CAR_Public/190902.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, September 2, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 175

                            Headlines

22ND CENTURY GROUP: Continues to Defend Bull Class Action Suit
3M COMPANY: Haight Sues in N.D. Florida Over Defective Earplugs
ABBVIE INC: Rubinstein's Bid to Certify Nixed Due to Settlement
ADVOCARE INT’L: Texas Court Dismisses Ranieri RICO Suit
AEROTEK INC: Court Stays Echevarria Pending Appeal of June 17 Order

AGRI STATS: Court Dismissal of Pork Antitrust Litigation
AIR EVAC: $3MM Settlement in Unpaid OT Suit Has Prelim OK
ALARM.COM INCORPORATED: Court OKs $28MM Settlement in Abante Suit
ALPHA TEAM: Court Extends Discovery Filing Deadline in Drummer
APYX MEDICAL: Pritchard Class Action Ongoing

ARC OF FAYETTE COUNTY: Lynn Moves for Certification of FSPs Class
AREAS USA: Court Enters Stipulated Protective Order in Cazares Suit
ASCENT TALENT: Coyle Seeks Unpaid Wages for Brand Ambassadors
ASTEC INDUSTRIES: City of Taylor General Employees Suit Ongoing
ATWELLS REALTY: Fails to Properly Pay Exotic Dancers, Gavel Says

AUROBINDO PHARMA: Court Stays Collins Suit Over Tainted Valsartan
BAI BRANDS: Faces Class Action Over "Real Fruit" Labeling
BAUSCH HEALTH: Amended Complaint Filed in Consolidated RICO Suit
BAUSCH HEALTH: Contact Lens Antitrust Suit Removed From Calendar
BLOOM ENERGY: Lead Plaintiff Hearing in Roberts Set for Sept. 4

BOB BELL HYUNDAI: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Burchett Claims
BRIGHTVIEW HOLDINGS: Court Consolidates McComas & Speiser Suits
BURGER KING: Huerta Sues Over Illegal Capture of Biometric Info
C&J ENERGY: Faces Keane Group Merger-Related Class Suits
CANON GARDEN: Lopez Sues Over Illegal Tip Pooling Scheme

CAPITAL ONE: Atachbarian Sues over Credit Card Data Theft
CAPITAL ONE: Credit Card Users Sue Over Data Breach
CAPITAL ONE: Dames Sue Over Credit Card Data Breach
CAPITAL ONE: Greenstein Sues Over Credit Card Data Breach
CAPITAL ONE: Hun Sues Over Credit Card Data Breach

CAPITAL ONE: Jacobs Sues Over Credit Card Data Breach
CENTRAL RESEARCH: Hall Suit Seeks Redress Over FDCPA Violations
CESARE ATTOLINI: Diaz Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
CH VENTURES: Illegally Collects Biometric Info, Gonzalez Claims
CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION: 6th Cir. Affirms Class Certification

CHICKEN OF THE SEA: Judge Approves Division of Tuna Class Action
CHINACACHE INT'L: Likas Sues over Government Probe
CLIENT SERVICES: Faces Silberstein Suit in District of New Jersey
COINBASE INC: Seeks Ninth Circuit Review of Ruling in Berk Suit
COMCAST CORP: Illegally Records Phone Calls, Escobar Claims

COMMONWEALTH FINANCIAL: Thomas Files FDCPA Class Suit in Texas
CRST EXPEDITED: Sellars Appeals Opinion and Order to 8th Circuit
CULMIN STAFFING: Fails to Pay Minimum, Overtime Wages, Bloom Says
CV SCIENCES: Bid to Dismiss Consolidated Smith Class Suit Pending
CV SCIENCES: Court Enters Final Order Dismissing Sallustro Suit

CVS HEALTH: Class Suit  over Retail/LTC Business Ongoing
CVS HEALTH: Klein Suit Now Part of EpiPen ERISA Suit
CVS HEALTH: Still Defends Corcoran and Podgorny Complaints
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE: Settles Sexual Misconduct Class Action
DELTA AIR: Anecdotal Accounts Can't Support Class Claim

ELECTRONIC RECYCLERS: Removes Gilman FCRA Suit to E.D. California
ELTMAN ELTMAN: Moukengeshcaie Moves for Prelim. OK of Settlement
ENTEGRA FINANCIAL: Parshall and Karp Class Suits Dismissed
EQUIFAX INC: Faces Carpenter Suit in Minn. State Court
EVENTBRITE INC: Rosen Law, Glancy Prongay Named Co-Lead Counsel

EVENTBRITE INC: Securities Class Action Pending in Calif.
EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Wins Summary Judgment to Toss Harrod FDUTPA Suit
FGL HOLDINGS: Brokerage Insurance Partners Suit Ongoing
FIFTH THIRD: Court OKs Conditional Certification in Seldomridge
FIRST HORIZON: Still Defends GSE Bonds Antitrust Suit

FRANKLIN COUNTY, MA: Reid Appeals D. Mass. Ruling to 1st Circuit
FREEEATS.COM INC: 8th Cir. Affirms Judgment in Golan Suit
FRONT YARD: Nov. 8 Deadline to Complete Fact Discovery in Martin
FRONTIER COMM: Leave to Amend Complaint in CT Class Suit Pending
FULTON, GA: Faces Class Action Over Property Appraisals

GLASCOTT: Kohlhoss Sues for Failure to Attach RLTO Summaries
GOOGLE LLC: Court OKs $11MM Settlement in R. Heath Suit
HANGER INC: Dismissal of City of Pontiac Suit Upheld
HERTZ CORPORATION: Aiyekusibe's Bid to Certify Class Denied
HERTZ GLOBAL: Ramirez Class Suit Ongoing

HODINKEE INC: Diaz Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
HUKARIASCENDENT INC: Court Dismisses McClure FLSA Suit
IMMUNOMEDICS INC: Bid to Consolidate Odeh & Choi Suits Pending
IMMUNOMEDICS INC: Bid to Dismiss Consolidated Fergus Suit Pending
JELD-WEN HOLDING: Interior Molded Doors Antitrust Litig. Pending

KANSAS CITY, MO: Zimmerli Appeals W.D. Mo. Ruling to 8th Circuit
KARYOPHARM THERAPEUTICS: Faces Securities Suit over SOPRA Trials
KNIGHT-SWIFT TRANSPORT: Accord in Hedglin Case Wins Final Approval
KNIGHT-SWIFT TRANSPORT: Settlement in Sheer Wins Initial Approval
KNIGHT-SWIFT TRANSPORT: Settlement in Slack Wins Final Approval

KNIGHT-SWIFT TRANSPORT: Settlement Reached in Burnell Class Suit
KNIGHT-SWIFT TRANSPORT: Settlement Reached in Rudsell Class Suit
LABRAD DIAGNOSTICS: Dart Files Labor Class Action in Arizona
LEGACY EDUCATION: McCoy Seeks Unpaid Wages for Adjunct Instructors
LENDINGCLUB CORP: Agreement in Principle Reached in Plouffe Suit

LENDINGCLUB CORP: Bid to Amend Accardo Complaint Pending
LENDINGCLUB CORP: Continues to Defend Shron Suit in New York
LENDINGCLUB CORP: Hearing This Month on Bid to Dismiss Veal Suit
LENDINGCLUB CORP: Moses Class Suit Sent to Arbitration
LINDA SNOW: Reyes Labor Suit Claims Unpaid Overtime

LIVANOVA PLC: Makes $135MM Payment to Settlement Fund
LIVENT CORP: Class Suits over 2018 IPO Underway
LUMBER LIQUIDATORS: Appeal in Formaldehyde & Abrasion MDL Pending
LUMBER LIQUIDATORS: MOU Reached in Gold Class Action
LUMBER LIQUIDATORS: Parties in Kramer Suit Reach MOU

LUMBER LIQUIDATORS: Steele Class Action in Canada Ongoing
MAS-SAR-O INC: Denied Guevara Overtime Pay, Minimum Wages
MASTEC NETWORK: Cavins Labor Suit Claims Unpaid Overtime
MDL 2672: Court Refuses Bosch's Bid to Seal Exhibits
MDL 2705: Bid to Amend "Grated Parmesan Cheese" Suit Denied

MDL 2724: Joint Bid to Dismiss Generic Drug Antitrust Suit Denied
MDL 2905: Meyer v. FCA over Defective Airbag Moved to Calif.
MDL 2905: Payne Suit v. FCA over Defective Airbag Moved to Calif.
MDL 2905: Radi Suit v. FCA over Defective Airbag Moved to Calif.
MEDLEY LLC: Sept. 24 Preliminary Conference for 2 Suits vs. MCC Set

MERIDIAN BIOSCIENCE: Tentative Agreement Reached in Forman Suit
MG SECURITY SERVICES: Atkinson Action Seeks Reimbursements
MGM SPRINGFIELD: Faces Class Action Over Blackjack Payouts
MICHIGAN: Denies Bid to Certify Class in Salami Suit
MICROCHIP TECH: Bid to Dismiss Jackson Class Action Still Pending

MONITRONICS INTL: Receives $4.8MM from Insurer
MSAB PARK: Hoff Suit Seeks to Recoup Overtime Under FLSA & OMFWSA
MUELLER WATER: Continues to Defend Chapman Class Action
NANTHEALTH INC: Appeals Class Certification Order in Deora Suit
NATIONAL FOOTBALL: Antitrust Class Action Dismissal Reversed

NATURAL HEALTH: Bid to Dismiss Kauffman Class Suit Due Sept. 6
NORTHSTAR ALARM: Summary Judgment Bid in Braver Suit Partly Granted
NOVARTIS PHARMA: Court OKs Partial Dismissal of Antitrust Suit
OCULAR THERAPEUTIX: Appeal in Suit over DEXTENZA Reports Underway
OCWEN FINANCIAL: 11th Cir. Affirms Securities Suit Dismissal

OVERLAND: Parducci Suit Over Excessive Insurance Premiums Dismissed
OXY USA: Bid for Partial Summary Judgment in Hitch Partly Granted
PANASONIC: Judge Okays $31MM Capacitor Price-Fixing Settlement
PARKING REIT: Court Extends Time to Answer in Securities Suit
PENNSYLVANIA SEA: Third Circuit Appeal Initiated in Diamond Suit

PEP BOYS: Court Dismisses Thorne Suit Without Prejudice
PER DIEM: Court Denies Wage & Hour Suit Dismissal
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY: Court Refuses Reconsideration in ERISA Suit
PROPERTY LOSS: Underpays Claim Adjusters, Blue-Mosby et al. Say
PURDUE PHARMA: In Talks for $12-Billion Deal to Fix Opioid Crisis

QUIRK CARS: Sapp, et al Seek Unpaid Wages for Auto Dealers
QUORUM HEALTH: Della-Maggiora Suit v. Watsonville Resolved
QUORUM HEALTH: Discovery Ongoing in Zwick Partners Class Suit
READING, PA: Pa. Cmmw. Affirms City's Win in Collection Cost Suit
REVEL SYSTEMS: $2.75MM Bisaccia FLSA Suit Deal Has Final Approval

RINGCENTRAL INC: $2.725MM Settlement in Stemple Has Prelim Approval
SEAWORLD ENTERTAINMENT: Trial in Anderson Suit Set for April 2020
SEAWORLD ENTERTAINMENT: Trial in Baker Suit Set for Jan. 2020
SHAFER LAW: Hanks Seeks FDCPA Damages for Virginia Consumers
SHUTTERFLY INC: Appeal in Vigeant Suit Against Lifetouch Pending

SHUTTERFLY INC: Miracle-Pond and Paraf Class Suit Ongoing
SI-BONE INC: Continues to Defend Fromer TCPA Class Suit
SIMPSON MANUFACTURING: Gentry Homes Class Action Ongoing
SIMPSON MANUFACTURING: Kaneshiro Class Action Ongoing
SIMPSON MANUFACTURING: Vitale Suit v. D.R. Horton Ongoing

SS&C TECHNOLOGIES: Unit Still Defends Ferguson ERISA Class Suit
STATE FARM: 7th Cir. Affirms Insurance Suit Dismissal
STEPHEN A. ARNALL: Court Dismisses Paskowitz Securities Suit
STOKES TIRE: Underpays Workers, Steinkamp Alleges
SUNDANCE ENERGY: Faces Lawsuit in Oklahoma Over Fracking Quakes

SUNRISE SENIOR: Removes Tunstall Case to C.D. California
SUNRUN INC: Court Grants Final Approval to Slovin Case Settlement
TALLGRASS FREIGHT: Dobson Hits Misclassification, Claims Overtime
TARGET CORP: Bid to Intervene in Selective Remanded
TELIGENT INC: Amended Complaint in Mo-Kan Suit Due Sept. 13

TELIGENT INC: Bid to Dismiss Econazole Antitrust Suit Still Pending
TEVA PHARMA: Bid to Dismiss Ontario Teachers Suit Still Pending
TEVA PHARMA: PROVIGIL(R) Related Class Suit Ongoing
TEVA PHARMA: Still Defends Consolidated Baker-Grodko Class Suit
TEVA PHARMA: Suit Over Employee Stock Purchase Plan Still Stayed

TEVA PHARMA: Trial in MDL Opioid Litigation Set for Oct. 2019
TRAVELERS AID: Underpays Case Managers, Carney Suit Alleges
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY: Rental Car Coverage Class Action Revived
TREVENA INC: Amended Complaint Filed in E.D. Pa. Securities Suit
UNITED PARCEL: Hobbs Suit Seeks to Recover Overtime & Deductions

UNITED STATES: 3rd Cir. Flips Visa Termination Suit Dismissal
VELOCITY INVESTMENTS: Meola Sues Over FDCPA Violation
VEREIT INC: Final Pre-Trial Conference in ARCP Suit Set for Nov. 7
VEREIT INC: Realistic Partners' Class Action Still Ongoing
VITAL RECOVERY: Court Dismisses Qureshi FDCPA Suit

WELBILT INC: Still Defends Schlimm Class Suit in Florida
WERNER ENTERPRISES: Post-Verdict Awards Under Appeal
WHOLE FOODS: Court Dismisses SAC in Overcharging Suit
WISCONSIN: Court Dismisses Lindell Prisoner Suit
WYNDHAM WORLDWIDE: 11th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Embree Suit

YALE ASSOCIATES: Court Approves $562.5K Settlement in Noye Suit
ZILLOW GROUP: Continues to Defend Consolidated Class Suit in Wash.
ZOVIO INC: Continues to Defend Stein Class Action
ZTO EXPRESS: Court Dismisses Nurlybayev Amended Securities Suit

                            *********

22ND CENTURY GROUP: Continues to Defend Bull Class Action Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
22nd Century Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend a class action suit initiated by Matthew Jackson Bull.

On January 21, 2019, Matthew Jackson Bull, a resident of Denver,
Colorado, filed a Complaint against the Company, the Company's
Chief Executive Officer, Henry Sicignano III, and the Company's
Chief Financial Officer, John T. Brodfuehrer, in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York entitled:
Matthew Bull, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, v. 22nd Century Group, Inc., Henry Sicignano III, and
John T. Brodfuehrer, Case No. 1:19-cv-00409.

The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff Mr. Bull purchased shares of
the Company's common stock. Mr. Bull sues individually and seeks to
bring a class action for persons or entities who acquired the
Company's common stock between February 18, 2016 and October 25,
2018, and alleges in Count I that the Company's Annual Reports on
Form 10-K for the years 2015, 2016 and 2017 allegedly contained
false statements in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, and alleges in
Count II that Messrs. Sicignano and Brodfuehrer are liable for the
allegedly false statements pursuant to Section 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act.

The Complaint seeks declaratory relief, unspecified money damages,
and attorney's fees and costs.

22nd Century said, "We believe that the claims are frivolous,
meritless and that the Company and Messrs. Sicignano and
Brodfuehrer have substantial legal and factual defenses to the
claims. We intend to vigorously defend the Company and Messrs.
Sicignano and Brodfuehrer against such claims."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

22nd Century Group, Inc., a plant biotechnology company, provides
technology that allows increasing or decreasing the level of
nicotine and other nicotinic alkaloids in tobacco plants, and
cannabinoids in hemp/cannabis plants through genetic engineering
and plant breeding. 22nd Century Group, Inc. was founded in 1998
and is headquartered in Williamsville, New York.


3M COMPANY: Haight Sues in N.D. Florida Over Defective Earplugs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DAVID HAIGHT, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated v.
3M COMPANY, 3M OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY LLC, AEARO HOLDING LLC, AEARO
INTERMEDIATE LLC, AEARO LLC, and AEARO TECHNOLOGIES LLC, Case No.
3:19-cv-03050-MCR-GRJ (N.D. Fla., Aug. 13, 2019), is brought as a
class action to allow the Plaintiff and the Class Members to
receive notice, be informed, seek, and receive appropriate
audiological care and other declaratory relief they require as a
direct and proximate result of the negligent and wrongful conduct
of the Defendants in connection with the development, design,
promotion, and sale of 3M Dual-ended Combat Arms earplugs (Version
2 CAEv.2).

Mr. Haight, served in the United States Navy ("Navy") as a Navy
Flight Corpsman from approximately 1979-2007.  He contends that the
3M Dual-ended Combat Navy earplugs were provided to him at many
Navy and Marine basis at various locations throughout the world.
As a result of his use of the 3M Dual-ended Combat Arms earplugs,
he allegedly suffered and continues to suffer from hearing loss and
tinnitus, as well as any of its sequelae and attendant pain,
suffering, and emotional distress.

3M Company is a corporation organized and existing under the laws
of the State of Delaware with its principal place of business in
St. Paul, Minnesota.  3M Occupational Safety LLC is a Delaware
limited liability company.  Aearo Holding LLC is a Delaware limited
liability company with a principal place of business in Minnesota.
Aearo Intermediate LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with
a principal place of business in Indiana.  Aearo LLC is a Delaware
limited liability company with a principal place of business in
Indiana.  Aearo Technologies LLC is a Delaware limited liability
corporation with a principal place of business in Indiana.  All the
other Defendants are subsidiaries of 3M Company.

Among other things, 3M is in the business of designing,
manufacturing, and selling worker safety products, including
hearing protectors.  3M has a dominant market share in virtually
every safety product market, including hearing protection.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Zachary S. Bower, Esq.
          James E. Cecchi, Esq.
          Mark M. Makhail, Esq.
          CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C.
          5 Becker Farm Road
          Roseland, NJ 0706-1739
          Telephone: (973) 994-1700
          E-mail: zbower@carellabyrne.com
                  jcecchi@carellabyrne.com
                  mmakhail@carellabyrne.com


ABBVIE INC: Rubinstein's Bid to Certify Nixed Due to Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Clerk of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois made a docket entry in the case styled Murray Rubinstein,
et al. v. Richard Gonzalez and AbbVie Inc., Case No. 1:14-cv-09465
(N.D. Ill.), relating to a hearing held before the Honorable Robert
M. Dow, Jr.

The minute entry states that:

   -- in view of the order granting preliminary approval of a
      settlement class, the Plaintiffs' amended motion for class
      certification is stricken without prejudice;

   -- Defendants' motion to exclude expert opinion is stricken
      without prejudice; and

   -- the matter remains set for final approval hearing on
      October 22, 2019, at 10:00 a.m.[CC]


ADVOCARE INT’L: Texas Court Dismisses Ranieri RICO Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LISA RANIERI and MEGAN CORNELIUS, individually and on
behalf of a class of similarly situated persons, v. ADVOCARE
INTERNATIONAL, L.P., Civil Action No. 3:17-CV-0691-S (N.D. Tex.),
Judge Karen Gren Scholer of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, granted AdvoCare's
Motion to Dismiss.

The class action lawsuit arises out of allegations that AdvoCare, a
company that distributes health and nutritional products, is a
pyramid scheme.  The participants in AdvoCare's system are called
"Distributors."  Plaintiffs Ranieri and Cornelius are former
Distributors.  The Plaintiffs joined AdvoCare in 2007 and 2014,
respectively, and both were terminated in 2016.  At all times that
Plaintiffs were associated with AdvoCare, the AdvoCare 'Distributor
Agreement' set forth the terms and conditions of the contractual
relationship between AdvoCare and its Distributors.  The
Distributor Agreement and AdvoCare's "Policies, Procedures and the
Compensation Plan" comprised the contract between Distributors and
AdvoCare.

The Distributors must pay initial and annual fees to access
AdvoCare's Compensation Plan.  Through its bonuses, the
Compensation Plan allegedly "encourages and, as a practical matter,
requires Distributors to pay AdvoCare more money through the
purchase of products to receive compensation."  The Plaintiffs
allege that the Distributors are unable to make any significant
retail sales and that AdvoCare makes extremely few retail sales.
They contend that the key to succeeding in AdvoCare is recruiting,
not selling product.  According to them, AdvoCare uses commissions,
bonuses, and the prospect of advancement to encourage Distributors
to recruit and inventory load.

Like a classic pyramid scheme, the Plaintiffs allege, AdvoCare pays
the Distributors with other the Distributors' money.  According to
them, the "overwhelming majority" of money made by AdvoCare during
the relevant time came from Distributors.  Ergo, the "overwhelming
majority" of the money AdvoCare used to pay the Distributors must
have come from the other Distributors.  Due to this compensation
structure, the Plaintiffs allege that very few Distributors make
any money at all from their participation in AdvoCare, and the vast
majority lose money.

In the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs refer to certain
individuals formerly named as Defendants in the case as "Scheme
Beneficiaries.  They allege that these individuals are in the top
2% of the Distributors, actively participate in AdvoCare's pyramid
scheme, and profit from the Compensation Plan at the expense of the
vast majority of Distributors.  The Plaintiffs contend that these
individuals seek to intentionally mislead people to recruit new
Distributors and to ensure that current Distributors continue
participating in the AdvoCare system, which requires the purchasing
of product and recruiting, all to the benefit of AdvoCare and the
Scheme Beneficiaries.  It is the continued hard work of the
Distributors at recruiting that will affect the ability of AdvoCare
and the Scheme Beneficiaries to continue to reap financial
rewards.

According to the Plaintiffs, the so-called Scheme Beneficiaries
"exist by design."  Likely because of its dependence on the Scheme
Beneficiaries' maintenance of their downlines, AdvoCare allegedly
"allows the Scheme Beneficiaries to manipulate the Compensation
Plan.  The Plaintiffs allege that certain of these individuals
wrongfully transferred money to downline Distributors, practiced
inventory loading, and sold products through online retailers in
violation of AdvoCare's policies.

The Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of a putative class of
similarly situated persons, initially sued AdvoCare on five counts
and certain individual Defendants on three counts.  AdvoCare and
the individual Defendants moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims,
and the Court granted in part and denied in part both motions on
Aug. 27, 2018.

On Sept. 11, 2018, the Plaintiffs dismissed the individual
Defendants and moved for leave to amend their claims against
AdvoCare.  On Sept. 12, 2018, the Court granted that motion.  The
Plaintiffs now bring two causes of action against AdvoCare.  First,
they seek a declaratory judgment declaring the arbitration
provision in their contracts unenforceable.  Second, they allege
that AdvoCare engaged in racketeering activity in violation of §§
1961(5) and 1962(c) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO").
The Defendant moves to dismiss only the RICO cause of action.

Judge Scholer finds that the Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged
the first element of an association-in-fact enterprise -- common
purpose -- and thus grants the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
Because the Plaintiffs have not alleged an enterprise, she will not
consider the Defendant's remaining arguments -- that the alleged
enterprise is not distinct from AdvoCare, the RICO person, and that
the Plaintiffs did not plead an enterprise distinct from the
alleged wrongdoing,

For these reasons, the Judge granted the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs' RICO claim.  She granted the Plaintiffs'
request for leave to amend.  The Plaintiffs must file an amended
complaint by no later than July 31, 2019.  If a proposed amended
complaint is not filed by this date, the Plaintiffs' RICO claim
will be dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 16, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/m9Yzwr from Leagle.com.

Lisa Ranieri & Megan Cornelius, Plaintiffs, represented by J.
Benjamin King -- bking@rctlegal.com -- Reid Collins & Tsai LLP &
Randall Adam Swick -- aswick@rctlegal.com -- Reid Collins & Tsai
LLP.

Advocare International LP, Defendant, represented by Thomas M.
Melsheimer -- tmelsheirmer@winston -- Winston & Strawn LLP, John
C.C. Sanders, Jr. -- jsanders@winston.com -- Winston & Strawn LLP,
Rex Andrew Mann -- rmann@winston.com -- Winston & Strawn LLP &
Steven H. Stodghill , Fish & Richardson.

ADR Provider, Mediator, represented by William Royal Furgeson.


AEROTEK INC: Court Stays Echevarria Pending Appeal of June 17 Order
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAIME ECHEVARRIA, Plaintiff, v. AEROTEK, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 16-cv-04041-BLF (N.D. Cal.), Judge Beth Labson
Freeman of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, granted the Defendant's motion to
stay all proceedings pending appeal of the Court's order issued
June 17, 2019.

Echevarria, a former temporary services employee of Defendant
Aerotek, filed the action in the Santa Clara County Superior Court,
asserting putative class claims on behalf of Aerotek's current and
former temporary services employees for violations of state labor
laws and unfair competition laws, as well as a representative claim
under California's Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA").

Aerotek removed the action to federal district court, premising
federal subject matter jurisdiction on the Class Action Fairness
Act ("CAFA").  After the Supreme Court issued Epic Sys. Corp. v.
Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018), the parties stipulated to
Echevarria's dismissal of his individual and putative class claims,
leaving only his PAGA claim for disposition.

Aerotek thereafter filed a motion seeking dismissal of Echevarria's
representative PAGA claim and seeking to compel arbitration of any
individual PAGA claim.  Echevarria opposed that motion and sought
remand to the state court, arguing that the Court's jurisdiction
over the PAGA claim was supplemental to its CAFA jurisdiction over
the other claims, and that it would be appropriate for the Court to
decline continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction following
dismissal of the claims giving rise to CAFA jurisdiction.

On June 17, 2019, the Court issued an order denying Aerotek's
motion and granting Echevarria's motion.  It stayed its June 17
Order for 30 days to afford Aerotek an opportunity to file a notice
of appeal before the case was remanded.  Aerotek filed a timely
notice of appeal on June 25, 2019, and a motion to stay pending
appeal on July 3, 2019.

On July 5, 2019, the Court granted Aerotek's unopposed
administrative motion to shorten time for briefing the stay motion.
The Court vacated the hearing on the stay motion and indicated
that it would be submitted for decision without oral argument upon
completion of the briefing.  The briefing was completed on July 12,
2019.

Aerotek's appeal raises serious legal questions both with respect
to the effect of Epic on the continuing validity of the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803
F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 2015), and with respect to the interplay between
CAFA jurisdiction and PAGA claims in the removal and remand
contexts.  It asserts that Aerotek has not demonstrated a serious
legal question with respect to the Court's decision to remand the
PAGA claim because it has not cited any cases supporting its
position.

Echevarria argues that Aerotek cannot show irreparable injury here
because the issues which Defendant appeals upon is not
determinative of the actual merits of the case, but is merely one
procedural aspect of it -- whether the case belongs in State Court,
Federal Court, and/or arbitration.  

Judge Freeman holds that this argument ignores the fact that if
Aerotek prevails on appeal, Echevarria's representative PAGA claim
will be dismissed.  Accordingly, the appeal is not merely
determinative of a procedural issue -- where the PAGA claim is
litigated -- but whether the PAGA claim can be litigated at all on
a representative basis.  Under these circumstances, she concludes
that the irreparable injury factor is satisfied.

The Judge also concludes that any prejudice that Echevarria would
suffer as a result of a stay pending appeal is outweighed by the
prejudice Aerotek would suffer absent a stay.  Echevarria argues
that the case already has been pending for more than three years,
attributing that delay to Aerotek's insistence on filing motions
and an interlocutory appeal.  In fact, Aerotek prevailed on its
appeal, and it cannot be faulted for seeking to enforce its
contractual rights by way of motion.  Echevarria clearly will
suffer some prejudice if his PAGA action is delayed during the
pendency of the appeal in the Ninth Circuit.

Finally, in the case, substantial judicial resources would be
wasted if the representative PAGA claim were litigated in the state
court, only for the Ninth Circuit later to determine that it should
have been dismissed.

Having weighed the relevant factors and considered the arguments of
the parties, Judge Freeman concludes that Aerotek has demonstrated
that its appeal presents serious legal questions, that it would
suffer irreparable injury absent a stay pending appeal, and that
the balance of hardships tips sharply in Aerotek's favor with
respect to the remaining factors of prejudice to others and the
public interest.  Therefore, she granted the motion for stay
pending appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 16, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/A5hXho from Leagle.com.

Jaime Echevarria, as an individual and on behalf of all ohers
similarly entitled, Plaintiff, represented by Kristen Michelle
Agnew -- kagnew@diversitylaw.com -- Diversity Law Group, APC &
Larry W. Lee -- lwlee@diversitylaw.com -- Diversity Law Group,
P.C.

Aerotek, Inc., a Maryland corporation, Defendant, represented by
Kevin Dennis Sullivan -- ksullivan@ebglaw.com -- Epstein Becker &
Green, P.C. & Michael Stuart Kun -- mkun@ebglaw.com  -- Epstein
Becker & Green, P.C.

Dang Lam, Interested Party, represented by Brett Donald Szmanda --
Brett@szmandalaw.com -- Szmanda Law Group, P.C.


AGRI STATS: Court Dismissal of Pork Antitrust Litigation
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss in the case captioned IN RE PORK ANTITRUST LITIGATION
This Document Relates To: All Actions. Civil No. 18-1776 (JRT/LIB).
(D. Minn.).

The Plaintiffs separated into three putative classes allege that
the Defendants, some of the nation's leading pork producers and
integrators, conspired to limit the supply of pork in order to fix
prices in violation of state and federal antitrust laws. Defendants
now move to dismiss the claims against them.

The Defendants subsequently brought the present consolidated and
individual motions to dismiss. First, Defendants brought a
consolidated motion to dismiss the Sherman Act claims in each of
the three complaints, arguing that each class of Plaintiffs has
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Defendants also brought a joint motion to dismiss the IPP and CIP
state law claims.  Additionally, each individual Defendant brought
a motion to dismiss all the above claims, arguing that each class
of Plaintiffs had failed to adequately state a claim as to it.

THE FEDERAL SHERMAN ACT CLAIMS

Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.

To establish a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act a plaintiff
must demonstrate (1) that there was a contract, combination, or
conspiracy (2) that the agreement unreasonably restrained trade
under either a per se rule of illegality or a rule of reason
analysis and (3) that the restraint affected interstate commerce.

Because Section 1 of the Sherman Act does not prohibit all
unreasonable restraints of trade but only restraints effected by a
contract, combination, or conspiracy.

Certain agreements, such as horizontal price fixing and market
allocation, are thought so inherently anticompetitive that each is
illegal per se without inquiry into the harm it has actually
caused. Thus, where, as here, a plaintiff alleges horizontal price
fixing or that a defendant entered into an agreement with competing
retailers to limit output in order to increase price, the only
thing that must be alleged at the motion to dismiss stage is that
defendants acted collectively.

To adequately plead this requirement, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendants shared a unity of purpose or a
common design and understanding, or a meeting of the minds.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege
an agreement. Plaintiffs do not dispute that they have not alleged
a direct and explicit agreement at this stage. However, Plaintiffs
point out that courts have long recognized that such direct
evidence is rare, particularly at the pleading stage. Courts must
often consider whether complaints which fall short of alleging the
smoking gun nevertheless allege sufficient circumstantial facts to
plausibly establish that defendants agreed to engage in the given
anticompetitive conduct. Instead of direct evidence, therefore,
agreements may be proved by inferences that may be drawn from the
behavior of the alleged conspirators.

Plaintiffs that lack smoking gun evidence often highlight parallel
conduct between defendants such as when several defendants raise or
lower prices together to demonstrate that an agreement is
plausible. The Eighth Circuit has repeatedly recognized that a
plaintiff can survive a motion to dismiss by alleging parallel
conduct, but has specified that pleading only parallel conduct or
other conduct merely consistent with an agreement is not sufficient
to show a conspiracy. Instead, it is possible to infer the
existence of an agreement from consciously parallel conduct if the
parallelism is accompanied by substantial additional evidence often
referred to as plus factors.

Plaintiffs argue that their complaints allege parallel conduct and
plus factors sufficient to support a plausible inference of an
agreement. For plus factors, Plaintiffs point to the collusive and
constricted nature of the industry, the inelasticity of pork
demand, trade associations attended by the Defendants, actions
taken by some of the Defendants' against their own self-interests,
pricing practices, and the fact that some of these Defendants
engaged in similar practices in the chicken industry.  Additional
plus factors include the central role that Agri Stats played in the
alleged conspiracy and the frequent public statements made by
Defendants regarding the state of the pork market.

The plus factors identified and discussed by Plaintiff are
undoubtedly strong and are of the type often used to support an
inference of an agreement. However, in the same way that parallel
conduct on its own is insufficient to establish an agreement, plus
factors without plausible allegations of parallel conduct are
insufficient to establish an inference of an agreement.  

While Plaintiffs' cited plus factors are strong, the allegations at
this point regarding parallel conduct are sparse and conclusory.
Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants conspired together to limit
the supply of pork, and that their actions in furtherance of that
agreement actually limiting pork supplyconstituted parallel
conduct. Plaintiffs allege, at most, two types of actions: (1) that
Defendants intentionally decreased the production of pork and (2)
that Defendants intentionally exported a greater percentage of
their pork.

To attempt to show that Defendants engaged in parallel conduct by
decreasing the total production of pork, Plaintiffs rely on
industry-wide data and public statements made by some of the
individual Defendants. While the industry-wide data certainly shows
that pork production decreased in various years after 2009, it does
nothing to indicate how any of the individual Defendants acted.
Without specific information regarding each Defendant, the Court
has no basis to analyze which, how many, or when any of the
individual Defendants may have affirmatively acted to reduce the
supply of pork. And that type of information is vital to pleading
parallel conduct.

For instance, the complaint in In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust
Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d at 782, a case on which Plaintiffs rely,
alleges specific production cuts from specific individual
defendants. In the present case, however, Plaintiffs rely almost
exclusively on industry-wide data and ask the Court to infer that
the individual Defendants all contributed to the decreased
production, seemingly simply because they make up the majority of
the industry.9 The Court will not engage in such speculation. While
it is entirely possible that each of the accused Defendants engaged
in production cuts as alleged, the plausibility standard  asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully. Without more specific facts, Plaintiffs' allegations
that the Defendants engaged in production cuts are nothing more
than bare assertions.

Nor do Plaintiffs adequately plead when each Defendant undertook
production cuts. In Park Irmat Drug Corp., 911 F.3d at 516, the
Eighth Circuit found that plaintiffs had failed to plead parallel
conduct in part because the alleged parallel conduct lacked
temporal proximity. Here, Plaintiffs do not plead with any
specificity which Defendants reduced production during which years.
Instead, they simply point to industry-wide decreases over more
than a five-year period. The Court is therefore unable to analyze
whether Defendants' production cuts were temporally proximate.

Plaintiffs assert that Smithfield's sentiment was echoed by, at a
minimum, Tyson, JBS, Hormel, and Indiana Packers, and that the
collective statements amount to an admission of parallel conduct.
None of these statements indicate that any individual Defendant was
making cuts; but rather that each Defendant simply noticed that the
industry's production as a whole was declining. At a minimum, the
statements are too indefinite to plausibly establish that any
Defendant other than Smithfield actually made cuts. Although it is
true that Smithfield claimed that it discussed cuts with other
industry producers and publicly stated that other producers would
start making cuts, such statements form no basis on which to
conclude that the specific Defendants alleged here actually
undertook production cuts. Plaintiffs attempt to implicate the
non-Smithfield Defendants through Smithfield's public statements is
weak and does not suffice to plausibly establish parallel conduct.

This same analysis applies to the export theory of parallel
conduct. Plaintiffs give no individualized examples of any one
Defendant increasing its rate of export, but simply provide the
Court with the industry-wide data. As discussed above, this does
not suffice to plausibly plead parallel conduct.

Except for Smithfield, the Court finds no specific allegations in
the complaints that plausibly establish that the individual
Defendants decreased their own production of pork. It is clear that
the pork industry as a whole saw a decrease in production in
various years following 2009. But Plaintiffs have not adequately
pleaded that this decrease was the result of consciously parallel
conduct undertaken by the specific Defendants they accuse. Instead,
Plaintiffs rely on industry-wide data and vague public statements
and ask the Court to infer that each Defendant engaged in similar
parallel conduct simply because they make up the majority of the
industry. It may be true that some of these Defendants cut
production in the years following 2009.

It may also be true that all of these Defendants cut production.
The fact that the complaints contain this ambiguity is exactly the
problem, and the Court is unwilling to force Defendants into
significant and costly discovery without plausible allegations that
they engaged in the conduct alleged. Therefore, the Court finds
that Plaintiffs have not adequately pleaded parallel conduct, an
essential element in showing that Defendants engaged in an
agreement to limit the supply of pork.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently stated a
claim upon which relief may be granted.

STATE ANTITRUST CLAIMS

In addition to the federal Sherman Act claims brought by each class
of Plaintiffs, the CIP and the IPP plaintiffs also brought a
variety of consumer protection and antitrust state law claims.
Defendants move to dismiss these claims on a variety of grounds.
Their primary argument is that each of the state law claims
requires Plaintiffs to allege a conspiracy to limit the supply of
pork and that, because Plaintiffs fail to do so, all of the state
law claims fail. Plaintiffs do not disagree.

Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to adequately
plead a conspiracy, the Court will grant Defendants' motions to
dismiss the state law claims.

Accordingly, the Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the Direct
Purchaser Plaintiffs' Complaint and the Federal Law Claims in the
Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs' Complaints is granted.

The Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the State Law Claims in the
Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs' Complaints is granted.

The Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint is
dismissed without prejudice.  The Consumer Indirect Purchaser
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint is dismissed without
prejudice.

The Commercial and Institutional Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs'
First Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

All individual Motions to Dismiss are denied as moot.

A full-text copy of the Amended Memorandum Opinion and Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3ylxjtg from Leagle.com.


AIR EVAC: $3MM Settlement in Unpaid OT Suit Has Prelim OK
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JASON PECK, et al., Plaintiffs, v. AIR EVAC EMS, INC.,
d/b/a AIR EVAC LIFETEAM, Defendant, Civil Action No. 5:18-615-DCR
(E.D. Ky.), Judge Danny C. Reeves of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Kentucky, Central Division, Lexington,
granted Peck's unopposed motion for class certification and for
preliminary approval of a class action settlement for unpaid
overtime.

Peck, a former flight nurse employed by Defendant Air Evac, filed a
purported class action on behalf of current and former flight
paramedics, flight nurses, and pilots employed by Air Evac, for
overtime compensation between Oct.  25, 2013, to the present. Prior
to March 2014, the Defendant's overtime policy required an employee
to work 120 hours per two-week pay period before receiving
overtime.  From March 2014 to July 2018, the policy required that
an individual work 84 hours per pay period before receiving
overtime.  Air Evac's policy provided that non-exempt employees
were entitled to shift pay when hours were worked in excess of 7
shifts per given pay period.  The Defendant changed its overtime
policy prior to reaching the settlement to pay all flight nurses,
flight paramedics, and pilots overtime for all time worked in
excess of forty hours per week.  Peck asserts that Air Evac's
former policy violates the Kentucky Wage and Hour Act ("KWHA").

The Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in Fayette Circuit Court on Oct.
25, 2018.  The Defendant removed the matter to the Court pursuant
to the Class Action Fairness Act.  In a companion case, Day et al.
v. Air Methods Corp., the Court previously found that air ambulance
companies are not exempt from the KWHA.  Air Evac concluded it
would likely be found liable for unpaid overtime and the parties
agreed that mediation would be helpful in resolving the matter.
The parties used experts to analyze payroll and time data.  They
agreed that there was great uncertainty and, in the absence of an
approved settlement, the parties could face long and uncertain
litigation.

The parties reached an agreement that includes a monetary maximum
gross settlement fund of $3 million, including up to $800,000 in
attorney's fees and costs and a $15,000 incentive to Peck.  The
proposed class is all current and former flight nurses, flight
paramedics, and pilots employed by Air Evac in the Commonwealth of
Kentucky at any time from Oct. 25, 2013 through preliminary
approval.  The parties agree that the class includes 428 current
and former employees of Air Evac.

The Defendant will pay the total settlement amount into a
settlement fund if approved.  The class members who do not opt-out
of their share of the net settlement fund will receive their share
after deductions for attorney's fees, costs, and the incentive to
Peck.  Rust Consulting, Inc., will administer the net settlement
fund and provide notice to potential class members.

The parties state that the agreement requires that the
administrator finalize and mail by first class mail a notice packet
and opt-out form to each member of the class, maintain a static
website where the notice can be downloaded, and respond to
inquiries from the class members regarding procedures to be
followed.  Further, the administrator will attempt to locate
current addresses for the class members if the notice packet is
returned as undeliverable and will resend the notice and opt-out
form. If a class member does not timely submit a request to opt-out
of the action, his or her claims will be released and barred once
the settlement is final.

Individual settlement payments were calculated by reviewing Air
Evac's time and payroll records to establish the amount of unpaid
overtime assuming that Peck's class claims were true.

The Plaintiff has filed an unopposed motion for preliminary
approval of the class action settlement and release, the proposed
notice and opt-out forms, and for attorney's fees.  Before the
Court can preliminarily approve the class action settlement, it
must preliminarily certify the class under Rule 23(a) and (b) of
the Federal Rules of the Civil Procedure, appoint the class
counsel, and approve the class representative.  Afterward, it must
determine if the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and
reasonable.

Judge Reeves finds that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and Rule
23(b) are satisfied.  

He also finds that the Plaintiff's counsel (i) spent time analyzing
significant amounts of payroll and time data to calculate how much
each member of the putative class was owed for overtime; and (ii)
is involved in a similar class action before the Court that is
centered around the same legal issue presented in the case.
Accordingly, Charles W. Arnold and Christopher D. Miller of Arnold
& Miller, PLC and J. Robert Cowan and Gerry L. Calvert, II, of the
Cowan Law Office, PLC, will be appointed as the class counsel.

The Judge further finds that all of the factors in Rule 23(e)(2)
and the majority of the Sixth Circuit factors weigh in favor of
settlement.

Finally, he finds that the proposed plan for providing notice is
reasonably clear and conforms with the requirements of Rule 23(c).
Both the unopposed motion and Magistrate Judge Stinnett note that
the administrator will create a static website where class members
can download notice.  However, the notice packet and the settlement
agreement do not make reference to a static website.  The parties
must amend the settlement agreement to include information about
creating a static website.

Based on the reasons stated, Judge Reeves granted the consent
motion for preliminary approval, and preliminarily approved the
parties' proposed settlement.  The Plaintiff's objections to the
Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation are sustained.

Air Evac's president must submit a written declaration to the named
Plaintiff to provide to the Court, as required by the settlement
agreement.

The class defined in the parties' settlement agreement is
conditionally certified for settlement purposes, including $800,000
in attorney's fees.  Additionally, the schedule set forth in the
settlement agreement is approved.

The Judge appointed (i) Plaintiff Jason Peck as the class
representative; (ii) Charles W. Arnold and Christopher D. Miller of
Arnold & Miller, PLC, and J. Robert Cowan and Gerry L. Calvert, II,
of the Cowan Law Office, PLC, as the class counsel; and (iii) Rust
Consulting, Inc. as the settlement administrator.

The notice packet and opt-out form are approved, conditioned on the
settlement agreement and notice packet stating that a static
website has been created to download notice.

A final fairness hearing will be scheduled for Oct. 16, 2019,
beginning at the hour of 1:30 p.m.

The Judge adopted the United States Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation in part, and incorporated in the Order by
reference.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 17, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/AgDJum from Leagle.com.

Jason W. Peck, individually & Jason W. Peck, on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Charles William
Arnold, Christopher D. Miller, Arnold & Miller, Gerry Lynn Calvert,
II -- gerry.calvert@gmail.com -- Cowan Law Office, PLC, Henrietta
Gera Meyman, Apt B & J. Robert Cowan, Cowan Law Office, PLC.

Air Evac EMS, Inc., doing business as Air Evac Lifeteam, Defendant,
represented by Keith Moorman -- kmoorman@fbtlaw.com -- Frost Brown
Todd LLC, Mallory M. Stumpf -- mallory.zoia@ogletree.com --
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., pro hac vice &
Rodney A. Harrison -- rodney.harrison@ogletree.com -- Ogletree,
Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., pro hac vice.


ALARM.COM INCORPORATED: Court OKs $28MM Settlement in Abante Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, Oakland Division, issued an Oder granting  Plaintiffs'
Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement in the case
captioned ABANTE ROOTER AND PLUMBING, INC., MARK HANKINS, and
PHILIP J. CHARVAT, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ALARM.COM INCORPORATED, and
ALARM.COM HOLDINGS, INC., Defendants. No. 4:15-cv-06314-YGR. (N.D.
Cal.).

Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and for the purposes of settlement only, the Class is certified as
follows:

     All persons who, from December 30, 2011 through the date of
Final Approval, received a telemarketing call made by Alliance
Security or any of Alliance's sub-dealers, Independent Business
Operators, vendors, lead generators, or agents (defined as
Alliance) either promoting Alarm.com's goods or services or that
could have resulted in the installation of a security system that
could use or include any Alarm.com product or service (a) to a
cellular telephone number through the use of an automatic telephone
dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, (b) to a
residential telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded
voice, or (c) to a cellular or residential telephone number
registered on the national Do Not Call Registry and who received
more than one such call within any twelve-month period. Persons who
provided their telephone numbers to Alarm.com prior to receiving
calls from Alliance are not Settlement Class Members.

Class Members who previously excluded themselves from the Class are
not Settlement Class Members.

If the Settlement terminates for any reason, the certification of
the Settlement Class shall be automatically vacated, null and void,
and this Action shall revert to its status immediately prior to the
execution of the Settlement Agreement.

The Court finds that the notice given to members of the Settlement
Class pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement fully and
accurately informed Settlement Class members of all material
elements of the Settlement and constituted valid, sufficient, and
due notice to all such members. The notice fully complied with due
process, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and with
all other applicable law.

The following individuals who timely submitted valid requests for
exclusion are excluded from the Settlement Class and are not bound
by this Final Approval Order: Frederick Alexander, Olden Bailey,
Todd Bank, Angela L. Brown, Tiffany Brown, Bill Dallapiazza, Diane
Gigandet, Abigail Gonzalez, Jan T. Hammel, Eric Houston, Tammy
Hussin, Mark Kubasky, Jamal Mackin, James Ruoss, Shrail
Tucker-Curry, Adelita Valentine and Keisha Willis.

The Settlement requires Alarm.com to pay $28,000,000 into a
Settlement Fund that the Parties propose to use to make payments to
all Settlement Class Members who submit timely and valid claims;
pay the Settlement Administrator the costs of notice and Settlement
Administration Expenses in an amount capped at $1,400,000; pay
Service Awards in the amount of $10,000 to each Class
Representative; and pay Class Counsel's attorneys' fees in the
amount of $7,000,000 and litigation costs of $529,313.20. Each
Settlement Class Member will be entitled to submit only one claim
for each cellular or residential number on which calls were claimed
to be received, regardless of the number of calls claimed to be
received on each cellular or residential telephone. The Settlement
Fund is non-reversionary and any amounts remaining after the
initial distribution to Settlement Class Members and a second
distribution, if necessary and administratively feasible, will be
disbursed cy pres to the National Consumer Law Center, a non-profit
organization dedicated to protecting consumers, including consumers
harassed by unlawful telemarketing calls.

The Court finally approves this Settlement, and finds that it is in
all respects fair, reasonable, and adequate and in the best
interest of the Settlement Class Members. The Parties dispute the
validity of the claims in the Action, and their dispute underscores
not only the uncertainty of the outcome but also why the Court
finds the Settlement Agreement to be fair, reasonable, and
adequate. Had they continued to litigate, Settlement Class members
faced the challenge of convincing a jury that Alarm.com should be
held responsible for telephone calls placed by one of its
independent dealers. They also would have faced the challenge of
surviving an appeal of the Court's summary judgment and class
certification orders, and any other rulings rendered during trial.
Class Counsel have reviewed the Settlement Agreement and find it to
be in the best interest of Settlement Class members. For all these
reasons, the Court finds that the uncertainties of continued
litigation in both the trial and appellate courts, as well as the
expense associated with it, weigh in favor of Settlement approval.
In making this determination, the court has considered the Northern
District of California Procedural Guidance for Class Action
Settlements, the criteria set forth in the recently amended Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and the factors outlined in Hanlon v.
Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998), and Churchill
Village, L.L.C. v. General Electric, 361 f.3d 566, 575-76 (9th Cir.
2004).

The Court approves payment of attorneys' fees in the amount of
$7,000,000 and costs to Class Counsel in the amount of $529,313.20.
These amounts shall be taken out of the Settlement Fund that is
paid by Alarm.com pursuant to the terms of the Settlement
Agreement. The Court finds these amounts to be appropriate and
reasonable in light of the work performed by Class Counsel and the
benefits obtained by the Class Members. In addition, the Court
finds that the Settlement Agreement was negotiated at arms' length
and without collusion.

In the event that settlement payments exceed the threshold amounts
that must be reported to the Internal Revenue Service by means of a
Form 1099, Class Counsel, and the Settlement Administrator, will
take all necessary and reasonable steps to obtain W-9's from
claimants and to comply with applicable IRS regulations on issuing
1099's without a social security number or tax entity
identification number, and shall take all reasonable and necessary
steps to avoid imposition of IRS penalties against the Settlement
Fund, including, but not limited to limiting payments below the
reportable threshold and/or withholding of taxes and any applicable
penalties. The Settlement Administrator will contact Settlement
Class Members who are entitled to payments that exceed the taxable
income threshold twice, with at least 30 days between the two
contacts. Any Class Member who fails to submit a valid and timely
W9 response will have their payment reduced to $599 below the
taxable income threshold.

The Court approves the service fee payment of $10,000 for each
Class Representative and specifically finds that amount to be
reasonable in light of the service performed by the Class
Representatives for the class. This amount shall be paid from the
Settlement Fund in accordance with the terms of the Settlement
Agreement. Any service award will be reported as "other income" in
Box 3 of the Form 1099-MISC.

The Court finds that no justifiable reason exists for delaying
entry of this Final Approval Order and, good cause appearing, it is
expressly directed that this Final Approval Order and separate
Judgment be entered as final and appealable and the case dismissed
with prejudice.

Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is ordered to enter this Final
Approval Order and Judgment.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 15, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y4ewwldh from Leagle.com.

Abante Rooter and Plumbing, Inc., individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Mark Hankins, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated & Philip J. Charvat, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Beth E. Terrell -- bterrell@terrellmarshall.com --
Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC, Brian A. Glasser --
bglasser@baileyglasser.com -- Bailey and Glasser, LLP, pro hac
vice, Chiharu Gina Sekino -- csekino@sfmslaw.com -- Shepherd,
Finkelman, Miller & Shah, LLP, Edward A. Broderick --
ted@broderick-law.com -- Broderick and Paronich, P.C., Elizabeth
Anne Adams -- eadams@terrellmarshall.com -- Terrell Marshall Law
Group PLLC, James C. Shah -- jshah@sfmslaw.com -- Shepherd
Finkelman Miller & Shah, LLP, Jennifer Rust Murray --
jmurray@terrellmarshall.com -- Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC, pro
hac vice, John W. Barrett – jbarrett@bailetglasser.com -- Bailey
Glasser, LLP, pro hac vice, Jonathan Rehe Marshall --
jmarshall@bailetglasser.com -- Bailey Glasser LLP, pro hac vice,
Kerem M. Levitas -- klevitas@terrellmarshall.com -- Terrell
Marshall Law Group PLLC,Matthew Passi McCue, The Law Office of
Matthew P. McCue, 179 Union Ave., Framingham, MA 01702 & Ryan
McCune Donovan @bailetglasser.com, Bailey Glasser, LLP.

Alarm.com Incorporated & Alarm.com Holdings, Inc., Defendants,
represented by Kasey C. Townsend -- ktownsend@murchisonlaw.com --
Murchison & Cumming, Susan Jane Welde -- swelde@murchisonlaw.com --
Murchison & Cumming, LLP, Craig S. Primis --
craig.primis@kirkland.com -- Kirkland and Ellis LLP, Daniel I.
Schlessinger -- dschlessinger@jaszczuk.com -- Jaszczuk P.C.,
Kathleen Ann Brogan -- kathleen.brogan@kirkland.com -- Kirkland &
Ellis LLP, pro hac vice, Margaret M. Schuchardt, Locke Lord LLP,
111 S. Wacker Drive. Chicago, Illinois 60606, Martin Wojslaw
Jaszczuk -- mjaszczuk@jaszczuk.com -- Jaszczuk P.C. & Seth Haines
Corthell -- scorthell@jaszczuk.com -- Jaszczuk P.C..


ALPHA TEAM: Court Extends Discovery Filing Deadline in Drummer
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada issued
an Order extending the Deadline for Filing the Parties' Amended
Joint Proposed Discovery Plan and Scheduling in the case captioned
QUINTON DRUMMER, STEFFAN WEBB, and DEMONTRAY STALLWORTH,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. ALPHA TEAM CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, BG CONSTRUCTION
SERVICES, LLC, HECTOR BELTRAN, and J.C.M. INDUSTRIES, INC., doing
business as ADVANCE STORAGE PRODUCTS, jointly and severally,
Defendants. Case No. 2:18-cv-01251-RFB-NJK. (D. Nev.).

The Plaintiffs served their First Amended Collective and Class
Action Complaint on JCM, adding JCM as a Defendant to this action.
The parties stipulated to extend JCM's deadline to answer or
otherwise respond to Plaintiff's First Amended Collective and Class
Action Complaint The parties believe that more meaningful
discussions regarding scope of discovery may be had after the
filing of JCM's responsive pleading.

The parties seek an extension through and including September 9,
2019 to file their proposed Discovery Plan and Scheduling Order.
This extension will provide the parties with two weeks to confer
regarding the scope of discovery based on JCM's responsive pleading
and any defenses asserted.

The deadline for filing the parties' Amended Joint Proposed
Discovery Plan and Scheduling order be continued to September 9,
2019.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 15, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3g5mngg from Leagle.com.

Quinton Drummer, Steffan Webb & Demontray Stallworth, Plaintiffs,
represented by Bradley Scott Schrager -- bschrager@wrslawyers --
Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, Charles Robert Ash, IV --
crash@sommerspc.com -- Sommers Schwartz, P.C., pro hac vice, Daniel
Bravo -- dbravo@wrslawyers.com -- Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman,
& Rabkin, LLP, Kevin J. Stoops  -kstoops@sommerspc.com -- Sommers
Schwartz PC, pro hac vice & Don Springmeyer  --
dspringmeyer@wrslawyers.com -- Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman and
Rabkin, LLP.

BG Construction Services, LLC, Defendant, pro se.

Hector Beltran, Defendant, pro se.

J.C.M. Industries, Inc., doing business as Advance Storage
Products, Defendant, represented by Daniel Aquino --
Daniel.Aquino@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis P.C. & Kirsten Ann
Milton --  Kirsten.Milton@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis PC.


APYX MEDICAL: Pritchard Class Action Ongoing
--------------------------------------------
APYX Medical Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend a class action suit initiated by Kyle Pritchard.

On April 17, 2019, a complaint (the "Complaint") was filed in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida by
plaintiff Kyle Pritchard, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated against the Company and Charles D. Goodwin
("Goodwin"), the Company's President and Chief Executive Officer
and a member of the Company's Board of Directors.

The Complaint (which as of the date hereof has not been delivered
through formal process to the Company) seeks class action status on
behalf of all persons and entities that acquired the Company's
securities between August 1, 2018 and April 1, 2019 and alleges
violations by the Company and Goodwin of Sections 10(b) and 20(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder,
primarily related to certain public statements concerning the
Premarket Notification 510(k) submission made to the US Food and
Drug Administration for a new indication for the Company's
J-Plasm(R) technology for use in dermal resurfacing procedures.

The Complaint seeks an unspecified amount of compensatory damages,
an award of interest, reasonable attorneys' fees, expert fees and
other costs, and equitable relief as the court may deem just and
proper. On July 16, 2019, the court appointed a lead plaintiff for
the putative class and approved the lead plaintiff's selection of
counsel.

APYX Medical Corporation  is a medical technology company and the
developer of J-Plasma(R) (marketed and sold under the Renuvion(R)
Cosmetic Technology brand in the cosmetic surgery market), a
patented plasma-based surgical product for cutting, coagulation and
ablation of soft tissue.  The company also leverage its expertise
through original equipment manufacturing (OEM) agreements with
other medical device manufacturers. The company is based in
Clearwater, Florida.


ARC OF FAYETTE COUNTY: Lynn Moves for Certification of FSPs Class
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit entitled JESSE LYNN and BELINDA
DARNELL, on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated
employees v. ARC OF FAYETTE COUNTY and FAYETTE COUNTY BEHAVIORAL
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, Case No. 2:17-cv-00474-MRH-LPL (W.D. Pa.),
file their Motion for Certification of Class Action.

Jesse Lynn and Belinda Darnell filed the action on April 23, 2017,
against Defendant ARC of Fayette County alleging that they were
owed statutorily required wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. Sections 207(a) and 216(b) and the
Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (PMWA), 43 P.S. Sections 333.104(c)
and 333.113.

The action was filed on behalf of approximately 75 individuals
employed as Family Support Persons (FSP's) working in the Home
Support Programs in Fayette County since April 23, 2014 to the
present.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Joseph E. Fieschko, Jr., Esq.
          FIESCHKO & ASSOCIATES, INC.
          436 Seventh Avenue, Suite 2230
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 281-2204
          Facsimile: (412) 338-9169
          E-mail: joe@fieschko.com

               - and -

          John R. Linkosky, Esq.
          JOSEPH E. FIESCHKO, JR. & ASSOC.
          715 Washington Avenue
          Carnegie, PA 15106
          Telephone: (412) 278-1289
          E-mail: linklaw@comcast.net

Defendant ARC OF FAYETTE COUNTY is represented by:

          Craig M. Brooks, Esq.
          HOUSTON HARBAUGH, PC
          401 Liberty Ave., 22nd Floor
          Three Gateway Center
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222-1005
          Telephone: (412) 288-2214
          E-mail: cbrooks@hh-law.com

Defendant FAYETTE COUNTY BEHAVIORAL HEALTH ADMINISTRATION is
represented by:

          Marie Milie Jones, Esq.
          Michael R. Lettrich, Esq.
          JONES PASSODELIS, PLLC
          Gulf Tower, Suite 3410
          707 Grant St.
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 315-7272
          Facsimile: (412) 315-7273
          E-mail: mjones@jonespassodelis.com
                  mlettrich@jonespassodelis.com


AREAS USA: Court Enters Stipulated Protective Order in Cazares Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JUAN RAMOS CAZARES, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AREAS USA LAX, LLC, a
Florida limited liability company; AREAS SKYVIEW LAX JV, LLC, a
Florida limited liability company; EDUARDO RIOS, AN INDIVIDUAL; and
DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-03061
RGK (JPRx) (C.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Jean P. Rosenbluth of the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California has
entered the parties' stipulated protective order and clawback
agreement.

The wage and hour putative class action is likely to involve
private and/or confidential information regarding the Defendants'
current and/or former employees, including but not limited to
information about employees' pay, time punches, contact information
and/or work performance histories, commercial, financial, technical
and/or proprietary information for which the parties believe
special protection from public disclosure and from use for any
purpose other than prosecution of the action is warranted.  Such
confidential and proprietary materials and information consist of,
among other things, personnel records, confidential business or
financial information, information regarding confidential business
practices, or other confidential commercial information (including
information implicating privacy rights of third parties),
information otherwise generally unavailable to the public, or which
may be privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure under
state or federal statutes, court rules, case decisions, or common
law.

Accordingly, to expedite the flow of information, to facilitate the
prompt resolution of disputes over confidentiality of discovery
materials, to adequately protect information the parties believe
they are entitled to keep confidential, to ensure that the parties
are permitted reasonable necessary uses of such material in
preparation for and in the conduct of trial, to address their
handling at the end of the litigation, and serve the ends of
justice, a protective order for such information is justified in
the matter.  It is the intent of the parties that information will
not be designated as confidential for tactical reasons and that
nothing be so designated without a good faith belief that it has
been maintained in a confidential, non-public manner, and there is
good cause why it should not be part of the public record of the
case.

Confidential Information and Attorneys Eyes Only Material will be
used solely and exclusively for preparing for, prosecuting and
defending this case, including any claims on behalf of Plaintiff
pending the completion of the judicial process, including appeal.
They cannot be used for any other purpose or in any other matter or
proceeding for any reason whatsoever, nor may it be used in
furtherance of pursuing any other action.

The terms of the protective order will survive the final
termination of the action and will be binding on all of the parties
thereafter.

Within 30 business days of the dismissal or entry of a final
judgment in the action, each party must return or make available
for pick-up Confidential Information or Attorneys Eyes Only
Material received during the litigation from the other party and
copies of any deposition transcripts designated as Confidential
Information or Attorneys Eyes Only Material .

Upon returning to the other side all Confidential Information or
Attorneys Eyes Only Material and/or deposition testimony, the
returning party must also execute and furnish the Certificate of
Surrender and Deletion of Confidential Information and Attorneys
Eyes Only Material Agreement.

The protective order is subject to modification by stipulation of
the parties.  No such stipulation will have the force or effect of
a court order absent the Court's approval.  In addition, the Court
may modify the terms and conditions of this protective order sua
sponte in the interest of justice.  The Order is subject to further
Court Orders based upon public policy or other considerations.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 16, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/9oCLes from Leagle.com.

Juan Ramos Cazares, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by David D. Bibiyan --
david@tomorrowlaw.com -- Bibiyan Law Group APC & Diego F. Aviles --
diego@tomorrowlaw.com -- Bibiyan Law Group APC.

Areas USA LAX, LLC, a Florida limited liability company & Areas
Skyview LAX JV, LLC, a Florida limited liability company,
Defendants, represented by James Becerra, Littler Mendelson PC,
Maggy Mokhles Athanasious, Littler Mendelson PC & Carlos Jimenez --
cajimenez@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC.


ASCENT TALENT: Coyle Seeks Unpaid Wages for Brand Ambassadors
-------------------------------------------------------------
AMBER COYLE, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Ascent Talent, Model, Promotion Ltd.,
a California Corporation, and DOES 1-100, Case No. 19STCV27841
(Cal. Super, Aug. 9, 2019), alleges that Ascent Talent failed to
comply with various wage and hour laws in violation of Business and
Professions Code Section 17200.

According to the complaint, the Defendant does not pay terminated
employees all the wages owed to them. The Plaintiff worked for
Defendant as a non-exempt employee from sometime in 2015 through
approximately the end of 2015. The Plaintiff worked as brand
ambassador and/or product demonstrator. Her job with Defendant
entailed going to various locations to demonstrate and promote
products. During her employment with Defendant, Plaintiff was not
paid wages for all compensable "hours worked", including time spent
travelling from one work assignment to another, training time,
early arrival time required by Defendant, work performed prior to
the scheduled starting time of her assignment, work performed after
the scheduled ending time of her assignment, and work performed in
between assignments on a workday, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff are:

          Gregory karasik, Esq.
          KARASIK LAW FIRM
          11835 W. Olympic Blvd., Suite 1275
          Los Angeles, CA 90064
          Telephone: (310)312-6800
          Facsimile: (310) 943-2582
          E-mail: greg@karasiklawfirm.com

               - and -

          Peter M. Hart, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF PETER M. HART
          12121 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 725
          Los Angeles, CA 90025
          Telephone: (310) 478-5789
          Facsimile: (509) 561-6441
          E-mail: hartpeter@msn.com

ASTEC INDUSTRIES: City of Taylor General Employees Suit Ongoing
---------------------------------------------------------------
Astec Industries, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend a class action suit entitled, City of Taylor General
Employees Retirement System v. Astec Industries, Inc., et al.

The Company and certain of its current and former executive
officers have been named as defendants in a putative shareholder
class action lawsuit filed on February 1, 2019, in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee.

The action is styled City of Taylor General Employees Retirement
System v. Astec Industries, Inc., et al., Case No.
1:19-cv-00024-PLR-CHS.

The complaint generally alleges that the defendants violated the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"),
and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by making allegedly false and
misleading statements and that the individual defendants are
control person under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.

The complaint was filed on behalf of shareholders who purchased
shares of the Company's stock between July 26, 2016 and October 22,
2018 and seeks monetary damages on behalf of the purported class.

Astec said, "The Company disputes these allegations and intends to
defend this lawsuit vigorously. The Company is unable to estimate
the possible loss or range of loss at this time."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Astec Industries, Inc. designs, engineers, manufactures, and
markets equipment and components for the road building, aggregate
processing, geothermal, water, oil and gas, and wood processing
industries in the United States and internationally. The company
was founded in 1972 and is based in Chattanooga, Tennessee.


ATWELLS REALTY: Fails to Properly Pay Exotic Dancers, Gavel Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
SHANNON GAVEL on Behalf of Herself and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated v. ATWELLS REALTY CORP., THE ONE, INC., both
d/b/a CLUB DESIRE, MADELINE DI SANTO, GERARD DI SANTO II, Case No.
1:19-cv-00433 (D.R.I., Aug. 14, 2019), alleges that the Defendants
required and/or permitted the Plaintiff and others to work as
exotic dancers at their adult entertainment club but refused to
compensate them at the applicable minimum wage under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Atwells Realty Corp., doing business as Club Desire, may be served
with process by serving registered agent for the company, Richard
W. Nicholson, Esq., in Smithfield, Rhode Island.  The One, Inc.,
doing business as Club Desire, may be served with process by
serving its registered agent, Richard W. Nicholson, Esq.  The
Individual Defendants own and manage Club Desire.

The Defendants operate an adult entertainment club in Rhode Island,
under the name of "Club Desire."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Thomas J. Enright, Esq.
          ENRIGHT LAW LLC
          696 Reservoir Avenue
          Cranston, RI 02910
          Telephone: (401) 526-2620
          Facsimile: (401) 457-7117
          E-mail: tom@enrightlawoffice.com

               - and -

          Gabriel A. Assaad, Esq.
          David W. Hodges, Esq.
          KENNEDY HODGES, L.L.P.
          4409 Montrose Blvd., Suite 200
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 523-0001
          Facsimile: (713) 523-1116
          E-mail: gassaad@kennedyhodges.com
                  dhodges@kennedyhodges.com


AUROBINDO PHARMA: Court Stays Collins Suit Over Tainted Valsartan
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CARRIE COLLINS, an individual, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AUROBINDO PHARMA
USA, INC.; and AUROBINDO LTD.; Defendants, Case No.
3:19-cv-00688-MMA-KSC (S.D. Cal.), Judge Michael M. Anello of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California (i)
denied the Plaintiff's motion to remand the action back to state
court; and (ii) granted in part Aurobindo USA's motion to stay
proceedings pending a decision by the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation ("JPML").

On Nov. 24, 2018, the Plaintiff, a California resident, was
prescribed the prescription drug Valsartan-HCTZ 320-12.5
manufactured by the Defendants.  On Dec. 31, 2018, the Defendants
recalled 80 lots of valsartan-containing medications including
Valsartan, Valsartan HCTZ, and Amlodipine Valsartan.

On March 11, 2019, the Plaintiff filed the putative class action in
San Diego Superior Court, alleging three claims for relief: (1)
violation of California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act; (2) breach
of implied warranty under California's Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act; and (3) violation of California's Unfair Competition
Law.  The Plaintiff defines the proposed class as all persons or
entities who purchased or used Defendants' contaminated Valsartan
in California.

On April 15, 2019, Aurobindo USA removed the action to the Court
pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA").  Subsequently,
the Plaintiff filed the instant motion to remand.  Aurobindo USA
filed an answer on June 25, 2019.

On April 17, 2019, Aurobindo USA filed a Notice of Potential
Tag-Along Action with the JPML.  Pursuant to that notice, the JPML
entered a Conditional Transfer Order ("CTO") on April 19, 2019,
indicating that the action would be transferred to an existing
multi-district litigation ("MDL") in the District of New Jersey, In
re: Valsartan Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 2875, unless
parties object to the transfer.

On April 26, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a notice of opposition to
the CTO, and later filed a motion to vacate or stay the CTO pending
this Court's decision on the instant motion to remand to state
court.

Judge Anello finds that Aurobindo USA has shown by a preponderance
of the evidence that there are more than 100 class members and the
amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.  As such, he denies the
Plaintiff's motion to remand.

The Judge has resolved the Plaintiff's motion to remand, and
Aurobindo USA has already filed an answer to the Plaintiff's
complaint.  Thus, a stay will not prejudice the Plaintiff with
respect to the motion to remand or responsive pleading deadline.
Additionally, as the motion to vacate the CTO is fully briefed, the
stay will be of limited duration, and it is unlikely that any
damage will result from the granting of a stay.  Further, a stay
will save both party and judicial resources with respect to
discovery and other pretrial proceedings.  Finally, deference to
the JPML allows for the uniformity, consistency, and predictability
in litigation that underlies the MDL system.  Accordingly, he finds
a stay is warranted pending the JPML's ruling on the Plaintiff's
motion to vacate the CTO.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Anello (i) denied the Plaintiff's
motion to remand, and (ii) granted in part Aurobindo USA's motion
to stay.  The case is stayed pending the JPML's final determination
on whether the case should be transferred to MDL No. 2875.  The
stay will automatically lift upon the JPML's final order regarding
transferring the matter to the District of New Jersey.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 16, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/gyJzs5 from Leagle.com.

Carrie Collins, an individual; on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Graham Lambert --
gl@haffnerlawyers.com -- Haffner Law PC.

AUROBINDO PHARMA U.S.A., INC., Defendant, represented by ERNEST F.
KOSCHINEG, III , CIPRIANI & WERNER PC, JESSICA MARGARET HEINZ ,
CIPRIANI & WERNER, P.C., pro hac vice, Kyle Anthony Fellenz --
kfellenz@clarkhill.com -- Clark Hill LLP & Roger G. Perkins, Morris
Polich and Purdy, LLP.

AUROBINDO LTD., Defendant, represented by ERNEST F. KOSCHINEG, III,
CIPRIANI & WERNER PC & JESSICA MARGARET HEINZ, CIPRIANI & WERNER,
P.C., pro hac vice.


BAI BRANDS: Faces Class Action Over "Real Fruit" Labeling
---------------------------------------------------------
Marian Johns, writing for Legal Newsline, reports that a Los
Angeles man is claiming that Bai Brands and Dr Pepper Snapple
Bottling Group are violating federal and state labeling laws
because the labels on their line of bai Antioxidant Cocofusion
beverages falsely advertises that the drinks contain real fruit
ingredients.

According to the July 19 U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California Western Division filing, plaintiff Daniel
Schwartz filed a class action suit against defendants Bai Brands
LLC and Dr Pepper Snapple Bottling Group alleging violation of the
Consumer Legal Remedies Act, false and misleading advertising,
unfair competition and unjust enrichment.

The plaintiff alleges that the defendants' bai Antioxidant
Cocofusion beverages have front labels that display "in bold
uppercase letters" two fruits along with "color images" of two
fruits. The plaintiff argues the label display leads the consumer
to believe the beverages contain "real fruit ingredients," but they
really contain "flavored compounds" that "mimic" fruit taste and
are not actually made from real limes, pineapples, raspberries or
mangos.

The lawsuit seeks punitive damages, declaratory, injunctive and
equitable relief as well for the plaintiff along with attorneys'
fees and costs. The plaintiff is represented by attorneys with
Hobson, Bernardino & Davis of Los Angeles and the Law Offices of
Peter N. Wasylyk of Providence, Rhode Island.

U.S. District Court for the Central District of California case
number 2:19-cv-06249 [GN]


BAUSCH HEALTH: Amended Complaint Filed in Consolidated RICO Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Bausch Health Companies Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that an amended complaint
has been filed in the case entitled, In re Valeant Pharmaceuticals
International, Inc. Third-Party Payor Litigation, No.
3:16-cv-03087,

Between May 27, 2016 and September 16, 2016, three virtually
identical actions were filed in the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey against the Company and various
third-parties, alleging claims under the federal Racketeer
Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") on behalf of a
putative class of certain third-party payors that paid claims
submitted by Philidor Rx Services, LLC ("Philidor") for certain
Company branded drugs between January 2, 2013 and November 9, 2015.


On November 30, 2016, the Court entered an order consolidating the
three actions under the caption In re Valeant Pharmaceuticals
International, Inc. Third-Party Payor Litigation, No.
3:16-cv-03087.

A consolidated class action complaint was filed on December 14,
2016. The consolidated complaint alleges, among other things, that
the defendants committed predicate acts of mail and wire fraud by
submitting or causing to be submitted prescription reimbursement
requests that misstated or omitted facts regarding (1) the identity
and licensing status of the dispensing pharmacy; (2) the
resubmission of previously denied claims; (3) patient co-pay
waivers; (4) the availability of generic alternatives; and (5) the
insured's consent to renew the prescription.  

The complaint further alleges that these acts constitute a pattern
of racketeering or a racketeering conspiracy in violation of the
RICO statute and caused plaintiffs and the putative class
unspecified damages, which may be trebled under the RICO statute.


The Company moved to dismiss the consolidated complaint on February
13, 2017. On March 14, 2017, other defendants filed a motion to
stay the RICO class action pending the resolution of criminal
proceedings against Andrew Davenport and Gary Tanner.

On August 9, 2017, the Court granted the motion to stay and entered
an order staying all proceedings in the case and accordingly
terminating other pending motions. On April 12, 2019, the court
lifted the stay. On July 30, 2019, the plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint.

The Company believes these claims are without merit and intends to
defend itself vigorously.

Bausch Health Companies Inc. develops, manufactures, and markets a
range of pharmaceutical, medical device, and over-the-counter (OTC)
products primarily in the therapeutic areas of eye health,
gastroenterology, and dermatology. The company operates through
four segments: Bausch + Lomb/International, Salix, Ortho
Dermatologics, and Diversified Products. The company was formerly
known as Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. and changed
its name to Bausch Health Companies Inc. in July 2018. Bausch
Health Companies Inc. was founded in 1983 and is headquartered in
Laval, Canada.


BAUSCH HEALTH: Contact Lens Antitrust Suit Removed From Calendar
----------------------------------------------------------------
Bausch Health Companies Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the Court overseeing
the case entitled, In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust
Litigation, has removed the matter from the trial calendar.

Beginning in March 2015, a number of civil antitrust class action
suits were filed by purchasers of contact lenses against B&L Inc.,
three other contact lens manufacturers, and a contact lens
distributor, alleging that the defendants engaged in an
anticompetitive scheme to eliminate price competition on certain
contact lens lines through the use of unilateral pricing policies,
and alleging violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
Section 1, and of various state antitrust and consumer protection
laws.

These cases have been consolidated in the Middle District of
Florida by the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation, under
the caption In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litigation,
Case No. 3:15-md-02626-HES-JRK.

On August 20, 2018, defendants filed motions for summary judgment.
The Court has set oral argument on the motions for summary
judgement for August 21 and 22, 2019. On December 4, 2018, the
Court certified six classes, four of which relate to B&L Inc.
Defendants' petitions seeking leave from the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals to file an immediate appeal of the class certification
order have been denied.

On February 20, 2019, the Court removed the case from the trial
calendar.

The Company continues to vigorously defend this matter.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Bausch Health Companies Inc. develops, manufactures, and markets a
range of pharmaceutical, medical device, and over-the-counter (OTC)
products primarily in the therapeutic areas of eye health,
gastroenterology, and dermatology. The company operates through
four segments: Bausch + Lomb/International, Salix, Ortho
Dermatologics, and Diversified Products. The company was formerly
known as Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. and changed
its name to Bausch Health Companies Inc. in July 2018. Bausch
Health Companies Inc. was founded in 1983 and is headquartered in
Laval, Canada.


BLOOM ENERGY: Lead Plaintiff Hearing in Roberts Set for Sept. 4
---------------------------------------------------------------
Bloom Energy Corporation said in its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2019, that lead plaintiff selection hearing in Elissa
Roberts' class action case is scheduled for September 4, 2019.

In May of 2019, Elissa Roberts filed a class action complaint in
the federal district court for the Northern District of California
against the Company and certain of its directors alleging
violations under Section 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933,
as amended, for alleged misleading statements or omissions in its
Form S-1 Registration Statement filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission in connection with its July 25, 2018 initial
public offering.

Lead plaintiff applications were submitted to the court on July 29,
2019 and the lead plaintiff selection hearing is scheduled for
September 4, 2019.

Bloom Energy Corporation designs, manufactures, and sells
solid-oxide fuel cell systems for on-site power generation. The
company was formerly known as Ion America Corp. and changed its
name to Bloom Energy Corporation in September 2006. Bloom Energy
Corporation was founded in 2001 and is headquartered in San Jose,
California.


BOB BELL HYUNDAI: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Burchett Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTI BURCHETT, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. BOB BELL HYUNDAI, Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-02298-DKC (D. Md., Aug. 9, 2019) seeks to stop the
Defendants' practice of making unsolicited calls. The case is
assigned to Deborah K. Chasanow.

Bob Bell Hyundai is a Maryland company engaged in online dealership
of motor vehicles. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrea Gold, Esq.
          TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP
          1828 L Street, NW, Suite 1000
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 973-0900
          Facsimile: (202) 973-0950
          E-mail: agold@tzlegal.com

               - and -

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 1205
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (305) 479-2299
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
                  gberg@shamisgentile.com

              - and -

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          Jordan D. Utanski, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, PA
          19495 Biscayne Blvd #607
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (305) 975-3320
          E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com
                  utanski@edelsberglaw.com


BRIGHTVIEW HOLDINGS: Court Consolidates McComas & Speiser Suits
---------------------------------------------------------------
Brightview Holdings Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the Court has entered an
order consolidating the "McComas" and "Speiser" state court
actions, under the caption, In re BrightView Holdings, Inc.
Securities Litigation.

On April 11, 2019, a purported class action complaint, captioned
Speiser v. BrightView Holdings, Inc., was filed in federal court in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the Company and two of
the Company's officers.  

On April 16, 2019, a second purported class action complaint,
captioned McComas v. BrightView Holdings, Inc., was filed in the
Court of Common Pleas in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania against
the Company, certain current and former officers and directors of
the Company, the underwriters in the Company's initial public
offering (IPO), and the Company's alleged controlling stockholders.


On May 31, 2019, McComas filed an amended complaint.  

In early June 2019, Speiser voluntarily dismissed his complaint in
federal court, but filed a new complaint in the Court of Common
Pleas in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. The Speiser state court
complaint is substantively identical to the McComas amended
complaint.  

Both complaints allege violations of Section 11 of the Securities
Act of 1933 against all defendants and controlling person claims
under Section 15 of the Act against certain defendants.  

The plaintiffs purport to represent similar classes of persons who
purchased BrightView stock in its IPO in July 2018 or purchased
BrightView stock in the market that was traceable to the shares
issued in the IPO. The complaints allege that the IPO prospectus
was misleading because it allegedly failed to disclose that a
portion of BrightView's contracts were underperforming and/or
represented undesirable costs to the Company and that, as a result,
BrightView would implement a managed exit strategy from low margin
or non-profitable contracts that would negatively impact its future
revenues; and that BrightView failed to disclose an alleged labor
shortage caused by the Company's inability to hire sufficient
workers through the H-2B visa program would adversely affect
earnings.  

On July 19, 2019, the Court entered an order consolidating the
McComas and Speiser state court actions, under the caption, In re
BrightView Holdings, Inc. Securities Litigation, with the amended
McComas complaint as the operative pleading. The Company intends to
defend itself vigorously against the actions.  

Brightview said, "The Company is unable at this time to determine
the amount of the possible loss or range of loss, if any, that it
may incur as a result of these matters."

Brightview Holdings Inc. is a commercial landscaping services
provider. The Company provides commercial landscaping services,
ranging from landscape maintenance and enhancements to tree care
and landscape development. It operates through an integrated
national service prototype, which systematically delivers services
at the local levels. The company is based in Blue Bell,
Pennsylvania.


BURGER KING: Huerta Sues Over Illegal Capture of Biometric Info
---------------------------------------------------------------
ARACELI REFUGIO HUERTA, individually and on behalf of similarly
situated individuals v. BURGER KING CORPORATION, a Florida
corporation, Case No. 2019CH09351 (Ill. Cir., Cook Cty., Aug. 14,
2019), alleges that using biometric-enabled technology, the
Defendant is capturing, collecting, disseminating, or otherwise
using the biometrics of the Plaintiff and other employees, without
their informed written consent as required by the Illinois
Biometric Information Privacy Act.

Burger King Corporation is a Florida corporation that conducts
substantial business throughout Illinois, including in Cook
County.

The Defendant is a global leader in the quick service restaurant
industry, with hundreds of locations in the state of Illinois.

A hearing in the lawsuit is set for December 12, 2019, at 9:45
a.m.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William P.N. Kingston, Esq.
          Jad Sheikali, Esq.
          MCGUIRE LAW, P.C.
          55 W. Wacker Drive, 9th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 893-7002
          E-mail: wkingston@mcgpc.com
                  jsheikali@mcgpc.com


C&J ENERGY: Faces Keane Group Merger-Related Class Suits
--------------------------------------------------------
C&J Energy Services Ltd. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company has been
named as a defendant in two class action suits related to its
merger agreement with Keane Group, Inc.

On June 16, 2019, C&J and Keane Group, Inc.("Keane") entered into
an agreement and plan of merger (the "Merger Agreement") with King
Merger Sub Corp. ("Merger Sub).

Following the public announcement of the merger, the company and
its directors have been named as defendants in two putative class
action complaints filed by purported stockholders of C&J on behalf
of the named plaintiff and all owners of C&J common stock (other
than defendants and related or affiliated persons).

The complaints, Wuollet v. C&J Energy Services, Inc., et al., filed
on July 29, 2019, and Plumley v. C&J Energy Services, Inc. et al.,
filed on August 1, 2019, were both filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware. The complaints contain
allegations contending, among other things, that the registration
statement on Form S-4 filed by Keane with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) on July 16, 2019 (File No. 333-232662),
of which the joint proxy statement/prospectus of C&J and Keane
filed in connection with the merger forms a part, misleads and
fails to disclose certain allegedly material information in
violation of federal securities laws. The lawsuits seek injunctive
relief enjoining the merger, damages and costs, among other
remedies.

The defendants have not yet answered or otherwise responded to the
complaints.

C&J Energy said, "We and our Board believe these lawsuits are
without merit and intend to defend against them vigorously."

C&J Energy Services Ltd. provides well construction, well
completions, well support and other complementary oilfield services
to oil and gas exploration and production companies primarily in
North America. As one of the largest completion and production
services companies in North America, C&J offers a full, vertically
integrated suite of services involved in the entire life cycle of
the well, including hydraulic fracturing, cased-hole wireline,
coiled tubing, cementing, rig services, fluids management services
and other special well site services.


CANON GARDEN: Lopez Sues Over Illegal Tip Pooling Scheme
--------------------------------------------------------
WALTERIO LOPEZ and RIJEL LINDA EGGAN TAVELLA, individually and on
behalf of all aggrieved employees and the general public,
Plaintiffs, v. CANON GARDEN, INC., a California Corporation dba
CAFFE ROMA; SANDRO SCIANDRI, an individual; AGOSTINO SCIANDRI, an
individual; MICHELE RIVIELLO, an individual; and DAVIDE GILIBERTI,
an individual; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case
No. 19STCV2930 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., Aug. 21, 2019)
is a California class action arising from Defendants' scheme to
pool tips to pay managerial staff and to deny legally mandated meal
and rest periods.

Under Caffe Roma's mandatory "tip pooling policy" Defendants
required tipped employees to contribute up to 40% of their
collected tips, a portion of which was then paid to managerial
staff. Defendants thereby obtain an illegal "tip credit" against
wages they owe and cause tipped employees to lose a portion of
their tips. The Defendants did and continue to maintain a mandatory
policy requiring servers and bartenders to contribute up to 40
percent of collected tips to a tip-pool. The Defendants
distributed, and continue to distribute, a portion of the employee
tip pool to managerial personnel. Defendants failed to provide
Plaintiffs and other class members with a proper accounting showing
all other individuals who received shares of their earned tips.

Plaintiffs bring this action to recover their stolen tips, premium
wages, interest, liquidated damages, and penalties based on the
Defendants' violations of their rights under California labor law,
including the California Labor Code and Industrial Welfare
Commission Wage Order 5-2001. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants'
actions not only violate numerous provisions of the California
Labor Code, but also constitute unfair business practices under
California's Unfair Competition Law (hereinafter "UCL"). Plaintiffs
assert that Defendants' violations of state labor laws are unlawful
acts which have afforded Defendants an unfair competitive advantage
over restaurants that comply with California wage and hour laws.
Thus, Plaintiffs seek restitution, disgorgement, and other
equitable relief to remedy Defendants' illegal and unfair business
practices, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs were employed by Defendants pursuant to oral contracts
of employment to perform the work of servers, bussers and
bartenders at Caffe Roma.

CANON GARDEN, INC., doing business as CAFFE ROMA is a Corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the state of California
operating a well-known Beverly Hills restaurant.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Jenna L Miara, Esq.
     Sebastian Sanchez, Esq.
     Kelsey R Chappie, Esq.
     BET TZEDEK LEGAL SERVICES
     3250 Wilshire Blvd. 13th Floor
     Los Angeles, CA 90010
     Phone: (323) 939-0506
     Facsimile: (213)471-4568
     Email: jmiara@bettzedek.org
            ssanchez@bettzedek.org
            kchapple@bettzedek.org

          - and -

     Matthew K Handley, Esq.
     HANDLEY FARAH ANDERSON
     777 6th Street, NW
     Eleventh Floor
     Washington, DC 20001
     Email: mhandey@hfajustice.com


CAPITAL ONE: Atachbarian Sues over Credit Card Data Theft
---------------------------------------------------------
ABRAHAM ATACHBARIAN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-06965 (C.D. Cal., Aug. 9, 2019) is a
class action brought by Plaintiff and all other persons harmed by a
cyberattack and breach of personal financial information maintained
by Capital One on Amazon Web Services.

According to the complaint, in a press release appended to a Form
8-K filed by Capital One on July 30, 2018, Capital One announced
that it was the subject of a hack consisting of the unauthorized
access by an outside individual who obtained certain types of
Personal Information relating to persons who had applied for its
credit card and to Capital One customers

The Defendant failed to take adequate steps to maintain its
firewall and to detect the hacking, which made sensitive customer
information vulnerable to attack. The Defendant acted without
reasonable due care and thereby breached their duties owed to the
Plaintiff and Class members. The Defendant's breach of their duty
of due care, proximately caused damage and will continue to cause
damage to the Plaintiff and Class members.

Capital One Financial Corporation provides commercial banking
services. The Bank accepts deposits and offers personal credit
cards, investment products, loans, and online banking services.
Capital One serves customers in the State of Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Patrice L. Bishop, Esq.
          STULL STULL & BRODY
          9430 W. Olympic Blvd., Suite 400
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Telephone: (310) 209-2468
          Facsimile: (310) 209-2087
          E-mail: pbishop@ssbla.com


CAPITAL ONE: Credit Card Users Sue Over Data Breach
---------------------------------------------------
Belinda L. Fisher, James Scott Jewell, Howard Clark, Amanda
Stevens, and Casey Thaxton, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Capital One Financial
Corporation, Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., and Capital One, N.A.,
Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-04485, (N.D. Cal., August 1, 2019), seeks
damages, attorneys' fees and costs, and such other and further
relief resulting from breach of contract, negligence, unjust
enrichment and violations of and violations of various state
consumer protection acts.

On July 29, 2019, it was reported that Capital One experienced an
unauthorized access by a hacker who obtained certain types of
personal information relating to people who had applied for credit
card products. Plaintiffs have applied for and/or used a Capital
One credit card at some time.

Capital One is a bank holding company and financial institution
that offers credit cards to consumer applicants throughout the
United States. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Benjamin Heikali, Esq.
      Joshua Nassir, Esq.
      10866 Wilshire Blvd., Esq.
      Los Angeles, CA 90024
      Telephone: (424) 256-2884
      Fax: (424) 256-2885
      E-mail: bheikali@faruqilaw.com
              jnassir@faruqilaw.com

              - and -

      Bonner C. Walsh, Esq.
      WALSH PLLC
      1561 Long Haul Road
      Grangeville, ID 83530
      Telephone: (541) 359-2827
      Facsimile: (866) 503-8206
      Email: bonner@walshpllc.com


CAPITAL ONE: Dames Sue Over Credit Card Data Breach
---------------------------------------------------
Deborah Dames, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Capital One Financial Corporation and
Amazon Web Services, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-01010, (E.D.
Va., August 2, 2019), seeks damages, attorneys' fees and costs, and
such other and further relief resulting from breach of contract,
negligence, unjust enrichment and violations of and violations of
various state consumer protection acts.

On July 29, 2019, it was reported that Capital One experienced an
unauthorized access by a hacker who obtained certain types of
personal information relating to people who had applied for credit
card products. Dames applied for and/or used a Capital One credit
card at some time.

Capital One is a bank holding company and financial institution
that offers credit cards to consumer applicants throughout the
United States. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Haley N. Proctor, Esq.
     David H. Thompson, Esq.
     COOPER & KIRK, PLLC
     1523 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20036
     Tel: (202) 220-9600
     Fax: (202) 220-9601
     Email: dthompson@cooperkirk.com
            hproctor@cooperkirk.com

            - and -

     Kessler Topaz, Esq.
     Joseph H. Meltzer, Esq.
     Naumon A. Amjed, Esq.
     Melissa L. Troutner, Esq.
     MELTZER & CHECK LLP
     280 King of Prussia Road
     Radnor, PA 19087
     Tel: (610) 667-7706
     Fax: (610) 667-7056
     Email: jmeltzer@ktmc.com
            namjed@ktmc.com
            mtroutner@ktmc.com


CAPITAL ONE: Greenstein Sues Over Credit Card Data Breach
---------------------------------------------------------
Lara Greenstein, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Capital One Financial Corporation, Capital
One Bank (USA), N.A., and Capital One, N.A., Defendants, Case No.
19-cv-02307, (D.C., August 1, 2019), seeks damages, attorneys' fees
and costs, and such other and further relief resulting from breach
of contract, negligence, unjust enrichment and violations of and
violations of various state consumer protection acts.

On July 29, 2019, it was reported that Capital One experienced an
unauthorized access by a hacker who obtained certain types of
personal information relating to people who had applied for credit
card products. Greenstein applied for and/or used a Capital One
credit card at some time.

Capital One is a bank holding company and financial institution
that offers credit cards to consumer applicants throughout the
United States. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Linda P. Nussbaum, Esq.
      Bart D. Cohen, Esq.
      NUSSBAUM LAW GROUP, P.C.
      1211 Avenue of the Americas, 40th Floor
      New York, NY 10036-8718
      Tel: (917) 438-9189
      Email: lnussbaum@nussbaumpc.com
             bcohen@nussbaumpc.com

             - and -

      Michael E. Criden, Esq.
      Lindsey C. Grossman, Esq.
      CRIDEN & LOVE, P.A.
      7301 SW 57th Court, Ste. 515
      South Miami, FL 33143
      Tel: (305) 357-9000
      Email: mcriden@cridenlove.com
             lgrossman@cridenlove.com

             - and -

      Adam Frankel, Esq.
      GREENWICH LEGAL ASSOCIATES, LLC
      881 Lake Avenue
      Greenwich, CT 06831
      Tel: (203) 622-6001
      Email: adam@grwlegal.com


CAPITAL ONE: Hun Sues Over Credit Card Data Breach
--------------------------------------------------
Alexander Hun, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Capital One Financial Corporation and
Amazon Web Services, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-04436, (E.D.
N.Y., August 1, 2019), seeks damages, attorneys' fees and costs,
and such other and further relief resulting from breach of
contract, negligence, unjust enrichment and violations of and
violations of various state consumer protection acts.

On July 29, 2019, it was reported that Capital One experienced an
unauthorized access by a former Amazon Web Services employee who
obtained certain types of personal information relating to people
who had applied for credit card products. Hun applied for and/or
used a Capital One credit card at some time.

Capital One is a bank holding company and financial institution
that offers credit cards to consumer applicants throughout the
United States. Amazon Web Services is a cloud platform with data
centers globally located. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joseph N. Kravec, Jr., Esq.
     FEINSTEIN DOYLE PAYNE & KRAVEC, LLC
     429 Forbes Avenue, 17th Floor
     Pittsburgh, PA 15219
     Phone: (412) 281-8400
     Fax: (412) 281-1007
     Email: jkravec@fdpklaw.com


CAPITAL ONE: Jacobs Sues Over Credit Card Data Breach
-----------------------------------------------------
Jeffrey Jacobs, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. . Capital One Financial Corporation,
Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., and Capital One, N.A., Defendants,
Case No. 19-cv-04436, (E.D. N.Y., August 1, 2019), seeks damages,
attorneys' fees and costs, and such other and further relief
resulting from breach of contract, negligence, unjust enrichment
and violations of and violations of various state consumer
protection acts.

On July 29, 2019, it was reported that Capital One experienced an
unauthorized access by a hacker who obtained certain types of
personal information relating to people who had applied for credit
card products. Jacobs applied for and/or used a Capital One credit
card at some time.

Capital One is a bank holding company and financial institution
that offers credit cards to consumer applicants throughout the
United States. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Richard E. Shevitz, Esq.
     Lynn A. Toops, Esq.
     Lisa M. La Fornara, Esq.
     COHEN & MALAD, LLP
     One Indiana Square, Suite 1400
     Indianapolis, IN 46204
     Telephone: (317) 636-6481
     Fax: (317) 636-2593
     Email: rshevitz@cohenandmalad.com
            ltoops@cohenandmalad.com


CENTRAL RESEARCH: Hall Suit Seeks Redress Over FDCPA Violations
---------------------------------------------------------------
WARREN HALL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. CENTRAL RESEARCH, INC., Case No. 1:19-cv-00660-TSB
(S.D. Ohio, Aug. 13, 2019), seeks redress for the Defendant's
actions of using an unfair and unconscionable means to collect a
debt, in violation of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act.

The Defendant is a collection agency with its principal office
located in Lowell, Arkansas.

The Defendant is a company that uses the mail, telephone, or
facsimile in a business the principal purpose of which is the
collection of debts, or that regularly collects or attempts to
collect debts alleged to be due another.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Marc E. Dann, Esq.
          Brian D. Flick, Esq.
          DANNLAW
          P.O. Box 6031040
          Cleveland, OH 44103
          Telephone: (216) 373-0539
          Facsimile: (216) 373-0536
          E-mail: mdann@dannlaw.com
                  bflick@dannlaw.com

               - and -

          Ari Marcus, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN, LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Telephone: (732) 695-3282
          Facsimile: (732) 298-6256
          E-mail: ari@marcuszelman.com


CESARE ATTOLINI: Diaz Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
--------------------------------------------------------------
Cesare Attolini NY LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Edwin Diaz, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Cesare Attolini NY LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-07848 (S.D. N.Y., Aug. 21, 2019).

Cesare Attolini NY LLC is a men's clothing store in New York City,
New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (929) 575-4175
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


CH VENTURES: Illegally Collects Biometric Info, Gonzalez Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
FABIOLA VANEGAS GONZALEZ, individually and on behalf of similarly
situated individuals v. CH VENTURES, LLC, an Illinois limited
liability company, Defendant and ADP, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability, Respondent in Discovery, Case No. 2019CH09349 (Ill.
Cir., Cook Cty., Aug. 14, 2019), alleges that the Defendant
violates the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act by
capturing, collecting, disseminating, or otherwise using the
biometrics of the Plaintiff and other Class members, without their
informed written consent as required by law, in order to track
their employment and work performance.

CH Ventures, LLC is an Illinois limited liability company that
conducts substantial business and markets its construction services
throughout Illinois, including in Cook County.  The Defendant is a
construction and real estate company that relies on biometric
technologies to track its employees while at work.

Respondent ADP, LLC., ("ADP"), is a Delaware corporation with its
principal offices located in New Jersey. ADP maintains offices in
Chicago and regularly conducts business throughout the state of
Illinois.  ADP possesses information necessary for the Plaintiff to
adequately ascertain the identity of additional culpable parties in
this action.

A hearing in the lawsuit is set for December 12, 2019, at 10:00
a.m.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William P.N. Kingston, Esq.
          Jad Sheikali, Esq.
          MCGUIRE LAW, P.C.
          55 W. Wacker Drive, 9th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 893-7002
          E-mail: wkingston@mcgpc.com
                  jsheikali@mcgpc.com


CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION: 6th Cir. Affirms Class Certification
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court's judgment granting
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned
ZEHENTBAUER FAMILY LAND, LP; HANOVER FARMS, LP; EVELYN FRANCES
YOUNG, Successor Trustee of Robert Milton Young Trust,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION, L.L.C.; CHESAPEAKE
OPERATING, INC.; CHK UTICA, L.L.C.; TOTAL E&P USA, INC.,
Defendants-Appellants. No. 18-4139. (6th Cir.).

This appeal concerns oil and gas leases in Ohio's Utica Shale
Formation. The defendants are exploration and production companies
that have contracted with landowners to drill for oil and gas on
the leased properties, and the plaintiffs are a putative class of
such landowners. Chesapeake Exploration, LLC, and a predecessor
company, Ohio Buckeye Energy, LLC, entered into hundreds of oil and
gas leases with landowners in Ohio, including the three named
plaintiffs in the present case.

The named plaintiffs sued the defendants in Ohio state court,
seeking relief on behalf of themselves and a putative class
consisting of all persons entitled to royalty payments from the
defendants under what the plaintiffs called uniform oil and gas
leases, known generally as Gross Royalty Leases.

The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for class
certification regarding the Group A and Group B subclasses. Because
none of the named plaintiffs are in Group C, the court concluded
that the plaintiffs had failed to establish typicality under Rule
23(a)(3) with respect to the Group C subclass and therefore denied
the motion with respect to Group C.

The district court agreed with the plaintiffs that the issue of the
propriety of the netback method is the central issue in this case
and that the answer to that question will resolve the claims of
each and every individual in the class.  

In this interlocutory appeal, the defendants argue that class
certification under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is improper because issues common to the class members do
not predominate over individual issues.

Class-certification requirements

A putative class must also comply with Rule 23(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which has four requirements, numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequate representation, that
effectively limit the class claims to those fairly encompassed by
the named plaintiff's claims.

In addition to the four requirements of Rule 23(a), the putative
class must satisfy at least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b).
The district court certified the class under Rule 23(b)(3) in the
present case. A court may certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3) only
if it finds that the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

Ohio's oil and gas law

The plaintiffs' claim that the defendants are improperly
transferring the burden of paying for post-production costs is part
of a broader debate about how oil and gas royalties should be
calculated. Until the 1960s, the law uniformly applied the
at-the-well rule, meaning that oil and gas leases that are either
silent on the point at which royalty calculations are to occur, or
provide for royalties at the wellhead, authorize lessees to
apportion post-production costs in determining the value of the
lessor's royalty.

But critics of the at-the-well rule argue that it is inherently
unfair to lessors who lack the necessary expertise to negotiate
clauses to protect their interests and that it therefore gives the
lessee which is in the best position to control post-production
costs a windfall.

If the at-the-well rule applies, then a producer may deduct
post-production costs before calculating a lessor's royalties, even
if the contract provides that the royalties are to be calculated
based on gross proceeds and without deductions. By contrast, if the
marketable-product rule applies, then most post-production costs
are not deductible even where the royalty is to be paid based on
[the] market price at the mouth of the well.

The defendants in the present case have been calculating royalties
as though the leases incorporate the at-the-well rule. If they are
correct, and if the parties always intended the royalties to be
calculated based on the wellhead prices, then applying the
marketable-product rule "runs the risk of giving [the plaintiffs]
the benefit of a bargain not made. But if they are incorrect, then
the plaintiffs have been systematically undercompensated for the
oil and gas removed from their land. Both sides argue that the
leases expressly require their own respective royalty-calculation
method.

Because the plaintiffs no longer argue that the defendants breached
the leases by selling oil and gas to the defendants' midstream
affiliates at below-market prices, class certification is
appropriate.

The defendants argue that the district court improperly certified
the class because the plaintiffs failed to establish predominance
under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. They
argue that the plaintiffs' allegation that the defendants used a
uniform practice of calculating royalties the netback method is
insufficient to show predominance. Specifically, the defendants
argue that common issues do not predominate because the plaintiffs'
claims rely on showing that the defendants' royalty payments were
based on sale prices that fell below what an unaffiliated company
would have paid for the oil and gas at the wellhead.  

The Court agrees with the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs
have not met their burden of showing that common issues predominate
with respect to the plaintiffs' theory that the defendants sold oil
and gas to midstream affiliates at below-market prices. But the
defendants' argument ultimately fails because the plaintiffs no
longer pursue at the class-certification stage the theory that the
defendants breached the leases by selling oil and gas at
below-market prices at each wellhead. And the plaintiffs stipulated
during oral argument and asserted in their brief that they are
willing to proceed solely on their post-production-costs theory of
liability.

The plaintiffs satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) with their
liability theory based on the defendants' deductions of
post-production costs.

The plaintiffs argue that the netback method breached the leases
because the defendants improperly deducted post-production costs,
in violation of the lease language prohibiting the defendants from
deducting any expenses other than the plaintiffs' share of taxes.

The Court concludes that the plaintiffs satisfy the predominance
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) under this theory of the case. Under
this theory, liability is based on the question of whether the
lease language permits the defendants to deduct post-production
costs in calculating the plaintiffs' royalty payments.

In other words, the case will turn on whether the lease language is
deemed to invoke the at-the-well rule, the marketable-product rule,
or a different valuation system entirely. This question will have a
common answer that turns on the court's interpretation of the lease
language under Ohio law.  

If the plaintiffs prevail in showing that the defendants' uniform
practice of deducting post-production costs to calculate royalties
breached the leases, then the plaintiffs will have succeeded in
proving liability. And conversely, if the defendants' method of
calculating royalty payments by deducting post-production costs did
not breach the leases, then all of the plaintiffs' claims will fail
on the merits.

This theory of liability, moreover, does not require an estimation
of the individual market prices of oil and gas at each well.
Liability will turn solely on whether the leases permit the
defendants to deduct post-production costs in calculating the
royalties due to the plaintiffs like the at-the-well rule or
whether the leases prohibit the defendants from deducting
post-production costs like the marketable-product rule. And if the
plaintiffs prevail on the merits, then damages will be calculated
by estimating what the royalty payments would have been if the
defendants had not deducted post-production costs using the netback
method. This will be done without regard to the individual market
prices of oil and gas at each well.

The Court therefore concludes that the common question of whether
the defendants breached the leases by employing the netback method
predominates over individual questions. The defendants, however,
challenge this post-production-costs theory of the case on two
grounds. First, they argue that it is inconsistent with the
pleadings. The pleadings, according to the defendants, primarily
focused on the theory that the netback method violated the leases
because it yielded royalties based on below-market prices at the
wellhead. Second, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs'
post-production-costs theory has no merit.  

Per the defendants' first argument, they contend that the
plaintiffs are now asserting a theory of liability based on the
defendants' deduction of post-production costs that is inconsistent
with the plaintiffs' complaint. The defendants accuse the
plaintiffs of presenting a plausible breach-of-contract theory that
would survive an initial motion to dismiss and then changing course
by advancing a different, implausible theory of breach that would
propel a motion for class certification.

But scrutiny of the complaint reveals that the plaintiffs asserted
both theories of liability at the pleading stage. The plaintiffs
alleged in the complaint that the Defendants breached their lease
duties by systematically selling Oil and Gas to affiliated entities
at below-market prices, and also passed improper and/or excessive
production and/or post-production expenses to the plaintiffs,
plainly violating the leases.

In addition, the plaintiffs assert throughout the complaint that
the defendants acted improperly by deducting post-production costs.
The Court is therefore not persuaded by the defendants' argument
that the plaintiffs presented one theory of the case to survive a
motion to dismiss and then pivoted to another theory of the case to
survive class certification. Instead, the plaintiffs have pleaded
that the defendants' use of the netback method has violated the
leases under both theories.

The defendants' argument challenging the plaintiffs'
post-production-costs theory is a merits argument that is not
germane to the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), so the
Court declines to engage with it at the present time.

A full-text copy of the Sixth Circuit's August 15, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yyttgeue from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Gregory G. Garre -- gregory.garre@lw.com -- LATHAM &
WATKINS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellants.

Dennis E. Murray, Jr., MURRAY & MURRAY, CO., L.P.A., 111 East
Shoreline Drive, Sandusky, OH 44870-2517, for Appellees.

ON BRIEF: Gregory G. Garre, Elana Nightingale Dawson --
elana.nightingaledawson@lw.com -- Samir Deger-Sen-
samir.deger-sen@lw.com -- Charles S. Dameron --
charles.dameron@lw.com -- LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, Washington, D.C.,
Daniel T. Donovan -- daniel.donovan@kirkland.com -- KIRKLAND &
ELLIS LLP, Washington, D.C., Timothy B. McGranor --
tbmcgranor@vorys.com -- VORYS, SATER, SEYMOUR AND PEASE LLP,
Columbus, Ohio, for Appellants.

Dennis E. Murray, Jr., William H. Bartle, MURRAY & MURRAY, CO.,
L.P.A., 111 East Shoreline DriveSandusky, OH 44870- 2517, Scott M.
Zurakowski, Terry A. Moore, Gregory W. Watts, KRUGLIAK, WILKINS,
GRIFFITHS & DOUGHERTY CO., L.P.A., 4775 Munson Street, North West
Canton, OH 44718, for Appellees.

L. Bradfield Hughes -- bhughes@porterwright.com -- PORTER WRIGHT
MORRIS & ARTHUR LLP, Columbus, Ohio,  Andrew J. Pincus --
apincus@mayerbrown.com -- MAYER BROWN LLP, Washington, D.C., for
Amici Curiae.


CHICKEN OF THE SEA: Judge Approves Division of Tuna Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Cliff White, writing for SeafoodSource, reports that the judge
presiding over the class-action lawsuit alleging a price-fixing
conspiracy amongst the so-called "Big Three" tuna companies has
made the decision to approve four separate tracks on which the suit
will continue.

Chicken of the Sea, Bumble Bee, and StarKist, as well as their
parent companies, face potential punitive damages from claims they
participated in a scheme to artificially inflate the prices of
canned tuna. Bumble Bee and StarKist have both pleaded guilty in
related criminal cases brought by the U.S. Department of Justice,
while Chicken of the Sea avoided criminal prosecution, as it served
as the whistleblower in the case.

In a 30 July ruling, U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of California Judge Janis L. Sammartino approved the division of
the lawsuit into four tracks: claims brought by the direction
purchasers bringing their owns suits against the tuna companies, or
so called "direct-action plaintiffs" (DAPs); direct purchasers
pursuing a collective class action (DPPs); indirect purchasers
moving forward as a putative class, or commercial food-preparers
(CFPs); and individual consumers proceeding as a joint class, or
end-payer plaintiffs (EPPs).

The DAPs have indicated they will opt-out of any class that is
certified, therefore Sammartino focused her judgment on arguments
in favor of and opposed to the creation of the DPP, CFP, and EPP
classes.

Parties currently included in the DPP class include: Olean
Wholesale Grocery Cooperative, Inc.; Pacific Groservice Inc. d/b/a
PITCO Foods; Piggly Wiggly Alabama Distributing Co., Inc.; Howard
Samuels as Trustee in Bankruptcy for Central Grocers, Inc.; Trepco
Imports and Distribution Ltd.; and Benjamin Foods LLC.

Parties currently included in the CFP class include: Thyme Café &
Market; Simon-Hindi LLC, d/b/a Simon's; Capitol Hill Supermarket;
Confetti's; Maquoketa Care Center, Inc; A-1 Diner; Francis T.
Enterprises d/b/a Erbert & Gerbert's; Groucho's Deli of Raleigh;
Sandee's Catering; Groucho's Deli of Five Points; Rushin Gold d/b/a
the Gold Rush; and Erbert & Gerbert's.

Parties currently included in the EPP class include 73 individual
consumers.

In seeking certification as classes, each plaintiff group enlisted
an econometric expert to submit a report, which was then countered
by a report compiled by experts hired by the interests defending
the tuna companies.

"The reports detail the canned tuna market characteristics and
state the experts' findings regarding whether there is evidence to
support that a conspiracy occurred; whether all, or nearly all, of
the Class members suffered impact; and whether damages can
reasonably be calculated,"  according to Sammartino's judgment.

In the case of the DPP, the CFP, and the EPP classes, Sammartino
found the evidence put forward by each expert for the plaintiffs
was substantial enough to warrant the creation of a separate
class.

"The evidence put forward . . . supplemented by the correlation
tests, the record evidence, and the guilty pleas and admissions
entered in this case, is sufficient to show common questions
predominate as to common impact," Sammartino said.

Sammartino additionally approved Hausfeld LLP to continue operating
as class counsel for the DPPs; Cuneo Gilbert & Laduca LLP to
continue as representatives of the CFPs; and Wolf Haldenstein Adler
Freeman & Herz LLP to continue as counsel for the EPPs.

Each class's counsel must now submit a proposal on how they will
disseminate the existence of the class to all potential parties in
the lawsuit, which is due within 30 days. [GN]


CHINACACHE INT'L: Likas Sues over Government Probe
--------------------------------------------------
WILLIAM LIKAS, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. CHINACACHE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS
LTD., SONG WANG, GUANGSHENG MENG, FENGYE GAO, and JING AN, the
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-06942 (C.D. Cal., Aug. 9, 2019), seeks
to recover damages caused by Defendants' violations of the federal
securities laws and to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The case is a federal securities class action on behalf of a class
consisting of all persons other than Defendants who purchased or
otherwise acquired ChinaCache securities between April 10, 2015 and
May 17, 2019, both dates inclusive.

The Defendants made materially false and misleading statements
regarding the Company's business, operational and compliance
policies. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) ChinaCache and
Defendant Song Wang (Wang) -- the Company's Chief Executive Officer
and Chairman of the Board of Directors at all relevant times --
were engaged in enterprise bribery; (ii) the foregoing conduct
placed ChinaCache and Wang at a heightened risk of criminal
investigation and enforcement action by government authorities,
which would foreseeably disrupt the Company's operations; and (iii)
as a result, the Company's public statements were materially false
and misleading at all relevant times.

On May 31, 2019, ChinaCache filed a Report of Foreign Private
Issuer on Form 6-K with the SEC, wherein the Company disclosed that
it had "terminated Michael T. Studer CPA P.C. as the Company's
independent registered public accounting firm". According to the
May 2019 6-K, "the decision was approved by the Company's Audit
Committee" and "the Company  intended to appoint a new auditor in
the near future." The May 2019 6-K also noted that the timing of
the Company's new auditor's appointment is dependent on the status
of its ongoing investigation.

Finally, on June 6, 2019, ChinaCache issued a press release
announcing the resignation of Defendant Wang from the Company's
Board of Directors.  Trading in ChinaCache ADRs on the NASDAQ
remains halted as of the date this Complaint was filed.

As a result of Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages.

ChinaCache was founded in 1998 and is headquartered in Beijing,
China. ChinaCache's American depositary receipts (ADRs) trade on
the NASDAQ under the ticker symbol "CCIH." ChinaCache is an
investment holding company that provides content and application
delivery services in the PRC. It purports to offer a portfolio of
services and solutions to businesses, government agencies, and
other enterprises to enhance the reliability and scalability of
their online services and applications.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff are:

          Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
          355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2450
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 785-2610
          Facsimile: (213) 226-4684
          E-mail: lrosen@rosenlegal.com

CLIENT SERVICES: Faces Silberstein Suit in District of New Jersey
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Client Services, Inc.
The case is captioned as ESTHER H. SILBERSTEIN individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. CLIENT
SERVICES, INC. and JOHN DOES 1-25, the Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-16497-KM-ESK (D.N.J., Aug 8, 2019). The case is assigned to
the Hon. Judge Kevin McNulty. The suit alleges violation of the
Fair Debt Collection Act.

Client Services is a full service Accounts Receivable Management
(ARM) firm offering a diverse selection of collection and recovery
solutions.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          David Paul Force, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 282-6500
          Facsimile: (201) 282-6501
          E-mail: dforce@steinsakslegal.com

COINBASE INC: Seeks Ninth Circuit Review of Ruling in Berk Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Brian Armstrong, Coinbase, Inc. and David Farmer filed
an appeal from a Court ruling in the lawsuit entitled Jeffrey Berk,
et al. v. Coinbase, Inc., et al., Case No. 3:18-cv-01364-VC, in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San
Francisco.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit is
brought against the Defendants for violation of California's Unfair
Competition Law and negligence.

The lawsuit is a class action on behalf of all Coinbase customers
who placed purchase, sale or trade orders with Coinbase or the GDAX
in connection with Coinbase's launch of BCH during the period of
December 19, 2017 through and including December 21, 2017 and who
suffered monetary loss as a result of Defendants' wrongdoing.
Excluded from the Class are Defendants, any entity owned or
controlled by them, and any officer, director, employee or agent of
any of the Defendants, and any heirs, assigns, or family members of
any individual defendant.

The appellate case is captioned as Jeffrey Berk, et al. v.
Coinbase, Inc., et al., Case No. 19-16594, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by September 12, 2019;

   -- Transcript is due on October 11, 2019;

   -- Appellants Brian Armstrong, Coinbase, Inc. and David
      Farmer's opening brief is due on November 20, 2019;

   -- Appellees Jeffrey Berk, William Crowe, Preetham Periaswami,
      Nathaniel Pyron, Michael Shriber, Spencer Soltau and Niko
      Younts' answering brief is due on December 20, 2019;

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees JEFFREY BERK, et al., are represented by:

          Robert S. Green, Esq.
          GREEN & NOBLIN, P.C.
          2200 Larkspur Landing Circle, Suite 101
          Larkspur, CA 94939
          Telephone: (415) 477-6700
          Facsimile: (415) 477-6710
          E-mail: rsg@classcounsel.com

               - and -

          James Robert Noblin, Esq.
          GREEN & NOBLIN, P.C.
          4500 East Pacific Coast Highway, Fourth Floor
          Long Beach, CA 90804
          Telephone: (562) 391-2487
          Facsimile: (415) 477-6710
          E-mail: jrn@classcounsel.com

Defendants-Appellants COINBASE, INC., a Delaware corporation, DBA
Global Digital Asset Exchange, GDAX, et al., are represented by:

          Benjamin W. Berkowitz, Esq.
          Nicholas David Marais, Esq.
          Erin Meyer, Esq.
          Steven Paul Ragland, Esq.
          KEKER, VAN NEST & PETERS LLP
          633 Battery Street
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 391-5400
          E-mail: bberkowitz@keker.com
                  NMarais@keker.com
                  emeyer@keker.com
                  sragland@keker.com


COMCAST CORP: Illegally Records Phone Calls, Escobar Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------
DAVID ESCOBAR, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. COMCAST CORPORATION and COMCAST CABLE
COMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT, LLC, the Defendants, Case No.
4:19-cv-04612-HSG (N.D. Cal., Aug. 9, 2019), targets Defendant's
non-consensual recording of cellular communications in violation of
the California Invasion of Privacy Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant has a pattern and
practice of recording every call to or from (800) 934-6489, even
calls to or from cellular telephones in California.

Comcast Corporation is an American telecommunications conglomerate
headquartered in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the Proposed Class are:

          Jon B. Fougner, Esq.
          FOUGNER LAW
          600 California Street, 11th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (415) 577-5829
          Facsimile: (206) 338-0783
          E-mail: jon@fougnerlaw.com

COMMONWEALTH FINANCIAL: Thomas Files FDCPA Class Suit in Texas
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Commonwealth
Financial Systems, Inc. The case is styled as Amber Thomas,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Commonwealth Financial Systems, Inc., Pendrick Capital
Partners II, LLC and John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No.
4:19-cv-00614 (E.D. Tex., Aug. 21, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Commonwealth Financial Systems, Inc. is a debt collecting agency in
Dickson City, Pennsylvania.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Yaakov Saks, Esq.
   Stein Saks, PLLC
   285 Passaic Street
   Hackensack, NJ 07601
   Tel: (201) 282-6500
   Fax: (201) 282-6501
   Email: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com


CRST EXPEDITED: Sellars Appeals Opinion and Order to 8th Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Leslie Fortune, Claudia Lopez and Cathy Sellars filed an
appeal from the District Court's Memorandum Opinion & Order and
Judgment both dated July 15, 2019, and entered in their lawsuit
titled Cathy Sellars, et al. v. CRST Expedited, Inc., Case No.
1:15-cv-00117-LTS, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids.

The appellate case is captioned as Cathy Sellars, et al. v. CRST
Expedited, Inc., Case No. 19-2708, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiffs
also appealed a court ruling in their lawsuit.  That appellate case
is titled Cathy Sellars, et al. v. CRST Expedited, Inc., Case No.
19-8002.

On Feb. 4, 2019, Judge Leonard T. Strand granted the Defendant's
(i) motion for partial summary judgment on the Plaintiffs'
retaliation claim, and (ii) motion for decertification of the
Hostile Work Environment class.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript is due on or before September 23, 2019;

   -- Appendix is due on October 2, 2019;

   -- Brief of Appellants Leslie Fortune, Claudia Lopez and Cathy
      Sellars is due on October 2, 2019;

   -- Appellee brief is due 30 days from the date the court
      issues the Notice of Docket Activity filing the brief of
      appellant; and

   -- Appellant reply brief is due 21 days from the date the
      court issues the Notice of Docket Activity filing the
      appellee brief.[BN]

The Plaintiffs-Appellants are represented by:

          Joshua N. Friedman, I, Esq.
          Rebecca Houlding, Esq.
          Shilpa Narayan, Esq.
          Giselle Schuetz, Esq.
          FRIEDMAN & HOULDING LLP
          1050 Seven Oaks Lane
          Mamaroneck, NY 10543
          Telephone: (888) 369-1119
          E-mail: josh@joshuafriedmanesq.com
                  rebecca@joshuafriedmanesq.com
                  giselle@joshuafriedmanesq.com

               - and -

          Thomas Andrew Newkirk, Esq.
          NEWKIRK ZWAGERMAN PLC
          521 E. Locust, Suite 300
          Des Moines, IA 50309
          Telephone: (515) 883-2000
          E-mail: tnewkirk@newkirklaw.com

Defendant-Appellee CRST Expedited, Inc. is represented by:

          Jessica Ring Amunson, Esq.
          JENNER & BLOCK LLP
          1099 New York Avenue, N.W., Suite 900
          Washington, DC 20001
          Telephone: (202) 639-6000
          E-mail: jamunson@jenner.com

               - and -

          James T. Malysiak, Esq.
          John H. Mathias, Jr. , Esq.
          JENNER & BLOCK LLP
          353 N. Clark Street
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 923-2813
          E-mail: jmalysiak@jenner.com
                  jmathias@jenner.com

               - and -

          Nicholas Petersen, Esq.
          Kevin James Visser, Esq.
          SIMMONS PERRINE MOYER BERGMAN PLC
          1200 Firstar Bank Building
          115 Third Street, S.E.
          Cedar Rapids, IA 52401-0000
          Telephone: (319) 366-7641
          E-mail: npetersen@simmonsperrine.com
                  kvisser@simmonsperrine.com


CULMIN STAFFING: Fails to Pay Minimum, Overtime Wages, Bloom Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
KAHMYLE BLOOM aka VIRGILIO AGUILERA v. CULMIN STAFFING GROUP, INC.;
COSMETIX WEST; STG LOGISTICS, INC.; EMPLOYERS HR LLC; and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive, Case No. 19STCV28168 (Cal. Super., Los
Angeles Cty., Aug. 13, 2019), is brought on behalf of the Plaintiff
and all similarly situated employees arising from the Defendants'
failure to pay all wages, including minimum wages and overtime
wages.

Culmin Staffing Group, Inc. is a Delaware business entity, which is
registered and conducting business in the State of California.
Culmin provides temporary staffing and/or payroll services
throughout California.

Cosmetix West is a California business entity, which is registered
and conducting business in the State of California.  Cosmetix West
provides cosmetic and other beauty product manufacturing services
throughout California.

STG Logistics, Inc. is a California business entity, which is
registered and conducting business in the State of California.  STG
provides distribution and transportation services throughout
California.

Employers HR LLC is a Florida business entity, which is registered
and conducting business in the State of California.  Employers HR
provides temporary staffing and/or payroll services throughout
California.  The Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and
capacities of the Doe Defendants.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kevin Mahoney, Esq.
          Michael A. Swift, Esq.
          MAHONEY LAW GROUP, APC
          249 E. Ocean Blvd., Suite 814
          Long Beach, CA 90802
          Telephone: (562) 590-5550
          Facsimile: (562) 590-8400
          E-mail: kmahoney@mahoney-law.net
                  mswift@mahoney-law.net


CV SCIENCES: Bid to Dismiss Consolidated Smith Class Suit Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CV Sciences, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company's motion to
dismiss the consolidated class action suit initiated by David Smith
remains pending.

On August 24, 2018, David Smith filed a purported class action
complaint in Nevada District Court alleging certain misstatements
were contained in financial filings that led to stock price
fluctuations and resulting financial harm.

Several additional individuals filed similar claims, and the Smith
suit and each of the other suits all arise out of a report
published by Citron Research on Twitter on August 20, 2018
suggesting that the Company misled investors by failing to disclose
that the Company's efforts to secure patent protection had been
"finally rejected" by the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO).

On November 15, 2018, the Court consolidated the actions and
appointed Richard Ina, Trustee for the Ina Family Trust as Lead
Plaintiff for the consolidated actions. On January 4, 2019, Counsel
for Lead Plaintiff Richard Ina, Trustee for the Ina Family Trust
filed a "consolidated amended complaint".

On March 5, 2019, the company filed a motion to dismiss the action.


Management intends to vigorously defend the allegations.

CV Sciences said, "Since no discovery has been conducted and the
case remains stayed, an estimate of the possible loss or recovery
cannot be made at this time. Various shareholder derivative suits
have been filed which are premised on the same event as the
already-pending case. These are stayed pending the outcome of the
securities class action case."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

CV Sciences, Inc. operates as a life science company. It operates
through two segments, Consumer Products and Specialty
Pharmaceuticals. The company was formerly known as CannaVest Corp.
and changed its name to CV Sciences, Inc. in January 2016. CV
Sciences, Inc. was founded in 2010 and is based in Las Vegas,
Nevada.


CV SCIENCES: Court Enters Final Order Dismissing Sallustro Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
CV Sciences, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that a New York court has
entered a final order dismissing the complaint with prejudice.

On April 23, 2014, Tanya Sallustro filed a purported class action
complaint (the "Complaint") in the Southern District of New York
(the "Court") alleging securities fraud and related claims against
the Company and certain of its officers and directors and seeking
compensatory damages including litigation costs. Ms. Sallustro
alleges that between March 18-31, 2014, she purchased certain
shares of the Company's common stock for a total investment of $16
thousand.

The Complaint refers to Current Reports on Form 8-K and Current
Reports on Form 8-K/A filings made by the Company on April 3, 2014
and April 14, 2014, in which the Company amended previously
disclosed sales (sales originally stated at $1.3 million were
restated to $1.1million, a reduction of $0.2 million) and restated
goodwill as $1.9 million (previously reported at net zero).

Additionally, the Complaint states after the filing of the
Company's Current Report on Form 8-K on April 3, 2014 and the
following press release, the Company's stock price "fell $7.30 per
share, or more than 20%, to close at $25.30 per share."

Subsequent to the filing of the Complaint, six different
individuals filed a motion asking to be designated the lead
plaintiff in the litigation. On March 19, 2015, the Court issued a
ruling appointing Steve Schuck as lead plaintiff. Counsel for Mr.
Schuck filed a "consolidated amended complaint" on September 14,
2015.

On December 11, 2015, the Company filed a motion to dismiss the
consolidated amended complaint. After requesting several
extensions, counsel for Mr. Schuck filed an opposition to the
motion to dismiss on March 21, 2016. The Company's reply brief was
filed on April 25, 2016. On April 2, 2018, the Court issued a
ruling granting in part and denying part the motion to dismiss.

Thereafter, on October 3, 2018, plaintiff's counsel filed a motion
to withdraw Mr. Schuck as Lead Plaintiff and to substitute Jane Ish
as new Lead Plaintiff. This motion was granted by the Court. On
July 2, 2019, the Court entered a final order dismissing the
Complaint with prejudice.

CV Sciences said, "However, various shareholder derivative suits
and complaints have been filed which are premised on the same event
as the Complaint (which has now been dismissed with prejudice).
These derivative suits are stayed and were waiting the outcome of
the Complaint. Management intends to vigorously defend these
allegations and an estimate of possible loss cannot be made at this
time."

CV Sciences, Inc. operates as a life science company. It operates
through two segments, Consumer Products and Specialty
Pharmaceuticals. The company was formerly known as CannaVest Corp.
and changed its name to CV Sciences, Inc. in January 2016. CV
Sciences, Inc. was founded in 2010 and is based in Las Vegas,
Nevada.


CVS HEALTH: Class Suit  over Retail/LTC Business Ongoing
--------------------------------------------------------
CVS Health Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend class action suits related to to the performance of the
Company's Retail/LTC business unit.

Between February and June 2019, five class action complaints were
filed by putative plaintiffs against the Company and certain
current and former officers and directors: Anarkat v. CVS Health
Corp., et al., Case No. 1:19-cv-01725 (S.D.N.Y.); Labourers'
Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada v. CVS Health Corp., et
al., Case No. 651700/2019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.); City of Warren Police
and Fire Retirement Sys.v. CVS Health Corp., et. al., Case No.
PC-2019-5658 (R.I. Super. Ct.); Cambria Co. Employees Retirement
Sys. v. CVS Health Corp., et al., Case No. 653223/2019 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct.); and Freundlich v. CVS Health Corp., et al., Case No.
PC-2019-6685 (R.I. Super. Ct.).

The plaintiffs in these cases assert a variety of causes of action
under federal securities laws that are premised on allegations that
the defendants made certain omissions and misrepresentations
relating to the performance of the Company's LTC business unit,
which allegedly injured investors who acquired CVS Health
securities between May 21, 2015 and February 20, 2019. The
Freundlich case also alleges that defendants misrepresented
anticipated synergies of the Aetna Acquisition.

The Company is defending itself against these claims.

CVS Health Corporation, incorporated on August 22, 1996, together
with its subsidiaries, is an integrated pharmacy healthcare
company. The Company provides pharmacy care for the senior
community through Omnicare, Inc. (Omnicare) and Omnicare's
long-term care (LTC) operations, which include distribution of
pharmaceuticals, related pharmacy consulting and other ancillary
services to chronic care facilities and other care settings. It
operates through three segments: Pharmacy Services, Retail/LTC and
Corporate. The company is based in Woonsocket, Rhode Island.


CVS HEALTH: Klein Suit Now Part of EpiPen ERISA Suit
----------------------------------------------------
CVS Health Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the class action suit
entitled, Klein, et al. v. Prime Therapeutics, et al. (U.S.
District Court for the District of Minnesota), has been
consolidated and is now proceeding as In re EpiPen ERISA
Litigation.

This putative class action was filed against the Company and other
pharmacy benefits managers ("PBMs") in June 2017 on behalf of ERISA
plan members who purchased and paid for EpiPen or EpiPen Jr.
Plaintiffs allege that the PBMs are ERISA fiduciaries to plan
members and have violated ERISA by allegedly causing higher
inflated prices for EpiPens through the process of negotiating
increased rebates from EpiPen manufacturer Mylan. This case has
been consolidated with a similar matter and is now proceeding as In
re EpiPen ERISA Litigation.

The Company is defending itself against these claims.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

CVS Health Corporation, incorporated on August 22, 1996, together
with its subsidiaries, is an integrated pharmacy healthcare
company. The Company provides pharmacy care for the senior
community through Omnicare, Inc. (Omnicare) and Omnicare's
long-term care (LTC) operations, which include distribution of
pharmaceuticals, related pharmacy consulting and other ancillary
services to chronic care facilities and other care settings. It
operates through three segments: Pharmacy Services, Retail/LTC and
Corporate. The company is based in Woonsocket, Rhode Island.


CVS HEALTH: Still Defends Corcoran and Podgorny Complaints
----------------------------------------------------------
CVS Health Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend Corcoran et al. v. CVS Health Corporation (U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California) and Podgorny et al.
v. CVS Health Corporation (U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois).

These putative class actions were filed against the Company in July
and September 2015. The cases were consolidated in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California.

Plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive relief under the consumer
protection statutes and common laws of certain states on behalf of
a class of consumers who purchased certain prescription drugs.

Several third-party payors filed similar putative class actions on
behalf of payors captioned Sheet Metal Workers Local No. 20 Welfare
and Benefit Fund v. CVS Health Corp. and Plumbers Welfare Fund,
Local 130 v. CVS Health Corporation (both pending in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Rhode Island) in February and
August 2016.

In all of these cases the plaintiffs allege the Company overcharged
for certain prescription drugs by not submitting the price
available to members of the CVS Health Savings Pass program as the
pharmacy’s usual and customary price.

In the Corcoran case, the U.S. District Court granted summary
judgment to CVS on plaintiffs' claims in their entirety and
certified certain subclasses in September 2017.

In June 2019, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's
granting of summary judgment and reversed the District Court's
narrowing of the requested class.

The Sheet Metal Workers plaintiffs have amended their complaint to
assert a claim under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”) premised on an alleged conspiracy
between the Company and other pharmacy benefits managers ("PBMs").


The Company is defending itself against these claims.

CVS Health Corporation, incorporated on August 22, 1996, together
with its subsidiaries, is an integrated pharmacy healthcare
company. The Company provides pharmacy care for the senior
community through Omnicare, Inc. (Omnicare) and Omnicare's
long-term care (LTC) operations, which include distribution of
pharmaceuticals, related pharmacy consulting and other ancillary
services to chronic care facilities and other care settings. It
operates through three segments: Pharmacy Services, Retail/LTC and
Corporate. The company is based in Woonsocket, Rhode Island.


DARTMOUTH COLLEGE: Settles Sexual Misconduct Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
LaMont Jones, writing for Diverse, reports that Dartmouth College
has settled with nine former and current female students and
researchers who filed a class-action lawsuit accusing college
administrators of ignoring sexual misconduct by three professors in
the Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, according to
the Valley News.

The settlement, which the college announced on Aug. 6 in a
community-wide email, includes $14 million for the class of
plaintiffs, which is defined as all students who meet certain
criteria and who certify that they endured a hostile environment
created by the conduct of the three former professors.

The agreement needs federal court approval and includes specific
Dartmouth-funded efforts under the Campus Climate and Culture
Initiative. The efforts aim to identify and rectify current
problems and prevent future issues.

Seven plaintiffs filed the lawsuit last November and two more
plaintiffs joined the suit this spring. The college and the
plaintiffs entered mediation in late July.

Two of the professors, Dr. Paul Whalen and Dr. Bill Kelley,
resigned last summer, and the third, Dr. Todd Heatherton, retired
after internal Dartmouth reviews recommended that all three be
terminated.

In October 2017, the New Hampshire Attorney General's office began
a criminal investigation into the allegations of sexual misconduct
by the three men. [GN]


DELTA AIR: Anecdotal Accounts Can't Support Class Claim
-------------------------------------------------------
Atticus Lee, Esq. -- atticus.Lee@jacksonlewis.com. -- of Jackson
Lewis P.C., in an article for The National Law Review, reports that
a federal judge in Kentucky recently ruled that anecdotal accounts
alone cannot support a class claim of discrimination without
"substantial statistical evidence of company-wide discrimination."
Freeman v. Delta Air Lines, No. 2:15-cv-160 (WOB-CJS) (E.D. Ky.
June 14, 2019).

Federal District Judge William O. Bertelsman denied class
certification to a putative class of six African-American part-time
baggage handlers for Delta Airlines at the Cincinnati-Northern
Kentucky International Airport ("CVG"). The plaintiffs alleged
hostile work environment on the basis of racial harassment, race
discrimination based on disparate impact and disparate treatment,
and retaliation for complaining about discrimination and filing
EEOC charges. They sought front and back pay, punitive damages, a
declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction for roughly 36
part-time African-American "Ready-Reserve" baggage handlers, ground
equipment maintenance workers, and ramp employees employed by Delta
Airlines in Hebron, Kentucky.

The Court denied class certification because, among other things,
the plaintiffs failed to provide adequate statistical evidence from
the putative class over the class period to support their
across-the-board theory of discrimination. "Plaintiffs have not
directed the Court to a case where an employment discrimination
class action was certified based solely on anecdotal evidence."

The Court found that plaintiffs failed to establish several of the
requirements for class certification, including class
representative standing; commonality; typicality; and
adequacy-of-representation.  Further, the Court stated it was not
convinced that certification would be appropriate under either Rule
23(b)(2) or (b)(3). The Court held that Rule 23(b)(2) did not apply
to these claims because each individual class member would be
entitled to a different injunction or declaratory judgment against
Delta. The Court also found plaintiffs failed to satisfy Rule
23(b)(3) as they did not show through reliable statistical evidence
that they could produce a common answer to the crucial question of
why each plaintiff was individually disfavored and because their
allegations involved various managers who exercised discretion over
six years. The Court was not impressed with plaintiffs' statistics
expert who only examined data for two of the six years requested by
plaintiffs in the class period resulting in a meager sample size
(14 and 11 disciplinary corrective actions in 2013 and 2014,
respectively).

Ultimately, the Court found that mini-trials would be inevitable
even if plaintiffs had presented probative statistical evidence to
make a prima facie case of discrimination applicable to every class
member. It also found that individual damages calculations would
inevitably overwhelm questions common to the class, because the
plaintiffs would not be able to prove damages on a class-wide
basis. Therefore, the Court denied plaintiffs' motion to certify
the case as a class action. [GN]


ELECTRONIC RECYCLERS: Removes Gilman FCRA Suit to E.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Electronic Recyclers International Inc. removed on August 14, 2019,
the lawsuit entitled AMY GILMAN, on behalf of herself, all others
similarly situated v. ELECTRONIC RECYCLERS INTERNATIONAL, INC., a
Delaware Corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No.
19C0249, from the Superior Court of the State of California for the
County of Kings to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of California.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-at-00580 to the
proceeding.

In this action, the Plaintiff has asserted a cause of action
against ERI for a purported violation of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shaun Setareh, Esq.
          William M. Pao, Esq.
          Alexandra R. McIntosh, Esq.
          SETAREH LAW GROUP
          315 South Beverly Drive, Suite 315
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Telephone: (310) 888-7771
          Facsimile: (310) 888-0109
          E-mail: shaun@setarehlaw.com
                  william@setarehlaw.com
                  alex@setarehlaw.com

Defendant ELECTRONIC RECYCLERS INTERNATIONAL INC. is represented
by:

          Mark D. Kruthers, Esq.
          William H. Littlewood, Esq.
          G. Andrew Slater, Esq.
          DOWLING AARON INCORPORATED
          8080 North Palm Avenue, Third Floor
          P.O. Box 28902
          Fresno, CA 93729-8902
          Telephone: (559) 432-4500
          Facsimile: (559) 432-4590
          E-mail: mkruthers@dowlingaaron.com
                  wlittlewood@dowlingaaron.com
                  aslater@dowlingaaron.com


ELTMAN ELTMAN: Moukengeshcaie Moves for Prelim. OK of Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit titled JOVANA MOUKENGESHCAIE, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. ELTMAN,
ELTMAN & COOPER, P.C., LVNV FUNDING, LLC, and RESURGENT CAPITAL
SERVICES, L.P., Case No. 14-CV-7539-MKB-CLP (E.D.N.Y.), with the
consent of the Settling Defendants, move the Court for an order:

   -- certifying a Class for the sole purpose of settlement with
      the Settling Defendants;

   -- preliminarily approving the proposed class action
      settlement; and

   -- appointing the Plaintiff's attorneys as class counsel.

The Settling Defendants are LVNV Funding, LLC and Resurgent Capital
Services, L.P.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan R. Miller, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF JONATHAN R. MILLER, PLLC,
          D/B/A SALEM COMMUNITY LAW OFFICE
          717 S. Marshall St., Suite 105F
          Winston-Salem, NC 27101
          Telephone: (336) 837-4437
          Facsimile: (336) 837-4436
          E-mail: jmiller@salemcommunitylaw.com

               - and -

          Brian L. Bromberg, Esq.
          BROMBERG LAW OFFICE, P.C.
          26 Broadway, 27th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 248-7906
          Facsimile: (212) 248-7908
          E-mail: brian@bromberglawoffice.com


ENTEGRA FINANCIAL: Parshall and Karp Class Suits Dismissed
----------------------------------------------------------
Entegra Financial Corp. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the class action suits
entitled, Karp v. Edwards et al. and Parshall v. Entegra Financial
Corp. et al., have been dismissed.

On April 23, 2019, Entegra's Board of Directors caused the Company
to enter into an agreement and plan of merger with First Citizens
BancShares, Inc. ("BancShares"). Pursuant to the terms of the
Merger Agreement, shareholders of Entegra will receive $30.18 in
cash for each share of Entegra they own.

Two lawsuits challenging the proposed merger with BancShares were
filed on June 20, 2019. The lawsuits are captioned Karp v. Edwards
et al, No. 1:19-cv-05798, filed in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, and Parshall v. Entegra
Financial Corp. et al., No. 1:19-cv-01152, filed in the United
States District Court for the District of Delaware.

Both lawsuits name as defendants Entegra, its directors,
BancShares, First Citizens Bank and Merger Sub and seek, among
other relief, an order enjoining completion of the proposed
merger.

The Karp lawsuit is an individual action alleging that all
defendants violated Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act") by failing to disclose
certain facts about certain financial projections of Entegra and
financial analysis performed by Entegra's financial advisor. The
complaint further alleges that Entegra's directors violated Section
20(a) of the Exchange Act by acting as control persons.

The Parshall lawsuit is a putative class action filed on behalf of
the shareholders of Entegra. The complaint alleges that Entegra and
its directors violated Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act by failing
to disclose certain facts about certain financial projections of
Entegra, financial analysis performed by Entegra's financial
advisor, and fees received and prior services performed by
Entegra’s financial advisor.

The complaint further alleges that Entegra's directors, BancShares,
First Citizens Bank and Merger Sub violated Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act by acting as control persons.

On July 25, 2019, Entegra filed with the SEC a Form 8-K and
supplemental proxy materials providing information that mooted the
Karp and Parshall plaintiffs' claims. Entegra did so without
agreeing with plaintiffs that any such disclosure was material (and
specifically denying such materiality).  

Counsel to the Karp and Parshall plaintiffs have dismissed such
actions and agreed not to seek injunctive relief against the
proposed merger with BancShares. Entegra understands that such
counsel may seek attorneys' fees and expenses from it to compensate
such counsel for the benefits allegedly provided to Entegra’s
shareholders.

Entegra denies that any such benefit was so provided. Entegra
cannot predict what amount plaintiffs' counsel will seek and/or
whether any court will award any fees in connection with either
lawsuit.

Entegra Financial Corp., incorporated on May 31, 2011, is the
holding company for Entegra Bank. The Company provides a range of
financial services through full-service offices located in
Cherokee, Henderson, Jackson, Macon, Polk and Transylvania
counties, North Carolina and Anderson, Greenville, and Spartanburg
counties, South Carolina. It provides full service retail and
commercial banking products, as well as wealth management services
through a third party. It operates through retail banking segment.
The company is based in Franklin, North Carolina.


EQUIFAX INC: Faces Carpenter Suit in Minn. State Court
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Equifax Inc. The case
is captioned as Dustin Carpenter and Jasmine Dennis, the
Plaintiffs, v. Equifax Inc. and Equifax Information Services, LLC,
the Defendants, Case No.27-CV-19-13673 (Minn. 4th Jud'l Dist., Aug
9, 2019).

Equifax Inc. is a consumer credit reporting agency. Equifax
collects and aggregates information on over 800 million individual
consumers and more than 88 million businesses worldwide.[BN]

EVENTBRITE INC: Rosen Law, Glancy Prongay Named Co-Lead Counsel
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Gomes v. Eventbrite, Inc. et al., Case No.
5:19-cv-02019 (N.D. Calif., April 15, 2019), Judge Edward J. Davila
appointed the Eventbrite Investor Group as Lead Plaintiff of the
Class, saying the Investor Group has the largest financial interest
in this litigation and otherwise satisfies the requirements of Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23.

The Eventbrite Investor Group's choice of counsel is approved, and
accordingly, The Rosen Law Firm, P.A., and Glancy Prongay & Murray
LLP are appointed as Co-Lead Counsel.

The Gomes Securities Class Action is consolidated for all purposes
with the lawsuit initiated by Charles Robinson.  The consolidated
action is captioned as, In re Eventbrite, Inc. Securities
Litigation, Master File No. 5:19-cv-02019-EJD.

Eventbrite, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that on April 15, 2019, a
purported stockholder of the company filed a putative class action
complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California, entitled Gomes v. Eventbrite, Inc., et al.,
5:19-cv-02019-EJD (the Gomes Complaint) against Eventbrite, Inc.,
certain of its officers (the Officer Defendants), certain current
and former members of the company's board of directors (the
Director Defendants), and the underwriters for the company's
initial public offering (IPO).

Among other things, the Gomes Complaint alleges that defendants
misrepresented and/or omitted material information in the company's
IPO registration statement in violation of the Securities Act. The
Gomes Complaint also alleges that Eventbrite, Inc. and the Officer
Defendants misrepresented and/or omitted material information in
the company's earnings release and Form 10-Q for the third quarter
of 2018, rendering statements therein allegedly false and
misleading and in violation of the Exchange Act and related
regulations.

In addition, the Gomes Complaint alleges that the Officer
Defendants and Director Defendants acted as controlling persons
within the meaning and in violation of Section 15 of the Securities
Act, and that the Officer Defendants acted as controlling persons
within the meaning and in violation of Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act, to allegedly influence and control the dissemination
of the IPO registration statement and subsequent statements,
respectively.

The Gomes Complaint seeks compensatory damages, costs and expenses,
including attorneys' and expert fees, and such other relief as the
court may deem just and proper.

On June 14, 2019, three purported stockholders of the company filed
a motion to be appointed as lead plaintiff. On June 17, 2019
another purported stockholder of the company filed a competing
motion for appointment as lead plaintiff, but subsequently withdrew
the motion.

Eventbrite said, "Accordingly, there is one motion for lead
plaintiff currently pending before the court. Following appointment
of lead plaintiff, we expect that the lead plaintiff will file a
consolidated amended complaint."

Eventbrite, Inc., incorporated on October 20, 2009, provides a
global platform for live experiences. The Company’s platform
allows anyone to create, share, find and attend events. It enable
events ranging from fundraisers, seminars, wellness activities and
music festivals to classes and cultural celebrations all over the
world. The company is based in San Francisco, California.


EVENTBRITE INC: Securities Class Action Pending in Calif.
---------------------------------------------------------
Eventbrite, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend a consolidated class action suit in California.

On May 24, 2019, a purported stockholder of our company filed a
putative class action complaint in the Superior Court of California
for the County of San Mateo, entitled Long v. Eventbrite, Inc., et
al., 19-CIV-02798 (the Long Complaint), against Eventbrite, Inc.,
the Officer Defendants, the Director Defendants, Sequoia Capital,
and the underwriters for the company's initial public offering
(IPO).

Among other things, the Long Complaint alleges that defendants
misrepresented and/or omitted material information in the company's
IPO registration statement in violation of the Securities Act.

On June 3, 2019, another purported stockholder of the company filed
a substantially similar putative class action complaint in the
Superior Court of California for the County of San Mateo, entitled
Clemons v. Eventbrite, Inc., et al., 19-CIV-02911 (the Clemons
Complaint) against Eventbrite, Inc., the Officer Defendants, the
Director Defendants, Sequoia Capital, Tiger Global Management, and
the underwriters for the company's IPO.

On June 24, 2019, the court consolidated the Long and Clemons
actions, entitled In re Eventbrite, Inc. Securities Litigation,
Lead Case No, 19-CIV-02798.

The consolidated complaint is due on or before July 24, 2019. On
July 12, 2019, Eventbrite, the Officer Defendants, the Director
Defendants, and Sequoia filed a motion to stay the proceedings
pending resolution of the Gomes action. The hearing on this motion
is set for August 8, 2019.

Eventbrite, Inc., incorporated on October 20, 2009, provides a
global platform for live experiences. The Company’s platform
allows anyone to create, share, find and attend events. It enable
events ranging from fundraisers, seminars, wellness activities and
music festivals to classes and cultural celebrations all over the
world. The company is based in San Francisco, California.


EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Wins Summary Judgment to Toss Harrod FDUTPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. James S. Moody, Jr., issued an order in the lawsuit styled
CYNTHEA HARROD v. EXPRESS SCRIPTS, INC., Case No.
8:17-cv-01607-JSM-TGW (M.D. Fla.):

   1. granting the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment;

   2. denying as moot the Plaintiff's Motion to Certify Class;

   3. directing the Clerk of Court to enter Final Judgment in
      favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiff; and

   4. directing the Clerk of Court to close this case and
      terminate any pending motions as moot.

A $75 processing fee to obtain certain records forms the basis for
this lawsuit.  Ms. Harrod claims this fee violates the Florida
Deceptive Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA").  She also alleges
related breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims.[CC]


FGL HOLDINGS: Brokerage Insurance Partners Suit Ongoing
-------------------------------------------------------
FGL Holdings said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to defend a
putative class action suit initiated by Brokerage Insurance
Partners.

On June 30, 2017, a putative class action complaint was filed
against FGL Insurance, FGL, and FS Holdco II Ltd in the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland, captioned
Brokerage Insurance Partners v. Fidelity & Guaranty Life Insurance
Company, Fidelity & Guaranty Life, FS Holdco II Ltd, and John Doe,
No. 17-cv-1815.

The complaint alleges that FGL Insurance breached the terms of its
agency agreement with Brokerage Insurance Partners ("BIP") and
other agents by changing certain compensation terms. The complaint
asserts, among other causes of action, breach of contract,
defamation, tortious interference with contract, negligent
misrepresentation, and violation of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").  

The complaint seeks to certify a class composed of all persons who
entered into an agreement with FGL Insurance to sell life insurance
and who sold at least one life insurance policy between January 1,
2015 and January 1, 2017.  

The complaint seeks unspecified compensatory, consequential, and
punitive damages in an amount not presently determinable, among
other forms of relief.

On September 1, 2017, FGL Insurance filed a counterclaim against
BIP and John and Jane Does 1-10, asserting, among other causes of
action, breach of contract, fraud, civil conspiracy and violations
of RICO.

On September 22, 2017, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, and on
October 16, 2017, FGL Insurance filed an Amended Counterclaim
against BIP, Agent Does 1-10, and Other Person Does 1-10. The
parties also filed cross-Motions to Dismiss in Part.

On August 17, 2018, the Court in the BIP Litigation denied all
pending Motions to Dismiss filed by all parties without prejudice,
pending a decision as to whether the BIP Litigation will be
consolidated into related litigation, captioned Fidelity & Guaranty
Life Insurance Company v. Network Partners, et al., Case No.
17-cv-1508.

On August 31, 2018, FGL Insurance filed its Answer to BIP's Amended
Complaint. Also on that date, FGL Insurance filed its Answer to
Amended Complaint, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim, Filed
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A).

As of June 30, 2019, BIP has not filed any paper or pleading in
response to the Court’s August 17, 2018 Order or to FGL
Insurance’s filing.

FGL Holdings sells individual life insurance products and annuities
in the United States. The company offers deferred annuities,
including fixed indexed annuity contracts and fixed rate annuity
contracts; immediate annuities; and life insurance products. FGL
Holdings is headquartered in Des Moines, Iowa.


FIFTH THIRD: Court OKs Conditional Certification in Seldomridge
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio,
Western Division, issued a Memorandum and Order granting
Plaintiff's motion for conditional certification in the case
captioned JENNIFER SELDOMRIDGE, on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. FIFTH THIRD BANK, Defendant. Case
No. 1:18-cv-553. (S.D. Ohio).

This civil action is before the Court on Plaintiff's motion for
conditional certification.
Plaintiff claims she regularly worked forty or more hours per
workweek, not including pre-shift work. Plaintiff alleges that she
was not paid for all hours worked because Defendant did not permit
her or her co-workers clock in prior to the start of their shifts
even though they were performing compensable work during the
pre-shift time.

Accordingly, Plaintiff requests conditional certification of the
following class:

     All former and current Service to Solutions employees, and
those working in other call center positions, employed by Defendant
at any time in the period measured from three years prior to the
filing of this Complaint to the present.

Standard of Review

The FLSA authorizes employees to bring collective actions against
employers to recover damages for unpaid wages provided two
conditions are met: (1) the employees are similarly situated and
(2) all plaintiffs provide written consent to become a party and
such consent is filed with the court.  

The first step, commonly referred to as conditional certification,
takes place prior to the completion of discovery and requires the
plaintiff to make an initial showing that the employees in the
proposed class are similarly situated. At this first stage,
conditional certification may be given along with judicial
authorization to notify similarly situated employees of the action,
which allows plaintiffs to opt-in to the lawsuit.  

At the conditional certification stage, a plaintiff must only make
a modest factual showing' that the plaintiff is similarly situated
to the other employees he is seeking to notify. The standard
employed during this initial stage of the litigation is fairly
lenient and typically results in conditional certification' of a
representative class.

The second step of an FLSA collective action follows discovery and
receipt of all opt-in forms from putative plaintiffs. At this
stage, the Court will examine the factual basis of Plaintiffs'
proposed class more closely and will apply a stricter standard in
evaluating whether Plaintiffs are similarly situated. If the Court
determines at this second phase that the Plaintiffs are not
similarly situated, it will de-certify the class, dismiss the
opt-in plaintiffs without prejudice, and proceed with the lawsuit
on the named plaintiffs' individual claims.  

Defendant opposes certification. Notably, Defendant argues that the
declarations are vague and conclusory. Defendant further contends
that conditional certification should be denied because the
evidence shows that she could (and frequently did) clock in and
start getting paid within minutes of arriving to the building.  

However, Courts have found that evidence similar to that submitted
by Plaintiff has been sufficient at this stage in the litigation to
warrant conditional certification of a class of call center service
representatives for failure to pay overtime for time spent on
activities like those alleged in the instant action.  

Here, although modest, the evidence submitted by Plaintiff is
sufficient to show that Defendant had a policy of requiring call
center employees to be ready to take their first call promptly at
the start of their shifts, which required 10 minutes or more of
conducting pre-shift preparatory work booting up, logging in, etc.

Defendant submitted several declarations from other Service to
Solutions employees to demonstrate that they do not perform the
unpaid pre-shift work alleged by Seldomridge. Specifically,
numerous other Service to Solutions employees confirm that it takes
virtually no time to log into their computers and clock in at the
start of each shift.  

To the extent that Seldomridge, Buttrey, and Larkin routinely
performed unpaid pre-shift work, Defendant contends that their
actions were contrary to Fifth Third's written policies. More
importantly, their actions were markedly different from those of
the other Service to Solutions employees whom Seldomridge seeks to
represent, who consistently deny that Fifth Third instructed or
required unpaid pre-shift work.

Under these circumstances, Defendant argues Seldomridge has not and
cannot show that she is similarly situated to the other Service to
Solutions employees for which she seeks conditional certification.

Plaintiff, however, contends that happy camper declarations such as
those submitted by the Defendant, are uniformly rejected as
improperly submitted at the notice stage of conditional
certification. Plaintiffs have not had the opportunity to depose
the employees who submitted affidavits on Defendant's behalf. And,
a balancing of Plaintiff's and Defendant's competing affidavits
would require credibility and factual determinations and is thus
improper at this time.

Here, Plaintiffs submitted three declarations to support the
allegations in the Amended Complaint and thus have (barely) met the
lenient standard for conditional certification. Ultimately,
Defendant's arguments against certification may prove fruitful. But
at this stage of the litigation, it does not matter if the
employees held different job titles. Nor should the Court consider
the declarations submitted by Defendant, as doing so at this stage
of the litigation would constitute a premature examination of the
merits of the FLSA claims.

In light of this, Plaintiff's motion to conditionally certify class
is granted.

It is further ordered that the parties should meet and confer to
develop a mutually agreeable class definition.  The Plaintiff
proposes the following class definition:

     All former and current Service to Solutions employees, and
those working in other call center positions, employed by Defendant
at any time in the period measured from three years prior to the
filing of this Complaint to the present.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 15, 2019 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yyuq4rfu from
Leagle.com.

Jennifer Seldomridge, Plaintiff, represented by Hans A. Nilges,
Nilges Draher LLC, Shannon Marie Draher, Nilges Draher LLC, 7266
Portage St., N.W., Suite D., Massillon, OH, 44646 & Matthew James
Porter Coffman, Coffman Legal, LLC,1550 Old Henderson Road, Suite
126, Columbus, OH, 43220

Fifth Third Bank, Defendant, represented by David Kirsten
Montgomery -- David.Montgomery@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis
LLP & Jamie Marie Goetz-Anderson --
Jamie.Goetz-Anderson@jacksonlewis.com --  Jackson Lewis LLP.


FIRST HORIZON: Still Defends GSE Bonds Antitrust Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
First Horizon National Corporation ("FHN") said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August
7, 2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the
company continues to defend a consolidated class action suit
entitled, In re GSE Bonds Antitrust Litigation, No.
1:19-cv-01704-JSR.

FHN is one of multiple defendants in a consolidated putative class
action suit: In re GSE Bonds Antitrust Litigation, No.
1:19-cv-01704-JSR (U.S. District Court S.D.N.Y.). The plaintiffs
claim that defendants conspired to fix secondary market prices of
government-sponsored enterprise ("GSE") bonds from 2009 through
2015.

Plaintiffs seek unspecified antitrust damages, which (if proved as
claimed) would be trebled and applied jointly and severally among
those defendants found liable. In addition, FHN has received a
civil investigative demand from the Florida attorney general's
anti-trust office for information relating to GSE bonds from 2008
to the present.

The attorney general's demand is not an assertion of liability or a
demand for payment against FHN. FHN is unable to determine that
material loss is probable, and unable to estimate an RPL range, for
FHN's potential exposure related to its GSE bond activities. Those
inabilities are due to significant uncertainties regarding:
plaintiffs' theory of the case; the evidence that will emerge in
discovery; the absence of specific dollar amounts claimed in the
pending suit; the potential damages that might be awarded; the
absence of a governmental claim against FHN; and the availability
of substantial defenses to plaintiffs' claims.

In the second quarter of 2019, FHN settled a suit claiming material
deficiencies in the offering documents under which certificates
relating to First Horizon branded proprietary securitizations were
sold under FHN's former (pre-2009) mortgage business: Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") as receiver for Colonial
Bank, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York (Case No. 12 Civ. 6166 (LLS)(MHD)).

The plaintiff in that suit claimed to have purchased (and later
sold) certificates totaling $83.4 million, relating to a number of
separate securitizations.

At June 30, 2019 the settlement for this matter had not been paid.
A substantial majority of the aggregate liabilities for loss
contingency matters mentioned above relates to this matter; payment
in the third quarter will reduce those liabilities significantly.

First Horizon National Corporation ("FHN") began as a community
bank chartered in 1864 and as of June 30, 2017, was one of the 40
largest publicly traded banking organizations in the United States
in terms of asset size. The company is based in Memphis,
Tennessee.


FRANKLIN COUNTY, MA: Reid Appeals D. Mass. Ruling to 1st Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Leo Felix Charles, Mark Anthony Reid and Robert Williams
filed an appeal from a Court ruling in their lawsuit styled Reid,
et al. v. Donelan, et al., Case No. 3:13-cv-30125-PBS, in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Springfield.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, District Judge
Patti B. Saris (i) allowed the Plaintiffs' motions to amend the
complaint and modify the class definition, and (ii) denied the
Government's motion to decertify the class.

In the class action, the Plaintiffs challenge the mandatory
detention of certain criminal aliens for more than six months
without the opportunity for a bond hearing during removal
proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1226(c) under the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment Excessive
Bail Clause.

The appellate case is captioned as Reid, et al. v. Donelan, et al.,
Case No. 19-1787, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that Docketing
Statement, Transcript Report/Order form, and Appearance form are
due on August 27, 2019.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Petitioners-Appellants ROBERT WILLIAMS, on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated; LEO FELIX CHARLES, on behalf
of himself and others similarly situated; and MARK ANTHONY REID are
represented by:

          Muneer I. Ahmad, Esq.
          Harpeet Ahuja, Esq.
          Zachary-John Manfredi, Esq.
          Aseem Mehta, Esq.
          My Khanh Ngo, Esq.
          Javier Heres, Esq.
          Clare Kane, Esq.
          Amber Qureshi, Esq.
          Pamela Rioles, Esq.
          YALE LAW SCHOOL
          PO Box 209090
          New Haven, CT 06511
          Telephone: (203) 432-4800
          E-mail: muneer.ahmad@yale.edu
                  zachary.manfredi@gmail.com
                  aseem.mehta@aya.yale.edu
                  mk.ngo@yale.edu
                  javier.luque@yale.edu

               - and -

          Lunar Mai, Esq.
          Marisol Orihuela, Esq.
          Michael J. Wishnie, Esq.
          YALE LAW SCHOOL
          127 Wall St.
          New Haven, CT 06511
          Telephone: (203) 432-4992
          E-mail: marisol.orihuela@yale.edu
                  michael.wishnie@yale.edu

               - and -

          Ahilan Arulanantham, Esq.
          AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
          1313 West 8th St.
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 977-5211
          E-mail: aarulanantham@aclu-sc.org

               - and -

          Lauren J. Carasik, Esq.
          WESTERN NEW ENGLAND UNIVERSITY
          1215 Wilbraham Rd.
          Springfield, MA 01119-2684
          Telephone: (413) 782-1504
          E-mail: Carasik@law.wne.edu

               - and -

          Michelle Nyein, Esq.
          Anant Kumar Saraswat, Esq.
          WOLF GREENFIELD & SACKS PC
          600 Atlantic Ave
          Boston, MA 02210-0000
          Telephone: (617) 646-8000
          E-mail: Michelle.Nyein@WolfGreenfield.com
                  Anant.Saraswat@WolfGreenfield.com

               - and -

          Matthew R. Segal, Esq.
          AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MASSACHUSETTS
          211 Congress St., 3rd Floor
          Boston, MA 02110-2485
          Telephone: (617) 482-3170

               - and -

          Michael King Thomas Tan, Esq.
          AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION
          125 Broad St., 18th Floor
          New York, NY 10004-0000
          Telephone: (212) 519-7848
          E-mail: mtan@aclu.org

Respondents-Appellees CHRISTOPHER J. DONELAN, Sheriff, Franklin
County, Massachusetts, et al., are represented by:

          Janette L. Allen, Esq.
          Yamileth G. Davila, Esq.
          Lauren E. Fascett, Esq.
          Colin A. Kisor, Esq.
          Huy Le, Esq.
          Elianis N. Perez, Esq.
          Catherine M. Reno, Esq.
          J. Max Weintraub, Esq.
          U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
          PO Box 878
          Ben Franklin Station
          Washington, DC 20044-0878
          Telephone: (202) 532-4095
          E-mail: janette.allen@usdoj.gov
                  yamileth.g.davila@usdoj.gov
                  Lauren.Fascett@usdoj.gov
                  colin.kisor@usdoj.gov
                  elianis.perez@usdoj.gov
                  catherine.m.reno@usdoj.gov
                  jacob.weintraub@usdoj.gov

               - and -

          Karen L. Goodwin, Esq.
          U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
          300 State St., Suite 230
          Springfield, MA 01105-2926
          Telephone: (413) 785-0269
          E-mail: karen.goodwin@usdoj.gov

               - and -

          Cynthia A. Young, Esq.
          U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
          1 Courthouse Way, Suite 9200
          Boston, MA 02210
          Telephone: (617) 748-3100


FREEEATS.COM INC: 8th Cir. Affirms Judgment in Golan Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Ron Golan; Dorit Golan, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Appellants, v. FreeEats.com, Inc.,
doing business as ccAdvertising; AIC Communications, LLC, doing
business as ccAdvertising; James R. Leininger,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 17-3156 (8th Cir.), Judge Leonard
Steven Grasz of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the Defendants.

Dr. James R. Leininger, through his business that invests in
family-friendly entertainment, helped finance Last Ounce of
Courage, a film with religious and political themes.  The firm
responsible for marketing the film hired ccAdvertising to conduct a
telephone marketing campaign.  In conducting the campaign,
ccAdvertising made around 3.2 million phone calls in the course of
a week.  The named Plaintiffs in the class action ("Appellants"),
who received two answering machine messages, sued numerous parties
involved with the film and marketing campaign for violating the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").

In October 2012, the Golans filed a class action in Missouri state
court.  As later amended, the complaint asserted a cause of action
under the TCPA and named numerous parties involved with the film
and its marketing as the Defendants, including ccAdvertising,
Joseph, and Dr. Leininger.

In May 2014, the district court dismissed the case, concluding that
the Golans lacked standing because the messages they received did
not violate the TCPA.  A panel of the Court reversed, concluding
that even the brief messages qualified as "telemarketing" in
violation of the TCPA because their underlying purpose was to
promote a product or service.

The case eventually proceeded to trial in August 2017.  The Golans'
pre-trial proposed jury instructions did not seek to hold Dr.
Leininger directly liable but sought liability under an agency
theory.  Similarly, in the Golans' pre-trial brief, they stated
that they had enough evidence to hold ccAdvertising and Joseph
directly liable and that the liability of the remaining Defendants
rests on principalsof agency and ratification.   But midway through
trial, the Appellees accused the Golans of shifting their theory of
liability to also pursue a direct liability theory against Dr.
Leininger.

At the close of evidence, the district court granted the Golans'
motion for judgment as a matter of law against ccAdvertising.

The next day, the district court held a jury instruction conference
to discuss the court's proposed jury instructions, which it
explained would not necessarily be the final instruction package.
They included instructions regarding Dr. Leininger under both
direct and agency liability theories.  The court's proposed direct
liability instruction required the Golans to prove both that
ccAdvertising was acting as the agent of Courage 2012 and that Dr.
Leininger, as an officer of Courage 2012, had direct, personal
participation in or personally authorized the conduct of
ccAdvertising found to have violated the TCPA.

At the beginning of the conference, the Golans moved to voluntarily
dismiss their claims against Courage 2012 and two other defendants.
The Golans also abandoned the direct liability theory against Dr.
Leininger, instead "only submitting an agency theory, with Dr.
Leininger as the principal, ccAdvertising as the agent.  The
district court granted the motion to voluntarily dismiss certain
defendants.  The district court also agreed to put the Golans'
proposed instruction on direct liability in the record.

After the Golans declined to submit a direct liability theory
against Dr. Leininger, the only theory presented to the jury was
the agency theory.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr.
Leininger and the other Defendants.  The district court entered
judgment against ccAdvertising based on its prior grant of the
Golans' motion for judgment as a matter of law.  It entered
judgment in favor of the remaining Defendants.

ccAdvertising filed a post-trial motion for reduction of damages,
arguing the statutory damages of $500 per call for 3,242,493 calls
-- totaling $1,621,246,500 -- was so excessive it violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  The district court
concluded that the $1.6 billion award was "obviously unreasonable
and wholly disproportionate to the offense" and reduced the damages
to $10 per call for a total of $32,424,930.

The Golans appealed the judgment, specifically challenging the
district court's refusal to give their requested jury instruction
on direct liability and its reduction of damages.

At issue in the appeal is whether the Appellants have standing
based on the receipt of the two messages, whether the district
court abused its discretion by refusing to give one of the
Appellants' requested jury instructions on Dr. Leininger's personal
liability, and whether the district court erred by finding the
statutory damages against ccAdvertising to be unconstitutional and
reducing them from $500 per call ($1.6 billion total) to $10 per
call ($32 million total).

Judge Grasz finds that the harm was the receipt of two
telemarketing messages without prior consent.  These harms bear a
close relationship to the types of harms traditionally remedied by
tort law, particularly the law of nuisance.  It is not dispositive
whether unsolicited telephone calls are actually actionable under
any common law tort because Congress may elevate to the status of
legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were
previously inadequate in law.  Nor does it matter that the harm
suffered here was minimal; in the standing analysis, the Judge
considers the nature or type of the harm, not its extent.  He thus
concludes the Golans suffered a concrete injury and have standing.

Next, the Judge finds that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by refusing to give the Golans' requested instruction.
The Golans' instruction did not accurately state the law because it
would allow direct liability even where the Defendant did not
initiate the calls.  Further, the evidence did not warrant
instructing the jury regarding Dr. Leininger on a correctly
understood direct liability theory.

Finally, the Judge is unpersuaded by the Golans' attempt to
distinguish Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset on the basis
that there was only one plaintiff there, whereas there are multiple
Plaintiffs in the class in the present case.  The aggregate award
is still relevant.  The district court did not err in concluding
the statutory damages would violate the Due Process Clause and
reducing the award.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Grasz affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 16, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/fl1sXq from Leagle.com.

Robert Schultz -- bob@morgdevo.com -- for Appellant.

John G. Simon -- jsimon@simonlawpc.com -- for Appellant.

John W. Moticka -- john.moticka@stinson.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Ronald J. Eisenberg, for Appellant.

Patrick Thomas McLaughlin -- pmclaughlin@spencerfane.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Teresa Michelle Young -- tyoung@bjpc.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Jaclyn Niccole Warr -- nicci.warr@stinson.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Fredrick J. Ludwig, for Defendant.

Kevin M. Carnie, Jr. -- kcarnie@simonlawpc.com -- for Appellant.


FRONT YARD: Nov. 8 Deadline to Complete Fact Discovery in Martin
----------------------------------------------------------------
Front Yard Residential Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7,
2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the
deadline for the completion of fact discovery in Martin v.
Altisource Residential Corporation et al., is scheduled for
November 8, 2019.

On March 27, 2015, a putative shareholder class action complaint
was filed in the United States District Court of the Virgin Islands
by a purported shareholder of the Company under the caption Martin
v. Altisource Residential Corporation, et al., 15-cv-00024.

The action names as Defendants the Company, its former Chairman,
William C. Erbey, and certain officers and a former officer of the
Company and alleges that the Defendants violated federal securities
laws by, among other things, making materially false statements
and/or failing to disclose material information to the Company's
shareholders regarding the Company's relationship and transactions
with Altisource Asset Management Corporation (AAMC), Ocwen
Financial Corporation ("Ocwen") and Home Loan Servicing Solutions,
Ltd.

These alleged misstatements and omissions include allegations that
the Defendants failed to adequately disclose the Company's reliance
on Ocwen and the risks relating to its relationship with Ocwen,
including that Ocwen was not properly servicing and selling loans,
that Ocwen was under investigation by regulators for violating
state and federal laws regarding servicing of loans and Ocwen's
lack of proper internal controls.

The complaint also contains allegations that certain of the
Company's disclosure documents were false and misleading because
they failed to disclose fully the entire details of a certain asset
management agreement between the Company and AAMC that allegedly
benefited AAMC to the detriment of the Company's shareholders.

The action seeks, among other things, an award of monetary damages
to the putative class in an unspecified amount and an award of
attorney's and other fees and expenses.

In May 2015, two of the company's purported shareholders filed
competing motions with the court to be appointed Lead Plaintiff and
for selection of lead counsel in the action. Subsequently,
opposition and reply briefs were filed by the purported
shareholders with respect to these motions. On October 7, 2015, the
court entered an order granting the motion of Lei Shi to be Lead
Plaintiff and denying the other motion to be Lead Plaintiff.

On January 23, 2016, the Lead Plaintiff filed an amended
complaint.

On March 22, 2016, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss all claims
in the action. The Plaintiff filed opposition papers on May 20,
2016, and the Defendants filed a reply brief in support of the
motion to dismiss the amended complaint on July 11, 2016.

On November 14, 2016, the Martin case was reassigned to Judge Anne
E. Thompson of the United States District Court of New Jersey. In a
hearing on December 19, 2016, the parties made oral arguments on
the motion to dismiss, and on March 16, 2017 the Court issued an
order that the motion to dismiss had been denied.

On April 17, 2017, the Defendants filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Court's decision to deny the motion to
dismiss. On April 21, 2017, the Defendants filed their answer and
affirmative defenses.

Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants' motion for
reconsideration on May 8, 2017. On May 30, 2017, the Court issued
an order that the motion for reconsideration had been denied.
Shortly thereafter, discovery commenced.

On October 10, 2018, the Lead Plaintiff filed a second amended
complaint, which added a second Lead Plaintiff to the case. The
allegations and causes of action asserted by the Plaintiffs were
virtually identical to the prior complaint, except that they added
what the Plaintiffs claimed was additional detail in support of
their allegations.

On December 7, 2018, the Defendants moved to dismiss the second
amended complaint in its entirety. Plaintiffs filed their
opposition to the motion on December 31, 2018, and Defendants filed
their reply brief on January 24, 2019. On February 21, 2019, Judge
Thompson issued an order that granted Defendants’ motion and
dismissed the second amended complaint in its entirety.

On February 26, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiffs' request for
leave to file a Third Amended Complaint within 14 days. On March
12, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint, and on
April 12, 2019, Defendants moved to dismiss the Third Amended and
Restated Complaint in its entirety.

Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss on May
13, 2019, and Defendants filed their reply in support of the motion
on May 31, 2019. On June 12, 2019, Judge Thompson issued an Order
granting in part and denying in part Defendants' motion to dismiss
the Third Amended Complaint.

Specifically, Judge Thompson granted Defendants' motion to dismiss
any alleged misrepresentation made after each Plaintiff’s final
purchase of securities. Judge Thompson denied Defendants' motion to
dismiss on the remaining grounds.

On June 26, 2019, Defendants filed a motion to certify
interlocutory appeal to the Third Circuit of Judge Thompson's Order
granting in part and denying in part Defendants' motion to dismiss
the Third Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs filed their opposition to
the motion on July 10, 2019 and Defendants’ reply in support of
the motion was filed on July 24, 2019.

Separately, on July 5, 2019, Judge Thompson accepted the case
schedule proposed by the parties. Discovery is ongoing. The
deadline for the completion of fact discovery is November 8, 2019,
the deadline for the completion of expert discovery is January 30,
2020, and the deadline to submit dispositive motions is February
27, 2020.

We believe this complaint is without merit. At this time, we are
not able to predict the ultimate outcome of this matter, nor can we
estimate the range of possible loss, if any.

Front Yard Residential Corporation is an industry leader in
providing quality, affordable rental homes to America's families in
a variety of suburban communities that have easy accessibility to
metropolitan areas. The company is based in Christiansted, Virgin
Islands.


FRONTIER COMM: Leave to Amend Complaint in CT Class Suit Pending
----------------------------------------------------------------
said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on August 7, 2019, for the quarterly period ended June
30, 2019, that a motion for leave to amend along with a proposed
amended complaint has been filed in the consolidated class action
suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut.

On April 30, 2018, an amended consolidated class action complaint
was filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut on behalf of certain purported stockholders against
Frontier, certain of its current and former directors and officers
and the underwriters of certain Frontier securities offerings.

The complaint was brought on behalf of all persons who (1) acquired
Frontier common stock between February 6, 2015 and February 28,
2018, inclusive, and/or (2) acquired Frontier common stock or
Mandatory Convertible Preferred Stock either in or traceable to
Frontier's offerings of common and preferred stock conducted on or
about June 2, 2015 and June 8, 2015.

The complaint asserted, among other things, violations of Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the
"Exchange Act"), and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act and Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933,
as amended, in connection with certain disclosures relating to the
CTF Acquisition. The complaint sought, among other things, damages
and equitable and injunctive relief.

On March 8, 2019, the District Court granted in its entirety
Frontier's motion to dismiss the complaint. The District Court
dismissed with prejudice a number of claims and with respect to
certain other claims that were not dismissed with prejudice,
Plaintiffs were permitted to seek the court's permission to refile.


On May 10, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend along
with a proposed amended complaint that is narrower in scope than
the dismissed complaint.  

Frontier said, "We continue to dispute the allegations and intend
to vigorously defend against such claims. In addition, shareholders
have filed derivative complaints on behalf of the Company in
Connecticut, California, and Delaware courts. The derivative
complaints are based, generally, on the same facts asserted in the
consolidated class action complaint and allege against current and
former officers and directors of the Company (i) breach of
fiduciary duty claims for disseminating false and misleading
information to shareholders, failure to manage internal controls,
and failure to oversee and manage the company; (ii) unjust
enrichment and waste of corporate assets claims; and (iii)
violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act for the false and
misleading statements. We also dispute the allegations in the
derivative complaints described above and intend to vigorously
defend against such claims. Given that all of these matters are in
the early stages of litigation, we are unable to estimate a
reasonably possible range of loss, if any, that may result."

Frontier Communications Corporation provides communications
services to consumer, commercial, and wholesale customers in the
United States. It offers broadband, video, voice, and other
services and products through a combination of fiber and copper
based networks to consumer customers. The company was formerly
known as Citizens Communications Company and changed its name to
Frontier Communications Corporation in July 2008. Frontier
Communications Corporation was founded in 1927 and is based in
Norwalk, Connecticut.


FULTON, GA: Faces Class Action Over Property Appraisals
-------------------------------------------------------
Arielle Kass, writing for The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, reports
that a Fulton County homeowner has filed a lawsuit claiming the
county missed a crucial deadline to complete thousands of property
value appeals and now must accept lower assessed values for those
properties -- a mistake that could cost the county tens of millions
of dollars over several years.

More than 42,000 property owners, representing a combined $5.9
billion in real estate, appealed their appraisals last year when
the county assessor's office increased property values after years
of failing to update the tax rolls. State law allows 180 days to
complete appeals, with an additional six-month extension if more
than 3% of the tax digest is under appeal. In Fulton, 8% of the tax
digest was under appeal. But the law also says that property owners
must be notified of the extension within 150 days of their appeal
being filed. The filing deadline last year was July 6, 2018. The
suit, filed by Viktoriya Rachkova in Fulton Superior Court, claims
the property appraiser's office missed the deadline to notify home
owners of the extension by more than a month. That means thousands
of Fulton property owners should be granted the lower property
valuation cited in their appeals, the lawsuit says. More than 5,000
property owners could be affected by the suit. Many of those
property owners have already paid taxes based on the higher
assessment, and they would be due refunds if the lawsuit is
successful. A spokesperson for Fulton County declined to comment on
the lawsuit. Sam Brannen Jr., Rachkova's attorney, said the county
could owe between $10 million and $20 million in refunds for
property taxes that were improperly paid. And since property
assessments that have been successfully appealed doesn't see
increases for three years, the error would multiply and cost Fulton
even more in lost revenue, Brannen said.

The missed deadline would also affect cities, schools and other
taxing entities that could be required to refund tax money,
according to Brannen. Brannen said the county has approved lower
assessed property values when he has contacted officials about
specific cases. But he said Fulton continued to work on other
appeals after it was legal to do so. "It's a violation of equal
protection," he said. "The government is required to apply and
enforce the law equally for all citizens. They just brazenly
disregarded that requirement, when they knew the appeal was dead."
Brannen said he is seeking class action status on behalf of the
thousands of property owners whose appeals were started on time.
One such person is Richard Daley, an Atlanta resident who appealed
the value of his Buckhead townhouse June 3, 2018. Daley, a retiree
on a fixed income, said his value increased 59% in 2018, to
$267,800.Daley received a Jan. 2 letter saying the county needed
more time to consider his appeal, then was informed in a Feb. 5
letter that it had been denied. An April trip to the board of
equalization reduced the value slightly, but Daley still had to pay
an additional $1,445 in taxes for the home he has lived in since
1993. That's money he said could go toward paying to install grab
bars in the bathroom or widening his doors so he could stay in his
home a little bit longer. "It just drains my resources," Daley
said. If Rachkova's lawsuit is successful, it would mean that the
$173,100 value Daley placed on his home would stand, and he would
receive a refund for the additional taxes he paid." I have no
problem paying taxes," Daley said. "What I do have a problem with
is when there's malfeasance on the part of an agency." It's not the
only class action lawsuit the county is involved in regarding
property values. Another, which counts Atlanta City Council
President Felicia Moore among its plaintiffs, claims that county
appraisers matched more than 18,000 new home buyers' property
values to the prices they paid for their houses, while leaving
their neighbors' values alone. A former member of the board of
assessors estimated last year that suit could cost $36 million in
refunds. The county has filed a motion to dismiss that suit. Fulton
also faced a suit from the state Department of Revenue, which was
settled late last month. The state cried foul after Fulton county
commissioners used a law from the 1880s to freeze property values
in 2017 after residents complained about huge increases. As part of
the settlement, the county agreed not to use the law again, and the
state agreed not to force residents to pay more in taxes for that
year. [GN]


GLASCOTT: Kohlhoss Sues for Failure to Attach RLTO Summaries
------------------------------------------------------------
SUNNEY KOHLHOSS, Individually and on behalf all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. GLASCOTT AND ASSOCIATES, INC. and 2559 W
HADDON LLC, Defendants, Case No. 2019CH09316 (Circuit Ct., Cook
Cty., Ill., Aug. 13, 2019) is a class action against Defendants for
violating the City of Chicago Residential Landlord and Tenant
Ordinance ("RLTO").

Glascott is listed as the "Landlord(s) or Authorized Management
Agent" on Plaintiffs lease dated April 1, 2016 (hereinafter the
"2016 Lease") for the residential dwelling unit located at 2559 W.
Haddon, #1, Chicago, Illinois 60622 (the "Dwelling Unit").
Plaintiff's one page "Renewal of Apartment Lease," dated February
15, 2018 (hereinafter 2018 Renewal Lease) for the Dwelling Unit is
on a page with Glascott's letterhead. The Dwelling Unit is part of
an apartment complex (hereinafter "Premises") that includes eight
(8) dwelling units. Glascott is a landlord (as defined by the RLTO)
for all of the dwelling units in the Premises.

The 2016 Lease and 2018 Renewal Lease were standardized
fill-in-the-blank form documents. On information and belief, the
2016 Lease and 2018 Renewal Lease tendered to Plaintiff are
standard form documents that were utilized by Defendants for all of
the tenants for whom Glascott is a Landlord.

According to the complaint, the Defendants failed to attach to
Plaintiffs and the class's leases the then current RLTO summaries,
including the separate summary describing the respective rights,
obligations, and remedies of landlords and tenants with respect to
security deposits (the "RLTO Summaries"), as required by Section
5-12-170 the RLTO. It was Defendants' common business practice to
not attach the RLTO Summaries to the leases, including renewal
leases, says the complaint.

Plaintiff resides in Chicago, Cook County, Illinois.

Glascott is an Illinois company registered with the Illinois
Secretary of State.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeffrey S. Sobek, Esq.
     JS Law
     29 E. Madison Street, Suite 1000
     Chicago, IL 60602
     Phone: (312) 756-1330
     Email: jeffs@jsslawoffices.com


GOOGLE LLC: Court OKs $11MM Settlement in R. Heath Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, issued an Order granting Parties'
Joint Motion for Final Approval of Collective Action Settlement
Agreement in the case captioned ROBERT HEATH, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. GOOGLE LLC, Defendant. Case No. 15-cv-01824-BLF. (N.D. Cal.).

In this collective action, Named Plaintiff Cheryl Fillekes alleges
that Defendant Google LLC violated the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), by engaging in a systematic pattern
or practice of discrimination against applicants age forty and
older for three positions at Google across the United States.

The Court conditionally certified the following collective:

     All individuals who: interviewed in-person for any Site
Reliability Engineer (SRE), Software Engineer (SWE), or Systems
Engineer (SysEng) position with Google, Inc. (Google) in the United
States; were age 40 or older at the time of the interview; and were
refused employment by Google; and received notice that they were
refused employment on August 28, 2014 through October 5, 2016.

Settlement Agreement

In the Parties' Settlement Agreement, Defendant agrees to a gross
settlement amount of $11 million.

The remainder of the fund will go to Plaintiffs. $2.683 million of
the gross fund will be distributed equally among the 227 Opt-In
Plaintiffs, which amounts to at least $11,465 per Plaintiff. The
remainder of the fund will be distributed on a pro rata basis to
those Opt-In Plaintiffs who have provided information to Collective
counsel concerning lost-wages damages they may have suffered as a
result of Defendant's decision not to hire them. Each Opt-In
Plaintiff will receive a pro rata share of the fund proportional to
their alleged lost wages. All payroll withholding taxes will be
paid out of the fund.  

Approval of the Collective Settlement

Before approving an ADEA settlement, pursuant to FLSA procedures,
the Court must find that (1) the case involves a bona fide dispute
(2) the proposed settlement agreement is fair and reasonable and
(3) the award of costs is reasonable.  

Bona Fide Dispute

A bona fide dispute exists when there are legitimate questions
about the existence and extent of the defendant's FLSA liability.
If there were no doubt as to the employer's liability, the FLSA
settlement would allow an employer to avoid paying out the full
cost of complying with the FLSA.  

Here, the Court finds that there is a bona fide dispute. The
Parties have rigorously debated whether Defendant's interviewing
and hiring practices and policies constitute age discrimination
under the ADEA, as evidenced by the years of litigation on these
issues, including hotly contested motions to dismiss, to certify
the collective, to decertify the collective, and to reconsider the
order declining to recertify the collective.  

Because the Parties disputed these aspects of the case, the Court
finds a bona fide dispute under the FLSA. Most importantly, the
Court acknowledges that the purpose of the bona fide dispute
requirement has been satisfied here.  

Fair and Reasonable Resolution

To determine whether the settlement is fair and reasonable, the
Court looks to the totality of the circumstances. In making this
determination, courts consider the following factors: (1) the
plaintiffs' range of possible recovery (2) the stage of proceedings
and amount of discovery completed (3) the seriousness of the
litigation risks faced by the Parties (4) the scope of any release
provision in the settlement agreement (5) the experience and views
of counsel and the opinion of participating plaintiffs; and (6) the
possibility of fraud or collusion.  

Plaintiffs' Range of Possible Recovery

Regarding the Plaintiffs' range of possible recovery, courts in the
Ninth Circuit have found FLSA cases settling for approximately
25%-35% of the total possible recovery to be reasonable.  

Each Plaintiff's average gross recovery under the Agreement is
$48,458. Plaintiffs submit that this amount represents over 80% of
the estimated actual damages each Opt-In allegedly suffered during
the relevant time, based on the lost wages information provided to
Plaintiffs' counsel.  

The Stage of the Proceedings and Amount of Discovery Completed

The Court next assesses the stage of proceedings and the amount of
discovery completed to ensure the Parties have an adequate
appreciation of the merits of the case before reaching a
settlement. If the Parties have sufficient information to make an
informed decision about the settlement, this factor weighs in favor
of approval.

This case is several years old, and in that time the Parties have
engaged in extensive discovery, including depositions, written
discovery, and expert reports. Indeed, at the time the case
settled, Defendant had filed a summary judgment motion. Before
that, the Parties had engaged in extensive discovery and briefing
related to the motions to certify and then to decertify the
collective. Moreover, the Parties have participated in numerous
settlement discussion throughout this time. Given the current stage
of the case, the Parties have a good understanding of the merits of
their respective positions.

This factor weighs in favor of approving the settlement.

The Seriousness of the Litigation Risks Faced by the Parties

Courts will approve an FLSA settlement when there is a significant
risk that litigation could result in a lower recovery for the class
or no recovery at all. Plaintiffs faced significant risks if they
were to proceed with this litigation. At the time the case settled,
Defendant had filed a summary judgment motion targeting several
potential weaknesses in Plaintiffs' case. Moreover, when the Court
declined to decertify the case, it indicated that it reserved the
right to reconsider the decision either for both phases of the
two-phase Teamsters pattern-or-practice trial or for the remedial
phase only.   

Thus, Plaintiffs faced the risk that the collective might
eventually be decertified. And given Defendant's vehement denial of
any wrongdoing, it is likely that this case would have been
appealed on both factual and legal issues were it to proceed to
trial.

Accordingly, further litigation could easily result in Plaintiffs
recovering less than the settlement amount or perhaps nothing at
all, so this factor weighs in favor of approving the settlement.

The Scope of Any Release Provision in the Settlement Agreement

Courts in this district have rejected blanket releases of all
potential claims against the employer for all unlawful acts
whatsoever.  However, when a district court in the Ninth Circuit
approves an FLSA collective action settlement, it may approve a
release of any claims sufficiently related to the current
litigation.  

Here, the release provision, consistent with Ninth Circuit
precedent, is limited to releasing age discrimination claims that
Plaintiffs could have asserted in the instant action.  As such, the
release is not a blanket release of all potential claims, but is
instead tailored to the age discrimination action here.
Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of approval of the
settlement.

The Experience and Views of Counsel and the Opinion of
Participating Plaintiffs

In determining whether a settlement is fair and reasonable, the
opinions of counsel should be given considerable weight both
because of counsel's familiarity with the litigation and previous
experience with cases.

Here, the Parties' counsel, who are experienced in class
litigation, believe that the Settlement is fair and reasonable. The
Agreement was reached as the result of arms-length, non-collusive
negotiations over more than a year and with the aid of Magistrate
Judge Ryu. Moreover, after notice and discussion with counsel, only
six opt-ins declined to join the settlement. No objections were
filed. Thus, 97% of the class chose to participate in the
settlement, indicating widespread approval of the Agreement by the
Plaintiffs. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of approval of
the settlement.

The Possibility of Fraud or Collusion

When courts in the Ninth Circuit examine the terms of FLSA
settlements, courts will often find fraud or collusion if the
following conditions are present:

(1) when counsel receives a disproportionate distribution of the
settlement, or when the class receives no monetary distribution but
class counsel are amply rewarded (2) when the plaintiffs negotiate
a clear sailing' agreement providing for the payment of attorney's
fees separate and apart from class funds and (3) when the parties
arrange for fees not awarded to revert to defendants rather than be
added to the class fund.

In this case, the Court finds no signs of fraud or collusion. The
Parties reached the settlement through arm's-length negotiations,
including with the help of Magistrate Judge Ryu. Plaintiffs'
Counsel will not receive a disproportionate distribution of the
settlement fund since only 25% of the gross settlement amount will
go towards attorney's fees. In addition, the Court does not find
any evidence of a clear sailing agreement or any reversion of
funds.
  
Therefore, the Court concludes this factor weighs in favor of
approval.

The Court finds that the proposed settlement is a fair and
reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute.

Accordingly, the Court grants the Parties' Joint Motion for Final
Approval of Collective Action Settlement Agreement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 15, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3o47npf from Leagle.com.

Cheryl Fillekes, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented byDaniel A. Kotchen, Kotchen & Low
LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel Lee Low -- dlow@kotchen.com -- Kotchen
and Low LLP, Amy McCann Roller -- aroller@kotchen.com -- Kotchen
and Low, pro hac vice, George S. Duesdieker, Law Office of George
Duesdieker,  2570 N 1st St #200, San Jose, CA 95131, Lindsey
Grunert -- ltremaine@kotchen.com -- Kotchen and Low LLP, pro hac
vice, Michael F. Brown, DVG Law Partner LLC, PO Box 645, Neenah, WI
54957, pro hac vice & Michael J. Von Klemperer --
mvonklemperer@kotchen.com -- Kotchen and Low LLP, pro hac vice.

Google LLC, a Delaware corporation, Defendant, represented by Brian
Davis Berry -- brian.berry@ogletreedeakins.com -- Ogletree,
Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Thomas Michael McInerney --
tmm@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, P.C.,
Anthony Craig Cleland -- craig.cleland@ogletree.com -- Ogletree,
Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., pro hac vice, Elizabeth A.
Falcone -- elizabeth.falcone.ogletree.com -- Ogletree, Deakins,
Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. & Lisa Mireille Bowman --
lisa.bowman@ogletree.com --  Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart,
P.C..


HANGER INC: Dismissal of City of Pontiac Suit Upheld
----------------------------------------------------
Hanger, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that Court of Appeals ruling affirming the
dismissal of all claims with prejudice against all defendants in
the City of Pontiac General Employees' Retirement System v. Hanger,
is now final.

In November 2014, a securities class action complaint, City of
Pontiac General Employees' Retirement System v. Hanger, et al.,
C.A. No. 1:14-cv-01026-SS, was filed against us in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Texas.  

The complaint named the company and certain of its current and
former officers for allegedly making materially false and
misleading statements regarding, inter alia, the company's
financial statements, RAC audit success rate, the implementation of
new financial systems, same-store sales growth, and the adequacy of
our internal processes and controls.  

The complaint alleged violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder. The complaint sought unspecified damages,
costs, attorneys' fees, and equitable relief.

On April 1, 2016, the court granted the company's motion to dismiss
the lawsuit for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, and permitted plaintiffs to file an amended complaint. On
July 1, 2016, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint.  

On September 15, 2016, the company and certain of the individual
defendants filed motions to dismiss the lawsuit. On January 26,
2017, the court granted the defendants' motions and dismissed with
prejudice all claims against all defendants for failure to state a
claim. On February 24, 2017, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.  

On August 6, 2018, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and
reversed in part. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of
the case against individual defendants Vinit Asar, the company's
current President and Chief Executive Officer, and Thomas Kirk, the
company's former President and Chief Executive Officer, but
reversed the dismissal of the case against George McHenry, the
company's former Chief Financial Officer, and Hanger, Inc.  

On August 20, 2018, Hanger, Inc. and George McHenry filed a
petition for panel rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc
with the Court of Appeals.  

On April 10, 2019, the Court of Appeals granted the petition for
panel rehearing, withdrew its previous panel decision, and
substituted a new panel decision in its place that affirmed the
District Court's dismissal with prejudice of all claims against all
the defendants for failure to state a claim.  

Plaintiffs did not petition the Court of Appeals for a panel
rehearing or a rehearing en banc, and did not file a writ of
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. Therefore, the
April 10, 2019 Court of Appeals ruling affirming the dismissal of
all claims with prejudice against all defendants is now final.

Hanger, Inc. provides orthotic and prosthetic (O&P) services; and
distributes O&P devices and components, manages O&P networks, and
provides therapeutic solutions to patients and businesses in acute,
post-acute, and clinic settings in the United States. It operates
through two segments, Patient Care and Products & Services. The
company was formerly known as Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc. and
changed its name to Hanger, Inc. in June 2012. Hanger, Inc. was
founded in 1861 and is headquartered in Austin, Texas.


HERTZ CORPORATION: Aiyekusibe's Bid to Certify Class Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Sheri Polster Chappell denied without prejudice the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification in the lawsuit
titled BAMIDELE AIYEKUSIBE, MISCHELE HIGGINSON and SHANTAL
BROWN-WINN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. THE HERTZ CORPORATION and DTG OPERATIONS, INC., Case
No. 2:18-cv-00816-SPC-MRM (M.D. Fla.).

The parties' Joint Motion and Stipulation for Conditional
Certification is denied without prejudice.  The non-party's Motion
for Conference and Cross-Notice is denied as moot.  The Plaintiffs'
Motion for Equitable Tolling of Statute of Limitations is also
denied as moot.  The Clerk is directed to file a copy of this Order
in Figueroa v. The Hertz Corp., 2:19-cv-00326-SPC-NPM.

According to the Order, in the related case, Figueroa v. The Hertz
Corp., the Figueroa plaintiffs will file a notice of how they will
proceed on or before August 29, 2019.  Then, on or before September
5, 2019, those plaintiffs will proceed accordingly by filing an
amended complaint in that case or opting into the collective action
here.

At that point, Judge Chappell notes, this action will be in better
focus, and the parties can file a motion for conditional
certification, stipulated or otherwise.  Judge Chappell adds that
the Plaintiffs' Motion for Equitable Tolling of Statute of
Limitations is partially unopposed, but the Defendants have until
August 28, 2019, to respond.  That Motion is tied to conditional
certification, which is denied without prejudice and impacted by
the Figueroa Order.  So for now, the Court denies this Motion as
moot with leave to refile.[CC]


HERTZ GLOBAL: Ramirez Class Suit Ongoing
----------------------------------------
Hertz Global Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend a purported shareholder class action entitled, Pedro
Ramirez, Jr. v. Hertz Global Holdings, Inc., et al.

In November 2013, a purported shareholder class action, Pedro
Ramirez, Jr. v. Hertz Global Holdings, Inc., et al., was commenced
in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey naming
Old Hertz Holdings and certain of its officers as defendants and
alleging violations of the federal securities laws.

The complaint alleged that Old Hertz Holdings made material
misrepresentations and/or omissions of material fact in certain of
its public disclosures in violation of Section 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder.

The complaint sought an unspecified amount of monetary damages on
behalf of the purported class and an award of costs and expenses,
including counsel fees and expert fees.

The complaint, as amended, was dismissed with prejudice on April
27, 2017 and on September 20, 2018, the Third Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of the complaint with prejudice.  

On February 5, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion asking the
federal district court to exercise its discretion and allow the
plaintiffs to reinstate their claims to include additional
allegations from the administrative order agreed to by the SEC and
the Company in December 2018.

The motion has been fully briefed and is pending before the federal
district court.

Hertz Global Holdings, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
provides airport and off airport vehicle rental and leasing
services. It operates through three segments: U.S. RAC,
International RAC, and All Other Operations. Hertz Global Holdings,
Inc. was founded in 1918 and is headquartered in Estero, Florida.


HODINKEE INC: Diaz Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
-----------------------------------------------------
Hodinkee, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to
the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Edwin
Diaz, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Hodinkee, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-07854
(S.D. N.Y., Aug. 21, 2019).

Hodinkee is a blog, e-commerce site, and co-creator of watches. The
name is derived from the Czech word for wristwatch, "hodinky".[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (929) 575-4175
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


HUKARIASCENDENT INC: Court Dismisses McClure FLSA Suit
------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Bowman of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, issued
Report and Recommendation dismissing the Complaint in the case
captioned JERRY E. McCLURE, Plaintiff, v. HUKARIASCENDENT, INC.,
Defendant. Case No. 1:18-cv-873. (S.D. Ohio).

Plaintiff Jerry E. McClure, who resides in Florida, was employed by
Defendant HukariAscendent Services, LLC (Hukari), a technical and
professional services company, for four months approximately two
years ago. Despite agreeing that he would arbitrate any dispute
relating to his employment with Hukari, McClure seeks to bring a
collective action pursuant to and for violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), and to bring a class action pursuant to Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for violations of the
Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act and the Ohio Prompt Pay.

Hukari now seeks to enforce the terms of the arbitration clause
agreed to by the parties, and moves under the Federal Arbitration
Act, for an order compelling arbitration of McClure's claims and
dismissing this action.

Plaintiff does not oppose arbitration of his claims, but requests
the Court deny Hukari Motion to Dismiss, and instead stay the case
and order the parties to proceed with arbitration as agreed. A stay
is not necessary and dismissal is appropriate when all of the
issues raised in the district court must be submitted to
arbitration.  

At this time, Plaintiff contends it is unclear if all the issues
raised by Plaintiff are subject to the decision of an arbitrator.


As such, Plaintiff contends it is unclear if all members of the
classes will be required to submit their claims to arbitration, and
what role, if any, an arbitrator may have on class certification,
notice and settlement procedures.  Because the arbitration
provision does not address these facets, Plaintiff claims that
prudence supports a stay rather than dismissal.

In response to Plaintiff's arguments, Defendant asserts that
Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66 (2012) requires
dismissal. Although the claims in Genesis HealthCare were mooted by
a Rule 68 offer of judgment, subsequent cases have applied Genesis
HealthCare's holding when the named plaintiff's claims were ordered
to arbitration.  

The Court has discretion to stay or dismiss the instant matter.
However, under the guidance of Genesis Healthcare the Court finds
that dismissal is appropriate.

Accordingly, the Defendant's motion to compel arbitration and
dismiss should be granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 15, 2019 Report and
Recommendation is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3352pal from
Leagle.com.

Jerry E. McClure, Individually and for others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Michael A. Josephson --
mjosephson@mybackwages.com -- Josephson Dunlap Law Firm, pro hac
vice, William R. Liles -- wliles@mbwages.com -- Josephson Dunlap
LLP, pro hac vice & Robert E. DeRose -- bderose@barkanmeizlish.com
-- Barkan Meizlish Handelman Goodin DeRose Wentz, LLP.

HukariAscendent, Inc., Defendant, represented by Fred G. Pressley,
Jr. -- fpressley@porterwright.com -- Porter Wright Morris & Arthur
& Rachel E. Burke -- rburke@porterwright.com -- Porter, Wright,
Morris & Arthur.


IMMUNOMEDICS INC: Bid to Consolidate Odeh & Choi Suits Pending
--------------------------------------------------------------
Immunomedics, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the motion to for the
appointment of a lead plaintiff and lead counsel and to consolidate
the  Odeh v. Immunomedics, Inc., et al. and hoi v. Immunomedics,
Inc., et al., is pending.

A purported class action case was filed in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey; namely, Odeh v.
Immunomedics, Inc., et al., filed December 27, 2018.

The complaint in this action alleges that the Company failed to
disclose the results of observations made by the Federal Drug
Administration (FDA) during an inspection of the Company's
manufacturing facility in Morris Plains, New Jersey in August 2018.


The complaint alleges that Immunomedics misled investors by failing
to disclose the Form 483 inspection report issued by the FDA which
set forth the observations of the FDA inspector during the
inspection.

Such observations purportedly included, inter alia, manipulated
bioburden samples, misrepresentation of an integrity test procedure
in the batch record, and backdating of batch records. The complaint
further alleges that the Company's failure to disclose the Form 483
resulted in an artificially inflated price for the company's common
stock, and that the Company and certain of its officers are thus
liable under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act.

On February 8, 2019, a purported class action case was filed in the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey;
namely, Choi v. Immunomedics, Inc., et al. The complaint asserts
violations of the federal securities laws based on claims that the
Company violated the federal securities laws by making alleged
misstatements in various press releases and securities filings from
February 8, 2018 to November 7, 2018 and by failing to disclose the
substance of its interactions with the FDA in connection with the
Company's submission of its Biologics License Application (BLA) for
sacituzumab govitecan.

Motions for the appointment of a lead plaintiff and lead counsel
and to consolidate the Odeh and Choi complaints have been filed.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Immunomedics, Inc., a clinical-stage biopharmaceutical company,
develops monoclonal antibody-based products for the targeted
treatment of cancer. The company was founded in 1982 and is
headquartered in Morris Plains, New Jersey.


IMMUNOMEDICS INC: Bid to Dismiss Consolidated Fergus Suit Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Immunomedics, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that a motion to dismiss has
been filed in the consolidated Fergus class action suit.

Two purported class action cases were filed in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey; namely, Fergus v.
Immunomedics, Inc., et al., filed June 9, 2016; and Becker v.
Immunomedics, Inc., et al., filed June 10, 2016.

These cases arise from the same alleged facts and circumstances,
and seek class certification on behalf of purchasers of our common
stock between April 20, 2016 and June 2, 2016 (with respect to the
Fergus matter) and between April 20, 2016 and June 3, 2016 (with
respect to the Becker matter).

These cases concern the Company's statements in press releases,
investor conference calls, and filings with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (the "SEC") beginning in April 2016 that the
Company would present updated information regarding its IMMU-132
breast cancer drug at the 2016 American Society of Clinical
Oncology ("ASCO") conference in Chicago, Illinois.

The complaints allege that these statements were false and
misleading in light of June 2, 2016 reports that ASCO had canceled
the presentation because it contained previously reported
information. The complaints further allege that these statements
resulted in artificially inflated prices for our common stock, and
that the Company and certain of its officers are thus liable under
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended (the "Exchange Act").

An order of voluntary dismissal without prejudice was entered on
November 10, 2016 in the Becker matter. An order granting motion to
consolidate cases, appoint lead plaintiff, and approve lead and
liaison counsel was entered on February 7, 2017 in the Fergus
matter. A consolidated complaint was filed on October 4, 2017. The
Company filed a motion to dismiss the consolidated complaint on
January 26, 2018.

On March 31, 2019, the court granted the Company's motion to
dismiss, without prejudice, and left plaintiffs with the ability to
file an amended complaint within 30 days. Counsel for the Company
has consented to an extension of time for plaintiffs to file the
proposed amended complaint for an additional 30 days.

On May 30, 2019, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging
many of the same allegations that were set forth in the previously
filed complaints, and the Company has filed a motion to dismiss.

Immunomedics, Inc., a clinical-stage biopharmaceutical company,
develops monoclonal antibody-based products for the targeted
treatment of cancer. The company was founded in 1982 and is
headquartered in Morris Plains, New Jersey.


JELD-WEN HOLDING: Interior Molded Doors Antitrust Litig. Pending
----------------------------------------------------------------
JELD-WEN Holding, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend a class action suit entitled, In Re: Interior Molded Doors
Antitrust Litigation.  

On October 19, 2018, Grubb Lumber Company, on behalf of itself and
others similarly situated, filed a putative class action lawsuit
against the company and one of its competitors in the doors market,
Masonite Corporation ("Masonite"), in the Eastern District of
Virginia.

The company subsequently received additional complaints from and on
behalf of direct and indirect purchasers of interior molded doors.
The suits have been consolidated into two separate actions, a
Direct Purchaser Action and an Indirect Purchaser Action.

The suits allege that Masonite and the company violated Section 1
of the Sherman Act, and in the Indirect Purchaser Action, related
state law antitrust and consumer protection laws, by engaging in a
scheme to artificially raise, fix, maintain or stabilize the prices
of interior molded doors in the United States.

The complaints seek unquantified ordinary and treble damages,
declaratory relief, interest, costs and attorneys' fees.

The Company believes the claims lack merit and intends to
vigorously defend against the actions.

JELD-WEN said, "At this early stage of the proceedings, we are
unable to conclude that a loss is probable or to estimate the
potential magnitude of any loss in the matters, although a loss
could have a material adverse effect on our operating results,
consolidated financial position or cash flows."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

JELD-WEN Holding, Inc. manufactures and sells doors and windows
primarily in North America, Europe, and Australasia. The company
was founded in 1960 and is headquartered in Charlotte, North
Carolina.


KANSAS CITY, MO: Zimmerli Appeals W.D. Mo. Ruling to 8th Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs John Zimmerli and Matthew Dietrick filed an appeal from
a Court ruling in their lawsuit titled John Zimmerli, et al. v. The
City of Kansas City, MO, Case No. 4:17-cv-00370-BP, in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiffs
asked the Court to certify this class pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act:

     all current and former employees of Defendant who worked in
     the position of Static, Single Role EMT or Paramedic, and/or
     Fire Medic, or otherwise had similar job duties and
     compensation structures as the Named Plaintiffs, from
     May 12, 2013 to the Present.

The appellate case is captioned as John Zimmerli, et al. v. The
City of Kansas City, MO, Case No. 19-2721, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants John Zimmerli, on behalf of themselves and
all other persons similarly situated, and Matthew Dietrick, on
behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated, are
represented by:

          Michael Hodgson, Esq.
          THE HODGSON LAW FIRM, L.L.C.
          3699 SW Pryor Rd
          Lee's Summit, MO 64082
          Telephone: (816) 600-0117
          E-mail: mike@thehodgsonlawfirm.com

Defendant-Appellee The City of Kansas City, Missouri, is
represented by:

          Timothy Robert Ertz, Esq.
          Saskia Jacobse, Esq.
          Tara M. Kelly, Esq.
          CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
          City Hall
          414 E. 12th Street
          Kansas City, MO 64106-0000
          Telephone: (816) 513-3121
          E-mail: timothy.ertz@kcmo.org
                  saskia.jacobse@kcmo.org
                  tara.kelly@kcmo.org


KARYOPHARM THERAPEUTICS: Faces Securities Suit over SOPRA Trials
----------------------------------------------------------------
Karyopharm Therapeutics Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company has been
named as a defendant in a class action suit related to the results
from the Phase 2 SOPRA study and Part 2 of the Phase 2b STORM
study.

On July 23, 2019, a class action complaint was filed in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the
company and certain of its current and former executive officers
and directors as well as the underwriters of the company's public
offerings of common stock conducted in April 2017 and May 2018.

The complaint alleges violations of federal securities laws based
on the company's disclosures related to the results from the Phase
2 SOPRA study and Part 2 of the Phase 2b STORM study.

The complaint seeks unspecified compensatory damages, including
interest; reasonable costs and expenses, including attorneys' and
expert fees; unspecified recessionary damages; and such
equitable/injunctive relief or other relief as the court may deem
just and proper.

Karyopharm said, "We have reviewed the allegations and believe the
lawsuit is without merit. We intend to defend vigorously against
the lawsuit."

Karyopharm Therapeutics Inc., incorporated on December 22, 2008, is
an oncology-focused pharmaceutical company. The Company is focused
on the discovery, development, and commercialization of drugs
directed against nuclear export and related targets for the
treatment of cancer and other diseases. The company is based in
Newton, Massachusetts.


KNIGHT-SWIFT TRANSPORT: Accord in Hedglin Case Wins Final Approval
------------------------------------------------------------------
Knight-Swift Transportation Holdings Inc. said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August
7, 2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the a
court has granted final approval of the settlement in the class
action suit initiated by Julie Hedglin.

On January 14, 2016 Julie Hedglin , Individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated filed a class action suit against
Swift Transportation Company of Arizona, LLC and Swift
Transportation Corporation in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Washington.

The plaintiff allege one or more of the following, pertaining to
Washington state-based driving associates: that Swift 1) failed to
pay minimum wages; 2) failed to pay overtime; 3) failed to pay all
wages due at established pay periods; 4) failed to provide proper
meal and rest periods; 5) failed to provide accurate wage
statements; and 6) unlawfully deducted from employee wages. The
plaintiffs seek unpaid wages, exemplary damages, interest, other
costs, and attorneys' fees.

In July 2019, the court granted final approval of the settlement in
the Hedglin matter. The likelihood that a loss has been incurred
for the Hedglin matters is probable and estimable, and the loss has
accordingly been accrued.

Knight-Swift Transportation Holdings Inc., together with its
subsidiaries, provides truckload transportation and logistics
services in the United States, Mexico, and Canada. The company
operates through six segments: Knight Trucking, Knight Logistics,
Swift Truckload, Swift Dedicated, Swift Refrigerated, and Swift
Intermodal. The Company was founded in 1989 and is headquartered in
Phoenix, Arizona.


KNIGHT-SWIFT TRANSPORT: Settlement in Sheer Wins Initial Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Knight-Swift Transportation Holdings Inc. said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August
7, 2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the
court has granted preliminary approval of the settlement in the
class action suit initiated by Joseph Sheer related to the
so-called Independent Contractor Misclassification Class Action.

On December 22, 2009 Joseph Sheer, Virginia Van Dusen, Jose
Motolinia, Vickii Schwalm, Peter Wood,   Individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, filed a class action suit against
Swift Transportation Co., Inc., Interstate Equipment Leasing, Inc.,
Jerry Moyes, and Chad Killebrew, and is currently pending in the
Unites States District Court of Arizona and Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.

In April 2019, the court granted preliminary approval of the
settlement in this matter. Based on the above, the likelihood that
a loss has been incurred is probable and estimable, and the loss
has accordingly been accrued as of June 30, 2019.

Knight-Swift Transportation Holdings Inc., together with its
subsidiaries, provides truckload transportation and logistics
services in the United States, Mexico, and Canada. The company
operates through six segments: Knight Trucking, Knight Logistics,
Swift Truckload, Swift Dedicated, Swift Refrigerated, and Swift
Intermodal. The Company was founded in 1989 and is headquartered in
Phoenix, Arizona.


KNIGHT-SWIFT TRANSPORT: Settlement in Slack Wins Final Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
Knight-Swift Transportation Holdings Inc. said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August
7, 2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the the
court has granted final approval of the settlement in the class
action suit initiated by Troy Slack.

On September 9, 2014 Troy Slack, Individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated filed a class action suit against Swift
Transportation Company of Arizona, LLC and Swift Transportation
Corporation in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington.

The plaintiff allege one or more of the following, pertaining to
Washington state-based driving associates: that Swift 1) failed to
pay minimum wages; 2) failed to pay overtime; 3) failed to pay all
wages due at established pay periods; 4) failed to provide proper
meal and rest periods; 5) failed to provide accurate wage
statements; and 6) unlawfully deducted from employee wages. The
plaintiffs seek unpaid wages, exemplary damages, interest, other
costs, and attorneys' fees.

In February 2019, the court granted final approval of the Slack
settlement.

Knight-Swift Transportation Holdings Inc., together with its
subsidiaries, provides truckload transportation and logistics
services in the United States, Mexico, and Canada. The company
operates through six segments: Knight Trucking, Knight Logistics,
Swift Truckload, Swift Dedicated, Swift Refrigerated, and Swift
Intermodal. The Company was founded in 1989 and is headquartered in
Phoenix, Arizona.


KNIGHT-SWIFT TRANSPORT: Settlement Reached in Burnell Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Knight-Swift Transportation Holdings Inc. said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August
7, 2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the
company has reached a settlement of the class action suits
initiated by John Burnell.

On March 22, 2010, John Burnell, Individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated filed a class action suit against Swift
Transportation Co., Inc in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California.

The plaintiff generally allege one or more of the following: that
the Company 1) failed to pay the California minimum wage; 2) failed
to provide proper meal and rest periods; 3) failed to timely pay
wages upon separation from employment; 4) failed to pay for all
hours worked; 5) failed to pay overtime; 6) failed to properly
reimburse work-related expenses; and 7) failed to provide accurate
wage statements.

In April 2019, the parties reached settlement of this matter. The
likelihood that a loss has been incurred is probable and estimable,
and the loss has accordingly been accrued as of June 30, 2019.

Knight-Swift Transportation Holdings Inc., together with its
subsidiaries, provides truckload transportation and logistics
services in the United States, Mexico, and Canada. The company
operates through six segments: Knight Trucking, Knight Logistics,
Swift Truckload, Swift Dedicated, Swift Refrigerated, and Swift
Intermodal. The Company was founded in 1989 and is headquartered in
Phoenix, Arizona.


KNIGHT-SWIFT TRANSPORT: Settlement Reached in Rudsell Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Knight-Swift Transportation Holdings Inc. said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August
7, 2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the
company has reached a settlement of the class action suit initiated
by James R. Rudsell.

On April 5, 2012, James R. Rudsell, Individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated filed a class action suit in the
United States District Court for the Central District of
California.

The plaintiff generally allege one or more of the following: that
the Company 1) failed to pay the California minimum wage; 2) failed
to provide proper meal and rest periods; 3) failed to timely pay
wages upon separation from employment; 4) failed to pay for all
hours worked; 5) failed to pay overtime; 6) failed to properly
reimburse work-related expenses; and 7) failed to provide accurate
wage statements.

In April 2019, the parties reached settlement of this matter. The
likelihood that a loss has been incurred is probable and estimable,
and the loss has accordingly been accrued as of June 30, 2019.

Knight-Swift Transportation Holdings Inc., together with its
subsidiaries, provides truckload transportation and logistics
services in the United States, Mexico, and Canada. The company
operates through six segments: Knight Trucking, Knight Logistics,
Swift Truckload, Swift Dedicated, Swift Refrigerated, and Swift
Intermodal. The Company was founded in 1989 and is headquartered in
Phoenix, Arizona.


LABRAD DIAGNOSTICS: Dart Files Labor Class Action in Arizona
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Labrad Diagnostics.
The case is styled as Kari Dart, on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Labrad Diagnostics, a corporation,
SPSAZ Enterprises LLC, a foreign corporation, Sam Akers, an
individual and Melodie Julian, an individual, Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-04997-JJT (D. Ariz., Aug. 21, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Labor: Fair
Standards filed pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Labrad Diagnostics is a Laboratory in Phoenix, Arizona.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Troy Patrick Foster, Esq.
   Foster Group PLLC
   518 E Willetta St.
   Phoenix, AZ 85004
   Tel: (602) 461-7990
   Email: tfoster@thefosterlaw.com


LEGACY EDUCATION: McCoy Seeks Unpaid Wages for Adjunct Instructors
------------------------------------------------------------------
LISA MCCOY and CYNTHIA THOMA, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. LEGACY EDUCATION,
LLC, d/b/a/ HIGH DESERT MEDICAL COLLEGE, a California Limited
Liability Company, the Defendant, Case No. 19STCV27920 (Cal.
Super., Aug. 9, 2019), alleges that Defendant failed to:

     -- pay wages for all hours worked,

     -- authorize and permit rest breaks and pay premium pay,

     -- issue accurate itemized wage statements,

     -- reimburse business-related expenses, and

     -- pay compensation due upon discharge from employment under
the California Labor Code.

The Plaintiffs brings this action on behalf of themselves and all
other similarly situated individuals currently and formerly
employed in California by Legacy Education, LLC as adjunct
instructors or in a similar capacity and paid on an hourly basis
from four years prior to the filing of this Complaint through to
the trial date.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Julian Hammond, Esq.
          Polina Brandler, Esq.
          Ari Cherniak, Esq.
          HAMMONDLAW, P.C.
          1829 Reisterstown Rd., Suite 410
          Baltimore, MD 21208
          Telephone: (310) 601-6766
          Facsimile: (310) 295-2385
          E-mail: jhammond@hammondlawpc.com
                  pbrandler@hammondlawpc.com
                  acherniak@hammondlaw.com



LENDINGCLUB CORP: Agreement in Principle Reached in Plouffe Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
LendingClub Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that an agreement in
principle has been reached in the class action suit entitled,
Plouffe v. LendingClub Corporation.

In March 2019, a putative class action lawsuit was filed against
the Company in the State of Florida (Plouffe v. LendingClub
Corporation, 0:19-cv-60715-FAM) alleging violations of the federal
Fair Credit Reporting Act.

The complaint alleges that the Company made unauthorized credit
report inquiries relating to the plaintiff following the receipt of
a bankruptcy discharge by the plaintiff. The plaintiff seeks to
represent a class of similarly situated individuals in the lawsuit.


In May 2019, the parties agreed to submit all claims in the case to
binding arbitration and to stay all court proceedings pending the
outcome of the arbitration. More recently, the parties reached an
agreement in principle to settle the dispute on an individual basis
in a manner that does not materially impact the financial
operations of the Company and the parties will work to finalize a
written settlement agreement.

LendingClub said, "No assurances can be given as to the timing,
outcome or consequences of this matter in the event a written
settlement agreement is not finalized or otherwise."

LendingClub Corporation operates an online lending marketplace
platform that connects borrowers and investors in the United
States. The company's marketplace facilitates various types of loan
products for consumers and small businesses, including unsecured
personal loans, unsecured education and patient installment loans,
auto refinance loans, and small business loans. It also enables
investors to invest in a range of loans based on term and credit.
The company was founded in 2006 and is headquartered in San
Francisco, California.


LENDINGCLUB CORP: Bid to Amend Accardo Complaint Pending
--------------------------------------------------------
LendingClub Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the motion for leave to
amend the complaint in the case entitled, Accardo v. Lending Club,
et al., is pending.

In September 2018, a lawsuit was filed against the Company in the
State of New York (Accardo v. Lending Club, et al.,
2:18-cv-05030-JS-AKT) asserting an individual claim under the
federal Fair Credit Reporting Act against the Company.

In early 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend his
complaint in the case to assert a putative class claim under the
Fair Credit Reporting Act. The plaintiff's proposed amended
complaint contends that LendingClub failed to conduct a reasonable
investigation into plaintiff's identity theft dispute and plaintiff
seeks to represent a class of similarly situated individuals.

The Company filed an opposition to plaintiff's motion for leave to
amend and also filed a motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff's
claim against the Company on an individual basis. The court has not
yet ruled on either motion. Discovery in the case is stayed.

LendingClub said, "This matter is in the early stages. No
assurances can be given as to the timing, outcome or consequences
of this matter."

LendingClub Corporation operates an online lending marketplace
platform that connects borrowers and investors in the United
States. The company's marketplace facilitates various types of loan
products for consumers and small businesses, including unsecured
personal loans, unsecured education and patient installment loans,
auto refinance loans, and small business loans. It also enables
investors to invest in a range of loans based on term and credit.
The company was founded in 2006 and is headquartered in San
Francisco, California.


LENDINGCLUB CORP: Continues to Defend Shron Suit in New York
------------------------------------------------------------
LendingClub Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend a class action suit entitled, Shron v. LendingClub Corp.,
1:19-cv-06718.

In July 2019, a putative class action lawsuit was filed against the
Company in federal court in the State of New York (Shron v.
LendingClub Corp., 1:19-cv-06718) alleging various claims including
fraud, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and violations of the
federal Truth-in-Lending Act and New York General Business Law
sections 349 and 350, et seq., based on allegations, among others,
that the Company made misleading or inadequate statements or
omissions in relation to the total cost and origination fee
associated with loans available through the Company's platform.

The plaintiff seeks to represent classes of similarly situated
individuals in the lawsuit. This matter is in the early stages.

The Defendant has until September 5 to respond to the complaint.

LendingClub said, "No assurances can be given as to the timing,
outcome or consequences of this matter."

LendingClub Corporation operates an online lending marketplace
platform that connects borrowers and investors in the United
States. The company's marketplace facilitates various types of loan
products for consumers and small businesses, including unsecured
personal loans, unsecured education and patient installment loans,
auto refinance loans, and small business loans. It also enables
investors to invest in a range of loans based on term and credit.
The company was founded in 2006 and is headquartered in San
Francisco, California.


LENDINGCLUB CORP: Hearing This Month on Bid to Dismiss Veal Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Veal v. LendingClub Corporation et al., Case No.
5:18-cv-02599 (N.D. Cal., May 2, 2018), Judge Beth Labson Freeman
will hold a hearing on September 26 to consider a motion to dismiss
the complaint.

The hearing date was originally set for August 8 but was reset to
September.

An initial case management conference has also been reset for
November 14.  A Case Management Statement is due by November 7.

LendingClub Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that in May 2018, following
the announcement of the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC's)
litigation against the Company, putative shareholder class action
litigation was filed in the U.S. District Court of the Northern
District of California (Veal v. LendingClub Corporation et.al., No.
5:18-cv-02599) against the Company and certain of its current and
former officers and directors alleging violations of federal
securities laws in connection with the Company's description of
fees and compliance with federal privacy law in securities filings.


The court appointed XiangHong Ding and Zhenbin Chen (LendingClub
Investor Group) as lead plaintiffs and their counsel, Pomerantz
LLP, as lead counsel for the litigation in November 2018. On
January 7, 2019, the lead plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended
class action complaint which asserts the same causes of action as
the original complaint and adds additional allegations.

On March 8, 2019, the Company and the individual defendants in the
case filed motions to dismiss the consolidated amended class action
complaint. These motions are set for hearing in September 2019.

LendingClub said "This lawsuit is in the early stages. The Company
denies and will vigorously defend against the allegations. No
assurances can be given as to the timing, outcome or consequences
of this matter."

LendingClub Corporation operates an online lending marketplace
platform that connects borrowers and investors in the United
States. The company's marketplace facilitates various types of loan
products for consumers and small businesses, including unsecured
personal loans, unsecured education and patient installment loans,
auto refinance loans, and small business loans. It also enables
investors to invest in a range of loans based on term and credit.
The company was founded in 2006 and is headquartered in San
Francisco, California.


LENDINGCLUB CORP: Moses Class Suit Sent to Arbitration
------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff in the case, Moses v. Lending Club, Case No.
2:17-cv-03071 (D.N.J., Dec. 15, 2017), has yet to initiate
arbitration proceedings, LendingClub Corporation revealed in its
Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on August 7, 2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019.

On February 6, 2019, Nevada District Court Judge Jennifer A Dorsey
entered an order granting Motion to Compel Arbitration and
dismissing Moses's claim without prejudice.  The Court ordered the
parties to arbitrate the claim in compliance with the arbitration
agreements. The Clerk of Court was directed to close the case.

The Company said in its Form 10-Q report that it "denies the
plaintiff's claim and is prepared to vigorously defend against it
in the event the plaintiff initiates an arbitration following the
court's recent order."

In December 2017, a putative class action lawsuit was filed against
the Company in the State of Nevada (Moses v. LendingClub
Corporation, 2:17-cv-03071-JAD-PAL) alleging violations of the
federal Fair Credit Reporting Act.

The complaint alleged that the Company improperly accessed the
credit report of the plaintiff, who had formerly had a loan
serviced by the Company. The complaint further alleged, on
information and belief, that the Company improperly accessed credit
reports of other similarly situated individuals.

The Company filed a motion to compel arbitration on the grounds
that the plaintiff waived the right to bring a class action and
must individually arbitrate any claim.

On February 6, 2019, the court issued an order granting this
motion, dismissed the putative class action without prejudice, and
ordered the parties to arbitrate the plaintiff's claim.

The Company denies the plaintiff's claim and is prepared to
vigorously defend against it in the event the plaintiff initiates
an arbitration following the court's recent order.

LendingClub said, "No assurances can be given as to the timing,
outcome or consequences of this matter."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

LendingClub Corporation operates an online lending marketplace
platform that connects borrowers and investors in the United
States. The company's marketplace facilitates various types of loan
products for consumers and small businesses, including unsecured
personal loans, unsecured education and patient installment loans,
auto refinance loans, and small business loans. It also enables
investors to invest in a range of loans based on term and credit.
The company was founded in 2006 and is headquartered in San
Francisco, California.


LINDA SNOW: Reyes Labor Suit Claims Unpaid Overtime
---------------------------------------------------
Daisy Reyes, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Linda Snow and John Richmond, individually,
Pizza Hut of San Antonio Number 1, Inc., Pizza Hut of San Antonio
Number 2, Inc., Pizza Hut of San Antonio Number 3 Inc., Pizza Hut
of San Antonio Number 6, Inc., Pizza Hut of San Antonio Number 7,
Inc., Pizza Hut of San Antonio Number 9, Inc., Pizza Hut of San
Antonio Number 10, Inc., Pizza Hut of San Antonio Number 11, Inc.,
Pizza Hut of San Antonio Number 12, Inc., Pizza Hut of San Antonio
Number 13, Inc., Pizza Hut of San Antonio Number 14, Inc., Pizza
Hut of San Antonio Number 18, Inc., Pizza Hut of San Antonio Number
20, Inc., Pizza Hut of San Antonio Number 21, Inc., Pizza Hut of
San Antonio Number 25, Inc., Pizza Hut of San Antonio Number 27,
Inc., Pizza Hut of San Antonio Number 28, Inc., Pizza Hut of San
Antonio Number 29, Inc., Pizza Hut of San Antonio Number 30, Inc.,
Pizza Hut of San Antonio Number 31, Inc., Pizza Hut of San Antonio
Number 36, Inc., Pizza Hut of San Antonio Number 37, Inc., Pizza
Hut of San Antonio Number 38, Inc., Pizza Hut of San Antonio Number
39, Inc., Pizza Hut of San Antonio Number 40, Inc., Pizza Hut of
San Antonio Number 41, Inc., Pizza Hut of San Antonio Number 42,
Inc., Pizza Hut of San Antonio Number 43, Inc., Pizza Hut of San
Antonio Number 44, Inc., Pizza Hut of San Antonio Number 45, Inc.,
Pizza Hut of San Antonio Number 47, Inc., Pizza Hut of San Antonio
Number 48, Inc., Pizza Hut of San Antonio Number 49, Inc., Pizza
Hut of San Antonio Number 50, Inc., Pizza Hut of San Antonio No.
51, Inc., Newton Associates, Inc., And Newton Associates I, Ltd.
All D/B/A Pizza Hut of San Antonio, Inc., Defendants, Case No.
19-cv-00934, (S.D. Tex., August 2, 2019), seeks unpaid overtime
wages and statutory damages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

Defendants operate numerous Pizza Hut franchises where Reyes worked
as an hourly, non-exempt employee. She claims to have worked in
excess of 40 in a workweek but was not paid time-and-one-half her
regular rate of pay. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jay Forester, Esq.
      FORESTER HAYNIE PLLC
      1701 N. Market Street, Suite 210
      Dallas, Texas 75202
      Tel: (214) 210-2100
      Email: jay@foresterhaynie.com


LIVANOVA PLC: Makes $135MM Payment to Settlement Fund
-----------------------------------------------------
LivaNova PLC said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 31, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that the first payment of $135 million was
paid into a qualified settlement fund in July 2019, and the
remainder will be paid in January 2020 in the class action
settlement involving the company's 3T device.

The Company is currently involved in litigation involving its 3T
device. The litigation includes a class action complaint in the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania,
federal multi-district litigation in the U.S. District Court for
the Middle District of Pennsylvania, various U.S. state court cases
and cases in jurisdictions outside the U.S.

The class action, filed in February 2016, consists of all
Pennsylvania residents who underwent open heart surgery at WellSpan
York Hospital and Penn State Milton S. Hershey Medical Center
between 2011 and 2015 and who currently are asymptomatic for NTM
infection.

Members of the class seek declaratory relief that the 3T devices
are defective and unsafe for intended uses, medical monitoring,
damages, and attorneys' fees.

On March 29, 2019, the company announced a settlement framework
that provides for a comprehensive resolution of the personal injury
cases pending in the multi-district litigation in U.S. federal
court, the related class action pending in federal court, as well
as certain cases in state courts across the United States.

The agreement, which makes no admission of liability, is subject to
certain conditions, including acceptance of the settlement by
individual claimants and provides for a total payment of up to $225
million to resolve the claims covered by the settlement. Per the
agreed-upon terms, the first payment of $135 million was paid into
a qualified settlement fund in July 2019, and the remainder will be
paid in January 2020.

Cases covered by the settlement will be dismissed as amounts are
disbursed to individual plaintiffs from the qualified settlement
fund. Cases in state courts in the U.S. and in jurisdictions
outside the U.S. continue to progress.

LivaNova said, "As of July 30, 2019, including the cases
encompassed in the settlement framework described above, we are
aware of approximately 215 filed and unfiled claims worldwide, with
the majority of the claims in various federal or state courts
throughout the United States. The complaints generally seek damages
and other relief based on theories of strict liability, negligence,
breach of express and implied warranties, failure to warn, design
and manufacturing defect, fraudulent and negligent
misrepresentation or concealment, unjust enrichment, and violations
of various state consumer protection statutes."

LivaNova PLC, a medical device company, designs, develops,
manufactures, and sells therapeutic solutions worldwide. It
operates in two segments, Cardiovascular (CV) and Neuromodulation
(NM). The company was founded in 1987 and is headquartered in
London, the United Kingdom.


LIVENT CORP: Class Suits over 2018 IPO Underway
-----------------------------------------------
Livent Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend class action complaints related to its October 2018 initial
public offering (IPO)

Beginning on May 13, 2019, purported stockholders of the Company
filed putative class action complaints in the Pennsylvania Court of
Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, and in the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, against the Company and
certain of its current and former executives and directors, in
connection with the Company's October 2018 initial public offering
(IPO).  

Some of these actions also name as defendants the underwriters in
the IPO and/or FMC Corporation, whom the Company is generally
obligated to indemnify.  

The action pending in state court is Plymouth County Retirement
Association v. Livent Corp., et al., No. 190501229, filed May 13,
2019. The actions pending in federal court are Nikolov v. Livent
Corp., et al., No. 19-cv-02218, filed on May 22, 2019 and Roe v.
Livent Corp., et al., No. 19-cv-02683, filed on June 20, 2019.  

The complaints allege generally that the offering documents for the
IPO failed to adequately disclose certain information related to
Livent's business and prospects. The complaints allege violations
of Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and/or 15 of the Securities Act of 1933
and seek unspecified damages and other relief on behalf of all
persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired Livent
common stock pursuant and/or traceable to the IPO offering
documents.

On July 2, 2019, defendants moved to stay the Plymouth County
action, in state court, in favor of the federal court actions. On
July 26, 2019, Plymouth County filed an amended complaint. Subject
to the outcome of defendants' motion to stay, defendants have until
September 20, 2019, to answer, plead, or otherwise respond to the
amended complaint.  

In connection with the federal actions, on July 22, 2019, eight
investor groups filed motions to consolidate the actions and to be
appointed lead plaintiff. The federal court set a hearing on those
motions for August 23, 2019. Since that time, seven of the investor
groups have filed notices of non-opposition to the competing
motions.

Livent said, "As of August 6, 2019, no lead plaintiff had been
appointed. At this point, a range of reasonably possible losses, if
any, cannot be estimated by the Company."

Livent Corporation is a lithium company. The Company is focused on
producing performance lithium compounds. Its primary products
include battery-grade lithium hydroxide, butyllithium and high
purity lithium metal. Its produces lithium compounds for use in
applications that have specific performance requirements, including
battery-grade lithium hydroxide for use in high performance
lithium-ion batteries. The company is based in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania.


LUMBER LIQUIDATORS: Appeal in Formaldehyde & Abrasion MDL Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Lumber Liquidators Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7,
2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the
consolidated appeal in the Formaldehyde & Abrasion multi-district
litigation remains pending.

Beginning on or about March 3, 2015, numerous purported class
action cases were filed in various U.S. federal district courts and
state courts involving claims of excessive formaldehyde emissions
from the Company's Chinese-manufactured laminate flooring products.


The purported classes consisted of all U.S. consumers that
purchased the relevant products during certain time periods.
Plaintiffs in these cases challenged the Company's labeling of its
products as compliant with the California Air Resources Board
Regulation and alleged claims for fraudulent concealment, breach of
warranty, negligent misrepresentation and violation of various
state consumer protection statutes.

The plaintiffs sought various forms of declaratory and injunctive
relief and unquantified damages, including restitution and actual,
compensatory, consequential and, in certain cases, punitive
damages, as well as interest, costs and attorneys' fees incurred by
the plaintiffs and other purported class members in connection with
the alleged claims.

The United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (the
"MDL Panel") transferred and consolidated the federal cases to the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
(the "Virginia Court").

The consolidated case in the Virginia Court is captioned In re:
Lumber Liquidators Chinese-Manufactured Flooring Products
Marketing, Sales, Practices and Products Liability Litigation (the
"Formaldehyde MDL").

Beginning on or about May 20, 2015, multiple class actions were
filed in the United States District Court for the Central District
of California and other district courts located in the place of
residence of each non-California plaintiffs consisting of U.S.
consumers who purchased the Company's Chinese-manufactured laminate
flooring products challenging certain representations about the
durability and abrasion class ratings of such products.

These plaintiffs asserted claims for fraudulent concealment, breach
of warranty and violation of various state consumer protection
statutes. The plaintiffs did not quantify any alleged damages in
these cases; however, in addition to attorneys' fees and costs,
they did seek an order (i) certifying the action as a class action,
(ii) adopting the plaintiffs' class definitions and finding that
the plaintiffs are their proper representatives, (iii) appointing
their counsel as class counsel, (iv) granting injunctive relief to
prohibit the Company from continuing to advertise and/or sell
laminate flooring products with false abrasion class ratings, (v)
providing restitution of all monies the Company received from the
plaintiffs and class members and (vi) providing damages (actual,
compensatory and consequential), as well as punitive damages. On
October 3, 2016, the MDL Panel transferred and consolidated the
abrasion class actions to the Virginia Court. The consolidated case
is captioned In re: Lumber Liquidators Chinese-Manufactured
Laminate Flooring Durability Marketing and Sales Practices
Litigation (the "Abrasion MDL").

On March 15, 2018, the Company entered into a settlement agreement
to jointly settle the Formaldehyde MDL and the Abrasion MDL. Under
the terms of the settlement agreement, the Company agreed to fund
$22 million (the "Cash Payment") and provide $14 million in
store-credit vouchers for an aggregate settlement amount of $36
million to settle claims brought on behalf of purchasers of
Chinese-manufactured laminate flooring sold by the Company between
January 1, 2009 and May 31, 2015.

The $36 million aggregate settlement amount was accrued in 2017. On
June 16, 2018, the Virginia Court issued an order that, among other
things, granted preliminary approval of the settlement agreement.
Following the preliminary approval, and pursuant to the terms of
the settlement agreement, the Company, in June, paid $0.5 million
for settlement administration costs, which is part of the Cash
Payment, to the plaintiffs' settlement escrow account. Subsequent
to the Final Approval and Fairness Hearing held on October 3, 2018,
the Court approved the settlement on October 9, 2018 and, as a
result, the Company paid $21.5 million in cash into the plaintiffs'
settlement escrow account.

On November 8, 2018, an individual filed a Notice of Appeal in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (the "Appeals
Court") challenging the settlement. On December 14, 2018, another
individual filed a Notice of Appeal in the Appeals Court.
Subsequently, the Appeals Court consolidated both appeals and
entered a briefing schedule.

Vouchers, which generally have a three-year life, will be
distributed by the administrator upon order of the Virginia Court.
At December 31, 2018, the Company's obligations related to
Formaldehyde MDL and Abrasion MDL consisted of a short-term payable
of $35.5 million with $14 million expected to be satisfied by the
issuance of vouchers.

If the appeals were to result in the settlement being set aside,
the Company would receive $21.5 million back from the escrow agent.
Accordingly, the Company has accounted for the payment of $21.5
million as a deposit in the accompanying condensed consolidated
financial statements. The Company has no liability accrued related
to the appeals.

In addition to those purchasers who elected to opt out of the above
settlement (the "Opt Outs"), there are a number of individual
claims and lawsuits alleging personal injuries, breach of warranty
claims or violation of state consumer protection statutes that
remain pending (collectively, the "Related Laminate Matters").

Certain of these Related Laminate Matters were settled in 2019 and
2018. The Company recognized charges to earnings of $0.4 million
and $2.9 million for the six months ended June 30, 2019 and 2018,
respectively, within selling, general and administrative expenses
for these Related Laminate Matters.  

As of June 30, 2019, the remaining accrual related to these matters
was $0.1 million, which has been included in the caption "Accrual
for Legal Matters and Settlements Current" on the condensed
consolidated balance sheet.

While the Company believes that a further loss associated with the
Opt Outs and Related Laminate Matters is possible, the Company is
unable to reasonably estimate the amount or range of possible loss
beyond what has been provided. Any such losses could, potentially,
have a material adverse effect, individually or collectively, on
the Company's results of operations, financial condition and
liquidity.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Lumber Liquidators Holdings, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
operates as a multi-channel specialty retailer of hard-surface
flooring, and hard-surface flooring enhancements and accessories.
The company also offers its products through its Website, catalogs,
and call center. Lumber Liquidators Holdings, Inc. was founded in
1994 and is headquartered in Toano, Virginia.


LUMBER LIQUIDATORS: MOU Reached in Gold Class Action
----------------------------------------------------
Lumber Liquidators Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7,
2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the
parties in the class action suit initiated by Dana Gold have
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (the "MOU").

On or about December 8, 2014, Dana Gold filed a purported class
action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California alleging that the Morning Star bamboo
flooring that the Company sells is defective (the "Gold
Litigation").

Plaintiffs narrowed the complaint to the Company's Morning Star
Strand Bamboo flooring (the "Strand Bamboo Product") sold to
residents of California, Florida, Illinois, Minnesota, Pennsylvania
and West Virginia for personal, family or household use.

The Gold Litigation alleges that the Company engaged in deceptive
trade practices in conjunction with the sale of the Strand Bamboo
Products. The plaintiffs did not quantify any alleged damages in
their complaint but, in addition to attorneys' fees and costs, the
plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Company's actions violate
the law and that it is financially responsible for notifying all
purported class members, injunctive relief requiring the Company to
replace and/or repair all of the Strand Bamboo Product installed in
structures owned by the purported class members and a declaration
that the Company must disgorge, for the benefit of the purported
classes, all or part of the profits received from the sale of the
allegedly defective Strand Bamboo Product and/or to make full
restitution to the plaintiffs and the purported class members.

In November 2017, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for
class certification with respect to the six states. The Company
appealed the decision, but the petition for appeal was denied. On
January 2, 2019, the court denied the Company's motion for summary
judgment. The Company participated in court-ordered mediation
sessions. Trial, which was previously scheduled for February 25,
2019, has been postponed.

Following settlement discussions with the respect to the Gold
Litigation, on March 15, 2019, the Company entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding (the "Gold MOU"), which would resolve
the Gold Litigation on a nationwide basis.

Under the terms of the Gold MOU, the Company will contribute $14
million in cash and provide $14 million in store-credit vouchers,
with a potential additional $2 million in store-credit vouchers
based on obtaining a claim’s percentage of more than 7%, for an
aggregate settlement of up to $30 million.

The Gold MOU is subject to certain contingencies, including the
execution of a definitive settlement agreement, board approval of
the definitive settlement agreement and court approvals.

The entry into the Gold MOU or any subsequent execution of a
definitive settlement agreement does not constitute an admission by
the Company of any fault or liability and the Company does not
admit any fault or liability.

Lumber Liquidators said, "There can be no assurance that a
settlement will be finalized and approved or as to the ultimate
outcome of the litigation. If a final, court-approved settlement is
not reached, the Company will defend the matter vigorously and
believes there are meritorious defenses and legal standards that
must be met for, among other things, success on the merits. The
Company has notified its insurance carriers and continues to pursue
coverage, but the insurers to date have denied coverage. As the
insurance claim is still pending, the Company has not recognized
any insurance recovery related to the Gold Litigation."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Lumber Liquidators Holdings, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
operates as a multi-channel specialty retailer of hard-surface
flooring, and hard-surface flooring enhancements and accessories.
The company also offers its products through its Website, catalogs,
and call center. Lumber Liquidators Holdings, Inc. was founded in
1994 and is headquartered in Toano, Virginia.


LUMBER LIQUIDATORS: Parties in Kramer Suit Reach MOU
----------------------------------------------------
Lumber Liquidators Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7,
2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) has been entered into in the
class action suit initiated by Robert J. Kramer.

On or about November 17, 2017, Robert J. Kramer, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated (collectively, the
"Kramer Plaintiffs") filed a purported class action lawsuit in the
Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento on behalf of all
current and former store managers, all others with similar job
functions and/or titles and all current and former employees
classified as non-exempt or incorrectly classified as exempt and
who worked for the Company in the State of California
(collectively, the "CSM Employees") alleging violation of the
California Labor Code including, among other items, failure to pay
wages and overtime and engaging in unfair business practices (the
"Kramer matter").

The Kramer Plaintiffs seek certification of the CSM Employees for a
class action covering the prior four-year period prior to the
filing of the complaint through the disposition of this action for
the CSM Employees who currently are or were employed in California
(the "California SM Class").

On or about February 19, 2019, the Kramer Plaintiffs filed a first
amended complaint adding a claim for penalties under the California
Private Attorney General Act for the same substantive alleged
violations asserted in the Complaint. The Kramer Plaintiffs did not
quantify any alleged damages but, in addition to attorneys' fees
and costs, the Kramer Plaintiffs seek unspecified amounts for
unpaid wages and overtime wages, liquidated and/or punitive
damages, declaratory relief, restitution, statutory penalties,
injunctive relief and other damages.

In July 2019, the Company entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding ("Kramer MOU") with the lead plaintiff in the Kramer
matter. Under the terms of the Kramer MOU, the Company will pay
$4.75 million to settle the claims asserted in the Kramer matter
(or which could have been asserted in the Kramer matter) on behalf
of all current and/or former store managers and store managers in
training employed by the Company at any time between November 17,
2013 until the time of preliminary approval of the settlement by
the court. The Kramer MOU is subject to certain contingencies,
including the execution of a definitive settlement agreement and
court approvals of the definitive settlement agreement.

Lumber Liquidators said, "There can be no assurance that a
settlement will be finalized and approved or as to the ultimate
outcome of the litigation. If a final, court-approved settlement is
not reached, the Company will defend the matter vigorously and
believes there are meritorious defenses and legal standards that
must be met for, among other things, class certification and
success on the merits. If the parties are unable to finalize the
settlement, the Kramer matter could have a material adverse effect
on the Company's financial condition and results of operations.
However, as a result of these developments, the Company has
determined that a probable loss has been incurred and has
recognized a net charge to earnings of approximately $4.75 million
within selling general and administrative expense during the
quarter ended June 30, 2019."

Lumber Liquidators Holdings, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
operates as a multi-channel specialty retailer of hard-surface
flooring, and hard-surface flooring enhancements and accessories.
The company also offers its products through its Website, catalogs,
and call center. Lumber Liquidators Holdings, Inc. was founded in
1994 and is headquartered in Toano, Virginia.


LUMBER LIQUIDATORS: Steele Class Action in Canada Ongoing
---------------------------------------------------------
Lumber Liquidators Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7,
2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the
company continues to defend a class action lawsuit in Canada
initiated by Sarah Steele.

On or about April 1, 2015, Sarah Steele ("Steele") filed a
purported class action lawsuit in the Ontario, Canada Superior
Court of Justice against the Company.

In the complaint, Steele's allegations include strict liability,
breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose,
breach of implied warranty of merchantability, fraud by
concealment, civil negligence, negligent misrepresentation and
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Steele did not quantify any alleged damages in her complaint, but
seeks compensatory damages, punitive, exemplary and aggravated
damages, statutory remedies, attorneys' fees and costs.

Lumber Liquidators said, "While the Company believes that a further
loss associated with the Steele litigation is possible, the Company
is unable to reasonably estimate the amount or range of possible
loss."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Lumber Liquidators Holdings, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
operates as a multi-channel specialty retailer of hard-surface
flooring, and hard-surface flooring enhancements and accessories.
The company also offers its products through its Website, catalogs,
and call center. Lumber Liquidators Holdings, Inc. was founded in
1994 and is headquartered in Toano, Virginia.


MAS-SAR-O INC: Denied Guevara Overtime Pay, Minimum Wages
---------------------------------------------------------
Andrea Guevara, on behalf of herself and similarly situated
individuals, Petitioner, v. Mas-Sar-O Inc. and Peter Massaro,
Respondents Case No. 19-cv-04440, (E.D. N.Y., August 1, 2019),
seeks to recover minimum and overtime wages as mandated by New York
labor law and the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Defendants operate as Cobblestones Pop and Biergarten where Guevara
worked as a server. He claims to be denied overtime pay and paid
below the mandatory minimum wage rate. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Lawrence Spasojevich, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF JAMES F. SULLIVAN PC
     52 Duane St., 7th Floor
     New York, NY 11702
     Tel. (212) 374-0009
     Fax: (212) 374-9931
     Email: ls@jfslaw.net


MASTEC NETWORK: Cavins Labor Suit Claims Unpaid Overtime
--------------------------------------------------------
David Lee Cavins, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MasTec Network Solutions, LLC and
MasTec Renewables Puerto Rico, LLC, Defendants, Case No.
19-cv-23227 (S.D. Fla., August 2, 2019), seeks recover unpaid
overtime and other damages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act and the Puerto Rico Wage Payment Statute.

MasTec is a full service infrastructure, construction company
centering on most facets of the utility industry where Cavins
worked as a lineman. Throughout his employment with MasTec, he was
paid a day-rate with no overtime compensation. He claims that he
was paid a salary regardless of the number of hours he worked that
day without any overtime pay for hours worked in excess of forty
hours in a workweek. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
      Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
      JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LAW FIRM
      11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
      Houston, TX 77046
      Tel: (713) 352-1100
      Fax: (713) 352-3300
      Email: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
             adunlap@mybackwages.com

             - and -

      Richard J. Burch, Esq.
      BRUCKNER BURCH, P.L.L.C.
      8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
      Houston, TX 77046
      Tel: (713) 877-8788
      Fax: (713) 877-8065
      Email: rburch@brucknerburch.com

             - and -

      Andrew R. Frisch, Esq.
      MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
      600 N. Pine Island Road, Suite 400
      Plantation, FL 33324
      Telephone: (954) 318-0268
      Facsimile: (954) 327-3016
      Email: afrisch@forthepeople.com


MDL 2672: Court Refuses Bosch's Bid to Seal Exhibits
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order denying Defendants Bosch GmbH and Bosch
LLC (Bosch)’s Motion to Seal Three Exhibits Attached to
Declaration in the case captioned IN RE: VOLKSWAGEN "CLEAN DIESEL"
MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. This
Order Relates To: Napleton, No. 3:16-cv-2086-CRB. MDL No. 2672 CRB
(JSC). (N.D. Cal.).

Bosch has asked for permission (i) to redact certain information
from the parties' discovery dispute letter and from the
accompanying declaration of Plaintiffs' counsel and (ii) to file
under seal the three exhibits attached that declaration. Two of
those exhibits are internal Bosch emails from 2009 and 2010. The
third exhibit is a 2009 Bosch PowerPoint presentation. Plaintiffs'
counsel submitted these exhibits to the Court as part of the
discovery dispute.

The discovery dispute is only tangentially related to the merits of
the case. As a result, Bosch only needs to put forward a good cause
for sealing and redacting the information in question. Yet although
the good cause standard is less exacting than the compelling
reasons standard, which applies to requests to seal information in
dispositive motions, it requires more than broad allegations of
harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated
reasoning.

For the three exhibits attached to counsel's declaration, Bosch has
not met the good cause standard. Bosch explains that the exhibits
contain confidential business information regarding company
policies and operations, as well as certain technical information
concerning programing and calibration. That appears to be an
accurate description of the exhibits, but what is missing is a
showing that specific prejudice or harm will result if the exhibits
are not sealed. The exhibits are Bosch documents that are nearly a
decade old. How Bosch will be harmed if these documents are
publicly disclosed is not explained.

Bosch offers an alternative justification for its request to seal
the exhibits. Bosch argues that Plaintiffs have mischaracterized
the exhibits in the discovery dispute letter, and Bosch asserts
that it could be harmed if these false or misleading
characterizations of confidential information are circulated. If
Plaintiffs have indeed mischaracterized the substance of Bosch's
internal documents, then public disclosure of the documents will
benefit Bosch. For if the documents are not sealed, members of the
public can examine them and judge for themselves whether
Plaintiffs' characterizations are accurate. Bosch's concern, then,
counsels in favor of keeping the exhibits publicly available and
does not constitute "good cause" for sealing them.

As for Bosch's request to redact portions of the parties' discovery
dispute letter and of the accompanying attorney declaration, only
some of the redactions are warranted. Consistent with prior Orders,
the Court will permit Bosch to redact the names and job titles of
employees who are nonparties in this action. The other requested
redactions will not be permitted. They are of quotes, paraphrases,
and citations to the three exhibits attached to counsel's
declaration and to other Bosch documents referred to in the
declaration but not attached as exhibits. Because the Court has
denied Bosch's request to seal the exhibits, and because Bosch has
not shown good cause for sealing references to the exhibits or to
the other documents referenced in the declaration, the Court will
not permit Bosch to redact these quotes, paraphrases, and
citations.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 15, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3hqeod4 from Leagle.com.

Nicholas Benipayo, Plaintiff, represented by Steve W. Berman --
steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice,
Thomas Eric Loeser -- toml@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice & Robert B. Carey -- rob@hbsslaw.com --
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice.

James Babiak, Jonathon Horacek & Alfred Howe, Plaintiffs,
represented by Robert B. Carey, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP,
pro hac vice & Steve W. Berman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP,
pro hac vice.

Nadine Bonda, Plaintiff, represented by Adam M. Stewart --
astewart@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP & Thomas G. Shapiro
-- tshapiro@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.
Brian Connelly, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas G. Shapiro,
Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.
Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Amie Adelia Vague --
avague@lightfootlaw.com -- Lightfoot Franklin & White, Casey Erin
Lucier -- clucier@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, Charles J.
Baker, III -- cbaker@wcsr.com -- Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice,
Colin Hampton Tucker, Rhodes Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable, 100
W. Fifth Street, Suite 400, Tulsa, Oklahoma 74121-1100, Dana
Woodrum Lang -- dlang@wcsr.com -- Womble Carlyle Sandridge and
Rice, David M. Eisenberg -- eisenberg@bscr-law.com -- Baker,
Sterchi, Cowden & Rice, LLC, Henry Buist Smythe, Jr. --
hsmythe@wcsr.com -- Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, Howard
Feller -- hfeller@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, William R.
Scherer, Conrad and Scherer, LLP, 633 South Federal Highway Fort
Lauderdale, FL 33301, J. Randolph Bibb, Jr. --
rbibb@lewisthomason.com -- Lewis, Thomason, King, Krieg & Waldrop,
P.C., James K. Toohey -- tooheyj@jbltd.com -- Johns & Bell LTD,
Jeffrey Lance Chase, Chase Kurshan Herzfeld & Rufin LLC, 354
Eisenhower ParkwaySuite 1100Livingston, NJ 07039.


MDL 2705: Bid to Amend "Grated Parmesan Cheese" Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE 100% GRATED PARMESAN CHEESE MARKETING AND SALES
PRACTICES LITIGATION. This Document Relates to All Cases, Case Nos.
16 C 5802, MDL 2705 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Gary Feinerman of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division, (i) denied the Plaintiffs' motion to amend their
complaints to allege an Anticaking claim against Publix Super
Markets, Inc. and to cure the defects in their Anticaking claim
against Target Corp. and ICCO-Cheese Co., Inc; (ii) granted in part
and denied in part Albertsons Companies, Inc., Albertsons LLC, and
SuperValu, Inc.'s motion for partial summary judgment; and (iii)
granted in part and denied in part Kraft Heinz Co.'s respective
motion for judgment on the pleadings.

The Defendants in the multidistrict litigation are purveyors of
grated parmesan cheese products with labels stating "100% Grated
Parmesan Cheese" or some variation thereof.  After the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation assigned these suits to Judge
Feinerman, the Plaintiffs filed five consolidated class action
complaints, which alleged that they were misled by the "100% Grated
Parmesan Cheese" labels because the products contained non-cheese
ingredients such as cellulose.

The Defendants moved to dismiss the complaints under Civil Rules
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).  The Court denied the Rule 12(b)(1) motions
but granted the Rule 12(b)(6) motions without prejudice to
repleading.

The Plaintiffs then filed five amended consolidated class action
complaints -- against Kraft; Publix; Albertsons/SuperValu;
Target/ICCO; and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and ICCO-Cheese Co., Inc.
Like the initial complaints, the amended complaints allege that the
Plaintiffs were misled by the "100% Grated Parmesan Cheese" labels
because the products in fact contained cellulose.  In addition, the
amended complaints except for the one against Publix allege that
the products' ingredient lists were misleading because they
represented that the cellulose was added to prevent caking, when in
fact the cellulose also acted as filler.

The Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaints under Rule
12(b)(6).  Those motions were granted as to the claims based on the
"100% Grated Parmesan Cheese" label and granted in part and denied
in part as to the claims based on the ingredient lists'
representation that cellulose was added to prevent caking, and
Publix and Target/ICCO were dismissed as Defendants.

The Plaintiffs now move under Rule 15(a)(2) to amend their
complaints to allege an Anticaking claim against Publix and to cure
the defects in their Anticaking claim against Target/ICCO;
Albertsons/SuperValu moves under Rule 56 for partial summary
judgment and under Rule 12(c) for partial judgment on the
pleadings; and Kraft moves under Rule 12(c) for judgment on the
pleadings.

Among other things, Judge Feinerman finds that the Defendants
included the Anticaking representation on the products' ingredient
labels -- even though, as they conceded at the motion hearing, the
representation is not required by law -- trongly suggests that the
representation helped the Defendants sell more cheese at higher
prices, thereby driving up the price for all consumers.  The
Plaintiffs therefore have Article III standing to pursue the
Anticaking claims.

He also finds that an amendment at this late stage, following two
hard-fought Rule 12(b)(6) rounds that took significant time and
effort for the parties to litigate and for the Court to resolve,
would therefore prejudice Publix and Target/ICCO by "forcing them
to articulate even more reasons for dismissal, and, at the same
time providing the Plaintiffs with the opportunity to correct
mistakes facially apparent since the first complaint after the
defendants had shown their hand.

The Judge further finds that the Plaintiffs did not see the
ingredient lists' Anticaking representations, so those
representations could not possibly have deceived them.  The
Plaintiffs therefore have no viable Anticaking claim under ICFA.
As for the MCPA, the anticaking representation and corresponding
"filler" omission could not have been material to the Plaintiffs'
decisions to buy the Kraft product because they did not see the
ingredient label, and thus they neither knew that the product
contained cellulose nor saw the representation that allegedly made
Kraft's failure to disclose additional information deceptive and
misleading.  Kraft therefore is entitled to judgment on the
Anticaking claims under MCPA.

As for the Alabama warranty claims, the Judge finds that the
Plaintiffs make no argument and cite no authority to support their
contention that Alabama law recognizes an actual knowledge
exception to the notice requirement, thereby forfeiting the issue.
Even if Alabama recognized an actual knowledge exception, the
Plaintiffs have forfeited any argument that the Alabama actual
notice exception differs from the Illinois exception, which as
shown, is not satisfied.

Kraft argues that it is also entitled to judgment on the California
implied warranty claims because implied warranty claims based on a
product's failure to "conform to the promises or affirmations of
fact" on the label rise or fall with express warranty claims based
on the same representation.  The Plaintiffs do not respond to that
argument, thereby forfeiting the issue and the California implied
warranty claims.

Finally, the Judge finds that SuperValu is entitled to judgment on
the Alabama express warranty claim because even if the Anticaking
representation created an express warranty under Alabama law, the
Plaintiffs still could not recover because they did not provide
SuperValu with adequate pre-suit notice.  In so holding, the Judge
did not reach the question whether the Anticaking representation in
fact created an express warranty, and SuperValu has not provided
any argument or cited any case law showing that it did, thereby
forfeiting the issue.  Accordingly, SuperValu is not entitled to
judgment on the Alabama unjust enrichment claims.

For the reasons provided, Judge Feinerman denied the Plaintiffs'
motion for leave to file second amended complaints against Publix
and Target/ICCO.  The claims against Publix and Target/ICCO remain
dismissed.

As to Kraft, the Plaintiffs' CUTPA, ICFA, and MCPA claims; their
California, Florida, and Minnesota express warranty claims; their
California, Connecticut, and Minnesota implied warranty claims; and
their Illinois unjust enrichment claims are dismissed.  Their New
York, Connecticut, Minnesota, Florida, California, Alabama, and
Michigan unjust enrichment claims against Kraft may proceed, along
with their Alabama express warranty claims and Michigan implied
warranty claims (neither of which were addressed in Kraft's Rule
12(c) motion).

As to Albertsons/SuperValu, the Plaintiffs' ICFA claims; their
Illinois and Alabama express warranty claims; their Illinois
implied warranty claims; and their Illinois unjust enrichment claim
are dismissed.  Their Alabama unjust enrichment claim against
SuperValu may proceed.  As there are no remaining claims against
Albertsons, it is dismissed as a Defendant.

The dismissed claims against Publix, Target/ICCO, Kraft, and
Albertsons/SuperValu are dismissed with prejudice.  The Plaintiffs
were on notice of the reliance and causation issues that resulted
in the dismissals at least since the Court issued its more recent
opinion.  They have not proposed, in either their motion for leave
to amend or their responses to Kraft's and Albertsons/SuperValu's
present motions, a way to amend their complaint to sufficiently
allege reliance or causation.

Moreover, the Plaintiffs have from the beginning of the litigation
known what information they saw and relied upon at the time they
purchased the Defendants' products.  Permitting them to amend those
allegations at this late stage, following three protracted and
resource-intensive rounds of briefing, would prejudice Defendants
and waste judicial resources.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 16, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/jllirj from Leagle.com.

Rosemary Quinn, Plaintiff, represented by Ben Barnow -
b.barnow@barnowlaw.com - Barnow and Associates, P.C..
Rosemary Quinn, Plaintiff, represented by Todd Seth Garber -
tgarber@fbfglaw.com - Finkelstein Blankinship, Frei- Pearson &
Garber, LLP.

Alfonso Fata, Plaintiff, represented by Ben Barnow, Barnow and
Associates, P.C. & Todd Seth Garber, Finkelstein Blankinship,
Frei- Pearson & Garber, LLP.

Alan Ducorsky, Plaintiff, represented by Ben Barnow, Barnow and
Associates, P.C. & Todd Seth Garber, Finkelstein Blankinship,
Frei- Pearson & Garber, LLP.

Kristie Perkins, Plaintiff, represented by Phillip Timothy Howard,
Howard & Associates. 8511 Bull Headley Rd, Ste 400, Leon County,
Tallahassee, FL 32312-5131.

Chrissy Sellers, Plaintiff, represented by Phillip Timothy Howard,
Howard & Associates.

Kiara Cruz, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander Jan-Yura
Korolinsky, 500 S Australian Ave, West Palm Beach, FL, 33401-6223
Melissa Leigh Randolph, Plaintiff, represented by Grey Tesh &
William Charles Wright, William C. Wright Law Offices. 515 N.
Flagler Dr., Ste P-300, West Palm Beach, FL 33401

Michael Jones, Plaintiff, represented by Gary F. Lynch -
jlynch@carlsonlynch.com - Carlson Lynch Sweet & Kilpela, LLP, John
J. Driscoll - driscoll@clm.com - The Driscoll Firm & Philip Sholtz
- psholtz@goldbergsegalla.com - The Driscoll Firm.

Chauncy Ellison, Plaintiff, represented by Gary F. Lynch, Carlson
Lynch Sweet & Kilpela, LLP, John J. Driscoll, The Driscoll Firm &
Philip Sholtz, The Driscoll Firm.

Albertson Companies, Inc, Defendant, represented by Gary Hansen -
ghansen@foxrothschild.com - Fox Rothschild LLP, Heidi A.O. Fisher
- hfisher@foxrothschild.com - Fox Rothschild LLP, Samuel John
Tunheim - stunheim@foxrothschild.com - Fox Rothschild LLP, Joseph
Edward Collins - jcollins@foxrothschild.com - Fox Rothschild LLP &
Robert J. Rohrberger - rrohrberger@foxrothschild.com - Fox
Rothschild LLP.

Albertsons, LLC, Defendant, represented by Gary Hansen, Fox
Rothschild LLP, Heidi A.O. Fisher, Fox Rothschild LLP, Samuel John
Tunheim, Fox Rothschild LLP, Joseph Edward Collins, Fox Rothschild
LLP & Robert J. Rohrberger, Fox Rothschild LLP.

Supervalu, Inc., Defendant, represented by Gary Hansen, Fox
Rothschild LLP, Heidi A.O. Fisher, Fox Rothschild LLP, Samuel John
Tunheim, Fox Rothschild LLP, Joseph Edward Collins, Fox Rothschild
LLP & Robert J. Rohrberger, Fox Rothschild LLP.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Defendant, represented by DAVID E.
SELLINGER - sellingere@gtlaw.com - GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP, David
Eric Sellinger, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Francis A. Citera -
citeraf@gtlaw.com - Greenberg Traurig, LLP. & John F. Gibbons -
gibbonsj@gtlaw.com - Greenberg Traurig, LLP..

Kraft Heinz Company, Defendant, represented by Alexander M. Smith
- asmith@jenner.com - Jenner and Block LLP, Dean Nicholas Panos -
dpanos@jenner.com - Jenner & Block LLP & Kenneth Kiyul Lee -
klee@jenner.com - Jenner & Block LLP.

Target Corporation, Defendant, represented by Joshua Gliki, -
glikin@bowie-jensen.com - Bowie & Jensen, LLC, Eileen Marie Letts,
Zuber Lawler & Del Duca LLP & Martin Peter Greene, Zuber Lawler &
Del Duca LLP.

ICCO-Cheese Company, Inc., Defendant, represented by Joshua
Glikin, Bowie & Jensen, LLC.

Publix Super Markets, Inc., Defendant, represented by Heidi A.O.
Fisher, Fox Rothschild LLP & Ted C. Craig, GrayRobinson, PA.

Competitive Enterprise Institute Center for Class Action Fairness,
Amicus, represented by Anna St. John, Competitive Enterprise
Institute Center for Class Action Fai & M. Frank Bednarz, Center
For Class Action Fairness.


MDL 2724: Joint Bid to Dismiss Generic Drug Antitrust Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued an Opinion denying Defendants' Joint Motion to
Dismiss in the case captioned IN RE GENERIC PHARMACEUTICALS PRICING
ANTITRUST LITIGATION. THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO The State Attorneys
General Litigation The Kroger Co. v. Actavis Holdco U.S., Inc.
1199SEIU Nat'l Benefit Fund v. Actavis Holdco US, Inc. West Val
Pharmacy v. Actavis Holdco U.S., Inc. Ahold USA, Inc. v. Actavis
Holdco U.S., Inc. Humana Inc. v. Actavis Elizabeth, LLC Marion
Diagnostic Center, LLC v. McKesson Corp. Nos. MDL 2724, 16-MD-2724,
Civil Action No. 17-3768, No. 18-284., 18-2401, 18-2533, 18-2641,
18-3299, 18-4137 (E.D. Pa.).

This is a multidistrict antitrust litigation involving allegations
that certain pharmaceutical companies engaged in an unlawful scheme
or schemes to fix, maintain, and stabilize prices, rig bids, and
engage in market and customer allocations of certain generic
pharmaceutical products.

Defendants seek to dismiss the overarching conspiracy claims
against them pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
which provides for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a
claim when a plaintiff's plain statement lacks enough substance to
show that it is entitled to relief. Judging the sufficiency of a
pleading is a context-dependent exercise.

UNITED STATES V. KELLY

To determine whether Plaintiffs' allegations are enough to state an
overarching conspiracy claim, Defendants argue the Court should
apply the three-factor test set forth in United States v. Kelly.
892 F.2d 255, 258-59 (3d Cir. 1989).

They argue that plaintiffs must plead facts showing that (1) each
alleged conspirator was aware of, and committed to, a common goal
that transcended individual agreements in which it is specifically
alleged to have participated (2) the alleged agreement contemplated
a result that will not continue without the cooperation of the
conspirators, that the individual conspiracies were interdependent
and (3) there was sufficient overlap among the participants in the
individual conspiracies.

COMMON GOAL

The common goal required under Kelly need not be complex or
detailed to state a claim. In Kelly, the common goal was simply to
make money selling speed. In the Overarching Complaints, Plaintiffs
have alleged that Defendants shared the common goal of increasing
and stabilizing the prices of generic drugs.

For example, Direct Purchasers (DPPs) allege that Defendants had a
common understanding and goal to achieve artificially inflated
prices by disincentivizing competition for additional market share
through price erosion. End-Payor Plaintiffs (EPPs) allege that the
purpose of Defendants' unlawful fair share allocation was to fix,
maintain and stabilize prices either for a particular generic drug
or any number of generic drugs. In this way, each entrant would
benefit from coordination as a whole, even if a manufacturer did
not seek a market allocation for a particular drug.

Humana alleges that Defendants' shared understanding and goal is
for the competitors in a particular market to discuss amongst
themselves an agreement on 'fair share' with the objective of
attaining a state of equilibrium where no competitor is
incentivized to compete for additional market share by eroding
price.

Kroger Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' common goal was to
cartelize the Price-Fixed Generic Drugs in order to achieve
substantial supracompetitive profits. Plaintiff States allege that
Defendants' overarching goal was to avoid price erosion and
maintain inflated pricing within and across their respective broad
product portfolios and, at times, increase pricing for targeted
products without triggering a fight to the bottom' among existing
competitors. No more is required to allege a common goal at this
stage of the case.

Defendants argue that the Overarching Complaints should be
dismissed because Plaintiffs have not alleged facts showing that
each Defendant shares the common goal of an overarching conspiracy
involving other drugs sold by other Defendants. But Kelly does not
require proof that each defendant knew all the details, goals or
other participants in order for the Court to find there was a
single conspiracy. A common goal may exist even when conspirators
individually or in groups perform different tasks in pursuing the
common goal, and a single conspiracy may attract different members
at different times or involve different sub-groups committing acts
in furtherance of the overall plan. A defendant need not be accused
of having engaged in all activities alleged to have advanced the
conspiracy.

In other words, one conspiracy can involve multiple subsidiary
schemes. That is what Plaintiffs have alleged in their Overarching
Complaints: a single conspiracy with a common goal, facilitated by
multiple schemes specific to various individual generic drugs.

INTERDEPENDENCE

The second Kelly factor asks the Court to consider whether
Defendants' conduct was intended to bring to pass a continuous
result that would not continue without the continuous cooperation
of the conspirators.

To evaluate interdependence, the court engages in an inquiry
focused on the extent to which the success or failure of one
conspiracy is independent of a corresponding success or failure by
the other. Courts consider how helpful one individual's
contribution is to another's goals.

Interdependence helps establish whether the alleged coconspirators
are all committed to the same set of objectives in a single
conspiracy.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' Overarching Complaints should
fail because they fail to allege facts demonstrating why an
agreement as to all drugs would be necessary to reach agreement on
one drug. Responding to Defendants, Plaintiffs explain that while
Defendants' massive web of interlocking market allocation and
price-fixing agreements might not have completely unraveled if one
strand had to come apart, the Complaints contain multiple examples
of how the agreements fit together and reinforced each other,
allowing for easy collaboration and policing. Further, by
connecting multiple single-drug conspiracies, Defendants were able
to better conceal their overarching conspiracy by varying the
leader of the price increase across drugs.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' interdependence allegations make
no economic sense  that individual Defendants had no incentive to
increase prices for products that they did not sell. But in the
Overarching Complaints, Plaintiffs have alleged the contrary.
Humana alleges that putative competitors declined to compete
meaningfully on a bid for one drug in exchange for the opportunity
to provide a pre-determined winning bid for a different drug and
that an agreement by a putative competitor to join in the price
increase for one drug often instigated a trade-off for that same
competitor to lead a price increase for another drug.

Defendants insist that Plaintiffs cannot show interdependence by
alleging the existence of an alleged 'series' of numerous
individual conspiracies in the same industry. They argue that to
state a claim for an overarching conspiracy, a complaint must
allege facts demonstrating how, when, or where' the individual
conspiracies became connected to each other in a single overarching
conspiracy.

However, through detailed allegations regarding communications and
other interactions between individual Defendants, Plaintiffs'
Overarching Complaints have sufficiently alleged the how, when, or
where needed to make plausible a claim that Defendants' actions
regarding the prices of individual generic drugs in their
portfolios were beneficial to and reinforced a broader scheme
regarding generic drug prices.

At this stage of the litigation, Plaintiffs have sufficiently
alleged interdependence.

SUFFICIENT OVERLAP

Even if Plaintiffs' allegations did fall short on the other Kelly
factors, their allegations of significant overlap among Defendants
and the alleged individual drug conspiracies permit their
overarching conspiracy claims to withstand dismissal.

Defendants argue that there is insufficient overlap between the
participants in the alleged individual conspiracies because none of
the Private Plaintiffs alleges that any single Defendant
participated in each of the individual drug conspiracies, and the
Plaintiff States allege that only one Defendant participated in
each of the 15 individual drug conspiracies alleged in the State
Complaint.

Plaintiffs respond that their claims rest on far more than the mere
overlap of some defendants in the interlocking conspiracies
alleged. The States argue that their Overarching Complaint contains
much more connective tissue between the Defendants and their
agreements: overlapping, but not identical, sets of Defendants
discussing price increases for multiple drugs at the same time,
discussions on pricing activities for drugs that a Defendant did
not manufacture; constant, crisscrossing communications among each
other.

There is no question that mere overlap of some defendants in some
of the transactions is, on its own, insufficient to establish an
overarching agreement. But in the Overarching Complaints,
Plaintiffs allege much more than the mere overlap of some of the
Defendants.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have numerous and sustained
contacts through (1) representation on trade association boards of
directors (2) trade association membership (3) attendance at trade
association meetings and events and (4) other industry gatherings.
Under the allegations in the Overarching Complaints, Defendants
participated in and in many cases governed the same trade
associations and attended numerous trade association activities. As
EPPs argue, Defendants' meetings at trade association events were
not partitioned into drug-specific conclaves. Trade events are
broadly focused; there were not, for example, Glyburide conferences
and Acetazolamide conferences, but rather, an incredible number of
events at which all manufacturers of all drugs were together.

Other allegations in the Overarching Complaints paint a similar
picture of overlap between Defendants, although the allegations are
more detailed with respect to some Defendants than others.

When Plaintiffs' allegations in each Overarching Complaint are
viewed as a whole, they do not simply reflect a series of
disconnected conspiracies. Plaintiffs do not rely exclusively on
the illustrative examples of collusive activity among Defendants or
the trade meetings. They also allege similar price trends across
the market for generic drugs and various investigations involving
overlapping Defendants, including one resulting in Malek's
admission of guilt. Malek is specifically alleged to have had
numerous contacts with employees of Defendants other than his own
employer. These allegations bolster the plausibility of the
antitrust claims set forth in the Overarching Complaints. Whether
the points of overlap alleged in the Overarching Complaints
ultimately will be sufficient to prove Plaintiffs' overarching
conspiracy claims is not the question before the Court.

Plaintiffs have alleged enough overlap under Kelly to allow them to
proceed with discovery regarding the question of whether there was
or is a broad overarching conspiracy connecting the alleged
individual generic drug conspiracies.

Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the existence of an
overarching conspiracy and the Court will permit the claims based
on an overarching conspiracy theory to proceed. Defendants' joint
motion to dismiss plaintiffs' overarching conspiracy claims will be
denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 15, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3nkn5z9 from Leagle.com.

In re DEFENSE LIAISON COUNSEL, Plaintiff, represented by CHUL PAK,
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI PC, 1301 Avenue of the Americas,
40th Floor, New York, NY 10019, JAN P. LEVINE --
levinej@pepperlaw.com -- PEPPER HAMILTON LLP, LAURA S. SHORES --
laura.shores@arnoldporter.com -- ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP,
SAUL P. MORGENSTERN -- saul.morgenstern@arnoldporter.com -- ARNOLD
& PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP & SHERON KORPUS -- skorpus@kasowitz.com
-- KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES LLP.

In re DIRECT PURCHASER PLAINTIFFS PSC, Plaintiff, represented by
DAVID F. SORENSEN -- dsorensen@bm.net -- BERGER MONTAGUE PC, DIANNE
M. NAST -- dnast@nastlaw.com -- NASTLAW LLC, LINDA P. NUSSBAUM --
lnussbaum@nussbaumpc.com -- NUSSBAUM LAW GROUP PC, MICHAEL L.
ROBERTS, ROBERTS LAW FIRM, 153 S 9th St., Gadsden, Alabama 35901,
ROBERT N. KAPLAN -- rkaplan@kaplanfox.com -- KAPLAN FOX &
KILSHEIMER, LLP, THOMAS M. SOBOL, HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP,
One Main Street 4th Floor Cambridge, MA 02142, CANDICE ENDERS --
cenders@bm.net -- BERGER MONTAGUE PC & ROBERTA D. LIEBENBERG ,
FINE, KAPLAN AND BLACK. 1 S Broad St., Ste 2300, Philadelphia, PA
19107-3423

MCKESSON MEDICAL-SURGICAL, INC., Defendant, represented by ABRAM J.
ELLIS -- aellis@stblaw.com -- SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, PETER
C. THOMAS -- peter.a.thomas@stblaw.com -- SIMPSON THACHER &
BARTLETT LLP & SARA YOUNG RAZI -- aellis@stblaw.com -- SIMPSON
THACHER & BARTLETT LLP.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervenor, represented by JAY OWEN, U.S.
DEPT OF JUSTICE -- ANTITRUST DIV, NATHAN D. BRENNER, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION & RYAN J. DANKS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.


MDL 2905: Meyer v. FCA over Defective Airbag Moved to Calif.
------------------------------------------------------------
The case, Regina Heilman-Ryan and Desiree Meyer on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs.
ZF TRW Automotive Holdings Corp. and FCA U.S., LLC, the Defendants,
Case No. 4:19-cv-11464 (Filed May 17, 2019), was transferred from
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, New York, to the United States District Court for the
Central District of California (Western Division - Los Angeles) on
Aug. 8, 2019.  The Central District of California Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-06899-JAK-FFM to the proceeding.

The Meyer case is being consolidated with MDL 2905 in re: ZF-TRW
AIRBAG CONTROL UNITS PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. The MDL was
created by Order of the United States Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation on August 7, 2019. These actions share
common factual questions arising from allegations that airbag
control units manufactured by the ZF-TRW defendants are defective,
in that an electrical overstress condition can cause a malfunction
of the ACU's application specific integrated circuit. Because of
this alleged defect -- which may affect more than 12 million
vehicles made bymultiple automakers, including FCA, Honda,
Hyundai/Kia, Mitsubishi, and Toyota -- there is a risk that the
airbag could fail to deploy in an accident. In its August 7, 2019
Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions in this MDL involve
common questions of fact, and that centralization in the Central
District of California will serve the convenience of the parties
and witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of the
litigation. Centralization would eliminate duplicative discovery
and other pretrial proceedings, as well as the possibility of
inconsistent rulings on class certification, Daubertmotions, and
other pretrial matters, and conserve judicial and party resources.
Presiding Judge in the MDL is Hon. Judge John A. Kronstadt. The
lead case is 2:19-ml-02905-JAK-FFM.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs and the Proposed Classes are:

          Gretchen Freeman Cappio, Esq.
          Ryan Patrick McDevitt, Esq.
          Lynn L Sarko, Esq.
          Keller Rohrback LLP
          1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3200
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 623-1900
          Facsimile: (206) 623-3384
          E-mail: gcappio@kellerrohrback.com
                  rmcdevitt@kellerrohrback.com
                  lsarko@kellerrohrback.com

               - and -

          Tana Lin, Esq.
          US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
          P O Box 65968
          Washington, DC 20035
          Telephone: (202) 514-2168

Attorneys for ZF TRW Automotive Holdings Corp.

          Herbert C. Donovan, Esq.
          Matthew Letzmann, Esq.
          BROOKS WILKINS
          SHARKEY AND TURCO PLLC
          401 South Old Woodward Avenue Suite 400
          Birmingham, MI 48009
          Telephone: (248) 971-1720
          Facsimile: (248) 971-1801
          E-mail: donovan@bwst-law.com
                  letzmann@bwst-law.com

               - and -

          Jason Wilcox, Esq.
          Judson Brown, Esq.
          Matthew T Regan, Esq.
          Michael A Glick, Esq.
          KIRKLAND AND ELLIS LLP
          1301 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
          Washington, DC 20004
          Telephone: (202) 389-5000
          Facsimile: (202) 389-5200
          E-mail: jason.wilcox@kirkland.com
                  jdbrown@kirkland.com
                  mregan@kirkland.com
                  michael.glick@kirkland.com

Attorneys for FCA U.S., LLC:

          Kathy A Wisniewski, Esq.
          Stephen A D'Aunoy, Esq.
          Thomas L. Azar , Jr., Esq.
          THOMPSON COBURN LLP
          One US Bank Plaza
          St Louis, MO 63101
          Telephone: (314) 552-6000
          Facsimile: (314) 552-7000
          E-mail: kwisniewski@thompsoncoburn.com
                  sdaunoy@thompsoncoburn.com
                  tazar@thompsoncoburn.com

MDL 2905: Payne Suit v. FCA over Defective Airbag Moved to Calif.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case against 17 car manufacturers was transferred from the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida,
to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, to the United States District Court for the Central
District of California (Western Division - Los Angeles) on Aug. 8,
2019. The Central District of California Court Clerk assigned Case
No. 2:19-cv-06894-JAK-FFM to the proceeding.

The case is captioned as THOMAS PAYNE, Andrea Acosta, KRYSTINA
BONILLA, ALEXIA BOUCLIER, YONI BREVE, Brian Chaiken, SAMUEL CHOC,
EDUARDO CONSUEGRA, RYAN CRESPO, GRISSELL DENIZARD, Marlene
Martinez, ARMANDO PAZ, JR., Alexander Perez, Jose Portillo,
Alejandro Ramirez, NOE RIVERON, JUAN ZAMORA, Michael Hines,
BERNADETTE POLANSKY DANNY BUSTAMANTE, and Gilberto Perez
(Petitioner), individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs. vs. ZF Friedrichshafen AG; ZF TRW
AUTOMOTIVE HOLDINGS CORPO; TRW AUTOMOTIVE INC.; TRW AUTOMOTIVE U.S.
LLC; TRW Vehicle Safety Systems Inc.; Honda Motor Co Ltd.; American
Honda Motor Co Inc.; Honda of America Mfg Inc.; Honda R&D Co. Ltd.;
Hyundai Motor Group; Hyundai Motor Co.; Hyundai Motor America; KIA
MOTORS CORP.; KIA Motors America; Toyota Motor Corp.; Toyota Motor
Sales, U.S.A., Inc.; and Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing
North America, Inc. the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-21681 (S.D.
Fla.).

The Payne case is being consolidated with MDL 2905 in re: ZF-TRW
AIRBAG CONTROL UNITS PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. The MDL was
created by Order of the United States Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation on August 7, 2019. These actions share
common factual questions arising from allegations that airbag
control units manufactured by the ZF-TRW defendants are defective,
in that an electrical overstress condition can cause a malfunction
of the ACU's application specific integrated circuit. Because of
this alleged defect -- which may affect more than 12 million
vehicles made bymultiple automakers, including FCA, Honda,
Hyundai/Kia, Mitsubishi, and Toyota -- there is a risk that the
airbag could fail to deploy in an accident. In its August 7, 2019
Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions in this MDL involve
common questions of fact, and that centralization in the Central
District of California will serve the convenience of the parties
and witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of the
litigation. Centralization would eliminate duplicative discovery
and other pretrial proceedings, as well as the possibility of
inconsistent rulings on class certification, Daubertmotions, and
other pretrial matters, and conserve judicial and party resources.
Presiding Judge in the MDL is Hon. Judge John A. Kronstadt. The
lead case is 2:19-ml-02905-JAK-FFM.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs and the Proposed Classes are:

          Alissa Del Riego, Esq.
          John Gravante, III, Esq.
          Matthew Weinshall, Esq.
          Peter Prieto, Esq.
          PODHURST ORSECK PA
          Suntrust International Center
          1 SE 3rd Avenue Suite 2300
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 358-2800
          Facsimile: (305) 358-2382
          E-mail: adelriego@podhurst.com
                  jgravante@podhurst.com
                  mweinshall@podhurst.com
                  pprieto@podhurst.com

MDL 2905: Radi Suit v. FCA over Defective Airbag Moved to Calif.
----------------------------------------------------------------
The case, DAVID RADI, CURLINE G. REGISTE, and YAMIRA COLLAZO,
individually, and on behalf of other members of the public
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. FCA ("Fiat Chrysler
Automobiles") US LLC, a Delaware Corporation, HYUNDAI MOTOR
AMERICA, INC., a Delaware Corporation, TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A,
INC.., a California Corporation, KIA MOTOR AMERICA, INC., a
California Corporation, TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION, and ZF TRW
AUTOMOTIVE HOLDINGS CORP., a Delaware Corporation, the Defendants,
Case No.: 19-cv-2769 (Filed May 10, 2019), was transferred from the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York,
to the United States District Court for the Central District of
California (Western Division - Los Angeles) on Aug. 8, 2019. The
Central District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:19-cv-06900-JAK-FFM to the proceeding.

The Radi case is being consolidated with MDL 2905 in re: ZF-TRW
AIRBAG CONTROL UNITS PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. The MDL was
created by Order of the United States Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation on August 7, 2019. These actions share
common factual questions arising from allegations that airbag
control units manufactured by the ZF-TRW defendants are defective,
in that an electrical overstress condition can cause a malfunction
of the ACU's application specific integrated circuit. Because of
this alleged defect -- which may affect more than 12 million
vehicles made bymultiple automakers, including FCA, Honda,
Hyundai/Kia, Mitsubishi, and Toyota -- there is a risk that the
airbag could fail to deploy in an accident. In its August 7, 2019
Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions in this MDL involve
common questions of fact, and that centralization in the Central
District of California will serve the convenience of the parties
and witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of the
litigation. Centralization would eliminate duplicative discovery
and other pretrial proceedings, as well as the possibility of
inconsistent rulings on class certification, Daubertmotions, and
other pretrial matters, and conserve judicial and party resources.
Presiding Judge in the MDL is Hon. Judge John A. Kronstadt. The
lead case is 2:19-ml-02905-JAK-FFM.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs and the Proposed Classes are:

          Paul J. Napoli, Esq.
          Hunter J. Shkolnik, Esq.
          Nicholas R. Farnolo, Esq.
          NAPOLI SHKOLNIK PLLC
          400 Broadhollow Road
          Melville, NY 11747
          Telephone: (212) 397-1000
          Facsimile: (646)843-7603
          E-mail: NFarnolo@NapoliLaw.com

MEDLEY LLC: Sept. 24 Preliminary Conference for 2 Suits vs. MCC Set
-------------------------------------------------------------------
With regards to two purported class actions in New York against
Medley Capital Corporation ("MCC"), among other defendants, a
preliminary conference is scheduled to take place on September 24,
2019, according to Medley LLC's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2019.

On January 25, 2019, two purported class actions were commenced in
the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York, by
alleged stockholders of Medley Capital Corporation, captioned,
respectively, Helene Lax v. Brook Taube, et al., Index No.
650503/2019, and Richard Dicristino, et al. v. Brook Taube, et al.,
Index No. 650510/2019 (together with the Lax Action, the "New York
Actions").

Named as defendants in each complaint are Brook Taube, Seth Taube,
Jeffrey Tonkel, Arthur S. Ainsberg, Karin Hirtler-Garvey, John E.
Mack, Mark Lerdal, Richard T. Allorto, Jr., Medley Capital
Corporation, Medley Management Inc., Sierra Income Corporation, and
Sierra Management, Inc.

The complaints in each of the New York Actions allege that the
individuals named as defendants breached their fiduciary duties in
connection with the proposed merger of MCC with and into Sierra,
and that the other defendants aided and abetted those alleged
breaches of fiduciary duties.  Compensatory damages in unspecified
amounts are sought.

On February 27, 2019, the Court entered a stipulated scheduling
order requiring that defendants respond to the complaints 45 days
following the later of (a) the stockholder vote on the proposed
merger and (b) plaintiffs' filing of a consolidated, amended
complaint.

The defendants believe the claims asserted in the New York Actions
are without merit and they intend to defend these lawsuits
vigorously.  At this time, the Company is unable to determine
whether an unfavorable outcome from these matters is probable or
remote or to estimate the amount or range of potential loss, if
any.

Medley LLC is an alternative asset management firm offering yield
solutions to retail and institutional investors.  The company
focuses on credit-related investment strategies, primarily
originating senior secured loans to private middle market companies
in the United States that have revenues between US$50 million and
US$1 billion.


MERIDIAN BIOSCIENCE: Tentative Agreement Reached in Forman Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Meridian Bioscience Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the parties in the class
action suit initiated by Barbara Forman have advised the Court that
they have reached a tentative agreement to resolve the case.

On November 15, 2017, Barbara Forman filed a class action complaint
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio naming Meridian, its Chief Executive Officer and Chief
Financial Officer (in their capacities as such) as defendants.

An amended complaint was filed on April 16, 2018 and the Company
believes the essential elements of the amended complaint are the
same. The complaint and the amended complaint are hereafter
referred to as the "Complaint". The Complaint seeks compensatory
damages and attorneys' fees.

On February 13, 2019 the Court granted Meridian's motion to dismiss
and dismissed the Complaint in its entirety. Plaintiff filed a
Motion to Reconsider, Set Aside, Alter, Amend, or Vacate the
Judgment of dismissal on March 13, 2019.

Meridian opposed the Plaintiff's motion on April 3, 2019 and the
Plaintiff filed a reply on April 17, 2019. On May 20, 2019, the
Court granted Plaintiffs' motion.

On June 24, 2019, the parties submitted a joint motion advising the
Court that the parties had reached a tentative agreement to resolve
the matter and were seeking an extension of all deadlines and a
stay pending finalization of the settlement documents.

Meridian said, "We expect the settlement to be fully funded by
insurance, and accordingly, no provision for litigation losses has
been included within either of the accompanying Condensed
Consolidated Statements of Operations for the three and nine months
ended June 30, 2019 or June 30, 2018."

Meridian Bioscience Inc., an integrated life science company,
manufactures, develops, sells, and distributes diagnostic test
kits. Meridian, founded in 1976, is based in Cincinnati Ohio.


MG SECURITY SERVICES: Atkinson Action Seeks Reimbursements
----------------------------------------------------------
Chantell Atkinson, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. MG Security Services LLC, Defendants, Case
No. 157562/2019 (N.Y. Sup., August 2, 2019), seeks reimbursement or
additional pay for time spent off the clock and money spent in
laundering and maintaining his company-provided uniform in
accordance with new York Labor Law.

Atkinson worked as a security guard and fire guard from
approximately September 6, 2018 through February 16, 2019. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Mark Gaylord, Esq.
      BOUKLAS GAYLORD LLP
      400 Jericho Turnpike Suite 226
      Jericho, NY 11753
      Phone: (516) 742-4949
      Fax: (516)742-1977
      Email: mark@bglawny.com


MGM SPRINGFIELD: Faces Class Action Over Blackjack Payouts
----------------------------------------------------------
Yogonet Gaming News reports that a class-action lawsuit was
submitted in Hampden Superior Court against MGM Springfield, in
which the plaintiffs claim that the casino paid customers odds of 6
to 5 when a player is dealt a blackjack, even though Massachusetts
law states that a player who is dealt a blackjack "shall be paid at
odds of 3 to 2."

MGM Springfield said its following state regulations on the payouts
and cited an advisory opinion from the Massachusetts Gaming
Commission, Mass Live reports.

A similar lawsuit was filed against Wynn Resorts' Encore Boston
Harbor recently, claiming also that customers were being
short-changed but the regulator determined "preliminarily" that
Encore was in compliance with state regulations.

Elaine Driscoll, spokeswoman for the Massachusetts Gaming
Commission, said the commission is aware of the MGM Springfield
lawsuit and is evaluating it as it determines the appropriate next
steps.

"We comply with all Massachusetts Gaming Commission regulations and
feel confident that this lawsuit will be found to have no merit,"
said MGM Springfield spokesman Saverio Mancini.

According to Massachusetts Gaming Commission rules, winning bets
payout 1 to 1 unless the player is dealt a blackjack, in which case
the winning bets is paid out at odds of 3 to 2 or odds of 6 to 5.
The odds are posted at each table, the Gaming Commission says in
its regulations.

In response to the suit against Encore, the Massachusetts Gaming
Commission investigation and Enforcement Bureau reviewed the claims
and determined "preliminarily" that Encore was in compliance with
state regulations. But chairwoman Cathy Judd-Stein said the casino
would still be monitored. "We want to make sure we review matters
fairly, objectively and transparently," she said. [GN]


MICHIGAN: Denies Bid to Certify Class in Salami Suit
----------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL MOHAMMED SALAMI, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL EAGEN,
SONIA WARCHOK, ANTHONY KING, GWENDYLYN WARREN, and HEIDI
WASHINGTON, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-11558 (E.D. Mich.), Judge
George Caram Steeh of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, Southern Division, (i) denied the Plaintiff's
motion for a preliminary injunction and protective order, (ii)
denied his request for class-action certification, (iii) denied his
request to file a complaint against the Court; and (iv) denied
without prejudice the Plaintiff's request for a declaratory
ruling.

The matter has come before the Court on Salami's pro se complaint
under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act.  The Plaintiff is a Muslim and state prisoner at
the Saginaw Correctional Facility in Freeland, Michigan.

The Defendants are: Michael Eagen, Chairman of the Michigan Parole
Board; Sonia Warchok and Anthony King, two members of the Michigan
Parole Board; Gwendylyn Warren, a therapist employed by the
Michigan Department of Corrections ("MDOC"); and Heidi Washington,
Director of the MDOC.  

The Plaintiff sues the Defendants in their personal capacities for
money damages, a declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief.  He
alleges in his complaint that, from May 3, 2018 to Dec. 7, 2018,
Defendant Eagen forced him to participate in Alcoholics Anonymous
("AA") and Narcotics Anonymous ("NA") at the Detroit Re-Entry
Center, which is a programing center for parolees.  As part of the
programming, he was required to engage in prayer, listen to
religious speeches, and use materials that contain references to
the serenity prayer, God, and spirituality.  Defendant Warren,
moreover, allegedly forced the Plaintiff to consent to treatment,
to listen to her religious speeches, and to say serenity prayers.
The Plaintiff states that, as a Muslim, he may only pray to Allah,
and Warren refused to allow him to make Wudu or to pray in an
Islamic style.

The Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants Warchok and King gave
him a twelve-month "flop" and wrote frivolous misconduct tickets
about him to discredit him.  He contends that Eagen suspended his
parole because he asked the Parole Board for a secular, alternative
program to the "higher power" programs such as AA and NA.  The
Plaintiff blames Defendant Washington for failing to create an
alternative program and for allowing the Defendants' illegal
conduct to occur.

The Court granted the Plaintiff permission to proceed without
prepaying the fees and costs for the action.

The Plaintiff attempts to hold Defendant Washington liable for
failing to create an alternative program to AA and NA and for
refusing to do anything about the Defendants' allegedly illegal
behavior.  The complaint, however, fails to indicate that
Washington was personally involved in requiring parolees to
participate in AA and NA, and she cannot be held liable on a theory
of vicarious liability for failing to properly supervise the other
defendants, because vicarious liability is not applicable in
Section 1983 lawsuits.  Accordingly, Judge Steeh summarily
dismisses Defendant Washington from the lawsuit.

In a document filed as a "Motion for Preliminary Injunction and
Protection Order," the Plaintiff alleges that, on June 6, 2019, the
librarian at the Saginaw Correctional Facility refused to make
photocopies for him.  According to him, the librarian also refused
to provide him with free paper, pens, and carbon paper even though
he is indigent.  He asserts that, pursuant to a prison policy
directive, he is entitled to the items which he requested, and the
librarian is retaliating against him for filing a lawsuit against
the named Defendants.

The Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction directing the
librarian to make photocopies of exhibits and forms to serve on the
parties and to provide him with pens, paper, and carbon paper.  He
also seeks a protective order directing the Defendants not to
harass, stalk, retaliate, or threaten him for constitutionally
protected conduct.

The Judge holds that the librarian at the Saginaw Correctional
Facility is not a party to the action, and the incident involving
him on June 6, 2019, took place after the conduct that gave rise to
the instant complaint.  The incident with the librarian also took
place at a different facility, and it involves entirely different
conduct from the conduct challenged in the Plaintiff's complaint.
Furthermore, the Plaintiff merely speculates that the librarian is
retaliating against him on behalf of the named Defendants.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief is denied
as improperly brought in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiff has asked the Court to certify a class action in the
case on behalf of 800 unnamed parolees.  He asserts that, due to
the large number of other prisoners and parolees who are, or will
be, affected by the Defendants' use of AA and NA programs, joinder
of separate complaints would be impossible.

The Judge declines to certify a class action or to appoint the
Plaintiff as a class representative.  He denied the request for
class-action certification.  The Judge finds that although the
Plaintifd alleges that he is a certified paralegal with over 900
hours of training, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated
that pro se prisoners generally cannot adequately or fairly
represent a class.  The Plaintiff, in fact, admits that he cannot
represent the proposed class.

The Plaintiff seeks a declaratory ruling on his claims to prevent
similar lawsuits in the future and to "make it easier to get an
injunction to stop actions."  In the case, the Judge opines that it
would be premature to enter a declaratory ruling because the
complaint has not been served on the Defendants.  Until responsive
pleadings are filed or the issues have been resolved, there is no
basis for granting a declaratory ruling.  Accordingly, the
Plaintiff's request for a declaratory ruling is denied without
prejudice.

Finally, in his final request, the Plaintiff states that he wishes
to file a complaint against the Court on the basis that the Court
has ignored his ex parte motions and requests.  The Judge holds
that the Court has not ignored the Plaintiff's case, and the Order
resolves the Plaintiff's pending motion and requests.  The judge
anticipates that the case will now proceed to mediation or will be
resolved after the Defendants are served and have filed responsive
pleadings.  Accordingly, a complaint or petition to compel further
action in the case is unnecessary, and the Judge denies the
Plaintiff's request to file a complaint against the Court.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Steeh summarily dismissed
Defendant Heidi Washington from the lawsuit, and denied the
Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and protective
order, his request for class-action certification, and his request
to file a complaint against the Court.  The Judge also denied
without prejudice the Plaintiff's request for a declaratory
ruling.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 16, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/3kpZZE from Leagle.com.

Michael Mohammed Salami, Plaintiff, pro se.


MICROCHIP TECH: Bid to Dismiss Jackson Class Action Still Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Microchip Technology Inc. is awaiting a court ruling on defendants'
motion to dismiss a class action lawsuit, the company said in its
Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on August 7, 2019, for the quarterly period ended June 29, 2019.

Beginning on September 14, 2018, the Company and certain of its
officers were named in two putative shareholder class action
lawsuits filed in the United States District Court for the District
of Arizona, captioned Jackson v. Microchip Technology Inc., et al.,
Case No. 2:18-cv-02914-JJT and Maknissian v. Microchip Technology
Inc., et al., Case No. 2:18-cv-02924-JJT. On November 13, 2018, the
Maknissian complaint was voluntarily dismissed.  

The Jackson complaint is allegedly brought on behalf of a putative
class of purchasers of Microchip common stock between March 2, 2018
and August 9, 2018.  

The complaint asserts claims for alleged violations of the federal
securities laws and generally alleges that the defendants issued
materially false and misleading statements and failed to disclose
material adverse facts about the Company's business, operations,
and prospects during the putative class period.  

The complaint seeks, among other things, compensatory damages and
attorneys' fees and costs on behalf of the putative class. On
December 11, 2018, the Court issued an order appointing the lead
plaintiff.  An amended complaint was filed on February 22, 2019.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on April
1, 2019.

Plaintiff has opposed the request.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Microchip Technology Inc. develops and manufactures semiconductor
products for various embedded control applications worldwide. The
company, which was incorporated in 1989, is based in Chandler,
Arizona.


MONITRONICS INTL: Receives $4.8MM from Insurer
----------------------------------------------
Ascent Capital Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that Monitronics
International, Inc., a company subsidiary, has settled a claim
against one insurance carrier in which that carrier paid
Monitronics $4,800,000 in connection to the settlement in the
concluded multiple class action suits related to telemarketing
calls.

Monitronics was named as a defendant in multiple putative class
actions consolidated in U.S. District Court (Northern District of
West Virginia) on behalf of purported class(es) for persons who
claim to have received telemarketing calls in violation of various
state and federal laws.

The actions were brought by plaintiffs seeking monetary damages on
behalf of all plaintiffs who received telemarketing calls made by a
Monitronics Authorized Dealer, or any Authorized Dealer's lead
generator or sub-dealer.

In the second quarter of 2017, Monitronics and the plaintiffs
agreed to settle this litigation for $28,000,000 ("the Settlement
Amount"). In the third quarter of 2017, Monitronics paid $5,000,000
of the Settlement Amount pursuant to the settlement agreement with
the plaintiffs. In the third quarter of 2018, Monitronics paid the
remaining $23,000,000 of the Settlement Amount.

Monitronics recovered a portion of the Settlement Amount under its
insurance policies held with multiple carriers. In the fourth
quarter of 2018, Monitronics settled its claims against two such
carriers in which those carriers paid Monitronics an aggregate of
$12,500,000.

In April of 2019, Monitronics settled a claim against one such
carrier in which that carrier paid Monitronics $4,800,000.

Ascent Capital Group, Inc., through its subsidiary, Monitronics
International, Inc., provides security alarm monitoring services to
residential and commercial customers in the United States, Canada,
the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. The company provides
monitoring services for alarm signals arising from burglaries,
fires, medical alerts, and other events through security systems at
customers' premises. Ascent Capital Group, Inc. was incorporated in
2008 and is based in Greenwood Village, Colorado.


MSAB PARK: Hoff Suit Seeks to Recoup Overtime Under FLSA & OMFWSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CANDICE A. HOFF on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. MSAB PARK CREEK, LLC, Case No. 1:19-cv-01849 (N.D.
Ohio, Aug. 14, 2019), seeks to recover overtime wages and
liquidated damages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act and the Ohio Constitution.

The Defendant is a limited liability company, registered in Ohio,
which owns and operates an assisted living retirement community in
Cuyahoga County.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jason R. Bristol, Esq.
          Joshua B. Fuchs, Esq.
          COHEN ROSENTHAL & KRAMER LLP
          3208 Clinton Avenue
          Cleveland, OH 44113
          Telephone: (216) 815-9500
          E-mail: jbristol@crklaw.com
                  jfuchs@crklaw.com


MUELLER WATER: Continues to Defend Chapman Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
Mueller Water Products, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company
continues to defend a class action suit entitled, Chapman v.
Mueller Water Products, et al.

In 2017, the company's warranty analyses identified that certain
Technologies radio products produced prior to 2017 and installed in
particularly harsh environments had been failing at higher than
expected rates.

During the quarter ended March 31, 2017, the company conducted
additional testing of these products and revised its estimates of
warranty expenses. As a result, the company recorded additional
warranty expense of $9.8 million in the second quarter of 2017.

During the quarter ended June 30, 2018, the company completed a
similar analysis and determined, based on this new information,
that certain other Technologies products had been failing at
higher-than-expected rates as well and that the average cost to
repair or replace certain products under warranty was higher than
previously estimated.

As a result, in the third quarter of 2018, the company recorded
additional warranty expense of $14.1 million associated with such
products.

Related to the above warranty expenses, on April 11, 2019, an
alleged stockholder filed a putative class action lawsuit against
Mueller Water Products, Inc. and certain of our former and current
officers (collectively, the "Defendants") in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York.

The proposed class consists of all persons and entities that
acquired our securities between May 9, 2016 and August 6, 2018 (the
"Class Period").

The complaint alleges violations of the federal securities laws,
including, among other things, that the company made materially
false and/or misleading statements and failed to disclose material
adverse facts about its business, operations, and prospects during
the proposed Class Period.

The plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and attorneys' fees and
costs but does not specify the amount.

Mueller Water said, "We believe the allegations are without merit
and intend to vigorously defend against the claims. However, the
outcome of this legal proceeding cannot be predicted with
certainty."

Mueller Water Products, Inc. manufactures and markets products and
services for use in the transmission, distribution, and measurement
of water in the United States, Canada, and internationally. It
operates in two segments, Infrastructure and Technologies. The
company is headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia.


NANTHEALTH INC: Appeals Class Certification Order in Deora Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Nanthealth, Inc., Patrick Soon-Shiong, Paul A. Holt,
Michael S. Sitrick, Kirk K. Calhoun, Mark Burnett, Edward Miller
and Michael Blaszyk filed an appeal from the District Court's
order, dated July 30, 2019, granting class certification in the
lawsuit styled Atul Singh Deora, et al. v. NantHealth, Inc., et
al., Case No. 2:17-CV-01825-TJH-MRW, in the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on Aug. 13,
2019, the Hon. Judge Terry J. Hatter, Jr. the order certifying a
class of purchasers of NantHealth's IPO stock with the following
two subclasses:

   Securities Act Subclass:

   "(1) all persons or entities who purchased or acquired
   NantHealth common stock in or traceable 13 to the IPO
   because, inter alia, NantHealth, allegedly, negligently or
   innocently made misrepresentations or omissions of
   material fact in NantHealth's IPO"; and

   Exchange Act Subclass:

   "(2) all persons or entities who purchased any NantHealth
   common stock between June 1, 2016, and May 1, 2017
   because, inter alia, NantHealth, allegedly, fraudulently
   made misrepresentations or omissions of material fact in
   various communications after the IPO".

The appellate case is captioned as ATUL SINGH DEORA, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff-Respondent v. NANTHEALTH, INC., PATRICK SOON-SHIONG, PAUL
A. HOLT, MICHAEL S. SITRICK, KIRK K. CALHOUN, MARK BURNETT, EDWARD
MILLER, MICHAEL BLASZYK, Defendants-Petitioners, and JEFFERIES LLC,
FIRST ANALYSIS SECURITIES CORPORATION, CANACCORD GENUITY INC., FBR
CAPITAL MARKETS & CO., Non-Petitioning Defendants, Case No.
19-80106, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Respondent ATUL SINGH DEORA, Individually and on Behalf
of All Others Similarly Situated, is represented by:

          Charles Henry Linehan, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 201-9150
          E-mail: clinehan@glancylaw.com

Plaintiff- Respondent MICHAEL DI RIENZO, Individually and on Behalf
of All Others Similarly Situated is represented by:

          Jennifer Pafiti, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          1100 Glendon Avenue, 15th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (310) 405-7190
          E-mail: jpafiti@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Laurence Mathew Rosen, Esq.
          275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
          New York, NY 10016-1101
          Telephone: (212) 686-1060
          E-mail: lrosen@rosenlegal.com

Plaintiffs-Respondents MICHAEL FONTAINE and SOUTHEASTERN
PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY are represented by:

          Eric H. Gibbs, Esq.
          David K. Stein, Esq.
          GIRARD GIBBS LLP
          601 California Street
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (510) 350-9710
          E-mail: ehg@classlawgroup.com
                  ds@classlawgroup.com

               - and -

          Amanda Karl, Esq.
          Amy M. Zeman, Esq.
          GIBBS LAW GROUP LLP
          505 14th Street, Suite 1110
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 350-9700
          E-mail: amk@classlawgroup.com
                  amz@classlawgroup.com

Plaintiff-Respondent JOHN SHAFIK, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, is represented by:

          Rosemary M. Rivas, Esq.
          LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP
          44 Montgomery Street, Suite 650
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 373-1671
          E-mail: rrivas@zlk.com

Defendants-Petitioners NANTHEALTH, INC., et al., are represented
by:

          Michael W. McConnell, Esq.
          Boris Feldman, Esq.
          Joni Ostler, Esq.
          Michael Petrocelli, Esq.
          WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
          650 Page Mill Road
          Palo Alto, CA 94304
          Telephone: (650) 493-9300
          Facsimile: (650) 565-5100
          E-mail: mmcconnell@wsgr.com
                  boris.feldman@wsgr.com
                  jostler@wsgr.com
                  mpetrocelli@wsgr.com

               - and -

          Gideon A. Schor, Esq.
          WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
          1301 Avenue of the Americas, 40th Floor
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (212) 999-5800
          Facsimile: (212) 999-5899
          E-mail: gschor@wsgr.com


NATIONAL FOOTBALL: Antitrust Class Action Dismissal Reversed
------------------------------------------------------------
Nathan Solis, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
from mid-August until the beginning of February, millions of people
don their best outfits for a church-like experience: watching
Sunday football. That is, of course, if the NFL game is being
carried on a local TV station or those devout fans have signed up
for a satellite football package.

On Aug. 13, a Ninth Circuit panel reversed a federal judge's
dismissal of an antitrust class action against DirecTV by
subscribers who claim an arrangement between the National Football
League and the satellite provider eliminates competition for live
telecasts.

Without the agreement, the putative class claims, competitors could
distribute telecasts of NFL games through various cable, satellite,
and internet channels.

The Ninth Circuit panel agreed the class has so far stated a cause
of action and revived the case.

The agreement between the NFL, the individual teams and DirecTV is
just another byproduct of a long history of broadcasting rights
that stretches back to the 1950s. Rulings in antitrust lawsuits
forced the NFL to "black out" home games to avoid hurting
attendance in those markets.

Fast-forward to 1994, when the NFL entered into an agreement with
DirecTV. The current shape of the NFL's broadcast agreement with
the 32 individual teams involves two columns: local games broadcast
on CBS and Fox affiliates, and NFL-DirecTV's Sunday Ticket package,
which in 2015 cost $251 annually for home viewers. The package cost
commercial venues like sports bars anywhere from $2,300 to $120,000
per year, according to the panel's ruling.

Writing for the majority, U.S. Circuit Judge Sandra Ikuta held the
plaintiffs plausibly alleged violations of the Sherman Act and they
have standing to challenge the NFL agreements, which they claim
locks out others from broadcasting games. These interlocking
agreements hampered competition because the teams pooled their
rights in telecasting, according to the complaint.

Ikuta wrote this type of arrangement was deemed a violation of the
Sherman Act in 1951. She also noted the Supreme Court found the
arrangement harmed competition for college football games.

Just like college football teams, NFL teams are restricted on where
their games are broadcast argues the plaintiffs. "Independent
telecasts are forbidden under the terms of the agreements because
they would cause the teams to compete with each other and with
DirecTV," Ikuta wrote.

"Because the complaint alleges that the interlocking agreements in
this case involve the same sorts of restrictions that NCAA v.
University of Oklahoma concluded constituted an injury to
competition, we likewise conclude that the complaint plausibly
alleges an injury to competition," she continued. "Further, because
the alleged restrictions on the production and sale of telecasts
constitute 'a naked restriction' on the number of telecasts
available for broadcasters and consumers, the plaintiffs were not
required to establish a relevant market."

Dissenting on the issue of standing regarding antitrust, U.S.
Circuit Judge N. Randy Smith wrote the Supreme Court has held
indirect purchasers like plaintiffs cannot use a pass-on theory to
recover damages and therefore have no legal standing to sue.

Attorney Marc Seltzer says his clients are pleased with the Ninth
Circuit's decision and look forward to the next phase of
litigation.

In a statement, DirecTV's parent company AT&T said, "We
respectfully disagree with the court's ruling. It's important to
note, however, that the court did not rule that the plaintiffs'
allegations were true; only that they had alleged enough to proceed
with their case. We will continue to fight this case."

An email to the NFL for comment was not immediately answered.

U.S. District Judge George Steeh III, sitting by designation from
the Eastern District of Michigan, rounded out the panel. Ikuta and
Smith are George W. Bush appointees and Steeh was appointed by Bill
Clinton.

A copy of the Opinion is available at:

                       https://is.gd/Ten0J5


NATURAL HEALTH: Bid to Dismiss Kauffman Class Suit Due Sept. 6
--------------------------------------------------------------
Natural Health Trends Corp. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that a motion to dismiss the
class action suit entitled, Kauffman v. Natural Health Trends
Corp., is due September 6, 2019.

On January 8, 2019, the Company and its two executive officers were
named in a putative securities class action filed in the United
States District Court for the Central District of California,
captioned Kauffman v. Natural Health Trends Corp., Case No.
2:19-cv-00163.

The complaint purports to assert claims on behalf of all persons
who purchased or otherwise acquired our common stock between April
27, 2016 and January 5, 2019, inclusive, under (i) Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder against the Company and Chris T. Sharng and
Timothy S. Davidson (together, the "Individual Defendants"), and
(ii) Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act against the Individual
Defendants.

The complaint alleges, in part, that the Company made materially
false and misleading statements regarding the legality of its
business operations in China, including running an allegedly
illegal multilevel marketing business. The complaint seeks an
indeterminate amount of damages, plus interest and costs.

On May 3, 2019, the court issued an order appointing Xia Yang as
lead plaintiff and appointing The Rosen Law Firm, P. A. as lead
counsel. On June 3, 2019, lead plaintiff filed an amended
complaint.

On June 27, 2019, the parties filed a joint stipulation seeking to
postpone briefing on defendants' motion to dismiss to allow the
parties to continue ongoing discussions. Such joint stipulation was
granted on July 1, 2019, and defendants' motion to dismiss is now
due on or before September 6, 2019.

Defendants believe that these claims are without merit and intend
to vigorously defend against them.

Natural Health Trends Corp., a direct-selling and e-commerce
company, provides personal care, wellness, and lifestyle products
under the NHT Global brand. Natural Health Trends Corp. was founded
in 1988 and is headquartered in Kowloon, Hong Kong.


NORTHSTAR ALARM: Summary Judgment Bid in Braver Suit Partly Granted
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROBERT H. BRAVER, for himself and all individuals
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. NORTHSTAR ALARM SERVICES, LLC, et
al., Defendants, Case No. CIV-17-0383-F (W.D. Okla.), Judge Stephen
P. Friot of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma granted in part and denied in part (i) Braver's motion for
summary judgment, and (ii) NorthStar's motion for summary judgment,
joined in by Yodel Technologies, LLC.

In the action, Braver alleges, for himself and on behalf of the
class the court has certified under Rule 23, that Yodel initiated
telemarketing calls on behalf of NorthStar in a manner which
violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") and
regulations implemented thereunder.

Braver appears on his own behalf and on behalf of the class with
respect to count one, and appears on his own behalf with respect to
count three.  Yodel is a company which allegedly provides
telemarketing services to its clients. The  Defendants describe
Yodel's business as "qualifying leads" (prospects) for its clients.
NorthStar is (or was) one of Yodel's clients.  NorthStar provides
residential security and home automation systems to consumers.

On Oct. 15, 2018, the Court certified the following class and
subclass:

     a. Class: All persons in the Red Dot Data marketing list for
whom Yodel's records reflect a telephone call regarding Northstar's
home security systems that lasted more than 30 seconds, that was
handled by an agent who applied status code 20 or 50 to the call,
and that resulted in the normal clearing disposition.

     b. Subclass: All persons in the Red Dot Data marketing list
for whom Yodel's records reflect a telephone call regarding
Northstar's home security systems that lasted more than 30 seconds,
that was handled by an agent who applied status code 50 to the
call, and that resulted in the normal clearing disposition.

Cross-motions for summary judgment are before the Court.  Braver
moves for summary judgment on his own behalf and on behalf of the
class.  He seeks summary judgment against both the Defendants for
their violations of the TCPA.  Braver's motion, however, presents
no developed argument with respect to count three.  NorthStar filed
a response brief.  Braver filed a reply brief.

NorthStar moves for summary judgment on counts one and three.  
Braver has responded and NorthStar has replied.

Yodel moves to join NorthStar's motion for summary judgment. No
party responded to Yodel's motion, which is broadly construed as a
motion seeking leave to join in all of NorthStar's motion papers
currently before the Court, specifically, NorthStar's motion for
summary judgment, NorthStar's reply brief, and NorthStar's brief in
response to Braver's motion for summary judgment.  The Court
construes Yodel's motion in this manner because the arguments made
by NorthStar in all of these papers overlap and because it appears
this was Yodel's intent.  The Court is confident, for example, that
Yodel did not intend to confess Braver's motion for summary
judgment by failing to respond to it.

The Court previously dismissed any direct liability claims alleged
against NorthStar, ruling that any potential liability on
NorthStar's part must be based on its alleged vicarious liability
for Yodel's acts.  At this stage, Braver argues that Yodel has
direct liability on both of the remaining counts and that NorthStar
has vicarious liability on those counts.

Count one alleges that the Defendants violated the TCPA,
specifically 47 U.S.C. Section 227(b)(1)(B), and the Federal
Communications Commission's implementing regulation at 47 C.F.R.
Section 64.1200(a)(3).  Braver contends that defendants violated
these provisions by making telemarketing calls on the residential
phone lines of Braver and the class, using soundboard technology to
deliver prerecorded messages to persons with whom the Defendants
had no prior relationship and from whom prior consent had not been
obtained.

Count three alleges that the Defendants violated 47 C.F.R. Section
64.1200(d).  Braver contends that the Defendants violated this
regulation in two ways: by initiating calls without first having
implemented an effective written policy meeting the regulatory
standards, and by failing to provide the called party (Braver) with
the required identifying information.

Judge Friot holds that Yodel's motion to join NorthStar's motion
for summary judgment is construed as a motion seeking leave to join
in all of NorthStar's moving papers currently before the Court,
including NorthStar's motion for summary judgment, NorthStar's
reply brief, and NorthStar's brief filed in response to the
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.  So construed, the motion
is granted.

The Judge granted in part and denied in part each of the
cross-motions for summary judgment.  Braver's motion for summary
judgment, brought on Braver's behalf and on behalf of the class, is
granted on count one.   Yodel has direct liability for its actions
in violation of 47 U.S.C. Section 227(b)(1)(B) and 47 C.F.R.
Section 64.1200(a)(3), and NorthStar has vicarious liability for
Yodel's actions in violation of that statute and regulation.
Braver and the class are therefore granted summary judgment in
their favor, against NorthStar and Yodel, on count one.  In all
other respects Braver's motion for summary judgment is denied.

The Judge granted NorthStar's motion for summary judgment, joined
in by Yodel, on count three.  He holds that there is no private
right of action for violations of 47 C.F.R. Section 64.1200(d).
Accordingly, NorthStar and Yodel are entitled to summary judgment
in their favor, against Braver, on the claim alleged by Braver in
count three.  In all other respects, he denied the Defendants'
motion for summary judgment.

The Judge desires to bring this case to a conclusion without undue
delay.  The case is set for a status conference in chambers (to be
attended by the lead counsel for all parties) on Aug. 13, 2019 at
8:30 a.m.  The purposes of the status conference will include
planning for a standardized claims process.  To that end, the
parties are directed to promptly confer with a view to agreeing on
a claims process (at least in broad outline).  A notice describing
any such agreement will be filed not later than noon on Aug. 12,
2019.  If the parties are unable to agree on a claims process, they
will file their respective proposals not later than noon on Aug.
12, 2019.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 16, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/KuIHNZ from Leagle.com.

Robert H Braver, for himself & Robert H Braver, and for all
individuals similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by David
Humphreys -- david@hwh-law.com -- Humphreys Wallace Humphreys PC,
Keith J. Keogh -- keith@keoghlaw.com -- Keogh Law LTD, pro hac
vice, Luke J. Wallace -- luke@wh-law.com -- Humphreys Wallace
Humphreys PC, Paul M. Catalano -- paul@hwh-law.com -- Humphreys
Wallace Humphreys PC & Timothy J. Sostrin -- tsostrin@keoghlaw.com
-- Keogh Law LTD, pro hac vice.

Northstar Alarm Services LLC, a Utah Limited Liability Company,
Defendant, represented by Brian R. Matula, Gum Puckett & Mackechnie
LLP, Daniel S. Blynn -- dsblynn@Venable.com -- Venable LLP, pro hac
vice, Elizabeth C. Rinehart -- lcrinehart@venable.com -- Venable
LLP, pro hac vice & Stephen R. Freeland -- srfreeland@Venable.com
-- Venable LLP, pro hac vice.

Yodel Technologies LLC, Defendant, represented by Anne E. Zachritz,
Resolution Legal Group & Eric S. Allen, Allen Mitchell & Allen
PLLC, pro hac vice.


NOVARTIS PHARMA: Court OKs Partial Dismissal of Antitrust Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order granting Defendant's Motion for
Partial Dismiss in the case captioned In Re Novartis and Par
Antitrust Litigation. Nos. 18 Civ. 4361 (AKH), 18 Civ. 5536, 18
Civ. 5603, 18 Civ. 5708, 18 Civ. 5886, 18 Civ. 6776, 18 Civ. 9861,
18 Civ. 11835, 18 Civ. 12293. (S.D.N.Y.).

Two Novartis companies, Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation and
Novartis AG, nearing the end of one patent covering their
prescription drug, Exforge, a blood pressure regulator, and facing
challenges to two others, made an agreement with Par
Pharmaceutical, Inc. to keep Par's generic equivalent off the
market for as much as two years. Plaintiffs, for themselves and a
class, sued Novartis and Par for violating federal antitrust laws,
alleging "per se and rule of reason violations.

The Defendants move to dismiss the per se count and claims under
state laws.

Legal Standard

In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the
court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.

Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs (DPP)

Per Se Claim for Violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act

DPPs assert that the no-AG reverse payment agreement alleged
between defendants is a market division that is per se illegal
under Section 1. The per se standard was created to streamline
antitrust claims in situations where the agreement has such a
predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect, and such limited
potential for procompetitive benefit that courts may predict with
confidence that the conduct is unreasonably anticompetitive every
time it arises.

FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013) forecloses the type of
per se claim that plaintiffs seek to assert here. There, the
Supreme Court explicitly rejected the FTC's position that reverse
payment settlement agreements are presumptively unlawful and that
courts reviewing such agreements should proceed via a quick look
approach, rather than applying a rule of reason.

The Actavis Court explained its basis for adopting a rule of reason
rather than a per se or presumptive rule, observing that the
likelihood of a reverse payment bringing about anticompetitive
effects depends upon its size, its scale in relation to the payor's
anticipated future litigation costs, its independence from other
services for which it might represent payment, and the lack of any
other convincing justification.  

Plaintiffs' per se Section 1 claim is dismissed.

End Payor Plaintiffs' State Law Claims

The Defendants seek to dismiss a number of the EPPs' state-law
claims, based on the following arguments: (1) Many of the state
claims are barred by statutes of limitation  (2) Unjust enrichment
claims, where not specifically provided by state law, are
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent under Illinois Brick,
which limits recovery to direct purchasers in antitrust actions (3)
Where alternative remedies are available, claims for unjust
enrichment are duplicative  (4) Certain unjust enrichment claims
require a direct benefit, which the EPPs, as indirect purchasers,
do not plead (5) The Illinois Antitrust Act limits antitrust class
claims to those brought by the attorney general. (6) Consumer
protection claims under Massachusetts and Missouri law require
claims by end consumers, and not corporations, and thus fail.

Statute of Limitations

Defendants argue that, based on the most favorable reading of the
complaint, plaintiffs admit that a reasonable plaintiff would have
been on notice of the claims no later than September 2014, when
they allege that, after Novartis failed to launch an AG upon market
entry by Par it became clear that Novartis and Par's Agreement
contained a no-AG promise. On this basis, defendants argue that
claims based on statutes of limitation shorter than three years and
nine months should be dismissed.

None of the EPPs' arguments to the contrary are persuasive.  

Moreover, EPPs' theory of continuing harm is not plausible. There
is no plausible interpretation of the facts in which the conspiracy
or any harm caused by it extended past March 2015, at which time at
least five additional manufacturers entered the market, resulting
in intense" competition. Similarly, the complaint lacks proper
allegations of a continuing course of conduct. For the same
reasons, plaintiffs' reliance on continuing violations doctrine,
which depends on an allegation of continuing harm, also fails.

Accordingly, the statutory antitrust claims based on the laws of
Kansas, Mississippi, and Tennessee; and the unjust enrichment
claims based on the laws of Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi,
Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Puerto
Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and
Washington are dismissed.

State Unjust Enrichment Claims

States that Follow Illinois Brick

Where barred from bringing statutory antitrust claims, EPPs have
pleaded unjust enrichment. Defendants argue that these claims are
precluded in the jurisdictions that have not repudiated Illinois
Brick's prohibition against indirect purchaser damages actions.
There, the Supreme Court held that only direct purchasers could sue
for unjust benefits gained by a defendant manufacturer through
anticompetitive conduct that violated federal antitrust laws.

Plaintiffs' position amounts to an attempt to circumvent Illinois
Brick, which confined antitrust claims to direct purchasers, in the
absence of a showing that such a recovery is allowed. EPPs' cited
authority generally did not directly address these principles, or
are otherwise distinguishable. Plaintiffs' citation to In re
Generic Pharm. Pricing Antitrust Litig., 368 F.Supp.3d 814, 849
(E.D. Pa. 2019) is unpersuasive. While it is true that the gains to
the defendant, rather than plaintiffs' losses, present the first
step in considering a claim for unjust enrichment, the concern for
double recovery and the apportionment of claims remains.

Accordingly, EPPs' unjust enrichment claims based on the laws of
Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia,
Washington, and Wyoming are dismissed.

Direct Benefit Pleading Requirement for Certain Unjust Enrichment
Claims

Defendants identify eleven states that require that a plaintiff
confer a direct benefit on the defendant in order to recover under
a theory of unjust enrichment.  

EPPs attempt to call into question the existence of a direct
benefit requirement in these jurisdictions, but their cited
authority is either consistent with the direct benefit requirement,
predates more recent authority establishing a direct benefit
requirement, is distinguishable, or provides only a cursory
analysis of the law in the state. In the absence of persuasive
authority to the contrary, unjust enrichment claims arising based
on the laws of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine,
Michigan, New Jersey, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island
are dismissed.

States Conferring an Independent Statutory Remedy: Plaintiffs'
Unjust Enrichment Claims in States with Antitrust Remedies Are
Duplicative and Dismissed

At the hearing, the Court raised the issue, sua sponte, of whether
plaintiffs' remaining claims for unjust enrichment, even where not
barred by Illinois Brick, were not unnecessarily duplicative of
their statutory claims, and thus appropriately dismissed. I
permitted the parties to submit supplementary briefing on the
issue, providing sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2), a party may set out two or
more statements of a claim alternatively or hypothetically, either
in a single count or in separate ones. While parties are also
permitted to plead inconsistent claims,  The Court nevertheless
conclude that plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claims are unnecessary
and duplicative of their statutory claims. EPPs' unjust enrichment
claims will rise and fall with its statutory claims. To the extent
that those claims succeed, they are duplicative, and to the extent
they are deficient, its unjust enrichment claims will not remediate
them.

Dismissing these claims serves an important function in
streamlining the litigation proceedings of a complex case.
Accordingly, EPPs' unjust enrichment claims based on the laws of
Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin are
dismissed.

Indirect Purchaser Class Action Under Illinois Antitrust Act

Defendants also move to dismiss EPPs' claims under the Illinois
Antitrust Act,   asserting that only the State Attorney General may
maintain a class action on behalf of indirect purchasers.  

No person shall be authorized to maintain a class action in any
court of this State for indirect purchasers asserting claims under
this Act, with the sole exception of this State's Attorney General.
District courts are divided on whether the Illinois Antitrust Act
precludes indirect purchasers from filing class actions. However, a
majority of courts have held that the Act is distinguishable from
the New York law in Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398 (2010) and that it prohibits
indirect purchaser class actions.

As a result, EPPs' Illinois claims are dismissed.

Massachusetts and Missouri Consumer Protection Claims

Under Massachusetts law, indirect purchasers may not bring claims
under Section 11 of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, so
EPPs have sought to bring them under Section 9 of the Act, which
excludes those engaged in trade or commerce. Those provisions are
naturally construed to make section nine exclusively applicable to
consumers and section eleven exclusively applicable to business
entities. The single case cited by the EPPs calling into question
this distinction concerned a non-profit hospital that was created
by legislative mandate, conditions not present here.

Similarly, the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act requires that
purchases be made primarily for personal, family or household
purpose and does not cover insurance plans, because such purchases
are not for personal purposes but to fulfill the plan's business
purposes.  

As a result, EPPs' claims based on the laws of Massachusetts and
Missouri are dismissed.

For the reasons stated, defendants' partial motion to dismiss is
granted. DPPs' per se Section 1 claim is dismissed. Walgreen Co.
and the Kroger Co.'s claims for injunctive relief are dismissed.

The following end-payor claims are dismissed:

   a. Statutory antitrust claims in the following jurisdictions
with a statute of limitations three years or shorter: Kansas,
Mississippi, and Tennessee;

   b. Unjust enrichment claims in the following jurisdictions with
a statute of limitations three years or shorter: Alaska, Arkansas,
Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Kansas, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Washington;

   c. Unjust enrichment claims in the following jurisdictions with
a direct benefit pleading requirement: Alabama, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, New Jersey, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island;

   d. Unjust enrichment claims in the following jurisdictions that
are precluded by state law restrictions, including restrictions on
indirect purchaser antitrust suits: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri,
Montana, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, South
Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming;

   e. Unjust enrichment claims in the following jurisdictions that
are duplicative of otherwise pled state statutory claims: Arizona,
California, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas,
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin;

   f. Statutory antitrust claim brought in Illinois, where only the
Attorney General may bring a class-action lawsuit on behalf of
indirect purchasers.

   g. Statutory consumer protection claims brought in
Massachusetts, which prohibits entities engaged in trade or
commerce are prohibited from pursuing indirect purchaser suits.

   h. Statutory consumer protection claims brought in Missouri,
which allows only claims based on purchases made primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes.

Accordingly, DPPs' Section 1 and Section 2 Sherman Act claims
remain. In addition, remaining in the action are end payor
plaintiffs' statutory antitrust claims arising under the laws of
Arizona, California, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah,
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Also remaining is EPPs'
Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat.
Section 501.204, claim.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 15, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y34q348l from
Leagle.com.

Walgreen CO, The Kroger Co. & H-E-B L.P., Plaintiffs, represented
by Scott Eliot Perwin -- sep@knpa.com -- Kenny Nachwalter, P.A.

Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, Defendant, represented by
Julie A. North -- jnorth@cravath.com -- Cravath, Swaine & Moore
LLP.


OCULAR THERAPEUTIX: Appeal in Suit over DEXTENZA Reports Underway
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Ocular Therapeutix, Inc.said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the appeal in the
consolidated class action suit related to DEXTENZA drug remains
pending.

On July 7, 2017, a putative class action lawsuit was filed against
the Company and certain of the Company's current and former
executive officers in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey, captioned Thomas Gallagher v. Ocular
Therapeutix, Inc, et al., Case No. 2:17-cv-05011.

The complaint purports to be brought on behalf of shareholders who
purchased the Company's common stock between May 5, 2017 and July
6, 2017. The complaint generally alleges that the Company and
certain of the Company's current and former officers violated
Sections 10(b) and/or 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by making
allegedly false and/or misleading statements concerning the Form
483 issued by the FDA related to DEXTENZA and the Company's
manufacturing operations for DEXTENZA. The complaint seeks
unspecified damages, attorneys' fees, and other costs.  

On July 14, 2017, an amended complaint was filed; the amended
complaint purports to be brought on behalf of shareholders who
purchased the Company’s common stock between May 5, 2017 and July
11, 2017, and otherwise includes allegations similar to those made
in the original complaint.

On July 12, 2017, a second putative class action lawsuit was filed
against the Company and certain of the Company's current and former
executive officers in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey, captioned Dylan Caraker v. Ocular
Therapeutix, Inc., et al., Case No. 2:17-cv-05095.

The complaint purports to be brought on behalf of shareholders who
purchased the Company's common stock between May 5, 2017 and July
6, 2017. The complaint includes allegations similar to those made
in the Gallagher complaint, and seeks similar relief.

On August 3, 2017, a third putative class action lawsuit was filed
against the Company and certain of the Company's current and former
executive officers in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey, captioned Shawna Kim v. Ocular Therapeutix,
Inc., et al., Case No. 2:17-cv-05704.

The complaint purports to be brought on behalf of shareholders who
purchased the Company's common stock between March 10, 2016 and
July 11, 2017. The complaint includes allegations similar to those
made in the Gallagher complaint, and seeks similar relief.

On October 27, 2017, a magistrate judge for the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey granted the
defendants' motion to transfer the above-referenced Gallagher,
Caraker, and Kim litigations to the United States District Court
for the District of Massachusetts.  These matters were assigned the
following docket numbers in the District of Massachusetts:
1:17-cv-12288 (Gallagher), 1:17-cv-12146 (Caraker), and
1:17-cv-12286 (Kim).

On March 9, 2018, the court consolidated the three actions and
appointed co-lead plaintiffs and co-lead counsel for the
consolidated action. On May 7, 2018, co-lead plaintiffs filed a
consolidated amended class action complaint. The amended complaint
makes allegations similar to those in the original complaints,
against the same defendants, and seeks similar relief on behalf of
shareholders who purchased the Company's common stock between March
10, 2016 and July 11, 2017.  

The amended complaint generally alleges that defendants violated
Sections 10(b) and/or 20(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder. On July 6, 2018, defendants filed a motion
to dismiss the consolidated amended complaint.  

Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss on
September 4, 2018, and defendants filed a reply on October 4, 2018.
The court held oral argument on the motion to dismiss on February
6, 2019.  

By order dated April 30, 2019, the court granted defendants' motion
to dismiss.  

On May 31, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit regarding the
District Court's opinion and order of dismissal of the Complaint.

The Company denies any allegations of wrongdoing and intends to
vigorously defend against these lawsuits.

Ocular Therapeutix, Inc., a biopharmaceutical company, focuses on
the formulation, development, and commercialization of therapies
for diseases and conditions of the eye using its bioresorbable
hydrogel platform technology. Ocular Therapeutix, Inc. was founded
in 2006 and is headquartered in Bedford, Massachusetts.



OCWEN FINANCIAL: 11th Cir. Affirms Securities Suit Dismissal
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court's judgment granting
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned KAREN A.
CARVELLI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
Lead Plaintiff, Plaintiff-Appellant, RYAN HUSEMAN, Consolidated
Plaintiff, v. OCWEN FINANCIAL CORPORATION, RONALD M. FARIS, MICHAEL
R. BOURQUE, JR., Defendants-Appellees. No. 18-12250. (11th Cir.).

The University of Puerto Rico Retirement System purchased Ocwen
Financial Corporation common stock at an allegedly inflated price
after a series of statements by Ocwen's officers implied that the
company would emerge from a regulatory mess. When Ocwen's stock
price instead began to fall, the Retirement System brought a
private securities-fraud action under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the SEC's Rule 10b-5,
claiming that it had detrimentally relied on Ocwen's materially
misleading statements and omissions concerning the likelihood of
achieving regulatory compliance.

The district court dismissed the Retirement System's complaint,
finding that it had failed to identify any material
misrepresentations or omissions or otherwise state a claim against
Ocwen for securities fraud.

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits the
use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security of any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the SEC may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.

One such rule, Rule 10b-5, makes it unlawful for any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security, to make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.

To state a claim for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff
must allege the following elements: (1) a material
misrepresentation or omission (2) made with scienter (3) a
connection with the purchase or sale of a security (4) reliance on
the misstatement or omission; 5) economic loss and (6) a causal
connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the loss,
commonly called loss causation.

The district court determined that the majority of Ocwen's
statements were nonactionable because they constituted immaterial
puffery. Puffery comprises generalized, vague, nonquantifiable
statements of corporate optimism.The puffery doctrine presumes a
relatively but realistically savvy consumer the general idea being
that some statements are just too boosterish to justify reasonable
reliance. In general parlance, puffing is seller's or dealer's talk
in praise of the virtues of something offered for sale.

So, what of Ocwen's statements promising, among other things, that
it continued to devote substantial resources to . regulatory
compliance and risk management efforts, that its investments in
those areas were now mature and delivering improved results, that
it felt good about the progress it had made towards its national
mortgage settlement compliance, and that it had taken a leading
role in helping to stabilize communities most affected by the
financial crisis?

The district court reasoned that these statements and others like
them weren't the sort that a reasonable investor could possibly
regard as significant because Ocwen never said it was in compliance
with regulations but rather made vague statements about its efforts
towards compliance. In short, Ocwen's statements were puffery.

The Retirement System raises two objections. First, it contends
that Ocwen's statements can't be nonactionable puffery because
Ocwen did not genuinely or reasonably believe them.

This argument fails.

Whether a statement was made in bad faith or without a reasonable
basis is irrelevant to the question whether the statement is
nonetheless so airy as to be insignificant. Certainly, such
considerations could and very well may be relevant to whether the
statements were made with the requisite level of scienter or
whether the statements are entitled to safe-harbor protection more
on that later but what matters for materiality purposes is whether
a statement is of a type that a reasonable investor would find
relevant to investment decision-making. Put another way, the
anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws are plainly
disinterested with immaterial statements, no matter the state of
mind of the speaker.

Second, and more concretely, the Retirement System argues that the
statements deemed puffery by the district court are, in fact,
material. In our view, though, the complained-of statements are
quintessential puffery. Ocwen's proclamations that it was devoting
substantial resources to its problems, with improved results, as
well as its boasts that it was taking a leading role and making
progress toward compliance are precisely the sorts of statements
that our sister circuits have the Court think correctly deemed
puffery and found immaterial as a matter of law.  

The Retirement System nonetheless insists that these statements
become materially misleading when considered in context because
nothing had changed with REALServicing, it argues, promises about
improvements and progress were false, and significantly so.

The Court disagrees.

As both parties acknowledge, the market was well aware of Ocwen's
regulatory problems the consent orders, the auditors, and the fines
were far from secret, and indeed were addressed openly in Ocwen's
filings, investor calls, and press releases. To the extent that the
Retirement System contends that Ocwen had a duty to disclose the
specifics of its technological difficulties, its position is
untenable. A duty to disclose information to investors arises only
when omission of that information would render misleading other
information that an issuer has disclosed.  

None of the statements that the Retirement System highlights here
are misleading in the absence of the disclosure of REALServicing's
issues because (as already explained) a reasonable investor
wouldn't have regarded such corporate banalities as relevant in
deciding whether to invest in Ocwen in the first place.

What's more, attending to the context of the complained-of
statements, at times, actually cuts the Retirement System's
argument out from under it. For example, the Retirement System's
complaint highlights Ocwen's announcement that as a company we
continue to make progress in resolving our legacy issues. But the
complaint elides the remainder of the sentence, including the
recognition that there is more work to be done. That context
matters in the materiality analysis cuts both ways.

In sum, we conclude that a number of Ocwen's statements can't be
classified as material misrepresentations because no reasonable
investor would have considered them in making investment decisions
in short, because they weren't material.

There's more. Several other statements, the district court found,
were forward-looking statements that are immune from liability
under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, which Congress
enacted as a check against abusive litigation by private parties.
The Supreme Court has explained that the PSLRA's twin goals are to
curb frivolous, lawyer-driven litigation, while preserving
investors' ability to recover on meritorious claims. As a means of
encouraging companies to share relevant information with the
public, in part by providing a measure of protection for those
disclosures, the Act includes a safe harbor provision that
immunizes certain forward-looking statements from liability.

The Retirement System contends that the safe harbor doesn't apply
to several of Ocwen's statements because they were made within
three years of a cease-and-desist order regarding violations of
Rule 12b-20.  

To explain, the PSLRA's safe-harbor provisions won't shield a
forward-looking statement if, during the 3-year period preceding
the date on which the statement was first made, the company on
whose behalf the statement is made has been made the subject of a
judicial or administrative decree or order arising out of a
governmental action that requires that the issuer cease and desist
from violating the antifraud provisions of the securities laws.

The Retirement System asserts that Rule 12b-20 is an antifraud
provision such that receipt of the related cease-and-desist order
which, as a factual matter, all agree occurred renders the safe
harbor inapplicable to any of Ocwen's statements made in the
ensuing three years.

The Court rejects the legal premise that Rule 12b-20 constitutes an
antifraud provision within the meaning of the PSLRA. Rule 12b-20
provides that in addition to the information expressly required to
be included in a statement or report under Sections 12(b), 12(g),
13, and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
accompanying regulations, there shall be added such further
material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the
required statements, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made not misleading.

For a few reasons, the Court thinks it clear that this rule isn't
an antifraud provision. Most conspicuously, the Rule doesn't
contain a scienter requirement. By its very nature, an antifraud
provision aims to counter fraud, and by its very nature, fraud
involves intentional wrongdoing.

Having cleared away that bit of underbrush, let's head back to the
four corners of the safe-harbor provision. The provision, if you'll
recall, is framed in the disjunctive it provides three independent,
alternative means of inoculating forward-looking statements: those
that are (1) accompanied by meaningful cautionary language (2)
immaterial, or (3) made without actual knowledge of their falsity.

The Retirement System contends that these and similar statements
aren't shielded under the safe harbor because (1) some weren't
accompanied by meaningful cautionary language and were knowingly
false and (2) others contained false statements of present fact.  

The Court first considers the Retirement System's contention that
the statements aren't accompanied by meaningful cautionary
language.  

While the Retirement System doesn't dispute this premise, it
asserts that none of the cautionary language in the statements here
could be meaningful because Ocwen's technology failures which would
preclude it from properly servicing loans and achieving regulatory
compliance had already occurred.  

Certainly, cautionary language can't be meaningful if it is nothing
more than a front for present problems. After careful review,
however, the Court finds that the warnings accompanying Ocwen's
complained-of statements here were meaningful, and none the less so
because some of the warned-of risks related to events unfolding in
the public eye.

For example, in a January 2015 news release concerning regulatory
action against it, Ocwen stated that it was fully cooperating with
the California Department of Business oversight to resolve an
administrative action dated October 3, 2014 and that, going
forward, it expected its ongoing cooperation would result in a
satisfactory outcome for all parties.  

Given the circumstances, the Court finds this language sufficient
to warn an investor of risks of a significance similar to that
actually realized and provide adequate notice of the danger of the
investment to make an intelligent decision about it according to
her own preferences for risk and reward.

The Court next considers the Retirement System's contention that
several purportedly forward-looking statements are ineligible for
safe-harbor protection because they contain false statements of
present fact. Ocwen's multiple statements that it was committed to
correcting any servicing deficiencies, the Retirement System
contends, cannot be classified as forward-looking because they are
statements about the Company's present condition and intentions.

We addressed a similar argument in Harris v. Ivax Corporation, 182
F.3d at 805-06. There, investors alleged that a list of primarily
forward-looking statements, sprinkled with a few assertions of
present facts, was misleading when taken as a whole. This Court
held that the list fell within the safe harbor, despite the fact
that it was a mixed bag, containing some sentences that were
forward-looking and some that were not. Key to this holding,
however, was the investors' allegation that the list as a whole was
misleading.

The Court clarified that our holding didn't give companies carte
blanche to shield present statements of fact in the safe harbor,
explaining that a list or explanation will only qualify for this
treatment if any present-tense statements were limited to
assumptions underlying a forward-looking statement.

The Court do not hold today that false misrepresentations of
present fact can be smuggled in under the cover of forward-looking
statements. The Court do hold, however, that when a forward-looking
statement is of the sort that, by its nature, rolls in present
circumstances, that is, when a statement forecasts in a tentative
way a future state of affairs in which a present commitment unfolds
into action the statement isn't barred from safe-harbor protection
solely on that ground. After thorough review, we conclude that
Ocwen's statements are either (1) forward-looking and accompanied
by meaningful cautionary language or (2) contain present-tense
statements that (for reasons already explained) are immaterial
puffery or weren't alleged to be false.

Accordingly, the Court holds that the Retirement System has failed
to properly allege a material misrepresentation or omission and
thus has failed to state a valid claim under Section 10 and Rule
10b-5.  

That conclusion compels the next, namely, that the Retirement
System also fails to allege an actionable control persons violation
against Ocwen officers Ron M. Farris and Michael R. Bourque, Jr.
under Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. A Section 20(a)
claim, which imposes derivative securities-fraud liability on
certain company individuals, has three elements: (1) a primary
violation of the securities laws, here, allegedly, of Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 (2) individual defendants who had the power to
control the general business affairs of the company and (3)
individual defendants who had the requisite power to directly or
indirectly control or influence the specific corporate policy which
resulted in primary liability.

Here, because the Court have determined that the Retirement System
failed to adequately plead a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, there is no underlying primary violation on which to hang a
Section 20(a) claim.

Lastly, the Retirement System asserts (in summary, afterthought
fashion) that Ocwen could be liable for securities fraud based on
violations of SEC Rule Item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii), or
generally accepted accounting principles established by the
Financial Accounting Standards.

Neither argument withstands scrutiny.

Item 303 is entitled Management's discussion and analysis of
financial condition and results of operations and falls within the
SEC's Standard Instructions for Filing Forms. The Rule requires
that an issuer's filings describe any known trends or uncertainties
that have had or that the registrant reasonably expects will have a
material favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues
or income from continuing operations. The Retirement System's
reliance on Item 303 is doubly misplaced.

As an initial matter, no court of which we are aware has found a
private right of action under Item 303, and the rule itself doesn't
seem to contemplate one. Moreover, and in any event, the Retirement
System's assertion that a violation of Item 303 is actionable under
Section 10(b), regardless of whether the plaintiff has alleged
other false or misleading statements fails on the merits. The
disclosure obligations imposed by Item 303 and Rule 10b-5 are
materially no pun intended different the former is far more
sweeping than the latter. Item 303 requires disclosure of any known
trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty that is likely to
come to fruition and, in the event that management can't determine
the likelihood it must nonetheless disclose unless it determines
there is no reasonable likelihood of material effect on the
registrant's financial condition.  

This conclusory assertion fails to state a claim. To start, the
Retirement System never explains precisely how Ocwen's disclosures
ran afoul of GAAP. And even assuming for argument's sake that they
did, an accounting violation doesn't necessarily give rise to Rule
10b-5 liability any more than an Item 303 violation does.  

At the end of the day, the Retirement System has failed to allege
an actionable violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act and Rule 10b-5 or Section 20(a) of the Act. Accordingly, the
Court affirms the district court's dismissal of the Retirement
System's complaint.

A full-text copy of the Eleventh Circuit's August 15, 2019 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yyygyud7 from Leagle.com.

Kenneth J. Vianale , 5355 Town Center Road, Suite 801 Boca Raton,
Florida 33486, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jeffrey Allan Hirsch -- hirschj@gtlaw.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Mitchell M.Z. Twersky , One Penn Plaza Suite 2805. New York, NY
10119,  for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jason Moff -- jmoff@kramerlevin.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

Atara Hirsch, 1 Penn Plz Ste 2805, New York, NY, 10119-2900, for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Matthew Enrico Guarnero-  mguarnero@bernlieb.com --  for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Ian D. Berg , 11622 El Camino Real Ste 100, San Diego, CA 92130,
for Plaintiff-Appellant.

John Patrick Coffey, 1177 Ave of The Americas, New York, NY
10036-2714,  for Defendant-Appellee.


OVERLAND: Parducci Suit Over Excessive Insurance Premiums Dismissed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RICHARD P. PARDUCCI, Plaintiff, v. OVERLAND SOLUTIONS,
INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-07162-WHO (N.D. Cal.),
Judge William H. Orrick of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California (i) granted AMCO Insurance Co. and
Overland's motion to dismiss; and (ii) denied AMCO's motion to
strike class allegations as premature and moot.

Parducci brings suit against Defendants AMCO and Overland for
allegedly engaging in a scheme to overcharge customers for
homeowners' insurance by intentionally overestimating the
replacement cost of homes.  He brings the action on behalf of
Margarett Parducci as her recently appointed conservator, as
Trustee of the John A. Parducci and Margarett L. Parducci
Survivor's Trust, and on behalf of a putative class of similarly
situated customers.

Parducci is the grandson of Margarett Parducci and the late John. A
Parducci.  During the relevant time period, the Senior Parduccis
were both over the age of 65 and resided in a home located in
Ukiah, California.  The home is held by the Parducci Trust and has
been covered by a "homeowners replacement cost insurance policy"
issued by AMCO since at least 2008 under policy number
HA0010221189.  Parducci alleges that his grandparents, due to their
advanced age and frailties, relied on AMCO and its agents to treat
them fairly and place the proper amount of insurance on their home.


Parducci believes that the replacement value estimate on the Senior
Parduccis' residence was too high.  At some point while he was
trustee, he requested a seven-year history of the amount of
insurance carried on the home and an explanation of how the
replacement cost had been determined for each year that the
property had been insured from AMCO's agent, Mark Davis Insurance
Agency.  He learned that the original replacement value placed on
the home by AMCO in 2010 (based on a report by Overland) was
$1,525,000.  AMCO increased the replacement value of the home until
it reached $1,766,900 in policy year 2016-2017.

In 2016, Parducci moved the homeowner's policy to a new AMCO agent,
hoping to get a new replacement evaluation.  The new agent
estimated that the replacement value of the residence should be
between $855,000 to $925,000, depending on the value of certain
fixtures.  He then solicited the opinion of various unidentified
contractors and architects in the area who estimated the total
replacement cost as between $840,000 and $1,020,000.  He then used
these estimates to request that AMCO reduce the amount of coverage
to reflect the lowered home replacement cost.  AMCO refused to
lower the replacement cost, claiming that the higher replacement
cost reflected in the policy was correct.

Parducci alleges that the actual replacement cost of the residence
in early 2017 was approximately $1 million, $766,900 less than what
was represented by AMCO and its agents.  He posits that this
resulted in the home being over-insured by approximately 77% and
caused the Senior Parduccis to pay premiums for coverage that they
could never collect in the event of a total loss.

Parducci asserts a number of claims against AMCO and Overland.  As
to both AMCO and Overland, he brings claims for (i) unlawful,
unfair, and fraudulent business practices under Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Section 17200, et seq.; (ii) intentional misrepresentation; (iii)
negligent misrepresentation; and (iv) financial elder abuse.
Against only AMCO, he brings claims for (i) breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing and (ii) breach of contract.  All
claims are brought on behalf of a putative class.

Parducci seeks to define the class as all owners of a dwelling
coverage insurance policy issued by AMCO Insurance Co. that insured
a dwelling in California on a replacement cost basis utilizing AMCO
or its agent's survey, appraisal or inspection methodology to
calculate the dwelling coverage limits.

He also seeks to represent two sub-classes.  The first is defined
as all Owners over the age of 65 of a dwelling coverage insurance
policy issued by AMCO Insurance Co. that insured a dwelling in
California on a replacement cost basis utilizing AMCO or its
agent's survey, appraisal or inspection methodology to calculate
the dwelling coverage limits.  The second sub-class is defined as
all Owners of a dwelling coverage insurance policy issued by AMCO
Insurance Company that insured a dwelling in California on a
replacement cost basis utilizing a survey, appraisal or inspection
by Overland Solutions, Inc. to calculate the dwelling coverage
limits.

AMCO and Overland move to dismiss Parducci's complaint.  AMCO
argues that California law and the homeowner's policy place
responsibility for selection of policy limits on the insureds, not
the insurer, and that the entire Complaint should be dismissed on
that basis alone.  According to AMCO, it was up to the Senior
Parduccis to determine if the replacement cost estimate utilized by
AMCO would provide coverage in excess of what they needed and that
they cannot now complain that AMCO should have charged them less.

AMCO also moves to strike Parducci's class action claims.  It
argues that the class allegations do not satisfy the requirements
of Rule 23 on their face because individual issues predominate over
common questions and class treatment is not the superior method for
resolving the claims of any absent putative class members.

Judge Orrick finds that Parducci has failed to plead fraud with the
requisite particularity to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(b), cannot state a claim under California Insurance Code section
785, for which there is no private right of action, and has not
stated a claim for breach of contract because of operation of the
voluntary payments doctrine.  Accordingly, because no claims
survive, he will grant AMCO's and Overland's motion to dismiss.  

The Judge will deny AMCO's motion to strike class allegations as
premature and moot.
  Tthe motion is moot given the dismissal of the complaint.  It is
also premature.  The motion will be denied without prejudice to
renewal at a more appropriate time, once there is an operative
complaint and discovery has occurred.

For the reasons he stated, Judge Orrick (i) granted AMCO's motion
to dismiss.  He dismissed Parducci's Section 785 claim with
prejudice.  Parducci's other claims are dismissed with leave to
amend.  Overland's motion to dismiss is granted with leave to
amend.  AMCO's motion to strike class allegations is denied as
premature and moot.  Parducci may file an amended complaint within
20 days of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 17, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/wu6S5l from Leagle.com.

Richard P. Parducci, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph John Turri --
insterminator@aol.com -- Insurance Litigators & Counselors PLC,
Attila Panczel, Insurance Litigators & Counselors PLC, Courtney
Cooper Gipson -- cgipson@mtattorneys.com -- Methvin, Terrell,
Yancey, Stephens Miller, P.C., pro hac vice & Lawrence Genaro
Papale -- lgpapale@papalelaw.com -- Law Offices of Lawrence G.
Papale.

Overland Solutions, Inc., Defendant, represented by Hsiao C. Mao ,
Troutman Sanders LLP, Sonia Renee Martin --
sonia.martin@dentons.com -- Dentons US LLP, Katharine Lane Malone
-- katharine.malone@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders LLP & Yanni
Lin -- ylin@bsfllp.com -- Troutman Sanders LLP.

AMCO Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by Sonia Renee
Martin, Dentons US LLP, Anna S. Youssefi --
anna.youssefi@dentons.com -- Dentons US LLP & Mark Lane Hanover --
mark.hanover@dentons.com -- Dentons US LLP, pro hac vice.


OXY USA: Bid for Partial Summary Judgment in Hitch Partly Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HITCH ENTERPRISES, INC. Plaintiff, v. OXY USA INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 18-1030-EFM-KGG (D. Kan.), Judge Eric F.
Melgren of the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas (i)
denied Hitch's Motion to Certify the Class, (ii) granted in part
and denied in part Oxy's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and
(iii) denied Hitch's Motion to Strike Expert Reports of John C.
McBeath and Stephen L. Becker and Exclude Their Testimony.

Hitch and the putative class are royalty owners in approximately
631 oil and gas wells located throughout Kansas.  Oxy operates
these wells and produces, among other things, Residue Gas, NGLs,
and Helium.  All the gas from these wells was comingled on the same
gas lines and processed at the same location (the Jayhawk
Processing Plant) under a single Processing Agreement.  After
processing, Oxy sold most of the Residue Gas and about half the
NGLs to its affiliate, Occidental Energy Marketing, Inc. ("OEMI"),
and OEMI subsequently sold those products further downstream to
unaffiliated third parties.  Oxy sold the Helium to ONEOK Field
Service Co.

As general background, oil and gas operators frequently perform
Midstream Services -- Gathering, Compression, Dehydration,
Treatment, and Processing ("GCDTP") -- to prepare raw gas for
market.  Here, most of the gas from the putative class wells was
Gathered, Compressed then delivered for Processing at the Jayhawk
Processing Plant.  A small percentage of the gas underwent no GCDTP
services and was sold as irrigation gas or was used as house gas.
The central issue in this case relates to Processing costs Oxy
deducted from its royalty checks to the putative class.

Hitch initiated the lawsuit on Jan. 11, 2018, in the District Court
of Seward County, Kansas, alleging that Oxy breached its lease with
the putative class members by underpaying royalties from July 1,
2007, to April 30, 2014.  Hitch was a member of a previous class
action in Kansas state court -- Littell v. Oxy -- that settled
claims against Oxy for improper deductions taken for Gathering,
Compression, Dehydration, and Treatment Costs prior to July 1,
2007.

In the lawsuit now before the Court, Hitch alleges two ways in
which Oxy underpaid royalties.  First, Oxy deducted from royalties
a portion of the costs Oxy expended processing the gas.  These
deductions were taken in cash and in kind.  Hitch asserts that
these deductions were impermissible because it was Oxy's sole
obligation to pay all pre-sale costs necessary to make the gas
marketable, including Processing costs.  Second, when OEMI
purchased the Residue Gas and NGLs from Oxy, OEMI paid Oxy based on
a standardized Index Price. OEMI later resold those products
downstream to third parties and sometimes -- though not always --
the weighted average sales price ("WASP") of OEMI's third-party
sales was higher than the Index Price.  Oxy always calculated its
royalty payments based on the Index Price.  Hitch asserts, however,
that it was entitled to be paid royalties on whichever was higher
each month: the Index Price or OEMI's WASP.

Hitch also brings a separate claim seeking interest on Conservation
Fees that Oxy previously deducted from its royalty payments and
later refunded. The Kansas Corporation Commission imposes
Conservation Fees under K.S.A. Section 55-166.  Whether these
Conservation Fees were the sole responsibility of oil and gas
operators was an open question in Kansas until 2011, when the
Kansas Supreme Court held in Hockett v. Trees Oil Company that
these fees are an expense attributable to the well operator alone.
In light of Hockett, Oxy refunded the wrongly withheld Conservation
Fees to Hitch and the putative class.  However, Oxy paid no
interest on the refunded Conservation Fees, and Hitch argues that
it was owed interest at 10% per annum.

On Feb. 2, 2018, Oxy removed the case to federal court.  Hitch
filed a motion with the Court to certify the class of all royalty
owners in Kansas wells: (a) where Oxy USA Inc. was the operator
(or, as a non-operator, separately marketed gas); (b) who were paid
royalties for production of gas, NGLs, or Helium from July 1, 2007
to April 30, 2014; and (c) whose gas was moved over the ONEOK/West
Texas Gas/NNG lines to the Jayhawk Plant for processing.

Oxy opposes class certification.  Within Oxy's Response to Hitch's
Motion, Oxy objected to the Sharp Declaration and the Reineke
Report, asking the Court to strike both.  Additionally, Oxy
provided two expert reports prepared by John McBeath and Stephen
Becker. Hitch objects to the McBeath and Becker reports and filed a
separate motion to strike both.

On March 11, 2019, Oxy filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
seeking judgment on three claims.  First, Oxy argues that the
statute of limitations bars all of Hitch's claims occurring before
Jan. 11, 2013.  Second, Oxy argues that Kansas law does not require
Oxy to pay 10% interest on the refunded Conversation Fees.  Third,
Oxy argues that it paid royalties on all "field fuel" and "plant
fuel."  On June 5, 2019, the Court, at the parties' request, held a
hearing on these motions.

Judge Melgren concludes that most of Hitch's proposed common
questions are not common to the entire putative class.  The only
question that is common -- the interest rate on refunded
Conservation Fees -- is so minor that even if it satisfies
commonality under Rule 23(a), it would be wholly insufficient to
tip the scale under Rule 23(b)(3)'s more demanding predominance
requirement.  Based on these shortcomings, it is unnecessary for
the Judge to determine whether typicality, adequacy, and
superiority are met.  He denies Hitch's motion to certify the
class.

As for Oxy's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Judge finds
that (i) Oxy is equitably estopped from asserting a statute of
limitations defense even if Hitch was required to exercise
reasonable diligence; (ii) Hitch is entitled to an interest rate of
prime plus 1.5%; and (iii) Hitch is only bringing a claim for fuel
used or lost on those pipelines, and therefore does not contest
Oxy's request for summary judgment.

Because the Judge holds that the putative class should not be
certified on grounds unrelated to the Reineke Report and Sharp
Declaration, it is unnecessary for him to rule to on these
objections.  He therefore denies them as moot.
  

The Judge disagrees with Hitch's reading of Fawcett v. Oil
Producers, Inc. of Kansas, and holds that gas may be marketable
before a good faith sale, so McBeath's opinions do not contravene
Kansas law.  For these reasons, Hitch's Motion to Strike the
McBeath Report is denied.

Finally, the Judge denied Hitch's Motion to strike the McBeath
Report and the Becker Report.  As the Court addressed at the June 5
hearing, he is skeptical of Oxy's position that a lease-by-lease
analysis would be necessary at trial; and this argument did not
factor into the Court decision to deny class certification.
Neither was the Court swayed by any legal interpretations Becker
provided on the Littell Settlement Agreement or on the significance
of Fawcett.  At trial, the Court will perform its gatekeeper
function to ensure that the jury is not presented with improper
expert witness testimony.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Melgren (i) denied the Plaintiff's
Motion for Class Certification; (ii) granted in part and denied in
part Oxy's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; and (iii) denied
the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 16, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/YR9Ne0 from Leagle.com.

Hitch Enterprises, Inc., on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Barbara C. Frankland
-- bfrankland@midwest-law.com -- Rex A. Sharp, PA, Rex A. Sharp --
rsharp@midwest-law.com -- Rex A. Sharp, PA, Ryan C. Hudson --
rhudson@midwest-law.com -- Rex A. Sharp, PA & Scott B. Goodger --
sgoodger@midwest-law.com -- Rex A. Sharp, PA.

OXY USA Inc., Defendant, represented by Aurra Fellows, Vinson &
Elkins LLP, pro hac vice, Deborah C. Milner, Vinson & Elkins LLP,
pro hac vice, James M. Armstrong -- jarmstrong@foulston.com --
Foulston Siefkin LLP, Mark C. Rodriguez, Vinson & Elkins LLP, pro
hac vice & Mikel L. Stout -- mstout@foulston.com -- Foulston
Siefkin LLP.

Occidental Energy Marketing, Inc., Objector, represented by Mikel
L. Stout, Foulston Siefkin LLP.


PANASONIC: Judge Okays $31MM Capacitor Price-Fixing Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reported that a federal judge gave his
preliminary OK to a settlement in which four Japanese companies
will pay indirect purchasers of capacitators $31 million to resolve
price-fixing claims.

Settling defendants include Panasonic ($4.7 million), Nichicon
($21.5 million), Elna ($2.25 million) and Matsuo ($2.5 million).

A copy of the Order Granting Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs' Motion
for Preliminary Approval of Settlements with Panasonic, Nichicon,
Elna, and Matsuo Defendants and for Approval of the Plan of
Allocation is available at:

                    https://is.gd/V846nd


PARKING REIT: Court Extends Time to Answer in Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada issued
a Scheduling Order extending Time to File an Answer to Amended
Complaint in the case captioned SIPDA REVOCABLE TRUST, by Trenton
J. Warner, Director, on behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. THE PARKING REIT, INC., MICHAEL V. SHUSTEK,
ROBERT J. AALBERTS, DAVID CHAVEZ, JOHN E. DAWSON, SHAWN NELSON,
NICHOLAS NILSEN and ALLEN WOLFF, Defendants. Case No.
2:19-cv-00428-APG-BNW. Case No. 2:19-cv-00428-APG-BNW. (D. Nev.).

The Plaintiff filed the complaint in the above-captioned action, a
putative class action arising under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, including the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (PSLRA) against the Defendants.

The Parties agreed that in the interests of judicial economy,
conservation of time and resources, and orderly management of this
action, Defendants should not answer or otherwise respond to the
Action until after: (i) a lead plaintiff and lead counsel are
appointed by the Court pursuant to the PSLRA (ii) such lead
plaintiff designates or serves an operative complaint and (iii)
lead plaintiff and Defendants have conferred in good faith
concerning a schedule for Defendants to respond to the operative
complaint and a scheduling order has been entered by the Court, and
submitted a Stipulation Extending Time to Respond to Complaint to
the Court.

The Court issued an order granting the Stipulation Extending Time
to Respond.

The Plaintiff shall file its Amended Complaint by October 11, 2019,
and the Defendants shall answer or otherwise respond to the Amended
Complaint by December 18, 2019.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 15, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y4zmmcz5 from Leagle.com.

SIPDA Revocable Trust, by Trenton Warner, on behalf of itself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by
Christopher J. Gray , Law Office of Christopher J. Gray, P.C., 460
Park Avenue, 21st Floor, New York, NY 10022, pro hac vice, Donald
J. Enright -- denright@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky LLP, pro hac
vice, Joshua B. Kons -- joshuakons@konslaw.com -- Law Offices of
Joshua B. Kons, LLC, pro hac vice & Martin L. Welsh, Law Office of
Hayes & Welsh, 199 North Arroyo Grande BoulevardSuite 200Henderson,
NV 89074-1609

The Parking Reit, Inc., Michael Shustek, Robert J. Aalberts, David
Chavez, John Dawson, Shawn Nelson, Nicholas Nilsen & Allen Wolff,
Defendants, represented by David L. Edelblute  --
dedelblute@swlaw.com -- c/o Snell & Wilmer, John S. Delikanakis --
jdelikanakis@swlaw.com --  Snell & Wilmer LLP, Kristin N. Murphy --
kristin.murphy@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins, pro hac vice & Michele
D. Johnson -- michele.johnson@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins, pro hac
vice.


PENNSYLVANIA SEA: Third Circuit Appeal Initiated in Diamond Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Justin Barry, Arthur Diamond, Douglas R. Kase, Jeffrey
Schawartz, Matthew Shively, Matthew Simkins and Sandra H. Ziegler
filed an appeal from a Court ruling in their lawsuit entitled
Arthur Diamond, et al. v. Pennsylvania State Education Association,
et al., Case No. 3-18-cv-00128, in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on July 19,
2019, the District Court issued a Memorandum Opinion granting the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the case.

The Plaintiffs, who are all current or retired Pennsylvania
public-school teachers, allege that the Union Defendants violated
the Plaintiffs' constitutional rights by forcing the Plaintiffs to
pay fees to unions as a condition of their employment (fair-share
fees) under 71 Pa. Stat. Section 575 (Section 575), even though the
Plaintiffs chose not to join the Pennsylvania State Education
Association or its affiliate unions.  The Plaintiffs also claim
that Commonwealth Defendants, who are charged in various ways with
enforcing Pennsylvania's laws, must be enjoined from enforcing
Section 575 in an unconstitutional manner.

The appellate case is captioned as Arthur Diamond, et al. v.
Pennsylvania State Education Association, et al., Case No. 19-2812,
in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants ARTHUR DIAMOND, on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated, et al., are represented by:

          Shannon Conway, Esq.
          Talcott Franklin, Esq.
          TALCOTT FRANKLIN PC
          1920 McKinney Avenue, 7th Floor
          Dallas, TX 75201
          Telephone: (214) 736-8730
          E-mail: sconway@talcottfranklin.com
                  tal@talcottfranklin.com

               - and -

          Sean T. Logue, Esq.
          LOGUE LAW GROUP
          27 West Main Street
          Carnegie, PA 15106
          Telephone: (412) 389-0805

               - and -

          Jonathan F. Mitchell, Esq.
          STANFORD LAW SCHOOL
          559 Nathan Abbott Way
          Standford, CA 94305
          Telephone: (650) 723-1397
          E-mail: jfmitche@stanford.edu

Defendants-Appellees PENNSYLVANIA STATE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION;
CHESTNUT RIDGE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, as representative of the
class of all chapters and affiliates of the Pennsylvania State
Education Association; and NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION are
represented by:

          Lubna A. Alam, Esq.
          NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
          1201 16th Street, N.W., Room 820
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 822-7044

               - and -

          Adam Bellotti, Esq.
          Leon Dayan, Esq.
          Jacob Karabell, Esq.
          John M. West, Esq.
          BREDHOFF & KAISER PLLC
          805 15th Street, N.W., Suite 1000
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 842-2600
          E-mail: ldayan@bredhoff.com

               - and -

          Amanda Bundick, Esq.
          Robert A. Eberle, Esq.
          EBERLE & BUNDICK LLC
          P.O. Box 44290
          Pittsburgh, PA 15205
          Telephone: (412) 368-5541
          E-mail: amanda@eblaborlaw.com
                  bob@eblaborlaw.com

               - and -

          Joseph F. Canamucio, Esq.
          PENNSYLVANIA STATE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
          400 North Third Street
          Harrisburg, PA 17101
          Telephone: (717) 255-7131

Defendants-Appellees JOSH SHAPIRO, in his official capacity as
Attorney General of Pennsylvania; JAMES DARBY; ALBERT MESSAROBA;
and ROBERT H. SHOOP, JR., in their official capacities as chairman
and members of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, are
represented by:

          Scott A. Bradley, Esq.
          Sandra A. Kozlowski, Esq.
          OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA
          1251 Waterfront Place
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Telephone: (412) 565-7680


PEP BOYS: Court Dismisses Thorne Suit Without Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case, VICKIE THORNE, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PEP BOYS - MANNY, MOE &
JACK INC., Defendant, Civil Action No. 19-cv-00393 (E.D. Pa.),
Judge Curtis Joyner of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania granted without prejudice the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss.

In 1966, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act was
enacted to reduce traffic accidents as well as deaths and injuries
resulting from traffic accidents.  The instant action concerns a
regulation, promulgated under the Safety Act, aimed at facilitating
notification to purchasers of defective or nonconforming tires in
the interest of motor vehicle safety.

Under the federal regulation, independent distributors and dealers
of tires are required to assist tire manufacturers in the
recordkeeping of new tire owners.  While independent distributors
and dealers must comply with specific recordkeeping requirements
under this regulation, ultimately, tire manufacturers shoulder the
responsibility of maintaining new tire purchasers' contact
information.

The case arises from a putative class action brought by Thorne and
all the other unnamed Plaintiffs similarly situated against
Defendant Pep Boys, alleging willful and noncompliant practices in
the automobile retail market regarding tires sold by Pep Boys from
Oct. 1, 2012 to the present.

The Plaintiff is a resident of Rocky Mount, North Carolina.  On
Jan. 19, 2017, the Plaintiff purchased tires from a Pep Boys store
located in Richmond, Virginia.  At the time of this purchase, the
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant willfully failed to register
tires sold to the Plaintiff and also failed to provide
federally-mandated forms, in compliance with tire identification
and recordkeeping regulations.  Not only did the Defendant fail to
provide the Plaintiff with a tire-registration form at the time of
the purchase, but her invoice/receipt also did not indicate that
Pep Boys intended to electronically-transmit the relevant
information for registration directly to the tire manufacturer.

Defendant Pep Boys is a Delaware corporation, headquartered at 3111
West Allegheny Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  Under the
Safety Act, it is an independent tire dealer/distributor, not owned
or controlled by any tire manufacturer or brand name owner.

The Plaintiff brought the action pursuant to the Class Action
Fairness Act, on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated
consumers who purchased tire(s) from the Defendant or their
subsidiaries during the class period, for their personal use rather
than for resale or distribution, without receiving a registration
card ("Nationwide Class"); as well as on behalf of the subclass of
all consumers within the State of North Carolina who purchased a
tire from the Defendant or their subsidiaries during the class
period, for their personal use rather than for resale or
distribution, without receiving a registration card ("North
Carolina Subclass").

The Plaintiff's allegations stem from the Defendant's alleged
failure to register or provide the appropriate means for
registration of tires sold to consumers during the Class Period.
Her principal claim is that the Defendant's inaction exposed and
continues to expose all Class Members, including Thorne, to harm.
Se also claims that the Defendant's practice deprived the Class
Members from the full benefit of their tire purchases, and that the
Class Members received only partial benefit of what they paid the
Defendant, because the payment to the Defendant encompassed not
only the physical tire but also the cost of its compliance with
federal law.

In her Complaint, the Plaintiff requests that the Court issues an
order certifying the matter for class action status and ultimately
providing the Plaintiff with the means to recover for the
Defendant's failure to register or otherwise comply with federal
requirements for tire registration in the form of monetary damages
and restitution as well as injunctive and declaratory relief.

Although the Defendant's Brief in Support of its Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Complaint contains only the legal standard under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), its Motion contains explicit language
requesting dismissal under both Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6).  The thrust of the Defendant's motion is that the
Plaintiff lacks Article III standing under recent Supreme Court and
Third Circuit decisions.

Judge Joyner finds that the Plaintiff does not have Article III
standing to bring her claim.  Viewing the allegations and drawing
all inferences in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the
Defendant's alleged non-compliance with the Safety Act does not
make it plausible that the Plaintiff is imminently threatened with
a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact that is fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the Defendant nor likely to
be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.  All other requests
made by the Plaintiff are disregarded due to a lack of Article III
standing.

For these foregoing reasons, the Judge granted the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss without prejudice.  An accompanying Order will
follow.  He granted the Plaintiffs leave to file an amended
complaint within 20 days of the entry of the Order correcting the
deficiencies noted in the Memorandum.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 17, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/Iyk2pI from Leagle.com.

VICKIE THORNE, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiff, represented by ALEXANDRA WARREN --
awarren@cuneolaw.com -- Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP, BRENDAN S.
THOMPSON -- brendant@cuneolaw.com -- CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP,
CHRIS KESSLER, THE KESSLER LAW FIRM PLLC, DINA E. MICHELETTI --
dem@fazmiclaw.com -- FAZIO MICHELETTI LLP, J. OLIN MCDOUGALL, II ,
MCDUGALL LAW FIRM LLC, ROBERT K. SHELQUIST, LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL
NAUEN, P.L.L.P., CHRISTOPHER C. KESSLER, THE KESSLER LAW FIRM PLLC,
ERIC N. LINSK -- rnlinsk@locklaw.com -- LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL NAUEN
PLLP & YIFEI LI -- evelyn@cuneolaw.com -- CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA,
LLP.

PEP BOYS-MANNY, MOE & JACK INC, Defendant, represented by CHARLES
SCOTT TOOMEY -- scott.toomey@littletonpark.com -- LITTLETON PARK
JOYCE UGHETTA & KELLY LLP & HERBERT BEIGEL, HERBERT BEIGEL &
ASSOCIATES LLC.


PER DIEM: Court Denies Wage & Hour Suit Dismissal
-------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in
the case captioned TERESA JUNKERSFELD, Plaintiff, v. PER DIEM
STAFFING SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant. Case No. 4:18-cv-07795-KAW.
(N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Teresa Junkersfeld filed a putative California wage and
hour class action alleging that Defendant improperly excludes per
diem expense reimbursements from the calculation of the regular
rate of pay for purposes of overtime and missed meal penalties.  

The Defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The
Court granted the motion with leave to amend. The Plaintiff filed
her first amended complaint.

Fair interpretation of the FLSA exemption

The Defendant argues that the undersigned erred by applying the
incorrect standard in deciding whether per diem allowances were
properly excluded from the regular rate of pay under 29 U.S.C.
Section 207(e)(2). In making this argument, Defendant is
essentially seeking reconsideration of the undersigned's prior
order on the grounds that FLSA exemptions should not be narrowly
construed after Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S.Ct. 1134,
1142 (2018). As such, Defendant should have filed a motion for
leave to file a motion for reconsideration, rather than a motion to
dismiss, and the instant motion may be denied on that grounds
alone.

Notwithstanding, while Defendant is correct that FLSA exemptions
are no longer narrowly construed, the court is now tasked with
providing a fair rather than a narrow interpretation. This standard
does not change the outcome in this case, because, by employing a
fair interpretation, reducing the per diem and housing payments
based on the number of shifts worked inextricably ties the payments
to the hours worked, rendering them part of the employee's regular
rate.

The motion to dismiss is denied.

Whether Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts

Additionally, Defendant moves to dismiss on the grounds that the
operative complaint is devoid of specific factual allegations about
how Plaintiff incurred expenses on behalf of Per Diem Staffing when
she did not work and had her per diem prorated. Indeed, Plaintiff
alleges that she remained away from home for the duration of her
travel assignments with Defendants, and incurred housing, meal, and
other travel expenses each week as a result of being away from home
for the assignments without regard to the specific number of
scheduled hours or shifts she worked.

In opposition, Plaintiff does not address the fact that the amended
complaint does not allege that her housing allowance or per diem
were actually prorated nor does it cite to instances of when that
happened. At the hearing, Plaintiff clarified that the harm is not
the reduction or proration of the per diem. Rather, it is the
exclusion of the per diem from the regular rate of pay, which is
used to calculate the overtime premium. By excluding the per diem
from the regular rate of pay, Plaintiff was underpaid for the
overtime hours worked. Thus, upon reflection, the Court erred in
instructing Plaintiff to plead facts pertaining to when her housing
allowance and per diem were prorated, because proration is not
required for her to serve in a representative capacity.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 15, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y32dz2dz from Leagle.com.

Teresa Junkersfeld, Plaintiff, represented by Matthew Bryan Hayes
-- mhayes@helpcounsel.com -- Hayes Pawlenko LLP & Kye Douglas
Pawlenko -- kpawlenko@helpcounsel.com -- Hayes Pawlenko LLP.

Per Diem Staffing Systems, Inc., Defendant, represented by Kenneth
Dawson Sulzer -- ksulzer@constangy.com -- Constangy, Brooks, Smith
& Prophete, LLP, Matthew Scholl -- mscholl@constangy.com --
Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete, LLP, Sarah Kroll-Rosenbaum --
skrollrosenbaum@constangy.com -- Constangy Brooks Smith and
Prophete LLP & Sayaka Karitani -- skaritani@constangy.com --
Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete, LLP.


PRINCETON UNIVERSITY: Court Refuses Reconsideration in ERISA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion denying Defendant'S Motion for Reconsideration in
the case captioned ELYSEE NICOLAS, individually and as a
representative of a class of participants and beneficiaries on
behalf of the Princeton University 403(b) Plan, Plaintiff, v. THE
TRUSTEES OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, Defendant. Civ. No. 17-3695.
(D.N.J.).

THE Plaintiff brings this putative class action alleging breaches
of fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA). Plaintiff, like other faculty and staff at Princeton
University, is a participant in the Princeton University Retirement
Plan and the Princeton University Savings Plan (Plans).  Plaintiff
filed the Complaint, wherein she alleged three counts, each
alleging a breach of both the duties of loyalty and prudence: (1)
unreasonable administrative fees (2) unreasonable investment
management fees and performance losses and (3) failure to monitor
fiduciaries and service providers.

THE Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary
Judgment. The Court, noting that Plaintiff had not opposed the
motion, and the time for response had expired, determined, inter
alia, that the Complaint was not time-barred under ERISA's statute
of limitations and thus denied Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment in that regard.

THE Defendant thus offers no intervening change in law to justify
reconsideration. Nor does Defendant offer any new evidence not
previously available. Presumably, then, Defendant perceives the
Court's prior Opinion as being a clear error of law or manifest
injustice. Defendant contends that the Court erred in allowing
Plaintiff's underperformance claim to proceed because it is
time-barred by ERISA's statute of limitations.

ERISA's Three-Year Statute of Limitations

ERISA provides that no action may be commenced under this title
with respect to a fiduciary's breach of any responsibility, duty or
obligation after three years after the earliest date on which the
plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation. Actual
knowledge of a breach or violation' requires that a plaintiff have
actual knowledge of all material facts necessary to understand that
some claim exists, which facts could include necessary opinions of
experts, knowledge of a transaction's harmful consequences, or even
actual harm.

Defendant Is Not Entitled to Reconsideration

THE Defendant first raises that it previously offered, in its Rule
56.1 Statement of Undisputed Facts, detailed disclosures on the
relative performance of the Accounts that were mailed to all
participants every year from 2012 to 2016. One particular
disclosure, dated July 9, 2013, detailed that the Accounts had
average annual returns of 12.04%, 4.25%, and 8.91% over the
previous 1, 5 and 10 year periods, and these returns underperformed
the Russell 3000 Index. Defendant contends that this disclosure
demonstrates that Plaintiff had actual knowledge of the
underperformance of the Plans on this date, and thus her suit must
have been filed by July 9, 2016, almost a year before Plaintiff
actually filed suit.

However, the mailing of this disclosure, a sophisticated and
nuanced fifteen-page document of average annual returns and
benchmarks, alone, is insufficient to satisfy Defendant's high
burden for reconsideration. Not only does the record presented
before the Court during summary-judgment briefing lack any evidence
that Plaintiff reviewed and amply digested such information to
comprehend that retention of the Accounts was imprudent, but it
also lacks evidence that Plaintiff even received the disclosure.
Mere access to such information is insufficient as access may only
amount to constructive knowledge; Plaintiff must have actually
understood that some claim existed at the time, which could include
or require necessary opinions of experts.

THE Defendant also assumes that the Court is obligated to treat its
previous Motion for Summary Judgment as unopposed and thus deem all
of Defendant's proffered facts as undisputed and conceded. But the
Court ruled on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment before
Plaintiff's deadline to oppose had lapsed, depriving Plaintiff of
the opportunity to submit a response to Defendant's Rule 56.1
Statement of Undisputed Facts. Plaintiff therefore did not fail to
properly address another party's assertion of fact or concede as
undisputed for purposes of the summary judgment motion Defendant's
proffered material facts, L. Civ. R. 56.1.

Lastly, Defendant argues that Plaintiff effectively admitted that
he received the disclosures concerning the performance of the
Accounts by referencing these disclosures in his Complaint. Though
these allegations mention disclosures" and information contained
therein, they do not state or even suggest that Plaintiff received
the disclosures in July 2013. Moreover, the Court already rejected
this argument in its prior Opinion.  

A full-text copy of the District Court'S August 15, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y5r7yqu5 from Leagle.com.

ELYSEE NICOLAS, Individually and as representative of a class of
participants and beneficiaries on behalf of the Princeton
University 403(b) Plan, Plaintiff, represented by ERIC LECHTZIN --
elechtzin@bm.net -- BERGER MONTAGUE PC & JOSEPH J. DEPALMA --
jdepalma@litedepalma.com -- LITE, DEPALMA, GREENBERG, LLC.

THE TRUSTEES OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, Defendant, represented by
NEIL V. SHAH -- nshah@proskauer.com -- Proskauer Rose LLP.


PROPERTY LOSS: Underpays Claim Adjusters, Blue-Mosby et al. Say
---------------------------------------------------------------
AUDREY BLUE-MOSBY, and SAMANTHA JENKINS, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. PROPERTY LOSS
SPECIALIST, LLC; JEFF NACHREINER; ANDY CORBETT; and JOE ARKIN,
Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-01901-L (N.D. Tex., Aug. 9, 2019) is
an action against the Defendant's failure to pay the Plaintiff and
the class overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40
hours per week.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as claim adjusters.

Property Loss Specialist, LLC provides adjustments of residential
and commercial property losses. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Larry Taylor, Esq.
          Nicole Taylor, Esq.
          THE COCHRAN FIRM
          3400 Carlisle Street Suite 550
          Dallas, TX 75204
          Telephone: (214) 651-4260
          Facsimile: (214) 651-4261
          E-mail: Ltaylor@CochranTexas.com
                  Nicole.Taylor@CochranTexas.com

               - and -

          Sara Wyn Kane, Esq.
          Alexander M. White, Esq.
          VALLI KANE & VAGNINI LLP
          600 Old Country Road, Suite 519
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 203-7180
          Facsimile: (516) 706-0248
          E-mail: skane@vkvlawyers.com
                  awhite@vkvlawyers.com


PURDUE PHARMA: In Talks for $12-Billion Deal to Fix Opioid Crisis
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Privately held Purdue Pharma has been in talks for a multi-billion
dollar settlement to resolve a multi-district litigation involving
more than 2,000 lawsuits related to the opioid crisis, according to
various news reports this past week.

As widely reported, the proposed deal would provide for:

     -- up to $12 billion in settlement funds;

     -- the Sackler family, which has owned the company since 1950,
would relinquish control of Purdue Pharma and contribute at least
$3 billion in personal funds to the settlement;

     -- the Sackler family would sell another pharmaceutical
company, Mundipharma, which would add $1.5 billion to the deal;

     -- Purdue Pharma would seek bankruptcy protection and
transform itself into a public benefit trust corporation, with all
profits from drug sales and other proceeds going to the plaintiffs;
and

     -- Purdue Pharma would supply its addiction treatment drugs
free to the public.

Jared S. Hopkins and Sara Randazzo, writing for The Wall Street
Journal, report that the proposed deal is facing pushback from a
vocal group of state attorneys general, including New York and
Massachusetts, who say it doesn't bring in enough cash to satisfy
their demands, according to people familiar with the matter.

Ben Winck, writing for Business Insider, reports that the news
followed an Oklahoma judge ruling against Johnson & Johnson in a
state case focused on the opioid crisis.

On August 26, an Oklahoma judge found Johnson & Johnson responsible
for fueling the state's opioid crisis and ordered it to pay $572
million to help clean up the problem, according to
Marketwatch.com.

According to Business Insider, though J&J was ordered to pay about
3% of the state's requested damages, the ruling set a new legal
precedent that could affect other opioid-related lawsuits
throughout the U.S.

Business Insider further notes that a handful of opioid producers
and distributors have already been affected by increased legal
scrutiny in recent months:

     -- Teva Pharmaceutical Industries settled with an Oklahoma
judge for $85 million in June; and

     -- Opioid distributors McKesson, Cardinal Health, and
AmerisourceBergen all fell as much as 7% in early August trading
after Bloomberg reported that their $10 billion settlement offer
was met with a $45 billion counter from the National Association of
Attorneys General.

The proposed deal, first reported by NBC News, has been in the
works for months, according to a report by Washington Post's Lenny
Bernstein and Scott Higham.  They report that the deal was
discussed at a meeting in Cleveland in August called by U.S.
District Judge Dan Aaron Polster, who oversees the litigation.

The federal lawsuit is scheduled to get underway in mid-October,
the Post adds.

According to the Post, leaders of the 2,000 plaintiffs in a
consolidated lawsuit pending in federal court are seriously
considering the offer, according to one person with knowledge of
the negotiations. Another person familiar with the discussions
said: "I think this is a last effort. If they don't take this deal,
[Purdue is] going to bankruptcy very quickly."

The Post notes that Purdue Pharma is widely blamed for sparking the
prescription opioid crisis in the United States with the
introduction of OxyContin in 1996, followed by an aggressive
marketing effort that persuaded doctors to prescribe it more widely
and at higher doses.

According to the Post, Purdue, asked for comment, said in a
statement: "While Purdue Pharma is prepared to defend itself
vigorously in the opioid litigation, the company has made clear
that it sees little good coming from years of wasteful litigation
and appeals."

QUIRK CARS: Sapp, et al Seek Unpaid Wages for Auto Dealers
----------------------------------------------------------
DMANI SAPP and JOEL COLON, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. QUIRK CARS, INC. and DANIEL
J. QUIRK, the Defendants, Case No. 19-2545-B (Mass. Super.), seeks
damages based on the Defendants' failure to pay wages.

According to the complaint, Quirk operates a group of automobile
dealerships it refers to as 'Quirk Auto Dealers'.

Mr. Sapp worked as a salesperson for Quirk from September 2018
through April 2019. Mr. Colon worked as a salesperson for Quirk
from December 2016 through January 2019.

Quirk did not pay any additional compensation for such work beyond
the draws and commissions. The Plaintiffs worked more than 40 hours
in at least one week during the class period.

Employees are entitled to overtime pay for all hours worked above
40 hours in one Retail employees are entitled to premium pay for
work performed on Sundays and certain holidays pursuant to the
Massachussetts General Laws, the lawsuit says.

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Josh Gardner, Esq.
          Nicholas J. Rosenberg, Esq.
          GARDNER & ROSENBERG P.C.
          One State Street, Fourth Floor
          Boston, MA 02109
          Telephone: 617-390-7570
          E-mail: josh@gardnerrosenberg.com

QUORUM HEALTH: Della-Maggiora Suit v. Watsonville Resolved
----------------------------------------------------------
Quorum Health Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the class action suit
entitled, Mary Della-Maggiora, as an individual and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, v. Watsonville Community Hospital,
entity unknown, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive (Superior Court of
the State of California for the County of Santa Cruz), has been
settled by the parties.

On January 22, 2018, Plaintiff filed a purported class action
alleging violations of California Labor Code Section 226(a). On May
14, 2018, Plaintiff filed her Second Amended Class Action
Complaint. The Second Amended Class Action Complaint contains two
causes of action.

The first cause of action is brought by Plaintiff in her individual
capacity and as potential class representative for all other
Watsonville Community Hospital employees for alleged violations of
Labor Code Section 226(a), subsections (6), (8), and (9).

The second cause of action is brought under the California Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004 by Plaintiff in her individual
capacity and as "appointed" representative of the State of
California Labor and Workforce Development Agency, for alleged
violations of Labor Code Section 226(a), subsection (9).

Plaintiff generally alleges that the paystubs issued to Watsonville
employees did not include all information required by California
Labor Code Section 226(a).

The case was settled between the parties on July 16, 2019.

Quorum Health Corporation, together with its subsidiaries, provides
hospital and outpatient healthcare services in the United States.
Its hospital and outpatient healthcare services include general and
acute care, emergency room, general and specialty surgery, critical
care, internal medicine, diagnostic, obstetric, psychiatric, and
rehabilitation services. The company was incorporated in 2015 and
is headquartered in Brentwood, Tennessee.


QUORUM HEALTH: Discovery Ongoing in Zwick Partners Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Quorum Health Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that discovery is still
ongoing in the class action entitled, Zwick Partners LP and Aparna
Rao, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v.
Quorum Health Corporation, Community Health Systems, Inc., Wayne T.
Smith, W. Larry Cash, Thomas D. Miller and Michael J. Culotta.

On September 9, 2016, a shareholder filed a purported class action
in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee against the Company and certain of its former officers.

On April 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint
adding additional defendants, Community Health Systems, Inc.
("CHS"), Wayne T. Smith and W. Larry Cash. The Second Amended
Complaint alleges claims for violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange
Act"), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, and is brought on
behalf of a class consisting of all persons (other than defendants)
who purchased or otherwise acquired securities of the Company
between May 2, 2016 and August 10, 2016. The Complaint sought
damages related to the claims.

On June 23, 2017, the Company filed a motion to dismiss, which
Plaintiff opposed. On April 19, 2018, the Court denied the
Company's motion to dismiss, and the Company filed its answer to
the Second Amended Complaint on May 18, 2018. On July 13, 2018,
Plaintiff filed its motion for class certification, which
Defendants opposed. On March 29, 2019, the Court granted the motion
and certified the class.

Defendants filed a petition for permission to appeal the class
certification decision with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which petition was denied on July 31, 2019. On September 14, 2018,
Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint alleging additional
misstatements. On October 12, 2018, Defendants moved to dismiss,
and, on March 29, 2019, the Court granted the motion and dismissed
the new allegations.

The case is in discovery, and the Company is vigorously defending
itself.

Quorum Health said, "The Company is unable to predict the outcome
of this matter. However, it is reasonably possible that the Company
may incur a loss. The Company is unable to reasonably estimate the
amount or range of such possible loss. Under some circumstances,
losses incurred in connection with adverse outcomes in this matter
could be material."

Quorum Health Corporation, together with its subsidiaries, provides
hospital and outpatient healthcare services in the United States.
Its hospital and outpatient healthcare services include general and
acute care, emergency room, general and specialty surgery, critical
care, internal medicine, diagnostic, obstetric, psychiatric, and
rehabilitation services. The company was incorporated in 2015 and
is headquartered in Brentwood, Tennessee.


READING, PA: Pa. Cmmw. Affirms City's Win in Collection Cost Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania issued an Opinion affirming
in part and vacating in part the Court of Common Pleas' judgment
granting Declaratory Judgment in favor of the Defendant City in the
case captioned  Alan Ziegler, Nicolas Bene, Lissette Chevalier,
Jose Munoz, and Efrain Caban, Individually and on Behalf of all
Similarly Situated Persons, v. The City of Reading, and Reading
Area Water Authority. Appeal of: The City of Reading. No. 169 C.D.
2018. (Pa. Cmmw.).

In this appeal, the City of Reading (City) challenges the order of
the trial court entering declaratory judgment in favor of Appellees
(Residents)1 that the City's residential curbside recycling fee is
inconsistent with the Municipal Waste Planning, Recycling, and
Waste Reduction Act (Act 101).

The City is a third class city located in Berks County with a
population of over 10,000 residents, operating under a home rule
charter. The Reading Area Water Authority (RAWA) is a municipal
authority created under the Municipality Authorities Act.  

Residents filed a class action complaint against the City and RAWA
(collectively, the City), challenging the Recycling Fee. In Count
I, the Residents sought a declaratory judgment that the Recycling
Fee is in violation of the laws of the Commonwealth, namely, Act
101 and the Solid Waste Management Act (SWMA).

In Count II, the Residents sought a preliminary injunction
enjoining the City from billing for current or future Recycling
Fees and from pursuing the collection of any Recycling Fees
currently outstanding.

In Count III, the Residents sought compensatory and punitive
damages as well as reasonable attorney fees. Id. By joint request
and agreement of the parties, the trial court considered only Count
I and deferred disposition of the other two counts.

The trial court ruled that the Recycling Fee was permissible and
entered an order granting judgment in favor of the City. The trial
court later amended its order to facilitate interlocutory appeal to
this Court.

On appeal, an en banc panel of this Court vacated the order and
remanded the matter to the trial court for further analysis
consistent with our then recent decision in Waste Management of
Pennsylvania v. Department of Environmental Protection, 107 A.3d
273 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). In particular, the Court directed the trial
court to consider whether the City's Recycling Fee will have a
negative impact on the recycling program's financial
self-sufficiency, as that term is used in Act 101, or a deleterious
effect on the efficiencies of the City's recycling program.

On remand, the trial court interpreted this Court's opinion to mean
that if the Recycling Fee is permitted without limits, it will
relieve the City of an incentive to increase the program's
efficiency and pursue other appropriate sources of funding.

Upon concluding that the City's recycling fees were inconsistent
with Act 101 as evidenced both by the amount of the fees exceeding
the costs of recycling even before adding in revenue from sales of
recyclables and Act 101 grants, and by the language of Ordinance
20-2014 itself permitting fees to cover all costs associated with
the collection and removal of all curbside waste, the trial court
did not entertain any specific calculation of realizable avoided
costs or the precise appropriate fee amount generally.

The trial court noted that the exact extent to which avoided costs
should have lowered the fees is an issue for future proceedings on
damages. The trial court also declined to consider monetary damages
at this juncture because the parties agreed to have the court rule
solely on Count I , the declaratory judgment count before
proceeding with other aspects of the case. Accordingly, the trial
court entered declaratory judgment in favor of the Residents.

This appeal now follows.

The City raises five issues for review.

First, the City contends that the trial court erred by misapplying
a burden shifting analysis and placing the burden on the City to
prove that its Recycling Fee as authorized by Ordinances 20-2014
and 21-2014 complied with Act 101. Prior decisional law clearly
holds that the burden of proof always lies with the party
challenging the reasonableness of a fee and never shifts to the
municipality.

Second, the City argues that the trial court disregarded credible
evidence proving the City's compliance with Act 101.

Third, the City claims that the trial court erred by considering
evidence of avoided costs of tipping fees as a factor in
determining that the City's Recycling Fee is inconsistent with Act
101.

Fourth, the trial court abused its discretion and committed an
error of law in finding that any surplus of fees in proportion to
the costs of the recycling program is inconsistent with Act 101.

Finally, the City maintains that the trial court erred by allowing
the Residents to alter their claim thereby exceeding the scope of
both the declaratory judgment claim and the trial court's August 1,
2014 order limiting these proceedings to the disposition of Count I
of the Complaint only.

Burden of Proof

First, the City argues that the trial court improperly used a
shifting burden of proof requiring the Residents to show only that
the City had a surplus of fees for certain years before shifting
the burden to the City to show that the City's Recycling Fee is
consistent with Act 101. This is contrary to case law requiring the
party challenging an ordinance to show the ordinance's invalidity.


The Residents failed to prove facts supporting their claim. The
Residents produced no expert testimony that the amount charged had
a negative impact on the efficiencies of the recycling program. In
fact, the trial court never found that the Residents met their
burden of proof or that the evidence proved that the City's
Recycling Fee had a negative impact on the financial
self-sufficiency of the City's recycling program.

Ordinances are presumed to be valid and those who challenge their
validity carry a heavy burden to establish their invalidity. A
rebuttable presumption is not absolute or unassailable. It is
merely an assumption until it is disproved.  

The trial court applied the burden analysis applicable to
ordinances here. The City was entitled to a presumption that its
ordinances, which authorized the assessment and collection of a
Recycling Fee, were valid. The trial court placed the burden on the
Residents to show that the City's ordinances were inconsistent with
Act 101's purposes and provisions.  

Based on the Residents' evidence, the trial court found that the
fee charged and collected was high enough to cover all of the
program costs and enabled the City to ignore the statutorily
favored funding from grants and sales of recyclables in
contravention of Act 101. Once the Residents presented evidence
tending to show that the ordinances had a negative effect on the
efficiency and self-sufficiency of the recycling program, it was up
to the City to rebut this evidence. In other words, the City could
no longer rely on the presumption of the ordinances' validity, and
it was required to rebut the Residents' evidence in order to
prevail.

Upon review, the trial court correctly assigned the burden of
proof.

Disregard of Evidence

Next, the City contends that the trial court abused its discretion
by failing to consider evidence and arguments relating to the
City's Recycling Fee and program costs. The City discovered
evidence that it had significant leaf and yard waste collection
costs that should have been accounted for in the recycling fund,
but were assessed to the City's general fund. The trial court
accepted the City's evidence that the leaf and yard waste
collection program costs $326,000 per year, but the court did not
include these costs when calculating that the City had a surplus in
the recycling program. Yard waste falls within the definition of
recycling. There is no explanation why the trial court ignored this
evidence.

As fact-finder, the trial court maintains exclusive province over
matters involving the credibility of witnesses and the weight
afforded to the evidence. The trial court is free to believe all,
part, or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise free to
make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the
evidence. As a result, this Court is prohibited from making
contrary credibility determinations or reweighing the evidence in
order to reach an opposite result.  

In fact, the Court is bound by the findings of the trial court
which have adequate support in the record so long as the findings
do not evidence capricious disregard of competent and credible
evidence.

Leaf and Yard Waste

After the August 2017 hearing, the City discovered it had
significant leaf and yard waste collection costs that should have
been accounted for in the recycling fund, but were assessed to the
City's general fund. The Residents filed a motion in limine to
preclude this evidence. The trial court did not rule on the motion,
but did consider the City's evidence regarding yard waste and leaf
collection.

In fact, the trial court found that this service costs the City
approximately $326,000 per year. Despite this finding, the trial
court did not factor this evidence into its surplus analysis. The
trial court found that the City accounted for this expense in the
City's general fund, not in the City's recycling program fund. By
including this expense in the general fund, it was paid for by
property taxes, not by user fees, Act 101 grants or the sale of
recyclable materials.  

Thus, the Court concludes that the trial court erred by excluding
these expenses in its calculations and efficiency analysis.

Section 904 Performance Grants

As for the Section 904 performance grants, the trial court found
that from years 2014 through 2016, the user fees collected,
standing alone, without the inclusion of grants or sales of
recyclables exceeded the total costs of the recycling program. The
trial court reached this determination regarding the fees
irrespective of the performance grants.

The Court notes that the City's use of this unrestricted grant
money towards its recycling program is evidence that the City is
using any means available to attain "financial self-sufficiency, as
that term is used in Act 101.

Past Deficits

As for the deficit years, the trial court found that the program
ran a deficit in the years 2011-2013. The trial court found that it
was not clear what efforts, if any, the City made to operate the
program as efficiently as possible during the deficit years. The
trial court did not apply deficits in its calculations. Again, the
purpose of the remand order was to determine the efficiency of the
recycling program. The uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that
the City ran a deficit in some years. Those deficits had to be
recouped in future years.

The Court concludes that the trial court erred by not considering
deficits in its calculations.

Anticipated Costs

The City also presented evidence that the current fee contemplates
anticipated costs.

Specifically, the City presented testimony that it expects to incur
a $1.2 million expense in replacing recycling bins for all 26,636
customer households. If the City were to apply all $1.2 million to
any single year, it would require the City to add approximately $46
to each customer's recycling bill. The City's managing director
testified that the City is considering amortizing that cost over a
three- or five-year period. Despite finding that the City
anticipates an upcoming cost of $1.2 million to provide new
collection bins, the trial court did not consider this sum in its
analysis or offer any explanation as to why anticipated costs could
not be used to offset the amount of revenue generated. In this
regard, the trial court erred.

Thus, it is necessary to vacate and remand for proper consideration
of this evidence and further calculations that include the
disregarded data.

Surplus of Fees

Next, the City argues that a surplus that is reasonably
commensurate with the costs of the recycling program is consistent
with Act 101. The law states that any fee is valid if the revenue
generated by the fees is reasonably commensurate with the costs
incurred. The trial court summarily concluded that any surplus is
inconsistent with Act 101, without regard to whether the fees were
disproportionate to the costs.

A demonstration of surpluses alone would not defeat the
reasonableness of the fee. This Court has held that fees charged by
a municipality for services rendered are proper if they are
reasonably proportional to the costs of the regulation or the
services performed.

Here, the trial court found that the Residents demonstrated that
the ordinances permitted a Recycling Fee that covers all costs of
the recycling program and, as applied, the Recycling Fee covered
all costs of recycling and generated surpluses that were not
considered by the City in setting the fee.

As discussed above, the trial court erred in its calculation of a
surplus. Until a new calculation is made, it is unclear whether the
fee generated a surplus over multiple years. Moreover, while a
surplus may be indicative of inefficiency under Act 101, such may
be offset by other factors, including evidence regarding
amortization of anticipated costs.

Alteration of the Residents' Claims

Finally, the City argues that the trial court erred by allowing the
Residents to argue that the fee was excessive, a claim not raised
in their complaint. In Count I of the complaint, the Residents
merely claimed that the City's fee was inconsistent with Act 101,
not excessive. The trial court should have precluded the Residents
from proceeding on its new excessive fee argument without amending
its complaint to include this new claim. By allowing this new claim
to move forward, the trial court deprived the City the opportunity
to present preliminary objections or conduct full discovery.

On remand, this Court directed the trial court to consider whether
the curbside recycling fee will have a negative impact on the
recycling program's financial self-sufficiency, as that term is
used in Act 101, or a deleterious effect on the efficiencies of the
City's recycling program.  As the trial court found, consideration
of the amount of the fee and related financial details was thus
necessary to comply with the remand and give a final answer to the
question of whether the City's fee is permissible. Consideration of
whether the fee was inconsistent with Act 101 requires an
examination of whether the fee was excessive or unreasonable in
relation to actual costs of the program.

The Court notes that a fee is unreasonable if it is used by a
municipality purely to generate revenue with little regard to the
recycling program's efficiency or the goals of Act 101.

The Court vacates and remands insofar as the trial court's
calculations did not include leaf and yard waste collection costs,
prior year's deficits or anticipated program costs, and the Court
affirms in all other respects.

A full-text copy of the Commonwealth Court's August 15, 2019
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y33g8fxo from
Leagle.com.

Frederick Thomas Lachat, III, City of Reading Department of Law,
for Appellant, City of Reading.

Laura Elizabeth Cooper -- contact@libertylawgroup.us -- Liberty Law
Group, LLC, Sol H. Weiss -- sweiss@anapolweiss.com -- for
Appellees, Alan Ziegler, Jose Munoz, Lissette Chevalier, Efrain
Caban and Nicolas Bene.


REVEL SYSTEMS: $2.75MM Bisaccia FLSA Suit Deal Has Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSEPH BISACCIA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. REVEL SYSTEMS
INC., Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-02533-HSG (N.D. Cal.), Judge
Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California granted the Plaintiffs' motions (i) for
final approval of the class and collective action settlement, and
(ii) for attorneys' fees, costs, and incentive awards.

On May 3, 2017, Plaintiff Bisaccia filed the putative class action
against Revel for failure to pay overtime compensation as required
under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").  The initial complaint
alleged that Plaintiff Bisaccia and other inside sales
representatives ("ISRs") employed by the Defendant regularly worked
more than 40 hours in a workweek but did not receive overtime
compensation.  Instead, the Defendant classified them as "exempt"
employees who were not entitled to such overtime compensation.

On July 18, 2017, the Plaintiff sought conditional certification of
a collective action as to all ISRs, across sales titles and across
Defendant's various offices.  The Defendant eventually stipulated
to conditional certification and distribution of judicial notice to
the collective action members.  Judicial notice was distributed
pursuant to the parties' agreement, and the case now includes
approximately 149 opt-in Plaintiffs.

On June 7, 2018, Plaintiff Bisaccia, along with new Named
Plaintiffs Rosie O'Brien and Joshua Michi, filed an amended
complaint asserting putative class action claims under California
and New York law in addition to the FLSA claims asserted in the
original complaint.  

The parties participated in two mediations and were eventually able
to reach an agreement.  On Aug. 16, 2018, the parties jointly filed
a notice of settlement. They fully executed the Settlement
Agreement on Sept. 6, 2018, and filed a motion for preliminary
approval of class and collective action settlement on Sept. 20,
2018.  The Court granted preliminary approval of the settlement on
Feb. 22, 2019.

The settlement includes all ISRs who were employed by Defendant
from May 30, 2014 through and until Jan. 15, 2017, and who properly
and timely submitted a consent to join collective action form.

The settlement includes three Rule 23 settlement classes, defined
as follows:

     a. The California Class: All ISRs employed by the Defendant
who worked for Defendant in its California locations and who did
not receive payment in exchange for a release of California claims
through the Chatfield v. Revel class action settlement from May 30,
2013 through and until Jan. 15, 2017, and who do not communicate a
timely written request for exclusion from the settlement.

     b. The California Travel Class: All ISRs employed by the
Defendant who worked for Revel outside of California but who
traveled to, and performed work in, California from May 30, 2013
through and until Jan. 15, 2017, and who do not communicate a
timely written request for exclusion from the settlement.

     c. The New York Class: All ISRs who were employed by Defendant
in New York from May 30, 2011 through and until Jan. 15, 2017, and
who do not communicate a timely written request for exclusion from
the settlement.

The Defendant will pay a total settlement amount of $2.75 million,
including settlement payments to all Class and Collective Members,
administrative costs, incentive awards, any attorneys' fees and
costs award, and all individual settlement payments, including
employee taxes but excluding employer taxes.  The individual
settlement payments will be calculated proportionately based on
individualized damages calculations using payroll data provided by
the Defendant.  The average settlement payment after deducting any
attorneys' fees and costs is approximately $7,818.58.  The
settlement is non-reversionary.

A third-party settlement administrator will send class notices via
U.S. First-Class Mail to each member of the classes, using a class
list provided by Defendant.  The notice will include: the nature of
the action, a summary of the settlement terms, and instructions on
how to object to and opt out of the settlement, including relevant
deadlines.

The parties propose that any putative class member who does not
wish to participate in the settlement must sign and postmark a
written request for exclusion to the settlement administrator no
later than 60 days after the date notice is mailed.

The Named Plaintiffs will apply for incentive awards of no more
than $5,000 each, subject to the approval of the Court.

The Plaintiffs will file an application for attorneys' fees not to
exceed 25% of the settlement fund, and costs not to exceed $20,000.


The Class Counsel asks the Court to approve an award of $687,500 in
attorneys' fees and $16,307 in costs.  The Class Counsel also seeks
a $5,000 incentive award for each of the three Named Plaintiffs.

After considering and weighing the factors, Judge Gilliam finds
that the settlement agreement is fair, adequate, and reasonable,
and that the Class and Collective Members received adequate notice.
He also finds that the Class Counsel's requested fees, costs, and
incentive award; and the settlement administrator costs in the
amount of $14,000 are reasonable.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Gilliam granted the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, and their
Motion for Class Counsel's Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Incentive
Award.  He approved the settlement amount of $2.75 million,
including settlement administrator costs in the amount of $14,000;
attorneys' fees in the amount of $687,500; costs in the amount of
$16,306.92; and an incentive fee for each of the Named Plaintiffs
in the amount of $5,000, for a total of $15,000.

The parties and settlement administrator are directed to implement
the Final Order and the settlement agreement in accordance with the
terms of the settlement agreement.  The parties are further
directed to file a stipulated final judgment within 21 days from
the date of the order.  All other deadlines and hearing dates in
the case are vacated.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 17, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/5yhbcQ from Leagle.com.

Joseph Bisaccia, Plaintiff, represented by Matthew C. Helland --
helland@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster, LLP, Kevin R. Allen, Velton
Zegelman PC, Kevin Robert Allen, Allen Attorney Group & Daniel S.
Brome -- dbrome@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster, LLP.

Rosie O'Brien & Joshua Michi, Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel S.
Brome, Nichols Kaster, LLP & Kevin Robert Allen, Allen Attorney
Group.

Revel Systems Inc., Defendant, represented by Mollie Michelle
Burks
-- mburks@grsm.com -- Gordon & Rees LLP, Sara Allison Moore --
smoore@grsm.com -- Gordon and Rees LLP & Sat Sang S. Khalsa --
skhalsa@grsm.com -- Gordon and Rees LLP.


RINGCENTRAL INC: $2.725MM Settlement in Stemple Has Prelim Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Francisco Division, issued an Order granting
Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of the Proposed
Collective and Class Action Settlement in the case captioned DARREN
STEMPLE and STEFAN FLORES, on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. RINGCENTRAL, INC., Defendant.
Case No. 18-cv-04909-LB. (N.D. Cal.).

It is a putative collective action under the Federal Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) and a putative class action for the two state
classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The plaintiffs
claim that their employer, defendant RingCentral, Inc.,
misclassified them as exempt under the FLSA and similar state laws
and so failed to pay them requisite compensation.

Settlement Classes

The parties agreed to the following class definitions for
settlement purposes only:
Class or Class Member(s) means the members of the following
subclasses:

   a. FLSA class means all individuals who worked for Defendant in
a Covered Position at any time during the period beginning August
13, 2015 and ending on March 31, 2019, or the date of Preliminary
Approval, whichever is earlier. The Pre-Settlement FLSA Class means
those individuals who have already filed consent forms in the
Action.

   b. Colorado Class means all individuals who worked for Defendant
in a Covered Position in Colorado at any time during the period
beginning August 13, 2015 and ending on March 31, 2019.

   c. North Carolina Class means all individuals who worked for
Defendant in a Covered Position in North Carolina at any time
during the period beginning October 5, 2015 and ending on March 31,
2019. Members of the Colorado Class and North Carolina Class are
collectively referred to as the

Rule 23 Class Members.

Settlement Amount and Allocation

The total settlement amount is $2,724,714.75, which includes
service awards for the two named plaintiffs to be approved by the
court in an amount not to exceed $5,000 for Darren Stemple and
$1,000 for Stefan Flores and attorney's fees and actual litigation
costs and expenses (to be approved by the court in an amount not to
exceed $681,178.69, or 25 percent of the settlement amount, for
fees and $15,000 for reasonable actual expenses incurred.

Conditional Certification of Settlement Classes

The court determines whether the settlement classes meet the
requirements for class certification first under Rule 23 and then
under the FLSA.

Rule 23 Requirements

Class certification requires the following: (1) the class must be
so numerous that joinder of all members individually is
impracticable (2) there must be questions of law or fact common to
the class (3) the claims or defenses of the class representatives
must be typical of the claims or defenses of the class and (4) the
person representing the class must be able to fairly and adequately
protect the interests of all class members.  

Here, the factors, numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy, support the certification of the class for settlement
purposes only.

First, there are approximately 316 class members.The class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.

Second, there are questions of law and fact common to the class.
All class members worked for RingCentral as inside sales
representatives. Common questions include whether RingCentral
improperly classified them as exempt and whether they thus are
entitled to unpaid overtime compensation. The claims depend on
common contentions that true or false will resolve an issue central
to the validity of the claims.  

Third, the claims of the representative parties are typical of the
claims of the class. The representative parties and all class
members allege wage-and-hours violations based on similar facts.
All representatives possess the same interest and suffer from the
same injury.  

Fourth, the representative parties fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class. The factors relevant to a determination
of adequacy are (1) the absence of potential conflict between the
named plaintiff and the class members and (2) counsel chosen by the
representative party who is qualified, experienced, and able to
vigorously. conduct the litigation. The court is satisfied that the
factors exist here: the named plaintiffs have shared claims and
interests with the class (and no conflicts of interest and they
retained qualified and competent counsel who have prosecuted the
case vigorously.  

Thus, the court finds preliminarily (and for settlement purposes
only) that the proposed settlement class meets the Rule 23(a)
prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable (2) there are common questions of law and fact common
to the class (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4)
the representative party will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.  

The court also finds preliminarily (and for settlement purposes
only that questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and a class action is superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The court
certifies the class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)
for settlement purposes only.

The court thus conditionally certifies the class for settlement
purposes only and for the purposes of giving the class notice of
the settlement and conducting a final approval hearing.

Preliminary Approval of Settlement and Leave to File Amended
Complaint

The approval of a class-action settlement has two stages: (1) the
preliminary approval, which authorizes notice to the class and (2)
a final fairness hearing, where the court determines whether the
parties should be allowed to settle the class action on the
agreed-upon terms.

In Hanlon, Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026-27 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth
Circuit identified factors relevant to assessing a settlement
proposal: (1) the strength of the plaintiff's case (2) the risk,
expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation (3)
the risk of maintaining class-action status throughout trial (4)
the amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent of discovery
completed and the stage of the proceeding (6) the experience and
views of counsel (7) the presence of a government participant and
(8) the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.

Where a settlement is the product of arms-length negotiations
conducted by capable and experienced counsel, the court begins its
analysis with a presumption that the settlement is fair and
reasonable.

The court has evaluated the proposed settlement agreement for
overall fairness under the Hanlon factors and concludes that
preliminary approval is appropriate.

First, the settlement appears fair. As the plaintiffs point out, it
provides good value when contrasted to the maximum damages
calculated in anticipation of mediation, discussed supra,which
assumed complete success on the merits and 100% participation. The
fees also are capped at 25%.

Second, the plaintiffs provide examples of settlements in this
district that show that the settlement is in the range of possible
approval a relevant consideration at the preliminary approval
stage. (1) appears to be the product of serious, informed,
non-collusive negotiations (2) has no obvious deficiencies (3) does
not grant preferential treatment to class representatives or
segments of the class and (4) falls within the range of possible
approval, court also fully considered the Hanlon factors because
the settlement was reached before class certification.

Third, a class action allows class members who otherwise would not
pursue their claims individually because costs would exceed
recoveries  to obtain relief.

Fourth, litigation poses risk. RingCentral disputes that it wrongly
classified the inside sales representatives as exempt, and the
exemption has not been tested in this industry which involves sales
of a cloud-based unified telecommunications system and
collaboration solution  including video and audio conferencing,
team messaging and collaboration, and business-app integration
features used in healthcare, financial services, real estate,
retrial stores, and enterprises.  

Finally, the settlement is the product of serious, non-collusive,
arm's-length negotiations and was reached after mediation with an
experienced mediator with subject-matter expertise.

The recoveries here are adequate to justify preliminary approval.
Given other comparable settlements, and the litigation risks
identified above, the settlement amount at least preliminarily
appears fair.

The court  conditionally certifies the classes for settlement
purposes only preliminarily approves the settlement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 15, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y5h6sjh9 from Leagle.com.

Darren Stemple, Plaintiff, represented by Matthew C. Helland --
helland@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster, LLP & Daniel S. Brome --
dbrome@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster, LLP.

RingCentral, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jessica Perry --
jperry@orrick.com -- Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP & Kevin
David Whittaker, III -- kwhittaker@orrick.com -- Orrick, Herrington
& Sutcliffe LLP.


SEAWORLD ENTERTAINMENT: Trial in Anderson Suit Set for April 2020
-----------------------------------------------------------------
SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that trial in Marc
Anderson, et. al., v. SeaWorld Parks & Entertainment, Inc. suit, is
currently scheduled for April 2020.

On April 13, 2015, a purported class action was filed in the
Superior Court of the State of California for the City and County
of San Francisco against SeaWorld Parks & Entertainment, Inc.,
captioned Marc Anderson, et. al., v. SeaWorld Parks &
Entertainment, Inc. Civil Case No. 15-cv-02172-JSW, (the "Anderson
Matter").  

The putative class consisted of all consumers within California
who, within the past four years, purchased tickets to SeaWorld San
Diego. The complaint (as amended) alleges causes of action under
the California False Advertising Law, California Unfair Competition
Law and California CLRA.  

Plaintiffs' claims are based on their allegations that the Company
misrepresented the physical living conditions and care and
treatment of its orcas, resulting in confusion or misunderstanding
among ticket and orca plush purchasers with intent to deceive and
mislead the plaintiffs and purported class members.  

The complaint seeks restitution, equitable relief, attorneys' fees
and costs.  

Based on plaintiffs' definition of the class, the amount in
controversy could have exceeded $5.0 million assuming the class
became certified. The liability exposure is speculative though. On
May 14, 2015, the Company removed the case to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California.

The Company filed a motion for summary judgment on October 30, 2017
which the Court granted in part and denied in part. On May 23,
2018, the plaintiffs represented to the Court that they will not
file a motion for class certification. The case is no longer a
class action.  

All three named plaintiffs continue to have claims for individual
restitution in a nominal amount and injunctive relief. Trial is
currently scheduled for April 2020.  

Pre-trial motions and mediation proceedings are continuing.

SeaWorld said, "The Company believes that the lawsuit is without
merit and intends to defend the lawsuit vigorously; however, there
can be no assurance regarding the ultimate outcome of this
lawsuit."

SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
operates as a theme park and entertainment company in the United
States. The company operates SeaWorld theme parks in Orlando,
Florida; San Antonio, Texas; and San Diego, California, as well as
Busch Gardens theme parks in Tampa, Florida, and Williamsburg,
Virginia. The company was formerly known as SW Holdco, Inc. and
changed its name to SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc. in December 2012.
SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc. was founded in 1959 and is
headquartered in Orlando, Florida.


SEAWORLD ENTERTAINMENT: Trial in Baker Suit Set for Jan. 2020
-------------------------------------------------------------
SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that trial in the class
action suit entitled, Baker v. SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc., et
al., is currently scheduled to begin on January 21, 2020.  

On September 9, 2014, a purported stockholder class action lawsuit
consisting of purchasers of the Company's common stock during the
periods between April 18, 2013 to August 13, 2014, captioned Baker
v. SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc., et al., Case No. 14-CV-02129-MMA
(KSC), was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California against the Company, the Chairman of the
Company's Board, certain of its executive officers and Blackstone.


On February 27, 2015, Court-appointed Lead Plaintiffs,
Pensionskassen For Børne- Og Ungdomspædagoger and Arkansas Public
Employees Retirement System, together with additional plaintiffs,
Oklahoma City Employee Retirement System and Pembroke Pines
Firefighters and Police Officers Pension Fund (collectively,
"Plaintiffs"), filed an amended complaint against the Company, the
Chairman of the Company's Board, certain of its directors, certain
of its executive officers, Blackstone, and underwriters of the
initial public offering and secondary public offerings.  

The amended complaint alleges, among other things, that the
prospectus and registration statements filed contained materially
false and misleading information in violation of the federal
securities laws and seeks unspecified compensatory damages and
other relief. Plaintiffs contend that defendants knew or were
reckless in not knowing that Blackfish was impacting SeaWorld’s
business at the time of each public statement.

On May 29, 2015, the Company and the other defendants filed motions
to dismiss the amended complaint. On March 31, 2016, the Court
granted the motions to dismiss the amended complaint, in its
entirety, without prejudice.  

On May 31, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a second amended consolidated
class action complaint ("Second Amended Complaint"), which, among
other things, no longer names the Company's Board or underwriters
as defendants and no longer brings claims based on the prospectuses
and registration statements. On September 30, 2016, the Court
denied the renewed motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint.


On May 19, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification,
which the Court granted on November 29, 2017. On December 13, 2017,
Defendants filed a petition for permission to appeal the Court's
class certification order with the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, which was denied on June 28, 2018.

Discovery is now complete and, on April 15, 2019, Defendants filed
a motion for summary judgment.  Also on April 15, 2019, Defendants
filed motions to exclude each of Plaintiffs' three expert witnesses
and Plaintiffs filed motions to exclude two of Defendants' expert
witnesses. The briefing on the motions is complete. The date for
oral argument was adjourned and has not yet been rescheduled.

Trial is currently scheduled to begin on January 21, 2020.  

SeaWorld Entertainment said, "The Company believes that the class
action lawsuit is without merit and intends to defend the lawsuit
vigorously; however, there can be no assurance regarding the
ultimate outcome of this lawsuit."

SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
operates as a theme park and entertainment company in the United
States. The company operates SeaWorld theme parks in Orlando,
Florida; San Antonio, Texas; and San Diego, California, as well as
Busch Gardens theme parks in Tampa, Florida, and Williamsburg,
Virginia. The company was formerly known as SW Holdco, Inc. and
changed its name to SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc. in December 2012.
SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc. was founded in 1959 and is
headquartered in Orlando, Florida.


SHAFER LAW: Hanks Seeks FDCPA Damages for Virginia Consumers
------------------------------------------------------------
TEDRA HANKS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. SHAFER LAW FIRM, PC and JOHN DOES 1-25, Case No.
2:19-cv-00428-RBS-DEM (E.D. Va., Aug. 13, 2019), is brought on
behalf of consumers seeking damages and declaratory relief for
violations of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act.

Shafer is a "debt collector" as the phrase is defined and used in
the FDCPA with an address in Atlanta, Georgia.  The identities of
the Doe Defendants are unknown.

Shafer is a company that uses the mail, telephone, and facsimile
and regularly engages in business the principal purpose of which is
to attempt to collect debts alleged to be due another.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Aryeh E. Stein, Esq.
          MERIDIAN LAW, LLC
          600 Reisterstown Rd., Suite 700
          Baltimore, MD 21208
          Telephone: (443) 326-6011
          Facsimile: (410) 653-9061
          E-mail: astein@meridianlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Raphael Deutsch, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 282-6500
          Facsimile: (201) 282-6501
          E-mail: rdeutsch@steinsakslegal.com


SHUTTERFLY INC: Appeal in Vigeant Suit Against Lifetouch Pending
----------------------------------------------------------------
Shutterfly, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the appeal in the
Vigeant v Meek et al. suit remains pending.

On March 1, 2018, a purported class action complaint was filed
against several directors of Lifetouch, Inc. (which became a direct
wholly-owned subsidiary of Shutterfly on April 2, 2018) and the
trustee of the Lifetouch Employee Stock Ownership Plan (the "ESOP")
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota.

On April 2, 2018, the complaint was amended to include the prior
ESOP trustees and plan sponsor (Lifetouch) as additional named
defendants.

The complaint alleges violations of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act, including that the ESOP should not have been
permitted to continue investing in Lifetouch stock during a period
in which the Lifetouch stock price was declining.

The plaintiffs seek recovery for damages arising from the alleged
breaches of fiduciary duty.

On November 7, 2018, the District Court granted defendant's motion
to dismiss in its entirety and with prejudice. Plaintiffs' counsel
filed a timely notice of appeal with the 8th Circuit Court of
Appeals.

The Company believes the suit is without merit and intends to
vigorously defend against it.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Shutterfly, Inc. manufactures and retails personalized products
primarily in the United States, Canada, and the European Community.
The company operates through three reportable segments: Shutterfly
Consumer, Lifetouch, and Shutterfly Business Solutions. Shutterfly,
Inc. was founded in 1999 and is headquartered in Redwood City,
California.


SHUTTERFLY INC: Miracle-Pond and Paraf Class Suit Ongoing
---------------------------------------------------------
Shutterfly, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend a class action suit entitled, Miracle-Pond and Paraf v.
Shutterfly, Inc.

On June 11, 2019, Vernita Miracle-Pond and Samantha Paraf on behalf
of themselves and all other similarly situated Shutterfly and
non-Shutterfly customers, filed a complaint against the Company in
the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois.

The complaint asserts that the Company violated the Illinois
Biometric Information Privacy Act by extracting their biometric
identifiers from photographs and seeks statutory damages and an
injunction.

The Company removed the case to federal court. Miracle-Pond and
Paraf are seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief.

The Company believes the suit is without merit and intends to
vigorously defend against it.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Shutterfly, Inc. manufactures and retails personalized products
primarily in the United States, Canada, and the European Community.
The company operates through three reportable segments: Shutterfly
Consumer, Lifetouch, and Shutterfly Business Solutions. Shutterfly,
Inc. was founded in 1999 and is headquartered in Redwood City,
California.


SI-BONE INC: Continues to Defend Fromer TCPA Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on August 7, 2019, for the quarterly period ended June
30, 2019, that the company continues to defend a class action suit
entitled, Eric B. Fromer Chiropractic, Inc. v. SI-BONE, Inc.

On February 6, 2019, a putative class action captioned Eric B.
Fromer Chiropractic, Inc. v. SI-BONE, Inc. (Civil Action No.
5:19-cv-633-SVK), was filed in the United States District Court,
Northern District of California.

The complaint alleges violations of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act (the "TCPA") on behalf of an individual and putative
classes of persons alleged to be similarly situated. The complaint
alleges that the Company sent invitations to an educational dinner
event to health care providers by way of facsimile transmission.

The TCPA prohibits using a fax machine to send unsolicited
advertisements not including proper opt-out instructions or to send
unsolicited advertisements to persons with whom the sender did not
have an established business relationship.

On August 5, 2019, the District Court denied the Company's motion
to dismiss the case.

The Company believes that it has meritorious defenses and intends
to vigorously defend itself in the action.

SI-BONE said, "It is too early in this matter to reasonably predict
the probability of the outcomes or to estimate the range of
possible loss, if any."

SI-BONE, Inc., a medical device company, develops and
commercializes a proprietary minimally invasive surgical implant
system in the United States and Internationally. It offers iFuse,
an implant system to fuse the sacroiliac joint to treat sacroiliac
joint dysfunction that causes lower back pain. The company was
founded in 2008 and is headquartered in Santa Clara, California.


SIMPSON MANUFACTURING: Gentry Homes Class Action Ongoing
--------------------------------------------------------
Simpson Manufacturing Co. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the continues to defend
a class action suit initiated by Gentry Homes, Ltd.

Gentry Homes, Ltd. v. Simpson Strong-Tie Company, Inc., et al.,
Case No. 17-cv-00566, was filed in federal district court in Hawaii
against Simpson Strong-Tie Company, Inc. and Simpson Manufacturing,
Inc. on November 20, 2017.  

The Gentry case is a product of a previous state court class
action, Nishimura v. Gentry Homes, Ltd., et al. which is now
closed. The Nishimura case concerned alleged corrosion of the
Company's galvanized strap-tie holdowns and mudsill anchor products
used in a residential project in Honolulu, Hawaii, Ewa by Gentry.


In the Nishimura case, the plaintiff homeowners and the developer,
Gentry, arbitrated their dispute and agreed on a settlement in the
amount of $90 million, with $54 million going to repair costs and
$36 million going to attorney's fees.  

In the Gentry case, Gentry alleges breach of warranty and negligent
misrepresentation related to the Company's strap-tie holdowns and
mudsill anchor products. Gentry is demanding general, special, and
consequential damages from the Company in an amount to be proven at
trial.  

Gentry also seeks pre-judgment and post-judgment interest,
attorneys' fees and costs, and other relief.

Simpson Manufacturing Co., Inc., through its subsidiaries, designs,
engineers, manufactures, and sells building construction products.
Simpson Manufacturing Co., Inc. was founded in 1956 and is
headquartered in Pleasanton, California.


SIMPSON MANUFACTURING: Kaneshiro Class Action Ongoing
-----------------------------------------------------
Simpson Manufacturing Co. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend a class action suit initiated by Stephen Kaneshiro.

Stephen Kaneshiro, et al. v. Stanford Carr Development, LLC et
al./Stanford Carr Development, LLC, et al. v. Simpson Strong-Tie
Company, Inc., Civil No. 18-1-1472-09 VLC, is a putative class
action lawsuit filed in the Hawaii First Circuit.  The Company was
added as a third-party defendant on December 28, 2018.  

The homeowner plaintiffs allege that all homes built by Stanford
Carr Development and its subsidiaries (collectively "Stanford
Carr") in the State of Hawaii have strap-tie holdowns and mudsill
anchors that are suffering premature corrosion.

Stanford Carr has asserted indemnity and contribution claims
against the Company.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Simpson Manufacturing Co., Inc., through its subsidiaries, designs,
engineers, manufactures, and sells building construction products.
Simpson Manufacturing Co., Inc. was founded in 1956 and is
headquartered in Pleasanton, California.



SIMPSON MANUFACTURING: Vitale Suit v. D.R. Horton Ongoing
---------------------------------------------------------
Simpson Manufacturing Co. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that D.R. Horton, Inc.
continues to defend a class action suit initiated by Charles
Vitale.

Charles Vitale, et al. v. D.R. Horton, Inc. and D.R. Horton-Schuler
Homes, LLC, Civil No. 15-1-1347-07, a putative class action
lawsuit, was filed in the Hawaii First Circuit on July 13, 2015, in
which homeowner plaintiffs allege that all homes built by D.R
Horton/D.R. Horton-Schuler Homes (collectively "Horton Homes") in
the State of Hawaii have strap-tie holdowns that are suffering
premature corrosion. The court has denied a motion for statewide
class certification.  

The Company is not currently a party to the Vitale lawsuit. If
claims are asserted against the Company in the Vitale case, it will
vigorously defend any such claims, whether brought by the plaintiff
homeowners, or third party claims by Horton Homes.

Simpson said, "Based on facts currently known to the Company and
subject to future events and circumstances, the Company believes
that all or part of any claims that any party might seek to allege
against it related to the Vitale case may be covered by its
insurance policies."

Simpson Manufacturing Co., Inc., through its subsidiaries, designs,
engineers, manufactures, and sells building construction products.
Simpson Manufacturing Co., Inc. was founded in 1956 and is
headquartered in Pleasanton, California.


SS&C TECHNOLOGIES: Unit Still Defends Ferguson ERISA Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
SS&C Technologies Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that DST Systems, Inc.
(DST) continues to defend a putative class action lawsuit entitled,
Ferguson, et al v. Ruane Cunniff & Goldfarb Inc, et al.

A putative class action suit was filed against DST, the
Compensation Committee of DST's Board of Directors, the Advisory
Committee of DST Systems, Inc. 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan (the
"Plan") and certain of DST's present and/or former officers and
directors, alleging breach of fiduciary duties and other violations
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.  

On September 1, 2017, a complaint was filed purportedly on behalf
of the Plan in the Southern District of New York, captioned
Ferguson, et al v. Ruane Cunniff & Goldfarb Inc., et al., naming as
defendants DST, the Compensation Committee of DST's Board of
Directors, the Advisory Committee of the Plan and certain of DST's
present and/or former officers and directors.

SS&C Technologies said, "We continue to defend this case
vigorously. We have not yet determined what effect this lawsuit
will have, if any, on our financial position or results of
operations."

SS&C Technologies completed its acquisition of DST Systems, a
global strategic advisory, technology, and operations outsourcing
company, in April 2018.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

SS&C Technologies Holdings, Inc. provides software products and
software-enabled services to financial services and healthcare
industries in the United States, Canada, rest of the Americas,
Europe, the Asia Pacific, and Japan. SS&C Technologies Holdings,
Inc. was founded in 1986 and is headquartered in Windsor,
Connecticut.


STATE FARM: 7th Cir. Affirms Insurance Suit Dismissal
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court's judgment granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the captioned MAO-MSO RECOVERY II,
LLC, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cross-Appellees, v. STATE FARM
MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee,
Cross-Appellant. APPEAL OF: CHRISTOPHER L. COFFIN, et al. Nos.
18-2377, 18-2463. (7th Cir.).

The Plaintiffs assert that they are assignees of certain private
insurers called Medicare Advantage Organizations, which provide
Medicare benefits. They brought a putative class action against
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company in an effort to
recover payments State Farm allegedly should have made to them as
reimbursement for certain medical costs.

The district court dismissed the action with prejudice, although
the basis for the dismissal was lack of standing.

The plaintiffs in this case are not themselves Medicare Advantage
Organizations; they assert instead that they are assignees of
claims that originally belonged to such entities. They argue that
Medicare Advantage Organizations are among the proper plaintiffs
that can exercise this private right of action, and that through
the assignments, they stand in the shoes of those Organizations.
The plaintiffs and related entities have pursued this theory not
just in this litigation, but in several suits throughout the
country.   

At the same time as it granted State Farm's motion to dismiss the
First Amended Complaint for lack of standing in this case, the
district court agreed with the plaintiffs that the statute does
support a private right of action for Medicare Advantage
Organizations.

Although State Farm did not challenge this point in the district
court, it has changed its tune on appeal and now argues that the
private right of action does not extend to Medicare Advantage
Organizations.

Plaintiffs' efforts in the present case foundered, however, when
the district court found that they did not have valid assignments
from any Medicare Advantage Organization that made unreimbursed
payments. Without the link to a proper Organization that possessed
claims to reimbursement, the court concluded, plaintiffs had no
injury for which they could seek redress on this or any other legal
theory. Accordingly, it ruled, no matter the scope of the private
right of action, these plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. We come
to the same conclusion. We save for another day the question
whether a Medicare Advantage Organization or a proper assignee of
its rights may invoke the Medicare Secondary Payer private right of
action for double damages against a primary insurer.

The Court now turns to the specific defects that the district court
found to be fatal to the plaintiffs' case. This appeal comes to us
on a dismissal of the plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. A brief
review of the first two iterations of the complaint sheds some
light on what went wrong and why plaintiffs are entitled to no
further amendments.

From the outset of this litigation, the question of standing has
been hotly disputed. Plaintiffs acknowledge that they and similar
organizations have filed a number of suits in which the initial
complaints did not name any exemplar beneficiaries or their
corresponding assignor Medicare Advantage Plans. Instead, they
generally alleged the assignments held by plaintiffs from multiple
Medicare Advantage Organizations, and alleged plaintiffs' analysis
of the data from multiple unreimbursed claims.

This led to successful defense motions to dismiss for lack of
standing: as the plaintiffs put it, generally, the district court
rulings on these early motions were to dismiss the complaints, with
leave to amend, directing some degree of greater specificity. When
State Farm in this case moved to dismiss the initial complaint for
lack of Article III standing among other grounds, the plaintiffs
responded by filing an amended complaint to put more meat on the
bone.

The First Amended Complaint fell short, however. It identified an
exemplar beneficiary by initials and a Medicare Advantage
Organization (whose identity was redacted) that allegedly had made
secondary payments, but it provided little additional information
about the underlying claims or payments. Even after the district
court issued a protective order, plaintiffs still failed to
disclose the name of the assignor Medicare Advantage Organization
to State Farm.

This time, in response to State Farm's motion, the district court
dismissed the complaint for lack of Article III standing. It found
that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate an "injury in fact" for
purposes of Article III standing without more specificity as to the
injuries sustained by the exemplar beneficiary and the assignor
Medicare Advantage Organization that had allegedly paid the
unreimbursed medical costs. The court gave the plaintiffs another
chance to cure that defect by granting leave to amend.

Plaintiffs took advantage of that opportunity and filed a Second
Amended Complaint. In this iteration, the plaintiffs chose a new
exemplar beneficiary identified by the initials R.Y. and named the
Medicare Advantage Organization that had made the secondary
payments as Health First Administrative Plans (HFAP). A chain of
assignments transferred HFAP's alleged right of recovery to
Recovery Claims. The complaint alleged that R.Y. suffered specific
injuries in an accident; that HFAP was the entity that paid medical
costs for R.Y.; that State Farm entered into a settlement agreement
with R.Y.; and that State Farm failed to reimburse HFAP for the
costs HFAP had incurred.

This time, however, there was a new problem: it was not clear that
HFAP qualified as a Medicare Advantage Organization. After the
defendants filed another motion to dismiss for lack of standing,
but before the district court had arrived at a decision, a district
court in Florida ruled in a related case that HFAP was not a
Medicare Advantage Organization at all. Accordingly, the Florida
court found that HFAP did not have any recovery rights to assign,
even assuming plaintiffs were correct about the private right of
action: any such claims belonged only to Health First Health.

The court was particularly bothered by what it saw as a bombshell:
the revelation in the plaintiffs' response that Health First
Health, which had never been mentioned in the Central Illinois
case, not HFAP, was the entity that paid the unreimbursed medical
costs. This fact contradicted earlier filings that identified HFAP
as the payer with reimbursement rights. If that was true, the
district court thought, then HFAP (whatever its status) never
incurred any injury and so had no rights that it could assign.

The court also reasoned that in light of this development, there
was no need to decide, as the Florida court had, whether HFAP was a
qualifying Medicare Advantage Organization. It was Health First
Health that paid the unreimbursed bills, but the plaintiffs had an
assignment only from HFAP. Only if Health First Health's service
contract with HFAP also assigned HFAP its legal rights could the
case have a leg to stand on. And on this point, the district court
agreed fully with its Florida counterpart: it emphasized, contrary
to the plaintiffs' arguments, that a document creating an agency
relationship and one effecting an assignment of rights are two
entirely different things.

Accordingly, the district court dismissed the case on this ground
alone. Assuming HFAP is a Medicare Advantage Organization,
Plaintiffs still need to satisfy Article-III standing requirements,
and this they cannot do.

A dismissal for lack of jurisdiction without leave to amend is not
the same thing as a dismissal with prejudice. A dismissal with
prejudice is a ruling on the merits, because it carries with it a
preclusive effect that prevents the plaintiffs from relitigating in
any court, ever again any claim encompassed by the suit. We have
emphasized this distinction before.  

If plaintiffs believe they have satisfied the standing requirements
of a proper state-court forum requirements that may differ from
those used by the federal courts they may try their luck in state
court. Or, if they later believe they can demonstrate that they
have suffered an injury in fact after all, perhaps on the basis of
a different assignment or exemplar claim, they can present these
claims against the same defendant in a new federal suit assuming of
course that no independent barrier, such as the statute of
limitations, exists.

Indeed, in a case brought by these plaintiffs against the same
defendant and before the same district judge which the court called
a putative class action with slightly different facts, but
consisting of virtually identical allegations under the law these
plaintiffs did successfully demonstrate standing and survived a
motion to dismiss.  

The Court finds no abuse of discretion in its decision to dismiss
on standing grounds and to refuse further amendments.  

Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirms the district court's
dismissal without leave to amend, but modifies it to be a dismissal
without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Seventh Circuit's August 15, 2019 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yy89fwnd from Leagle.com.

Joseph Cancila, Jr. -- jcancila@rshc-law.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

James P. Gaughan -- jgaughan@rshc-law.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Christopher L. Coffin -- ccoffin@pbclawfirm.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Christopher L. Coffin, for Appellant.

David M. Hundley -- dhundley@pbclawfirm.com -- for Appellant.

Patrick Dennis Cloud -- pcloud@heylroyster.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Courtney L. Stidham -- cstidham@pbclawfirm.com -- for Appellant.

D. Matthew Allen -- mallen@carltonfields.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.


STEPHEN A. ARNALL: Court Dismisses Paskowitz Securities Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina, Charlotte Division, issued an Order granting Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Class Action Complaint in the
case captioned LAURENCE PASKOWITZ, KAREN STORY, Plaintiffs, v.
STEPHEN A. ARNALL, CAPITALA FINANCE CORP., JOSEPH B. ALALA, III,
Defendants. Civil Action No. 3:18-CV-00096-KDB-DSC. (W.D.N.C.).

Defendant Capitala is a business development company that invests
in lower middle market companies through debt and equity, in a
combination of subordinated or more senior first-lien type.
Capitala's common stock trades under the ticker symbol CPTA.
Plaintiffs are two purchasers of Capitala's common stock during the
period who seek to represent a class of purchasers of Capitala's
securities during the Class Period who were allegedly damaged by
the disclosures made by the Company at the end of the Class
Period.

Plaintiffs bring claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) and SEC Rule 10b-5
alleging that the Company's disclosures related to the waiver of
the incentive fee due to Capitala Advisors and certain risk warning
disclosures were materially false because they did not include
disclosure of the alleged negative effects of the fee waiver and
did not discuss the loss of investment employees.

Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, makes it unlawful to use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe. Section
10(b) is implemented by Rule 10b-5, which makes it unlawful to
employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, to make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made not misleading,
or, to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.

Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act imposes liability on every person
who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any
provision of the Exchange Act to the same extent as such controlled
person unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did
not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the
violation or cause of action.

Material Misrepresentation or Omission

The first element necessary to state a claim under Rule 10b-5 is a
material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant. To allege
a false statement or omission of material fact, plaintiffs must
point to a factual statement or omission that is, one that is
demonstrable as being true or false. A statement of opinion is only
a false factual statement if the statement is false, disbelieved by
its maker, and related to matters of fact which can be verified by
objective evidence.

The Amended Complaint recites and describes in detail the
statements that Plaintiffs contend are materially false and
misleading.  Plaintiffs challenge three categories of statements:
(1) a press release describing the incentive fee waiver (2)
statements in the Company's 2015 and 2016 10-K Annual Reports
regarding the Investment Advisor's investment committee and
investment professionals (Investment Professionals Statements)  and
(3) risk disclosures made by Capitala related to its ability to
attract and retain qualified personnel and dependence on key
employees Risk Disclosure Statements.

The Amended Complaint fails to sufficiently allege falsity or a
misleading omission as to each of these statements under the PSLRA.


First, the Amended Complaint does not allege that the Incentive Fee
Statement was itself false; that is, that it failed to accurately
describe the Investment Advisor's voluntary agreement to waive all
or a portion of its quarterly incentive fees. Nor do Plaintiffs'
allege that the reason given for the waiver  to help support the
ability of the company to cover distributions to shareholders was
untruthful.

Rather, Plaintiffs contend that the Company was reckless in not
including in the press release a description of the potential
negative consequences of the fee waiver. However, the Amended
Complaint does not allege that at the time the statement was made
the Company knew that the fee waiver would have any of the negative
consequences that later occurred.

In the absence of such knowledge, a truthful statement about a
corporate action (and the reasons for it cannot become the basis
for a materially false and misleading statement simply because the
action later turns out to have negative consequences. Accordingly,
the Amended Complaint fails to sufficiently allege that the
Incentive Fee Statement was materially false and misleading.

Similarly, Plaintiffs contend that the second category of
statements describing the Investment Advisor's investment
committee, the number of investment professionals working with the
investment committee and the overall experience and qualifications
of those professionals is materially false and misleading because
the statements did not disclose that the Investment Advisor's
waiver of the incentive fees had resulted in a significant loss of
professionals and had compromised the Investment Advisor's ability
to provide quality underwriting and investment portfolio management
services to the Company.   

Again, however, Plaintiffs do not allege that anything said in the
Investment Professionals Statements is untrue.

Put another way, absent an affirmative duty to disclose the
reason(s) for the change in the number of investment professionals
(for which no authority has been cited), the Company had no duty to
provide such reasons, unless it chose to do so, which the Company
did not do. Indeed, applying Plaintiffs' argument more broadly,
companies routinely present a wealth of information on revenue,
expenses, employee counts and many other aspects of their
operations without explaining in detail why each number went up or
down. To hold that a fraudulentomission sufficient to create
potential liability can be created from a Company's failure to
explain11 why an accurately stated operational statistic has
changed from a previous public securities filing would greatly
expand the scope of potentially liability under Section 10(b)
contrary to the letter and spirit of the PSLRA and the Court
declines to do so.

Therefore, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently plead that the
Investment Professionals Statements were materially false or
misleading.

The final category of statements on which Plaintiffs base their
claims are the Risk Disclosure Statements. In those statements, the
Company warned investors that:

Our success depends on the ability of Capitala Investment Advisors
to attract and retain qualified personnel in a competitive
environment and We depend upon Capitala Investment Advisors' key
personnel for our future success.

Plaintiffs contend that these risk disclosures, along with the
explanatory text that followed them, were materially false and
misleading because the risk of which Defendants warned in the 2015
10-K had already materialized.

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the inherently prospective
nature of risk disclosures does not mean, as Defendants contend,
that such statements can never be the basis for a materially false
or misleading statement. On the contrary, a risk disclosure that
discusses a risk that has already come to fruition as only a
potential risk might, under appropriate circumstances, be the basis
for a claim that the disclosure is false or misleading. For
example, it would plainly be misleading for a company to disclose
in general terms the risk that material contracts may be
terminated, while failing to disclose that the counterparty to its
largest contract has already requested termination.  

However, the possibility that risk disclosures may be actionable
does not make them so in this case. Here, in light of the
disclosures discussed above which disclosed the identity of the key
personnel operating the Investment Committee and the declining
number of investment professionals in the company, Plaintiffs have
not sufficiently plead that the risk disclosures are misleading.  

Scienter

Defendants argue that in addition to failing to properly plead a
material misstatement or omission, the Amended Complaint does not
sufficiently allege the required strong inference of scienter, a
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.
While the discussion above suggests a further amended pleading, if
one is filed, will need to pay careful attention to sufficiently
pleading scienter as well as material misstatements or omissions,
because the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to plead
sufficient facts to show Defendants have made false material
statements or omissions, the Court does not reach the issue of
whether the Amended Complaint adequately alleges scienter.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Class Action
Complaint is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs Amended Complaint is dismissed
without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 15, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2kqzkvg from Leagle.com.

Laurence Paskowitz, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Gary W. Jackson --
gary.jackson@farrin.com -- Law Offices of James Scott Farrin, Jacob
A. Goldberg -- jgoldberg@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm P.A.
& Laurence Matthew Rosen -- lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law
Firm, P.A., pro hac vice.

Karen Story, Lead Plaintiff, Plaintiff, represented by Jacob A.
Goldberg, The Rosen Law Firm P.A., pro hac vice, Phillip C. Kim,
The Rosen Law Firm, P.A., pro hac vice, Gary W. Jackson, Law
Offices of James Scott Farrin & Laurence Matthew Rosen, The Rosen
Law Firm, P.A., pro hac vice.

Capitala Finance Corp., Joseph B. Alala, III & Stephen A. Arnall,
Defendants, represented by B. Warren Pope -- wpope@kslaw.com --
King & Spalding, LLP, pro hac vice, Bethany Marie Rezek --
brezek@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding, LLP, pro hac vice, Bradley
Jason Lingo -- blingo@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding LLP, Cory
Hohnbaum -- chohnbaum@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding LLP & Jennifer
Taylor Stewart -- jstewart@kslaw.com -, King and Spalding LLP.

Sanford B. Salzman, Movant, represented by Robert Vincent Prongay
-- rprongay@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP.

Darryl Ledet, Stevy Dingus & Erik Pohl, Movants, represented by Avi
N. Wagner -- avi@thewagnerfirm.com -- Wagner Firm.


STOKES TIRE: Underpays Workers, Steinkamp Alleges
-------------------------------------------------
TAYLOR STEINKAMP, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. STOKES TIRE SERVICE, INC., a
California corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, Inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. 19STCV28071 (Cal. Super., Aug. 08, 2019),
alleges that Defendants have had a consistent policy or practice of
failing to pay proper wages, including minimum and overtime wages,
to Plaintiff and other non-exempt aggrieved employees in the State
of California in violation of California state wage and hour laws.
The plaintiff contends that the Defendant rounds off employees'
work time.

According to the complaint, the Defendants employed Plaintiff as a
non-exempt employee at their facilities in the State of
California.

Stokes Tire is a tire dealer and auto repair shop in Santa Monica
California.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated are:

          Michael Nourmand, Esq.
          James A. De Sario, Esq.
          Melissa M. Kurata, Esq.
          THE NOURMAND LAW FIRM, APC
          8822 West Olympic Boulevard
          Beverly Hills, CA 90211
          Telephone: (310) 553-3600
          Facsimile: (310) 553-3603

SUNDANCE ENERGY: Faces Lawsuit in Oklahoma Over Fracking Quakes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reported that more than 100 people sued
Sundance Energy Oklahoma and 20 other companies in Oklahoma County
Court, claiming their wastewater injection and fracking caused
earthquakes that damaged their property.

A copy of the Petition is available at:

                      https://is.gd/19sm0B


SUNRISE SENIOR: Removes Tunstall Case to C.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------
Sunrise Senior Living Management, Inc. removes case captioned
ANTHONY TUNSTALL, as an individual and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. SUNRISE SENIOR LIVING
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Virginia corporation; and DOES 1 through 50,
inclusive, the Defendants, Case 30-2019-01077618-CU-OE-CJC, from
the Orange County Superior Court, State of California, to the
United States District Court for the Central District of California
on Aug. 8, 2019. The Central District of California Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 8:19-cv-01554-JVS-DFM to the proceeding.

The  Plaintiff seeks to bring a class action on behalf of a "all
current and former non-exempt employees of Defendant in the State
of California who were paid overtime wages at any time from June
18, 2018, through the present. The Plaintiff alleges causes of
action against Sunrise in violation of California Labor Code.[BN]

Attorneys for the Defendant are:

          Michele L. Maryott, Esq.
          Ashley Allyn, Esq.
          GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
          3161 Michelson Drive
          Irvine, CA 92612-4412
          Telephone: 949.451.3800
          Facsimile: 949.451.4220
          E-mail: mmaryott@gibsondunn.com
                  aallyn@gibsondunn.com

SUNRUN INC: Court Grants Final Approval to Slovin Case Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Sunrun Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that the Court granted final approval of the
settlement in the class action suit entitled, Slovin et al. v.
Sunrun Inc. and Clean Energy Experts, LLC

On November 20, 2015, a putative class action captioned Slovin et
al. v. Sunrun Inc. and Clean Energy Experts, LLC, Case No.
4:15-cv-05340, was filed in the United States District Court,
Northern District of California.

The complaint generally alleged violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (the "TCPA") on behalf of an individual and
putative classes of persons alleged to be similarly situated.

Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint on December 2, 2015, and
a Second Amended Complaint on March 25, 2016, also asserting
individual and putative class claims under the TCPA.

By Order entered on April 28, 2016, the Court granted the Company's
motion to strike the class allegations set forth in the Second
Amended Complaint, and granted leave to amend. Plaintiffs filed a
Third Amended Complaint on July 12, 2016 asserting individual and
putative class claims under the TCPA. On October 12, 2016, the
Court denied the Company's motion to again strike the class
allegations set forth in the Third Amended Complaint.

On October 3, 2017, plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a
Fourth Amended Complaint, seeking to, among other things, revise
the definitions of the classes that plaintiffs seek to represent.

In each iteration of their complaint, plaintiffs seek statutory
damages, equitable and injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees and
costs, on behalf of themselves and the absent classes.

On April 12, 2018, the Company and plaintiffs advised the Court
that they reached a settlement in principle, and the Court vacated
all deadlines relating to the motion for class certification. On
September 27, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary
approval to settle all claims against the Company for $5.5 million,
which was accrued as of March 31, 2018.

On November 27, 2018, a hearing was held on Plaintiff's motion for
preliminary approval. The Court requested certain clarifications be
made to the proposed settlement agreement and notice documents.

On January 11, 2019, Plaintiffs filed revised settlement documents
reflecting the changes requested by the Court, and on July 19,
2019, the Court granted final approval of the settlement.

Sunrun Inc. engages in the design, development, installation, sale,
ownership, and maintenance of residential solar energy systems in
the United States. It also sells solar energy systems and products,
such as panels and racking, as well as solar leads generated to
customers. The company markets and sells its products through
direct-to-consumer approach across online, retail, mass media,
digital media, canvassing, field marketing, and referral channels,
as well as its partner network. Sunrun Inc. was founded in 2007 and
is headquartered in San Francisco, California.


TALLGRASS FREIGHT: Dobson Hits Misclassification, Claims Overtime
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jocelyn Dobson, on her own behalf and on behalf of other similarly
situated persons, Plaintiff, v. Tallgrass Freight Co., LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-02444 (D. Kan., August 2, 2018), seeks
unpaid overtime compensation and related penalties, costs and
attorneys' fees. under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Dobson worked for Tallgrass as an Account Assistant from March 2018
through April 2019 their in Basehor, Kansas location, managing
shipping solutions for its business clients. She claims to be
misclassified for compensation purposes, thus denied overtime pay.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     John J. Ziegelmeyer III, Esq.
     HKM EMPLOYMENT ATTORNEYS LLP
     1501 Westport Road
     Kansas City, MO 64111
     Tel: (816) 875-3332
     Email: jziegelmeyer@hkm.com
     Website: www.hkm.com


TARGET CORP: Bid to Intervene in Selective Remanded
---------------------------------------------------
In the case, SELECTIVE AUTO INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW JERSEY, as
subrogee of Roy Wolochow, Plaintiff, v. TARGET CORP. and THE HOME
DEPOT, et al., Defendants, Civil No. 19-13720 (RMB/JS) (D. N.J.),
Judge Renee Marie Bumb of the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey, Camden Vicinage, remanded the Motion to Intervene to
the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County.

The matter comes before the Court upon its Order to Show Cause why
the Motion to Intervene should not be remanded and Removing
Defendant Target's response thereto.

The removal statute provides that "civil actions" may be removed.
Consistent with the long-established maxim that the removal statute
must be strictly construed against removal, the statute cannot be
interpreted to allow removal of a portion of a civil action.  Yet,
as set forth in Target's response, Target seeks to remove only a
portion of an existing state court civil action: only Selective
Insurance's proposed complaint in intervention.

The two cases upon which Target relies are distinguishable. Broquet
v. Microsoft Corp. addressed the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act.  While Broquet
apparently involved removal of a petition in intervention, Judge
Bumb finds that it did not address the issue raised by the Court,
namely, the propriety of removing only a portion of a civil
action.

Davenport v. Hamilton, Brown, & Babst, LLC also did not directly
address whether a portion of a civil action may be removed.
Rather, it considered whether the claims of the
plaintiffs-in-intervention should be treated as a separate and
distinct lawsuit from the main state court action, and thus the
one-year time limitation under Section 1446(b) is inapplicable.
The Davenport court held that the claims of the
plaintiffs-in-intervention were separate and distinct under very
different facts from this case. In Davenport, the main state court
action had proceeded to a final order and judgment more than a year
before the petition of intervention was filed and then removed.

In the case before the Court, the main state court case is ongoing
and the state court has not granted Selective Insurance's Motion to
Intervene, therefore there is not yet a Complaint in Intervention
to be removed in the first instance.  Section 1441 does not permit
dissection of a state court case under these circumstances.

Having considered Target's response, Judge Bumb holds that Target
has not established that removal is proper, therefore remand is
required.  Accordingly, she remanded the Motion to Intervene to the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 16, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/TtnpXm from Leagle.com.

SELECTIVE AUTO INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW JERSEY, AS SUBROGEE OF ROY
WOLOCHOW, Plaintiff, represented by JOSEPH CELAWDON BEVIS, III, LAW
OFFICE OF STEVEN A KLUXEN.

TARGET CORPORATION, Defendant, represented by POLLY N. PHILLIPPI --
pphillippi@schnader.com -- Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis, LLP.


TELIGENT INC: Amended Complaint in Mo-Kan Suit Due Sept. 13
-----------------------------------------------------------
Teligent, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that a consolidated amended
complaint must be filed in the class action suit initiated by
Mo-Kan Iron Workers Pension Fund, by September 13, 2019.

On April 15, 2019, Mo-Kan Iron Workers Pension Fund, on behalf of
itself and all other persons or entities, except defendants, who
purchased Teligent common stock between May 2, 2017 and November 7,
2017, commenced a putative class action against the Company and its
CEO, Jason Grenfell-Gardner, alleging violations of the securities
laws.

The complaint alleges that the defendants made materially
misleading statements regarding the Company's business, operational
and compliance policies. On July 1, 2019, the Oklahoma Police
Pension Fund and Retirement System was appointed as lead plaintiff
in the case ("Lead Plaintiff"). Lead Plaintiff will file a
consolidated amended complaint on or before September 13, 2019, and
the defendants will have until November 13, 2019 to answer or move
with respect to the consolidated amended complaint.

Teligent said, "Due to the early stage of the case, we are unable
to form a judgment at this time as to whether an unfavorable
outcome is either probable or remote or to provide an estimate of
the amount or range of potential loss. We believe the claims are
without merit, and we intend to vigorously defend against them."

Teligent, Inc., a specialty generic pharmaceutical company,
develops, manufactures, markets, and sells generic topical, branded
generic, and generic injectable pharmaceutical products in the
United States and Canada. The company was formerly known as IGI
Laboratories, Inc. and changed its name to Teligent, Inc. in
October 2015. Teligent, Inc. was founded in 1977 and is based in
Buena, New Jersey.


TELIGENT INC: Bid to Dismiss Econazole Antitrust Suit Still Pending
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Teligent, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the motion to dismiss
the class action suit entitled, In re Generic Pharmaceuticals
Pricing Antitrust Litigation, is still pending.

To date, thirteen putative class action antitrust lawsuits have
been filed against the Company along with co-defendants, including
Taro Pharmaceuticals U.S.A., Inc. and Perrigo New York Inc.,
regarding the pricing of generic econazole nitrate cream
("econazole").

The class plaintiffs seek to represent nationwide or state classes
consisting of persons who directly purchased, indirectly purchased,
paid and/or reimbursed patients for the purchase of generic
econazole from July 1, 2014 until the time the defendants'
allegedly unlawful conduct ceased or will cease.

The class plaintiffs seek treble damages for alleged overcharges
for econazole during the alleged period of conspiracy, and certain
of the class plaintiffs also seek injunctive relief against the
defendants.

All actions have been consolidated by the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
for pre-trial proceedings as part of the In re Generic
Pharmaceuticals Pricing Antitrust Litigation matter.

On October 16, 2018 the court dismissed the class plaintiffs'
claims against the Company with leave to replead. On December 21,
2018 the class plaintiffs filed amended complaints, which the
Company moved to dismiss on February 21, 2019.

This motion remains pending.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Teligent, Inc., a specialty generic pharmaceutical company,
develops, manufactures, markets, and sells generic topical, branded
generic, and generic injectable pharmaceutical products in the
United States and Canada. The company was formerly known as IGI
Laboratories, Inc. and changed its name to Teligent, Inc. in
October 2015. Teligent, Inc. was founded in 1977 and is based in
Buena, New Jersey.


TEVA PHARMA: Bid to Dismiss Ontario Teachers Suit Still Pending
---------------------------------------------------------------
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7,
2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the motion
to dismiss the Ontario Teachers Securities Litigation, is still
pending.

On November 6, 2016 and December 27, 2016, two putative securities
class actions were filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California against Teva and certain of its current and
former officers and directors.

After those two lawsuits were consolidated and transferred to the
U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, the court
appointed the Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan Board as lead
plaintiff (the "Ontario Teachers Securities Litigation").

The lead plaintiff then filed a consolidated amended complaint. On
April 3, 2018, the court dismissed the case without prejudice. The
lead plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on June 22, 2018,
purportedly on behalf of purchasers of Teva's securities between
February 6, 2014 and August 3, 2017.

The second complaint asserts that Teva and certain of its current
and former officers and directors violated federal securities laws
in connection with Teva's alleged failure to disclose pricing
strategies for various drugs in its generic drug portfolio and by
making allegedly false or misleading statements in certain offering
materials issued during the class period. The second complaint
seeks unspecified damages, legal fees, interest, and costs.

Teva and the current and former officer and director defendants
filed motions to dismiss the second complaint on September 14,
2018. Those motions are pending before the court.

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, a pharmaceutical company,
develops, manufactures, markets, and distributes generic medicines
and a portfolio of specialty medicines worldwide. It operates
through two segments, Generic Medicines and Specialty Medicines.
The Company was founded in 1901 and is headquartered in Petach
Tikva, Israel.


TEVA PHARMA: PROVIGIL(R) Related Class Suit Ongoing
---------------------------------------------------
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7,
2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the
company continues to defend a class action suit related to the drug
PROVIGIL(R).

In April 2006, certain subsidiaries of Teva were named in a class
action lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. The case alleges that the settlement
agreements entered into between Cephalon, Inc., now a Teva
subsidiary ("Cephalon"), and various generic pharmaceutical
companies in late 2005 and early 2006 to resolve patent litigation
involving certain finished modafinil products (marketed as
PROVIGIL(R)) were unlawful because they had the effect of excluding
generic competition.

The case also alleges that Cephalon improperly asserted its
PROVIGIL patent against the generic pharmaceutical companies. The
first lawsuit was filed by a purported class of direct purchasers.


Similar complaints were also filed by a purported class of indirect
purchasers, certain chain pharmacies and by Apotex, Inc.
(collectively, these cases are referred to as the "Philadelphia
Modafinil Action").

Separately, Apotex challenged Cephalon's PROVIGIL patent and, in
October 2011, the court found the patent to be invalid and
unenforceable based on inequitable conduct. Teva has either settled
or reached agreements in principle to settle with all of the
plaintiffs in the Philadelphia Modafinil Action.

Additionally, Cephalon and Teva reached a settlement with 48 state
attorneys general, which was approved by the court on November 7,
2016, and on July 23, 2019, reached a settlement with the State of
California, which is pending court approval.

In May 2015, Cephalon entered into a consent decree with the FTC
(the "Modafinil Consent Decree") under which the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) dismissed its claims against Cephalon in the FTC
Modafinil Action in exchange for payment of $1.2 billion (less
set-offs for prior settlements) by Cephalon and Teva into a
settlement fund. The settlement fund does not cover any judgments
or settlements outside the United States.

Under the Modafinil Consent Decree, Teva also agreed to certain
injunctive relief with respect to the types of settlement
agreements Teva may enter into to resolve patent litigation in the
United States for a period of ten years.

In February 2019, in connection with the settlement of other
unrelated FTC antitrust lawsuits, as described below, Teva and the
FTC agreed to amend certain provisions of the Modafinil Consent
Decree and to restart its ten-year term.


Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, a pharmaceutical company,
develops, manufactures, markets, and distributes generic medicines
and a portfolio of specialty medicines worldwide. It operates
through two segments, Generic Medicines and Specialty Medicines.
The Company was founded in 1901 and is headquartered in Petach
Tikva, Israel.


TEVA PHARMA: Still Defends Consolidated Baker-Grodko Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7,
2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the
company continues to defend the consolidated putative securities
class action suit of Elliot
Grodko and Barry Baker.

On August 21 and 30, 2017, Elliot Grodko and Barry Baker filed
putative securities class actions in the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania purportedly on behalf of
purchasers of Teva's securities between November 15, 2016 and
August 2, 2017 seeking unspecified damages, legal fees, interest,
and costs.

The complaints allege that Teva and certain of its current and
former officers violated the federal securities laws and Israeli
securities laws by making false and misleading statements in
connection with Teva’s acquisition and integration of Actavis
Generics.

On November 1, 2017, the court consolidated the Baker and Grodko
cases. On April 10, 2018, the court granted Teva's motion to
transfer the consolidated action to the District of Connecticut
where the Ontario Teachers Securities Litigation is currently
pending.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, a pharmaceutical company,
develops, manufactures, markets, and distributes generic medicines
and a portfolio of specialty medicines worldwide. It operates
through two segments, Generic Medicines and Specialty Medicines.
The Company was founded in 1901 and is headquartered in Petach
Tikva, Israel.


TEVA PHARMA: Suit Over Employee Stock Purchase Plan Still Stayed
----------------------------------------------------------------
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7,
2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the
lawsuit over an Employee Stock Purchase Plan remains stayed.

On July 17, 2017, a lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio derivatively on behalf of the
Teva Employee Stock Purchase Plan, and alternatively as a putative
class action lawsuit on behalf of individuals who purchased Teva
stock through that plan.

That lawsuit seeks unspecified damages, legal fees, interest and
costs.

The complaint alleges that Teva failed to maintain adequate
financial controls based on the facts underpinning Teva's FCPA DPA
and also based on allegations substantially similar to those in the
Ontario Teachers Securities Litigation.

On November 29, 2017, the court granted Teva's motion to transfer
the litigation to the U.S. District Court for the District of
Connecticut where the Ontario Teachers Securities Litigation is
pending.

On February 12, 2018, the district court stayed the case pending
resolution of the motions to dismiss filed in the Ontario Teachers
Securities Litigation.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, a pharmaceutical company,
develops, manufactures, markets, and distributes generic medicines
and a portfolio of specialty medicines worldwide. It operates
through two segments, Generic Medicines and Specialty Medicines.
The Company was founded in 1901 and is headquartered in Petach
Tikva, Israel.


TEVA PHARMA: Trial in MDL Opioid Litigation Set for Oct. 2019
-------------------------------------------------------------
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7,
2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that trial in
the MDL Opioid Litigation is scheduled on October 2019.

The MDL Opioid Proceeding for the first track of cases is closed
and motions for summary judgment were filed in June 2019. Trial is
scheduled for October 2019.

Since May 2014, approximately 2,000 complaints have been filed with
respect to opioid sales and distribution against various Teva
affiliates, along with several other pharmaceutical companies, by a
number of cities, counties, states, other governmental agencies and
private plaintiffs (including various putative class actions of
individuals) in both state and federal courts. Most of the federal
cases have been consolidated into a multidistrict litigation in the
Northern District of Ohio ("MDL Opioid Proceeding") and many of the
cases filed in state court have been removed to federal court and
consolidated into the MDL Opioid Proceeding.

Complaints asserting claims under similar provisions of different
state law, generally contend that the defendants allegedly engaged
in improper marketing and distribution of opioids, including
ACTIQ(R) and FENTORA(R). The complaints also assert claims related
to Teva's generic opioid products.

In addition, approximately 350 complaints have named Anda, Inc.
(and other distributors and manufacturers) alleging that Anda
failed to develop and implement systems sufficient to identify
suspicious orders of opioid products and prevent the abuse and
diversion of such products to individuals who used them for other
than legitimate medical purposes.

Plaintiffs seek a variety of remedies, including restitution, civil
penalties, disgorgement of profits, treble damages, attorneys' fees
and injunctive relief. Certain plaintiffs assert that the measure
of damages is the entirety of the costs associated with addressing
the abuse of opioids and opioid addiction and certain plaintiffs
specify multiple billions of dollars in the aggregate as alleged
damages. In many of these cases, plaintiffs are seeking joint and
several damages among all defendants.

An adverse resolution of any of these lawsuits or investigations
may involve large monetary penalties, damages, and/or other forms
of monetary and non-monetary relief and could have a material and
adverse effect on Teva's reputation, business, results of
operations and cash flows.

On October 5, 2018, the magistrate judge in the MDL Opioid
Proceeding issued a Report & Recommendation rejecting the first
motion to dismiss, except for the common law public nuisance claim,
which was dismissed. On December 19, 2018, the District Court
overruled defendants' objections to the Report & Recommendation.

On April 1, 2019, the magistrate judge in the MDL Opioid Proceeding
issued two Report & Recommendations in which he recommended that
the court grant in part and deny in part pending motions to dismiss
of the manufacturer, distributor, pharmacy, and generic
manufacturing defendants.

Specifically, the magistrate judge recommended that The Muscogee
(Creek) Nation's Lanham Act claim be dismissed as to all
defendants, and that its claims against the generic manufacturers
are partially preempted; he recommended that the motions to dismiss
be denied as to the remaining claims. The magistrate judge also
recommended that the Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian
Reservation's federal common law public nuisance and Montana Unfair
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act claims be dismissed,
and that its claims against the generic manufacturers are partially
preempted; he recommended that the motions to dismiss be denied as
to the remaining claims.

On June 13, 2019, the District Court adopted the two Report &
Recommendations in all respects except those regarding the
plaintiffs' negligence per se claims, for which the District Court
overruled the Report & Recommendation and held that Plaintiffs
cannot state a claim for negligence per se pursuant to the statutes
that the plaintiffs identified. Motions to dismiss in additional
similar cases remain pending. Discovery in the MDL Opioid
Proceeding for the first track of cases is closed and motions for
summary judgment were filed in June 2019. Trial is scheduled for
October 2019.

Other cases remain pending in various states. In some
jurisdictions, such as Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Texas and Utah, certain state court cases have been
transferred to a single court within their respective state court
systems for coordinated pretrial proceedings.

Trials are expected to proceed in several states in 2020. In May
2019, Teva settled the Oklahoma litigation brought by the Oklahoma
Attorney General (State of Oklahoma, ex. rel. Mike Hunter, Attorney
General of Oklahoma vs. Purdue Pharma L.P., et. al.) for $85
million. The settlement did not include any admission of violation
of law for any of the claims or allegations made. Management
believes that the Oklahoma settlement amount is not likely
indicative of the settlement of the other opioid-related litigation
due to a variety of distinguishing factors.

Teva Pharmaceutical said, "There is a wide range of potential
outcomes given the state governments, subdivisions and other
private party suits have made claims for large recoveries, the
breadth of the litigation, novel legal theories and numerous
defenses raised versus Teva's willingness to potentially settle for
a small fraction of such claimed amounts. As the Company
demonstrated a willingness to settle part of the litigation, for
accounting purposes, management considered a portion of
opioid-related cases as probable and, as such, recorded an
estimated provision. Given the relatively early status of the
cases, management viewed no amount within the range to be the most
likely outcome. Therefore, management recorded a provision for the
reasonably estimable minimum amount in the assessed range for such
opioid-related cases in accordance with Accounting Standards
Codification 450 "Accounting for Contingencies."

On April 27, 2018, Teva received subpoena requests from the DOJ
seeking documents relating to the manufacture, marketing and sale
of opioids. Teva is complying with this subpoena. In addition, a
number of state attorneys general, including a coordinated
multistate effort, have initiated investigations into sales and
marketing practices of Teva and its affiliates with respect to
opioids. Other states are conducting their own investigations
outside of the multistate group. Teva is cooperating with these
ongoing investigations and cannot predict the outcome at this
time.

In addition, several jurisdictions in Canada have initiated
litigation regarding opioids alleging similar claims as those in
the United States. The cases in Canada are likely to be
consolidated and are in their early stages.

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, a pharmaceutical company,
develops, manufactures, markets, and distributes generic medicines
and a portfolio of specialty medicines worldwide. It operates
through two segments, Generic Medicines and Specialty Medicines.
The Company was founded in 1901 and is headquartered in Petach
Tikva, Israel.


TRAVELERS AID: Underpays Case Managers, Carney Suit Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------
WENONAH CARNEY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. TRAVELERS AID SOCIETY OF PHILADELPHIA D/B/A
FAMILIES FORWARD PHILADELPHIA, Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-03599-MMB (E.D. Pa., Aug. 8, 2019) is an action against the
Defendant's failure to pay the Plaintiff and the class overtime
compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week.

The Plaintiff Carney was employed by the Defendant as case
manager.

Travelers Aid Society Of Philadelphia D/B/A Families Forward
Philadelphia is a non-profit corporation organized and existing
under the laws of Pennsylvania offering housing and support to
homeless families. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Murphy, Esq.
          Michael Groh, Esq.
          MURPHY LAW GROUP, LLC
          1628 John F. Kennedy Blvd.
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (267) 273-1054
          Facsimile: (215) 525-021
          E-mail: murphy@phillyemploymentlawyer.com
                  mgroh@phillemploymentlawyer.com


TRAVELERS INDEMNITY: Rental Car Coverage Class Action Revived
-------------------------------------------------------------
Law360 reports that the Third Circuit agreed on Aug. 2 to revive a
class action lawsuit accusing a Travelers Indemnity Co. unit of
falling short on promises to pay for rental vehicles and other
transportation costs incurred by policyholders whose cars are
damaged in accidents.  A three-judge panel said a trial judge had
incorrectly determined that Kyle and Marie Stechert's claims
against Travelers were merely a result of miscommunication about
how long the insurer would cover the costs of a rental. [GN]


TREVENA INC: Amended Complaint Filed in E.D. Pa. Securities Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Trevena, Inc., said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that an amended complaint has
been filed in the consolidated class action suit pending before the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(EDPA).

In October and November 2018, the Company and certain current and
former officers and directors were sued in three purported class
actions filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, or the EDPA, alleging violations of the federal
securities laws.

In January 2019, the three lawsuits were consolidated into one
action, and on May 29, 2019, the District Court appointed a group
of five individual investors as lead plaintiffs.

A consolidated amended complaint was filed on August 2, 2019,
alleging, among other things, that the Company and two former
officers made false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operations, and prospects, including certain
statements made relating to the Company's End-of-Phase 2 meeting
with the FDA, and certain statements concerning top-line results
from the Company's Phase 3 studies.

The plaintiffs seek, among other remedies, unspecified damages,
attorneys' fees and other costs, and unspecified equitable or
injunctive relief.

The Company believes that the claims are without merit, and it
intends to vigorously defend itself against the allegations.

Trevena, Inc., a biopharmaceutical company, focuses on the
development and commercialization of treatment options that target
and treat diseases affecting the central nervous system. The
company was founded in 2007 and is headquartered in Chesterbrook,
Pennsylvania.


UNITED PARCEL: Hobbs Suit Seeks to Recover Overtime & Deductions
----------------------------------------------------------------
JERRY HOBBS and FRANK SWENSON on behalf of themselves and those
similarly situated v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE OF AMERICA, INC. and
THE UPS FOUNDATION, Case No. 1:19-cv-04652 (E.D.N.Y., Aug. 13,
2019), seeks to recover damages pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act and New York wage and hour law for alleged unpaid
overtime wages and unlawful deductions from wages designated as for
United Way.

United Parcel Service of America, Inc. is a corporate entity
organized under the laws of the State of Georgia.  UPS operates out
of "facilities" which receive packages, sort them, and send the
packages out for delivery with drivers.  UPS operates an
international parcel delivery service with a total of approximately
500,000 employees.

The UPS Foundation is a Georgia not-for-profit corporation
affiliated with UPS that has as one of its signature programs the
"United Way Partnership."  The Defendants have a very public
relationship with the charitable entity United Way, to wit, the
Defendants actively publicize and market the large scale collective
charitable giving by their employees and the matching grant from
Defendant UPS Foundation.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Nathaniel K. Charny, Esq.
          CHARNY & WHEELER P.C.
          9 West Market Street
          Rhinebeck, NY 12572
          Telephone: (845) 876-7500
          Facsimile: (845) 876-7501
          E-mail: ncharny@charnywheeler.com

               - and -

          Benjamin N. Dictor, Esq.
          EISNER & DICTOR, P.C.
          39 Broadway, Suite 1540
          New York, NY 10006
          Telephone: (212) 473-8700
          Facsimile: (212) 473-8705
          E-mail: ben@eisnerdictor.com


UNITED STATES: 3rd Cir. Flips Visa Termination Suit Dismissal
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, issued an
Opinion vacating the District Court's judgment granting Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned JIE FANG; XIAOYU ZHANG;
SHAOFU LI; KAUSHALKUMAR PATEL; HIRENKUMAR PATEL, Appellants, v.
DIRECTOR UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; SECRETARY
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DIRECTOR UNITED
STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES. No. 17-3318. (3rd.
Cir.).

According to its website, the University of Northern New Jersey was
founded in 2012 after several years of witnessing the challenges
inexperienced graduates face in a diverse and global job market. It
was purportedly nationally accredited by the Accrediting Commission
of Career Schools and Colleges and the Commission on English
Language Accreditation and certified by the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, Student and Exchange Visitor Program to educate
international students. But the University never existed. Neither
did Dr. Brunetti or the newlywed alumni. The Department of Homeland
Security created UNNJ as a sham university as part of a scheme to
catch brokers of fraudulent student visas.

The Government sent the letter after filing charges against
twenty-one individuals for fraudulently procuring visas. The letter
terminated the plaintiffs' student visas and the plaintiffs
thereafter filed this class action alleging violations of the
Administrative Procedure Act, their Due Process rights, and
alleging the Government should be estopped from revoking their
visas.

The District Court dismissed the claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, and because no final action had been taken by the
Government. The District Court concluded that there was no final
Government action because reinstatement proceedings could still
provide administrative relief.

The F-1 Visa Program

Nonimmigrant students, such as the plaintiffs, may lawfully obtain
an F-1 visa and reside in the United States while enrolled at
Government-approved schools. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
administers the F-1 visa system, which governs nonimmigrant
students' legal status, through its Student and Exchange Visitor
Program (SEVP). Each school that educates F-1 students has a
Designated School Official (DSO) who monitors, advises, and
oversees the students attending his or her institution.

The University of Northern New Jersey

In 2013, ICE created the University of Northern New Jersey and
situated it in Cranford, New Jersey. ICE's goal was to target
academic recruiters and brokers who charged foreign students a fee
to place them into universities that did not actually offer the
course of study or authorized practical training required to
satisfy the F-1 visa requirements. As is apparent from what we said
at the outset, for all outward appearances, UNNJ looked like a real
university.

Jurisdiction Under the Administrative Procedures Act

Under the APA, final agency actions for which there is no other
adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. For an
agency action to be final under the APA, the action must mark the
consummation of the agency's decision-making process, and the
action must determine a right or obligation.

Here, the second condition is clearly satisfied. The termination
order ended the student's legal status in the United States.
However, the question of whether the action also marked the
consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process is not as
clear.

The appellants argue the termination of their status constituted a
final order because ICE's decision-making process is now complete.
Their lawful F-1 student status has been stripped away from them
and ICE has already determined that they fraudulently enrolled in
UNNJ to obtain visas.

The Government counters that the action is not final because the
appellants have avenues of recourse other than a lawsuit in federal
court. According to the Government, appellants can pursue either of
two administrative avenues of relief.

First, the Government claims the UNNJ students may seek
reinstatement pursuant to 8 C.F.R. Section 214.2(f)(16). Second, it
claims that an adverse reinstatement decision can be addressed
during removal proceedings, which give the appellants the
opportunity to contest the grounds of their removal before an
immigration judge (IJ), with the opportunity to appeal any adverse
decisions to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and from there
to a court of appeals.

The District Court agreed with the Government's first argument. The
Court held that the order was not final because reinstatement
proceedings were pending. It did not address the argument about
deportation proceedings.

The order terminating these students' F-1 visas marked the
consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process, and is
therefore a final order, for two reasons. First, there is no
statutory or regulatory requirement that a student seek
reinstatement after his or her F-1 visa has been terminated.
Moreover, even if the students attempt to pursue the administrative
procedures for reinstatement, there is no mechanism to review the
propriety of the original termination order. Second, the students
need not wait for removal proceedings to be instituted.  An order's
finality cannot depend on the institution of removal procedures
which may never occur. And in any event, immigration judges cannot
review the original denial of reinstatement. They do not have that
authority.

The Court explains each aspect of our holding in turn.

First, the Court disagrees with the District Court's conclusion
that the order is not final because the students are either seeking
reinstatement or could seek reinstatement in the future. Nothing in
the Immigration and Nationality Act or the Code of Federal
Regulations requires a nonimmigrant whose visa has been terminated
to seek reinstatement as a form of review. The reinstatement
regulation itself notes only that a student may not appeal an
unsuccessful attempt at reinstatement. In short, reinstatement is
not a prerequisite to judicial review. It is neither expressly
required by statute nor does any administrative rule require appeal
before review and the administrative action is made inoperative
pending that review.

The Court also disagrees with the District Court's conclusion that
terminating the students' status was akin to an initial
administrative action that begins an investigation and therefore
was not final. The Government relies on this position on appeal,
and attempts to analogize this situation to cases involving, for
example, termination of asylum. The asylum cancellation statutes
illustrate why the termination in this case is final as opposed to
the termination of asylum which does not consummate agency action
and thus is not final.

When the Government terminates asylum status, it must necessarily
initiate removal proceedings. During those proceedings, the former
asylee may contest the termination in front of an immigration judge
and/or reapply for asylum. The provisions regarding termination of
F-1 status contain no such analogous requirement that the
Government initiate removal proceedings. Indeed, as the Government
concedes, some of the plaintiffs here have yet to have removal
proceedings initiated against them even after their F-1 status had
been set to terminated. Unlike the situation with asylees, each
student's status was terminated without any proceedings ever being
initiated. That clearly distinguishes the students' procedural path
from that of an ex-asylee.

Accordingly, the Court holds that the termination of the students'
F-1 visa status in the manner that occurred here is not akin to the
initiation of the agency's decisionmaking process. Rather, it is
the culmination of that process.

Second, the Court disagree with the Government's contention that
the agency's action is not final because the students can obtain
review of any denial of reinstatement during removal proceedings.
This argument fails for two reasons. First,  the finality of an
order cannot be conditioned on something that may never happen.
Accordingly,  uninitiated removal proceedings cannot be a
prerequisite to finality when there is no guarantee that such
proceedings will ever occur.

We therefore hold that removal proceedings cannot serve as an
opportunity to review the USCIS's denial of reinstatement because
neither immigration judges nor the BIA have jurisdiction to review
those decisions. Our decision is dictated by the Code of Federal
Regulations and is consistent with decisions of the BIA and our
sister circuit courts of appeals.

The Court  therefore rejects the Government's argument that the
order terminating the appellants' student status in this case is
not final until after removal proceedings are instituted a process
which the Government contends must itself occur (if at all) only
after denial of reinstatement.

In sum, the Court holds that reinstatement proceedings neither are
required by statute or regulation nor afford the students an
opportunity for review of DHS's decision to terminate their F-1
visa status and therefore are not a prerequisite to finality for
the purposes of our subject matter jurisdiction under the APA.
Similarly, the students need not wait until removal proceedings are
instituted to challenge the termination of their student status.
Since neither immigration judges nor the BIA have the authority to
overturn the USCIS's denial of reinstatement, those proceedings do
not offer the students an opportunity to contest agency action.

The order terminating the students' F-1 visa status was therefore a
final order for jurisdictional purposes because there was no
further opportunity for review.

Ripeness

The Court also disagree with the District Court's conclusion that
this case is not ripe for review. Ripeness is a justiciability
doctrine that derives from Article III of the United States
Constitution. The function of the ripeness doctrine is to determine
whether a party has brought an action prematurely. The doctrine
counsels that the Court should abstain until such time as a dispute
is sufficiently concrete to satisfy the constitutional and
prudential requirements of the doctrine.

At bottom, the doctrine is inextricably tied to Article III's
requirement of a case or controversy. It requires that the
challenge grow out of a real, substantial controversy between
parties involving a dispute definite and concrete.

The District Court found that ongoing reinstatement proceedings
rendered this case unripe for review, because Plaintiffs are
seeking the same determination whether their enrollments were
fraudulent  that they are already seeking from their pending
reinstatement applications. But, as the Court have just explained,
the ongoing reinstatement proceedings do not provide an avenue to
review ICE's termination of the students' F-1 visa status. Given
that procedural conundrum, the posture of this case satisfies all
of the traditional factors that the Court have considered in a
ripeness analysis.

The order dismissing this case is reversed and the case is remanded
to the District Court for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

A full-text copy of the Third Circuit's August 15, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y5darkm4 from Leagle.com.

Ira J. Kurzban, [Argued] Kurzban, Kurzban, Tetzeli & Pratt, 131
Madeira Avenue, Coral Gables, FL 33134.

Thomas E. Moseley One Gateway Center, Suite 2600, Newark, NJ 07102,
Attorneys for Appellants.

Daniel W. Meyler Office of United States Attorney, 970 Broad
Street, Room 700, Newark NJ, 07102,

Joshua S. Press, [Argued] United States Department of Justice,
Office of Immigration Litigation, P.O. Box 868, Ben Franklin
Station, Washington, DC 20044, Attorneys for Appellees.


VELOCITY INVESTMENTS: Meola Sues Over FDCPA Violation
-----------------------------------------------------
MARY ELLEN MEOLA and ROBERT GRIFFITH, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. VELOCITY INVESTMENTS,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-00997-DSC (W.D. Pa., Aug. 13,
2019) is an action seeking damages, attorneys' fees, and costs
against Defendant for violations of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

On August 14 2018, Defendant filed a lawsuit against Plaintiff
Meola in Washington County ("Lawsuit 1") for a loan Defendant
claimed was issued by WebBank ("Loan 1"). Loan 1 was issued for
personal, family, or household use. Defendant alleged WebBank
transferred Loan 1 to LendingClub shortly after Loan 1 was
charged-off. Defendant also alleged LendingClub transferred Loan 1
to Defendant shortly after Loan 1 was transferred from WebBank to
LendingClub. Defendant sought to collect $11,761.03 on Loan 1,
which Defendant claimed consisted of $10,531.90 in outstanding
principal, $1,198.44 in outstanding interest, and $30.69 in
outstanding late fees. According to documents produced by Defendant
in Lawsuit 1, the outstanding interest on Loan 1 was charged at an
annual percentage rate of 31.27%. Lawsuit 1 proceeded through a
Washington County Magisterial District Court to the Washington
County Court of Common Pleas, where an arbitration panel ruled for
Plaintiff Meola and against Defendant. The Defendant did not appeal
the arbitration award in Plaintiff Meola's favor.

On February 20, 2019, Defendant filed a lawsuit against Plaintiff
Griffith in Washington County ("Lawsuit 2") for a loan Defendant
claimed was issued by WebBank ("Loan 2"). The Defendant claimed
WebBank transferred Loan 2 to LendingClub shortly after Loan 2 was
charged-off. 20. Defendant also alleged LendingClub transferred
Loan 2 to Defendant shortly after Loan 2 was transferred from
WebBank to LendingClub. Defendant sought to collect $5,133.79 on
Loan 2. According to documents produced by Defendant in Lawsuit 2,
the balance sought on Loan 2 consisted of $4947.66 in outstanding
principal, $171.13 in outstanding interest, and $15.00 in
outstanding fees. Additionally, according to the documents
Defendant produced, the outstanding interest on Loan 2 was charged
at an annual percentage rate of 11.77%. Lawsuit 2 proceeded through
a Washington County Magisterial District Court, where the
Magisterial District Court ruled for Plaintiff Griffith and against
Defendant. Defendant did not appeal the judgment entered in
Plaintiff Griffith's favor.

According to the complaint, despite representing that it could
collect and receive the full amount of outstanding interest on
Loans 1 and 2, Defendant did not have the legal authority to
collect the amount set forth in Lawsuits 1 and 2. The Loans were
not for the purchase of goods and services. Instead, the Loans were
personal money loans in an amount under $25,000. Accordingly, the
Loans fall under Pennsylvania's Consumer Discount Company Act
("CDCA"). Defendant is not licensed under the CDCA. Yet, Defendant
purchased the Loans and sought to collect and receive the full
amount of outstanding interest charged on the Loans at rates of
31.27% and 11.77%. The Defendant, however, is not a federal or
state chartered financial institution, and is not licensed under
the CDCA. As a result, Defendant cannot lawfully collect or receive
interest above Pennsylvania's six percent rate cap on person loans
of $25,000 or less. By representing that it could collect and
receive the full amount of interest charged on the Loans, Defendant
made false, deceptive, and misleading representations. By
attempting to collect and receive the full amount of interest
charged on the Loans, Defendant was attempting to collect interest
it was not permitted by law to collect.

As a result of Defendant's actions, the rights of Plaintiffs and
those similarly situated to Plaintiffs were violated, and
Plaintiffs and the members of the class defined below suffered
injury in fact, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs were residents of Washington County, Pennsylvania.

Velocity Investments, LLC is a limited liability company.
Defendant's sole business is the purchasing of consumer debt with
the purpose of collecting on that debt for profit.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Kevin Abramowicz, Esq.
     BCJ Law LLC
     186 42nd Street, P.O. Box 40127
     Pittsburgh, PA 15201
     Phone: (412) 223-5740
     Email: kevina@bcjlawyer.com

          - and -

     Mark G. Moynihan, Esq.
     Moynihan Law, P.C.
     2 Chatham Center, Suite 230
     Pittsburgh, PA 15219
     Phone: (412) 889-8535
     Email: mark@moynihanlaw.net


VEREIT INC: Final Pre-Trial Conference in ARCP Suit Set for Nov. 7
------------------------------------------------------------------
Vereit, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that a final pre-trial conference in the class
action, In re American Realty Capital Properties, Inc. Litigation,
No. 15-MC-00040 (AKH), is scheduled for November 7, 2019.

Between October 30, 2014 and January 20, 2015, the Company and
certain of its former officers and directors, among other
individuals and entities, were named as defendants in ten
securities class action complaints filed in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York.

The court consolidated these actions under the caption In re
American Realty Capital Properties, Inc. Litigation, No.
15-MC-00040 (AKH) (the "SDNY Consolidated Securities Class
Action").

The plaintiffs filed a second amended class action complaint on
December 11, 2015, which asserted claims for violations of Sections
11, 12(a)(2) and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

On September 8, 2016, the court issued an order directing
plaintiffs to file a third amended complaint to reflect certain
prior rulings by the court in connection with various motions to
dismiss.

The third amended complaint was filed on September 30, 2016 and the
defendants were not required to file new answers. On August 31,
2017, the court issued an order granting plaintiffs' motion for
class certification.

Defendants' petitions seeking leave to appeal the court's order
granting class certification were denied on January 24, 2018. Fact
depositions were concluded at the end of 2018.

At a status conference in April 2019, the court denied the summary
judgment motions filed by the defendants. The court also set a
schedule for expert discovery, which was completed at the end of
July 2019. Trial has been adjourned from September 9, 2019 to
January 21, 2020 and the Court has scheduled conferences during the
week of September 9, 2019 to address pre-trial motions.

A final pre-trial conference was also scheduled for November 7,
2019.

Vereit, Inc. is a full-service real estate operating company which
owns and manages one of the largest portfolios of single-tenant
commercial properties in the U.S. The company is based in Phoenix,
Arizona.


VEREIT INC: Realistic Partners' Class Action Still Ongoing
----------------------------------------------------------
Vereit, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to defend a
putative class action suit entitled, Realistic Partners v. American
Realty Capital Partners, et al.

In December 2013, Realistic Partners filed a putative class action
lawsuit against the Company and the then-members of its board of
directors in the Supreme Court for the State of New York, captioned
Realistic Partners v. American Realty Capital Partners, et al., No.
654468/2013.

The plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the board of the
Company breached its fiduciary duties in connection with the
transactions contemplated under the Cole Merger Agreement (in
connection with the merger between a wholly owned subsidiary of
Cole Credit Property Trust III, Inc. and Cole Holdings Corporation)
and that Cole Credit Property Trust III, Inc. aided and abetted
those breaches.

In January 2014, the parties entered into a memorandum of
understanding regarding settlement of all claims asserted on behalf
of the alleged class of the Company's stockholders. The proposed
settlement terms required the Company to make certain additional
disclosures related to the Cole Merger, which were included in a
Current Report on Form 8-K filed by the Company with the SEC on
January 17, 2014.

The memorandum of understanding also contemplated that the parties
would enter into a stipulation of settlement, which would be
subject to customary conditions, including confirmatory discovery
and court approval following notice to the Company's stockholders,
and provided that the defendants would not object to a payment of
up to $625,000 for attorneys' fees.

Vereit said, "If the parties enter into a stipulation of
settlement, which has not occurred, a hearing will be scheduled at
which the court will consider the fairness, reasonableness and
adequacy of the settlement. There can be no assurance that the
parties will enter into a stipulation of settlement, that the court
will approve any proposed settlement, or that any eventual
settlement will be under the same terms as those contemplated by
the memorandum of understanding."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Vereit, Inc. is a full-service real estate operating company which
owns and manages one of the largest portfolios of single-tenant
commercial properties in the U.S. The company is based in Phoenix,
Arizona.


VITAL RECOVERY: Court Dismisses Qureshi FDCPA Suit
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York issued a Memorandum and Order granting Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss in the case captioned SOHAIL QURESHI, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. VITAL RECOVERY
SERVICES, INC., Defendant.No. 18-CV-4522 (ENV) (RML).(E.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiff Sohail Qureshi initiated this action against Vital
Recovery Services, Inc. (VRS), alleging violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Qureshi received a consumer debt
collection letter from VRS, offering to resolve an outstanding debt
of $888.84 for 80% of the total balance owed on the account, that
is, for $711.07. The letter set forth an account summary listing
the following amounts: $888.84 in principal amount due, $0 each in
interest due and miscellaneous fee due and $888.84 in total balance
due. According to Qureshi, the letter misrepresented the amount and
character of the alleged debt and conveyed an implicit threat to
coerce him to pay it.

Section 1692e

Section 1692e prohibits, inter alia, false representations as to
the character, amount, or legal status of any debt, the threat to
take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not
intended to be taken and the use of any false representation or
deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to
obtain information concerning a consumer. Under the least
sophisticated consumer standard, a collection letter can be
deceptive if it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation,
at least one of which is inaccurate.

In the complaint, Qureshi alleges first, that the letter
misrepresents the amount and character of the debt, in violation of
Section 1692e(2)(A), by implying that interest and miscellaneous
fees might accrue even though no such fees were contractually
permissible; second, that the letter thereby threatens to take
action that VRS could not legally take or did not intend to take,
in violation of Section 1692e(5); and third, that these alleged
misrepresentations and implicit threats constitute the use of
deceptive means to collect the debt, in violation of Section
1692e(10).

The first claim is utterly meritless.

The letter sets forth the principal amount of the debt, which is
$888.84; a $0 balance for interest; a $0 balance for miscellaneous
fees; and, since there is no outstanding charge besides principal,
a total balance due of $888.84. Qureshi does not contest the
accuracy of these numbers but insists that the inclusion of
zero-balance line items somehow misrepresented the amount of the
debt. Taking this argument at face value, the Court notes that the
least sophisticated consumer standard does not assume the absence
of all mathematical knowledge, including the concept of zero and
its application to grade-school arithmetic. Since Qureshi does not
contend that the amount referenced in the letter is incorrect, he
fails to allege a misrepresentation as to the amount of the debt.


Turning now to any mischaracterization in the letter, Qureshi does
not allege that the letter demands payment of a debt that he does
not owe.
  
Accordingly, Qureshi's first FDCPA claim fails.

For similar reasons, Qureshi's implicit threat claim, under Section
1692e(5), and catchall claim, under Section 1692e(10), also fail.
Absolutely nothing in the letter implies that VRS might add
interest and fees to induce him to pay, and, as plaintiff himself
alleges, there was no contractual basis for VRS to pursue them. The
mere itemization of a $0 balance for interest and fees has no
coercive import. Since Qureshi's Section 1692e(10) claim, as
pleaded, is contingent on the assertions that the letter
misrepresented the debt and carried an implied threat, the failure
to allege those violations is fatal as well.

Having failed to identify a material misrepresentation or a threat
to take improper action, plaintiff muses, Why couldn't an
unsophisticated consumer logically conclude that additional charges
may incur if the current balance is listed as zero? Such a
conclusion from a zero charge, of course, would be far from
logical. Then, seeking to add a second floor to his house of cards,
Qureshi contends that the least sophisticated consumer may assume
that charges were not added but could be added in the future if he
did not pay.

Bluntly, this reasoning ignores the total absence of language in
the letter suggesting even the slightest possibility that
additional charges might accrue without which plaintiff's proposed
reading is both idiosyncratic and irrational. The mere inclusion of
zero-balance line items for interest and fees does not imply that
such charges may accrue in the future, just as a statement that an
act did not occur in the past does not, on its own, suggest that it
may occur in the future.

Furthermore, to the extent that Qureshi contends debt collectors
must advise consumers that no interest or other fees are accruing,
that argument has been explicitly rejected by the Second Circuit.

This Court is not the first to draw this conclusion. Multiple
district courts within this circuit have dismissed Section 1692e
claims based on collection letters containing language virtually
identical to that in the letter received by Qureshi. Plaintiff has
presented no reason to depart from the sound reasoning guiding
those decisions, nor does the Court discern any.

Section 1692g

Having fallen short of his objective under Section 1692e, Qureshi
attempts to change tack through the medium of his opposition
papers, asserting an alternative Section 1692g claim. First, the
Court notes that the complaint does not cite or otherwise allude,
even obliquely, to Section 1692g. Thus, no notice was provided in
the complaint that plaintiff might assert an alternative claim on
this theory, and he cannot allege a new claim for the first time in
opposition to a motion to dismiss. In any event, the putative
Section 1692g allegations he offers are self-contradictory,
specifically that no interest and fees were accruing on his account
and that VRS was not contractually entitled to charge any.   

Astoundingly, there is no basis to assume that VRS was entitled to
assess any interest or fees, and that, as a result, the balance due
on Qureshi's debt could possibly vary. On the contrary, the core of
this lawsuit is plaintiff's misguided contention that VRS was
required to affirmatively advise him that no fees were accruing so
that he was not mislead by the inclusion of $0 balance line items
for interest and fees. Although that premise has proven
fundamentally flawed, as discussed above, that does not enable
plaintiff to radically overhaul his theory of liability at the
eleventh hour, in direct contradiction to factual allegations
already pleaded in the complaint.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss must be granted.

The motion to dismiss is granted in its entirety.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 15, 2019 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3mhjlul from
Leagle.com.

Sohail Qureshi, on behalf of himself and all other similarly
situated consumers, Plaintiff, represented by Maxim Maximov, Maxim
Maximov, LLP, 1701 Avenue P, Brooklyn, NY 11229-1205

Vital Recovery Services, LLC, Defendant, represented by Arthur
Sanders -- asanders@bn-lawyers.com -- Barron & Newburger, P.C.


WELBILT INC: Still Defends Schlimm Class Suit in Florida
--------------------------------------------------------
Welbilt, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend a class action suit entitled, Schlimm v. Welbilt, Inc., et
al.

On December 13, 2018, a purported securities class action lawsuit
was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Florida against the Company and certain of its former executive
officers.

The lawsuit is captioned Schlimm v. Welbilt, Inc., et al., and
alleges that the defendants violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, by making material misstatements or
omissions in certain of the Company's periodic reports filed with
the SEC relating to, among other things, the Company's business
operations and the effectiveness of the Company’s internal
control over financial reporting.

The lawsuit seeks an unspecified amount of damages and an award of
attorney’ 'fees, in addition to other relief.

On March 15, 2019, a purported shareholder derivative action was
filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware
against certain of the Company's current and former executive
officers and directors, with the Company named as a nominal
defendant.

The lawsuit is captioned Quinney v. Muehlhaeuser, et al., and
alleges violation of Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and breach of fiduciary duty, among other claims, based
upon similar underlying allegations as those in the Schlimm
lawsuit.

The Quinney lawsuit seeks an unspecified amount of damages and an
award of attorney's fees, in addition to other relief.

On June 5, 2019, the Delaware court stayed the Quinney lawsuit,
pending further developments in the Schlimm lawsuit.

The Company intends to defend against these lawsuits vigorously.

Welbilt said, "However, litigation is inherently uncertain, and the
Company is unable to predict the outcome of these matters and is
unable to estimate the range of loss, if any, that could result
from an unfavorable outcome."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Welbilt, Inc., a foodservice equipment company, designs,
manufactures, supply, and services food and beverage equipment for
commercial foodservice market worldwide. The company was formerly
known as Manitowoc Foodservice, Inc. and changed its name to
Welbilt, Inc. in February 2017. Welbilt, Inc. was founded in 1902
and is headquartered in New Port Richey, Florida.


WERNER ENTERPRISES: Post-Verdict Awards Under Appeal
----------------------------------------------------
Werner Enterprises, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the plaintiffs in a
class action suit in Nebraska have taken an appeal from the
post-verdict amounts awarded by the trial court for fees, costs and
liquidated damages.

The company is involved in class action litigation in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Nebraska, in which the
plaintiffs allege that the company owes drivers for unpaid wages
under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the Nebraska Wage
Payment and Collection Act and that the company failed to pay
minimum wage per hour for drivers in its student driver training
program, related to short break time and sleeper berth time. The
period covered by this class action suit is August 2008 through
March 2014.

The case was tried to a jury in May 2017, resulting in a verdict of
$0.8 million in plaintiffs' favor on the short break matter and a
verdict in the company's favor on the sleeper berth matter.

As a result of various post-trial motions, the court has awarded
$0.5 million to the plaintiffs for attorney fees and costs.

Werner Enterprises said, "As of June 30, 2019, we had accrued for
the jury’s award, attorney fees and costs in the short break
matter and had not accrued for the sleeper berth matter."

Plaintiffs have appealed the post-verdict amounts awarded by the
trial court for fees, costs and liquidated damages.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Werner Enterprises, Inc., a transportation and logistics company,
engages in transporting truckload shipments of general commodities
in interstate and intrastate commerce in the United States, Mexico,
Canada, and China. It operates in two segments, Truckload
Transportation Services and Werner Logistics. Werner Enterprises,
Inc. was founded in 1956 and is headquartered in Omaha, Nebraska.


WHOLE FOODS: Court Dismisses SAC in Overcharging Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: WHOLE FOODS MARKET GROUP, INC. OVERCHARGING
LITIGATION, Case No. 15 Civ. 5838 (PAE) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Paul A.
Engelmayer of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York dismissed the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC").

On June 24, 2015, the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs
("DCA") issued a press release stating that, based on its
investigation, Whole Foods, by assigning exaggerated weights to
pre-packaged foods priced by individual weight, frequently
overcharged consumers for these products.  

On July 24, 2015, John, a customer of certain Whole Foods stores in
Manhattan, brought a putative class action against Whole Foods
based on his having purchased allegedly short-weighted pre-packaged
cupcakes and cheeses during 2014 and 2015.  He claimed violations
of sections 349 and 350 of the New York General Business Law
("GBL").  Federal jurisdiction was based on the Class Action
Fairness Act.  He did not claim ever to have weighed any cupcake or
cheese that he had bought, to have direct evidence of any kind that
any product he had bought had been short-weight, or even to have
retained records of his purchases.  His claim to have been
personally overcharged was instead based on extrapolating from the
DCA investigation.

On July 31, 2015, Whole Foods removed to federal court, under CAFA,
a class action filed against it by Plaintiff Joseph Bassolino, who
brought similar claims to John's but involving other products
(e.g., chicken fingers).  On Aug. 21, 2015, Bassolino's case was
reassigned to the Court as related to John's.

On Aug. 28, 2015, Bassolino filed a motion to remand on the grounds
that Whole Foods had not demonstrated that the amount in
controversy exceeded CAFA's $5 million jurisdictional minimum.  On
Sept. 25, 2015, while the remand motion was pending, Whole Foods
moved to dismiss both John and Bassolino's lawsuits.  On Oct. 2,
2015, the Court stayed briefing on the motions to dismiss pending
the resolution of Bassolino's motion to remand.  On Oct.21, 2015,
after hearing argument, the Court denied Bassolino's motion to
remand.  The Court consolidated the John and Bassolino actions
under the caption In re Whole Foods Market Group, Inc. Overcharging
Litigation, and docket number 15 Civ. 5838.  On Nov. 6, 2015, the
Plaintiffs filed a Consolidated Amended Complaint ("CAC"), bringing
claims under GBL Sections 349 and 350, and under the doctrine of
unjust enrichment.

On Nov. 20, 2015, Whole Foods moved to dismiss the CAC for lack of
standing, under Rule 12(b)(1), and for failure to state a claim,
under Rule 12(b)(6).  On March 1, 2016, the Court granted the
motion to dismiss on both grounds.  

On March 30, 2016, John and Bassolino appealed.  On April 26, 2016,
Bassolino dropped his appeal.  On June 2, 2017, the Second Circuit
reversed.  It held that John had plausibly alleged injury-in-fact
sufficient to confer Article III standing.

On Oct. 23, 2017, after soliciting the parties' views, the Court
approved a new case management plan, with discovery conducted in
two phases.  The plan contemplated, first, full discovery (fact and
expert) on John's individual claims, followed by an anticipated
motion by Whole Foods for summary judgment.  The case management
plan further contemplated, if John's claims survived summary
judgment, a second phase of discovery, in anticipation of a motion
by John for class certification.

On Nov. 11, 2017, the Court granted John leave to file a SAC to
excise Bassolino and allegations unique to his claims.  On Nov. 22,
2017, John filed the SAC, the operative complaint today.  On Dec.
12, 2017, Whole Foods answered.

On July 13, 2018, during discovery, the Court granted a joint
motion to extend the schedule for discovery of John's claims.  On
Oct. 19, 2018, the Court again extended the schedule for such
discovery, this time to accommodate a mediation session, and
extended the schedule for briefing on the summary judgment motion.
Discovery on John's claims closed on Dec. 14, 2018, with the
completion of expert discovery.

Now, Whole Foods seeks summary judgment on these claims.  It argues
that the undisputed facts would not permit a jury to find, other
than by speculation, that John himself was ever overcharged by
Whole Foods for any pre-packaged food item.  This failure, Whole
Foods argues, entitles it now to prevail, either on the merits or
because the same facts demonstrate that John has failed to
establish an injury-in-fact, as necessary for Article III standing.


John counters that a jury could find injury to him by extrapolating
from what he contends is proof of a uniform Whole Foods practice of
falsely inflating the weights, and therefore the price, of its
pre-packaged foods. John argues that a jury could find that Whole
Foods used uniform, systematic practices to prepare and price
cupcakes and cheeses and, considering these unitary practices
alongside the DCA's findings of short-weighted products, could
infer that at least some items John bought in 2014 and 2015 must
also have been short-weight.

Judge Engelmayer finds that the evidence adduced could not support
a verdict in John's favor.  Although John's testimony can establish
that he purchased cupcakes and cheeses from two Whole Foods stores,
there is no competent, non-speculative, evidence that any cupcake
or cheese item John bought weighed less than the weight used to
price it.  The DCA investigation, in the form of spot checks at
certain stores, does not support the inference of systematic
over-pricing. And John in discovery did not adduce competent
evidence of a uniform practice by Whole Foods of falsely inflating
the weight of its pre-packaged goods in general, or of cupcakes and
cheese in particular.

Although John's failure to prove his own injury would support
either dismissal for lack of Article III standing or entry of
summary judgment for Whole Foods on the merits of his claims, the
Judge dismissed the case for lack of standing because standing is
jurisdictional.  The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to
terminate the motion pending at Dkt. 87 and to close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 17, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/PbjCPW from Leagle.com.

Sean John, individually, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Charles
White -- awhite@fbfglaw.com -- Finkelstein, Blankinship,
Frei-Pearson & Garber, LLP, Clark Andrew Binkley --
cbinkley@richmanlawgroup.com -- Richman Law Group, Kim Eleazer
Richman -- krichman@richmanlawgroup.com -- Richman Law Group,
Vincent Imbesi, Imbesi Christensen and Michael, Douglas Gregory
Blankinship, Finkelstein Blankinship, Frei-Pearson & Garber, LLP &
Jeremiah Lee Frei-Pearson, Finkelstein Blankinship, Frei- Pearson &
Garber, LLP.

Sean John, on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
represented by Andrew Charles White, Finkelstein, Blankinship,
Frei-Pearson & Garber, LLP, Kim Eleazer Richman, Richman Law Group,
Michael B. Mietlicki, Richman Law Group, Douglas Gregory
Blankinship, Finkelstein Blankinship, Frei-Pearson & Garber, LLP &
Jeremiah Lee Frei-Pearson, Finkelstein Blankinship, Frei- Pearson &
Garber, LLP.

Joseph Bassolino, individually & Joseph Bassolino, on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Consolidated Plaintiffs, represented by
Douglas Gregory Blankinship, Finkelstein Blankinship, Frei- Pearson
& Garber, LLP & Jeremiah Lee Frei-Pearson, Finkelstein Blankinship,
Frei-Pearson & Garber, LLP.

Whole Foods Market Group, Inc., Defendant, represented by David
Sellinger -- sellingerd@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig,LLP, Gregory
J. Casas -- casasg@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig, LLP & John H.
Hempfling, II, Whole Foods Market.


WISCONSIN: Court Dismisses Lindell Prisoner Suit
------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin issued an Opinion dismissing the Prisoner Pro Se
Complaint in the case captioned NATE A. LINDELL, Plaintiff. v. JON
E. LITSCHER, MARC CLEMENTS, CINDY O'DONNELL, CATHY JESS, JIM
SCHWOCHERT, AMY SMITH, CHARLES E. COLE, DENNIS SCHUH, CHARLES
FACKTOR, WELCOME F. ROSE, ANNA BOATWRIGHT, EMILY DAVIDSON, TOM
GOZINKE, BRAD HOMPE, MANDY MATHISON, JOHN D. PAQUIN, GARY BOUGHTON,
TIMOTHY HAINES, PETER HUIBREGSTE, MARK KARTMAN, LEBBEUS BROWN, DAN
WINKLESKI, JOLINDA WATERMAN, MARY MILLER, ROBERT HABLE, DR. SCOTT
RUBIN-ASCH, STACY HOEM, TRINA KROENING-SKIME, JOHN SHARPE, DANE M.
ESSER, LARRY PRIMMER, SARAH MASON, KURT HOEPER, TODD BRUDOS, THOMAS
HANKE, MATTHEW HANKE, JASON ROBERTS, JOSEPH YANSKE, PHILLIP
FRIEDRICH, JULIE PAYNE, BENJAMIN WOHLAND, ELLEN K. RAY, WILLIAM
BROWN, CINDY BEERKIRCHER, ANTHONY BROADBENT, HEIDER HOUCHHAUSEN,
and SANDRA MCARDLE, Defendants. Case No. 18-cv-1021-slc.
(W.D.Wis.).
  
Lindell has filed this particular case as a proposed class action
lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, claiming that the
decision-making process related to, and the conditions of,
restrictive housing at WSPF violate Wisconsin law and the United
States Constitution. Lindell's proposed defendants are or were
Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) employees in various
capacities, ranging from warden, to inmate complaint examiner, to
correctional officer, to DOC Secretary. Lindell's complaint is
ready for screening as required by 28 U.S.C. Section 1915A.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to
include a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief. Under Rule 8(d), each allegation
must be simple, concise, and direct, with the primary purpose being
to provide fair notice to defendants so that the court and
defendants may understand whether a valid claim is alleged and if
so what it is.  

Lindell's claims are straightforward and he has litigated enough
cases in this court to be able to present them succinctly. Despite
this, most of the 316 paragraphs in Lindell's proposed complaint
are irrelevant or overly detailed, which make the claims he
actually seeks to pursue unnecessarily burdensome to parse and
respond to.

The thrust of Lindell's complaint is clear: DOC's and WSPF's
approach to assigning prisoners to restrictive housing which
encompasses both disciplinary and administrative housing at WSPF,
the review of that placement, and then the actual conditions in
restrictive housing all violate Wisconsin law and the First,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Lindell's complaint does include
allegations related to his personal experiences related to his
2001, 2002, 2016, and 2017 efforts to challenge his placement on
administrative confinement status, as well as his complaints about
particular conditions.

However, his claims are woven into hundreds of unnecessary or
improper paragraphs and sections, including: (1) allegations about
news articles and studies calling into question the use of solitary
confinement in prisons (2) legal arguments and citations to cases
related to his purported constitutional claims (3) numerous
paragraphs describing other WSPF prisoners' experiences with
restrictive housing placement and (4) several hundred paragraphs
describing in granular detail various restrictions attendant to
restrictive housing at WSPF. The first two categories of
allegations are irrelevant and thus inappropriate at the pleading
stage.

Lindell's allegations about other prisoners' experiences are
irrelevant. If Lindell included the allegations recounting other
prisoners' experiences for the purpose of personally representing
other prisoners or pursuing a class action, then he is mistaken.
Lindell is the only named plaintiff in this lawsuit. Even if there
were other plaintiffs that signed the complaint, Lindell could not
represent them in this lawsuit.

Even hypothesizing first, that Lindell might find a lawyer to
represent him, and second, that this lawyer might agree to pursue
class certification, it would not be necessary to include in the
complaint all these lengthy allegations about the experiences of
other class members. Rather, at this stage of the case, it would be
enough for Lindell to set forth what happened to him and that
similarly-situated prisoners also suffered similar harm.
Accordingly, to get this lawsuit off the ground, Lindell must limit
the allegations in his complaint to his experiences. The question
of other prisoners' experiences within WSPF's restrictive housing
will arise, if appropriate, at the class certification stage.

To proceed with this lawsuit, Lindell must file an amended
complaint, that reduces his complaint to a manageable size by
focusing only on essential factual allegations related to his own
experiences. Lindell submits a proposed amended complaint no later
than September 13, 2019, the court will take it under advisement
for prompt screening under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915A.

Plaintiff Nate Lindell may have until September 13, 2019, to amend
his complaint to address the deficiencies described above. If
Lindell does not timely file an amended complaint as directed, this
case will be closed without further notice. Any amended complaint
will be screened in accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(2).
If the amended complaint fails to comply with this order, then this
action will be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 15, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y665dc2p from
Leagle.com.

Nate A. Lindell, Plaintiff, pro se.


WYNDHAM WORLDWIDE: 11th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Embree Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TOMMY J. EMBREE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WYNDHAM
WORLDWIDE CORPORATION, WYNDHAM VACATION RESORTS, INC., FAIRSHARE
VACATION OWNERS ASSOCIATION, WYNDHAM VACATION OWNERSHIP, INC., RCI
LLC, TERRY DOST, PETER HERNANDEZ, ROB HEBELER,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 18-13924 (11th Cir.), the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
dismissal with prejudice of her counseled second amended class
action complaint.

Embree, who allegedly owns an interest in the Defendants' timeshare
program, appeals the district court's dismissal with prejudice of
her counseled second amended class action complaint as an
impermissible shotgun pleading, under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 8 and 10, after twice granting her leave to amend her
complaint.  

In January 2016, Embree filed her initial class action complaint,
in the Western District of Arkansas, against eight of the
Defendants, including Wyndham Worldwide Corp., Wyndham Vacation
Resorts, Inc., Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc., RCI, LLC,
FairShare Vacation Owners Association, Terri Dost, Peter Hernandez,
and Rob Hebeler.  Her 24-page counseled complaint, containing a
total of 114 enumerated paragraphs, presented 44 paragraphs of
factual allegations relating to the players of the Wyndham
timeshare program, how the program operated, its operation of an
Arkansas-based trust that encompassed the timeshare interests of
all its timeshare owners, and Embree's transactions with the
program.

Her proposed class included all U.S. citizens who purchased a
timeshare interest from Wyndham and placed their interest in the
Trust. She raised 6 causes of action against various subsets of the
eight Defendants, including Arkansas Trust Code ("ATC") violations,
breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and unjust enrichment, all
arising out of various profiteering schemes referenced in the
complaint.

The district court dismissed Embree's first amended complaint
without prejudice as another shotgun pleading because it failed to
separate into a different count each cause of action or claim for
relief.  

In February 2018, still proceeding with the counsel, Embree filed
her second amended complaint, adding Wyndham Consumer Finance, Inc.
and Wyndham Vacation Management as Defendants.  This 41-page and
172-paragraph complaint presented substantially similar factual
allegations and raised 21 causes of action against subsets of the
defendants based on the same four core profiteering schemes.

Embree's second amended complaint raised 21 causes of action
against various subsets of the 10 Defendants, purporting to allege,
among other claims, violations of the ATC, breach of fiduciary
duties, negligence, breach of the implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy.  Her second
amended complaint generally alleged that Wyndham's timeshare
program had devised a complex "profiteering scheme" to use
financing property held in a trust operated by the program -- which
was made up of the monies and fees that the timeshare owners paid
into the program -- to enhance its own profits to the detriment of
the timeshare owners, who were forced to participate in the trust.

On appeal, Embree argues that: (1) the district court abused its
discretion in dismissing her second amended complaint as a shotgun
pleading because the complaint contained a short and plain
statement of each of her claims, each count contained a separate
cause of action and identified which of the Defendants was
implicated, the Defendants never argued that the complaint failed
to provide notice of the specific claims against each of them, and
there is ample evidence that the defendants and the district court
understood the facts and claims presented; (2) the Defendants'
apparent claim -- that her second amended complaint impermissibly
lumped them together by asserting claims against them when some of
the named Defendants were not liable for a particular cause of
action -- goes to the merits and has no bearing on whether her
complaint was subject to dismissal as a shotgun pleading; and (3)
her failure to incorporate any of the general factual allegations
into the individual counts is a "technical deficiency" that did not
warrant dismissal.

The Eleventh Circuit holds that despite the court's detailed and
repeated instructions, Embree's second amended complaint still
failed to provide a "short and plain statement" giving each
Defendant fair notice of the claims against it and the grounds upon
which they rested, presented in separately numbered paragraphs
"limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances."
And Embree never moved to file a third amended complaint.   In
light of Embree's counseled status and her failure to cure the
prior complaints' deficiencies after two opportunities to amend her
complaint, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing with prejudice her second amended complaint as a shotgun
pleading.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 16, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/LGV6ix from Leagle.com.


YALE ASSOCIATES: Court Approves $562.5K Settlement in Noye Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum granting Plaintiff's Unopposed
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement in the
case captioned T. JASON NOYE, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. YALE ASSOCIATES, INC.,
Defendant. No. 1:15-cv-02253. (M.D. Pa.).

Plaintiff filed a putative class action complaint, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated,1 in this Court against
Defendant Yale Associates, Inc., alleging that Defendant violated
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), in connection with its
national database of public records and related employment
histories as a nationwide consumer reporting agency (CRA), which it
maintains to prepare and furnish consumer reports for employment
and other purposes. Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant failed to
provide required FCRA notices to Plaintiff in violation of FCRA,
and for maintaining a policy and practice of inaccurately reporting
Pennsylvania summary offenses, a separate and less serious category
of criminal offense, as misdemeanors.

Preliminary Certification of Class Action

Proposed Settlement Class Definition

The parties define the proposed Class Members, Settlement Class
Members, the Class, or the Settlement Class as follows:

     all individuals who were subject to at least one consumer
report created by Yale containing one or more traffic violations;
offenses listed as pending awaiting trial; driving while
intoxicated, driving under the influence, or operating while
intoxicated offenses; felonies; misdemeanors; or violations,
infractions, or summary offenses; which included records provided
by Pennell from its court searches, less those reports which
included admitted convictions on the application and those where
Yale personally spoke to the applicants and confirmed the public
record, from November 24, 2010 through November 30, 2017.

Upon review of this proposed definition, the Court considers this
definition to be sufficiently precise, objective and presently
ascertainable for purposes of this preliminary determination.
Accordingly, the Court proceeds to its examination of whether the
requirements set forth in Rule 23(a)(1) through (a)(4) are
satisfied.

Numerosity

The numerosity requirement is satisfied if the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable. No minimum number of
plaintiffs is required to maintain a suit as a class action, but
generally if the named plaintiff demonstrates that the potential
number of plaintiffs exceeds 40, the first prong of Rule 23(a) has
been met. Here, Plaintiff represents that the Settlement Class
would include 1,115 members, in light of the total number of
reports subject to the conditions set forth in the proposed
definition explained supra, that have been identified by the
parties. Upon consideration of this figure, the Court finds that,
for purposes of preliminary certification, the numerosity
requirement is met.

Commonality

The second element of Rule 23(a) requires that there are questions
of law or fact common to the class. A putative class satisfies Rule
23(a)'s commonality requirement if `the named plaintiffs share at
least one question of fact or law with the grievances of the
prospective class. Plaintiff asserts that the primary legal
question presented in the instant case is whether Defendant
willfully and negligently violated FCRA by failing to provide
required notices to Plaintiff in violation of 15 U.S.C. Section
1681k(a), and for maintaining a policy and practice of inaccurately
reporting Pennsylvania summary offenses, a separate and less
serious category of criminal offense, as misdemeanors, in violation
of 15 U.S.C. Section 1681e(b). For purposes of preliminary
certification, the Court finds that the commonality requirement is
satisfied, as well.  

Typicality

Pursuant to Rule 23(a)(3)'s typicality requirement, the claims or
defenses of the representative parties must be typical of the
claims or defenses of the class. In the Third Circuit, this
requirement has been recognized as having a low threshold.
Accordingly, even relatively pronounced factual differences will
generally not preclude a finding of typicality where there is a
strong similarity of legal theories or where the claim arises from
the same practice or course of conduct.

Here, Plaintiff asserts that the typicality requirement has been
satisfied because the Class Representative is a member of the
Settlement Class, has the same interest in resolution of the issue
as all other members of the Class, and his claims are typical of
all members of the Class.

The Court agrees with this contention, and for purposes of
preliminary certification, finds that the typicality requirement is
met.

Adequacy of Representation

Rule 23(a) also imposes a fourth requirement: that the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class. In order to determine whether this
requirement has been met, the Court must examine (1) whether the
representatives' interests conflict with those of the class and (2)
whether the class attorney is capable of representing the class.
Having reviewed the record in this case, the Court is persuaded
that there is no conflict of interest between Plaintiff and the
members of the Settlement Class, and that the evident competence
and experience on the part of Plaintiff's counsel satisfies Rule
23(a)'s requirement as to adequacy of representation.

Rule 23(b)(3)

As the predominance inquiry examines whether the defendant's
conduct was common as to all of the class members, and whether all
of the class members were harmed by the defendant's conduct.
According to Plaintiff, this requirement is met because Plaintiff
has alleged on behalf of the Class that Defendant failed to comply
with Section 1681K of FCRA by failing to provide contemporaneous
notice to consumer job applicants about whom it reported
information for employment purposes, and also failing to maintain
strict procedures to insure that the public record information it
reported was complete and up to date.

Plaintiff further maintains that the internal policies and
procedures that Defendant followed in preparing reports containing
public record information and notifying consumers about the sale of
such reports to employers  factual issues central to Plaintiff's
claims  are generally common to all members of the Settlement
Class. Lastly, Plaintiff notes that Plaintiff has claimed, on
behalf of the Settlement Class, that Defendant's alleged FCRA
violations are willful for purposes of the causes of action
asserted in the complaint.  

The Court is satisfied that, for purposes of preliminary
certification, there are common questions surrounding Defendant's
compliance with FCRA such that these questions predominate over any
individual questions of law or fact in this case.  

The second focal point for purposes of Rule 23(b)(3) , the
superiority inquiry requires the Court to balance, in terms of
fairness and efficiency, the merits of a class action against those
of alternative methods of adjudication. As to this prong, Plaintiff
asserts that all four factors pertinent to this inquiry militate in
favor of finding superiority because in this case, separately
litigating the common issues that bind the Settlement Class would
be a practical impossibility, even assuming consumers had notice of
their claims and it were economically feasible to pursue these
claims on their own and in light of the strong presumption in favor
of a finding of superiority in instances where the alternative to a
class action is likely to be no action at all for most of the class
members. Having considered these arguments, as well as the
pertinent authority, the Court agrees that in this case, resolution
of this case through class action settlement presents a more
desirable outcome for the class than individualized litigation.

In light of the Court's conclusion that the requirements set forth
in Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3) have been met on a preliminary basis,
the Court will preliminarily certify the proposed Settlement Class.
Accordingly, the Court turns to its examination of whether
preliminary approval of the proposed settlement agreement is
proper.

Preliminary Approval of Settlement Agreement

Upon review of the terms of the proposed settlement agreement, the
Court is satisfied that the Agreement contains no obvious
deficiencies and falls within the range of possible approval. To
determine whether a settlement falls within the range of possible
approval, a court must consider plaintiffs' expected recovery
balanced against the value of the settlement offer.

The parties' Agreement provides that Defendant will pay a
settlement fund totaling $562,500.00 which, after being
administered by the Settlement Administrator named in the proposed
Agreement, results in compensation of approximately $313.00 for
each of the 1,115 potential Class Members.  The parties have also
agreed that, subject to the Court's final approval, Plaintiff may
seek a service award reflecting the amount of time and effort
expended in acting as a Class Representative for the Settlement
Class in the amount of $10,000.00.   

In addition, Defendant agrees to pay the costs of notice to the
class, as well as the cost of settlement and claims administration.
Further, the parties also agree, that, subject to final approval by
the Court, the appointed class counsel may seek an award of
attorney's fees plus reimbursement of litigation costs and expenses
in an amount not to exceed one-third of the Settlement Fund. In
exchange, the members of the Settlement Class agree to release any
and all claims against Defendant and certain affiliates of
Defendant listed in the Agreement stemming from the alleged FCRA
violations that are the subject of this case.  

The Court finds that the proposed Agreement falls within the range
of possible approval for purposes of preliminary approval. Here,
the parties did not agree to the proposed payment of attorney's
fees and costs, an amount not to exceed one third of the Settlement
Fund for the combined attorney's fees and costs incurred by Class
Counsel in the prosecution of this litigation, until after the
parties reached an agreement in principle as to other terms in the
proposed Agreement.  

Further, the proposed monetary award to Plaintiff is permissible in
class action litigation and appears reasonable at this stage.
Accordingly, the Court will preliminarily approve the Agreement
submitted in this case.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 15, 2019 Memorandum
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y4wbfjum from Leagle.com.

T. Jason Noye, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by David A. Searles --
dsearles@consumerlawfirm.com -- Francis & Mailman, P.C., James A.
Francis -- jfrancis@consumerlawfirm.com -- Francis & Mailman, PC,
John Soumilas -jsoumilas@consumerlawfirm.com -- Francis & Mailman
PC, pro hac vice, Marielle R. Macher, Community Justice Project
&Megan Lovett, Community Justice Project, 100 Fifth Avenue, Suite
900. Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Yale Associates, Inc., Defendant, represented by Kristi A. Buchholz
-- kristi.buchholz@wilsonelser.com -- Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz,
Edelman & Dicker LLP, pro hac vice, Louis J. Isaacsohn  --
louis.isaacsohn@wilsonelser.com -- Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz,
Edelman & Dicker LLP & William F. McDevitt  --
william.mcdevitt@wilsonelser.com -- Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman
& Dicker LLP.

monty pennell & Pennell & Associates, Inc., Amicuss, represented by
James F. Logue -- jflogue@mijs.com -- Moore, Ingram, Johnson &
Steele.


ZILLOW GROUP: Continues to Defend Consolidated Class Suit in Wash.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Zillow Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend a consolidated class action suit in the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Washington.

In August and September 2017, two purported class action lawsuits
were filed against the company and certain of its executive
officers, alleging, among other things, violations of federal
securities laws on behalf of a class of those who purchased our
common stock between February 12, 2016 and August 8, 2017.

One of those purported class actions, captioned Vargosko v. Zillow
Group, Inc. et al, was brought in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California. The other purported class action
lawsuit, captioned Shotwell v. Zillow Group, Inc. et al, was
brought in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington.

The complaints allege, among other things, that during the period
between February 12, 2016 and August 8, 2017, the company issued
materially false and misleading statements regarding its business
practices. The complaints seek to recover, among other things,
alleged damages sustained by the purported class members as a
result of the alleged misconduct.

In November 2017, an amended complaint was filed against the
company and certain of its executive officers in the Shotwell v.
Zillow Group class action lawsuit, extending the beginning of the
class period to November 17, 2014.

In January 2018, the Vargosko v. Zillow Group purported class
action lawsuit was transferred to the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington and consolidated with the Shotwell
v. Zillow Group purported class action lawsuit.

In February 2018, the plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended
complaint, and in April 2018, the company filed its motion to
dismiss the consolidated amended complaint. In October 2018, the
company's motion to dismiss was granted without prejudice, and the
plaintiffs were given 45 days file a second consolidated amended
complaint and attempt to cure the defects in their consolidated
amended complaint.

In November 2018, the plaintiffs filed a second consolidated
amended complaint, which the company moved to dismiss in December
2018. On April 19, 2019, the company's motion to dismiss the second
consolidated amended complaint was denied, and the company filed
its answer to the second amended complaint on May 3, 2019.

Zillow Group said, "We have denied the allegations of wrongdoing
and intend to vigorously defend the claims in this lawsuit. We have
not recorded an accrual related to this lawsuit as of June 30, 2019
and December 31, 2018, as we do not believe a loss is probable."

Zillow Group, Inc. operates real estate and home-related brands on
mobile and the Web in the United States. Zillow Group, Inc. was
incorporated in 2004 and is headquartered in Seattle, Washington.


ZOVIO INC: Continues to Defend Stein Class Action
-------------------------------------------------
Zovio Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to defend a class
action suit initiated by Shiva Stein.

On March 8, 2019, a securities class action complaint (the "Stein
Complaint") was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California by Shiva Stein naming the Company, Andrew
Clark, Kevin Royal, and Joseph D'Amico as defendants (the
"Defendants").

The Stein Complaint alleges that Defendants made false and
materially misleading statements and failed to disclose material
adverse facts regarding the Company's business, operations and
prospects, specifically that the Company had applied an improper
revenue recognition methodology to students enrolled in the FTG
program.

The Stein Complaint asserts a putative class period stemming from
March 8, 2016 to March 7, 2019. The Stein Complaint alleges
violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

Zovio siad, "The Company is evaluating the Stein Complaint and
intends to vigorously defend against the Stein Complaint. However,
because of the many questions of fact and law that may arise, the
outcome of the legal proceeding is uncertain at this point. Based
on information available to the Company at present, the Company
cannot reasonably estimate a range of loss and accordingly has not
accrued any liability associated with this action the Stein
Complaint."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Zovio Inc. operates as an education technology services company in
the United States. The company was formerly known as Bridgepoint
Education, Inc. and changed its name to Zovio Inc in April 2019.
Zovio Inc was founded in 1999 and is headquartered in San Diego,
California.


ZTO EXPRESS: Court Dismisses Nurlybayev Amended Securities Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RUSTEM NURLYBAYEV, Individually and On Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. ZTO EXPRESS (CAYMAN)
INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 17 CV 6130-LTS-SN (S.D. N.Y.),
Judge Laura Taylor Swain of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York granted the Defendants' motion to
dismiss the Amended Class Action Complaint.

Lead Plaintiffs Wong Family Trusts and Dongna Fang, bring the
putative class action against Defendant ZTO, its executive officers
and directors, and its underwriters, alleging that the registration
statement and prospectus filed in connection with ZTO's initial
public offering of American Depository Shares omitted material
information in violation of Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the
Securities Act of 1933.  The Court has jurisdiction of this action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 and 15 U.S.C. Section 78v.

Defendant ZTO is an express delivery company headquartered in
Shanghai, China.  It operates through a network partner model in
which independent network partner outlets, operating under the ZTO
brand, pick up parcels from senders and deliver those parcels to a
regional hub owned and operated by ZTO.  ZTO then sorts the parcels
and transports them to the regional hub closest to the end
recipient.  From there, another network partner outlet is
responsible for last-mile delivery. ZTO's network partners are paid
a delivery service fee by parcel senders and, in turn, the pickup
outlet pays ZTO a "network transit fee" for its sorting and
transportation services.

On Oct. 27, 2016, ZTO made an IPO of 72.1 million American
Depository Shares on the New York Stock Exchange at $19.50 per
share, generating approximately $1.36 billion.  In connection with
its IPO, ZTO filed the Offering Documents with the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC").

The Plaintiffs contend that the statements in the Offering
Documents omit material factual information necessary to make the
statements not misleading, and that ZTO was also required to
disclose the omitted information pursuant to Items 303 and 503 of
Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. Section 229.303 ("Item 303"), Section
229.503 ("Item 503").  Specifically, they allege that the Offering
Documents did not disclose: (1) that ZTO had lowered its network
transit fees in April 2016; (ii) that transportation costs were
"out of control" and increasing, requiring ZTO to increase its
reliance upon costly third-party trucking companies in the fourth
quarter of 2016 and utilize more self-owned and operated
distribution centers in the first quarter of 2017; (3) that ZTO had
previously attempted to negotiate with its competitors a last-mile
fee adjustment in 2015, which it ultimately announced in May 2017;
and (4) that ZTO was keeping its network partners' businesses off
its own books.

The Plaintiffs argue that the omitted information was made public
after ZTO's IPO in three separate disclosures.  First, on Feb. 27,
2017, ZTO announced its fourth quarter 2016 financial results,
reporting that its quarterly cost of revenues had increased 49.8%
year-over-year, primarily as a result of increases in "line-haul
transportation costs, sorting hub costs, and cost of accessories.
Second, on ay 12, 2017, J.P. Morgan issued a report announcing that
ZTO and five other express delivery companies had agreed to raise
last-mile delivery fees effective June 1, 2017.  Finally, on May
17, 2017, during an earnings call with investors and analysts, in
response to a question about the decline in ZTO's gross profit
margin in the first quarter of 2017.

The Plaintiffs allege that ZTO's share price decreased following
each of the aforementioned disclosures, and that the Plaintiffs, as
purchasers of ZTO American Depository Shares pursuant or traceable
to the Offering Documents, have sustained damages as a result.

ZTO and the Underwriter Defendants now move, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to dismiss the AC for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Judge Swain finds that the Plaintiffs have not alleged plausibly
that disclosure of the April 2016 network transit fee decrease was
necessary to make statements regarding ZTO's "principal" source of
revenue not misleading, and dismisses the Plaintiffs' claims to the
extent that they are based on those statements.

Next, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs have not alleged
plausibly that, in light of the information already disclosed to
investors, the omission of the April 2016 fee decrease was
substantially likely to have significantly altered the total mix of
information available to investors.  Accordingly, the Plaintiffs'
Section 11 claims are dismissed to the extent that they are
premised upon ZTO's failure to disclose the April 2016 fee decrease
in connection with statements regarding its profitability and
operating margin.

She also dismissed the Plaintiffs Section 11 claims to the extent
that they allege that the risk disclosure statements identified in
paragraphs 60 of the AC were materially misleading.  She finds that
the AC contains no facts connecting the 2015 negotiation to
last-mile partners' costs, nor would such facts render materially
misleading a statement that ZTO may have to subsidize its network
partners in the future.  Accordingly, the Judge finds that the AC
fails to state a claim under Section 11 based upon the alleged
omission of the 2015 negotiation.

Because the Plaintiffs have failed to identify any trends, events,
or uncertainties that were not already disclosed in the Offering
Documents and which would have had a material impact on ZTO's
revenues or operations, the Judge holds that the Plaintiffs have
not pleaded adequately that ZTO omitted information that it was
required to disclose under either Item 303 or Item 503.   The
Plaintiffs have not alleged plausibly that ZTO had an affirmative
obligation to disclose the April 2016 fee decrease because the AC
contains no facts from which the Court can infer that the decrease
was so substantial that it could reasonably have been expected to
have a material effect on ZTO's revenues or financial condition.

In light of the dismissal of the Plaintiffs' Section 11 claims
against the Defendants, the Plaintiffs' Section 12 and Section 15
claims, which rely on the same underlying factual allegations, must
also be dismissed.  

Finally, the Plaintiffs request leave to amend the AC should the
Court grants the Defendants' motion.  That request is granted in
light of the "liberal amendment policy" embodied by Rule 15 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Swain granted the Defendants'
motion, and dismissed the Amended Class Action Complaint in its
entirety.  The Plaintiffs may move for leave to amend by Aug. 7,
2019.  Any such motion must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Local Rules of the Court, and the individual rules
of practice of the undersigned, and must be accompanied by a
proposed amended complaint and a blacklined version of that
proposed complaint showing all changes from the AC.  If the
Plaintiffs do not file a timely motion for leave to amend, the
dismissal of the AC against the Defendants will be with prejudice
and judgment dismissing the AC will be entered without further
advance notice.  The Memorandum Opinion and Order resolves docket
entry number 60.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 17, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/WBYYRy from Leagle.com.

Wong Family Trusts, Lead Plaintiff, represented by Jason Allen
Zweig -- jasonz@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP,
Reed R. Kathrein -- reed@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro
LLP, Reed R. Kathrein, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac
vice, James I. Jaconette, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP &
Matthew Melamed, ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP.

Rustem Nurlybayev, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Albert Yong Chang ,
Johnson Bottini, LLP & Frederick Taylor Isquith, Sr. --
fisquith@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP.

ZTO Investor Group, Movant, represented by Shannon Lee Hopkins --
shopkins@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky, LLP.

ZTO Express (Cayman) Inc., Defendant, represented by Jay B. Kasner
-- jay.kasner@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
LLP & Scott D. Musoff -- scott.musoff@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP.

J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC,
Citigroup Global Markets Inc., China Renaissance Securities (Hong
Kong) Limited, Goldman Sachs (ASIA) L.L.C. & Morgan Stanley & Co.
International PLC, Defendants, represented by Adam Selim Hakki --
ahakki@shearman.com -- Shearman & Sterling LLP, Daniel Craig Lewis,
Shearman & Sterling LLP & Katherine Mallory Tosch Brennan --
mallory.brennan@shearman.com -- Shearman & Sterling LLP.



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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