CAR_Public/190812.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, August 12, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 160

                            Headlines

3 DAY BLINDS: Court Orders Etzkorin Case Dismissal
3M CO: Bair Hagger Suit in Ontario, Canada Ongoing
3M CO: Faces 116 Suits Related to Aqueous Film Forming Foam
3M CO: Water Contamination Suit in Alabama State Court Still Stayed
AARON'S INC: Bid for Summary Judgment in Byrd Suit Underway

AARON'S INC: Winslow Class Action Still Stayed
ADVOCATE HEALTH: Smith et al Seek OT Pay for Call Center Workers
AETERNA ZENTARIS: Still Defends Securities Suit over Macrilen Drug
AKORN INC: Pullos Appeals N.D. Ill. Decision in Securities Suit
ALMOST FAMILY: DeVries Labor Suit Seeks Overtime Pay

ALON USA: Bids to Dismiss Arkansas Teacher Suit Partly Granted
AMAZON.COM: Removes Swearingen Suit to District of Oregon
AMERICAN AIRLINES: Settlement in Passenger Capacity Suit Appealed
AMPLIFY ENERGY: 5 Suits Filed over Midstates Petroleum Merger
ANNETT HOLDINGS: Injured Truckers' Class Action Can Proceed

ANTARES PHARMA: Bid to Dismiss Consolidated Amended Smith Granted
ARIZONA BEVERAGES: Ashour Suit Transferred to S.D. New York
ARTHUR J. GALLAGHER: Bid to Dismiss Artex Clients' Suit Pending
BARILLA AMERICA: Illinois Court Narrows Claims in Kubilius
BARNES & NOBLE: Halper Sadeh Files Shareholder Class Action

BETHPAGE FEDERAL: Corbett Sues Over Unreasonable NFS Fees
BIMBO FOODS: Second Circuit Appeals Filed in Franze FLSA Suit
BLACKJEWEL LLC: Ex-Employees' Class Suits Filed in Bankruptcy
BOB EVANS: Jensen et al. Suit Transferred to W.D. Pennsylvania
BOEING COMPANY: 737 MAX Pilot Sues Over Concealed Plane Defect

BROOKLYN CHRYLSER: Denied Detailers Breaks, Overtime Pay, Says Suit
CARGO AIRPORT: $200K Settlement in Oladipo Suit Has Prelim Approval
CENTRAL PAYMENT: Court Denies Dismissal of RICO Suit
CEP AMERICA-CALIFORNIA: Fails to Timely Pay Wages, Valikhani Says
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Van Connor Hits Illegal Telemarketing Calls

CHRISTOPHER ANDREWS: Court OKs Judgment on Pleadings
CITIBANK CORP: Thomas Sues over Background Credit Reports
CITIBANK NA: Court Dismisses Suit Over Interest Rate Benchmarks
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE: ERISA Class Suit in New York Still Ongoing
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE: Recall of Dog Food Generates 35 Class Suits

CONSUMERS ENERGY: Gas Index Price Reporting Suit Still Ongoing
CORECIVIC INC: Appeals W.D. Texas Ruling in Gonzalez Class Suit
CORELOGIC INC: Feliciano Class Action in New York Ongoing
COTTAGE HOMECARE: Orelus Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages Under FLSA
DAMIANI LAW: Denial of Third Party Claim in Bailey Suit Affirmed

DAUPHINS LLC: Servers Hit Unpaid Overtime and Withheld Tips
DISCOVER BANK: Ward et al. Suit Moved to D. South Carolina
DOMETIC GROUP: Florida Court Dismisses Class-Action Lawsuit
EAGLE BANCORP: Bernstein Liebhard Files Securities Class Suit
EAGLE BANCORP: Gainey McKenna Files Securities Class Suit

EAGLE BANCORP: Rosen Law Files Securities Class Action
EDISON INTERNATIONAL: Thomas & Koenigstein Fire Triggers 191 Suits
ENDOCHOICE HOLDINGS: Ga. App. Affirms Raczewski Class Certification
ENTREVOICE VIRTUAL: Court Denies Hobbs Class Certification
EQT CORP: Kay Company Class Settlement Gets Final Approval

EQUIFAX INC: Appeal in Saskatchewan Cybersecurity Suit Ongoing
EQUIFAX INC: Consolidated Securities Class Suit in Georgia Ongoing
EQUIFAX INC: Data Breach Suits in Fulton County, Georgia Stayed
EQUIFAX INC: Final Settlement Approval Hearing Set for Sept. 13
EQUIFAX INC: Settlement Reached in U.S. Consumer MDL Litigation

ERIE INDEMNITY: Bid for Reconsideration in Ritz Case Denied
ERIE INDEMNITY: Welgus Class Action Terminated
FOX & KOHLER: Frederick Suit Moved to District of New Jersey
FRONTIER COMMUNICATIONS: Weiss Sues Over Telemarketing Calls
GENERAL DYNAMICS: Bid to Conditionally Certify Hubbard Class Denied

GENERAL MILLS: Eleventh Circuit Appeal Filed in Doss Class Suit
GENERAL MOTORS: Leave to File 5th Amended Sloan Suit Granted
GLYNN COUNTY, GA: Court Dismisses Bail Systems Suit With Prejudice
GOOGLE LLC: Cabrera Appeals Decision in Woods Suit to 9th Circuit
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES: 5 Plaintiffs Win Summary Judgment

GUARANTEED RATE: Can Compel Arbitration in Pereyra Labor Suit
GUESS? INC: Kyo Claims Website not Blind-Friendly
HEALTHCARE REVENUE: Santos Seeks Damages Over False Credit Reports
HOME DEPOT: Ct. Partly Affirms Atty Fees Award in Data Breach Suit
HONSHU LLC: Cao Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages, Withheld Tips

HOTBOX DETOX: Sims Sues over Unsolicited Text Messages
HP INC: $1.77MM Attys' Fees Awarded in Printer Firmware Update Suit
INDEPENDENT BANK: Discovery Ongoing in Suit over BOH Acquisition
IOWA HEALTH: Court Narrows Claims in Date Breach Suit
JAMES A. LUSTIG: Court Narrows Claims on Securities Suit

JAMES T. ROBINSON: Braddy Seeks to Recover Minimum, Overtime Wages
JOSHUA LINER: Website Not Accessible to Blind Person, Picon Says
JPMORGAN CHASE: Court Conditionally Certifies Class in Childress
KATES' DETECTIVE & SECURITY: Security Guards Hit Illegal Deductions
KEURIG GREEN: California Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Smith

L.A.R.E.: OT Pay for Business Development Specialist Sought
LABORATORY CORP: Faces Ocasio Suit in Illinois Over Data Breach
LANNETT COMPANY: Class Action Survives Motion to Dismiss
LATSHAW DRILLING: Stegall Suit Moved to Northern Dist. of Texas
LEXINGTON LAW: Fluent & Reward Can't Compel Arbitration in Anand

LIBERTY LIFE: Cal. App. Affirms Dismissal of Regents from Yalley
LIBERTY NATIONAL: Corrected Joint Bid to Alter in Goostree OK'd
LOGMEIN INC: Wasson Class Action Still Ongoing
LYFT INC: Court Consolidates Securities Suits for Pretrial
MACHOL & JOHANNES: Hall Contests Illegal Garnishment

MALLINCKRODT: Misleading Reports Inflate Share Price, Strougo Says
MARRIOTT HOTEL: Settlement in Dharia ADA/FLSA Suit Can be Enforced
MATRIX WARRANTY: Thrower Sues over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
MATTEL INC: Continues to Defend Wyatt Class Suit
MATTEL INC: Fisher-Price Rock 'n Play Sleeper Related Suits Ongoing

MDL 2472: Court Certifies Class in Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Suit
MDL 2895: 5 Sensipar Antitrust Suits Moved to District of Delaware
MEDICAL GUARDIAN: GoHealth's Bid to Dismiss Blackbourn Suit Mooted
MIDLAND CREDIT: Carbajal Sues Over Vague Collection Letters
MIDLAND CREDIT: Court OKs Compel Arbitration in Clemons

MILLION DOLLAR: Wright Seeks Minimum Wage for Exotic Dancers
MONARCH RECOVERY: Dash Suit Moved to Eastern Dist. of New York
MONGER ENTERTAINMENT: Bowden Sues Over Illegal Deductions
MOVE INC: Ninth Circuit Appeal Initiated in Silverman TCPA Suit
NAVIENT SOLUTIONS: Fennell Appeals Decision to Eleventh Circuit

NEXTGEN LEADS: Teblum Sues Over Unsolicited Telemarketing Calls
NIKE RETAIL: 9th Cir. Flips Summary Judgment in Rodriguez Suit
NINTENDO OF AMERICA: Diaz Sues Over Defective Game Controllers
NMJ RESTAURANT: Cardona Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
NTT DATA: Mandala, Barnett Appeal Decision in FCRA Suit to 2nd Cir.

NYC HEALTH: Taylor et al Seek Overtime Compensation
OCWEN LOAN: Torliatt Sues over Pay-to-Pay Fee
OCWEN SERVICING: Snyder Asks Court to Enter Judgment in TCPA Suit
OHIO NATIONAL: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Cook Suit
OHIO NATIONAL: Denial of Bid for Judgment on Pleadings Endorsed

OMNICELL INC: Bursick Sues Over Share Price Drop
PAYPAL HOLDINGS: Bid to Dismiss Sgarlata Case Underway
POINT BLANK: Porras Suit Transferred to S.D. Florida
ROCKEFELLER UNIVERSITY: Court Grants Bid to Stay Poppel
SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY, CA: Court Narrows Claims in Black Lives Suit

SC JOHNSON: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Crespo Class Suit
SCHUMACHER AUTOMOTIVE: $5MM Eisenband Settlement Has Final OK
SEI INVESTMENTS: Settlement Discussion in Stevens Suit Ongoing
SEI INVESTMENTS: Suits over SPTC Services Ongoing
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON: 98 Suits Filed Related to Woolsey Fire

SPOTTED LAKES: Washington Seeks OT Wages for Sand Haulers
ST. ELIZABETH MEDICAL: Court Dismisses Boden ERISA Claims
STATE FARM: Court Grants Bids to Dismiss Sheahan Antitrust Suit
STEELSCAPE WASHINGTON: Mendez Suit Transferred to W.D. Wash.
STRADA CRUSH: Lawyer Must Find New Representative Plaintiff

SUPER CARE: Nagar Files Suit Over Denied Breaks, Last Pay
SYNCHRONOSS TECHNOLOGIES: Securities Suit Dismissed w/o Prejudice
SYNCHRONY FINANCIAL: Stichting Depositary APG Class Suit Ongoing
SYNCHRONY FINANCIAL: Still Defends Cambell, Neal & Mott TCPA Suits
TALISMAN ENERGY: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in Regmund Suit

TED BAKER: Farr Claims Website not Blind Friendly
TEXAS: 5th Cir. Terminates 1977 Consent Decree in Brown Suit
TJX COS: Cal. App. Reverses Final Approval of Ebo Suit Settlement
TOWERS WATSON: Court Junks Suit Over $18-Bil. Merger With Willis
TRADER JOE'S: Weiss Appeals C.D. California Ruling to 9th Circuit

UNITED PF: T. N. Suit Moved to Southern Dist. of West Virginia
UNITED STATES: Court Modifies April 5 Prelim Injunction in Padilla
VERMYCK LLC: Astoria Tenants Mount Class Suit Against Landlord
VISA INC: Nuts-for-Candy Class Suit Remains Stayed
VOLKSWAGEN AG: Court Denies Partial Summary Judgment Bid in Manlove

VOLUME SERVICES: D.C. App. Flips Dismissal of Jeffries FACTA Suit
WAL-MART STORES: Court Stays Mott FDCPA Suit
WASHINGTON: Court Certifies Class of TRS Plan 2 Members
WASTE PRO: Tweedie Sues over Background Consumer Reports
WORLDMARK: Court Narrows Claims in Timeshare Suit

ZILLOW GROUP: Maness Suit Moved to Eastern District of New York
ZIMMER BIOMET: Class in Karl FLSA Suit Conditionally Certified
ZUMPER INC: Court Extends Case Deadlines in Gonzalez-Torres

                            *********

3 DAY BLINDS: Court Orders Etzkorin Case Dismissal
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri, Eastern Division, issued Memorandum and Order dismissing
the case captioned KEVIN P. ETZKORN, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. 3 DAY BLINDS LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company doing business in Missouri as
3DB of MO LLC, its registered name, Defendant. Case No.
4:17-cv-02836-JAR. (E.D. Mo.).

The Court entered a final order approving a class action settlement
in this case. Defendant 3 Day Blinds LLC (3DB) was directed to pay
the Claims Administrator total funds of $675,000 no later than
December 8, 2018, and to distribute the settlement funds, in
accordance with the terms of the parties' Settlement Agreement. The
parties were further ordered to report to the Court within 200 days
following issuance of payments "to inform the Court as to the
number and total amount of checks that remain uncashed and to
recommend how and where such funds should be distributed."

As a general rule, if a settlement involves individual
distributions to class members and funds remain after
distributions, the settlement should presumptively provide for
further distributions to participating class members unless the
amounts involved are too small to make individual distributions
economically viable or other specific reasons exist that would make
such further distributions impossible or unfair.

The role of a district court with regard to settlement in a class
action is to determine whether the compromises reflected in the
settlement  including those terms relating to the allocation of
settlement funds are fair, reasonable, and adequate when considered
from the perspective of the class as a whole. Id. Under the
circumstances of this case, the Court finds that redistribution
would not be economically feasible and that a distribution of the
remaining funds to the Settlement Adminstrator is both reasonable
and appropriate.

Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement that this cause
of action is DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(e).

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 25, 2019 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3s7a7ek from
Leagle.com.

Kevin P. Etzkorn, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Dennis N. Smith, Jr.,
THE SMITH LAW FIRM, LLC. 255 West Julian Street, Suite 501, San
Jose, CA 95110

3 Day Blinds LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Defendant,
represented by Glennon P. Fogarty --
glennon.fogarty@huschblackwell.com -- HUSCH BLACKWELL, LLP, Robert
Joseph Gerard -- rgerard@fsglawyers.com -- FRIEDMAN AND STROFFE PC,
pro hac vice & Matthew D. Knepper --
matt.knepper@huschblackwell.com -- HUSCH BLACKWELL, LLP.


3M CO: Bair Hagger Suit in Ontario, Canada Ongoing
--------------------------------------------------
3M Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 26, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to defend itself
against a putative class action related to the company's Bair
Hugger(TM)patient warming system, pending before the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice.

In June 2016, the Company was served with a putative class action
filed in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice for all Canadian
residents who underwent various joint arthroplasty, cardiovascular,
and other surgeries and later developed surgical site infections
due to the use of the Bair Hugger(TM) patient warming system.

The representative plaintiff seeks relief (including punitive
damages) under Canadian law based on theories similar to those
asserted in the MDL.

3M said, "No liability has been recorded for the Bair Hugge(TM)
litigation because the Company believes that any such liability is
not probable and estimable at this time."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

3M Company operates as a technology company worldwide. The
company's Industrial segment offers tapes, abrasives, adhesives,
ceramics, sealants, specialty materials, purification products,
closure systems, acoustic systems products, automotive components,
abrasion-resistant films, and paint finishing and detailing
products. The company was founded in 1902 and is headquartered in
St. Paul, Minnesota.


3M CO: Faces 116 Suits Related to Aqueous Film Forming Foam
-----------------------------------------------------------
3M Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 26, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that as of June 30, 2019, 116 putative class
action and other lawsuits have been filed against 3M and other
defendants related to Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF).

3M manufactured and marketed Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF) for
use in firefighting at airports and military bases from
approximately 1963 to 2000.

As of June 30, 2019, 116 putative class action and other lawsuits
have been filed against 3M and other defendants in various state
and federal courts where current or former airports, military
bases, or fire training facilities are or were located. In these
cases, plaintiffs
typically allege that certain PFAS used in AFFF contaminated the
soil and groundwater where AFFF was used and seek damages for loss
of use and enjoyment of properties, diminished property values,
investigation costs, remediation costs, and in some cases, personal
injury and funds for medical monitoring.

Several companies have been sued along with 3M, including Ansul Co.
(acquired by Tyco, Inc.), Angus Fire, Buckeye Fire Protection Co.,
Chemguard, National Foam, Inc., and United Technologies Corp.

In December 2018, the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation granted motions to transfer and consolidate all AFFF
cases pending in federal courts to the U.S. District Court for the
District of South Carolina to be managed in a multi-district
litigation (MDL) proceeding to centralize pre-trial proceedings. As
of June 30, 2019, there were 106 cases in the MDL.

3M Company operates as a technology company worldwide. The
company's Industrial segment offers tapes, abrasives, adhesives,
ceramics, sealants, specialty materials, purification products,
closure systems, acoustic systems products, automotive components,
abrasion-resistant films, and paint finishing and detailing
products. The company was founded in 1902 and is headquartered in
St. Paul, Minnesota.


3M CO: Water Contamination Suit in Alabama State Court Still Stayed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
3M Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 26, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that the class action suit filed in the state
court in Lawrence County, Alabama, remains stayed.

In August 2016, a group of over 200 plaintiffs filed a putative
class action against West Morgan-East Lawrence Water and Sewer
Authority (Water Authority), 3M, Dyneon, Daikin, BFI, and the City
of Decatur in state court in Lawrence County, Alabama.

Plaintiffs are residents of Lawrence, Morgan and other counties who
are or have been customers of the Water Authority.

They contend defendants have released PFAS that contaminate the
Tennessee River and, in turn, their drinking water, causing damage
to their health and properties.

In January 2017, the court in the St. John case, stayed this
litigation pending resolution of the St. John case.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

3M Company operates as a technology company worldwide. The
company's Industrial segment offers tapes, abrasives, adhesives,
ceramics, sealants, specialty materials, purification products,
closure systems, acoustic systems products, automotive components,
abrasion-resistant films, and paint finishing and detailing
products. The company was founded in 1902 and is headquartered in
St. Paul, Minnesota.


AARON'S INC: Bid for Summary Judgment in Byrd Suit Underway
-----------------------------------------------------------
Aaron's, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 25, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company has filed a
motion for summary judgment in Byrd v. Aaron's, Inc., Aspen Way
Enterprises, Inc., John Does (1-100) Aaron's Franchisees and
Designerware, LLC.

In Crystal and Brian Byrd v. Aaron's, Inc., Aspen Way Enterprises,
Inc., John Does (1-100) Aaron's Franchisees and Designerware, LLC,
filed on May 16, 2011, in the United States District Court, Western
District of Pennsylvania, plaintiffs allege the Company and its
independently owned and operated franchisee Aspen Way Enterprises
("Aspen Way") knowingly violated plaintiffs' privacy in violation
of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA") and the
Computer Fraud Abuse Act and sought certification of a putative
nationwide class.

Plaintiffs based these claims on Aspen Way's use of a software
program called "PC Rental Agent." Plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint, asserting claims under the ECPA, common law invasion of
privacy, seeking an injunction, and naming additional independently
owned and operated Company franchisees as defendants.

Plaintiffs seek monetary damages as well as injunctive relief.

In March 2014, the United States District Court dismissed all
claims against all franchisees other than Aspen Way Enterprises,
LLC, dismissed claims for invasion of privacy, aiding and abetting,
and conspiracy against all defendants, and denied plaintiffs'
motion to certify a class action, but denied the Company's motion
to dismiss the claims alleging ECPA violations.

Following an appeal of the decision to deny class certification,
the matter was sent back to the District Court and, on September
26, 2017, the District Court denied plaintiffs' motion for class
certification.

A petition with the United States Court of Appeals for permission
to appeal the denial of class certification a second time was
denied on December 11, 2018.

The case is now proceeding for determination on an individual basis
as to the named plaintiffs. The case is on a trial calendar in
October 2019. The Company filed a motion for summary judgment in
July 2019.

Aaron's, Inc. operates as an omnichannel provider of lease-purchase
solutions to underserved and credit-challenged customers. It
operates in three segments: Progressive Leasing, Aaron's Business,
and DAMI. The company was founded in 1955 and is headquartered in
Atlanta, Georgia.


AARON'S INC: Winslow Class Action Still Stayed
----------------------------------------------
Aaron's, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 25, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the class action
entitled, Michael Winslow and Fonda Winslow v. Sultan Financial
Corporation, Aaron's, Inc., John Does (1-10), Aaron's Franchisees
and Designerware, LLC, remains stayed.

In Michael Winslow and Fonda Winslow v. Sultan Financial
Corporation, Aaron's, Inc., John Does (1-10), Aaron's Franchisees
and Designerware, LLC, filed on March 5, 2013 in the Los Angeles
Superior Court, plaintiffs assert claims against the Company and
its independently owned and operated franchisee, Sultan Financial
Corporation (as well as certain John Doe franchisees), for
unauthorized wiretapping, eavesdropping, electronic stalking, and
violation of California's Comprehensive Computer Data Access and
Fraud Act and its Unfair Competition Law.

Each of these claims arises out of the alleged use of PC Rental
Agent software. The plaintiffs are seeking injunctive relief and
damages as well as certification of a putative California class.

In April 2013, the Company removed this matter to federal court. In
May 2013, the Company filed a motion to stay this litigation
pending resolution of the Byrd litigation, a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, and a motion to strike certain
allegations in the complaint.

The Court subsequently stayed the case. The Company's motions to
dismiss and strike certain allegations remain pending. In June
2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion to lift the stay, which was
denied in July 2015

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Aaron's, Inc. operates as an omnichannel provider of lease-purchase
solutions to underserved and credit-challenged customers. It
operates in three segments: Progressive Leasing, Aaron's Business,
and DAMI. The company was founded in 1955 and is headquartered in
Atlanta, Georgia.


ADVOCATE HEALTH: Smith et al Seek OT Pay for Call Center Workers
----------------------------------------------------------------
MARIAH SMITH and CRYSTAL WATERS, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. ADVOCATE HEALTH CARE
NETWORK, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-05148 (N.D. Ill., July 30,
2019), alleges the Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs and other
similarly situated persons all earned regular and overtime pay for
all time worked pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
Illinois Minimum Wage Law, and the Illinois Wage Payment and
Collection Act.

The Defendant manages, controls and operates customer service call
centers within this judicial district and throughout the country
and employs. The company manages and controls the telephone-based
workers who are the putative class and collective members in the
lawsuit.

The telephone-dedicated employees in the case handled phone calls
regarding medical treatment of Advocate's patients and related
issues.

The Defendant required Plaintiffs and similarly situated
telephone-dedicated employees to be ready to handle a call at the
start of their scheduled shift times. In order to be ready to
handle a call at the start of their scheduled shift time, the
Plaintiffs and similarly situated telephone-dedicated employees had
to first boot up their computers, open various software programs
necessary for handling a call and/or read company work email
regarding services and information for the day’s calls.

Under its policies and practices, Defendant regularly failed to pay
the telephone-dedicated employees for this pre-shift work.

Additionally, under Defendant's policies and practices, Plaintiffs
and similarly situated telephone-dedicated employees had to be
available to handle a call until the end of their scheduled shift
time. As a result, they regularly worked past the end of their
scheduled shift time when completing customer calls, closing their
software programs and securing confidential information.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Thomas M. Ryan, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF THOMAS M. RYAN, P.C.
          35 East Wacker Drive, Suite 650
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: 312-726-3400

               - and -

          James X. Bormes, Esq.
          Catherine P. Sons, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF JAMES X. BORMES, P.C.
          8 South Michigan Avenue, Suite 2600
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: 312-201-0575

AETERNA ZENTARIS: Still Defends Securities Suit over Macrilen Drug
------------------------------------------------------------------
Aeterna Zentaris Inc. said in its Form 20-F/A report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on July 26, 2019, 2019, for
the fiscal year ended December 31, 2018, that the company continues
to defend a class action suit related to the safety and efficacy of
Macrilen(TM).

The Company and certain of its current and former officers are
defendants in a class-action lawsuit pending in the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey, brought on behalf of
shareholders of the Company.

The lawsuit alleges violations of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 in connection with allegedly false and misleading statements
made by the defendants between August 30, 2011 and November 6, 2014
(the "Class Period"), regarding the safety and efficacy of
Macrilen(TM)(macimorelin) and the prospects for the approval of the
Company's New Drug Application for the product by the FDA.

The plaintiffs represent a class comprised of purchasers of the
Company's common shares during the Class Period and seek damages,
costs and expenses and such other relief as determined by the
Court.

The Company considers the claims that have been asserted in the
lawsuit to be without merit and is vigorously defending against
them.  

Aeterna said, "The Company cannot, however, predict at this time
the outcome or potential losses, if any, with respect to this
lawsuit."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Aeterna Zentaris Inc., incorporated on October 12, 1990, is a
specialty biopharmaceutical company engaged in developing and
commercializing treatments in oncology, endocrinology and women's
health. The Company operates through the biopharmaceutical segment.
The Company is engaged in drug development activities and in the
promotion of products for others. The Company's principal product
candidates are Zoptrex (zoptarelin doxorubicin) and Macrilen
(macimorelin) in oncology and endocrinology. The company is based
in Summerville, South Carolina.


AKORN INC: Pullos Appeals N.D. Ill. Decision in Securities Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Demetrios Pullos filed an appeal from a Court ruling in
the lawsuit entitled Demetrios Pullos v. Akorn, Inc., et al., Case
No. 1:17-cv-05026, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on July 16, 2019, the
District Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order abrogating the
Settlement Agreement in the cases styled SHAUN A. HOUSE,
individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated,
Plaintiff, ROBERT CARLYLE, Plaintiff, DEMETRIOS PULLOS,
individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. AKORN, INC.; JOHN N. KAPOOR; KENNETH S. ABRAMOWITZ;
ADRIENNE L. GRAVES; RONALD M. JOHNSON; STEVEN J. MEYER; TERRY A.
RAPPUHN; BRIAN TAMBI; and ALAN WEINSTEIN, Defendants. Nos. 17 C
5018, 17 C 5022, 17 C 5026 (N.D. Ill.).

As the District Court has recounted in greater detail in previous
opinions, the Plaintiffs in these cases sued Akorn and members of
its board of directors seeking certain disclosures regarding a
proposed acquisition by Frensenius Kabi AG. After Akorn revised its
proxy statement and issued a Form 8-K, Plaintiffs dismissed their
lawsuits and settled for attorney's fees.

The appellate case is captioned as Demetrios Pullos v. Akorn, Inc.,
et al., Case No. 19-2401, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript information sheet was due by August 7, 2019; and

   -- Appellant's brief is due on or before September 3, 2019,
      for Demetrios Pullos.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant DEMETRIOS PULLOS, Individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated is represented by:

          Lewis S. Kahn, Esq.
          KAHN SWICK FOTI LLC
          1100 Poydras Street
          New Orleans, LA 70163
          Telephone: (504) 648-1850
          E-mail: lewis.kahn@ksfcounsel.com

Defendants-Appellees AKORN, INC., JOHN N. KAPOOR, KENNETH S.
ABRAMOWITZ, ADRIENNE L. GRAVES and RONALD M. JOHNSON are
represented by:

          Sohil Shah, Esq.
          POLSINELLI PC
          150 N. Riverside Plaza
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 819-1900
          E-mail: sshah@polsinelli.com


ALMOST FAMILY: DeVries Labor Suit Seeks Overtime Pay
----------------------------------------------------
Avalee DeVries, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Almost Family, Inc. and LHC Group, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-00148 (N.D. Tex., July 18, 2019), seeks
unpaid overtime and other compensation, interest thereon,
liquidated damages, costs of suit and reasonable attorney fees and
other relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Defendants provide healthcare services to customers including home
health and hospice care. DeVries was employed by Defendants as a
coder. She regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week but was
not properly paid overtime compensation for any hours worked in
excess of forty per workweek, says the complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jeremi K. Young, Esq.
      YOUNG & NEWSOM, PC
      1001 S. Harrison, Suite 200
      Amarillo, TX 79101
      Tel: (806) 331-1800
      Fax: (806) 398-9095
      Email: jyoung@youngfirm.com


ALON USA: Bids to Dismiss Arkansas Teacher Suit Partly Granted
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ARKANSAS TEACHER RETIREMENT SYSTEM, on Behalf of
Itself and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. ALON USA
ENERGY, INC., DELEK US HOLDINGS, INC., DELEK HOLDCO, INC., EZRA UZI
YEMIN, ILAN COHEN, ASSAF GINZBURG, FREDEREC GREEN, RON W. HADDOCK,
WILLIAM J. KACAL, ZALMAN SEGAL, MAKR D. SMITH, AVIGAL SOREQ,
FRANKLIN WHEELER, and DAVID WIESSMAN, Defendants, C.A. No.
2017-0453-KSJM (Del. Ch.), Judge Kathaleen S. McCormick of the
Court of Chancery of Delaware granted in part and denied in part
the Defendants' motions to dismiss the  Second Amended Verified
Class Action Complaint.

Section 203 of the Delaware General Corporation Law prohibits a
stockholder from engaging in a business combination with a company
within three years from the date it acquires 15% or more of the
company's outstanding voting equity.  The statute's prohibitions do
not apply under certain circumstances, including when the company's
board pre-approves the transaction by which the stockholder
acquires 15% or more of the outstanding voting equity.

In 2015, Delek US Holdings, Inc. acquired 48% of the common stock
of Alon from Alon's largest stockholder.  Delek paid approximately
$16.99 per share.  At the time of the stock purchase, Delek was
interested in acquiring the entirety of Alon's outstanding stock.
To avoid the three-year standstill period imposed by Section 203,
Delek requested that the Alon board pre-approve the stock purchase.
Alon's board granted Section 203 approval, but conditioned that
approval on Delek entering into a stockholder agreement.  The
stockholder agreement established anti-takeover protections like
those imposed by Section 203, but for a period of only a year.  The
agreement's prohibitions were broadly worded; they prevented Delek
and its affiliates not only from acquiring over a majority of
Alon's equity, but also from "seek[ing] to" acquire stock over a
majority or otherwise circumventing the contractual restrictions.

According to the Plaintiff, shortly after Delek executed the
stockholder agreement, Delek began violating its terms.

During the stockholder agreement's one-year standstill period:
Delek's CEO, who also served on Alon's board, publicly announced
Delek's intent to acquire the remaining 52% of Alon's outstanding
equity.  In light of Delek's public statements, Alon's
eleven-person board formed a special committee comprised of the six
directors without direct ties to Delek.  Representatives of Delek
and the committee met six times, engaged in substantive
negotiations, settled on all-stock consideration, and apparently
agreed that the exchange ratio need not be at a premium to Alon's
trading price.  Near the end of the standstill period, the
committee made a formal proposal to Delek.

After the standstill period expired in May 2016, the special
committee issued two additional formal proposals to Delek, each on
terms more favorable to Delek than the last.  Delek had made no
formal counteroffers, so the committee was effectively bidding
against itself. In response to the third proposal, Delek delivered
its first formal counteroffer, proposing an exchange ratio that
equated to approximately $7.62 per Alon share.  The special
committee negotiated with Delek in the months that followed,
focusing its efforts on improving the exchange ratio.

By late December 2016, Delek made its best and final offer
including an exchange ratio that equated to approximately $12.13
per Alon share, significantly less than the price paid by Delek
only two years before.  The committee received a fairness opinion
from its financial advisor.  Although certain of the advisor's
analyses yielded price ranges above the merger price, the committee
and ultimately the board approved the merger.  The merger was
agreed to in January 2017, approved by Alon's stockholders in June
2017, and consummated in July 2017.

On behalf of itself and a class of Alon's common stockholders, the
Plaintiff asserts claims against Alon's board and Delek challenging
the merger.  

The Plaintiff's Second Amended Verified Class Action Complaint
asserts five counts: Count I claims that all the Defendants
breached the Amended Stockholder Agreement.  Count II claims that
the Defendants' breaches of the Amended Stockholder Agreement
vitiated the Board's waiver of Section 203; consequently, Delek,
Alon, and Holdco, Inc., an entity formed for the purpose of the
merger, were subject to the prohibitions set forth in 8 Del. C.
Section 203, which they violated.

Count III claims that Delek, Alon, and Holdco committed conversion
by taking possession over the stockholder class's Alon shares
through the merger.  Count IV claims that Delek, Holdco, and the
Director Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to Plaintiff
and the class by consummating the merger.  Count V claims that the
Director Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to the
Plaintiff and the class by violating and failing to enforce the
Amended Stockholder Agreement and Section 203 and by making
materially false and incomplete disclosures in the Proxy and June
21 8-K.43

The Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Court of
Chancery Rule 12(b)(6).

Judge McCormick finds that alongside the familiar fiduciary duty
claims, the Plaintiff pursues a less customary claim for breach of
the stockholder agreement.  The Plaintiff alleges that Delek
breached the stockholder agreement by seeking to enter into the
merger during the standstill period.  As its primary defense, Delek
argues that the Plaintiff is not a third-party beneficiary of the
stockholder agreement and thus lacks standing to enforce it.

Under Delaware law, a third party to a contract may sue to enforce
its terms if: the contracting parties intended to confer a benefit
directly to that third party; they conveyed the benefit as a gift
or in satisfaction of a pre-existing obligation; and conveying the
benefit was a material part of the purpose for entering into the
agreement.  The stockholder agreement's relationship to Section 203
renders each of these elements easily satisfied.  The stockholder
agreement replicates aspects of the anti-takeover protections of
Section 203, which provide a direct benefit to stockholders of a
Delaware corporation.  It therefore provides a direct benefit to
the Plaintiff.  Those benefits, the Judge holds, were established
in place of Section 203's pre-existing protections, or at minimum,
intended as a gift to the stockholders.  Because the purpose of the
stockholder agreement is to restrict Delek's ability to acquire
Alon, without the anti-takeover provisions, the agreement would not
achieve that purpose.  The anti-takeover provisions are therefore
material, and the Plaintiff has standing to enforce the stockholder
agreement.

The Judge finds that the Plaintiff adequately alleges that Delek
breached the stockholder agreement.  Delek publicly announced its
intent to acquire Alon stock, met with the special committee's
chairperson six times, negotiated substantive terms, and proposed a
deal structure, all before the standstill period expired. These
acts are sufficient to state a claim that Delek breached the
broadly worded anti-takeover protections of the stockholder
agreement.

In another creative twist, the Plaintiff asserts claims under
Section 203, contending that Delek's breaches of the stockholder
agreement vitiated the Alon board's Section 203 approval and
restored the protections of Section 203.  Under Section 203(a)(3),
a business combination otherwise prohibited by the statute may be
effected if it is approved by the board and authorized by at least
two-thirds of the outstanding voting stock.  The Defendants contend
that the approval of the merger by Alon's board and stockholders
satisfied Section 203(a)(3).  

Yet for stockholder approval of any corporate action to be valid,
the vote must be fully informed.  The Defendants' argument thus
fails because the Plaintiff has adequately alleged multiple
deficiencies in the disclosures relating to the merger.  Those
deficiencies include failing to fully and fairly describe the
stockholder agreement, only partially disclosing facts and flaws
relating to the special committee's formation, and neglecting to
mention that the special committee's financial advisor increased
its stock holdings in the acquirer by 60% while advising the
special committee.  These deficiencies not only foreclose the
Defendants' Section 203 defense but also support a standalone claim
for breach of the duty of disclosure.

The Plaintiff's claims for breach of fiduciary duty are equally
viable, the Judge holds.  It is reasonably conceivable that Delek's
48% equity interest, employment of five of Alon's eleven board
members, and influence over a sixth, renders Delek a controller
with concomitant fiduciary duties.  The merger, therefore, is
presumptively subject to the entire fairness standard.

The Defendants argue that the business judgment standard applies
under Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp. ("MFW") because both the
special committee's initial proposal and Delek's initial
counterproposal conditioned the merger on the approval of a special
committee and a majority of the minority stockholders.  Leaving
aside the uninformed nature of the stockholder vote, the Judge
holds that the Defendants' argument fails in light of two recent
Delaware Supreme Court decisions clarifying that a controller must
impose MFW conditions before the start of substantive economic
negotiations.  Because the complaint adequately alleges that Delek
engaged in substantive economic negotiations months before any MFW
conditions were established, the Defendants are not entitled to
application of the business judgment standard of review at the
pleadings stage.

The complaint adequately alleges unfair process and unfair price
sufficient to state a claim under the entire fairness standard.  In
support of its unfair process assertion, the complaint alleges that
Delek disregarded contractual obligations prohibiting negotiation
of the merger during the standstill period.  The scope of the
special committee's authority to explore alternative transactions
was unclear at critical stages of the negotiations.  At Delek's
insistence, the Alon board replaced two of the six special
committee members over the course of negotiations.  And the special
committee's chairperson's alleged ties to Delek cast doubt on his
independence.  

In support of its unfair price assertion, the complaint alleges
that the merger consideration was keyed to the values of Alon and
Delek stock, which Delek manipulated through public statements made
before the merger.  Also, the implied per-share merger price was at
the low end of value ranges presented by the special committee's
financial advisor.  These allegations are sufficient to establish
unfair process and price at the pleadings stage.

Based on the foregoing, Judge McCormick granted in part and denied
in part the Defendants' motions to dismiss.  Count I is dismissed
as to the Director Defendants.  Count IV is dismissed to the extent
it is pled against Holdco and to the extent it asserts a disclosure
claim against Delek.  Count V is dismissed to the extent it asserts
a disclosure claim with respect to the confidentiality agreement.
The Defendants' motions to dismiss are otherwise denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 28, 2019 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/pJneGG from Leagle.com.

Michael Hanrahan -- mhanrahan@prickett.com -- Stephen D. Dargitz --
sddargitz@prickett.com -- Paul A. Fioravanti, Jr., Corinne Elise
Amato, Kevin H. Davenport, Eric J. Juray, PRICKETT, JONES &
ELLIOTT, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Lee D. Rudy, Michael C.
Wagner, J. Daniel Albert, Grant D. Goodhart III, KESSLER TOPAZ
MELTZER & CHECK, LLP, Radnor, Pennsylvania; Counsel for Plaintiff
Arkansas Teacher Retirement System.

David J. Teklits -- dteklits@mnat.com -- Thomas P. Will --
twill@mnat.com -- MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP, Wilmington,
Delaware; Mark Oakes, William Patrick Courtney, Ryan Metzer, NORTON
ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP, Austin, Texas; Counsel for Defendants Alon
USA Energy, Inc., Delek US Holdings, Inc., Delek HoldCo, Inc., Ezra
Uzi Yemin, Assaf Ginzburg, Frederec Green, Mark D. Smith, and
Avigal Soreq.

Raymond J. DiCamillo -- dicamillo@rlf.com -- Brian F. Morris, Sara
C. Hunter, RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware;
Colin B. Davis, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, Irvine, California;
Mark H. Mixon, Jr., GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, New York, New
York; Counsel for Defendants David Wiessman, Ilan Cohen, Ron W.
Haddock, William J. Kacal, Zalman Segal, and Franklin Wheeler.


AMAZON.COM: Removes Swearingen Suit to District of Oregon
---------------------------------------------------------
Amazon.com Services, Inc., Amazon.com Inc. and Amazon.com.dedc, LLC
remove the case captioned as KRISTIN SWEARINGEN, Plaintiff, vs.
AMAZON.COM SERVICES, INC. and AMAZON.COM INC., Delaware
corporations, and, AMAZON.COM.DEDC, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company, the Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-22154 (May 15,
2019), from the the Multnomah County Circuit Court to the United
States District Court for the District of Oregon on July 26, 2019.
The District of Oregon Court Clerk assigned Case No. Case
3:19-cv-01156-SB to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff alleges "unpaid time claims' and "unlawful deductions
claims."  The "unpaid time claims" arise because Amazon allegedly
"rounded Plaintiff's and the other class members' time punches and
failed to pay for breaks of fewer than 30 minutes, resulting in a
consistent net underpayment to them." The Plaintiff further alleges
that "unlawful deduction claims" arise because Amazon allegedly
"rounded certain purported tax deductions up instead of down as
required by 26 C.F.R. section  31.3102-1(d), resulting in all or
part of the deductions being prohibited by law."

The Plaintiff seeks to represent the following class: "all current
and former Oregon Amazon employees who received a paycheck on or
after December 20, 2012 for work performed in Oregon."[BN]

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          Sarah J. Crooks, Esq.
          PERKINS COIE LLP
          1120 N.W. Couch Street, 10th Floor
          Portland, OR 97209-4128
          Telephone: 503.727.2000
          Facsimile: 503.727.2222
          E-mail: SCrooks@perkinscoie.com

               - and -

          Sari M. Alamuddin, Esq.
          Stephanie L. Sweitzer, Esq.
          Kevin F. Gaffney, Esq.
          MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          77 West Wacker Drive, Fifth Floor
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 324-1000
          E-mail: sari.alamuddin@morganlewis.com
                  stephanie.sweitzer@morganlewis.com
                  kevin.gaffney@morganlewis.com

AMERICAN AIRLINES: Settlement in Passenger Capacity Suit Appealed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
American Airlines Group Inc., said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 25, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that three objectors to
the settlement in the class action related to passenger capacity
have taken an appeal from the preliminarily approval order entered
by the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia.

The company, along with Delta Air Lines, Inc., Southwest Airlines
Co., United Airlines, Inc. and, in the case of litigation filed in
Canada, Air Canada, have been named as defendants in approximately
100 putative class action lawsuits alleging unlawful agreements
with respect to air passenger capacity.

The U.S. lawsuits have been consolidated in the Federal District
Court for the District of Columbia (the DC Court).

On June 15, 2018, the company reached a preliminary settlement
agreement with the plaintiffs in the amount of $45 million that,
once approved, will resolve all class claims in the U.S. lawsuits.
That settlement was approved by the DC Court on May 13, 2019.

Three parties who objected to the settlement have appealed that
decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia.

American Airlines said, "We believe these appeals are without merit
and intend to vigorously defend against them."

American Airlines Group Inc., through its subsidiaries, operates as
a network air carrier. It provides scheduled air transportation
services for passengers and cargo. American Airlines Group Inc. was
founded in 1934 and is headquartered in Fort Worth, Texas.


AMPLIFY ENERGY: 5 Suits Filed over Midstates Petroleum Merger
-------------------------------------------------------------
Amplify Energy Corp. said in its Form 8-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 26, 2019, that the
company has been named as a defendant in five  purported class
action suits related to its merger with Midstates Petroleum
Company, Inc..

On May 5, 2019, Amplify Energy Corp. ("Amplify" or the "Company")
entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger (the "Merger
Agreement") with Midstates Petroleum Company, Inc. ("Midstates")
and Midstates Holdings, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of
Midstates ("Merger Sub"), pursuant to which (i) Merger Sub will
merge with and into Amplify, with Amplify surviving the merger as a
wholly owned subsidiary of Midstates and (ii) immediately
thereafter, as part of the same transaction, Amplify will merge
with and into a wholly owned subsidiary of Midstates, with such
subsidiary continuing as the surviving entity (collectively, the
"Merger").

In connection with the Merger Agreement and the transactions
contemplated thereby, five purported class action complaints have
been filed on behalf of Amplify stockholders against Amplify,
members of the Amplify board of directors in the United States
District Courts for the District of Delaware and the Southern
District of New York.

The five complaints are captioned as follows: Rachel Salpeter-Levy
v. Amplify Energy Corp., et al, Case No.: 1:19-cv-06572 (S.D.N.Y.)
(July 15, 2019), Eric Sabatini v. Amplify Energy Corp., et al, Case
No.: 1:19-cv-01321 (D. Del.) (July 16, 2019), Stephen Bushansky v.
Amplify Energy Corp., et al, Case No.: 1:19-cv-01339 (D. Del.)
(July 17, 2019), Stephen Paul Flaherty v. Amplify Energy Corp., et
al, Case No.: 1:19-cv-01333 (D. Del.) (July 17, 2019), and Barry
Tresch v. Amplify Energy Corp., et al, Case No.: 1:19-cv-06740
(S.D.N.Y.) (July 19, 2019) which Amplify and Midstates refer to
collectively as the "Stockholder Actions."

In general, the Stockholder Actions allege that the defendants
violated Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"), or aided and abetted in such
alleged violations, because the Joint Proxy Statement/Prospectus
allegedly omits or misstates material information.

The Stockholder Actions seek, among other things, injunctive relief
preventing the consummation of the Merger, unspecified damages and
attorneys' fees.

Amplify and the other named defendants believe that no supplemental
disclosures are required under applicable laws; however, to avoid
the risk of the Stockholder Actions delaying the Merger, and
without admitting any liability or wrongdoing, Amplify is making
certain disclosures that supplement and revise those contained in
the Joint Proxy Statement/Prospectus, which Amplify refers to as
the "litigation-related supplemental disclosures."

A copy of the supplemental disclosure is available at
https://urlzs.com/nrAhQ.

Amplify Energy Corp., incorporated on March 21, 2017, is an
upstream oil and natural gas company. The Company is focused on the
acquisition, production and development of oil and gas properties
in the United States. Its assets consist primarily of producing oil
and natural gas properties and are located in Texas, Louisiana,
Wyoming and offshore Southern California. The company is based in
Houston, Texas.


ANNETT HOLDINGS: Injured Truckers' Class Action Can Proceed
-----------------------------------------------------------
Louise Esola, writing for Business Insurance, reports that several
dozen injured truck drivers who claim their trucking company has
improperly forced them to live in another city for medical care and
light-duty work can sue their employer in a class action, an
appellate court in Iowa ruled July 24, 2019, in a decision that the
Iowa Supreme Court ruled will stay.

Anthony Roland, the first plaintiff in the suit and a resident of
Oxford, Alabama, was working as a truck driver for the Des Moines,
Iowa, firm Annette Holdings LLC, which requires all of its drivers
as a condition of their employment to sign a memorandum of
understanding that states if one is injured they may be required to
temporarily relocate to Des Moines for modified duty work,
according to documents in Anthony Roland v. Annett Holdings Inc.,
filed in the Court of Appeals of Iowa in Des Moines.

The memorandum also states that "Iowa Law allows Annett Holdings to
suspend workers' compensation benefits to an injured worker if an
injured worker fails to accept and work in the modified duty
position offered by Annett Holdings" and that "because drivers
agree to be away from home as an essential function and an agreed
upon term of their employment with Annett Holdings, injured workers
are expected to temporarily relocate and perform their modified
duty work in Des Moines, Iowa, irrespective of your state of
residence."

Mr. Roland, following an injury to his elbow in 2014, was relocated
to Des Moines after preliminary medical treatment in Indiana, where
his injury occurred. In Iowa, he was provided access to further
medical care, 897 miles away from his home in Alabama, documents
state.

"Dissatisfied with the medical care he was receiving in Des Moines,
Roland asked Annett Holdings to authorize treatment by an
orthopedic surgeon in Alabama," documents state. Annett Holdings
agreed and paid for elbow surgery in Alabama. Still recovering, the
company then assigned Mr. Roland to modified-duty work in Iowa,
forgoing follow-up care in Alabama, according to documents.

Mr. Roland then petitioned the Iowa Workers' Compensation
Commission seeking alternate medical care in his home state. The
deputy commissioner concluded the memorandum of understanding
functionally deprived Roland of reasonable medical care.

In granting Mr. Roland's petition, the commissioner explained: "The
agreement signed by Roland is contrary to the law and case law of
Iowa because it attempts to use an agreement to relieve the
employer from part of its liability to provide reasonably suited
treatment for the injury without undue inconvenience to the
employee under (law). The agreement appears to be an attempt to
either avoid or eliminate both the reasonable and undue
inconvenience clauses in Iowa Code."

Annett Holdings sought judicial review and a district court
affirmed. Annett Holdings then appealed, and the Court of Appeals
of Iowa affirmed, "finding substantial evidence supported the
agency's conclusion the MOU, as applied to Mr. Roland, violated
Iowa" law.

Less than a week after that decision, Mr. Roland sued Annett
Holdings on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
according to documents. He cited the company's continued attempts
to compel him to travel to Des Moines for the light-duty work
program despite judicial direction otherwise. Mr. Roland alleged
Annett Holdings acted in bad faith and violated his statutory
rights and those of similarly situated employees. Mr. Roland sought
compensatory and punitive damages and that the district court to
certify the matter as a class action, according to documents.

A district court held a hearing on the class certification in 2018.
Annett Holdings moved to decertify the class action despite the
facts that some 40 injured drivers had been subjected to the MOU,
according to documents.

That district court decided Mr. Roland and the other drivers met
the requirements for class certification, writing "a central issue
common to the proposed class is the lawfulness or validity of the
MOU as it relates to the light duty work and medical care provided
in Iowa. This common question clearly predominates over any
questions" on the similar cases.

Annett Holdings then appealed the court's certification of the
class, asserting Mr. Roland did not "show the existence of a
question of law or fact common to a (the) class," documents state.
At that time, the state Supreme Court granted a stay of the
district court's proceedings until conclusion of the appeal,
according to documents.

Citing that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
certifying the class, the appeals court affirmed.

The "generalized evidence is the legality of the MOU, properly
recognized by the district court as central to each member's
claim," Wednesday's appeals court ruling states. "Even if
individual class members may offer evidence specific to their own
injuries and what medical treatment was reasonably necessary, the
elephant in the room will continue to be the MOU and its conflict
with (state law)."

The company and attorneys involved could not immediately be reached
for comment. [GN]


ANTARES PHARMA: Bid to Dismiss Consolidated Amended Smith Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RANDY SMITH, Plaintiff, v. ANTARES PHARMA, INC., et
al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 17-8945 (MAS) (DEA) (D. N.J.),
Judge Michael A. Shipp of the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the
Consolidated Amended Complaint ("CAC").

The matter is a putative securities class action brought on behalf
of all persons other than the Defendants who purchased or otherwise
acquired Antares common stock between Dec. 21, 2016 and Oct. 12,
2017, both dates inclusive.  Founded in 1979, Antares develops,
manufactures and commercializes therapeutic products using its drug
delivery systems.

The product at issue in the lawsuit -- XYOSTED -- is an auto
injector product designed for testosterone replacement therapy
("TRT").  The gravamen of the CAC is that Antares made materially
false and misleading statements regarding the Company's business,
operational and compliance policies, as related to the Federal Drug
Administration ("FDA") approval process of XYOSTED.

The Plaintiff brings the putative class action against the
Defendants asserting two Counts.  Count One, brought against all
the Defendants, alleges that they violated Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by, inter alia, making a series of
materially false and misleading statements.  Count Two, brought
against Individual Defendants (Robert F. Apple, Fred M. Powell, and
Leonard S. Jacob), alleges that pursuant to Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act, they are liable as "controlling persons."

In sum, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants made 10
statements that are actionable under the Exchange Act because they
were materially false and misleading.  The Plaintiff alleges that
those ten statements were materially false and misleading because,
inter alia: (i) the risk of suicide with XYOSTED was far greater
than with any other currently marketed TRT; (ii) multiple suicides
had occurred during the QST clinical studies, as opposed to the
single instance disclosed to investors; (iii) XYOSTED's pivotal
trial showed a clear tendency towards a high risk of hypertension;
(iv) Antares had provided insufficient data to the FDA in
connection with its NDA for XYOSTED; and (v) Antares had overstated
the approval prospects for XYOSTED.

The Plaintiff also alleges that the 2016 10-K; the Q1 2017 10-Q;
and the Q2 2017 10-Q contained certifications pursuant to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the certifications were false.  He avers
that the same three documents were false because suicide and
hypertension were not merely part of an array of adverse events
present among study participants, but were the two most serious
adverse events flagged internally by Antares.

The Defendants move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) arguing that the Plaintiff failed to plead essential
elements of both claims.  They argue that the Plaintiff's Section
10(b) claim fails because he failed to allege: (1) a material
misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter; and (3) loss
causation.  The Defendants further argue that the Plaintiff's
Section 20(a) claim fails because: (1) the Plaintiff has not plead
a primary violation of the Exchange Act; (2) he has not alleged
facts showing that each Defendant was a "controlling person" within
the meaning of Exchange Act; and (3) he did not plead "culpable
participation" by each Defendant.

Judge Shipp cannot consider Exhibit 18.  As the Plaintiff argues,
Exhibit 18 is attorney work product, not a table of historical
prices compiled by a reliable financial news service.  Thus,
Exhibit 18 requires authentication, and it has not been
authenticated.  The Judge notes that the website URL provided by
the Defendants does not lead directly to a table of stock prices.
Instead, the website visitor must enter a date range for the
website to return a table.  This required manipulation further
suggests that Exhibit 18 must be authenticated before the Court may
consider it.  The Judge, therefore, does not consider Exhibit 18.

Because the Plaintiff relies on CWI's allegations to show that the
Defendants' statements were materially false and misleading as well
as in support of the Plaintiff's scienter allegations, the
ambiguity of CWI's allegations is significant in light of the
PSLRA's high standard.  The Judge, therefore, must steeply discount
CWI's allegations.

Finally, the PSLRA requires the Plaintiff to specify the reason or
reasons why a statement is misleading.  After each paragraph
identifying the actionable statement, the CAC includes a paragraph
repeating the same conclusory statements and adding other
conclusions for certain statements.  The Judge finds that the
Plaintiff's pleading fails because he does not relate the
Defendants' statements to specific reasons why the statements were
false or misleading.  The CAC is not "puzzle pleading" but it also
does not satisfy the PSLRA's particularity requirement by repeating
the same five allegations ten times without ever explaining why
those allegations, or other allegations, show that the statements
were false.

Judge Shipp concludes that the CAC fails to meet the PSLRA's
particularity requirements.  The Defendants advance several
additional arguments regarding scienter, whether the statements are
actionable under the Exchange Act, and a lack of loss causation.
The Judge however, does not reach the merits of those arguments at
this juncture because the Plaintiff may be able to address some of
the deficiencies in the CAC in an amended complaint.  He,
accordingly, finds good cause to allow the Plaintiff to amend the
CAC.

An order consistent with the Memorandum Opinion will be entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 2, 2019 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/RKmAyY from Leagle.com.

Faraj Touchan, Movant, represented by SHERIEF MORSY --
smorsy@faruqilaw.com -- FARUQI & FARUQI LLP.

Tai Duong, Dennis Roof, Robert Szczodrowski, Qiang Xie & Daniel
DeYoe, Movants, represented by EDUARD KORSINSKY -- ek@zlk.com --
LEVI & KORSINSKY LLP.

Rehan Khan, Movant, represented by DONALD A. ECKLUND --
DEcklund@carellabyrne.com -- CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN,
BRODY
& AGNELLO, P.C.

SERGHEI LUNGU, Lead Plaintiff, represented by BRUCE DANIEL
GREENBERG -- bgreenberg@litedepalma.com -- LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG,
LLC.

RANDY SMITH, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by BRUCE DANIEL GREENBERG, LITE
DEPALMA GREENBERG, LLC.

ANTARES PHARMA, INC., ROBERT F APPLE & FRED M POWELL, Defendants,
represented by DAVID A. KOTLER -- david.kotler@dechert.com --
DECHERT LLP.


ARIZONA BEVERAGES: Ashour Suit Transferred to S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
The case, AHMED ASHOUR, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. ARIZONA BEVERAGES USA LLC,
HORNELL BREWING CO., INC., BEVERAGE MARKETING USA, INC., ARIZONA
BEVERAGES HOLDINGS LLC, and ARIZONA BEVERAGES HOLDINGS LLC, the
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-04170 (Filed May 14, 2019), was
transferred from the U.S. District Court for the  Central District
of the California Central, to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York (Foley Square) on July 30, 2019. The
Southern District of New York Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-07081-UA to the proceeding. The suit demands $5 million
worth of damages.

According to the complaint, the Defendants seek to take advantage
of the premium placed on products without preservatives by
specifically labeling and packaging their Products as containing no
preservatives.

To the detriment of consumers, the Products do, in fact, contain
preservatives as they contain citric acid, a known preservative,
the lawsuit says.

Accordingly, as a result of Defendants' false and deceptive
labeling, the Plaintiff and the Classes have been misled, have
purchased products they otherwise would not have purchased, and
have paid more for products than they otherwise would have
paid.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Daniel L Warshaw, Esq.
          Melissa S. Weiner, Esq.
          PEARSON SIMON AND WARSHAW LLP
          15165 Ventura Boulevard Suite 400
          Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
          Telephone: (818) 788-8300
          Facsimile: (818) 788-8104
          E-mail: dwarshaw@pswlaw.com
                  mweiner@pswlaw.com

               - and -

          George Volney Granade, Esq.
          Michael R Reese, Esq.
          REESE RICHMAN LLP
          875 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10001
          Telephone: (706) 338-6617
          Facsimile: (212) 253-4272
          E-mail: ggranade@reesellp.com
                  mreese@reesellp.com

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          David A. Ring, Esq.
          Derek Henry Lim, Esq.
          DEMIER ARMSTRONG AND ROWLAND LLP
          4500 East Pacific Coast Hwy 4th Floor
          Long Beach, CA 90804
          Telephone: (562) 597-0029
          Facsimile: (562) 494-3958
          E-mail: rin@darlaw.com
                  lim@darlaw.com

               - and -

          Robert P. Donovan, Esq.
          CARELLA, BYRNE, BAIN, GILFILLAN
             CECCHI, STEWART & OLSTEIN
          6 Becker Farm Road
          Roseland, NJ 07068-1739
          Telephone: (201) 994-1700

ARTHUR J. GALLAGHER: Bid to Dismiss Artex Clients' Suit Pending
---------------------------------------------------------------
Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 26, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the motion to dismiss
the class action suit initiated by micro-captive clients of Artex
Risk Solutions, Inc., is pending.

On December 7, 2018, a class action lawsuit was filed against the
company, its subsidiary Artex Risk Solutions, Inc. (Artex) and
other defendants including Tribeca, in the District of Arizona. An
amended complaint was filed on March 29, 2019.

The named plaintiffs are micro-captive clients of Artex or Tribeca
and their related entities and owners who had Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) Section 831(b) tax benefits disallowed by the IRS.
The complaint attempts to state various causes of action and
alleges that the defendants defrauded the plaintiffs by marketing
and managing micro-captives with the knowledge that the captives
did not constitute bona fide insurance and thus would not qualify
for tax benefits.

The named plaintiffs are seeking to certify a class of all persons
who were assessed back taxes, penalties or interest by the IRS as a
result of their ownership of or involvement in an IRS Section
831(b) micro-captive formed or managed by Artex or Tribeca during
the time period January 1, 2005 to the present.

The complaint does not specify the amount of damages sought by the
named plaintiffs or the putative class.

The defendants have filed motions to dismiss, arguing that the case
should be put into arbitration and that the amended complaint fails
to state a claim. We will vigorously defend against the lawsuit.

Arthur J. Gallagher said, "Litigation is inherently uncertain,
however, and it is not possible for us to predict the ultimate
outcome of this matter and the financial impact to us."

Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., together with its subsidiaries, provides
insurance brokerage, consulting, and third party claims settlement
and administration services to entities in the United States and
internationally. The company offers its services through a network
of correspondent insurance brokers and consultants. Arthur J.
Gallagher & Co. was founded in 1927 and is headquartered in Rolling
Meadows, Illinois.


BARILLA AMERICA: Illinois Court Narrows Claims in Kubilius
----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Elaine E. Bucklo of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted in part and denied
in part the Defendant move to dismiss the case, Lukas Kubilius, on
behalf of himself and others similarly situated Plaintiff, v.
Barilla America, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 18 C 6656 (N.D. Ill.).

Kubilius is a New Yorker who claims he was duped into buying a jar
of pasta sauce from a New York supermarket because Barilla -- the
Illinois company that markets the sauce -- billed it as having "no
preservatives," even though, as the product label disclosed, it
contains citric acid -- an ingredient known to function as a
preservative.  Kubilius sues Barilla, claiming that he and a
nationwide class are entitled to damages for this alleged deception
(and the deception he claims was visited on the class by Barilla's
similar marketing of other pasta sauces), as well as injunctive
relief under Illinois' Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act
("ICFA") and the "substantively similar consumer protection laws"
of the remaining 49 states and the District of Columbia.
Alternatively, Kubilius asserts claims on behalf of a New York
class under that state's statutes prohibiting false advertising and
deceptive trade practices.  Finally, Kubilius claims common law
fraud on behalf of nationwide or New York classes.

The Defendant move to dismiss the complaint and to strike its class
allegations on four grounds: that Illinois' consumer protection
statute cannot be enforced extra-territorially; that a nationwide
class action would be unmanageable because of differences among the
various states' fraud and consumer protection laws; that plaintiff
has not adequately alleged either a false statement or a resulting
injury; and that the Plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive
relief or pursue claims relating to items he did not purchase.

Judge Bucklo begin with the Plaintiff's claim under ICFA, which, as
his own authority holds squarely, has no extra-territorial
application.  Accordingly, to govern the Plaintiff's New York
purchase of the Defendant's pasta sauce, "the bulk of the
circumstances" making up that transaction would have to have
occurred in Illinois.  Plainly, that is not the case.

She finds that the Plaintiff's ICFA claim is based not on a course
of dealing with the Defendant but on a single statement he claims
to have seen on a single product label during a straightforward
retail purchase transacted in New York.  Because it is not
"difficult to identify the situs" of that transaction, she need not
consider any other factors to conclude that the ICFA does not apply
to the Plaintiff's purchase.

Also apparent from the complaint is that the Plaintiff's statutory
and common law consumer fraud claims cannot feasibly be maintained
as a nationwide class action.  The Plaintiff's first count asserts,
on behalf of a nationwide class, violations of the ICFA in
conjunction with the substantively similar consumer protection laws
of other states and the District of Columbia to the extent the ICFA
does not reach the claims of out-of-state Class members.  As she
explained, the ICFA does not apply to the claims of class members
who purchased their products outside of Illinois.  And, as the
Plaintiff acknowledges, the claims of the absent class members will
be governed by the laws of all 50 states and the District of
Columbia.

The Plaintiff also argues that it is too soon to tell whether
nationwide classes can be certified, and that a proper
determination of the issue must await discovery and a motion for
class certification.  He also insists that the consumer protection
and fraud laws of the various states are "substantively similar,
and that to the extent they are materially different, any
differences can be dealt with by the creation of subclasses.

Neither argument avails, the Judge holds.  First, the cases the
Plaintiff cites in which courts declined to strike class
allegations prior to discovery do not persuade the Judge to take
that course.  Second, while subclasses can sometimes facilitate the
management of multi-state class actions requiring application of
dissimilar state laws, the Plaintiff's superficial argument fails
to account for the various axes along which state consumer
protection laws differ.  The Plaintiff's nationwide class
allegations are stricken.

The Judge now turns to the Defendant's argument that the Plaintiff
lacks standing to pursue the claims of absent class members who
purchased products that he did not himself purchase but that
likewise bore labels stating "no preservatives" alongside
ingredients lists that included citric acid.

Having determined that the Plaintiff's nationwide class allegations
cannot stand and that his individual claims (like his claims on
behalf of a New York class) are governed by New York law, that is
the law the Judge applies in considering the adequacy of his
allegations. Her review of the issue is facilitated by the
Plaintiff's submission of Quiroz v. Beaverton Foods, Inc., a
decision issued after briefing on the Defendant's motion was
complete.  

Quiroz is indeed on all fours with the present case: Quiroz,
represented by the same counsel as Kubilius, filed a putative class
action against the manufacturer of Inglehoffer Original Stone
Ground Mustard alleging that the Defendant's use of labels stating
that the product contains "No Preservatives" is misleading because
the label also discloses that the product contains citric acid.
Many paragraphs in the two complaints are identical.  Like the
Plaintiff, Quiroz asserts alternative nationwide and New York class
claims for violation of NY GBL Section 349 (deceptive business
practices) and NY GBL Section 350 (false advertising) and each
state's consumer protection laws (to the extent New York consumer
protection laws are inapplicable to out-of-state Class members"),
as well as for common law fraud.

The Judge sees no reason to depart from the majority view that
allegations such as the Plaintiff's are sufficient to state an
injury under NY GBL Sections 349 and 350.  She also joins the
Quiroz court in rejecting the argument -- for which the Defendant
cites no legal authority -- that the Plaintiff was required to
plead facts indicating that citric acid "functions as a
preservative" in the Defendant's product.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Bucklo granted in part the
Defendant's motion to strike and dismiss the amended complaint.
She dismissed the Plaintiff's ICFA claim, as are all claims he
asserts on behalf of a nationwide class.  The Defendant's motion is
denied with respect to the Plaintiff's claims under New York GBL
Sections 349 and 350 the common law of fraud on behalf of himself
and a class of New York residents who purchased the products
identified in the Plaintiff's amended complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 2, 2019 Memorandum Opinion and
Order is available at https://is.gd/fMhJ9q from Leagle.com.

Lukas Kubilius, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by C.K. Lee -- cklee@leelitigation.com --
Lee Litigation Group, PLLC.

Barilla America, Inc., Defendant, represented by Steven P. Blonder
-- sblonder@muchlaw.com -- Much Shelist P.C. & Marissa Lynn Downs
-- mdowns@muchlaw.com -- Much Shelist, P.C..


BARNES & NOBLE: Halper Sadeh Files Shareholder Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Halper Sadeh LLP, a global investor rights law firm, announces the
filing of a shareholder class action lawsuit against Barnes &
Noble, Inc. (BKS) in connection with the proposed sale of Barnes &
Noble to funds advised by Elliott Advisors (UK) Limited
("Elliott"). The lawsuit seeks damages and/or equitable relief on
behalf of Barnes & Noble shareholders.

If you are a Barnes & Noble shareholder and would like to join the
action or discuss your legal rights and options, please visit
Barnes & Noble Merger or contact Daniel Sadeh or Zachary Halper,
free of charge, at (212) 763-0060 or sadeh@halpersadeh.com or
zhalper@halpersadeh.com.

On June 7, 2019, Barnes & Noble announced that it had entered into
a definitive agreement to be acquired by funds advised by Elliott
for $6.50 per share. According to a document that Barnes & Noble
filed with the SEC, on June 18, 2019, a company identified as
"Company C" submitted a written proposal to purchase Barnes & Noble
for $7.25 per share. In order to engage and negotiate with Company
C on its proposal, Barnes & Noble requested a waiver from Elliott
of Barnes & Noble's obligations under the non-solicitation
covenants in the definitive merger agreement. On June 21, 2019,
Barnes & Noble was informed that Elliott declined to grant the
requested waiver that would have permitted Barnes & Noble to engage
with Company C. Thereafter, Barnes & Noble determined that Company
C's proposal was not reasonably likely to lead to a superior offer
and declined "Company C's requests."

The lawsuit alleges that Defendants issued a materially misleading
solicitation statement recommending that Barnes & Noble
shareholders tender their shares to Elliott. According to the
complaint, the solicitation statement contains materially
incomplete and misleading information concerning: (1) Barnes &
Noble's financial projections; (2) the financial analyses performed
by Barnes & Noble's financial advisors; and (3) potential conflicts
of interest involving those financial advisors. The lawsuit seeks
to enjoin the shareholder vote on the proposed transaction until
such information is disclosed.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than Sept. 23, 2019.  A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. If you would like to join the action or discuss your
legal rights and options, please visit https://tinyurl.com/y32ruejq
or contact Daniel Sadeh or Zachary Halper, free of charge, at (212)
763-0060 or sadeh@halpersadeh.com or zhalper@halpersadeh.com

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE OR YOU MAY REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT.

Halper Sadeh LLP represents investors all over the world who have
fallen victim to securities fraud and corporate misconduct. Our
attorneys have been instrumental in implementing corporate reforms
and recovering millions of dollars on behalf of defrauded
investors.

Contact Information:

         Daniel Sadeh, Esq.
         Zachary Halper, Esq.
         Halper Sadeh LLP
         Tel.No.: (212) 763-0060
         Website: https://www.halpersadeh.com
         Email: sadeh@halpersadeh.com
                zhalper@halpersadeh.com [GN]


BETHPAGE FEDERAL: Corbett Sues Over Unreasonable NFS Fees
---------------------------------------------------------
Catherine Corbett, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. Bethpage Federal Credit Union, Defendant,
Case No. 19-cv-04194 (E.D. N.Y., July 19, 2019), seeks damages,
restitution and injunctive relief for breach of contract and
violation of New York consumer protection law.

Bethpage is alleged of charging multiple $30 Non-Sufficient Funds
Fees (NFS) on the same payment item, which is barred by the account
contract. On May 2, 2019, Corbett attempted to make a payment via
automated clearing house to Mid-Island Mortgage which Bethpage
rejected due to insufficient funds in her account and charged her a
$30 NSF Fee. However, four days later, on May 6, 2019, Bethpage
processed the same transaction yet again, and again rejected the
transaction due to insufficient funds and charged Corbett another
$30 NSF Fee. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Todd S. Garber, Esq.
      Bradley F. Silverman, Esq.
      FINKELSTEIN, BLANKINSHIP, FREI-PEARSON & GARBER, LLP
      445 Hamilton Avenue, Suite 605
      White Plains, NY 10605
      Telephone: (914) 298-3281
      Facsimile: (914) 824-1561
      Email: tgarber@fbfglaw.com
             bsilverman@fbfglaw.com

             - and -

      Jeffrey Kaliel, Esq.
      KALIEL PLLC
      1875 Connecticut Ave. NW 10th Floor
      Washington, DC 20009
      Tel: (202) 350-4783
      Email: jkaliel@kalielpllc.com

             - and -

      Jeff Ostrow, Esq.
      Jonathan M. Streisfeld, Esq.
      Daniel Tropin, Esq.
      KOPELOWITZ OSTROW FERGUSON WEISELBERG GILBERT
      One West Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 500
      Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
      Telephone: (954) 525-4100
      Facsimile: (954) 525-4300
      Email: ostrow@kolawyers.com


BIMBO FOODS: Second Circuit Appeals Filed in Franze FLSA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Nicholas Franze and George Schrufer, Jr., filed an
appeal from the District Court's Opinion & Order entered on July 2,
2019, in their lawsuit styled Franze, et al. v. Bimbo Foods
Bakeries Distribution, LLC, et al., Case No. 17-cv-3556, in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (White
Plains).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Judge Nelson
S. Roman granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion
for conditional certification and judicial notice under the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").

Plaintiffs Franze and Schrufer bring the action, initiated on May
12, 2017, against the Defendants, alleging violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and New York Labor Law ("NYLL").  They
bring the proposed collective and class action alleging that the
Defendants misclassified the Plaintiffs and the Distributors as
independent contractors, exempt from the FLSA, in order to avoid
paying them overtime in violation of the FLSA and NYLL.

The appellate case is captioned as Franze, et al. v. Bimbo Foods
Bakeries Distribution, LLC, et al., Case No. 19-2275, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Counter-Defendants - Appellants Nicholas Franze, on
behalf of themselves, and of all similarly situated individuals,
and George Schrufer, Jr., on behalf of themselves, and of all
similarly situated individuals are represented by:

          Randy J. Perlmutter, Esq.
          KANTROWITZ, GOLDHAMER & GRAIFMAN P.C.
          747 Chestnut Ridge Road
          Chestnut Ridge, NY 10977
          Telephone: (845) 356-2570
          E-mail: rperlmutter@kgglaw.com

Defendants-Counter-Claimants - Appellees Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc.
and Bimbo Foods Bakeries Distribution, LLC, FKA Bimbo Foods
Bakeries Distribution Inc., FKA George Weston Bakeries
Distribution, Inc. are represented by:

          Melissa C. Rodriguez, Esq.
          MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          101 Park Avenue
          New York, NY 10178
          Telephone: (212) 309-6000
          E-mail: melissa.rodriguez@morganlewis.com


BLACKJEWEL LLC: Ex-Employees' Class Suits Filed in Bankruptcy
-------------------------------------------------------------
Slater Teague, writing for WJHL, reports that class action lawsuits
have been filed against a bankrupt coal operator by employees
claiming the company violated labor laws.

A lawsuit against Blackjewel LLC was filed in US Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia.  According to WYMT, a
similar lawsuit was filed in Kentucky.

The lawsuits claim Blackjewel failed to pay wages and benefits and
provide adequate notice before suddenly closing operations and
laying off hundreds of employees.

The class actions aim to recover unpaid wages and benefits.

The West Virginia lawsuit was filed by Mountain State Justice, Inc.
[GN]


BOB EVANS: Jensen et al. Suit Transferred to W.D. Pennsylvania
--------------------------------------------------------------
Regina Jensen, Vickie Rash, and Rebecca Bailey Individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. Bob
Evans Farms, LLC and Bob Evans Restaurants, LLC, the Defendants,
Case No. 2:19-cv-01090 (Filed March 23, 2019), was transferred from
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, to the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(Pittsburgh) on July 29, 2019. The Western District of Pennsylvania
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-00921-MRH to the proceeding.
The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Mark R. Hornak.

The lawsuit arises under the Fair Labor Standards Act., the Ohio
Constitution, the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act, and the
West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act, for Defendants'
failure to pay Plaintiffs and other similarly-situated tipped
employees all earned minimum wages.

The Defendants own and operate over 500 Bob Evans restaurants. The
restaurants in Ohio and West Virginia are the subject of the
lawsuit.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Michael Fradin, Esq.
          FRADIN LAW OFFICE
          8 N. Court St., Suite 403
          Athens, OH 45701
          Telephone: (847) 644-3425
          Facsimile: (847) 673-1228
          E-mail: mike@fradinlaw.com

               - and -

          Anthony J. Lazzaro, Esq.
          Chastity Lynn Christy, Esq.
          Lori M. Griffin, Esq.
          THE LAZZARO LAW FIRM, LLC
          920 Rockefeller Building
          614 W. Superior Avenue
          Cleveland, OH 44113
          Telephone: (216) 696-5000
          Facsimile: (216) 696-7005
          E-mail: anthony@lazzarolawfirm.com
          E-mail: chastity@lazzarolawfirm.com
          E-mail: lori@lazzarolawfirm.com

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          Jonathan Ross Vaughn, Esq.
          Adam Jeffery Rocco, Esq.
          VORYS SATER SEYMOUR & PEASE-2
          PO Box 1008
          52 E Gay Street
          Columbus, OH 43216-1008
          Telephone: (614) 464-6400
          Facsimile: (614) 464-5672
          E-mail: jrvaughn@vssp.com
                  ajrocco@vorys.com

BOEING COMPANY: 737 MAX Pilot Sues Over Concealed Plane Defect
--------------------------------------------------------------
Pilot "E," individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. The Boeing Company, Defendant, Case No.
2019CH08487, (Ill. Cir., July 19, 2019), seeks compensatory and
punitive damages, interest, litigation costs and attorneys' fees
and such other and further relief resulting from negligence.

Pilots seek compensation on behalf of approximately two hundred
pilots qualified to fly Boeing's 737 MAX series of aircraft whose
personal and professional life were disrupted when Boeing and the
Federal Aviation Administration grounded the 737 MAX after the
crashes of two of its 737 MAX aircrafts. Its "Maneuvering
Characteristics Augmentation System" allegedly was allegedly
defective but the Company failed to sufficiently inform the pilots.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Patrick M. Jones, Esq.
      Sarah M. Beaujour, Esq.
      PMJPLLC
      100 South State Street
      Chicago, IL 60603
      Tel: (312) 255-7976
      Email: pmj@patjonespllc.com
             smb@patjonespllc.com

             - and -

      Joseph C. Wheeler, Esq.
      IALPG PTY LTD ID, 7/139 Junction Road
      Clayfield, Queensland
      Australia 4011
      Tel: +61 7 3040 1099
      Email: jwheeler@ialpg.com


BROOKLYN CHRYLSER: Denied Detailers Breaks, Overtime Pay, Says Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Tahje Bumford and James Wimms on behalf of themselves and all
others persons similarly situated Plaintiffs v. Brooklyn Chrylser
Jeep Dodge Ram and Zack Schwebel, individually, Defendants, Case
No. 19-cv-04176, (E.D. N.Y., July 19, 2019), seeks to recover
unpaid wages, overtime premium pay, liquidated damages and
attorneys' fees and costs for violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act and New York labor law.

Defendants operate a car dealership located at 2286 Flatbush
Avenue, Brooklyn, where Bumford and Wimms worked as detailers. They
claim to have routinely worked well over 40 hours per workweek and
worked through their breaks without being compensated. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Alexander Granovsky, Esq.
      GRANOVSKY & SUNDARESH PLLC
      48 Wall Street, 11th Floor
      New York, NY 10005
      Tel: (646) 524-6001
      Email: ag@g-s-law.com


CARGO AIRPORT: $200K Settlement in Oladipo Suit Has Prelim Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BABATUNDE OLADIPO, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CARGO AIRPORT SERVICES USA, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 16 CV 6165 (CLP) (E.D. N.Y.), Magistrate Judge
Cheryl L. Pollak of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York granted the Plaintiff's unopposed motion
requesting: (1) an Order granting preliminary approval of the
proposed settlement as set forth in the Joint Settlement Agreement
and Release; (2) conditional certification of the proposed class
for settlement purposes; (3) approval of the Notice of Proposed
Settlement of Class Action Lawsuit and Fairness Hearing; 4)
approval of the proposed schedule for final settlement approval and
an Order scheduling a date for the Fairness Hearing; and 5)
appointment of the Plaintiff's counsel, the Law Firm of Louis
Ginsberg, P.C. as the Class Counsel.

On Sept. 21, 2016, the Plaintiff commenced the class action and
collective action on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated against Defendant Cargo, alleging that it failed to pay
its employees proper straight time and overtime wages, in violation
of the New York Labor Law Section 190 et seq. and Section 650 et
seq., and supporting regulations in the New York Codes, Rules and
Regulations.

The Class Counsel engaged in numerous conferences with the
Defendant's counsel and participated in a mediation on Feb. 6, 2018
before JAMS Mediator Robin H. Gise, Esq.  In preparation for the
mediation, the counsel prepared a detailed mediation statement with
exhibits, and analyzed and prepared a summary of damages for the
Class.  The attorneys also participated in two mediations before
the undersigned on June 27, 2018 and then on Sept. 12, 2018.
Following the second session, it appeared that a settlement had
been reached but then additional negotiations were required over
the next four months before a final agreement was reached in
mid-January 2019.  The Class Counsel thereafter drafted the
Settlement Agreement and submitted the papers in connection with
the motion for Preliminary Approval.

After discovery and mediation, the parties agreed to settle the
action on a class wide basis.  The proposed settlement covers all
current and former Cargo Agents, also known as Office Of Traffic
Agents, who were employed by Cargo Airport Services USA, LLC or any
parent, Subsidiary, predecessor or successor, in cargo Buildings 9,
66, 73, 76, 78, and 151 at JFK Airport in the State of New York, at
any time from Sept. 20, 2010 through the date of the Preliminary
Approval.

The Agreement creates a gross settlement sum of $200,000 to
compensate the approximately 600 Class Members for their unpaid
wage claims, and includes an award to the Named Plaintiff, a fee
for the third-party administrator, and attorneys' fees and costs.

The Class Notice directs members who "choose to participate in the
settlement" to "do nothing" and they will receive a payment
calculated by dividing the Class Member's gross earnings into the
total of all Qualified Class Members' earnings and multiplying the
resulting percentage by the Net Settlement Amount8 to reflect their
length of employment and percentage of earnings relative to the
Class.

The Settlement is non-reversionary; if any Class Members opt out,
their share of the Settlement will be distributed to the Class
Members according to the formula set forth above.  Any uncashed
checks will be divided as follows: 75%will be returned to the
defendant with the remaining 25% donated to a 501(c)(3)
organization.

The Settlement Agreement contemplates that the Class Counsel will
file a motion for an award of attorney's fees, equal to 33.33% of
the Settlement Amount, which equals $66,660, plus reasonable
litigation costs and expenses.  The Plaintiff will move separately
for attorney's fees and costs in connection with their motion for
final settlement approval.

In addition, the Named Plaintiff, Babatunde Oladipo, will seek to
receive a Service Award of $5,000, in recognition of the services
he rendered on behalf of the Class.  These services include
attending the three mediations, participating in conferences with
plaintiff's counsel, and producing documents.  In addition, a fee
will be deducted from the Settlement Fund to compensate the
third-party claims administrator.

The parties propose the following schedule: 1) within 20 business
days of an Order of Preliminary Approval of the Settlement,
defendant will provide the Settlement Administrator with a list of
the Class Members, their contact and wage information necessary to
calculate each member's settlement amount; 2) within 10 days after
receiving the contact and wage information, the Administratorwill
mail the Notice to the Class Members; 3) the Class Members then
have 30 days from the date of the mailing of the Notice to opt-out,
and to file any objections to the Settlement with the Court; 4) a
final fairness hearing will be held and if approved, the Court will
issue a Final Approval Order.

Judge Pollak granted the Plaintiff's motion for preliminary
approval of the proposed settlement as articulated in the
Settlement Agreement and granted certification of the class for the
purposes of settlement.  She further Ordered that: (1) the Law
Offices of Louis Ginsberg, P.C. be appointed as the Class Counsel;
(2) the proposed Notice of Class Action Lawsuit Settlement be
approved; (3) the parties are to provide the name of the Claims
Administrator and the procedure for issuing payment to
participating Class Members by July 15, 2019; and (4) the Fairness
Hearing is scheduled for Sept. 24, 2019 at 11:00 a.m., which is
more than 75 days from the date of this Order, as requested by the
parties.

The Proposed Class will have 30 days after the date the Proposed
Notice is mailed to opt-out of or object to the Settlement
Agreement.  To the extent any Notice is returned or otherwise
determined to be undeliverable, such putative Class Memberswill be
entitled to 15 days from the date of any subsequent mailing (but no
less than the original 30 days) to opt-out or object to the
Settlement Agreement.

The Clerk is directed to send copies of the Order to the parties
either electronically through the Electronic Case Filing (ECF)
system or by mail.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 2, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/RO5tHh from Leagle.com.

Babatunde Oladipo, Plaintiff, represented by Louis Ginsberg, Law
Firm of Louis Ginsberg, P.C.

Cargo Airport Services USA, LLC, Defendant, represented by Joel R.
Hlavaty -- jhlavaty@frantzward.com -- Frantz Ward LLP, Richard
Granofsky -- rgranofsky@lskdnylaw.com -- Lester, Schwab, Katz &
Dwyer, Dennis M. Rothman -- drothman@lskdnylaw.com -- Lester,
Schwab, Katz & Dwyer LLP, Gregory R. Farkas --
gfarkas@frantzward.com -- Frantz Ward LLP & Ryan T. Smith --
rsmith@frantzward.com -- Frantz Ward LLP.


CENTRAL PAYMENT: Court Denies Dismissal of RICO Suit
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska
issued a Memorandum and Order denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Counts II and III in the case captioned CUSTOM HAIR DESIGNS BY
SANDY, LLC, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated; and SKIP'S PRECISION WELDING, LLC, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated; Plaintiffs, v.
CENTRAL PAYMENT CO., LLC, Defendant. No. 8:17CV310. (D. Neb.).

The Plaintiffs contend they are merchants that processed credit and
debit transactions through CPAY. CPAY processes over 65,000
businesses and over $10 billion in credit sales annually. The
Plaintiffs contracted with CPAY for payment processing services.
The Plaintiffs allege that CPAY charged fees for its payment
processing services that do not coincide with the terms of
plaintiffs' merchant agreements and Terms and Conditions. The
Plaintiffs plead this case as a putative nationwide class action
and argue that CPAY is a multi-year, interstate,
multi-million-dollar scheme to defraud unsophisticated merchants.

The Defendant moves to dismiss Counts II and III of plaintiffs'
first amended complaint. Counts II asserts claims in violation of
(RICO), 18 U.S.C. Section 1962, and Claim III asserts fraudulent
concealment.

RICO was passed to provide criminal and civil protections against
organized crime. RICO prohibits receiving any income derived from a
pattern of racketeering activity or using or investing any part of
such income in acquisition, establishment, or operation of any
enterprise engaged in interstate commerce. RICO makes it illegal
for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity. In addition, a person cannot conspire to do either of
these actions. Plaintiffs, argues defendant, did not allege an
enterprise or the predicate acts engaged in a pattern of
racketeering activity, where in plaintiffs suffered from a
predicate act.

The Defendants argue that to establish an enterprise plaintiffs
must plead (1) a common purpose that animates the individuals
associated with it (2) an ongoing organization with members who
function as a continuing unit and (3) an ascertainable structure
distinct from the conduct of a pattern of racketeering.

The Defendant also contends that this is not the subject matter
encompassed under RICO.

The Defendant further argues that plaintiffs fail to adequately
plead the existence of an enterprise  as only CPAY and its
affiliates and employees or agents operate the business. The scheme
to defraud, predicate acts and mail or wire fraud allegations are
only generically pleaded by the plaintiffs defendant argues.  

The Plaintiff opposes the motion to dismiss. First, plaintiff
asserts that proof that a RICO defendant has been involved in
multiple criminal schemes is highly relevant to the inquiry into
the continuity of the defendant's racketeering activity. In this
case, argues plaintiffs, the Hyman brothers are fraudsters and have
been banned by the FTC for deceptive misconduct. Plaintiffs argue
that they have plead the who want when and where as required under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Plaintiffs argue that the enterprise is
cognizable and distinct.

The Court will deny the motion to dismiss and allow discovery to
continue. The Court has carefully reviewed the amended complaint.
The plaintiff has sufficiently pled an enterprise with multiple,
independent players who benefit from the alleged scheme. Further,
plaintiff has clearly pled a pattern of racketeering and a common
purpose. The common purpose is to defraud the merchants they
service. Upon reviewing the complaint, the Court believes the
plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged more than mere breach of
contract and more than your normal civil fraud case. The plaintiffs
allege nationwide planning with fraudulent concealment over a
number of years.

This is sufficient under Boyle. With regard to the mail or wire
fraud argument, the Court finds it is without merit at this point
in the case. Plaintiffs have clearly alleged that sufficient
mailings, emails, wire transfers so as to meet this requirement at
the motion to dismiss stage.

There were also allegedly unlawful withdrawals from the bank
accounts of certain of the merchants. These facts are more than
sufficient to meet the pleading stage requirements, with
particularity.

The Court will deny the motion to dismiss Count II.

Fraudulent Concealment

In order to state a claim for fraudulent concealment in Nebraska,
plaintiff must allege: a duty to disclose a material fact;
knowledge of the fact; concealment of the fact; that the fact was
not within the plaintiff's reasonable attention, observation and
judgment; that defendant concealed the fact intending that
plaintiffs act or refrain from acting; and that plaintiffs
reasonable relied on those facts; and that plaintiffs were damaged
by the action or inaction of the concealment.

With regard to the fraudulent concealment claim, defendant argues
that plaintiffs have failed to identify any material fact that was
concealed by CPAY nor do they contend that plaintiffs failed to
allege they reasonably relied on such facts. Defendant argues that
plaintiffs fail to identify any specific misrepresentations or
undisclosed material facts. The allegations, argues defendant, go
to the breach of contract claims. Plaintiff contends that CPAY
concealed its true intentions from merchants and deceived them into
the contractual relationship by failing to disclose the truth about
the relationship and CPAY's business model of systematically
overcharging merchants and inflating service fees to fraudulently
pad its profits.

Again, for the reasons previously stated herein regarding
plaintiffs' pleading, as well as the examples of alleged fraudulent
activities cited herein by the plaintiff, the Court will deny the
motion to dismiss Count III. As stated, plaintiffs have alleged
that material facts were hidden and not disclosed; plaintiffs had
no other way of knowing about the fraud; the plaintiffs relied on
the representations; and the plaintiffs are clearly harmed. The
motion to dismiss is denied.

Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 25, 2019 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3wu9555 from
Leagle.com.

Custom Hair Designs by Sandy, LLC, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated & Skip's Precision Welding, LLC, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Eric D. Barton -- EBARTON@WCLLP.COM -- WAGSTAFF,
CARTMELL LAW FIRM, Melody R. Dickson -- MDICKSON@WCLLP.COM --
WAGSTAFF, CARTMELL LAW FIRM, Sarah S. Ruane -- SRUANE@WCLLP.COM --
WAGSTAFF, CARTMELL LAW FIRM &Tyler W. Hudson -- THUDSON@WCLLP.COM
-- WAGSTAFF, CARTMELL LAW FIRM.

Central Payment Co., LLC, Defendant, represented by Allison H.
White -- awhite@kslaw.com- KING, SPALDING LAW FIRM, pro hac vice,
Brandon R. Keel -- bkeel@kslaw.com -- KING, SPALDING LAW FIRM, pro
hac vice, David L. Balser -- dbalser@kslaw.com -- KING, SPALDING
LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Jonathan R. Chally -- jchally@kslaw.com --
KING, SPALDING LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Kenneth W. Hartman --
khartman@bairdholm.com -- BAIRD, HOLM LAW FIRM & Krista M. Eckhoff
-- keckhoff@bairdholm.com- BAIRD, HOLM LAW FIRM.


CEP AMERICA-CALIFORNIA: Fails to Timely Pay Wages, Valikhani Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MOHAMMAD VALIKHANI, as individuals and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. CEP AMERICA-CALIFORNIA, a California General
Partnership; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No. 19CV351523
(Cal. Super., Santa Clara Cty., July 24, 2019), accuses the
Defendants of violating the California Labor Code by failing to pay
all employees their earned wages in a timely manner.

CEP America-California is a General Partnership, under the laws of
the state of California, and doing business in California.  The
Plaintiff does not know the true names or capacities of the Doe
Defendants.

The Plaintiff was hired by the Defendants in August 2016 to work as
a physician at one of their hospitals located in San Jose,
California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Larry W. Lee, Esq.
          Kristen M. Agnew, Esq.
          Nicholas Rosenthal, Esq.
          Max W. Gavron, Esq.
          DIVERSITY LAW GROUP, P.C.
          515 S. Figueroa St., Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488-6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488-6554
          E-mail: lwlee@diversitylaw.com
                  kagnew@diversitylaw.com
                  nrosenthal@diversitylaw.com
                  mgavron@diversitylaw.com

               - and -

          William L. Marder, Esq.
          POLARIS LAW GROUP LLP
          501 San Benito Street, Suite 200
          Hollister, CA 95023
          Telephone: (831) 531-4214
          Facsimile: (831) 634-0333
          E-mail: bill@polarislawgroup.com


CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Van Connor Hits Illegal Telemarketing Calls
-------------------------------------------------------------------
James Van Connor, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Charter Communications, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 19-cv-02008 (D. S.C., July 18, 2019), seeks statutory
damages and injunctive relief for violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act and the South Carolina Telephone Privacy
Protection Act.

Mr. Connor alleges that Charter Communication sent him automated
telemarketing calls promoting their television, internet and voice
services without prior express written consent, despite the fact
his number has long been listed on the National Do Not Call
Registry.

Charter sells television, internet, and voice services to customers
through its "Spectrum" brand. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      David A. Maxfield, Esq.
      DAVE MAXFIELD, ATTORNEY, LLC
      Columbia, SC 29211
      Tel: (803) 509-6800
      Fax: (855) 299-1656
      Email: dave@consumerlawsc.com


CHRISTOPHER ANDREWS: Court OKs Judgment on Pleadings
----------------------------------------------------
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, Flint, issued an Opinion granting
Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in the case
captioned IN RE: CHRISTOPHER ANDREWS, Chapter 7 Proceeding, Debtor.
INDIRECT PURCHASER CLASS, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTOPHER ANDREWS,
Defendant. Case No. 18-31345-dof, Adversary Proceeding Case No.
18-3072-dof. (E.D. Mich.).

The Plaintiff, Indirect Purchaser Class (IPC), moves for judgment
on the pleadings, seeking a determination that the Defendant's
indebtedness to IPC by virtue of various sanctions imposed against
him by a federal court should not be discharged pursuant to 11
U.S.C. Section 523(a)(6).  

Pursuant to the Complaint, IPC is a court-approved settlement class
of indirect purchasers harmed by a price-fixing conspiracy among
manufacturers of polyurethane foams. The Defendant, appearing pro
se, filed objections to the Class Action settlement, and filed
numerous other objections and appeals, all of which were overruled.
The Plaintiff claims the Defendant's objections: (i) delayed
disbursement of settlement funds to IPC (ii) caused IPC to incur
unnecessary attorney fees responding to the various objections
(iii) devolved into personal attacks against the Class Action
Court, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and counsel for IPC, and
(iv) amounted to a knowing and willful abuse of the judicial
process.  

The Complaint alleges that the various sanctions orders described
above are the result of a willful and malicious injury by the
Defendant to IPC which should be excepted from discharge pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. Section 523(a)(6).

IPC filed the Motion requesting judgment on the pleadings pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(c), applicable pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 7012. IPC argues that the Complaint and the attached
sanctions orders conclusively establish that the Defendant's debt
to IPC is for a willful and malicious injury.

The Defendant filed a response to the Motion pro se. In his
response, the Defendant states that the sanctions against him have
no legal basis and were the result of prejudice, fraud, bias, and a
smear campaign designed to discredit the Defendant and cover up
court errors. The Defendant further argues that his filings in the
Class Action were not willful, malicious, or vexatious.

Motion to Dismiss Standard

If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.
All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all
the material that is pertinent to the motion.

11 U.S.C. Section 523(a)(6) and Sanction Orders

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for willful and
malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property
of another entity. The United States Supreme Court has stated that
a willful and malicious injury occurs only if the actor intended
the consequences of the act, not simply the act itself and has held
that debts arising from negligent or reckless conduct do not fall
within the statutory exception.  

A willful and malicious injury can be inferred through the
circumstances surrounding the injury at issue. Failing to comply
with a court order has been found to satisfy the willful and
malicious conduct requirements of Code  523(a)(6).  

Issue Preclusion

The preclusive effect of a federal-court judgment is determined by
federal common law. The doctrine of res judicata has been described
as follows:

The preclusive effect of a judgment is defined by claim preclusion
and issue preclusion, which are collectively referred to as res
judicata. Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment
forecloses successive litigation of the very same claim, whether or
not relitigation of the claim raises the same issues as the earlier
suit. Issue preclusion, in contrast, bars successive litigation of
an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid
court determination essential to the prior judgment' even if the
issue recurs in the context of a different claim.

The Court finds that the Defendant's actions were willful as the
Defendant knew his actions were causing financial harms to IPC, and
they were malicious as they were purposeful and without just cause
or excuse. The Complaint's allegations, together with the Sanctions
Orders, warrant judgment in favor of IPC and against the
Defendant.

The Court is not persuaded by the Defendant's various arguments to
the contrary, including his attacks on the Sanctions Orders. This
is not an appellate court as to orders entered in the Class Action.
Both IPC and the Defendant were litigants in the Class Action, and
both parties had the opportunity, and indeed did, litigate the
sanctions issue. The sanctions were opposed, litigated,
adjudicated, and appealed. The Orders are final. As such, they have
preclusive effect as to all of the issues necessarily decided.
There was a legal finding that the Defendant engaged in vexatious
litigation that harmed IPC, and as such sanctions against the
Defendant were warranted and imposed.

The Defendant was further sanctioned for refusing to comply with
the Class Action Court's order requiring his deposition. The
Defendant is precluded from now rearguing the legal basis for those
orders in this Court. Also, the Defendant's arguments that he was
trying to increase the settlement award misses the critical point
that while every plaintiff seeks to increase an award, improper and
inappropriate methods to do so cannot be allowed.

Here, two courts, the Class Action Court and the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, have rejected the Defendant's arguments. All of
these factors show that the Defendant has acted willfully, that he
intended the consequence of his acts, and those acts caused the
injury and corresponding damage as found by the Class Action Court.


A full-text copy of the Bankruptcy Court's July 25, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3dodtx7 from Leagle.com.

Indirect Purchaser Class, Plaintiff, represented by Michael L.
Dallaire -- MDallaire@dickinsonwright.com -- Dickinson Wright
PLLC.

Christoper Andrews, Defendant, pro se.


CITIBANK CORP: Thomas Sues over Background Credit Reports
---------------------------------------------------------
JOSH THOMAS, an individual, the Plaintiff, vs. CITIBANK
CORPORATION, the Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-01168 (W.D. Wash.,
July 26, 2019), alleges that Citibank did not perform any actual
investigation into Thomas' disputes regarding Citibank's credit
reporting.

Mr. Thomas is an independent contractor who provides computer
programming services. In December 2013, he obtained a credit card
through Citibank. On March 22, 2019, Thomas submitted a payment to
Citibank via check in the amount of $12,728.74, which was the total
outstanding balance on the credit card.

Unfortunately, the Plaintiff's March 22, 2019 payment was
subsequently returned for insufficient funds. Upon receipt of the
check, Citibank reduced Thomas' outstanding balance to $0.00, even
though the check had yet to clear Thomas' checking account.

Thomas subsequently made additional purchases on his Citibank
credit card related to a business he is currently starting, which
raised his outstanding balance above his revolving credit limit. On
April 20, 2019, Thomas logged into his Citibank account to make a
payment.

The screen indicated that Plaintiff Thomas' minimum payment to
avoid being late was $310.65, which is the amount Plaintiff Thomas
paid. On or about April 24, 2019, Thomas received an email
notifications from two of the credit reporting agencies that there
had been a change to his credit score.

Upon reviewing the notifications, Plaintiff Thomas saw that
Citibank was reporting his account as 30 days late in the amount of
$379.00 to the credit bureaus, even though when Plaintiff Thomas
logged in on April 20, 2019 the $379.00 was not included in the
minimum due.

On or about May 9, 2019, Citibank reported to the credit bureaus
that both of Thomas' April 2019 and May 2019 payments were 30 days
past due, even though the April 2019 payment was timely made and
the May 2019 payment was not due until May 22, 2019.

Additionally, Citibank is reporting to credit bureaus that Thomas'
monthly payment is $14,001.00.

Thomas has requested Citibank to correct the information it is
reporting to the credit bureaus; however, Citibank has refused and
instead has reported that the information is disputed by Thomas.

Citibank has contacted Plaintiff Thomas multiple times in one day
and on numerous occasions has contacted with Thomas with multiple
consecutive telephone calls using different telephone numbers via
automated telephone system.

Due to the excessive robocalls Thomas has been receiving from
Citibank, Thomas has essentially been forced to ignore his cell
phone. On or about July 17, 2019, Thomas was contacted by a
Citibank representative in response to Thomas' attempt to amicably
resolve this matter. Thomas recognized the telephone number as one
he had previously called in an attempt to amicably resolve this
matter.

Citibank representative failed to take any steps to verify that the
individual he was speaking with was actually in fact Thomas. The
July 17, 2019 telephone call was recorded without Thomas' knowledge
or permission in violation of his right to privacy.

After Thomas contacted Defendant Citibank to resolve this matter
amicably, Citibank has applied excessive fees to Plaintiff Thomas'
balance in violation of the Parties’ contract, the lawsuit says.

Despite statements that it will work with Plaintiff Thomas in
resolving the credit reporting disputes, Citibank has failed to
work with Plaintiff Thomas.

Citi is an American multinational investment bank and financial
services corporation headquartered in New York City. The company
was formed by the merger of banking giant Citicorp and financial
conglomerate Travelers Group in 1998.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff is:

          Chris Rosfjord, Esq.
          ROSFJORD LAW, PLLC
          6725 22nd Ave NW
          Seattle, WA 98117
          Telephone: (206) 321-4849
          E-mail: rosfjordlaw@gmail.com

CITIBANK NA: Court Dismisses Suit Over Interest Rate Benchmarks
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order granting Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss the third amended complaint (TAC) in the case captioned
FUND LIQUIDATION HOLDINGS LLC, as assignee and
successor-in-interest to FrontPoint Asian Event Driven Fund L.P.,
on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v. CITIBANK, N.A., BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., JPMORGAN CHASE BANK,
N.A., THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND PLC, UBS AG, BNP PARIBAS, S.A.,
OVERSEA-CHINESE BANKING CORPORATION LTD., DEUTSCHE BANK AG, CREDIT
AGRICOLE CORPORATE AND INVESTMENT BANK, CREDIT SUISSE AG, STANDARD
CHARTERED BANK, DBS BANK LTD., UNITED OVERSEAS BANK LIMITED,
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP, LTD., THE BANK OF
TOKYO-MITSUBISHI UFJ, LTD., THE HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION LIMITED, AND JOHN DOES NOS. 1-50, Defendants. No. 16
Civ. 5263 (AKH). (S.D.N.Y.).

The TAC alleges a conspiracy to manipulate two interest rate
benchmarks, the Singapore Interbank Offered Rate (SIBOR) and the
Singapore Swap Offer Rate (SOR). FLH asserts claims of conspiracy
to restrain trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. Section 1 et seq., against financial institutions
participating in the rate setting process. The Plaintiff also
alleges a state law claim against two defendants, Deutsche Bank AG
and Citibank N.A., for breach of implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.

The district courts of the United States are 'courts of limited
jurisdiction.' They possess only that power authorized by
Constitution and statute. A district court properly dismisses an
action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction if the court lacks the statutory or constitutional
power to adjudicate it. The party invoking federal jurisdiction
bears the burden of establishing' prudential and constitutional
standing.

To effect a transfer of the right to bring an antitrust claim, the
transferee must expressly assign the right to bring that cause of
action, either by making specific reference to the antitrust claim
or by making an unambiguous assignment of causes of action in a
manner that would clearly encompass the antitrust claim.

In determining whether the Agreement has effectively made an
assignment of the right to bring an antitrust claim, ordinary
principles of contract law will be applied. A contract is
unambiguous when the contractual language has a definite and
precise meaning about which there is no reasonable basis for a
difference of opinion.

Terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement (APA)

In determining whether the APA is effective in assigning the claims
from FrontPoint to FLH, the Court begins with the language of the
contract. Section 1.1 of the APA provides that "FLH purchases all
of FrontPoint's right, title and interest in all of the Assets,
including, without limitation, all of [FrontPoint's] right, title
and interest in all of the Assets, now or hereafter payable
pursuant to any Recovery Rights."

The APA Does Not Effect an Assignment of Claims from FrontPoint to
FLH

First, plaintiff argues that the law of the case doctrine precludes
consideration of standing and the propriety of the claims'
assignment. As discussed, plaintiff alleged the assignment of
claims by FrontPoint to it for the first time in the TAC. The issue
was not previously decided and is properly before me now.

Next, plaintiff disputes defendants' standing to challenge the
assignment of claims under the APA. Although defendants are not
parties to the APA, such a challenge is clearly appropriate, where,
as here, defendants face legal liability based on claims asserted
pursuant to the assignment.  

Plaintiff's claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing is a cause of action in a state, common law claim
and thus explicitly excluded from the definition of Future Claims.


In order for the contract to have assigned FrontPoint's antitrust
claims arising under the Sherman Act, to FLH, the antitrust claims
must be, within the meaning of the contract, claims arising out of
a securities class action lawsuit, so as to constitute unambiguous
assignment of causes of action in a manner that would clearly
encompass the antitrust claim and those claims must not be excepted
from transfer as non-securities related claims.

The APA lacks express language transferring either antitrust claims
or all causes of action. As the APA's terms and definitions make
clear, assets and causes of action to be transferred were not total
but subject to important limitations. The APA distinguishes between
security class actions, which were subject to transfer, and any
non-security related claims, which were not.

Plaintiff urges a broad, generic reading of the term security as
employed in the contract. This interpretation of the contract is
inconsistent with the contract's terms. By invoking claims arising
out of securities class actions, the parties showed an intention to
name and transfer a specific category of causes of action, to the
exclusion of others.  Even if securities class actions could be
understood to include antitrust actions such as this one, it hardly
constitutes an unambiguous assignment required by federal law. This
understanding is further enforced by the parties' explicit
exception of any causes of action and interests in any
non-securities related claim.

Securities and antitrust claims are distinct. Absent some explicit
definition in the APA, a securities class action lawsuit is
understood as a suit arising out of the securities laws, mirroring
its use by other courts.

As plaintiff points out, the APA defines Securities broadly, to
encompass a wide array of financial instruments, but the wide scope
of securities and securities-adjacent instruments nowhere suggests
that securities class action lawsuit should also encompass
antitrust claims. While the broadly delimited term Securities is
explicitly defined by the APA, the lowercases securities class
action and non-securities related claim used to define Future
Claims are not, making security suitable for interpretation in
light of common understanding.

In further support of its interpretation of the APA, plaintiff
cites the declaration of T. A. McKinney, a former general counsel
of FrontPoint. Because the Court concludes that the terms of the
APA are unambiguous on their face, it is unnecessary and
inappropriate to apply extrinsic evidence here. The APA does not
assign the claims at issue in this case, and plaintiff lacks
standing to assert them.

Plaintiff's Substitution Under Rule 17(a)(3) Is Improper and its
Claims are Untimely

There is another reason for dismissing the TAC. Because FrontPoint
and Sonterra lacked capacity to sue, there was no real case or
controversy before the court and, consequently, no subject matter
jurisdiction. As the Second Circuit observed in dictum, In the
absence of a plaintiff with standing there is no lawsuit for the
real party in interest to ratify, join, or be substituted into
under Rule 17(a)(3) or otherwise. Whether the real party in
interest that is, Fund made a mistake by not suing originally does
not even enter into consideration. Although I gave leave to
Frontpoint and Sonterra to substitute Fund, my order could not
confer jurisdiction where it did not originally exist.

FLH, if it were a proper assignee, could file a claim of its own
that mirrored the complaint filed by Frontpoint and Sierra.
However, its complaint would be a new filing, not capable of
relating back in time to Frontpoint's and Sonterra's filing. The
four-year statute of limitations, running from no later than June
2013, would bar Fund from now filing such suit or at the time it
filed the TAC.

Because the APA does not effect the assignment of claims from
FrontPoint to FLH, plaintiff lacks standing to bring its antitrust
and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
claims. Defendants' motion to dismiss the case is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 25, 2019 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y5d5fs2l from
Leagle.com.

FrontPoint Asian Event Driven Fund, Ltd., Plaintiff, represented by
Geoffrey Milbank Horn, Lowey Dannenberg P.C. 1 N Broadway, White
PlainsNY, 10601

Sonterra Capital Master Fund, LTD. & FrontPoint Asian Event Driven
Fund, L.P., Plaintiffs, represented by Christian Levis --
clevis@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg P.C., Peter Dexter St.
Phillip, Jr., Lowey Dannenberg, P.C., Raymond Peter Girnys, Lowey
Dannenberg, P.C., Roland Raymond St. Louis, III, Lowey Dannenberg
P.C., Sitso W. Bediako, Lowey Dannenberg P.C., Vincent Briganti,
Lowey Dannenberg P.C. & Geoffrey Milbank Horn, Lowey Dannenberg
P.C., 44 S Broadway Ste 1100, White Plains, NY 10601-4459

Fund Liquidation Holdings LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Vincent
Briganti, Lowey Dannenberg P.C., Margaret Ciavarella MacLean, Lowey
Dannenberg P.C. & Geoffrey Milbank Horn, Lowey Dannenberg P.C., 44
S Broadway Ste 1100, White Plains, NY 10601-4459

Citibank, N.A., Defendant, represented by Alan M. Wiseman --
awiseman@cov.com -- Covington & Burling, L.L.P., Andrew D. Lazerow
-- alazerow@cov.com -- Covington & Burling, L.L.P., Andrew Arthur
Ruffino -- aruffino@cov.com -- Covington & Burling LLP, Jamie A.
Heine -- jheine@cov.com -- Covington & Burling, L.L.P. & Joel
Laurence Kurtzberg -- jkurtzberg@cahill.com -- Cahill Gordon &
Reindel LLP.

CitiGroup Inc., Defendant, represented by Alan M. Wiseman,
Covington & Burling, L.L.P.,Andrew D. Lazerow, Covington & Burling,
L.L.P., Andrew Arthur Ruffino, Covington & Burling LLP, Jamie A.
Heine, Covington & Burling, L.L.P. & Joel Laurence Kurtzberg,
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP.


COLGATE-PALMOLIVE: ERISA Class Suit in New York Still Ongoing
-------------------------------------------------------------
Colgate-Palmolive Company continues to defend against a class
action alleging ERISA violation, the company said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July
26, 2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019.

In June 2016, a putative class action claiming that residual
annuity payments made to certain participants in the
Colgate-Palmolive Company Employees' Retirement Income Plan (the
"Plan") did not comply with the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act was filed against the Plan, the Company and certain individuals
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York.

This action has been certified as a class action.

The relief sought includes recalculation of benefits, pre- and
post-judgment interest and attorneys' fees. The Company is
contesting this action vigorously.

Colgate-Palmolive said, "Since the amount of any potential loss
from this case currently cannot be reasonably estimated, the range
of reasonably possible losses in excess of accrued liabilities
disclosed above does not include any amount relating to the case."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Colgate-Palmolive Company, together with its subsidiaries,
manufactures and sells consumer products worldwide. The company
operates through two segments, Oral, Personal and Home Care; and
Pet Nutrition. Colgate-Palmolive Company was founded in 1806 and is
headquartered in New York, New York.


COLGATE-PALMOLIVE: Recall of Dog Food Generates 35 Class Suits
--------------------------------------------------------------
Colgate-Palmolive Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 26, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company and Hill's
Pet Nutrition have been named as defendants in 35 putative class
action lawsuits.

Colgate-Palmolive said, "During the quarter ended March 31, 2019,
Hill's Pet Nutrition (Hill's) announced a voluntary recall, which
was subsequently expanded, of select canned dog food products due
to potentially elevated levels of Vitamin D resulting from a
supplier error."

In the United States, the voluntary recall was conducted in
cooperation with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

Following the announcement of the voluntary recall, and as of June
30, 2019, Hill's and/or the Company have been named as defendants
in 35 putative class action lawsuits and one individual action
filed in various jurisdictions in the United States related to the
voluntary recall, three of which were voluntarily dismissed.

Hill's is entitled to indemnification from the supplier related to
the voluntary recall. Sales of products voluntarily recalled
represent less than 2% of Hill's annual Net sales. The sales loss
and other costs associated with the voluntary recall and subsequent
expansion did not have a material impact on the Company's Net sales
or Operating profit for the three and six months ended June 30,
2019 and are not expected to have a material impact in future
periods.

Colgate-Palmolive Company, together with its subsidiaries,
manufactures and sells consumer products worldwide. The company
operates through two segments, Oral, Personal and Home Care; and
Pet Nutrition. Colgate-Palmolive Company was founded in 1806 and is
headquartered in New York, New York.


CONSUMERS ENERGY: Gas Index Price Reporting Suit Still Ongoing
--------------------------------------------------------------
Consumers Energy Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 25, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend itself in class action suits related to gas index price
reporting.

CMS Energy, along with CMS Marketing, Services and Trading Company
(CMS MST), CMS Field Services, Cantera Natural Gas, Inc., and
Cantera Gas Company, were named as defendants in four class action
lawsuits and one individual lawsuit arising as a result of alleged
inaccurate natural gas price reporting to publications that report
trade information.

Allegations include price‑fixing conspiracies, restraint of
trade, and artificial inflation of natural gas retail prices in
Kansas, Missouri, and Wisconsin.

In 2016, CMS Energy entities reached a settlement with the
plaintiffs in the Kansas and Missouri class action cases for an
amount that was not material to CMS Energy. In 2017, the federal
district court approved the settlement.

Plaintiffs are making claims for the following: treble damages,
full consideration damages, exemplary damages, costs, interest,
and/or attorneys' fees.

After removal to federal court, all of the cases were transferred
to a single federal district court pursuant to the multidistrict
litigation process.

In 2010 and 2011, all claims against CMS Energy defendants were
dismissed by the district court based on the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, (FERC) preemption.

In 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
the district court decision. The appellate court found that FERC
preemption does not apply under the facts of these cases. The
appellate court affirmed the district court's denial of leave to
amend to add federal antitrust claims. The matter was appealed to
the U.S. Supreme Court, which in 2015 upheld the Ninth Circuit's
decision.

The cases were remanded back to the federal district court.

In 2016, the federal district court granted the defendants' motion
for summary judgment in the individual lawsuit filed in Kansas
based on a release in a prior settlement involving similar
allegations; the order of summary judgment was subsequently
appealed.

In March 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed the lower court's ruling and remanded the case back to the
federal district court.

In 2017, the federal district court denied plaintiffs' motion for
class certification in the two pending class action cases in
Wisconsin.

The plaintiffs appealed that decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit and in August 2018, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded the matter back to the federal
district court for further consideration.

In January 2019, the judge in the multidistrict litigation granted
motions filed by plaintiffs for Suggestion of Remand of the actions
back to the respective transferor courts in Wisconsin and Kansas
for further handling.

In the Kansas action, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation ordered the remand and the case is being transferred.

In the Wisconsin actions, oppositions to the remand were filed, but
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation granted the remand
in June 2019.

Consumers Energy said, "These cases involve complex facts, a large
number of similarly situated defendants with different factual
positions, and multiple jurisdictions. Presently, any estimate of
liability would be highly speculative; the amount of CMS Energy's
reasonably possible loss would be based on widely varying models
previously untested in this context. If the outcome after appeals
is unfavorable, these cases could negatively affect CMS Energy's
liquidity, financial condition, and results of operations."

Consumers Energy Company operates as an electric and gas utility in
Michigan. The company operates Electric Utility and Gas Utility
segments. The Electric Utility segment generates, purchases,
transmits, distributes, and sells electricity. The company was
founded in 1886 and is based in Jackson, Michigan. Consumers Energy
Company is a subsidiary of CMS Energy Corporation.


CORECIVIC INC: Appeals W.D. Texas Ruling in Gonzalez Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant CoreCivic, Incorporated, filed an appeal from a Court
ruling in the lawsuit titled Martha Gonzalez v. CoreCivic,
Incorporated, Case No. 1:18-CV-169, in the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Texas, Austin.

The appellate case is captioned as Martha Gonzalez v. CoreCivic,
Incorporated, Case No. 19-50691, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on July 10, 2019, the
Defendant filed an appeal from the District Court's denial of its
motion to dismiss the TVPA claim in the lawsuit.  That appellate
case is entitled Martha Gonzalez v. CoreCivic, Incorporated, Case
No. 19-90017.

The class action lawsuit was filed on February 22, 2018, arguing
that a company that manages immigrant detention centers, including
the T. Don Hutto Center in Taylor, is violating the federal
Trafficking Victims and Protection Act by forcing labor on those in
the center.

Martha Gonzalez, a Harris County resident who was formerly detained
at one center in Laredo, one in Taylor and a third center just
north of Laredo, is suing private prison company CoreCivic on
behalf of herself and "all others similarly situated."

Ms. Gonzalez's lawsuit says she was required to work at these
detention centers under threat of isolation, retaliation and other
deprivations.

"CoreCivic threatened detainees who refused to work with
confinement, physical restraint, substantial and sustained
restrictions, deprivation, violation of their liberty and solitary
confinement," the lawsuit says.  "CoreCivic made frequent examples
of individual detainees who complained or refused to work."[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee MARTHA GONZALEZ, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Josef Franz Buenker, Esq.
          BUENKER LAW FIRM
          2030 North Loop, W.
          Houston, TX 77018
          Telephone: (713) 868-3388
          E-mail: jbuenker@buenkerlaw.com

               - and -

          Iain Gordon Simpson, Esq.
          SIMPSON, P.C.
          1005 Heights Boulevard
          Houston, TX 77008
          Telephone: (281) 936-1722
          E-mail: iain@simpsonpc.com

Defendant-Appellant CORECIVIC, INCORPORATED is represented by:

          Nicholas D. Acedo, Esq.
          STRUCK LOVE BOJANOWSKI & ACEDO, P.L.C.
          3100 W. Ray Road
          Chandler, AZ 85226
          Telephone: (480) 420-1600
          E-mail: nacedo@strucklove.com


CORELOGIC INC: Feliciano Class Action in New York Ongoing
---------------------------------------------------------
CoreLogic, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 25, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company, together
with Rental Property Solutions, LLC ("RPS"), continues to defend a
putative class action suit entitled, Claudinne Feliciano, et al.,
v. CoreLogic SafeRent, LLC.

In July 2017, Rental Property Solutions, LLC ("RPS") was named as a
defendant in Claudinne Feliciano, et. al., v. CoreLogic SafeRent,
LLC, a putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York.

The named plaintiff alleges that RPS prepared a background
screening report about her that contained a record of a New York
Housing Court action without noting that the action had previously
been dismissed.

On this basis, she seeks damages under the Fair Credit Reporting
Act and the New York Fair Credit Reporting Act on behalf of herself
and a class of similarly situated consumers with respect to reports
issued during the period of July 2015 to the present.

CoreLogic said, "We have denied the claims and are defending the
case vigorously."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

CoreLogic, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, provides property
information, insight, analytics, and data-enabled solutions in
North America, Western Europe, and the Asia Pacific. The company
operates in two segments, Property Intelligence & Risk Management
Solutions (PIRM) and Underwriting & Workflow Solutions (UWS). The
company was formerly known as The First American Corporation and
changed its name to CoreLogic, Inc. in June 2010. CoreLogic, Inc.
was incorporated in 1894 and is headquartered in Irvine,
California.


COTTAGE HOMECARE: Orelus Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MARIE ORELUS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. COTTAGE HOMECARE SERVICES, INC.; KENNETH J. VILLIANI;
KAUR RUPENDER; and any other related persons and/or entities, Case
No. 2:19-cv-04271 (E.D.N.Y., July 24, 2019), seeks to recover for
unpaid wages, which the Defendants allegedly failed to pay in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Cottage Homecare Services, Inc. is a New York corporation with a
principal place of business in Hicksville, New York.  The
Individual Defendants are owners and/or principals of Cottage.

Cottage is a home health agency.  Home health care agencies offer
wide range of health care services that can be given in your home
for an illness or injury.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Laura R. Reznick, Esq.
          Jonathan R. Bell, Esq.
          BELL LAW GROUP, PLLC
          100 Quentin Roosevelt Boulevard, Suite 208
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 280-3008
          Facsimile: (212) 656-1845
          E-mail: lr@belllg.com
                  jb@belllg.com


DAMIANI LAW: Denial of Third Party Claim in Bailey Suit Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GARRY A. BAILEY et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v.
CHARLES EVERETTE ROSE, Defendant, DAMIANI LAW GROUP, APC et al.,
Third Party Claimants and Appellants, Case No. H044788 (Cal. App.),
Judge Adrienne M. Grover of the Court of Appeals of California,
Sixth District, affirmed the trial court's order denying Damiani's
third party claim and releasing funds to the Respondents.

The Plaintiffs and class representatives Garry and Brooke Bailey
sued Charles Everette Rose and others for operating a scheme to
collect advance fees for purported loan modification services.  The
Plaintiffs won a multi-million-dollar default judgment in December
2013, which the Court affirmed.

In February 2015, the Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Judgment Lien
against Charles with the California Secretary of State.  Charles
appeared for a debtor's examination in October 2016, and the
following month the Plaintiffs served a levy under a writ of
execution on JP Morgan Chase Bank, with the San Diego County
Sheriff acting as levying officer.  The Plaintiffs' levy revealed a
deposit account in the name of Charles's wife, Amber Rose, with a
balance of $43,736, and created an execution lien on the account
under Code of Civil Procedure section 697.710.  Charles' former
legal counsel, Damiani Law Group, served a notice with the levying
officer claiming a superior right to the deposit account based on a
security interest purportedly created in December 2013.

The Plaintiffs petitioned as judgment creditors to the trial court
to adjudicate Damiani's third-party claim.  Damiani argued that it
had perfected a security interest in the account through its
December 2013 UCC-1 filing despite Charles's name being entered
incorrectly on the financing statement, which was not corrected
until November 2015.  Damiani argued its security interest attached
to the deposited funds because they are "identifiable proceeds of
original collateral" securing the retainer agreement between
Charles and Damiani.  

Amber sought an order under Family Code section 911 shielding the
deposit account from Charles's creditors based on her status as the
spouse of a judgment debtor.  The trial court issued a notice two
days before the scheduled hearing "confirming" that Amber's claim
of exemption was improperly filed and was therefore not on the
hearing calendar.

After hearing argument from the parties and allowing input from
Amber's attorney, the trial court ruled that Family Code section
911 did not protect the deposit account from the judgment lien
because some causes of action underlying the judgment were
statutory; thus, Charles did not incur the resulting debt until
entry of the judgment in December 2013, which was after his July
2013 marriage to Amber.  The court ruled that the judgment lien
attached to the deposit account under Code of Civil Procedure
section 697.530, subdivision (a)(1) as proceeds from the accounts
receivable of Amber's business.  The lien filed in February 2015
took priority over Damiani's security interest, which was not
perfected until Damiani amended its faulty financing statement in
November 2015.  Damiani and Amber have both appealed.

Damiani contends the debt reflected in the Plaintiffs' judgment was
incurred by Charles before he married Amber in July 2013.
According to Damiani, Amber's deposit account is not liable for
that debt by operation of Family Code section 911, but it is
subject to Damiani's security interest in community property assets
pledged as collateral in the December 2013 agreement securing
Charles' payment of Damiani's fees.  Damiani argues that the
judgment lien does not attach to the deposited funds for the
additional reason that the funds are not proceeds from an interest
in personal property subject to a judgment lien under Code of Civil
Procedure section 697.530.  Even if the deposit account is subject
to the judgment lien, Damiani alternatively argues that its
security interest was perfected when Charles signed the agreement
in December 2013 (not November 2015 when the UCC-1 was corrected),
which would give it priority over the February 2015 judgment lien.

Judge Grover opines that Charles' liability under the fourth cause
of action is not a debt incurred "in the case of" a contract or
tort under Family Code section 903, subdivisions (a) and (b).  The
debt was "incurred" at the time of the obligation under Family Code
section 903, subdivision (c).  Charles' obligation under the fourth
cause of action arose when judgment was entered in December 2013,
during his marriage to Amber.  Accordingly, Family Code section
911, which could protect Amber's earnings from Charles's
pre-marital debt, does not apply in the case.  Because she
concludes that by virtue of the fourth cause of action Charles's
debt was incurred during his marriage to Amber, the Judge need not
decide whether contract or tort obligations arose from the other
causes of action, nor whether a third-party claimant such as
Damiani who is not the debtor's spouse may claim the spousal
earnings exception under Family Code section 911 for its own
benefit.

The Judge also opines that substantial evidence in the record
supports the trial court's characterization of the funds as
traceable revenue from Amber's company.  Even if the funds also
come within the definition of earnings under Family Code section
911, subdivision (b)(2), they would still be "accounts receivable"
and subject to the judgment lien.  The funds in the deposit account
were adequately traced to Amber Rose Holdings' accounts receivable
to support the trial court's determination.

Given her conclusion that the judgment lien takes priority over
Damiani's security interest, it is unnecessary for her to address
the parties' dispute as to the scope and reach of the security
interest.

Finally, to the extent Amber opposes the characterization of her
business and its revenues as community property, the argument lacks
merit.  Relying on Amber's declaration, her attorney argued to the
trial court that the funds in the deposit account were not
community property because Charles was not a signatory on the
account and the funds were not comingled.  The trial court rejected
that argument based on Family Code section 24760 which states that
all property acquired by a married person during marriage is
community property.  It noted that Amber Rose Holdings began to
realize profits in 2015 (during the marriage), so the resulting
funds deposited into the levied account were community property.
Amber's declaration establishes that her company profits are
community property, and the company itself is also presumed to be
community property.

In light of the foregoing, Judge Grover affirmed the order denying
Damiani's third party claim and releasing funds to the Respondents.
Costs on appeal are awarded to the Respondents.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 28, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/P0N0nc from Leagle.com.


DAUPHINS LLC: Servers Hit Unpaid Overtime and Withheld Tips
-----------------------------------------------------------
Tara Boothe and Jutta Mayland on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Dauphins, LLC and Aloha
Hospitality International, Inc. and Robert Baumhower Defendants,
Case No. 19-cv-00408 (S.D. Ala., July 19, 2019), seekd to recover
unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation, monetary damages,
liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, and costs, including
reasonable attorneys' fees as required by the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

Defendants operate as "Dauphins," a restaurant located at 107 St.
Francis St., Suite 3400, Mobile where Boothe and Mayland worked as
servers. They claim to be denied overtime pay and subjected to an
illegal tip pool. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Robert C. Epperson, Esq.
      ROBERT EPPERSON LAW OFFICE
      Foley, AL 36536-0477
      Tel: (251) 943-8870
      Email: repperson@rcelaw.com

             - and -

      Sam J. Smith, Esq.
      Loren B. Donnell, Esq.
      BURR & SMITH, LLP
      111 2nd Avenue N.E., Suite 1100
      St. Petersburg, FL 33701
      Tel: (813) 253-2010
      Email: ssmith@burrandsmithlaw.com
             ldonnell@burrandsmith.com


DISCOVER BANK: Ward et al. Suit Moved to D. South Carolina
----------------------------------------------------------
The case, Harold C. Ward, Carol Rogers, Langdon Erwin, Antonio
Bates, Clyde Smith, Toney McCallum, Benjamin Drakeford, AJohn
Rosier, Azilee Boykin, Bobby Wilson, Gene Moore, Michael Powell,
and Jeanette Vinson, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. Discover Bank, the
Defendant, Case No. 2019-CP-40-03395, was removed from the Richland
County Court of Common Pleas, to the U.S. District Court for the
District of South Carolina (Columbia) on July 29, 2019. The
District of South Carolina Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:19-cv-02124-MGL to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Mary Geiger Lewis.

Discover Bank is an Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insured
online bank with numerous options, including a debit card that
offers cash back rewards.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          David Andrew Maxfield, Esq.
          DAVID MAXFIELD ATTORNEY LLC
          PO Box 11865
          Columbia, SC 29211
          Telephone: (803) 509-6800
          Facsimile: (855) 299-1656
          E-mail: dave@consumerlawsc.com

               - and -

          Herbert W Louthian , Jr
          LOUTHIAN AND LOUTHIAN
          PO Box 1299
          Columbia, SC 29202
          Telephone: (803) 256-4274
          Facsimile: (803) 256-6033
          E-mail: bert@louthianlaw.com

Attorneys for the Defendant are:

          David Alan Elliott, Esq.
          BURR AND FORMAN LLP
          3000 Southtrust Tower
          420 N 20th Street, Suite 3400
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Telephone: (205) 251-3000
          Facsimile: (205) 458-5100
          E-mail: delliott@burr.com

DOMETIC GROUP: Florida Court Dismisses Class-Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Amelia Arvesen, writing for Snews Net, reports that a Florida
district court dismissed a class-action lawsuit against Dometic, an
RV refrigerator and cooler manufacturer, that alleged that certain
products corrode, leak gas, and pose a fire risk.

Dometic is a popular brand among RVers because the fridges hook up
to a vehicle's gas absorption.  The brand also makes
electric-powered coolers, appealing to overlanders, and vanlifers.

Eighteen individuals led the charge against the Swedish company,
not based on fires or damage to property, but for paying a "premium
price that they otherwise would not have paid" had they known about
the defect. Models named in the lawsuit are all fridges, not
coolers. They cost anywhere from $500 to more than $4,000, and are
typically bought through RV dealers and makers.

Ultimately, the Court for the Southern District of Florida ruled
that the allegations of a "common defect" were not susceptible to
class-wide treatment, especially since nobody had suffered
injuries.

"I am pleased to see the ruling to dismiss the class action
lawsuit. We have all along remained firm in the position that the
allegations in the consolidated case were without merit," Dometic
President and CEO Juan Vargues said in a news release.

Dometic's lawyers argued that "all refrigerators will eventually
leak within their useful life," meaning that some "refrigerators
will likely last their full useful life."

This is the second time that a court has rejected class-wide
allegations against Dometic for its gas-absorption refrigerators.
In 2017, a similar suit also in Florida was dismissed because
individuals didn't establish the existence of a defect. [GN]


EAGLE BANCORP: Bernstein Liebhard Files Securities Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard LLP, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law
firm, announces that a securities class action lawsuit has been
filed on behalf of shareholders of Eagle Bancorp Inc. (EGBN)
between March 2, 2015 and July 17, 2019, both dates inclusive.  The
lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York and seeks to recover damages for
Eagle Bancorp investors under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

If you purchased Eagle Bancorp securities, and/or would like to
discuss your legal rights and options please visit Eagle Bancorp
Shareholder Class Action Lawsuit or contact Matthew E. Guarnero
toll free at (877) 779-1414 or MGuarnero@bernlieb.com

According to the lawsuit, the Defendants made materially false and
misleading statements regarding the Company's business, operational
and compliance policies.  Specifically, Defendants made false
and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i)
Eagle Bancorp's internal controls and procedures and compliance
policies were inadequate; (ii) the foregoing shortcoming created a
foreseeable risk of heightened regulatory scrutiny and the need for
the Company to undertake its own internal investigations; and (iii)
as a result, the Company's public statements were materially false
and misleading at all relevant times.

On July 17, 2019, Eagle Bancorp disclosed rising legal costs from
ongoing internal and government investigations of "the Company's
identification, classification and disclosure of related party
transactions; the retirement of certain former officers and
directors; and the relationship of the Company and certain of its
former officers and directors with a local public official."

On this news, Eagle Bancorp's stock price fell $14.30 per share, or
26.75%, to close at $39.15 per share on July 18, 2019.

If you purchased EGBN securities, and/or would like to discuss your
legal rights and options please visit https://is.gd/Bw6gKw or
contact Matthew E. Guarnero toll free at (877) 779-1414 or
MGuarnero@bernlieb.com.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the court no
later than September 23, 2019.  A lead plaintiff is a
representative party acting on behalf of other class members in
directing the litigation. Your ability to share in any recovery
doesn't require that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you take no
action, you may remain an absent class member.

Since 1993, Bernstein Liebhard LLP has recovered over $3.5 billion
for its clients. In addition to representing individual investors,
the Firm has been retained by some of the largest public and
private pension funds in the country to monitor their assets and
pursue litigation on their behalf. As a result of its success
litigating hundreds of lawsuits and class actions, the Firm has
been named to The National Law Journal's "Plaintiffs' Hot List"
thirteen times and listed in The Legal 500 for ten consecutive
years.

Contact Information:

         Matthew E. Guarnero, Esq.
         Bernstein Liebhard LLP
         Website: https://www.bernlieb.com
         Tel.No.: (877) 779-1414
         Email: MGuarnero@bernlieb.com [GN]


EAGLE BANCORP: Gainey McKenna Files Securities Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Gainey McKenna & Egleston announces that a class action lawsuit has
been filed against Eagle Bancorp, Inc. (Nasdaq: EGBN) in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York on
behalf of those who purchased or acquired the securities of Eagle
between March 2, 2015 through July 17, 2019, inclusive (the "Class
Period"), seeking to recover damages caused by Defendants'
violations of the federal securities laws and to pursue remedies
under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

The Complaint alleges Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) Eagle's internal
controls and procedures and compliance policies were inadequate;
(2) the foregoing shortcoming created a foreseeable risk of
heightened regulatory scrutiny and the need for Eagle to undertake
its own internal investigations; and (3) as a result, Eagle's
public statements were materially false and misleading at all
relevant times. When the true details entered the market, the
lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

Investors who purchased or otherwise acquired shares during the
Class Period should contact the Firm prior to the September 23,
2019 lead plaintiff motion deadline.  A lead plaintiff is a
representative party acting on behalf of other class members in
directing the litigation.  If you wish to discuss your rights or
interests regarding this class action, please contact Thomas J.
McKenna, Esq. or Gregory M. Egleston, Esq. of Gainey McKenna &
Egleston at (212) 983-1300, or via e-mail at tjmckenna@gme-law.com
or gegleston@gme-law.com.

Please visit the website at http://www.gme-law.com/for more
information about the firm.
[GN]


EAGLE BANCORP: Rosen Law Files Securities Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announces the
filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Eagle Bancorp, Inc. (NASDAQ: EGBN) from March 2, 2015
through July 17, 2019, inclusive.  The lawsuit seeks to recover
damages for Eagle investors under the federal securities laws.

To join the Eagle class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1629.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Eagle's internal controls and procedures and compliance
policies were inadequate; (2) the foregoing shortcoming created a
foreseeable risk of heightened regulatory scrutiny and the need for
Eagle to undertake its own internal investigations; and (3) as a
result, Eagle's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times. When the true details entered the
market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than September
23, 2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If you
wish to join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1629.htmlor to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013. Rosen Law Firm has secured hundreds of
millions of dollars for investors.

Contact:

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
         New York, NY 10016
         Tel: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Website: www.rosenlegal.com
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com
                cases@rosenlegal.com [GN]


EDISON INTERNATIONAL: Thomas & Koenigstein Fire Triggers 191 Suits
------------------------------------------------------------------
Edison International said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 25, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company is aware of
at least 191 lawsuits, representing approximately 3,000 plaintiffs,
related to the Thomas and Koenigstein Fires naming the company as a
defendant.

In December 2017, wind-driven wildfires impacted portions of SCE's
service territory, causing substantial damage to both residential
and business properties and service outages for SCE customers. The
Ventura County Fire Department (VCFD) and the California Department
of
Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) have determined that the
largest of the 2017 fires originated on December 4, 2017, in the
Anlauf Canyon area of Ventura County (the investigating agencies
refer to this fire as the "Thomas Fire"), followed shortly
thereafter by the Koenigstein Fire.

According to CAL FIRE information, the Thomas and Koenigstein Fires
burned over 280,000 acres, destroyed or damages an estimated 1,343
structures and resulted in two fatalities.

As of July 22, 2019, SCE was aware of at least 191 lawsuits,
representing approximately 3,000 plaintiffs, related to the Thomas
and Koenigstein Fires naming SCE as a defendant. Ninety of these
lawsuits also name Edison International as a defendant based on its
ownership and alleged control of SCE. At least four of the lawsuits
were filed as purported class actions. The lawsuits, which have
been filed in the superior courts of Ventura, Santa Barbara and Los
Angeles Counties allege, among other things, negligence, inverse
condemnation, trespass, private nuisance, and violations of the
public utilities and health and safety codes. The lawsuits have
been coordinated in the Los Angeles Superior Court. Three
categories of plaintiffs have filed lawsuits against SCE and Edison
International relating to the Thomas Fire, Koenigstein Fire and
Montecito Mudslides: individual plaintiffs, subrogation plaintiffs
and public entity plaintiffs.

An initial jury trial for a limited number of plaintiffs, sometimes
referred to as a bellwether jury trial, on certain fire only
matters is scheduled for January 13, 2020.

Edison International, through its subsidiaries, engages in the
generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity in the
United States. It generates electricity through hydroelectric,
diesel/liquid petroleum gas, natural gas, nuclear, and photovoltaic
sources. Edison International was founded in 1886 and is based in
Rosemead, California. Edison International, incorporated on April
20, 1987, is the holding company of Southern California Edison
Company (SCE).


ENDOCHOICE HOLDINGS: Ga. App. Affirms Raczewski Class Certification
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Elizabeth Gobeil of the Court of Appeals of Georgia, Third
Division, affirmed the Superior Court of Fulton County's grant of
class certification in the case, ENDOCHOICE HOLDINGS, INC. et al.
v. KENNETH T. RACZEWSKI et al. J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES, LLC et al.
v. KENNETH T. RACZEWSKI et al, A19A0151, A19A0152 (Ga. App.).

In the securities fraud action, Raczewski and Jesse L. Bauer sued
EndoChoice and certain of its executives and directors, together
with J.P. Morgan Securities, LLC, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, &
Smith, Inc., William Blair and Co., LLC, and Stifel, Nicolaus, &
Company, Inc., for violations of the Securities Act of 19332 in
connection with EndoChoice's 2015 initial public offering ("IPO").

EndoChoice is a medical device company specializing in products
used by gastrointestinal medical providers.  Its principal place of
business is in Alpharetta, Georgia.  EndoChoice's IPO took place on
June 5, 2015.  In connection with the IPO, EndoChoice filed a
registration statement on Form S-1 and Form S-1/A and a Prospectus
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, offering 6.35
million shares of EndoChoice common stock at a price of $15 per
share.  The offering materials highlighted the "Fuse" endoscopy
system, EndoChoice's "flagship" product.  The offering materials
also detailed EndoChoice's "world-class" sales force and a second
generation version of the Fuse system.

On Nov. 5, 2015, EndoChoice reported its results for the third
quarter of 2015, announcing that it had sold 21 Fuse units, a
number that fell short of the projected 26-27 units.  EndoChoice's
stock price fell from $10.28 to $8.01 per share after this news.
Dollowing a series of public disclosures about the company's
continued failure to meet projected sales goals, EndoChoice shares
closed at $5.09 per share as of July 15, 2016.  Thereafter, on
Sept. 27, 2016, it agreed to be acquired by Boston Scientific for
$8 per share.  The merger closed in November of 2016.

Bauer purchased 50 shares of EndoChoice stock on June 5, 2015, for
$14.50 per share, and 50 shares on June 9, 2015, for $19 per share.
He sold his shares on Nov. 21, 2016, at a price of $8 per share.
Raczewski purchased 750 shares of EndoChoice stock on June 10,
2015, for $17.40 per share.  He sold his shares on Oct. 12, 2016,
at a price of $7.97 per share.

Bauer and Raczewski filed the underlying complaint under Sections
11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, alleging that
the offering materials contained material misrepresentations and
omissions in violation of the federal securities laws.  The
Plaintiffs allege the decline in sales was known at the time of the
IPO and that the Defendants failed to disclose this information.
The Plaintiffs allege that under § 11, the defendants are strictly
liable for any material misrepresentations or omissions in the
offering materials.  They further allege the Defendants breached
their affirmative duty to provide adequate disclosures about risks,
adverse conditions, and market uncertainties, thereby violating 17
CFR Section 229.303(a)(3) (ii).

The Plaintiffs contend their damages are traceable to the offering
materials' allegedly false or misleading information pertaining to
the quality and design of the Fuse system, the ability of
EndoChoice's sales force to effectively market and sell the Fuse
system, and the availability of the second generation Fuse system.
They proposed a class of persons or entities who were damaged by
purchasing or acquiring common stock pursuant or traceable to
EndoChoice's June 5, 2015 IPO.

The Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification on May 30,
2017.  The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion on Jan.
24, 2018.  At the hearing, the parties stipulated that the putative
class satisfied the numerosity requirement of OCGA Section
9-11-23(a)(1), the commonality requirement of OCGA Section
9-11-23(a)(2), and the superiority requirement of OCGA Section
9-11-23(b)(3).  The trial court concluded that the Plaintiffs
satisfied the typicality, adequacy, and predominance requirements
necessary to proceed on behalf of the proposed class.  The trial
court limited the class to those who purchased shares of EndoChoice
common stock prior to Aug. 3, 2016.

The Defendants appeal, arguing that the trial court abused its
discretion in certifying the class under OCGA Section 9-11-23(a)(4)
and (b)(3).

After a review of the record, Judge Gobeil finds no abuse of
discretion in the trial court's ruling that Bauer and Raczewski are
the adequate representatives of the class.  There is no evidence in
the record that any potential Seon ct12 claimants have come
forward, or that any putative class members with standing to bring
such claims would be willing to represent the class.  Moreover, the
Defendants have failed to show that the Plaintiffs' abandonment of
their Section 12(a)(2) claims renders them inadequate to pursue
Sections 11 and 15 claims on behalf of the class.

In addition, the Judge finds that common legal issues of whether
EndoChoice's offering materials contained material misstatements or
omissions will predominate over the question of whether some
investors may have had knowledge of corrective disclosures.  She
concludes that the trial court did not err in ruling that
individual considerations do not predominate over those relevant to
the entire class.  Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that the Plaintiffs satisfied the
predominance requirement of OCGA Section 9-11-23(b)(3).

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Gobeil affirmed the trial court's
order granting class certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 28, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/NNwZbx from Leagle.com.

Benjamin Lee -- benjamin.lee@cliffordchance.com -- for Appellant.

Michael R. Smith -- MSmith@HandPonist.com -- for Appellant.

Srimath S. Subasinghe -- ssubasinghe@kslaw.com -- for Appellant.

David Andrew Bain -- dbain@bain-law.com -- for Appellee.

William C. Fredericks, for Appellee.

Shannon L. Hopkins -- shopkins@zlk.com -- for Appellee.


ENTREVOICE VIRTUAL: Court Denies Hobbs Class Certification
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Georgia, Columbus Division, issued an Order denying Plaintiffs'
Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned KEITH HOBBS
and JEREMY JACKSON, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. ENTREVOICE VIRTUAL SOLUTIONS, INC. and
JOSELYN CORNEJO, Defendants. Case No. 4:18-CV-247 (CDL). (M.D.
Ga.)

The Plaintiffs ask the Court to certify the class identified in
their complaint before entering default judgment.

Plaintiffs Keith Hobbs and Jeremy Jackson filed this class action
complaint against Entrevoice Virtual Solutions, Inc. and its CEO,
Joselyn Cornejo. They allege that Entrevoice and Cornejo violated
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), by making autodialed
solicitations to cellular telephone numbers. Because neither
Entrevoice nor Cornejo answered or otherwise defended in this
action.

Neither Entrevoice nor Cornejo is a resident of Georgia. The Court
may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant
only if (1) jurisdiction is appropriate under the long-arm statute
of Georgia the state where the Court sits and (2) the exercise of
jurisdiction does not violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that
individuals have fair warning that a particular activity may
subject them to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.

Defendants' Contacts with Georgia

Because no discovery has been conducted in this action, the Court's
jurisdiction decision is based upon the factual allegations in
Plaintiffs' complaint, which the Court accepts as true given that
Defendants are in default.

Here, Plaintiffs allege that Cornejo and Entrevoice had three
contacts with Georgia. The first contact is Entrevoice's autodialed
phone call to the Georgia Plaintiff who has a cell phone number
with a Georgia area code (706).  The Georgia Plaintiff hung up on
this call after a man named Robert with Entrevoice came on the
line. There is no allegation that Cornejo placed that call. The
second contact is Cornejo's subsequent follow-up call to the
Georgia Plaintiff advertising Entrevoice services. There is no
allegation that this phone call violated the TCPA. The third
contact is Cornejo's follow-up email to the Georgia Plaintiff.
There is no allegation that this email violated the TCPA.

Personal Jurisdiction Over Cornejo

Even if these minimal contacts satisfy Georgia's long-arm statute,
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Cornejo based on these
limited contacts would offend due process. Plaintiffs allege no
facts to support general jurisdiction over Cornejo. It appears
undisputed that her domicile is not Georgia. Therefore,
jurisdiction can only be exercised over her if the Court has
specific jurisdiction arising from the claims against her in this
action.

Here, the only contacts that Plaintiffs allege Cornejo herself
purposefully made with Georgia are her follow-up phone call and
email to the Georgia Plaintiff. Both these contacts occurred after
the Georgia Plaintiff suffered the harm underlying his cause of
action in this case receiving the first phone call which was an
autodialed solicitation from another Entrevoice
employee.1Therefore, Cornejo's follow-up phone call and email were
not the but-for cause of the Georgia Plaintiff's harm; thus
Cornejo's contacts with Georgia do not arise out of or relate to
Plaintiffs' cause of action.

Accordingly, the Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over
Cornejo, and Plaintiffs' claims against her must be dismissed.

Personal Jurisdiction Over Entrevoice

Based on the allegations in Plaintiffs' complaint, the Court finds
that it can exercise personal jurisdiction over Entrevoice. Those
factual allegations, which are taken as true given Entrevoice's
default, establish that Entrevoice transacted business in Georgia,
Entrevoice's violations of the TCPA and corresponding harm to the
Georgia Plaintiff arose directly from that transaction of business,
and Entrevoice purposefully directed its conduct at Georgia by
using an autodialer to call a cell phone with a Georgia area code.


Plaintiffs' Pending Motion for Class Certification

Plaintiffs' pending motion for class certification seeks
certification of a class with claims against both Cornejo and
Entrevoice. In light of today's ruling dismissing one of the class
Defendants, this class cannot be certified. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs' pending motion for class certification is denied.
However, today's Order does not prevent Plaintiffs from pursuing
their class claims against Entrevoice. If Plaintiffs wish to pursue
class certification of those claims, Plaintiffs shall file an
amended motion for class certification as to Entrevoice only within
twenty-one days of today's Order.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' claims against Cornejo are dismissed
for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the Plaintiffs' pending
motion for class certification is denied.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 25, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y6tpgeeh from Leagle.com.

KEITH HOBBS, invidually and on behalf of other similarly situated &
JEREMY JACKSON, invidually and on behalf of other similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, represented by ANTHONY I. PARONICH --
anthony@paronichlaw.com -- & STEVEN H. KOVAL, 3575 Piedmont Road
Northeast, Ste 120 Bldg. 15, Atlanta, GA 30324.


EQT CORP: Kay Company Class Settlement Gets Final Approval
----------------------------------------------------------
EQT Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 25, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that a final order has been
entered approving the settlement in the class action suit entitled,
Kay Company, LLC, et al. v. EQT Production Company, et al., United
States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia.

On January 16, 2013, several royalty owners who had entered into
leases with EQT Production Company, a subsidiary of the Company,
filed a gas royalty class action lawsuit in the Circuit Court of
Doddridge County, West Virginia.

The suit alleged that EQT Production Company and a number of
related companies, including the Company, EQT Energy, LLC, EQT
Investments Holdings, LLC, EQM Midstream Partners, LP (the
Company's former midstream affiliate) and Equitrans Gathering
Holdings, LLC (formerly known as EQT Gathering Holdings, LLC, and a
former subsidiary of the Company), failed to pay royalties on the
fair value of the gas produced from the leases and took improper
post-production deductions from the royalties paid.

The plaintiffs sought more than $100 million (according to expert
reports) in compensatory damages, punitive damages, and other
relief.

On May 31, 2013, the defendants removed the lawsuit to federal
court. On September 6, 2017, the district court granted the
plaintiffs' motion to certify the class and granted the plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment, finding that EQT Production Company
and its marketing affiliate EQT Energy, LLC are alter egos of one
another.

The defendants sought immediate appeal of the class certification.
On November 30, 2017, the Court of Appeals declined the request for
an immediate review.

On February 13, 2019, the Company announced that it and the other
defendants reached a tentative settlement agreement with the class
representatives.

Pursuant to the terms of the proposed settlement agreement, the
Company agreed to pay $53.5 million into a settlement fund
established to disburse payments to class participants (the
Qualified Settlement Fund), and stop taking future post production
deductions on leases that are determined by the Court to not permit
deductions.

The Company and the class representatives also agreed that future
royalty payments will be based on a clearly defined index pricing
methodology. The tentative settlement agreement was subject to
Court approval and achieving a threshold minimum percentage of
participation by the class members.

The Court preliminarily approved the settlement on February 13,
2019. Each class member had until May 17, 2019 to elect to opt-out
of the settlement. Less than 1% of the class members elected to
opt-out of the settlement.

The final approval hearing was held on June 24, 2019 and the Court
orally granted final approval of the settlement.

All money owed by the Company under the settlement agreement was
paid by the Company into the Qualified Settlement Fund on July 8,
2019.

A final Order approving the settlement was issued on July 22, 2019,
and all royalty claims (other than those that elected to opt-out of
the settlement or that are excluded as part of the settlement
agreement) for the class period, which spans from 2009 through
2017, have been resolved.

EQT Corporation operates as a natural gas production company in the
United States. It produces natural gas, natural gas liquids (NGLs),
and crude oil. The company was founded in 1925 and is headquartered
in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.


EQUIFAX INC: Appeal in Saskatchewan Cybersecurity Suit Ongoing
--------------------------------------------------------------
Equifax Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 25, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that the Court's order staying a case in
Saskatchewan related to a 2017 cybersecurity incident is under
appeal.

Eight Canadian class actions, six of which are on behalf of a
national class of approximately 19,000 Canadian consumers, have
been filed against us in Ontario, Saskatchewan, Quebec, British
Columbia and Alberta.

Each of the proposed Canadian class actions asserts a number of
common law and statutory claims seeking monetary damages and other
related relief in connection with the 2017 cybersecurity incident.


The plaintiffs in each case seek class certification/authorization
on behalf of Canadian consumers whose personal information was
allegedly impacted by the 2017 cybersecurity incident.

In some cases, plaintiffs also seek class certification on behalf
of Canadian consumers who had contracts for subscription products
with Equifax around the time of the incident.

"All purported class actions are at preliminary stages, and we are
opposing class certification or authorization in cases where such
motions are pending," the Company said.

In addition, one of the cases in Ontario as well as the
Saskatchewan case have been stayed.

The Court's order staying the Saskatchewan case is on appeal.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Equifax Inc. provides information solutions and human resources
business process outsourcing services for businesses, governments,
and consumers. The company operates through four segments: U.S.
Information Solutions (USIS), International, Workforce Solutions,
and Global Consumer Solutions. Equifax Inc. was founded in 1899 and
is headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia.


EQUIFAX INC: Consolidated Securities Class Suit in Georgia Ongoing
------------------------------------------------------------------
Equifax Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 25, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to defend a
consolidated securities class action suit in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

A consolidated putative class action lawsuit alleging violations of
certain federal securities laws in connection with statements and
alleged omissions regarding the company's cybersecurity systems and
controls is pending against the company and its former Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia.

The consolidated complaint seeks certification of a class of all
persons who purchased or otherwise acquired Equifax securities from
February 25, 2016 through September 15, 2017 and unspecified
monetary damages, costs and attorneys' fees.

The Company moved to dismiss the consolidated class action
complaint in its entirety. On January 28, 2019, the court dismissed
claims against certain individual defendants and claims challenging
certain statements, but allowed other claims against Equifax and
its former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer to proceed.

Pursuant to scheduling and case management orders issued by the
court, pre-trial proceedings, including discovery between the
parties, are moving forward on the remaining claims.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Equifax Inc. provides information solutions and human resources
business process outsourcing services for businesses, governments,
and consumers. The company operates through four segments: U.S.
Information Solutions (USIS), International, Workforce Solutions,
and Global Consumer Solutions. Equifax Inc. was founded in 1899 and
is headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia.


EQUIFAX INC: Data Breach Suits in Fulton County, Georgia Stayed
---------------------------------------------------------------
Equifax Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 25, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that the Fulton County Business Court has
stayed the single and consolidated class action lawsuit over data
breach.

Four putative class actions arising from a 2017 cybersecurity
incident were filed against the Company in Fulton County Superior
Court and Fulton County State Court in Georgia based on similar
allegations and theories as alleged in the U.S. consumer class
actions pending in the MDL Court and seek monetary damages,
injunctive relief and other related relief on behalf of Georgia
citizens.

These cases have been transferred to a single judge in the Fulton
County Business Court and three of the cases were consolidated into
a single action.

On July 27, 2018, the Fulton County Business Court granted the
Company's motion to stay the remaining single case, and on August
17, 2018, the Fulton County Business Court granted the Company's
motion to stay the consolidated case.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Equifax Inc. provides information solutions and human resources
business process outsourcing services for businesses, governments,
and consumers. The company operates through four segments: U.S.
Information Solutions (USIS), International, Workforce Solutions,
and Global Consumer Solutions. Equifax Inc. was founded in 1899 and
is headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia.


EQUIFAX INC: Final Settlement Approval Hearing Set for Sept. 13
---------------------------------------------------------------
Equifax Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 25, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that a hearing to consider final approval of
the settlement in Mark William Thomas, et al. v. Equifax
Information Services LLC, has been set for September 13, 2019.

Equifax has been named as a defendant in 19 putative class action
lawsuits pending in federal courts across the country relating to
its reporting of civil judgments and tax liens on consumers' credit
files.

In October 2018, Equifax and the plaintiffs' attorneys who filed
the lawsuits reached an agreement in principle to settle the public
records-related claims at issue on behalf of a nationwide class of
consumers and we accrued an estimate of $18.5 million for our
liability for these matters in the third quarter of 2018.

The amount accrued represents the company's best estimate of the
liability related to this matter. The parties have filed notices of
settlement in the pending lawsuits, and on April 17, 2019, the
plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary approval of the
nationwide class action settlement in the case titled Mark William
Thomas, et al. v. Equifax Information Services LLC.

On May 14, 2019, the court preliminarily approved the settlement
and scheduled a final approval hearing for September 13, 2019.

Equifax Inc. said, "If the settlement is not finally approved by
the court, Equifax believes it has valid defenses to each of these
actions and will continue to defend against them."

Equifax Inc. provides information solutions and human resources
business process outsourcing services for businesses, governments,
and consumers. The company operates through four segments: U.S.
Information Solutions (USIS), International, Workforce Solutions,
and Global Consumer Solutions. Equifax Inc. was founded in 1899 and
is headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia.


EQUIFAX INC: Settlement Reached in U.S. Consumer MDL Litigation
---------------------------------------------------------------
Equifax Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 25, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that the Company has entered into a settlement
agreement in the case entitled, In re: Equifax, Inc. Customer Data
Security Breach Litigation, MDL No. 2800.

In 2017, the company experienced a cybersecurity incident following
a criminal attack on the company's systems that involved the theft
of certain personally identifiable information of U.S., Canadian
and U.K. consumers.

Criminals exploited a software vulnerability in a U.S. website
application to gain unauthorized access to the company's network.
In March 2017, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security distributed
a notice concerning the software vulnerability. The company
undertook efforts to identify and remediate vulnerable systems;
however, the vulnerability in the website application that was
exploited was not identified by the company's security processes.

The company discovered unusual network activity in late July 2017
and upon discovery promptly investigated the activity. Once the
activity was identified as potential unauthorized access, the
company acted to stop the intrusion and engaged a leading,
independent cybersecurity firm to conduct a forensic investigation
to determine the scope of the unauthorized access, including the
specific information potentially impacted. Based on the company's
forensic investigation, the unauthorized access occurred from
mid-May through July 2017.

Hundreds of class actions were filed against the company in federal
and state courts relating to the 2017 cybersecurity incident. The
plaintiffs in these cases, who purport to represent various classes
of U.S. consumers and small businesses, generally claim to have
been harmed by alleged actions and/or omissions by Equifax in
connection with the 2017 cybersecurity incident and assert a
variety of common law and statutory claims seeking monetary
damages, injunctive relief and other related relief.

In addition, certain class actions have been filed by financial
institutions that allege their businesses have been placed at risk
due to the 2017 cybersecurity incident and generally assert common
law claims, such as claims for negligence, as well as, in some
cases, statutory claims. The financial institution class actions
seek compensatory damages, injunctive relief and other related
relief.

Furthermore, a lawsuit has been filed against the company by the
City of Chicago with respect to the 2017 cybersecurity incident
alleging violations of state laws and local ordinances governing
protection of personal data, consumer fraud, breach notice
requirements and business practices and seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief and the imposition of fines the aggregate amount
of which the complaint does not specifically quantify.

Three Indian Tribes filed suits in federal court asserting putative
class actions relating to the 2017 cybersecurity incident brought
on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated federally
recognized Indian Tribes and Nations.

Additionally, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico filed an action on
its own behalf and on behalf of the people of Puerto Rico arising
out of the 2017 cybersecurity incident.

Beginning on December 6, 2017 and pursuant to multiple subsequent
orders, the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered
the consolidation and transfer for pre-trial proceedings with
respect to the U.S. cases pending in federal court, including the
City of Chicago action, the Indian Tribal suits, and the Puerto
Rico action, to the Northern District of Georgia as the single U.S.
District Court for centralized pre-trial proceedings (the "MDL
Court").

Based on these orders, consolidated proceedings with respect to
U.S. consumer, small business and financial institution federal
class actions and other lawsuits related to the 2017 cybersecurity
incident have been conducted in the MDL Court.

The MDL Court has established separate tracks for the consumer and
financial institution class action cases and appointed lead counsel
on behalf of plaintiffs in both tracks. The company refers to the
consumer class action cases, captioned In re: Equifax, Inc.
Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, MDL No. 2800 (Consumer
Cases), as the "U.S. Consumer MDL Litigation."

Certain plaintiffs with cases pending in the MDL consolidated
proceedings, including the Indian Tribe plaintiffs, Puerto Rico and
the City of Chicago, have sought the establishment of additional
tracks and other related relief. The MDL Court denied the request
for a separate track by an individual plaintiff, but has not yet
ruled on the remaining requests.

The Company moved to dismiss the consolidated class action
complaints filed by the U.S. consumer, small business and financial
institution plaintiffs in their entirety.

On January 28, 2019, the MDL Court dismissed the small businesses'
consolidated class action complaint in its entirety. The MDL Court
dismissed certain claims brought by the consumer and financial
institution plaintiffs, while allowing other claims by those
plaintiffs to proceed.

Pursuant to case management orders issued by the MDL Court,
consolidated pre-trial proceedings, including discovery between the
parties, have been proceeding on the remaining claims of the U.S.
consumer and financial institution plaintiffs.

In the third quarter of 2019, the Company entered into a settlement
agreement that, upon approval by the MDL Court, will resolve and
dismiss the claims asserted in the U.S. Consumer MDL Litigation.

This settlement does not resolve the financial institution class
action before the MDL Court or the actions by the City of Chicago
or the Indian Tribes. The action by Puerto Rico will be dismissed
with prejudice after the U.S. Consumer MDL Litigation settlement is
approved.

Equifax Inc. provides information solutions and human resources
business process outsourcing services for businesses, governments,
and consumers. The company operates through four segments: U.S.
Information Solutions (USIS), International, Workforce Solutions,
and Global Consumer Solutions. Equifax Inc. was founded in 1899 and
is headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia.


ERIE INDEMNITY: Bid for Reconsideration in Ritz Case Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------
Erie Indemnity Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 25, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the motion for revive
the "Ritz" lawsuit has been denied and plaintiff has declined to
appeal the case's dismissal.

On December 28, 2017 a lawsuit was filed in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania captioned
Lynda Ritz, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated and derivatively on behalf of Nominal Defendant Erie
Insurance Exchange v. Erie Indemnity Company, J. Ralph Borneman,
Jr., Terrence W. Cavanaugh, Eugene C. Connell, LuAnn Datesh,
Jonathan Hirt Hagen, Thomas B. Hagen, C. Scott Hartz, Brian A.
Hudson, Sr., Claude C. Lilly, III, George R. Lucore, Thomas W.
Palmer, Martin P. Sheffield, Richard L. Stover, Elizabeth A. Hirt
Vorsheck, and Robert C. Wilburn, and Erie Insurance Exchange
(Nominal Defendant) (the "Ritz" lawsuit).

The individual named as Plaintiff is alleged to be a policyholder
(subscriber) of the Erie Insurance Exchange (the "Exchange").

With the exception of Terrence W. Cavanaugh and Robert C. Wilburn,
the individuals named as Defendants comprise the current Board of
Directors of Indemnity. Messrs. Cavanaugh and Wilburn are former
Directors of Indemnity (the "Directors").

The Complaint alleges that since at least 2007, Erie Indemnity
Company has taken "unwarranted and excessive" management fees as
compensation for its services under the Subscriber's Agreement.  

Count I of the Complaint purports to allege a claim for breach of
alleged fiduciary duties against Indemnity and the Directors on
behalf of Plaintiff and a putative class of subscribers.  

Count II purports to allege a claim for breach of alleged fiduciary
duties against Indemnity and the Directors on behalf of Exchange.


Count III purports to allege a claim for breach of contract and an
alleged implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against
Indemnity on behalf of Plaintiff and a putative class.  

Count IV purports to allege a claim of unjust enrichment against
several Directors.

The Complaint seeks compensatory and punitive damages and requests
the Court to enjoin Indemnity from continuing to retain excessive
management fees; and order such other relief as may be
appropriate.

On March 5, 2018, Indemnity filed a motion to dismiss the Ritz
lawsuit. The Directors also filed their own motions to dismiss the
Ritz lawsuit on March 5, 2018. Plaintiff filed her responses to
both motions on April 26, 2018; and Indemnity and the Directors
filed their replies in support of their motions on May 25, 2018.

On February 4, 2019, the Court granted Indemnity's and the
Directors' motions to dismiss the Ritz suit in its entirety, with
prejudice, on the basis that all of the alleged claims in the Ritz
suit are barred and precluded as a matter of law by the judgment
entered in favor of Indemnity and the Directors in the Beltz II
suit.

On March 4, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the Court's ruling dismissing the suit with prejudice. On April 5,
2019, Indemnity and the Directors filed their opposition to the
Motion for Reconsideration. The Motion for Reconsideration was
denied on May 13, 2019. Plaintiff declined to appeal the dismissal
of the Ritz lawsuit.

Erie Indemnity Company operates as a managing attorney-in-fact for
the subscribers at the Erie Insurance Exchange in the United
States. The company provides sales, underwriting, and policy
issuance services for the policyholders on behalf of the Erie
Insurance Exchange. Erie Indemnity Company was founded in 1925 and
is based in Erie, Pennsylvania.


ERIE INDEMNITY: Welgus Class Action Terminated
----------------------------------------------
TriNet Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 25, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the class action suit
entitled, Welgus v. TriNet Group, Inc., et. al., has been
terminated.

In August 2015, Howard Welgus, a purported stockholder, filed a
putative securities class action lawsuit, Welgus v. TriNet Group,
Inc., et. al., under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.

On December 18, 2017, the district court granted TriNet’s motion
to dismiss the complaint, which had been amended in April 2016 and
again in March 2017, in its entirety, without leave to amend.

Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal of the district court's order on
January 17, 2018 and oral arguments were held before the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals on March 14, 2019.

On March 26, 2019, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the amended complaint in its
entirety. The deadline for Plaintiff-Appellant to petition the U.S.
Supreme Court to review the decision by the Court of Appeals
expired on June 24, 2019 and the litigation is therefore
terminated.

TriNet Group, Inc. provides human resources solutions for small and
midsize businesses in the United States and Canada. TriNet Group,
Inc. was founded in 1988 and is headquartered in Dublin,
California.


FOX & KOHLER: Frederick Suit Moved to District of New Jersey
------------------------------------------------------------
The case, CAREN FREDERICK, on behalf of herself and all other class
members similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. LAW OFFICE OF FOX,
KOHLER & ASSOCIATES, P.L.L.C., trading as NATIONAL LEGAL CENTER;
ARTHUR M KOHLER; ROSEANNA FOX; COMERICA BANK; GLOBAL CLIENT
SOLUTIONS, L.L.C.; and JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 100, where name of John
Doe(s) being fictitious, the Defendants, Case No. BUR-L-001238-19,
was removed from the Superior Court of Burlington County, New
Jersey, to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey
(Camden) on July 26, 2019. The District of New Jersey Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-15887 to the proceeding.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          Vincent E. Gentile, Esq.
          DRINKER, BIDDLE & REATH, LLP
          105 College Road East, Suite 300
          P.O. Box 627
          Princeton, NJ 08542-0627
          Telephone: (609) 716-6500
          E-mail: vincent.gentile@dbr.com

FRONTIER COMMUNICATIONS: Weiss Sues Over Telemarketing Calls
------------------------------------------------------------
Corey Weiss, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Frontier Communications Corporation, and
Does 1 through 10, inclusive, and each of them, Defendant, Case No.
19-cv-06221, (C.D. Cal., July 18, 2019), seeks injunctive relief,
statutory and treble damages for violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

Frontier Communications Corporation is a national communications
company. Defendant contacted Plaintiff on his cellular telephone in
an attempt to solicit Defendant's products using an automatic
telephone dialing system. Plaintiff explicitly requested that
Defendant cease calling Plaintiff and that Defendant place
Plaintiff on their internal do-not-call list. Despite the
aforementioned requests, Frontier continued to call Plaintiff for
the purpose of marketing and solicitation.[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
      Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
      Meghan E. George, Esq.
      LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
      21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
      Woodland Hills, CA 91367
      Phone: (877) 206-4741
      Fax: (866) 633-0228
      Email: friedman@toddflaw.com
             abacon@toddflaw.com
             mgeorge@toddflaw.com


GENERAL DYNAMICS: Bid to Conditionally Certify Hubbard Class Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LACRYSTAL HUBBARD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GENERAL
DYNAMICS INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, INC., Defendant, Civil Action No.
2:18-CV-91-KS-MTP (S.D. Miss.), Judge Keith Starrett of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Eastern
Division, denied Plaintiffs Hubbard and Krisha D. Hollingsworth's
Motion for Conditional Certification of a Collective Action Class.

Defendant, General Dynamics Information Technology, Inc. ("GDIT")
has operated contact centers at thirteen locations throughout the
United States pursuant to different government contracts.  One such
contact center was located in Hattiesburg, Mississippi.  The
primary focus of the contact center was to support the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services ("CMS") with the Federally Facilitated
Marketplaces and Medicare Program by taking calls from customers
about these programs.  GDIT provided these services through a
contract known as Contact Center Operations ("CCO").  At the call
centers GDIT employed CCO agents, including Customer Service
Representatives ("CSR"), Internal Support Group ("ISG") employees,
Quality Specialists, Instructors/Trainers, and Supervisors to
support the contract and the customer.

Plaintiffs Hubbard and Hollingsworth, former employees of GDIT in
various capacities, filed the lawsuit against GDIT as individuals
and on behalf of others similarly situated, for alleged violations
of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").  In their Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff Hubbard alleges that she and others "similarly
situated" worked over 40 hours in one week for one or more weeks
while employed at GDIT, and GDIT did not compensate them on a
routine basis and failed to compensate them at the proper rate for
their overtime.  The Plaintiffs allege that Hubbard and others
similarly situated worked approximately 10 to 20 overtime hours
each week depending on the individual and the circumstances.

In the allegations particularly relating to alleged violations of
the FLSA, Plaintiff Hubbard alleges that she and others were
non-exempt and subject to the FLSA as it pertains to whether or not
Plaintiff Hubbard and others similarly situated were entitled to
minimum wage and overtime pay for all hours over 40 hours worked in
a given week.  She goes on to allege that they are entitled to
overtime pay and have not received it and that GDIT violated the
FLSA by misclassifying her and others as exempt employees.

The Plaintiffs filed the action on May 24, 2018.   GDIT filed a
Motion to Dismiss as to portions of the Plaintiffs' claims, and the
Court dismissed Counts II and III with prejudice.  Following a case
management conference on Sept. 6, 2018, the Court entered an
Initial Case Management Order allowing for a few months of
discovery prior to the Plaintiffs having to file their Motion for
Conditional Certification on or before the deadline of Dec. 3,
2018. On Sept. 7, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint.
In the ensuing months, there were depositions, document exchanges,
as well as written discovery taken.  After being granted a brief
extension for filing the motion, the Plaintiffs now seek
conditional certification.

The Plaintiffs seek to conditionally certify the following class:
All Hattiesburg, MS and Waco, TX General Dynamics Information
Technology, Inc. non-exempt employees who were denied overtime pay
and/or straight time pay as a result of policies, procedures, and
customs and practice related to security and recording time
worked.

GDIT denies liability for violations of FLSA and presents a host of
arguments in opposition to conditional certification.  In their
opposition memorandum, GDIT asserts the following arguments: (1)
the Plaintiffs cannot obtain conditional certification of claims
that are not actionable3 and that the class to be certified is not
supported by the allegations of the Amended Complaint; (2)
Plaintiff Hubbard is not yet a party to the collective action and
therefore not a proper class representative;4 (3) Plaintiffs cannot
show that they are similarly situated; (4) the Plaintiffs have not
shown sufficient interest in joining in the lawsuit;5 (5) Some
potential opt-in plaintiffs are not viable parties.  GDIT also
submitted a host of documentary evidence for the Court's
consideration in determining whether the Plaintiffs have carried
their initial burden for issuing notice to a potential class of
aggrieved employees.

Judge Starrett concludes that the Plaintiffs are inappropriately
seeking certification of a class that does not match the
allegations of the Amended Complaint, and therefore, he denied
certification on that basis.  Additionally, following a thorough
analysis, he further concludes that the Plaintiffs have failed to
meet their burden of proof under any of the lenient standards at
this notice stage.  Accordingly, the Judge denied the Plaintiffs'
Motion to Certify Collective Action Class .

A full-text copy of the Court's July 2, 2019 Memorandum Opinion and
Order is available at https://is.gd/yMGwlQ from Leagle.com.

LaCrystal Hubbard, Individually, and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated & Krisha D. Hollingsworth, Plaintiffs,
represented by Robin L. Roberts -- robin@rablaw.net -- ROBIN L.
ROBERTS, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, PLLC.

General Dynamics Information Technology, Inc., Defendant,
represented by Jaklyn L. Wrigley -- jwrigley@fisherphillips.com --
FISHER & PHILLIPS, LLP & Michelle I. Anderson --
manderson@fisherphillips.com -- FISHER & PHILLIPS, LLP, pro hac
vice.


GENERAL MILLS: Eleventh Circuit Appeal Filed in Doss Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Mounira Doss filed an appeal from a Court ruling in the
lawsuit entitled Mounira Doss v. General Mills, Inc., Case No.
0:18-cv-61924-RNS, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
alleges that the products of the Defendant, including Cheerios,
contain glyphosate which causes cancer, in violation of the Florida
Deceptive & Unfair Trade Practices Act.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that recent testing
confirmed that Cheerios and other products of the Defendant contain
glyphosate, which the World Health Organization classifies as a
"probable human carcinogen." Glyphosate is even more dangerous for
children, whose bodies are more sensitive to exposure, leaving them
more vulnerable to carcinogens.  Had the Plaintiff known that
Cheerios contained glyphosate, she would never have purchased
them.

The appellate case is captioned as Mounira Doss v. General Mills,
Inc., Case No. 19-12714, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- The appellant's brief is due on or before August 28, 2019;

   -- The appendix is due no later than 7 days from the filing of
      the appellant's brief; and

   -- Appellee's Certificate of Interested Persons is due on or
      before August 12, 2019, as to Appellee General Mills,
      Inc.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant MOUNIRA DOSS, individually and on behalf of all
other similarly situated, is represented by:

          Jeffrey Louis Haberman, Esq.
          SCHLESINGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
          1212 SE Third Avenue
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33316
          Telephone: (954) 320-9507
          E-mail: jhaberman@schlesingerlaw.com

Defendant-Appellee GENERAL MILLS, INC. is represented by:

          Chris S. Coutroulis, Esq.
          CARLTON FIELDS JORDEN BURT, PA
          4221 W Boy Scout Blvd., Suite 1000
          PO Box 3239
          Tampa, FL 33607
          Telephone: (813) 223-7000
          E-mail: ccoutroulis@cfjblaw.com

               - and -

          Angela Teresa Puentes, Esq.
          CARLTON FIELDS JORDEN BURT, PA
          100 SE 2nd St., Suite 4200
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 530-0050
          E-mail: APuentes-Leon@cfjblaw.com


GENERAL MOTORS: Leave to File 5th Amended Sloan Suit Granted
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MONTEVILLE SLOAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GENERAL
MOTORS LLC, Defendant, Case No. 16-cv-07244-EMC (N.D. Cal.), Judge
Edward M. Chen of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California granted the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a
Fifth Amended Complaint.

The Plaintiffs allege that Defendant GM knowingly manufactured and
sold a car engine with inherent defects that caused excessive oil
consumption and engine damage.  The defects affect 2010 to 2014
model year GM vehicles.

Based on those allegations, the Plaintiffs assert claims under
various state consumer protection and fraud statutes on behalf of a
nationwide class as well as 29 statewide classes.  The Plaintiffs'
original class action complaint was filed in Dec. 19, 2016.  They
have since amended their pleadings several times, and the operative
complaint is the Fourth Amended Complaint.

The Plaintiffs now seek leave from the Court to file a Fifth
Amended Complaint.  The purpose of the amendment is to substitute
Thomas Szep, a member of the putative Ohio class, in place of the
current Ohio class representatives, Thomas Gulling and Ronald
Jones, who are no longer able to participate in the litigation due
to "personal reasons."  

GM opposes the Plaintiffs' motion
.  GM does not argue that the Plaintiffs are seeking to amend in
bad faith or that their proposed amendment would be futile.
Rather, GM asserts that the Plaintiffs unduly delayed in filing
their motion and the delay is prejudicial to GM.

Judge Chen finds that the Plaintiffs' willingness to make Szep
available for a deposition and vehicle inspection ameliorates any
prejudice GM might suffer as a result of the amendment.   GM will
have nearly as much time to prepare its response to Szep's claim as
the claims of the other class representatives.  GM's assertions of
prejudice are thus unpersuasive.  Finally, although the Plaintiffs
have previously amended their complaint four times, the Judge notes
that this factor does not preclude their latest amendment request.

Because GM has failed to show that the Plaintiffs unduly delayed in
bringing their motion or that GM would suffer prejudice, it is
appropriate under Rule 15(a) to allow the Plaintiffs to amend their
complaint.

For these reasons, Judge Chen granted the Plaintiffs' motion for
leave to file their Fifth Amended Complaint.  The parties are
ordered to meet and confer regarding an appropriate extension of
the fact discovery deadline to allow GM to take discovery from
Szep.  If the parties cannot agree on an extension, they must
follow the procedure for filing a joint letter brief outlining
their respective positions in accordance with the Court's civil
standing order on discovery.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 2, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/u2cUes from Leagle.com.

Monteville Sloan, Jr., Raul Siqueiros, Donald Ludington, Thomas
Shorter, Gabriel Del Valle & Steven Ehrke, Plaintiffs,
represented by Lori Erin Andrus -- lori@andrusanderson.com --
Andrus Anderson LLP, Adam J. Levitt, DiCello Levitt & Casey LLC,
Andrew England Brashier -- andrew.brashier@beasleyallen.com --
Beasley Allen, pro hac vice, Anthony J. Garcia --
Anthony@aglawinc.com -- AG Law, P.A., Archibald Irwin Grubb, II,
Beasley Allen, 218 Commerce St. PO Box 4160, Montgomery, AL
36103, pro hac vice, Daniel Richard Ferri -- dferri@dlcfirm.com -
- DiCello Levitt & Casey LLC, H. Clay Barnett, III --
clay.barnett@beasleyallen.com -- Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin,
Portis and Miles, P.C., pro hac vice, Jennell Kristine Shannon --
jshannon@johnsonbecker.com -- Johnson Becker, pro hac vice, John
Ernst Tangren -- jtangren@dlcfirm.com -- DiCello Levitt & Casey
LLC, Mark A. DiCello -- madicello@dlcfirm.com -- The DiCello Law
Firm, pro hac vice, Timothy J. Becker --
tbecker@johnsonbecker.com -- Johnson Becker, PLLC, pro hac vice,
Wilson Daniel Miles, III -- dee.miles@beasleyallen.com -- Beasley
Allen, pro hac vice & Jennie Lee Anderson --
jennie@andrusanderson.com -- Andrus Anderson LLP.

Joseph Brannan, Plaintiff, represented by Lori Erin Andrus,
Andrus Anderson LLP, Adam J. Levitt, DiCello Levitt & Casey LLC,
Amy E. Keller, DiCello Levitt & Casey LLC, pro hac vice, Andrew
England Brashier, Beasley Allen, pro hac vice, Anthony J. Garcia,
AG Law, P.A., pro hac vice, Archibald Irwin Grubb, II, Beasley
Allen, pro hac vice, Daniel Richard Ferri, DiCello Levitt & Casey
LLC, H. Clay Barnett, III, Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis
and Miles, P.C., pro hac vice, Jennell Kristine Shannon, Johnson
Becker, pro hac vice, John Ernst Tangren, DiCello Levitt & Casey
LLC, Mark A. DiCello, The DiCello Law Firm, Marybeth V. Gibson,
The Finley Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Timothy J. Becker, Johnson
Becker, PLLC, pro hac vice, Wilson Daniel Miles, III, Beasley,
Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis & Miles, P.C. & Jennie Lee Anderson,
Andrus Anderson LLP.

Gail Lannom, Bradley K. Zierke, Ross Dahl, Drew Peterson, Barbara
Molina, Bill Mauch, Thomas Gulling & Ronald Jones, Plaintiffs,
represented by Lori Erin Andrus, Andrus Anderson LLP, Adam J.
Levitt, DiCello Levitt & Casey LLC, Amy E. Keller, DiCello Levitt
& Casey LLC, pro hac vice, Andrew England Brashier, Beasley
Allen, pro hac vice, Anthony J. Garcia, AG Law, P.A., pro hac
vice, Archibald Irwin Grubb, II, Beasley Allen, pro hac vice,
Daniel Richard Ferri, DiCello Levitt & Casey LLC, H. Clay
Barnett, III, Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis and Miles,
P.C., pro hac vice, Jennell Kristine Shannon, Johnson Becker, pro
hac vice, John Ernst Tangren, DiCello Levitt & Casey LLC, Mark A.
DiCello, The DiCello Law Firm, Marybeth V. Gibson, The Finley
Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Timothy J. Becker, Johnson Becker, PLLC,
pro hac vice, Wilson Daniel Miles, III, Beasley, Allen, Crow,
Methvin, Portis & Miles, P.C. & Jennie Lee Anderson, Andrus
Anderson LLP.

John Graziano, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jennie Lee Anderson, Andrus
Anderson LLP, Adam J. Levitt, DiCello Levitt & Casey LLC, Amy E.
Keller, DiCello Levitt & Casey LLC, pro hac vice, Andrew England
Brashier, Beasley Allen, pro hac vice, Anthony J. Garcia, AG Law,
P.A., Archibald Irwin Grubb, II, Beasley Allen, pro hac vice,
Daniel Richard Ferri, DiCello Levitt & Casey LLC, H. Clay
Barnett, III, Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis and Miles,
P.C., pro hac vice, Jennell Kristine Shannon, Johnson Becker, pro
hac vice, John Ernst Tangren, DiCello Levitt & Casey LLC, Mark A.
DiCello, The DiCello Law Firm, Timothy J. Becker, Johnson Becker,
PLLC, pro hac vice & Wilson Daniel Miles, III, Beasley, Allen,
Crow, Methvin, Portis & Miles, P.C.

Rudy Sanchez, Plaintiff, represented by Adam J. Levitt, DiCello
Levitt & Casey LLC, Amy E. Keller, DiCello Levitt & Casey LLC,
pro hac vice, Jennell Kristine Shannon, Johnson Becker, Timothy
J. Becker, Johnson Becker, PLLC & Jennie Lee Anderson, Andrus
Anderson LLP.

Mike Warpinski, Marc Perkins, Joseph Olivier, Christopher
Thacker, Derick Bradford, Larry Goodwin, James Robertson, Joshua
Byrge, Randy Clausen, Steve Kitchen, Ted Edgecomb, Kevin
Hanneken, Michael Ware, Scott Smith, John Neubauer, James
Faulkner & Dan Madson, Plaintiffs, represented by Adam J. Levitt,
DiCello Levitt & Casey LLC, Amy E. Keller, DiCello Levitt & Casey
LLC, pro hac vice, Anthony J. Garcia, AG Law, P.A., pro hac vice,
Jennell Kristine Shannon, Johnson Becker, Timothy J. Becker,
Johnson Becker, PLLC & Jennie Lee Anderson, Andrus Anderson LLP.

Jonas Bednarek, Plaintiff, represented by Adam J. Levitt, DiCello
Levitt & Casey LLC, Amy E. Keller, DiCello Levitt & Casey LLC,
pro hac vice, Anthony J. Garcia, AG Law, P.A., pro hac vice, Eric
J. Haag, Atterbury Kammer Haag S.C., pro hac vice, Jennell
Kristine Shannon, Johnson Becker, Timothy J. Becker, Johnson
Becker, PLLC & Jennie Lee Anderson, Andrus Anderson LLP.

Doepel Katelyn, Plaintiff, represented by Jennie Lee Anderson,
Andrus Anderson LLP & Adam J. Levitt, DiCello Levitt & Casey LLC.

Katelyn Doepel, Todd Cralley, Jill Cralley, Dennis Vita, Edwin
Doepel, Kelly Harris & William Martell, Plaintiffs, represented
by Amy E. Keller, DiCello Levitt & Casey LLC, pro hac vice,
Jennie Lee Anderson, Andrus Anderson LLP & Adam J. Levitt,
DiCello Levitt & Casey LLC.

General Motors LLC, Defendant, represented by Joseph John Ybarra
-- Joseph.Ybarra@hygmlaw.com -- Huang Ybarra Gelberg & May LLP &
Gregory Richard Oxford -- goxford@iccolaw.com -- Isaacs Clouse
Crose & Oxford LLP.


GLYNN COUNTY, GA: Court Dismisses Bail Systems Suit With Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARGERY FREIDA MOCK; and ERIC SCOTT OGDEN, JR.,
Individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. GLYNN COUNTY GEORGIA; E. NEAL JUMP, Glynn County
Sheriff; ALEX ATWOOD, Glynn County Chief Magistrate Judge; B. REID
ZEH, III, Glynn County Misdemeanor Public Defender, Defendants,
Civil Action No. 2:18-CV-25 (S.D. Ga.), Judge R. Stan Baker of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, Brunswick
Division, dismissed with prejudice all of the Plaintiffs' claims
against the Defendants.

The matter is before the Court on the parties' Joint Stipulation of
Dismissal.  On March 9, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed the putative
class action alleging entitlement to a remedy under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983.  Following a hearing on the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, the Court ordered a Settlement Conference,
which was held on Dec. 6, 2018.

At the conference, the parties reached a settlement agreement to
release all claims and to dismiss the case pursuant to the agreed
upon terms.  As agreed upon by the parties, the Court maintains
jurisdiction in the case to enforce the parties' Settlement
Agreement in the manner, and to the extent, set forth by that
Agreement.  

Further, in accordance with the Settlement Agreement, the Court
sets forth the following established legal principles which pertain
to the parties' settlement and the Court's continued jurisdiction
in the case: In the pretrial context, it is accepted that
imprisonment solely because of indigent status is invidious
discrimination and not constitutionally permissible.  The demands
of equal protection of the laws and of due process prohibit
depriving pre-trial detainees of the rights of other citizens to a
greater extent than necessary to assure appearance at trial and
security of the jails.  The incarceration of those who cannot meet
a bond schedule's requirements, without meaningful consideration of
other possible alternatives, infringes on both due process and
equal protection requirements.

Judge Baker holds that due process and equal protection principles
converge in the Court's analysis of cases where criminal defendants
are treated differently by wealth.  This due process mode of
analysis ensures an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner, but is flexible and requires analysis
of the governmental and private interests that are affected.
Federal courts should give States wide latitude to fashion
procedures for setting bail, and there is no single preferred
approach.

To that end, bail systems that make indigency determinations for
purposes of setting bail within 48 hours of arrest are
presumptively constitutional.  Bail set at a figure higher than an
amount reasonably calculated to assure the presence of the accused
is excessive under the Eight Amendment.

At a minimum, procedural due process requires notice of bail
hearings so that detainees have an opportunity to challenge the
contemplated action and to understand the nature of what is
happening to him.  Moreover, due process generally requires the
decision maker to state the reasons for his determination and
indicate the evidence he relied on, though his statement need not
amount to a full opinion or even formal findings of fact and
conclusions of law.  And, of course, an impartial decision maker is
essential.

Pursuant to the parties' Joint Stipulation of Dismissal, and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(ii), Judge Baker dismissed
with prejudice all of the Plaintiffs' claims against the
Defendants.  He directed the Clerk of Court to enter the
appropriate judgment of dismissal and to close the case.

However, the parties have consented to the Court retaining
jurisdiction over the case for the purpose of enforcing their
Settlement Agreement.  Pursuant to that consent, the Court retains
jurisdiction for a period of up to five years to enforce the terms
of the Settlement Agreement reached by the parties in the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 2, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/SyVD0O from Leagle.com.

Margery Freida Mock, Individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated & Eric Scott Ogden, Jr., Individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Andrea Woods
-- awoods@aclu.org -- American Civil Liberties Union, pro hac vice,
Brandon Buskey, American Civil Liberties Union, pro hac vice, James
A. Yancey, Jr. -- jayjr@standinthegap.biz -- James A. Yancey, PC,
Kosha Shonyetta Tucker, American Civil Liberties Union of Georgia,
pro hac vice, Twyla Carter -- tcarter@aclu.org -- American Civil
Liberties Union, pro hac vice & Sean J. Young, American Civil
Liberties Union of Georgia.

Glynn County, Georgia, Defendant, represented by Aaron W. Mumford,
Glynn County Attorney's Office, Bradley J. Watkins --
bwatkins@brbcsw.com -- Brown, Readdick, Bumgartner, Carter,
Strickland & Watkins, LLP, Richard K. Strickland --
rstrickland@brbcsw.com -- Brown, Readdick, Bumgartner, Carter,
Strickland & Watkins, LLP & Emily Rose Hancock, Brown, Readdick &
Bumgartner.

E. Neal Jump, Glynn County Sheriff & Alex Atwood, Glynn County
Chief Magistrate Judge, Defendants, represented by Bradley J.
Watkins, Brown, Readdick, Bumgartner, Carter, Strickland & Watkins,
LLP, Richard K. Strickland, Brown, Readdick, Bumgartner, Carter,
Strickland & Watkins, LLP & Emily Rose Hancock --
ehancock@brbcsw.com -- Brown, Readdick & Bumgartner.

B. Reid Zeh, III, Glynn County Misdemeanor Public Defender,
Defendant, represented by Paul H. Threlkeld, Oliver Maner, LLP,
David William Bobo Mullens, III, Oliver Maner, LLP & Patrick T.
O'Connor, Oliver Maner, LLP.


GOOGLE LLC: Cabrera Appeals Decision in Woods Suit to 9th Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Rene Cabrera filed an appeal from a Court ruling in the
lawsuit styled RENE CABRERA and RICK WOODS, individually and on
behalf of Others Similarly Situated v. GOOGLE LLC, Case No.
5:11-cv-01263-EJD, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose.

The appellate case is captioned as RENE CABRERA and RICK WOODS,
individually and on behalf of Others Similarly Situated v. GOOGLE
LLC, Case No. 19-16466, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 26, 2019,
Plaintiff Rene Cabrera filed an appeal from a Court ruling in the
lawsuit.  That appellate case is titled as Rene Cabrera, et al. v.
Google LLC, Case No. 19-16120.

District Court Judge Edward J. Davila previously granted Google's
motion to dismiss as to Rene Cabrera's claims in the Fourth Amended
Complaint, and denied in all other respects.

Co-plaintiff Rick Woods filed his initial complaint in March 2011
alleging that Google bilked him and other advertisers into
overpaying for advertising services through Google's AdWords
program and pricing scheme.  After several rounds of pleadings,
Woods' allegations were pared down to the following.  First, Woods
states a plausible claim for breach of contract based upon Google's
alleged failure to Smart Price clicks on the Display Network.  The
court found that the "measurements clause" of the AdWords Agreement
could be reasonably interpreted as requiring Google to base its
charges for Display Network clicks at least in part on the Smart
Pricing formula.  Second, Woods states a plausible claim for
violation of the California Unfair Competition Law ("UCL") to the
extent his claim is based upon location targeting.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- August 23, 2019 -- Transcript shall be ordered;

   -- September 23, 2019 -- Transcript shall be filed by court
      reporter;

   -- November 1, 2019 -- Appellant's opening brief and excerpts
      of record shall be served and filed pursuant to FRAP 31 and
      9th Cir. R. 31-2.1;

   -- December 2, 2019 -- Appellee's answering brief and excerpts
      of record shall be served and filed pursuant to FRAP 31 and
      9th Cir. R. 31-2.1; and

   -- The optional appellant's reply brief shall be filed and
      served within 21 days of service of the appellee's brief,
      pursuant to FRAP 31 and 9th Cir. R. 31-2.1.[BN]


GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES: 5 Plaintiffs Win Summary Judgment
-------------------------------------------------------
Steven A. Meyerowitz, writing for Daily Business Review, reports
that an Orlando federal magistrate granted summary judgment to five
plaintiffs in a class action against Geico and awarded damages to
each class member.

Ashley Barrett, Micah Bellamy, Anthony Cook, Maurice Jones and
Anthony Lorenti filed a breach of contract lawsuit on behalf of
themselves and a proposed class against the Government Employees
Insurance Co. and Geico General Insurance Co.

Each named plaintiff was insured by a GEICO Form A30-FL (03-11)
policy when their vehicles were involved in an accident. Each
plaintiff submitted claims to GEICO, and their vehicles were
declared a total loss.

During the time period, GEICO had a uniform policy of not paying
title fees or license plate transfer fees in Florida total loss
claim settlements. Each of the claims against GEICO stemmed from
total loss claims settled by GEICO that did not include
compensation for title or license plate transfer fees.
The plaintiffs contended GEICO breached its contracts with them and
the class by failing to pay title fees or license plate transfer
fees as part of actual cash value payments after total losses.

The parties moved for summary judgment.

U.S. Magistrate Judge Leslie Hoffman granted summary judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs, concluding  the policy required GEICO to
pay title fees and license plate transfer fees as components of
loss in the event of a total loss.

In its decision, the court explained the policy limited GEICO's
loss liability to "actual cash value," defined as "the replacement
cost of the [insured vehicle] less depreciation or betterment."

The court then ruled title transfer fees were a component of actual
cash value, reasoning title transfer fees were costs an insured was
"reasonably likely to incur" in replacing his or her vehicle.

The court next decided license plate transfer fees also were
included in actual cash value, noting they had to be paid within 30
days of the purchase of a replacement vehicle and rejecting GEICO's
argument that transfer fees were not part of replacement cost
because the fees were incurred after purchasing a replacement
vehicle.

The court concluded GEICO materially breached its contracts with
the plaintiffs by failing to include these fees in total loss claim
settlements. It awarded each of the named plaintiffs damages in the
amount of $79.35 and ruled class members also were entitled to
$79.35 each.

The case is Jones v. Government Employees Insurance, Nos:
6:17-cv-891-Orl-40LRH, 6:17-cv-1755-Orl-40LRH (M.D. Fla. July 19.
Attorneys involved include: For plaintiffs (6:17cv891): Bradley W.
Pratt, lead attorney, Pratt Clay, Atlanta; Christopher B. Hall,
Hall & Lampros, Atlanta; Christopher J. Lynch, Christopher J. Lynch
P.A., South Miami; Edmund A. Normand, Normand Law, Orlando; Tracy
Lynne Markham, Avolio & Hanlon, St. Augustine; Jacob Lawrence
Phillips, Normand, Orlando. For defendants  Alexander Fuchs and
Kymberly Kochis, Eversheds Sutherland, New York; Amelia Toy
Rudolph, Eversheds Sutherland, Atlanta; Susan Banks Harwood, Kaplan
Zeena, Miami [GN]


GUARANTEED RATE: Can Compel Arbitration in Pereyra Labor Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KARLA PEREYRA, Plaintiff, v. GUARANTEED RATE, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-06669-EMC (N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward M.
Chen of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California granted the Defendant's motion to compel arbitration.

The Plaintiff seeks to file a class action for claims arising under
the California Labor Codes Sections 510; 1198; 226.7(a); 512(a);
226.7(a); 226(a); 201-203; 221-224 et seq.; and violations of the
Business and Professions Code Section 17200 et seq.  She argues
that she and the other class members are entitled to premium wages
for overtime pay based on a regular rate with commission and
bonuses.  She alleges that the Defendant denied her, and the other
class members, minimum wages owed to her and others based on
overtime work laws, wages upon discharge, and compensation for
meals and rest breaks.  Similarly, she claims that the Defendant
failed to keep accurate payroll and wage statements in accordance
with California law.

She also raises a breach of contract claim.  She claims the breach
of her employment contract was the failure to provide her with the
draw amount as stated and in the proper amounts, failing to provide
her with the basis points on each loan, failing to pay the correct
commission payments for loans originated, failing to pay the
enhanced commission, failing to pay accurate monthly commissions
after submitting questions within the time required, failing to pay
all wages owed per the contract for each pay period, and imposing
deductions for expenses not contemplated by the employment
contract.

The Plaintiff worked as an employee of the Defendant from August
2015 to August 2016.  She held the position of mortgage specialist
in Orange County, California.  She contends that in that position
she regularly worked over eight hours a day and more than 40 hours
a week without overtime pay or compensation for meal and rest
breaks.

After the Plaintiff filed the Complaint, the Defendant moved to
compel arbitration and to dismiss the action under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1).  The basis for this motion
is an arbitration agreement in the Plaintiff's employment
contract.

The Plaintiff opposes the motion to compel arbitration on several
grounds.  She argues the contract is procedurally unconscionable
because it was a contract of adhesion and Defendant failed to
include the AAA rules.  She also challenges the agreement on
substantive unconscionability grounds, asserting that it lacked
mutuality, it requires the Plaintiff to waive un-waivable claims,
and allows Defendant to recover attorneys' fees and costs in
violation of California law.  She also argues that both the choice
of law provision and choice of forum provision are unconscionable.
Despite the choice of law clause, the Defendant does not argue that
Illinois law applies.

Judge Chen granted the Defendant's motion to compel arbitration.
He finds that the Plaintiff has established a high degree of
substantive unconscionability as it relates to the choice of law
provision, the lack of mutuality pertaining to exceptions from
arbitration, the fee provision, and the choice of forum provision.
Because there is some procedural unconscionability, these
provisions are unenforceable.

In addition, the Judge finds that in the case, the four provisions
tainted with unconscionability, while presenting a close question,
do not permeate the arbitration agreements to such an extent that
the purpose of the agreements -- i.e., to arbitrate rather than
litigate -- was transformed -- i.e., to impose arbitration `not
simply as an alternative to litigation, but as an inferior forum.
And in view of the severability clause, the unconscionable
carve-outs can be severed without disturbing the primary intent of
the parties to arbitrate their dispute.  The objectionable
provisions may be severed or construed without re-writing the
agreement.  The Plaintiff also argues that courts can never sever
non-mutual provisions of an arbitration agreement.  The Ninth
Circuit has ruled otherwise.

The Order disposes of Docket No. 14.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 28, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/rIrxbM from Leagle.com.

Karla Pereyra, Plaintiff, represented by John James Glugoski ,
Righetti Glugoski PC, Matthew Righetti, Righetti Glugoski, P.C. &
Reuben D. Nathan -- rnathan@nathanlawpractice.com -- Nathan &
Associates, APC.

Guaranteed Rate, Inc., Defendant, represented by Spencer C. Skeen
-- spencer.skeen@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak
Stewart PC, Clint S. Engleson -- clint.engleson@procopio.com --
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak and Stewart, P.C. & Timothy Lloyd
Johnson -- tim.johnson@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak
and Stewart, P.C..


GUESS? INC: Kyo Claims Website not Blind-Friendly
-------------------------------------------------
Kyo Hak Chu, individually and on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Guess?, Inc. and Does 1 to
10, inclusive, Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-04166 (C.D. Cal., July 19,
2019), seeks preliminary and permanent injunction, compensatory,
statutory and punitive damages and fines, prejudgment and
post-judgment interest, costs and expenses of this action together
with reasonable attorneys' and expert fees and such other and
further relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act and
California's Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Defendant's website, https://shop.guess.com/en/, offers assortment
of men and women's apparel. Kyo is legally blind and claims that
the site cannot be accessed by the visually-impaired. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Bobby Saadian, Esq.
     Thiago Coelho, Esq.
     WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
     3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor
     Los Angeles, CA 90010
     Tel: (213) 381-9988
     Fax: (213) 381-9989
     Email info@wilshirelawfirm.com


HEALTHCARE REVENUE: Santos Seeks Damages Over False Credit Reports
------------------------------------------------------------------
OMAR SANTOS and AMANDA CLEMENTS on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated v. HEALTHCARE REVENUE RECOVERY GROUP, LLC
d/b/a ARS ACCOUNT RESOLUTION SERVICES and EXPERIAN INFORMATION
SOLUTIONS, INC., Case No. 1:19-cv-23084-XXXX (S.D. Fla., July 24,
2019), is an action for statutory and punitive damages, costs, and
attorneys' fees brought pursuant to the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

The Plaintiffs contend that the lawsuit is brought on behalf of
those consumers whose Experian credit reports contain false,
misleading, and inaccurate information.  The Plaintiffs add that
Experian willfully fails to follow reasonable procedures to assure
the maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the
Plaintiffs and members of the class and fails to conduct any
reasonable investigation into the accuracy of information reported
by HRRG about Plaintiffs and members of the class, as required by
the FCRA.

HRRG is a Florida limited liability company with its principal
place of business located in Sunrise, Florida.  HRRG is a
Florida-based medical debt collection company.

Experian is an Ohio corporation with its principal place of
business located in Costa Mesa, California.  Experian is a
"consumer reporting agency," and is engaged in the business of
assembling, evaluating, and disbursing information concerning
consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third
parties.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Peter Prieto, Esq.
          Alissa Del Riego, Esq.
          PODHURST ORSECK, P.A.
          SunTrust International Center
          One S.E. 3rd Avenue, Suite 2300
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 358-2800
          E-mail: pprieto@podhurst.com
                  adelriego@podhurst.com

               - and -

          Roland Tellis, Esq.
          Jonas P. Mann, Esq.
          BARON & BUDD, P.C.
          15910 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 1600
          Encino, CA 91436
          Telephone: (818) 839-2320
          E-mail: rtellis@baronbudd.com
                  jmann@baronbudd.com

               - and -
          Dennis McCarty, Esq.
          Jonathan Raburn, Esq.
          McCARTY & RABURN PLLC
          2931 Ridge Road, Suite 101 #504
          Rockwall, TX 75032
          Telephone: (817) 704-3375
          E-mail: dennismccartylaw@gmail.com
                  jonathan@geauxlaw.com


HOME DEPOT: Ct. Partly Affirms Atty Fees Award in Data Breach Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming in part and vacating in part the District Court's
judgment Awarding Attorrney's Fees in the case captioned In Re: THE
HOME DEPOT INC., CUSTOMER DATA SECURITY BREACH LITIGATION.
NORTHEASTERN ENGINEERS FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, PITTSFIELD COOPERATIVE
BANK, PHENIX-GIRARD BANK, KELSEY O'BRIEN, FIRST FINANCIAL CREDIT
UNION, FIRST CHOICE FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, SOUTHERN CHAUTAUQUA
FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, GARY LOWENTHAL, SARA SAFFRAN, BARBARA
SAFFRAN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees Cross Appellants, HOWARD
STERN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HOME DEPOT, INC. (THE), THE HOME
DEPOT U.S.A., INC., Defendants-Appellants Cross Appellees. No.
17-14741. (11th Cir.).

Following a data breach at Home Depot, the information for tens of
millions of credit cards was stolen, and a class of banks who
issued the cards sued Home Depot to recover their resulting losses.
Home Depot eventually settled with the class. As part of the
settlement, Home Depot agreed to pay the reasonable attorney's fees
of Class Counsel. The agreement specified that the attorney's fees
would be paid separate from and in addition to the class fund, but
the parties left the amount of those fees undetermined.

The District Court awarded Class Counsel $15.3 million in fees. It
reached this award using the lodestar method, finding Class
Counsel's hours to be reasonable and applying a multiplier of 1.3
to account for the risk the case presented. The Court also used the
percentage method as a cross-check to ensure the amount of fees was
reasonable.

First, whether it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court
to apply a multiplier.

Second, whether it was an abuse of discretion to compensate Class
Counsel for time spent litigating about the card-brand recovery
process.

Third, whether it was an abuse of discretion to compensate Class
Counsel for time spent soliciting class representatives.

And fourth, whether the District Court's order fails to provide
sufficient detail for meaningful appellate review.

The main issue underlying the appeal is whether the fee arrangement
outlined in the settlement should be characterized as a
constructive common fund or as a fee-shifting contract.

The Court reviews a district court's award of attorney's fees for
abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs if the judge
fails to apply the proper legal standard or to follow proper
procedures in making the determination, or bases an award upon
findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.

Before tackling the specific issues raised in Home Depot's appeal,
the Court addresses a preliminary question on which much of the
subsequent analysis turns: whether this is a common-fund or
fee-shifting case.

There are three exceptions to the American Rule: (1) when a statute
grants courts the authority to direct the losing party to pay
attorney's fees (2) when the parties agree in a contract that one
party will pay attorney's fees; and (3) when a court orders one
party to pay attorney's fees for acting in bad faith.

A common-fund case is when a lawyer who recovers a common fund for
the benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled
to a reasonable attorney's fee from the fund as a whole. This is
typical in class actions, where the class might receive a large
payout, from which the attorney derives his fees. Common-fund cases
are consistent with the American Rule, because the attorney's fees
come from the fund, which belongs to the class. In this way, the
client, not the losing party, pays the attorney's fees.  

Thus, the key distinction between common-fund and fee-shifting
cases is whether the attorney's fees are paid by the client, as in
common-fund cases or by the other party as in fee-shifting cases.

Applying this understanding of attorney's fees, the Court is
convinced that this is a fee-shifting case.

On its face, the settlement agreement provides that Home Depot will
pay the attorney's fees. The agreement states that Home Depot
agrees to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses of
counsel for the Financial Institution Plaintiffs. Even more
explicit, the agreement goes on to state that any award of
attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses shall be paid separate from
and in addition to the Settlement Fund. That sounds like fee
shifting.

Indeed, it is hard to imagine how the settlement agreement could be
any clearer that Home Depot will pay the attorney's fees, and that
payment will not come out of the class fund. A settlement agreement
is a contract, which the Court construes to effectuate the intent
of the parties, and the parties' intent seemed to be for the fees
to be paid separately by Home Depot, i.e., a fee-shifting
arrangement.

The rationale for the constructive common fund is that the
defendant negotiated the payment to the class and the payment to
counsel as a package deal. The defendant is concerned, first and
foremost, with its total liability. Thus, courts have recognized
that, as a practical matter, defendants undoubtedly take into
account the amount of attorney's fees when they agree on an amount
to pay the class.  By taking the amount of attorney's fees into
account, the defendant effectively reduces the class' recovery
accordingly.  

Admittedly, a defendant could and probably does make an educated
guess concerning the amount of attorney's fees, even when the
amount is left undetermined. But if this were enough to create a
constructive common fund, it would be virtually impossible to
contract for fee-shifting. The purported rule would be that any
class settlement no matter whether the fees are paid by the
defendant or out of the class award, or whether the fees are
negotiated separately or as part of the settlement should be
treated as a common fund. As a result, construing the agreement
here as a constructive common fund would effectively eliminate the
ability to contract for fee-shifting absent perhaps some magic-word
requirement.

In sum, the Court holds that the constructive common fund does not
apply when the agreement provides that attorney's fees will be paid
by the defendant separately from the settlement fund, and the
amount of those fees is left completely undetermined. The Court
construes the settlement agreement here as a fee-shifting
arrangement.

With these preliminary matters decided, the Court resumes with the
issues raised by Home Depot on appeal.

Depot argues that the District Court abused its discretion by
applying a multiplier to Class Counsel's lodestar. Home Depot bases
its argument on Supreme Court precedent outlining the use of
multipliers in statutory fee-shifting cases. Although we are not
bound in a contractual fee-shifting case by statutory fee-shifting
cases, the Court agrees that it was error for the District Court to
enhance Class Counsel's lodestar based on risk.

A reasonable fee is one sufficient to attract competent counsel to
represent the case, but not one that provides a windfall for
attorneys. There is a strong presumption that the lodestar yields a
reasonable fee for this purpose. Because the lodestar is presumed
to be sufficient, a multiplier will be appropriate only in rare and
exceptional cases. To warrant a multiplier, the fee applicant must
produce specific evidence that an enhancement is necessary to
provide a reasonable fee. An enhancement may be necessary if the
lodestar does not reflect the true value of counsel's work.  

The question becomes, what specific evidence would satisfy this
standard. The Supreme Court has made it plain that most, if not
all, of the factors used to determine a reasonable fee are already
subsumed in the lodestar, and it is not permissible to enhance a
fee based on a factor that is subsumed. That would be double
counting, i.e., a windfall. In a series of cases, the Court has
expanded on which factors are subsumed and why.

The Court offered three examples of when the lodestar may not
adequately capture counsel's superior performance. First, where the
method used in determining the hourly rate does not adequately
measure the attorney's true market value. Second, if counsel incurs
an extraordinary outlay of expenses in the case.Third, if there is
an exceptional delay in the payment of fees.

Finally, the Court determined that risk is not an appropriate basis
for a multiplier in statutory fee-shifting cases. The Court
explained that the risk of loss is the product of two inputs: (1)
the legal and factual merits of the claim and (2) the difficulty of
establishing those merits. The second input is subsumed in the
lodestar either in the higher number of hours expended to overcome
the difficulty, or in the higher hourly rate of the attorney
skilled and experienced enough to do so. While the first input is
not reflected in the lodestar, there are good reasons not to
enhance fees for the risk presented by meritless claims.  

Namely, if fees are enhanced for contingency fee cases as a class
rather than based on a risk assessment of each case it would
inevitably overcompensate some cases and undercompensate others.
Conversely, if fees are enhanced based on the riskiness of each
particular case, it would reward lawyers for taking cases with
relatively little merit and incentivize bad claims.

For this reason, not adjusting fees for risk is consistent with
fee-shifting statutes. These statutes limit fees to prevailing
parties, and adjusting fees for risk effectively subsidizes the
attorney's losing cases a result at odds with the prevailing party
requirement. Plus, enhancing for risk would make the setting of
fees more complex and arbitrary, hence more unpredictable, and
hence more litigable. For all of these reasons, the Supreme Court
decreed that courts could not use a multiplier in statutory
fee-shifting cases to account for risk.  

If these precedents apply, it was an abuse of discretion for the
District Court to apply a multiplier. The District Court's only
stated reason for using a multiplier was the exceptional risk taken
by counsel in litigating the case. And risk, according to the
Supreme Court, is not an appropriate basis for enhancing an
attorney's fee in statutory fee-shifting cases. But this is a
contractual fee-shifting arrangement.  

But this is a contractual fee-shifting case, not a common-fund
case. As such, it is more closely related to the Supreme Court
precedent governing fee-shifting statutes. And just because
precedent is not technically binding does not mean we should
blithely disregard it. To promote consistency in the law, the Court
should adhere to precedent where its reasoning applies.

For example, it makes sense to draw a clear line between
fee-shifting cases and common-fund cases. The common-fund doctrine
serves a different purpose preventing unjust enrichment and the
fees are paid by the client, rather than by the opposing party. In
contrast, the Supreme Court cases reviewed above and the present
case are all fee-shifting arrangements, where the fees are paid by
the other party and the purpose is to fairly compensate counsel for
the value of their work. The only difference is that the Supreme
Court cases are fee-shifting by statute, and this one is
fee-shifting by contract. Thus, while the statutory cases are not
binding on contractual arrangements, the Court will not lightly
cast aside the statutory fee-shifting precedent if its reasoning
applies with full force. Obviously, the reasoning does not apply if
it is specific to statutory interpretation.

With that in mind, the Court considers whether the Supreme Court's
reasons for limiting the use of multipliers in statutory
fee-shifting cases apply to contractual fee-shifting cases. The
Court's reasons largely turn on the point that most of the factors
used to justify an enhancement are already subsumed in the
lodestar, so it would result in a windfall to count them again with
a multiplier. This reasoning makes it just as unreasonable to
double-count in a contractual fee-shifting case as it is in a
statutory fee-shifting case.

Here, the District Court used a multiplier to account for risk. The
Supreme Court forbade adjusting for risk for a number of reasons.
To start, the Court said that risk was partly reflected in the
lodestar. For the part of risk that is not reflected in the
lodestar, the Court gave one reason for not using it to justify an
enhancement that is specific to statutes subsidizing losing claims
contrary to the prevailing-party requirement found in most
fee-shifting statutes. But the Court gave other reasons that apply
equally in contractual fee-shifting settings, such as incentivizing
meritless claims and making fees less predictable. Thus, on the
whole, the Court finds that the Court's prohibition on enhancements
for risk applies to contractual fee-shifting cases when courts use
the lodestar method.

Because it is inappropriate to enhance a lodestar in a fee-shifting
case to account for risk, the District Court abused its discretion
in applying a multiplier on the basis of the exceptional litigation
risk that class counsel took in litigating this case.

Class Counsel insists, however, that Home Depot waived the
multiplier issue. It's a close call, but the Court do not think
Home Depot waived the issue.

The Court generally will not review issues raised for the first
time on appeal.  But there is a difference between raising new
issues and making new arguments on appeal. If an issue is properly
presented, a party can make any argument in support of that
[issue]; parties are not limited to the precise arguments they made
below. This principle begs the question: does Home Depot raise a
new argument or a new issue?

Home Depot argued that the District Court should not apply a
multiplier to Class Counsel's lodestar. In support of this
position, Home Depot argued that Class Counsel did not achieve a
great result, the case was not more complex than the consumer case,
and Class Counsel did not face greater risk than counsel for the
consumers. Now, on appeal, Home Depot makes a different pitch: it's
not that the level of risk did not justify a multiplier; it's that
the District Court cannot use a multiplier to account for risk,
period. The new argument is based on a different line of precedents
and is inconsistent with the old argument, which seemed to accept
that multipliers for risk could be appropriate in the right
circumstances.

Nevertheless, in the final analysis, the Court thinks this is a new
argument, not a new issue. Home Depot asked the District Court not
to apply a multiplier. On appeal, Home Depot makes the same
request, albeit for different and contradictory reasons. The issue
was not waived.

The second issue Home Depot raises in its appeal is whether the
District Court abused its discretion by compensating Class Counsel
for the time spent litigating about the card-brand recovery
process.

Home Depot says that it was an abuse of discretion because our
precedent requires courts to deduct time spent on discrete and
unsuccessful claims. And the time spent litigating about the
card-brand recovery process—whether the release offers were
misleading and coercive, whether Home Depot improperly directed the
releases, and whether the releases should be vacated was, in Home
Depot's view, discrete and unsuccessful. However, the rule that
Home Depot relies on does not apply here.

The rule against compensating counsel for time spent on discrete
and unsuccessful claims comes from fee-shifting statutes.
Specifically, this rule derives from language commonly found in
such statutes that limits recovery to a prevailing party. Notably,
some fee-shifting statutes do not contain the prevailing-party
language, in which case, as you would expect, the prevailing-party
limitation does not apply.  

Here, of course, the fees are awarded pursuant to a contract, not a
statute, and there is no prevailing-party limitation in the
settlement agreement. Accordingly, the prevailing-party limitation
does not apply, and the District Court did not need to deduct time
spent on discrete and unsuccessful claims. Instead, the question is
simply whether the time spent was reasonable, which is the standard
set in the agreement.

Time spent is reasonable, and thus compensable, if it would be
proper to charge the time to a client.  As with a client, counsel
should not include in the lodestar hours that are excessive,
redundant or otherwise unnecessary. In other words, counsel must
exercise billing judgment. If counsel does not exercise billing
judgment, courts are obligated to do it for them. Thus, in the
final analysis, exclusions for excessive or unnecessary work on
given tasks must be left to the discretion of the district court.

In this case, it was firmly within the District Court's discretion
to compensate Class Counsel for time spent challenging the release
offers. To be clear, the release offers were effectively settlement
offers: they promised additional payment in exchange for releasing
the class claims.

Indeed, institutions representing around 70-80% of the compromised
payment cards settled their claims through the release offers.
Class Counsel thought these were lousy settlement offers and that
the class could recover more from the litigation. Moreover, Class
Counsel was concerned that the offers were misleading and coercive.
It was perfectly reasonable for Class Counsel to take action to
ensure that class members' releases were voluntary and informed,
especially since Class Counsel thought the terms were unfavorable.
To hold otherwise would be to say, as a matter of law, that it is
unreasonable for Class Counsel to ever oppose a settlement.

It was not an abuse of discretion to compensate Class Counsel for
time spent on the card-brand recovery process.

The third issue Home Depot raises in its appeal is whether the
District Court abused its discretion by compensating Class Counsel
for time spent soliciting class representatives.

A significant chunk of Class Counsel's lodestar included time spent
selecting and vetting class representatives. Class Counsel wanted
to ensure that if the proposed national class was not certified,
there would be state-specific classes as an alternative. To that
end, Class Counsel needed to find and select a class representative
from each state. Ultimately, Class Counsel secured representatives
from 44 states. This is a sound and not uncommon strategy. It is
also a time-consuming process.

In Barnes, 168 F.3d at 435, the Court said that hours spent looking
for and soliciting potential plaintiffs should not have been
included in the time billed. The Court explained that, based on
fee-shifting statutes, counsel is entitled to compensation for time
reasonably spent on the litigation. Thus, time spent procuring
potential plaintiffs is not compensable, because until the attorney
has a client, there is no case to litigate This reasoning made
sense in Barnes; it does not apply to this case.

As an initial matter, it is questionable whether the formal limit
on compensation to time spent on the litigation even applies, since
this case is not governed by a fee-shifting statute and the
settlement agreement says only that Class Counsel should be
compensated with a reasonable attorney's fee.  

Furthermore, it would be seriously misguided to say that Class
Counsel cannot be paid for time spent vetting class
representatives. Selecting proper class representatives is an
important part of what class counsel does. And counsellors should
be paid for work reasonably done on behalf of their clients.There
is no question that Class Counsel's efforts in this instance meet
that standard.

The Court holds that it was not an abuse of discretion to pay Class
Counsel for their time spent finding and vetting class
representatives.

Finally, Home Depot argues that the District Court's order does not
allow for meaningful review.

A district court has ample discretion in awarding fees and with
good reason. But that discretion is not without limits. A district
court's order on attorney's fees must allow meaningful review the
district court must articulate the decisions it made, give
principled reasons for those decisions, and show its calculation.
In other words, the court must provide a concise but clear
explanation of its reasons for the fee award. Home Depot contends
that the District Court failed to satisfy this requirement.

The Court disagrees.

Home Depot raises two alleged deficiencies in the order. First,
Home Depot complains that the District Court did not deduct a
single hour from Class Counsel's lodestar. Home Depot suggests that
it was unreasonable for the District Court to accept more than
21,000 hours without showing any analysis of those hours
specifically. While it is the obligation of district courts to
ensure that the hours claimed are reasonable,  the Court have said
that courts need not engage in an hour-by-hour analysis when the
fee motion and supporting documents are so voluminous that an
hour-by-hour review is simply impractical and a waste of judicial
resources.

The problem for Home Depot is that it did not make specific
objections to Class Counsel's lodestar. Instead, Home Depot offered
two general reasons why Class Counsel's hours were excessive:
first, because Class Counsel spent more than twice as many hours as
counsel in the consumer track; second, because it was unreasonable
to spend time litigating the card-brand recovery process. The
District Court responded to both arguments. It found that it was
reasonable to spend more time in the financial track.

The Court accepts that the lawyers for the financial institutions
have expended more effort than the lawyers who represented
consumers, that they had to expend more effort than did the
consumer lawyers in arriving at a settlement, and that dealing with
financial institutions rather than consumers added difficulty to
the process of litigating this case, such as finding adequate class
representatives, and thus required more time and effort.

And it determined that the issues relating to the card brand
recovery processes were appropriate for plaintiffs to address in
this case. The latter response is a little conclusory, but Home
Depot's argument below for why this time was not reasonably spent
was equally conclusory: The Court should not compensate Plaintiffs
for this time, accompanied by a citation stating that only hours
reasonably expended are included in the lodestar. Given the lack of
specificity of Home Depot's objections, the District Court's
response was adequate.

The second deficiency raised by Home Depot is that the District
Court did not address the Johnson factors in its order.23
Essentially, Home Depot asks us to declare that, in order to allow
for meaningful review, an order awarding attorney's fees must
explicitly consider the Johnso nfactors. The Court have never
announced such a rule, and the Court declines to do so now. Such a
rule would be especially misguided in cases using the lodestar
method.

With the percentage method, courts use the Johnson factors to help
determine what percentage of the fund to award

The Court's precedent puts this a little differently. We have said
that courts may use the Johnson factors to determine what is a
'reasonable' hourly rate and what number of compensable hours is
reasonable. But that does not mean that courts should march through
the Johnson factors considering the time and labor required, the
novelty and difficulty of the issues, the results obtained, etc. to
arrive at an hourly rate. Instead, after counsel proposes an hourly
rate based on the prevailing market rate in the community, courts
may consider the Johnson factors to determine if the proposed rate
accurately reflects the true worth of counsel.  

While the Supreme Court reserves this analysis whether the market
rate is an accurate reflection of counsel's true worth for the
adjustment stage, the result is the same. The Court use the Johnson
factors to adjust the hourly rate, the Supreme Court uses the
Johnson factors to adjust the overall lodestar. Either way, the
Johnson factors are relevant only in the rare cases where they are
not fully captured in the lodestar.

The crucial point, under both line of precedents, is that the
Johnson factors are largely redundant to the lodestar analysis
because they are almost always subsumed in the lodestar.
Consequently, it would be inefficient, to say the least, to require
district courts to slog through the Johnson factors when those
factors have little independent bearing on the analysis.

The here is no merit to Home Depot's contention that the District
Court's order does not allow for meaningful review.
  
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in
part, and remanded.

A full-text copy of the Eleventh Circuit's July 25, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y6snxsx4 from Leagle.com.

Thomas A Withers -- twithers@gwllawfirm.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross Appellant.

Jere L. Beasley -- jere.beasley@beasleyallen.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross Appellant.

Kristine McAlister Brown -- kristy.brown@alston.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant-Cross Appellee.

Roy E. Barnes, 31 Atlanta Street, Marietta, Georgia 30060, for
Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross Appellant.

John R. Bevis, 31 Atlanta Street, Marietta, Georgia 30060, for
Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross Appellant.

Michael L. Roberts, 153 S 9th St, Gadsden, Alabama 35901, for
Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross Appellan

Andrew J. Knight, II -- ajknight@mppkj.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant-Cross Appellee.

John E. Suthers -- jes@sutherslaw.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant-Cross Appellee.

Eileen Tilghman Moss -- elmoss@shb.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant-Cross Appellee.

Daniel B. Rogers -- drogers@shb.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant-Cross Appellee.


HONSHU LLC: Cao Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages, Withheld Tips
------------------------------------------------------
Weiqing Cao, individually and on behalf of all other employees
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Honshu, LLC. and Fendai Chen,
Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-15528 (D. N.J., July 18, 2019), seeks
unpaid overtime compensation, unpaid minimum wages, recovery of
illegally-withheld tips, liquidated damages, prejudgment and
post-judgment interest and attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law
including monetary damages and other relief.

Defendants operate "Honshu Sushi," a sushi restaurant business
located at 95 Greene Street, Jersey City where Cao was hired as a
delivery driver. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Qinyu Fan, Esq.
      HANG & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
      136-20 38th Avenue, Suite 10G
      Flushing, NY 11354
      Tel: (718)353-8588
      Fax: (718) 353-6288
      Email: qfan@hanglaw.com


HOTBOX DETOX: Sims Sues over Unsolicited Text Messages
------------------------------------------------------
KELLY SIMS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. HOTBOX DETOX, LLC D/B/A HOTWORX
STUDIO, a Florida Limited Liability Company, the Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-23143-XXXX (S.D. Fla., July 30, 2019), contends that
the Defendant promotes and markets its merchandise, in part, by
sending unsolicited text messages to wireless phone users, in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Defendant is a specialized 24-hour fitness studio. To promote
its services, Defendant engages in unsolicited marketing, harming
thousands of consumers in the process. The case arises from
Defendant's unauthorized text messages to cellular subscribers who
never provided Defendant with prior express consent, as well as
cellular subscribers who expressly requested not to receive
Defendant's text messages.

As a result, the Defendant caused thousands of text messages to be
sent to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and Class Members who
either never provided Defendant with consent to contact them or who
had revoked any prior express consent.

The Defendant caused Plaintiff and Class Members injuries,
including invasion of their privacy, aggravation, annoyance,
intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt Defendant’s illegal
conduct, which has resulted in the invasion of privacy, harassment,
aggravation, and disruption of the daily life of thousands of
individuals. The Plaintiff also seeks statutory damages on behalf
of herself and members of the class, and any other available legal
or equitable remedies.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Class are:

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 1205
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: 305-479-2299
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
                  gberg@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          Jordan D. Utanski, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, PA
          19495 Biscayne Blvd No. 607
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: 305-975-3320
          E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com
                  utanski@edelsberglaw.com

HP INC: $1.77MM Attys' Fees Awarded in Printer Firmware Update Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE HP PRINTER FIRMWARE UPDATE LITIGATION, Case No.
5:16-cv-05820-EJD (N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward J. Davila of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose
Division, (i) granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs'
motion for attorneys' fees, and (ii) granted their motion for costs
and ervice awards to each of the five Class Representatives.

Numerous consumers reported that their HP printers unexpectedly
stopped working on or around Sept. 13, 2016.  Approximately a month
later, Plaintiffs Richard San Miguel and DeLores Lawty filed suit,
alleging that HP had violated California's Unfair Competition Law
("UCL") by executing a firmware update that disabled HP inkjet
printers that were fitted with certain replacement ink cartridges
manufactured by HP's competitors.  They alleged that the failed HP
printers displayed a false or misleading error message that the ink
cartridges were "damaged or missing," when in fact HP had disabled
the printers to induce purchases of its own higher-priced
cartridges. Approximately a week after the lawsuit was filed, HP
issued a modified apology on its website to add an offer of a
remedial "patch" that HP claimed would restore printer
functionality.

In December of 2016, HP moved to dismiss the action, arguing that
it had no duty to keep its printers compatible with third-party ink
cartridges with infringing security chips, and that it made no
representation of that compatibility.  After a few cases were
related and consolidated, Plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended
complaint adding several more claims.  HP renewed its motion to
dismiss and the matter was taken under submission.

Meanwhile, the parties engaged in discovery.  The Plaintiffs
learned that HP's "Dynamic Security" technology caused the printers
to stop functioning, but that HP had "turned off" the Dynamic
Security technology in the Class Printers as of December 2017.
Dynamic Security is an HP-developed technology which causes Class
Printers to run authentication checks that change over time on
installed ink cartridges to determine whether the ink cartridges
contain a non-HP security chip, and that may prevent Class Printers
from operating with any such ink cartridges.

The Plaintiffs later moved for a hybrid Rule 23(b)(2)-(c)(4)
certification of (1) a subclass of California printer owners
seeking injunctive relief under the UCL, and (2) a national class
of consumers who experienced print interruptions for purposes of
adjudicating the liability elements of the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act ("CFAA") and trespass-to-chattels claims, with individualized
damages proceedings to follow.  The Plaintiffs also sought and were
granted leave to file a consolidated amended complaint.  The
parties stipulated that the pending motion to dismiss would apply
to the consolidated amended complaint.

In March of 2018, the Court entered an order granting in part and
denying in part HP's motion to dismiss.  It upheld the Plaintiffs'
computer intrusion claims under the CFAA and the California Penal
Code, the trespass claims at common law, and the statutory consumer
fraud claims to the extent they were based on HP's misleading error
messages and material omissions.  The Court dismissed the
Plaintiffs' UCL unfairness and tortious interference claims and
others with leave to amend.

A few days later the parties entered into settlement discussions
and succeeded in reaching a settlement in principle in mid-July of
2018.  In November of 2018, the Court granted the Plaintiffs'
motion for preliminary approval of the proposed settlement, and in
April of 2019, the court granted final approval of the settlement.

Through the Settlement, HP agreed to pay $1.5 million in
compensation to owners of certain HP inkjet printers.  HP also
agreed to pay for all notice and administration costs required to
effectuate the Settlement.  With respect to non-monetary relief, HP
agreed not to reactivate Dynamic Security on the printers at issue.
HP also agreed to reimburse the Plaintiffs' counsel for
out-of-pocket litigation costs that were actually and reasonably
incurred.  The Settlement further provided that the Plaintiffs'
counsel would apply to the court for attorneys' fees and expenses
to be paid by HP.

Presently before the Court is the Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys'
fees in the amount of $2.75 million, costs in the amount of
$83,011.78 and $5,000 service awards to each of the five class
representatives.

Joseph Saveri Law Firm, Inc. calculated lodestar figure is
$246,209.50; the Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C. figure is
$413,855; the Girard Sharp LLP law firm figure is $1,991,950; the
Heninger Garrison Davis LLC law firm figure is $170,170; and the
Karon LLC law firm figure is $135,914.  The total calculated
lodestar is $2,958,099.  The Plaintiffs' counsel, however, seek a
lesser amount -- $2.75 million—which is approximately 0.93 of the
counsels' calculated lodestar.   Judge Davila finds that the hourly
rates for the partners and associates of each Plaintiffs' firm are
consistent with market rates and are reasonable.

The Judge next considers whether the hours claimed are reasonable.
He finds that there are numerous entries that are too vague to
determine whether the hours billed were reasonable.  These amounts
will be excluded.  The billing records include numerous entries
related to MDL proceedings No. 2763.  These amounts will also be
excluded.

The billing records from the Friedman Firm include 20 hours for Mr.
Friedman's travel time and appearances at the July 14, 2017 hearing
on HP's motion to dismiss and the Nov. 8, 2018 hearing on the
Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary approval.  These hours are
unreasonably high given that Mr. Friedman did not argue either
motion and the hearings for the motions took less than an hour in
total.  Accordingly, the Judge will exclude $12,325 (17 hours x
$725/hour) from the Friedman Firm's fee request.

The Judge also finds that the Plaintiffs were successful in
achieving benefits for the class.  The level of success achieved,
however, does not justify an award of fees that is 200% of the
monetary amount obtained for the class.

HP contends that a cross-check is appropriate to determine whether
the requested fees are excessive and asks that the Court awards no
more than $375,000, which is 25% of the monetary benefit to the
class.  The Judge has already applied a 30% across-the-board
reduction to arrive a reasonable fee amount.  Any further
reductions are unwarranted.  Furthermore, a cross-check is not
required.  Hence, the Judge awarded $1,772,979.95 in attorneys'
fes.

The Counsel incurred $83,011.78 in unreimbursed, out-of-pocket
expenses in the action.  The Judge accepts the counsels'
declarations as verification of the costs that have been incurred
and finds that the requested amount is reasonable.  He approved the
costs.

Finally, the Plaintiffs request that the court approve service
awards in the amount of $5,000 to each of the five Class
Representatives.  HP agrees to pay each of the five class
representatives $5,000, subject to Court approval.  The service
awards are approved.  The requested service awards are reasonable
considering each representative's efforts in the case.

Having considered the parties' briefing and conducted an in camera
review of the billing records, Judge Davila (i) granted in part and
deny in part the Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees, and (ii)
granted the Plaintiffs' motion for costs and service awards.  

A full-text copy of the Court's June 28, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/2QNn9z from Leagle.com.

Richard San Miguel, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated & DeLores Lawty, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Elizabeth
Antonia Kramer -- ekramer@girardsharp.com -- Girard Sharp LLP,
Jordan S. Elias -- jelias@girardsharp.com -- Girard Sharp LLP,
Taylor Christopher Bartlett -- Taylor@hgdlawfirm.com -- Heninger
Garrison Davis, pro hac vice, Todd Michael Friedman, Law Offices of
Todd M. Friedman, P.C. & Daniel C. Girard --
dgirard@girardsharp.com -- Girard Sharp LLP.

Christopher Ware, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel C. Girard,
Girard Sharp LLP, Elizabeth Antonia Kramer, Girard Sharp LLP,
Joseph R. Saveri, Joseph Saveri Law Firm, Inc., Todd Michael
Friedman, Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C. & Jordan S. Elias,
Girard Sharp LLP.

Robert Doty, Plaintiff, represented by Adrian R. Bacon, Law Offices
of Todd M. Friedman, P.C., Todd Michael Friedman, Law Offices of
Todd M. Friedman, P.C., Elizabeth Antonia Kramer, Girard Sharp LLP
& Jordan S. Elias, Girard Sharp LLP.

Richard Faust, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel C. Girard, Girard
Sharp LLP, Elizabeth Antonia Kramer, Girard Sharp LLP, Todd Michael
Friedman, Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C. & Jordan S. Elias,
Girard Sharp LLP.

James Andrews, Plaintiff, represented by Adrian R. Bacon, Law
Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C., Todd Michael Friedman, Law
Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C., Elizabeth Antonia Kramer, Girard
Sharp LLP & Jordan S. Elias, Girard Sharp LLP.

HP Inc., Delaware corporation, Defendant, represented by Samuel G.
Liversidge -- sliversidge@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher
LLP, Jared Michael Strumwasser, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP & Joseph
C. Hansen, Gibson, Dunn Crutcher LLP.


INDEPENDENT BANK: Discovery Ongoing in Suit over BOH Acquisition
----------------------------------------------------------------
Independent Bank Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 25, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that discovery in the
lawsuit related to the acquisition of BOH Holdings has been
extended and the Company now expects that the trial will be delayed
until sometime after May 2020.

Independent Bank is a party to a legal proceeding inherited by
Independent Bank in connection with the Company's acquisition of
BOH Holdings, Inc. and its subsidiary, Bank of Houston, or BOH,
that was completed on April 15, 2014.

Several entities related to R.A. Stanford, or the Stanford
Entities, including Stanford International Bank, Ltd., or SIBL, had
deposit accounts at BOH. Certain individuals who had purchased
certificates of deposit from SIBL filed a class action lawsuit
against several banks, including BOH, on November 11, 2009 in the
U.S. District Court Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, in
a case styled Peggy Roif Rotstain, et al. on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, v. Trustmark National Bank, et
al., Civil Action No. 3:09-CV-02384-N-BG.

The suit alleges, among other things, that the plaintiffs were
victims of fraud by SIBL and other Stanford Entities and seeks to
recover damages and alleged fraudulent transfers by the defendant
banks.

On May 1, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion requesting permission
to file a Second Amended Class Action Complaint in this case, which
motion was subsequently granted. The Second Amended Class Action
Complaint asserted previously unasserted claims, including aiding
and abetting or participation in a fraudulent scheme based upon the
large amount of deposits that the Stanford Entities held at BOH and
the alleged knowledge of certain BOH officers.

The plaintiffs seek recovery from Independent Bank and other
defendants for their losses.

The case was inactive due to a court-ordered discovery stay issued
March 2, 2015 pending the Court's ruling on plaintiff's motion for
class certification and designation of class representatives and
counsel. On November 7, 2017, the Court issued an order denying the
plaintiff's motion.

In addition, the Court lifted the previously ordered discovery
stay. On January 11, 2018, the Court entered a scheduling order
providing that the case be ready for trial on January 27, 2020.

However, discovery in this case has been extended and the Company
now expects that the trial will be delayed until sometime after May
2020.

Independent Bank said, "The Company has experienced an increase in
legal fees associated with the defense of this claim and
anticipates further increases in legal fees as the case proceeds to
trial."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Independent Bank Group, Inc. operates as a national commercial
bank. The Bank offers personal and business banking services.
Independent Bank provides personal checking accounts, loans, debit
and credit cards, mobile banking, and investment services.
Independent Bank Group serves customers in the State of Texas. The
company is based in McKinney, Texas.


IOWA HEALTH: Court Narrows Claims in Date Breach Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for Western District of Wisconsin
issued an Opinion and Order granting in part Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss in the case captioned YVONNE MART FOX, GRANT NESHEIM,
DANIELLE DUCKLEY, and SHELLY KITSIS, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. IOWA HEALTH SYSTEM
d/b/a UNITYPOINT HEALTH, Defendant. No. 18-cv-327-jdp. (W.D.
Wis.).

UnityPoint moves to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) for lack of standing and under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Defendant UnityPoint Health runs a network of hospitals, clinics,
home care services, and health insurers throughout Wisconsin, Iowa,
and Illinois. In 2017 and 2018, UnityPoint's email system was
hacked. Plaintiffs, all customers of UnityPoint, say that hackers
obtained their private health information and other personal
identifying information (such as Social Security numbers) that can
be used to commit identity theft. Plaintiffs filed this proposed
class action, asserting 14 different claims under Wisconsin,
Illinois, and Iowa law.

UnityPoint moves to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint for lack of
standing and for failure to state a claim. On all aspects of
UnityPoint's motion, the court accepts plaintiffs' well-pleaded
factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inference from
those facts in plaintiffs' favor.  

In deciding the jurisdictional issue of standing, the court may
consider supporting evidence adduced by the parties. But the court
may not consider any evidence from outside the pleadings in
deciding the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim. The question under Rule 12(b)(6) is simply whether
the complaint includes factual allegations that state a plausible
claim for relief.

Standing

Plaintiffs bear the burden to establish standing to sue in federal
court. Standing requires (1) an injury in fact (2) that is fairly
traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant and (3) that
is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.
UnityPoint contends that plaintiffs cannot establish the first two
elements.

Injury in fact

To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she
suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest that is
concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural
or hypothetical. An injury must be certainly impending to
constitute an injury in fact.

The Plaintiffs have alleged several injuries: lost time due to
increased spam calls and emails, time spent dealing with fraud
attempts, the threat of future identity theft, and money spent
mitigating that threat. Any of these allegations would be
sufficient to establish standing; even an identifiable trifle can
constitute an injury in fact.  And the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held that injuries like plaintiffs'
injuries are sufficient to establish standing in data breach
cases.

And in this case, plaintiff have alleged facts sufficient to
establish an objectively reasonable likelihood of future identity
theft. Personal information, including Social Security numbers, was
stolen in the data breaches. The breaches were serious enough that
UnityPoint offered identity-theft protection services to the
affected customers. And plaintiffs say that thieves used the
information to target Fox for a medical scam, open a new credit
card in Nesheim's name, and attempt to gain access to Duckley's
Experian account. Even if plaintiffs had not already lost time
resolving fraud attempts and answering spam calls, the looming
threat of fraud would qualify as an injury in fact.

Fairly traceable

UnityPoint says that hackers may have obtained plaintiffs'
information from other sources, and that plaintiffs cannot show
that any of their alleged injuries were caused by the UnityPoint
data breaches. In the context of standing, the complaint need only
allege that but for some act or omission of the defendant, the
injury would not have occurred.  If a defendant puts forth evidence
that challenges standing as a factual matter, then the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to "come forward with competent proof that
standing exists.

UnityPoint says that it has put forth unrebutted evidence that
challenges plaintiffs' allegations of causation: a declaration from
UnityPoint's privacy officer that says that no email addresses,
passwords, credit card numbers, or account login information were
stolen in the data breach and screenshots of Fox's personal website
that show that her email address and phone number are publicly
available. This evidence casts doubt on the traceability of some of
plaintiffs' allegations, namely the increases in spam calls and
emails (particularly those received by Fox, who published her
contact information) and the fraudulent charge on Nesheim's credit
card because credit card numbers weren't included in the breach.

But UnityPoint has not rebutted plaintiffs' allegations that
hackers also stole patient names, addresses, Social Security
numbers, dates of birth, and medical records. Plaintiffs have
plausibly alleged injuries that can be linked to this information.
Nesheim says that someone attempted to open a credit card in his
name using his personal health information and Duckley says that
someone used information from the data breach to try to log in to
her Experian account. Plaintiffs also allege that the information
exposed in the first data breach was serious enough that UnityPoint
encouraged Fox to "take precautions to protect her information.

In the end, UnityPoint may be correct that some other entity
exposed the plaintiffs' private information and is responsible for
the injuries listed in the complaint. But that is an issue of
causation that will need to be resolved at trial or summary
judgment. At this stage plaintiffs have alleged injuries that are
fairly traceable to UnityPoint's data breaches.

Failure to state a claim

The Plaintiffs assert 14 claims: (1) negligence (2) negligence per
se (3) violation of Wisconsin's confidentiality of health records
statute (4) violation of Wisconsin, Illinois, and Iowa's breach
notification statutes (5) invasion of privacy, (6)
misrepresentation (7) breach of contract (8) breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing (9) violation of the Wisconsin
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, (10) violation of the Illinois
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, (11) violation of the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, (12)
violation of Iowa's consumer fraud statute (13) unjust enrichment
and (14) declaratory relief.

UnityPoint moves to dismiss all 14 claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The
court will evaluate the claims in logical groups, not necessarily
the order set forth above.

Economic loss doctrine

UnityPoint contends that in Illinois and Iowa the economic loss
doctrine bars plaintiffs' claims for negligence, negligence per se,
misrepresentation, and invasion of privacy. The court agrees that
the economic loss doctrine applies to the claims for negligence and
negligence per se, and it will dismiss those claims for plaintiffs
Duckley and Kitsis. The court will dismiss the misrepresentation
and invasion-ofprivacy claims on other grounds, so it need not
decide whether the economic loss doctrine applies to them.

The economic loss doctrine bars a plaintiff from using a tort claim
to recover purely economic losses arising from a contractual
relationship.  

The Plaintiffs say that Iowa recently abandoned the doctrine when
it adopted the Restatement (Third) of Torts. They rely on an
unpublished federal district court case that predicts that Iowa
courts will stop using the economic loss rule in the future. But
more recently, the Iowa Supreme Court revisited the economic loss
doctrine and described its continued applicability (subject to
exceptions that do not apply here. Because the Iowa Supreme Court
says that it still follows the doctrine, the court will apply it to
Kitsis's Iowa claims as well as Duckley's Illinois's claims.

The Plaintiffs give three reasons why the doctrine should not apply
in this case, but none of them are persuasive.

First, plaintiffs say that they have suffered the following
non-economic damages: drained phone batteries from an increase in
spam calls; lost time; loss in the value of their private health
information and damages caused by the violation of their privacy
rights, attempted and/or actual identity theft and fraud, statutory
violations, and being placed at increased risk of identity theft
and fraud in the future. But all of these are economic damages
because they reflect a pecuniary loss rather than a personal injury
or damage to property. Plaintiffs argue that a phone battery is
damaged when it loses its charge, but this is a stretch  the only
expense associated with a drained phone battery is the money spent
recharging it. And claims for inconvenience or lost time fall
squarely within the economic loss doctrine.  

Second, for the proposition that the economic loss doctrine applies
only in cases where the parties have negotiated and established
contractual remedies for the underlying harm. Instead, both parties
had contracts with the same third parties, and because they had the
opportunity to negotiate remedies as part of those contracts, the
economic loss doctrine barred the introduction of new remedies
under a theory of tort. The same logic applies here: the plaintiffs
had a contract with UnityPoint for health services, and the parties
had an opportunity to include a remedy for data breaches as part of
their contract but chose not to.

Third, plaintiffs say that the doctrine does not apply to Duckley
or the proposed Illinois class because UnityPoint had a preexisting
duty to protect patient health records under federal law.
Plaintiffs argue that Illinois has an exception to the economic
loss doctrine for duties that exist independent of any contract.
But this exception applies only in professional malpractice cases,
such as claims for legal malpractice, in which the defendant is a
member of a skilled profession and has a duty of reasonable
professional competence. It does not apply simply because
UnityPoint violated a federal statute.

Negligence under Wisconsin law

UnityPoint contends that Fox and Nesheim's claims for negligence
and negligence per se must be dismissed because plaintiffs have
failed to allege actual damages. But Rule 8 does not create a
pleading standard for damages beyond what is necessary to establish
standing. To say that the plaintiffs have standing is to say that
they have alleged injury in fact, and if they have suffered an
injury then damages are available. Furthermore, both Fox and
Nesheim have alleged measurable, pecuniary damages that they
suffered as a result of the data breaches. Fox says that she
subscribed to a credit monitoring service to mitigate the risk of
identity theft after the first data breach. Nesheim says that he
had to buy a second phone to use for work because he received too
many spam calls on his personal phone.  

This is sufficient at the pleading stage.

Wisconsin confidentiality of health records statute

Wisconsin Statute Section 146.82(1) says that patient health care
records may be released only with the informed consent or
authorization of the patient, or to persons otherwise designated by
the statute. Any person who negligently violates the statute shall
be liable to any person injured as a result of the violation for
actual damages to that person, exemplary damages of not more than
$1,000 and costs and reasonable actual attorney fees. Plaintiffs
Fox and Nesheim say that UnityPoint negligently released their
health care records without consent, and that they suffered actual
damages through credit monitoring fees and the cost of buying a new
phone to avoid spam calls. That is more than sufficient for Fox and
Nesheim to state a claim that they were injured by UnityPoint's
violation of the statute.

Invasion of privacy

The court will dismiss plaintiffs' claims for invasion of privacy
because plaintiffs have not alleged that UnityPoint intentionally
disclosed their private information. None of the plaintiffs' home
states recognize a claim for invasion of privacy for negligent or
reckless behavior that results in a third party's disclosure of
plaintiffs' private information.

The parties focus on Wisconsin law, so the court will start there.
In Wisconsin, torts related to the invasion of privacy are codified
under Wisconsin Statute Section 995.50. Plaintiffs' claims arise
under subsection (2)(c), which creates a cause of action for the
publication of private information. A claim for publication of
private information has four elements: (1) a public disclosure of
facts regarding the plaintiff (2) the facts disclosed are private
facts (3) the private matter made public is one which would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities;
and (4) the defendant acted either unreasonably or recklessly as to
whether there was a legitimate public interest in the matter, or
with actual knowledge that none existed.  

Section 995.50 does not specify whether the first element of this
claim requires intentional disclosure by the defendant. But
Wisconsin Statute Section 893.57 categorizes invasion of privacy as
an intentional tort, alongside other intentional torts like
assault, battery, and false imprisonment. And courts that have
considered similar claims in other jurisdictions have held that
intentional action is required. Section 995.50 is to be interpreted
in accordance with the developing common law of privacy, so it's
likely that Wisconsin courts would come to the same conclusion as
these other courts.

In contrast, plaintiffs have pointed to no authority (and the court
has found none in which a defendant was held liable under this
statute, or a similar statute, for information stolen by a third
party.

The Plaintiffs say that Iowa courts have not decided whether an
invasion-of-privacy claim requires the defendant to intentionally
publish private information, but that "one would expect Iowa law to
follow the same approach as Wisconsin and Illinois. The court
agrees with this assessment, but unfortunately for plaintiffs,
neither Wisconsin or Illinois allows claims for negligent or
reckless publication of private information.

So the court will dismiss all the invasion-of-privacy claims.

Fraud and misrepresentation claims

The Plaintiffs assert five claims related to alleged
misrepresentations made by UnityPoint: (1) common law
misrepresentation, (2) violation of the Wisconsin Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (3) violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act (4) violation of the Iowa Consumer
Fraud Act and (5) violation of the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act.

UnityPoint says that all five claims are subject to heightened
pleading standards under Rule 9(b), which requires plaintiffs to
plead fraud claims with particularity. Plaintiffs agree that their
claims for common law misrepresentation are subject to heightened
pleading, but they argue that their statutory claims are subject to
ordinary notice pleading under Rule 8.

The court need not decide the pleading standard issue because even
under Rule 8's relaxed pleading standard, plaintiffs fail to state
any claims related to misrepresentation. The first four claims fail
because plaintiffs have not alleged facts showing that they relied
on UnityPoint's statements or suffered damages because of them.

The claim for violation of the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act fails because plaintiffs have not alleged facts
showing that UnityPoint's misrepresentations are likely to cause
future injury.

Common law misrepresentation and consumer fraud statutes

The court starts with plaintiffs' claim for misrepresentation,
together with claims for violation of the Wisconsin Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act, and the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act. All four claims
require plaintiffs to prove either their reliance on UnityPoint's
misrepresentations or that they suffered actual damages caused by
the misrepresentations.

In Wisconsin, a claim for intentional or negligent
misrepresentation requires plaintiffs to prove that (1) the
defendant made a representation of fact (2) that was untrue and (3)
that plaintiffs relied on it to their damage. Plaintiffs must also
prove reliance to prevail on a misrepresentation claim under
Illinois or Iowa law.

A claim under the Wisconsin Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Wis.
Stat. Section 100.18, is similar to a claim for common law
misrepresentation, except that plaintiffs do not need to prove
reliance. Instead, they must prove that the representation
materially induced (caused) a pecuniary loss to the plaintif[s.
Likewise, a claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/2, requires plaintiffs to
prove that the misrepresentation caused plaintiffs to suffer actual
pecuniary loss.

The Plaintiffs say that the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act, I.C. Section
714H, does not require them to prove reliance or damages. But the
case they cite is referring to actions brought by the Iowa attorney
general under I.C. Section 714.16. Private actions are brought
under I.C. Section 714H.5, and that statute requires plaintiffs to
prove an ascertainable loss of money or property caused by the
misrepresentation.

First, plaintiffs say that UnityPoint intentionally misrepresented
the scope of the breaches by telling customers that the first data
breach did not include Social Security numbers and that the second
breach did not affect its electronic medical record system. But
these allegations are conclusory; plaintiffs do not explain how
they relied on the statements or would have changed their behavior
had they known they were false. And it's not clear what additional
steps plaintiffs could have taken if UnityPoint had fully informed
them. A mere statement that plaintiffs could have done something to
mitigate their injuries is insufficient to allege reliance or
damages.

Second, plaintiffs allege that UnityPoint's privacy policy
misrepresented that health care records were stored in a secure
database that could be accessed by only a few computer technicians.
Again, plaintiffs have not alleged facts showing that they relied
on these statements or that the statements caused them damage. None
of the plaintiffs say that the privacy policy was a factor in their
decision to choose UnityPoint as a healthcare provider, or that
they were even aware of the policy before the data breach.  

Because the alleged facts fail to show any reliance by plaintiffs,
or any link between the alleged misrepresentations and the damages
suffered by plaintiffs, the court will dismiss plaintiffs' claims
for misrepresentation and violation of the consumer fraud
statutes.

Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act

Duckley contends that UnityPoint's misrepresentations about its
security procedures violate the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (UDTPA). The UDTPA was enacted to prohibit unfair
competition and was not intended to be a consumer protection
statute. Nonetheless, a consumer may seek injunctive relief under
the act if she can show that she is likely to be damaged in the
future by the defendant's misleading trade practices. In most
consumer actions, however, the plaintiff is unable to allege facts
showing a likelihood of future harm because the harm has already
occurred, and because the plaintiff is unlikely to be deceived by
defendant's misstatements again in the future.  

In this case, Duckley says that UnityPoint has shown a repeated
pattern of dishonesty by misrepresenting the scope of its breaches,
exaggerating the actions it took in response to the first breach,
and continuing to represent that it keeps patient health
information in a secure database. In short, UnityPoint has a
history of making empty promises to patients that it will secure
their information without actually doing so. But even if UnityPoint
continues to make similar misrepresentations in the future, Duckley
does not explain how this creates a likelihood of future damage to
her. She argues that UnityPoint's misrepresentations leave her
unaware about the full scope of the data breaches and whether her
data is protected from future unauthorized access. But these
arguments go to the risk of harm that Duckley faces from the data
breaches themselves, not the risk of harm that she faces if
UnityPoint continues to misrepresent its protective measures.

And because Duckley does not explain how this risk of harm will be
abated if the court enters an injunction ordering UnityPoint to
stop making misrepresentations, the court will dismiss Duckley's
claim under the UDTPA.

Breach notification statutes

The Plaintiffs assert claims for violations of Wisconsin's,
Illinois's, and Iowa's data breach notification statutes. The court
will dismiss all three claims. The Wisconsin statute does not
create a private right of action, and plaintiffs have not alleged
facts showing that they suffered damages as a result of
UnityPoint's violation of the Illinois and Iowa statutes.

Wisconsin's notification statue

Under Wisconsin law, a statute provides a private right of action
only if there is a clear indication of the legislature's intent to
create such a right. An implied right of action is created only
when (1) the language or the form of the statute indicates the
legislature's intent to create a private right of action and (2)
the statute establishes private civil liability rather than merely
providing for protection of the public.  

Wisconsin Statute Section 134.98 requires companies that do
business in Wisconsin to notify their customers within 45 days of a
data breach. But the Wisconsin legislature made clear that
violation of the statute does not itself establish civil liability:
"Failure to comply with this section is not negligence or a breach
of any duty, but may be evidence of negligence or a breach of a
legal duty. The Plaintiffs concede that, under this language, a
bare procedural violation of the statute does not impose liability
or constitute a breach of duty for a negligence claim. But they
argue that the legislature intended to impose liability when a
defendant's violation of the statute is also a violation of a
separate, preexisting duty of care. But that would already be a
claim for common law negligence, so even in that case, the statute
would not create a right of action. Because the legislature has not
provided any indication that Section 134.98 creates a separate
right of action, the court will dismiss plaintiffs' claims under
the statute.

Illinois and Iowa data breach statutes

Unlike the Wisconsin statute, the Illinois data breach statute, 815
ILCS 530/20, clearly creates a private right of action. A violation
of the statute constitutes an unlawful practice under the Illinois
Consumer Fraud Deceptive Business Practices Act. And the Consumer
Fraud Act allows consumers to bring private actions when damaged by
an unlawful practice.  

The only courts to have interpreted the Iowa breach notification
statute have held that it is ambiguous as to whether it creates a
private right of action.5 But plaintiffs contend that, like the
Illinois statute, they may bring an action for violation of the
Iowa breach notification statute under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act.
UnityPoint does not respond to plaintiffs' arguments. The court
will assume, without deciding, that the Iowa statute works the same
way as the Illinois statute, and that a violation of Section 715C.2
can give rise to a claim under Section 714H.2.

Because plaintiffs do not explain how they would have suffered less
damages had UnityPoint notified them sooner, the court will dismiss
their claims for violations of the breach notification statutes.

Contract claims

The Plaintiffs assert claims for breach of contract and breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court will allow
plaintiffs to proceed on both claims.

To state a claim for breach of contract, plaintiffs must allege:
(1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract (2)
substantial performance by the plaintiff (3) a breach by the
defendant and (4) resultant damages. Plaintiffs say that the data
breaches were caused when UnityPoint breached its privacy policy.
UnityPoint says that the privacy policy is not a contract, that it
did not breach the policy, and that there are no damages. As
already explained above, plaintiffs have adequately alleged that
they were damaged by the data breach. So at this point the court
need consider only the other two disputed elements.

UnityPoint says that even if the policy is binding, plaintiffs have
not alleged any breach of the policy. But plaintiffs plausibly
allege that UnityPoint breached its promise to store patient
information in a secure database when it sent patient health
information in employee email attachments. And in any event, the
allegations in the complaint allow the court to reasonably infer
that the data breach occurred because UnityPoint did not follow the
procedures laid out in its privacy policy. Plaintiffs have pleaded
sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss.

As for plaintiffs' claim for breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, UnityPoint says only the court should dismiss it
as duplicative of the breach of contract claim. But this claim may
be pleaded as an alternative to the breach of contract claim.
Because that is UnityPoint's only argument for dismissing this
claim, the court will allow the claim to proceed.

Unjust enrichment

As an alternative to the contract claims, plaintiffs assert a claim
for unjust enrichment. The elements of this claim are: (1) a
benefit conferred by plaintiffs to the defendant (2) defendant's
knowledge of the benefit and (3) it would be inequitable for
defendant to retain the benefit without paying its value.  

UnityPoint says that plaintiffs do not state a claim for unjust
enrichment because they received the medical services that they
paid for. But plaintiffs allege that privacy protection was part of
the services that they paid for, and because UnityPoint was
negligent in its privacy practices, they did not provide the full
benefit of that bargain. These allegations are sufficient at the
pleading stage to state a claim.

UnityPoint also says that plaintiffs cannot bring a claim for
unjust enrichment because they already allege the existence of a
contract for privacy protection. An unjust enrichment claim is
unavailable when a contract already establishes rights and
remedies. But plaintiffs are allowed to plead contract and unjust
enrichment claims in the alternative. At this stage, it is too
early to tell whether the parties had a valid contract for privacy
services. UnityPoint's arguments may be renewed at summary judgment
if the evidence supports them.

Accordingly, Defendant UnityPoint System's motion to dismiss is
granted in part:

   a. Plaintiff Danielle Duckley's claims for negligence,
negligence per se, violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act, violation of the Illinois Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act and violation of the Illinois data
breach notification statute are dismissed.

   b. Plaintiff Shelly Kitsis's claims for negligence, negligence
per se, violation of the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act and violation of
the Iowa data breach notification statute are dismissed.

   c. Plaintiff Yvonne Fox and Grant Nesheim's claims for violation
of the Wisconsin Deceptive Trade Practices Act and violation of the
Wisconsin data breach notification statute are dismissed.

   d. Plaintiffs' claims for misrepresentation, invasion of
privacy, and declaratory relief are dismissed.

   e. The motion is denied in all other regards.

The Plaintiffs' motion to submit supplemental authority is granted.
The Defendant's motion for leave to respond to the supplemental
authority is denied.  The Defendant's motion to submit supplemental
authority is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 25, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yyddvthh from Leagle.com.

Yvonne Mart Fox, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Grant Nesheim, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Danielle Duckley & Shelley Kitsis, Plaintiffs,
represented by Robert Teel -- rcrichton@kellerrohrback.com -- Cari
Campen Laufenberg -- claufenberg@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller
Rohrback L.L.P.,Christopher Londergan Springer --
cspringer@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback L.L.P. & Thomas
David Copley -- dcopley@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback
L.L.P.

Iowa Health System, doing business as UnityPoint Health, Defendant,
represented by Casie Dell Collignon -- ccollignon@bakerlaw.com --
Baker & Hostetler LLP & Emily Marie Feinstein --
emily.feinstein@quarles.com -- Quarles & Brady.


JAMES A. LUSTIG: Court Narrows Claims on Securities Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
issued an Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned DETROIT STREET PARTNERS,
INC. and BIRCHWOOD RESOURCES INC., Plaintiffs, v. JAMES A. LUSTIG,
ALLIED FUNDING, INC., BENNETT PAUL "BUZZ" ALTERMAN, ALTERMAN
HARRISON INVESTMENTS, INC., ARROWHEAD INVESTMENTS, INC., CLFS
EQUITIES, LLLP, NANCY DAVIS, DAVIS FAMILY OFFICE, INC., TODD J.
EBERSTEIN, GLOBAL CAP LIMITED, INC., WILLIAM HALL, ANDREW HARRISON,
HAVEN CAPITAL VENTURES INC., JAL VENTURES CORPORATION, KEN LANDE,
LION GATE CAPITAL, INC., MACK INVESTOR GROUP, INC., MELISSA
MACKIERNAN, MESA INVESTMENT PARTNERS, LLC, STEWART "SKIP" MILLER,
BRANDON PERRY, PINEHURST CAPITAL, INC., PREAKNESS CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT INC., QUANDARY CAPITAL INC., RANCHO HOLDINGS, LLC,
KENNETH RICKEL, RIO NORTE CAPITAL, INC., SMM INVESTMENTS, INC.,
WILLIAM SANDLER, STEVE SHOFLICK, UNITED CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, INC.,
and AARON WOLK, Defendants. Civil Action No. 17-cv-2992-WJM-STV,
Consolidated with Civil Action No. 18-cv-0190-WJM-STV. (D. Colo.).

This lawsuit is about an allegedly unlawful scheme to curry the
investment banks' favor and thus to obtain more IPO shares.
Plaintiffs Detroit Street Partners, Inc. (Detroit Street), and
Birchwood Resources, Inc. (Birchwood) (Plaintiffs), accuse
Defendants of using false pretenses to carry out a scheme by which
they received many more IPO shares than they would have if they had
behaved honestly.

In this case, the Lustig Defendants bring a facial attack, so the
Court cannot stray from the allegations of the complaint.

The Lustig Defendants assert that Plaintiffs lack Article III
standing to bring this lawsuit, referring to Article III of the
United States Constitution.  

Here, the Lustig Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail all three
standing requirements because, in essence, the alleged injury flows
from the Banks' policies, but the Banks are not defendants here;
and in any event Plaintiffs plead no true injury, but just the loss
of an opportunity to obtain more IPO shares. The Court agrees with
Plaintiffs, however, that the Supreme Court's decision in Bridge v.
Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008), counsels that
Plaintiffs' allegations satisfy the requirements for Article III
standing.

The dispute in Bridge involved the system by which Cook County,
Illinois, auctions property tax liens. In theory, the winning
bidder is the one willing to accept the lowest penalty, as a
percentage of taxes owed, on the property owner. But tax lien
properties are usually very valuable the delinquent taxpayers
rarely clear the lien within the required amount of time, and the
winner of the tax lien auction can then take the property outright
upon paying those delinquent taxes, which are usually far less than
the price at which the property can be resold. So winning a tax
lien auction is, in most cases, like buying real estate at a fire
sale price. Knowing as much, most bidders in Cook County are
willing to accept the lowest penalty permissible, 0%, that is to
say, no penalty at all.

By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, it appears that no
party was questioning Article III standing. However, the Supreme
Court must satisfy itself that Article III standing exists, even if
not previously challenged.  In that light, it is notable that the
Supreme Court declared, without any hint of concern regarding
Article III standing, that the plaintiffs' theory of the case is
straightforward. They allege that the defendants devised a scheme
to defraud when they agreed to submit false attestations of
compliance with the county's single-bidder rule. As a result, the
plaintiffs lost the opportunity to acquire valuable liens.

For Article III standing purposes, Plaintiffs' theory of this case
is similarly straightforward: through allegedly unlawful conduct,
Defendants obtained more IPO shares than they would have if they
had proceeded lawfully, and Plaintiffs thus lost the opportunity to
acquire valuable IPO shares. A Seventh Circuit decision from a
later (post-remand) stage in the Bridge dispute is persuasive in
this regard. The Seventh Circuit explained that the tax lien
bidding process was literally a matter of who raised their hand the
fastest in the auction room. The Seventh Circuit thus asked
rhetorically, How likely is it that the plaintiffs lost no bids to
bidders who had 13 arms in the room but should have had only three?


Similarly, in terms of Plaintiffs' Article III standing in this
lawsuit, given the sophisticated machinations Plaintiffs allege
comprised the scheme undertaken by the various Defendants, it is
extremely unlikely that there was no occasion on which Defendants
received IPO shares that would have gone to Plaintiffs but for
Defendants' allegedly unlawful conduct. That is enough to establish
injury in fact loss of money Plaintiffs would have earned through
reselling those IPO shares they would have been allocated but for
Defendants' alleged scheme caused by Defendants' conduct  that this
Court could redress through a judgment awarding money damages to
Plaintiffs.

Accordingly, at least in these circumstances, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs' loss-of-an-opportunity theory of injury is enough for
Article III standing.

RULE 12(b)(6) ANALYSIS

The next question is whether Plaintiffs state any viable claim that
would allow them to recover against Defendants for Defendants'
allegedly unlawful actions. For reasons that will become clear
below, the Court does not need to examine all fifteen of
Plaintiffs' claims for relief. The Court can instead focus on
Plaintiffs' claims for relief under federal law, namely, Claims
10-14. These claims allege violations of Exchange Act Section 10(b)
and SEC Rule 10-b-5 (Claims 10-13), and the Lustig Defendants'
control person liability for any such violation by the Affiliates
(Claim 14).

Exchange Act Section 10(b) reads in relevant part as follows:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange
to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
SEC may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.

For a private plaintiff (as distinct from the SEC) to prevail on a
claim for violation of Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
the plaintiff must prove six elements: (1) a material
misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter (3) a
connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the
purchase or sale of a security (4) reliance upon the
misrepresentation or omission (5) economic loss; and (6) loss
causation.

The major question raised by Plaintiffs' Exchange Act Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 claims centers on the fourth element, reliance. The
reliance element ensures that there is a proper connection between
a defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiff's injury.

Here, the market for IPO share allocations was not public, but
rather was administered by the Banks. In this market, the true
price of the IPO shares including the commissions Bank clients had
to generate to be allocated such shares was determined not by
publicly-disclosed information, but rather by the number of
accounts competing for such shares and the amount of trading
activity in which the owners of such accounts engaged.

Plaintiffs' reference to the statements that were made directly to
the Banks means the various Affiliates' allegedly false statements
that they were opening trading accounts for themselves, with their
own money, when in fact they were opening accounts to trade with
the Lustig Defendants' money on the Lustig Defendants' behalf.

Plaintiffs' supposed analogy to the fraud-on-the-market theory is
far too distant from the real fraud-on-the-market elements to be
fairly called an analogy. Plaintiffs entirely drop the publicly
portion of the publicly known element. As for the efficient market
element, Plaintiffs neither plead the existence of such a market
nor attempt to demonstrate market efficiency through argument. Nor
could Plaintiffs plausibly allege an efficient market, for at least
three reasons.

First, an efficient market is one which rapidly reflects new
information in the price of the stock.

Perhaps this definition should say security, rather than stock, to
encompass more than just equity shares (e.g., bonds). Regardless,
the market at issue here is not for stock or any other form of
security, but the opportunity, provided by the Banks, to be
allocated IPO shares when the Banks have IPO shares to allocate.

Second, even if the fraud-on-the-market theory could apply to the
circumstances here, Plaintiffs' allegation about the hypothetical
Companies A, B, C, D, E, and F shows that this market is at least
partly inscrutable, which is far from rapidly reflecting new
information.

Although Plaintiffs make this allegation three times, Plaintiffs
fail to plead the formula that leads to this outcome, so the Court
presumes that Plaintiffs do not know it. And if Plaintiffs do not
know how market inputs lead to market outputs, then, almost by
definition, the market is not efficient.

Third, a market surely is not efficient if its creator (here, the
Banks) can change the rules without informing market participants.
Yet that is what happened here: J.P. Morgan did not notify
Birchwood of the change from the $10-million-on-account preference
to the $600,000-in-commissions preference, and Birchwood remained
unaware of the change for some time afterwards.  

In their response brief, Plaintiffs assert in a footnote that, \at
the pleadings stage, a plaintiff need only allege that the subject
securities traded in an efficient market to benefit from the
presumption of reliance. They only allege that they relied on the
integrity of the IPO Share allocation market. IPO Share allocation
is not a security, and, regardless, an investor's unilateral
reliance on the integrity of a market is not a relevant factor when
deciding whether a market is efficient. Furthermore, Plaintiffs'
allegations in their complaint and concessions in their response
brief show that the lack of an efficient market may be discerned as
a matter of law in these circumstances.

In short, Plaintiffs are not asking for an analogy to the
fraud-on-the-market presumption, but for a securities fraud cause
of action that simply does not exist at present. Nor do Plaintiffs
point to a statute or regulation under which such a cause of action
could exist. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Claims 10-12 fail to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. In turn, Claim 13's request
for control person liability against the Lustig Defendants must
fail as well.  

28 U.S.C. Section 1367(c) ANALYSIS

Here, the third option applies because this Court will dismiss
Claims 10-13, which are the only claims over which the Court has
original jurisdiction. In such a situation, the Court should
generally decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining claims absent compelling reasons to the contrary.

Plaintiffs argue that such compelling reasons exist here because
(i) federal law offers instructive guidance on COCCA claims and so
this case presents no `novel or complex issue of State law
counseling for a decision by[a state court and (ii) the case does
present exceptionally egregious facts. Taking these arguments in
reverse order, Plaintiffs cite no authority that the presence of
exceptionally egregious facts assuming they are that has anything
to do with whether a federal district court should retain
supplemental jurisdiction.

As for novel or complex issues of state law, Plaintiffs somewhat
misread Section 1367(c). A novel or complex issue of state law is a
reason to dismiss a state-law claim even if the lawsuit will
proceed on federal claims. But the absence of a novel or complex
issue of state law is not a compelling reason, to continue
adjudicating state-law claims when all federal claims have been
dismissed. Even if the case were otherwise, there is an important
issue of state law in play here.

The parties agree that Colorado has yet to adopt the
fraud-on-the-market theory for causes of action arising under the
CSA. Whether Colorado would adopt that theory and, even more
importantly, whether it would extend the theory as far as
Plaintiffs want to extend it should be left to Colorado courts.

The Court finds no compelling reason to continue adjudicating
Plaintiffs' state-law claims in a federal forum. Accordingly,
Claims 1-9 and 14-15 will be dismissed without prejudice to
refiling in state court.

Accordingly, the Lustig Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted to
the extent the Court finds that Plaintiffs' Claims 10-13 fail to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and that the Court
should decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' remaining
claims, but is otherwise denied.

The Perry Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted to the extent
the Court finds that the Plaintiffs' Claims 10-13 fail to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, but is otherwise denied.

The Abelson Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is denied as moot.

The Plaintiffs' Claims 10-13 are dismissed with prejudice, and the
Plaintiffs' remaining claims are dismissed without prejudice to
refiling in state court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 25, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y36zda25 from Leagle.com.

Detroit Street Partners Inc. & Birchwood Resources Inc.,
Plaintiffs, represented by Perry Ray Sanders, Jr. --
PRSanders@PerrySandersLaw.com -- Sanders Law Firm, LLC, Justin
Tyler Bailey -- justin.bailey1985@gmail.com -- Sanders Law Firm,
LLC, Lisa Marie Coyle -- LCoyle@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins Kaplan,
LLP & Qian Julie Wang -- QWang@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins Kaplan,
LLP.

James A. Lustig, JAL Ventures Corporation, CLFS Equities, LLLP &
United Capital Management, Inc., Defendants, represented by
Christopher John Clark -- chris.clark@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins,
LLP, Harold Alan Haddon -- hhaddon@hmflaw.com -- Haddon Morgan &
Foreman, P.C., Pamela Robillard Mackey -- pmackey@hmflaw -- Haddon
Morgan & Foreman, P.C. & Saskia A. Jordan -- sjordan@hmflaw.com --
Haddon Morgan & Foreman, P.C.

Global Cap Limited, Inc., Brandon Perry, Haven Capital Ventures
Inc., Pinehurst Capital, Inc., William Sandler, Rancho Holdings,
LLC, Andrew Harrison, SMM Investments, Inc., Stewart Miller, Skip,
Arrowhead Investments, Inc., Steve Shoflick, Alterman Harrison
Investments, Inc., Bennett Paul Alterman, Buzz, Allied Funding,
Inc., Rio Norte Capital, Inc., Ken Lande, Mesa Investment Partners,
LLC, Todd J. Eberstein, JMC Capital, Inc., Preakness Capital
Management Inc., William Hall, Davis Family Office, Inc., Nancy
Davis, Lion Gate Capital, Inc., Kenneth Rickel, Mack Investor
Group, Inc., Aaron Wolk, Quandary Capital Inc. & Melissa
Mackiernan, Defendants, represented by David Alan Zisser --
dzisser@joneskeller.com --  Jones & Keller, PC.


JAMES T. ROBINSON: Braddy Seeks to Recover Minimum, Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------------------
Stacey Braddy, on behalf of herself and other similarly situated
employees, Plaintiff, v. James T. Robinson, Defendant, Case No.
19-cv-22993 (S.D. Fla., July 18, 2019), seeks to recover overtime
premium pay, liquidated damages and reasonable attorneys' fees and
costs pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

James T. Robinson operates "Booby Trap Lounge," also known as "The
Trap Lounge," where Braddy worked as an exotic dancer. She claims
that her only compensation was in the form of tips from club
patrons and does not receive minimum and overtime wages. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Andrew R. Frisch, Esq.
      MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
      600 N. Pine Island Road, Suite 400
      Plantation, FL 33324
      Telephone: (954) 318-0268
      Facsimile: (954) 327-3016
      Email: afrisch@forthepeople.com


JOSHUA LINER: Website Not Accessible to Blind Person, Picon Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
YELITZA PICON AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, the Plaintiffs, v. JOSHUA LINER GALLERY LLC, the
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-07080 (S.D.N.Y., July 30, 2019),
asserts that Defendant failed to design, construct, maintain, and
operate its website to be fully accessible to and independently
usable by Plaintiff and other blind or visually-impaired people.
Defendant's denial of full and equal access to its website, and
therefore denial of its products and services offered thereby and
in conjunction with its physical location, is a violation of
Plaintiff's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA").

The Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person who
requires screen-reading software to read website content using her
computer. Plaintiff uses the terms "blind" or "visually-impaired"
to refer to all people with visual impairments who meet the legal
definition of blindness in that they have a visual acuity with
correction of less than or equal to 20 x 200. Some blind people who
meet their definition have limited vision. Others have no vision.

Based on a 2010 U.S. Census Bureau report, approximately 8.1
million people in the United States are visually impaired,
including 2.0 million who are blind, and according to the American
Foundation for the Blind's 2015 report, approximately 400,000
visually impaired persons live in the State of New York.

The Defendant's website is http://www.joshualinergallery.com/

The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in
Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that
Defendant's website will become and remain accessible to blind and
visually-impaired consumers.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Telephone: 212.228.9795
          Facsimile: 212.982.6284
          E-mail: nyjg@aol.com
                  Jeffrey@gottlieb.legal
                  DanaLGottlieb@aol.com

JPMORGAN CHASE: Court Conditionally Certifies Class in Childress
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GARY and ANNE CHILDRESS, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., et al., Defendants, Case No. 5:16-CV-298-BO
(E.D. N.C.), Judge Terrence W. Boyle of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina, Western Division, (i)
granted in part the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class and appoint
the class counsel; (ii) denied the Defendants' motion to exclude
the testimony of Arthur Olsen; and (iii) denied without prejudice
the Defendants' motion to exclude damages evidence.

Plaintiffs Gary and Ann Childress, Russell and Suzannah Ho, and
Michael Clifford, filed the case on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated alleging claims against the Defendants for
violations of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act ("SCRA"), breach
of contract, violation of the Truth in Lending Act, negligence,
negligent misrepresentation, violation of the Delaware Consumer
Fraud Act, violation of the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, and breach of fiduciary duty.  In addition to
damages, the Plaintiffs seek a constructive trust and an
accounting.

The SCRA requires that all debts incurred by members of the armed
services before being called to active duty are reduced to a 6%
interest rate from the date of deployment through the period of
active duty, and that all financial institutions must forgive
interest above the rate of 6%.  The Plaintiffs allege that
Defendants, JP Morgan Chase & Co., JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
Chase Bank USA, and Chase Bankcard Services, offered active duty
military members more generous benefits than those required by the
SCRA.  They allege that, despite the requirements of the SCRA and
its own beneficial contractual terms with active-duty customers,
Chase charged an illegally high interest rate and improper fees on
the debts of thousands of servicemembers, allowed these unlawful
interest charges to improperly inflate servicemembers' principal
balances, and then charged compound interest on these inflated
balances.  The Plaintiffs then allege that Chase concealed its SCRA
violations from the thousands of military families impacted.  The
Plaintiffs and others did not discover the violations until 2016
when Chase sent misleading correspondence and checks to some
military customers.

On Sept. 18, 2013, Chase Bank USA, JP Morgan Chase Bank, and
JPMorgan Bank and Trust Co. entered into a consent order with the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC").  The consent
order concerned Chase's discovery that it had not implemented
effective controls of its SCRA benefits process, and Chase
self-reported this issue to the OCC.  Chase contends that the
consent order was designed to remediate any customers potentially
affected by Chase's ineffective SCRA controls.  The remediation was
designed to be overinclusive and to minimize the risk that
SCRA-eligible customers would be excluded.  For those accounts
identified, Chase identified the amount of interest charged over 6%
and any eligible fees assessed. For any amount of remediation that
was $10 or more, Chase "provided the greater of $500 or three times
the total remediation amount, net (after trebling) of any prior
correction credits it had granted the servicemember."  The consent
order covered the period of Jan. 1, 2005, through Sept. 18, 2013.

On May 6, 2016, Chase Bank USA, with whom he maintained accounts,
mailed plaintiff Gary Childress a check for $6,899, in remediation
funds.  Gary Childress deposited the check on May 16, 2016.

Chase Bank USA calculated a remediation amount for Plaintiff
Russell Ho of $570, and mailed him a check for the same with a
substantially similar letter as above on May 13, 2016.  Russell Ho
deposited the check on May 27, 2016. After determining that
Plaintiff Michael Clifford had previously been fully compensated
for any overcharges by prior remediations, Chase Bank USA
calculated a remediation amount of $1,044 meant only to compensate
Clifford for any inconvenience that the prior overcharges had
caused.  Chase Bank USA mailed Plaintiff Clifford a check for that
amount along with a substantially similar letter, with the
clarification that the amount enclosed was an inconvenience
payment, on May 6, 2016.  Clifford deposited the check on May 17,
2016.

The Plaintiffs seek to define the class as follows: All persons
who, at any time on or after Sept. 11, 2001, received reduced
interest and/or fee benefits from Defendants on a credit card
obligation or account because of an obligor's military service, but
excluding persons who have executed a release of the rights claimed
in the action.

They further seek appointment of Plaintiffs Gary Childress, Russell
Ho, and Michael Clifford as the class representatives.  The
Plaintiffs have clarified that the class will be limited to credit
card holders whose claims concern only defendant Chase Bank USA,
N.A.  They have further clarified that their claims proceed against
Chase for its own conduct and not for those of predecessor banks.
Finally, the Plaintiffs seek appointment of the law firms of
Shanahan McDougal, Smith and Lowney, and Keller Rohrback as the
class counsel.

In support of their motion to certify class, the Plaintiffs have
proffered the opinions of two experts, Olsen and Jonathan Shefftz,
which the Defendants seek to exclude under Federal Rule of Evidence
702, and Federal Rule of Evidence 37.  The Defendants further seek
to exclude any evidence of damages offered by the Plaintiffs in
connection with any motion or at trial for failure to comply with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A)(iii).

Judge Boyle finds that Olsen has been and would be able to use
customer and account information that Chase maintains in order to
accurately ascertain the class and calculate class damages.  While
Chase makes much of Olsen's reliance on Chase's own calculations
and formulations for its remediation payments, arguing that the
parameters for remediation qualification were different from the
parameters which would be used to identify class members or
calculate class damages here, it is difficult to understand how if
Chase could utilize an algorithm and data searches to determine
which of its customers should be remediated, Olsen could not, using
the same and possibly additional data, perform similar
calculations.

He also finds that although the Plaintiffs oppose excluding
Shefftz's testimony, they concede that all of the same conclusions
reached by Mr. Shefftz could be reached by the Court without any
expert assistance.  Shefftz's declaration does not offer any
technical or specialized expertise that will assist the Court in
making its determination as to whether the Plaintiffs have
satisfied the burden under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 to certify a class.

Next, the Judge finds that Chase's current motion to exclude
damages evidence to be premature and denies it without prejudice.
Damages discovery was ordered to commence after a status conference
and joint status report to establish a damages discovery plan,
which is to take place after the close of liability and class
certification discovery.  The case was then stayed for a period of
180 days to permit the parties to engage in mediation, and the
deadlines have been extended for a similar period.  The Court has
not been apprised that a damages discovery plan has been filed.

Finally, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs have carried their
burden to show that certification of a class action is appropriate
as to each of their claims with the exception of their claim under
the NCUDTPA.  The Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the putative
class is ascertainable beginning Jan. 1, 2005, and that the
requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy
of representation have been satisfied.  A determination as to
whether Chase is liable for breach of contract and violations of
the SCRA and the DCFA plainly can proceed using common proof,
insuring that individualized issues will not predominate.  Insofar
as the Plaintiffs' remaining claims require resolution of
individualized issues as to liability, the impact of these less
significant claims is insufficient to disturb the conclusion that
the Plaintiffs' allegations are suitable for class certification.

Judge Boyle granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs'
motion to certify class.  The class is defined as all persons who,
at any time on or after Jan. 1, 2005, received reduced interest
and/or fee benefits from defendant Chase Bank USA, N.A. on a credit
card obligation or account because of an obligor's military
service, but excluding persons who have executed a release of the
rights claimed in the action.

Plaintiffs Gary Childress, Russell Ho, and Michael Clifford are
named as the class representatives, and the Plaintiffs' counsel
with the law firms of Shanahan McDougal, Smith and Lowney, and
Keller Rohrback are named as the class counsel.

The Plaintiffswill show cause within 14 days of the date of entry
of the Order why the remaining Defendants should not be dismissed.
The Plaintiffswill further provide to the Court their plan for
providing the best notice practicable to the Rule 23(b)(3) class
within 14 days of the date of entry of the Order.

The Judge denied the Defendants' motion to exclude the testimony of
Olsen.  Their motion to exclude the testimony of Shefftz is
granted.  The Defendants' motion to exclude damages evidence is
denied without prejudice.  The Defendants' motion for leave to file
a surreply is granted, and the Court has considered the surreply in
deciding the motion for class certification.  Because a hearing on
these matters has been held, the motion for hearing is denied as
moot.  The consent motion for leave to file excess pages is
granted.  For good cause shown, the motions to seal at DE 184, 186,
219, 235, 245, and 249 are allowed.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 2, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/br5qnb from Leagle.com.

Gary Childress, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Anne Childress, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
Russell Ho, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Suzannah Ho, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated &
Michael Clifford, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Claire E. Tonry, Smith &
Lowney PLLC, Eric Knoll Lowney, Eric "Knoll" Lowney, Brandon S.
Neuman -- bneuman@shanahanlawgroup.com -- Shanahan Law Group, PLLC,
Christopher S. Battles, Shanahan Law Group, PLLC, Mark A. Griffin
-- mgriffin@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback LLP, Raymond J.
Farrow -- rfarrow@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback LLP &
Kieran J. Shanahan, Shanahan Law Group, PLLC.

JPMorgan Chase & Co., JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Chase Bank USA,
N.A. & Chase Bankcard Services, Inc., Defendants, represented by
Adam M. Cambier, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Nathan
B. Atkinson, Spilman Thomas & Battle, PLLC, Pressly M. Millen --
press.millen@wbd-us.com -- Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP & Alan
Evan Schoenfeld -- alan.schoenfeld@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP.

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interested Party,
represented by Amber N. Melton, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency.


KATES' DETECTIVE & SECURITY: Security Guards Hit Illegal Deductions
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Damita Evans and Tonya Thomas, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Kates' Detective &
Security Services Agency And Special Events Services, Inc.,
Defendants, Case No. 2019CH08440, (Ill. Cir., July 18, 2019), seeks
to recover illegal deductions, liquidated damages, reasonable
attorney's fees, costs and expenses of this action and such other
relief under the Illinois Wage Payment Collection Act.

Kates is a security guard company that operates throughout Illinois
where Plaintiffs worked as security guards. Defendant allegedly
deducted various amounts from their pay including the cost of
firearm control cards. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Christopher J. Wilmes, Esq.
      Kate E. Schwartz, Esq.
      Iman N. Boundaoui, Esq.
      HUGHES, SOCOL, PIERS, RESNICK & DYM, LTD.
      70 West Madison Street, Suite 4000
      Chicago, IL 60602
      Tel: (312) 580-0100
      Email: cwilmes@hsplegal.com
             kschwartz@hsplegal.com
             iboundaoui@hsplegal.com


KEURIG GREEN: California Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Smith
----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California denied the Defendant's motion to
dismiss the case, KATHLEEN SMITH, Plaintiff, v. KEURIG GREEN
MOUNTAIN, INC., Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-06690-HSG (N.D. Cal.).

Smith brings the putative class action against Defendant Keurig,
alleging that the Defendant's "recyclable" single-serve plastic
coffee pods were mislabeled as such because they are not in fact
recyclable, due to their size, composition, and a lack of a market
to reuse the pods.

Keurig sells various single-serve plastic coffee pods, some of
which Keurig markets and sells as "recyclable."  Although the
purportedly "recyclable" Pods are made from Polypropylene (#5)
plastic -- a material currently accepted for recycling in
approximately 61% of U.S. communities -- domestic municipal
recycling facilities ("MRFs") are not equipped to capture materials
as small as the Pods and separate them from the general waste
stream.  Keurig's instructions further impede the Pods'
recyclability by advising users that they need not remove the Pods'
paper filter, which ensures contamination. And due to the Pods'
design, their foil lids are difficult to remove, posing another
risk of contamination.

The Plaintiff is a California resident who purchased Pods in
reliance on Keurig's false representations that the Pods are
recyclable and followed Keurig's recycling instructions.  Had the
Plaintiff known the Pods were not recyclable, she neither would
have purchased them, nor would have paid the amount she did for
them.  The Plaintiff desires to continue purchasing recyclable
single-serve coffee pods and would purchase such products properly
manufactured and labeled by Keurig in the future.

The Plaintiff brings six causes of action against Keurig, on behalf
of herself and the putative class: (1) breach of express warranty,
(2) violation of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act
("CLRA"), (3) violation of California's Unfair Competition Law
("UCL") based on fraudulent acts and practices, (4) violation of
the UCL based on commission of unlawful acts, (5) violation of the
UCL based on unfair acts and practices, and (6) unjust enrichment.

Now pending before the Court is the Defendant's motion to dismiss,
briefing for which is complete.  Keurig raises seven grounds for
dismissing all or some of the Plaintiff's causes of action, none of
which are persuasive: (i) the Plaintiff has failed to plead facts
to establish standing; (ii) the amended complaint fails to state
any actionable claim because Keurig's labeling is truthful and
consistent with what is known as the "Green Guides"; (iii) the
Plaintiff's claim under the "unlawful" prong of the UCL on the
grounds that the complaint does not show how a reasonable consumer
under the circumstances would find the representation of
recyclability untruthful, deceptive, or misleading; (iv)  the
purported statement of warranty is so equivocal as to be
inactionable; (v) the Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim must fail
because California law does not recognize unjust enrichment as a
standalone cause of action; (vi) the Plaintiff's invocation of the
Green Guides is tantamount to compelling speech by requiring the
Defendant to change its labeling of the Pods, and that such
compelled speech violates the First Amendment; and (vii) it moves
to strike the Plaintiff's class allegations, claiming that the
class definition is overbroad.

Judge Gilliam finds that (i) the Plaintiff has adequately pled
facts to establish standing; (ii) the allegations in the complaint
are not precluded based on the Green Guides's plain text; (iii) the
Plaintiff's claims are adequately pled under the reasonable
consumer test; (iv) dismissal of the Plaintiff's express warranty
claim is unwarranted because the Defendant does not contest the
Plaintiff's satisfaction of the other elements of a breach of
express warranty claim; (v) he will apply the principle set forth
in Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp. and construe its unjust
enrichment claim as one in quasi-contract seeking restitution for
the money wrongly earned by the Defendant; (vi)  Keurig cites to no
persuasive case law for the principle that a prohibition against
deceiving consumers constitutes compelled speech; and (vii) the
class allegations should not be stricken because the Defendant's
motion is based on a misreading of the complaint.

For the foregoing reasons, he denied the Defendant's motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 28, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/CTxzOJ from Leagle.com.

Kathleen Smith, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Howard Judd Hirsch --
hhirsch@lexlawgroup.com -- Lexington Law Group & Ryan Berghoff --
rberghoff@lexlawgroup.com -- Lexington Law Group.

Keurig Green Mountain, Inc., Defendant, represented by Creighton R.
Magid -- magid.chip@dorsey.com -- Dorsey and Whitney LLP, pro hac
vice, Navdeep Kumar Singh -- singh.navdeep@dorsey.com -- Dorsey and
Whitney LLP & Kent Jeffrey Schmidt -- schmidt.kent@dorsey.com --
Dorsey & Whitney LLP.


L.A.R.E.: OT Pay for Business Development Specialist Sought
-----------------------------------------------------------
VICKI UMBRINO and RICHARD ZOLLER, on behalf of themselves and all
other employees similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. L.A.R.E.
PARTNERS NETWORK, INC. d/b/a L.A.R.E. PARTNERS f/k/a LIST ASSIST
REAL ESTATE, INC., REAL AGENT PRO, LLC f/k/a L.A.R.E. MARKETING
LLC, L.A.R.E. PROPERTIES, LLC, LIST-ASSIST OF ROCHESTER, LLC, and
ISAIAH COLTON, the Defendants, Case No. 6:19-cv-06559 (W.D.N.Y.,
July 26, 2019), seeks injunctive and declaratory relief, monetary
damages and equitable relief to redress the deprivation of rights
secured to the Plaintiffs under the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 and the New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiffs were employed by Defendants as Business Development
Specialists. Despite regularly working over 40 hours each workweek,
they were not compensated at time and a half her regular hourly
rate of pay for the hours they worked in excess of 40 in a
workweek, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Michael J. Lingle, Esq.
          Jonathan W. Ferris, Esq.
          THOMAS & SOLOMON LLP
          693 East Avenue
          Rochester, NY 14607
          Telephone: (585) 272-0540
          E-mail: mlingle@theemploymentattorneys.com
                  jferris@theemploymentatorneys.com

LABORATORY CORP: Faces Ocasio Suit in Illinois Over Data Breach
---------------------------------------------------------------
ERICKSON J. OCASIO, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA HOLDINGS,
d/b/a LabCorp, Case No. 1:19-cv-04989 (N.D. Ill., July 24, 2019),
is brought to address the Defendant's negligent failure to use
reasonable cybersecurity measures to protect class members' Most
Sensitive Personal Information.

The lawsuit is a data breach class action on behalf of 7.7 million
patients whose sensitive personal information was accessed by
computer hackers in a cyber-attack (the "Data Breach"), the
Plaintiff contends.

Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings, doing business as
LabCorp, is incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of
business located in Burlington, North Carolina.

LabCorp is one of the largest providers of medical diagnostic
testing services.  The Company performs medical tests that aid in
the diagnosis or detection of diseases, and that measure the
progress of or recovery from a disease.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

         Rusty A. Payton, Esq.
         PAYTON LEGAL GROUP LLC
         20 North Clark Street, Suite 3300
         Chicago, IL 60602
         Telephone: (773) 682-5210
         Facsimile: (773) 787-1550
         E-mail: info@payton.legal

               - and -

         William B. Federman, Esq.
         FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
         10205 N. Pennsylvania Ave.
         Oklahoma City, OK 73120
         Telephone: (405) 235-1560
         Facsimile: (405) 239-2112
         E-mail: wbf@federmanlaw.com


LANNETT COMPANY: Class Action Survives Motion to Dismiss
--------------------------------------------------------
Shareholder rights law firm Robbins Arroyo LLP announces that
Lannett Company (LCI) may face damages caused by a pending
securities lawsuit. Lannett develops, manufactures, and distributes
generic versions of brand pharmaceutical products in the United
States.

Shareholder Class Action Alleging Lannett Made Materially False and
Misleading Statements Survives Motion to Dismiss, Lannett's Motion
for Reconsideration Denied

Investors filed a class action complaint against Lannett for
alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
According to the complaint, since 2013, Lannett's business strategy
has been to collusively enter into industry-wide anti-competitive
agreements with other generic drug manufacturers. Regulatory
investigations revealed that Lannett was involved in an
industry-wide conspiracy to fix prices and allocate territories for
the sale of at least 18 different generic medications.
Nevertheless, Lannett insiders misled investors by stating that
price increases were the result of legitimate and competitive
market forces contrary to their knowledge that the market was being
driven by antitrust violations. The complaint further alleges that
Lannett insiders misrepresented the scope of their investigations
into potential antitrust violations and the likelihood that Lannett
would be implicated in the broader price-fixing prosecutions.
Capitalizing on Lannett's artificially inflated stock prices,
certain executives made nearly $10 million in insider sales. As a
result of its price-fixing, Lannett is now defending itself against
regulatory inquiries and investigations and private lawsuits
alleging securities fraud, consumer deception, and violations of
state and federal antitrust laws. On May 15, 2019, U.S. District
Court Judge Wendy Beetlestone denied Lannett's motion to dismiss
plaintiffs' complaint. After this denial, Lannett filed a motion
for reconsideration. The motion was denied by Judge Beetlestone on
July 22, 2019, paving the way for litigation to proceed.

Lannett Shareholders Have Legal Options

Concerned shareholders who would like more information about their
rights and potential remedies can contact attorney Leonid Kandinov
at (800) 350-6003, LKandinov@robbinsarroyo.com, or via the
shareholder information form on the firm's website.

Robbins Arroyo LLP is a nationally recognized leader in shareholder
rights law. The firm represents individual and institutional
investors in shareholder derivative and securities class action
lawsuits, and has helped its clients realize more than $1 billion
of value for themselves and the companies in which they have
invested. [GN]


LATSHAW DRILLING: Stegall Suit Moved to Northern Dist. of Texas
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case, JOHN STEGALL, Individually and On Behalf of Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. LATSHAW DRILLING COMPANY,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 5:19-cv-00432 (Filed April 22, 2016), was
transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Louisiana, to U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas (Dallas) on July 26, 2019. The Northern District of Texas
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:19-cv-01781-L to the proceeding.
The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Sam A. Lindsay.

Latshaw does not pay its oilfield mechanics overtime as required by
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act.
Instead, Latshaw pays them a flat salary. Because these employees
are not exempt under the FLSA and the NMMWA, Stegall and the other
salaried oilfield mechanics are entitled to recover unpaid overtime
as well as other damages, the lawsuit says.

Latshaw Drilling is a Tulsa-based company founded in June
1981.[BN]

Attorneys for the  Plaintiff are:

          Derrick Glenn Earles, Esq.
          LABORDE EARLES LAW FIRM (LAF)
          P O Box 80098
          Lafayette, LA 70598-0098
          Telephone: (337) 261-2617
          Facsimile: (337) 261-1934
          E-mail: digger@onmyside.com

               - and -

          David I. Moulton, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH
          8 Greenway Plaza Ste 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 877-8788
          Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
          E-mail: dmoulton@brucknerburch.com

Attorneys for the Latshaw Drilling are:

          Phyllis Guin Cancienne, Esq.
          BAKER DONELSON ET AL (BR)
          450 Laurel St 20th Fl
          Baton Rouge, LA 70801
          Telephone: (225) 381-7000
          Facsimile: (225) 343-3612
          E-mail: pcancienne@bakerdonelson.com

               - and -

          Madalene A B Witterholt, Esq.
          CROWE & DUNLEVY PC
          321 South Boston Avenue, Suite 500
          Tulsa, OK 74103-3313
          Telephone: (918) 592-9809
          Facsimile: (918) 592-9801
          E-mail: m.witterholt@crowedunlevy.com

LEXINGTON LAW: Fluent & Reward Can't Compel Arbitration in Anand
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NARANTUYA ANAND, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. JOHN C. HEATH, ATTORNEY AT LAW
PLLC DBA LEXINGTON LAW FIRM; PROGREXION MARKETING INC.; FLUENT,
INC.; AND REWARD ZONE USA, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 19-CV-00016
(N.D. Ill.), Judge John J. Tharp, Jr. of the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, denied
Fluent, Inc. and Reward Zone USA, LLC's motion to compel
arbitration.

Anand brought a putative class action complaint alleging that she
received unsolicited telemarketing calls to her cellular phone in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

In June 2017, Anand registered on the website
www.retailproductzone.com and completed a survey on that website to
receive a free gift card. The website is owned and operated by
Reward Zone, which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fluent.
Defendant John C. Heath, Attorney at Law PLLC, doing business as
Lexington Law Firm, hired Defendant Progrexion Marketing, Inc. to
market Lexington's services to consumers.  Progrexion, in turn,
contracted with Fluent to gather consumers' personal information
through websites including www.retailproductzone.com and to contact
such consumers on behalf of Lexington.

The Defendants contend that when Anand registered on the website,
she submitted her contact information, including her phone number,
and expressly consented to being contacted at that number by or on
behalf of marketing partners including HomeHelp, which is a
registered business name of Fluent, and Lexington.  Anand denies
that she consented to being contacted and alleges that during July
2017 she received several unwanted telemarketing voicemails and
text messages from the defendants on behalf of Lexington.  At least
some of the calls and texts were made from a phone number that
Anand believes belongs to Fluent.

When Anand navigated through the www.retailproductzone.com website
in 2017, the words "I understand and agree to the Terms &
Conditions which includes mandatory arbitration and Privacy Policy"
were displayed above a "Continue" button.  Clicking the underlined
"Terms & Conditions" hyperlink would have directed Anand to a page
that displays the full terms and conditions.  The terms and
conditions included, among other things, an "Arbitration/Dispute
Resolution" provision.

Defendants Fluent and Reward Zone have moved to compel arbitration,
requesting that the Court dismisses Anand's complaint or stays the
case pending arbitration.  They contend that both of them are
entitled to enforce the arbitration agreement because Anand agreed
to arbitrate with both companies and because Anand's claims against
the parent company (Fluent) and its wholly-owned subsidiary (Reward
Zone) are intertwined.  Although Defendants Progrexion and
Lexington did not join the motion to compel arbitration, they
asserted in their respective affirmative defenses that if Anand
agreed to arbitrate the dispute, then the case should be dismissed
or stayed pending arbitration.  

Anand contends that she did not enter into an enforceable
arbitration agreement, and that she is at least entitled to an
evidentiary hearing because she has raised a genuine dispute of
material fact as to the enforceability of the arbitration
agreement.  Fluent and Reward Zone respond that arbitration is
required as a matter of law.

Judge Tharp finds that there is no evidence that Anand had actual
notice of the terms and conditions the Defendants sought to impose,
and the facts necessary to resolve the question of whether she had
constructive notice of those terms and conditions (that is, that a
reasonable user in Anand's shoes would have understood she was
assenting to the terms and conditions by clicking the "Continue"
button) are not disputed.  There was also no language that linked
the notice regarding mandatory arbitration or the terms and
conditions to the "Continue" button, and Anand was permitted to
click the "Continue" button to continue through the site without
expressly manifesting her assent.

The moving Defendants, Fluent and Reward Zone, have not requested
an evidentiary hearing, nor would they be entitled to one.  The
other Defendants, Lexington and Progrexion, have not moved to
compel arbitration.  Lexington and Progrexion have stated in their
respective affirmative defenses that to the extent the Plaintiff
has agreed to arbitrate the dispute, the Complaint violates that
agreement and the matter should be dismissed and/or stayed pending
arbitration.  Lexington and Progrexion have made no argument
explaining why that should be the result, nor have they filed or
joined any motion requesting relief.  Accordingly, the case against
all the Defendants will proceed.

For the reasons stated, Judge Tharp denied Fluent and Reward Zone's
motion to compel arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 28, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/iAsUvZ from Leagle.com.

Narantuya Anand, individually and on behalf of other similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Lance A. Raphael, TheConsumer
Advocacy Center, P.C., Christopher Davis Kruger, Kruger & Gruber,
LLP & Craig Rein Frisch, Consumer Advocacy Center.

John C Heath, Attorney at Law PLLC & Progrexion Marketing, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by Mary S. DiRago --
molly.dirago@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders LLP.

Fluent, Inc. & Reward Zone USA, LLC, Defendants, represented by
George V. Desh -- gdesh@mandellmenkes.com -- Mandell Menkes LLC,
John David Fitzpatrick -- jfitzpatrick@mandellmenkes.com -- Mandell
Menkes LLC & Neil Eric Asnen -- nasnen@kleinmoynihan.com -- Klein
Moynihan Turco LLP, pro hac vice.


LIBERTY LIFE: Cal. App. Affirms Dismissal of Regents from Yalley
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, RENEE YALLEY, ET AL., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v.
LIBERTY LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF BOSTON, ET AL., Defendants and
Respondents, Case Nos. A154076, A154803 (Cal. App.), Judge Henry E.
Needham, Jr. of the Court of Appeals of California for the First
District, Division Five, affirmed the judgment of dismissal as to
Respondent, The Regents of the University of California.

Appellants Yalley and Chris Anezinos appeal from a judgment of
dismissal as to Respondent Regents, which the Court entered after
sustaining without leave to amend the Regents' demurrer to the
Appellants' second amended complaint.  Seeking to represent a
proposed class of the Regents' employees, the Appellants alleged
that (1) the Regents violated Labor Code sections 3751 and 3752
because, essentially, the earnings or savings the Regents obtained
on the employees' contributions toward their supplemental
disability benefits could possibly have been used to defray the
Regents' costs of providing workers compensation benefits; and (2)
the employees were contractually entitled to their full
supplemental disability benefits, without an offset for their
workers compensation benefits.

The Appellants are former employees of the Regents.  While
employed, they opted to purchase coverage under a supplemental
disability plan that was offered by the Regents and insured by a
policy issued by Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston.  They
contend they suffered workplace injuries, were awarded workers'
compensation benefits, and received supplemental disability
benefits, but pursuant to the terms of the policy those
supplemental disability benefits were offset by the amount of their
workers' compensation benefits.

The Appellants filed a complaint against Liberty and the Regents in
April 2017, claiming the offset was unlawful.  The action was
removed to federal court and later remanded.  

After remand, the Appellants filed a first amended complaint,
alleging breach of contract and eight other individual and class
claims against Liberty, as well as a class claim of conversion
against the Regents.  Liberty and the Regents each filed a demurrer
to the first amended complaint.  The Court sustained Liberty's
demurrer without leave to amend.  It sustained the Regents'
demurrer on the ground that the conversion claim was barred by the
exclusive remedy provisions of California's workers' compensation
statute, but granted the Appellants leave to amend.

The Appellants' second amended complaint asserted four new class
claims against the Regents: declaratory relief; breach of express
contract; breach of implied contract; and unjust enrichment.  

The Regents pays for and provides to University of California
employees a Short Term Disability Plan ("STD").  The Appellants
contended the Regents caused employees to contribute indirectly
toward the Regents' workers compensation costs in violation of
section 3751 and section 3752, and the Appellants and the class are
entitled to recover the amount of the offset as damages.  In other
words, employees would receive not only their full workers'
compensation benefits and their SDIP benefits pursuant to the terms
of the Policy, but also an additional amount equal to the offset.

The Appellants alleged that the Regents' standing orders and
policies, including Board of Regents Policy 7200 defining "Total
Compensation," created an express or implied contract entitling
employees to this Total Compensation, including "the dollar value
of the deduction/offset of California Workers' Compensation
benefits they received from the SDIP benefits paid by Liberty."
They contended the Regents breached this contract, and the class
suffered damages in the amount their SDIP benefits were offset by
their workers compensation benefits.

The Regents filed a demurrer to the second amended complaint and
requested judicial notice of documents including Regents Policy
1000, Regents Policy 7200, and Regents Policy 7201.  The Appellants
opposed the demurrer, contending they had stated causes of action
because they and other employees had paid indirectly for their
workers' compensation benefits in violation of sections 3751 and
3752.

The Court granted the Regents' request for judicial notice as to
the existence and content of Regents Policy 1000, 7200, and 7201,
and sustained the Regents' demurrer without leave to amend.  It
found: the Appellants' declaratory relief claim failed because they
did not allege an actual controversy between themselves and the
Regents; the Appellants' express and implied contract claims failed
because they did not adequately allege any contract; and the
Appellants' unjust enrichment claim failed because unjust
enrichment does not constitute an independent cause of action and,
in any event, the Appellants did not plead any violation of law or
equitable principles that would provide a basis for restitution.
Judgment was entered in favor of the Regents.

The appeal followed.  Acknowledging that sections 3751 and 3752 do
not themselves create a right of action, the Appellants contend
they nonetheless stated causes of action for declaratory relief,
breach of an express contract, breach of an implied-in-fact
contract, and unjust enrichment.

Judge Needham finds that the Appellants' allegations do not state a
cause of action because they (1) fail to allege an actual
controversy as to future rights and (2) fail to allege facts from
which a violation of section 3751 or 3752 might be inferred.
Either ground is sufficient to uphold the trial court's ruling.

He also finds that Regents Policy 7200 is inapplicable to the
Appellants, who are not alleged to be entitled to executive
compensation.  Moreover, Regents Policy 7200 does not promise any
employees anything.  It defines Total Compensation as including
benefits that are "provided" to the employee, but it does not
require any particular benefits to be provided, let alone SDIP
benefits without the offset mandated by the Policy.  There was no
express contract for the provision of SDIP benefits without offset,
and no contract entitling the Appellants or class members the
recovery they seek.

The further Judge finds that Regents offered the Appellants the
option to purchase SDIP coverage insured by Liberty pursuant to the
terms of the Policy.  The Policy contradicts the Appellants'
alleged implied-in-fact contract, because it defines Liberty as the
insurer of appellants' SDIP benefits and states that the Appellants
would not receive the SDIP benefit payments without offset.  As the
Appellants alleged, the SDIP plan pays benefits in coordination
with Workers' Compensation benefits the SDIP benefits offset other
income, including temporary disability benefits paid under Workers'
Compensation.

Finally, the Judge finds that the Appellants fail to demonstrate
error in the trial court's sustaining the demurrer without leave to
amend.  Even if California does now recognize a cause of action for
unjust enrichment (or restitution), athe Appellants have not
alleged one. While they claim in their brief that the Regents
obtained a benefit based on their illegal transfer of the cost of
workers compensation to employees, the second amended complaint
does not contain facts that would give rise to an inference of such
a transfer.  There is no allegation that employee premiums for SDIP
are actually used to defray the costs of workers compensation, or
any facts from which a violation of section 3751 or 3752 may be
inferred.

For these reasons, Judge Needham affirmed the judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 28, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/mmwihQ from Leagle.com.


LIBERTY NATIONAL: Corrected Joint Bid to Alter in Goostree OK'd
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion Defendant
Liberty National and Defendant Robert D. Bice's Corrected Joint
Motion to Alter or Amend in the case captioned KEE GOOSTREE, as
representative of the ESTATE OF ALTON H. PADGETT, and JEAN G.
PADGETT, Plaintiffs, v. LIBERTY NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY and
ROBERT D. BICE, Defendants. Case No. 1:19-CV-00071-KOB. (N.D.
Ala.).

The Padgetts filed this suit individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated against Liberty National and Mr. Bice in
the Circuit Court of Talladega County, Alabama. The complaint
alleges eight claims: breach of contract; breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing; conversion; rescission;
unjust enrichment; declaratory and injunctive relief; negligence,
willfulness, and/or wantonness in the recommendation and sale of
life insurance policies; and negligent and/or wanton training and
supervision.

Whether to grant a motion to reconsider under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) or 60(b) is within the discretion of the trial
court. A motion to reconsider must demonstrate why the court should
reconsider its prior decision and set forth facts or law of a
strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior
decision.

Three grounds justify reconsideration of an order: when a party
submits evidence of (1) an intervening change in controlling law
(2) the availability of new evidence or (3) the need to correct
clear error or manifest injustice.

Liberty National and Mr. Bice filed the corrected joint motion.
Because the motions are otherwise identical in substance, the court
will find as moot the original motion to amend and will only
consider the merits of the corrected motion to amend.

In their corrected motion, the Defendants contend that the court
committed clear error in its order finding that a possibility
existed that the Plaintiffs alleged a claim against Mr. Bice for
breach of duty of fair dealing because of an alleged special
relationship. As one of their arguments for reconsideration, the
Defendants maintain that the court relied upon allegations in the
Plaintiffs' jurisdictional response brief to find a special
relationship, when the court should have been limited to the
Plaintiffs' pleadings in its complaint.

When considering subject matter jurisdiction in a removal action,
the status of the case as disclosed by the plaintiff's complaint is
controlling in the case of a removal, since the defendant must file
his petition before the time for answer or forever lose his right
to remove.

In the June 17 Order, this court found that Plaintiffs alleged a
special relationship existed because Plaintiffs contended that by
and through this long-term relationship' with Mr. Bice over the 33
years he was their insurance agent, the Padgetts `reposed trust in
him regarding their insurance needs. In that statement, the court
quoted Plaintiffs' argument in their jurisdictional response brief,
erroneously expecting the factual statements to accurately reflect
those in their complaint. But the complaint does not allege either
a long-term relationship or that the Padgetts reposed trust in Mr.
Bice. So, the court committed clear error when it relied on
allegations outside of Plaintiffs' pleadings at the time of the
removal, despite the Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent
to the contrary.  Therefore, the court must grant the Defendants'
motion to amend.

Liberty National and Mr. Bice contend that Plaintiffs cannot assert
a claim against Mr. Bice for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in Count Two because Mr. Bice is not a party
to any of the insurance contracts between Liberty National and
Plaintiffs. In its June 17 Memorandum Opinion, the court found that
a possibility existed that Plaintiffs alleged a claim for breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing against Mr. Bice
specifically because Plaintiffs had alleged a special relationship
between them and Mr. Bice. Absent a special relationship, Mr. Bice
owed Plaintiffs no duty.  

As stated above, Plaintiffs' complaint fails to provide any
allegations of a special relationship. The only allegations of a
special relationship come from Plaintiffs' jurisdictional response.
So, because Plaintiffs failed to plead a special relationship with
Mr. Bice, as an insurance agent for Liberty National, Mr. Bice owes
no duty to Plaintiffs. Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot state a claim
against Mr. Bice for breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing.

In its June 17 Memorandum Opinion, the court stopped at this point
because it found a possibility existed that Plaintiffs had alleged
a claim against Mr. Bice, and so Plaintiffs could not have
fraudulently joined Mr. Bice. Because the court now finds the
opposite, the court will continue to consider whether a possibility
exists that Plaintiffs alleged any other claim against Mr. Bice.

The complaint alleges two additional claims against Mr. Bice, not
including Count One for breach of contract that the court
previously disposed of in its June 17 order: Count Six for
declaratory and injunctive relief; and Count Seven for negligence,
willfulness, and/or wantonness in the recommendation and sale of
life insurance policies.

In Count Six, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Bice breached the life
insurance policies by actively soliciting and selling life
insurance policies to the Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class with
benefits which were illusory, Defendants sold policies . for which
there was no need and no tangible economic benefit and Defendants
sale of such policies was motivated by pure profit at the expense
of Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class. Plaintiffs allege they are
without adequate remedies at law, and seek a declaration of the
parties' respective rights and duties under the Policy and Class
Policies and request the Court to declare the aforementioned
conduct of Defendant as unlawful and in material breach of the
Policy and Class Policies.

To declare that Mr. Bice's conduct was unlawful and in material
breach of the Policy and Class Policies, the court would first have
to determine that Mr. Bice was a party to the contract. And as
established regarding Count One, which alleged breach of contract
against Mr. Bice, Mr. Bice was not a party to the life insurance
contracts and cannot be held liable for breach of the contract
because he was not a party. Likewise, the court cannot declare that
he is in material breach of the life insurance policies and enter
declaratory judgment in favor of Plaintiffs because Mr. Bice is not
bound by the policies. So, no possibility exists that Plaintiffs
alleged the proper facts for a declaratory judgment against Mr.
Bice.

In Count Seven, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants owed duties to
properly assess the Plaintiffs' needs and advise as to the
suitability of the insurance product recommended, that Defendants
failed to exercise reasonable care, and that Defendants acted
negligently, willfully, and/or wantonly in soliciting, recommending
and inducing the Plaintiffs to purchase life insurance policies
which were not needed, conferred no economic benefit, and were
wholly unsuitable for the Plaintiffs' needs.

To establish a claim of negligence, the claimant must demonstrate
(1) duty (2) breach of duty (3) proximate cause, and (4) injury.  

And, as this court has already discussed at length, no other duty
between the insurance agent and the insured party exists absent
either a contract between the parties or a special relationship
between the parties. Here, no contract existed between Mr. Bice and
the Padgetts, and the Padgetts have failed to plead in the
complaint a special relationship existed. So, Plaintiffs have not
sufficiently pled that Mr. Bice had a duty to the Padgetts.
Therefore, no possibility exists that Plaintiffs stated a claim for
negligence, wantonness, and/or willfulness against Mr. Bice.

Because no possibility exists that Plaintiffs stated a claim
against Mr. Bice, the court finds that Plaintiffs fraudulently
joined Mr. Bice. So, the court will ignore Mr. Bice in determining
whether it has diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. As previously
explained, Mr. Bice defeated diversity because he and Plaintiffs
are citizens of Alabama. So, this court does have diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction over this case.

In this case, Plaintiffs do not allege a certain amount in
controversy. So Defendants must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the amount in controversy more likely than not
exceeds the jurisdictional requirement. But the court may also find
the jurisdictional requirement for the amount in controversy has
been met when the amount is facially apparent' from the pleading
itself.

The Plaintiffs allege that the persons who fall within the Class
number in at least the hundreds, and most likely thousands. They
also allege that the Padgetts' claims are typical of the class. The
suit challenges the solicitation of life insurance policies in
which the premiums paid exceed the face value of the policy and
seeks among other relief, including punitive damages a return of
all premiums paid thereunder. The Padgetts allegedly paid more than
$188,000 in premiums since 1995.

So, the court conservatively estimates that the Padgetts' amount in
controversy is $188,000. But the calculation does not end here,
because the claims of the individual class members shall be
aggregated to determine whether the amount in controversy exceeds
the sum or value of $5,000,000. Using the low end of Plaintiffs'
class size, the court multiplies 100 putative class members by the
$188,000 sought by the Padgetts, whose claims are supposedly
typical of the class. Under the court's calculation, the
approximate amount in controversy is $18,800,000, which exceeds the
$5,000,000 jurisdictional requirement.

Once the defendant establishes subject-matter jurisdiction under
CAFA, the plaintiff seeking remand bears the burden to demonstrate
that the local controversy exception applies.The legislative
history of CAFA suggests that Congress intended the local
controversy exception to be a narrow on, with all doubts resolved
in favor of exercising jurisdiction over the case.

In this case, Plaintiffs attached an affidavit from Ms. Goostree,
in which she stated that she reasonably believes that more than
two-thirds of the class members are citizens of Alabama. The court
struck the portion of the affidavit regarding individuals other
than Ms. Goostree's parents because Ms. Goostree did not base her
statements on personal knowledge. Even if the court considered the
affidavit, Plaintiffs fail to provide any proof that the class
comprised at least two-thirds Alabama citizens. The plaintiffs
ignore that the class also disjunctively includes the predecessors
in interest of the potential victims, many of whom may not live in
Alabama. And, as noted by Plaintiffs, mere residency does not
equate to citizenship for jurisdictional purposes.  As such,
reliance on residence alone to infer citizenship under CAFA is
misplaced.

Plaintiffs also fail to provide evidence that Mr. Bice, assuming he
was not fraudulently joined, is a defendant from whom significant
relief is sought by members of the class.  

Because Plaintiffs did not demonstrate that two-thirds of the class
members are citizens of Alabama and that Mr. Bice is a significant
defendant, they fail to establish that the local controversy
exception applies. As such, in addition to having diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction through fraudulent joinder, the court also
has subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA.

Accordingly, the court will grant the Defendants' Corrected Joint
Motion to Alter or Amend.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 25, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y4tg8cqq from
Leagle.com.

Kee Goostree, as representative of the estate of Alton H Padgett &
Jean G Padgett, Plaintiffs, represented by Jeffrey P. Mauro,
BADDLEY & MAURO, LLC & John Parker Yates, YATES LAW, LLC, 2545
Highland Avenue South, Suite 100, Birmingham, AL 35205

Liberty National Life Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by
Kriston Laney Gifford -- lgifford@bradley.com -- BRADLEY ARANT
BOULT CUMMINGS LLP, Michael R. Pennington --
mpennington@bradley.com -- BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP & Scott
B. Smith -- ssmith@bradley.com -- BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS
LLP.


LOGMEIN INC: Wasson Class Action Still Ongoing
----------------------------------------------
LogMeIn, Inc. continues to defend a securities class action, the
company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on July 26, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019.

On August 20, 2018, a securities class action lawsuit was initiated
by purported stockholders of the Company in the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California against the Company and
certain of its officers, entitled Wasson v. LogMeIn, Inc. et al.
(Case No. 2:18-cv-07285).

On November 6, 2018 the case was transferred to the District of
Massachusetts (Case No. 1:18-cv-12330).

The lawsuit asserts claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 based on alleged misstatements
or omissions concerning renewal rates for the Company's
subscription contracts.

LogMeIn said, "The Company believes the lawsuit lacks merit and
intends to defend it vigorously."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

LogMeIn, Inc. provides a portfolio of cloud-based communication and
collaboration, identity and access, and customer engagement and
support solutions. LogMeIn, Inc. was founded in 2003 and is
headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts with additional locations in
North America, South America, Europe, Asia, and Australia.

LYFT INC: Court Consolidates Securities Suits for Pretrial
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, Oakland Division, issued an Order consolidating the
related cases captioned MATIAS MALIG, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE MALIG
FAMILY TRUST, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. LYFT INC., ET AL., Defendants. KEVIN LEWIS,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff, v. LYFT INC., ET AL., Defendants, Case Nos.
4:19-cv-02690-HSG, 4:19-cv-03003-HSG (N.D. Cal.), into Civil Action
No. 4:19-cv-02690-HSG for pretrial proceedings before this Court.
The consolidated action shall be captioned: In re Lyft Inc.
Securities Litigation.

For all actions subsequently filed in, or transferred to this
District, that are related to the Consolidated Action by the Court,
the parties (including the parties to the subsequently filed or
transferred action) shall meet and confer regarding potential
consolidation. If the parties ultimately stipulate to
consolidation, such action will be consolidated with the
Consolidated Action. If the parties are unable to agree on
consolidation, the parties shall bring the matter to the Court's
attention within 10 days after the subsequently filed or
transferred action is related to the Consolidated Action.

The docket in Civil Action No. 4:19-cv-02690-HSG shall constitute
the Master Docket for this action.

In re LYFT INC. SECURITIES Master File No. 4:19-cv-02690-HSG
LITIGATION CLASS ACTION This Document Relates To: All Actions

The file in Civil Action No. 4:19-cv-02690-HSG shall constitute a
Master File for every action in the consolidated action. When the
document being filed pertains to all actions, the phrase All
Actions shall appear immediately after the phrase This Documents
Relates To: When a pleading applies only to some, not all, of the
actions, the document shall list, immediately after the phrase This
Documents Relates To:, the docket number for each individual action
to which the document applies, along with the last name of the
first-listed plaintiff in said action.

The clerk is directed to administratively close the later-filed
civil action, Case No. 4:19-cv-03003-HSG. All future filings should
be done in the lead case only and should be captioned In Re LYFT
INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 25, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y4cq3qqo from Leagle.com.

Matias Malig, as Trustee for the Malig Family Trust, Plaintiff,
represented by Jacob Allen Walker -- jake@blockesq.com -- Block &
Leviton LLP.

Lyft, Inc., Defendant, represented by Andrew Brian Clubok --
andrew.clubok@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice, Colleen
Carlton Smith -- colleen.smith@lw.com -- Latham and Watkins LLP,
Elizabeth L. Deeley -- elizabeth.deeley@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins
LLP &Matthew Rawlinson -- matt.rawlinson@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins
LLP.


MACHOL & JOHANNES: Hall Contests Illegal Garnishment
----------------------------------------------------
Ian Hall, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. Machol & Johannes, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
19-cv-00239, (E.D. Wash., July 12, 2019) seeks damages and remedies
pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Washington
Collection Agency Act and Washington's Consumer Protection Act.

Machol & Johannes attempted to collect a debt that Hall allegedly
owed Capital One Bank. It attempted to secure a garnishment on
Hall's bank account but failed to include statutory exemptions of
$2,500 in student loan money and/or a $500 cash exemption and did
not have an enforceable contractual arrangement with the original
creditor, says the complaint. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Kirk D. Miller, Esq.
      KIRK D. MILLER, P.S.
      421 W. Riverside Avenue, Ste. 660
      Spokane, WA 99201
      Tel: (509) 413-1494
      Fax: (509) 413-1724

             - and -

      Shayne Sutherland, Esq.
      Brian Cameron, Esq.
      CAMERON SUTHERLAND, PLLC
      421 W. Riverside Ave., Ste. 660
      Spokane, WA 99201
      Tel: (509) 315-4507
      Fax: (509) 315-4585


MALLINCKRODT: Misleading Reports Inflate Share Price, Strougo Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
BARBARA STROUGO, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. MALLINCKRODT PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY,
MARK C. TRUDEAU, BRYAN M. REASONS, GEORGE A. KEGLER, and MATTHEW K.
HARBAUGH, the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-07030 (S.D.N.Y., July
26, 2019), seeks to recover damages caused by Defendants'
violations of the federal securities laws and to pursue remedies
under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.

The case is a federal securities class action on behalf of a class
consisting of all persons other than Defendants who purchased or
otherwise acquired Mallinckrodt securities between February 28,
2018 and July 16, 2019, both dates inclusive.

Mallinckrodt was founded in 1867 and is based in the United
Kingdom. The Company, together with its subsidiaries, develops,
manufactures, markets, and distributes specialty pharmaceutical
products and therapies in the United States, Europe, the Middle
East, Africa, and internationally. It operates in two segments,
Specialty Brands, and Specialty Generics and Amitiza. The Company
markets its branded products to physicians, pharmacists, pharmacy
buyers, hospital procurement departments, ambulatory surgical
centers, and specialty pharmacies.

Among other products, Mallinckrodt's portfolio includes H.P. Acthar
Gel ("Acthar"), an injectable drug for various indications, such as
rheumatoid arthritis, multiple sclerosis, infantile spasms,
systemic lupus erythematosus, polymyositis, and others. During the
Class Period, Acthar was in a Phase 2B study designed to assess its
efficacy and safety as an investigational treatment for amyotrophic
lateral sclerosis ("ALS").

The Defendants made materially false and misleading statements
regarding the Company's business, operational and compliance
policies. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Acthar posed
significant safety concerns that rendered it a non-viable treatment
for ALS; (ii) accordingly, Mallinckrodt overstated the viability of
Acthar as an ALS treatment; and (iii) as a result, the Company's
public statements were materially false and misleading at all
relevant times.

On July 16, 2019, post-market, Mallinckrodt announced that the
Company was permanently discontinuing the PENNANT Trial assessing
Acthar's safety and efficacy as an ALS treatment. Mallinckrodt
stated that it decided "to halt the trial after careful
consideration of a recent recommendation by the study's independent
Data and Safety Monitoring Board" ("DSMB"), which "was based on the
specific concern for pneumonia, which occurred at a higher rate in
the ALS patients receiving Acthar Gel compared to those on placebo"
and that "the board also mentioned other adverse events specific to
this patient population."

On this news, Mallinckrodt's stock price fell $0.64 per share, or
7.8%, to close at $7.56 per share on July 17, 2019.

As a result of Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          Gustavo F. Bruckner, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood I, Esq.
          Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue, 20 th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
          E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  gfbruckner@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com
                  pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com

MARRIOTT HOTEL: Settlement in Dharia ADA/FLSA Suit Can be Enforced
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JATIN DHARIA, Plaintiff, v. MARRIOTT HOTEL SERVICES,
INC. d/b/a WAIKIKI BEACH MARRIOTT RESORT & SPA, Defendant, Case No.
CV 18-00008 HG-WRP (D. Haw.), Judge Helen Gilmor of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Hawaii adopted the Magistrate
Judge's May 3, 2019 Findings and Recommendation to Grant
Defendant's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement.

Dharia asserts two types of claims against the Defendant.  First,
the Plaintiff asserts unlawful discrimination pursuant to the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").  Second, the Plaintiff
asserts wage and hour claims on behalf of all employees employed by
the Defendant pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").

On Oct. 4, 2018, the Parties engaged in private mediation in
Honolulu, Hawaii.  They agreed to the Mediator's Proposal and
indicated in their Joint Status Reports that they have reached a
settlement.  In their subsequent Joint Status Report, the Parties
stated that the Plaintiff rescinded his agreement to settle.

On Feb. 19, 2019, the Defendant filed a Motion to Enforce
Settlement Agreement.

On May 3, 2019, the Magistrate Judge entered a Findings and
Recommendation to Grant Defendant's Motion to Enforce Settlement
Agreement.  

The Plaintiff objects to the Findings and Recommendation.  He
objects to the Magistrate Judge's determination that a binding
contract exists.  He argues that the Parties had not come to an
agreement of an essential term: the scope of the waiver and
release.  He also argues that an enforceable agreement does not
exist because the Parties did not physically sign a final
settlement agreement.

Judge Gilmore finds that federal district courts apply state
contract law principles when enforcing settlement agreements.
Pursuant to Hawaii state law, a court may enforce a settlement
agreement if the parties have agreed to the essential terms.  The
Plaintiff does not provide any binding case showing that waiver and
release is an essential term to a contract pursuant to Hawaii law.

She also finds that the Parties' multiple joint status reports also
support the Magistrate Judge's conclusions.  The Plaintiff never
objected to the settlement agreement in the joint status reports
prior to date.  The counsel for both Parties indicated their
agreement to the Mediator's Proposal and the Mediator stated that
both Parties agreed to the terms of the global settlement.  Hence,
the Magistrate Judge properly determined that a binding contract
exists. The Magistrate Judge properly determined that an
enforceable settlement agreement exists between the Parties.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 74.2,
Judge Gilmore adopted, as modified, as the Opinion and Order of the
Court, the "Findings and Recommendation to Grant Defendant's Motion
to Enforce Settlement Agreement."  She modified line 4 on page 12
of the Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation and replaces
"fo" with "of."  She denied the Plaintiff's Objections to the
Magistrate Judge's May 3, 2019 Findings and Recommendation to Grant
Defendant's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 28, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/91PEdV from Leagle.com.

Jatin Dharia, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory K. McGillivary --
fo@mselaborlaw.com -- McGillivary Steele Elkin LLP, pro hac vice,
Matthew D. Purushotham, McGillivary Steele Elkin LLP, pro hac vice,
Sara L. Faulman, McGillivary Steele Elkin LLP, pro hac vice, Sharon
V. Lovejoy -- slovejoy@starnlaw.com -- Starn O'Toole Marcus &
Fisher & T. Reid Coploff, McGillivary Steele Elkin LLP, pro hac
vice.

Marriott Hotel Services, Inc., doing business as Waikiki Beach
Marriott Resort & Spa, Defendant, represented by Eileen C. Zorc --
EZorc@marrjones.com -- Marr Jones & Wang.


MATRIX WARRANTY: Thrower Sues over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
--------------------------------------------------------------
GENE THROWER, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. MATRIX WARRANTY SOLUTIONS, INC. d/b/a
ELEMENT PROTECTION, and AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES CENTER, the Defendants,
Case No. 3:19-cv-00066-CAR (M.D. Ga., July 26, 2019), alleges that
Matrix Auto Warranty Solutions, Inc. commissioned automated and
pre-recorded telemarketing calls to Plaintiff and other putative
class members without their consent. The suit enforces the
consumer-privacy provisions of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act in response to widespread public outrage about the
proliferation of automated and prerecorded telephone calls.

The calls were made pursuant to an arrangement between Matrix and
Automotive Services Center, a vendor for Matrix, who telemarketed
Matrix's services, and at its direction.  Matrix Warranty shifts
the burden of wasted time to the consumers it calls with
unsolicited messages.

Matrix Warranty provides extended warranty services to consumers.
To generate business through sales, Matrix Warranty relies on
telemarketing. However, Matrix Warranty's contact with the
potential new customers is limited, and the telemarketing is
conducted by third parties, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff is:

          Steven H. Koval, Esq.
          3575 Piedmont Road
          Building 15, Suite 120
          Atlanta, GA 30305
          Telephone: (404) 513-6651
          Facsimile: (404) 549-4654
          E-mail: shkoval@aol.com

MATTEL INC: Continues to Defend Wyatt Class Suit
------------------------------------------------
Mattel, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 26, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to defend a
purported class action suit entitled, Wyatt v. Mattel, Inc., et
al.

A purported class action lawsuit is pending in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California (Wyatt v.
Mattel, Inc., et al., filed March 6, 2019) against Mattel, Ynon
Kreiz, and Joseph J. Euteneuer alleging federal securities laws
violations in connection with statements allegedly made by the
defendants during the period February 7, 2019 through February 15,
2019.

In general, the lawsuit alleges that the defendants artificially
inflated Mattel's common stock price by knowingly making materially
false and misleading statements and omissions to the investing
public about Mattel's Structural Simplification Program and
regarding prospects for Barbie and Hot Wheels in 2019.

The lawsuit alleges that the defendants' conduct caused the
plaintiff and other stockholders to purchase Mattel common stock at
artificially inflated prices.

The lawsuit seeks unspecified compensatory damages, attorneys'
fees, expert fees, and/or costs.

Mattel believes that the allegations in the lawsuit are without
merit and intends to vigorously defend against them. A reasonable
estimate of the amount of any possible loss or range of loss cannot
be made at this time.

Mattel, Inc., a children's entertainment company, designs and
produces toys and consumer products worldwide. The company operates
through North America, International, and American Girl segments.
The company was founded in 1945 and is headquartered in El Segundo,
California.


MATTEL INC: Fisher-Price Rock 'n Play Sleeper Related Suits Ongoing
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mattel, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 26, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that 16 purported class action lawsuits are
pending against Fisher-Price, Inc. and/or Mattel, Inc. asserting
claims for false advertising, negligent product design, breach of
warranty, fraud, and other claims in connection with the marketing
and sale of the Fisher-Price Rock 'n Play Sleeper (the "Sleeper").


In general, the lawsuits allege that the Sleeper should not have
been marketed and sold as safe and fit for prolonged and overnight
sleep for infants. The class action lawsuits propose nationwide and
statewide consumer classes comprised of those who purchased the
Sleeper as marketed as safe for prolonged and overnight sleep,
and/or a class of all children who sustained an injury or death due
to the alleged defective design of the Sleeper, and their parents.

Four additional lawsuits are pending against Fisher-Price, Inc. and
Mattel, Inc. alleging that a product defect in the Sleeper caused
the fatalities of eight children. Additionally, Fisher-Price, Inc.
and/or Mattel, Inc. have also received letters from lawyers
purporting to represent additional plaintiffs who are threatening
to assert similar claims.

The lawsuits seek compensatory damages, punitive damages, statutory
damages, restitution, disgorgement, attorneys’ fees, costs,
interest, declaratory relief, and/or injunctive relief.

Mattel believes that the allegations in the lawsuits are without
merit and intends to vigorously defend against them. A reasonable
estimate of the amount of any possible loss or range of loss cannot
be made at this time.

Mattel, Inc., a children's entertainment company, designs and
produces toys and consumer products worldwide. The company operates
through North America, International, and American Girl segments.
The company was founded in 1945 and is headquartered in El Segundo,
California.


MDL 2472: Court Certifies Class in Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE LOESTRIN 24 FE ANTITRUST LITIGATION. THIS
DOCUMENT RELATES TO: ALL ACTIONS, MDL No. 13-2472-WES-PAS, Master
File No. 1:13-md-2472 (D. R.I.), Judge William E. Smith of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Rhode Island (i) granted Direct
Purchaser Plaintiffs ("DPPs")' Motion for Class Certification, and
(ii) denied the Defendants' Motion to Exclude the Opinions and
Testimony of Dr. Leitzinger.

In the putative class action, the DPPs allege that Defendants
Warner Chilcott (US), LLC, Warner Chilcott Sales (US), LLC, Warner
Chilcott Company LLC, Warner Chilcott plc, and Warner Chilcott
Limited "Warner Chilcott") and Defendants Watson Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. and Watson Laboratories, Inc. ("Watson") violated federal law
through a series of actions intended to delay and suppress generic
competition for the oral contraceptive Loestrin 24 Fe.

The DPPs are corporate entities that purchased brand and/or generic
Loestrin 24 directly from Warner Chilcott or a non-defendant
generic manufacturer.  They allege that Warner Chilcott committed
fraud on the Patent and Trademark Office in securing the patent for
Loestrin 24 and proceeded to file sham litigation to enforce its
patent against potential generic competitors.  The Plaintiffs
further allege that Warner Chilcott then settled its sham patent
lawsuits against Watson and Lupin Pharmaceutical, Inc. and/or Lupin
Ltd. by making large and unjustified payments in exchange for their
agreement to stay out of the Loestrin 24 market.  Right before
generic entry was set to occur, Warner Chilcott introduced a drug,
Minastrin 24 (a chewable version of Loestrin 24 with added
sweetener on the reminder days), to erode the brand Loestrin 24
prescription base. Id. at 323-24.  This product hop allowed Warner
Chilcott to retain branded sales (in Minastrin 24) once generic
Loestrin 24 entered and state automatic-substitution laws kicked
in.

The order of events has consequences for the Court's ability to
determine -- as antitrust law requires -- what the world would have
looked like but for the Defendants' alleged anticompetitive
conduct.5 Because Defendants executed the product hop and pulled
brand Loestrin 24 from the market before automatic substitution
laws could take hold, there is a dearth of evidence reflecting how
the market would have responded to generic entry in a but -- for
world.  This dearth of evidence means that the DPPs and the
Defendants, and their respective experts, do not agree on the best
methodology to use to construct the contours of the but-for world.

The Defendants have moved to exclude the opinions and testimony of
the DPPs' proposed expert, Jeffrey J. Leitzinger, Ph.D.  They argue
that (1) Dr. Leitzinger's opinions are based on "unsupported
assumptions provided to him by counsel" rather than scientific
method; (2) he improperly assumes that generic drug prices decrease
with additional generic entrants, ignoring evidence specific to
Loestrin 24 suggesting otherwise; and (3) his methodology for
calculating the alleged aggregate overcharge due to generic delay
and related calculations is unreliable.

Before dealing with the DPPs' Rule 23 Motion for Class
Certification, Judge Smith must address the Defendants' challenge
to some of the expert analysis that underpins the DPPs' claims
regarding what the but for world would look like, who was damaged,
and to what extent.  

The Judge finds that the Defendants have not demonstrated that any
of Dr. Leitzinger's assumptions are sufficiently problematic to
render his opinions and testimony unreliable.  Their criticisms,
instead, go to the weight of the evidence.  He also finds that the
DPPs have satisfied their burden to produce a scientifically sound
and methodologically reliable opinion.  It will be up to the jury
to determine which party's theory wins the day.  The Plaintiffs
have satisfied their burden by demonstrating that Dr. Leitzinger's
opinions and testimony rest on a reliable foundation and are
relevant to the task at hand.  Now it is for the trier of fact to
weigh the DPPs' evidence, with the aid of cross-examination and the
Defendants' rebuttal expert evidence.  Accordingly, the Judge
denied the Defendants' Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony
of Dr. Leitzinger.

Turning to DPPs' Motion for Class Certification, the DPPs move to
certify a class of 47 members,11 as defined as all persons or
entities in the United States and its territories who purchased
brand or generic Loestrin 24 directly from Warner Chilcott or
Amneal at any time during the period from Sept. 1, 2009, through
and until June 3, 2015, and all persons or entities in the United
States and its territories who purchased brand Minastrin 24
directly from Warner at any time during the period from Sept. 1,
2009, through and until March 14, 2017.

The Judge finds that the putative class satisfies each of the four
prerequisites set forth in Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedures: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation.  He also finds that the putatice class had
demonstrated that the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, as set forth in Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedures.

For the reasons stated, Judge Mueller (i) granted the the DPPs'
Motion for Class Certification, and (ii) deneid the Defendants'
Motion to Exclude.  She appointed (i) as the class representative
Ahold USA, Inc., and (ii) Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Berger &
Montague, P.C., Faruqi & Faruqi LLP, and Kessler Topaz Meltzer &
Check LLP as the Co-Lead Counsel for the DPP Class.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 2, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/qhsVsc from Leagle.com.

City of Providence, individually and on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Donald A.
Migliori, Motley Rice LLC, Jeffrey M. Padwa , DarrowEverett LLP,
John Andrew Ioannou, Motley Rice LLC, pro hac vice, Michael M.
Buchman -- mbuchman@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice LLC, pro hac
vice, Robert J. McConnell, Motley Rice LLC, Bonnie A. Kendrick, The
Dugan Law Firm, pro hac vice, David S. Scalia, The Dugan Law Firm,
Douglas R. Plymale, Dugan Law Firm, Ellen T. Noteware , Berger
Montague PC, pro hac vice, Michelle C. Clerkin, Motley Rice LLC,
pro hac vice, Donna M. Evans -- devans@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Matthew C. Weiner --
matt@hilliardshadowenlaw.com -- Hilliard & Shadowen, LLP, pro hac
vice & Sharon K. Robertson -- srobertson@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC.

United Food and Commercial Workers Local 1776, and Participating
Employers Health and Welfare Fund individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Bonnie A.
Kendrick , The Dugan Law Firm, pro hac vice, David S. Scalia , The
Dugan Law Firm, Donald Sean Nation , Hilliard & Shadowen, LLP, pro
hac vice, Douglas R. Plymale , Dugan Law Firm, Ellen T. Noteware ,
Berger Montague PC, pro hac vice, Matthew C. Weiner , Hilliard &
Shadowen, LLP, pro hac vice, Natalie Finkelman Bennett , Shepard,
Finkelman, Miller & Shah, LLP, pro hac vice, Robert J. McConnell ,
Motley Rice LLC, Steve D. Shadowen -- steve@hilliardshadowenlaw.com
-- Hilliard & Shadowen LLC, Vincent L. Greene, IV , Motley Rice
LLC, Donna M. Evans , Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC & Sharon
K. Robertson , Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC.

New York Hotel Trades Council & Hotel Association of New York City,
Inc. Health Benefits Fund, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Lometti ,
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Sharon K. Robertson , Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Bonnie A. Kendrick , The Dugan Law
Firm, pro hac vice, David S. Scalia , The Dugan Law Firm, Douglas
R. Plymale , Dugan Law Firm, Ellen T. Noteware , Berger Montague
PC, pro hac vice, Robert J. McConnell , Motley Rice LLC, Donna M.
Evans , Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC & Matthew C. Weiner ,
Hilliard & Shadowen, LLP, pro hac vice.

Fraternal Order of Police Fort Lauderdale Lodge 31, Insurance Trust
Fund - individually and behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Adam G. Kurtz , Pomerantz LLP, pro hac
vice, Jayne A. Goldstein , Shepherd Finkelman Miller & Shah LLP,
pro hac vice, Bonnie A. Kendrick , The Dugan Law Firm, pro hac
vice, David S. Scalia , The Dugan Law Firm, Douglas R. Plymale ,
Dugan Law Firm, Ellen T. Noteware , Berger Montague PC, pro hac
vice, Robert J. McConnell , Motley Rice LLC, Donna M. Evans , Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Matthew C. Weiner , Hilliard &
Shadowen, LLP, pro hac vice & Sharon K. Robertson , Cohen Milstein
Sellers & Toll PLLC.

Electrical Workers 242 & 294 Health & Welfare Fund, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
represented by Diana J. Zinser , Spector Roseman & Kodroff P.C.,
Bonnie A. Kendrick , The Dugan Law Firm, pro hac vice, David S.
Scalia , The Dugan Law Firm, Douglas R. Plymale , Dugan Law Firm,
Ellen T. Noteware , Berger Montague PC, pro hac vice, Robert J.
McConnell , Motley Rice LLC, Donna M. Evans , Cohen Milstein
Sellers & Toll PLLC, Matthew C. Weiner , Hilliard & Shadowen, LLP,
pro hac vice & Sharon K. Robertson , Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll
PLLC.

Denise Loy, a resident citizen of the State of Florida,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated & Mary
Alexander, a resident citizen of the State of North Carolina,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Christopher W. Cantrell , Doyle Lowther
LLP, pro hac vice, Donald A. Migliori , Motley Rice LLC, James R.
Hail , Doyle Lowther LLP, pro hac vice, William J. Doyle, II ,
Doyle Lowther LLP, pro hac vice, Bonnie A. Kendrick , The Dugan Law
Firm, David S. Scalia , The Dugan Law Firm, Ellen T. Noteware ,
Berger Montague PC, pro hac vice, Robert J. McConnell , Motley Rice
LLC, Donna M. Evans , Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Matthew
C. Weiner , Hilliard & Shadowen, LLP, pro hac vice & Sharon K.
Robertson , Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC.

Warner Chilcott Public Limited Company, Warner Chilcott Company,
LLC, Warner Chilcott Holdings Company III, Ltd., Warner Chilcott
Corporation, Warner Chilcott Sales (US), LLC & Warner Chilcott
Laboratories Ireland Limited, Defendants, represented by John A.
Tarantino -- jtarantino@apslaw.com -- Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C.,
Nicole J. Benjamin -- nbenjamin@apslaw.com -- Adler, Pollock &
Sheehan, PC, Patricia K. Rocha -- procha@apslaw.com -- Adler
Pollock & Sheehan P.C., A. Lee Czocher, White & Case LLP, pro hac
vice, Alyson M. Cox, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Angela D.
Daker, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Caitlin Cipicchio, White &
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Celia A. McLaughlin, White & Case LLP, pro
hac vice, Christopher Swift-Perez , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
Daniel Grossbaum , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Danielle M.
Audette , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, David Courchaine, White &
Case, pro hac vice, Demetra Frawley, White & Case, pro hac vice,
Don Zhe Nan Wang, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Eileen M. Cole --
ecole@whitecase.com -- White & Case, pro hac vice, Emily Renzelli,
White & Case, pro hac vice, Holly Smith Letourneau , White & Case
LLP, pro hac vice, Jaclyn Phillips , White & Case LLP, pro hac
vice, Katherine Dyson, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Kristen
O'Shaughnessy, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Lauren Papenhausen,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Martin Toto, White & Case, pro hac
vice, Matthew S. Leddicotte, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
Michael J. Gallagher, White & Case, pro hac vice, Michael E.
Hamburger, White & Case LLP, Noah Brumfield, White & Case, pro hac
vice, Peter J. Carney, White & Case LLP, Robert A. Milne, White &
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Stefan Mentzer, White & Case LLP, pro hac
vice, William K. Wray, Jr., Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C., pro hac
vice & Zachary Dickens, White & Case, pro hac vice.

Warner Chilcott U.S., LLC, Defendant, represented by Alison
Hanstead , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, J. Mark Gidley , White &
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Jack E. Pace, III , White & Case LLP, pro
hac vice, John A. Tarantino , Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C., Nicole
J. Benjamin , Adler, Pollock & Sheehan, PC, Patricia K. Rocha ,
Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C., Peter J. Carney , White & Case LLP,
A. Lee Czocher , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Alyson M. Cox ,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Angela D. Daker , White & Case LLP,
pro hac vice, Caitlin Cipicchio , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
Celia A. McLaughlin , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Christopher
Swift-Perez , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel Grossbaum ,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Danielle M. Audette , White & Case
LLP, pro hac vice, David Courchaine , White & Case, pro hac vice,
Demetra Frawley , White & Case, pro hac vice, Don Zhe Nan Wang ,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Eileen M. Cole , White & Case, pro
hac vice, Emily Renzelli , White & Case, pro hac vice, Holly Smith
Letourneau , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Jaclyn Phillips ,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Katherine Dyson , White & Case LLP,
pro hac vice, Kristen O'Shaughnessy , White & Case LLP, pro hac
vice, Lauren Papenhausen , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Martin
Toto , White & Case, pro hac vice, Matthew S. Leddicotte , White &
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Michael J. Gallagher , White & Case, pro
hac vice, Michael E. Hamburger , White & Case LLP, Noah Brumfield ,
White & Case, pro hac vice, Robert A. Milne , White & Case LLP, pro
hac vice, Stefan Mentzer , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, William
K. Wray, Jr. , Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C., pro hac vice & Zachary
Dickens , White & Case, pro hac vice.

Warner Chilcott Company, Inc., Defendant, represented by John A.
Tarantino , Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C., Nicole J. Benjamin ,
Adler, Pollock & Sheehan, PC, Patricia K. Rocha , Adler Pollock &
Sheehan P.C., A. Lee Czocher , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
Alyson M. Cox , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Angela D. Daker ,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Christopher Swift-Perez , White &
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel Grossbaum , White & Case LLP, pro
hac vice, Danielle M. Audette , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
David Courchaine , White & Case, pro hac vice, Demetra Frawley ,
White & Case, pro hac vice, Don Zhe Nan Wang , White & Case LLP,
pro hac vice, Eileen M. Cole , White & Case, pro hac vice, Emily
Renzelli , White & Case, pro hac vice, Holly Smith Letourneau ,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Jaclyn Phillips , White & Case LLP,
pro hac vice, Katherine Dyson , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
Kristen O'Shaughnessy , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Lauren
Papenhausen , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew S. Leddicotte
, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Michael J. Gallagher , White &
Case, pro hac vice, Michael E. Hamburger , White & Case LLP, Noah
Brumfield , White & Case, pro hac vice, Peter J. Carney , White &
Case LLP, Robert A. Milne , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Stefan
Mentzer , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, William K. Wray, Jr. ,
Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C., pro hac vice & Zachary Dickens ,
White & Case, pro hac vice.

Actavis, Inc., Defendant, represented by Alison Hanstead , White &
Case LLP, J. Mark Gidley , White & Case LLP, Jack E. Pace, III ,
White & Case LLP, John A. Tarantino , Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C.,
Nicole J. Benjamin , Adler, Pollock & Sheehan, PC, Patricia K.
Rocha , Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C., Angela D. Daker , White &
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Danielle M. Audette , White & Case LLP, pro
hac vice, Holly Smith Letourneau , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
Lauren Papenhausen , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice & Robert A.
Milne , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice.

Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. & Watson Laboratories, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by Alison Hanstead , White & Case LLP, J.
Mark Gidley , White & Case LLP, Jack E. Pace, III , White & Case
LLP, John A. Tarantino , Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C., Nicole J.
Benjamin , Adler, Pollock & Sheehan, PC, Patricia K. Rocha , Adler
Pollock & Sheehan P.C., A. Lee Czocher , White & Case LLP, pro hac
vice, Alyson M. Cox , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Angela D.
Daker , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Caitlin Cipicchio , White &
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Celia A. McLaughlin , White & Case LLP, pro
hac vice, Christopher Swift-Perez , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
Daniel Grossbaum , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Danielle M.
Audette , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, David Courchaine , White
& Case, pro hac vice, Demetra Frawley , White & Case, pro hac vice,
Don Zhe Nan Wang , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Eileen M. Cole ,
White & Case, pro hac vice, Emily Renzelli , White & Case, pro hac
vice, Holly Smith Letourneau , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
Jaclyn Phillips , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Katherine Dyson ,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Kristen O'Shaughnessy , White &
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Lauren Papenhausen , White & Case LLP, pro
hac vice, Martin Toto , White & Case, pro hac vice, Matthew S.
Leddicotte , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Michael J. Gallagher ,
White & Case, pro hac vice, Michael E. Hamburger , White & Case
LLP, Noah Brumfield , White & Case, pro hac vice, Peter J. Carney ,
White & Case LLP, Robert A. Milne , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
Stefan Mentzer , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, William K. Wray,
Jr. , Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C., pro hac vice & Zachary Dickens
, White & Case, pro hac vice.


MDL 2895: 5 Sensipar Antitrust Suits Moved to District of Delaware
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: SENSIPAR (CINACALCET HYDROCHLORIDE TABLETS)
ANTITRUST LITIGATION, MDL No. 2895, Judge Sarah S. Vance of the
U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has entered an
order transferring five actions to the District of Delaware and
with the consent of that court, assigned them to the Honorable
Leonard P. Stark for coordinated or consolidated pretrial
proceedings.

Plaintiffs in actions pending in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania (KPH Healthcare Services) and the District of Delaware
(UFCW Local 1500) separately move under 28 U.S.C. Section 1407 to
centralize this litigation in their respective districts.  The
litigation consists of four putative class actions (the two
aforementioned actions, District of Delaware Cesar Castillo, and
District of New Jersey Teamsters Local 237), and one individual
action (District of Delaware Cipla),as listed on the attached
Schedule A.

Most responding parties support centralization, but there is
disagreement concerning the choice of an appropriate transferee
district, as well as to whether the Cipla action should be included
in the centralized proceedings.  Both moving plaintiffs favor
inclusion of Cipla.  The Cesar Castillo plaintiff argues for the
District of Delaware, and for "coordination" of Cipla with the
other actions.  The Teamsters Local 237 plaintiff opposes inclusion
of Cipla, and argues for the District of New Jersey.  Defendants
Amgen Inc., Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Watson Laboratories,
Inc., and Actavis Pharma, Inc., support centralization in any of
the three districts, but oppose "consolidation" as to Cipla.
Finally, the Cipla plaintiffs (Cipla Ltd. and Cipla USA, Inc.) take
no position on centralization other than that Cipla should be
excluded from the proposed MDL.

On the basis of the papers filed and the hearing session held,
Judge Vance finds that these actions involve common questions of
fact, and that centralization in the District of Delaware will
serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the
just and efficient conduct of this litigation.  The actions share
factual issues arising from allegations of anticompetitive conduct
designed to restrain competition in the market for Amgen's highly
successful Sensipar drug and its generic equivalents.  The alleged
anticompetitive conduct appears principally to implicate a January
2019 agreement between Amgen and Teva, pursuant to which Teva
purportedly agreed to stop selling its generic version of Sensipar.
The common factual issues, which include the merits of patent
litigation dating back to September 2016, appear to be complex, and
likely will require significant discovery.  Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery, the possibility of inconsistent
rulings on class certification and other pretrial matters, and
conserve judicial and party resources.

The Judge selects the District of Delaware as the transferee
district.  The three earliest-filed actions are pending there
(Cipla, UFCW Local 1500, and Cesar Castillo), and it is a
relatively convenient venue for all parties.  Significant pretrial
activity, including a hearing and decision on a preliminary
injunction motion, has taken place in Cipla.  Chief Judge Leonard
P.  Stark, who is presiding over Cipla and the other two Delaware
actions, already has gained substantial familiarity with many
aspects of this litigation.  He is an experienced transferee judge,
and Judge Vance is confident that he will steer the litigation on a
prudent course.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 31, 2019 Transfer Order is
available at https://is.gd/8IN8b6


MEDICAL GUARDIAN: GoHealth's Bid to Dismiss Blackbourn Suit Mooted
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Robert F. Rossiter, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Nebraska denied as moot GoHealth, LLC's pending motion
to dismiss the case, APRIL BLACKBOURN, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MEDICAL GUARDIAN,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 8:19CV144 (D. Neb.).

GoHealth filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).  GoHealth was named as a Defendant in
Blackbourn's original Class Action Complaint.  

On June 24, 2019, Blackbourn filed a First Amended Class Action
Complaint naming only Medical Guardian, LLC as a Defendant in the
case and gave written notice of her voluntary dismissal of GoHealth
as a Defendant.  As a result, GoHealth is no longer a Defendant in
the case.  Accordingly, Judge Rossiter denied as moot GoHealth's
pending motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 3, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/7dTORz from Leagle.com.

April Blackbourn, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Mark L. Javitch --
javitchm@gmail.com -- MARK JAVITCH, pro hac vice.

Medical Guardian, LLC, a Pennsylvania limited liability company,
Defendant, represented by Allison D. Balus -- abalus@bairdholm.com
-- BAIRD, HOLM LAW FIRM & Jeffrey N. Rosenthal --
rosenthal-j@blankrome.com -- BLANK, ROME LAW FIRM.


MIDLAND CREDIT: Carbajal Sues Over Vague Collection Letters
-----------------------------------------------------------
Esmerelda Carbajal, individually and on behalf of other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Midland Credit Management, Inc.,
Midland Funding, LLC and John Does 1-25,Defendant, Case No.
19-cv-01351, (E.D. Cal., July 19, 2019), requests statutory
damages, actual damages and attorney's fees and costs of suit along
with injunctive relief under the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act.

On September 14, 2018, Midland sent Plaintiff a letter in an
attempt to collect a personal loan from Citibank, N.A. The letter
contained three ambiguous payment options that are in actuality
discount options, says the complaint.

Midland Credit is a debt collection agency based in 3111 Camino Del
Rio North Ste. 103, San Diego. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jonathan A. Stieglitz, Esq.
     THE LAW OFFICES OF JONATHAN A. STIEGLITZ
     11845 W. Olympic Blvd., Suite 800
     Los Angeles, CA 90064
     Telephone: (323) 979-2063
     Facsimile: (323) 488-6748
     Email: jonathan.a.stieglitz@gmail.com


MIDLAND CREDIT: Court OKs Compel Arbitration in Clemons
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion granting Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration
in the case captioned ASHLEY CLEMONS, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT,
INC., Defendant. No. 1:18-cv-16883-NLH-AMD. (D.N.J.).

This matter concerns claims by the Plaintiff, on behalf of herself
and other similarly situated parties, against a credit card account
servicer for its efforts to collect on the Plaintiff's credit card
debt. The Plaintiff alleges that MCM has violated various
provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).,
which prohibits debt collectors from engaging in abusive, deceptive
and unfair practices.

The Third Circuit has articulated the standard for a court to apply
when assessing a motion to compel arbitration: "When it is
apparent, based on the face of a complaint, and documents relied
upon in the complaint, that certain of a party's claims are subject
to an enforceable arbitration clause, a motion to compel
arbitration should be considered under a Rule 12(b)(6) standard
without discovery's delay."

But if the complaint and its supporting documents are unclear
regarding the agreement to arbitrate, or if the plaintiff has
responded to a motion to compel arbitration with additional facts
sufficient to place the agreement to arbitrate in issue, then the
parties should be entitled to discovery on the question of
arbitrability before a court entertains further briefing on the
question. After limited discovery, the court may entertain a
renewed motion to compel arbitration, this time judging the motion
under a summary judgment standard.

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides that a written
arbitration provision contained in a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce shall be valid, irrevocable and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.

Under the FAA, a private arbitration agreement is enforceable if
(1) a valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties and
(2) the dispute before it falls within the scope of the agreement.


The Plaintiff does not dispute that she did not reject the
arbitration provision and that is it applicable to any dispute she
would have with Comenity. Because the Plaintiff disputes that the
arbitration provision transferred to MCM, and that MCM is permitted
to enforce the arbitration provision, the Court must consider the
relevant provisions of the agreement relating to the transfer of
rights under the agreement, as well as the documents that establish
the transfer of Plaintiff's account and corresponding agreement to
MCM.

The agreement provides: We may transfer or assign your Account
and/or this Agreement, or any of our rights under this Agreement,
to another person or entity at any time without prior notice to you
or your consent.

It is undisputable that one of Comenity's rights was the
arbitration provision in Plaintiff's account agreement.

The Plaintiff argues that her claims against MCM are not the type
contemplated by the relationship she had with Comenity. Plaintiff
argues that her claims against MCM are regarding a deceptive
collections letter, while any claims Plaintiff would have against
Comenity would arise out of her credit card account or the
agreement itself.

This argument is not persuasive. Plaintiff does not show that her
agreement with Comenity precluded any collection efforts by
Comenity. To the contrary, the majority of the agreement relates to
Plaintiff's obligations to pay for her transaction and the
consequences of her failure to do so, which includes Comenity's
right to suspend your ability to make charges, close your Account,
require you to pay the full amount you owe immediately or take any
other action permitted by law and require Plaintiff to pay the
reasonable costs for collecting amounts due, including reasonable
attorney's fees and court costs incurred by us or another person or
entity.

MCM, though Midland, assumed these rights when it purchased
Plaintiff's account. MCM therefore merely endeavored to collect on
Plaintiff's account just as Comenity had the right to do before it
sold her account.

Next, Plaintiff argues that MCM should be equitably estopped from
enforcing the arbitration agreement. The Court is not persuaded, as
the cases cited by Plaintiff concern thirdparty non-signatories'
attempts to enforce arbitration provisions, such as a collection
company hired by an account owner, rather than the situation here,
where Comenity sold Plaintiff's account and all the rights and
obligations therein  to another party, which then stood in the same
shoes as Comenity when Plaintiff signed the agreement.

The enforcement of the arbitration provision does not eliminate
Plaintiff's FDCPA claim against MCM   it simply changes the forum
for its resolution and prevents her from pursuing a class action.

Plaintiff had options if she wished to preserve a potential FDCPA
class action against any unlawful collection efforts arising from
her credit card debt. Plaintiff had the option to reject the
arbitration provision, the procedure for which was spelled out in
bold lettering and large font in the agreement, or cancel the
credit card.
  
The FAA established a national policy favoring arbitration when the
parties contract for that mode of dispute resolution.

After consideration of the presumption in favor of arbitration in
tandem with Plaintiff's inability to meet her burden of proving
that her claims are unsuitable for arbitration, the Court finds
that Plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed in favor of
arbitration.

Accordingly, the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's
claims and to compel arbitration will be granted.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 25, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3dodtx7 from Leagle.com.

ASHLEY CLEMONS, individually, and on behalf all other similarly
situated consumers, Plaintiff, represented by DANIEL ZEMEL, Zemel
Law LLC, 70 Clinton Ave. Suite 3, Newark, New Jersey 07114

MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendant, represented by ELLEN
BETH SILVERMAN esilverman@hinshawlaw.com -- HINSHAW & CULBERTSON
LLP & MATTHEW BLAKE CORWIN -- mcorman@hinshawlaw.com -- HINSHAW &
CULBERTSON LLP.


MILLION DOLLAR: Wright Seeks Minimum Wage for Exotic Dancers
------------------------------------------------------------
REBECCA WRIGHT, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
the Plaintiffs, vs. MILLION DOLLAR CORPORATION D/B/A DANDY DAN’S
CLUB, TERRANCE ("TERRY") DIKEMAN, the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-02160 (D. Colo., July 29, 2019), alleges that Defendants'
practice of failing to pay wages violates the Fair Labor Standards
Act's minimum wage provision.

According to the complaint, the Defendants required and/or
permitted Plaintiffs to work as exotic dancers at their adult
entertainment club but refused to compensate them at the applicable
minimum wage. In fact, Defendants refused to compensate Plaintiffs
whatsoever for any hours worked. Their only compensation was in the
form of tips from club patrons.

In fact, the Defendants took money from Plaintiffs in the form of
"house fees" or "rent". The Plaintiffs were also required to divide
tips with Defendants' managers and employees who do not customarily
receive tips.

The Defendants operate an adult entertainment club in Denver,
Colorado, under the name of "Dandy Dan's." The Defendants employ
exotic dancers and have employed hundreds of dancers over the
years.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Gabriel A. Assaad, Esq.
          KENNEDY HODGES, L.L.P.
          4409 Montrose Blvd., Suite 200
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 523-0001
          Facsimile: (713) 523-1116
          E-mail: gassaad@kennedyhodges.com

MONARCH RECOVERY: Dash Suit Moved to Eastern Dist. of New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
The case, Howard Dash, On Behalf of Himself and All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Monarch Recovery Management,
Inc., the Defendant, Case No. 602364/2019, was removed from the
Supreme Court State of New York, Nassau County,  to the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Central Islip)
on July 26, 2019. The Eastern District of New York Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-04325 to the proceeding. The suit alleges
violation of the Fair Debt Collection Act.

Monarch Recovery operates as a collection agency. The Company
provides debt recovery services such as new placement review,
advanced skip tracing, and arranging promises to pay, as well as
offers speech analytics, online payment portal, full call
recording, and flexible collection systems.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          Michael Zumwalt, Esq.
          ABRAMS, GORELICK,
          FRIEDMAN & JACOBSON, LLP
          One Battery Park Plaza, 4th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 419-8747
          E-mail: mzumwalt@agfjlaw.com

MONGER ENTERTAINMENT: Bowden Sues Over Illegal Deductions
---------------------------------------------------------
Chanel Bowden, on her own behalf and on behalf of those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Monger Entertainment Group, Inc., Sampson
B. Monger and Bernice P. Monger, Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-00123,
(M.D. Ga., July 19, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid minimum wage
compensation, liquidated damages and other relief under the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

Defendant owns and operates Barnacles Sports Bar & Grill, with
locations in Duluth, Fulton County and Decatur, DeKalb County.
Bowden worked as a server from approximately May of 2018 through
November of 2018.

According to the complaint, employees were required to pay a "house
fee" each shift that they worked. However, Monger was not entitled
to utilize the tip credit provision to credit its employees' tips
towards a portion of their minimum wage obligations. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Carlos Leach, Esq.
      THE LEACH FIRM, P.A.
      1950 Lee Rd., Suite 213
      Winter Park, FL 32789
      Telephone: (407) 574-4999
      Facsimile: (833) 423-5864
      Email: CLeach@theleachfirm.com
             yhernandez@theleachfirm.com


MOVE INC: Ninth Circuit Appeal Initiated in Silverman TCPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Courtney Silverman filed an appeal from a Court ruling in
the lawsuit entitled Courtney Silverman v. Move, Inc., et al., Case
No. 5:18-cv-05919-BLF, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on July 15, 2019, the
District Court issued an Order granting Defendant National
Association of Realtors' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim.

In this putative class action, Plaintiff Courtney Silverman alleges
a single cause of action against Defendants NAR and Move for
advertising text messages that violated the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act (TCPA).  Move and NAR, jointly and as agents of one
another, allegedly sent unsolicited advertising text messages to
real estate professionals, including Plaintiff and the putative
class, who were members of NAR, in order to promote Realtor.com and
its services.

The appellate case is captioned as Courtney Silverman v. Move,
Inc., et al., Case No. 19-16468, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by August 23, 2019;

   -- Transcript is due on September 23, 2019;

   -- Appellant Courtney Silverman's opening brief is due on
      November 1, 2019;

   -- Appellees Move, Inc. and National Association of Realtors'
      answering brief is due on December 2, 2019; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant COURTNEY SILVERMAN, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Sarah Lynn Hennessy, Esq.
          FLAHERTY HENNESSY, LLP
          8055 W. Manchester, Suite 420
          Playa Del Rey, CA 90293
          Telephone: (310) 305-1280
          E-mail: sarah@fhattorneys.com

               - and -

          Jordan A. Shaw, Esq.
          ZEBERSKY PAYNE LLC
          110 Tower, 110 SE 6th Street, Suite 2150
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 989-6333
          E-mail: jshaw@zpllp.com

Defendants-Appellees MOVE, INC., a California corporation, and
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, an Illinois corporation, are
represented by:

          Michael L. Fox, Esq.
          Duane Morris LLP
          One Market Plaza, Suite 2200
          San Francisco, CA 94105-1127
          Telephone: (415) 957-3000
          E-mail: MLFox@duanemorris.com


NAVIENT SOLUTIONS: Fennell Appeals Decision to Eleventh Circuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Susan Fennell filed an appeal from a Court ruling in the
lawsuit styled Susan Fennell v. Navient Solutions, LLC, Case No.
6:17-cv-02083-RBD-DCI, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Florida.

The Class Action Reporter on July 1, 2019, reported that the Hon.
Judge Roy Dalton entered an order on June 13, 2019, declining to
certify a class of:

    "all persons within the United States whose (1) cellular
     telephone number was called by [Navient]; (2) with an
     automatic telephone dialing system; (3) without consent; and
     (4) from December 4, 2013 to October 31, 2018."

The Court denied the motion for class certification without leave
to amend.

In her complaint, Fennell alleged that the use of the ATDS to call
her violates the TCPA and brings this action on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated. Based on discovery, Fennell
contends Navient placed 9,645,524 debt collection calls to at least
27,397 customers who told Navient to stop calling during the class
period in violation of the TCPA.

The appellate case is captioned as Susan Fennell v. Navient
Solutions, LLC, Case No. 19-12654, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that the
Appellee's Certificate of Interested Persons is due today, August
12, 2019, as to Appellee Navient Solutions, LLC.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant SUSAN FENNELL, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Christopher W. E. Boss, Esq.
          BOSS LAW FIRM, PLLC
          9887 Fourth Street NE, Suite 202
          St. Petersburg, FL 33702
          Telephone: (727) 471-0039
          Facsimile: (888) 449-8792
          E-mail: cpservice@bosslegal.com

               - and -

          Jarrett L. Ellzey, Esq.
          William Craft Hughes, Esq.
          HUGHES ELLZEY, LLP
          Galleria Tower I
          2700 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 1120
          Houston, TX 77056-5767
          Telephone: (888) 350-3931
          Facsimile: (888) 995-3335
          E-mail: jarrett@hughesellzey.com
                  craft@hughesellzey.com

Defendant-Appellee NAVIENT SOLUTIONS, LLC is represented by:

          Brian D. Roth, Esq.
          SESSIONS FISHMAN NATHAN & ISRAEL, LLC
          3850 N Causeway Blvd., Suite 200
          Metairie, LA 70002-7227
          Telephone: (504) 828-3700
          E-mail: broth@sessions.legal

               - and -

          Ashley Nicole Wydro, Esq.
          SESSIONS FISHMAN NATHAN & ISRAEL, LLC
          3350 Buschwood Park Drive, Suite 195
          Tampa, FL 33618
          Telephone: (813) 890-2460
          E-mail: awydro@sessions.legal


NEXTGEN LEADS: Teblum Sues Over Unsolicited Telemarketing Calls
---------------------------------------------------------------
DARYL TEBLUM, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NEXTGEN LEADS, LLC, a Delaware Limited
Liability Company, the Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-00532 (M.D.
Fla., July 30, 2019), alleges that Defendant engages in unsolicited
telemarketing directed towards individuals with no regard for
consumers' privacy rights pursuant to the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

The Defendant's telemarketing consists of sending text messages to
consumers soliciting them to input their information on Defendant's
website in order to purportedly receive health insurance quotes. In
reality, Defendant takes this information and sells it to
third-parties, which then proceed to further market to unsuspecting
consumers.

The Defendant utilizes mass text messages to drive individuals to
its website in order to obtain their contact information to resell
to third parties. The Defendant caused thousands of unsolicited
text messages to be sent to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff
and Class Members, causing them injuries, including invasion of
their privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion,
trespass, and conversion.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt Defendant's illegal
conduct. The Plaintiff also seeks statutory damages on behalf of
himself and Class Members, as defined below, and
any other available legal or equitable remedies resulting from the
illegal actions of Defendant.

The Defendant is a lead generator, which operates the website
www.firstquotehealth.com under the FirstQuoteHealth name.

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Ignacio J. Hiraldo, Esq.
          IJH LAW
          1200 Brickell Ave. Suite 1950
          Miami, FL 33131
          E-mail: IJHiraldo@IJHLaw.com
          Telephone: 786-496-4469

               - and -

          Michael Eisenband, Esq.
          EISENBAND LAW, P.A.
          515 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 120
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          E-mail: MEisenband@Eisenbandlaw.com
          Telephone: 954 533 4092

NIKE RETAIL: 9th Cir. Flips Summary Judgment in Rodriguez Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ISAAC RODRIGUEZ, as an individual and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NIKE RETAIL
SERVICES, INC., Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 17-16866 (9th Cir.),
Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed the District Court's grant of summary judgment for
Nike.

Nike has 34 retail stores in California.  At these stores,
employees (other than those exempt from applicable wage and hour
laws) are required to track their hours by "punching" in and out on
a time clock.  Separately, these employees are required to submit
to exit inspections each time they leave the store on a break or at
the end of the day.  Regardless of how long the inspections take,
however, they occur after the employee has punched out, such that
exit inspections are "off the clock" and are thus uncompensated.

Plaintiff Rodriguez worked at Nike's Gilroy, California retail
store from November 2011 to January 2012.  On Feb. 25, 2014,
Rodriguez filed a class-action complaint in Santa Clara County
Superior Court, and on April 1, 2014, Nike removed the case to the
District Court.  

On Dec. 8, 2014, Rodriguez filed his First Amended Class Action
Complaint, which brings claims under: (1) California Labor Code
Sections 1194 and 1197 (failure to pay minimum wages); (2)
California Labor Code Sections 510 and 1194 (failure to pay
overtime wages); and (3) California Business and Professions Code
Section 17200 et seq. (unfair business practices).  

On Aug. 19, 2016, the District Court certified a class of all
current and former non-exempt retail store employees of Nike who
worked in California during the period from Feb. 25, 2010 to the
present.

On Jan. 31, 2017, Nike moved for summary judgment against the
certified class.  On Sept. 12, 2017, the District Court granted
Nike's motion and dismissed the case.  The District Court held that
Rodriguez's claims were barred by the federal de minimis doctrine,
which precludes recovery for otherwise compensable amounts of time
that are small, irregular, or administratively difficult to record.


Rodriguez filed his notice of appeal on Sept. 14, 2017, and on
April 20, 2018, the Court stayed appellate proceedings pending the
California Supreme Court's decision in Troester v. Starbucks Corp.
In July 26, 2018, the California Supreme Court issued its decision,
holding that the federal de minimis doctrine does not apply to wage
and hour claims brought under California law.

After the California Supreme Court issued its ruling, the Court
reversed and remanded the District Court's order granting summary
judgment for Starbucks. Troester v. Starbucks Corp.  Because the
California Supreme Court had held that the de minimis doctrine did
not apply to the wage and hour claims at issue, it declined to
reach alternate grounds for appeal, which challenged the
correctness of the district court's application of the de minimis
doctrine to the evidence presented.

Rodriguez filed his appeal and opening brief before the California
Supreme Court issued its decision in Troester.  The parties
subsequently stipulated that Rodriguez would strike his opening
brief and file a revised brief in light of Troester.  In his
revised brief, Rodriguez argues that the District Court erred in
granting summary judgment for Nike based on the federal de minimis
doctrine.  Nike argues that reversal is unwarranted because the
amounts of time at issue here are de minimis even under Troester.

Judge Rakoff holds that the District Court's grant of summary
judgment cannot be affirmed on the record.  The undisputed facts
show only that an exit inspection takes between zero seconds and
several minutes.  And the evidence before the Court indicated that
employees frequently exited multiple times per day, although it did
not indicate how many times an employee leaves the store each day,
or if an employee ever leaves more than twice in a single day.
Moreover, while Crandall found that 69% of exit inspections took
less than 15 seconds, and that 81.4% of inspections took less than
30 seconds, multiple Nike store managers testified, to the
contrary, that longer inspections were common.

The Judge cannot conclude that exit inspections qualify as
"split-second absurdities."  Nor do they appear so "irregular that
it is unreasonable to expect the time to be recorded."  Even
according to Crandall's study, the vast majority of inspections
took measurable amounts of time, and there is a genuine dispute
between the parties as to whether these amounts were more than
"minute," "brief," or "trifling."  As such, the record does not
support affirmance of the District Court's grant of summary
judgment.

He therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with Troester.  Each party will bear its own costs on
appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 28, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/IZyqJ5 from Leagle.com.

MMax W. Gavron (argued), Nicholas Rosenthal, and Larry W. Lee,
Diversity Law Group APC, Los Angeles, California; William L.
Marder
-- bill@polarislawgroup.com -- Polaris Law Group LLP, Hollister,
California; Dennis S. Hyun, Hyun Legal APC, Los Angeles,
California; for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jon D. Meer -- jmeer@seyfarth.com -- (argued) and Michael Afar --
mafar@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Los Angeles, California,
for Defendant-Appellee.


NINTENDO OF AMERICA: Diaz Sues Over Defective Game Controllers
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ryan Diaz, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly
situated third party payors, Plaintiff, v. Nintendo Of America,
Inc., Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-01116, (W.D. Wash., July 19,
2019), seeks monetary relief for damages suffered, declaratory
relief, injunctive relief for violations of California consumer
fraud statutes, negligent misrepresentation, breach of implied
warranty, unjust enrichment and for violations of the federal
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and California's Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act.

Diaz purchased Nintendo Switch game systems whose Joy-Con
controllers "drift" or manipulate game play without manual
operation by the user thus compromising its core functionality.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Kim D. Stephens, Esq.
     Jason T. Dennett, Esq.
     Kaleigh N.B. Powell, Esq.
     TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS PLLC
     1700 Seventh Avenue, Suite 2200
     Seattle, WA 98101
     Tel: (206) 682-5600
     Fax: (206) 682-2992
     Email: kstephens@tousley.com
            jdennett@tousley.com
            kpowell@tousley.com


NMJ RESTAURANT: Cardona Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------
Anaisis Cardona, and other similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiffs, v. NMJ Restaurant and Marketplace Inc., Niva Bishouty,
Jawdat Mazzawi and Monem Mazzawi, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-22980,
(S.D. Fla., July 18, 2019) seeks to recover unpaid overtime
compensation, as well as an additional amount as liquidated
damages, costs and reasonable attorneys' fees under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Defendants operate as Harvest Delights, a Greek restaurant located
at 3470 NW 82nd Avenue, Suite 105, Miami where Cardona worked as a
cook. He claims to have worked approximately an average of 45-50
hours per week without being paid overtime compensation for hours
over 40 per work week. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      R. Martin Saenz, Esq.
      SAENZ & ANDERSON, PLLC
      20900 NE 30th Avenue, Ste. 800
      Aventura, FL 33180
      Telephone: (305) 503-5131
      Facsimile: (888) 270-5549
      Email: msaenz@saenzanderson.com


NTT DATA: Mandala, Barnett Appeal Decision in FCRA Suit to 2nd Cir.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Charles Barnett and George Mandala filed an appeal from
the District Court's decision and order issued on July 17, 2019, in
their lawsuit styled Mandala, et al. v. NTT Data, Inc., Case No.
18-cv-6591, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
New York (Rochester).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
alleges violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

The Plaintiffs allege in the complaint that the Defendant has in
the past, and continues to, utilize a job applicant screening
process that systematically eliminates qualified African American
applicants based on their race, color or national origin.

The appellate case is captioned as Mandala, et al. v. NTT Data,
Inc., Case No. 19-2308, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants George Mandala and Charles Barnett,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated are
represented by:

          Ossai Miazad, Esq.
          OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
          3 Park Avenue
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 245-1000
          Facsimile: (646) 509-2060
          E-mail: om@outtengolden.com

Defendant-Appellee NTT Data, Inc. is represented by:

          Jacqueline Phipps Polito, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          375 Woodcliff Drive
          Fairport, NY 14450
          Telephone: (585) 203-3400
          E-mail: jpolito@littler.com


NYC HEALTH: Taylor et al Seek Overtime Compensation
---------------------------------------------------
JAYSON TAYLOR, KRYSTAL WONGWON-REGIS, ANGEL BENITEZ, VICTOR
NDUBUISI, and PAMELA ALEXANDER, on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. NYC HEALTH + HOSPITALS and
MITCHELL KATZ, in his official capacity as President and Chief
Executive Officer of NYC HEALTH + HOSPITALS, the Defendants, Case
No. 1:19-cv-07086 (S.D.N.Y., July 30, 2019), seeks monetary and
other relief to redress violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
by Defendant for failing to pay proper overtime compensation.

The Plaintiffs and those similarly situated are entitled to be paid
at least one and one-half times their respective weighted average
regular rates of pay for each hour in excess of 40 hours that they
worked in any workweek pursuant to the FLSA.

The Defendants did not compensate Plaintiffs and those similarly
situated with one and one-half times their weighted average regular
hourly rate for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek as
required by the FLSA.

H+H is a not-for-profit municipal health care system organized
pursuant to the laws of the State of New York.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Robert J. Burzichelli,, Esq.
          Daniel Doeschner, Esq.
          GREENBERG BURZICHELLI GREENBERG P.C.
          225 Broadway, Suite 1515
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: 516 570-4343
          E-mail: rburzichelli@gbglawoffice.com
                  ddoeschner@gbglawoffice.com

               - and -

          Steven E. Sykes, Esq.
          ASSOCIATE GENERAL COUNSEL
          125 Barclay Street – Room 510
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: 212-815-1450
          E-mail: rroach@dc37.net
                  ssykes@dc37.net

OCWEN LOAN: Torliatt Sues over Pay-to-Pay Fee
---------------------------------------------
LAWRENCE TORLIATT, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC, the
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-04303 (N.D. Cal., July 26, 2019),
alleges breach of contract, violations of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, and and the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act against Ocwen.

According to the complaint, borrowers in California struggle enough
to make their regular mortgage payments without getting charged
extra, illegal fees when they try to pay by phone or online
("Pay-to-Pay fees"). Federal and state debt collection laws
strictly prohibit these charges unless expressly agreed by the
borrower, but these Pay-to-Pay fees are found nowhere in the
standard deed of trust. Here, Ocwen pays Western Union to process
these Pay-to-Pay transactions at a cost of about $0.40 each.
Despite this low cost, Ocwen charges California homeowners an
excessive $5.00 to $20.00 Pay-to-Pay fee for each online or
pay-by-phone mortgage payment transaction, pocketing the difference
as profit.

Ocwen services mortgages throughout the United States, including
California. It has already been sued for this same conduct in an
Alabama federal court, where it agreed to pay $9.7 million. But,
Ocwen makes too much profit charging Pay-to-Pay fees and continues
to charge the fees nationwide and in California. In doing so, Ocwen
leverages its position of power over homeowners and demands
excessive Pay-to-Pay fees, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

           Hank Bates, Esq.
           CARNEY BATES & PULLIAM, PLLC
           519 W. 7th St.
           Little Rock, AR, 72201
           Telephone: 501 312-8500
           Facsimile: 501-312-8505
           E-mail: hbates@cbplaw.com

OCWEN SERVICING: Snyder Asks Court to Enter Judgment in TCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs ask Judge Matthew F. Kennelly of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern Illinois, Eastern Division, to order the
clerk of the Court to enter judgment in the case, Keith Snyder and
Susan Mansanarez, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC. Tracee A. Beecroft,
on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Honorable
Matthew F. Kennelly, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Case No.
1:14-cv-08461, Consolidated Case No. 1:16-cv-08677 (N.D. Ill.).

On June 4, 2019, the Court signed and entered an Order Granting
Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Dismissing Class
Plaintiffs' Claim.  The Order states, "A Judgment substantially in
the form attached hereto as Exhibit H-1 will be entered forthwith."
The proposed Judgment attached as Exhibit H-was unsigned.

Absent exceptions that do not apply in the case, Rule 58 requires
that every judgment must be set out in a separate document.  The
ECF notice accompanying the June 4, 2019 Order provides: "ORDER
GRANTING FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND DISMISSING
CLASS PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS, signed by the Honorable Matthew F.
Kennelly on 6/4/2019."  It does not otherwise reference a judgment,
and the Clerk of the Court has not since entered a judgment.

The transcript from the June 19, 2019 status hearing includes a
discussion by and between the counsel, and the Court that makes it
appear that everyone may be operating under the mistaken belief
that a judgment has been entered in the matter and that the 30-day
period to file a notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. Proc.
4(a)(1) is running and will lapse on July 5, 2019.

The Plaintiffs bring their motion to seek clarification and entry
of judgment under Rule 58(d).  

A full-text copy of the Court's June 28, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Q1M8Or from Leagle.com.

Keith Snyder, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Mark Daniel Ankcorn --
MARK@ANKCORNLAW.COM -- Ankcorn Law Firm, PLLC, Adrienne D. McEntee
-- amcentee@terrellmarwill.com -- Terrell Marwill Law Group PLLC,
pro hac vice, Alexander Holmes Burke -- ABurke@BurkeLawLLC.com --
Burke Law Offices, LLC, Ann Marie Hansen, Ann Marie Hansen, Beth
Ellen Terrell -- bterrell@terrellmarwill.com -- Terrell Marwill
Law
Group PLLC, pro hac vice, Daniel J. Marovitch, Burke Law Offices,
LLC, Guillermo Cabrera --  gil@cabrerafirm.com gil@cabrerafirm.com

-- The Cabrera Firm, Apc, Jared Matthew Quient, The Cabrera Firm,
pro hac vice & Mark Luther Heaney -- mark@heaneylaw.com -- Heaney
Law Firm, Llc.

Susan Mansanarez, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Mark Daniel Ankcorn,
Ankcorn Law Firm, PLLC, Adrienne D. McEntee, Terrell Marwill Law
Group PLLC, pro hac vice, Alexander Holmes Burke, Burke Law
Offices, LLC, Beth Ellen Terrell, Terrell Marwill Law Group PLLC,
pro hac vice & Daniel J. Marovitch, Burke Law Offices, LLC.

Tracee A. Beecroft, Plaintiff, pro se.

Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, Defendant, represented by Simon A.
Fleischmann -- sfleischmann@lockelord.com -- Locke Lord LLP, Brian
Vincent Otero -- botero@hunton.com -- Hunton & Williams LLP, pro
hac vice, Chethan G. Shetty -- cshetty@lockelord.com -- Locke Lord
LLP, David F. Standa -- dstanda@lockelord.com -- Locke Lord LLP,
Ryan Andrew Becker -- rbecker@hunton.com -- Hunton & Williams LLP,
pro hac  vice, Stephen Roy Blacklocks -- sblacklocks@hunton.com --
Hunton & Williams LLP, pro hac vice & Thomas Justin Cunningham --
tcunningham@lockelord.com -- Locke Lord LLP.

Zachariah C. Manning, Intervenor Plaintiff, represented by Erea
Lynette Stone, The Stone Law Office.

Wilmington Trust, N.A., Movant, represented by Frank A. Hirsch,
Jr.
-- frank.hirsch@alston.com -- Alston & Bird LLP, pro hac vice &
Kenneth Michael Kliebard -- kenneth.kliebard@morganlewis.com --
Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP.

U.S. Bank, N.A. & Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, Movants,
represented by Michael Kliebard -- william.kraus@morganlewis.com
--
Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP & William James Kraus, Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius LLP.


OHIO NATIONAL: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Cook Suit
----------------------------------------------------
In the case, STEPHEN COOK, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. THE OHIO NATIONAL LIVE INSURANCE
COMPANY et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-195 (S.D.
Ohio), Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Bowman of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division,
recommended that the motion to dismiss field by Defendants Ohio
National Life Insurance Co., Ohio National Life Assurance Co., Ohio
National Equities, Inc., and Ohio National Financial Services, Inc.
be denied.

The Plaintiff is a securities representative affiliated with Triad
Advisors LLC, a brokerdealer that has signed a Selling Agreement
with Ohio National to promote, sell, and service variable annuity
policies with guaranteed income benefit riders issued by Ohio
National. The policies sold by Plaintiff feature a guaranteed
minimum income benefit ("GMIB") rider, offered by Ohio National.

Pursuant to the Selling Agreement entered into by Ohio National and
Triad, Triad and its affiliated securities representatives,
including the Plaintiff, marketed and sold the Ohio National GMIB
variable annuities to customers, with all customer premiums from
those sales being paid directly to Ohio National.  In return for
promoting, selling, and servicing these complex Annuities, Triad
and its affiliated securities representatives received commissions,
including "trailing commissions," that were paid to Triad and
affiliated securities representatives on a regular basis until and
unless the Annuities were surrendered or annuitized.

In September 2018, Ohio National announced that it was terminating
the Selling Agreement with Triad, and numerous other
broker-dealers, with regard to the Annuities.  As part of that
termination, it also announced that it would no longer pay trailing
commissions stemming from Annuities that were already in existence.
Effective Dec. 12, 2018, Ohio National stopped paying Triad and
its affiliated securities representatives any trailing commissions
on the Annuities.

Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed the instant action for breach of
contract and unjust enrichment.  The Plaintiff also seeks an
injunction to require Ohio National to live up to its obligations
under the Selling Agreement and cease causing damage and
irreparable harm, including the loss of goodwill and the negative
impact to the business relationships and reputation of the
Plaintiff and the proposed class.  The Plaintiff additionally seeks
declaratory relief resolving Ohio National's future obligations
pursuant to the Selling Agreement with Triad.  

The Plaintiff also brings the suit as a class action pursuant to
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of
himself and all members of the following Class: All securities
representatives who: (1) sold an individual variable annuity with a
guaranteed minimum income benefit rider pursuant to any and all
Selling Agreements by and between the Defendants and the
broker-dealers, provided that such annuity had not been surrendered
or annuitized by Dec. 12, 2018; (2) received commission
compensation from such sale in the form of trail commissions; and
(3) ceased receiving such trail commissions pursuant to the
Defendants' 2018 unilateral decision to terminate the Selling
Agreements.

Ohio National moves to dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint asserting
that the Plaintiff lacks standing and/or fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.  The Defendant Ohio National
argues that the Plaintiff is not a party to the Selling Agreement
at issue and therefore lacks contractual privity to enforce the
agreement.

Based on her analysis, consideration of Ohio law, and the factual
similarities in Benison, et al. v. The Ohio National Life Insurance
Co., et al., and the instant action, Magistrate Judge Bowman is
persuaded by the finding in Benson.  As such, at this stage in the
litigation, she finds that the Plaintiff has stated a claim for
relief as an intended third-party beneficiary under the Selling
Agreement.  Accordingly, Ohio National's motion to dismiss is not
well-taken in this regard.

With respect to unjust enrichment, the Magistrate Judge recognizes
that a plaintiff cannot recover on both a theory of breach of
contract and a theory of unjust enrichment.  the However, at this
stage in the litigation, Plaintiff may proceed with the alternative
pleading of unjust enrichment in addition to his claim for breach
of contract.

Finally, the related cases involve common questions of law and
fact.  As such, a global disposition of the issues presented will
best provide justice to the parties involved.  Accordingly, in the
interest of judicial economy and fairness, the Magistrate further
recommends that the matter be consolidated with the related case,
Browning v. The Ohio National Life Insurance Company et al.

In light of the foregoing, Magistrate Judge Bowman therefore
recommended that Defendant Ohio National's motion to dismiss be
denied.  She furtehr recommended that the matter be consolidated
with Browning.  As is the practice of the Court, she recommended
that the case numbers 1:18-cv-763 and 1:19-cv-00195 be consolidated
into case number 1:18-cv-763 since that case was the first filed
case.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file
specific, written objections to the Report & Recommendation ("R&R")
within 14 days after being served with a copy thereof.  That period
may be extended further by the Court on timely motion by either
side for an extension of time.  All objections will specify the
portion(s) of the R&R objected to, and will be accompanied by a
memorandum of law in support of the objections.  A party will
respond to an opponent's objections within14 days after being
served with a copy of those objections.  Failure to make objections
in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 28, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/5dL7NN from Leagle.com.

Stephen Cook, Individually And On Behalf Of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by B. Nathaniel Garrett, Helmer,
Martins, Rice & Popham Co., L.P.A., Jennifer Lynn Lambert, Helmer,
Martins, Rice & Popham, Joseph Gentile, Sarraf Gentile LLP, pro hac
vice, Robert M. Rice, Helmer Martins, Rice & Popham Co., Ronen
Sarraf, Sarraf Gentile LLP & James Burdette Helmer, Jr., Helmer
Martins, Rice & Popham Co., L.P.A.

The Ohio National Life Insurance Company, Ohio National Life
Assurance Corporation, Ohio National Equities, Inc. & Ohio National
Financial Services, Inc., Defendants, represented by Christopher J.
Hogan -- hogan@litohio.com -- Zeiger Tigges & Little LLP & Marion
H. Little -- little@litohio.com -- Zeiger Tigges & Little LLP.


OHIO NATIONAL: Denial of Bid for Judgment on Pleadings Endorsed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LANCE BROWNING, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. THE OHIO NATIONAL LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-763
(S.D. Ohio), Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Bowman of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division,
recommended that the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by
Defendants Ohio National Life Insurance Co., Ohio National Life
Assurance Co., Ohio National Equities, Inc., and Ohio National
Financial Services, Inc. ("ONFS"), be denied.

The Plaintiff is one of the many licensed securities
representatives of the broker-dealer LPL Financial, LLC who have
sold variable annuities to customers nationwide that feature a
guaranteed minimum income benefit ("GMIB") rider, offered by The
Ohio National Life Insurance Co. and its subsidiaries Ohio National
Life Assurance Corp. and Ohio National Equities, Inc. ("Ohio
National").  All of these entities operate under the umbrella of
Ohio National Financial Services, Inc.

Pursuant to the Selling Agreement entered into by Ohio National and
LPL, LPL and its affiliated securities representatives, including
the Plaintiff, marketed and sold the Ohio National GMIB variable
annuities to customers, with all customer premiums from those sales
being paid directly to Ohio National.  In return for promoting,
selling, and servicing these complex Annuities, LPL and its
affiliated securities representatives received commissions,
including "trailing commissions," that were paid to LPL and
affiliated securities representatives on a regular basis until and
unless the Annuities were surrendered or annuitized.

On Sept. 28, 2018, Ohio National announced that it was terminating
the Selling Agreement with LPL, and numerous other broker-dealers,
with regard to the Annuities.  As part of that termination, it also
announced that it would no longer pay trailing commissions stemming
from Annuities that were already in existence.  Effective Dec. 12,
2018, Ohio National stopped paying LPL and its affiliated
securities representatives any trailing commissions on the
Annuities.

Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed the instant action for breach of
contract, unjust enrichment, tortious interference and promissory
estoppel, the Plaintiff also seeks an injunction to require Ohio
National to live up to its obligations under the Selling Agreement
and cease causing damage and irreparable harm, including the loss
of goodwill and the negative impact to the business relationships
and reputation of the Plaintiff and the proposed class.  The
Plaintiff additionally seeks declaratory relief resolving Ohio
National's future obligations pursuant to the Selling Agreement
with LPL.

The Plaintiff also brings the suit as a class action pursuant to
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of
himself and all members of the following Class: All persons who:
(1) act as securities representatives of LPL; and (2) have
solicited the sale of an Ohio National guaranteed minimum income
benefit Variable Annuity that that has not been surrendered or
annuitized.

Ohio National moves for Judgment on the Pleadings asserting that
the Plaintiff lacks standing and/or fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.  It argues that the Plaintiff is not a
party to the Selling Agreement at issue and therefore lacks
contractual privity to enforce the agreement.

Based on her analysis, consideration of Ohio law, and the factual
similarities in Benison, et al. v. The Ohio National Life Insurance
Co., et al., and the instant action, Magistrate Judge Bowman is
persuaded by the finding in Benison.  As such, at this stage in the
litigation, she finds that the Plaintiff has stated a claim for
relief as an intended third-party beneficiary under the Selling
Agreement.  Accordingly, Ohio National's motion for judgment on the
pleadings is not well-taken in this regard.

With respect to unjust enrichment, the Magistrated recognizes that
a plaintiff cannot recover on both a theory of breach of contract
and a theory of unjust enrichment.  However, at this stage in the
litigation, the Plaintiff may proceed with the alternative pleading
of unjust enrichment in addition to his claim for breach of
contract.

Finally, she finds that the related cases involve common questions
of law and fact.  As such, a global disposition of the issues
presented will best provide justice to the parties involved.
Accordingly, in the interest of judicial economy and fairness, she
further recommends that the matter be consolidated with the related
case, Cook v. The Ohio National Life Insurance Company et al. Case
No. 1:19-cv-00195.

In light of the foregoing, Magistrate Judge Bowman therefore
recommended that Defendant Ohio National's motion for judgment on
the pleadings be denied.  However, she recommended that ONFS'
motion for judgment on the pleadings be granted, and the
Plaintiff's tortious interference claim be dismissed and ONFS be
dismissed as a party in the case.  

The Magistrate further recommended that the matter be consolidated
with the related case, Cook.  As is the practice of the Court, she
recommended that case numbers 1:18-cv-763 and 1:19-cv-00195 be
consolidated into case number 1:18-cv-763 since that case was the
first filed case.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 28, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/3Kil4s from Leagle.com.

Lance Browning, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by David P. Meyer --
dmeyer@meyerwilson.com -- Meyer Wilson Co., LPA, Dennis J. Concilla
-- dconcilla@cpmlaw.com -- Carlile Patchen & Murphy, John C.
Camillus, Law Offices of John C Camillus, LLC, Matthew R. Wilson --
mwilson@meyerwilson.com -- Meyer Wilson Co., LPA & Michael J.
Boyle, Jr. -- mboyle@meyerwilson.com -- Meyer Wilson, LPA.

The Ohio National Life Insurance Company, Ohio National Life
Assurance Corporation, Ohio National Equities, Inc. & Ohio National
Financial Services, Inc., Defendants, represented by Christopher J.
Hogan -- hogan@litohio.com -- Zeiger Tigges & Little LLP & Marion
H. Little -- little@litohio.com -- Zeiger Tigges & Little LLP.


OMNICELL INC: Bursick Sues Over Share Price Drop
------------------------------------------------
Frank Bursick, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Omnicell, Inc., Randall A. Lipps and Peter
J. Kuipers, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-04150, (N.D. Cal., July 18,
2019) seeks to recover compensatory damages, reasonable costs and
expenses incurred in this action, including counsel fees and expert
fees and such other and further relief under the Exchange Act.

Omnicell provides automation and business analytics software
solutions for patientcentric medication and supply management to
customers in the healthcare industry. On July 11, 2019, it was
published that Omnicell prematurely recognized over $38 million in
sales and alleged that new product lines had been pushed onto
customers, who were hesitant to purchase more inventory because of
implementation issues and that the it will need to write off $23
million in obsolete inventory. On this news, the Company's stock
price fell $11.41 per share, or nearly 14%, to close at $75.11 per
share on July 11, 2019, on unusually heavy trading volume.

Bursick, purchased Omnicell securities and suffered damages as a
result of the federal securities law violations. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Lionel Z. Glancy, Esq.
      Robert V. Prongay, Esq.
      Charles H. Linehan, Esq.
      Pavithra Rajesh, Esq.
      GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
      1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
      Los Angeles, CA 90067
      Telephone: (310) 201-9150
      Facsimile: (310) 201-9160
      Email: info@glancylaw.com


PAYPAL HOLDINGS: Bid to Dismiss Sgarlata Case Underway
------------------------------------------------------
PayPal Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 25, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company is awaiting
the court's decision on the motion to dismiss the Sgarlata v.
PayPal Holdings, Inc., et al. class action suit.

In November 2017, the company announced that it had suspended the
operations of TIO Networks ("TIO") as part of an ongoing
investigation of security vulnerabilities of the TIO platform. On
December 1, 2017, the company announced that it had identified
evidence of unauthorized access to TIO's network, including
locations that stored personal information of some of TIO's
customers and customers of TIO billers and the potential compromise
of personally identifiable information for approximately 1.6
million customers.

The company received a number of governmental inquiries, including
from state attorneys general, and the company may be subject to
additional governmental inquiries and investigations in the future.


In addition, on December 6, 2017, a putative class action lawsuit
captioned Sgarlata v. PayPal Holdings, Inc., et al., Case No.
3:17-cv-06956-EMC was filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California (the "Court") against the Company,
its Chief Executive Officer, its Chief Financial Officer and Hamed
Shahbazi, the former chief executive officer of TIO (the
"Defendants") alleging violations of federal securities laws.

The initial complaint alleged that Defendants made false or
misleading statements or failed to disclose that TIO's data
security program was inadequate to safeguard the personally
identifiable information of its users, those vulnerabilities
threatened continued operation of TIO's platform, the Company's
revenues derived from TIO services were thus unsustainable, and
consequently, the Company overstated the benefits of the TIO
acquisition, and, as a result, the Company's public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

The plaintiff who initiated the lawsuit sought to represent a class
of shareholders who acquired shares of the Company's common stock
between February 14, 2017 through December 1, 2017 and sought
damages and attorneys' fees, among other relief.

On March 16, 2018, the Court appointed two new plaintiffs, not the
original plaintiff who filed the case, as interim co-lead
plaintiffs in the case and appointed two law firms as interim
co-lead counsel.

On June 13, 2018, the interim co-lead plaintiffs filed a first
amended complaint, which named TIO Networks ULC, TIO Networks USA,
Inc., and John Kunze (the Company's Vice President, Global Consumer
Products and Xoom) as additional defendants. The first amended
complaint was purportedly brought on behalf of all persons other
than the Defendants who acquired the Company's securities between
November 10, 2017 and December 1, 2017.

The amended complaint alleged that the Company's and TIO's November
10, 2017 announcement of the suspension of TIO's operations was
false and misleading because the announcement only disclosed
security vulnerabilities on TIO's platform, rather than an actual
security breach that Defendants were allegedly aware of at the time
of the announcement.

Defendants' filed their motion to dismiss the first amended
complaint on July 13, 2018 and the Court granted the motion,
without prejudice, on December 13, 2018.

Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on January 14, 2019.
The second amended complaint alleges substantially the same theory
of liability as the first amended complaint, but no longer names
Hamed Shabazi as a defendant.

The remaining Defendants filed their motion to dismiss the second
amended complaint on March 15, 2019, and a hearing was held on July
16, 2019.

PayPal Holdings said, "We may be subject to additional litigation
relating to TIO's data security platform or the suspension of TIO's
operations in the future."

PayPal Holdings, Inc. operates as a technology platform and digital
payments company that enables digital and mobile payments on behalf
of consumers and merchants worldwide. PayPal Holdings, Inc. was
founded in 1998 and is headquartered in San Jose, California.


POINT BLANK: Porras Suit Transferred to S.D. Florida
----------------------------------------------------
The case, MIGUEL PORRAS, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. POINT BLANK ENTERPRISES,
INC., the Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-01542 (Filed March 3, 2019),
was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California, to U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida (Ft Lauderdale) on July 26, 2019. The Southern
District of Florida Court Clerk assigned Case No. 0:19-cv-61881-MGC
to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Marcia G.
Cooke.

The class action arises from the sale of defective PBBA and PACA
concealable model vests manufactured by PBE containing what
Defendant touts in its marketing materials as a proprietary and
exclusive "Self-Suspending Ballistic System" (SSBS) feature (SSBS
Vests).

PBE is a manufacturer of law enforcement protective products,
including ballistic resistant soft body armor (commonly referred to
as bullet resistant vests) which PBE sells through various channels
(directly, through manufacturer sales representatives employed by
PBE, or through authorized distributors and representatives) to
police officers and others all across the United States. PBE
manufactures these products through wholly-owned subsidiaries
and/or brand names, including Point Blank Body Armor, Inc.
("PBBA"), Protective Apparel Corporation of America ("PACA"),
Paraclete, Protective Products Enterprises, and others.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Allan Kanner, Esq.
          Cynthia St. Amant, Esq.
          KANNER & WHITELEY, LLC
          701 Camp Street
          New Orleans, LA 70130
          Telephone: (504) 524-5777
          E-mail: a.kanner@kanner-law.com
                  c.stamant@kanner-law.com

               - and -

          Conrad B. Stephens, Esq.
          STEPHENS AND STEPHENS LLP
          505 South McClelland Street
          Santa Maria, CA 93454
          Telephone: (805) 922-1951

               - and -

          David M. Cohen, Esq.
          COMPLEX LAW GROUP, LLC
          40 Powder Springs Street
          Marietta, GA 30064
          Telephone: (770) 200-3100
          E-mail: dcohen@complexlaw.com

               - and -

          Frank J. Johnson, Esq.
          JOHNSON & WEAVER, LLP
          110 West "A" Street, Suite 750
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 230-0063
          E-mail: frankj@johnsonandweaver.com

               - and -

          Phong L. Tran, Esq.
          JOHNSON FISTEL LLP
          655 West Broadway Suite 1400
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 230-0063

Attorneys for Point Blank Enterprises, Inc. are:

          Brian Michael Ercole, Esq.
          Clay Matthew Carlton, Esq.
          Esther Kyungmin Ro, Esq.
          Jamie Lee Whittenburg, Esq.
          Troy S. Brown, Esq.
          MORGAN LEWIS , BOCKIUS
          200 South Biscayne Blvd., Suite 5300
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 415-3416
          Facsimile: (325) 415-3001
          E-mail: brian.ercole@morganlewis.com
                  clay.carlton@morganlewis.com
                  troy.brown@morganlewis.com

ROCKEFELLER UNIVERSITY: Court Grants Bid to Stay Poppel
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order granting Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss in the case captioned JEFFREY M. POPPEL, on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ROCKEFELLER
UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, ROCKEFELLER UNIVERSITY, and ROCKEFELLER
INSTITUTE, Defendants. No. 19-CV-1403 (ALC). (S.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiff Jeffery M. Poppel brings this putative class action
against The Rockefeller Institute, The Rockefeller University, and
The Rockefeller University Hospital alleging, among other things,
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress and
intrusion upon seclusion.

The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent
in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its own
docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and
for litigants. A decision to stay proceedings is one that rests
firmly within a district court's discretion. In determining whether
to grant a motion to stay proceedings, courts consider the
following factors: (1) the private interests of the plaintiffs in
proceeding expeditiously with the civil litigation as balanced
against the prejudice to the plaintiffs if delayed (2) the private
interest of and burden on the defendants; (3) the interests of the
courts (4) the interests of persons not parties to the civil
litigation and (5) the public interest.

The first factor asks the Court to balance Mr. Poppel's interest in
proceeding expeditiously with the case with the prejudice Mr.
Poppel would face if the case is delayed.

Here, although Mr. Poppel has a significant interest in proceeding
quickly with this litigation, the prejudice imposed on Mr. Poppel
by a temporary stay in this case would be minimal. Plaintiff cites
to the ages of the victims, parents, nurses, and employees as an
indication of prejudice. While the Court is sensitive to
Plaintiff's concerns, Plaintiff's age-related arguments are far too
general for the Court to infer any prejudice that would stem from a
stay. Thus, due to Plaintiff's inherent interest in proceeding
expeditiously, the first factor weight in favor of Plaintiff,
albeit slightly.  

The second factor asks the Court to evaluate Defendants' interest
in staying the case and the burden of proceeding without a stay.
Defendants' main argument is a logistical one  the case will be
easier to manage and more efficient if a brief stay is imposed.
Defendants cite to the intertwined nature of the case and the
potential for successive rounds of briefing and discovery should
the case proceed as is. However, any overlap, redundancies, or
duplicities would be largely avoidable in the short amount of time
between now and Defendants' proposed end of the stay. Thus,
although any burden on Defendants to proceed without a stay would
be minimal, the second factor leans in favor of Defendants.  

The third factor  accounting for the interests of the court weighs
in favor of granting a stay in this particular case.  A stay may be
proper when "it is efficient for a trial court's docket and the
fairest course for the parties. The unique procedural posture of
the case currently has the case on two separate tracks. It is
undisputed that Plaintiff will be amending his Complaint to add
claims pursuant to the CVA. It is also undisputed that there is at
least some overlap between the facts relevant to both sets of
Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff stated that his Amended Complaint
will be ready on August 14, 2019,  the day the CVA window is open.
Defendants proposed a stay until September 13, 2019. At this point,
the most efficient course of action is to temporarily stay this
matter to allow Plaintiff to amend his Complaint. Defendants will
then respond to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint in a timely fashion.

The Defendants have satisfied their burden, and accordingly, the
Court grants the Defendants' Motion to Stay.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 25, 2019 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxpvfgdl from
Leagle.com.

Jeffrey M. Poppel, on his own behalf and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Renner Kincaid Walker
, Levy Konigsberg LLP & Corey Matthew Stern, Levy Konigsberg, LLP,
800 Third Avenue, 11th Floor, New York, New York 10022

Rockefeller University Hospital, Rockefeller University &
Rockefeller Institute, also known as Rockefeller University
Hospital, Defendants, represented by David Holcomb --
David.Holcomb@ropesgray.com -- Ropes & Gray LLP, Mary Elizabeth
Brust -- Mary.Brust@ropesgray.com -- Ropes & Gray LLP & Robert G.
Jones -- Robert.Jones@ropesgray.com -- Ropes & Gray LLP.


SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY, CA: Court Narrows Claims in Black Lives Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BLACK LIVES MATTER-STOCKTON CHAPTER, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-00591-KJM-AC (E.D. Cal.), Judge
Kimberly J. Mueller of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California granted in part and denied in part the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the first amended complaint.

Black Lives Matter Stockton Chapter ("BLM") and several of its
members bring the civil rights action and putative class action
against San Joaquin County, the San Joaquin County Sheriff's
Office, and several individual officers.  On March 7, 2017,
Plaintiffs Lareesha Brown, Kenneth Marbley and three others were
arrested at a BLM protest in Stockton and eventually charged with
state criminal misdemeanor charges of assaulting officers and
resisting arrest.

On Oct. 30, 2017, a discovery motion related to the five BLM
members' cases was heard before Judge Bernard J. Garber at the San
Joaquin County Superior Court.  BLM organized "court support" for
the October 30 hearing, meaning that it organized BLM members to
attend the hearing, dressed in ways that identified them as BLM
members.  When BLM members, including the Plaintiffs in the case,
attempted to enter the courthouse to attend the hearing, San
Joaquin County sheriff's deputies controlled the entrance to the
courthouse.

Allegedly, the officers questioned and denied entrance to
individuals who are black and brown, and to BLM members
specifically, while allowing white individuals unfettered entrance.
On Jan. 29, 2018, after a hearing on another related motion, a
group of sheriff's deputies allegedly followed, insulted, harassed
and intimidated BLM members inside the courthouse, implying BLM
members were not welcome and would be subjected to violence and
arrest if they did not leave.

BLM and its founding member Dionne Smith-Downs sued the County, the
sheriff, and several individual sheriff's deputies for violating
their civil rights under federal and state law.  The Defendants
moved to dismiss each of the claims in the original complaint, the
Plaintiffs opposed, and the Defendants replied.

After a hearing on May 18, 2018, the Court granted the Defendants'
motion and dismissed the complaint with leave to amend.  The
Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint on Aug. 13, 2018,
identifying Denise Friday, Lareesha Brown and Kenneth Marbley as
the Plaintiffs, in addition to BLM and Smith-Downs.

In the FAC, the Plaintiffs allege violations of federal
constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.  Specifically,
they assert claims under the First Amendment, providing the right
to free speech and association (Claim 1); the Sixth Amendment,
establishing the right to a public trial (Claim 2); and the
Fourteenth Amendment, providing rights of due process (Claim 3).
The Plaintffs also assert two state civil rights claims under the
Act (Claim 4), and the Bane Act (Claim 5).  Finally, they bring a
negligence claim (Claim 6).

The Plaintiffs ask the Court to certify as a class the members and
supporters of BLM, make findings of fact reflecting the Defendants'
violations of the Plaintiffs' rights, grant preliminary and
permanent injunctive relief, award compensatory damages, and award
punitive damages against the individual Defendants.  All claims are
pled against all the Defendants, without differentiation.

The Defendants have moved to dismiss the FAC.  The Court held a
hearing on Dec. 7, 2018.  

The Defendants request that the Courts take judicial notice of two
online news articles that were published in early 2017, both
reporting on the subject of public disturbances purportedly caused
by BLM and its members.  Because the existence of these articles is
not relevant to the issues requiring resolution at this stage of
the litigation, Judge Mueller declines to take judicial notice as
requested.  She denied the Defendants' request for judicial
notice.

The Judge granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss
as follows: (i) the Plaintiffs' claims against San Joaquin County
and San Joaquin County Sheriff's Office are dismissed with
prejudice; (ii) all of the Plaintiffs' claims for damages and
declaratory relief against Defendant Moore, sued only in his
official capacity, are dismissed with prejudice; (iii) the
Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claim against all defendants is
dismisssed with leave to amend; (iv) the Plaintiffs' Ralph Act
claim against Defendants Petrino, Oliver, and Moore is dismissed
with leave to amend; (v) the Plaintiffs' negligence claim against
all the Defendants is dismissed with leave to amend; and (vi) the
Defendants' request for judicial notice is denied.  

Among other things, the Judge finds that (i) the Eleventh Amendment
bars the Plaintiffs' federal and state law claims for damages
against any Defendant sued in his or her official capacity; in the
case the Defendant protected by immunity is Defendant Moore; (ii)
the declaratory relief regarding past violations of federal law
prohibited under Eleventh Amendment where it would have essentially
same effect as damages award due to its res judicata implications
in state court; (iii) the Section 1983 claims (claims one through
three) against Defendant Moore for prospective injunctive relief
are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment; and (iv) because
Defendants Petrino and Oliver are only being sued in their
individual capacity, the Section 1983 claims and state claims
against them may proceed if otherwise adequately alleged and if not
otherwise barred by another form of immunity.

As to the remaining claims, the Judge finds that (i) when the
Defendants allegedly denied BLM members access to the court because
they were affiliated with BLM, and BLM had organized "court
support" for that day, the Defendants could plausibly have violated
plaintiffs First Amendment rights to free expression and
association; (ii) the Plaintiffs have adequately pled individual
standing as to Plaintiffs Marbley and Brown and associational
standing as to BLM as well; (iii) the Plaintiffs have not pled
sufficient facts to support a substantive due process claim; and
(iv) the Plaintiffs fail to plead that the Defendants' negligence
was a proximate cause of an injury to the Plaintiffs.

Within 21 days, the Plaintiffs may file an amended complaint
consistent with the Order.  The order resolves ECF No. 17.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 2, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/NmvRiV from Leagle.com.

Black Lives Matter-Stockton Chapter, Dionne Smith-Downs, Denise
Friday, Lareesha Brown & Marbley Kenneth, Plaintiffs, represented
by Yolanda Huang -- yhuang.law@gmail.com -- Law Office of Yolanda
Huang.

Steve Moore, Joe Petrino & Dave Oliver, "Olivr", Defendants,
represented by Gregory Brian Thomas -- gthomas@bwslaw.com -- Burke,
Williams & Sorensen LLP & Temitayo Peters -- tpeters@bwslaw.com --
Burke Williams & Sorensen, LLP.


SC JOHNSON: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Crespo Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Robert Crespo, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.
Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-06869 (ARR) (RML) (E.D. N.Y.), Judge
Allyne R. Rose of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of New York denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss the
Plaintiff's complaint.

Crespo filed the putative class action on behalf of United States
purchasers of Raid Concentrated Deep Reach Fogger, a public-health
pesticide sold by the Defendant.  Raid's label makes several claims
about the Product's efficacy, the manner in which it operates, and
the pests it targets.  

Despite these representations, the Plaintiff alleges that the
Product is entirely ineffective and that the statements contained
on the label are misleading and inaccurate.  He asserts claims for
breach of express warranty and violations of the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act and the New York General Business Law.

The Defendant has moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint,
arguing that his claims are preempted by the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA").  In the alternative, it
argues that the Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.  

The Defendant's motion requires the Court to consider the scope of
express and conflict preemption under FIFRA, the nature of the
pesticide registration and review process mandated by FIFRA and its
interpreting regulations, and whether the Supreme Court's holding
in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005), applies
equally to public-health and agricultural pesticides.

Judge Rose cannot conclude that the Plaintiff's claims are all
conflict preempted solely because the Defendant would need to
obtain EPA approval to alter Raid's label.  She thus proceeds to
address each of the Plaintiff's claims individually to determine
whether they are preempted under the Supreme Court's two-step
formulation in Bates, and whether the Plaintiff otherwise states a
claim that would entitle him to relief.

She finds that to the extent that the Defendant relies on cases
analyzing statutes without a "prima facie evidence/no defense"
provision, those cases are not binding on the scope of preemption
under FIFRA.  Therefore, the Plaintiff's GBL claims are not
preempted, and the Plaintiff's claims do not fall within the safe
harbor provisions of the GBL.

She also finds that under the unique statutory and regulatory
scheme of FIFRA, even a state-law labeling and packaging
requirement is not necessarily preempted by the statute.  The
laintiff alleges that these warranties are all misleading and
inaccurate.  Thus, the Plaintiff's claim for breach of express
warranty is not preempted to the extent that it seeks only to give
effect to FIFRA's prohibition on misbranding, Section
136(q)(1)(A).

Finally, she finds that it is arguable that some of the challenged
label statements are mandated by federal law, and thus governed by
FIFRA.  However, other aspects of the challenged statements appear
to be purely voluntary, and they therefore constitute warranties
that were made without regard to FIFRA's requirements.  Because the
Plaintiff's MMWA claim can survive even if some of the challenged
statements are mandated disclosures, the Judhe denies the
Defendant's motion to dismiss this claim.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Rose concludes that the
Plaintiff's claims are not preempted and that the Plaintiff's
complaint meets the pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).  Accordingly, she denied the Defendant's motion
to dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 28, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/BgAR0c from Leagle.com.

Robert Crespo, Plaintiff, represented by Yitzchak Kopel --
ykopel@bursor.com -- Bursor & Fisher P.A.

S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., Defendant, represented by James D. Arden
-- JARDEN@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP.


SCHUMACHER AUTOMOTIVE: $5MM Eisenband Settlement Has Final OK
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JERRY EISENBAND, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SCHUMACHER AUTOMOTIVE,
INC., Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-80911-BLOOM/Reinhart (S.D. Fla.),
Judge Beth Bloom of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida granted the Parties' Motion for Final Approval
of Class Settlement and Application for Service Award, Attorneys'
Fees and Costs.

On Feb. 19, 2019, the Court granted preliminary approval to the
proposed class action settlement set forth in the Settlement
Agreement and Release between the Parties.  It also provisionally
certified the Settlement Class for settlement purposes, approved
the procedure for giving Class Notice to the members of the
Settlement Class, and set a Final Approval Hearing to take place on
June 28, 2019.

On June 28, 2019, the Court held a duly noticed Final Approval
Hearing.  Following consideration, Judge Bloom granted the Motion
for Final Approval.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, the Judge certified the Settlement
Class, as identified in the Settlement Agreement: All individuals
residing in the United States (i) who were sent a text message (ii)
on his or her cellular telephone (iii) by or on behalf of
Schumacher Automotive, Inc. (iv) from July 11, 2014 through the
date of certification.

The Settlement required the Defendant to make available up to $5
million for the Settlement Class and will produce a per person cash
benefit that is well within the range of recoveries established by
other court approved TCPA class action settlements.

She (i) appointed Scott A. Edelsberg of Edelsberg Law, P.A.; Andrew
J. Shamis of Shamis and Gentile, P.A.; and Manuel S. Hiraldo of
Hiraldo P.A; as the Class Counsel for the Settlement Class; and
(ii) designated Plaintiff Jerry Eisenband as the Class
Representative.

The Settlement Agreement is approved in all respects as fair,
reasonable and adequate.  The terms and provisions of the
Settlement Agreement, including all Exhibits, have been entered
into in good faith and are fully and finally approved as fair,
reasonable, and adequate as to, and in the best interests of, each
of the Parties and the Settlement Class Members.

The Judge directed the Parties to implement the Settlement
Agreement according to its terms and provisions.  The Administrator
is directed to provide Claim Settlement Payments to those
Settlement Class Members who submit valid, timely, and complete
Claims.

She approved the Class Counsel's request for attorney fees, costs,
and expenses, and awards Class Counsel 25% of the Settlement Fund
as reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, inclusive of the award of
reasonable costs incurred in this Action.  The award of attorneys'
fees and costs to Class Counsel will be paid from the Settlement
Fund within the time period and manner set forth in the Settlement
Agreement.  She also awarded the Class Counsel for their time
incurred and expenses advanced.

The Judge further awarded a Service Award in the amount of $5,000
to Plaintiff Jerry Eisenband payable pursuant to the terms of the
Settlement Agreement.

Upon the conclusion of the claims period on July 15, 2019, the
Action, including all individual claims and class claims presented
herein, will be dismissed on the merits and with prejudice against
the Plaintiff and all the other Settlement Class Members, without
fees or costs to any party except as otherwise provided in the
Final Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 28, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/7Luia4 from Leagle.com.

Jerry Eisenband, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew John Shamis --
ashamis@shamisgentile.com -- Scott Adam Edelsberg --
scott@edelsberglaw.com -- Edelsberg Law PA & Manuel Santiago
Hiraldo -- mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com -- Hiraldo P.A.

Schumacher Automotive, Inc., Defendant, represented by Craig Howard
Blinderman -- cblinderman@kfb-law.com -- Kurkin Forehand Brandes
LLP.


SEI INVESTMENTS: Settlement Discussion in Stevens Suit Ongoing
--------------------------------------------------------------
SEI Investments Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 25, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that Gordon Stevens and SEI
have informed the court of their collective intent to settle the
Stevens litigation.

On September 28, 2018, a class action complaint was filed in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania by Gordon Stevens, individually and as the
representative of similarly situated persons, and on behalf of the
SEI Capital Accumulation Plan (the "Plan") naming the Company and
its affiliated and/or related entities SEI Investments Management
Corporation, SEI Capital Accumulation Plan Design Committee, SEI
Capital Accumulation Plan Investment Committee, SEI Capital
Accumulation Plan Administration Committee, and John Does 1-30 as
defendants (the "Stevens Complaint").

The Stevens Compliant seeks unspecified damages for defendants'
breach of fiduciary duties under ERISA with respect to selecting
and monitoring the Plan's investment options and by retaining
affiliated investment products in the Plan.

On May 14, 2019, Plaintiff and SEI filed notice with the court of
their collective intent to settle the Stevens Litigation.

As of the date of this report, the terms of the settlement have not
yet been finalized, and will be subject to court review and
approval.

Although SEI has agreed to settle this matter in the very early
stages of the litigation in order to avoid the high cost of
protracted class-action litigation and internal distractions such
cases bring, SEI believes its defenses against the plaintiff's
allegations remain valid.

SEI Investments said, "While the outcome of this litigation remains
uncertain, the defendants believe that they have valid defenses to
plaintiffs' claims and intend to defend the allegations contained
in the Stevens Complaint vigorously. Because of uncertainty in the
make-up of the purported class named in the Stevens Complaint, the
specific theories of liability that may survive a motion for
summary judgment or other dispositive motion, the lack of
specificity or discovery regarding damages, causation, mitigation
and other aspects that may ultimately bear upon loss, the Company
is not reasonably able to provide an estimate of loss, if any, with
respect to the matters set forth in the Stevens Complaint."

SEI Investments Company is a publicly owned asset management
holding company. Through its subsidiaries, the firm provides wealth
management, retirement and investment solutions, asset management,
asset administration, investment processing outsourcing solutions,
financial services, and investment advisory services to its
clients. SEI Investments Company was founded in 1968 and is based
in Oaks, Pennsylvania.


SEI INVESTMENTS: Suits over SPTC Services Ongoing
-------------------------------------------------
SEI Investments Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 25, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company and SEI
Private Trust Company (SPTC) continues to defend several class
action suits related to SPTC's services to Stanford Trust Company.

SEI has been named in seven lawsuits filed in Louisiana courts;
four of the cases also name SEI Private Trust Company (SPTC) as a
defendant. The underlying allegations in all actions relate to the
purported role of SPTC in providing back-office services to
Stanford Trust Company.

The complaints allege that SEI and SPTC participated in some manner
in the sale of "certificates of deposit" issued by Stanford
International Bank so as to be a "seller" of the certificates of
deposit for purposes of primary liability under the Louisiana
Securities Law or so as to be secondarily liable under that statute
for sales of certificates of deposit made by Stanford Trust
Company.

Two of the actions also include claims for violations of the
Louisiana Racketeering Act and possibly conspiracy, and a third
also asserts claims of negligence, breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty, violations of the uniform fiduciaries law,
negligent misrepresentation, detrimental reliance, violations of
the Louisiana Racketeering Act, and conspiracy.

The procedural status of the seven cases varies.

The Lillie case, filed originally in the 19th Judicial District
Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, was brought as a class
action and is procedurally the most advanced of the cases.

SEI and SPTC filed exceptions, which the Court granted in part,
dismissing claims under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act
and permitting the claims under the Louisiana Securities Law to go
forward.

On March 11, 2013, newly-added insurance carrier defendants removed
the case to the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Louisiana.

On August 7, 2013, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
transferred the matter to the Northern District of Texas where MDL
2099, In re: Stanford Entities Securities Litigation ("the Stanford
MDL"), is pending.

On September 22, 2015, the District Court on the motion of SEI and
SPTC dismissed plaintiffs' claims for primary liability under
Section 714(A) of the Louisiana Securities Law, but declined to
dismiss plaintiffs' claims for secondary liability under Section
714(B) of the Louisiana Securities Law based on the allegations
pled by plaintiffs.

On November 4, 2015, the District Court granted SEI and SPTC's
motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims under Section 712(D) of the
Louisiana Securities Law. Consequently, the only claims of
plaintiffs remaining in Lillie are plaintiffs' claims for secondary
liability against SEI and SPTC under Section 714(B) of the
Louisiana Securities Law.

On May 2, 2016, the District Court certified the class as being
"all persons for whom Stanford Trust Company purchased or renewed
Stanford Investment Bank Limited certificates of deposit in
Louisiana between January 1, 2007 and February 13, 2009".

Notice of the pendency of the class action was mailed to potential
class members on October 4, 2016.

On December 1, 2016, a group of plaintiffs who opted out of the
Lillie class filed a complaint against SEI and SPTC in the United
States District Court in the Middle District of Louisiana ("Ahders
Complaint"), alleging claims essentially the same as those in
Lillie.

In January 2017, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
transferred the Ahders proceeding to the Northern District of Texas
and the Stanford MDL.

During February 2017, SEI filed its response to the Ahders
Complaint, and in March 2017 the District Court for the Northern
District of Texas approved the stipulated dismissal of all claims
in this Complaint predicated on Section 712(D) or Section 714(A) of
the Louisiana Securities Law.

In both cases, as a result of the proceedings in the Northern
District of Texas, only the plaintiffs' secondary liability claims
under Section 714(B) of the Louisiana Securities Law remain.
Limited discovery and motions practice have occurred, including SEI
and SPTC's filing of a dispositive summary judgment motion in the
Lillie proceeding.

On January 31, 2019, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
remanded the Lillie and Ahders proceedings to the Middle District
of Louisiana.

On July 9, 2019, the District Court issued an order granting SEI's
Summary Judgment Motion to dismiss the remaining Section 714(B)
claim in the Lillie proceeding and denying Plaintiffs' Motion for
Continuance of SEI and SPTC's Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant
to Rule 56(d).


On July 16, 2019, SEI and SPTC filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
pursuant to Rule 56(d) in the Ahders proceeding to have the
remaining Section 714(B) claim dismissed.

On July 17, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration
and/or New Trial as to the July 9, 2019 Ruling and Order (ECF 146)
by the Honorable Brian A. Jackson denying a continuance of SEI's
Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56(d). SEI and SPTC
expect to file an answer to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration
on or before the deadline for responding of August 8, 2019.

Another case, filed in the 23rd Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Ascension, also was removed to federal court and
transferred by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to
the Northern District of Texas and the Stanford MDL. The schedule
for responding to that Complaint has not yet been established.

Two additional cases remain in the Parish of East Baton Rouge.
Plaintiffs filed petitions in 2010 and have granted SEI and SPTC
indefinite extensions to respond. No material activity has taken
place since.

In two additional cases, filed in East Baton Rouge and brought by
the same counsel who filed the Lillie action, virtually all of the
litigation to date has involved motions practice and appellate
litigation regarding the existence of federal subject matter
jurisdiction under the federal Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act (SLUSA).

The matters were removed to the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas and consolidated. The court then
dismissed the action under SLUSA.

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed that order, and
the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the Court of
Appeals judgment on February 26, 2014. The matters were remanded to
state court and no material activity has taken place since that
date.

SEI Investments said, "While the outcome of this litigation remains
uncertain, SEI and SPTC believe that they have valid defenses to
plaintiffs' claims and intend to defend the lawsuits vigorously.
Because of uncertainty in the make-up of the Lillie class, the
specific theories of liability that may survive a motion for
summary judgment or other dispositive motion, the relative lack of
discovery regarding damages, causation, mitigation and other
aspects that may ultimately bear upon loss, the Company is not
reasonably able to provide an estimate of loss, if any, with
respect to the foregoing lawsuits."

SEI Investments Company is a publicly owned asset management
holding company. Through its subsidiaries, the firm provides wealth
management, retirement and investment solutions, asset management,
asset administration, investment processing outsourcing solutions,
financial services, and investment advisory services to its
clients. SEI Investments Company was founded in 1968 and is based
in Oaks, Pennsylvania.


SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON: 98 Suits Filed Related to Woolsey Fire
------------------------------------------------------------------
Southern California Edison Company said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 25, 2019,
for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company is
aware of at least 98 lawsuits, representing approximately 2200
plaintiffs, related to the Woolsey Fire naming the company as a
defendant.

In November 2018, wind-driven wildfires impacted portions of
Southern California Edison Company's (SCE's) service territory and
caused substantial damage to both residential and business
properties and service outages for SCE customers.

The largest of these fires, known as the Woolsey Fire, originated
in Ventura County and burned acreage located in both Ventura and
Los Angeles Counties.

According to California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection
(CAL FIRE) information, the Woolsey Fire burned almost 100,000
acres, destroyed an estimated 1,643 structures, damaged an
estimated 364 structures and resulted in three fatalities.

As of July 22, 2019, SCE was aware of at least 98 lawsuits,
representing approximately 2200 plaintiffs, related to the Woolsey
Fire naming SCE as a defendant.

Eighty-two of these lawsuits also name Edison International as a
defendant based on its ownership and alleged control of SCE. At
least two of the lawsuits were filed as purported class actions.
The lawsuits, which have been filed in the superior courts of
Ventura and Los Angeles Counties allege, among other things,
negligence, inverse condemnation, personal injury, wrongful death,
trespass, private nuisance, and violations of the public utilities
and health and safety codes. The Woolsey Fire lawsuits have been
coordinated in the Los Angeles Superior Court. Three categories of
plaintiffs have filed lawsuits against SCE and Edison International
relating to the Woolsey Fire: individual plaintiffs, subrogation
plaintiffs and public entity plaintiffs. Two initial jury trials
for a limited number of plaintiffs on certain matters, sometimes
referred to as bellwether jury trials, are scheduled for February
10, 2020 and July 20, 2020.

Southern California Edison Company, a public utility, engages in
the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity in
Southern California. It generates electricity through
hydroelectric, diesel/liquid petroleum gas, natural gas, nuclear,
and photovoltaic resources. The company was founded in 1896 and is
based in Rosemead, California. Southern California Edison Company
is a subsidiary of Edison International.


SPOTTED LAKES: Washington Seeks OT Wages for Sand Haulers
---------------------------------------------------------
CLIFFORD WASHINGTON, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the PLAINTIFF, vs. SPOTTED LAKES, L.L.C., the
DEFENDANT, Case No. 7:19-cv-00186 (W.D. Tex., July 30, 2019), seeks
to recover monetary damages for regular and overtime hours worked
by Plaintiff and the putative class members under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The proposed Section 216 class is composed entirely of employees
who are or were Sand Haulers for Defendant, who, during the
applicable time period, work/worked for Defendant and are/were
denied their rights under applicable federal wage and hour laws.

Spotted Lakes, L.L.C was founded in 2004. The company's line of
business includes manufacturing motor truck trailers.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Merideth Q. McEntire, Esq.
          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          One Financial Center
          650 S. Shackleford Road, Suite 411
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: merideth@sanfordlawfirm.com
                  josh@sanfordlawfirm.com

ST. ELIZABETH MEDICAL: Court Dismisses Boden ERISA Claims
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky, Northern Division, Covington, issued a Memorandum Opinion
and Order granting Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
in the case captioned DOLORES JANE BODEN, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
ST. ELIZABETH MEDICAL CENTER, INC., et al., Defendants. Civil
Action No. 16-49-DLB-CJS. (E.D. Ky.).

Dolores Jane Boden, Jeanine Godsey, and Patricia Schafer previously
worked as nurses at St. Elizabeth Medical Center a nonprofit
corporation with its headquarters in Edgewood, Kentucky. Each of
the Plaintiffs is a participant in the St. Elizabeth Medical Center
Employees' Pension Plan (Plan). The Plan provides monthly pension
benefits to retired St. Elizabeth employees. Dr. Robert Prichard,
informed Plan participants in a letter, the St. Elizabeth Plan was
59% funded. In light of this information, the Plaintiffs filed this
putative class action suit alleging, inter alia,violations of
ERISA.

Church-Plan Issue

Congress passed ERISA in 1974 to remedy certain defects in the
private retirement system which limit the effectiveness of the
system in providing retirement income security.The statute
generally applies to employee-benefit plans, but exempts certain
plans, including governmental plans and church plans.  

The Statutory Language

Under ERISA, for purposes of the church-plan exemption: "A plan
established and maintained for its employees (or their
beneficiaries) by a church or by a convention or association of
churches [a church plan] includes a plan maintained by an
organization, whether a civil law corporation or otherwise, the
principal purpose or function of which is the administration or
funding of a plan or program for the provision of retirement
benefits or welfare benefits, or both, for the employees of a
church or a convention or association of churches, if such
organization is controlled by or associated with a church or a
convention or association of churches."

Inquiry 1 -- Is the entity associated with a church?

The Court must first determine whether the entity whose employees
the plan benefits [is a tax-exempt nonprofit associated with a
church. Pursuant to ERISA, an organization, whether a civil law
corporation or otherwise is associated with a church or a
convention or association of churches if it shares common religious
bonds and convictions with that church or convention or association
of churches.

The first portion of the three-part inquiry is satisfied here. The
relevant entity in this case is St. Elizabeth, as the Plan was
developed to provide retirement benefits to St. Elizabeth
employees. The Court now must determine if there is a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether St. Elizabeth is associated with a
church. The Court finds that there is no question that St.
Elizabeth is associated with the Catholic Church.

The Defendants identify several ways in which St. Elizabeth is
associated with the Catholic Church St. Elizabeth was founded in
1861 by Franciscan Sisters of the Poor and the property was
acquired in the name of this Catholic religious order. Sponsorship
of St. Elizabeth was transferred to the Diocese of Covington in
1973 and continues to this day; this is evidenced, for example, by
the fact that the Bishop of Covington is the only person with the
authority to dispose of hospital properties upon dissolution of St.
Elizabeth. Beyond this, St. Elizabeth is listed in the Official
Catholic Directory.

The Defendants argue that this, among other evidence, is sufficient
to find that St. Elizabeth is associated with the Catholic Church.
The Court agrees. Like the Catholic Health Initiative in Medina,
Mercy Health in Sanzone, and OSF Healthcare in Smith, which were
all found to be associated with the Catholic Church, St.
Elizabeth's Articles of Incorporation indicate its relationship
with the Catholic Church and St. Elizabeth's is listed in the
Official Catholic Directory. Moreover, the Defendants have
presented a myriad of undisputed evidence demonstrating the
connection between St. Elizabeth and the Catholic Church.

Considering the evidence put forth as a whole, including the role
the Catholic Church plays in guiding St. Elizabeth's work, the
control the Bishop has over certain decisions, and the integration
of Catholicism into the day-to-day operations of the facilities,
the Court finds that there is no dispute of material fact that St.
Elizabeth is associated with the Catholic Church.

Inquiry 2 -- Is the plan maintained by a principal-purpose
organization?

Next, the Court turns to the question of whether the Committee
maintains the Plan, and whether the Committee is considered a
principal-purpose organization under the terms of ERISA. Defendants
argue generally that the Committee, along with St. Elizabeth,
maintains the plan and is a principal-purpose organization.
Plaintiffs alternatively assert that the Committee is not an
organization, that only one organization may maintain the Plan, and
that the Committee does not maintain the Plan but even if it did
the Committee does not administer the Plan so it cannot be a
principal-purpose organization.
  
Whether the Committee is an organization

The Plaintiffs suggest that the Committee cannot be a
principal-purpose organization because it is not, by definition, an
organization. Rather, they seem to suggest that the Committee, one
of multiple internal committees whose members are appointed and
removed by the Board is part of the Board under Kentucky law.
Plaintiffs suggest that the Committee is not an organization
because it does not create a separate entity or relieve the Board
from its ultimate responsibilities. Though the Plaintiffs fail to
explain or provide support for this claim,6 they seem to advocate
that an entity, in order to qualify as an organization, must be
completely separate from any other entity. The Court finds this
suggestion lacks merit.

ERISA does not define organization on its own.  

The Court finds that the Committee meets the two requirements
necessary for an entity to be an organization within the scope of
the ERISA exemption. The Plan document indicates that the Board
shall appoint an Administrative Committee to manage and administer
the plan. The Committee shall be the plan administrator and the
named fiduciary of the plan. The plain language of the Plan
indicates that the Committee is a group of people with a particular
purpose administering the Plan and serving as the named fiduciary
of the plan and therefore the Court finds that, as a matter of law,
the Committee is an organization for purposes of ERISA. Other
courts considering this issue and using similar definitions of
organization have found internal-benefits committees to be
"organizations. Accordingly, the Court will consider the Committee
to be an "organization" for purposes of further analysis.

Whether the Committee maintains the Plan

As ERISA does not define the word maintain, the Court again must
consider the ordinary or natural meaning of the word.  Black's Law
Dictionary defines maintain in several ways, the most relevant of
which are to continue something and to care for property for
purposes of operational productivity or appearance; to engage in
general repair and upkeep. The most relevant Merriam-Webster
definition of maintain is similar: to keep in an existing state as
of repair, efficiency, or validity: preserve from failure or
decline.

Beyond its plain meaning, the language and structure of the ERISA
statute appear to shine additional light on the meaning of
maintained in the church-plan-exemption context. Specifically, the
language of the statute suggests that maintained must mean more
than either administered or funded. If Congress had not intended to
attach any significance to the word `maintained, it could have
simply required that a plan be `administered or funded' by a
principal-purpose organization, and not also maintained' by one. It
did not make that choice. If maintained has no independent
significance, its presence in the statute would be mere surplusage
and would violate a well-settled principle of statutory
construction.

While maintenance must be more than either administration or
funding, case law suggests that to maintain a plan does not require
the ability to amend or terminate the plan. Rather, an organization
said to maintain a plan must merely care for the plan for the
purposes of operational productivity. Moreover, in determining
whether an organization is the one maintaining a plan, courts look
to the documents governing the pension plans for guidance and focus
on the responsibilities designated to the organization rather than
the day-to-day functions of the organization.

The Defendants have conceded that two organizations maintain the
Plan, St. Elizabeth and the Committee. Plaintiffs argue that such a
conclusion is inconsistent with the language of the church-plan
exemption which indicates that a principal-purpose organization is
an organization. Plaintiffs claim that the use of an, as well as
the primary responsibility language from Stapleton suggest that
only one organization can be found to maintain the Plan and, thus,
the Court must identify only one organization that is doing so.  

The Plaintiffs, however, fail to point to any binding case law
suggesting that a plan must be maintained exclusively by one
organization. Additionally, nothing in the text of the exemption
suggests that the Plan must be exclusively maintained by only one
organization. Had the drafters of the statute and exemption
intended to suggest that one and only one organization could
maintain the plan, they could have included more specific language.
However, they did not do so.

In fact, the church-plan exemption seems to suggest that more than
one organization may maintain a plan. The construction of the
statute indicates that maintenance means more than administration
or funding combined and seems to acknowledge the necessity of both
to the viability of a plan. A principal-purpose organization,
however, need only perform one of those critical functions
administration or funding.

As both are obviously necessary to have a successful pension plan,
more than one organization could potentially be found to be
maintaining the plan. As the plaintiffs have failed to point to any
cases suggesting otherwise and without further guidance, the Court
finds that more than one organization can maintain a church plan.

Whether the Committee is a Principal-Purpose Organization

Now that the Court has determined that the Committee is indeed
maintaining the Plan, it must finally determine whether the
Committee is a principal-purpose organization. The language of the
exemption indicates that a principal-purpose organization is an
organization with the principal purpose or function of
administering or funding a retirement-benefits plan.  The
Defendants admit that the Committee does not fund the plan, but the
Court does find that the Committee's principal purpose is
administration of the Plan.

Looking to the Plan documents, as the Court did in determining
whether the Committee maintains the Plan, the Court concludes that
the Committee's principal purpose is administration.The Plan
document itself indicates that the objective and goal of the of the
Committee is to manage and administer the Plan. The Resolution
creating the Committee indicates the same that the objective of the
Committee is to administer the Plan. The Resolution and the Plan
Document are the relevant documents which lay out the objective,
goal and end of the Committee in other words, they define the
Committee's purpose.  

As the purpose of the Committee, according to the documents, is
administration, and the Committee is maintaining the Plan, the
Committee clearly falls within the definition of a
principal-purpose organization. While Plaintiffs argue that the
Committee does not actually undertake administrative activities as
those activities have been delegated to Transamerica and others
this does not change the Court's conclusion. While the day-to-day
activities of the Committee may go toward the Committee's principal
function, it is undisputable that the principal purpose of the
Committee is administration.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Committee is a
principal-purpose organization that is maintaining the Committee,
and there is no genuine dispute of material fact that the second
prong of the Medina test is satisfied.

Inquiry 3 -- Is the principal-purpose organization associated with
a church?

As the Court previously found that St. Elizabeth is associated with
the Catholic Church, and the Committee is an internal subset of St.
Elizabeth, the Court also finds that the Committee is associated
with the Catholic Church and therefore satisfies the third prong of
the Medina test.

This conclusion is also supported by Plan documents governing the
Committee. For example, according to the Plan, the Committee shall
consist of not fewer than three (3) members who believe in and
follow the tenets of the Catholic Church. Additionally, the
Resolution creating the Committee indicated its role to administer
the St. Elizabeth Medical Center Employees' Penson Plan in a manner
consistent with the tenets of the Catholic Church. Following
logical reasoning and looking at the Plan documents, there is no
genuine issue of material fact that the Committee is also
associated with the Catholic Church.

As all three inquiries of the Medina three-part test are answered
in the affirmative St. Elizabeth is associated with a church, the
Committee is a principal-purpose organization and is maintaining
the Plan, and the Committee is associated with a church the Court
finds that the Plan at issue meets the requirements for the
church-plan exemption under ERISA.

Accordingly, as the requirements of ERISA do not apply to St.
Elizabeth's Plan, Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
shall be granted, and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment shall
be denied. As the Court has found that ERISA does not apply to the
at-issue church plan, it must dismiss claims one through five
claims brought by the Plaintiffs under ERISA.

The Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted, and
the Plaintiffs' ERISA claims (claims one through five) are
dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 25, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2qwolzu from
Leagle.com.

Dolores Jane Boden, on behalf of themselves and all others similary
situated, Jeanine Godsey, on behalf of themselves and all others
similary situated & Patricia Schaefer, on behalf of themselves and
all others similary situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Donna
Siegel Moffa -- dmoffa@ktmc -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP,
pro hac vice, Douglas P. Needham -- dneedham@ikrlaw.com -- Izard
Kindall & Raabe LLP, pro hac vice, Erik David Peterson, Mehr
Fairbanks & Peterson Trial Lawyers, PLLC, 201 W Short St Ste 800,
Lexington,  KY, 0507-1225, Mark K. Gyandoh -- mgyandoh@ktmc.com --
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP, pro hac vice, Mark P. Kindall --
mkindall@ikrlaw.com -- Izard Kindall & Raabe LLP, pro hac vice &
Robert A. Izard -- rizard@ikrlaw.com -- Izard Kindall & Raabe LLP,
pro hac vice.

St. Elizabeth Medical Center, Inc., The St. Elizabeth Medical
Center Employees' Pension Plan Administrative Committee & John
Does, 1-20, Defendants, represented by Christopher B. Markus --
cmarkus@dbllaw.com -- Dressman Benzinger LaVelle P.S.C., Mark D.
Guilfoyle, Dressman Benzinger LaVelle P.S.C.,Mark R. Hervey &
Richard G. Meyer, Dressman Benzinger LaVelle P.S.C., 207 Thomas
More Pkwy, Crestview Hills, KY 41017


STATE FARM: Court Grants Bids to Dismiss Sheahan Antitrust Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRIAN SHEAHAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE FARM
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Defendants, Case No.
18-cv-06186-EMC (N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward M. Chen of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California granted both
State Farm and the Verisk Defendants' motions to dismiss.

The Plaintiffs are the Sheahans, Douglas Pope, and Neil and Sandra
Wylie.  They have filed a class action against State Farm as well
as three additional companies that are affiliated with one another,
namely, Verisk Analytics, Inc.; Insurance Services Office, Inc.;
and Xactware Solutions, Inc. ("Verisk Defendants").

In the operative second amended complaint ("SAC"), the Plaintiffs
that State Farm is the largest property and casualty insurance
provider in the United States.  They all purchased homeowners
insurance policies from State Farm.  State Farm uses software
provided by the Verisk Defendants in conjunction with its
homeowners insurance policies.

The gist of the operative class action complaint is that (1) the
Plaintiffs and others similarly situated purchased homeowners
insurance policies from State Farm and that (2) State Farm, using
software developed by the Verisk Defendants, undervalued the
replacement cost of the Plaintiffs' homes when issuing the
policies.  After the Plaintiffs' homes were destroyed during the
October 2017 Northern California wildfires, they did not have
enough money from the policies to rebuild their homes.

Based on, inter alia, thse allegations, the Plaintiffs have
asserted the following claims for relief (against both State Farm
and the Verisk Defendants, unless otherwise noted): (1) breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (State Farm
only); (2) Fraud - intentional misrepresentation; (3) fraud - false
promise; (4) negligent misrepresentation; (5) negligence; (6)
reformation of insurance policies (State Farm only); (7) violation
of California Business & Professions Code Section 17200; (8)
violation of the California Cartwright Act; (9) violation of
California Insurance Code Section 790.03; (10) violation of the
federal Sherman Act -Cartel; (11) violation of the federal Sherman
Act - Monopoly; (12) violation of the federal Sherman Act -
Conspiracy; and (13) violation of California Products Liability
Act.

Currently pending before the Court are two motions to dismiss: one
filed by State Farm and the other filed by the Verisk Defendants.

Among other things, Judge Chen finds that (i) the SAC as pled does
not allege what the Plaintiffs assert in the excerpt from the
opposition brief; (ii) he cannot assess Plaintiffs'
misrepresentation claims without first having an understanding as
to what the alleged misrepresentations were in the first place;
(iii) there is nothing to suggest that State Farm and the Verisk
Defendants had an agreement pursuant to which State Farm would use
the software in a manner that would predictably yield inaccurate
results; (iv)  the negligence claim is duplicative of the claim for
negligent misrepresentation and the Judge need not entertain any
additional arguments made by State Farm and the Verisk Defendants;
(v) to the extent the Plaintiffs assert unlawful conduct, the SAC
fails to state a claim for relief; and (vi) the Plaintiffs have
failed to state any antitrust claim.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Chen granted both State Farm and the
Verisk Defendants' motions to dismiss.  He ruled as follows:

      a. The claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing (against State Farm only).  The claim is dismissed
but with leave to amend.

      b. The misrepresentation claims (fraudulent and negligent)
against both State Farm and the Verisk Defendants are dismissed
with leave to amend.

      c. The negligence claim is dismissed as duplicative of the
claim for negligent misrepresentation.  The Plaintiffs have leave
to amend.

      d. The Section 17200 claim based on fraudulent conduct is
dismissed with leave to amend.  The claim based on unlawful conduct
is dismissed with prejudice.  The claim based on unfair conduct is
viable but, based on the factual predicate, is sustainable as to
State Farm only.  The Plaintiffs have leave to amend the unfair
conduct claim as to the Verisk Defendants.  Certain remedies sought
by the Plaintiffs for the alleged violation of Section 17200 are
not cognizable and are dismissed without leave to amend; but the
Plaintiffs are not barred at this juncture from seeking an order
enjoining the Defendants from continuing their alleged illegal

      e. The claim for violation of Section 790.03 is dismissed
with prejudice.

      f. The product liability claim is dismissed with prejudice,
if only because of the economic loss rule.

      g. The antitrust claims are dismissed with leave to amend.

In short, at this juncture, the only viable claim the Plaintiffs
have is a claim for unfair conduct pursuant to Section 17200, which
is asserted against State Farm only.  The Plaintiffswill file their
amended complaint by Aug. 1, 2019.  The only amendments permitted
at this juncture are those specified.

The Order disposes of Docket Nos. 34 and 36.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 2, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/qWg2xY from Leagle.com.

Brian Sheahan, Alison Sheahan, Douglas Pope, Neil Wylie & Sandra
Wylie, Plaintiffs, represented by Rebecca McWilliams & Julia Anne
Donoho -- jdonoho@legalconstructs.com -- Policyholder Pros, LLP.

State Farm General Insurance Company, an Illinois company,
Defendant, represented by Frank Falzetta --
ffalzetta@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton
LLP, Jeffrey Scott Crowe -- jcrowe@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard,
Mullin, Richter and Hampton LLP & Jennifer Marie Hoffman --
jhoffman@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin Richter Hampton.

Verisk Analytics, a Delaware corporation, Insurance Services
Office, Inc., a Delaware corporation & Xactware Solutions Inc, a
Delaware corporation, Defendants, represented by Andrew David
Yaphe, Davis Polk, Micah Galvin Block, Davis Polk and Wardwell LLP
& Neal Alan Potischman, Davis Polk & Wardwell.


STEELSCAPE WASHINGTON: Mendez Suit Transferred to W.D. Wash.
------------------------------------------------------------
The case, Frank "Joe" Mendez an individual, on behalf of himself
and others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Steelscape
Washington, LLC, a Washington limited liability company; and
Steelscape, LLC, a foreign limited liability company, the
Defendants, Case No. 19-00002-00651-08, was removed from the
Cowlitz County Superior Court, to the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington (Tacoma) on July 29, 2019. The
Western District of Washington Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:19-cv-05691 to the proceeding.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Brian Lee Dolman, Esq.
          Donald W Heyrich, Esq.
          Erin Norgaard, Esq.
          HKM EMPLOYMENT ATTORNEYS LLP
          600 STEWART STREET, STE 901
          SEATTLE, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 838-2504
          E-mail: bdolman@hkm.com
                  dheyrich@hkm.com
                  enorgaard@hkm.com

Attorneys for the Defendant are:

          Patrick M. Madden, Esq.
          Ryan Drew Redekopp, Esq.
          K&L GATES LLP (SEATTLE)
          925 FOURTH AVE., STE 2900
          SEATTLE, WA 98104-1158
          Telephone: (206) 623-7580
          Facsimile: (206) 623-7022
          E-mail: patrick.madden@klgates.com
                  ryan.redekopp@klgates.com

STRADA CRUSH: Lawyer Must Find New Representative Plaintiff
-----------------------------------------------------------
Colin Perkel, writing for The Star, reports that a lawyer who
successfully won certification of a class action will get two
months to find a new representative plaintiff after an ugly spat
erupted with the current one.

If Henry Juroviesky fails to come up with a replacement, the
defendant in the case can move to have the action decertified,
Superior Court Justice Ed Morgan ruled this week.

Last August, Morgan appointed Juroviesky class counsel and George
Azar as plaintiff in the action against Vaughan-based Strada Crush,
which makes crushed aggregate for construction projects. About 154
past and present employees maintain in their unproven claim they
were illegally denied overtime pay.

Juroviesky and Azar had a falling out despite the certification
success, with recriminations flying back and forth. Azar sought to
fire the lawyer and replace him with another, Darryl Singer.

In turn, Juroviesky maintained Azar had mental health issues, was
incompetent, and was in need of a litigation guardian. Among other
things, the lawyer said his client was slow in providing
instructions and lacked mathematical skills — arguments that left
Morgan singularly unimpressed.

"If weakness in math and a tendency to procrastinate were signs of
a lack of capacity, half the bar and bench, including myself, might
have to submit to guardianship," Morgan said. "I say that, of
course, with the greatest of respect."

Morgan said Azar appeared perfectly competent despite Juroviesky's
call to appoint a colleague as litigation guardian. The position
was "rather surprising" given Juroviesky's previous argument that
his client was suitable, understood the issues and could provide
proper instructions.

"The evidence in support of this (incompetence) assertion does not
come from a medical practitioner or a social worker or any other
person in a relevant profession," Morgan said. "It comes from
another lawyer, who swears to his willingness to act as litigation
guardian."

Regardless, Morgan said he would be hesitant to appoint anyone as
litigation guardian for a representative plaintiff in a class
action.

"That would put the entire action in the control of lawyers without
any real client to answer to at all," the judge said.

Morgan noted that Azar was introduced to Juroviesky through Robert
Nunes, who had been the lawyer's business partner until a recent
falling out. Nunes then hired Singer to sue Juroviesky. He also
tried to persuade his friend Azar to fire Juroviesky and hire
Singer instead.

Ultimately, Morgan said, the key was what was in the best interests
of the class, and Azar had put his own interests first in choosing
Nunes' personal lawyer over one with a proven track record in the
case.

"The rest of the class care about this case, not the Nunes v.
Juroviesky case," Morgan said. "The class deserves to have a
representative plaintiff devoting his time and attention to the
litigation and instructing class counsel."

Morgan gave Juroviesky 60 days to find a new representative
plaintiff from among class members. If unsuccessful, Strada can
move to de-certify the case. [GN]


SUPER CARE: Nagar Files Suit Over Denied Breaks, Last Pay
---------------------------------------------------------
Emmanuel V. Nagar, an individual, on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Super Care, Inc., Super Care
Holdings, Inc. and Does 1 thru 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
19STCV25071 (Cal. Super., July 19, 2019), seeks redress for
Defendants' failure to provide meal periods, rest periods, minimum
wages, overtime, complete and accurate wage/leave statements
resulting from unfair business practices.

The Plaintiff further seeks waiting time penalties for unpaid wages
due upon termination and for violation of the California Labor
Code, California Business and Professions Code, including
declaratory relief, damages, penalties, equitable relief, costs and
attorneys' fees. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Darren M. Cohen, Esq.
      KINGSLEY & KINGSLEY, APC
      16133 Ventura Blvd, Suite 1200
      Encino, CA 91436
      Tel: (818) 990-8300
      Fax: (818) 990-2903
      Email: dcohen@kingsleykingsley.com


SYNCHRONOSS TECHNOLOGIES: Securities Suit Dismissed w/o Prejudice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE SYNCHRONOSS TECHNOLOGIES, INC. DERIVATIVE
LITIGATION. THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: ALL ACTIONS, Civil Action No.
17-2978 (FLW) (LHG) (D. N.J.), Judge Freda L. Wolfson of the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey granted the motion to
dismiss Lead Plaintiff Employees Retirement System of the State of
Hawaii's Amended Class Action Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6) field by Defendants
Synchronoss Technologies, Inc., Stephen G. Waldis, and Karen L.
Rosenberger.

In the putative class action securities litigation, the Plaintiff
alleges that it, and other similarly situated investors, purchased
Synchronoss' stock between Oct. 28, 2014 and June 13, 2017, and
that the Defendants have violated Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.  In
addition, the Plaintiff avers that Defendants Waldis and
Rosenberger have violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.

Specifically, the Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants
fraudulently inflated Synchronoss' stock by knowingly falsifying
the Company's publicly reported revenues, and that the Plaintiff
and the other investors relied on these material misrepresentations
and omissions to their detriment.

On May 1, 2017, two business days after the Company announced lower
than expected financials, the Plaintiffs filed the action, alleging
that the Company's miss of its Q12017 projections was the result of
an alleged fraud perpetrated by the Company and its senior
executives.  Following the consolidation of numerous similar
complaints, but before any consolidated complaint was filed,
Synchronoss announced that it would be restating certain prior
financial results reported for the years 2014 through 2016.

The Defendants moved to dismiss the Consolidated Complaint in
February 2018, which was pending when Synchronoss filed the
Restatement on July 9, 2018.  The Lead Plaintiff filed its Amended
Complaint on Aug. 24, 2018, adding allegations related to the
Restatement and testimony from CW3.  The Amended Complaint brings
claims under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and under Section
20(a) of the Exchange Act, alleging that the Defendants made
material false or misleading statements concerning its financial
health and the status of certain contracts.  

Subsequently, the Defendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint
on the basis that the Plaintiff has failed to plead with
particularity that Defendants acted with scienter, an element of a
Section 10(b) claim, and because any forward-looking misstatements
are protected by the Private Security Litigation Reform Act's
("PSLRA") Safe Harbor provision.

Judge Wolfson finds that the testimony of the CWs does not support
an inference of scienter.  The Plaintiff first attempts to
establish scienter through the testimony of three confidential
witnesses.  The Plaintiff has, in some respects, adequately
described the confidential witnesses with particularity, including
by alleging the duration of each CW's employment and the time
period during which the CWs acquired the relevant information.
Nonetheless, the confidential witness statements on which the
Plaintiff relies suffer from a more fundamental problem: they do
not contain specific details regarding the basis for the source's
personal knowledge and/or do not describe supporting events in
detail.

Based on the alleged GAAP violations, the Judge finds that the
Plaintiff has failed to show that Individual Defendants had clear
reasons to doubt the validity of the Synchronoss's financials but,
nonetheless, kept turning a blind eye to all such factual "red
flags."  Accordingly, the GAAP violations alleged do not support an
inference of scienter.

The Judge also finds that the Plaintiff's argument rests heavily on
the mere fact that the Company significantly restated its
financials, which revealed serious deficiencies in the Company's
accounting practices.  But the Plaintiff has failed to buttress
this fact with particularized allegations of fraudulent intent" on
the part of the Individual Defendants.  Accordingly, the size and
scope of the Restatement of Synchronoss' financials "provide at
most some inference of scienter but not a strong inference."

Absent any particularized allegations, the Judge finds that the
Plaintiff's "core business" argument amounts to an attempt to
impute knowledge to the Individual Defendants of the alleged fraud
only because they held leadership positions at the Company and,
hence, "must have known" of every detail of the Company's business
with key customers.  Such an argument, without more, cannot support
an inference of scienter.

The Plaintiff's motive-and-opportunity allegations in connection
with Waldis and Rosenberger stock sales do not support an inference
of scienter either.  The Judge finds that the Plaintiff's
speculation that Waldis and Rosenberger's 10(b)(5)-1 trading plans
must have been amended does not satisfy the PSLRA's heightened
pleading standards, and trades made pursuant to these plans are of
little probative value in establishing scienter.

The Judge finds that the Plaintiff has not provided any additional
evidence to infer that the resignations are suggestive of fraud,
arguing only that the timing of the resignations was
"uncharacteristic" of the Company's typical hiring and firing
practices.  Thus, the resignations of Waldis and Rosenberger do not
support an inference of scienter.  Also, the inference that
Rosenberger and Waldis acted with fraudulent intent is not more
plausible than the inference that they simply did a poor job
overseeing the accounting department.  Such an inference cannot
support a securities fraud claim.

Because the Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead that the
Defendants were actually aware of the falsity of the revenue
projections, the Plaintiff's claims based on forward-looking
statements fail, and the Judge need not address the adequacy of the
Defendants' cautionary language.

Finally, the liability under Section 20(a) is derivative of an
underlying violation of Section 10(b) by the controlled person.
Because the Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead a claim under
Section 10(b), it is impossible to hold the Individual Defendants
liable under Section 20(a).  The Section 20(a) claims against
Individual Defendants Waldis and Rosenberger are therefore also
dismissed.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Wolfson granted the Defendants'
motion, and dismissed without prejudice the Plaintiff's claims.
However, the Plaintiff will have 30 days from the date of the Order
accompanying the Opinion to amend its Amended Complaint consistent
with the Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 28, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/afQlyl from Leagle.com.

William Melchione, Movant, represented by EDUARD KORSINSKY --
ek@zlk.com -- LEVI & KORSINSKY LLP.

City of Atlanta Police Officers' Pension Fund & CITY OF ATLANTA
FIREFIGHTERS' PENSION FUND, Movants, represented by JAMES E. CECCHI
-- JCecchi@carellabyrne.com -- CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY &
AGNELLO, P.C.

Employees Retirement System of the State of Hawaii, Movant,
represented by DONALD A. ECKLUND -- DEcklund@carellabyrne.com --
CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C., JAMES E.
CECCHI, CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C. & KYLE
JOHN MCGEE, GRANT & EISENHOFER PA.

Bhavisha Parmar, Movant, represented by SHERIEF MORSY --
smorsy@faruqilaw.com -- FARUQI & FARUQI LLP.

Employees Retirement System of the State of Hawaii, Lead Plaintiff,
represented by JAMES E. CECCHI, CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY
& AGNELLO, P.C.

JOHN ROBINSON, Plaintiff, represented by LAURENCE M. ROSEN, THE
ROSEN LAW FIRM, PA.

SYNCHRONOSS INVESTOR GROUP, Plaintiff, represented by BRUCE DANIEL
GREENBERG, LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG, LLC.

DAVID COLLEGE, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, 17-3005 & CITY OF ATLANTA FIREFIGHTERS' PENSION FUND,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
17-4326, Plaintiff Consolidated, represented by JAMES E. CECCHI,
CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C.

JEFFREY L. FLACK, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, 17-4147, Plaintiff Consolidated, represented by
BRUCE DANIEL GREENBERG -- bgreenberg@litedepalma.com -- LITE
DEPALMA GREENBERG, LLC.

SYNCHRONOSS TECHNOLOGIES, INC., STEPHEN G. WALDIS, KAREN L.
ROSENBERGER, RONALD W. HOVSEPIAN & JOHN FREDERICK, Defendants,
represented by HARVEY BARTLE, IV -- harvey.bartle@morganlewis.com
-- MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP.


SYNCHRONY FINANCIAL: Stichting Depositary APG Class Suit Ongoing
----------------------------------------------------------------
Synchrony Financial said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 25, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend a class action suit entitled, Stichting Depositary APG
Developed Markets Equity Pool and Stichting Depositary APG Fixed
Income Credit Pool v. Synchrony Financial et al.

On November 2, 2018, a putative class action lawsuit, Retail
Wholesale Department Store Union Local 338 Retirement Fund v.
Synchrony Financial, et al., was filed in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Connecticut, naming as defendants the Company
and two of its officers.

The lawsuit asserts violations of the Exchange Act for allegedly
making materially misleading statements and/or omitting material
information concerning the Company's underwriting practices and
private-label card business, and was filed on behalf of a putative
class of persons who purchased or otherwise acquired the Company's
common stock between October 21, 2016 and November 1, 2018.

The complaint seeks an award of unspecified compensatory damages,
costs and expenses.

On February 5, 2019, the court appointed Stichting Depositary APG
Developed Markets Equity Pool as lead plaintiff for the putative
class.

On April 5, 2019, an amended complaint was filed, asserting a new
claim for violations of the Securities Act in connection with
statements in the offering materials for the Company's December 1,
2017 note offering.

The Securities Act claims are filed on behalf of persons who
purchased or otherwise acquired Company bonds in or traceable to
the December 1, 2017 note offering between December 1, 2017 and
November 1, 2018.

The amended complaint names as additional defendants two additional
Company officers, the Company's board of directors, and the
underwriters of the December 1, 2017 note offering.

The amended complaint is captioned Stichting Depositary APG
Developed Markets Equity Pool and Stichting Depositary APG Fixed
Income Credit Pool v. Synchrony Financial et al.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Synchrony Financial, incorporated on September 12, 2003, is a
consumer financial services company. The Company provides a range
of credit products through programs it has established with a group
of national and regional retailers, local merchants, manufacturers,
buying groups, industry associations and healthcare service
providers. The Company's revenue activities are managed through
three sales platforms: Retail Card, Payment Solutions and
CareCredit. It offers its credit products through its subsidiary,
Synchrony Bank (the Bank). The company is based in Stamford,
Connecticut.


SYNCHRONY FINANCIAL: Still Defends Cambell, Neal & Mott TCPA Suits
------------------------------------------------------------------
Synchrony Financial said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 25, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend class suits alleging Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(TCPA) violations.

The Bank or the Company is, or has been, defending a number of
putative class actions alleging claims under the federal Telephone
Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") as a result of phone calls made by
the Bank.

The complaints generally have alleged that the Bank or the Company
placed calls to consumers by an automated telephone dialing system
or using a pre-recorded message or automated voice without their
consent and seek up to $1,500 for each violation, without
specifying an aggregate amount.

Campbell et al. v. Synchrony Bank was filed on January 25, 2017 in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York. The
original complaint named only J.C. Penney Company, Inc. and J.C.
Penney Corporation, Inc. as the defendants but was amended on April
7, 2017 to replace those defendants with the Bank.

Neal et al. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Synchrony Bank, for which
the Bank is indemnifying Wal-Mart, was filed on January 17, 2017 in
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina.
The original complaint named only Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. as a
defendant but was amended on March 30, 2017 to add Synchrony Bank
as an additional defendant.

Mott et al. v. Synchrony Bank was filed on February 2, 2018 in the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Synchrony Financial, incorporated on September 12, 2003, is a
consumer financial services company. The Company provides a range
of credit products through programs it has established with a group
of national and regional retailers, local merchants, manufacturers,
buying groups, industry associations and healthcare service
providers. The Company's revenue activities are managed through
three sales platforms: Retail Card, Payment Solutions and
CareCredit. It offers its credit products through its subsidiary,
Synchrony Bank (the Bank). The company is based in Stamford,
Connecticut.

TALISMAN ENERGY: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in Regmund Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RAYANNE REGMUND, et al, Plaintiffs, v. TALISMAN ENERGY
USA, INC.; cp REPSOL S.A., Defendant, Civil Action No.
4:16-CV-02960 (S.D. Tex.), Judge Keith P. Ellison of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston
Division, denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.

The Plaintiffs are the royalty owners on oil and gas leases.  They
have brought claims for breach of contract, accounting, and unjust
enrichment, and seek declaratory judgment.

In 2010, Defendant Talisman entered the Texas oil and gas market in
the Eagle Ford Shale region in a joint venture with Statoil.  From
2013 to 2016, Statoil and Talisman divided the operations of the
wells. Throughout this time, Talisman continued to take, market,
and pay royalties on its share of the production from all wells.  

Talisman and/or Statoil operated 468 wells in the Eagle Ford Shale
region from which Talisman paid royalties pursuant to approximately
2,920 leases.  There are 3,957 royalty owners who have been paid by
Talisman.  The wells produce oil/condensate and natural gas.
Generally, royalty volumes are determined based on calculated sales
volumes allocable to each well.

Plaintiffs Rayanne Regmund Chesser, Gloria Janssen, Michael
Newberry, and Carol Newberry filed the class action suit against
Defendant Talisman in the Western District of Pennsylvania in 2016,
and the case was subsequently transferred to the Southern District
of Texas.  The Plaintiffs take issue with the volumetric allocation
and estimated shrinkage Defendant used in its royalty calculations.


The Plaintiffs argue that their leases require a calculation of
royalties based on the amount of production ultimately available
for sale.  First, they object to the commingling of the
leaseholders' gross production of oil and gas, and the volumetric
allocation of the net sales volumes.  Second, they object to the
calculation of royalties; they challenge the shrinkage estimates
applied and estimated sales volumes.  The Plaintiffs' position is
that liability can be established as a class, and then
individualized damages can be determined from business records
without mini-trials.

The Plaintiffs seek to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class, which they
define as all persons who, pursuant to an oil and gas lease,
received between Jan. 1, 2013 and June 1, 2016, royalty payments
from Defendant Talisman Energy USA, Inc. attributable to
production, including but not limited to gas, oil, condensate and
all hydrocarbons separated, extracted or manufactured from gas that
was commingled with production from one or more other wells, and to
whom Talisman paid such royalties using a volumetric allocation
methodology of net production sold and/or estimated shrunk
production volumes.

The Plaintiffs seek to certify a class of nearly 4,000 Texas
mineral owners to challenge the Defendant's failure to properly
report, account for, and make royalty payments in accordance with
the putative class members materially similar lease agreements from
Jan. 1, 2013 through June 1, 2016.

Judge Ellison finds that, although the putative class presents
common questions, those common questions do not predominate over
the individualized issues in the case.  The class also faces a high
risk of intra-class conflicts of interest, which destroys adequacy.
He finds that it must deny the class certification.  Accordingly,
the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 2, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/sMEIq1 from Leagle.com.

RAYANNE REGMUND & GLORIA JENSSEN, Plaintiffs, represented by Bryan
O. Blevins, Jr. -- BBlevins@provostumphrey.com -- Provost Umphrey
Law Firm, Joseph N. Kravec, Jr.-- jkravec@fdpklaw.com -- Feinstein
Doyle et al, W. Michael Hamilton -- MHamilton@provostumphrey.com --
Provost & Umphrey, William T. Payne & Wyatt A. Lison --
wlison@fdpklaw.com -- Feinstein Doyle Payne & Kravec LLC.

MICHAEL NEWBERRY & CAROL NEWBERRY, Plaintiffs, represented by
Joseph N. Kravec, Jr., Feinstein Doyle et al, Paul Franklin
Ferguson, Jr., The Ferguson Law Firm, LLP, William T. Payne & Wyatt
A. Lison, Feinstein Doyle Payne & Kravec LLC.

Talisman Energy USA, Inc., Defendant, represented by Robert L.
Theriot -- rltheriot@liskow.com -- Liskow Lewis, Aaron Michael
Streett -- aaron.streett@bakerbotts.com -- Baker Bottts LLP, Jason
Allen Newman -- jason.newman@bakerbotts.com -- Attorney at Law,
Jonathan Mark Little -- mark.little@bakerbotts.com -- Baker Botts
LLP & Jana L. Grauberger -- jlgrauberger@liskow.com -- Liskow
Lewis.

Texas Oil & Gas Association, Amicus, represented by William Joseph
Boyce, Alexander Dubose Jefferson LLP.

Talisman Energy USA, Inc., Counter Claimant, represented by Robert
L. Theriot, Liskow Lewis, Jonathan Mark Little, Baker Botts LLP &
Jana L. Grauberger, Liskow Lewis.

CAROL NEWBERRY & MICHAEL NEWBERRY, Counter Defendants, represented
by Joseph N. Kravec, Jr., Feinstein Doyle et al, Paul Franklin
Ferguson, Jr., The Ferguson Law Firm, LLP, William T. Payne & Wyatt
A. Lison, Feinstein Doyle Payne & Kravec LLC.

RAYANNE REGMUND & GLORIA JENSSEN, Counter Defendants, represented
by Bryan O. Blevins, Jr., Provost Umphrey Law Firm, Joseph N.
Kravec, Jr., Feinstein Doyle et al, W. Michael Hamilton, Provost &
Umphrey, William T. Payne & Wyatt A. Lison, Feinstein Doyle Payne &
Kravec LLC.


TED BAKER: Farr Claims Website not Blind Friendly
-------------------------------------------------
James Farr, individually and on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Ted Baker Limited and Does 1 to
10, inclusive, Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-06220 (C.D. Cal., July 18,
2019), seeks preliminary and permanent injunction, compensatory,
statutory and punitive damages and fines, prejudgment and
post-judgment interest, costs and expenses of this action together
with reasonable attorneys' and expert fees and such other and
further relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act and
California's Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Defendant's website, https://www.tedbaker.com/, offers assortment
of men and women’s apparel. Farr is legally blind and claims that
the site cannot be accessed by the visually-impaired. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Bobby Saadian, Esq.
     Thiago Coelho, Esq.
     WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
     3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor
     Los Angeles, CA 90010
     Tel: (213) 381-9988
     Fax: (213) 381-9989
     Email info@wilshirelawfirm.com


TEXAS: 5th Cir. Terminates 1977 Consent Decree in Brown Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BOBBY R. BROWN, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, WILLIAM E. SCOTT,
Intervenor Plaintiff-Appellee, TYRONE DAY; KENNETH HICKMAN; R.
WAYNE JOHNSON; TORRANCE FLEMINGS; KENNETH PRYOR; JULIAN A. RANDALL;
LONNIE DEAN COLLINS; LAMONT EDWARD WILSON, Intervenor
Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BRYAN COLLIER, Executive Director of the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Defendant-Appellant. BOBBY R.
BROWN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellee, TYRONE DAY; KENNETH HICKMAN; R. WAYNE JOHNSON;
TORRANCE FLEMINGS; KENNETH PRYOR; JULIAN A. RANDALL; LONNIE DEAN
COLLINS; LAMONT EDWARD WILSON, Intervenor Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
BRYAN COLLIER, Executive Director of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice, Defendant-Appellant, Case No. 14-20249,
Consolidated with No. 14-20444 (5th Cir.), Judge Priscilla R. Owen
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (i) reversed the
district court's denial in part of the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice ("TDCJ")'s motion to terminate the consent decree and the
award of attorneys' fees; and (ii) terminated the 1977 consent
decree.

Pursuant to a provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
("PLRA"), TDCJ seeks to terminate a consent decree entered in 1977,
which exempts Muslim inmates from the requirement that all
religious gatherings and activities in Texas state prisons attended
by more than four inmates must be directly supervised by either
prison staff or a prison-approved outside volunteer.  The district
court denied the motion in part, concluding that a portion of the
consent decree remains necessary to correct current and ongoing
violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act ("RLUIPA"), the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

More than 40 years ago, Brown, a Muslim, initiated a class action
against the executive director of TDCJ that resulted in the 1977
consent decree.  That decree required TDCJ to make an exception for
Muslim inmates to a policy that otherwise applied to those
attending religious activities.  TDCJ's rules and policies have
required religious worship services or study gatherings attended by
more than four inmates to be "directly" supervised by either prison
staff, which would include a chaplain employed by TDCJ, or a
prison-approved outside volunteer.  If an officer is not available,
the service or activity will be cancelled, even if a volunteer is
scheduled to be present.

The 1977 consent decree afforded Muslim inmates the right to
participate in group religious services and studies that were
"indirectly" supervised if no prison staff member or outside
volunteer was available for direct supervision.  Indirect
supervision means that a prison staff member is in the vicinity and
observes the religious gathering intermittently, through windows or
by the use of audio or video equipment, but does not remain present
in the room or area where the activity is occurring.  In the
present proceedings, the district court found that from 1977 until
Jan. 1, 2013, Muslim, Jewish, Catholic, Protestant, and Native
American inmates could engage in an average of six hours of
religious activities each week at units in which members of each of
these faith groups were housed.

However, members of other faiths were not permitted to gather as
frequently due to the lack of civilian volunteers.  William Scott,
a Jehovah's Witness, sued the director of TDCJ in federal district
court in 2009, seeking an injunction ordering prison officials to
allow him and other members of the Jehovah's Witness faith to meet
without volunteers, just as Muslims were permitted to do as a
result of the consent decree.  TDCJ asserted that it did not have
sufficient staff to provide adequate supervision of all offender
faith groups if they were allowed to meet without volunteers
present.

The district court held in Scott that the Establishment Clause
requires "denominational neutrality," its "prohibition against
preferential treatment of religion is 'absolute,'" and that Muslim
inmates "are preferred to Jehovah's Witnesses with respect to the
volunteer policy.  The court concluded f alternative means exist to
treat Muslim and Jehovah's Witness prisoners without favoritism,
then the Establishment Clause demands them."  The district court
concluded that injunctive relief based on the Establishment Clause
violation was warranted but did not enter an injunction at that
time.  It instead ordered the Executive Director of TDCJ "to
propose a method of compliance" within sixty days. The district
court's opinion in Scott observed that if Muslims regularly engage
in communal worship without an approved religious volunteer
present, evidence exists that the government's rule against
Jehovah's Witnesses meetings is not closely fitted to the
government's compelling interest in enforcing the [Brown] consent
decree.

In the Scott litigation, Scott had also requested injunctive relief
under RLUIPA.  TDCJ responded to the district court's decision in
Scott by promulgating Administrative Directive AD-07.30 (rev. 7)
(June 30, 2014), which the parties refer to as the "Scott Plan."
Under the Scott Plan, all religious gatherings of more than four
inmates require direct supervision, including worship and studies
by more than four Muslim inmates. The Scott Plan conflicts with the
1977 consent decree that permitted Muslim inmates to congregate
with only indirect supervision.  Under the Scott Plan, each
religious group is permitted to have a group worship service for
one hour per week that is directly supervised by prison staff.
Additional group religious activities are permitted if supervised
by an outside, authorized volunteer.

In the present case, and as a result of the district court's
conclusion in the Scott case that TDCJ had violated the
Establishment clause by preferring adherents to the Religion of
Islam over the Jehovah's Witness faith group, TDCJ moved to
terminate the 1977 Brown consent decree pursuant to the PLRA.
Pursuant to provisions of the PLRA, TDCJ's motion operated as an
automatic stay of the 1977 Brown consent decree, allowing TDCJ to
implement the Scott Plan pending further proceedings in the
district court.  Accordingly, the direct supervision requirement
for all religious groups in TDCJ prisons, including members of the
Religion of Islam, went into effect in 2013.

The district court held an evidentiary hearing on TDCJ's motion to
dissolve the 1977 decree.  That decree had 22 specific provisions,
twenty of which the district court terminated without objection by
any party.  But the district concluded that two provisions were
necessary to correct current and ongoing violations of the federal
Constitution and to give effect to statutory rights of Muslim
inmates, effectively rejecting the Scott Plan as it applies to
Muslim inmates.

One of the two provisions of the 1977 consent decree that the
district court refused to dissolve, found in section III(15) of the
decree, required TDCJ officials to allow adherents to the Religion
of Islam at each unit of the Texas Department of Corrections equal
time for worship services and other religious activities each week
as is enjoyed by adherents to the Catholic, Protestant and Jewish
faiths.  The other provision that the district court ordered be
left intact is found in section III(8) of the consent decree, which
required TDCJ officials to permit inmates professing adherence to
the Religion of Islam to congregate for worship, study, and other
religious functions and activities under the supervision of an
inmate leader whenever an ordained Islamic minister is unavailable
at a regularly scheduled time for worship and study.

The district court held that the Scott Plan and its direct
supervision requirement result in violations of three different
federal rights.  Specifically, it held that the Scott Plan (1)
unjustifiably imposes a substantial burden on Muslim inmates'
religious exercise, thereby violating RLUIPA; (2) restricts Islamic
religious exercise in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment; and (3) disfavors Islam and favors other faiths,
violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Subsequently, the district court awarded attorneys' fees in favor
of Brown and a group of Muslim inmates who intervened in the case
(the Inmate Intervenors) as prevailing parties.

The TDCJ appeals both the district court's denial of its motion to
terminate the consent decree and the award of attorneys' fees.  A
motions panel of the Court ordered that the district court's
judgment on the merits be stayed pending appeal.

Judge Owen holds that the consent decree does not remain necessary
to correct current and ongoing violations of RLUIPA, the Free
Exercise Clause, or the Establishment Clause.  Accordingly, the
TDCJ's motion to vacate the consent decree should have been
granted.

The district court also awarded attorneys' fees to Brown and the
Inmate Intervenors as prevailing parties pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
Section1988(b).  However, in light of her conclusion as to the
merits of the TDCJ's motion to vacate the consent decree, Brown and
the Inmate Intervenors are not prevailing parties.  She vacates the
award of attorneys' fees.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Owen hods that the district
court's denial of the TDCJ's motion to terminate the consent decree
and award of attorneys' fees to Brown and the Inmate Intervenors
were in error.  She reversed the district court's judgment, and
terminated the consent decree.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 2, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/mNMAnf from Leagle.com.

Gerald Mark Birnberg -- birnberg@wba-law.com - for
Plaintiff-Appellee.

Edward A. Mallett -- edward@msblawyers.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.

Celamaine Cunniff, for Defendant-Appellant.

Kevin Hayden Theriot , for Defendant-Appellant.

Carolyn Frances Corwin -- ccorwin@cov.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant.

Bruce Davidson Oakley, for Defendant-Appellant.

Michael P. Murphy, for Defendant-Appellant.

Brian Rolland McGiverin, for Intervenor Plaintiff-Appellee.

Deborah Carleton Milner -- cmilner@velaw.com -- for Intervenor
Plaintiff-Appellee.

Leslie Carol Griffin -- leslie.griffin@unlv.edu -- for Intervenor
Plaintiff-Appellee.

Crystal Robles, for Intervenor Plaintiff-Appellee.


TJX COS: Cal. App. Reverses Final Approval of Ebo Suit Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALBERT EBO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE TJX
COMPANIES, INC., et al., Defendants and Respondents, Case No.
B285404 (Cal. App.), Judge Lee Anne Smalley Edmon of the Court of
Appeals of California for the Second District, Division Three,
reversed the trail court's judgment granting final approval of a
class action settlement.

Ebo commenced the action against TJX, a clothing retailer, in
November 2007.  The operative first amended complaint alleged
causes of action for (1) failure to provide meal and rest breaks,
and (2) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements.  The
wage statement claim alleged that TJX, the employer, failed to
include "the name and address of the legal entity employing the
employee" in its wage statements.1

In November 2008, Ebo filed a motion for class certification of his
claims that TJX failed to provide meal and rest breaks and failed
to provide accurate wage statements.  In January 2009, the trial
court denied the class certification of the meal and rest break
claims.  It certified the wage statement claim, but limited the
class to non-exempt employees of Marshalls of CA, LLC.

In March 2009, Ebo filed a notice of appeal from the order denying
certification of the meal and rest break class.  In May 2010, TJX
reformatted its wage statements to include the omitted information.
On May 1, 2013, the Court affirmed the order denying certification
of the meal and rest break claims.

The parties participated in a mandatory settlement conference
before Judge Dunn, and in November 2016, they entered into a joint
stipulation for settlement of the class action. Ebo then brought a
motion for preliminary approval of the class action settlement.

Under the terms of the settlement, TJX agreed to make a cash
payment of up to $150,000 to be distributed as follows: (1) $45,000
for the costs of the settlement administrator, Simpluris, Inc.; (2)
an attorney fee award of $85,000 to the class counsel; (3)
reimbursement of costs and litigation expenses of $12,500 to the
class counsel; and (4) a $7,500 enhancement award to Ebo, the lead
plaintiff, for his time and efforts in prosecuting the case.

Further, separate and apart from the Minimum Settlement Amount, TJX
agreed to make settlement payments to individual class members for
injuries caused by the allegedly incomplete wage statements.
Examples of injuries may include bank fees, check cashing fees, or
other costs that arose from the allegedly incomplete wage
statements.  To be eligible for an Individual Settlement Payment,
the Class Member must attach evidence of actual injury directly
caused by the incomplete wage statements.

In December 2016, the trial court (Judge Highberger) granted
preliminary approval to the class action settlement.  On July 26,
2017, Ebo filed a motion for final approval of the class action
settlement, and a separate motion for an award of attorney fees,
costs, and an enhancement, pursuant to the terms of the settlement.
Both motions were unopposed.

On Aug. 18, 2017, after hearing the matter and taking it under
submission, the trial court gave final approval to the class action
settlement.  The trial court approved attorney fees in the reduced
sum of $5,886.50, which was just one percent of the $588,650
lodestar amount and a fraction of the requested amount of $85,000.
As for the enhancement award to Ebo, the trial court approved $750,
rather than the $7,500 that had been requested.  In accordance with
the Aug. 18, 2017 ruling, the trial court entered a judgment that
provides for an award of attorney fees to the class counsel in the
amount of $5,886.50, and an enhancement award of $750 to Ebo.

On Sept. 28, 2017, Ebo filed a timely notice of appeal from the
judgment.  Ebo contends: he has a legal right to recover reasonable
attorney fees incurred in the litigation; the trial court applied
an arbitrary and incorrect legal standard by imposing a 99%
lodestar reduction; and the trial court erred in denying his
request, as the named Plaintiff, for a reasonable enhancement award
of $7,500.

Judge Edmon concludes the trial court applied incorrect criteria in
ruling on Ebo's requests for attorney fees and for an enhancement
award.  She finds that (i) the trial court abused its discretion in
awarding one percent of the lodestar amount as attorney fees on the
ground there was no pecuniary recovery; (ii) the fact that the
claims process did not result in a pecuniary recovery for the class
members is not a basis for awarding 1% of the lodestar amount, and
the statutory scheme also authorizes employees to sue for
injunctive relief and the class action lawsuit was successful in
that regard; and (iii) the trial court abused its discretion with
respect to the amount of the enhancement award because the
enhancement award to Ebo could not affect recovery by the absent
class members because there was no common fund.

The Judge concludes, however, that remand is the preferable
approach, to enable the trial court to rule on the matter anew,
guided by the principles articulated.  This is because, as a
reviewing court, its role is to review the trial court's exercise
of its discretion, not to determine appropriate attorney fee and
enhancement awards in the first instance.  The Judge thinks it best
that the able and experienced trial judge decide the issue.

On remand, the trial court is directed to reconsider Ebo's requests
for attorney fees and an enhancement award without regard to the
fact that the class members did not obtain a pecuniary recovery,
bearing in mind that employees are authorized to sue for injunctive
relief to ensure an employer's compliance with the statute even in
the absence of actual injury, and that Ebo succeeded in obtaining
TJX's compliance with the statute.  In exercising its discretion
with respect to the amount of attorney fees to be awarded, the
trial court will be guided by the usual factors including the
nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the
experience and expertise of counsel, the amount of time involved,
and whether the amount requested was based upon unnecessary or
duplicative work.

For these reasons, Jude Edmon reversed the Aug. 18, 2017 judgment
granting final approval of the class action settlement with respect
to paragraph 9 (the award of attorney fees to class counsel) and
paragraph 10 (the enhancement award to Ebo).  She remanded the
matter for further proceedings consistent with her Opinion.  In all
other respects, she affirmed the judgment.  In the interests of
justice, because there was no appearance by TJX on appeal, Ebo will
bear his own appellate costs.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 28, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/DCNSim from Leagle.com.

The Van Vleck Law Firm and Brian F. Van Vleck --
bvanvleck@vvlawgroup.com -- for Plaintiff and Appellant.

No appearance for Defendants and Respondents.


TOWERS WATSON: Court Junks Suit Over $18-Bil. Merger With Willis
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Chancery of Delaware issued a Memorandum Opinion
granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the captioned IN RE
TOWERS WATSON & CO. STOCKHOLDERS LITIGATION. C.A. No.
2018-0132-KSJM. (Del. Ch.).

This stockholder class action challenges the $18 billion
merger-of-equals between Towers Watson & Co. (Towers) and Willis
Group Holdings plc (Willis). After the transaction was publicly
announced, multiple stockholders and analysts disparaged the deal
as a windfall for Willis. Unsure of whether the Towers stockholders
would approve the transaction, the Towers board postponed the
stockholder vote. Towers's CEO, who was also Towers's lead
negotiator, then renegotiated the transaction, securing a dividend
for Towers's stockholders more than double the amount previously
agreed upon by the merging parties.

Reactions to the Initial Merger Agreement

Towers and Willis announced the merger on June 30, 2015. Towers's
stockholders reacted negatively to the announcement. In the months
before the merger, Willis's financial condition had worsened, and
Towers's financial condition had strengthened. Regarding the
merger, analysts noted that Willis appears to be extracting more
value from the transaction than Towers. By the close of trading on
the day the merger was announced, Towers's stock price had dropped
9%.

Negative reactions continued into September 2015. Willis's
financial woes exacerbated the issue. Willis missed earnings in
July. In contrast, Towers reported in August earnings that beat
street expectations and set a record-breaking fiscal year. Analysts
remarked, and the plaintiffs allege, that the market reaction
imperiled the deal by decreasing the likelihood that Towers would
obtain the majority stockholder approval necessary to close.

The Amended Complaint asserts three causes of action. In Count I,
the Plaintiffs claim that Haley breached his fiduciary duties by
failing to disclose the ValueAct proposal to the Towers board. In
Count II, the Plaintiffs claim that the director defendants
breached their fiduciary duties by allowing Haley to negotiate the
transaction. In Count III, the Plaintiffs claim that ValueAct and
Ubben aided and abetted in the director defendants' breach of their
fiduciary duties.

The Defendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to
Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6). They argue that the business
judgment standard presumptively applies given the nature of the
merger and the Plaintiffs' failure to plead facts sufficient to
rebut the business judgment rule. Alternatively, they argue under
Corwin that a fully informed stockholder vote invoked the business
judgment standard. Because the first issue is dispositive, this
decision does not address the second issue.

Breach of Fiduciary Duties

The Defendants argue that the business judgment rule presumptively
applies to the challenged transaction because the transaction is a
mostly stock-for-stock merger between widely-traded public entities
and because the propriety of deal protection devices are not at
issue. The Plaintiffs do not dispute that the business judgment
rule presumptively applies. Instead, they try to rebut the business
judgment rule and invoke the entire fairness standard based solely
on Haley's alleged conflict of interests.

The business judgment rule applies

To rebut the business judgment rule based solely on the material
conflicts of a minority of the directors of a multi-director board,
a plaintiff must allege that those conflicts affected the majority
of the board. A plaintiff can show this in one of two ways: by
demonstrating that the conflicted director either "controls or
dominates the board as a whole or failed to disclose his interest
in the transaction to the board and a reasonable board member would
have regarded the existence of the material interest as a
significant fact in the evaluation of the proposed transaction.

The Plaintiffs pursue the second theory, contending that the
ValueAct compensation proposal was a material interest, which Haley
failed to disclose to the board, and which a reasonable board
member would have regarded as significant in evaluating the
merger.43 In support, Plaintiffs compare this case to Mills
Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., in which management and their
financial advisor gave tips to their preferred bidder and then
failed to inform the board. The Delaware Supreme Court described
the failure to disclose the tip as fraud upon the board.

In this case, the Plaintiffs argue that Haley's failure to inform
the Towers board of the ValueAct proposal constituted deceptive
silence and fraud upon the board. The Plaintiffs focus on the
allegation that Haley viewed the $10.00 dividend as the minimum of
what stockholders would accept and that Ubben reported that this
amount didn't trouble him. They contend that but for Haley's
undisclosed conflicts and personal interest in seeing the merger
through, Haley would have pressed the Willis board for more than
the minimum of what stockholders would accept.

The facts alleged do not support Plaintiffs' argument. Again, the
operative question is whether a reasonable board member would have
viewed the ValueAct proposal as significant in evaluating the
proposed transaction. Three facts, appropriately alleged or
inferred, foreclose an inference that the Towers board would have
found the ValueAct compensation proposal significant.

First, at the time ValueAct made the proposal, the Towers board
already knew of Haley's post-merger employment and resulting
personal interest in seeing the merger close. It was the board
through Rabbitt that proposed to Willis that Haley lead the
combined entities post-merger. The board knew that Willis agreed to
this proposal as of March 19, 2015. The board knew that the
combined entities would be much larger and thus would likely
generate a much larger salary for Haley. The board was fully
informed of this conflict and resulting risk when it empowered
Haley to negotiate the transaction.

Second, the Towers board was generally apprised of the
negotiations. Haley reported to Rabbitt during the preliminary
negotiations, worked with Ganzi during the rounds of negotiations
in June, and periodically updated the board on the negotiations. In
fact, the Towers board knew that Ubben was agreeable to the $10.00
dividend because Haley shared this information during a board
meeting.

Third, Value Act's compensation proposal was a proposal only.
Although it offered greater potential upside to Haley, that upside
was based on pie-in-the-sky scenarios and a theory of compensation,
not any alleged business plans or projections. To put a fine point
on it, according to Defendants, achieving the full $140 million
upside of ValueAct's compensation proposal would require Herculean
efforts, such as more than doubling the combined entity's market
capitalization  from approximately $18 to $40 billion in three
years. In any event, Haley did not agree to the compensation
proposal in September. Nor did he engage in negotiations over his
compensation until after the merger closed. It was not until March
1, 2016, that the Willis Towers compensation committee formalized
an agreement with Haley on compensation.

In the end, the facts alleged do not support a finding of deceptive
silence, fraud on the board, or a conflicted negotiator gone rogue.
Given what the Towers board knew and the nature of the ValueAct
proposal, Plaintiffs fail to establish that a reasonable director
would consider the ValueAct proposal to be significant when
evaluating the merger.

The Plaintiffs have thus failed to show that the merger is subject
to the entire fairness standard of review based on the ValueAct
compensation proposal.

Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty
under the business judgment rule

Applying the business judgment rule insulates the merger from all
attacks other than on grounds of gift or waste. The doctrine of
waste is a residual protection for stockholders that polices the
outer boundaries of the broad field of discretion afforded
directors by the business judgment rule.

The test to show corporate waste is difficult for any plaintiff to
meet; indeed to prevail on a waste claim the plaintiff must
overcome the general presumption of good faith by showing that the
board's decision was so egregious or irrational that it could not
have been based on a valid assessment of the corporation's best
interests.

The Plaintiffs do not expressly apply the waste standard in the
Amended Complaint or briefing, but a claimant need not necessarily
expressly aver 'gift' or waste in order to make out a claim on
these theories, so long as claimant alleges facts in his
description of a series of events from which a gift or waste may
reasonably be inferred.

The Plaintiffs direct their arguments to the non-exculpated claim
standard. To state a claim against the director defendants who are
protected by an exculpatory provision, the Plaintiffs must plead
facts supporting a rational inference that the directors harbored
self-interest adverse to the stockholders' interests, acted to
advance the self-interest of an interested party from whom they
could not be presumed to act independently, or acted in bad faith.


Aside from Haley, the Plaintiffs concede that the director
defendants were disinterested with respect to the transaction, and
they do not meaningfully contend that the director defendants could
not be presumed to have acted independently from any interested
party. The Plaintiffs appear to argue that the director defendants
nevertheless acted in bad faith. Bad faith will be found if a
fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to
act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties. In the
transactional context, a very extreme set of facts would seem to be
required to sustain a disloyalty claim premised on the notion that
disinterested directors were intentionally disregarding their
duties.

While the standards for corporate waste and bad faith by the board
are similar, the former is not necessarily a lesser-included act of
the latter. That is, it is not necessarily true that every act of
bad faith by a director constitutes waste. This decision need not
dilate on the distinctions between the two legal theories, or their
respective applicability in the context of this analysis, because
Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged bad faith.

To show that the director defendants acted in bad faith, Plaintiffs
focus on the board's oversight of Haley during the merger
negotiations, and specifically during the five-month interim period
leading up to Haley's renegotiation of the special dividend. To be
clear, Plaintiffs acknowledge that there is nothing inherently
wrong with allowing an interested CEO to negotiate a transaction.

They further admit that the Towers board acted consistently with
their fiduciary duties during the initial phase of merger
negotiations. Plaintiffs contend, however, that with respect to the
interim period, the Towers board took a dramatically different
approach, by abdicating its fiduciary duties by failing to oversee
Haley 'creating the atmosphere in which' Haley could act freely and
improperly. The board's failures were especially egregious,
Plaintiffs allege, because stockholders like Driehaus openly
complained about Haley's supposed adverse incentives in connection
with the transaction.

Separately, Plaintiffs contend that the director defendants acted
in bad faith by issuing disclosures that the directors knew omitted
a material fact. According to Plaintiffs, the Towers board knew
that Haley and Ubben renegotiated the merger consideration in a
singular exchange, but failed to disclose this to stockholders, and
instead implied that the board supervised Haley through an
arm's-length negotiation. Plaintiffs, however, plead no facts to
suggest that the omitted information should have been disclosed or
that the board acted with intentional' dereliction or a conscious
disregard' of duty in omitting that information.

In sum, the Amended Complaint does not plead facts necessary to
establish a reasonably conceivable bad-faith claim, against the
majority of Towers's board. Because Plaintiffs fail to state a
non-exculpated claim of bad faith against the director defendants,
they also fail to state a claim under the onerous and exacting test
for waste. As a result, Plaintiffs' claim for breach of fiduciary
duty against the director defendants is dismissed.

Aiding and Abetting

To state a claim for aiding and abetting in breach of fiduciary
duty, a complaint must adequately allege an underlying breach
Because the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty, Count III for aiding and abetting is dismissed.

Accordingly, the Amended Complaint is dismissed in its entirety.

A full-text copy of the Chancery Court's July 25, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y53bs6r9 from
Leagle.com.

Michael J. Barry, Christine M. Mackintosh, GRANT & EISENHOFER P.A.,
Wilmington, Delaware; Counsel for Plaintiff Alaska
Laborers-Employers Retirement Trust.

Michael J. Barry, Christine M. Mackintosh, GRANT & EISENHOFER P.A.,
Wilmington, Delaware; Lee D. Rudy, Geoffrey C. Jarvis, J. Daniel
Albert, Stacey A. Greenspan, KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP,
Radnor, Pennsylvania; Counsel for Plaintiff City of Fort Myers
General Employees' Pension Fund.

Bradley R. Aronstam, Roger S. Stronach, ROSS ARONSTAM & MORITZ LLP,
Wilmington, Delaware; John A. Neuwirth, Joshua S. Amsel, Matthew S.
Connors, Amanda K. Pooler, Sean Moloney, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES
LLP, New York, New York; Counsel for Defendants Victor F. Ganzi,
John J. Haley, Leslie S. Heisz, Brenda R. O'Neill, Linda D.
Rabbitt, Gilbert T. Ray, Paul Thomas, and Wilhelm Zeller.

Raymond J. DiCamillo, Sarah T. Andrade, RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER,
P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Richard S. Horvath, Jr., PAUL HASTINGS
LLP, San Francisco, California; Counsel for Defendants ValueAct
Capital Management, L.P. and Jeffrey Ubben.


TRADER JOE'S: Weiss Appeals C.D. California Ruling to 9th Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Dana Weiss filed an appeal from a Court ruling in the
lawsuit titled Dana Weiss v. Trader Joe's Company, et al., Case No.
8:18-cv-01130-JLS-GJS, in the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California, Santa Ana.

The nature of suit is stated as other fraud.

The appellate case is captioned as Dana Weiss v. Trader Joe's
Company, et al., Case No. 19-55841, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by August 22, 2019;

   -- Transcript is due on September 23, 2019;

   -- Appellant Dana Weiss' opening brief is due on October 31,
      2019;

   -- Appellees Does and Trader Joe's Company's answering brief
      is due on December 2, 2019; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant DANA WEISS, an individual, and all others
similarly situated, is represented by:

          Blake J. Lindemann, Esq.
          THE LINDEMANN LAW GROUP
          433 N. Camden Dr., Fourth Floor
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: (310)-279-5269
          Facsimile: (310)-300-0267
          E-mail: blake@lawbl.com

Defendant-Appellee TRADER JOE'S COMPANY, a California Corporation,
is represented by:

          Dawn Sestito, Esq.
          O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
          400 South Hope Street, 18th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 430-6352
          E-mail: dsestito@omm.com


UNITED PF: T. N. Suit Moved to Southern Dist. of West Virginia
--------------------------------------------------------------
The case, T.N. in her own capacity and on behalf of others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. John Doe, an individual;
United PF LOM, LLC; Pla-Fit Franchise, LLC, a limited liability
company; Planet Fitness, Inc., a corporation; and Pla-Fit
Franchise, LLC, a limited liability company, the Defendants, Case
No. 19-C-266-K, was removed from the Raleigh County Circuit Court,
to the United States District Court for the Southern District of
West Virginia (Beckley) on July 30, 2019. The Southern District of
West Virginia Court Clerk assigned Case No. 5:19-cv-00558 to the
proceeding.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Anthony M. Salvatore, Esq.
          Greg A. Hewitt, Esq.
          HEWITT & SALVATORE
          204 North Court Street
          Fayetteville, WV 25840
          Telephone: (304) 574-0272
          Facsimile: (304) 574-0273
          E-mail: asalvatore@hewittsalvatore.com
                  ghewitt@hewittsalvatore.com

Attorneys for United PF LOM, LLC are:

          Sharon Z. Hall, Esq.
          ZIMMER KUNZ
          310 Grant Street, Suite 3000
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 281-8000
          Facsimile: (412) 281-1765
          E-mail: hall@zklaw.com

UNITED STATES: Court Modifies April 5 Prelim Injunction in Padilla
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, YOLANY PADILLA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, et al., Defendants, Case No.
C18-928 MJP (W.D. Wash.), Judge Marsha J. Pechman of the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington, Seattle, has
issued an order on (i) the Defendants' Motion to Vacate the Court's
Preliminary Injunction Order; and (ii) the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Modification of the Existing Preliminary Injunction.

On March 16, 2019, the Court certified a Bond Hearing Class
consisting of immigrants who have entered the United States without
inspection, requested asylum, and who the Government has determined
have a credible fear of persecution if they return home.  The Court
ruled, if the members of the class are given a bond hearing, it
must comply with the Due Process Clause.  An injunction ordering
the Defendants to do so has already issued.

On April 5, 2019, the Court entered an Order Granting Preliminary
Injunction requiring Defendant Executive Office for Immigration
Review to (i) conduct bond hearings within seven days of a bond
hearing request by a class member, and release any class member
whose detention time exceeds that limit; (ii) place the burden of
proof on Defendant Department of Homeland Security in those bond
hearings to demonstrate why the class member should not be released
on bond, parole, or other conditions; (iii) record the bond hearing
and produce the recording or verbatim transcript of the hearing
upon appeal; and (iv) produce a written decision with
particularized determinations of individualized findings at the
conclusion of the bond hearing.  Compliance with the injunction was
to be effected no later than May 5, 2019.

The first decision was based, not only on the Court's analysis of
the constitutional due process owed to these class members, but
also on 50 years of statutory and case law supporting the right of
persons detained for non-criminal reasons to be released upon
posting bond.  

On April 16, 2019, the Attorney General issued a decision in Matter
of M-S overruling a 2005 Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA")
determination in Matter of X-K which had been cited in the
preliminary injunction order.  On the basis of the AG's ruling, the
parties (1) agreed to stay the enforcement of the preliminary
injunction until May 31, 2019, and (2) filed the cross-motions
which are the subject of this order.  Additionally, the Plaintiffs
filed a Third Amended Complaint ("TAC") incorporating challenges to
the AG's decision in Matter of M-S, and the Defendants moved to
dismiss it.

In Matter of M-S, the AG determined that aliens who are originally
placed in expedited removal proceedings and then transferred to
full removal proceedings after establishing a credible fear do not
become eligible for bond upon transfer and that Matter of X-K, in
which the BIA had ruled that such aliens were entitled to bond
hearings under Section1225(b) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act ("INA"), "was wrongly decided."  The AG found that aliens
classified as "entering without inspection" ("EWI") were subject to
mandatory detention without bond following a successful credible
fear determination and could be released only upon being paroled
for "urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit"
under 8 U.S.C. Section 1182(d)(5)(A).

In the wake of that decision, the Government moved to vacate the
previously-entered injunction.

Judge Peachman concludes that the Plaintiffs of the Bond Hearing
Class have succeeded in establishing all the requisite elements for
granting their request for modified injunctive relief: a change in
circumstances, a continuing likelihood of success on the merits on
at least one of their claims, irreparable harm if their relief is
not granted, a balance of equities in their favor, and a benefit to
the public interest if granted the relief they seek.  Accordingly,
she granted the requested relief.

Anticipating that an appeal will swiftly follow the publication of
the order, the Judge divided the modified injunction into two parts
to facilitate appellate review:

     a. PART A: Affirming the Court's previously-entered injunctive
relief requiring Defendant Executive Office for Immigration Review
to:

          1. Conduct bond hearings within seven days of a bond
hearing request by a class member, and release any class member
whose detention time exceeds that limit;

          2. Place the burden of proof on Defendant Department of
Homeland Security in those bond hearings to demonstrate why the
class member should not be released on bond, parole, or other
conditions;

          3. Record the bond hearing and produce the recording or
verbatim transcript of the hearing upon appeal; and

          4. Produce a written decision with particularized
determinations of individualized findings at the conclusion of the
bond hearing.

     b. PART B: Modifying the injunction to find that the statutory
prohibition at Immigration and Nationality Act Section
235(b)(1)(B)(ii) against releasing on bond persons found to have a
credible fear and awaiting a determination of their asylum
application violates the U.S. Constitution; the Bond Hearing Class
is constitutionally entitled to a bond hearing before a neutral
decisionmaker (under the conditions enumerated) pending resolution
of their asylum applications.

The preliminary injunction, as modified, will enter into effect 14
days from the date of the Order.  The clerk is ordered to provide
copies of the Order to all counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 2, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/EpshiQ from Leagle.com.

Yolany Padilla, Ibis Guzman, Blanca Orantes & Baltazar Vasquez,
Plaintiffs, represented by Kristin Macleod-Ball, AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, pro hac vice, Leila Kang -- leila@nwirp.org --
NORTHWEST IMMIGRANT RIGHTS PROJECT, Matt Adams -- matt@nwirp.org --
NORTHWEST IMMIGRANT RIGHTS PROJECT, Trina Realmuto, AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, pro hac vice & Aaron Korthuis, NORTHWEST
IMMIGRANT RIGHTS PROJECT.

US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, also known as ICE, US
Department of Homeland Security, also known as DHS, US Customs and
Border Protection, also known as DHS, United StatesCitizenship and
Immigration Services, also known as DHS, Thomas Homan, Acting
Director of ICE, Kirstjen M Nielsen, Secretary of DHS, Kevin K.
McAleenan, Acting Commissioner of CBP, L Francis Cissna, Director
of USCIS, Marc J Moore, Seattle Field Office Director, ICE,
Executive Office for Immigration Review, Jefferson Beauregard
Sessions, III, United States Attorney General, Lowell Clark, Warden
of the Norwest Detention Center in Tacoma, Charles Ingram, Warden
of the Federal Detention Center in SeaTac, Washington & David
Shinn, Warden of the Federal Correctional Institute in Victorville,
CA, Defendants, represented by Joseph A. Darrow, US DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Lauren C. Bingham, US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & Sarah S.
Wilson, US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

James Janecka, Warden of the Adelanto Detention Facility,
Defendant, represented by Sarah S. Wilson, US DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE.


VERMYCK LLC: Astoria Tenants Mount Class Suit Against Landlord
--------------------------------------------------------------
Max Parrott, writing for QNS, reports that a pair of Astoria
tenants just won a strategic battle in a lawsuit against one of
three landlord groups challenging the state's newly strengthened
rent laws.

A Queens State Supreme Court Judge has granted a class action
lawsuit that will allow more than 50 identified members to recover
rent overcharges allegedly collected by defendant Vermyck LLC.

The two tenants filed a suit in 2018 that alleges the landlord
fraudulently deregulated many or all the apartments in their
building, while simultaneously receiving J-51 benefits, a property
tax exemption for renovations. Now the lawsuit could potentially
impact more than 100 current and other "similarly situated" tenants
of Vermyck's building at 28-30 34th St., according to the Housing
Rights Initiative, a legal support group whose investigation led to
the lawsuit.

In the time elapsed since the original lawsuit against the
landlord, Vermyck's management companies joined two other landlords
to file a lawsuit of its own against New York City and the Rent
Guidelines Board that claims measures included in the rent control
legislation that the state passed in June violate the U.S.
Constitution.

"It's highly ironic that a landlord accused of flouting the old
rent laws (Vermyck LLC) is now suing to challenge the new ones,"
said Aaron Carr, founder of HRI. "This victory couldn't be more
timely."

Seven of the 57 pending class action lawsuits HRI generated have
been granted class-certification status, Carr said. Last week, a
judge granted a motion allowing more than 100 East Harlem tenants
to sue landlord Steven Croman for similar charges of allegedly
overcharging and not offering rent-stabilized leases. [GN]


VISA INC: Nuts-for-Candy Class Suit Remains Stayed
--------------------------------------------------
Visa Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 26, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that on October 18, 2018, the court stayed the
Nuts for Candy case pending the district court's decision on
preliminary approval of the Amended Settlement Agreement in the
Interchange Multidistrict Litigation (MDL), and pending final
approval of that agreement if preliminary approval is granted.

Preliminary approval was granted on January 24, 2019, which
extended the stay in the Nuts for Candy case pending final approval
of the Amended Settlement Agreement.

Visa Inc. operates as a payments technology company worldwide. The
company facilitates commerce through the transfer of value and
information among consumers, merchants, financial institutions,
businesses, strategic partners, and government entities. Visa Inc.
was incorporated in 2007 and is headquartered in San Francisco,
California.


VOLKSWAGEN AG: Court Denies Partial Summary Judgment Bid in Manlove
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JONATHAN MANLOVE, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. VOLKSWAGEN AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT et
al., Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-145 (E.D. Tenn.), Judge Travis R.
McDonough of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee, Chattanooga, denied the Defendants' motion for partial
judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff Manlove's class-action
claims under the Tennessee Human Rights Act ("THRA"), and
collective-action claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act ("ADEA"), or, alternatively, motion to strike the class- and
collective-action allegations from the complaint.

Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, a German corporation, manufactures
automobiles at production plants throughout the world.  Volkswagen
Group of America, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Volkswagen AG,
is the operational headquarters for its presence in North America.
Volkswagen Group of America Chattanooga Operations, LLC is a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Volkswagen America that operates the
Volkswagen Chattanooga Assembly Plant in Chattanooga, Tennessee.

In November 2016, "Volkswagen AG Brand Chief" Dr. Herbert Diess
announced a rebranding effort known as "TRANSFORM 2025+" and a new
global policy known as "Pact for the Future," which would focus on
significant improvements in efficiency and productivity.  According
to Volkswagen, it planned to achieve increased efficiency through a
combination of early retirement and "natural fluctuations."
Additionally, Volkswagen explained that implementing the Pact would
include the elimination of 30,000 jobs globally, including 7,000
outside Germany.  Dr. Karlheinz Blessing, a Volkswagen AG Human
Resources Board Member, stated in a press release that the Pact
would "make Volkswagen slimmer, faster, and stronger."

On June 29, 2017, Volkswagen transferred Manlove, who was 53 years
old at the time, from his position of Assistant Manager to the
lower-ranking and lower-paid position of Supervisor in another
department.  A human resources representative told Manlove he would
continue to receive the higher Assistant Manager salary for only
the first year in the new position.  She also told him the demotion
was for "economic reasons" and unrelated to his performance.

His transfer occurred after the new manager of In-House Logistics
reorganized that department and eliminated two of five Assistant
Manager positions, including his position and the position of
another employee older than 50.  Two younger employees and one
older than 50 filled the three surviving Assistant Manager
positions.  That older employee, however, supervised only 12
employees in his new position, as opposed to the ninety he
supervised before the reorganization.

Before the Pact was announced, seven of the 14 employees in
Logistics at or above a Grade-8 salary level were over 50 years of
age.  Afterwards, only three of 14n employees at or above Grade 8
were over 50 years of age.

Plaintiff Manlove filed the action on June 29, 2018, and an amended
complaint on Sept. 18, 2018.  He sues Volkswagen for injunctive
relief against Volkswagen's policy in his individual capacity and
on behalf of a class of current and former employees 50 years of
age and older who work for Volkswagen in the United States.
Specifically, Manlove asserts: (1) individual and collective-action
claims under the ADEA, pursuant to Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"); and (2) individual and class-action claims
under the THRA, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

With regard to his collective-action claims under the ADEA, Manlove
alleges that he and all Volkswagen employees in the United States
50 years old or older are similarly situated in that Volkswagen
transferred, demoted, or otherwise pressured them into leaving
their employment as part of its common plan and scheme to phase out
older workers.   He claims there is a common nexus of fact and law
suggesting that the Plaintiff and members of the collective action
were discriminated against in the same manner.

With regard to his THRA claims, Manlove asserts class-action claims
on behalf of all Volkswagen employees 50 years old or older who
worked at any of Volkswagen's Tennessee facilities from November
2016 through the date of the final judgment.  He asserts that this
class can fulfill the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(a), and both 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) in large part
because all members of the proposed class are allegedly subject to
the same discriminatory policy.

In March 2019, Manlove moved for conditional certification of a
collective action based on his ADEA claim.  The next month,
Volkswagen filed its motion for partial judgment on the pleadings
as to the class- and collective-action allegations or,
alternatively, to strike them.  

On June 11, 2019, the Court granted in part Manlove's motion for
conditional certification of an ADEA collective action composed of
Volkswagen employees 50 years of age or older who work in
Chattanooga.  Manlove has not yet moved for class certification of
his THRA claim.

Volkswagen asks the Court to dismiss Manlove's class-action and
collective-action claims, arguing that Manlove has not pleaded
sufficient facts to make his Rule 23 Class Action and Section 216
Collective Action allegations plausible.  Alternatively, it asks
the Court to strike the class-action allegations under Rule
23(d)(1)(D) and collective-action allegations under Rule 12(f).

Judge McDonough finds that the factual allegations involving the
Pact and its implementation in the United States plausibly support
a claim of age discrimination based upon a common scheme or policy,
and it is not clear from the face of the complaint that Manlove
will be unable to satisfy Rule 23's requirements.  Accordingly, he
will deny Volkswagen's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to
Manlove's class-action claims and Volkswagen's alternative motion
to strike the class-action allegations.

Moreover, at this stage, Manlove plausibly alleges that the
conditionally certified collective-action members are similarly
situated.  The Judge will therefore deny Volkswagen's motion for
judgment on the pleadings as to Manlove's collective-action claims.
Manlove's collective-action allegations in support of those claims
are fully relevant to this proceeding, and, therefore, the Judge
will deny Volkswagen's alternative motion to strike them.

For the reasons set forth, Volkswagen's motion for oral argument,
and its partial motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the
class allegations and collective-action claims or, alternatively,
to strike the class and collective-action allegations are denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 28, 2019 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/zxk9V5 from Leagle.com.

Jonathan Manlove, Individually, and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Melzer --
amelzer@sanfordheisler.com -- Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP, pro hac
vice, Leigh Anne St. Charles -- lstcharles@sanfordheisler.com --
Sanford, Heisler, Sharp, LLP, pro hac vice & Kevin H. Sharp --
ksharp@sanfordheisler.com -- Sanford, Heisler, Sharp, LLP.

Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, Defendant, represented by Bradford
G. Harvey -- brad.harvey@millermartin.com -- Miller & Martin, PLLC,
Charles B. Lee -- chuck.lee@millermartin.com -- Miller & Martin,
PLLC, Jessica Malloy-Thorpe --
jessica.malloy-thorpe@millermartin.com -- Miller & Martin, PLLC,
Julia M. Jordan, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, pro hac vice, Megan
Welton, Miller & Martin, PLLC, Michael W. Johnston --
mjohnston@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding, LLP, Rebecca Cole Moore --
rcolemoore@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding, LLP, pro hac vice &
William B. Monahan -- monahanw@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan & Cromwell
LLP, pro hac vice.

Volkswagen Group of America, Inc & Volkswagen Group of America
Chattanooga Operations, LLC, Defendants, represented by Bradford G.
Harvey, Miller & Martin, PLLC, Charles B. Lee, Miller & Martin,
PLLC, Jessica Malloy-Thorpe, Miller & Martin, PLLC, Megan Welton,
Miller & Martin, PLLC, Michael W. Johnston, King & Spalding, LLP &
Rebecca Cole Moore, King & Spalding, LLP, pro hac vice.


VOLUME SERVICES: D.C. App. Flips Dismissal of Jeffries FACTA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DORIS JEFFRIES, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Appellant, v. VOLUME SERVICES AMERICA, INC.,
DOING BUSINESS AS CENTERPLATE AND CENTERPLATE/NBSE AND DOES 1
THROUGH 10, INCLUSIVE, Appellee, Case No. 18-7139 (D.C. App.),
Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed the judgment of the district
court granting Centerplate's motion to dismiss.

Jeffries made a credit card purchase at a Centerplate location and
received a receipt that displayed her 16-digit credit card number
and credit card expiration date.  Jeffries sued Centerplate for
violating the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003
("FACTA"), which prohibits printing more than the last five digits
of the card number or the expiration date upon any receipt provided
to the cardholder at the point of the sale or transaction.  

Centerplate moved to dismiss the case for lack of standing.  The
district court granted Centerplate's motion to dismiss, concluding
that Jeffries lacked standing.  The district court determined that
Jeffries did not suffer an increased risk of identity theft because
Jeffries -- and only Jeffries -- viewed the receipt containing her
credit card information.  It also concluded that the burden of
safeguarding the non-compliant receipt -- the second form of harm
identified in the complaint -- was insufficiently concrete to
support standing.  Finding both harms alleged in the complaint
inadequate, the district court held that Jeffries lacked standing
and dismissed her case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Jeffries timely appealed.  She contends that the violation of her
statutory right under FACTA constitutes an injury in fact without
any additional showing of harm.  She believes FACTA is such a
statute and vests consumers with a concrete interest in using their
credit and debit cards without incurring an increased risk of
identity theft.

Judge Henderson agrees.  FACTA's truncation requirement imposes on
the merchant the duty not to print more than the last five digits
of the card number or the expiration date.  The duty applies at the
point of the sale or transaction and a violation occurs regardless
whether a plaintiff ever becomes the victim of any crime.  In other
words, FACTA itself does not prohibit the crimes of identity theft
or fraud; its truncation requirement is a procedure designed to
decrease the risk that a consumer would have his identity stolen.
The requirement thus vests consumers with an interest in using
their credit and debit cards without facing an increased risk of
identity theft.

The question now becomes whether the interest protected by FACTA --
avoiding an increased risk of identity theft -- is concrete.
Jeffries' effort to safeguard her receipt does not change the fact
that she was prevented from using her credit card without at the
same time facing exposure to increased identity theft risk.
Because the receipt contained enough information to defraud
Jeffries, she suffered an injury in fact at the point of sale.  The
alleged violation of her statutory right has already occurred:
there is nothing "conjectural" or "hypothetical" about it.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Henderson reversed the judgment of
the district court, and remanded for further proceedings consistent
with her Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 2, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/DB03i7 from Leagle.com.

Brian K. Herrington argued the cause for the appellant. Chant
Yedalian -- chant@chant.mobi -- was with him on brief.

Mark W. Bayer -- mark.bayer@btlaw.com -- argued the cause for the
appellee Volume Services America, Inc. Scott N. Godes --
scott.godes@btlaw.com -- was with him on brief.


WAL-MART STORES: Court Stays Mott FDCPA Suit
--------------------------------------------
This matter is before the United States District Court for the
Western District of North Carolina, Charlotte Division, on two
motions in three consolidated putative class action cases, Neal v.
Wal-Mart Stores, et al., 3:17-cv-00022 (Neal); Campbell v.
Synchrony Bank, 3:18-cv-00501 (Campbell); and Mott v. Synchrony
Bank, 3:18-cv-00221 (Mott) which assert claims against defendants
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart) and Synchrony Bank (Synchrony)
under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).  Plaintiffs
Neal and Mott have moved the Court to appoint their counsel,
Greenwald Davidson Radbil PLLC, and Terrell Marshall Law Group
PLLC, as Interim Lead Counsel for the consolidated actions, and
Plaintiff Campbell has moved to appoint his counsel, Lemberg Law
LLC, as Interim Lead Counsel and to stay the Mott case.

The Court grants the motion to stay the Mott case because it
effectively duplicates the earlier filed Neal case. However, the
Court denies both motions seeking the appointment of Interim Lead
Counsel prior to Class Certification (if any class is ultimately
certified) because the Court finds that neither counsel for Neal or
Campbell is likely to be able to fully represent the interests of
the different putative classes in the respective actions in light
of their currently divergent views of the proper scope of the
putative classes and their underlying interpretation of the TCPA.
Also, it is regrettably apparent that counsel for Neal and Campbell
are unable to work together cooperatively such that it would be
efficient to appoint them to serve as co-Interim Lead Counsel.
However, consistent with the earlier Order of this Court
consolidating these cases for discovery, the Court will enter a
Pretrial Order and Case Management Plan that requires the parties
to conduct discovery to avoid, as much as possible, multiple,
duplicative discovery requests and effort.

Curtis Neal filed the first of the three cases naming Wal-Mart and
later Synchrony as defendants. Neal's claims are based on
allegations that he received telephone calls that were not intended
for him from Synchrony, which used an automatic telephone dialing
system to make the calls. Neal further alleges that he is not, nor
was he, one of Synchrony's customers nor did he give Synchrony
prior consent to place calls to his cellular telephone number by
using an automatic telephone dialing system. Neal alleges that this
conduct, more fully detailed in his complaint, violates the TCPA.

Campbell is the second filed case.  Campbell filed his complaint in
the Northern District of New York (No. 1:17-cv-00080) against
defendant J.C. Penney, later substituting Synchrony Bank as the
defendant. Campbell generally alleges that Synchrony violated the
TCPA by placing automated telephone calls to Campbell on his
cellular telephone and continuing to call him even after he told
the Synchrony representative that he was not the person Synchrony
was trying to call and expressly requested that Synchrony stop
calling him.  

The final case filed was Mott, which was not filed until over a
year later on in the Middle District of Florida. Ms. Mott similarly
alleges that she received unwanted telephone calls from Synchrony
in error and asked Synchrony not to call her again. She seeks,
however, only to represent the same class as Neal. Mott voluntarily
asked to have her case transferred to the Western District of North
Carolina, and the Middle District of Florida transferred Mott's
action to this Court.

As part of his motion to appoint Interim Lead Counsel, Campbell has
moved the Court to stay the Mott case while the Neal and Campbell
cases proceed on the grounds that Mott is duplicative of the other
cases.  

The Court cannot find any material differences in the Mott and Neal
cases as they have been presented. Also, at the hearing on the
parties' motions, Mott's counsel acknowledged that the Mott and
Neal cases were the same case in all material respects, suggesting
only that the class would get a better result if Mott's counsel was
appointed along with Neal's counsel to serve as Interim Lead
Counsel.

Further, the Court does not find that it would be in the interests
of efficient justice to maintain the duplicative Mott action simply
to keep her counsel involved (although the Court does not question
TMLG's experience, competence or the value they would likely add to
a case in which they are counsel).

The Court will exercise its discretion to stay the Mott case while
the Neal and Campbell cases continue.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 25, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y4w7hos9 from Leagle.com.

Curtis Neal, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Aaron David Radbil  --
aradbil@gdrlawfirm.com -- Greenwald Davidson Radbil PLLC, pro hac
vice, Adrienne D. McEntee amcentee@terrellmarshall.com -- Terrell
Marshall Law Group PLLC & Wesley Steven White, Law Offices of
Wesley S. White, 2300 E 7th St Ste 101, Charlotte, NC, 28204-3313

Barbara Mott, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Aaron David Radbil,
Greenwald Davidson Radbil PLLC, pro hac vice, Adrienne D. McEntee,
Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC, pro hac vice, Beth Ellen Terrell,
Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC, pro hac vice, Robert W. Murphy,
Law Office of Robert W. Murphy, pro hac vice & Wesley Steven White,
Law Offices of Wesley S. White.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., doing business as Walmart & Synchrony Bank,
Defendants, represented by Julia B. Strickland  --
jstrickland@stroock.com -- Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP, pro hac
vice, Julieta Stepanyan -- jstepanyan@stroock.com -- Stroock &
Stroock & Lavan LLP, pro hac vice, Michael D. DeFrank --
mdefrank@wyrick.com -- Wyrick Robbins Yates & Ponton LLP & Samuel
Allen Slater  -- sslater@wyrick.com -- Wyrick Robbins Yates &
Ponton LLP.


WASHINGTON: Court Certifies Class of TRS Plan 2 Members
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Tacoma, issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for
Class Certification in the case captioned PMICKEY FOWLER, LEISA
MAURER, and a class of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs,
v. TRACY GUERIN, Director of the Washington State Department of
Retirement Systems, Defendant. Case No. C15-5367 BHS. (W.D.
Wash.).

The Plaintiffs are public school teachers who participate in
Washington's Teachers' Retirement System (TRS), a public retirement
system managed by the Washington State Department of Retirement
Services (DRS). As members of Plan 2, Plaintiffs made contributions
to their Plan 2 accounts from each paycheck. Plaintiffs filed suit
against Defendant Marcie Frost (Frost) under 42 U.S.C. Section
1983. Plaintiffs' only cause of action was that the method DRS used
to calculate the interest on funds transferred between two plans
within TRS deprived them of their property in violation of the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)

Regarding numerosity, the Plaintiffs clarify that the estimated
class size of over 20,000 is based on information that the
defendant provided many years ago in state proceedings and Guerin
does not dispute. Though this information is again somewhat
minimal, the Court is satisfied based on the long history of the
litigation in this case and the newly-provided indication of the
source of this estimate that the numerosity element is satisfied.

Regarding commonality, as long as a single common question of law
or fact exists, plaintiffs may satisfy the commonality requirement.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs are correct that the legal
questions in this case have been litigated extensively and are
clearly identified as (1) whether a taking under the Fifth
Amendment occurred and (2) what relief is available if a taking did
occur.   

In this case, each putative class member suffers exactly the same
constitutional injury" and eligibility for relief may be determined
in one stroke. Therefore, the Court finds that commonality is
satisfied.

Regarding typicality, where the challenged conduct is a policy or
practice that affects all class members, the underlying issue
presented with respect to typicality is similar to that presented
with respect to commonality. Here, the challenged conduct is the
policy of non-crediting earned interest and allocating this
interest to others. This policy impacted the named plaintiffs in
the same manner as the absent class members. This policy also
caused them the same injury, a loss of interest earned on their
retirement accounts.

Therefore, the Court finds that typicality is satisfied.

Regarding adequacy, this element serves to uncover conflicts of
interest between named parties and the class they seek to
represent.  Plaintiffs were appointed class representatives in the
parallel state court action in 2009 and have represented the class
since that time. Regarding class counsel, a trial court [should
consider] the competence of counsel when deciding to grant or deny
class certification. Plaintiffs' counsel David F. Stobaugh declares
that he and his firm, Benedich Stobaugh & Strong, have successfully
represented individuals in class action cases for many years,
including in numerous actions dealing with employee benefits.
Plaintiffs' counsel has been litigating this case for many years
and the Court finds no reason to doubt their competency.

Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs and class counsel
satisfy the requirement to adequately represent the class.

Guerin's Objection to Certification

The Court finds that Guerin's objections to class certification for
injunctive relief under the first class definition are properly
addressed in Guerin's petition for certiorari and do not constitute
issues properly before this Court at this point in the proceedings.
Guerin does not oppose class certification to the extent plaintiffs
are seeking relief in the form of a declaration that defendant
violated the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.  

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit explicitly considered and rejected
Guerin's argument that Plaintiffs' takings claim is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. The Circuit found that the Teachers actually
seek an injunction ordering the Director to return the savings
taken from them, reasoned that the prospective injunctive relief
sought is readily distinguishable from a compensatory damages award
and explained that the Eleventh Amendment does not stand in the way
of a citizen suing a state official in federal court to return
money skimmed from a state-managed account. The Circuit held that
the claim can be certified for class treatment under Rule 23(b)(2)
because the relief of correcting the entire records system for the
class member accounts is in the nature of injunctive relief.

Therefore, it is ordered that the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification is GRANTED, and the Court certifies the following
class:

     All active and retired TRS members who: (1) were previously
members of TRS Plan 2 and (2) transferred from TRS Plan 2 to TRS
Plan 3 prior to January 20, 2002.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 25, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2c5wymf from Leagle.com.

Mickey Fowler & Leisa Maurer, and a class of similarly situated
individuals, Plaintiffs, represented by David F. Stobaugh, BENDICH
STOBAUGH & STRONG & Stephen K. Strong, BENDICH STOBAUGH & STRONG,
126 NW Canal Street, Suite 100, Seattle, WA 98107-4970

Tracy Guerin, Director of the Washington State Department of
Retirement Systems, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey A.O.
Freimund, FREIMUND JACKSON & TARDIF PLLC & Michael E. Tardif,
FREIMUND JACKSON & TARDIF PLLC, Evergreen Plaza Bldg, 711 Capitol
Way S., Ste 602, Olympia, WA 98501.


WASTE PRO: Tweedie Sues over Background Consumer Reports
--------------------------------------------------------
CANDISS TWEEDIE, on behalf of herself and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. WASTE PRO OF FLORIDA, INC.,
a Florida profit corporation, and WASTE PRO USA, INC., a Florida
profit corporation, the Defendants, Case No. 8:19-cv-01827 (M.D.
Fla., July 26, 2019), alleges that Defendants willfully violated
the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 by procuring consumer reports
on Plaintiff and other putative class members for employment
purposes, without first making proper disclosures in the format
required by the statute.

The Defendants failed to satisfy the FCRA's requirement that an
applicant/consumer be provided a stane alone disclosure when it
procured Plaintiff's consumer report without providing her a
compliant disclosure.

The Plaintiff asserts FCRA claims against Defendants on behalf of
herself and the class consisting of all applicants and employees
upon whom Defendants procured a consumer report for employment
purposes.

Waste Pro of Florida provides solid waste collection, recycling,
and disposal services to residential and commercial customers in
the state of Florida. Waste Pro USA performs administrative
services for all the related Waste Pro entities, including but not
limited to procuring background checks/consumer reports on
applicants/consumers seeking employment at all Waste Pro entities.
Waste Pro USA, Inc. and all other Waste Pro entities routinely
obtain and use information in consumer reports to conduct
background checks on applicants and employees.[BN]

Attorney for Plaintiffs are:

          Marc R. Edelman, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          201 N. Franklin Street, Suite 700
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: 813-223-5505
          Facsimile: 813-257-0572
          E-mail: MEdelman@forthepeople.com

WORLDMARK: Court Narrows Claims in Timeshare Suit
-------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued a Memorandum Decision and Order granting in part
and denying in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the case
captioned ERINA CLARK & BRYAN CLARK, individually and as Private
Attorney Generals on behalf of the general public, Plaintiffs, v.
WORLDMARK, THE CLUB, et al., Defendants. No. 1:18-cv-01661-LJO-JLT.
(E.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants engaged in unfair
business practices when they unlawfully sold a real estate interest
within California through unlicensed individuals who earned
commissions on the sales in violation of California law.
Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants engaged in unfair
business practices by making materially false representations in
connection with the sale of a timeshare interest as to the equity
value of their timeshare points. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that
Defendants violated the California Vacation Ownership and
Time-Share Act of 2004 (Timeshare Act) by making materially false
and misleading representations about the equity value of
Plaintiffs' timeshare points.

The Timeshare Act claim (Second Cause of Action) fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted and does not meet the
particularity requirement under Rule 9(b)

The Vacation Ownership and Timeshare Act of 2004 (Timeshare Act),
prohibits a person or entity subject to the Act from making
material misrepresentations in the advertising and promoting of
timeshares that materially misrepresent the size, nature, extent,
qualities, and characteristics of the offered timeshare plan.  

The Timeshare Act provides that any timeshare interest owner may
bring an action for damages or for injunctive relief for violations
under the statute.  

The First Amended Complaint (FAC) states that Brett Dean signed the
contract for the April 2017 sale of timeshare points on behalf of
Worldmark and WRDC. In the Addendum to Retail Installment Contract
Vacation Owner Agreement, Brett Dean signed as an authorized agent
on behalf of WYNDHAM RESORT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND WORLDMARK,
THE CLUB.

The Clarks allege that Defendants, through their representative,
misrepresented the actual amount of equity in their existing
timeshare interest. As evidence of the misrepresented amount of
equity, Plaintiffs attached Exhibit 2, a Final Summary webpage
dated September 8, 2016, which shows that the Clarks have equity of
$10,089.03.  However, Plaintiffs do not specifically allege that
the caller in April 2017 made specific reference to the
misrepresented amount of equity.

Thus, even when the Court accepts the Clarks' claims as true,
Plaintiffs do not establish a prima facie case that the Defendants
made a materially false statement or misrepresentation in
connection with the promotion or advertising of a timeshare plan. A
bare recitation of the elements of the cause of action is
insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.  

Furthermore, the FAC fails adequately to set forth the alleged
fraudulent scheme with particularity as required by FRCP 9(b).
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' Timeshare Act claims sound in
fraud, and Plaintiffs are therefore required to plead the
circumstances of fraud with particularity as required by Rule 9(b).


The Court agrees.

The Plaintiffs contend that the alleged unlawful activity does not
need to be pleaded with specificity. While a federal court will
examine state law to determine whether the elements of fraud have
been pleaded sufficiently to state a cause of action, Rule 9(b) is
a federally imposed rule that requires the circumstances of the
fraud be pleaded with particularity. Therefore, Rule 9(b) requires
the Clarks' claims of a fraudulent misrepresentation to be pleaded
with particularity.

Accordingly, the Timeshare Act claim must be dismissed.

The Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion to
dismiss with respect to the UCL claim (First Cause of Action).

Under California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL., any person or
entity that has engaged, is engaging or threatens to engage in
unfair competition may be enjoined in any court of competent
jurisdiction. Unfair competition includes any unlawful, unfair or
fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue
or misleading advertising. A business act or practice need only
meet one of three criteria unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent to be
considered unfair competition under the UCL.  Plaintiffs assert the
UCL claims under all three of the prongs.  

Where a UCL claim is grounded in alleged fraudulent conduct, it is
subject to the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b).  For
example, when a plaintiff relies entirely on a unified course of
fraudulent conduct as a basis for a UCL claim, the claim must
satisfy the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b). But when a
plaintiff's allegations do not rely entirely on a unified
fraudulent course of conduct, those aspects of the UCL claim that
are not grounded in fraud need not meet the Rule 9(b) requirements.


Unlawful prong

The UCL's unlawful prong borrows violations of other laws and
treats them as independently actionable. The UCL's coverage is
interpreted broadly, embracing anything that can properly be called
a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.
A violation of another law is a predicate for stating a cause of
action under the UCL's unlawful prong.
  
First, Plaintiffs claim that it is unlawful and unfair in
California for an entity to sell real estate other than through a
licensed real estate broker or sales person and unlawful to permit
the unlicensed individual to receive any compensation arising from
the sale. Plaintiffs allege that timeshare interests are interests
in real property. They also assert that a timeshare interest may
only be sold by a California licensed real estate broker or agent
and since the representative on the sales contract, Brett Dean, is
not a licensed real estate broker or salesperson, Defendants
violated the law.   

In addition, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Dean received a commission
on the sale which violates Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section 10137.
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section 10137 states it is unlawful for any
licensed real estate broker to employ or compensate, directly or
indirectly, any person for performing any of the acts within the
scope of this chapter who is not a licensed real estate broker, or
a real estate salesperson licensed under the broker. This
contention raises a plausible claim that the Defendants acted
unlawfully when Mr. Dean sold the timeshare interest to the Clarks.


This allegation is also not connected to any allegations of
fraudulent conduct, and therefore does not need to meet the
particularity requirements of Rule 9(b).

However, Plaintiffs also appear to be relying on an alleged
fraudulent scheme to satisfy the unlawful prong of the UCL claim.
Specifically, the FAC alleges that it is unlawful, unfair and
fraudulent in California to make a material misrepresentation of
facts in connection with the promotion of any timeshare interest
and asserts that Defendants made materially false representations
to Plaintiffs in connection with the sale of a timeshare interest
by stating to Plaintiffs that they had `equity' in excess of
$10,000 arising from their prior timeshare purchases.

In the present case, the Clarks' claim of unlicensed sales and
financing is separate from the alleged fraudulent scheme of
misrepresenting the amount of equity held by Plaintiffs. Thus,
Plaintiffs' claims under the unlawful prong of the UCL are not
entirely grounded in fraud and need not be pleaded with
particularity. Therefore, Defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED
with respect to the asserted unlawful UCL claim based upon
unlicensed sales and financing. The motion is granted with leave to
amend as to any unlawful UCL claim based upon the alleged
fraudulent scheme of misrepresenting the amount of equity held by
Plaintiffs. If Plaintiffs wish to rely on the alleged fraudulent
course of conduct to satisfy the unlawful prong of the UCL claim,
they must meet the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) in any
amended complaint.

Next, Plaintiffs reassert the allegations from their Timeshare Act
claim that Defendants violated California law when Defendants made
false or materially misleading statements about the equity value of
Plaintiffs' timeshare points. Because the Court dismisses the
Timeshare Act claim above, this claim cannot form the basis of the
UCL claim.

Unfair prong

The UCL does not define the term unfair and the California courts
are unresolved as to the exact definition under the statute.  The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has acknowledged a split in the
California courts as to whether a claim under the unfair prong may
be properly brought by consumers or if the cause of action is
limited to competitors. Prior to the decision in Cel-Tech Comms.
Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal.4th 163 (1999), the
California courts held that unfair conduct occurs when the practice
offends an established public policy or when the practice is
immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially
injurious to consumers. Under this approach, a court must balance
the utility of the defendant's conduct against the gravity of the
harm to the alleged victim. Id. Cel-Tech held that this balancing
test provided too little guidance to the courts.  

The FAC fails to meet either the Cel-Tech approach or the
pre-Cel-Tech balancing test in pleading unfair conduct under the
UCL. Under the Cel-Tech approach, the Clarks have not directly
alleged or presented facts that plausibly suggest how
misrepresenting the amount of equity or employing an unlicensed
salesperson violates the policy or spirit of the antitrust laws.
Furthermore, under the pre-Cel-Tech balancing approach, the FAC
offers no more than It is unlawful and unfair in California for an
entity to sell real estate other than through a licensed real
estate broker or sales person and "It is unlawful, unfair and
fraudulent in California to make a material misrepresentation of
facts in connection with the promotion of any timeshare interest.

These bare allegations of unfairness do not establish a claim under
the unfair prong of the UCL.

Fraudulent prong

For the reasons stated, the Plaintiffs have failed to plead with
the particularity required by Rule 9(b) that the Defendants'
conduct was fraudulent. For these same reasons, the Court dismisses
Plaintiffs' claim under the UCL that Defendants conduct was
fraudulent.

In sum, the Court denies in part and grants in part with leave to
amend the motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs' UCL claim
under the unlawful prong. With respect to the UCL claims under the
unfair and fraudulent prongs, the Court grants the motion to
dismiss with leave to amend.

Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part
with leave to amend and denied in part.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 25, 2019 Memorandum
Decision and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6hczwkg
from Leagle.com.

Terina Clark, individually and as Private Attorney Generals on
behalf of the general public & Bryan Clark, individually and as
Private Attorney Generals on behalf of the general public,
Plaintiffs, represented by Robert D. Bedinger, US Consumer
Attorneys, P.A. & Ashton Boswell Inniss, US Consumer Attorneys.

WorldMark, The Club, a California Corporation, Wyndham Resort
Development Corporation, an Oregon Corporation & Wyndham Vacation
Ownership, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Defendants, represented by
Elizabeth Marie Treckler -- etreckler@bakerlaw.com -- Baker &
Hostetler LLP & Michael R. Matthias -- mmatthias@bakerlaw.com --
Baker & Hostetler, LLP.


ZILLOW GROUP: Maness Suit Moved to Eastern District of New York
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case, Moshe Maness, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Zillow Group, Inc., the
Defendant, Case No. 513513/2019, was removed from the Supreme Court
of New York County of Kings, to the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York (Brooklyn) on July 26, 2019. The
Eastern District of New York Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-04330 to the proceeding. The suit alleges violation of
Americans with Disabilities Act.

Zillow Group is an online real estate database company that was
founded in 2006, and was created by Rich Barton and Lloyd Frink,
former Microsoft executives and founders of Microsoft spin-off
Expedia, and Spencer Rascoff, a cofounder of Hotwire.com.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

Attorneys for the Defendant are:

          Daniella Adler, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON PC
          900 Third Avenue, 8th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 471-4470
          Facsimile: (212) 898-1201
          E-mail: dadler@littler.com

ZIMMER BIOMET: Class in Karl FLSA Suit Conditionally Certified
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMES KARL, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ZIMMER BIOMET HOLDINGS, INC., a
Delaware corporation; ZIMMER US, INC., a Delaware corporation;
BIOMET U.S. RECONSTRUCTION, LLC, an Indiana limited liability
company; BIOMET BIOLOGICS, LLC, an Indiana limited liability
company; and BIOMET, INC., an Indiana corporation, Defendants, Case
No. C 18-04176 WHA (N.D. Cal.), Judge William Alsup of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California granted the
Plaintiff's motion for conditional certification of an FLSA
collective action and to file under seal.

In August 2015, Karl signed a sales associate agreement with
Defendants Zimmer US; Biomet Reconstruction; and Biomet
Biologicals.  He thereafter began working for those three entities
as a sales representative in California.  Pursuant to the
agreement, the Plaintiff sold medical devices in the surgical field
-- particularly, orthopedics -- such as replacement hips and
surgical tools.  The agreement also classified the Plaintiff as an
independent contractor.  the Pales representatives such as
plaintiff were primarily paid on commission.

Defendant Zimmer Biomet Holdings was formed in June 2015 as a
result of a merger between two previous competitors, Zimmer
Holdings, Inc. and Biomet, Inc.  Zimmer Biomet Holdings is a
holding company and the parent corporation of various subsidiaries,
including the three subsidiary entities the Plaintiff contracted
with.  It did not have any employees or directly contract with
independent contractor sales representatives who sell orthopedic
products.

The subsidiaries of Zimmer Biomet Holdings were responsible for
selling and distributing various product lines (with each
subsidiary selling different products).  These products included
orthopedic reconstructive products, sports medicine, biologics,
extremities, and trauma products, office-based technologies, spine,
craniomaxillofacial and thoracic products, dental implants, and
related surgical products.  The primary customers were surgeons,
other specialists, hospitals, and other health care dealers.

As to the three subsidiary entities the Plaintiff directly
contracted with, Zimmer US engaged Biomet Reconstruction and Biomet
Biologics in designing, manufacturing, and marketing medical
devices and biologics related to knees, hips, sports medicine, foot
and ankle, extremities, and trauma.  These three entities (and
Zimmer Biomet Holdings' subsidiaries generally) used two different
sales models relevant to the action: (1) direct, and (2)
distributor.

Under the direct territory sales model, the Zimmer Biomet Holdings
subsidiaries contracted directly with independent contractor sales
representatives who sold primarily their products.  Under the
distributor sales model, the subsidiary entities contracted with a
third-party distributor -- who owned and operated its independent
business -- who was in turn responsible for all sales within a
geographic territory, including hiring sales representatives.

The Plaintiff filed the instant action in July 2018, alleging that
the Defendants misclassified him and others similarly situated as
independent contractors.  Relevant to the motion, the Plaintiff
seeks to represent other sales representatives who were classified
as independent contractors and allegedly subsequently denied
overtime pay under the FLSA.  

The Plaintiff now moves under Section 216(b) of the FLSA to
conditionally certify a collective action and to disseminate
notice.  His proposed FLSA class is defined as any person who
signed a contract, from three years prior to the date on which
notice is issued to the date on which notice is issued, with Zimmer
Biomet, or any of its subsidiaries, that engages the person as an
independent contractor for the solicitation of sales of Zimmer
Biomet products and/or services in the market segments or product
lines: Orthopedics, S.E.T., Biologics, Reconstructive, Spine, CMF,
Thoracic, Knee, Hip, Foot & Ankle, Sports Medicine, Extremities,
Surgical, Microfixation, Bone Healing, Cement, Trauma.

The Defendants oppose.  They contend that (1) those individuals who
have not contracted with the same entities as plaintiff (i.e.,
Zimmer US, Biomet Reconstruction, and Biomet Biologicals) should be
excluded from the collective; (2) those individuals who contracted
with third-party distributors should be excluded from the
collective; (3) the forum-selection clause narrows the scope of the
collective; and (4) fact-intensive inquiries bar conditional
certification.

Judge Alsup finds that the Plaintiff fails to sufficiently show a
joint employment relationship at this stage.  Nor has the Plaintiff
shown any evidence that the subsidiary entities he contracted with
and those non-party subsidiary entities share operations.

He also finds that the Plaintiff's proposed FLSA class definition
encompasses only those independent contractors who "signed a
contract with with Zimmer Biomet, or any of its subsidiaries"
directly.  This definition thus excludes distributor independent
contractor sales representatives from the putative collective --
whether in connection with Zimmer US, Biomet Reconstruction, and
Biomet Biologics, or other non-party entities (i.e., ZB Spine,
CMF&T, MedTech, and ZB Surgical) -- as they are not similarly
situated to the Plaintiff, who directly contracted with the Zimmer
Biomet Holdings entities and sold within a direct territory.

The Judge also finds that the scope of the forum-selection clause
is ambiguous.  There is a plausible reading of the relevant
forum-selection clause that would bar the FLSA claim from compelled
litigation in Indiana.  As such, the clause will be construed
against the drafter of the agreement.  Accordingly, he order finds
that the forum-selection clause related to restrictive covenants
only, and the Plaintiff may therefore represent the FLSA claim
nationwide for other sales representatives who are similarly
situated.

He further finds that the Plaintiff has advanced more than mere
generalized allegations and shown sufficient similarity with other
sales representatives such that the collective should proceed,
subject to possible decertification in the event that the nightmare
of litigation horrors truly materialize.  The Plaintiff's showing
is sufficient at this early stage in the proceedings to support
conditional certification.   Certification may be revisited at the
second stage as to the proper scope of the FLSA class.

The Defendants also take issue with the Plaintiff's proposed
notice, arguing that it is overbroad and misleading.  They thus
request that if conditional certification is granted, they be given
an opportunity to meet and confer on the proposed notice and then
submit any specific disputes to the Court.  The request is
granted.

Finally, the Plaintiff seeks to file under seal in connection with
the motion for conditional certification sales numbers and/or
revenue for certain products sold by defendants found in Exhibit
17.  Because the information at issue has no bearing on the
Plaintiff's FLSA claim and the Plaintiff's joint employer theory
does not in any way rely on these specific numbers (and thus the
public has no real interest in accessing said information), the
Judge finds compelling reasons to seal.  The motion is therefore
granted.

To the foregoing extent, Judge Alsup granted the Plaintiff's motion
for conditional certification and administrative motion to file
under seal.  The partieswill meet and confer regarding the issue of
notice and jointly submit a proposed notice by July 10 at noon.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 2, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/dVfD0f from Leagle.com.

James Karl, on behalf of himself, and on behalf of a class of
those
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alec Llewellyn
Segarich -- alec.segarich@lrllp.com -- Lohr Ripamonti & Segarich
LLP, Denis S. Kenny -- denis@sfcounsel.com -- Scherer & Smith, LLP
& Jason Shelton Lohr -- jason.lohr@lrllp.com -- Lohr Ripamonti &
Segarich LLP.

Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Zimmer US,
Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Biomet Inc., an Indiana Corporation,
Biomet U.S. Reconstruction, LLC, an Indiana limited liability
company & Biomet Biologics, LLC, an Indiana limited liability
company, Defendants, represented by Eric Meckley --
eric.meckley@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP &
Joseph Raymond Lewis -- joseph.lewis@morganlewis.com -- Morgan
Lewis.


ZUMPER INC: Court Extends Case Deadlines in Gonzalez-Torres
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order extending Case Deadlines in the case
captioned LUIS ARMANDO GONZALEZ-TORRES, Plaintiff, v. ZUMPER, INC.,
Defendant. Case No. 19-cv-02183-PJH. (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Luis Armando Gonzalez-Torres filed an administrative
motion to order discovery, stay initial case deadlines, and extend
his deadline to file an opposition to defendant's motion to compel
arbitration.  

Gonzalez-Torres filed a class-action complaint against Zumper,
stating seven causes of action.   Zumper operates a website that
enables prospective renters to apply for apartment rentals, and
landlords to evaluate prospective tenants. Plaintiff used the
website as a prospective renter looking for an apartment. Plaintiff
alleges that he submitted a rental application using Zumper, and
thereafter Zumper published a report that erroneously associated
him with criminal offenses of another individual. Gonzalez-Torres
alleges that his rental applications were denied, the inaccuracy
was a substantial factor in the denial, and Zumper did not
adequately respond when plaintiff disputed the report.

Whether to Change Case Deadlines

The Plaintiff asks the court to stay initial case deadlines and to
extend his deadline to oppose defendant's motion to compel.

First, plaintiff asks the court to stay the deadlines to exchange
Rule 26(a) initial disclosures, meet and confer on discovery
issues, file a Rule 26(f) report, file a Case Management Statement,
and conduct the Case Management Conference. He asks that those
deadlines be rescheduled only after the court's ruling on Zumper's
motion to compel arbitration. Defendant does not oppose this
request, and the court finds the request reasonable given the
pending motion to compel arbitration.

As such, the above-listed deadlines are STAYED, and will be
rescheduled as necessary following this court's order on
defendant's motion to compel arbitration.

Second, plaintiff asks the court to extend his deadline to oppose
defendant's motion to compel arbitration. If the court does not
grant discovery, plaintiff seeks an August 15, 2019 deadline.

The Defendant does not object to a reasonable extension of time for
Gonzalez-Torres to prepare an opposition brief on any legal issues.
Defendant proposes an extension limited to one week from the
publication of this order.

The Plaintiff shall file his opposition to defendant's motion to
compel arbitration, if any, on or before August 14, 2019.
Defendant's reply brief, if any, shall be filed within seven days
of plaintiff's opposition. The hearing on the motion is rescheduled
to August 28, 2019.

Whether to Order Discovery

Plaintiff includes a request for discovery in his administrative
motion. Plaintiff makes two arguments to support the request.
First, he does not recall being presented with the arbitration
agreement and wants discovery to determine whether a contract
containing an arbitration agreement was ever formed between the
parties. Second, he wants discovery to help him explore whether he
can assert any state-law defenses to the arbitration agreement to
render it unenforceable.

The FAA provides for discovery and a full trial in connection with
a motion to compel arbitration only if the making of the
arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to
perform the same be in issue.

First, plaintiff declares that he does not recall ever being
presented with an agreement containing an arbitration provision,
although he does recall being presented with another agreement at
some point. Notably, plaintiff does not declare that he was never
presented with an arbitration agreement. Because he does not recall
reading the arbitration provision, plaintiff argues that there may
not have been a meeting of the minds with respect to forming an
agreement to arbitrate.

On that basis, plaintiff argues that he is entitled to discovery to
refresh his recollection as to whether or not he was presented with
an arbitration agreement.

Plaintiff could have raised a plausible argument that an agreement
to arbitrate was never formed because he was in fact never
presented with such an agreement. But plaintiff does not make that
argument. Plaintiff's averment that he does not recall being
presented with or reviewing the agreement containing the
arbitration provision is not sufficient to order discovery.  

Second, plaintiff requests discovery to assist his general
exploration of potential state-law contract defenses he may like to
raise. Plaintiff does not identify a particular defense that the
requested discovery would target, much less what factual issues
require discovery to support that defense. The court declines to
grant plaintiff's request for early discovery to conduct what would
essentially amount to a fishing expedition without even a
suggestion of what basis exists in state law to invalidate the
contract, or what facts he hopes to find that might help assert
such a defense.  

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's request for discovery is denied.  The
Plaintiff's request to adjust case deadlines is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 25, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yxtcabut from Leagle.com.

Luis Armando Gonzalez-Torres, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by John Soumilas --
jsoumilas@consumerlawfirm.com -- Francis and Mailman, P.C., pro hac
vice, Justin Michael Baxter -- michael@baxterlaw.com -- pro hac
vice, Samira Ghazal , Law Offices of Samira Ghazal, PA, 1900 SW 3rd
Ave, Miami, Florida 33129, pro hac vice & Erika Angelos Heath ,
Duckworth & Peters LLP, 369 Pine Street, Suite 410, San Francisco,
CA, 94104

Zumper, Inc., Defendant, represented by David Mark Goldstein, Esq.
-- dgoldstein@fbj-law.com -- Farmer Brownstein Jaeger & Goldstein
LLP, John Andrew Shope -- jshope@foleyhoag.com -- Foley Hoag LLP,
pro hac vice, David C. Brownstein -- dbrownstein@fbj-law.com --
Farmer Brownstein Jaeger & Goldstein LLP & Kevin James Conroy --
kconroy@foleyhoag.com -- Foley Hoag LLP, pro hac vice.



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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