CAR_Public/190909.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, September 9, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 180

                            Headlines

45 MERCER: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Ballinas et al. Claim
ACACIA COMMS: MOU Reached over Dismissal of Cisco Merger Suits
ACTION TOWING: Adikhanov Sues over Deceptive Billing Practices
ADVENTURE BOUND: Murphy Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
ALPHA CONSTRUCTION: Bid to Certify Class in Torres-Tinajero Denied

ALTA MESA: Continues to Defend Securities Class Suit in Texas
AMERICAN MIDSTREAM: Sold to ArcLight Too Cheaply, Thomas Asserts
ANGLIN'S BEACH: Court Denies Bid for Class Certification
ANGLIN'S BEACH: Vertilus Moves for Class Certification and Notice
AO SMITH: Bid to Appoint Lead Plaintiff Underway

APPLE INC: Court OKs Admin Bid to Relate Cameron, Sermons Cases
ATLANTIC COLLECTION AGENCY: Gonzalez Sues over FDCPA Violations
AXOS FINANCIAL: Appeal in Calif. Securities Class Suit Underway
AXOS FINANCIAL: Appeal in Mandalevy Class Suit Underway
BANK OF AMERICA: Key et al. Sue over Overdraft Fees

BILOXI HMA: Henley Files Class Suit in Mississippi
BIMBO BAKERIES: Burke et al. Seek OT Premium Pay
BIMBO BAKERIES: Oddo Seeks to Certify FLSA Collective Action
BIOTIME INC: Case Management Hearing in Lampe Suit  on Sept. 17
BOB MOORE: Court Stays Class Claims Pending Arbitration

BRINKER INTERNATIONAL: Has Incurred $4.2MM in Cyber Security Suit
BURFORD CAPITAL: Faces Merz Securities Suit in E.D. New York
CALVARY PORTFOLIO SERVICES: Neumann Suit Transferred to S.D.N.Y.
CANCER GENETICS: Bid to Dismiss NJ Consolidated Suit Still Pending
CARDINAL HEALTH: Continues to Defend Louisiana Sheriffs Fund Suit

CARDINAL HEALTH: Facing Bellwether Trial in Opioid Suit in October
CARRIZO (MARCELLUS): Court Denies Common Benefit Fund in Slamon
CASA SYSTEMS: Hook Sues over 2017 IPO
CBE GROUP: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
CBS CORP: Bid to Dismiss New York Consolidated Class Suit Pending

CEMTREX INC: Court Approves Securities Class Action Settlement
CHAMPION PETFOODS: Reitman et al Seek to Certify Class
CHI NEBRASKA: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Blackbourn Suit Claims
CHICO'S FAS: Mediation in Fisher Class Suit Next Month
CHICO'S FAS: Petition for Rehearing in Altman Suit Pending

CHILDREN'S PLACE: Court Lifts Stay in Rael Class Action
CORNERSTONE BUILDING: Still Defends Voigt Class Suit
COSTCO WHOLESALE: Demurrer to Complaint in Littlejohn Affirmed
CREDIT SUISSE: Court Narrows Claims in E. Halbert Securities Suit
CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD: Underpays Appraisers, Bursey Alleges

D & A SERVICES: Spera Sues over Collection Letter, Unfair Interest
D. & B. CORP: Breached 2013 Settlement, Jenks Claims
DESMOND FOODS: Suggs Seeks Overtime Pay
DIAMOND RESORTS: Spurling et al. Seek to Recover Unpaid Wages
DLING MEDICAL AESTHETIC: Wang Sues over Labor Law Violations

DOTERRA INTERNATIONAL: Jones Files ADA Class Suit in New York
DYCK O'NEAL INC: Cheeks Sues over FDCPA Violations
FACEBOOK, INC: Adkins Seeks to Certify Two Classes
FIELDWORK, INC: "Damasco" Bid for Class Certification Filed
FLINT, MI: Mich. App. Flips Dismissal of Contaminated Water Suit

FORD MOTOR: Court Denies Class Certification Bid in C. Van Suit
FRIENDLY'S MANUFACTURING: Fields Files Fraud Class Suit in New York
FRONTLINE ASSET: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
GENERAL ELECTRIC: Court Issues Confidential Info Production Order
GOLUB CAPITAL: Bushansky Suit Over Fifth Ave. Merger Underway

HAIN CELESTIAL: Stockholders' Consolidated Class Suit Still Stayed
HECLA MINING: Faces 2 Securities Class Suits in SDNY
HERTZ CORPORATION: Conditional Class Certification Sought
HERTZ CORPORATION: Court Narrows Claims in Bradley Suit
HICKORY RIDGE: Murphy Files ADA Class Action in New York

HR STAFFING: Martinez-Zungia Sues Over Unpaid Minimum & OT Wages
HUDSON VALLEY: Objections to Denial of Spoliation Sanctions Junked
HUNTINGTON NATIONAL: Ohio Flips Appeals Ruling in Cheatham IRA Suit
ILLINOIS: Court Denies Class Certification & Tosses Perconti Suit
INDIANA: Jeffers' Pro Se Rights Dismissed as Class Suit

INSTANT CHECKMATE: Fischer et al. Suit Transferred to N.D. Ill.
INTEL CORP: Mishandled Retirement Plan Investment, Anderson Says
JARROW FORMULAS: Bid for Class Certification Denied
KEURIG GREEN: Diaz Files ADA Class Suit in New York
KIDDING AROUND: Conner Files Class Suit under Disabilities Act

LABORATORY CORP: Covance Faces Mitchell Class Suit in Pennsylvania
LABORATORY CORP: Faces Ignacio Class Suit in California
LABORATORY CORP: Faces Jan Class Action Suit in California
LAKE ARBOR 80M TIC: Russell et al. Suit Transferred to W.D.N.C.
LAND O'FROST: Accused by Kelly of Reprisal Over Use of FMLA Leave

LANNETT CO: Conspiracy Claims in Generic Drugs Suit Stand
LANNETT CO: Final Settlement Approval Hearing Set for Feb. 2020
LANNETT CO: Suit over Drug Pricing Methodologies Underway
LEGAL & GENERAL: Life Insurance Policy Violates RICO, Suits Say
LOANCARE LLC: Court Denies Dismissal of Hamilton FDCPA Suit

LOUISIANA: Class of Medicaid Recipients Certified in AJ Suit
LUMENTUM HOLDINGS: Oclaro Still Defends Karri Class Action
LVNV FUNDING: Bowman Files Class Suit under FDCPA
MACHOL & JOHANNES: Class Settlement in A. Blanks Suit Has Final OK
MCNEIL GROUP: Agrees to Certification of Class in Harbour Suit

METROPOLITAN LIFE: 9th Circuit Appeal in Martin Suit Still Pending
METROPOLITAN LIFE: Continues to Defend Miller Class Action
METROPOLITAN LIFE: Still Defends Julian & McKinney Suit
MHC LAKE GEORGE: Murphy Alleges Violation under ADA
MIDLAND CREDIT: Atwood Sues over Debt Collection Practices

MIDLAND CREDIT: Balluch Sues over Debt Collection Practices
MIDWEST RECEIVABLE: Court Stays Bid for Class Certification
MISS LASER: Underpays Technicians, Caicedo Soto Suit Alleges
MONAT GLOBAL: Jones Alleges Violation under ADA
MUNCHERY, INC: Phillips et al. Seek to Certify Class

NEBRASKA: Court Refuses to Strike Expert Declarations in Sabata
NETAPP INC: Faces Securities Class Suit in California
NOVAVIVE USA: Fauley's Bid to Certify Class Denied as Premature
OMEGA HEALTHCARE: Appeal in Securities Class Action Ongoing
OMEGA HEALTHCARE: Appointment of Lead Pltf. in Bushansky Pending

OMEGA HEALTHCARE: MedEquities Realty Trust Faces Scarantino Suit
OMEGA HEALTHCARE: Russell Suit v. MedEquities Realty Trust Ongoing
ORRSTOWN FINANCIAL: Bid for Protective Order Granted in Part
ORTHO MATTRESS: Cal. App. Affirms Arbitration Denial in Banuelos
OS RESTAURANT: Court Takes Class Cert. Bid under Submission

PFIZER INC: Class Suits Related to Adalimumab Biosimilars Ongoing
PFIZER INC: Continues to Defend Lipitor-Related Antitrust Suits
PFIZER INC: Continues to Defend Saline Solution Class Suit
PFIZER INC: Hormone Therapy Consumer Class Action vs. Wyeth Ongoing
PHILADELPHIA CONSOLIDATED: Huck Suit Transferred to N.D. Georgia

PILLARS PROTECTION: O'Byant Wins Collective Class Certification
PLURALSIGHT INC: Faces Suit over 40% Drop in Share Price
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Class Certification Sought in Johnson Suit
PREMIER NUTRITION: Certification of 9 Joint Juice Classes Sought
PRESSED JUICERY: Brooks Files Class Suit in California Under ADA

QUINCY BIOSCIENCE: Karathanos Suit Transferred to S.D. New York
RAYMOND JAMES: Final Settlement Approval Hearing Set for Oct. 25
RECEIVABLES MANAGEMENT: Seeks Prelim. Nod of Coulter Class Deal
RHODE ISLAND: Chapdelaine, et al Seek to Certify Class
RITE AID: Faces Product Liability Lawsuit in Connecticut

ROCHELLE PROPERTY: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Beaudet Claims
ROUNDY'S ILLINOIS: Class Certification Sought in Haugen Suit
RUTHERFORD COUNTY, TN: KW Seeks to Certify 3 Classes of Arrestees
S-L DISTRIBUTION: Macedonia Moves to Certify Distributors Class
SAEXPLORATION HOLDINGS: Bodin Sues over 34% Drop in Share Price

SAEXPLORATION HOLDINGS: Faces Bodin Class Suit in Texas
SALESFORCE.COM INC: Curtis Challenges Tableau Software Merger Deal
SALESFORCE.COM INC: Scheufele Suit v. Tableau Software Ongoing
SARATOGA ESCAPE: Murphy Alleges Violation under ADA
SIFCO INDUSTRIES: Still Defends Wage-and-Hour Suit in California

SINCLAIR BROADCAST: Bid to Nix Maryland Securities Suit Pending
SINCLAIR BROADCAST: Continues to Defend 22 Price-Fixing Class Suits
SOUTHERN COMPANY: Court Certifies Class in Securities Suit
SPEEDWAY MOTORSPORTS: Thompson Balks at Sonic Financial Deal
SPIN MASTER: Conner Asserts Breach of ADA

SPRINKLES CUPCAKES: Brooks Files ADA Class Suit in California
STERLING BUSINESS FORMS: Garcia Sues over Civil Rights Violations
TARONIS TECHNOLOGIES: Continues to Defend Shareholders Class Suit
TAYLOR FARMS: Court Denies Prelim Approval of Workers' Settlement
THESY LLC: Tyksinski Sues over Personal Data Theft

UBIQUITI INC: Consolidated Class Suit in New York Ongoing
ULTIMATE NUTRITION: Kingsbury Seeks to Recover WARN Act Damages
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE: Ramirez Seeks Minimum Wage, OT Pay
VERU INC: Court Dismisses Amended Complaint in Aspen Merger Suit
VISION PRECISION HOLDINGS: Martinez Suit Transferred to E.D. Cal.

WELLS FARGO: Hernandez et al. Seek Certification of Classes
WESTERN DIGITAL: Final Settlement Approval Hearing This Month
WHITE COUNTY, TN: Bilbrey et al. Sue Sheriff Dept., Seek OT Pay
ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES: Warren Suit Moved to E.D. New York

                            *********

45 MERCER: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Ballinas et al. Claim
-----------------------------------------------------------
MIGUEL BALLINAS, and MIGUEL TEJEDA individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. 45 MERCER RESTAURANT,
LLC, d/b/a GALLI; HOST RG 45, LLC; LOCAL WEST, LLC d/b/a LOCAL
WEST; HOST RG 54, LLC, d/b/a BILL'S; HOST RG 40, LLC d/b/a PRINTERS
ALLEY; CAMP 1382, LLC d/b/a CAMPAGNOLA; RED ONE PLAZA, LLC, d/b/a
LUCY'S CANTINA; ROYAL, LDV RG LUCY, LLC; IMIAN 550, LLC, d/b/a
PUBLICANS; CURT HUEGEL; ASH HEDLI; JOHN W. HEIL III; SEI HOON CHU;
and RICHARD WEISFISCH, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-07766
(S.D.N.Y., Aug. 19, 2019) seeks to recover from the Defendants
unpaid wages and overtime compensation, interest, liquidated
damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as non-exempt
employees.

45 Mercer Restaurant, LLC, d/b/a Galli owns and operates as a
restaurant. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          Taimur Alamgir, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          148 West 24th Street, 8th Floor
          New York, NY 10011
          Telephone: (212) 465-1188
          Facsimile: (212) 465-1181


ACACIA COMMS: MOU Reached over Dismissal of Cisco Merger Suits
--------------------------------------------------------------
Acacia Communications, Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filed on August 27, 2019,
2019, that the plaintiffs in the O'Brien Action, the Rosenblatt
Action and the Mac Action have entered into a memorandum of
understanding in which these plaintiffs agreed to dismiss with
prejudice their individual claims and to dismiss without prejudice
the class claims asserted, in relation to the company's merger
agreement with Cisco Systems. Inc.

On July 8, 2019, the Company entered into an Agreement and Plan of
Merger (the "Merger Agreement") with Cisco Systems, Inc., a
California corporation (the "Parent"), and Amarone Acquisition
Corp., a Delaware corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of the
Parent (the "Merger Sub").

On July 8, 2019, Acacia Communications, Inc., a Delaware
corporation (the "Company"), entered into an Agreement and Plan of
Merger (the "Merger Agreement") with Cisco Systems, Inc., a
California corporation (the "Parent"), and Amarone Acquisition
Corp., a Delaware corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of the
Parent (the "Merger Sub"), providing for the acquisition of the
Company by the Parent through the merger of the Merger Sub with and
into the Company (the "Merger"), with the Company surviving the
Merger as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Parent.

On August 5, 2019, a lawsuit, captioned Jiang v. Acacia
Communications, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-07267, was
filed against the Company and each of the Company's directors in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York alleging violations of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 14a-9
promulgated thereunder against the defendants for allegedly
disseminating a materially incomplete and misleading preliminary
proxy statement in connection with the proposed Merger.

On August 5, 2019, a putative class action lawsuit, captioned
O'Brien v. Acacia Communications, Inc., et al., Civil Action No.
1:19-cv-01463 (the "O'Brien Action"), was filed against the Company
and each of the Company's directors in the United States District
Court for the District of Delaware alleging that the Company's
directors breached their fiduciary duties by, among other things,
agreeing to the proposed Merger without taking steps to obtain
adequate, fair and maximum consideration under the circumstances
and engineering the proposed Merger to improperly benefit
themselves, Company management and/or the Parent without regard for
the Company's public stockholders, and that the Company and its
directors violated Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act by
disseminating a materially incomplete and misleading preliminary
proxy statement in connection with the proposed Merger.

On August 6, 2019, a putative class action lawsuit, captioned
Rosenblatt v. Acacia Communications, Inc., et al., Civil Action No.
1:19-cv-01470 (the "Rosenblatt Action"), was filed against the
Company and each of the Company's directors in the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware alleging violations of
Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9
promulgated thereunder against the defendants for allegedly
disseminating a false and misleading preliminary proxy statement in
connection with the proposed Merger.

On August 7, 2019, a lawsuit, captioned Mac v. Acacia
Communications, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-11706 (the
"Mac Action"), was filed against the Company and each of the
Company's directors in the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts alleging violations of Sections 14(a) and
20(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder
against the defendants for allegedly disseminating a materially
deficient and misleading preliminary proxy statement in connection
with the proposed Merger.

The plaintiffs in these lawsuits seek various forms of injunctive
and declaratory relief, as well as awards of damages, costs, expert
fees and attorneys' fees.

On August 27, 2019, the Company and the plaintiffs in the O'Brien
Action, the Rosenblatt Action and the Mac Action entered into a
memorandum of understanding in which these plaintiffs agreed to
dismiss with prejudice their individual claims and to dismiss
without prejudice the class claims asserted in those actions, in
return for the Company's agreement to make the supplemental
disclosures set forth herein.

The Company believes that no further supplemental disclosure is
required under applicable laws and that the definitive proxy
statement filed by the Company with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "SEC") on August 7, 2019 (the "Proxy Statement")
disclosed all material information required to be disclosed
therein. However, to avoid the risk of the O'Brien Action, the
Rosenblatt Action and the Mac Action delaying or adversely
affecting the proposed Merger and to minimize the expense of
defending such actions, it has agreed, pursuant to the terms of the
memorandum of understanding, to make certain supplemental
disclosures related to the proposed Merger, all of which are set
forth below and which should be read in conjunction with the Proxy
Statement.

The memorandum of understanding will not affect the amount of the
merger consideration that the Company’s stockholders are entitled
to receive in the proposed Merger or the timing of the special
meeting of the Company’s stockholders, scheduled for September 6,
2019, to, among other things, consider and vote upon a proposal to
adopt the Merger Agreement.

A copy of the supplemental disclosure is available at
https://bit.ly/2HBPk7x.

Acacia Communications, Inc., incorporated on June 2, 2009, provides
high-speed coherent interconnect products. The company is based in
Maynard, Massachusetts.


ACTION TOWING: Adikhanov Sues over Deceptive Billing Practices
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Action Emergency
Management Services, Inc. for unjust enrichment. The case is
captioned ABDUMALIK ADIKHANOV, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, vs. ACTION EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
SERVICES, INC., d/b/a ACTION TOWING, Defendant, Case No. 19-2335B
(Mass. Cmmw., Suffolk Cty., July 23, 2019). Plaintiff alleges that
the Defendant is unlawful, unfair and/or deceptive billing
practices as it relates to its involuntary towing services.
Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Action Towing has a practice
of demanding and/or collecting impermissible amounts of money in
connection with its involuntary towing practices in violation of
Massachusetts law.

Action Emergency Management Services, Inc. is a domestic
corporation, maintaining a principal office and registered agent in
Suffolk County, Massachusetts. The company provides towing,
transportation, road service and repairs to individuals and
businesses in Massachusetts. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Brian P. McNiff, Esq.
     John R. Yasi, Esq.
     Michael C. Forrest, Esq.
     FORREST, LAMOTHE, MAZOW, MCCULLOUGH YASI & YASI, P.C.
     2 Salem Green, Suite 2
     Salem, MA 01970
     Telephone: (617)231-7829
     E-mail: bmcniff@forrestlamothe.com
             ivasi@forrestlamothe.com
             mforrest@forrestlamothe.com

ADVENTURE BOUND: Murphy Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
----------------------------------------------------------
Adventure Bound Camps, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as James Murphy, on behalf of himself and all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Adventure Bound Camps, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-08060 (S.D. N.Y., Aug. 28, 2019).

ABC provides up to week-long traveling day & overnight summer camps
for campers 10-15 yrs old.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Zare Khorozian, Esq.
   Zare Khorozian Law, LLC
   1047 Anderson Avenue
   Fort Lee, NJ 07024
   Tel: (201) 957-7269
   Email: zare@zkhorozianlaw.com


ALPHA CONSTRUCTION: Bid to Certify Class in Torres-Tinajero Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PEDRO TORRES-TINAJERO, on behalf of himself and all
other similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs, v. ALPHA CONSTRUCTION
OF THE TRIAD, INC. and JEFFREY W. ALLEY, Defendants, Case No.
1:18CV160 (M.D. N.C.), Judge William L. Osteen, Jr. of the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina denied
without prejudice the Torres-Tinajero's Motion for Class
Certification and for Approval of Class Notice and Method of
Distribution.

The Plaintiff brought the case as both a collective action pursuant
to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), and a class
action under the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act ("NCWHA").  The
Court has federal question jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's FLSA
claim, and can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his NCWHA
claims.

ThePlaintiff's FLSA claim is for unpaid overtime wages.  He
Plaintiff brings two NCWHA claims, one of which he alleges in the
alternative to the FLSA claim.  His first NCWHA claim is based on
the Defendants' failure to pay overtime wages when due on the
scheduled payday under N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 95-25.6.  The
Plaintiff's second NCWHA claim, which he alleges in the alternative
to the FLSA claim, is for unpaid overtime wages under N.C. Gen.
Stat. Section 95-25.4.

The Plaintiff moves to certify a class as to the payday claim under
N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 95-25.6 or, in the alternative, a class as
to the NCWHA overtime claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 95-25.4.
He moved to certify a class when he did, on Jan. 23, 2019, to
comply with Local Rule 23.1(b)'s deadline, which Magistrate Judge
Peake extended until Feb. 1, 2019.

Under Local Rule 23.1(b), a plaintiff has 90 days from filing a
class action complaint to move to certify a class.  That 90-day
window does not apply to a motion for conditional certification of
collective action under the FLSA.  And the Plaintiff does not move
contemporaneously for conditional certification of collective
action under the FLSA because he has not obtained any of the
discovery necessary to conclusively establish that the Plaintiff's
employment was subject to 'enterprise coverage' under the FLSA.

Judge Osteen concludes that granting the Plaintiff's motion at this
time would be imprudent.  The Judge extends the Plaintiff's time to
file a motion for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 pending further discovery.  If necessary, the
Magistrate Judge may extend the discovery deadline, which is
currently Sept. 30, 2019.  The Plaintiff may renew his motion, or
file a new one, when he seeks collective action treatment of his
FLSA claim.

The Judge therefore denied the Plaintiff's Motion for Class
Certification and for Approval of Class Notice and Method of
Distribution, without prejudice as described.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 24, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/J2mepX from Leagle.com.

PEDRO TORRES-TINAJERO, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHER SIMILARLY
SITUATED PERSONS, Plaintiff, represented by ROBERT JAMES WILLIS --
rwillis@rjwillis-law.com --
ALPHA CONSTRUCTION OF THE TRIAD INC., Defendant, pro se.

JEFFREY W. ALLEY, Defendant, pro se.


ALTA MESA: Continues to Defend Securities Class Suit in Texas
-------------------------------------------------------------
Alta Mesa Resources, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 27, 2019, for
the fiscal year ended December 31, 2018, that the company continues
to defend putative securities class action suits in Texas.

On January 30, 2019, the Company, James T. Hackett, its interim
Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board, certain of its
former and current directors, Thomas J. Walker, its former Chief
Financial Officer, and Riverstone Investment Group LLC were named
as defendants in a putative securities class action filed in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
("SDNY Complaint").

The plaintiff, Plumbers and Pipefitters National Pension Fund,
alleges that the defendants disseminated a false and misleading
proxy statement in connection with the Business Combination and,
therefore, violated Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"), and Rule 14-9 promulgated
thereunder.

In addition, the plaintiff alleges that Riverstone and the
individual defendants violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.
The plaintiff is seeking compensatory and/or rescissory damages
against the defendants. The District Court transferred this action
to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

On March 14 and 19, 2019, two additional putative securities class
action complaints were filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Texas ("SDTX Complaints") against the same
defendants named in the SDNY Complaint, and Harlan H. Chappelle and
Michael A. McCabe, the company's former President and Chief
Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer, respectively.

These complaints include the same claims asserted in the initial
complaint, but also add claims under Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder against the company and
certain of its current and former officers and directors on behalf
of all persons or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired
Silver Run or AMR securities between March 24, 2017, and February
25, 2019.

The new claims are based upon alleged misstatements contained in
the company's proxy statement and made after the Business
Combination. The plaintiffs seek compensatory and/or rescissory
damages against the defendants.

Alta Mesa said, "The outcome of the above securities class action
complaints is uncertain, and while we believe that we have valid
defenses to the plaintiff's claims and intend to defend the
lawsuits vigorously, no assurance can be given as to the outcome of
the lawsuits."

Alta Mesa Resources, Inc., together with its consolidated
subsidiaries, is an independent exploration and production company
focused on the acquisition, development, exploration and
exploitation of unconventional onshore oil and natural gas reserves
in the eastern portion of the Anadarko Basin in Oklahoma. The
company operatez in two reportable business segments - Upstream and
Midstream. The company is based in Houston, Texas.


AMERICAN MIDSTREAM: Sold to ArcLight Too Cheaply, Thomas Asserts
----------------------------------------------------------------
CRAIG W. THOMAS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. STEPHEN W. BERGSTROM; JOHN F. ERHARD; PETER
A. FASULLO; DONALD R. KENDALL, JR.; LYNN L. BOURDON, III; DANIEL R.
REVERS; JOSEPH W. SUTTON; LUCIUS H. TAYLOR; GERALD A. TYWONIUK; and
AMERICAN MIDSTREAM GP, LLC n/k/a THIRD COAST MIDSTREAM HOLDINGS,
LLC, Defendants, Case No. 20190641 (Del. Ch., Aug. 14, 2019) seeks
relief for the bad faith conduct of American Midstream GP, LLC, its
Board of Directors, and its purportedly independent Conflicts
Committee in connection with ArcLight Energy Partners Fund V,
L.P.'s acquisition of all issued and outstanding AMID common units
through its subsidiary.

According to the complaint, the Defendants "opportunistically and
in bad faith" designed and timed the ArcLight Acquisition and
otherwise manipulated the Company's unit price to deprive common
unitholders of the full value of their investments, violating the
terms of the Composite Fifth Amended and Restated Agreement of
Limited Partnership ("LPA") and the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. The Conflicts Committee also acted in bad faith,
knowing of, but disregarding, this manipulation along with other
material information in approving the Acquisition.

On March 18, 2019, two weeks before filing its Form 10-K for the
year 2018 ("2018 Form 10-K"), the Company announced that the
Conflicts Committee had approved the Acquisition, by which Magnolia
Infrastructure Holdings, LLC ("Magnolia"), a subsidiary of ArcLight
and a 23% indirect owner of American Midstream, would acquire all
issued and outstanding AMID common units not already owned by
Magnolia or its affiliates at the unfairly low price of $5.25 per
common unit.

The Acquisition materially undervalued AMID in order to benefit
ArcLight. American Midstream opportunistically timed the
Acquisition to take advantage of perceived and temporary
operational and financial issues, including several manufactured by
it or its affiliate ArcLight, in disregard for the long-term value
and prospects of AMID's business.

The Company's unaffiliated unitholders, however, will actually net
less than $5.25 per unit as a result of ArcLight's maneuvering.
Just prior to the closing of the Acquisition, ArcLight caused the
conversion of the Company's preferred units, which ArcLight
exclusively held, into common units. Conversion was not required to
effectuate the Acquisition, and the Plaintiff can discern no
legitimate Acquisition-related purpose for the conversion. But, as
with other material aspects of the Acquisition, the conversion
handicapped common unitholders, in this case by shifting a portion
of ArcLight's tax liability onto the Company's unaffiliated common
unitholders while solely providing ArcLight with the benefits
arising from the corresponding taxable loss.

American Midstream GP LLC owns and operates a diversified portfolio
of natural gas midstream energy assets. The Company provides
midstream services in the Gulf Coast and Southeast regions of the
United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Samuel L. Closic, Esq.
          Kevin H. Davenport, Esq.
          Mary S. Thomas, Esq.
          PRICKETT, JONES & ELLIOTT, P.A.
          1310 King Street
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 888-6500


ANGLIN'S BEACH: Court Denies Bid for Class Certification
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as SHUBERT VERTILUS, the
Plaintiff, vs. ANGLIN'S BEACH CAFE, LLC, and SPIRO MARCHELOS, the
Defendants, Case No. 0:19-cv-61462-RKA (S.D. Fla.), the Hon. Judge
Roy K. Altman entered an order on Aug. 28, 2019:

   1. denying without prejudice Plaintiff's motion for default
judgment; and

   2. denying Plaintiff's motion for class certification.

The Plaintiff may file an amended motion for default judgment. That
amended motion must describe, in detail, any proposed attorney's
fees and costs, including counsel's hours and rates, the Court
says.

The Plaintiff has neither identified similarly situated class
members or pointed to class members who wish to opt into this
lawsuit. Instead, the Plaintiff, in rather conclusory fashion, says
only that:

(1) "Defendants have failed to pay myself and similarly situated
employees minimum wage for all hours worked and overtime for all
hours worked in excess of 40 in a given work week";

(2) "Plaintiff and all other similarly situated individuals
routinely are not paid minimum wage for all hours worked"; and

(3) "there are numerous other employees employed as hourly kitchen
staff who were not paid full and proper overtime and minimum wage
for all hours worked".

The Plaintiff brought this action to recover unpaid minimum and
overtime wages -- along with liquidated damages -- under the Fair
Labor Standards Act.[CC]

ANGLIN'S BEACH: Vertilus Moves for Class Certification and Notice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit styled SHUBERT VERTILUS, and all
others similarly situated v. ANGLIN'S BEACH CAFE, LLC, an active
Florida limited liability company; and SPIRO MARCHELOS,
individually, Case No. 0:19-cv-61462-RKA (S.D. Fla.), filed with
the Court a motion for certification as a collective action and
issuance of court supervised notice.

On June 12, 2019, the Plaintiff filed his complaint alleging
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.  He alleges that he was
not paid overtime and minimum wage pursuant to the FLSA.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael L. Elkins, Esq.
          MLE LAW
          633 S. Andrews Ave., Suite 500
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 401-2608
          E-mail: melkins@mlelawfirm.com

               - and -

          Joshua M. Entin, Esq.
          ENTIN LAW GROUP, P.A.
          633 S. Andrews Ave., Suite 500
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 761-7201
          E-mail: josh@entinlaw.com


AO SMITH: Bid to Appoint Lead Plaintiff Underway
------------------------------------------------
A. O. Smith Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 8, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that a putative class member
has filed a motion seeking to be named lead plaintiff in the class
action suit, entitled, Henry Bleier v. A. O. Smith Corporation, et
al.

On May 28, 2019, a putative securities class action lawsuit was
filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin against the Company and certain of its current or former
officers.

This action, captioned Henry Bleier v. A. O. Smith Corporation, et
al., asserts securities fraud claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and seeks damages and other
relief based upon the allegations in the complaint.

Although the named plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his complaint on
August 2, 2019, another putative class member filed a motion
seeking to be named lead plaintiff in the case, and the Court has
until August 26, 2019 to rule on that motion.

A. O. Smith Corporation, incorporated on July 9, 1986, operates
through two segments: North America and Rest of World. The
Company's Rest of World segment primarily consists of China, Europe
and India. Both segments manufacture and market comprehensive lines
of residential and commercial gas, gas tankless and electric water
heaters, as well as water treatment products. Both segments
primarily manufacture and market in their respective regions of the
world. The company is based in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.


APPLE INC: Court OKs Admin Bid to Relate Cameron, Sermons Cases
----------------------------------------------------------------
On August 22, 2019, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a
mandate in Robert Pepper v. Apple, Inc., Case No. 11-cv-06714.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an order granting the two Administrative Motions
by defendant Apple Inc.'s to Consider Whether Cases Should Be
Related Pursuant to Civil L.R. 3-12, namely Cameron v. Apple, Inc.,
Case No. 19-cv-03074-WHA (Cameron) and Sermons v. Apple, Inc., Case
No. 19-cv-03796-WHA (Sermons).

Here, the defendant in all three cases is the same. The plaintiffs
differ and their relationship to the defendant also differs.
However, each case stems from the use of the exact same technology
and the economics regarding that same technology. The time periods
overlap, albeit one case is significantly longer than the other
two. Procedurally, even though one case has a long history,
discovery has not begun in any case. Given the Court's
understanding of the cases, it also appears that discovery will
overlap.

Having reviewed the parties' filings, the Court finds that
significant economies exist in terms of case management and
resolution of motions inextricably tied to an understanding of the
technology, platform markets, and the transactions at issue.

Opposing plaintiffs' arguments against relating Cameron and Sermons
to the Pepper action do not persuade. The argument that plaintiffs
in Cameron and Sermons are app developers and therefore the cases
do not present substantially similar parties fails. Although
plaintiffs' relationships to defendant differ, the alleged
breakdown in those relationships, which form the bases of
plaintiffs' complaints, center around the same technology and
economic structures.  

Cameron plaintiffs' argument that the property at issue is not
substantially the same similarly fails.

Plaintiffs misconstrue the Supreme Court's statement regarding
conflicting claims to the common fund. The Court's statement does
not, as plaintiffs suggest, mean that the property at issue is not
substantially similar. As the Court explained, if the consumer
class prevails, they will be entitled to the full amount of the
unlawful overcharge that they paid to Apple as the overcharge has
not been passed on by anyone to anyone.

Plaintiffs' argument that there is no risk of conflicting results
if the cases are not related is unpersuasive. Plaintiffs rely on
surface differences in the damages theories presented, however as
the Court previously noted, courts routinely relate cases in which
the theories of damages differ. Moreover, the fact that both sets
of plaintiffs seek injunctive relief presents a sufficient risk of
inconsistent results to warrant relation.

Finally, relating these actions would, contrary to plaintiffs'
argument, avoid unduly burdensome duplication of effort. All three
cases are currently in a similar procedural posture and have yet to
begin substantial discovery and so efficiency gains will be
achieved in discovery. Moreover, given overlap, relating both
actions to Pepper would prevent unnecessary duplication of judicial
effort and resources.

Accordingly, the Court grants Apple's motions to relate the Cameron
and Sermons actions.

A full-text copy of the District Court's dated August 22, 2019
Order is available at  https://tinyurl.com/y24lfnbp from
Leagle.com.

Robert Pepper, Stephen H. Schwartz & Edward W. Hayter, Plaintiffs,
represented by Betsy Carol Manifold -- manifold@whafh.com -- Wolf
Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, LLP, Mark Carl Rifkin-
rifkin@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP,
Rachele R. Byrd -- Byrd@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman
& Herz LLP, Matthew Moylan Guiney -- guiney@whafh.com -- Wolf
Haldenstein Adler Freeman Herz LLP, pro hac vice & Michael Milton
Liskow -- liskow@gmail.com -- The Sultzer Law Group, P.C.

Harry Bass, Plaintiff, represented by Betsy Carol Manifold, Wolf
Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, LLP, Mark Carl Rifkin, Wolf
Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP, Rachele R. Byrd, Wolf
Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP & Michael Milton Liskow, The
Sultzer Law Group, P.C.

Eric Terrell, Plaintiff, represented by Mark Carl Rifkin, Wolf
Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP, Matthew Moylan Guiney, Wolf
Haldenstein Adler Freeman Herz LLP, pro hac vice &Rachele R. Byrd,
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP.

James Blackwell & Crystal Boykin, Plaintiffs, represented by Mark
Carl Rifkin, Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP & Rachele R.
Byrd, Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP.

Apple Inc., Defendant, represented by Christopher S. Yates --
chris.yates@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, Daniel Murray Wall --
dan.wall@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, Sadik Harry Huseny --
sadik.huseny@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, Cynthia Richman --
crichman@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn and Crutcher LLP, pro hac
vice, Daniel Glen Swanson -- dswanson@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Melissa Phan -mphan@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson
Dunn, Richard Joseph Doren, Gibson Dunn Crutcher, 333 S Grand Ave,
Los Angeles, CA 90071 & Theodore Joseph Boutrous, Jr. --
tboutrous@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP.

Donald R. Cameron & Pure Sweat Basketball, Inc., Miscellaneouss,
represented by Steve W. Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens
Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.


ATLANTIC COLLECTION AGENCY: Gonzalez Sues over FDCPA Violations
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Atlantic Collection
Agency Inc. et al. for alleged violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The case is captioned Pedro
Gonzalez, III, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Atlantic Collection Agency Inc. et al,
Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-01130-JCH (D. Conn., July 23, 2019).
This consumer credit-related lawsuit is assigned to Hon. Judge
Janet C. Hall.

Atlantic Collection Agency Inc. is a debt collection agency in East
Lyme, Connecticut. The company specializes in medical debt
collection. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Benjamin Wolf, Esq.
     JONES, WOLF & KAPASI, LLC
     One Grand Central Place
     60 East 42nd Street, 46th Floor
     New York, NY 10165
     Telephone: (646) 459-7971
     Facsimile: (646) 459-7971
     E-mail: bwolf@legaljones.com

             - and –

     Joseph K. Jones, Esq.
     JONES, WOLF & KAPASI, LLC
     One Grand Central Place
     60 East 42nd Street, 46th Floor
     New York, NY 10165
     Telephone: (646) 459-7971
     Facsimile: (646) 459-7973
     E-mail: jkj@legaljones.com

AXOS FINANCIAL: Appeal in Calif. Securities Class Suit Underway
---------------------------------------------------------------
Axos Financial, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 28, 2019, for the
fiscal year ended June 30, 2019, that the appeal in the
consolidated class action suit entitled, In re BofI Holding, Inc.
Securities Litigation, Case #: 3:15-cv-02324-GPC-KSC, remains
pending.

On October 15, 2015, the Company, its Chief Executive Officer and
its Chief Financial Officer were named defendants in a putative
class action lawsuit styled Golden v. BofI Holding, Inc., et al,
and brought in United States District Court for the Southern
District of California (the "Golden Case").

On November 3, 2015, the Company, its Chief Executive Officer and
its Chief Financial Officer were named defendants in a second
putative class action lawsuit styled Hazan v. BofI Holding, Inc.,
et. al, and also brought in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of California (the "Hazan Case").

On February 1, 2016, the Golden Case and the Hazan Case were
consolidated as In re BofI Holding, Inc. Securities Litigation,
Case #: 3:15-cv-02324-GPC-KSC (the "Class Action"), and the Houston
Municipal Employees Pension System was appointed lead plaintiff.

The plaintiffs allege that the Company and other named defendants
violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, by failing to disclose
wrongful conduct that was alleged in a complaint filed in
connection with a wrongful termination of employment lawsuit filed
on October 13, 2015 (the "Employment Matter") and that as a result
the Company's statements regarding its internal controls, as well
as portions of its financial statements, were false and misleading.


On March 21, 2018, the Court entered a final order dismissing the
Class Action with prejudice.

Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal and opening
brief and the Company has filed its answering brief.

Axos Financial, Inc. operates as the holding company for BofI
Federal Bank that provides consumer and business banking products
in the United States. The company offers deposits products,
including consumer and business checking, demand, savings, and time
deposit accounts. Axos Financial, Inc. was incorporated in 1999 and
is based in San Diego, California.


AXOS FINANCIAL: Appeal in Mandalevy Class Suit Underway
-------------------------------------------------------
Axos Financial, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 28, 2019, for the
fiscal year ended June 30, 2019, that the appeal from a court
decision in the case, Mandalevy v. BofI Holding, Inc., et al.,
remains pending.

On April 3, 2017, the Company, its Chief Executive Officer and its
Chief Financial Officer were named defendants in a putative class
action lawsuit styled Mandalevy v. BofI Holding, Inc., et al, and
brought in United States District Court for the Southern District
of California (the "Mandalevy Case").

The Mandalevy Case seeks monetary damages and other relief on
behalf of a putative class that has not been certified by the
Court. The complaint in the Mandalevy Case (the "Mandalevy
Complaint") alleges a class period that differs from that alleged
in the First Class Action, and that the Company and other named
defendants violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, by
failing to disclose wrongful conduct that was alleged in a March
2017 media article.

On December 7, 2018, the Court entered a final order granting the
defendants' motion and dismissing the Mandalevy Case with
prejudice. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal and
opening brief and the Company has filed its answering brief.

Axos Financial, Inc. operates as the holding company for BofI
Federal Bank that provides consumer and business banking products
in the United States. The company offers deposits products,
including consumer and business checking, demand, savings, and time
deposit accounts. Axos Financial, Inc. was incorporated in 1999 and
is based in San Diego, California.


BANK OF AMERICA: Key et al. Sue over Overdraft Fees
---------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Bank of America,
N.A. and Bank of America Corporation for unjust enrichment and
breach of contract in connection with their practices of
systematically assessing improper overdraft fees, overdraft
protection transfer fees, and withdrawal limit fees to the personal
checking and savings accounts of its customers. The case is
captioned IMANI NIA KEY; FERNANDO DE CESPEDES; and HOLLY DILLON,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; and BANK OF AMERICA
CORPORATION, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-CV-23020 (S.D. Fla., July,
19 2019).

Specifically, on April 6, 2016, April 25, 2016, June 3, 2016,
August 3, 2016, and August 12, 2016, Bank of America breached the
Deposit Agreement and Schedule of Fees by charging Plaintiff De
Cespedes $12.00 overdraft protection transfer fees as a result of
nonrecurring debit card transactions for which insufficient
available funds existed in his primary deposit account balance to
cover, even though there were insufficient available funds
available in Plaintiff De Cespedes's linked savings account to
cover both the amounts of the insufficient funds in his primary
deposit account balance and the applicable $12.00 overdraft
protection transfer fees. Additionally, on May 31, 2016, Bank of
America breached the Deposit Agreement and Schedule of Fees by
charging Plaintiff Key a $12.00 overdraft protection transfer fee
as a result of an ATM transaction for which insufficient available
funds existed in her primary deposit account balance to cover, even
though there were also insufficient available funds available in
Plaintiff Key's linked savings account to cover both the amount of
the insufficient funds in her primary deposit account balance and
the applicable $12.00 overdraft protection transfer fee.

Bank of America is incorporated in Delaware and maintains its
headquarters and principal place of business in Charlotte, North
Carolina. Bank of America provides, inter alia, retail banking
products and services to consumers, including personal checking
accounts and debit cards. Bank of America operates banking centers
throughout Florida and the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Frank S. Hedin, Esq.
     HEDIN HALL LLP
     1395 Brickell Ave, Suite 900
     Miami, FL 33131
     Telephone: (305) 357-2107
     Facsimile: (305) 200-8801
     E-mail: fhedin@hedinhall.com

             - and -

     Robert Ahdoot, Esq.
     AHDOOT & WOLFSON, PC
     10728 Lindbrook Drive
     Los Angeles, CA 90024
     Telephone: (310) 474-9111
     Facsimile: (310) 474-8585
     E-mail: rahdoot@ahdootwolfson.com

BILOXI HMA: Henley Files Class Suit in Mississippi
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Biloxi H.M.A., LLC.
The case is styled as Kimberly Henley, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Biloxi H.M.A., LLC doing
business as: Merit Health Biloxi a Mississippi Limited Liability
Company, Community Health Systems, Inc., a Delaware Corporation,
John and Jane Does 1 through 25, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-00544-HSO-JCG (S.D. Miss., Aug. 27, 2019).

The case type is stated as Diversity-Other Contract.

Biloxi H.M.A. LLC is in the General Medical and Surgical Hospitals
business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Christopher C Van Cleave, Esq.
   Van Cleave Law, P.A.
   146 Porter Avenue
   Biloxi, MS 39530
   Tel: (228) 432-7826
   Fax: (228) 456-0998
   Email: christopher@vancleavelaw.com


BIMBO BAKERIES: Burke et al. Seek OT Premium Pay
------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Bimbo Bakeries USA,
Inc. and Bimbo Foods Bakeries Distribution, LLC for alleged
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the New York
Labor Law (NYLL). The case is captioned ERIC BURKE, CRAIG BARKER,
RICK CALTON, ARTHUR SALISBURY, WILLIAM CORY TANNER, BRIAN TANNER,
and TONY WEAVER, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. BIMBO BAKERIES USA, INC. and, BIMBO
BAKERIES DISTRIBUTION, LLC, Defendants, Case No.
5:19-CV-0902-MAD-ATB (N.D.N.Y., July 23, 2019).

Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants misclassified them as
independent contractors instead of employees under the NYLL from
April 10, 2014 to the present. Plaintiffs assert claims as a class
action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, alleging
that Defendants violated the New York Labor laws by making unlawful
deductions from their wages, failing to comply with the
recordkeeping and notice requirements of the NYLL and failing to
pay an overtime premium when Plaintiffs worked more than forty
hours per week.

Headquartered in Horsham, Pennsylvania, Bimbo Bakeries and their
affiliates are engaged in the manufacturing, delivery, and sale
breads and baked goods to grocery stores and other outlets across
the United States under the brand names Sara Lee, Nature's Harvest,
and others. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Samuel A. Alba, Esq.
     FRIEDMAN & RANZENHOFER, P.C.
     74 Main Street
     P.O. Box 31
     Akron, NY 14001
     Telephone: (716)-542-5444
     E-mail: Sam@legalsurvival.com

             - and -

     Harold L. Lichten, Esq.
     Matthew W. Thomson, Esq.
     LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
     729 Boylston St., Suite 2000
     Boston, MA 02116
     Telephone: (617) 994-5800
     E-mail: hlichten@llrlaw.com
             mthomson@llrlaw.com

BIMBO BAKERIES: Oddo Seeks to Certify FLSA Collective Action
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as CHRISTOPHER ODDO, et al., on
behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, the Plaintiffs,
vs. BIMBO BAKERIES U.S.A. INC., the Defendant, Case No.
2:17-cv-04775-PD (E.D. Pa.), the Plaintiffs move the Court for an
order:

   1. conditionally certifying collective action pursuant to the
      Fair Labor Standards Act on behalf of:

      "all individuals who, during at least one workweek during
      the time period from September 11, 2014 through the present
      1) worked for Defendant as a Route Sales Representative or
      Route Sales Professional and 2) drove a Bimbo vehicle with a

      Gross Vehicle Weight Rating of 10,000 pounds or less on his
      or her route"; and

   2. appproving Court-authorized notice to the putative
class.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Matthew D. Miller, Esq.
          Joshua S. Boyette, Esq.
          Justin L. Swidler, Esq.
          Richard S. Swartz, Esq.
          SWARTZ SWIDLER, LLC
          1101 Kings Highway North, Suite 402
          Cherry Hill, NJ 08034
          Telephone: (856) 685-7420
          Facsimile: (856) 685-7417

BIOTIME INC: Case Management Hearing in Lampe Suit  on Sept. 17
---------------------------------------------------------------
BioTime, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 8, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that a case management
conference in Lampe v. Asterias Biotherapeutics, Inc. et al., has
been set for September 17, 2019.

On March 8, 2019, the company acquired the remaining ownership
interests in Asterias Biotherapeutics, Inc. via merger.

On February 19, 2019, a putative shareholder class action lawsuit
was filed (captioned Lampe v. Asterias Biotherapeutics, Inc. et
al., Case No. RG19007391) in the Superior Court of the State of
California, County of Alameda challenging the Asterias Merger.

On March 1, 2019, Asterias made certain amendments and supplements
to its public disclosures regarding the Asterias Merger (the
"Supplemental Disclosures").

On May 3, 2019, an amended class action complaint (the "Amended
Complaint") was filed. The Amended Complaint names BioTime, Patrick
Merger Sub, Inc., the Asterias board of directors, one member of
BioTime's board of directors, and certain stockholders of both
BioTime and Asterias.

The action was brought by two purported stockholders of Asterias,
on behalf of a putative class of Asterias stockholders, and asserts
breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting claims under
Delaware law.

The Amended Complaint alleges, among other things, that the process
leading up to the Asterias Merger was conflicted and inadequate,
and that the proxy statement filed by Asterias with the Securities
and Exchange Commission omitted certain material information, which
allegedly rendered the information disclosed materially misleading.


The Amended Complaint seeks, among other things, that a class be
certified, the recovery of monetary damages, and attorneys' fees
and costs.

On June 3, 2019, defendants filed demurrers to the Amended
Complaint. Plaintiffs' counsel subsequently indicated that, after
reviewing the demurrers and analyzing certain documents produced by
defendants, Plaintiffs wished to voluntarily dismiss the action
with prejudice as to themselves, and without prejudice as to the
unnamed putative class members.

Plaintiffs' counsel also indicated that, independent of their
decision to voluntarily dismiss the action, Plaintiffs believe they
have a claim for attorneys' fees and expenses in connection with
the purported benefit conferred on Asterias stockholders by the
Supplemental Disclosures (the "Fee Claim").

On July 26, 2019, the parties entered into a stipulation to stay
the briefing schedule on the demurrers and to take the hearing on
the demurrers off calendar so that the parties could discuss the
Fee Claim (the "Stipulation").

On July 29, 2019, the Court entered the Stipulation as an order,
took the demurrer hearing off calendar, and set a case management
conference for September 17, 2019.

Thereafter, the parties began negotiating the Fee Claim and, on
August 5, 2019, agreed in principle to resolve the Fee Claim for
$200,000.

The parties intend to submit a stipulation to the Court seeking
dismissal of the action with prejudice as to the named Plaintiffs
and without prejudice as to the unnamed putative class members, and
seeking approval of the negotiated Fee Claim.

BioTime continues to believe that the claims and allegations in the
action lack merit, but believes that it is in BioTime's
shareholders' best interest for the action to be dismissed and to
resolve the Fee Claim in a timely manner without additional costly
litigation expenses.

BioTime, Inc., a clinical-stage biotechnology company, focuses on
developing and commercializing therapies for the treatment of
degenerative diseases in the United States and internationally.
BioTime, Inc. was founded in 1990 and is headquartered in Alameda,
California.


BOB MOORE: Court Stays Class Claims Pending Arbitration
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
Defendants' Motion to Stay and Compel Arbitration in the case
captioned (1) LESLIE BROWN, individually; (2) LESLIE BROWN, parent
and next friend of H.B., a minor child; and (3) LESLIE BROWN, on
behalf of all other putative plaintiffs, similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. (1) BOB MOORE AUTO GROUP, L.L.C., a domestic limited
liability company; (2) BMAG LUXURY 1, L.L.C., a domestic limited
liability company; (3) JOZEF DAREN DABROWSKI; (4) TONY G. GRISSOM,
individually and acting in his official capacity as an agent of Bob
Moore Auto Group, L.L.C. and BMAG Luxury 1, L.L.C.; (5) JOHN DOE
TOWING SERVICES; (6) JOHN DOE TOW TRUCK DRIVER # 1; and (7) JOHN
DOE TOW TRUCK DRIVER # 2, Defendants. Case No. CIV-19-409-R. (W.D.
Okla.).

This dispute began with a car sale. Plaintiff Leslie Brown alleges
that she purchased a 2010 Audi Q5 SUV for her minor daughter, H.B.,
from a Bob Moore auto dealership. Plaintiffs filed this suit
asserting claims for conversion, embezzlement, fraud, conspiracy to
commit fraud, theft, breach of the peace, false imprisonment,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Oklahoma Consumer
Protection Act.

The Defendants move to stay this action and compel all claims
asserted by Plaintiffs1 against them to bilateral arbitration.

Standard of Review

The parties agree, and the contract evinces, that this dispute is
governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The FAA applies to
all arbitration agreements involving commerce, and creates a body
of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any
arbitration agreement within coverage of the Act.  

Here, Plaintiffs challenge, among other things, the existence of an
agreement to arbitrate. Conversely, the Bob Moore Defendants argue
that an arbitration agreement exists and that it contains a broad
delegation clause.  

Plaintiffs argue, broadly, that (1) no arbitration agreement exists
(2) BMAG and BMAG Luxury 1 are not parties to the contract and,
therefore, cannot enforce it  (3) H.B. is not a party to the
contract and, therefore, cannot be compelled to arbitrate her
claims and (4) the arbitration agreement is unenforceable for a
host of reasons. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that
Plaintiffs' claims are subject to arbitration and that Leslie Brown
has waived her right to bring claims on behalf of a putative class.


The Arbitration Agreement's Existence and Signatories

The Court starts with Plaintiffs' challenge to the making and
existence of the arbitration agreement itself. When parties dispute
the making of an agreement to arbitrate, a jury trial on the
existence of the agreement is warranted unless there are no genuine
issues of material fact regarding the parties' agreement. Thus, the
party moving to compel arbitration bears the initial burden of
presenting evidence sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an
enforceable agreement and the opposing party's failure, neglect, or
refusal to arbitrate; if it does so, the burden shifts to the
nonmoving party to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
regarding the existence of an agreement or the failure to comply
therewith.

As noted above, questions about the making of arbitration
agreements turn on state law contract formation principles. Under
Oklahoma law, a contract is simply an agreement to do or not to do
something, requiring (1) parties capable of contracting (2) those
parties' consent; (3) a lawful object and (4) sufficient
consideration.  

In support of their motion to compel, Defendants have submitted the
Retail Purchase Agreement, which Leslie Brown signed on the day she
purchased the vehicle.  Attached to this is the Agreement to
Arbitrate, which also bears Ms. Brown's signature. A Bob Moore Auto
Group logo appears in the top left corner of these documents; under
Dealership Name on the Agreement to Arbitrate, BMAG Luxury 1, LLC
is listed.  

Defendant Dabrowski also signed both agreements as the Authorized
Dealership Representative. Thus, Defendants have produced
sufficient evidence that they and Ms. Brown entered into an
arbitration agreement.

In response, Plaintiffs argue that no arbitration agreement
existed. Specifically, they contend that, while BMAG Luxury's name
appears on the Agreement to Arbitrate, it does not appear on the
Retail Purchase Agreement. And, say Plaintiffs, because the
underlying Retail Purchase Agreement was between BMAG and Ms.
Brown, the Agreement to Arbitrate between BMAG Luxury and Ms. Brown
is invalid.   

This argument is unconvincing. Both agreements are signed by
Defendant Dabrowski, an agent of Bob Moore. Moreover, Ms. Brown
specifically alleges that she entered into a contract with the
Dealerships to purchase" the vehicle in question. Faced with the
Bob Moore Defendants' evidence of an arbitration agreement, Ms.
Brown, as a nonmovant, must raise a genuine issue of material fact
regarding the arbitration agreement's existence. Her assertions
about which Defendants are listed on which documents do not call
into question the existence or making of the arbitration agreement
overall.
Thus, the Court finds that Ms. Brown entered into an arbitration
agreement when she purchased the vehicle.

Plaintiffs also deploy these same arguments, and others, to
question whether BMAG and BMAG Luxury may enforce the arbitration
agreement, and whether claims Leslie Brown brings on behalf of H.B.
are subject to arbitration.   

While the existence of the arbitration agreement is
straightforward, the issue of non-signatories' rights and
liabilities is more involved. First, Ms. Brown argues that BMAG and
BMAG Luxury lack standing to compel arbitration because they are
not signatories to the arbitration agreement. As noted above, Ms.
Brown explicitly alleges that she contracted with the Dealerships,
BMAG and BMAG Luxury and that the Retail Purchase and Arbitration
Agreements were both signed by Defendant Dabrowski, an employee and
agent of the Dealerships.  

While the general rule is that a non-signatory to an arbitration
agreement cannot compel a signatory to that agreement, an exception
to this rule is where a signatory to the contract containing an
arbitration clause raises allegations of substantially
interdependent and concerted misconduct by both the nonsignatory
and one or more of the signatories to the contract.

Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the causes of action arise out
of a RETAIL PURCHASE AGREEMENT  dated September 27, 2018 and that
all of the Defendants have engaged in a pattern and practice and
used deceit, unlawful conduct, breach of the peace, fraud,
misrepresentation, and conversion against the Plaintiffs. As
Plaintiffs group Defendants' together in their allegations, BMAG
and BMAG Luxury, even treated as non-signatories, may compel
arbitration here.

Regarding H.B., Leslie Brown's minor daughter, however, the Court
agrees with Ms. Brown: H.B.'s claims are not subject to arbitration
because H.B. is not a party to the arbitration agreement. The Tenth
Circuit recently decided a case similar to this one, involving
children who were non-signatories to an arbitration agreement
signed by their parent-plaintiff. In Jacks v. CMH Homes, Inc., Ms.
Jacks brought claims individually and on behalf of her children
regarding a manufactured home she purchased from defendant CMH.
Jacks, 856 F.3d at 1303-04. CMH moved to compel arbitration; the
district court granted the motion as to Ms. Jacks, but denied it as
to her children because they were non-signatories to the agreement.
Id. Affirming the district court, the Tenth Circuit held that CMH
had failed to carry its burden of establishing that the
non-signatory children could be held to the arbitration agreement.


Like CMH, Defendants here fail to establish that claims brought on
behalf of H.B. by Ms. Brown are subject to arbitration. First,
Defendants argue that H.B.'s claims are subject to arbitration
because they arise out of the vehicle purchase agreement. But this
argument similar to the intertwined claims theory discussed above
does not govern situations, such as this one, where
signatory-defendants seek to compel arbitration with a
non-signatory-plaintiff.

Second, Defendants' reliance on a direct benefits estoppel theory
under which a non-signatory plaintiff seeking the benefits of a
contract is estopped from simultaneously attempting to avoid the
contract's burdens, such as the obligation to arbitrate disputes
and citation omitted, is unavailing.  

Remaining Arguments by the Parties

Having found an existing arbitration agreement that the Bob Moore
Defendants may enforce against claims brought by Ms. Brown in her
individual capacity, but not against claims brought by Ms. Brown on
behalf of H.B., the next step is to determine whether the Agreement
to Arbitrate contains a delegation provision. If it does, then the
Court will compel arbitration and stay proceedings unless
Plaintiffs specifically challenge the enforceability of the
delegation provision.  

The Agreement to Arbitrate contains the following language: By
entering into this Agreement to Arbitrate (Agreement), Customer(s)
and Dealership agree to settle by binding arbitration (4) any
dispute with respect to the existence, scope or validity of this
Agreement. The Court holds that this language, especially in
comparison with similar provisions held to constitute delegation
clauses, is clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed
to arbitrate arbitrability.  

Given that the parties have agreed to arbitrate arbitrability, the
Court will compel arbitration unless Plaintiffs specifically attack
the delegation clause.

Plaintiffs challenge the arbitration agreement on the following
grounds: (1) the agreement is oppressive, one-sided, and
discriminatory (2) the agreement is coercive (3) the agreement is
unenforceable (4) Plaintiffs' claims do not fall within the
agreement's scope and (5) Defendants have committed fraud against
the Plaintiffs. None of these arguments are specifically leveled
against the delegation clause. Indeed, Plaintiffs never even
mention delegation.

Thus, in light of the unchallenged delegation clause in the
parties' arbitration agreement, the Court must stay proceedings and
compel arbitration of Leslie Brown's individual claims.  

Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration is hereby GRANTED IN PART
and DENIED IN PART. Those claims against the Bob Moore Defendants
brought by Ms. Brown on behalf of herself are subject to
arbitration and are, therefore, stayed. Claims against Defendants
brought by Ms. Brown on behalf of a putative class are also stayed,
as the question of whether Ms. Brown waived her right to bring such
claims must be determined by the arbitrator. Finally, those claims
brought by Ms. Brown on behalf of her daughter, H.B., are not
subject to arbitration. Therefore, these claims, along with claims
against the remaining, non-moving Defendants, shall proceed in this
Court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's dated August 22, 2019
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yyr47tej from
Leagle.com.

Leslie Brown, Individually, Leslie Brown, Parent and Next Friend of
H.B., a minor Child & Leslie Brown, On behalf of all other putative
plaintiffs, similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Laurence
K. Donahoe, LKDLAW PC, 113 E. Noble Avenue, Guthrie, Oklahoma
73044

Bob Moore Auto Group LLC, a Domestic Limited Liability Company,
BMAG Luxury 1 LLC, a Domestic Limited Liability Company & Jozef
Daren Dabrowski, Defendants, represented by Jared R. Boyer , HB Law
Partners PLLC & Rodney K. Hunsinger, II, HB Law Partners PLLC, 4217
28th Ave. NW, Suite 101, Norman, OK 73069


BRINKER INTERNATIONAL: Has Incurred $4.2MM in Cyber Security Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Brinker International, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 22, 2019, for
the fiscal year ended June 30, 2019, that the company has incurred
costs of $4.2 million related to a 2018 cyber security incident.

On May 12, 2018, the company issued a public statement notifying
guests that the company had discovered that credit and debit card
numbers and related payment card information may have been acquired
from Chili's locations without authorization as a result of a
malware attack.

The Company engaged third-party forensic firms and cooperated with
law enforcement to investigate the matter.

Based on the investigation of the company's third-party forensic
experts, the company believes most Company-owned Chili's
restaurants were impacted by the malware during time frames that
vary by restaurant, but the company believes in each case began no
earlier than March 21, 2018 and ended no later than April 22,
2018.

As a result of the incident, the company has been assessed with
financial responsibility by certain payment card companies for card
issuer losses, card replacement costs and other charges issued by
payment card companies.

In addition, the company is the defendant in a purported class
action lawsuit, alleging that the company negligently failed to
provide adequate security to protect the payment card information
of the plaintiffs, causing those individuals to suffer financial
losses.

The company may also be subject to fines and penalties imposed by
state and federal regulators relating to or arising out of the
incident.

In the future the company may become subject to additional claims
for purportedly fraudulent transactions arising out of the actual
or alleged theft of credit or debit card information, and the
company may also become subject to additional lawsuits or
proceedings relating to the incident. While the company do not
acknowledge responsibility to pay any such amounts imposed or
demanded, these proceedings and demands may result in significant
related settlement costs.

Brinker said, "Since the incident, through June 26, 2019, we have
incurred costs of $4.2 million related to the cyber security
incident, and expect to incur significant legal and professional
services expenses associated with the incident in future periods.
Although we maintain cyber liability insurance, we are not able to
reliably forecast all of the losses that may occur as a result of
the incident or whether such costs will be covered by insurance. It
is possible that our losses will be in excess of our cyber
liability insurance coverage applicable to the incident. If losses
exceed our cyber liability insurance coverage such excess losses
could have a material adverse effect on our financial condition or
results of operations in future periods."

Brinker International, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, owns,
develops, operates, and franchises casual dining restaurants in the
United States and internationally. As of June 27, 2018, it owned,
operated, or franchised 1,686 restaurants comprising 997
company-owned restaurants and 689 franchised restaurants under the
Chili's Grill & Bar and Maggiano's Little Italy brand names. The
company was founded in 1975 and is based in Dallas, Texas.


BURFORD CAPITAL: Faces Merz Securities Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
STEPHEN MERZ, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. BURFORD CAPITAL LIMITED, SIR PETER MIDDLETON GCB,
CHRISTOPHER BOGART, JONATHAN MOLOT, AND CHARLES PARKINSON, Case No.
1:19-cv-04807 (E.D.N.Y., Aug. 21, 2019), seeks to recover
compensable damages caused by the Defendants' violations of the
federal securities laws under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The Plaintiff, a shareholder, alleges that the Defendants made
false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that:
(1) Burford has been manipulating its metrics, including return on
invested capital ("ROIC") and internal rate of return ("IRR"), to
create a misleading picture of investment returns to investors; (2)
these manipulations hid the fact that the Company is at high risk
for a liquidity crunch and is already arguably insolvent; and (3)
as a result of the misconduct, the Defendants' statements about
Burford's business, operations, and prospects were materially false
and misleading.  As a result of the Defendants' wrongful acts and
omissions, and the precipitous decline in the market value of the
Company's common shares, the Plaintiff and other Class members have
suffered significant losses and damages.

Burford is a litigation-financing company, offering services for
clients participating in litigation, arbitration, assert recovery,
and other legal finance activities.  Burford is based in the United
Kingdom, and has one of its primary business offices in New York
City.  The Individual Defendants are directors and officers of the
Company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Phillip Kim, Esq.
          Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
          275 Madison Ave., 34th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 686-1060
          Facsimile: (212) 202-3827
          E-mail: pkim@rosenlegal.com
                  lrosen@rosenlegal.com


CALVARY PORTFOLIO SERVICES: Neumann Suit Transferred to S.D.N.Y.
----------------------------------------------------------------
The case, David Neumann, individually and on behalf of all other
similarly situated consumers, v. Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC,
Case No. 33234/2019, was transferred from the Rockland County
Supreme Court to the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York on July 19, 2019. In this complaint, Plaintiff
alleges that the Defendant has violated the Fair Debt Collection
Act. This consumer credit-related lawsuit is now assigned to Hon.
Judge Nelson Stephen Roman. The United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York has opened Case No.
7:19-cv-06750-NSR for further proceedings.

Founded on 2002, Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC is engaged in the
acquisition and management of non-performing consumer loan
portfolios. Its principal place of business is at 500 Summit Lake
Drive, Suite 400 Valhalla, New York. [BN]

Attorneys for Defendant:

     Thomas Robert Dominczyk, Esq.
     MAURICE & NEEDLEMAN, P.C.
     5 Walter E. Foran Blvd. Suite 2007
     Flemington, NJ 08822
     Telephone: (908) 237-4550
     Facsimile: (908) 237-4551
     E-mail: tdominczyk@mauricewutscher.com

CANCER GENETICS: Bid to Dismiss NJ Consolidated Suit Still Pending
------------------------------------------------------------------
Cancer Genetics, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 19, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the motion to dismiss
filed in the class action suit entitled, In re Cancer Genetics,
Inc. Securities Litigation, is still pending.

On April 5, 2018 and April 12, 2018, purported stockholders of the
Company filed nearly identical putative class action lawsuits in
the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, against the
Company, Panna L. Sharma, John A. Roberts, and Igor Gitelman,
captioned Ben Phetteplace v. Cancer Genetics, Inc. et al., No.
2:18-cv-05612 and Ruo Fen Zhang v. Cancer Genetics, Inc. et al.,
No. 2:18-06353, respectively.

The complaints alleged violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5 based on
allegedly false and misleading statements and omissions regarding
the company's business, operational, and financial results.

The lawsuits sought, among other things, unspecified compensatory
damages in connection with purchases of the company's stocks
between March 23, 2017 and April 2, 2018, as well as interest,
attorneys' fees, and costs.

On August 28, 2018, the Court consolidated the two actions in one
action captioned In re Cancer Genetics, Inc. Securities Litigation
(the "Securities Litigation") and appointed shareholder Randy Clark
as the lead plaintiff.

On October 30, 2018, the lead plaintiff filed an amended complaint,
adding Edward Sitar as a defendant and seeking, among other things,
compensatory damages in connection with purchases of CGI stock
between March 10, 2016 and April 2, 2018.

On December 31, 2018, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
amended complaint for failure to state a claim. On March 1, 2019,
lead plaintiff filed its opposition to the motion to dismiss. On
April 15, 2019, defendants filed their reply in further support of
their motion to dismiss.

Defendants' motion remains pending before the Court.

Cancer Genetics said, "The Company is unable to predict the
ultimate outcome of the Securities Litigation and therefore cannot
estimate possible losses or ranges of losses, if any."

Cancer Genetics, Inc. develops, commercializes, and provides
molecular and biomarker-based tests and services in the United
States, Europe, and Asia. Cancer Genetics, Inc. was founded in 1999
and is based in Rutherford, New Jersey.


CARDINAL HEALTH: Continues to Defend Louisiana Sheriffs Fund Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Cardinal Health, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 20, 2019, for the
fiscal year ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend a class action suit initiated by Louisiana Sheriffs' Pension
& Relief Fund.

In August 2019, the Louisiana Sheriffs' Pension & Relief Fund filed
a purported class action complaint against Cardinal Health and
certain current and former officers and employees in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio purportedly
on behalf of all purchasers of the company's common shares between
March 2015 and May 2018.

The complaint alleges that the defendants violated Sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 by making
misrepresentations and omissions related to the integration of the
Cordis business and inventory and supply chain problems within the
Cordis business, and seeks to recover unspecified damages and
equitable relief for the alleged misstatements and omissions.

Cardinal said, "We believe that the claims asserted in this
complaint are without merit and intend to vigorously defend against
them. Due to the early stage of this proceeding, it is not possible
to reasonably estimate the amount of any possible loss or range of
loss in this matter."

Cardinal Health, Inc. operates as an integrated healthcare services
and products company in the United States and internationally. It
provides medical products and pharmaceuticals, and solutions that
enhance supply chain efficiency for hospitals, healthcare systems,
pharmacies, ambulatory surgery centers, clinical laboratories, and
physician offices. Cardinal Health, Inc. was founded in 1979 and is
headquartered in Dublin, Ohio.


CARDINAL HEALTH: Facing Bellwether Trial in Opioid Suit in October
------------------------------------------------------------------
Cardinal Health, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 20, 2019, for the
fiscal year ended June 30, 2019, that a court has ordered that a
bellwether trial involving two county plaintiffs begin in October
2019.

Pharmaceutical wholesale distributors, including the company, have
been named as defendants in approximately 2,500 lawsuits relating
to the distribution of prescription opioid pain medications.

These lawsuits have been filed in various federal, state, and other
courts by a variety of plaintiffs, primarily counties,
municipalities and political subdivisions.

Plaintiffs also include unions and other health and welfare funds,
hospital systems and other healthcare providers, as well as
individuals.

Of these lawsuits, 95 are purported class actions.

The lawsuits seek equitable relief and monetary damages based on a
variety of legal theories including various common law claims, such
as negligence, public nuisance and unjust enrichment as well as
violations of controlled substance laws, the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act and various other statutes.

These lawsuits also name pharmaceutical manufacturers, retail
pharmacy chains and other entities as defendants.

The vast majority of these lawsuits were filed in U.S. federal
court and have been transferred for consolidated pre-trial
proceedings in a Multi-District Litigation proceeding in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.

The court, among other things, has ordered that a bellwether trial
involving two county plaintiffs begin in October 2019. Motions for
summary judgment have been filed by plaintiffs and defendants.

In addition, 18 state attorneys general have filed lawsuits against
distributors, including the company, in various state courts.

Several of these lawsuits, including lawsuits filed by the New
York, Ohio and Washington Attorneys General, as well as other cases
pending in state court, are currently scheduled to go to trial in
the second half of fiscal year 2020 or early fiscal 2021.

In addition to the 18 state attorneys general that have filed suit,
43 state attorneys general have formed a multi-state task force to
investigate the manufacturing, distribution, dispensing and
prescribing practices of opioid medications.

Cardinal said, "We have received requests related to the
multi-state investigation, as well as separate civil investigative
demands, subpoenas or requests for information from these and other
state attorneys general offices. We are cooperating with the
offices conducting these investigations."

In connection with these proceedings, distributors continue to
discuss possible resolution with various parties, including state
attorneys general and representatives of the MDL plaintiffs.

Cardinal said, "We are vigorously defending ourselves in all of
these opioid-related matters. Given the uncertainty surrounding
these lawsuits and investigations, we are unable to predict their
outcome or estimate a range of reasonably possible losses, but the
defense and resolution of these lawsuits could have a material
adverse effect on our results of operations, financial condition,
cash flows and liquidity or have adverse reputational or
operational effects on our business."

Cardinal Health, Inc. operates as an integrated healthcare services
and products company in the United States and internationally. It
provides medical products and pharmaceuticals, and solutions that
enhance supply chain efficiency for hospitals, healthcare systems,
pharmacies, ambulatory surgery centers, clinical laboratories, and
physician offices. Cardinal Health, Inc. was founded in 1979 and is
headquartered in Dublin, Ohio.


CARRIZO (MARCELLUS): Court Denies Common Benefit Fund in Slamon
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum Opinion denying Plaintiffs' Motion
seeking an Order Establishing Common Benefit Fund in the case
captioned JAMES SLAMON, Plaintiff, v. CARRIZO (MARCELLUS) LLC, et
al., Defendants. No. 3:16-CV-02187. (M.D. Pa.).

Presently before the Court is the Motion of Plaintiff James Slamon
and Plaintiff's counsel LeVan Law Group and Berger Montague PC
seeking an Order from this Court establishing a Common Benefit
Fund.

Plaintiff James Slamon claims that he and other similarly situated
individuals were paid royalties on their oil and gas leases that
were improperly calculated by Defendants, Reliance Marcellus II
LLC, Reliance Holdings USA, Inc.

On October 3, 2016, Slamon filed a five-count Complaint in the
Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County, Pennsylvania seeking
declaratory relief for breach of the terms of the Lease (Count I)
and alleging breach of contract (Count II) breach of contract
through a breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing
(Count III) and breach of fiduciary duty (Count IV) and requesting
an accounting (Count V).

Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel summarize their theory in support
of their Motion for the Establishment of a Common Fund as follows:

In essence, the putative Class Member is releasing the exact claims
at issue in this case that have been vigorously pursued by
Plaintiff and Class Counsel for nearly two years. The consideration
for giving up these claims against BKV, Carrizo, and Reliance is,
according to the terms of the Release, TEN DOLLARS ($10.00), but,
in reality, is the signing bonus monies, which range from $100 to
more than $260,000. There can be little doubt that the signing
bonus is exactly what it appears to be a settlement offer to settle
the claims in the instant case.

BKV then sets forth its reasons why the motion of Plaintiff and
Plaintiff's counsel should be denied. First, BKV argues that if it
completes its settlement with potential class members before class
certification, then the Court is without jurisdiction to order the
recipients to contribute a portion of their payments to compensate
Class Counsel. In other words, because there has been no class
certification and the potential class members do not have
individual lawsuits pending before the Court, the Court does not
have authority to order that the potential class members contribute
a portion of their settlements for payment of Class Counsel's
fees.

Second, BKV argues that because there has been no certification of
a class, no proper notice of the action and no opportunity to opt
out, there is no basis upon which to conclude that any absentee
plaintiff has consented to being subject to the Court's
jurisdiction. Further, BKV asserts that to the extent that the
curative communication from BKV to the lessors was proper notice of
this action, the settling lessors are expressly choosing not to be
a party to this litigation, which they have a right to do.

A review of the governing case law and the current posture of this
action demonstrate that Plaintiff's Motion for an Order
Establishing a Common Benefit Fund must be denied.

First, there has been no class certification under Fed.R. Civ. P.
23 in this case. Plaintiff filed his Motion for an Order
Establishing a Common Benefit Fund on August 30, 2018, and 11
months later, moved for the first time for class certification.
That motion is not yet ripe as Defendants' responses are due on
September 3, 2019, and Plaintiff's reply thereafter on October 21,
2019.

Second, Plaintiff has not achieved the status of a successful
litigant, either by judgment or settlement of his claim.

Third, there is no clear nexus between Plaintiff's filing of his
Complaint and this Court's denial of Defendants' motions to dismiss
Plaintiff's Complaint (with the exception of Count IV for breach of
fiduciary duty and the settlement offers which BKV made in
accordance with this Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order  filed
July 27, 2018, which granted as modified Plaintiff's Motion for
Expedited Emergency Relief Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(d), ordered the BKV Defendants to provide Plaintiff's
counsel with the identity of all putative Class Members and which
further ordered that BKV send a curative notice, the text of which
is set forth in Doc. 58-1, to all putative Class Members to whom
BKV had sent the communication which Plaintiff's Motion deemed to
be false or misleading and which extended the deadline to such
putative Class Members for responding to BKV's settlement offers
until August 31, 2018.

The Court's Order of July 27, 2018, also declared not enforceable
any previously executed cover letter, Full and Final Release,
and/or Lease Amendment and Ratification that any putative Class
Member had executed and returned to BKV unless and until the Class
Member re-signs and returns the Materials after receipt of the
proposed curative notice.

Plaintiff has not submitted sufficient evidence that any settlement
offers accepted by members of the putative class were so accepted
as a result of Plaintiff's lawsuit. BKV asserts that it commenced
negotiation for amendments to the oil and gas leases to which the
putative Class Members, as lessors, were party with it or its
predecessors, Defendants Carrizo and Reliance, before Plaintiff's
suit was filed. Moreover, as this Court has previously ruled,
Defendants may negotiate settlement with potential members of a
class prior to class certification.  

Despite the extensive explanation offered to members of the
putative class and, perhaps more importantly, notwithstanding this
Court's Order rendering unenforceable any prior execution of a
cover letter, release, or lease amendment so as to allow putative
Class Members an opportunity to decide against settling their
claims against BKV and the other Defendants in light of the intent
of Plaintiff to seek class certification, various lessors
nonetheless again entered into releases and lease amendments with
BKV in exchange for valuable consideration.

From this sequence of events, the Court cannot draw the inferences
which Plaintiff argues should be drawn: (1) that the filing of
Plaintiff's lawsuit and its actions thereafter in opposing motions
to dismiss and engaging in discovery present a clear nexus between
those actions and the individual settlements undertaken by various
lessors (2) so as to allow the conclusion that this lawsuit has
conferred a substantial benefit upon the settling lessors which (3)
requires the establishment of a common benefit fund.

A full-text copy of the District Court's dated August 22, 2019
Memorandum Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3klcj6k
from Leagle.com.

Janie Slamon, as Executrix of the Estate of James Slamon,
Plaintiff, represented by Gerard M. Karam, Mazzoni and Karam, 321
Spruce Street, Suite 201, Scranton, PA, 18503, Peter H. LeVan, Jr.
-- plevan@levanlawgroup.com -- LeVan Law Group LLC, Shanon J.
Carson -- scarson@bm.net -- Berger Montague PC & Glen L. Abramson
-- gabramson@bm.net -- Berger & Montague, P.C.

Carrizo (Marcellus) LLC, Defendant, represented by Amy L. Groff --
amy.groff@klgates.com -- K&L Gates LLP & David R. Fine --
david.fine@klgates.com -- K&L Gates LLP.

Reliance Marcellus II, LLC, Defendant, represented by Justin H.
Werner -- jwerner@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP, Stefanie Lepore
Burt -- sburt@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP & Alex G. Mahfood --
amahfood@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP.

Reliance Holdings USA, Inc., Defendant, represented by Justin H.
Werner, Reed Smith LLP & Stefanie Lepore Burt, Reed Smith LLP.


CASA SYSTEMS: Hook Sues over 2017 IPO
-------------------------------------
DONALD HOOK, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, v. CASA SYSTEMS, INC., WEIDONG CHIEN, LUCY
XIE, JOE TIBBETTS, BILL STYSLINGER, BRUCE R. EVANS, GARY HALL,
JERRY GUO, MORGAN STANLEY & CO. LLC, MACQUARIE CAPITAL (USA) INC.,
LLC, RAYMOND JAMES & ASSOCIATES, INC., NORTHLAND SECURITIES, INC.,
AND SUMMIT PARTNERS, the Defendants, Case No. 654548/2019 (N.Y.
Sup., Aug. 9, 2019), asserts non-fraud, strict liability claims
under Sections 11, 12, 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 against
Casa, certain of Casa's officers and directors, and the
underwriters of an initial public stock (IPO).

The Plaintiff brings the securities class action on behalf of all
persons who purchased or otherwise acquired Casa common stock
pursuant or traceable to the Registration Statement and Prospectus
issued in connection with Casa's December 15, 2017 IPO.

The Defendants used a negligently-prepared false and misleading
Registration Statement to lure investors into buying Casa's common
stock pursuant to its IPO by omitting material information
regarding its core business.

Casa is a hardware and software technology company that principally
sells its products to cable service providers in order for them to
deliver voice, video and data services.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Proposed Class are:

          Stanley D. Bernstein, Esq.
          Michael S. Bigin, Esq.
          BERNSTEIN LIEBHARD LLP
          10 East 40th Street
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 779 1414
          Facsimile: (212) 779 3218
          E-mail: bernstein@bernlieb.com
                 bigin@bernlieb.com

               - and -

          Guillaume Buell, Esq.
          THORNTON LAW FIRM LLP
          1 Lincoln Street
          Boston, MA 02111
          Telephone: (617) 720 1333
          Facsimile: (617) 720 2445
          E-mail: gbuell@tenlaw.com

CBE GROUP: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MARYANN OLSZEWSKI,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff, v. THE CBE GROUP, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-01253-JPS (E.D Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an
order certifying a class, appointing the Plaintiff as class
representative, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class
Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiffs file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class. Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir.
2017).[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com



CBS CORP: Bid to Dismiss New York Consolidated Class Suit Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CBS Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 8, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the defendants' motions
to dismiss the consolidated "Samit and Lantz" class suit remain
pending.

On August 27, 2018 and on October 1, 2018, each of Gene Samit and
John Lantz, respectively, filed putative class action suits in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, for claims
that are similar to those alleged in the amended complaint
described below.

On November 6, 2018, the Court entered an order consolidating the
two actions. On November 30, 2018, the Court appointed Construction
Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California as the lead
plaintiff of the consolidated action.

On February 11, 2019, the lead plaintiff filed a consolidated
amended putative class action complaint against the Company,
certain current and former senior executives and members of the
Board.

The consolidated action is stated to be on behalf of purchasers of
the Company's Class A Common Stock and Class B Common Stock between
September 26, 2016 and December 4, 2018. This action seeks to
recover damages arising during this time period allegedly caused by
the defendants' purported violations of the federal securities
laws, including by allegedly making materially false and misleading
statements or failing to disclose material information, and seeks
costs and expenses as well as remedies under Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder.

On April 12, 2019, the defendants filed motions to dismiss this
action, which are pending.

The Company believes that the claims are without merit and is
currently unable to determine a range of potential liability, if
any.

CBS said, "Accordingly, no accrual for this matter has been made in
the Company's consolidated financial statements."

CBS Corporation operates as a mass media company worldwide. The
company operates in four segments: Entertainment, Cable Networks,
Publishing, and Local Media. The company was founded in 1986 and
is headquartered in New York, New York.


CEMTREX INC: Court Approves Securities Class Action Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
Cemtrex, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 19, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company has reached
a settlement in the securities class action litigation before the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York.

Three securities class action complaints were filed against the
company and certain of its executive officers in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of New York on February 24, 2017.

Under the requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, these three alleged class actions, as well as any
further related actions, were consolidated into a single lawsuit on
March 9, 2018.

A follow-on, related derivative complaint also was filed against
the company and its executive officers and directors in New York
State court on April 10, 2017. That derivative action has been
stayed by agreement of the parties until after the motion to
dismiss process in the consolidated alleged class actions has run
its course.

Pursuant to a stipulated District Court schedule, plaintiffs filed
an Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint on May 7, 2018.

The company filed a motion to dismiss this class action with the
Court on July 6, 2018.

On October 4, 2018, the Company reached a settlement on the
securities class action litigation through a mediator for an amount
of $625,000 and also reached a settlement on Derivative action for
an amount of $100,000.

This settlement is subject to a final court approval which will
take several months. The settlement amounts shall be paid by the
Company's insurance carrier.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Cemtrex, Inc. (CETX) is a diversified  technology company that's
driving innovation in a wide range of sectors, including smart
technology, virtual and augmented realities, advanced electronic
systems, industrial solutions, and intelligent security systems.
The company is based in Brooklyn, New York.


CHAMPION PETFOODS: Reitman et al Seek to Certify Class
------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as JENNIFER REITMAN, CAROL
SHOAFF and ERIN GRANT, individually and on behalf of a class of
similarly situated individuals, the PLAINTIFFS, vs. CHAMPION
PETFOODS USA, INC. and CHAMPION PETFOODS LP, the DEFENDANTS, Case
No. 2:18-cv-01736-DOC-JPR (C.D. Cal.), the Plaintiffs move the
Court to enter an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all persons residing in of the State of California who
      purchased the Dog Food 1 from July 1, 2014 to the present";

   2. certifying a Pentobarbital Subclass of:

      "all persons residing in the State of California who
      purchased JBS Dog Foods between January 2016 and December
      2018".

   3. appointing themselves as Class Representatives; and

   4. appointing Lockridge Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P.; Gustafson
      Gluek, PLLC; Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca LLP; Robbins Arroyo LLP;

      and Lite DePalma Greenberg, LLC as Class Counsel.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Rebecca A. Peterson, Esq.
          Robert K. Shelquist, Esq.
          LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL NAUEN P.L.L.P.
          100 Washington Avenue South, Suite 2200
          Minneapolis, MN 55401
          Telephone: (612) 339-6900
          Facsimile: (612) 339-0981
          E-mail: rapeterson@locklaw.com
          rkshelquist@locklaw.com

               - and -

          Kevin A. Seely, esq.
          Steven M. McKany, esq.
          ROBBINS ARROYO LLP
          600 B Street, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 525-3990
          Facsimile: (619) 525-3991
          E-mail: kseely@robbinsarroyo.com
                  smckany@robbinsarroyo.com

               - and-

          Daniel E. Gustafson, Esq.
          Karla M. Gluek, Esq.
          Joseph C. Bourne, Esq.
          Raina C. Borrelli, Esq.
          GUSTAFSON GLUEK, PLLC
          Canadian Pacific Plaza
          120 South 6th Street, Suite 2600
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 333-8844
          Facsimile: (612) 339-6622
          E-mail: dgustafson@gustafsongluek.com
                  kgluek@gustafsongluek.com
                  jbourne@gustafsongluek.com
                  rborrelli@gustafsongluek.com

               - and -

          Charles Laduca, Esq.
          Katherine Van Dyck, Esq.
          CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP
          4725 Wisconsin Ave NW, Suite 200
          Washington, DC 20016
          Telephone: 202-789-3960
          Facsimile: 202-789-1813
          E-mail: kvandyck@cuneolaw.com
                  charles@cuneolaw.com

               - and -

          Joseph Depalma, Esq.
          Susana Cruz Hodge, Esq.
          LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG, LLC
          570 Broad Street, Suite 1201
          Newark, NJ 07102
          Telephone: (973) 623-3000
          E-mail: jdepalma@litedepalma.com
                  scruzhodge@litedepalma.com

CHI NEBRASKA: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Blackbourn Suit Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
APRIL BLACKBOURN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CHI NEBRASKA d/b/a CHI HEALTH,
Defendant, Case No. 8:19-cv-00352 (D. Neb., Aug. 17, 2019) seeks to
stop the Defendants' practice of making unsolicited calls.

Chi Nebraska D/B/A Chi Health provides nursing and health-related
care to patients. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark L. Javitch, Esq.
          JAVITCH LAW OFFICE
          480 S. Ellsworth Ave
          San Mateo, CA 94401
          Telephone: (650) 781-8000
          Facsimile: (650) 648-0705


CHICO'S FAS: Mediation in Fisher Class Suit Next Month
------------------------------------------------------
Chico's FAS, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 28, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended August 3, 2019, that mediation in Fisher v.
Chico's FAS, Inc., is set for October 22, 2019.

In May 2019, the Company was named as a defendant in Fisher v.
Chico's FAS, Inc., a putative class action filed in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California.

The complaint alleges that the Company advertised fictitious prices
and corresponding phantom discounts on its made-for-outlet products
in its Chico's outlets in violation of California's Unfair
Competition Laws, California's False Advertising Laws and the
California Consumer Legal Remedies Act.

The plaintiff seeks disgorgement of the Company's profits and
alleged unjust enrichment resulting from such advertising
practices, injunctive relief, a corrective advertising campaign, as
well as attorneys' fees and costs. The Company was served on May
10, 2019. The parties have scheduled a mediation date of October
22, 2019. Additionally, the parties have jointly asked the court to
extend Companys response deadline to November 22, 2019.

Chico's FAS, Inc. operates as an omnichannel specialty retailer of
women's private branded casual-to-dressy clothing, intimates, and
complementary accessories. It operates under the Chico's, White
House Black Market (WHBM), and Soma brand names. The company also
sells its products through catalogs and its Websites. Chico's FAS,
Inc. was founded in 1983 and is headquartered in Fort Myers,
Florida.
  

CHICO'S FAS: Petition for Rehearing in Altman Suit Pending
----------------------------------------------------------
Chico's FAS, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 28, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended August 3, 2019, that the petition for
rehearing in the class action suit entitled, Altman v. White House
Black Market, Inc., remains pending.

In July 2015, White House Black Market, Inc. ("WHBM") was named as
a defendant in Altman v. White House Black Market, Inc., a putative
class action filed in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia ("District Court").

The complaint alleges that WHBM, in violation of federal law,
willfully published more than the last five digits of a credit or
debit card number on customers' point-of-sale receipts. The
plaintiff seeks an award of statutory damages of $100 to $1,000 for
each alleged willful violation of the law, as well as attorneys'
fees, costs and punitive damages. WHBM denies the material
allegations of the complaint and believes the case is without
merit. On February 12, 2018, the District Court issued an order
certifying the class.

On April 9, 2018, the District Court, sua sponte, issued an order
granting WHBM's earlier 2016 request to appeal, to the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals ("Eleventh Circuit"), the District Court's
ruling that the plaintiff has standing to maintain the lawsuit. On
April 19, 2018, WHBM filed a petition for review in the Eleventh
Circuit. In the meantime, the District Court stayed all further
proceedings in the case pending the outcome of the appeal in the
Eleventh Circuit.

On July 12, 2018, the plaintiff and WHBM notified the Eleventh
Circuit that the plaintiff and WHBM had reached a class settlement
on all claims and therefore voluntarily dismissed WHBM's appeal to
the Eleventh Circuit. On August 2, 2018, the District Court
reopened the case for purposes of reviewing/approving the proposed
settlement.

On October 22, 2018, the plaintiff filed the settlement papers with
the District Court, along with a motion to stay the District
Court's consideration of the settlement pending the Eleventh
Circuit's final disposition of Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier,
Inc., in which the Eleventh Circuit held, in an opinion issued
October 3, 2018, that the display of the first five and last four
digits of a credit or debit card number on a customer's receipt
given at the point of sale establishes a "concrete injury"
sufficient to confer Article III standing, enabling the customer to
maintain a lawsuit.

The motion to stay was granted on November 15, 2018. A petition for
rehearing on the October 2018 opinion was filed in the Muransky
case on October 24, 2018. The Eleventh Circuit issued a new opinion
on April 22, 2019, sua sponte, superseding the October 2018
opinion, and reaffirming the establishment of Article III standing
in the Muransky case.  

A petition for rehearing on that April 2019 opinion was filed on
May 13, 2019 and is currently pending before the Eleventh Circuit.
The Muransky opinion, if not altered on the petition for rehearing,
would bind the District Court in the Altman case and likely
establish that the plaintiff has standing to maintain her lawsuit
against WHBM. In such event, the stay will be lifted and the
proposed settlement will be reviewed by the District Court.

Chico's FAS said, "If the Eleventh Circuit does not find standing
in the Muransky case, the parties have agreed to submit the
proposed settlement to the Superior Court for Cobb County, Georgia
for approval. The proposed settlement would not have a material
adverse effect on the Company's consolidated financial condition or
results of operations."

Chico's FAS said, "However, no assurance can be given that the
proposed settlement will be approved. If the proposed settlement is
rejected and the case were to proceed as a class action and WHBM
were to be unsuccessful in its defense on the merits, then the
ultimate resolution of the case could have a material adverse
effect on the Company's consolidated financial condition or results
of operations."

Chico's FAS, Inc. operates as an omnichannel specialty retailer of
women's private branded casual-to-dressy clothing, intimates, and
complementary accessories. It operates under the Chico's, White
House Black Market (WHBM), and Soma brand names. The company also
sells its products through catalogs and its Websites. Chico's FAS,
Inc. was founded in 1983 and is headquartered in Fort Myers,
Florida.


CHILDREN'S PLACE: Court Lifts Stay in Rael Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
The Children's Place, Inc.  said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 27, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended August 3, 2019, that the stay in Rael v. The
Children's Place, Inc., has been lifted.

The Company is a defendant in Rael v. The Children's Place, Inc., a
purported class action, pending in the U.S. District Court,
Southern District of California.  

In the initial complaint filed in February 2016, the plaintiff
alleged that the Company falsely advertised discount prices in
violation of California's Unfair Competition Law, False Advertising
Law, and Consumer Legal Remedies Act.  

The plaintiff filed an amended complaint in April 2016, adding
allegations of violations of other state consumer protection laws.
In August 2016, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint,
adding an additional plaintiff and removing the other state law
claims.

The plaintiffs' second amended complaint seeks to represent a class
of California purchasers and seeks, among other items, injunctive
relief, damages, and attorneys' fees and costs.

The Company engaged in mediation proceedings with the plaintiffs in
December 2016 and April 2017. The parties reached an agreement in
principle in April 2017, and signed a definitive settlement
agreement in November 2017, to settle the matter on a class basis
with all individuals in the U.S. who made a qualifying purchase at
The Children's Place from February 11, 2012 through the date of
preliminary approval by the court of the settlement.

The settlement is subject to court approval and provides for
merchandise vouchers for class members who submit valid claims, as
well as payment of legal fees and expenses and claims
administration expenses. The court stayed the matter in April 2018,
pending an appellate court ruling in another lawsuit to which the
Company is not a party.  

In June 2019, the court entered an order lifting the stay. The
settlement, if ultimately approved by the court, will result in the
dismissal of all claims through the date of the court’s
preliminary approval of the settlement.

However, if the settlement is rejected by the court, the parties
will likely return to litigation, and in such event, no assurance
can be given as to the ultimate outcome of this matter.

In connection with the proposed settlement, the Company recorded a
reserve for $5.0 million in its consolidated financial statements
in the first quarter of 2017.

The Children's Place, Inc. operates as a children's specialty
apparel retailer. The company operates through two segments, The
Children's Place U.S. and The Children's Place International. The
company was formerly known as The Children's Place Retail Stores,
Inc. and changed its name to The Children's Place, Inc. in June
2014. The Children's Place, Inc. was founded in 1969 and is
headquartered in Secaucus, New Jersey.


CORNERSTONE BUILDING: Still Defends Voigt Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------
Cornerstone Building Brands, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7,
2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the
company continues to defend a class action suit initiated by Gary
D. Voigt.

On August 14, 2009, the Company entered into an Investment
Agreement (as amended, the "Investment Agreement"), by and between
the Company and Clayton, Dubilier & Rice Fund VIII, L.P., a Cayman
Islands exempted limited partnership ("CD&R Fund VIII"). In
connection with the Investment Agreement and the Stockholders
Agreement dated October 20, 2009 (the "Old Stockholders
Agreement"), CD&R Fund VIII and CD&R Friends & Family Fund VIII,
L.P., a Cayman Islands exempted limited partnership ("CD&R FF Fund"
and, together with CD&R Fund VIII, the "CD&R Fund VIII Investor
Group") purchased convertible preferred stock of the Company, which
was converted into shares of our common stock on May 14, 2013.

On December 11, 2017, the CD&R Fund VIII Investor Group completed a
registered underwritten offering of 7,150,000 shares of the
Company's Common Stock at a price to the public of $19.36 per share
(the "2017 Secondary Offering"). Pursuant to the underwriting
agreement, at the CD&R Fund VIII Investor Group request, the
Company purchased 1.15 million of the 7.15 million shares of the
Company’s Common Stock from the underwriters in the 2017
Secondary Offering at a price per share equal to the price at which
the underwriters purchased the shares from the CD&R Fund VIII
Investor Group. The total amount the Company spent on these
repurchases was $22.3 million.

Ply Gem Holdings was acquired by CD&R Fund X and Atrium
Intermediate Holdings, LLC, GGC BP Holdings, LLC and AIC Finance
Partnership, L.P. (collectively, the "Golden Gate Investor Group")
and merged with Atrium on April 12, 2018 (the "Ply Gem-Atrium
Merger").

Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, on November 16,
2018, the Company entered into (i) a stockholders agreement (the
"New Stockholders Agreement") between the Company, and each of the
CD&R Fund VIII Investor Group, CD&R Pisces Holdings, L.P., a Cayman
Islands exempted limited partnership ("CD&R Pisces", and together
with the CD&R Fund VIII Investor Group, the "CD&R Investor Group")
and the Golden Gate Investor Group (together with the CD&R Investor
Group, the "Investors"), pursuant to which the Company granted to
the Investors certain governance, preemptive and subscription
rights and (ii) a registration rights agreement (the "New
Registration Rights Agreement") between the Company and each of the
Investors, pursuant to which the Company granted the Investors
customary demand and piggyback registration rights, including
rights to demand registrations and underwritten shelf registration
statement offerings with respect to the shares of the Company's
Common Stock that are held by the Investors following the
consummation of the Merger.

Pursuant to the terms of the New Stockholders Agreement, the
Company and the CD&R Fund VIII Investor Group terminated the Old
Stockholders Agreement. Pursuant to the terms of the New
Registration Rights Agreement, the Company and the CD&R Fund VIII
Investor Group terminated the Registration Rights Agreement, dated
as of October 20, 2009 (the "Old Registration Rights Agreement"),
by and among the Company and the CD&R Fund VIII Investor Group.

On November 14, 2018, an individual stockholder, Gary D. Voigt,
filed a putative class action complaint in the Delaware Court of
Chancery against Clayton, Dubilier & Rice, LLC (CD&R), Clayton,
Dubilier & Rice Fund VIII, L.P. (CD&R Fund VIII), and certain
directors of the Company.

Voigt purports to assert claims on behalf of himself, on behalf of
a class of other similarly situated stockholders of the Company,
and derivatively on behalf of the Company, the nominal defendant.

An amended complaint was filed on April 11, 2019. The amended
complaint asserts claims for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust
enrichment against Clayton, Dubilier & Rice Fund VIII, L.P., (CD&R
Fund VIII) and Clayton, Dubilier & Rice, LLC (CD&R), and for breach
of fiduciary duty against the director defendants in connection
with the Merger.

Voigt seeks damages in an amount to be determined at trial. The
Company intends to vigorously defend the litigation.

Cornerstone Building Brands, Inc., formerly NCI Building Systems,
Inc., incorporated on December 23, 1991, is a manufacturer and
marketer of metal products in North America. The Company's
operating segments include Engineered building systems, Metal
components, Insulated Metal Panels and Metal coil coating. The
company is based in Cary, North Carolina.


COSTCO WHOLESALE: Demurrer to Complaint in Littlejohn Affirmed
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, First District, Division Three,
issued an Opinion affirming the Trial Court's Order granting
Defendant's Demurrer to Complaint in the case captioned  LARRY
LITTLEJOHN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COSTCO WHOLESALE
CORPORATION, Defendant and Respondent. No. A144440. (Cal. App.).

Plaintiff and appellant Larry Littlejohn is seeking to recover
amounts he paid in sales tax reimbursement to Costco Wholesale
Membership, Inc. (Costco) on his purchases of Ensure dietary
supplement. When the Court first considered this lawsuit, the Court
held that Littlejohn was unable to state a claim because he could
show neither that the state of California was unjustly enriched by
any overpayment of tax on sales of Ensure, nor that the Board of
Equalization (Board) ever concluded that refunds were owed on such
purchases.

Because there has been no legal determination that consumers are
entitled to a refund for sales tax reimbursement paid on purchases
of Ensure, we again hold that Littlejohn cannot state a cause of
action. The trial court's order sustaining the demurrer to
Littlejohn's complaint without leave to amend is affirmed.

Littlejohn's complaint alleged three causes of action against
Costco premised on the charged sales tax reimbursement. Two of them
challenged the charges as unlawful business practices proscribed by
Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq. The trial
court held that these causes of action were governed by Loeffler v.
Target Corp.(2014) 58 Cal.4th 1081 (Loeffler), and sustained
Costco's demurrer.

The Court agreed. Loefflermade clear that it is for the Board in
the first instance to interpret and administer an intensely
detailed and fact specific sales tax system governing an enormous
universe of transactions. Administrative procedures must be
exhausted before the taxpayer may resort to court. Accordingly, the
Court rejected Littlejohn's unlawful business practices causes of
action because they would have required the court, not the Board,
to determine the taxability of Ensure.

The record contains four documents that Littlejohn claims
demonstrate such a legal determination. They are a legal ruling of
the Board's tax counsel that appears in the annotations, a letter
from tax counsel to an individual consumer, a letter from the Board
to Littlejohn, and a 2013 Tax Information Bulletin published by the
Board. All of them contain a statement that sales of Ensure
beginning in 2006 are not taxable. Indeed, it appears the Board has
not taken action to collect tax on the sales of Ensure products
since 2006. That much seems clear and cannot be reasonably
disputed.

The other documents on which Littlejohn relies provide no better
support for his claimed right to sue.  For similar reasons that the
Court decline to give legal effect to the opinion of counsel, the
Court decline to give effect to the March 2013 letter by a Board
auditor. The March 13 letter is written in response to an e-mail
inquiry by a consumer. It is not advice to a taxpayer, nor does it
address particular sales transactions over a specific time. It
merely directs the inquiring consumer to address a possible claim
of refund with the appropriate retailer.  

As the Court said in Littlejohn I, even though the Board considers
sales of Ensure non-taxable, none of the documents Littlejohn
relies upon were issued in response to an inquiry about refunds or
address whether tax paid by retailers on sales of Ensure products
would be refunded.

The judgment is affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Cal. App.'s dated August 22, 2019 Opinion
is available at  https://tinyurl.com/yyeuzwx6 from Leagle.com.


CREDIT SUISSE: Court Narrows Claims in E. Halbert Securities Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama, Southern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion granting in
part and denying in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the case
captioned ERICH HALBERT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CREDIT SUISSE AG,
et al., Defendants. Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-00615-AKK. (N.D.
Ala.).

Erich, Sherri, and John Halbert bring this action against Credit
Suisse, AG and Janus Index & Calculation Services, LLC for alleged
violations of federal and state securities laws and common law
causes of action stemming from a market-wide volatility spike. The
Halberts claim Credit Suisse sold them high-risk securities in the
days leading up to this volatility spike, but failed to disclose
that the Defendants intended to facilitate the collapse of these
securities by hedging against them, and then profit off their
collapse by redeeming the securities at a fraction of their earlier
value.

The Defendants have moved to dismiss the federal securities claims
for failure to sufficiently allege misrepresentation, scienter, and
loss causation.  

They also contend that the state securities law and common law
claims fail as a matter of law. The opinion is divided as follows.
In Section A, the court, first, finds that the Halberts have
adequately alleged standing for their Section 10(b) claims premised
on the allegedly false Intraday Indicative Values on February 5,
2018.

Second, the court finds that, the Halberts adequately alleged
material misstatements or omissions under Section 10(b) premised on
the allegedly false Intraday Indicative Values, but not with
respect to the alleged omissions in the Offering Documents and,
therefore, their Section 11 claims also fail.

Third, the court finds that the Halberts have not alleged scienter
for their Section 10(b) claims. Because the Halberts' claims fail
on the issues of misrepresentation and scienter, the court does not
reach the issue of loss causation.

Next, in Section B, the court finds that the Halberts have pled
violations of Alabama Code Sections 8-6-19(a)(2) and (c), based on
the allegedly false Intraday Indicative Values. Finally, in Section
C the court finds that the Halberts have pled breach of contract
against Credit Suisse and negligent misrepresentation against
Janus, and that the rest of their common law claims fail.

The Federal Securities Law Claims

The Halberts assert securities claims under Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act, and SEC Rule 10b-5, as well as under Section 11 of
the Securities Act.

Standing under Section 10(b)

As an initial matter, the Defendants contend that the Halberts lack
standing to assert their Section 10(b) claim with respect to the
alleged misrepresentations of the Intraday Indicative Value on
February 5, 2018 because they failed to allege that they purchased
or sold the XIV ETNs during the one-hour window when Defendants
purportedly misrepresented the value. Doc.  

However, although the Halberts do not specifically allege that they
bought and sold XIV ETNs within the one-hour period when the
Intraday Indicative Value allegedly failed to update, they do
allege that they bought and sold XIV ETNs on February 5 and 6,
2018.  

The Defendants further contend that the Halberts have merely
alleged impermissible holding claims that the allegedly false
Intraday Indicative Values on February 5, 2018 induced them to
hold, rather than to buy or sell, their XIV ETNs. In ruling on a
motion to dismiss, however, the court's review is limited to the
allegations in the complaint, incorporated exhibits, central and
undisputed extrinsic documents, and judicially-noticed documents
and facts. The court cannot, and does not, consider unpleaded
allegations in the parties' briefs.  

Accordingly, at this stage of the proceedings, the Halberts have
adequately alleged standing for their Section 10(b) claim premised
on the allegedly false Intraday Indicative Values on February 5,
2018.

Material Misrepresentations under Section 10(b) and Section 11

To state a claim under Section 11 of the Securities Act, or a
misrepresentation claim under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b) of
the Exchange Act, a complaint must allege the misstatement or
omission of a material fact. A statement is misleading under the
securities laws if in the light of the facts existing at the time
of the statement a reasonable investor, in the exercise of due
care, would have been misled by it.

Alleged Omissions Concerning Hedging and Plan to Collapse and
Accelerate the XIV ETNs

The Halberts allege that Credit Suisse and Janus made materially
misleading statements in the Offering Documents concerning Credit
Suisse's anticipated hedging and its conflict of interests with
investors in the XIV ETNs. To support this contention, the Halberts
quote in their Amended Complaint the allegedly misleading
statements from the Offering Documents,5and argue that, under
Section 11 and Section 10(b), the quoted statements in the Offering
Documents were materially misleading.6 The Halberts maintain the
Defendants failed to disclose that they knew Credit Suisse's
hedging would inevitably cause the XIV ETNs to collapse during the
next volatility spike due to inadequate market liquidity and the
number of outstanding XIV ETNs, and that Credit Suisse intended to
profit from this collapse by subsequently accelerating and
redeeming the XIV ETNs and, thus, had an active conflict of
interest with investors in the XIV ETNs.

To analyze claims about purported misstatements or omissions, the
court must assess the Section 11 claim information as it existed at
the time the registration statement became effective or in the case
of a Section 10(b) claim, whether a reasonable investor would find
the alleged misstatement misleading in the light of the facts
existing at the time of the statement.

In that respect, here, the Halberts' assertion that Credit Suisse
knew its hedging would cause the XIV ETNs to crash during the next
volatility spike, due to the size of the XIV ETNs and the
inadequate liquidity of the market, is merely speculative, and
lacks any of the factual allegations that are required to support
such a conjecture.

Moreover, where, as here, allegations regarding misleading
omissions are made on information and belief, the PSLRA requires,
for Section 10(b)(5) claims, that the complaint state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.

However, the Halberts fail to allege facts indicating what the
alleged liquidity issues were, how or why the Defendants were aware
of them, or how the Defendants knew that hedging in a market with
liquidity issues and 16,275,000 outstanding XIV ETNs would
inevitably cause the value of the XIV ETNs to plummet. And, to the
extent that such information was public knowledge, Defendants did
not have a duty to include forecasts based on a range of historical
VIX volatility because historical volatility data and the
volatility trends are publicly available.  

Similarly, the Halberts' allegations that the Defendants knew
Credit Suisse intended to profit off the collapse of the XIV ETNs
are speculative at best. The allegations appear to be based on a
retrospective analysis, i.e. that, because Credit Suisse engaged in
hedging activities and the XIV ETNs collapsed, Credit Suisse must
have intended, at the time it issued the Offering Documents, to
depress the value of the XIV ETNs through hedging in order to
declare an Acceleration Event. Such allegations that a defendant
knew and should have disclosed that volatility-linked notes would
become worthless in two years, for example, are insufficient to
sustain a claim and courts have rejected securities claims that
were based on a backward-looking assessment that interprets, in the
context of later events, the statements that plaintiff has
identified as untrue or misleading at the time they were made.

In other words, the Halberts have not plausibly alleged that the
Defendants knew that they would profit off the Halberts by hedging
and accelerating the XIV ETNs during a volatility spike, and have
failed to plead a material omission based on a failure to disclose
Credit Suisse's alleged plan to profit off the collapse of the XIV
ETNs.

Scienter under Section 10(b)

With respect to each act or omission alleged to violate Section
10(b), a complaint must state with particularity facts giving rise
to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind.

Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Halberts, the
Halberts allege three distinct Section 10(b) claims against each
defendant: (1) misrepresentations in the Offering Documents
concerning Credit Suisse's anticipated hedging, its plan to profit
by collapsing and accelerating the XIV ETNs, and the accuracy of
Intraday Indicative Values, in violation of Rule 10b-5(b) (2) the
allegedly false Intraday Indicative Values on February 5, 2018 in
violation of Rule 10b-5(b)  and (3) the Defendants' fraudulent
scheme to manipulate the XIV ETNs' value by hedging and failing to
update the Intraday Indicative Value in violation of Rule 10b-5(a)
and (c).  

As to these contentions, the Defendants generally contend that the
Halberts have failed to plead scienter under Section 10(b).
Therefore, although the Defendants do not separately address the
Halberts' scheme liability/market manipulation claims under Rule
10b-5(a) and (c) the court will consider whether the Halberts have
alleged scienter for these claims.   Finally, because all the
claims arise from the same set of facts and allegations and,
therefore, an analysis of scienter for each claim requires
consideration of the same aggregate of allegations,  

Credit Suisse

The Halberts attempt to plead scienter for their Section 10(b)
claims against Credit Suisse by alleging, in part: (1) Credit
Suisse had the motive and opportunity to profit by hedging against
the XIV ETNs in order to cause an Acceleration Event, and
ultimately did profit by doing so (2) Credit Suisse knew that a
volatility spike was imminent, and that hedging would cause the XIV
ETNs to crash due to insufficient market liquidity and the large
number of outstanding XIV ETNs (3) Credit Suisse knew or should
have known the Intraday Indicative Values did not reflect the
actual value of the XIV ETNs for approximately one hour on February
5, 2018, which made an Acceleration Event more likely.

Summary

To close, while the Halberts have adequately pleaded false or
misleading statements against the Defendants premised on the
Intraday Indicative Values on February 5, 2018, they failed to
adequately allege material omissions in the Offering Documents and
scienter for any of their claims under Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act. In particular, the Halberts' allegations do not give
rise to a strong inference of scienter against either Credit Suisse
or Janus for their misrepresentation claims under Rule 10b-5(b) or
their market manipulation claims under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c). And,
the Halberts have failed to adequately plead violations of Section
11 of the Securities Act based on the alleged misrepresentations in
the Offering Documents.

Therefore, the Defendants' motion is due to be granted as to the
federal securities law claims.

Alabama Blue Sky Law

The Defendants contend that the Halberts also fail to plead a valid
claim against Credit Suisse under the Alabama Blue Sky Law, Alabama
Code Section 8-6-19. The Halberts allege that Credit Suisse
violated Section 8-6-19(a)(2) based on the alleged omissions in the
Offering Documents and the allegedly false Intraday Indicative
Values.  Alternatively, the Halberts allege that Credit Suisse
violated Section 8-6-19(c) by materially aiding the unlawful sale
of a security within the meaning of

Alabama's Blue Sky Law.

Alabama Code Section 8-6-19(a)(2)

To plead a violation of Section 8-6-19(a)(2), a plaintiff must
plausibly allege (1) a sale or an offer to sell a security (2) by
means of a false statement or omission (3) of material fact and (4)
the ignorance of the buyer as to the untruth or omission. Section
8-6-19 is a strict liability statute: there need be no showing of
reckless disregard' for the truth of a representation or that such
representations were knowingly made.

Credit Suisse contends that, because the alleged misrepresentations
are not actionable under Section 11 of the Securities Act or
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, the Halberts cannot state a
claim under Section 8-6-19(a)(2).  

See Altrust Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Adams, 76 So.3d 228, 236 (Ala.
2011) (quoting Buffo v. State, 415 So.2d 1158, 1161-62 (Ala.
1982)). Moreover, in applying Section 8-6-19(a)(2), the Alabama
Supreme Court has explicitly relied on the same standard for
materially misleading statements or omissions under Sections
12(a)(2) and 11 of the Securities Act, and Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act. Accordingly, because the same standards for
determining materially misleading statements or omissions are
applicable under both federal securities law and Section
8-6-19(a)(2), the court finds that the Halberts fail to plead
materially misleading statements and omissions relating to Credit
Suisse's hedging and the alleged scheme under Section 8-6-19(a)(2)
for the same reasons it fails to plead such misrepresentations
under Section 11 of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act.  

Alabama Code Section 8-6-19(c)

The Halberts also allege, in the alternative, that Credit Suisse
violated Section 8-6-19(c) by materially aiding in the unlawful
sale of a security. Section 8-16-19(c) imposes secondary liability
on certain persons who materially aid in the conduct giving rise to
liability under subsection (a) or (b). As discussed, the Halberts
have adequately alleged a violation of Section 8-16-19(a)(2) based
on the allegedly false Intraday Indicative Values, and, therefore,
have alleged a predicate violation under Section 8-6-19(c).
Moreover, the Defendants offer no argument as to why the Halberts'
allegations are insufficient to plead that Credit Suisse materially
aided in the conduct giving rise to liability under Section
8-6-19(a)(2).   

Thus, the motion to dismiss the 8-6-19(c) claim also fails.

State Common Law Claims

The Halberts plead that Credit Suisse's alleged failure to update
the Intraday Indicative Value was a breach of contract, and that
the Defendants' failure to update the Intraday Indicative Value
also gives rise to claims for negligence, wantonness, negligent
misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent
suppression.

Breach of Contract

As an initial matter, the court must determine whether the Halberts
are correct that the Offering Documents constitute a binding
contract between Credit Suisse and the Halberts who purchased the
XIV. The basic elements of a contract are an offer and an
acceptance, consideration, and mutual assent to the essential terms
of the agreement.  The Halberts, however, do not identify what they
believe were the offer and acceptance in this case. Assuming the
Offering Documents constituted the purported offer and the Halberts
purchase of the XIV ETNs constituted the purported acceptance, the
contract formed would be a unilateral one in which one party makes
an offer or promise which invites performance by another, and
performance constitutes both acceptance of that offer and
consideration.

Therefore, the court finds that the Halberts have sufficiently
plead mutuality of obligation and the existence of a contractual
duty to calculate and disseminate the Intraday Indicative Value.

For these reasons, the motion to dismiss the breach of contract
claim is due to be denied.

Negligence and Wantonness

The Halberts allege negligence and wantonness claims against Credit
Suisse and Janus based on their alleged failure to update the
Intraday Indicative Value on February 5, 2018.  

Here, the Halberts allege a contractual breach based on Credit
Suisse's failure to perform its obligations under the Offering
Documents when it did not keep up the Intraday Indicative Value as
promised. Basically, drawing all reasonable inferences in their
favor, the Halberts allege that Credit Suisse breached the Offering
Documents by failing to calculate the Intraday Indicative Value
every 15 seconds based on a VIX Futures Index that incorporated
real time prices of the relevant VIX futures contracts. Relatedly,
with respect to their negligence and wantonness claims, the
Halberts allege also that Credit Suisse breached its duty to
regularly update the Intraday Indicative Value. However, the
Halberts have failed to identify any source of this duty other than
the Offering Documents. Thus, because the duties and breaches
alleged by the Halberts would not exist but for the contractual
relationship between the parties, the proper avenue for seeking
redress is a breach of contract claim, not a wantonness or
negligence claim.

Accordingly, the negligence and wantonness claims against Credit
Suisse fail.  

Misrepresentation and Suppression Claims

The Halberts allege negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation
claims, and fraudulent suppression claims, against Credit Suisse
and Janus. To establish a prima facie case of fraudulent or
negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the
representation was false (2) that it concerned a material fact (3)
that the plaintiff reasonably relied on the false representation
and (4) that actual injury resulted from that reliance.  

The Halberts have alleged negligent misrepresentation claims
against Janus based on the allegedly false Intraday Indicative
Values on February 5, 2018, but have failed to allege
misrepresentation and suppression claims against either Credit
Suisse or Janus premised on the alleged omissions in the Offering
Documents.

The Halberts have failed to plead violations of Section 11 of the
Securities Act or Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. However, the
Halberts have adequately plead violations of the Alabama Code
Section 8-6-19(a)(2) and (c) against Credit Suisse based on the
allegedly false Intraday Indicative Values. Furthermore, the
Halberts have adequately plead breach of contract against Credit
Suisse and negligent misrepresentation against Janus, but the
remainder of their state common law claims fail. The court will
issue a separate order consistent with this opinion.

A full-text copy of the District Court's dated August 22, 2019
Memorandum Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxzzhnn2
from Leagle.com.

Erich Halbert, Sherri Halbert & John Halbert, Plaintiffs,
represented by Cason M. Kirby -- cason@campbellpartnerslaw.com --
CAMPBELL PARTNERS & Stephen D. Wadsworth, CAMPBELL PARTNERS, 505
20th St N, Ste 1600, Birmingham, AL 35203-4622

Credit Suisse AG, Defendant, represented by David G. Januszewski --
djanuszewski@cahill.com -- CAHILL GORDON & REINDEL LLP, pro hac
vice, Herbert S. Washer -- hwasher@cahill.com -- CAHILL GORDON &
REINDEL LLP, pro hac vice, Richard Jon Davis --
rdavis@maynardcooper.com -- MAYNARD COOPER & GALE, Sesi V.
Garimella -- sgarimella@cahill.com -- CAHILL GORDON & REINDEL LLP,
pro hac vice & Sheila C. Ramesh -- sramesh@cahill.com -- CAHILL
GORDON & REINDEL LLP, pro hac vice.

Janus Index and Calculation Services LLC, Defendant, represented by
Adam P. Plant, BATTLE & WINN LLP, 2901 2nd Ave S, Ste 220,
Birmingham, AL 35233, Gillian Groarke Burns --
gillian.burns@cwt.com -- Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, pro hac
vice, Jared Stanisci -- jared.stanisci@cwt.com -- CADWALADER,
WICKERSHAM & TAFT, LLP, pro hac vice, Jason M. Halper --
jason.halper@cwt.com -- CADWALADER WICKERSHAM & TAFT, pro hac vice,
Robert E. Battle, BATTLE & WINN LLP, The Martin Biscuit Building,
2901 2nd Avenue South, Suite 220, Birmingham, AL 35233 & Richard
Jon Davis -- rdavis@maynardcooper.com -- MAYNARD COOPER & GALE.


CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD: Underpays Appraisers, Bursey Alleges
---------------------------------------------------------
PATRICK BURSEY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD, INC.; and CUSMAN &
WAKEFIELD OF COLORADO, INC., Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-02344 (D.
Colo., Aug. 16, 2019) is an action against the Defendant's failure
to pay the Plaintiff and the class overtime compensation for hours
worked in excess of 40 hours per week.

The Plaintiff Bursey was employed by the Defendants as appraiser.

Cushman & Wakefield, Inc. provides real estate services. The
Company represents clients in buying, selling, financing, leasing,
managing, and valuing assets. Cushman & Wakefield also provide
strategic planning and research, portfolio analysis, site
selection, and space location services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John Neuman, Esq.
          Beatriz Sosa-Morris, Esq.
          SOSA-MORRIS NEUMAN, PLLC
          5612 Chaucer Drive
          Houston, TX 77005
          Telephone: (281) 885-8630
          Facsimile: (281) 885-8813
          E-mail: jneuman@smnlawfirm.com
                  bsosamorris@smnlawfirm.com


D & A SERVICES: Spera Sues over Collection Letter, Unfair Interest
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against D&A Services, LLC
et al. for alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act. The case is captioned CHRIS J. SPERA, individually and on
behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v.
D & A SERVICES, LLC., doing business as D & A Services; THE
BUREAUS, INC. and BUREAUS INVESTMENT GROUP PORTFOLIO NO 15 LLC, and
BUREAUS INVESTMENT GROUP III, LLC, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-04873 (N.D. Ill., July 19, 2019). Among other things,
Plaintiff alleges that D&A Services' debt collection letter failed
to identify the date and amount of purported charge-off of the
subject debt. He also claims that the Defendants improperly added
interest to the subject debt. Moreover, this consumer
credit-related lawsuit is assigned to Hon. Judge Andrea R. Wood.

D & A Services, LLC is a debt collection agency with a principal
place of business at 1400 E. Touhy Ave, Suite G2, Des Plaines,
Illinois. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     James C. Vlahakis, Esq.
     SULAIMAN LAW GROUP, LTD.
     2500 South Highland Avenue, Suite 200
     Lombard, IL 60148
     Telephone: (630) 575-8181
     E-mail: jvlahakis@sulaimanlaw.com

D. & B. CORP: Breached 2013 Settlement, Jenks Claims
----------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against D. & B. Corp.,
d/b/a The Golden Banana, and Mark Filtranti for civil contempt of
court. The case is captioned KAYLA L. JENKS, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. D. & B. CORP.,
d/b/a THE GOLDEN BANANA, Mark Filtranti, and Its Other Corporate
Presidents, Defendants, Case No. 1977CV01042A (Mass. Cmmw., July
22, 2019). Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Rule 65.3 of
the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure.

On July 3, 2013, the Court approved a class action settlement
agreement which called for Defendants to pay $900,000 to class
members. The settlement agreement states that Defendants will make
annual payments varying between $100,000 and $200,000 over the
course of six years. The fourth of these payments was $200,000 and
was due on Sept. 1, 2018.

On Aug. 29, 2018, Defendants requested to revise the payment
schedule and make payments of $100,000 every nine months, and
plaintiffs accepted this revision. Under the revised payment
schedule, Defendants owe $100,000 on July 1, 2019. On June 29, 2019
Plaintiffs emailed counsel for Defendants to remind him of the July
1 deadline, then again Plaintiffs reminded counsel of the July 1
payment on July 5, and 9, 2019.

Although Defendant's counsel promised three times to find out when
the payment would be made and alert Plaintiffs, he has never done
so. To this point, Defendants have not made the required payment,
or contacted Plaintiffs to explain when the payment will be made.
By refusing to comply with the Court's July 3, 2013 Order,
Defendants' actions constitute contempt of Court.

D. & B. Corp. is a corporation that operates Golden Banana
Gentlemen's Club in Peabody, Massachusetts. Mark Filtranti is the
President and owner of D & B Corp.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Tod A. Cochran, Esq.
     PYLE ROME EHRENBERG PC
     2 Liberty Square, 10th Floor
     Boston, MA 02109
     Telephone: (617) 367-7200
     E-mail: tcochran@pylerome.com


DESMOND FOODS: Suggs Seeks Overtime Pay
---------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Desmond Foods LP
for alleged violations of the California Labor Code and the
California Business and Professions Code. The case is captioned
Tyson Suggs and on behalf of all others similarly situated vs.
Desmond Foods LP, Case No. 34-2019-00260891-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super.,
Sacramento Cty., July 19, 2019). In this complaint, Plaintiff
alleges that the Defendant failed to pay premium and regular rate
of wages, failed to pay overtime compensation, failed to provide
meal breaks, failed to authorize and permit rest breaks, failed to
timely pay final wage upon termination, failed to provide accurate
itemized wage statements, and engaged in unfair business practices.


Desmond Foods LP is a California Limited Partnership with its
principal place of business in Sacramento California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Kane Moon, Esq.
     MOON & YANG, APC
     1055 W. Seventh St. Suite 1880
     Los Angeles, CA 90017
     Telephone: (213) 232-3128
     Facsimile: (213) 232-3125

DIAMOND RESORTS: Spurling et al. Seek to Recover Unpaid Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Diamond Resorts
International et al. for alleged violations of the Hawaii Revised
Statutes Section 388-2. The case is captioned DOMINIQUE SPURLING,
DONOVAN CHANG, and FLORENCE MIGUEL, Individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. DIAMOND RESORTS
INTERNATIONAL; DOE DEFENDANTS 1-50, Defendants, Case No.
19-1-1158-08-JPC (Hawaii Cir., July 23, 2019). Plaintiffs allege
that the Defendants failed to pay and failed to timely pay them and
the members of the putative class all of their earned wages as
required under Hawaii Revised Statutes Section 388-2.

Diamond Resorts International, a limited liability company, has
conducted business in Honolulu, Hawaii and has owned and operated
the following hotels in the State of Hawaii: The Modern Honolulu
(The Modern), Ka'anapali Beach Club (the Ka'anapali), The Point at
Poipu (The Point). [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     James J. Bickerton, Esq.
     Bridget G. Morgan-Bickerton, Esq.
     BICKERTON LAW GROUP
     745 Fort Street, Suite 801
     Honolulu, Hawaii 96813
     Telephone: (808) 599-3811
     Facsimile: (808) 694-3090

DLING MEDICAL AESTHETIC: Wang Sues over Labor Law Violations
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Dling Medical
Aesthetic Center, Inc. for alleged violations of the California
Labor Code and the California Business & Professions Code. The case
is captioned HSIN-YU WANG, an individual, Plaintiff, vs. DLING
MEDICAL AESTHETIC CENTER, INC., a California Corporation, XIAOQIN
"KELLY" LING, an individual, and DOES 1 to 80, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 19STCV25708 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty.,
July 23, 2019). Among other things, Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendants violated the Labor Code by failing to pay minimum,
straight, overtime wages, failing to reimburse necessary expenses,
and failing to provide meal and rest periods.

Dling Medical Aesthetic Center, Inc. is a business entity located
in Los Angeles County, State of California, operating as a medical
spa at 9525 E. Las Tunas Dr., Temple City, CA, 91780. Xiaoqin
“Kelly” Ling an officer, director, owner, and/or managing agent
of Dling. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Steven D. Kramar, Esq.
     H. Mark Madnick, Esq.
     KRAMAR MADNICK, LLP
     16133 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 585
     Encino, CA 91436-2405
     Telephone: (818) 380-3500
     Facsimile: (818) 380-3505
     E-mail: SDKramar@KramarMadnick.com
             HMMadnick@KramarMadnick.com

DOTERRA INTERNATIONAL: Jones Files ADA Class Suit in New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
Doterra International, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Kahlimah Jones, individually and as the representative of a
class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. Doterra
International, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-04923 (E.D. N.Y.,
Aug. 28, 2019).

Doterra International, LLC is a global developer and manufacturer
of aromatherapy and essential oils.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Dan Shaked, Esq.
   Shaked Law Group, P.C.
   14 Harwood Court, Suite 415
   Scarsdale, NY 10583
   Tel: (917) 373-9128
   Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com



DYCK O'NEAL INC: Cheeks Sues over FDCPA Violations
--------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Dyck O'Neal, Inc.
for alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA). The case is captioned Nakia Cheeks, individually, and on
behalf of all similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff, v. Dyck
O'Neal, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 8:19-cv-02148-GJH (D. Md., July
22, 2019). This consumer credit-related lawsuit is assigned to Hon.
Judge Jarrod Hazel.

Founded in August 1988, Dyck O'Neal, Inc. operates as a debt
collector. The company serves banking, mortgage insurance, legal,
and real estate industries. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Kathy Lynn Ducassou, Esq.
     2383 Sundew Terrace
     Baltimore, MD 21209
     Telephone: (410) 624-5524
     Facsimile: (410) 624-5524
     E-mail: ducassou@aol.com

FACEBOOK, INC: Adkins Seeks to Certify Two Classes
--------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as STEPHEN ADKINS, an individual
and Michigan resident, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. FACEBOOK, INC., the
Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-05982-WHA (N.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff
will move the Court on October 31, 2019, for an order:

   1. certifying, under Rule 23(b)(2), their claims for
      declaratory relief on behalf of the Declaratory Relief
      Class:

      "all Facebook users whose personally identifiable
      information (PII) was compromised in the data
      breach announced by Facebook on September 28, 2018. The
      proposed Class Representative for the Declaratory Relief
      Class is Stephen Adkins.";

   2. certifying, under Rule 23(b)(3), the Damages Class with the
      same definition of  Declaratory Relief Class. The Plaintiff
      seeks to damages for the diminished value of his and class
      members' PII, and for the costs of credit monitoring. The
      proposed Class Representative for the Damages Class is
      Stephen Adkins; and

   3. appointing Andrew N. Friedman of Cohen Milstein Sellers &    
   
      Toll PLLC, John A. Yanchunis of Morgan & Morgan Complex
      Litigation Group, and Ariana H. Tadler of Tadler Law LLP as
      Class Counsel.

      Excluded from all Classes are Defendants, any entity in
      which Facebook or its successors Whether Facebook's
      security is still inadequate to protect user PII.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Andrew N. Friedman, Esq.
          COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC
          1100 New York Ave. NW, Fifth Floor
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 408-4600
          Facsimile: (202) 408-4699
          E-mail: afriedman@cohenmilstein.com

               - and -

          John A. Yanchunis, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN
          COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP
          201 N. Franklin St., 7th Floor
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: 813/223-5505
          Facsmile: 813/2223-5402
          E-mail: jyanchunis@ForThe People.com

               - and -

          Ariana J. Tadler, Esq.
          TADLER LAW, LLP
          atadler@TadlerLaw.com
          One Penn Plaza
          New York, NY 10119
          Telephone: (212) 946-9453
          Facsimile: (212) 273-4375

FIELDWORK, INC: "Damasco" Bid for Class Certification Filed
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as DIXIE PLUMBING SPECIALTIES,
INC., a Georgia corporation, individually and as the representative
of a class of similarly-situated persons, the Plaintiff, v.
FIELDWORK, INC., a Delaware corporation, and FIELDWORK
CHICAGO-SCHAUMBURG, INC., FIELDWORK CHICAGO, INC., and FIELDWORK
CHICAGO DOWNTOWN, INC., Illinois corporations, the Defendants, Case
No. 1:19-cv-05821 (N.D. Ill.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an
order:

   1. certifying a "Damasco" motion for class certification of:

      "all persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the
      filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile
      messages of material advertising the commercial availability

      or quality of any property, goods, or services by or on
      behalf of Defendant, (3) from whom Defendant did not obtain
      "prior express invitation or permission" to send fax
      advertisements, or (4) with whom Defendant did not have an
      established business relationship, and (5) where the fax
      advertisements did not include an opt-out notice compliant
      with 47 C.F.R. section 64.1200(a)(4)(iii)";

   2. appointing Plaintiff as the class representative; and

   3. appointing Plaintiff's attorneys as class counsel.

The Plaintiff will file its memorandum after Rule 23 discovery has
been completed. The parties need to meet and confer and propose a
Rule 23 discovery schedule to this Court and Plaintiff respectfully
requests a status conference with the Court as soon as practicable.


The Defendants sent the Plaintiff and others a standardized form
advertisement.  The Plaintiff anticipates that the proposed class
definition will change after discovery defines the precise contours
of the class and the advertisements that were sent. Plaintiff
requests leave to submit a brief and other evidence in support of
this motion after discovery about the class elements has been
completed.

The Plaintiff submits its Motion for Class Certification pursuant
to Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2011)
(holding plaintiffs "can move to certify the class at the same time
that they file their complaint" and "the pendency of that motion
protects a putative class from attempts to buy off the named
plaintiffs"), overruled in part by Chapman v. First Index, Inc.,
796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) (overruling Damasco “to the
extent [it] hold[s] that a defendant's offer of full compensation
moots the litigation or otherwise ends the Article III case or
controversy" but not commenting on effect of a "placeholder" motion
if plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot for some other
reason); Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (Jan. 20,
2016) (holding “an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of
judgment does not moot a plaintiff's case," and "a would-be class
representative with a live claim of her own must be accorded a fair
opportunity to show that certification is warranted").[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Ryan M. Kelly, Esq.
          ANDERSON + WANCA
          3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 500
          Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
          Telephone: 847/368-1500
          Facsimile: 847/368-1501
          E-mail: rkelly@andersonwanca.com

FLINT, MI: Mich. App. Flips Dismissal of Contaminated Water Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Michigan issued an Opinion reversing the
District Court's judgment grating Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment in the case captioned DORIS COLLINS, and all others
similarly situated, ROBIN PLEASANT, JASON PHINSEE, LEE MCDONALD,
and CONLEY COLLISION, INC., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF
FLINT, Defendant-Appellee. No. 345203. (Mich. App.).

In this class-action lawsuit arising out of the Flint water crisis,
plaintiffs Doris Collins, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, along with Robin Pleasant, Jason Phinsee, Lee
McDonald, and Conley Collision, Inc., appeal the trial court's
order granting summary disposition to defendant, the city of
Flint.

The city of Flint changed their water source from the city of
Detroit to drawing water from the Flint River. The discovery that
the water provided to Flint residents from the Flint River was
dangerous resulted in the filing of thousands of lawsuits. The
instant lawsuit was filed in 2016, alleging breach of contract,
unjust enrichment, a breach of the implied warranties of fitness, a
violation of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act, and conversion.


On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred when it
granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) on their unjust
enrichment claim.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the
legal sufficiency of a claim by the pleadings alone.  In reviewing
a trial court's decision on a (C)(8) motion, this Court accepts as
true all factual allegations supporting the claim and reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from them.  

Unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine. Unjust enrichment of a
person occurs when he has and retains money or benefits which in
justice and equity belong to another. In order to sustain a claim
of unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must establish (1) the receipt of
a benefit by the defendant from the plaintiff and (2) an inequity
resulting to the plaintiff because of the retention of the benefit
by the defendant.

In this case, plaintiffs argue that they have pleaded a valid
unjust enrichment claim because defendant received an inequitable
benefit by accepting residents' water payments in exchange for
contaminated and undrinkable water. Stated differently, plaintiffs
claim defendant has inequitably profited by accepting the water
payments at the expense of its residents.

Defendant, however, sets forth two main arguments: (1) an unjust
enrichment claim is barred on grounds of governmental immunity and
(2) even if it is not barred on such grounds, summary disposition
is still appropriate because (a) there is no implied contract to
serve as the basis for an unjust enrichment claim (b) plaintiffs'
unjust enrichment claim fails because there is no genuine issue of
fact that defendant fulfilled its obligation to provide water
service and (c) plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim fails because
they have an adequate remedy at law and did not exhaust their
administrative remedies.

In light of our Supreme Court's decision in Genesee Co, the Court
agrees that the trial court erred when it granted summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) in favor of defendant.

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY

The Court first addresses defendant's argument that plaintiffs'
unjust enrichment claim fails because they have not pleaded in
avoidance of governmental immunity.

Our Supreme Court recently answered this very question. In Genesee
Co, the defendant, Genesee County, served as the administrator for
certain employee health insurance plans. After conducting an audit,
the insurer, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, determined that
the payment of the county's collective premiums resulted in a
significant overpayment, which was then refunded back to Genesee
County. Based on this rule, the Court held that the plaintiff's
unjust enrichment claim was not barred on grounds of governmental
immunity because the GTLA does not provide governmental immunity
for those seeking compensatory damages for breach of contract and
claims seeking a remedy other than compensatory damages. Because
the plaintiff was seeking a remedy other than compensatory damages,
i.e., restitution, his action did not sound in tort or contract,
and his claim survived summary disposition.  

In this case, plaintiffs' claim for unjust enrichment is not barred
by governmental immunity. As in Genesee Co, plaintiffs have alleged
a claim that is neither grounded in tort nor contract in which the
remedy sought is compensatory damages. Rather, plaintiffs seek
restitution for their payments for water services.

Therefore, defendant is not entitled to governmental immunity.

UNJUST ENRICHMENT

Plaintiffs argue that the trial court ultimately erred when it held
that they failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In particular, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred because
it misapplied Borg-Warner to the facts of this case when ruling on
the unjust enrichment claim. While The Court agrees with plaintiffs
regarding the trial court's application of Borg-Warner to this
case, The Court further concludes that in light of Genesee Co,the
question of whether the unjust enrichment claim involved an implied
contract in law versus an implied contract in fact under
Borg-Warner is no longer relevant.

In applying Borg-Warner, the trial court held that delivery of
water in exchange for payment of the water bills is not sufficient
consideration to create an implied contract necessary to bring a
claim for unjust enrichment.

In fact, Borg-Warner did not involve unjust enrichment or any other
equitable doctrine, but instead acknowledged that governmental tort
immunity does not apply to contract claims, and decided whether the
elements for an implied contract were satisfied. Although some
contract claims involve equitable remedies, contract damages
constitute a remedy in law. Our Supreme Court in Borg-Warner simply
did not consider the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment as
plaintiffs invoked it in this case.

Regardless, the decision in Genesee Co makes clear that an unjust
enrichment claim is independent of a cause of action based in
contract. Therefore, the trial court erred when it granted
defendant's motion for summary disposition based on Borg-Warner.

Defendant, however, argues two alternative bases for affirming the
trial court's decision. First, defendant asserts that plaintiffs'
unjust enrichment claim fails because it provided water services to
plaintiffs as required under the applicable ordinances. Second,
defendant claims that plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law and
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. These arguments
fail.

Defendant's first argument is essentially that plaintiffs have not
set forth a valid claim for unjust enrichment because defendant
provided water service as required under Flint's city ordinance,
and plaintiffs were obligated to pay for the water service
received. Therefore, plaintiffs have not shown that defendant
retained a benefit at plaintiffs' expense.

This argument fails for obvious reasons.

Unjust enrichment is grounded in the idea that a party shall not be
allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at another's
expense. Plaintiffs have stated a valid claim for unjust enrichment
because they allege to have paid for water that was poisonous. It
is clear that defendant retained a benefit in keeping the payments
for water that proved to be undrinkable. Plaintiffs also allege to
have incurred a huge expense in not only being provided
contaminated water, but having to pay for that contaminated water.
Thus, plaintiffs have stated a valid unjust enrichment claim upon
which relief could be granted.

Defendant's second argument is that, because all residents are
entitled by ordinance to a mandatory hearing to dispute a water
bill that they believe is unusually large, plaintiffs failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies. The Court disagrees.
Defendant's argument implicates the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.  

Defendant invokes the exhaustion doctrine not in connection to an
administrative agency, but rather with its own internal procedures,
whereby its city administrator, or a person that officer designates
for the purpose, acts as referee when determining the validity of a
utility billing dispute. Defendant points out that plaintiffs do
not assert in their complaint that they had sought relief through
the mechanism set forth in the Flint city ordinances, but neither
does defendant assert that it asked the trial court to dismiss the
action below, or at least stay proceedings so that possible
administrative avenues could be pursued. Therefore, defendant's
argument fails. The trial court thus erred when it granted summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) in favor of defendant because
plaintiffs have stated a claim upon which relief may be granted.

A full-text copy of the Mich. App.'s dated August 22, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y68pot8y from Leagle.com.

LOYST FLETCHER, JR., 718 Beach St, Flint, Michigan 48502, BRENDA R.
WILLIAMS -- Brenda.Halliburton-Williams@abhms.org -- for DORIS
COLLINS/ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff-Appellant.


FORD MOTOR: Court Denies Class Certification Bid in C. Van Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification in the case
captioned CHRISTIE VAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
Defendant. Case No. 14-cv-8708. (N.D. Ill.).

The Plaintiffs are women who currently are employed or who were
employed at one of the two Chicago-area Ford Motor Company
facilities, the Chicago Assembly Plant and the Chicago Stamping
Plant. Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of all present and
former female employees who worked at the Assembly Plant or the
Stamping Plant. Plaintiffs and other putative class members have
been subjected to a pervasively sexual, hostile, intimidating and
abusive work environment at Defendant's Plants. Female employees at
the Plants have been forced to work in an environment containing
sexually explicit graffiti, carvings, and drawings.

Plaintiffs propose that the class be defined as:

     All women working at the Ford Chicago Assembly Plant and
Chicago Stamping Plant from January 2012 to present.

The parties do not dispute that Plaintiffs' proposed class
satisfies Rule 23(a)'s numerosity requirement or Rule 23's implicit
ascertainability requirement.

The Defendant argues, however, that Plaintiffs fail to satisfy Rule
23(a)'s commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements.
Defendant further argues that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the
requirements of any Rule 23(b) subsection.

Commonality under Rule 23(a)(2)

Plaintiffs contend that they have met their burden of establishing
commonality by identifying significant proof that Defendant
operated under a general policy of discrimination, which is an
acceptable method of establishing commonality.  

Plaintiff asserts that these common questions and issues regarding
the extensive and far-reaching practice of sexual harassment and
retaliation at the Plants are at the core of all the Title VII
claims held by the proposed class in this case.  However, in their
opening brief, Plaintiffs fail to connect these purported questions
to the elements of their claims. As noted in Defendant's response
brief, the Court specifically directed that should Plaintiffs again
move for class certification Plaintiffs should address to what
extent the elements of their claims can be decided on a class-wide
basis.

The Court therefore turns to an analysis of the elements of the
sexual harassment claims that Plaintiffs seek to bring.

Pattern-and-Practice Analysis

Plaintiffs must prove that discrimination was the company's
standard operating procedure the regular rather than the unusual
practice.

This method of proving discrimination often comes up in the context
of hiring practices. For example, if an employer has an established
policy of making employment decisions with racial animus in
violation of Title VII, it is likely that any specific employment
decision also violates Title VII, and if a particular decision was
not discriminatory, the employer is in the best position to show
why. Thus, as noted by Plaintiffs, the liability phase in a
pattern-and-practice case does not require showing that each
individual member of the class was a victim of the employer's
discriminatory policy, since proof of the pattern or practice
supports an inference that any particular employment decision
during the period in which the discriminatory policy was in force
was made pursuant to that policy.  

However, it is not clear to the Court that such a claim can be
brought in the context of this case. Plaintiffs claim that
Defendant has maintained a policy of failing to take prompt
remedial action in response to credible allegations of harassment.


Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant as a rule has
allowed known harassers to remain in the workplace, failed to
discipline harassers despite the harassment being witnessed by
supervisors, threatened female complainants with termination or
otherwise reprimanded female complainants, assigned less desirable
tasks to women who did not submit to sexual advances, among other
conduct. Although Plaintiffs cite to allegations in the second
amended complaint to support these assertions, which are
insufficient to carry Defendant's burden of satisfying Rule 23,
Plaintiffs renewed motion for class certification elsewhere
identifies anecdotal evidence that certain of Defendant's employees
have engaged in such conduct.

Even assuming these facts to be true, however, a finding that an
employer had a pattern or practice of tolerating sexual harassment
in violation of Title VII does not necessarily establish that an
individual claimant was exposed to harassment or that the
harassment an individual claimant suffered violates Title VII.  

The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs cannot establish
liability on their individual sexual hostile work environment
claims based on a pattern-and-practice theory. Instead, the Court
will look to whether any of the elements of Plaintiffs' sexual
hostile work environment claims can be addressed on a class-wide
basis.

Sexual Hostile Work Environment

To establish a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must
show that she was (1) subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct,
advances, or requests (2) because of her sex (3) that were severe
or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment and (4)
that there is a basis for employer liability.

The Plaintiffs argue that there is a common question with respect
to whether Plaintiffs are women and therefore part of a protected
class because this can be established by answering a single common
question of whether women make up the proposed class. However, even
if the proposed class definition limits the class to women,
putative class members still would need to show that they fall
within the scope of the class definition. Moreover, it is well
established that superficial common questions like whether each
class member shares a characteristic or suffered a violation of the
same provision of law are not enough to establish commonality.  

The Plaintiffs also argue that there are common questions with
respect to whether harassment was severe or pervasive enough to
establish a hostile work environment (i.e., to affect a term,
condition, or privilege of employment. As noted by Plaintiffs, this
element requires that Plaintiffs establish that they were subjected
to sufficiently severe and pervasive conditions that were both
subjectively and objectively hostile. To qualify as hostile, the
work environment must be both objectively and subjectively
offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so.
Plaintiffs contend that it is obvious that the objective hostility
component can be addressed as a common question because the
reasonableness standard can be applied to the conduct and the
environmental factors that make up the hostile work environment.
Plaintiffs further contend that questions such as whether sexual
batteries and assaults, requests for sexual favors, stories of
sexual conquests, constantly staring and requiring women to bend
over, and threats of sexual assault were commonplace, are subject
to common proof.

However, because the objective hostility component still depends on
the specific conduct to which each named Plaintiff and putative
class member was exposed, Plaintiffs' arguments miss the mark.
Although Plaintiffs have presented the Court with evidence
indicating that named Plaintiffs and putative class members were
exposed to a wide-range of conduct that certainly would support
hostile work environment claims, the evidence does not suggest that
named Plaintiffs and putative class members all were exposed to the
same conduct.

To the contrary, the evidence indicates that named Plaintiffs and
putative class members were exposed to a wide range of purported
misconduct from exposure to sexual graffiti, to quid pro quo sexual
propositions, to rape .

The Plaintiffs similarly argue that they can establish on a
class-wise basis that they and putative class members were exposed
to harassment on the basis of sex. However, if named Plaintiffs and
putative class members cannot establish that they even were exposed
to the same conduct on a class-wide basis, they cannot address on a
class-wide basis whether the differing conduct to which they were
exposed was based on sex.

The Plaintiffs have not established that an actionable corporate
policy existed. Plaintiffs have not presented statistical evidence
on that point. And Plaintiffs' anecdotal evidence is insufficient
to establish an actionable policy of failing to take prompt
remedial action in response to credible allegations of improper
conduct, especially in light of the fact that Defendant did
discipline salaried employees for sexual harassment.  

The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs have not met their
burden of satisfying Rule 23(a)'s commonality requirement.

Typicality under Rule 23(a)(3)

Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class. Claims of class representatives and class members are
typical if they arise from the same practice or course of conduct
and are based on the same legal theory.

Plaintiffs recognize that each class member may have witnessed
and/or been subjected to different styles of sexual harassment,
depending on the individual perpetrator and their own reaction.
Still, Plaintiffs argue that minor variations in their experiences
cannot defeat typicality. However, as discussed above, the wide
range of allegations at issue in this case cannot accurately be
characterized as minor variations. With such wide-ranging
allegations, named Plaintiffs' claims cannot be said to have the
same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large.
Named Plaintiffs' and putative class members' claims depend on
exposure to differing conduct, by different employees of Defendant,
in different areas of the Plants, on different shifts, and with
different resolutions. Under such circumstances, named Plaintiffs
cannot be expected to vigorously litigate issues relating to these
crucial aspects of all putative class members' claims, making
denial of class certification for lack of typicality appropriate.
For example, with no named Plaintiffs from the MP&L department at
the Assembly Plant, it is not clear to the Court why any named
Plaintiff would have the incentive to establish the extent to which
improper conduct was occurring in that department.

By attempting to tie together the claims of all named Plaintiffs
and putative class members by using an objective hostile work
environment analysis, Plaintiffs undermine the claims of those who
were exposed to the most egregious misconduct. As the Court has
observed at prior hearings in this case, if the Plaintiffs who
experienced the most severe misconduct identified in the
allegations and deposition testimony in this case can convince a
jury that Defendant was aware of that misconduct and did nothing to
stop and/or punish it, they may be entitled to a large verdict far
larger than any reasonable verdict based on proven allegations of
exposure to sexist graffiti or exposure to isolated comments that
did not bother them. To date, Plaintiffs have not made a showing
that any two individuals much less the class they seek to certify
experienced the same misconduct in the same way.

Perhaps they can with further effort. But for all of these reasons,
the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not at this juncture
satisfied Rule 23(a)'s typicality requirement.

Adequacy of Representation under Rule 23(a)(4)

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs fail to satisfy Rule 23(a)(4)'s
adequacy requirement because (1) the class is permeated by
conflicts of interest (2) Plaintiffs' pursuit of this case in the
face of the EEOC Conciliation Agreement and their attempted
interreference with that agreement render them inadequate class
representatives and (3) Plaintiffs' counsel is not adequate. The
Court addresses each of these arguments in turn.

Conflicts of Interest

Defendant argues that conflicts of interest among named Plaintiffs
and putative class members bars class certification. Specifically,
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the adequacy
requirement because certain named Plaintiffs' and putative class
members also are accused of engaging in the misconduct at issue in
this case. Due process requires that absent class members be
adequately represented in order to be bound by a court's judgment.
Furthermore, Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 expressly
prohibits undertaking a representation of one client that is
"directly adverse to another client. Accordingly, courts have found
inadequate representation where plaintiffs sought to represent a
class that included those who allegedly participated in the
wrongful conduct.  

In this case, on the other hand, Defendant has identified evidence
that named Plaintiffs and putative class members contributed to the
sexually hostile work environment that Plaintiffs challenge.
Plaintiff Van accuses her then supervisor and co-Plaintiff Cephani
Miller of making inappropriate comments. Specifically, Ms. Van
testified that Ms. Miller retaliated against her and asked Ms. Van
whether she thought everyone was sexually harassing her because
she's so sexy. Ms. Van in turn was accused of engaging in
misconduct by putative class member Shanetta Myles. Specifically,
Ms. Myles indicated in an interview that Ms. Van commented on Ms.
Myles's weight and body parts.  

According to Ms. Myles, Ms. Van also stated give me some of those
titties. Similarly, putative class member Rosetta Smith submitted
an affidavit indicating that Maria Price openly discussed her
sexual preferences in the workplace. Ms. Price also would greet
male employees with a hug and often would blow kisses at them.  Ms.
Price testified that Carmel Gregory was interested in a romantic
relationship with Ms. Price and would constantly call Ms. Price to
the office upstairs and tell her how pretty she was and stop giving
Ms. Gregory the babydoll eyes and just to get to know her.

Indeed, in Ms. Price's EEOC Charge, Ms. Price listed Ms. Gregory as
one of her sexual harassers. Plaintiffs also note that an employee
of Defendant testified that Labor Relations representative Natalie
Dahringer told him that Plaintiff Van would need to drop her case
before she would be moved out of her location where she was being
harassed. Although Ms. Dahringer denies this, there is conflicting
testimony on the issue. Plaintiff Helen Allen-Amos accused Monique
Johnson of acting inappropriately by always grabbing on men,
sitting on their laps, and squeezing their butts when she hugged
the men. Defendant's response brief outlines numerous other
examples of allegations of misconduct against women working at the
Plants.

Plaintiffs propose that the Court also could eliminate conflicts of
interest by certifying a subclass of women who have been accused of
engaging in sexual harassment and/or contributing to a sexually
hostile work environment. However, such a definition would be
impermissible vague. Avoiding vagueness is important `because a
court needs to be able to identify who will receive notice, who
will share in any recovery, and who will be bound by a judgment.
The Court has no way of knowing at this time whether any named
Plaintiff or putative class member will be accused of engaging in
misconduct.

In addition to the vagueness problem, conflicts would still remain
within the group of class members accused of misconduct.
Specifically, that group still would include women who allege that
they were harassed by other women within the sub-class. For
example, Ms. Van, who has been accused of misconduct, presumably
would be in that sub-class with Ms. Miller, against whom Ms. Van
has made allegations of misconduct. Plaintiffs' proposed subclasses
do not eliminate the conflicts identified by Defendant.

The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs fail to satisfy Rule
23(a)'s adequacy requirement and denies Plaintiffs' motion for
class certification on that basis.

EEOC Conciliation Agreement

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' pursuit of this case in the face
of the 2017 EEOC Conciliation Agreement and their attempted
interference with that agreement render them inadequate class
representatives. Rule 23(a)(4)'s adequacy requirement is not met
where class representatives fail to act in the best interests of
the unnamed members of the class and do not keep the interests of
the entire class at the forefront.
As noted by Plaintiffs, many claimants had their claims denied
through the EEOC conciliation process. To the extent that these
putative class members have viable claims, it cannot be said that
these putative class members already have adequate remedies in
place.

Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' counsel have
proven their inadequacy by opposing the interests of putative class
members first by filing an emergency motion to prevent their
co-workers from even receiving the Claims Forms that would enable
them to benefit from the Agreement that the EEOC negotiated on
their behalf, and later by filing a motion to stay the distribution
of award notices to those whom the Panel identified as eligible for
an award. Plaintiffs have identified reasons for having concerns
regarding the EEOC claims process. Although the Court previously
declined to interfere with the EEOC claims process, noting that
there was no reason why putative class members who decided to file
claims forms should not be permitted to determine for themselves
whether they want to settle their claims as part of the
conciliation process or pursue other avenues of relief, the Court
is not persuaded that Plaintiffs' efforts relating to the EEOC
claims process demonstrate a failure to act in the best interests
of putative class members.

Adequacy of Counsel

The Court denied Plaintiffs' initial motion for class certification
based on Plaintiffs' failure to establish the adequacy of class
counsel. Since Plaintiffs filed their initial motion for class
certification, however, Plaintiffs have added attorneys from the
law firm of Romanucci & Blandin LLC as class counsel. Although the
qualifications of the attorneys from Romanucci & Blandin LLC are
not disputed, the Court continues to have concerns regarding the
adequacy of counsel as structured.

To begin, Plaintiffs indicate that Mr. Hunt will continue to
control pivotal aspects of this case. Specifically, Plaintiffs
indicate that Mr. Hunt will continue his lead role in client
communication, motion practice, and arguments with the company of
Mr. Romanucci. Although attorneys from Romanucci & Blandin LLC will
act as co-counsel, Mr. Hunt had co-counsel in Warnell, Mr. Hunt's
prior federal class-action lawsuit in which he was sanctioned and
which resulted in numerous malpractice lawsuits.  

The Court therefore is not satisfied that the addition of Romanucci
& Blandin LLC eliminates the adequacy concerns the Court outlined
in its prior decision denying Plaintiffs' initial motion for class
certification.

The Court notes that Plaintiffs' counsel also fail to raise
arguments available to Plaintiffs. For example, Defendant argues
that Plaintiffs could not certify any issue for class treatment
under Rule 23(c)(4) because that rule still requires that the
requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b) be met. The Court agrees with
Defendant's characterization of the law with respect to the Rule
23(a) requirements. Rule 23(c)(4) does not exempt class
representatives from the threshold requirements of Rule 23(a).

Plaintiffs fail entirely to address that authority, even though it
could be helpful to their case for certification under Rule
23(c)(4). Instead, Plaintiffs simply respond that they have
satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b).  In sum, the
Court still has concerns regarding the adequacy of class counsel.
Although these concerns about counsel would not alone be sufficient
to deny certification on adequacy grounds, coupled with the
significant conflicts of interest identified above, the Court
concludes that Plaintiffs have not satisfied Rule 23(a)'s adequacy
requirement.

Rule 23(b) Requirements

Rule 23(b)(3)

To certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class, Plaintiffs must demonstrate
predominance and superiority. It requires that the questions of law
or fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members. The predominance inquiry tests
whether the proposed class is sufficiently cohesive to warrant
adjudication by representation. Plaintiffs satisfy predominance
requirement only if they can show that common questions represent a
significant aspect of a case and can be resolved for all members of
a class in a single adjudication.

Here, the Court agrees that Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden of
establishing that common issues predominate. As discussed above,
Plaintiffs cannot proceed on a pattern and practice theory for
their damages claims. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have not identified
any common issues in this case. Even if Plaintiffs could proceed on
a pattern and practice theory or could otherwise establish employer
liability on a class-wide basis, the Court still would conclude
that common issues do not predominate, as highly-individualized
hearings still would be necessary for each named Plaintiff and each
putative class member. Plaintiffs argue that to the extent that
individual issues remain they can be handled through streamlined
mechanisms" such as affidavits and proper auditing procedures.  

As the district court in that case noted, the individual questions
had straightforward binary answers and the parties could utilize a
form affidavit, with accompanying audit procedures, to address
those questions. The individual questions here are much more
complex. Even assuming that Plaintiffs could establish a basis for
employer liability on a class-wide basis, hundreds if not thousands
of individual hearings still would be necessary to resolve the
remaining elements of Plaintiffs' hostile work environment claims.


The Court therefore concludes that common issues do not
predominate.

Turning to the second prong of Rule 23(b)(3), which is satisfied
when a class action is superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. A class action
is the superior method for managing litigation if no realistic
alternative exists.

The Defendant argues that Plaintiffs here have two superior methods
for evaluating adjudicating class claims the EEOC conciliation
process and individual damages suits.
Plaintiffs respond that the EEOC conciliation process is
inadequate. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that (1) the awards
given were lower than the tier amounts identified in the agreement,
(2) the conciliation process resulted in the denial of more than
one-third of the claims submitted by women, and (3) the claims
process was mechanical and inflexible. With respect to the first
argument, although the awards given were lower than the tier
amounts identified $10,000, $20,000, or $30,000, depending on the
seriousness of the claim), the awards still were consistent with
the terms of the 2017 Conciliation Agreement.  Furthermore,
claimants were informed of the amount of their awards before they
decided whether they would accept their respective awards. The fact
that the award amounts are lower than the presumptive tier amounts
does not itself make the EEOC conciliation process inadequate.

The Plaintiffs' third argument, that the claims process was
mechanical and inflexible because it failed to adequately
distinguish claimants based on the relative severity of the conduct
they experienced, likewise is unpersuasive. In making this
argument, Plaintiffs cite to the fact that a putative class member
who submitted a claim describing egregious sexual harassment only
was offered an award of $24,086.80.   Specifically, this putative
class member's claim form indicates that she was harassed and
assaulted by numerous employees, including a manager. By way of
example, the putative class member indicates that an area manager
threatened her, hit her, choked her, and forced her into a sexual
relationship.  

In another example, the putative class member indicates that she
inappropriately was touched while on Defendant's premises at least
weekly from 2015 to early 2017. The putative class member goes on
to allege additional harassment by numerous employees of Defendant.
The Court agrees that the alleged conduct identified by this
putative class member is appalling. However, for such severe claims
and there may be many such claims in the putative class here
individual Title VII lawsuits are a very viable option, with
significant money damages and attorneys' fees providing the
incentive to litigate.  And those who entered the conciliation
process were under no obligation to take the money offered if they
felt they could do better in litigation.

That leaves Plaintiffs' second argument, that the conciliation
process resulted in the denial of more than one-third of the claims
submitted by women. Without more information regarding why these
claims were denied, the Court is unable fully to evaluate this
argument. In other words, Plaintiffs have not shown that the
damages available to any of the putative class members whose claims
were denied as part of the EEOC conciliation process were too
insignificant to provide them the incentive to pursue their claims
individually.

The Plaintiffs have not met their burden of demonstrating that a
class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy as required to certify a
class under Rule 23(b)(3).

The Court denies the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

A full-text copy of the District Court's dated August 22, 2019
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yyu54fyd from Leagle.com.

Helen Allen, Charmella Leviege, Maria Price, Christie Van,
Jacqueline Barron, Theresa Bosan, Keturah Carter, Michelle Dahn,
Tonya Exum, Jeannette Gardner, Arlene Goforth, Christine Harris,
Orissa Henry, Lawanda Jordan, Danielle Kudirka, Terri
Lewis-Bledsoe, Constance Madison, Cephani Miller, Miyoshi Morris,
Stephanie Szot, Shirley Thomas-Moore, Rose Thomas, Toni Williams,
Bernadette Clyburn, Angela Glenn, Ladwyna Hoover, Latricia
Shanklin, Antoinette Sullivan, Derricka Thomas & Nichea Walls,
Plaintiffs, represented by Keith L. Hunt, Keith L. Hunt &
Associates, P.C., 55 W Monroe St Ste 3600, Chicago, IL, 60603-5026,
Antonio Maurizio Romanucci -- aromanucci@rblaw.net -- Romanucci &
Blandin, LLC, Bhavani Keeran Raveendran -- braveendran@rblaw.net --
Romanucci & Blandin LLC, Bradley Edwin Faber, Hunt & Associates,
P.C., 55 W Monroe St Ste 3600, Chicago, IL, 60603-5026, Bryce
Thomas Hensley -- bhensley@rblaw.net -- Romanucci & Blandin, LLC,
Nicolette A. Ward -
nward@rblaw.net -- Romanucci & Blandin, LLC & Stephan David Blandin
-
sblandin@rblaw.net -- Romanucci & Blandin.

Shranda Campbell, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Cooper, Law
Office of Christopher Cooper, Inc., 79 W Monroe St., Ste 1213,
Chicago, IL 60603

Ford Motor Company, Defendant, represented by Kathleen M. Nemechek,
Berkowitz Oliver LLP, Timothy Scott Millman, Berkowitz Oliver LLP,
2600 Grand Boulevard, Suite 1200, Kansas City, MO 64108, Andrea
Ruth Lucas -- alucas@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP,
pro hac vice, Curtiss Scott Schreiber -- schreiber@dbmslaw.com --
Donohue Brown Mathewson & Smyth, Eugene Scalia, Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, pro hac vice, Jocelyn A. Villanueva, Berkowitz Oliver
LLP, 2600 Grand Boulevard, Suite 1200, Kansas City, MO 64108, Karen
Kies DeGrand -- karen.degrand@dbmslaw.com -- Donohue, Brown,
Mathewson & Smyth LLC, Katherine V.A. Smith --
ksmith@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, pro hac vice,
Mark Howard Boyle -- mark.boyle@dbmslaw.com -- Donohue, Brown,
Mathewson & Smyth, Meagan Pearl Vanderweele, Donohue Brown
Mathewson & Smyth LLC, 140 S Dearborn St. Ste. 800, Chicago,
Illinois, Molly T. Senger -- msenger@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn
& Crutcher LLP, pro hac vice, Naima Lillian Farrell --
nfarrell@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, pro hac
vice, Nicholas Lee Divita, Berkowitz Oliver LLP & Stephen M.
Bledsoe, Berkowitz Oliver Williams Shaw & Eisenbrandt LLP, 2600
Grand Boulevard, Suite 1200, Kansas City, MO 64108

Brittney Carlisle, Respondent, represented by Keith L. Hunt, Keith
L. Hunt & Associates, P.C.

MS. DAWN FARON, Intervenor, represented by Christopher Cooper, Law
Office of Christopher Cooper, Inc.


FRIENDLY'S MANUFACTURING: Fields Files Fraud Class Suit in New York
-------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Friendly's
Manufacturing and Retail, LLC. The case is styled as Miranda Fields
and Jane Doe, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. Friendly's Manufacturing and Retail, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-04924 (E.D. N.Y., Aug. 28, 2019).

The case type is stated as Fraud or Truth-In-Lending.

Friendly's Manufacturing and Retail, LLC (trade name Friendly's) is
in the Family Restaurant Chain business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Spencer I. Sheehan, Esq.
   Sheehan & Associates, P.C.
   505 Northern Boulevard, Suite 311
   Great Neck, NY 11021
   Tel: (516) 303-0552
   Fax: (516) 234-7800
   Email: Spencer@spencersheehan.com

FRONTLINE ASSET: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CYNTHIA JOHNSON,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the
Plaintiff, v. FRONTLINE ASSET STRATEGY, LLC, the Defendant, Case
No. 2:19-cv-01252-PP (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for
an order certifying a class, appointing the Plaintiff as class
representative, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class
Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiffs file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class. Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir.
2017).[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


GENERAL ELECTRIC: Court Issues Confidential Info Production Order
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
issued an Order on Production and Exchange of Confidential
Information in the case captioned In re GE ERISA LITIGATION. This
Document Relates To: ALL ACTIONS. Master File No. 1:17-cv-12123-IT.
(D. Mass.).

This Order shall govern the handling, production, or exchange of
any Material by any Party to this Action, and the handling,
production or exchange of any Material by any non-Party that is
either a Producing Party or Receiving Party.

A full-text copy of the District Court's dated August 22, 2019
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y29ursx5 from
Leagle.com.

Brian Sullivan, Individually and on behalf of a class of all
persons simlarly situated and on behald of the GE RETIREMENT
SAVINGS PLAN, Plaintiff, represented by Lee Squitieri, Squitieri &
Fearon, LLP, 32 E 57th St Fl 12, New York, New York 10022, pro hac
vice, Theodore M. Hess-Mahan -- thess-mahan@hutchingsbarsamian.com
-- Hutchings, Barsamian, Cross and Mandelcorn, LLP, Jacob A. Walker
-- jake@blockesq.com -- Block & Leviton LLP, James S. Notis, Gardy
& Notis, LLP, 440 Sylvan Avenue, Suite 110 Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey 07632, pro hac vice, Jason M. Leviton -jason@blockesq.com --
Block & Leviton LLP, pro hac vice, Jeffrey C. Block --
jeff@blockesq.com -- Block & Leviton LLP & Mark C. Gardy, Gardy &
Notis, LLP, 440 Sylvan Avenue, Suite 110 Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey 07632,  pro hac vice.

General Electric Company, GE Asset Management Incorporated, Dmitri
Stockton, Ralph Richard Layman, Rochelle Lazarus, Matthew Simpson,
Francisco DSouza, Robert Lane, James Tisch, Matthew Zakrzewski,
Marjin Dekkers, Mary Schapiro, Susan Hockfield, John J. Brennan,
Benefit Plans Investment Committee, Michael Cosgrove, W. Geoffrey
Beattie, GE Pension Board, Andrea Jung, David Wiederecht, James
Mulva, Jeffrey Immelt, Don Torey, John Flannery, GEAM Committee,
George Bicher, Jessica Holscott, James Rohr, Greg Hartch, Jeanne
LaPorta, Paul Colonna, GE Board of Directors, Roger Penske, Matt
Cribbins, Keith Sherin, Sam Nunn, Alan Lafley, James Cash, John
Samuels, Carol Anderson, Douglas Warner, Kelly Lafnitzegger, Brian
Worrell, Susan Peters, Jamie Miller, Jan Hauser, Ann Fudge, Robert
Swieringa, Sharon Daley, John Lynch, Tracie Winbigler, Jeff
Bornstein, Puneet Mahajan & Trevor Schauenberg, Defendants,
represented by Alison V. Douglass -adouglass@goodwinlaw.com --
Goodwin Procter, LLP, Jaime A. Santos -- jsantos@goodwinlaw.com --
Goodwin Procter LLP & James O. Fleckner -- jfleckner@goodwinlaw.com
-- Goodwin Procter, LLP.

Dan Torey, Matthew Wiederecht & John Walker, Defendants,
represented by James O. Fleckner, Goodwin Procter, LLP.


GOLUB CAPITAL: Bushansky Suit Over Fifth Ave. Merger Underway
-------------------------------------------------------------
Golub Capital BDC, Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission filed on August 26, 2019, 2019,
that the company continues to defend a class action suit entitled,
Bushansky v. Golub Capital BDC, Inc., et al.

On November 27, 2018, Golub Capital BDC, Inc., a Delaware
corporation ("GBDC"), entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger
(as amended, the "Merger Agreement") with Golub Capital Investment
Corporation, a Maryland corporation ("GCIC"), Fifth Ave Subsidiary
Inc., a Maryland corporation and wholly owned subsidiary of GBDC
("Merger Sub"), GC Advisors, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company and investment adviser to each of GBDC and GCIC ("GC
Advisors"), and, for certain limited purposes, Golub Capital LLC.
The Merger Agreement provides that, subject to the conditions set
forth in the Merger Agreement, Merger Sub will merge with and into
GCIC, with GCIC continuing as the surviving company and as a
wholly-owned subsidiary of GBDC (the "Merger"), and, immediately
thereafter, GCIC will merge with and into GBDC, with GBDC
continuing as the surviving company (together with the Merger, the
"Mergers").

On August 12, 2019, Mr. Stephen Bushansky filed a putative
shareholder class action against GBDC and the individual members of
GBDC's Board of Directors (collectively, the "GBDC Board") in the
Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York (the
"Court").

The case is captioned Bushansky v. Golub Capital BDC, Inc., et al.,
Index. No. 654576 (the "Merger Litigation"). Mr. Bushansky's
lawsuit alleges breach of fiduciary duty claims against GBDC and
the GBDC Board in connection with the solicitation of stockholder
approval of the Mergers contemplated by the Merger Agreement.

Mr. Bushansky alleges, among other things, that GBDC's definitive
proxy statement included in the prospectus filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to Rule 497 of the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended, on July 15, 2019 (the "Proxy
Statement") omitted certain information that he claims is material.
Mr. Bushansky requests that the Court enjoin the transactions
contemplated by the Merger Agreement unless the GBDC Board causes
GBDC to make additional disclosures. Mr. Bushansky requests
attorneys' fees and damages in an unspecified amount.

On August 23, 2019, Mr. Bushansky requested accelerated briefing
for the entry of a preliminary injunction to require GBDC to make
additional disclosures prior to conducting a shareholder vote on
the Mergers by filing a proposed order to show cause.

The Court has not approved the request for an order to show cause,
and the defendants have not yet answered or otherwise responded to
the complaints in the foregoing actions.

Golub Capital BDC, Inc., incorporated on November 9, 2009, is an
externally managed, non-diversified, closed-end, management
investment company. The Company's investment objective is to
generate current income and capital appreciation by investing
primarily in senior secured and one stop loans of the United States
middle-market companies. It may also selectively invest in second
lien and subordinated loans of, and warrants and minority equity
securities in the United States middle-market companies. The
company is based in New York, New York.


HAIN CELESTIAL: Stockholders' Consolidated Class Suit Still Stayed
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Hain Celestial Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 29,
2019, for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2019, that the
stockholders' consolidated class action suit remains stayed.

On April 19, 2017 and April 26, 2017, two class action and
stockholder derivative complaints were filed in the Eastern
District of New York against the Board of Directors and certain
officers of the Company under the captions Silva v. Simon, et al.
(the "Silva Complaint") and Barnes v. Simon, et al. (the "Barnes
Complaint"), respectively.

Both the Silva Complaint and the Barnes Complaint allege violation
of securities law, breach of fiduciary duty, waste of corporate
assets and unjust enrichment.

On May 23, 2017, an additional stockholder filed a complaint under
seal in the Eastern District of New York against the Board of
Directors and certain officers of the Company. The complaint
alleged that the Company's directors and certain officers made
materially false and misleading statements in press releases and
SEC filings regarding the Company's business, prospects and
financial results.

The complaint also alleged that the Company violated its by-laws
and Delaware law by failing to hold its 2016 Annual Stockholders
Meeting and includes claims for breach of fiduciary duty, unjust
enrichment and corporate waste. On August 9, 2017, the Court
granted an order to unseal this case and reveal Gary Merenstein as
the plaintiff (the "Merenstein Complaint").

On August 10, 2017, the court granted the parties stipulation to
consolidate the Barnes Complaint, the Silva Complaint and the
Merenstein Complaint under the caption In re The Hain Celestial
Group, Inc. Stockholder Class and Derivative Litigation (the
"Consolidated Stockholder Class and Derivative Action") and to
appoint Robbins Arroyo LLP and Scott+Scott as Co-Lead Counsel, with
the Law Offices of Thomas G. Amon as Liaison Counsel for
Plaintiffs.

On September 14, 2017, a related complaint was filed under the
caption Oliver v. Berke, et al. (the "Oliver Complaint"), and on
October 6, 2017, the Oliver Complaint was consolidated with the
Consolidated Stockholder Class and Derivative Action. The
Plaintiffs filed their consolidated amended complaint under seal on
October 26, 2017. On December 20, 2017, the parties agreed to stay
Defendants' time to answer, move, or otherwise respond to the
consolidated amended complaint through and including 30 days after
a decision was rendered on the motion to dismiss the Amended
Complaint in the consolidated Consolidated Securities Action.

On March 29, 2019, the Court in the Consolidated Securities Action
granted Defendants' motion, dismissing the Amended Complaint in its
entirety, without prejudice to replead. Co-Lead Plaintiffs in the
Consolidated Securities Actions filed a second amended complaint on
May 6, 2019.

The parties to the Consolidated Stockholder Class and Derivative
Action agreed to continue the stay of Defendants' time to answer,
move, or otherwise respond to the consolidated amended complaint.
The stay is continued through 30 days after the Court rules on the
motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint in the Consolidated
Securities Action.

The Hain Celestial Group, Inc. manufactures, markets, distributes,
and sells organic and natural products. The company operates in
seven segments: the United States, United Kingdom, Tilda, Ella's
Kitchen UK, Canada, Europe, and Cultivate. The Hain Celestial
Group, Inc. was founded in 1993 and is headquartered in Lake
Success, New York.


HECLA MINING: Faces 2 Securities Class Suits in SDNY
----------------------------------------------------
Hecla Mining Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 8, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company is defending
against two class action suits in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York.

On May 24, 2019, a purported Hecla stockholder filed a putative
class action lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York against Hecla and certain of its executive
officers, one of whom is also a director.

The complaint, purportedly brought on behalf of all purchasers of
Hecla common stock from March 19, 2018, through and including May
8, 2019, asserts claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder and seeks, among other things, damages and costs and
expenses.

Specifically, the complaint alleges that Hecla, under the authority
and control of the individual defendants, made certain false and
misleading statements and allegedly omitted certain material
information regarding Hecla's Nevada Operations unit.

The complaint alleges that these actions artificially inflated the
market price of Hecla common stock during the class period, thus
purportedly harming investors.

A second suit was filed on June 19, 2019, alleging virtually
identical claims.

Hecla Mining said, "We cannot predict the outcome of these lawsuits
or estimate damages if plaintiffs were to prevail. We believe that
these claims are without merit and intend to defend them
vigorously."

Hecla Mining Company, together with its subsidiaries, discovers,
acquires, develops, and produces precious and base metal properties
worldwide. The company offers lead, zinc, and bulk flotation
concentrates to custom smelters and brokers; and unrefined gold and
silver bullion bars to precious metals traders. Hecla Mining
Company was founded in 1891 and is headquartered in Coeur d'Alene,
Idaho.


HERTZ CORPORATION: Conditional Class Certification Sought
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as BAMIDELE AIYEKUSIBE, MISCHELE
HIGGINSON, AND SHANTAL BROWN-WINN, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. THE HERTZ
CORPORATION and DTG OPERATIONS, INC., the Defendants, Case No.
2:18-CV-0816-UA-MRM (M.D. Fla.), the Parties ask the Court to enter
an Order:

   1. conditionally certifying a collective action under 29 U.S.C.
      section 216(b):

      "all persons who worked for Defendants The Hertz Corporation

      and DTG Operations, Inc. in the positions of Function
      Manager or Location Manager, at any time from July 1, 2017
      to the present"

   2. reserving Defendants a right to file a motion for
      decertification of the conditionally certified class;

   3. adopting a Stipulation providing that:

      a. Within 21 days of the entry of the Court's Order adopting

         this Stipulation, Defendants shall produce to a mutually
         agreeable Notice Administrator and Plaintiff's counsel a
         list with the names, last known physical addresses,
         telephone numbers, and dates of employment for all
         individuals who worked for Defendants The Hertz
         Corporation and DTG Operations, Inc. in the positions of
         Function Manager or Location Manager, at any time from
         July 1, 2017 to the present.

      b. Plaintiffs' counsel agrees to the following conditions
         regarding the list: (1) Plaintiffs'counsel will not
         contact anyone on the list during the notice period --
         only the Notice Administrator may do so; (2) Plaintiffs'
         counsel will treat the list as confidential and as
         "attorneys'eyes only"; and (3) Plaintiffs' counsel agrees

         to destroy all copies of the list within 14 days of the
         conclusion of this case and the exhaustion of any
         appeals, and will notify Defendants' counsel of
         doing so.

      c. The Parties shall refrain from initiating contact with
         any individuals disclosed by Defendants pursuant to this
         Stipulation and the Order on this Stipulation for reasons

         related to this action; except for as provided for in
         this Order, upon leave of the Court, or after a Consent
         to Join has been filed for such individual.

      d. Within 30 days of the Court's issuance of an Order on
         this Stipulation, the Plaintiffs'counsel will take
         reasonable actions to facilitate the Notice Administrator

         issuing initial Notice via U.S. Mail to all individuals
         whose contact information was provided by Defendants
         pursuant to this Stipulation and the Order on this
         Stipulation. Such Notice shall be in the form of the
         Notice, and include the parties agreed upon Consent to
         Join form. The Notice will not be provided to any
         individual who has previously filed a Consent to Join in
         this case, or who files a Consent to Join within 25 days
         of entry of the Order on this Stipulation.

      e. Within 30 days of sending the initial Notice, the Notice
         Administrator shall be permitted to issue a "reminder"
         Notice that is identical in all respects to the initial
         Notice, with a blind copy to Defendants' counsel. The
         "reminder” Notice need not be provided to any individual

         who has filed a Consent to Join.

      f. Plaintiffs' counsel may not post the Notice to any firm
         website.

      g. The Notice Administrator may create a website for the
         purposes of posting the identical Notice and Consent to
         Joint Form, and links or incorporated system which may
         allow for electronic signing and collection of the
         Consent to Join form. The website shall have no other
         content. Alternatively the Notice Administrator may post
         the notice and content on its own website in duplication
         of the notice and consent form and with links or
         instructions for electronically signing and submitting
         the consent to join form.

      h. Plaintiffs' counsel shall endeavor to file with the Court

         any Consent to Join forms received from opt-in Plaintiffs

         within one week of receipt. Unless the Parties permit
         late filings, or good cause can be shown for why consent
         was not provided by the deadline, all Consent to Join
         forms must be postmarked or facsimile time-stamped no
         later than the 60th day after the date of mailing of the
         first Notice by Plaintiffs' counsel.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Mitchell L. Feldman, Esq.
          FELDMAN LEGAL GROUP
          6940 W. Linebaugh Avenue, Suite 101
          Tampa, FL 33625
          Telephone: (813) 639-9366
          Facsimile: (813) 639-9376
          E-mail: MLF@feldmanlegal.us
                  kimp@feldmanlegal.us

Attorneys for Hertz and DTG Operations, Inc. are:

          John E. Phillips, Esq.
          Reed L. Russell, Esq.
          Erin L. Malone, Esq.
          PHELPS DUNBAR LLP
          100 South Ashley Drive, Suite 1900
          Tampa, FL 33602-5311
          Telephone: (813) 472-7865
          Facsimile: (813) 472-7570
          E-mail: john.phillips@phelps.com
                  reed.russell@phelps.com
                  erin.malone@phelps.com

HERTZ CORPORATION: Court Narrows Claims in Bradley Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned EMMA
BRADLEY, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. THE HERTZ CORPORATION, Defendant. Case No.
3:15-CV-652-NJR-RJD. (S.D. Ill.).

Plaintiff Emma Bradley, a Missouri citizen, filed this putative
class action against Hertz alleging that she and a class of
consumers who rented vehicles from Hertz were compelled by Hertz to
pay improper, deceptive, unfair and unethical fees.

The Missouri Merchandising Practices Act

The MMPA is a consumer protection statute created to supplement the
common law definition of fraud and to preserve fundamental honesty,
fair play and right dealings in public transactions.

To succeed on a cause of action under the MMPA, a plaintiff must
prove that: (1) she purchased or leased merchandise (2) the
merchandise was for personal, family, or household purposes (3) she
suffered an ascertainable loss of money and (4) the loss was the
result of an unlawful act, as defined by the statute.  

Misrepresentation Claims (Count I and IV)

Hertz argues it is entitled to summary judgment on Bradley's
misrepresentation claims for two reasons. First, Bradley admitted
that Hertz never misrepresented anything to her. Second, Bradley
cannot show that any alleged misrepresentations in the website
descriptions caused her an ascertainable loss when she never saw
the descriptions she claims are deceiving.  

As a preliminary matter, the Court disagrees with Hertz's argument
that the fee names must have led her to book the reservation with
Hertz. The MMPA does not have a reliance requirement that is, a
consumer need not prove that she relied on the unfair act in
deciding to purchase or lease the merchandise. Instead, the MMPA
requires a causal connection only between the unfair or deceptive
merchandising practice and the plaintiff's ascertainable loss. In
other words, the unlawful practice must have caused Bradley a loss,
but it need not have caused Bradley to make a purchase.

Nevertheless, the Court finds that both of Bradley's
misrepresentation claims fail as a matter of law, because she
cannot prove that any misrepresentation caused her a loss. Bradley
testified that she never received or saw a document from Hertz that
was deceiving or misrepresented the facts with respect to either
the Energy Surcharge or the VLCR. In fact, the only evidence in the
record indicating Hertz ever harmed Bradley is her testimony that
the charges on her receipt were inaccurate because the fees were
higher than they should have been not that the names or
descriptions of the fees were factually inaccurate or misleading.

Because Bradley admitted that Hertz has never misrepresented
anything to her, Counts I and IV must fail.

Even if Bradley had not made these admissions in her deposition,
her claims, at least with regard to the website descriptions, fail
for another reason: Bradley could not have suffered an
ascertainable loss when she admits she has never to this day viewed
the alleged misrepresentations on Hertz's website.

The Court agrees with Judge Sykes in her dissent that nothing more
is needed than an allegation that the plaintiff viewed the
defendant's website, which contained the alleged misrepresentations
at the motion to dismiss stage. At the summary judgment stage,
however, Bradley has the burden of proof of demonstrating the
essential elements of her case.  

Here, she has failed to do so. Because Bradley never read the
website descriptions, she cannot prove any causal connection
between the alleged misrepresentations and any loss she suffered.

Accordingly, summary judgment is granted to Hertz on Counts I and
IV.

Omission Claims (Counts II and V)

Hertz next argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on
Bradley's claims that Hertz omitted material facts related to the
fees. With regard to the Energy Surcharge, Bradley alleges that
Hertz failed to inform consumers that it: was imposing the Energy
Surcharge even though energy costs were declining; based the Energy
Surcharge on projected 2008 costs without reviewing them after the
fact and discovering the projections failed to come to fruition;
included non-energy related costs of replacement tires and water
utilities; kept the Energy Surcharge in place even after becoming
aware of economic projections indicating 2009 fuel costs were
expected to decline drastically.

With regard to the VLCR, Bradley claims Hertz failed to inform
consumers that: only 12 percent of the VLCR actually recovers
licensing costs; even considering all costs the VLCR does recover,
it generally results in an overcharge; because the VLCR is charged
as a percentage of the daily rate, it does not provide a fair
allocation of Hertz's costs among its customers; the fee was
different for different cars even though the licensing expense was
the same; the way the fee was calculated reflected the limitations
of Hertz's computer system; and the fee is not based on the
percentage of licensing expense attributable to the consumer's
rental  

Hertz asserts that these alleged omissions are just another way to
say that Hertz misrepresented the truth. Furthermore, Hertz
asserts, Bradley has failed to show that the omissions were
material when there is no evidence she would have found it
important to know how Hertz calculates its fees when deciding
whether to rent a vehicle from Hertz. Finally, Hertz contends that
Bradley has not shown that any alleged omissions caused her a loss
when she never saw the statements with the alleged omissions.

In response, Bradley argues it is irrelevant whether there is
evidence that she would have found it important to know how Hertz
calculates its fees when deciding whether to rent a car from the
company. Rather, the Court should consider whether there is any
evidence that a reasonable consumer would find a fact important to
consider in deciding whether to rent from Hertz. Here, that
evidence exists in the form of her expert's testimony that a
consumer would be more willing to choose Hertz than another rental
company because of Hertz's terms and explanations.

Despite Bradley's arguments to the contrary, the Court finds that
her omission claims, which only relate to the website descriptions,
fail as a matter of law because she never read the website
descriptions in the first place. Bradley is correct that the Court
should use a reasonable consumer standard in determining whether an
omitted fact would be important to the purchasing decision, but
while the reasonable consumer standard is relevant to whether a
practice is unlawful under the MMPA, it is not relevant to whether
there was an ascertainable loss to the plaintiff.

Here, Bradley never viewed the website descriptions that contained
the alleged omissions, so she cannot prove that, but for the
omissions, she would not have sustained a loss. Just as with her
misrepresentation claims, Bradley cannot prove she suffered an
ascertainable loss as a result of Hertz's omissions. Accordingly,
Hertz is entitled to summary judgment on Counts II and V.

Unfair Practices Claims (Counts III and VI)

Lastly, Hertz argues that Bradley's unfair practices claims in
Counts III and VI fail as a matter of law because she is
essentially relabeling her misrepresentation and omission claims as
unfair practices. Because she cannot show causation with regard to
those claims, Hertz argues, her unfair practices claims should also
fail.

Bradley, on the other hand, argues that her unfair practices claims
relate to the actual miscalculation of the fees, not Hertz's
representations regarding what the fees pay for. For example,
Bradley alleges that Hertz: based its calculation of the Energy
Surcharge on projections of costs that did not come to fruition;  

With regard to the VLCR, Bradley claims Hertz engaged in unfair
practices in that: 88 percent of the costs Hertz included in the
VLCR were not costs it incurred for licensing and registering its
vehicles; Hertz persistently overcharges for those costs and does
not reimburse customers for the overcharges; and Hertz unfairly and
unethically sets the VLCR as a percentage of its daily rates rather
than a flat fee, resulting in an inequitable allocation of costs
among consumers.

Although Hertz couches Bradley's unfair practices claims as mere
restatements of her misrepresentation claims, the Court is not
convinced. As pleaded, the alleged unfair practices are independent
acts that a jury could find to be unlawful under the MMPA.
The unfair practices are not relying on the same baseline
allegation that Hertz misled consumers by hiding information.

Of course, there is still a causation requirement. Bradley must be
able to prove that Hertz's unfair practices caused her to suffer an
ascertainable loss. In the Third Amended Complaint, Bradley claims
that, as a result of Hertz's acts as described above, she and the
class she seeks to represent suffered an ascertainable loss when
they paid more than they should have for both the Energy Surcharge
and the VLCR (See Doc. 148). Hertz has neither argued the merits of
this allegation nor presented any evidence demonstrating that this
claim ultimately would fail as a matter of law.

Accordingly, the Court declines to grant summary judgment on
Bradley's unfair practices claims in Counts III and VI.

The Court grants in part and denies in part the Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by Defendant The Hertz Corporation. Counts I, II,
IV, and V are dismissed with prejudice as to named Plaintiff Emma
Bradley.

A full-text copy of the District Court's dated August 22, 2019
Memorandum and Order is available at  https://tinyurl.com/yyr47tej
from Leagle.com.

Emma Bradley, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony S. Bruning, Bruning Law
Firm, Anthony S. Bruning, Jr., Bruning Law Firm, 555 Washington
Ave, Saint Louis, MO, 63101-1249 -- Kevin P. Green --
kevin@ghalaw.com -- Goldenberg Heller & Antognoli PC, Mark C.
Goldenberg -- mark@ghalaw.com -- Goldenberg Heller & Antognoli PC,
Richard S. Cornfeld, Law Office of Richard S. Cornfeld, 1010 Market
St # 1605, Saint Louis, MO, 63101, Thomas P. Rosenfeld --
tom@ghalaw.com -- Goldenberg Heller & Antognoli PC, Daniel Scott
Levy, Law Office of Richard S. Cornfeld, 1010 Market St # 1605,
Saint Louis, MO, 63101, David G. Bender --
DBENDER@ROSENBLUMGOLDENHERSH.COM -- Rosenblum, Goldenhersh et al.,
Edward M. Roth, Bruning Law Firm, 555 Washington Ave, Saint Louis,
MO, 63101-124, Jessica C. Gittemeier --
JGITTEMEIER@ROSENBLUMGOLDENHERSH.COM -- Rosenblum, Goldenhersh et
al. & Richard S. Bender -- rbender@rgsz.com -- Rosenblum,
Goldenhersh et al.

The Hertz Corporation, Defendant, represented by Andrew J. Lichtman
-- alichtman@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP, Daniel J. Weiss --
dweiss@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block, LLP, Jacob D. Alderdice --
jalderdice@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP, Joel T. Pelz --
jpelz@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block, LLP, John F. Ward, Jr.-
jward@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block, LLP, Ross B. Bricker --
rbricker@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block, LLP & William D. Heinz --
wheinz@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block, LLP.


HICKORY RIDGE: Murphy Files ADA Class Action in New York
--------------------------------------------------------
Hickory Ridge RV Resort Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as James Murphy, on behalf of himself and all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Hickory Ridge RV Resort Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-08053 (S.D. N.Y., Aug. 28, 2019).

Hickory Ridge RV Resort Inc. is an RV Park with an 18 hole, par-72
professional golf course, located between Rochester and Buffalo,
near Niagara Falls and just 1.5 miles from the Erie Canal walking
trails .[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Zare Khorozian, Esq.
   Zare Khorozian Law, LLC
   1047 Anderson Avenue
   Fort Lee, NJ 07024
   Tel: (201) 957-7269
   Email: zare@zkhorozianlaw.com

HR STAFFING: Martinez-Zungia Sues Over Unpaid Minimum & OT Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
MARIA MARTINEZ-ZUNGIA, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. HR STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC., a corporation;
CLW Foods, LLC, a limited liability company; and DOES 1-20,
inclusive, Case No. 19STCV29270 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty.,
Aug. 21, 2019), alleges that the Defendants have engaged in a
uniform policy and systematic scheme of wage abuse against the
Plaintiff and their other non-exempt employees by, among other
things, failing to provide meal and rest breaks and failing to pay
minimum and overtime wages.

HR Staffing Solutions Inc. provides staffing services to various
employers throughout the Los Angeles area.

CLW Foods, LLC sells and distributes meat products to various
restaurants throughout Southern California.  The Plaintiff is
unaware and ignorant of the true names and capacities of the Doe
Defendants.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Caspar Jivalagian, Esq.
          Vache A. Thomassian, Esq.
          KJT LAW GROUP, LLP
          230 N. Maryland Avenue, Suite 306
          Glendale, CA 91206
          Telephone: (818) 507-8525
          Facsimile: (818) 507-8588
          E-mail: caspar@KJTlawgroup.com
                  vache@kjtlawgroup.com

               - and -

          Christopher A. Adams, Esq.
          ADAMS EMPLOYMENT COUNSEL
          230 N. Maryland Avenue, Suite 306
          Glendale, CA 91206
          Telephone: (818) 425-1437
          E-mail: CA@AdamsEmploymentCounsel.com


HUDSON VALLEY: Objections to Denial of Spoliation Sanctions Junked
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the  Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order overruling Plaintiffs' objection
on Judge decision to deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Spoliation
Sanctions in the case captioned JOSE RIVERA, individually and on
behalf of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. HUDSON
VALLEY HOSPITALITY GROUP, INC.; GOLDFISH RESTAURANTS, INC.; MICHAEL
CASARELLA; and ATHANASIOS STRATIGAKIS. Defendants. No. 17-CV-5636
(KMK). (S.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiff brings this putative Class Action against Hudson Valley
Hospitality Group, Inc.  Goldfish Restaurants, Inc., Michael
Casarella and Athanasios Stratigakis, asserting claims for failure
to pay overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1983
(FLSA) and Articles 6 and 19 of the New York Labor Law (NYLL).

The Plaintiff objects to Judge Smith's decision not to impose
spoliation sanctions.

Specifically, Plaintiff argues that: (1) Judge Smith erred in
holding that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendants violated
a duty to preserve Plaintiff's time records (2) Judge Smith erred
in holding that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendants
destroyed the original time records after the lawsuit began, and
thus failed to establish that Defendants had a culpable state of
mind (3) Judge Smith erred in holding that an adverse inference
instruction was not warranted and (4) Judge Smith erred by not
awarding Plaintiff attorneys' fees.  

Application

Duty to Preserve Under FLSA and NYLL

The Plaintiff argues that Judge Smith incorrectly held that an
employer can destroy its original, contemporaneous time records
within the statutory periods prescribed by the FLSA and NYLL's
record keeping requirements.

The Plaintiff first argues that Judge Smith cited the incorrect
provision of law when she applied 12 N.Y.C.R.R. Section 142, rather
than 12 N.Y.C.R.R. Section 146, which pertains specifically to the
hospitality industry. However, the recordkeeping standards included
in these two provisions are substantively identical. Under 12
N.Y.C.R.R. Section 142-2.6, Every employer shall establish,
maintain, and preserve for not less than six years, weekly payroll
records. Under 12 N.Y.C.R.R. Section 146-2.1(a), Every employer
shall establish, maintain, and preserve for at least six years
weekly payroll records.

Thus the application of Section 142 rather than Section 146 is, at
most, harmless error.

Next, Plaintiff interprets Section 146-2.1(e), which provides that
employers, including those who maintain their records containing
the information required by this section shall make such records or
sworn certified copies thereof available at the place of employment
upon request of the commissioner, and NYLL Section 195(4), which
provides that an employer must establish, maintain, and preserve
for not less than six years contemporaneous, true, and accurate
payroll records, to mean that employers must keep the original
versions of all employee time records, and argues Judge Smith
committed clear error by holding otherwise.

However, there is nothing in the statutory language mandating the
preservation of original time records, rather than preserving the
same information contained in those time records in another format.
Indeed, the word original appears nowhere in Section 146-2.1 or
Section 195(4). Although Plaintiff argues that his conclusion
reflects well-settled law, he cites only a single case in support
of this proposition, issued in 1972.  Even if that case was binding
on this Court, the court there was not evaluating the culpability
of a party who spoliated evidence, but rather determining whether a
government contractor failed to maintain adequate and accurate
payroll records as required by 41 U.S.C. Section 36, a statute not
at issue in this Action.
The Court therefore finds no clear error in Judge Smith's
conclusion that Defendants' failure to retain the original
handwritten time records violated any duty to preserve payroll
records under state law.

Plaintiff's argument that Judge Smith misinterpreted the
regulations pertaining to the FLSA is similarly unavailing. Federal
regulations require that every employer shall maintain and preserve
payroll or other records and that each employer shall preserve for
at least 3 years from the last date of entry, all payroll or other
records containing the employee information and data required under
any of the applicable sections of this part. As Judge Smith
observed, none of these requirements require that such records must
be original and absolutely contemporaneous with the work so
recorded. Judge Smith held that so long as employee work records
are (a) accurate, (b) are prepared at or near the time of work
performed, and (c) are maintained, the requirements of 29 C.F.R.
Section 516.5 are satisfied.

Absent any caselaw to the contrary, the Court finds that Judge
Smith's conclusion was not clear error. Plaintiff did not adduce
any evidence suggesting that the records produced by the Defendant
were inaccurate. Plaintiff suggests that without original copies of
the handwritten records, there is no proof that Defendants did not
simply make up some fake time records once they were sued.  

The Court finds only that Judge Smith did not clearly err in
holding that the failure to retain the handwritten timesheets on
which electronic payroll records are based does not, without more,
violate the obligation to preserve such records warranting
spoliation sanctions.

Culpable State of Mind

The state of mind of the alleged spoliator determines what standard
is necessary to prove relevance. The level of culpability is
important because when bad faith is found, the court presumes
relevance and when a party is grossly negligent, relevance is
presumed under certain circumstances and a movant need not
separately demonstrate the relevance of the material.

Judge Smith held that the evidence as to whether Defendants acted
with a culpable state of mind is equivocal at best. She reasoned
that the inconclusive nature of Casarella's testimony, in which he
was unable to identify exactly when the originals were discarded,
and the absence of any other evidence on the subject, precluded her
from finding that the records were destroyed after the start of the
litigation.  Because Plaintiff failed to offer any evidence of bad
faith, Judge Smith did not clearly err in holding that Plaintiff
failed to demonstrate that Defendants acted with a culpable state
of mind.

Relevance to Plaintiff's Claims

To prove relevance, the party must show that the destroyed evidence
was relevant' to the party's claim or defense such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support that
claim or defense. Judge Smith held that there is no evidence in the
record that the contents of the handwritten time records differ in
any way from the typewritten time records contained in the Excel
spreadsheets and that the original timesheets are therefore not
relevant to any claim or defense.  Furthermore, Judge Smith found
that even if Defendants negligently destroyed the handwritten
timesheets, an adverse inference instruction would not be an
appropriate sanction because any claim of prejudice is
speculative.

The Court finds no clear error in Judge Smith's conclusions.
Because Plaintiff failed to introduce any evidence that the
handwritten records would reveal something that contradicts the
typewritten records, his claim that the original timesheets were
relevant fails. Plaintiff argues that the mere fact that the
handwritten copies were lost demonstrates that they would have
contradicted the typewritten records.   Plaintiff cites no case
that supports this argument. Nor could he, as the caselaw supports
the notion that the mere loss of original copies of evidence does
not automatically warrant preclusion of that evidence or an adverse
inference instruction.   

However, the Court agrees with Judge Smith's finding that although
an adverse inference instruction is unwarranted, evidence of the
destruction of the original handwritten time records as well as the
creation of the Excel spreadsheets may be admissible at trial.

New Evidence

Plaintiff seeks to introduce metadata evidence showing that the
handwritten records were destroyed after the litigation had begun,
as well as evidence from class discovery, proffered for the first
time in Plaintiff's Reply, showing that Defendants did not have
records, handwritten or computerized, for any other back of the
house kitchen staff employee.

While the Court is generally not precluded from considering
additional evidence not submitted by a party to a magistrate judge
when reviewing a report and recommendation issued by such a judge
on a dispositive motion pursuant to Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, there is nothing in Rule 72(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure which states that it may do so on a
non-dispositive issue, such as that decided here. Indeed, the Court
has not found a case in which Rule 72(a) objections are sustained
based on evidence not presented to the magistrate judge and
Plaintiff concedes that "there are no cases on record on which
objections were sustained based on additional evidence, but argues
that this case should be the first.

In light of the overwhelming caselaw in the Second Circuit
indicating that courts may not consider evidence not presented to
the magistrate judge in connection with the original
non-dispositive motion, the Court declines to consider the new
evidence submitted by Plaintiff.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's dated August 22, 2019
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2lsk5fa from
Leagle.com.

Jose Rivera, Individually and on behalf of all persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jordan Alexander El-Hag, El-Hag
and Associates, P.C., 777 westchester Ave, Suite 101, White Plains,
NY, 10604

Michael Casarella, Athanasios Stratigakis, Hudson Valley
Hospitality Group, Inc. & Goldfish Restaurants, Inc., Defendants,
represented by Mark Anthony Rubeo, Jr. , Reisman, Rubeo & McClure,
LLP, 151 Broadway, Hawthorne, NY, 10532-1103 & Sharman Toby Propp ,
Sharman T. Propp, Attorney At Law, 138 Sleepy Hollow Rd.,
Briarcliff Manor, NY 10510


HUNTINGTON NATIONAL: Ohio Flips Appeals Ruling in Cheatham IRA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Paul Cheatham I.R.A., Appellee, v. Huntington
National Bank, Appellant. No. 2018-0184. (Ohio), presents a
question of first impression regarding the rights of a bondholder
to seek redress for injuries suffered by a prior holder of the
bonds.  At common law, only the person who suffered the injury can,
absent assignment of a chose in action, seek redress for the
injury.  The Sixth District Court of Appeals found a statutory
exception to the common-law rule for securities under R.C.
1308.16(A) (Ohio's codification of Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC")
8-302), which states that "a purchaser of a certificated or
uncertificated security acquires all rights in the security that
the transferor had or had power to transfer."  The court of appeals
held that this statute allows a purchaser of a bond to assert a
breach-of-contract claim that accrued before the bondholder's
purchase because the purchaser acquired the rights of one who held
the bond when the breach allegedly occurred.

The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the court of
appeals.

The Cheatham IRA filed a class-action complaint, alleging that
Huntington had breached the trust indenture. It alleged that the
trust indenture required Huntington to exercise the rights and
power vested in it by the trust indenture using the same degree of
care and skill that a prudent person would exercise or use under
the circumstances in the conduct of that person's own affairs. It
further alleged that Huntington allowed the Villa North project to
be mismanaged despite having available to it different remedies
that could have protected the interests of the bondholders.

The Cheatham IRA asked the court to certify a class of more than 50
bondholders who owned bonds secured by the Villa North project.

The trial court held that commonality had not been established. It
found that the Cheatham IRA had alleged numerous breaches of the
trust indenture over a significant period of time and that the
original bondholders' claims based on those breaches did not
transfer to subsequent purchasers under the rights in the security
language in R.C. 1308.16(A).

On appeal, the Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed. That court
noted that the Cheatham IRA had phrased the issue as whether the
purchaser of a bond acquires causes of action that arose, under the
terms of a Trust Indenture, prior to the time that the bondholder
acquired the bonds.

The court of appeals held that a contract claim for breach of the
Trust Indenture, whether asserted against the trustee or the
obligor, arises out of the contract with the bondholders and is
thus a right in the security' that automatically transfers to
subsequent purchasers pursuant to R.C. 1308.16(A).

The law distinguishes the rights inuring to the possession of
property from personal rights or claims that remain with the seller
or transferor of that property after sale to another. A personal
right is known as a chose in action, meaning a proprietary right in
personam, such as a debt owed by another person, a share in a
joint-stock company, or a claim for damages in tort.

There is no question that the Cheatham IRA purchased its bonds
after Huntington allegedly breached the trust indenture. There is
likewise no question that the Cheatham IRA has not been assigned
any rights to causes of action by a party who held the bonds at a
time when the Cheatham IRA alleges that Huntington's alleged breach
occurred. The Cheatham IRA has stated that its class certification
effort is based upon the fundamental proposition that the purchase
of one of the bonds at issue in this case gives the purchaser all
of the rights in that bond that the seller had prior to the sale.
That includes any claim that the seller had against Huntington
Bank. The trial court noted that the Cheatham IRA conceded that if
its interpretation of R.C. 1308.16 is incorrect, class
certification is not justified in this case.

The court of appeals erred to the extent that it held that a
breach-of-contract claim that accrued before the sale of a bond
automatically transferred with the bond under R.C. 1308.16(A).
While language in R.C. 1308.16(A) stating that a purchaser of a
certificated or uncertificated security acquires all rights in the
security that the transferor had or had power to transfer might
superficially support the conclusion that it provides for the
automatic assignment of any rights held by the prior bondholder,
the drafting history of this section shows that it does not apply
to transfers of choses in action.

The clearest statement of intent behind R.C. 1308.16(A) is
contained in the Official Comment to that section: Subsection (a)
provides that a purchaser of a certificated or uncertificated
security acquires all rights that the transferor had or had power
to transfer. This statement of the familiar shelter' principle is
qualified by the exceptions that a purchaser of a limited interest
acquires only that interest, subsection (b), and that a person who
does not qualify as a protected purchaser cannot improve its
position by taking from a subsequent protected purchaser,
subsection (c).

In other words, after property has passed into the hands of a bona
fide purchaser, subsequent purchasers, even those with notice of
asserted defenses, take clear of the defense. The reason is to
protect the bona fide purchaser so that he can sell what he has
purchased. As an expression of the shelter rule, Section 8-302(a)
does not define rights in the security' as any right associated
with the security that the transferor had or had power to transfer.
Instead, the phrase had or had power to transfer' stands for the
unremarkable proposition that people cannot transfer rights that
they do not own or control.

The Court holds that R.C. 1308.16(A) does not operate to allow the
automatic assignment of rights upon a transfer of title; it sets
forth only the shelter rule of securities the transferee takes all
rights in the thing transferred that the transferor had the power
to give.

It follows that absent specific assignment of a chose in action for
breach of contract, the trust indenture here does not automatically
assign that right. The Cheatham IRA has, by virtue of being a
bondholder, standing to enforce the terms of the trust indenture,
but that does not mean that it was assigned a chose in action that
accrued before it owned the bonds. The Cheatham IRA has been clear
that its claim is based on Huntington's alleged failure to act upon
notice of the initial default. Only those who owned the bonds at
the time of the original default could bring an action for that
breach of the trust indenture.

This case came to the state Supreme Court on appeal from a judgment
finding that the court of common pleas erred by refusing to certify
a class action on grounds that the class lacked commonality. A
class action is a representative action in which a plaintiff sues a
defendant on behalf of a group or class of absent persons who have
suffered harm similar in kind to the named plaintiff. As applicable
here, the Cheatham IRA relies on Civ.R. 23(B)(3) as a basis for
certifying a class: the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

The Cheatham IRA concedes that if a breach-of-contract claim did
not automatically transfer, a class action is no longer viable. The
Court therefore reverses the judgment of the Sixth District Court
of Appeals, and the Court remands to the court of common pleas for
further proceedings.

A full-text copy of the state Supreme Court's dated August 22, 2019
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2swmu3g from
Leagle.com.

Strauss Troy, 150 E 4th St #4, Cincinnati, OH 4520 and Ronald R.
Parry, 150 E 4th St., The Federal Reserve Bldg., Cincinnati, OH,
45202-4018, for appellee.

Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., Kathleen M. Trafford --
ktrafford@porterwright.com -- J. Philip Calabrese, 950 Main Ave.
Ste. 500, Cleveland, Ohio and Jay A. Yurkiw, 41 South High Street
Suite 2900 Columbus, OH 43215, for appellant.

Thompson Hine, L.L.P., Scott A. King -- Scott.King@ThompsonHine.com
-- Brian J. Lamb -- Brian.Lamb@ThompsonHine.com -- and Terry W.
Posey Jr. -- terry.posey@thompsonhine.com -- urging reversal for
amicus curiae American Bankers Association.

Dennis D. Hisch, 303 E Broad Street, Columbus, OH, 43215-3201,
urging reversal for amici curiae commercial-law professors.


ILLINOIS: Court Denies Class Certification & Tosses Perconti Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly issued an order in the lawsuit
captioned Thomas Perconti (B-38657) v. John Baldwin, et al., Case
No. 1:19-cv-03566 (N.D. Ill.), denying the Plaintiff's motion for
class certification and dismissing his complaint.

If the Plaintiff wants to proceed with this action, he must submit
an amended complaint that complies with this order, Judge Kennelly
ruled.  Failure to submit an amended complaint by September 23,
2019, will result in summary dismissal of this action, Judge
Kennelly added.

The Court defers ruling on the Plaintiff's motion for attorney
representation.  The Clerk of Court is directed to send the
Plaintiff an amended complaint form and instructions along with a
copy of this order.

Thomas Perconti, an Illinois prisoner, has filed a pro se lawsuit
under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 concerning his experiences at the
Stateville Correctional Center.  The Plaintiff, who is incarcerated
at the Lawrence Correctional Center, makes occasional trips to
Stateville's Northern Reception and Classification Center (NRC) to
attend court.  Sometimes the trips are monthly but other times
months elapse between trips, with each trip resulting in a stay of
about two weeks before the Plaintiff is returned to Lawrence.

"Suffice it to say that Plaintiff does not like his visits to the
NRC. His 91-page complaint consists of 38 single-spaced, typed
pages of allegations accompanied by 53 pages of exhibits that
largely reiterate the issues asserted in his allegations.  The
scope of the allegations are wide-ranging and cover nearly every
aspect of an inmate's experience at the NRC," according to the
Order.

Judge Kennelly opined that the Plaintiff's complaints about the
conditions at the NRC are, for the most part, generalized insofar
as he would like to bring this lawsuit as a class action.  He may
not, however, represent a class pro se, Judge Kennelly noted.

"In other words, Plaintiff may not pursue in this lawsuit claims
about every event or adverse condition he experienced or heard
about at the NRC.  He must limit his allegations to events that
occurred and matters that he (not others) experienced, at
identifiable times and identifiable places.  He also may not
combine unrelated claims into a single lawsuit, which means that he
may not bring claims concerning the conditions in his cell in the
same lawsuit as claims concerning a denial of religious services or
allegedly retaliatory conduct involving, for instance, a denial of
yard time," Judge Kennelly said.[CC]


INDIANA: Jeffers' Pro Se Rights Dismissed as Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division, issued an Order dismissing
Prisoner's Pro Se Complaint in the case captioned NATHANIEL
JEFFERS, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT E. CARTER, et al. Defendants. No.
1:19-cv-03278-JRS-DLP. (S.D. Ind.).

Because the plaintiff is a prisoner as defined by 28 U.S.C. Section
1915A(c), this Court has an obligation under 28 U.S.C. Section
1915A(b) to screen his complaint before service on the defendants.

Plaintiff Nathaniel Jeffers is a prisoner currently incarcerated at
the Pendleton Correctional Facility (Pendleton). He brings this
civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.   

The complaint names the following defendants: 1) Commissioner
Robert E. Carter; 2) Warden Dushan Zatecky; and 3) Assistant Warden
Duane Alsip. The plaintiff sues each defendant in his individual
and official capacity. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages
and injunctive relief.

The plaintiff alleges that Pendleton is overcrowded. He alleges
that the Warden and Assistant Warden have started double-bunking
inmates. He also alleges that due to the overcrowding and being on
lockdown, medical treatments have been delayed and denied. He
alleges many inmates have suffered from delayed treatment.

The plaintiff further alleges that Pendleton is understaffed which
has led to denials of recreation and visitation. He alleges that
violence among the prison inmates has increased. Also on his list
of complaints is the number of hours between meals, that the
nutritional value of meals is not adequate for grown men, and the
kitchen equipment is not properly sanitized. Finally, he complains
that the Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC) has revised the
grievance policies to make it more difficult for inmates to
complete the process. He alleges that these conditions violate his
Eighth Amendment rights.

Pursuant to the Eighth Amendment, prison officials have a duty to
provide humane conditions of confinement, meaning, they must take
reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates and
ensure that they receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and
medical care.  

To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must
allege facts sufficient to support a claim that the conditions of
his confinement resulted in the denial of the minimal civilized
measure of life's necessities, and that the defendants were
deliberately indifferent to the conditions in which he was held.  

The overarching problem with the plaintiff's complaint is that he
does not allege that he has suffered any compensable injury as a
result of overcrowding or the other conditions he describes.
Section 1983 allows for recovery only by a party injured by a
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws.  

Double-bunking in prison is not per se unconstitutional. The
plaintiff alleges no violence or other injuries that he suffered as
a result of double-bunking and overcrowding. The plaintiff's
double-bunking claim is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.

Absent an allegation that the plaintiff has a serious medical
condition and has been denied necessary treatment, he cannot state
a viable Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference. The
plaintiff's denial of medical care claim is dismissed for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

While nutritional food and opportunity for exercise are two of
life's necessities, the plaintiff has not alleged that he has been
denied meals on a regular basis, lost weight as a result of lack of
food, been denied access to the commissary to purchase additional
food, or been denied the ability to exercise in or outside of his
cell. Again, because he has not alleged that he has suffered these
or other types of harm, his inadequate food and recreation claims
are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.

With respect to the change in the IDOC grievance policies, no
action lies under § 1983 unless a plaintiff has asserted the
violation of a federal right. The plaintiff's allegations of
violations of or changes in IDOC policy does not support a claim
under section 1983 and are therefore dismissed for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Finally, the complaint contains no allegations of personal
wrongdoing on the part of Commissioner Carter. Individual liability
under Section 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged
constitutional deprivation. Any claim against Commissioner Carter
is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.

The complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.  

Motion to Maintain Suit as a Class Action

A non-attorney cannot bring claims on behalf of anyone else in
federal court. Here, the complaint is being dismissed for failing
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For that reason
and because the plaintiff is pro se, the plaintiff's motion to
maintain suit as a class action is denied.

If the plaintiff fails to respond to this order to show cause, the
case will be dismissed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section
1915A(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, without further notice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's dated August 22, 2019
Order is available at  https://tinyurl.com/y4frg2ne from
Leagle.com.

NATHANIEL JEFFERS, Plaintiff, pro se.

ROBERT E. CARTER, Commissioner of IDOC, Defendant, pro se.

DUSHAN ZATECKY, Warden, Defendant, pro se.

DUANE ALSIP, Assistant Warden, Defendant, pro se.


INSTANT CHECKMATE: Fischer et al. Suit Transferred to N.D. Ill.
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case, Fischer et al v. Instant Checkmate LLC., Case No.
2019-CH-07517 (Filed on June 21, 2019), was transferred from the
Illinois Circuit Court of Cook County to the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois on July 22, 2019. The
removal of this case is based on the diversity of citizenship of
the parties and the amount in controversy. This class action
lawsuit is now assigned to Hon. Judge Charles R. Norgle, Sr.

Instant Checkmate LLC is a public records search service in the
United States. It offers online background checks. [BN]
Attorneys for Defendant:

     Aimee Elizabeth Graham, Esq.
     DENTONS US LLP
     233 South Wacker Drive Suite 5900
     Chicago, IL 60606
     Telephone: (312) 876-8000
     E-mail: aimee.graham@dentons.com

             - and -

     Natalie J. Spears, Esq.
     DENTONS US LLP
     233 South Wacker Drive Suite 5900
     Chicago, IL 60606
     Telephone: (312) 876-8000
     E-mail: natalie.spears@dentons.com

INTEL CORP: Mishandled Retirement Plan Investment, Anderson Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
WINSTON R. ANDERSON, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. INTEL CORPORATION INVESTMENT
POLICY COMMITTEE; INTEL RETIREMENT PLANS ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE;
FINANCE COMMITTEE OF THE INTEL CORPORATION BOARD OF DIRECTORS;
CHRISTOPHER C. GECZY; RAVI JACOB; DAVID S. POTTRUCK; ARVIND
SODHANI; RICHARD TAYLOR; TERRA CASTALDI; RONALD D. DICKEL; TIFFANY
DOON SILVA; TAMI GRAHAM; CARY KLAFTER; STUART ODELL; CHARLENE
BARSHEFSKY; JOHN J. DONAHOE; REED E. HUNDT; JAMES D. PLUMMER; STACY
SMITH; ROBERT H. SWAN; TODD UNDERWOOD; INTEL 401(K) SAVINGS PLAN
and INTEL RETIREMENT CONTRIBUTION PLAN, Defendants, Case No.
5:19-cv-04618 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 9, 2019) alleges violation of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the Defendants breached
their fiduciary duties by investing billions of dollars in
retirement savings in unproven and unprecedented investment
allocation strategies featuring high-priced, low-performing
illiquid and opaque hedge funds. The Plaintiff is a participant in
the Plans and brings this action on behalf of a class of similarly
situated participants as a class action to recover relief on behalf
of the Plans against the Intel Retirement Plans Investment Policy
Committee ("the Investment Committee") and its members, the Intel
Retirement Plans Administrative Committee ("the Administrative
Committee") and its members, the Finance Committee of the Intel
Corporation Board of Directors ("the Finance Committee") and its
members, and the Chief Financial Officers of Intel Corporation
("the Chief Financial Officers").

The Investment Committee designed and implemented retirement
investment strategies, a suite of target date portfolios ("Intel
TDFs") with a dynamic allocation model and a multi-asset fund with
a fixed allocation model ("Intel GDFs") that deviated greatly from
prevailing professional investment standards for such retirement
strategies in several critical ways—chief among them investing
billions in hedge funds, private equity, and commodities—and then
as investment returns repeatedly lagged peers and benchmarks did
nothing while billions of dollars in retirement savings were lost.
The Investment Committee deviated from the standard of care of
similarly-situated plan fiduciaries who select target date funds
for their plans that include little or no exposure to these
strategies.

The Investment Committee (a) failed to properly monitor the
performance and fees of the Intel TDFs and Intel GDF in the Plans
and to properly investigate the availability of lower-cost
investment alternatives with similar or superior performance, and
(b) failed to properly monitor and evaluate the unconventional,
high-risk allocation models adopted for these custom investment
options, which excessively allocated assets of the Plans to
speculative investments. Additionally, the Administrative Committee
failed to provide adequate disclosures associated with the custom
investment options' heavy allocation to hedge funds and private
equity, and either misinformed or failed to inform participants
about the allocation mix of their account balances and the
allocation strategy of the custom target-date options. Finally, the
Finance Committee and the Chief Financial Officers failed to
monitor the Investment and Administrative Committees. As a result
of these imprudent decisions and inadequate processes, Defendants
caused the Plans and many participants in the Plans to suffer
substantial losses in retirement savings.

Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee is a named fiduciary
of the Intel 401(k) Savings Plan and the Intel Retirement
Contribution Plan. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          R. Joseph Barton, Esq.
          BLOCK & LEVITON LLP
          1735 20th St NW
          Washington DC 20009
          Telephone: (202) 734-7046
          Facsimile: (617) 507-6020
          E-mail: joe@blockesq.com

               - and -

          Joseph Creitz, Esq.
          CREITZ & SEREBIN LLP
          100 Pine Street, Suite 1250
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 466-3090
          Facsimile: (415) 513-4475
          E-mail: joe@creitzserebin.com

               - and -

          Gregory Y. Porter, Esq.
          BAILEY & GLASSER LLP
          1054 31st Street, NW, Suite 230
          Washington, DC 20007
          Telephone: (202) 463-2101
          Facsimile: (202) 463-2103
          E-mail: gporter@baileyglasser.com

               - and -

          Major Khan, Esq.
          MAJOR KHAN LLC
          1120 Avenue of the Americas, Suite 4100
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (646) 546-5664
          Facsimile: (646) 546-5755


JARROW FORMULAS: Bid for Class Certification Denied
---------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as Collin Shanks, the Plaintiff,
v. Jarrow Formulas, Inc., the Defendant, Case No.
2:18-cv-09437-PA-AFM (C.D. Cal.), the Court denied the Plaintiff's
motion for class certification of:

   "all persons who, since November 6, 2014, purchased in the
   United States (or alternatively in California, if the Court
   does not certify a nationwide class), for personal or household

   use, and not for resale or distribution, a 16 oz. or 32 oz.
   Jarrow Organic Extra Virgin or Jarrow Regular Coconut Oil whose

   label did not bear a disclosure statement of the type required
   by 21 C.F.R. 101.13(h)."

Even assuming a per se violation, the Plaintiff still must be able
to demonstrate "what portion of the sale price was attributable to
the value consumers placed on the [challenged] statements." Rahman
v. Mott's LLP, 13CV03482, 2014 WL 6815779 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2014).
The Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing, by a preponderance
of the evidence, what portion of the sale of Defendant's coconut
oil products was attributable to the value consumers placed on the
challenged statements, because Plaintiff has not introduced any
evidence that any consumer other than himself actually relied on
the challenged statements and paid a premium for Defendant's
products based on that reliance, the lawsuit says.[CC]

KEURIG GREEN: Diaz Files ADA Class Suit in New York
---------------------------------------------------
Keurig Green Mountain, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Edwin Diaz, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Keurig Green Mountain, Inc., Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-08039 (S.D. N.Y., Aug. 28, 2019).

Keurig Green Mountain, Inc. operates as a beverage company. The
Company produces and sells coffee, hot cocoa, teas, beverages, and
other related products.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.

The Defendant is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (929) 575-4175
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal



KIDDING AROUND: Conner Files Class Suit under Disabilities Act
--------------------------------------------------------------
Kidding Around NYC, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Mary Conner, individually and as the representative of a class
of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. Kidding Around NYC,
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-04909 (E.D. N.Y., Aug. 28,
2019).

Kidding Around Nyc, Inc. (trade name Kidding Around) is in the
Children's Toys and Games, except Dolls business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Dan Shaked, Esq.
   Shaked Law Group, P.C.
   14 Harwood Court, Suite 415
   Scarsdale, NY 10583
   Tel: (917) 373-9128
   Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com




LABORATORY CORP: Covance Faces Mitchell Class Suit in Pennsylvania
------------------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August
8, 2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that
Covance, Inc. has been named as a defendant in a class action suit
entitled, Mitchell v. Covance, Inc. et al.

On July 1, 2019, a class action lawsuit, Mitchell v. Covance, Inc.
et al., was filed in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Plaintiff alleges that certain individuals employed by Covance Inc.
and Chiltern International Inc. were misclassified as exempt
employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Pennsylvania
Minimum Wage Act and were thereby not properly paid overtime
compensation.

The lawsuit seeks monetary damages, liquidated damages, and
recovery of attorneys' fees and costs.

The Company will vigorously defend the lawsuit.

Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings operates as an
independent clinical laboratory company worldwide. It operates
through two segments, LabCorp Diagnostics and Covance Drug
Development. The company was founded in 1971 and is headquartered
in Burlington, North Carolina.

LABORATORY CORP: Faces Ignacio Class Suit in California
-------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August
8, 2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the
company has been named as a defendant in a class action suit
entitled, Ignacio v. Laboratory Corporation of America.

On June 10, 2019, the Company was served with a class action
lawsuit, Ignacio v. Laboratory Corporation of America, filed in
Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los
Angeles.

Plaintiff alleges that non-exempt employees based in California
were not properly paid overtime compensation, minimum wages, meal
and rest break premiums, were not indemnified for business
expenses, did not receive compliant wage statements, and were not
properly paid wages upon termination of employment.

Plaintiff asserts these actions violate various California Labor
Code provisions and constitute an unfair competition practice under
California law.

The lawsuit seeks monetary damages, liquidated damages, injunctive
relief, and recovery of attorney's fees and costs.

The Company will vigorously defend the lawsuit.

Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings operates as an
independent clinical laboratory company worldwide. It operates
through two segments, LabCorp Diagnostics and Covance Drug
Development. The company was founded in 1971 and is headquartered
in Burlington, North Carolina.


LABORATORY CORP: Faces Jan Class Action Suit in California
----------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August
8, 2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the
company has been named as a defendant in a class action suit
entitled, Jan v. Laboratory Corporation of America.

On June 26, 2019, a class action lawsuit, Jan v. Laboratory
Corporation of America, was filed in the Superior Court for the
State of California for the County of Sacramento.

Plaintiff alleges that non-exempt employees based in California
were not properly paid meal and rest break premiums, did not
receive compliant wage statements, and were not properly paid wages
upon termination of employment.

Plaintiff asserts these actions violate various California Labor
Code provisions and constitute an unfair competition practice under
California law. The lawsuit seeks monetary damages, liquidated
damages, injunctive relief, and recovery of attorney's fees and
costs.

The Company will vigorously defend the lawsuit.

Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings operates as an
independent clinical laboratory company worldwide. It operates
through two segments, LabCorp Diagnostics and Covance Drug
Development. The company was founded in 1971 and is headquartered
in Burlington, North Carolina.


LAKE ARBOR 80M TIC: Russell et al. Suit Transferred to W.D.N.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case, Russell et al v. Lake Arbor 80M TIC, LLC et al, Case No.
19-cvs-11761, was transferred from Mecklenburg County Superior
Court to the United States District Court for the Western District
of North Carolina on July 17, 2019. The case is now assigned to
Hon. Judge Frank D. Whitney. The United States District Court for
the Western District of North Carolina opened Case No.
3:19-cv-00338-FDW-DSC for further proceedings.

Lake Arbor 80M TIC, LLC is doing business as Lake Arbor Apartments.
It manages an apartment complex in Charlotte, North Caronila. [BN]

Attorneys for Defendant:

     Erik M. Rosenwood, Esq.
     HAMILTON STEPHENS STEELE MARTIN, PLLC
     525 N. Tryon Street Suite 1400
     Charlotte, NC 28244-2020
     Telephone: (704) 227-1078
     Facsimile: (704) 344-1117
     E-mail: Erik@rosenwoodrose.com

             - and -

     Jennifer K. Van Zant, Esq.
     BROOKS, PIERCE, MCLENDON, HUMPHREY & LEONARD, LLP
     P. O. Box 26000
     Greensboro, NC 27420
     Telephone: (336) 271-3132
     Facsimile: (336) 232-9132
     E-mail: jvanzant@brookspierce.com

             - and -

     Whitaker Boykin Rose, Esq.
     BAUCOM, CLAYTOR, BENTON, MORGAN & WOOD
     P.O. Box 35246
     Charlotte, NC 28235
     Telephone: (704) 376-6527
     Facsimile: (704) 376-6207
     E-mail: wrose@rosenwoodrose.com

             - and –

     D. J. O'Brien, III, Esq.
     BROOKS PIERCE MCLENDON HUMPHREY & LEONARD
     2000 Renaissance Plaza
     230 North Elm Street
     Greensboro, NC 27401
     Telephone: (336) 383-8850
     Facsimile: (336) 232-9195
     E-mail: dobrien@brookspierce.com

LAND O'FROST: Accused by Kelly of Reprisal Over Use of FMLA Leave
-----------------------------------------------------------------
EVA KELLY, on Behalf of herself and All Others Similarly-situated
v. LAND O'FROST, INC., Case No. 4:19-cv-00103-JHM-HBB (W.D. Ky.,
Aug. 21, 2019), alleges violations of the Family and Medical Leave
Act.

The Defendant's termination of the Plaintiff in retaliation for her
exercise of her rights to apply for intermittent FMLA leave and
request FMLA leave on the day of her termination interfered with,
restrained, and denied her rights under the FMLA, and otherwise
violated the FMLA, according to the complaint.

The Defendant is an Illinois For-Profit Corporation.  The Defendant
has registered itself with the Kentucky Secretary of State as
having a principal office in Lansing, Illinois.

Land O'Frost offers food products.  The Company provides
ready-to-eat processed meat and other associated food
products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark N. Foster, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF MARK N. FOSTER, PLLC
          P.O. Box 869
          Madisonville, KY 42431
          Telephone: (270) 213-1303
          E-mail: MFoster@MarkNFoster.com


LANNETT CO: Conspiracy Claims in Generic Drugs Suit Stand
---------------------------------------------------------
Lannett Company, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 28, 2019, for the
fiscal year ended June 30, 2019, that a court has denied the
defendants' joint motion to dismiss conspiracy claims in the class
action suit related to alleged price-fixing of generic drugs.

On September 25, 2018, two other alleged direct purchasers filed a
purported class action complaint alleging an overreaching,
industry-wide horizontal and vertical conspiracy involving the
company, numerous other generic pharmaceutical manufacturers, and
various pharmaceutical distributors to allocate markets and fix
prices generally for a variety of generic drugs.

The case has been added to the multidistrict litigation. On
December 21, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On
February 21, 2019, the Company and the other defendants filed
motions to dismiss the overarching conspiracy claims.

On August 15, 2019, the Court denied the defendants' joint motion
to dismiss the overarching conspiracy claims, but has yet to decide
an individual motion filed by the Company to dismiss the
overarching conspiracy claims as to it.

Lannett said, "The Company believes that it acted in compliance
with all applicable laws and regulations. Accordingly, the Company
disputes the allegations set forth in these class actions and plans
to vigorously defend itself from these claims."

Lannett Company, Inc. develops, manufactures, packages, markets,
and distributes generic versions of brand pharmaceutical products
in the United States. The company offers solid oral and extended
release, topical, liquid, nasal, and oral solution finished dosage
forms of drugs that address a range of therapeutic areas, as well
as ophthalmic, patch, foam, buccal, sublingual, suspension, soft
gel, and injectable dosages. Lannett Company, Inc. was founded in
1942 and is based in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.


LANNETT CO: Final Settlement Approval Hearing Set for Feb. 2020
---------------------------------------------------------------
Lannett Company, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 28, 2019, for the
fiscal year ended June 30, 2019, that a final hearing to consider
approval of the settlement in a Pennsylvania class action suit has
been set for February 7, 2020.

In October 2018, a putative class action lawsuit was filed against
the Company and two of its officers in the federal court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging that the Company, its
Chief Executive Officer and its Chief Financial Officer damaged the
purported class by making false and misleading statements in
connection with the possible renewal of the Company's distribution
agreement with Jerome Stevens Pharmaceuticalsthe (JSP Distribution
Agreement).     

In December 2018, counsel for the putative class filed an amended
complaint. The Company moved to dismiss the amended complaint in
January 2019.  

In March 2019, the Court granted in part and denied in part the
Company's motion to dismiss. In May 2019, the Company filed an
answer to the amended complaint.  

During May and June 2019, the parties negotiated a proposed
settlement and agreed to settle the litigation, by which the
Company agreed to pay the sum of $300,000 without an admission of
liability and subject to the negotiation of the terms of a
stipulation of settlement and approval by the Court.  

In July 2019, counsel for the putative class filed a motion for
preliminary approval of the proposed settlement and on July 31,
2019, the Court issued an Order granting the motion and scheduling
a hearing for final approval of the settlement for February 7,
2020.

Lannett Company, Inc. develops, manufactures, packages, markets,
and distributes generic versions of brand pharmaceutical products
in the United States. The company offers solid oral and extended
release, topical, liquid, nasal, and oral solution finished dosage
forms of drugs that address a range of therapeutic areas, as well
as ophthalmic, patch, foam, buccal, sublingual, suspension, soft
gel, and injectable dosages. Lannett Company, Inc. was founded in
1942 and is based in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.


LANNETT CO: Suit over Drug Pricing Methodologies Underway
---------------------------------------------------------
Lannett Company, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 28, 2019, for the
fiscal year ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend a class action suit related to the company's drug pricing
methodologies and internal controls.  

In November 2016, a putative class action lawsuit was filed against
the Company and two of its officers in the federal court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging that the Company damaged
the purported class by including in its securities filings false
and misleading statements regarding the Company's drug pricing
methodologies and internal controls.  

An amended complaint was filed in May 2017, and the Company filed a
motion to dismiss the amended complaint in September 2017. In
December 2017, counsel for the putative class filed a second
amended complaint, and the Court denied as moot the Company's
motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. The Company filed a
motion to dismiss the second amended complaint in February 2018.  

In July 2018, the court granted the Company's motion to dismiss the
second amended complaint. In September 2018, counsel for the
putative class filed a third amended complaint.  

The Company filed a motion to dismiss the third amended complaint
in November 2018. In May 2019, the court denied the Company's
motion to dismiss the third amended complaint.  

In July 2019, the Company filed an answer to the third amended
complaint.

The Company believes it acted in compliance with all applicable
laws and plans to vigorously defend itself from these claims. The
Company cannot reasonably predict the outcome of the suit at this
time.

Lannett Company, Inc. develops, manufactures, packages, markets,
and distributes generic versions of brand pharmaceutical products
in the United States. The company offers solid oral and extended
release, topical, liquid, nasal, and oral solution finished dosage
forms of drugs that address a range of therapeutic areas, as well
as ophthalmic, patch, foam, buccal, sublingual, suspension, soft
gel, and injectable dosages. Lannett Company, Inc. was founded in
1942 and is based in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.


LEGAL & GENERAL: Life Insurance Policy Violates RICO, Suits Say
---------------------------------------------------------------
GERTRUDE H. ALLEN; MARIANNE E. ALLEN; LAURIE L. ALLEN; and RONALD
WM. COLE, as Trustees of 1988 TRUST FOR ALLEN CHILDREN individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. LEGAL
& GENERAL AMERICA, INC.; BANNER LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; FIRST
AMERICAN INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS, INC.; and JONATHAN GOLDSTEIN,
Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-04729-KAW (N.D. Cal., Aug. 13, 2019)
seeks to recover damages that the Plaintiffs and the Class
sustained in connection with their purchase of, ownership of and
participation in the Life Insurance Policies that Defendants
designed, developed, promoted, sold, and issued. The complaint also
alleges the Defendants' breach of fiduciary duty, negligent
misrepresentation, disgorgement, rescission, fraud, violations of
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, there is conspiracy among the
Defendants to prey on elderly individuals by marketing and selling
to them a product that did not actually exist. The Defendants
targeted elderly individuals seeking to obtain permanent life
insurance that would last the remainder of their lives. Such
individuals were in a particularly vulnerable position as their age
made it difficult to obtain permanent life insurance at an
affordable cost. The Defendants purported to offer a solution for
this dilemma to bring peace of mind to these individuals. In
reality, what the Defendants marketed and sold to these individuals
was a sham.

The Defendants developed flexible premium universal life insurance
policies that purportedly had three features that would
collectively keep the death benefit on the policies in place for
the remainder of the Insured's life: (1) a low 20-year Monthly
Guarantee Premium (marketed as a "term alternative"); (2) a grace
period provision that would keep the policy in force after 20 years
as long as the account value was sufficient to cover the monthly
deduction (the "Grace Period"); and (3) and Extension of Maturity
Date endorsement that would keep the death benefit in force beyond
age 100 with no further premiums.

The Defendants then marketed and sold these insurance policies.
The Defendants and Other Participants designed the Banner Policies
to have an initial 20-year term during which the premiums were
guaranteed to remain level.  Based on written promises and
representations contained in the life insurance contracts and the
in-force illustrations prepared by the Defendants and provided to
the Plaintiffs and members of the Class, the Banner Policies were
further designed so that, at the expiration of the Guaranteed
Period, the policies could be extended through the Grace Period
until the Insured reached the age of 100 with the payment of
additional premiums, at which point the death benefit would remain
in place for the remainder of the Insured's life with no additional
premiums due after the attainment of age 100.

At the time the Plaintiffs and members of the Class purchased the
Banner Policies, the Defendants represented in the policy documents
that the value of the policy account during the Guaranteed Period
would remain at or above $0, that it would never go negative during
the Guaranteed Period, unless there were loans taken out against
the policy. The Defendants reiterated this representation each year
during the Guaranteed Period in the annual account statements that
were sent to the Plaintiffs and members of the Class.

Unbeknownst to the Plaintiffs and members of the Class, the
Defendants were secretly keeping a second set of books that
purported to show a deficit account accruing and increasing
annually on each of the policies. Specifically, the Defendants
secretly allocated "costs" to each of the Banner Policy accounts on
a separate, undisclosed set of books, such that each account
carried a "deficit" from the outset that continued to grow
throughout the Guaranteed Period.

The amount of the Deficit Account, the basis for the Deficit
Account, or even the fact that such a Deficit Account existed were
never disclosed to the Plaintiffs and members of the Class at the
time they purchased the Banner Policies. The Defendants sent annual
account statements to the Plaintiffs and members of the Class
purporting to disclose the "value" of the respective Banner Policy
accounts, but these account statements made no mention of the
Deficit Account purportedly growing in each account and
consistently showed a value of $0 or more. Moreover, the life
insurance contracts provided to the Plaintiffs and members of the
Class when the Banner Policies were purchased contained a
"Statement of Policy Cost and Benefit Information" that purported
to show the value of the account through the expiration of the
Guaranteed Period. The Statement of Policy Cost and Benefit
Information for each Banner Policy indicated an "end of year
account value" at the expiration of the Guaranteed Period of $0 or
more.

Based on this secret second set of books, the Defendants would then
demand that the Purchasers, or other owner of the policy at the
time, pay the balance of the enormous Deficit Account in order to
keep the policies in place for the first year after the expiration
of the Guaranteed Period. In the Plaintiffs' case, the Banner
Defendants demanded that the Plaintiffs pay a premium of
$5,876,215.11 in order to keep the policy in place, even though the
death benefit remained the same -- only $1,000,000 for year 21.

The amount of the premiums due in year 21 to keep the Banner
Policies in place was (1) unconscionable on its face; and (2)
inconsistent with the numerous written representations from the
Defendants in the life insurance contracts, illustrations and
annual account statements regarding the value of the Banner
Policies. None of these facts were disclosed to the Plaintiffs or
members of the Class at the time they purchased the Banner
Policies.

Despite the Defendants' written promises and representations, the
Banner Policies were never designed to provide a permanent death
benefit through the remainder of the Insureds' lives. Rather, the
Defendants intentionally, and without the knowledge of the
Plaintiffs and members of the Class, designed the Banner Policies
so that the policies could not be extended beyond the Guaranteed
Period unless the Purchaser, or other owner of the policy at the
time, paid the unconscionable premium that the Banner Defendants
demanded in year 21, that included the balance of the undisclosed
Deficit Account.

Legal & General America, Inc. provides insurance services. The
Company offers life insurance, retirement planning, and claim
settlement services. Legal & General America serves customers in
the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Kyle G. Bates, Esq.
          Ryan M. Hecht, Esq.
          SCHNEIDER WALLACE COTTRELL KONECKY WOTKYNS LLP
          200 Powell Street, Suite 1400
          Emeryville, CA 94608
          Telephone: (415) 421-7100
          Facsimile: (415) 421-7105
          E-mail: kbates@schneiderwallace.com
                  rhect@schneiderwallace.com

               - and -

          David R. Deary, Esq.
          W. Ralph Canada Jr., Esq.
          Jevin R. Sloan, Esq.
          LOEWINSOHN FLEGLE DEARY SIMON LLP
          12377 Merit Drive, Suite 900
          Dallas, TX 75251
          Telephone: (214) 572-1700
          Facsimile: (214) 572-1717
          E-mail: DavidD@lfdslaw.com
                  RalphC@lfdslaw.com
                  JevenS@lfdslaw.com


LOANCARE LLC: Court Denies Dismissal of Hamilton FDCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the captioned DERICK L.
HAMILTON, Plaintiff, v. LOANCARE, LLC, Defendant. No. 19 C 0554.
(N.D. Ill.).

The Plaintiff on behalf of all others similarly situated, filed a
complaint against Defendant, LoanCare, LLC, pertaining to a letter
Hamilton received concerning a debt from a real estate mortgage.
Hamilton brings the claim for violation of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA).

Hamilton's claim is for a violation of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA), LoanCare moves to dismiss the claim, arguing
that the Complaint fails to state a cause of action for three
reasons: (1) the Waiver Notice is not collection activity under the
FDCPA (2) the Waiver Notice was sent to Hamilton's attorney's
rather than Hamilton and no competent attorney would have been
deceived by the notice; and (3) if the competent attorney standard
is not applied, the unsophisticated consumer would still not have
been misled by the Waiver Notice. The Court will address the first
two of these arguments.

Whether the Waiver Notice is collection activity under the FDCPA

The FDCPA generally prohibits debt collectors from engaging in
abusive, deceptive, or unfair debt-collection practices. Pursuant
to Section 1692e of the FDCPA, a debt collector may not use any
false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in
connection with the collection of any debt.

Loancare does not dispute that it qualifies as a debt collector,
but argues that the Waiver Notice was not sent in connection with
the collection of a debt because the Waiver Notice did not make an
express demand for payment, list a payment due date, or threaten
consequences should the debtor fail to pay.  

Whether a communication was sent in connection with the collection
of a debt is a commonsense inquiry and a question of objective
fact, to be proven like any other fact. While there is no
bright-line rule to determine whether a communication from a debt
collector was made in connection with the collection of a debt, the
Seventh Circuit identified three factors courts should consider: 1)
the absence of a demand for payment 2) the nature of the parties'
relationship and 3) the purpose and context of the communications
viewed objectively.

The third factor, the purpose and context of the communications
viewed objectively, also weighs in favor of applying the FDCPA at
least at the pleadings stage.
Here, the Waiver Notice expressly stated there remains a deficiency
of $49.867.54, and included a disclaimer in all caps and bold
stating, TO THE EXTENT THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRATICES ACT
(FDCPA) IS APPLICABLE, PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT THIS COMMUNICATION IS
FROM A DEBT COLLECTOR AND ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL BE USED FOR
THAT PURPOSE.  Given the overall context, here, where (1) the
relationship between Loancare and Hamilton is solely one of debt
collector/debtor (2) the letter identified a deficiency balance and
(3) the letter included a disclaimer that this communication is
from a debt collector and any information obtained will be used for
that purpose; the Court finds that a reasonable consumer could
plausibly view the communication as one in connection with the
collection of a debt.  

Loancare argues that the presence of a bankruptcy disclaimer in the
Waiver Notice strongly favors granting the motion to dismiss. But,
as Hamilton correctly asserts, the presence of a bankruptcy
disclaimer is not dispositive. Numerous courts have found
communications to be in connection with an attempt to collect a
debt despite the inclusion of a bankruptcy disclaimer.  

Loancare also argues that a reasonable consumer could not plausibly
believe the purpose of this communication was to collect a debt
because the Waiver Notice explicitly stated that Loancare waives
its right to collect the unpaid deficiency balance and will not
pursue Hamilton for any portion of the deficiency balance.

Although admittedly a close call, the Court agrees with Hamilton,
at least at the pleadings stage, that given the context here of the
exclusive debt collector/debtor relationship between Loancare and
Hamilton, and the fact that the letter identified a deficiency
balance and included a debt collector disclaimer, a reasonable
consumer could view this communication as debt collection activity
despite the waiver language.  

When taken as a whole and construed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiffs, the Court finds that, from the perspective of a
reasonable consumer, the amended complaint plausibly alleges that
the purpose of the Waiver Notice was to collect a debt. The Court
now turns to Loancare's next argument that any alleged false or
misleading communication in the Waiver Notice is not actionable
under the FDCPA when subject to the competent attorney standard.

Whether Loancare's false and misleading representation is
actionable under the competent attorney standard

When a case involves alleged false representations to a debtor's
attorney, the Seventh Circuit has found that the relevant inquiry
is whether a competent attorney, even if he is not a specialist in
consumer debt law, would be deceived by the representation.The
Seventh Circuit has held that there is not an actionable FDCPA
violation where a competent attorney would be able to determine
whether his client continued to owe a debt and would therefore not
be deceived by the communication.

Loancare points out, and Hamilton does not dispute, that although
Hamilton is the recipient named in the Waiver Notice, the Waiver
Notice was sent to the office suite of Hamilton's lawyers in the
present cause of action. Loancare argues that given this, the
heightened competent attorney standard as opposed to the
unsophisticated consumer standard should be used. Because the
Waiver Notice was sent to Hamilton's attorney, the Court will apply
the competent attorney standard" in its analysis.
  
Here, Hamilton alleges that the Waiver Notice contained an implicit
false representation, that the deficiency balance in excess of the
maximum home loan guaranty was owed up to the date it was waived by
the deficiency holder.

Although admittedly another close determination, the Court finds at
this early stage of the litigation, without expressing an opinion
on the ultimate merits of Hamilton's claim, that Hamilton has
plausibly alleged that a competent attorney would be unable to
discover the falsity of the representation without an
investigation; and thus the misrepresentation would be actionable.
Accordingly, Loancare's motion to dismiss is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's dated August 22, 2019
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yyta82vk from Leagle.com.

Derrick L. Hamilton, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph Scott
Davidson, Sulaiman Law Group, Ltd. & Mohammed Omar Badwan, Sulaiman
Law Group, Ltd, 2500 South Highland Avenue, Suite 200, Lombard, IL,
60148

Loancare, LLC, Defendant, represented by Charles Michael Baum,
Fidelity National Law Group, 105 Eisenhower Pkwy Ste 103, Roseland,
NJ 07068-1640


LOUISIANA: Class of Medicaid Recipients Certified in AJ Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Brian A. Jackson certified a class in the lawsuit styled
A.J., a minor child by and through his mother, DONNELL CREPPEL, ET
AL. v. REBEKAH GEE, in her official capacity as secretary of the
Louisiana Department of Health, ET AL., Case No.
3:19-cv-00324-BAJ-RLB (M.D. La.).

The class is defined as:

     All current and future Medicaid recipients under the age of
     twenty-one (21) in Louisiana who are certified in the
     Children's Choice Waiver, or the New Opportunities Waiver,
     the Supports Waiver, or the Residential Options Waiver who
     are also prior authorized to receive extended home health
     services or intermittent nursing services which do not
     require prior authorization, but are not receiving some or
     all of the hours of extended home health services or
     intermittent nursing services as authorized by Defendants.

The Advocacy Center and National Health Law Program is appointed to
serve as class counsel.[CC]


LUMENTUM HOLDINGS: Oclaro Still Defends Karri Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Lumentum Holdings Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 27, 2019, for the
fiscal year ended June 29, 2019, that Oclaro, Inc. continues to
defend itself from a class action suit entitled, SaiSravan B. Karri
v. Oclaro, Inc., et al.

On December 10, 2018, we completed a merger with Oclaro, Inc.
("Oclaro"), a provider of optical components and modules for the
long-haul, metro and data center markets. Oclaro's products provide
differentiated solutions for optical networks and high-speed
interconnects driving the next wave of streaming video, cloud
computing, application virtualization and other bandwidth-intensive
and high-speed applications.

In connection with the company's acquisition of Oclaro, seven
lawsuits were filed by purported stockholders of Oclaro challenging
the proposed merger (the "Merger").

Two of the seven suits were putative class actions filed against
Oclaro, its directors, Lumentum, Prota Merger Sub, Inc. and Prota
Merger, LLC: Nicholas Neinast v. Oclaro, Inc., et al., No.
3:18-cv-03112-VC, in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California (filed May 24, 2018) (the "Neinast
Lawsuit"); and Adam Franchi v. Oclaro, Inc., et al., No.
1:18-cv-00817-GMS, in the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware (filed June 9, 2018) (the "Franchi Lawsuit").
Both the Neinast Lawsuit and the Franchi Lawsuit were voluntarily
dismissed with prejudice.

The other five suits, styled as Gerald F. Wordehoff v. Oclaro,
Inc., et al., No. 5:18-cv-03148-NC (the "Wordehoff Lawsuit"),
Walter Ryan v. Oclaro, Inc., et al., No. 3:18-cv-03174-VC (the
"Ryan Lawsuit"), Jayme Walker v. Oclaro, Inc., et al., No.
5:18-cv-03203-EJD (the "Walker Lawsuit"), Kevin Garcia v. Oclaro,
Inc., et al., No. 5:18-cv-03262-VKD (the "Garcia Lawsuit"), and
SaiSravan B. Karri v. Oclaro, Inc., et al., No. 3:18-cv-03435-JD
(the "Karri Lawsuit" and, together with the other six lawsuits, the
"Lawsuits"), were filed in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California on May 25, 2018, May 29, 2018, May
30, 2018, May 31, 2018, and June 9, 2018, respectively.

These five Lawsuits named Oclaro and its directors as defendants
only and did not name Lumentum.

The Wordehoff, Ryan, Walker, and Garcia Lawsuits have been
voluntarily dismissed, and the Wordehoff, Ryan, and Walker
dismissals were with prejudice. The Karri Lawsuit has not yet been
dismissed.

The Ryan Lawsuit was, and the Karri Lawsuit is, a putative class
action.

The Lawsuits generally alleged, among other things, that Oclaro and
its directors violated Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"), and Rule 14a-9
promulgated thereunder by disseminating an incomplete and
misleading Form S-4, including proxy statement/prospectus. The
Lawsuits further alleged that Oclaro's directors violated Section
20(a) of the Exchange Act by failing to exercise proper control
over the person(s) who violated Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act.

The remaining Lawsuit (the Karri Lawsuit) currently purports to
seek, among other things, damages to be awarded to the plaintiff
and any class if the Merger is consummated, and litigation costs,
including attorneys’ fees. The defendants intend to defend the
Karri Lawsuit vigorously.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Lumentum Holdings Inc. manufactures and sells optical and photonic
products in the Americas, the Asia-Pacific, Europe, the Middle
East, and Africa. The company operates through two segments,
Optical Communications and Commercial Lasers. Lumentum Holdings
Inc. was incorporated in 2015 and is headquartered in Milpitas,
California.


LVNV FUNDING: Bowman Files Class Suit under FDCPA
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against LVNV Funding LLC. The
case is styled as Pia Bowman, on behalf of herself individually and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. LVNV Funding LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-08078 (S.D. N.Y., Aug. 28, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

LVNV Funding, LLC is a debt purchasing agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Novlette Rosemarie Kidd, Esq.
   Fagenson & Puglisi
   450 Seventh Avenue, Suite 704
   New York, NY 10123
   Tel: (212) 268-2128
   Fax: (212) 268-2127
   Email: nkidd@fagensonpuglisi.com



MACHOL & JOHANNES: Class Settlement in A. Blanks Suit Has Final OK
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
issued an Order granting Plaintiff Alannah Blanks' Unopposed Motion
for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement in the case captioned
ALANNAH BLANKS, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. MACHOL & JOHANNES, LLC, Defendant. Civil
Action No. 18-cv-02291-CMA-KMT. (D. Colo.).

Settlement Classes: Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3), the Court certifies two classes (the Settlement Classes,
composed of Class Members):

     The FCRA Settlement Class includes all Colorado consumers who
have had their TransUnion consumer reports/credit scores published
in various judicial court actions by Defendant within two years of
the date of the filing of this actionand

     The FDCPA Settlement Class includes all Colorado consumers who
have had their TransUnion consumer reports/credit scores published
in various judicial court actions by Defendant within one year of
the date of the filing of this action.

Class Representative and Class Counsel: The Court finally certifies
Plaintiff Alannah Blanks as the Class Representative and Thomas L.
Lyons, Jr. as Class Counsel.

Settlement Approval: The Court finds that the settlement of the
lawsuit, on the terms and conditions set forth in the Settlement
Agreement , is in all respects fundamentally fair, reasonable,
adequate, and in the best interest of the Class Members, especially
in light of the benefits to the Class Members; the strength of the
Plaintiff's case; the complexity, expense, and probable duration of
further litigation; the risk and delay inherent in possible
appeals; and, the limited amount of any potential total recovery
for the class.

Service Award for Class Representative: The Court approves a
service award of $5,000.00 to the Class Representative, Plaintiff
Alannah Blanks.

Attorneys' Fees: The Court approves attorneys' fees of $50,000.00
to be paid to Class Counsel.

A full-text copy of the District Court's dated August 22, 2019
Order is available at  https://tinyurl.com/yxfc76uv from
Leagle.com.

Alannah Blanks, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas John Lyons, Jr.,
Consumer Justice Center, P.A., 367 Commerce Court, Vadnais Heights,
MN 55127

Machol & Johannes, LLC, Defendant, represented by Alan Daniel
Schindler, Timmins, LLC & Edward P. Timmins, Timmins, LLC, 450 E
17th Ave Unit 210, Denver, CO, 80203-1254


MCNEIL GROUP: Agrees to Certification of Class in Harbour Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The parties in the lawsuit titled William Harbour, Individually and
on behalf of other members of the general public similarly situated
v. McNeil Group, Inc d/b/a Pinnacle Metal Products, Case No.
2:19-cv-01545-EAS-CMV (S.D. Ohio), jointly agree to conditionally
certify the collective action and provide notice to the putative
class members under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Parties jointly submit as Exhibit A the proposed Notice and
Consent to Join forms ("Notice Packet") to be authorized by the
Court.  The Parties agree that within 14 days of the Court entering
an Order approving the Parties Joint Stipulation, the Defendant
shall provide to the Plaintiff's Counsel a list containing the
names, last known addresses (including zip code), phone numbers,
and e-mail addresses of these employees:

     All current and former hourly employees of Defendant, who
     worked over 40 hours in any workweek during the previous
     three (3) years through the date of final disposition of
     this case, and were not paid time and half for the hours
     they worked over 40 because of Defendant's use of "comp
     time" or its practice to bank hours worked over 40 in any
     given workweek to apply them to subsequent workweeks.

The Plaintiff's counsel shall mail Exhibit A to the Putative
Collective Class Members via First Class U.S. Mail within 7 days of
receiving the list. The Putative Collective Class Members shall
have 60 days from the date the Notice Packet is mailed to return
their Consent to Join form and opt-in to this case.  The
Plaintiff's counsel will mail a reminder post-card to the Putative
Collective Class Members via First Class U.S. Mail 30 days after
the initial mailing of the Notice Packet.

The Plaintiff's counsel may e-mail the Notice Packet to all
Putative Collective Class Members whose Notice Packets are returned
as "undeliverable" by the United States Post Office.  If there is
no e-mail address for the Putative Collective Class Member, then
Plaintiff's counsel may call the Putative Collective Class Member
only to obtain the current mailing address or e-mail address to
re-mail the Notice Packet.

Neither party shall contact any of the Putative Collective Class
Members for the purpose of discussing the subject matter of or
their participation in this lawsuit through the end of the opt-in
period, except that either counsel may respond to inquiries from
the Putative Collective Class Members during this time.

The Plaintiff's Counsel may contact the Putative Collective Class
Members after they have opted in.  Nothing in the Stipulation shall
be construed as a prohibition on the Defendant's interactions with
any of the potential opt-in plaintiffs in the normal course of
their business.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew J.P. Coffman, Esq.
          COFFMAN LEGAL, LLC
          1550 Old Henderson Rd., Suite 126
          Columbus, OH 43220
          Telephone: (614) 949-1181
          Facsimile: (614) 386-9964
          E-mail: mcoffman@mcoffmanlegal.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Sara H. Jodka, Esq.
          DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC
          150 E. Gay Street, Suite 2400
          Columbus, OH 43215
          Telephone: (614) 744-2943
          Facsimile: (844) 670-6009
          E-mail: sjodka@dickinsonwright.com


METROPOLITAN LIFE: 9th Circuit Appeal in Martin Suit Still Pending
------------------------------------------------------------------
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 8,
2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the appeal
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the case,
Martin v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, is still pending.

Plaintiffs filed this putative class action lawsuit on behalf of
themselves and all California persons who have been charged
compound interest by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company in life
insurance policy and/or premium loan balances within the last four
years.

Plaintiffs allege that Metropolitan Life Insurance Company has
engaged in a pattern and practice of charging compound interest on
life insurance policy and premium loans without the borrower
authorizing such compounding, and that this constitutes an unlawful
business practice under California law.

Plaintiffs assert causes of action for declaratory relief,
violation of California's Unfair Competition Law and Usury Law, and
unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive
relief, restitution of interest, and damages in an unspecified
amount. On April 12, 2016, the court granted Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company's motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs appealed this
ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.


The Company intends to defend this action vigorously.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, together with its
subsidiaries, provides insurance, annuities, employee benefits, and
asset management services in the United States. The company was
incorporated in 1868 and is based in New York, New York.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company is a subsidiary of MetLife,
Inc.


METROPOLITAN LIFE: Continues to Defend Miller Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 8,
2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the
company continues to defend a class action suit entitled, Miller,
et al. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (S.D.N.Y., filed
January 4, 2019).

Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint in this putative class
action, purporting to assert claims on behalf of all persons who
replaced their MetLife Optional Term Life or Group Universal Life
policy with a Group Variable Universal Life policy wherein
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company allegedly charged smoker rates
for certain non-smokers.

Plaintiff seeks unspecified compensatory and punitive damages, as
well as other relief.

The Company intends to defend this action vigorously.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, together with its
subsidiaries, provides insurance, annuities, employee benefits, and
asset management services in the United States. The company was
incorporated in 1868 and is based in New York, New York.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company is a subsidiary of MetLife,
Inc.


METROPOLITAN LIFE: Still Defends Julian & McKinney Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 8,
2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the
company continues to defend a class action suit entitled, Julian &
McKinney v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (S.D.N.Y., filed
February 9, 2017).

Plaintiffs filed this putative class and collective action on
behalf of themselves and all current and former long-term
disability ("LTD") claims specialists between February 2011 and the
present for alleged wage and hour violations under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, the New York Labor Law, and the Connecticut Minimum
Wage Act.

The suit alleges that Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
improperly reclassified the plaintiffs and similarly situated LTD
claims specialists from non-exempt to exempt from overtime pay in
November 2013.

As a result, they and members of the putative class were no longer
eligible for overtime pay even though they allege they continued to
work more than 40 hours per week.

Plaintiffs seek unspecified compensatory and punitive damages, as
well as other relief. On March 22, 2018, the Court conditionally
certified the case as a collective action, requiring that notice be
mailed to LTD claims specialists who worked for the Company from
February 8, 2014 to the present. The Company intends to defend this
action vigorously.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, together with its
subsidiaries, provides insurance, annuities, employee benefits, and
asset management services in the United States. The company was
incorporated in 1868 and is based in New York, New York.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company is a subsidiary of MetLife,
Inc.


MHC LAKE GEORGE: Murphy Alleges Violation under ADA
---------------------------------------------------
MHC Lake George, L.L.C. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as James Murphy, on behalf of himself and all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MHC Lake George, L.L.C. and MHC
Property Management, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-08058 (S.D.
N.Y., Aug. 28, 2019).

MHC Lake George, L.L.C. owns and operates premier manufactured
housing communities in the western United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Zare Khorozian, Esq.
   Zare Khorozian Law, LLC
   1047 Anderson Avenue
   Fort Lee, NJ 07024
   Tel: (201) 957-7269
   Email: zare@zkhorozianlaw.com


MIDLAND CREDIT: Atwood Sues over Debt Collection Practices
----------------------------------------------------------
ROCKY L. ATWOOD, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT INC., Defendant,
Case No. 3:19-cv-01514-L-RBB (S.D. Cal., Aug. 13, 2019) seeks to
stop the Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to collect a
debt.

Midland Credit Management, Inc., a licensed debt collector, assists
customers in resolving past-due financial obligations through
various education and payment plans. The company was founded in
1953 and is based in San Diego, California. Midland Credit
Management, Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Encore Capital Group,
Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nicholas M. Wajda, Esq.
          WAJDA LAW GROUP, APC
          3111 Camino Del Rio North, Suite 400
          San Diego, CA 92108
          Telephone: (619) 649-2492
          E-mail: nick@wajdalawgroup.com

               - and -

          James C. Vlahakis, Esq.
          SULAIMAN LAW GROUP, LTD.
          2500 South Highland Avenue, Suite 200
          Lombard, IL 60148
          Telephone: (630) 581-5456
          E-mail: jvlahakis@sulaimanlaw.com


MIDLAND CREDIT: Balluch Sues over Debt Collection Practices
-----------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL BALLUCH, individually and on on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-01514-L-RBB (S.D. Cal., Aug. 13, 2019)
seeks to stop the Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to
collect a debt.

Midland Credit Management, Inc., a licensed debt collector, assists
customers in resolving past-due financial obligations through
various education and payment plans. The company was founded in
1953 and is based in San Diego, California. Midland Credit
Management, Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Encore Capital Group,
Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nicholas M. Wajda, Esq.
          WAJDA LAW GROUP, APC
          3111 Camino Del Rio, Suite 400
          San Diego, CA 92108
          Telephone: (619) 649-2492
          E-mail: nick@wajdalawgroup.com

               - and -

          James C. Vhalakis, Esq.
          SULAIMAN LAW GROUP, LTD
          2500 South Highland Avenue, Suite 200
          Lombard, IL 60148
          Telephone: (630) 581-5456
          E-mail: jvlahakis@sulaimanlaw.com


MIDWEST RECEIVABLE: Court Stays Bid for Class Certification
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as PAULA RODZ, the Plaintiff, v.
MIDWEST RECEIVABLE SOLUTIONS, LLC, the Defendant, Case No.
19-CV-1191 (E.D. Wisc.), the Hon. Judge William E. Duffin entered
an order on Aug. 27, 2019, granting Plaintiff's motion to stay
further proceedings on the motion for class certification.

On August 19, 2019, the plaintiff filed a class action complaint.
At the same time, she filed what the court commonly refers to as a
"protective" motion for class certification.

The Plaintiff moved to certify the class described in the complaint
but also moved the court to stay further proceedings on that
motion. In Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir.
2011), the court suggested that class‐action plaintiffs "move to
certify the class at the same time that they file their complaint."
"The pendency of that motion protects a putative class from
attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs." However, because parties
are generally unprepared to proceed with a motion for class
certification at the beginning of a case, the Damasco court
suggested that the parties "ask the district court to delay its
ruling to provide time for additional discovery or investigation."


The Plaintiff's motion to stay further proceedings on the motion
for class certification is granted. The parties are relieved from
the automatic briefing schedule set forth in Civil Local Rule 7(b)
and (c). Moreover, for administrative purposes, it is necessary
that the Clerk terminate the plaintiff’s motion for class
certification. However, the motion will be regarded as pending to
serve its protective purpose under Damasco.[CC]

MISS LASER: Underpays Technicians, Caicedo Soto Suit Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------
MICHELLE CAICEDO SOTO, individually and on behalf all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MISS LASER INC. D/B/A MISS LASER;
FRIDA KOYUNOV; EMANUEL ARABOV; and JOSEF YUNAEV, Defendants, Case
No. 1:19-cv-04745 (E.D.N.Y., Aug. 17, 2019) seeks to recover from
the Defendants unpaid wages and overtime compensation, interest,
liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Plaintiff Caicedo Soto was employed by the Defendants as
technician.

Miss Laser Inc. d/b/a Miss Laser offers laser hair removal
treatments. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John Troy, Esq.
          TROY LAW, PLLC
          41-25 Kissena Boulevard Suite 119
          Flushing, NY 11355
          Telephone: (718) 762-1324


MONAT GLOBAL: Jones Alleges Violation under ADA
-----------------------------------------------
Monat Global Corp. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant
to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as
Kahlimah Jones, individually and as the representative of a class
of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. Monat Global Corp.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-04913 (E.D. N.Y., Aug. 28, 2019).

Monat Global Corp. is an international hair product
corporation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Dan Shaked, Esq.
   Shaked Law Group, P.C.
   14 Harwood Court, Suite 415
   Scarsdale, NY 10583
   Tel: (917) 373-9128
   Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com


MUNCHERY, INC: Phillips et al. Seek to Certify Class
----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as Joshua James Eaton Phillips
and Christina Brooks, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. Munchery, Inc., the
Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-00469-JSC (N.D. Cal.), the Plaintiffs
move the Court for an order, in furtherance of their claims under
the Worker Adjustment Retraining and Notification and California
Labor Code:

   "(a) certifying a 28 class, pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3)
   of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, comprised of (i)
   Plaintiffs and all persons who worked at, were based out of,
   received assignments from, or reported to Defendant's facility
   at 200 Shaw Road, South San Francisco, California, (ii) who
   were terminated without cause, as part of, or as the result of,

   a mass layoff or plant closing ordered by Defendant and carried

   out on or about January 21, 2019 and within 30 days of that
   date or in reasonable anticipation of or as the reasonably
   foreseeable consequence of the mass layoff or plant closing
   ordered by Defendant on or about January 21, 2019, (iii) who
   are "affected employees" within the meaning of 29 U.S.C.
   section 2101(a)(5) and (iv) who have not filed a timely request

   to opt-out of the class, (b) appointing Outten & Golden LLP as
   Class Counsel, (c) appointing Plaintiffs as the Class
   Representatives, (d) approving the form and manner of Notice,
   and (e) and such further relief as this Court may deem
   proper."[CC]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the other similarly situated former
employees are:

          Gail C. Lin, Esq.
          OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
          One California Street, Suite 1250
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 638-8800
          Facsimile: (415) 638-8810
          E-mail: gl@outtengolden.com

               - and -

          Jack A. Raisner, Esq.
          René S. Roupinian, Esq.
          OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
          685 Third Avenue, 25th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 245-1000
          E-mail: jar@outtengolden.com
                  rsr@outtengolden.com

NEBRASKA: Court Refuses to Strike Expert Declarations in Sabata
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska
issued an Order issued an Order denying Defendants' Motion to
Strike Expert Declarations in the case captioned HANNAH SABATA, et
al, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. NEBRASKA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, et
al., Defendants. No. 4:17CV3107. (D. Neb.).

The Plaintiffs, inmates within the custody and control of the NDCS,
filed this proposed class action against Defendants NDCS and its
administrators and medical staff, asserting violations of the
plaintiffs' civil and constitutional rights. Plaintiffs' claims
arise out of their allegations that Nebraska state prisons are
overcrowded, under-resourced, and understaffed, and that prisoners
are consistently deprived of adequate health care, including
medical, dental, and mental health care, and denied accommodations
for their disabilities.  

The Defendants move to strike the entire expert declarations of
Margo Schlanger, Eldon Vail, Craig Haney and Pablo Stewart and
portions of the expert declarations of Jay Shulman and Marc Stern
offered by Plaintiffs in support of their Motion for Class
Certification.

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that an expert
witness may offer an opinion if: (a) the expert's scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue (b)
the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data (c) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and(d)
the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the
facts of the case.

In this case, the Court finds that the expert opinions offered by
Margo Schlanger, Eldon Vail, Craig Haney, Pablo Stewart, Jay
Shulman, and Marc Stern are sufficiently reliable in light of the
available evidence and purpose for which they were offered.

Each declaration sets forth the expert's qualifications,
experience, and facts and data upon which the expert's opinions
were based. As stated above, at the class certification stage the
Court is to examine the reliability of the expert testimony in
light of the existing state of the evidence and with Rule 23's
requirements in mind. The proponent of class certification must
demonstrate that the Rule 23(a) requirements of numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and fair and adequate representation exist
and that one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b) have been met.


The Court concludes that Plaintiffs' experts' opinions assist in
this determination.

In particular, the experts' opinions relate to the commonality
requirement, which requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
class members `have suffered the same injury and that a classwide
proceeding will generate common answers apt to drive the resolution
of the litigation. The expert opinions also relate to typicality,
which is generally considered to be satisfied if the claims or
defenses of the representatives and the members of the class stem
from a single event or are based on the same legal or remedial
theory and means that there are other members of the class who have
the same or similar grievances as the plaintiff. Although
Defendants suggest that Plaintiffs' experts' opinions are deficient
because they do not address all of the requirements of Rule 23(a),
there is no such requirement that the experts do so.

The Defendants further argue that the expert declarations should be
stricken because they are based on insufficient or inadequate data
and facts, including some opinions offered without the expert
visiting a Nebraska prison or citing Nebraska-specific statistics.
However, as a general rule, the factual basis of an expert opinion
goes to the credibility of the testimony, not the admissibility.
Such testimony should be excluded only if it 'is so fundamentally
unsupported that it can offer no assistance to the jury.'

Here, the court is equipped to evaluate and determine what weight,
if any, to afford relevant expert testimony when determining
whether Plaintiffs satisfied the prerequisites of Rule 23 to
certify the class and subclasses.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's dated August 22, 2019
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3648hwv from
Leagle.com.

Hannah Sabata, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Dylan Cardeilhac, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, James Curtright, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Jason Galle, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Richard Griswold, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Michael Gunther, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Angelic
Norris, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Isaac Reeves, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Zoe Rena, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated & Brandon Sweetser, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Aaron T.
Goodman --  
aaron.goodman@dlapiper.com -- DLA PIPER LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Amy
Fettig, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION -- NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT,
915 15th Street, NW, 7th Floor, Washington DC 2005, pro hac vice,
Amy A. Miller, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, 915 15th
Street, NW, 7th Floor, Washington DC 2005, Andrew D. Day --
andrew.day@dlapiper.com -- DLA PIPER US LAW FIRM, pro hac vice,
Anna P. Bitencourt Emilio, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THE DEAF LAW &
ADVOCACY CENTER, 8630 Fenton Street Suite 820 Silver Springs, MD
20910, pro hac vice, Benjamin Bien-Kahn -- bbien-kahn@rbgg.com --
ROSEN, BIEN LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Brittany Shrader, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF THE DEAF LAW & ADVOCACY CENTER, 8630 Fenton Street
Suite 820 Silver Springs, MD 20910, pro hac vice, Christopher M.
Young -- christopher.young@dlapiper.com -- DLA PIPER LAW FIRM, pro
hac vice, David C. Fathi, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION --
NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT, 915 15th Street, NW, 7th Floor, Washington
DC 2005, pro hac vice, Dawn M. Jenkins --
dawn.jenkins@dlapiper.com, DLA PIPER LAW FIRM, pro hac vice

Nebraska Department of Correctional Services, Scott Frakes, In his
official capacity as Director of the Nebraska Department of
Correctional Services, Harbans Deol, In his official capacity as
Director of Health Services of the Nebraska Department of
Correctional Services, Nebraska Board of Parole & Julie Micek, In
her official capacity as the Board of Parole Acting Parole
Administrator, Defendants, represented by Benjamin M. Goins,
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, Danielle L. Rowley, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
OFFICE, Katherine O'Brien, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, Ryan S. Post,
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE & Scott R. Straus, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
OFFICE.

Marshall Lux, Movant, represented by Shawn D. Renner --
srenner@clinewilliams.com -- CLINE, WILLIAMS LAW FIRM.


NETAPP INC: Faces Securities Class Suit in California
-----------------------------------------------------
NetApp, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 19, 2019, for the quarterly
period ended July 26, 2019, that the company faces a purported
securities class action lawsuit in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California.

On August 14, 2019, a purported securities class action lawsuit was
filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California, naming as defendants NetApp and certain of its
executive officers.

The complaint alleges that the defendants violated Section 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and
SEC Rule 10b-5, by making materially false or misleading statements
with respect to the company's financial guidance for fiscal 2020,
as provided on May 22, 2019.

Members of the alleged class are purchasers of the Company's stock
between May 22, 2019 and August 1, 2019, the date the company
provided revised financial guidance for fiscal 2020.

The complaint alleges unspecified damages based on the decline in
the market price of our shares following the issuance of the
revised guidance on August 1, 2019.

NetApp said, "We believe the complaint is without merit and intend
to defend the case vigorously."

NetApp, Inc. (NetApp), incorporated on November 1, 2001, provides
software, systems and services to manage and store customer data.
The Company enables enterprises, service providers, governmental
organizations, and partners to envision, deploy and evolve their
information technology (IT) environments. The company is based in
Sunnyvale, California.


NOVAVIVE USA: Fauley's Bid to Certify Class Denied as Premature
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Clerk of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois made a docket entry in the case entitled Shaun Fauley v.
NovaVive USA Inc., et al., Case No. 1:19-cv-05301 (N.D. Ill.),
relating to the motion for class certification pending before the
Honorable Edmond E. Chang.

The minute entry states that the Plaintiff has filed a motion for
class certification, but it is premature because none of the
necessary discovery has been finished.  To the extent that the
Plaintiff filed the motion to prevent mootness if the defense were
to offer full relief, that is no longer necessary after the
decision in Campbell−Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672
(2016).

To the extent that the Plaintiff is concerned about the question
left open by Campbell−Ewald (whether payment of funds into an
account to be paid to Plaintiff or deposited with the Court should
require entry of judgment), the premature certification motion is
still unnecessary, because the Court will not enter judgment
without allowing the Plaintiff to file an objection to entry of
judgment, including whether the relief is full or whether that
procedure is even proper, according to the Notification of Docket
Entry.

Hence, the motion for class certification is denied without
prejudice.[CC]


OMEGA HEALTHCARE: Appeal in Securities Class Action Ongoing
-----------------------------------------------------------
Omega Healthcare Investors, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 8, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the appeal in the
consolidated class action suit in New York remains pending.

On November 16, 2017, a purported securities class action complaint
captioned Dror Gronich v. Omega Healthcare Investors, Inc., C.
Taylor Pickett, Robert O. Stephenson, and Daniel J. Booth was filed
against the Company and certain of its officers in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the
"Court"), Case No. 1:17-cv-08983-NRB.  

On November 17, 2017, a second purported securities class action
complaint captioned Steve Klein v. Omega Healthcare Investors,
Inc., C. Taylor Pickett, Robert O. Stephenson, and Daniel J. Booth
was filed against the Company and the same officers in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Case
No. 1:17-cv-09024-NRB.  

Thereafter, the Court considered a series of applications by
various shareholders to be named lead plaintiff, consolidated the
two actions and designated Royce Setzer as the lead plaintiff.

Pursuant to a Scheduling Order entered by the Court, lead plaintiff
Setzer and additional plaintiff Earl Holtzman filed a Consolidated
Amended Class Action Complaint on May 25, 2018 (the "Securities
Class Action").

The Securities Class Action purports to be a class action brought
on behalf of shareholders who acquired the Company's securities
between May 3, 2017 and October 31, 2017. The Securities Class
Action alleges that the defendants violated the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"), by making materially
false and/or misleading statements, and by failing to disclose
material adverse facts about the Company's business, operations,
and prospects, including the financial and operating results of one
of the Company's operators, the ability of such operator to make
timely rent payments, and the impairment of certain of the
Company's leases and the uncollectibility of certain receivables.

The Securities Class Action, which purports to assert claims for
violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, as well as Section 20(a) of the Exchange
Act, seeks an unspecified amount of monetary damages, interest,
fees and expenses of attorneys and experts, and other relief.  

The Company and the officers named in the Securities Class Action
filed a Motion to Dismiss on July 17, 2018 and the Court heard Oral
Argument on February 13, 2019.  

On March 25, 2019, the Court entered an order dismissing with
prejudice all claims against all defendants.  

On April 22, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal with the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
notifying the Court that they are appealing the Court's order of
dismissal with prejudice to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.

On June 10, 2019, the plaintiffs filed their appeal brief with the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, on July 15,
2019, the Company filed its opposition brief, and on July 29, 2019,
the Plaintiffs filed their reply brief in further support of the
appeal.  

Omega Healthcare Investors, Inc. is a real estate investment trust
(REIT). The Company invests in and provides financing to the
long-term care industry. Omega operates healthcare facilities in
the United States which are operated by independent healthcare
operating companies. The company is based in Hunt Valley,
Maryland.


OMEGA HEALTHCARE: Appointment of Lead Pltf. in Bushansky Pending
----------------------------------------------------------------
Omega Healthcare Investors, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 8, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the motion for
appointment of lead plaintiff in the class action suit entitled,
Bushansky v. MedEquities Realty Trust, Inc., et al., remains
pending.

On May 17, 2019, Omega Healthcare Investors, Inc. (Omega) and OHI
Healthcare Properties Limited Partnership (Omega OP) completed
their merger with MedEquities Realty Trust, Inc. ("MedEquities")
and its subsidiary operating partnership and the general partner of
its subsidiary operating partnership.

Pursuant to the Agreement and Plan of Merger, as amended by the
First Amendment to the Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated March
26, 2019, (the "Merger Agreement") Omega acquired MedEquities and
MedEquities was merged with and into Omega (the "Merger") at the
effective time of the Merger with Omega continuing as the surviving
company.

On March 17, 2019, a purported stockholder of MedEquities filed a
class action lawsuit against MedEquities and members of the
MedEquities board of directors in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee. Bushansky v. MedEquities
Realty Trust, Inc., et al., Case 3:19-cv-00231.  

The complaint alleges, among other things, that MedEquities and its
directors violated Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act by
making materially incomplete and misleading statements in, and/or
omitting certain information that is material to stockholders from,
the Combined Proxy Statement and Form S-4, relating to the merger.


The complaint seeks, among other things, an injunction preventing
the consummation of the merger and, in the event the merger is
consummated, rescission of the merger or damages, plus attorneys'
fees and costs.  

By Stipulation and Order dated May 15, 2019, the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee stayed all
deadlines in the action pending, among other things, the
appointment of a lead plaintiff and the designation of an operative
complaint or the filing of an amended complaint.  

By Order filed on July 9, 2019, the Court, in response to a joint
motion by the parties, continued the Initial Case Management
Conference scheduled for July 16, 2019 and confirmed that all the
deadlines in the cases were stayed until after a ruling on any
motion to dismiss the operative complaint or amended complaint or
until Defendants have filed an answer to the complaint or amended
complaint.  

In addition, the plaintiff in this action on July 10, 2019 filed a
motion asking that he be appointed lead plaintiff and that his
counsel be appointed lead counsel.

Omega Healthcare Investors, Inc. is a real estate investment trust
(REIT). The Company invests in and provides financing to the
long-term care industry. Omega operates healthcare facilities in
the United States which are operated by independent healthcare
operating companies. The company is based in Hunt Valley,
Maryland.


OMEGA HEALTHCARE: MedEquities Realty Trust Faces Scarantino Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Omega Healthcare Investors, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 8, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that  MedEquities Realty
Trust, Inc. is defending against a class action suit entitled,
Scarantino v. McRoberts et al.

On May 17, 2019, Omega Healthcare Investors, Inc. (Omega) and OHI
Healthcare Properties Limited Partnership (Omega OP) completed
their merger with MedEquities Realty Trust, Inc. ("MedEquities")
and its subsidiary operating partnership and the general partner of
its subsidiary operating partnership.

Pursuant to the Agreement and Plan of Merger, as amended by the
First Amendment to the Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated March
26, 2019, (the "Merger Agreement") Omega acquired MedEquities and
MedEquities was merged with and into Omega (the "Merger") at the
effective time of the Merger with Omega continuing as the surviving
company.

On February 22, 2019, a purported stockholder of MedEquities filed
a derivative and class action lawsuit against MedEquities, members
of the MedEquities board of directors, and the Company in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland.  

Scarantino v. McRoberts et al., Case No.  24-c-19-001027,  alleges,
among other things, breaches of fiduciary duties by the
MedEquities' board of directors in connection with its approval of
the merger and the omission from the Form S-4 of certain
information that is material to stockholders.  

The complaint seeks, among other things, an injunction preventing
the consummation of the merger and, in the event the merger is
consummated, rescission of the merger or damages, plus attorneys'
fees and costs.  

The plaintiff has not served summonses upon the defendants in this
action.

Omega Healthcare Investors, Inc. is a real estate investment trust
(REIT). The Company invests in and provides financing to the
long-term care industry. Omega operates healthcare facilities in
the United States which are operated by independent healthcare
operating companies. The company is based in Hunt Valley,
Maryland.


OMEGA HEALTHCARE: Russell Suit v. MedEquities Realty Trust Ongoing
------------------------------------------------------------------
Omega Healthcare Investors, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 8, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that MedEquities Realty
Trust, Inc. continues to defend a class action suit entitled,
Russell v. MedEquities Realty Trust, Inc., et al., Case No.
C-03-CV-19-000721.  

On May 17, 2019, Omega Healthcare Investors, Inc. (Omega) and OHI
Healthcare Properties Limited Partnership (Omega OP) completed
their merger with MedEquities Realty Trust, Inc. ("MedEquities")
and its subsidiary operating partnership and the general partner of
its subsidiary operating partnership.

Pursuant to the Agreement and Plan of Merger, as amended by the
First Amendment to the Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated March
26, 2019, (the "Merger Agreement") Omega acquired MedEquities and
MedEquities was merged with and into Omega (the "Merger") at the
effective time of the Merger with Omega continuing as the surviving
company.

On March 29, 2019, a purported stockholder of MedEquities filed a
class action lawsuit against MedEquities and members of the
MedEquities board of directors in the Circuit Court of Maryland,
Baltimore City, Maryland alleging, among other things, that
MedEquities and members of the MedEquities board of directors
breached their fiduciary duties by: (i) failing to fulfill their
fiduciary oversight function; (ii) authorizing the filing of a
materially incomplete and misleading proxy statement/prospectus;
and (iii) authorizing in the company's Amended and Restated Bylaws
the enactment of an exclusive venue designation whereby the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City, Maryland is the sole and exclusive forum
for certain litigation against the company, or if that court does
not have jurisdiction, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland, Baltimore Division  (the "Exclusive Venue Bylaw").
Russell v. MedEquities Realty Trust, Inc., et al., Case No.
C-03-CV-19-000721.  

The complaint seeks, among other things, an injunction preventing
the special meeting of MedEquities stockholders to vote on the
transaction and, in the event the transaction is implemented,
rescission of the transaction or damages, a declaration that the
Exclusive Venue Bylaw is invalid, an injunction preventing the
enforcement of the Exclusive Venue Bylaw, and attorneys’ fees and
costs.  

On May 10, 2019, the parties filed a stipulation requiring
plaintiff to file, within 30 days of the closing of the merger, an
amended complaint or notify defendants that plaintiff does not
intend to file an amended complaint, and requiring defendants to
respond to plaintiff's pleading or amended pleading within 60 days
thereafter.  

Omega Healthcare said, "As of this date, the plaintiff has neither
filed an amended complaint nor notified that he does not intend to
file an amended complaint."

Omega Healthcare Investors, Inc. is a real estate investment trust
(REIT). The Company invests in and provides financing to the
long-term care industry. Omega operates healthcare facilities in
the United States which are operated by independent healthcare
operating companies. The company is based in Hunt Valley,
Maryland.


ORRSTOWN FINANCIAL: Bid for Protective Order Granted in Part
------------------------------------------------------------
Orrstown Financial Services, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 8,
2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that a court
has entered an Order partially granting Orrstown's motion for
protective order, ruling that all deposition discovery in the case
is stayed pending a decision on The Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority's (SEPTA's) motion for leave to file a
third amended complaint.

On May 25, 2012, The Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority (SEPTA) filed a putative class action complaint in the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against
the Company, the Bank and certain current and former directors and
executive officers (collectively, the "Defendants").

The complaint alleges, among other things, that (i) in connection
with the Company's Registration Statement on Form S-3 dated
February 23, 2010 and its Prospectus Supplement dated March 23,
2010, and (ii) during the purported class period of March 24, 2010
through October 27, 2011, the Company issued materially false and
misleading statements regarding the Company's lending practices and
financial results, including misleading statements concerning the
stringent nature of the Bank's credit practices and underwriting
standards, the quality of its loan portfolio, and the intended use
of the proceeds from the Company's March 2010 public offering of
common stock.

The complaint asserts claims under Sections 11, 12(a) and 15 of the
Securities Act of 1933, Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, and
seeks class certification, unspecified money damages, interest,
costs, fees and equitable or injunctive relief.

Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
("PSLRA"), motions for appointment of Lead Plaintiff in this case
were due by July 24, 2012. SEPTA was the sole movant and the Court
appointed SEPTA Lead Plaintiff on August 20, 2012.

Pursuant to the PSLRA and the Court's September 27, 2012 Order,
SEPTA was given until October 26, 2012 to file an amended complaint
and the Defendants until December 7, 2012 to file a motion to
dismiss the amended complaint. SEPTA's opposition to the
Defendant's motion to dismiss was originally due January 11, 2013.


Under the PSLRA, discovery and all other proceedings in the case
were stayed pending the Court's ruling on the motion to dismiss.

The September 27, 2012 Order specified that if the motion to
dismiss were denied, the Court would schedule a conference to
address discovery and the filing of a motion for class
certification.

On October 26, 2012, SEPTA filed an unopposed motion for
enlargement of time to file its amended complaint in order to
permit the parties and new defendants to be named in the amended
complaint time to discuss plaintiff's claims and defendants'
defenses.

On October 26, 2012, the Court granted SEPTA's motion, mooting its
September 27, 2012 scheduling Order, and requiring SEPTA to file
its amended complaint on or before January 16, 2013 or otherwise
advise the Court of circumstances that require a further
enlargement of time. On January 14, 2013, the Court granted SEPTA's
second unopposed motion for enlargement of time to file an amended
complaint on or before March 22, 2013.

On March 4, 2013, SEPTA filed an amended complaint. The amended
complaint expands the list of defendants in the action to include
the Company's independent registered public accounting firm and the
underwriters of the Company's March 2010 public offering of common
stock.

In addition, among other things, the amended complaint extends the
purported 1934 Exchange Act class period from March 15, 2010
through April 5, 2012. Pursuant to the Court's March 28, 2013
Second Scheduling Order, on May 28, 2013, all defendants filed
their motions to dismiss the amended complaint, and on July 22,
2013, SEPTA filed its "omnibus" opposition to all of the
defendants' motions to dismiss.

On August 23, 2013, all defendants filed reply briefs in further
support of their motions to dismiss.

On December 5, 2013, the Court ordered oral argument on the
Orrstown Defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint to be
heard on February 7, 2014. Oral argument on the pending motions to
dismiss SEPTA's amended complaint was held on April 29, 2014.

The Second Scheduling Order stayed all discovery in the case
pending the outcome of the motions to dismiss, and informed the
parties that, if required, a telephonic conference to address
discovery and the filing of SEPTA's motion for class certification
would be scheduled after the Court's ruling on the motions to
dismiss.

On April 10, 2015, pursuant to Court order, all parties filed
supplemental briefs addressing the impact of the U.S. Supreme
Court's March 24, 2015 decision in Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers
District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund on
defendants’ motions to dismiss the amended complaint.

On June 22, 2015, in a 96-page Memorandum, the Court dismissed
without prejudice SEPTA's amended complaint against all defendants,
finding that SEPTA failed to state a claim under either the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, as amended.

The Court ordered that, within 30 days, SEPTA either seek leave to
amend its amended complaint, accompanied by the proposed amendment,
or file a notice of its intention to stand on the amended
complaint.

On July 22, 2015, SEPTA filed a motion for leave to amend under
Local Rule 15.1, and attached a copy of its proposed second amended
complaint to its motion. Many of the allegations of the proposed
second amended complaint are essentially the same or similar to the
allegations of the dismissed amended complaint.

The proposed second amended complaint also alleges that the
Orrstown Defendants did not publicly disclose certain alleged
failures of internal controls over loan underwriting, risk
management, and financial reporting during the period 2009 to 2012,
in violation of the federal securities laws. On February 8, 2016,
the Court granted SEPTA's motion for leave to amend and SEPTA filed
its second amended complaint that same day.

On February 25, 2016, the Court issued a scheduling Order
directing: all defendants to file any motions to dismiss by March
18, 2016; SEPTA to file an omnibus opposition to defendants’
motions to dismiss by April 8, 2016; and all defendants to file
reply briefs in support of their motions to dismiss by April 22,
2016. Defendants timely filed their motions to dismiss the second
amended complaint and the parties filed their briefs in accordance
with the Court-ordered schedule, above.

The February 25, 2016 Order stays all discovery and other deadlines
in the case (including the filing of SEPTA's motion for class
certification) pending the outcome of the motions to dismiss.

The allegations of SEPTA's second amended complaint disclosed the
existence of a confidential, non-public, fact-finding inquiry
regarding the Company being conducted by the SEC. As disclosed in
the Company's Form 8-K filed on September 27, 2016, on that date
the Company entered into a settlement agreement with the SEC
resolving the investigation of accounting and related matters at
the Company for the periods ended June 30, 2010, to December 31,
2011.

As part of the settlement of the SEC's administrative proceedings
and pursuant to the cease-and-desist order, without admitting or
denying the SEC's findings, the Company, its Chief Executive
Officer, its former Chief Financial Officer, its former Executive
Vice President and Chief Credit Officer, and its Chief Accounting
Officer, agreed to pay civil money penalties to the SEC.

The Company agreed to pay a civil money penalty of $1,000,000. The
Company had previously established a reserve for that amount which
was expensed in the second fiscal quarter of 2016. In the
settlement agreement with the SEC, the Company also agreed to cease
and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future
violations of Securities Act Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) and
Exchange Act Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B), and Rules
12b-20, 13a-1 and 13a-13 promulgated thereunder.

On September 27, 2016, the Orrstown Defendants filed with the Court
a Notice of Subsequent Event in Further Support of their Motion to
Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, regarding the settlement with
the SEC. The Notice attached a copy of the SEC's cease-and-desist
order and briefly described what the Company believed were the most
salient terms of the neither-admit-nor-deny settlement. On
September 29, 2016, SEPTA filed a Response to the Notice, in which
SEPTA argued that the settlement with the SEC did not support
dismissal of the second amended complaint.

On December 7, 2016, the Court issued an Order and Memorandum
granting in part and denying in part defendants’ motions to
dismiss SEPTA's second amended complaint. The Court granted the
motions to dismiss the Securities Act claims against all
defendants, and granted the motions to dismiss the Exchange Act
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims against all defendants except
Orrstown Financial Services, Inc., Orrstown Bank, Thomas R. Quinn,
Jr., Bradley S. Everly, and Jeffrey W. Embly. The Court also denied
the motions to dismiss the Exchange Act Section 20(a) claims
against Quinn, Everly, and Embly.

On January 31, 2017, the Court entered a Case Management Order
establishing the schedule for the litigation and, on August 15,
2017, it entered a revised Order that, among other things, set the
following deadlines: all fact discovery closes on March 1, 2018,
and SEPTA's motion for class certification is due the same day;
expert merits discovery closes May 30, 2018; summary judgment
motions are due by June 26, 2018; the mandatory pretrial and
settlement conference is set for December 11, 2018; and trial is
scheduled to begin on January 7, 2019.

On December 15, 2017, the Orrstown Defendants and SEPTA exchanged
expert reports in opposition to and in support of class
certification, respectively. On January 15, 2018, the parties
exchanged expert rebuttal reports.

SEPTA's motion for class certification was due March 1, 2018, with
the Orrstown Defendants' opposition due April 2, 2018, and
SEPTA’s reply due April 23, 2018.

On February 9, 2018, SEPTA filed a Status Report and Request for a
Telephonic Status Conference asking the Court to convene a
conference to discuss the status of discovery in the case and
possible revisions to the case schedule.

On February 12, 2018, the Orrstown Defendants filed their status
report to provide the Court with a summary of document discovery in
the case to date. On February 27, 2018, SEPTA filed an unopposed
motion for a continuance of the existing case deadlines pending a
status conference with the Court or the issuance of a revised case
schedule. On February 28, 2018, the Court issued an Order
continuing all case management deadlines until further order of the
Court.

On March 27, 2018, the Court held a telephonic status conference
with the parties to discuss outstanding discovery issues and case
deadlines. On May 2, 2018, the parties filed a joint status report.
On May 10, 2018, the Court held a follow-up telephonic status
conference at which the parties reported on the progress of
discovery to date. Party and non-party document discovery in the
case has continued.

To date, SEPTA has taken a few non-party depositions.

On August 9, 2018, SEPTA filed a motion to compel the production of
Confidential Supervisory Information (CSI) of non-parties the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB) and the
Pennsylvania Department of Banking and Securities, in the
possession of Orrstown and third parties. On August 23, 2018, the
Orrstown Defendants filed a response to the motion to compel. On
August 30, 2018, the FRB filed an unopposed motion to intervene in
the Action for the purpose of opposing SEPTA's motion to compel,
and on September 27, 2018, the FRB filed its brief in opposition to
SEPTA's motion. On October 11, 2018, SEPTA filed its reply brief in
support of its motion to compel.

On February 12, 2019, the Court denied SEPTA's motion to compel the
production of CSI on the ground that SEPTA had failed to exhaust
its administrative remedies.

On April 11, 2019, SEPTA filed a motion for leave to file a third
amended complaint. The proposed third amended complaint seeks to
reassert the Securities Act claims that the Court dismissed as to
all defendants on December 7, 2016, when the Court granted in part
and denied in part defendants' motions to dismiss SEPTA's second
amended complaint.

The proposed third amended complaint also seeks to reassert the
Exchange Act claims against those defendants that the Court
dismissed from the case on December 7, 2016.

Defendants' briefs in opposition to SEPTA's motion for leave to
file a third amended complaint were filed on April 25, 2019. SEPTA
filed a reply brief in further support of its motion for leave to
file a third amended complaint on May 9, 2019. That motion is
pending.

On June 13, 2019, Orrstown filed a motion for protective order to
stay discovery pending resolution of SEPTA's motion for leave to
file a third amended complaint. On June 19, 2019, former defendants
Smith Elliott Kearns & Company, LLC and the underwriters joined in
Orrstown's motion for protective order. On June 25, 2019, SEPTA
filed its opposition to Orrstown's motion. On July 9, 2019,
Orrstown filed a reply brief in further support of its motion.

On July 17, 2019, the Court entered an Order partially granting
Orrstown's motion for protective order.

Orrstown said, "The Company believes that the allegations of
SEPTA's second amended complaint, and the allegations of the
proposed third amended complaint, are without merit and intends to
defend itself vigorously against those claims. It is not possible
at this time to estimate reasonably possible losses, or even a
range of reasonably possible losses, in connection with the
litigation."

Orrstown Financial Services, Inc. operates as the holding company
for Orrstown Bank that provides commercial banking and trust
services in the United States. The company provides its banking
and
bank-related services through branches located in Berks,
Cumberland, Dauphin, Franklin, Lancaster, Perry, and York counties
of Pennsylvania, as well as Washington County, Maryland. Orrstown
Financial Services, Inc. was founded in 1919 and is headquartered
in Shippensburg, Pennsylvania.


ORTHO MATTRESS: Cal. App. Affirms Arbitration Denial in Banuelos
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division Two,
issued an Opinion affirming the Trial Court's judgment denying
Defendants' RAMIRO BANUELOS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v.  ORTHO
MATTRESS, INC. INC., Defendant and Appellant. No. E070393. (Cal.
App.).

Defendant and appellant Ortho Mattress, Inc. (Ortho) appeals the
denial of its petition to compel arbitration against plaintiff and
respondent Ramiro Banuelos.

As alleged, Ortho employed Banuelos as a salesperson from 2016 to
2017 and failed to provide meal and rest breaks or other
entitlements under the Labor Code. In 2017, Banuelos filed a class
action complaint, which was later amended to bring a single PAGA
claim as an aggrieved employee on behalf of the state.

Ortho petitioned to compel arbitration, arguing that Banuelos
received a copy of Ortho's Mutual Arbitration Policy (MAP) and
signed an applicable arbitration agreement when he was first
hired.

The trial court denied the petition.

Applicable Law

Under the PAGA, an aggrieved employee may bring a civil action
personally and on behalf of other current or former employees to
recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations.

In a PAGA action, the relevant question is not only whether the
aggrieved employee bringing the action is a party to the
arbitration agreement, but also whether the state is. It is well
settled that the state is the real party in interest in a PAGA
action.  

Neither party contends here that Banuelos entered into a
postdispute arbitration agreement. This is unsurprising, given that
Banuelos alleges he sent the Agency written notice in December
2017, approximately two years after he signed his arbitration
agreement. The state is therefore not bound by the arbitration
agreement. There is no indication in the record that the state has
otherwise expressed its consent to arbitration here. Accordingly,
the trial court properly denied Ortho's petition.

Ortho advances several arguments in contending the PAGA claim
should be arbitrated.

The Court considers each in turn.

Delegation Clause

First, Ortho contends that the trial court should never have
considered whether the PAGA claim should be arbitrated, but rather
should have allowed the arbitrator to decide it in the first
instance. Ortho notes that the arbitration agreement incorporated
the AAA's arbitration rules, which provided in part that the
arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own
jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the
existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement or to the
arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim.

Such a provision is sometimes referred to as a delegation clause.
Ortho asserts that, pursuant to the delegation clause, the trial
court was wrong to have reached the question of arbitrability at
all.

Cases interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), however, have
held that the threshold issue of whether the delegation clause is
even applicable to a certain party must be decided by the Court,
and Ortho does not point us to any cases to the contrary. This
principle has been recently affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court: to be sure, before referring a dispute to an arbitrator, the
court determines whether a valid arbitration agreement exists.

The Court concludes that the trial court was correct to consider
whether the delegation clause applied to the state. Moreover, the
trial court correctly determined that the delegation clause did not
apply.

Non-PAGA Relief

Second, Ortho argues that the trial court incorrectly treated
Banuelos as bringing only a PAGA claim despite the fact that the
complaint alleges Labor Code violations and requests certain types
of relief not covered by the PAGA. A motion to compel arbitration
is not the proper procedural vehicle for sorting through alleged
defects in the complaint. Ortho needs to challenge the defects it
believes are in the complaint; and then, if there are private,
non-PAGA actions, seek arbitration on those matters. Whether or not
Banuelos's complaint contains non-PAGA claims is therefore not a
ground for reversal here.

Individual PAGA Claim

Fourth, Ortho asserts that Banuelos is entitled to pursue civil
penalties for PAGA claims in his own name and that at least his
individual claim should be arbitrated.

This is contradicted, however, by the fact that the state is the
real party in interest in a PAGA action and that the PAGA is simply
a procedural statute allowing an aggrieved employee to recover
civil penalties for Labor Code violations that otherwise would be
sought by state labor law enforcement agencies. As our cases have
held, a single representative claim cannot be split into an
arbitrable individual claim and a nonarbitrable representative
claim.

Ortho disputes that the state is the real party in interest in a
PAGA action, citing Villacres v. ABM Industries, Inc. (2010) 189
Cal.App.4th 562 (Villacres). The plaintiff in Villacres filed a
PAGA action against his employer despite previously participating
in a class action alleging similar violations against the same
employer. The PAGA action was filed just days after the previous
class action was settled, and the trial court granted summary
judgment for the employer on res judicata grounds, which the Court
of Appeal affirmed.  

Villacres does not support Ortho here. For one, the opinion does
not state when the plaintiff met the statutory requirements to
bring a PAGA action, so it is not clear whether the general release
contained in his class action settlement agreement operated on a
predispute or postdispute basis. Regardless, even if Villacres
stood for the idea that a plaintiff could forego a PAGA claim on a
predispute basis, Iskanian which our Supreme Court decided four
years after Villacres makes that position no longer tenable.

Severance

Fifth, Ortho argues that Banuelos can be compelled to arbitration
here even if the class action waiver in his arbitration agreement
were severed. Our holding that the state is not bound by the
arbitration agreement, however, does not depend on the existence or
operation of the class action waiver. Accordingly, whether the
class action waiver is severable or not does not affect our
result.

FAA

Finally, Ortho argues that affirming the trial court's ruling would
violate the FAA in two ways.

First, Ortho contends that affirming the trial court would
effectively create a rule barring enforcement of the arbitration
agreement as to PAGA claims, which would run afoul of the FAA
because a State cannot categorically exempt certain claims from
arbitration.

As Ortho points out, when state law prohibits outright the
arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is
straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA. But
the Court is not barring enforcement of arbitration agreements as
to PAGA claims, which, the Court have said, can be arbitrated;
rather, the Court is barring enforcement of arbitration agreements
against non-parties.  

The order is affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Cal. App.'s dated August 22, 2019 Opinion
is available at  https://tinyurl.com/y2xkndvc from Leagle.com.

Hill, Farrer & Burrill, James A. Bowles -- jbowles@hillfarrer.com
-- and Elissa L. Gysi -- egysi@hillfarrer.com -- for Defendant and
Appellant.

Blumenthal Nordrehaug Bhowmik De Blouw, Norman B. Blumenthal, and
Kyle R. Nordrehaug, 2255 Calle Clara La Jolla, CA 92037, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.


OS RESTAURANT: Court Takes Class Cert. Bid under Submission
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as Lloyd T. Briggs III, the
Plaintiff v. OS Restaurant Services, LLC, et al., the Defendants,
Case No. 2:18-cv-08457-JAK-AFM (C.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge John A.
Kronstadt has taken Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment
and Plaintiff's motion for class certification under submission.

The Court said it is inclined to grant-in-part Defendants' Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment as to the Ninth Cause of Action, the
Tenth Cause of Action, and the Request for Injunctive Relief. The
Court said Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification satisfies the
requirements of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(a) numerosity, commonality
and typicality, but that the Court needs additional information
from counsel before reaching a view on whether the terms of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(b) are satisfied. Counsel address the Court.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Allen B. Felahy, Esq.
          FELAHY EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS
          550 S Hope St, Ste 2655
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-2647
          Telephone: (323) 645-5197
          Facsimile: (323) 645-5198
          E-mail: afelahy@felahylaw.com

               - and -

          Yashdeep Singh, Esq.
          YASH LAW GROUP
          3 Pointe Dr Ste 304, Brea, CA 92821-7604
          Telephone: (714) 494-6244
          Facsimile: (714) 406-2722
          E-mail: ysingh@yashlaw.com

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          Jason C. Ross, Esq.
          Kyle W. Nageotte, Esq.
          James M. Peterson, Esq.
          HIGGS FLETCHER & MACK
          401 West A Street, Suite 2600
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 595-4249
          Facsimile: (619) 696-1410
          E-mail: info@higgslaw.com

PFIZER INC: Class Suits Related to Adalimumab Biosimilars Ongoing
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Pfizer Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 8, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that the company together with AbbVie Inc.
continues to defend against purported class action suits related to
Adalimumab Biosimilars.

Beginning in March 2019, purported class actions relating to Humira
and adalimumab biosimilars were filed in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois against AbbVie Inc.
(AbbVie), certain affiliates of AbbVie, and other pharmaceutical
manufacturers.

Pfizer is a named defendant in three of the actions.

The plaintiffs seek to represent nationwide and multi-state classes
consisting of persons and/or entities who are indirect purchasers
of Humira from January 1, 2017 until the allegedly unlawful
antitrust effects cease.

Against Pfizer, the plaintiffs generally allege that Pfizer's and
AbbVie's 2018 licensing agreements, resolving all global
intellectual property matters for Pfizer's proposed adalimumab
biosimilar, delayed market entry of Pfizer's biosimilar product in
the U.S. in violation of federal antitrust laws, various state
antitrust or consumer protection laws, and unjust enrichment laws.


Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief and treble damages for alleged
overcharges for Humira since 2017.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Pfizer Inc. discovers, develops, manufactures, and sells healthcare
products worldwide. It offers medicines and vaccines in various
therapeutic areas, including internal medicine, vaccines, oncology,
inflammation and immunology, and rare diseases under the Lyrica,
Chantix/Champix, Eliquis, Ibrance, Sutent, Xalkori, Inlyta, Xtandi,
Enbrel, Xeljanz, Eucrisa, BeneFix, Genotropin, and Refacto
AF/Xyntha brands. Pfizer Inc. was founded in 1849 and is
headquartered in New York, New York.


PFIZER INC: Continues to Defend Lipitor-Related Antitrust Suits
---------------------------------------------------------------
Pfizer Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 8, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to defend itself
from purported class action suits over sales of Lipitor.

Beginning in November 2011, purported class actions relating to
Lipitor were filed in various federal courts against, among others,
Pfizer, certain affiliates of Pfizer, and, in most of the actions,
Ranbaxy, Inc. (Ranbaxy) and certain affiliates of Ranbaxy.

The plaintiffs in these various actions seek to represent
nationwide, multi-state or statewide classes consisting of persons
or entities who directly purchased, indirectly purchased or
reimbursed patients for the purchase of Lipitor (or, in certain of
the actions, generic Lipitor) from any of the defendants from March
2010 until the cessation of the defendants' allegedly unlawful
conduct (the Class Period).

The plaintiffs allege delay in the launch of generic Lipitor, in
violation of federal antitrust laws and/or state antitrust,
consumer protection and various other laws, resulting from (i) the
2008 agreement pursuant to which Pfizer and Ranbaxy settled certain
patent litigation involving Lipitor, and Pfizer granted Ranbaxy a
license to sell a generic version of Lipitor in various markets
beginning on varying dates, and (ii) in certain of the actions, the
procurement and/or enforcement of certain patents for Lipitor.

Each of the actions seeks, among other things, treble damages on
behalf of the putative class for alleged price overcharges for
Lipitor (or, in certain of the actions, generic Lipitor) during the
Class Period.

In addition, individual actions have been filed against Pfizer,
Ranbaxy and certain of their affiliates, among others, that assert
claims and seek relief for the plaintiffs that are substantially
similar to the claims asserted and the relief sought in the
purported class actions described above.

These various actions have been consolidated for pre-trial
proceedings in a Multi-District Litigation (In re Lipitor Antitrust
Litigation MDL-2332) in the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey.

In September 2013 and 2014, the District Court dismissed with
prejudice the claims by direct purchasers. In October and November
2014, the District Court dismissed with prejudice the claims of all
other Multi-District Litigation plaintiffs.

All plaintiffs have appealed the District Court's orders dismissing
their claims with prejudice to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit.

In addition, the direct purchaser class plaintiffs appealed the
order denying their motion to amend the judgment and for leave to
amend their complaint to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit.

In August 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed the District Court's decisions and remanded the claims to
the District Court.

Also, in January 2013, the State of West Virginia filed an action
in West Virginia state court against Pfizer and Ranbaxy, among
others, that asserts claims and seeks relief on behalf of the State
of West Virginia and residents of that state that are substantially
similar to the claims asserted and the relief sought in the
purported class actions described above.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Pfizer Inc. discovers, develops, manufactures, and sells healthcare
products worldwide. It offers medicines and vaccines in various
therapeutic areas, including internal medicine, vaccines, oncology,
inflammation and immunology, and rare diseases under the Lyrica,
Chantix/Champix, Eliquis, Ibrance, Sutent, Xalkori, Inlyta, Xtandi,
Enbrel, Xeljanz, Eucrisa, BeneFix, Genotropin, and Refacto
AF/Xyntha brands. Pfizer Inc. was founded in 1849 and is
headquartered in New York, New York.


PFIZER INC: Continues to Defend Saline Solution Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Pfizer Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 8, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that Hospira and Hospira Worldwide, Inc.
continue to defend a consolidated class action suit related to
intravenous saline solution.

Beginning in November 2016, purported class actions were filed in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
against Hospira, Hospira Worldwide, Inc. and certain other
defendants relating to intravenous saline solution. Plaintiffs seek
to represent a class consisting of all persons and entities in the
U.S. who directly purchased intravenous saline solution sold by any
of the defendants from January 1, 2013 until the time the
defendants' allegedly unlawful conduct ceases. Plaintiffs allege
that the defendants' conduct restricts output and artificially
fixes, raises, maintains and/or stabilizes the prices of
intravenous saline solution sold throughout the U.S. in violation
of federal antitrust laws.

Plaintiffs seek treble damages (for themselves and on behalf of the
putative classes) and an injunction against defendants for alleged
price overcharges for intravenous saline solution in the U.S. since
January 1, 2013.

All of these actions have been consolidated in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

In July 2018, the District Court granted defendants' motions to
dismiss the consolidated amended complaint without prejudice.
Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint in September 2018.

Pfizer said, "On February 3, 2017, we completed the sale of our
global infusion systems net assets, HIS, which includes intravenous
saline solution, to ICU Medical. The litigation is the subject of
cross-claims for indemnification by both Pfizer and ICU Medical
under the purchase agreement."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Pfizer Inc. discovers, develops, manufactures, and sells healthcare
products worldwide. It offers medicines and vaccines in various
therapeutic areas, including internal medicine, vaccines, oncology,
inflammation and immunology, and rare diseases under the Lyrica,
Chantix/Champix, Eliquis, Ibrance, Sutent, Xalkori, Inlyta, Xtandi,
Enbrel, Xeljanz, Eucrisa, BeneFix, Genotropin, and Refacto
AF/Xyntha brands. Pfizer Inc. was founded in 1849 and is
headquartered in New York, New York.


PFIZER INC: Hormone Therapy Consumer Class Action vs. Wyeth Ongoing
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Pfizer Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 8, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that Wyeth LLC continues to defend itself from
the Hormone Therapy Consumer class action lawsuit.

A certified consumer class action is pending against Wyeth in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California based
on the alleged off-label marketing of its hormone therapy products.


The case was originally filed in December 2003.

The class consists of California consumers who purchased Wyeth's
hormone-replacement products between January 1995 and January 2003
and who do not seek personal injury damages therefrom.

The class seeks compensatory and punitive damages, including a full
refund of the purchase price.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Pfizer Inc. discovers, develops, manufactures, and sells healthcare
products worldwide. It offers medicines and vaccines in various
therapeutic areas, including internal medicine, vaccines, oncology,
inflammation and immunology, and rare diseases under the Lyrica,
Chantix/Champix, Eliquis, Ibrance, Sutent, Xalkori, Inlyta, Xtandi,
Enbrel, Xeljanz, Eucrisa, BeneFix, Genotropin, and Refacto
AF/Xyntha brands. Pfizer Inc. was founded in 1849 and is
headquartered in New York, New York.

PHILADELPHIA CONSOLIDATED: Huck Suit Transferred to N.D. Georgia
----------------------------------------------------------------
The case, RONALD HUCK and PEGGY HUCK, Individually and on behalf of
all those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. PHILADELPHIA
CONSOLIDATED HOLDING CORP. D/B/A PHILADELPHIA INSURANCE COMPANIES,
and PHILADELPHIA INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants,
2019-0083851-CV, was removed from Cobb County Superior Court to the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
on July 23, 2019. The removal of this case is pursuant to the Class
Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The minimal diversity requirement under
CAFA is satisfied in this case because (a) Plaintiffs are citizens
of Georgia, and (b) Defendants are not citizens of Georgia. The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
has opened Case No. 1:19-cv-03336-AT for further proceedings.

In this complaint, Plaintiffs allege that on or about Jan. 7, 2014,
their home suffered a water loss that was covered under an
insurance policy issued by Defendants.  Plaintiffs further allege
that Defendants failed to assess for or pay diminished value
arising out of that loss.

Philadelphia Consolidated is a Pennsylvania corporation with its
principal place of business in Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania. [BN]

Attorneys for Defendants:

     Jeffrey A. Zachman, Esq.
     DENTONS US LLP
     303 Peachtree Street, NE. Suite 5300
     Atlanta, GA 30308
     Telephone: (404) 527-4000
     Facsimile: (404) 527-4198
     E-mail: jeff.zachman@dentons.com

             - and -

     Richard L. Fenton, Esq.
     DENTONS US LLP
     233 South Wacker Drive, Suite 5900
     Chicago, IL 60606-6462
     Telephone: (312) 876-8000
     Facsimile: (312) 876-7934
     E-mail: richard.fenton@dentons.com

PILLARS PROTECTION: O'Byant Wins Collective Class Certification
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as ROBERT BRANDON CAVANESS
O'BRYANT, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, v. PILLARS PROTECTION SERVICES, LLC, the Defendant, Case
No. 2:19-cv-01354-GCS-KAJ (S.D. Ohio, Aug. 29, 2019), the Hon.
Judge George C. Smith entered an order:

   1. granting Plaintiff's Motion, as amended by the terms of the
      Stipulation filed by the parties;

   2. certifying a collective class of:

      "current or former Security Guards employed by Pillars
      Protective Services, LLC, who worked at least 35 hours in
      any single workweek during the three years prior to
      Aug. 29, 2019";

   3. approving form and substance of the Notice filed in the
      action;

   4. approving form and substance of the Consent Form filed in
      the action; and

   5. directing Clerk to remove from the Court’s pending motions

      list, the Motion for Conditional Class Certification and
      Court-Supervised Notice to Potential Opt-In Plaintiff.

The parties have agreed to, and the Court approves, the following
timeline in connection with the dissemination of the Notice:

   a.   No later than 14 days after the date of this Order:

        Defendant to provide names and contact information of
        putative class members to class counsel.

   b.   No later than 14 days after class counsel receives contact

        information from Defendant:

        Class counsel to send the Notice and Consent Form (Notice
        Packet) to the putative class via U.S. first-class mail
        and electronic mail.

   c.   At the conclusion of the Notice Period:

        Parties to schedule status conference with the Court.[CC]

PLURALSIGHT INC: Faces Suit over 40% Drop in Share Price
--------------------------------------------------------
CITY OF BIRMINGHAM FIREMEN'S AND POLICEMEN'S SUPPLEMENTAL PENSION
SYSTEM, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. PLURALSIGHT, INC.; AARON SKONNARD; and JAMES
BUDGE, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-07563 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 13, 2019)
is an action on behalf of all persons or entities that purchased or
otherwise acquired Pluralsight common stock from August 2, 2018
through July 31, 2019, inclusive, seeking to pursue remedies under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

According to the complaint, on July 31, 2019, after the close of
the markets, Pluralsight announced disappointing financial results
for the second quarter ended June 30, 2019, and that its billings
growth rate had sharply deteriorated from over 40% to just 23%
year-over-year. The Company blamed its declining growth in billings
on sales execution challenges and other issues with its salesforce.
Pluralsight also disclosed that its Chief Revenue Officer was
resigning. In response to these disclosures, Pluralsight's share
price plummeted. The stock price fell $12.13 per share in a single
day -- a nearly 40% drop -- to close at $18.56 per share on August
1, 2019.

Pluralsight, Inc. operates as a software company. The Company
provides a platform which offers assessments, learning paths and
courses to businesses and individuals seeking to enhance their
programming and IT related skill sets. Pluralsights serves
customers around the world. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Steven B. Singer, Esq.
          SAXENA WHITE P.A.
          10 Bank Street, 8th Floor
          White Plains, NY 10606
          Telephone: (914) 437-8551
          Facsimile: (888) 631-3611
          E-mail: ssinger@saxenawhite.com

               - and -

          Joseph E. White, III, Esq.
          SAXENA WHITE P.A.
          150 East Palmetto Park Road, Suite 600
          Boca Raton, FL 33432
          Telephone: (561) 394-3399
          Facsimile: (561) 394-3382
          E-mail: jwhite@saxenawhite.com

               - and -

          David R. Kaplan, Esq.
          SAXENA WHITE P.A.
          12750 High Bluff Drive, Suite 475
          San Diego, CA 92130
          Telephone: (858) 997-0860
          Facsimile: (858) 369-0096
          E-mail: dkaplan@saxenawhite.com


PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Class Certification Sought in Johnson Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jumoka Johnson moves the Court to certify the class described in
the complaint of the lawsuit styled JUMOKA JOHNSON, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. PORTFOLIO
RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC, Case No. 2:19-cv-01240 (E.D. Wisc.), and
further asks that the Court both stay the motion for class
certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief
from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules and
requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed with the
Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff avers.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          Denise L. Morris, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com
                  dmorris@ademilaw.com


PREMIER NUTRITION: Certification of 9 Joint Juice Classes Sought
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in nine class action lawsuits will move the Court on
November 7, 2019, for an order:

   1. certifying the following nine Classes and appointing each
      respective Plaintiff as Class representative for his or her
      state. The Classes to be certified are defined as:

      "all persons who purchased Joint Juice in the States of
      Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts,
      Michigan, New Mexico, New York, and Pennsylvania from March
      1, 2009 up to and including the date class notice is
      disseminated"; and

   2. appointing Timothy G. Blood of the law firm of Blood Hurst &

      O'Reardon, LLP as class counsel for each Class.

      Excluded from each Class are: the Defendant, its parents,
      subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, and directors; those who

      purchased the Joint Juice Products for the purpose of
      resale; all persons who make a timely election to be
      excluded from the Class; the judge to whom this case is
      assigned and any immediate family members thereof; and those

      who assert claims for personal injury.

The nine class action lawsuits are:

   "VINCENT D. MULLINS, individually and on behalf of all others
   similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. PREMIER NUTRITION
   CORPORATION f/k/a JOINT JUICE, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
   3:16-cv-06685-RS (N.D. Cal)";

   "VINCENT D. MULLINS, individually and on behalf of all others
   similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. PREMIER NUTRITION
   CORPORATION f/k/a JOINT JUICE, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
   3:16-cv-06703-RS (N.D. Cal)";

   "VINCENT D. MULLINS, individually and on behalf of all others
   similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. PREMIER NUTRITION
   CORPORATION f/k/a JOINT JUICE, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
   3:16-cv-06704-RS (N.D. Cal)";

   "VINCENT D. MULLINS, individually and on behalf of all others
   similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. PREMIER NUTRITION
   CORPORATION f/k/a JOINT JUICE, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
   3:16-cv-06708-RS (N.D. Cal)";

   "VINCENT D. MULLINS, individually and on behalf of all others
   similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. PREMIER NUTRITION
   CORPORATION f/k/a JOINT JUICE, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
   3:16-cv-06721-RS (N.D. Cal)";

   "VINCENT D. MULLINS, individually and on behalf of all others
   similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. PREMIER NUTRITION
   CORPORATION f/k/a JOINT JUICE, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
   3:16-cv-06980-RS (N.D. Cal)";

   "VINCENT D. MULLINS, individually and on behalf of all others
   similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. PREMIER NUTRITION
   CORPORATION f/k/a JOINT JUICE, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
   3:16-cv-07078-RS (N.D. Cal)";

   "VINCENT D. MULLINS, individually and on behalf of all others
   similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. PREMIER NUTRITION
   CORPORATION f/k/a JOINT JUICE, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
   3:16-cv-07090-RS (N.D. Cal)"; and

   "VINCENT D. MULLINS, individually and on behalf of all others
   similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. PREMIER NUTRITION
   CORPORATION f/k/a JOINT JUICE, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
   3:17-cv-00054-RS".

The following are the respective Plaintiff seeking for appointment
for each Class:

   Susan Caiazzo (Florida), Case No. 3:16-cv-06685-RS

   Donna Lux (Connecticut), Case No. 3:16-cv-06703-RS

   Annette Ravinsky (Pennsylvania), Case No. 3:16-cv-06704-RS

   Arthur Sandoval (New Mexico), Case No. 3:16-cv-06708-RS

   Sandra Dent (Illinois), Case No. 3:16-cv-06721-RS

   Beverly Avery (Michigan), Case No. 3:16-cv-07078-RS

   Marilyn Spencer (Maryland), Case No. 3:16-cv-07090-RS

   Eric Fishon (New York), Case No. 3:16-cv-06980-RS

   Mary Trudeau (Massachusetts), Case No. 3:17-cv-00054-RS[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          BLOOD HURST & O'REARDON, LLP
          TIMOTHY G. BLOOD (149343)
          THOMAS J. O’REARDON II (247952)
          501 West Broadway, Suite 1490
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: 619 338-1100
          Facsimile: 619 338-1101
          E-mail: tblood@bholaw.com
                  toreardon@bholaw.com

PRESSED JUICERY: Brooks Files Class Suit in California Under ADA
----------------------------------------------------------------
Pressed Juicery, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Valerie Brooks, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Pressed Juicery, Inc., a Delaware
corporation, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-01687 KJM-CKD (E.D. Cal.,
Aug. 28, 2019).

Pressed Juicery is a cold-pressed juice brand.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Thiago Merlini Coelho, Esq.
   Wilshire Law Firm
   3055 Wilshire Blvd
   12th Floor
   Los Angeles, CA 90010
   Tel: (213) 381-9988
   Fax: (213) 381-9989
   Email: thiago@wilshirelawfirm.com


QUINCY BIOSCIENCE: Karathanos Suit Transferred to S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case, John Karathanos, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Quincy Bioscience Holding
Company, Inc., a corporation; Quincy Bioscience, LLC, a limited
liability company; Prevagen, Inc., doing business as: Sugar River
Supplements a corporation; Quincy Bioscience Manufacturing, LLC, a
limited liability company  Mark Underwood, individually and as an
officer of Quincy Bioscience Holding Company, Inc., Quincy
Bioscience, LLC, and Prevagen, Inc.; and Michael Beaman,
individually and as an officer of Quincy Bioscience Holding
Company, Inc., Quincy Bioscience, LLC, and Prevagen, Inc.,
Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-01091 (Feb. 27, 2017), was transferred
from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York,
to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
(Foley Square) on Aug. 28, 2019. The Southern District of New York
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-08023-RA to the proceeding.

The suit demands $5 million in damages and alleges violation of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge Ronnie Abrams.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Daniel Robert Lapinski, Esq.
          MOTLEY RICE LLC
          210 Lake Drive East, Suite 101
          Cherry Hill, NJ 08002
          Telephone: (856) 667-0500
          Facsimile: (856) 667-5133
          E-mail: dlapinski@motleyrice.com

               - and -

          Kevin P. Roddy, Esq.
          WILENTZ, GOLDMAN & SPITZER, P.A.
          90 Woodbridge Center Drive, Suite 900
          Woodbridge, NJ 07095
          Telephone: (732) 855-6402
          Facsimile: (732) 726-6686
          E-mail: kroddy@wilentz.com

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          Geoffrey White Castello, III, Esq.
          KELLEY DRYE & WARREN LLP
          200 Kimball Drive
          Parsippany, NJ 07054
          Telephone: (973) 503-5922
          Facsimile: (973) 503-5950
          E-mail: gcastello@kelleydrye.com

               - and -

          Joshua Simon, Esq.
          Matthew R. Orr, Esq.
          William P. Cole, Esq.
          CALL & JENSEN
          610 Newport Center Drive, Suite 700
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (949) 717-3000
          Facsimile: (949) 717-3100
          E-mail jsimon@calljensen.com
                  morr@calljensen.com
                  wcole@calljensen.com

               - and -

          Glenn T. Graham, Esq.
          Jaclyn Marie Metzinger, Esq.
          KELLEY DRYE & WARREN LLP
          One Jefferson Road, 2nd Floor
          Parsippany, NJ 07054
          Telephone: (973) 503-5917
          Facsimile: (973) 503-5950
          E-mail: ggraham@kelleydrye.com
                  jmetzinger@kelleydrye.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey S. Jacobson, Esq.
          DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP
          1177 Avenue of the Americas, 41st Floor
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone:  (212) 248-3191
          E-mail: jeffrey.jacobson@dbr.com

RAYMOND JAMES: Final Settlement Approval Hearing Set for Oct. 25
----------------------------------------------------------------
Raymond James Financial, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 8, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that a court has set a
hearing date of October 25, 2019 for final approval of the
settlement.

On February 17, 2015, Jyll Brink ("Brink") filed a putative class
action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida (the "District Court") under the caption Jyll
Brink v. Raymond James & Associates, Inc. (the "Brink Complaint").


The Brink Complaint alleges that Brink, a former customer of RJ&A,
was charged a fee in her Passport Investment Account, and that the
fee included an unauthorized and undisclosed profit to RJ&A in
violation of its customer agreement and applicable industry
standards.

The Passport Investment Account is a fee-based account in which
clients pay asset-based advisory fees and certain processing fees
for ongoing investment advice and monitoring of securities
holdings.

The Brink Complaint seeks, among other relief, damages in the
amount of the difference between the actual cost of processing a
trade, as alleged by Brink, and the fee charged by RJ&A.

On October 19, 2018, the District Court certified a class of former
and current customers of RJ&A who executed a Passport Agreement and
were charged processing fees during the period between February 17,
2010 and February 17, 2015.

On February 11, 2016, Caleb Wistar ("Wistar") and Ernest Mayeaux
("Mayeaux") filed a putative class action complaint in the District
Court under the caption Caleb Wistar and Ernest Mayeaux v. Raymond
James Financial Services, Inc. and Raymond James Financial Services
Advisors, Inc. (as subsequently amended, the "Wistar Complaint").

Similar to the Brink Complaint, the Wistar Complaint alleges that
Wistar and Mayeaux, former customers of Raymond James Financial
Services, Inc. ("RJFS") and Raymond James Financial Services
Advisors, Inc. ("RJFSA"), were charged a fee in RJFS and RJFSA's
Passport Investment Account and that the fee included an
unauthorized and undisclosed profit to RJFS and RJFSA in violation
of its customer agreement and applicable industry standards.

The Wistar Complaint seeks, among other relief, damages in the
amount of the difference between the actual cost of processing a
trade, as alleged by Wistar and Mayeaux, and the fee charge by RJFS
and RJFSA.

On April 5, 2019, the parties to the Brink Complaint and the Wistar
Complaint agreed in principle to an aggregate settlement of $15
million.

On June 11, 2019, the parties filed a Stipulation of Settlement and
Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement
and Certification of the Settled Subclasses.

On June 12, 2019, the District Court entered an order preliminarily
approving the Class Action Settlement and set a hearing date of
October 25, 2019 for final approval of the settlement.

Raymond James said, "While the hearing for final approval has been
set, the settlement remains subject to approval by the District
Court. The settlement amounts for both complaints were included in
"Other payables" in our Condensed Consolidated Statement of
Financial Condition as of June 30, 2019."

Raymond James Financial, Inc., through its subsidiaries, engages in
the underwriting, distribution, trading, and brokerage of equity
and debt securities, and the sale of mutual funds and other
investment products in the United States, Canada, Europe, and
internationally. It operates in five segments: Private Client Group
(PCG), Capital Markets, Asset Management, RJ Bank, and Other. The
company was founded in 1962 and is headquartered in St. Petersburg,
Florida.


RECEIVABLES MANAGEMENT: Seeks Prelim. Nod of Coulter Class Deal
---------------------------------------------------------------
The parties in the lawsuit captioned JOSHUA COULTER, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. RECEIVABLES
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, Case No. 2:17-cv-03970-JS (E.D. Pa.), jointly
move the Court for an order certifying the case to proceed as a
class action and granting preliminary approval of the Parties'
Class Settlement Agreement.

The class consists of:

     All consumers who were sent an initial collection letter
     from Defendant, with an address in Chester County,
     Pennsylvania, during the period of September 5, 2016 to
     March 3, 2017, attempting to collect a consumer debt, which
     stated: "If you feel that this balance may be due from your
     insurance carrier, please contact your carrier prior to
     contacting the representative at the extension listed
     below."

The Plaintiff filed this class action lawsuit pursuant to the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, which alleges that RMS violated the
FDCPA by sending consumers written collection communications that
misleadingly suggested that the Plaintiff could dispute the alleged
RMS debt by calling RMS, when in fact, a dispute must be made in
writing to be effective under the FDCPA.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ari H. Marcus, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN, LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Telephone: (732) 695-3282
          Facsimile: (732) 298-6256
          E-mail: Ari@MarcusZelman.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Thomas Collins, Esq.
          BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC
          409 N. 2nd Street, Suite 500
          Harrisburg, PA 17101
          Telephone: (717) 237-4800
          Facsimile: (717) 233-0852
          E-mail: thomas.collins@bipc.com


RHODE ISLAND: Chapdelaine, et al Seek to Certify Class
------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as THEODORE CHAPDELAINE, et al.,
the Plaintiffs, v. PETER NERONHA, in his official capacity as
Attorney General of the State of Rhode Island, et al., the
Defendants, Case No. 1:15-cv-00450-JJM-LDA (D.R.I., Aug. 27, 2019),
Theodore Chapdelaine, Frederick Kenney, and Richard Moreau  ask the
Court for an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all persons currently residing in, and those who may in the
      future relocate to, the State of Rhode Island who were or
      are convicted of offenses that require registration under
      the Sexual Offender Registration and Community Notification
      Act of the State of Rhode Island, chapter 11-37.1 of the
      General Laws of the State of Rhode Island, and have been, or

      will be, assigned to "tier" or "level" and are therefore
      subject to the Residency Prohibition and the 2020 Residency
      Prohibition contained in section 11-37.1-10(d). Excluded
      from the class are any persons as to whom a criminal charge
      or indictment for alleged violation of the Residency
      Prohibition is pending."

   2. appointing Plaintiffs as representatives of the certified
      class; and

   3. appointing Plaintiffs' counsel as class counsel.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Lynette Labinger, Esq.
          LABINGER LAW
          128 Dorrance Street Box 710
          Providence, RI 02903
          Telephone: (401) 465-9565 -tel
          E-mail: LL@labingerlaw.com

               - and -

          John E. MacDonald, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF JOHN E. MACDONALD, INC.
          One Turks Head Place, Suite 1440
          Providence, RI 02903
          Telephone: (401) 421-1440 -tel
          Facsimile: (401) 421-1442 -fax
          E-mail: jm@jmaclaw.com

RITE AID: Faces Product Liability Lawsuit in Connecticut
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Rite Aid of
Connecticut, Inc. and Maxi Drug, Inc. for alleged tort liability.
The case is captioned John Howell, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, v. Rite Aid of Connecticut, Inc. et
al., Case No. HHD-CV-19-6114418-S (Conn. Super., July 17, 2019).
This product liability lawsuit is filed in Hartford County,
Connecticut.

Headquartered in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, Rite Aid is a
drugstore chain in the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     BROWN PAINDIRIS & SCOTT LLP
     100 Pearl Street
     Hartford, CT 061034506
     Telephone: (203) 522-3343

ROCHELLE PROPERTY: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Beaudet Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
GALINA BEAUDET, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ROCHELLE PROPERTY SOLUTIONS, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 8:19-cv-02054 (M.D. Fla., Aug. 18, 2019) seeks to stop the
Defendants' practice of making unsolicited calls.

Rochelle Property Solutions, LLC offers real estate investment
services providing real estate solutions of all types. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.
          401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 400-4713
          E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com


ROUNDY'S ILLINOIS: Class Certification Sought in Haugen Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit titled JAMES HAUGEN AND CHRISTIAN
GOLDSTON, on behalf of themselves, and all other Plaintiffs
similarly situated, known and unknown v. ROUNDY'S ILLINOIS, LLC
D/B/A MARIANO'S, Case No. 1:18-cv-07297 (N.D. Ill.), filed with the
Court their Motion for Stage-One Conditional Certification and
Notice to Putative Class Members.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          John W. Billhorn, Esq.
          BILLHORN LAW FIRM
          53 W. Jackson Blvd., Suite 401
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Telephone: (312) 853-1450
          E-mail: jbillhorn@billhornlaw.com


RUTHERFORD COUNTY, TN: KW Seeks to Certify 3 Classes of Arrestees
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit entitled K.W., EX REL KANISA DAVIS;
A.B., EX REL SANDRA BRIEN; AND J.B., EX REL JAQUELINE BRINKLEY,
DYLAN J. GEERTS v. RUTHERFORD COUNTY, TENNESSEE, Case No.
3:17-cv-01014 (M.D. Tenn.), submit their revised motion for
certification of three classes:

   A. Arrest Class (certification sought under Rule 23(b)(3) for
      compensatory damages):

      All persons who have been taken into custody by a
      Rutherford County Sheriff's deputy for a juvenile unruly or
      misdemeanor delinquent charge, where the child was taken
      into custody on or after July 20, 2016 or the child was
      born on or after July 20, 1999, and:

      1. The Sheriff's file reflects that no law enforcement
         officer personally witnessed the alleged offense;

      2. The alleged offense was not for runaway, violation of
         probation, violation of valid court order, domestic
         assault, driving under the influence, a traffic offense
         in connection with a motor vehicle collision, or
         stalking; and,

      3. The arrest was not made pursuant to a previously-issued
         court arrest order based on individualized findings that
         a summons would be ineffective;

   B. Injunctive Detention Class (certification sought under Rule
      23(b)(2) for declaratory and injunctive relief):

      All children who may, in the future, be securely detained
      at the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center on a
      delinquent or unruly charge where:

      1. The child is not charged with the delinquent offense of
         Aggravated Assault, any form of robbery, any form of
         kidnapping, any form of criminal homicide, any rape or
         sexual battery offense, Aggravated Arson, or any illegal
         weapons offense;

      2. The child is not charged with a felony delinquent
         offense, probation violation, or aftercare violation
         while the child:

         a) Is already on supervised probation;

         b) Is already awaiting court action on a previously
            alleged delinquent offense;

         c) Is alleged to have escaped or absconded from a
            juvenile facility, institution, or other
            court-ordered placement; or

         d) Has, within the previous twelve months, been charged
            with failing to appear at any juvenile court hearing
            or committing a violent felony delinquent offense
            involving a risk of serious bodily injury or death;

         e) Has, within the previous twelve months, been
            adjudicated delinquent of a felony delinquent
            offense;

         3. There are not "special circumstances" justifying the
            secure detention because of a risk of immediate harm
            to the child if he or she is not securely detained;

         4. The child is not alleged to be an escapee from a
            secure juvenile facility or institution;

         5. The child is not wanted in another jurisdiction for a
            felony delinquent offense;

         6. The child is not charged as an unruly child for
            violating a valid court order; and

   C. Detention Damages Class (certification sought under Rule
      23(b)(3) for compensatory damages):

      All persons who have been securely detained at the
      Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center on a delinquent
      or unruly allegation, where the person was detained on or
      after October 14, 2015, or the person was born on or after
      October 14, 1998, and the Juvenile Court and Juvenile
      Detention Center files reflect:

      1. The person was not charged with the delinquent offense
         of Aggravated Assault, any form of robbery, any form of
         kidnapping, any form of criminal homicide, any rape or
         sexual battery offense, Aggravated Arson, or any illegal
         weapons offense;

      2. The person was not charged with a felony delinquent
         offense, probation violation, or aftercare violation
         while the person:

         a) Was already on supervised probation;

         b) Was already awaiting court action on a previously
            alleged delinquent offense;

         c) Was alleged to have escaped or absconded from a
            juvenile facility, institution, or other
            court-ordered placement; or

         d) Had, within the previous twelve months, been charged
            with failing to appear at any juvenile court hearing
            or committing a violent felony delinquent offense
            involving a risk of serious bodily injury or death;

         e) Had, within the previous twelve months, been
            adjudicated delinquent of a felony delinquent
            offense.

         3. No court order was issued within 24 hours of the
            detention, excluding nonjudicial days, documenting
            "special circumstances" justifying the secure
            detention because of a risk of immediate harm to the
            person if he or she was not securely detained;

         4. The person was not alleged to be an escapee from a
            secure juvenile facility or institution;

         5. The person was not wanted in another jurisdiction for
            a felony delinquent offense; and

         6. The person was not charged as an unruly child for
            violating a valid court order already in effect.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Wesley B. Clark, Esq.
          BRAZIL CLARK, PLLC
          2706 Larmon Dr.
          Nashville, TN 37204
          Telephone: (615) 984-4681
          Facsimile: (615) 514-9674
          E-mail: wesley@brazilclark.com

               - and -

          Kyle F. Mothershead, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF KYLE MOTHERSHEAD
          414 Union St., Suite 900
          Nashville, TN 37219
          Telephone: (615) 982-8002
          Facsimile: (615) 229-6387
          E-mail: kyle@mothersheadlaw.com

               - and -

          Mark J. Downton, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF MARK J. DOWNTON
          2706 Larmon Dr.
          Nashville, TN 37204
          Telephone: (615) 984-4681
          Facsimile: (615) 514-9674
          E-mail: lawyerdownton@gmail.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Randall Mantooth, Esq.
          HUDSON, REED & MCCREARY, PLLC
          16 Public Square North
          P.O. Box 884
          Murfreesboro, TN 37133
          Telephone: (615) 893-5522
          E-mail: rmantooth@mborolaw.com


S-L DISTRIBUTION: Macedonia Moves to Certify Distributors Class
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit entitled MACEDONIA DISTRIBUTING INC.,
on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated v. S-L
DISTRIBUTION COMPANY, LLC, Case No. 8:17-cv-01692-JVS-KES (C.D.
Cal.), moves for an order certifying a class defined as:

     All individuals or entities in the state of California who,
     as of May 2017, were a party to a Distributor Agreement with
     S-L Distribution Company, LLC and whose Distributor
     Agreements were terminated as part of S-L's 2017 system-wide
     termination of Distributor Agreements.

Macedonia also asks the Court to appoint it as Class
representative, and to appoint its counsel, Tycko & Zavareei LLP
and Spangenberg Shibley & Liber LLP, as Class Counsel.

The Court will commence a hearing on December 16, 2019, at 1:30
p.m., to consider the Motion.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Annick M. Persinger, Esq.
          V Chai Oliver Prentice, Esq.
          TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP
          1970 Broadway, Suite 1070
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone (510) 254-6808
          Facsimile (510) 210-0571
          E-mail: apersinger@tzlegal.com
                  vprentice@tzlegal.com

               - and -

          Hassan A. Zavareei, Esq.
          TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP
          1828 L Street, NW, Suite 1000
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone (202) 973-0900
          Facsimile (202) 973-0950
          E-mail: hzavareei@tzlegal.com

               - and -

          Stuart E. Scott, Esq.
          SPANGENBERG SHIBLEY & LIBER LLP
          1001 Lakeside Avenue East, Suite 1700
          Cleveland, OH 44114
          Telephone (216) 696-3232
          Facsimile (216) 696-3924
          E-mail: sscott@spanglaw.com


SAEXPLORATION HOLDINGS: Bodin Sues over 34% Drop in Share Price
---------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN BODIN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SA EXPLORATION HOLDINGS, INC.; JEFF
HASTINGS; BRIAN BEATTY; and BRENT WHITELEY, Defendants, Case No.
4:19-cv-03089 (S.D. Tex., Aug. 18, 2019) is a class action on
behalf of persons or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired
publicly traded SAExploration securities from March 15, 2016
through August 15, 2019, inclusive, seeking to recover compensable
damages caused by the Defendants' violations of the federal
securities laws under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

On March 15, 2016, the Company filed a Form 10-K for the fiscal
year ended December 31, 2015 (the "2015 10-K"). The 2015 10-K was
signed by Defendants Hasting, Beatty, and Whiteley. The 2015 10-K
contained signed certifications pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 ("SOX") by Defendants Beatty and Whiteley attesting to the
accuracy of financial reporting, the disclosure of any material
changes to the Company's internal control overfinancial reporting
and the disclosure of all fraud.

The 2015 10-K stated that "management has concluded that we
maintained effective internal control over financial reporting as
of December 31, 2015." The 2015 10-K also provided that there "were
no changes in our internal control over financial reporting that
occurred during the fourth quarter of the period covered by this
report that have materially affected, or are reasonably likely to
materially affect, our internal control over financial reporting."

The statements were materially false and misleading because they
misrepresented and failed to disclose the following adverse facts
pertaining to the Company's business, operations, and prospects,
which were known to Defendants or recklessly disregarded by them.
Specifically, Defendants made false and misleading statements and
failed to disclose that: (1) the Company improperly did not
classify Alaska Seismic Ventures, LLC ("ASV") as a variable
interest entity; (2) the Company had a controlling financial
interest in ASV, which required the Company to consolidate ASV in
its financial statements; (3) the Company had deficient internal
controls over financial reporting; (4) these practices were likely
to lead to an investigation of the Company by the SEC; (5)
SAExploration would be forced to delay the filing of its quarterly
report for the quarter ended June 30, 2019; and (6) as a result,
Defendants' statements about SAExploration's business, operations
and prospects were materially false and misleading and/or lacked a
reasonable basis at all relevant times.

On August 15, 2019, the Company announced in a press release that
the SEC was conducting into certain accounting matters that arose
in 2015-2016. The Company also announced that it would restate its
previously issued financial statements for fiscal years 2015-2018
and delay filing its 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2019. The
Company further announced that Defendant Hastings had been placed
on administrative leave and resigned as Chairman, and that
Defendant Whiteley had been terminated.

On this news, the Company's shares fell $1.13 per share or over 34%
to close at $2.14 per share on August 16, 2019, damaging investors.
Trading volume on that date was unusually high.

SAExploration Holdings Inc. operates as a holding company. The
Company offers a full range of seismic data services including
surveying, program design, logistical support, data acquisition,
processing, camp services, catering, environmental assessment, and
community relations. SAExploration serves oil and gas companies
worldwide. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          R. Dean Gresham, Esq.
          STECKLER GRESHAM COCHRAN PLLC
          12720 Hillcrest Rd, Suite 1045
          Dallas, TX 75230
          Telephone: (972) 387-4040
          Facsimile: (972) 387-4041
          E-mail: dean@stecklerlaw.com

               - and -

          Phillip Kim, Esq.
          Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
          275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 686-1060
          Facsimile: (212) 202-3827
          E-mail: pkim@rosenlegal.com
                  lrosen@rosenlegal.com


SAEXPLORATION HOLDINGS: Faces Bodin Class Suit in Texas
-------------------------------------------------------
SAExploration Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filed on August 22, 2019,
that the company faces a putative class action suit entitled, John
Bodin v. SAExploration Holdings, Inc., et al. Case No.
4:2019cv03089.

On August 18, 2019, a purported stockholder, John Bodin (the
"Plaintiff"), filed a putative class action lawsuit against the
Company and certain current and former executive officers named
therein (the "Defendants") in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Texas captioned John Bodin v. SAExploration
Holdings, Inc., et al. Case No. 4:2019cv03089.

Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of stockholders who purchased
or otherwise acquired publicly traded securities of the Company
from March 15, 2016 through August 15, 2019 (the "Covered Period").


The complaint generally alleges that the Defendants violated
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
SEC Rule 10b-5 by making false and misleading statements in the
periodic reports the Company filed with the SEC during the Covered
Period.

The complaint requests damages, including interest, and an award of
reasonable costs and expenses, including counsel and expert fees.

SAExploration Holdings, Inc., incorporated on February 2, 2011, is
an internationally focused oilfield services company. The Company
offers a range of seismic data acquisition and logistical support
services in Alaska, Canada, South America and Southeast Asia to
customers in the oil and natural gas industry. The company is based
in Houston, Texas.


SALESFORCE.COM INC: Curtis Challenges Tableau Software Merger Deal
------------------------------------------------------------------
Salesforce.com, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 23, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended July 31, 2019, that the company has been
named as a defendant in a class action suit initiated by Marcy
Curtis related to its merger with Tableau Software, Inc.

On August 1, 2019, pursuant to an Agreement and Plan of Merger
dated June 9, 2019, the Company acquired all of the outstanding
capital stock of Tableau, which provides a self-service analytics
platform that enables users to easily access, prepare, analyze, and
present findings in their data.

In July 2019, three civil actions were filed against Tableau
Software, Inc. ("Tableau")  and each of the members of Tableau's
board of directors as of the dates of the complaints asserting
claims under Sections 14(e), 14(d), and 20(a) of the Exchange Act
challenging the adequacy of certain public disclosures made by
Tableau concerning its proposed transaction with Salesforce.

Salesforce was named as a defendant in one of these three actions.


Specifically, Shiva Stein, a purported Tableau stockholder,
commenced an action in the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware (the "Stein Action");  Marcy Curtis, a
purported Tableau stockholder, commenced a putative class action in
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware (the
"Curtis Action"); and Cathy O'Brien, a purported Tableau
stockholder, commenced an action in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York (the "O'Brien Action").
Salesforce was named as a defendant in the Curtis Action.

The plaintiffs seek, among other things, an injunction that would
have prevented the acquisition of Tableau by Salesforce, rescission
of the transaction or rescissory damages, an accounting by the
defendants for all damages caused to the plaintiffs, and the award
of attorneys' fees and expenses.  

Tableau has not answered the complaint in the Curtis, or O'Brien
Actions, and Salesforce has not answered the complaint in the
Curtis Action.

Salesforce.com, Inc. develops enterprise cloud computing solutions
with a focus on customer relationship management. The company
offers Sales Cloud to store data, monitor leads and progress,
forecast opportunities, and gain insights through analytics and
relationship intelligence, as well as deliver quotes, contracts,
and invoices. The company was founded in 1999 and is headquartered
in San Francisco, California.


SALESFORCE.COM INC: Scheufele Suit v. Tableau Software Ongoing
--------------------------------------------------------------
Salesforce.com, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 23, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended July 31, 2019, that Tableau Software, Inc.
continues to defend "Scheufele" class action suit in the U.S.
District for the Southern District of New York.

On August 1, 2019, pursuant to an Agreement and Plan of Merger
dated June 9, 2019, the Company acquired all of the outstanding
capital stock of Tableau, which provides a self-service analytics
platform that enables users to easily access, prepare, analyze, and
present findings in their data.

In July and August 2017, two substantially similar securities class
action complaints were filed against Tableau Software, Inc.
("Tableau") and two of its now former executive officers.  

The first complaint was filed in the U.S. District for the Southern
District of New York (the "Scheufele Action"). The second complaint
was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington and was voluntarily dismissed on October 17, 2017.  

In December 2017, the lead plaintiff in the Scheufele Action filed
an amended complaint, which alleged that between February 5, 2015
and February 4, 2016, Tableau and certain of its executive officers
violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, in
connection with statements regarding Tableau's business and
operations by allegedly failing to disclose that product launches
and software upgrades by competitors were negatively impacting
Tableau’s competitive position and profitability.

The amended complaint sought unspecified damages, interest,
attorneys' fees and other costs. In February 2018, the lead
plaintiff filed a second amended complaint (the "SAC"), which
contains substantially similar allegations as the amended
complaint, and added as defendants two of Tableau’s now former
executive officers and directors.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the SAC in March 2018, which
was denied in February 2019. Defendants filed an answer to the SAC
in March 2019, and subsequently amended their answer in April
2019.

Salesforce.com, Inc. develops enterprise cloud computing solutions
with a focus on customer relationship management. The company
offers Sales Cloud to store data, monitor leads and progress,
forecast opportunities, and gain insights through analytics and
relationship intelligence, as well as deliver quotes, contracts,
and invoices. The company was founded in 1999 and is headquartered
in San Francisco, California.


SARATOGA ESCAPE: Murphy Alleges Violation under ADA
---------------------------------------------------
Saratoga Escape Lodges & RV Resort, Inc. is facing a class action
lawsuit filed pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The
case is styled as James Murphy, on behalf of himself and all other
persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Saratoga Escape Lodges &
RV Resort, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-08063 (S.D. N.Y., Aug.
28, 2019).

Saratoga Escape Lodges & RV Resort, Inc. offers Adirondack cabin
rentals, campsites, RV hook-up sites, and amenities like swimming
pools, mini golf and tennis courts.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Zare Khorozian, Esq.
   Zare Khorozian Law, LLC
   1047 Anderson Avenue
   Fort Lee, NJ 07024
   Tel: (201) 957-7269
   Email: zare@zkhorozianlaw.com



SIFCO INDUSTRIES: Still Defends Wage-and-Hour Suit in California
----------------------------------------------------------------
SIFCO Industries, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 16, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend a purported wage-and-hour class action suit in California.

The Company is a defendant in a purported class action lawsuit
filed in the Superior Court of California, County of Orange,
arising from employee wage-and-hour claims under California law for
alleged meal period, rest break, hourly and overtime wage
calculation, timely wage payment and necessary expenditure
indemnification violations; failure to maintain required wage
records and furnish accurate wage statements; and unfair
competition. As mentioned previously, the Company records reserves
for legal disputes and other matters in accordance with the
generally accepted accounting principles in the United States of
America ("GAAP"), the ultimate outcomes of these types of matters
are inherently uncertain.

Actual results may differ significantly from current estimates.

Given the current status of this matter, the Company has not
recorded a loss as the Company does not have a reasonable basis on
which to establish an estimate.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

SIFCO Industries, Inc. produces and sells forgings and machined
components primarily for the aerospace and energy markets in the
United States and Europe. It was founded in 1916 and is
headquartered in Cleveland, Ohio.


SINCLAIR BROADCAST: Bid to Nix Maryland Securities Suit Pending
---------------------------------------------------------------
Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 8, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the motion to
dismiss the class action suit entitled, In re Sinclair Broadcast
Group, Inc. Securities Litigation, case No. 1:18-CV-02445-CCB, is
pending.

On August 9, 2018, Edward Komito, a putative Company shareholder,
filed a class action complaint (the "Initial Complaint") in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland (the
"District of Maryland") against the Company, Christopher Ripley and
Lucy Rutishauser, which action is now captioned In re Sinclair
Broadcast Group, Inc. Securities Litigation, case No.
1:18-CV-02445-CCB (the "Securities Action").  

On March 1, 2019, lead counsel in the Securities Action filed an
amended complaint, adding David Smith and Steven Marks as
defendants, and alleging that defendants violated the federal
securities laws by issuing false or misleading disclosures
concerning (a) the Merger prior to the termination thereof; and (b)
the Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation concerning the
alleged exchange of pacing information.  

The Securities Action seeks declaratory relief, money damages in an
amount to be determined at trial, and attorney's fees and costs.

On May 3, 2019, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint, which motion has been opposed by lead plaintiff.

The Company believes that the allegations in the Securities Action
are without merit and intends to vigorously defend against the
allegations.

Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. operates as a television
broadcasting company in the United States. It owns or provides
various programming, operating, sales, and other non-programming
operating services to television stations. The company was founded
in 1986 and is headquartered in Hunt Valley, Maryland.


SINCLAIR BROADCAST: Continues to Defend 22 Price-Fixing Class Suits
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 8, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company is aware
of 22 putative class action lawsuits related to exchange of pacing
data.

According to Sinclair, 22 putative class action lawsuits were filed
against the Company following published reports of the Department
of Justice (DOJ) investigation into the exchange of pacing data
within the industry. On October 3, 2018, these lawsuits were
consolidated in the Northern District of Illinois.

The consolidated action alleges that the Company and eight other
broadcasters conspired to fix prices for commercials to be aired on
broadcast television stations throughout the United States and
engaged in unlawful information sharing, in violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.

The consolidated action seeks damages, attorneys' fees, costs and
interest, as well as injunctions against adopting practices or
plans that would restrain competition in the ways the plaintiffs
have alleged.

The Company believes the lawsuits are without merit and intends to
vigorously defend itself against all such claims.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. operates as a television
broadcasting company in the United States. It owns or provides
various programming, operating, sales, and other non-programming
operating services to television stations. The company was founded
in 1986 and is headquartered in Hunt Valley, Maryland.


SOUTHERN COMPANY: Court Certifies Class in Securities Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia, Atlanta Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned
MONROE COUNTY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM and ROOFERS LOCAL NO.
149 PENSION FUND, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. THE SOUTHERN COMPANY, THOMAS A.
FANNING, ART P. BEATTIE, EDWARD DAY, VI, G. EDISON HOLLAND, JR.,
JOHN C. HUGGINS, AND THOMAS O. ANDERSON, Defendants. Civil Action
No. 1:17-cv-00241-WMR. (N.D. Ga.).

Roofers Local No. 149 Pension Fund and Monroe County Employees'
Retirement System, as putative class representatives, seek damages
for Defendants' alleged violations of Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder,
and Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. The operative complaint in
this action is the Consolidated Complaint for Violations of the
Federal Securities Laws.

The Plaintiffs seek certification of a Class consisting of:

     All persons who purchased or otherwise acquired The Southern
Company common stock between April 25, 2012 and October 30, 2013,
inclusive (the Class Period), and were damaged thereby.

Here, the Plaintiffs seek certification by Rule 23(b)(3), which
requires that the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

Rule 23(a)

Numerosity
To satisfy the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1), a movant
must show that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable.

Defendants do not dispute numerosity. Further, Plaintiffs have
furnished evidence demonstrating that Southern Company's average
number of shares outstanding during the Class Period was 872.5
million.   Thus, the Court finds Plaintiffs have satisfied their
burden under the numerosity requirement.  

Commonality

Rule 23(a)(2) requires a showing that questions of law or fact are
common to the class.  Generally, where plaintiffs allege that the
action is a result of a unified scheme to defraud investors, the
element of commonality is met.

Defendants do not dispute commonality. In addition, Plaintiffs
allege that all Class members have been harmed as a result of a
common course of conduct arising from a common set of material
misrepresentations and omissions that Defendants made during the
Class Period. Thus, there is a well-defined community of interest
in the questions at issue, which include, inter alia:

   1. Whether Defendants violated the 1934 Act;

   2. Whether Defendants omitted and/or misrepresented material
facts;

   3. Whether Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded that their
statements were false and misleading; and

   4. Whether Defendants' statements and/or omissions artificially
inflated the price of Southern Company common stock and the extent
and appropriate measure of damages.

Thus, Plaintiffs have shown that this case presents common
questions of law and fact.

Typicality

Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the class representative's claims or
defenses be typical of the claims or defenses of the putative
class. A class representative's claim is typical if there is a
nexus between the class representative's claims or defenses and the
common questions of fact or law which unite the class.

Here, as with the other Rule 23(a) requirements, Defendants do not
dispute typicality. Further, the proposed class representatives,
Roofers Local No. 149 and Monroe County, purchased Southern Company
common stock during the Class Period, as did all putative Class
members. Thus, Plaintiffs have shown their claims are typical of
those of the Class.

Adequacy

Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class. Courts in the
Eleventh Circuit examine a two-prong test for adequacy: (1) whether
any substantial conflicts of interest exist between the
representatives and the class and (2) whether the representatives
will adequately prosecute the action.

Defendants do not challenge the adequacy requirement, and the Court
finds Plaintiffs are adequate. First, there are no substantial or
fundamental conflicts of interest between Plaintiffs and the Class.
Like other potential Class members, Roofers Local No. 149 and
Monroe County purchased Southern Company common stock at market
prices during the Class Period and were allegedly injured by the
same alleged material misrepresentations and omissions that injured
all proposed Class members. Plaintiffs' interests in establishing
Defendants' liability and maximizing the recovery are aligned with
the interests of absent Class members.  

Furthermore, Roofers Local No. 149 and Monroe County have
demonstrated their willingness and ability to serve as class
representatives. Plaintiffs have supervised and monitored the
progress of the litigation, have participated in discussions with
Lead Counsel concerning case developments, have reviewed Court
filings, understand their duty to the Class and are committed to
vigorously prosecuting this action to maximize recovery for all
Class members.   

In other words, Plaintiffs have demonstrated a willingness to
assert and defend the interests of putative Class members. Thus,
the Court finds that Roofers Local No. 149 and Monroe County are
adequate.

In conclusion, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have satisfied all
of the Rule 23(a) requirements.

Rule 23(b)(3)

Plaintiffs seek certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), which
requires a showing that common questions of fact or law predominate
over any individual questions and that maintaining the action as a
class action is superior to other available methods for
adjudicating the controversy. Rule 23(b)(3).

Predominance

Rule 23(b)(3) requires that the questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members. This requirement tests whether proposed classes
are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by
representation. It is not necessary that all questions of fact or
law be common, but only that some questions are common and that
they predominate over individual questions.

Considering whether questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate' begins, of course, with the elements of the
underlying cause of action. The elements of a private securities
fraud claim based on violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
are: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant
(2) scienter  (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or
omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon
the misrepresentation or omission (5) economic loss and (6) loss
causation.

Despite the many common issues identified above as part of the Rule
23(a) analysis, Defendants contend that individual issues regarding
reliance and damages predominate over any common inquiries. The
Court addresses these arguments in turn.
Reliance

The reliance element ensures that there is a proper connection
between a defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiff's injury.
The traditional and most direct way a plaintiff can demonstrate
reliance is by showing that he was aware of a company's statement
and engaged in a relevant transaction based on that specific
misrepresentation.

In this case, Plaintiffs invoke Basic's presumption of reliance in
order to demonstrate that common issues of reliance predominate
over individual issues.

Defendants do not dispute that the alleged misrepresentations were
publicly known or that Plaintiffs purchased Southern Company common
stock between the time the alleged misrepresentations were made and
the end of the Class Period. Rather, Defendants argue only that
Plaintiffs fail to show the market for Southern Company stock
during the Class Period was efficient, which they say precludes
Plaintiffs' invocation of the fraud-on-the-market presumption of
reliance. Further, Defendants contend that even if Plaintiffs have
established that the market for Southern Company stock was
efficient during the Class Period such that they can invoke the
fraud-on-the-market presumption, Defendants have rebutted the
presumption.

The Court addresses Plaintiff's showing of market efficiency and
Defendants' attempt to rebut the presumption in turn.

Market Efficiency

The Court finds that all of the traditional indicia of efficiency
outlined by the Eleventh Circuit in Regions existed with respect to
Southern Company stock during the Class Period, and neither
Defendants nor their expert dispute this fact. First, millions of
shares changed hands daily during the Class Period. Specifically,
the average daily and weekly trading volumes for Southern Company
common stock during the Class Period were 4.5 million and 22.5
million shares, respectively.  Because Plaintiffs have shown and
Defendants do not dispute  that the traditional indicia of
efficiency are satisfied, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have
established market efficiency.

Damages

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to articulate a
common damages methodology capable of calculating class-wide
damages. First, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to
proffer a damages model tailored to the needs of the case
specifically, how Plaintiffs would calculate damages allegedly
suffered by investors who bought stock at different times; prices;
and levels of inflation. Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs'
damages model is inconsistent with their alleged theory of
liability, violating the Supreme Court's holding in Comcast Corp.
v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 133 S.Ct. 1426 (2013). Notably, however,
Professor Gompers does not opine that damages cannot be calculated
on a class-wide basis; he merely claims that Professor Feinstein
fails to propose a model that does so.  

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that the damages model
proposed by Professor Feinstein is capable of measuring damages on
a class-wide basis, that the model is consistent with Plaintiffs'
theory of liability, and that Defendants' arguments are based on a
mischaracterization of Plaintiffs' theory of liability in this
case.

It is axiomatic that individualized damages calculations are
generally insufficient to foreclose class certification, and
particularly so where the central liability question is common to
each class member.  

Thus, at the class certification stage, while the Court must
determine whether Plaintiffs have articulated a damages model
capable of calculating damages stemming from the Defendants'
actions on a class-wide basis, a determination in the negative is
not necessarily fatal to class certification. Rather, if damages
cannot be ascertained by a methodology applicable to all class
members, the Court must then consider whether questions of
individual damages overwhelm the questions of liability that are
subject to common proof. Nevertheless, because the Court finds that
Plaintiffs have proffered a damages model consistent with their
theory of liability and capable of calculating damages on a
class-wide and per share basis, the Court does not need to reach
the latter inquiry.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have articulated a damages model
that is capable of calculating damages on a class-wide basis.
First, Plaintiffs' sole theory of liability misrepresentations
regarding the Kemper Plant giving rise to their sole alleged harm,
artificial stock inflation, is straightforward. Second, Professor
Feinstein's proposed damages model has been accepted in securities
fraud class actions in cases like this one, where Plaintiffs seek
out-of-pocket damages to recover artificial inflation caused by
Defendants' misrepresentations.  

Plaintiffs' theory of liability is straightforward, and their
class-wide damages model is appropriately articulated at this
stage. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not allege that the underlying risks
vis-a-vis the Kemper Plant changed over time. The Court finds that
Plaintiffs' proffered damages model satisfies Rule 23(b)(3).

Superiority

Before certifying a class under Rule 23(b)(3), the Court must find
that a class action is superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. Rule 23(b)(3).
To make this decision, the Court considers: (A) the class members'
interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions (B) the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already begun by or against class
members  (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum and (D) the
likely difficulties in managing a class action.

Defendants do not contest that a class action is the superior
method for adjudicating this case, and the Court finds this
requirement satisfied. Absent class members have little interest in
individually controlling separate actions, as the amount of
individual damages is likely to be relatively small. The Court is
not aware of any securities fraud litigation concerning this
controversy that has already begun by or against absent class
members. Concentrating litigation of the claims in this forum is
desirable, as Southern Company is headquartered in this District
and many of the acts alleged in the Complaint occurred in this
District. Finally, any difficulties in managing a class action do
not outweigh the benefits of certifying a class in this case.

The Court finds that adjudicating this case as a class action is
the superior method.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have established the requirements
for class certification under Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3).
Consequently, Plaintiffs' motion for class certification and
appointment of Class Representatives and Class Counsel is granted.

The Court certifies the following Class:

     All persons who purchased or otherwise acquired The Southern
Company common stock between April 25, 2012 and October 30, 2013,
inclusive (the Class Period), and were damaged thereby.

A full-text copy of the District Court's dated August 22, 2019
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3wra3o2 from
Leagle.com.

Monroe County Employees' Retirement System, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by
Daniel S. Drosman -- dand@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd, LLP, pro hac vice, Darryl J. Alvarado --
dalvarado@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, LLP, John C.
Herman -- jherman@hermanjones.com -- Herman Jones LLP, Thomas C.
Michaud -- tmichaud@vmtlaw.com -- Vanoverbeke Michaud & Timmony,
P.C. & Scott H. Saham -- scotts@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd, LLP.

Roofers Local 149 Pension Fund, Plaintiff, represented by Austin P.
Brane -- abrane@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, LLP,
Darryl J. Alvarado, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, LLP, Henry Rosen
-- henryr@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, LLP, pro hac
vice, Hillary B. Stakem -- hstakem@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd, LLP, pro hac vice, Rachel A. Cocalis --
RCocalis@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, LLP, Regis C.
Worley, Jr. -- rworley@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd,
LLP, Scott H. Saham, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, LLP, pro hac
vice, Daniel S. Drosman, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, LLP & John
C. Herman, Herman Jones LLP.

The Southern Company, Thomas A. Fanning, Art P. Beattie, Edward
Day, VI & G. Edison Holland, Jr., Defendants, represented by
Kristin Murphy -- kristin.murphy@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins,
Michele Johnson -- michele.johnson@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins,
Sarah A. Tomkowiak -- sarah.tomkowiak@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins,
William R. Baker, III -- william.baker@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins,
pro hac vice, Ashley Heintz -- aheintz@jonesday.com -- Jones Day,
Janine Cone Metcalf -- jmetcalf@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, Joseph
E. Finley -- jfinley@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, Michael Joseph
McConnell -- mmcconnell@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, Robert Watts --
rwatts@jonesday.com -- Jones Day & Walter W. Davis --
wwdavis@jonesday.com -- Jones Day.

John C. Huggins & Thomas O. Anderson, Defendants, represented by
Sarah A. Tomkowiak, Latham & Watkins, Ashley Heintz, Jones Day,
Janine Cone Metcalf, Jones Day, Joseph E. Finley, Jones Day &
Robert Watts, Jones Day.


SPEEDWAY MOTORSPORTS: Thompson Balks at Sonic Financial Deal
------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN THOMPSON, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, v. SPEEDWAY MOTORSPORTS, INC., O. BRUTON
SMITH, MARCUS G. SMITH, WILLIAM R. BROOKS, B. SCOTT SMITH, BERNARD
C. BYRD, JR., MARK M. GAMBILL, JAMES P. HOLDEN, TOM E. SMITH, SONIC
FINANCIAL CORPORATION, and SPEEDCO, INC., the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-01597-UNA (D. Del., Aug. 28, 2019), stems from a proposed
transaction announced on July 24, 2019, pursuant to which Speedway
Motorsports will be acquired by Sonic Financial Corporation and
Speedco, Inc.

On July 23, 2019, Speedway's Board of Directors caused the Company
to enter into an agreement and plan of merger with Sonic. Pursuant
to the terms of the Merger Agreement, Merger Sub commenced a tender
offer to acquire all of Speedway's outstanding common stock for
$19.75 per share in cash. The Tender Offer is scheduled to expire
on September 16, 2019.

On August 16, 2019, the Defendants filed a
Solicitation/Recommendation Statement with the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with the Proposed
Transaction. The Solicitation Statement omits material information
with respect to the Proposed Transaction, which renders the
Solicitation Statement false and misleading.

The Plaintiff brings this action as a class action on behalf of
himself and the other public stockholders of Speedway. Excluded
from the Class are defendants herein and any person, firm, trust,
corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any
Defendant.

As of July 19, 2019, there were 40,853,902 shares of Speedway
common stock outstanding, held by hundreds, if not thousands, of
individuals and entities scattered throughout the country.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
          RM LAW, P.C.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (484) 324-6800
          Facsimile: (484) 631-1305
          E-mail: rm@maniskas.com

               - and -

          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          Seth D. Rigrodsky, Esq.
          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 295-5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
          E-mail: sdr@rl-legal.com
                  bdl@rl-legal.com
                  gms@rl-legal.com

SPIN MASTER: Conner Asserts Breach of ADA
-----------------------------------------
Spin Master, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant
to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Mary
Conner, individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. Spin Master, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-04910 (E.D. N.Y., Aug. 28, 2019).

Spin Master, Inc. is a mobile application and games developing
company which has developed an application for iOS users named Air
Hogs.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Dan Shaked, Esq.
   Shaked Law Group, P.C.
   14 Harwood Court, Suite 415
   Scarsdale, NY 10583
   Tel: (917) 373-9128
   Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com




SPRINKLES CUPCAKES: Brooks Files ADA Class Suit in California
-------------------------------------------------------------
Sprinkles Cupcakes CA, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Valerie Brooks, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Sprinkles Cupcakes CA, LLC, a
California corporation, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-01688-KJM-KJN
(E.D. Cal., Aug. 28, 2019).

Sprinkles Cupcakes is a Beverly Hills, California-based cupcake
bakery chain established in 2005.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Thiago Merlini Coelho, Esq.
   Wilshire Law Firm
   3055 Wilshire Blvd
   12th Floor
   Los Angeles, CA 90010
   Tel: (213) 381-9988
   Fax: (213) 381-9989
   Email: thiago@wilshirelawfirm.com


STERLING BUSINESS FORMS: Garcia Sues over Civil Rights Violations
-----------------------------------------------------------------
An employment-related class action complaint has been filed against
Sterling Business Forms Inc. The case is captioned Joseph Garcia,
on behalf of all others similarly situated, vs. Sterling Business
Forms Inc., an Oregon Corporation, Case No.
34-2019-00260886-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super., Sacramento Cty., July 19,
2019). This civil rights-related lawsuit is assigned to the
Department 47 of the California Superior Court.

Sterling Business Forms Inc. is an office supply store located at
4119 N Freeway Blvd # A, Sacramento, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Kane Moon, Esq.
     Moon & Yang, APC
     1055 W. Seventh St. Suite 1880
     Los Angeles, CA 90017
     Telephone: (213) 232-3128
     Facsimile: (213) 232-3125

TARONIS TECHNOLOGIES: Continues to Defend Shareholders Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Taronis Technologies, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 19, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend a class action suit initiated by the company's
shareholders.

On April 15, 2019, the company received notice that a class action
lawsuit was filed on behalf of its shareholders who purchased
shares of the Company, f/k/a MagneGas Applied Technology Solutions,
Inc. from January 28, 2019 through February 12, 2019, inclusive.

The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for the Company's investors
under the federal securities laws.

Taronis said, "The litigation is in the early stages and it is
unknown whether it will have a financial impact on the Company."

Taronis Technologies, Inc., a technology-based company, focuses on
addressing the constraints on natural resources primarily in the
United States. The company offers MagneGas, a hydrogen-based
synthetic fuel that is used as an alternative to acetylene and
other natural gas derived fuels for metal cutting and other
commercial uses. The company was formerly known as MagneGas Applied
Technology Solutions, Inc. and changed its name to Taronis
Technologies, Inc. in January 2019. Taronis Technologies, Inc. was
founded in 2005 and is headquartered in Clearwater, Florida.


TAYLOR FARMS: Court Denies Prelim Approval of Workers' Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Approval of a Settlement in the case captioned MARIA
DEL CARMEN PENA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TAYLOR FARMS PACIFIC, INC.,
et al., Defendants. Case No. 2:13-cv-01282-KJM-AC. (E.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs move for preliminary approval of a settlement
reached with the defendants in this long-pending class action.

The Plaintiffs were hourly employees at the Tracey plants.
Plaintiffs filed this action seeking to represent a class of
defendants' current and former employees arising from the following
core allegations: (1) defendants did not properly compensate
plaintiffs for time spent donning and doffing equipment (2)
defendants did not provide plaintiffs with rest breaks and meal
breaks required under California labor law and (3) defendants did
provide plaintiffs with paychecks in the form and timely manner
required under California labor law.

LEGAL STANDARD

There is a strong judicial policy favoring settlement of class
actions. To determine whether a proposed class action settlement is
fair, reasonable and adequate, courts consider several factors, as
relevant, including:

(1) [T]he strength of the plaintiff's case (2) the risk, expense,
complexity, and likely duration of further litigation (3) the risk
of maintaining class action status throughout the trial (4) the
amount offered in settlement  (5) the extent of discovery completed
and the stage of the proceedings (6) the experience and view of
counsel (7) the presence of a governmental participant and (8) the
reaction of the class members of the proposed settlement.

Upon review of the plaintiffs' filing, the court concludes that
although plaintiffs have adequately addressed most outstanding
issues the court identified at hearing, they still have not
sufficiently explained the proposed class on whose behalf they wish
to settle or the terms of their settlement, which precludes the
court's ability to exercise its proper role here.

Accordingly, the court is unable to grant the motion on the present
record.

Plaintiffs Have Not Shown the Settlement Class Satisfies Rule 23

Even if the parties have agreed to settle a case on a class-wide
basis, the court must determine whether the proposed class
satisfies all the requirements of Rule 23(a) (numerosity,
typicality, commonality, and adequacy of representation) and either
Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3).

Here, the court previously certified several subclasses but denied
certification of other subclasses.  The settlement agreement
defines the Settlement Class as:

     All former and current non-exempt hourly employees who worked
at Taylor Farms Pacific, Inc.'s Tracy, California facilities during
the relevant time period. For purposes of this Settlement
Agreement, non-exempt hourly employees' includes employees and
direct hires of Taylor Farms Pacific, Inc. as well as temporary
workers who provided services to Taylor Farms, Pacific, Inc.

The Plaintiffs do not explain how class members' shared employment
status presents a common contention that is capable of classwide
resolution and will resolve an issue that is central to the
validity of each one of the claims in one stroke. This showing is
what commonality requires.  Instead, perhaps tacitly acknowledging
the shortcoming in their briefing on this certification
prerequisite, plaintiffs argue it is routine for courts to alter or
expand previously certified classes for purposes of certifying a
settlement class and in order for Taylor Farms to finally conclude
the claims made in the operative complaint, any settlement must
necessarily include all such claims even though not covered by this
Court's certification order.

In other words, plaintiffs do not make an argument for commonality,
they make an argument for the court's foregoing a commonality
analysis in favor of approving their settlement. This argument is
not persuasive, but it is emblematic of plaintiffs' approach to the
Rule 23 analysis here.  

It is certainly possible that the proposed settlement class
satisfies Rule 23's requirements, and this order should not be
construed as finding otherwise. But plaintiffs provide no concrete
explanation of the relevant details of the entire settlement class
they seek to certify and they omit any cogent showing of how that
class satisfies Rule 23.

The court cannot approve their motion on this record.

Reasonableness

While plaintiffs' motion provides some explanation of the facts and
circumstances that led them to believe the settlement amount
reached is adequate, here as well they provide little detail.
Counsel's supplemental declaration provides additional information,
but appears to address only meal break violations and not all
claims the expanded settlement class will release.  Assuming
plaintiffs choose to renew their motion, they must more completely
explain how those additional claims are accounted for in the
settlement, or, alternatively, why they need not be accounted for
despite being released under the parties' agreement.

While the court acknowledges and strives to further the strong
judicial policy favoring settlement, it cannot simply rubber stamp
a class action settlement because it promises recovery and follows
years of hard-fought litigation. The motion is DENIED without
prejudice to a renewed motion that adequately addresses the court's
remaining concerns described above.

A full-text copy of the District Court's dated August 22, 2019
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxf2oxxs from
Leagle.com.

Maria del Carmen Pena, Consuelo Hernandez, Leticia Suarez, Rosemary
Dail & Wendell T. Morris, Plaintiffs, represented by Stuart Rowe
Chandler -- stuart@chandlerlaw.com -- Law Office Of Stuart R.
Chandler, Alexander Russell Wheeler -- awheeler@parrislawyers.com
-- Parris Law Firm, Eric Daniel Rouen -- rouenlaw@att.net -- Law
Office of Eric D. Rouen, Kitty Kit Yee Szeto --
kszeto@parrislawyers.com -- Parris Law Firm, Naomi C. Pontious --
NPontious@meyersfozi.com -- Meyers Fozi & Dwork, LLP, Patricia K.
Olive -- rrexparris@rrexparris.com -- Parris Law Firm & Philip A.
Downey, The Downey Law Firm, LLC, Po Box 1021, Unionville, PA,
19375 pro hac vice.

Taylor Farms Pacific, Inc., Doing business as Taylor Farms,
Defendant, represented by Jesse Alvin Cripps, Jr. --
jcripps@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn and Crutcher LLP.

Abel Mendoza, Inc., Defendant, represented by Justin G. Donner --
justin.donner@mccormickbarstow.com -- McCormick Barstow Sheppard
Wayte & Carruth, LLP, Laura A. Wolfe, McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard,
Wayte & Carruth LLP, 7647 N. Fresno Street, Fresno, CA 9372 & Wade
M. Hansard -- justin.donner@mccormickbarstow.com -- McCormick
Barstow Sheppard Wayte & Carruth LLP.

Manpower, Inc., Defendant, represented by Simerdip Khangura,
Littler Mendelson PC & Gregory G. Iskander -- giskander@littler.com
-- Littler Mendelson, P.C.


THESY LLC: Tyksinski Sues over Personal Data Theft
--------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Thesy, LLC, d/b/a
Element Vape, for its failure to implement a reasonably adequate
cybersecurity prevention, detection, and response protocol which
led to his private personal information, and that of other members
of the putative class, being compromised and exposed over an
extended period of time in a cybersecurity attack. The case is
captioned ARTUR TYKSINSKI, individually and on behalf of similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff, THESY, LLC, a California limited
liability corporation, Defendant, Case No. 2019CH08518 (Ill. Cir.,
Cook Cty., July 19, 2019). Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant for
breach of express agreements and for violations of the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.

Thesy, LLC, is a California limited liability corporation that
transacts business in Illinois, including in Cook County, under the
d/b/a Element Vape. The company operates a website dedicated to the
marketing and sale of certain electronic "vape" products. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     David L. Gerbie, Esq.
     Timothy P. Kingsbury, Esq.
     McGUIRE LAW, P.C.
     55 W. Wacker Dr., 9th Fl. Chicago, IL 60601
     Telephone: (312) 893-7002
     E-mail: dgerbie@mcgpc.com

UBIQUITI INC: Consolidated Class Suit in New York Ongoing
---------------------------------------------------------
Ubiquiti Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 21, 2019, for the
fiscal year ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend a consolidated class action suit in New York.

On February 21, 2018, a purported class action, captioned Paul
Vanderheiden v. Ubiquiti Networks, Inc. et al., No. 18-cv-01620
(the "Vanderheiden Action"), was filed in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York against the
Company and certain of its current and former officers.

The Vanderheiden Action complaint alleges that the defendants
violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by making false and/or
misleading statements, including purported overstatements of the
Company's online community user engagement metrics and accounts
receivable.

On February 28, 2018 and March 13, 2018, substantially similar
purported class actions, captioned Xiya Qian v. Ubiquiti Networks,
Inc. et al., No. 18-cv-01841 (the "Qian Action") and John Kho v.
Ubiquiti Networks, Inc. et al., No. 18-cv-02242 (the "Kho Action",
together with the Vanderheiden Action and the Qian Action, the
"Class Actions"), respectively, were filed in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York.

On October 24, 2018, the court consolidated the Class Actions and
appointed lead plaintiff and lead counsel (the "Consolidated Class
Action"). Plaintiff filed its Consolidated Amended Complaint on
December 24, 2018.

On March 21, 2019, Defendants informed the Court that they were
prepared to move to dismiss the Consolidated Amended Complaint but
that, consistent with the Court's individual practices, they would
refrain from filing that motion pending receipt of further guidance
from the Court.

Ubiquiti said, "While the Company believes that the Consolidated
Class Action is without merit and plans to vigorously defend
itself, there can be no assurance that the Company will prevail.
The Company cannot currently estimate the possible loss or range of
losses, if any, that it may experience in connection with this
litigation."

Ubiquiti Inc. develops technology platforms for high-capacity
distributed Internet access, unified information technology, and
consumer electronics for professional, home and personal use. The
company categorize its solutions in to three main categories: high
performance networking technology for service providers,
enterprises and consumers. The company is based in New York, New
York.


ULTIMATE NUTRITION: Kingsbury Seeks to Recover WARN Act Damages
---------------------------------------------------------------
CHRIS KINGSBURY, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. ULTIMATE NUTRITION, INC. and PROSTAR, INC., Case No.
3:19-cv-01299 (D. Conn., Aug. 21, 2019), seeks to recover damages
in the amount of 60 days' pay and Employee Retirement Income
Security Act benefits arising from the Defendants' violation of the
Plaintiff's rights under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act of 1988.

On August 17, 2019, and thereafter, the Defendants, as a single
employer, ordered the termination of the Plaintiff's employment
together with the termination of all other employees, who worked at
or reported to the Facilities as part of a mass layoff and/or plant
closing as defined by the WARN Act for which they were entitled to
receive 60 days advance written notice under the WARN Act,
according to the complaint.

Ultimate is incorporated in the state of Connecticut with a
facility located at 21 Hyde Road, in Farmington, Connecticut.
Prostar was a Connecticut corporation with its principal place of
business located at 7 Corporate Ave., in Farmington, Connecticut.
The Defendants jointly maintained, owned, and operated facilities
located at 7 Corporate Ave., at 21 Hyde Rd., and at 1 Hartford
Square, in New Britain, Connecticut.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David Rintoul, Esq.
          ZELDES, NEEDLE & COOPER, PC
          1000 Lafayette Blvd., 7th Floor
          Bridgeport, CT 06604
          Telephone: (203) 333-9441
          E-mail: drintoul@znclaw.com

               - and -

          Stuart J. Miller, Esq.
          LANKENAU & MILLER, LLP
          132 Nassau Street, Suite 1100
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 581-5005
          Facsimile: (212) 581-2122
          E-mail: sjm@lankmill.com

               - and -

          Mary E. Olsen, Esq.
          M. Vance McCrary, Esq.
          THE GARDNER FIRM
          182 St. Francis Street, Suite 103
          Mobile, AL 36602
          Telephone: (251) 433-8100
          Facsimile: (251) 433-8181
          E-mail: molsen@thegardnerfirm.com
                  vmccrary@thegardnerfirm.com

               - and -

          THE NLG MAURICE AND JANE SUGAR LAW CENTER FOR ECONOMIC
          AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, A NON-PROFIT LAW FIRM
          4605 Cass Ave.
          Detroit, MI 48201
          Telephone: (313) 993-4505


UNITED PARCEL SERVICE: Ramirez Seeks Minimum Wage, OT Pay
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against United Parcel
Service, Inc. and Enrique Evangelista for alleged violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the New York Labor Law (NYLL).
The case is captioned LUIS RAMIREZ, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC. D/B/A
UPS, GUFFANTI GROUP INC., and ENRIQUE EVANGELISTA, as an
individual, Defendants, Case No. CV19-4188 (E.D.N.Y., July 19,
2019). Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants have violated the
overtime and minimum wage provisions of the FLSA and the NYLL. In
addition, Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants failed to comply
the notice and recordkeeping requirements, the wage statement
requirements and the spread of hours compensation under the NYLL.

United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) is a foreign business corporation
organized under the laws of Ohio with a principal executive office
at 55 Glenlake Parkway NE, Atlanta, Georgia. UPS is a corporation
authorized to conduct business under the laws of New York. Guffanti
Group Inc. maintains its principal executive office at 28-24
Steinway Street, Astoria, New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
     HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
     80-02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
     Kew Gardens, NY 11415
     Telephone: (718) 263-9591

VERU INC: Court Dismisses Amended Complaint in Aspen Merger Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Veru Inc.said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on August 8, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that the court has denied plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment, granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment on all counts, dismissed the Amended Consolidated
Complaint, and entered final judgment in favor of all defendants.

In response to the Aspen Park Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (APP)
Acquisition, two purported derivative and class action lawsuits
were filed against the Company and certain of its officers and
directors in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, captioned
Glotzer v. The Female Health Company, et al., Case No.
2016-CH-13815, and Schartz v. Parrish, et al., Case No.
2016-CH-14488.  

These lawsuits were originally filed on or about October 21, 2016
and November 7, 2016, respectively. On January 9, 2017, these two
lawsuits were consolidated. On March 31, 2017, the plaintiffs filed
a consolidated complaint.  

The consolidated complaint named as defendants Veru, the members of
its board of directors prior to the closing of the APP Acquisition
and the members of our board of directors after the closing of the
APP Acquisition.

The consolidated complaint alleged, among other things, that the
directors breached their fiduciary duties, or aided and abetted
such breaches, by consummating the APP Acquisition in violation of
the Wisconsin Business Corporation Law and NASDAQ voting
requirements and by causing the company to issue the shares of its
common stock and Series 4 Preferred Stock to the former
stockholders of APP pursuant to the APP Acquisition in order to
evade the voting requirements of the Wisconsin Business Corporation
Law.

The consolidated complaint also alleged that Dr. Steiner, a
director and the Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of
Veru and a co-founder of APP, and Dr. Fisch, a director and Vice
Chairman of Veru and a co-founder of APP, were unjustly enriched in
receiving shares of our common stock and Series 4 Preferred Stock
in the APP Acquisition.

On May 5, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
consolidated complaint. On August 15, 2017, the court entered an
order dismissing without prejudice the claims that the
post-acquisition directors aided and abetted the alleged breaches
of fiduciary duties by the pre-acquisition directors and that Dr.
Steiner and Dr. Fisch were unjustly enriched.  

The court did not dismiss the claims that the company's directors
prior to the closing of the APP Acquisition breached their
fiduciary duties and the claims that Veru consummated the APP
Acquisition in violation of the Wisconsin Business Corporation Law
and NASDAQ voting requirements.  

On November 30, 2018, plaintiffs filed an Amended Consolidated
Complaint.  

The Amended Consolidated Complaint makes allegations similar to
those in the original consolidated complaint as to the claims that
were not dismissed and names as defendants Veru and the members of
its board of directors prior to the closing of the APP Acquisition.
The Amended Consolidated Complaint also makes claims against Dr.
Steiner for allegedly aiding and abetting the pre-acquisition
directors' breach of fiduciary duty and for unjust enrichment.  

Like the original consolidated complaint, which was previously
dismissed in part, the Amended Consolidated Complaint seeks
equitable relief, including rescission of the APP Acquisition,
money damages, disgorgement of the shares of our common stock and
Series 4 Preferred Stock issued to Dr. Steiner, and costs and
expenses of the litigation, including attorneys' fees.  

On December 14, 2018, the defendants filed their answer to the
Amended Consolidated Complaint wherein they denied any and all
liability and asserted additional defenses.  

On January 14, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class
certification. On May 6, 2019, the Court granted plaintiffs' motion
and certified a class consisting of "All holders of common stock of
the Female Health Company as of October 31, 2016 and their
successors in interest, excluding the named defendants to the
Action and any person, firm, trust, corporation or other entity
related to or affiliated with any of the Defendants."  

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on April 15,
2019. On July 10, 2019, the Court denied plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment, granted defendants' motion for summary judgment
on all counts, dismissed the Amended Consolidated Complaint, and
entered final judgment in favor of all defendants.

Plaintiffs have a right to appeal the final judgment.

Veru will continue vigorously defending itself on appeal if
necessary.

Veru said, "No amount has been accrued for possible losses relating
to this litigation as any such losses are not both probable and
reasonably estimable."

Veru Inc. operates as an oncology and urology biopharmaceutical
company. The company operates through two segments, Commercial, and
Research and Development. The company was formerly known as The
Female Health Company and changed its name to Veru Inc. in July
2017. Veru Inc. was founded in 1896 and is headquartered in Miami,
Florida.


VISION PRECISION HOLDINGS: Martinez Suit Transferred to E.D. Cal.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case, MAYRELI MARTINEZ, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, and on behalf of the general public, v.
Plaintiff, VISION PRECISION HOLDINGS, LLC and DOES 1-100,
Defendants, Case No.  BCV-19-101374 (Filed on May 17, 2019), was
transferred from the Kern County Superior Court to the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of California on
July 22, 2019. The removal of this case is pursuant to Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA). The federal court has jurisdiction
over this action under the CAFA which amended 28 U.S.C. Section
1332 to provide that a putative class action is removable to
federal court if the proposed class consists of at least 100; the
amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and
costs; and one member of the proposed class is a citizen of a state
different from any defendant. The United District Court for the
Eastern District of California assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-01002-DAD-JLT to the proceeding.

Vision Precision Holdings is an optical retailer in the United
States. The company has 50 locations nationwide. [BN]

Attorneys for the Defendants:

     Michele Haydel Gehrke, Esq.
     Anne Cherry Barnett, Esq.
     REED SMITH LLP
     101 Second Street, Suite 1800
     San Francisco, CA 94105-3659
     Telephone: +1 (415) 543-8700
     Facsimile: +1 (415) 391-8269
     E-mail: mgehrke@reedsmith.com
             abamett@reedsmith.com
   
             - and -

     Mara D. Curtis, Esq.
     Brittany M. Hernandez, Esq.
     REED SMITH LLP
     355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2900
     Los Angeles, CA 90071-1514
     Telephone: +1 (213) 457-8000
     Facsimile: +1 (213) 457-8080
     E-mail: mcurtis@reedsmith.com
             brnhernandez@reedsmith.com

WELLS FARGO: Hernandez et al. Seek Certification of Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Alicia Hernandez et al., individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. Wells Fargo & Company and
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-07354-WHA
(N.D. Cal.), Alicia Hernandez, Emma White, Troy Frye, Coszetta
Teague, Russell and Brenda Simoneaux, John and Yvonne Demartino,
Rose Wilson, Tiffanie Hood, Cyndi Floyd, and Diana Trevino will
move the Court on October 17, 2019, for an order:

   1. certifying these class and sub-classes:

      Nationwide Class:

      "all persons who between 2010 and 2018 (i) qualified for a
      home loan modification or repayment plan pursuant to the
      requirements of government-sponsored enterprises (such as
      Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), the Federal Housing
      Administration (FHA), the U.S. Department of Treasury's Home
      Affordable Modification Program (HAMP); and (ii) were not
      offered a home loan modification or repayment plan by Wells
      Fargo due to excessive attorneys fees being included in the
     loan modification decisioning process"

      [State] Unfair Practices Sub-class:

      "all members of the Nationwide Class whose home loan was
      secured by real property located in [State]".

      [California / Georgia] Wrongful Foreclosure Sub-class:

      "all members of the Nationwide Class whose home loan was
      secured by real property located in [California / Georgia]
      whose home Wells Fargo sold in foreclosure".

   2. appointing themselves as class representatives;

   3. appointing Michael L. Schrag of Gibbs Law Group LLP and
      Richard M. Paul III of Paul LLP as co-lead class counsel
      pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
      [CC]

Counsel for the Plaintiffs and the Proposed Classes are:

          Michael L. Schrag, Esq.
          Joshua J. Bloomfield, Esq.
          Linda P. Lam, Esq.
          GIBBS LAW GROUP LLP
          505 14th Street, Suite 1110
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 350-9700
          Facsimile: (510) 350-9701
          E-mail: mls@classlawgroup.com
                  jjb@classlawgroup.com
                  lpl@classlawgroup.com

               - and -

          Richard M. Paul III, Esq.
          Ashlea G. Schwarz, Esq.
          Laura C. Fellows, Esq.
          PAUL LLP
          601 Walnut Street, Suite 300
          Kansas City, MO 64106
          Telephone: (816) 984-8100
          Facsimile: (816) 984-8101
          E-mail: Rick@PaulLLP.com
                  Ashlea@PaulLLP.com
                  Laura@PaulLLP.com

WESTERN DIGITAL: Final Settlement Approval Hearing This Month
-------------------------------------------------------------
Western Digital Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 27, 2019, for
the fiscal year ended June 28, 2019, that the court in the class
action suit involving SanDisk has granted the motion for
preliminary approval of the parties' settlement and scheduled a
hearing to consider final approval of the deal for September 2019.


Beginning in March 2015, SanDisk and two of its officers, Sanjay
Mehrotra and Judy Bruner, were named in three putative class action
lawsuits filed with the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California.

Two complaints are brought on behalf of a purported class of
purchasers of SanDisk's securities between October 2014 and March
2015, and one is brought on behalf of a purported class of
purchasers of SanDisk's securities between April 2014 and April
2015.

The complaints generally allege violations of federal securities
laws arising out of alleged misstatements or omissions by the
defendants during the alleged class periods. The complaints seek,
among other things, damages and fees and costs.

In July 2015, the District Court consolidated the cases and
appointed Union Asset Management Holding AG and KBC Asset
Management NV as lead plaintiffs. The lead plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint in August 2015.

In January 2016, the District Court granted the defendants' motion
to dismiss and dismissed the amended complaint with leave to amend.
In February 2016, the District Court issued an order appointing as
new lead plaintiffs Bristol Pension Fund; City of Milford,
Connecticut Pension & Retirement Board; Pavers and Road Builders
Pension, Annuity and Welfare Funds; the Newport News Employees'
Retirement Fund; and Massachusetts Laborers’ Pension Fund
(collectively, the "Institutional Investor Group"). In March 2016,
the Institutional Investor Group filed an amended complaint.

In June 2016, the District Court granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss and dismissed the amended complaint with leave to amend. In
July 2016, the Institutional Investor Group filed a further amended
complaint. In June 2017, the District Court denied the defendants'
motion to dismiss.

In September 2018, the District Court granted the Institutional
Investor Group's motion to certify a class of all persons and
entities who purchased or otherwise acquired SanDisk's publicly
traded common stock between October 2014 and April 2015, excluding
those who purchased or otherwise acquired SanDisk's publicly traded
common stock during the class period but who sold their stock prior
to the first corrective disclosure in March 2015.

The Institutional Investor Group alleged artificial inflation in
the price of SanDisk's publicly traded common stock of $9.04 per
share from October 16, 2014 through March 25, 2015, $2.26 per share
on March 26, 2015, and $1.35 per share from March 27, 2015 through
April 15, 2015.

In March 2019, the parties reached a settlement of all claims in
this matter, subject to formal ratification by party
representatives and approval by the court. In May 2019, the court
granted the motion for preliminary approval and scheduled a hearing
on the final approval for September 2019. The charge related to the
settlement was recorded in Selling, general and administrative
expense.

Western Digital Corporation develops, manufactures, and sells data
storage devices and solutions worldwide. The company sells its
products under the HGST, SanDisk, and WD brands to original
equipment manufacturers, distributors, resellers, cloud
infrastructure players, and retailers. Western Digital Corporation
was founded in 1970 and is headquartered in San Jose, California.


WHITE COUNTY, TN: Bilbrey et al. Sue Sheriff Dept., Seek OT Pay
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against the White County
Sheriff Department and Sheriff Steve Page for alleged violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The case is captioned JEWELL
BILBREY, CRAIG CAPPS, DANIEL HAGGARD, CHRIS ISOM, GREG MATTHEWS,
Plaintiffs, v. WHITE COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT, and STEVE PAGE,
SHERIFF, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00058 (M.D. Tenn., July 22,
2019). Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and as part of a
collective action, under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b), on
behalf of other employees of Defendants who were denied overtime
compensation, straight time compensation, and were worked "off the
clock." Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek to recover overtime
compensation, non-overtime compensation, liquidated damages,
interest, and attorneys' fees and cost pursuant to the FLSA.

White County Sheriff Department is a law enforcement agency that
serves and protects the citizens of White County, their rights and
property. Sheriff Steve Page currently leads this law enforcement
agency. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Robin C. Moore, Esq.
     ROBIN MOORE ATTORNEY AT LAW
     220 Main Street St.
     P.O. Box 182
     Carthage, TN 37030
     Telephone: (615) 735-1100
     Facsimile: (615) 735-2598
     E-mail: robin@robinmoorelaw.com

             - and -

     Dana R. Looper, Esq.
     FRY, FRY, KNIGHT, & LOOPER
     165 E. Spring Street
     Cookeville, TN 38501
     Telephone: (931) 526-5594
     Facsimile: (931) 526-5441
     E-mail: danalooper@danalooperlaw.com

ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES: Warren Suit Moved to E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
The case, CITY OF WARREN POLICE AND FIRE RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION, ANDERS GUSTAFSSON
and MICHAEL C. SMILEY, the Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-04412
(Filed July 26, 2017), was removed from the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of New York, to the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois on Aug. 28, 2019. The Northern
District of Illinois Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-05782 to
the proceeding. The suit is assigned to the Hon. John Z. Lee.

The case is a securities class action on behalf of all persons who
purchased Zebra common stock between March 17, 2015 and May 9,
2016, inclusive, seeking to pursue remedies under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

Zebra Technologies Corporation is a public company based in
Lincolnshire, Illinois, USA, that manufactures and sells marking,
tracking and computer printing technologies.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Alan I. Ellman, Esq.
          LABATON SUCHAROW LLP
          140 Broadway
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 907-0700
          E-mail: aellman@labaton.com

               - and -

          David A. Rosenfeld, Esq.
          Robert D. Gerson, Esq.
          Samuel H. Rudman, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          58 South Service Road, Suite 200
          Melville, NY 11747
          Telephone: (631) 367-7100
          E-mail: drosenfeld@rgrdlaw.com
                  rgerson@grdlaw.com
                  srudman@rgrdlaw.com

Attorneys for the Defendants:

          Andrew W. Stern, Esq.
          James Wallace Ducayet, Esq.
          Walter C. Carlson, Esq.
          SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
          787 Seventh Avenue
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (212) 839-5397
          E-mail: astern@sidley.com
                  jducayet@sidley.com
                  wcarlson@sidley.com

Attorneys Movants Gerardo Birkenfeld, City of Taylor Police and
Fire Retirement System, and Steve Sylvander, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated are:

          Kim E. Miller, Esq.
          KAHN SWICK & FOTI, LLC
          500 5th Ave., Suite 1810
          New York, NY 10110
          Telephone: (212) 696-3730
          E-mail: kim.miller@ksfcounsel.com

               - and -

          Lindsay K. La Marca, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          58 S Service Rd., Suite 200
          Melville, NY 11747
          Telephone: (631) 367-7100
          E-mail: llamarca@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          Adam M Apton, Esq.
          LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP
          1101 30th Street NW, Suite 115
          Washington, DC 22201
          Telephone: (202) 524-4290
          E-mail: aapton@zlk.com

               - and -

          Nicholas Porritt, Esq.
          LEVI & KORSINSKY LLP
          1101 30th Street, Nw, Suite 115
          Washington, DC 20007
          Telephone: (202) 524-4293
          E-mail: nporritt@zlk.com


                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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