CAR_Public/190814.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Wednesday, August 14, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 162

                            Headlines

3M CO: Continues to Defend PFAS Related Class Suit in NJ
3M COMPANY: Drago Sues Over Defective Earplugs
ABERCROMBIE & FITCH: Removes Shaw Case to C.D. California
ADVANCED DRAINAGE: Court Denies Bid to Reconsider Wyche Dismissal
ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PA: Russo Seeks to Certify Class Action

AMAZON.COM: Knipe Suit Transferred to N.D. California
ANADARKO PETROLEUM: Faces Thompson Class Action
ANTHEM LIFE: Court Allows Protective Order in Yost
APEX MIDSTREAM: Santifer Seeks Overtime Wages for Workers
APPLE INC: Hid Device Defects & Battery Issues, Naylor et al. Say

ARC OF FAYETTE COUNTY: Certification of Collective Action Sought
ARK FINANCIAL: Barry Law Sues over Unsolicited Fax Messages
ASV HOLDINGS: Kent Files Suit Over Yanmar Merger Deal
AUTOPARTSPROS LLC: Underpays Drivers, Alvarez Suit Alleges
BANK OF AMERICA: Sharp Sues over Alleged Improper Overdraft Fees

BEAVER DAM COMMUNITY: Hansen Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages, Damages
BET INFORMATION: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Caldwell Suit Says
BIG PICTURE: 4th Cir. Flips Denial of Bid to Dismiss Williams Suit
BLOOMBERG LP: Data Analysts File Suit Over Unpaid Overtime Back pay
BOEING COMPANY: Pilot G Seeks Indemnity over Opportunity Losses

BOUCHERIE LLC: Gabilly Seeks Return of Tip Credit, Unpaid Wages
BRIXMOR PROPERTY: $19.5MM Settlement Balance Released from Escrow
BROCK BEAUTY: Morgan Files ADA Class Action
CALIFORNIA: Court Dismisses J. Austin's Class Claims
CANNTRUST HOLDINGS: Jones Sues Over Share Price Drop

CAPITAL ONE BANK: Labajo Sues Over Data Breach
CAPITAL ONE: Francis Sues Over Failure to Properly Secure PII
CAPITAL ONE: Haque Sues Over Failure to Protect Personal Info
CAPITAL ONE: Tadrous Sues over Data Breach
CARBONITE INC: Luna Suit Hits Share Price Drop

CARDINAL HEALTH: Louisiana Sheriffs' Fund Hits Share Price Drop
CARGILL INC: Court Narrows Claims in Tavares Labor Suit
CARRINGTON MORTGAGE: Court Dismisses MFDCPA Claims in Miller Suit
CELLULAR SALES OF KNOXVILLE: Seeks Arbitration of Deardorff Case
CENIKOR FOUNDATION: Williams Suit Transferred to S.D. Texas

CHEERLEADERS GENTLEMEN'S: Exotic Dancer Sues Over Wages
CONOCOPHILLIPS: Duffy Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
CORELOGIC RENTAL: Court OKs Class Certification in Feliciano
CREDITREPAIR.COM INC: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Forrest Alleges
CURLKIT LLC: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Addo Suit Claims

DAVID NOLAN GALLERY: Picon Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website
DEL TACO: Discovery Ongoing in Former Calif. Employee's Suit
DHALIWAL LABS: Perez et al Sue over Collection of Biometric Data
DOORDASH INC: Faces Arkin Suit over Delivery Tip Policy
EAGLE BANCORP: Glancy Prongay Files Securities Fraud Suit

EAGLE BANCORP: Kahn Swick Files Securities Fraud Suit
EAGLE BANCORP: Kessler Topaz Files Securities Class Action
EAGLE BANCORP: Kirby McInerney Files Securities Fraud Suit
ECIG DISTRIBUTORS: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Gallion Alleges
ENTREVOICE VIRTUAL: Bid for Class Certification Denied

EPIC GAMES: R.A. Suit transferred to E.D. North Carolina
FELIX ENERGY: Evans Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages, Damages
FIGS INC: Torres Files Class Suit in California
GASTRO BAR: Rios Seeks Unpaid Wages for Food Service Workers
GEO GROUP: Underpays Security Personnel, Azpeitia Suit Alleges

GLOCK INC: Melian Sues Over Defective Handguns
GRENNING GALLERY: Picon Asserts Violation under Disabilities Act
HELIX ENERGY: McKnight Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
HOME DEPOT: Moshtagh Sues Over Unpaid Regular, Overtime Wages
HOUND DOGS TOWING: Muncy Sues Over Unpaid Wages

HYUNDAI MOTOR: Court Narrows Claims in Defective Powertrain Suit
IDEANOMICS INC: Howard G. Smith Files Securities Fraud Suit
IDEANOMICS INC: Pomerantz Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
INDOCHINO APPAREL: Freeman Sues Over Deceptive Business Practices
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: 1,500 Suits Filed Hip Resurfacing System

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Agreement in XARELTO(R) Suit Finalized
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: AWP Suits in Illinois and New Jersey Ongoing
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Continues to Defend INVOKANA(R) Related Suits
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Suits Over Ethicon Pelvic Mesh Devices Ongoing
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Talc-Related Class Suit Ongoing in NJ

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: XARELTO Sales Class Suit in Louisiana Ongoing
KIA MOTORS: Baldwin et al Sue over Defective Airbags
LIFESHARE BLOOD: Court Narrows Claims in Trisler FLSA Suit
LITTLE CAESAR: Court Dismisses Ogden Antitrust Suit
LOBBY VENTURES: Morgan Asserts Violation under Disabilities Act

LOS ANGELES, CA: Customers Want $67MM Overcharging Deal Tossed
LYFT INC: More Rape Victims Join Class Action in SLO Court
MACY'S CREDIT: Guardino Suit Asserts TCPA Violation
MADDIES MAYHEM: Sanchez Seeks Overtime Wages for Service Staff
MCDERMOTT INT'L: Class Cert. Bid in Chicago Bridge Suit Pending

MCDERMOTT INT'L: Curti and Stremcha Class Suits Dismissed
MCDERMOTT INT'L: Lead Plaintiff Appointed in Consolidated Suit
MCDERMOTT INT'L: Tentative Settlement Reached in Cantrell Suit
MDL 2472: Warner Chilcott Appeals Cert. Order in Loestrin MDL
MDL 2492: Hutcherson v. NCAA over Health Issues Consolidated

MJ ENTERPRISES: McDaniel Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
MUTH CAPITAL: Fabricant Suit  Asserts TCPA Violation
MYLAN NV: Bid to Dismiss MYL Litigation Recovery Suit Pending
MYLAN NV: Class Cert. in EpiPen(R) Auto-Injector Suit Still Pending
MYLAN NV: Israeli Securities Suit Still Stayed

MYLAN NV: Valsartan-Related Class Suit in New Jersey Ongoing
NETFLIX INC: Faces Class Action, Sept. 20 Lead Plaintiff Deadline
NETFLIX INC: Schall Investigating Claims on Behalf of Investors
NEW BALANCE: $1.4MM Class Settlement in Dashnaw Suit Has Final OK
NEW JERSEY: Ct. Denies Gittens Inmate's Bid to Maintain Class Suit

NEW ORIENTAL: Bid to Dismiss Amended Chan Securities Suit Granted
OMNI FAMILY: Removes Ower Suit to Eastern District of California
PERFORMANCE TRANSPORT: Sonia Seeks Overtime Wages for Workers
PETES TOWING: Nelson Seeks Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
PETROLEO BRASILIERO: Court Denies Cornell's Sect 1782 Discovery Bid

PREMERA BLUE: $74MM Settlement in Data Breach Suit Has Prelim OK
PROGRESSIVE SELECT: Clearview Suit Moved to M.D. Florida
QUICK CHANGE: Tindol Seeks Overtime Wages for Technicians
RESEARCH AMERICA: Byer Files Damasco Bid for Class Certification
RESEARCH AMERICA: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Byer Clinic Says

RUE21 INC: Removes Avila Suit to Eastern District of California
SAFECO INSURANCE: Signor Suit Moved to S.D. Florida
SHEARD-LOMAN: Miranda Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
SIRIUS XM: Sued Over 'Bait and Switch' Advertising Methods
STACKIN INC: Maddux Sues Over Unsolicited Text Messages

STATE FARM: Dismissal of L. Daniels Suit Reversed
TATE & KIRLIN: Key Files Class Suit Under FDPCA
THRIFTY PAYLESS: Cal. Reverses Certification Denial in D. Noel Suit
UCLA: Fails to Protect Women from Heaps' Sexual Misconducts
VECTOR STRUCTURAL: Osorio Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages

WELLPATH LLC: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Barnett Suit Alleges
WELLS FARGO: Bid to Defer Ruling on Bid to Certify Class Granted
ZUORA INC: Schall Law Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit

                            *********

3M CO: Continues to Defend PFAS Related Class Suit in NJ
--------------------------------------------------------
3M Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 26, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to defend a
putative PFAS related class action suit in New Jersey in connection
to the DuPont "Chambers Works" plant.

In New Jersey, 3M is defending one putative class action in federal
court that relates to the DuPont "Chambers Works" plant.

Plaintiffs allege that PFAS compounds from the plant have
contaminated private wells for drinking water.

3M Company operates as a technology company worldwide. The
company's Industrial segment offers tapes, abrasives, adhesives,
ceramics, sealants, specialty materials, purification products,
closure systems, acoustic systems products, automotive components,
abrasion-resistant films, and paint finishing and detailing
products. The company was founded in 1902 and is headquartered in
St. Paul, Minnesota.


3M COMPANY: Drago Sues Over Defective Earplugs
----------------------------------------------
MICHAEL DRAGO, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. 3M COMPANY, and AEARO TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-11663-FDS (D. Mass., Aug. 2, 2019) is
an action on behalf of Plaintiff and all other similarly situated
individuals against Defendants to recover damages for personal
injuries and to enjoin the Defendants' unfair, deceptive and
unlawful practices.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants made false statements to the
United States Government regarding its dangerously defective
dual-ended Combat Arms earplugs. These false statements lead to
Defendants selling Combat Arms earplugs to the U.S. military for
more than a decade. The subject dual-ended Combat Arms earplugs
were standard issue in certain branches of the U.S. military
between 2003 and 2015.

The Defendants falsely promised the Combat Arms earplugs would
protect soldiers' ears from dangerous impulse noises, despite
internal testing which revealed that such promises were false.
Because of the defects, thousands of soldiers have been exposed to
and/or suffered significant hearing loss and tinnitus. The
Defendants statements and practices were nothing short of a
continuing fraud which endangered the health and fitness of Drago
and other U.S. service men and women that lasted more than a
decade, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Drago was a retired Army sergeant of the United States
National Guard In January of 2011.

3M Company was in the business of manufacturing, sale and
distribution of consumer goods throughout the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Kevin J. McCullough, Esq.
     Michael C. Forrest, Esq.
     David J. Relethford, Esq.
     Forrest, LaMothe, Mazow,
     McCullough, Yasi & Yasi, P.C.
     2 Salem Green, Suite 2
     Salem, MA 01970
     Phone: (617) 231-7829
     Fax: (877) 599-8890
     Email: kmccullough@forrestlamothe.com
            mforrest@forrestlamothe.com
            drelethford@forrestlamothe.com


ABERCROMBIE & FITCH: Removes Shaw Case to C.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------
Abercrombie & Fitch Co., Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. and
Hollister Co. removed the case captioned as JASMAINE SHAW, the
Plaintiff, vs. ABERCROMBIE & FITCH CO., an Ohio Corporation,
ABERCROMBIE & FITCH STORES, INC., an Ohio Corporation; HOLLISTER
CO., an Ohio Corporation, and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Case No.
2:19-cv-06642 (Filed May 8, 2019), was removed from the Superior
Court of the State of California, County of Orange, to the United
States District Court for the Central District of California on
July 31. 2019. The Central District of California Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-06642 to the proceeding.

The complaint asserts that Defendants failed to pay wages including
overtime, failed to provide meal periods, failed to provide rest
periods as required by the as required by the California Labor
Code.[BN]

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          Emily T. Patajo, Esq.
          Rachael Lavi, Esq.
          Cassidy C. Veal, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          2049 Century Park East, 5th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90067.3107
          Telephone: 310 553 0308
          Facsimile: 310 553 5583
          E-mail: epatajo@littler.com
                  rlavi@littler.com
                  cveal@littler.com

ADVANCED DRAINAGE: Court Denies Bid to Reconsider Wyche Dismissal
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTOPHER WYCHE, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ADVANCED DRAINAGE SYSTEMS,
INC., JOSEPH A. CHLAPATY, and MARK B. STURGEON, Defendants, Case
No. 15 Civ. 5955 (KPF) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Katherine Polk Failla of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
denied the Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration under Rule
60(b)(2).

The Plaintiff brought a class action lawsuit on behalf of
purchasers of securities issued by ADS during the period from July
25, 2014, through March 29, 2016.  Broadly, he alleged that the
Defendants violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, in
financial statements issued in conjunction with the Company's
Initial Public Offering and during the months thereafter.

The Court found that Plaintiff had failed adequately to allege that
the Defendants acted with scienter, an element of both the Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims.  The Plaintiff's Section 20(a) claim
was also dismissed in light of his failure to plead a primary
violation under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.  Thus, the Court
dismissed the Plaintiff's class action lawsuit with prejudice on
March 10, 2017.  The Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on March
13, 2017.

The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal by summary order issued
on Oct. 13, 2017.  Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed a motion for
panel rehearing and, in the alternative, for rehearing en banc.
The motion was denied by the Circuit by order dated Nov. 28, 2017.
Approximately one week later, the Second Circuit issued the mandate
returning the case to the Court on Dec. 7, 2017.

In July 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission entered a
cease-and-desist order against Defendants ADS and Sturgeon.  The
SEC Order included a findings of fact section, in which the SEC
made multiple findings regarding Sturgeon's conduct at ADS that led
the SEC to conclude that Sturgeon had "willfully violated" the
federal securities laws.  ADS and Sturgeon neither admitted nor
denied the findings contained within the SEC Order.

Four months after publication of the SEC Order, on Nov. 27, 2018,
the Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2) and for leave to file a second amended
complaint under Rule 15(a).

The Defendants filed a joint memorandum of law in opposition on
Dec. 28, 2018.  The Plaintiff filed his reply on Jan. 8, 2019.

The Plaintiff claims that the SEC Order contains new facts that
could not have been discovered until the Order was made public.
According to him, these facts directly support his allegations that
the Defendants acted with scienter.  Had he known these facts at
the time the Amended Complaint was filed, the Plaintiff says, he
could have alleged with sufficient particularity that the
Defendants acted with scienter, allowing the suit to survive
Defendants' motion to dismiss.  The Plaintiff thus requests Rule
60(b)(2) relief from the Court's grant of the motion to dismiss,
and leave to file a second amended complaint.

Judge Failla holds that she need not decide whether the evidence
the Plaintiff identifies would merit Rule 60(b)(2) relief, because
the Plaintiff's motion is untimely.  To review, Rule 60(b)(2)
relief is only available if the motion was (i) filed within one
year of the entry of final judgment it seeks to have reconsidered;
and (ii) filed within a "reasonable time."  As set forth in the
remainder of her Opinion, the Judge concludes that Plaintiff's
motion satisfies neither prong.

For the reasons outlined, she denied the Plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration under Rule 60(b)(2).  The Clerk of Court is
directed to terminate the motion pending at docket entry 68.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 3, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/bEQq77 from Leagle.com.

Christopher Wyche, on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Jacob A. Goldberg --
jgoldberg@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A., Keith Robert,
The Rosen Law Firm, P.A. & Phillip C. Kim, The Rosen Law Firm P.A.

Christopher Wyche, individually, Plaintiff, represented by Phillip
C. Kim, The Rosen Law Firm P.A.

Advanced Drainage Systems, Inc., Defendant, represented by Victor
Genecin -- victor.genecin@squiresanders.com -- Squire Patton Boggs
(US) L.L.P., David W. Alexander, Squire Patton Boggs (US) L.L.P.,
Joseph C. Weinstein, Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP & Sean Logan
McGrane, Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP.

Joseph A Chlapaty, Defendant, represented by Robert Allen Scher --
rscher@foley.com -- Foley & Lardner, LLP & Bryan B. House, Foley &
Lardner.

Mark B Sturgeon, Defendant, represented by Peter Joseph Pizzi --
ppizzi@walsh.law -- Walsh Pizzi O'Reilly Falanga LLP, Roger P.
Sugarman, Kegler, Brown, Hill Ritter & Selina Miriam Ellis, Walsh
Pizzi O'Reilly Falanga LLP.


ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PA: Russo Seeks to Certify Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as LEO RUSSO, both individually
and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. THE COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY, the Defendant, Case No.
2:18-cv-00097-MRH (W.D. Pa.), the Plaintiff filed a motion for
preliminary injunction and to certify the case as a class action
pursuant to federal rule of Civil Procedure 23.

Allegheny County is a county in the southwest of the U.S. state of
Pennsylvania.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          D. Aaron Rihn, Esq.
          ROBERT PEIRCE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          707 Grant Street, Suite 125
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219-1918
          Telephone: 412-281-7229
          Facsimile: 412-281-4229
          E-mail: arihn@peircelaw.com

               - and -

          Elmer Robert Keach, III, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF ELMER ROBERT KEACH, III
          One Pine West Plaza, Suite 109
          Albany, NY 12205
          Telephone: 518 434 1718
          E-mail: Bobkeach@keachlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Nicholas Migliaccio, Esq.
          MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD, LLP
          412 H Street, NE, Suite 302
          Washington, DC 20002
          Telephone: 202 470 3520
          E-mail: Nmigliaccio@classlawdc.com

AMAZON.COM: Knipe Suit Transferred to N.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------
PERSIS KNIPE, an individual, on behalf of herself, on behalf of all
persons similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. AMAZON.COM, INC., a
Corporation; AMAZON LOGISTICS, INC., a Corporation; and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. 3:17-cv-01889
(Filed Oct 17, 2017), was transferred from the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of California, to U.S. District Court for
Northern District of California (San Francisco) on July 31, 2019.
The Northern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:19-cv-04376-JCS to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Joseph C. Spero.

The lawsuit is brought on behalf of Delivery Drivers who worked for
Defendants in California and were classified as independent
contractors, in order to collect the wages due them as employees of
Defendant, the cost of the employer's share of payments to the
federal and state governments for income taxes, social security
taxes, medicare insurance, unemployment insurance and payments for
workers' compensation insurance, plus penalties and interest.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Norman B. Blumenthal, Esq.
          Ricardo Ramon Ehmann, Esq.
          Aparajit Bhowmik, Esq.
          Ruchira Piya Mukherjee, Esq.
          Victoria Bree Rivapalacio, Esq.
          Blumenthal Nordrehaug Bhowmik De Blouw LLP
          2255 Calle Clara
          La Jolla, CA 92037
          Telephone: (858) 551-1223 x127
          Facsimile: (858) 551-1232
          E-mail: norm@bamlawlj.com
                  rico@bamlawca.com
                  aj@bamlawlj.com
                  piya@bamlawlj.com
                  victoria@bamlawca.com

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          Brian D. Fahy, Esq.
          John Spivey Battenfeld, Esq.
          Max C Fischer, Esq.
          Amy Alyssa McGeever, Esq.
          Andrea Fellion, Esq.
          Robin Marie Lagorio, Esq.
          MORGAN LEWIS AND BOCKIUS
          300 South Grand Avenue, 22nd Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 612-2500
          Facsimile: (213) 612-2501
          E-mail: brian.fahy@morganlewis.com
                  jbattenfeld@morganlewis.com
                  max.fischer@morganlewis.com
                  amy.mcgeever@morganlewis.com
                  andrea.fellion@morganlewis.com
                  robin.lagorio@morganlewis.com

               - and -

          Theresa Mak, Esq.
          GBG LLP
          601 Montgomery Street, Suite 1150
          San Francisco, CA 94111-4615
          Telephone: (415) 603-5000
          Facsimile: (415) 840-7210
          E-mail: theresamak@gbgllp.com

ANADARKO PETROLEUM: Faces Thompson Class Action
-----------------------------------------------
Anadarko Petroleum Corporation said in its Form 8-K filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filed on July 29, 2019,
that the company has been named as a defendant in a class action
suit entitled, John Thompson v. Anadarko Petroleum Corporation et
al.

A proposed acquisition of Anadarko Petroleum Corporation
("Anadarko") by Occidental Petroleum Corporation
(“Occidental”). Subject to the terms and conditions of the
Agreement and Plan of Merger (the "Merger Agreement"), dated as of
May 9, 2019, by and among Anadarko, Occidental and Baseball Merger
Sub 1, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Occidental ("Merger
Sub"), Merger Sub will merge with and into Anadarko (the "Merger"),
with Anadarko surviving and continuing as the surviving corporation
in the Merger and a wholly owned subsidiary of Occidental.

In connection with the Merger Agreement and the transactions
contemplated thereby, a putative class action lawsuit was filed on
behalf of Anadarko stockholders in the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware.

The lawsuit is captioned John Thompson v. Anadarko Petroleum
Corporation et al., Case 1:19-cv-01368 (filed July 23, 2019).

In general, the complaint asserts claims against Anadarko and
Anadarko's board of directors, alleging, among other things, that
the defendants failed to make adequate disclosures in Anadarko's
proxy statement relating to the Merger (in its definitive form, the
"Proxy Statement"). Anadarko believes that the allegations in the
complaint are without merit.

While Anadarko believes that the disclosures set forth in the Proxy
Statement comply fully with applicable law, to moot plaintiffs’
disclosure claims, to avoid nuisance, potential expense and delay,
and to provide additional information to Anadarko's stockholders,
Anadarko has determined to voluntarily supplement the Proxy
Statement.

A copy of the supplemental disclosure is available at
https://urlzs.com/umxrj.

Anadarko Petroleum Corporation (Anadarko), incorporated on June 12,
1985, is an independent exploration and production company. The
Company is engaged in developing, acquiring, and exploring for oil
and natural-gas resources. The company is based in The Woodlands,
Texas.


ANTHEM LIFE: Court Allows Protective Order in Yost
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum Opinion granting in part and
denying in part Defendant's Motion for Protective Order in the case
captioned ERIC YOST, individually and on behalf of a class of
similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. ANTHEM LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, Defendant. No. 3:16-CV-00079. (M.D. Pa.).

The Complaint alleged three counts. In Count I, Plaintiff sought a
declaratory judgment that Defendant may not obtain reimbursement,
or assert a right of subrogation against the proceeds of personal
injury settlements or verdicts, on motor vehicle claims in
accordance with Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial
Responsibility Law (MVFRL). Count II of the Complaint asserted a
claim for unjust enrichment. In Count III, Plaintiff brought a
claim for bad faith.

The Defendant states that it seeks a protective order in connection
with a series of Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) deposition notices issued
by the Plaintiff that seek impermissibly to intrude on the
attorney-client privilege and constitute impermissible attempts at
second corporate representative depositions of the same party on
the same topics without good cause or court permission.

The Defendant posits that the August 10, 2018, notices are not
limited to the subject of Plaintiff's fiduciary duty/conflict of
interest claim and seek to revisit the same subject matter that
Plaintiff should have explored at the June 14, 2018, deposition,
i.e., Defendant's search for, identification of, and production of
documents.  

As required by Rule 7.8(a) of the Middle District of Pennsylvania
Rules of Court, Defendant provides a Statement of Questions
Involved:

   1. Should the Court issue a protective order forbidding
Plaintiff from deposing Anthem Life pursuant to the Plan Attorney
Notice of Deposition where Topics 1 and 3 of the notice seek to
impermissibly invade the attorney-client privilege and where the
discovery previously produced demonstrates there were no
communications satisfying Topic 2?

   2. Should the Court issue a protective order forbidding
Plaintiff from deposing Anthem Life pursuant to Topic 5 of the
Patton 1 Notice of Deposition to the extent it inquires about
Plaintiff's first requests for production of documents?.

   3. Should the Court issue a protective order forbidding
Plaintiff from deposing Anthem Life pursuant to the Patton 2 Notice
of Deposition where the notice seeks to impermissibly re-depose
Anthem Life on the same topics that were noted as the subject
matter of the June 14, 2018 Rule 30(b)(6) deposition?

   4. Should the Court issue a protective order forbidding
Plaintiff from deposing Anthem Life pursuant to Topic 1 of the
Pruitt Notice of Deposition to the extent it inquires about
Paragraphs 11 through 15 of the Declaration of M. Catherine
Pruitt?

   5. Should the Court issue a protective order forbidding
Plaintiff from deposing Anthem Life pursuant to Topic 2 of the
Pruitt Notice of Deposition where the topic seeks to impermissibly
re-depose Anthem Life on a topic on which Anthem Life was already
deposed on June 14, 2018?

The Defendant asserts as a preliminary matter that no party should
be able to take the deposition of any given deponent more than once
pursuant to Rule 30(a)(2)(A)(ii). However, Defendant's agreement to
be deposed on the issue of fiduciary duty indicates that leave of
court was not required for the deposition to which Defendant
agreed. Given that Plaintiff did not counter Defendant's statement
of facts, Defendant's agreement to be deposed was limited to
fiduciary duty topics.

Although Plaintiff did not seek leave of court to depose Plaintiff
on any other topic before serving the August 10, 2018, deposition
notices, the analysis of the proper scope of Defendant's second
deposition does not end with Defendant's agreement to be deposed on
fiduciary duty matters for the reasons discussed below.

In the course of informal presentation and consideration of
discovery matters, by Order of August 16, 2018, the Court directed
Defendant to designate a representative or representatives to
testify at the noticed depositions. The Court did not limit the
subject matter of the deposition(s) or address the topics
identified in Plaintiff's August 10, 2018, Notices.

The Court directed the parties to address any related dispute by
way of formal motion (id. at 4) and Defendant has done so. As noted
in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. New Horizont, Inc., 254 F.R.D.
227 (E.D. Pa. 2008), leave is not required to conduct a second Rule
30(b)(6) deposition which is ordered by the court. Id. at 235 n.7.
Because the Court ordered the deposition(s) now at issue (Doc. 81
at 4-5), in the unique circumstances presented here, Plaintiff has
not run afoul of the requirements of Rule 30(a)(2)(A)(ii).

The Court will therefore address the questions presented by
Defendant. However, the Court need not address whether to issue a
protective order forbidding Plaintiff from deposing Anthem Life
pursuant to the Patton 2 Notice of Deposition because Plaintiff has
withdrawn that Notice of Deposition due to Patton's retirement.

Before undertaking consideration of the remaining questions
involved, the Court notes that the designations of the remaining
August 10, 2018, notices as `Plan Attorney Notice of Deposition,
Patton 1 Notice of Deposition and Pruitt' Notice of Deposition do
not seek the deposition of specific individuals but leave Defendant
to designate a representative.

Plan Attorney Notice of Deposition

Defendant asserts that it is not properly deposed on any of the
topics for testimony identified in the Plan Attorney deposition
notice which seeks information regarding the following:

1. Communications or documents regarding the administration of the
Plan concerning subrogation shared between the Plan, its
administrators, trustees, or other fiduciaries, and any attorney
assisting in the administration of the Plan, prior to the outset of
the instant litigation.

2. Any and all communications to beneficiaries of the Plan from any
attorney assisting in the administration of the Plan concerning
subrogation.3. Advice relating to [l]egal compliance, alternatives,
or strategy regarding the operation of the plan insured by Anthem
Life.

Topics 1 and 3

Defendant first argues that topics 1 and 3 seek to invade the
attorney client privilege by seeking to discover communications
between Defendant's employed attorneys and those involved in the
administration of the Plan.  

Noting that Plaintiff has argued that the fiduciary exception to
the attorney-client privilege provides a basis to invade the
privilege in the circumstances presented here, Defendant maintains
that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held otherwise in Wachtel
v. Health Net, Inc., 482 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2007).  

In considering the scope of the fiduciary duty exception under
ERISA, Wachtel first looked at early cases which applied the
exception and concluded that the exception might not apply in every
fiduciary situation; where it had been found applicable, the ERISA
fiduciaries at issue had strong parallels to trustees, were
actually trustees, or were plan sponsors.

Based on this language and Wachtel's historical analysis, the
distinction between trustees, plan sponsors, and plan
administrators on the one hand and insurance company fiduciaries
such as the defendant in the case on the other is an important one
in that Wachtel ultimately decided that the latter was not subject
to the fiduciary exception to the attorney client privilege. In
drawing a distinction between the two groups, Wachtel noted two
significant differences between the groups: the identity of the
entity for whom the legal advice is given and the fiduciary's duty
of disclosure.  

Regarding the identity of the client, Wachtel identified four
relevant factors: unity of ownership and management, conflicting
interests regarding profits, conflicting fiduciary obligations, and
payment of counsel with the fiduciary's own funds. Based on
consideration of these factors, the Circuit Court concluded that an
insurer which sells insurance contracts to ERISA-regulated benefit
plans is itself the sole and direct client of counsel retained by
the insurer, not the mere representative of client-beneficiaries,
and not a joint client with its beneficiaries. The Circuit Court
added that if the insurer's counsel were to also represent the
beneficiaries who seek to maximize their benefit payments, that
counsel would face a direct conflict of interest under any standard
of legal ethics. It would be odd indeed if ERISA were to force
lawyers into precisely this conflicted role.

Within this legal framework, the question of whether Defendant is
entitled to invoke the attorney client privilege to preclude
Plaintiff from deposing Defendant on topics 1 and 3 in the Plan
Attorney Deposition Notice depends on whether Defendant is a plan
administrator who would not be exempt from disclosure under Wachtel
or an insurer who is the type of ERISA fiduciary to whom the
fiduciary exception to the attorney client privilege would not
apply. This distinction presents a threshold issue of whether
Defendant is the plan administrator rather than a limited-purpose
fiduciary.

Defendant argues that Wachtel is dispositive and is fatal to
Plaintiff's argument that he is entitled to the information sought
with the Plan Attorney Deposition Notice under the fiduciary
exception. Among his arguments, Plaintiff asserts that distinctions
between this case and Wachtel dictate a different result: neither
Health Net nor any of its subsidiaries were plan administrators for
any of the plaintiffs' benefit plans. Nor did the plaintiff in
Wachtel allege that Health Net had breached its fiduciary duty of
loyalty it owed to the plaintiff.

Evidence shows that the Short Term Disability Plan (Plan) at issue
does not designate an administrator or contain a definition of
administrator or plan administrator. The definitional section of
the plan defines Plan Sponsor as the employer or other organization
that has entered into an agreement with Us as outlined in the
Policy. Us means the insurer, Anthem Life Insurance Company.  

With this documentary evidence, the Court concludes that Defendant
was not the plan administrator, as that term is statutorily defined
for ERISA purposes, for the Plan at issue. Therefore, the Court
will proceed with an analysis of the factors set out in Wachtel.

As in Wachtel where the defendant had interests larger and distinct
from those of its beneficiaries, here Defendant sells insurance to
multiple employee benefit plans and, therefore has conflicting
fiduciary obligations.

Finally, Defendant satisfies the fourth factor which considers
whether the insurer pays for legal services using its own assets
rather than those of their beneficiaries, because when legal advice
is needed regarding benefit determinations under insured plans,
Anthem Life pays the cost of that legal service; it is not paid by
or back-charged to the benefit plans.

Having satisfied these four factors, pursuant to Wachtel, Defendant
is itself the sole and direct client of counsel retained by the
Defendant.

Considering Defendant's status pursuant to the duty of disclosure,
Defendant is not the plan administrator or trustee of the Plan at
issue or for any of the plans it insures. Although Defendant and
its affiliates carry out administrative functions regarding the
review of claims and award of benefits as did the defendant in
Wachtel, 482 F.3d at 227, those functions do not transform its
legal status regarding its duty of disclosure because Defendant
does not operate as a trustee.  

Thus, within the relevant legal framework, although Defendant had
fiduciary obligations toward the beneficiaries of the Plan, it did
not have a trustee's duty of disclosure toward Plaintiff.

Finding no basis to distinguish Wachtel, the Court finds that the
fiduciary exception to the attorney client privilege does not apply
and Defendant's motion is granted as to topics 1 and 3 of the Plan
Attorney Notice of Deposition. With this determination, the Court
emphasizes it is not stating that Defendant does not have fiduciary
responsibilities to beneficiaries of the Plan. Rather, the Court
concludes that Wachtel makes clear that Defendant's fiduciary
responsibilities do not compel application of the fiduciary
exception where information traditionally consistent with the
attorney client privilege is sought.

Topic 2

Defendant asserts that Beebe's Declaration shows there are no
communications regarding communications to beneficiaries of the
Plan from any attorney assisting in the administration of the Plan
concerning subrogation and therefore, Defendant should not be
required to produce a witness about non-existent communications.
Plaintiff does not dispute this assertion in his responsive brief.


Beebe provided the following information in his Declaration:
between January 1, 2010 and August 23, 2016, he was the only
attorney who would have provided the information sought, he would
have made a notation regarding any such communication, and he has
reviewed claims files and there were no notations of any such
discussions.

Based on Beebe's Declaration and Plaintiff's lack of response to
Defendant's argument, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has been
provided a response to his request for the information sought in
Topic 2 in that Beebe's declaration establishes that no such
information exists. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 26(b)(2)(C),
Plaintiff is not entitled to depose Defendant on the matter
requested.

Having found that Plaintiff is not entitled to depose Defendant on
any of the matters identified in the August 10, 2018, Plan Attorney
Notice of Deposition, the Court concludes that Defendant Anthem
Life Insurance Company's Motion for Protective Order as to this
deposition is properly granted.

Patton 1 Notice of Deposition

Defendant seeks to partially preclude deposition on the matters
identified in Topic 5 of what has been identified as the Patton
1Notice of Deposition which requests that Defendant designate a
person for oral examination concerning the documents identified in
Plaintiff's First Demand for Production of Documents Directed to
Defendant' and `Plaintiff's Second Demand for Document.

Defendant asserts that the first half of Topic 5 seeks the same
discovery as noticed in the original Rule 30(b)(6) notice of
deposition for which it produced a witness on June 14, 2018.  

As relates to the limitation sought regarding deposition concerning
Plaintiff's first demand for production of documents, the
deposition testimony is to be limited if it is cumulative,
duplicative, if Plaintiff had ample opportunity to obtain the
information, or if it is outside the scope of Rule 26(b)(1).   

While it appears that Plaintiff had ample opportunity to obtain
information regarding his first demand for production of documents,
rather than grant Defendant's motion as to this aspect of Topic 5,
the Court will deny the motion and caution Plaintiff that strict
adherence to the commands of Rule 26 are expected. Should issues
arise during the deposition, the Court will be available to rule on
whether Plaintiff is seeking testimony regarding matters outside
the scope of that allowed by Rule 26.

Pruitt Notice of Deposition

For the reasons discussed regarding the Patton 1 Notice of
Deposition, the Court will deny Defendant Anthem Life Insurance
Company's Motion for Protective Order. The Court does so with the
same cautionary notice to Plaintiff and the assurance of the
Court's availability to resolve disputed matters at the time of the
deposition.

As discussed previously, the Court is guided by the fundamental
maxim that restrictions on the free exchange of information should
be the exception to disclosure of evidence and the broad scope of
discovery in general. The procedural history of this case has been
a winding road marked by filings and disputes which have hindered
the orderly progress of the litigation. By allowing the deposition
topics in the Pruitt' Notice of Deposition, the Court seeks to move
this case toward a long-overdue resolution with matters relevant to
that resolution adequately disclosed.

Accordingly, Defendant Anthem Life Insurance Company's Motion for
Protective Order will be granted in part and denied in part. The
Motion will be granted as to the Plan Attorney Notice of Deposition
the Motion will be denied as to the Patton 1 Notice of Deposition
and the Pruitt' Notice of Deposition.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 29, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3mrda3b from
Leagle.com.

Eric Yost, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff, represented by Charles
Kannebecker, Weinstein Schneider Kannebecker & Lokuta, 104 West
High Street, Milford, PA 18337 & James C. Haggerty --
jhaggerty@hgsklawyers.com -- Haggerty, Goldberg, Schleifer &
Kupersmith.

Anthem Life Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by Dan J.
Hofmeister, Jr. -- dhofmeister@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP,
Douglas R. Widin -- dwidin@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP, John N.
Ellison -- jellison@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP & Miranda A.
Jannuzzi -- mjannuzzi@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP.


APEX MIDSTREAM: Santifer Seeks Overtime Wages for Workers
---------------------------------------------------------
RICKY SANTIFER, Individually and For Others Similarly Situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. APEX MIDSTREAM INSPECTION, LLC, the Defendant, Case
No. 5:19-cv-00696-SLP (w.D. Okla, July 31, 2019), seeks to recover
unpaid overtime wages and other damages from Defendant under the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, Santifer and the Putative Class Members
regularly work more than 40 hours a week. But Apex pays these
workers a flat amount for each day worked without
overtime compensation. Apex never pays Santifer a guaranteed
salary. Apex's day rate pay plan violates the overtime requirements
of the FLSA.

Apex offers next generation services for midstream construction
projects.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          Taylor A. Jones, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: 713 352 1100
          Facsimile: 713 352 3300
          E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  adunlap@mybackwages.com
                  tjones@mybackwages.com

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: 713 877-8788
          Facsimile: 713 877-8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com

APPLE INC: Hid Device Defects & Battery Issues, Naylor et al. Say
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ZOE NAYLOR, HANNAH STRATTON, ERICA DILLARD, KIMBERLY BROWN, GERALD
TIANO, RONALD HAWKINS, KENNETH WOOLSEY, FREDRICK CHRISTENSEN,
LAUREN LONG, JEANETTE TAYLOR, LAURA CARLO, ROBYN LIPETZ, JAMES
KILE, HAYLEY GOLDFELD, AMY NORMAN, TIM MORGAN, SHEMINA GHEEWALLA,
and YUICHI MURAKAMI, the Plaintiffs, vs. APPLE INC., the Defendant,
Case No. 5:19-cv-04421 (N.D. Cal., July 31, 2019), alleges that
Apple designed, manufactured, advertised, promoted, and sold
iDevices that it knew contained Defects or Battery Issues, and
withheld that information from consumers or purposefully
misrepresented the Devices to consumers.

The Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated are consumers who
purchased, owned, used, or leased one or more of Apple's Devices.
The Apple's Devices include Apple iPhone 6, 6s, 6 Plus, 6s Plus,
SE, 7, and 7 Plus.

In 2017, Apple installed software updates on the Devices to gather
additional diagnostic data. Based in part on that diagnostic data,
on January 23, 2017, Apple released a software update, known as iOS
10.2.1. Apple told consumers that the update was to fix "bugs" or
improve "security" on the Devices and a month later, Apple publicly
disclosed that the software update had largely addressed the
shutdown problem.

Missing from these statements to consumers or to the tech press was
the true purpose of the software update -- to conceal a much larger
defect than the public knew -- namely, there was a mismatch between
the Devices' hardware, including their processing chips and
rechargeable lithium-ion batteries, and the ever-increasing demands
placed on the Devices via Apple's constantly-updating iOS software
platform. This mismatch is referred to as the "Defect(s)." And the
software update did not "fix" or "cure" the Defect—it instead
concealed it by secretly throttling the Devices' performance to
reduce the number of unexpected shutdowns to a more manageable
volume. Apple partially "cured" one defect by making another defect
more aggressive -- accomplished by violating federal computer fraud
laws and a host of various state laws. For 11 months, the secret
remained uncovered as Apple continued to hide the whole truth.

Apple's throttling did not stop at iOS 10.2.1. On December 2, 2017,
another set of throttling code was inserted in iOS 11.2 2 , but
Apple again told consumers the update was primarily
to fix "bugs" and provide "improvements." Apple did not reveal the
Defects, the lawsuit says.

Apple Inc. is an American multinational technology company
headquartered in Cupertino, California, that designs, develops, and
sells consumer electronics, computer software, and online services.
It is considered one of the Big Four tech companies along with
Amazon, Google, and Facebook.[BN]

Attorneys for Zoe Naylor:

          Rosemary M. Rivas, Esq.
          Rosanne L. Mah, Esq.
          LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP
          44 Montgomery Street, Suite 650
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 373-1671
          Facsimile: (415) 484-1294
          E-mail: rrivas@zlk.com
                  rmah@zlk.com

Attorneys for Jeanette Taylor, Erica Dillard, Kimberly Brown,
Robyn Lipetz. Ronald Hawkins, and Amy Norman:

          Daniel C. Levin, Esq.
          510 Walnut Street, Suite 500
          Philadelphia, PA 19106-3697
          Telephone: (877) 882-1011
          Facsimile: (215) 592-4663

Attorneys for Hannah Stratton:

          James Vlahakis, Esq.
          SULAIMAN LAW GROUP
          2500 South Highland Ave, Suite 200
          Lombard, IL 60148
          Telephone: (312) 313-1613

Counsel for Shemina Gheewalla are:

          Kathleen Herkenhoff, Esq.
          HAEGGQUIST & ECK, LLP
          225 Broadway, Suite 2050
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 342-8000
          Facsimile: (619) 342-7878

Counsel for Kenneth Woolsey, Laura Carlo, Hayley Goldfeld are:

          Melissa R. Emert, Esq.
          STULL STULL & BRODY
          6 East 45 th Street
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (954) 341-5561
          Facsimile: (954) 341-5531

Counsel for Gerald Tiano are:

          Joshua Harris Eggnatz, Esq.
          EGGNATZ PASCUCCI, P.A.
          5400 University Drive, Suite 417
          Davie, FL 33328
          Telephone: 954-889-3359
          Facsimile: 954-889-5913

Counsel for James Kile are:

          Bradford B. Lear, Esq.
          LEAR & WERTS, LLP
          2003 W. Broadway, Ste. 107
          Columbia, MO 65203
          Telephone: (573) 875-1991
          Facsimile: (573) 875-1985

Counsel for Timothy Morgan are:

          Derek G. Howard, Esq.
          DEREK G. HOWARD LAW FIRM, INC.
          42 Miller Avenue
          Mill Valley, CA 94941
          Telephone: 415 432-7192
          Facsimile: 415-524-2419

Counsel for Fredrick Christensen and Lauren Long are:

          David J. Stone, Esq.
          BRAGAR EAGEL & SQUIRE, P.C.
          885 Third Avenue, Suite 3040
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: 212 308 1704

Counsel for Yuichi Murakami are:

          Kyle J. McGee, Esq.
          GRANT & EISENHOFER. PV
          123 Justison Street, 7th Floor
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: 302 622 7000

ARC OF FAYETTE COUNTY: Certification of Collective Action Sought
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as JESSE LYNN and BELINDA
DARNELL, on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated
employees, the Plaintiffs, vs. ARC OF FAYETTE COUNTY and FAYETTE
COUNTY BEHAVIORAL HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, the Defendants, Case No.
2:17-cv-00474-MRH-LPL (W.D. Pa., Filed April 23, 2017), the
Plaintiffs asks the Court for an order granting their motion for
conditional certification of collective action.

The Plaintiffs filed the action against ARC alleging that they were
owed statutorily required wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act

All of the putative class members were subject to the same policies
concerning unpaid time and unpaid overtime. Moreover, all putative
class members were subject to the same unilateral job action on
September 12, 2014 at which time the employer declared them to be
"independent contractors".[CC]

Counsel for the Plaintiffs and Class are:

          Joseph E. Fieschko, Jr., Esq.
          436 Seventh Avenue, Suite 2230
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: 412 281-2204
          E-mail: joe@fieschko.com

               - and -

          John R. Linkosky, Esq.
          715 Washington Avenue
          Carnegie, PA 15106
          Telephone: 412-278-1289
          E-mail: linklaw@comcast.net

ARK FINANCIAL: Barry Law Sues over Unsolicited Fax Messages
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Barry Law Office, Ltd, on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Ark Financial LLC, the
Defendant, Case No. 0:19-cv-02037 (D. Minn., July 31, 2019),
contends that the Defendant promotes and markets its merchandise,
in part, by sending unsolicited fax messages, in violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act as amended by the Junk Fax
Prevention Act of 2005.

Beginning in January 2019 and throughout the month of June 2019,
the Defendant repeatedly transmitted, or caused to be transmitted,
by telephone facsimile machine unsolicited fax advertisements that
were received by Plaintiff.

The Defendant willfully and knowingly violated the TCPA by sending
these facsimiles, as evidenced by the fact that it utilized caller
ID spoofing and continually changed its telephone number
information to thwart automated number blocking systems that might
attempt to block these Junk Faxes.

The Plaintiff had not invited or given permission to Defendant to
send the Junk Fax. The Plaintiff does not have an established
business relationship with Defendant, the lawsuit says. [BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff is:

          Thomas J. Lyons, Jr., Esq.
          CONSUMER JUSTICE CENTER, P.A.
          367 Commerce Court
          Vadnais Heights, MN 55127
          Telephone: (651) 770-9707
          Facsimile: (651) 704-0907
          E-mail: tommy@consumerjusticecenter.com

ASV HOLDINGS: Kent Files Suit Over Yanmar Merger Deal
-----------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL KENT, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. ASV HOLDINGS, INC., ANDREW M. ROOKE, BRIAN
J. HENRY, MICHAEL A. LISI, JOSEPH M. NOWICKI, and DAVID ROONEY,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01450-UNA (D. Del., Aug. 1, 2019) is
an action stemming from a proposed transaction announced on June
27, 2019, pursuant to which ASV Holdings, Inc. ("ASV" or the
"Company") will be acquired by Yanmar America Corporation, Osaka
Merger Sub, Inc., and Yanmar Co, Ltd. (together, "Yanmar").

On June 26, 2019, ASV's Board of Directors caused the Company to
enter into an agreement and plan of merger (the "Merger Agreement")
with Yanmar. Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, ASV's
stockholders will receive $7.05 in cash for each share of ASV
common stock they own. On July 30, 2019, defendants filed a proxy
statement with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
(the "SEC") in connection with the Proposed Transaction, which
scheduled a stockholder vote on the Proposed Transaction for
September 4, 2019.

The complaint alleges that the Proxy Statement omits material
information with respect to the Proposed Transaction, which renders
the Proxy Statement false and misleading. Accordingly, Plaintiff
alleges that the Defendants violated Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with the Proxy
Statement.

Plaintiff is the owner of ASV common stock.

ASV is a designer and manufacturer of compact construction
equipment.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Seth D. Rigrodsky, Esq.
     Brian D. Long, Esq.
     Gina M. Serra, Esq.
     RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
     300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
     Wilmington, DE 19801
     Phone: (302) 295-5310
     Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
     Email: sdr@rl-legal.com
            bdl@rl-legal.com
            gms@rl-legal.com

          - and -

     Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
     RM LAW, P.C.
     1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
     Berwyn, PA 19312
     Phone: (484) 324-6800
     Facsimile: (484) 631-1305


AUTOPARTSPROS LLC: Underpays Drivers, Alvarez Suit Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------
GUSTAVO ALVAREZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. AUTOPARTSPROS, LLC; GENUINE PARTS COMPANY;
and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
37-2019-00039872-CU-OE-CTL (Cal. Super., San Diego Cty., July 31,
2019) is an action against the Defendants for unpaid regular hours,
overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for missed meal and rest
periods.

The Plaintiff Alvarez was employed by the Defendants as driver.

Autopartspros, LLC was founded in 1999. The Company's line of
business includes the wholesale distribution of motor vehicle
supplies, accessories, tools, and equipment. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert Drexler, Esq.
          Molly DeSario, Esq.
          Jonathan Lee, Esq.
          CAPSTONE LAW APC
          1875 Century Park East, Suite 1000
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone:  (310) 556-4811
          Facsimile:  (310) 943-0396
          E-mail: Robert.Drexler@CapstoneLawyers.com
                  Molly.DeSario@CapstoneLawyers.com
                  Jonathan.Lee@CapstoneLawyers.com


BANK OF AMERICA: Sharp Sues over Alleged Improper Overdraft Fees
----------------------------------------------------------------
MATTHEW J. SHARP, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; and
BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION, the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05223
(N.D. Ill., Aug. 1, 2019), seeks legal and equitable remedies
resulting from Bank of America's practices of improperly assessing
$35.00 fees to its customers for overdrafts triggered by
non-recurring transactions initiated with "decoupled" debit cards
issued by Target, Speedway, and numerous other convenience stores,
grocery stores, retailers, and other companies nationwide.

Since June of 2010, in the Deposit Agreement, Schedule of Fees, and
Card Agreement, Bank of America has promised its accountholders
that any "non-recurring" transaction initiated with any type of
"debit card" is absolutely immune from the assessment of an
overdraft fee -- and yet over that same period of time has
systematically assessed $35.00 fees to its accountholders for
overdrafts triggered by numerous types of "non-recurring"
transactions initiated with numerous types of "debit cards."

By assessing fees for overdrafts caused by one-time,
"non-recurring" transactions initiated with "debit cards," Bank of
America breached the Deposit Agreement and Schedule of Fees, the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and various
other legal obligations owed to its accountholders, and unjustly
enriched itself, the lawsuit says.

For people living paycheck to paycheck, like Plaintiff and other
members of the Class, the improper overdraft fees at issue in this
case not only damaged them monetarily but have had a serious effect
on their everyday lives.

On behalf of themselves and the other members of the Class, the
Plaintiff brings this action to recover all of the
improperly-assessed overdraft fees at issue in this case, and for
other legal and equitable remedies, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class are:

          Eugene Y. Turin, Esq.
          MCGUIRE LAW, P.C.
          55 W. Wacker Dr., 9th Fl.
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 893-7002
          E-mail: eturin@mcgpc.com

               - and -

          Frank S. Hedin, Esq.
          HEDIN HALL, LLP
          1395 Brickell Ave, Suite 900
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 357-2107
          Facsimile: (305) 200-8801
          E-mail: fhedin@hedinhall.com

               - and -

          Robert Ahdoot, Esq.
          AHDOOT & WOLFSON, PC
          E-mail: rahdoot@ahdootwolfson.com
          10728 Lindbrook Drive
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (310) 474-9111
          Facsimile: (310) 474-8585

BEAVER DAM COMMUNITY: Hansen Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages, Damages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
KRISTI HANSEN on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. BEAVER DAM COMMUNITY HOSPITALS, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-00633 (W.D. Wis., Aug. 2, 2019) is a
collective and class action brought pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), and Wisconsin's Wage Payment and
Collection Laws ("WWPCL") by Plaintiff for purposes of obtaining
relief under the FLSA and WWPCL for unpaid overtime wages, unpaid
agreed-upon wages, liquidated damages, costs, attorneys' fees,
declaratory and/or injunctive relief, and/or any such other relief
the Court may deem appropriate.

According to the complaint, the Defendant operated (and continues
to operate) an unlawful compensation system that deprived and
failed to compensate all current and former hourly-paid, non-exempt
employees for all hours worked and work performed each workweek,
including at an overtime rate of pay for hours worked in excess of
40 in a workweek. Specifically, Defendant: (1) failed to compensate
said employees with agree-upon wages, such as monetary "Shift
Differentials," at their regular and overtime rates of pay for any
and all hours worked and work performed during the workweek; and
(2) failed to include all forms of non-discretionary compensation,
such as monetary bonuses, commissions, incentives, awards, and/or
other rewards, in said employees' regular rates of pay for overtime
calculation purposes, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant from approximately the years
2012 to 2016 and was re-hired by Defendant as a Food & Nutrition
Aid working in Defendant's Food & Nutrition Department in
approximately August 2017.

Beaver Dam Community Hospitals, Inc., is a hospital and health care
system headquartered in Beaver Dam, Wisconsin that operates
primarily within Columbia, Fond du Lac, and Dodge counties in the
State of Wisconsin.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     James A. Walcheske, Esq.
     Scott S. Luzi, Esq.
     WALCHESKE & LUZI, LLC
     15850 W. Bluemound Rd., Suite 304
     Brookfield, WI 53005
     Phone: (262) 780-1953
     Fax: (262) 565-6469
     Email: jwalcheske@walcheskeluzi.com
            sluzi@walcheskeluzi.com



BET INFORMATION: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Caldwell Suit Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
APRIL CALDWELL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. BET INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INC. D/B/A
SURVEY.COM, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-11625-ADB (D. Mass., July
29, 2019) seeks to stop the Defendant's practice of making
unsolicited calls. The case is assigned to Judge Allison D.
Burroughs.

BET Information Systems, Inc. offers an online content aggregator.
BET Information Systems, Inc. was formerly known as Interaction
Media Group, Inc. The company was incorporated in 2006 and is based
in Boston, Massachusetts. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jason Campbell Esq.
          250 First Avenue, Unit 602
          Charlestown, MA 02129
          Telephone: (617) 872-8652
          E-mail: jasonrcampbell@ymail.com

               - and -

          Avi R. Kaufman, Esq.
          KAUFMAN P.A.
          400 NW 26 th Street
          Miami, FL 33127
          Telephone: (305) 469-5881
          E-mail: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com


BIG PICTURE: 4th Cir. Flips Denial of Bid to Dismiss Williams Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LULA WILLIAMS; GLORIA TURNAGE; GEORGE HENGLE; DOWIN
COFFY; FELIX GILLISON, JR., on behalf of themselves and all
individuals similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BIG
PICTURE LOANS, LLC; ASCENSION TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
Defendants-Appellants, and DANIEL GRAVEL; JAMES WILLIAMS, JR.;
GERTRUDE McGESHICK; SUSAN McGESHICK; GIIWEGIIZHIGOOKWAY MARTIN;
MATT MARTORELLO, Defendants. NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS;
NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL CENTER FOR AMERICAN
INDIAN ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT; CONFERENCE OF TRIBAL LENDING
COMMISSIONERS; ONLINE LENDERS ALLIANCE, Amici Supporting Appellant.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; STATE OF CONNECTICUT; STATE OF HAWAII; STATE
OF ILLINOIS; STATE OF IOWA; STATE OF MAINE; STATE OF MARYLAND;
STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS; STATE OF MINNESOTA; STATE OF NEW JERSEY;
STATE OF NEW YORK; STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA;
STATE OF VERMONT; STATE OF VIRGINIA; CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING, Amici Supporting Appellee, Case No. 18-1827 (4th Cir.),
Judge Roger Gregory of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed the district court's order denying the Entities'
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Lac Vieux Desert Band of the Lake Superior Chippewa Indians
formed two business entities under tribal law.  The Tribe entered
the business of online lending in 2011 when it organized Red Rock
Lending as a tribally owned LLC.  Two members of the Tribe managed
Red Rock, and the Tribe was its sole member.  Red Rock provided
loans to consumers from its offices on the Reservation and was
subject to the Tribe's Tribal Financial Services Regulatory Code,
which is enforced by the Tribal Financial Services Regulatory
Authority.  Red Rock contracted with Bellicose, a non-tribal LLC,
to provide vendor management services, compliance management
assistance, marketing material development, and risk modeling and
data analytics development. Matt Martorello, a non-tribe member,
was its founder and chief executive officer.

Two years after the formation of Red Rock, in February 2013, the
New York Department of Financial Services sent cease and desist
letters to several lending entities, including Red Rock, accusing
them of using the Internet to offer and originate illegal payday
loans to New York consumers, in violation of New York's civil and
criminal usury laws.  The Tribe and entities sought a preliminary
injunction based in part on a claim that New York's regulation
would infringe on tribal sovereignty.  The district court denied
the request, however, finding that the entities had not shown a
likelihood of success on the merits because their online lending to
New York customers constituted off-reservation activity and could
thus be properly regulated under New York's anti-usury law.  The
Second Circuit affirmed this decision in October 2014.

Around the same time, the Tribe formed three entities central to
this appeal.  On Aug. 26, 2014, months before the Second Circuit's
decision in Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians v. N.Y. State Dep't of
Fin. Servs., the Tribe organized Big Picture as an independent
tribal lending entity that would ultimately consolidate the
activities of its other lending entities, including Red Rock.  On
Feb. 5, 2015, the Tribe Council formed another entity, Tribal
Economic Development Holdings, LLC ("TED"), to operate the Tribe's
current and future lending companies.  Also on February 5, 2015,
the Tribe formed Ascension as a subsidiary of TED for the purpose
of engaging in marketing, technological, and vendor services to
support the Tribe's lending entities.  The Tribe was the sole
member of TED, and TED became Big Picture's and Ascension's sole
member.

Also in early 2015, Martorello and the Tribe agreed on a basic
framework for the sale of Bellicose: a seller-financed transaction
with non-fixed payments over a seven-year term, with any
outstanding amount due to be forgiven at the end of that term.
Prior to that time, the Tribe and Martorello had engaged in
multiple conversations about the potential sale of Martorello's
consulting companies to the Tribe, which would allow the Tribe to
engage in online lending without relying on outside vendors for
support services.  The seller-financier would be Eventide Credit
Acquisitions, LLC, a company managed and majority-owned by multiple
entities of which Martorello was the president.  In short, Eventide
would provide a $300 million loan to TED, which TED would then use
to purchase Bellicose.

After continuing negotiations, the parties reached a final
agreement in September 2015, memorializing the terms of the deal in
a loan agreement and a promissory note.  Under those terms, Big
Picture would first make a distribution to TED of its gross
revenues.  TED would then distribute 2% of those revenues to the
Tribe and reinvest an additional 2% of gross revenues in growing
Big Picture's loan portfolio.  The parties agreed to increase the
monthly distribution to the tribe from 2% to 3% in September 2016,
and the agreement also provided that the percentage distribution
would increase to 6% when half the loan had been repaid. In January
2016, the Tribe completed its purchase of Bellicose and acquired
all of Bellicose's data and software.  By September 2017, TED had
distributed approximately $20 million in loan payments to Eventide
and nearly $5 million to the Tribe.

TED now oversees both Big Picture and Ascension, and all three
entities have their headquarters on the Reservation.  Big Picture
currently employs 15 tribal members on the Reservation, and
Ascension employs 31 individuals, most of whom work outside the
Reservation.  An Intratribal Servicing Agreement sets forth the
relationship between Big Picture and Ascension, with Ascension
handling certain day-to-day aspects of the loan operations for Big
Picture.  Michelle Hazen and James Williams, both Tribe Council
members, co-manage all three companies. Hazen is also chief
executive officer of Big Picture, but Ascension's president is a
non-tribal member.

In June 2017, Plaintiffs Williams, Turnage, Hengle, Coffy, and
Gillison, Jr. brought a putative class action against Big Picture
and Ascension, as well as the individual Defendants who are not
parties to the appeal.  The Plaintiffs sought declaratory and
injunctive relief, alleging that Big Picture charges interest rates
on its loans that are substantially-50 times-higher than would be
allowed if Virginia law were applicable. Before the district court,
the Entities appeared specially to claim that they are entitled to
tribal sovereign immunity, submitting documentation in support of
their assertion that they are arms of the Tribe.

Following jurisdictional discovery, the district court rejected the
Entities' invocation of arm-of-the-tribe immunity.  In reaching its
decision, the district court determined that the driving force
behind the formation of Big Picture and Ascension was "to shelter
outsiders from the consequences of their otherwise illegal
actions."  It placed the burden of proof for the immunity issue on
the Entities.  The Entities timely appealed.

Judge Gregory finds that all of the factors weigh in favor of
immunity for Big Picture and all but one of the factors weigh in
favor of immunity for Ascension.  Accordingly, both Entities are
entitled to immunity as arms of the Tribe.

He reachs this conclusion with due consideration of the underlying
policies of tribal sovereign immunity, which include tribal
self-governance and tribal economic development as well as
protection of "the tribe's monies" and the "promotion of commercial
dealings between Indians and non-Indians."  The evidence here shows
that the Entities have increased the Tribe's general fund, expanded
the Tribe's commercial dealings, and subsidized a host of services
for the Tribe's members.  Accordingly, the Entities have promoted
"the Tribe's self-determination through revenue generation and the
funding of diversified economic development."  A finding of no
immunity in the case, even if animated by the intent to protect the
Tribe or consumers, would weaken the Tribe's ability to govern
itself according to its own laws, become self-sufficient, and
develop economic opportunities for its members.

Although the Plaintiffs stress the injuries they allegedly face as
a result of the Entities' commercial activities, an entity's
entitlement to tribal immunity cannot and does not depend on a
court's evaluation of the respectability of the business in which a
tribe has chosen to engage.  Accordingly, the potential merit of
the borrowers' claims against Big Picture and Ascension -- and the
lack of a remedy for those alleged wrongs -- does not sway the
tribal immunity analysis.  It is the Congress -- not the courts --
that has the power to abrogate tribal immunity.

Because a proper weighing of the factors demonstrates by a
preponderance of the evidence that the Entities are indeed arms of
the Tribe, Big Picture and Ascension are entitled to tribal
sovereign immunity.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Gregory reversed the district
court's order, and remanded with instructions to grant the
Entities' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.  

A full-text copy of the Court's July 3, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/DRZzmL from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: William H. Hurd, TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellants. Matthew W.H. Wessler, GUPTA WESSLER PLLC,
Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

ON BRIEF: David N. Anthony -- david.anthony@troutmansanders.com --
Timothy J. St. George -- tim.stgeorge@troutmansanders.com --
TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP, Richmond, Virginia; Justin A. Gray --
jgray@rosettelaw.com -- ROSETTE, LLP, Mattawan, Michigan, for
Appellants. Kristi C. Kelly -- kkelly@kellyandcrandall.com --
Andrew Guzzo -- aguzzo@kellyandcrandall.com -- Casey S. Nash --
casey@kellyandcrandall.com -- KELLY & CRANDALL, PLC, Fairfax,
Virginia; Alexandria Twinem, GUPTA WESSLER PLLC, Washington, D.C.,
for Appellees. Pilar M. Thomas LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER CHRISTIE LLP,
Tucson, Arizona; Derrick Beetso , NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN
INDIANS, Washington, D.C., for Amici National Congress of American
Indians, National Indian Gaming Association, and National Center
for American Indian Enterprise Development. Sarah J. Auchterlonie,
BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK LLP, Denver, Colorado; Brendan
Johnson , Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Luke A. Hasskamp , ROBINS
KAPLAN LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Amicus Conference of Tribal
Lending Commissioners. Brian Foster , Michael Nonaka , Luis Urbina
, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Online
Lenders Alliance. William Corbett , Diane M. Standaert , CENTER FOR
RESPONSIBLE LENDING, Durham, North Carolina, for Amicus Center for
Responsible Lending. Karl A. Racine, Attorney General, Loren L.
AliKhan , Solicitor General, Caroline S. Van Zile, Deputy Solicitor
General, Richard S. Love, Senior Assistant Solicitor General,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Washington, D.C.; George Jepsen , Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, Hartford,
Connecticut; Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Chicago, Illinois; Janet T.
Mills, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE
STATE OF MAINE, Augusta, Maine; Maura Healey, Attorney General,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS, Boston, Massachusetts; Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NEW
JERSEY, Trenton, New Jersey; Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
Raleigh, North Carolina; Thomas J. Donovan, Jr., Attorney General,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF VERMONT,
Montpelier, Vermont; Russell A. Suzuki, Attorney General, OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF HAWAII, Honolulu, Hawaii; Tom
Miller, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE
STATE OF IOWA, Des Moines, Iowa; Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF MARYLAND,
Baltimore, Maryland; Lori Swanson, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF MINNESOTA, St. Paul, Minnesota;
Barbara D. Underwood, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK, New York, New York; Josh
Shapiro, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; Mark R.
Herring, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Amici District of
Columbia, State of Connecticut, State of Hawaii, State of Illinois,
State of Iowa, State of Maine, State of Maryland, Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, State of Minnesota, State of New Jersey, State of
New York, State of North Carolina, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
State of Vermont, and Commonwealth of Virginia.


BLOOMBERG LP: Data Analysts File Suit Over Unpaid Overtime Back pay
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Jane Doe 1, and Jane Doe 2, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BLOOMBERG L.P.,
Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-16262 (D. N.J., Aug. 2, 2019) is a Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") collective action and a Rule 23 class
action under the wage and hour laws of New Jersey brought to remedy
Defendant's Unlawful refusal to pay overtime at the rate of time
and one half to individuals with the job titles of "Data Analyst"
and "Data Specialist" (and related title) who worked in Bloomberg's
Global Data Division.

In January 2019, Bloomberg recognized that Global Data positions
were not exempt from federal and state overtime requirements and
reclassified most of the positions as overtime non-exempt. However,
Bloomberg made no effort to calculate the overtime back pay and
liquidated damages due to its employees as a matter of law. By this
action, Plaintiffs seek unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages,
costs and attorneys' fees as well as declaratory relief under the
FLSA, and New Jersey's wage-and-hour laws.

Plaintiffs are and were employed by Defendant to work with data and
generally have the position of Data Analyst" or "Data Specialist".

Defendant's business is a multinational mass media corporation that
provides financial software tools such as analytics and equity
trading platforms, data services and news to financial companies
and organizations around the world through the Bloomberg
Terminal.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Michael Korik, Esq.
     Law Offices of Charles A. Gruen
     382 Broadway, Suite 300
     Westwood, NJ 07675
     Phone: 201-342-1212
     Fax: 201-342-6474
     Email: mkorik@gruenlaw.com

          - and -

     Dan Getman, Esq.
     Artemio Guerra, Esq.
     Getman, Sweenet & Dunn PLLC
     260 Fair St.
     Kingston, NY 12401
     Phone: (845) 255-9370
     Fax: (845) 255-8649
     Email: dgetman@getmansweeney.com


BOEING COMPANY: Pilot G Seeks Indemnity over Opportunity Losses
---------------------------------------------------------------
PILOT G, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. THE BOEING COMPANY, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-05177 (N.D. Ill., July 31, 2019) is an action seeking
compensation on behalf of the Plaintiff and the Class, qualified to
fly the Boeing 737 MAX series of aircraft (the "MAX") as employees
of an international airline.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff's personal and
professional life was disrupted when BOEING and the Federal
Aviation Administration engaged in an unprecedented cover-up of
known design flaws of the MAX, which predictably resulted in the
crashes of two MAX aircraft and grounding of all MAX aircraft
worldwide. The Plaintiff relied on BOEING's representations that
the MAX was safe when the Plaintiff chose to qualify to fly the
MAX, and the Plaintiff suffered significant lost wages, among other
economic and non-economic damages, when the MAX was grounded with
no end in sight.

Additionally, the Plaintiff suffered severe emotional and mental
distress when the Plaintiff was compelled to fly the MAX -- placing
the Plaintiff's life and the lives of the crews and passengers in
danger -- despite the growing awareness of the dangerous nature of
the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (the "MCAS")
and other problems that BOEING had previously concealed or failed
to disclose to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff, individually and on
behalf of all those similarly situated, requests entry of a
judgment against BOEING in an amount that will make the Plaintiff
whole and deter BOEING and other manufacturers from valuing
corporate profits over human life.

The Boeing Company, together with its subsidiaries, develops,
produces, and markets commercial jet aircraft, as well as provides
related support services to the commercial airline industry
worldwide. The Company also researches, develops, produces,
modifies, and supports information, space, and defense systems,
including military aircraft, helicopters and space and missile
systems. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Patrick M. Jones
          Sarah M. Beaujour
          PMJ PLLC
          100 South State Street
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 255-7976
          E-mail: pmj@patjonespllc.com
                  smb@patjonespllc.com

               - and -

          Joseph C. Wheeler, Esq.
          IALPG PTY LTD (T/AS INTERNATIONAL
             AEROSPACE LAW & POLICY GROUP)
          1D, 7/139 Junction Road
          Clayfield, Queensland, Australia 4011
          Telephone: +61 7 3040 1099
          E-mail: jwheeler@ialpg.com


BOUCHERIE LLC: Gabilly Seeks Return of Tip Credit, Unpaid Wages
---------------------------------------------------------------
Julien Gabilly and Marius Zemache, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. BOUCHERIE LLC, BOUCHERIE
PAS LLC, and EMIL STEFKOV, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-07240 (S.D.
N.Y., Aug. 2, 2019) is a collective action brought pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act, and the New York Labor Law to recover
unpaid minimum wages, unlawfully misappropriated tips, and other
monies.

The complaint alleges that Defendants have failed to compensate
their food service workers at the federal and state minimum wage,
and unlawfully misappropriated a portion of their tips.

Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief against
Defendants' unlawful actions, return of the tip credit, return of
the misappropriated tips, return of unpaid wages, liquidated
damages, interest, and attorneys' fees and costs as permitted in
accordance with the FLSA and NYLL, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs were employed by Defendants as waiters.

Defendants are New York limited liability companies that own and
operate Boucherie, a restaurant.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Darren P.B. Rumack, Esq.
     The Klein Law Group, P.C.
     39 Broadway, Suite 1530
     New York, NY 10006
     Phone: 212-344-9022
     Facsimile: 212-344-0301


BRIXMOR PROPERTY: $19.5MM Settlement Balance Released from Escrow
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Brixmor Property Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 29, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the remaining
settlement balance of $19.5 million in the class action suit
initiated by Westchester Putnam Counties Heavy & Highway Laborers
Local 60 Benefit Funds has been released from escrow.

On December 13, 2017, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York granted final approval of the
settlement of the previously disclosed putative securities class
action complaint filed in March 2016 by the Westchester Putnam
Counties Heavy & Highway Laborers Local 60 Benefit Funds related to
the review conducted by the Audit Committee of the Board of
Directors.

Pursuant to the approved settlement, without any admission of
liability, the Company paid $28.0 million to settle the claims.

This amount was within the coverage amount of the Company's
applicable insurance policies and was funded into escrow by the
insurance carriers.

During the year ended December 31, 2018, $8.5 million of the
settlement amount was released from escrow per the court approved
settlement agreement for the payment of plaintiff's legal fees.

During the six months ended June 30, 2019, the remaining settlement
balance of $19.5 million was released from escrow.

The settlement provides for the release of, among others, the
Company, its subsidiaries, and their respective current and former
officers, directors and employees from the claims that were or
could have been asserted in the class action litigation.

Brixmor Property Group, Inc. operates as a real estate investment
trust. The Company owns and operates grocery anchored community and
neighborhood shopping centers. Brixmor Property Group serves
customers in the United States. The company is based in New York,
New York.


BROCK BEAUTY: Morgan Files ADA Class Action
--------------------------------------------
Brock Beauty Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant
to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Jon
R. Morgan, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Brock Beauty Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-07217-JMF (S.D. N.Y., Aug. 1, 2019).

Brock Beauty's offers vitamins and hair care products..[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
   Shalom Law, PLLC.
   124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
   Kew Gardens, NY 11374
   Tel: (516) 807-1748
   Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com



CALIFORNIA: Court Dismisses J. Austin's Class Claims
----------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMES AUSTIN, CDCR # AK-6078, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT
BROWN; FABRICE HADJADJ; J. DAVIES; P. COVELLO, Defendants, Case No.
3:18-cv-600-WQH-JLB (S.D. Cal.), Judge William Q. Hayes of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California granted in
part and denied in part the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

Austin, a prisoner at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility
in San Diego, California, is proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis with a complaint pursuant to the Civil Rights Act against
Defendants Brown, Hadjadj, Davies, and Covello.  The Plaintiff
claims RJD officials violated his right to free exercise of his
Buddhist faith under the First Amendment, imposed a substantial
burden on the exercise of that faith in violation of the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), and denied
him equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment.  He
seeks compensatory and punitive damages, mental and emotional
damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief.

The Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the basis that the Plaintiff has failed to
state a First Amendment, Equal Protection, or RLUIPA claim.  They
also argue they are entitled to qualified immunity and the
Plaintiff's state law claims should also be dismissed.  Finally,
the Defendants seeks to dismiss any claim the Plaintiff purports to
bring on behalf of other RJD inmates who practice the Buddhist
religion.  They have also filed a request for judicial notice which
is granted.

The Plaintiff sought two extensions of time to respond to the
Defendants' Motion, and Magistrate Judge Jill L. Burkhardt granted
both extension.  The Plaintiff was given until May 8, 2019 to file
his opposition.  That date has long since passed and the Plaintiff
has not filed an opposition.

Judge Hayes granted in part and denied in part the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss.  He (i) granted the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss the Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
claims without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); (ii)
granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's state law
claims with prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); (iii)
granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss to the extent the
Plaintiff seeks to litigate claims of others in a representative
capacity; (iv) denied the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the
Plaintiff's First Amendment and RLUIPA claims pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6); and (v) denied the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
the Plaintiff's claims on qualified immunity grounds pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Among other things, the Judge finds that (i) the Plaintiff's
Complaint alleges facts sufficient to show that his free exercise
rights were sufficiently "impinged upon" to justify First Amendment
protection; (ii) the Plaintiff has adequately alleged facts to show
that the alleged actions by the Defendants constitute a substantial
burden on the exercise of his religious beliefs; (iii) the
Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a First Amendment and RLUIPA
violation as to the Defendants and that it would be clear to
reasonable officers in the Defendants' positions that to deny te
Plaintiff the right to participate in group worship, in light of
only the circumstances as they are currently alleged, would violate
clearly established law; and (iv) the Plaintiff, as a pro se
litigant, is not permitted to bring claims on behalf of others in a
representative capacity.

The Defendants will serve and file an Answer to the remaining
claims in the Plaintiff's Complaint within the time set forth in
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A).

The Defendants also seek to dismiss any claim the Plaintiff brings
on behalf of other persons. Specifically, they contend that
"Plaintiff is attempting to maintain a class action on behalf of
inmates at RJD." The Court rules that the Defendants are correct
that the Plaintiff, as a pro se litigant, is not permitted to bring
claims on behalf of others in a representative capacity.
Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's
class action claims is granted.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 3, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/bhFg4N from Leagle.com.

James Austin, Plaintiff, pro se.

Robert Brown, Community Resource Manager, Fabrice Hadjadj, Rabbi
Chaplain, J. Davies, AA/PIO & P. Covello, Chief Deputy Warden,
Defendants, represented by Lyndsay Rebecca Crenshaw, California
Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General.


CANNTRUST HOLDINGS: Jones Sues Over Share Price Drop
----------------------------------------------------
RONALD E. JONES, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. CANNTRUST HOLDINGS INC., PETER ACETO and
GREG GUYATT, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-06883 (S.D. N.Y., July
24, 2019) is a securities class action on behalf of all purchasers
of CannTrust common stock between February 25, 2019 and July 12,
2019, inclusive, against CannTrust and certain of the Company's
executive officers seeking remedies under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act").

At the start of the Class Period, Health Canada had licensed
facilities for certain activities, such as the indoor cultivation
of cannabis, but not for other activities, such as outdoor
cultivation. But as demand started to outpace supply, unbeknownst
to investors, CannTrust had cut corners, lied to regulators, and
illegally grown cannabis at its facilities in order to continue to
show revenue and sales growth. Then, on July 8, 2019, the Company
issued a press release revealing that Health Canada had discovered
during an audit of the Company that it had been growing cannabis in
five unlicensed rooms at the Niagara Facility over a six-month
period and had provided misleading information to the regulator.
The Company also announced that Health Canada had placed a hold on
a significant quantity of CannTrust's cannabis inventory, and that
CannTrust had placed a voluntary hold on additional inventory as
Health Canada investigated just how far CannTrust's wrongdoing
extended. On this news, the price of CannTrust common stock dropped
from a close of $4.94 per share on July 5, 2019, to a close of
$3.83 per share on July 8, 2019, a decline of more than 22%.

CannTrust now faces the possibility of not only fines and criminal
charges, but stiffer penalties, up to and including the loss of its
licenses to operate, which would pose an existential threat to the
Company. Then, on July 12, 2019, CannTrust announced that it had
implemented a voluntary and indefinite hold on all of its products
pending an internal review and the results of the investigation by
Health Canada. On this news, the price of CannTrust common stock
dropped from a close of $3.11 per share on July 11, 2019 to a close
of $2.58 per share on July 12, 2019, a decline of more than 17%,
says the complaint.

Plaintiff Ronald E. Jones purchased CannTrust common stock during
the Class Period.

CannTrust produces and distributes recreational and medicinal
cannabis products. CannTrust's products include dried flower,
capsules, oil tinctures, and topicals, along with products for the
pet and coffee markets.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Samuel H. Rudman, Esq.
     ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
     58 South Service Road, Suite 200
     Melville, NY 11747
     Telephone: 631/367-7100
     Fax: 631/367-1173
     Email: srudman@rgrdlaw.com

          - and -

     BRIAN E. COCHRAN, ESQ.
     ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
     55 South Main Street, Suite 390
     Naperville, IL 60540
     Phone: 312/674-4674
     Fax: 312/674-4676
     Email: bcochran@rgrdlaw.com

          - and -

     KENNETH J. BLACK, ESQ.
     ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
     Post Montgomery Center
     One Montgomery Street, Suite 1800
     San Francisco, CA 94104
     Phone: 415/288-4545
     Fax: 415/288-4534 (fax)
     Email: kennyb@rgrdlaw.com

          - and -

     W. SCOTT HOLLEMAN, ESQ.
     JOHNSON FISTEL, LLP
     99 Madison Avenue, 5th Floor
     New York, NY 10016
     Phone: 212/292-5690
     Fax: 212/602-1592
     Email: scotth@johnsonfistel.com


CAPITAL ONE BANK: Labajo Sues Over Data Breach
----------------------------------------------
CHRISTINA LABAJO and MARY YOON, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA),
N.A., CAPITAL ONE N.A., and CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION
Defendants, Case No. 5:19-cv-01431 (C.D. Cal., Aug. 1, 2019) is a
class action against Defendants for their failure to secure and
safeguard personal identifying information ("Private Information"),
which was wrongfully disclosed in a March 2019 data breach (the
"Data Breach").

The Data Breach occurred on March 22 and 23, 2019, but was not
discovered by Defendants until nearly four months later, on July
19, 2019. The Defendants did not discover the Data Breach as a
result of their own policies or diligence, asserts the complaint.

As a result, Plaintiffs and class members are entitled to
injunctive relief and restitution of all funds Defendants acquired,
including fees that Defendants charged in connection with their
credit card services, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs are citizens of California who have credit cards issued
by Capital One.

Defendant Capital One, N.A., is a national bank with its principal
place of business in McLean, Virginia..[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     L. Timothy Fisher, Esq.
     Joel D. Smith, Esq.
     Frederick J. Klorczyk III, Esq.
     BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
     1990 North California Blvd., Suite 940
     Walnut Creek, CA 94596
     Phone: (925) 300-4455
     Facsimile: (925) 407-2700
     Email: ltfisher@bursor.com
            jsmith@bursor.com
            fklorczyk@bursor.com


CAPITAL ONE: Francis Sues Over Failure to Properly Secure PII
-------------------------------------------------------------
GLORIA FRANCIS, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION, CAPITAL
ONE N.A. AND CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA) Defendants, Case No.
8:19-cv-01898 VMC-CPT (M.D. Fla., Aug. 2, 2019) is a class action
against Defendants for their failure to properly secure and
safeguard personally identifiable information, including without
limitation names, bank account numbers, dates of birth, address,
social security numbers, self-reported income, telephone numbers
and email addresses (collectively, "PII").

On July 29, 2019, Capital One announced that its customers personal
information had been breached. Capital One advised that it
determined there was unauthorized access to certain types of
personal information relating to people who had applied for its
credit card products and to credit card customers from 2005 through
early 2019. This Data Breach occurred because Defendants failed to
implement adequate and reasonable cyber-security procedures and
protocols to protect customers' PII. Indeed, the deficiencies in
Defendants' data security protocols were so significant that 100
million individuals were affected in the United States.

As a result of Defendants' failure to implement and follow basic
security procedures, Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII is now in
the hands of thieves. As a result, Plaintiff and Class Members face
a substantial increased risk of identity theft. Consequently,
Capital One's current and former customers have had to spend, and
will continue to spend, significant time and money in the future to
protect themselves due to Defendants' basic failures, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff Gloria Francis is a resident of Safety Harbor, Florida
and applied for and obtained a Capital One credit card in 2012.

Capital One Bank is a national bank and corporation headquartered
in Virginia.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     William "Billy" Peerce Howard, Esq.
     Heather H. Jones, Esq.
     THE CONSUMER PROTECTION FIRM
     4030 Henderson Boulevard
     Tampa, FL 33629
     Phone: (813) 500-1500
     Facsimile: (813) 435-2369
     Email: Billy@TheConsumerProtectionFirm.com
            Heather@TheConsumerProtectionFirm.com


CAPITAL ONE: Haque Sues Over Failure to Protect Personal Info
-------------------------------------------------------------
ZAKARIA HAQUE, individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION, CAPITAL
ONE, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, and CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA), NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-03512-MMB (E.D. Pa., Aug.
2, 2019) is an action on behalf of a nationwide class against
Defendants because of their failure to protect the confidential
information of millions of consumers and small businesses,
including financial information, and/or personal information
(collectively, their "Sensitive Information").

On July 29, 2019, Capital One publicly announced that ten days
earlier, on July 19, 2019, it had "determined there was
unauthorized access by an outside individual who obtained certain
types of personal information relating to people who had applied
for its credit card products and to Capital One credit card
customers." The Defendants only discovered the Data Breach after an
individual previously unknown to Capital One sent an email to
Capital One providing a link to a file containing the leaked
Sensitive Information. The file provided in the link, which was
timestamped April 21, 2019, also contained code for commands used
in the intrusion, as well as a list of more than 700 folders or
buckets of data.

The Defendants had obligations, arising from federal and state
laws, industry standards, and promises made to credit card
applicants and customers like Plaintiff and other Class Members, to
keep the Sensitive Information confidential and to protect it from
unauthorized disclosures. Class Members provided their Sensitive
Information to Capital One with the understanding that Capital One
and any business partners to whom Capital One disclosed the
Sensitive Information would comply with their obligations to keep
such information confidential and secure from unauthorized
disclosures. Plaintiff and other Class Members have been injured by
the disclosure of their Sensitive Information in the Data Breach,
says the complaint.

Plaintiff Zakaria Haque is an individual residing in Fairfield,
Connecticut, who has been a credit card and automobile loan
customer of Capital One.

Capital One Financial Corporation, through its subsidiaries,
including Defendants CONA and COBNA, is one of the largest
credit-card issuers in the United States, and one of the top 10
largest banks based on deposits, serving approximately 45 million
customer accounts.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Roberta D. Liebenberg, Esq.
     Mary L. Russell, Esq.
     Ria C. Momblanco, Esq.
     FINE, KAPLAN AND BLACK, RPC
     One South Broad Street, 23rd Floor
     Philadelphia, PA 19107
     Phone: (215) 567-6565
     Email: rliebenberg@finekaplan.com
            mrussell@finekaplan.com
            rmomblanco@finekaplan.com

          - and -

     Adam Frankel, Esq.
     GREENWICH LEGAL ASSOCIATES, LLC
     881 Lake Avenue
     Greenwich, CT 06831
     Phone: (203) 622-6001
     Email: adam@grwlegal.com


CAPITAL ONE: Tadrous Sues over Data Breach
------------------------------------------
AKRAM TADROUS, individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
CAPITAL ONE, N.A., and CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA), N.A., the
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-02292 (D. Colo., July 31, 2019),
alleges that Defendants failed to protect confidential information
of millions of consumers and small businesses -- including
financial information (e.g., bank account numbers, fragments of
transaction history, self-reported income, and credit scores),
and/or personal information (e.g., Social Security Numbers, names,
addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, and dates of birth)
(collectively, "Sensitive Information").

The Defendants' wrongful disclosure has harmed Plaintiff and the
Class, believed to include approximately 106 million card customers
and applicants.

Beginning sometime before July 2019, Capital One began storing its
customers' data on cloud serves in Amazon Web Services (AWS)
popular data storage software Simple Storage Service. In using AWS'
data servers, Capital One built its own web application on top of
AWS' cloud data so that Capital one could use the information in a
manner that was tailored to its needs. Capital One was wholly in
control over the construction of this application.

The Data Breach that had occurred on March 22 and 23, 2019, was
discovered by Defendants only in July 19, 2019 and publicly
disclosed on July 29, 2019, over four months after the Sensitive
Information of over 100 million customers and credit card
applicants were breached. Defendants apparently continued to allow
the hacker to intrude their systems at least until April 21, 2019.

Capital One Financial Corporation, by and through its subsidiaries,
including Defendants Capital One, N.A., and Capital One Bank (USA),
N.A., is one of the largest credit-card issuers in the United
States, and one of the top 10 largest banks based on deposits,
serving approximately 45 million customer accounts, and with a
reported $249.8 billion in deposits as of December 31, 2018.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class are:

          Linda P. Nussbaum, Esq.
          Bart D. Cohen, Esq.
          NUSSBAUM LAW GROUP, P.C.
          1211 Avenue of the Americas, 40th Floor
          New York, NY 10036-8718
          Telephone: (917) 438-9189
          E-mail: lnussbaum@nussbaumpc.com
                  bcohen@nussbaumpc.com

               - and -

          James E. Cecchi, Esq.
          Caroline F. Bartlett, Esq.
          Mark M. Makhail, Esq.
          CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN,
             BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C.
          5 Becker Farm Road
          Roseland, NJ 0706-1739
          Telephone: (973) 994-1700
          E-mail: jcecchi@carellabyrne.com
                  cbartlett@carellabyrne.com
                  mmakhail@carellabyrne.com

CARBONITE INC: Luna Suit Hits Share Price Drop
----------------------------------------------
RUBEN A. LUNA, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. CARBONITE, INC., MOHAMAD S. ALI and ANTHONY
FOLGER, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-11662 (D. Mass., Aug. 1, 2019)
is a securities class action on behalf of all purchasers of
Carbonite common stock between February 7, 2019 and July 25, 2019,
inclusive, seeking remedies under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.

On October 18, 2018, Carbonite launched its "Server Backup VM
Edition" for managed services providers ("MSPs'). The new service
was designed to allow MSPs to protect their virtual data both
locally and in their own cloud. The Server Backup VM Edition was
projected to add "meaningfully" to Carbonite's revenues for fiscal
2019. However, from the start of its launch, the Server Backup VM
Edition was of poor quality and technologically flawed and received
poor customer reviews and complaints, or as Carbonite put it: "the
virtual server edition of our server backup product was not at the
level of quality that customers have come to expect from Carbonite"
and Carbonite was forced to remove "any growth expectations
associated with virtual server edition from our short-term
outlook." Just as problematic, the poor reception of the Server
Backup VM edition in the marketplace was acting as a "disruptive"
factor in and among Carbonite's salesforce, keeping the sales
organization from closing opportunistically on several larger deals
during fiscal 2019.

According to the complaint, the Defendants issued materially false
and misleading statements regarding the technological quality of
the Server Backup VM Edition and its potential to add
"meaningfully" to Carbonite's financial performance for fiscal
2019. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose that: (i)
Carbonite's Server Backup VM Edition was of poor quality and
technologically flawed; (ii) Carbonite was receiving poor reviews
and complaints from customers about the Server Backup VM Edition;
(iii) the poor quality and technological flaws of the Server Backup
VM Edition was acting as a "disruptive" factor throughout the
Carbonite salesforce and keeping that sales organization from
closing opportunistically on several larger deals during fiscal
2019; and (iv) as a result of the foregoing, Carbonite lacked any
reasonable for issuing its positive projections and financial
forecasts.

Finally, on July 25, 2019, Carbonite announced that it was
withdrawing its Server Backup VM Edition product from the
marketplace and consequently dramatically lowered its financial
projections for fiscal 2019 and 2020. That same day, the strongest
proponent and supporter of Server Backup VM Edition, Defendant Ali,
announced he was leaving Carbonite. On this news, Carbonite stock
declined more than 24%, from $23.90 per share when the market
closed on July 25, 2019, to $18.01 per share when the market closed
on July 26, 2019, on extremely heavy trading volume, the complaint
relates.

Plaintiff purchased the common stock of Carbonite during the Class
Period.

Defendant Carbonite, headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts, is a
software company that provides cloud-based backup services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     THEODORE M. HESS-MAHAN, ESQ.
     HUTCHINGS BARSAMIAN, ESQ.
     MANDELCORN, LLP
     110 Cedar Street, Suite 250
     Wellesley Hills, MA 02481
     Phone: 781-431-2231
     Fax: 781/431-8726
     Email: thess-mahan@hutchingsbarsamian.com

          - and -

     SAMUEL H. RUDMAN, ESQ.
     VICKI M. DIAMOND, ESQ.
     ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
     58 South Service Road, Suite 200
     Melville, NY 11747
     Phone: 631/367-7100
     Fax: 631/367-1173
     Email: srudman@rgrdlaw.com
            vdiamond@rgrdlaw.com

          - and -

     GURI ADEMI, ESQ.
     ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
     3620 East Layton Avenue
     Cudahy, WI 53110
     Phone: 414/482-8000
     Fax: 414/482-8001
     Email: gademi@ademilaw.com


CARDINAL HEALTH: Louisiana Sheriffs' Fund Hits Share Price Drop
---------------------------------------------------------------
LOUISIANA SHERIFFS' PENSION & RELIEF FUND, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CARDINAL
HEALTH, INC., GEORGE S. BARRETT, DONALD M. CASEY, JR., MICHAEL C.
KAUFMANN, JORGE M. GOMEZ, and DAVID J. WILSON, Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-03347-EAS-EP (S.D. Ohio, Aug. 1, 2019) is a securities
class action brought on behalf of all purchasers of Cardinal common
stock between March 2, 2015 and May 2, 2018, inclusive. The claims
asserted in the complaint are alleged against Cardinal and certain
of the Company's senior executives, and arise under Sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder.

This action arises from Defendants' misrepresentations and
omissions relating to Cardinal's integration of Cordis Corp., a
medical device manufacturer Cardinal purchased from Johnson &
Johnson ("J&J") in March 2015, and the inventory and supply chain
problems at Cordis. The Defendants misled investors by stating that
Cordis would benefit from Cardinal's advanced inventory management
and supply chain information technology solutions. In truth, the
inventory tracking and supply chain technology that Defendants said
the Company would use to improve Cordis's performance was never
implemented. Consequently, the Company materially overstated
Cordis's inventory balances by failing to account for significant
amounts of unsellable or expired Cordis medical devices. Further,
Cardinal falsely stated that Cordis was "performing well" and that
the integration of Cordis was "on track," "largely on plan," and
"going incredibly well," while failing to disclose serious supply
chain issues that were hurting the Company's operational
performance and financial results, says the complaint.

The first indications of the truth about Cordis's inventory and
supply chain issues were revealed on August 2, 2017. That day,
Cardinal reported weak earnings for its fourth quarter and fiscal
year 2017 and lowered its earnings guidance for fiscal year 2018
due in part to "higher than-planned write-offs for excess
inventory" at Cordis. On this news, the price of Cardinal stock
declined over 8 percent. The Defendants, however, falsely assured
Cardinal's investors that Cordis's operational deficiencies had
been addressed, that the Company had built the necessary
infrastructure and IT systems for Cordis such that it now had
"visibility" of Cordis's inventory, and that the Cordis business
was "going into a phase of a lot more stability."

Then, on May 3, 2018, Cardinal announced disappointing results for
its third quarter fiscal year 2018 and cut its fiscal year 2018
earnings guidance. The Company explained that the "biggest variable
driving these results" was the "disappointing performance" of the
Cordis business. On this news, the Company's stock price dropped
over 21 percent. The Company subsequently took a $1.4 billion
non-cash goodwill impairment charge driven by continued "inventory
and cost challenges within the Cordis business" representing almost
70% of Cordis's acquisition price, adds the complaint.

Plaintiff Louisiana Sheriffs is a multi-employer, defined benefit,
governmental retirement plan providing retirement, disability and
death benefits to approximately 25,000 active and retired employees
of the sheriff's offices in all 64 Louisiana parishes.

Cardinal is a global, integrated healthcare services and products
company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Todd A. Long, Esq.
     MCNEES WALLACE & NURICK LLC
     21 East State Street, Suite 1700
     Columbus, OH 43215
     Phone: (614) 719-2843
     Facsimile: (614) 614-469-4653
     Email: tlong@mcneeslaw.com

          - and -

     Avi Josefson, Esq.
     Michael D. Blatchley, Esq.
     BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP
     1251 Avenue of the Americas
     New York, NY 10020
     Phone: (212) 554-1400
     Facsimile: (212) 554-1444
     Email: avi@blbglaw.com
            michaelb@blglaw.com

          - and -

     Robert D. Klausner, Esq.
     KLAUSNER KAUFMAN JENSEN & LEVINSON
     7080 Northwest 4th Street
     Plantation, FL 33317
     Phone: (954) 916-1202
     Email: bob@robertdklausner.com


CARGILL INC: Court Narrows Claims in Tavares Labor Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARIBEL TAVARES, individually, and on behalf of other
members of the general public similarly situated and on behalf of
other aggrieved employees pursuant to the California Private
Attorneys General Act, Plaintiff, v. CARGILL INCORPORATED, an
unknown business entity; CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS CORP., an unknown
business entity, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-00792-DAD-SKO (E.D.
Cal.), Judge Dale A. Drozd of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California granted in part and denied in part
the Defendants' motions to dismiss Tavares' first amended complaint
("FAC").

The case was originally filed in Fresno County Superior Court on
April 20, 2018, and removed to the federal court on June 8, 2018
under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.  The Plaintiff filed
the FAC on July 12, 2018.

In her FAC, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants jointly and
severally employed the Plaintiff as an hourly-paid, non-exempt
employee from approximately April 2013 to approximately February
2017 in Fresno County.  According to her, the Defendants were her
joint employers because they had the authority to hire and
terminate Plaintiff and other class members, exercised sufficient
authority over the terms and conditions governing their employment,
and supervised their daily employment activities.  The Defendants
continue to employ hourly-paid or non-exempt employees within
California.

The Defendants engaged in a pattern and practice of wage abuse
against their hourly-paid or non-exempt employees by failing to pay
them for all regular and/or overtime wages earned and for missed
meal periods and rest breaks.  The Plaintiff and the other class
members worked over eight hours in a day and/or 40 hours in a week
during their employment with the Defendants.

Additionally, the Plaintiff and the other class members were
regularly required to perform unpaid work before clocking in and
after clocking out for each shift due to time spent donning and
doffing necessary uniforms and equipment.  Similarly, the Plaintiff
and the class members were not provided with uninterrupted meal and
rest periods, free from being required to perform work duties,
since they were required to spend time donning and doffing
necessary uniforms and equipment.

The Plaintiff and the other class members did not receive all wages
owed to them for the unpaid work they had performed upon their
discharge or resignation.  The Defendants did not provide accurate
wage statements or keep complete and accurate payroll records
because they used a time-keeping system that failed to record all
hours worked by the Plaintiff and the class members and
consistently shaved time in their own favor by rounding time
punches.  Finally, the Defendants failed to reimburse the Plaintiff
and the class members for business-related expenses for the
specific uniforms and protective equipment -- such as boots, cold
suits, and protective helmets -- which the Defendants required
employees to purchase and maintain.

The Plaintiff's FAC asserts the following nine causes of action:
(1) failure to pay overtime wages in violation of California Labor
Code Sections 510 and 1198; (2) failure to provide lawful meal
periods in violation of Labor Code Sections 226.7 and 512(a); (3)
failure to provide lawful rest periods in violation of Labor Code
Sections 226.7; (4) failure to pay minimum wage in violation of
Labor Code Sections 1194, 1197, and 1197.1; (5) failure to pay
wages due at termination in violation of Labor Code Sections 201
and 202; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements
in violation of Labor Code Section 226(a); (7) failure to reimburse
business expenses in violation of Labor Code Sections 2800 and
2802; (8) violation of California's unfair competition law ("UCL")
codified at California Business & Professions Code Sections 17200,
et seq.; and (9) a claim under California's Private Attorney
General Act ("PAGA") under Labor Code Sections 2698, et seq.

The matter is before the Court on motions to dismiss the FAC.  They
move to dismiss each of the Plaintiff's nine causes of action in
which violations of the Labor Code are asserted, arguing that the
Plaintiff's FAC fails to allege facts sufficient to state
cognizable claims.  The Plaintiff filed an opposition to these
motions on Sept. 19, 2018, and the Defendants replied on Sept. 25,
2018.  The Court heard oral argument on Oct. 2, 2018.

Judge Drozd finds that the FAC does not include any factual
allegations indicating how, under what circumstances or when the
Plaintiff was allegedly required to work off-the-clock, or what
work she purportedly performed when required to do so.  The only
other potential relevant factual allegation in the FAC is that
off-the-clock work, included, but was not limited to, time spent
"donning and doffing necessary uniforms and equipment."  Even if
this allegation were construed to relate to an overtime and minimum
wage claim based on uncompensated work time, the Plaintiff has not
alleged any facts that, if proven, would show that this time was
not compensated nor that would show how it should have been
compensated.  Therefore, the Plaintiff's first and fourth causes of
action will be dismissed.

In her opposition to the Defendants' motions, the Plaintiff states
that her meal and rest period claims are "derivative of the
Plaintiff's unpaid wage claims because they are largely based upon
the Defendants' off-the-clock work requirements."  As discussed
above, the Judge has also concluded that the Plaintiff's FAC fails
to allege sufficient facts to state cognizable unpaid overtime and
unpaid minimum wage claims.  The Plaintiff's derivative claims as
alleged also fail.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff's second and third
causes of action will also be dismissed.

The Defendants argue that fifth claim too is unsupported by any
factual allegations regarding "when or what work the Defendants
required the Plaintiff to perform" or if "the Plaintiff is claiming
the Defendants failed to pay final wages within the allowable
window."  The Judge finds tha the FAC employs conclusory
allegations that merely repeat the language of the applicable
statutory provisions and does not provide any supporting factual
allegations.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff's fifth cause of action
will also be dismissed.

In her opposition, the Plaintiff states that her claim for failure
to provide accurate itemized wage statements arises from the
allegations of unpaid time worked.  However, the JUdge has
concluded that the Plaintiff's FAC fails to allege cognizable
unpaid overtime and unpaid minimum wage claims.  Therefore, he
cannot find the derivative non-compliant wage statement claim to be
cognizable.  For these reasons, the Plaintiff's sixth cause of
action will also be dismissed.

The Plaintiff's seventh cause of action is also subject to
dismissal.  The Judge finds that although the Plaintiff includes a
general allegation in the FAC that she and prospective class
members were not reimbursed for required uniforms and equipment
such as boots, cold suits, and protective helmets, she fails to
allege any single specific cost incurred that was not fully
reimbursed by the Defendant.  Instead, the Plaintiff's conclusory
allegations again merely mirror the language of the statute without
any supporting factual allegations.

Because the Plaintiff has not adequately pled her wage and hour
claims, her UCL claim also fails.  The Judge also observes that the
FAC does not contain any non-conclusory factual allegations
regarding the Defendants' alleged unfair or fraudulent business
practices.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff's eighth cause of action
must also be dismissed.

The Judge holds it cannot be said at this stage of the litigation
that the Plaintiff's PAGA claim is time-barred because it is
possible that she filed her initial complaint within the
limitations period.  Therefore, the Defendants' motions to dismiss
on that ground will be denied without prejudice.

The Plaintiff alleges that her employment with the Defendant ended
in February 2017.  The Plaintiff has not alleged any intention of,
or interest in, seeking to return to work for the Defendants in the
future.  Therefore, as a former employee, the Plaintiff has not
shown a likelihood of future injury that is a real and immediate.
Accordingly, the Defendants' motions to dismiss the Plaintiff's
request for injunctive relief will be granted.

Defendant Cargill's motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's joint
employer and all allegations as to Defendant Cargill will be
denied.  The Judge finds that the Plaintiff alleges that both
Defendants Cargill and CMSC had the authority to hire and terminate
her and the other class members, exercised sufficient authority
over the terms and conditions governing their employment, and
supervised their daily employment activities.  These allegations
are sufficient to state a claim against Defendant Cargill on the
basis of its joint employment of the Plaintiff.

Finally, at the hearing on the pending motion, the Plaintiff's
counsel represented that she could, if permitted, allege additional
facts in support of her claims rendering them facially plausible.
In addition, her counsel requested leave to amend to provide
additional factual allegations regarding her dates of employment
and in support of equitable tolling of the applicable statute of
limitations with respect to the fourth, sixth, and seventh causes
of action.  Finally, the Plaintiff may be able to allege facts
regarding her desire for future employment with the Defendants in
support of her request for injunctive relief.  The Defendants have
not shown that they will suffer prejudice if the Plaintiff is
granted further leave to amend.  Given these considerations, the
dismissal of the Plaintiff's FAC will be without prejudice in all
respects, and the Plaintiff will be granted leave to file a second
amended complaint.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Drozd granted in part the
Defendants' motions to dismiss with leave to amend.  Any amended
complaint will be filed within 28 days from the date of service of
the order.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 3, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/yv11Xq from Leagle.com.

Maribel Tavares, individually and on behalf of other members of the
general public similarly situated and on behalf of the aggrieved
employees pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act,
Plaintiff, represented by Cody R. Kennedy, Marlin & Saltzman LLP,
Edwin Aiwazian -- edwin@lfjpc.com -- Lawyers for Justice, PC,
Stanley D. Saltzman -- ssaltzman@marlinsaltzman.com -- Marlin &
Saltzman, LLP & William Anthony Baird, Marlin & Saltzman, LLP.

Cargill, Incorporated, an unknown business entity & Cargill Meat
Solution Corp., an unknown business entity, Defendants, represented
by Jason Eric Barsanti -- jbarsanti@cozen.com -- COZEN O'CONNOR &
Tina Syring-Petrocchi, Cozen O'Connor, pro hac vice.


CARRINGTON MORTGAGE: Court Dismisses MFDCPA Claims in Miller Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Jon D. Levy of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maine granted in part and denied in part Carrington Mortgage's
motion to dismiss the case, JAMES F. MILLER, Individually and on
Behalf of Himself and Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v.
CARRINGTON MORTGAGE SERVICES, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-00016-JDL (D. Me.).

Miller brings the putative class action against Carrington
Mortgage, alleging that various communications he received from
Carrington Mortgage after his bankruptcy discharge violated the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), and the Maine Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act ("MFDCPA").

On July 21, 2008, Miller and his then-wife executed a promissory
note and mortgage in favor of Countrywide Bank, FSB, in the amount
of $64,980 to finance the purchase of their home in Washburn,
Maine.  In 2010, Miller and his wife separated, and they started to
fall behind on the loan. The loan has been in arrears ever since.
In October 2011, Miller and his wife divorced, and she conveyed her
interest in the property to Miller.  Miller continued living at the
Washburn property for a short time, but he was unable to keep up
with the loan payments and fell further behind.  Miller then moved
to Gray, Maine, in February 2012.

In November 2012, Miller filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maine.  By that time, the
mortgage had been assigned to Bank of America, which had begun
servicing the loan.  Bank of America received notice of the
bankruptcy filing and all subsequent filings and orders in the
bankruptcy case.  As part of his Chapter 7 Individual Debtor's
Statement of Intention in the bankruptcy case, Miller stated that
he would surrender the Washburn property.  Miller received his
bankruptcy discharge in February 2013, which resulted in the
discharge of any personal obligation that Miller had on the
mortgage loan.  Miller has not made a payment on the mortgage loan
since before he filed for bankruptcy.

Carrington Mortgage began servicing Miller's loan in September 2016
and at that time received from Bank of America the documentation of
Miller's bankruptcy case and discharge.  From late 2016 until early
2018, a Carrington Mortgage representative called Miller every
couple of months about resolving the amounts he purportedly owed on
the loan. Each time the representative called, Miller informed them
that he had moved out of and surrendered the Washburn property, and
that he had received a bankruptcy discharge. During the same time
period, Carrington Mortgage also mailed a notice regarding debt
relief and several notices regarding the purchase of force-placed
hazard insurance for the Washburn property to Miller, but they were
sent to an incorrect address in Gray and Miller did not receive
them.  In July 2017, the loan was assigned to Wilmington Savings
Fund Society, FSB, as trustee for Sandwich Mortgage Loan Trust.
Carrington Mortgage continued to service the loan.

On May 9, 2018, Miller was served with a summons and foreclosure
complaint for a state foreclosure action for the Washburn property,
which was brought by Wilmington Savings.  The original foreclosure
complaint alleged that only Miller's exwife was in default on the
note and in breach of the mortgage, but Wilmington Savings later
filed an amended complaint that sought to hold Miller liable for
any deficiency balance remaining due after the sale of the property
and application of the proceeds of the sale.  With the help of an
attorney, Miller alerted Wilmington Savings' counsel to the fact
that he was not personally liable for any deficiency balance on the
loan because of his bankruptcy discharge.  Wilmington Savings
amended the foreclosure complaint again to remove the request for a
deficiency from Miller.

While the foreclosure case was pending, Carrington Mortgage sent
Miller a series of mortgage statements, as well as letters
notifying him that a hazard insurance policy had been purchased for
which Miller would be required to pay, each of which Miller alleges
violate the FDCPA and the MFDCPA.  The complaint alleges that the
mortgage statements, the insurance letters, and the foreclosure
complaint seeking a deficiency judgment against Miller caused
Miller "severe emotional distress and anxiety" and led him to worry
that "he would never be free from demands for payment of the Loan
and also that somehow Carrington might have found a way of getting
around the bankruptcy discharge protections."

The complaint asserts violations of four provisions of the FDCPA
and the MFDCPA.  Specifically, the complaint alleges that through
the telephone calls, forced-placed hazard insurance letters,
foreclosure complaint, and monthly mortgage statements, Carrington
Mortgage: (1) falsely represented the character, amount, and legal
status of the loan debt; (2) used false representations and
deceptive means to collect on the loan debt; (3) engaged in conduct
the natural consequence of which was to harass, oppress, or abuse
Miller in connection with the mortgage debt by attempting to
collect the debt despite knowing of the bankruptcy discharge, and
(4) used unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to
collect on the mortgage loan.

At the pleading stage, Judge Levy finds that Carrington Mortgage
has not demonstrated, as a matter of law, that its disclaimer
language is sufficiently clear that it is implausible that an
unsophisticated debtor would believe that the company was
attempting to collect a debt from the debtor personally.  He
therefore concludes that the complaint, considered alongside the
mortgage statements, plausibly alleges that "one of the animating
purposes" of the statements "was to induce payment" by Miller.

The Judge also concludes that the Complaint plausibly alleges that
the force-placed hazard insurance letters constitute debt
collection under the FDCPA.  Hazard insurance is an obligation to
pay money that arises out of the mortgage transaction between the
creditor and the debtor.  Therefore, a demand for payment of hazard
insurance is fairly treated as debt collection under the FDCPA.

Next, absent any legal support for the imposition of vicarious
liability on Carrington Mortgage for the actions of Wilmington
Savings, the Judge declines to impose such liability.  He finds
that the complaint does not allege that Wilmington Savings was
acting as Carrington Mortgage's agent when it filed the amended
foreclosure complaint.  Furthermore, because Wilmington Savings is
the creditor and enlisted Carrington Mortgage to service the loan,
it would be implausible to infer that that was the case.

Because the FDCPA and MFDCPA claims alleged in the complaint are
not based solely on the phone calls, however, they are not subject
to dismissal.  Rather, the complaint plausibly alleges that the
mortgage statements and force-placed hazard insurance letters that
Carrington Mortgage sent to Miller constitute debt collection under
the FDCPA and, therefore, the complaint states a claim under the
FDCPA.

Finally, the Judge concludes that the Bankruptcy Code impliedly
preempts the MFDCPA and therefore, the MFDCPA claims asserted in
the complaint are dismissed.  He finds that the only remedy
provided for in the MFDCPA that does not "overlap" with a remedy
available under the Bankruptcy Code is an award of statutory
damages of $1,000.  Therefore, this is not a case where there is
"no comparable overlap between a specific remedy available under
the Bankruptcy Code" and the state law cause of action.   In fact,
the opposite is true: there is a complete overlap in remedy, with
the exception of the statutory damages for which the MFDCPA
provides.  That difference, however, is not enough to show that the
MFDCPA is not pre-empted by the Bankruptcy Code.  To the contrary,
because the Congress has plenary power to enact uniform federal
bankruptcy laws, states may not pass or enforce laws to interfere
with or complement the Bankruptcy Act or to provide additional or
auxiliary regulations.

For the reasons stated , Judge Levy granted in part and denied in
part Carrington Mortgage's Motion to Dismiss.  He granted the
Motion with respect to claims brought under the MFDCPA, which are
accordingly dismissed.  He denied in partT with respect to claims
brought under the FDCPA.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 3, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/9k3MB5 from Leagle.com.

JAMES F MILLER, individually and on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by ANDREA BOPP STARK --
andrea@molleurlaw.com -- NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CHARLES
DELBAUM -- cdelbaum@nclc.org -- NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, pro
hac vice & ELIZABETH A. MILLER, MOLLEUR LAW OFFICE, pro hac vice.

CARRINGTON MORTGAGE SERVICES LLC, Defendant, represented by CELIA
C. FALZONE -- celia.falzone@akerman.com -- AKERMAN LLP, MARC J.
GOTTLIEB -- marc.gottlieb@akerman.com -- AKERMAN LLP, DAVID B.
MCCONNELL -- dmcconnell@perkinsthompson.com -- PERKINS THOMPSON,
PA, DAWN M. HARMON -- dharmon@perkinsthompson.com -- PERKINS
THOMPSON, PA & JOSEPH G. TALBOT -- jtalbot@perkinsthompson.com --
PERKINS THOMPSON, PA.


CELLULAR SALES OF KNOXVILLE: Seeks Arbitration of Deardorff Case
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Defendants in the case captioned as JESSICA DEARDORFF; and
DAVID CHAPMAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CELLULAR SALES OF KNOXVILLE, INC.; CELLULAR
SALES OF PENNSYLVANIA, LLC; and CELLULAR SALES OF NORTH CAROLINA,
LLC, Case No. 2:19-cv-02642 (E.D. Pa., June 18, 2019) filed a
motion to compel individual arbitration and to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' claims on July 29, 2019. The case is assigned to Judge
Nitza Quinones Alejandr.

Cellular Sales of Knoxville, Inc. provides telecommunication
products and services. The Company offers retail of basic phones,
smartphones, tablets, and mobile broadband, as well as provides
internet and home phone services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Deirdre A. Aaron, Esq.
          Molly A. Brookes, Esq.
          Maya S. Jumper, Esq.
          OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
          685 Third Avenue, 25th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 245-1000
          Facsimile: (646) 509-2060
          E-mail: daaron@outtengolden.com
                  mb@outtengolden.com
                  mjumper@outtengolden.com

               - and -

          Michael J.D. Sweeney, Esq.
          GETMAN SWEENEY & DUNN, PLLC
          260 Fair Street
          Kingston, NY 12401
          Telephone: (845) 255-9370
          Facsimile: (845) 255-8649
          E-mail: msweeney@getmansweeney.com


CENIKOR FOUNDATION: Williams Suit Transferred to S.D. Texas
-----------------------------------------------------------
The case, SHELBY LEE WILLIAMS and RANDY EDWARD POUNCY, Individually
and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiffs, v.
CENIKOR FOUNDATION and WILLIAM BAILEY, the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-00229 (Filed May 22, 2019), was transferred from the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, to the U.S.
District Court for the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas (Houston) on Aug. 1, 2019. The Southern District
of Texas Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:19-cv-02828 to the
proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Keith P.
Ellison. The suit alleges violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Curt Christopher Hesse, Esq.
          Bridget Dale Davidson, Esq.
          Melissa Moore, Esq.
          MOORE & ASSOCIATES
          440 Louisiana Street, Ste 675
          Houston, TX 77002-1637
          Telephone: (713) 222-6775
          Facsimile: (713) 222-6739
          E-mail: curt@mooreandassociates.net
                  bridget@mooreandassociates.net

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          David Mitchell Gregory, Esq.
          LOCKE LORD ET AL
          600 Travis, Ste 2800
          Houston, TX 77002
          Telephone: (713) 226-1344
          Facsimile: (713) 229-2630
          E-mail: dgregory@lockelord.com

CHEERLEADERS GENTLEMEN'S: Exotic Dancer Sues Over Wages
-------------------------------------------------------
Torsten Ove, writing for Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, reports that a
former dancer at a Downtown strip club has sued the club for not
paying her and other dancers anything beyond tips from patrons.

In a federal suit, Franchesca Reyes said Cheerleaders Gentlemen's
Club on Liberty Avenue and its director illegally classifies
dancers as "independent contractors" and not employees.

As a contractor, she and her lawyers said, she didn't get paid
anything from the club and only collected tips.

In addition, she said she had to share those tips with the club and
employees who don't get tips, such as bouncers. She said she also
had to pay a "house fee" to the club for each shift she worked.

The suit is seeking class-action status for other dancers. Another
former Cheerleaders dancer brought a similar complaint in federal
court two years ago that also sought class-action status, but later
dropped the complaint.

Ms. Reyes, of Bridgeville, worked at Cheerleaders for about a year,
from August 2016 to July 2017.

She said she worked six-hour shifts five times a week and the club
treated her and other dancers as employees, including requiring
them to audition, making them sign in and sign out and having them
wear a wrist band to keep track of how many lap dances they did.

Under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, according to the suit,
she and the other dancers should have been classified as employees
and not contractors and thus eligible for minimum wage.

The suit is seeking unpaid wages for Ms. Reyes and other dancers,
claiming the club is in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act
as well as the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act.

In addition to the club, the suit names as defendants its corporate
owners, Mag Pitt LLC and Mag Pitt LLP, and co-owner John Meehan.

The club's lawyer didn't immediately respond to a request for
comment. [GN]


CONOCOPHILLIPS: Duffy Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------
JOHN DUFFY, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiffs, v. CONOCOPHILLIPS and CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY,
Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-02877 (S.D. Tex., Aug. 2, 2019) is a
lawsuit seeking to recover unpaid overtime wages and other damages
from Defendants under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Plaintiff and the other workers like him regularly worked for
Conoco in excess of 40 hours each week. But these workers never
received overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a
single workweek. Instead of paying overtime as required by the
FLSA, Conoco improperly classified Plaintiff and similarly situated
workers as independent contractors and paid them a daily rate with
no overtime compensation. This collective action seeks to recover
the unpaid overtime wages and other damages owed to these workers.

Duffy worked for Conoco from approximately 2013 until 2018.

Conoco is an oil and natural gas exploration and production company
operating worldwide and throughout the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
     Andrew Dunlap, Esq.
     Taylor A. Jones, Esq.
     JOSEPHSON DUNLAP
     11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
     Houston, TX 77046
     Phone: 713-352-1100
     Facsimile: 713-352-3300
     Email: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
            adunlap@mybackwages.com
            tjones@mybackwages.com

          - and -

     Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
     BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
     8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
     Houston, TX 77046
     Phone: (713) 877-8788
     Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
     Email: dmoulton@brucknerburch.com


CORELOGIC RENTAL: Court OKs Class Certification in Feliciano
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for
Class Certification in the case captioned CLAUDINNE FELICIANO,
Plaintiff, v. CORELOGIC RENTAL PROPERTY SOLUTIONS, LLC, Defendant.
No. 17 Civ. 5507 (AKH). (S.D.N.Y.).

This case is about alleged inaccuracies in tenant data registries.
Plaintiff Claudinne Feliciano, on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, filed suit against defendant CoreLogic Rental
Property Solutions, LLC, alleging violations of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA) and under the New York Fair Credit Reporting
Act (NYFCRA), General Business Law (GBL).Plaintiff alleges that
defendant has failed to insure the accuracy of bulk tenant data
before selling the data and the resulting reports to prospective
landlords, who rely on them to assess and screen potential
tenants.

The Plaintiff moves for class certification of a class defined as
all persons who within two years prior to the commencement of this
action (1) were the subject of a credit report prepared by
CoreLogic (2) prior to the issuance of the credit report, were a
party in a Housing Court proceeding filed in a New York State
court, which had a disposition of dismissed, discontinued or
withdrawn and (3) the CoreLogic credit report referenced the
Housing Court proceeding but failed to include such disposition.

The Plaintiff seeks certification of the class pursuant to Rule
23(b)(3), which is satisfied when the court finds that the
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

Standing

As a preliminary matter, defendant challenges class members'
standing to assert their claims. To establish injury in fact, a
plaintiff must show that he or she suffered an invasion of a
legally protected interest  that is `concrete and particularized'
and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.
Feliciano's rental application was denied on the basis of her
ScorePlus Score, of which her inaccurate Housing Court case
disposition status was a contributing factor. The Court holds that
Feliciano has suffered a concrete and particularized injury and has
standing to assert her claims.

Personal Jurisdiction

Defendant argues that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over
certain out-of-state class members. The argument is irrelevant.
Jurisdiction is based on the collection of data in New York state
courts, wherever the class member resides. In light of this
connection to the forum, defendant's citation to Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco Cty., 137
S.Ct. 1773, 1775 (2017), is inapplicable.

Numerosity

Certification is appropriate when the number of class members is
sufficiently large so that joinder of all members would make
litigation needlessly complicated and inefficient. In this Circuit,
numerosity is presumed at a level of 40 members, although the
determination of practicability depends on all the circumstances
surrounding the case, not on mere numbers.

CoreLogic does not contest numerosity, and the proposed class
satisfies the numerosity requirement.

Commonality

The second requirement under Rule 23(a) is that the action must
raise questions of law or fact common to the class. Even a single
common question of law or fact may suffice to satisfy the
commonality requirement.

This case presents a number of common questions. See Br. at 19.
These include whether defendant maintained a uniform practice of
publishing inaccurate Housing Court disposition statuses; whether
such inaccurate reporting violates the FCRA and NYFCRA; whether
defendant followed reasonable procedures to ensure the accuracy of
its records; whether the alleged conduct was willful; the
appropriate amount of statutory damages; and the possible award of
punitive damages.

Defendant argues that a number of individual issues preclude class
certification. These include 1) variations in the timing of data 2)
number of updates or audits to the file3) case-specific barriers to
information updates, such as loss of terminal access and 4)
variations in procedures adopted by different data collectors and
vendors, including CoreLogic, LexisNexis, and LexisNexis'
subcontractor NYE. All of these information resources ultimately
derived from the same New York Housing Court sources. These issues
ultimately address a single, uniform inquiry: whether defendant's
information collection procedures were sufficient and reasonable.


The commonality requirement is satisfied by the proposed class.

Typicality

The third prerequisite to a class action, known as typicality, is
that the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class. The third and
fourth requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge with the
commonality requirement, as all three serve as guideposts for
determining whether under the particular circumstances maintenance
of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiff's
claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests
of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in
their absence.

The fact that records of plaintiff were derived solely from records
collected by CoreLogic, and not as a result of data acquired by
LexisNexis, does not distinguish her from prospective class members
whose data derived from alternative sources. Feliciano's claims are
typical of the class and arise out of the same allegations and
claims. There are no individualized claims or defenses.

The proposed class meets the requirements of typicality.

Adequacy

The last prerequisite to a class action is whether the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class, known as the adequacy requirement.  That
determination requires a two pronged inquiry: (1) class counsel
must be `qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the
litigation; and (2) class members must not have antagonistic
interests to one another.

Feliciano has actively participated in the litigation up to the
present time. There is no indication that she possesses any
interests adverse to the class. Plaintiff's counsel is experienced
in the relevant law and in conducting class actions. Feliciano and
her counsel are adequate class representatives.

Rule 23(b)(3)

Predominance

The predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are
sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.
The predominance inquiry `asks whether the common,
aggregation-enabling, issues in the case are more prevalent or
important than the non-common, aggregation-defeating, individual
issues.

With the class, common issues predominate individual issues. The
allegations as to CoreLogic's collection, updating, and reporting
of case information are common to all members of the class. Because
the class seeks statutory damages, there is no requirement for
individual class members to demonstrate actual harm or for
determination of damages. A finding of predominance is consistent
with other FRCA cases.  

Defendant argues that individual issues especially the accuracy of
the individual reports and the willfulness of CoreLogic
predominate. Whether a report is accurate may involve an
individualized inquiry. Here, defendant takes the position that the
accuracy, timing, and technique used to acquire Housing Court data
of each class member would require individualized class
determinations. Moreover, it argues that its methods have varied
over time, creating an individualized question of reasonableness in
each case.

Defendant's arguments are not persuasive. To the extent that the
reports' accuracy entails differentiated determinations, these are
straightforward issues apparent on the basis of documentary
evidence. Moreover, to the extent that defendant would seek to
preemptively litigate any and all possible defenses, and the
reasonableness of CoreLogic and its partners' information
aggregation procedures, these are merits issues not suited to the
class certification inquiry.

Common issues predominate within the proposed class.

Superiority

The superiority requirement asks courts to balance, in terms of
fairness and efficiency, the advantages of a class action against
those of alternative available methods of adjudication.

Here, a class action represents a superior method of resolving the
controversy. There are significant efficiency gains to aggregation,
and the use of a class action will enable members of the class to
prosecute claims even for relatively modest statutory damages.

Ascertainability

A class is ascertainable when defined by objective criteria that
are administratively feasible and when identifying its members
would not require a mini-hearing on the merits of each case.

The class, based on documented records produced by CoreLogic, is
ascertainable. From a list of 4,229 Housing Court Reports issued
during the relevant period, plaintiff's counsel cross-checked court
records in New York, Queens, Staten Island, Kings, and Bronx
counties, identifying 3,996 matching proceedings. In 2,605 of those
cases, the courts had recorded a disposition of the cases before
the relevant report had issued, leading to an inaccurate report.
The individuals associated with this cases constitute the scope of
the class.

Defendant makes much of the fact that the determination of the
class, and the procedures complained of, both ultimately derive
from the same source, Housing Court records. This line of attack is
unpersuasive. Contrary to defendant's arguments, plaintiff does not
take the position that the records available at Housing Court
public access terminals are intrinsically unreliable. Rather,
defendant's alleged failures in developing suitable procedures to
access and update the information forms that basis of plaintiff's
claim.

The identity of the prospective class members is thus sufficiently
definite. Accordingly, the proposed class meets the requirements
for acertainability.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's motion to certify the class is
granted. In light of good cause shown and consistent with the
Court's prior order, defendant's motion to seal is granted.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 29, 2019 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yy4mntoz from
Leagle.com.

Claudinne Feliciano, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Seth Richard Lesser
-- seth@klafterolsen.com -- Klafter, Olsen & Lesser, LLP, Alexis
Helene Castillo -- alexis.castillo@klafterolsen.com -- Klafter,
Olsen & Lesser, LLP, Andrew Palmer Bell, Locks Law Firm PLLC, 457
Haddonfield Road, Ste 500 Cherry Hill, NJ 08002, Reuben Jeffrey
Fuller-Bennett, Fishman Rozen LLP & James B. Fishman, Fishman Rozen
LLP, 305 Broadway, New York, NY 10007

Corelogic Saferent, LLC, Defendant, represented by Joshua Aaron
Dachs -- joshua.dachs@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders LLP, Ronald
I. Raether, Jr. -- ron.raether@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders
LLP, pro hac vice & Timothy James St. George --
tim.st.george@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders LLP.

LexisNexis Risk Data Retrieval Services LLC, Interested Party,
represented by Michael Bruce Miller -- mbmiller@mofo.com --
Morrison & Foerster LLP.


CREDITREPAIR.COM INC: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Forrest Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
RAY FORREST, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CREDITREPAIR.COM, INC., Defendant, Case No.
0:19-cv-61930 (S.D. Fla., July 31, 2019) seeks to stop the
Defendants' practice of making unsolicited calls. The case is
assigned to Judge William P. Dimitrouleas and referred to
Magistrate Lurana S. Snow.

Creditrepair.com, Inc. is a Florida corporation engaged in
providing consumer credit reporting services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
          Thomas J. Patti, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI
          110 SE 6th Street, Suite 1744
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 907-1136
          Facsimile: (855) 529-9540
          E-mail: jibrael@jibraellaw.com
                  tom@jibraellaw.com


CURLKIT LLC: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Addo Suit Claims
---------------------------------------------------------
DARCEY ADDO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CURLKIT, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
6:19-cv-01402 (M.D. Fla., July 30, 2019) seeks to stop the
Defendants' practice of making unsolicited calls. The case is
assigned to Judge Wendy W. Berger.

Curlkit, LLC is a New Jersey limited liability company which offers
natural hair brands for women in the market, which covers all the
needs for simple house hold lady to a top fashion model. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 1205
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (305) 479-2299
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
                  gberg@shamisgentile.com

              - and -

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          Jordan D. Utanski, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, PA
          19495 Biscayne Blvd #607
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (305) 975-3320
          E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com
                  utanski@edelsberglaw.com


DAVID NOLAN GALLERY: Picon Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website
---------------------------------------------------------------
YELITZA PICON AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiffs, v. DAVID NOLAN GALLERY, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-07244 (S.D. N.Y., Aug. 2, 2019) is a civil rights
action against Defendant for its failure to design, construct,
maintain, and operate its website to be fully accessible to and
independently usable by Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired people.

The Defendant's denial of full and equal access to its website, and
therefore denial of its products and services offered thereby and
in conjunction with its physical location, is a violation of
Plaintiff's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), says the complaint.

Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in
Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that
Defendant's website will become and remain accessible to blind and
visually-impaired consumers.

Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person who
requires screen-reading software to read website content using her
computer.

Defendant operates its art gallery as well as the Website and
advertises, markets, and operates in the State of New York and
throughout the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
     Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
     GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
     150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
     New York, NY 10003-2461
     Phone: (212) 228-9795
     Email: nyjg@aol.com
            danalgottlieb@aol.com


DEL TACO: Discovery Ongoing in Former Calif. Employee's Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Del Taco Restaurants, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 29, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 18, 2019, that discovery is still
ongoing in the class action suit initiated by a former employee of
the company.

In March 2014, a former Del Taco employee filed a purported class
action complaint alleging that Del Taco has not appropriately
provided meal breaks and failed to pay wages to its California
hourly employees.

Discovery is in process and Del Taco intends to assert all of its
defenses to this threatened class action and the individual claims.


Del Taco has several defenses to the action that it believes could
prevent the certification of the class, as well as the potential
assessment of any damages on a class basis.

Del Taco said, "Legal proceedings are inherently unpredictable, and
the Company is not able to predict the ultimate outcome or cost of
the unresolved matter. However, based on management's current
understanding of the relevant facts and circumstances, the Company
does not believe that these proceedings give rise to a probable or
estimable loss and should not have a material adverse effect on the
Company's financial position, operations or cash flows. Therefore,
Del Taco has not recorded any amount for the claim as of June 18,
2019."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Del Taco Restaurants, Inc. operates a chain of fast food
restaurants. The company consists of two separate Mexican fast-food
groups, 79 Del Taco units and 36 Taco Villa restaurants. The
company offers Mexican food items, such as tacos, burritos,
quesadillas, burgers, French fries, and soft drinks. The company
was incorporated in 1983 and is based in Atlanta, Georgia. Del Taco
Restaurants operates as a subsidiary of W.R. Grace & Co.


DHALIWAL LABS: Perez et al Sue over Collection of Biometric Data
----------------------------------------------------------------
Roxana Perez, Araceli Hernandez, and Maria Jimenez, on behalf of
themselves and similarly situated employees, known and unknown, the
Plaintiffs. vs. Dhaliwal Labs North, LLC, the Defendant, Case No.
2019CH08952 (Ill. Cir., July 31, 2019), alleges that Defendant
obtained confidential and sensitive unique biometric information,
specifically thumbprints of the Plaintiffs and other similarly
situated employees without complying with the requirements of BIPA,
including:

     (1) failing to inform Plaintiffs and similarly situated
employees in writing that such biometric information was being
collected;

     (2) failing to inform Plaintiffs and similarly situated
employees in writing of the specific purpose and length of term for
which such biometric information was being collected, stored or
used; and

     (3) obtaining from Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees
a written release authorizing the collection of such biometric
information, under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act.

According to the complaint, from approximately 2015 until October
2018, Plaintiffs were employed by Defendant as hourly employees.
The Defendant instituted a policy to collect biometric information
from Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees of
Defendant, specifically thumbprints, for the purpose of use on a
biometric clock in and clock out system for the benefit of the
employer.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiffs is:

          Christopher J. Williams, Esq.
          NATIONAL LEGAL ADVOCACY NETWORK
          53 W. Jackson Blvd, Suite 1224
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Telephone: (312) 795-9121

DOORDASH INC: Faces Arkin Suit over Delivery Tip Policy
-------------------------------------------------------
ALAN ARKIN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. DOORDASH, INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-04357 (E.D.N.Y., July 29, 2019) alleges that the Defendant
has engaged in unlawful and deceptive acts, practices and
misconduct by misleading the Plaintiff and the consuming public to
believe that the tip amount entered on the Defendant's app would be
received as a tip by the Defendant's delivery workers for their
service.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the Defendant knew, and
failed to disclose, that the tip amount entered by the Plaintiff
and other consumers on the app was received by the Defendant, in
whole or in part, and used to subsidize its cost of doing business.
Had the Plaintiff and other customers known that by entering a tip
on the Defendant's app they were simply contributing to the
Defendant's bottom line, they never would have agreed to pay a tip
using the Defendant's app.

DoorDash, Inc. provides restaurant food delivery services. The
Company develops technology to connect customers with merchants
through an on-demand food delivery application. DoorDash serves
customers in the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Catherine E. Anderson, Esq.
          Oren Giskan, Esq.
          GISKAN SOLOTAROFF
          & ANDERSON LLP
          90 Broad Street 10th floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 847-8315
          E-mail: canderson@gslawny.com
                  ogiskan@gslawny.com

               - and -

          Cory L. Zajdel, Esq.
          Z LAW, LLC
          2345 York Road, Suite #B-13
          Timonium, MD 21903
          Telephone: (443) 213-1977
          E-mail: clz@zlawmaryland.com


EAGLE BANCORP: Glancy Prongay Files Securities Fraud Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP ("GPM") reminds investors of the
upcoming September 23, 2019 deadline to file a lead plaintiff
motion in the class action filed on behalf of Eagle Bancorp, Inc.
("Eagle Bancorp" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: EGBN) investors who
purchased securities between March 2, 2015 and July 17, 2019,
inclusive (the "Class Period").

If you wish to learn more about this action, or if you have any
questions concerning this announcement or your rights or interests
with respect to these matters, please contact Lesley Portnoy,
Esquire, at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, or by email to
shareholders@glancylaw.com or visit our website at
www.glancylaw.com

On December 1, 2017, Aurelius Value published a report alleging
that the Company has been engaged in a pattern of conduct similar
to conduct that preceded previous bank failures, including "large
insider loans that finance the CEO's companies but haven't been
disclosed," and "undisclosed financial entanglements between
largest borrowers and the CEO." Aurelius Value also accused
insiders of treating Eagle Bancorp as their own "private piggy
bank."

On this news, shares of Eagle Bancorp fell $16.20 per share or
24.5% to close at $49.95 per share on December 1, 2017, thereby
injuring investors.

Then, on July 17, 2019, the Company revealed that due to ongoing
internal and government investigations regarding, "the Company's
identification, classification and disclosure of related party
transactions; the retirement of certain former officers and
directors; and the relationship of the Company and certain of its
former officers and directors with a local public official," it
would be facing additional legal costs that would be rising as the
investigation continues.

On this news, shares of Eagle Bancorp fell $14.30 per share, or
nearly 26%, to close at $39.15 per share on July 18, 2019, thereby
further injuring investors.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) that Eagle Bancorp's internal controls and
procedures and compliance policies were inadequate; (2) that the
foregoing shortcoming created a foreseeable risk of heightened
regulatory scrutiny and the need for the Company undertake its own
internal investigations; and (3) that as a result, the Company's
public statements were materially false and misleading at all
relevant times.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired Eagle Bancorp securities
during the Class Period you may move the Court no later than
September 23, 2019 to request appointment as lead plaintiff in this
putative class action lawsuit. To be a member of the class action
you need not take any action at this time; you may retain counsel
of your choice or take no action and remain an absent member of the
class action. If you wish to learn more about this class action, or
if you have any questions concerning this announcement or your
rights or interests with respect to the pending class action
lawsuit, please contact Lesley Portnoy, Esquire, of GPM, 1925
Century Park East, Suite 2100, Los Angeles, California 90067 at
310-201-9150, Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, by email to
shareholders@glancylaw.com, or visit our website at
www.glancylaw.com. If you inquire by email please include your
mailing address, telephone number and number of shares purchased.
[GN]


EAGLE BANCORP: Kahn Swick Files Securities Fraud Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC ("KSF") and KSF partner, former Attorney
General of Louisiana, Charles C. Foti, Jr., remind investors that
they have until September 23, 2019 to file lead plaintiff
applications in a securities class action lawsuit against Eagle
Bancorp, Inc. (NasdaqCM: EGBN), if they purchased the Company's
securities between March 2, 2015 and July 17, 2019, inclusive (the
"Class Period").  This action is pending in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York.

What You May Do

If you purchased shares of Eagle Bancorp and would like to discuss
your legal rights and how this case might affect you and your right
to recover for your economic loss, you may, without obligation or
cost to you, contact KSF Managing Partner Lewis Kahn toll-free at
1-877-515-1850 or via email lewis.kahn@ksfcounsel.com or visit
https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/nasdaqcm-egbn/ to learn more. If
you wish to serve as a lead plaintiff in this class action, you
must petition the Court by September 23, 2019.

About the Lawsuit

Eagle Bancorp and certain of its executives are charged with
failing to disclose material information during the Class Period,
violating federal securities laws.

On July 17, 2019, the Company disclosed an increasing level of
legal expenses resulting from ongoing internal and government
investigations of "the Company's identification, classification and
disclosure of related party transactions; the retirement of certain
former officers and directors; and the relationship of the Company
and certain of its former officers and directors with a local
public official."

On this news, the price of Eagle Bancorp's shares plummeted.

The case is Stein v. Eagle Bancorp, Inc., 19-cv-06873.

Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC, whose partners include the former Louisiana
Attorney General Charles C. Foti, Jr., is a law firm focused on
securities, antitrust and consumer class actions, along with merger
& acquisition and breach of fiduciary litigation against publicly
traded companies on behalf of shareholders. The firm has offices in
New York, California and Louisiana.

To learn more about KSF, you may visit www.ksfcounsel.com.

Contact:

         Lewis Kahn, Esq.
         Managing Partner
         Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC
         1100 Poydras St., Suite 3200
         New Orleans, LA 70163
         Tel.No.: 1-877-515-1850
         Email: lewis.kahn@ksfcounsel.com [GN]


EAGLE BANCORP: Kessler Topaz Files Securities Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP alerts investors
that a securities fraud class action lawsuit has been filed against
Eagle Bancorp, Inc. (Nasdaq:EGBN) on behalf of those who purchased
or otherwise acquired Eagle Bancorp securities between March 2,
2015 and July 17, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period").

Investors who purchased Eagle Bancorp securities during the Class
Period may, no later than September 23, 2019, seek to be appointed
as a lead plaintiff representative of the class. For additional
information or to learn how to participate in this litigation
please visit
www.ktmc.com/eagle-bancorp-inc-securities-class-action.

According to the complaint, Eagle Bancorp operates as the bank
holding company for EagleBank, Inc., which provides commercial and
consumer banking services primarily in the United States.

The Class Period commences on March 2, 2015, when Eagle Bancorp
filed its Annual Report on a Form 10-K with the SEC, announcing
Eagle Bancorp's financial and operating results for the fiscal year
ended December 31, 2014.  The Annual Report stated, in relevant
part, that "[t]he [c]ompany's internal control over financial
reporting includes those policies and procedures that pertain to
the [c]ompany's ability to record, process, summarize and report
reliable financial data. The internal control system contains
monitoring mechanisms, and appropriate actions taken to correct
identified deficiencies."  The Annual Report further stated,
"management believes that the [c]ompany maintained effective
internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2014.
Management's assessment concluded that there were no material
weaknesses within the [c]ompany's internal control structure."

According to the complaint, on July 17, 2019, Eagle Bancorp issued
a press release announcing "Net Income For Second Quarter 2019 of
$37.2 Million and Total Assets of $8.7 Billion." In the press
release, Eagle Bancorp disclosed ongoing internal and government
investigations into its disclosure of related party transactions,
the retirement of certain former officers and directors, and the
relationship of Eagle Bancorp and certain of its former officers
and directors with a local public official.  Following this news,
Eagle Bancorp's stock price fell $14.30 per share, or 26.75%, to
close at $39.15 per share on July 18, 2019.

The complaint alleges that, throughout the Class Period, the
defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (i) Eagle Bancorp's internal controls and procedures
and compliance policies were inadequate; (ii) the foregoing
shortcoming created a foreseeable risk of heightened regulatory
scrutiny and the need for Eagle Bancorp to undertake its own
internal investigations; and (iii) as a result, Eagle Bancorp's
public statements were materially false and misleading at all
relevant times.

Eagle Bancorp investors who wish to discuss this securities fraud
class action lawsuit and their legal options are encouraged to
contact Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP (James Maro, Jr., Esq.
or Adrienne Bell, Esq.) at (844) 887-9500 (toll free) or at
info@ktmc.com.

Eagle Bancorp investors may, no later than September 23, 2019, seek
to be appointed as a lead plaintiff representative of the class
through Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, or other counsel, or may
choose to do nothing and remain an absent class member.  A lead
plaintiff is a representative party who acts on behalf of all class
members in directing the litigation.  In order to be appointed as a
lead plaintiff, the Court must determine that the class member's
claim is typical of the claims of other class members, and that the
class member will adequately represent the class.  Your ability to
share in any recovery is not affected by the decision of whether or
not to serve as a lead plaintiff.

Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check prosecutes class actions in state and
federal courts throughout the country involving securities fraud,
breaches of fiduciary duties and other violations of state and
federal law. Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check is a driving force
behind corporate governance reform, and has recovered billions of
dollars on behalf of institutional and individual investors from
the United States and around the world.  The firm represents
investors, consumers and whistleblowers (private citizens who
report fraudulent practices against the government and share in the
recovery of government dollars).  The complaint in this action was
not filed by Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check. For more information
about Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, please visit
http://www.ktmc.com/

CONTACT:

         James Maro, Jr., Esq.
         Adrienne Bell, Esq.
         Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP
         280 King of Prussia Road
         Radnor, PA 19087
         Tel.No.: (844) 887-9500  (toll free)
                  (610) 667-7706
         Email: info@ktmc.com
                abell@ktmc.com
                jmaro@ktmc.com [GN]


EAGLE BANCORP: Kirby McInerney Files Securities Fraud Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Kirby McInerney LLP announces that a class action
lawsuit has been filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York on behalf of those who acquired Eagle Bancorp,
Inc. (NASDAQ: EGBN) securities during the period from March 2, 2015
to July 17, 2019 (the "Class Period").  Investors have until
September 23, 2019 to apply to the Court to be appointed as lead
plaintiff in the lawsuit.

The lawsuit alleges that Eagle Bancorp concealed from the investing
public that: (i) its internal controls and procedures and
compliance policies were inadequate; and (ii) the foregoing
shortcoming created a foreseeable risk of heightened regulatory
scrutiny and the need for the Company to undertake its own internal
investigations.

On July 17, 2019, Eagle Bancorp disclosed rising legal costs
stemming from ongoing internal and government investigations of
"the Company's identification, classification and disclosure of
related party transactions; the retirement of certain former
officers and directors; and the relationship of the Company and
certain of its former officers and directors with a local public
official." On this news, Eagle Bancorp's stock price fell $14.30,
or 26.8%, to close at $39.10 on July 18, 2019.

If you acquired Eagle Bancorp securities during the Class Period,
have information, or would like to learn more about these claims,
please contact Thomas W. Elrod of Kirby McInerney at 212-371-6600,
by email at investigations@kmllp.com, or by filling out this
contact form, to discuss your rights or interests with respect to
these matters without any cost to you.

Kirby McInerney is a New York-based plaintiffs' law firm
concentrating in securities, antitrust, and whistleblower
litigation.  The firm's efforts on behalf of shareholders in
securities litigation have resulted in recoveries totaling billions
of dollars.  Additional information about the firm can be found at
Kirby McInerney's Web site http://www.kmllp.com/

Contacts:

         Thomas W. Elrod, Esq.
         Kirby McInerney LLP
         Tel.No.: (212) 371-6600
         Website: www.kmllp.com
         Email: investigations@kmllp.com [GN]


ECIG DISTRIBUTORS: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Gallion Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------------
STEVE GALLION, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ECIG DISTRIBUTORS, INC.; DOES 1-10
Inclusive, Defendant, Case No. 5:19-cv-01411 (C.D. Cal., July 31,
2019) seeks to stop the Defendants' practice of making unsolicited
calls. The case is assigned to Jesus G Bernal and referred to
Magistrate Shashi H Kewalramani.

Electronic Cigarettes International Group, Ltd. markets and
distributes products for smokers. The Company's product allows
smokers to "smoke" nicotine without the fire, flame, tobacco, tar,
carbon monoxide all the other chemicals found in traditional
cigarettes. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St. Suite 780,
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (877) 206-4741
          Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com


ENTREVOICE VIRTUAL: Bid for Class Certification Denied
------------------------------------------------------
KEITH HOBBS and JEREMY JACKSON, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. ENTREVOICE VIRTUAL
SOLUTIONS, INC. and JOSELYN CORNEJO, the Defendants, Case No.
4:18-cv-00247-CDL (M.D. Ga.), the Hon. Judge Clay D. Land entered
an order July 25, 2019:

   1. dismissing Plaintiffs' claims against Cornejo for lack of
      personal jurisdiction; and

   2. denying Plaintiffs' pending motion for class
      certification.

If Plaintiffs wish to pursue class certification as to their claims
against Entrevoice only, they must file an amended motion for class
certification, the Court said.[CC]

EPIC GAMES: R.A. Suit transferred to E.D. North Carolina
--------------------------------------------------------
The case, R.A., a minor, by and through his Guardian, Steve Altes,
on  behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. Epic Games, Inc., the Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-01488 (Filed Feb. 28, 2019), was transferred from the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California, to the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina (Western
Division) on July 31, 2019. The Eastern District of North Carolina
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 5:19-cv-00325-BO to the proceeding.
The suit demands $5 million worth of damages. The case is assigned
to the Hon. Judge Terrence W. Boyle.

According to the complaint, Epic systematically advertises Llamas
with promises that they will contain appealing and valuable loot.
Like with a slot machine, Epic psychologically manipulates its
young players into thinking they will "get lucky." But what Epic
knows -- and what its young players do not know -- is that the
Llamas almost never contain what they are touted as containing. The
reasonable consumer purchasing Llamas believes that he or she will
have significantly better chances of receiving valuable loot than
they actually do.  Worse yet, Epic fails to disclose that the odds
of receiving the valuable 24 loot are next to nothing.

Had Plaintiff known the odds of receiving the desired loot in
Llamas were virtually nil, he would not have purchased them.

The Plaintiff and the Class members have been injured by Epic's
practices. The Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself
and the putative Class. The Plaintiff seeks actual damages,
punitive damages, restitution, and an injunction to prevent  Epic
from continuing to engage in the illegal practices.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Alexander Lee Simon, Esq.
          Joseph C Bourne, Esq.
          Melissa S Weiner, Esq.
          Daniel L Warshaw, Esq.
          PEARSON SIMON AND WARSHAW LLP
          44 Montgomery Street Suite 2450
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 433-9000
          Facsimile: (415) 433-9008

               - and -

          Jeffrey Douglas Kaliel, Esq.
          Sophia Goren Gold, Esq.
          KALIEL PLLC
          1875 Connecticut Ave NW 10th Floor
          Washington, DC 20009
          Telephone: (202) 450-4783

Attorneys for the Defendant are:

          Jeffrey S. Jacobson, Esq.
          Ryan Matthew Salzman, Esq.
          DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP
          1177 Avenue of the Americas, 41st Floor
          New York, NY 10036-2714
          Telephone: (212) 248-3191
          Facsimile: (212) 248-3141
          E-mail: jeffrey.jacobson@dbr.com

FELIX ENERGY: Evans Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages, Damages
--------------------------------------------------------
WILLIAM EVANS, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, v. FELIX ENERGY, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-02204
(D. Colo., Aug. 2, 2019) is a lawsuit seeking to recover unpaid
overtime wages and other damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA") against Defendant.

Plaintiff and the other workers like him regularly worked for Felix
in excess of 40 hours each week. But these workers never received
overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a single
workweek. Instead of paying overtime as required by the FLSA, Felix
paid these workers a daily rate with no overtime pay and improperly
classified them as independent contractors. This collective action
seeks to recover the unpaid overtime wages and other damages owed
to these workers.

Plaintiff Evans worked exclusively for Felix as a Mud Engineer from
approximately January 2018 until January 2019.

Felix is an oil and natural gas exploration and production company
operating worldwide and throughout the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
     Andrew Dunlap, Esq.
     JOSEPHSON DUNLAP
     11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
     Houston, TX 77046
     Phone: 713-352-1100
     Facsimile: 713-352-3300
     Email: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
            adunlap@mybackwages.com

          - and -

     Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
     BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
     8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
     Houston, TX 77046
     Phone: (713) 877-8788
     Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
     Email: dmoulton@brucknerburch.com


FIGS INC: Torres Files Class Suit in California
-----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against FIGS, Inc. The case
is styled as Avegail Torres, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, and on behalf of the General Public, Plaintiff
v. FIGS, Inc. and Does 1-10, Defendants, Case No. 5:19-cv-01432
(C.D. Cal., Aug. 1, 2019).

The case type is stated as Other Fraud - Diversity-Fraud.

FIGS, INC. engages in the design and production of scrubs for men
and women.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David C Wright, Esq.
   McCune Wright Arevalo LLP
   3281 East Guasti Road Suite 100
   Ontario, CA 91761
   Tel: (909) 557-1250
   Fax: (909) 557-1275
   Email: dcw@mccunewright.com



GASTRO BAR: Rios Seeks Unpaid Wages for Food Service Workers
------------------------------------------------------------
MIGUEL RIOS, Individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. GASTRO BAR & RESTAURANT CORP. c/o TRYP
HOTEL,  TRYP HOTELS WORLDWIDE, INC., d/b/a TRYP HOTEL NYC and JOHN
SHARMA, the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-07146 (S.D.N.Y., July 31,
2019), seeks to recover upnaid wages and related damages for unpaid
wages and misappropriated tips while employed by the Defendants,
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor
Law.

According to the complaint, the Defendants have failed to
compensate their food service workers at the federal and state
minimum wage, and unlawfully misappropriated a portion of their
tips.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class are:

          Darren P.B. Rumack, Esq.
          THE KLEIN LAW GROUP
          39 Broadway Suite 1530
          New York, NY 10006
          Telephone: (212) 344 9022
          Facsimile: (212) 344 0301

GEO GROUP: Underpays Security Personnel, Azpeitia Suit Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------------
KRYSTAL AZPEITIA, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. THE GEO GROUP, INC.; GEO
CORRECTIONS AND DETENTION, LLC; and DOES 1- 100, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-06578 (C.D. Cal., July 30, 2019) is an
action against the Defendants for failure to pay minimum wages,
overtime compensation, authorize and permit meal and rest periods,
provide accurate wage statements, and reimburse necessary business
expenses.

The Plaintiff Azpeitia was employed by the Defendants as security
personnel.

The GEO Group, Inc. operates private correctional facilities
located mostly in the United States, but also in Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, and South Africa. The Company offers educational
programs, vocational training, and rehabilitation therapy services.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James R. Patterson, Esq.
          Jennifer M. French, Esq.
          PATTERSON LAW GROUP APC
          1350 Columbia St., Suite 603
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 756-6990
          Facsimile: (619) 756-6991
          E-mail: jim@pattersonlawgroup.com
                  jenn@pattersonlawgroup.com


GLOCK INC: Melian Sues Over Defective Handguns
----------------------------------------------
DAVID MELIAN; CHRISTOPHER GEORGE, on their own behalf and on behalf
of all similarly situated individuals Plaintiffs, v. GLOCK, INC, an
Georgia Corporation; GLOCK Ges.m.b.H, an Austrian entity; JOHN and
JANE DOES I through V; ABC CORPORATIONS I-X, XYZ PARTNERSHIPS, SOLE
PROPRIETORSHIPS and/or JOINT VENTURES I-X, GUN COMPONENT
MANUFACTURERS I-V, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-04872-GMS (D.
Ariz., Aug. 1, 2019) is a class action on behalf of Plaintiffs, and
all other individuals who own certain handguns (the "Class Guns")
which were designed, manufactured, assembled, imported, and
marketed by Glock Ges.m.d.H, and Glock, Inc., and distributed and
sold throughout the United States.

According to the complaint, all of the Class Guns contain at least
one defect that renders the pistols unreasonably dangerous and
unfit for their intended use. Each gun contains a feed ramp that is
too long and goes into the chamber causing a lack of chamber
support for the round/casing which causes the force of a fired
round to exert unreasonable pressures upon the round/casing in the
6 o'clock position (the "Unsupported Chamber Defect" or "Defect").
This defect creates a "blow out" or a "kaboom" which is a dangerous
situation which causes the round/casing to separate and dislodge a
piece of the casing at the 6 o'clock position. The Glock
Defendants' representations that the Class Guns are safe for use
are deceptive and false, and the Class Guns were sold while
omitting information that would be material to a reasonable
consumer, says the complaint.

The Class Guns are defective and unreasonably dangerous because the
common design of the Class Guns will not prevent and has not
prevented a "blow out" or a "Kaboom" which can, and does, result in
personal injury. The Defects result from the inadequate design,
manufacturing, and testing of the Class Guns, and the continued
failure of the Glock Defendants to remedy the Defects. Despite
actual knowledge of the Defects, the Glock Defendants have never
remedied either Defect, have never issued an effective and complete
warning to the public or recall of the Class Guns and the Glock
Defendants continue to falsely represent to the public that the
Class Guns are safe, adds the complaint.

Plaintiffs own Class Guns which was designed, manufactured,
assembled, to be tested, marketed, imported, warranted,
distributed, and sold by the Glock Defendants.

Glock, Inc. is a Georgia corporation that is licensed to and doing
business in the State of Arizona and does business in Maricopa
County.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Craig M. Nicholas, Esq.
     Alex Tomasevic, Esq.
     NICHOLAS & TOMASEVIC, LLP
     225 Broadway, 19th Floor
     San Diego, CA 92101
     Phone: (619) 325-0492
     Facsimile: (619) 325-0496
     Email: cnicholas@nicholaslaw.org
            atomasevic@nicholaslaw.org

          - and -

     Robert K. Lewis, Esq.
     Christopher A. Treadway, Esq.
     LEWIS LAW FIRM, PLC
     2302 N 3rd Street
     Phoenix, AR 85004
     Phone: (602) 889-6666
     Fax: (602) 252-1446
     Email: rob@lewisandpokora.com
            chris@lewisandpokora.com

          - and -

     Amy M. Pokora, Esq.
     POKORA LAW, PLC
     2302 N 3rd Street
     Phoenix, AR 85004
     Phone: (602) 889-6666
     Fax: (602) 252-1446
     Email: amy@lewisandpokora.com


GRENNING GALLERY: Picon Asserts Violation under Disabilities Act
----------------------------------------------------------------
Grenning Gallery, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Yelitza Picon on behalf of herself and of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Grenning Gallery, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-07221 (S.D. N.Y., Aug. 1, 2019).

Grenning Gallery showcases artists whose works utilize traditional
methods created by the great masters.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
   150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
   New York, NY 10003
   Tel: (212) 228-9795
   Fax: (212) 982-6284
   Email: nyjg@aol.com


HELIX ENERGY: McKnight Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------
VANTRERIUS MCKNIGHT, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. HELIX ENERGY SOLUTIONS GROUP,
INC., Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-02852 (S.D. Tex., Aug. 1, 2019)
is a collective action and lawsuit under the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), on behalf of Plaintiff and all other
similarly situated employees to recover unpaid overtime wages from
Defendant.

During Plaintiff's employment with Helix, he regularly worked in
excess of forty hours per week. In fact, Plaintiff worked a minimum
of 84 hours per week each week that he was on rotation. However,
Helix did not pay Plaintiff overtime "at a rate not less than one
and one-half times the regular rate at which he was employed."
Instead, Helix paid Plaintiff a flat sum for each day's work
regardless of the number of hours he worked in a workweek, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff McKnight was employed by Helix as steward from
approximately 2014 to 2018. McKnight continues to work for Helix as
a roustabout from 2018 to present.

Helix provides subsea construction, inspection, maintenance, repair
and salvage services to customers in the offshore natural gas and
oil industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Melissa Moore, Esq.
     Curt Hesse, Esq.
     Bridget Davidson, Esq.
     MOORE & ASSOCIATES
     Lyric Centre
     440 Louisiana Street, Suite 675
     Houston, TX 77002
     Phone: (713) 222-6775
     Facsimile: (713) 222-6739


HOME DEPOT: Moshtagh Sues Over Unpaid Regular, Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------
STEVE MOSHTAGH, an individual, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. THE HOME DEPOT U.S.A., Inc., a
Delaware Corporation; Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-01205 (Wash.
Super. Ct., King Cty., Aug. 1, 2019) is a class action against
Defendant to recover unpaid regular wages, unpaid overtime wages,
penalties, interest, and attorneys' fees and costs, and to obtain
injunctive relief.

The Plaintiff seeks to redress Home Depot's unlawful employment
policies and practices of (1) failing to provide part-time hourly
employees statutorily required meal and rest breaks; (2) failing to
compensate hourly employees for mandatory work done before and
after their scheduled shifts; and (3) making unlawful payroll
deductions to fund The Homer Fund, a Home Depot-run charity.

Plaintiff Steve Moshtagh worked at the Home Depot store in Bothell,
Washington from approximately February 2016 to the present.

Home Depot is the world's largest home improvement retailer.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Peter D. Stutheit, Esq.
     STUTHEIT KALIN LLC
     1 SW Columbia, Suite 1850
     Portland, OR 97258
     Phone: (503) 493-7488
     Email: peter@stutheitkalin.com

          - and -

     Donald w. Heyrich, Esq.
     Jason A. Rittereiser, Esq.
     Rachel M. Emens, Esq.
     Henry Brudney, Esq.
     HKM EMPLOYMENT ATTORNEYS LLP
     600 Stewart Street, Suite 901
     Seattle, WA 98101
     Phone: 206-838-2504
     Email: dheyrich@hkm.com
            jrittereiser@hkm.com
            remens@hkm.com
            hbrudney@hkm.com


HOUND DOGS TOWING: Muncy Sues Over Unpaid Wages
-----------------------------------------------
James T. Muncy, Jr., Christine Wheeler individually and on behalf
of other members of the general public similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. Hound Dogs Towing and Recovery, Josh Ingold d/b/a
Hound Dogs Towing and Recovery, Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-03324-ALM-KAJ (S.D. Ohio, Aug. 1, 2019) is an action
seeking all available relief, including compensation, liquidated
damages, attorneys' fees, and costs, pursuant the Fair Labor
Standards Act, Ohio's Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act, and the Ohio
Prompt Pay Act.

Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members routinely work (and
worked) in excess of 40 hours per workweek but were not paid
overtime of at least one and one-half their regular rates for all
hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek, says the
complaint.

Plaintiffs worked for Defendants within the meaning of the FLSA and
the Ohio Acts.

HDTR is trade name registered with the Ohio Secretary of State by
Defendant Ingold who operates HDTR as a towing and transportation
of vehicles business located at 2918 Parsons Ave., Columbus, Ohio,
43207.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Matthew J.P. Coffman, Esq.
     Coffman Legal, LLC
     1550 Old Henderson Road, Ste. 126
     Columbus, OH 43220
     Phone: 614-949-1181
     Fax: 614-386-9964
     Email: mcoffman@mcoffmanlegal.com

          - and -

     Peter Contreras, Esq.
     CONTRERAS LAW, LLC
     1550 Old Henderson Road, Ste. 126
     Columbus, OH 43220
     Phone: 614-787-4878
     Fax: 614-923-7369
     Email: peter.contreras@contrerasfirm.com


HYUNDAI MOTOR: Court Narrows Claims in Defective Powertrain Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion granting in part and denying in part Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned JAN SCHECHTER, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. HYUNDAI
MOTOR AMERICA and HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY, Defendants. Civil Action
No. 18-13634 (FLW). (D.N.J.).

Plaintiff Jan Schechter (Plaintiff) brings this putative class
action, alleging that Defendants fraudulently concealed the fact
that certain of its vehicles contained a defective powertrain
component. Plaintiff asserts the following claims: fraud (Count 1)
negligent misrepresentation (Count 2) breach of the express
warranty (Count 3) breach of the implied warranty (Count 4)
violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (Count 5) unjust
enrichment (Count 6) violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act
(Count 7)  violation of California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act
(Count 8) and violation of California's Unfair Competition Law
(Count 9).

STANDING

In his Complaint, the Plaintiff seeks to represent a nationwide
class, as well as two sub-classes of consumers in New Jersey and
California, under their respective state's laws. Confusingly,
however, Plaintiff also asserts claims under New Jersey and
California law with respect to the nationwide class, without having
performed the requisite choice of law analysis for the purpose of
determining which state has the most significant relationship to
the nationwide class claims. In that regard, the claims of the
nationwide class are either governed by New Jersey or California
law, not both.  

California Sub-class

To demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must establish: (1) an
injury-in-fact (2) a sufficient causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of and (3) a likelihood that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.

Here, Plaintiff asserts claims under the laws of California, and
seeks to represent that state's citizens, where he neither resides
nor suffered any injury. Plaintiff, however, cannot do so, as he
lacks standing to assert these claims. Therefore, Plaintiff's
California claims on the behalf of the sub-class of California
residents are dismissed.

Non-leased Class Vehicles

Citing this Court's decision in Lieberson v. Johnson & Johnson
Consumer Cos., 865 F.Supp.2d 529 (D.N.J. Sept. 21, 2011),
Defendants next contend that Plaintiff is precluded from bringing
claims relating to the following class vehicles: the 2017-2018
Sante Fe Sport 2.0T and the 2017-2018 Sante Fe Sport 3.3L. He did
not lease these particular makes and models, and, as such, he did
not suffer an injury-in-fact with respect to those models.

In response, Plaintiff cites a line of district court cases for the
proposition that this issue should be more appropriately decided
within the context of a motion for class certification, not a
dismissal motion. Plaintiff additionally maintains that he may
assert claims as to all Class Vehicles, as long as he demonstrates
that they are sufficiently similar. However, the Court disagrees,
because Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege that the Class
Vehicles are sufficiently similar.

Plaintiff is correct that he may have standing to assert claims
regarding other models of vehicles that he did not lease, so long
as all Class Vehicles, including his own, have sufficiently similar
powertrain components and common defects. Indeed, a plaintiff may
have standing to assert claims on behalf of putative class members
regarding products he did not personally purchase where (1) the
basis of the claims is the same (2) the products are closely
related and (3) the claims are against the same defendants. Based
on these factors, Plaintiff lacks standing to assert claims on
behalf of class members who only owned or leased the 2017-2018
Sante Fe Sport 2.0T and the 2017-2018 Sante Fe Sport 3.3. Plaintiff
leased a 2017 Hyundai Sante Fe Sport 2.4.

Indeed, Plaintiff fails to adequately allege that the Class
Vehicles all have similar powertrain components and defects, such
that all three vehicular models are so closely related that
standing would be conferred upon Plaintiff. Without these
allegations, all claims related to the 2017-2018 Sante Fe Sport
2.0T and the 2017-2018 Sante Fe Sport 3.3 are dismissed for lack of
standing on the part of Plaintiff. Plaintiff can only represent
class members who have leased or purchased the 2017 Hyundai Sante
Fe Sport 2.4, his model vehicle.

Omission-Based Claims

In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts NJCFA, common law fraud, and
negligent misrepresentation claims. Moreover, although Plaintiff,
in his pleading, references affirmative misrepresentations which
Defendants purportedly made, Plaintiff's brief only discusses
Defendants' alleged failure to disclose the defective nature of the
Class Vehicles before the date on which he leased his vehicle.
Thus, because, according to Plaintiff, each of these claims are
based only upon omissions of material facts, rather than the
affirmative misrepresentations, the Court will not consider
misrepresentations as the basis for Plaintiff's fraud and negligent
misrepresentation claims.

NJCFA

Count Seven of the Complaint asserts a violation of the NJCFA, on
the basis of Defendants having knowingly concealed, suppressed,
and/or omitted the existence of the Powertrain Defect in the Class
Vehicles at the time of sale or lease and at all relevant times
thereafter.

To state a claim under the NJCFA, a plaintiff must allege three
elements: (1) unlawful conduct by the defendant (2) an
ascertainable loss by the plaintiff and (3) a causal relationship
between the unlawful conduct and the ascertainable loss. Unlawful
conduct falls into three general categories: affirmative acts,
knowing omissions, and regulation violations.

Here, Plaintiff asserts a single unlawful act of a material
omission: Defendants concealed the Powertrain Defect from the
owners and lessees of the Class Vehicles at the time of sale or
lease. To establish Defendants' knowledge of the Powertrain Defect,
Plaintiff primarily relies on anonymous consumer complaints posted
online and Defendants' issuance of three TSBs, which were posted or
issued both before and after Plaintiff's lease.

First, Plaintiff fails to allege an adequate basis to support the
fact that Defendants were aware of the anonymous consumer
complaints posted online. Indeed, Plaintiff merely asserts that
these complaints demonstrate that the Powertrain Defect is
widespread and dangerous, without alleging that Defendants either
monitored or tracked the NHTSA's website. In a similar vein,
Plaintiff does not allege that the NHTSA informed Defendants about
the posted complaints. Absent such allegations, consumer complaints
on third-party websites are insufficient to support a
manufacturer's knowledge of an alleged defect.  

Second, even if the Court were to presume that Defendants were
aware of the online postings, the consumer complaints and the TSBs
also do not indicate that Defendants had knowledge of the
Powertrain Defect as to Plaintiff's model vehicle at the time of
Plaintiff's lease. Approximately half of the consumer complaints
and two of the TSBs were neither posted nor issued before October
2016, the date on which Plaintiff leased his vehicle. Clearly,
Plaintiff cannot rely on events which occurred after his lease, in
order to establish that Defendants were aware of the alleged defect
during that relevant timeframe.  

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered an ascertainable loss,
since he was mislead into leasing his Class Vehicle which was worth
less than promised as a result of the Powertrain Defect.

According to Plaintiff, he has suffered an out-of-pocket loss
constituting the difference between the value of the vehicle with a
fully functioning powertrain versus the value of the vehicle with
the Powertrain Defect. Indeed, had Plaintiff known the true nature
of the vehicle as he alleges, he would not have leased the vehicle
on the same terms and would have paid less or he would have leased
a comparable vehicle instead. However, Plaintiff's out of pocket
loss theory fails.

As a preliminary matter, the Court questions whether Plaintiff
would have leased a vehicle, in the first instance, with a faulty
powertrain, particularly since he alleges that this defect creates
a significant safety hazard. Notwithstanding Plaintiff's
confounding theory, he has failed to plead an ascertainable loss
that is sufficiently quantifiable or measurable in nature. In that
connection, Plaintiff has not provided any information with respect
to the terms of his leased vehicle, including its price; nor has he
alleged any facts that describe what a hypothetical lease for a
vehicle with a defective powertrain would be, in order for the
Court to ascertain, or even reasonably estimate, the difference in
value between Plaintiff's lease and the alleged lease which he
would have executed.

Rather, Plaintiff merely contends that he would have paid less if
he was informed about the condition of his Class Vehicle. With
nothing more, this theory of loss is purely based on conjecture.
Alternatively, in the event Plaintiff would have have leased a
different vehicle, he does not identify a comparable vehicle or
allege its price. These allegations cannot satisfy the
ascertainable loss element, as Plaintiff has not shown that his
alleged out of pocket losses are readily quantifiable.  

The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to plead unlawful conduct
or ascertainable loss, and, therefore, fails to state an individual
claim under the NJCFA. In lieu of dismissal, however, Plaintiff
shall be given leave to amend his Complaint to cure the
deficiencies discussed above.

Common Law Fraud by Omission

Count One of the Complaint asserts a common law fraud by omission
claim, on the basis of Defendants' failure to disclose that the
powertrain system in the class vehicles is defective.  

Pursuant to New Jersey law, a plaintiff must allege five elements
to succeed on a common law fraud claim: (1) a material
misrepresentation or omission of a presently existing or past fact
(2) knowledge or belief by the defendant of its falsity (3) an
intention that the other person rely on it (4) reasonable reliance
thereon by the other person and (5) resulting damages.  Although
fraud claims are subject to the strictures of Rule 9(b), courts
within this district have held that the heightened pleading
standard is somewhat relaxed in a case based on a fraudulent
omission.

As a threshold issue, Plaintiff fails to adequately allege that
Defendants had a duty to disclose the Powertrain Defect. In that
regard, a plaintiff may only assert an omission-based fraud claim
if the defendant possesses a duty to disclose. As the Third Circuit
has clarified, where a claim for fraud is based on silence or
concealment, New Jersey courts will not imply a duty to disclose,
unless such disclosure is necessary to make a previous statement
true or the parties share a special relationship.

Here, Plaintiff's common law fraud claim solely arises from
Defendants' alleged failure to disclose the Powertrain Defect.
Indeed, in his brief, Plaintiff clarifies that his fraud claim is
based on a fraudulent omission, as opposed to a
misrepresentation.Nevertheless, Plaintiff's Complaint is entirely
devoid of facts to support that he shared any one of the three
recognized special relationships with Defendants, in order to
establish a duty to disclose on their part. In fact, New Jersey
Courts have found no special relationship between individual
consumers and automobile manufacturers that would impose a duty to
disclose on the manufacturers within the context of omission-based
fraud claims. Rather than allege special relationship, Plaintiff
appears to argue that a duty to disclose was created on the sole
basis of Defendants' knowledge with respect to the alleged
defective powertrain. However, a party's superior knowledge is
insufficient to impose a duty to disclose in New Jersey.  

Nonetheless, even if Plaintiff adequately alleged a duty to
disclose, his common law fraud claim would fail for the same
reasons as his NJCFA claim. More specifically, Plaintiff's fraud
claim is entirely based upon Defendants' alleged concealment of the
defective nature of the Class Vehicles, but, for the reasons
previously described, he has failed to adequately allege that
Defendants omitted a material fact with respect to the Powertrain
Defect. Therefore, Plaintiff's common law fraud claim is likewise
dismissed.  

Negligent Misrepresentation

Count Two of the Complaint asserts a claim for negligent
misrepresentation, arising from Defendants alleged failure to
disclose the Powertrain Defect and its corresponding safety risk.

Under New Jersey law, to assert a claim for negligent
misrepresentation, a plaintiff must allege the following three
elements: (1 ) the defendant negligently made an incorrect
statement of a past or existing fact (2) that the plaintiff
justifiably relied on it and (3) that his reliance caused a loss or
injury.

Here, Plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation claim cannot stand
for multiple reasons. First, as stated previously, New Jersey
courts have found that a special relationship between an individual
consumer and a vehicle manufacturer creating a duty to disclose
does not exist. It is, therefore, incumbent upon Plaintiff to
identify the circumstances under which good faith and common
decency would arise. On that point, Plaintiff fails to plead such a
transaction, as the Complaint is entirely silent with respect to
this requirement. Rather, in a conclusory fashion, Plaintiff
alleges in his brief that Defendants were obligated to act in good
faith by disclosing the Powertrain Defect at the time of sale or
lease.

However, Plaintiff cannot advance this position, for the first
time, in his opposition brief. Indeed, it is axiomatic that the
complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a
motion to dismiss.  In any event, Plaintiff has not alleged facts
to support his position that the circumstances of this case somehow
created a duty to disclose due to good faith and common decency.

As such, Plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation claim is
dismissed.

Unjust Enrichment

Count Six of the Complaint asserts a claim for unjust enrichment,
because Defendants unjustly profited from the lease and sale of the
Class Vehicles at inflated prices, at the expense of Plaintiff.

As a preliminary issue, New Jersey law does not recognize unjust
enrichment as an independent tort cause of action.  Rather, unjust
enrichment requires that plaintiff show that he expected
remuneration from the defendant at the time it performed or
conferred a benefit on defendant.

Here, the conduct underlying Plaintiff's claim of unjust enrichment
sounds in tort. In the Complaint, Plaintiff does not allege that he
either performed or conferred a benefit upon Defendants pursuant to
a quasi-contractual relationship, for which he expected
remuneration in return. Rather, Plaintiff only alleges tort-based
claims which arise from Defendants' alleged unlawful, unjust and
inequitable conduct, i.e., their failure to disclose and
concealment of the Powertrain Defect. Clearly, Plaintiff could not
have anticipated or expected remuneration as a result of
Defendants' alleged fraudulent conduct.

Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim fails on this basis alone.  
.
Breach of Warranty

Express

In Count Three, Plaintiff asserts a breach of express warranty
claim, alleging that Defendants have failed to provide Plaintiff
with a meaningful remedy for the Powertrain Defect.

To adequately plead a breach of express warranty claim under New
Jersey law, a plaintiff must allege the following four elements:
(1) a contract between the parties (2) a breach of that contract
(3) damages flowing therefrom and (4) that the party stating the
claim performed its own contractual obligations.

Here, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff's vehicle is
covered by a ten-year/100,000-mile powertrain warranty, requiring
Defendants to repair or replace specific components of the engine,
transmission and transaxle, or that the alleged powertrain defect
manifested itself within the warranty period. Plaintiff alleges
that he brought his vehicle to an authorized Hyundai dealership on
two separate occasions, when he experienced problems that related
to power loss and acceleration. Specifically, Plaintiff explains
that his vehicle loses power while driving, you can hit the gas[,]
the RPMS will go high and the vehicle will not move and he also
reported a five to six second delay in acceleration.  

Without addressing the undisputed powertrain warranty, Defendants,
nonetheless, contend that Plaintiff has not alleged a breach. In
that regard, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to
address a series of specific questions that relate to his
interactions with the dealer, during the dates on which he brought
his vehicle in for repair. However, Plaintiff's allegations need
not be pled with a level of particularity that Defendants advocate;
indeed, a breach of the express warranty claim is not subject to
the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b).
  
Thus, because Plaintiff asserts that he informed Defendants about
his vehicle's defective powertrain, without Defendants having
remediated the issue in accordance with the provisions of the
warranty, Plaintiff has adequately alleged a breach.

Implied Warranty

Count Five asserts a claim for breach of the implied warranty.
Plaintiff alleges that the Class Vehicles, when sold or leased and
at all times thereafter, were not in merchantable condition and are
not fit for their ordinary purpose of providing safe and reliable
transportation.

New Jersey has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, which provides
that a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in
a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect
to goods of that kind. The implied warranty of merchantability
means that the thing sold is reasonably fit for the general purpose
for which it is manufactured and sold. However, the implied
warranty of merchantability does not impose a general requirement
that goods precisely fulfill the expectation of the buyer. Instead,
it provides for a minimum level of quality.

Under New Jersey law, as applied to automobiles, the implied
warranty of merchantability is simply a guarantee that they will
operate in a safe condition and substantially free of defects and,
therefore, where a car can provide safe, reliable transportation,
it is generally considered merchantable.

Notwithstanding these well-established principles, Defendants
contend that the ordinary purpose of a vehicle is simply to provide
transportation, regardless of whether the vehicle can be driven in
a safe and reliable manner.
  
Therefore, the Court finds that a breach of the implied warranty
can be based on an alleged safety defect of a vehicle.

Next, regarding safety, Plaintiff alleges that the powertrain
defect occurs unexpectedly and caused the following problems while
driving: significantly delayed acceleration (including but not
limited to delayed acceleration when turning or merging onto a road
or highway), loss of power, rough shifting, jerking, lurching,
and/or engine revving associated with the delayed acceleration.

Indeed, according to Plaintiff, his own vehicle loses power while
driving, and its acceleration suffers from a delayed response which
sometimes requires more than five to six seconds before initiating.
Because these conditions constitute serious safety concerns,
Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that his vehicle is unfit for
the ordinary purpose of providing transportation in a safe and
reliable manner. That Plaintiff does not say that he is unable or
unwilling to use his vehicle, as Defendants argue, is not relevant
to my inquiry on this motion.   

The Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged a breach of
the implied warranty.

Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

Count 5 asserts a violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
(MMWA), on the basis of Defendants' failure to comply with their
written and implied warranties.

The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act provides that a consumer who is
damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service
contractor to comply with any obligation under this chapter, or
under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract,
may bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief.
Magnuson-Moss claims based on breaches of express and implied
warranties under state law depend upon those state law claims.

Although Plaintiff has successfully pled express and implied
warranty claims, his MMWA claim is not viable. Indeed, as
Defendants argue, Plaintiff has not complied with the alternative
dispute resolution procedure available through the Better Business
Bureau's BBB Auto Line, which is explicitly set forth in the
powertrain warranty.  

Here, Plaintiff concedes that he did not comply with the dispute
resolution procedures set forth in the express warranty. Citing one
out-of-circuit, non-binding district court decision, Plaintiff
contends that he was not required to pursue the informal resolution
procedure, because it would have been futile. While Plaintiff does
not cite, nor has this Court found, any decisions within this
circuit that recognize such an exception, to the extent that it is
applicable, Plaintiff has not alleged futility.   

Accordingly, Plaintiff's MMWA claim is dismissed.

Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part
and denied in part. The Plaintiff's NJCFA, MMWA, negligent
misrepresentation, California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act, and
California's Unfair Competition Law claims are dismissed without
prejudice, as well as any claims which are asserted in connection
with the Class Vehicles, i.e., the 2017-2018 Sante Fe Sport 2.0T
and the 2017-2018 Sante Fe Sport 3.3L vehicles.  The Plaintiff is
given leave to amend the Complaint only as to his NJCFA and
negligent misrepresentation claims within 20 days from the date of
the Order accompanying this Opinion.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 29, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yywpjjg9 from Leagle.com.

JAN SCHECHTER, Plaintiff, represented by FREDERICK JOHN KLORCZYK,
III -- fklorczyk@bursor.com -- BURSOR & FISHER PA.

HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA & HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY, Defendants,
represented by JEREMY HALE ERSHOW -- jershow@jenner.com -- JENNER &
BLOCK LLP.


IDEANOMICS INC: Howard G. Smith Files Securities Fraud Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Law Offices of Howard G. Smith reminds investors of the upcoming
Sept. 17, 2019 deadline to file a lead plaintiff motion in the
class action filed on behalf of investors who purchased Ideanomics
Inc. (NASDAQ: IDEX) securities between May 15, 2017 and November
13, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period").

Investors suffering losses on their Ideanomics investments are
encouraged to contact the Law Offices of Howard G. Smith to discuss
their legal rights in this class action at 888-638-4847 or by email
to howardsmith@howardsmithlaw.com

On November 14, 2018, the Company announced that it would "phase
out [its] oil trading and consumer electronics businesses, with the
intention to fully divest these assets in the near future." It also
disclosed that it did "not anticipate meeting [its] EBITDA guidance
of $35 million for fiscal year 2019" due to "costs associated with
building out [its] U.S. infrastructure and hiring [its] new
executive team."

On this news, the Company's share price fell $1.59, or more than
48%, to close at $1.67 on November 14, 2018, thereby injuring
investors.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) that costs associated with building out Ideanomics'
U.S. infrastructure and hiring its new executive team were
negatively impacting the Company's bottom line performance; (2)
that, as a result, Ideanomics was highly unlikely to meet its 2018
EBITDA guidance; (3) that Ideanomics' margins in its oil trading
and consumer electronics businesses were too low for those
businesses to remain viable; and (4) that, as a result of the
foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects were materially misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

If you purchased shares of Ideanomics during the Class Period you
may move the Court no later than September 17, 2019 to ask the
Court to appoint you as lead plaintiff if you meet certain legal
requirements. To be a member of the class action you need not take
any action at this time; you may retain counsel of your choice or
take no action and remain an absent member of the class action. If
you wish to learn more about this class action, or if you have any
questions concerning this announcement or your rights or interests
with respect to these matters, please contact:

      Howard G. Smith, Esquire
      Law Offices of Howard G. Smith
      3070 Bristol Pike, Suite 112
      Bensalem, Pennsylvania 19020
      Telephone: (215) 638-4847
      Toll-free: (888) 638-4847
      E-mail: howardsmith@howardsmithlaw.com
              http://www.howardsmithlaw.com[GN]


IDEANOMICS INC: Pomerantz Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP announces that a class action lawsuit has been filed
against Ideanomics, Inc. f/k/a Seven Stars Cloud Group, Inc. f/k/a
Wecast Network Inc. (IDEX) and certain of its officers. The class
action, filed in United States District Court, for the Southern
District of New York, and indexed under 19-cv-06741, is on behalf
of a class consisting of all persons and entities other than
Defendants who purchased or otherwise acquired Ideanomics
securities between May 15, 2017 and November 13, 2018, both dates
inclusive (the "Class Period"). Plaintiff asserts claims against
Ideanomics and certain of Ideanomics' officers and directors
(collectively, "Defendants") under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act").

If you are a shareholder who purchased Ideanomics securities during
the class period, you have until September 17, 2019, to ask the
Court to appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the class. A copy of the
Complaint can be obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com  To discuss this
action, contact Robert S. Willoughby at rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or
888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who
inquire by e-mail are encouraged to include their mailing address,
telephone number, and the number of shares purchased.

Ideanomics purports to operate as a financial technology and asset
digitization services company. The Company asserts that its
"business model is to become a next-generation [fintech] company,
with the intention of offering both traditional financing solutions
and digital financing solutions based on the emergence of trading
systems that utilize blockchain and artificial intelligence
technologies." Historically, however, Ideanomics' purported
business activities have varied widely and changed with some
frequency.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, the
defendants made materially false and/or misleading statements, as
well as failed to disclose material adverse facts about the
Company's business, operations, and prospects. Specifically, the
defendants failed to disclose to investors that: (i) costs
associated with building out Ideanomics' U.S. infrastructure and
hiring its new executive team were negatively impacting the
Company's bottom line performance; (ii) as a result, Ideanomics was
highly unlikely to meet its 2018 EBITDA guidance; (iii) Ideanomics'
margins in its oil trading and consumer electronics businesses were
too low for those businesses to remain viable; and (iv) as a
result, Ideanomics' public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

On November 14, 2018, the Company issued a press release, filed as
an exhibit to a Current Report on Form 8-K with the SEC, announcing
the Company's financial and operating results for the third quarter
of 2018 (the "Q3 2018 Press Release"). In the Q3 2018 Press
Release, Ideanomics reported that "we intend to phase out our oil
trading and consumer electronics businesses, with the intention to
fully divest these assets in the near future," citing "low margins
in relation to top line sales." Ideanomics further reported that
"[c]osts associated with building out our U.S. infrastructure and
hiring our new executive team have put a strain on our bottom line
performance, resulting in our increased net loss for the third
quarter of 2018 as compared to the third quarter of 2017," and that
accordingly, "we do not anticipate meeting our EBITDA guidance of
$35 million for fiscal year 2018."

On this news, Ideanomics' stock price fell $1.59 per share, or
48.77%, to close at $1.67 per share on November 14, 2018, damaging
investors.

The Pomerantz Firm, with offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles,
and Paris, is acknowledged as one of the premier firms in the areas
of corporate, securities, and antitrust class litigation. Founded
by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known as the dean of the class
action bar, the Pomerantz Firm pioneered the field of securities
class actions. Today, more than 80 years later, the Pomerantz Firm
continues in the tradition he established, fighting for the rights
of the victims of securities fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, and
corporate misconduct. The Firm has recovered numerous
multimillion-dollar damages awards on behalf of class members.
[GN]


INDOCHINO APPAREL: Freeman Sues Over Deceptive Business Practices
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JEFFREY FREEMAN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. INDOCHINO APPAREL, INC.; INDOCHINO APPAREL
(US), INC.; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
3:19-cv-04539 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 2, 2019) is a class action targeting
Defendants for their business practice of advertising perpetual
sales with fictitious reference prices and corresponding phantom
discounts on men's clothing.

Specifically, Defendants engage in a systematic and pervasive false
reference pricing scheme by deceptively advertising through their
website, in stores, via e-mails and on social media that their
men's clothing is "on sale" and was previously sold at a
substantially higher price when, in fact, the clothing has always
been sold at or near the falsely claimed "sale" price.

As a result of this illicit pricing scheme, Defendants violated and
continue to violate California consumer protection laws. Defendants
not only breached their written contract with purchasers of the
Clothing; but also breached their express warranty under the
California Commercial Code Section 2313; violated the California
Consumers Legal Remedies Act; violated the California False
Advertising Law; and violated the California Unfair Competition Law
based on fraudulent, unlawful and unfair acts and practices, says
the complaint.

Plaintiff purchased the Clothing in reliance on Defendants' false
representations that the Clothing was "on sale" and of
substantially higher quality and value than the actual quality and
value of the Clothing.

Indochino Apparel, Inc. is a Canadian corporation with its
principal places of business in Vancouver, BC, Canada. It
advertises, markets and sells the Clothing.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Eric Somers, Esq.
     Ryan Berghoff, Esq.
     LEXINGTON LAW GROUP
     503 Divisadero Street
     San Francisco, CA 94117
     Phone: (415) 913-7800
     Facsimile: (415) 759-4112
     Email: esomers@lexlawgroup.com
            rberghoff@lexlawgroup.com


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: 1,500 Suits Filed Hip Resurfacing System
-----------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 29, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that as of June 30, 2019, in
the United States there were approximately 1,500 plaintiffs with
direct claims in pending lawsuits regarding injuries allegedly due
to the DePuy ASR(TM) XL Acetabular System and DePuy ASR(TM) Hip
Resurfacing System.

In August 2010, DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. (DePuy) announced a
worldwide voluntary recall of its ASR(TM) XL Acetabular System and
DePuy ASR(TM) Hip Resurfacing System used in hip replacement
surgery.

Claims for personal injury have been made against DePuy and Johnson
& Johnson. The number of pending lawsuits is expected to fluctuate
as certain lawsuits are settled or dismissed and additional
lawsuits are filed.

Cases filed in federal courts in the United States have been
organized as a multi-district litigation in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.

Litigation has also been filed in countries outside of the United
States, primarily in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia,
Ireland, Germany and Italy.

In November 2013, DePuy reached an agreement with a Court-appointed
committee of lawyers representing ASR Hip System plaintiffs to
establish a program to settle claims with eligible ASR Hip patients
in the United States who had surgery to replace their ASR Hips,
known as revision surgery, as of August 31, 2013.

DePuy reached additional agreements in February 2015 and March
2017, which further extended the settlement program to include ASR
Hip patients who had revision surgeries after August 31, 2013 and
prior to February 15, 2017.

This settlement program has resolved more than 10,000 claims,
therefore bringing to resolution significant ASR Hip litigation
activity in the United States.

However, lawsuits in the United States remain, and the settlement
program does not address litigation outside of the United States.

In Australia, a class action settlement was reached that resolved
the claims of the majority of ASR Hip patients in that country.

In Canada, the Company has reached agreements to settle two pending
class actions which have been approved by the Quebec Superior Court
and the Supreme Court of British Columbia. The British Columbia
order is currently the subject of an appeal.

The Company continues to receive information with respect to
potential additional costs associated with this recall on a
worldwide basis.

The Company has established accruals for the costs associated with
the United States settlement program and DePuy ASR(TM) Hip-related
product liability litigation.

As of June 30, 2019, in the United States there were approximately
1,500 plaintiffs with direct claims in pending lawsuits regarding
injuries allegedly due to the DePuy ASR(TM) XL Acetabular System
and DePuy ASR(TM) Hip Resurfacing System.

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. It operates in three segments: Consumer,
Pharmaceutical, and Medical Devices. The company was incorporated
in 1887 and is based in New Brunswick, New Jersey.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Agreement in XARELTO(R) Suit Finalized
---------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 29, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that an agreement in the
class action suit involving XARELTO(R), has been finalized and
executed establishing a United States settlement program.

Claims for personal injury arising out of the use of XARELTO(R), an
oral anticoagulant, have been made against Janssen Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. (JPI); Johnson & Johnson; and JPI's collaboration partner for
XARELTO(R) Bayer AG and certain of its affiliates.

Cases filed in federal courts in the United States have been
organized as a multi-district litigation in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

In addition, cases have been filed in state courts across the
United States. Many of these cases have been consolidated into a
state mass tort litigation in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and in a
coordinated proceeding in California. Class action lawsuits also
have been filed in Canada.

In March 2019, the Company announced an agreement in principle to
the settle the XARELTO(R) cases in the United States; such
agreement was finalized and executed in May 2019 establishing a
United States settlement program.

The Company has established accruals for the costs associated with
the United States settlement program and XARELTO(R) related product
liability litigation.     

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. It operates in three segments: Consumer,
Pharmaceutical, and Medical Devices. The company was incorporated
in 1887 and is based in New Brunswick, New Jersey.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: AWP Suits in Illinois and New Jersey Ongoing
---------------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 29, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend class action suits in Illinois and New Jersey related to
Average Wholesale Price (AWP).

Johnson & Johnson and several of its pharmaceutical subsidiaries
(the J&J AWP Defendants), along with numerous other pharmaceutical
companies, were named as defendants in a series of lawsuits in
state and federal courts involving allegations that the pricing and
marketing of certain pharmaceutical products amounted to fraudulent
and otherwise actionable conduct because, among other things, the
companies allegedly reported an inflated Average Wholesale Price
(AWP) for the drugs at issue.

Payors alleged that they used those AWPs in calculating provider
reimbursement levels. The plaintiffs in these cases included three
classes of private persons or entities that paid for any portion of
the purchase of the drugs at issue based on AWP, and state
government entities that made Medicaid payments for the drugs at
issue based on AWP.

Many of these cases, both federal actions and state actions removed
to federal court, were consolidated for pre-trial purposes in a
multi-district litigation in the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts, where all claims against the J&J AWP
Defendants were ultimately dismissed. The J&J AWP Defendants also
prevailed in a case brought by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Other AWP cases have been resolved through court order or
settlement. Two cases remain pending. A case brought by Illinois
was tried in May 2019 and post-trial briefing is underway.

In New Jersey, a putative class action based upon AWP allegations
is pending against Centocor, Inc. and Ortho Biotech Inc. (both now
Janssen Biotech, Inc.), Johnson & Johnson and ALZA Corporation.

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. It operates in three segments: Consumer,
Pharmaceutical, and Medical Devices. The company was incorporated
in 1887 and is based in New Brunswick, New Jersey.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Continues to Defend INVOKANA(R) Related Suits
----------------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 29, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend class action suits related to INVOKANA(R).

Claims for personal injury have been made against a number of
Johnson & Johnson companies, including Janssen Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. and Johnson & Johnson, arising out of the use of INVOKANA(R),
a prescription medication indicated to improve glycemic control in
adults with Type 2 diabetes.

Lawsuits filed in federal courts in the United States have been
organized as a multi-district litigation in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey. Cases have also been
filed in various state courts including Pennsylvania and Louisiana.
Class action lawsuits have been filed in Canada.

Product liability lawsuits continue to be filed, and the Company
continues to receive information with respect to potential costs
and the anticipated number of cases.

The Company has settled or otherwise resolved many of the cases and
claims in the United States and the costs associated with these
settlements are reflected in the Company's accruals.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. It operates in three segments: Consumer,
Pharmaceutical, and Medical Devices. The company was incorporated
in 1887 and is based in New Brunswick, New Jersey.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Suits Over Ethicon Pelvic Mesh Devices Ongoing
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 29, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company has
established accruals with respect to product liability litigation
associated with Ethicon's pelvic mesh products.

Claims for personal injury have been made against Ethicon, Inc.
(Ethicon) and Johnson & Johnson arising out of Ethicon's pelvic
mesh devices used to treat stress urinary incontinence and pelvic
organ prolapse.

The Company continues to receive information with respect to
potential costs and additional cases. Cases filed in federal courts
in the United States have been organized as a multi-district
litigation in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia.

The Company has settled or otherwise resolved a majority of the
United States cases and the estimated costs associated with these
settlements and the remaining cases are reflected in the Company's
accruals.

In addition, class actions and individual personal injury cases or
claims have been commenced in various countries outside of the
United States, including claims and cases in the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands and Belgium, and class actions in Israel, Australia
and Canada, seeking damages for alleged injury resulting from
Ethicon's pelvic mesh devices.

In Australia, a trial of class action issues has been completed and
the parties are awaiting a decision.

The Company has established accruals with respect to product
liability litigation associated with Ethicon's pelvic mesh
products.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. It operates in three segments: Consumer,
Pharmaceutical, and Medical Devices. The company was incorporated
in 1887 and is based in New Brunswick, New Jersey.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Talc-Related Class Suit Ongoing in NJ
--------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 29, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend a class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the
District Court of New Jersey involving talc contained in
JOHNSON'S(R) Baby Powder and JOHNSON'S(R) Shower to Shower.

In May 2014, two purported class actions were filed in federal
court, one in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California and one in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Illinois, against Johnson & Johnson
and Johnson & Johnson Consumer Companies, Inc. (now known as
Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc.) (JJCI) alleging violations of
state consumer fraud statutes based on nondisclosure of alleged
health risks associated with talc contained in JOHNSON'S(R) Baby
Powder and JOHNSON'S(R) Shower to Shower (a product no longer sold
by JJCI).

Both cases seek injunctive relief and monetary damages; neither
includes a claim for personal injuries.

In October 2016, both cases were transferred to the United States
District Court for the District Court of New Jersey as part of a
newly created federal multi-district litigation.

In July 2017, the district court granted Johnson & Johnson's and
JJCI's motion to dismiss one of the cases.

In September 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit affirmed this dismissal.

In September 2017, the plaintiff in the second case voluntarily
dismissed the complaint. In March 2018, the plaintiff in the second
case refiled in Illinois State Court.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. It operates in three segments: Consumer,
Pharmaceutical, and Medical Devices. The company was incorporated
in 1887 and is based in New Brunswick, New Jersey.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: XARELTO Sales Class Suit in Louisiana Ongoing
----------------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 29, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend a class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana related to its improper marketing and
promotion of XARELTO(R).

In August 2015, two third-party payors filed a purported class
action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana against Janssen Research & Development, LLC, Janssen
Ortho LLC, Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Ortho-McNeil-Janssen
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Johnson & Johnson (as well as certain
Bayer entities), alleging that the defendants improperly marketed
and promoted XARELTO(R) as safer and more effective than less
expensive alternative medications while failing to fully disclose
its risks. The complaint seeks damages.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. It operates in three segments: Consumer,
Pharmaceutical, and Medical Devices. The company was incorporated
in 1887 and is based in New Brunswick, New Jersey.


KIA MOTORS: Baldwin et al Sue over Defective Airbags
----------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against seven automotive
manufacturers, including Kia Motors and Hyundai Motor, and the
tier-one parts supplier, ZF TRW, for alleged violations of the
Magnuson Moss Act, violations of California consumer protection
statutes and violations of common law claims of fraud and unjust
enrichment. The case is captioned RYAN BALDWIN; ERIN REILLY; BILAL
MOHAMMAD ALI; JASON KLEIN; JOSHUA KIM; ERIC RUIZ; REX WESTON,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated;
Plaintiffs, vs. KIA MOTORS AMERICA, INC., a California corporation;
HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, a California corporation; FCA US LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company; MITSUBISHI MOTORS AMERICA,
INC., a Delaware corporation; AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., a
California corporation; ACURA, a Division of American Honda Motor
Co., Inc.; TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC., a California
corporation; ZF TRW AUTOMOTIVE HOLDINGS CORP., a Delaware
corporation, Defendants, Case No. 8:19-cv-01376-DOC-KES (C.D. Cal.,
July 15, 2019).

This case alleges an egregious breach of public trust by seven
automotive manufacturers and a tier-one parts supplier, who have
concealed a deadly airbag defect in 12.3 million U.S. cars. On the
heels of the Takata recall, and the $1.5 billion in class action
settlements that accompanied it, the manufacturers -- Acura, Honda,
Toyota, FCA, Mitsubishi, Kia and Hyundai -- have known of this new
airbag defect for years, and have yet refused to issue a recall to
fix it. At issue is the vehicles’ airbag control unit (ACU)
manufactured by supplier ZF-TRW that becomes over-stressed by
excess electrical energy generated during a crash. The "electrical
over-stress" forces the ACU to seize-up at the moment of impact,
causing the airbags to not deploy and the seatbelt locks to fail.

Kia Motors America, Inc is a California corporation, with its
corporate headquarters located in this district at 111 Peters
Canyon Road, Irvine, California 92606. Kia is a manufacturer and
distributor of new motor vehicles under the Kia brand. Kia markets,
leases, warrants, and oversees regulatory compliance and warranty
servicing of Kia-brand vehicles through a network of dealers
throughout the United States from its headquarters in California.

Hyundai Motor America is a California corporation, with its
corporate headquarters located in this district at 10550 Talbert
Avenue, Fountain Valley, California 92708. Hyundai is a
manufacturer and distributor of new motor vehicles under the
Hyundai brand. Hyundai markets, leases, warrants, and oversees
regulatory compliance and warranty servicing of Hyundai-brand
vehicles through a network of dealers throughout the United States
from its headquarters in California.

FCA US LLC is a Delaware limited liability company, with its
corporate headquarters located at 1000 Chrysler Drive, Auburn
Hills, Michigan 48326. FCA is a manufacturer and distributor of new
motor vehicles under the Chrysler, Dodge, Jeep, Ram, and Fiat
brands. FCA markets, leases, warrants, and oversees regulatory
compliance and warranty servicing of Chrysler, Dodge, Jeep, Ram,
and Fiat-brand vehicles through a network of dealers throughout the
United States from its headquarters in Michigan. FCA also creates
and distributes the warranties and other written materials that
accompany the sale and lease of Chrysler, Dodge, Jeep, Ram, and
Fiat-branded vehicles throughout the United States, and makes
decisions concerning warranty coverage of customer vehicles when
problems arise. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Jonathan A. Michaels, Esq.
     Kyle Gurwell, Esq.
     Ryan Jones, Esq.
     MLG, APLC
     151 Kalmus Dr., Suite A-102
     Costa Mesa, CA 92626
     Telephone: (949) 581-6900
     Facsimile: (949) 581-6908
     E-mail: jmichaels@mlgaplc.com
             kgurwell@ mlgaplc.com
             rjones@ mlgaplc.com

             - and -

     Robert N. Kaplan, Esq.
     KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP
     850 3rd Ave., 14th Floor
     New York, NY 10022
     Telephone: (212) 687-1980
     Facsimile: (212) 687-7714
     E-mail: rkaplan@kaplanfox.com

             - and -

     Laurence D. King, Esq.
     KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP
     350 Sansome Street, Suite 400
     San Francisco, CA 94104
     Telephone: (415) 772-4700
     Facsimile: (415) 772-4707
     E-mail: lking@kaplanfox.com


LIFESHARE BLOOD: Court Narrows Claims in Trisler FLSA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana, Alexandria Division, issued granting in part and denying
in part Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in the case
captioned NATASHA TRISLER, ET AL., v. LIFESHARE BLOOD CENTERS. Case
No. 17-CV-421. (W.D. La.).

The original Plaintiffs in this motion, Natasha Trisler and Heather
Savage filed this collective action in Louisiana's Ninth Judicial
District Court, in their individual capacities and on behalf of
others similarly situated. Trisler and Savage allege that, while
employed as technicians at the Alexandria, Louisiana location of
LifeShare, they were subjected to violations of both the FLSA and
Louisiana law. Specifically, the representative Plaintiffs allege
that LifeShare's policy of automatically deducting 30 minutes for
meal breaks from any day's time exceeding 6 hours was applied to
them, even on days where they did not receive a bona fide meal
break.  

A court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A dispute of material fact
is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.   

However, the non-moving party does not establish a genuine dispute
with some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by
conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a
scintilla of evidence. It is important to note that the standard
for a summary judgment is two-fold: (1) there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact, and (2) the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.

Plaintiffs' Overtime Gap Time Claims

LifeShare's motion seeks a judgment in its favor as to all claims
by plaintiffs for what are commonly referred to as overtime gap
time claims. Gap time claims, also referred to as straight time
claims, are claims for unpaid wages below the weekly 40-hour
threshold. When an employee is paid at or above the minimum wage
requirement and does not claim unpaid overtime wages, such gap time
claims are not cognizable under the FLSA. Moreover, claims for
straight time in weeks where an employee also works overtime are
not contemplated by the FLSA.  

The Plaintiffs allege that LifeShare's meal deduction policy
resulted in LifeShare's failure to pay them for both straight time
and overtime. While plaintiffs concede that claims for straight
time are generally not cognizable under the FLSA, plaintiffs assert
that their overtime gap time claims claims for both straight time
and overtime in weeks where these employees worked overtime are
within the ambit of relief under the FLSA. This court does not
agree. Rather, the Court applies Lundy and its progeny as
persuasive on this issue.  

Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs' straight time claims
in weeks where these employees worked overtime are not cognizable
as FLSA claims.

The Court agrees, however, that such claims may be cognizable as
state law claims. The court will address this issue with
specificity in this ruling. Any claims by plaintiffs alleging
breach of the FLSA based on failure to pay overtime wages will be
preserved at this time, though the Court notes that plaintiffs fail
to cite any evidence of the existence of these claims in response
to the motion. Here, the Court observes that simply filing hundreds
of pages of payroll evidence and citing it generally is
unacceptable as a defense to a motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs are required to cite evidence with specificity. Out of
an abundance of caution, the Court preserves these claims, but will
not maintain the claims in the future if evidence is not cited
directly and, particularly, in the event of another motion
challenging these claims.  

Plaintiffs' Claims for Alteration of Time

LifeShare's motion next seeks summary judgment as to plaintiffs'
claims that it violated the FLSA by allowing managers to
redistribute hours worked among successive weeks in order to reduce
or eliminate overtime hours.   Plaintiffs' response affirms that it
seeks voluntary dismissal of those particular claims, but carefully
preserves claims both for alteration of time cards and for
undercompensation for travel time.  

Plaintiffs' allegations regarding the alteration of timecards are
duplicative of the prime issue in this case: failure to administer
LifeShare's meal deduction policy fairly and consistently under the
law. Specifically, plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition asks the
court to preserve such claims based on evidence that managers
directed employees to record meal breaks on their timecards when
they were afforded no such meal break.
  
Similarly, plaintiffs point to alleged instances where meal
deductions were taken although an employee wrote no lunch on
his/her handwritten timesheets. These alleged alterations comprise
the central FLSA claim in this case and, to that end, will be
preserved as part of plaintiffs' FLSA meal deduction claim, but
will not be recognized as separate claims. Plaintiffs' claims for
transfer of time between weeks will be dismissed according to their
stated intent.

Preemption of Louisiana Law Claims

Plaintiffs' complaint includes alternative claims based on the
Louisiana law of conversion and unjust enrichment.  LifeShare's
motion argues for dismissal of these claims based on FLSA
preemption. LifeShare qualifies its argument by conceding that
plaintiffs' gap time claims, claims for hourly wages below the
40-hour per week threshold are not covered by the FLSA and, for
that reason, are not preempted. Instead, however, LifeShare
advocates dismissal of these claims based on insufficiency of
proof.

The Court finds applicable jurisprudence dictates that plaintiffs'
straight time and gap time overtime claims are not cognizable under
the FLSA. Accordingly, the Court does not find that such claims are
preempted by the FLSA, since they do not, at their root, allege a
violation of the FLSA.

Addressing the remaining Louisiana law claims, the Court must now
determine to what cause of action such claims belong. Plaintiffs
urge the court to view these claims as sounding in Louisiana's law
of conversion. Plaintiffs admit, however, that no Louisiana or
Fifth Circuit jurisprudence supports an application of the law of
conversion to these facts.LifeShare contends that plaintiffs'
claims do not satisfy the elements of a conversion claim, pointing
out that plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate ownership of the
wages at issue, which Louisiana law requires.

Having considered the arguments, the court finds that conversion is
inapplicable to plaintiffs' gap time and gap time overtime claims.
Louisiana's Wage Payment Statute  expressly provides that employers
have a duty to pay all wages due an employee under the terms of
employment no later than fifteen (15) days following the date of
discharge.   Jurisprudence illustrates that claims under the Wage
Payment Statute are not preempted by the FLSA, where the wages
sought are not covered by the FLSA or where the Louisiana statute
provides the more generous remedy.

An action for unjust enrichment under Louisiana law requires proof
of the following elements: (1) an enrichment (2) an impoverishment
(3) a connection between the enrichment and resulting
impoverishment (4) an absence of justification or cause for the
enrichment and impoverishment and (5) demonstration that the law
provides no other remedy to the plaintiffs. Unjust enrichment is a
subsidiary claim, meaning that unjust enrichment is not an
available cause of action when Louisiana law provides another
remedy.  

Based on the Court's finding that the proper state law cause of
action for unpaid wages rests in Louisiana's Wage Payment Statute,
the Court does not find that plaintiffs' claims are proper under
the theory of unjust enrichment, since a remedy is clearly
contemplated under existing law. Plaintiffs' petition fails to
assert a claim under the Wage Payment Statute, but the mere fact
that plaintiffs did not successfully pursue such a claim does not
entitle them to unjust enrichment claims. The Court make no finding
as to the merits of any future claims under Louisiana's Wage
Payment Statute.

Accordingly, LifeShare's motion for partial summary judgment will
be granted as to the plaintiffs' claims for alteration of time
regarding the transfer of time between workweeks, conversion and/or
unjust enrichment, dismissing these claims with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 29, 2019 Memorandum
Ruling is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2fq6r3a from
Leagle.com.

Natasha Trisler, individually & on behalf of others similarly
situated, Heather Savage, individually & on behalf of others
similarly situated, Jaleisha Jones, Nia Robinson, Elaine Matthews,
Michelle Taylor, Mecos Green, Courtney Ware, Jessica Ward, Nicole A
Howard, Eunice Mason, Brianca Delton, Miranda Streetman, Kristina
Beverly, LaNiece Johnson, Lafayette Romeka Anderson, Jeannie Fay
Davidson-Harris, Judy L Knighton, Kimberly Fontenot, Ashley
Schneider, Bryant McDonald, Andrea M Groshong, Frederickea Lawson,
Laterica Cain, Stephanie Schaper, Krystal Fontenot, Dave Solomon
Marie, Jr, Takachel R Green, Alicia L Williams, Angel Morris,
Tabatha Brown, John Davis, Jr, Pauline Whitney, Chyla Wilson,
Alexandra Johnson, Layvfette Hill, Sharone N Gillion, Michelle
Pursley, Ravonda Norman, Patricia A Elmore, Kayla White, Natasha
Holmes, Amber Vargas, Brad Kindrix, Jeanette Ferguson, Destiny
Mink, Lecreatia Rawls, Shawron Clavelle, Ebony Holyfield, Mikesha
Jolivet, Crystal Allen, Shealyn Stokely, Carrie James, Yolanda
Wright, Tiaeh Rome Antoine, Cornelius Smith, Jr, Shondolyn Ensley,
Kasey N Leckie, Leslie McClain, Kierra Godwin, Alexis Neville,
Audreuna McCarter, Diana Turner, Leshia Gipson, Ashley E Goudeau,
Shenequa Spencer, Samantha Holder, Dominique Reynolds, Jasmine C
Brown, Karissa Shantel Scott, Labrisha Ford, Cathy Parker, Tiffany
Dixon, All Plaintiffs, Brianna J Howard, Michael Vidrine, Alexis
Bernard, Kelly Wilson, Ungelique Davis, Marlisha Armelin, Jessica
Allison, Skylyn Granger Pete, Kayla A Lastrapes, Veronica Newsome,
Felicia Williams, Victoria Short, Rachel Green, Milton J Ardoin &
Lorilee Miguel Faulkner, Plaintiffs, represented by Kathleen
Thompson Deanda, Stockwell Sievert et al, David L. Morgan,
Stockwell Sievert et al, P O Box 2900. Lake Charles, LA 70601 &
Somer George Brown, Cox Cox et al. 723 Broad Street, Lake Charles,
LA 70601

LifeShare Blood Centers, Defendant, represented by Michael D. Lowe
-- michael.lowe@keanmiller.com -- Kean Miller & Brian Ross Carnie
-- brian.carnie@keanmiller.com -- Kean Miller.


LITTLE CAESAR: Court Dismisses Ogden Antitrust Suit
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned CHRISTOPHER
OGDEN, Plaintiff, v. LITTLE CAESAR ENTERPRISES, INC. and LC
TRADEMARKS, INC., Defendants. Case No. 18-12792. (E.D. Mich.).

The defendants, Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc. (LCE) and LC
Trademarks, Inc., have moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that
it does not state a viable antitrust claim.

Plaintiff Christopher Ogden has sued Little Caesar Enterprises,
alleging that the pizza maker violated the Sherman Act by requiring
its franchisees to adhere to a no poaching provision in its
franchise agreement, which has the effect of stifling competitive
wages and mobility of their restaurant managers, including Ogden.
That provision prevents one franchisee from hiring the management
employee of another franchisee without permission.

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face. A claim is facially plausible when a
plaintiff 'pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.' When reviewing the motion, the Court must
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.

Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States. For a plaintiff to
successfully bring an antitrust claim under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant's
actions constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade which caused
the plaintiff to experience an antitrust injury.

Restraints can be unreasonable in one of two ways; in the first
category, a small group of restraints are unreasonable per se
because they always or almost always tend to restrict competition
and decrease output. Typically only horizontal' restraints
restraints imposed by agreement between competitors qualify as
unreasonable per se. Restraints that are not unreasonable per se
are judged under the rule of reason, which requires courts to
conduct a fact-specific assessment of market power and market
structure to assess the restraint's actual effect on competition.

The defendants argue that the plaintiff has not pleaded facts that
would justify application of the per se approach, and even the
quick look method is inappropriate here. The plaintiff counters by
citing several cases for the proposition that courts typically
defer the commitment to a rule of decision until after discovery
has produced a sufficient record for the typically fact-bound
inquiry into the market effects of the defendants' conduct.

However, the plaintiff pointedly resists the defendants' insistence
that the claims can and should be subjected to the default and most
commonly applied rule of reason analysis which is favored by the
federal courts in nearly all anti-trust cases. Thus, the plaintiff
himself has tethered the viability of his pleading to the
application of either the per se or quick look rules of decision,
which are more amenable to analysis at the pleading stage. He has
not even attempted to advance allegations or arguments supporting
any claim under the rule-of-reason standard.

That may make sense for a tactical reason, as the plaintiff seeks
to certify this case as a class action and represent a putative
nationwide class. Attempting to define the relevant market for
fast-food employees generally and Little Caesar employees in
particular could be problematic.  

Regardless of his rationale, the plaintiff's avoidance of the
rule-of-reason theory cuts against his reliance on authorities that
counsel against addressing dispositive motions until some discovery
has taken place.

The defendants argue that the agreement in this case, between
franchisor and franchisee, is a vertical agreement that only
restricts intrabrand competition, which has the effect of actually
promoting interbrand competition by restraining franchisees under
the same brand from harming each other. Such agreements, the
defendants contend, must be evaluated under the rule-of-reason, not
the per se, approach. And they insist that the allegations here do
not measure up under that theory because they fail to allege any
substantial facts to establish that any franchisees entered into
actual horizontal agreements, and the mere allegations of
horizontal effects of the franchise agreement are not sufficient to
establish a plausible anti-trust claim per Twombly.

The plaintiff responds that the coordinated establishment of
vertical agreements that orchestrate restraints of competition
between horizontal competitors has been regarded as a horizontal
agreement where the scheme is directed by a single controlling
upstream entity in a hub and spoke pattern. They assert that
contrary to the defendants' naked assertions that Little Caesar's
franchisees do not compete with each other, the franchise paperwork
contains numerous caveats informing franchisees that they are not
guaranteed exclusive territories and may compete with other
franchisees, or any exclusive territory may be narrowed or
eliminated at the discretion of the defendants. And they contend
that it is well-settled that agreements to fix prices or wages
among horizontal competitors are per se illegal under the Sherman
Act.

The Sixth Circuit has explained that, regardless of the alignment
of the parties to an agreement, the per se doctrine applies only if
a restraint clearly and unquestionably falls within one of the
handful of categories that have been collectively deemed per se
anticompetitive.

The plaintiff has not established that his claims properly could be
allowed to proceed under a per se analysis, because the complaint
does not anywhere allege that the defendants, or their franchisees,
engaged in any explicit agreement either to fix wages or to divide
the labor market into any discernible exclusive territories. Those
are the only two narrow categories of agreements to which the Sixth
Circuit has applied that strict rule of decision.

The Sixth Circuit has explained that the per se doctrine should be
applied reluctantly and infrequently, informed by other courts'
review of the same type of restraint, and only when the rule of
reason would likely justify the same result and it has observed
with caution that the Supreme Court has described the per se rule
as a demanding' rule that should be applied only in clear cut
cases.

In this case, the plaintiff has not explained how his claims fit
into the narrow categories delineated by the Sixth Circuit for
application of the per se rule, nor has he cited any decision
holding that the sort of agreement pleaded here properly can be
subjected to that mode of analysis.

The plaintiff correctly points out that there is some authority for
the proposition that the agreements here are not strictly vertical
because although nominally executed between only the corporate
parent and an individual franchisee, the agreements explicitly
allowed for enforcement of the no-poaching clause by any non-party
franchisee by civil suit, and they threatened that violating the
provision to the detriment of a non-party franchisee could lead to
sanctions from the corporate parent including termination of the
franchise. Thus, the defendants' insistence that the agreements are
purely vertical is not well taken.

But even if the agreements are viewed as between horizontal
competitors, that does not settle the question of which mode of
analysis must apply. Horizontality alone does not necessarily
justify invocation of the per se rule, because applying the rule of
reason is the default position and can be applied to horizontal
restraints as well if they do not fit into existing categories of
per se violations.

In this case, regardless of the alignment of the agreements, the
per se analysis is not warranted; even the cases cited by the
plaintiff as the leading decisions in support of his position have
declined plaintiffs' invitations to apply a per se analysis to
franchise agreements of the sort alleged here.

The plaintiff's invocation of statutory and regulatory guidance by
the Department of Justice offers little support for his position,
since that guidance has been held to be inapplicable to the sort of
agreement at issue here, which does not qualify for the heightened
scrutiny afforded to a naked no-poaching compact between
unaffiliated entities.

Finally, even if a per se approach could be applied, the plaintiff
has failed sufficiently to allege the sort of explicit,
comprehensive wage-fixing compact that has been found to sustain
claims in no-poaching cases under that rubric. The complaint here
merely alleges in a very general fashion that no-poaching
agreements have had some broad effect in depressing wages of
employees in the fast-food industry on a macro scale. He has not
alleged that franchisees in any relevant market, or nationally,
actually met to fix wages or establish uniform wage scales or caps
that all participants in the scheme would adhere to.

The allegations here contrast sharply with the specific allegations
of broad, explicit wage-fixing agreements in cases such as In re
Animation Workers Antitrust Litigation, 123 F.Supp.3d 1175 (N.D.
Cal. 2015), where the plaintiffs alleged that a cabal of half a
dozen major movie studios conspired to suppress compensation in two
ways. First, Defendants allegedly entered into a scheme not to
actively solicit each other's employees.

Second, Defendants allegedly engaged in 'collusive discussions in
which they exchanged competitively sensitive compensation
information' and agreed upon compensation ranges, which would
artificially limit compensation offered to Defendants' current and
prospective employees. The allegations there included
comprehensive, regular collaborations by executives and human
resource officers of the defendant studios to determine uniform
wage schedules that they agreed to follow.

The plaintiff's complaint fails to plead facts sufficient to
support the proposition that the franchise agreements' no-poaching
provisions are unreasonable per se.

The complaint in this case contains no similar allegations. Ogden
does not allege that he tried to obtain employment at another
Little Caesar franchise, let alone that he was offered a job for
more pay that he had to refuse, or that another employer would hire
him but for the no-poaching clause. The quick look approach may
provide refuge for near-miss per se antitrust plaintiffs, but the
framework still requires an equivalent amount of obviousness that
is lacking here. That is especially so here, where the agreements
display both vertical and horizontal components, and therefore
require a more in-depth analysis to determine unreasonableness.

The facts alleged in the complaint, no matter how generously
construed, fall far short of the required showing to sustain an
antitrust claim, principally because the plaintiff has not put
forth any allegations to define the scope of any relevant market,
or to show that any anti-competitive effects of the agreements are
not negated by the pro-competitive effects on interbrand
competition. Thus, no matter how well sustained by the evidence,
the allegations could not survive scrutiny under the rule of
reason.  

The defendants also argue that the complaint falls short of
alleging an antitrust injury, where the plaintiff suggests, at
most, that he was merely unhappy with the terms of his employment
and decided to take a job with another employer, without alleging
that he ever actually was restrained from seeking a transfer or
other employment by the defendants. The plaintiff responds that he
has sufficiently alleged an antitrust injury where he asserts that
the no-poaching clause in the franchise agreement artificially
depressed his wages and suppressed his employment mobility, which
had the effect of causing him to work for lower wages than he could
have obtained in a fully competitive labor market.

Regardless of whether the challenged agreement may have been
unlawful, the plaintiff has not validly pleaded an antitrust injury
where he has not offered any facts to show that the agreement
precipitated any specific wage or opportunity loss to him. That is
particularly apparent where, as here, the plaintiff contends that
he had no knowledge of the no-poaching agreement, and that he never
was subjected to any invocation of the clause by either his former
or any prospective employer.  

In this case, the plaintiff has not alleged any similar facts to
show that he ever attempted to  or even considered  transferring to
another Little Caesar franchisee location. Nor has he alleged that
any restrictive condition of his employment drove him to seek work
outside the industry, by preventing him from being hired by any
out-of-brand competitor. As the Sixth Circuit has held, the
antitrust plaintiff who cannot show that the defendants'
anti-competitive collusion actually deprived him of an opportunity
to market his services has not made the required connection between
the unlawful agreement and his injury.  But the point remains that
a plaintiff must allege facts that plausibly suggest the existence
of all the elements of his claim.
  
The Court in Twombly was referring to the idea of conscious
parallelism, but the underlying principle infests the pleadings
here as well. The plaintiff has not alleged facts under an
applicable antitrust theory from which one plausibly could find
that the no-poaching provision in the defendants' franchise
agreements amount to an unreasonable restraint of trade. And
particularly as to the consequences suffered by the plaintiff, the
complaint suggests very little more than that the plaintiff was
unhappy with the conditions of his employment and decided to seek
work elsewhere, which he eventually found, albeit at a lower rate
of pay than in his former job.

Nothing in his extensive pleadings positively establishes that the
plaintiff's departure from his job was due to anything other than
his own choice to seek better work with a new employer; so far as
they go, those circumstances are not sufficient to allege a
plausible claim for relief under any legal theory alluded to in the
complaint.

Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 29, 2019 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y5kwj6zl from
Leagle.com.

Christopher Ogden, Plaintiff, represented by Anne B. Shaver --
ashaver@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann and Bernstein LLP, Dean
Michael Harvey -- dharvey@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann and
Bernstein, LLP, Derek Y. Brandt -- derek@brandtlawllc.com -- McCune
Wright Arevalo LLP, Lin Yee Chan -- lchan@lchb.com -- Lieff
Cabraser Heimann & Berstein LLP, Michelle E. Conston --
MCONSTON@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM -- Scott and Scott Attorneys at Law LLP,
Richard D. McCune -- rdm@mccunewright.com -- McCune Wright Arevalo,
LLP, Sean C. Russell -- sean.russell@scott-scott.com -- Scott Scott
Attorneys at Law LLP, Sharon S. Almonrode -- ssa@miller.law -- The
Miller Law Firm, P.C., Stephanie A. Hackett --
SHACKETT@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM -- Scott and Scott Attorneys at Law LLP,
Walter W. Noss, Scott and Scott Attorneys at Law LLP, 600 W.
Broadway, Suite 3300, San Diego, CA 92101, William Kalas --
WK@miller.law -- The Miller Law Firm, P.C., Yaman Salahi --
ysalahi@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann and Bernstein LLP & E.
Powell Miller -- epm@miller.law -- The Miller Law Firm.

Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc. & LC Trademarks, Inc., Defendants,
represented by Adam Michael Wenner -- awenner@honigman.com --
Honigman LLP, David A. Ettinger -- dettinger@honigman.com --
Honigman, Miller, Schwartz and Cohn LLP, J. Michael Huget --
mhuget@honigman.com -- Honigman LLP, Michael L. Sturm --
michael.sturm@gpmlaw.com -- Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Bennett,
P.A. & Robert L. Zisk -- robert.zisk@gpmlaw.com -- Gray, Plant,
Mooty, Mooty & Bennett, P.A..


LOBBY VENTURES: Morgan Asserts Violation under Disabilities Act
---------------------------------------------------------------
Lobby Ventures Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant
to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Jon
R. Morgan, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Lobby Ventures Inc, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-07216-PGG (S.D. N.Y., Aug. 1, 2019).

Lobby Ventures Inc. have been selling on the Amazon.com marketplace
since 2017. They sell in the Home & Kitchen department .[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
   Shalom Law, PLLC.
   124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
   Kew Gardens, NY 11374
   Tel: (516) 807-1748
   Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com

LOS ANGELES, CA: Customers Want $67MM Overcharging Deal Tossed
--------------------------------------------------------------
Nathan Solis, writing for Courthouse News, reports that a $67
million settlement between Los Angeles County utility customers who
were overcharged due to faulty meters and the Department of Water
and Power should be tossed due to the discovery of millions more in
damages, according to new attorneys representing the class action
plaintiffs.

The report filed in Los Angeles County Superior Court caps a
turbulent week for city officials and the Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power. FBI agents raided LADWP headquarters July 22 as
part of an ongoing investigation into the settlement and the
utility's top director was ousted by LA Mayor Eric Garcetti shortly
after.

In 2016, the LADWP reached a $67.5 million settlement with
overcharged utility customers. The department blamed a consulting
firm for designing faulty meters.

But LA and the utility sued the consulting firm,
PricewaterhouseCoopers, over the botched meter reading system.
PricewaterhouseCoopers argued in court an attorney who represented
the lead plaintiff in the meter-reading class action also acted as
outside counsel for the city and LADWP in the separate lawsuit.

PricewaterhouseCoopers argued this relationship ensured a more
favorable settlement for the city.

Now the class of customers are represented by attorney Brian
Kabateck, who says large groups of customers were excluded from the
initial settlement.

In a 31-page report filed on July 25, the class claims there is at
least $50 million owed to customers in addition to the $67 million
initial settlement.

There were customers who are owed back-billing pay, others from
separate class actions, solar subclass customers and many others,
says Kabateck.

"The exclusion of these claims makes no sense. As part of the
overall aim to refund 100% to the rate payers and maximize
recovery, class counsel intends to reopen the settlement and
request that the foregoing claims be included so the class may
receive an immediate benefit," writes Kabateck.

Attorney's fees should be paid out if a special master assigned to
audit and investigate relationships in the case determines ethical
violations occurred, the class says.

Moreover, class members want the court to reopen discovery in the
ratepayer case against the city of Los Angeles and the utility.

"It is our preliminary conclusion that the customers and rate
payers of the LADWP were in some manner victimized by the city's
and/or outside counsel's actions," writes Kabateck. "It is also our
opinion that there is additional money owed to the rate payers, and
other claims were likely waived or eliminated because there was
little or no likelihood the city could recover from
PricewaterhouseCoopers on those claims."

In a statement, an LADWP spokesperson said the settlement included
multiple layers of review of the incorrect billing statements,
which were then reviewed by a third-party monitor and approved by
the court.

"However, in keeping with the city's twin goals of achieving a 100%
return to ratepayers of all overcharges and fully remediating the
billing system, we welcome a thorough review of the settlement, the
payouts and the programs developed to identify class members," the
spokesperson said. "This includes the sampling of the payouts that
class counsel proposes."

A spokesperson for the City Attorney's Office said while it
disagrees with most of the report filed in court, it agrees
ratepayers should be repaid in full. The spokesperson did not
address the claim that terms of the settlement intentionally
excluded customers.

Jamie Court from the nonpartisan Consumer Watchdog says customers
should not just be compensated for money, but also any legal rights
they may have waived from the class action settlement.

"Those consumers should be able to sue when their smart readers are
in error and they waived their rights with the fraudulent
settlement," said Court. "The conduct here rose to malice and
fraud."

Before the FBI raided the LADWP headquarters, Court asked
California Attorney General Xavier Becerra's office to take over
the corruption probe of the Los Angeles City Attorney's Office and
the utility. A top executive at LADWP, David Wright, was set to
leave the post later this year but was replaced by 35-year veteran
of the agency Marty Adams after the raid.

Court said, "We need fresh blood in that department." [GN]


LYFT INC: More Rape Victims Join Class Action in SLO Court
----------------------------------------------------------
Cal Coast Times reports that two alleged rape victims have joined a
Nipomo woman as plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit filed in San
Luis Obispo Superior Court, in California, against the ridesharing
company Lyft.

San Luis Obispo attorney Jim McKiernan, Esq. initially filed the
lawsuit in January 2019 on behalf of a Nipomo woman whom a Lyft
driver allegedly raped after bringing her home last November
following a night of drinking. McKiernan refiled the lawsuit on
July 24 in San Luis Obispo Superior Court.

The two additional plaintiffs who joined the class action complaint
were sexually assaulted by Lyft drivers in Los Angeles and San
Diego counties, according to the suit. Both of the new plaintiffs
were using Lyft's "tipsy taxi" service for rides home when they
were allegedly sexually assaulted by their drivers.

McKiernan's class action suit argues crimes involving Lyft drivers
are common because of the company's inadequate screening process
and negligent supervision.

The suit details the incident in which a Lyft driver allegedly
raped the Nipomo woman.

"After being dropped off at Jane Doe's home around midnight by a
Lyft driver, Jane Doe woke up the next morning in her bed bruised,
naked and bleeding from her intimate private parts," the lawsuit
states. "The entire assault by the Lyft driver was captured on a
home surveillance system, amounting to approximately 30 minutes."

On Nov. 4, the Nipomo woman was intoxicated when she stepped into a
Lyft vehicle driven by Lompoc man Jason Fenwick, 52. She had
blacked out by the time they arrived at her home, where she was
escorted inside by Fenwick.

Fenwick placed her in bed and then wandered around the house,
snooping and checking for other occupants and closing curtains. He
was oblivious to the home surveillance system that was recording
his very action, according to the lawsuit.

The Lyft driver proceeded to "fondle, paw, kiss, molest and
disrobe" the woman. Eventually he removed her underwear and
performed oral sex and penetrated her, according to the lawsuit.

During the sexual assault, Fenwick took several breaks to surveil
the inside of the home. He also took several photos of himself with
the unconscious woman.

After the assault, Fenwick grabbed the woman's phone and used it to
leave himself a $20 tip for the Lyft ride, the lawsuit states.

On Nov. 8, SLO County sheriff's deputies arrested Fenwick on
charges of oral copulation with an intoxicated victim, sexual
penetration with a foreign object, using a device to see through
clothing and burglary. Fenwick remains in jail with his bail set at
$500,000.

According to the suit, Lyft has high driver turnover and rushes to
fill driving positions. Lyft's high demand for drivers and
inadequate background checks result in the hiring of dangerous
drivers and drivers with criminal records.

McKiernan has suggested that Lyft could monitor its drivers through
an app currently used by customers to track drivers in order to
monitor the amount of time drivers spend at the homes of their
riders. Lyft employees could then call both the client and the
driver to determine a reason for the delay in leaving the drop off
point, McKiernan said.

The plaintiffs are suing for unspecified damages, as well as
reimbursement for legal fees. Likewise, the plaintiffs are seeking
the imposition of fines and changes to Lyft policies.

A recent California Supreme Court case set new standards for
determining whether workers are employees of a company or
independent contractors. The new standards make it much for
difficult for companies to claim workers are independent
contractors, thus making Lyft liable for its drivers' actions,
according to the lawsuit. [GN]


MACY'S CREDIT: Guardino Suit Asserts TCPA Violation
---------------------------------------------------
JIMMY GUARDINO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. MACY'S CREDIT AND CUSTOMER SERVICES, INC.,
and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and each of them, Defendant, Case
No. 2:19-cv-06675 (C.D. Cal., Aug. 1, 2019) is an action
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated seeking
damages and any other available legal or equitable remedies
resulting from the illegal actions of Defendants, in negligently,
knowingly, and/or willfully contacting Plaintiff on Plaintiff's
cellular telephone in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act ("TCPA"), causing Plaintiff to incur charges for
incoming calls and invading Plaintiff's privacy.

Beginning in May of 2019, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on
Plaintiff's cellular telephone, in an attempt to collect on an
alleged debt. Plaintiff spoke to several customer service
representatives and two supervisors. Despite Plaintiff's attempts
to stop the calls, Defendant continued to contact Plaintiff.
Plaintiff neither provided Defendant with his cellular telephone
number, nor gave Defendant permission to call, says the complaint.

Plaintiff JIMMY GUARDINO is a natural person residing in Woodland
Hills, California.

MACY'S CREDIT AND CUSTOMER SERVICES, INC. is a debt collection
company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
     Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
     Meghan E. George, Esq.
     Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C.
     21550 Oxnard Street, Suite 780
     Woodland Hills, CA 91367
     Phone: (323) 306-4234
     Fax: (866) 633-0228
     Email: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
            abacon@toddflaw.com
            mgeorge@toddflaw.com


MADDIES MAYHEM: Sanchez Seeks Overtime Wages for Service Staff
--------------------------------------------------------------
SYBIL SANCHEZ, on behalf of herself and other persons similarly
situated the Plaintiff, v. MADDIES MAYHEM LLC D/B/A HAT TRICKS, the
Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-00574 (E.D. Tex., July 31, 2019), seeks
to recover unpaid wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class
were employed as bar tenders and waiters (Service Staff) by
Defendant Maddies Mayhem LLC. While working for the Defendant, they
were not paid overtime premium pay for overtime hours worked, in
violation of the FLSA.

Maddies Mayhem is a sports bar offering live music.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff is:

          Tailim Song, Esq.
          TAILIM SONG LAW FIRM
          8111 LBJ Freeway, Suite 480
          Dallas, TX 75251
          Telephone: (214) 528-8400
          Facsimile: (214) 528-8402
          E-mail: tsong@tailimsong.com

MCDERMOTT INT'L: Class Cert. Bid in Chicago Bridge Suit Pending
---------------------------------------------------------------
McDermott International, Inc.  said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 29, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the motion for class
certification and appointment as class representatives in the class
action suit entitled, In re Chicago Bridge & Iron Company N.V.
Securities Litigation, is pending.

On March 2, 2017, a complaint was filed in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking class
action status on behalf of purchasers of CB&I common stock and
alleging damages on their behalf arising from alleged false and
misleading statements made during the class period from October 30,
2013 to June 23, 2015.

The case is captioned: In re Chicago Bridge & Iron Company N.V.
Securities Litigation, No. 1:17-cv-01580-LGS (the "Securities
Litigation").

The defendants in the case are: CB&I; a former chief executive
officer of CB&I; a former chief financial officer of CB&I; and a
former controller and chief accounting officer of CB&I.

On June 14, 2017, the court named ALSAR Partnership Ltd. as lead
plaintiff. On August 14, 2017, a consolidated amended complaint was
filed alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, arising out of alleged
misrepresentations about CB&I's accounting for the acquisition of
The Shaw Group, CB&I's accounting with respect to the two nuclear
projects being constructed by The Shaw Group, and CB&I's financial
reporting and public statements with respect to those two projects.


On May 24, 2018, the court denied defendants' motion to dismiss and
the parties are currently engaged in the discovery process.

On February 4, 2019, lead plaintiff ALSAR Partnership Ltd. and
additional plaintiffs Iron Workers Local 40, 361, & 417 – Union
Security Funds and Iron Workers Local 580 – Joint Funds moved for
class certification and appointment as class representatives.

That motion remains pending before the magistrate-judge.

McDermott said, "We are not able at this time to determine the
likelihood of loss, if any, arising from this matter and,
accordingly, no amounts have been accrued as of June 30, 2019. We
believe the claims are without merit and intend to defend against
them vigorously."

McDermott International, Inc. provides engineering, procurement,
construction and installation, and technology solutions to the
energy industry worldwide. It operates through five segments:
North, Central and South America; Europe, Africa, Russia and
Caspian; the Middle East and North Africa; Asia Pacific; and
Technology. McDermott International, Inc. was founded in 1923 and
is headquartered in Houston, Texas.


MCDERMOTT INT'L: Curti and Stremcha Class Suits Dismissed
---------------------------------------------------------
McDermott International, Inc.  said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 29, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the plaintiffs in
Curti v. McDermott International, Inc., et al. and Stremcha v.
McDermott International, Inc., et al., have voluntarily filed a
notice of nonsuit and their actions have been dismissed without any
payment by the company.

On May 10, 2018, McDermott announced that it has completed its
combination with Chicago Bridge & Iron Company N.V. creating a
premier, fully integrated provider of technology, engineering and
construction solutions for the energy industry.

On March 1, 2019 and March 4, 2019, two essentially identical class
action lawsuits were filed in the Harris County (Texas) District
Court alleging violations of Sections 11, 12 and 15 of the
Securities Act of 1933 on behalf of CB&I shareholders who acquired
McDermott common stock pursuant or traceable to the Registration
Statement on Form S-4 and the related Prospectus McDermott issued
in connection with the Combination.

These actions were captioned Curti v. McDermott International,
Inc., et al., Case No. 2019-15780 and Stremcha v. McDermott
International, Inc., et al., Case No. 2019-15473.

The defendants, besides McDermott International, Inc., included
present officers of McDermott and current and past members of
McDermott’s board of directors.

On or about July 9, 2019, the plaintiffs in these actions
voluntarily filed a notice of nonsuit and the actions have been
dismissed without any payment by the company.

McDermott International, Inc. provides engineering, procurement,
construction and installation, and technology solutions to the
energy industry worldwide. It operates through five segments:
North, Central and South America; Europe, Africa, Russia and
Caspian; the Middle East and North Africa; Asia Pacific; and
Technology. McDermott International, Inc. was founded in 1923 and
is headquartered in Houston, Texas.


MCDERMOTT INT'L: Lead Plaintiff Appointed in Consolidated Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
McDermott International, Inc.  said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 29, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the court appointed
lead plaintiffs in the consolidated Edwards v. McDermott
International, Inc., et al. and Public Employees Retirement System
of Mississippi v. McDermott International, Inc., et al. suit.

On November 15, 2018, a complaint was filed in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas seeking class
action status on behalf of purchasers of McDermott common stock and
alleging damages on their behalf arising from allegedly false and
misleading statements made during the class period from January 24,
2018 to October 30, 2018.

The case is captioned: Edwards v. McDermott International, Inc., et
al., No. 4:18-cv-04330.

The defendants in the case are: McDermott; David Dickson, its
president and chief executive officer; and Stuart Spence, its chief
financial officer.

The plaintiff has alleged that the defendants made material
misrepresentations and omissions about the integration of the CB&I
business, certain CB&I projects and their fair values, and our
business, prospects and operations. The plaintiff asserts claims
under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5
thereunder.

On January 14, 2019, a related action was filed in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas seeking
class action status on behalf of all shareholders of McDermott
common stock as of April 4, 2018 who had the right to vote on the
Combination, captioned: The Public Employees Retirement System of
Mississippi v. McDermott International, Inc., et al., No.
4:19-cv-00135.

The plaintiff has alleged the defendants (which include the
company's chief executive officer and chief financial officer) made
material misrepresentations and omissions in the proxy statement we
used in connection with the Combination.

The plaintiff asserted claims under Section 14(a) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act.

The company filed a motion to consolidate the two actions, and the
court granted that motion on February 22, 2019. The court appointed
lead plaintiffs in both actions on June 5, 2019.

McDermott said, "We plan to file motions to dismiss all of the
claims once amended pleadings are filed. We are not able at this
time to determine the likelihood of loss, if any, arising from
these matters and, accordingly, no amounts have been accrued as of
June 30, 2019. We believe the claims are without merit and we
intend to defend against them vigorously."

McDermott International, Inc. provides engineering, procurement,
construction and installation, and technology solutions to the
energy industry worldwide. It operates through five segments:
North, Central and South America; Europe, Africa, Russia and
Caspian; the Middle East and North Africa; Asia Pacific; and
Technology. McDermott International, Inc. was founded in 1923 and
is headquartered in Houston, Texas.


MCDERMOTT INT'L: Tentative Settlement Reached in Cantrell Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
McDermott International, Inc.  said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 29, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that a tentative
settlement has been reached among the parties in Cantrell v. Lutech
Resources, Inc.

A former employee of one of the company's subsidiaries commenced a
class action lawsuit under the Fair Labor Standards ACT ("FLSA")
entitled Cantrell v. Lutech Resources, Inc., (S.D. Texas 2017) Case
No. 4:17-CV-2679 on or about September 5, 2017, alleging that he
and his fellow class members were not paid one and one half times
their normal hourly wage rates for hours worked that exceeded 40
hours in a work week.

The company's subsidiary has yet to answer the allegations in the
complaint, as agreed by the parties, in order to allow mediation to
take place. The first mediation session commenced in October 2018
and is ongoing, and a tentative settlement has been reached between
the parties.

McDermott said, "We do not believe a risk of material loss is
probable related to this matter, and, accordingly, our reserves for
this matter were not significant as of June 30, 2019."

McDermott International, Inc. provides engineering, procurement,
construction and installation, and technology solutions to the
energy industry worldwide. It operates through five segments:
North, Central and South America; Europe, Africa, Russia and
Caspian; the Middle East and North Africa; Asia Pacific; and
Technology. McDermott International, Inc. was founded in 1923 and
is headquartered in Houston, Texas.


MDL 2472: Warner Chilcott Appeals Cert. Order in Loestrin MDL
-------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Warner Chilcott (US), LLC, et al., filed an appeal from
the District Court's direct purchaser class certification order
issued in the multidistrict litigation titled In Re: LOESTRIN 24 FE
ANTITRUST LITIGATION, Case No. 1:13-md-02472-WES-PAS, in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Rhode Island.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Direct
Purchaser Class Plaintiffs Ahold USA, Inc. and Rochester Drug
Co-Operative, Inc. asked the Court for an order certifying a class
of:

    "all persons or entities in the United States and its
     territories who purchased brand or generic Loestrin 24
     directly from Warner or Amneal at any time during the
     period from September 1, 2009, through and until June 3,
     2015, and all persons or entities in the United States and
     its territories who purchased brand Minastrin 24 directly
     from Warner at any time during the period from September 1,
     2009, through and until March 14, 2017."

The appellate case is captioned as WARNER CHILCOTT (US), LLC, et
al. v. AHOLD USA, INC., Case No. 19-8014, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

The Petitioners are Warner Chilcott (US), LLC; Warner Chilcott
Sales (US), LLC; Warner Chilcott Company, LLC; Warner Chilcott plc;
Warner Chilcott Limited; Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; and Watson
Laboratories, Inc.

The Respondent is Ahold USA, Inc.[BN]

The Petitioners-Defendants are represented by:

          J. Mark Gidley, Esq.
          Peter J. Carney, Esq.
          Matthew S. Leddicotte, Esq.
          WHITE & CASE LLP
          701 Thirteenth Street, N.W.
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 626-3600
          Facsimile: (202) 639-9355
          E-mail: mgidley@whitecase.com
                  pcarney@whitecase.com
                  mleddicotte@whitecase.com

               - and -

          Robert A. Milne, Esq.
          Jack E. Pace III, Esq.
          Bryan D. Gant, Esq.
          WHITE & CASE LLP
          1221 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10020-1905
          Telephone: (212) 819-8200
          Facsimile: (212) 354-8113
          E-mail: rmilne@whitecase.com
                  jpace@whitecase.com
                  bgant@whitecase.com

One of the Plaintiff's attorneys certifies that copies of the
Petition were sent, via third-party commercial carrier for delivery
overnight and e-mail to these counsel:

          Patrick C. Lynch, Esq.
          Jeffrey B. Pine, Esq.
          LYNCH & PINE
          One Park Row, 5th Floor
          Providence, RI 02903
          Telephone: (401) 274-3306
          E-mail: patrick@patricklynchgroup.com
                  jbp@pinelaw.com

               - and -

          Daniel J. Walker, Esq.
          BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C.
          2001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 300
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 559-9745
          E-mail: dwalker@bm.net

               - and -

          David F. Sorensen, Esq.
          Ellen T. Noteware, Esq.
          BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C.
          1818 Market Street, Suite 3600
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 875-3000
          E-mail: dsorensen@bm.net
                  enoteware@bm.net

               - and -

          Thomas M. Sobol, Esq.
          Kristen A. Johnson, Esq.
          Laura Hayes, Esq.
          Edward Notargiacomo, Esq.
          HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
          55 Cambridge Parkway, Suite 301
          Cambridge, MA 02142
          Telephone: (617) 482-3700
          E-mail: tom@hbsslaw.com
                  kristenj@hbsslaw.com
                  lhayes@hbsslaw.com
                  ed@hbsslaw.com

               - and -

          Joseph H. Meltzer, Esq.
          Terence S. Ziegler, Esq.
          KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK LLP
          280 King of Prussia Road
          Radnor, PA 19087
          Telephone: (610) 667-7706
          E-mail: jmeltzer@ktmc.com
                  tziegler@ktmc.com

               - and -

          Peter R. Kohn, Esq.
          Neill W. Clark, Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI LLP
          1617 JFK Boulevard, Suite 1550
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 277-5770
          E-mail: pkohn@faruqilaw.com
                  nclark@faruqilaw.com

               - and -

          David C. Calvello, Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI LLP
          685 Third Avenue, 26th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 983-9330
          E-mail: dcalvello@faruqilaw.com

               - and -

          Barry S. Taus, Esq.
          Archana Tamoshunas, Esq.
          TAUS, CEBULASH & LANDAU, LLP
          80 Maiden Lane, Suite 1204
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 931-0704
          E-mail: btaus@tcllaw.com
                  atamoshunas@tcllaw.com

               - and -

          John Radice, Esq.
          THE RADICE LAW FIRM, PC
          34 Sunset Boulevard
          Long Beach, NJ 08008
          Telephone: (646) 386-7688
          E-mail: jradice@radicelawfirm.com


MDL 2492: Hutcherson v. NCAA over Health Issues Consolidated
------------------------------------------------------------
The case, Cameron Hutcherson, individually and on behalf of all
similarly situated individuals, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, the Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-02572 (Filed June 25, 2019), was transferred from the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) on
August 1, 2019. The Northern District of Illinois Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-05133 the proceeding.

The Plaintiff brings this class action complaint against NCAA to
obtain redress for injuries sustained as result of Defendant's
reckless disregard for the health and safety of generations of
student-athletes.

The Hutcherson case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2492, Re:
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION STUDENT-ATHLETE CONCUSSION
INJURY LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Dec. 18, 2013.
These actions seek medical monitoring for putative classes of
former student athletes at NCAA-member schools who allege they
suffered concussions. The Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA concealed
information about the risks of the long-term effects of concussion
injuries. Opponents to centralization argue, inter alia, that (1)
the putative classes and claims alleged in these actions do not
sufficiently overlap; and (2) given the small number of actions
pending, alternatives to centralization are preferable. Opponents'
arguments, while persuasive when the Section 1407 motion was first
filed, are less compelling now given the current state of the
litigation, the Panel said.

Since the motion for centralization was filed, an additional eight
related actions have been filed, most alleging overlapping putative
classes of former football players at NCAA-member schools. The
Arrington action in the Northern District of Illinois involves
student-athletes who participated in additional sports, and the
putative class alleged in that action is more limited in scope.
Most of the actions now pending, however, involve nearly completely
overlapping putative classes and claims. Moreover, the Panel is
persuaded that the overlap between Arrington and the remaining
actions is sufficient to warrant centralization. Regardless of the
scope of the putative classes alleged, all actions share common
factual questions concerning the NCAA's knowledge of the risks of
concussions in football players and its policies governing the
protection of players from such injuries. Plaintiffs in all actions
seek medical monitoring for putative class members.

In its Dec. 18, 2013 Order, the MDL Panel found that the these
actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization
in the Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. These actions share factual questions
relating to allegations against the NCAA stemming from injuries
sustained while playing sports at NCAA-member institutions,
including damages resulting from the permanent long-term effects of
concussions. Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery;
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to
class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties,
their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the MDL is
Hon. Judge John Z. Lee Paul. The lead case is 1:16-cv-08727.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER S LANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: 713 554 9099
          Facsimile: 713 554 9098
          E-mail: jefile@raiznerlaw.com
                  rbalabanian@edelson.com

MJ ENTERPRISES: McDaniel Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------
JUSTIN MCDANIEL, on his own behalf, and on behalf of all similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. MJ ENTERPRISES OF FLORIDA, LLC,
d/b/a/ BENCHMARK ALUMINUM AND CONSTRUCTION a Florida corporation
and MICHAEL ST. GERMAIN, individually and JACQUELINE ST. GERMAIN,
individually, Defendants, Case No. 8:19-cv-01900-SDM-AEP (M.D.
Fla., Aug. 2, 2019) is a Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")
collective action seeking to recover from Defendant overtime
compensation, liquidated damages, and reasonable attorneys' fees
and costs.

When Plaintiff worked over forty hours a week, Defendants did not
pay Plaintiff time and one half for all hours worked over forty in
that work week in violation of the FLSA, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendants in a non-exempt position from
January 1, 2016 to June 29, 2018.

MJ ENTERPRISES OF FLORIDA, LLC, d/b/a BENCHMARK ALUMINUM AND
CONSTRUCTION is an aluminum company constructing swimming pool
enclosures and deck extensions in North Port, Sarasota County,
Florida and surrounding areas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     BRIANNA A. JORDAN, ESQ.
     Morgan & Morgan, P.A.
     201 N. Franklin Street, Suite 700
     Tampa, FL 33602
     Direct No. 813-393-5457
     Facsimile: 813-393-5481
     Email: bjordan@forthepeople.com


MUTH CAPITAL: Fabricant Suit  Asserts TCPA Violation
----------------------------------------------------
TERRY FABRICANT, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. MUTH CAPITAL, LLC, and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive, and each of them, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-06750
(C.D. Cal., Aug. 2, 2019) is an action individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated seeking damages and any other
available legal or equitable remedies resulting from the illegal
actions of Defendants, in negligently, knowingly, and/or willfully
contacting Plaintiff on Plaintiff's cellular telephone in violation
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") and related
regulations, specifically the National Do-Not-Call provisions,
thereby invading Plaintiff's privacy.

Beginning in June of 2018, DEFENDANTS, by and through their agents
MCA Leads World Solutions, contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff's
cellular telephone. The Defendants used an "automatic telephone
dialing system" to place its call to Plaintiff seeking to solicit
its services. The Defendants' calls constituted calls that were not
for emergency purposes. Further, Plaintiff's cellular telephone
number has been on the National Do-Not-Call Registry since at least
June 4, 2008. The Defendants called Plaintiff in an attempt to
solicit its services in violation of the National Do-Not-Call
provisions of the TCPA, says the complaint.

Plaintiff, TERRY FABRICANT is a natural person residing in
Winnetka, California.

MUTH CAPITAL, LLC is a business funding lender.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
     Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
     Meghan E. George, Esq.
     Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C.
     21550 Oxnard Street, Suite 780
     Woodland Hills, CA 91367
     Phone: (323) 306-4234
     Fax: (866) 633-0228
     Email: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
            abacon@toddflaw.com
            mgeorge@toddflaw.com


MYLAN NV: Bid to Dismiss MYL Litigation Recovery Suit Pending
-------------------------------------------------------------
Mylan N.V. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 29, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that the defendants' motion to dismiss the MYL
Litigation Recovery I LLC's complaint, is pending.

Purported class action complaints were filed in October 2016
against Mylan N.V., Mylan Inc. and certain of their current and
former directors and officers (collectively, for purposes of this
paragraph, the "defendants") in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York ("SDNY") on behalf of certain
purchasers of securities of Mylan N.V. and/or Mylan Inc. on the
NASDAQ.

The complaints alleged that defendants made false or misleading
statements and omissions of purportedly material fact, in violation
of federal securities laws, in connection with disclosures relating
to Mylan N.V. and Mylan Inc.'s classification of their EpiPen(R)
Auto-Injector as a non-innovator drug for purposes of the MDRP.

The complaints sought damages, as well as the plaintiffs' fees and
costs.

On March 20, 2017, a consolidated amended complaint was filed,
alleging substantially similar claims and seeking substantially
similar relief, but adding allegations that defendants made false
or misleading statements and omissions of purportedly material fact
in connection with allegedly anticompetitive conduct with respect
to EpiPen(R) Auto-Injector and certain generic drugs, and alleging
violations of both federal securities laws (on behalf of a
purported class of certain purchasers of securities of Mylan N.V.
and/or Mylan Inc. on the NASDAQ) and Israeli securities laws (on
behalf of a purported class of certain purchasers of securities of
Mylan N.V. on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange).

On March 28, 2018, defendants' motion to dismiss the consolidated
amended complaint was granted in part (including the dismissal of
claims arising under Israeli securities laws) and denied in part.

On July 6, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint,
including certain current and former directors and officers and
additional allegations in connection with purportedly
anticompetitive conduct with respect to EpiPen(R) Auto-Injector and
certain generic drugs. On August 6, 2018, defendants filed a motion
to dismiss the second amended complaint, which was granted in part
and denied in part on March 29, 2019.

On June 17, 2019, plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint,
including certain current and former directors and
employees/officers and additional allegations in connection with
purportedly anticompetitive conduct with respect to certain generic
drugs.

On February 26, 2019, MYL Litigation Recovery I LLC (an assignee of
entities that purportedly purchased stock of Mylan N.V.) filed an
additional complaint against Mylan N.V., Mylan Inc., and certain of
their current and former directors and officers in the SDNY
asserting allegations pertaining to EpiPen(R) Auto-Injector under
the federal securities laws that overlap in part with those
asserted in the third amended complaint identified above.

MYL Litigation Recovery I LLC's complaint seeks damages as well as
the plaintiff's costs. On June 5, 2019, defendants filed a motion
to dismiss certain of MYL Litigation Recovery I LLC's claims, which
remains pending.

Mylan said, "We believe that the claims in these lawsuits are
without merit and intend to defend against them vigorously."

Mylan N.V., together with its subsidiaries, develops, licenses,
manufactures, markets, and distributes generic, branded-generic,
brand-name, and over-the-counter (OTC) pharmaceutical products in
North America, Europe, and internationally. The company was founded
in 1961 and is headquartered in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania.


MYLAN NV: Class Cert. in EpiPen(R) Auto-Injector Suit Still Pending
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mylan N.V. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 29, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that the motion for class certification in the
EpiPen(R) Auto-Injector Civil Litigation is still pending.

Mylan Specialty and other Mylan-affiliated entities have been named
as defendants in putative class actions relating to the pricing
and/or marketing of the EpiPen(R) Auto-Injector.

The plaintiffs in these cases assert violations of various federal
and state antitrust and consumer protection laws, the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, as well as common law
claims.

Plaintiffs' claims include purported challenges to the prices
charged for the EpiPen(R) Auto-Injector and/or the marketing of the
product in packages containing two auto-injectors, as well as
allegedly anti-competitive conduct.

A Mylan officer and other non-Mylan affiliated companies were also
named as defendants in some of the class actions. These lawsuits
were filed in the various federal and state courts and have either
been dismissed or transferred into a multidistrict litigation
("MDL") in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas and
have been consolidated.

Mylan filed a motion to dismiss the consolidated amended complaint,
which was granted in part and denied in part.

On December 7, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for class
certification. This motion remains pending.

A trial date has been scheduled for November 2020.

Mylan said, "We believe that the remaining claims in these lawsuits
are without merit and intend to defend against them vigorously."

On April 24, 2017, Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC ("Sanofi") filed a
lawsuit against Mylan Inc. and Mylan Specialty in the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey. This lawsuit has been
transferred into the aforementioned MDL.

In this lawsuit, Sanofi alleges exclusive dealings and
anti-competitive marketing practices in violation of the antitrust
laws in connection with the sale and marketing of the EpiPen(R)
Auto-Injector.

On November 1, 2018, Sanofi filed a Motion for a Suggestion of
Remand of the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey. On January 23, 2019, the Court denied Sanofi's motion
without prejudice.

On June 28, 2019, Mylan filed a motion for summary judgment as to
the claims asserted by Sanofi and Sanofi filed both a motion for
partial summary judgment with respect to its claims against Mylan
and for summary judgment with respect to Mylan's counterclaims.
These motions remain pending.

Mylan said "We believe that Sanofi's claims in this lawsuit are
without merit and intend to defend against them vigorously."

Mylan N.V., together with its subsidiaries, develops, licenses,
manufactures, markets, and distributes generic, branded-generic,
brand-name, and over-the-counter (OTC) pharmaceutical products in
North America, Europe, and internationally. The company was founded
in 1961 and is headquartered in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania.


MYLAN NV: Israeli Securities Suit Still Stayed
----------------------------------------------
Mylan N.V. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 29, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that the IEC Fund Action in the Tel Aviv
District Court (Economic Division) remains stayed until a judgment
is issued in the securities litigation pending in the United
States

On October 13, 2016, a purported shareholder of Mylan N.V. filed a
lawsuit, together with a motion to certify the lawsuit as a class
action on behalf of certain Mylan N.V. shareholders on the Tel Aviv
Stock Exchange, against Mylan N.V. and four of its directors and
officers (collectively, for purposes of this paragraph, the
"defendants") in the Tel Aviv District Court (Economic Division)
(the "Friedman Action").

The plaintiff alleges that the defendants made false or misleading
statements and omissions of purportedly material fact in Mylan
N.V.'s reports to the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange regarding Mylan
N.V.’s classification of its EpiPen(R) Auto-Injector for purposes
of the MDRP, in violation of both U.S. and Israeli securities laws,
the Israeli Companies Law and the Israeli Torts Ordinance. The
plaintiff seeks damages, among other remedies.

On April 30, 2017, another purported shareholder of Mylan N.V.
filed a separate lawsuit, together with a motion to certify the
lawsuit as a class action on behalf of certain Mylan N.V.
shareholders on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, in the Tel Aviv
District Court (Economic Division), alleging substantially similar
claims and seeking substantially similar relief against the
defendants and other directors and officers of Mylan N.V., but
alleging also that this group of defendants made false or
misleading statements and omissions of purportedly material fact in
connection with allegedly anticompetitive conduct with respect to
EpiPen(R) Auto-Injector and certain generic drugs, and alleging
violations of both U.S. federal securities laws and Israeli law
(the "IEC Fund Action").

On April 10, 2018, the Tel Aviv District Court granted the motion
filed by plaintiffs in both the Friedman Action and the IEC Fund
Action, voluntarily dismissing the Friedman Action and staying the
IEC Fund Action until a judgment is issued in the purported class
action securities litigation pending in the U.S.

Mylan said, "We believe that the claims in these lawsuits are
without merit and intend to defend against them vigorously."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Mylan N.V., together with its subsidiaries, develops, licenses,
manufactures, markets, and distributes generic, branded-generic,
brand-name, and over-the-counter (OTC) pharmaceutical products in
North America, Europe, and internationally. The company was founded
in 1961 and is headquartered in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania.


MYLAN NV: Valsartan-Related Class Suit in New Jersey Ongoing
------------------------------------------------------------
Mylan N.V. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 29, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to defend a class
action suit related to sills of valsartan.

Mylan N.V., and certain of its subsidiaries, along with numerous
other manufacturers, retailers and others, have been named (or
plaintiffs are seeking to name certain Mylan entities) as
defendants in lawsuits in the United States, Canada and other
countries stemming from recalls of valsartan-containing
medications.

The United States litigation, which is taking place in an MDL in
the District of New Jersey, includes class action and individual
allegations seeking the refund of the purchase price and other
economic damages allegedly sustained by consumers who purchased
valsartan-containing products as well as claims for personal
injuries allegedly caused by ingestion of the medication.

Moreover, Mylan has received requests to indemnify purchasers of
Mylan's active pharmaceutical ingredient and/or finished dose forms
of the product.

Mylan said, "We believe that the claims in these lawsuits are
without merit and intend to defend against them vigorously."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Mylan N.V., together with its subsidiaries, develops, licenses,
manufactures, markets, and distributes generic, branded-generic,
brand-name, and over-the-counter (OTC) pharmaceutical products in
North America, Europe, and internationally. The company was founded
in 1961 and is headquartered in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania.


NETFLIX INC: Faces Class Action, Sept. 20 Lead Plaintiff Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP on July 31 disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
been filed against Netflix, Inc. ("Netflix" or the "Company")
(NASDAQ:  NFLX) and certain of its officers.   The class action,
filed in United States District Court, for the Northern District of
California, and indexed under 19-cv-04395, is on behalf of a class
consisting of all persons and entities who purchased or otherwise
acquired the publicly traded securities of Netflix between April
17, 2019 and July 17, 2019, both dates inclusive (the "Class
Period").  Plaintiff seeks to recover compensable damages caused by
Defendants' violations of the federal securities laws and to pursue
remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder.

If you are a shareholder who purchased Netflix securities during
the class period, you have until, September 20, 2019, to ask the
Court to appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of
the Complaint can be obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com.   To discuss
this action, contact Robert S. Willoughby at
rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or 888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW),
toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who inquire by e-mail are encouraged to
include their mailing address, telephone number, and the number of
shares purchased.

For more information about joining the class action, you can go to
https://form.jotform.com/pomerantzllp2/NFLX

Netflix provides Internet entertainment services, primarily
streaming services.  
             
The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operational and compliance policies.
Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that:  (i) Netflix would not be able to
gain its expected target number of new subscribers in the second
quarter of 2019; (ii) Netflix would also lose subscribers from the
United States in the second quarter of 2019; and (iii) as a result,
Defendants' public statements were materially false and misleading
at all relevant times.

On July 17, 2019, post-market, Netflix released a letter to
shareholders which revealed that Netflix missed its expected target
for number of new subscribers and lost 126,000 subscribers in the
United States during the second quarter of 2019.  Also on July 17,
2019, Netflix held an earnings call to discuss its financial and
operating results for the quarter.  During the earnings call, the
Company's Chief Financial Officer attributed the missed
subscription target to the "timing of [Netflix's] content slate"
and price increases.

On this news, Netflix's stock price fell $47.34 per share, or over
13%, over the following two trading sessions, closing at $315.10
per share on July 19, 2019

With offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Paris, The
Pomerantz Firm -- http://www.pomerantzlaw.com–- concentrates its
practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and antitrust class
litigation.  Founded by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known as the
dean of the class action bar, the Pomerantz Firm pioneered the
field of securities class actions.  Today, more than 80 years
later, the Pomerantz Firm continues in the tradition he
established, fighting for the rights of the victims of securities
fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, and corporate misconduct.  The
Firm has recovered numerous multimillion-dollar damages awards on
behalf of class members. [GN]


NETFLIX INC: Schall Investigating Claims on Behalf of Investors
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
announces that it is investigating claims on behalf of investors of
Netflix, Inc. (NASDAQ: NFLX) for violations of Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.

The investigation focuses on whether the Company issued false
and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose information
pertinent to investors. Netflix announced its second quarter 2019
earnings on July 17, 2019. During the Company's earnings call, as
well as in its shareholder letter, it was revealed that Netflix
gained only 2.7 million new subscribers against a forecast of 5
million new subscribers. Based on this startling news, shares of
Netflix dropped by more than 13% over the next two days.

We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law
Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at
424-303-1964, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also
reach us through the firm's website at www.schallfirm.com, or by
email at brian@schallfirm.com.

The class in this case has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

The Schall Law Firm represents investors around the world and
specializes in securities class action lawsuits and shareholder
rights litigation.

CONTACT:

          Brian Schall, Esq.
          The Schall Law Firm
          Tel.No.: 310-301-3335
          Cell: 424-303-1964
          Website: www.schallfirm.com
          Email: info@schallfirm.com
                 brian@schallfirm.com [GN]


NEW BALANCE: $1.4MM Class Settlement in Dashnaw Suit Has Final OK
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Final
Class Action Settlement Approval in the case captioned SHEILA
DASHNAW et al., Plaintiffs, v. NEW BALANCE ATHLETICS, INC.,
Defendant. Case No. 17cv159-L(JLB). (S.D. Cal.).

This consumer action alleging false advertising has been certified
as a class action. The Plaintiffs allege consumer fraud relating to
made in USA representations on certain New Balance athletic shoes
in violation of California False Advertising Law, relating to the
sale of goods produced abroad); Consumer Legal Remedies Act, breach
of express warranty; negligent misrepresentation; and unjust
enrichment. In the operative complaint.

Class Membership and Representation

In the absence of new evidence or objections to class
certification, the Court certifies for settlement purposes a class
comprised of:

     All persons who purchased any and all Made in USA Shoes[1]
from New Balance and/or its Authorized Retailers in California from
December 27, 2012 up to and including January 24, 2019 (Class and
Class Period respectively). 'Made in USA' Shoes means the New
Balance's Made in USA labeled shoes listed below and purchased as
new by Class members in California during the Class Period:
ELIGIBLE NEW BALANCE SHOE MODELS 601 ML996 M1140 ML997 M1290 MR1105
M1300 MR993 M1400 MW812 M1540 PM15 M1700 PM16 M2040 US574 M3040
US576 M498 US990 M574 US993 M585 US998 M587 W1140 M770 W1290 M990
W1400 M991 W1540 M995 W3040 M996 W498 M997 W587 M9975 W990 M998
W998 MK706 WK706 ML1300 WR993 ML1978 WW81Excluded from the Class
are: (a) New Balance's board members and employees, including its
attorneys (b) any persons who purchased the Made in USA Shoes for
the purposes of resale (c) distributors or re-sellers of Made in
USA Shoes (d) the judge and magistrate judge and their immediate
families presiding over this action (e) governmental entities and
(f) persons or entities who or which exclude themselves from the
Class as provided in the notice.

Notice to the Class

In the Preliminary Approval Order, Heffler Claims Group was
appointed as Settlement Administrator for purposes of notice to the
Class and claim processing. The Court approved, with changes, the
proposed notice of class action certification and settlement, and
set a schedule for notice, claim submissions, exclusions, and
objections.

Notice Content

A class certification notice must clearly and concisely state in
plain, easily understood language the following: (i) the nature of
the action  (ii) the definition of the class certified (iii) the
class claims, issues, or defences (iv) that a class member may
enter an appearance through an attorney if the member so desires
(v) that the court will exclude from the class any member who
requests exclusion (vi) the time and manner for requesting
exclusion; and(vii) the binding effect of a class judgment on
members under Rule 23(c)(3).

Although the Court does not condone alterations of Court-approved
notice, the content of the notice distributed to the Class is
approved because the notices as distributed were adequate to meet
Rule 23(c)(2)(B) and (e) requirements.

Notice Distribution

Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requires the best notice that is practicable under
the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who
can be identified through reasonable effort. Such notice can be
given by United States mail, electronic means, or other appropriate
means.

Direct Notice

Direct notice was distributed by email and United States first
class mail. Settlement Administrator timely sent 51,282 emails
containing the long form notice. Of those notices, 2,038 bounced
and 239 putative Class members unsubscribed. Settlement
Administrator timely sent 3,093 summary notices by first class mail
to putative Class members who unsubscribed, whose email notices
were returned as undeliverable, or for whom only a physical address
was available. Of the notices sent by U.S. mail, 247 were returned
as undeliverable. Upon return of undeliverable notices, the
Settlement Administrator was to perform an address search and
re-send them to new addresses no later than March 14, 2019,
however, notices were not re-sent until May 14, 2019.

Accordingly, 157 notices were sent two months late and only three
weeks before the claims due date. No justification for the failure
to follow the Court's orders has been provided.

Settlement Fairness

Class action settlements require court approval.  Settlement of
class actions presents unique due process concerns for absent class
members[in part because class counsel may collude with the
defendants, tacitly reducing the overall settlement in return for a
higher attorney's fee. The Court's role in reviewing class action
settlements is to police the inherent tensions among class
representation, defendant's interests in minimizing the cost of the
total settlement package, and class counsel's interest in fees.  

The Court received one Objection. The Objection, however, was not
to the Settlement fairness or class action certification. The
objector disagrees with the law and the reality that manufacturers
of quality products may be subject to lawsuits for various reasons.
Because the Objection does not speak to any fairness factors, it
does not warrant rejecting the Settlement.

Adequacy of Representation and Arm's Length Negotiations

As relevant to class action settlements, Rule 23(e)(2)(A) and (B)
require consideration whether the class representatives and class
counsel adequately represented the class, and whether the proposed
settlement was negotiated at arm's length. Also relevant to the
inquiry are the terms of any proposed attorneys' fees, including
timing of payment. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23(e)(2)(C)(iii).

Adequacy of Class Counsel's Representation

The proposed Settlement provides for injunctive and monetary
relief. The injunctive relief requires that for five years,
Defendant's shoes with less than 95% domestic content less
prominently advertise the Made in USA label and disclose that the
Made in USA collection contains domestic value of 70% or greater.
In the monetary relief portion of the Settlement, Defendant agreed
to create a non-reversionary Escrow Fund of $750,000 from which
$200,000 is to be paid to the Settlement Administrator for
Administrative Costs, $15,000 for Plaintiffs incentive awards,
subject to Court approval, with the balance to be used for Class
member claims and, if any funds remain, for cy pres awards.  
Defendant also agreed to pay without objection up to $650,000 to
Class Counsel for attorneys' fees, costs and litigation expenses,
subject to Court approval.  

Accordingly, the Settlement obligates Defendant to pay up to $1.4
million in exchange for dismissal of this action and release of
claims, including Class members' claims.

Based on the submissions made in support of the Attorneys' Fee
Motion and Final Approval Motion, as well as on the docket in this
case, the Class Counsel had sufficient information to negotiate a
fair Settlement and had adequately prosecuted this action with
Plaintiffs' assistance.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 29, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yyofnlgl from Leagle.com.

Sheila Dashnaw, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, William Meier, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated & Sherryl Jones, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Jason
Hoon Kim -- O'Melveny and Myers, Todd M. Schneider --
tschneider@schneiderwallace.com -- Schneider Wallace Cottrell
Brayton Konecky LLP & Aubry Wand -- awand@wandlawfirm.com -- The
Wand Law Firm.

New Balance Athletics, Inc., a corporation, Defendant, represented
by Elizabeth E. Brenckman -- Eebrenckman@orrick.com -- Orrick,
Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, pro hac vice, Garrett K. Sakimae --
sakimae@fr.com -- Fish & Richardson P.C.,Laura B. Najemy --
najemy@fr.com -- Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP, pro hac vice,
Mark Puzella -- puzella@fr.com -- Fish & Richardson P.C., pro hac
vice, Richard David Hosp -- hosp@fr.com -- Orrick, Herrington &
Sutcliffe LLP & Sheryl K. Garko -- garko@fr.com -- Orrick,
Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, pro hac vice.

The Attorney General of the State of California, Miscellaneous
Party, represented by Timothy Dean Lundgren.


NEW JERSEY: Ct. Denies Gittens Inmate's Bid to Maintain Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion denying motion to maintain class action in the
case captioned DARIUS GITTENS, Plaintiff, v. MILDRED SCHOLTZ, et
al., Defendants. Civil Action No. 18-2519 (RBK)(KMW). (D.N.J.).

This case arises from Plaintiff's time at the Burlington County
Jail, as a pretrial detainee.  Despite Plaintiff's chronic
conditions, officials housed him in a cell with two other inmates,
and assigned him the floor mattress, which caused Plaintiff a great
deal of pain and discomfort. Moreover, Plaintiff's mattress was
nine inches from the toilet bowl, which resulted in his cellmates
carelessly urinating on Plaintiff and his mattress on a regular
basis.

The Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint, alleging that Defendants
violated his rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, as well as related state law claims. He also seeks to
bring some of his claims as a class action, naming other detainees
who complain of the conditions at the Burlington County Jail. (ECF
No. 1, at 29).

It appears that Plaintiff is attempting to bring parts of his
Complaint as a class action on behalf of some of the inmates at the
Burlington County Jail. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(a)(4), plaintiffs can only maintain a class action if the class
representative will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class.

Here, Plaintiff is a pro se prisoner without formal training in the
law. Thus, Plaintiff would not be able to represent the interests
of the class and maintain this suit as a class action.

Furthermore, Plaintiff no longer resides at the Burlington County
Jail and currently resides at Northern State Prison in Newark, New
Jersey. It would be extremely difficult for him to lead a
multi-prisoner litigation when he is separated from the" other
inmates he seeks to lead as a class representative. Accordingly, to
the extent Plaintiff seeks to maintain a class action, the Court
will deny that request.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 29, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yxb9f75a from Leagle.com.

DARIUS GITTENS, Plaintiff, pro se.


NEW ORIENTAL: Bid to Dismiss Amended Chan Securities Suit Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, AMY CHAN, STEVEN WADE, SHUNFENG CHENG, and ELBURN
IRISH, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Plaintiffs, v. NEW ORIENTAL EDUCATION & TECHNOLOGY GROUP INC. and
CHENGGUANG ZHOU, Defendants, Civ. No. 16-9279 (KSH) (CLW) (D.
N.J.), Judge Katherine S. Hayden of the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss
the amended class action complaint.

New Oriental is a China-based educational services company that has
historically focused on affording "access to overseas opportunities
to Chinese citizens," including through English language courses
and preparation for foreign standardized tests.  It is purportedly
the "largest provider of private educational services in China
based on number of program offerings, total student enrollments,
and geographic presence" and "offers a range of educational
programs, services, and products, including English and foreign
language training, test preparation courses for admissions, and
assessment tests."  The company's ADSs trade on the New York Stock
Exchange.  According to the Pplaintiffs, New Oriental has
historically dominated the market for Chinese students seeking to
prepare to take foreign admissions tests like the SAT.

Since 2008, the company has, through its subsidiary, Beijing New
Oriental Vision Overseas Consulting Co., Ltd. ("EDU Overseas"),
engaged in admissions counseling or consulting for students
applying to foreign universities and in providing "assistance" to
students with their applications.  Zhou was the president of EDU
Overseas from 2008 to 2016, when he became CEO of New Oriental.

In securities filings, New Oriental has claimed that EDU Overseas'
business is to consult with Chinese citizens to assist them in
applying to foreign schools.  The Plaintiffs aver, however, that
EDU Overseas goes much further, and that it provides its customers
with more than just advice.

The amended complaint alleges that the alleged true nature of EDU
Overseas' business -- and consequently the purported falsity of New
Oriental's statements about the business to that point -- was
revealed in a Dec. 2, 2016 Reuters article.  The article reported
widespread practices of Chinese education companies, including New
Oriental, that purportedly constituted "college application fraud."
Three former New Oriental employees, David Shi, Olivia Qiu, and
Alan Li, claimed that they were the ghost-writers of student essays
and teacher recommendations that were sent to universities in
support of student applications.  The Plaintiffs allege that the
Reuters article alerted the market and investors to the true nature
of New Oriental's business, resulting in a drop in stock price that
damaged investors.

The purported discrepancies between New Oriental's public
statements and characterizations about EDU Overseas' business,
including in a securities filing, and the picture painted by the
former employees and the documents discussed above form the basis
for the Plaintiffs' claims.  Specifically, they assert that New
Oriental's Form 20-F, filed with the SEC on Sept. 27, 2016, for the
fiscal year ended May 31, 2016, made several actionable
misrepresentations. They also contend that New Oriental's
English-language website mischaracterized the nature of EDU
Overseas' business.

On Dec. 3, 2016, New Oriental issued a Chinese-language press
release denying the claims in the Reuters article, contending that
EDU Overseas had always prohibited falsification and that the
falsification claims in the article came "essentially from former
employees."  Two days later, on Dec. 5, 2016, New Oriental issued
an English-language press release that also denied the assertions
in the Reuters article.

On a Dec. 15, 2016 conference call with investors, New Oriental
executives purportedly "highlighted that EDU's business operations
are governed by strict policies and stringent procedures with
disciplined controls of its employee behavior," and, although the
AIRC investigation was pending, management expressed that it
expected a limited financial impact.

The Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on Dec. 15, 2016, and
the amended complaint on May 30, 2017.  The amended complaint was
filed on behalf of a putative class consisting of all persons or
entities who purchased or otherwise acquired New Oriental ADSs
traded on the NYSE during the Class Period, defined as Sept. 28,
2016 through Dec. 1, 2016, inclusive.

New Oriental, joined later by Zhou, has moved to dismiss the
amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, and for failure to meet the heightened pleading
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) and the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA").  The Defendants argue that the
amended complaint fails to allege an actionable misstatement or
omission; that it does not adequately allege the existence of
scienter; and that it fails to plead loss causation.  The
Plaintiffs dispute that they failed to plausibly plead these
elements of their claims under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.

Judge Hayden finds that the facts in the amended complaint do not
indicate that New Oriental acted with the required state of mind,
nor is the inference that New Oriental knew about the alleged fraud
"at least as compelling as any plausible opposing inference of
nonfraudulent intent.  The confidential witnesses admit to their
own misdeeds and broadly paint their counterparts with the same
brush. When it comes to ascribing knowledge to management, however,
they resort to "must have knowns" for support.  The Plaintiffs make
no effort to supply plausible detail for the confidential
witnesses' conclusion about management and Zhou, let alone a
factual basis from which a strong inference can be drawn.  As such,
the amended complaint fails to allege scienter with the necessary
particularity.

The Plaintiffs allege that Zhou is personally liable because he had
"direct and supervisory involvement in the day-to-day operations of
the company" and is "therefore presumed to have had the power to
control or influence the particular transactions giving rise to the
securities violations" alleged.  But because no Section 10(a) claim
has been adequately pleaded, the Plaintiffs' claim against Zhou
under Section 20(a) must likewise be dismissed.

JUdge Hayden concludes that the Plaintiffs' amended complaint fails
to state with particularity any material misrepresentation or
omission by New Oriental or any facts that would allow a strong
inference of scienter.  Accordingly, she granted the motion to
dismiss.  An appropriate order will issue.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 3, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/wrRYy9 from Leagle.com.

AMY CHAN, STEVEN WADE & ELBURN IRISH, Individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by JING CHEN
-- jchen@rosenlegal.com -- THE ROSEN LAW FIRM & LAURENCE M. ROSEN
-- lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, PA.

SHUNFENG CHENG, Plaintiff, represented by JAMES E. CECCHI --
JCecchi@carellabyrne.com -- CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY &
AGNELLO, P.C., JING CHEN, THE ROSEN LAW FIRM & LAURENCE M. ROSEN,
THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, PA.

NEW ORIENTAL EDUCATION & TECHNOLOGY GROUP INC. & CHENGGANG ZHOU,
Defendants, represented by SCOTT DAVID MUSOFF --
scott.musoff@skadden.com -- SKADDEN ARPS SLATE MEAGHER & FLOM LLP.


OMNI FAMILY: Removes Ower Suit to Eastern District of California
----------------------------------------------------------------
Omni Family Health removes case captioned MARILOU OWER,
individually, and aon behalf of other members of the general public
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. OMNI FAMILY HEALTH, a
California corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Case No.
BCV-19-101775 (Filed June 24, 2019), from the California Superior
Court for the County of Kern, to the United States of Eastern
District of California on July 31, 2019. The Eastern District of
California Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-at-00560 to the
proceeding. The suit alleges violation of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act.

Omni Family Health provides quality healthcare services throughout
Kern County.[BN]

Attorneys for the Defendant are:

          T. Scott Belden, Esq.
          Jazmine Flores, Esq.
          BELDEN BLAINE RAYTIS, LLP
          5016 California Avenue, Suite 3
          Bakersfield, CA 93309
          Telephone: (661) 864 7872
          Fascimile: (661) 878 9797
          E-mail: scott@bbr.law
                  jazmine@bbr.law

PERFORMANCE TRANSPORT: Sonia Seeks Overtime Wages for Workers
-------------------------------------------------------------
MATT SONIA, Individually and For Others Similarly Situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. PERFORMANCE TRANSPORT, LLC, the Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-00163-DLH-CRH (D.N.D., July 31, 2019), seeks to recover
unpaid overtime wages and other damages from Performance Transport,
LLC under the Fair Labor Standards.

According to the complaint, Sonia and the Putative Class Members
regularly work more than 40 hours a week. But Performance
classifies these workers as independent contractors to avoid paying
them overtime.

Instead, Performance pays these workers the same hourly rate for
all hours worked, including those in excess of 40 in a workweek
("straight time for overtime"), the lawsuit says.

Performance provides transportation and logistics services to the
oil and gas industry.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          Taylor A. Jones, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: 713 352-1100
          Facsimile: 713-352-3300
          E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  adunlap@mybackwages.com
                  tjones@mybackwages.com

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: 713-877-8788
          Facsimile: 713-877-8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com

PETES TOWING: Nelson Seeks Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------------------
JOHN A. NELSON, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. PETES TOWING AND RECOVERY, LLC and PETER DIMILTA,
JR., individually, Defendants, Case No. 8:19-cv-01899-WFJ-AAS (M.D.
Fla., Aug. 2, 2019) is an action for damages and for declaratory
relief, under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") to recover
unpaid minimum wages and overtime, an additional equal amount as
liquidated damages, obtain declaratory relief, and reasonable
attorney's fees and costs and relief as available under Florida
common law.

As a tow truck driver who never left the state of Florida,
Plaintiff was not exempt from the minimum wage and overtime
requirement of the FLSA. By Plaintiff's estimates, he routinely
worked more than 70 hours or more in a workweek. During his
employment with Defendant, Plaintiff was not paid time and one-half
his regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 within
a work week during one or more weeks of employment, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as an tow truck driver and
performed related activities for Defendants in and around Pinellas
County, Florida.

Defendants operate a tow truck business in and around Pinellas
County and surrounding counties.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     BRIANNA A. JORDAN, ESQ.
     Morgan & Morgan, P.A.
     201 N. Franklin Street, Suite 700
     Tampa, FL 33602
     Direct No. 813-393-5457
     Facsimile: 813-393-5481
     Email: bjordan@forthepeople.com


PETROLEO BRASILIERO: Court Denies Cornell's Sect 1782 Discovery Bid
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order denying Cornell University's
Motion to Order Discovery in the case captioned In re: PETROBRAS
SECURITIES LITIGATION. No. 14-cv-9662 (JSR). (S.D.N.Y.).

Cornell University moves the Court to intervene in the securities
fraud class action against Petroleo Brasiliero S.A. (Petrobras) and
for an order under 28 U.S.C. Section 1782 authorizing discovery for
use in a foreign proceeding.

Petitioner Cornell University is a member of the class of
plaintiffs suing Petrobras in the Southern District of New York
over allegations that Petrobras violated U.S. securities laws by
making materially misleading statements in connection with the sale
of American Depository Receipts (ADRs) on the New York Stock
Exchange. Cornell is now proceeding against Petrobras before the
Bovespa's Market Arbitration Chamber (the CAM), alleging that the
same fraudulent misstatements underlying the U.S. class action also
caused Cornell to incur losses on the Petrobras securities that
Cornell purchased on the Bovespa.

Motion for an Order Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1782 Authorizing
Discovery for Use in a Foreign Proceeding

Legal Framework

28 U.S.C. Section 1782(a) authorizes the district court of the
district in which a person resides or is found to order him to give
his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing
for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.
Either the foreign tribunal itself or any interested person may
move the court to compel discovery.

Before deciding whether to exercise this discretion, however, the
district court must first conclude that the petition satisfies
three mandatory requirements found in the language of the statute:
first, the person from whom the applicant seeks to compel discovery
must reside or be found in the district in which the court sits;
second, the discovery must be for use in a foreign proceeding
before a foreign or international tribunal and third, the moving
party must be the foreign or international tribunal itself or any
interested person.

Cornell's motion fails to satisfy the first and second
requirements. Petrobras is not found in the Southern District of
New York, and the CAM is not a foreign or international tribunal.

The motion is therefore denied.

Petrobras is not Found in the District

Petrobras argues that Section 1782's resides or is found language
means that a district court must have personal jurisdiction over
the party from whom the petitioner seeks discovery. Petrobras
reasons that because it is a foreign corporation that does not
maintain its principal place of business in New York, this Court
lacks general personal jurisdiction under Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571
U.S. 117 (2014) and BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S.Ct. 1549
(2017).

The threshold question for this Court to decide is whether the
resides or is found language in Section 1782 means that a court
must have personal jurisdiction over the party from whom the movant
seeks discovery. There is no binding precedent on this question.  

It is true that the decisions of two Courts in this District could
be read to suggest that a foreign person was found in the district
for purposes of Section 1782 based on business activities in New
York that would not confer general personal jurisdiction under
Daimler and BNSF. It appears, however, that the parties in these
cases never raised arguments about personal jurisdiction, and in
any event, the opinions do not discuss the issue, so they are of
little weight as far as this issue is concerned.

This Court therefore concludes that it should apply a personal
jurisdiction analysis to determine whether Petrobras is found in
the district for the purposes of the Section 1782 motion.

General Personal Jurisdiction

The parties do not argue that this Court has general personal
jurisdiction over Petrobras, and the Court clearly does not. A
corporation is subject to the general personal jurisdiction of the
courts in the states of its incorporation and its principal place
of business. In an exceptional case, a corporation could become
subject to the personal jurisdiction of the courts in an additional
state if the corporation's contacts with that state are so
continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home. But
even extensive business contacts such as significant physical
infrastructure and thousands of employees in a particular state do
not constitute such an exceptional case.  

Petrobras is incorporated and maintains its principal place of
business in Brazil. While the company maintained an office in
Manhattan at the time Cornell filed its motion and sells ADRs on
the New York Stock Exchange, these business contacts are far from
sufficient to subject Petrobras to the general personal
jurisdiction of courts in New York.

Specific Personal Jurisdiction

A closer question is whether this Court has specific personal
jurisdiction over Petrobras with respect to this motion. Cornell
argues that the Court does, because this Court undoubtedly has
personal jurisdiction in the underlying securities fraud class
action, and because Cornell simply seeks access to the discovery
that is already conducted in this case.

Courts in the Second Circuit employ a two-step analysis to
determine whether they have specific jurisdiction over a claim.
First, the court must decide if the defendant has purposefully
directed his activities at the forum and the litigation arises out
of or relates to those activities. Second, once the court has
established these minimum contacts, it determines whether the
assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with fair play and
substantial justice.

The relevant facts here presented are somewhat different from the
cases cited above in which courts in this District held that they
lacked personal jurisdiction over a Section 1782 respondent.
Neither the discovery request in In re Sargeant, 278 F.Supp.3d 814,
nor that in In re Del Valle Ruiz, 342 F.Supp.3d 448, for example,
involved foreign corporations that were already the defendants in a
related U.S. action, as well as documents that the corporation had
already produced in that action.

Nevertheless, Petrobras has the better argument. Cornell seeks
discovery under Section 1782 for use in the CAM arbitration, which
alleges misconduct by Petrobras that occurred entirely in Brazil.
The test for personal jurisdiction therefore fails at the first
step, because Petrobras did not purposefully direct its activities
relevant to the CAM arbitration at the forum.  

This Court holds that Petrobras is not found in the District for
the purposes of Section 1782.

The CAM is not a Foreign or International Tribunal

Petrobras also urges this Court to reject Cornell's Section 1782
motion on the independent ground that the CAM is not a foreign or
international tribunal. In Petrobras's view, the term in the
statute excludes arbitral bodies established by private parties.
Cornell does not dispute the fact that the CAM is a private entity,
but argues for a broader reading of the statutory language.  

Here, unlike the previous question, there is a Second Circuit
precedent directly on point. In NBC v. Bear Stearns, 165 F.3d 184,
191 (2d Cir. 1999), the Second Circuit held that an arbitral body
established by private parties was not a foreign tribunal for the
purposes of Section 1782.  

Cornell responds, however, that the Supreme Court effectively
abrogated NBC in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542
U.S. 241 (2004). In dicta, Intel quotes a 1965 law review article
by Professor Hans Smit for the proposition that the term tribunal
includes investigating magistrates, administrative and arbitral
tribunals, and quasi-judicial agencies, as well as conventional
civil, commercial, criminal, and administrative courts.

According to Cornell, the Supreme Court's reference to arbitral
tribunals is enough to overturn NBC's holding. And indeed, Cornell
has some authorities on its side. There have been three post-Intel
cases in this District examining the question of whether Intel
overruled NBC's holding that a private arbitral body is not a
foreign tribunal for the purposes of Section 1782, and two of them
held that it did.

Upon consideration of these conflicting cases, as well as the
arguments of the parties, this Court concludes that NBC remains
good law. To begin with, the Court is doubtful that a passing
dictum in a Supreme Court opinion taken, moreover, out of its
context  is sufficient to abrogate an extensively-reasoned and
directly on-point Second Circuit precedent.  

More importantly, it is far from clear that the quotation
referencing arbitral tribunals in Inteleven casts doubt on the
holding of NBC. Recall that NBC held that arbitral bodies created
by governments or intergovernmental agreements are tribunals for
the purposes of Section 1782, but that arbitral bodies created by
private parties are not. The quote in Intel from Professor Smit's
1965 article, simply says that arbitral tribunals are within the
scope of Section 1782, not that private arbitral tribunals are.
Professor Smit's explanation, therefore, is not inconsistent with
NBC, because the author may only have been referring to arbitral
tribunals created by governments and intergovernmental agreements.
This is not only a plausible reading of his words, but is in fact
probably what he meant, given his other writing on the topic.

This Court accordingly further denies Cornell's Section 1782 motion
on the independent ground that NBC remains good law and that the
statutory term foreign or international tribunal does not include
an arbitration chamber created by private parties.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 29, 2019 Opinion and
Order is available at  https://tinyurl.com/yxc5fsl8 from
Leagle.com.

Universities Superannuation Scheme Limited, Lead Plaintiff,
represented by Emma Gilmore -- egilmore@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz
LLP, Jeremy Alan Lieberman -- jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz
LLP, Marc Ian Gross -- migross@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP,Adam G.
Kurtz -- agkurtz@pomlaw.com -- E72 Law, Brenda F. Szydlo --
bszydlo@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, Jennifer Pafiti --
jpafiti@rgrdlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice, Jennifer Banner
Sobers -- jbsobers@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, John Anthony Kehoe
-- jkehoe@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, Justin Solomon Nematzadeh --
jnematzadeh@pomlaw.com -- DiCello Levitt, Marc Christian Gorrie --
mgorrie@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, Patrick Vincent Dahlstrom --
pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP & Susan Jessica Weiswasser
-- sjweiswasser@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.

Jose Sergio Gabrielli, Defendant, represented by Roger Allen Cooper
-- racooper@cgsh.com -- Cleary Gottlieb, Edward M. Spiro --
espiro@maglaw.com -- Morvillo, Abramowitz, Grand, Iason, & Anello
P.C., Elizabeth Vicens -- evicens@cgsh.com -- Cleary Gottlieb,
Elkan Abramowitz -- eabramowitz@maglaw.com -- Morvillo, Abramowitz,
Grand, Iason, & Anello P.C. & Jasmine Marie Juteau --
jjuteau@maglaw.com -- Morvillo, Abramowitz, Grand, Iason, & Anello
P.C.

BB Securities Ltd., Defendant, represented by Albert L. Hogan, III
-- al.hogan@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom,
LLP, Jeremy A. Berman -- jeremy.berman@skadden.com -- Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP & Michael Scott Bailey --
michael.bailey@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
LLP.


PREMERA BLUE: $74MM Settlement in Data Breach Suit Has Prelim OK
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon issued
an Opinion and Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Class Action Settlement in the case captioned IN RE:
PREMERA BLUE CROSS CUSTOMER DATA SECURITY BREACH LITIGATION. This
Document Relates to All Actions. Case No. 3:15-md-2633-SI. (D.
Or.).

Premera Blue Cross (Premera) is a provider and servicer of
healthcare benefits. Premera publicly disclosed that its computer
network had been breached (Data Breach), compromising the
confidential information of approximately 11 million current and
former members, affiliated members, and employees of Premera.
Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Consolidated Class Action
Allegation Complaint. Plaintiffs alleged that the Data Breach began
in May 2014 and went undetected for almost a year and that after
Premera learned of the breach, Premera unreasonably delayed in
notifying all affected individuals.

Preliminary Certification of the Settlement Class

The Plaintiffs request preliminary certification for settlement
purposes only of a Settlement Class defined as:

     All persons in the United States whose Personal Information
was stored on Premera's computer network systems that was
compromised in the Security Incident as publicly disclosed on March
17, 2015. Excluded from the Settlement Class are: (1) the Judge
presiding over the Action, and members of his family (2) the
Defendant, its subsidiaries, parent companies, successors,
predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendant or its parents
have a controlling interest and their current or former officers
and directors (3) Persons who properly execute and submit a request
for exclusion prior to the expiration of the Opt-Out Period and (4)
the successors or assigns of any such excluded Persons.

Rule 23(a)

Numerosity

In this district, there is a rough rule of thumb that 40 class
members is sufficient to meet the numerosity requirement. With an
alleged class size of approximately 10.6 million people, the Court
finds that the numerosity requirement is met.

Commonality

In order to satisfy the commonality requirement, Plaintiffs must
show that the class members suffered the same injury that their
claims depend upon a common contention.  

The alleged harm is that all purported class members had their
Sensitive Information accessed due to Premera's challenged conduct
and inaction. There are many common issues of law and fact. These
include whether Premera's data security practices were sufficient,
whether the contracts issued by Premera included enforceable data
security promises, whether Premera engaged in unfair or deceptive
business practices with its data security practices or response to
the Data Breach, whether the Data Breach compromised class members'
Sensitive Information, and whether class members are entitled to
damages as a result of Premera's conduct.

The Court finds that the commonality requirement is satisfied.

Typicality

In order to meet the typicality requirement, Plaintiffs must show
that the named parties' claims or defenses are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class.  To determine whether claims and
defenses are typical, courts often look to whether other members
have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on
conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether
other class members have been injured by the same course of
conduct.

In this case, the claims of the Representative Plaintiffs are
reasonably co-extensive with those of the absent class members.
They all allegedly suffered the same or similar injury from the
same alleged conduct by Premera. The Court finds that the
typicality requirement is satisfied.

Adequacy of representation

Rule 23(a)(4) states that before a class can be certified, a court
must find that the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class. This requirement
turns on two questions: (1) whether the named plaintiffs and their
counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class member and
(2) whether the named plaintiffs and their counsel will prosecute
the action vigorously on behalf of the class.  

During the briefing on Plaintiffs' motion for class certification,
Premera argued that Representative Plaintiffs are inadequate
because they are abandoning significant individual claims of
identity theft which likely could not be certified as a class due
to the predominance of individual issues in favor of smaller
potential classwide damages for loss of value of Sensitive
Information and overpayment of health insurance premiums or a
market price premium damages theory.

Premera argued that abandoning identity theft damages constitutes
claim splitting to the detriment of absent class members. Premera
asserted that certification cannot be purchased at the price of
presenting putative class members with significant risks of being
told later that they had impermissibly split a single cause of
action.  

The Court finds that Representative Plaintiffs share an interest
with absent class members and do not have claims adverse to absent
class members or that would benefit Representative Plaintiffs to
the detriment of absent class members. The Court also finds that
the Representative Plaintiffs and class counsel will prosecute this
action vigorously on behalf of the class. The Court specifically
selected class counsel for their extensive experience in
prosecuting complex class actions. Class counsel has vigorously
prosecuted the case thus far, including: responding to two motions
to dismiss; obtaining and reviewing extensive discovery; filing
several discovery motions, a sanctions motion, and motions to
strike portions of the testimony of Premera's experts; and moving
for class certification. Class Counsel has demonstrated their
willingness to continue prosecuting this case, including taking
this matter to trial if necessary.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Representative Plaintiffs and
Class Counsel are adequate to represent the class.

Ascertainability

Rule 23 also requires, at least implicitly, that the members of the
proposed class be objectively ascertainable. A proposed class must
be precise, objective and presently ascertainable. Class members
must be identifiable through a manageable process that does not
require much, if any, individual factual inquiry. The purported
class members have been identified through Premera's records.

The Court finds that any ascertainability requirement is met.

Rule 23(b)(3)

Rule 23(b)(3) requires a court to find that the questions of law or
fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy.

Predominance

There is substantial overlap between the test for commonality under
Rule 23(a)(2) and the predominance test under 23(b)(3). The
predominance test, however, is far more demanding and asks whether
proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication
by representation.

In the class action context, choice of law should be considered as
part of the predominance inquiry.  

The Settlement seeks to resolve four factually related causes of
action: nationwide consumer protection act claims (CPA), nationwide
negligence claims, nationwide breach of contract claims, and claims
under California's Confidentiality of Medical Information Act
(CMIA). Plaintiffs argue, and Premera does not object, that
Washington law applies to the nationwide claims and California law
applies to the CMIA claims.

Choice of law

In briefing the motion for class certification, Plaintiffs argued
that Washington's choice-of-law rules should apply because
Representative Plaintiffs are all from cases that were transferred
from the Western District of Washington, and thus the forum state
for those cases is Washington.

The Plaintiffs did not discuss which state's choice-of-law rules
should apply in their motion for preliminary approval of the
Settlement. The Ninth Circuit, however, recently accepted the forum
state for purposes of an MDL case as the forum to which the MDL
cases were transferred to, not from, in noting that generally when
a federal court sits in diversity the forum state's choice-of-law
rules apply, particularly absent argument by one of the parties to
use the choice-of-law rules of a different state.  

Notably, Washington and Oregon apply the same choice-of-law
analysis first determining whether an actual conflict exists and
then applying the most significant relationship test. Both
jurisdictions also look to Section 148 of the Restatement Conflict
of Laws when considering claims that sound in fraud. Thus, the
analysis is not meaningfully different, regardless of which state's
choice-of-law analysis is applied.

The Court applies choice-of-law rules of Oregon, the forum state.

Negligence and unfair practices claims

The Court presumes that there are conflicts between the law of
Oregon and the laws and interests of various other states with
respect to Plaintiffs' CPA and negligence claims. The Court
therefore applies the most significant relationship test.

The Plaintiffs' remaining unfair practices claim under the CPA is
that Premera did not provide adequate data security. This claim
does not sound in fraud and therefore is analyzed under Section
145. Plaintiffs' negligence claim is also analyzed under Section
145.

The contacts to be weighed in Restatement Conflict of Laws Section
145 are: (a) the place where the injury occurred (b) the place
where the conduct causing the injury occurred (c) the domicile,
residence, place of incorporation, and place of business of the
parties and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between
the parties is centered. A court also must evaluate the interests
and policies of the potentially concerned jurisdictions by applying
the factors set forth in Restatement Conflict of Laws Section 6.
This approach is not merely to count contacts, but rather to
consider the state that "has the most significant contacts with
this dispute.

The place where the relationship of the parties is centered, for
purposes of the unfair practices claim alleging Premera's provision
of inadequate data security, is Washington. Washington is where the
servers housing Plaintiffs' Sensitive Information resided, Premera
implemented its data security, Premera employees received their
allegedly inadequate training, the Premera employee opened the
email providing access to the hackers, and the hackers were able to
access the Sensitive Information.  Although there is some contact
with Plaintiffs' various home states because Plaintiffs reside
there, suffered injury there, and some provided Sensitive
Information from there, that contact is more attenuated with the
claim of Premera's inadequate provision of data security. Premera
did not provide data security in any state other than Washington.
The contacts with other states are more fortuitous than in the
usual consumer protection case because where a particular plaintiff
lives is not directly related to Premera's provision of data
security, unlike consumer-protection cases involving the marketing
and sale of goods to a consumer in a different state, or when
products are purchased and readily could be taken to another
state.

For Plaintiffs' negligence claims, there are multiple contacts
within the relationship between Premera and the putative class
members. Premera contracts to provide services for employers in
Washington, Alaska, and Oregon. These employers, however, may have
employees in all fifty states.

Premera contracts with individuals in Washington and Alaska.
Premera provides processing services for BlueCard members who
receive health care in Washington. The bulk of these relationships,
therefore, is in Washington. Furthermore, although the relationship
between the putative class members and Premera involves contacts
with more than one location, the place where the conduct causing
the injury occurred is Washington. Ultimately, when the
relationship is not clearly centered in one location, this factor
bears little weight. Although there are many relationships and many
relevant locations, the most dominant location is Washington.
Considering the factors and looking beyond merely counting
contacts, the Court finds that the most substantive contact is the
location causing the injury, which is Washington.

Considering the general policy concerns of Restatement Conflict of
Laws Section 6 and each state's CPA and similar laws also supports
the application of Washington law to Plaintiffs' unfair practices
claim. Some of these interests were discussed above in considering
foreign state contacts. Additionally, Washington's interest in
having businesses within its state comply with its statutes and
provide adequate data security is greater than the interest of
other states in having an out-of-state business provide adequate
data security. Washington also has a paramount interest in
enforcing its CPA against one of its own corporate citizens. As
discussed above, other state's interests in protecting their
consumers are not as strong when the connection to that state is
more fortuitous and there is no product sale or other transaction
at issue. Under the facts of this data breach, the Court finds the
choice-of-law interests better served by applying Washington law,
where Premera is located, the data was maintained, the data
security allegedly was inferior, and the breach occurred.  

Similarly, some other states do not enforce a duty to maintain
confidential information. Again, the interests of those state in
protecting their resident companies from such a duty is weakened
when the defendant is a nonresident. To the extent Washington does
enforce a duty to maintain confidential information, its interest
in enacting and enforcing that duty on its resident corporations is
stronger than a different state's interest in allowing a
nonresident corporation not to be subject to such a duty.
Considering the factors in Restatement Conflicts of Law Section 6
and the purposes of each state's law, the Court finds application
of Washington law to be appropriate.

Breach of contract claim

The Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim is based on the Privacy
Notice. Contracts by Premera were entered into in Alaska, Oregon,
and Washington. The Court need not conduct a choice-of-law analysis
on this claim because common issues predominate regardless of the
law applied, as discussed below.

CMIA claim

Plaintiffs' CMIA claim involves only Class Members who resided in
California as of March 17, 2015, and asserts a claim under
California law. Although Premera's conduct occurred in Washington,
Premera offered insurance to persons in California knowing it was
subjecting itself to additional statutory protections put in place
by the California legislature. California has a significant
interest in enforcing its statutory protections with respect to its
citizens. Thus, California has the most significant interest with
respect to this claim.

The application of California law, therefore, is appropriate.

Claim specific application

CPA unfair practices claim

Whether Premera implemented proper data security is a general
question relating to Premera's practices and procedures and does
not relate to individual class members' conduct. Premera is
obligated under HIPAA to protect all Sensitive Information on
Premera's servers. Determining the proximate cause of harm to Class
Members is a fact question that involves common proof, such as
whether Premera had adequate data security, whether Premera's lax
security led to the data breach, and whether there was exfiltration
of data. Additionally, under Washington law reliance is not an
element of this claim.

The unfair practices claim is not a claim involving deception. The
Washington Supreme Court acknowledged that unfair could be
different from deceptive under Washington's CPA. Challenges to the
legal sufficiency of this claim (including whether it is nothing
more than a negligence claim and impermissible under the CPA) and
would survive on the merits is a uniform question for the entire
class and does not pose individualized questions. Accordingly, this
claim does not present a predominance issue.

The Court finds common issues predominate with respect to
Plaintiffs' unfair practices CPA claim.

Negligence claim

To prove a negligence claim under Washington law, a plaintiff must
show: (1) the existence of a duty (2) breach of that duty (3)
resulting in injury and (4) proximate cause. These elements can be
resolved on a classwide basis, because Plaintiffs' negligence claim
predominantly turns on whether Premera provided adequate data
security. Premera's duty, if any, to protect Sensitive Information,
would be owed classwide and whether that duty was breached also
would be a class question. Proximate cause similarly would be shown
by class wide evidence. Plaintiffs also had two theories of damages
that involved classwide proof and apply uniformly.  

Thus, common issues of law and fact predominate.

Breach of contract claim

The key issues of interpretation and breach asserted in this case
do not require individualized adjudication. The central issue of
breach turns on the common question of whether Premera's security
measures are adequate. The central issues of interpretation are
whether Premera's contracts incorporated by reference the Privacy
Notice, whether the Privacy Notice created any obligation by
Premera, and whether Premera bears legal responsibility for the
privacy notice sent by self-funded employers. All of those involve
common issues of law and fact and do not require the resolution of
individualized inquiries.

The basic elements of breach of contract are the same across
states. The Court had identified a material difference between
Oregon and Washington law relating to Plaintiffs' alternative
theory of breach of an implied term in the express contract in its
opinion on Premera's second motion to dismiss.   Plaintiffs,
however, are not pursuing that theory. Plaintiffs are pursuing only
a theory of breach of the express terms of the contract.

Although the Court does not find any material conflict with
applying Washington law to the basic elements of breach of
contract, Plaintiffs' contract allegations also include that the
Privacy Notice was incorporated into the parties' contract by
reference. There are differences between Oregon, Alaska, and
Washington law on how documents are incorporated by reference into
a contract.

Under Oregon law, one document need not expressly incorporate the
other by reference if the connection between them is unmistakable.
Washington law, however, requires the parties to a contract clearly
and unequivocally incorporate by reference into their contract some
other document. Under Alaska law, parties do not undertake
obligations contained in a separate document unless their contract
clearly says so. A reference in a contract to another document will
incorporate the other document only to the extent indicated and for
the specific purpose indicated.

Accordingly, the Court finds that there are material differences
between Oregon, Washington, and Alaska law on how documents are
incorporated by reference.

The fact that there are material differences in the laws of the
three states on this point of contract law, however, does not
preclude certification of a nationwide class. Because the
individual state law issues do not swamp the common issues and
there are only three states involved, the Court finds that common
issues predominate even when portions of Plaintiffs' breach of
contract claims are governed by state law.  

CMIA claim

California's CMIA requires covered entities to maintain medical
information in a manner that preserves the confidentiality of the
information and establishes than any such entity who negligently
creates, maintains, preserves, stores, abandons, destroys, or
disposes of medical information shall be subject to the remedies
and penalties set forth in the act.  Protected medical information
includes information regarding a patient's medical history, mental
or physical condition, or treatment and individually identifiable
information such as the patient's name, address, electronic mail
address, telephone number, or social security number, or other
information that, alone or in combination with other publicly
available information, reveals the individual's identity. To state
a claim under the CMIA, a plaintiff must show that the defendant
had the plaintiff's medical information, negligently maintained,
preserved, stored, abandoned, destroyed, or disposed of that
information, and that as a result the confidential nature of the
plaintiff's medical information was breached, meaning that the
information was accessed, viewed, or used.  

The Plaintiffs' CMIA claim only includes Class Members who resided
in California before March 17, 2015. This claim involves common
issues of law and fact. The question of whether Premera had
Sensitive Information is not disputed. The question of whether
Premera negligently maintained, preserved, or stored the
information would be resolved on a classwide basis. The question of
whether a third party the alleged hackers accessed the data is also
a common question, because it involves common evidence regarding
whether data was exported or exfiltrated from Premera's servers.
Finally, the question of whether a particular Class Member resided
in California during the relevant time period is easily resolved on
a classwide basis.

Common issues of law and fact predominate with respect to this
claim.

Superiority

Rule 23(b)(3) provides four non-exhaustive factors to consider.
These factors are:
(A) the class members' interests in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions (B) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun
by or against class members (C) the desirability or undesirability
of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular
forum and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

Regarding the first factor, where recovery on an individual basis
would be dwarfed by the cost of litigating on an individual basis,
this factor weighs in favor of class certification. The amount at
stake for putative class members is too small when compared to the
cost of litigating individual claims. Even the small percentage of
class members who have suffered actual identity theft have claims
that are too small. Litigation costs would be quite high, given
that the case involves complex technical issues and requires
substantial expert testimony.

Accordingly, because individual damages pale in comparison to the
costs of litigation, this factor points toward certification.

Regarding the second factor, the JPML originally transferred 29
related federal cases to this Court for coordinated pretrial
proceedings. As additional related actions were filed and brought
to the attention of the JPML, they also were transferred.
Currently, there are 42 actions pending before this Court. The
parties have not identified any other related cases. As articulated
by the JPML, the actions share factual questions arising from the
same data security breach and centralization will eliminate
duplicative discovery, prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings,
particularly with respect to class certification, and conserve the
resources of the parties, their counsel, and the judiciary.

This factor thus weighs in favor certification.  

With respect to the third factor, the JPML explained that this
district is a convenient and accessible forum for this litigation
and has the necessary judicial resources and expertise to manage
this litigation efficiently. The Court agrees that this forum is
convenient for Premera, who is headquartered in Washington, and who
contracts in Oregon. Plaintiffs are located in all 50 states, but
have a higher concentration in Washington, Oregon, and Alaska. This
factor is also less important in the context of a settlement
because it is likely that the only remaining in-court proceeding
will be the final hearing to evaluate whether the Settlement is
fair, reasonable, and adequate and to consider the requested
attorney's fees and costs and Service Awards.
Consequently, this factor also supports certification.

The fourth factor requires courts to consider the likely
difficulties in managing a class action. Manageability concerns,
however, are not relevant in the context of a settlement.  
Thus, this factor is not applicable. The applicable superiority
factors support certification.

Conclusion Under Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3)

The Court preliminarily finds that the proposed Settlement Class
meets the requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3).
Accordingly, the Court preliminary certifies, for settlement
purposes only, the proposed Settlement Class.

Preliminary Approval of the Settlement

The Plaintiffs ask the Court preliminarily to find that Settlement
Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and that the notice
procedures comport with due process. The Court considers the
relevant factors as set forth by the Ninth Circuit and previously
stated.

Strength of Plaintiffs' case and the risk, expense, complexity, and
likely duration of further litigation and maintaining class action
status through trial.

This case is complex, involving evidence spanning multiple years,
technical information regarding computer servers and hackers,
state-sponsored hacking versus other types of hacking, medical
information, the dark web, and the implications of spoliation of a
particular server. The parties exchanged 1.5 million pages of
documents. The case has been expensive to litigate, and continuing
litigation would be time-consuming and add further expense. There
is currently pending a motion for partial summary judgment that
requires additional briefing, and the case schedule includes
additional dispositive motions that the parties anticipate would be
filed. If at least some of Plaintiffs' claims survive dispositive
motions, the parties would spend significant time and expense
preparing for a class action or bellwether trial, possible
additional trials in other jurisdictions, and likely appeals. The
case schedule that was put on hold and ultimately stricken because
of the Settlement included another nearly 11 months of litigation.

The motion for class certification was fully briefed and argued at
the time of Settlement. Plaintiffs risk that none of their claims
would be certified for class treatment, and Premera risks that all
or some of Plaintiffs' claims would be certified. If certified,
there remains a risk for Plaintiffs that certification would not be
able to be maintained throughout trial, including after Premera's
dispositive motions were resolved. Considering these three factors
the strength of Plaintiffs' case; the risk, expense, complexity,
and likely duration of continued litigation; and the risk of
maintaining class action status through trial, the Court finds that
they weigh in favor of granting approval to the Settlement.

The amount offered in settlement

The Settlement Agreement provides for both monetary and
non-monetary relief.

Monetary relief

In considering the potential fairness of the recovery, courts often
compare the total amount of recovery in a settlement to the
estimated total amount of damages that could be recovered if the
case was litigated when considering the fairness of the recovery.
Nonetheless, it is well-settled law that a cash settlement
amounting to only a fraction of the potential recovery does not per
se render the settlement inadequate or unfair.

The Settlement Agreement provides that Premera will pay $32 million
to fund a non-reversionary Qualified Settlement Fund. This fund
will pay the costs of recovery to Class Members, attorney fees and
costs, Service Award to the Representative Plaintiffs, and the
costs to administer the Settlement, including giving notice to
Class Members. No less than $10 million will be used to provide the
recovery to Class Members. This recovery includes: (1) up to
$10,000 per Class Member for reimbursement of proven out-of-pocket
damages that can plausibly be traced to the Data Breach, including
up to 20 hours of personal time at $20 per hour; (2) a default
settlement amount of up to $50 for Class Members who do not have
out-of-pocket damages that can plausibly be traced to the Data
Breach; (3) up to an additional $50 for Class Members who resided
in California as of March 17, 2015, for the CMIA claim; and (4) two
years of credit monitoring and insurance services for Class
Members, who may choose to delay the start of such services for up
to two years if the Class Member already has credit monitoring. Up
to $3,500,000 will be set aside for the wholesale purchase of this
insurance. If the credit monitoring and insurance services cost
less than $3.5 million, the remaining amount will revert to the
Qualified Settlement Fund to be distributed to the Class Members on
a pro rata basis or to fund additional credit monitoring services.

The Plaintiffs argue that the retail value of credit monitoring,
and not the wholesale cost, should be considered as the value of
the benefit provided to Class Members. The retail value of the plan
being offered to the Settlement Class is $19.99 per month, which
equals $479.79 for the two-year period. Plaintiffs argue that
equals $50,854,560 for every one percent of the class that enrolls
in this benefit, before subtracting the cost of the credit
monitoring. Because Plaintiffs have not provided the Court with the
cost of the credit monitoring, the Court cannot at this juncture
make this comparison with any precision. The Court accepts,
however, that the benefit to Class Members is greater than the
initial estimated $3.5 million wholesale cost that will come out of
the Qualified Settlement Fund.

This benefit, therefore, has a significant value to the Settlement
Class.

Non-monetary relief

Under the Settlement, Premera also will pay $42 million on improved
data security between 2019 and 2022. Improved data security
benefits all Class Members, even if they are no longer insured by
Premera or a related Blue Cross entity, because Sensitive
Information remains stored on Premera's servers. If Premera has
improved data security, it will decrease the chance of a future
data breach and future harm to Class Members from such a breach.

Plaintiffs submit the expert witness declaration of Dr. Robert
Vigil, in support of the estimated value of this non-monetary
benefit to Class Members. Dr. Vigil used the Cost Approach, which
is an accepted methodology to value certain types of intangible
assets, including where cost information is known, the intangible
asset is new, and the type of value being estimated is the value in
continued use by the current owner. Dr. Vigil opines that the value
to the Settlement Class of the increased data security Premera will
implement is $11,872,000.

Although the cash recovery is a mere fraction of what Plaintiffs
generally argued they could recover at trial, that does not require
a finding that the recovery is not fair, reasonable, or adequate.
Considering the cash settlement, the value of the credit monitoring
services, the additional non-monetary elief, the risks and
weaknesses of Plaintiffs' case, and all of the other circumstances
of this Settlement and how it was reached, the recovery is fair,
reasonable, and adequate. This factor thus supports approval of the
Settlement.

The extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings

This factor is concerned with whether the parties have sufficient
information to make an informed decision about settlement. This
case has been pending for four years. The parties have litigated
two motions to dismiss, fully briefed and argued the motion for
class certification and motions to exclude expert testimony, and
Premera filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The parties
and their counsel have exchanged 1.5 million pages in document
discovery, which they have extensively reviewed. The parties have
also conducted more than 50 depositions, including those of eight
experts, filed and argued numerous discovery motions, and
Plaintiffs filed and argued a motion for sanctions for the
spoliation of evidence, which the Court granted in part.  

This factor, therefore, supports approval.

The experience and views of counsel

Lead Plaintiffs' Counsel and Liaison Plaintiffs' Counsel are
experienced class action litigators. Premera is also represented by
experienced counsel. This factor supports approval.

The reaction of the class

Because there has not yet been notice or a response to the
Settlement, this factor is not applicable at this stage of the
Court's review.

The absence of collusion or other conflicts of interest

The Court finds that the Settlement is the product of extensive
arm's-length negotiations, with assistance from experienced
mediators Judge Gandhi and Mr. Rosen in multiple mediation
sessions. There is no evidence of collusion or any other conflict
of interest. Premera has and continues to dispute the claims
against it and the Action was litigated for nearly four years
before the parties reached their proposed Settlement Agreement.

After considering the relevant factors and circumstances, the Court
finds that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate to the
Settlement Class, and that each Class Member (except those who
submit a timely and valid request for exclusion) shall be bound by
the Settlement. The persons who timely request exclusion from the
Settlement Class will not be members of the Settlement Class, shall
have no rights or interests with respect to the Settlement, and
shall not be bound by any orders or judgments entered in respect to
the Settlement.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Proposed Settlement Agreement is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 29, 2019 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y34dcvtt from
Leagle.com.

Premera Blue Cross, In Re, represented by Daniel R. Warren --
dwarren@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler LLP, pro hac vice, Darin
M. Sands -- sandsd@lanepowell.com -- Lane Powell, PC, James A.
Sherer -- jsherer@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler LLP & Paul G.
Karlsgodt -- pkarlsgodt@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler LLP.

All Plaintiffs, Plaintiff, represented by Arielle S. Wagner-
aswagner@locklaw.com -- Lockridge, Grindal and Nauen, P.L. L. P.,
Chase C. Alvord -- calvord@tousley.com -- Tousley Brain Stephens
PLLC, Christopher I. Brain -- cbrain@tousley.com -- Tousley Brain
Stephens, PLLC, Jason T. Dennett  -- jdennett@tousley.com --
Tousley Brain Stephens PLLC, Kim D. Stephens  --
kstephens@tousley.com -- Tousley Brain Stephens PLLC, Yoona Park --
ypark@stollberne.com -- Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlacchter
P.C., Keith S. Dubanevich -- kdubanevich@stollberne.com -- Stoll
Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlachter P.C. & Steve D. Larson --
slarson@stollberne.com -- Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlachter
P.C.


PROGRESSIVE SELECT: Clearview Suit Moved to M.D. Florida
--------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Clearview Imaging, LLC d/b/a Clearview Open
MRI, as assignee, individually, and on behalf of all similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Progressive Select Insurance Company,
the Defendant, Case No. 19-CA-003886 (Filed April 12, 2019), was
removed from the Circuit Court of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit,
to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida
(Tampa) on Aug. 1, 2019. The Middle District of Florida Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 8:19-cv-01881 to the proceeding. The suit alleges
insurance related violation.

Progressive Select Insurance Company operates as an insurance
company. The Company offers auto, trailers, motorcycles, boats,
renters, condos, flood, life, and health insurance services.
Progressive Select Insurance serves customers in the United
States.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

Attorneys for Progressive Select Insurance Company are:

           Jason L. Margolin, Esq.
           AKERMAN LLP
           401 E Jackson St Ste 1700
           Tampa, FL 33602-5250
           Telephone: (813) 209-5009
           Facsimile: (813) 223-2837
           E-mail: jason.margolin@akerman.com

QUICK CHANGE: Tindol Seeks Overtime Wages for Technicians
---------------------------------------------------------
JAYSEN TINDOL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. QUICK CHANGE OIL & LUBE, INC., the
Defendant, Case No. 9:19-cv-00128-RC-KFG (E.D. Tex., July 31,
2019), alleges that Defendant failed to pay overtime wage
compensation for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek, pursuant
to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff and all similarly situated persons who worked as
technicians performed non-exempt duties and are entitled to
overtime pay, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees as
allowed by the FLSA.

Quick Change is a domestic for-profit corporation operating six oil
change facilities in Texas and Louisiana.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott E. Brady, Esq.
          BOHRER BRADY, LLC
          8712 Jefferson Highway, Suite B
          Baton Rouge, LA 70809
          Telephone: (225) 925-5297
          Facsimile: (225) 231-7000
          E-mail: scott@bohrerbrady.com

RESEARCH AMERICA: Byer Files Damasco Bid for Class Certification
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as BYER CLINIC OF CHIROPRACTIC,
LTD., an Illinois corporation, individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly-situated persons, the
Plaintiff, vs. RESEARCH AMERICA, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-05080 (N.D. Ill.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an
order:

   1. granting Plaintiff's "Damasco" motion for class
      certification of:

      "all individuals in the United States who, within the four
      years prior to the filing of the instant Complaint,
      received a non-emergency, unauthorized text message to
      their cellular telephones from Defendant, Research
      America, Inc., through the use of an automatic dialing
      system and who did not provide prior express consent
      and/or prior express written consent to receive such text
      messages";

   2. appointing the Plaintiff as the class representative; and

   3. appoint Plaintiff's attorneys as class counsel.

The Defendant sent Plaintiff and others unauthorized text messages.
The Plaintiff anticipates that the proposed class definition will
change after discovery defines the precise contours of the class
and the text messages that were sent. The Plaintiff requests leave
to submit a brief and other evidence in support of this motion
after discovery about the class elements has been completed.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan M. Kelly, Esq.
          Ross M. Good, Esq.
          ANDERSON + WANCA
          3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 500
          Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
          Telephone: 847/368-1500
          Facsimile: 847/368-1501
          E-mail: rkelly@andersonwanca.com
                  rgood@andersonwanca.com

RESEARCH AMERICA: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Byer Clinic Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
BYER CLINIC OF CHIROPRACTIC, LTD., individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. RESEARCH AMERICA, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-05080 (N.D. Ill., July 29, 2019) seeks
to stop the Defendant's practice of making unsolicited calls. The
case is assigned to Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer.

Research America Inc provides marketing research services. The
Company offers awareness and image studies, market feasibility and
competitive intelligence, product testing and pricing research,
market segmentation, and qualitative and quantitative surveys and
analysis. Research America operates in the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan M. Kelly, Esq.
          ANDERSON + WANCA
          3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 500
          Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
          Telephone: (847) 368-1500
          Facsimile: (847) 368-1501
          E-mail: rkelly@andersonwanca.com


RUE21 INC: Removes Avila Suit to Eastern District of California
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Defendants in the case of MARIA AVILA, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. RUE21, INC.;
and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants, filed a notice to
remove the lawsuit from the Superior Court of the State of
California, County of Tulare (Case No. VCU277300) to the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of California on July 30,
2019. The clerk of court for the Eastern District of California
assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-01040-LJO-SKO. The case is assigned to
Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill and referred to Magistrate Sheila K.
Oberto.

Rue21, Inc. retails clothing products. The Company offers dresses,
tops, jeans, jewelry, and other related products. rue21 serves
customers in the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Karin M. Cogbill, Esq.
          Angela E. Meakin, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          50 W. San Fernando, 7th Floor
          San Jose, CA 95113-2303
          Telephone: (408) 998-4150
          Facsimile: (408) 288-5686


SAFECO INSURANCE: Signor Suit Moved to S.D. Florida
---------------------------------------------------
The case, Gina Signor, individually and on behalf of all those
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Safeco Insurance Company of
Illinois, the Defendant, Case No. CACE-19-013419, was removed from
the 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida, to
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida (Ft
Lauderdale) on Aug. 1, 2019. The Southern District of Florida Court
Clerk assigned Case No. 0:19-cv-61937-WPD to the proceeding. The
suit alleges insurance related violation. The case is assigned to
the Hon. Judge William P. Dimitrouleas.

Safeco offers car insurance, home insurance and other personal
insurance through independent insurance agents.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Alec Huff Schultz, Esq.
          LEON COSGROVE LLC
          255 Alhambra Circle, Suite 800
          Coral Gables, FL 33134
          Telephone: (305) 740-1986
          Facsimile: (305) 437-8158
          E-mail: aschultz@leoncosgrove.com

               - and -

          Casim Adam Neff, Esq.
          NEFF INSURANCE LAW, PLLC
          4051 27th Ave North
          Saint Petersburg, FL 33713
          Telephone: (727) 342-0617

               - and -

          Craig Evan Rothburd, Esq.
          CRAIG E. ROTHBURD, P.A.
          320 W. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 700
          Tampa, FL 33606
          Telephone: (813) 251-8800
          Facsimile: 251-5042
          E-mail: craig@rothburdpa.com

               - and -

          Edward Herbert Zebersky, Esq.
          Mark S. Fistos, Esq.
          ZEBERSKY PAYNE, LLP
          110 S.E. 6th Street, Suite 2150
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 989-6333
          Facsimile: (954) 989-7781
          E-mailL ezebersky@zpllp.com
                  mfistos@zpllp.com

               - and -

          Scott Jeeves, Esq.
          JEEVES LAW GROUP
          954 1st Avenue North
          Saint Petersburg, FL 33705
          Telephone: (727) 894-2929
          Facsimile: (727) 822-1499
          E-mail: sjeeves@jeeveslawgroup.com

               - and -

          Todd Bruce Allen, Esq.
          8950 Fontana Del Sol Way
          Naples, FL 34109
          Telephone: (239) 331-5100
          E-mail: Todd@flcommunitylaw.com

Attorneys for Safeco Insurance Company Of Illinois are:

          Steven Myer Appelbaum, Esq.
          ARNSTEIN & LEHR LLP
          200 South Biscayne Blvd., Suite 3600
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 428-4500
          Facsimile: (305) 397-2155
          Steven.Appelbaum@saul.com

SHEARD-LOMAN: Miranda Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------
ANTONIO MIRANDA, on behalf of himself, and all other plaintiffs
similarly situated, known and unknown, Plaintiff, v. SHEARD-LOMAN
TRANSPORT, LLC, AN ILLINOIS LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, DEBRA BROWN,
INDIVIDUALLY AND TAURIA DILWORTH, INDIVIDUALLY Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-05206 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 1, 2019) is an action brought under
the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, the
Cook County Minimum Wage Ordinance of the Municipal Code of Cook
County and the Chicago Minimum Wage Ordinance.

Plaintiff, and members of the Plaintiff Class, on a regular basis
worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek without pay at a rate of
time and one-half for such hours pursuant to the requirements of
the federal and state statutes herein relied upon, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as a delivery driver from
approximately October 2018 to May 2019, performing non-exempt
delivery driving services.

SHEARD-LOMAN TRANSPORT, LLC, is an Illinois corporation that owns
and operates a delivery service business located at 2801 S. Western
Ave. Chicago, Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     John William Billhorn, Esq.
     BILLHORN LAW FIRM
     53 West Jackson Blvd., Suite 401
     Chicago, IL 60604
     Phone: (312) 853-1450


SIRIUS XM: Sued Over 'Bait and Switch' Advertising Methods
----------------------------------------------------------
Ashley King, writing for Digital Music News, reports that a state
court complaint filed by Jeffrey Parrella claims that Sirius XM
offered three years of service for $99.  The mailing may have been
too good to be true.  A customer service representative who took
Parella's call said she could only provide one year for $60.

That was the wrong answer: the freshly-filed lawsuit says Sirius XM
violated state laws against consumer fraud.

In the complaint, Parrella alleges he made multiple unsuccessful
attempts to redeem the offer received in the mail. He couldn't sign
up on Sirius XM's website at the advertised rate, nor could he seal
the deal on the phone.

Parrella received the offer in the mail in December of 2017 after
deactivating his account. The proposal included a letter signed by
Sirius CEO James E. Meyer.  The ad in question touted Sirius'
"biggest, best offer EVER" with the three year, $99 bargain.  The
wording on the Sirius ad described the offer as 82% off the
standard rate of $15.99/month.

Parrella says the customer service representative he contacted told
him the system would not allow the offer.  The only offer available
to him was the one-year, $60 deal.  Parrella told the customer
service rep he would only accept the offer of the advertised terms.
However, Sirius XM charged his credit card for the one-year offer
he was quoted.

Representatives for both parties have been contacted, but neither
has returned a request for comment. Parrella is represented by
Bharati O. Sharma, Esq. -- bsharma@wolflawfirm.net -- of the Wolf
Law Firm. Michael James Gesualdo, Esq. --
mgesualdo@rwmlegal.com -- of Robinson Miller represents Sirius XM.
[GN]


STACKIN INC: Maddux Sues Over Unsolicited Text Messages
-------------------------------------------------------
DAVID MADDUX, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. STACKIN, INC., a Delaware corporation, and
STACKIN FINANCIAL, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-06716 (C.D. Cal., Aug. 2, 2019) is a
Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial against Defendant.
The Plaintiff seeks to stop the Defendants' violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act by sending unsolicited,
autodialed text messages to consumers, including to consumers who
have registered their phone numbers on the national Do Not Call
registry ("DNC"), and to otherwise obtain injunctive and monetary
relief for all persons injured by Defendants' conduct.

The Defendants sent numerous unsolicited autodialed text messages
to the Plaintiff without obtaining his prior written express
consent and despite Plaintiff having his phone number registered on
the Do Not Call registry specifically to avoid unsolicited
telemarketing, asserts the complaint. In response to these text
messages, Plaintiff files this class action lawsuit seeking
injunctive relief, requiring the Defendants to cease sending
unsolicited, autodialed text messages to consumers' cellular
telephone numbers, and to other phone numbers registered on the
DNC, as well as an award of statutory damages to the members of the
Classes.

Plaintiff Maddux is a Council Bluffs, Iowa resident.

Stackin, Inc. is a technology company that markets financial
products and services to millennials and provides products and
services such as a Stackin bank account.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Rachel E. Kaufman, Esq.
     KAUFMAN P.A.
     400 NW 26th Street
     Miami, FL 33127
     Phone: (305) 469-5881
     Email: rachel@kaufmanpa.com      


STATE FARM: Dismissal of L. Daniels Suit Reversed
-------------------------------------------------
In the case, LAZURI DANIELS, individually, and on behalf of all
those similarly situated, Petitioner, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent, Case No. 96185-9 (Wash.),
Judge Charles W. Johnson of the Supreme Court of Washington
reversed the trial court's dismissal of Daniels' claims under CR
12(b)(6).

The case concerns whether a first-party insurer, upon obtaining a
partial recovery in a subrogation action, is required to reimburse
its fault-free insureds for the full amount of their deductibles
before any portion of the subrogation proceeds can be allocated to
the insurer.  Daniels brought claims and sought class action status
in a lawsuit against State Farm arguing that by failing to fully
reimburse its insureds for their deductibles after recovering in a
subrogation action, State Farm violates both Washington law and its
own insurance policy.  Daniels asserted claims for breach of
contract, bad faith, and conversion.

State Farm filed a motion to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6), relying on
Averill v. Farmers Insurance Co. of Washington, where the Court of
Appeals held that the made whole doctrine does not extend to this
type of subrogation action, as well as WAC 284-30-393, which
requires subrogated insurers to return deductibles "less applicable
comparable fault."  Finally, State Farm argued that nothing in its
policy language required it to return the full amount of
deductibles before allocating to itself the proceeds of a direct
subrogation action.

The trial court granted State Farm's motion to dismiss, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed.  Daniels petitioned the Court, and the
Court granted review.

The issues before the Court are: (i) whether Washington's made
whole doctrine requires that insurers allocate subrogation proceeds
to the full reimbursement of its insureds' deductibles prior to
allocating any portion of the proceeds to itself; (ii) whether, in
the absence of an acknowledgement that an insured bears comparative
fault, WAC 284-30-393 requires an insurer to recover and return its
insured's full deductible; and (iii) whether State Farm's policy
language required that it allocate subrogation proceeds to the full
reimbursement of its insureds' deductibles prior to allocating any
portion of the proceeds to itself.

The analysis in Averill is in conflict with the policy underlying
the made whole doctrine, and to the extent the Court of Appeals
held the made whole doctrine is confined to reimbursement claims,
Judge Johnson overrules it.  He holds that under Thiringer v.
American Motors Insurance Co. and Sherry v. Financial Indemnity
Co., no distinction exists based on who brings a claim against a
responsible third party.  Since the claim seeks recovery of the
insured's losses, that the insurer brings the subrogation claim
makes no difference in the application of the made whole doctrine
-- the principles of the doctrine apply equally and the result is
the same.

Whether in the context of a reimbursement request, offset, or
direct subrogation action, a fault-free insured must be made whole
for their entire loss before an insurer may offset or recover its
own payments.  Stated another way, the proceeds of any recovery
from a third-party tortfeasor, whether in a subrogation action or
otherwise, must be allocated in such a way as to first make the
insured whole.  Daniels's complaint asserted that State Farm fails
to abide by this requirement, which states a valid claim supported
by the common law made whole doctrine and survives a CR 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss.

The Judge interpretes the regulation in the manner intended by the
agency, and in doing so, it is evident that Daniels raised a valid
claim regarding violation of the WAC.  Accepting the facts alleged
in her complaint as true, there appears to have been no assertion
that Daniels herself bore any fault for the wreck, yet State Farm
withheld 30 percent of her deductible.  Daniels also alleges that
this conduct is consistent with State Farm's dealings with its
other insureds.  Such assertions support the claim that State Farm
violates WAC 284-30-393 with regard to the asserted class.

Finally, the Judge finds that he is presented with two different
interpretations of State Farm's policy language; however, the
presence of two possible interpretations does not make the language
ambiguous unless both interpretations are reasonable.  There can be
only one reasonable interpretation, which is one that aligns with
the common law made whole doctrine.  The interpretation State Farm
urges, and which was adopted by the courts below, does not align
with that doctrine; therefore we reject it.

The Judge accepts Daniels' assertion that the second section of the
policy language prohibits State Farm from allocating subrogation
proceeds to itself until its insured is fully compensated for their
loss, which includes full reimbursement for the insured's
deductible.  This interpretation is consistent, as it must be, with
the made whole doctrine and the basic principles of subrogation,
which emphasize the loss suffered by the insured.  Under this
interpretation, Daniels has asserted a valid claim that State Farm
violates the policy.

Judge Johnson concludes that Daniels' complaint asserted valid
claims for relief under the common law, under Washington insurance
regulations, and under State Farm's own policy language.  As such,
dismissal under CR 12(b)(6) was improper.  He reversed and remanded
to the trial court for further proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 3, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/0fRm3V from Leagle.com.

Matthew James Ide , Ide Law Office, 7900 Se. 28th St. Ste. 500,
Mercer Island, WA, 98040-6004, Counsel for Petitioner(s).

Joseph D. Hampton -- jhampton@bpmlaw.com -- Betts, Patterson &
Mines, P.S., 701 Pike St. Ste. 1400, Seattle, WA, 98101-3927, Frank
Falzetta, Shephard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLC, 333 South Hope
Street 43rd Floor, Los Angeles, CA, 90071, Jennifer Hoffman,
Shephard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLC, 333 South Hope Street 43rd
Floor, Los Angeles, CA, 90071, Counsel for Respondent(s).

Marta Uballe Deleon, Office of the Attorney General, 1125
Washington St. Se., Po Box 40100, Olympia, WA, 98504-0100, Amicus
Curiae on behalf of Washington State Insurance Commissioner.

Linda Blohm Clapham -- clapham@carneylaw.com -- Carney Badley
Spellman, P.S., 701 5th Ave. Ste. 3600, Seattle, WA, 98104-7010,
Michael Barr King, Carney Badley Spellman PS, 701 5th Ave. Ste.
3600, Seattle, WA, 98104-7010, Amicus Curiae on behalf of American
Property Casualty Ins. Association.

Linda Blohm Clapham, Carney Badley Spellman, P.S., 701 5th Ave.
Ste. 3600, Seattle, WA, 98104-7010, Michael Barr King , Carney
Badley Spellman PS, 701 5th Ave. Ste. 3600, Seattle, WA,
98104-7010, Amicus Curiae on behalf of National Association of
Mutual Insurance Companies.

Valerie Davis Mcomie, Attorney at Law, 4549 Nw Aspen St., Camas,
WA, 98607-8302, Daniel Edward Huntington, Richter-Wimberley PS, 422
W. Riverside Ave. Ste. 1300, Spokane, WA, 99201-0305, Amicus Curiae
on behalf of Washington State Association for Justice Foundation.


TATE & KIRLIN: Key Files Class Suit Under FDPCA
-----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Tate & Kirlin
Associates Inc. The case is styled as Renada S Key, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Tate &
Kirlin Associates Inc, LVNV Funding LLC and John Does 1-25,
Defendants, Case No. 8:19-cv-02151-BHH (D.S.C., Aug. 1, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Act.

Tate & Kirlin Associates Inc. is a debt collection agency in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Kenneth Edward Norsworthy , Jr, Esq.
   Norsworthy Law Ltd Co
   505 Pettigru Street
   Greenville, SC 29601
   Tel: (864) 804-0581
   Fax: (864) 756-1153
   Email: kenorsworthy@me.com


THRIFTY PAYLESS: Cal. Reverses Certification Denial in D. Noel Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court of California issued Opinion reversing the
Opinion of the Court of Appeals affirming the District Court's
judgment denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the
case captioned DIANA NIEVES NOEL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v.
THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC., Defendant and Respondent. No. S246490.
(Cal.).

This case is a putative class action brought on behalf of retail
purchasers of an inflatable outdoor pool sold in packaging that
allegedly misled buyers about the pool's size. Plaintiff James
Noel1 filed a verified complaint in Marin County Superior Court,
alleging claims under the unfair competition law (UCL), the false
advertising law (FAL) and the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA).

Noel moved to certify a class defined as all persons who purchased
the Ready Set Pool at a Rite Aid store located in California within
the four years preceding the date of the filing of this action.

The trial court denied the motion for class certification. The
court's order explained that while the court might reasonably infer
that the class, as defined by plaintiff, could be ascertained based
on common business practices and record keeping, plaintiff has
presented no evidence on this subject. Absent some evidence as to
what method or methods will be utilized to identify the class
members, what records are available, either from defendant, the
manufacturer, or other entities such as banks or credit
institutions), how those records would be obtained, what those
records will show, and how burdensome their production would be,
the court is without sufficient evidence to determine whether the
proposed class is ascertainable.

Accordingly, the motion to certify must be denied.

After Noel appealed the denial of certification to an entire class
is an appealable order, the Court of Appeal found no abuse of
discretion in the denial of class certification. Addressing the
superior court's determination that Noel had not shown an
ascertainable class, the reviewing court diagnosed the underlying
problem with the class certification motion as class counsel's
premature filing of the motion without first conducting sufficient
discovery to meet its burden of demonstrating there are means of
identifying members of the putative class so that they might be
notified of the pendency of the litigation.

The Court of Appeal emphasized that Noel had submitted nothing
offering a glimmer of insight into who purchased the pools or how
one might find that out. He neither described nor produced Rite
Aid's records nor did he indicate how much information those
records might reveal. Unless Noel could propose some realistic way
of associating names and contact information with the 20,000-plus
transactions identified by interrogatory response, there remained a
serious due process question in certifying a class action.

In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, the
Court begins by surveying the relevant general principles
applicable to class certification. The Court then turn to case law
that has considered what it means for a class to be ascertainable.
Drawing from this review, the Court concludes that the functions
properly assigned to the ascertainability requirement are best
served by regarding a class as ascertainable when it is defined in
terms of objective characteristics and common transactional facts
that make the ultimate identification of class members possible
when that identification becomes necessary. This standard was
satisfied here because the class definition provided a basis for
class members to self-identify. The courts below erred in importing
an additional evidentiary burden into the ascertainability
requirement.

General Principles

In reviewing a class certification order, the Court's inquiry is
narrowly circumscribed.
The decision to certify a class rests squarely within the
discretion of the trial court, and the Court affords that decision
great deference on appeal, reversing only for a manifest abuse of
discretion: Because trial courts are ideally situated to evaluate
the efficiencies and practicalities of permitting group action,
they are afforded great discretion in granting or denying
certification. A certification order generally will not be
disturbed unless (1) it is unsupported by substantial evidence (2)
it rests on improper criteria or (3) it rests on erroneous legal
assumptions. Under this standard, an order based upon improper
criteria or incorrect assumptions calls for reversal even though
there may be substantial evidence to support the court's order.

Here, plaintiff sought certification of a class pursuant to section
382 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides a general
authorization for class actions, and section 1781 of the Civil
Code, the provisions of which govern class suits brought under the
CLRA and inform class action practice more generally.

Section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes a class
action when the question is one of a common or general interest, of
many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is
impracticable to bring them all before the court.

The views of the Courts of Appeal regarding ascertainability

Following the Court's decision in Daar, supra, 67 Cal.2d 695, the
Courts of Appeal have developed two basic views of the
ascertainability requirement.

One view of ascertainability concentrates on the proposed class
definition itself. This view was applied in Bartold v. Glendale
Federal Bank (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 816 (Bartold), superseded by
statute on another point as stated in Markowitz v. Fidelity Nat.
Title Co. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 508, 524. The Bartold court
explained that a class is ascertainable if it identifies a group of
unnamed plaintiffs by describing a set of common characteristics
sufficient to allow a member of that group to identify himself or
herself as having a right to recover based on the description.

This basic view of ascertainability has been reiterated by numerous
other Courts of Appeal, including the courts in Estrada, supra, 154
Cal.App.4th at page 14 and Aguirre, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at pages
1299 to 1300. A similar formulation regards a class as
ascertainable when it is defined in terms of objective
characteristics and common transactional facts that make the
ultimate identification of class members possible when that
identification becomes necessary.

The second basic view of ascertainability entails a more exacting
inquiry. One such articulation regards the ascertainability
requirement as calling for an examination into (1) the class
definition (2) the size of the class and (3) the means of
identifying class members. Consistent with this view, it has been
said that class members are ascertainable' where they may be
readily identified without unreasonable expense or time by
reference to official records.  

The differences between these two basic approaches to
ascertainability can be somewhat blurred in practice. The Court of
Appeal attempted to synthesize these views. But as this case
illustrates, a court's choice between the two views can be
critical. A construction of ascertainability that assigns the
plaintiff in a putative class action an affirmative responsibility
to show the existence of records or some other mechanism or channel
through which individual class members can be identified for the
purpose of providing them with personal notice of the proceeding
may function to defeat class certification in a variety of
situations. A plaintiff may not anticipate the need to adduce such
proof at the time class certification is sought, meaning that no
precertification discovery will have occurred on this point. This
kind of evidentiary requirement also can prevent certification when
a plaintiff's discovery efforts, albeit substantial, produce
inadequate evidence from the perspective of the court.

An additional burden emerges when the plaintiff must demonstrate
that individual members of the proposed class can be readily
identified without unreasonable expense or time. With such a
requirement, class certification may be denied on ascertainability
grounds due to expected complexities in the provision of notice, or
in distinguishing class members from nonmembers  without close
consideration necessarily being given to whether these difficulties
are actual, as opposed to merely hypothetical, or whether they are
so intransigent and pervasive that they would make a class
proceeding unmanageable, or undesirable in light of the plausible
alternatives.

The views of the federal courts regarding ascertainability

Federal courts have wrestled with ascertainability issues in cases
where plaintiffs have sought certification of a class under rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28 U.S.C.). Although this
rule does not expressly demand an ascertainable class, most courts
tasked with applying it have regarded ascertainability as an
implicit`threshold requirement for certification of a class under
Rule 23(b)(3). In this context, competing views regarding
ascertainability have emerged within the federal system, just as
they have within the courts of this state.

A stringent view of ascertainability is most closely associated
with decisions produced by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit. Under this approach, a plaintiff seeking class
certification under Rule 23(b)(3) must show not only that the class
has been defined with reference to objective criteria, but also
that there is a reliable and administratively feasible mechanism
for determining whether putative class members fall within the
class definition. Courts adopting this conception of
ascertainability have refused to certify (or upheld refusals to
certify consumer classes in situations such as the one presently
before this court in which it is unlikely, or at least unproven,
that individual purchasers of the commodity at the heart of the
dispute would have retained their receipts or other proof of
purchase, the defendant did not maintain a specific list of
purchasers, and the putative class representative offered no proof
when seeking certification "that a single purchaser of [the
product] could be identified using records of customer membership
cards or records of online sales.

Other courts have pushed back on this stringent approach to
ascertainability. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit is among the federal courts that assign a narrower
function to the ascertainability requirement. Its decision in
Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC (7th Cir. 2015) 795 F.3d 654
(Mullins) offers a thorough, and in the Court's view illuminating,
assessment of how ascertainability should be understood in
connection with class certification. Because the analysis in
Mullins is particularly helpful in resolving the issue before us,
the Court discusses its facts and reasoning at some length below.

The plaintiff in Mullins, supra, 795 F.3d 654, secured the
certification of a consumer class under Rule 23(b)(3) in a matter
alleging that the defendant made fraudulent representations in
marketing a dietary joint supplement.   Drawing from the Third
Circuit's jurisprudence, the defendant in Mullins argued on appeal
of the certification order that the class was not ascertainable
because the plaintiff had failed to show a reliable and
administratively feasible way to determine whether a particular
person is a member of the class.

The appellate court in Mullins, supra, 795 F.3d 654, rejected this
view of ascertainability and affirmed the class certification order
entered by the district court. In doing so, the federal court of
appeals distinguished between a relatively uncontroversial weak
version of ascertainability and the more demanding ascertainability
standard adopted by the Third Circuit.

The weak construction of ascertainability, the court explained,
derives from experience that has led courts to require that classes
be defined clearly and based on objective criteria Even in this
weak form, Mullins elaborated, the requirement of a clearly defined
class based on objective criteria is far from toothless, for it
serves to weed out classes that are defined too vaguely classes
that are defined by subjective criteria, such as by a person's
state of mind and classes that are defined in terms of success on
the merit so-called fail-safe classes all of which raise due
process or other fairness concerns.

The Mullins court regarded this approach to ascertainability as
striking an appropriate balance, whereas the Third Circuit's more
exacting conception of this requirement did not. In the view of the
Mullins court, the more demanding specification does not further
any interest of Rule 23 that is not already adequately protected by
the Rule's explicit requirements. On the other side of the balance,
the costs of imposing the requirement are substantial. The
stringent version of ascertainability effectively bars low-value
consumer class actions, at least where plaintiffs do not have
documentary proof of purchases, and sometimes even when they do.

An ascertainable class is one defined in objective terms that make
the eventual identification of class members possible

Although Mullins, supra, 795 F.3d 654 applied only federal law,
much of its analysis rings true here as well. The Court agree with
Mullins' assignment of a limited but important function to the
ascertainability requirement. The Court concludes that the
objectives of this requirement are best achieved by regarding a
class as ascertainable when it is defined in terms of objective
characteristics and common transactional facts that make the
ultimate identification of class members possible when that
identification becomes necessary. The Court regards this standard
as including class definitions that are sufficient to allow a
member of the class to identify himself or herself as having a
right to recover based on the class description.

This understanding of the threshold requirement of ascertainability
for class certification protects the due process interests of all
parties and absent class members without unduly impairing the
efficacy of the class action mechanism.  

But a class proceeding must be maintained in a manner consistent
with due process. A class definition framed in objective terms that
make the identification of class members possible promotes due
process in at least two ways. Such phrasing puts members of the
class on notice that their rights may be adjudicated in the
proceeding, so they must decide whether to intervene, opt out, or
do nothing and live with the consequences.

The Court of Appeal saw a slightly different set of due process
considerations as favoring a more stringent approach to
ascertainability. It expressed concern that, without an evidentiary
showing by plaintiff, absent class members would never receive
notice of the action and would therefore lack the opportunity to
opt out. To this effect, the Court of Appeal quoted Sotelo, supra,
207 Cal.App.4th at page 649: The theoretical ability to
self-identify as a member of the class is useless if one never
receives notice of the action. The Courts appreciate the court's
interest in protecting the due process rights of absent class
members. Yet, as the Court explains below, this concern does not
justify the evidentiary burden that the Court of Appeal attached to
the ascertainability requirement or, for that matter, any blanket
requirement that class members must be identifiable by reference to
official records.  

The Court agrees, of course, that the provision of notice to absent
class members carries due process connotations.  But due process
does not dictate that certification of a putative plaintiff class
invariably must depend on all absent class members being sent much
less receiving individual notice of the action. Instead, the law
adopts a more nuanced and pragmatic approach, consistent with the
general principle that when an important judicial mechanism for
advancing the social good is involved, a construction of the Due
Process Clause which would place impossible or impractical
obstacles in the way could not be justified.

To summarize, due process does not invariably require that personal
notice be directed to all members of a class in order for a class
action to proceed, or for that matter that an individual member of
a certified class must receive notice to be bound by a judgment. It
follows that a construction of the ascertainability requirement
that presumes such notice is necessary to satisfy due process, and
demands that the plaintiff show how it can be accomplished,
threatens to demand too much, too soon. It is likewise mistaken to
take a categorical view that the relevant due process interests can
be satisfied only when official records supply the means of
identifying class members, and for a similar reason: due process is
not that inflexible.

Reading into the ascertainability element an additional requirement
that the identification of class members must occur without
unreasonable expense or time runs a similar risk of preempting a
more careful analysis later. The Court's jurisprudence addressing
class certification has stressed the importance of a careful
weighing of both the benefits and the burdens that may be
associated with a proposed class action. A conception of
ascertainability as concerned with whether class members can be
identified without an unreasonable commitment of expense or time is
at cross purposes with this direction.

As the court in Mullinssupra, 795 F.3d at pages 663 to 664
explained in rejecting a similar expansion of the ascertainability
requirement, such an approach trains the court's attention, at a
threshold juncture, exclusively toward the side of the ledger where
costs and challenges are compiled. This focus means that full
attention will not necessarily be given to countervailing
considerations such as whether these difficulties, although
present, might nevertheless be effectively managed through
application of the various tools and resources courts have at their
disposal for effective supervision of a class proceeding, and
whether, notwithstanding possible notice issues, an appropriately
supervised class action nevertheless can be expected to deliver
benefits that, from a comparative perspective, would make it
preferable to alternative courses of action.

The Court's view of the ascertainability requirement does not
prohibit a court asked to certify a class from considering the
separate question of notice to absent class members. Arguments and
evidence relating to the provision of notice to the class
conceivably could counsel against class certification insofar as
they may show that another requirement for a proper class
proceeding, aside from ascertainability, has not been met, e.g.,
that a class action would be unmanageable, even after due
consideration is given to how manageability concerns could be
resolved; or that a class proceeding would not be superior to the
alternatives. But, at the risk of repetition, the Court concludes
that these issues, where they exist, are appropriately addressed
outside of and separately from the ascertainability requirement.

The trial court abused its discretion when it found no
ascertainable class existed
It follows from the analysis above that the trial court erred when
it determined that the class proposed by plaintiff is not
ascertainable. It is. The phrasing, All persons who purchased the
Ready Set Pool at a Rite Aid store located in California within the
four years preceding the date of the filing of this action is
neither vague nor subjective. A member of the class could
appreciate from this definition whether he or she is included
within it, and thus be in a position to take appropriate steps to
protect his or her interests. And the definition makes the res
judicata consequences of a judgment clear, creating no ambiguity as
to who will and will not be bound by the outcome.  

To the extent that the trial court had concerns regarding the state
of the record as it pertained to matters such as the provision of
notice to class members, or how burdensome it would be to identify
class members, those issues should not have been resolved in the
context of ascertainability. And regardless of whether plaintiff's
failure to supply evidence associated with the identification of
class members might have supported a refusal to certify a class on
some other ground it manifestly did not justify a failure to find
an ascertainable class. The Court's review ends there.

The trial court denied the motion for class certification in its
entirety on ascertainability grounds. That court also denied
certification of the proposed CLRA class on the basis that common
issues did not predominate. Because the Court do not address the
latter aspect of the trial court's ruling here, overturning its
ascertainability determination would not, by itself, make a CLRA
class viable. The trial court also offered a third justification
for denying class certification that was ambiguous in its scope. It
is unclear whether the trial court had only the proposed CLRA class
in mind when it determined that a class action would not be
superior to the alternatives, or whether this conclusion applied to
the entirety of the action.

It also cannot be discerned from this vantage point whether the
court's erroneous view of ascertainability informed its analysis on
this issue. Because of these uncertainties, the Court reverses the
judgment below and remands the case to the Court of Appeal with
directions to remand the matter to the superior court for further
proceedings consistent with the Court's decision.

A full-text copy of the state Supreme Court's July 29, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6gxpypg from
Leagle.com.

Emergent Legal, Emergent, Christopher Wimmer, 25 Taylor Street, San
Francisco, CA, 94102, Peter Roldan -- peter@emergent.law -- Public
Justice, Leslie Bruecknerand Karla Gilbride for Plaintiff and
Appellant.

Chavez & Gertler, Mark A. Chavez -- mark@chavezgertler.com --
Public Citizen Ligation Group and Allison M. Zieve 3501 Sansom
Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, for Public Citizen as Amicus Curiae
on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Rock Law, Matt J. Malone, 11 1/2 E 2nd St Ashland, OH 44805, Nelson
& Fraenkel, Gretchen M. Nelson, 750 Third Avenue, 32nd Floor, New
York, NY 10017, Arbogast Law and David M. Arbogast --
david@arbogastlaw.com -- for Consumer Attorneys of California as
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, Robert J. Nelson --
rnelson@lchb.com -- Roger N. Heller -- rheller@lchb.com -- and
Melisa Gardner -- mgardner@lchb.com -- for National Consumer Law
Center and National Association of Consumer Advocates as Amici
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Jocelyn D. Larkin and Daniel Nesbit, 125 University Avenue, Suite
102, Berkeley, CA 97410,  for Impact Fund, California Employment
Lawyers Association, Centro Legal de la Raza, Legal Aid at Work and
Worksafe as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Kelly, Hockel & Klein, Klein, Hockel, Iezza & Patel, Michael D.
Early and Mark P. Iezza, 455 Market Street, Suite 1480, San
Francisco, CA 94105, for Defendant and Respondent.

Utrecht & Lenvin and Paul F. Utrecht --  putrecht@ullawfirm.com --
for Washington Legal Foundation and California Retailers
Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.


UCLA: Fails to Protect Women from Heaps' Sexual Misconducts
-----------------------------------------------------------
A.B. and C.D., individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA; JAMES MASON HEAPS, M.D.; and JOHN DOES 1-20,
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-06586 (C.D. Cal., July 30, 2019) is a
class action on behalf of a class of women who were examined by
James Heaps, M.D. at UCLA facilities after January 1, 2014,
alleging that UCLA failed to protect the Plaintiffs and the class
against Dr. Heaps sexual misconducts.

According to the complaint, Dr. James Heaps, an
obstetrician-gynecologist (OB-GYN) specializing in oncology, saw
patients at UCLA medical facilities between 1983 and 2018. He was
arrested in June 2019 and indicted on two counts of sexual battery
and one count of sexual exploitation by a physician.

The Plaintiffs are two of the many women who visited Dr. Heaps for
sensitive women's health treatment at UCLA. Dr. Heaps caused
lasting damage to them and his other patients by sexually
assaulting them and making lewd statements while conducting medical
examinations.

UCLA breached its duties to the Plaintiffs and other women by
keeping Dr. Heaps on staff despite receiving several complaints
about his behavior. UCLA did not terminate or suspend Dr. Heaps
during or after its investigation of those complaints, or after the
Medical Board of California opened its own investigation into Dr.
Heaps's conduct in 2014. UCLA nurses and medical assistants also
attended Dr. Heaps's examinations and observed his predatory
behavior, but did nothing to stop it.

More than 50 women have now come forward to report inappropriate
sexual contact by Heaps, and UCLA has paid over $3 million in
individual settlements relating to Dr. Heaps's misconduct. In June
2018, without disclosing the results of its investigation -- which
found Dr. Heaps violated university policy on sexual violence --
UCLA allowed Heaps to quietly resign. Only after Dr. Heaps's arrest
did UCLA issue a statement that it was "deeply sorry" that its
women's health doctor violated "the trust of his patients."

The Regents of the University of California is the governing board
of the University of California. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Daniel C. Girard, Esq.
          Elizabeth A. Kramer, Esq.
          GIRARD SHARP LLP
          601 California Street, Suite 1400
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (415) 981-4800
          Facsimile: (415) 981-4846
          E-mail: dgirard@girardsharp.com
                  ekramer@girardsharp.com

               - and -

          Eric H. Gibbs, Esq.
          Amy M. Zeman, Esq.
          GIBBS LAW GROUP LLP
          505 14th Street, Suite 1110
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 350-9700
          Facsimile: (510) 350-9701
          E-mail: ehg@classlawgroup.com
                  amz@classlawgroup.com


VECTOR STRUCTURAL: Osorio Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------------------
Alejandro Manuel Zapata Osorio, Arturo del Razo, Braulio Rolando
Cashabamba Chango, Byron Salvador Barrera Sanchez, Carlos E. Sierra
Rodriguez, Edwin Fabricio Cashabamba Tubon, Jesus Sierra, Juan
Sierra, Ramon Rosales Galvez, Raul Chavez Diaz, Segundo Leandro
Alulema Guano, Segundo Nicolas Siguencia Encalada, and Wilder
Rodriguez, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. VECTOR STRUCTURAL PRESERVATION CORP. (D/B/A VECTOR
STRUCTURAL PRESERVATION), NORTH STAR STRATEGY, INC. (D/B/A NORTH
STAR STRATEGY), BILL HANDAKAS, VASSILIOS HANDAKAS, and SERGIO DOE,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-07261 (S.D. N.Y., Aug. 2, 2019) is an
action on behalf of themselves, and other similarly situated
individuals, for unpaid minimum and overtime wages pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), and for violations of
the N.Y. Labor Law (the "NYLL"), including applicable liquidated
damages, interest, attorneys' fees and costs.

Plaintiffs worked for Defendants in excess of 40 hours per week,
without appropriate minimum wage and overtime compensation for the
hours that they worked. Rather, Defendants failed to maintain
accurate recordkeeping of the hours worked and failed to pay
Plaintiffs appropriately for any hours worked, either at the
straight rate of pay or for any additional overtime premium, says
the complaint.

Plaintiffs were employed as brick layers at the construction
corporations.

Defendants own, operate, or control two construction corporations,
located at 75 Harbor Road, Port Washington, New York 11050 under
the name "Vector Structural Preservation" and at 238 W Jericho
Turnpike, Huntington Station, New York 11746 under the name "North
Star Strategy".[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Michael Faillace, Esq.
     MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
     60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
     New York, NY 10165
     Phone: (212) 317-1200
     Facsimile: (212) 317-1620


WELLPATH LLC: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Barnett Suit Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------------
JILLIAN BARNETT, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. WELLPATH LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-23149 (S.D. Fla., July 30, 2019) seeks to stop the
Defendants' practice of making unsolicited calls. The case is
assigned to Judge Darrin P. Gayles.

Wellpath LLC offers medical, dental, mental, and behavioral health
services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 1205
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (305) 479-2299
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
                  gberg@shamisgentile.com

              - and -

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          Jordan D. Utanski, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, PA
          19495 Biscayne Blvd #607
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (305) 975-3320
          E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com
                  utanski@edelsberglaw.com



WELLS FARGO: Bid to Defer Ruling on Bid to Certify Class Granted
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In the class action lawsuit styled as Daniel Loughran, et al., the
Plaintiff, vs. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al., the Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-04023 (N.D. Ill.), the Hon. Judge Charles P. Kocoras
entered an order granting Wells Fargo's motion to defer ruling on
Plaintiff's motion to certify class action.

According to the docket entry made by the Clerk on July 30, 2019,
Plaintiff's motion for class certification is entered and
continued. Wells Fargo's motion to defer ruling on Plaintiff's
motion to certify class action is granted. Wells Fargo & Companys
and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s motion to leave to exceed page limit
is granted. Motion hearing set for August 1, 2019 is stricken.[CC]

ZUORA INC: Schall Law Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
announces the filing of a class action lawsuit against Zuora, Inc.
("Zuora" or "the Company") (ZUO) for violations of Sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.

Investors who purchased the Company's shares between April 12, 2018
and May 30, 2019, inclusive (the ''Class Period''), are encouraged
to contact the firm before August 13, 2019.

We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law
Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at
424-303-1964, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also
reach us through the firm's website at www.schallfirm.com, or by
email at brian@schallfirm.com.

The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. Zuora focused on implementing its RevPro
product for new customers ahead of the compliance deadline for
accounting standard ASC 606. The Company failed to maintain
adequate resources to facilitate the integration of RevPro with its
core business. The year-long focus on RevPro after its acquisition
and the delay in integration materially impacted the Company's
results. Because of the limited market for RevPro after the ASC 606
deadline, demand for the solution could be reasonably expected to
decline. Based on these facts, the Company's public statements were
false and materially misleading throughout the class period. When
the market learned the truth about Zuora, investors suffered
damages.

Join the case to recover your losses.

The Schall Law Firm represents investors around the world and
specializes in securities class action lawsuits and shareholder
rights litigation.

CONTACT:

         Brian Schall, Esq.
         The Schall Law Firm
         Sherin Mahdavian, Esq.,
         Website: www.schallfirm.com
         Office: 310-301-3335
         Cell: 424-303-1964
         Email: info@schallfirm.com
                brian@schallfirm.com [GN]



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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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