CAR_Public/190807.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Wednesday, August 7, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 157

                            Headlines

ABC CORP: Zhen Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
ADLER WALLACH: McCorkle Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. Tennessee
AIRWAY CLEANERS: Court Certifies Class in Burgess Labor Suit
ALIZ GROUP: Duncan Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
ASCENA RETAIL: Schall Law Firm Files Securities Class Suit

AUTOMATIC LOFTS: Fails to Give Summary on Deposits, Farhat Claims
BANK OF AMERICA: Josh Thomas Sues over Background Checks
BONNIER CORP: $2.15MM Settlement in Friske Suit Has Prelim Approval
BRIDGECREST ACCEPTANCE: Canady Sues Over Auto-dialled Calls
CHAMPION PETFOODS: Court Narrows Claims in Simpson Suit

CIMAREX ENERGY: Court Narrows Claims in Reirdon Suit
CONAGRA FOODS: Court Denies Nationwide Class Certification in Allen
CONSTRUCTION SOLUTIONS: Fields Sues Over Laborers' Unpaid Wages
CREATIVE HAIRDRESSERS: Anderson Seeks Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
CRYSTAL ENTERPRISES: Underpays Production Managers, Backman Says

CVS HEALTH: Staff Labor Suit Removed to E.D. Cal.
DALLAS, TX: Prelim Injunction Bid as to Section 552.007 Granted
DEMARK INC: Bid to Certify Class in Griffin Suit Denied as Moot
DIVYA DRISHTI: Fails to Pay Minimum, Overtime Wages, Peralta Says
DURHAM D&M: Removes Gardner Labor Class Suit to C.D. California

DUVAL COUNTY, FL: Schatzel Files Civil Rights Suit v. School Board
EAGLE CREEK: Dennis Claims Website Not Blind-Friendly
EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Bruno FCRA Suit Dismissed With Prejudice
EVENTBRITE INC: Barbieri Sues Over Text Ads re Cinco De Mayo Fest
EVERALBUM INC: Figueroa Appeals N.D. Cal. Decision to 9th Circuit

EXPEDIA INC: Court Narrows Claims in Woodell Suit
EXTREME NETWORKS: $7MM Class Settlement in Securities Suit OK'd
FACEBOOK INC: Court Narrows Claims in Bass Data Breach Suit
FORD MOTOR CO: Arendt Files Fraud Class Suit in Minn.
GAW MINERS: Court Certifies Class in Audet Securities Suit

GRAGIL ASSOCIATES: Navarro Suit Asserts FDCPA Violation
GRAND CANYON: Webb Klase Files Class Action Lawsuit
HEARTLAND FINANCIAL: Bangart Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime
HELIUS MEDICAL: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Class Action Lawsuit
HENRY COUNTY, IN: Court Certifies Class in Bell Prisoners Suit

HIGHMARK HEALTH: Court Narrows Claims in Antitrust Suit
IDEANOMICS INC: Pomerantz Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Hernandez Sues Over Tylenol's Misleading Labels
KCG HOLDINGS: Bid to Dismiss Amended Chester Suit Denied
KIDS BEHAVIORAL: Bonanini Seeks to Recover Damages Under WARN Act

KIEWIT CORP: Avila Labor Suit Remanded to California State Court
LANNETT COMPANY: Class Action Survives Motion to Dismiss
LEE LAW OFFICES: Shanahan FDCA Suit Settlement Has Final Approval
LOS LUNAS CENTER: Settlement in Jackson Suit Has Final Approval
LYNDON DINER WEST: Brown Labor Suit Hits FLSA Breach

MALLARD COMPLETIONS: Does not Properly Pay Workers, Parks Says
MANTEI & ASSOCIATES: Removes Black et al. Suit to D. S.C.
MDL 2672: Court Denies Bosch's Bid for Lone Pine CMO
MIDLAND FUNDING: Can Compel Arbitration in George FDCPA Suit
MIDLAND FUNDING: Can't Compel Arbitration in Ramirez FDCPA Suit

MLB HOTEL MANAGER: Nelson Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
MONSANTO COMPANY: Brogan Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Browns Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Case Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: D'Heur Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup

MONSANTO COMPANY: Hineses Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Mitchells Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MUTUAL FUND: Emerson Securities Suit Dismissed With Prejudice
NATIONAL RURAL: Sued over Mismanagement of 401(k) Pension Plan
NAVY FEDERAL: Bid to Reconsider Expert Fees in Plemons Suit Denied

NETSHOES (CAYMAN): Securities Class Action Claim Dismissed
NEW YORK: $2.9MM Attorney's Fees OK'd Willowbrook Litigation
NINTENDO CO: Class Action Over Drifting Joy-Con Controllers
NRG ENERGY: Removes Tejero Labor Class Suit to N.D. California
OHIO EQUITY PLUS: Brett Sues Over Illegal Telemarketing Calls

OMNICELL INC: Bernstein Liebhard Files Securities Class Suit
OMNICELL INC: Federman & Sherwood Files Securities Class Action
OMNICELL INC: Glancy Prongay Files Securities Fraud Class Action
OMNICELL INC: Hagens Berman Files Securities Class Action
OMNICELL INC: Sept. 16 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline

ONE WORLD TELECOM: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Boriskin Claims
ONLINE INFORMATION: Freeman Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
OWL INC: Perez Appeals M.D. Florida Decision to Eleventh Circuit
PER.SE BEAUTY: Kiler Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
PETSMART INC: Delsalvo Claims Website not Blind-Friendly

PREMIERE CREDIT: Ward Files FDCPA Suit in M.D. Florida
PROCOLLECT INC: Bradswell Files FDCPA Suit in Connecticut
PROGRESSIVE SELECT: Lopez's Class Cert. Bid Denied as Moot
PSP DISTRIBUTION: Ash Sues over Mislabeled Cat Food Products
PURDUE PHARMA: Poughkeepsie City Opioid Row Removed to S.D.N.Y.

QUOGUE CLUB: Duncan Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
RBS CITIZENS: Renewed Bid to Decertify Reinig FLSA Class Denied
RECOLOGY SAN FRANCISCO: Dwelle Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
SHOWS CALI: Court Dismisses Calogero FDCPA Suit With Prejudice
SIRIUS XM: Removes Parrella Suit to New Jersey District Court

SOUTHAMPTON VILLAGE: Duncan Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
SPIROS PARTNERS: Bailey Hits Misclassification, Unpaid Wages
STANFORD INTERNATIONAL: 5th Cir. Affirms Bar Orders in Zacarias
STEMGENEX MEDICAL: Court Certifies 2 Subclasses in Moorer Suit
STUDENT LOANS: Garcia TCPA Suit Asserts Invasion of Privacy

TECH RABBIT: Zarrabian Remanded to California State Court
UNITED AIRLINES: Seeks 9th Circuit Review of Ruling in Brown Suit
UNITED COLLECTION: Israel Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
UNITED STATES: Sweet Moves to Certify Borrowers' Class & Subclass
UNIVERSAL PROTECTION: Underpays Security Officers, Griffith Says

US BANK: Casper Files Suit Over Illegal Fees
VACO TECHNOLOGY: Google's Bid to Junk Bush Wage & Hour Suit OK'd
VITA-MIX CORP: $41K in Costs Awarded in Linneman Suit
WALGREEN PHARMACY: Epstein Labor Suit Removed to C.D. Cal.
WYETH: Denial of Browning's Claims in Diet Drugs Suit Affirmed

XPO LOGISTIC: Sept. 4 Hearing on Kramer Deal Prelim Approval Bid

                            *********

ABC CORP: Zhen Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------
Zhen Ming Chen, individually and on behalf of all other employees
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ABC Corporation, Yiming Peng and
John Doe 1-10, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-06673, (S.D. N.Y., July
17, 2019), seeks unpaid wages for overtime compensation due,
liquidated damages, reasonable attorney's fees, costs and expenses
of this action and such other relief under the Fair Labor Standards
Act and New York labor laws.

Defendant operates as "Taco Today" located at 1659 First Avenue,
New York where Zhen worked as a delivery person but was required to
perform non-tipped side work, including taking out the trash,
cleaning, cutting, and preparing items to be used for delivery
orders. He claims to be denied overtime for time worked in excess
of 40 hours in any given workweek.[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Vincent S. Wong. Esq.
      LAW OFFICES OF VINCENT S. WONG
      39 East Broadway, Suite 306
      New York, NY 10002
      Tel: (212) 349-6099
      Fax: (212) 349-6599
      Email: VW@WongESQ.com


ADLER WALLACH: McCorkle Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. Tennessee
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Adler Wallach &
Associates, Inc. The case is styled as Travis McCorkle individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Adler
Wallach & Associates, Inc., John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-00220 (E.D. Tenn, July 31, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Adler Wallach & Associates, Inc. (AWA) is a collection agency that
was established in 1991. AWA offers customized delinquent accounts
receivable solutions.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Yaakov Saks, Esq.
     Stein Saks, PLLC
     285 Passaic Street
     Hackensack, NJ 07601
     Phone: (201) 282-6500 ext 101
     Fax: (201) 282-6501
     Email: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com



AIRWAY CLEANERS: Court Certifies Class in Burgess Labor Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHANETTAY BURGESS, SHANAE BURTON, JEAN CAYEMITTE, YAYA
KARRIEM, ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED Plaintiff, v. AIRWAY
CLEANERS, LLC, Defendant, Docket No. 158584/2014, Motion Seq. No.
002 (N.Y. Sup.), Judge Nancy M. Bannon of the Supreme Court of New
York County granted the Plaintiffs' motion to certify a settlement
class, to preliminarily approve the settlement dated Dec. 18, 2018,
to approve the forms for notices and claims, and to appoint the
Plaintiff's counsel as the class counsel.

In the class action to recover unpaid wages and benefits, the
Plaintiffs move for the certification of the settlement class,
approval of a settlement of the class action, approval of the forms
of notices and claims, and the appointment of the Plaintiff's
counsel as the class counsel.  The Defendant does not oppose the
motion.

The Plaintiffs, Burgess, Burton, Cayemitte, and Karriem,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, commenced
the action against Airway, alleging that, beginning or about
September 2008, Airway violated Labor Law Sections 650 et seq.,
Labor Law Sections 190 et seq., and 12 NYCRR 142-2.1 by failing to
pay its employees for all hours worked, failing to pay its
employees for an additional hour of time at the minimum wage rate
for all days during which the spread of hours exceeded 10 hours or
a split shift occurred, and failing to pay its employees for the
supply, maintenance or laundering of required uniforms.

The class sought to be certified consists of all individuals
employed by Airway at its JFK airport location between Sept. 3,
2008, and April 5, 2015.  The proposed class settlement will
require the defendant to pay $500,000 into a settlement fund, of
which $166,666.66 thereof is allocated to pay the fees of the
Plaintiff's attorneys.

Judge Bannon finds that the representatives have demonstrated that
they can fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class,
as they have no claims potentially adverse to other class members.
The class action procedure appears to be superior to other
available methods of adjudicating the controversy, since the amount
that might be recovered by an individual class member in a separate
lawsuit might be quite modest.

She also finds that the Plaintiffs have demonstrated that, in light
of the fact that the membership in the class is not overwhelmingly
large, the class members performed the same job, and the claims
cover only a limited period of time, the claims as set forth in the
complaint can be efficiently and economically managed by the Court
on a classwide basis.

She further finds that the affidavit of the Plaintiffs' counsel
describes dozens of class actions that his firm has litigated
successfully, which amply demonstrated its experience and skill in
class action litigation, and that it will adequately represent the
interest of all the class members.

Finally, the Plaintiffs also seek an order scheduling a "fairness
hearing" pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2), a procedure which
has been adopted in CPLR article 9 class actions in New York.  That
application is granted, the hearing is scheduled, and all parties
will appear on Oct. 3, 2019, at 2:30 p.m.

Accordingly, Judge Bannon granted the Plaintiffs' motion to certify
a settlement class, to preliminarily approve the settlement, to
approve the forms for notices and claims, and to appoint the class
counsel.  Without opposition, she certified the class,
preliminarily approved the agreement, and approved the forms.  A
fairness hearing will be conducted on Oct. 3, 2019, at 2:30 p.m.
The decision and order constitutes the Decision and Order of the
Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 25, 2019 Decision and Order is
available at https://is.gd/C90j9e from Leagle.com.


ALIZ GROUP: Duncan Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Aliz Group, LLC. The
case is styled as Eugene Duncan AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER PERSONS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff v. Aliz Group, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-07168 (S.D. N.Y., July 31, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Aliz Group, LLC is a privately owned and operated property
management, acquisition, and development company headquartered in
New York City.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
     The Marks Law Firm PC
     175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
     New York, NY 10014
     Phone: (646) 770-3775
     Fax: (646) 867-2639
     Email: bmarkslaw@gmail.com


ASCENA RETAIL: Schall Law Firm Files Securities Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
announces the filing of a class action lawsuit against Ascena
Retail Group, Inc. (NASDAQ: ASNA) for violations of Sec. 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.

Investors who purchased the Company's shares between Sept. 16, 2015
and June 8, 2017, inclusive (the "Class Period"), are encouraged to
contact the firm before August 6, 2019.

We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law
Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at
424-303-1964, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also
reach us through the firm's website at www.schallfirm.com, or by
email at brian@schallfirm.com.

The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. Ascena's acquisition of ANN, Inc.
developed into a disaster for the Company based on ANN's operations
to be in far worse condition than was generally believed to be the
case. The Company improperly delayed the recognition of an
impairment charge related to ANN's goodwill to mask the true extent
of this problem. Based on this delay, the Company's income and
assets were overstated and its financial results were not in
conformity with GAAP. Ascena overvalued many of the brands in the
ANN acquisition as they were in serious decline. Based on these
facts, the Company's public statements were false and materially
misleading throughout the class period. When the market learned the
truth about Ascena, investors suffered damages.

Join the case to recover your losses.

The Schall Law Firm represents investors around the world and
specializes in securities class action lawsuits and shareholder
rights litigation.

CONTACT:

        Brian Schall, Esq.
        The Schall Law Firm
        Office: 310-301-3335
        Cell: 424-303-1964
        Website: www.schallfirm.com
        E-mail: info@schallfirm.com
                brian@schallfirm.com [GN]


AUTOMATIC LOFTS: Fails to Give Summary on Deposits, Farhat Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
NATALIE FARHAT & MAGIDA FARHAT, Individually And As Representatives
of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons v. AUTOMATIC LOFTS, LLC &
JMG REALTY, INC., Case No. 2019CH08530 (Ill. Cir., Cook Cty., July
22, 2019), accuses the Defendants of violating the Chicago
Residential Landlord and Tenant Ordinance, Section 5-12-170 by
failing to provide the Plaintiffs with a separate summary
describing the respective rights, obligations, and remedies of
landlords and tenants with respect to security deposits.

The Plaintiffs were tenants of dwelling units located at 410 S.
Morgan Street, in Chicago, Illinois.  The subject building is a
large residential apartment building in Chicago containing over 200
residential rental dwelling units.

Automatic Lofts, was an owner, lessor, and landlord of 410 Morgan.
JMG Realty was a lessor, authorized agent for the owner, and
landlord of 410 Morgan.  JMG Realty was hired and paid by Automatic
Lofts to manage 410 Morgan.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Aaron A. Krolik, Esq.
          AARON KROLIK LAW OFFICE, P.A.
          225 W. Washington St., Suite 2200
          CHICAGO, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 924-0278
          Facsimile: (312) 650-8241
          E-mail: akrolik@securitydepositlaw.com

               - and -

          Mark Silverman, Esq.
          MARK SILVERMAN LAW OFFICE LTD.
          225 W. Washington St., Suite 2200
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 775-1015
          Facsimile: (312) 256-2055
          E-mail: mark@depositlaw.com


BANK OF AMERICA: Josh Thomas Sues over Background Checks
--------------------------------------------------------
JOSH THOMAS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION, Defendants,
Case No. 3:19-cv-05689-TLF (W.D. Wash., July 26, 2019) alleges
violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The case is assigned
to Judge Theresa L. Fricke.

Bank of America Corporation accepts deposits and offers banking,
investing, asset management, and other financial and
risk-management products and services. The Company has a mortgage
lending subsidiary, and an investment banking and securities
brokerage subsidiary. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Chris Rosfjord, Esq.
          ROSFJORD LAW, PLLC
          6725 22nd Ave NW
          Seattle, WA 98117
          Telephone: (206) 321-4849
          E-mail: rosfjordlaw@gmail.com


BONNIER CORP: $2.15MM Settlement in Friske Suit Has Prelim Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, REBECCA FRISKE, Plaintiff, v. BONNIER CORPORATION,
Defendant, Case No. 16-12799 (E.D. Mich.), Judge David M. Lawson of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan,
Southern Division, granted the Plaintiff's unopposed motions to
certify a settlement class and for preliminary approval of the
proposed settlement agreement and procedure for providing the class
notice.

The named Plaintiff, Friske, brought the action under Michigan's
Video Rental Privacy Act ("VRPA"), alleging that the Defendant, a
Delaware corporation that sells subscriptions to magazines
nationwide, sold and disclosed customer data to third parties in
violation of that state law.  She seeks damages and injunctive
relief to prevent further disclosure of her and other similarly
situated class members' personal information.

The Plaintiff filed a second motion to conditionally certify a
settlement class and a motion to preliminarily approve a class
settlement agreement, appoint a settlement administrator, authorize
notice of a class action settlement, and set a date for a final
fairness hearing.  These motions are unopposed.  The Court
previously conditionally certified a class for settlement purposes,
but after the first motion to approve a proposed settlement on
behalf of the class was denied, it decertified the class.  After a
third party attempted unsuccessfully to intervene, the parties
returned to mediation and negotiated a revised settlement.

On March 18, 2019, the Plaintiff filed the instant, unopposed
motions to conditionally certify the settlement class and appoint
class counsel and for preliminary approval of the class action
settlement.  They propose a settlement class defined as all
Michigan residents who subscribed to or received one or more
subscriptions to a magazine published by Bonnier between July 28,
2010 and the date of Preliminary Approval of the Agreement, and who
did not purchase such subscriptions through a Third-Party
Subscription Agent.
The parties now anticipate that the class would consist of
approximately 164,509 Michigan residents.

The terms of the proposed settlement include the following
features:

     a. A non-reversionary settlement fund of $2,150,000 furnished
by the Defendant.

     b. The class members who submit a claim form will receive a
pro rata cash payment that the Plaintiff's counsel estimates to be
between $43 and $86 (based on claim-submission optin rates of 20%
and 10%, respectively).

     c. If a class member does not submit a claim form, he or she
will receive a voucher or purchase code for a free, one-year
subscription to one of Bonnier's magazines.

     d. Bonnier will retain disclosure language contained in all
its publications and undertake commercially reasonable measures to
honor the request of any individual who submits a request to opt
out of the subscriber list occasionally made available to third
parties.

     e. Bonnier will undertake commercially reasonable measures to
include disclosure language in informational materials used to
establish a new magazine subscription so that disclosure is
available to consumers before subscribing.

     f. The costs of administration will not exceed $100,000, but
they will be paid from settlement fund.

     g. The named Plaintiff's incentive award will be no more than
$2,500, paid from settlement fund.

     h. The class counsel will seek attorney's fees of no more than
$625,000 or 29% of the settlement fund.

Judge Lawson heard the parties' arguments on June 11, 2019.  No one
appeared in opposition.  The Plaintiff has presented an adequate
basis to recertify a settlement class, and she has shown that the
new settlement proposal merits approval.  Therefore, he will
recertify the settlement class, grant preliminary approval of the
proposed settlement, authorize the notice (with some minor
modifications), and set a date for a final hearing.

Accordingly, The Judge granted the Plaintiff's unopposed motions to
certify a settlement class and for preliminary approval of the
proposed settlement agreement and procedure for providing class
notice.  The proposed settlement agreement is preliminarily
approved, subject to objections by absent class members and except
for the determination of the attorney's fees and costs.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), the following
settlement class is conditionally certified in the case: All
Michigan residents who subscribed to or received one or more
subscriptions to a magazine published by Bonnier between July 28,
2010 and the date of Preliminary Approval of the Agreement, and who
did not purchase such subscriptions through a Third-Party
Subscription Agent.

The counsel of record for the named Plaintiff, namely attorneys
Gary Lynch, Jamisen Etzel, and Daniel Myers, are appointed as the
counsel for the designated settlement class.  Plaintiff Rebecca
Friske is appointed as the class representative.

Angeion Group is approved as the claims administrator for the
settlement.  The Judge further approved the deposit within 30 days
of the settlement funds into an escrow account to be held pending
final disposition of all settlement claims, or until further order
of the Court, and the Court orders the Defendant's compliance with
the term.

On July 10, 2019, the Defendant shall provide notice of the
proposed class settlement to the appropriate state and federal
authorities.  The Defendant must file proof that it has provided
the required notice with the Court, in compliance with the Class
Action Fairness Act.

The Plaintiff's counsel or their designated representative shall
cause notice of the proposed settlement to be given to the class
members in the following manner:

     (a) On July 10, 2019, a copy of the Notice of Class Action
Settlement Agreement must be mailed to each class member.  The
class administrator shall ensure that the creation of a claims
website is accomplished by that same date.

     (b) The notice to the class members must explain that
objections to, and requests to be excluded from, the class
settlement must be filed with the Court and the parties' counsel on
Aug. 26, 2019.

     (c) In lieu of the notice described, an abbreviated notice,
may be mailed to each class member for whom the Plaintiff's counsel
or his designated representative can confirm has an active email
account with access to the Internet.

The Plaintiff's counsel shall file proof of mailing of the class
notice in conformity with the Order on July 17, 2019.

The expenses of printing and mailing and publishing all notices
required shall be paid as described in the settlement agreement.

The notice of class settlement must inform the absent class members
that Proofs of Claim and supporting documentation must be submitted
on Aug. 23, 2019.  The Proofs of Claim sent by mail shall be deemed
submitted when postmarked if mailed by first class, registered or
certified mail, postage prepaid, addressed in accordance with the
instructions in the Proof of Claim.  All other Proofs of Claim
shall be deemed submitted at the time of actual receipt.

The Judge ordered that on Sept. 3, 2019, the Plaintiff's counsel
must file a motion for final approval of the settlement identifying
absent class members who opt out or object.  The Defendant's
response, if the motion is opposed, must be filed by Sept. 10,
2019, and the Plaintiff's reply, if any, must be filed by Sept. 17,
2019.  The Fairness Hearing shall be held at 1:00 p.m. on Sept. 23,
2019.

No class member shall be entitled to be heard or entitled to
contest the approval of the terms and conditions of the proposed
settlement or the judgment to be entered pursuant thereto approving
the same, or the Plaintiff's counsel's fee, expense and incentive
award application, unless, by Aug. 23, 2019, such person: (a) has
filed with the Clerk of Court a notice of such person's intention
to appear, together with a statement that indicates the basis for
such opposition along with any supporting documentation, and (b)
has served copies of such notice, statement, and documentation,
together with copies of any other pleadings that such person has
filed with the Clerk of the Court and each parties' counsel at the
following addresses:

Clerk of the Court United States District Court 231 Lafayette
Boulevard Detroit, MI 48226 Re: Rebecca Friske v. Bonnier
Corporation Case Number 16-12799 Counsel for the Plaintiff Gary
Lynch and Jamisen A. Etzel Carlson Lynch Sweet & Kilpela, LLP 36 N.
Jefferson St. P.O. Box 7635 New Castle, PA 16107 724-656-1555 Fax:
724-656-1556 Daniel Myers The Law Offices of Daniel O. Myers 4020
Copper View Ste. 225 Suite 225 Traverse City, MI 49684 231-943-1135
Counsel for the Defendant Daniel T. Stabile and Francis A. Zacherl
Shutts & Bowen LLP 200 South Biscayne Blvd Suite 4100 Miami, FL
33131 305-415-9063 Fax: 305-347-7714 John J. Gillooly Garan Lucow
1155 Brewery Park Blvd., Suite 200 Detroit, MI 48207-2641
313-446-5501

The applications for incentive awards, attorney's fees, or
reimbursable expenses under Rule 23(h) must be filed by Sept. 3,
2019.  The counsel must provide notice to class members in
accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h)(1).

The class counsel shall be responsible for maintaining a file of
all responses to the notice of settlement and any and all other
written communications received from the class members.  The class
counsel immediately shall provide copies of such responses and
communications to the Defendant's counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 25, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/5Pjx99 from Leagle.com.

Rebecca Friske, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel O. Myers, The Law
Offices of Daniel O. Myers & Gary Lynch -- glynch@carlsonlynch.com
-- Carlson Lynch Sweet & Kilpela, LLP.

Bonnier Corporation, Defendant, represented by Daniel T. Stabile
--
DStabile@shutts.com -- Shutts & Bowen LLP, Francis A. Zacherl --
FZacherl@shutts.com -- Shutts Bowen LLP & John J. Gillooly --
jgillooly@garanlucow.com -- Garan Lucow.


BRIDGECREST ACCEPTANCE: Canady Sues Over Auto-dialled Calls
-----------------------------------------------------------
Tonya Canady, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. Bridgecrest Acceptance Corporation, Defendant, Case
No. 19-cv-04738 (D. Ariz., July 19, 2019), seeks statutory damages
and injunctive relief for violations of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

Bridgecrest is a provider and servicer of Auto Loans where
Plaintiff's husband availed of financing to purchase a car.
Bridgecrest began calling Plaintiff's cellular telephone number in
an attempt to reach her husband using an automatic telephone
dialing system and would have long delays before an agent came on
the line and often used an artificial or prerecorded voice. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Trinette G. Kent, Esq.
      LEMBERG LAW, LLC
      3219 E. Camelback Rd., #588
      Phoenix, AZ 85018
      Tel: (855) 301-2100
      Email: tkent@lemberglaw.com

             - and -

      Keith J. Keogh, Esq.
      KEOGH LAW, LTD
      55 West Monroe Street, Suite 3390
      Chicago, IL 60603
      Tel: (312) 726-1092
      Fax: (312) 726-1093
      Email: Keith@KeoghLaw.com

             - and -

      Max Story, Esq.
      328 2nd Avenue North
      Jacksonville Beach, FL 32250
      Telephone: (904) 372-4109
      Facsimile: (904) 758-5333


CHAMPION PETFOODS: Court Narrows Claims in Simpson Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TRACY SIMPSON ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. CHAMPION PETFOODS
USA, INC. ET AL., Defendants, Civil Action No. 2:18-CV-74 (WOB-CJS)
(E.D. Ky.), Judge William O. Bertelsman of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky, Northern Division, Covington,
granted in part and denied in part the Defendants' motion to
dismiss.

Defendant Champion Petfoods LP owns and controls Defendant Champion
Petfoods USA, Inc.  Champion manufactures, markets, and sells
premium-priced dog food throughout the United States, including in
Kentucky and Virginia, where, respectively, Plaintiff Simpson and
Danika Lolles purchased Champion's dog food from various
third-party pet food stores.  Champion's dry dog food products are
sold under two brand names: "Orijen" and "Acana," both of which
contain substantially similar representations on the package label.


The proposed class action involves alleged misrepresentations on
the package labeling for dog food.  The Plaintiffs allege in
particular that Defendant Champion Petfoods misrepresented the
quality of its premium dry dog food by labeling it as containing
"fresh, raw, or dehydrated ingredients" that are "regional" and
"deemed fit for human consumption prior to inclusion."

According to the Plaintiffs, their injury stems from the fact that
they believed Champion's products were "healthy, quality products
for their pets, and they paid a premium price they would not have
paid had they been aware of the alleged facts pertaining to
Champion's products.  They seek compensation for their loss and
classwide treatment for the thousands of estimated class members in
Kentucky and Virginia.

The Plaintiffs assert the following seven counts: (i) Count I -
Violation of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act; (ii) Count II -
Violation of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act of 1977; (iii)
Count III - Breach of express warranty under Kentucky law; (iv)
Count IV - Breach of express warranty under Virginia law; (v) Count
V - Breach of implied warranty; (vi) Count VI - Fraudulent
omission; and (vii) Count VII - Unjust enrichment.

On Jan. 8, 2019, the Court heard oral argument on the Defendants'
first motion to dismiss.  At the end of the hearing, the
Plaintiffs' counsel made an oral request to amend the complaint.
That request was granted.  

The matter is now before the Court on the Defendants' motion to
dismiss the amended complaint.  The Court dispenses with oral
argument at this stage because the materials before it adequately
present the facts and legal contentions, and argument would not aid
the decisional process.  Accordingly, the matter is ripe for
disposition.

Judge Bertelsman finds that the claims Simpson has asserted against
Champion fail under Kentucky law.  The only remaining claims in the
case are those arising under Virginia law that pertain to Lolles
and the proposed class of Virginia Plaintiffs she intends to
represent (Counts II, IV, and V).  As a result, "the interests of
justice" and the "convenience of the parties and witnesses" suggest
that it would be appropriate to transfer the action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Section 1404(a) to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, Norfolk Division.

Accordingly, the parties are notified that the Court is considering
a sua sponte transfer of the case based on the various factors to
be weighed.

Consistent with the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, Judge
Bertelsman granted in part and denied in part the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the amended complaint.  All of Plaintiff
Simpson's claims (Counts I, III, V, VI, and VII), are dismissed
with prejudice.  Plaintiff Lolles' claims under Counts VI and VII
are also dismissed with prejudice. The parties will file
simultaneous briefs by July 8, 2019, addressing the appropriateness
of transferring the action under 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a).

A full-text copy of the Court's June 21, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/NmYbR3 from Leagle.com.

Tracy Simpson & Danika Lolles, Plaintiffs, represented by Adam S.
Brown -- abrown@blfohio.com -- Brown Law Firm LLC, Ben Barnow --
b.barnow@barnowlaw.com -- Barnow and Associates, P.C., pro hac
vice, Joseph J. Braun -- jjbraun@strausstroy.com -- Strauss & Troy
Co., LPA, pro hac vice, Phyllis E. Brown -- pbrown@blfohio.com --
Brown Law Firm LLC, Richard S. Wayne -- rswayne@strausstroy.com --
Strauss & Troy, LPA, pro hac vice & Robert R. Sparks --
rrsparks@strausstroy.com -- Strauss & Troy Co., LPA.

Champion Pet Foods USA Inc. & Champion Petfoods LP, Defendants,
represented by David A. Coulson -- coulsond@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg
Traurig, P.A., pro hac vice & John W. Hays --
jwhays@jacksonkelly.com -- Jackson Kelly PLLC.


CIMAREX ENERGY: Court Narrows Claims in Reirdon Suit
----------------------------------------------------
In the case, DORSEY J. REIRDON, Plaintiff, v. CIMAREX ENERGY
COMPANY, AND CIMAREX ENERGY CO. OF COLORADO, Defendants, Case No.
CIV-16-445-SPS (E.D. Okla.), Magistrate Judge Steven P. Shreder of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma
granted in part and denied in part Defendants Cimarex Energy Co.
and Cimarex Energy Co. of Colorado's Partial Motion for Summary
Judgment on Plaintiff's Non-Contract Claims and Brief in Support.

The Plaintiff filed the case in the Court on Oct.14, 2016.  On Jan.
19, 2017, the Court held a status and scheduling conference, at
which time the Court granted the parties leave to file a series of
partial summary judgment motions without prejudice to ultimately
filing a summary judgment motion on the main merits of the case.
The Plaintiff filed an Amended Class Action Complaint on Oct. 11,
2017, following the Court's ruling on a partial Motion to Dismiss.
The Defendants then filed a series of partial summary judgment
motions.  The Court then stayed the case on June 26, 2018, pending
formal mediation by the parties, and the case was thereafter
reopened following the conclusion of mediation on Sept. 25, 2018.

The Plaintiff contends in the Amended Class Action Complaint that
Cimarex used, caused to be used, and/or allowed third parties to
use natural gas from Oklahoma wells, but that despite express
provisions in the oil and gas leases, Cimarex knowingly and
systematically underpaid royalty to him through a policy of not
paying royalties for fuel gas, and that Cimarex failed to disclose
on monthly royalty check stubs that it was not paying royalty on
the full volume and value of production from the Oklahoma wells.

In addition to the personal allegations, the Plaintiff asserts that
he is acting as a representative of a class defined as all
non-excluded persons or entities who are or were royalty owners in
Oklahoma wells where Cimarex, including its predecessors or
affiliates, is or was the well operator and working interest owner
(or, as a non-operating working interest owner, Cimarex separately
marketed gas), and who, from Jan. 1, 2013 are or were entitled to
share in royalty proceeds payable under oil and gas leases that
contain an express provision stating that royalty will be paid on
gas used off the lease premises and/or in manufacture of products.

The class allegations indicate that the common questions of fact
include: (a) whether, under express terms of the oil and gas leases
under which Reirdon and the putative Class are entitled to be paid
royalty, Cimarex has or had a duty to pay royalty on Fuel Gas; (b)
whether Cimarex has paid the full amount of royalty owed on Fuel
Gas; and (c) whether Cimarex's uniform royalty payment methodology
breaches Cimarex's express duties to pay royalty on Fuel Gas.

The Plaintiff's First Amended Class Action Complaint sets out the
following enumerated causes of action: (I) breach of contract, (II)
unjust enrichment, and (III) fraud (actual and constructive) and
deceit, as well as enumerated claims for (IV) an accounting and (V)
an injunction.  

Having filed separate summary judgment motions as to the
Plaintiff's breach of contract claim, the Defendants now move for
summary judgment on the Plaintiff's non-contract claims, Counts
II-V (unjust enrichment, constructive fraud, actual fraud,
accounting, and injunction).  Cimarex asserts that it is entitled
to summary judgment as to the Plaintiff's claims for unjust
enrichment, constructive fraud, accounting, and injunction, because
the Plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, i. e., his breach of
contract claim.  Additionally, Cimarex contends that the
Plaintiff's claim of actual fraud fails because the alleged breach
of duty is not recognized under Oklahoma law.

Magistrate Judge Shreder granted in part and denied in part the
Defendants' Partial Motion for Summary Judgment.  He granted in
part as to the Plaintiff's equitable, quasi-contract claims of
unjust enrichment, constructive fraud, accounting, and injunction.
He denied as to the Plaintiff's claim of actual fraud and deceit.

The Judge finds that the Plaintiff's claim for breach of contract
in the case is an adequate remedy at law.  As such, he declines to
exercise its equitable jurisdiction as to the Plaintiff's claim for
unjust enrichment.  This likewise applies to the Plaintiff's claims
for an accounting and an injunction, as success on both claims is
contingent upon there being no adequate remedy at law.  Because the
Plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, he may not pursue a claim
for an accounting or injunction.

He further finds that genuine issues of material fact remain and
that reasonable jurors could find that Cimarex "misrepresented
and/or concealed information" required to be disclosed.  

A full-text copy of the Court's June 25, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/8FIGPs from Leagle.com.

Dorsey J. Reirdon, Plaintiff, represented by Bradley E. Beckworth
-- bbeckworth@nixlaw.com -- Nix Patterson, LLP, Cody L. Hill, Nix
Patterson, LLP, Jeffrey J. Angelovich, Nix Patterson, LLP, Lisa P.
Baldwin, Nix Patterson, LLP, pro hac vice, Susan R. Whatley, Nix
Patterson, LLP, pro hac vice, Trey Duck -- tduck@nixlaw.com -- Nix
Patterson, LLP, pro hac vice, Lawrence R. Murphy, Jr., Lawrence R.
Murphy, Jr., PC, Michael Burrage, Whitten Burrage, Patranell Lewis,
Barnes & Lewis, LLP & Robert N. Barnes, Barnes & Lewis, LLP.

Cimarex Energy Company & Cimarex Energy Co. of Colorado,
Defendants, represented by Bradley W. Welsh -- bwelsh@gablelaw.com
-- GableGotwals & Nathan K. Davis -- ndavis@swlaw.com -- Snell &
Wilmer, pro hac vice.


CONAGRA FOODS: Court Denies Nationwide Class Certification in Allen
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned
ERIN ALLEN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CONAGRA FOODS, INC., Defendant.
Case No. 3:13-cv-01279-WHO. (N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs in this case bring various claims against defendant
Conagra Brands, Inc., on the grounds that the Parkay Spray label
misrepresents its true fat and calorie contents. Plaintiffs Erin
Allen, Ofelia Frechette, Shelley Harder, Deana Marr, Tammie
Shawley, Brian Smith, and Betty Vazquez bring this proposed class
action against Conagra   alleging unjust enrichment, violations of
various states' consumer protection laws, and violations of
California law.

They argue that Conagra incorrectly and misleadingly labels Parkay
Spray as Fat Free Zero Calories and 0g Fat 0 Calories per serving
and charges a premium price based on those misrepresentations. The
Plaintiffs seek to certify a nationwide class along with various
subclasses of consumers who purchased Parkay Spray in states across
the country.

RULE 23(A)

Numerosity

The Plaintiffs assert that their class is so numerous that joinder
is impracticable because Conagra sold millions of units of Parkay
Spray during the class period . ConAgra counters that plaintiffs
have failed to present any evidence of the number of potential
class members who in fact have Article III standing based on their
use of a serving size of greater than five sprays. Because
Conagra's argument is based on a mischaracterization of the injury
plaintiffs assert, it fails for the same reasons articulated above.


Commonality

Rule 23 requires that there be questions of law or fact common to
the class. Plaintiffs must show that the class members have
suffered the same injury, meaning their claims depend upon a common
contention that is of such a nature that determination of its truth
or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of
each claim in one stroke. Plaintiffs must demonstrate not merely
the existence of a common question, but rather the capacity of
classwide proceedings to generate common answers apt to drive the
resolution of the litigation.

Plaintiffs assert the following common questions: (1) whether the
Fat Free Zero Calories and 0g Fat 0 Calories  per serving
representations violate federal and state labeling laws (2) whether
Conagra received a benefit that it would be inequitable for it to
retain without compensating plaintiffs and (3) whether the
representations were likely to deceive consumers. Conagra does not
oppose plaintiffs' contention that there are at least these
questions in common.

Typicality

The test of typicality is whether other members have the same or
similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not
unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members
have been injured by the same course of conduct. Class
certification is not appropriate if unique defenses threaten to
preoccupy the class representatives and thus cause absent members
to suffer. But, the defense of non-reliance is not a basis for
denial of class certification.

The Plaintiffs assert that their claims are typical of other class
members because they purchased Parkay Spray with both labels,
believed it did not contain any fat or calories, paid a price
premium based on that belief, and now seek restitution of that
price premium.  Conagra counters that the named plaintiffs have in
fact had a variety of unique experiences with Parkay Spray.

None of Conagra's challenges to typicality overcome plaintiffs'
showing. First it asserts that the plaintiffs are subject to
non-reliance defences. The Ninth Circuit has foreclosed Conagra's
non-reliance argument as a basis for denying class certification.

Adequacy

Finally, to establish adequacy under Rule 23(a)(4), named
plaintiffs must show that they will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class. To determine whether named plaintiffs
will adequately represent a class, courts must resolve two
questions: (1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any
conflicts of interest with other class members and (2) will the
named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously
on behalf of the class?

Conagra argues that the individual state subclasses are not
certifiable because the named representatives for each state cannot
adequately represent a class in that state. First, named plaintiffs
lack standing to pursue injunctive relief because they have no
desire to purchase Parkay Spray in the future. But plaintiffs raise
deposition testimony that indicates they continue to seek reduced
fat and calorie products while grocery shopping and would buy
Parkay Spray if they could trust its labeling.  

Conagra next argues that plaintiffs Allen, Shawley, Marr, and
Frechette would be inadequate class representatives because they
failed to read or rely on the per serving" language on the Parkay
Spray label. This argument fails for the reasons laid out in the
discussion of typicality. Conagra does not challenge Gutride
Safier's competence to represent the class, and the Court finds
that they are competent.

Having found that named plaintiffs have met their burden on Rule
23(a)'s requirements, I must also evaluate whether they meet the
requirements for certification under Rule 23(b)(3) for damages and
Rule 23(b)(2) for injunctive relief.

Nationwide Unjust Enrichment Class

Conagra asserts that plaintiffs fail the predominance requirement
on their unjust enrichment claim because they have not met their
burden to show that it would be constitutional to apply California
law to a nationwide class. Because each state's law would have to
apply, individualized issues predominate over common ones.

The Plaintiffs cannot meet their initial burden under California's
choice of law rules. California does not have constitutionally
sufficient contact or aggregation of contacts to the claims of each
class member. Plaintiffs do not contend that ConAgra is
headquartered in California, that Conagra is incorporated under
California's laws, or that the challenged statements originated in
California.  Plaintiffs' reply brief does not address Conagra's
arguments on this issue. Because plaintiffs do not make the
threshold showing, the burden does not shift to Conagra and there
is no need to assess whether other states' interests outweigh
California's.

Given that it would be unconstitutional to apply California unjust
enrichment law to the claims of a nationwide class, the laws from
all 50 states would have to apply. Accordingly, plaintiffs cannot
meet their burden to show that common questions of fact or law
predominate over individualized questions as required by Rule
23(b)(3). The Court will deny plaintiffs' motion for certification
of a nationwide unjust enrichment class. Plaintiffs have not sought
certification of any other classes to pursue unjust enrichment
claims.

Multistate Consumer Protection Subclasses

Conagra argues plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden for
certification of the proposed consumer protection subclasses
because: (1) common questions into materiality and reliance do not
predominate (2) plaintiffs have not shown that damages are capable
of calculation on a classwide basis (3) there are material
differences between the laws of the states in the various
subclasses and (4) it is neither manageable nor superior to proceed
on a classwide basis.

Materiality and Reliance

Conagra argues that individualized questions into materiality and
reliance will predominate over common questions.  Specifically,
plaintiffs cannot show that the alleged misrepresentations would be
material to a reasonable consumer, and therefore they will not be
entitled to a classwide presumption of reliance under the state
laws that permit such a presumption.

Under California law, questions of materiality and reliance are
determined based upon the reasonable consumer standard, not the
subjective understandings of individual plaintiffs. A class of
plaintiffs can make the required materiality showing without
individualized proof by establishing with, for example, market
research) that the statements would be material to a reasonable
member of the purchaser class.  

For the state laws that follow a reasonable person standard for
assessing materiality, plaintiffs present sufficient evidence to
show that they could be entitled to a presumption of reliance. They
put forth their own survey evidence, which shows that consumers
were willing to pay a 34-40% premium based on their understanding
that the food topping was fat free and had 0g Fat' and Zero
Calories. Plaintiffs also raise testimony from Conagra witness
Patrick Fitzgerald, who acknowledged that health-conscious
consumers are looking for products with reduced calories, less
cholesterol, zero cholesterol and less fat.

Conagra also argues that plaintiffs are not entitled to a classwide
presumption of reliance because the challenged statements were not
uniform; instead, in 2009 Conagra approved a new label that added
the language per serving. As Judge Chhabria previously concluded, a
jury could find that the first label was misleading while the
second label was not. Class Cert. Order 2. But this does not defeat
plaintiffs' showing on materiality and reliance; rather, it
requires that each class be divided into two time periods -- one
before and another after the label change -- as plaintiffs suggest
in their reply.

Conagra next argues that individualized inquiries will be necessary
because each person will likely have a different interpretation of
the challenged statements. In addition, those who viewed the label
as a whole would have realized that the statements were limited to
the serving size articulated on the bottle, while understanding
that, given the ingredients, the bottle as a whole contained some
fat and calories. Where individuals are likely to have different
understandings for a word with no fixed meaning, this lack of
cohesion can prevent plaintiffs from satisfying the predominance
requirement. Conagra's arguments are not persuasive. By contrast
with the word natural, zero means zero just as per serving means
per serving; the interpretation of the challenged statements is
susceptible to common proof. At this stage, the plaintiffs have
presented sufficient to allow a fact finder to conclude that a
reasonable consumer would have considered the challenged statements
material.

Finally, Conagra argues that named plaintiffs' own testimony would
make a classwide presumption of reliance impossible because they
did not in fact rely on the challenged statements. It alleges some
did not read the per serving language, and plaintiff Shawley
purchased Parkay Spray after another person recommended it, not
because of the label.  Conagra can raise these and other arguments
later in the litigation, but plaintiffs have made a sufficient
showing at the class certification stage. Plaintiffs have put forth
evidence to allow a fact finder to conclude they are entitled to a
classwide presumption of reliance in the states that permit one.]

Key to the Court’s conclusions in this Order is the absence of
any arguments by plaintiffs that common issues would predominate
even if a state's law requires proof of individual reliance.
Instead, they argue that the states in their proposed subclasses
either do not require reliance or use an objective test for
establishing it on a classwide basis.  Accordingly, for plaintiffs'
subclasses, where they do not successfully show either that (1)
reliance is not required under a state's law or (2) the state's law
allows them to prove reliance on a classwide basis, plaintiffs have
not met their Rule 23 burden.

Differences in States' Laws

Conagra argues that there are material differences between the
state laws invoked by the plaintiffs in their various subclasses,
and these differences predominate. In response to some of Conagra's
critiques, plaintiffs in their reply agreed to eliminate the first
subclass and remove certain states that Conagra challenged.

Subclass #2

Plaintiffs seek to certify a class of individuals who purchased
Parkay Spray in the following states: Alabama, Alaska, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, and Ohio, subject to the applicable
statutes of limitations. Subclass #2 will pursue claims arising
under the following consumer protection statutes:  

Alabama

Plaintiffs seek to pursue claims under Alabama's Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, Ala. Code § 8-19-5(27). But that law provides, A
consumer or other person bringing an action under this chapter may
not bring an action on behalf of a class. Instead, only the
Attorney General or district attorney may bring class actions.
Courts have found differences such as this one material.
Plaintiffs do not address Conagra's arguments that it would be
inappropriate to certify a class to proceed under Alabama law in
this Court when Alabama courts would not allow the same. This
subclass cannot include individuals who purchased Parkay Spray in
Alabama.

Mississippi

Plaintiffs seek to pursue claims under Mississippi's Consumer
Protection Act.  But that law provides: Nothing in this chapter
shall be construed to permit any class action or suit, but every
private action must be maintained in the name of and for the sole
use and benefit of the individual person. Again, plaintiffs do not
address Conagra's arguments that it would be inappropriate to
certify a class to proceed under Mississippi law in this Court when
Mississippi courts would not allow the same. This subclass cannot
include individuals who purchased Parkay Spray in Mississippi.

Ohio

Plaintiffs seek to pursue claims under Ohio's Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (ODTPA). Although there is disagreement in Ohio over
whether consumers have standing to sue under this law, most courts
have determined they do not.  One court recently laid out for
reasons why it would side with the majority and find no consumer
standing. First, courts have found that the ODTPA should be
interpreted consistently with the Lanham Act, under which
individual consumers lack standing to sue. Second, the court cited
the Sixth Circuit's decision in Holbrook. Third, the court
concluded that the Ohio Supreme Court would likely agree with the
Ohio court of appeal decision Dawson v. Blockbuster, Inc.,
2006-Ohio-1240. Fourth, the court determined that if consumers
could sue under the ODTPA, the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act
would be superfluous.

The plaintiffs have not met their burden to show Ohio can be part
of this subclass because they have not shown that the Ohio Supreme
Court would likely disagree with the Ohio courts of appeal.
Plaintiffs cannot proceed under Ohio law.

Michigan

Plaintiffs seek to pursue claims under the Michigan Consumer
Protection Act (MCPA).. Plaintiffs contend that none of the states
in this subclass require reliance, yet they cite to a case in which
the court determined that a class could proceed by showing that a
reasonable person would have relied on the representations. In
response to the other cases Conagra cites, plaintiffs contend only
that they were wrongly decided. Plaintiffs have not met their
burden to show Michigan can be part of this subclass because they
have not shown that the statute does not require reliance.

In the alternative, plaintiffs request certification of a Michigan
subclass. The Court will grant this request. Plaintiffs can show
reliance and intent to deceive on a representative basis.  

Minnesota

Plaintiffs seek to pursue claims under Minnesota's Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (DTPA). Under the DTPA, a person may not, among other
things, (1) represent goods as having characteristics they do not
have or (2) represent that goods are of a standard that they are
not. It is well-settled that monetary damages are not available
under the DTPA the sole statutory remedy for deceptive trade
practices is injunctive relief. While the subclass can include
plaintiffs who purchased Parkay Spray in Minnesota, they may only
pursue injunctive relief.

Alaska

Plaintiffs seek to pursue claims under Alaska's Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA). To establish a prima
facie case of unfair or deceptive acts or practices under the UTPA,
a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the defendant engaged
in trade or commerce and (2) that in the conduct of trade or
commerce, an unfair act or practice has occurred. The plaintiffs
need only show that the acts and practices were capable of being
interpreted in a misleading way. The subclass can include
plaintiffs who purchased Parkay Spray in Alaska.

For these reasons, plaintiffs have met their burden to show that it
is appropriate to certify a subclass to pursue claims under Alaska
and Minnesota law, the latter for injunctive relief only. But with
the states eliminated above, plaintiffs lack a class representative
who purchased Parkay Spray in either of the states that remain.
Without an adequate representative, this subclass cannot proceed.

Subclass #3

Plaintiffs seek to certify a class of individuals who purchased
Parkay Spray in the following states: District of Columbia,
Florida, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Washington, subject to the applicable statutes of
limitations. Plaintiffs support this grouping as follows: All
states in this class broadly prohibit deceptive conduct. For each
state in the class, the misrepresentation must be likely to deceive
reasonable consumers. No state requires reliance, knowledge or
intent; all require proximate causation.

Conagra's challenges to this subclass go to predominance; it argues
that some of the states require proof of actual reliance by an
individual consumer. As noted above, plaintiffs do not meaningfully
counter Conagra's argument that where actual reliance is required,
that individualized inquiry would predominate over issues common to
the class.
  
District of Columbia

Plaintiffs seek to pursue claims under the District of Columbia
Consumer Protection Practices Act (DCCPPA). In a case Conagra
cites, the court found it unnecessary to resolve the reliance
question but did determine that the plaintiff would have to show
that defendants' allegedly deceptive trade practices caused her
injuries, whether by virtue of her reliance on those practices or
by virtue of some other reason. The court noted that causation
could be established independently of reliance although the
concepts of reliance and causation will often be intertwined.
Because plaintiffs could meet their burden by showing causation
without a showing of individual reliance, the subclass can include
plaintiffs who purchased Parkay Spray in the District of Columbia.

Florida

Plaintiffs seek to pursue claims under the Florida Deceptive and
Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA). A claim under the FDUTPA has
three elements: (1) a deceptive or unfair practice; (2) causation;
and (3) actual damages. The Act does not require individual proof
of reliance.The subclass can include plaintiffs who purchased
Parkay Spray in Florida.

Missouri

Plaintiffs seek to pursue claims under Missouri Merchandising
Practices Act (MMPA). Plaintiffs must prove four elements: (1) the
use or employment of a deception, a fraud, a false pretense, a
false promise, a misrepresentation, an unfair practice, or a
concealment, suppression or omission of a material fact (2) in
connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise in
trade or commerce (3) that results in ascertainable loss of money
or real or personal property (4) to a person who purchases
merchandise primarily for personal, family or household purposes.
The subclass can include plaintiffs who purchased Parkay Spray in
Missouri.

Montana

Plaintiffs seek to pursue claims under the Montana Consumer
Protection Act, Mont. Code Section 30-14-103. According to the Act,
unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are unlawful.
Plaintiffs do not address Conagra's arguments that it would be
inappropriate to certify a class to proceed under Montana law in
this Court when Montana courts would not allow the same. Plaintiffs
have not met their burden with regard to Montana.

New Jersey

Plaintiffs seek to pursue claims under the New Jersey Consumer
Fraud Act (CFA). To state a CFA claim, a plaintiff must allege
three elements: (1) unlawful conduct (2) an ascertainable loss  and
(3) a causal relationship between the defendants' unlawful conduct
and the plaintiff's ascertainable loss. But plaintiffs' theory of
classwide ascertainable loss is that the challenged statements
permitted Conagra to charge a premium price for Parkay Spray, and
the Supreme Court of New Jersey has rejected this theory in the
context of CFA claims.  Accordingly, plaintiffs' theory does not
entitle them to a presumption of causation under New Jersey law.
Plaintiffs do not meet their burden to show that common issues
would predominate over individualized inquiries into causation.

New York

Plaintiffs seek to pursue claims under New York's Deceptive
Practices Act. A plaintiff under section 349 must prove three
elements: first, that the challenged act or practice was
consumer-oriented; second, that it was misleading in a material
way; and third, that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of
the deceptive act.  Section 349 does not require individual proof
of reliance.  In Morrissey, Morrissey v. Nextel Partners, Inc., 895
N.Y.S.2d 580, 588 (2010), the court found that extensive
individualized inquiries would be required to determine whether the
plaintiffs' unique conversations with sales representatives cured
the alleged deception in the standard contract documents. By
contrast here, all the representations both the allegedly deceptive
ones and the allegedly curative ones were identical. The subclass
can include plaintiffs who purchased Parkay Spray in New York.

Rhode Island

Plaintiffs seek to pursue under the Rhode Island Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (RIDTPA). Plaintiffs must establish that he or she is
a consumer, and that defendant is committing or has committed an
unfair or deceptive act while engaged in a business of trade or
commerce. A practice is unfair if one of the following factors is
strongly met or two to three are less strongly met: (1) if it
violates law or public policy (2) if it is immoral, unethical,
oppressive, or unscrupulous and (3) if it causes substantial injury
to consumers.  Plaintiffs present evidence under all three factors,
including that the alleged misrepresentations caused injuries to
the class members. Plaintiffs can proceed under Rhode Island law.

Vermont

Plaintiffs seek to pursue claims under Vermont's Consumer
Protection Act (VCPA).  Under the Act, a consumer who contracts for
goods or services in reliance on false or fraudulent
misrepresentations may recover `his or her damages, or the
consideration or the value of the consideration given by the
consumer. Plaintiffs indicate in their reply chart that they wish
to proceed under the ascertainable loss theory rather than the
reliance theory. The premium price theory of damages prevents the
need for individual proof of damages. The subclass can include
plaintiffs who purchased Parkay Spray in Vermont.

Washington

Plaintiffs seek to pursue under Washington's Consumer Protection
Act (WCPA). To prevail on a private CPA claim, a private plaintiff
must show (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice (2) that
occurs in trade or commerce (3) a public interest (4) injury to the
plaintiff in his or her business or property and (5) a causal link
between the unfair or deceptive act and the injury suffered.

Accordingly, it is clear that reliance is not necessarily required
to show causation, and a district court in Washington has accepted
a price inflation theory for purposes of proving this element on a
classwide basis. The subclass can include plaintiffs who purchased
Parkay Spray in Washington.

For these reasons, plaintiffs have met their burden to show that it
is appropriate to certify a subclass to pursue claims under laws in
the District of Columbia, Florida, Missouri, Montana, New York,
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. But with the states
eliminated above, plaintiffs lack a class representative who
purchased Parkay Spray in any of the states that remain. Without an
adequate representative, this subclass cannot proceed.

Subclass #4

Plaintiffs seek to certify a class of individuals who purchased
Parkay Spray in the following states: California, Georgia,
Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia,
and Hawaii, subject to the applicable statutes of limitations.
Subclass #4 will pursue claims arising under the following consumer
protection statutes.

California

Plaintiffs seek to pursue claims under California's Unfair
Competition Law (UCL). As described above, under California law,
questions of materiality and reliance are determined based upon the
reasonable consumer standard, not the subjective understandings of
individual plaintiffs. The subclass can include plaintiffs who
purchased Parkay Spray in California.

Georgia

Plaintiffs seek to pursue claims under Georgia's Fair Business
Practices Act (FBA). The Act bars class actions.  Plaintiffs do not
address Conagra's arguments that it would be inappropriate to
certify a class to proceed under Georgia law in this Court when
Georgia courts would not allow the same.

Maryland

Plaintiffs seek to proceed under the Maryland Consumer Protection
Act (MCPA). In Maryland, whether a statement is misleading is
judged from the point of view of a reasonable, but unsophisticated
consumer. Assessing the availability of classwide proof under the
MCPA, a court in the central district of California certified a
class after concluding that the MPCA imposes an objective test
whereby a plaintiff's reliance on a defendant's omission can be
presumed by the materiality of the omitted fact.  Given this
authority, which is more recent than the cases cited by Conagra,
plaintiffs have met their burden to certify a class in Maryland.

Massachusetts

Plaintiffs seek to proceed under the Massachusetts Consumer
Protection Act (CPA). The Act declares unlawful unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce. The need for proof of causation
does not preclude class certification when there is common evidence
of causation. Where the total mix of information made available to
each purchaser was distinctive, if not unique, individualized
determinations of causation are necessary and will predominate over
common issues.In the case at bar, plaintiffs were exposed to the
same statements, in terms of both of the alleged misrepresentations
and the information that Conagra argues would have cleared up any
confusion. This evidence is common across the class.

It is appropriate to certify a class of Massachusetts purchasers,
but given that the Act requires proof of causation rather than
reliance as plaintiffs assert, this state belongs in subclass #3
rather than subclass #4. Given that subclass #3 lacks a class
representative, plaintiffs have not met their burden to proceed as
a class under Massachusetts law.

North Carolina

Plaintiffs seek to proceed under North Carolina's Unfair and
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (NCUDTPA). Under this Act, a
plaintiff must establish actual and reasonable reliance on the
defendant's alleged misrepresentation in order to show proximate
cause. Conagra argues that the inquiry into each class member's
actual reliance will defeat predominance. Plaintiffs responded to
Conagra's challenge by moving North Carolina to subclass #4 and
noting that they agree that reliance is required for the named
plaintiff. Plaintiffs cite no authority for the proposition that
the named plaintiff's actual reliance is sufficient for the entire
class.  As noted above, neither do plaintiffs argue that
individualized inquiries into reliance would not defeat
predominance.

While the Court do not conclude that the requirements of North
Carolina law would defeat predominance in every case, plaintiffs in
this one have not met their burden.  

Virginia

Plaintiffs seek to proceed under the Virginia Consumer Protection
Act (CPA). But class actions are not generally allowed in Virginia.
Plaintiffs do not address Conagra's arguments that it would be
inappropriate to certify a class to proceed under Virginia law in
this Court when Virginia courts would not allow the same.
Plaintiffs have not met their burden.

West Virginia

Plaintiffs seek to proceed under the West Virginia Consumer Credit
and Protection Act. Under this Act, plaintiffs must show: (1)
unlawful conduct by a seller (2) an ascertainable loss on the part
of the consumer and (3) proof of a causal connection between the
alleged unlawful conduct and the consumer's ascertainable loss.

Plaintiffs justify this grouping by asserting that all of the
states have an objective standard for proving classwide reliance,
yet they acknowledge that the question is unresolved in West
Virginia. Plaintiffs do not cite to authority suggesting that West
Virginia would be likely to permit classwide proof, and neither do
they meaningfully argue that common issues would still predominate
if individual inquiries are necessary. Given these failures,
plaintiffs have not met their burden to show that West Virginia
belongs in this subclass.

Hawaii

Plaintiffs seek to proceed under the Hawaii Unfair and Deceptive
Trade Practices Act. A deceptive act or practice is (1) a
representation, omission, or practice that (2) is likely to mislead
consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances where (3) the
representation, omission, or practice is material. A representation
is material of it is information that is important to consumers
and, hence, likely to affect their choice of, or conduct regarding,
a product. Given the objective nature of this inquiry, plaintiffs
have met their burden to show Hawaii can be part of the class.

Plaintiffs have met their burden to show that it is appropriate to
certify a subclass to pursue claims under laws in California and
Hawaii.

Individual State Consumer Protection Subclasses

California

Plaintiffs seek to certify claims of a California class for
violations of (1) California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act  (2)
California's False Advertising Law and (3) common law claims of
fraud, breach of express warranty, and misrepresentation.

The CLRA provides relief to any consumer who suffers any damage as
a result of the use or employment of any unlawful method, act, or
practice. The FAL prohibits not only advertising which is false,
but also advertising which, although true, is either actually
misleading or which has a capacity, likelihood or tendency to
deceive or confuse the public. California's UCL, FAL and CLRA rely
on the same objective test, that is, whether members of the public
are likely to be deceived. For this reason, district courts in
California routinely certify consumer class actions arising from
alleged violations of the CLRA, FAL, and UCL.

Plaintiffs' California class can proceed.

Wisconsin

Plaintiffs seek to proceed under the Wisconsin Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (WDTPA). The plaintiffs must show: (1) the defendant
made a representation to the public with the intent to induce an
obligation (2) that the representation was untrue, deceptive or
misleading and (3) that the representation caused the plaintiff a
pecuniary loss.

Conagra cites one case in which the court declined to certify a
class because the plaintiff did not identify the standard by which
he intended to show that the labels were objectively deceptive or
misleading, which led the court to conclude that individualized
inquiries would be necessary.  By contrast here, plaintiffs will
rely on common evidence to prove the labels were objectively
deceptive or misleading. Conagra can argue to the jury that any
reliance was unreasonable given the list of ingredients and the per
serving language on the revised label, but the presence of that
information does not preclude certification of a Wisconsin class.
Such individualized inquiries into loss will not be necessary here
because plaintiffs rely on expert testimony to support their price
premium theory.

Plaintiffs have met their burden to certify a class of plaintiffs
in Wisconsin.

Illinois

Plaintiffs seek to proceed under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act (ICFA). Plaintiffs must prove the
following: (1) a deceptive act or practice by the defendant (2) the
defendant's intent that the plaintiff rely on the deception (3) the
occurrence of the deception in the course of conduct involving
trade or commerce and (4) actual damage to the plaintiff (5)
proximately caused by the deception. The materiality standard is an
objective one that inquires whether it is a matter upon which a
reasonable person could be expected to rely in determining whether
to proceed with the transaction. The conduct of the individual
plaintiff is not pertinent.

Plaintiffs have met their burden to certify a class of consumers
who purchased Parkay Spray in Illinois.

Indiana remains part of subclass #6, so there is no need for
individual Indiana class. Plaintiffs have not met their burden for
Georgia or Ohio. Accordingly, the Court will certify individual
state subclasses in California, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Michigan.

The Court grants in part and denies in part Plaintiffs’ motion
for class certification.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 22, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y658234t from Leagle.com.

Erin Allen, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Adam Gutride -adam@gutridesafier.com --
Gutride Safier LLP, Anthony J. Patek -- anthony@gutridesafier.com
-- Gutride Safier LLP, Kristen Gelinas Simplicio --
kristen@gutridesafier.com -- Gutride Safier LLP, Seth A. Safier --
seth@gutridesafier.com -- Gutride Safier LLP & Ureka Ellie Idstrom
-uidstrom@eurekalawfirm.com -- The Eureka Law Firm.

Ofelia Frechette, Shelley Harder, Deana Marr, Tammie Shawley, Brian
Smith & Betty Vazquez, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Anthony J. Patek,
Gutride Safier LLP & Kristen Gelinas Simplicio, Gutride Safier
LLP.

ConAgra Foods, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, represented
by Rachel Elizabeth King Lowe -- rachel.lowe@alston.com -- Alston &
Bird, Andrew G. Phillips -- andrew.phillips@alston.com -- Alston &
Bird LLP, Angela M. Spivey -- angela.spivey@alston.com -- Alston &
Bird LLP, Jamie Smith George -- jamie.george@alston.com -- Alston
and Bird LLP, pro hac vice & Patrick E. Brookhouser, Jr., McGrath
North Mullin & Kratz, PC LLO, 1601 Dodge Street, Omaha, NE
68102FIRST NATIONAL TOWER.


CONSTRUCTION SOLUTIONS: Fields Sues Over Laborers' Unpaid Wages
---------------------------------------------------------------
JAMES FIELDS and THOMAS LIBERT, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated v. CONSTRUCTION SOLUTIONS OF THE FOX
VALLEY LLC, Case No. 1:19-cv-01044-WCG (E.D. Wisc., July 22, 2019),
is brought pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and
Wisconsin's Wage Payment and Collection Laws on behalf of current
and former hourly-paid, non-exempt laborers of the Defendant to
recover alleged unpaid wages, unpaid overtime and regular wages,
liquidated damages, costs, attorneys' fees, and other relief.

Construction Solutions of the Fox Valley, is a privately owned
construction company headquartered in Neenah, Wisconsin.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Scott S. Luzi, Esq.
          WALCHESKE & LUZI, LLC
          15850 W. Bluemound Road, Suite 304
          Brookfield, WI 53005
          Telephone: (262) 780-1953
          Facsimile: (262) 565-6469
          E-mail: sluzi@walcheskeluzi.com


CREATIVE HAIRDRESSERS: Anderson Seeks Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
India Anderson, individually, and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Creative Hairdressers, Inc. And Ratner
Companies, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-00041 (W.D. Va., July
17, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages, liquidated
damages and declaratory relief pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

Creative Hairdressers operate as Hair Cuttery where Anderson worked
as a hairdresser. She claims overtime for hours worked in excess of
forty in a workweek at a rate less than time-and-a-half of her
regular rate of pay.[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Curtis Daniel Cannon
     GOLDBERG & FINNEGAN, LLC
     8401 Colesville Road, Suite 630
     Silver Spring, MD 20910
     Tel: (301) 589-2999
     Fax: (301) 589-2644
     Email: ccannon@goldbergfinnegan.com

            - and -

     Nicholas Conlon, Esq.
     BROWN, LLC
     111 Town Square Place, Suite 400
     Jersey City, NJ 07310
     Tel: (877) 561-0000
     Fax: (855) 582-5297
     Email: nicholasconlon@jtblawgroup.com


CRYSTAL ENTERPRISES: Underpays Production Managers, Backman Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
KATHLEEN BACKMAN, individually and on behalf on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CRYSTAL ENTERPRISES, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-04312 (E.D.N.Y., July 26, 2019) is an
action against the Defendant's failure to pay the Plaintiff and the
class overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours
per week.

The Plaintiff Backman was hired by the Defendant as production
manager.

Crystal Enterprises, Inc. operates theme park facilities. The
Company provides child care, dining, spa, fitness center, meeting
room, wedding celebration, and related services. Crystal
Enterprises serves customers in the State of Michigan. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey R. Maguire, Esq.
          Alexander T. Coleman, Esq.
          Michael J. Borrelli, Esq.
          BORRELLI & ASSOCIATES, P.L.L.C.
          655 Third Avenue, Suite 1821
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 679-5000
          Facsimile: (212) 679-5005


CVS HEALTH: Staff Labor Suit Removed to E.D. Cal.
-------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Abel Cachola, Hardeep Dhillon, Misty Baily,
Shivjot Pabla, Devonna Gilmore, Michael Manzone, Pauline Mikhail,
Felicia Ivy, Randall Radke, Dayna Bowles, Melanie Jipp, Lorna Ruse,
Marisol Baez, William Shafer, Rachel Goff, Bre Michaels, Margee Mae
Dela Cruz, Tangerine Ponchione, Sonal Sehgal, Maikel Nagib, John
Hadi, Jeanny Keota, Sharika Williams, Shaina Larmore, Tina
Rodriguez, Debbie Schultz, Kim M. Rose, Mary Albana, Jessica Xe,
Daniel Rivera II, Rafaelita Adjei, Samantha Andrews, Aryan Rabbani,
Brianna Bertrand, Celia Carton, Jose L. Delgado, Liz Bennett,
Michelle Perez, Michelle Dias, Diane Kim, Kyrollos Mekail, Saravie
You, Elisha N. Pennington, Dion R. Lorusso, Maria M. Lorusso,
Kaitlyn Holdren, Amaris B. Lane, Joe Martinez, Nikkolae V. Jacinto,
Jessica Hernandez, Erin Riffle, Craig Jensen, Robert M. Wilson,
Daniel Setiawan, Yvonne Martinez, Ahmed Hegazy, Leila Vanderwerff,
Roxanna Hernandez, Nicole Kotecki, Mitchell Woothen, Steven
Chalker, Maisha Cherry, Lyna Le and Mahran Izoli, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. CVS Health
Corporation, CVS RX Services, Inc., CVS Pharmacy, Inc., Garfield
Beach CVS, LLC and Does 1 through 50, Defendants, Case No.
34-2019-00256809 (Cal. Super., July 19, 2019), was removed to the
U.S. District Court for  Eastern District of California on July 19,
2019, under Case No. 19-cv-01362.

Epstein seeks redress for failure to provide meal periods, rest
periods, minimum wages, overtime, complete and accurate wage/leave
statements, reimbursement of business-related expenses and
resulting from unfair business practices, waiting time penalties
for unpaid wages due upon termination and in violation of the
California Labor Code, California Business and Professions Code,
including declaratory relief, damages, penalties, equitable relief,
costs and attorneys' fees. Plaintiffs are pharmacists, pharmacist
interns, pharmacy technicians, cashiers, customer service
representatives, home health care specialists, shift managers,
store and/or operations managers who worked for CVS stores.[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jacob N. Whitehead, Esq.
      WHITEHEAD EMPLOYMENT LAW
      15615 Alton Pkwy, Suite 175
      Irvine, CA 92618
      Telephone: (949) 936-4001
      Facsimile: (949)450-1588
      Email: jacob@jnwpc.com

Defendants are represented by:

      Michael D. Weil, Esq.
      ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
      The Orrick Building
      405 Howard Street
      San Francisco, CA 94105
      Telephone: (415) 773-5700
      Facsimile: (415) 773-5759
      Email: mweil@orrick.com


DALLAS, TX: Prelim Injunction Bid as to Section 552.007 Granted
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, YVETTE GBALAZEH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF
DALLAS, TEXAS, a municipality of the State of Texas, Defendant,
Civil Action No. 3:18-CV-0076-N (N.D. Tex.), Judge David C. Godbey
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas,
Dallas Division, granted the Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary
injunction as to Texas Transportation Code Section 552.007.

The Judge addresses Plaintiffs Gbalazeh, Lee Sunbury, and Fred
Sims' application for preliminary injunction.  By previous Order,
the Court denied the Plaintiffs' motion with respect to their
challenges to sections 31-35 and 28-63.3 of the Code of Ordinances
of the City of Dallas.  The Court reserved judgement on the
Plaintiffs' challenge to section 552.007 until after the Texas
Attorney General had an opportunity to intervene, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.1.  The 60-day period outlined in
Rule 5.1(c) has elapsed and the Attorney General has not
intervened.  The Court thus has authority to rule on the
Plaintiffs' challenge to section 552.007.

The case is about the enforcement of three panhandling laws in
Dallas, Texas.  The Court addressed the first two, Dallas
Ordinances Sections 31-35 and 28-63.3, in its previous Order.  Now,
it addresses the third: section 552.007.  Section 552.007 prohibits
a person standing in a roadway to solicit a ride, contribution,
employment, or business from an occupant of a vehicle.  The statute
makes a single exception for individuals that have gained the
permission of local government to solicit charitable contributions,
i.e., local fire departments' "fill the boot" campaigns.  

The Plaintiffs allege that they have been cited under section
552.007 and that it violates their First and Fourth Amendment
rights.

Judge Godbey holds that the Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the
merits of their First Amendment challenge to section 552.007.  A
regulation is content based if it applies to particular speech
because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.
Section 552.007 is a content based restriction.  The ordinance does
not stop individuals from standing in the roadway to advocate for a
political campaign or church.  But once the speakers begin to offer
or ask for something from drivers, their speech runs afoul of
section 552.007.  Indeed, of the various forms of protected speech,
the statute picks and prohibits only solicitation, and makes an
explicit exception for pre-approved charitable solicitations.
Accordingly, the Judge holds that section 552.007 is a content
based restriction on speech.

The Plaintiffs have also shown a risk of irreparable injury.  The
loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal amounts of time,
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.  The Judge holds
that section 552.007 poses a threat to the Plaintiffs' First
Amendment rights.  Thus, the Plaintiffs have shown a threat of
irreparable injury.

In light of this, the balance of harms tilts in favor of an
injunction.  The City argues that preventing enforcement of section
552.007 will render it unable to sufficiently protect against
traffic hazards.  The Judge disagrees.  The City has other laws it
can use to protect against traffic hazards in the interim that do
not risk citing and arresting people under a potentially
unconstitutional law.

As to the public interest, it is always in the public interest to
prevent the violation of a party's constitutional rights.  The
enforcement of section 552.007 potentially violates First Amendment
rights.  As such, the Judge finds an injunction to be consistent
with the public interest.

For the reasons stated, Judge Godbey granted the Plaintiffs' motion
for preliminary injunction as to section 552.007.  The Court
exercised its discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
65(c) to waive the bond requirement, as the Plaintiffs are engaged
in "public-interest litigation" to protect their constitutional
rights.  The relief will take effect 30 days from the date of the
Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 25, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/rCdqif from Leagle.com.

Yvette Gbalazeh, Lee Sunbury & Fred Sims, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Ramon
de Jesus Rodriguez -- Ramon@rrtxlaw.com -- Murphy Rodriguez, PLLC &
Christopher S. Murphy, Murphy Rodriguez, PLLC.

City of Dallas Texas, a municipality of the State of Texas,
Defendant, represented by Sonia Tahira Ahmed, City of Dallas
Attorney's Office, Justin Henry Roy, Dallas City Attorney's Office
& Kathleen MacInnes Fones, Dallas City Attorney's Office.


DEMARK INC: Bid to Certify Class in Griffin Suit Denied as Moot
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable Charles P. Kocoras denied as moot the motion to
certify class in the lawsuit entitled John Griffin, et al. v.
Demark, Inc., Case No. 1:18-cv-00979 (N.D. Ill.).[CC]

DIVYA DRISHTI: Fails to Pay Minimum, Overtime Wages, Peralta Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
TAURINA BONILLA PERALTA and SUSANA GEORGINA GUILLCA, individually
and on behalf of others similarly situated v. DIVYA DRISHTI LLC
(D/B/A LENOX SPA & NAILS) and ARCHANA POKHREL (A/K/A DAISY), Case
No. 1:19-cv-06762 (S.D.N.Y., July 19, 2019), alleges that under
both the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Law, the
Plaintiffs are entitled to minimum and overtime wages, and
applicable liquidated damages.

Divya Drishti LLC, doing business as Lenox Spa & Nails, is a
domestic corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
state of New York.  The Individual Defendant serve or served as
owner, manager, principal, or agent of the Defendant Corporation.

The Defendants owned, operated, or controlled a nail salon, located
at 1051 Third Avenue, in New York City, under the name "Lenox Spa &
Nails."  The Plaintiffs were employed as manicurists and
pedicurists at the salon.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: Michael@Faillacelaw.com


DURHAM D&M: Removes Gardner Labor Class Suit to C.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Durham D&M LLC removed on July 22, 2019, the lawsuit
titled PENNY GARDNER, as an individual and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. DURHAM D&M LLC; and DOES 1 through 50
inclusive, Case No. CIVDS1917372, from the Superior Court of the
State of California for the County of San Bernardino County to the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 5:19-cv-01344 to the
proceeding.

Plaintiff Penny Gardner filed this complaint in the Superior Court
on June 12, 2019.  The Plaintiff asserts one cause of action in her
PAGA Complaint against the Defendant: "Violation of Cal. Labor Code
Section 2698, et seq."  The Complaint "seeks penalties on behalf of
all Aggrieved Employees from April 10, 2018, through the present,
for Defendant's violations of Labor Code section 204."[BN]

Defendant DURHAM D&M LLC is represented by:

          Jon D. Meer, Esq.
          Michael Afar, Esq.
          Jared W. Speier, Esq.
          SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
          2029 Century Park East, Suite 3500
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-3021
          Telephone: (310) 277-7200
          Facsimile: (310) 201-5219
          E-mail: jmeer@seyfarth.com
                  mafar@seyfarth.com
                  jspeier@seyfarth.com


DUVAL COUNTY, FL: Schatzel Files Civil Rights Suit v. School Board
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Duval County School
Board/District. The case is styled as Richard E. Schatzel
Individually (parens Patraie), John Does, Jane Does Individually,
And all those similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Duval County School
Board/District Officially, Leslie Russell and successors
Officially, Alicia G. Officiially, individually, D.B.A./Durham
School Bus Services also known as: Durham D&M LP, John Zeigler and
successor(s) Officially, Lisa Burkert Officially, Doreen Sams and
successor Officially, D.B.A./International Brotherhood of Teamsters
(IBT) Local 512, Jim Shirling Officially, Individually, Stewart
Cauthan Officially, Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-00888-MMH-PDB (M.D.
Fla., July 31, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Civil Rights.

Duval County Public Schools is the 20th largest school district in
the nation and the sixth largest school district in Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear pro se.


EAGLE CREEK: Dennis Claims Website Not Blind-Friendly
-----------------------------------------------------
Derrick U. Dennis, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. Eagle Creek, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
19-cv-06674, (S.D. N.Y., July 17, 2019) seeks preliminary and
permanent injunction, compensatory, statutory and punitive damages
and fines, prejudgment and post-judgment interest, costs and
expenses of this action together with reasonable attorneys' and
expert fees and such other and further relief under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, New York State Human Rights Law and New York
City Human Rights Law.

Defendant operates a commercial website, www.eaglecreek.com.com,
which markets and sells outdoor gear. Plaintiff is legally blind
and claims that Defendant's website cannot be accessed by the
visually-impaired. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
     SHALOM LAW, PLLC.
     124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
     Kew Gardens, NY 11415
     Tel: (718) 971-9474
     Fax: (718) 865-0943
     Email: Jshalom@JonathanShalomLaw.com


EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Bruno FCRA Suit Dismissed With Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DANIEL BRUNO, Individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES,
LLC; GENEVA FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.; MARK HASSAN; GENEVA MOTORS,
INC. d/b/a GENEVA FINANCIAL SERVICES, ROBERT MCGINLEY, KAMIES
ELHOUTY, JOHN MCGINLEY, ANDY MITCHELL, and REBS SUPPLY, INC. d/b/a
REBS MARKETING, INC., Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-00327-WBS-EFB
(E.D. Cal.), Judge William B. Shubb of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of California dismissed with prejudice all the
claims for relief as they pertain to Equifax only.

The Stipulation of Dismissal will not affect the Plaintiff's claims
against any party other than Equifax.  The Plaintiff and Equifax
will bear their own costs, including attorneys' fees, with respect
to the dismissed claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 25, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/PXMZxs from Leagle.com.

Daniel Bruno, Individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by James Louis Kohl --
jamesk.legal@gmail.com -- Law Offices Of James Louis Kohl & Joseph
Messer, Messer Strickler, Ltd., pro hac vice.

Geneva Financial Services, LLC, John McGinley & Robert McGinley,
Defendants, represented by Rebecca Dena Wester -- rdj@smbgroup.com
-- Law Offices of Henry N. Jannol, APC.

Geneva Financial Services, Inc. & Mark Hassan, Defendants,
represented by Neil C. Evans, Law Office of Neil C. Evans.

Geneva Motors, Inc., Doing business as Geneva Financial Services &
Kamies Elhouty, Defendants, represented by Craig Richard Smith,
Smith Law Firm.


EVENTBRITE INC: Barbieri Sues Over Text Ads re Cinco De Mayo Fest
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ADRIANA BARBIERI, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. EVENTBRITE, INC., and SWARM INC., Case No.
0:19-cv-61825-XXXX (S.D. Fla., July 21, 2019), alleges violations
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act relating to text messages
sent by the Defendants in connection with, and to otherwise promote
and market, a Cinco De Mayo music festival and/or concert scheduled
for May 4-5, 2019, in Miami, Florida.

Eventbrite is a Delaware corporation, with a principal office
located in San Francisco, California.  Eventbrite operates as a
platform as a service company.  The Company offers a platform that
allows users to provide online event planning services, as well as
publishes, promotes, and sells tickets through social networks and
e-mails.

Swarm is a Florida corporation, with a principal office located in
Miami, Florida.  The Defendants directs, markets, and controls
their online businesses in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
          Thomas J. Patti, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI
          110 SE 6th Street, Suite 1744
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 907-1136
          Facsimile: (855) 529-9540
          E-mail: jibrael@jibraellaw.com
                  tom@jibraellaw.com


EVERALBUM INC: Figueroa Appeals N.D. Cal. Decision to 9th Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Gabrielle Figueroa and Daisy Franklin filed an appeal
from a Court ruling in their lawsuit styled Gabrielle Figueroa, et
al. v. Everalbum, Inc., Case No. 4:17-cv-05909-JSW, in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, Oakland.

The nature of suit is stated as consumer credit.

The appellate case is captioned as Gabrielle Figueroa, et al. v.
Everalbum, Inc., Case No. 19-16442, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appellants Gabrielle Figueroa and Daisy Franklin's opening
      brief is due on September 18, 2019;

   -- Appellee Everalbum, Inc.'s answering brief is due on
      October 18, 2019; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants GABRIELLE FIGUEROA and DAISY FRANKLIN, on
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, are represented
by:

          Jonathan Edward Fortman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF JONATHAN E. FORTMAN, LLC
          250 St. Catherine Street
          Florissant, MO 63031
          Telephone: (314) 522-2312
          E-mail: jef@fortmanlaw.com

               - and -

          Steve A. Miller, Esq.
          STEVE A. MILLER, P.C.
          1625 Larimer Street
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 892-9933
          E-mail: sampc01@gmail.com

               - and -

          Robert W. Thompson, Esq.
          THOMPSON LAW OFFICES, P.C.
          700 Airport Boulevard, Suite 160
          Burlingame, CA 94010
          Telephone: (650) 513-6111
          E-mail: bobby@tlopc.com

Defendant-Appellee EVERALBUM, INC. is represented by:

          Nathan M. McClellan, Esq.
          DECHERT LLP
          633 West 5th Street, Suite 4900
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 808-5758
          E-mail: nathan.mcclellan@dechert.com

               - and -

          Christina Sarchio, Esq.
          DECHERT LLP
          1900 K Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 261-3465
          E-mail: christina.sarchio@dechert.com

               - and -

          Lily North, Esq.
          BENESCH FRIEDLANDER COPLAN & ARONOFF LLP
          One Montgomery, Suite 2700
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (628) 600-2238
          E-mail: lnorth@beneschlaw.com


EXPEDIA INC: Court Narrows Claims in Woodell Suit
-------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, issued an Order granting in part and denying
in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned
PATRICIA WOODELL, Plaintiff, v. EXPEDIA INC., et al., Defendants.
Case No. C19-0051JLR. (W.D. Wash.).

Before the court is Defendants Expedia, Inc. (Expedia), EAN.com, LP
(EAN), Travelscape, LLC (Travelscape), and Hotels.com, L.P.'s
(Hotels.com) (Defendants) motion to dismiss Plaintiff Patricia
Woodell's putative class action complaint.

Ms. Woodell alleges that contrary to Reservations.com's
representations and/or the expectations of consumers, the 'Taxes &
Fees' charged by Defendants are not the actual taxes and fees
remitted to governmental authorities but contain additional amounts
surreptitiously added by Defendants (the tax overcharge). Ms.
Woodell generally alleges that Defendants populate the room rates
and Taxes & Fees fields on the Reservation.com website and
unlawfully collect and retain the Taxes & Fees' overcharge.

Ms. Woodell brings a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). In addition to her RICO claim,
Ms. Woodell asserts a claim for violation of Washington's Consumer
Protection Act (CPA). She also asserts equitable claims of
conversion, unjust enrichment and constructive trust.  

RICO

Under RICO, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant participated
in the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity that proximately caused the plaintiff's harm. Defendants
argue that Ms. Woodell's RICO claim fails because she inadequately
alleges the following elements: (1) any racketeering activity (2) a
pattern of such activity (3) an enterprise (4) that Defendants
directed the conduct of an enterprise and (5) proximate causation.
The court will consider each of these elements in turn.

Racketeering Activity

Ms. Woodell bases her RICO claim on mail and wire fraud as the
alleged underlying racketeering activity.

The Defendants argue that Ms. Woodell fails to plead Defendants'
alleged racketeering activity mail and wire fraud violations with
sufficient particularity. The mail and wire fraud statutes are
identical except for the particular method used to disseminate the
fraud, and contain three elements: (A) the formation of a scheme to
defraud (B) the use of the mails or wires in furtherance of that
scheme and (C) the specific intent to defraud.

Mail Fraud

Nowhere in her complaint does Ms. Woodell allege any specific use
of the mails in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme. At most, she
generally alleges:

Defendants and Reservations.com violated 18 U.S.C. Section 1341 by
sending and receiving, and by causing to be sent and/or received,
materials via U.S. Mail or commercial interstate carriers for the
purpose of executing the unlawful scheme to design, manufacture,
market, and sell hotel room reservations by means of false
pretenses, misrepresentations, promises, and omissions.

General allegations concerning the use of the mails is
insufficient. Accordingly, the court dismisses Ms. Woodell's RICO
claim predicated on the alleged racketeering activity of mail
fraud.

Wire Fraud

The court next considers the adequacy of Ms. Woodell's pleading
concerning the alleged racketeering activity of wire fraud.
Specifically, Ms. Woodell alleges that the Taxes & Fees' charged on
the Reservations.com website are pass-through items established and
collected by Expedia.  She also alleges that the amount charged by
Expedia on Reservations.com bookings as Taxes & Fees'  is
significantly more than the sum actually owed to the government for
'applicable taxes, government fees, and other charges' that he
hotels must pay to the government.

She further alleges, on information and belief, that Expedia
pockets the tax overcharge as additional profit (above and beyond
the markup' it already makes on the room price. Finally, she
alleges that this scheme has been repeated millions of times
through the Reservations.com website.

These allegations meet the Rule 9(b) pleading requirement of
sufficient particularity for asserting a predicate act of wire
fraud in a RICO claim against Expedia.

In other portions of the complaint, however, Ms. Woodell charges
Defendants collectively with this same conduct.  At a minimum, a
plaintiff must identify the role of each defendant in the alleged
fraudulent scheme. Thus, although Ms. Woodell's specific
allegations concerning Expedia are sufficient, her generalized
allegations lumping the three remaining Defendants together with
respect to the same conduct are not.

Ms. Woodell counters that the Rule 9(b) standard may be relaxed as
to matters within the opposing party's knowledge. She also argues
that she alleges with specificity the roles each Defendant played
as follows: For Travelscape, she alleges that it contracts with
hotel properties for room inventory at wholesale prices, which, in
turn, is offered for sale by Reservations.com. She also alleges
that Travelscape administers payments for reservations" made
through Reservations.com

For EAN, she alleges that it contracts with Reservations.com to
provide third parties with hotel room inventory obtained by
Expedia, Travelscape, and Hotels.com. For Hotels.com, Ms. Woodell
alleges that it provides room inventory to Reservations.com and/or
collects monies paid for room reservations sold by
Reservations.com.

However, the relaxation of the Rule 9(b) particularized pleading
requirement for matters within the opposing party's knowledge does
not nullify Rule 9(b). Indeed, a plaintiff who makes allegations on
information and belief must state the factual basis for this
belief. Alleging no more than suspicious circumstances is
insufficient.  

Here, Ms. Woodell has not even alleged suspicious circumstances
with respect to Travelscape, EAN, and Hotels.com. The specific
conduct she alleges regarding each of these Defendants does not
inform them of their alleged participation in the fraud, which in
this case is Expedia's purported misrepresentation on
Reservations.com's website regarding the Taxes & Fees charge.
Rather, her allegations describe nothing more than legitimate
business conduct contracting for hotel room inventory at wholesale
prices and administering payments for reservations.
  
Accordingly, the court concludes that Ms. Woodell has failed to
plead wire fraud as a predicate act for her RICO claim with
sufficient particularity to satisfy Rule 9(b) for Defendants
Travelscape, EAN, and Hotels.com and, therefore, grants Defendants'
motion with respect to these Defendants.

RICO Enterprise

Defendants also argue that Ms. Woodell fails to adequately allege a
RICO Enterprise. RICO enterprises come in two varieties: (1) an
association-in-fact or (2) a legal entity. An association-in-fact
is a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of
engaging in a course of conduct. A legal entity applies to the
infiltration of legitimate businesses the enterprise by racketeers
the defendants. Ms. Woodell alleges both types of enterprises in
the alternative.  

Association-in-fact

To plead an association-in-fact enterprise, Ms. Woodell must allege
that the association-in-fact: (1) has a common purpose (2) is an
ongoing organization and (3) its various associates function as a
continuing unit.  Further, Ms. Woodell must allege that the group
engaged in enterprise conduct distinct from their own affairs. Ms.
Woodell alleges that Defendants and Reservations.com formed an
association-in-fact enterprise. As discussed below, Ms. Woodell
fails to adequately allege that this putative association-in-fact
has a common purpose.

Ms. Woodell pleads that Defendants and Reservations.com associated
for the common purpose of obtaining tax overpayments from
consumers. However, this and other similar, conclusory allegations
fall short of the pleading standard. Except for the allegation that
Expedia established and collected the Taxes & Fees charge as
pass-through line items on Reservations.com's website, the
complaint contains no specific factual allegations that any other
Defendant acted with an objective unrelated to ordinary business
aims. Ms. Woodell's formulaic, conclusory allegations concerning
these Defendants4 are insufficient to create facial plausibility
concerning an association-in-fact.

Indeed, Ms. Woodell admits in her complaint that the alleged
enterprise functioned by selling hotel room reservations to the
consuming public and that such bookings are legitimate
transactions.  

Allegations that are consistent with ordinary business activities
or purposes are insufficient when pleading an association-in-fact
RICO enterprise. Where the alleged association-in-fact is formed
through routine contracts for services, the common purpose element
is unmet because the entities are pursuing their own individual
economic interests, rather than a shared purpose. Based on the
foregoing authorities, the court concludes that Ms. Woodell fails
to adequately allege a common purpose for her association-in-fact.
Accordingly, the court grants this portion of Defendants' motion.

Legal Entity

Ms. Woodell alternatively argues that non-party Reservations.com is
a single legal entity enterprise through which Defendants conducted
a pattern of racketeering activity. Insofar as 18 U.S.C. Section
1961(4) defines an enterprise to include any partnership,
corporation or other legal entity, Ms. Woodell is correct.

Accordingly, the court denies this portion of Defendants' motion.
The difficulty with this allegation, however, arises in the next
element of Ms. Woodell's RICO claim namely, whether Defendants
conducted or participated, directly or indirectly, in the conduct
of such enterprise's affairs.

Directed the Conduct of a RICO Enterprise

The conduct element of a RICO claim requires Ms. Woodell to allege
that a defendant has some part in the directing of the enterprise's
affairs. Ms. Woodell fails to allege facts supporting a plausible
theory that Defendants participated in the conduct of the
enterprise's affairs, not just their own affairs.   

Once again, at most, Ms. Woodell alleges that Expedia establishes
and collects the Taxes & Fees charge as pass-through line items on
Reservations.com's website. This alleged action does not amount to
participation in the operation or management of Reservations.com as
a legal entity enterprise or Ms. Woodell's alleged
association-in-fact enterprise. This is particularly so in light of
her allegations that Reservations.com hosts its own website, does
its own marketing of its services and obtains its inventory of
hotel reservations through multiple third-party suppliers and not
just through Defendants. Ms. Woodell's remaining allegations are
all too general and conclusory to meet the pleading standard and
raise this element of her claim from the merely possible to the
plausible.

Specifically, Ms. Woodell has not adequately alleged that
Defendants' actions were undertaken on behalf of the enterprise as
opposed to on behalf of Defendants in their individual capacities,
to advance their individual self-interests. In Walgreen, an
employee health benefit fund alleged that a pharmaceutical company
and drug manufacturer engaged in a scheme to defraud insurers by
filling prescriptions for generic drugs with more expensive dosages
than prescribed, in violation of RICO.

The Walgreencourt, United Food & Commercial Workers Unions &
Emp'rs. Midwest Health Benefits Fund v. Walgreen Co., 719 F.3d 849,
854 (7th Cir. 2013), explained that the complaint did not allege,
for instance, that officials from either company involved
themselves in the affairs of the other, among other things, but
instead defendants' interactions showed only that the defendants
had a commercial relationship.

The court finds this analysis persuasive here and concludes that
Ms. Woodell fails to adequately allege that Defendants directed the
affairs of a RICO enterprise.

Accordingly, the court grants this portion of Defendants' motion.

Proximate Causation

A plaintiff may sue under RICO only if the alleged RICO violation
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.

Ms. Woodell alleges that a reasonable consumer would expect that a
charge for Taxes & Fees would consist of amounts imposed by taxing
authorities. She alleges that she was overcharged $8.31 because she
paid $14.82 in Taxes & Fees when only $6.51 was due to the
government.  However, she does not allege that she read or even
noticed the Taxes & Fees charge at the time she made her
reservation.   

She does not allege that the charge would have affected her
transaction if she had noticed it or what she would have
interpreted the phrase to mean if she had seen it. She does not
allege that she would not have completed the transaction had she
understood that not all of the $14.82 listed under Taxes & Fees
would be paid to a governmental entity or that a portion of the
$14.82 would be retained by Expedia. In short, she does not plead
that, except for the alleged misrepresentation concerning Taxes &
Fees, she would not have suffered an injury. As a result, the court
concludes that Ms. Woodell fails to adequately allege proximate
cause.

Because Ms. Woodell fails to adequately plead that her $8.31 injury
was proximately caused by Defendants' purported RICO violation, the
court grants Defendants' motion and dismisses her RICO claim.

CPA Claim

To state a claim under the CPA, Ms. Woodell must allege: (1) an
unfair or deceptive act or practice (2) occurring in trade or
commerce (3) affecting the public interest (4) injury to a person's
business or property, and (5) causation. Defendants argue that Ms.
Woodell fails to adequately plead the first, third, and fifth
elements.  

Unfair or Deceptive Act

An unfair or deceptive act is one undertaken with a capacity to
deceive a substantial portion of the public.Ms. Woodell relies on
the same factual allegations to underpin her CPA claim as she does
to underpin her RICO claim alleged misrepresentation regarding
Taxes & Fees. Thus, just as Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading
standard applies to Ms. Woodell's allegations concerning mail and
wire fraud,  those same heightened pleading standards apply to Ms.
Woodell's allegations of the unfair or deceptive act underpinning
her CPA claim.

For example, in Fidelity Mortgage Corp. v. Seattle Times Co., 213
F.R.D. 573 (W.D. Wash. 2003), the plaintiff claimed that the
defendant violated the CPA by publishing false, deceptive, and/or
misleading Interest Rates. The court explained that, even with
regard to complaints that do not specifically plead fraud, the
Ninth Circuit has consistently held that cases that are grounded in
fraud' or sound in fraud' must satisfy the particularity
requirement of Rule 9(b). Thus, although Ms. Woodell avoids using
the term fraud in describing her CPA claim her CPA allegations are
still governed by the heightened Rule 9(b) standard.  

The court agrees with Ms. Woodell that the alleged mislabeling of
the Taxes & Fees charge could constitute an unfair or deceptive act
under the CPA. However, although Ms. Woodell pleads with
particularity Expedia's involvement in this alleged deceptive act,
her collective and generalized allegations concerning the remaining
Defendants are insufficient under Rule 9(b). Thus, for the same
reasons that the court concluded that Ms. Woodell's allegations
concerning the alleged Taxes & Fees misrepresentation meet Rule
9(b)'s pleading requirements for her RICO claims against Expedia,
but not for her RICO claim against the other Defendants,  the court
also so concludes here concerning this element of her CPA claim.

Impact on the Public Interest

Ms. Woodell can establish impact on the public interest by showing
that the conduct injured other persons, or even "had the capacity
to injure other persons. The court agrees with Ms. Woodell that she
has not alleged an essentially private dispute. Rather, she has
alleged hundreds of thousands of similar transactions using the
same alleged Taxes & Fees misrepresentation. These allegations are
sufficient to meet this element of her CPA claim. The court,
therefore, denies this portion of Defendants' motion.

Proximate Causation

Proximate cause is a required element of a CPA claim. As noted
above in the court's discussion of proximate causation of Ms.
Woodell's RICO claim, Ms. Woodell does not allege that she read or
even noticed the Taxes & Fees charge, that the phrase would have
affected her booking had she noticed it, what she would have
interpreted the phrase to mean had she seen it, that she would not
have completed the booking had she understood that Expedia would
retain a portion of the amount listed as Taxes & Fees, or that she
would have taken any other course of action other than the one she
did. In other words, she does not allege that, except for
Defendants' alleged deceptive act, the outcome of her booking would
have been any different. Just as the court concluded that Ms.
Woodell failed to plead proximate cause for her RICO claim, the
court similarly concludes that she fails to plead proximate cause
for her CPA claim, as well.

The court concludes that Ms. Woodell has not adequately alleged
proximate causation for her CPA claim and, therefore, grants this
portion of Defendants' motion.

Conversion

Defendants assert that Ms. Woodell's claim for conversion should be
dismissed because an 'authorized' payment by the payor is not the
proper subject of the tort of conversion under Washington law. Ms.
Woodell does not respond to this portion of Defendants' motion and,
indeed, implicitly concedes that Defendants' motion to dismiss her
conversion claim has merit. Accordingly, the court grants this
aspect to Defendants' motion and dismisses Ms. Woodell's claim for
conversion with prejudice and without leave to amend.

Unjust Enrichment and Constructive Trust

The elements of a claim for unjust enrichment are: (1) a benefit
conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff (2) an appreciation
or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit and (3) the acceptance
or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such
circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain
the benefit without the payment of its value
The court disagrees.

The elements Ms. Woodell must allege for her RICO and CPA claims
are distinct from her unjust enrichment and constructive trust
claims. She need not allege either a RICO or a CPA claim to allege
circumstances rendering inequitable Defendants' retention of the
funds at issue for purposes of her unjust enrichment claim.
Similarly, she need not allege either a RICO or a CPA claim to
adequately plead a claim for constructive trust. For a constructive
trust, Ms. Woodell only needs to allege some element of wrongdoing.
Further, although such wrongdoing is ordinarily found in the form
of fraud, misrepresentation, or bad faith, equity's need for
flexibility requires that wrongdoing not be so limited.

However, to state a claim for either unjust enrichment or
constructive trust, Ms. Woodell must allege that the defendant
retains the benefit or holds title to the property, respectively.
Here, Ms. Woodell specifically alleges that Expedia pockets the tax
overcharge. Although Ms. Woodell also alleges that Defendants
retained these funds and Defendants retained the overcharge as
extra revenue these generalized, collective allegations do not move
her claims against EAN, Travelscape, and Hotels.com from the mere
possible to the plausible particularly given her specific
allegations concerning Expedia.
  
The court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss Ms. Woodell's
equitable claims for unjust enrichment and constructive trust
against EAN, Travelscape, and Hotels.com, but denies it with
respect to Expedia.

Accordingly, the court grants in part and denies in part the
Defendants' motion to dismiss. The court dismisses Ms. Woodell's
claim for conversion with prejudice and without leave to amend. The
court dismisses her RICO and CPA claims but grants her leave to
amend these claims. The court dismisses her equitable claims for
unjust enrichment and constructive trust against EAN, Travelscape,
and Hotels.com but grants her leave to amend these claims.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 22, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yxtnxjoq from Leagle.com.

Patricia Woodell, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew M. Volk --
andrew@huppertpc.com -- HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP, Ian W.
Freeman -- Freeman@WGFLLAW.com -- WALKER GRESSETTE FREEMAN LINTON
LLC, pro hac vice, James L. Ward, Jr., MCGOWAN HOOD & FELDER LLC,
1517 Hampton Street, Columbia, SC 29201, pro hac vice, John P.
Linton, Jr. -- Linton@WGFLLAW.com -- WALKER GRESSETTE FREEMAN
LINTON LLC, pro hac vice, Ranee Saunders, MCGOWAN HOOD & FELDER
LLC, 1517 Hampton Street. Columbia, SC 29201,  pro hac vice, Ted
Wojcik -- tedw@hbsslaw.com -- HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP, pro
hac vice, Jessica Thompson, HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP, Shayne
C. Stevenson -- shaynes@hbsslaw.com -- HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO
LLP & Steve W. Berman -- steveb@hbsslaw.com -- HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL
SHAPIRO LLP.

Expedia Inc, EAN.com LP, Travelscape LLC & Hotels.com LP,
Defendants, represented by Emily Dodds Powell --
emilyp@calfoeakes.com -- CALFO EAKES & OSTROVSKY PLLC, Patricia A.
Eakes -- pattye@calfoeakes.com -- CALFO EAKES & OSTROVSKY PLLC &
Angelo J. Calfo -- angeloc@calfoeakes.com -- CALFO EAKES &
OSTROVSKY PLLC.


EXTREME NETWORKS: $7MM Class Settlement in Securities Suit OK'd
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, issued an Order granting Plaintiff's
Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Plan of
Allocation in the case captioned In re EXTREME NETWORKS, INC.
SECURITIES LITIGATION. Case No. 15-cv-04883-BLF. (N.D. Cal.).

The First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleges that the Defendants
misrepresented to investors the success of Extreme's
post-acquisition integration with its former competitor, Enterasys
Networks, Inc. (Enterasys), as well as developments in Extreme's
key partnership with Lenovo Group Ltd. (Lenovo).

The Defendants' positive representations to investors about the
resulting synergies from the Enterasys integration and benefits of
the Lenovo partnership including a commitment that cost savings
from these arrangements would lead to double-digit revenue growth
and a 10% operating margin by June 2015 caused Extreme's stock
price to rise. Extreme's stock price then dropped when Extreme
reported disappointing financial results at various points between
February 2014 and the end of the Class Period on April 9, 2015.

The Defendants have agreed to pay $7,000,000 in cash, to secure a
settlement of the claims in the Action and related claims that
could have been brought (Released Claims).

In order to grant final approval of the class action settlement,
the Court must determine that (1) the class meets the requirements
for certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and (2)
the settlement reached on behalf of the class is fair, reasonable,
and adequate.  

The Class Meets the Requirements for Certification under Rule 23

A class action is maintainable only if it meets the four
requirements of Rule 23(a):
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class and(4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.

The Court concluded that these requirements were satisfied when it
granted preliminary approval of the class action settlement. The
Court is not aware of any new facts which would alter that
conclusion. However, the Court reviews the Rule 23 requirements
again briefly, as follows.

Turning first to the Rule 23(a) prerequisites, the Court has no
difficulty concluding that because the class contains thousands of
members (3,845 claims filed as of the June 20, 2019 hearing),
joinder of all class members would be impracticable. The
commonality requirement is met because the key issues in the case
are the same for all class members, including, for example, whether
Defendants misrepresented material facts or omitted material facts
for publicly traded stocks in violation of the law and whether
these alleged actions artificially inflated the stock price.

ATRS's claims are typical of those of the class, as it advances the
same claims, shares identical legal theories, and allegedly
experienced losses from Extreme's misrepresentations.  

Finally, to determine ATRS's adequacy, the Court must resolve two
questions: (1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any
conflicts of interest with other class members and (2) will the
named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously
on behalf of the class? The Court has no reservations regarding the
abilities of Class Counsel or their zeal in representing the class,
and the record discloses no conflict of interest which would
preclude ATRS from acting as class representative.  

With respect to Rule 23(b)(3), the predominance inquiry tests
whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant
adjudication by representation. The common questions in this case
which would be subject to common proof include whether Defendants
misrepresented material facts or omitted material facts for
publicly traded stocks in violation of the law, whether Defendants
had a duty to disclose alleged material omissions or acted with
scienter, and whether the market price of Extreme's common stock
during the class period was artificially inflated due to the
alleged material omissions and/or misrepresentations. These
questions predominate. Moreover, given this commonality, and the
number of potential class members, the Court concludes that a class
action is a superior mechanism for adjudicating the claims at
issue.

The Court concludes that the requirements of Rule 23 are met and
that certification of the class for settlement purposes is
appropriate. Plaintiff Arkansas Teacher Retirement System is hereby
appointed as class representative and Labaton Sucharow LLP is
appointed class counsel.

The Settlement is Fundamentally Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable

In the Ninth Circuit, courts use a multi-factor balancing test to
analyze whether a given settlement is fair, adequate and
reasonable. That test includes the following factors:
the strength of the plaintiffs' case; the risk, expense,
complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the risk of
maintaining class action status throughout the trial; the amount
offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the
stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; the
presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction of the
class members to the proposed settlement.

Strength of Plaintiffs' Case and Risk of Continuing Litigation

In assessing the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal,
courts in the Ninth Circuit evaluate the strength of the
plaintiffs' case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely
duration of further litigation; [and] the risk of maintaining class
action status throughout the trial. The Court finds that ATRS faced
significant obstacles in this case, including needing to survive
multiple motions to dismiss that raised important and complicated
issues. The class would have faced similar risks at trial.

As set forth in ATRS's motion, these obstacles included challenges
to the material falsity of each alleged misstatement, class
certification challenges, loss causation and damages challenges,
and the risks inherent in a battle of the experts of complex
economic theories in a jury trial.

Throughout the litigation and mediation, Defendants raised many
substantive, potentially meritorious defenses to the claims;
indeed, the Court narrowed the claims significantly through the
motions to dismiss phase. Securities actions in particular are
often long, hard-fought, complicated, and extremely difficult to
win.

The Court finds this factor weighs in favor of approval.

Effectiveness of Distribution Method, Terms of Attorney's Fees, and
Supplemental Agreements
The Court must likewise consider the effectiveness of the proposed
method of distributing relief to the class. The Court has already
approved the Plan of Allocation and has determined that it is
reasonable and effective. The terms of the proposed award of
attorney's fees are reasonable as discussed below. There are no
supplemental agreements. This factor weighs in favor of approval.

Equitable Treatment of Class Members

Rule 23 also requires consideration of whether the proposal treats
class members equitably relative to each other. Consistent with
this instruction, the Court considers whether the proposal
improperly grant[s] preferential treatment to class representatives
or segments of the class.

Under the Agreement, class members who have submitted timely claims
will receive payments on a pro rata basis based on the value of
their original claim and the number of claims filed. In granting
preliminary approval, the Court found that this proposed allocation
did not constitute improper preferential treatment. The Court
adheres to its view that the allocation plan is equitable.
Moreover, the service award ATRS seeks is reasonable and does not
constitute inequitable treatment of class members.

This factor weighs in favor of approval.

Settlement Amount

Here, the $7 million fund represents a substantial recovery for the
class. Experts have calculated that the maximum potential damages
in this action is $74 million to $140 million, with a recovery as
low as $13 million to $36 million if Defendants' disaggregation
arguments had succeeded. The gross settlement amount thus
represents a recovery of between 5% and 9.5% of non-disaggregated
damages and between 19% to 54% if disaggregated arguments are
credited. Other courts have found similar recoveries to be fair and
reasonable.  

Accordingly, the amount of the settlement also weighs in favor of
approval.

Counsel's Experience

The Court also considers the experience and views of counsel.
Labaton Sucharow has extensive experience representing plaintiffs
in securities and financial class action lawsuits. That such
experienced counsel advocate in favor of the settlement weighs in
favor of approval.

Objections

The absence of a large number of objections to a proposed class
action settlement raises a strong presumption that the terms of a
proposed class settlement action are favorable to the class
members. Here, Class Counsel and the Court received zero
objections.  Many potential class members are sophisticated
institutional investors; the lack of objections from such
institutions indicates that the settlement is fair and reasonable.
Likewise, there were only two requests for exclusion, one of which
KCC deemed invalid. This positive response from the class confirms
that the settlement is fair and reasonable.

Balancing the relevant factors, the Court finds the settlement fair
and reasonable under Rule 23(e) and Hanlon.

The Court finds that notice of the proposed settlement was
adequate, the settlement was not the result of collusion, and the
settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

Accordingly, the Lead Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of
Class Action Settlement and Plan of Allocation is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 22, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2d4baqn from Leagle.com.

Jui-Yang Hong, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Kenneth Joseph Black --
kennyb@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP & Shawn A.
Williams -- shawnwrgrdlaw.com  -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP.

Mark Kasprzak, Plaintiff, represented by Jennifer Pafiti --
jpafiti@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP & Jeremy Alan Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.

Extreme Networks, Inc., Charles W. Berger, Kenneth B. Arola & John
T. Kurtzweil, Defendants, represented by Elliot Schlesinger Katz
-- elliot.katz@dlapiper.com -- Shirli Fabbri Weiss
-shirli.weiss@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper LLP & David Allen Priebe --
david.priebe@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper LLP.

William Reardon, Movant, represented by Laurence Matthew Rosen --
lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.

City of Lakeland Employees Pension Plan, Movant, represented by
Brian O. O'Mara -- bomara@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP, Kenneth Joseph Black, Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP
&Shawn A. Williams, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.


FACEBOOK INC: Court Narrows Claims in Bass Data Breach Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WILLIAM BASS JR., an individual and California
resident, and STEPHEN ADKINS, an individual and Michigan resident,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. FACEBOOK, INC., Defendant, Case No. C 18-05982 WHA
(JSC), Consolidated Case No. C 18-06022 WHA (JSC)., C 19-00117 WHA
(JSC) (N.D. Cal.), Judge William Alsup of the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California granted in part and denied
in part Facebook's motion to dismiss the consolidated complaint
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6).

The "access tokens" star in the instant data breach.  When a
Facebook user logs into Facebook with a specific username and
password, that user can conveniently access Facebook again without
being forced to re-enter that information.  This ease-of-access is
facilitated by the "access token" generated by Facebook for that
user upon his or her first log-in.  The access token operates as an
automatic super password which allows a user to log in numerous
times without typing out their username and password each time.
Many companies, not just Facebook, use this tool to reduce barriers
between the user and the online platform thereby increasing
ease-of-access and efficiency.

Facebook's access tokens, however, carry specific value.  Once a
Facebook user's access token is compromised, all tokens from the
user's shared or connected web applications (like Skype and Uber)
purportedly become accessible.  In addition, anyone with access to
the token can reset all other user data permissions and steal the
tokens of all connected applications without alerting the original
user.  Facebook's access tokens are allegedly the key to a
breathtaking amount of online access.

Importantly, standard industry practice is for companies to limit
the lifespan of the tokens.  By contrast, Facebook allegedly
designed its access tokens to never expire.

On Sept. 14, 2018, Facebook discovered it had a coding
vulnerability related to its "View As" feature.  The vulnerability
revealed users' access tokens.  Hackers accordingly stole the
access tokens for 69,000 users.  This led to the theft of a narrow
set of information for 15 million worldwide users (2.7 million
United States users) and a more comprehensive set of information
for 14 million worldwide users (1.2 million United States users) .

The hacking began sometime after July 2017.  The specific source of
the vulnerability related to the internal coding of Facebook's
"View As" feature.  This feature permitted users to see what their
own "Timeline" looked like to other users.  To illustrate, if a
teenage user wanted to see his own account from the perspective of
his parents' account, the teenager would utilize this "View As"
feature on his own account to "view" the account "as" his parents.
This would enable the teenager to see firsthand what information
his parents could and could not see on the teenager's account.

Facebook's engineering team isolated the security flaws on
September 25, 2018.  Facebook notified potentially affected users
on Sept. 28, 2018.  It then purportedly invalidated the access
tokens of over 90 million accounts that were potentially impacted
by the vulnerability and effected a "forced logout" which "required
users to reenter their passwords" to access their accounts.

After the breach had been publically announced, 11 separate
lawsuits were filed against Facebook.  These lawsuits generally
alleged that Facebook failed to adequately protect its users'
accounts.  A public tutorial on the issue of personal information
in the context of data breaches proceeded in the district court.
The 11 actions were then consolidated and an amended consolidated
complaint was filed.  Five named Plaintiffs filed the consolidated
complaint.  Except for one original named Plaintiff, every named
Plaintiff who had not filed the consolidated complaint voluntarily
withdrew without prejudice.

The consolidated complaint asserted 10 claims on behalf of a class
of Facebook users in the United States whose personal identifiable
information] was compromised in the data breach announced by
Facebook on Sept. 28, 2018.  Those 10 claims are: (i) breach of
contract; (ii) breach of implied contract; (iii) breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (iv) quasi-contract for
non-restitutionary damages; (v) negligence; (vi) negligence per se;
(vii) violation of California's Unfair Competition Law; (viii)
violation of California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act; (ix) breach
of confidence; and (x) declaratory judgment.

Due to the number of consolidated cases, an order was issued
appointing co-interim class counsel to coordinate motion practice
and discovery.  Facebook moved to dismiss.  After full briefing, a
hearing followed in May 2019.  At the hearing, it came to light
that Facebook had asked for, and not received, the benefit of the
Plaintiffs' depositions.  Those depositions were immediately
ordered.

The depositions took place. The parties filed supplemental
briefing.  Three of the five remaining named Plaintiffs abruptly
withdrew.  Facebook moves under two different rules: Rule 12(b)(1)
and Rule 12(b)(6).  

Two named Plaintiffs remain in the action -- Plaintiff Stephen
Adkins and Plaintiff William Bass.  They both allege four theories
of harm due to Facebook's alleged inadequate safeguarding of its
users' personal information.  Facebook has factually attacked the
Plaintiffs' Article III standing by properly presenting the
declaration of Christopher Bream, the individual who led the
security response to the data breach, and depositions of the named
Plaintiffs.  Both the Plaintiffs must now defend jurisdiction by
"furnish[ing] affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its
burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction."

Judge Alsup finds that Adkins satisfied his burden to establish
Article III standing through the dual harms of increased risk of
future harm and loss of time.  As to plaintiff Adkins, Facebook's
Rule 12(b)(1) motion is therefore denied.  

Plaintiff Bass, on the other hand, has not established standing.
Real victims from the data breach exist.  Facebook has put forward
sufficient evidence to show that Plaintiff Bass was not one of
them.  Plaintiff Bass has not sufficiently rebutted this evidence.
Facebook's Rule 12(b)(1) motion as to plaintiff Bass is granted.

Next, the Judge finds that Facebook is not cost-free.  The user
incurs the cost of having his information mined and shared.  Even
if this is not a monetary charge, the user still incurs this
burden.  Nonetheless, the procedure followed by Facebook was fair.
The clause was not buried.  The clause was plainly above board and
contained clear enough language.  True, it is an adhesion contract,
but there is no "rule that an adhesion contract is per se
unconscionable."  No one is forced to enroll in Facebook's social
media service.  The four breach-of-contract claims are therefore
dismissed.  The breach of confidence claim is also dismissed
because it is covered by the clause.

The Judge also finds that the limitation-of-liability clause does
not mention "negligence" at all, let alone unequivocally preclude
liability for negligence.  At this early stage, no facts have been
teased out.  Precluding the claims for negligence pursuant to the
liability clause is therefore impossible.  They remain for now.

He further finds that negligence has been plausibly alleged.
Specifically, Facebook allegedly failed to comply with minimum
data-security standards during the period of the data breach.  The
lack of reasonable care in the handling of personal information can
foreseeably harm the individuals providing the information.

In order to establish standing for Section 17200 and the CLRA, the
Plaintiffs must show that they personally lost money or property as
a result of the unfair competition.  As to the loss of value of the
personal information, Plaintiff Adkins has provided no market for
the personal information or the impairment of the ability to
participate in that market.  This lack of specificity is fatal.  It
is not enough to merely say the information was taken and therefore
it has lost value.  And, even if Plaintiff Adkins did intend to
sell his own data, it is unclear whether or how the data has been
devalued by the breach.  This alleged economic harm therefore also
fails.

Plaintiff Adkins has only plausibly alleged harm arising from risk
of future harm and loss of time.  As alleged, neither of these show
lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.
Accordingly, Plaintiff Adkins has not sufficiently alleged standing
under Section 17200 and the CLRA.

The Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that Facebook's existing
security measures do not comply with its explicit or implicit
contractual obligations to provide adequate security, and duties of
care towards plaintiff's personal identifiable information . A
dispute exists as to the continued risk Plaintiff Adkins and
similarly situated Facebook users face.  While Facebook purports to
have fixed the issues which led to this data breach, it is too
early in the litigation to confidently say whether that is so.
Dismissal of the declaratory judgment relief would be premature.

To the extent stated, Judge Alsup granted in part and denied in
part the motion to dismiss.  Only Plaintiff Adkins may proceed with
his claims.  Plaintiff Bass has not adequately alleged standing.
For plaintiff Bass to proceed, he must specify a connection to the
data breach.  Leave to amend will be allowed for him to attempt to
do so.

Excluding standing, the Judge order holds as follows.  First, the
four breach of contract claims and the breach of confidence claim
cannot move forward because of the limitation-of-liability clause.
Leave to amend will be allowed, however, because facts may
conceivably be alleged which go towards determining whether
procedural unfairness existed upon entering into the contract.  

Second, turning to the next two claims, negligence and negligence
per se, these survive the motion to dismiss as a single claim.  The
limitation-of-liability clause does not preclude negligenc because
contracts that limit liability without mentioning negligence
specifically narrow the scope of liability based on a severe
factual determination.  Some circumstances will bar the claim under
the clause.  Some will cause the claim to survive the clause.  So,
the Judge takes a discovery-first approach to whether the clause
applies to the negligence claim.  Moving past the waiver,
negligence has been plausibly alleged.

Third, turning to the next two claims, the Section 17200/CLRA
claims are barred because the only harm the Plaintiff plausibly
alleged is risk of future harm and loss of time.  Both of these
statutes, however, require economic injury (money/property).
Plaintiff Adkins may seek leave to amend.

Fourth, the last claim is for declaratory judgment.  This claim
survives because the rights of the parties remain unknown at this
early stage.  In sum, only the dual claims for negligence and
declaratory judgment survive the motion to dismiss.  Negligence per
se survives as a theory of the asserted negligence claim but not as
a standalone claim.  The rest of the claims are dismissed with
leave to amend as set forth.  Discovery should be moving with
alacrity.

Finally, both the Plaintiffs may move for leave to amend by July
18, 2019 at noon.  Any such motion should include as an exhibit a
redlined version of the proposed amendments that clearly identifies
all changes from the initial complaint.  The Order highlights
certain deficiencies in the initial complaint, but it will not
necessarily be enough to add a sentence parroting each missing item
identified herein.  If the Plaintiffs so move, they should be sure
to plead their best case.  Any motion should explain how the
proposed complaint overcomes all deficiencies, even those the Order
did not reach.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 21, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/7HjgaY from Leagle.com.

William Bass, Jr., Plaintiff, represented by John A. Yanchunis --
jyanchunis@ForThePeople.com -- Morgan and Morgan, P.A., Tarek H.
Zohdy -- Tarek.Zohdy@CapstoneLawyers.com -- Capstone Lawyers, APC &
Ariana J. Tadler, Milberg Tadler Phillips Grossman LLP.

Stephen Adkins, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew N. Friedman, Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Ariana J. Tadler,
Milberg Tadler Phillips Grossman LLP & John A. Yanchunis, Morgan
and Morgan, P.A.

Luis Licea, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Ebby Shahrokh
Bakhtiar, Livingston Bakhtiar, Keith David Griffin, Girardi &
Keese, Thomas V. Girardi, Girardi & Keese & Ariana J. Tadler,
Milberg Tadler Phillips Grossman LLP.

Facebook, Inc., Defendant, represented by Elizabeth L. Deeley --
elizabeth.deeley@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, Andrew Brian
Clubok -- andrew.clubok@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac
vice, Melanie Marilyn Blunschi -- melanie.blunschi@lw.com -- Latham
& Watkins LLP, Michael H. Rubin -- michael.rubin@lw.com -- Latham &
Watkins LLP, Serrin A. Turner -- serrin.turner@lw.com -- Latham &
Watkins LLP, pro hac vice & Susan E. Engel -- susan.engel@lw.com --
Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice.

Scott Schinder, Interested Party, represented by Andrew N.
Friedman, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC & Lesley Elizabeth
Weaver, Bleichmar Fonti & Auld LLP.


FORD MOTOR CO: Arendt Files Fraud Class Suit in Minn.
-----------------------------------------------------
Mark Arendt, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Ford Motor Company, Defendant, Case No.
19-cv-01886 (D. Minn., July 17, 2019), seeks redress for breach of
the express warranties and for violation of the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act.

Mr. Arendt purchased a new 2018 F-150 Ford SuperCrew truck from
Apple Ford, an authorized Ford dealership, located in Shakopee,
Minnesota. He claims that Ford's fuel economy ratings were
erroneous and overstated.

Ford is engaged in the business of designing, manufacturing,
marketing, warranting, distributing, selling, and leasing
automobiles. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Daniel E. Gustafson, Esq.
     Linda S. Wang, Esq.
     David A. Goodwin, Esq.
     Raina C. Borrelli, Esq.
     GUSTAFSON GLUEK PLLC
     Canadian Pacific Plaza
     120 S. Sixth St., Suite 2600
     Minneapolis, MN 55402
     Tel: (612) 333-8844
     Fax: (612) 339-6622
     Email: dgustafson@gustafsongluek.com
            lwang@gustafsongluek.com
            dgoodwin@gustafsongluek.com
            rborrelli@gustafsongluek.com

            - and -

     Charles Kocher, Esq.
     Simon Paris, Esq.
     Patrick Howard, Esq.
     SALTZ MONGELUZZI BARRETT BENDESKY, PC
     120 Gibraltar Road, Suite 218
     Horsham, PA 19044
     Tel: (215) 575-3985
     Email: ckocher@smbb.com
            sparis@smbb.com
            phoward@smbb.com


GAW MINERS: Court Certifies Class in Audet Securities Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DENIS MARC AUDET, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STUART A.
FRASER, GAW MINERS, LLC, and ZENMINER, LLC, Defendants, Case No.
3:16-cv-0940 (MPS) (D. Conn.), Judge Michael P. Shea of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Connecticut (i) granted the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification to the extent set forth
in the ruling, and (ii) denied as moot Fraser's motion to strike
the declarations of the Plaintiffs' experts.

The case comes from the brave new world of cryptocurrency.  The
Plaintiffs are individuals who invested in products that ostensibly
allowed them to share in the profits generated by "mining" -- or
solving complex mathematical problems to clear transactions in --
digital currency.  They are suing two companies that sold them
these products and an individual who allegedly controlled these
companies, claiming they were defrauded in violation of federal and
state securities laws and the common law.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Companies (1) violated Section 10(b)
of the Securities and Exchange Act; (2) violated Sections
36b-29(a)(2) and 36b-4 of the Connecticut Uniform Securities Act;
(3) violated Conn. Gen. Stat. Section 36b-29(a)(1); and (4) engaged
in common law fraud.  They allege that Fraser is liable as a
control person or aider/abettor under (1) Section 20(a) of the
Securities and Exchange Act; (2) Conn. Gen. Stat. Section
36b-29(a)(2); (3) Conn. Gen. Stat. Section 36b-29(c); and (4)
common law fraud.  

The Plaintiffs seek to certify the following class: All persons or
entities who, between Aug. 1, 2014, and Dec. 1, 2015 purchased or
acquired Hashlets, Hashpoints, HashStakers, and Paycoin from GAW
Miners and ZenMiner.

The Court held a hearing on the Plaintiffs' class certification
motion on April 12, 2019. After the hearing, he received
supplemental submissions from the parties.

Judge Shea must decide whether the Plaintiffs may represent a class
of such investors under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.  He concludes that they may do so and thus granted their
motion to certify the class, although he narrowed the proposed
class to address valid objections raised by the individual
Defendant, who is at this point the only active Defendant in the
case.

The Judge modified the class definition and certified the following
class: All persons or entities who, between Aug. 1, 2014 and Jan.
19, 2015, (1) purchased Hashlets, Hashpoints, HashStakers, or
Paycoin; or (2) acquired Hashlets, Hashpoints, HashStakers, or
Paycoin by converting, upgrading, or exchanging other products sold
by the Companies.  

The Judge denied the Defendant's motion to exclude the Plaintiffs'
expert declarations as moot because he does not rely on them to
reach the conclusion.  

Because the parties have not yet had a chance to comment on the
modified class definition, they may, by July 5, 2019, file briefs
not exceeding 10 pages in which they address any new issues raised
by the modified class definition that the Judge has not already
addressed in the decision.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 21, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/dyaQvx from Leagle.com.

Denis Marc Audet, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Michael Pfeiffer, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, Dean Allen Shinners, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated & Jason Vargas,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Colin M. Watterson --
cwatterson@susmangodfrey.com -- Susman Godfrey, L.L.P., pro hac
vice, Kathryn P. Hoek -- khoek@susmangodfrey.com -- Susman Godfrey
L.L.P, pro hac vice, Marc M. Seltzer -- mseltzer@susmangodfrey.com
-- Susman Godfrey L.L.P, Mark P. Kindall -- mkindall@ikrlaw.com --
Izard, Kindall & Raabe, LLP, Matthew B. Allen --
mallen@susmangodfrey.com -- Susman Godfrey, pro hac vice, Seth D.
Ard -- sard@susmangodfrey.com -- Susman Godfrey L.L.P, pro hac vice
& Robert A. Izard, Jr. -- rizard@ikrlaw.com -- Izard, Kindall &
Raabe, LLP.

Stuart A. Fraser, Defendant, represented by Daniel H. Weiner --
daniel.weiner@hugheshubbard.com -- Hughes, Hubbard & Reed, pro hac
vice, Sara E. Echenique -- sarah.cave@hugheshubbard.com-- Hughes,
Hubbard & Reed L.L.P., pro hac vice, Sarah L. Cave, Hughes, Hubbard
& Reed L.L.P., pro hac vice, David R. Schaefer --
dschaefer@bswlaw.com -- Brenner, Saltzman & Wallman & Sean M.
Fisher -- sfisher@bswlaw.com -- Brenner, Saltzman & Wallman.


GRAGIL ASSOCIATES: Navarro Suit Asserts FDCPA Violation
-------------------------------------------------------
CLARISSA NAVARRO, individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. GRAGIL ASSOCIATES, INC, Defendants, Case
No. 0:19-cv-61901-XXXX (S.D. Fla., July 28, 2019) sues Defendant
for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the
Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act.

The debt at issue is a financial obligation Plaintiff incurred
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. The
Defendant attempted to collect the debt from Plaintiff. However,
the Defendant has never registered, or otherwise been licensed, to
collect consumer debts from Florida consumers in accordance with
the FDCPA. The Defendant cannot legally collect, or attempt to
collect, the Consumer Debt from Plaintiff without first
registering, and thereafter maintaining, a valid consumer
collection agency license, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is a natural person, and a citizen of the State of
Florida, residing in Miami-Dade County, Florida.

Defendant engages in interstate commerce by regularly using
telephone and mail in a business whose principal purpose is the
collection of debts.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     JIBRAEL S. HINDI, ESQ.
     THOMAS J. PATTI, ESQ.
     The Law Offices of Jibrael S. Hindi
     110 SE 6th Street, Suite 1744
     Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
     Phone: 954-907-1136
     Fax: 855-529-9540
     Email: jibrael@jibraellaw.com
            tom@jibraellaw.com


GRAND CANYON: Webb Klase Files Class Action Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------
Atlanta-based law firm Webb, Klase & Lemond, LLC has filed a class
action lawsuit against Grand Canyon University and Grand Canyon
Education, Inc. alleging that Grand Canyon induces students to
enroll in online professional degree and certificate programs that
are not accredited in most states. These programs are primarily in
the educational and healthcare fields for which licensure by state
agencies is required. Because the Grand Canyon programs are not
accredited in the state where the students work, they allege that
they cannot gain the needed state license.

The suit alleges Grand Canyon trains its recruiters to misrepresent
the accreditation status of the school's professional programs. The
suit further alleges that students are enrolled in a course of
study which Grand Canyon knows will not be accepted by the relevant
state due to the program's lack of accreditation. The Class Action
Complaint (at Paragraph 80) seeks to certify a nationwide class
which is preliminarily defined as follows: "All Grand Canyon
University students who have been enrolled in an online
professional graduate degree or certificate program that is not
accredited in the state where they are employed or, if not
employed, where they reside."

The suit alleges that the challenged practice of Grand Canyon
University has impacted tens of thousands of online students and
brings causes of action for fraud, RICO (the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act), misrepresentation, violations of
the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act, and unjust enrichment.

The case, styled Austin, et al. v. Grand Canyon University, Inc.
and Grand Canyon Education, Inc., is pending in the Superior Court
of Fulton County in Atlanta, Georgia, and has been given Case No.
4324168. Even though the case has been filed in Georgia, it seeks
to have a class action certified on behalf of all victims of Grand
Canyon's practices nationwide.

If you would like further information about this action, please
visit http://www.GrandCanyonUniversityLawsuits.comor email
contact@WebbLLC.com [GN]


HEARTLAND FINANCIAL: Bangart Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime
-------------------------------------------------------------
Denise Bangart, on her own behalf and on behalf of those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Heartland Financial USA, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 19-cv-01021, (E.D. Wis., July 17, 2019), seeks payment of
all overtime hours at one and one-half the regular rate of pay for
the hours worked, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys' fees
and costs incurred in this action and all further relief under the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

Defendant owns and operates at least 19 banking locations
throughout the state of Wisconsin where Bangart was a Mortgage Loan
Originator at their Calumet County location. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Carlos Leach, Esq.
      THE LEACH FIRM, P.A.
      1950 Lee Rd., Suite 213
      Winter Park, FL 32789
      Telephone: (407) 574-4999
      Facsimile: (833) 423-5864
      Email: CLeach@theleachfirm.com

             - and -

      Verona Swanigan, Esq.
      THE SWANIGAN FIRM
      425 W. Capitol Ave., Suite #1533
      Little Rock, AR 72201
      Telephone: (866) 603-5239
      Facsimile: (866) 603-5239
      Email: veronaS25@outlook.com


HELIUS MEDICAL: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Class Action Lawsuit
------------------------------------------------------------
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC notifies investors that a class
action lawsuit has been filed against Helius Medical Technologies,
Inc. (NASDAQ: HSDT) and certain of its officers, on behalf of
shareholders who purchased or otherwise acquired Helius securities
from November 9, 2017 and April 10, 2019, inclusive (the "Class
Period"). Such investors are encouraged to join this case by
visiting the firm's site: www.bgandg.com/hsdt

This class action seeks to recover damages against Defendants for
alleged violations of the federal securities laws under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

On January 25, 2019, Helius said that it had received a request for
additional data and information from the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (the "FDA") related to the its request for de novo
classification and 510(k) clearance of its Portable Neuromodulation
Stimulator (PoNS(TM) device. Following this news, Helius stock
dropped $0.48 per share, or roughly 6%, to close at $7.13 on
January 25, 2019.

On April 10, 2019, Helius disclosed that the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") had declined the Company's request for De
Novo classification and clearance of its Portable Neuromodulation
Stimulator device.  The FDA stated that it lacked sufficient data
to determine the relative contributions of the device and physical
therapy in clinical studies.  Following this news, Helius stock
dropped $4.11 per share, or more than 66%, to close at $2.10 on
April 10, 2019.

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that:  (1) that the clinical study on the use of PoNS did not
produce statistically significant results regarding the
effectiveness of the treatment; (2) that, as a result, the clinical
study did not support the Company's application for regulatory
clearance; (3) that, as a result, the Company was unlikely to
receive regulatory approval of PoNS; and (4) that, as a result of
the foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects were materially misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

If you wish to review a copy of the Complaint you can visit the
firm's site: www.bgandg.com/hsdt or you may contact Peretz
Bronstein, Esq. or his Investor Relations Analyst, Yael Hurwitz of
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC at 212-697-6484. If you suffered
a loss in Helius you have until September 9, 2019 to request that
the Court appoint you as lead plaintiff.  A lead plaintiff acts on
behalf of all other class members in directing the litigation. The
lead plaintiff can select a law firm of its choice. Your ability to
share in any recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead
plaintiff.

Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC is a corporate litigation
boutique.  Our primary expertise is the aggressive pursuit of
litigation claims on behalf of our clients.  In addition to
representing institutions and other investor plaintiffs in class
action security litigation, the firm's expertise includes general
corporate and commercial litigation, as well as securities
arbitration.

Contact:

         Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
         Yael Hurwitz, Esq.
         Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC
         Tel.No.: 212-697-6484
         Email: peretz@bgandg.com
                info@bgandg.com [GN]


HENRY COUNTY, IN: Court Certifies Class in Bell Prisoners Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ADAM BELL, Plaintiff, v. SHERIFF OF HENRY COUNTY, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00557-SEB-MJD (S.D. Ind.), Judge
Sarah Evans Barker of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, granted the Plaintiff's
motion to certify class.

In the action, the Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive
relief related to the conditions of the Henry County Jail.  He
seeks certification of the class of all persons currently confined,
or who will in the future be confined, in the Henry County Jail.

The Defendants have responded to the Plaintiff's motion.  They
contest class certification only on the ground that the named
Plaintiff, Bell, does not satisfy the requirement of Rule 23(a)(4).
Specifically, they contend that Mr. Bell will not adequately and
fairly protect the interests of the class because he is no longer a
member of the purported class and lacks standing to pursue the
requested relief

Judge Barker finds that the case is indistinguishable from Olson v.
Brown.  The Defendants argue that the case fails to meet the first
requirement of the inherently transitory exception because inmates
may be incarcerated in the Jail for as much as two and a half
years.  This argument is unavailing, however, because it is the
uncertainty about the length of incarceration, not the maximum
length of incarceration, that controls.  Although Mr. Bell could
have been housed at the Jail for as much as two and a half years,
the duration of his incarceration was not certain at its inception.
As emphasized in Olson, the duration of Mr. Bell's incarceration
was impacted by a number of factors he could not anticipate.  This
uncertainty is precisely what makes the 'inherently transitory'
exception applicable in the case.  

Second, although Mr. Bell has been released from the Jail, he filed
for class certification shortly after filing his complaint and
before being released from the Jail.  The first exception is
satisfied.  The inherently transitory exception applies to the case
and Mr. Bell's release from the Jail does not render the case
moot.

The Defendants present no other challenges to Mr. Bell's ability to
satisfy the requirement in Rule 23(a)(4) that he fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the class.  The evidence
submitted by Mr. Bell establishes that he fulfills this
requirement.  He has averred that he is "strongly committed" to the
case, that he will remain in communication with his attorney, and
that he will make himself available for deposition, discovery, and
trial.  Additionally, the Judge finds that Mr. Bell's counsel is
experienced in class action litigation.

Judge Barker concludes that the Plaintiff has demonstrated that the
action fulfills the requirements of both Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b).
She therefore granted the Plaintiff's motion to certify class.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 25, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/FnSEpZ from Leagle.com.

ADAM BELL, individually and on behalf of a class of those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Kenneth J. Falk, ACLU OF
INDIANA.

SHERIFF OF HENRY COUNTY, in his official capacity & HENRY COUNTY,
INDIANA, Defendants, represented by James S. Stephenson, STEPHENSON
MOROW & SEMLER, Joel Elias Harvey -- jharvey@hcclaw.com -- HAYES
COPENHAVER CRIDER & Pamela G. Schneeman, STEPHENSON MOROW &
SEMLER.


HIGHMARK HEALTH: Court Narrows Claims in Antitrust Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned PRESQUE ISLE
COLON AND RECTAL SURGERY, on Behalf of Itself and All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. HIGHMARK HEALTH, HIGHMARK INC.
f/k/a HIGHMARK HEALTH SERVICES, and HIGHMARK CHOICE COMPANY f/k/a
KEYSTONE HEALTH PLAN WEST, INC., Defendants. Civil Action No.
17-122. (W.D. Pa.).

Plaintiff Presque Isle Colon and Rectal Surgery instituted this
action against Highmark alleging in its original complaint that
Highmark violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act as
well as Pennsylvania's antitrust laws, breached the parties'
contract and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
was unjustly enriched.  

Currently before the Court is Highmark's motion to dismiss the
amended complaint in its entirety, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the amended complaint still
fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

Highmark's central argument is that the amended complaint fails to
adequately plead an antitrust injury. Thus, the Court will begin
there.

Antitrust Injury

At this early stage, the pleading standard is permissive; indeed,
as the Third Circuit has recognized, the existence of antitrust
injury is not typically resolved through motions to dismiss.

An antitrust plaintiff is only required to allege facts capable of
supporting a finding or inference that the purported
anticompetitive conduct produced the purported harm.
  
Highmark claims that Plaintiff has failed to meet even this low
standard in its amended complaint. It moves the Court to dismiss
based largely on the contention that the Plaintiff has advanced
only purely conclusory allegations of reduced output and quality
and that these allegations are "unsupported by any factual
allegations showing harm to competition or consumers. Further, it
alleges that Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead injury
stemming from anticompetitive conduct based on a summary claim of a
$200-300,000 annual loss.

The Plaintiff replies that it has sufficiently alleged antitrust
injury based on pleading that Highmark's anticompetitive conduct,
including predatorily low reimbursement rates for outpatient
services, unnecessary audits, unfair steering of patients away from
independent physicians, and inefficient procedure codes and
requirements, leaves patients with no choice but to turn to
inferior, more costly services and independent physicians with no
choice but to endure Highmark's anticompetitive actions or go out
of business.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged a sufficient antitrust
injury to establish its antitrust standing.

Plaintiff Pleads Injury of the Type the Antitrust Laws Were
Intended to Prevent

Highmark contends that Plaintiff has failed to allege a single
example of an actual reduction in the delivery of outpatient
physician services or any reduction in competition or harm to
consumers. For example, Highland contests that patients will be
forced to turn to inferior, more costly services from
Highmark-controlled facilities. In sum, the thrust of Highmark's
arguments is that Plaintiff has still failed to allege
anticompetitive conduct and that such conduct led to harm to
competition or consumers.

Plaintiff replies that the amended complaint adequately alleges
antitrust injury based on the addition of further alleged
anticompetitive conduct, which supplemented Plaintiff's original
complaint of predatorily low reimbursement rates, including
unnecessary audits, unfair steering, and inefficient procedure
codes and requirements.  

In its amended complaint, however, Plaintiff has added substantive
claims of additional anticompetitive conduct that it alleges has
and will continue to cause adverse effects on competition and
consumers. First, Plaintiff claims it and other independent
physicians have been subjected to unnecessary audits as a means to
claw-back previously disbursed reimbursements that interfere with
treatment decisions. Plaintiff claims that Highmark "does not
subject physicians working at Highmark-controlled facilities to the
same scrutiny. These audits hurt independent physicians by raising
physicians costs and diverting resources away from providing
outpatient colorectal services to patients.

Second, Plaintiff alleges that Highmark subjects independent
physicians to inefficient procedure codes and requirements. These
procedure codes have forced Plaintiff to schedule patients for two
different procedures, where one would suffice, subjecting patients
to inconvenience and burden not to mention any pain and discomfort
resultant from the procedures themselves.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Highmark uses its dominance and
market presences to steer patients away from independent physicians
to its own facility.  

When these allegations are taken in concert with Plaintiff's
allegations of predatory reimbursement reductions, market
dominance, and alleged coercion through the use of the All Product
Clause, a facially plausible pleading emerges.

First, there is plausible harm to competition. Plaintiff has
alleged that Highmark uses its dominance on the buy side of the
market, including insisting on unnecessary audits, inefficient
procedure codes, and predatorily low reimbursement rates, to drive
up the costs for and lower the income of independent physicians. In
fact, this is the entire point according to Plaintiff, as
Highland's dominance on the insurance end of the market allows it
to unfairly compete on the physician services end of the market,
driving independent physicians into the Hobson's choice between
absorption or going out of business. Thus, these allegations are
enough to establish anticompetitive conduct in differentiated
treatment meant to harm competition on the provider side of the
market by utilizing monopsony power on the insurance side of the
market.

Meanwhile, Plaintiff has also plausibly alleged harm to patients.
Through weakening competition between independent physicians and
Highmark facilities by exploiting its position as buyers of medical
services, Plaintiff alleges that patients have been subjected to a
reduction in the quantity and a degradation in the quality of
outpatient physician services. This includes patients being
subjected to unnecessary procedures, increases in premiums, and the
confusion and frustration that potentially arises when being
steered away from one's preferred physician based on what insurance
allegedly will and will not cover.

These allegations, taken as true and as a whole as the Court must,
are sufficient to adequately plead at the 12(b)(6) stage that
Highmark has engaged in anticompetitive conduct and that the
alleged conduct has caused harm to competition and consumers.

Plaintiff Pleads Injury Which Flowed from Anticompetitive Conduct

It is not sufficient for Plaintiff to simply allege that there has
been anticompetitive conduct that caused harm to the market and
consumers. Rather, Plaintiff must also show that it was injured by
the anticompetitive conduct and that the injury flows from that
which makes defendants' acts unlawful.

Highmark contends that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead
this prong of antitrust injury in the amended complaint. It
disputes the amended complaint's contention that Plaintiff has lost
approximately $200,000 to $300,000 annually on two levels.

First, Highmark asserts that the loss is not an antitrust injury
because it does not arise from conduct the type of which the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent.  Second, it attacks the
figure directly by asserting that the alleged losses are
insufficient because they say nothing about whether and to what
extent those losses relate to reimbursements from Highmark or other
payors, how Highmark's reimbursements relate to Plaintiff's costs.
Plaintiff simply responds that it has alleged proper injury based
on the claimed losses of $200,000 to $300,000 annually due to
Highmark's predatory rates.

While Plaintiff's pleading regarding injury stemming from
anticompetitive conduct is barebones, it is sufficient to survive
this stage of the pleadings. Plaintiff has alleged an injury,
$200,000 to $300,000 annually, resulting from a rates drop below
its costs for numerous procedures attributable to predatorily
depressed reimbursement rates.
  
As such, Plaintiff has established a showing of antitrust injury,
which comports with the goals of antitrust law.  Having so
determined, the Court will proceed to examine Plaintiff's
substantive claims under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.

Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act

In counts one and three of the amended complaint, Plaintiff charges
Highmark with unlawful monopsonization and unlawful attempted
monopsonization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act. Similarly, Plaintiff charges Highmark with unlawful
monopsonization and unlawful attempted monopsonization in violation
of Pennsylvania common law in counts two and four. As these causes
of action contain significant overlap, the Court will address them
together.  

Count 1: Unlawful Monopsonization in Violation of Section 2

In its motion to dismiss, Highmark claims that Plaintiff fails to
adequately plead the necessary elements for a claim under Section 2
based largely on the same complaint of conclusory anticompetitive
conduct unconnected to any antitrust injury. Plaintiff's pleading,
according to Highmark, fails to allege the second required element
of willful acquisition or maintenance of power.  

Plaintiff responds that it has adequately pled a Section 2 claim
based on Highmark's dominant position in the market and ability to
effect prices, including reducing prices paid to independent
providers, while simultaneously raising premiums paid by consumers.


As it relates to the first element, market share, Plaintiff claims
that Highmark insures "in excess of" 65-75% of all health insurance
enrollees in Western Pennsylvania and far "in excess of" 65-70% of
all health insurance enrollees in the Erie County MSA. Similarly,
it pleads that Highmark is responsible for buying "at least" 65% of
outpatient services in Western Pennsylvania and well in excess of
65-75% of the same services in the Erie County MSA.  Such high
market shares are sufficient, at this stage, to plead monopsony
power in the relevant markets.

As it relates to the second element, that of the the willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power, a monopolist willfully
acquires or maintains monopoly power when it competes on some basis
other than the merits. The Court has already established that
Plaintiff has sufficiently pled that Highmark engaged in
anticompetitive conduct and that such conduct caused injury to
competition and consumers to survive a 12(b)(6) motion. As such,
the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a claim under
Section 2 to survive a 12(b)(6) challenge.  

Count 3: Unlawful Attempted Monopsonization in Violation of Section
2

Highmark attacks Plaintiff's pleading of attempted monopsonization
on the independent ground that Plaintiff has failed to adequately
allege intent. Plaintiff responds that the amended complaint
alleges that Highmark acted with anticompetitive purpose to gain
unlawful market power sufficient to meet the intent requirement of
attempted monopsonization.  

The amended complaint charges Highmark with engaging in conduct
that had and continues to have an anticompetitive purpose and
effect on competition that was not offset by any procompetitive
benefits. These practices, according to the amended complaint, were
intended to reap supra-competitive profits for Highmark, entrench
its own market power in the outpatient physician services market
and private health insurance market," and force independent
physicians to either join Highmark or go out of business. These
pleadings are sufficient to establish the intent element under
Iqbal's standards.  

Counts 2 and 4: Unlawful Monopsonization and Unlawful Attempted
Monopsonization in Violation of Pennsylvania Common Law

Highmark advances no independent grounds for dismissal of
Plaintiff's Pennsylvania common law antitrust causes of action.
Instead, Highmark's motion to dismiss merely contends that, if the
Court dismisses Plaintiff's causes of action under the Sherman
Antitrust Act, it must also dismiss the common law claims which are
based on identical allegations.

Plaintiff concedes that the elements necessary to plead a
Pennsylvania common law antitrust claim are substantially similar
to its federal claims.  

This, however, is not the full picture. Pennsylvania has no general
antitrust statute, nor any statute creating a private right of
action against restraints of trade. In fact, the Pennsylvania
courts that have examined the issue have expressly concluded that
no private remedy for damages is available under Pennsylvania law.
Numerous federal courts have followed this guidance, disallowing
claims for damages under Pennsylvania common law for antitrust
violations to proceed.
  
Plaintiff's complaint does seek injunctive relief.. As such, the
Court grants Highmark's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Pennsylvania
common law antitrust claims, counts 2 and 4, so far as it seeks
damages but not so far as it seeks injunctive relief.

Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act

Similar in structure to its Section 2 claims, Plaintiff advances
causes of action for unlawful restraint of trade in violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act in counts five and seven and
Pennsylvania common law in counts six and eight. All four causes of
action rest on a theory of unlawful tying, i.e., that Highmark
violated antitrust laws by "unlawfully tying the reimbursement of
outpatient physician services under any of its health insurance
products to the reimbursement of the same under any of its other
health insurance products. Highmark seeks to dismiss all four
causes of action for the simple reason that there is no precedent
to assert a tying theory against an alleged monopsonist.  

Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act outlaws every contract in
restraint of interstate or international trade or commerce.

The Court need not, however, proceed to the substantive
requirements of a prima facia case, because the principals
underlying a tying claim's illegality do not extend from the
established case of a monopolist to a monopsonist. Elaborations on
the underlying principle for the illegality of tying agreements
consistently emphasize concerns over sellers' market power, not
buyers.  

As Highmark points out, tying arrangements raise antitrust concerns
among courts for three prominent reasons. First, such agreements
foreclose markets to competitors. Plaintiff does not refute this
underlying logic.  

As Highmark points out, Plaintiff is unable to identify a case in
which a court extended tying liability to a monopsonist. The Court
is also unable to find such a case. As such, the Court will dismiss
Plaintiff's amended unlawful restraint of trade counts of action
under violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act and
Pennsylvania common law without leave to amend.

Parker State Action Doctrine

In the event that the Court declined to dismiss some or all of the
Plaintiff's antitrust claims, as it has, Highmark contends it is
insulated from antitrust liability by the Parker state action
doctrine. The Parker doctrine descends from Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341(1943), in which the Supreme Court held that States are
immune from antitrust liability because the purpose of the Sherman
Antitrust Act was to suppress combinations to restrain competition
and attempts to monopolize by individuals and corporations and gave
no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official
action directed by a state.

Plaintiff contests the applicability of the Parker doctrine to this
case. In its opposition, Plaintiff in essence argues that
Highmark's Parker contentions are both too broad and too deep.

First, Plaintiff claims that its allegations of antitrust conduct
extend beyond the PPA and the All Products Clause. Thus, Highmark's
invocation of the Parker doctrine sweeps too broadly in attempting
to immunize all of Highmark's alleged anticompetitive actions
simply through the State's approval of the PPA. Second, Plaintiff
claims that Highmark extends the Parker doctrine too deeply,
attempting to expand a simple ministerial approval into an
expression of state policy approving anticompetitive conduct.

In this instance, Plaintiff's arguments carry the day.

In order to invoke the protections of the Parker doctrine in this
instance, Highmark must pass a rigorous two-part test: first, the
state must enact a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed'
policy permitting anticompetitive conduct; and second, the State
must actively supervise that conduct. Highmark bears the burden of
establishing this affirmative defense.  

As to the first prong, that of clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed, it is not enough that anticompetitive
conduct is prompted' by state action; rather, anticompetitive
activities must be compelled by direction of the State acting as a
sovereign. Instead, competition may only be displaced if the
displacement is both intended by the State and implemented in its
specific details and thus is applicable only when it is clear that
the challenged anticompetitive conduct is undertaken pursuant to a
regulatory scheme that `is the State's own.

Regarding the second prong, active supervision, the inquiry is
whether the State has exercised sufficient independent judgment and
control to establish that the anticompetitive conduct was
sanctioned as a product of deliberate state intervention.

With these principles in mind, Highmark's appeal to the Parker
doctrine is unavailing for two independent reasons. First, Highmark
is incorrect that all of Plaintiff's alleged harms flow from the
All Products Clause and the PPA, the state approval of which
provides the basis for its invocation of the Parker doctrine. As
Plaintiff replies, the all products clause is but one aspect of
Highmark's anticompetitive behavior. As previously discussed,
Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges other anticompetitive
conduct, which the Court considered to determine whether Plaintiff
had met the pleading requirements to establish anticompetitive
conduct. Plaintiff's amended complaint characterizes the All
Products clause as an exacerbating factor, not a sole factor. There
is no indication in the Pennsylvania administrative code, or
Exhibit A, that Pennsylvania approved of Plaintiff's alleged other
anticompetitive conduct or the reduced rates of primary concern to
Plaintiff.

As such, Highmark has failed to make a prima facia showing that the
Parker doctrine is broadly applicable to all the alleged conduct.

Second, Highmark fails to meet the substantive requirements of the
Midcal standard. Quite simply, Highmark overstates the extent of
Pennsylvania's approval of its actions through submission and
review of the draft PPA. For example, Section 9.722 contains no
indication that the DOH reviews for antitrust concerns, let alone
expresses a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy to permit anticompetitive conduct.  

Nor does the submission of annual and quarterly reports, as
required by 28 Pa. Code Section 9.604 and pointed to by Highmark,
prove active supervision where, again, the provision evidences no
condoning of anticompetitive activity. Nothing within either texts
provides evidence of a policy approving all the possible negative
ramifications that may arise from the contract or inoculating plans
from federal antitrust scrutiny.

As such, Highmark's invocation of the Parker doctrine is
unavailing, and Plaintiff's surviving antitrust claims may
proceed.

Count Nine: Unjust Enrichment

Having determined that at least some of Plaintiff's antitrust
causes of action may stand, the Court will address the pendant
common law causes of action. The first of which, in count nine, is
Plaintiff's claim of unjust enrichment based on the allegation that
Highmark knowingly received and retained wrongful benefits in the
form of the difference in the amount of the reimbursement rates and
claw-back audits as well as other wrongfully held amounts.

Highmark moves to dismiss this cause of action based on the
contention that a cause of action for unjust enrichment may arise
only when a transaction of the parties is not otherwise governed by
an express contract.  

The Court is persuaded that Highmark is correct. First, as Highmark
points out, under both Third Circuit precedent and Pennsylvania law
unjust enrichment is inapposite where a valid contract exists.
Nowhere in its complaint or subsequent pleadings has Plaintiff
claimed that the PPA is invalid.  

Plaintiff's sole precedential support is unavailing. It points to
only one out-of-Circuit case, Quality Auto Painting Ctr. Of
Roselle, Inc. v. v. State Farm Indem. Co., 870 F.3d. 1262 (11th
Cir. 2017), for the proposition that the existence of the PPA does
not extinguish its unjust enrichment claim. That case, however,
rested its conclusion on an assumption that a valid contract did
not exist between the parties.  

The Court therefore will dismiss Plaintiff's cause of action for
unjust enrichment with prejudice.

Count Ten: Breach of Contract and Implied Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing

Plaintiff pleads its claim for breach of contract and breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in one count. As
the parties have argued separate theories for dismissing or
maintaining these separate grounds, the Court will address them in
turn.

Breach of Contract

Plaintiff does not allege a breach of the terms of the PPA itself.
Instead, the amended complaint accuses Highmark of violating the
ACA's antidiscrimination provision, which the PPA in turn
incorporates by reference.

While Highmark contests whether it materially violated the
provisions of the ACA, Highmark chiefly argues that Plaintiff
cannot assert a breach of action claim under Pennsylvania law based
on the incorporation of a statute which gives Plaintiff no private
right of action. Plaintiff disagrees based on the substance and
understanding of Pennsylvania law and the ACA.  

The Court finds Petty v. Hosp. Serv. Ass'n of Ne. Pennsylvania, 23
A.3d 1004 (Pa. 2011) persuasive and controlling for the proposition
that Plaintiff cannot assert a claim for breach of contract in this
instance. In Petty, Pennsylvania's Supreme Court set out to
determine whether an employer could assert a breach of contract
claim against a nonprofit hospital corporation that contracted to
provide health insurance coverage to the employer's employees.  

The problem with Plaintiff's argument is that it is incorrect in
its assertion that the ACA lacks any limit on who can sue under it.
There is fair consensus that the ACA's antidiscrimination
provision, does not create a private right of action. Thus, under
Pennsylvania law, Plaintiff does not have standing to assert a
breach of contract claim based on the ACA, where it could not
enforce its rights directly through the ACA.

Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Highmark, according to Plaintiff, violated that duty by
unilaterally imposing discriminatory reimbursement rate cuts and
engaging in other unfair, anticompetitive conduct. Highmark
counters that to the extent that Plaintiff purports to base its
claim for breach of fiduciary duty on such allegations, dismissal
is appropriate because, under Pennsylvania law, such claims must be
based on a specific provision of a contract.  

Plaintiff's however, can point to such a provision, the variable
reimbursement rate clause, which provides that allowances paid to
specialist] may be reviewed and adjusted from time to time during
the Term.Thus, Plaintiff contends that even if the PPA affords
Highmark the discretion to pay whatever rates it chooses, Highmark
still has a duty to exercise its discretion in good faith.
  
Under Pennsylvania law, a duty of good faith is not divorced from
the specific clauses of the contract and cannot be used to override
an express contractual term. Instead, the duty is defined as
honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned. As the
Pennsylvania Court of Common pleas has stated, after confessing
that the duty is shrouded in mystery and confusion in Pennsylvania,
the duty does not allow for a claim separate and distinct from a
breach of contract claim but rather a claim arising from a breach
of the covenant of good faith must be prosecuted as a breach of
contract claim, as the covenant does nothing more than imply
certain obligations into the contract itself.

Pennsylvania Courts have recognized that it is not possible to
classify every situation constituting a breach of the duty, but
have instead determined that examples include evasion of the spirit
of the bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off, willful
rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of a power to specify
terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other
party's performance.

Thus, Plaintiff's breach of contract and implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing may survive to the extent that Plaintiff
alleges that Highmark exercised its contractual rights under the
variable rates clause in violation of its duty of good faith but
not to the extent that either (1) it violated the terms of the PPA
by exercising its right to adjust rates in the first place or (2)
by adjusting rates it violated the antidiscrimination provision of
the ACA.

Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied as to
counts 1 and 3.

The Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied as to counts 2 and 4,
to the extent that Plaintiff seeks only injunctive relief.

The Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted as to counts 5, 6, 7,
and 8. Counts 5, 6, 7, and 8 are dismissed with prejudice.

The Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted as to count 9. Count 9
is dismissed with prejudice.

The Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in
part as to count 10.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 22, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yyhtbndr from Leagle.com.

PRESQUE ISLE COLON AND RECTAL SURGERY, Plaintiff, represented by
Kenneth J. Grunfeld -- kgrunfeld@golombhonik.com -- Golomb & Honik,
P.C.

HIGHMARK HEALTH, HIGHMARK INC., formerly known as HIGHMARK HEALTH
SERVICES & HIGHMARK CHOICE COMPANY, formerly known as KEYSTONE
HEALTH PLAN WEST, INC., Defendants, represented by Daniel I. Booker
-- dbooker@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP, Courtney B. Averbach --
caverbach@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP & William J. Sheridan --
wsheridan@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP.


IDEANOMICS INC: Pomerantz Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP announces that a class action lawsuit has been filed
against Ideanomics, Inc. f/k/a Seven Stars Cloud Group, Inc. f/k/a
Wecast Network Inc. (NASDAQ:IDEX) and certain of its officers.  The
class action, filed in United States District Court, for the
Southern District of New York, and indexed under 19-cv-06741, is on
behalf of a class consisting of all persons and entities other than
Defendants who purchased or otherwise acquired Ideanomics
securities between May 15, 2017 and November 13, 2018, both dates
inclusive (the "Class Period").  Plaintiff asserts claims against
Ideanomics and certain of Ideanomics' officers and directors
(collectively, "Defendants") under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act").

If you are a shareholder who purchased Ideanomics securities during
the class period, you have until September 17, 2019, to ask the
Court to appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of
the Complaint can be obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com To discuss
this action, contact Robert S. Willoughby at
rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or 888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW),
toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who inquire by e-mail are encouraged to
include their mailing address, telephone number, and the number of
shares purchased.

Ideanomics purports to operate as a financial technology and asset
digitization services company.  The Company asserts that its
"business model is to become a next-generation [fintech] company,
with the intention of offering both traditional financing solutions
and digital financing solutions based on the emergence of trading
systems that utilize blockchain and artificial intelligence
technologies."  Historically, however, Ideanomics' purported
business activities have varied widely and changed with some
frequency.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, the
defendants made materially false and/or misleading statements, as
well as failed to disclose material adverse facts about the
Company's business, operations, and prospects. Specifically, the
defendants failed to disclose to investors that: (i) costs
associated with building out Ideanomics' U.S. infrastructure and
hiring its new executive team were negatively impacting the
Company's bottom line performance; (ii) as a result, Ideanomics was
highly unlikely to meet its 2018 EBITDA guidance; (iii) Ideanomics'
margins in its oil trading and consumer electronics businesses were
too low for those businesses to remain viable; and (iv) as a
result, Ideanomics' public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

On November 14, 2018, the Company issued a press release, filed as
an exhibit to a Current Report on Form 8-K with the SEC, announcing
the Company's financial and operating results for the third quarter
of 2018 (the "Q3 2018 Press Release").  In the Q3 2018 Press
Release, Ideanomics reported that "we intend to phase out our oil
trading and consumer electronics businesses, with the intention to
fully divest these assets in the near future," citing "low margins
in relation to top line sales."  Ideanomics further reported that
"[c]osts associated with building out our U.S. infrastructure and
hiring our new executive team have put a strain on our bottom line
performance, resulting in our increased net loss for the third
quarter of 2018 as compared to the third quarter of 2017," and that
accordingly, "we do not anticipate meeting our EBITDA guidance of
$35 million for fiscal year 2018."

On this news, Ideanomics' stock price fell $1.59 per share, or
48.77%, to close at $1.67 per share on November 14, 2018, damaging
investors.

The Pomerantz Firm, with offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles,
and Paris, is acknowledged as one of the premier firms in the areas
of corporate, securities, and antitrust class litigation. Founded
by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known as the dean of the class
action bar, the Pomerantz Firm pioneered the field of securities
class actions. Today, more than 80 years later, the Pomerantz Firm
continues in the tradition he established, fighting for the rights
of the victims of securities fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, and
corporate misconduct. The Firm has recovered numerous
multimillion-dollar damages awards on behalf of class members.

CONTACT:

         Robert S. Willoughby, Esq.
         Pomerantz LLP
         Email: rswilloughby@pomlaw.com [GN]


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Hernandez Sues Over Tylenol's Misleading Labels
------------------------------------------------------------------
EDUARDO HERNANDEZ, GREG HOFER, MARGARET CRINER, ROBERT URANTIA,
TERRI ELSE, THOMAS BUTLER, GLENN PARKER, and MAURA TUSO, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated v. JOHNSON &
JOHNSON CONSUMER INC., Case No. 3:19-cv-15679 (D.N.J., July 22,
2019), alleges that J&J sells its Tylenol(R) rapid release gelcaps
with false, misleading, deceptive labeling and marketing in an
effort to dupe consumers into purchasing these gelcaps for prices
that exceed their true value.

Despite what J&J's marketing and labeling would have consumers
believe, the term "rapid release" does not actually mean that the
drug works faster for consumers than non-rapid release products,
the Plaintiffs contend.

Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc. is an Indiana foreign corporation
that maintains its principal place of business in Skillman,
Somerset County, New Jersey.  The relevant division of Johnson &
Johnson Consumer Inc. is McNeil Consumer Healthcare Division, which
is located in Fort Washington, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania.

J&J produces, manufactures, markets, and distributes
over-the-counter products to families, children, and other
consumers worldwide, including analgesic or pain-relieving
medicines under the Tylenol(R) brand name.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Mitchell M. Breit, Esq.
          SIMMONS HANLY CONROY
          112 Madison Avenue, 7th Floor
          New York, NY 10016-7416
          Telephone: (212) 784-6400
          Facsimile: (212) 213-5949
          E-mail: mbreit@simmonsfirm.com


KCG HOLDINGS: Bid to Dismiss Amended Chester Suit Denied
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHESTER COUNTY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT FUND on behalf of
itself and all other similarly situated former stockholders of KCG
HOLDINGS, INC., Plaintiff, v. KCG HOLDINGS, INC., DEBRA J.
CHRAPATY, DANIEL COLEMAN, PETER R. FISHER, CHARLES E. HALDEMAN,
JR., RENE M. KERN, JAMES T. MILDE, JOHN C. (HANS) MORRIS, ALASTAIR
RAMPELL, DANIEL F. SCHMITT, LAURIE M. SHAHON, COLIN SMITH, HEATHER
E. TOOKES, ADRIAN WELLER, VIRTU FINANCIAL, INC., and JEFFERIES LLC,
Defendants, C.A. No. 2017-0421-KSJM (Del. Ch.), Judge Kathaleen S.
McCormick of the Court of Chancery of Delaware denied the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint.

In July 2017, Virtu Financial, Inc. acquired KCG  for $20 per
share.  In the case, a former KCG stockholder alleges KCG's
directors failed to maximize value for the KCG stockholders in
negotiating the merger, largely because of the actions of different
influencers at both the beginning and the very end of the process
that led to the transaction.

At the front end of the process, the Plaintiff points to secret
dealings between Virtu and Jefferies, LLC, KCG's largest
stockholder and long-time financial advisor, which allegedly
undermined the KCG board's ability to extract greater value from
Virtu.  The Plaintiff contends that beginning in December 2016 and
continuing through February 2017, Virtu and Jefferies met and
discussed a potential acquisition of KCG.  During that time,
Jefferies proposed to Virtu that a sale of KCG's standalone
bond-trading platform, BondPoint, would increase KCG's tangible
book value ("TBV") to over $21 per share.  Jefferies even gave
Virtu confidential information about BondPoint, information which
the Plaintiff alleges Jefferies obtained as KCG's financial
advisor.  The Plaintiff posits that by mid-February, Virtu and
Jefferies had agreed that Jefferies would support a $20 per share
deal price, and Virtu would sell BondPoint post-acquisition using
Jefferies as its financial advisor.

Meanwhile, KCG's board was unaware that Virtu was interested in
acquiring KCG until late February.  On Feb. 23, 2017, Virtu sent
KCG's board a proposal to acquire KCG at a price in the range of
$18.50 to $20 per share.  At the time, Jefferies was advising KCG's
board on a restructuring plan that KCG's management believed was a
financially superior alternative to KCG's offer.  KCG's board still
determined to engage in negotiations with Virtu at Jefferies'
recommendation.

Just before KCG received Virtu's initial expression of interest,
Jefferies informed KCG's board of some -- but not all -- of its
discussions with Virtu.  Not immediately, but eventually, KCG
became suspicious of Jefferies, tried to exclude Jefferies from the
sales process, and hired another financial advisor.  But Jefferies
continued to advise KCG on the restructuring plan and pressure
KCG's board to pursue a transaction with Virtu.

At the back end of the process, the Plaintiff points to different
culprits.  In April 2017, Virtu made its best and final bid of $20
per share.  Every director except for KCG's CEO, Daniel Coleman,
approved a $20.21 per share counteroffer.  Coleman told the board
that a $20.21 counteroffer was "too low" and that the restructuring
plan would create 25% more value than KCG's offer.  Still, Coleman
promised that he would support the merger if he could negotiate a
satisfactory compensation and retention pool for himself and his
management team.  Coleman's desire to obtain compensation for his
management team conflicted with the KCG board's obligation to
maximize consideration paid to the KCG stockholders.  Despite this
conflict, the board authorized Coleman to negotiate simultaneously
the compensation pool and deal price.  In the end, KCG rejected the
$20.21 counteroffer and Coleman negotiated a compensation pool to
his satisfaction.  Then, the KCG board -- including Coleman --
approved a $20 per share price.

Compounding concerns, the night before the board approved the $20
per share price, Coleman and his management team revised the
company's financial projections to be more pessimistic.  The
Plaintiff says that the board approved those revisions over email.
KCG's financial advisor then based the fairness opinion on the more
pessimistic projections.  With the revised projections, the deal
price fit squarely in the middle of the financial advisor's
discounted cash flow analysis.

The Plaintiff commenced the litigation shortly after KCG announced
the merger.  Initially, it sought a preliminary injunction based on
a claim that the merger was subject to anti-takeover measures found
in Section 203 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.  After
discovery on the preliminary injunction motion, KCG issued a new
proxy designed to moot the Plaintiff's Section 203 claim, and the
Plaintiff withdrew the preliminary injunction motion. Using
documents and testimony obtained in the preliminary injunction
phase, the Plaintiff amended its complaint to allege that the
director Defendants breached their fiduciary duties in negotiating
and approving the merger and that Virtu and Jefferies aided and
abetted in those breaches.  The Plaintiff also asserted a civil
conspiracy claim against Virtu and Jefferies.

The Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint.  They argue
that the merger is subject to the deferential business judgment
standard of review under Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings, LLC
because it was approved by a majority of KCG's stockholders in a
fully informed, uncoerced vote.

However, Judge McCormick finds that the Plaintiff has identified
three significant deficiencies in the Defendants' disclosures
concerning the merger that render the stockholder vote uninformed.

First, the proxy fails to disclose detailed information about the
BondPoint divestiture strategy proposed by Jefferies to Virtu.  The
proxy instead includes an ambiguous statement that Jefferies
proposed that "certain divestitures" could raise KCG's TBV,
creating the misleading impression that the divestiture strategy
was undeveloped.  By contrast, the complaint portrays a detailed,
BondPoint-specific divestiture strategy informed by confidential
financial information not previously disclosed to the stockholders.
Next, the proxy fails to disclose Coleman's initial "too low" view
of the $20.21 per share counteroffer, later support of the $20 per
share deal price, and intervening negotiations of the compensation
pool.  Last, the proxy fails to disclose the more optimistic,
earlier projections presented during the merger negotiations and
the circumstances surrounding the creation of the later revised
projections.  It is reasonably conceivable that a stockholder would
view the omitted facts as material and that the information
disclosed is materially misleading.

Because the Plaintiff alleges facts sufficient to support a finding
that the stockholder vote was not fully informed, Corwin does not
lead to dismissal.

As an independent basis for dismissal, the Defendants argue that
the Plaintiff fails to state non-exculpated claims against the
director Defendants.  The complaint, however, adequately alleges
that the director Defendants were fully complicit in the procedural
flaws at the back-end negotiations.  According to the complaint,
the director Defendants knowingly placed Coleman in a position to
extract compensation for management at the expense of the per share
merger price received by the stockholders.  They then approved
last-minute revisions to the company's projections that made the
deal price more reasonable relative to the company's discounted
cash flow valuation. These actions are enough to infer bad faith
and state a non-exculpated claim for breach of fiduciary duties.

The claims of aiding and abetting and conspiracy against Virtu and
Jefferies also survive the Defendants' motion.  Claims for breach
of the duty of care, though exculpated, provide a valid predicate
for claims of aiding and abetting.  Here, at a minimum, the
Plaintiff's concerns about the front-end process flaws concerning
Jefferies and Virtu's secret negotiations adequately state a claim
that the director Defendants breached their duty of care.

The complaint also adequately alleges that Virtu and Jefferies
created the sort of informational vacuum the Court has found
sufficient to constitute knowing participation in a breach of
fiduciary duties in support of an aiding and abetting claim.
Further, the complaint adequately alleges facts from which it can
be inferred that Virtu and Jefferies conspired to pursue the merger
for their own benefit and to the detriment of the stockholder
class.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge McCormick denied the Defendants'
motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 21, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/S9Be1L from Leagle.com.

Michael Hanrahan, Paul A. Fioravanti, Jr. --
pafioravanti@prickett.com -- Kevin H. Davenport --
khdavenport@prickett.com -- Samuel L. Closic --
slclosic@prickett.com -- Eric J. Juray -- ejjuray@prickett.com --
PRICKETT, JONES & ELLIOTT, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Eric L.
Zagar, J. Daniel Albert, Stacey A. Greenspan, Matthew C. Benedict,
KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP, Radnor, Pennsylvania; Counsel
for Chester County Employees' Retirement Fund.

Daniel A. Mason -- dmason@paulweiss.com -- Brendan W. Sullivan --
bsullivan@paulweiss.com -- PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON
LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Andrew G. Gordon, Susanna M. Buergel,
PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP, New York, New York;
Counsel for Virtu Financial, Inc. and KCG Holdings Inc. (n/k/a
Virtu KCG Holdings LLC).

William M. Lafferty, Ryan D. Stottmann, Coleen W. Hill, MORRIS,
NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Counsel for
Defendants Debra J. Chrapaty, Daniel Coleman, Peter R. Fisher,
Charles E. Haldeman, Jr., Rene M. Kern, James T. Milde, John C.
(Hans) Morris, Alastair Rampell, Daniel F. Schmitt, Laurie M.
Shahon, Colin Smith, Heather E. Tookes and Adrian Weller.

Gregory V. Varallo, Kevin M. Gallagher, Sarah T. Andrade, RICHARDS,
LAYTON & FINGER, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Brian A. Herman, John
M. Maloy, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP; Counsel for Jefferies LLC.


KIDS BEHAVIORAL: Bonanini Seeks to Recover Damages Under WARN Act
-----------------------------------------------------------------
VALERIE BONANINI, JIM BOOTHE, JOLYNN BROWNING, DENISE BUXTON,
MICHELLE CRAWFORD, MYRA DEAVEL, LINDA HARDING, KIMBERLY HOLM,
MICHELE HUBERSTEARNS, DARLENE JAEGER, WANDA JOHNSON, COLLEEN KAHM,
KATHY KOPF, TAYLER LIEBEL, AMY MARTIN, JEAN PARNELL, PATRICIA
PETERSON, BRYNN RALPH, TAWNA REDFERN, PATRICIA ROONEY, CHELSEA
ROSALES, LENA SCHWARTZMILLER, SUMMER SHARKEY, SHERRY SPEAR, SHEILA
STRATFORD, LELAND SWANSON, NOREEN SWANSON, CHEYENNE TAYLOR, DANA
THOMPSON, SARA WELDON, Individually and on Behalf of the Class of
All Kids Behavioral Health Employees Similarly Situated v. KIDS
BEHAVIORAL HEALTH OF MONTANA, INC., dba ACADIA MONTANA, dba
ALTACARE OF MONTANA, Case No. 2:19-cv-00033-BMM-JCL (D. Mont., July
19, 2019), seeks to recover damages under the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act of 1988 and the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant violated the WARN Act by
failing to give them and the other similarly situated employees at
least 60 days' advance written notice of termination as a result of
a planned mass layoff and/or plant closing ordered by the Defendant
on July 14, 2019.

Kids Behavioral Health Of Montana, Inc., doing business as Acadia
Montana and Altacare of Montana, is an entity incorporated in the
state of Montana, which is doing business in Butte-Silver Bow
County and the state of Montana.

The Defendant owned and operated its facilities in and out of Butte
providing mental health services, residential mental health care
and hospitalization to children and providing mental health
services to schools and school districts.  The Defendant operated
under the assumed business names of Altacare and Acadia from the
same location.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Robert G. McCarthy, Esq.
          MCCARTHY LAW, PC
          3738 Harrison Avenue
          Butte, MT 59701
          Telephone: (406) 494-2500
          E-mail: bob@mccarthylaw.net


KIEWIT CORP: Avila Labor Suit Remanded to California State Court
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MELVIN AVILA, Plaintiff, v. KIEWIT CORPORATION, ET
AL., Defendants, Case No. CV 19-1295-PJW (C.D. Cal.), Magistrate
Judge Patrick J. Walsh of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California remanded the case back to Los Angeles County
Superior Court.

In January 2019, the Plaintiff filed the action in the Superior
Court against his former employer, Defendant Kiewit.  He claimed
that the Defendant failed to pay proper wages, provide meal breaks,
etc.  He brought the action on behalf of present and past employees
similarly situated and sought class certification.

In February 2019, the Defendant removed the case to the Court,
arguing that federal jurisdiction existed under the Class Action
Fairness Act.  The Plaintiff now moves to remand the case back to
the Superior Court on the ground that the Defendant has not shown
that the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, a
jurisdictional requirement under CAFA.

Magistrate Judge Walsh finds that the Defendant complains that it
cannot provide additional evidence because the Plaintiff has
brought only "off the book" claims -- such as unpaid overtime hours
-- for which no records exist.  He acknowledges the difficulty the
Defendant faces in establishing the amount in controversy at this
stage of the proceedings but finds that this is not enough to
justify lowering the bar.  Further, he notes that remand does not
deprive the Defendant of a forum to litigate the case; it only
deprives it of litigating the case in its preferred forum.

Finally, in his motion for remand, the Plaintiff asks the Court to
award $9,100 in attorney's fees because he believes that the
Defendant acted unreasonably when he removed the case.  The Judge
denied this request.  Though Defendant was not able to meet its
burden of proof in opposing the Plaintiff's motion for remand, that
does not mean that it acted unreasonably when it removed the case
from state court.  It is clear to the Judge that before the ink is
dry on this decision, the parties and their counsel will be
switching their positions, with the Plaintiff's side arguing that
the damages are well above the $5 million mark and the Defendant's
camp arguing that they are not.

For these reasons, Magistrate Judge Walsh remanded the case to the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County.  He denid the Plaintiff's
request for attorney's fees.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 25, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/cC22VA from Leagle.com.

Melvin Avila, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Allen Victor Feghali --
allen.feghali@moonyanglaw.com -- Moon and Yang APC, Howard Scott
Leviant -- scott.leviant@moonyanglaw.com -- Moon and Yang APC, Kane
Moon -- kane.moon@moonyanglaw.com -- Moon and Yang APC & Lilit
Ter-Astvatsatryan , Moon and Yang APC.

Kiewit Corporation, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant, represented
by Arthur J. Rooney, Baker and McKenzie LLP, pro hac vice & Michael
David Hidalgo -- michael.hidalgo@bakermckenzie.com -- Baker and
McKenzie LLP.


LANNETT COMPANY: Class Action Survives Motion to Dismiss
--------------------------------------------------------
The Law Offices of Timothy L. Miles, who has been leading the fight
to protect shareholder rights for over 18 years, announces that
Lannett Company (LCI) may face damages caused by a pending
securities lawsuit action lawsuit. Lannett develops, manufactures,
packages, markets, and distributes generic versions of brand
pharmaceutical products in the United States.

Investors filed a class action complaint against Lannett for
alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
According to the complaint, since 2013, Lannett's business strategy
has been to collusively enter into industry-wide anti-competitive
agreements with other generic drug manufacturers. Extensive
regulatory investigations revealed that Lannett was involved in an
industry-wide conspiracy to fix prices and allocate territories for
the sale of at least 18 different generic medications.
Nevertheless, Lannett insiders misled investors by stating that
price increases were the result of legitimate and competitive
market forces contrary to their knowledge that the market was being
driven by antitrust violations. The complaint further alleges that
Lannett insiders misrepresented the scope of their investigations
into potential antitrust violations and the likelihood that Lannett
would be implicated in the broader price-fixing procecutions.
Capitalizing on Lannett's artificially inflated stock prices,
certain executives made nearly $10 million in insider sales. As a
result of its price-fixing, Lannett is now defending itself against
regulatory inquiries and investigations and private lawsuits
alleging securities fraud, consumer deception, and violations of
state and federal antitrust laws. On May 15, 2019, U.S. District
Court Judge Wendy Beetlestone denied Lannett's motion to dismiss
plaintiffs' complaint, paving the way for litigation to proceed.

If you purchased Lannett securities, have information, or would
like to learn more about these claims, or have any questions
concerning this announcement or your rights or interests with
respect to these matters, please contact Timothy L. Miles, Esquire,
at 615-587-7384, Toll-Free at 855-846-6529, or by email to
tmiles@timmileslaw.com. If you inquire by email please include your
mailing address, telephone number, and the number and dates of
shares purchased.

Timothy L. Miles is a nationally recognized shareholder rights
attorney from Nashville, Tennessee. Mr. Miles maintains the AV
Preeminent Rating by Martindale-Hubbell, their highest rating for
both legal ability and ethics, and is a is a member of the
prestigious Top 100 Civil Plaintiff Trial Lawyers: The National
Trial Lawyers Association, and is also a supurb rated attorney by
Avvo, and the only class action lawyer in Nashville with an Avvo
rating of 10, their highest rating available. Awards: Member of the
Top 100 Civil Plaintiff Trial Lawyers: The National Trial Lawyers
Association (2017-2019); AV® Preeminent(TM) Rating by
Martindale-Hubble(R) (2014-2019); PRR AV Preeminent Rating on
Lawyers.com (2017 & 2019); The Top-Rated Lawyer in Litigation(TM)
for Ethical Standards and Legal Ability (Martindale-Hubble(R)
2015); Superb Rated Attorney (Avvo); Avvo Top Rated Lawyer for 2017
& 2018 (Avvo); Distinguished Lawyer (Lawyers of Disinction, 2019);
America's Most Honored Professionals 2018 - Top 1% (The American
Registry 2016-2018).

Contact:

         Timothy L. Miles, Esq.
         Law Offices of Timothy L. Miles
         124 Shiloh Ridge
         Hendersonville, TN 37075
         Telephone: (855-846-6529)
         Website: www.timmileslaw.com
         Email: tmiles@timmileslaw.com [GN]


LEE LAW OFFICES: Shanahan FDCA Suit Settlement Has Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TIMOTHY J. SHANAHAN JR. and MOLLI M. LARSEN, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. LEE
LAW OFFICES, et al., Defendants, Case No. 8:18-CV-129 (D. Neb.),
Judge John M. Gerrard of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Nebraska granted (i) the parties' Joint Motion for Final
Approval of Class Settlement, and (ii) the Plaintiffs' Unopposed
Motion for Approval of Plaintiffs' Incentive Awards & Damages and
Plaintiffs' Attorneys' Fees and Costs.

The action was filed on March 23, 2018, and the settlement
agreement at issue was executed by the parties on Oct. 30, 2018.
The parties filed a joint motion, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)
and (e), to certify the settlement class, preliminarily approve the
settlement agreement, and approve the form and manner of notice to
the class.  In an order entered Feb. 19, 2019, the Court granted
that motion.  The Court designated class representatives, appointed
settlement class counsel and a claims administrator, and scheduled
a fairness hearing.

On June 4, the present motion to approve the class settlement was
filed, along with a brief and index of evidence in support. The
scheduled fairness hearing was held on June 20, at which no
objecting class members or other objectors appeared.

Judge Gerrard finds that the settlement agreement is fair,
reasonable, and adequate within the meaning of Rule 23(e)(2), and
will approve it.  He will grant the Joint Motion for Final Approval
of Class Settlement.  

The settlement provides for attorney's fees and costs in the amount
of $28,500.  The Judge is aware that the separate negotiation of
attorney fees, and the settling Defendants' agreement not to
contest fees up to a point, may present an opportunity for abuse.
But he finds no basis to suspect any type of abuse or collusion.
He also notes that the potential award of fees and expenses was
disclosed in the notices to class members, including the amount,
and no objections were received.  Accordingly, he will grant the
Plaintiffs' requested attorney's fees.

The Defendants have agreed to pay compensation to the class
representatives of $9,000 ($4,500 each, paid by the Defendants over
and above the class action settlement fund).  That's based on
awarding $1,000 each for each of their claims -- that is, $1,000
for the FDCPA claim and another $1,000 for the NCPA claim -- and an
incentive award of $2,500 each.  The Judge finds that they are
fair, reasonable, and properly based in the benefits to the class
members generated by the litigation.  He will award the requested
incentives.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Gerrard granted (i) the parties'
Joint Motion for Final Approval of Class Settlement, and (ii) the
Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Approval of Plaintiffs' Incentive
Awards & Damages and Plaintiffs' Attorneys' Fees and Costs.

The certification of the settlement class, under Rules 23(b)(3) and
23(e), solely for settlement purposes, is confirmed: All persons
with addresses in Nebraska to whom the defendants sent, or caused
to be sent, a letter in the form of Filing 29-1 or Filing 29-2 in
an attempt to collect an alleged obligation which, as shown by the
nature of the alleged obligation, the defendants' records, or the
records of the original creditors, was primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes.  

The FDCPA class extends from March 23, 2017 through March 23, 2018.
The NCPA class extends from March 23, 2014 through March 23,
2018.

The settlement agreement is approved in all respects, and the
parties are directed to perform and satisfy the terms and
conditions of the settlement agreement.

The settlement classes are awarded $25,000 ($600 to the FDCPA class
and $24,400 to the NCPA class) as statutory damages to be
distributed on a pro rata basis among the class members.  Any
undistributed amounts are awarded as a cy pres remedy to Legal Aid
of Nebraska, for use in consumer representation and/or consumer
education.  The Defendants agree that they will no longer send
letters in the form of filing 29-1 or filing 29-2, containing a
Voluntary Appearance form, to Nebraska residents.

Filing 48-4 shows proper distribution of the settlement funds to
the class members.  Checks will be made payable to the class
member, unless the Class Administrator has received an indication
that the class member is deceased, in which case the settlement
check may be made payable to the estate.

Pursuant to Rule 23, the Judge finally certified Timothy J.
Shanahan, Jr. and Molli M. Larsen as the class representatives; and
William L. Reinbrecht and Pamela A. Car of the law firm Car &
Reinbrecht, and O. Randolph Bragg of the law firm Horwitz, Horwitz
& Associates, Ltd., as the Class Counsel.

Timothy J. Shanahan, Jr. and Molli M. Larsen are each awarded
$4,500 as statutory damages and as an incentive award for their
services as class representatives.

The Plaintiffs' counsel are awarded the amount of $28,500 as
reasonable costs and attorney's fees.

The Judge dismissed with prejudice the case.  A separate judgment
will be entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 25, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/scQbTjc from Leagle.com.

Timothy J. Shanahan, Jr., on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated & Molli M. Larsen, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by O.
Randolph Bragg -- rand@horwitzlaw.com -- HORWITZ, HORWITZ LAW FIRM,
Pamela A. Car, CAR, REINBRECHT LAW FIRM & William L. Reinbrecht --
billr205@gmail.com -- CAR, REINBRECHT LAW FIRM.

Lee Law Offices, Dennis P. Lee, Jimmy Newton & Dennis P. Lee, P.C.,
L.L.O., doing business as Lee Law Office, Defendants, represented
by Christopher M. Schmidt -- cschmidt@baylorevnen.com -- BAYLOR,
EVNEN LAW FIRM & Randall L. Goyette -- rgoyette@baylorevnen.com --
BAYLOR, EVNEN LAW FIRM.


LOS LUNAS CENTER: Settlement in Jackson Suit Has Final Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WALTER STEVEN JACKSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. LOS
LUNAS CENTER, et al., Defendants, and THE ARC OF NEW MEXICO,
Intervenors, and MARY TERRAZAS, et al., Intervenors, pro se, Case
No. CIV 87-839 JAP/KBM (D. N.M.), Judge James A. Parker of the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Mexico granted the parties'
Joint Motion for Final Approval of Settlement Agreement.

The civil rights class action began 32 years ago on July 8, 1987
when 21 individual developmentally disabled citizens of New Mexico
on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated individuals
("JCMs") filed a complaint to "redress the unconstitutional and
illegal conditions" at Fort Stanton Hospital and Training School
and Los Lunas Hospital and Training School (Los Lunas) (jointly,
institutions) that operated, in part, with federal funds.10
Defendants were the institutions and individuals operating the
institutions.  On June 27, 1988, the Court granted parents and
guardians of some of the residents of the institutions leave to
intervene, which they did on July 6, 1988.

On Oct. 16, 1989, the merits trial commenced.  On Dec. 28, 1990,
the Court ruled that the Defendants had violated the JCMs' rights
under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the substantive due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.  Since 1990, the parties have attempted to resolve
compliance issues and achieve disengagement of the Defendants'
obligations to the JCMs.

On April 17, 2019, the parties jointly filed a motion asking the
Court to give preliminary approval to the Settlement Agreement.  On
April 18, 2019, the Court held a hearing on the motion. During the
hearing, the counsel clarified provisions of the Preliminary SA.
On April 19, 2020, the Court approved the Preliminary SA as
clarified and directed the parties to issue Notice to all the
Plaintiff Class Members and Intervenors.

On June 4, 2019, the parties filed their Joint Motion for Final
Approval, Joint Memorandum, and final Settlement Agreement, which
as directed by the Court's Preliminary Approval Order, clarified
the language of the Preliminary SA.

The parties structured the Settlement Agreement to close the gap
between the Defendants' policies and actions and thereby establish
a durable remedy.  The Settlement Agreement contemplates a deadline
of 18 months from the Court's final approval for completion of its
terms.  The Settlement Agreement replaces all existing orders of
the Court except Jackson by Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. and
Training School ("Jackson I"), the Memorandum and Order approving
the motion to amend the complaint and the Memorandum and Order on
class reconfiguration.

However, the Settlement Agreement incorporates, as of the date of
its entry, current New Mexico state policies, procedures,
practices, and waiver standards. The Settlement Agreement also
introduces a new agreement: the Qualified Provider Agreement
Initiative ("QPAI"). The QPAI is a revised provider agreement
between the New Mexico Department of Health47 Developmental
Disability Supports Division ("DDSD") and community providers of
developmental disability services.

The Settlement Agreement describes seven action provisions that the
Defendants will complete to fulfill their obligations to the JCMs.
Six of the action provisions are substantive48 and include:
Incident Management, Mortality Review, Health, Provider Oversight,
Supported Employment, and Individual Quality Review ("IQR").

The actions provisions obligate the Defendants to do the
following:

     a. The Defendants will eliminate the backlog of incident
investigations, will conduct timely and adequate investigations,
and will take necessary remedial actions as required by the current
policies and procedures of the Division of Health Improvement of
the New Mexico Department of Health ("DHI"s).
     
     b. By Dec. 31, 2019, the Defendants will eliminate the backlog
of outstanding mortality reviews.  Going forward they will conduct
timely and adequate mortality reviews and take remedial actions as
required by the current DOH/DHI policies.

     c. There are three subdivisions under this action provision:
medical, behavior, and case management.   Each subdivision
addresses the needs of the JCMs designated high-acuity or with high
behavioral needs and provides a mechanism for evaluating
individuals not currently designated high-acuity.  The Defendants
are required to provide health related services as required by the
current waiver standards.

     d. Provider Oversight - This subsection implements the QPAI
and contemplates enforcement of its terms through DOH contract
management policies and IRC policies.

     e. The Defendants ensure they will assess each working age
class member's abilities and interests as required by their
policies, procedures, and waiver standards.

     f. By June 30, 2020, the current Community Monitor will have
transferred the IQR process to DHI and will cease serving as
Community Monitor.

On June 12, 2019, the Court held a hearing on final approval of the
Settlement Agreement.  After considering the long history of the
case, the Settlement Agreement, the arguments of counsel, and the
comments of pro se Intervenor, guardians and/or family
representatives of members of the class, Judge Parker granted the
parties' Joint Motion to Approve Settlement Agreement, and approved
the Settlement Agreement as revised.  Additionally, he vacated the
Scheduling Order.  

Moreover, he vacated all other orders in the case except Jackson I.


A full-text copy of the Court's June 21, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/KGY00n from Leagle.com.

Walter Stephen Jackson, by his parents and next friends, Walter
and
Helen Jackson, Steve Nunez, by his guardian and next friend, Mary
Kathryn Reed, Mildred Tsosie, by her next friend, Polly Arango,
Mary Katherine Nowak, by her next friend, James W. Ellis, Esquire,
Lillian Willmon, by her next friend, Arthur Grumblatt, Andra
Martinez, by her next friend, Paula Duvall, Clinton Heath, by his
next friend, Belva Heath, Shawn Heath, by next friend, Belva
Heath,
Richard Stanfield, by his father and next friend, The Reverend
Clyde Stanfield, Joseph Gonzales, by his mother and next friend,
Charlotte Gonzales, Sean McHenry, by his next friend, Robert
Desiderio, Esquire, Alfred Shirley, by his next friend, Frederick
Hart, Esquire, James Fritche, by his next friend, Sally Dehon,
Roseann Crockett, by her next friend, Robert McNeill, Esquire,
Andre Armenta, by his mother and next friend, Loretta Armenta,
Kelli Van Curen, by her parents and next friends, Ted and Sallie
Van Curen, Lacey Walker, by her mother and next friend, Sandra
Walker, Kim Lautenschlager, by her mother and next friend, Dale
Lautenschlager, William Thomas, by his parents and next friends,
James and Elizabeth Thomas; on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated & Developmentally Disabled New Mexicans, Inc,
Supporters of, on behalf of its members, Plaintiffs, represented
by
Ann Tilford McCartney -- asims98891@aol.com -- Cathy Costanzo --
ccostanzo@cpr−ma.org -- Center for Public Representation,
Nancy
Koenigsberg -- nkoenigsberg@drnm.org -- Disability Rights New
Mexico, Peter Cubra -- pcubra@qwestoffice.net -- Law Office of
Peter Cubra, Philip B. Davis -- phil@davislawnm.com -- Philip B.
Davis, Attorney at Law,Steven Schwartz --
sschwartz@cpr−ma.org --
Center for Public Representation & Tim Gardner --
tgardner@drnm.org
-- Protection & Advocacy System.

Fort Stanton Hospital and Training School, All State Defendants as
listed on manual docket, Los Lunas Center for Persons with
Developmental Disabilities & Jack Callaghan, New Mexico Department
of Health, Secretary of, Defendants, represented by Jerry A. Walz
,
Walz and Associates.

New Mexico Human Services Department, Defendant, represented by
Paul R. Ritzma & Jerry A. Walz, Walz and Associates.

ARC of New Mexico, Intervenor, represented by Maureen A. Sanders,
Sanders & Westbrook, PC.


LYNDON DINER WEST: Brown Labor Suit Hits FLSA Breach
----------------------------------------------------
Crystalle Brown, on behalf of herself and similarly situated
employees, Plaintiff, v. Lyndon Diner West, Inc., Defendant, Case
No. 19-cv-01227 (M.D. Pa. July 17, 2019), seeks all available
relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Pennsylvania
Minimum Wage Act.

Defendant owns and operates the Lyndon Diner located at 1353
Kenneth Road, York where Brown was employed as a server. Lyndon
allegedly utilizes a "tip credit" for each hour worked by Brown
without providing any notice explaining the tip credit or the
manner in which the tip credit is implemented. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Peter Winebrake, Esq.
      R. Andrew Santillo, Esq.
      Mark J. Gottesfeld, Esq.
      WINEBRAKE & SANTILLO, LLC
      715 Twining Road, Suite 211
      Dresher, PA 19025
      Phone: (215) 884-2491
      Facsimile: (215) 884-2492
      Email: pwinebrake@winebrakelaw.com


MALLARD COMPLETIONS: Does not Properly Pay Workers, Parks Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
John Parks, Tracy Ledlow, George Garcia, and Kustuss Phillips, on
Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs
v. Mallard Completions, LLC, and Ranger Energy Services, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 7:19-cv-00184 (S.D. Fla., July 26, 2019) is a
civil action brought by Plaintiffs, each individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, pursuant to the federal Fair
Labor Standards Act, and the federal Portal to-Portal Pay Act, for
Defendants' misclassification of the pump-truck supervisors as
employees exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA and
their resulting failure to pay them time and one-half their regular
rates of pay for all hours worked over 40 during each seven-day
workweek.

The Defendants did not make, keep or require an accurate record of
hours worked by Plaintiffs on a daily basis. Plaintiffs were
non-exempt employees under the FLSA, and when they worked more than
40-hours in a seven-day workweek, they were entitled to be paid
overtime premium compensation at one and one-half times their
respective regular rates of pay for each and every hour worked over
40, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs worked as pump-truck supervisors for Defendants.

Mallard maintains multiple yards in Texas from which it offers
pressure pumping services to the oilfield industry.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     John M. Rogers, Esq.
     Alyssa S. Turner, Esq.
     ROGERS, LLP
     409 West 4th Street, Ste. 102
     Post Office Box 2530
     Weatherford, TX 76086
     Phone: 817.341.9300
     Fax: 817.341.9301
     Email: john.rogers@rogersllp.com
            alyssa.turner@rogersllp.com


MANTEI & ASSOCIATES: Removes Black et al. Suit to D. S.C.
---------------------------------------------------------
The Defendant in the case of DONALD BLACK; MARCIA BLACK; LARRY
MARTIN; REBECCA MARTIN; BARBARA THOMPSON; and JAMES THOMPSON,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. MANTEI & ASSOCIATES, LTD.; RICKY ALAN MANTEI; CINDY
CHIELLINI; CENTAURUS FINANCIAL, INC.; and J.P. TURNER & COMPANY,
L.L.C., Defendants, filed a notice to remove the lawsuit from the
Circuit Court of the State of South Carolina, County of Lexington
(Case No. 2019-CP-32-02636) to the U.S. District Court for the
District of South Carolina on July 26, 2019. The clerk of court for
the District of South Carolina assigned Case No.
3:19-cv-02097-MGL.

Mantei and Associates Ltd is in the management consulting services
business. [BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Michael H. Montgomery, Esq.
          Montgomery Willard, LLC
          1002 Calhoun Street
          Post Office Box 11886
          Columbia, SC 29211
          Telephone: (803) 779-3500
          E-mail: mhm@montgomerywillard.com

               - and -

          Joel H. Smith, Esq.
          Kevin J. Malloy, Esq.
          Bowman and Brooke LLP
          1441 Main Street, Suite 1200
          Columbia, SC 29201-2897
          Telephone: (803) 726-7422
          E-mail: Joel.Smith@bowmanandbrooke.com
                  Kevin.Malloy@bowmanandbrooke.com


MDL 2672: Court Denies Bosch's Bid for Lone Pine CMO
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order denying Bosch's Motion for Entry of Lone
Pine Order in the case captioned IN RE: VOLKSWAGEN "CLEAN DIESEL"
MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. This
Order Relates To: MDL Dkt. Nos. 6358, 6359 Napleton, No.
3:16-cv-2086-CRB. MDL No. 2672 CRB (JSC). (N.D. Cal.).

In the Volkswagen franchise dealers' putative class action against
Bosch, Bosch has filed a motion for entry of a Lone Pine case
management order.  

In support of the motion, Bosch argues (i) that the evidence
produced in discovery proves that the three named plaintiffs have
no recoverable damages, (ii) that it is correspondingly doubtful
that any of the putative class members have recoverable damages,
and (iii) that before the parties embark on further expensive
litigation, the Court should require putative class counsel to
circulate a Lone Pine questionnaire to each putative class member
to elicit information about the factual basis for any damages they
have in this matter. With its motion, Bosch has included a proposed
Lone Pine questionnaire.  

Discovery from absent class members is generally discouraged and
the Court concludes that such discovery is currently unnecessary
here. There is no need to canvass absent class members about their
damages at least until Bosch proves as it claims that the three
named plaintiffs have no recoverable damages. To prove that the
named plaintiffs lack recoverable damages, Bosch should file a
motion for summary judgment. Bosch has leave to file such a motion,
but its request for a Lone Pine order is premature.

The Court denies Bosch's motion for entry of a Lone Pine order and
vacates the scheduled hearing on the motion.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 22, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3ooq3ds from Leagle.com.

Nicholas Benipayo, Plaintiff, represented by Steve W. Berman --
steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice,
Thomas Eric Loeser -- toml@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice & Robert B. Carey -- rob@hbsslaw.com --
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice.  

James Babiak, Jonathon Horacek & Alfred Howe, Plaintiffs,
represented by Robert B. Carey, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP,
pro hac vice & Steve W. Berman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP,
pro hac vice.

Nadine Bonda, Plaintiff, represented by Adam M. Stewart --
astewart@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP & Thomas G. Shapiro
-- tshapiro@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.
Brian Connelly, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas G. Shapiro,
Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.

Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Amie Adelia Vague, Lightfoot Franklin &
White, Casey Erin Lucier -- clucier@mcguirewoods.com --
McGuireWoods LLP, Charles J. Baker, III, Womble Carlyle Sandridge
and Rice, Po Box 999, Charleston, SC, 29402-0999, Colin Hampton
Tucker, Rhodes Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable, 620 North Robinson
#203, Oklahoma City, OK 73102, Dana Woodrum Lang, Womble Carlyle
Sandridge and Rice, Po Box 999, Charleston,  SC, 29402-0999, David
M. Eisenberg -- eisenberg@bscr-law.com -- Baker, Sterchi, Cowden &
Rice, LLC, Henry Buist Smythe, Jr., Womble Carlyle Sandridge and
Rice, Po Box 999, Charleston, SC, 29402-0999, Howard Feller --
hfeller@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, William R. Scherer,
Conrad and Scherer, LLP, 633 South Federal Highway, Eighth Floor,
Fort Lauderdale, FL, 33301-3164, J. Randolph Bibb, Jr.-
rbibb@lewisthomason.com -- Lewis, Thomason, King, Krieg & Waldrop,
P.C.


MIDLAND FUNDING: Can Compel Arbitration in George FDCPA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALISON GEORGE, individually and on behalf of those
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC; MIDLAND
CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC.; and JOHN DOES 1 TO 10, Defendant, Docket
No. 18-cv-15830 (D. N.J.), Judge William J. Martini of the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey granted Midland's
Motion to Compel Arbitration and Dismiss the Complaint.

George brings the putative class action against Midland for alleged
violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").
The Plaintiff allegedly incurred personal debts on a Citibank Sears
credit card that became past due and in default.  The debts were
subsequently "assigned, placed, transferred or sold" to Defendants
Midland Funding, LLC and Midland Credit Management for collection.


To collect the debts, Midland sent two letters to the Plaintiff
which allegedly contained a "false threat of interest" accruing on
the amount of the stale debt.  The Plaintiff alleges that these
letters stated that she had a "current balance" of $6,483.88 and
deceptively created the false impression that interest and fees she
agreed to under the Terms and Conditions of her Citibank Sears
credit card agreement were accruing on the "balance."  In reality,
the Plaintiff's debt had been purchased from Citibank by Midland
and no further interest or fees were accruing.

The Plaintiff alleges that these letters were deceptive given the
Plaintiff's understanding and belief that, under the terms and
conditions applicable to her use of the Account, interest, late
charges, and other charges and fees (such as annual fees) could
accrue.  In addition, she also alleges that the letters contained
additional violations of the FDCPA because they failed to disclose
that she had no legal liability as to the stale debt because any
legal action would be barred by the statute of limitations.  The
Plaintiff attaches to her complaint copies of the letters she
received, but she does not attach a copy of the credit card
agreement with Citibank or any documents related to Defendants'
eventual purchase of her stale debt.

Based on these allegations, the Plaintiff asserts a single claim
for violation of the FDCPA and proposes to represent two subclasses
of New Jersey residents receiving similar collection letters from
Midland.

The Defendants move to compel arbitration and dismiss the action.
The Agreement contains an arbitration clause, and the Defendants
assert that the Plaintiff's claims arise from debts incurred
pursuant to the Agreement.   Based on the provision and the
assignment contract, the Defendants argue that the Court should
apply the standard under FRCP 12(b)(6), find that the Federal
Arbitration Act requires enforcement of the arbitration provision
found in the Agreement and compel arbitration.

In opposition, the Plaintiff argues that the Court should deny the
motion to compel arbitration and allow her to request limited
discovery on the question of arbitrability because it is not
apparent from the face of her complaint or the documents attached
to it that the action is governed by an enforceable arbitration
agreement.

Judge Martini concludes that the Agreement broadly incorporates any
claim related to the Agreement, including claims asserted against
debt collectors or assignees like Defendants.  The Agreement
further contains a class action waiver and requires any questions
related to arbitrability and the enforceability of the arbitration
agreement must be resolved in arbitration.  The Judge is satisfied
that there is a valid agreement to arbitrate and that it covers the
claims alleged in the complaint.

For these reasons, the Judge granted the Defendants' Motion to
Compel Arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 25, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/Vx76pa from Leagle.com.

ALISON GEORGE, individually and on behalf of those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by YONGMOON KIM --
jhk@thekimlawfirm.com -- Kim Law Firm LLC.

MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC & MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendants,
represented by DANA BRETT BRIGANTI -- dbriganti@hinshawlaw.com --
HINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP & ELLEN BETH SILVERMAN --
esilverman@hinshawlaw.com -- HINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP.


MIDLAND FUNDING: Can't Compel Arbitration in Ramirez FDCPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GABRIELA RAMIREZ, FIDELA AVINA, RUEL NIETO, KATHERINE
RANOS, and EVALINA GONZALEZ, Plaintiffs, v. MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC,
MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC., and ENCORE CAPITAL GROUP, INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-2626 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Jorge L. Alonso
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, denied the Defendants' motion to compel
arbitration.

After the Plaintiffs received allegedly misleading collection
letters sent by Defendant Midland Credit Management, LLC, they
filed a one-count purported class action complaint alleging three
Defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA").  The Plaintiffs are individuals who applied for and used
credit cards whose card agreements contained arbitration
provisions.  They allege that they were unable to pay their debts
and that the Defendants violated the FDCPA in attempting to collect
the debts.

After plaintiffs were unable to pay their debts, their debts were
purchased by Defendant Midland Funding, LLC ("Midland").  The
Defendants have submitted the agreements by which the various
creditors assigned plaintiffs' respective debts to Midland.
Midland, according to the Defendants' disclosure statement, is an
indirect subsidiary of Defendant Midland Credit Management, Inc.
("MCM"), which, in turn, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant
Encore.

The Plaintiffs allege that after Midland purchased their respective
debts, Midland "retained MCM to assist with collection."  They
further allege that MCM sent collection letters to the Plaintiffs
and that the letters violated the FDCPA by including the sentence,
"If the account goes to an attorney, our flexible options may no
longer be available to you."  The Plaintiffs seek to hold Midland
and Encore liable as entities with a burden to monitor MCM.

The Defendants have filed a joint motion to compel arbitration.
The Plaintiffs argue that their claims are outside the scope of the
arbitration provisions.  Each Plaintiff brings one claim, alleging
the Defendants violated the FDCPA when MCM sent her/him a
collection letter.

Judge Alonso finds that the Plaintiffs' FDCPA claims are within the
scope of their respective arbitration agreements.  The claims
arising out of a letter sent in an attempt to collect a debt on an
account are related to the account.  Accordingly, the Judge agrees
with the Defendants that the Plaintiffs' claims are within the
scope of the arbitration agreements.

Next, the Judge considers who may enforce the arbitration
agreements.  In the case, all three Defendants seek to enforce the
arbitration agreements, but none was an original party to the card
agreements in the case.  Under Utah law, the assignment of an
interest in a contract gives the assignee the same rights as the
assignor and nothing more.  Midland, which stands in the shoes of
the original creditors with respect to the card agreements
applicable to Avina, Gonzalez and Nieto, may enforce the
arbitration clauses against those Plaintiffs.  However, MCM cannot
enforce the arbitration clause in the agreements applicable to
Avina, Gonzalez and Nieto.  Under Utah law, an agent cannot enforce
for its own benefit its principal's arbitration agreement.  Encore
has not shown it can enforce the arbitration clauses in the
agreements applicable to Avina, Gonzalez and Nieto.

The Judge also finds South Dakota law is more generous than is Utah
law with respect to enforcement of arbitration agreements by
nonsignatories.  The Plaintiffs' claims against the Defendants all
arise out of the same letter sent to the Plaintiffs.  Accordingly,
he concludes that, under South Dakota law, Defendants Encore and
MCM can enforce the arbitration provisions applicable to Ranos and
Ramirez just as Midland, the assignee, can.

Finally, the Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants have waived the
right to arbitrate.  The Judge concludes that the Defendants waived
any right to arbitrate the claims in the case.  He does not agree
that the filing of a lawsuit on one claim constitutes a waiver of
the right to arbitrate every subsequent claim.  The arbitration
agreements in the case are written to allow either party to elect
arbitration on any claim; they are not written to require the
parties to arbitrate every claim.  The Defendant did not waive its
right to arbitrate the FDCPA claim in the case merely by filing an
earlier, separate claim to collect the debt on the account.  Also,
other things the Defendants have done in the case are suggestive of
an intent to litigate, rather than in arbitration.  Nowhere in
their motion to reassign did defendants mention arbitration or
suggest they intended to move to compel arbitration.  

For the reasons set forth, Judge Alonso denied the motion to compel
arbitration.  The case is set for status on July 24, 2019 at 9:30
a.m.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 21, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
and Order Order is available at https://is.gd/xmdf1m from
Leagle.com.

Gabriela Ramirez, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Finko, Andrew
Finko P.C., Holly Rose McCurdy -- info@communitylawyersgroup.com --
Community Lawyers Group, Ltd, Michael Jacob Wood, Community Lawyers
Group, Ltd. & Celetha Chatman, Community Lawyers Group, Ltd.

Fidela Avina, Ruel Nieto, Evalina Gonzalez & Katherine Ranos,
Plaintiffs, represented by Andrew Finko, Andrew Finko P.C. &
Celetha Chatman, Community Lawyers Group, Ltd.

Midland Funding LLC & Midland Credit Management, Inc, Defendants,
represented by David M. Schultz -- dschultz@hinshawlaw.com --
Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Todd Philip Stelter , Hinshaw &
Culbertson LLP, Brandon S. Stein -- tstelter@hinshawlaw.com --
Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP & Lindsey A.L. Conley --
lconley@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP.

Encore Capital Group, Inc., Defendant, represented by Todd Philip
Stelter, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP & Lindsey A.L. Conley, Hinshaw &
Culbertson LLP.


MLB HOTEL MANAGER: Nelson Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------------------
CRISTY NELSON, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. MLB HOTEL MANAGER, LLC, a Florida limited liability
company, and MLB FAIRWINDS, LLC, a Florida limited liability
company, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-23117-XXXX (S.D. Fla., July
26, 2019) is a Collective Action Complaint for unpaid minimum and
overtime wages, liquidated damages, return of tips wrongfully
taken, and other relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938.

The Defendants knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard
carried out their illegal pattern or practice of suffering or
permitting Plaintiff and Class Members to work without paying them
for all hours worked, and to require them to participate in an
illegal tip pool, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was a non-exempt employee who worked as a tipped employee
(server) for Defendants at their restaurant, La Sombra, during the
period from January, 2019 to June 18, 2019.

Defendants own and operate the restaurant La Sombra.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Robert W. Brock II, Esq.
     Law Office of Lowell J. Kuvin
     17 East Flagler Street, Suite 223
     Miami, FL 33131
     Phone: 305.358.6800
     Fax: 305.358.6808
     Email: robert@kuvinlaw.com
            legal@kuvinlaw.com


MONSANTO COMPANY: Brogan Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
------------------------------------------------------------
DENIS BROGAN, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendants,
Case No. 4:19-cv-02062 (E.D. Mo., July 22, 2019), seeks to recover
damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result
of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection
with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging,
promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or
sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active
ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Browns Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-----------------------------------------------------------
JOHN T. BROWN and MARY ANN BROWN, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO
COMPANY, the Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-02067 (E.D. Mo., July 22,
2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, as a
direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. John T.
Brown's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Case Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
----------------------------------------------------------
LEWIS CASE, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendants,
Case No. 4:19-cv-02069 (E.D. Mo., July 22, 2019), seeks to recover
damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result
of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection
with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging,
promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or
sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active
ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: D'Heur Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
------------------------------------------------------------
BEVERLY D'HEUR, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendants,
Case No. 4:19-cv-02075 (E.D. Mo., July 22, 2019), seeks to recover
damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result
of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection
with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging,
promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or
sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active
ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Hineses Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
------------------------------------------------------------
EDITH and ALVIN HINES, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the
Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-02080 (E.D. Mo., July 22, 2019), seeks
to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, as a direct and
proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct
in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Edith Hines's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Mitchells Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
--------------------------------------------------------------
ATON MITCHELL and DENISE COX MITCHELL, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO
COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-02121 (E.D. Mo., July 23,
2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, as a
direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Aton
Mitchells' injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MUTUAL FUND: Emerson Securities Suit Dismissed With Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROGER EMERSON, MARY EMERSON, ROBERT CAPLIN and MARTHA
J. GOODLETT, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. MUTUAL FUND SERIES TRUST, CATALYST CAPITAL
ADVISORS LLC, NORTHERN LIGHTS DISTRIBUTORS LLC, JERRY SZILAGYI,
TOBIAS CALDWELL, TIBERIU WEISZ, BERT PARISER, and ERIK NAVILOFF,
Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-02565 (ADS)(GRB)(E.D. N.Y.), Judge
Arthur D. Spatt of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of New York (i) granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
Amended Complaint in its entirety, and (ii) dismissed the
Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice.

On April 28, 2017, the Plaintiffs brought the putative class action
on behalf of certain persons who purchased shares of the Fund
seeking to pursue remedies under the Securities Act of 1933,
against the registrant for the Fund, certain of the Fund's
executive officers and/or trustees, the investment advisor to the
Fund, and the underwriter for the ongoing offering of Fund shares
to the public.

The Fund is an open-end mutual fund that invests in cash, and cash
equivalents, such as high-quality short-term fixed income
securities, and long and short call and put options on Standard &
Poor's 500 Index futures contracts.  The Plaintiffs allege that the
Defendants sold shares of the Fund pursuant to misrepresentations
in publicly filed registration statements and prospectuses that the
Fund was a low-risk investment suitable for capital preservation in
all market conditions.  

Contrary to these representations, the Fund purportedly made
numerous highly speculative investments that exposed the Fund to
potentially unlimited losses of capital in rising markets.  Giving
rise to the action, the Fund had a "melt down" when the S&P 500
experienced a steady and rapid increase in value during the first
two weeks of February 2017.

The Plaitiffs assert violations of: (1) Section 11 of the
Securities Act by the Trust, the Distributor, and the Trustee
Defendants; (2) Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act by the
Defendants; and (3) Section 15 of the 1933 Act by Catalyst Advisors
and the Individual Defendants.

On Jan. 8, 2018, the Court appointed the Folk Group and Jeffrey
Berkowitz Co-Lead Plaintiffs to represent the putative class.

On March 30, 2018, the Co-Lead Plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint asserting the same causes of actions but adding
additional factual allegations.

On June 5, 2018, the Defendants filed a joint motion, pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6), to dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety
with prejudice.

The Defendants argue that, in light of the relevant disclosures in
the Offering Documents, the Plaintiffs fail to allege any material
misstatements or omissions as a matter of law.  The representations
at issue fall into four categories, namely, statements regarding
the Fund's: (1) stated objective of capital preservation and
portrayal as a low-risk, low-volatility investment with low
correlation to equity markets; (2) options strategies and risks;
(3) purportedly robust risk management procedures; and (4) past
performance.

Judge Spatt concurs with the Defendants that no actionable
misstatements or omissions occurred.  He finds that (i) the Amended
Complaint fails to allege an actionable misrepresentation or
omission based on the Funds statements regarding investment
objectives and market correlation; (ii) the Amended Complaint fails
to allege an actionable misrepresentation or omission based on the
Fund's statements regarding options strategy and risks; (iii) the
Amended Complaint fails to allege an actionable misrepresentation
or omission based on the Fund's statements regarding risk
management; (iv) the Amended Complaint fails to allege an
actionable misrepresentation or omission based on the Fund's
statements regarding past performance; and (v) the Plaintiffs base
their allegations on unreasonable assumptions regarding the meaning
of the statements at issue.

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' claims also fail because
they cannot show that their losses were "caused" by the purported
misrepresentations.  Assuming the Plaintiffs retained a viable
misrepresentation claim, the Judge cannot conclude that negative
loss causation serves as an independent basis for dismissing the
Plaintiffs' claims.  He finds that the Defendants failed to
establish negative loss causation based solely on the allegations
in the Amended Complaint.  He cannot say that the revelation of the
Fund's overinvestment in naked call options had no causal
connection to decline in the Fund's NAV.  

While it may not have resulted in the market "reacting" with a
lower evaluation of the Fund's shares, the fund's over-exposure to
upward movements in the S&P 500 was certainly intertwined with the
diminution of the Fund's assets.  Parsing out the extent to which
the Fund's assets deteriorated because of the concealed risk --
i.e., its writing of uncovered options -- or something else seems
better suited for a motion for summary judgment.

The Judge finds that the Amended Complaint lacks facts sufficient
to confer standing upon the Plaintiffs to bring claims against the
Individual Defendants and Catalyst Advisors under Section 12.  To
the extent the Plaintiffs argue that additional facts show
solicitation by Catalyst Advisors due to its role as manager of the
fund, they are irrelevant because the Plaintiffs drew these facts
from exhibits to the Defendants' brief rather than allegations in
the Amended Complaint.

Finally, the Judge finds that the Amended Complaint lacks facts
sufficient to plead control under Section 15.  The Plaintiffs
cannot recover under Section 15 due to their failure to allege a
primary violation.  In addition, the Amended Complaint's
allegations regarding Catalyst Advisors are insufficient.  The fact
that Catalyst Advisors managed the Fund's strategy, without more,
fails to allege actual control and merely constitutes a boilerplate
statement of control status.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Spatt granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety, and
dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6).  The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to close
the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 25, 2019 Memorandum Decision
and Order is available at https://is.gd/1sSyay from Leagle.com.

Catalyst Futures Fund Investor Group, Movant, represented by
Shannon Lee Hopkins -- shopkins@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky, LLP.

Richard Kingston, Margaret Pak, Ken Hopkins, The Weinstein Family
Trust & Kelly Farmer, Movants, represented by Phillip Kim --
pkim@rosenlegal.com -- Rosen Law Firm, P.A. P.C.

Eugene Almendinger, William H. Tod, Earle Folk, Debra Folk, Tom
Lovelidge & Maryann Lovelidge, Movants, represented by David Avi
Rosenfeld , Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, LLP, Samuel H. Rudman ,
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, LLP, William John Geddish , Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP & Evan Jay Kaufman , Robbins Geller Rudman
& Dowd LLP.

Roger Emerson, Mary Emerson, Robert Caplin & Martha J. Goodlett,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Samuel H. Rudman, Robbins Geller Rudman
& Dowd, LLP.

Jeffrey Berkowitz, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Joseph
Keller, Labaton Sucharow & Rudoff LLP, Evan Jay Kaufman, Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, James W. Johnson, Labaton Sucharow &
Rudoff LLP, Michael H. Rogers, Labaton Sucharow LLP, Samuel H.
Rudman, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, LLP, Francis P. McConville,
Labaton Sucharow LLP, John Julian Esmay, Labaton Sucharow & William
John Geddish, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Mutual Fund Series Trust, Catalyst Capital Advisors LLC, Jerry
Szilagyi & Erik Naviloff, Defendants, represented by James F. Moyle
-- jmoyle@lpgmlaw.com -- Lazare Potter Giacovas & Moyle LLP & Jacob
Ari Englander -- jenglander@lpgmlaw.com -- Lazare Potter Giacovas &
Moyle LLP.

Northern Lights Distributors LLC, Defendant, represented by
Elizabeth S. David, Goodwin Procter LLP & Mark Holland, Goodwin
Procter LLP.

Tobias Caldwell, Tiberiu Weisz & Bert Pariser, Defendants,
represented by Michelle Gitlitz Courtney, Blank Rome LLP.


NATIONAL RURAL: Sued over Mismanagement of 401(k) Pension Plan
--------------------------------------------------------------
THADDIUS INTRAVAIA; and STEVEN MARVIK, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. NATIONAL RURAL
ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION (NRECA); and INSURANCE AND
FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMITTEE, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00973
(E.D. Va., July 25, 2019) alleges that the Defendants:

     -- failed to prudently monitor and control the Plaintiffs'
401(k) Pension Plan administrative costs in the interests of Plan
participants,

     -- appropriated the extra fees from the Plan for their own
benefit, and

     -- diverted monies from the Plan to subsidize other expenses
of NRECA and its member.

The Plan's administrative costs are grossly excessive. The Plan is
one of the 75 largest defined contribution plans in the United
States (out of more than 650,000). As a result, the Defendants have
access to the most competitive pricing and services in the
marketplace. While fiduciaries of similarly-sized plans typically
incur administrative expenses well under $100 per participant, the
Plan's administrative costs are wildly out of scale at more than
$400 per participant.

The problem is also getting worse with time. The Plan's
administrative costs have increased each year since 2013, and the
2017 rate of $404 per participant is a 50% surge from the 2013
rate. Based on trends in the overall marketplace, the Plan's
administrative costs should have decreased on a per-participant
basis during this time. Further, the growth within the Plan
provided significant opportunities for Defendants to reduce the
Plan's administrative expenses. Yet, the Defendants failed to take
measures to reduce the Plan's expenses consistent with other
retirement plan fiduciaries and marketplace trends, failed to
leverage the Plan's size, and failed to advance the interest of
participants, causing the Plan to pay unreasonable administrative
fees.

The Defendants also improperly used the Plan to subsidize costs of
NRECA's overall benefits program. As a defined contribution plan,
the Plan is distinct from NRECA's traditional pension and health
and welfare plans, in which participants are promised certain
benefits, and NRECA's member employers are financially obliged to
underwrite those benefits. This funding distinction incentivizes
Defendants to shift more shared costs to the Plan, thereby
minimizing the financial liabilities incurred by NRECA's member
employers related to the administration of the traditional pension
and health and welfare plans.

The National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA) is the
organization that represents the interests of over 900 electric
cooperatives in the U.S., to various legislatures. Independent
electric utilities are not-for-profit and are owned by their
members. The Association, which was founded in 1942, unites the
country's generation, transmission and distribution cooperatives
which are found in 47 states and serve over 40 million people. It
is headquartered in Arlington, Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregg C. Greenberg, Esq.
          ZIPIN, AMSTER, & GREENBERG.
          8757 Georgia Ave., Ste. 400
          Silver Spring, MD 20910
          Telephone: (301) 587-9373
          Facsimile: (240) 839-9142
          E-mail: ggreenberg@zagfirm.com

               - and -

          Kai H. Richter, Esq.
          Paul J. Lukas, Esq.
          Carl F. Engstrom, Esq.
          Brandon T. McConough, Esq.
          Chloe A. O'Neill, Esq.
          NICHOLS KASTER, PLLP
          4600 IDS Center
          80 S 8th Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 256-3200
          Facsimile: (612) 338-4878
          E-mail: krichter@nka.com
                  lukas@nka.com
                  bmcdonough@nka.com
                  cengstrom@nka.com
                  coneill@nka.com


NAVY FEDERAL: Bid to Reconsider Expert Fees in Plemons Suit Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JENNA LLOYD, JAMIE PLEMONS, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. NAVY FEDERAL
CREDIT UNION, Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-1280-BAS-RBB (S.D. Cal.),
Judge Cynthia Bashant of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California denied the Plaintiffs' motion for partial
reconsideration and request approval of the remaining $109,100 in
Arthur Olsen's charged fees.

Plaintiffs Lloyd and Plemons move for partial reconsideration of
the Court's order granting in part and denying in part their
consolidated motion for attorneys' fees in the amount of $6.125
million, reimbursement of costs and expenses in the amount of
$143,038.82, and $5,000 service awards for each named Plaintiff, a
motion that they filed in connection with the motion for final
approval of the class action settlement in the case.

In its preliminary approval order, the Court ordered the Plaintiffs
to thoroughly support all requests for attorneys' fees and costs
and expenses sought in connection with final approval.  And, more
specifically, during the Final Approval Hearing, the Court
requested additional information regarding fees for the Plaintiffs'
expert, Olsen, for whom they requested approval of $132,500 in fees
charged.

After consideration of the Plaintiffs' submissions, the Court
granted in full the Plaintiffs' request for an award of $6.125
million in attorneys' fees and granted their request for service
award.  The Court, however, did not approve in full the Plaintiffs'
request for reimbursement of $132,500 in fees for Olsen.  The Court
approved $23,400 in fees for Olsen's work performed prior to the
Court's preliminary approval order as reflected in his invoices and
denied reimbursement of $109,100 on the ground that the amount was
unreasonable based on the information provided to the Court.

Seeking now to present the Court with supplemental information
regarding the work Olsen performed, the Plaintiffs move for partial
reconsideration and request approval of the remaining $109,100 in
Olsen's charged fees.  They contend that denial of this additional
amount would be "manifestly unjust."

Judge Bashant finds that the Plaintiffs' motion mistakes the
asserted importance of Olsen's work as the relevant issue on
reconsideration.  However, it is not the importance of Olsen's
work, but rather the Plaintiffs' failure to comply with two court
orders directing them to thoroughly support their requests and,
more specifically, their request for reimbursement of Olsen's fees.
It is not manifestly unjust to require a party to abide by the
Court's orders.  Under these circumstances, denial of
reconsideration of the Plaintiffs' request for an additional
$109,100 in fees for Olsen is not manifestly unjust.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Bashant denied the Plaintiffs'
motion for partial reconsideration.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 25, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/xMaE8L from Leagle.com.

Jenna Lloyd, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Andrea Gold --
agold@tzlegal.com -- Tycko & Zavareei LLP, pro hac vice, Andrew
Silver -- asilver@tzlegal.com -- Tycko and Zavareei LLP, pro hac
vice, Hassan Ali Zavareei -- hzavareei@tzlegal.com -- Tycko &
Zavareei LLP, Jeffrey Douglas Kaliel -- jdkaliel@gmail.com --
Kaliel PLLC, Jeffrey M. Ostrow -- ostrow@kolawyers.com --
Kopelowitz Ostrow Ferguson Weiselberg Gilbert, pro hac vice,
Jonathan M. Streisfeld -- streisfeld@kolawyers.com -- Kopeloiwtz
Ostrow Ferguson Weiselberg Gilbert, pro hac vice, Chiharu Sekino
--
csekino@sfmslaw.com -- Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller & Shah, LLP,
James C. Shah -- jshah@sfmslaw.com -- Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller
&
Shah, LLP & Taras Kick.

Jamie Plemons, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented byAndrea Gold, Tycko & Zavareei
LLP, pro hac vice, Andrew Silver, Tycko and Zavareei LLP, pro hac
vice, Hassan Ali Zavareei, Tycko & Zavareei LLP, Jeffrey Douglas
Kaliel, Kaliel PLLC, Jeffrey M. Ostrow, Kopelowitz Ostrow Ferguson
Weiselberg Gilbert, pro hac vice, Jonathan M. Streisfeld,
Kopeloiwtz Ostrow Ferguson Weiselberg Gilbert, pro hac vice,
Chiharu Sekino, Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller & Shah, LLP & James C.
Shah, Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller & Shah, LLP.

Navy Federal Credit Union, Defendant, represented by Jason J. Kim
-- kimj@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP & Neil K. Gilman
-- ngilman@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton & Williams, pro hac vice.


NETSHOES (CAYMAN): Securities Class Action Claim Dismissed
----------------------------------------------------------
Tom McParland, writing for New York Law Journal, reports that a
Manhattan Supreme Court judge has dismissed a securities class
action claim against Brazilian online retailer Netshoes (Cayman)
Limited, finding the suit failed to support allegations that the
company had purposely misrepresented key aspects of its business to
would-be investors.

The cause of action, brought under federal securities law, claimed
that the Brazilian online  sporting goods retailer "painted a
materially false and misleading picture of Netshoes' business" in
the face of increasing competition, which improperly lifted its IPO
offering price in 2017. Investors said the alleged missteps
ultimately caused Netshoes' stock price to collapse from its $18
per-share IPO price to a low of $2.87 per share 13 months later.
However, New York County Supreme Court Justice Andrew S. Borrok, in
a revised opinion released Wednesday, ruled that statements cited
from Netshoes' IPO materials were either opinion, accurate
assessments of past performance or expressions of "puffery or
corporate optimism" that are not actionable under the statute.

"Absent factual allegations demonstrating that these statements
were false or misleading when made (and there are none in the
complaint), statements concerning Netshoe's customer loyalty and
past performance do not give rise to a securities claim," Borrok
wrote last week in an 18-page revised opinion, published July 17.

Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, which represented Netshoes,
said the decision was one the first to dismiss a securities class
action for allegedly false or misleading disclosures since the U.S.
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed in 2017 that state courts have
jurisdiction to hear such cases.

According to Borrok's ruling, plaintiffs had targeted Netshoes'
pre-IPO statements touting its competitive position, "high margin"
strategy and new supplements and vitamins business. The complaint,
however, alleged that, in fact, Netshoes' core sports and lifestyle
e-commerce business was under pressure to significantly ramp up
marketing and provide deeper discounts to preserve its business
model in light of increased competition from Mercado Libre, its
rival in Latin America, as well as from Amazon, which was active in
Mexico at the time.

Netshoes, the plaintiffs alleged, knew or should have known that
the net income the net income it posted in 2016 was overstated and
in line with the international reporting standards it cited in its
offering documents.

Reviewing the case under the Omnicare standard, Borrok said there
was no evidence in the complaint to support allegations that
Netshoes knew its statements concerning competition were false when
they were made. On other points regarding the company's future
growth, he said, Netshoes shared relevant risk factors with
investors, and its forward-looking statements were protected by
"ample cautionary language" in the prospectus, which isolated the
company from legal challenges.

"Netshoes disclosed the information that the plaintiffs claim was
omitted," he said. "To the extent that it did not disclose certain
information, it had no duty to do so."

Skadden attorneys were not available July 19 afternoon to comment
on the decision.

Thomas Laughlin, Esq. -- TLAUGHLIN@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM -- a Scott+Scott
attorney who represented the proposed class did not immediately
return a call seeking comment. [GN]


NEW YORK: $2.9MM Attorney's Fees OK'd Willowbrook Litigation
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York issued a Memorandum and Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for
Attorney's Fees and Costs in the case captioned  NEW YORK
ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED CHILDREN et al., Plaintiffs, v. ANDREW M.
CUOMO, et al., Defendants. Nos. 72 CV 356 (RJD), 72 CV 357 (RJD)
(E.D.N.Y).

This motion for attorneys' fees and costs arises out of a 1972
class action (Willowbrook Litigation) related to the deprivation of
basic rights, including unclean and unsafe living conditions, of
individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities housed
at the Willowbrook State Developmental Center in Staten Island, New
York. The litigation resulted in a 1975 Consent Judgment, which was
replaced in 1993 by a Permanent Injunction (Injunction).

Attorneys' Fee Disputes

The Plaintiffs request attorneys' fees and costs in the amounts of
$3,789,386.39 for NYCLU, $124,140 for NYLPI and $88,137.50 for the
law firm of Kasowitz, Benson and Torres LLP (Kasowitz firm),
retained specifically to prepare the Plaintiffs' fee application.
The requested fee award is based on Southern District of New York
(SDNY) hourly billing rates between $525 and $600 for attorneys
from NYCLU and NYLPI and between $300 and $925 for attorneys from
the Kasowitz firm, and accounts for almost 7,000 hours of time over
seven years, including over 200 hours spent preparing this fee
application.

Billing Rates

Legal Standard

The Plaintiffs' counsel argues the Court should apply prevailing
market rates from the Southern District of New York (SDNY) because
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a law firm or
group of lawyers practicing solely within the Eastern District with
the combination of constitutional expertise, monitoring experience,
and resources to have prosecuted a disability law case as complex
and demanding as this action, and to have continued to monitor the
Permanent Injunction for so long with such skill and expertise.

The Defendants, however, contend that the forum rule must be
applied because the Plaintiffs' counsel has not overcome the strong
forum rule presumption by persuasively establishing out-of-district
counsel was likely to produce a substantially better net result.

The Court agrees the Plaintiffs have not overcome the strong
presumption in favor of the forum rule and thus Eastern District
rates provide the appropriate benchmark for calculating the
Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs; however, the Court finds
that counsel is nevertheless entitled to in-district rates at the
higher end of the spectrum and sufficient to reflect counsels'
significant experience and institutional knowledge.

The Forum Rule

The Plaintiffs' counsel, indisputably, has significant skill and
expertise with respect to the subject matter of this litigation and
is uniquely positioned to effectively and efficiently enforce the
Injunction and monitor the OPWDD's own enforcement efforts.
However, the Court must also account for the nature of the work
counsel has performed during the period covered by the fee
application, not the considerably more extensive work counsel
performed decades ago, including overseeing the development of the
OPWDD infrastructure that exists today.  

In Restivo v. Nassau County, 2015 WL 7734100 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30,
2015), a section 1983 suit arising out of a wrongful murder
conviction, the Court permitted a fee award applying SDNY billing
rates because the case was exceedingly arduous and complex,
involving extensive expert analysis and presentation of DNA
evidence spanning eight years and two trials and even defense
counsel acknowledged that the Plaintiff's firm might have held a
monopoly on DNA law and that no lawyers with primary offices in the
Eastern District of New York have obtained a successful jury
verdict in a section 1983 wrongful conviction suit as Plaintiff's
counsel did here.

Despite their expertise and institutional knowledge, Plaintiffs'
counsel in this case has not made the requisite showing to rebut
the forum rule presumption. Instead, Plaintiffs do not provide
sufficient evidence that no attorneys in this district possess such
skill.  Like United States v. City of New York, Plaintiffs'
application at most shows that in-district counsel might be harder
to find, but that is not enough to show that there is a complete
dearth of such counsel.

Moreover, Plaintiffs' counsel does not have a monopoly on
disability-rights law like counsel in Restivo, nor has counsel
shown that no Eastern District lawyer has secured a successful
Permanent Injunction in an important civil rights case requiring
prospective monitoring.   

Billing Rates

The Plaintiffs argue that even if the Court declines to award
out-of-district rates, their requested hourly rates nevertheless
fall within the accepted range of rates for the Eastern District,
particularly in light of counsels' extensive experience and the
complexity of this case. Defendants disagree, and argue for a
substantial reduction in billing rates. Of course, both sides
cherry pick case citations depending upon their magic number.   

The Plaintiffs request an hourly rate of $600 for Beth Haroules, an
NYCLU attorney with over 30 years of experience who has worked on
the Willowbrook Litigation since 1994, $525 for Lisa Laplace, an
NYCLU attorney with close to 30 years of experience who has worked
on the Willowbrook Litigation since 2005, $550 for Roberta Mueller,
an NYLPI attorney with over 30 years of experience who has worked
on the Willowbrook Litigation since 2001 and $150 for Suhali
Mendez, an NYLPI paralegal with over 10 years of experience.
Defendants counter with hourly rates of $375, $275, $325 and $0,
respectively.

Viewed in light of prevailing market rates in this district for
cases requiring comparable levels of experience and expertise,
Plaintiffs' proposed rates are too high, and Defendants' counter is
too low; however, the Court concludes that rates approaching
Plaintiffs' proposal are more appropriate in this case.  

Ultimately, counsels' subject-matter expertise and vast
institutional knowledge persuade the Court that a billing rate on
the higher end of the spectrum in this District is warranted, and
counsels' independent interest in the litigation and delay in
submitting a fee application only sway the pendulum marginally in
Defendants' favor. Ms. Haroules is entitled to a $500 rate, Ms.
Laplace is entitled to a $425 rate, Ms. Mueller is entitled to a
$450 and Ms. Mendez is entitled to a $100 rate. These rates are
consistent with those prevailing in this district for attorneys
with similar experience, and reduced slightly to account for the
delay, of Plaintiff's own creation, in requesting fees.  

Number of Hours Billed

The Plaintiffs seek compensation for approximately 6,700 hours of
work between 2012 and 2019 performing monitoring and enforcement
tasks on behalf of the Willowbrook class pursuant to the terms of
the Injunction, 6,400 hours of work performed by NYCLU and just
under 300 hours of work performed by NYLPI. Plaintiffs contend
these hours are reasonable in light of the directives set out by
the Injunction, and that their supporting documentation is
contemporaneous and of sufficient detail.

Specifically, Plaintiffs note that in recent years, OPWDD, the
state agency counsel are charged with monitoring, has seen a number
of highly experienced and knowledgeable staff' retire and
experienced significant turnover.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs explain counsel are repeatedly called upon
by Defendants to educate new state employees and provider agencies
on issues relating to Willowbrook entitlements and Plaintiffs'
compliance rights  and counsel have also been invited to comment on
and/or craft regulatory and programmatic initiatives that are vital
to OPWDD.

The Defendants, on the other hand, claim counsels' billing entries
(i) reflect work outside the scope of that contemplated by the
Injunction, (ii) contain numerous duplicative time entries, (iii)
are vague, and (iv) reflect inappropriate block billing practices.
Defendants contend that these billing record deficiencies warrant a
40% across-the-board reduction in counsels' total billable hours.
Though the Court finds some deduction in billable hours is
appropriate, a 40% deduction is not necessary.  

Nature of Work Performed by Counsel

The Defendants claim Plaintiffs' counsel attempts to bill the state
for any work even tangentially related to their representations of
the Willowbrook class, as well as activities and tasks that are
simply not contemplated or required by the Permanent Injunction,
including attendance or participation in public conferences,
webinars, and forums," providing testimony and public comments on
OPWDD initiatives and programs and tasks independently undertaken
in an unsolicited effort to policy agency operations. Though
Defendants include ample citations to counsels' billing records
which it claims reference work falling outside the scope of the
Injunction, Defendants do not explain why such work is inconsistent
with the role of counsel envisioned by the Injunction. Plaintiffs
claim counsels' billing records reflect work done together with, or
at the behest of, OPWDD.

To this end, Ms. Haroules submitted two detailed declarations
describing recent changes to the OWPDD services delivery system and
counsels' need to participate in briefings and submit comments
related to those changes in order to ensure that the entitlements
of the Willowbrook class members are protected in whatever new
system is developed. Moreover, Ms. Haroules explains that
Defendants' attempt to take issue with Plaintiffs' efforts to
police agency operations is improper because the entire structure
of the Injunction vests Plaintiffs' Counsel with that obligation
insofar as the policing related to the rights and entitlements of
the Willowbrook class under the Injunction.

Indeed, Ms. Haroules notes the Injunction obligates Defendants to
provide ongoing information sessions  to counsel to monitor the
development and implementation of the plans to address systemic
issues and give counsel an opportunity to make suggestions.
  
Duplicative Billing Entries

The Defendants also complain that Plaintiffs' counsel billed an
excessive amount of time for conferring with each other without any
particularized explanation as to why these duplicative efforts were
necessary or otherwise justify billing by multiple lawyers.
However, Plaintiffs contend, and the Court agrees, that this matter
has been staffed leanly, with only two attorneys from NYCLU and one
attorney for NYLPI, reducing the incidence of duplicative billing.
Indeed, Courts often make fee reductions to reflect what billable
hours would have been had the case been leanly staffed. The fact
that counsel communicated with each other regarding monitoring and
enforcement work is not enough to warrant a deduction in hours for
duplicative billing.

Vague Billing Entries

The Defendants next argue that the proliferation of vague billing
entries warrants a fee reduction and point to a number of entries
referencing indecipherable abbreviations and acronyms and sparsely
described activities and tasks.   Plaintiffs counter with an
11-page abbreviation and acronym key designed to translate the
allegedly vague billing entries and insist that counsel does not
bill for every email we review or write, every phone call we take,
or every time we speak with co-counsel, the Consumer Advisory Board
going on to list a number of other stakeholders.  

The Plaintiffs' key only goes so far. The Court agrees that even
with the key, a number of billing entries are too vague for the
Court to ascertain whether counsels' time was reasonably spent.   A
modest deduction is warranted to account for counsels' vague
billing entries.

Block Billing

Finally, Defendants ask the Court to reduce fees based on NYCLU's
rampant use of block billing which render it impossible to
determine the reasonableness of the time expended on any individual
task. Plaintiffs respond that their block-billed entries amply
satisfy standards established in the Second Circuit" and note that
in the majority of instances where counsel submitted a single entry
for more than five hours on a particular day, OPWDD should be able
to understand how those hours were spent because counsel was either
(i) engaged in meetings or court proceedings with Defendants (ii)
covering court proceedings where OPWDD declined to participate to
ensure Willowbrook class members' rights and entitlements were
protected, or (iii) engaged in drafting court pleadings, regulatory
comments and demand letters, all of which were shared with or
directed at OPWDD.  

Block billing is disfavored because it can cloud the court's
ability to assess whether counsels' time expenditures were
reasonable. However, in this case, counsels' entries often list out
discrete tasks, even if those individual tasks might, at times, be
vaguely described. Though all of counsels' tasks for a particular
day are contained within a single billing entry, the Court
concludes that the tasks are broken out within that entry to a
sufficient degree, and thus counsels' block billing practices do
not warrant a fee reduction.

Overall, a 10% deduction of Plaintiffs' requested fees for
monitoring and enforcement work is appropriate in light of the
incidence of vague billing entries and, relatedly, billing for
activities that are not clearly germane to the enforcement and
monitoring activities contemplated by the Injunction. This results
in a fee award of $2,773,152.90 to NYCLU and $104,283 to NYLPI.  

Costs

NYCLU requests costs in the amount of $3,985.70 for some, but not
all, of the costs incurred over the last seven years, including
conference calls, shipping, PACER and other court fees, as well as
certain travel expenses.   However, Defendants argue that because
Plaintiffs merely provide general ledger reports of expenses
allegedly incurred, such reports do not constitute adequate
documentation to establish whether a charge is reasonable.
Defendants would prefer Plaintiffs submit the underlying invoices.
  
Notwithstanding the fact that Defendants may have accepted general
ledger reports as acceptable documentation of costs in the past,
this Circuit requires the party seeking costs provide "adequate
documentation of costs incurred.

Here, Plaintiffs have at least provided the dates on which expenses
were incurred rather than the lump sum format submitted in Rotella.
Theoretically, one could cross-verify these costs with Plaintiffs'
billing records to confirm their legitimacy. The Court finds that a
10% deduction in costs is warranted: though these costs are not
impossible to verify, in light of the minimal supporting
documentation and the difficulty associated with verifying the
requested costs, some deduction is appropriate. NYCLU may thus
recover costs totaling $3,587.13.  

Fees on Fee

The Plaintiffs also request fees on fees, fees for the time spent
preparing and litigating this fee application -- to the tune of
$120,680. Specifically, Plaintiffs request $88,137.50 for the
Kasowitz firm, retained, on a pro bono basis, for the sole purpose
of preparing this application, and $32,542.50 for attorneys from
NYCLU and NYLPI for a total of 227 attorney hours. Defendants
contend that the requested fees must be dramatically reduced to no
more than 30 hours, which is the maximum number generally approved
for preparing fee applications.

The hourly rates requested by counsel in this case and number of
hours spent preparing the fee application far surpass the realm the
of reasonableness. First, the hourly rates must be reduced to match
the rates that apply in the underlying action and second, the
number of hours billed reveals innumerable redundancies and
excessive billing practices, particularly by the Kasowitz firm.
Guida, However, even though the rates and hours must be
substantially reduced, a reduction to no more than 30 hours the
billable time Defendants contend is reasonable is not necessary.  

Hourly Rates

Plaintiffs' fees on fees application seeks payment for hours billed
by one partner, Mr. Abrams, with just under thirty years of
experience (28.3 hours at $925 per hour), one senior-level
associate, Ms. Roberts, (48.7 hours at $500 per hour), one
mid-level associate, Ms. Cusick, (92.6 hours at $400 per hour), and
one junior-level associate, Mr. Intravatola, (1.9 hours at $300 per
hour). In order to match the rates the Court has calculated for the
underlying action, Mr. Abrams is entitled to a $500 hourly rate,
Ms. Roberts is entitled to a $325 rate, Ms. Cusick is entitled to a
$300 rate, and Mr. Intravalota is entitled to a $250 rate. The
hourly rates for Ms. Haroules and Ms. Mueller will be the same as
they are in the underlying action $500 and $450, respectively.
These fees are similar to those recently awarded in a variety of
cases litigated in this district and appropriately reflect the
experience of counsel as well as the relatively straightforward,
albeit tedious, work involved in preparing a fee application.  

Hours Billed by the Kasowitz Firm in Preparing the Fee Application

With respect to the number of hours billed in preparing the fee
application, the amount reported by the Kasowitz firm is well above
the norm and replete with examples of redundant billing,
inefficiencies and overstaffing. Most notably, the billing records
for Ms. Roberts and Ms. Cusick reveal a number of overlapping and
vague time entries and reflect duplicative work. To the extent Ms.
Roberts and Ms. Cusick performed different work or focused on
different sections of the fee petition, it would be impossible to
discern from the vague time entries submitted.

For example, on February 5, 2019 Ms. Roberts billed 5.4 hours to
review and revise draft fee petition and the very same day Ms.
Cusick billed 7.5 hours to draft and revise fee petition. Again, on
February 7, 2019, Ms. Roberts billed 4.2 hours to revise fee
petition and Ms. Cusick billed 5.1 hours to revise sections of fee
petition. And, on February 11, 2019, Ms. Roberts billed 1.2 hours
to review comments and edits made by co-counsel while Ms. Cusick
also billed 1.2 hours to review co-counsel's edits. Though Ms.
Roberts, who is several years Ms. Cusick's senior, billed
relatively fewer hours, there are nevertheless too many instances
of duplicative work in the billing records.

The Court thus finds that a 50% hours reduction across Ms. Roberts
and Ms. Cusick's total hours is appropriate. Reducing Ms. Roberts's
48.70 hours by 50% results in 24.35 hours at $325 per hour and
totaling $7,913.75. Reducing Ms. Cusick's 92.60 hours billed by 50%
results in 46.3 hours at $300 per hour and totaling $13,890.  

Hours Billed by NYCLU and NYLPI in Preparing the Fee Application

Ms. Haroules spent 53.1 hours and Ms. Mueller spent 14.4 hours on
this fee application. Overall, Ms. Mueller's time entries relating
to the fee application reflect sound billing judgment, specifically
tailored to reviewing her own declaration and some additional,
limited time reviewing the brief as a whole. No deduction in hours
is warranted for Ms. Mueller and she is thus entitled to her
requested 14.4 hours at $450 per hour, totaling $6,480.

Ms. Haroules submitted several lengthy declarations in support of
this fee application which surely required substantial work and
review, capitalizing on her significant institutional knowledge as
reflected by her billing records. However, Ms. Haroules's records
also reflect a number of vague, block-billed entries for "attention
to fee app, making it difficult for the Court to determine how Ms.
Haroules's review differed from that of her NYLPI colleague Ms.
Mueller or Mr. Abrams of the
Kasowitz firm.

Accordingly, the Court finds that a 30% deduction in Ms. Haroules's
hours is warranted to account for large number of vague entries and
entries overlapping with work performed by the Kasowitz senior
attorneys on the fee application. Reducing Ms. Haroules's hours by
30% yields 37.17 hours at $500 per hour, totaling $18,585.

The Kasowitz firm is therefore awarded $30,293.75 in fees for
preparing the fee application, NYLPI is awarded $6,480 and NYCLU is
awarded $18,585 for their work in preparing the fee application.  

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees is granted,
subject to the modifications. NYCLU counsel is awarded
$2,791,737.90 and NYLPI counsel is awarded $110,763 for monitoring
and enforcement work as well as the time spent preparing this fee
application. NYCLU may recover $3,587.13 in costs. The Kasowitz
firm is awarded $30,293.75 for its work preparing the fee
application. Moving forward, with the assistance of OPWDD, class
members must be provided notice of any fee application pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h), and Plaintiffs' counsel is required to
submit fee requests on an annual basis.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 22, 2019 Memorandum
and Order is available at  https://tinyurl.com/y62nth93 from
Leagle.com.

In re National Archives and Records Administration, Plaintiff,
represented by Margaret M. Kolbe, United States Attorneys Office.

New York State Association for Retarded Children, Plaintiff,
represented by Beth Haroules, New York Civil Liberties Union
Foundation, Marianne L. Engelman Lado, New York Lawyers for the
Public Interest, Roberta L. Mueller, New York Lawyers for the
Public Interest, Inc., Christopher T. Dunn, NY Civil Liberties
Union, 125 Broad Street, 19th Floor, New York, NY 10004, David J.
Abrams -- dabrams@kasowitz.com -- Kasowitz Benson Torres LLP, Deva
Roberts -- droberts@kasowitz.com -- Kasowitz Benson Torres LLP &
Lisa J. Laplace, New York Civil Liberties Union.

George Pataki, Defendant, represented by Jane R. Goldberg, State of
New York, Office of Attorney General, Richard Paul Wolfe, NYS
Office of Mental Retardation & Erin P. Kandel, Office of the New
York State Attorney General.


NINTENDO CO: Class Action Over Drifting Joy-Con Controllers
-----------------------------------------------------------
James Brightman, writing for Yahoo! Finance News, reports that
Nintendo, after sleepwalking through a generation with the Wii U,
is once again at the top of its game. The Switch has sold around 35
million units worldwide and continues to lead hardware sales each
month, according to NPD. Some frustrated gamers, however, may have
found Nintendo's Achilles heel. If a newly-filed class action
lawsuit has any weight to it, the House of Mario may have a serious
defect in its Switch Joy-Con controllers.

Filed by plaintiff Ryan Diaz on July 19, 2019 in the US District
Court for the Western District of Washington at Seattle, the suit
alleges that a number of Nintendo Switch owners are experiencing
drifting with the Joy-Con controllers; this means movements are
being registered in games when the analog sticks are left
untouched. If the drifting gets bad enough, it can render a Joy-Con
practically useless.

Diaz sent a faulty Joy-Con to Nintendo for repair under the
one-year warranty, only to experience drifting again a few months
later. At that point, he said he would have had to pay for an
out-of-pocket repair and decided to purchase two additional left
and right Joy-Con controllers for $90.

Diaz and the class represented in the suit allege that Nintendo is
fully aware of the drifting defect from its own pre-release testing
and numerous online complaints received from its customers and yet
the company continues to fail to "disclose the defect and routinely
refuses to repair the joysticks without charge when the defect
manifests and never disclosed this material defect to consumers."
The suit claims that Diaz's "experiences are by no means isolated
or outlying occurrences. Indeed, the internet is replete with
examples of message boards and other websites where consumers have
complained of the exact same Joy-Con defect."

Switch owners, the suit says, have "suffered an ascertainable loss
of money and/or property and/or value." Nintendo is specifically
being accused of "violations of California consumer fraud statutes,
negligent misrepresentation, breach of implied warranty, unjust
enrichment, and...violations of the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act and California's Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act."

The class is seeking "monetary relief for damages suffered,
declaratory relief as to the parties' rights under Defendant's
warranty, and public injunctive relief."

Nintendo is no stranger to lawsuits, and the company in fact
actually has a pretty long history of winning patent cases in
particular. Warranty-related cases are a bit different; just ask
Microsoft, which ultimately lost $1 billion due to its "Red Ring of
Death" problem for the Xbox 360. Microsoft wound up extending its
warranty from one year to three for the console, but it's not clear
at all if Nintendo's situation is even comparable.

"I think social media has amplified this to be larger than it
actually is," Brandon J Huffman, Esq. attorney with Odin Law and
Media told GameDaily. "If 100 people total had this problem, and
all posted about it and posted video, it does not mean,
necessarily, that they are representative of millions more with the
same issue. Time will tell if that hypothesis is correct.

"Whether this lawsuit will succeed is a crapshoot at this point…
For Nintendo, the best case is it gets dismissed or the class does
not get certified for some reason. Worst case is that Nintendo
faces millions in damages and millions more in attorneys fees, but
I think that is pretty unlikely."

One key issue in the suit that may be hard to prove is whether
there is actually a problem with the Joy-Con design.

"The fact that this issue is happening does not prove why it is
happening," Huffman continued. "Is there a design defect, or did
these people just not take great care of a sophisticated piece of
electronic equipment? I have had the drifting issue personally, on
the left Joy-Con. But, I have always just assumed it is because I
sometimes toss my Switch in my bag without much regard for what is
putting pressure [on] it, etc.

"Even if it is a defect, and they knew, and they do nothing about
it, what are the damages? In my personal experience, the device
still works so long as I am actively using the controller. It has a
minimal impact. What is a minor inconvenience in gameplay worth?"

Richard Hoeg, Esq. -- rhoeg@hoeglaw.com -- attorney at Hoeg Law, is
largely in agreement with Huffman. He told us, "As both a consumer
of their products and a corporate attorney, I find some significant
flaws with the reasoning set forth in the claim. (1) Everything
before Page 14 is establishing the reasoning behind why the court
should certify the class (i.e., that the people described should
all be afforded the same rights under the law). (2) The main counts
are basically a general claim that Nintendo breached its warranties
under Federal law and CA law.

"The Plaintiffs try to make the case that Nintendo has produced
intentionally defective products, that they know about the defects
because of Internet complaints and that they haven't held up their
end of the contract."

Hoeg noted that because Nintendo did in fact fix one of Diaz's
Joy-Con controllers under warranty, there likely was no formal
contractual violation.

"By all outward appearances they did what they said they were going
to do and the lead plaintiff received more than a year of use out
of his purchase," Hoeg continued. "Thus there is already an issue
with whether or not he was truly harmed. [Also,] as the lead
plaintiff is usually the most sympathetically situated plaintiff a
law firm can find, this already suggests a certain softness in the
class."

That being said, Hoeg also stressed that "California is generally
the most ‘consumer protection' oriented of the US jurisdictions,
and no doubt why the lead plaintiff (from CA) was selected." From a
PR standpoint, it's not a great situation for Nintendo, but the
company does need to take any possible legal consequences seriously
as well.

"Should Nintendo ‘worry' about it? The answer is yes," Hoeg
continued. "This will be bad publicity for them and their Switch
product, especially with a new one on the way and the holidays
around the corner, and it would behoove them to make it go away.
The plaintiff's attorney knows this. This is how the class action
litigation boutique model works. So I would expect them to settle
if they can't get it immediately kicked out of court with
prejudice."

If Hoeg's assessment is correct, there's a chance that this class
action doesn't even proceed to discovery. In the end, to put it in
layman's terms, this suit feels like it's overblown.

"I think the likely state of reality is that Nintendo sold somewhat
cheap Joy-Cons with an expected lifespan of 1-3 years under a
1-year warranty That doesn't make them the sellers of high-end
consumer goods, but it doesn't make them fraudsters either. The law
generally recognizes a usefulness in lower quality goods sold at
lower prices," Hoeg explained.

"Or said another way, you don't buy a cheap fan at Walmart and
expect it to last as long as a $3,000 fan you buy from an upscale
fixture store. If you buy a product with a 1-year warranty and get
13+ months out of it, the law isn't terribly inclined to swing
around and get you a refund. As a side note, the law of products
liability is generally much more concerned with actual physical
injury or death than mere loss of use of a product. Did that
swingset kill your child? Was that pill incorrectly labeled? . . .
That's not to say that claims like the one at issue here can't
succeed, just that it is a much tougher road for plaintiffs."

We reached out to Nintendo for comment and will update the story if
we receive a response.
[GN]


NRG ENERGY: Removes Tejero Labor Class Suit to N.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Corporations removed on July 19, 2019, the lawsuit titled
AARON TEJERO, JR., individually, and on behalf of other members of
the general public similarly situated v. NRG ENERGY SERVICES, LLC,
a Delaware Limited Liability Company; NRG ENERGY SERVICES GROUP
LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company; NRG ENERGY, INC., a
Delaware Corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Case No.
MSC18-01067, from the Superior Court of the State of California for
the County of Contra Costa to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:19-cv-04187-DMR to the
proceeding.

On May 25, 2018, the Plaintiff filed an unverified complaint in the
Superior Court.  On July 12, 2018, after filing their Answer to the
Complaint in the Superior Court, NRG removed the action to the
District Court (assigned Case No. 4:18-cv-04188-PJH).  On November
16, 2018, the District Court granted the Plaintiff's motion to
remand, finding that NRG had not met its burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy
exceeds $5 million.

On May 5, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint.  The
FAC alleges 10 causes of action, including violation of the
California Labor Code Sections 510 and 1198 (Unpaid Overtime), and
Sections (Unpaid Minimum Wages).[BN]

Defendants NRG ENERGY SERVICES LLC, NRG ENERGY SERVICES GROUP LLC
and NRG ENERGY, INC. are represented by:

          Thomas M. McInerney, Esq.
          Carolyn B. Hall, Esq.
          Roshni Chaudhari, Esq.
          OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
          Steuart Tower, Suite 1300
          One Market Plaza
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 442-4810
          Facsimile: (415) 442-4870
          E-mail: tmm@ogletree.com
                  carolyn.hall@ogletree.com
                  roshni.chaudhari@ogletree.com


OHIO EQUITY PLUS: Brett Sues Over Illegal Telemarketing Calls
-------------------------------------------------------------
Erin Brett on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. Ohio Equity Plus LLC, Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-01633
(N.D. Ohio, July 17, 2018), seeks injunctive relief, statutory
damages and any other available legal or equitable remedies for
violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Brett alleges that Ohio Equity Plus made telemarketing calls to her
phone without her prior express written consent. Brett is on the
National Do-Not-Call Registry. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael C. Lueder, Esq.
      HANSEN REYNOLDS LLC
      301 N. Broadway, Suite 400
      Milwaukee, WI 53202
      Tel: (414) 273-7676
      Fax: (414) 273-8476
      Email: mlueder@hansenreynolds.com

             - and -

      Anthony Paronich, Esq.
      PARONICH LAW, P.C.
      350 Lincoln Street, Suite 2400
      Hingham, MA 02043
      Tel: (617) 485-0018
      Fax: (508) 318-8100
      Email: anthony@paronichlaw.com


OMNICELL INC: Bernstein Liebhard Files Securities Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard LLP, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law
firm, announces that a securities class action lawsuit has been
filed on behalf of investors who purchased shares of Omnicell Inc.
(OMCL) between October 25, 2018, and July 11, 2019, inclusive (the
"Class Period"). The lawsuit, which was filed in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, seeks to
recover damages under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

If you purchased Omnicell securities, and/or would like to discuss
your legal rights and options please visit Omnicell OMCL
Shareholder Class Action or contact Matthew E. Guarnero toll free
at (877) 779-1414 or MGuarnero@bernlieb.com

According to the lawsuit, throughout the Class Period, Defendants
failed to disclose: (1) that the Company recognized revenue for
certain transactions before fulfilling its performance obligations;
(2) that the Company engaged in improper accounting practices to
meet revenue targets; (3) that the Company experienced weaker
demand for new product lines than it had previously projected; (4)
that, as a result, the Company would be required to write-off
certain inventory; (5) that the Company misclassified certain
expenses as capitalized expenditures; and (6) that, as a result of
the foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects were materially misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

On July 11, 2019, GlassHouse Research LLC published a report
entitled "Ominous Omnicell, Inc. (OMCL) Delays the Inevitable." The
report concluded that Omnicell prematurely recognized $38.3 million
in sales that should have been recognized long-term consistent with
the Company's performance obligations. Among other things, the
report alleged that Omnicell's "new product lines [were] previously
pushed onto hospitals, GPOs, and other customers to the point where
they are stuffed with products and hesitant to procure any more
inventory, especially when dealing with implementation issues." The
report further stated that, due to these accounting practices, the
Company would be required to write off $23 million of obsolete
inventory. Due to inconsistent increases in capitalized expenses
and prepaid commissions, the report alleged that $38.0 million in
capitalized expenditures should have been expensed.

On this news, the Company's stock price fell $11.41 per share, or
nearly 14%, to close at $75.11 per share on July 11, 2019, on
unusually heavy trading volume.

If you purchased Omnicell securities, and/or would like to discuss
your legal rights and options please visit
https://tinyurl.com/y4vkcsqx or contact Matthew E. Guarnero toll
free at (877) 779-1414 or MGuarnero@bernlieb.com.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff you must move the court no
later than September 17, 2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require
that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you choose to take no action,
you may remain an absent class member.

Since 1993, Bernstein Liebhard LLP has recovered over $3.5 billion
for its clients. In addition to representing individual investors,
the Firm has been retained by some of the largest public and
private pension funds in the country to monitor their assets and
pursue litigation on their behalf. As a result of its success
litigating hundreds of lawsuits and class actions, the Firm has
been named to The National Law Journal's "Plaintiffs' Hot List"
thirteen times and listed in The Legal 500 for ten consecutive
years.

Contact Information:

         Matthew E. Guarnero, Esq.
         Bernstein Liebhard LLP
         https://www.bernlieb.com
         Tel: (877) 779-1414
         E-mail: MGuarnero@bernlieb.com [GN]


OMNICELL INC: Federman & Sherwood Files Securities Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
Federman & Sherwood announces that on July 18, 2019, a class action
lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California against Omnicell, Inc. (NASDAQ:
OMCL). The complaint alleges violations of federal securities laws,
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Rule 10b-5, including allegations of issuing a series of material
or false misrepresentations to the market which had the effect of
artificially inflating the market price during the Class Period,
which is October 25, 2018 through July 11, 2019.

To learn how to participate in this action, please visit
https://tinyurl.com/yxpb3akk

Plaintiff seeks to recover damages on behalf of all Omnicell, Inc.
shareholders who purchased common stock during the Class Period and
are therefore a member of the Class as described above. You may
move the Court no later than Monday, September 16, 2019 to serve as
a lead plaintiff for the entire Class. However, in order to do so,
you must meet certain legal requirements pursuant to the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.

If you wish to discuss this action, obtain further information and
participate in this or any other securities litigation, or should
you have any questions or concerns regarding this notice or
preservation of your rights, please contact:

        Robin Hester
        FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
        10205 North Pennsylvania Avenue
        Oklahoma City, OK 73120
        Email: rkh@federmanlaw.com

Or, visit the firm's website at http://www.federmanlaw.com/[GN]


OMNICELL INC: Glancy Prongay Files Securities Fraud Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP ("GPM") announces that it has filed a
class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, captioned Bursick v. Omnicell,
Inc. et al., (Case No. 3:19-cv-04150), on behalf of persons and
entities that purchased or otherwise acquired Omnicell, Inc.
(NASDAQ: OMCL) securities between October 25, 2018 and July 11,
2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"). Plaintiff pursues claims
under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act").

Investors are hereby notified that they have 60 days from the date
of this notice to move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff in this
action.

On July 11, 2019, GlassHouse Research LLC published a report
alleging that Omnicell prematurely recognized over $38 million in
sales. The report also alleged that new product lines had been
pushed onto customers, who were hesitant to purchase more inventory
because of implementation issues, and that the Company will need to
write off $23 million in obsolete inventory.

On this news, the Company's stock price fell $11.41 per share, or
nearly 14%, to close at $75.11 per share on July 11, 2019, thereby
injuring investors.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) that the Company recognized revenue for certain
transactions before fulfilling its performance obligations; (2)
that the Company engaged in improper accounting practices to meet
revenue targets; (3) that the Company experienced weaker demand for
new product lines than it had previously projected; (4) that, as a
result, the Company would be required to write-off certain
inventory; (5) that the Company misclassified certain expenses as
capitalized expenditures; and (6) that, as a result of the
foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects were materially misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

If you purchased Omnicell securities during the Class Period, you
may move the Court no later than 60 days from the date of this
notice to ask the Court to appoint you as lead plaintiff. To be a
member of the Class you need not take any action at this time; you
may retain counsel of your choice or take no action and remain an
absent member of the Class. If you wish to learn more about this
action, or if you have any questions concerning this announcement
or your rights or interests with respect to these matters, please
contact Lesley Portnoy, Esquire, of GPM, 1925 Century Park East,
Suite 2100, Los Angeles, California 90067 at 310-201-9150,
Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, by email to shareholders@glancylaw.com,
or visit our website at www.glancylaw.com. If you inquire by email
please include your mailing address, telephone number and number of
shares purchased. [GN]


OMNICELL INC: Hagens Berman Files Securities Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP alerts investors in Omnicell, Inc.
(OMCL) to the securities class action, Bursick v. Omnicell, Inc. et
al., No. 3:19-cv-04150, filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired OMCL securities between
October 25, 2018 and July 11, 2019 (the "Class Period"), you do not
need to sign up to be included in the putative class of investors.

If you suffered significant losses (in excess of $50,000) you may
qualify to be a lead plaintiff -- one who selects and oversees the
attorneys prosecuting the case.

If you wish to serve as a lead plaintiff in this class action, you
must move the Court no later than September 16, 2019 (the "Lead
Plaintiff deadline").  Contact Hagens Berman immediately for more
information about the case and being a lead plaintiff
https://www.hbsslaw.com/investor-fraud/omnicell or contact Reed
Kathrein, who is leading the firm's investigation, by calling
510-725-3000 or emailing OMCL@hbsslaw.com

According to the Complaint, Defendants misled investors by
concealing that Omnicell (1) engaged in improper revenue
recognition, (2) experienced weaker demand for new product lines
than it previously projected, (3) would be required to write off
certain obsolete inventory, and (4) misclassified certain expenses
as capitalized expenditures.

"We're focused on investors' losses, whether Omnicell and senior
management engaged in GAAP violations and, if so, the extent to
which investors may have been misled," said Hagens Berman partner
Reed Kathrein.

Whistleblowers: Persons with non-public information regarding
Omnicell should consider their options to help in the investigation
or take advantage of the SEC Whistleblower program.  Under the new
program, whistleblowers who provide original information may
receive rewards totaling up to 30 percent of any successful
recovery made by the SEC.  For more information, call Reed Kathrein
at 510-725-3000 or email OMCL@hbsslaw.com

Hagens Berman is a national law firm with nine offices in eight
cities around the country and eighty attorneys.  The firm
represents investors, whistleblowers, workers and consumers in
complex litigation.  More about the firm and its successes is
located at hbsslaw.com.  For the latest news visit our newsroom or
follow us on Twitter at @classactionlaw.

Contact:

        Reed Kathrein, Esq.
        Tel: 510-725-3000
        E-mail: reed@hbsslaw.com [GN]


OMNICELL INC: Sept. 16 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
--------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announces the
filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Omnicell, Inc. (OMCL) from October 25, 2018 through
April 9, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The lawsuit seeks to
recover damages for Omnicell investors under the federal securities
laws.

To join the Omnicell class action, go to
https://tinyurl.com/y5onc3tp or call Phillip Kim, Esq. toll-free at
866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or cases@rosenlegal.com
for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Omnicell recognized revenue for certain transactions
before fulfilling its performance obligations; (2) the Company
engaged in improper accounting practices to meet revenue targets;
(3) the Company engaged in improper accounting practices to meet
revenue targets; (4) as a result, the Company would be required to
write-off certain inventory; (5) the Company misclassified certain
expenses as capitalized expenditures; and (6) as a result,
defendants' statements about Omnicell's business, operations, and
prospects were materially false and misleading and/or lacked a
reasonable basis at all relevant times. When the true details
entered the market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered
damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than September
16, 2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If you
wish to join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1624.htmlor to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013. Rosen Law Firm has secured hundreds of
millions of dollars for investors.

Contact:

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
         New York, NY 10016
         Tel: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Website: www.rosenlegal.com
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com
                cases@rosenlegal.com [GN]


ONE WORLD TELECOM: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Boriskin Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
ELIZABETH BORISKIN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ONE WORLD TELECOM LLC d/b/a NO
PIN, Defendant, Case No. 9:19-cv--81063 (S.D. Fla., July 26, 2019)
seeks to stop the Defendant's practice of making unsolicited
calls.

One World Telecom provides telephone features and services to small
business customers. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.
          401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 400-4713
          E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com

               - and -

          Michael Eisenband, Esq.
          EISENBAND LAW, P.A.
          515 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 120
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 533-4092
          E-mail: MEisenband@Eisenbandlaw.com


ONLINE INFORMATION: Freeman Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Online Information
Services, Inc. The case is styled as Yisroel Freeman on behalf of
himself and all other similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff v.
Online Information Services, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-04398 (E.D. N.Y., July 31, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

ONLINE Information Services, Inc. is a developer of credit risk
assessment and debt recovery solutions.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Adam Jon Fishbein, Esq.
     Adam J. Fishbein, P.C.
     735 Central Avenue
     Woodmere, NY 11598
     Phone: (516) 668-6945
     Email: fishbeinadamj@gmail.com


OWL INC: Perez Appeals M.D. Florida Decision to Eleventh Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Jose Perez, Douglas Richey and Alfredo Santos filed an
appeal from a Court ruling in their lawsuit titled Jose Perez, et
al. v. Owl, Inc., Case No. 6:17-cv-01092-CEM-GJK, in the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Hon.
Carlos E. Mendoza granted the Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for
Issuance of Notice.

These collective subclasses are conditionally certified:

   a. Road Supervisors:

      Drivers employed by Owl, Inc. since June 15, 2014, who
      have been labeled as "road supervisors" and paid on a
      salary basis; and

   b. Hourly Drivers:

      Drivers employed by Owl, Inc. since June 15, 2014, who
      have been paid on an hourly basis.

The appellate case is captioned as Jose Perez, et al. v. Owl, Inc.,
Case No. 19-90011, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Petitioners JOSE PEREZ, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated; ALFREDO SANTOS, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated; and DOUGLAS RICHEY, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Joseph Egan, Jr., Esq.
          EGAN, LEV, LINDSTROM & SIWICA, P.A.
          231 E. Colonial Drive
          PO Box 2231
          Orlando, FL 32802-2231
          Telephone: (407) 422-1400
          E-mail: jegan@eganlev.com

               - and -

          Eric Jacob Lindstrom, Esq.
          EGAN, LEV, LINDSTROM & SIWICA, P.A.
          PO Box 5276
          Gainesville, FL 32627
          Telephone: (352) 672-6901
          E-mail: elindstrom@eganlev.com

               - and -

          Shannon Liss-Riordan, Esq.
          Benjamin J. Weber, Esq.
          LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
          729 Boylston Street, Suite 2000
          Boston, MA 02116
          Telephone: (617) 994-5800
          E-mail: sliss@llrlaw.com
                  bweber@llrlaw.com

Defendant-Respondent OWL, INC., d.b.a. Owl, Inc. Transportation is
represented by:

          Marci E. Britt, Esq.
          COTNEY CONSTRUCTION LAW, LLP
          8621 E Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd.
          Tampa, FL 33610
          Telephone: (813) 853-0574
          E-mail: MBritt@TrentCotney.com

               - and -

          Anthony Tilton, Esq.
          COTNEY CONSTRUCTION LAW, LLP
          113 S Monroe St., Suite 405
          Tallahassee, FL 32301
          Telephone: (850) 213-1295
          E-mail: atilton@trentcotney.com

               - and -

          James Larry Stine, Esq.
          WIMBERLY LAWSON STECKEL SCHNEIDER & STINE, PC
          3400 Peachtree Rd. NE, Suite 400
          Atlanta, GA 30326-1107
          Telephone: (404) 365-0900
          E-mail: jls@wimlaw.com


PER.SE BEAUTY: Kiler Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Per.Se Beauty
Incorporated. The case is styled as Marion Kiler Individually and
as the representative of a class of similarly situated persons,
Plaintiff v. Per.Se Beauty Incorporated also known as: PerSe
Beauty, Inc. doing business as: Prose, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-04404 (E.D. N.Y., July 31, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Per.Se Beauty Incorporated provides personal care products. The
Company offers soap and other detergent products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Dan Shaked, Esq.
     Shaked Law Group, P.C.
     44 Court Street, Suite 1217
     Brooklyn, NY 11217
     Phone: (917) 373-9128
     Fax: (718) 504-7555
     Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com


PETSMART INC: Delsalvo Claims Website not Blind-Friendly
--------------------------------------------------------
Brett Delsalvo, individually and on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Petsmart, Inc. and Does 1
to 10, inclusive, Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-06172 (C.D. Cal., July
17, 2019), seeks preliminary and permanent injunction,
compensatory, statutory and punitive damages and fines, prejudgment
and post-judgment interest, costs and expenses of this action
together with reasonable attorneys' and expert fees and such other
and further relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act and
California's Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Defendant's website https://www.petsmart.com/ offers pet
merchandise online. Brett Delsalvo is legally blind and claims that
the site cannot be accessed by the visually-impaired. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Bobby Saadian, Esq.
     Thiago Coelho, Esq.
     WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
     3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor
     Los Angeles, CA 90010
     Tel: (213) 381-9988
     Fax: (213) 381-9989
     Email info@wilshirelawfirm.com


PREMIERE CREDIT: Ward Files FDCPA Suit in M.D. Florida
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Premiere Credit of
North America, LLC. The case is styled as Dominique Ward
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Premiere Credit of North America, LLC, John Does 1-25,
Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-00893 (M.D. Fla., July 31, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Premiere Credit of North America, LLC  is a debt collection firm
that offers financial services. It serves federal and state
government, universities, guaranty agencies, private lenders,
healthcare providers, and other asset class creditors in the United
States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Justin Zeig, Esq.
     Zeig Law Firm, LLC
     3595 Sheridan Street, Suite 103
     Hollywood, FL 33021
     Phone: (754) 217-3084
     Email: justin@zeiglawfirm.com


PROCOLLECT INC: Bradswell Files FDCPA Suit in Connecticut
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against ProCollect, Inc. The
case is styled as Valerie Bradswell also known as: Valerie Nelson
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. ProCollect, Inc., John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No.
3:19-cv-01179 (D. Conn., July 31, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

ProCollect, Inc. is one of the nation's debt collection
agencies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Raphael Deutsch, Esq.
     Stein Saks PLLC
     285 Passaic St
     Hackensack, NJ 07601
     Phone: (347) 668-9326
     Email: rdeutsch@steinsakslegal.com


PROGRESSIVE SELECT: Lopez's Class Cert. Bid Denied as Moot
----------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. William P. Dimitrouleas granted the Plaintiff's Unopposed
Motion to Withdraw Class Certification Motion in the lawsuit
entitled MICHAEL A. LOPEZ, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. PROGRESSIVE SELECT INSURANCE CO., Case No.
0:18-cv-61844-WPD (S.D. Fla.).

The Plaintiff's original Motion to Certify Class was denied as moot
as the Plaintiff has withdrawn the motion.  The Plaintiff has also
filed a new motion for class certification on August 2, 2019.[CC]

PSP DISTRIBUTION: Ash Sues over Mislabeled Cat Food Products
------------------------------------------------------------
CARYN ASH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. PSP DISTRIBUTION, LLC; PSP FRANCHISING LLC;
and PSP GROUP, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05042 (N.D. Ill.,
July 26, 2019) alleges that the Defendants' brand of cat food known
as Redford Naturals do not contain ground flaxseed. Instead, the
Redford Naturals contain whole flaxseed which does not provide the
nutritional and health benefits compared to ground flaxseed.

According to the complaint, the ground flaxseed -- a seed derived
from the flax plant -- and flaxseed oil are popular nutritional
supplements due to the fact that they are rich sources of the
essential fatty acid alpha-linolenic acid ("ALA"), which is a
heart-healthy omega-3 fatty acid. Ground flaxseed and flaxseed oil
reduce cholesterol and blood sugar, treat digestive conditions, and
treat inflammatory diseases such as allergies, arthritis, and
kidney and heart disease. The nutritional and health benefits of
ground flaxseed and flaxseed oil also extend to animals, and
therefore many types of animal food contain ground flaxseed or
flaxseed oil.

Several scientific studies conducted on humans and animals found
that ground flaxseed is more effective at delivering ALA than whole
flaxseed. For example, one study noted that plasma levels of ALA in
subjects fed whole flaxseed did not vary significantly from their
baseline ALA values—i.e., consuming whole flaxseed is essentially
the same as consuming no flaxseed at all.

Studies have also found that adverse effects were more severe in
subjects consuming whole flaxseed as opposed to ground flaxseed and
flaxseed oil, such that some of the test subjects had to withdraw
from the study after consuming whole flaxseed due to the severity
of the adverse effects.

The Defendants' Redford Naturals do not contain ground flaxseed.
Instead, these varieties of Redford Naturals contain whole
flaxseed. Prior to purchasing Redford Naturals, the Plaintiff and
members of the Class were repeatedly exposed to, saw, read, and
understood the Defendants' representations regarding the
ingredients in Redford Naturals, including the representation that
the aforementioned flavors of Redford Naturals contained ground
flaxseed. Those representations were made on the Defendants'
website.

The Defendants, intended that the Plaintiff and members of the
Class rely on the standardized representations contained on cans of
Redford Naturals, and on their website. In reliance on the
Defendants' representations that the aforementioned flavors of
Redford Naturals contained ground flaxseed, the Plaintiff and
members of the Class reasonably believed that these varieties of
Redford Naturals contained ground flaxseed and were willing to pay
a premium for them over other cat food that did not contain any
flaxseed. Based on that belief, the Plaintiff and members of the
Class purchased the aforementioned varieties of Redford Naturals
and paid a premium for them.

Psp Distribution, LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with
its principle place of business at 17197 North Laurel Park Drive,
Suite 402, Livonia, MI 48152, that does business nationwide,
including in Cook County and throughout the state of Illinois.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Thomas A. Zimmerman, Jr., Esq.
          Sharon A. Harris, Esq.
          Matthew C. De Re, Esq.
          Nickolas J. Hagman, Esq.
          ZIMMERMAN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
          77 W. Washington Street, Suite 1220
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 440-0020
          Facsimile: (312) 440-4180
          E-mail: tom@attorneyzim.com
                  sharon@attorneyzim.com
                  matt@attorneyzim.com
                  nick@attorneyzim.com


PURDUE PHARMA: Poughkeepsie City Opioid Row Removed to S.D.N.Y.
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned The City of Poughkeepsie, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, V. Purdue
Pharma L.P., Purdue Pharma Inc., Purdue Frederick Company, Inc.,
Teva Pharmaceuticals Usa, Inc., Cephalon, Inc., Johnson & Johnson,
Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. (now
Janssen Pharmaceuticals), Inc., Ortho-Mcneil-Janssen
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (now Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc.), Endo
Health Solutions Inc., Endo Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Allergan PLC
(formerly Actavis PLC), Actavis, Inc. (formerly Watson
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.), Watson Laboratories, Inc., Actavis LLC,
Actavis Pharma, Inc. (formerly Watson Pharma, Inc.), Insys
Therapeutics, Inc., Mckesson Corporation, Cardinal Health Inc.,
Amerisourcebergen Drug Corporation, American Medical Distributors,
Inc., Bellco Drug Corp., Blenheim Pharmacal, Inc., Eveready
Wholesale Drugs Ltd., Kinray, LLC, Pss World Medical, Inc.,
Rochester Drug Cooperative, Inc., Darby Group Companies, Inc.,
Raymond Sackler Family, Mortimer Sackler Family, Richard S.
Sackler, Jonathan D. Sackler, Mortimer D. A. Sackler, Kathe A.
Sackler, Ilene Sackler Lefcourt, Beverly Sackler, Theresa Sackler,
David A. Sackler, Rhodes Technologies, Rhodes Technologies Inc.,
Rhodes Pharmaceuticals L.P., Rhodes Pharmaceuticals Inc., Trust For
The Benefit Of Members of the Raymond Sackler Family, the P.F.
Laboratories, Inc., Stuart D. Baker, Par Pharmaceutical, Inc., Par
Pharmaceutical Companies, Inc., Mallinckrodt PLC, Mallinckrodt LLC,
Specgx LLC, Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Sandoz, Inc., West-Ward
Pharmaceuticals Corp. (now Hikma Pharmaceuticals, Inc.), Amneal
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Noramco, Inc., John N. Kapoor, Anda, Inc.,
Discount Drug Mart, Inc., HBC Service Company, Morris & Dickson
Co., LLC, Publix Supermarkets, Inc., SAJ Distributors, Value Drug
Company, Smith Drug Company, CVS Health Corporation, Rite Aid Of
Maryland, Inc., Inc., Rite Aid Corp., Walgreens Boots Alliance,
Inc., Walgreen Eastern Co., Walgreen, Co., Wal-Mart Inc.,
Miami-Luken, Inc., The Kroger Co., Henry Schein, Inc. and Henry
Schein Medical Systems, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 2019-51786,
(N.Y. Sup., May 15, 2019), was removed to the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York on July 22,
2019, under Case NO. 19-cv-06800.

Defendants are manufacturers, distributors, and dispensers of
prescription opioid medications that allegedly contain opioids
which have narcotic effects and may cause addiction. The City of
Poughkeepsie asserts claims for deceptive acts and practices under
New York General Business Law, false advertising under New York
General Business Law, public nuisance, violation of New York Social
Services Law, fraud, unjust enrichment and negligence.[BN]

CVS Health Corporation is represented by:

      Shawn P. Naunton, Esq.
      Adam L. Fotiades, Esq.
      Vanessa I. Garcia, Esq.
      ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER LLP
      485 Madison Avenue, 10th Floor
      New York, NY 10022
      Telephone: (212) 704-9600
      Fax: (212) 704-4256
      E-mail: snaunton@zuckerman.com
              afotiades@zuckerman.com
              vgarcia@zuckerman.com

              - and -

      Conor B. O'Croinin, Esq.
      ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER LLP
      100 East Pratt Street, Suite 2440
      Baltimore, MD 21202–1031
      Telephone: (410) 949–1160
      Fax: (410) 659-0436
      E-mail: cocroinin@zuckerman.com


QUOGUE CLUB: Duncan Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Quogue Club
Management LLC. The case is styled as Eugene Duncan and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Quogue Club
Management LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-07170 (S.D. N.Y., July
31, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

The Quogue Club at Hallock House in Quogue, NY, is a boutique hotel
at the gateway to the Hamptons and the east end of Long
Island.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
     The Marks Law Firm PC
     175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
     New York, NY 10014
     Phone: (646) 770-3775
     Fax: (646) 867-2639
     Email: bmarkslaw@gmail.com


RBS CITIZENS: Renewed Bid to Decertify Reinig FLSA Class Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALEX REINIG, KEN GRITZ, BOB SODA, MARY LOU GRAMESKY,
PETER WILDER SMITH, WILLIAM KINSELLA, DANIEL KOLENDA, VALERIA DAL
PINO, AHMAD NAJI, ROBERT PEDERSON, TERESA FRAGALE, and DAVID
HOWARD, Plaintiffs, v. RBS CITIZENS, N.A., Defendant, Case No.
15cv1541 (W.D. Pa.), Judge Arthur J. Schwab of the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied without
prejudice the Defendant's Renewed Motion to Decertify the FLSA
Collective Action.

The Court previously certified the Plaintiffs' collective action
pursuant to Section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")
on May 3, 2016.  Thereafter, approximately 350 Plaintiffs opted-in
to the FLSA collective action between May of 2016 and August of
2017.

The Defendant filed a Motion to Decertify the FLSA Collective
Action on April 11, 2017.  The Court denied the Motion to Decertify
on Aug. 22, 2017.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in its
precedential Opinion, ruled that it declined to exercise pendent
appellate jurisdiction over the FLSA collective action
certification order in the case and that it will leave undisturbed
the District Court certifying a collective action under the FLSA.
It held that that Rule 23 class certification and FLSA final
collective action certification are not inextricably intertwined.
Thus, the Court of Appeals held that there was not sufficient
overlap in the facts relevant to both issues to warrant plenary
review.

Despite the language of the precedential Opinion of the Court of
Appeals that (1) the legal standard for a FLSA collective action is
meaningfully different than the legal standard for a Rule 23 class
action, and (2) there was insufficient overlap in the facts
relevant to the FLSA and Rule 23 issues, the Defendant in effect
now argues to the contrary, and thus seeks the Court to reconsider
its previous decision not to decertify the FLSA collective action.

Judge Schwab denied the Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration is
denied.  He finds that the Defendant does not cite to any
intervening change in controlling law from the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit.  The only "new" case cited by the Defendant is
an opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
(Campbell v. City of Los Angeles), which is inconsistent with the
governing precedential Opinion in the case, and factually inapt.
Indeed, the only possible intervening change in controlling law is
the Court of Appeal's Opinion in the case, which stated explicitly
that its Rule 23 analysis did not apply to the issue of FLSA
certification because the two standards are "fundamentally
different."

Further, the Judge finds that the Defendant fails to cite any "new
evidence" and fails to cite any "clear error of law or manifest
injustice," other than its continued disagreement with the Special
Master's Second Report, and the Court's prior rulings on the FLSA
collective action issue.  The factual record sufficiently
establishes that the opted-in Plaintiffs are "similarly situated."

Therefore, the Defendant's Renewed Motion to Decertify the FLSA
Collective Action is denied without prejudice, and a new
Pretrial/Trial Order will be promptly entered on the following
narrow, single-issue jury question applicable to the collective
FLSA claims (scheduling the jury trial to commence on Sept. 23,
2019):  Did the Plaintiffs prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that Citizens Bank had a policy or practice that caused mortgage
loan officers to not report all of the hours they worked (i.e., to
work `off the clock')?

A full-text copy of the Court's June 25, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/bEXdll from Leagle.com.

DAVID R. COHEN, Special Master, pro se.

ALEX REINIG, KEN GRITZ & BOB SODA, Plaintiffs, represented by
Daniel A. Horowitz -- dhorowitz@swartz-legal.com -- Swartz Swidler
LLC,  Justin L. Swidler, Swartz Swidler LLC, Joshua Boyette --
jboyette@swartz- legal.com -- Swartz Swidler LLC, pro hac vice &
Robert D. Soloff, Robert D. Soloff, P.A., pro hac vice.

MARY LOU GRAMESKY, PETER WILDER SMITH, WILLIAM KINSELLA, DANIEL
KOLENDA, VALERIE DAL PINO, AHMAD NAJI, ROBERT PEDERSON, TERESA
FRAGALE & DAVID HOWARD, Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel A.
Horowitz, Swartz Swidler LLC, Justin L. Swidler, Swartz Swidler LLC
& Joshua Boyette, Swartz Swidler LLC, pro hac vice.

DANIEL JENKINS & MARK ROSS, Plaintiffs, represented by Joshua
Boyette, Swartz Swidler LLC.

RBS CITIZENS, N.A., Defendant, represented by Richard L. Etter, Fox
Rothschild LLP, Thomas E. Hill -- thill@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith
LLP, pro hac vice, Christina T. Tellado -- ctellado@reedsmith.com
-- Reed Smith LLP, Gretchen Woodruff Root -- groot@reedsmith.com --
Reed Smith LLP & Robert J. Tyler, III -- rtyler@reedsmith.com --
Reed Smith LLP.


RECOLOGY SAN FRANCISCO: Dwelle Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against RECOLOGY SAN
FRANCISCO. The case is styled as THEA DWELLE, FOR HERSELF
INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Plaintiff v. RECOLOGY SAN FRANCISCO, GOLDEN GATE DISPOSAL &
RECYCLING COMPANY, SUNSET SCAVENGER COMPANY, DOES 1-50, Defendants,
Case No. CGC19578069 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco Cty., July 31,
2019).

The case type is stated as "BUSINESS TORT".

Recology is an integrated resource recovery company headquartered
in San Francisco, California. The company also operates transfer
stations, materials recovery facilities (MRFs), a number of
landfills, and continues to spearhead renewable energy
projects.[BN]


SHOWS CALI: Court Dismisses Calogero FDCPA Suit With Prejudice
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IRIS CALOGERO, v. SHOWS, CALI & WALSH, LLP, a
Louisiana limited liability partnership; MARY CATHERINE CALI, an
individual; and JOHN C. WALSH, an individual, SECTION M (3), Civil
Action No. 18-6709 (E.D. La.), Judge Barry W. Ashe of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted the
Defendants' motion to dismiss Calogero's individual and class
action Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") claims.

In August and September 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused
widespread property damage in Louisiana and other Gulf Coast
states.  To aid in disaster relief, Congress appropriated funds
that were administered through the Community Development Block
Grant Program of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD") and distributed to state governments.
Louisiana created the Road Home program to disburse these funds to
homeowners in the form of grants to compensate them up to $150,000
for structural damages caused by the storms.  The Road Home program
was administered through the Louisiana Office of Community
Development ("OCD") and the Louisiana Recovery Authority.  It
placed certain conditions on the recipients' use of the money and
other covenants to run with the land.

Calogero's home in Slidell, Louisiana, was significantly damaged by
the storms.  On May 11, 2007, Calogero entered into a contract with
the OCD to receive a Road Home grant in the amount of $33,392.68.
In consideration of receipt of all Grant proceeds as compensation
for damages incurred by Calogero due to the Hurricanes, she agreed
to contractual covenants pertaining to alienation and use of the
property, maintenance of flood insurance, and other items.
Calogero also agreed to repay to the State any additional funds she
received from her insurance company or the Federal Emergency
Management Agency ("FEMA") for damage to the property caused by
Hurricanes Katrina and/or Rita in the amount by which her Road Home
grant would have been reduced if she had received those payments
prior to receiving the grant.

On Feb. 9, 2018, the Defendants sent Calogero a letter informing
her that they represented the OCD in an effort to retrieve Road
Home grant overpayments, and that she owed $4,598.89 to the State
because she received more in total insurance proceeds than the
amount used to calculate her grant.  On March 5, 2018, Calogero
disputed the alleged overpayment.

On April 10, 2018, the Defendants sent a letter to Calogero's
counsel explaining that Calogero initially reported to OCD $5,200
in FEMA payments and $14,733.29 in homeowners' insurance proceeds
for structural damage, which amounts were used to calculate
Calogero's Road Home grant.  OCD later learned that Calogero
actually received $10,500 from FEMA and $16,003.14 in structural
damage insurance proceeds from her insurer, resulting in variances
of FEMA benefits and insurance benefits used to calculate her Road
Home grant in the amounts of $5,300 and $1,269.85, respectively.
As a result, after accounting for a $1,970.96 credit in the
lack-of-flood-insurance penalty, OCD calculated that Calogero's
Road Home grant should have been $28,793.79, rather than the
$33,392.68 she received.

On July 16, 2018, Calogero filed the action alleging that
Defendants violated the FDCPA because the collection letter did not
inform her both that the alleged debt is prescribed and thus
unenforceable, and that any repayment would restart the statute of
limitations.  She contends that, by administering the Road Home
program to distribute federal funds, the OCD acted as a federal
agency and any action to recover overpayments is subject to a
six-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. Section 2425.
Thus, Calogero argues that the overpayment debt is unenforceable
and Defendants' collection letter violated the FDCPA by falsely
(according to her) implying that OCD could sue her for breach of
contract.  Calogero also asserts that the letter misrepresented the
nature of her alleged debt because it stated that the entire
$4,598.89 Road Home grant overpayment was due to unreported
insurance proceeds, when only $1,269,85 of that amount was in
unreported insurance proceeds, whereas the rest was unreported
payments from FEMA.

The Defendants move to dismiss Calogero's individual and class
FDCPA claims arguing that the FDCPA is inapplicable because
Calogero's obligation to repay the overpayment on her Road Home
grant is not a debt as defined by the statute.  

Calogero counters that her obligation to repay the alleged
overpayment is a debt under the FDCPA because it arose from the
consumer transaction of her entering into the Road Home contract.
She analogizes her situation to that of the seller in Oppenheim v.
I.C. Sys., Inc., in which the Eleventh Circuit held that a seller's
obligation to repay PayPal, under the user agreement, for funds he
withdrew from his account on a transaction that PayPal later
reversed as fraudulent on the part of the third-party buyer, was a
debt under the FDCPA.  According to Calogero, Oppenheim stands for
the proposition that a contractual obligation to repay is a debt
under the FDCPA.  Further, she argues that the Defendants must have
considered themselves subject to the FDCPA by including in the
collection letter language required by the statute.

Judge Ashe explains that the FDCPA is designed in part "to
eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors.
Not all payment obligations are "debts" under the FDCPA.
Calogero's obligation to repay the alleged Road Home overpayment is
not a "debt" as defined by the FDCPA.  The precise transaction that
created the obligation was OCD's issuing a grant to Calogero under
the Road Home program, a condition of which was that she agreed to
repay any overpayments.  There was no consumer transaction between
Calogero and OCD. Calogero did not give OCD money for goods or
services, or vice versa.  Rather, OCD granted to Calogero money to
repair her home -- money that Calogero would never be obligated to
repay unless she broke one of the covenants or received an
overpayment.  The FDCPA's application is limited to the recovery of
debts incurred as a result of transactions for the consumption of
consumer goods and services.  OCD's grant of funds to a hurricane
victim that elicited a promise from the recipient to return funds
to which she was never entitled is not such a transaction.

Calogero did not incur any consumer debt by purchasing any goods or
services from OCD; instead she received grant monies, and the
obligation to repay arose as a result of the overpayment of the
grant funds to which Calogero was never entitled.  The overpayment
of the Road Home grant funds is more like the overpaid salary the
court in Orenbuch v. Leopold, Gross & Sommers, P.C. concluded was
not a debt for purposes of the FDCPA, than it is like the
quintessential consumer credit transaction at issue in Oppenheim.
As such, Calogero's case is distinguishable from Oppenheim.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Judge Ashe granted the
Defendants' motion to dismiss, and dismissed with prejudice
Calogero's complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 25, 2019 Order and Reasons is
available at https://is.gd/rVSoJY from Leagle.com.

Iris Calogero, On her own behalf and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Keren E. Gesund --
gesundk@gesundlawoffices.com -- Gesund & Pailet, LLC.

Shows, Cali & Walsh, LLP, a Louisiana limited liability
partnership, Mary Catherine Cali & John C Walsh, Defendants,
represented by David Scranton Daly -- ddaly@frilot.com -- Frilot
L.L.C., Allen Joseph Krouse, III -- akrouse@frilot.com -- Frilot
L.L.C., Elliot Mitchell Lonker -- elonker@frilot.com -- Frilot
L.L.C. & Suzanne Marie Risey -- srisey@frilot.com -- Frilot
L.L.C..


SIRIUS XM: Removes Parrella Suit to New Jersey District Court
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Defendants removed on July 24, 2019, the lawsuit titled JEFFREY
PARRELLA, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v.
SIRIUS XM HOLDINGS INC. d/b/a SIRIUS XM SATELLITE RADIO; SIRIUS XM
RADIO INC.; and JAMES E. MEYER, Case No. MERL00120719, from the
Superior Court of New Jersey to the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey.  The District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:19-cv-15778 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff initiated the action in the Superior Court on June
19, 2019.  The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conducted a
"bait-and-switch advertising scheme" by advertising to sell to him
and others Sirius XM's "Select Service" radio package at a price of
$99 for three years, but then sold to him a one year-plan for $68.
The Plaintiff's Complaint contends that the Defendants, thereby,
violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, the General Advertising
Regulations, and the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and
Notice Act.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bharati O. Sharma, Esq.
          THE WOLF LAW FIRM, LLC
          1520 U.S. Highway 130, Suite 101
          North Brunswick, NJ 08902
          Telephone: (732) 545-7900
          Facsimile: (732) 545-1030
          E-mail: bsharma@wolflawfirm.net

Defendants Sirius XM Holdings Inc., Sirius XM Radio Inc., and James
E. Meyer are represented by:

          Keith J. Miller, Esq.
          Michael J. Gesualdo, Esq.
          Justin T. Quinn, Esq.
          ROBINSON MILLER LLC
          One Newark Center, 19th Floor
          Newark, NJ 07102
          Telephone: (973) 690-5400
          E-mail: kmiller@rwmlegal.com
                  mgesualdo@rwmlegal.com
                  jquinn@rwmlegal.com

               - and -

          Mark A. Baghdassarian, Esq.
          Aaron M. Frankel, Esq.
          Eileen M. Patt, Esq.
          KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS & FRANKEL LLP
          1177 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (212) 715-9100
          E-mail: mbaghdassarian@kramerlevin.com
                  afrankel@kramerlevin.com
                  epatt@kramerlevin.com


SOUTHAMPTON VILLAGE: Duncan Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Southampton Village
Motel, Inc. The case is styled as Eugene Duncan and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Southampton
Village Motel, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-07165 (S.D. N.Y.,
July 31, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Southampton Village Motel is a Hamptons hotel with 5 star service
and amenities.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
     The Marks Law Firm PC
     175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
     New York, NY 10014
     Phone: (646) 770-3775
     Fax: (646) 867-2639
     Email: bmarkslaw@gmail.com

SPIROS PARTNERS: Bailey Hits Misclassification, Unpaid Wages
------------------------------------------------------------
JENNIFER BAILEY, On Behalf of Herself and Others Similarly Situated
v. SPIROS PARTNERS, LTD. d/b/a RICK'S CABARET SAN ANTONIO, Case No.
5:19-cv-00866 (W.D. Tex., July 19, 2019), alleges that the
Defendant misclassified the Plaintiff and other similarly situated
female exotic dancers as "independent contractors" rather than as
employees.

As a result of this misclassification, the Defendant failed to pay
her and other similarly situated female exotic dancers required
wages under the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act, Ms. Bailey
alleges.

Rick's Cabaret is a corporation formed in Texas that operates as a
gentlemen's club featuring female exotic dancers at 5418 Brewster
Street, in San Antonio, Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jay Forester, Esq.
          FORESTER HAYNIE PLLC
          1701 N. Market Street, Suite 210
          Dallas, TX 75202
          Telephone: (214) 210-2100
          E-mail: jay@foresterhaynie.com

               - and -

          Gregg C. Greenberg, Esq.
          ZIPIN, AMSTER & GREENBERG, LLC
          8757 Georgia Avenue, Suite 400
          Silver Spring, MD 20910
          Telephone: (301) 587-9373
          E-mail: GGreenberg@ZAGFirm.com


STANFORD INTERNATIONAL: 5th Cir. Affirms Bar Orders in Zacarias
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit issued an Opinion
affirming the District Court's judgment entering bar orders and
approving the settlements in the appeals cases captioned ANTONIO
JUBIS ZACARIAS; ROBERTO BARBAR, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STANFORD
INTERNATIONAL BANK, LIMITED, Defendant, BARRY L. RUPERT; CAROL
RUPERT; MICHAEL RISHMAGUE; LIONEL ALESSIO; DAN AULI PANOS, et al.,
Movants-Appellants, v. OFFICIAL STANFORD INVESTORS' COMMITTEE;
MANUEL CANABAL; WILLIS, LIMITED; WILLIS OF COLORADO, INCORPORATED,
Interested Parties-Appellees, WILLIS GROUP HOLDINGS LIMITED; WILLIS
NORTH AMERICA, INCORPORATED; AMY S. BARANOUCKY; BOWEN MICLETTE;
BRITT, INCORPORATED; RALPH S. JANVEY; SAMUEL TROICE, Appellees, v.
EDNA ABLE, Interested Party-Appellant, THE OFFICIAL STANFORD
INVESTORS' COMMITTEE; SAMUEL TROICE, on their own behalf and on
behalf of a class of all others similarly situated; MANUEL CANABAL,
on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CARLOS TISMINESKY;
ROBERTO BARBAR; ANA LORENA NUILA DE GADALA-MARIA,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WILLIS OF COLORADO, INCORPORATED; WILLIS
LIMITED; WILLIS GROUP HOLDINGS LIMITED; WILLIS NORTH AMERICA,
INCORPORATED; AMY S. BARANOUCKY; BOWEN, MICLETTE; BRITT,
INCORPORATED, Defendants-Appellees, v. BARRY L. RUPERT; CAROL
RUPERT; MICHAEL RISHMAGUE; LIONEL ALESSIO; DAN AULI PANOS, EDNA
ABLE; et al., Appellants, v. RALPH S. JANVEY, in his Capacity as
Court-Appointed Receiver for Stanford Receivership Estate,
Appellee, EDNA ABLE; ROBERT C. AHDERS; RODRIGO RIVERA ALCAYAGA;
DAVID ARNTSEN; CARLIE ARNTSEN; ET AL, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
WILLIS OF COLORADO, INCORPORATED; WGH HOLDINGS, LTD.; WILLIS LTD.,
Defendants-Appellees, ANTONIO JUBIS ZACARIAS, Individual; ANA
VIRGINIA GONZALEZ DE JUBIS, Individual; GLADIS JUBIS DE ACUNA,
Individual; ERIC ACUNA JUBIS, Individual; TULIO CAPRILES,
Individual; JORGE CASAUS HERRERO, Individual; MARTHA BLANCHET,
Individual; LUIS ZABALA, Individual; EMMA LOPEZ, Individual; ELBA
DE LA TORRE, Individual, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WILLIS LIMITED;
WILLIS OF COLORADO, INCORPORATED, Defendants-Appellees, ANA LORENA
NUILA DE GADALA-MARIA, Individual; JOSE NUILA, Individual; JOSE
NUILA FUENTES, Individual; GLADYS BONILLA DE NUILA, Individual;
GLADYS ELENA NUILA DE PONCE, Individual, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WILLIS LIMITED, a United Kingdom Company;
WILLIS OF COLORADO, INCORPORATED, a Colorado Corporation,
Defendants-Appellees, CARLOS TISMINESKY, Individual; RACHEL
TISMINESKY, Individual; FELIPE BRONSTEIN, Individual; ETHEL
TISMINESKY DE BRONSTEIN, Individual; GUY GERBY, Individual; VICENTE
JUARISTI SUAREZ, Individual; AMPARO MATEO LONGARELA, Individual;
SALVADOR GAVILAN, Individual; LARRY FRANK, Individual; MERCEDES
BITTAN, Individual; OMAIRA BERMUDEZ, Individual,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WILLIS LIMITED; WILLIS OF COLORADO,
INCORPORATED, Defendants-Appellees. No. 17-11073, Consolidated with
Nos. 17-11114, 17-11122, 17-11127, 17-11128, 17-11129. (5th Cir.).

Certain objectors bring this appeal challenging the district
court's jurisdiction and discretion to enter the bar orders.

Under the operation of Robert Allen Stanford, the Antigua-based
Stanford International Bank issued certificates of deposit, (SIB
CDs) and marketed them throughout the United States and Latin
America. Stanford's financial advisors promoted SIB CDs by blurring
the line between the Antiguan bank and Stanford's United
States-based financial advisors, creating the impression that SIB
CDs were better protected than similar investments backed by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Stanford trained its brokers
to assure potential investors that the Bank's investments were
highly liquid and achieved consistent double-digit annual returns,
all under the protection of extensive insurance coverage.

The Securities and Exchange Commission filed a complaint in the
Northern District of Texas against Robert Allen Stanford, the
Stanford International Bank, and other Stanford entities, alleging
a massive, ongoing fraud. Invoking the court's long-held statutory
authority, the Commission requested that the district court take
custody of the troubled Stanford entities and delegate control to
an appointed officer of the court.

After years of litigation, the insurance brokers, negotiating for
complete peace, agreed to settle conditioned on bar orders
enjoining related Ponzi-scheme suits filed against the brokers. The
district court entered the bar orders and approved the settlements.


The Plaintiffs-Objectors argue that the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to bar claims not before the court.
Alternatively, they argue the bar orders were an improper exercise
of the district court's power over the receivership. The Court
reviews the district court's subject matter jurisdiction de novo
and review the settlement for abuse of discretion.

The Plaintiffs-Objectors repeatedly urge that their claims are
independent and distinct from those asserted by the receiver and
Investors' Committee. The Plaintiffs-Objectors argue that the bar
orders entail the district court's assertion of jurisdiction to
settle their claims pending in other judicial proceedings.

They are mistaken. It is necessarily the case that where a district
court appoints a receiver to coordinate interests in a troubled
entity, that entity's creditors will have hypothetical claims they
could independently bring but for the receivership: the
receivership exists precisely to gather such interests in the
service of equity and aggregate recovery. While claims seeking
recovery for Ponzi-scheme harms can sound in tort, contract, or
numerous other causes of action, the harms arise from a singular
scheme, not isolated acts that is, from a composite of conduct by
numerous conspirators taken over years, collectively establishing
and perpetuating the fraud.

The Stanford Ponzi scheme, and Willis and BMB's participation in
it, increased the receivership entities' liabilities and
misappropriated its funds, such that those liabilities could not be
satisfied; SIB CD investors were saddled with the corresponding
lost investments. The Stanford International Bank, and hence SIB CD
investors attracted by the promise of high returns plus
comprehensive insurance were injured by these alleged Ponzi players
who created, amplified, and maintained the fraud.

The Plaintiffs-Objectors seek to recover assets directly from
Willis and BMB to compensate lost investments in the Stanford
entities; the receiver and Investors' Committee attempt to recover
from the same defendants to satisfy corresponding liabilities to
investors through the receivership's distribution process. To the
point, the claims of the Plaintiffs-Objectors' and those of the
receiver and Investors' Committee seek recovery to address the same
harms sustained by the same conduct in the same Ponzi scheme.

By entering the bar orders, the district court recognizes the
reality that, given the finite resources at issue in this
litigation, Stanford's investors must recover Ponzi-scheme losses
through the receivership distribution process. The Willis
Defendants and BMB contend that the bar orders are preconditions of
their respective settlements. The brokers' incentives to settle are
reduced  likely eliminated if each SIB CD investor retains an
option to pursue full recovery in individual satellite litigation.
Such resolution is no resolution. And the costs of undermining this
settlement are potentially large. The receivership and thus
qualifying investor claimants will be deprived of $132 million in
settlement proceeds. Continued prosecution of the receiver and
Investors' Committee's suit against Willis and BMB could result in
the same if not greater recovery, but this is sheer speculation.

Further, any potential value of the receiver's ultimate recovery
must be reduced by the costs of prolonged litigation over the same
assets, not only in the receiver's own action but also in the
Plaintiffs-Objectors' myriad satellite suits, into which the
receivership is likely to be drawn. Supposing that Willis, an
allegedly deep-pocketed defendant, remains able to satisfy any
judgment against it, the same cannot be said of BMB: continued
litigation would eat away at the limited funds available under its
wasting insurance policy.

The Court says its decision is consistent with this court's
decision in SEC v. Stanford International Bank, Limited. (Lloyds)
reviewing bar orders entered by the same receivership court in
connection with the Stanford receiver's $65 million settlement with
insurance underwriters. While it held that the bar orders
improperly enjoined co-insured Stanford officers'
non-investment-related suits against the underwriters, the court
approved the bar orders relative to investors in Stanford
securities, as here.

Unlike the co-insured officers, the investors were able to
participate in the receivership's distribution process they were
afforded a means of filing claims apart from the direct action
suit, and many availed themselves of that opportunity. The bar
order functioned to channel investors' recovery into the
receivership distribution process and did not interfere with or
improperly extinguish the investors' rights.

In this appeal the Court addresses only the effect of the Willis
and BMB bar orders enjoining third-party investors' claims. The
receiver initiated suit, negotiated, and settled with the Willis
Defendants and BMB while empowered to offer global peace, that is,
to deal with potential investor holdouts like the
Plaintiffs-Objectors. These holdouts have been content for the
receiver to pursue litigation for their benefit, then to
participate as receivership claimants, collecting pro rata. Now,
however, they ask to jump the queue, come what may to their fellow
claimants who remain within the receivership distribution process.

At bottom, the Plaintiffs-Objectors seek special treatment: they
ask this court to recreate the collective-action problem that
Congress sought to eliminate so that they -- and no one else -- can
recover in full. The Court says it will not do so. The bar orders
-- enjoining these investors' third-party claims fall well within
the broad jurisdiction of the district court to protect the
receivership res. The exercise of jurisdiction over a receivership
is not an exercise of jurisdiction over other judicial proceedings.
It rather permits the barring of such proceedings where they would
undermine the receivership's operation.

The district court has wide discretion to determine the appropriate
relief in an equity receivership. Again, the receivership solves a
collective-action problem among the Stanford entities' defrauded
creditors, all suffering losses in the same Ponzi scheme. It
maximizes assets available to them and facilitates an orderly and
equitable distribution of those assets. Allowing creditors to
circumvent the receivership would dissolve this orderly process
circumvention must be foreclosed for the receivership to work. It
was no abuse of discretion for the district court to enter the bar
orders to effectuate and preserve the coordinating function of the
receivership.

Under the Anti-Injunction Act, a court of the United States may not
grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as
expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid
of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.  

The district court exercises jurisdiction over the receivership
estate. The particular part of that res at issue here is $132
million receivable owed to the receivership, conditioned upon the
BMB and Willis bar orders. When in 2009 the district court took the
receivership estate into its custody, the res was as much withdrawn
from the judicial power of the other courts, as if it had been
carried physically into a different territorial sovereignty. The
Plaintiffs-Objectors' suits in state court implicate that same res.
The formal distinction between the Plaintiffs-Objectors' and the
receivers' claims against the brokers arises from the
receivership's mediating role, interposed by the district court
between the investor-creditors and the assets belonging to the
Stanford entities.

The receiver sues the brokers on behalf of the Stanford entities so
that assets owed to creditors can be distributed to them
administratively, through the distribution process rather than
through their own piecemeal satellite litigations: any proceeds of
the Plaintiffs-Objectors' claim are potential receivership assets,
falling squarely within the bounds of the Receivership Order.

The bar orders here prevent Florida and Texas state-court
proceedings from interfering with the res in custody of the federal
district court. The bar orders aided the court's jurisdiction over
the receivership entities, which remain in the custody of the
court. The bar orders do not violate the Act.

The Texas and Florida Plaintiffs-Objectors argue that the Willis
bar order deprived them of their property (that is, their claims)
without due process and without just compensation. This is a
recasting of the jurisdictional argument the Court  have rejected.
The district court was empowered to bar judicial proceedings not
before it to protect the receivership. In so doing, the court
afforded the Plaintiffs-Objectors all the process due, notice and
opportunity to be heard on the proposed settlement and bar orders
an opportunity they seized. All due process has been afforded.

The Plaintiffs-Objectors challenge the settlement agreements and
bar orders, inferring from the large settlement sums that these are
de facto class settlements entered unlawfully without certification
of a settlement class. There is a likeness in function between the
receivership and a hypothetical certified SIB CD investor class
action: both offer means to pursue litigation in an aggregative
form. In the former, the court channels recovery through its
officer, the receiver, and retains power to bar parallel
proceedings that would interfere. In the latter, creditors pursue
their entitlements via class representatives under the requirements
of Rule 23. But, as Congress authorizes, the district court
appointed a receiver and did not certify an investor class. The
Willis and BMB settlements bring monies ultimately to be
distributed to all SIB CD investor-claimants through the
receivership. There was no illicit class settlement, and the bar
orders do not offend Rule 23.

The Texas Plaintiffs-Objectors argue that the bar orders deny their
right to a jury trial, retreading the jurisdictional argument we
have addressed. Their argument presumes the Objector-Plaintiffs
were otherwise entitled to pursue their independent action in state
court unconstrained by the receivership court's bar order. The
Court  have explained why they have no such entitlement. The right
to a jury does not create a right to proceed outside the
receivership proceeding.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the
BMB and Willis settlement agreements. The Texas
Plaintiffs-Objectors argue that a far greater recovery was
possible, that the settlement was premature, and SIB CD investors
could have recovered 100 percent of their investments. This is at
best speculative. The settlement was reached after years of
investigation and litigation. There was no certainty in the outcome
of the Receivership Action. The defendant brokers contested
liability and insist they would continue to do so if the
settlements are terminated. It remained for the plaintiffs to prove
their claims at trial, including proving the brokers' role in the
Ponzi scheme.

The potential benefits of continued litigation must be discounted
by the risk of failing in that proof or in overcoming defenses,
together with attendant costs, mindful that to succeed it would not
be enough to prove that the brokers aided and abetted. The district
court considered tradeoffs the parties faced with the prospect of
settlement and found the settlements consistent with interests of
both the receivership and the investors.

The district court found no evidence of fraud or collusion and did
not abuse its discretion in approving the settlements.

Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirms the district court's
approval of the BMB and Willis settlements and its entering of the
corresponding bar orders enjoining the Plaintiffs-Objectors'
third-party investor claims.

A full-text copy of the Fifth Circuit's July 22, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yyhtbndr from Leagle.com.

Judith R. Blakeway -- judith.blakeway@clarkhillstrasburger.com --
for Appellee.

Judith R. Blakeway, for Interested Party-Appellee.

T. Ray Guy -- ray.guy@weil.com -- for Appellee.

T. Ray Guy, for Interested Party-Appellee.

Peter Michael Jung -- michael.jung@ clarkhillstrasburger.com -- for
Appellee.

Christopher John King, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jonathan D. Polkes -- jonathan.polkes@weil.com -- for Appellee.

Jonathan D. Polkes, for Interested Party-Appellee.

Curtis Bradley Miner, 255 Alhambra Circle, PH. Coral Gables, FL
33134.  for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Matthew John McGowan, 1107 1/2 Tacoma Ave S, Tacoma, WA, 98402, for
Movant-Appellant.

STEMGENEX MEDICAL: Court Certifies 2 Subclasses in Moorer Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Selena Moorer, Plaintiff, v. Stemgenex Medical Group,
Inc., et al. Defendants, Case No. 16-cv-2816-AJB-NLS (S.D. Cal.),
Judge Anthony J. Battaglia of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California (i) granted the Plaintiffs' motion
to certify the class; and (ii) denied both the Defendants' motions
to strike the reports of Dr. David Stewart, Dr. Michael Kamins and
Dr. Eliot Hartstone, with some caveats.

On Aug. 22, 2014, the Plaintiffs filed a putative class action
complaint against the Defendants in the Superior Court of
California, County of San Diego, alleging violations of
California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), California's False
Advertising Law ("FAL"), California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act
("CLRA"), California's Health and Safety Code section 24170 ("Human
Experimentation"), 18 U.S.C. section 1961, et seq., ("RICO"),
Fraud, Negligent Misrepresentation, and Unjust Enrichment.

On Sept. 15, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint,
("FAC"), to include a claim for damages under the CLRA.  The FAC
contained similar factual allegations, but added Plaintiff Stephen
Ginsberg to the action and alleged an additional claim for
Financial Elder Abuse.  On Nov. 16, 2016, the Defendants removed
the action to the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1441(a) and
(b).

The operative complaint alleges that the Defendants engage in a
nationwide scheme to wrongfully market and sell stem cell
treatments to consumers who are often "sick or disabled, suffering
from incurable diseases and a dearth of hope."  Specifically, the
Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants advertise their "stem cell
treatments" to consumers via their website and make
misrepresentations that the treatments "effectively treat a
multitude of diseases," when in actuality, the Defendants maintain
"no reasonable basis" to make these claims.

The Plaintiffs further allege that the Defendants represent to
consumers that "100% of its prior consumers are satisfied with its
service," while omitting material information about its services,
including consumer dissatisfaction and complaints regarding the
ineffectiveness of the treatments.  These statements were based
upon "Patient Satisfaction Ratings" or "PSR" collected by the
Defendant.

The Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of all consumers
nationwide who purchased Stem Cell Treatments from StemGenex
between Dec. 8, 2013 and present, and a subclass of all members of
the nationwide class aged 65 years or older at the time of
purchase.

The Plaintiffs allege that each customer was exposed to the
Defendants' website, relied on the Defendants' "false and
misleading marketing" of the Stem Cell Treatments, and have been
harmed as a result.  Specifically, Plaintiff Moorer, suffering from
lupus, and Plaintiff Gardener, suffering from diabetes, each relied
upon the customer satisfaction statistics posted on the StemGenex
website in deciding to purchase the Defendants' Stem Cell
Treatments.

The Plaintiffs allege that each Plaintiff paid a total of $14,900
for the treatment, did not benefit from the treatment, and informed
Defendants of their dissatisfaction.  Further, they allege they
would not have paid for the Stem Cell Treatment had they known that
the statistics on the StemGenex website regarding consumer
satisfaction were false, and that StemGenex had no reasonable basis
for its marketing claim that the Stem Cell Treatments were
effective to treat diseases as advertised.

The Defendants seek to strike two of the Plaintiffs' expert reports
from Dr. Stewart and Drs. Kamins and Hartstone.

The Defendants seek to strike Dr. Stewart's report, which attempts
to analyze what effect the PSR impacted a consumer's decision to
purchase the treatment.  Essentially, Dr. Stewart's report relates
to the proposed class's damages.  The Defendants argue the report
ought to be disqualified because Dr. Stewart is unqualified and
touches on efficacy—a charge that has been excluded from the
Plaintiffs' complaint.  Judge Battaglia finds both the Defendants'
objections without merit and thus denies the motion.  However, the
he directs the Plaintiffs to change the survey question in
accordance with his directions.  

The Defendants also argue the report proposed by Dr. Kamins and Dr.
Hartstone must be stricken.  This report establishes that the Pie
Chart is material and misleading to consumers.  The proposed survey
seeks to establish that the Overall Experience Pie Chart was
material to consumers in choosing to consider stem cell treatment.
The Defendants assert that the survey design did not adhere to
necessary quality controls or have a proper control mechanism
necessary for a causal survey.

The Judge will grant in part and deny in part the Defendants'
request.  To the extent the report is to be used to show causation,
the the Judge grants the motion.  However, to the extent that the
Plaintiffs will use the report to show whether or not the pie chart
was material in considering stem cell therapy, he denies the
motion.  The simple fact is that the Defendants put out an overly
vague statement and created confusion where different
interpretations might lie.  The Defendants cannot then turn around
and use that confusion as a shield.

As to the Plaintiffs' move to certify their class under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, they seek to certify a class defined as
all persons residing in the United States who purchased Stem Cell
Therapy Treatment from StemGenex for at least $14,900 between Dec.
8, 2013 and the time of trial, after (a) visiting www.stemgenex.com
when the website contained Patient Satisfaction Ratings and/or (b)
receiving an email from StemGenex with Patient Satisfaction
Ratings.

The Judge finds that the Plantiffs have met the Rule 23(a) and Rule
23(b) requirements.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Battaglia denied the Defendants'
motions to strike, albeit with caveats and change.  He granted the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

He certified the following Rule 23(b)(3) classes:

     a. Subclass A: All persons residing in the United States who
purchased Stem Cell Therapy Treatment from StemGenex for at least
$14,900 between Dec. 8, 2013 and April 2016, after (a) visiting
www.stemgenex.com when the website contained Patient Satisfaction
Ratings and/or (b) receiving an email from StemGenex with Patient
Satisfaction Ratings.

     b. Subclass B: All persons residing in the United States who
purchased Stem Cell Therapy Treatment from StemGenex for at least
$14,900 between April 2016 and March 2017, or when the information
was no longer on the website or being used in emails or advertising
materials, after (a) visiting www.stemgenex.com when the website
contained Patient Satisfaction Ratings and/or (b) receiving an
email from StemGenex with Patient Satisfaction Ratings.

Plaintiffs Jennifer Brewer and Alexandra Gardner are appointed as
the class representatives of Subclass A, as they both received
treatment prior to April 2016.  The Plaintiffs are to submit a
class representative(s) for Subclass B for the Court's approval
within three weeks of the Order.  

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g), the Plaintiffs' attorneys are
appointed as the class counsel.  Collectively, they are Elizabeth
Banham, Janice Mulligan, Brian Findley, Harvey Berger, Timothy
Williams, and Stephanie Reynolds.

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B), the parties will meet and
confer, and submit to the Court an agreed-upon form of class notice
that will advise individual members of, among other things, the
nature of the action, the relief sought, the right of class members
to intervene or opt out, and the binding effect of a class judgment
on members under Rule 23(c)(3).  The parties will also jointly
submit a plan for dissemination of the proposed notice.  The
proposed notice and plan of dissemination will be filed with the
Court by Aug. 1, 2019.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 25, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/0Ov1To from Leagle.com.

Selena Moorer, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Jennifer Brewer & Rebecca King, Plaintiffs, represented
by Brian Keith Findley, Mulligan & Banham, Elizabeth A. Banham,
Mulligan, Banham & Findley, Harvey C. Berger, Berger, Williams &
Reynolds, LLP, Janice F. Mulligan, Mulligan, Banham & Findley,
Stephanie Reynolds -- reynolds@popeberger.com -- Berger, Williams &
Reynolds, LLP & Timothy Garr Williams -- williams@popeberger.com --
Berger, Williams & Reynolds, LLP.

Stemgenex Medical Group, Inc., a California Corporation, Stemgenex,
Inc., a California Corporation, Stem Cell Research Centre, Inc., a
California Corporation & Rita Alexander, an individual, Defendants,
represented by Annette Farnaes, Rosenberg Shpall & Associates APLC,
Malte L.L. Farnaes, Farnaes & Lucio, APC & Christina Marie Lucio --
christina@jameshawkinsaplc.com -- Farnaes & Lucio, APC.

Andre P. Lallande, D.O., an individual, Defendant, represented by
Clark Ray Hudson, Neil Dymott Frank McCabe & Hudson, Jonathan Reza
Ehtessabian, Neil Dymott Frank McFall Trexler McCabe & Hudson,
APLC, Nicole T. Melvani, Neil Dymott Frank McCabe & Hudson, APLC &
Malte L.L. Farnaes, Farnaes & Lucio, APC.


STUDENT LOANS: Garcia TCPA Suit Asserts Invasion of Privacy
-----------------------------------------------------------
NICOLE GARCIA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. STUDENT LOANS OF AMERICA LLC, a California Limited
Liability Company, Case No. 1:19-cv-23033-XXXX (S.D. Fla., July 22,
2019), arises from the Defendant's alleged illegal actions in
negligently or willfully contacting the Plaintiff on her cellular
telephone, in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act,
thereby, invading her privacy.

Student Loans of America LLC is a California Limited Liability
Company and citizen of the state of California, listing its
principal address in San Diego, California.

Student Loans is in the business of selling fee based application
assistance services to consumers who apply for various student loan
repayment programs, such as income-driven repayment plans.  Student
Loans promotes and markets its services, in part, by calling
wireless phone users.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Seth M. Lehrman, Esq.
          EDWARDS POTTINGER LLC
          425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 524-2820
          Facsimile: (954) 524-2822
          E-mail: seth@epllc.com


TECH RABBIT: Zarrabian Remanded to California State Court
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SAHAND ZARRABIAN, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TECH RABBIT, LLC; and DOES
1-100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-10648-ODW (JCx)
(C.D. Cal.), Judge Otis D. Wright of the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California granted Zarrabian's Motion to
Remand, and remanded the action to the Superior Court of
California, County of Los Angeles.

The Plaintiff brings nine causes of action based on various state
law claims against the Defendant arising from a data breach of the
Defendant's website that resulted in consumers' private information
being disclosed to unauthorized third parties.  As a result of the
Defendant's alleged action/inaction, the Plaintiff seeks a number
of equitable reliefs including appropriate methods and policies
with respect to consumer data collection, storage, and safety.

On Dec. 26, 2018, the Defendant removed the action to federal court
based on alleged diversity jurisdiction.  It invokes diversity as
the basis of the Court's subject matter jurisdiction.  To satisfy
the jurisdictional threshold, the Defendant argues that Plaintiff's
prayer for equitable relief requiring the Defendant to utilize
appropriate methods and policies with respect to consumer data
collection, storage, and safety results in costs in excess of the
jurisdictional minimum.

Judge Wright finds that based on the allegations in the Class
Action Complaint, the jurisdictional minimum has not been met.  At
most, the Class Action Complaint alleges that the amount in
controversy is over $25,000 to meet the superior court's unlimited
jurisdiction requirement.

The Defendant has not met its burden to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.  In
its Notice of Removal, the Defendant, without support, asserts that
it would cost $300,000 to $500,000 to adopt banking-grade security
standards.  It is unclear in the Defendant's Notice of Removal how
it arrived at that figure, but nonetheless, the estimate appears to
be based on speculation as it states that it cannot ascertain,
what, precisely Plaintiff Zarrabian supposes to be equitable relief
compelling Tech Rabbit to utilize appropriate methods and policies
and assumes the statement to require "banking-grade security."
This estimation is highly speculative and not sufficient to invoke
diversity jurisdiction.

Through its Motion, the Plaintiff argues that the Defendant failed
to meet its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that
the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.  As such, the Defendant
had another opportunity, through its Opposition, to establish that
the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. Again, the Defendant
failed to do so.

In light of the standard of construing the removal statute against
removal and the record before the Court, the Defendant has not made
a sufficient showing to invoke this Court's jurisdiction.  Judge
Wright therefore remanded the action to the Superior Court of
California, County of Los Angeles, Case No. 18STCV01352, 111 North
Hill Street, Los Angeles, California 90012.  As such, the Motion to
Dismiss is denied as moot.  The Clerk of the Court will close the
case.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 25, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/h9mjnj from Leagle.com.

Sahand Zarrabian, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Ebby Shahrokh
Bakhtiar -- esb@lb-lawyers.com -- Livingston Bakhtiar, Keith David
Griffin, Girardi Keese & Thomas Vincent Girardi, Girardi Keese.

Tech Rabbit, LLC, a New Jersey Limited Liability Company,
Defendant, represented by Christian S. Molnar --
cmolnar@arendsenlaw.com --Arendsen Cane Molnar LLP.


UNITED AIRLINES: Seeks 9th Circuit Review of Ruling in Brown Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant United Airlines, Inc., filed an appeal from a Court
ruling in the lawsuit styled Ella Brown v. United Airlines, Inc.,
Case No. 3:19-cv-00537-MMA-JLB, in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California, San Diego.

The appellate case is captioned as Ella Brown v. United Airlines,
Inc., Case No. 19-80094, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Respondent ELLA BROWN, an individual, on behalf of
herself and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, is
represented by:

          Norman B. Blumenthal, Esq.
          Aparajit Bhowmik, Esq.
          BLUMENTHAL, NORDREHAUG & BHOWMIK
          2255 Calle Clara
          La Jolla, CA 92037
          Telephone: (858) 551-1223
          Facsimile: (858) 551-1232
          E-mail: norm@bamlawca.com
                  aj@bamlawlj.com

Defendant-Petitioner UNITED AIRLINES, INC., a Corporation, is
represented by:

          Adam P. KohSweeney, Esq.
          O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
          Two Embarcadero Center, 28th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 984-8700
          E-mail: akohsweeney@omm.com


UNITED COLLECTION: Israel Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against United Collection
Bureau Inc. The case is styled as Amram Israel individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. United
Collection Bureau Inc, LVNV Funding LLC, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-04408 (E.D. N.Y., July 31, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

United Collection Bureau, Inc. provides debt collection services
for companies (government, healthcare, utility, financial service,
communication, and student markets) and individuals in the United
States.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


UNITED STATES: Sweet Moves to Certify Borrowers' Class & Subclass
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit captioned THERESA SWEET, CHENELLE
ARCHIBALD, DANIEL DEEGAN, SAMUEL HOOD, TRESA APODACA, ALICIA DAVIS,
and JESSICA JACOBSON on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated v. ELISABETH DEVOS, in her official capacity as
Secretary of the United States Department of Education, And THE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Case No. 3:19-cv-03674-WHA
(N.D. Cal.), move the Court for an order certifying a class and
subclass:

   * Class:

     All people who borrowed a Direct Loan or FFEL loan to pay
     for a program of higher education, who have asserted a
     borrower defense to repayment to the U.S. Department of
     Education, whose borrower defense has not been granted or
     denied on the merits, and who is not a class member in
     Calvillo Manriquez v. DeVos, No. 17-7106 (N.D. Cal.); and

   * Subclass:

     All people who borrowed a Direct Loan or FFEL loan to pay
     for a program of higher education, who have asserted a
     borrower defense to the U.S. Department of Education, who
     meet the prima facie criteria for a loan discharge (as
     established in Department policies, including but not
     limited to Department memoranda on "CCI Transferability of
     Credit" claims, "CCI Guaranteed Employment Claims," and "ITT
     Guaranteed Employment claims"), and who have not received
     notice of their borrower defense decision.

The Plaintiffs further ask that the Court appoint Theresa Sweet,
Chenelle Archibald, Daniel Deegan, Samuel Hood, Tresa Apodaca,
Alicia Davis, and Jessica Jacobson as class representatives, and
that it appoint their counsel as class counsel.

In the alternative, the Plaintiffs ask the Court to hold this
motion in abeyance and permit limited discovery in support of the
motion for class certification.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Joseph Jaramillo, Esq.
          Natalie Lyons, Esq.
          HOUSING & ECONOMIC RIGHTS ADVOCATES
          1814 Franklin Street, Suite 1040
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone:  (510) 271-8443
          Facsimile: (510) 868-4521
          E-mail: jjaramillo@heraca.org
                  nlyons@heraca.org

               - and -

          Eileen M. Connor, Esq.
          Toby R. Merrill, Esq.
          Kyra A. Taylor, Esq.
          Joshua D. Rovenger, Esq.
          LEGAL SERVICES CENTER OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL
          122 Boylston Street
          Jamaica Plain, MA 02130
          Telephone: (617) 390-3003
          Facsimile: (617) 522-0715
          E-mail: econnor@law.harvard.edu
                  tmerrill@law.harvard.edu
                  ktaylor@law.harvard.edu
                  jrovenger@law.harvard.edu


UNIVERSAL PROTECTION: Underpays Security Officers, Griffith Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
AKEYA GRIFFITH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. UNIVERSAL PROTECTION SERVICE, LLC; ALLIED
UNIVERSAL SECURITY SERVICES d/b/a ALLIED UNIVERSAL; and [FNU]
JONES, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-06983 (S.D.N.Y., July 25, 2019)
seeks to recover from the Defendants unpaid wages due to
time-shaving, statutory penalties, liquidated damages, attorneys'
fees and costs.

The Plaintiff Griffith was employed by the Defendants as security
officer.

Universal Protection Service, LLC provides security solutions. The
Company specializes in the design, installation, and monitoring of
security and fire monitoring systems. Universal Protection Service
serves customers in the States of North Carolina and Massachusetts.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

           C.K. Lee, Esq.
           LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
           William Brown, Esq.
           148 West 24th Street, 8th Floor
           New York, NY 10011
           Telephone: (212) 465-1188
           Facsimile: (212) 465-1181


US BANK: Casper Files Suit Over Illegal Fees
--------------------------------------------
Theodore Casper, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. US Bank, N.A., Defendant, Case No.
19-cv-00850, (N.D. N.Y., July 17, 2019) alleges breach of contract
and violations of the New York General Business Law.

Casper alleges that U.S. Bank borrowers are charged illegal fees
when they try to pay by automated phone system or online. He claims
to have paid this fee 44 times. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Theodeos Basdekis, Esq.
      SCARZAFAVA, BASDEKIS & DADEY, PLLC
      48 Dietz Street, Suite C
      Oneonta, NY 13820-5107
      Telephone: (607) 432-9341
      Fax: (607) 432-1986
      Email: tbasdekis@stny.1r.com

             - and -

      James L. Kauffman, Esq.
      BAILEY GLASSER, LLP
      1055 Thomas Jefferson Street, NW, Suite 540
      Washington, DC 20007
      Telephone: (202) 463-2101
      Fax: (202) 342-2103
      Email: jkauffman@baileyglasser.com


VACO TECHNOLOGY: Google's Bid to Junk Bush Wage & Hour Suit OK'd
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, issued an Order granting in part
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned  CHRISTIANA
BUSH, Plaintiff, v. VACO TECHNOLOGY SERVICES, LLC., et al.,
Defendants. Case No. 17-cv-05605-BLF. (N.D. Cal.).

In her Second Amended Complaint (SAC), the Plaintiff alleged that
VTS staffed her at Google in Google's Expedition Team as an
Expedition Team Lead and that she was the victim of several wage
and hour violations by both Defendants while in that position. She
brought labor law claims on behalf of herself and several putative
classes against VTS, Google, and several other Vaco entities.

Google moves to dismiss the Plaintiff's Vaco Class and sub-classes,
as well as all references in the TAC to equitable tolling.

LEGAL STANDARD

Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted tests
the legal sufficiency of a claim. When determining whether a claim
has been stated, the Court accepts as true all well-pled factual
allegations and construes them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.  However, the Court need not "accept as true allegations
that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or
allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of
fact, or unreasonable inferences.

Tolling Law

In 1974, the Supreme Court in American Pipe held that the
commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of
limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have
been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class
action.

In that case, a class action was filed just before the statute of
limitations expired, and then the trial court declined to certify
the class. Eight days after the denial of certification, class
members sought to intervene in the action to assert the same claims
as the class would have asserted. The Supreme Court tolled the
statute of limitations for those class members, holding that the
commencement of the original class suit tolls the running of the
statute for all purported members of the class who make timely
motions to intervene after the court has found the suit
inappropriate for class action status.

In so holding, the Supreme Court noted that the purpose of
statutory limitation periods is to ensure essential fairness to
defendants by barring a plaintiff who has slept on his rights by
not putting the defendants on notice of the claims against them
early enough for the defendants to marshal fresh evidence and
witnesses. This purpose is satisfied, the Supreme Court held, when
a named plaintiff who is found to be representative of a class
commences a suit and thereby notifies the defendants not only of
the substantive claims being brought against them, but also of the
number and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs who may
participate in the judgment.

Under this law, the Court finds that equitable tolling is not
appropriate in this case. As a reminder, Plaintiff only references
equitable tolling in two places in the TAC: (1) explicitly in her
individual FLSA claim; and (2) implicitly in her class allegations,
and thus in each of her class claims, by defining the class period
in terms of the Trujillo action. She does not expressly allege
tolling as to her state law individual claims.

As to the FLSA claim, Plaintiff concedes by not arguing otherwise)
that American Pipe bar her class claim. American Pipe expressly
tolls individuals' successive claims asserted previously in a
putative class action.

As to the state law claims, Plaintiff does not plead equitable
tolling for her individual state law claims. She pleads it only in
the definition of the classes. If she had pled tolling for her
individual claims, American Pipe tolling would apply. However,
American Pipe tolling does not apply to the class claims.  

Several facts weigh against allowing equitable tolling here, each
of which indicates that it would prejudice Defendants to allow
equitable tolling. First, the class definitions in the cases do not
overlap. Trujillo brought claims on behalf of a Vaco Class that are
no longer in this case because the Court has substantially narrowed
them. Though Google may have been on notice that Vaco employees
working at Google were the focus of the Trujillo action, the number
of claimants in that case and the range of jobs at issue were
drastically more numerous than remain in this case.

Likewise, this case has and had in previous iterations of the
complaint broader class allegations, in that it involves a Google
Expedition Class that the Trujillo Action did not include. At the
very least then, the Google Expedition Class could not be tolled.

Second, the claims brought in each action are not the same. Though
some claims overlap, and they are all wage and hour violations,
several claims do not overlap. The substantial identity of
successive claims was a key motivating factor in Hatfield and the
cases on which it relies. Denying equitable tolling when neither
the parties nor the claims overlaps comports with Hatfield's
guidance to look to American Pipe, even if the types of tolling are
not identical. American Pipe emphasized that the defendant was on
notice of the substantive claims being brought against them and
also of the number and generic identities of the potential
plaintiffs who may participate in the judgment.

Third, and finally, Plaintiff filed her claims in this case before
the Trujillo Action ended. Not only does this reinforce that the
claims and parties at stake differ, but also it is an anomaly in
the tolling jurisprudence. How Plaintiff's state-law claims here
can be tolled by an action that was still ongoing at the time she
filed those claims here is a mystery. But more importantly, it
shows that Defendants could not have been on notice that
Plaintiff's claims would be tolled based on Trujillo, and thus
Defendants would be prejudiced to allow such tolling. It also
indicates that Plaintiff is not acting reasonably in seeking to
toll her claims. Given that she cannot toll her claims, it is
likewise inequitable to allow tolling of even the narrow overlap
between Trujillo and this case: the narrowed three-job Vaco Class
for the handful of claims asserted both here and in Trujillo.

Accordingly, Google's motion is granted without leave to amend with
respect to tolling.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 22, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yyher32p from Leagle.com.

Christiana Bush, Plaintiff, represented by Chaim Shaun Setareh --
shaun@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group & Thomas Alistair Segal
-- thomas@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group.

Vaco Technology Services, LLC, a Tennessee limited liability
company, Defendant, represented by Alexandria Marie Witte --
awitte@fordharrison.com -- Ford & Harrison LLP & Daniel B. Chammas
-- dchammas@fordharrison.com -- Ford & Harrison LLP.

Google, LLC, a Delaware corporation, Defendant, represented by
Zachary P. Hutton -- zachhutton@paulhastings.com -- Paul Hastings
LLP, Paul Andrew Holton -- paulholton@paulhastings.com -- Paul
Hastings LLP & William Tucker Page --
rickkirkbride@paulhastings.com -- Paul Hastings LLP.


VITA-MIX CORP: $41K in Costs Awarded in Linneman Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case, Vicki Linneman, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Vita-Mix
Corporation, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:15-cv-748 (S.D. Ohio),
Judge Susan J. Dlott of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, Western Division, granted in part the Class
Counsel's Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Class
Representative Service Awards.

The consumer class action was filed on Nov. 19, 2015.  The
Plaintiffs alleged that Vitamix2 blenders were defective because a
seal in the container deposited tiny black polytetrafluoroethylene
("PTFE") flecks into the blended food and drink.  They filed a
First Amended Class Action Complaint on Feb. 26, 2016, seeking
certification of a nationwide class of purchasers of Vitamix
blenders and asserting the following claims: (1) breach of express
warranty; (2) breach of implied warranty of merchantability; (3)
negligent design, engineering, and manufacture; (4) fraud and
fraudulent concealment; (5) unjust enrichment; (6) breach of
contract; and (7) violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices
Act.

In April 2016, the Defendants filed a motion for partial dismissal
of the action as well as an answer with a jury demand.  While the
dismissal motion was pending, the parties began settlement
negotiations and attended a settlement conference before U.S.
District Court Judge Michael R. Barrett on Aug. 3, 2016.  Although
no settlement was reached, ongoing negotiations continued.  The
parties met for an additional conference with the Hon. Michael R.
Barrett on Nov. 30, 2016, at which the parties negotiated a
Memorandum of Understanding of substantive terms for a settlement.
The parties spent the early part of 2017 negotiating the details of
a Class Action Settlement Agreement and Release.  However, as set
forth in the Settlement Agreement, the parties did not reach an
agreement on the amount of attorneys' fess and expenses Vita-Mix
would pay to the class counsel, except that the parties agreed the
class counsel is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and
expenses and that the Defendants have a right to object to and
contest a fee application.

In September 2017, the Plaintiffs filed an amended motion for
preliminary approval of the Class Action Settlement.  On May 3,
2018, the Court entered an Order Granting Final Approval of Class
Action Settlement, but reserved the issue of attorneys' fees,
costs, and service awards for a separate ruling.

The matter is before the Court on the Class Counsel's Motion for
Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Class Representative Service Awards.
The Plaintiffs request approval of $7,188,846.25 in attorneys'
fees, $41,194.77 in expenses, and $3,000 in service awards for each
of the two named Plaintiffs.  Although Vita-Mix does not object to
expenses or service awards, they strongly oppose the request for
attorneys' fees.

Although Judge Dlott has established applicable rates, she is not
in a position to compute the final lodestar in the case because the
attorney time is subject to revision and objections.  The parties
will be required to submit a final lodestar calculation for her
after all objections to billing records have been resolved.

The Judge has reviewed the documentation regarding expenses and
finds them to be reasonable and related to the case.  Further, the
Defendants do not object to payment of $41,194.77 in expenses.

The Judge is satisfied that each Plaintiff contributed meaningfully
to the case and an award of a $3,000 to each is in no way a
"bounty."  Furthermore, the service awards are not taken from a
common fund but paid separately by the Defendants irrespective of
any settlement benefits.  She finds that the service awards
appropriately incentivize active, effective, and meaningful
participation in class action litigation, which is necessary to
move the case forward and, in the case, reach a meaningful
settlement.  For these reasons, she approves the two awards.

Finally, having considered the named Plaintiffs' time investment in
the case, the Judge finds that two small service awards are not
bounties but a meaningful way to compensate these individuals for
their contributions to the case.  The objections to approval of the
settlement on the basis that they objected to attorneys' fees are
overruled.

For these reasons, Judge Dlott granted in part the Class Counsel's
Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Class Representative Service
Awards.  She granted the request for expenses and service awards.
Although she has ruled on aspects of the request for attorneys'
fees, the request remains pending, subject to the protocol
described.

To reiterate, within 14 days of entry of the Order, the Class
Counsel will provide modified billing records to the Defendants for
their review.  Within 14 days of the Class Counsel's submission to
the Defendants, the Defendants must submit an updated list of
objections (if necessary) to te Class Counsel.  Within 14 days of
circulating updated objections, the Class Counsel and the
Defendants must meet and confer in person to attempt to resolve all
remaining objections without Court intervention.  Within 14 days of
the meet-and-confer, the parties must file a joint statement of all
objections as well as a joint submission of the Class Counsel's
time entries.  If any redacted entries remain, the Class Counsel
must file a redacted version with any remaining privileged entries
with a privilege log.  If necessary, the Court will review the
remaining objections and set a date for a hearing during which it
will rule on the remaining objections.  In addition, the
Defendants' Motion to Receive Expert Testimony is granted.

The Judge has also received the parties' Joint Request for a Status
Conference in light of the conclusion of the validation process.
She granted the request.  An in-person status conference is set for
July 18, 2019 at 10:00 a.m. in chambers.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 25, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/JAV6mT from Leagle.com.

Kamala Bennett, Objector, represented by Simina Vourlis --
svourlis@vourlislaw.com -- The Law Offices of Simina Vourlis.

Franklin DeJulius & Jon Lorenzo, Objectors, represented by Edward
W. Cochran.

Avagail Short, Objector, pro se.

Vicki A Linneman, On behalf of themselves and those similarly
situated & Obadiah N Ritchey, On behalf of themselves and those
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Andrew Biller
-abiller@msdlegal.com -- Markovits, Stock & DeMarco, LLC,
Christopher P. Finney -- chris@finneylawfirm.com -- Finney Law
Firm, LLC, Jeffrey Scott Goldenberg -- jgoldenberg@gs-legal.com --
Goldenberg Schneider, LPA, Justin Charles Walker --
justin@finneylawfirm.com -- Finney Law Firm, LLC, Paul M. De Marco
-- pdemarco@msdlegal.com -- Markovits, Stock & DeMarco, LLC,
Terence Richard Coates -- tcoates@msdlegal.com -- Markovits, Stock
& DeMarco, LLC, Christopher D. Stock -- cstock@msdlegal.com --
Markovits, Stock & DeMarco LLC & Wilbert Benjamin Markovits --
bmarkovits@msdlegal.com -- Markovits, Stock & DeMarco LLC.  

Vita-Mix Corporation, Vita-Mix Management Corporation & Vita-Mix
Manufacturing Corporation, Defendants, represented by Carolyn Ann
Taggart -- ctaggart@porterwright.com -- Porter Wright Morris &
Arthur, LLP, J. Philip Calabrese  -- pcalabrese@porterwright.com --
Porter Wright Morris & Arthur LLP, Tracey L. Turnbull --
tturnbull@porterwright.com -- Porter Wright Morris & Arthur LLP,
Ana P. Crawford -- acrawford@porterwright.com -- Porter Wright
Morris & Arthur, Caroline Gentry -- cgentry@porterwright.com --
Porter Wright Morris & Arthur & Ryan Lewis Graham , Porter --
rgraham@porterwright.com -- Wright, Morris & Arthur.


WALGREEN PHARMACY: Epstein Labor Suit Removed to C.D. Cal.
----------------------------------------------------------
Christina Epstein, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly, Plaintiff, v. Walgreen Pharmacy Services Midwest, LLC,
Walgreen Co. and Does 1 through 50, inclusive, and Does 1 through
100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. RIC1903150 filed on May 31,
2019, in California Superior Court, was removed to U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California on July 18, 2019,
under Case No. 19-cv-01323.

Epstein seeks redress for Defendants' failure to provide meal
periods, rest periods, minimum wages, overtime, complete and
accurate wage statements, reimbursement of business-related
expenses and resulting from unfair business practices, waiting time
penalties for unpaid wages due upon termination and for violation
of the California Labor Code, California Business and Professions
Code, including declaratory relief, damages, penalties, equitable
relief, costs and attorneys' fees.[BN]

Walgreen Pharmacy is represented by:

     Allison C. Eckstrom, Esq.
     Christopher J. Archibald, Esq.
     Karina Lo, Esq.
     BRYAN CAVE LEIGHTON PAISNER LLP
     3161 Michelson Drive, Suite 1500
     Irvine, CA 92612-4414
     Telephone: (949) 223-7000
     Facsimile: (949) 223-7100
     Email: allison.eckstrom@bclplaw.com
            christopher.archibald@bclplaw.com
            karina.lo@bclplaw.com


WYETH: Denial of Browning's Claims in Diet Drugs Suit Affirmed
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: DIET DRUGS
(PHENTERMINE/FENFLURAMINE/DEXFENFLURAMINE) PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION. Debra K. Browning and Rick E. Browning, Appellants,
Case No. 18-2978 (3d Cir.), Judge Paul Matey of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's Aug. 7,
2018 order denying Debra K. Browning's claim for benefits under the
Diet Drugs Nationwide Class Action Settlement Agreement.

In 2000, Wyeth, the successor in interest to America Home Products,
settled a class action related to certain diet drugs.  Under the
continuing supervision of the District Court, the AHP Settlement
Trust administers and reviews claims by the class members to
determine their qualification to participate in the settlement.
The class settlement agreement uses matrices that assess factors
such as age, length of illness, and medical severity, to determine
the amount each claimant may recover from the Trust.  The
Settlement Agreement requires that each claim for these "Matrix"
benefits be supported by a reasonable medical basis.  So claims
submitted to the Trust must come with a physician's attestation.

In 2002, the District Court ordered the Trust to audit all claims
for medical reasonableness.  The next year, the District Court,
with the consent of the parties, approved new "Audit Rules" for the
review of claims submitted to the Trust.  The Audit Rules now guide
the Trust's scrutiny of the medical basis for a successful
settlement claim and underlie the issues in the appeal.

Browning submitted her claim for benefits in November 2015 with the
attestation of her physician Richard DiNardo.  Citing an
echocardiogram dated Aug. 5, 2015, Dr. DiNardo diagnosed Browning
as suffering from moderate mitral regurgitation.  Under the
applicable Matrix, this diagnosis qualified Browning for "Level II"
benefits equaling $604,808.

Following the Audit Rules, the Trust forwarded the claim for review
to Zuyue Wang, a cardiologist retained by the Trust.  Dr. Wang
reviewed the echocardiogram and other studies, reports, and
materials submitted by Browning and concluded that there was no
reasonable medical basis for Dr. DiNardo's finding that Browning
exhibited moderate mitral regurgitation.  This alternate conclusion
was significant, because Level II benefits for mitral valve damage
require at least moderate mitral regurgitation, as well as one of
the five complicating factors listed in the Settlement Agreement.
Under the Settlement Agreement, moderate mitral regurgitation has
an objective definition and exists only where the regurgitant jet
area ("RJA") in any apical view is equal to or greater than 20% of
the left atrial area ("LAA").  Dr. Wang's reading of Browning's
2015 echocardiogram found an RJA/LAA of 18%, below the required 20%
ratio threshold. Based on this diagnosis, the Trust denied
Browning's claim.

Browning, backed by Dr. DiNardo, challenged the denial of her
claim, arguing that her echocardiogram showed a reasonable medical
basis for a diagnosis of moderate mitral regurgitation.  Dr.
DiNardo stood by his reading of the August 2015 echocardiogram as
showing "mitral regurgitation near the border between mild and
moderate mitral valve regurgitation."  And Dr. DiNardo noted that
Browning complained of worsening chest pain and heart palpitations,
consistent with moderate mitral valve regurgitation.  Although not
required to do so by the Audit Rules, the Trust forwarded
Browning's case back to Dr. Wang for a second review.  Dr. Wang
confirmed her original measurements of the RJA/LAA ratio and again
found no reasonable medical basis for a diagnosis of moderate
mitral regurgitation. She also dismissed Dr. DiNardo's references
to Browning's other symptoms as "not indicative of moderate mitral
regurgitation.  

Browning disputed this second review, and the Trust applied to the
supervising District Court for an order to show cause requiring
Browning to demonstrate her entitlement to benefits.  The District
Court issued the order and referred the matter to a Special Master.
Both parties submitted their documents from the earlier reviews to
the Special Master.  Additional medical disputes followed.

The Special Master forwarded the record and the technical advisor's
report to the District Court for review.  The District Court
considered it all, and ultimately credited the findings of both Dr.
Vigilante and Dr. Wang.  Finding that Browning failed to meet her
burden of establishing a reasonable medical basis, the District
Court affirmed the Trust's denial of her claim.  Browning timely
appealed.

Jugde Matey begins with the District Court's conclusion that
Browning failed to show a "reasonable medical basis" for her
alleged condition.  He finds that (i) because Browning did not show
the required RJA/LAA ratio, the District Court did not abuse its
discretion by not considering her other symptoms; and (ii) the
District Court correctly concluded that adopting Browning's
argument would allow a claimant to recover Matrix Benefits with an
RJA/LAA ratio that does not meet the definition under the
Settlement Agreement and would render meaningless this critical
provision of the Settlement Agreement.

Browning also claims error in the decision to exclude Dr. McLean's
second affidavit.  The Judge finds that the Trust's reply to
Browning's submission to the Special Master questioned Dr. McLean's
findings, and Browning sought permission to file both a surreply
and another affidavit from Dr. McLean.  Browning argued that the
Trust misconstrued Dr. McLean's affidavit, warranting rebuttal.
The Special Master accepted that claim as good cause and allowed
her to reframe his testimony in the most favorable light in a
surreply.  But the Special Master declined to allow a new affidavit
from Dr. McLean, a decision logically connected to Browning's
desire to correct, rather than supplement, the closed record.  That
decision is not an abuse of discretion.

For all these reasons, Jugde Matey affirmed the order of the
District Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 25, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/cRC4Eh from Leagle.com.


XPO LOGISTIC: Sept. 4 Hearing on Kramer Deal Prelim Approval Bid
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KEVIN KRAMER on behalf of himself, all others
similarly situated, and on behalf of the general public,
Plaintiffs, v. XPO LOGISTICS, INC.; and DOES 1-100, Defendants.
HECTOR IBANEZ on behalf of himself, all others similarly situated,
and on behalf of the general public Plaintiffs, v. XPO LAST MILE,
INC.; and DOES 1-100, Defendants, Case No. 3:16-cv-07039-WHO,
Consolidated with No. 3:17-cv-04009-JSC (N.D. Cal.), Judge William
H. Orrick of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California continued the hearing on the Plaintiff's Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement to Sept. 4, 2019 at
2:00 p.m. as stipulated by the parties.  The Motion for Preliminary
Approval must be filed by July 31, 2019.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 25, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/FXNPgb from Leagle.com.

Kevin Kramer, Plaintiff, represented by David Thomas Mara --
dmara@maralawfirm.com -- Mara Law Firm, PC, Jamie Kathryn Serb --
jserb@maralawfirm.com -- Mara Law Firm, PC, William David Turley,
Mara Law Firm, PC & Katharine McCall -- kmccall@kmtg.com -- The
Turley Law Firm, APLC.

Hector Ibanez, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by David Thomas Mara, Mara Law
Firm, PC, Matthew Roland Bainer, The Bainer Law Firm & Jamie
Kathryn Serb, Mara Law Firm, PC.

XPO Logistics, Inc., Defendant, represented by Adam Lewis Lounsbury
-- Adam.Lounsbury@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis, PC, pro hac
vice, Fraser Angus McAlpine -- Fraser.McAlpine@jacksonlewis.com --
Jackson Lewis P.C. & Ronald John Holland, II -- rjholland@mwe.com
-- McDermott Will & Emery LLP.

XPO Last Mile Inc., a Georgia corporation, Defendant, represented
by Allyson Suzanne Ascher, Jackson Lewis P.C., David Scott Durham,
McDermott Will & Emery, Fraser Angus McAlpine, Jackson Lewis P.C.,
Lauren Ashley Ziegler, DLA Piper LLC, Robert Irving Lockwood,
Pacific Employment Law LLP & Ronald John Holland, II, McDermott
Will & Emery LLP.



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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