 1, 1994 and May 1, 1998. Fox alleges acts of
discrimination in his EEOC charge that may have occurred in this
time period, and it is alleged that Fox was a member of Local 198
at this time.

Regarding Fox's claims of racial discrimination under Title VII, it
is undisputed that Fox filed a charge with the EEOC on March 5,
2001. It appears that this charge was filed within 300 days of
alleged discriminatory acts in November 2000.  While the
discriminatory acts specifically detailed in Fox's questionnaire
allegedly took place from 1974-1998, Fox's EEOC charge provides a
discriminatory time period of 1998-2001. Therefore, the charge
appears to be timely filed within 300 days of the alleged acts.  

Defendant's motion with regard to Lee Fox's claims under state law
and Section 1981 is denied. Fox's claims under Title VII are
dismissed with prejudice.

Darryl Freeman

Freeman is named in the original complaint filed on May 1, 1998.
Freeman did not oppose this motion in Plaintiffs' first opposition
and is listed on Mr. Wilson's statement of Plaintiffs with no
opposition to the motion.  In the revised chart, Freeman is listed
as not opposing the motion.  However, in Wilson's supplemental
opposition to the motion, he argues that Plaintiff Lee Fox was the
earliest filed EEOC charge, filed in February 1997, and Freeman can
piggyback on Fox's charge.

Freeman refers the Court to Fox's Notice of Charge of
Discrimination made a part of the record in support of Defendant's
motion. Fox's Charge of Discrimination is dated March 5, 2001, is
filed adverse to Local 198, complains of racial discrimination, and
provides a date range of alleged discrimination from January 1,
1998 to November 8, 2000.
  
Defendant, in support of its motion, directs the Court to summary
judgment evidence reflecting that Freeman was a member of Local 198
from 1978 to 1996; he gave his deposition in 2002; and he testified
that he did not file an EEOC charge. (Doc. 639-2 at p. 21, citing
Doc. 639-24 at pp. 14, 16).

In order for Freeman's state law claims to be timely, he must show
through competent summary judgment evidence that some allegedly
discriminatory act occurred within one year of May 1, 1998.  
Freeman attempts to do this by piggy-backing on Fox's allegations
in his Charge of Discrimination, which alleges racial
discrimination beginning as early as January of 1998, specifically
described as being denied recall due to his race. This time period
is within one year of Freeman filing suit.

Freeman's claims under Section 1981 are subject to a four-year
prescriptive period. Since Freeman filed suit on May 1, 1998, the
evidence must show that the last alleged act of discrimination
occurred between May 1, 1994 and May 1, 1998. Based upon Fox's EEOC
charge, January 1, 1998 falls within this time period; however, it
does not appear that Freeman was a member of Local 198 at this
time.

Regarding Freeman's claims of racial discrimination under Title
VII, there is no evidence that Freeman filed an EEOC charge at any
time. Rather, Freeman attempts to prove exhaustion of
administrative remedies and timely filing of suit by piggy-backing
upon Fox's Charge of Discrimination. Freeman has not made a showing
that he is similarly situated to Fox.  
All claims by Darryl Freeman are dismissed with prejudice based on
untimeliness.

Larry Freeman

Freeman is a named Plaintiff in the original complaint filed on May
1, 1998. Defendant is seeking to dismiss Freeman's claims of racial
discrimination under Title VII only. Defendant argues that Freeman
has not produced an EEOC charge or right to sue letter.  

Plaintiffs opposed Defendant's motion and argued that Larry Freeman
provided a questionnaire and the piggy-back rule should apply.

Freeman must make some showing of his relationship with Local 198
within the relevant time period. Freeman has offered evidence of
membership in 1992, 1993 and 1999. The Court notes that the
discovery responses also reflect that Freeman was expelled from
Local 198 on September 30, 1999. It is unclear whether Freeman was
a member in the relevant 1996-1998 time period. Therefore, there is
a genuine issue of fact regarding whether Freeman was a member in
Local 198 in the relevant time period.

Regarding Freeman's claims of racial discrimination under Title
VII, it is undisputed that Freeman did not file a charge with the
EEOC. Rather, Freeman attempts to prove exhaustion of
administrative remedies and timely filing of suit by piggybacking
upon charges filed by others. Freeman's argument does not
specifically argue upon which charge Freeman attempts to piggyback,
however, the opposition memoranda generally argue piggybacking on
Fox's Charge of Discrimination and Earnest Ford's Charge of
Discrimination.

Ford's charge reflects complaints of racial discrimination by Local
198 from January 1998 to May 24, 2001. Ford claims that he was
continuously subjected to unequal treatment, specifically regarding
call-outs and call-backs. As set forth above, Freeman has not made
a showing that he is similarly situated to Ford.  

Larry Freeman's Title VII claims are dismissed with prejudice based
on untimeliness. Larry Freeman's claims pursuant to state law and
Section 1981 remain pending.

Accordingly, Defendant United Association of Journeymen and
Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United
States and Canada, AFL-CIO, Local 198's Motion for Summary
Judgment, is granted in part and denied in part.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 18, 2019 Ruling and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3jg7uth from
Leagle.com.

Charles Adams, Frank Cage, Joseph Catherine, Leo Davis, Jr, David
Dixon, Lee Fox, Larry Freeman, Larry Gilmore, Rayfield Goings, John
Green, Alfreddie Greensberry, Mannie Henderson, Michael Jackson,
Jonas Jacob, Michael Kyles, Hebert Lavergne, James Miles, Sam
Parker, Lionel Richard, Donald L Robertson, Willie Stone, Earl
Turner, Alfred Wallace, James White, Tommie Williams, All
Plaintiffs, Roberta McDomic, Larry Bell, Joseph Collins, Earnest
Ford, Sr, Freddie Jackson, Earnest Johnson, Carl Judson, Kenneth
Judson, Ivan W Morgan, Derrick Wicker, Kevin T Gauthier, Clyde
Holliday, Robin Nicole Hayes, Andre Christopher Gatlin, Freddie
Judson, Jr, Wayne Dukes & Joseph Wicker, Plaintiffs, represented by
Donna Unkel Grodner, Grodner and Associates, APLC, 2223 Quail Run
Drive Suite B-1. Baton Rouge, LA 70808 & J. Courtney Wilson, J.
Courtney Wilson, Attorney at Law, 1510 Veterans Memorial
BlvdMetairie, LA 70005- 2704.

United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing
and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada AFL-CIO,
Local 198, Defendant, represented by Louis L. Robein, Robein,
Urann, Spencer, Picard & Cangemi, APLC, 2540 Severn Ave Ste 400,
Metairie, LA, 70002-5955, Daniel J. McNeil, O'Donoghue &
O'Donoghue, 5301 Wisconsin Ave NW Suite 800, Washington, DC 20015,
Edward K. Newman, US Attorney's Office, Jean M. Kelly, O'Donoghue &
O'Donoghue, 5301 Wisconsin Ave NW Suite 800, Washington, DC 20015,
Julie Richard-Spencer, Robein, Urann, Spencer, Picard & Cangemi,
APLC,, 2540 Severn Ave Ste 400, Metairie, LA, 70002-5955Keith R.
Bolek, O'Donoghue & O'Donoghue, Nancy Picard, Robein, Urann &
Lurye, Robert P. Curley, Robein, Urann & Lurye, 2540 Severn Ave Ste
400, Metairie, LA, 70002-5955 & Teresa White Murray, O'Donoghue &
O'Donoghue,  5301 Wisconsin Ave NW Suite 800, Washington, DC 20015


VSL PHARMA: Starr et al. Allege Inferior VSL No. 3 Version
----------------------------------------------------------
DAVID STARR, SANDI COOK, BERNADETTE MAVRIKOS, EDMUND QUIAMBAO,
JAMES TETTENHORST, JEREMY HANSEN, KRISTA KARO and ARLENE
REED-COSSAIRT, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. VSL PHARMACEUTICALS, INC; LEADIANT
BIOSCIENCES, INC., F/K/A SIGMA-TAU PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., and
ALFASIGMA USA, INC., the Defendants, Case No. 8:19-cv-02173-TDC (D.
Md., July 23, 2019), alleges that Defendants falsely represented
the version of VSL No. 3 that Defendants marketed and sold during
the Class Period was the same as, and as effective as, the version
of VSL No. 3 that was marketed and sold prior to that time.

The lawsuit alleges violation of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act, the Massachusetts Consumer Protection
Act, the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, the California
Unfair Competition Law, the False Advertising Law, the Texas
Consumer Protection Act, the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, the
Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, the Washington
Consumer Protection Act, the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practices Act, and the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.

VSL No. 3 is a medical food used as a probiotic, or "friendly
bacteria" to maintain a healthy digestive tract (stomach and
intestines).  It is used in people with irritable bowel syndrome,
ulcerative colitis, or an ileal pouch.

According to the complaint, because Defendants presented to
consumers a product that purported to be the same VSL No. 3 that
consumers had come to trust, while delivering to consumers an
inferior product that was unsupported by clinical evidence, the
product Defendants promised to consumers was substantially more
valuable than the product Defendants actually delivered. As such,
all of the Plaintiffs were economically harmed insofar as they paid
for a product that was an inferior, unproven alternative to the
product that Defendants had represented it was, and they would not
have bought Defendants’ product in the absence of the false
advertising.

Specifically, beginning on or before June 1, 2016, the Defendant
Leadiant, via a license from Defendant VSL Inc., began selling the
Fraudulent Formulation under the brand name "VSL No. 3," the same
brand name consumers understood to be the clinically proven De
Simone Formulation. Then, beginning on July 1, 2016, Defendant
Alfasigma, also partially owned by the Cavazza Family, superseded
Defendant Leadiant as the United States distributor and seller of
the Fraudulent Formulation, still under the deceptive brand name
"VSL No. 3." Alfasigma and VSL Inc. continued to market the
Fraudulent Formulation as "VSL No. 3" throughout the Class Period.

The Plaintiffs are purchasers of VSL No. 3 during the Class
Period.

VSL Pharmaceuticals, Inc. provides medical food for the dietary
management of patients. The Company offers probiotic medical food
for the dietary management of patients with ulcerative colitis,
irritable bowel syndrome, and ileal pouch.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff  are:

          Jeremy W. Schulman, Esq.
          Jeffrey S. Gavenman, Esq.
          SCHULMAN BHATTACHARYA, LLC
          7500 Old Georgetown Road, Suite 901
          Bethesda, MD 20814
          Telephone: (240) 356-8550
          E-mail: jschulman@schulmanbh.com
                  jgavenman@schulmanbh.com

               - and -

          Edward F. Haber, Esq.
          Ian J. McLoughlin, Esq.
          SHAPIRO HABER & URMY LLP
          Seaport East
          Two Seaport Lane, Floor 6
          Boston, MA 02210
          Telephone: (617) 439-3939
          Facsimile: (617) 439-0134
          E-mail: ehaber@shulaw.com
                  imcloughlin@shulaw.com

WAL-MART STORES: Evans Seek to Certify 4 FLSA Classes
-----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as JAMES S. EVANS and KEINEISHA
SMITH, on behalf of themselves, all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs, vs. WAL-MART STORES, INC., a Delaware corporation; and
DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No.
2:17-cv-07641-AB-KK (C.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff will move the Court
on August 30, 2019, for an order:

   1. certifying plaintiff classes:

      a. "Regular Rate Class" defined as:

          "all persons employed as hourly-paid employees by
          Defendant in any store in California at any time on or
          after September 13, 2013 through the date of class
          certification who were paid overtime and non-
          discretionary bonus in any pay period";

      b. "Vacation/Holiday Pay Class" defined as:

          "all persons employed by Defendant in any store in
           California at any time on or after September 13, 2013
          through the date of class certification who earned
          paid vacation days, including but not limited to,
          holiday pay without receiving compensation for each
          vested paid vacation day and/or holiday pay.";

      c. "Wage Statement Class" defined as:

          "all persons employed as hourly-paid employees by
          Defendant in any store in California at any time
          during the period beginning one year before the filing
          of this action and ending when final judgment is
          entered."

      d. "Waiting Time Penalty" defined as:

          "all persons employed as hourly-paid employees by
          Defendant in any store in California at any time
          during the period beginning three years before the
          filing of this action and ending when final judgment
          is entered."

   2. appointing Plaintiffs as class representatives for the
      classes proposed 23 herein or later proposed and approved
      by the Court and any other sub-class the Court 24 may
      devise; and

   3. appointing Shaun Setareh and William M. Pao of Setareh Law
      Group as Class Counsel pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
      23(g).[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Shaun Setareh, Esq.
          William M. Pao, Esq.
          Alexandra R. McIntosh, Esq.
          SETAREH LAW GROUP
          315 South Beverly Drive, Suite 315
          5 Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Telephone (310) 888-7771
          Facsimile (310) 888-0109
          E-mail: shaun@setarehlaw.com
                  william@setarehlaw.com
                  alex@setarehlaw.com

WALMART INC: Settlement in Famuliner Suit Has Prelim Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ARTHUR FAMULINER and RUSS MAPES, o/b/o himself and
others similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs, v. WALMART INC., et
al., Defendants, Case No. 19-00060-CV-W-ODS (W.D. Mo.), Judge
Ortrie D. Smith of the U.S. District Court for the West District of
Missouri, Western Division, granted the parties' (i) joint motion
to stay and (ii) joint motion for preliminary approval of a class
action settlement.

The parties have agreed to settle and resolve this matter based
upon the terms and conditions set forth in the Settlement Agreement
and Release.  Judge Smith preliminarily approved the Settlement
Agreement and Release as fair, reasonable, and adequate, subject to
further consideration at the Final Fairness Hearing.

He conditionally certified, for settlement purposes only, the
following Settlement Class: All persons and other entities who
purchased Super Tech 303 Tractor Hydraulic & Transmission Oil from
Walmart Stores in Missouri at any point in time from Aug. 30, 2013
to present, excluding those who purchased for resale.finds Class
Counsel are competent and capable of exercising their
responsibilities as Class Counsel.

The Judge appointed RG/2 Claims Administration, LLC to serve as the
Settlement Administrator, which will perform the Settlement
Administrator's duties as set forth in the Settlement Agreement and
Release.

A Final Fairness Hearing will be held at 10:00 a.m. on March 3,
2020.

Pending the Final Fairness Hearing, all proceedings in the matter,
other than proceedings necessary to carry out or enforce the terms
and conditions of the Settlement Agreement and Release and the
Order, are stayed.

The Judge approved the form and content of the Long Form Notice and
Summary Notice.  The Settlement Class members may request the
particularized Long Form Notice and Claim Form through the
Settlement Website and Settlement Administrator.  The Settlement
Class members will have until the date identified herein to submit
Claim Forms.

The Notice will be provided to the Settlement Class members in
compliance with the following procedures:

     (a) Within ten business days after entry of the Order, the
Defendants will provide to the Settlement Administrator, to the
extent available, the full name and last known address of each
member of the Settlement Class and, where available, the number of
five-gallon buckets of Super Tech 303 Tractor Hydraulic &
Transmission Oil purchased by each Settlement Class member during
the Class Period.

     (b) Within 30 calendar days after receipt of the information
set forth, the Settlement Administrator will mail by bulk mailing
Long Form Notices to the last known mailing address of each member
of the Settlement Class.

     (c) Within 30 calendar days after entry of the Order, but no
later than the Notice Date, the Settlement Administrator shall: (1)
secure and maintain a Post Office Box or similar mailing address
for the receipt of Claim Forms, opt-out notices, and any other
correspondence related to the Settlement; and (2) establish a
unique, case-specific e-mail address for online receipt of Claim
Forms, opt-out notices, and any other correspondence related to the
Settlement.

     (d) Within 30 calendar days after entry of the Order, but no
later than the Notice Date, the Settlement Administrator will
create and maintain an operating website.

     (e) Within t3o calendar days after entry of the Order, but no
later than the Notice Date, the Claims Administrator will set up a
toll-free telephone number for receiving toll-free calls related to
the Settlement.

     (f) On the Notice Date or as close thereto as reasonably
practicable under the circumstances, the Settlement Administrator
will cause the Summary Notice in substantially the form attached as
Exhibit E to the Settlement Agreement and Release be published in
the various publications, including Missouri Farmer Today,
Springfield News Leader and Kansas City Star.

     (g) The Settlement Administrator will mail a Claim Form to
each person and/or entity that makes such request.

     (h) Claim Forms will be available through the Settlement
Website.

The Class Counsel will file their application(s) for attorneys'
fees and expenses by no later than 10 business days before the Bar
Date.  

The papers in support of final approval of the Settlement Agreement
and Release, and in response to any objections to the Settlement
Agreement and Release or Class Counsels' fee application, will be
filed with the Court by no later than 10 business days before the
date of the Final Fairness Hearing.

The Bar Date will be 150 calendar days after the Notice Date.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 21, 2019 Order Opinion and is
available at https://is.gd/giV1Op from Leagle.com.

Arthur Famuliner, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated & Russ Mapes, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Bryan White --
bwhite@wagblaw.com -- White Graham Buckley & Carr, LLC, Dirk L.
Hubbard -- dhubbard@hab-law.com -- Horn, Aylward & Bandy, LLC, Gene
P. Graham, Jr. -- ggraham@wagblaw.com -- White, Graham, Buckley &
Carr, LLC & Thomas V. Bender -- tbender@hab-law.com -- Horn,
Aylward & Bandy, LLC.

Walmart Inc. & Warren Distribution, Inc., Defendants, represented
by Benjamin R. Wesselschmidt -- bwesselschmidt@sandbergphoenix.com
-- Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, PC, G. Keith Phoenix --
kphoenix@sandbergphoenix.com -- Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, PC
& Anthony L. Martin, Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, PC.


ZF TRW AUTOMOTIVE: Berry Sues Over Defective Airbag Control Units
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTOPHER BERRY, KEVIN BURNS, LARRY FLOWERS, DIANA KING, DEE
ROBERTS, and CARMA ROCKERS on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated v. ZF TRW AUTOMOTIVE HOLDINGS CORP., HYUNDAI
MOTOR AMERICA, INC., KIA MOTORS AMERICA, INC., AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR
CO., INC., HONDA OF AMERICA MFG. INC., HONDA R&D AMERICAS, INC.,
TOYOTA MOTOR NORTH AMERICA, INC., TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC.,
and TOYOTA MOTOR ENGINEERING & MANUFACTURING NORTH AMERICA, INC.,
Case No. 8:19-cv-01403 (C.D. Cal., July 18, 2019), stems from the
alleged continuing and deliberate decision by automakers and a
major parts supplier to conceal a potentially deadly defect within
a critical safety device in vehicles that were purchased by
consumers in the United States.

The defect involves the Airbag Control Unit ("ACU") designed and
manufactured by ZF-TRW Automotive Holdings Corp. and supplied to
numerous automakers, including Hyundai, Kia, Honda, Toyota, and
FCA.  This ACU defect is alarming because it is manifest only
during a collision, precisely when consumers need its functionality
most, the Plaintiffs contend.

ZF TRW Automotive Holdings Corp. ("ZF-TRW") is incorporated in
Delaware and is headquartered in Livonia, Michigan.  ZF-TRW is a
key supplier of automotive parts, including safety systems, to auto
manufacturers.  ZF-TRW developed, designed, and supplied defective
ACUs for installation by the defendant auto manufacturers in the
Class Vehicles.

Hyundai Motor America, Inc. ("HMA") is a manufacturer and
distributor of new motor vehicles under the Hyundai brand and is
incorporated and headquartered in the state of California.  Its
principal place of business is located in Fountain Valley,
California.

Kia Motors America, Inc. ("KMA") is a manufacturer and distributor
of new motor vehicles under the Kia brand and is incorporated and
headquartered in the state of California.  Its principal place of
business is located in Irvine, California.

American Honda Motor Co., Inc., ("American Honda") is a California
corporation, with its corporate headquarters located at in
Torrance, California.

Honda of America Mfg., Inc. ("Honda Mfg.") is an Ohio corporation
with its corporate headquarters located in Marysville, Ohio. Honda
Mfg. is a subsidiary of Honda Motor.  Honda Mfg. is involved in the
design, manufacture, testing, marketing, distribution and sale of
Honda vehicles in the United States.

Honda R&D Americas, Inc. ("Honda R&D") is a California corporation
with its corporate headquarters located in Raymond, Ohio.  Honda
R&D is involved in the design, development, manufacture, assembly,
testing, distribution and sale of Honda vehicles.  Honda designs,
engineers, manufactures, markets and/or sells vehicles under the
Honda and Acura brands in California and throughout the United
States, through its network of authorized motor vehicle dealers.

Toyota Motor North America, Inc. ("Toyota") is a Texas corporation
with its corporate headquarters located in Plano, Texas.  Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., ("TMS") is a Texas corporation with its
corporate headquarters located at 6565 Headquarters Drive, Plano,
Texas.  Toyota designs, engineers, manufactures, markets and/or
sells vehicles under the Toyota brand in California and throughout
the United States through its network of authorized motor vehicle
dealers.

Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing North America, Inc.
("TEMA") has its principal place of business at 6565 Headquarters
Drive, Plano, Texas.  TEMA is responsible for Toyota's engineering
design and development, research and development, and manufacturing
activities in the U.S., Mexico, and Canada.  TEMA is a subsidiary
of Toyota.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Michael F. Ram, Esq.
          ROBINS KAPLAN LLP
          2440 West El Camino Real, Suite 100
          Mountain View, CA 94040
          Telephone: (650) 784-4007
          Facsimile: (650) 784-4041
          E-mail: Mram@robinskaplan.com

               - and -

          Stacey P. Slaughter, Esq.
          J. Austin Hurt, Esq.
          Michael J. Pacelli, Esq.
          ROBINS KAPLAN LLP
          800 LaSalle Avenue, Suite 2800
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 349-8500
          Facsimile: (612) 339-4181
          E-mail: Sslaughter@RobinsKaplan.com
                  Ahurt@robinskaplan.com
                  Mpacelli@robinskaplan.com

               - and -

          Samuel J. Strauss, Esq.
          TURKE & STRAUSS LLP
          613 Williamson Street, Suite 201
          Madison, WI 53703
          Telephone: (608) 237-1775
          Facsimile: (608) 509-4423
          E-mail: Sam@turkestrauss.com



                            *********

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Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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