CAR_Public/190820.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Tuesday, August 20, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 166

                            Headlines

ACADIA PHARMA: Reply in Securities Class Suit Due Aug. 22
AMALGA COMPOSITES: Imes Seeks Unpaid Wages, Damages
AMARIN CORP: Consolidated Securities Class Suit in NJ Ongoing
AMAZON.COM INC: Nicosia Appeals District Court Decision
AMERICAN MEDICAL: Freeman Files Suit Over Data Breach

AMERICAN NATIONAL: Court OKs Filing of FAC in Morrison
AMERICAN SELECT: Haeussinger Sues Over Unauthorized Telemarketing
AMGEN INC: Antitrust Class Suit over Humira(R) Sales Ongoing
ANADARKO PETROLEUM: Thompson Files Suit Over Occidental Merger Deal
ANGELA BRADSTREET: Court OKs Reopening of Goldrick Case

AT&T SERVICES: Bell Alleges Age Discrimination
ATLAS LAW PLLC: Curtis Disputes Collection Letter Validity
BRG SPORTS: Court Strikes Class Allegation in Jones Suit
BRINKER INT'L: Court Narrows Claims in Data Incident Litigation
C&J ENERGY: Plumley Suit Challenges Proposed Sale to Keane

C&J ENERGY: Wuollet Balks at Merger Deal with Keane Group
CAPITAL ONE: Faces Ouellette Suit in W.D. Wash. Over Data Breach
CAREFUSION RESOURCES: Bid to Remand Ramirez Labor Suit Denied
CARRIAGE SERVICES: Class Claims Process in Faria Underway
CATALINA RESTAURANT: Cal. App. Affirms Arbitration Denial in Lacayo

CHICAGO GYMS: Members Sue Over Denied Rewards Redemption
CHIPOTLE MEXICAN: Schneider Has 45 Days to File Settlement Bid
COGNIZANT TECH: Bid to Dismiss NJ Consolidated Class Suit Pending
COMENITY BANK: Dmytriw Sues Over Auto-dialed Telemarketing Calls
CONNER LOGISTICS: Figueroa Labor Suit Removed to E.D. Cal.

DEVITO REAL ESTATE: Grigorian Sues Over Unsolicited Text Messages
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: D.C. App. Flips Final Judgment in Brown Suit
EMPATH LLC: Court Orders Castaneda to Serve Protective Order Bid
ENCOMPASS HEALTH: Settling Plaintiffs in Nichols Suit Already Paid
ENVISION HEALTHCARE: Court Won't Dismiss Shareholder Litigation

EUROPEAN-AMERICAN WASTE: Flores Sues Over Unpaid Min., OT Wages
EZCORP INC: Prel. Approval of Securities Case Settlement Pending
FCA US: Court Narrows Claims in Cummings' Defective Car Suit
FIRST SOLAR: Trial in Smilovits Suit to Begin January 2020
FLING.COM LLC: Cunningham Sues Over Illegal SMS Ad Blasts

FLUOR CORPORATION: Bid to Dismiss Shareholder Suit in Texas Pending
FMC CORPORATION: Faces Plymouth County Retirement Association Suit
GARRIDO COMPANY: Gonzalez Seeks Unpaid Wages
GEICO CASUALTY: Butta Seeks to Certify Class
GENERAL ELECTRIC: Bid to Dismiss Bezio Class Action Underway

GENERAL ELECTRIC: Bid to Dismiss Hachem Class Suit Still Pending
GENERAL ELECTRIC: Houston Class Suit Stayed, Awaits Hachem Ruling
GENERAL ELECTRIC: Touchstone Suit Stayed, Awaits Hachem Ruling
GEORGIA POWER: Ruling in Franchise Fees Suit under Appeal
HASBRO INC: Class Suit Over Toys R Us Disclosure Still Ongoing

HOLLIS TAGGART: Picon Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website
HOME DEPOT: Freeman Asserts FCRA Breach Over Consumer Report
JC PENNEY: Court Dismisses Rojas Derivative Suit
LARIO OIL: Court OKs Conditional Certification in Hancock Suit
LEXICON PHARMACEUTICALS: Continues to Defend Manopla Class Suit

MASIMO CORP: Objection to PHI's Class Cert. Bid Due Aug. 26
MAVENIR INC. Court Appoints Lead Plaintiff in Securities Suit
MDL 2875: Collins Suit v. Aurobindo over Valsartan Consolidated
MERCHANTS & MEDICAL: Placeholder Bid for Class Cert. Filed
MICHAEL ANGELO MARBLE: Maxwell Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime

MIDWEST RECOVERY: Hicke Sues Over Erroneous Credit Report
MISSISSIPPI POWER: Bid to Dismiss Turnage Class Suit Underway
MONEYGRAM INT'L: Continues to Defend Illinois Class Action
MRS BPO: Court Stays Class Certification Proceedings in "Rozani"
NATIONS INFO: Sent Unsolicited Telemarketing Texts, Rice Suit Says

NESTLE SA: 9th Cir. Amends Oct. 2018 Opinion in Child Slavery Suit
NETGEAR INC: Suit in California State Court Stayed
NIAGARA CREDIT: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
NIKODEMO OPERATING: Court Denies Bid for Class Certification
NINTENDO OF AMERICA: Carusone Sues Over Defective Game Controllers

NORTHERN TRUST: 9th Cir. Flips Dismissal of Banks Suit
NOVAVIVE USA: Fauley Sues Over Unsolicited Advertisements
PATERNO'S PIZZA: Espitia Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
PERRY ROOFING: Lovett Suit to Recover Unpaid Overtime
POOL CORPORATION: Hickerson Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages

POSTMATES INC: Rogers Hits Illegal SMS Recruitment Ad Blasts
PRAXAIR, INC: Garcia Seeks to Certify Settlement Class
PRESIDENTIAL REAL: Williams Seeks Redress From TCPA Violations
PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL: PICA Settlement Approved, Case Dismissed
QUALCOMM INC: Calif. Consumer Action Still Stayed Pending Appeal

QUALCOMM INC: Discovery in Calif. Suit Must Be Completed by March
QUALCOMM INC: Dismissal in 3226701 Canada Class Suit Affirmed
QUALCOMM INC: Hearing on Bid to Dismiss Set for Sept. 19
QUALCOMM INC: Quebec Superior Court Certifies Class
QUANTA SERVICES: CIaims in Benton Suit Narrowed

R&M Towing: Lockwood Hits Misclassification, Claims Overtime
RADIUS GLOBAL: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
RUTH'S HOSPITALITY: Guerrero Class Action in Calif. Ongoing
RYSZARD FOOD DISTRIBUTOR: Buestan Suit to Recover Unpaid Overtime
SAFEWAY INC: Mathews Suit Removed to N.D. Cal.

SARCHIONE CHEVROLET: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in Streater
SEABOARD CORP: Continues to Defend Pork Buyers' Lawsuit
SEMPRA ENERGY: Investors Seek to Revive Securities Suit
SEMPRA ENERGY: Ruling in Aliso Canyon Leak-Related Suit Affirmed
SOTHEBY'S: Kent Files Suit Over BidFair Merger Deal

ST. CLOUD STATE: Female Student-Athletes Win Gender Bias Case
STERLING JEWELERS: Lara Suit to Recover Unpaid Overtime
SUPERIOR ENERGY: Womack Seeks to Certify FLSA Class of Operators
T-MOBILE USA: Grob Labor Suit Removed to C.D. Cal.
TAMRAK MANAGEMENT: Hernandez Suit to Recover Unpaid Overtime

TCF FINANCIAL: Suits Challenging Chemical Financial Merger Dropped
TENSSOURCE LLC: Cancelino Claims Unpaid Overtime Wages
TESLA INC: Nguyen Sues Over Vehicle's Defective Battery
THAI CHILI 2 GO: Chiang Suit Seeks to Recover Overtime Pay
TOTAL SYSTEM: 3 Suits Balk at Global Payments Merger

TOTAL SYSTEM: Telexfree Securities Suit Ongoing
TOYOTA MOTOR: Court Enters Protective Order in McCarthy Suit
TRW GROUP: Brown Sues Over Defective Air Bag Sensor
TYSON FARMS: Accused of Dumping Waste into River by Residents
US STEEL: Clairton Fire-Related Class Suit Ongoing

US STEEL: Underwriters Dropped as Defendants in Shareholder Action
VOLT INFORMATION: Court Compels Arbitration in Data Breach Suit
WABASH NATIONAL: Appeal in Class Suit v. Supreme Ongoing

                            *********

ACADIA PHARMA: Reply in Securities Class Suit Due Aug. 22
---------------------------------------------------------
ACADIA Pharmaceuticals Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 1, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that defendants reply in the
class action suit entitled, In re ACADIA Pharmaceuticals Inc.
Securities Litigation, Case No. 18-cv-01647, is due August 22,
2019.

Between July 19 and August 3, 2018, following negative publicity
about NUPLAZID, three purported Company stockholders filed putative
securities class action complaints (captioned Staublein v. ACADIA
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Case No. 18-cv-01647, Stone v. ACADIA
Pharmaceuticals Inc., Case No. 18-cv-01672, and Barglow v. ACADIA
Pharmaceuticals Inc., Case No. 18-cv-01812) in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of California against the company
and certain of our current and former executive officers.

Thereafter, several putative lead plaintiffs filed motions to
consolidate the cases and to appoint a lead plaintiff.

On January 3, 2019, the court consolidated the cases under the
caption In re ACADIA Pharmaceuticals Inc. Securities Litigation,
Case No. 18-cv-01647, and took the lead plaintiff motions under
submission.

On February 26, 2019, the Court appointed a lead plaintiff and lead
counsel. Lead plaintiff filed a consolidated complaint on April 15,
2019.

The consolidated complaint generally alleges that defendants
violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 by making materially false and misleading statements regarding
the company's business, operations, and prospects by failing to
disclose that adverse events and safety concerns regarding NUPLAZID
threatened initial and continuing FDA approval, and by failing to
disclose that the company engaged in business practices likely to
attract regulatory scrutiny.

The consolidated complaint seeks unspecified monetary damages and
other relief.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the consolidated complaint on
June 7, 2019 and the lead plaintiff filed an opposition on July 23,
2019.

Defendants' reply is due August 22, 2019. A hearing on the motion
to dismiss is scheduled for September 5, 2019.

ACADIA Pharmaceuticals said, "Given the unpredictability inherent
in litigation, we cannot predict the outcome of this matter. We are
unable to estimate possible losses or ranges of losses that may
result from this matter, and therefore we have not accrued any
amounts in connection with this matter other than ongoing
attorneys' fees."

ACADIA Pharmaceuticals Inc., a biopharmaceutical company, focuses
on the development and commercialization of small molecule drugs
that address unmet medical needs in central nervous system
disorders. The Company was founded in 1993 and is headquartered in
San Diego, California.


AMALGA COMPOSITES: Imes Seeks Unpaid Wages, Damages
---------------------------------------------------
TIA IMES, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. AMALGA COMPOSITES, INC., Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-01130-NJ (E.D. Wis., Aug. 6, 2019) is a collective and
class action brought pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, and Wisconsin's Wage Payment and Collection Laws by Plaintiff
for purposes of obtaining relief under the FLSA and WWPCL for
unpaid overtime compensation, unpaid agreed upon wages, liquidated
damages, costs, attorneys' fees, declaratory and/or injunctive
relief, and/or any such other relief the Court may deem
appropriate.

The Defendant operated (and continues to operate) an unlawful
compensation system that deprived and failed to compensate all
current and former hourly paid, non-exempt Production employees for
all hours worked and work performed each workweek, including at an
overtime rate of pay, by: (1) failing to compensate Production
employees for pre-shift and post-shift activities, such as donning
and doffing Defendant-issued uniforms and protective gear (and
performing other compensable work) at the beginning and end of each
work day; (2) compensating Production employees based upon their
daily scheduled shift start and end times, as opposed to when
compensable work commenced and ceased, respectively, which resulted
in Defendant shaving time from Production employees' timesheets
each workweek; (3) failing to compensate Production employees with
agreed-upon "shift premiums"; and (4) failing to include all other
non-discretionary forms of compensation, such as Scrap Bonuses,
incentives, awards, and/or other monetary payments, in Production
employees' regular rates of pay for overtime calculation purposes,
says the complaint.

Plaintiff commenced her employment with Defendant as a Production
employee in the position of Winder, on or about July 16, 2018.

Amalga Composites, Inc., is a privately owned company headquartered
in West Allis, Wisconsin that provides filament winding operations
and manufactures composite products, among other things.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     James A. Walcheske, Esq.
     Scott S. Luzi, Esq.
     WALCHESKE & LUZI, LLC
     15850 W. Bluemound Rd., Suite 304
     Brookfield, WI 53005
     Phone: (262) 780-1953
     Fax: (262) 565-6469
     Email: jwalcheske@walcheskeluzi.com
            sluzi@walcheskeluzi.com


AMARIN CORP: Consolidated Securities Class Suit in NJ Ongoing
-------------------------------------------------------------
Amarin Corporation plc said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 31, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the class action suits
entitled, Debendra Sharma v. Amarin Corporation plc, John F. Thero
and Steven Ketchum, and Richard Borghesi v. Amarin Corporation plc,
John F. Thero and Steven Ketchum, have been consolidated and are
now proceedingd as,  In re Amarin Corporation PLC Securities
Litigation.

On February 22, 2019, a purported investor in the company's
publicly traded securities filed a putative class action lawsuit
against Amarin Corporation plc, its chief executive officer and
chief scientific officer in the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey, Debendra Sharma v. Amarin Corporation plc,
John F. Thero and Steven Ketchum, No. 2:19-cv-06601 (D.N.J. Feb.
22, 2019).

On March 12, 2019, another purported investor filed a substantially
similar lawsuit captioned Richard Borghesi v. Amarin Corporation
plc, John F. Thero and Steven Ketchum, No. 3:19-cv-08423 (D.N.J.
March 12, 2019).

On May 14, 2019 the court consolidated the cases under the caption
In re Amarin Corporation PLC Securities Litigation, No.
3:19-cv-06601 and appointed two other purported shareholders, Dan
Kotecki and the Gaetano Cecchini Living Trust, as Co-Lead
Plaintiffs.

Co-Lead Plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended complaint ("Amended
Complaint") on July 22, 2019 that adds as defendants the company's
current chief medical officer and its former chief executive
officer, who is a current director.

The Amended Complaint alleges that from September 24, 2018 to
November 9, 2018 the company misled investors by releasing topline
results for the REDUCE-IT study without disclosing data on
biomarker increases in the placebo group as compared with baseline
measurement. The Amended Complaint alleges that these data suggest
that the mineral oil placebo used in the REDUCE-IT study may have
interfered with statin absorption in the placebo group, which they
allege may have increased adverse outcomes in the placebo group.
The Amended Complaint further allege that these purported
misrepresentations and omissions inflated the company's share
price. Based on these allegations, the suit asserts claims under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and seeks unspecified monetary
damages and attorneys' fees and costs.  

Amarin said, "We believe that we have valid defenses and we will
vigorously defend against the claims, but cannot predict the
outcome. We are unable to reasonably estimate the loss exposure, if
any, associated with these claims. We have insurance coverage that
is anticipated to cover any significant loss exposure that may
arise from this action after payment by us of the associated
deductible obligation."

Amarin Corporation plc, a pharmaceutical company, engages in the
development and commercialization of therapeutics for the treatment
of cardiovascular diseases in the United States. The company was
formerly known as Ethical Holdings plc and changed its name to
Amarin Corporation plc in 1999. Amarin Corporation plc was
incorporated in 1989 and is headquartered in Dublin, Ireland.


AMAZON.COM INC: Nicosia Appeals District Court Decision
-------------------------------------------------------
An appeal has been filed by Dean Nicosia from a ruling in the case,
Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., Case No. 19-1833. The appeal was
brought to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit to challenge the district court decision that denied his
motion for preliminary injunction.

Headquartered in Seattle Washington, Amazon.com, Inc. is an
American multinational technology company that focuses on
e-commerce, cloud computing, digital streaming and artificial
intelligence. [BN]

Attorneys for Appellant:

     Joseph Seth Tusa, Esq.
     TUSA P.C.
     P.O. Box 566
     Southold, NY 11971
     Telephone: (631) 407-5100

Attorneys for Appellee:

     Gregory T. Parks, Esq.
     MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
     1701 Market Street
     Philadelphia, PA 19103
     Telephone: (215) 963-5170


AMERICAN MEDICAL: Freeman Files Suit Over Data Breach
-----------------------------------------------------
Clyde Freeman and Tim Collinsworth, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. American Medical
Collection Agency, Inc., Laboratory Corporation of America
Holdings, Clinical Pathology Laboratories, Inc., Bio-Reference
Laboratories, Inc. and Does 1-10,, Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-06853,
(S.D. N.Y., July 23, 2019), seeks damages, attorneys' fees and
costs, and such other and further relief resulting from negligence
and violations of Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 and the consumer protection laws of New York.

Defendants are providers of medical diagnostic services, drug
development and provides comprehensive laboratory and end-to-end
drug development services worldwide. Plaintiffs allege that
Defendants failed to protect the confidential information of
millions of its patients, including credit card numbers and bank
account information, medical information, social security numbers
and/or other protected health information.

Freeman has been a patient of Laboratory Corporation of America and
Bio-Reference Laboratories, Inc. while Collinsworth has been a
patient of Clinical Pathology Laboratories. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Robert R. Ahdoot, Esq.
      Tina Wolfson, Esq.
      Theodore W. Maya, SBN 223242
      Bradley K. King, SBN 274399
      AHDOOT & WOLFSON, PC
      10728 Lindbrook Drive
      Los Angeles, CA 90024
      Telephone: (310) 474-9111
      Facsimile: (310) 474-8585
      Email: rahdoot@ahdootwolfson.com
             twolfson@ahdootwolfson.com
             tmaya@ahdootwolfson.com
             bking@ahdootwolfson.com

             - and -

      Russell Yankwitt, Esq.
      Michael H. Reed, Esq.
      YANKWITT LLP
      140 Grand Street, Suite 705
      White Plains, NY 10601
      Tel: (914) 686-1500
      Fax: (914) 487-5000
      Email: russell@yankwitt.com
             michael@yankwitt.com


AMERICAN NATIONAL: Court OKs Filing of FAC in Morrison
------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LA TOIYA MORRISON, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN NATIONAL RED
CROSS, a Congressional Charter Corporation, Defendant, Case No.
3:19-cv-2855-HSG (N.D. Cal.), Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted
the Parties' Joint Stipulation to File First Amended Complaint and
Extend Time for Defendant to Respond.
The Plaintiff filed a Class Action Complaint for failure to
reimburse business expenses pursuant to California Labor Code
section 2802, and unfair and unlawful business practices pursuant
to California Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.,
in the Superior Court of California for the County of Alameda on
April 24, 2019.  The Defendant filed its Answer to the Plaintiff's
Complaint on May 22, 2019.

On May 23, 2019, the Defendant removed the action from the Superior
Court of California for the County of Alameda to the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California.

The Plaintiff now seeks to amend her Complaint to add a Private
Attorneys General Act cause of action based on the alleged failure
to reimburse business expenses; and update her Complaint to comply
with federal pleadings standard.  

The Parties have met and conferred, and the Defendant does not
object to the filing of the First Amended Complaint.  They have
agreed to extend the Defendant's deadline to respond to the
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint from 14 days to 21 days after
service of the Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint.

The Defendant reserves all defenses to the Plaintiff's claims and
the stipulation will not be construed as a waiver of its defenses.

The Parties stipulated and agreed, and Judge Gilliam approved that
(i) the Plaintiff may file the First Amended Complaint; (ii) the
Defendant's deadline to respond to tge Plaintiff's First Amended
Complaint is extended from 14 days to 21 days after service of the
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint; and (iii) the Defendant does
not impliedly or expressly concede any of the legal or factual
statements in the First Amended Complaint, nor does it waive any
arguments or defenses to the First Amended Complain.  The Defendant
disagrees with the legal and factual assertions contained in the
First Amended Complaint.  It has only provided its agreement to
permit the Plaintiff to file the First Amended Complaint for the
reasons set forth.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/setTSa from Leagle.com.

La Toiya Morrison, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Julian Ari Hammond --
jhammond@hammondlawpc.com -- HammondLaw, P.C., Ari Nathan Cherniak
-- acherniak@hammondlawpc.com -- HammondLaw, PC & Polina Brandler
-- pbrandler@hammondlawpc.com -- HammondLaw, P.C.

American National Red Cross, a Congressional Charter Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Lisa Lin Garcia -- llgarcia@littler.com
-- Littler Mendelson, P.C. & Cheryl A. Kinoshita --
CKinoshita@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C..


AMERICAN SELECT: Haeussinger Sues Over Unauthorized Telemarketing
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CHARLES HAEUSSINGER, individually and behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN SELECT INSURANCE
COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-01471-WQH-NLS (S.D. Cal., Aug.
6, 2019) is an action for damages and injunctive relief against
Defendant, and its present, former, or future direct and indirect
parent companies, subsidiaries, affiliates, agents, related
entities for unauthorized telemarketing calls made to Plaintiff and
Class Members without obtaining prior express written consent in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

According to the complaint, at no point did Plaintiff inquire
Defendant about car insurance or provide authorization to receive
autodialed marketing calls on his cellular telephone from
Defendant. Nonetheless, between May 6, 2019 through May 13, 2019,
Defendant initiated repeated marketing telephone calls to
Plaintiff's cellular telephone using an automatic telephone dialing
system. The Defendant negligently and/or willfully or knowingly
contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff's cellular telephone, in violation
of the TCPA, thereby invading Plaintiff's privacy, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff is a natural person and a resident of the County of San
Diego, State of California, in this judicial district.

Defendant regularly makes autodialed telemarketing telephone calls
to consumers in order to market products including car
insurance.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Yana A. Hart, Esq.
     Robert L. Hyde, Esq.
     HYDE & SWIGART, APC
     2221 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 101
     San Diego, CA 92108-3609
     Phone: (619) 233-7770
     Fax: (619) 297-1022
     Email: yana@westcoastlitigation.com
            bob@westcoastlitigation.com

          - and -

     Daniel G. Shay, Esq.
     LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL G. SHAY
     409 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 101B
     San Diego, CA 92108
     Phone: (619) 222-7429
     Fax: (866) 431-3292
     Email: danielshay@tcpafdcpa.com


AMGEN INC: Antitrust Class Suit over Humira(R) Sales Ongoing
------------------------------------------------------------
Amgen Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 31, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to defend a
consolidated Humira(R) Biosimilar Antitrust Class Suit.

In March and April 2019, ten purported class actions against Amgen,
along with AbbVie Inc. and AbbVie Biotechnology Ltd. (collectively,
AbbVie), were filed in U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois (the Illinois Northern District Court).

In April and May 2019, two additional purported class actions
against Amgen and AbbVie were filed in the Illinois Northern
District Court.

The additional cases are captioned: Louisiana Health Service &
Indemnity Co., d/b/a Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Louisiana, and
HMO Louisiana, Inc. v. AbbVie Inc., et al. (April 30, 2019)
(Louisiana Health); and Cleveland Bakers and Teamsters Health and
Welfare Fund v. AbbVie Inc., et al. (May 10, 2019) (Cleveland
Bakers, and together with Louisiana Health, the New Humira(R)
Antitrust Class Actions).

In each of the New Humira(R) Antitrust Class Actions, the
plaintiffs bring federal antitrust claims along with various state
law claims under common law and antitrust, consumer protection, and
unfair competition statutes.

The plaintiffs in the New Humira(R) Antitrust Class Actions
specifically allege that AbbVie has unlawfully monopolized the
alleged market for Humira(R) and biosimilars of Humira(R),
including by creating an allegedly unlawful so-called patent
thicket around Humira(R). The plaintiffs in the New Humira(R)
Antitrust Class Actions allege that AbbVie and Amgen entered into
an allegedly unlawful settlement agreement under which Amgen
allegedly agreed to delay its entry into the U.S. market with
AMGEVITATM, its Humira(R) biosimilar, in exchange for an alleged
promise of exclusivity as the sole Humira® biosimilar in that
market for five months, beginning in January 2023.

In each of the New Humira(R) Antitrust Class Actions, plaintiffs
seek injunctive relief, treble damages and attorney's fees on
behalf of a putative class of third-party payers and/or consumers
that have indirectly purchased, paid for or provided reimbursement
for Humira(R) in the United States.

On June 4, 2019, the Illinois Northern District Court entered an
order consolidating the twelve purported class action cases for
pre-trial purposes. On June 13, 2019, the Illinois Northern
District Court entered an order requiring the plaintiffs to file a
consolidated complaint by August 12, 2019.

Amgen Inc. discovers, develops, manufactures, and delivers human
therapeutics worldwide. It offers products for the treatment of
oncology/hematology, cardiovascular, inflammation, bone health,
and
neuroscience. Amgen Inc. was founded in 1980 and is headquartered
in Thousand Oaks, California.


ANADARKO PETROLEUM: Thompson Files Suit Over Occidental Merger Deal
-------------------------------------------------------------------
John Thompson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, R. A.
Walker, Anthony R. Chase, David E. Constable, H. Paulett Eberhart,
Claire S. Farley, Peter J. Fluor, Joseph W. Gorder, John R. Gordon,
Sean Gourley, Michael K. Grimm, Mark C. Mckinley, Eric D. Mullins
and Alexandra Pruner, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-01368, (D. Del.,
July 23, 2019), seeks to enjoin defendants and all persons acting
in concert with them from proceeding with, consummating or closing
the acquisition of Anadarko Petroleum Corporation by Occidental
Petroleum Corporation and Baseball Merger Sub 1, Inc.; rescinding
it in the event defendants consummate the merger; and rescissory
damages, costs of this action, including reasonable allowance for
plaintiff's attorneys' and experts' fees and such other and further
relief under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Anadarko's stockholders will receive $59.00 in cash and 0.2934 of a
share of Occidental Petroleum Corporation common stock for each
share of Anadarko common stock they own.

However, the complaint alleges that the Merger Agreement contains a
"no solicitation" provision that prohibits soliciting alternative
proposals and severely constrains their ability to communicate and
negotiate with potential buyers who wish to submit or have
submitted unsolicited alternative proposals. The registration
statement for the merger also failed to include critical financial
analysis performed by its financial advisor, Evercore Group LLC
including all line items used to calculate consolidated EBITDAX,
line items used to calculate unlevered free cash flow and a
reconciliation of all non-GAAP to GAAP metrics that support the
fairness opinions in order to make a fully informed decision
whether to vote in favor of the proposed transaction or seek
appraisal needed by the shareholders to make an informed decision
on the merger deal.

Anadarko explores for, acquires, and develops oil and natural gas
resources. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Brian D. Long, Esq.
      Gina M. Serra, Esq.
      RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
      300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
      Wilmington, DE 19801
      Tel: (302) 295-5310
      Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
      Email: bdl@rl-legal.com
             gms@rl-legal.com

             - and -

      Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
      RM LAW, P.C.
      1055 Westlakes Dr., Ste. 3112
      Berwyn, PA 19312
      Tel: (484) 324-6800
      Email: rm@maniskas.com


ANGELA BRADSTREET: Court OKs Reopening of Goldrick Case
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio,
Eastern Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting Plaintiffs'
Motion for Reopen the Case captioned Joanne McGoldrick, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. Angela Bradstreet, Defendant. Case No. 2:08-cv-1.
(S.D. Ohio) for the purpose of enforcing a 2008 Consent Decree.

The Consent Decree governed how the defendant, the Labor
Commissioner for the State of California's Department of Industrial
Relations, would handle certain benefits claims filed by employees
of Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company. Plaintiffs, which include
Nationwide and its Benefits Administrative Committee, allege that
the Labor Commissioner has recently taken or threatened to take
action in violation of the Consent Decree.

In the plaintiffs' view, the Court has continued and inherent
jurisdiction over the enforcement of its own order, one which
contained provisions having prospective injunctive effect.

The Labor Commissioner argues that the Consent Decree itself
contained a one-year limitation on the Court's jurisdiction and
that any dispute arising afterward must be treated as a new, breach
of contract matter.

The 2008 Lawsuit and Consent Decree

The Plaintiffs originally filed this suit in 2008, alleging that
Nationwide sponsored an employee welfare benefit plan known as the
Your Time Plan. The Benefits Administrative Committee administered
the Your Time Plan on behalf of Nationwide employees.  

The Court granted the parties' motion to approve a Consent Decree.
Under the Decree, the Labor Commissioner:  The Agency agrees that
at the present time, and for all periods since October 24, 2005,
the Your Time Plan is and was an ERISA welfare benefit plan and
California's vacation benefit laws are preempted as they relate to
the Your Time Plan.

The Consent Decree contains two other sections which are relevant
to the Court's analysis of the motion to reopen. In Section VIII,
entitled Compliance and Dispute Resolution, the Decree provided: If
Nationwide believes that the Agency has failed to comply with any
provision of this Consent Decree, it may petition this Court to
enforce the Decree. Nationwide first had to provide written notice
to the Agency of the nature of the dispute and allow the Agency 60
days to address the issue. Id. The Decree provided as follows if
the parties could not resolve their dispute: "After 60 days have
passed with no resolution or agreement to extend the time further,
Nationwide may petition this Court for compliance with this Decree,
seeking all available relief, including, but not limited to, an
extension of the term of the Decree for such period of time as the
Court deems necessary and appropriate to remedy the breach of the
Decree."

Nationwide moves to reopen the 2008 case and have the Court enjoin
the Labor Commissioner from unilaterally terminating the Consent
Decree. Nationwide asserts that the Commissioner must have the
Court's approval to terminate the Decree and that the
Commissioner's posture of being ready to hear vacation wage claims
filed by Nationwide employees is contrary to the Decree. The
Commissioner argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this
dispute.

In determining whether the Consent Decree authorizes the Court to
exercise jurisdiction over the present dispute, the Court looks to
the four corners of the consent decree. The Commissioner
understandably points to the first part of the Duration of Decree
provision, which states, The Court shall retain jurisdiction over
this Decree for a period of one (1) year after the Effective Date.

The question presented is whether the Court's jurisdiction ended
after one year or whether jurisdiction over the protocol was
retained beyond the first year. The Court finds that the Duration
of Decree provision, standing alone, is reasonably susceptible of
two different interpretations. One could interpret the provision to
mean that the Court's jurisdiction ceased after one year and was
followed by a period during which the parties agreed to follow the
protocol until the Commissioner terminated it. After the first
year, the protocol provision would be treated as a private
settlement agreement and any claim that one party was violating the
protocol could be brought as a separate action for breach of
contract.  

Section VIII, entitled Compliance and Dispute Resolution, provided
a mechanism for court involved enforcement of the Decree. Namely,
it authorized Nationwide to petition this Court to enforce the
Decree if it believed the Commissioner had failed to comply with
any provision of this Consent Decree. The provision did not contain
any time limits by which Nationwide had to file a petition.

In other words, the Decree does not state that Nationwide may
petition this Court within one year of the Effective Date to
enforce the Decree. This too runs contrary to the notion that the
parties were left on their own after one year. And again, with the
protocol serving as the centerpiece of the Decree, it would seem
apparent that the protocol would be the most likely aspect of the
Decree that Nationwide would seek to enforce.

The Compliance and Dispute Resolution section expressly authorizes
the Court to extend the term of the Decree "for such period of time
as the Court deems necessary and appropriate. So, the Commissioner
may invoke and follow the protocol for termination, but the Court
still has the authority to intervene and prevent the Decree from
being terminated. That's what happened here,  the Commissioner gave
notice of a proposed termination date of April 23, 2019, Nationwide
petitioned the Court and the Court intervened with a Standstill
Order on April 19.

The Court's interpretation of the Decree should not upset the
reasonable expectations of the parties. The Decree did not define
changes in applicable law or existence of new facts the two grounds
on which the Commissioner could initiate a proposed termination of
the protocol. It is foreseeable that attorneys would later disagree
over the meaning and application of those terms.

In the Court's view, a disagreement over this provision would be
one of the more likely disputes, if not the most likely dispute,
for which Nationwide would exercise its right under the Compliance
and Dispute Resolution section to petition the Court to enforce the
Decree. It falls on the Court, as issuer of the Decree and the
injunctive relief provided therein, to interpret and apply the
terminology to the circumstances at hand.  

The structure, language and context of the Consent Decree lead the
Court to conclude that it retained jurisdiction beyond the first
year to resolve disputes regarding the protocol. In the
alternative, the Court finds under Sixth Circuit case law that it
has inherent authority to enforce the Decree. The circumstances
presented here satisfy the Court that it must act to effectuate the
terms of the Decree. The Decree memorializes the Commissioner's
agreement that the Your Time Plan is an ERISA welfare benefit plan
and [that] California's vacation benefit laws are preempted as they
relate to the Your Time Plan. The Commissioner further agreed not
to hear claims relating to Your Time Plan benefits.

Now the Commissioner asserts that there has been a change in
applicable law. The Court, however, at this preliminary stage will
not allow the Commissioner to terminate the Decree. There has not
been a change of law so clear as to be indisputable, such as a
change to the ERISA statute or a binding United States Supreme
Court or Sixth Circuit ruling. Indeed, the only development in the
law of this Circuit since the Consent Decree is at odds with
Mostajo.
  
While the Court agrees with the Commissioner that the Decree should
not last in perpetuity the Court finds that its exercise of
jurisdiction is appropriate under the circumstances. In reopening
the case the Court will afford the Commissioner an opportunity to
demonstrate why the Decree should be terminated.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 1, 2019 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3fzu4jx from
Leagle.com.

Joanne McGoldrick, in her fiduciary capacity as member of the
Benefits Administrative Committee of Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company, The Administrative Committee of Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Company & Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company,
Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel W. Srsic -- dsrsic@littler.com --
Littler Mendelson PC, Amardeep K. Bharj -- abharj@ebglaw.com --
Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C., pro hac vice, James J. Oh --
joh@ebglaw.com -- Epstein Becker & Green, P.C., pro hac vice, John
Houston Pope, Epstein, Becker & Green. P.C., 250 Park AvenueNew
York, NY 10177, pro hac vice, Paul P. DeCamp -- PDeCamp@ebglaw.com
-- Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. & Susan Katz Hoffman, Littler
Mendelson, P.C., Three Parkway, 1601 Cherry Street, Suite 1400,
Philadelphia, PA 19102

Angela Bradstreet, Labor Commissioner, Department of Industrial
Relations, State of California, in her official capacity,
Defendant, represented by Miles E. Locker, Department of Industrial
Relations Division of Labor Standards, pro hac vice, Kristin
Seifert Watson, Cloppert Latanick Sauter & Washburn & Susan A.
Dovi, Department of Industrial Relations Division of Labor
Standards, pro hac vice.


AT&T SERVICES: Bell Alleges Age Discrimination
----------------------------------------------
Lela C. Bell, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. AT&T, Services Inc., Defendant, Case No.
19-cv-01184 (N.D. Ala., July 24, 2019), seeks declaratory judgment,
injunctive relief, equitable and monetary relief in violation of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.

Bell was employed by AT&T as a sales account executive since May of
2005. She was transferred to another area in South Alabama and
claims that the quality of her assigned customers would not support
her sales quota. She claims to be treated disparately compared to
the favorable treatment given her younger co-workers whose assigned
customers were of better quality. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Robert J. Camp, Esq.
      WIGGINS, CHILDS, PANTAZIS, FISHER & GOLDFARB, LLC
      The Kress Building
      301 19th Street North
      Birmingham, Alabama 35203
      Tel: (205) 314-0500
      Email: rcamp@wigginschilds.com


ATLAS LAW PLLC: Curtis Disputes Collection Letter Validity
----------------------------------------------------------
Leonard Curtis, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Atlas Law, PLLC, Defendant, Case No.
19-cv-01811, (M.D. Fla., July 24, 2019), seeks awards of actual,
compensatory, statutory and punitive damages, prejudgment and
post-judgment interest on any amounts awarded, reasonable
attorney's fees and costs, injunctive relief and such other and
further relief resulting pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act.

Atlas Law was assigned to collect an alleged debt of Curtis via
collection letter that failed to state that in order for Curtis to
trigger Atlas' obligation to send verification of the debt, he must
send a request for the same "in writing." [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Alex D. Weisberg
      WEISBERG CONSUMER LAW GROUP, PA
      5846 S. Flamingo Rd, Ste. 290
      Cooper City, FL 33330
      Tel: (954) 212-2184
      Fax: (866) 577-0963
      Email: aweisberg@afclaw.com


BRG SPORTS: Court Strikes Class Allegation in Jones Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting Defendant's Motion to Strike Class Allegations in the case
captioned JEFFREY JONES, BRIAN MILNE, PATRICK JOHNSON, RANDALL
SCOTT, EDWARD WILKINS III, JOHN HARRIS II, ARIES MONROE, RHONDELL
SAWYER, RODNEY GALLON, JOSEPH MANNING, JAVAR GHOLSON, PASQUALE
DESTRO, SHEDRICK McCALL, JOSEPH MLEZIVA, STEPHEN HARRIS, and HENRY
MILTON, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. BRG SPORTS, INC., Defendant. Case No. 18 C 7250.
(N.D. Ill.).

The plaintiffs in this putative class action sued BRG Sports, Inc.,
the maker of sports equipment bearing the Riddell brand, alleging
that it manufactured football helmets that were defective as
designed, was negligent with respect to the design, and failed to
adequately warn users of its products' shortcomings.

In their first amended complaint, the named plaintiffs seek to
represent eighteen separate putative classes, each including
players who played football in a particular state. They propose the
following class definitions: All individuals who wore a Riddell
helmet while participating in a high school and/or college-level
football program based in each named plaintiff's state of football
participation between 1975 and the present.

Riddell has moved to strike the plaintiffs' class allegations under
Rules 12(f) and 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 23 sets out a number of familiar requirements. First, Rule
23(a) requires a plaintiff class to satisfy the requirements of
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy. And Rule
23(b)(3) allows a class action to be maintained only if questions
of law or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and  a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy. The rule identifies four factors that
may be relevant to the superiority analysis: (1) the class members'
interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions(2) the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already begun by or against class
members (3) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum and (4) the likely
difficulties in managing a class action.

Standard for a motion to strike

Rule 23(c)(1)(A) says that a federal district court should rule at
an early practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a class
representative whether to certify the action as a class action.
Some courts have deemed a motion to strike an appropriate device to
accomplish this task of assessing the viability of a class action
where a complaint is so facially lacking that no amount of
discovery or time could provide support for class status for the
claims pleaded.  

Second, courts have come to very different conclusions about the
correct scope of the analysis on a motion to strike class
allegations. Some courts have concluded that, because discovery has
not yet occurred, the proper approach approximately mirrors that of
a motion to dismiss targeted narrowly at the class claims.  

In sum, the Court will grant Riddell's motion to strike only if it
concludes that this is an exceptional case where it is clear from
the complaint that circumstances warrant a motion to strike class
allegations to conserve court and party resources and where the
pleadings make clear that the suit cannot satisfy Rule 23.

Application

Riddell argues that the plaintiffs' class allegations should be
stricken because they do not satisfy the requirements of Rule 23.
It focuses on Rule 23(b)(3), contending that the plaintiffs have
failed to make allegations giving rise to questions of law or fact
common to class members that predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members.

Riddell makes three primary arguments. First, it argues that the
putative class's claims, by their very nature, raise individualized
questions of causation and damages that preclude class treatment.
Riddell also makes a related argument about its affirmative
defenses. Second, Riddell contends that this class action calls for
the application of eighteen different states' laws to the class's
claims, defeating predominance and superiority. Third, Riddell
argues that the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate the superiority of
class litigation because some members of the class have initiated
individual lawsuits.

The Court concludes that the motion to strike class allegations
must be granted because the complaint demonstrates, on its face,
that allowing this case to proceed as a putative class action would
be futile.  

Individualized inquiries

First, Riddell points to several issues it believes render class
certification untenable. It argues that this suit is primarily
about personal injuries and, as a result, is brimming with
individualized questions of causation and damages because members
of the plaintiff class indisputably wore different helmets that
were designed, tested, engineered, and marketed differently. It
also points to individualized problems of timing generated by the
decades-long class definition.  

The plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that this dispute, at its
core, is about Riddell's dysfunctional design process and the
resulting defective products. They point to several common
questions that they contend will dominate, including:

Was Riddell negligent in designing and testing its helmets? Were
those helmets defective in design -- including as to the efficacy
of their frontal pads and liner system and were they unreasonably
dangerous? Were Riddell's warnings ever sufficient to alert members
of the Proposed Classes to the true risks of head injury identified
in the FAC? When did Defendant become aware of the long-term risks
of concussion and repeated head injuries and when should it have?

The plaintiffs freely admit the existence of individualized
questions that will eventually need answers but contend that the
common questions outlined here, among others, represent a
significant aspect of the case and therefore will satisfy the
predominance requirement. The plaintiffs also argue that
affirmative defenses such as statutes of limitations should not
defeat predominance because they go to an individual's right to
recover rather than issues underlying the defendant's liability.  

Although Riddell is incorrect in its assertion that personal injury
and products liability suits are never amenable to class action,
the Court concludes that the individualized inquiries that pervade
this case utterly destroy the plaintiffs' ability to satisfy Rule
23(b)(3).

To be sure, some of the design defect issues involving allegedly
categorical choices not to adopt certain safety technologies appear
to be relatively amenable to common resolution.  For instance, on
the negligence claims, each individual plaintiff will need to
demonstrate that he or she was injured and their his or her injury
was caused by Riddell's conduct. But each plaintiff used different
Riddell products for different lengths of time, at various levels
of play and in different positions on the field, sustaining
different numbers of concussions and other injuries, and receiving
varying medical care.  

Similarly thorny individualized issues pervade the plaintiffs'
products liability claims. At the end of the day, each plaintiff
will necessarily need to prove causation and injury. And contrary
to the plaintiffs' assertions, these simply are not the sort of
routine, or ancillary inquiries about damages amounts that are
often found not to predominate. Rather, these questions of
causation and injury lie inextricably at the heart of the
plaintiffs' claims.

The Court also concludes that discovery promises no hope of a
remedy this infirmity, nor could the class definitions themselves
be narrowed sufficiently to address the problems raised here. Even
taking the allegations in the complaint as true, the Court is
satisfied that there simply are not facts that could later be
discovered that would render the complex, ubiquitous individualized
questions of harm and causation that pervade this case amenable to
collective resolution.

The motion to strike must here be granted because the plaintiffs'
particular class allegations, taken as true, are unfit for
resolution using the class action device due to the individualized
questions of law and fact that will invariably predominate over
common questions.

Variations in governing law

Riddell also argues that predominance is defeated because the
plaintiffs seek to represent a class spanning eighteen different
states. Under Illinois law, the law of the state with the most
significant relationship with each individual claim will control.


Riddell argues that, as a result, this putative class action runs
afoul of a Seventh Circuit ruling that no class action is proper
unless all litigants are governed by the same legal rules. Riddell
also spends much of its opening brief and a lengthy appendix
enumerating potential differences in the application of relevant
states' laws, including variations in relevant defenses, burdens of
proof, and elements of negligence and products liability regimes
across states.  

The plaintiffs acknowledge that in cases like DuRocher,
Bridgestone/Firestone, and In re National Collegiate Athletic
Association Student-Athlete Concussion Injury Litigation, 314
F.R.D. 580, 597 (N.D. Ill. 2016), courts have emphasized that the
class action device is ill suited for disputes that call for the
application of multiple states' laws to a single class's claims.

In response, they emphasize that the amended complaint proposes
separate classes for claims governed by each of the eighteen
relevant states' tort laws. They suggest that Riddell may have
simply missed that the amended complaint made this change, as the
original complaint proposed a single class spanning all eighteen
states.

The Court is unpersuaded that the plaintiffs' formal division of
the class into eighteen separate parts resolves the predominance
and manageability concerns presented by an enormous multistate
personal injury class like this one. The legal variations described
at length by Riddell are truly significant. And these
irregularities do not exist in a vacuum but rather interact in
complex ways with the factual variations explained at length above
to compound the disparities between individual plaintiffs.  
predominance and superiority and thus preclude certification under
Rule 23(b)(3).

And, again, the Court concludes that no amount of discovery or
further narrowing of class definitions will ameliorate these
problems. The motion to strike is therefore, for this reason too,
granted.

Parallel litigation

Riddell also contends that this putative class action runs afoul of
Rule 23(b)(3)'s superiority requirement because a handful of
putative class members filed parallel litigation. It notes that one
of the factors identified by the rule is "the extent and nature of
any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or
against class members. Riddell argues that, because 100 individual
lawsuits based on claims closely analogous to those in question
here were initiated in late 2016 and transferred to this Court,
individual litigation is a viable alternative.

The plaintiffs disagree that these individual suits undermine the
superiority of the class device. They note that the claims that
have been filed represent only a tiny fraction of those potentially
injured by Riddell's alleged misconduct and emphasize that
significant economies of scale may follow from the same lawyers
litigating both the individual suits and this class action.

Both parties present viable arguments about the relevance of the
parallel suits. Riddell, for its part, is correct that the fact
that members of the plaintiff class have filed individual parallel
litigation weighs against superiority. But so too are the
plaintiffs correct that the discovery involved in this litigation
is likely to closely track that individual litigation, which has
also been consolidated for pretrial purposes before the undersigned
judge. The plaintiffs also rightly point out that counsel for both
parties reside in this district and that the continued maintenance
of a single action may lend significant economies of scale to the
proceeding. The Court therefore concludes that this factor is a
wash.  

The Court grants the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiffs'
class allegations.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 1, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y5n89pro from
Leagle.com.

Jeffrey Jones, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated
individuals, Brian Milne, individually and on behalf of all
similarly situated individuals, Patrick Johnson, individually and
on behalf of all similarly situated individuals, Randall Scott,
individually and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals,
Edward Wilkins III, individually and on behalf of all similarly
situated individuals & John Harris II, individually and on behalf
of all similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, represented by
Daniel Joshua Schneider -- dschneider@edelson.com -- Edelson PC,
Rafey S. Balabanian -- rbalabanian@edelson.com -- Edelson PC &
Benjamin Harris Richman -- brichman@edelson.com -- Edelson PC.

Rodney Gallon, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated
individuals, Joseph Mleziva, individually and on behalf of all
similarly situated individuals, Joseph Manning, individually and on
behalf of all similarly situated individuals, Javar Gholson,
individually and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals,
Rhondell Sawyer, individually and on behalf of all similarly
situated individuals, Henry Milton, individually and on behalf of
all similarly situated individuals, Stephen Harris, individually
and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals, Shedrick
McCall, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated
individuals, Aries Monroe, individually and on behalf of all
similarly situated individuals & Pasquale Destro, individually and
on behalf of all similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs,
represented by Rafey S. Balabanian, Edelson PC & Daniel Joshua
Schneider, Edelson PC.

BRG Sports, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, represented by
Paul Gerard Cereghini -- paul.cereghini@bowmanandbrooke.com --
Bowman And Brooke Llp, pro hac vice, David Jeffrey Duke --
david.duke@bowmanandbrooke.com -- Bowman And Brooke Llp, Eden Marie
Darrell -- eden.darrell@bowmanandbrooke.com -- Bowman And Brooke
Llp, Jenny Alyssa Covington --
jenny.covington@msp.bowmanandbrooke.com -- Bowman And Brooke Llp,
Mark Howard Boyle -- mark.boyle@dbmslaw.com -- Donohue, Brown,
Mathewson & Smyth, Robert Latane Wise --
rob.wise@bowmanandbrooke.com -- Bowman And Brooke Llp & Thomas
William Cushing -- cushing@dbmslaw.com -- Donohue Brown Mathewson &
Smyth LLC.


BRINKER INT'L: Court Narrows Claims in Data Incident Litigation
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Jacksonville Division, issued an Order granting in part
and denying in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case
captioned In re Brinker Data Incident Litigation. Case No.
3:18-cv-686-J-32MCR. (M.D. Fla.).

Eight named plaintiffs bring this class action on behalf of
themselves and all similarly situated customers whose payment card
and other personal information were stolen by criminal hackers from
Defendant Brinker International, Inc.the company that owns,
operates, and franchises Chili's Grill and Bar.

Brinker has moved to dismiss every count under Rule 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim, and has moved to dismiss the case under
Rule 12(b)(1), arguing that the named plaintiffs lack standing.  

Here, Plaintiffs Green-Cooper, Thomas, Sanders, Summers, and
Franklin had unauthorized charges on their cards.  As a result of
needing to replace their compromised cards, Green-Cooper, Sanders,
and Franklin lost the ability to accrue cash back or point rewards.
Except for Lang and Alamillo, all Plaintiffs spent time disputing
fraudulent charges, cancelling their credit or debit cards,
monitoring their accounts for additional fraudulent activity, or
placing fraud alerts on their credit files. As alleged, these are
personalized, concrete injuries that are neither conjectural nor
hypothetical.

The Defendants rely heavily on Torres v. Wendy's Company (Torres
I), 195 F.Supp.3d 1278, 1282-83 (M.D. Fla. 2016) for the
proposition that monetary harm is required for Article III
standing. This reliance is misplaced. In Torres I, the plaintiff
alleged that he had two fraudulent debit card charges because of a
data breach against Wendy's. The district court found no standing,
relying on Resnick v. Avmed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2012)
and several district court cases from other districts. Torres I,
195 F. Supp. 3d at 1282-83. In Resnick, the Eleventh Circuit held:
Plaintiffs allege that they have become victims of identity theft
and have suffered monetary damages as a result. This constitutes an
injury in fact under the law. Torres I interpreted this holding to
require monetary harm.  

However, Resnick held that identity theft plus monetary harm is
sufficient for an injury in fact; it did not say that both are
necessary. The Eleventh Circuit, like the Supreme Court, has
frequently found an injury in fact despite an absence of monetary
harm.  

After the district court in Torres I dismissed the complaint for
lack of standing, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint,
alleging that his stolen identity caused him to incur a $3 late
charge on his utility bill. Additionally, other named plaintiffs
were added, and they alleged that they lost the opportunity to
accrue cash back and rewards points as a result of the breach, as
plaintiffs here have alleged. The Torres II court found both the $3
charge and lost rewards points as independently sufficient injuries
that meet the standing requirement.

This Court finds that all named plaintiffs except for Lang and
Alamillo, have sufficiently alleged a concrete actual injury and
therefore have standing.

Future Injury

Two named plaintiffs, Lang and Alamillo, failed to allege actual
injuries and attempt to allege only future injuries.   Alamillo
alleges that he received an email from Chili's informing him of the
breach, he has spent time and will continue to spend time
monitoring his financial accounts for fraudulent activity, and that
the twelve months of free credit monitoring required him to provide
his payment card information and to take affirmative steps to
cancel the service after the twelve months to avoid being charged.

  
Whether these minimal allegations are sufficient to confer standing
presents a closer call.
An increased risk of future harm is, in some circumstances,
sufficient for standing. To constitute a concrete injury, the risk
of future harm must be certainly impending not merely possible and
cannot be too speculative.  

Lang's and Alamillo's allegations are insufficient to demonstrate a
future risk of harm beyond a speculative level. . Neither Lang nor
Alamillo allege a substantial risk or heightened risk of future
harm. Looking at the three factors developed in 21st Century
Oncology, they fail to allege an injury in fact. Although the first
factor the motive of the hackers supports Lang and Alamillo, the
other two factors the type of information stolen and whether it has
been misused do not. Lang and Alamillo do not allege that their
information was actually compromised only that it is at risk.
Although Lang alleges that his PII was involved, which could
include social security numbers, driver's license numbers, and the
like, according to his own complaint this is not the type of
information that Brinker collected. Lastly, Lang and Alamillo's
information, if even compromised, has not been misused.  

Thus, the three factors do not support finding an injury in fact
for standing based on future harm.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT

The Defendants move to dismiss every count in the complaint as
failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.The
parties primarily rely on Florida law in discussing the common law
claims, but then sporadically use other data breach cases that
apply different states' laws. The parties fail to explain why
Florida law (or any other state's law) should apply.

The Court cannot determine whether the complaint states claims upon
which relief can be granted if it does not know what law to apply
to each count. Thus, the parties need to brief choice of law before
the Court rules on the Rule 12(b)(6) portion of the motion to
dismiss.

Accordingly, Defendant Brinker International, Inc.'s Motion to
Dismiss is denied in part, granted in part, and deferred in part.

The Defendant's Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss is granted as to
Plaintiffs Christopher Lang and Peter Alamillo. Plaintiff
Christopher Lang's and Peter Alamillo's claims are dismissed
without prejudice for lack of standing. The remainder of
Defendant's Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 1, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yy85atw4 from Leagle.com.

Marlene Green-Cooper, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Shenika Thomas, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Fred Sanders, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Daniel Summers,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Christopher Lang, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated & Eric Steinmetz, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Frank A.
Perez -- fperez@klwtlaw.com -- Kasdan Lippsmith Weber Turner LLP,
pro hac vice, Graham B. LippSmith -- glippsmith@klwtlaw.com --
Kasdan LippSmith Weber Turner LLP, pro hac vice, Jaclyn L. Anderson
-- janderson@klwtlaw.com -- Kasdan LippSmith Weber Turner LLP, pro
hac vice, Jean Sutton Martin, Morgan & Morgan, PA, pro hac vice,
John Allen Yanchunis, Sr., Morgan & Morgan, PA, 20 North Orange
Avenue, Suite 1600, Orlando, FL 32801, Joseph G. Sauder --
jgs@sstriallawyers.com -- Sauder Schelkopf, LLC, pro hac vice,
Kevin S. Hannon, The Hannon Law Firm, LLC, 1641 Downing Street,
Denver, CO 80218, pro hac vice, Miles Clark, Knepper & Clark, LLC,
10040 W. Cheyenne Ave, Suite 170-109, Las Vegas, NV 89129, pro hac
vice, Patrick A. Barthle, Morgan & Morgan, PA, 20 North Orange
Avenue, Suite 1600, Orlando, FL 32801, Tina Wolfson --
aw@ahdootwolfson.com -- Ahdoot & Wolfson, PC, pro hac vice &
William B. Federman -- Federman & Sherwood, pro hac vice.

Brinker International, Inc., Defendant, represented by Brian
Chrisopher Lawrence -
brian.lawrence@lowndes-law.com -- Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor
& Reed, PA, Jason K. Fagelman --
jason.fagelman@nortonrosefulbreight.com -- Norton Rose Fulbright
US, LLP, pro hac vice, Kelsey Ann Maher -- kmaher@omm.com -- Norton
Rose Fulbright US, LLP, pro hac vice, Nicholas J. Hendrix --
nick.hendrix@nortonrosefulbright.com -- Norton Rose Fulbright US,
LLP, Spencer Persson -- spencer.persson@nortonrosefulbright.com --
Norton Rose Fulbright US, LLP & W. Drew Sorrell, II --
drew.sorrell@lowndes-law.com -- Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor &
Reed, PA.

Brinker International, Inc., a Texas Corporation, Consol Defendant,
represented by Kelsey Ann Maher, Norton Rose Fulbright US, LLP, pro
hac vice, Nicholas J. Hendrix, Norton Rose Fulbright US, LLP &
Spencer Persson, Norton Rose Fulbright US, LLP.

Brinker International, Inc., doing business as CHILI'S GRILL AND
BAR, Consol Defendant, represented by Jason K. Fagelman, Norton
Rose Fulbright US, LLP, pro hac vice, Kelsey Ann Maher, Norton Rose
Fulbright US, LLP, pro hac vice, Nicholas J. Hendrix, Norton Rose
Fulbright US, LLP, Spencer Persson, Norton Rose Fulbright US, LLP &
W. Drew Sorrell, II, Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, PA.


C&J ENERGY: Plumley Suit Challenges Proposed Sale to Keane
----------------------------------------------------------
PATRICK PLUMLEY, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. C&J ENERGY SERVICES, INC., DONALD GAWICK, PATRICK
MURRAY, STUART BRIGHTMAN, JOHN KENNEDY, STEVEN MUELLER, MICHAEL
ROEMER, MICHAEL ZAWADZKI, AMY NELSON, KEANE GROUP, INC., and KING
MERGER SUB CORP., Case No. 1:19-cv-01446-UNA (D. Del., Aug. 1,
2019), stems from a proposed transaction, pursuant to which C&J
will be acquired by Keane Group, Inc. ("Parent") and King Merger
Sub Corp. ("Merger Sub").

On June 16, 2019, C&J's Board of Directors caused the Company to
enter into an agreement and plan of merger with Keane.  On July 16,
2019, the Defendants filed a Form S-4 Registration Statement with
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") in
connection with the Proposed Transaction.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Registration Statement omits
material information regarding the Company's and Keane's financial
projections, in violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
The Plaintiff contends that the Registration Statement is an
essential link in causing him and the Company's other stockholders
to approve the Proposed Transaction.

C&J is a Delaware corporation and maintains its principal executive
offices in Houston, Texas.  The Individual Defendants are directors
and officers of the Company.

C&J is a leading provider of well construction and intervention,
well completion, well support, and other complementary oilfield
services and technologies to independent and major oilfield
companies engaged in the exploration, production, and development
of oil and gas properties in onshore basins throughout the
continental United States.

Parent is a Delaware corporation and a party to the Merger
Agreement.  Merger Sub is a Delaware corporation, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Parent, and a party to the Merger Agreement.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 295-5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
          E-mail: bdl@rl-legal.com
                  gms@rl-legal.com

               - and -

          Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
          RM LAW, P.C.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (484) 324-6800
          Facsimile: (484) 631-1305
          E-mail: rm@maniskas.com


C&J ENERGY: Wuollet Balks at Merger Deal with Keane Group
---------------------------------------------------------
CHAD WUOLLET, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. C&J ENERGY SERVICES, INC., DONALD
GAWICK, PATRICK MURRAY, STUART BRIGHTMAN, JOHN KENNEDY, STEVEN
MUELLER, MICHAEL ROEMER, MICHAEL ZAWADZKI, AMY NELSON, KING MERGER
SUB CORP., and KEANE GROUP, INC., the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-01411-UNA (D. Del., July 29, 2019), seeks to enjoin the
Defendants from taking any steps to consummate a proposed merger
transaction, including filing an amendment to the Form S-4 with the
Securities and Exchange Commission or otherwise causing an
amendment to the S-4 to be disseminated to C&J's shareholders,
unless and until the material information is included in any such
amendment or otherwise disseminated to C&J's shareholders, and in
the event the Proposed Transaction is consummated without the
material omissions referenced below being remedied, Plaintiff seeks
to recover damages resulting from the Defendants' violations.

The Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of the public
stockholders of C&J Energy Services, Inc. against C&J's Board of
Directors for their violations of Section 14(a) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Defendants have violated the
Exchange Act by causing a materially incomplete and misleading
registration statement to be filed with the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 16, 2019.

The S-4 recommends that C&J shareholders vote in favor of a
proposed transaction whereby C&J is acquired by Keane. The Proposed
Transaction was first disclosed on June 17, 2019, when C&J and
Keane announced that they had entered into a definitive merger
agreement pursuant to which C&J stockholders will receive 1.6149
shares of Keane common stock for each share of C&J common stock
that they hold. The deal is valued at approximately $1.8 billion
and is expected to close in the fourth quarter of 2019.

The S-4 is materially incomplete and contains misleading
representations and information in violation of Sections 14(a) and
20(a) of the Exchange Act. Specifically, the S-4 contains
materially incomplete and misleading information concerning the
sales process, financial projections prepared by C&J management,
and the financial analyses conducted by Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC,
C&J's financial advisor.

C&J Energy is a leading provider of well construction, well
completions and well services.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Shane T. Rowley, Esq.
          Danielle Rowland Lindahl, Esq.
          ROWLEY LAW PLLC
          50 Main Street, Suite 1000
          White Plains, NY 10606
          Telephone: (914) 400-1920
          Facsimile: (914) 301-3514

               - and -

          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 295-5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
          E-mail: bdl@rl-legal.com
                  gms@rl-legal.com

CAPITAL ONE: Faces Ouellette Suit in W.D. Wash. Over Data Breach
----------------------------------------------------------------
NATHAN OUELLETTE, JESI AN E. RODRIGUEZ, GREGG STAPPAS, AND CB HOME,
INC., individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated v.
CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION, CAPITAL ONE, N.A., CAPITAL ONE
BANK (USA), N.A., AMAZON.COM, INC., and AMAZON WEB SERVICES, INC.,
Case No. 2:19-cv-01203 (W.D. Wash., Aug. 1, 2019), arises from the
Defendants' failure to protect the confidential information of over
100 million consumers, including names, addresses, zip codes/postal
codes, phone numbers, email addresses, dates of birth, income,
credit scores, credit limits, balances, payment history, contact
information, transaction data, as well as approximately 140,000
social security numbers and approximately 80,000 bank account
numbers.

On July 29, 2019, Capital One publicly announced that "there was
unauthorized access by an outside individual who obtained certain
types of personal information relating to people who had applied
for its credit card products and to Capital One credit card
customers" (the "Data Breach").

Capital One Financial Corporation is a corporation existing under
the laws of the State of Delaware with its headquarters and
principal place of business located in McLean, Virginia.  Capital
One, NA is a corporation with its principal place of business
located in McLean.  Capital One, NA is a wholly owned subsidiary of
Capital One Financial Corporation.  Capital One Bank (U.S.A.), NA
is a corporation with its principal place of business located in
McLean.  Capital One Bank is a wholly owned subsidiary of Capital
One Financial Corporation.

Capital One is a bank holding company specializing in credit cards
and offering other credit, including car loans and bank accounts.
Capital One offers credit cards and other services to customers
throughout the United States.  Capital One solicits potential
customers to provide them with sensitive PII through applications
for credit cards and other financial products.

Amazon.com, Inc. is a corporation existing under the laws of the
State of Delaware with its headquarters and principal place of
business located in Seattle, Washington.  Amazon Web Services, Inc.
is a corporation existing under the laws of the State of Delaware
with its headquarters and principal place of business located in
Seattle.  Amazon Web is a subsidiary of Amazon.com, Inc.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Kim D. Stephens, Esq.
          Jason T. Dennett, Esq.
          Kaleigh N.B. Powell, Esq.
          TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS PLLC
          1700 Seventh Avenue, Suite 2200
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 682-5600
          Facsimile: (206) 682-2992
          E-mail: kstephens@tousley.com
                  jdennett@tousley.com
                  kpowell@tousley.com

               - and -

          James J. Pizzirusso, Esq.
          Swathi Bojedla, Esq.
          Theodore F. DiSalvo, Esq.
          HAUSFELD LLP
          1700 K Street NW, Suite 650
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 540-7200
          E-mail: jpizzirusso@hausfeld.com
                  sbojedla@hausfeld.com
                  tdisalvo@hausfeld.com

               - and -

          Adam J. Levitt, Esq.
          Amy E. Keller, Esq.
          DICELLO LEVITT GUTZLER LLC
          Ten North Dearborn Street, Eleventh Floor
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 214-7900
          E-mail: alevitt@dicellolevit.com
                  akeller@dicellolevitt.com

               - and -

          Andrew N. Friedman, Esq.
          Douglas J. McNamara, Esq.
          Eric A. Kafka, Esq.
          Karina Puttieva, Esq.
          COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC
          1100 New York Avenue, NW, Suite 500
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 408-4600
          E-mail: afriedman@cohenmilstein.com
                  dmcnamara@cohenmilstein.com
                  ekafka@cohenmilstein.com
                  kputtieva@cohenmilstein.com

               - and -

          E. Michelle Drake, Esq.
          BERGER MONTAGUE, PC
          43 SE Main Street, Suite 505
          Minneapolis, MN 55414
          Telephone: (612) 594-5933
          E-mail: emdrake@bm.net

               - and -

          Daniel L. Warshaw, Esq.
          Matthew A. Pearson, Esq.
          PEARSON, SIMON & WARSHAW, LLP
          15165 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 400
          Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
          Telephone: (818) 788-8300
          E-mail: dwarshaw@pswlaw.com
                  mapearson@pswlaw.com


CAREFUSION RESOURCES: Bid to Remand Ramirez Labor Suit Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Roger T. Benitez of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California denied the Plaintiff's motion to remand the
case, LISA RAMIREZ, an individual, on behalf of herself and on
behalf of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CAREFUSION
RESOURCES, LLC, a Limited Liability Company; and DOES 1-50,
Inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-2852-BEN-MSB (S.D. Cal.), to
the California Superior Court, County of San Diego.

Plaintiff Ramirez filed the action against her employer, the
Defendant in the California Superior Court, County of San Diego.
She brings suit for various California Labor Code violations,
including (1) failure to pay overtime wages in violation of Cal.
Lab. Code Section 510, (2) failure to provide required meal and
rest periods in violation of Sections 226.7 and 512, (3) failure to
provide accurate itemized wage statements in violation of Sectiojn
226, and (4) failure to provide wages when due in violation of
Sections 201, 202, and 203.

The Defendant removed the action based on original jurisdiction
under the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA").  It removed the
action under CAFA, which confers jurisdiction on district courts in
any civil action where three requirements are met: the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5 million, exclusive of
interests and costs, the proposed class consists of more than 100
members, and any member of the class of the Plaintiffs is a citizen
of a State different from any Defendant.

The Plaintiff now moves to remand, arguing that the Defendant has
not carried its burden to show either minimal diversity or the
requisite amount in controversy.  She further contends that, even
if the Court finds the CAFA requirements are satisfied, both the
"local controversy" and "home-state controversy" exceptions apply
to deprive this Court of jurisdiction.

The parties appear to agree, and Judge Benitez is satisfied by the
evidence, that the proposed class consists of more than 100
members.  Thus, he turns to the Plaintiff's attack on both the
minimal diversity and amount in controversy requirements.  He finds
that for purposes of CAFA, the Defendant is a citizen of the State
where it has its principal place of business and the State under
whose laws it is organized.  Although the Defendant's notice of
removal did not identify its principal place of business, it did
assert that its principal place of business is not in Texas.  In
addition, the Defendant provides a California address on the
Earning Statements it issues to its employees.  Finally, it
identifies San Diego, California as its "headquarters" on its
LinkedIn page.

When weighed against the Defendant's failure to identify its
headquarters and its minimal evidence showing New Jersey to be its
principal place of business, the Judge finds that the Plaintiff has
offered sufficient evidence to raise a question as to whether the
Defendant's principal place of business is in New Jersey or
California.  Still, the Judge need not resolve the dispute because
regardless of whether the Defendant is a citizen of California or
New Jersey, minimal diversity is met: at least one class member is
domiciled in Texas, making at least one class member diverse from
Delaware, as well as both California and New Jersey.  As a CAFA
case, the presumption against removal does not apply, and thus,
regardless of whether the Defendant's principal place of business
is in California or New Jersey, the Judge is satisfied that minimal
diversity exists.

As to the amount in controversy, the Defendant estimates the wage
statement penalties claim, alone, is worth $1,934,400.  It
calculates the $50 penalty as $37,600 (752 initial pay period
violations × $50), and the subsequent pay period violations as
$1,896,800 (18,968 wage statements × $100), for a total of
$1,934,400.  As to the Plaintiff's waiting time penalties claim,
the Defendant estimates a sum of $4,015,938.40.  It estimates total
penalties of $4,015,958.40 after assuming an average hourly rate of
$26.31 × 8 hours × 30 days × 636 putative class members.

Because the Defendant has proved by a preponderance of the evidence
more than the $5 million requisite amount ($1,934,400 +
$4,015,958.40 = $5,950,358.40), the Judge need not consider the
Plaintiff's meal and rest break claims, overtime claims, or whether
attorneys fees should be included in the amount in controversy
calculation, totaling to what Defendant contends is almost $25
million in controversy.  Accordingly, because the proposed class
exceeds 100 class members, minimal diversity exists, and the amount
in controversy exceeds $5 million, the Court has jurisdiction under
CAFA.

The Plaintiff asks the Court to make a jurisdictional finding of
fact based on the unsupported assumption that more than two-thirds
of the putative class members, including the 636 putative class
members who separated from their employment with the Defendant, are
California citizens.  First, the Judge finds that the Plaintiff's
class definition is not "limited to citizens of the state in
question," which would arguably permit such an inference.  Second,
as in Mondragon, it is just as likely that many of the putative
class member employees -- although employed at one time by the
Defendant in California -- are no longer California citizens.  
Based on the foregoing, Judge Benitez denied the Plaintiff's motion
to remand.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/SixGlP from Leagle.com.

Lisa Ramirez, an individual, on behalf of herself and on behalf of
all persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Shani Or
Zakay -- szakay@silldorf-levine.com -- Zakay Law Group, APLC.

Carefusion Resources, LLC, a Limited Liability Company, Defendant,
represented by Spencer C. Skeen --
spencer.skeen@ogletreedeakins.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak
& Stewart, P.C., Jesse C. Ferrantella --
jesse.ferrantella@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins, Nikolas Trpe
Djordjevski -- nikolas.djordjevski@ogletree.com -- Ogletree,
Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, PC & Timothy L. Johnson --
tim.johnson@ogletree.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &
Stewart, P.C..


CARRIAGE SERVICES: Class Claims Process in Faria Underway
---------------------------------------------------------
Carriage Services, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 1, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the class claims process
in the suit entitled, Faria, et al. v. Carriage Funeral Holdings,
Inc., Superior Court of California, Contra Costa County, Case No.
MSC18-00606, is underway.

On March 26, 2018, six Plaintiffs filed a putative class action
against Carriage Funeral Holdings, Inc., the company's subsidiary,
their alleged employer, on behalf of themselves and all similarly
situated current and former employees.

Plaintiffs seek monetary damages and claim that Carriage Funeral
Holdings, Inc. failed to pay minimum wages, provide meal and rest
breaks, provide accurately itemized wage statements, reimburse
employees for required expenses, and provide wages when due.

Plaintiffs also claim that Carriage Funeral Holdings, Inc. violated
California Business and Professions Code Section 17200 et seq. On
June 5, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint to add a
claim under the California Private Attorney General Act.

On October 23, 2018, the parties mediated this matter and executed
a Memorandum of Understanding for class settlement.

In February 2019, a Class Action Settlement Agreement was fully
executed, which was preliminarily approved by the Court. The class
claims process is underway.

Carriage Services said, "At December 31, 2018, we accrued $650,000
for the estimated settlement amount related to this case. At June
30, 2019, the amount accrued remains adequate."

Carriage Services, Inc., provides funeral and cemetery services and
merchandise in the United States. It operates through two segments,
Funeral Home Operations and Cemetery Operations. The Company was
founded in 1991 and is headquartered in Houston, Texas.


CATALINA RESTAURANT: Cal. App. Affirms Arbitration Denial in Lacayo
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division Two,
issued an Opinion affirming the District Court's judgment denying
Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration in the case captioned
YALILA LACAYO, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CATALINA RESTAURANT
GROUP INC. et al., Defendants and Appellants. No. E069833. (Cal.
App.).

Plaintiff and respondent Yalila Lacayo (Lacayo) was an employee of
Catalina Defendants. Lacayo filed her plaintiff's class action
complaint on behalf of herself and others similarly situated (Class
Members) against Catalina Defendants in superior court (Complaint)
alleging numerous wage and hour violations under the Labor Code,
and an injunctive relief claim under California's unfair
competition law (UCL).  

Catalina Defendants responded by filing a motion to compel
arbitration of Lacayo's individual claims, including the UCL claim,
and dismissal of the class claims (Motion). The trial court granted
the Motion as to Lacayo's individual claims; refused to dismiss the
class claims, instead letting the arbitrator decide if the class
claims were subject to arbitration or a class action waiver; and
denied the Motion as to the UCL claim; and stayed the matter until
after arbitration was completed.

Catalina Defendants on appeal contend the trial court erred by (1)
refusing to enforce the individual arbitration agreement according
to its terms and (2) refusing to compel arbitration of Lacayo's UCL
claim.

The Arbitration Agreement included a class action waiver, which
provided as follows: Any claim covered by this Agreement shall be
brought and conducted solely on an individual basis and not in a
class, multiple plaintiff or representative action, or as a named
or unnamed member in a class, consolidated, representative or
private attorney general action. Similarly, the arbitrator may not
consolidate more than one party's claims, and may not otherwise
preside over any form of a class action or representative
proceeding. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Employee is not waiving
his or her rights under the National Labor Relations Act, and he or
she will not be retaliated against for concertedly challenging the
validity of this Agreement through class or collective actions.
The Arbitration Agreement also included a clause, The Arbitrator,
and not any federal, state, or local court or Company, shall have
exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the
interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of this
Agreement, including but not limited to any claim that all or any
part of this Agreement is void or voidable.

The Arbitration Agreement also provided that it would be governed
by the FAA and was to be construed broadly. It included a section
entitled Claims Covered by the Agreement, which provided in
pertinent part, The claims covered by this Agreement include, but
are not limited to, claims for wages or other compensation due;
claims for breach of any contract or covenant express or implied;
tort claims; claims for discrimination (including, but not limited
to, race, sex, religion, national origin, age, marital status,
medical condition, or disability) under state or federal law;
claims for benefits except where an employee benefit or pension
plan specifies that its claims procedure shall culminate in an
arbitration procedure different from this one), and claims for
violation of any federal, state, or other governmental law,
statute, regulation, or ordinance, except claims excluded in the
Claims Not Covered section below.

Catalina Defendants insisted that all of the claims were subject to
arbitration under the Arbitration Agreement. Further, the
Arbitration Agreement must be enforced by its terms. The trial
court must dismiss the class claims as Lacayo clearly executed a
class action waiver. Lacayo's UCL claim was not precluded from
arbitration. The Arbitration Agreement provided that all disputes
arising out of Lacayo's employment were subject to arbitration.

OPPOSITION TO MOTION AND REPLY

Lacayo filed opposition to the Motion. Lacayo rejected that the UCL
claim was subject to arbitration based upon the Arbitration
Agreement language, which provided that claims not covered by the
agreement included immediate injunctive and/or equitable relief for
unfair competition.

Lacayo also alleged she was going to amend the Complaint to include
a Labor Code Private Attorneys' General Act of 2004 (PAGA) claim,
which was not subject to arbitration. Further, the trial court
should conclude that the class action waiver was unconscionable and
the Arbitration Agreement was procedurally and substantively
unconscionable.

Catalina Defendants filed a reply to the opposition to the Motion.
Catalina Defendants insisted the Arbitration Agreement was neither
procedurally nor substantively unconscionable. Catalina Defendants
insisted Lacayo had misread the Arbitration Agreement as it
pertained to arbitration of UCL claims. The Arbitration Agreement
did not preclude arbitration of a UCL claim because it included
permissive language. Catalina Defendants also claimed Lacayo was
not entitled to injunctive relief because she no longer worked for
Catalina Defendants. Further, the class action waiver was valid;
the class claims must be dismissed.

FIRST HEARING

The trial court believed the class action waiver was valid but that
it was up to the arbitrator to decide the meaning and scope of the
class action waiver based on the terms of the Arbitration
Agreement. Catalina Defendants disagreed it was something to be
decided by the arbitrator.

The trial court requested additional briefing on whether the UCL
claim should be stayed and whether the meaning of the class action
waiver should be decided by the trial court or left for the
arbitrator to decide.

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING

Catalina Defendants filed their supplemental brief on November 9,
2017. They insisted the FAA contained language that the trial court
must direct the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance
with the terms of the agreement. There was no doubt the class
action waiver was valid and the trial court had to order the
dismissal of the class claims. The trial court must dismiss the
class claims. Further, the UCL claim was subject to arbitration,
but if the trial court disagreed, it should be stayed.

In response, Lacayo argued the UCL claim should not be stayed
pending arbitration.

SECOND HEARING AND RULING

The trial court initially stated it intended to stay the UCL
proceeding because it was based on the Labor Code violations that
were being sent to arbitration. The trial court also believed the
language was clear that the arbitrator was to decide the meaning of
the Arbitration Agreement. It was up to the arbitrator to decide if
class arbitration was appropriate.

Catalina Defendants argued that the language in the Arbitration
Agreement provided the arbitrator would decide any dispute about
the Agreement; there was no dispute about the class action waiver.
The provision was clear and Lacayo agreed. Lacayo clarified she did
not concede the class action waiver was clear and enforceable.
Catalina Defendants argued Sandquistwas not applicable because the
agreement in that case was silent as to class arbitration.

In this case, there was a clear class waiver and the arbitrator had
no authority to hear class claims. Catalina Defendants requested a
statement of decision including that the trial court denied
Catalina Defendants' request to order individual arbitration only.
Catalina Defendants asked that the order include that their relief
was denied.

APPEALABILITY

The Court must first decide if Catalina Defendants can appeal the
trial court's order granting the Motion to compel individual
arbitration but leaving the issue of classwide arbitration to the
arbitrator for the first seven Labor Code claims.

Catalina Defendants insist they can appeal the trial court's order
relying upon Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela (2019) ___ U.S. ___ [139
S.Ct. 1407, 1412] (Lamps Plus), which they claim found that an
order compelling arbitration of a putative class action is a denial
of a motion to compel individual arbitration and is appealable.

Here, the Motion requested an order compelling Lacayo to arbitrate
her individual claims and dismiss the class claims. The trial court
granted the order inasmuch as it ordered arbitration of Lacayo's
individual claims. It did not grant the Motion to dismiss the class
claims, but rather left it up to the arbitrator to decide if there
was the possibility of class arbitration based on the language of
the Arbitration Agreement. The trial court also found that, based
on the language of the Arbitration Agreement, the UCL claim was not
subject to arbitration.

Only the partial denial of the Motion on the UCL claim is
appealable.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1294 provides An aggrieved party
may appeal from: An order dismissing or denying a petition to
compel arbitration. In contrast, orders compelling arbitration are
considered interlocutory and are not appealable.

In Reyes v. Macys, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1119, the employer
sought an order from the trial court compelling the employee to
arbitrate her individual claims and to dismiss her class claims The
court issued an order that the individual claims were to proceed to
arbitration. The class claims and an additional PAGA claim were
stayed and would remain in the trial court.  
Employer appealed the order. The appellate court dismissed the
appeal.

First, it found that the partial grant of the employer's motion to
compel arbitration of the individual claims was not appealable
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1294.
Second, the court rejected that the employer requested in the lower
court that the class claims be arbitrated and that such request was
denied. Instead, the employer sought to dismiss the claims, which
the trial court refused, and stayed the proceedings pending
arbitration. There was no basis to appeal on the motion to compel
arbitration because it was granted. Further, the request to dismiss
the class claims was not appealable because a motion to dismiss was
an interlocutory order. A motion to dismiss was not an appealable
order listed in Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1.

Here, Catalina Defendants requested Lacayo be required to submit
her individual wage and hour claims to arbitration based on the
terms of the Arbitration Agreement; the trial court agreed. Lacayo
had raised additional class claims and the Motion specifically
requested that they be dismissed and that they not be subject to
arbitration. The trial court refused to dismiss the class claims
and left the issue to the arbitrator to decide if the class claims
could be arbitrated. These orders, as in Reyes, are not
appealable.

Catalina Defendants request that this court consider the appeal a
petition for writ of mandate and order the superior court to vacate
its order. The Courts declines to consider this appeal a petition
for writ of mandate. Writ review of orders directing parties to
arbitrate is available only in unusual circumstances or in
exceptional situations. California courts have held that writ
review of orders compelling arbitration is proper in at least two
circumstances (1) if the matters ordered arbitrated fall clearly
outside the scope of the arbitration agreement or (2) if the
arbitration would appear to be unduly time consuming or expensive.

Here, the trial court ordered that the arbitrator decide if the
class claims were subject to arbitration under the Arbitration
Agreement. The parties specifically provided that the arbitrator
would decide any interpretation of the Arbitration Agreement and it
is conceivable the arbitrator will dismiss the claims. The Court
declines to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate.
Here, Catalina defendants filed an appeal, not a petition for writ
of mandate. Moreover, the trial court did not order classwide
arbitration in this case. That decision was left to the arbitrator
and we will not issue a petition for writ of mandate to the trial
court to make a decision on the classwide arbitration.

Catalina Defendants have not provided this court with authority to
support that we have jurisdiction to review the trial court's order
as to the first seven causes of action. As such we dismiss the
appeal as to the first seven causes of action. The only appealable
issue before this court is the denial of arbitration of the UCL
claim, which we address, post.

MERITS

Here, the only reviewable claim is the denial of the Motion as to
the UCL claim, which Catalina Defendants argue on appeal should
have been found to be subject to arbitration. Catalina Defendants
claim the Arbitration Agreement was broadly worded to include all
claims and it also subjected any claims arising under any state
statute to arbitration.

The principal purpose' of the FAA is to ensure that private
arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms. Code
of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 requires a trial court to grant a
petition to compel arbitration if the court determines that an
agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists. Accordingly, when
presented with a petition to compel arbitration the trial court's
first task is to determine whether the parties have in fact agreed
to arbitrate the dispute.  

Here, there was a specific exemption agreed to by the parties in
the Arbitration Agreement for unfair competition claims. The
Arbitration Agreement provided that Upon a showing of reasonable
cause, either party to this Agreement may petition a court of
competent jurisdiction for immediate injunctive relief and/or other
equitable relief for unfair competition and/or the use and/or
unauthorized disclosure or trade secrets or confidential
information. This appeared under the heading Claims Not Covered by
the Agreement. As such, based on the terms of the contract, it is
clear here, as found by the trial court, that the parties intended
to exempt the UCL claim from arbitration.

Moreover, the Court rejects the claim of Catalina Defendants that
somehow the parties agreed they would interpret the Arbitration
Agreement in conjunction with the California Arbitration Act. In
fact, the Arbitration Agreement itself stated it would be subject
to the FAA. Based on the foregoing, the Court cannot conclude the
order to deny the Motion as to the UCL claim was erroneously
entered.

The Court dismisses the appeal as to causes of action one through
seven and affirms the order on the eighth cause of action.  

A full-text copy of the Cal. App.'s August 1, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2mh7w72 from Leagle.com.

Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, Spencer C. Skeen --
spencer.skeen@ogletree.com --  Jesse C. Ferrantella --
jesse.ferrantella@ogletree.com -- and Nikolas T. Djordjevski --
nikolas@djordjevski.com -- for Defendants and Appellants.

Payton Employment Law, Chantal McCoy Payton --
chantalpayton@knightemploymentlaw.com -- Marissa L. Simmons --
marissa@marissasimmonslaw.com -- McNicholas and McNicholas, Patrick
McNicholas, David Angeloff and Chantal McCoy Payton 10866 Wilshire
Blvd., Suite 1400, Los Angeles, CA 90024 for Plaintiff and
Respondent.


CHICAGO GYMS: Members Sue Over Denied Rewards Redemption
--------------------------------------------------------
Andy Ambrosius, Da Ve Crabill and Michelle Sobarnia, individually,
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, V.
Chicago Athletic Clubs LLC, Evanston Athletic Club, Inc., Lincoln
Park Athletic Club, Inc., LPAC Holdings LLC, Westloop Athletic Club
LLC, Lakeview Athletic Club, Inc., Lincoln Square Athletic Club
LLC, Wicker Park Athletic Club LLC, and Bucktown Athletic Club LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 2019CH08662 (Ill Cir., July 24, 2019), seeks
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, compensatory damages, attorneys'
fees and costs and all such further and other relief resulting from
unjust enrichment and in violation of Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act.

Defendants own and operate the following athletic clubs in and
around Chicago, Illinois. They provide their members a rewards
program in which gym members earn points for various activities.
However, on July 16, 2018, they announced that they had
unilaterally terminated said rewards program and refused to allow
members to redeem unused points. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Thomas Zimmerman, Jr., Esq.
      Matthew C. De Re, Esq.
      Nickolas J. Hagman, Esq.
      Sharon A. Harris, Esq.
      ZIMMERMAN LAW OFFICES, P .C.
      77 West Washington Street, Suite 1220
      Chicago, Illinois 60602
      Tel: (312) 440-0020
      Fax: (312) 440-4180
      Email: matt@attorneyzim.com
             nick@attorneyzim.com
             sharon@attorneyzim.com
             tom@attorneyzim.com


CHIPOTLE MEXICAN: Schneider Has 45 Days to File Settlement Bid
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARTIN SCHNEIDER, SARAH DEIGERT, THERESA GAMAGE, and
NADIA PARIKKA, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiffs, v. CHIPOTLE MEXICAN GRILL, INC., a Delaware
Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 4:16-cv-02200-HSG (KAW) (N.D.
Cal.), Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California, Oakland Division, ordered the
Plaintiffs to submit their Motion for Preliminary Approval of the
settlement within 45 days of the Court's approval of the
Stipulation.

The Parties inform the Court that, after a second all-day mediation
on July 2, 2019 with the Hon. Jay C. Gandhi (Ret.) of JAMS, they've
reached and executed a settlement term sheet as to the core terms
of a class action settlement that will resolve all claims against
the Defendant.  After the Parties finalize the remaining details
and terms, they will then execute a formal, comprehensive class
action settlement agreement.

Accordingly, the Parties, by and through their attorneys, jointly
stipulated and requested the Court, and Judge Gilliam granted that
(i) in light of the execution of the settlement term sheet by the
Parties to settle the action, all pending dates, including the
hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Decertify the Classes,
currently scheduled for July 18, 2019, should be vacated; and (ii)
the Plaintiffs will submit their Motion for Preliminary Approval of
the settlement within 45 days of the Court's approval of the
Stipulation.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/ZOkjPR from Leagle.com.

Martin Schneider, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Sarah Deigert, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, Theresa Gamage, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated & Nadia Parikka,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Donald R. Hall -- dhall@kaplanfox.com --
Kaplan Fox and Kilsheimer, pro hac vice, Frederic S. Fox --
ffox@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer, pro hac vice, Linda
M. Fong -- lfong@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP,
Mario Man-Lung Choi -- mchoi@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox &
Kilsheimer LLP, Matthew B. George -- mgeorge@kaplanfox.com --
Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP & Laurence D. King --
lking@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP.

Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant,
represented by Angela Christine Agrusa, DLA Piper LLP, Charles C.
Cavanagh -- ccavanagh@messner.com -- Messner Reeves, Adam M. Royval
-- aroyval@messner.com -- Messner Reeves, Allison Dodd --
adodd@messner.com -- Messner Reeves, Jacqueline Raquel Guesno --
jguesno@messner.com -- Messner Reeves, Kristina M. Wright --
kwright@messner.com -- Messner Reeves & Sascha Von Mende Henry --
shenry@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton
LLP.


COGNIZANT TECH: Bid to Dismiss NJ Consolidated Class Suit Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Cognizant Technology Solutions Corp. said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 1,
2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the
company's motion to dismiss a consolidated class action suit in the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey remains
pending.

In 2016, three putative securities class action complaints were
filed in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey, naming the company and certain of its current and former
officers as defendants.

These complaints were consolidated into a single action and on
April 7, 2017, the lead plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended
complaint on behalf of a putative class of persons and entities who
purchased the company's common stock during the period between
February 27, 2015 and September 29, 2016, naming the company and
certain of its current and former officers as defendants and
alleging violations of the Exchange Act, based on allegedly false
or misleading statements related to potential violations of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), the company's
business, prospects and operations, and the effectiveness of the
company's internal controls over financial reporting and the
company's disclosure controls and procedures.

The lead plaintiffs seek an award of compensatory damages, among
other relief, and their reasonable costs and expenses, including
attorneys' fees.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the consolidated amended
complaint on June 6, 2017. On August 8, 2018, the Court issued an
order which granted the motion to dismiss in part, including
dismissal of all claims against current officers of the Company,
and denied them in part.

On September 7, 2018, the company filed a motion in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey to certify the
August 8, 2018 order for immediate appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Section 1292(b).

On October 18, 2018, the District Court issued an order granting
the company's motion, and staying the action pending the outcome of
the company's appeal petition to the Third Circuit.

On October 29, 2018, the company filed a petition for permission to
appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit.

On March 6, 2019, the Third Circuit denied our petition without
prejudice. In an order dated March 19, 2019, the District Court
directed the lead plaintiffs to provide the defendants with a
proposed amended complaint. On April 26, 2019, lead plaintiffs
filed their second amended complaint.

The company filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint
on June 10, 2019.

Cognizant Technology Solutions Corp. provides information
technology consulting and technology services in North America,
Europe, and Asia. The company was founded in 1994 and is based in
Teaneck, New Jersey.


COMENITY BANK: Dmytriw Sues Over Auto-dialed Telemarketing Calls
----------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Dmytriw, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Comenity Bank, Defendant, Case
No. 18-cv-00320, (M.D. Fla., June 25, 2018), seeks to recover
damages and obtain injunctive relief for injuries caused under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Defendant is a Delaware State FDIC-insured bank and a
limited-purpose credit card bank located in Delaware, offering
credit programs. Defendant placed more than 379 telephone calls to
Dmytriw's cellular telephone number using an automatic telephone
dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice in an attempt
to solicit credit card applications. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      William B. Bowles, Esq.
      Amanda J. Allen, Esq.
      THE CONSUMER PROTECTION FIRM, PLLC
      4030 S. Henderson Blvd.
      Tampa, FL 33629
      Telephone: (813) 500-1500
      Facsimile: (813) 435-2369
      Email: Billy@TheConsumerProtectionFirm.com
             Amanda@TheConsumerProtectionFirm.com


CONNER LOGISTICS: Figueroa Labor Suit Removed to E.D. Cal.
----------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Ubaldo Figueroa, an individual, on behalf of
herself, and on behalf of all persons similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. Conner Logistics, Inc. and Does 1 through 50,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 15CECG02546 (Cal. Super., June 21,
2019), was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California on July 23, 2019, under Case No.
19-at-00538.

Figueroa seeks redress for Defendant's failure to provide meal and
rest breaks, failure to provide itemized wage statements, interest
thereon at the statutory rate, actual damages, all wages due
terminated employees, costs of suit, prejudgment interest and such
other and further relief pursuant to the California Labor Code and
applicable Industrial Welfare Commission wage orders.

Figueroa worked for Conner Logistics in California from May of 2014
through September of 2014 as a Truck Driver. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Norman B. Blumenthal, Esq.
      Kyle R. Nordrehaug, Esq.
      Aparajit Bhowmik, Esq.
      BLUMENTHAL, NORDREHAUG & BHOWMIK LLP
      2255 Calle Clara
      La Jolla, CA 92037
      Telephone: (858) 551-1223
      Facsimile: (858) 551-1232
      Website: www.bamlawca.com

Conner Logistics is represented by:

      Russell K. Ryan, Esq.
      MOTSCHIEDLER, MICHAELIDES, WISHON, BREWER & RYAN, LLP
      1690 West Shaw Avenue, Suite 200
      Fresno, CA  93711
      Tel: (559) 439-4000
      Email: rkr@mmwlawfirm.com


DEVITO REAL ESTATE: Grigorian Sues Over Unsolicited Text Messages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
HENRY GRIGORIAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. DEVITO REAL ESTATE GROUP, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 9:19-cv-81105-XXXX (S.D. Fla., Aug. 6, 2019) is a putative
class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, arising
from Defendant's violations of the TCPA.

To solicit new agents for its brokerage, Defendant engages in
unsolicited text messaging with no regard for privacy rights of the
recipients of those messages, asserts the complaint. The Defendant
caused thousands of unsolicited text messages to be sent to the
cellular telephones of Plaintiff and Class Members, causing them
injuries, including invasion of their privacy, aggravation,
annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion.
Through this action, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt
Defendant's illegal conduct. Plaintiff also seeks statutory damages
on behalf of himself and Class Members and any other available
legal or equitable remedies resulting from the illegal actions of
Defendant.

Plaintiff is a natural person who was a resident of Palm Beach
County, Florida.

Defendant is a real estate brokerage based in Boynton Beach,
Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Ignacio J. Hiraldo, Esq.
     IJH LAW
     1200 Brickell Ave. Suite 1950
     Miami, FL 33131
     Phone: 786.496.4469
     Email: IJHiraldo@IJHlaw.com

          - and -

     Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
     HIRALDO P.A.
     401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
     Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
     Phone: 954.400.4713
     Email: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com


DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: D.C. App. Flips Final Judgment in Brown Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IVY BROWN, IN HER INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AND AS
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CERTIFIED CLASS, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, Appellee, Case No. 17-7152 (D.C.
App.), Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's
final judgment for the District.

The District funds both nursing-facility-based and community-based
care for individuals with physical disabilities.  In both settings,
individuals are provided with assistance in eating, bathing,
toileting and dressing, as well as with their mobility, medication
management, meal preparation, money management and telephone use.
The District does not operate nursing facilities itself; it funds
care in nursing facilities certified for Medicaid reimbursement
through its Medicaid State Plan.  There are nineteen
Medicaid-certified nursing facilities in the District, which house
a total of approximately 2,770 beds.  The Plaintiffs are physically
disabled individuals in these facilities who have been receiving
nursing-facility-based care for more than ninety days but wish to
transition -- and are capable of transitioning -- to
community-based care.

The litigation began in late 2010, when four disabled individuals
filed a class action against the District, alleging that the
District's failure to transition them to community-based care
violated Title II of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act.  The district court rejected the District's initial argument
that it was entitled to summary judgment because it had in place an
effective "Olmstead Plan" -- that is, a "comprehensive, effectively
working plan for placing qualified persons with physical
disabilities in less restrictive settings, with a waiting list that
moves at a reasonable pace not controlled by the District's
endeavors to keep its institutions fully populated.  It was
"undisputed" that the District had not adopted a "formal Olmstead
Plan," and the district court rejected the District's argument that
its existing programs and services for individuals with
disabilities met the requirements of an Olmstead Integration Plan,"
pointing to undisputed figures that showed the District lacked a
measurable commitment to the transitioning of disabled individuals
to the community.

In May 2012, the Plaintiffs moved for class certification.  The
district court identified certain deficiencies in the proposed
class and denied the motion without prejudice.  In March 2013, the
Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that revised the proposed
class definition and alleged multiple deficiencies in the services
the District provides to transition disabled individuals from
nursing homes to the community.  In March 2014, the district court
granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

The certified class consisted of all persons with physical
disabilities who, now or during the pendency of thes lawsuit: (1)
receive DC Medicaid-funded long-term care services in a nursing
facility for 90 or more consecutive days; (2) are eligible for
Medicaid-covered home and community-based long-term care services
that would enable them to live in the community; and (3) would
prefer to live in the community instead of a nursing facility but
need the District of Columbia to provide transition assistance to
facilitate their access to long-term care services in the
community.

Although the district court found class certification appropriate,
it expressed doubt that the Plaintiffs would ultimately be able to
establish a causal link between any proven deficiencies in the
District's system of transition assistance and the injury
associated with being 'stuck' in a nursing facility.

At the same time, the district court denied the District's renewed
motion to dismiss based on its then-recent implementation of a
formal "Olmstead Plan."  It held that the District had yet to
demonstrate that its Olmstead Plan is an effectively working plan
for placing qualified persons with disabilities in less restrictive
settings, with a waiting list that moves at a reasonable pace not
controlled by the State's endeavors to keep its institutions fully
populated.

In April 2014, the District petitioned the Court for leave to file
an interlocutory appeal of the district court's class
certification.  The Court denied the petition in June 2015.

After the Court's decision, the district court ordered discovery
and the Plaintiffs filed another amended complaint, which contained
their proposed injunction.  The litigation then proceeded to a
bench trial. T he district court bifurcated the trial into a
"liability" phase and a "remedy" phase.

In September 2017, the district court concluded that the Plaintiffs
had failed to establish the District's liability under both the ADA
and the Rehabilitation Act.  Thus, without proceeding to the
"remedy" phase of the trial, the district court entered judgment in
favor of the District.  Finding that the Plaintiffs sought no
individual relief, the district court entered final judgment for
the District.

The Plaintiffs timely appealed.

Judge Henderson reviews the district court's factual findings for
clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.  She finds that the
district court's fundamental error was looking for the existence
vel non of a "concrete, systemic deficiency" in the District's
transition services.  Having determined that he tPlaintiffs bore
the burden of demonstrating the existence of a concrete, systemic
deficiency, the district court considered four potential systemic
deficiencies at trial.  At the end of the trial, the district court
concluded that the Plaintiffs had not proved any of the four and
therefore entered judgment against them.  The district court's
formulation led it to require the Plaintiffs to meet a burden they
should not have been made to shoulder.

Next, the Judge finds that there is no commonality problem in the
case because common proof will lead to common answers to each of
the five questions on which resolution of the Plaintiffs' claims
turns.  Dor example, the first provision of the proposed
injunction.  This provision would require the District to provide
all the class members with information regarding community-based
long-term care options, determine whether they prefer to transition
to the community and, if they do, plan their transition and assist
them in accessing available resources to help them transition.
Common proof will establish, first, how costly it would be to
provide all class members with these services and, second, whether
it is reasonable to require the District to use its limited
resources to pay this cost, considering the District's obligations
to other disabled individuals.  The same analysis will apply to the
other three provisions of the proposed injunction.  Thus, on the
current record, there does not appear to be a Rule 23(a)(2)
deficiency.

She also finds that the Plaintiffs claim that their transition to
the community is legally mandated.  Because the proposed injunction
would provide, at least in part, each member of the class an
increased opportunity to obtain that outcome, Rule 23(b)(2) is
satisfied on the current record.

The Judge recognizes and appreciates the significant time and
effort the district court has expended on the case, which presents
complicated legal issues.  That time and effort has not been
wasted.  On remand, the district court is free to apply certain
facts it has already found to the legal standards articulated in
the Opinion.  It need not start over completely.

Finally, the Judge finds that the concurrence's lengthy causation
analysis does not represent the opinion of the Court.  As the
concurrence recognizes, treating individuals in institutions when
they wish to and could be treated in the community is
discrimination because of disability.  The members of the class
have thus already proven causation.  The only remaining question is
whether the requested accommodations are reasonable.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Henderson reversed the district
court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with her Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/ke9kYC from Leagle.com.

Kelly Bagby argued the cause for the appellant. Maame Gyamfi , Iris
Y. González, Sasha M. Samberg-Champion --
ssamberg-champion@relmanlaw.com -- and Ryan Downer --
contact@civilrightscorps.org -- were with her on brief.

David A. Reiser -- dreiser@zuckerman.com -- and Jonathan H. Levy --
jonathan.levy@morganlewis.com -- were on brief for the amici curiae
The Legal Aid Society for the District of Columbia, et al. in
support of the appellants.

Jonathan L. Marcus -- jonathan.marcus@skadden.com -- was on brief
for the amici curiae American Association of People with
Disabilities, et al. in support of the plaintiffs-appellants.

Sonya L. Lebsack, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the
Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause for
the appellee District of Columbia. Karl A. Racine, Attorney
General, Loren L. AliKhan, Solicitor General, and Caroline S. Van
Zile, Deputy Solicitor General were with her on brief. Stacy
Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, entered an appearance.


EMPATH LLC: Court Orders Castaneda to Serve Protective Order Bid
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JONASER CASTANEDA, ET AL., v. EMPATH, LLC, Civil
Action No. 19-131-JWD-EWD (M.D. La.), Magistrate Judge Erin
Wilder-Doomes of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Louisiana ordered Plaintiffs Castaneda and Greg Paliaro (ii) to
serve their Supplemental Emergency Motion for Protective Order,
Sanctions, and Corrective Notice on the Defendant; (ii) to confer
with the Defendant regarding the Motion; and (iii) to file either a
Supplemental Certification or a Motion to Withdraw the Motion.

On Feb. 28, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a Collective Action
Complaint pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") on
behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated Technicians
based on the Defendant's alleged failure to pay the Plaintiffs and
other Technicians for "all hours worked" and "appropriate overtime
wages."  The Plaintiffs seek an award of wages for all hours worked
up to 40 hours per week, overtime compensation for all hours worked
in excess of 40 hours per week, an equal amount as liquidated
damages, and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.

Per the instant Motion, the Plaintiffs assert that on May 21, 2019,
one day following the Defendant's receipt of the Complaint, the
Defendant called a meeting of its cable technicians at the Baton
Rouge office and attempted to settle their overtime and unpaid wage
claims in exchange for the potential class members' execution of
certain confidentiality agreement[s] and waiver of litigation and
FLSA rights.

The Plaintiffs contend that the Defendant's actions warrant
sanctions, and request an order from the Court requiring (1) that
the Defendant provide a listing of all telephone numbers and e-mail
addresses of the putative class members that received its documents
evidenced by Exhibit 2; (2) monetary sanctions that would include
attorneys' fees and costs, including the costs of a third-party to
evaluate the monetary claim of all the potential class members; (3)
the delivery of a corrective notice to the class to be paid for by
the Defendant; (4) striking as invalid any signed agreements and
waivers; and (5) a tolling of the claims of all the potential class
members.

Before the Court is the Plaintiffs' Supplemental Emergency Motion
for Protective Order, Sanctions, and Corrective Notice.  The
Plaintiffs attach the affidavit of Mr. Castaneda, as well as a copy
of the document which the Defendant allegedly asked technicians to
sign.  Per his affidavit, Mr. Castaneda states that he refused to
sign the proffered waiver, and that following the May 21, 2019
meeting, the Defendant's representative met with him individually
and stated that he does not want to deal with lawyers and lawyers
would be bad for me because lawyers will take a fee out of any
overtime payment owed.  

The Plaintiffs argue that the Defendant's actions are a not so
thinly veiled threat to the employment of anyone who decides to
join the lawsuit, and will potentially have a chilling effect on
class member participation, and that during the May 21, 2019
meeting the Defendant failed to mention this pending litigation,
the class members' rights under the law, and misleads the reader
into believing that the execution of the document is necessary for
continued employment.

Magistrate Judge Wilder-Doomes holds that at this stage of these
proceedings, the Court does not rule on the merits of the
Plaintiffs' Motion.  Significantly, and assuming arguendo that they
entitled to all or some of the sought, the Plaintiffs have provided
no explanation as to how the Court can impose any limitation or
sanction on the Defendant at this point.

Finally, although they style their Motion as an "emergency," the
Plaintiffs do not explain the basis for asserting the Motion
requires immediate consideration by the Court, and it appears that
the relief requested in the Motion will be available (if ultimately
deemed appropriate) following the Defendant's appearance and
response to the instant Motion.  Related to the issue of the
Defendant's future response to the Motion, there is no indication
in the Plaintiffs' briefing that they've reached out to the
Defendant regarding the alleged communications or otherwise
conferred with respect to the Motion.

Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Wilder-Doomes ordered the Plaintiffs
to serve the Defendant with a copy of the Motion, as well as with a
copy of the Notice and Order, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.
Following service of the Motion and the Notice and Order on the
Defendant, the Plaintiffs will confer with the Defendants regarding
the Motion.

Within 14 days following service of the Motion and the Notice and
Order on the Defendant, the Plaintiffs will file either: (1) a
Motion to Withdraw Plaintiffs' Supplemental Emergency Motion for
Protective Order, Sanctions, and Corrective Notice to the extent
the conference resolves the issues raised in the Motion, or (2) a
Supplemental Certification.  

In the event the Plaintiffs file a Supplemental Certification, such
Supplemental Certification will specifically set forth: (a) how the
conference required by the Notice and Order was scheduled and
agreed upon, (b) who participated in the conference, (c) when the
conference took place, (d) whether the conference was conducted by
phone or in person, (e) the duration of the conference, (f) the
specific, itemized topics that were addressed at the conference,
and (g) whether any issues were resolved by the parties, and, if
so, the terms of the resolution.

In the event the parties are unable to resolve the issues raised in
the Motion, the Defendant will file a response to the Motion within
21 days following service of the Motion and the Notice and Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2019 Notice and Order is
available at https://is.gd/HOpRCV from Leagle.com.

Jonaser Castaneda, on Behalf of Himself and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated & Greg Paliaro, on Behalf of Himself and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, represented by
George Brian Recile -- GBR@CHEHARDY.COM -- Chehardy, Sherman,
Williams, Murray, Recile, Stakelum &Hayes, Anya M. Jones --
AMJ@chehardy.com -- Chehardy Sherman Williams, Preston L. Hayes --
PLH@CHEHARDY.COM -- Chehardy Sherman Williams, Ryan P. Monsour --
RPM@CHEHARDY.COM -- Chehardy Sherman Williams & ZACHARY R. SMITH --
ZRS@CHEHARDY.COM -- Chehardy Sherman Williams.


ENCOMPASS HEALTH: Settling Plaintiffs in Nichols Suit Already Paid
------------------------------------------------------------------
Encompass Health Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 31, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company has
entered into settlement agreements with all but one plaintiff in
the class action suit entitled, Nichols v. HealthSouth Corp., and
paid those settling plaintiffs an aggregate amount of cash less
than $0.1 million.

The company was named as a defendant in a lawsuit filed March 28,
2003 by several individual stockholders in the Circuit Court of
Jefferson County, Alabama, captioned Nichols v. HealthSouth Corp.

The plaintiffs allege that the company, some of its former
officers, and its former investment bank engaged in a scheme to
overstate and misrepresent the company's earnings and financial
position. The plaintiffs are seeking compensatory and punitive
damages.

This case was stayed in the circuit court on August 8, 2005. The
plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on November 9, 2010 to which
the company responded with a motion to dismiss filed on December
22, 2010.

During a hearing on February 24, 2012, plaintiffs' counsel
indicated his intent to dismiss certain claims against the company.
Instead, on March 9, 2012, the plaintiffs amended their complaint
to include additional securities fraud claims against Encompass
Health and add several former officers to the lawsuit. On September
12, 2012, the plaintiffs further amended their complaint to request
certification as a class action.

One of the former officers named as a defendant has repeatedly
attempted to remove the case to federal district court, most
recently on December 11, 2012. The company filed its latest motion
to remand the case back to state court on January 10, 2013.

On September 27, 2013, the federal court remanded the case back to
state court. On November 25, 2014, the plaintiffs filed another
amended complaint to assert new allegations relating to the time
period of 1997 to 2002.

On December 10, 2014, the company filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds the plaintiffs lack standing because their claims were
derivative in nature, and the claims were time-barred by the
statute of limitations.

On May 26, 2016, the court granted the company's motion to dismiss.
The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of the case to the Supreme
Court of Alabama on June 28, 2016. On March 23, 2018, the Alabama
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's dismissal, holding that
the plaintiffs' claims were not derivative or time-barred, and
remanded the case for further proceedings.

On April 6, 2018, the company filed an application for rehearing
with the Alabama Supreme Court. On March 22, 2019, the Alabama
Supreme Court denied the company's application for rehearing and
remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

In July 2019, the company entered into settlement agreements with
all but one plaintiff and paid those settling plaintiffs an
aggregate amount of cash less than $0.1 million.

Encompass Health said, "We intend to vigorously defend ourselves in
this case against the sole remaining plaintiff. Based on the stage
of litigation, review of the current facts and circumstances as we
understand them, the nature of the underlying claim, the results."

Encompass Health Corporation provides facility-based and home-based
post-acute healthcare services in the United States. The company
operates through two segments, Inpatient Rehabilitation, and Home
Health and Hospice. The company was formerly known as HealthSouth
Corporation and changed its name to Encompass Health Corporation in
January 2018. Encompass Health Corporation was founded in 1983 and
is based in Birmingham, Alabama.


ENVISION HEALTHCARE: Court Won't Dismiss Shareholder Litigation
---------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Sherry R. Fallon of the United States District
Court for the District of Delaware issued a Report and
Recommendation denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the case
captioned IN RE ENVISION HEALTHCARE CORP. CONSOLIDATED SHAREHOLDER
LITIGATION Civil Action No. 18-1068-RGA. (D. Del.).

Presently before the court in this class action for violations of
Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
filed by defendants Envision Healthcare Corp. (Envision), and
Envision's Board of Directors (Board): William A. Sanger,
Christopher A. Holden, James D. Shelton, Michael L. Smith, Leonard
M. Riggs, Carol J. Burt, Cynthia S. Miller, Kevin P. Lavender, Joey
A. Jacobs, Steven I. Geringer, John T. Gawaluck, and James A. Deal
(Defendants).

Whether the Sensitivity Case Projections are materially false or
misleading

In support of the motion to dismiss, defendants argue that the
complaint fails to state a claim because the Management Case
Projections and the Sensitivity Case Projections were fully and
accurately disclosed in the Proxy. (D.I. 30 at 9) Defendants
contend that the Sensitivity Case Projections represented the
potential impact of risks outside of Envision's control, and they
were not disclosed in the Proxy as a factual statement about
Envision's prospects.

In response, plaintiff contends that the Sensitivity Case
Projections were misleading because they were created to justify
KKR's low offer, and they did not reflect the legitimately held
beliefs of management or defendants regarding Envision's future
financial prospects. In this regard, plaintiff's challenge is based
on the Sensitivity Case Projections as an actionable statement of
opinion, not a statement of fact. Plaintiff alleges that the
bespeaks caution doctrine does not bar the claims because
defendants cannot immunize themselves from liability for knowingly
disclosing unreasonable projections containing generalized warnings
that the projections may not come to fruition.  

The Third Circuit has held that financial projections attached to a
proxy statement do not stand alone as a statement of affirmative
fact, particularly where their inclusion is accompanied by a
lengthy and specific disclaimer.

However, the amended complaint challenges the veracity of the Proxy
based on the assertion that the Sensitivity Case Projections did
not truly and accurately reflect management's legitimately-held
views regarding Envision's future prospects.The Third Circuit has
held that opinions, predictions and other forward-looking
statements are not per seinactionable under the securities laws.
Rather, such statements of `soft information' may be actionable
misrepresentations if the speaker does not genuinely and reasonably
believe them. The amended complaint in the present case alleges
that management did not reasonably believe the Sensitivity Case
Projections were an accurate assessment of Envision's future
prospects, citing the timing of the preparation of the Sensitivity
Case Projections in relation to the overtures of KKR and other
potential bidders.  

In the present case, the September 6, 2018 supplement to the Proxy
states that forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future
performance. Whether actual results will conform to expectations
and predictions is subject to known and unknown risks and
uncertainties. However, the bespeaks caution doctrine does not bar
plaintiff's cause of action in the present case because the crux of
plaintiff's Section 14(a) claim is based not on the contents of the
Sensitivity Case Projections themselves, but rather on defendants'
motivation for soliciting the Sensitivity Case Projections in the
first instance and defendants' alleged representation that the
Management Case Projections and the Sensitivity Case Projections
were equally likely to come to fruition.

The Court recommends that the court deny defendants' motion to
dismiss Count I of plaintiff's amended complaint for violations of
Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9.

Whether opinions relating to the Sensitivity Case Projections were
materially false or misleading

Reasonable sensitivities

The Proxy states that, "in light of feedback received from
stockholders and bidders regarding risks and uncertainties
affecting the Company's business, as well as management's ongoing
testing of the potential impact of these risks and uncertainties,
members of management began preparing a presentation reflecting
reasonable sensitivities to the Management Case to assist
management and the board in assessing market and sector risks that
were viewed by management to be not subject to the Company's
control and that could give rise to deviations from the long-term
projections set forth in the Management Case."

The Defendants contend that the Proxy's reference to reasonable
sensitivities is not false or misleading because the differences
between the two sets of projections were modest, and the new
assumptions were intended to account for the long-term impact of
market and sector risks outside of Envision's control.

The Defendants allege that plaintiff has not shown why this
projected view of market and sector risks was unreasonable, or
whether the Board believed the assumptions were unreasonable.
Moreover, defendants argue that the Board's opinion regarding the
reasonableness of the Sensitivity Case Projections was not material
to the decision made by investors in light of the relevant
information available to them.  

According to plaintiff, the Sensitivity Case Projections were
prepared to give the Financial Advisors numbers to justify a
fairness opinion, and not for any legitimate changes to Envision's
future prospects. Plaintiff points to the lack of any meaningful
change between February and May 2018, the timing of the creation of
the Sensitivity Case Projections, the fact that the Sensitivity
Case Projections were not given to KKR, and statements made by
executives regarding confidence in the Management Case Projections
as factual support for the allegations in the amended complaint.  

The Court recommends that the court deny the motion to dismiss with
respect to defendants' allegations regarding the reasonable
sensitivities reflected in the Proxy because the amended complaint
adequately pleads allegations showing that the Sensitivity Case
Projections were created for the purpose of depressing Envision's
stock price before the acquisition by KKR.  

Consequently, defendants' motion is denied on this issue.

Equally likely projections

The Proxy provides that, "as a result of discussions with
Envision's management and the board regarding their views of the
risks associated with the Management Case and the Management
Sensitivity Case, for purposes of [the Financial Advisors' opinion
and financial analyses, the Financial Advisors assumed that the
Management Case and Management Sensitivity Case are equally
likely."

The Defendants argue that, although the Financial Advisors assumed
the Management Case Projections and the Sensitivity Case
Projections were equally likely in rendering their opinions, the
Proxy did not otherwise make representations about the likelihood
of the projections. According to defendants, plaintiff fails to
plead that the Financial Advisors did not actually assume that the
two sets of projections were equally likely.  

In response, plaintiff contends that the challenged statements
represent the position of Envision and the Board that the two sets
of projections were equally likely. According to plaintiff, the
equally likely statements were false or misleading because the two
sets of projections were not equally likely from an objective
standpoint, and defendants did not subjectively believe they were
equally likely.  

The Court recommends that the court deny defendants' motion to
dismiss on this issue. Although the amended complaint does not
allege that the Financial Advisors misrepresented their opinions by
concluding that the Management Case Projections and Sensitivity
Case Projections were equally likely, the amended complaint does
allege that defendants knew the two sets of projections were not
equally likely. The Proxy acknowledges that the opinions of the
Financial Advisors regarding the Management Case Projections and
the Sensitivity Case Projections were the result of discussions
with Envision's management and the board regarding their views of
the risks associated with the Management Case and the Management
Sensitivity Case.

The amended complaint adequately pleads facts supporting the
position that defendants were aware of the alleged
misrepresentations in the Proxy regarding the Sensitivity Case
Projections.

Fairness of Merger consideration

Defendants contend that the amended complaint should be dismissed
because plaintiff provides no factual basis to conclude that the
Board did not subjectively believe the Merger consideration to be
fair. Defendants allege that plaintiff offers no provable facts
about Envision's worth to justify greater Merger consideration or
to show that the $46.00 per share consideration received in the
Merger was unfair.  

In response, plaintiff alleges that statements in the Proxy
regarding defendants' belief in the fairness of the Merger
consideration were false or misleading because defendants knew the
valuation ranges calculated by the Financial Advisors using the
Management Case Projections exceeded the Merger consideration.
Plaintiff challenges defendants' contention regarding whether
receiving a premium over the trading price is indicative of the
fairness of an offer price, noting that stockholders often receive
a significant premium over trading prices in a merger transaction.


The Court recommends that the court deny defendants' motion to
dismiss on this issue. In the amended complaint, plaintiff
challenges the veracity of the Proxy's representation that the
Merger was advisable, fair to and in the best interests of the
Company and its stockholders.

Fairness opinions as a positive factor in the Merger

Defendants stress that the fairness opinions were only one of eight
factors the Board found to favor the Merger, and the fairness
opinions themselves were based on multiple factors, including
consideration of the two sets of projections reflecting different
risk assumptions.  

In response, plaintiff contends that defendants did not genuinely
believe the fairness opinions were a positive factor in support of
the Merger because they knew the fairness opinions were predicated
on the flawed Sensitivity Case Projections. According to plaintiff,
the Financial Advisors could not have concluded that the Merger was
fair absent consideration of the Sensitivity Case Projections.
Plaintiff alleges that a reasonable shareholder could interpret the
challenged statement to establish that defendants were confident in
the assessment of the Financial Advisors.  

The Court recommends that the court deny defendants' motion to
dismiss on this issue. The Proxy states that the Board considered
eight positive factors supporting the Board's decision on the
Merger, one of which was the fairness opinions of the Financial
Advisors The amended complaint alleges that it was materially false
or misleading for defendants to identify these fairness opinions as
a positive factor because defendants knew the fairness opinions
were based on the fundamentally flawed Sensitivity Case Projections
and did not accurately project Envision's future financial
performance.  

Because the Proxy represented that defendants placed confidence in
the Financial Advisors' fairness opinions, the amended complaint
alleges that a reasonable investor could have mistakenly assumed
that defendants believed in the accuracy of the underlying
information, including the Sensitivity Case Projections, on which
the fairness opinions were based. Taking these allegations as true,
plaintiff has adequately stated a claim for relief at this stage of
the proceedings.
Loss causation

Defendants contend that plaintiff failed to plead the alleged
misstatements or omissions caused a loss because the amended
complaint contains no plausible factual basis to conclude that
Envision's value exceeded the Merger consideration. In response,
plaintiff alleges that the amended complaint satisfies the Rule 8
standard with respect to loss causation because there is a
presumption of loss causation when a proxy containing a material
misstatement or omission is an essential link in the consummation
of a transaction.

Loss causation requires a showing of a causal connection between
the material misrepresentation and the loss. To show loss
causation, a plaintiff must prove both economic loss and proximate
causation.  

Plaintiffs sufficiently plead loss causation. The amended complaint
adequately pleads facts establishing the materiality of the
misrepresentations, which led the stockholders to accept the Merger
as a fair transaction. Moreover, the amended complaint states that
the materially false and misleading Proxy was an essential link in
the consummation of the Merger, as the Stockholder Vote and
resulting Merger could not have occurred without the dissemination
of the Proxy. Courts have concluded that such statements are
sufficient to plead proximate causation at this stage of the
proceedings.  

The amended complaint also adequately pleads economic loss.  

Negligence

Defendants contend that the amended complaint does not sufficiently
allege that defendants acted negligently in preparing the Proxy.
According to defendants, the Proxy contained extensive information
about the Sensitivity Case Projections, including why they were
prepared, how they differed from the Management Case Projections,
and how they were used by the Financial Advisors. Defendants argue
that disclosure of projections provided to the Financial Advisors
is required by law and, therefore, cannot be negligent. In
response, plaintiff contends that defendants are negligent as a
matter of law where, as here, the Proxy contains a material
omission or misleading statement.  

The Court recommends that the court deny defendants' motion to
dismiss as it pertains to plaintiff's Section 14(a) claim sounding
in negligence. Defendants owed a duty to plaintiff under Section
14(a) fully and fairly to disclose the material facts in the proxy
materials they issued to them. The amended complaint adequately
alleges that defendants failed to perform this duty.

Section 20 claim

Defendants allege that plaintiff's Section 20(a) claims against the
individual defendants should also be dismissed for the same reasons
plaintiff's Section 14(a) claims should be dismissed. In response,
plaintiff agrees that a claim under Section 20(a) rises and falls
with a Section 14(a) claim, but contends that the amended complaint
adequately alleges that the individual defendants held positions of
authority as Envision directors who had the ability to control the
issuance and contents of the Proxy.  

The Court recommends that the court deny defendants' motion to
dismiss plaintiff's cause of action under Section 20(a). Section
20(a) claims are derivative claims premised on an independent
violation of the federal securities laws.

The Court recommends that the court deny defendants' motion to
dismiss.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 1, 2019 Report and
Recommendation is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6pydp4f from
Leagle.com.

Jon Barrett, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similiarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Blake A. Bennett --
bbennett@coochtaylor.com -- Cooch and Taylor.

James P. White, Plaintiff, represented by Ryan M. Ernst --
rernst@oelegal.com -- O'Kelly Ernst & Joyce, LLC.

Envision Healthcare Corporation, Defendant, represented by Brian F.
Morris -- bmorris@rlf.com -- Richards, Layton & Finger, PA, Craig
S. Waldman -- cwaldman@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher & Bartlett
LLP, pro hac vice, Peter E. Kazanoff -- pkazanoff@stblaw.com --
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, pro hac vice & Raymond J. DiCamillo
-- dicamillo@rlf.com -- Richards, Layton & Finger, PA.

William A. Sanger, Christopher A. Holden, James D. Shelton, Michael
L. Smith, Leonard M. Riggs, Carol J. Burt, Cynthia S. Miller, Kevin
P. Lavender, Joey A. Jacobs, Steven I. Geringer, John T. Gawaluck &
James A. Deal, Defendants, represented by Brian F. Morris ,
Richards, Layton & Finger, PA & Raymond J. DiCamillo , Richards,
Layton & Finger, PA.


EUROPEAN-AMERICAN WASTE: Flores Sues Over Unpaid Min., OT Wages
---------------------------------------------------------------
Rafael Flores, on behalf of himself and similarly situated
individuals, Plaintiff, v. EUROPEAN-AMERICAN WASTE DISPOSAL CORP.,
and FRANK F. OZPOLAT, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-04516 (E.D.
N.Y., Aug. 6, 2019) seeks to recover from the Defendants, unpaid
wages at the minimum wage rate; unpaid wages at the overtime rate
for all work hours over 40 hours in a work week; unpaid "spread of
hours" pay; statutory penalties; liquidated damages, prejudgment
and post-judgment interest; and attorneys' fees and costs, pursuant
to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, and for violations of the
N.Y. Labor Law.

The Defendants knowingly and willfully failed to pay Plaintiff and
similarly situated individuals a wage at the minimum wage rate and
at the overtime rate for all hours worked over 40 hours in a work
week, in contravention of the FLSA and NYLL, asserts the complaint.
Furthermore, the Defendants knowingly and willfully failed to pay
Plaintiff and similarly situated individuals an extra hour of
minimum wage for all work shifts over 10 hours in duration, says
the complaint.

Plaintiff was hired by Defendants to work as a cleaner in June
2009, and was terminated in June 2019.

Defendants are a domestic business corporation, organized and
existing under the laws of the State of New York.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     James F. Sullivan, Esq.
     Lawrence Spasojevich, Esq.
     Law Offices of James F. Sullivan, P.C.
     52 Duane Street, 7th Floor
     New York, NY 10007
     Phone: (212) 374-0009
     Facsimile: (212) 374-9931


EZCORP INC: Prel. Approval of Securities Case Settlement Pending
----------------------------------------------------------------
EZCORP, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 31, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that the lead plaintiff in the class action
suit entitled, In re EZCORP, Inc. Securities Litigation (Master
File No. 1:15-cv-00608-SS), has filed an unopposed motion
requesting the Court to preliminarily approve the proposed
settlement and set a settlement fairness hearing.

In July 2015 and August 2015, two substantially identical lawsuits
were filed in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas. Those lawsuits were subsequently consolidated
into a single action under the caption In re EZCORP, Inc.
Securities Litigation (Master File No. 1:15-cv-00608-SS).

The original complaint related to the Company's announcement on
July 17, 2015 that it will restate its financial statements for
fiscal 2014 and the first quarter of fiscal 2015, and alleged
generally that the Company issued materially false or misleading
statements concerning the Company, its finances, business
operations and prospects and that the Company misrepresented the
financial performance of the Grupo Finmart business.

In January 2016, the plaintiffs filed an Amended Class Action
Complaint (the "Amended Complaint"), which asserted that the
Company and Mark E. Kuchenrither, the company's former Chief
Financial Officer, violated Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, issued materially false or misleading
statements concerning the Company and its internal controls,
specifically regarding the financial performance of Grupo Finmart.
The plaintiffs also allege that Mr. Kuchenrither, as a controlling
person of the Company, violated Section 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act.

In October 2016, the Court granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss and dismissed the Amended Complaint without prejudice. In
November 2016, the plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Consolidated
Class Action Complaint ("Second Amended Complaint"), raising the
same claims previously dismissed by the Court, but reducing the
class period (November 7, 2013 to October 20, 2015 instead of
November 6, 2012 to October 20, 2015).

In May 2017, the Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss
with regard to claims related to accounting errors relating to
Grupo Finmart's bad debt reserve calculations for "nonperforming"
loans, but denied the motion to dismiss with regard to claims
relating to accounting errors related to certain sales of loan
portfolios to third parties.

Following discovery on the surviving claims, the plaintiff filed a
Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint, seeking to
revive the "nonperforming" loan claims that the Court previously
dismissed, and on July 26, 2018, the Court granted the plaintiff's
motion for leave to amend, thus accepting the Third Amended
Consolidated Class Action Complaint.

The Court issued an order certifying the class and approving the
class representative and class counsel in February 2019, and the
company appealed that order to the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which appeal was granted in March 2019.

On May 30, 2019, the parties agreed to a mediated settlement of all
remaining claims and entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
regarding that settlement.

The proposed settlement provides for the payment of $4.875 million
by the defendants (which will be covered by applicable directors'
and officers' liability insurance). The accrued settlement and
offsetting insurance receivable are included in "Accounts payable,
accrued expenses and other current liabilities" and "Prepaid
expenses and other current assets" in the company's condensed
consolidated balance sheets as of June 30, 2019.

On July 18, 2019, the parties entered into a Stipulation and
Agreement of Settlement reflecting the terms of the agreed
settlement and the lead plaintiff filed an unopposed motion
requesting the Court to preliminarily approve the proposed
settlement and set a settlement fairness hearing. The parties are
awaiting the Court's action on that motion. The proposed settlement
remains subject to several conditions, including Court approval.

EZCORP, Inc. provides pawn loans. It operates through three
segments: U.S. Pawn, Latin America Pawn, and Other International.
EZCORP, Inc. was founded in 1989 and is headquartered in Austin,
Texas.


FCA US: Court Narrows Claims in Cummings' Defective Car Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of New
York issued a Decision and Order granting in part and denying in
part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned LISA
CUMMINGS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. FCA US LLC, Defendant. No. 5:18-CV-1072
(GTS/TWD) (N.D.N.Y.).

The Plaintiff asserts six causes of action. First, the Plaintiff
asserts, on behalf of the class, or, alternatively, the New York
subclass, a violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA).
Second, the Plaintiff asserts, on behalf of the New York subclass,
that Defendant violated N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. Section 349. Third, the
Plaintiff asserts, on behalf of the New York subclass, that the
Defendant violated N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. Section 350. Fourth, the
Plaintiff asserts, on behalf of the New York subclass, that the
Defendant breached the implied warranty of merchantability. Fifth,
the Plaintiff asserts, on behalf of the New York subclass, that the
Defendant breached express warranties. Sixth, and last, the
Plaintiff asserts, on behalf of the New York subclass, that
Defendant was unjustly enriched by its contract with the Plaintiff
and the members of the New York subclass.

First, Defendant argues that, as to the injury-in-fact requirement
for the purposes of standing, Plaintiff's allegations that she paid
a premium for her vehicle are conclusory and not based on any
facts, noting in particular that she has not pled any facts about
the resale market for her vehicle or any other facts to support her
allegation that her vehicle lost value as a result of the discovery
of the defect.

Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Third, and last, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's class
allegations must be dismissed because (a) Plaintiff admitted that
the Court might not have personal jurisdiction over her claims as
to all out-of-state putative class members, as a procedural rule,
cannot deprive a defendant of his substantive right to challenge
personal jurisdiction, and (c) Bristol-Myers Squibb should be
applied to this class action case because Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 does
not expand a court's personal jurisdiction over defendant and
cannot create jurisdiction where it would otherwise be lacking

GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARDS

Legal Standard Governing Motions to Dismiss for Lack of
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

A district court may look to evidence outside of the pleadings when
resolving a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving
subject-matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.
When a court evaluates a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, all ambiguities must be resolved and
inferences drawn in favor of the plaintiff.

Legal Standard Governing Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a
Claim

It has long been understood that a dismissal for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), can be based on one or both of two grounds: (1) a
challenge to the sufficiency of the pleading under Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2); or (2) a challenge to the legal cognizability of the
claim.  

Because of this requirement of factual allegations plausibly
suggesting an entitlement to relief, the tenet that a court must
accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by merely conclusory
statements, do not suffice. Similarly, a pleading that only tenders
naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement will not
suffice. Rule 8 demands more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.

Legal Standard Governing Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction

When a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(2)
for want of personal jurisdiction, courts must perform a two-part
analysis. First, personal jurisdiction over a defendant must be
established under the law of the state where the federal court
sits. Under Rule 4(k)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the service of a summons establishes personal
jurisdiction over a defendant who could be subjected to the
jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state in
which the district court is located.

Second, if jurisdiction is established under the governing statute,
courts must determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction under
the relevant state law would violate the defendant's due process
rights.

Whether Plaintiff Possesses Article III Standing to Bring Suit

To show Article III standing, the plaintiff must have suffered an
injury in fact (1) that is concrete and particularized (2) that is
causally linked to the defendant's challenged conduct, and (3) that
is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.

To establish an injury in fact, a plaintiff need only show that he
or she suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest that is
concrete and particularized.

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that she experienced issues as the
result of the vehicle's allegedly defective transmission including
unexpected acceleration or deceleration and unreliable gear
shifting for which she sought service from an FCA authorized
dealer" multiple times including in January or February 2016, and
on April 20, 2016, July 1, 2016, March 20, 2017, March 24, 2017,
October 25, 2017, November 8, 2017, and January 11, 2018.  

The Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant issued multiple TSBs on
December 5, 2015, August 2016, February 21, 2017, and April 4,
2017, that variously related to defects in the transmission of Jeep
Cherokee vehicles with model years of 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016,
with the three most recent TSBs specifically covering the 2016
model, the model owned by Plaintiff). Plaintiff also alleges that
the TSB and software updates did not repair the Defect.

Based on this, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled
that she has suffered an injury-in-fact and thus that she has
Article III standing. Specifically, she alleged that (a) she
overpayed for a defective product due to Defendant's
misrepresentations, (b) despite the fact that TSBs were issued as
to the defect, the TSBs did not repair the defect, and (c) she
attempted to have the defect repaired but Defendant's authorized
dealer had not been successful (i.e., the remedy provided by
Defendant was inadequate).

The Court notes that, regardless of whether the TSBs were issued
before or after Plaintiff purchased her Class Vehicle, they would
not constitute an impediment to a finding of standing because
Article III standing is not based on a determination of the merits
of any of Plaintiff's substantive claims; Plaintiff therefore need
not show that Defendant had notice of the defect or that any
provided fix for the defect was unsuccessful in order to show
standing.
  
Consequently, because Plaintiff alleged economic injury as a result
of Defendant's conduct that could be redressed by a favorable
decision, the Court finds that she has Article III standing to
bring this action.

Whether Plaintiff's Claims for Deceptive Practices and False
Advertising Must Be Dismissed
Section 349 of the New York General Business Law prohibits
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade
or commerce or in the furnishing of any services in this state,
while N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. Section 350 prohibits false advertising in
the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing
of any service in this state.

To successfully assert a claim under either section, a plaintiff
must allege that a defendant has engaged in (1) consumer-oriented
conduct that is (2) materially misleading and that (3) plaintiff
suffered injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive act or
practice.

Affirmative Representations as Materially Misleading Conduct

In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following facts: (a) she
purchased the Class Vehicle because of its reputation for safety
and reliability, consistent with her exposure to marketing
materials for the Class Vehicle (b) she purchased the Class Vehicle
in part because of the Limited Warranties Defendant represented the
vehicle came with (c) she believed the Class Vehicle was safe and
reliable based on her test drive, review of the features and
options available, and Defendant's representations regarding the
Class Vehicle (d) a statement in American Machinist magazine that
the 9-speed transmission was a critical part of their strategy to
meet fuel economy requirements (e) promises in a press kit that the
9-speed transmission would deliver numerous benefits customers will
appreciate, including aggressive launches, smooth power delivery at
highway speeds and improved fuel efficiency (f) Defendant's Chief
Executive Officer stated in Automotive News that the 2016 Jeep
Cherokee would not have transmission problems; and (g) in its
advertising, Defendant represented that the Class Vehicle was more
fuel efficient while delivering the power drivers appreciate on the
road.

The Plaintiff variously alleges facts related to statements made by
Defendant's representatives, in advertisements and in a press kit.
The only factual allegations that clearly relate to factors that
Plaintiff was aware of before her purchase was her knowledge of its
reputation for safety and reliability, consistent with her exposure
to marketing materials for the Class Vehicle, her review of the
features and options available, and Defendant's representations
regarding the Class Vehicle. It is not clear from her vague
references to marketing materials and representations regarding the
Class Vehicle whether Plaintiff had seen none, some, or all of the
more specifically discussed representations included later in her
Complaint.  

The Plaintiff has, however, additionally alleged (in relation
specifically to Defendant's CEO's statement that the 2016 Jeep
Cherokee would not have transmission problems3 and an advertisement
that stated that the transmission made the Class Vehicle more fuel
efficient while delivering the power drivers appreciate on the
road") that she and other putative class members purchased the
Class Vehicle based in part on these representations. This
statement more plausibly suggests that Plaintiff saw at least these
particular statements before purchasing the Class Vehicle.
Therefore, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff,
the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts plausibly
suggesting that she saw at least some of the allegedly false
misrepresentations before she purchased the Class Vehicle. The
question of whether these representations were ones that might
deceive a reasonable consumer is a question of fact better left for
decision on a developed record.  

The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts
plausibly suggesting claims pursuant to N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. Sections
349 and 350 based on affirmative representations. Defendant's
motion on this issue must be denied.

Omissions as Materially Misleading Conduct

In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following facts: (a)
Defendant knew but failed to disclose the transmission defect and
its attendant safety risks at the time she purchased the Class
Vehicle; and (b) Defendant failed to disclose the defect in its
advertisements. Consequently, the basis for Plaintiff's claims
related to omissions involve Defendant's alleged failure to inform
consumers that the 9-speed transmission was defective. Defendant
argues that Plaintiff has not stated claims based on this omission
because (a) she has not alleged facts plausibly suggesting that
Defendant was aware of the defect at the time Plaintiff purchased
the Class Vehicle, and (b) has not alleged that this omission
rendered any other statements made by Defendant misleading.  

Defendant also argues in its reply brief that Plaintiff has not
alleged an injury in response to her submission of extrinsic
evidence related to her claims that she paid a premium price for
her defective vehicle.

To state an omission claim, Plaintiff must allege facts plausibly
suggesting that (a) Defendant alone possessed material information
about the defect and (2) Defendant failed to provide that
information to her and other consumers.  

As to the alleged pre-production testing and pre- and
post-production design failure mode analysis, Plaintiff does not
allege any facts plausibly suggesting that this testing in fact
showed any sort of defect in the transmission in the Class Vehicle
or any occurrence of the problems Plaintiff has alleged she and
others have experienced. Although Plaintiff is certainly not
required to present evidence related to this testing at this stage,
she must make more than generalized allegations to plausibly
suggest that the testing actually supports her claims; the mere
existence of testing, without any allegations as to what that
testing revealed, does not plausibly suggest that Defendant was
aware of the alleged defect.  

Plaintiff has not plausibly suggested that Defendant had knowledge
of the defect before she purchased the Class Vehicle and therefore,
to the extent her claims pursuant to N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. Sections 349
and 350 are based on the relevant omission, they must be
dismissed.

Whether Plaintiff's Claim for Breach of Implied Warranty Must Be
Dismissed

Section 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code which has been adopted
by New York states that a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller
is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind and must be, in
relevant part, fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods
are used.

To establish that a product is defective for the purposes of a
breach of implied warranty of merchantability claim, a plaintiff
must show that the product was not reasonably fit for its intended
purpose, an inquiry that focuses on the expectations for the
performance of the product when used in the customary, usual and
reasonably foreseeable manners.

Plaintiff's Complaint does not contain any such plausible
allegations of privity. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that, in
January 2016, she purchased the relevant vehicle from an FCA
authorized dealer, Fuccillo, in Adams, New York. She therefore
admits in the Complaint that she did not purchase the vehicle
directly from Defendant, but rather through a third-party dealer.
In this respect, Plaintiff argues that the third-party dealer was
Defendant's authorized agent and therefore Plaintiff's contract
with the authorized dealership and provision of warranties by
Defendant directly, places her in privity with Defendant.

However, Plaintiff offers no factual allegations plausibly
suggesting that the specific dealership from which she purchased
her vehicle was Defendant's agent; rather, she simply alleges that
it was an authorized dealer. At least one New York court has
explicitly indicated that an authorized dealer is not the same as
an agent under New York law. The case that Plaintiff relies on in
support of her argument does not contradict this. Because Plaintiff
has not pled any facts plausibly suggesting that the third-party
dealer was in fact Defendant's agent, the third-party dealer's
relationship with Defendant does not provide a basis for finding
privity between Plaintiff and Defendant.

Nor is the Court convinced that any express warranties provided by
Defendant create privity for the purposes of a claim for breach of
implied warranty. In particular, Plaintiff cites to a paragraph in
the warranty booklet filed by Defendant6 which states that (a)
Defendant is providing limited warranties (b) the dealer shall
perform any needed warranty service (c) the booklet encompassed the
only express warranties made by Defendant and (d) the purchaser may
have some implied warranties, depending on the state where your
vehicle was sold or is registered.

Plaintiff has cited no legal authority for her contention that a
manufacturer's provision of a limited warranty on a new vehicle
automatically creates privity between the manufacturer and a
purchaser who obtained the vehicle from a third-party dealer.  

Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged facts
plausibly suggesting privity between Plaintiff and Defendant, the
only way in which Plaintiff's claim for breach of implied warranty
can proceed is if she meets an exception to the requirement for
privity. The Court finds that she does not meet any such exception
for the following three reasons.

First, Plaintiff argues that privity is not required because New
York recognizes a thing of danger exception, relying on Hubbard v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 95-CV-4362, 1996 WL 274018 (S.D.N.Y. May 22,
1996). (Dkt. No. 23, at 22-23 [Pl.'s Opp'n Mem. of Law].) However,
courts within the Second Circuit have more recently questioned
whether Hubbard is an accurate interpretation of New York law.  

After reviewing the case law, the Court is not convinced that New
York law contains a thing-of-danger exception to the privity
requirement. Hubbard relied solely on Goldberg v. Kollsman Instr.
Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 436 (N.Y. 1963), and All-Tronics, Inc. v.
Ampelectric Co., 354 N.Y.S.2d 154, 156 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept.
1974), in making its finding; yet these cases do not convincingly
suggest that the thing of danger exception if it still exists at
all applies to claims for breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability where the only alleged injury is economic, given
that they involved either bodily harm/death or property damage
rather than pure economic loss.  

Such stretching of the bounds of the implied warranty cause of
action is no longer necessary now that New York recognizes strict
products liability as a separate and distinct cause of action from
a breach of implied warranty.  

The Court is particularly mindful of the fact that Hubbard did not
cite or acknowledge the New York Court of Appeal's decision in
Denny or consider the change in the legal landscape since Goldberg
was decided in 1963. As other Courts rejecting Hubbard's
interpretation have noted, New York courts after Goldberg have
routinely required a showing of privity for claims under a theory
of breach of implied warranty where only economic injury was
claimed, including in cases involving allegations of defective
vehicles and other potentially dangerous goods. Consequently, the
Court agrees with the other courts that have rejected Hubbard's
interpretation in concluding that no thing-of-danger exception
exists under New York law for claims involving purely economic
injury.

Second, to the extent that Plaintiff relies an exception to the
privity requirement based on being a third-party beneficiary of the
contract between Defendant and its authorized dealer, Plaintiff has
failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting the applicability of
such exception here because she has not included any factual
allegations regarding the contract between Defendant and the
authorized dealer, much less any factual allegations plausibly
suggesting that the contract was intended to provide a sufficiently
immediate benefit to her.  

Third, and finally, the Court is not swayed by Plaintiff's policy
argument that requiring privity in this case would essentially
eviscerate the implied warranty of merchantability altogether. New
York law makes it crystal clear that privity is a required element
of such a claim, and this Court is constrained by New York law when
determining claims arising under New York law.

The Court finds that Plaintiff's failure to allege facts plausibly
suggesting that she was in privity with Defendant requires
dismissal of her claim for breach of implied warranty.

Whether Plaintiff's Claim for Breach of Express Warranty Must Be
Dismissed

The only ground on which Defendant bases its request for the
dismissal of Plaintiff's claim for the breach of express warranty
is that the warranty does not cover the design defect, which it
argues is the only defect plausibly alleged by Plaintiff in the
Complaint; Defendant does not otherwise argue that Plaintiff has
not stated a claim for breach of express warranty.

Courts in this circuit have found that a warranty protecting
defects in materials or workmanship covers manufacturing defects
but not design defects.  

Multiple courts have indicated that determining whether the alleged
defect arose from a faulty design or faulty manufacturing cannot be
ascertained absent discovery because information related to the
manufacturer's intention is within the sole possession of the
manufacturer.  However, those cases also involved findings that the
plaintiff had made sufficiently broad allegations to encompass
defects in material and workmanship.  

Here, although Plaintiff made passing notations of a defect in
material, manufacturing and/or workmanship, her overall Complaint
suggests that she is really alleging a design defect. Given that
Plaintiff's references to a defect in manufacturing or workmanship
are conclusory and unsupported by any factual allegations, and that
her Complaint overall suggests that she is alleging a design
defect, the Court finds that the limited references to a defect in
manufacturing or workmanship do not plausibly suggest that she was
actually intending to allege a defect in manufacturing or
workmanship.

Because the Court therefore finds that (a) the only defect
Plaintiff has plausibly alleged is a design defect and (b) design
defects are not covered by the Limited Warranty, Plaintiff cannot
assert a claim for breach of the Limited Warranty based on the
alleged design defect. Consequently, the Court grants Defendant's
motion as to this claim.

Whether Plaintiff's Claim Pursuant to the MMWA Must Be Dismissed

To state a claim under the MMWA, plaintiffs must adequately plead a
cause of action for breach of written or implied warranty under
state law. To that effect, claims under the MMWA stand or fall with
the express and implied warranty claims under state law.

Because the Court has already determined that Plaintiff's claims
for breach of express or implied warranty were not sufficiently
pled to survive Defendant's motion, Plaintiff's claim pursuant to
the MMWA must also be dismissed.  

Whether Plaintiff's Claim for Unjust Enrichment Must Be Dismissed

After careful consideration, the Court answers this question in the
negative for the following reasons.

Unjust enrichment is a quasi-contract claim viable only in the
absence of an enforceable agreement between the parties governing
the subject matter of the dispute. The basis of a claim for unjust
enrichment is that the defendant has obtained a benefit which in
equity and good conscience' should be paid to the plaintiff.
However, unjust enrichment is not a catchall cause of action to be
used when others fail"; rather, it is available only in the unusual
situations when, though the defendant has not breached a contract
or committed a recognized tort, circumstances create an equitable
obligation running from the defendant to the plaintiff.

Although Plaintiff cites cases in which courts have allowed unjust
enrichment claims to proceed as alternative claims to other
contract or tort claims, Plaintiff misses a crucial point inherent
in those cases: namely, that unjust enrichment claims were allowed
as alternatives where there was some question as to the validity of
the underlying agreement.  

Here, neither party disputes that Defendant executed a Limited
Warranty to Plaintiff as part of her purchase of the relevant
vehicle. Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim is based on the
alleged fact that she and the members of the New York subclass
overpaid for defective cars and had been forced to pay other costs
related to that defect. However, given that the Court has
determined that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged only a design
defect, and, given that design defects are not covered under the
Limited Warranty, Plaintiff does not have an ability to sue and/or
recover for breach of contract based on that design defect. The
Court therefore finds that Plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment
arises outside of the scope of the Limited Warranty and is
consequently not barred. Defendant's motion on this claim must be
denied.

Whether the Class Allegations Should Be Dismissed

After careful consideration, the Court answers this question in the
negative for the following reasons.

In this case, Defendant does not appear to argue that this Court
lacks personal jurisdiction over it per se, but rather that
Plaintiff has not established that it has personal jurisdiction
over the claims of all of the putative class members. In
particular, Defendant argues that the class allegations should be
dismissed based on Plaintiff's inability to plead facts showing
that the Court has either general or specific jurisdiction over the
putative members of the nationwide Class.  

In Bristol-Myers Squibb, the Supreme Court found that
non-California-resident plaintiffs in a mass personal injury action
had not established that the California court had personal
jurisdiction over their claims. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S.Ct.
1773. In particular, the Supreme Court indicated that the fact that
other (resident) plaintiffs obtained, were prescribed, and ingested
the relevant pharmaceutical in California did not allow the state
to assert specific jurisdiction over the non-residents' claims for
the same injuries caused by that pharmaceutical.  

Here, Plaintiff has established personal jurisdiction over
Defendant with respect to her claims: she has alleged that she is a
New York citizen and resident who purchased the Class Vehicle in
New York.  Of note, Defendant does not appear to argue that
personal jurisdiction is lacking as to Plaintiff's claims, because
its argument seeks only to dismiss the class allegations from this
action for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff therefore has
established that personal jurisdiction exists as to her claims.

Given that there is personal jurisdiction as to Plaintiff's claims,
the Court follows the example of other courts in declining to
address the issue of whether personal jurisdiction exists as to the
nationwide class members until the class-certification stage.  

The Court does find, however, that, as to the New York subclass
identified by Plaintiff, which she defines as all members of the
Class who reside in New York State or purchased or leased in New
York State a 2016 Jeep Cherokee equipped with the 9-Speed
Transmission, such allegations are supported by traditional
personal jurisdiction minimum contacts. As a result, the Court
finds that Plaintiff has adequately established specific personal
jurisdiction as to the New York subclass even if Bristol-Myers
Squibb is applied because the suit by Plaintiff and on their behalf
arises out of an occurrence taking place in New York, and each
putative member of that subclass has a related tie to New York.

Regardless of the findings above, the Court finds that, whether or
not Bristol-Myers Squibb applies, Plaintiff's class action claims
as to the nationwide class must be dismissed based on the Court's
finding that Plaintiff's MMWA claim must be dismissed. The claim
pursuant to the MMWA was the only claim asserted on behalf of the
nationwide class and therefore the dismissal of that claim
necessarily requires the dismissal of the nationwide putative class
members. However, because the remaining state law claims were
asserted on behalf of the New York subclass, that putative subclass
need not be dismissed.

The Court denies Defendant's motion to dismiss the class
allegations without prejudice as to the out-of-state putative class
members, but with prejudice as to the New York subclass.
Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part; and it is further
ORDERED that the following claims are DISMISSED without prejudice:

(a) Plaintiff's First Claim pursuant to the MMWA (b) Plaintiff's
Second and Third Claims as they relate to the alleged omission (c)
Plaintiff's Fourth Claim for breach of implied warranty (d)
Plaintiff's Fifth Claim for breach of express warranty and it is
further
The following claims SURVIVE this motion to dismiss:

(a) Plaintiff's Second and Third Claim as they relate to the
alleged affirmative representations;(b) Plaintiff's Sixth Claim for
unjust enrichment; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendant's request to dismiss the nationwide class is
GRANTED (although the class allegations may be reinstated if, in
her motion to amend, Plaintiff can allege facts plausibly
suggesting her claim pursuant to the MMWA), while its request to
dismiss the New York subclass is DENIED with prejudice; and it is
further

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 1, 2019 Decision
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y4klyh5l from
Leagle.com.

Lisa Cummings, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Todd S. Garber --
tgarber@fbfglaw.com -- Finkelstein, Blankinship, Frei-Pearson &
Garber LLP.

FCA US LLC, Defendant, represented by Kathy A. Wisniewski --
kwisniewski@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson, Coburn Law Firm,
Stephen A. D'Aunoy -- sdaunoy@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson,
Coburn Law Firm, Thomas L. Azar, Jr. -- tazar@thompsoncoburn.com --
Thompson, Coburn LLP & Alan J. Pope -- Apope@cglawoffices.com --
Coughlin, Gerhart Law Firm.


FIRST SOLAR: Trial in Smilovits Suit to Begin January 2020
----------------------------------------------------------
First Solar, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the trial in the case,
Smilovits v. First Solar, Inc., et al., is slated to begin on
January 7, 2020.

On March 15, 2012, a purported class action lawsuit titled
Smilovits v. First Solar, Inc., et al., Case No. 2:12-cv-00555-DGC,
was filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Arizona (hereafter "Arizona District Court") against the Company
and certain of its current and former directors and officers.

The complaint was filed on behalf of persons who purchased or
otherwise acquired the Company's publicly traded securities between
April 30, 2008 and February 28, 2012 (the "Class Action").

The complaint generally alleges that the defendants violated
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by
making false and misleading statements regarding the Company's
financial performance and prospects.

The action includes claims for damages, including interest, and an
award of reasonable costs and attorneys' fees to the putative
class. The Company believes it has meritorious defenses and will
vigorously defend this action.

On July 23, 2012, the Arizona District Court issued an order
appointing as lead plaintiffs in the Class Action the Mineworkers'
Pension Scheme and British Coal Staff Superannuation Scheme
(collectively, the "Pension Schemes").

The Pension Schemes filed an amended complaint on August 17, 2012,
which contains similar allegations and seeks similar relief as the
original complaint. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on
September 14, 2012. On December 17, 2012, the court denied
defendants' motion to dismiss.

On October 8, 2013, the Arizona District Court granted the Pension
Schemes' motion for class certification and certified a class
comprised of all persons who purchased or otherwise acquired
publicly traded securities of the Company between April 30, 2008
and February 28, 2012 and were damaged thereby, excluding
defendants and certain related parties. Merits discovery closed on
February 27, 2015.

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on March 27, 2015.
On August 11, 2015, the Arizona District Court granted defendants'
motion in part and denied it in part, and certified an issue for
immediate appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (the "Ninth
Circuit"). First Solar filed a petition for interlocutory appeal
with the Ninth Circuit, and that petition was granted on November
18, 2015.

On May 20, 2016, the Pension Schemes moved to vacate the order
granting the petition, dismiss the appeal, and stay the merits
briefing schedule. On December 13, 2016, the Ninth Circuit denied
the Pension Schemes' motion. On January 31, 2018, the Ninth Circuit
issued an opinion affirming the Arizona District Court's order
denying in part defendants' motion for summary judgment.

On March 16, 2018, First Solar filed a petition for panel rehearing
or rehearing en banc with the Ninth Circuit. On May 7, 2018, the
Ninth Circuit denied defendants' petition. On August 6, 2018,
defendants filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S.
Supreme Court.

Meanwhile, in the Arizona District Court, expert discovery was
completed on February 5, 2019. On June 24, 2019, the U.S. Supreme
Court denied the petition. Following the denial of the petition,
the Arizona District Court ordered that the trial begin on January
7, 2020.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

First Solar, Inc. provides photovoltaic (PV) solar energy solutions
in the United States and internationally. It operates in two
segments, Modules and Systems. The company was formerly known as
First Solar Holdings, Inc. and changed its name to First Solar,
Inc. in 2006. First Solar, Inc. was founded in 1999 and is
headquartered in Tempe, Arizona.


FLING.COM LLC: Cunningham Sues Over Illegal SMS Ad Blasts
---------------------------------------------------------
Craig Cunningham, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. FLING.COM, LLC and Does 1 through
10, inclusive, and each of them, Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-23073,
(S.D. Fla., July 24, 2019), seeks injunctive relief, statutory and
treble damages in violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act.

Fling offers a "Free Adult Dating" website and utilizes unsolicited
autodialed text messages to market itself to prospective customers
of its website.

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Rachel E. Kaufman, Esq.
      Avi R. Kaufman, Esq.
      KAUFMAN P.A.
      400 NW 26th Street
      Miami, Florida 33127
      Tel: (305) 469-5881
      Email: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com
             rachel@kaufmanpa.com


FLUOR CORPORATION: Bid to Dismiss Shareholder Suit in Texas Pending
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fluor Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 1, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the motion to dismiss
the consolidated class action suit in the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Texas remains pending.

In May 2018, purported shareholders filed complaints against Fluor
Corporation and certain of its current and former executives in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

The plaintiffs purport to represent a class of shareholders who
purchased or otherwise acquired Fluor common stock from August 14,
2013 through May 3, 2018, and seek to recover damages arising from
alleged violations of federal securities laws.

In December 2018, the court appointed co-lead plaintiffs and
co-lead counsel. The co-lead plaintiffs filed an amended,
consolidated complaint in March 2019.

The company filed a motion to dismiss the matter on July 15, 2019.


Fluor said, "While no assurance can be given as to the ultimate
outcome of this matter, the company does not believe it is probable
that a loss will be incurred."

Fluor Corporation through its subsidiaries, provides engineering,
procurement, construction, fabrication and modularization,
operation, maintenance and asset integrity, and project management
services worldwide. It operates through four segments: Energy &
Chemicals; Mining, Industrial, Infrastructure & Power; Diversified
Services; and Government. Fluor Corporation was founded in 1912 and
is headquartered in Irving, Texas.


FMC CORPORATION: Faces Plymouth County Retirement Association Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
FMC Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 31, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company and its
former subsidiary Livent Corporation, are facing a class action
suit entitled, Plymouth County Retirement Association v. Livent
Corp., et al.

On May 13, 2019, purported stockholders of the company's former
subsidiary Livent Corporation ("Livent") filed a putative class
action complaint in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas,
Philadelphia County, in connection with Livent's October 2018
initial public offering (the "Livent IPO:).

The complaint in this case, Plymouth County Retirement Association
v. Livent Corp., et al., No. 190501229, named as defendants Livent,
certain of its current and former executives and directors, FMC
Corporation, and underwriters involved in the Livent IPO.

The complaint alleges generally that the offering documents for the
Livent IPO failed to adequately disclose certain information
related to Livent's business and prospects. The complaint alleges
violations of Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act
of 1933 and seeks unspecified damages and other relief on behalf of
all persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired Livent
common stock pursuant and/or traceable to the Livent IPO offering
documents.

On July 2, 2019, defendants moved to stay the Plymouth County
action, in favor of two similar putative class actions relating to
the Livent IPO, in which FMC has not been named as a defendant,
which are pending in Pennsylvania federal court. On July 26, 2019,
Plymouth County filed an amended complaint in its state court
case.

FMC said, "Livent has agreed to defend and indemnify FMC with
regard to this litigation. FMC is cooperating with Livent and other
defendants to defend the litigation."

FMC Corporation is a diversified chemical company serving
agricultural, consumer and industrial markets globally with
innovative solutions, applications and market-leading products. The
company is based in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.


GARRIDO COMPANY: Gonzalez Seeks Unpaid Wages
--------------------------------------------
Jose Ricardo Gonzalez, on behalf of himself and all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Garrido Company Truck, Inc., and
Ivan Garrido, Defendants, Case No. 610700/2019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
Nassau Cty., Aug. 6, 2019) alleges on behalf of himself and on
behalf of others similarly situated current and former employees of
Defendants that they are entitled to (i) minimum wages for work for
which Defendants willfully failed to pay at the proper rate as
required by the New York Labor Law and the supporting New York
State Department of Labor regulations; (ii) unpaid wages from
defendants for overtime work for which they did not receive
overtime premium pay as required by law; (iii) spread-of-hours pay
for days that Plaintiffs work exceeded 10 hours from start to
finish; (iv) liquidated damages pursuant to New York Labor Law for
these violations in the event that this case is not certified as a
class; and (v) compensation for Defendants' violation of the Wage
Theft Prevention Act.

Mr. Gonzalez worked 60 hours a week in January and February, 75
hours a week from March through October, and roughly 105 hours in
November and December. The Defendants did not provide a punch clock
or any other method for employees to track their time worked.

The complaint alleges that Defendants failed to compensate
Plaintiff at the appropriate statutory minimum wage for all of
their hours worked, in violation of the New York Labor Law and the
supporting New York Department of Labor regulations. Defendants'
failure to pay Plaintiff the appropriated minimum wage was willful,
and lacked a good faith basis, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as a helper from approximately
July 2012 until May 11, 2019.

Defendants owned and operated a trucking company in New York.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Michael Samuel, Esq.
     SAMUEL & STEIN
     38 West 32nd Street, Suite 1110
     New York, NY 10001
     Phone: (212) 563-9884



GEICO CASUALTY: Butta Seeks to Certify Class
--------------------------------------------
In the case, FRANCIS J. BUTTA, individually and on behalf of a
class of similarly situated persons, the Plaintiff, vs. GEICO
CASUALTY COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-00675-MAK (E.D.
Pa.), the Plaintiff moves the Court for an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "persons to seek relief from Geico Casualty Company, for
       certain practices pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and
       (b)(2)";

   2. appointing himself as representative of class; and

   3. appointing class counsel pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
      23(g).[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          James C. Haggerty, Esq.
          HAGGERTY, GOLDBERG,
          SCHLEIFER & KUPERSMITH, P.C.
             SCHMIDT KRAMER P.C.
          1835 Market Street, Suite 2700
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (267) 350-6600
          Facsimile: (215) 665-8197

               - and -

          Scott B. Cooper, Esq.
          SCHMIDT KRAMER P.C.
          209 State Street
          Harrisburg, PA 17101
          Telephone: (717) 232-6300

               - and -

          Jonathan Shub, Esq.
          KOHN SWIFT & GRAF, P.C.
          1600 Market Street, Suite 2500
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 238-1700

GENERAL ELECTRIC: Bid to Dismiss Bezio Class Action Underway
------------------------------------------------------------
General Electric Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 31, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company's motion to
dismiss the complaint in the Bezio class action suit is still
pending.

In June 2018, a lawsuit (the Bezio case) was filed in New York
state court derivatively on behalf of participants in GE's 401(k)
plan (the GE Retirement Savings Plan (RSP)), and alternatively as a
class action on behalf of shareowners who acquired GE stock between
February 26, 2013 and January 24, 2018, alleging violations of
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 based on alleged
misstatements and omissions related to insurance reserves and
performance of GE's business segments in a GE RSP registration
statement and documents incorporated therein by reference.

In November 2018, the plaintiffs filed an amended derivative
complaint naming as defendants GE, former GE executive officers and
Fidelity Management Trust Company, as trustee for the GE RSP.

In January 2019, GE filed a motion to dismiss.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

General Electric Company operates as a high-tech industrial company
worldwide. It operates in Power, Renewable Energy, Aviation, Oil &
Gas, Healthcare, Transportation, Lighting, and Capital segments.
The company was founded in 1892 and is headquartered in Boston,
Massachusetts.


GENERAL ELECTRIC: Bid to Dismiss Hachem Class Suit Still Pending
----------------------------------------------------------------
General Electric Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 31, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company's motion to
dismiss the Hachem class action suit is still pending.

Since November 2017, several putative shareholder class actions
under the federal securities laws have been filed against GE and
certain affiliated individuals and consolidated into a single
action currently pending in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York (the Hachem case).

In October 2018, the lead plaintiff filed a fourth amended
consolidated class action complaint naming as defendants GE and
current and former GE executive officers. It alleges violations of
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 related to insurance reserves and accounting for
long-term service agreements and seeks damages on behalf of
shareowners who acquired GE stock between February 27, 2013 and
January 23, 2018.

GE has filed a motion to dismiss, and briefing on that motion
concluded in October 2018.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

General Electric Company operates as a high-tech industrial company
worldwide. It operates in Power, Renewable Energy, Aviation, Oil &
Gas, Healthcare, Transportation, Lighting, and Capital segments.
The company was founded in 1892 and is headquartered in Boston,
Massachusetts.

GENERAL ELECTRIC: Houston Class Suit Stayed, Awaits Hachem Ruling
-----------------------------------------------------------------
General Electric Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 31, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the "Houston case" has
been stayed pending resolution of the motion to dismiss the "Hachem
case".

In October 2018, a putative class action (the Houston case) was
filed in New York state court naming as defendants GE, certain GE
subsidiaries and current and former GE executive officers and
employees.

It alleges violations of Sections 11, 12 and 15 of the Securities
Act of 1933 and seeks damages on behalf of purchasers of senior
notes issued in 2016 and rescission of transactions involving those
notes.

This case has been stayed pending resolution of the motion to
dismiss the Hachem case.

General Electric Company operates as a high-tech industrial company
worldwide. It operates in Power, Renewable Energy, Aviation, Oil &
Gas, Healthcare, Transportation, Lighting, and Capital segments.
The company was founded in 1892 and is headquartered in Boston,
Massachusetts.


GENERAL ELECTRIC: Touchstone Suit Stayed, Awaits Hachem Ruling
--------------------------------------------------------------
General Electric Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 31, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the Touchstone suit has
been stayed pending resolution of the motion to dismiss the Hachem
case.

In February 2019, a securities action (the Touchstone case) was
filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York naming as defendants GE and current and former GE executive
officers.

It alleges violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Section 1707.43 of the Ohio Securities Act
and common law fraud based on alleged misstatements regarding
insurance reserves, GE Power's revenue recognition practices
related to long term service agreements, GE's acquisition of
Alstom, and the goodwill recognized in connection with that
transaction.

The lawsuit seeks damages on behalf of six institutional investors
who purchased GE common stock between August 1, 2014 and October
30, 2018 and rescission of those purchases.

This case has been stayed pending resolution of the motion to
dismiss the Hachem case.

General Electric Company operates as a high-tech industrial company
worldwide. It operates in Power, Renewable Energy, Aviation, Oil &
Gas, Healthcare, Transportation, Lighting, and Capital segments.
The company was founded in 1892 and is headquartered in Boston,
Massachusetts.


GEORGIA POWER: Ruling in Franchise Fees Suit under Appeal
---------------------------------------------------------
Georgia Power Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 31, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company has filed a
notice of appeal with the Georgia Court of Appeals regarding the
Superior Court of Fulton County's February 2019 order in a class
action.

In 2011, plaintiffs filed a putative class action against Georgia
Power in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia alleging that
Georgia Power's collection in rates of amounts for municipal
franchise fees (which fees are paid to municipalities) exceeded the
amounts allowed in orders of the Georgia PSC and alleging certain
state tort law claims.

In 2016, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
previous dismissal of the case and remanded the case to the trial
court. Georgia Power filed a petition for writ of certiorari with
the Georgia Supreme Court, which was granted in 2017.

In June 2018, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
the Georgia Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial
court for further proceedings. Following a motion by Georgia Power,
on February 13, 2019, the Superior Court of Fulton County ordered
the parties to submit petitions to the Georgia PSC for a
declaratory ruling to address certain terms the court previously
held were ambiguous as used in the Georgia PSC's orders. The order
entered by the Superior Court of Fulton County also conditionally
certified the proposed class.

In March 2019, Georgia Power and the plaintiffs filed petitions
with the Georgia PSC seeking confirmation of the proper application
of the municipal franchise fee schedule pursuant to the Georgia
PSC's orders.

Georgia Power also filed a notice of appeal with the Georgia Court
of Appeals regarding the Superior Court of Fulton County's February
2019 order.

Georgia Power said, " The amount of any possible losses cannot be
calculated at this time because, among other factors, it is unknown
whether conditional class certification will be upheld and the
ultimate composition of any class and whether any losses would be
subject to recovery from any municipalities."

Georgia Power Company engages in generation, transmission,
distribution, purchases, and sells electric service in Georgia. It
generates electricity from coal, nuclear, and natural gas sources,
as well as renewable sources, such as solar, hydroelectric, and
wind.  The company was incorporated in 1930 and is based in
Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia Power Company is a subsidiary of The
Southern Company.


HASBRO INC: Class Suit Over Toys R Us Disclosure Still Ongoing
--------------------------------------------------------------
Hasbro, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 31 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to defend a
putative securities class action lawsuit over the company's alleged
misleading statements with  respect to the financial condition of
Toys"R"Us, Inc.

On or about September 28, 2018, a putative securities class action
complaint was filed against the Company and certain of our officers
and/or directors (the "Defendants") in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Rhode Island, on behalf of all purchasers of Hasbro
common stock between April 24, 2017 and October 23, 2017,
inclusive.

The complaint alleges violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, alleging that
Defendants purportedly made materially false and misleading
statements in connection with the financial condition of Toys"R"Us,
Inc. and its impact on the Company, as well as the financial impact
on the Company's business of economic conditions in the United
Kingdom and Brazil.

Toys"R"Us and several affiliates are debtors in a consolidated
chapter 11 proceeding.

Defendants deny liability and intend to vigorously defend the
action.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Hasbro, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as a play
and entertainment company. Hasbro, Inc. was founded in 1923 and is
headquartered in Pawtucket, Rhode Island.


HOLLIS TAGGART: Picon Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website
----------------------------------------------------------
YELITZA PICON AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiffs, v. HOLLIS TAGGART GALLERIES, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-07358-AT (S.D. N.Y., Aug. 6, 2019) is a civil
rights action against Defendant for its failure to design,
construct, maintain, and operate its website to be fully accessible
to and independently usable by Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired people.

The Defendant's denial of full and equal access to its website, and
therefore denial of its products and services offered thereby and
in conjunction with its physical location, is a violation of
Plaintiff's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, says
the complaint. Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a
change in Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and procedures
so that Defendant's website will become and remain accessible to
blind and visually-impaired consumers, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person who
requires screen-reading software to read website content using her
computer.

Defendant operates its art gallery as well as the Website and
advertises, markets, and operates in the State of New York and
throughout the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
     Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
     GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
     150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
     New York, NY 10003-2461
     Phone: (212) 228-9795
     Email: nyjg@aol.com
            Jeffrey@gottlieb.legal
            danalgottlieb@aol.com


HOME DEPOT: Freeman Asserts FCRA Breach Over Consumer Report
------------------------------------------------------------
TINA FREEMAN, on behalf of herself and all similarly-situated
individuals, Plaintiff, v. HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC., Defendant, Case
No. 93731586 filed in the 13th Judicial Circuit Court in
Hillsborough County, Florida, on Aug. 6, 2019, is an action against
Defendant for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

On November 20, 2017, Defendant procured a consumer report on
Plaintiff by using the services of a third-party vendor, First
Advantage, which qualifies as a consumer reporting agency.

The consumer report contained private, highly confidential
information about Plaintiff. However, pursuant to the FCRA,
Defendant is required to first disclose to its employees--in a
document that consists solely of the disclosure--that it may obtain
a consumer report on them for employment purposes, prior to
obtaining a copy of their consumer report. The Defendant's
disclosure form failed to follow the requirements of the FCRA. The
disclosure document provided to Plaintiff contained extraneous
information, the presence of which confused Plaintiff about her
rights pursuant to the FCRA and distracted her while she was
reading the document, says the complaint.

Plaintiff values her privacy and federally protected rights. If
Plaintiff had known the disclosure form that Defendant provided was
unlawful or Defendant would not comply with the FCRA, Plaintiff
would not have authorized Defendant to procure the consumer report,
notes the complaint.

Plaintiff Tina Freeman lives in Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida
and is a former employee of Defendant.

Defendant is a foreign limited liability company incorporated under
the laws of Georgia but routinely doing business in Tampa,
Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     LUIS A. CABASSA
     BRANDON J. HILL, ESQ.
     WENZEL FENTON CABASSA, P.A.
     1110 North Florida Ave., Suite 300
     Tampa, FL 33602
     Main No: 813-224-0431
     Direct Dial: 813-337-7992
     Facsimile: 813-229-8712
     Email: lcabassa@wfclaw.com
            bhill@wfclaw.com
            jcornell@wfclaw.com
            rcooke@wfclaw.com
            twells@wfclaw.com
            gnichols@wfclaw.com
            tsoriano@wfclaw.com



JC PENNEY: Court Dismisses Rojas Derivative Suit
------------------------------------------------
The Court of Chancery of Delaware issued a Memorandum Opinion
granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the case captioned JUAN C.
ROJAS, derivatively and on behalf of J.C. PENNEY COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff, v. MARVIN R. ELLISON, MYRON E. ULLMAN III, PAUL J.
BROWN, COLLEEN BARRETT, THOMAS ENGIBOUS, AMANDA GINSBERG, B. CRAIG
OWENS, LISA A. PAYNE, DEBORA A. PLUNKETT, LEONARD H. ROBERTS,
STEPHEN SADOVE, JAVIER G. TERUEL, R. GERALD TURNER, and RONALD W.
TYSOE, Defendants, and J.C. PENNEY COMPANY, INC., Nominal
Defendant. C.A. No. 2018-0755-AGB. (Del. Ch.).

A stockholder of J.C. Penney Company, Inc. asserts in this
derivative action that the company's directors breached their
fiduciary duty of loyalty by consciously disregarding their
responsibility to oversee J.C. Penney's compliance with California
laws governing price-comparison advertising. Plaintiff's central
allegation is that the directors ignored a red flag in the form of
a settlement of a civil case known as the Spann action, pursuant to
which J.C. Penney agreed to pay up to $50 million for the benefit
of a state-wide class of California consumers and to implement
certain improvements to its price comparison advertising policy and
practices.

The Spann Action

In 2012, Cynthia Spann, a J.C. Penney customer, filed an action
against J.C. Penney in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California on behalf of a class of California
consumers (Spann action). As amended, the complaint asserted that
J.C Penney had engaged in false reference pricing in violation of
California consumer protection statutes, including Section 17501 of
the California Business & Professions Code.

In the Settlement Agreement, J.C. Penney agreed to pay up to $50
million for the benefit of a state-wide class of California
consumers, with the amount for claimants (after the payment of
attorneys' fees and related costs) to be payable in cash or store
credits.23 J.C. Penney also agreed that as of the date of the
settlement it was not violating, and would not violate in the
future, federal or California law, including California
price-comparison advertising laws.

The district court approved the proposed settlement of the Spann
action.

The Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint under Court of
Chancery Rule 23.1 for failure to make a demand on the board before
filing suit.

A basic principle of the General Corporation Law of the State of
Delaware is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the
business and affairs of the corporation. For this reason, the
decision to bring or refrain from bringing a derivative claim on
behalf of the corporation is the responsibility of the board of
directors in the first instance.  This approach is designed to give
a corporation, on whose behalf a derivative suit is brought, the
opportunity to rectify the alleged wrong without suit or to control
any litigation brought for its benefit.

Under Court of Chancery Rule 23.1, a stockholder who wishes to
assert a derivative claim on behalf of a corporation must allege
with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to
obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or
comparable authority and the reasons for the plaintiff's failure to
obtain the action or for not making the effort.

Under the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 23.1, conclusory
allegations of fact or law not supported by the allegations of
specific fact may not be taken as true.

Here, Rojas does not challenge the independence of any members of
the Demand Board and does not contend that any of them have divided
loyalties because of a personal financial interest in any
underlying transaction. Rojas argues only that a majority of the
Demand Board is interested because they are exposed to a
substantial likelihood of personal liability. More specifically,
Rojas argues that a reasonable doubt exists regarding whether the
Demand Board could have considered, impartially and in good faith,
whether to pursue the claims in the Complaint because at least nine
of its eleven members face a substantial likelihood of liability
for failing to exercise their oversight obligations under Caremark,
In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del.
Ch. 1996). It is black letter law that the mere threat of personal
liability is insufficient to make this showing.

Chancellor Allen famously remarked in Caremark that to prove
liability for failing to monitor corporate affairs is possibly the
most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff
might hope to win a judgment.  

Under either theory, the imposition of liability requires a showing
that the directors knew that they were not discharging their
fiduciary obligations. The need to demonstrate scienter to
establish liability under an oversight theory follows not only from
Caremark itself, but from the existence of charter provisions
exculpating directors from liability for breaches of the duty of
care that have become ubiquitous in corporate America.

Rojas argues that a majority of the Demand Board faces a
substantial likelihood of liability under both prongs of Caremark.
He further argues that a majority of the J.C. Penney Board is
conflicted because of the ongoing nature of the California Action.
The court concludes that each of these arguments is without merit
and that plaintiff has failed to establish that any member of the
Demand Board faces a substantial likelihood of liability under
Caremark or is conflicted based on the California Action.

The Complaint Fails to Allege Facts Sufficient to Show that the
Directors Are Exposed to a Substantial Likelihood of Liability for
Utterly Failing to Implement a System of Controls

Rojas makes a faint-hearted attempt to argue that the members of
the Demand Board face a substantial likelihood of personal
liability under the first prong of Caremark for utterly failing to
implement any reporting or information system or controls with
respect to the Company's advertising and pricing policies.  

The Complaint and documents incorporated therein indicate that J.C.
Penney had a board-level reporting system in place at the time of
the Spann action to monitor the Company's compliance with laws and
regulations. Specifically, the Board's Audit Committee was charged
with legal and regulatory compliance and its charter required it:

To oversee the Company's compliance with the law and regulation
and, in connection therewith, to review and assess on no less than
an annual basis, a report from the Company's General Counsel
regarding the implementation and effectiveness of the Company's
legal compliance and ethics program.

To discuss with management any correspondence with regulators or
governmental agencies and any litigation or other legal matters
that raise material issues regarding the Company's financial
statements or accounting policies or its compliance with law or
regulation.75 Consistent with its mandate, the Audit Committee
received a report from the.

Company's General Counsel, Janet Link, on July 20, 2015, about
seven weeks before the Company entered into a Memorandum of
Settlement in the Spann action. Ms. Link reviewed with the Audit
Committee the status of the Spann pricing compliance class action
lawsuit and responded to questions asked and comments made by the
Committee members.

About two months later, shortly after the Company entered into the
Memorandum of Settlement but before the formal Settlement Agreement
was filed with the district court, the matter was reviewed with the
Board. On September 17, 2015, Ms. Link provided an update on the
Span naction that included a review of the history of the case as
well as recent developments.

Given the facts just recited, it cannot be said that J.C. Penney's
directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information
system or controls relevant to complying with price-comparison
advertising laws or, in the more recent words of March and, that
they made no good faith effort to try. Accordingly, Rojas has
failed to allege facts sufficient to support a reasonable inference
that the members of the Demand Board are exposed to a substantial
likelihood of personal liability under the first prong of
Caremark.

The Complaint Fails to Allege Facts Sufficient to Show that the
Directors Are Exposed to a Substantial Likelihood of Liability for
Consciously Failing to Monitor

Rojas' primary argument for establishing demand futility proceeds
under the second prong of Caremark, i.e., that having implemented
such a system or controls, the directors consciously failed to
monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from
being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.

To establish liability under this theory, a complaint must allege
(1) that the directors knew or should have known that the
corporation was violating the law (2) that the directors acted in
bad faith by failing to prevent or remedy those violations and (3)
that such failure resulted in damage to the corporation.

The typical way to plead that the directors knew or should have
known that a corporation was violating the law is to allege facts
demonstrating that the board was alerted to evidence of illegality
the proverbial red flag. Under Delaware law, red flags are only
useful when they are either waved in one's face or displayed so
that they are visible to the careful observer.

The Defendants respond with two arguments. First, they contend that
the Complaint's allegations fail to plead any particularized facts
supporting the inference that the Spann settlement put the
directors on notice of ongoing violations of law so as to establish
that it was a red flag.

Second, they contend that, even if the Spann settlement was a red
flag, plaintiff's answering brief confirms that the Company
responded to the Spann settlement extensively and apprised the
Board of its response. The court agrees with defendants' first
point, which is dispositive of plaintiff's argument under the
second prong of Caremark.

The critical flaw in plaintiff's red flag argument is that the
Complaint relies on conclusory rhetoric to charge J.C. Penney's
directors with knowledge of wrongdoing. Rojas does not allege as he
must particularized facts from which it reasonably can be inferred
that the Spann settlement put the directors on notice of any
ongoing violations of law. In particular, the Complaint does not
allege facts from which it can be inferred that any of the members
of the Demand Board were aware that the Company had violated any
California or other laws regulating pricing practices at any time
before or after the district court approved the Spann settlement.

To the contrary, per the Complaint's allegations, when the Spann
action was discussed with the Board in September 2015, it was in
terms of a settlement to resolve a consumer class action without
any admission of liability, with an express acknowledgement that
the Company was not then violating any federal or California laws,
and with a commitment to implement a program to ensure continued
compliance with California's price-comparison laws going forward.

Also, when the Spann settlement was approved by the district court
one year later, J.C. Penney represented to the court that it had
implemented a new price-comparison advertising policy in direct
response to the Spann action, pursuant to which J.C. Penney created
a Promotional Pricing Governance Committee, instituted regular
training sessions, and created a new position, Director of Pricing
Compliance, whose primary responsibility is to monitor and ensure
compliance with the new pricing policy.

The Spann action was a purely civil matter of the type that
commercial parties routinely settle after motion practice. It was
not brought against the backdrop of a prior settlement where clear,
repeated violations of a law had been found. Indeed, the reference
pricing claims in the Spannaction were not clear cut as
demonstrated by the fact that two California courts later disagreed
(in the California Action) over whether Section 17501 of the
California Business & Professions Code is unconstitutionally vague.
The cost of the Spann settlement, although sizeable, secured a
release from a state-wide class of California consumers as part of
a compromise without any admission of liability.

The law is clear that to establish oversight liability a plaintiff
must show that the directors knew they were not discharging their
fiduciary obligations or that the directors demonstrated a
conscious disregard for their responsibilities such as by failing
to act in the face of a known duty to act. Thus, a complaint must
allege particularized facts to show that the directors knew or
should have known that the corporation was violating the law in
order to state a claim under the second prong of Caremark.  In the
Court's view, the sheer amount of the Spann settlement payment and
the posture of the case when it settled are far from sufficient in
the context of the overall circumstances to support the inference
of scienter necessary to demonstrate that J.C. Penney's directors
acted in bad faith.

At bottom, Rojas asks the court to find that J.C. Penney's
directors have demonstrated a conscious disregard for their
responsibilities simply because, less than three months after the
district court approved the Spann settlement, the Los Angeles City
Attorney initiated coordinated civil proceedings against J.C.
Penney and three of its competitors asserting complex
price-comparison claims that have been disputed vigorously, and
because a single consumer filed suit in Kansas over a pair of
earrings in a case that has been settled on an individual basis.
Given the lack of any particularized factual allegations to support
a reasonable inference that the members of the Demand Board knew or
should have known that the Company was violating the law at any
time before or after those actions were filed, it would be
unwarranted to make such a finding and the court declines to do
so.

Rojas has failed to allege facts sufficient to support a reasonable
inference that the members of the Demand Board are exposed to a
substantial likelihood of personal liability under either prong of
Caremark. Accordingly, Rojas has failed to plead adequately that
demand would have been futile under either of those theories.

The Demand Board Is Not Conflicted Because of the Pendency of the
California Action

Rojas argues lastly that demand should be excused because bringing
the claims at issue in this Action would be tantamount to admitting
liability in the California Action. In making this argument, Rojas
relies on this court's decisions in Pfeiffer v. Toll and In re
Fitbit, Inc. Stockholder Derivative Litigation.

In Pfeiffer, a stockholder asserted a derivative claim to recover
damages resulting from alleged insider trading. The court found
that demand was futile under Rales because a majority of the board
members were defendants in a companion federal securities action
that had survived a motion to dismiss and in which the district
court held that the insider trading of the individual defendants
essentially the same trades at issue here raised a `powerful and
cogent inference of scienter' and was unusual in scope and timing.
In Fitbit, which also involved allegations of insider trading, the
court similarly considered as a relevant factor in the Rales
analysis the exposure certain directors faced in a related
securities action.

Both of these cases are readily distinguishable because none of the
members of the Demand Board is a party to the California Action
where the Company is the only defendant, and thus none of them has
any personal exposure in that action. The court has no reason to
doubt whether any members of the Demand Board could consider a
demand impartially based on the pendency of the California Action.

The court concludes that plaintiff has failed to allege facts from
which it may reasonably be inferred that any of the directors on
the Demand Board consciously allowed J.C. Penney to violate any
price-comparison advertising laws so as to demonstrate that they
acted in bad faith.

Accordingly, Rojas has failed to establish that his failure to make
a demand should be excused, and the Complaint is hereby dismissed
with prejudice in its entirety.

A full-text copy of the Chancery Court's July 29, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3rgjubf from
Leagle.com.

Thomas A. Uebler -- tuebler@mdsulaw.com -- and Jeremy J. Riley --
jriley@mdsulaw.com -- MCCOLLOM D'EMILIO SMITH UEBLER LLC,
Wilmington, Delaware; Melinda A. Nicholson --
melinda.nicholson@ksfcounsel.com -- KAHN SWICK & FOTI, LLC, New
Orleans, Louisiana; Roger A. Sachar, NEWMAN FERRARA LLP, 1250
Broadway, 27th Floor, New York, NY 10001, Attorneys for Plaintiff
Juan C. Rojas.

William M. Lafferty -- wlafferty@mnat.com -- Susan W. Waesco --
swaesco@mnat.com -- and Riley T. Svikhart -- rsvikhart@mnat.com --
MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Meryl
L. Young -myoung@gibsondunn.com -- GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP,
Irvine, California; Jason J. Mendro -- jmendro@gibsondunn.com --
and Lissa M. Percopo -- lpercopo@gibsondunn.com -- GIBSON, DUNN &
CRUTCHER LLP, Washington, D.C., Attorneys for Defendants Marvin R.
Ellison, Myron E. Ullman III, Paul J. Brown, Colleen Barrett,
Thomas Engibous, Amanda Ginsberg, B. Craig Owens, Lisa A. Payne,
Debora A. Plunkett, Leonard H. Roberts, Stephen Sadove, Javier G.
Teruel, R. Gerald Turner, and Ronald W. Tysoe, and Nominal
Defendant J.C. Penney Company, Inc.

LARIO OIL: Court OKs Conditional Certification in Hancock Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas issued
a Memorandum and Order granting Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional
Collective Action Certification in the case captioned NATHAN
HANCOCK, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. LARIO OIL & GAS CO., Defendant. Case No.
2:19-CV-02140-JAR-KGG. (D. Kan.).

Plaintiff Nathan Hancock brings this putative collective action
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), against Defendant Lario
Oil & Gas Co., claiming violations of the FLSA's overtime pay
requirements.  Plaintiff alleges that Defendant misclassified its
employees as independent contractors in order to bypass FLSA
overtime requirements. Plaintiff alleges that these employees,
referred to as company men, were paid a day rate for a twelve-hour
shift and not paid overtime if they worked beyond twelve hours.

The Defendant does not oppose Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional
Certification. Rather, the Defendant requests that the Court limit
the class to individuals engaged by Edwards Well Services (EWS).
Defendant argues that the putative class identified by Plaintiff is
not similarly situated because the class members were not
Defendant's employees. Rather, the company men were employed by
various staffing companies, including EWS, which contracted with
Defendant to provide managers at well and drill sites. Defendant
requests the Court look beyond Plaintiff's pleadings to an
affidavit and sample contract demonstrating EWS's role in
Plaintiff's employment.

The Defendant's argument requires the Court to decide whether
Defendant is an employer under the FLSA.

The FLSA defines employer as any person acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee. Determining whether Defendant is the putative plaintiffs'
employer is a fact-intensive inquiry requiring the Court to weigh
evidence, an inquiry not appropriate at this initial stage.15 As
such, this challenge to conditional certification is premature.

At the notice stage, with no discovery conducted, it is enough that
Plaintiff has alleged that he and the putative class were employees
of Defendant and subject to a single decision, policy, or plan the
day rate applicable to all company men. Plaintiff's Complaint, as
supported by the declaration and exhibits, is a substantial
allegation and therefore meets the threshold for sending notice to
other putative plaintiffs. To the extent Defendant wishes to raise
factual challenges to whether putative plaintiffs hired by various
staffing companies are similarly situated, such challenges are
appropriately raised at the stricter second stage of the
conditional certification process, after discovery is completed and
the evidence is more fully developed.

Possible defenses or justifications for decertification will be
considered should Defendant file a motion for summary judgment or
motion to decertify.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 1, 2019 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yyclm7k6 from
Leagle.com.

Nathan Hancock, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew W. Dunlap --
adunlap@mybackwages.com -- Josephson Dunlap, pro hac vice, Eric L.
Dirks -- dirks@williamsdirks.com -- Williams Dirks Dameron, LLC &
William R. Liles -- wliles@mbwages.com -- Josephson Dunlap, pro hac
vice.

Lario Oil & Gas Company, Defendant, represented by Forrest T.
Rhodes, Jr. -- frhodes@foulston.com -- Foulston Siefkin LLP.


LEXICON PHARMACEUTICALS: Continues to Defend Manopla Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Lexicon Pharmaceuticals, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 1, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company
continues to defend a securities class action suit entitled, Daniel
Manopla v. Lexicon Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Lonnel Coats, Jeffrey L.
Wade and Pablo Lapuerta, M.D.

On January 28, 2019, a purported securities class action complaint
captioned Daniel Manopla v. Lexicon Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Lonnel
Coats, Jeffrey L. Wade and Pablo Lapuerta, M.D. was filed against
the company and certain of its officers in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division.

An amended complaint was filed on July 30, 2019. The lawsuit
purports to be a class action brought on behalf of purchasers of
our securities during the period from March 11, 2016 through July
29, 2019.

The complaint alleges that the defendants violated federal
securities laws by making materially false and misleading
statements and/or omissions concerning data from our Phase 3
clinical trials of sotagliflozin in type 1 diabetes patients and
the prospects of FDA approval of sotagliflozin for the treatment of
type 1 diabetes.

The complaint purports to assert claims for violations of Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

The complaint seeks, on behalf of the purported class, an
unspecified amount of monetary damages, interest, fees and expenses
of attorneys and experts, and other relief.

Lexicon Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a biopharmaceutical company, focuses
on the development and commercialization of pharmaceutical
products. Lexicon Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was founded in 1995 and is
headquartered in The Woodlands, Texas.


MASIMO CORP: Objection to PHI's Class Cert. Bid Due Aug. 26
-----------------------------------------------------------
Masimo Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 31, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 29, 2019, that the company's opposition
to the motion for class certification of the class action suit
initiated by Physicians Healthsource, Inc., is due August 26, 2019

On January 2, 2014, a putative class action complaint was filed
against the Company in the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California by Physicians Healthsource, Inc..

The complaint alleges that the Company sent unsolicited facsimile
advertisements in violation of the Junk Fax Protection Act of 2005
and related regulations. The complaint seeks $500 for each alleged
violation, treble damages if the District Court finds the alleged
violations to be knowing, plus interest, costs and injunctive
relief.

On March 26, 2019, an amended complaint was filed adding Radha
Geismann MD PC as an additional named plaintiff. On June 17, 2019,
the plaintiffs filed their motion for class certification.

The Company's opposition to the motion for class certification is
due August 26, 2019. A trial date of November 5, 2019 has been set
by the District Court.

The Company believes it has good and substantial defenses to the
class claims, but there is no guarantee that the Company will
prevail. The Company is unable to determine whether any loss will
ultimately occur or to estimate the range of such loss; therefore,
no amount of loss has been accrued by the Company in the
accompanying condensed consolidated financial statements.

Masimo Corporation, a medical technology company, develops,
manufactures, and markets noninvasive monitoring technologies
worldwide. Masimo Corporation was founded in 1989 and is
headquartered in Irvine, California.


MAVENIR INC. Court Appoints Lead Plaintiff in Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Delaware
issued a Memorandum Opinion granting Plaintiff's Motion for
Appointment as Lead Plaintiff in the case captioned WAYNE COUNTY
EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MAVENIR, INC. F/K/A XURA, INC.,
PHILIPPE TARTAVULL, HENRY R. NOTHHAFT, SUSAN D. BOWICK, JAMES
BUDGE, NICCOLO DE MASI, MATTHEW A. DRAPKIN, DORON INBAR, and MARK
C. TERRELL, Defendants. Civil Action No. 18-1229-CFC-SRF.
(D.Del.).

Presently before the court in this putative class action alleging
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Xura's Board of
Directors entered into an agreement and plan of merger (Merger
Agreement), wherein Xura shareholders received $25 per share. The
merger was approved by Xura shareholders  and closed . Plaintiff
alleges that the Proxy and Supplemental Proxy contained materially
incomplete and misleading disclosures.

Appointment as Lead Plaintiff

Requirements under the PSLRA

The first element in creating a rebuttable presumption under the
PSLRA is filing the complaint. Defendants do not contest the second
element under the PSLRA, that Wayne County has the largest
financial interest in the relief sought by the class.  Therefore,
the court analyzes the third element under the PSLRA: the
typicality and adequacy requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P.
  
Typicality

The typicality requirement is designed to align the interests of
the class and the class representatives so that the latter will
work to benefit the entire class through the pursuit of their own
goals. However, typicality does not require that all putative class
members share identical claims.

The Defendants argue that Wayne County's legal strategies and legal
theories are distinct from the class because of confidential client
information likely improperly disclosed to the Labaton firm arising
from Mr. Farrell's conflict of interest. Furthermore, defendants
contend that Wayne County is subject to unique legal defenses due
to Mr. Farrell's conflict. Therefore, defendants conclude, Wayne
County fails to meet the typicality prong. Defendants do not
specify what is meant by unique legal defenses and provide no facts
or legal authority to support this argument. Defendants rely upon
speculation, characterizing the timing of this action's filing as
highly suspicious.

Defendants point to Labaton's filing of this action weeks after Mr.
Farrell joined the firm despite publicly available information
being released months beforehand. However, beyond allegations of
suspicious timing, defendants do not specify anything suspicious in
the complaint itself that would have been learned outside of
publicly available information.

Because at this juncture the court's initial inquiry into whether
Wayne County satisfies the typicality and adequacy requirements
need not be extensive, the court finds that Wayne County has the
same interests and shares the same legal theories as the rest of
the class.Therefore, Wayne County satisfies the prima facie showing
of typicality.

Adequacy

The adequacy determination is made in context with the movant's
choice of lead counsel The adequacy requirement mandates that a
representative party be able to fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.

For adequacy, courts should consider whether the movant has the
ability and incentive to represent the claims of the class
vigorously, whether the movant has obtained inadequate counsel and
whether there is a conflict between the movant's] claims and those
asserted on behalf of the class.
Defendants argue that Wayne County's representation of the class
flows from an irreconcilable conflict and is predicated on the
improper use of defendants' confidential client information.  
Therefore, defendants conclude that the adequacy prong is not met.

However, defendants provide no facts or legal authority in support
of their argument. Defendants have not provided examples of
disclosures of alleged confidential information relied upon by
Wayne County and their counsel in drafting the pleadings. The only
support cited for defendants' argument is the alleged suspicious
timing of the filing of the pending suit shortly after attorney
Farrell switched firms.

Because Wayne County filed the complaint, has the largest financial
interest in the outcome, and satisfies the prima facie showing of
typicality and adequacy, it has satisfied the requirements of the
presumptive lead plaintiff. Per the PSLRA, the court will move to
the second step in the analysis and consider whether defendants can
successfully rebut the presumption.

Rebutting the Presumption

Pursuant to the PSLRA, the court's presumption as to lead plaintiff
may be rebutted only upon proof by a member of the purported
plaintiff class that the presumptively most adequate plaintiff will
not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class; or is
subject to unique defenses that render such plaintiff incapable of
adequately representing the class.

Defendants argue that Wayne County fails to meet the typicality and
adequacy requirements because of Mr. Farrell's conflict, but
provide no facts or legal authority to support this argument.

Instead, defendants concede that the complaint references
information that was publicly available based on Chancery Court
filings. Defendants rely upon the same arguments to rebut the
presumption of lead plaintiff and to support their motion to
disqualify.

Wayne County argues that defendants lack standing to rebut the
presumption. The Third Circuit in Cendant noted that the PSLRA's
language makes clear that only class members may seek to rebut the
presumption, and the court should not permit or consider any
arguments by defendants or non-class members. The presumption of
lead plaintiff has not been rebutted.

Therefore, Wayne County's motion for appointment as lead plaintiff
is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 1, 2019 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxkbsmdr from
Leagle.com.

Wayne County Employees Retirement System, on behalf of itself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Guillaume
Buell -- gbuell@tenlaw.com -- Thornton Law Firm LLP, pro hac vice,
Ira M. Press -- ipress@kmllp.com -- Kirby McInerney LLP, pro hac
vice, Jessica Zeldin -- jzeldin@rmgglaw.com -- Rosenthal, Monhait &
Goddess, P.A., Peter S. Linden -- plinden@kmllp.com -- Kirby
McInerney LLP, pro hac vice & Peter Bradford DeLeeuw --
bdeleeuw@rmgglaw.com -- Rosenthal, Monhait & Goddess, P.A.

Mavenir, Inc., formerly known as Xura, Inc., Philippe Tartavull,
Henry R. Nothhaft, Susan D. Bowick, James Budge, Niccolo De Masi,
Doron Inbar & Mark C. Terrell, Defendants, represented by John
Leonard Reed -- john.reed@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper LLP, Peter H.
Kyle -- peter.kyle@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper LLP & Ethan Haller
Townsend -- ehtownsend@mwe.com -- McDermott Will & Emery LLP.

Matthew A. Drapkin, Defendant, represented by Jonathan A. Choa --
jchoa@potteranderson.com -- Potter Anderson & Corroon, LLP &
Jennifer L. Conn -- jconn@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher, pro hac vice.


MDL 2875: Collins Suit v. Aurobindo over Valsartan Consolidated
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case, Carrie Collins an individual; on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. AUROBINDO PHARMA
U.S.A., INC., AUROBINDO LTD., and DOES 1-10, the Defendants, Case
No. 3:19-cv-00688 (Filed April 15, 2019), was transferred from the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, to the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey on Aug. 6, 2019.
The New Jersey District Court Clerk assigned, Case No.
1:19-cv-16387 to the proceeding. The suit demands $9,999,000 and
alleges product liability for personal injury caused by the use of
generic valsartan.

The Collins case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2875, Re:
VALSARTAN N-NITROSODIMETHYLAMINE (NDMA) CONTAMINATION PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Feb. 14, 2019.
This litigation arises out of an investigation by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration into impurities found in generic drug products
containing valsartan, a medication indicated for the treatment of
high blood pressure and other conditions. During the course of the
FDA investigation, a number of voluntary recalls of generic
valsartan medications were issued. Purchasers of recalled lots of
generic valsartan subsequently filed actions alleging economic
losses. The initial wave of consumer class actions was followed by
actions alleging personal injuries from the ingestion of affected
valsartan medications, as well as other related litigation.

In its Dec. 18, 2013 Order, the MDL Panel found that these actions
involve common questions of fact, and that centralization will
serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the
just and efficient conduct of this litigation. All actions involve
common factual questions arising out of allegations that plaintiffs
purchased or used generic formulations of valsartan medications
containing the nitrosamine impurities NDMA and/or NDEA; that these
impurities present a risk of cancer and liver damage; and that
defendants knew, or should have known, of the impurities as early
as 2012. All actions stem from the same FDA investigation and
voluntary recall announced in July 2018, and the voluntary recalls
are ongoing. Although the investigation, and the earliest-filed
actions, focused on Zhejiang Huahai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. as the
source of the alleged impurities, the FDA investigation and the
actions before the Panel now encompass alleged industry-wide issues
concerning the production of the valsartan active pharmaceutical
ingredient (API) which will be common to all actions. The common
questions of fact include: (1) whether the generic valsartan sold
by defendants contained NDMA or NDEA; (2) the cause of the alleged
impurities, including alleged defects in the manufacturing and
sampling process; (3) when defendants knew or should have known of
the impurities; (4) how long the NDMA- and NDEA- containing
valsartan medications were in circulation; and (5) whether the
amounts of NDMA and NDEA in the medications presented a risk of
cancer or other injuries. All of the valsartan actions will raise
these issues, regardless of whether the alleged supplier of the
valsartan API was Zhejiang Huahai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., Mylan,
Hetero Labs Limited, or some other entity. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings, including with respect to class certification and Daubert
motions; and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel,
and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the MDL is Hon. Judge Robert
B. Kugler. The lead case is Case No.1:19-md-02875-RBK-JS.

Zhejiang Huahai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. provides formulations,
active pharmaceutical ingredients, and intermediates in China and
internationally.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Graham Lambert, Esq.
          HAFFNER LAW PC
          445 South Figueroa Street, Suite 2625
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 514-5681
          Facsimile: (213) 514-5682

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          Ernest Frank Koschineg , III
          CIPRIANI & WERNER, P.C.
          450 Sentry Parkway, Suite 200
          Blue Bell, PA 19422
          Telephone: (610) 567-0700
          Facsimile: (610) 567-0712

               - and -

          Jessica Margaret Heinz, Esq.
          CIPRIANI & WERNER, P.C.
          Parkway Blue Bell, PA 19422
          Telephone: (610) 567-0700
          E-mail: jheinz@c-wlaw.com

               - and -

          Kyle Anthony Fellenz, Esq.
          CLARK HILL LLP
          600 W. Broadway, Suite 500
          San Diego, CA 92101-3357
          Telephone: (619) 557-0404
          Facsimile: (619) 557-0460

              - and -

          Roger G Perkins, Esq.
          MORRIS POLICH AND PURDY, LLP
          One America Plaza
          600 West Broadway, Suite 500
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 819-2432

MERCHANTS & MEDICAL: Placeholder Bid for Class Cert. Filed
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JUMOKA JOHNSON,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, v. MERCHANTS & MEDICAL CREDIT CORPORATION INC. and
CAPITAL ONE N.A, the Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-01121-NJ (E.D
Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order certifying a
class, appointing the Plaintiff as class representative, and
appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class Counsel, and for such
other and further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiffs file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class. Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir.
2017).[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com

MICHAEL ANGELO MARBLE: Maxwell Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime
---------------------------------------------------------
Marcel Maxwell, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Michael Angelo Marble & Stone, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 712881/2019 (N.Y. Sup., July 23, 2019), seeks
to recover all available damages, including his lost wages,
reinstatement, maximum liquidated damages, other damages including
punitive damages, attorneys' fees and costs of the action pursuant
to New York labor laws.

Michael Angelo Marble & Stone was engaged in the business of
selling granite and marble where Maxwell worked as a manual
worker/delivery person performing all manual and physical tasks,
including handling and deliver of stones and marble from on or
about May 17, 2018 to on or about June 28, 2019. He claims not to
be paid all overtime hours worked in a week, and was deducted 2.5
hours per week for meal breaks despite not availing of them. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Abdul K. Hassan, Esq.
      Abdul Hassan Law Group, PLLC
      215-28 Hillside Avenue
      Queens Village, NY 11427
      Tel: (718) 740-1000
      Fax: (718) 740-2000
      E-mail: abdul@abdulhassan.com


MIDWEST RECOVERY: Hicke Sues Over Erroneous Credit Report
---------------------------------------------------------
Thomas R. Hicke, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Midwest Recovery Systems, LLC and Does
1-10, Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-01375, (S.D. Cal., July 23, 2019),
seeks injunctive relief, statutory and treble damages for
violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the California
Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act.

Midwest Recovery Systems provides information to consumer reporting
agencies. It sought to collect on debt allegedly owed by Hicke to
My Cash Now despite having no knowledge of said account. Derogatory
information had been placed on Hicke's credit report saying that he
was late in making payments, notes the complaint.[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
      Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
      Meghan E. George, Esq.
      Thomas E. Wheeler, Esq.
      LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
      21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
      Woodland Hills, CA 91367
      Phone: (877) 206-4741
      Fax: (866) 633-0228
      Email: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
             abacon@toddflaw.com
             mgeorge@toddflaw.com
             twheeler@toddflaw.com


MISSISSIPPI POWER: Bid to Dismiss Turnage Class Suit Underway
-------------------------------------------------------------
Mississippi Power Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 31, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that Mississippi Power and
the Mississippi PSC have each filed a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint by Ray C. Turnage

In November 2018, Ray C. Turnage and 10 other individual plaintiffs
filed a putative class action complaint against Mississippi Power
and the three current members of the Mississippi PSC in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.
Mississippi Power received Mississippi PSC approval in 2013 to
charge a mirror CWIP rate premised upon including in its rate base
pre-construction and construction costs for the Kemper IGCC prior
to placing the Kemper IGCC into service.

The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed that approval and ordered
Mississippi Power to refund the amounts paid by customers under the
previously-approved mirror CWIP rate. The plaintiffs allege that
the initial approval process, and the amount approved, were
improper. They also allege that Mississippi Power underpaid
customers by up to $23.5 million in the refund process by applying
an incorrect interest rate. The plaintiffs seek to recover, on
behalf of themselves and their putative class, actual damages,
punitive damages, pre-judgment interest, post-judgment interest,
attorney's fees, and costs.

In response to Mississippi Power and the Mississippi PSC each
filing a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint on March 14, 2019. The amended complaint included four
additional plaintiffs and additional claims for gross negligence,
reckless conduct, and intentional wrongdoing.

Mississippi Power and the Mississippi PSC have each filed a motion
to dismiss the amended complaint.

Mississippi Power believes this legal challenge has no merit;
however, an adverse outcome in this proceeding could have a
material impact on Mississippi Power's results of operations,
financial condition, and liquidity. The ultimate outcome of this
matter cannot be determined at this time.

Mississippi Power Company, headquartered in Gulfport, Mississippi,
is a regulated utility subsidiary of The Souterhern Company, a
utility holding company headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia.


MONEYGRAM INT'L: Continues to Defend Illinois Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
MoneyGram International, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company
continues to defend a putative securities class action suit in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois.

On November 14, 2018, a putative securities class action lawsuit
was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois against MoneyGram and certain of its executive
officers.

The lawsuit asserts claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and alleges that MoneyGram made
material misrepresentations regarding its compliance with the
stipulated order for permanent injunction and final judgment that
MoneyGram entered into with the Federal Trade Commission in October
2009 and with the deferred prosecution agreement (the "DPA") that
MoneyGram entered into with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania and the U.S. Department of Justice
in November 2012.

The lawsuit seeks unspecified damages, equitable relief, interest,
and costs and attorneys' fees. The Company is vigorously defending
this matter.

MoneyGram said, "We are unable to predict the outcome, or the
possible loss or range of loss, if any, related to this matter."  

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

MoneyGram International, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
provides money transfer services in the United States and
internationally. The company operates through two segments, Global
Funds Transfer and Financial Paper Products. MoneyGram
International, Inc. was founded in 1940 and is based in Dallas,
Texas.


MRS BPO: Court Stays Class Certification Proceedings in "Rozani"
----------------------------------------------------------------
JULIAN ROZANI, the Plaintiff, vs. MRS BPO LLC, ET AL., the
Defendant, Case No. 19-CV-1115 (E.D. Wisc.), the Hon. Judge William
E. Duffin entered an order on Aug. 5, 2019, granting Plaintiff's
motion to stay further proceedings on the motion for class
certification.

The parties are relieved from the automatic briefing schedule set
forth in Civil Local Rule 7(b) and (c). Moreover, for
administrative purposes, it is necessary that the Clerk terminate
the plaintiff's motion for class certification. However, this
motion will be regarded as pending to serve its protective purpose
under Damasco.

On August 2, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a class action complaint. At
the same time, the plaintiff filed what the court commonly refers
to as a "protective" motion for class certification.

In this motion the plaintiff moved to certify the class described
in the complaint but also moved the court to stay further
proceedings on that motion.

In Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2011),
the court suggested that class‐action plaintiffs "move to certify
the class at the same time that they file their complaint." "The
pendency of that motion protects a putative class from attempts to
buy off the named plaintiffs." However, because parties are
generally unprepared to proceed with a motion for class
certification at the beginning of case, the Damasco court suggested
that the parties "ask the district court to delay its ruling to
provide time for additional discovery or investigation."[BN]

NATIONS INFO: Sent Unsolicited Telemarketing Texts, Rice Suit Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
ALEXANDER RICE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. NATIONS INFO CORPORATION, a California Corporation,
Case No. 1:19-cv-23180-DPG (S.D. Fla., Aug. 1, 2019), accuses the
Defendant of violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by
sending unsolicited telemarketing text message to the Plaintiff's
cellular telephone.

Nations Info Corporation is a California corporation whose
principal office is located in Goleta, California.

The Defendant is a proprietary platform developer that provides a
variety of online real estate services, including
rentbeforeowning.com.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 1205
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (305) 479-2299
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
                  gberg@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          Jordan D. Utanski, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, PA
          19495 Biscayne Blvd., #607
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (305) 975-3320
          E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com
                  utanski@edelsberglaw.com


NESTLE SA: 9th Cir. Amends Oct. 2018 Opinion in Child Slavery Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN DOE, I; JOHN DOE, II; JOHN DOE, III; JOHN DOE,
IV; JOHN DOE, V; and JOHN DOE, VI, each individually and on behalf
of proposed class members, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NESTLE, S.A.;
NESTLE USA, INC.; NESTLE IVORY COAST; CARGILL INCORPORATED COMPANY;
CARGILL COCOA; CARGILL WEST AFRICA, S. A.; ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND
COMPANY, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 17-55435 (9th Cir.), the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit amended the Opinion
filed on Oct. 23, 2018.

The Opinion is amended as follows: "IV. Plaintiffs Have Standing to
Bring Their Claims - Defendants argue that plaintiffs lack Article
III standing to bring their claims. To have standing, plaintiffs
must allege [(1)] a concrete and particularized injury [(2)] that
is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, [(3)] and is likely
to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Consumer Fin.
Prot. Bureau v. Gordon, 819 F.3d 1179, 1187 (9th Cir. 2016), cert.
denied, (quoting Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 704 (2013)).
Plaintiffs easily satisfy the first and third requirements.
Defendants do not dispute that plaintiffs suffered concrete injury
by being abused and held as child slaves.  In addition, plaintiffs'
injuries are redressable because when one private party is injured
by another, the injury can be redressed in at least two ways: by
awarding compensatory damages or by imposing a sanction on the
wrongdoer that will minimize the risk that the harm-causing conduct
will be repeated.  Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523
U.S. 83, 127 (1998).  Plaintiffs also satisfy the traceability
requirement as to Cargill because they raise sufficiently specific
allegations regarding Cargill's involvement in farms that rely on
child slavery.  Baloco ex rel. Tapia v. Drummond Co., 640 F.3d
1338, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169
(1997) (Article III traceability requirement does not exclude
injury produced by determinative or coercive effect upon the action
of someone else.).  Plaintiffs' allegations against Nestle are far
less clear, though part of the difficulty is plaintiffs' reliance
on collective allegations against all or at least multiple
defendants.  Notwithstanding this deficiency, the allegations are
sufficient to at least allow plaintiffs a final opportunity to
replead.  On remand, plaintiffs must eliminate the allegations
against foreign defendants and specifically identify the culpable
conduct attributable to individual domestic defendants."

With the Amended Opinion, a majority of the panel voted to deny the
petition for panel rehearing.  Judges D. Nelson and Christen voted
to deny the petition for panel rehearing, and Judge Shea voted to
grant the petition for panel rehearing.

Judge Christen voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc,
and Judge D. Nelson so recommended.  Judge Shea recommended
granting the petition for rehearing en banc. The full court was
advised of the petition for rehearing en banc.  A judge of the
Court requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc.
The matter failed to receive a majority of the votes of non-recused
active judges in favor of en banc consideration.  No further
petitions for rehearing will be entertained.

The Court denied the petition for rehearing and petition for
rehearing en banc.  Judge Bennett's dissent from the denial of
rehearing en banc is filed concurrently with the Order.  Judges
Wardlaw, Watford, Owens, Friedland, Miller, and Collins did not
participate in the deliberations or vote in the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/cczqqC from Leagle.com.

Paul L. Hoffman (argued) -- tboutrous@gibsondunn.com -- John
Washington, and Catherine Sweetser, Schonbrun Seplow Harris &
Hoffman LLP, Los Angeles, California; Terrence P. Collingsworth,
International Human Rights Advocates, Washington, D.C.; for
Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. (argued), Abbey Hudson --
ahudson@gibsondunn.com -- Matthew A. Hoffman --
mhoffman@gibsondunn.com -- and Perlette Michèle Jura --
pjura@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Los Angeles,
California; Christopher B. Leach and Theodore B. Olson, Gibson Dunn
& Crutcher LLP, Washington, D.C.; Colleen Sinzdak, David M. Foster,
Craig A. Hoover, and Neal Kumar Katyal, Hogan Lovells US LLP,
Washington, D.C.; for Defendant-Appellee Nestlé USA, Inc.

Andrew John Pincus (argued) and Kevin S. Ranlett, Mayer Brown LLP,
Washington, D.C.; Lee H. Rubin, Mayer Brown LLP, Mayer Brown LLP,
Palo Alto, California; for Defendant-Appellee Cargill
Incorporated.

Marc B. Robertson and Richard A. Stamp, Washington Legal
Foundation, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae Washington Legal
Foundation.


NETGEAR INC: Suit in California State Court Stayed
--------------------------------------------------
NETGEAR, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that a California state court
judge has granted the Company's motion to stay the state court case
pending the outcome of the federal case.

On January 9, 2019 and January 10, 2019, February 1, 2019 and
February 8, 2019, the Company was sued in four separate securities
class action suits in Superior Court of California, County of Santa
Clara, along with Arlo Technologies, individuals, and underwriters
involved in the spin-off of Arlo.

Two more similar state actions have been filed against Arlo
Technologies Inc. et al.. In total, six putative class action
complaints have now been filed in California state court in Santa
Clara County.  The Company is named as a defendant in five of the
six lawsuits.  

The complaints generally allege that Arlo's initial public offering
(IPO) materials contained false and misleading statements, hiding
problems with Arlo’s Ultra product. These claims are styled as
violations of Sections 11, 12(a), and 15 of the Securities Act of
1933.

There is also a putative class action pending in federal court in
the Northern District of California, on behalf of the same class of
plaintiffs, making very similar claims. The Company is not
presently named in the federal action. Defendants filed motions to
stay the state court actions in deference to the federal court
action.  

The court held a hearing on April 26, 2019 to consider whether to
consolidate the six lawsuits and appoint a "lead plaintiff"  and
another hearing on May 31, 2019 to consider defendants' motions to
stay the state court cases. On June 21, 2019, the California state
court judge granted the Company's motion to stay the state court
case pending the outcome of the federal case.

The case will now proceed only in federal court, which the Company
believes is a more favorable jurisdiction.

It is too early to reasonably estimate any financial impact to the
Company resulting from these matters.

NETGEAR, Inc. designs, develops and markets networking products for
home users and small businesses worldwide. The Company, based in
Santa Clara, Calif., was founded in 1996.


NIAGARA CREDIT: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as KRISTINA GIBEAU,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, v. NIAGARA CREDIT SOLUTIONS, INC., the Defendant, Case
No. 2:19-cv-01123-PP (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for
an order certifying a class, appointing the Plaintiff as class
representative, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class
Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiffs file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class. Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir.
2017).[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com

NIKODEMO OPERATING: Court Denies Bid for Class Certification
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as SAINT SURIN EDUOARD, On
behalf of himself and others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
NIKODEMO OPERATING CORP. d/b/a FLORIDIAN DINER, DIMITRIOS KALOIDIS,
IOANIS PARAPONIARIS, and STEVE ZAHARAKIS, the Defendants, the Hon.
Judge Brian M. Cogan entered an order on Aug. 2, 2019, denying
Plaintiff's motion for class certification of:

   "all Hourly Employees of Defendants who worked at Defendants'
   diner from December 15, 2016 to Present." Plaintiff alleges
   that Defendants underpaid him and similarly situated
   employees by rounding their hours, often to the nearest hour.
   Defendants agree that they rounded their employees' hours,
   but deny that their practice of rounding these hours inured
   to the detriment of plaintiff or other employees."

The Court said, "the Plaintiff asserts that evaluating the claims
of the prospective class members would only require an examination
of paper records, but this argument is not persuasive. An
examination of paper records would confirm that defendants rounded
employees' time, but rounding practices are not per se unlawful."
Rather, "rounding policies that on average, favor neither
overpayment nor underpayment of wages are permissible, while those
that systematically undercompensate employees are unlawful."
Determining whether Defendants' rounding policies resulted in
systematic under-compensation of employees would involve not only a
review of paper records but also depositions to determine how
employees spent their time and whether they requested and received
supplemental cash from defendants after complaining about any
perceived under-compensation. Since the individualized inquiry
would predominate over any common inquiry in this case, the
Plaintiff has failed to meet the commonality and typicality
requirements. Because plaintiff has failed to meet these
requirements, the Court need not and does not determine whether
plaintiff meets any other requirement of class certification.[CC]

NINTENDO OF AMERICA: Carusone Sues Over Defective Game Controllers
------------------------------------------------------------------
Gillian Carusone, individually and on behalf of a class of
similarly situated third party payors, Plaintiff, v. Nintendo Of
America, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-01183, (N.D. Ala., July
24, 2019), seeks monetary relief for damages suffered, declaratory
relief, injunctive relief, negligent misrepresentation, breach of
implied warranty, unjust enrichment and for violations of the
federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

Carusone purchased Nintendo Switch game systems whose Joy-Con
controllers "drift" or manipulating game play without manual
operation by the user thus compromising its core functionality.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Eric J. Artrip, Esq.
      MASTANDO & ARTRIP, LLC
      301 Washington St., Suite 302
      Huntsville, AL 35801
      Phone: (256) 532-2222
      Fax: (256) 513-7489
      Email: artrip@mastandoartrip.com


NORTHERN TRUST: 9th Cir. Flips Dismissal of Banks Suit
------------------------------------------------------
Judge John B. Owens of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the case, LINDIE
L. BANKS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated; ERICA LEBLANC, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NORTHERN TRUST
CORPORATION; NORTHERN TRUST COMPANY, Defendants-Appellees, Case No.
17-56025 (9th Cir.).

Banks and her daughter Erica LeBlanc, hoping to represent a class
of the Plaintiffs, appeal from the dismissal of their putative
class action lawsuit against Northern Trust Co. and Northern Trust
Corp. for violations of state law involving breaches of fiduciary
duty by a trustee.

Banks is the beneficiary of the irrevocable Lindstrom Trust,
created under California law.  As trustee, Northern has sole
discretion on how to manage the trust's assets; Banks cannot
participate in, direct, or be involved in those decisions.

According to the First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), Northern invested
the trust's assets in Northern's own affiliated "Funds Portfolio,"
rather than seeking superior investments outside its financial
umbrella.  This practice allegedly led to the trust suffering
suboptimal returns, which would not have happened if Northern
prioritized the interests of the trust beneficiaries (and not
merely its own).  Banks argues that favoring these inferior
affiliated funds -- over better-performing non-Northern funds --
put money in the pockets of Northern, which thereby violated its
duties of prudent investment and loyalty to Banks.

The FAC also alleges that Northern, as part of an "undisclosed
internal decision to create a new profit center," charged improper
and excessive fees for "routine preparation of fiduciary tax
returns" and failed to maintain records to justify these expenses.
These new fees, which previously were "part of the base fee and a
fundamental duty for a trustee," allegedly breached Northern's duty
of prudent administration.

In addition, the FAC alleges elder abuse and unfair competition
claims under California law, both premised on the same factual
allegations underlying the investment and fee-related claims.

Northern filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, contending that
the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA")
prohibited these state-law claims from proceeding in federal court.
Over Banks' objection, the district court agreed with Northern and
dismissed the FAC without leave to amend.  The court reasoned that
the allegedly imprudent investments were in connection with the
purchase or sale of covered securities and featured material
misrepresentations or omissions.  It concluded that SLUSA precluded
Banks from bringing state-law fiduciary duty claims as a class
action in federal court.  The district court dismissed the fee,
elder law, and unfair competition claims without directly
addressing them.

Judge Owens finds that district court's dismissal relied entirely
on its conclusion that Northern was an agent of the trusts'
beneficiaries, a conclusion unsupported by the moving papers and
the FAC.  Not only did the district court fail to consider Banks'
allegations that the beneficiaries lacked any control over the
trustees -- an allegation supported by caselaw and secondary
sources -- but courts generally determine the existence of an
agency relationship at the summary judgment stage, not in
determining a motion to dismiss.  Moreover, the district court's
brief discussion of Troice did not acknowledge Troice's holding
that the "in connection with" requirement is not met if the
fraudster alone bought or sold the covered securities.  The
district court erred in concluding SLUSA precluded Banks' imprudent
investment claims.

Because he conclude Banks' imprudent investment claims do not meet
the "in connection with" requirement for SLUSA preclusion, the
Judge need not decide whether the claims meet SLUSA's fraudulent
conduct requirement, i.e., whether Banks adequately alleged
Northern (1) engaged in misrepresentation or omission of a material
fact or (2) used or employed any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance.  He reverses and remands all of Banks' imprudent
investment claims.

In addition, the Judge finds that the district court's order did
not address other considerations or discuss the fee claims in any
substantive manner, nor did it explain why SLUSA would preclude
these claims.  Because he agrees with the reasoning in both Taksir
v. Vanguard Grp. and Fleming v. Charles Schwab Corp., he oncludes
the district court erred in dismissing the tax-preparation and
overcharging claims on SLUSA-preclusion grounds.  He also finds
that the Banks' fee-related claims survive 12(b)(6).  The detailed
allegations in the FAC meet Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly's
plausibility requirement and amount to more than conclusory
labels.

Finally, as SLUSA does not preclude the elder abuse claims or the
claims against NT Corp., and because the briefing provides no other
basis for dismissal, the Judge also reverses the dismissal of those
claims.

In light of the foregoing, Judge Owens reversed and remanded.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/jO4Ko1 from Leagle.com.

Brian J. Malloy (argued) -- info@brandilaw.com -- and Thomas J.
Brandi, The Brandi Law Firm, San Francisco, California; Derek G.
Howard -- derek@derekhowardlaw.com -- Derek G. Howard Law Firm,
Mill Valley, California; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Craig C. Martin (argued) -- cmartin@jenner.com -- Brienne M.
Letourneau -- bletourneau@jenner.com -- Amanda S. Amert --
aamert@jenner.com -- Daniel J. Weiss -- dweiss@jenner.com -- and
Craig C. Martin -- cmartin@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP,
Chicago, Illinois; for Defendants-Appellees.


NOVAVIVE USA: Fauley Sues Over Unsolicited Advertisements
---------------------------------------------------------
SHAUN FAULEY, an Illinois resident, individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly-situated persons, Plaintiff,
v. NOVAVIVE USA INC., a Georgia corporation, NOVAVIVE INC., a
Canadian business corporation, and NOVAVIVE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a
Canadian limited partnership, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05301
(N.D. Ill., Aug. 6, 2019) is a case against Defendants' practice of
sending unsolicited advertisements via facsimile.

The federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, as amended
by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, and the regulations
promulgated under the Act, prohibit a person or entity from faxing
or having an agent fax advertisements without the recipient's prior
express invitation or permission.

In April/May 2016, Defendants sent an unsolicited facsimile to
Plaintiff using a telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other
device. The Fax, which was sent without prior express invitation or
permission, advertises the commercial availability and quality of
Defendants' product, namely, Immunocidin. The Fax is an
advertisement under the TCPA and its implementing regulations, says
the complaint.

Plaintiff, SHAUN FAULEY, is an Illinois resident.

NOVAVIVE USA INC., is a Georgia corporation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Ryan M. Kelly, Esq.
     ANDERSON + WANCA
     3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 500
     Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
     Phone: 847-368-1500
     Fax: 847-368-1501
     Email: rkelly@andersonwanca.com


PATERNO'S PIZZA: Espitia Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------
RIGOBERTO CARRILLO ESPITIA, an individual, on behalf of himself and
all other plaintiffs similarly situated, known and unknown,
Plaintiff, v. PATERNO'S PIZZA AND SPORTS BAR, INC., an Illinois
corporation, and PAUL V. PATERNO an individual, Defendants, Case
No. 1:19-cv-05307 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 6, 2019) is a lawsuit arising
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Illinois Minimum Wage Law,
and the Chicago Minimum Wage Ordinance, for Defendants' failure to
pay Plaintiff, and other similarly situated employees, overtime
compensation for hours worked over 40 in a workweek.

Paterno's Pizza and Sports Bar, Inc. is an Illinois corporation
that operates the Paterno's Pizza and Sports Bar restaurant located
on North Milwaukee Avenue in Chicago, Illinois. Plaintiff worked as
a cook and dishwasher at Defendants' restaurant from 2010 through
July 8, 2019.

According to the complaint, Plaintiff and other non-exempt cooks,
dishwashers and kitchen staff employees were directed to work, and
did work, more than 40 hours in individual workweeks. However, the
Defendants did not compensate them at one and one-half times their
regular hourly rate of pay. The Defendants never paid Plaintiff an
overtime premium when he worked more than 40 hours in a work week.
In order to conceal their failure to pay overtime compensation,
Defendants paid Plaintiff by check for only a portion of his hours,
typically 40 hours per week, and paid the remainder of Plaintiff's
hours in cash. Defendants also required that Plaintiff cash his
wage check through Defendants immediately upon receiving it from
the Defendants, says the complaint.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Timothy M. Nolan, Esq.
     NOLAN LAW OFFICE
     53 W. Jackson Blvd., Ste. 1137
     Chicago, IL 60604
     Phone: (312) 322-1100
     Fax: (312) 322-1106
     Email: tnolan@nolanwagelaw.com


PERRY ROOFING: Lovett Suit to Recover Unpaid Overtime
-----------------------------------------------------
Dearmus Lovett, on behalf of himself and all employees similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Perry Roofing, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
19-cv-00141 (N.D. Fla., July 25, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid
overtime wages and other relief, as well as an additional amount as
liquidated damages, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees under the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

Defendant installs and repairs roofs where Lovett was a piece rate
worker. He regularly worked in excess of forty hours per week but
was only paid per job basis. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Sean Culliton, Esq.
      SEAN CULLITON, ESQ., LLC
      150 John Knox Road
      Tallahassee, FL 32303
      Phone: (850) 385-9455
      Facsimile: (813) 441-1999
      E-mail: sean.culliton@gmail.com

              - and -

      John C. Davis, Esq.
      LAW OFFICE OF JOHN C. DAVIS
      623 Beard St.
      Tallahassee, FL 32303
      Tel: (850) 222-4770
      Fax: (850) 222-3119
      Email: john@johndavislaw.net


POOL CORPORATION: Hickerson Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------
ALEC HICKERSON and EDINAM MOTEN, on behalf of themselves and all
similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs, v. POOL CORPORATION, a
Delaware corporation, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-02229 (D. Colo.,
Aug. 6, 2019) is an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 ("FLSA") on behalf themselves and all current and former
exempt-classified Operations Managers (hereinafter, regardless of
precise title, referred to as "OMs") who work and/or worked for
Poolcorp within the United States at any time from August 5, 2016
to the date of judgment in this action.

The complaint alleges that Plaintiffs and the Collective Action
Members are entitled to unpaid overtime compensation from Poolcorp
for all unpaid hours worked by them in excess of 40 hours in a
workweek, and are also entitled to liquidated damages pursuant to
the FLSA. Poolcorp violated the FLSA by failing to pay Plaintiffs
and the Collective Action Members premium overtime compensation for
all of their overtime hours worked. Because Plaintiffs and the
Collective Action Members regularly worked more than forty hours in
a workweek, Poolcorp's policy and practices resulted in Plaintiffs
and the Collective Action Members working overtime hours for which
they were not compensated in violation of the FLSA, says the
complaint.

Plaintiffs worked for Poolcorp from June 2016 to March 2018.

Poolcorp is the world's leading wholesale distributor of swimming
pool equipment, parts and supplies, and related outdoor living
products.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Gregg I. Shavitz, Esq.
     Tamra C. Givens, Esq.
     SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A.
     951 Yamato Road, Suite 285
     Boca Raton, FL 33431
     Phone: (561) 447-8888
     Facsimile: (561) 447-8831
     Email: gshavitz@shavitzlaw.com
            tgivens@shavitzlaw.com

          - and -

     Michael Palitz, Esq.
     SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A
     800 Third Avenue, Suite 2800
     New York, NY 10022
     Phone: (800) 616-4000
     Facsimile: (561) 447-8831
     Email: mapalitz@shavitzlaw.com


POSTMATES INC: Rogers Hits Illegal SMS Recruitment Ad Blasts
------------------------------------------------------------
Richard Rogers, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Postmates Inc., Defendant, Case No.
19-cv-61877, (S.D. Fla., July 25, 2019), seeks statutory damages
and any other available legal or equitable remedies for violations
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Postmates Inc. connects customers with local couriers who can
deliver anything from any store or restaurant. It transmitted
multiple text messages with intent to recruit delivery persons. At
no point in time did Rogers provide them with his express written
consent to be contacted using an automated dialer. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Frank S. Hedin, Esq.
      HEDIN HALL LLP
      1395 Brickell Avenue, Suite 900
      Miami, Florida 33131
      Tel: (305) 357-2107
      Fax: (305) 200-8801
      Email: fhedin@hedinhall.com


PRAXAIR, INC: Garcia Seeks to Certify Settlement Class
------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as RITA GARCIA, individually,
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
PRAXAIR, INC., a Delaware corporation; PRAXAIR DISTRIBUTION, INC.,
a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-08170-JAK-AFM (C.D. Cal.), the
Plaintiff will move the Court on September 16, 2019, for an order:

   1. granting preliminary approval of the terms of the
      Agreement as fair, reasonable and adequate under Rule
      23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including
      the amount of the settlement; the amount of distributions
      to class members; the procedure for giving notice to class
      members; the procedure for opting out of the settlement;
      and the amounts allocated to the enhancement payments and
      attorney’s fees and costs;

   2. preliminarily certifying for settlement purposes the
      Settlement Class of:

      "all persons who worked for Defendant PDI in California as
      an hourly paid, non-exempt employee at any time, excluding
      truck drivers, during the Class Period (from May 18, 2014,
      through Preliminary Approval);

   3. appointing the Plaintiff as representative for the
      Settlement Class;

   4. appointing counsel for Plaintiff, Moon & Yang, APC, as
      Class Counsel;

   5. approving use of ILYM Group, Inc. as the settlement
      administrator;

   6. directing notice issue to members of the Settlement Class
      as provided in the Agreement; and

   7. scheduling a approval and fairness hearing on a date
      approximately 145 days after preliminary approval to
      consider whether the Agreement should be finally approved
      as fair, reasonable and adequate under Rule 23(e) of the
      Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and to rule on the motion
      for attorney’s fees, costs and enhancement award submitted

      by Plaintiff.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Kane Moon, Esq.
          H. Scott Leviant, Esq.
          Allen Feghali, Esq.
          MOON & YANG, APC
          1055 W. Seventh St., Suite 1880
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 232-3128
          Facsimile: (213) 232-3125
          E-mail: kane.moon@moonyanglaw.com
                  scott.leviant@moonyanglaw.com
                  allen.feghali@moonyanglaw.com

PRESIDENTIAL REAL: Williams Seeks Redress From TCPA Violations
--------------------------------------------------------------
JOSIE WILLIAMS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. PRESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE GROUP, INC. D/B/A RE/MAX
PRESIDENTIAL, a Florida Corporation, Case No. 0:19-cv-61932-KMW
(S.D. Fla., Aug. 1, 2019), seeks to secure redress for violations
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act

The Defendant is an international real estate company.  To promote
its services, the Defendant engages in unsolicited marketing,
harming thousands of consumers in the process, the Plaintiff
contends.  He adds that beginning on May 29, 2019, the Defendant
sent telemarketing text messages to his cellular telephone number.

The Defendant is a Florida corporation whose principal office is
located in Pembroke Pines, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 1205
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (305) 479-2299
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
                  gberg@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          Jordan D. Utanski, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, PA
          19495 Biscayne Blvd., #607
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (305) 975-3320
          E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com
                  utanski@edelsberglaw.com


PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL: PICA Settlement Approved, Case Dismissed
--------------------------------------------------------------
Prudential Financial, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that in May 2019, a state
court has entered an Order and Final Judgment approving the class
action settlement and dismissing the PICA et al. v. Wells Fargo
Bank, et al. case with prejudice.

Prudential Financial, Inc., incorporated in 1999, is a financial
services company. The Company, through its subsidiaries and
affiliates, offers a range of financial products and services,
which includes life insurance, annuities, retirement-related
services, mutual funds and investment management. The Company's
operations consists of four divisions, which together encompass
seven segments. Its divisions include The U.S. Retirement Solutions
and Investment Management division; the U.S. Individual Life and
Group Insurance division; the International Insurance division, and
Closed Block division. The Company has operations in the United
States, Asia, Europe and Latin America. The company is based in
Newark, New Jersey.



QUALCOMM INC: Calif. Consumer Action Still Stayed Pending Appeal
----------------------------------------------------------------
QUALCOMM Incorporated said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 31, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that a consolidated consumer
class-action lawsuit remains stayed pending an appeal before the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Since January 18, 2017, a number of consumer class action
complaints have been filed against the company in the United States
District Courts for the Southern and Northern Districts of
California, each on behalf of a putative class of purchasers of
cellular phones and other cellular devices.

Twenty-two such cases remain outstanding. In April 2017, the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred the cases
that had been filed in the Southern District of California to the
Northern District of California. On May 15, 2017, the court entered
an order appointing the plaintiffs' co-lead counsel.

On July 11, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended
complaint alleging that the company violated California and federal
antitrust and unfair competition laws by, among other things,
refusing to license standard-essential patents to the company's
competitors, conditioning the supply of certain of the company's
baseband chipsets on the purchaser first agreeing to license the
company's entire patent portfolio, entering into exclusive deals
with companies, including Apple Inc., and charging unreasonably
high royalties that do not comply with the company's commitments to
standard setting organizations.

The complaint seeks unspecified damages and disgorgement and/or
restitution, as well as an order that the company be enjoined from
further unlawful conduct.

On August 11, 2017, the company filed a motion to dismiss the
consolidated amended complaint. On November 10, 2017, the court
denied the company's motion, except to the extent that certain
claims seek damages under the Sherman Antitrust Act. On July 5,
2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, and
the court granted that motion on September 27, 2018.

On January 23, 2019, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the
company's permission to appeal the court's class certification
order. On January 24, 2019, the court stayed the case pending the
company's appeal.

QUALCOMM said, "We believe the plaintiffs' claims are without
merit."

QUALCOMM Incorporated designs, develops, manufactures, and markets
digital communication products worldwide. It operates through three
segments: Qualcomm CDMA Technologies (QCT); Qualcomm Technology
Licensing (QTL); and Qualcomm Strategic Initiatives (QSI). QUALCOMM
Incorporated was founded in 1985 and is headquartered in San Diego,
California.


QUALCOMM INC: Discovery in Calif. Suit Must Be Completed by March
-----------------------------------------------------------------
QUALCOMM Incorporated said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 31, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that discovery has commenced
in the consolidated class action suit pending before the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California, and is
scheduled to be completed by March 3, 2020.

On January 23, 2017 and January 26, 2017, securities class action
complaints were filed by purported stockholders of the company in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California against the company and certain of its current and
former officers and directors.

The complaints alleged, among other things, that we violated
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, by making false and misleading
statements and omissions of material fact in connection with
certain allegations that we are or were engaged in anticompetitive
conduct. The complaints sought unspecified damages, interest, fees
and costs.

On May 4, 2017, the court consolidated the two actions and
appointed lead plaintiffs. On July 3, 2017, the lead plaintiffs
filed a consolidated amended complaint asserting the same basic
theories of liability and requesting the same basic relief.

On September 1, 2017, the company filed a motion to dismiss the
consolidated amended complaint. On March 18, 2019, the court denied
the company's motion to dismiss the complaint. Discovery has
commenced and is scheduled to be completed by March 3, 2020.

QUALCOMM said, "We believe the plaintiffs' claims are without
merit."

QUALCOMM Incorporated designs, develops, manufactures, and markets
digital communication products worldwide. It operates through three
segments: Qualcomm CDMA Technologies (QCT); Qualcomm Technology
Licensing (QTL); and Qualcomm Strategic Initiatives (QSI). QUALCOMM
Incorporated was founded in 1985 and is headquartered in San Diego,
California.


QUALCOMM INC: Dismissal in 3226701 Canada Class Suit Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------------------
QUALCOMM Incorporated said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 31, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court's
dismissal of the second amended complaint in 3226701 Canada, Inc.
v. QUALCOMM Incorporated et al., in its entirety.

On November 30, 2015, a securities class action complaint was filed
by purported stockholders of the company in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of California against the
company and certain of its current and former officers.

On April 29, 2016, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On
January 27, 2017, the court dismissed the amended complaint in its
entirety, granting leave to amend. On March 17, 2017, the
plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, alleging that the
company and certain of its current and former officers violated
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended, by making false and misleading statements regarding our
business outlook and product development between November 19, 2014
and July 22, 2015. The second amended complaint sought unspecified
damages, interest, attorneys' fees and other costs.

On May 8, 2017, the company filed a motion to dismiss the second
amended complaint. On October 20, 2017, the court entered an order
granting in part the company's motion to dismiss, and on November
29, 2017, the court entered an order granting the remaining
portions of the company's motion to dismiss. On December 28, 2017,
the plaintiffs filed an appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

A hearing was held on July 11, 2019, and on July 23, 2019, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
District Court's dismissal of the second amended complaint in its
entirety.

QUALCOMM Incorporated designs, develops, manufactures, and markets
digital communication products worldwide. It operates through three
segments: Qualcomm CDMA Technologies (QCT); Qualcomm Technology
Licensing (QTL); and Qualcomm Strategic Initiatives (QSI). QUALCOMM
Incorporated was founded in 1985 and is headquartered in San Diego,
California.


QUALCOMM INC: Hearing on Bid to Dismiss Set for Sept. 19
--------------------------------------------------------
QUALCOMM Incorporated said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 31, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that a hearing on the
company's motion to dismiss the class action suit entitled, In re
Qualcomm/Broadcom Merger Securities Litigation (formerly Camp v.
Qualcomm Incorporated et al), is scheduled for September 19, 2019.

On June 8, 2018 and June 26, 2018, securities class action
complaints were filed by purported stockholders of the company in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California against the company and two of its current officers.

The complaints allege, among other things, that the company
violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, by failing to disclose that the
company had submitted a notice to the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) in January 2018.

The complaints seek unspecified damages, interest, fees and costs.


On January 22, 2019, the Court appointed the lead plaintiff in the
action and designated that the case be captioned "In re
Qualcomm/Broadcom Merger Securities Litigation."

On March 18, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a consolidated complaint.
On May 10, 2019, the company filed a motion to dismiss the
consolidated complaint.

A hearing on the company's motion to dismiss is scheduled for
September 19, 2019.

QUALCOMM said, "We believe the plaintiffs' claims are without
merit."

QUALCOMM Incorporated designs, develops, manufactures, and markets
digital communication products worldwide. It operates through three
segments: Qualcomm CDMA Technologies (QCT); Qualcomm Technology
Licensing (QTL); and Qualcomm Strategic Initiatives (QSI). QUALCOMM
Incorporated was founded in 1985 and is headquartered in San Diego,
California.


QUALCOMM INC: Quebec Superior Court Certifies Class
---------------------------------------------------
QUALCOMM Incorporated said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 31, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the Quebec Superior
Court has issued an order certifying a consumer class action.

Since November 9, 2017, eight consumer class action complaints have
been filed against the company in Canada (in the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice, the Supreme Court of British Columbia and the
Quebec Superior Court), each on behalf of a putative class of
purchasers of cellular phones and other cellular devices, alleging
various violations of Canadian competition and consumer protection
laws.

The claims are similar to those in the U.S. consumer class action
complaint. The complaints seek unspecified damages. One of the
complaints in the Supreme Court of British Columbia has since been
discontinued by the plaintiffs.

The company has not yet answered the complaints. On April 15, 2019,
the Quebec Superior Court held a class certification hearing, and
on April 30, 2019, the court issued an order certifying a class.

QUALCOMM said, "We believe the plaintiffs' claims are without
merit."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

QUALCOMM Incorporated designs, develops, manufactures, and markets
digital communication products worldwide. It operates through three
segments: Qualcomm CDMA Technologies (QCT); Qualcomm Technology
Licensing (QTL); and Qualcomm Strategic Initiatives (QSI). QUALCOMM
Incorporated was founded in 1985 and is headquartered in San Diego,
California.


QUANTA SERVICES: CIaims in Benton Suit Narrowed
-----------------------------------------------
Quanta Services, Inc.  said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that Telecom Network
Specialists (TNS) prevailed, in part, on its own motion for summary
judgment on the remaining wage statement and penalty claims, with
the court dismissing the claims for penalties based on alleged meal
and rest break violations in Lorenzo Benton v. Telecom Network
Specialists, Inc., et al.

In June 2006, plaintiff Lorenzo Benton filed a class action
complaint in the Superior Court of California, County of Los
Angeles, alleging various wage and hour violations against Telecom
Network Specialists (TNS), a former subsidiary of Quanta.

Quanta retained liability associated with this matter pursuant to
the terms of Quanta's sale of TNS in December 2012. Benton
represents a class of workers that includes all persons who worked
on certain TNS projects, including individuals that TNS retained
through numerous staffing agencies.

The plaintiff class in this matter is seeking damages for unpaid
wages, penalties associated with the failure to provide meal and
rest periods and overtime wages, interest and attorneys' fees.

In January 2017, the trial court granted a summary judgment motion
filed by the plaintiff class and found that TNS was a joint
employer of the class members and that it failed to provide
adequate meal and rest breaks and failed to pay overtime wages.

In February 2019, the court granted, in part, the plaintiff class's
final motion for summary judgment on damages awarding the class
approximately $7.5 million for its meal/rest break and overtime
claims, and denied the motion as to penalties.

Quanta believes the court's decisions on liability and damages are
not supported by controlling law and continues to contest its
liability and the damage calculation asserted by the plaintiff
class in this matter.

In July 2019, TNS prevailed, in part, on its own motion for summary
judgment on the remaining wage statement and penalty claims, with
the court dismissing the claims for penalties based on alleged meal
and rest break violations.

Quanta Services, Inc. provides specialty contracting services in
the United States, Canada, Australia, Latin America, and
internationally. The company serves electric power, energy, and
communications companies, as well as commercial, industrial, and
governmental entities. Quanta Services, Inc. was founded in 1997
and is headquartered in Houston, Texas.


R&M Towing: Lockwood Hits Misclassification, Claims Overtime
------------------------------------------------------------
Levi Lockwood, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated
individuals, Plaintiffs, v. R&M Towing, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
19-cv-04812, (D. Ariz., July 25, 2019) seeks to recover an award of
unpaid minimum wages and overtime premiums, liquidated damages,
penalties, injunctive and declaratory relief, attorneys' fees and
costs, prejudgment and post-judgment interest and any other
remedies under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.

R&M Towing specializes in towing in the Phoenix Metro Area where
Lockwood worked as a tow-truck driver. He claims that he was
misclassified as an independent contractors, thus denied minimum
wages, overtime wages for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours
per workweek. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Stephen I. Leshner, Esq.
      STEPHEN I. LESHNER, P.C.
      1440 East Missouri Avenue, Suite 265
      Phoenix, AZ 85014
      Fax: (602) 266-9134
      Tel. (602) 266-9000
      Email: steve@steveleshner.com


RADIUS GLOBAL: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as HOWARD BRUCHHAUSER and
JOSEPH FOTE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. RADIUS GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, LLC, the
Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-01125-NJ (E.D Wisc.), the Plaintiffs
ask the Court for an order on Aug. 5, 2019, certifying a class,
appointing the Plaintiff as class representative, and appointing
Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class Counsel, and for such other and
further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiffs further ask that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiffs file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class. Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir.
2017).[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com

RUTH'S HOSPITALITY: Guerrero Class Action in Calif. Ongoing
-----------------------------------------------------------
Ruth's Hospitality Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company
continues to defend a class action suit entitled, Quiroz Guerrero
v. Ruth's Hospitality Group, Inc., et al.

On February 26, 2018, a former restaurant hourly employee filed a
class action lawsuit in the Superior Court of the State of
California for the County of Riverside, alleging that the Company
violated the California Labor Code and California Business and
Professions Code, by failing to pay minimum wages, pay overtime
wages, permit required meal and rest breaks and provide accurate
wage statements, among other claims.  

This lawsuit seeks unspecified penalties under the California's
Private Attorney's General Act in addition to other monetary
payments (Quiroz Guerrero v. Ruth's Hospitality Group, Inc., et
al.; Case No RIC1804127).  

Ruth's Hospitality said, "Although the ultimate outcome of this
matter, including any possible loss, cannot be predicted or
reasonably estimated at this time, we intend to vigorously defend
this matter."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Ruth's Hospitality Group, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
develops, operates, and franchises fine dining restaurants. Its
restaurants offer food and beverage products to special occasion
diners and frequent customers, as well as business clientele. The
Company operates restaurants under the Ruth's Chris Steak House
trade name. The Company was founded in 1965 and is headquartered in
Winter Park, Florida.


RYSZARD FOOD DISTRIBUTOR: Buestan Suit to Recover Unpaid Overtime
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Nestor Buestan, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Ryszard Food Distributor, Inc., Ryszard
Horczak and Margaret Horczak, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-04273
(E.D. N.Y., July 24, 2019), seeks to recover overtime wages due,
liquidated damages, and all reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and New York labor laws.

Ryszard Food Distributor is a food supplier that delivers food
products to businesses in the New York metropolitan area and the
tri-state region where Buestan worked as a delivery truck driver
from in or around 2004 until on or around November 21, 2018. He
claims to have worked in excess of 40 hours per week without being
paid overtime premiums and was denied meal/rest breaks. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Nicole Grunfeld, Esq.
      KATZ MELINGER PLLC
      280 Madison Avenue, Suite 600
      New York, New York 10016
      Tel: (212) 460-0047
      Email: ndgrunfeld@katzmelinger.com


SAFEWAY INC: Mathews Suit Removed to N.D. Cal.
----------------------------------------------
The case captioned Johanna Mathews, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Safeway, Inc. and
Albertsons Companies, Inc., Defendant, Case No. RG19021948, (Cal.
Super., June 6, 2019), was removed to the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California on July 25, 2019, under Case
No. 19-cv-04261.

Mathews seeks compensatory and punitive damages for violation of
the Federal Credit Reporting Act, the Investigative Consumer
Reporting Agencies Act, the Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act
and the California Unfair Competition Law.

Safeway and Albertsons are food and drug retailers in the United
States. Mathews, a former Safeway employee, alleges that Safeway
routinely acquires consumer reports, including credit and
background reports, to conduct background checks on current and
former employees in connection with their hiring process without
providing proper disclosures. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Steven Tindall, Esq.
      Jeffrey Kosbie, Esq.
      GIBBS LAW GROUPLIP
      505 14th Street, Suite 1110
      Oakland, CA 94612
      Telephone: (510) 350-9700
      Facsimile: (510) 350-9701
      Email: smt@classlawgroup.com
             jbk@classlawgroup.com

             - and -

      Rosa Vigil-Gallenberg, Esq.
      Bridget Howze, Esq.
      Joseph Lin, Esq.
      GALLENBERG PC
      800 S. Victory Blvd Suite 203
      Burbank, CA 91502
      Telephone: (818) 237-5267
      Facsimile: (818) 330-5266
      Email: Rosa@GallenbergLaw.com

Defendants are represented by:

      Alison S. Hightower, Esq.
      LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
      333 Bush Street, 34th Floor
      San Francisco, CA 94104
      Tel: (415) 433-1940
      Email: ahightower@littler.com


SARCHIONE CHEVROLET: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in Streater
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSEPH STREATER, Plaintiff, v. SARCHIONE CHEVROLET,
INC., Defendant, Case No. 5:18-cv-643 (N.D. Ohio), Judge Sara Lioi
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio,
Eastern Division, denied Streater's motion for class
certification.

Streater, who was and is a resident of New Jersey, wanted to
purchase a 2014 (or newer) Chevrolet Camaro ZL1.  In or around
August of 2017, he searched the Internet and located several such
vehicles for sale by various dealers, including Sarchione, which
does business in Randolph, Ohio.  Although Streater negotiated
purchases with at least three other dealers, he was unable to
obtain financing because he had a credit problem.

Streater eventually negotiated a purchase remotely with a Sarchione
salesperson, Todd Bollman.  He claims he disclosed his credit
problems immediately, but Sarchione assured him that it could
obtain credit for him, if not through a bank, then through a
subprime lender.  Streater testified that he was advised by Bollman
that preapproval for his financing had been obtained from
Santander, provided he make a down payment of $10,000 or $12,000,
which he was willing to do.

Streater entered into a retail installment sale contract ("RISC")
with Sarchione on Oct. 28, 2017, for the purchase of a used 2017
Chevrolet Camaro.  On the same day, he executed a Spot Delivery
Agreement, which provided, inter alia, that Streater could take
delivery of the vehicle before financing was approved.  Ultimately,
Sarchione was unable to obtain financing from Santander, or from
anyone else, on the original terms and the deal fell through.

Streater never took possession of the Camaro and, apparently,
forfeited at least $1,000 of the down payment.  In addition, he
alleges that, while he was trying to figure out how to retrieve
from Sarchione the vehicle he had traded in, Sarchione contacted
the lienholder and misrepresented that Streater had abandoned the
vehicle, whereupon the lienholder repossessed the vehicle (even
though Streater was allegedly still making the payments on it) and
wrongfully sold it at auction.

On March 20, 2018, Streater filed a class action complaint against
Sarchione seeking relief under the Truth in Lending Act, and the
Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act.  On April 14, 2018, Streater
filed his first amended class action complaint, adding several
individual statelaw claims.

On Aug. 1, 2018, the Court granted Streater's motion for leave to
file a second amended complaint to add another class claim under
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.  The second amended complaint was
filed on Aug. 3, 2018.  Streater alleges that Sarchione violated
federal and state consumer protection statutes in connection with
the sale of new and used motor vehicles.

Streater seeks to certify the following class under Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3): All persons who have signed a retail installment sale
contract ("RISC") prepared by the Defendant and whose signatures
were also obtained by the Defendant on a form entitled Limited
Right to Cancel-Purchase (Spot Delivery) or similar document
purporting to give the Defendant the ability to revoke the RISC
under certain circumstances within one year of the filing of the
Plaintiff's complaint same as or more specifically defined as all
persons who signed a RISC similar or identical to exhibit A
attached which contained a limited right to cancel provision where
the box was not checked as being applicable and who were also
required to sign a spot delivery agreement similar or identical to
exhibit B from March 20, 2017 through the filing of the Plaintiff's
initial complaint.

Streater alleges, in support of his class allegations, that
Sarchione "surreptitiously" obtains buyers' signatures on documents
and delivers vehicles to customers "with no intention to honor any
contract term or provision."  He alleges that the RISC provided
that Sarchione was the "seller-creditor" who was extending credit
to Streater, whereas the SDA provided that Sarchione could void or
change the terms of the RISC if Sarchione was unable to sell the
deal to a third party.  He argues that, whereas the RISC contained
material credit disclosures required by TILA, the language in the
SDA purported to relieve Sarchione of its "creditor" status.

Judge Lioi finds that the proposed class is non-ascertainable.
Streater provides nothing but reliance on the allegations of his
SAC and case citations (none of which are controlling because they
are not from this circuit).  This is insufficient to meet
Streater's burden in the face of unrefuted facts adduced by
Sarchione.  Ascertaining the class members will require detailed
fact finding to determine whether the customized forms signed by
the other putative class members were "similar or identical to" the
one signed by Streater.

Where ascertainability has not been met, some courts, including the
Court, have found it unnecessary to conduct the full Rule 23(a)
analysis.  Nonetheless, the Judge briefly discuss the requirements,
out of an abundance of caution.  She finds that Streater is unable
to satisfy (i) the Rule 23(a)(1) numerosity requirement; (ii) the
Rule 23(a)(2) commonality requirement; (iii) the typicality
requirement of Rule 23(a)(3); (iv) the adequate representation
requirement of Rule 23(a)(4).  In addition, Streater has failed to
meet the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).

For the reasons set forth, Judge Lioi denied Streater's motion for
class certification.  The case will proceed only as to the claims
of Streater set forth in the second amended complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2019 Memorandum Opinion and
Order is available at https://is.gd/OOdPWX from Leagle.com.

Joseph Streater, on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Edward A. Icove,
Icove Legal Group & Steven C. Shane.

Sarchione Chevrolet, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jack B. Cooper
-- jbcooper@dayketterer.com -- Day Ketterer & Merle D. Evans, III
-- mdevans@dayketterer.com -- Day Ketterer.


SEABOARD CORP: Continues to Defend Pork Buyers' Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------
Seaboard Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 31, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 29, 2019, that the company continues to
defend against antitrust litigation commenced by purchasers of pork
products.

On June 28, 2018, Wanda Duryea and eleven other indirect purchasers
of pork products, acting on behalf of themselves and a putative
class of indirect purchasers of pork products, filed a class action
complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota
against several pork processors, including Seaboard Foods LLC and
Agri Stats, Inc., a company that provides data sharing service.

Subsequent to the filing of this initial complaint, additional
class action complaints making similar claims on behalf of putative
classes of direct and indirect purchasers were filed in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Minnesota.

The complaints allege, among other things, that beginning in
January 2009, the defendants conspired and combined to fix, raise,
maintain, and stabilize the price of pork products in violation of
U.S. antitrust laws by coordinating their output and limiting
production, allegedly facilitated by the exchange of non-public
information about prices, capacity, sales volume and demand through
Agri Stats, Inc.

The complaints on behalf of the putative classes of indirect
purchasers also include causes of action under various state laws,
including state antitrust laws, unfair competition laws, consumer
protection statutes, and state common law claims for unjust
enrichment.

The complaints also allege that the defendants concealed this
conduct from the plaintiffs and the members of the putative
classes.

The relief sought in the respective complaints includes treble
damages, injunctive relief, pre- and post-judgment interest, costs,
and attorneys' fees on behalf of the putative classes.

The complaints were amended and consolidated, and the cases are now
organized into three consolidated putative class actions brought on
behalf of (a) direct purchasers, (b) consumer indirect purchasers,
and (c) commercial and institutional indirect purchasers.  

The amended complaints named Seaboard Corporation as an additional
defendant.

On July 9, 2019, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico filed a similar
class action complaint against Seaboard Foods LLC and Seaboard
Corporation in the U.S. District Court of Puerto Rico making
essentially the same contentions as set forth in the cases filed in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, but also
contending violation of Puerto Rican antitrust laws.

Seaboard intends to defend these cases vigorously.

Seaboard said, "It is impossible at this stage either to determine
the probability of a favorable or unfavorable outcome resulting
from these suits, or to estimate the amount of potential loss, if
any, resulting from the suits."

Seaboard Corporation operates as a diverse agribusiness and
transportation company worldwide. The company's Pork division
produces and sells fresh pork products, such as loins, tenderloins,
and ribs, as well as frozen pork products to further processors,
food service operators, grocery stores, distributors, and retail
outlets. Seaboard Corporation was founded in 1918 and is
headquartered in Merriam, Kansas.


SEMPRA ENERGY: Investors Seek to Revive Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
Sempra Energy said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that a second request for
reconsideration has been filed in the securities class action suit
in California.

A federal securities class action alleging violation of the federal
securities laws has been filed against Sempra Energy and certain of
its officers and certain of its directors in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of California.

In March 2018, the court dismissed the action with prejudice, and
in December 2018 the court denied the plaintiffs' request for
reconsideration of that order.

The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal of the dismissal and,
subsequently, a second request for reconsideration of the order
based on the May 2019 report by Blade regarding the root cause
analysis of the Leak.

Sempra Energy, together with its subsidiaries, invests in,
develops, and operates energy infrastructure, as well as provides
electric and gas services in the United States and internationally.
The company was founded in 1998 and is headquartered in San Diego,
California


SEMPRA ENERGY: Ruling in Aliso Canyon Leak-Related Suit Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------------
Sempra Energy said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the California Supreme
Court has upheld the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate
District court's ruling that the purely economic damages alleged in
the Business Class Action are not recoverable under the law.

On October 23, 2015, SoCalGas discovered a leak at one of its
injection-and-withdrawal wells, SS25, at its Aliso Canyon natural
gas storage facility (the Leak), located in the northern part of
the San Fernando Valley in Los Angeles County. The Aliso Canyon
natural gas storage facility has been operated by SoCalGas since
1972. SS25 is one of more than 100 injection-and-withdrawal wells
at the storage facility.  SoCalGas worked closely with several of
the world's leading experts to stop the Leak, and on February 18,
2016, the California Department of Conservation's Division of Oil,
Gas, and Geothermal Resources (DOGGR) confirmed that the well was
permanently sealed. SoCalGas calculated that approximately 4.62 Bcf
of natural gas was released from the Aliso Canyon natural gas
storage facility as a result of the Leak.  

As of July 29, 2019, 395 lawsuits, including approximately 36,000
plaintiffs, are pending against SoCalGas, some of which have also
named Sempra Energy. The reduction in the number of plaintiffs
resulted from a number of factors including the plaintiffs'
counsels' reconciliation of duplicative claims as well as
dismissals of certain plaintiffs who failed to prosecute their
claims.

All these cases, other than a matter brought by the Los Angeles
County District Attorney and the federal securities class action
discussed below, are coordinated before a single court in the LA
Superior Court for pretrial management (the Coordination
Proceeding).

Pursuant to the Coordination Proceeding, in November 2017, the
individuals and business entities asserting tort and Proposition 65
claims filed a Third Amended Consolidated Master Case Complaint for
Individual Actions, through which their separate lawsuits will be
managed for pretrial purposes.

The consolidated complaint asserts causes of action for negligence,
negligence per se, private and public nuisance (continuing and
permanent), trespass, inverse condemnation, strict liability,
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress,
fraudulent concealment, loss of consortium, wrongful death and
violations of Proposition 65 against SoCalGas, with certain causes
also naming Sempra Energy.

The consolidated complaint seeks compensatory and punitive damages
for personal injuries, lost wages and/or lost profits, property
damage and diminution in property value, injunctive relief, costs
of future medical monitoring, civil penalties (including penalties
associated with Proposition 65 claims alleging violation of
requirements for warning about certain chemical exposures), and
attorneys' fees. The court has scheduled an initial trial for June
24, 2020 for a small number of randomly selected individual
plaintiffs.

In January 2017, pursuant to the Coordination Proceeding, two
consolidated class action complaints were filed against SoCalGas
and Sempra Energy, one on behalf of a putative class of persons and
businesses who own or lease real property within a five-mile radius
of the well (the Property Class Action), and a second on behalf of
a putative class of all persons and entities conducting business
within five miles of the facility (the Business Class Action).

Both complaints assert claims for strict liability for
ultra-hazardous activities, negligence and violation of the
California Unfair Competition Law. The Property Class Action also
asserts claims for negligence per se, trespass, permanent and
continuing public and private nuisance, and inverse condemnation.

The Business Class Action also asserts a claim for negligent
interference with prospective economic advantage. Both complaints
seek compensatory, statutory and punitive damages, injunctive
relief and attorneys' fees. In December 2017, the California Court
of Appeal, Second Appellate District ruled that the purely economic
damages alleged in the Business Class Action are not recoverable
under the law. In May 2019, the California Supreme Court affirmed
the ruling.

Sempra Energy, together with its subsidiaries, invests in,
develops, and operates energy infrastructure, as well as provides
electric and gas services in the United States and internationally.
The company was founded in 1998 and is headquartered in San Diego,
California.


SOTHEBY'S: Kent Files Suit Over BidFair Merger Deal
---------------------------------------------------
Michael Kent, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Sotheby's, Domenico De Sole, The Duke Of
Devonshire, Tad Smith, Jessica Bibliowicz, Linus Chueng, Kevin
Conroy, Daniel Loeb, Marsha E. Simms, Diana Taylor, Dennis M.
Weibling, Harry Wilson and Michael J. Wolf, Defendants, Case No.
19-cv-01374, (D. Del., July 23, 2019), seeks to enjoin defendants
and all persons acting in concert with them from proceeding with,
consummating or closing the acquisition of Sotheby's by BidFair USA
LLC and BidFair Merger Right Inc.; rescinding it in the event
defendants consummate the merger; and rescissory damages, costs of
this action, including reasonable allowance for plaintiff's
attorneys' and experts' fees and such other and further relief
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Sotheby's stockholders will receive $57.00 in cash for each share
of Sotheby's common stock they own.

According to the complaint, the registration statement for the
merger failed to include critical financial analysis performed by
its financial advisor, LionTree Advisors LLC including all line
items used to calculate consolidated EBITDA, line items used to
calculate unlevered free cash flow and a reconciliation of all
non-GAAP to GAAP metrics that support the fairness opinions in
order to make a fully informed decision whether to vote in favor of
the proposed transaction or seek appraisal needed by the
shareholders to make an informed decision on the merger deal.

Sotheby's is an international auction house. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Brian D. Long, Esq.
      Gina M. Serra, Esq.
      RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
      300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
      Wilmington, DE 19801
      Tel: (302) 295-5310
      Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
      Email: bdl@rl-legal.com
             gms@rl-legal.com

             - and -

      Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
      RM LAW, P.C.
      1055 Westlakes Dr., Ste. 3112
      Berwyn, PA 19312
      Tel: (484) 324-6800
      Email: rm@maniskas.com


ST. CLOUD STATE: Female Student-Athletes Win Gender Bias Case
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
issued an Order finding that both St. Cloud State University's Past
and Present Allocation of Athletic-Participation Opportunities and
Athletic Treatment and Benefits Do Not Comply with Title IX in the
case captioned ALEXIE PORTZ, JILL KEDROWSKI, ABIGAIL KANTOR,
MARILIA ROQUE DIVERSI, FERNANDA QUINTINO DOS SANTOS, MARIA HAUER,
HALEY BOCK, KAITLYN BABICH, ANNA LINDELL, and KIERSTEN ROHDE,
individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. ST. CLOUD STATE UNIVERSITY and MINNESOTA STATE
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, Defendants.Civil No. 16-1115 (JRT/LIB).
(D. Minn.).

The issues for trial included (1) whether SCSU's past allocation of
athletic participation opportunities and treatment and benefits was
inequitable in violation of Title IX and (2) whether SCSU's present
allocation of athletic participation opportunities and treatment
and benefits is inequitable in violation of Title IX.

The Plaintiffs brought this class action against Defendants St.
Cloud State University (SCSU) and Minnesota State Colleges and
Universities (MNSCU), alleging gender discrimination in SCSU's past
and present allocation of athletic opportunities and in SCSU's
treatment and allocation of benefits for its female
student-athletes in violation of Title IX of the Education
Amendments Act of 1972 (Title IX).

The Plaintiffs allege that SCSU violated Title IX in the past
(academic year 2015-16 and earlier). The Plaintiffs also allege
that SCSU is violating Title IX in the present (academic year
2016-17 to the present).

The Plaintiffs seek two types of relief: (1) declaratory relief
that SCSU did not comply with Title IX in the past, and (2)
injunctive relief to bring SCSU into compliance with Title IX going
forward.

TITLE IX COMPLIANCE

Title IX provides, in relevant part, that no person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance. SCSU is an educational institution that receives
federal assistance and is subject to Title IX.

Title IX regulation Section 106.41(c) provides a list of factors
relevant to determining compliance with Title IX's
anti-discrimination provisions. The first factor focuses on
effective accommodation: whether the selection of sports and levels
of competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities
of members of both sexes. This factor has been interpreted by HEW
to require that institutions meet one of three tests and the levels
of competition test.  

The three tests are referred to as Prong One, Prong Two and Prong
Three. Prong One requires institutions to provide athletic
participation opportunities in numbers substantially proportionate
to their respective enrollments. Prong Two requires an institution
to show a history and continuing practice of program expansion
which is demonstrably responsive to the developing interest and
abilities of the sex that has been and is underrepresented among
intercollegiate athletes. Prong Three requires an institution to
demonstrate that the interests and abilities of the members of the
underrepresented sex are fully and effectively accommodated by the
present program.

Prong One

An analysis under Prong One requires that a court first determine
the number of participation opportunities afforded to male and
female athletes in the intercollegiate athletic program.

The 1979 Policy Interpretation defines participants as those
athletes:

     Who are receiving the institutionally-sponsored support
normally provided to athletes competing at the institution
involved, e.g., coaching, equipment, medical and training room
services, on a regular basis during a sport's season; andb. Who are
participating in organized practice sessions and other team
meetings and activities on a regular basis during a sport's season;
andc. Who are listed on the eligibility or squad lists maintained
for each sport, ord. Who, because of injury, cannot meet a, b, or c
above but continue to receive financial aid on the basis of
athletic ability.

Generally, all athletes who are listed on a team's squad or
eligibility list and are on the team as of the team's first
competitive event are counted as participants. Athletes will be
counted as receiving one participation opportunity for each sport
they participate in. Athletes need not compete so long as they are
receiving other benefits of participation.

After determining the number of participation opportunities
afforded to each sex, a court will then determine whether the
numbers are substantially proportional to the enrollment numbers of
each sex. OCR will consider substantial proportionality achieved
where the number of additional participants necessary for exact
proportionality would not be sufficient to sustain a viable team..
A viable team is defined as a team for which there is a sufficient
number of interested and able students and enough available
competition to sustain an intercollegiate team.

Prong Two

Under Prong Two, an institution must show that it has both a
history and a continuing practice of program expansion that is
demonstrably responsive to the developing interests and abilities
of the underrepresented sex.

For a history of program expansion, the OCR has identified three
factors to evaluate: (1) an institution's record of adding
intercollegiate teams, or upgrading teams to intercollegiate
status, for the underrepresented sex (2) an institution's record of
increasing the numbers of participants in intercollegiate athletics
who are members of the underrepresented sex and an institution's
affirmative responses to requests by students or others for
addition or elevation of sports.

For a continuing practice of program expansion, the OCR has
identified two factors to evaluate: (1) an institution's current
implementation of a nondiscriminatory policy or procedure for
requesting the addition of sports (including the elevation of club
or intramural teams) and the effective communication of the policy
or procedure to students; and (2) an institution's current
implementation of a plan of program expansion that is responsive to
developing interests and abilities.

In conducting either of these analyses the court will review the
entire history of the athletic program, focusing on the
participation opportunities provided for the underrepresented sex.

Prong Three

Under Prong Three OCR considers whether there is (a) unmet interest
in a particular sport (b) sufficient ability to sustain a team in
the sport and (c) a reasonable expectation of competition for the
team. Where all three conditions are met then the institution fails
to comply with Prong Three. If an institution has recently
eliminated a viable team from the intercollegiate program, OCR will
find that there is sufficient interest, ability, and available
competition to sustain an intercollegiate team in that sport unless
an institution can provide strong evidence that interest, ability,
or available competition no longer exists.

To determine if unmet need exists, the Court evaluates five
indicators including: whether an institution uses nondiscriminatory
methods of assessment when determining the athletic interests and
abilities of its students; whether a viable team for the
underrepresented sex recently was eliminated; multiple indicators
of interest; multiple indicators of ability; and frequency of
conducting assessments.

Where an institution has recently eliminated a viable team for the
underrepresented sex from its intercollegiate athletics program,
the Court will find that sufficient interest, ability, and
available competition to sustain an intercollegiate team in that
sport. This creates a presumption that the institution is not in
compliance with Prong Three that the institution can rebut through
strong evidence that interest, ability, or competition no longer
exists.  

In evaluating whether a reasonable expectation of competition
exists, the Court will look at available competitive opportunities
offered by schools in the institution's geographic area whether or
not the institution normally competes against those schools in
other intercollegiate sports. The absence of a conference or
league, for a sport, however, is insufficient to show that a
reasonable expectation of competition does not exist. Institutions
may also be required to actively encourage the development of
intercollegiate competition for a sport for members of the
underrepresented sex when overall athletic opportunities within its
competitive region have been historically limited for members of
that sex.

SCSU'S PAST COMPLIANCE WITH TITLE IX

Plaintiffs' class was defined in relevant part as all present,
prospective, and future female students at St. Cloud State
University who are harmed by and want to end St. Cloud State
University's sex discrimination in the allocation of athletic
participation opportunities, which includes female students who
attended SCSU and did not participate in athletics that could have
been denied an athletic participation opportunity. The Plaintiffs
have standing to challenge SCSU's Title IX compliance going back to
at least the 2012-13 academic year because a senior during the
2015-16 academic year, when the case was filed, would have been a
freshman during the 2012-13 academic year and could have been
denied an athletic participation opportunity.

Furthermore, Jill Kedrowski, a named plaintiff, played three sports
in high school prior to attending SCSU, tennis, basketball, and
lacrosse. When she chose to attend SCSU, she was only able to play
tennis and basketball. Kedrowski was recruited to play all three
sports at various colleges and universities. In attending SCSU
Kedrowski lost the opportunity to play lacrosse because SCSU did
not offer it despite there being interest in the sport, and ability
on behalf of students. The Court finds that Kedrowski was denied
the opportunity to participate in lacrosse in the past.

The Court finds that SCSU failed to comply with Title IX prior to
the 2016-17 academic year. SCSU did not effectively accommodate
female students under any of the three prongs of compliance.

Prong One Compliance

The participation opportunities that SCSU reports for male and
female athletes show discrepancies between the rate of female
enrollment and rate of female participation of at least one hundred
participation opportunities during the years beginning in 2003 and
ending in 2016. This would have been sufficient to field several
intercollegiate teams and is much greater than any then-existing
women's team roster sizes. As such, SCSU did not comply with Prong
One.

Prong Two Compliance

In evaluating SCSU's past compliance with Prongs Two and Three, the
Court will evaluate SCSU's entire history with Title IX compliance
as by the 1996 Clarification.

SCSU has added six women's intercollegiate teams since the
inception of Title IX. SCSU added women's track and field in 1973,
women's golf and women's cross country in 1975, women's soccer in
1994, women's Nordic skiing in 1997, and women's ice hockey in
1998. For nearly two decades, 1999 to the present, SCSU has not
added any intercollegiate women's team to is sports program. It has
also not elevated any women's intramural or club sport to
intercollegiate level.  

SCSU has not shown a history of increasing participation
opportunities for women. Since 2003, women's participation
opportunities have fluctuated between 196 and 250. Female
participation was as low as 208, 196, 201, and 200 during the
academic years beginning in 2004, 2006, 2007, and 2011
respectively. Female participation numbers also rose as high as
229, 250, 228, 228, and 248 during the academic years beginning in
2005, 2008, 2012, 2013, and 2014 respectively. No consistent
pattern or record of increasing the numbers of participants for the
underrepresented sex is discernable.

The Court finds that SCSU has failed to show a history of program
expansion for the underrepresented sex. First, SCSU eliminated
women's gymnastics even though there was sufficient ability and
interest from students. This weighs heavily against a history of
program expansion. Second, women's participation opportunities have
not consistently increased in more than a decade.

Although participation numbers fluctuate and may increase during
specific years, this increase is neither sustained nor consistent.
Women's participation opportunities decrease as much as they
increase. Third, SCSU has denied requests to add or elevate women's
teams in the past. Although SCSU added women's teams two decades
ago, SCSU had a continuing obligation to expand opportunities for
women under Prong Two. Although SCSU supported all sports within
its conference, it was obligated to continue expanding its sports
program until participation opportunities for men and women were
substantially proportional to their enrollment numbers.

SCSU failed to comply with Prong Two. Where compliance under Prong
Two is impossible, SCSU should have moved to Prong One or Three
Compliance.

Prong Three Compliance

Unmet need exists at SCSU. First, SCSU failed to show that it had a
method of assessment of athletic interests and abilities of its
students, much less one that is nondiscriminatory. In its history,
SCSU has conducted two surveys of student interest in athletics.
The most recent, the 2015 Survey did not take into account any
nationally increasing levels of women's interests and abilities. It
merely asked whether students were interested in future
participation, were currently participating in or had prior
experience in a list of sports.

Second, the results of the 2015 Survey show that there is student
athletic interest. For example, twenty-four female students
expressed an interest in Nordic skiing, 111 female students were
interested in tennis, and ninety-three female students were
interested in bowling. Although SCSU did not act on the results of
the 2015 Survey because it decided to move to Prong One compliance,
it is highly unlikely that similar interest did not exist prior to
this survey. SCSU's failure to conduct surveys more often cannot be
used to show that no interest existed. Doing so would incentive
institutions to never find out if students had interest in adding
sports teams. Lastly, SCSU conducted just two surveys of student
interest since the passage of Title IX. This fact,
coupled with SCSU's lack of policies and procedures to receive
student requests to add teams, makes the absence of evidence of
interest suspect. SCSU also failed to document any assessments of
student interest and ability beyond the 1997 and 2015 Surveys. The
evidence shows that SCSU has largely ignored its obligation to
assess student interests and abilities, much less on a regular
basis.

Third, SCSU has received multiple requests to add women's teams to
SCSU's intercollegiate sports program but has denied these
requests. The denials were not due to lack of interest or ability
on the part of students, but due to lack of financial resources.
Indeed, the results of the 2015 Survey showed that students had
myriad interests and experience in many sports that SCSU did not
currently offer. SCSU also carried several club teams that even
more clearly showed student interest in those sports.

Fourth, SCSU failed to show that students and admitted students
lack sufficient ability to sustain a team. The 2015 Survey
indicated that fifty-one students were interested in women's
lacrosse, and SCSU currently has a club team. There is also ample
evidence that students have interest in other sports, such as
bowling, which was requested to be added on multiple occasions. On
at least two occasions SCSU faculty discussed the possibility of
adding a bowling team with the Athletic Director, showing that the
faculty believed there was sufficient potential to sustain an
intercollegiate team.

SCSU has also failed to show that there is no reasonable
expectation of competition for a team. The Court recognizes that
proving a negative is difficult, but the bar is not high here. SCSU
failed to show any evidence that it attempted to encourage the
development of intercollegiate competition in its competitive
region or that it even discussed the topic with its peer
institutions. Although no evidence has been provided to show that
overall athletic opportunities within SCSU's competitive region
have been historically limited for the underrepresented sex, Weems
testified that interest in women's lacrosse had been rising in
SCSU's competitive region.

Despite this rising interest, SCSU never attempted to investigate
the possibility of adding lacrosse, nor did it encourage the
conference or region to explore adding lacrosse as an
intercollegiate sport. SCSU simply rested on the assumption that it
was not reasonable to add women's lacrosse because it already
supported all women's sports in its conference. SCSU was obligated
to do more than make assumptions if it wished to comply with Title
IX under Prong Three.

The Court finds that SCSU failed to fully and effectively
accommodate the interests and abilities of female students. First,
there was clear unmet need at SCSU. SCSU received multiple requests
to add women's teams. Survey results showed great interest in
athletic participation from female students. SCSU was aware of the
growing interest in women's lacrosse. And SCSU failed to
sufficiently assess students' interests and abilities. Second, SCSU
failed to show that students did not have sufficient ability to
sustain an intercollegiate team. SCSU had a women's lacrosse club
team, yet it chose not to explore whether there was potential in
those players to sustain a varsity team. Lastly, SCSU made no
efforts to determine whether competition exists or could exist for
any new women's sports team. While institutions need not engage in
fruitless exercises to drum up support for adding a new team within
a region or conference, they are required to do more than wait for
competition develop on its own, especially when an institution is
aware of growing region-wide interest in specific women's sports.

SCSU failed to comply with Prong Three.

SCSU'S PRESENT COMPLIANCE WITH TITLE IX

The Court also finds that SCSU fails to comply with Title IX in the
present defined as the 2016-17 academic year to the present. SCSU's
allocation of athletic participation opportunities is not
substantially proportional to its male and female enrollment.
Indeed, SCSU recently tried to eliminate women's athletic teams an
action that would have happened but for an order of this Court.

Allocation of Athletic Opportunities

The Court finds that SCSU fails to comply with Title IX in its
allocation of athletic participation opportunities. The Court
further finds that the number of additional athletic participation
opportunities required to bring SCSU in exact proportionality is
sufficient to field a viable varsity team.

The Plaintiffs make two challenges to SCSU's count of athletic
participation opportunities. First, the Plaintiffs argue that
several female athletes did not receive genuine participation
opportunities and thus should not be counted. Second, the
Plaintiffs argue that some uncounted male athletes participated and
received the benefits of participation and should be counted. The
Court need not resolve this issue.  Even if SCSU's count were
correct, SCSU does not presently comply with Title IX's effective
accommodation requirement. The violation would be especially
egregious absent the Court's preliminary injunction.

The participation opportunity gap the number of additional
participation opportunities needed to bring SCSU into exact
proportionality during the 2016-17 academic year was 26. The
participation opportunity gap during the 2017-18 academic year was
28. In both years the gap would have been sufficient to field two
varsity teamswomen's tennis and Nordic skiing. Most SCSU women's
intercollegiate teams have rosters smaller than 26 and 28.  

The Court concludes that the gap likely would have been larger
because no women on the tennis or Nordic skiing teams would have
received participation opportunities. It is possible that, had the
Court not issued the preliminary injunction, SCSU may have elected
to increase the minimum roster numbers for women's teams or
decrease the maximum for men's teams. However, the Court finds this
outcome unlikely as the roster minimums for SCSU's women's teams
are already generally higher than average NCAA team sizes, and the
roster maximums for SCSU's men's teams are already below their
normal averages.  

Levels of Competition

The Plaintiffs failed to present evidence that SCSU failed to
provide equivalent levels of competition for its male and female
sports teams. Here, SCSU offers two levels of competition NCAA
Division I for men's and women's hockey, and NCAA Division II for
all other sports. There is no indication that NCAA division rules
do not provide similar levels of competition for each sport within
each division. Because SCSU has substantially equivalent numbers of
men and women competing at the Division I level 25 and 27
respectively and all other teams compete at the Division II level,
SCSU is substantially in compliance with Title IX's
levels-of-competition requirement. Although SCSU meets this test,
it still fails to comply with Title IX because it must meet at
least one of the three prongs of compliance in addition to the
levels of competition test.

TREATMENT AND BENEFITS

The Court considers SCSU's past and present compliance with Title
IX's treatment and benefits requirement together in this section.
No evidence was provided that SCSU substantially changed or
overhauled its treatment and benefits between the years preceding
2016-17 and the present. The photographs and other evidence that
the Court relies on portrays the condition of SCSU's treatment of
and benefits for athletes in the past and the present. The Court
finds that SCSU did not equitably treat its male and female
students and did not equitably confer benefits on them.

Significant disparities exist in SCSU's treatment of men's and
women's athletic teams and its allocation of benefits between
them.

The substantial inequity results from a disproportionate number of
male athletes benefiting from the better treatment and benefits
conferred on Tier 1 teams over Tier 2 and 3 teams. As with Tier 1,
women are underrepresented in Tier 2. In Tier 3, where teams
received the lowest level of support, women are overrepresented.
For an institution to meet Title IX's treatment and benefits
requirement when it creates different tiers of support for its
teams, a substantially equivalent number of men and women should be
in each tier and receive the same quality of benefits and
treatment.

In a factor by factor analysis, SCSU also conferred more and better
benefits to male athletes than female athletes.

The provision of housing and dining facilities and services is
equal overall for all sports and tiers because SCSU does not
provide specialized housing for athletes separate from housing
provided to the general student population. The opportunity for
athletes to receive academic tutoring is, likewise, equal across
all sports and tiers because SCSU does not provide specialized
tutoring services for athletes separate from what it provides to
the general student population.

Furthermore, men and women had equitable opportunities with respect
to coaching. Generally, coach-to-athlete ratios are similar for the
different sports, coaches are of generally similar experience or
quality, and numbers of full-time and part time coaches were
similar for both sexes. Not enough information was provided to
allow the Court to determine whether the compensation of coaches is
equitable.

SCSU's provision of equipment and supplies substantially favors
men. Men's hockey has a higher budget for hockey sticks; however,
this difference results from nondiscriminatory factor that men have
more need for hockey sticks because they break more sticks than
women do. As such, the Court did not credit this difference in its
analysis. Both teams' budgets for equipment are sufficient. The
women's basketball team has one set of travel gear that they use
for multiple years that must be returned at the end of each season.
New gear is only ordered when there are sufficient funds in the
team's budget. The men's basketball team orders new gear each year
and players are allowed to keep the gear. The men's baseball team
replaces six to eight uniform pants each year, and overhauls
jerseys roughly every four to five years. Nordic skiing team
uniforms and practice gear are replaced roughly every eight years.
Wrestling mats were recently replaced due to safety concerns.

The Nordic skiing team room had insufficient ventilation for waxing
skis, so SCSU designated a room with a hood for the team's use;
however, the room was unusable. SCSU also declined to purchase a
respirator for the Nordic skiing team despite safety concerns.
Overall, the equipment and gear provided to men's teams are
replaced more often, despite the women's teams' need to replace
their equipment and gear more often too. The men's basketball team
also enjoyed the benefit of keeping their gear at the close of
their season. When the wrestling team needed new equipment due to
safety concerns, mats were replaced; yet Nordic skiing's safety
concerns were not similarly addressed. Overall, an analysis of this
factor shows slightly better treatment of and benefits for men's
teams.

Overall, the scheduling of practice times and games do not favor
one sex over the other. The women's basketball practice time is
inadequate because many students are still in class when they have
access to their practice facility, so it is difficult to hold a
full practice. Likewise, the women's basketball game time is
inadequate because games begin at 5:30 p.m. so it is more difficult
for fans to attend games. Men's basketball plays games directly
after women's basketball at 7:30 p.m., the preferred time because
fans can more easily attend. The women's soccer team plays their
games at 1:00 p.m. on Fridays and Sundays a weekend series that
allows players to rest between games. The women's soccer team
practices at 6:30 or 7:00 a.m.

The men's football team plays games at 6:00 p.m. on Saturdays, and
after September the team plays at 1:00 p.m. due to weather. The
swimming and diving teams, both men's and women's, are offered four
practice times throughout the day to minimize the number of players
at each practice so players can have more individualized attention
from coaches. Most teams have opportunity for pre- and post-season
play. Overall this factor is substantially balanced and does not
favor one sex over the other because many disadvantages that one
team may experience are offset by advantages to other teams of the
same sex.

Travel funds and per diem allowance substantially favor men. The
women's basketball team generally does not travel out of the SCSU
region, although through fundraising they were able to travel to
Washington in 2018. During overnight travel, three to four female
players sleep in a room. The men's basketball team travels out of
state every two years. During overnight travel, two male players
sleep in a room. The baseball team travels by chartered bus and
rooms four players to a room during overnight travel. Every three
or four years the baseball team flies to Texas to play at the
Houston Minutemaid Stadium. The trips range from a weekend to nine
days.

The softball team travels once per year to Florida, but the team
must raise its own funds for the trip. The Nordic skiing team's
coach drives the team to meets in SCSU vehicles, but many meets are
not funded by SCSU, and players have had to pay for their own
travel and meet entry fees. The women's tennis team travels to
Florida during spring break, but they contribute personal funds to
attend the trip. The men's and women's swimming and diving teams
travel together by combination of bus and vans. On balance, this
factor favors men because men's teams are able to travel more
frequently, more comfortably, and for longer periods of time, and
SCSU funds more of the men's teams' expenses.

Judgment be entered for Plaintiffs and against Defendants.

SCSU did not comply with Title IX in its allocation of athletic
participation opportunities and treatment and benefits in the past,
from at least 2014.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 1, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y48twpj4 from Leagle.com.

Alexie Portz, Jill Kedrowski, Abigail Kantor, Marilia Roque
Diversi, Fernanda Quintino dos Santos, Maria Hauer, Haley Bock,
Kaitlyn Babich, Anna Lindell & Kiersten Rohde, individually and on
behalf of all those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by
Donald Chance Mark, Jr.  -- donald.mark@fmjlaw.com -- Fafinski Mark
& Johnson, PA, Sharon L. Van Dyck, Van Dyck Law Firm, PLLC, 5354
Parkdale Drive. Suite 103. St. Louis Park, Minnesota 55416 & Tyler
P. Brimmer -- tyler.brimmer@fmjlaw.com -- Fafinski Mark & Johnson
P.A.

St. Cloud State University & Minnesota State Colleges and
Universities, Defendants, represented by Ian M. Welsh, Minnesota
Attorney General's Office & Kevin A. Finnerty, Minnesota Attorney
General's Office.


STERLING JEWELERS: Lara Suit to Recover Unpaid Overtime
-------------------------------------------------------
Anibal Lara, on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-61852, (S.D. Fla., July 23, 2019), seeks
to recover all lawfully earned and due wages, specifically unpaid
overtime and compensation for missed meal breaks pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

Defendant operates retail locations in numerous states across the
country. Lara worked as an assistant manager for their Florida
location. He claims to have regularly worked in excess of 40 hours
per week. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Chad A. Justice, Esq.
      JUSTICE FOR JUSTICE LLC
      1205 N Franklin St., Suite 326
      Tampa, Florida 33602
      Tel. (813) 566-0550
      Fax: 813-566-0770
      E-mail: chad@getjusticeforjustice.com

              - and -

      Luis Cabassa, Esq.
      Brandon Hill, Esq.
      WENZEL, FENTON AND CABASSA PA
      1110 North Florida Ave., Suite 300
      Tampa, Florida, 33602
      Telephone: (813) 224-0431
      Facsimile: (813) 229-8712
      Email: lcabassa@wfclaw.com
             bhill@wfclaw.com


SUPERIOR ENERGY: Womack Seeks to Certify FLSA Class of Operators
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as AARON WOMACK, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
SUPERIOR ENERGY SERVICES-NORTH AMERICA SERVICES, INC. and SPN WELL
SERVICES f/k/a INTEGRATED PRODUCTION SERVICES, INC., the
Defendants, Case No. 7:19-cv-00074-DC-RCG (W.D. Tex.), the
Plaintiff seeks the Court for an order conditionally certifying a
Fair Labor Standards Act class of:

   "all Flowback Operators who worked for, or on behalf of,
   Defendants, who were classified as independent contractors
   and paid a day rate at any time during the last three
   years.".

The Defendants Paid Womack and the Flowback Operators a Day Rate.
The Defendants are engaged in drilling, completion and production
services, and they work as a unified operation and/or are under
common control, sharing at least an address and common
directors/officers. To perform their operations, Defendants employ
Flowback Operators on a day rate basis who they classified as
independent contractors.

The Court should conditionally certify this class because Womack
has more than satisfied his minimal burden of demonstrating that he
and the Flowback Operators are similarly situated, as they were all
subjected to Defendants' uniform day rate policy that deprived them
of overtime compensation in violation of the FLSA, the Plaintiff
said.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LAW FIRM
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 325-1100
          Facsimile: (713) 325-3300
          E-mail: adunlap@mybackwages.com
                  mjosephson@mybackwages.com

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch
          State Bar No. 24001807
          BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 877-8788
          Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com

T-MOBILE USA: Grob Labor Suit Removed to C.D. Cal.
--------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Gael F. Grob, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. and
Does 1 to 50, inclusive, Defendant, Case No. 19STCV20707 (Cal.
Super., June 14, 2019), was removed to the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California on July 23, 2019 under Case No.
19-cv-06352.

Grob seeks redress for failure to provide meal periods, rest
periods, minimum wages, overtime, complete and accurate wage/leave
statements, reimbursement of business-related expenses, and unfair
business practices; waiting time penalties for unpaid wages due
upon termination and in violation of the California Labor Code,
California Business and Professions Code, including declaratory
relief, damages, penalties, equitable relief, costs and attorneys'
fees.[BN]

T-Mobile is represented by:

     Keith A. Jacoby, Esq.
     LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
     2049 Century Park East, 5th Floor
     Los Angeles, CA 90067.3107
     Telephone: (310) 553-0308
     Facsimile: (310) 553-5583
     Email: kjacoby@littler.com

            - and -

     Gregory G. Iskander, Esq.
     LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
     Treat Towers
     1255 Treat Boulevard, Suite 600
     Walnut Creek, CA 94597
     Telephone: (925) 932-2468
     Facsimile: (925) 946-9809
     Email: giskander@littler.com

            - and -

     Perry K. Miska, Jr., Esq.
     LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
     333 Bush Street, 34th Floor
     San Francisco, CA 94104
     Telephone: (415) 433-1940
     Facsimile: (415) 399-8490
     Email: pmiska@littler.com


TAMRAK MANAGEMENT: Hernandez Suit to Recover Unpaid Overtime
------------------------------------------------------------
Carlos Hernandez, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly-situated Plaintiff, v. Tamrak Management Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 19-cv-06825, (S.D. N.Y., July 23, 2019), seeks to recover
damages for willful failure to pay for all regular hours worked,
the overtime premium rate for all hours worked in excess of forty
hours in a workweek, penalty damages for failure to provide the
wage notices and pay statements as required by the Fair Labor
Standards Act and New York labor law.

Tamrak Management is a property management company that does
business in New York City where Hernandez worked as the residential
superintendent for Tamrak's property located at 679-681 Magenta
Street, Bronx, NY 10467 from February 2017 through June 5, 2019.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Gregory N. Filosa, Esq.
      FILOSA GRAFF LLP
      111 John Street, Suite 2510
      New York, NY 10038
      Tel: (212) 256-1780
      Fax: (212) 256-1781
      Email: gfilosa@filosagraff.com


TCF FINANCIAL: Suits Challenging Chemical Financial Merger Dropped
------------------------------------------------------------------
TCF Financial Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 31, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the plaintiffs in the
Chemical Financial merger-related suits have dismissed their
respective complaints with prejudice as to their individual claims
and without prejudice to the claims of the members of the putative
class.

On January 27, 2019, TCF and Chemical Financial Corporation
("Chemical").issued a press release announcing that the two
entities had entered into a definitive agreement (the "Merger
Agreement"), by which Chemical will acquire all of the outstanding
shares of the Company in an all-stock transaction (the "Proposed
Transaction"). Under the terms of the Merger Agreement, each share
of TCF common stock will be converted into the right to receive
0.5081 shares of Chemical common stock (the "Merger
Consideration").

In connection with TCF's planned merger with Chemical, purported
stockholders of TCF filed five putative class action lawsuits and
individual lawsuits against TCF and members of TCF's board of
directors (collectively, the "Actions").

Three of these lawsuits were filed in the United States District
Court for the District of Delaware: Wang v. TCF Financial
Corporation et al., 1:19-cv-00661 (filed on April 9, 2019),
Parshall v. TCF Financial Corporation et al., 1:19-cv-00663 (filed
on April 10, 2019) and White v. TCF Financial Corporation et al.,
1:19-cv-00683 (filed on April 12, 2019).

One lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York: Harrelson v. TCF Financial
Corporation et al., 1:19-cv-03183 (filed on April 10, 2019).

And one lawsuit was filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery: Nelson
v. TCF Financial Corporation et al., 2019-0335-JTL (filed on May 6,
2019).

In general, the Actions asserted claims against TCF and TCF's board
of directors, alleging, among other things, that the defendants
misstated or failed to disclose certain allegedly material
information in the definitive joint proxy statement/prospectus
relating to the merger that Chemical and TCF filed with the SEC on
May 3, 2019.

TCF believes that the allegations in the Actions were without
merit; however, to avoid the costs, risks, nuisance and
uncertainties inherent in litigation, TCF voluntarily provided
supplemental disclosures related to the merger as set forth in
TCF's Current Report on Form 8-K dated May 28, 2019.

Plaintiffs in the Actions dismissed their respective complaints
with prejudice as to their individual claims and without prejudice
to the claims of the members of the putative class. In dismissing
the Actions, plaintiffs reserved the right to seek an award of
attorneys' fees from the court.

TCF Financial Corporation operates as the bank holding company for
TCF National Bank that provides various financial products and
services in the United States and Canada. It operates through
Consumer Banking, Wholesale Banking, and Enterprise Services
segments. TCF Financial Corporation was founded in 1923 and is
headquartered in Wayzata, Minnesota.


TENSSOURCE LLC: Cancelino Claims Unpaid Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------
John Cancelino, individually, and as class representatives of
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TENSsource, LLC, and
Nicholas Exarhos, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-01810, (M.D. Fla.,
July 24, 2019), seeks to recover from Defendants unpaid overtime
wages, monies due and owing, liquidated damages and reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs for violations of the minimum wage
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

TENSSource -- https://tenssource.com/ -- is a medical equipment
company that distributes electrotherapy devices to patients for
home medical use where Cancelino was employed as an inside
marketing and sales representative from approximately September 27,
2017 until January 14, 2019. He regularly worked in excess of forty
hours per week without payment of overtime premiums. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Peter A. Sartes, Esq.
      TRAGOS, SARTES & TRAGOS, PLLC
      601 Cleveland Street, Suite 800
      Clearwater, FL 33755
      Tel: (727) 441-9030
      Facsimile: (727) 441-9254
      Email: peter@greeklaw.com
             yaima@greeklaw.com

             - and -

      Michael P. Perenich, Esq.
      PERENICH CAULFIELD AVRIL NOYES
      1875 N. Belcher Rd.
      Clearwater, FL 33765
      Telephone: (727) 796-8282
      Email: michael@usalaw.com


TESLA INC: Nguyen Sues Over Vehicle's Defective Battery
-------------------------------------------------------
Hugh Nguyen, an individual, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Tesla, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
19-cv-01422 (C.D. Cal., July 23, 2019), seeks redress for breach of
express and implied warranties, intentional misrepresentation,
negligent misrepresentation, fraud by concealment and for violation
of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, the California Song-Beverly
Consumer Warranty Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, the
California Vehicle Code, California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act,
California's Unfair Competition Law and California's False
Advertising Law.

Nguyen purchased a used Tesla Model S vehicle and claim that its
battery was severely degraded and was defective.

Tesla engaged in the business of designing, manufacturing,
marketing, warranting, distributing and selling electric
automobiles. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Edward C. Chen, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF EDWARD C. CHEN
     1 Park Plaza, Suite 600
     Irvine, CA 92614
     Telephone: (949) 287-4278
     Facsimile: (626) 385-6060
     Email: Edward.Chen@edchenlaw.com


THAI CHILI 2 GO: Chiang Suit Seeks to Recover Overtime Pay
----------------------------------------------------------
Cesar Chiang, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Thai Chili 2 Go, LLC, TC2GO 101 & Elliot,
LLC, TC2GO Camelback LLC, TC2GO Chandler, LLC, TC2Go Dove, LLC,
TC2GO Power, LLC, TC2GO Santan, LLC, TC2GO Scottsdale, LLC, ARS
Global Inc., Akshat Sethi and Jane Doe Sethi, a Married Couple, and
"Tuk" Doe and John Doe, a Married Couple, Defendants, Case No.
19-cv-04801, (D. Ariz., July 24, 2019), seeks unpaid wages for
overtime compensation due, liquidated damages, reasonable
attorney's fees, costs and expenses of this action and such other
relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Defendants operate a chain of fast casual restaurants called "Thai
Chili 2 Go" where Chiang worked as a kitchen staff. He claims to be
denied overtime for time worked in excess of 40 hours in any given
workweek.

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Clifford P. Bendau, II, Esq.
      Christopher J. Bendau, Esq.
      THE BENDAU LAW FIRM PLLC
      P.O. Box 97066
      Phoenix, Arizona 85018
      Telephone: (480) 382-5176
      Facsimile: (602) 956-1409
      Email: cliffordbendau@bendaulaw.com
             chris@bendaulaw.com


TOTAL SYSTEM: 3 Suits Balk at Global Payments Merger
----------------------------------------------------
Total System Services, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 31, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that three putative class
action lawsuits challenging a Merger transaction have been filed.

On May 27, 2019, TSYS entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger
(the "Merger Agreement") with Global Payments Inc., a Georgia
corporation ("Global Payments"). The Merger Agreement provides
that, upon the terms and subject to the conditions set forth
therein, TSYS will merge with and into Global Payments (the
"Merger"), with Global Payments as the surviving entity in the
Merger.

Two of these lawsuits, captioned Peters v. Total System Services,
Inc. et al. (Case No. 4:19-cv-00114) and Wolf v. Total System
Services, Inc., et al. (Case No. 4:19-cv-00115), were filed in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia on
July 18, 2019.   

The third lawsuit, captioned Drulias v. Global Payments Inc., et.
al (Case No. 60774/2019) was filed in the Supreme Court of the
State of New York, County of Westchester on July 19, 2019.

In addition, a lawsuit challenging the Merger on behalf of an
individual plaintiff captioned Hickey v. Total System Services,
Inc., et al. (Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-03337-LMM) was filed in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia,
Atlanta Division, on July 23, 2019.

The Peters lawsuit names as defendants TSYS, the current members of
the TSYS board of directors and certain former members of the TSYS
board of directors.

The Wolf lawsuit names as defendants TSYS, members of the TSYS
board of directors and Global Payments.

The Drulias lawsuit names as defendants Global Payments and members
of its board.  

The Hickey lawsuit names as defendants TSYS and the members of the
TSYS board of directors.  

The complaints filed in the lawsuits assert, among other things,
claims for filing a materially incomplete registration statement
with the SEC.  The plaintiffs in the lawsuits seek, among other
things, an injunction barring the Merger, rescission of the Merger
or rescissory damages, and an award of damages and attorney's fees.


TSYS believes that the claims asserted in the lawsuits are without
merit.

Total System Services, Inc. provides payment processing, merchant,
and related payment services to financial and nonfinancial
institutions worldwide. The company operates through three
segments: Issuer Solutions, Merchant Solutions, and Consumer
Solutions. Total System Services, Inc. was founded in 1982 and is
headquartered in Columbus, Georgia.


TOTAL SYSTEM: Telexfree Securities Suit Ongoing
-----------------------------------------------
Total System Services, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 31, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend a class action suit entitled,  In Re: Telexfree Securities
Litigation (4:14-md-02566-TSH) (D. Mass.)

ProPay, Inc. ("ProPay"), a subsidiary of the Company, has been
named as one of a number of defendants (including other merchant
processors) in several purported class action lawsuits relating to
the activities of TelexFree, Inc. and its affiliates and
principals.

TelexFree is a former merchant customer of ProPay. With regard to
TelexFree, each purported class action lawsuit generally alleges
that TelexFree engaged in an improper multi-tier marketing scheme
involving voice-over Internet protocol telephone services.

The plaintiffs in each of the purported class action complaints
generally allege that the various merchant processor defendants,
including ProPay, aided and abetted the improper activities of
TelexFree. TelexFree filed for bankruptcy protection in Nevada. The
bankruptcy proceeding was subsequently transferred to the
Massachusetts Bankruptcy Court.

Specifically, ProPay has been named as one of a number of
defendants (including other merchant processors) in each of the
following purported class action complaints relating to TelexFree:
(i) Waldermara Martin, et al. v. TelexFree, Inc., et al. (Case No.
BK-S-14-12524-ABL) (Bankr. D. Nev.); (ii) Anthony Cellucci, et al.
v. TelexFree, Inc., et. al. (Case No. 4:14-BK-40987) (Bankr. D.
Mass.); (iii) Maduako C. Ferguson Sr., et al. v. Telexelectric,
LLP, et. al (Case No. 5:14-CV-00316-D) (E.D.N.C.); (iv) Todd Cook
v. TelexElectric LLP et al. (Case No. 2:14-CV-00134) (N.D. Ga.);
(v) Felicia Guevara v. James M. Merrill et al., CA No.
1:14-cv-22405-DPG) (S.D. Fla.); (vi) Reverend Jeremiah Githere, et
al. v. TelexElectric LLP et al. (Case No. 1:14-CV-12825-GAO) (D.
Mass.); (vii) Paulo Eduardo Ferrari et al. v. Telexfree, Inc. et
al. (Case No. 14-04080) (Bankr. D. Mass); (viii) Magalhaes v.
TelexFree, Inc., et al., No. 14-cv-12437 (D. Mass.); (ix) Griffith
v. Merrill et al., No. 14-CV-12058 (D. Mass.); (x) Abelgadir v.
Telexelectric, LLP, No. 14-09857 (S.D.N.Y.); and (xi) Rita Dos
Santos, v. TelexElectric, LLP et al., 2:15-cv-01906-NVW (D. Ariz.)
(together, the "Actions").

On October 21, 2014, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
("JPML") transferred and consolidated the Actions filed before that
date to the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts (the "Consolidated Action"). The JPML subsequently
transferred the remaining Actions to the Consolidated Action. The
Consolidated Action is styled In Re: TelexFree Securities
Litigation (4:14-md-02566-TSH) (D. Mass.).

The plaintiffs in the Consolidated Action filed a First
Consolidated Amended Complaint on March 31, 2015 and filed a Second
Consolidated Amended Complaint (the "Second Amended Complaint") on
April 30, 2015. The Second Amended Complaint, which supersedes the
complaints filed prior to consolidation of the Actions, purports to
bring claims on behalf of all persons who purchased certain
TelexFree "memberships" and suffered a "net loss" between January
1, 2012 and April 16, 2014.

With respect to ProPay, the Second Amended Complaint alleges that
ProPay aided and abetted tortious acts committed by TelexFree, and
that ProPay was unjustly enriched in the course of providing
payment processing services to TelexFree. Several defendants,
including ProPay, moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on
June 2, 2015. The court held a hearing on the motions to dismiss on
November 2, 2015.  

On January 29, 2019, the court granted in part and denied in part
ProPay's motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. The court
dismissed plaintiffs' claim that ProPay was unjustly enriched by
the alleged TelexFree fraud, but denied ProPay's motion to dismiss
the plaintiffs' claim that ProPay allegedly aided and abetted
TelexFree's purported scheme. The court’s ruling does not reflect
any determination of the merits of the plaintiffs' aiding and
abetting claim against ProPay, but instead is merely a ruling that
the plaintiffs have alleged facts that could potentially entitle
them to relief from ProPay if those facts were true. ProPay denies
that it had any knowledge of TelexFree's alleged fraud or that it
aided and abetted that fraud in any way.

After deciding the motions to dismiss filed by ProPay and some of
the other defendants in the litigation, the court lifted the stay
on discovery that had been in place since the outset of the
Consolidated Action. Approximately 50 defendants remain in the
litigation. The Court held a scheduling conference on March 20,
2019, but has not yet entered an order setting the case schedule.

Total System said, "While the Company and ProPay intend to
vigorously defend the Consolidated Action and other matters arising
out of the relationship of ProPay with TelexFree and believe ProPay
has substantial defenses related to these purported claims, the
Company currently cannot reasonably estimate losses attributable to
these matters."

Total System Services, Inc. provides payment processing, merchant,
and related payment services to financial and nonfinancial
institutions worldwide. The company operates through three
segments: Issuer Solutions, Merchant Solutions, and Consumer
Solutions. Total System Services, Inc. was founded in 1982 and is
headquartered in Columbus, Georgia.


TOYOTA MOTOR: Court Enters Protective Order in McCarthy Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Karen E. Scott of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California has entered a Stipulated Protective
Order in the case, REMY McCARTHY, KATHLEEN RYAN-BLAUFUSS, CATHLEEN
MILLS, JASON REID, and KHEK KUAN, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION,
TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC., and DOE DEFENDANTS 1-10,
Defendants. JEVDET REXHEPI, STEPHEN KOSAREFF and LAURA KAKISH, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES USA, INC., and DOES 1-10, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 8:18-cv-00201-JLS-KES (C.D. Cal.).

Discovery in the action is likely to involve production of
confidential, proprietary, or private information for which special
protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose
other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted.
Accordingly, the parties stipulated to and petitioned the Court to
enter their Stipulated Protective Order.  They acknowledged that
the Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or
responses to discovery and that the protection it affords from
public disclosure and use extends only to the limited information
or items that are currently contemplated for production by the
parties and entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable
legal principles.  They further acknowledge that the Stipulated
Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential
information under seal; Civil Local Rule 79-5 sets forth the
procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be
applied when a party seeks permission from the Court to file
material under seal.

The protections conferred by the Stipulation and Order cover not
only Protected Material, but also (1) any information copied or
extracted from Protected Material; (2) all copies, excerpts,
summaries, or compilations of Protected Material; and (3) any
testimony, conversations, or presentations by Parties or their
Counsel that might reveal, describe, summarize, or reference
Protected Material.  Any use of Protected Material at trial will be
governed by the orders of the trial judge.  The Order does not
govern the use of Protected Material at trial, but remains in
effect until the time period specified.

The Order will remain in force and effect until modified,
superseded, or terminated by consent of the parties or by order of
the Court made upon reasonable written notice.  Unless otherwise
ordered, or agreed upon by the parties, this Order will survive the
termination of the action.  Termination of the action will be
deemed to be the later of (1) dismissal of all claims and defenses
in the Action, with or without prejudice; and (2) final judgment
herein after the completion and exhaustion of all appeals,
rehearings, remands, trials, or reviews of the Action, including
the time limits for filing any motions or applications for
extension of time pursuant to applicable law.

Any Party or Non-Party may challenge a designation of
confidentiality at any time that is consistent with the Court's
Scheduling Order.

A Receiving Party may use Protected Material that is disclosed or
produced by another Party or by a Non-Party in connection with the
Action only for prosecuting, defending, or attempting to settle the
Action.  Such Protected Material may be disclosed only to the
categories of persons and under the conditions described in the
Order.  When the Action has been terminated, a Receiving Party must
comply with the provisions of section 13.

After the final disposition of the Action, within 60 days of a
written request by the Designating Party, each Receiving Party must
return all Protected Material to the Producing Party or destroy
such material.

Any violation of the Order may be punished by any and all
appropriate measures including, without limitation, contempt
proceedings and/or monetary sanctions.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2019 Protective Order is
available at https://is.gd/wd1MRD from Leagle.com.

Remy McCarthy, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated & Robert Phillips, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Amnon Z. Siegel --
asiegel@millerbarondess.com -- Miller Barondess LLP, Brian Procel
-- bprocel@millerbarondess.com -- Miller Barondess LLP, Casey Blair
Sypek -- csypek@millerbarondess.com -- Miller Barondess LLP, David
I. Bosko -- dbosko@millerbarondess.com -- Miller Barondess LLP,
Jeffrey A. Koncius -- koncius@kiesel.law -- Kiesel Law LLP, Nicole
Ramirez -- ramirez@kiesel.law -- Kiesel Law LLP, Paul R. Kiesel --
kiesel@kiesel.law -- Kiesel Law LLP, D. Bryan Garcia, Kiesel Law
LLP, Jeffrey Louis Fazio, DeHeng Law Offices PC & Louis R. Miller
-- smiller@millerbarondess.com -- Miller Barondess LLP.

Rajdave Bhandari, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Charles J. LaDuca , Cuneo
Gilbert and LaDuca LLP, pro hac vice, Dina E. Micheletti , Fazio
and Micheletti LLP, Donald R. Pepperman , Baker Marquart LLP,
Gwendolyn R. Giblin , Audet and Partners LLP, Jeffrey Louis Fazio ,
DeHeng Law Offices PC, Michael J. Flannery , Cuneo Gilbert and
LaDuca LLP & William M. Audet , Audet and Partners LLP.

Jevdet Rexhepi, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Charles J. LaDuca ,
Cuneo Gilbert and LaDuca LLP, pro hac vice, Dina E. Micheletti ,
Fazio and Micheletti LLP, Donald R. Pepperman , Baker Marquart LLP,
Gwendolyn R. Giblin , Audet and Partners LLP, Jeffrey Louis Fazio ,
DeHeng Law Offices PC, Michael J. Flannery , Cuneo Gilbert and
LaDuca LLP, William M. Audet , Audet and Partners LLP & David I.
Bosko , Miller Barondess LLP.

Kathleen Ryan-Blaufuss, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Cathleen Mills, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Jason Reid, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated & Khek Kuan, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Consol Plaintiffs, represented
by Amnon Z. Siegel , Miller Barondess LLP, Casey Blair Sypek ,
Miller Barondess LLP, David I. Bosko , Miller Barondess LLP,
Jeffrey Louis Fazio , DeHeng Law Offices PC & Louis R. Miller ,
Miller Barondess LLP.

Laura Kakish, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated & Stephen Kosareff, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Consol Plaintiffs, represented by Dina E.
Micheletti , Fazio and Micheletti LLP, Jeffrey Louis Fazio , DeHeng
Law Offices PC & David I. Bosko , Miller Barondess LLP.

Toyota Motor Corporation, Defendant, represented by David L.
Schrader -- david.schrader@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis and
Bockius LLP, Emily Lawrence Buller Calmeyer --
emily.calmeyer@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis and Bockius LLP &
Lisa Rose Veasman -- lisa.veasman@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis
and Bockius LLP.

Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., Defendant, represented by Emily
Lawrence Buller Calmeyer, Morgan Lewis and Bockius LLP, Joseph
Duffy, Morgan Lewis and Bockius LLP, Lisa Rose Veasman, Morgan
Lewis and Bockius LLP & David L. Schrader, Morgan Lewis and Bockius
LLP.


TRW GROUP: Brown Sues Over Defective Air Bag Sensor
---------------------------------------------------
Gordon Brown, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. ZF Friedrichshafen AG, ZF TRW Automotive
Holdings Corp., TRW Automotive Inc., TRW Automotive U.S. LLC, TRW
Vehicle Safety Systems Inc. and FCA US LLC,, Defendants, Case No.
19-cv-23082 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 2019), seeks compensatory,
exemplary and punitive remedies and damages and statutory
penalties, including interest, injunctive and equitable relief in
the form of a recall and program to repair, modify, and/or buy back
all defective vehicles and to fully reimburse all costs and
economic losses, disgorgement of all or part of the ill-gotten
profits they received from their sale or lease of the concerned
vehicles, all applicable statutory and civil penalties, award of
costs and attorneys' fees and such other or further relief in
breach of warranty and in violation of various state consumer
protection acts.

Brown owns a 2015 Jeep Wrangler Rubicon with a defective Airbag
Control Unit with an integrated circuit defect prevents deployment
of the airbags and seatbelt pre-tensioners.

The TRW Group is a major automotive parts supplier while FCA
designs, manufactures, and sells or distributes vehicles under the
Chrysler, Dodge, Jeep, Ram, FIAT and Alfa Romeo brands that uses
the airbag from TRW.

Plaintiff is represented by:

      David M. Buckner, Esq.
      Seth E. Miles, Esq.
      Brett E. von Borke, Esq.
      Elena M. Marlow, Esq.
      BUCKNER + MILES
      3350 Mary Street
      Coconut Grove, Florida 33133
      Telephone: (305) 964-8003
      E-mail: david@bucknermiles.com
              seth@bucknermiles.com
              vonborke@bucknermiles.com
              emarlow@bucknermiles.com

              - and -

      Cristina M. Pierson, Esq.
      Michael A. Hersh, Esq.
      Catherine C. Darlson, Esq.
      KELLEY UUSTAL, PLC
      500 N. Federal Highway, Suite 200
      Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
      Telephone: (954) 522-6601
      E-mail: cmp@kulaw.com
              mah@kulaw.com
              ccd@kulaw.com


TYSON FARMS: Accused of Dumping Waste into River by Residents
-------------------------------------------------------------
Tiffany Ashley, Charles Richard Corry and Bullheaded, LLC,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. Tyson Farms, Inc., Jason Spann, Hydraservice, Inc.
and Jasper Water Works and Sewer Board, Inc., Defendants, Case No.
19-cv-01180 (N.D. Ala., July 25, 2019), seeks to recover punitive
damages, prejudgment and post-judgment interest, attorney's fees
and costs of litigation and such other and further relief available
under all applicable state and federal laws and any relief
resulting from the contamination of the Mulberry Fork segment of
the Warrior River.

Plaintiffs are residents, property owners and/or business owners in
Walker County, Alabama. They allege that the Defendants dumped raw
sewage, effluent materials, toxins, bacteria, and/or other
contaminants into the Mulberry Fork of the Black Warrior River.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Joshua M. Vick, Esq.
      Dennis E. Goldasich, Jr., Esq.
      GOLDASICH, VICK, & FULK
      2100 Third Avenue North, Suite 400
      Birmingham, Alabama 35203
      Phone: (205) 731-2566
      Fax: (205) 731-9451
      Email: josh@golaw.net
             dennis@golaw.net

             - and -

      Robert O. Brvan, Esq.
      NELSON, BRYAN, & CROSS
      1807 Corona Avenue, # 200
      Jasper, Alabama 35502
      Phone: (205) 387-7777
      Fax: (205) 384-0659
      Email: bob@nelsonbryancross.com


US STEEL: Clairton Fire-Related Class Suit Ongoing
--------------------------------------------------
United States Steel Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the Company has been
served with a class action complaint that was filed in the
Allegheny Court of Common Pleas related to the December 24, 2018
fire at Clairton.

The complaint asserts common law nuisance and negligence claims and
seeks compensatory and punitive damages that allegedly were the
result of U. S. Steel's conduct that resulted in the fire and U. S.
Steel's operations subsequent to the fire.

The complaint was served on April 24, 2019.  U. S. Steel is
vigorously defending the matter.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

United States Steel Corporation produces and sells flat-rolled and
tubular steel products primarily in North America and Europe. It
operates through three segments: North American Flat-Rolled
(Flat-Rolled), U.S. Steel Europe (USSE), and Tubular Products
(Tubular). United States Steel was founded in 1901 and is
headquartered in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.


US STEEL: Underwriters Dropped as Defendants in Shareholder Action
------------------------------------------------------------------
United States Steel Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the underwriters are
no longer parties to a consolidated class action suit in
Pennsylvania.

On October 2, 2017, an Amended Shareholder Class Action Complaint
was filed in Federal Court in the Western District of Pennsylvania
consolidating previously-filed actions. Separately, four related
shareholder derivative lawsuits were filed in State and Federal
courts in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

The underlying consolidated class action lawsuit alleges that U. S.
Steel, certain current and former officers, an upper level manager
of the Company and the financial underwriters who participated in
the August 2016 secondary public offering of the Company's common
stock (collectively, Defendants) violated federal securities laws
in making false statements and/or failing to discover and disclose
material information regarding the financial condition of the
Company.

The lawsuit claims that this conduct caused a prospective class of
plaintiffs to sustain damages during the period from January 27,
2016 to April 25, 2017 as a result of the prospective class
purchasing the Company's common stock at artificially inflated
prices and/or suffering losses when the price of the common stock
dropped.

The derivative lawsuits generally make the same allegations against
the same officers and also allege that certain current and former
members of the Board of Directors failed to exercise appropriate
control and oversight over the Company and were unjustly
compensated.

The plaintiffs seek to recover losses that were allegedly
sustained. The class action Defendants moved to dismiss
plaintiffs’ claims. On September 29, 2018 the Court ruled on
those motions granting them in part and denying them in part.

On March 18, 2019, the plaintiffs withdrew the claims against the
Defendants related to the 2016 secondary offering. Therefore, the
underwriters are no longer parties to the case.

The Company and the individual defendants are vigorously defending
the remaining claims.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

United States Steel Corporation produces and sells flat-rolled and
tubular steel products primarily in North America and Europe. It
operates through three segments: North American Flat-Rolled
(Flat-Rolled), U.S. Steel Europe (USSE), and Tubular Products
(Tubular). United States Steel was founded in 1901 and is
headquartered in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.


VOLT INFORMATION: Court Compels Arbitration in Data Breach Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Francisco Division, issued an Order granting
Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration in the case captioned
ALVIN YU, Plaintiff, v. VOLT INFORMATION SCIENCES, INC., et al.,
Defendants. Case No. 19-cv-01981-LB. (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Alvin Yu brings this putative class action against his
former employer Volt, a staffing agency that employed him from July
2016 to November 2017 as a contingent employee hired for work at
Tesla, Inc. as an assembly line worker.  Mr. Yu asserts that Volt
caused harm to the plaintiffs and disregarded their rights by
intentionally, willfully, recklessly, or negligently failing to
take adequate and reasonable measures to ensure its email and data
systems were protected, failing to take available steps to prevent
and stop the breaches from ever occurring, and failing to disclose
to affected employees that it did not have adequate security
practices.
  
Mr. Yu does not dispute that by signing his employment agreement,
he entered into a binding contract with Volt. The employment
agreement thus is enforceable according to its terms.
The parties dispute three issues: (1) whether the data breach, and
Volt's response to it, falls within the scope of the arbitration
provision in the employment agreement (2) whether the arbitration
provision is unconscionable and (3) whether Volt has consented to
class arbitration.  

Arbitrability and Delegation

Governing Law

Under the Federal Arbitration Act, parties may agree to have an
arbitrator decide not only the merits of a particular dispute but
also gateway' questions of `arbitrability, such as whether the
parties have agreed to arbitrate or whether their agreement covers
a particular controversy.

Application

The parties' contract here expressly provides that any employment
related disputes and/or disputes arising out of or relating to the
actions of the Company or Company's employees shall be settled by
final and binding arbitration, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration
Act, in accordance with the employment rules of the American
Arbitration Association (AAA).

Mr. Yu argues that the arbitration provision does not extend to his
claims against Volt, because (so he argues) his dispute relates to
the actions of the third-party data breacher, not to the actions of
Volt or to his employment.37 This interpretation is somewhat
questionable, considering that Mr. Yu is bringing claims against
Volt, not against the third-party data breacher.   

In any event, whether the arbitration provision covers Mr. Yu's
claims here is a question that goes to the provision's scope, and
the parties agreed to delegate questions regarding the scope of the
arbitration provision to the arbitrator. Consequently, unless the
delegation agreement is itself unenforceable, it is for the
arbitrator, not the court, to decide whether Mr. Yu's claims are
covered by the arbitration provision.  

Unconscionability

Governing Law

The FAA provides that arbitration agreements are unenforceable upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract. Generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud,
duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate
arbitration agreements without contravening federal law.

In order to establish such a defense, the party opposing
arbitration must demonstrate that the contract as a whole or a
specific clause in the contract is both procedurally and
substantively unconscionable.

Application

As the party opposing arbitration, Mr. Yu has the burden of proving
that the agreement to delegate questions of arbitrability to the
arbitrator is both substantively and procedurally unconscionable.

He fails to meet that burden.

Mr. Yu makes no argument that the delegation agreement specifically
is substantively unconscionable. He argues that the arbitration
provision generally is substantively unconscionable because (1) it
bars class actions (2) it allows Volt to unilaterally modify the
employment agreement (3) it may require him to pay excessive fees
(4) it limits the parties' right to discovery and (5) it bars
appellate review.

Mr. Yu's first and fourth arguments go to the arbitration provision
generally but do not relate to and cannot be construed as attacking
the delegation agreement specifically and thus do not provide a
ground for overturning it. Mr. Yu's second argument fails because
the Ninth Circuit has held that a unilateral modification clause
does not make the arbitration provision and, by extension, a
delegation provision unconscionable.

Mr. Yu's third argument fails because the parties' arbitration
agreement and the AAA rules it incorporates do not require him to
pay excessive fees. Mr. Yu's fifth argument fails because while
binding arbitration would leave him with limited appeal rights,
such conclusiveness is one of the primary purposes of arbitration.

Because the agreement to delegate questions of arbitrability to the
arbitrator is not substantively unconscionable, it is enforceable,
and the court need not address procedural unconscionability. Mr. Yu
argues that the arbitration provision generally and, by implied
extension, the delegation agreement) is procedurally unconscionable
because (1) he was required to sign the arbitration provision as a
condition of his employment without any opportunity to negotiate
the provision's terms or to opt out (2) the arbitration provision
was hidden in fine print and includes legalese (3) he did not
realize at the time he signed the employment agreement what binding
arbitration meant and did not know he was giving up his right to a
trial and (4) he was surprised by the arbitration provision.

Mr. Yu's first argument fails because in the employment context, if
an employee must sign a non-negotiable employment agreement as a
condition of employment but `there is no other indication of
oppression or surprise, then the agreement will be enforceable
unless the degree of substantive unconscionability is high.

As another court in this district held in rejecting similar
arguments to find this same Volt arbitration provision
unconscionable, while the Court acknowledges that some measure of
procedural unconscionability exists as a result of the adhesive
nature of the employment contract, the degree of such procedural
unconscionability is low. Mr. Yu's second argument fails because
the arbitration provision was not hidden in fine print or
unintelligible through legalese  it was part of a one-page
employment agreement and was set out in its own paragraph in the
same size text as the rest of the agreement and highlighted in
bold. Mr. Yu's fourth argument fails because the complaints he
raises about surprise are insufficient to render the arbitration
provision so procedurally unconscionable as to be unenforceable.  

The agreement to delegate questions regarding arbitrability to the
arbitrator is not unconscionable or unenforceable. Further
objections about whether the arbitration provision as a whole is
unconscionable or unenforceable, or whether the scope of the
provision extends to Mr. Yu's claims, must be made to the
arbitrator, not the court.  

Class Arbitration

Governing Law

The Supreme Court has held that a party may not be compelled under
the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a
contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.
Neither silence nor ambiguity provides a sufficient basis for
concluding that parties to an arbitration agreement agreed to class
arbitration.

Application

While it is an open question as to whether the court should decide
the question of class arbitrability or whether that is an issue
delegated to the arbitrator, both parties ask the court to decide
the issue and neither asks the court to delegate it to an
arbitrator.42 The court therefore addresses the issue.

Mr. Yu has not pointed to a contractual basis for concluding that
Volt agreed to class arbitration. Mr. Yu argues that the AAA
employment rules, which the parties' arbitration provision
incorporates, anticipate and permit collective-action
arbitration.Mr. Yu does not support his argument with any citation
to any provision in the AAA employment rules that discuss or permit
class- or collective-action arbitration. Mr. Yu may be referring to
certain supplementary rules the AAA has for class arbitrations.

The supplementary rules expressly state, however, that in
construing the applicable arbitration clause, the arbitrator shall
not consider the existence of these Supplementary Rules, or any
other AAA rules, to be a factor either in favor of or against
permitting the arbitration to proceed on a class basis. Courts have
rejected the proposition that the existence of these supplementary
rules evinces an agreement to submit to class arbitration.

The court grants Volt's motion to compel arbitration.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 1, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3bznag8 from Leagle.com.

Mr. Alvin Yu, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented byMichael Astanehe, Astanehe Law,
71 Stevenson St, Ste 400, San Francisco, CA 94105-0908

Volt Information Sciences, Inc., a New York Corporation & Volt
Management Corp., Erroneously sued as Volt Information Sciences,
Inc., Defendants, represented by Jon Peter Kardassakis --
Jon.kardassakis@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard &
Smith LLP & Michael K. Grimaldi -- mgrimaldi@lbbslaw.com -- Lewis
Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP.


WABASH NATIONAL: Appeal in Class Suit v. Supreme Ongoing
--------------------------------------------------------
Wabash National Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 31, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that an appeal is ongoing in
the class action suit against Supreme.

Prior to the Company's acquisition of Supreme, on November 4, 2016,
a putative class action lawsuit was filed against Supreme
Corporation, Mark D. Weber (Supreme's former Chief Executive
Officer) and Matthew W. Long (Supreme’s former Chief Financial
Officer) in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California alleging the defendants violated Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
10b-5 by making material, misleading statements in July 2016
regarding projected backlog. The plaintiff seeks to recover
unspecified damages.

On February 14, 2017, the court transferred the venue of the case
to the Northern District of Indiana upon the joint stipulation of
the plaintiff and the defendants. An amended complaint was filed on
April 24, 2017 challenging statements made during a putative class
period of October 22, 2015, through October 21, 2016.

On May 24, 2018, the Court granted Supreme's motion to dismiss all
claims for failure to state a claim. On July 13, 2018, the
plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. On August 24, 2018,
Supreme filed a second motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, and requested dismissal with prejudice.

On March 29, 2019, the Court granted Supreme's motion and dismissed
Plaintiff's second amended complaint, with prejudice. Plaintiff
filed a notice of appeal on April 29, 2019, and Appellant's Brief
is currently due on August 7, 2019.

Wabash National Corporation manufactures and sells semi-trailers,
truck bodies, specialized commercial vehicles, and liquid
transportation systems. The company is based in Lafayette,
Indiana.



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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Copyright 2019. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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