CAR_Public/190913.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, September 13, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 184

                            Headlines

2U INC: Rosen Law Files Securities Fraud Suit
AARGON AGENCY: Briggs Files FDCPA Suit in W.D. Tennessee
ABIOMED INC: Rosen Law Files Securities Fraud Suit
AKORN INC: Settles Data Integrity Securities Litigation
ALBERTSONS COMPANIES: Says Ill. Biometrics Law Unconstitutional

AMERICAN SPECIALTY: Court OKs $11.75MM Settlement in ERISA Suit
ANTHEM BLUE: Wonderful Co. Sues over Fraudulent Medical Bills
AQUA ILLINOIS: Henderson Sues Over Contaminated Water Supply
BARCLAYS: Cadwalader Wickersham Attorneys Discuss UK Class Action
BLAIR'S BAIL: Sued Over Excessive Premiums for Bail Bond Purchase

BOBST NORTH: Court Denies Bobst Lyon's Bid to Junk Candelario Suit
CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT: Bid to Transfer Antitrust Suit Denied
CALSONIC KANSEI: AC Systems Price Fixing Settlement Approved
CANADA GOOSE: Cheng Files Suit Over Share Price Drop
CAPITAL ONE: Faces Bowen et al Suit in S.D. New York

CASA SYSTEMS: Panther Says Registration Statement Misleading
CBC RESTAURANT: Faces Jones Suit Over BIPA Violation
CLEVELAND, OH: Appeals Court Affirms $4MM Final Judgment in Lycan
CLIME CAPITAL: Settles Class Action for $8.3MM
COLLECTO INC: Kim Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York

COMMUNITY HEALTH: Court Certifies Class in Norfolk Securities Suit
CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY: Duffy Seeks Unpaid Overtime Under FLSA
CORECIVIC TENNESSEE: Court Acknowledges Settlement Bid Joinder
COVELLI ENTERPRISES: Settlement in FLSA Suit Gets Prelim Approval
CROSSROADS VILLAGE: Cal. App. Affirms Antonio Class Certification

CRYSTAL FARMS: Reyes Suit Over "Made With Real Butter" Label Nixed
CYS GROUP: Made Illegal Unsolicited Calls, Itayim Suit Asserts
DELEON LATIN: Does not Pay Minimum, Overtime Wages, Perez Says
DENSO CORP: Windshield Wiper Class Action Settlement Okayed
DIRECT ENERGY: 7th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Sevugan Suit

DYNAMIC RECOVERY: Kim Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
EPIC GAMES: Faces Class Action Over Hacked Fortnite Accounts
EXPERIAN MARKETING: Bowes Seeks More Time to File Writ in Melito
FACEBOOK INC: Must Face Biometric Data Privacy Class Action
FAIRWAY INDEPENDENT: Valdez Labor Suit Remanded to State Court

FIRST NATIONAL: Rios Files FDCPA Suit in C.D. California
FORD MOTOR: 3d Cir. Affirms Summary Judgment in Coba Class Suit
FULTONDALE ON TAP: Hasty Seeks Proper Wages Under FLSA
GOLDSMITH & HULL: Tavares Suit Asserts FDCPA Breach
GREAT AMERICAN POWER: Lechuga Files Class Suit in N.D. Illinois

GTT COMMUNICATIONS: Pomerantz LLP Investigates Securities Claims
GUTTERBRUSH LLC: Nathen Day Asserts Breach of TCPA
HEARTLAND PAYMENT: Court Dismisses Count II in Soranno Suit
HOME DEPOT: Camp Suit Remanded to Santa Clara County Superior Court
HYUNDAI MOTOR: Hauser Sues over Defective Airbag Control Unit

INTEPLAST GROUP: Robinson Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages, Damages
JACK MADDEN: Turner Seeks Overtime Pay for Salespersons
JETS STADIUM: 3rd Cir. Affirms Gengo NJCFA Suit Dismissal
JS SULLIVAN: Cooks Seek Overtime Wages for Construction Laborers
L BRANDS: Schall Law Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit

LOBLAW: Rana Plaza Factory Collapse Victims' Appeal Denied
LTD FINANCIAL: Court Dismisses Ladevaio FDCPA Suit
MARCEL AT GRAMERCY: Faces Duncan Suit in New York Southern
MASSACHUSETTS: Briggs Suit Settlement Has Prelim Approval
MDL 2795: Court Grants Minnesota's Bid for Continuance

MINNESOTA: Court Denies Bid to Decertify Class in Murphy Suit
MITSUBA: Power Window Motors Price Fixing Settlement Approved
MT. GOX: Pa. Court Denied Bid to Dismiss Pearce
NATIONAL AUSTRALIA: British Class Action Set to Go to Trial
NATIONAL BEVERAGE: Wins Dismissal of Securities Class Suit

NAVISTAR INT'L: Case Management Conference Sought in "Brown"
NAVISTAR INT'L: Court Sets Nov. 13 Settlement Fairness Hearing
NEKTAR THERAPEUTICS: Kessler Topaz Files Securities Class Suit
NEW YORK: Settlement Reached in Marijuana Crimes Class Suit
NISSAN NORTH: 9th Cir. Flips Denial of Nguyen Class Certification

NORTH CAROLINA MUTUAL: Court Narrows Claims in McClendon Suit
NTW LLC: Wall Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
OASMIA PHARMACEUTICAL: Pawar Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
ON DECK CAPITAL: Court Denies Dismissal on TCPA Suit
OREGON: Seeks Dismissal of Foster Care Class Action

PERDUE FARMS: Workers File Anti-Trust Action Over Depressed Wages
PREMIERE CREDIT: Echols Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
PROGRESSIVE WASTE: Loses Bid to Dismiss Landfill Nuisance Suit
R&C CLEANING: Godoy Seeks to Recover Damages for FLSA, NYLL Breach
RESURGENT CAPITAL: Fowler Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. Florida

REV GROUP: Continues to Defend Consolidated Suit over 2017 IPO
RIAL DE MINAS II: Court Dismisses Martinez Action With Prejudice
RO GALLERY: Court Dismisses GBL Claim in Rosenzweig Suit
SAEXPLORATION HOLDINGS: Zhang Investor Files Securities Fraud Suit
SANDERSON FARMS: Faces Wage & Benefits Class Suit in Maryland

SANTANDER BANK: Court Dismisses Aversano TILA Suit
SEAWORLD PARKS: Faces Mahoney Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
SEIU PENNSYLVANIA: Court Dismisses Union Dues Suit
SERVICELINK FIELD: Bid to Certify Class in Britton Suit Denied
SHASTA BEVERAGES: Garcia Suit Removed to C.D. California

SOC LLC: Nevada Court Decertifies Class in Risinger Suit
TEXTRON INC: Schall Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
TRAVELERS COMMERCIAL: Callaghan Suit Moved to M.D. Florida
TRIPPE MANUFACTURING: Mims Suit Asserts BIPA Violation
UNITED STATES: Medicare Patients Sue Over Nursing Home Coverage

UPS SUPPLY: Jones et al Seek Overtime Pay for California Drivers
US BANCORP: Leeson Appeals Bankr. Ct. Ruling to W.V. Dist. Ct.
USAA SAVINGS: Faces Tarter Suit in District of Massachusetts
VERB TECHNOLOGY: Kirby McInerney Files Class Action Lawsuit
WAWA INC: Settles Class Action Over Unpaid OT Wages for $1.4MM

WINGED FOOT: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in Clune Suit
YU BROTHERS INC: Mena Seeks Pay of All Overtime Hours Worked
ZB NA: Court Allows Leave to File FAC in Evans
ZIMMER BIOMET: Man Launches Class-Action Lawsuit Over Hip Implants

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Aerojet Rocketdyne Faces 61 Cases at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: American Biltrite Withdraws Appeal in Monaco Case
ASBESTOS UPDATE: ArvinMeritor Had US$100MM Reserves at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Corning Had $145MM Non-PCC Reserves at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Corning Inc. Has $135MM PCC Liability at June 30

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Court to Set New Trial Date in Clayton's Case
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Enstar Group Had $249.1MM Liability at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Expert's Opinion Excluded From Jackson Case
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Flowserve Still Defends PL Lawsuits at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: P.I. Claims vs. Arcata Auto Dismissed in Kuntz

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Stay Motion in Peterson Case Withdrawn
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Tenneco Has At Most 500 Cases in US, 50 in Europe


                            *********

2U INC: Rosen Law Files Securities Fraud Suit
---------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, reminds
purchasers of the securities of 2U, Inc. from February 25, 2019
through July 30, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period") of the
important October 7, 2019 lead plaintiff deadline in the case. The
lawsuit seeks to recover damages for 2U investors under the federal
securities laws.

To join the 2U class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1639.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) the Company faced increasing competition in online
education and particularly regarding graduate programs; (2) the
Company faced certain program-specific issues that negatively
impacted its performance; (3) as a result, the Company's business
model was not sustainable; (4) the Company would slow its program
launches; and (5) as a result, 2U's public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times. When the
true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that investors
suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than October 7,
2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf
of other class members in directing the litigation. If you wish to
join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1639.htmlor to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013. Rosen Law Firm has secured hundreds of
millions of dollars for investors.

Contact:

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
         New York, NY 10016
         Tel: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Website: www.rosenlegal.com
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com  
                cases@rosenlegal.com [GN]


AARGON AGENCY: Briggs Files FDCPA Suit in W.D. Tennessee
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Aargon Agency, Inc.
The case is styled as Makesha Briggs individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Aargon Agency, Inc.,
John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-02599 (W.D. Tenn.,
Sept. 9, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Aargon Agency, Inc. provides mercantile and consumer credit
reporting services. The Company offers national debt recovery, as
well as first party, early out collection, and billing
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Yaakov Saks, Esq.
     Stein Saks, PLLC
     285 Passaic Street
     Hackensack, NJ 07601
     Phone: (201) 282-6500 ext 101
     Fax: (201) 282-6501
     Email: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com


ABIOMED INC: Rosen Law Files Securities Fraud Suit
--------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, reminds
purchasers of the securities of Abiomed, Inc. (NASDAQ: ABMD) from
January 31, 2019 through July 31, 2019, inclusive (the "Class
Period") of the important October 7, 2019 lead plaintiff deadline
in the case. The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Abiomed
investors under the federal securities laws.

To join the Abiomed class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1645.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) ABIOMED's revenue growth was in decline; (2) ABIOMED did
not have a sufficient plan in place to stem its declining revenue
growth;  (3) ABIOMED was unlikely to restore its revenue growth
over the next several fiscal quarters; (4) consequently, ABIOMED
was reasonably likely to revise its full-year 2020 guidance in a
way that would fall short of the Company's prior projections and
market expectations; and (5) as a result, ABIOMED's public
statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant
times. When the true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims
that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than October 7,
2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf
of other class members in directing the litigation. If you wish to
join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1645.htmlor to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013.   Rosen Law Firm has secured hundreds
of millions of dollars for investors.

Contact:

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
         New York, NY 10016
         Tel: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Website: www.rosenlegal.com
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com
                cases@rosenlegal.com [GN]


AKORN INC: Settles Data Integrity Securities Litigation
-------------------------------------------------------
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION
In re Akorn, Inc. Data Integrity Securities Litigation

Civil No. 1:18-cv-01713
Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly

STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF SETTLEMENT
This Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, dated as of August 9,
2019, is entered into between (a) Lead Plaintiffs Gabelli & Co.
Investment Advisors, Inc. and Gabelli Funds, LLC, individually and
on behalf of the Settlement Class; and (b) Defendants Akorn, Inc.,
Rajat Rai ("Rai"), Duane Portwood ("Portwood"), Alan Weinstein
("Weinstein"), Brian Tambi ("Tambi") and Ronald Johnson
("Johnson"), and embodies the terms and conditions of the Settling
Parties' settlement of the claims against the Defendants in the
Action.1  Subject to the approval of the Court and the terms and
conditions expressly provided herein, this Stipulation is intended
to fully, finally and forever compromise, settle, release, resolve
and dismiss with prejudice all claims asserted in the Action
against the Defendants.
WHEREAS,
A.            The Action was commenced in the Court on March 8,
2018, by plaintiff Joshi Living Trust through the filing of a class
action complaint alleging violations by Akorn, Rai, Portwood and
Randall Pollard of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and
Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, captioned Joshi Living Trust v.
Akorn, Inc., et al., No. 1:18-cv-01713-MFK (N.D. Ill.);
B.            By order dated May 31, 2018, the Court appointed
Gabelli Funds as lead plaintiffs in this Action, Entwistle &
Cappucci LLP as lead counsel for the proposed class and Bernstein
Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP as local liaison counsel for the
proposed class;

1 All words or terms used herein that are capitalized and not
otherwise defined shall have the meanings ascribed to those words
or terms as set forth in Section I hereof, entitled "Definitions".
1
C.          On September 5, 2018, Lead Plaintiffs filed an amended
consolidated complaint, naming as defendants the Defendants, Mark
Silverberg ("Silverberg"), John Kapoor ("Kapoor"), Kenneth
Abramowitz ("Abramowitz"), Adrienne Graves ("Graves"), Steven Meyer
("Meyer") and Terry Rappuhn ("Rappuhn"), and asserting (i) on
behalf of persons who purchased or otherwise acquired the common
stock of Akorn during the period from November 3, 2016, through
April 20, 2018, inclusive, claims against Defendants and Silverberg
under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act, and (ii) on
behalf of Akorn shareholders of record as of June 9, 2017, claims
against Akorn, Rai, Kapoor, Weinstein, Abramowitz, Graves, Johnson,
Meyer, Rappuhn and Tambi, under Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act (the "Proxy Claims");
D.             On October 29, 2018, the parties filed a stipulation
and joint motion providing for the dismissal of certain claims and
defendants;
E.            On October 30, 2018, the Court granted the parties'
motion, dismissing all of the Proxy Claims without prejudice,
dismissing defendants Kapoor, Abramowitz, Graves, Meyer and Rappuhn
without prejudice and dismissing defendant Silverberg with
prejudice;
F.              On December 19, 2018, the Defendants filed an
answer to the amended consolidated complaint;
G.           On February 21, 2019, plaintiff Johnny Wickstrom filed
a class action complaint in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois (the "Northern District of
Illinois"), alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act during a class period from August 1, 2018 through
January 8, 2019, inclusive, and naming as defendants
2
Akorn, Rai and Portwood.  The case was captioned Wickstrom v.
Akorn, Inc., et al., No. 1:19-cv-01299 (the "Wickstrom Action");
H.            On March 27, 2019, the Court made a finding that the
Wickstrom Action was related to this Action and ordered the
Wickstrom Action to be transferred to the Court pursuant to Local
Rule 40.4 of the Local Rules of the Northern District of Illinois
(each a "Local Rule");
I.            On April 22, 2019, plaintiff Vicente Juan filed a
class action complaint in the Northern District of Illinois,
alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act
during a class period from May 2, 2018 through January 8, 2019,
inclusive, and naming as defendants Akorn, Rai and Portwood.  The
case was captioned Juan v. Akorn, Inc., et al., No. 1:19-cv-02720
(the "Juan Action");
J.            On April 22, 2019, Lead Plaintiffs, by and through
their attorneys, filed the Second Amended Complaint, alleging
claims on behalf of persons or entities who purchased or otherwise
acquired the common stock of Akorn during the Class Period against
Defendants pursuant to Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act
and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder;
K.           Also on April 22, 2019, Gabelli Funds and plaintiff
Vicente Juan filed motions in the Wickstrom Action to be appointed
as lead plaintiffs in that action;
L.            On April 23, 2019, the Court found that the Juan
Action was related to this Action and ordered the Juan Action to be
transferred to the Court pursuant to Local Rule 40.4;
M.           On April 29, 2019, plaintiff Vicente Juan filed a
notice of withdrawal of his motion for lead plaintiff status in the
Wickstrom Action;
3
N.            On May 3, 2019, the Litigation Parties and their
counsel commenced mediation before former United States District
Judge Layn R. Phillips ("Judge Phillips");
O.            On May 9, 2019, the Court consolidated both the
Wickstrom Action and the Juan Action into this Action for all
purposes;
P.          On May 31, 2019, plaintiffs Twin Master Fund, Ltd.,
Twin Opportunities Fund, LP and Twin Securities, Inc. filed a
complaint against Defendants in the Northern District of Illinois,
alleging violations of Sections 10(b), 18 and 20(a) of the Exchange
Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, as well as one count of
common law fraud (the "Twin Funds Action");
Q.            On June 11, 2019, the Court found that the Twin Funds
Action was related to this Action and ordered the Twin Funds Action
to be transferred to the Court pursuant to Local Rule 40.4;
R.            On July 5, 2019, Lead Plaintiffs filed a motion in
this Action seeking certification of a proposed class of all
persons or entities that purchased or otherwise acquired Akorn's
common stock during the Class Period and were damaged thereby;
S.            On July 11, 2019, plaintiffs Manikay Master Fund, LP
and Manikay Merger Fund, LP filed a complaint against Defendants in
the Northern District of Illinois, alleging violations of Sections
10(b), 18 and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder, as well as one count of common law fraud (the "Manikay
Funds Action");
T.            On July 25, 2019, after extensive arm's-length
negotiations facilitated by Judge Phillips, acting as mediator, the
Litigation Parties reached an agreement in principle as to
4
the economic elements of a settlement and agreed to settle this
Action and all issues in dispute therein on the terms set forth in
this Stipulation;
U.            On July 30, 2019, in connection with the agreement in
principle reached between them, the Litigation Parties jointly
moved the Court to enter the Stay Order;
V.            Also on July 30, 2019, the Court found that the
Manikay Funds Action was related to this Action and ordered the
Manikay Funds Action to be transferred to the Court pursuant to
Local Rule 40.4;
W.            Also on July 30, 2019, the Court entered the Stay
Order through at least August 26, 2019;
X.            Based upon their investigation and prosecution of
this case and review of materials and presentations regarding
Akorn's financial condition and ability to pay, Lead Plaintiffs and
Lead Counsel have concluded that the terms and conditions of this
Stipulation are fair, reasonable and adequate to Plaintiffs and in
their best interests.  Based upon Lead Plaintiffs' direct oversight
of the prosecution of this matter and with the advice of their
counsel, Lead Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of the
Settlement Class, have agreed to settle and release all claims
raised in the Action against Defendants pursuant to the terms and
provisions of this Stipulation, after considering, among other
things:  (a) the substantial financial benefit that Plaintiffs will
receive under the proposed Settlement; (b) Akorn's ability to pay
and financial condition—including risks attendant to the
renegotiation of Akorn's outstanding debt and other ongoing
litigation; and (c) the significant risks and costs of continued
litigation and trial against Defendants;
5
Y.            Defendants have denied and continue to deny all
allegations of wrongdoing, fault, liability or damage to
Plaintiffs; deny that they are or have engaged in any wrongdoing or
violation of law; deny that they improperly or misleadingly
disclosed (or improperly failed to disclose) the status of Akorn's
compliance with FDA rules and regulations concerning cGMP; and
maintain that they acted properly at all times, including complying
with all legal duties and public disclosure obligations.
Defendants believe that further conduct of this Action could be
protracted and expensive, and that it is desirable that this Action
be fully and finally settled in the manner and upon the terms and
conditions set forth in this Stipulation to limit further expense,
inconvenience and distraction, to dispose of the burden of
protracted litigation, and to permit the operation of Akorn's
business without further distraction and diversion of Akorn's
executives and other personnel with respect to the matters at issue
in this Action.  Defendants have also taken into account the
uncertainty and risks inherent in any litigation.  Defendants state
that they are entering into this Settlement solely in order to
eliminate the burden, expense, uncertainty and risk of further
litigation, and to avoid the business disruptions associated
therewith;
Z.            This Stipulation, whether or not consummated,
together with any proceedings related to any settlement, or any
terms of any settlement, whether or not consummated, shall in no
event be construed as or deemed to be evidence supporting, or an
admission or concession on the part of any Defendant with respect
to any claim or of any fault or liability or wrongdoing or damage
whatsoever, or any infirmity in any of the defenses that Defendants
have or could have asserted;
6
AA.            Each of the Litigation Parties recognizes and
acknowledges, however, that the Action has been prosecuted by Lead
Plaintiffs in good faith and defended by Defendants in good faith,
and that the Action is being voluntarily settled by the Litigation
Parties with the advice of counsel; and
BB.            This Stipulation (together with the exhibits hereto)
reflects the final and binding agreement between the Settling
Parties, subject to approval by the Court, and constitutes a
compromise of all Settled Claims between the Settling Parties.

NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby STIPULATED AND AGREED, by and among
Lead Plaintiffs (individually and on behalf of the Settlement
Class) and Defendants, by and through their respective undersigned
attorneys and subject to the approval of the Court pursuant to Rule
23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that, in
consideration of the benefits flowing to the Settling Parties
hereto from the Settlement, that all Settled Claims as against all
Released Persons shall be compromised, settled, released and
dismissed fully, finally and with prejudice, upon and subject to
terms and conditions. [GN]


ALBERTSONS COMPANIES: Says Ill. Biometrics Law Unconstitutional
---------------------------------------------------------------
Cole Lauterbach, writing for the Illinois Radio Network, reports
that the parent company of an Illinois grocery store chain claims
Illinois' biometric privacy law is unconstitutional because the
government doesn't have to comply with it.

Albertsons Companies Inc., which owns Jewel-Osco, has been fighting
a class-action lawsuit Bruhn v. New Albertsons Inc. since early
2018 for alleged violations of Illinois' Biometric Information
Privacy Act.  The class-action suit claimed the company violated
the rules when it required pharmacists to use fingerprints to
access a computer system to dispense medication to patients. In a
motion filed with the Cook County Circuit Court, attorneys for the
company argued the law was unconstitutional because public entities
and financial institutions don't have to abide by it.

"It is facially absurd that an employee of a government contractor
working in a government building is not covered by the BIPA, but is
covered when working in the non-government building next door,"
company attorneys wrote in the motion.

The state law is widely seen as the most robust consumer-protection
law of its kind in the nation because it allows people to file
lawsuits in court. The law requires a company to get affirmative
permission to collect an Illinois resident's biometric information
and disclose what the company is going to do with it. A breach of
this law is punishable by a $1,000 fine per instance or $5,000 if
it's proven the company was knowingly breaking the law.

One Biometric Information Privacy Act expert said she was skeptical
of the company's tactic to have the class-action case tossed.

"This is an extremely complex, and really awkward, procedural way
to try and get the class-action thrown out," said Alexandra M.
Franco, a visiting assistant professor of law at the Chicago-Kent
College of Law at the Illinois Institute of Technology. She said
that a challenge would have likely been brought against BIPA years
ago if there were constitutional weaknesses in the statute.

A company proving that a law it has been accused of breaking is
unconstitutional is rare, Franco said.

Franco said Albertsons claim of special legislation might not be
successful. She said the law exempted government because it wasn't
rational to have a state agency such as the Illinois State Police
get permission from the people troopers fingerprint.

"That is the only way to have the technology work for the
government," she said.

Should the ruling go against the grocery chain, it could be on the
hook for up to $5,000 for every instance where a pharmacist in one
of the company's Illinois-based Jewel-Osco stores used a
fingerprint to access computers.

Albertsons also asserted in its motion that the company's decision
to require the use fingerprints of didn't harm the pharmacists.
Franco said that was irrelevant because the Illinois Supreme Court
ruled in January that Six Flags Great America should be fined under
the law even though it may not have monetarily harmed the people
whose fingerprints the theme park acquired.

Both Facebook and Google have been sued for violating the act.
Google's case was dismissed but Facebook's case may be allowed to
move forward. [GN]


AMERICAN SPECIALTY: Court OKs $11.75MM Settlement in ERISA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum Opinion granting Plaintiffs'
Motion for Final Approval of the Settlement Agreement in the case
captioned HIGH STREET REHABILITATION, LLC, and DEFABIO SPINE AND
SPORT REHAB, LLC, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. AMERICAN SPECIALTY HEALTH
INCORPORATED, AMERICAN SPECIALTY HEALTH NETWORKS, INC., CIGNA
CORPORATION and CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants. Case No. 2:12-cv-07243-NIQA. (E.D. Pa.).

Dr. Steven G. Clarke, along with the American Chiropractic
Association (ACA), brought this action against Defendants American
Specialty Health Incorporated and American Specialty Health
Networks, Inc. and Cigna Corporation and Connecticut General Life
Insurance Company, seeking recovery under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), related to the denial of
out-of-network plan benefits claims for chiropractic services based
on Cigna and ASH's Utilization Management Reviews   procedures. In
that complaint, Cigna's insured, Carol Lietz, also alleged distinct
claims regarding administrative fees.

The Terms of the Settlement

The Settlement, the full terms of which are set forth in the
Settlement Agreement, provides substantial economic benefits to the
Class. The Settlement has three primary components: (1) Cigna and
ASH will pay $11.75 million as the total settlement amount, which
includes $1 million toward administrative fees and $10.75 million
toward benefit claims (2) ASH will make reasonable efforts to enact
certain business reforms related to the conduct challenged by
Plaintiffs in this action and (3) mutual releases of all claims
between the parties.  

When granting final approval of a class action settlement, a
district court must hold a hearing and conclude that the proposed
settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate.
In Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1975), the Third Circuit
set forth factors (Girsh factors) a district court should consider
when reviewing a proposed class action settlement. The Girsh
factors are: (1) the complexity, expense and likely duration of the
litigation (2) the reaction of the class to the settlement (3) the
stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed (4)
the risks of establishing liability (5) the risks of establishing
damages (6) the risks of maintaining the class action through the
trial (7) the ability of the defendant to withstand a greater
judgment (8) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in
light of the best possible recovery  and(9) the range of
reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible recovery in
light of all the attendant risks of litigation.

The complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation

Needless to say, had the Settlement not been reached, this matter
would likely have proceeded to trial on the issues of liability and
a determination of damages, if any. The continued prosecution of
Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants would have required
significant additional expense to the Class and a substantial delay
before any potential recovery. Though at the time the parties
reached the Settlement, the parties had vigorously litigated this
case for more than seven years and engaged in extensive fact
discovery, much work remained, including fact depositions, expert
discovery, and motion practices with respect to class certification
and summary judgment. Further, no matter the outcome of a trial, it
is likely that one or all of the parties would have appealed,
leading to further litigation costs and delay in any realized
recovery.

Thus, the avoidance of unnecessary expenditure of time and
resources benefits all parties, and weighs in favor of approving
the settlement.  

The reaction of the class to the settlement

A low number of objectors or opt-outs is persuasive evidence of the
proposed settlement's fairness and adequacy.  

Here, Defendants identified 26,128 individuals who meet the Class
definition. Those individuals identified as potential Class members
were mailed notices and Class forms. As of the date of the final
approval hearing held on August 16, 2019, no Class Member had
objected to the proposed settlement and only two (2) members had
opted out.

This factor is persuasive evidence of the fairness and adequacy of
the proposed settlement, and weighs in favor of a final approval.  


The stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed

The third Girsh factor captures the degree of case development that
class counsel had accomplished prior to settlement. Through this
lens, courts can determine whether counsel had an adequate
appreciation of the merits of the case before negotiating. When
evaluating this third Girsh factor, courts must evaluate the
procedural stage of the case at the time of the proposed settlement
to assess whether counsel adequately appreciated the merits of the
case while negotiating. Settlements reached following discovery are
more likely to reflect the true value of the claim.

This case has been actively litigated from its commencement.

Prior to reaching a settlement, the parties briefed multiple
motions to dismiss, engaged in extensive discovery and negotiations
over discovery issues, and participated in a successful private
mediation. As a result of the extensive proceedings that preceded
the parties' settlement, the parties had ample opportunity to
identify and grasp the strengths and weaknesses of each party's
case.

Consequently, this Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of
approval.

The risks of establishing liability

This Girsh factor weighs the likelihood of ultimate success against
the benefits of an immediate settlement. The existence of
obstacles, if any, to the plaintiff's success at trial weighs in
favor of settlement. This factor should be considered to examine
what potential rewards or downside of litigation might have been
had class counsel decided to litigate the claims rather than settle
them.

In this case, after considering the parties' various substantive
filings, the outcome of this matter with respect to liability is
far from certain. Defendants have denied any liability throughout
this litigation. The proposed settlement, of course, avoids the
risk that Defendants be found not liable.

Thus, this Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of
approval.

The risks of establishing damages

This factor attempts to measure the expected value of litigating
the action rather than settling it at the current time. The Court
looks at the potential damage award if the case were taken to trial
against the benefits of immediate settlement. In Warfarin Sodium I,
the trial court found that the risk of establishing damages
strongly favored settlement, observing that damages would likely be
established at trial through a battle of experts, with each side
presenting its figures to the jury and with no guarantee whom the
jury would believe. In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 212
F.R.D. 231, 256 (D. Del. 2002), aff'd 391 F.3d 516, 537 (3d Cir.
2004).  

Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of approval.

The risks of maintaining the class action through trial

Because the prospects for obtaining certification have a great
impact on the range of recovery one can expect to reap from the
class action, this factor measures the likelihood of obtaining and
keeping a class certification if the action were to proceed to
trial. As noted above, this action has been vigorously litigated by
both sides from the outset. As such, it is likely that the issue of
class certification would have been the subject of vigorous
dispute. Further, even if class certification were granted in this
matter, class certification can always be reviewed or modified
before trial, so the specter of decertification makes settlement an
appealing alternative. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of
approval.

The ability of defendants to withstand a greater judgment

This factor considers whether the defendants could withstand a
judgment for an amount significantly greater than the settlement.
Though the parties acknowledge that Defendants have the ability to
withstand a judgment greater than the settlement amount, where the
defendants' ability to pay greatly exceeds the potential liability,
this factor is generally neutral.  

This Court finds that this factor is neutral.

The range of reasonableness of settlement in light of best and
possible recovery and all attendant risks of litigation

The last two Girsh factors, often considered together, evaluate
whether the settlement represents a good value for a weak case or a
poor value for a strong case. In order to assess the reasonableness
of a settlement in cases seeking monetary relief, the present value
of the damages plaintiffs would likely recover if successful,
appropriately discounted for the risk of not prevailing, should be
compared with the amount of the proposed settlement.

In light of the questions of fact and law present in this
litigation, the value of the proposed settlement substantially
outweighs the mere possibility of future relief. Here, the Class is
receiving a significant settlement amount which offers real
economic benefits to Class Members. Class Members do not have to
submit claims, but instead will be automatically mailed checks to
offset the financial responsibility they incurred for services from
an ASH-contracted provider. The Settlement also requires ASH to use
reasonable efforts to implement an array of business reforms. As
previously noted, the expense of a trial and use of the parties'
resources would have been substantial, especially in conjunction
with the post-trial motions and appeals that would have likely
followed any trial on the merits. Thus, a settlement is
advantageous to all parties.

Therefore, these factors weigh in favor of approval.

Class Certification

This Court provisionally certified the following proposed class:

     All ONET Chiropractic Providers who provided clinical services
up to the Final Approval Date to a Plan Member, and whose claims
for reimbursement of such services were subjected to the ASH
policies or practices as part of the claims review or benefit
determination process and where some or all of the claim was
denied.

A plaintiff seeking class certification must satisfy all
requirements of Rule 23(a) and at least one of the requirements of
Rule 23(b).

To satisfy the Rule 23(a) requirements: (1) the class must be so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable (numerosity)
(2) there must be questions of law or fact common to the class
(commonality) (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties must be typical of the claims or defenses of the class
(typicality) and (4) the named plaintiffs must fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class (adequacy of
representation, or simply adequacy).

Rule 23(a) Requirements

Numerosity
Under Rule 23(a)(1), the court must determine whether the potential
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.
No minimum number of plaintiffs is required to maintain a suit as a
class action, but generally if the named plaintiff demonstrates
that the potential number of plaintiffs exceeds 40, the first prong
of Rule 23(a) has been met.

Here, the Settlement Class includes approximately 26,000 Settlement
Class Members. Given the number and geographic distribution of the
Settlement Class Members, joinder of all Settlement Class Members
would be impracticable, and the proposed Settlement Class satisfies
Rule 23's numerosity requirement for settlement purposes.  

Commonality and Typicality

Pursuant to Rule 23(a)(2), a court must determine whether there are
questions of law or fact common to the class, ordinarily known as
commonality. Under the Rule, commonality requires the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the class members have suffered the same injury.
It does not require identical claims or facts among class members.

Under Rule 23(a)(3), a court must also determine whether the claims
or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class. Typicality and commonality are closely
related and often merge.  

Typicality ensures that the putative class members and
representative's interests are aligned so that the latter will work
to benefit the entire class through the pursuit of their own goals.
Typicality is met when the named plaintiffs and the proposed class
members challenge the same unlawful conduct.

Here, a single overarching common question whether Defendants' UMR
processes violated ERISA cuts across every claim of every
Settlement Class Member. In addition, Plaintiffs assert the same
ERISA claim, under the same legal theories for the same wrongful
conduct as the other Settlement Class Members. As such Rule
23(a)(2) and (3)'s requirements of common question of law or fact
and typicality are satisfied.

Adequacy

Under Rule 23(a)(4), a court must determine whether the proposed
class representative will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class. To meet the adequacy requirement, a finding
must be made that (1) plaintiff's interests do not conflict with
those of the class and (2) the proposed class counsel are capable
of representing the class. The Third Circuit has recognized that
the linchpin of the adequacy requirement is the alignment of
interests and incentives between the representative plaintiffs and
the rest of the class and not proof of vigorous pursuit of the
claim.

Here, there is no conflict between the proposed Class
Representatives and the Class because, as with all members of the
Class, Plaintiffs seek compensation for the same claims from the
same Defendants. Plaintiffs have no interests that are antagonistic
to or in conflict with the Class they seek to represent and their
alleged injuries are identical to those suffered by Settlement
Class Members. In addition, Class Counsel have substantial
experience prosecuting large-scale class actions, including ERISA
class actions against health insurers.

Accordingly, both prongs of the adequacy inquiry are met.

Rule 23(b)(3) Requirements

Having found that Plaintiffs have satisfied each of the Rule 23(a)
prerequisites, this Court must determine pursuant to Rule 23(b)
whether the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

These two requirements are generally referred to as the
predominance and superiority factors.

Predominance

The predominance requirement tests whether proposed classes are
sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.
Issues common to the class must predominate over individual issues.
Because the nature of the evidence that will suffice to resolve a
question determines whether the question is common or individual, a
district court must formulate some prediction as to how specific
issues will play out in order to determine whether common or
individual issues predominate in a given case.

The predominance requirement is met here. Plaintiffs allege that
each Settlement Class member was subject to the same UMR practices.
As such, the claims of each similarly situated Settlement Class
Member address the same issues of law and fact.

Accordingly, this Court finds that the questions of law or fact
common to class members that involve liability predominate over
questions involving only individual members.

Superiority

Under the second criterion of Rule 23(b), this Court must find that
a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly
and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The superiority
element requires courts to balance, in terms of fairness and
efficiency, the merits of a class action against those of
alternative available methods of adjudication.

Here, a class action is the superior method of resolving the
Settlement Class Members' claims. All of the Settlement Class
Members' claims are based upon the same basic operative facts and
legal standards. It would be a far better use of judicial resources
to adjudicate all of these identical issues once, on a common
basis. In addition, the Settlement provides Settlement Class
Members the ability to obtain predictable, certain, and definite
compensatory relief promptly.

By contrast, individualized litigation carries with it great
uncertainty, risk, and costs, and provides no guarantee that
injured Settlement Class Members will obtain timely compensatory
relief at the conclusion of the litigation. Accordingly, this Court
finds that consideration of the Rule 23(b) factors weighs favorably
for certification. Because of the number and nature of potential
class plaintiffs and the fact that each member's potential recovery
is likely to be small compared to the cost of litigating an
individual case, maintaining this matter as a class action is
judicially advisable and superior to other available methods.

After carefully concluding the requisite vigorous analysis of the
factors in Rules 23(a) and (b), this Court finds that the
requirements of Rule 23 have been met and that certification of
Plaintiffs' proposed class is proper.

This Court grants final approval of the proposed class action
settlement.

The full-text copy of the District Court's August 29, 2019
Memorandum Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/yysmsflz
from Leagle.com.

HIGH STREET REHABILITATION, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by JASON M.
KNOTT -- jknott@zuckerman.com -- ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER LLP, STEVEN A.
SCHWARTZ -- StevenSchwartz@chimicles.com -- Chimicles Schwartz
Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, D. BRIAN HUFFORD --
dbhufford@zuckerman.com -- ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER LLP, JASON COWART --
jcowart@zuckerman.com -- ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER LLP & NELL Z. PEYSER --
npeyser@zuckerman.com -- ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER LLP.

DEFABIO SPINE AND SPORT REHAB, LLC, Individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by STEVEN A.
SCHWARTZ, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP & JASON
M. KNOTT, ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER LLP.

AMERICAN SPECIALTY HEALTH INCORPORATED, Defendant, represented by
ANDREW Z. EDELSTEIN -- aedelstein@mayerbrown.com -- MAYER BROWN
LLP, ELIZABETH D. MANN -- emann@mayerbrown.com -- MAYER BROWN
LLP,JENNIFER M. CHANG -- jchang@mayerbrown.com -- MAYER BROWN LLP,
MICHAEL P. DALY -- michael.daly@dbr.com -- DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH
LLP, MATTHEW H. MARMOLEJO -- mmarmolejo@mayerbrown.com -- MAYER
BROWN LLP & RICHARD M. HAGGERTY, Jr. --richard.haggerty@dbr.com --
DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP.

AMERICAN SPECIALITY HEALTH NETWORKS, INC, Defendant, represented by
ANDREW Z. EDELSTEIN, MAYER BROWN LLP, ELIZABETH D. MANN, MAYER
BROWN LLP,JASON M. KNOTT, ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER LLP, JENNIFER M. CHANG,
MAYER BROWN LLP, MICHAEL P. DALY, DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP,
MATTHEW H. MARMOLEJO, MAYER BROWN LLP & RICHARD M. HAGGERTY, Jr.,
DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP.


ANTHEM BLUE: Wonderful Co. Sues over Fraudulent Medical Bills
-------------------------------------------------------------
THE WONDERFUL COMPANY LLC, on behalf of itself and others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. ANTHEM BLUE CROSS LIFE AND HEALTH
INSURANCE COMPANY; LUCILE PACKARD CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL STANFORD; AND
DOES 1-100, the Defendants, Case No. 19STCV30239 (Cal. Super., Aug.
22, 2019), alleges that Defendants are accountable for unfair,
unlawful and unconscionable behavior in connection with medical
charges submitted to TWC in violation of of the Cartwright Act. The
action arises from Anthem's efforts to extort from TWC payment of
Stanford's unlawful and fraudulent medical bills for the benefit of
Anthem.

TWC, a self-insured employer who retained Anthem to act as its TPA,
is a privately held company based in Los Angeles, California. It
employs thousands of Californians, through its various holdings in
the areas of fruit, nut, flower, water, wine, and juice production,
among others. TWC is a self-funded health insurance provider for
its employees.

Anthem, a third party health administrator, is an Indiana
corporation with its principal place of business in Woodland Hills,
California. Anthem serves as the third party administrator of TWC's
employee health insurance plan and, among other things, provides
TWC's employees with access to Anthem's proprietary network of
service providers and negotiated billing rates pursuant to the
parties' 2014 Administrative Services Agreement.

As part of the Agreement, Anthem, inter alia, receives claims
and/or charges from various service providers, investigates and
reviews such claims to determine what amounts are due and payable,
disburses said amounts to the providers, and subsequently seeks
renumeration from TWC for those charges, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Kristina Diaz, Esq.
          Johnny Traboulsi, Esq.
          Courtney E. Vaudreuil, Esq.
          ROLL LAW GROUP PC
          11444 West Olympic Boulevard
          Los Angeles, CA 90064-1557
          Telephone: (310) 966-8400
          Facsimile: (310) 966-8810
          E-mail: kristina.diaz@roll.com
                  johnny.traboulsi@roll.com
                  courtney.vaudreuil@roll.com

               - and -

          ANDREW S. CLARE, Esq.
          E-mail: aclare@loeb.com
          LOEB & LOEB LLP
          10100 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 2200
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-4120
          Telephone: (310) 282-2000
          Facsimile: (310) 282-2200

AQUA ILLINOIS: Henderson Sues Over Contaminated Water Supply
------------------------------------------------------------
JOANN HENDERSON and WILLIAM HENDERSON, individually, and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. AQUA ILLINOIS,
INC., an Illinois corporation, Defendant, Case No. 2019CH10191
(Circuit Ct., Cook Cty., Ill., Sept. 3, 2019) is a class action
complaint arising out of the contamination of the water supply of
Plaintiffs and thousands of other residents in the village of
University Park, Illinois by Aqua, which owns and operates the
public water system in the Village.

In the summer of 2017, Aqua began adding a different chemical mix
to the Public Water System purportedly to remove iron or rust from
the water. Aqua constructed improvements to the Central A venue
Boosting Station in order to withdraw water from the Kankakee
River. Aqua introduced its new chemical mix into the Public Water
System at the Central Avenue Boosting Station. On information and
belief, as early as December 9, 2017, Aqua switched the source of
the Public Water System from local groundwater wells to the
Kankakee River.

The introduction by Aqua of the new chemical mix into the Public
Water System combined with the chemistry of the water from the
Kankakee River resulted in the removal of a protective layer in
residential plumbing throughout the Village, causing lead to leach
into the water delivered to Plaintiffs and other Village customers
of Aqua via the Public Water System.

Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all Class members, seek
damages as a result of Aqua distributing water to them that was not
assuredly safe and was contaminated with unsafe levels of lead as a
result of Aqua's actions and inactions, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs Joann Henderson and William Henderson are residents and
citizens of Illinois, residing in the Village.

Aqua Illinois, Inc. is an Illinois corporation with its principal
place of business in Kankakee, Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Thomas A. Zimmerman, Jr., Esq.
     Sharon A. Harris, Esq.
     Matthew C. De Re, Esq.
     Nickolas J. Hagman, Esq.
     ZIMMERMAN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
     77 W. Washington Street, Suite 1220
     Chicago, IL 60602
     Office: (312) 440-0020
     Facsimile: (312) 440-4180
     Email: tom@attorneyzim.com
            sharon@attorneyzim.com
            matt@attorneyzim.com
            nick@attorneyzim.com
            www.attorneyzim.com



BARCLAYS: Cadwalader Wickersham Attorneys Discuss UK Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Vincent Brophy, Esq. -- vincent.brophy@cwt.com -- and Tom
Bainbridge, Esq. -- tom.bainbridge@cwt.com -- of Cadwalader
Wickersham & Taft LLP, in an article for Lexology, report that on
29 July 2019, claimants brought a class action in the UK
Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) against five investment banks,
alleging potentially billions of pounds in damages from cartel
conduct in the foreign exchange markets.

The claim follows on from a recent antitrust infringement decision
of the European Commission, by which the five defendant banks --
Barclays, Citigroup, JP Morgan, RBS and UBS -- settled the
authority's long-running foreign exchange investigation. In the
decision, the banks admitted that their traders had exchanged
competitively sensitive information and coordinated trading in
foreign exchange markets in the period 2007 to 2013. The European
Commission imposed total fines of EUR 1.07 billion. A further
European Commission decision is pending against non-settling bank
Credit Suisse in the same investigation, which may result in
further fines, as well as an extension of the scope of the UK
litigation.

The class is represented by Michael O'Higgins, former Chairman of
the UK Pensions Regulator, and consists of a broad class of
claimants, including pension funds, asset managers, hedge funds and
corporates. To proceed to trial, the CAT must certify the claim by
way of a collective proceedings order (CPO), i.e. it must confirm
that the claim is brought on behalf of an identifiable class,
raises common issues, and is overall suitable to proceed as a class
action.

Why does this matter?

This is now the seventh CPO application since the UK introduced
class actions in the Consumer Rights Act 2015. The CAT, in
considering early applications, has openly stated that it intends
to tread carefully in certifying proposed classes, given the
novelty of class actions in the UK and the challenges that they
present for the legal system: "collective proceedings on an opt-out
basis can bring great benefits, if successful . . . but like almost
all substantial competition damages claims they can be very
burdensome and expensive for defendants . . . The eligibility
conditions . . . require the Tribunal to scrutinise an application
for a CPO with particular care, to ensure that only appropriate
cases go forward." (Justice Roth, in Merricks v Mastercard)

The certification procedure is therefore still in its infancy. Of
the previous applications, none thus far have been certified by the
CAT: the first application (Gibson v Pride Mobility Products) was
abandoned after it failed to receive certification; the second
application (Merricks v MasterCard) is on appeal to the Supreme
Court after conflicting judgments before the CAT and the Court of
Appeal (see here); and other applications (on claims concerning the
Trucks cartel and price-fixing by UK railway operators) have yet to
be heard pending the judgement of the Supreme Court.

Clearly, along with this new foreign exchange claim, there is now a
sufficient body of pending class actions for the CAT to develop
precedent (taking into account any guidance that might result from
the Supreme Court in the pending Merricks case), and clearly
articulate the grounds on which class certification should be
granted.

More broadly, the proceedings also highlight the increased
litigation risk faced by investment banks from antitrust
misconduct. Naturally, such misconduct exposes banks to
investigations by antitrust authorities, and also by financial
regulators, including the UK Financial Conduct Authority.
Misconduct now also exposes them, as a matter of course, to private
litigation in Europe -- brought both on an individual and class
action basis. Indeed, this new class action commenced in the CAT
will run alongside an FX-related joint antitrust claim brought in
the UK High Court by over 100 investors against the same five
defendants, as well as HSBC.

What happens next?

The claimants are seeking a CPO, which would allow their class
action against the defendant banks to proceed to trial before the
CAT. However, the appeal in Merricks v Mastercard will not be
resolved for some time, and the Supreme Court's ruling may have a
bearing on this and other applications. It is thus possible that,
although the CAT may consider preliminary issues, the main hearing
on the CPO application may be adjourned until the Supreme Court has
clarified the test for certification. [GN]


BLAIR'S BAIL: Sued Over Excessive Premiums for Bail Bond Purchase
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jerome Morgan, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. BLAIR'S BAIL BOND, INC., BANKER INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-12379-LMA-KWR (Civil
District Ct., Parish of Orleans, La., Aug. 29, 2019) seeks a
declaratory judgment that Section B. (1) of La. Act 54 violated the
Due Prices Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions and
Article II, of the Louisiana Constitution. He further seeks a
declaratory judgment that La. R.S. 22:1443 limits bail bond
companies and their insurers to charging a 12 percent premium to
purchase a bail bond and a declaration that La. R.S. 22:822 did not
allow Defendant to exceed this limitation.

The Defendants have since 2005 charged premiums in excess of what
Louisiana law authorizes to secure a person's release from jail.
Louisiana law limits bail bond companies and their sureties to
charging 12 percent of the face value of an individual's criminal
bail bond. Plaintiff signed a contract with Defendants in 2014 that
required him to pay a 13 percent premium to purchase a bail bond,
which is 1 percent more than what state law authorizes, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff Jerome Morgan is a resident of Orleans Parish.

Defendant BLAIR'S BAIL BOND, INC. is a domestic corporation dully
licensed under the laws of the state of Louisiana.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     William P. Quigley, Esq.
     LOYOLA UNIVERSITY NEW ORLEANS
     7214 St. Charles Avenue
     New Orleans, LA 70118
     Phone: (504) 861-5591
     Email: quigley@loyno.edu


BOBST NORTH: Court Denies Bobst Lyon's Bid to Junk Candelario Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of New
York issued a Decision and Order denying Defendants Bobst Lyon SAS'
motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction
in the case captioned JAN CARLOS CANDELARIO, Plaintiff, v. BOBST
NORTH AMERICA, INC., as Successor in Interest to BOBST CHAMPLAIN,
INC., and BOBST LYON, SAS, f/k/a SA MARTIN, Defendants. BOBST LYON,
SAS, f/k/a SA MARTIN, Third Party Plaintiff, v. JAMESTOWN CONTAINER
CORPORATION, Third Party Defendant. No. 18-CV-6281 CJS.
(W.D.N.Y.).

The Plaintiff filed a complaint against Bobst North America, Inc.
and Bobst Lyon, SAS1alleging negligence and products liability.
Plaintiff was injured at Jamestown Container Corporation, his place
of employment while using a Martin Transline 1228, a machine
designed to feed, slot, print, fold and glue corrugated cardboard
to make boxes. Plaintiff alleges that as he was operating the
machine, his hand was drawn into a nip point, trapping his hand and
injuring it in such a fashion that two of his fingers had to be
amputated and he was caused to sustain severe skin loss over his
hand requiring extensive grafting and severe loss of function of
his hand.

Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the Court has
jurisdiction over the defendants. Prior to discovery, a plaintiff
may defeat a motion to dismiss based on legally sufficient
allegations of jurisdiction.When sitting in diversity, this Court's
jurisdiction is consistent with the jurisdiction of the state
courts of general jurisdiction.

Plaintiff asserts specific2 jurisdiction over Bobst Lyon, SAS in
this diversity case through two subdivisions of New York's long-arm
statute.

In addition to New York's Long-Arm statute, constitutional due
process requires that a defendant who is not present in the
territory of the forum court have certain minimum contacts with it
such that maintenance of the suit does not offend `traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.

It appears that the machine at the heart of this litigation was
sold by Bobst Lyon, SAS's predecessor company to Bobst, Inc., at a
time when that company was authorized to do business in New York.
However, the machine was not sold by Bobst, Inc. to a New York
entity, but was sold to an entity in Ohio. Eleven years before the
filing of this action, in 2008, Bobst, Inc., now known as Bobst
Group, Inc., the entity authorized to do business in New York, and
the entity that purchased the machine at issue in this case and
sold it to an Ohio company, surrendered its authority to do
business in New York. The Ohio company sold the machine as used
equipment to Jamestown Container Corporation sometime before June
9, 2016, the date of Plaintiff's injuries.

N.Y. C.P.L.R. section 302(a)(3)(i)

The essence of personal jurisdiction under (a)(3)(i) is the
following: regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any
other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue
from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state. The
evidence before the Court at this point in the litigation does not
show that Bobst Lyon, SAS, meets this requirement. Nothing before
the Court demonstrates that Bobst Lyon, SAS, received any revenue
from sales in New York State.  

Plaintiff has pointed to no connection between the sale of the
machine by the Ohio company to Jamestown Container Corporation and
Bobst Lyon, SAS. No substantial relationship exists between the
Ohio company sale to Jamestown Container Corporation and Bobst
Lyon, SAS.

Bobst Lyon, SAS, addresses Plaintiff's argument that four of its
machines were sold to the New Jersey corporation which then sold
them to New York entities. Bobst Lyon, SAS, contends that those
four sales produced about one percent of Bobst Lyon, SAS's overall
revenue. The Honorable I. Leo Glasser of the Eastern District
observed in Copterline Oy v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 649 F.Supp.2d
5 (E.D.N.Y. 2007): District courts in this Circuit agree that where
a foreign corporation derives less than five percent of its overall
revenue from sales in New York, such sales are not substantial
enough to force a foreign defendant to litigate in New York.

The allegations concerning Bobst Lyon, SAS's statements about its
revenue from New York do not support Plaintiff's position of
jurisdiction under (a)(3)(i).

N.Y. C.P.L.R. section 302(a)(3)(ii)

The crux of personal jurisdiction under (a)(3)(ii) is that Bobst
Lyon, SAS, expects or should reasonably expect the act to have
consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from
interstate or international commerce. According to Plaintiff, Bobst
Lyon, SAS's sale of four machines to the New Jersey corporation,
which were eventually sold by that corporation to New York
entities, amounted to revenue more than $8,000,000.00. Bobst Lyon,
SAS, concedes that it derives substantial revenue from sales of its
machines outside of France, but that it could not and should not
have reasonably expected that its sale of a machine to the ultimate
customer in Ohio would have consequences in New York. The New York
statute's foreseeability requirement, as the courts have labeled
it, relates to forum consequences generally and not to the specific
event which produced injury within the state.

Bobst Lyon, SAS, argues that it was not foreseeable to it that the
machine it sold to an Ohio entity would end up in New York, and
makes the point that a nondomicillary manufacturer's amenability to
suit no longer `travel[s] with the chattel. This argument appears
at odds with the holding in Fantas Foods, Inc., where the New York
court stated that (a)(3)(iii) is concerned with foreseeability of
forum consequences generally, and not to the specific event which
produced injury within the state. Fantas Foods, Inc., 49 N.Y.2d at
326 n.4.

If Bobst Lyon, SAS, is selling machines to the New Jersey
corporation which it knows will enter the New York market, then it
should have foreseen that one of its machines could cause harm in
New York. Fantas Foods, Inc. is not concerned with whether Bobst
Lyon, SAS, could have foreseen that the specific machine that
caused the harm would enter New York, only that it could face forum
consequences generally. By selling machines to the New Jersey
corporation chargeable with the knowledge that one or more of them
would end up in New York, Bobst Lyon, SAS, could have foreseen the
potential for consequences in New York. Thus, it appears that
personal jurisdiction is available under (a)(3)(ii).

Therefore, the Court must analyze the due process impact.

Due Process

Bobst Lyon, SAS, relies heavily on the decision in J. McIntyre
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro. The decision did not result in the assent
of five justices, therefore, Bobst Lyon, SAS, citing the rule in
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976), relies on Justice
Breyer's concurring opinion in J. McIntyre Mach.

Addressing Bobst Lyon, SAS's argument that its amenability to suit
did not travel with the chattel that caused the injury, Justice
Breyer, in his concurring opinion in J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 891 (2011), disagreed with the majority's
determination that jurisdiction could rest upon no more than the
occurrence of a productbased accident in the forum State.

Instead, he wrote that the Supreme Court "has rejected the notion
that a defendant's amenability to suit travels with the chattel.
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 296). In World-Wide Volkswagen,
the Supreme Court held that simply because a manufacturer's chattel
finds its way into the forum state, does not mean the manufacturer
should foresee being brought into court there. Instead, the
foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the
mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum
State. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection
with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there.

The allegations in the complaint demonstrate prima facie that Bobst
Lyon, SAS's sales to the New Jersey corporation were done with the
intent to target the New York market, which would mean Bobst Lyon,
SAS, could foresee being brought into court in New York.

Bobst Lyon, SAS's motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction is denied without prejudice.

The full-text copy of the District Court's August 29, 2019 Decision
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6sbauc4 from
Leagle.com.

Jan Carlos Candelario, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph A. Regan,
Faraci & Lange LLP, 28 East Main Street, Suite 1100, Rochester, NY
14614

Bobst North America, Inc., As Successor in Interest to Bobst
Champlain, Inc., Defendant, represented by Matthew C. Lenahan --
cshank@barclaydamon.com -- Rupp Baase Pfalzgraf & Cunningham LLC
&Thomas R. Pender -- tpender@cremerspina.com -- Cremer Spina
Shaughnessy Jansen & Siegert LLC.

Bobst Lyon, SAS, formerly known as SA Martin, Defendant,
represented by Thomas R. Pender, Cremer Spina Shaughnessy Jansen &
Siegert LLC.

Bobst North America, Inc., As Successor in Interest to Bobst
Champlain, Inc., ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by Matthew C.
Lenahan, Rupp Baase Pfalzgraf & Cunningham LLC & Thomas R. Pender,
Cremer Spina Shaughnessy Jansen & Siegert LLC.

Bobst Lyon, SAS, formerly known as SA Martin & Bobst Lyon, SAS,
ThirdParty Plaintiffs, represented by Thomas R. Pender, Cremer
Spina Shaughnessy Jansen & Siegert LLC.

Jamestown Container Corporation, ThirdParty Defendant, represented
by Howard J. Snyder, Smith Mazure Director Wilkins Young & Yagerman
P.C., 111 John Street, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10038


CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT: Bid to Transfer Antitrust Suit Denied
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas,
Texarkana Division, issued an Order denying Defendants' Motion to
Transfer Venue of the case captioned TRAVELPASS GROUP LLC, PARTNER
FUSION INC, RESERVATION COUNTER LLC, Plaintiffs, v. CAESARS
ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION, CHOICE HOTELS INTERNATIONAL INC, HILTON
DOMESTIC OPERATING COMPANY INC., MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL INC, RED
ROOF INNS INC, SIX CONTINENTS HOTELS INC, WYNDHAM HOTEL GROUP LLC,
HYATT CORPORATION, Defendants. Civil Action No. 5:18-CV-00153-RWS.
(E.D. Tex.).

This is an antitrust case involving an alleged conspiracy among
hotel chains to eliminate interbrand competition for keyword
internet searches. The Plaintiffs allege the Defendants, conspiring
with one another and so-called gatekeeper online travel agencies
(OTAs) like Expedia and others, rigged bids and engaged in a group
boycott to eliminate competing paid search advertisements displayed
by internet search engines by agreeing not to bid on one another's
branded keywords.

The Plaintiffs assert four causes of action against Defendants,
including (1) violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1
(per se bid rigging/group boycott/market division) (2) violation of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1 (unreasonable restraint of
trade) (3) violation of related Utah Antitrust Act Section 1 and
(4) tortious interference with prospective business relations.

Whether this case should be transferred pursuant to the
first-to-file rule

The first-to-file rule is a discretionary rule by which a district
court may decline to hear a case which substantially overlaps with
a case in another district court.  

Here, although both cases contain similar allegations regarding the
existence of an unlawful agreement between the five hotel companies
in violation of antitrust laws, the Court agrees with the
Magistrate Judge that the cases do not substantially overlap. While
the cases are related, there are many significant differences
(different claimants, claims, allegations, defenses, defendants,
witnesses and damages) between them.

Different types of claimants and claims

In their briefing in support of a motion to dismiss, Defendants
acknowledged that the different types of claims and claimants in
this case justify different outcomes in certain situations.  Tichy
is a putative class action brought by a consumer. The Tichy denial
of a motion to dismiss the consumer claim does not address the lack
of antitrust injury that is fatal to the Complaint brought by
TravelPass, a downstream distributor of certain Defendants' hotel
rooms.

The Tichy action is a putative nationwide class action brought by
Karen Tichy on behalf of herself and a putative class of consumers
in the United States who, from January 1, 2015 through the present,
paid for a room reserved from any online travel agency or
Defendants' online websites. This is an individual action brought
by a downstream online travel agency. TravelPass is not a member of
the putative class in Tichy. Rather, TravelPass distributes
Defendants' hotel room inventory and is in competition with
Defendants in online travel booking.

Different allegations

Whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met for class certification
will be a complex issue in the Tichy action not present in this
case. Although both the Tichy action and this case involve
allegations of Sherman Act violations, this case alleges more
details of the alleged conspiracy. Additionally, this case contains
a tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, a
claim not present in the Tichy action.

Different defendants and defenses

Although the Tichy action and this case involve five of the same
defendants, this case involves three defendants who are not
defendants in the Tichy action (Caesars Entertainment Corporation,
Choice Hotels International, Inc. and Red Roof Inns, Inc.). As
mentioned by the Magistrate Judge, because TravelPass and the
plaintiff in the Tichy action stand in different relationships to
Defendants and the relevant markets, Defendants' arguments
regarding antitrust injury and antitrust standing are accordingly
different.

Different damages

The Plaintiffs' damages are also different than the damages sought
by the Tichy class. Whereas the plaintiffs in the Tichy action
allege they paid more for hotel rooms and incurred greater costs in
time and effort to locate suitable rooms than they would have
absent the alleged conspiracy, Plaintiffs here have alleged
Defendants' conduct caused a substantial diminution in the value of
its business. Defendants have also highlighted the differences in
the types of antitrust injury allegedly suffered by plaintiffs in
both cases.  

Based on these considerations, the Court exercises its discretion
not to apply the first-to-file rule. The Defendants have
demonstrated that similar issues may arise in both this case and
the Tichy action, but they have failed to show any substantial
likelihood of conflicting rulings.  

Whether this case should be transferred pursuant to Section
1404(a)

Focusing on the Tichy action already pending in the transferee
court, Defendants assert Section 1404(a) also calls for transfer to
the Northern District of Illinois. The Magistrate Judge found the
four private interest factors neutral and two of the four public
interest factors neutral. She found the public interest factor
regarding court congestion weighs against transfer and the public
interest factor regarding local interest weighs in favor of
transfer. Defendants object to the Magistrate Judge's conclusions
on the following three factors.

Cost of attendance for the parties and witnesses

Defendants and Plaintiffs both point out the headquarters of
Plaintiffs, Defendants and key third parties (i.e., Expedia and
Google) are scattered throughout the country. Plaintiffs argued,
and the Magistrate Judge agreed, the Northern District of Illinois
is no more convenient than this Court with respect to witness
travel given the wide geographical distribution of potential party
and non-party witnesses.

In their objections, Defendants assert the Magistrate Judge's
analysis of the convenience of witnesses factor failed to account
for the fact that without transfer trial witnesses will be forced
to travel twice to appear in court in two different districts. In
their response to the objections, Plaintiffs assert witnesses will
still have to travel twice if this matter were transferred and the
two cases continue on separate tracks.

As an initial matter, regardless of how the cases might be handled
in the event this case were transferred, the fact remains that
Defendants have failed to identify any specific party or non-party
witnesses who would be inconvenienced by retaining venue in this
Court. As stated by the Magistrate Judge, the Court has no
information on who any of the eight defendant's relevant witnesses
may be, where they might be located, or any evidence on which to
assess their convenience with respect to this transfer analysis.  

As exemplified in several recent opinions from within the Eastern
District of Texas, specifically identifying witnesses to testify is
required for the Court to perform a proper convenience analysis.  

Here, Defendants have not identified any specific witnesses, either
before the Magistrate Judge or in their objections to the R&R. Nor
have Defendants provided any evidence that any employees will
likely provide testimony that will be relevant at trial in this
case.

Even ignoring this failure, the Court agrees with the Magistrate
Judge that this factor is neutral. Defendants failed to explain
their position that witnesses would only be required to travel to a
single trial, likely because there is no plausible reason to
believe the two cases could be tried in a single trial. Moreover,
it is pure speculation that the cases would or could be
consolidated for pre-trial purposes, especially as Tichy will not
complete class certification discovery and briefing until September
2020.

Defendants have failed to show that transferring this case to the
Northern District of Illinois would actually be more convenient for
any witnesses.

All other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive

Defendants object to the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that this
factor is neutral.

Throughout the briefing on their motion and in their objections,
Defendants rely almost entirely on judicial economy (and the
pendency of the Tichy action in Illinois), which is an aspect of
the fourth private catch-all factor of other practical problems
that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive, to
meet their burden of demonstrating that the Northern District of
Illinois is a clearly more convenient venue. Defendants assert this
action and the Tichy action are similar actions which require
similar discovery from overlapping witnesses and involve
substantially similar issues regarding the alleged conspiracy.
According to Defendants, the risk of inconsistent rulings in
separate districts concerning common issues is significant and
weighs heavily in favor of transfer.

Although not an enumerated factor, judicial economy can be
considered when determining whether it is appropriate to transfer a
case in the interest of justice.  

The Magistrate Judge was not persuaded that this case and the Tichy
action involve precisely the same issues so that allowing the two
cases to proceed in different district courts would lead to the
wastefulness of time, energy and money that Section 1404(a) was
designed to prevent. Considering that transfer can often disrupt
and stall litigation, increasing costs and adding years to the time
of final resolution of the dispute as well as the procedural and
substantive differences between this case and the Tichy action, the
Magistrate Judge agreed with Plaintiffs that a transfer would not
render the trial of this case more easy, expeditious, and
inexpensive.

In their objections, Defendants assert as follows: (1) forcing
identical discovery to proceed on two tracks is antithetical to
judicial economy and (2) requiring resolution of the core question
of conspiracy by two different courts creates a risk of
inconsistent results, adverse to the interest of justice. The
benefits courts are attempting to actualize in keeping related
cases in the same district include the ability to save time, energy
and money.  

The Court is not convinced any of these types of benefits would be
realized if this case were transferred to the Northern District of
Illinois. Between the two cases, there is no reason to expect the
parties would be required to engage in joint discovery, and it is
implausible that the cases would be tried before a single jury. In
short, Defendants have not persuaded the Court that the Northern
District of Illinois would consolidate or coordinate this case with
the putative class action that has already been pending for over
one year.

Administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion

In addition to the statistics provided by Plaintiffs, scheduling
orders have now been entered in both cases that establish this case
will proceed to trial earlier in this district. The Court has set
this case for trial in October 2020, but the Tichy action does not
have a trial date. The parties informed the Court at the hearing
that the briefing on class certification in the Tichy action is
scheduled to end around the same time as the trial date in this
case. Considering this, and further considering the statistics that
show that a trial would occur significantly earlier if the case
proceeds in the Eastern District of Texas, this factor weighs
heavily against transfer. Accordingly, Defendants have failed to
carry their burden to show that the Northern District of Illinois
is clearly more convenient than this forum.

The full-text copy of the District Court's August 29, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y664ydkj from Leagle.com.

Travelpass Group LLC, Partner Fusion Inc & Reservation Counter LLC,
Plaintiffs, represented by Christopher W. Patton --
cpatton@lynnllp.com -- Lynn Pinker Cox & Hurst, LLP, Jared Daniel
Eisenberg -- jeisenberg@lynnllp.com -- Lynn Pinker Cox & Hurst LLP,
Jason H. Kim -- jkim@schneiderwallace.com -- Schneider Wallace
Cottrell Konecky Wotkyns LLP, Jeremy Alan Fielding --
jfielding@lynnllp.com -- Lynn Pinker Cox & Hurst LLP, Ruben Alan
Garcia -- rgarcia@lynnllp.com -- Lynn Pinker Cox & Hurst LLP, Todd
Schneider -- tschneider@schneiderwallace.com -- Schneider Wallace
Cottrell Konecky Wotkyns LLP & Christopher John Schwegmann --
cjs@lynnllp.com -- Lynn Pinker Cox & Hurst LLP.

Caesars Entertainment Corporation, Defendant, represented by Lezlie
Madden -- lmadden@cozen.com -- Cozen O'Connor, Aaron S. Lukas --
alukas@cozen.com -- Cozen O'Connor, David Reichenberg --
dreichenberg@cozen.com -- Cozen O'Connor, David Zerhusen, Cozen
O'Connor, Jennifer Haltom Doan -- jdoan@haltomdoan.com -- Haltom &
Doan, Ty William Wilson, The Davis Firm, PC & William Ellsworth
Davis, III, The Davis Firm, PC, 1 Bull Street, Suite 305, Savannah,
Georgia 31401

Choice Hotels International Inc, Defendant, represented by Maria
Wyckoff Boyce -- maria.boyce@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US
LLP, Jennifer Haltom Doan -- jdoan@haltomdoan.com -- Haltom & Doan,
Justin W. Bernick -- justin.bernick@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan
Lovells US LLP & Michael E. Jones, Potter Minton, a Professional
Corporation, 500 Plaza Tower 110 N. College Avenue, Tyler, TX
75702


CALSONIC KANSEI: AC Systems Price Fixing Settlement Approved
------------------------------------------------------------
Freed Kanner London & Millen LLC; Kohn, Swift & Graf, P.C.; Preti,
Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, LLP; and Spector Roseman & Kodroff,
P.C. ("Settlement Class Counsel") on Aug. 12 disclosed that the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
Southern Division ("Court") has approved the following announcement
of proposed class action settlements with the Calsonic Defendants,
DENSO Defendants, MAHLE Behr Defendants and Panasonic Defendants
(collectively "Settling Defendants").  The settlements resolve
allegations against the Settling Defendants that they conspired to
raise, fix, maintain, and/or stabilize prices, rig bids, and
allocate markets and customers for Air Conditioning Systems sold in
the United States, in violation of federal antitrust laws.

The settlements affect those who purchased Air Conditioning Systems
in the United States between January 1, 2001 and February 14, 2017
directly from any one of the following entities (or depending on
the specific settlement agreements, their parents, subsidiaries,
affiliates, and joint ventures): Calsonic Kansei Corp.;
CalsonicKansei North America, Inc.; DENSO Corporation; DENSO
International America, Inc.; MAHLE Behr Gmbh & Co. KG; MAHLE Behr
USA Inc.; Mitsubishi Heavy Industries America, Inc.; Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries Climate Control, Inc.; Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries, Ltd.; Panasonic Corp.; Panasonic Corp. of North
America; Sanden Automotive Climate Systems Corp.; Sanden Automotive
Components Corp.; Sanden Corp.; Sanden International (U.S.A.) Inc.;
Showa Aluminum Corp. of America; Showa Denko K.K.; Valeo Climate
Control Corp; Valeo Electrical Systems, Inc.; Valeo Inc.; Valeo
Japan Co., Ltd.; Valeo S.A.; Behr GmbH; Keihin Corp.; and Nichirin
Co., Ltd.

A hearing will be held on November 5, 2019, at 2:00 p.m., before
the Honorable Marianne O. Battani, United States District Judge, at
the Theodore Levin United States Courthouse, 231 West Lafayette
Boulevard, Detroit, MI 48226, Courtroom 250, for the purpose of
determining whether the proposed settlements with the Calsonic
Defendants, DENSO Defendants, MAHLE Behr Defendants and Panasonic
Defendants totaling $14.17 million should be approved by the Court
as fair, reasonable and adequate and whether the Court should
approve Settlement Class Counsel's request for an award of
attorneys' fees and reimbursement of litigation costs and
expenses.

A Notice of Proposed Settlements (the "Notice") was mailed to
potential Settlement Class members on or about August 8, 2019. The
Notice describes the litigation and options available to Settlement
Class members with respect to the Calsonic, DENSO, MAHLE Behr and
Panasonic settlements in more detail.  The Notice also explains
what steps a Settlement Class Member must take to (1) object to any
or all of the settlements or (2) request exclusion from one or more
of the settlement classes.  The Notice and other important
documents related to the Settlements can be accessed at
www.AutoPartsAntitrustLitigation.com/AC or by calling
1-888-737-9549, or writing to Air Conditioning Systems Direct
Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, P.O. Box 2530, Portland, OR
97208-2530. [GN]


CANADA GOOSE: Cheng Files Suit Over Share Price Drop
----------------------------------------------------
LI HONG CHENG, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. CANADA GOOSE HOLDINGS INC., DANI REISS,
JONATHAN SINCLAIR, and JOHN BLACK, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-08204 (S.D. N.Y., Sept. 3, 2019) is a federal securities
class action on behalf of a class consisting of all persons other
than Defendants who purchased or otherwise acquired Canada Goose
securities between March 16, 2017 and August 1, 2019, both dates
inclusive, seeking to recover damages caused by Defendants'
violations of the federal securities laws and to pursue remedies
under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, against the Company and
certain of its top officials.

The Company began trading on the New York Stock Exchange on March
16, 2017, following its initial public offering. On November 2,
2017, the non-profit organization People for the Ethical Treatment
of Animals ("PETA") issued a press release alleging that Canada
Goose suppliers used unethical measures to obtain the down and fur
used in creating the Company's clothing merchandise. The PETA Press
Release also stated that PETA had issued a complaint to the FTC
regarding these practices because the Company represented in
communications and promotional materials that its clothing was
produced with down and fur from sources that treated the animals
used in sourcing those materials ethically and humanely. On this
news, Canada Goose's stock price fell $0.70 per share, or roughly
3.27%, to close at $20.72 per share on November 2, 2017.
Nevertheless, even after the PETA Press Release, Canada Goose
continued to represent that the down and fur used in producing its
clothing products were collected using humane and ethical
practices.

Finally, on August 1, 2019, the New York Post published an article
entitled "Canada Goose pulls claims about its 'ethical' treatment
of animals". According to the New York Post Article, Canada Goose
had abandoned its claims of ethical treatment of animals used in
making its winter jackets and clothing in response to the FTC's
regulatory review. The New York Post Article also reported that
Canada Goose had removed from its website previous claims that the
Company sourced coyote fur from animals in overpopulated areas, as
well as videos purporting to show where Canada Goose obtained down
for its parkas. The New York Post article also reported PETA's
assertion that its complaint to the FTC in 2017 had precipitated
the FTC's investigation into Canada Goose for potential violations
of the FTC Act. On this news, Canada Goose's stock price fell $2.21
per share, or over 4.7%, to close at $44.58 per share on August 1,
2019.

Throughout the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and
misleading statements regarding the Company's business, operational
and compliance policies. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Canada
Goose sourced the down and fur used in its clothing products in a
way that treated animals in an unethical and inhumane manner; (ii)
Canada Goose was thus non-compliant with relevant FTC regulations
pertaining to false advertising with respect to its sourcing
practices; (iii) accordingly, Canada Goose was the subject of an
ongoing FTC investigation regarding false advertising; and (iv) as
a result, the Company's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

As a result of Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages, says the complaint.

Plaintiff acquired Canada Goose securities at artificially inflated
prices during the Class Period.

Canada Goose was founded in 1957 and is headquartered in Toronto,
Canada. The Company designs, manufactures, and sells premium
outdoor apparel for men, women, youth, children, and babies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
     J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
     POMERANTZ LLP
     600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
     New York, NY 10016
     Phone: (212) 661-1100
     Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
     Email: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
            ahood@pomlaw.com

          - and -

     Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
     POMERANTZ LLP
     10 South La Salle Street, Suite 3505
     Chicago, IL 60603
     Phone: (312) 377-1181
     Facsimile: (312) 377-1184
     Email: pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com

          - and -

     Brian Schall, Esq.
     Rina Restaino, Esq.
     Kate Kearney, Esq.
     THE SCHALL LAW FIRM
     1880 Century Park East, Suite 404
     Los Angeles, CA 90067
     Phone: (424) 303-1964
     Email: brian@schallfirm.com
            rina@schallfirm.com
            kate@schallfirm.com


CAPITAL ONE: Faces Bowen et al Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Capital One, N.A. et
al. The case is captioned as Cindy Bowen and Diane Dillashaw, on
behalf of themselves and a class of all others similarly situated,
the Plaintiffs, vs. Capital One Financial Corporation; Capital One,
N.A.; and Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-07917-JGK (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 23, 2019). The suit seeks $5
million in damages. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge John G.
Koeltl.

Capital One operates as a bank. The bank offers financial products
and services such as personal and business checking, savings
accounts, investment, mortgages, issues credit card, business
loans, and commercial banking solutions. Capital One serves
consumers, small businesses, and commercial clients worldwide.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Courtney Elizabeth Maccarone, Esq.
          LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP
          55 Broadway 10th Floor
          New York, NY 10006
          Telephone: (212) 363-7500
          Facsimile: (212) 363-7171
          E-mail: cmaccarone@zlk.com

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          Peter Manley Starr, Esq.
          Peter Joseph Isajiw, Esq.
          Robert Warren Gray, Jr., Esq.
          KING & SPALDING LLP
          1180 Peachtree St. NE, Suite 1600
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone: (404) 572-2767
          E-mail: peter.starr@davispolk.com
                  pisajiw@kslaw.com
                  bgray@kslaw.com

CASA SYSTEMS: Panther Says Registration Statement Misleading
------------------------------------------------------------
PANTHER PARTNERS, INC., Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. JERRY GUO, WEIDONG CHEN,
GARY D. HALL, LUCY XIE, JOE TIBBETS, BILL STYSLINGER, BRUCE R.
EVANS, CASA SYSTEMS, INC., MORGAN STANLEY & CO., LLC, MACQUARIE
CAPITAL (USA) INC., BARCLAYS CAPITAL INC., STIFEL, NICOLAUS &
COMPANY, INCORPORATED, WILLIAM BLAIR & COMPANY, L.L.C., RAYMOND
JAMES & ASSOCIATES, INC., NORTHLAND SECURITIES, INC., DANIEL S.
MEAD and ABRAHAM PUCHERIL, the Defendants, Case No. 654585/2019
(N.Y. Sup., Aug. 13, 2019), asserts strict liability claims under
Sections 11, 12(a)(2) and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 against
Casa, the Company's underwriters for the SPO and certain officers
and directors of Casa. The Plaintiff brings this securities class
action on behalf of all persons who purchased Casa common stock
directly in the Company's public stock offering that closed on
April 30, 2018 (the SPO).

According to the complaint, the Underwriter Defendants conducted
the SPO, drafted the Registration Statement, disseminated the
statements alleged to be false and misleading, and solicited
purchasers of Casa's common stock. The Underwriter Defendants
delivered the shares in the SPO against payment and the shares
trade on NASDAQ.

Panther Partners, Inc., purchased shares of the Company's common
stock directly in the SPO, and has been damaged thereby.

The Defendants were key members of the SPO working group and
executives of Casa who pitched investors to purchase the shares
sold in the SPO. The Defendants, other than Pucheril, signed the
Registration Statement and, as directors and/or executive officers
of the Company, participated in the solicitation and sale of the
Company's common stock to investors in the SPO for their own
financial benefit and the financial benefit of Casa. Defendant Casa
and the Individual Defendants are strictly liable for the false and
misleading statements made in the Registration Statement, the
lawsuit says.

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Samuel H. Rudman, Esq.
          James I. Jaconette, Esq.
          Brian E. Cochran, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          58 South Service Road, Suite 200
          Melville, NY 11747
          Telephone: 631 367-7100
          Facsimile: 631 367 1173
          E-mail: srudman@rgrdlaw.com
                  jamesj@rgrdlaw.com
                  bcochran@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          Jack G. Fruchter, Esq.
          ABRAHAM, FRUCHTER & TWERSKY, LLP
          One Penn Plaza, Suite 2805
          New York, NY 10119
          Telephone: 212 279-5050
          Facsimile: 212 279-3655
          E-mail: jfruchter@aftlaw.com

CBC RESTAURANT: Faces Jones Suit Over BIPA Violation
----------------------------------------------------
EBONY JONES, on behalf of herself and all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. CBC RESTAURANT CORP. d/b/a CORNER BAKERY
CAFE Defendant, Case No. 2019CH10119 (Circuit Ct., Cook Cty., Ill.,
Aug. 30, 2019) is a Class Action Complaint against Defendant for
violations of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act.

Starting in 2017, Defendant required employees to use a biometric
time clock system to record their time worked. The Defendant
required Plaintiff and other employees to scan their fingerprints
in Defendant's biometric time clock each time they started and
finished working, including punching in and out for lunch breaks.
In enacting the Biometric Information Privacy Act, the Illinois
legislature recognized that biologically unique identifiers, like
fingerprints, can never be changed when compromised, and thus
subject a victim of identity theft to heightened risk of loss. As a
result, Illinois restricted private entities, like Defendant, from
collecting, storing, using, or transferring a person's biometric
identifiers and information without adhering to strict
informed-consent procedures established by the Biometric
Information Privacy Act.

The complaint alleges that the Defendant collected, stored, used,
and transferred the unique biometric fingerprint identifiers, or
information derived from those identifiers, of Plaintiff and others
similarly situated without following the detailed requirements of
the Biometric Information Privacy Act, and compromised the privacy
and security of the biometric identifiers and information of
Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a cashier at its restaurant
located at 200 N. LaSalle in Chicago, Illinois from approximately
mid-2012 to August 2018.

Defendant is a casual dining restaurant chain.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Douglas M. Werman, Esq.
     Maureen A. Salas, Esq.
     Zachary C. Flowerree, Esq.
     Sarah J. Arendt, Esq.
     Jacqueline H. Villanueva, Esq.
     Werman Salas P.C.
     77 West Washington, Suite 1402
     Chicago, IL 60602
     Phone: (312) 419-1008
     Email: dwerman@flsalaw.com
            msalas@flsalaw.com
            zflowerree @flsalaw.com
            sarendt@flsalaw.com


CLEVELAND, OH: Appeals Court Affirms $4MM Final Judgment in Lycan
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga County,
issued an Opinion affirming the Trial Court's decision awarding
Final Judgment to the Class in the case captioned JANINE LYCAN, ET
AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, v. CITY OF CLEVELAND,
ET AL., Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

In this consolidated appeal, both the
plaintiffs-appellees/cross-appellants, Janine Lycan, et al. and
defendant-appellant/cross-appellee, the city of Cleveland, appeal
the trial court's decision awarding final judgment to the class in
the amount of $4,121,185.89.

Cleveland Codified Ordinances (CCO) 413.031 imposes liability on
the owner of a vehicle committing a red-light or speeding offense.
The ordinance formerly defined vehicle owner as the person or
entity identified by the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles, or
registered with any other State vehicle registration office, as the
registered owner of a vehicle.

In their complaint, plaintiffs contended that Cleveland had no
authority under the former version of CCO 413.031 to collect fines
from plaintiffs as vehicle lessees. As relief, plaintiffs sought
the following: (1) disgorgement, under an unjust-enrichment theory,
of fines paid to the city (2) an injunction preventing Cleveland
from enforcing the ordinance against vehicle lessees and (3)
declaratory relief.

The Plaintiffs also filed a motion for class certification.

In Dickson & Campbell, L.L.C. v. Cleveland, 181 Ohio App.3d 238,
2009-Ohio-738, 908 N.E.2d 964,   this court concluded, based on the
plain meaning of vehicle owner, that former CCO 413.031 did not
impose liability on vehicle lessees. In light of Dickson &
Campbell, the City subsequently amended CCO 413.031, effective
March 11, 2009. The ordinance now states that a vehicle owner
includes the lessee of a leased or rented vehicle.

The trial court granted Cleveland's motion for judgment on the
pleadings, finding that plaintiffs had waived the right to pursue
judicial remedies by paying their fines and failing to appeal their
citations as permitted by CCO 413.0319(k). In the same order, the
trial court denied plaintiffs' class-certification motion.

Plaintiffs' appeal to the Eighth District (Lycan I)

Plaintiffs appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals. The
appeals court affirmed the trial court's judgment dismissing
plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief, finding that an injunction
would serve no purpose because the offending ordinance has since
been repealed.  

But the appeals court reversed the trial court's dismissal of
plaintiffs' claims for restitution and declaratory relief. The
court found that plaintiffs' failure to challenge the fines before
payment did not necessarily foreclose plaintiffs from proving a set
of facts under which it would be unjust for Cleveland to retain the
paid fines. The appeals court also reversed the denial of
plaintiffs' class-certification motion and remanded for further
proceedings on that question.

On remand, and after completion of discovery, the trial court
addressed the parties' competing motions for summary judgment on
plaintiffs' unjust-enrichment claim. In support of its motion,
Cleveland argued that the administrative process provided an
adequate remedy to those receiving civil notices of liability and
that the doctrine of res judicata therefore precluded review of the
class's unjust-enrichment claim.

The trial court granted partial summary judgment for plaintiffs.
The court's entry consisted of two lines. The first line stated
that plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment is granted.
The second line of the order set a hearing date on plaintiffs'
motion for class certification and appointment of class counsel.

Cleveland's appeal to the Eighth District (Lycan II)

Cleveland's first assignment of error addressed the February 26,
2013 class-certification order and raised two arguments: that
plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements of Civ.R. 23 and that
res judicata precluded class relief. Cleveland's second assignment
of error alluded to the February 8, 2013 partial-summary-judgment
order. However, Cleveland did not address the summary-judgment
order in its brief.

The court found that plaintiffs' failure to challenge the fines
before payment did not necessarily foreclose plaintiffs from
proving a set of facts under which it would be unjust for Cleveland
to retain the paid fines.   The appeals court also reversed the
denial of plaintiffs' class-certification motion and remanded for
further proceedings on that question.

The court concluded that plaintiffs' failure to pursue
administrative relief did not bar plaintiffs' class action because
there was never an actual judgment' rendered by a court, or
administrative tribunal, of competent jurisdiction.

The court concluded that fairness and justice would not support the
application of res judicata in this case. The court then proceeded
to address Cleveland's challenge to class certification. The court
concluded that the class met all requirements under Civ.R. 23 and
affirmed the trial court's class-certification order.

The City appealed from Lycan II to the Ohio Supreme Court in Lycan
III. The Ohio Supreme Court accepted review on the following
proposition of law:

Cleveland Codified Ordinance 413.031 provides an adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law to those receiving civil notices of
liability by way of the administrative proceedings set forth in the
ordinance. Individuals who receive a civil citation issued pursuant
to a local ordinance and who knowingly decline to take advantage of
an available adequate remedy at law are precluded by res judicata
from subsequently acting as class representatives and presenting
equitable claims predicated in unjust enrichment.

In reaching its conclusion, the Lycan III court acknowledged that:
the parties do not dispute that the order that Cleveland appeals
here, the trial court's February 26, 2013 class-certification order
is a final, appealable order.

Nor does the trial court's February 8, 2013 entry granting partial
summary judgment provide a basis for reviewing the res judicata
question. The Court therefore declines to address the
partial-summary-judgment order in this appeal.

The matter was then remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.

The class filed a motion for implementation order requiring the
City to bear the administrative expenses in concluding the class
action proceeding.

Kahn appeared at the final hearing in August 2018. The parties
entered certain stipulations and presented evidence on contested
issues. The City did not dispute the class's satisfaction of the
class administration orders or the methodologies for calculating
the restitution award. The class asked the court for an additional
$1,841,563.51 to the disgorgement order, as an estimate of the
time-value of the funds that were wrongfully withheld.

In its judgment entry, the court resolved all remaining issues and
ordered the City to pay $4,121,185.89 as restitution for the civil
fines and penalties that were wrongfully collected and withheld by
the City. The court further found that interest based upon the
reasonably anticipated gains from these misappropriated funds is
not recoverable in this action.

It is from this order that the City appeals and the class
cross-appeals, raising the following assignments of error for
review:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the class and
issuing a final judgment and award in favor of the class as the
members of the class did not participate in the administrative
hearing process established by CCO 413.031 and therefore failed to
exhaust the administrative process available to them. Members of
the class have no right to the judicial remedy afforded to them by
the trial court as a result of their failure.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the class and
issuing a final judgment and award in favor of the class as the
members of the class lacked standing to seek judicial remedy.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THREE

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the class and
issuing a final judgment and award in favor of the class as the
members of the class are barred from proceeding by principles of
res judicata and collateral estoppel.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR FOUR

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the class and
issuing a final judgment and award in favor of the class given the
established unclean hands of each of the members of the class. The
judgment and award of the trial court violated applicable
principles of equity.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR FIVE

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the class and
issuing a final judgment and award in favor of the class of
non-owners where the payments by the class, were mistakes of law
and their voluntary payments were not subject to recoupment.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR SIX

The trial court erred in ordering [the City] to pay the fees and
expenses incurred by BrownGreer as the appointed claims
administrator in this matter.

CROSS-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The trial court erred as a matter of law, and otherwise committed
an abuse of discretion, in determining that an award of the
time-value of the wrongfully collected funds is not recoverable in
an action for equitable relief.

In the first assignment of error, the City argues the class failed
to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing its class
action. The City, relying on Walker,raised this argument in its
motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court.
The Court agrees with the trial court's decision.

In San Allen, Inc. v. Buehrer, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99786,
2014-Ohio-2071, the Court acknowledged that a party must generally
`exhaust any administrative remedy that could provide him with the
relief he seeks' before seeking judicial intervention. But, we also
found that where an administrative agency has no power to afford
the relief sought or an administrative appeal would otherwise be
futile, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not prerequisite
to seeking judicial relief.

In the instant case, the class includes all persons who were not a
vehicle owner under CCO 413.031, but were issued notice of citation
and/or assessed fine under that ordinance, prior to March 11, 2009,
by the City.

The deposition testimony of Administrator Vargas, the City's
then-Administrator of the Parking Violations Bureau and Photo
Safety Division, revealed that any administrative remedy the class
would have availed themselves to would have been futile.  

In light of the foregoing, it appears that the class was not
afforded an adequate forum to dispute any citation issued under CCO
413.031. Therefore, any participation in the City's administrative
hearing process would have been futile. As a result, the class was
not required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to pursuing
the current judicial remedy.

The first assignment of error is overruled.

In the second assignment of error, the City argues the class lacks
standing. In Lycan II, the Court specifically addressed the City's
standing argument and found:

The second requirement for class certification is that the class
representative must have proper standing, which requires that the
plaintiff must possess the same interest and suffer the same injury
shared by all members of the class that he or she seeks to
represent.

The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed this finding in Lycan III when our
decision to certify the class was upheld. In fact, the City
specifically did not challenge this court's conclusion in Lycan II
regarding class action certification. The Lycan III court noted
that the City does not challenge the Eighth District's conclusions
regarding whether the proposed class met the requirements of Civ.R.
23.  

Under the law of the case doctrine, the decision of a reviewing
court in a case remains the law of that case on legal questions
involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both trial
and reviewing levels. This rule is necessary to ensure consistency
of results in a case, to avoid endless litigation by settling the
issues, and to preserve the structure of superior and inferior
courts as designed by the Ohio Constitution. Therefore, the Court
is bound by the law of the case in Lycan II and the Ohio Supreme
Court's decision in Lycan III and cannot address the City's
standing argument.

The second assignment of error is overruled.

In the third assignment of error, the City argues the class is
barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel. The Court notes that
in Lycan II the City appealed the trial court's decision granting
the class certification. The City then made the deliberate decision
to submit a single proposition of law to the Ohio Supreme Court in
Lycan III that focused only upon res judicata. The Lycan III court
affirmed the Court’s decision with regard to the class
certification and vacated our decision in Lycan II with respect to
res judicata.  The court found that the Court improperly ruled on
the question of res judicata, because the trial court did not
decide that question in a final, appealable order. As a result, the
matter was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Indeed, such arguments are barred by the doctrine of waiver for
failure to raise these arguments before the trial court. Therefore,
based on the foregoing, the City waived its res judicata argument
and cannot now argue, for the first time on appeal, that the class
is barred by res judicata.

The third assignment of error is overruled.

In the fourth assignment of error, the City argues the class has
unclean hands because the class members violated the City's traffic
laws.

With an unclean hands argument, the City must demonstrate that the
class engaged in reprehensible conduct with respect to the subject
matter of the action.

In Dickson & Campbell, the Court concluded that lessee of the
vehicle cannot be held liable under CCO 413.031 as the vehicle
owner. Because the class did not violate CCO 413.031, the class
could not have engaged in reprehensible conduct. As a result, it
cannot have unclean hands.

The fourth assignment of error is overruled.

In the fifth assignment of error, the City argues that no recovery
is available for the class members because they voluntarily paid
their civil penalties.

Here, Administrator Vargas's deposition testimony revealed that if
a citation was not paid within 27 days, a delinquency notice was
issued automatically that imposed an additional $20 penalty. Three
weeks after that, another notice followed and an additional $40 was
assessed. Administrator Vargas further testified that when the
recipients refused to pay, collection agencies were used to place
phone calls and send collection letters. The debts were referred to
credit reporting offices. In extreme cases, vehicles would even be
impounded. Since the administrative hearing process could not be
completed before the additional penalties were imposed as required
by CCO 413.031, the nonvehicle owners had to either pay the ticket
or incur the penalties. At the time, there was no provision in the
ordinance placing a hold on the penalties if administrative review
was sought.

In Cleveland, the City successfully argued that the voluntary
payment doctrine applies when the plaintiff made the payments at
issue with full knowledge of the relevant facts. In the instant
case, there is no evidence establishing that any of the class
members who paid their tickets understood that the citations to
nonvehicle owners were not subject to CCO 413.031.

Therefore, the fifth assignment of error is overruled.

In the sixth assignment of error, the City challenges the trial
court's decision ordering that the City pay the fees and costs of
the appointed class administrator, BrownGreer. The City argues that
the basis of equity does not favor the City bear the significant
administrative costs associated with notification to the members of
the certified class.

In Rimmer v. CitiFinancial, Inc., 2013-Ohio-5732, 6 N.E.3d 621,
(8th Dist.), this court recognized that a trial court has
discretion to order the defendant (mortgage holder to bear the cost
of notice to the class members. The City argues that Rimmer is
distinguishable because it was not predicated in equity. We find
Rimmer persuasive.

In Rimmer, summary judgment was entered in favor of a class of
mortgagors against the mortgage holder that had violated the law by
failing to enter timely satisfactions of mortgages with the county
recorder.  On appeal, the mortgage holder argued that the trial
court erred by requiring it to pay for the class notice.

After reviewing several authorities, including United States
Supreme Court cases, we recognized that the class typically bears
the costs, but the costs can be shifted to the defendant after
liability has been determined. The Court found that no abuse of
discretion had been committed given that the mortgage holder
possessed the records needed for identifying the class members.  

In the instant case, it was within the trial court's discretion to
order the City to bear the costs incurred by BrownGreer. The trial
court was presented with Administrator Vargas's deposition
testimony, which revealed that the City knowingly exceeded the
authority granted under CCO 413.031 to issue the traffic camera
citations.

Therefore, the sixth assignment of error is overruled.

Judgment is affirmed.

The full-text copy of the Appeals Court's August 29, 2019 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y5887sfu from Leagle.com.

Bashein & Bashein Co., L.P.A., W. Craig Bashein, and John P. Hurst,
50 Public Square
Terminal Tower, 35th Floor, Cleveland, OH 44113; Paul W. Flowers
Co., L.P.A., Paul W. Flowers, and Louis E. Grube, Terminal Tower,
Suite 1910, 50 Public Square, Cleveland, OH 44113; The Dickson
Firm, L.L.C., Blake A. Dickson, 3401 Enterprise Parkway, Suite 420,
Beachwood, OH, 44122 for plaintiffs-appellees/cross-appellants,
Janine Lycan, et al.

Barbara A. Langhenry, Cleveland Director of Law, and Gary S.
Singletary and Craig J. Morice, Assistant Directors of Law, for
defendant-appellant/cross-appellee, City of Cleveland.


CLIME CAPITAL: Settles Class Action for $8.3MM
----------------------------------------------
Karren Vergara, writing for Financial Standard, reports that Clime
Capital has settled a Federal Court class action in principle for
an agreed sum of $8.3 million.

Backed by IMF Bentham, Clime told shareholders it was pleased the
in-principle settlement has been reached with UGL, a firm that
provides engineering, construction, maintenance and asset
management services to the rail, resources and infrastructure
sectors.

Clime alleged between 16 April 2014 and 5 November 2014, UGL
breached its continuous disclosure obligations by not being
transparent about the delays and rising project costs related to
its Ichthys power project.

Further, it claimed UGL engaged in misleading and/or deceptive
conduct, and breached its obligations of the Corporations Act 2001
and the ASX Listing Rules.

Consequently, investors that purchased UGL shares within the claim
period have suffered compensable loss, Clime and IMF said.

IMF said settling is conditional on the parties reaching an
agreement on the deed of settlement, as well as gaining approval
from the Federal Court.

If the settlement becomes unconditional, IMF expects to gain about
$8.3 million, which includes the reimbursement of project costs.

Clime recently made an off-market takeover bid for listed
investment company CBG Capital (CBC).

The merger is anticipated to create a $137.2 million Australian
equities LIC. [GN]


COLLECTO INC: Kim Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Collecto, Inc. The
case is styled as Heesoo Kim individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Collecto, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-05089 (E.D. N.Y., Sept. 6, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Collecto, Inc., doing business as EOS/CCA, Inc., operates as a debt
management and recovery resource company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     David M. Barshay, Esq.
     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     Barshay Sanders, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 281-7601
     Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com
            csanders@barshaysanders.com


COMMUNITY HEALTH: Court Certifies Class in Norfolk Securities Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NORFOLK COUNTY RETIREMENT SYSTEM, individually and on
behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. COMMUNITY HEALTH
SYSTEMS, INC., WAYNE T. SMITH, and LARRY CASH, Defendants, Case No.
3:11-cv-00433 (M.D. Tenn.), Judge Eli Richardson of the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville
Division, granted Lead Plaintiff NYC Funds' Motion for Class
Certification.

The case is a securities class action brought on behalf of all
persons or entities who purchased and/or sold the publicly traded
securities of CHS from July 27, 2006 through Oct. 26, 2011 against
CHS and its senior officers, namely CEO and Chairman of the Board
Wayne T. Smith and CFO and Director W. Larry Cash, for violations
of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
The Lead Plaintiff seeks recovery of monetary damages exceeding
$891 million plus prejudgment interest accruing from the filing of
the initial class action on May 9, 2011.

In May and June 2011, three different shareholders initially filed
putative securities fraud class actions against CHS and certain of
its officers and directors.  On Jan. 3, 2012, Judge John T. Nixon
granted the Lead Plaintiff's motion to consolidate cases, for
appointment as the Lead Plaintiff, and for approval of selection of
the lead counsel, thereby appointing the Lead Plaintiff as the Lead
Plaintiff and the Lead Plaintiff's counsel as the lead counsel.

On July 13, 2012, the Lead Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint.
On Sept. 11, 2012, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
Amended Complaint, which the parties briefed through the end of
January 2013 and again from December 2013 through June 2014.

On Aug. 20, 2015, Magistrate Judge Joe Brown granted the Lead
Plaintiff's oral motion to file an amended complaint to take
account of developments in the law, thereby mooting the pending
motion to dismiss.  The Lead Plaintiff, in turn, filed its First
Amended and Consolidated Class Action Complaint, i.e., the FAC.
The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss that complaint.

Judge Kevin Sharp granted the Defendants' motion and dismissed the
case with prejudice on June 16, 2016.  The Order was appealed, and
the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded.  The Defendants filed a
petition for an en banc review, which was denied, as was the
Defendants' subsequent petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari.

Separately, on Feb. 9, 2018, the Defendants filed a renewed partial
motion to dismiss.  Chief Judge Waverly Crenshaw denied the partial
motion to dismiss on Sept. 24, 2018.

On May 7, 2018, the Lead Plaintiff filed a Motion to Certify Class.
The case was transferred to the undersigned District Judge on Oct.
19, 2018.

The Lead Plaintiff now seeks certification of a class consisting of
all persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired the
publicly traded common stock of CHS from July 27, 2006 through Oct.
26, 2011, inclusive, and who were damaged thereby.  The Lead
Plaintiff also seeks an order appointing the Lead Plaintiff as the
Class Representative and Lowey Dannenberg, P.C. as the Class
Counsel.

Although the Lead Plaintiff retains the initial burden of
demonstrating compliance with the provisions of Rule 23(a) and Rule
23(b)(3), the Defendants challenge compliance with these rules only
in two respects: whether the Lead Plaintiff has typical claims, and
whether the Lead Plaintiff is an adequate class representative.
Accordingly, the Court will first consider Defendants' two
objections and then, if necessary, consider whether Lead Plaintiff
has carried its burden in all other respects.

Judge Richardson finds that the Defendants have failed to show any
degree of likelihood that the defense will play a significant role
at trial.  Accordingly, the Lead Plaintiff's motion for class
certification will not be denied based on the Defendants'
unique-defense argument.

The Lead Plaintiff otherwise meets the typicality and adequacy
requirements.  he Lead Plaintiff satisfies the typicality
requirement because all members of the class were victims of an
alleged fraud on the market throughout the Proposed Class Period
and sustained damages as a result.  The Lead Plaintiff also
establishes the adequacy requirement.  The Lead Plaintiff's
interests are neither antagonistic to nor in conflict with the
interests of other members of the proposed class.  The Lead
Plaintiff also has a significant financial stake in the litigation
and undisputedly has retained qualified attorneys with considerable
experience in securities class actions and complex litigation.

The Lead Plaintiff also satisfies the numerosity requirement.  Rule
23(a)(1) requires that the proposed class be so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable.  The Lead Plaintiff states
that while the exact number of persons who acquired CHS stock
during the Proposed Class Period is not known, at least 834 major
institutional investors owned CHS common stock during the Proposed
Class Period.

Finally, the Lead Plaintiff satisfies the commonality requirement.
It is clear that the Lead Plaintiff's claims depend upon a common
contention of such a nature that is capable of class-wide
resolution, i.e., a determination on the previously discussed
allegations will resolve in one stroke issues that are central to
the validity of each claim.  Accordingly, the Judge finds that the
Lead Plaintiff has satisfied the four factors under Rule 23(a) for
class certification.

In addition to meeting Rule 23(a)'s requirements, the Judge finds
that the Lead Plaintiff also satisfies Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance
and superiority requirements.  Common questions of law and fact
predominate because the putative class is entitled to a presumption
of reliance under Basic's fraud-on-the-market theory and Affiliated
Ute's omission doctrine.

Because the Judge finds that all requirements for class
certification are satisfied, he will grant the Lead Plaintiff's
motion.  The question remains as to whether the class should be
certified precisely as the Lead Plaintiff would have it, or whether
instead whether the class definition should be modified.

The Judge believes that the Lead Plaintiff likely would not be an
adequate representative of the additional class members, asthe
Lead Plaintiff well may focus heavily on the fact of, and resulting
harm from, the prior withholding of information that was revealed
on April 11, 2011; any such focus would likely be to the detriment
of the proposed additional class members.  Accordingly, in his
discretion, the JUdge will carve out those who first purchased CHS
stock after April 8, 2011.

Thus, investors who purchased CHS stock on or before April 8, 2011
may bring claims based on events that transpired through Oct. 26,
2011 (to the extent they held their stock until October).  But
investors who did not purchase on or before April 8, 2011 will be
excluded from the class based on Rule 23 consideration.

Finally, the Judge has no reason to believe that Lowey Dannenberg
will be unable to commit the resources necessary to represent the
class.  Therefore, because he finds Lowey Dannenberg clearly
satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(g), he will appoint Lowey
Dannenberg as the Class Counsel.

Judge Richardson granted the Lead Plaintiff's motion for class
certification.  He certified the Class of all persons and entities
who purchased the publicly traded common stock of CHS from July 27,
2006 through April 8, 2011, inclusive, and who were damaged
thereby.  Excluded from the Class are Defendants, the officers and
directors of the company, at all relevant times, members of their
immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs,
successors or assigns and any entities in which Defendants have or
had a controlling interest.

The Judge appointed NYC Funds as the Class Representative, and
Lowey Dannenberg as the Class Counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2019 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/LDXCmp from Leagle.com.

Norfolk County Retirement System, Individually and on Behalf of all
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher J.
Keller -- ckeller@labaton.com -- Labaton Sucharow LLP, James Gerard
Stranch, IV -- gstranch@branstetterlaw.com -- Branstetter, Stranch
& Jennings, PLLC, Rachel A. Avan -- ravan@labaton.com -- Labaton
Sucharow LLP & William Michael Hamilton --
mhamilton@provostumphrey.com -- Provost, Umphrey Law Firm, LLP.

General Retirement System of the City of Detroit, Plaintiff,
represented by David S. Hagy -- dhagy@hagylaw.com -- David S. Hagy,
Attorney at Law.

NYC Funds, Plaintiff, represented by Barbara J. Hart --
bhart@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg, PC, David Harrison --
dharrision@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg, PC, Scott Vincent Papp --
spapp@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg, PC, Thomas Skelton, Lowey
Dannenberg, PC & William Michael Hamilton, Provost, Umphrey Law
Firm, LLP.

Alberta Investment Management Corp & State-Boston Retirement
System, Plaintiffs, represented by James Gerard Stranch, IV,
Branstetter, Stranch & Jennings, PLLC.

New York City Employees' Retirement System, New York City Teachers'
Retirement System Variable Annuity Program, New York City Teachers'
Retirement System, New York City Fire Department Pension Fund & New
York City Police Pension Fund, Plaintiffs, represented by Barbara
J. Hart, Lowey Dannenberg, PC & Scott Vincent Papp, Lowey
Dannenberg, PC.

AIMCo/Boston, Consol Plaintiff, represented by James Gerard
Stranch, III, Branstetter, Stranch & Jennings, PLLC & James Gerard
Stranch, IV, Branstetter, Stranch & Jennings, PLLC.

Minneapolis Firefighters' Relief Association, Consol Plaintiff,
represented by Frederic S. Fox -- ffox@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan
Kilsheimer & Fox, LLP, Joel B. Strauss -- strauss@kaplanfox.com --
Kaplan Fox Kilsheimer LLP, Karen Hanson Riebel --
khriebel@locklaw.com -- Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP, Michael K.
Radford, Flynn & Radford, Pamela A. Mayer -- pmayer@kaplanfox.com
-- Kaplan Fox Kilsheimer LLP & Richard A. Lockridge --
lockrra@locklaw.com -- Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP.

De Zheng, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Consol Plaintiff, represented by James Gerard Stranch,
III , Branstetter, Stranch & Jennings, PLLC, Jeffrey A. Berens,
Dyer & Berens LLP & Robert J. Robbins, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP.

Community Health Systems, Inc., Defendant, represented by Alison C.
Barnes -- abarnes@robbinsrussell.com -- Robbins, Russell, Englert,
Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, Elizabeth O. Gonser --
egonser@rwjplc.com -- Riley, Warnock & Jacobson, Gary A. Orseck --
gorseck@robbinsrussell.com -- Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck,
Untereiner & Sauber LLP, John R. Jacobson -- jjacobson@rwjplc.com
-- Riley, Warnock & Jacobson, Matthew Madden --
mmadden@robbinsrussell.com -- Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck,
Untereiner & Sauber LLP, Michael L. Waldman --
mwaldman@robbinsrussell.com -- Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck,
Untereiner & Sauber LLP, Peter Duffy Doyle , Proskauer Rose, LLP,
Seth D. Fier -- sfier@proskauer.com -- Proskauer Rose, LLP & Steven
Allen Riley -- sriley@rwjplc.com -- Riley, Warnock & Jacobson.

Wayne T. Smith & W. Larry Cash, Defendants, represented by Alison
C. Barnes , Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber
LLP, Elizabeth O. Gonser , Riley, Warnock & Jacobson, Gary A.
Orseck , Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber
LLP, John R. Jacobson , Riley, Warnock & Jacobson, Michael L.
Waldman , Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber
LLP, Peter Duffy Doyle , Proskauer Rose, LLP, Seth D. Fier ,
Proskauer Rose, LLP & Steven Allen Riley , Riley, Warnock &
Jacobson.

Thomas Mark Buford, Consol Defendant, represented by James N.
Bowen, Riley, Warnock & Jacobson, John R. Jacobson, Riley, Warnock
& Jacobson, Milton S. McGee, III, Riley, Warnock & Jacobson & Peter
Duffy Doyle , Proskauer Rose, LLP.

Gary D. Newsome, Deponent, represented by Abid R. Qureshi, Latham &
Watkins LLP, Clarence J. Gideon, Jr., Gideon, Cooper & Essary PLC &
Justin B. Carter, Gideon, Cooper & Essary PLC.

Carolyn Lipp, Deponent, represented by Donald W. Davis, Brennan,
Manna & Diamond, LLC & Samuel P. Funk, Sims Funk, PLC.

Edward M. Yarbrough, Non-Party Edward M. Yarbrough, Objector, pro
se.


CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY: Duffy Seeks Unpaid Overtime Under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN DUFFY, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-00184-CRH (D. N.D., Sept. 3, 2019) is a lawsuit brought to
recover unpaid overtime wages and other damages from ConocoPhillips
Company under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Duffy and the other workers like him regularly worked for
ConocoPhillips in excess of 40 hours each week. But these workers
never received overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a
single workweek. Instead of paying overtime as required by the
FLSA, ConocoPhillips improperly classified Duffy and similarly
situated workers as independent contractors and paid them a daily
rate with no overtime compensation. This collective action seeks to
recover the unpaid overtime wages and other damages owed to these
workers, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Duffy worked for ConocoPhillips as a company man from
approximately 2013 until 2018.

ConocoPhillips is an oil and natural gas exploration and production
company operating worldwide and throughout the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
     Andrew Dunlap, Esq.
     JOSEPHSON DUNLAP
     11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
     Houston, TX 77046
     Phone: 713-352-1100
     Facsimile: 713-352-3300
     Email: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
            adunlap@mybackwages.com

          - and -

     Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
     BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
     8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
     Houston, TX 77046
     Phone: (713) 877-8788
     Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
     Email: rburch@brucknerburch.com


CORECIVIC TENNESSEE: Court Acknowledges Settlement Bid Joinder
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order acknowledging Plaintiff Richards'
Joinder in the Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class
Action Settlement in the case captioned  JOSE GONZALEZ, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. CORECIVIC OF TENNESSEE, et al., Defendants. Lead
Case No. 1:16-cv-01891-DAD-JLT, Member Case No.
1:17-cv-01094-DAD-JLT. (E.D. Cal.).

Having consolidated and reassigned cases Gonzalez v. CoreCivic of
Tennessee, LLC, et al., No. 1:16-cv-01891-DAD-JLT and Richards v.
CoreCivic of Tennessee, LLC, No. 1:17-cv-01094-LJO-JLT, and good
cause appearing, this order gives effect to the parties'
stipulation that the plaintiff in Richards joins in the unopposed
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement filed in
Gonzalez.

In addition, pursuant to the parties' stipulation, plaintiff Thomas
Richards' sixth cause of action for violation of the Private
Attorney General Act (PAGA) brought in his first amended complaint
is hereby dismissed without prejudice.

The full-text copy of the District Court's August 29, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y32rgutq from Leagle.com.

Jose Gonzalez, Plaintiff, represented by Peter R. Dion-Kindem --
peter@dion-kindemlaw.com -- Peter R. Dion-Kindem, P.C., Adrian R.
Bacon -- abacon@attorneysforconsumers.com -- Law Offices of Todd M.
Friedman, P.C., Jeff Holmes -- LaborLawCA@gmail.com -- Jeff Holmes,
Esq., Lonnie C. Blanchard, III -- lonnieblanchard@gmail.com -- The
Blanchard Law Group, APC & Todd M. Friedman- tfriedman@toddflaw.com
-- Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C.

Thomas Richards, Plaintiff, represented by Adrian R. Bacon, Law
Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C., Thomas Edward Wheeler --
twheeler@toddflaw.com -- Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman & Todd M.
Friedman, Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C.

CoreCivic of Tennessee, LLC & CoreCivic, Inc., Defendants,
represented by Paul M. Gleason -- pgleason@gleasonfavarote.com --
Gleason and Favarote LLP.


COVELLI ENTERPRISES: Settlement in FLSA Suit Gets Prelim Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge James S. Gwin of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio approved the collective action settlement in the
case, ERIN KIS, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COVELLI ENTERPRISES, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-54, No. 4:18-cv-434 (N.D. Ohio).

In the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") collective action, nearly
500 current and former Panera Bread assistant managers seek unpaid
overtime wages from Covelli.  The parties now propose a
settlement.

Under the proposed settlement, Defendant Covelli will pay up to
$3,725,000 to settle the collective action's claims.  The parties
also ask the Court to conditionally certify a related Ohio wage law
class action for settlement purposes.  Covelli will pay up to
$900,000 to settle the class action's claims.

The Plaintiffs ask the Court to: (i) approve the collective action
settlement, (ii) conditionally certify the class for settlement,
(iii) preliminarily approve the class settlement, (iv) appoint the
Plaintiffs' counsel as the class counsel, and (v) issue the
proposed class and collective action notices.

The Plaintiffs ask the Court to conditionally certify a class for
settlement composed of all Assistant Managers who work or have
worked for the Defendant at any time from Jan. 9, 2016 until the
date of final judgment in the action, who the Defendant classified
as exempt from overtime.

Judge Gwin finds that (i) the Plaintiffs would likely succeed on
the merits; (ii) the parties here conducted extensive discovery;
(iii) there is little risk that fraud or collusion produced the
settlement; (iv) the public interest favors settling large complex
actions to preserve judicial resources; (v) because the Plaintiffs
seek certification only for settlement purposes, there will be no
difficulty in managing the class; and (vi) the Plaintiffs'
attorneys as the class counsel will bring sufficient resources to
the representation.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Gwin granted the Plaintiffs'
motion, approved the FLSA collective action settlement, and
conditionally certified the class as described.  He further
preliminarily approved the class action settlement, appointed the
Plaintiffs' counsel as the class counsel, and ordered the
Plaintiffs to issue attached notices in the manner described in
their motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/LCWETW from Leagle.com.

Erin E Kis, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Beau D. Hollowell --
bhollowell@karonllc.com -- Law Office of Daniel R. Karon, Correy A.
Kamin -- kamin@whafh.com -- Wolf, Haldenstein, Adler, Freeman &
Herz, Darnley D. Stewart, Outten & Golden, Deirdre A. Aaron, Outten
& Golden, Drew T. Legando, Landskroner Grieco Merriman, Gregg I.
Shavitz, Shavitz Law Group, Hannah Cole-Chu, Outten & Golden, Jack
Landskroner, Landskroner Grieco Merriman, Justin M. Swartz, Outten
& Golden, Logan A. Pardell, Shavitz Law Group, Lucy B. Bansal,
Outten & Golden, Michael J. Palitz, Shavitz Law Group, Randall S.
Newman -- newman@whafh.com -- Wolf, Haldenstein, Adler, Freeman &
Herz, Robert Abrams -- abrams@whafh.com -- Wolf, Haldenstein,
Adler, Freeman & Herz, Sally J. Abrahamson, Outten & Golden, pro
hac vice & Daniel R. Karon --  dkaron@karonllc.com -- Law Office of
Daniel R. Karon.

Chelsea Romano, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Correy A. Kamin, Wolf,
Haldenstein, Adler, Freeman & Herz, Darnley D. Stewart, Outten &
Golden, Deirdre A. Aaron, Outten & Golden, Drew T. Legando,
Landskroner Grieco Merriman, Gregg I. Shavitz, Shavitz Law Group,
Hannah Cole-Chu, Outten & Golden, Jack Landskroner, Landskroner
Grieco Merriman, Justin M. Swartz, Outten & Golden, Logan A.
Pardell, Shavitz Law Group, Lucy B. Bansal, Outten & Golden,
Michael J. Palitz, Shavitz Law Group, Randall S. Newman, Wolf,
Haldenstein, Adler, Freeman & Herz & Sally J. Abrahamson, Outten &
Golden, pro hac vice.

Covelli Enterprises, Inc., Defendant, represented by Catherine L.
Strauss -- catherine.strauss@icemiller.com -- Ice Miller, James E.
Davidson -- james.davidson@icemiller.com -- Ice Miller & John P.
Gilligan -- john.gilligan@icemiller.com -- Ice Miller.

Panera, LLC, Interested Party, represented by Michael J. Kozimor --
Michael.Kozimor@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis.


CROSSROADS VILLAGE: Cal. App. Affirms Antonio Class Certification
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, AGUSTIN ANTONIO et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v.
CROSSROADS VILLAGE, LLC, Defendant and Appellant, Case No. A153751
(Cal. App.), Judge Barbara J.R. Jones of the Court of Appeals of
California for the First District, Division Five, (i) affirmed the
trial court's class certification order, but (ii) vacated the trial
court's determination that the Release Agreements were not
enforceable.

The case concerns a landlord's acknowledged failure to comply with
the terms of a rent ordinance in the City of Fremont's municipal
code.1 Section 9.60.040, subdivision (d) of the RRIDRO provided
that a landlord's notice of rent increase must include specified
language regarding a procedure for conciliation, mediation and
fact-finding for disputes over rent increases.  Section 9.60.030,
subdivision (b) provided that "Any rent increase accomplished in
violation of this chapter will be void and no landlord may take any
action to enforce such an invalid rent increase."

On Jan. 9, 2014, Antonio filed a putative class action alleging
Crossroads Village, the owner of a residential apartment complex in
Fremont, California, raised rents in a manner that violated
Fremont's municipal code, and, therefore, that the rent increases
were void.  Antonio alleged rent increase notices violated the
terms of the RRIDRO. He asserted causes of action for breach of
contract; violation of chapter 9.60 of Fremont's municipal code;
unfair business practices; conversion; and he sought punitive
damages and the appointment of an independent trustee or receiver.

On Feb. 24, 2015, Antonio filed a first amended complaint ("FAC")
making similar allegations, but adding a cause of action for
negligent hiring, supervising, or retaining of employees, and
alleging that around March 2014, Crossroads Village approached all
class members, including class representative and/or his former
roommates, and attempted to and/or did enforce the illegal rent
increases by offering to return portions of the illegally increased
rents while retaining portions of the illegally increased rents.
This new allegation was based on the fact that around March 2014,
after the lawsuit was initiated, Crossroads Village obtained
release agreements from 186 out of 231 households that rented
apartments from Crossroads Village.  Antonio, who resided in the
apartment complex from approximately March 2009 to August 2012, did
not execute a Release Agreement.

In March 2016, Antonio moved for class certification.  Crossroads
Village opposed the motion arguing, among other things, that
Antonio lacked standing to serve as the class representative
because he did not execute a Release Agreement.  In June 2016, the
court granted the motion.  The court defined the class as all
tenants who lived at the apartment complex in Fremont, California
and, at any time from Jan. 9, 2010 through the date of the Order,
received at least one notice of change of terms of tenancy which
notice did not contain language required by the RRIDRO.

After certifying the class, the court held a bench trial on
Antonio's claims based on stipulated facts and joint exhibits.  The
court found Crossroads Village's rent increase notices dated "Feb.
22, 2011, May 22, 2012, and June 24, 2013" were not in compliance
with the RRIDRO and were therefore void.  It also found the Release
Agreements did not result in a waiver or compromise of the rent
increases resulting from the noncompliant notices.  The court found
the total amount of damages to be awarded to the class for rent
increase amounts from February 2010 through October 2015 does not
exceed $723,344.  On Jan. 4, 2018, the court entered judgment in
favor of Antonio and the class.  

Crossroads Village appeals.  Crossroads Village contends the court
abused its discretion in certifying any issues relative to the
enforceability of the Release Agreements.  It also argues the court
erred in determining the Release Agreements were ineffective, and
in its award of damages.  On appeal, Crossroads Village argues
Antonio did not have standing to challenge the enforceability of
the Release Agreements because he did not sign one.  In addition,
Crossroads Village contends Antonio failed to satisfy the
"community of interest" requirement.

Judge Jones finds that Antonio's proposed class consisted of
tenants who both signed and did not sign the Release Agreements
because he argued the Release Agreements themselves constituted
illegal rent increases.  Therefore, Antonio was a member of the
proposed class.  Also, the mere fact that a defendant could raise a
defense against certain class members that would not apply to
Antonio does not defeat his standing.  Antonio alleged and argued
he was subjected to the same alleged wrong, by the same Defendant,
as the other members of the putative class.  Crossroads Village
fails to establish Antonio's interests were antagonistic to or in
conflict with the objectives of those he purports to represent.

Next, Crossroads Village argues the court erred "in concluding that
common, as opposed to individual questions, predominated regarding
the Release Agreements.  The Judge disagrees.  Individual issues do
not render class certification inappropriate so long as such issues
may effectively be managed.  Nor is it a bar to certification that
individual class members may ultimately need to itemize their
damages.  She finds that Crossroads Village fails to explain why
the court should have viewed those differing circumstances or
amounts as a bar to class certification.  Importantly, the trial
court found the notices of rent increase were the same in all
material respects for every member of the putative class.

Crossroads Village argues Antonio's claims were not typical
because, unlike most of the proposed class members, he did not
execute a Release Agreement and had no real interest in proving
they were invalid.  The Judge discerns no abuse of discretion in
the court's determination that Antonio's claims were typical even
though he did not sign a Release Agreement.  At the class
certification stage, the court properly focused on the nature of
the evidence that would be used to establish or attack the
enforceability of the Release Agreements, and whether this evidence
could be addressed on a class-wide basis.  The trial court acted
well within its discretion in certifying the class.

The Judge is not persuaded that, by signing the agreements,
putative class members did not release or waive their claims
arising from defective rent increase notices.  Each agreement
provides the text of the code section in block capitals.  At the
end of the document, immediately above the signature lines, each
agreement also provides in bold and block capitals that the
agreement includes a general release of all known and unknown
claims.  Also, there is no language in the Release Agreements that
attempts to exempt Crossroads Village from the requirements of the
RRIDRO, which pertained to language landlords were required to
include in rent increase notices.  The court erred in concluding
the Release Agreements were inadequate to compromise the void
amounts.

Finally, the Judge finds that it is not clear if the tenants who
signed the Release Agreements were aware of the putative class
action at the time they did so. But they were aware of a procedural
defect in certain Notices of Change of Terms, they acknowledged
there is a risk that such damages as are presently known may become
more serious than Tenant now expects or anticipates, and they
expressly waived their rights under Civil Code section 1542.
Antonio fails to establish the Release Agreements violate public
policy.

Judge Jones affirmed the class certification order but vacated the
trial court's determination that the Release Agreements were not
enforceable.  She remanded for a recalculation of the damages to be
awarded to the class, which now consists of all tenants who did not
execute Release Agreements, who lived at the apartment complex in
Fremont, California, and who, at any time from Jan. 9, 2010 through
June 2016, received at least one notice of change of terms of
tenancy which notice did not contain language required by the
RRIDRO.  She otherwise affirmed.  The parties will bear their own
costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/69nr9H from Leagle.com.


CRYSTAL FARMS: Reyes Suit Over "Made With Real Butter" Label Nixed
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York granted the Defendant's motion to
dismiss the case, MARILYN REYES, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CRYSTAL FARMS REFRIGERATED
DISTRIBUTION COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 18-CV-2250 (NGG) (RML)
(E.D. N.Y.).

Reyes brings the putative class action against Defendant Crystal
Farms.  She The Plaintiff filed the suit on April 4, 2018 and filed
an amended complaint on Oct. 19, 2018, bringing five claims.

First, the Plaintiff claims that the Defendant's representations
were false, deceptive, and misleading, violating New York General
Business Law ("NY GBL") Sections 349 and 350, because she believed,
based on its representations, that the mashed potatoes did not
contain margarine and were fresh.

Second, she brings a claim for negligent misrepresentation,
alleging that the Defendant misrepresented the composition of its
mashed potatoes by (1) highlighting that they contain butter,
giving consumers the impression that the product did not contain
margarine, and (2) implying the mashed potatoes were fresh.
According to the Plaintiff, the Defendant had a duty to not
deceptively describe the mashed potatoes, based in part on its
position as a trusted brand.  Further, it allegedly knew (or should
have known) that its advertising was false or misleading.  The
Plaintiff claims that these alleged misrepresentations induced it
to purchase the mashed potatoes, and that her reliance on the
misrepresentations was reasonable and justifiable.

Third, the Plaintiff claims that the Defendant breached an express
warranty and an implied warranty of merchantability.  In her view,
the Defendant warranted to the Plaintiff that the mashed potatoes
did not contain margarine and were fresh. Per the Plaintiff, since
it is not conceivable to have mashed potatoes with butter and
margarine, no reasonable consumer would expect the mashed potatoes
to contain margarine.  She Plaintiff avers that she relied on the
Defendant's claims in paying more for the mashed potatoes than she
would have otherwise.

Fourth, the Plaintiff brings a fraud claim, alleging that the
Defendant's intent in advertising that its mashed potatoes were
made with real butter and fresh whole potatoes was to prey on
consumers' expectations.  The Defendant was allegedly motivated by
a desire to increase its market share in the mashed potatoes
industry.

Finally, the Plaintiff contends that the Defendant was unjustly
enriched by its actions, to the detriment of her and the putative
class members.  She seeks restitution and disgorgement of the
Defendant's inequitably obtained profits.

The Defendant now moves to dismiss the amended complaint in its
entirety.  It maintains that: (1) the Plaintiff has failed to state
a claim; (2) even if she had, her claims (all of which are rooted
in state law) are expressly preempted by the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"); and (3) in any event, her purported
nationwide class allegations should be dismissed because her false
advertising claims under New York state law cannot apply to
transactions occurring outside of New York.

Judge Garaufis finds that the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim
with respect to any of her five causes of action.  First, the
Defendant's representation that its mashed potatoes were "made with
real butter" is truthful, and other labels on its packaging
dispelled any confusion about whether the mashed potatoes contained
margarine.

Next,the Judge finds that the Defendant's representation that its
mashed potatoes are "made with fresh whole potatoes" does not
violate NY GBL §§ 349 and 350 either, for two reasons.  First,
the Plaintiff does not allege that this statement is untruthful --
i.e, that Defendant does not incorporate raw, unfrozen potatoes
into its product.  Second, the Plaintiff's allegation is
implausible.  Contrary to the Plaintiff's suggestion, the Judge
does not believe a reasonable consumer would be misled into
believing that Defendant's mashed potatoes lacked artificial
preservatives.  He therefore dismisses the Plaintiff's NY GBL
Sections 349 and 350 claims.

To state a claim for fraud under New York law, a plaintiff must
allege (1) a material misrepresentation or omission of fact; (2)
which the defendant knew to be false.  Similarly, to allege a
negligent misrepresentation claim, a complaint must establish that
(1) the defendant had a duty, as a result of a special
relationship, to give correct information; (2) the defendant made a
false representation that he or she should have known was
incorrect.  The Judge finds that the Plaintiff has not alleged that
either of the representations at issue were false.  Thus, he
dismisses her fraud and negligent-misrepresentation claims.

The Judge also finds that the Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged
that either of the representations at issue were false or
misleading.  The Defendant warranted that its mashed potatoes were
"made with real butter" and "made with fresh whole potatoes" -- not
that the mashed potatoes lacked margarine or were themselves
"fresh."  Thus, he dismisses the Plaintiff's claim for breach of
express warranty.

The Plaintiff's injuries are financial.  The required privity does
not exist here because the Plaintiff has not alleged that she
purchased the product directly from Defendant.  Accordingly, the
Plaintiff's claim for breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability cannot proceed.

Finally, the Judge finds that laintiff has not properly alleged any
equitable obligation.  The Plaintiff brings an unjust enrichment
claim on the basis that the Defendant obtained benefits and monies
because the mashed potatoes were not as represented, to the
detriment and impoverishment of the Plaintiff and the class
members.  The claim cannot succeed ecause it merely duplicates the
Plaintiff's other claims based on the same alleged
misrepresentations.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Garaufis granted in full the
Defendant's (Dkt. 14) motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's amended
complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/JrbTRY from Leagle.com.

Marilyn Reyes, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Spencer I. Sheehan --
spencer@spencersheehan.com -- Sheehan & Associates, P.C. & Joshua
Levin-Epstein, Levin-Epstein & Associates, P.C.

Crystal Farms Refrigerated Distribution Company, Defendant,
represented by August Theodore Horvath -- ahorvath@foleyhoag.com --
Foley Hoag LLP.


CYS GROUP: Made Illegal Unsolicited Calls, Itayim Suit Asserts
---------------------------------------------------------------
MARIELA ITAYIM, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. CYS GROUP, INC., a Washington company,
Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-06716 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 3, 2019) is a
class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act against
Defendant to stop its practice of making unauthorized pre-recorded
voice calls promoting its photography products and services, and to
obtain redress for all persons similarly injured by its conduct.

This case challenges Defendant's practice of making unauthorized
pre-recorded voice calls to consumers promoting its photography
products and services. The Defendant's unsolicited pre-recorded
voice calls violated the TCPA, and caused Plaintiff and putative
members of the Class to suffer actual harm, including the
aggravation, nuisance, loss of time, and invasions of privacy that
result from the receipt of such calls, lost value of cellular
services paid for, and a loss of the use and enjoyment of their
phones, including wear and tear to their phones' data, memory,
software, hardware, and battery components, among other harms.

Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring Defendant to cease making
unsolicited pre-recorded voice calls to consumers, as well as an
award of actual and/or statutory damages and costs, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff Itayim is a Broward County, Florida resident.

Defendant is a company that provides photography products and
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Avi R. Kaufman, Esq.
     KAUFMAN P.A.
     400 NW 26th Street
     Miami, FL 33127
     Phone: (305) 469-5881
     Email: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com


DELEON LATIN: Does not Pay Minimum, Overtime Wages, Perez Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
HECTOR ANTONIO CACERES PEREZ, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. DELEON LATIN CUISINE,
CORP. d/b/a MI CASA RESTAURANT & LOUNGE and RICARDO MENDEZ and
JOHANNA MELENDEZ, as individuals, Defendants, Case No. CV19-5007
(E.D. N.Y., Sept. 3, 2019) is an action against Defendants to
recover damages for violations of state and federal wage and hour
laws arising out of Plaintiff's employment under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the New York Labor Law.

The complaint alleges that Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff the
legally prescribed minimum wage for her hours worked from January
2019 until July 2019, a blatant violation of the minimum wage
provisions contained in the FLSA and NYLL. Plaintiff worked
approximately 51 or more hours per week during his employment by
Defendants, yet Defendants did not pay Plaintiff time and a half
for hours worked over 40. The Defendants also willfully failed to
post notices of the minimum wage and overtime wage requirements in
a conspicuous place at the location of their employment and failed
to keep accurate payroll records, says the complaint.

Plaintiff HECTOR ANTONIO CACERES PEREZ was employed by Defendants
from January 2019 until July 2019.

DELEON LATIN CUISINE, CORP. d/b/a MI CASA RESTAURANT & LOUNG, is a
corporation organized under the laws of New York with a principal
executive office at 116-20 Jamaica Ave., Richmond Hill, NY
11418.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
     Helen f. Dalton & Associated, P.C.
     80—02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
     Kew Gardens, NY 11415
     Phone: 718-263-9591
     Fax: 718-263-9598


DENSO CORP: Windshield Wiper Class Action Settlement Okayed
-----------------------------------------------------------
Freed Kanner London & Millen LLC; Kohn, Swift & Graf, P.C.; Preti,
Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios LLP and Spector Roseman & Kodroff,
P.C. ("Settlement Class Counsel") on Aug. 12 disclosed that the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
Southern Division ("Court") has approved the following announcement
of proposed class action settlements with the MITSUBA Defendants
and DENSO Defendants.  The lawsuit claims that Defendants conspired
to raise, fix, maintain, and stabilize prices, rig bids, and
allocate the supply of windshield wiper systems sold in the United
States, in violation of federal antitrust laws.

The settlements affect those who purchased windshield wiper systems
in the United States between January 1, 2000 and August 14, 2018
directly from any of the following entities (or depending on the
specific settlement agreement, their parents, subsidiaries,
affiliates and joint ventures): ASMO Co. Ltd.; DENSO Corporation;
DENSO International America, Inc.; American Mitsuba Corp.; MITSUBA
Corp.; Robert Bosch GmbH; Bosch Electrical Drives Co., Ltd. f/k/a
Korea Automotive Corporation (KAMCO); and Valeo S.A.

A hearing will be held on November 5, 2019, at 2:00 p.m., before
the Honorable Marianne O. Battani, United States District Judge, at
the Theodore Levin United States Courthouse, 231 West Lafayette
Boulevard, Detroit, MI 48226, Courtroom 250, for the purpose of
determining: (1) whether the proposed settlements with the MITSUBA
and DENSO Defendants totaling $6,216,176 should be approved by the
Court as fair, reasonable and adequate; (2) whether the Court
should approve the proposed plan of distribution of MITSUBA and
DENSO settlement proceeds to members of the settlement classes; and
(3) whether the Court should approve Settlement Class Counsel's
request for an award of attorneys' fees, reimbursement of
litigation costs and expenses, and an incentive payment to the
Class Representative.

A Notice of Proposed Settlements and Claim Form (the "Notice") was
mailed to potential Settlement Class members on or about August 8,
2019. The Notice describes the litigation and options available to
Settlement Class members with respect to the MITSUBA and DENSO
settlements in more detail.  The Notice also explains what steps a
Class Member must take to (1) remain in the settlement classes and
file a Claim Form to share in the settlement proceeds, (2) object
to the settlements, or (3) request exclusion from the settlement
classes.  The Notice and other important documents related to the
settlements can be accessed at
www.AutoPartsAntitrustLitigation.com/WindshieldWiperSystems, or by
calling 1-877-670-0952 or writing to Windshield Wiper Systems
Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, P.O. Box 2838, Portland, OR
97208-2838.  Those who believe they may be a member of either of
the MITSUBA or DENSO settlement classes, are urged to obtain a copy
of the Notice. [GN]


DIRECT ENERGY: 7th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Sevugan Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Judge Michael B. Brennan of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
case, CHETTY SEVUGAN, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DIRECT ENERGY SERVICES,
LLC, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 18-3082
(7th Cir.).

Unhappy with his utility bill, Sevugan filed the putative class
action challenging the electricity prices of Direct Energy, an
alternative retail energy supplier in the Chicago market.  Sevugan,
hoping to save money on his monthly electric bills, contracted with
Direct Energy in 2011.  Sevugan's allegations center on two clauses
in his contract with Direct Energy.

The first is the "Terms Clause."  The contract required Direct
Energy to supply electricity at a fixed price per kilowatt hour
(kWh) for the first 12 months.  At the end of that initial term,
Sevugan renewed for an additional twelve months at a lower fixed
rate.  In 2013, though, Sevugan neither re-enrolled nor cancelled
service, which triggered what the "Renewal Clause."  Per the
Renewal Clause, Sevugan's contract automatically renewed on a
month-to-month basis, with his price set at a variable rate.

After several years as a customer, Sevugan became unhappy with his
electricity costs, believing them to be above market rates and more
expensive than if he had remained with ComEd. He cancelled service
with Direct Energy and sued in September 2017, alleging Direct
Energy deceived him (and others like him) in t he parties'
four-page form contract.

Sevugan made a variety of claims in his lawsuit, asserting that
after his fixed-rate term expired, the variable charges should have
been based on market-related factors.  He claimed the rates he paid
did not reflect changes in wholesale-market prices and failed to
correspond to rates offered by ComEd.

Direct Energy moved to dismiss, arguing that Sevugan did not
plausibly allege that the parties' contract made those promises.
In a thorough opinion, the district court dismissed Sevugan's
breach of contract claim without prejudice under FED. R. CIV. P.
9(b) and 12(b)(6), concluding that Sevugan failed to allege enough
facts to show that Direct Energy plausibly breached a contractual
duty.

As the dismissal was without prejudice, Sevugan filed a second
amended complaint, which asserted only that Direct Energy breached
paragraphs 3 and 5 of the parties' contract by: "(a) failing to
base its prices upon generally prevailing market prices for
electricity in the PJM market at the Electric Utility load zone for
the applicable period, (b) failing to provide a competitive rate,
(c) increasing its adder to an unreasonable level, or (d) all of
the above."

Direct Energy again moved to dismiss, contending Sevugan's breach
of contract claim was too speculative and lacked sufficient factual
allegations.  In a second detailed opinion, the district court
again dismissed Sevugan's case, this time with prejudice.  The
court concluded Sevugan did not allege facts showing Direct
Energy's rates were not "based on generally prevailing market
prices," as the complaint pleaded only the prices of ComEd and the
PJM market.  The complaint was silent on rates charged by other
Illinois alternative retail energy suppliers, which the district
court considered Direct Energy's competition.  The court further
ruled that the contract did not promise to charge rates lower than
ComEd, so a breach of contract had not been alleged.

The district court also held that Sevugan failed to include facts
showing the "adder" Direct Energy charged was "unreasonable."
Sevugan failed to allege the amount of the adder, what percentage
of the variable rates the adder constituted, or the adders charged
by other suppliers. Without any such facts, the district court
concluded Sevugan's pleaded claim was deficient.

Likewise, the district court rejected Sevugan's argument that
Direct Energy breached by not setting its variable rates
"competitively."  Sevugan failed to allege the prices of any other
alternative retail energy suppliers, making it impossible to know
whether Direct Energy's pricing of its variable rates were
competitive in the variable market.  The district court explained
that factual allegations regarding ComEd's prices were
insufficient, as they are set by regulators, not the market.

Sevugan timely appealed from the second dismissal.

Sevugan first contests how Direct Energy exercised its discretion
in setting electricity rates.  Judge Brennan holds that Sevugan's
claim that Direct Energy did not charge rates commensurate with
ComEd, or with the wholesale price of PJM, fails to allege a
breach.  The parties' contract does not require Direct Energy to
charge such rates.  Without any information about valid market
comparators, such as other alternative retail energy suppliers,
Sevugan's breach of contract claim is speculative and implausible.

Sevugan next claims Direct Energy breached the contract by using an
unreasonable adder.  The Judge finds that Sevugan has offered no
new arguments for how the adder in the price is unreasonable.  He
admits he does not know how the adder charge is established, or how
Direct Energy formulated its prices.  Nor does Sevugan allege
Direct Energy's adder was greater than that charged by other market
participants.  Sevugan has not plausibly alleged Direct Energy
charged him unreasonably for this component of the price.

Finally, Sevugan disputes the electricity prices Direct Energy set
by invoking a different portion of the contract, the Terms Clause,
paragraph 3.  The Judge finds that even if the Terms Clause did
control pricing, Sevugan again has failed to plausibly allege
Direct Energy improperly set its variable rate for electricity.  As
described, the complaint contains no references to proper
comparators, including alternative retail energy suppliers.
Sevugan's contention that the variable rates he paid were not
competitive because they were higher than ComEd's rates does not
speak to Direct Energy's competitiveness in the broader market.

Judge Brennan concludes that Sevugan's complaints failed to contain
allegations from which it can be reasonably inferred Direct Energy
breached the parties' contract.  Because his claim is not facially
plausible, the Judge affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
case.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/80MYHs from Leagle.com.

Richard J. Burke -- richard@Qulegal.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Grant Y. Lee, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Zachary Allen Jacobs, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Michael D. Matthews, Jr. -- matt.matthews@mhllp.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Diane S. Wizig -- diane.wizig@mhllp.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

Jonathan Shub -- jshub@kohnswift.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Kevin Laukaitis -- klaukaitis@kohnswift.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Joshua M. Feagans -- jfeagans@gwllplaw.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.


DYNAMIC RECOVERY: Kim Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Dynamic Recovery
Solutions, LLC. The case is styled as Suk Young Kim individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Dynamic Recovery Solutions, LLC, and CACH, LLC, Defendants, Case
No. 1:19-cv-05093 (E.D. N.Y., Sept. 6, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Dynamic Recovery Solutions, LLC is a full-service collection agency
based in South Carolina.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     David M. Barshay, Esq.
     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     Barshay Sanders, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 281-7601
     Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com
            csanders@barshaysanders.com


EPIC GAMES: Faces Class Action Over Hacked Fortnite Accounts
------------------------------------------------------------
Daniel Cleary, writing for Dexerto, reports that Fortnite Battle
Royale developers, Epic Games are facing a class-action lawsuit
after player's accounts were hacked in January.

On January 26, Epic Games revealed that a bug in Fortnite may have
exposed players' personal information due to an issue with the
game's log-in system.

Months after the company received massive backlash for their error
in security, they have now been hit with a class-action lawsuit
involving the players who were affected by the gap in Epic Games'
security measures, according to Polygon.

With Epic Games' sizable portion of young players who regularly
play Fortnite, many were concerned over the failure to prevent the
data breaches and to detail users on what had occurred.

The hacker's successful attempts to access the Epic Games accounts
led to a security breach, which may have possibly exposed the data
of millions of users' accounts and personal information.

The class-action lawsuit was filed by Franklin D. Azar & Associates
in U.S. District Court in North Carolina, and they claim that
Epic's "failure to maintain adequate security measures and notify
users of the security breach in a timely manner" was cause for the
suit.

The lawsuit also states that Epic Games failed to directly notify
those who could have been affected by the breach, claiming, "Epic
Games has not yet directly informed or notified individual Fortnite
users that their personally identifiable information may be
compromised as a result of the breach."

Despite the fact that Epic Games quickly acknowledged and fixed the
security issue, the lawsuit states that there are "more than 100
class members" who have decided to take action against the popular
battle royale game's developers.

The plaintiff, as well as other class members who are involved in
the lawsuit, have expressed that they "have an ongoing interest in
ensuring that their personally identifiable information is
protected from past and future cyber security threats." [GN]


EXPERIAN MARKETING: Bowes Seeks More Time to File Writ in Melito
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Kara Bowes asks the Honorable Ruth Bader Ginsburg for an
extension of time from September 3, 2019, to and including October
16, 2019, to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the matter
entitled Kara Bowes v. Christina Melito, et al., Case No. 19A214,
in the Supreme Court of United States.

Ms. Bowes seeks a review of the decision of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Christina Melito, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Ryan Metzger,
Alison Pierce, Gene Ellis, Walter Wood, Christopher Legg, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees;
American Eagle Outfitters, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, AEO
Management Co, a Delaware Corporation,
Defendants-Third-Party-Plaintiffs-Appellees v. Experian Marketing
Solutions, Inc., Consolidated
Defendant-Third-Party-Defendant-Appellant; Kara Bowes,
Objector-Appellant, eBay Enterprise, Inc., FKA eBay Enterprise
Marketing Solutions, Inc., Defendant, Case Nos. 17-3277-cv (L),
17-3279 (Con) (2d Cir. April 30, 2019).

The case is a consumer class action seeking statutory damages under
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) that was settled in
the District Court, which approved the payment of special "service
awards" or "incentive awards" to the class representatives.  Ms.
Bowes is a class member bound by the settlement of the matter, who
appeared through counsel as an objector challenging the
class-action settlement's fairness and the payment of service
awards before the Southern District of New York, and who then
timely appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.

The Second Circuit entered its decision in this matter on April 30,
2019, affirming the District Court's approval of the class-action
settlement and payment of service awards to the lead plaintiffs.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Judge Peter W.
Hall of the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District
Court approving the settlement and certifying the settlement
class.

On May 14, 2019, Ms. Bowes filed a timely petition for rehearing,
which the Second Circuit denied on June 3, 2019.  She contends that
her application should be granted because her counsel is a solo
practitioner and his responsibilities for several other pending
matters have made it impossible for him to complete a petition for
a writ of certiorari to be filed in this matter by September 3,
2019.[BN]

Petitioner Kara Bowes is represented by:

          Eric Alan Isaacson, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF ERIC ALAN ISAACSON
          6580 Avenida Mirola
          La Jolla, CA 92037-6231
          Telephone: (858) 263-9581
          E-mail: ericalanisaacson@icloud.com


FACEBOOK INC: Must Face Biometric Data Privacy Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Stempel, writing for Insurance Journal, reports that a
federal appeals court on Aug. 8 rejected Facebook Inc.'s effort to
undo a class action lawsuit claiming that it illegally collected
and stored biometric data for millions of users without their
consent.

The 3-0 decision from the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in San
Francisco over Facebook's facial recognition technology exposes the
company to billions of dollars in potential damages to the Illinois
users who brought the case.

It came as the social media company faces broad criticism from
lawmakers and regulators over its privacy practices. In July,
Facebook agreed to pay a record $5 billion fine to settle a Federal
Trade Commission data privacy probe.

"This biometric data is so sensitive that if it is compromised,
there is simply no recourse," Shawn Williams, a lawyer for
plaintiffs in the class action, said in an interview. "It's not
like a Social Security card or credit card number where you can
change the number. You can't change your face."

Facebook said it plans to appeal. "We have always disclosed our use
of face recognition technology and that people can turn it on or
off at any time," a spokesman said in an email.

Google, a unit of Alphabet Inc., won the dismissal of a similar
lawsuit in Chicago last December.

The lawsuit began in 2015, when Illinois users accused Facebook of
violating that state's Biometric Information Privacy Act in
collecting biometric data.

Facebook allegedly accomplished this through its "Tag Suggestions"
feature, which allowed users to recognize their Facebook friends
from previously uploaded photos.

Writing for the appeals court, Circuit Judge Sandra Ikuta said the
Illinois users could sue as a group, rejecting Facebook's argument
that their claims were unique and required individual lawsuits.

She also said the 2008 Illinois law was intended to protect
individuals' "concrete interests in privacy," and Facebook's
alleged unauthorized use of a face template "invades an
individual's private affairs and concrete interests."

The court returned the case to U.S. District Judge James Donato in
San Francisco, who had certified a class action in April 2018, for
a possible trial.

Illinois' biometric privacy law provides for damages of $1,000 for
each negligent violation and $5,000 for each intentional or
reckless violation.

Williams, a partner at Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, said the class
could include 7 million Facebook users.

The FTC probe arose from the discovery that Facebook had let
British consulting firm Cambridge Analytica harvest users' personal
information. Facebook's $5 billion payout still requires U.S.
Department of Justice approval.

The case is Patel et al v Facebook Inc, 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, No. 18-15982. [GN]


FAIRWAY INDEPENDENT: Valdez Labor Suit Remanded to State Court
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California granted the Plaintiff's motion to
remand the case, SUSANA VALDEZ, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. FAIRWAY INDEPENDENT
MORTGAGE CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-2748-CAB-KSC (S.D.
Cal.), to San Diego County Superior Court.

Valdez is a former employee of Defendant Fairway Independent
Mortgage.  On Oct. 23, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a complaint in San
Diego County Superior Court asserting claims on behalf of herself
and putative classes of all non-exempt current and former employees
of the Defendant.  The complaint asserts six claims under
California's labor and unfair competition laws and is silent as to
the amount of damages.

On Dec. 6, 2018, the Defendant removed the case to the Court.  In
the notice of removal, it asserts that all of the requirements for
subject matter jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act
("CAFA") are met insofar as minimum diversity exists and the amount
in controversy exceeds $5 million.  The notice includes
calculations for the amount in controversy for each of the
Plaintiff's claims and the underlying assumptions for those
calculations.  The notice of removal alleged the amount in
controversy is $5,873,923.71.

On June 14, 2019, the Plaintiff moved to remand the case to state
court.  She primarily avers that the Defendant inflated the
underlying numbers, used numbers without evidentiary support,
assumed improper violation rates, and allocated fees to claims for
which fees are not recoverable.  The Defendant filed its
opposition, and the Plaintiff filed a reply.

As Plaintiff notes, also assuming arbitrarily, even a 50% violation
rate with the Defendant's calculations would result in $125,882.71
in controversy for the overtime claim.  The allegation that the
Plaintiff and the putative class were not paid for "all" overtime
is not the same as an allegation that she and the putative class
were not paid for "any" overtime, which is what the Defendant
assumes in its calculation instead of using its records to
determine when overtime compensation was paid and adjusting
accordingly.  The Defendant thereby used its calculations as if
there was a 100% violation rate.  The Plaintiff's allegations
support the inference that she and members of the putative class
received some, but not all, of overtime owed.  As such, application
of a 100% violation rate is unwarranted and speculative.
Accordingly, Judge Bencivengo finds that the Defendant has not
satisfied its burden to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the amount in controversy for the overtime claim is
$251,765.42.

The Judge agrees with the Plaintiff's assertion that "regular rate
of compensation" is not equivalent to "regular rate of pay" and
likewise finds the legislature's distinction of the two terms
significant.  Moreover, similar to the analysis for the overtime
claim, the Defendant again arbitrarily assumed a violation rate of
one missed meal break and one missed rest break per week,
effectively a 20% violation rate, that is not grounded in any real
evidence.  Accordingly, the Judge finds that the Defendant has not
satisfied its burden to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the amount in controversy for the meal period and
rest break violation claims is $2,291,787.44.

Finally, as the Plaintiff notes, the Defendant attempts to multiply
its calculations for all of the Plaintiff's claims by 25% to
determine attorney's fees while courts have held that fees are not
recoverable for claims of meal period, rest break, and waiting time
violations.  The Judge need not reach this issue because even if
she applied the Defendant's use of the 25% benchmark to all of the
Plaintiff's claims the Defendant has failed to satisfy its burden
to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the amount placed in
controversy on the complaint excluding attorney's fees is $4
million.  

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Bencivengo granted the Plaintiff's
motion to remand, and denied as moot the Plaintiff's evidentiary
objections.  She remanded case to the Superior Court of the State
of California for the County of San Diego.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/ddlF0G from Leagle.com.

Susana Valdez, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Ali Sarah Carlsen --
acarlsen@aegislawfirm.com -- Aegis Law Firm, PC, Jessica Lynn
Campbell, Aegis Law Firm, Kashif Haque, Aegis Law Firm & Suren
Naradha Weerasuriya, Kushner Carlson, PC.

Fairway Independent Mortgage Corporation, a Texas corporation,
Defendant, represented by Christopher W. Decker --
christopher.decker@ogletreedeakins.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash
Smoak & Stewart PC & Mazen Khatib -- mazen.khatib@ogletree.com --
Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, P.C..


FIRST NATIONAL: Rios Files FDCPA Suit in C.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against First National
Collection Bureau, Inc. The case is styled as Christopher Rios,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. First National Collection Bureau, Inc., Cach, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-07751 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 6, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

First National Collection Bureau, Inc. is an agency that collects
debt on behalf of a variety of creditor clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jonathan Aaron Stieglitz, Esq.
     Jonathan Stieglitz Law Offices
     11845 West Olympic Boulevard, Suite 800
     Los Angeles, CA 90064
     Phone: (323) 979-2063
     Fax: (323) 488-6748
     Email: jonathan.a.stieglitz@gmail.com


FORD MOTOR: 3d Cir. Affirms Summary Judgment in Coba Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GALO COBA; COBA LANDSCAPING AND CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
individually, and on behalf of other members of the general public
similarly situated, Appellants, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Case No.
17-2933 (3d Cir.), Judge Cheryl Ann Krause of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's entry
of summary judgment in favor of Ford on all of Coba's claims.

Beginning in 2001 and continuing over the decade that followed,
Ford received waves of complaints from customers who purchased
certain F-Series and E-Series vehicles reporting similar types of
malfunction related to their vehicles' fuel tanks.  In 2001, when
Ford first received reports that some of its vehicles were
exhibiting fuel-tank delamination problems, the complaints came
exclusively from customers in Brazil.  Over the next few years,
cases of delamination cropped up in the United States, though they
were largely clustered in certain regions.

Although Ford could not confirm that biodiesel was the culprit --
and Ford's engineers sometimes questioned the biodiesel hypothesis
in light of inconclusive testing -- Ford's leads were compelling
enough that it started working with Magni in 2005 to develop a more
biodiesel-resistant coating.  And by February 2007, Ford released
an improved coating, called "A35," to replace the prior "A36"
coating in F-Series Super Duty trucks.  Around the same time, Ford
sent a message to dealers notifying them about the release of the
new tank coating and explaining that fuel tanks in certain Ford
trucks had delaminated, which Ford attributed to "the use of fuels
containing concentrations of bio-diesel greater than recommended by
Ford (5%)."

Ford's warranty claims did drop after the release of the A35
coating, but some reports of delamination persisted. Having not
fully solved the problem, Ford continued its investigation.  And by
2010, Ford's Materials Engineering department came to believe that
biodiesel was not the root cause after all; instead, acetic and
formic acids were more likely the cause all along.

Coba, the Plaintiff in the case, is one of the Ford-vehicle
customers whose fuel tanks delaminated.  He purchased two Ford 2006
F-350 Super Duty 6.0L diesel dump trucks for his landscaping
business, Coba Landscaping and Construction, Inc.  He bought the
first in October of 2006 and the second in March of 2007.  By March
of 2009, both trucks began exhibiting signs of tank delamination.
According to Coba, the engines would misfire, the trucks lacked
power when driven up hills, the fuel filters were contaminated with
fuel-tank debris, and the fuel systems rusted.

He brought the trucks into a Ford dealership, which replaced the
fuel tanks and fuel filters in both trucks at no cost to Coba.
Despite the repairs, Coba had the same problems over and over
again, needing additional replacements each time.  Altogether, Coba
replaced the fuel tank twice in his older truck and three times in
his newer truck.  Because several of the replacements occurred
after the trucks' warranties had expired, Coba spent several
thousand dollars on the fixes.

Coba filed the class-action lawsuit against Ford Motor Co. in March
of 2012.  As amended, the operative complaint asserts claims for
breach of express warranty, violation of the New Jersey Consumer
Fraud Act ("NJCFA"), and breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing.  Although Ford had replaced several of Coba's fuel tanks
under warranty, Coba alleges that Ford breached its written
warranty -- the New Vehicle Limited Warranty ("NVLW") -- by failing
to adequately repair and replace his tanks, as the replacements
turned out to have the same defects as his original tanks.  The
thrust of the implied-covenant-of-good-faith-and-fair-dealing claim
is that when Ford repaired Coba's vehicles, it knew that the
repairs would not solve Coba's delamination problems.  Finally,
Coba's NJCFA claim rests on allegations that Ford purposefully
failed to disclose to Coba and other customers the defect in its
fuel tanks.

The District Court entered summary judgment in Ford's favor on all
of Coba's claims.  The appeal followed.  On appeal, Coba challenges
the District Court's grant of summary judgment on his claims for
breach of express warranty, breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, and violation of the NJCFA.

Judge Krause concludes that, under New Jersey law, a warranty that
limits its coverage to defects in "materials" and "workmanship"
does not, without more, apply to defects in "design."  While
parties are free to redefine words in their contracts in ways that
deviate from plain and ordinary meaning, they did not do so in the
case.  "Materials" and "workmanship" in the NVLW carry their plain
meaning, and the warranty therefore does not extend to design
defects.

Having concluded that the NVLW does not cover design defects, the
Judge must determine whether the fuel-tank-delamination problem, as
alleged, reflected a defect in design.  She agrees with the
District Court that it does, so the court properly entered summary
judgment on Coba's breach-of-warranty claim.

Because Coba did not have any right to repair or replacement of his
fuel tanks under the NVLW, he also could not prevail on his claim
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
New Jersey recognizes an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in every contract, but to state a claim that it was
breached, a plaintiff must have the right to receive the fruits of
the contract and must show that the Defendant had "improper motive"
when interfering with that right.

Coba alleges that Ford breached the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing implied in the NVLW by repairing and replacing his tanks,
while knowing that those repairs and replacements would not fix or
remedy the fuel tank defect.  But even assuming Ford possessed an
improper motive -- a questionable notion given the evolving nature
of Ford's knowledge of a design defect -- the NVLW did not cover
design defects, so tank repair and replacement were not "fruits of
the NVLW" that Coba had a right to receive.

Because there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to Ford's
knowledge of a design defect, its failure to disclose that alleged
defect does not give rise to liability under the NJCFA.  Viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to Coba, it shows that
some Ford engineers had doubts whether biodiesel was the problem
and they were continuing to investigate.  It does not support the
inference, as Coba contends, that Ford knew the problem was a
design defect and that biodiesel was a "pretext."  Nor is that
inference supported either by the correspondence to which Coba
points concerning the mere prevalence of the delamination problem
or by other correspondence that post-dates his truck purchases and
thus has no bearing on Ford's earlier knowledge.

Finally, Coba's second NJCFA theory, predicated on non-disclosure
of the risk of delamination, also does not survive summary
judgment.  In any event, the relevant question is not the actual
rate of delamination viewed in hindsight, but what Ford knew and
therefore could have disclosed to customers about that rate.  And
the warranty data -- reflecting delamination-based replacements at
a rate of even less than 1% -- was the information Ford had at the
time.  As to that small percentage, based on the undisputed
evidence that Ford then believed biodiesel to be the culprit and
the recommendation in its owner's manual against using those fuels,
Ford had every reason to believe that risk was mitigated—as would
any reasonable customer in possession of that same information.

The Judge therefore agrees with the District Court that no
reasonable factfinder could conclude that this information would be
material to a reasonable consumer prospectively deciding, in March
2007, whether to purchase a Ford 6.0L diesel truck.  Accordingly,
Coba's second NJCFA theory, predicated on non-disclosure of the
risk of delamination, also does not survive summary judgment.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Krause affirmed the judgment of
the District Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/A7XEzy from Leagle.com.

John E. Stobart -- john.stobart@capstonelawyers.com -- Ryan Wu, I
-- Ryan.Wu@CapstoneLawyers.com -- Capstone Law, 1875 Century Park
East, Suite 1000, Los Angeles, CA 90067, Counsel for Appellant.

Robert M. Palumbos -- RMPalumbos@duanemorris.com -- Andrew R. Sperl
-- ARSperl@duanemorris.com -- Duane Morris, 30 South 17th Street,
United Plaza, Philadelphia, PA 19103, John M. Thomas, Dykema, 2723
South State Street, Suite 400, Ann Arbor, MI 48104, Karol C. Walker
, LeClairRyan, 1037 Raymond Boulevard, One Riverfront Plaza, 16th
Floor, Newark, NJ 07102, Counsel for Appellee.


FULTONDALE ON TAP: Hasty Seeks Proper Wages Under FLSA
------------------------------------------------------
DAISY HASTY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated Plaintiffs, v. FULTONDALE ON TAP, INC.; ON TAP SUMMIT,
LLC; ELAINE BEEGLE; AND TODD BEEGLE, Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-01456-SGC (N.D. Ala., Sept. 3, 2019) asserts claims for
unpaid overtime and minimum wages pursuant to the collective action
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act against Defendants.

Plaintiff asserts these claims due to Defendants' actions of: (1)
taking a "tip credit" and paying them less than $7.25 per hour, but
splitting a portion of their tips with Defendants' management
staff, and (2) failing to pay hourly employees at a rate of pay
equal to at least one-half times their regular rate of pay for all
hours they worked in excess for 40 per week. In so doing,
Defendants acted in a coordinated and calculated scheme and, with a
common practice and purpose, deliberately and willfully violated
Plaintiff's and the putative FLSA Collective Classes' rights under
the FLSA, says the complaint.

Plaintiff further asserts an individual claim for unpaid overtime
due to Defendants' willful and intentional failure to issue her any
pay at all during all or some of the period from February 2019 to
June 2019.

Plaintiff was a resident of the State of Alabama and worked for
Defendants as a bartender and waitress from February 2017 to July
2019.

Fultondale On Tap, Inc., an Alabama corporation, operates a
restaurant and pub.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jody Forester Jackson, Esq.
     JACKSON+JACKSON
     201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 2500
     New Orleans, LA 70170
     Phone: (504) 599-5953
     Fax: (888) 988-6499
     Email: jjackson@jackson-law.net


GOLDSMITH & HULL: Tavares Suit Asserts FDCPA Breach
---------------------------------------------------
Justine Tavares, on behalf of herself and similarly situated class
members, Plaintiff, v. Goldsmith & Hull A.P.C.; Central Veterinary
Associates, P.C., Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-01630-MMA-LL (S.D.
Cal., Aug. 29, 2019) is an action seeking to challenge the actions
of Defendants with regard to attempts by Defendants to unlawfully
and abusively collect a debt allegedly owed by Plaintiff in
violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Sometime around 2016, Plaintiff is alleged to have incurred certain
financial obligations to Central Vet. Sometime thereafter,
Plaintiff fell behind in the payments owed on the alleged debt.
Subsequently, the alleged debt was assigned, placed, or otherwise
transferred to G&H for collection. On December 7, 2018, G&H mailed
a letter to Plaintiff demanding payment of the alleged debt. In
this December 7, 2018 letter, which was the initial communication
to Plaintiff, Defendants failed to provide notice of the debt. The
Defendants are required to provide Plaintiff with proper notice of
the alleged debt by which she can respond to either confirming or
disputing the alleged debt within the time provided, notes the
complaint. In this December 7, 2018 letter G&H demanded payment for
certain amounts. On February 20, 2019, G&H sent another letter to
Plaintiff demanding payment of certain amounts.

The demands are expressly enumerated by the United States Congress
and the California state legislature as being material violations
of the FDCPA and California Rosenthal Act, respectively, as they
are the use of a false, deceptive, or misleading representations or
means in connection with the collection of any debt because they
are the false representation of the character, amount, or legal
status of a debt in violation of the FDCPA and in violation of
California Rosenthal Act, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is a natural person who resides in the City of San Diego,
State of California.

Defendant G&H is a California corporation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Yana A. Hart, Esq.
     KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
     2221 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 101
     San Diego, CA 92108
     Phone: (619) 233-7770
     Facsimile: (619) 297-1022
     Email: yana@kazlg.com

          - and -

     Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.
     Jason A. Ibey, Esq.
     Nicholas R. Barthel, Esq.
     KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
     245 Fischer Avenue, Unit D1
     Costa Mesa, CA 92626
     Phone: (800) 400-6808
     Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
     Email: ak@kazlg.com
            jason@kazlg.com
            nicholas@kazlg.com


GREAT AMERICAN POWER: Lechuga Files Class Suit in N.D. Illinois
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Great American Power,
LLC. The case is styled as Michelle Lechuga individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Great
American Power, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-05989 (N.D. Ill.,
Sept. 6, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Consumer Credit.

Great American Power is an energy supply company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Mohammed Omar Badwan, Esq.
     Joseph Scott Davidson, Esq.
     Sulaiman Law Group, Ltd.
     2500 S. Highland Avenue, Suite 200
     Lombard, IL 60148
     Phone: (630) 575-8181
     Email: mbadwan@sulaimanlaw.com
            jdavidson@sulaimanlaw.com


GTT COMMUNICATIONS: Pomerantz LLP Investigates Securities Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP is investigating claims on behalf of investors of
GTT Communications, Inc. ("GTT" or the "Company") (NYSE: GTT).  
Such investors are advised to contact Robert S. Willoughby at
rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or 888-476-6529, ext. 9980.

The investigation concerns whether GTT and certain of its officers
and/or directors have engaged in securities fraud or other unlawful
business practices.

In February 2018, GTT announced that it was purchasing Interoute
Communications Holdings S.A. ("Interoute") in a transformative
acquisition for EUR1.9 billion ($2.3 billion) in cash.  

On May 8, 2019, GTT disclosed a larger-than-expected loss for the
first quarter of 2019, including a sequential decline in revenues.
GTT blamed its poor performance on a host of issues with the
Interoute integration, including migrating legacy systems into
GTT's management database, discrepancies with Interoute's billing
systems, and a poor salesforce.  In addition, GTT disclosed that
shortly before the acquisition, Interoute had made a strategic
shift to sell cloud services that deviated from GTT's strategy of
focusing exclusively on cloud networking.  On this news, GTT's
stock price fell $7.04 per share, or 17.5%, to close at $33.25 per
share on May 8, 2019.  GTT's stock price continued to fall the
following day, closing at $29.91 per share, for a two-day decline
of over 25%.

On May 30, 2019, GTT made a presentation at the Cowen TMT
Conference 2019, in which the Company disclosed that the Interoute
integration was "challenging … as we moved thousands of Interoute
employees off of the Interoute systems and off of how they sold,
installed, billed and moved everything into GTT systems there
[were] some delays as we both went to render a new bill to the
customers who are going to be getting a GTT bill instead of an
Interoute bill."  On this news, GTT's stock price fell $1.22 per
share, or 4.9%, to close at $23.78 per share on May 31, 2019.

On June 24, 2019, analysts at Craig-Hallum reduced their price
target on GTT because "the company is in the midst of altering its
DNA, which had been largely built of growth via acquisitions, a
process that has been challenged by debt levels and recent
integration issues."  Craig-Hallum noted that instead of continuing
its roll-up strategy, GTT is now trying to "rebuild its organic
growth platform" by hiring a new salesforce.  On this news, GTT's
stock price fell $2.87 per share, or 12.6%, to close at $19.97 per
share on June 24, 2019.

Finally, on July 2, 2019, KeyBanc downgraded GTT and highlighted
how internal data on GTT suggested hiring activity remained slow,
indicating the increase in employee representatives necessary to
achieve revenue targets might be lower than expected.  KeyBanc also
reported on recent leadership changes in the Americas division,
noting that they were "an indication that organizational health is
not great."  On this news, GTT's stock price fell $0.50 per share,
or 2.7%, to close at $18.30 per share on July 2, 2019.

With offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Paris, The
Pomerantz Firm -- http://www.pomerantzlaw.com-- concentrates its
practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and antitrust class
litigation. Founded by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known as the
dean of the class action bar, the Pomerantz Firm pioneered the
field of securities class actions. Today, more than 80 years later,
the Pomerantz Firm continues in the tradition he established,
fighting for the rights of the victims of securities fraud,
breaches of fiduciary duty, and corporate misconduct. The Firm has
recovered numerous multimillion-dollar damages awards on behalf of
class members. [GN]


GUTTERBRUSH LLC: Nathen Day Asserts Breach of TCPA
--------------------------------------------------
NATHEN DAY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated Plaintiff, v. GUTTERBRUSH LLC, a Rhode Island limited
liability company, Defendant, Case No. 8:19-cv-00385 (D. Neb. Sept.
3, 2019) seeks to stop Defendant's illegal practice of making, and
permitting to be made on their behalf, unauthorized telephone calls
using an automatic dialing system to the cellular telephones of
consumers nationwide, and to obtain redress for all persons injured
by their conduct.

In the course of selling its product, Gutterbrush placed thousands
of calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice. The Defendant
did not obtain consent prior to placing these calls and, therefore,
is in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, notes the
complaint. By placing the calls at issue, Defendant has violated
the privacy and statutory rights of Plaintiff and the Class.
Plaintiff, therefore, seeks an injunction requiring Defendant to
stop its unconsented calling, as well as an award of actual and
statutory fines to the Class members, together with costs and
reasonable attorneys' fees.

Plaintiff NATHAN DAY is a natural person and is a citizen of the
District of Nebraska.

Gutterbrush LLC sells a product called "Gutter Brush" that cleans
household gutter systems.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Mark L. Javitch, Esq.
     Javitch Law Office
     480 S. Ellsworth Ave
     San Mateo, CA 94401
     Phone: 650-781-8000
     Facsimile: 650-648-0705
     Email: mark@javitchlawoffice.com



HEARTLAND PAYMENT: Court Dismisses Count II in Soranno Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSEPH SORANNO, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated Plaintiffs, v. HEARTLAND PAYMENT SYSTEMS,
LLC, successor in interest to HEARTLAND PAYMENT SYSTEMS, INC.,
Defendant, Civil Action No. 3:18-cv-16218-FLW-LHG (D. N.J.), Judge
Freda L. Wolfson of the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey granted Heartland's motion to dismiss Count Two (breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).

Heartland is in the business of providing processing services to
merchants for payment card transactions.  It hired Soranno in
January 2007 as a Relationship Manager, a commission-only sales
position.  Soranno sold Heartland's processing services for
American Express ("Amex") card payment transactions to merchants,
and for doing so, earned recurring monthly commissions.  All
commission-based positions at Heartland are eligible to attain
"Vested" status, which permits employees to continue earning
commissions even after their employment with Heartland ends.

In February or March of 2008, Soranno allegedly achieved Vested
status, and he executed Heartland's Vested Relationship Manager
Agreement.  According to Soranno, in April 2008, he took a new
position as a Territory Manager, which required him to execute
Heartland's Territory Manager Agreement.  Both executed agreements
("VA") are interchangeable.  Soranno alleges that the VA entitled
him to receive commissions for his merchants' transactions
processed through Heartland after his employment at Heartland
ended.  However, the VA also provided that Sorannos's commissions
would be paid consistent with Heartland's Sales Policy Manual and
that the manual could be amended periodically.

Soranno voluntarily resigned from his position with Heartland in
December 2012, and he continued to receive his commissions under
the VA in accordance with the Sales Policy Manual.  In 2014,
Soranno avers that Amex changed its pricing for card transactions
and Heartland converted merchants to the new pricing.  In 2015,
Heartland allegedly revised its Sale Policy Manual to reflect a new
commission structure for Amex processing services under the new
pricing.  As a result, Soranno acknowledges that he experienced an
increase in the value of his commissions for December 2014 and
January 2015, which Soranno maintained was an indication that
Heartland was receiving more revenue from merchants under the new
pricing.

During the price conversion, Soranno was subject to a restrictive
covenant in the VA prohibiting Soranno from soliciting any of
Heartland's merchants.  Then, in February 2015, Soranno alleges
that Heartland ceased commission payments to him and class members,
without warning, notice, or explanation, in violation of the VA.
However, Soranno alleges that Heartland continued to pay
commissions to its then-active sales employees who were subject to
the same sales policies.

Soranno asserts that, in bad faith and with improper motive,
Heartland failed to give warning or notice to Soranno that
Heartland would discontinue commissions.  Heartland, according to
the Complaint, did not communicate the Amex price change and
amendments made to the sales policies, and concealed the reasons
for terminating the commissions.

Moreover, Soranno claims that Heartland demonstrated improper
motive through its disparate treatment of former and active
employees because it continued to pay commissions on identically
price-converted merchant accounts to its active sales employees,
who were governed by the same Sales Policy Manual.  Soranno also
alleges that Heartland stopped paying the commissions because it
was facing competition from other payment processing companies, and
that Heartland's founder and former CEO, Robert O. Carr, labeled
the new pricing program as a new product altogether in order to
render subsequent transactions ineligible for commission payments
post-employment.  In addition, he claims that Heartland's executive
managers, who were also shareholders, were attempting to sell or
merge Heartland, and therefore, had a financial incentive to reduce
commissions to make Heartland a better candidate for a merger or
acquisition.

On Oct. 15, 2018, Soranno brought the putative class action against
Heartland for breach of contract (Count One), breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count Two), and unjust
enrichment (Count Three).  Heartland moves to dismiss Count Two
under Rule 12(b)(6).

The Complaint alleges that Heartland strategically and purposefully
ceased paying commissions in order to become more financially
attractive as a potential subject of a merger or acquisition, and
that in doing so, Heartland concealed its reasons, thereby
improperly depriving Soranno the benefits of the VA.  Heartland
requests dismissal of Soranno's claim on the basis that it is
premised on the same conduct underlying Soranno's breach of
contract claim.  Heartland also argues that Soranno fails to
specifically allege the improper motive on the part of Heartland,
other than the fact that the alleged breach benefited Heartland.
Because Soranno does not sufficiently allege that Heartland
breached the VA with ill-motive to injure Soranno, Soranno has
failed to state a claim for a breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.

Judge Wolfson finds that Soranno only alleges that Heartland failed
to perform its duties under the contract and his factual
allegations, even if true, present only economic motive on the part
of Heartland. Soranno alleges that Heartland impaired Soranno's
contractual right to commissions because Heartland and its
executive managers -- who were also shareholders -- sought to
position Heartland as a more attractive target for a potential
merger or acquisition.  Soranno alleges that Heartland stopped
paying commissions without notice after Amex's pricing structure
changed.  His allegations in this regard are insufficient, however,
because they merely show that Heartland made financially-motived
decisions, which benefited Heartland but to Soranno's detriment.

Furthermore, Soranno additionally alleges that Heartland continued
to pay the same commissions to active employees and that
Heartland's former CEO purposefully labeled Vested former employee
merchant accounts as new accounts after the price change, rendering
the accounts ineligible for commissions.  These allegations,
however, only show that Heartland breached the VA, and deprived
Soranno the anticipated benefit of the VA, which is also
insufficient to establish a breach the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.  That is, Soranno does not allege that Heartland
harbored ill-motive toward Soranno in terminating his commissions,
separate from Heartland's alleged financial incentives to breach
the VA.

Moreover, the Judge holds that Soranno's allegation that Heartland
concealed its reasons for ending commissions similarly amounts only
to a breach of contract; Soranno does not allege that Heartland
aimed to harm Soranno beyond the fruits of the contract.
Therefore, Heartland may have allegedly deprived Soranno of his
commissions, but there are no allegations that it took any actions,
or had any intentions, to harm Soranno beyond his contractual right
to commissions.  Thus, Soranno's allegations have failed to
establish bad faith, a requirement to properly plead a breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Wolfson granted Heartland's motion
to dismiss, and dismissed the Plaintiff's Count II for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/tBhorD from Leagle.com.

JOSEPH SORANNO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by PAUL A. DIGIORGIO --
pdigiorgio@keefe-lawfirm.com -- KEEFE LAW FIRM.

HEARTLAND PAYMENT SYSTEMS, LLC, successor in interest to HEARTLAND
PAYMENT SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant, represented by RICHARD J.
WILLIAMS, JR. -- rwilliams@mdmc-law.com -- MCELROY, DEUTSCH,
MULVANEY & CARPENTER, LLP & MICHAEL DAVID CELENTANO --
MCELENTANO@MDMC-LAW.COM -- MCELROY DEUTSCH MULVANEY & CARPENTER
LLP.


HOME DEPOT: Camp Suit Remanded to Santa Clara County Superior Court
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DELMER CAMP, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HOME DEPOT U.S.A.
INC., Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-02240-RS (N.D. Cal.), Judge Richard
Seeborg of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California (i) granted the Plaintiffs' motion to remand to the
Superior Court of California, Santa Clara, and (ii) denied their
request for an award of attorneys' fees.

Plaintiffs Camp and Adriana Correa filed the putative class action
in the Superior Court of California, Santa Clara.  The operative
complaint asserts state law claims against Home Depot.  Home Depot
removed the action to the Northern District of California pursuant
to the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), contending that the
amount in controversy can be reasonably estimated to exceed the $5
million threshold for jurisdiction under CAFA.

The parties' sole dispute is whether CAFA's $5 million amount in
controversy requirement is met.  In its Notice of Removal, Home
Depot contended the amount in controversy is over $8.5 million.  In
its Opposition, the company increased the estimated amount in
controversy to $10.2 million.  This estimate is based on the fact
that 122,070 employees had one or more pay periods where the total
recorded clock hours for that pay period was greater than total
rounded hours.

The Plaintiffs, for their part, argue the amount in controversy is
below $5 million and accuse Home Depot of improperly redefining the
scope of the proposed class in order to satisfy the amount in
controversy requirement.

The Complaint defines the class as all persons current or formerly
employed by Defendant HOME DEPOT U.S.A., Inc., in hourly-paid
positions within the State of California at any time on or after
the date four years prior to the filing of the initial Complaint in
this matter and whose aggregate work time for purposes of
calculating payroll was lower after application of time rounding by
Defendant HOME DEPOT U.S.A., Inc.'s timekeeping systems than the
aggregate work time captured by the timekeeping system before
applying rounding to daily total time worked.

The Plaintiffs estimate this class amounts to over 60,000
Associates employed by Home Depot who have been paid for less time
than was captured by the timekeeping system.

Judge Seeborg finds that Home Depot cites no authority for the
proposition that a defendant may redefine a plaintiff's class based
on its impressions of the merits of the class claims.  Home Depot's
estimates of the amount in controversy were not based on the
correct class and therefore cannot satisfy the amount in
controversy requirement.  Accordingly, the motion to remand is
granted.

The Plaintiffs seek an award of attorneys' fees incurred as a
result of removal.  Attorneys' fees are available under 28 U.S.C.
Section 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively
reasonable basis for seeking removal.  Home Depot had an
objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.  Accordingly, the
Judge denied the Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees.

For the reasons set forth , Judge Seeborg remanded the action to
the Superior Court of California, Santa Clara.  Attorneys' fees
will not be awarded.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/hY9IGr from Leagle.com.

Delmer Camp & Adriana Correa, Plaintiffs, represented by Allen
Victor Feghali -- allen.feghali@moonyanglaw.com -- Moon and Yang,
APC, Howard Scott Leviant -- scott.leviant@moonyanglaw.com -- Moon
& Yang, APC, Kane Moon -- kane.moon@moonyanglaw.com -- Moon and
Yang, APC & Lilit Ter-Astvatsatryan, Moon & Yang, APC.

Home Depot U.S.A. Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant,
represented by Liz Kathryn Bertko -- lbertko@akingump.com -- Akin
Gump Strauss Hauer and Feld LLP, Dorothy Frances Kaslow, Akin Gump
Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP & Donna Marie Mezias --
dmezias@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP.


HYUNDAI MOTOR: Hauser Sues over Defective Airbag Control Unit
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against nine automotive
manufacturers and a tier-one parts supplier alleging that they
concealed a deadly airbag defect in 12.3 million U.S. cars.

On the heels of the Takata recall, and the $1.5 billion in class
action settlements that accompanied it, the manufacturers -- Acura,
Honda, Toyota, FCA, Mitsubishi, Kia and Hyundai -- have known of
this new airbag defect for years, and have yet refused to issue a
recall to fix it.

At issue is the vehicles' airbag control unit ("ACU") manufactured
by supplier ZF-TRW that becomes over-stressed by excess electrical
energy generated during a crash. The "electrical over-stress"
forces the ACU to seize-up at the moment of impact, causing the
airbags to not deploy and the seatbelt locks to fail.

After numerous reports of deaths and serious injuries, in 2018 the
National Highway Safety Traffic Administration ("NHTSA") launched
an investigation into the matter, only to find out that ZF-TRW had
been having in-depth discussions with manufacturers about the
defective ACU since at least 2011.

Under the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, manufacturers are
required to issue a full vehicle recall within five days of
learning of a defect.

In April 2019, NHTSA elevated the investigation to an Engineering
Analysis and expanded the scope of the investigation to include
other manufacturers who had installed the ZF-TRW made ACU in their
production vehicles. At its early investigation stages, NHTSA has
confirmed that the defective ACU has been linked to at least four
deaths; however, NHTSA complaint logs confirm that many more
fatalities have been reported to NHTSA that are still under
investigation.

The complaint brings claims against each of the seven automotive
manufacturers and the tier-one parts supplier for violations of the
Magnuson Moss Act, violations of California consumer protection
statutes and violations of common law claims of fraud and unjust
enrichment, the lawsuit says.

The case is captioned as William Hauser, individually and on behalf
of those similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. ZF FRIEDRICHSHAFEN
AG, ZF-TRW AUTOMOTIVE HOLDINGS CORP., TRW AUTOMOTIVE INC., TRW
AUTOMOTIVE U.S. LLC, TRW VEHICLE SAFETY SYSTEMS INC., HYUNDAI MOTOR
GROUP, HYUNDAI MOTOR CO., HYUNDAI MOBIS CO. LTD., HYUNDAI MOTOR
AMERICA, INC., the Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-07292-JAK-FFM (N.D.
Ala., July 26, 2019).

The Defendants are manufacturer and distributor of motor
vehicles.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          F. Jerome Tapley, Esq.
          Douglas A. Delaccio, Esq.
          Hirlye R. "Ryan" Lutz, III, Esq.
          Adam W. Pittman, Esq.
          Lauren S. Miller, Esq.
          CORY WATSON P.C.
          2131 Magnolia Ave. S.
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-2200
          Facsimile: (205) 324-7896
          E-Mail: jtapley@corywatson.com
                  ddellacio@corywatson.com
                  rlutz@corywatson.com
                  apittman@corywatson.com
                  lmiller@corywatson.com

               - and -

          Chris T. Hellums, Esq
          Jonathan S. Mann, Esq
          PITTMAN, DUTTON & HELLUMS, P.C.
          2001 Park Place North, Suite 1100
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Telephone: (205) 322-8880
          Facsimile: (205) 328-2711
          E-Mail: chrish@pittmandutton.com
                  jonm@pittmandutton.com

INTEPLAST GROUP: Robinson Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages, Damages
--------------------------------------------------------------
JOSEPHINE ROBINSON, Individually, and on behalf of herself and
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. INTEPLAST GROUP
CORPORATION, a Texas Corporation, MEDIRA INC., a Delaware
Corporation, and MEDEGEN MEDICAL PRODUCTS, LLC a Delaware Limited
Liability Company, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-02588-SHL-TLP (W.D.
Tenn., Sept. 3, 2019) is a lawsuit brought against Defendants as a
collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act to recover
unpaid overtime compensation and other damages owed to Plaintiff
and other current and former employees of Defendants who are
members of a class.

According to the complaint, the Defendants failed to include shift
differential payments in the regular rate of pay for Plaintiff and
those similarly situated, resulting in underpayment of overtime on
Plaintiff's base hourly rate rather than the regular rate as
defined in Department of Labor regulation 29 CFR 778.207(b), which
requires the inclusion of shift differentials in the regular rate
when calculating overtime.

Defendants willfully failed to pay Plaintiff and other similarly
situated employees the correct overtime premium pay for overtime
work in order to save payroll costs, says the complaint. As a
consequence, Defendants have violated the FLSA and has thereby
enjoyed ill-gained profits at the expense of Plaintiffs and others
similarly situated. Plaintiff, therefore, seeks to recover back
pay, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, interest, and other cost,
fees and expenses from Defendants for all such unpaid overtime,
which is available under the FLSA.

Plaintiff Josephine Robinson was employed by Defendants as an
hourly-paid employee who received shift differentials.

Inteplast is a company that manufactures a variety of polymer-based
products, and sells and distributes them across the United States
and Canada.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Gordon E. Jackson, Esq.
     J. Russ Bryant, Esq.
     Robert E. Turner IV, Esq.
     Nathaniel A. Bishop, Esq.
     Robert E. Morelli, III, Esq.
     JACKSON, SHIELDS, YEISER & HOLT
     262 German Oak Drive
     Memphis, TN 38018
     Phone: (901) 754-8001
     Fax: (901) 759-1745
     Email: gjackson@jsyc.com
            rbryant@jsyc.com
            rturner@jsyc.com
            nbishop@jsyc.com
            rmorelli@jsyc.com


JACK MADDEN: Turner Seeks Overtime Pay for Salespersons
-------------------------------------------------------
LARRY TURNER, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. JACK MADDEN FORD SALES, INC.; JOHN P.
MADDEN JR., and DEBORAH REILLY, the Defendants, Case No. 19-1083
(Mass. Super., Aug. 22, 2019), seeks damages based on the
Defendants' failure to pay wages under the Massachusetts Wage Law.

The Defendants operate a car dealership located in Norwood,
Massachusetts. The Plaintiff worked as a salesperson for Defendants
from approximately June 2010 through September 2017.

The Plaintiff, as well as other members of the Class defined below,
was compensated through a commission program. Defendants'
company-wide compensation structure for salespeople was based on a
100% commission/draw model. Employees' pay each week was based on
percentage of each sale made by the employee. To the extent an
employee's pay for any given week fell below a certain threshold.
Defendants would advance the employee a "draw" on future
commissions.

Pursuant to this pay policy, draws and commissions were ostensibly
applied to hours worked over 40 hours per week, and to hours worked
on Sundays and holidays.

The Defendants did not pay any additional compensation for such
work beyond the draws and commissions. The Plaintiff worked more
than 40 hours in at least one week during the class, the lawsuit
says.

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Josh Gardner, Esq.
          Nicholas J. Rosenberg, Esq.
          GARDNER & ROSENBERG P.C..
          One State Street, Fourth Floor
          Boston, MA 02109
          Telephone: 617 390-7570
          E-mail: josh@gardnerrosenberg.com

JETS STADIUM: 3rd Cir. Affirms Gengo NJCFA Suit Dismissal
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court's Order granting Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned JAMES T. GENGO,
Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Appellant, v. JETS STADIUM DEVELOPMENT LLC; NEW YORK JETS LLC. No.
18-3103. (3rd Cir.).

At issue in this case is a personal seat license (PSL) agreement
between Gengo and defendants. The agreement both allows and
obligates Gengo to buy season tickets to football games played by
the New York Jets in MetLife Stadium. Gengo paid a fee for the
agreement because, at the time, it was the only way to purchase
season tickets in Section 245a of the Stadium. Defendants now sell
season tickets in the Section to purchasers who have not entered
into a seat licensing agreement. Gengo argues this decision by
defendants has rendered his agreement valueless, and constitutes a
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in
the agreement and is a violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud
Act.

The district court found that the complaint filed by Gengo did not
state a plausible ground for relief under either theory and
dismissed the action.  

This court reviews de novo a district court's grant of a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).

Gengo's claim under the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing fails because he has received the fruits of his contract.
By signing the agreement, Gengo represented that he acquired this
PSL solely for the right to purchase tickets to Jets Home Games
played in the Stadium. The agreement related to certain seats in
the Stadium and gave Gengo the right and the obligation to purchase
admission tickets for the Seats.

Nothing in the complaint suggests that Gengo has lost the exclusive
right to purchase season tickets for these seats, much less that it
was defendants' actions that denied him that right. That defendants
might now sell adjacent seats to members of the general public does
not implicate Gengo's rights and certainly does not strip him of
the benefit for which he bargained.

Gengo's claim under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act fails for
similar reasons. He needed to plead an unlawful practice and,
regardless of the type of unlawful practice alleged, capacity to
mislead is the prime ingredient. Gengo specifically disclaims that
a misrepresentation or omission regarding exclusivity or ticket
policies forms the basis of his NJFCA claim. But simply changing
the terms on which defendants sell other seats in the stadium is
not misleading: the plain language of the agreement stated that
Gengo entered it solely for the right to purchase season tickets
for his selected seats and that the agreement was limited to this
purpose. The agreement, therefore, belies that a licensee could
have been misled into thinking it dictated how defendants could
sell all other seats in his section.  

The full-text copy of the Third Circuit's August 29, 2019 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3dzs59p from Leagle.com.


JS SULLIVAN: Cooks Seek Overtime Wages for Construction Laborers
----------------------------------------------------------------
REGGIE COOKS, on behalf of himself and all current and former
aggrieved employees, the Plaintiff, vs. JS SULLIVAN DEVELOPMENT,
LLC, a California limited liability company; CREATIVE CONCEPT, LLC,
a Delaware limited liability company; SEAN SULLIVAN aka HYUN SEAN
SULLIVAN,PARK aka HYUN SULLIVAN, individual, and DOES 1-50,
Inclusive, the Defendants, CGC-19-578599 (Cal. Super., Aug. 22,
2019), seeks to recover minimum and overtime wages under the
California Labor Code.

The Plaintiff and all others similarly situated worked for
Defendants performing construction labor duties in California at
any time within the four years prior to the filing of the initial
complaint.

JS Sullivan Development is a privately operated, entrepreneurial
and real estate development and construction company.[BN]

Attorneys for Reggie Cooks, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, are:

          Michael R. Crosner, Esq.
          Zachary M. Crosner, Esq.
          David Watson, Esq.
          CROSNER LEGAL, PC
          433 N. Camden Dr., Ste. 400
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: (310) 496-5818
          Facsimile: (310) 510-6429
          E-mail: mike@crosnerlegal.com
                  zach@crosnerlegal.com
                  david@crosnerlegal.com


L BRANDS: Schall Law Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
announces the filing of a class action lawsuit against L Brands,
Inc. (NYSE:LB) for violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law
Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at
424-303-1964, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also
reach us through the firm's website at www.schallfirm.com, or by
email at brian@schallfirm.com.

The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. L Brands' Victoria's Secret and PINK
stores experiencing worsening performance due in part to competing
lingerie brands. The Company worked to drive sales through heavy
promotional efforts such as offering customers discounts and free
items. Although these tactics helped L Brands fight declines in
sales, they impacted profit margins and cash flow negatively, also
hurting the Company's liquidity. When asked by market analysts
about the sustainability of the Company's dividend, executives
replied that the Company "in its history, ha[d] never reduced the
dividend." Just weeks later, L Brands announced it was cutting its
dividend in half to pay down debts. On this news, shares of L
brands dropped by 18% on November 20, 2018. Based on these facts,
the Company's public statements were false and materially
misleading throughout the class period. When the market learned the
truth about L Brands, investors suffered damages.

Join the case to recover your losses.

The Schall Law Firm represents investors around the world and
specializes in securities class action lawsuits and shareholder
rights litigation.

Contact:

         Brian Schall, Esq.
         The Schall Law Firm
         Office: 310-301-3335
         Cell: 424-303-1964
         Website: www.schallfirm.com
         Email: info@schallfirm.com
                brian@schallfirm.com [GN]


LOBLAW: Rana Plaza Factory Collapse Victims' Appeal Denied
----------------------------------------------------------
Allan C. Hutchinson, writing for The Globe And Mail, reports that
the Supreme Court of Canada's recent decision to deny an appeal in
a lawsuit brought by victims of a Bangladeshi tragedy might seem
like a small and obscure footnote to class-action jurisprudence.
But it is not. Its ramifications are highly significant for serious
and wide-ranging matters on corporate responsibility and global
trade.

Some will remember the Rana Plaza factory collapse in Bangladesh a
few years ago, when 1,130 garment workers died and at least 2,520
others sustained serious injuries. Canadians were appropriately
shocked and saddened by this incident, one of an increasing number
of similar accidents with catastrophic results. However, sympathy
is not enough.

Canadians must begin to take responsibility and action on this
horrendous trend, especially when it involves Canadian companies.
As the beneficiaries of the cheap products made and exported to us,
we are implicated in the conditions that give rise to these deaths
and injuries.

Bangladesh and surrounding countries have a history of factory
deaths. In the past few years, many thousands of workers have been
killed and many more injured or maimed. Building codes are weak,
regularly flouted and rarely enforced. In short, any building site
or completed factory is a disaster waiting to happen.

These countries are the source of some of the cheapest labour for
manufacturing goods and clothing. Along with their U.S.
counterparts, Canadian companies outsource much of their
manufacturing to these countries. Paying wages as low as $3 or $4 a
day, they obtain merchandise at rock-bottom prices, ship the goods
here, sell them at rock-bottom prices and still reap enormous
profits.

One egregious example of these practices is the collapse of the
Rana Plaza in Savar, Bangladesh. Joe Fresh, now owned by Loblaw,
imported massive amounts of garments each year from more than 70
factories in Bangladesh. One of its main suppliers was New Wave,
which worked out of the Rana Plaza. The conditions were typical --
long hours, low pay and unrelenting pressure to get the job done.

On the morning of April 24, 2013, the Rana Plaza collapsed. Other
companies in the building had closed because of reports of its
perilous condition. New Wave did not heed such warnings; it had
orders to fill and deadlines to meet. Later that day, 1,130 garment
workers died and at least 2,520 others sustained serious injuries.

Actions were brought by the workers in Bangladesh. But, like the
buildings, the legal process is in ramshackle state. The government
is heavily dependent on and involved in the rag trade. The
prospects for any reasonable or sufficient redress are extremely
low. It is a case of business as usual. Workers are a cheap and
expendable resource.

In such circumstances, it is the main and highly profitable
beneficiaries of cheap Bangladeshi goods that should be held
accountable -- Loblaw, in this case. It had a longstanding and
close relationship with New Wave, and it would be well aware of the
dangerous state of buildings, the poor working conditions, the
history of fatal accidents and the need for robust monitoring of
the situation.

A group of injured Bangladeshi workers filed suit in Canada, but
courts here decided there was an insufficient link between what
happened and Loblaw. However, this defies serious analysis. Loblaw
kept the pressure on New Wave to live up to its contractual
obligations, delivery dates and product standards. As such, Loblaw
should step forward and assume a fair share of the responsibility.
It must be prepared to use its ample profits to help victims and
prevent future disasters.

Unless Loblaw and others are brought before Canadian courts and the
grounds of liability extended to encompass it, it will continue to
exploit cheap foreign labour for its own financial gain. In
contrast, Loblaw and other Canadian corporations must know that
they are not beyond the law or redress in such matters.

Gestures of relatively small contributions (of a few million
dollars) to local relief funds do not cut it. Loblaw reaps enormous
profits from its dealings in Bangladesh. If it can so easily
absolve itself from direct legal and substantial liability, little
will change. It is simply not acceptable that large corporations
should be able to enjoy the good times and then walk away when
tragedy strikes.

If Loblaw persists in taking the profits, then it must also accept
the blame and its costs. Global capitalism may be a modern
phenomenon, but it need not be carried out in such a Victorian and
oppressive manner. With profits, come responsibility; it is that
simple.

Canadian courts must open themselves up to the families of victims
and hit Loblaw, a leading Canadian corporation, where it hurts.
Arguments that it should pay at Bangladeshi rates add insult to
injury. The profits are measured in Canadian terms, so must the
liability imposed and damages awarded. [GN]


LTD FINANCIAL: Court Dismisses Ladevaio FDCPA Suit
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York issued an Memorandum and Order granting Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment in the case captioned GENINE IADEVAIO, ON BEHALF
OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff, v. LTD
FINANCIAL SERVICES, L.P., Defendant. No. 17-CV-4112 (JFB)(SIL).
(E.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiff Genine Iadevaio brings this putative class action against
LTD Financial Services, L.P., for alleged violations of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Defendant sent the
Collection Letter to collect the past due debt. The Collection
Letter is the initial communication from defendant to plaintiff
mandated by 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g(a).  

The Plaintiff contends that defendant violated Sections
1692g(a)(2), 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), and 1692e(10) of the FDPCA.
Specifically, plaintiff argues that the Collection Letter failed to
identify the actual entity to which plaintiff owed the Balance, as
the initial communication set forth the name of the Creditor as
Show Master Card.

The defendant's motion for summary judgment on the Fourth Cause of
Action is granted, and plaintiffs cross-motion is denied.
Specifically, the Court concludes that the uncontroverted facts
demonstrate the use of Show Master Card as the creditor in the
Collection Letter did not violate the FDCPA.

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

The FDCPA was created to respond to the use of abusive, deceptive,
and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors.
Finding that abusive debt collection practices contribute to the
number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the
loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy, the Act aims
to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors,
to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive
debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and
to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against
debt collection abuses.

Here, plaintiff alleges claims under FDCPA Sections 1692e and
1692g, and specific subsections thereunder, which the Court will
briefly address in turn.

Section 1692e

Section 1692e establishes a general prohibition against a debt
collector's use of any false, deceptive, or misleading
representation or means in connection with the collection of any
debt. The section then includes a non-exhaustive list of prohibited
conduct, including (1) the false representation of the character,
amount, or legal status of any debt and (2) the use of any false
representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect
any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.

Section 1692g(a)

Section 1692g(a) sets forth required disclosures for a debt
collector's initial communication to a consumer. As relevant here,
this section requires that the initial communication include the
name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.

The parties do not dispute that plaintiff is a consumer and
defendant is a debt collector, as those terms are defined by the
FDCPA, and that the instant dispute is therefore covered by the
statute. Moreover, it is uncontested that Exhibit A to plaintiff's
complaint is the initial communication from defendant to plaintiff
mandated by 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g(a). Finally, defendant concedes
that Bryant State Bank is the actual entity to which plaintiff owed
the Balance set forth in [the Collection Letter.

Therefore, the question is whether defendant violated the
above-described FDCPA provisions by identifying Show Master Card,
rather than Bryant State Bank, as plaintiffs creditor. For the
reasons that follow, the Court concludes that the Collection Letter
does not.

The Court will first address defendant's contention that
plaintiff's claim is time-barred before turning to the merits of
plaintiffs claims.

Timeliness

15 U.S.C. Section 1692k(d)

Defendant argues that plaintiffs cause of action is time-barred
under FDCPA Section 1692k(d). As set forth below, the Court denies
defendant's motion for summary judgment on this ground.

On February 21, 2016, plaintiff received the Collection Letter,
which allegedly violates the FDCPA. Plaintiff then filed a summons
and notice in Nassau County Supreme Court on February 17,
2017—within the prescribed one-year window.  

Defendant argues that the absence of a complaint until November 2,
2017 renders the action untimely. The Court disagrees.

Here, New York State procedure does not require the filing of a
complaint in order to properly institute an action and comply with
applicable statute of limitation provisions. Thus, at the time of
removal to this Court on July 11, 2017, plaintiff had satisfied the
applicable statute of limitations under New York State procedure.

The removal of the case to the federal court does not vitiate that
compliance. Once a case is removed, there is no requisite time
frame by which a complaint must be filed, although the Court can
certainly order the filing of such a pleading under Rule 81 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. No such order was issued in this
case. Thus, the filing of the complaint on November 2, 2017 did not
violate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, nor does the absence
of such a complaint impact a case that was timely filed for statute
of limitations purposes under New York State procedural rules prior
to removal.

Accordingly, this action was timely brought under 15 U.S.C. Section
1692k(d), and the Court denies defendant's motion on the grounds of
timeliness.

The Merits

Plaintiff argues that the Collection Letter fails to adequately
identify Bryant State Bank as her creditor in violation of Section
1692g(a)(2)'s requirement that a debt collection letter include the
name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed. Plaintiff also
alleges that this same failure renders the Collection Letter
misleading and deceptive under Sections 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and
1692e(10). As explained supra,defendant does not dispute that
Bryant State Bank is the actual entity to which plaintiff owed the
balance.

However, defendant argues that naming Show Master Card as the
creditor was sufficient as this name is commonly associated with
the account. As set forth below, the Court agrees with the
defendant and holds that, under the least sophisticated consumer
standard, the use of Show Master Card as the name of the creditor
in the Collection Letter does not violate the FDCPA.

Under the FDCPA a creditor is defined as: "any person who offers or
extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed, but such
term does not include any person to the extent that he receives an
assignment or transfer of a debt in default solely for the purpose
of facilitating collection of such debt for another."

Plaintiff makes two principal legal arguments in response to this
case authority. First, plaintiff suggests that the name of the
creditor used by the debt collector must be similar to the
corporate name.  

The Court disagrees with plaintiff's assertions. Although companies
often use a variation of their corporate name or an acronym in
identifying themselves to the public, that is not the relevant
inquiry for purposes of the FDCPA. Instead, the question is whether
the least sophisticated consumer would recognize the name in the
Collection Letter and understand, from that name, with whom the
debt originated. As the Second Circuit and other courts have
emphasized, that recognition of the creditor by the debtor may come
from not just an acronym, but from the name under which it usually
transacts business and/or any name that it has used from the
inception of the credit relation.   

Having reviewed the record in this case, it is clear from the
uncontroverted facts that the least sophisticated consumer would
understand the identity of the creditor from the use of the trade
name Show Master Card in the Collection Letter. The card that
plaintiff was using was called the Show Master Card and that trade
name was used from the beginning of the credit relationship.
Moreover, the least sophisticated consumer would undoubtedly
understand from the monthly statements for their credit card that
Show Master Card is the trade name used by Bryant State Bank. In
fact, the payment slip in the monthly statement combines the names
and states at the top.

In short, the uncontroverted evidence clearly demonstrates that
Show Master Card is the name under which Bryant State Bank
transacts business in connection with the credit card at issue, and
that it did so since the beginning of the credit relationship with
plaintiff, and that the identity of the creditor would be
understood by the least sophisticated consumer under these
circumstances.  

In sum, the uncontroverted facts demonstrate that the least
sophisticated consumer would be able to properly identify the
creditor through the use of the brand/trade name in the Collection
Letter. Accordingly, the Collection Letter does not violate 15
U.S.C. Section 1692g(a)(2). For the same reasons, the Collection
Letter does not violate 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e. In particular, the
least sophisticated consumer would not find the language of the
letter, as it relates to the identity of the creditor, to be
confusing or misleading under Section 1692e.

The Court grants defendant's motion for summary judgment on the
Fourth Cause of Action and denies plaintiffs cross-motion for
summary judgment.

The full-text copy of the District Court's August 29, 2019,
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxf9qol6
from Leagle.com.

Genine Iadevaio, on behalf of herself and all others similiarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Mitchell L. Pashkin, 775 Park
Ave Ste 255, Huntington, NY 11743-7538

LTD Financial Services, LP, Defendant, represented by Mitchell Lee
Williamson -- mwilliamson@bn-lawyers.com -- Barron & Newburger, PC
& Arthur Sanders -- asanders@bn-lawyers.com -- Barron & Newburger,
P.C.


MARCEL AT GRAMERCY: Faces Duncan Suit in New York Southern
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Marcel At Gramercy
LLC. The case is captioned as Eugene Duncan, and on behalf of all
other persons similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Marcel At
Gramercy LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-07925-DAB (S.D.N.Y.,
Aug 23, 2019). The suit alleges violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Deborah A.
Batts.

Marcel At Gramercy LLC is engaged in hotel and accomodation
business.

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
          THE MARKS LAW FIRM PC
          175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10014
          Telephone: (646) 770-3775
          Facsimile: (646) 867-2639
          E-mail: bmarkslaw@gmail.com

MASSACHUSETTS: Briggs Suit Settlement Has Prelim Approval
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LEONARD BRIGGS, GEORGE SKINDER, LOUIS MARKHAM, FRANCIS
MCGOWAN, ERIC ROLDAN, ROLANDO S. JIMENEZ, and JENNIFER WARD, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; CAROL A. MICI,
COMMISSIONER OF THE MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION;
JENNIFER A. GAFFNEY,* DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF CLASSIFICATION,
PROGRAMS, AND REENTRY DIVISION; COLETTE M. GOGUEN,* SUPERINTENDENT
OF MCI-SHIRLEY; STEVEN SILVA,* SUPERINTENDENT OF MCI-NORFOLK; LISA
MITCHELL,* SUPERINTENDENT OF THE MASSACHUSETTS TREATMENT CENTER;
ALLISON HALLET,* SUPERINTENDENT OF MCI-FRAMINGHAM; and
MASSACHUSETTS PARTNERSHIP FOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE, Defendants,
Civil Action No. 15-40162-GAO (D. Mass.), Judge George A. O'Toole,
Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts
granted the parties' joint motion, pursuant to Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for an order preliminarily
approving their settlement agreement.

The parties' settlement agreement resolves all claims in the action
except for the Plaintiffs' claims defined as "Reserved Claims" in
the settlement agreement.  Judge O'Toole has read and considered
the motion and attached exhibits, the settlement agreement, and the
arguments made by the parties.

For settlement purposes, he preliminarily certified a Plaintiff
class consisting of all individuals who are currently in
Massachusetts Department of Correction ("DOC") custody or in the
future are placed in DOC custody, and who are currently or in the
future become deaf or hard of hearing.

Under the settlement agreement, the parties will consult and timely
agree upon a third party to serve as the settlement monitor to
assess DOC's compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement.
The settlement monitor will prepare bi-annual reports regarding
DOC's implementation of and compliance with the terms of the
settlement agreement and will share those reports with DOC and the
Plaintiffs' counsel.

The settlement agreement calls for the Plaintiffs to dismiss DOC
from the action, with the exception of the Plaintiffs' claims
defined as "Reserved Claims" in the settlement agreement, if and
when the Court issues final approval of the settlement agreement.

The Court will retain jurisdiction over this action during the
settlement term (3 years) and will be the sole forum for
enforcement of the settlement's terms, as described in the
settlement agreement.

THe Judge approved the proposed notice attached as Exhibit 3 to the
motion as appropriate in the case and reasonably calculated to
reach absent class members.

Upon entry of the Preliminary Approval Order, the written notice
will be issued to the class members by Prisoners' Legal Services
sending the notice through first-class mail to currently identified
class members in DOC custody and by DOC posting the notice in a
common area in each DOC facility.  The class members will file any
written objection to the proposed settlement no later than Sept. 6,
2019.

A final fairness hearing will take place on Sept. 25, 2019 at 2:00
p.m.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/O6boPq from Leagle.com.

Leonard Briggs, George Skinder, Louis Markham, Francis McGowan,
Eric Roldan, Rolando Jimenez & Jennifer Ward, Plaintiffs,
represented by Deborah Golden, Washington Lawyers' Committee for
Civil Rights & Urban, pro hac vice, Katherine V. Mackey --
KATHERINE.MACKEY@WILMERHALE.COM -- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and
Dorr LLP, Lisa J. Pirozzolo -- LISA.PIROZZOLO@WILMERHALE.COM
-- Wilmer Hale LLP, Alexandra B. Lavin --
ALEXANDRA.LAVIN@WILMERHALE.COM -- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and
Dorr LLP, Elizabeth D. Matos, Prisoners' Legal Services, James R.
Pingeon, Prisoners Legal Services Inc., Jessica L. Lewis --
JESSICA.LEWIS@WILMERHALE.COM -- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and
Dorr LLP, Jocelyn M. Keider -- JOCELYN.KEIDER@WILMERHALE.COM --
Wilmer Hale LLP, Lindsay Kosan -- LINDSAY.KOSAN@WILMERHALE.COM --
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP & Tatum A. Pritchard,
Prisoners' Legal Services.

Massachusetts Department of Correction, Commissioner Carol Higgins
O'Brien, Deputy Commissioner Katherine A. Chmiel, Superintendent
Kelly Ryan, Acting Super. Paul Henderson, Superintendent Steven
O'Brien & Superintendent Sean Medeiros, Defendants, represented by
Timothy M. Pomarole, Massachusetts Department of Correction Legal
Division & Anna Rachel Dray-Siegel, Office of the Attorney General
Administrative Law Division.


MDL 2795: Court Grants Minnesota's Bid for Continuance
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
issued a Memorandum granting the State of Minnessota's Motion for a
Continuance in the case captioned IN RE CENTURYLINK SALES PRACTICES
AND SECURITIES LITIGATION. This Document Relates to Civil File Nos.
17-2832, 17-4613, 17-4614, 17-4615, 17-4616, 17-4617, 17-4618,
17-4619, 17-4622, 17-4943, 17-4944, 17-4945, 17-4947, 17-5046,
18-1562, 18-1565, 18-1572, 18-1573. MDL No. 17-2795 (MJD/KMM).

The Court issued an Order granting the State of Minnesota's Motion
for Continuance and Extension of Time to Respond to Defendant and
Intervenors' Motion for Temporary Injunction.

The Minnesota Attorney General began an investigation into the
billing practices of Defendant CenturyLink, Inc.  The State of
Minnesota filed an action against CenturyLink in Minnesota state
court to enforce Minnesota's consumer protection laws and its
parens patriae authority to vindicate the State's sovereign and
quasi-sovereign interest to protect the economic welfare of
Minnesota's citizens.  

The State filed the current Motion for Continuance.

The State requests that the Court 1) continue the hearing on
Defendant's motion until after Defendant files for preliminary
approval of the putative class action settlement and 2) alter the
briefing schedule on the motion so that the State is provided at
least 30 days after such filing to submit its response in
opposition to the motion.

A party who seeks a continuance must show good cause. When a party
moves for an extension before the original time expires, motions to
extend are to be liberally permitted.

Because the issue of good cause is case-by-case and subject to the
discretion of the district courts, it has no concrete definition
but is analyzed by a number of factors, including (1) the
possibility of prejudice to the defendant (2) the length of the
delay and the potential impact on judicial proceedings (3) the
reason for the delay, including whether the delay was within the
party's reasonable control and (4) whether the party acted in good
faith.

The State has established good cause for a continuance. At this
time, CenturyLink's motion is premature. Both the State and the
Court need to be able to review the specific terms of the proposed
settlement agreement in order to cogently argue and decide
CenturyLink's motion for a temporary injunction.

Knowing the terms of the proposed settlement will assist the Court
in determining whether there is nothing preventing the two sets of
claims and interests [i.e., private class and government
enforcement] from existing in parallel, for example, in a private
settlement that resolves only the individuals' right to pursue
damages and doesn't interfere with the government's ability to seek
restitution and other remedies.

Within CenturyLink's argument that the state court action endangers
the potential federal settlement to the extent that an injunction
is necessary, CenturyLink makes certain representations about the
terms of the tentative settlement, such as whether television
consumer claims are included in the settlement and how the
settlement treats restitution recovered in state attorney general
proceedings. These arguments belie CenturyLink's claim that the
State and the Court need not review the preliminary settlement
before being able to cogently analyze whether a temporary
injunction should issue.

As demonstrated by the cases relied upon by Defendant itself,
courts properly consider motions for temporary stays of parallel
state proceedings, particularly those prosecuted by states on their
own behalf, when or after they consider motions for preliminary
approval of the class-wide settlements.  

The few cases in which an injunction issued before the settlement
was submitted for preliminary approval involve unique procedural
postures not at issue here, such as when multiple defendants have
already settled with plaintiffs. There is no authority cited in
which a federal court has enjoined a state from litigating in a
parallel action before the federal settlement agreement has even
been submitted for preliminary approval or at least some of the
federal defendants have already settled the case.

The Court finds that the State is making the request for a
continuance in good faith to enable it to meaningfully respond to
the motion for an injunction and to protect its sovereign and
quasi-sovereign authority to pursue the procedurally advanced state
action and vindicate the interests of the citizens of the State of
Minnesota.

Additionally, CenturyLink will not be prejudiced by the
continuance.

There is no authority for the proposition that a putative class's
undisclosed, potential settlement justifies interfering with an
ongoing, procedurally advanced government enforcement action.
CenturyLink claims that the motion for preliminary approval will be
filed shortly. Thus, the motion for a preliminary injunction can be
briefed and heard shortly.  

The Court issued the August 20, 2019 Order granting the State's
motion for a continuance.  

The full-text copy of the District Court's August 29, 2019,
Memorandum is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3axql72 from
Leagle.com.

Plaintiffs' Interim Co-Lead Counsel, Plaintiff, represented by
Benjamin Jared Meiselas -- ben@geragos.com -- GERAGOS & GERAGOS,
pro hac vice, Brian C. Gudmundson -- brian.gudmundson@zimmreed.com
-- Zimmerman Reed, PLLP, Carolyn G. Anderson --
carolyn.anderson@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman Reed, PLLP, Charles J.
Hodge -- chodge@hodgelawfirm.com -- Daniel C. Hedlund :
dhedlund@gustafsongluek.com -- Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Francois
Michel Blaudeau -- francois@sml-legal.i-mlaw.com -- Southern
Institute for Medical &Legal Affairs LLC, Hart L. Robinovitch --
hart.robinovitch@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman Reed, PLLP, James F.
McDonough, III, Heninger Garrison Davis, LLC, 3621 Vinings Slope,
Suite 4320, Atlanta, GA 30339, Lori G. Feldman, Geragos & Geragos,
7 W 24th St Ste 2, New York, NY 10010-3212, pro hac vice

Defendant's Primary Outside Counsel, Defendant, represented by
David M. Aafedt -- daafedt@winthrop.com -- Winthrop & Weinstine,
PA, David A. Vogel -- dvogel@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, pro hac
vice, Douglas P. Lobel -- dlobel@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, pro hac
vice, Jeffrey M. Gutkin -- mhodes@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Joseph
M. Windler -- jwindler@winthrop.com -- Winthrop & Weinstine, PA &
William A. McNab-  jwindler@winthrop.com -- Winthrop & Weinstine,
PA.


MINNESOTA: Court Denies Bid to Decertify Class in Murphy Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Tenner Murphy, by his guardians Kay and Richard
Murphy; Marrie Bottelson; Dionne Swanson; and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Pam Wheelock in her capacity as
Commissioner of The Minnesota Department of Human Services,
Defendant, Civil No. 16-2623 (DWF/BRT) (D. Minn.), Judge Donovan W.
Frank of the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota
denied the Defendant's Motion to Decertify the Class.

The Plaintiffs are individuals with disabilities and Medicaid
recipients who receive Home and Community Based Disability Waivers
from the State of Minnesota under the direction of Defendant Pam
Wheelock, Acting Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human
Services ("DHS").  The Plaintiffs reside in Community Residential
Setting ("CRS") facilities -- otherwise known as corporate adult
foster care -- and wish to access various individualized housing
services available under the Disability Waivers to pursue more
integrated housing options.  The Plaintiffs assert that their
current living situations isolate and segregate them from their
communities in violation of federal law.  To access the services
they seek in a timely manner and with proper due process, the
Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to reform the
Defendant's administration of the Disability Waiver programs.

On Sept. 29, 2017, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Class Certification, certifying the class of all individuals age 18
and older who are eligible for and have received a Disability
Waiver, live in a licensed Community Residential Setting, and have
not been given the choice and opportunity to reside in the most
integrated residential setting appropriate to their needs.

The Defendant now argues that the Class should be decertified
because discovery has shown that: (1) the Named Plaintiffs are not
adequate class representatives; (2) the Plaintiffs lack sufficient
evidence to meet the numerosity requirement; (3) the Named
Plaintiffs' claims are neither common nor typical of the class; and
(4) the Plaintiffs' claims cannot be remedied by a single
injunction.  The Defendant also challenges the Class member
standing.  The Plaintiffs oppose decertification.

The Defendant first argues that the Named Plaintiffs are no longer
adequate Class representatives because two have moved into
individualized and integrated homes, and a third has interests that
differ from other Class members.  Judge Frank holds that the record
reflects that the two Named Plaintiffs who moved did not move until
after the Class was certified, and that until they moved, their
claims for systemic relief were common to and typical of the
members of the Class.  The Defendant has not cited changes in her
management of the Waiver programs such that the Court's analysis
when it certified the Class no longer apples; therefore, the claims
as they pertain to the Class continue.  

The Judge also finds that the two Named Plaintiffs who moved have
continued to adequately protect the interests of the class, and
that their interests do not conflict with those they seek to
advance; therefore, they remain adequate representatives of the
Class as a whole.  With respect to the third Named Plaintiff, the
Judge finds that the Defendant has failed to make a proper showing
that she no longer shares the interests or has suffered the same
injuries as the Class.  Therefore, she too remains an adequate
class representative.  Only one adequate class representative is
needed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4).  Accordingly,
the Judge finds that the Class continues to have adequate
representation and declines to decertify it on this basis.

The Defendant next argues that the Court should decertify the Class
because it no longer satisfies the numerosity requirement pursuant
to Rule 23(a)(1) and that discovery has made clear that determining
whether a person is a member of the Class is a highly
individualized process that cannot be based on objective criteria.


The Judge finds that a decision to decertify a class should arise
based on changed circumstances that were not present when the class
was certified.  The Defendant has failed to present changed
circumstances such that the Court's analysis that the numerosity
requirement is satisfied no longer applies.  Accordingly, he
declines to decertify the Class on this basis.

The Defendant also argues that the Court should decertify the Class
because the Plaintiffs cannot show that their claims are common to
the Class.  The Judge holds that the Plaintiffs need only show that
the Defendant's actions are "a substantial factor in bringing about
the harm."  As a public entity, the Defendant must "administer
services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting
appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with
disabilities.  Whether the Defendant's administration of its Waiver
system is a substantial factor contributing to segregation is a
question of fact common to the class that is capable of classwide
resolution.  At this stage, the Plaintiffs need not answer this
question; it is sufficient that resolution of the Plaintiffs'
claims turn on common questions with common proof that will lead to
common answers if the Plaintiffs are successful.

The Defendant next argues that the Class should be decertified
because the Named Plaintiffs' claims are not typical of the Class
members' claims.  The Judge has reviewed the alleged notices and
finds that the general information provided in them is not a proxy
for proper notice of a specific proposed adverse action and that
they fail to comply with the Due Process Clause or Medicaid
regulations.  He finds that the Plaintiff Class continues to
satisfy the typicality requirement and declines to decertify the
Class on this basis.

The Defendant next argues that the Court should decertify the Class
because the Court cannot provide the requested relief with a single
injunction.  The Judge finds that the Plaintiffs claim that their
ability to live in the most integrated settings appropriate to
their needs is legally mandated.  Because the proposed injunction
would provide, at least in part, each member of the class an
increased opportunity to achieve that outcome, the Judge finds that
Rule 23(b)(2) remains satisfied on the record before the Court.

Finally, the Defendant argues that the Court should decertify the
Class because the Plaintiffs cannot show that every Class member
has standing to sue on his or her own behalf.  The Judge holds that
the Defendant is a public entity that must administer services,
programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate
to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.  The
Defendant's administration of the Waiver system potentially affects
the choice and opportunity of each Class Member to reside in the
most integrated residential setting appropriate to their needs.
Because the proposed injunction would provide, at least in part,
each member of the class an increased opportunity to achieve
increased choice and opportunity to live in the most integrated
setting appropriate to their needs, all participants in the Waiver
system will be affected by the proposed remedy.  Accordingly, the
JUdge finds that the Class is defined in such a way that anyone
within it has standing.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Frank concludes that the Defendant
has failed to demonstrate changed circumstance warranting
decertification of the Class.  Accordingly, he denied the
Defendant's Motion to Decertify the Class.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/wr2yYC from Leagle.com.

Tenner Murphy, by his guardians Kay and Richard Murphy and on
behalf of others similarly situated, Marrie Bottelson, and on
behalf of others similarly situated & Dionne Swanson, and on
behalf
of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Eren
Ernest Sutherland, Mid-Minnesota Legal Aid Minnesota Disability
Law
Center, Joseph W. Anthony -- janthony@anthonyostlund.com --
Anthony
Ostlund Baer & Louwagie PA, Justin M. Page, Mid-Minnesota Legal
Aid/Disability Law Center, Justin H. Perl -- jperl@mylegalaid.org
--, Mid-Minnesota Legal Aid, Peter McElligott --
pmcelligott@anthonyostland.com -- Anthony Ostlund Baer & Louwagie
PA, Steven M. Pincus -- spincus@anthonyostlund.com -- Anthony
Ostlund Baer & Louwagie PA, Steven C. Schmidt, Mid-Minnesota Legal
Aid Minnesota Disability Law Center & Steven Andrew Smith, Nichols
Kaster, PLLP.

Emily Johnson Piper, in her Capacity as Commissioner of the The
Minnesota Department of Human Services, Defendant, represented by
Aaron Winter -- aaron.winter@ag.state.mn.us -- Minnesota Attorney
General's Office, Brandon L. Boese, Office of the Minnesota
Attorney General, Janine Wetzel Kimble --
janine.kimble@ag.state.mn.us -- Minnesota Office of Attorney
General & Scott H. Ikeda -- scott.ikeda@ag.state.mn.us --
Minnesota
Attorney General's Office.

ARRM, Amicus, represented by Pari McGarraugh --
pmcgarraugh@fredlaw.com -- Fredrikson & Byron & Samuel D. Orbovich
-- sorbovich@fredlaw.com -- Fredrikson & Byron, PA.


MITSUBA: Power Window Motors Price Fixing Settlement Approved
-------------------------------------------------------------
Freed Kanner London & Millen LLC; Kohn, Swift & Graf, P.C.; Preti,
Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios LLP and Spector Roseman & Kodroff,
P.C. ("Settlement Class Counsel") on Aug. 12 disclosed that the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
Southern Division ("Court") has approved the following announcement
of proposed class action settlements with the MITSUBA Defendants
and DENSO Defendants.  The lawsuit claimed that Defendants
conspired to raise, fix, maintain, and stabilize prices, rig bids,
and allocate the supply of Power Window Motors sold in the United
States, in violation of federal antitrust laws.

The settlements affect those who purchased Power Window Motors in
the United States between January 1, 2000 and July 19, 2018
directly from any of the following entities (or depending on the
specific settlement agreements, their parents, subsidiaries,
affiliates and joint ventures): DENSO Corporation; DENSO
International America, Inc.; DENSO Korea Corporation (f/k/a
separately as DENSO International Korea Corporation and DENSO Korea
Automotive Corporation); ASMO North America, LLC; ASMO North
Carolina, Inc.; MITSUBA Corporation; American Mitsuba Corporation;
Robert Bosch GmbH; Bosch Electrical Drives Co., Ltd.; Robert Bosch
LLC; Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd; Mabuchi Motor Co.,
Ltd.; Valeo S.A.; and Jidosha Denki Kogyo Co., Ltd.

A hearing will be held on November 5, 2019, at 2:00 p.m., before
the Honorable Marianne O. Battani, United States District Judge, at
the Theodore Levin United States Courthouse, 231 West Lafayette
Boulevard, Detroit, MI 48226, Courtroom 250, for the purpose of
determining: (1) whether the proposed settlements with the MITSUBA
Defendants and DENSO Defendants totaling $3,160,761 should be
approved by the Court as fair, reasonable and adequate; (2) whether
the Court should approve the proposed plan of distribution of
MITSUBA and DENSO settlement proceeds to members of the settlement
classes; and (3) whether the Court should approve Settlement Class
Counsel's request for an award of attorneys' fees, reimbursement of
litigation costs and expenses, and an incentive payment to the
Class Representative.

A Notice of Proposed Settlements and Claim Form (the "Notice") was
mailed to potential Settlement Class members on or about August 8,
2019. The Notice describes the litigation and options available to
Settlement Class members with respect to the MITSUBA and DENSO
settlements in more detail.  The Notice also explains what steps a
Class Member must take to (1) remain in the settlement classes and
file a Claim Form to share in the settlement proceeds, (2) object
to the settlements, or (3) request exclusion from the settlement
classes.  The Notice and other important documents related to the
settlements can be accessed at
www.AutoPartsAntitrustLitigation.com/PowerWindowMotors, or by
calling 1-877-440-0634, or writing to Power Window Motors Direct
Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, P.O. Box 6389, Portland, OR
97228-6389.  Those who believe they may be a member of either of
the MITSUBA or DENSO settlement classes, are urged to obtain a copy
of the Notice. [GN]


MT. GOX: Pa. Court Denied Bid to Dismiss Pearce
-----------------------------------------------
In the case, GREGORY PEARCE, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, V. MARK KARPELES, an
individual, Defendant, Civil Action No. 18-306 (E.D. Pa.), Judge
Robert F. Kelly, Sr. of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania denied Karpeles' Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Section 12(b)(2).

The case arises out of the collapse of Mt. Gox, one of the world's
most prominent bitcoin exchanges.  Bitcoin is a digital currency
that is used like money.  Bitcoins can be exchanged for other
digital currencies or can be exchanged for traditional currencies
such as the U.S dollar.  Each bitcoin is stored in an individual's
digital wallet.  Mt. Gox touted that it would keep its users'
bitcoins safe and that users would be able to retrieve any bitcoins
or cash that they had stored on the site. Mt. Gox, at one point,
claimed to be the "world's most established Bitcoin exchange."
However, as the sole controlling force behind Mt. Gox and the
designer of its software, Karpeles was aware that there were
security "bugs" in the system, but did not make these defects known
to the public.

Karpeles is a French citizen who owned and operated the Mt. Gox
Bitcoin Exchange. He was the CEO of Mt. Gox and providef overall
direction, responsible for supervising main operations and steering
the company according to his vision.  As President and CEO,
Karpeles was involved in nearly every detail of the Exchange, from
the technical to the operational.  Additionally, Karpeles directed
the drafting and dissemination of Mt. Gox's public statements and
representations, as well as statements made through Mt. Gox's
customer service department, and handled all aspects of Mt. Gox's
accounting.

In order to use Mt. Gox's services, users had to create an account
through its website and agree to the Terms of Service, which
expressly warranted that Mt. Gox would hold all monetary sums and
all Bitcoins deposited by each Member in its Account, in that
Member's name as registered in their Account details, and on such
Member's behalf.  Users would have to verify their accounts by
providing Mt. Gox with detailed information such as their full
name, date of birth, country of birth, physical address, as well as
proof of identity.  Users could then transfer their previous
bitcoins directly to their Mt. Gox account or deposit cash into
their account by wiring money to Mt. Gox's Japanese banking
partners.  Afterwards, users could begin to make purchases and
trades on the Exchange.

In mid-2013, Mizuho Bank, LTD. was the exclusive processor of all
bank deposits and withdrawals made by Mt. Gox users located in the
United States.  In that capacity, Mizuho facilitated international
cash wire transfers from Mt. Gox users into the Exchange and
processed user requests to withdraw fiat currency from the Exchange
to their outside bank accounts.  To facilitate a user's money into
the Exchange, Mizuho accepted payments that had been wired by users
through their outside banks.  The wire transfers designated Mt. Gox
as the beneficiary of the wire and Mizuho as the beneficiary's
bank, but also included the Mt. Gox user's account number to which
the funds were to be directed.  Moreover, to withdraw cash from the
Exchange, Mt. Gox users submitted requests online through their Mt.
Gox account.  Mt. Gox would compile these requests -- which
included a user's bank account information as well as the amount to
be transferred -- and provide the requests to Mizuho for
processing.

Around this time, Mizuho became concerned about Mt. Gox's growing
transaction volumes amid reports that U.S. authorities were
investigating Mt. Gox for business dealings related to money
laundering.  Accordingly, Mizuho decided to distance itself from
Karpeles and Mt. Gox.  In order to allegedly force an end to their
relationship, Mizuho implemented a series of new policies, and
ultimately, in June 2013, stopped processing international wire
withdrawals for Mt. Gox altogether.

In June 2013, Mt. Gox users began to report substantial
difficulties in withdrawing cash from their Mt. Gox accounts.
Despite growing problems with the Exchange's reliability and
security, Karpeles repeatedly assured users and the public that
delays in processing transactions were due to a temporary backlog
and that users' assets were safe.  These public claims were false.


On Feb. 7, 2014, Mt. Gox halted all user withdrawal requests of
bitcoin, leaving many users unable to withdraw bitcoins or fiat
currency from their accounts.  Karpeles claimed that he had
detected "unusual activity" with repsect to the Mt. Gox Bitcoin
wallets, but Karpeles concealed the fact that he had been aware of
the supposed security "bug" since 2011.

Moreover, in February 2014, Karpeles made numerous representations
to the public and to Mt. Gox users that the withdrawal issues were
only temporary and that user assets were safe.  On Feb. 24, 2014,
the Mt. Gox website went dark.  Users were no longer able to access
or view their accounts and a message on the webpage notified
visitors that a "decision was taken to close all transactions for
the time being."  Then, a few days later, on Feb. 28, 2014, Mt. Gox
filed for bankruptcy protection in Japan.  During a press
conference, Karpeles revealed that Mt. Gox had lost over $450
million worth of bitcoins through a security breach.

Pearce initiated the class action suit against Karpeles and Mizuho
on Jan. 24, 2018.  On Aug. 27, 2018, the Court found it did not
have personal jurisdiction over Mizuho and dismissed it.  In his
Class Action Complaint, Pearce claims one count of negligence and
one count of fraud against Karpeles.  Pearce brings these claims on
behalf of himself and the "Mt. Gox Class."

Presently before the Court is Karpeles' Motion to Dismiss,
Plaintiff Pearce's Response in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss,
and Karpeles' Reply to Pearce's Response in Opposition to the
Motion to Dismiss.

Judge Kelly finds that the Court has specific jurisdiction over
Karpeles because he availed himself of the privilege of conducting
business in Pennsylvania through soliciting business from Pearce
and thousands of other Pennsylvania residents through the Mt. Gox
website.  Since Mt. Gox actively transacted business over the
internet by providing an interactive website that engaged in
business with thousands of Pennsylvania residents, the Court's
exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper.  

Additionally, Karpeles "purposefully availed" himself of the
privilege of engaging in activity in Pennsylvania through
continually providing services to thousands of Pennsylvania
citizens, communicating with Pennsylvania citizens through e-mail
and the Mt. Gox support desk, and shipping products to Pennsylvania
residents. Moreover, Pearce and other Pennsylvania citizens'
contacts with the Exchange were not random, isolated, or
fortuitous.  Furthermore, the Court's exercise of personal
jurisdiction is supported by our sister case in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, where the
Northern District of Illinois found that it had personal
jurisdiction over Karpeles as an individual.

Karpeles argues that the contacts created by the Mt. Gox website do
not relate back to him as an individual.  Under the Corporate
Shield Doctrine, individuals performing acts in a state in their
corporate capacity are not subject to personal jurisdiction of the
courts of that state for those acts.  However, a corporate agent
may be held personally liable for torts committed in their
corporate capacity.

The Judge finds that Karpeles was a "key player" in Mt. Gox's
corporate structure. He was the CEO, majority owner, and president,
who controlled all aspects of Mt. Gox's business from the ground up
and was involved in nearly every detail of the Exchange.  This
included producing and designing the software used to run Mt. Gox.
Additionally, Karpeles directed the drafting and dissemination of
Mt. Gox's public statements and representations, and served in a
position of trust that gave rise to ongoing obligations toward, and
interactions with, Mt. Gox users and their property.  Based on this
analysis, Karpeles is subject to the Court's personal jurisdiction
in his individual capacity.

Having determined that minimum contacts exist, the Judge next
considers whether the exercise of jurisdiction would otherwise
comport with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."  The Judge holds that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Karpeles comports with "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."  Karpeles has failed to make a
"compelling case" that forcing him to litigate in Pennsylvania
would be unreasonable.  Karpeles cites no authority for the
proposition that confinement in a foreign country for the alleged
conduct underlying a civil suit makes litigating that suit in the
forum State unconstitutionally unfair, thereby forfeiting the
point.  It would not be constitutionally unreasonable for Karpeles
to defend the suit in Pennsylvania.

Based on the foregoing reasons, Judge Kelly concludes that personal
jurisdiction over Karpeles is proper.  Therefore, he denied
Karpeles' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction.  An
appropriate Order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2019 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/fmb6FD from Leagle.com.

GREGORY PEARCE, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiff, represented by DAVID S. SENOFF --
dsenoff@anapolweiss.com -- First Law Strategy Group, LLC & RAFEY S.
BALABANIAN -- rbalabanian@edelson.com -- EDELSON PC.

MARK KARPELES, AN INDIVIDUAL, Defendant, represented by ALBERT
ANTHONY CIARDI, III -- aciardi@ciardilaw.com -- CIARDI & CIARDI
PC.


NATIONAL AUSTRALIA: British Class Action Set to Go to Trial
-----------------------------------------------------------
Hans van Leeuwen, writing for Australian Financial Review, reports
that National Australia Bank and its former British subsidiary
Clydesdale & Yorkshire Banking Group have broken cover to
emphatically reject the claims made in a British class action suit,
setting the stage for a potential courtroom stoush later this
year.

In an end-July court filing that marks NAB's first formal response
to the potentially multimillion-dollar class action, the bank
described several of the litigants' claims as "without foundation"
and "embarrassing".

And a CYBG representative told The Australian Financial Review that
there was "no merit" and "no substance" to the allegations, so the
British bank planned to "defend its position robustly" as the
litigation unfolded.

But RGL Management, the company overseeing the class action for the
former CYBG customers, immediately hit back.

"There is nothing in the lengthy, expensive and obfuscatory
defences that we didn't expect. The bottom line is they have failed
to answer the allegations in our particulars of claim," James
Hayward, the Australian CEO of London-based RGL, said in a
statement on Aug. 9.

"Our claim book is continuing to grow and we have great confidence
that we will secure significant compensation for the thousands of
businesses damaged by the banks' actions."

With neither side seemingly in the mood to settle out of court, the
case now looks primed to go to trial.

RGL filed its suit on behalf of three claimants in May, who serve
as exemplars of the larger case it wants to make against the two
banks. It has also filed a claim on behalf of a further 146 former
CYBG clients, but has not yet served that second claim on the
banks.

The company is now assessing the merits of another 2000 or so other
possible claimants who could potentially join the action as it goes
along.

The action centres on a fixed-rate "tailored business loan" (TBL)
product that CYBG offered to some of its SME clients between 2001
and 2012. It included an interest-rate hedge and was supported by
technical expertise from Clydesdale's then parent NAB.

More than 8000 of these TBLs were issued. Problems emerged when
some clients tried to vary the terms of the loan to take advantage
of lower prevailing market rates than their original fixed rate.
They would then find themselves exposed to very high break fees,
creating heavy losses and disrupting their businesses.

RGL alleges that CYBG's levying of these break fees was
illegitimate and not part of the loan arrangement or contract,
amounting to deceit or "negligent misstatement".

RGL also alleges there was systematic overpricing of the interest
rates on the loans, while telling the clients that these higher
rates reflected the prevailing market rate. NAB is alleged to have
actively colluded in these efforts.

The banks' filings in response deny the allegations, or criticise
them for a lack of specificity. The next step is thus a case
management conference, in which the judge works with all parties'
lawyers to try and narrow down the issues that the trial will
actually grapple with.

NAB owned CYBG, which is in the process of renaming itself Virgin
Money after a merger last year, until 2016. The two banks'
decoupling took place late that year, leaving CYBG listed on the
ASX as well as the London Stock Exchange. [GN]


NATIONAL BEVERAGE: Wins Dismissal of Securities Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida issued an Order granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in
the case captioned THOMAS W. LUCZAK, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL
BEVERAGE CORPORATION, NICK A. CAPORELLA, and GEORGE R. BRACKEN,
Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-61631-KMM (S.D. Fla.).

The Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, brings the instant securities class action against
Defendants pursuant to Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.  The Plaintiff alleges that during the
designated, he acquired National Beverage stock at artificially
inflated prices due to repeated material misrepresentations and
omissions in National Beverage's publicly issued statements, and
that these misrepresentations and omissions caused the Plaintiff
and other class members significant losses and damages. The
Plaintiff identifies the following four categories of statements or
omissions that eventually led to a precipitous decline in the value
of National Beverage's securities.

The Defendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to
Fed. Rs. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 9(b), arguing that the Plaintiff
fails to establish standing and adequately allege falsity,
scienter, and loss causation for each of the above-mentioned
statements.

Standing

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff has insufficiently alleged
injury in fact and thus a lack of standing to proceed in federal
court because the Plaintiff apparently sold all of the shares he
purchased during the Class Period before any supposed fraud was
revealed.

In response, the Plaintiff argues that he has standing because he
traded National Beverage stock within a reasonable time after
Defendants issued allegedly false statements.  

A class action plaintiff must show that he or she has (1) suffered
an injury in fact, that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b)
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical (2) the injury
is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and
(3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision.

Here, the Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an injury in fact. The
Plaintiff alleges a decrease in the value of his National Beverage
shares caused by the Defendants' misleading statements in June and
December of 2017 related to National Beverage's sales growth,
corporate governance, and transparency, and that his loss can be
redressed by a favorable ruling in his favor.  Moreover, the
Plaintiff plausibly alleges that he bought and sold shares of the
stock in question within a reasonable period of time after the
allegedly fraudulent conduct occurred.

This suffices to establish standing.

Violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5

Defendants next argue that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege a
material misrepresentation or omissions, scienter, and loss
causation for each of the statements above. The Court will address
each statement in turn.

The All Natural Claim

Defendants claim that the all natural ingredient claim fails to
adequately allege falsity because it is entirely based on
allegations made in the Illinois state court action. Defendants
further argue that any decline in share price following the
reporting of the Illinois state action in no way suggests the
falsity of the claim.  

In response, Plaintiff argues that after the filing of the Illinois
action, Defendants were obligated to issue corrective disclosures
regarding its all natural claims by explaining that that it relied
on its suppliers to certify the accuracy of its claims.

A statement is misleading if in the light of the facts existing at
the time of the statement, a reasonable investor, in the exercise
of due care, would have been misled by it. Thus, the appropriate
primary inquiry is into the meaning of the statement to the
reasonable investor and its relationship to truth. Here, Plaintiff
fails to sufficiently allege that the all natural representation is
materially false.

First, Plaintiff cannot merely crib allegations from a complaint in
another jurisdiction as the sole source of support for his claims
here.  

Second, National Beverage's alleged reliance on its suppliers'
certifications that LaCroix's ingredients are all natural does not
necessarily render National Beverage's all natural claim false.
Here, National Beverage's reliance on its suppliers' certifications
in no way neutralizes its previous contentions that LaCroix is all
natural. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to present any evidence beyond
unproven allegations within a separate lawsuit that LaCroix is not,
in fact, all natural.

The Court finds this statement nonactionable. Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss the Amended Complaint as to Plaintiff's all natural
statement is therefore granted.

Revenue Concentration

Defendants next argue that the market was already aware of
LaCroix's dominance within National Beverage's portfolio, so any
omission of the exact amount or percentage of LaCroix sales
relative to other National Beverage products did not make National
Beverage's financial statements materially false.  Defendants
further argue that Plaintiff fails to establish scienter and loss
causation for the revenue concentration omission.  

In response, Plaintiff argues that GAAP required National Beverage
to disclose any risk relating to revenue concentration when such
concentration could have caused a near-term severe impact on the
company.

To establish scienter, a plaintiff must show a defendant's (1)
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud or (2) severe
recklessness.

Here, National Beverage repeatedly disclosed to the SEC that
LaCroix was its strategically largest,  significant, and dominant"
brand. Plaintiff provides no evidence to suggest that there was
ever any market confusion about whether LaCroix constituted a
disproportionate share of National Beverage's revenues. In fact,
Plaintiff alleges that analysts had already estimated that
throughout the class period, LaCroix accounted anywhere from one
half to two-thirds of National Beverage's entire portfolio, a huge
concentration.

Plaintiff thus fails to present any evidencebeyond a potential GAAP
violation-that Defendants acted with severe recklessness in failing
to disclose the precise concentration of LaCroix revenues within
National Beverage's product portfolio.
  
Moreover, Plaintiff entirely fails to detail Caporella or Bracken's
roles in omitting to specify LaCroix's exact revenue concentration
and whether either Defendant benefitted from these omissions. To
the extent Plaintiff argues that Caporella or Bracken must have
known of any concentration-related issue because of their senior
executive status within the company, this Court has repeatedly held
that merely holding a position of power does not lead to an
inference of scienter without specific allegations of the
individual defendants' role in the fraud.

Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts that, taken
collectively, give rise to a strong inference of scienter"
regarding the revenue concentration omission. Thus, Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint as to Plaintiff's revenue
concentration claim is granted.

VPO/VPC

Defendants next argue that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege
that the VPO/VPC statements were materially misleading and made
with scienter. Defendants further argue that Plaintiff fails to
plausibly allege loss causation because Defendants' responses to
the SEC do not constitute corrective disclosures that reveal new
facts or otherwise reveal any actual wrongdoing.  

In response, Plaintiff argues that Caporella falsely claimed that
VPO and VPC were proprietary to National Beverage, and misled
investors by suggesting that VPO and VPC were important metrics to
create growth in the company. Plaintiff further argues that
Caporella and National Beverage acted with scienter, and that
statements at issue caused a drop in the value of National Beverage
shares.  

To show loss causation in a Section 10(b) claim, a plaintiff must
offer proof of a causal connection between the misrepresentation
and the investment's subsequent decline in value.

Plaintiff argues that two public disclosures regarding VPO and VPC
constitute corrective disclosures demonstrating loss causation: (1)
the SEC's March 23 Letter to National Beverage, requesting that the
company explain the discrepancy between National Beverage's public
statements stressing VPO and VPC's importance and National
Beverage's representation to the SEC that these metrics are not key
performance indicators and (2) the WSJ's June 26 Article,
summarizing National Beverage's correspondence with the SEC, which,
according to Plaintiff, provided the market with a full realization
that Defendants' claims about the VPO and VPC metrics were false
and misleading. Plaintiff alleges that one business day after the
SEC issued the March 23 Letter, National Beverage suffered a
statistically significant" drop in share price.  

The Court agrees with Defendant that neither the March 23 Letter
nor the June 26 Article are corrective disclosures that revealed to
the market the pertinent truth that was previously concealed or
obscured by the company's fraud.

First, the March 23 Letter-noting a discrepancy between National
Beverage's various statements to the public and the SEC and then
requesting further information to address the discrepancy does not
reveal any previously concealed truth. Although the letter
certainly suggests skepticism with National Beverage's prior
response to the SEC, it does not constitute either proof of fraud
or proof of liability, and otherwise merely confirms the SEC's
already established doubt of the veracity of the relevant VPC/VPO
statements.  

Second, the June 26 Article is not a corrective disclosure because
the mere repackaging of already-public information is simply
insufficient to constitute a corrective disclosure. The June 26
Article does not add any commentary, analysis, or information
beyond a summary of the already existing correspondence between
National Beverage and the SEC.  

Plaintiff fails to allege any new information within that article
that revealed a previously concealed truth.

Because Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege that the March 23
Letter and June 26 Article constitute corrective disclosures that
establish a causal link to Plaintiff's stock-value loss, Plaintiff
fails to plausibly allege loss causation.  

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint as to the
VPO/VPC statements is GRANTED.

Sexual Harassment

Defendants finally argue that the allegations of sexual harassment
against Caporella: (1) did not render National Beverage's
anti-harassment policy within its code of ethics materially
misleading (2) are insufficient to establish scienter and (3) did
not contribute to a loss in stock price following the WSJ's July 3
Article describing the allegations.  

In response, Plaintiff argues that the allegations rendered the
code of ethics materially misleading, that Defendants acted with
scienter by recklessly or intentionally omitting information of
alleged harassment and that the July 3 Article is a corrective
disclosure for loss causation purposes.

The Court need not decide whether Plaintiff sufficiently alleged
any material misstatement or scienter because Plaintiff again fails
to plausibly allege loss causation.  

The mere repackaging of already-public information is simply
insufficient to constitute a corrective disclosure. As alleged, the
July 3 Article presents no facts to the market that are publicly
revealed for the first time.  

Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege that the July 3 Article
constitutes a corrective disclosure that establishes a causal link
to Plaintiff's stock-value loss. Thus, Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss the Amended Complaint as to the sexual harassment
allegations is GRANTED.

Because Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead that any material
statement or omission by Defendants violated Section 10(b),
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count I of the Amended Complaint is
GRANTED.

Violations of Section 20(a) (Count Two)

Because Plaintiff fails to state a predicate claim for primary
liability under Section 10(b), Plaintiff's claim under Section
20(a) also fails.  

Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Amended
Complaint is granted.

The full-text copy of the District Court's August 29, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3tpumk4 from Leagle.com.

THOMAS W. LUCZAK, Lead Plaintiff, Plaintiff, represented by Frank
S. Hedin -- fhedin@hedinhall.com -- Hedin Hall LLP, Leigh Handelman
Smollar -- lsmollar@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz, LLP, pro hac vice,
Patrick V. Dahlstrom -- pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz, LLP,
pro hac vice & Corey D. Holzer -- cholzer@holzerlaw.com -- Holzer &
Holzer LLC, pro hac vice.

NATIONAL BEVERAGE CORP., GEORGE R. BRACKEN & NICK A. CAPORELLA,
Defendants, represented by Jeffrey T. Kucera --
jeffrey.kucera@klgates.com -- K&L Gates LLP, Amy J. Eldridge --
amy.eldridge@klgates.com -- K&L Gates, LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel
Arthur Case -- dan.casey@klgates.com -- K&L Gates LLP, Lacey A.
Gehm -- Lacey.Gehm@klgates.com -- K&L Gates, LLP, pro hac vice &
Nicholas G. Terris -- nicholas.hanna@klgates.com -- K&L Gates, LLP,
pro hac vice.


NAVISTAR INT'L: Case Management Conference Sought in "Brown"
------------------------------------------------------------
Navistar International Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on September 4,
2019, for the quarterly period ended July 31, 2019, that the
plaintiff in a Manitoba putative class action lawsuit captioned
Vern Brown v. Navistar International Corporation and Navistar
Canada, Inc. served an expert report and wrote to the court seeking
a case management conference.

On June 24, 2014, N&C Transportation Ltd. ("N&C") filed a putative
class action lawsuit against Navistar International Corporation
(NIC), Navistar, Inc. (NI), Navistar Canada Inc., and Harbour
International Trucks in Canada in the Supreme Court of British
Columbia (the "N&C Action"). Subsequently, seven additional,
similar putative class action lawsuits have been filed in Canada
(together with the N&C Action, the "Canadian Actions").

From June 13-17, 2016, the court conducted a certification hearing
in the N&C Action.

On November 16, 2016, the court certified a Canada-wide class
comprised of persons who purchased heavy-duty trucks equipped with
Advanced EGR MaxxForce 11, MaxxForce 13, and MaxxForce 15 engines
designed to meet 2010 Environmental Protection Energy (EPA)
regulations. The court in the N&C Action denied certification to
persons who operated but did not buy the trucks in question.

On November 2, 2017, NIC, NI, Navistar Canada Inc. and Harbour
International Trucks filed a notice of appeal. On December 8, 2017,
the plaintiff filed a notice of cross-appeal. Both the appeal and
cross-appeal were heard by the British Columbia Court of Appeal on
February 9, 2018.

On August 1, 2018, the appellate court denied the company's appeal
and granted, in part, N&C's cross-appeal and as such certified
three narrow issues on whether misrepresentations were made in
Navistar's advertising materials. On September 28, 2018, Navistar
sought leave to appeal the certification decision to the Supreme
Court of Canada, but leave was denied on March 28, 2019.

The next step will be an attendance before the case management
judge regarding the details of the notice of certification to be
given to the class. No date for this attendance has been set.

On June 5, 2017, a hearing was held in the Quebec putative class
action lawsuit captioned 4037308 Canada Inc. v. Navistar Canada
Inc., NI, and NIC. At that hearing, the court ruled on certain
motions regarding evidence related to certification but deferred a
ruling on plaintiff's proposed amendment to narrow the proposed
class to Quebec-only purchasers and lessees of model year 2010-13
vehicles containing MaxxForce 11, 13, and 15 liter engines.

On November 23, 2017, the company filed a motion to stay the Quebec
case until the British Columbia Court of Appeal rules on the
certification order in the N&C Action. The stay motion was granted
on December 7, 2017. The decision of the British Columbia Court of
Appeal was provided to the Quebec court. On September 6, 2018, the
stay was extended until the Supreme Court of Canada decides the
application for leave to appeal in the N&C Action. The stay has
since been removed, but no hearing date or certification schedule
has been set.

In the Manitoba putative class action lawsuit captioned Vern Brown
v. Navistar International Corporation and Navistar Canada, Inc.,
the court held a case management conference on June 29, 2018, after
the plaintiff failed to file a complete certification record by the
previously court-ordered due date.

The plaintiff advised that it expected to file its remaining
certification affidavits by August 31, 2018, and the court
suspended certification scheduling in the interim. The plaintiff
filed an additional affidavit on July 5, 2018.

On September 5, 2018, the court adjourned the certification
application indefinitely to allow the plaintiff to obtain an expert
report. On July 30, 2019, the plaintiff served an expert report and
wrote to the court seeking a case management conference. There are
no certification or other hearings scheduled in any of the other
Canadian Actions at this time.

Navistar International Corporation, through its subsidiaries,
manufactures and sells commercial and military trucks, diesel
engines, school and commercial buses, and service parts for trucks
and diesel engines worldwide.  Navistar International Corporation
was founded in 1902 and is headquartered in Lisle, Illinois.


NAVISTAR INT'L: Court Sets Nov. 13 Settlement Fairness Hearing
--------------------------------------------------------------
Navistar International Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on September 4,
2019, for the quarterly period ended July 31, 2019, that a hearing
to consider the fairness of the settlement in the U.S. EGR
Warranty-related lawsuits is set for November 13, 2019.

On July 7, 2014, Par 4 Transport, LLC filed a putative class action
lawsuit against NI in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois (the "Par 4 Action").

Subsequently, seventeen additional putative class action lawsuits
were filed in various United States district courts, including the
Northern District of Illinois, the Eastern District of Wisconsin,
the Southern District of Florida, the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, the Southern District of Texas, the Western District
of Kentucky, the District of Minnesota, the Northern District of
Alabama, and the District of New Jersey (together with the Par 4
Action, the "U.S. Actions").

Some of the U.S. Actions name both Navistar International
Corporation (NIC) and Navistar, Inc. (NI), and allege matters
substantially similar to the Canadian Actions. More specifically,
one or more of the Canadian Actions and the U.S. Actions
(collectively, the "EGR Class Actions") seek to certify a class of
persons or entities in Canada or the United States who purchased
and/or leased a ProStar or other Navistar vehicle equipped with a
model year 2008-2013 MaxxForce Advanced EGR engine.

In substance, the EGR Class Actions allege that the MaxxForce
Advanced EGR engines are defective and that the Company and NI
failed to disclose and correct the alleged defect. The EGR Class
Actions assert claims based on theories of contract, breach of
warranty, consumer fraud, unfair competition, misrepresentation and
negligence. The EGR Class Actions seek relief in the form of
monetary damages, punitive damages, declaratory relief, interest,
fees, and costs.

On October 3, 2014, NIC and NI filed a motion before the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (the "MDL Panel")
seeking to transfer and consolidate before Judge Joan B. Gottschall
of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois all of the then-pending U.S. Actions, as well as certain
non-class action MaxxForce Advanced EGR engine lawsuits pending in
various federal district courts.

On December 17, 2014, Navistar's motion to consolidate the U.S.
Actions and certain other non-class action lawsuits was granted.
The MDL Panel issued an order consolidating all of the U.S. Actions
that were pending on the date of Navistar’s motion before Judge
Gottschall in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois (the "MDL Action").

The MDL Panel also consolidated into the MDL Action certain
non-class action MaxxForce Advanced EGR engine lawsuits pending in
the various federal district courts. Non-class federal lawsuits
presenting pre-trial issues similar to the MDL Action continue to
be transferred to the MDL Action. Approximately 28 such actions are
currently pending.

On March 5, 2015, Judge Gottschall entered an order in the MDL
Action appointing interim lead counsel and interim liaison counsel
for the plaintiffs. On May 11, 2015, lead counsel for the
plaintiffs filed a First Master Consolidated Class Action
Complaint. The parties to the MDL Action exchanged initial
disclosures on May 29, 2015.

The Company answered the Consolidated Complaint on July 13, 2015.
On September 22, 2016, lead counsel for the plaintiffs filed a
First Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint. The Amended
Consolidated Complaint added 25 additional named plaintiffs. NI and
NIC answered the Amended Consolidated Complaint on October 20,
2016.

On October 13, 2017, lead counsel for the plaintiffs filed a Motion
for Leave to File a Second Amended Consolidated Class Action
Complaint, as well as a Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of Claims
without Prejudice relating to 15 previously named plaintiffs.

On January 4, 2018, Judge Gottschall granted both motions. On
January 9, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Consolidated
Class Action Complaint. The Second Amended Consolidated Class
Action Complaint removed 15 named plaintiffs and substituted in 8
new named plaintiffs. Three class action cases were dismissed
without prejudice because there were no longer any remaining
plaintiffs in those cases. On May 30, 2019, the court granted
plaintiffs leave to file a Third Amended Consolidated Class Action
Complaint. The Third Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint
removed 2 named plaintiffs. NI and NIC answered the Third Amended
Consolidated Class Action Complaint on June 16, 2019.

On August 16, 2018, Judge Gottschall entered a minute order setting
a status hearing for September 26, 2018 in light of the ongoing
settlement efforts of the parties. During the September 26, 2018
status hearing, the parties advised the court that additional
settlement discussions were scheduled.

Accordingly, on September 27, 2018 Judge Gottschall entered a
minute order extending class plaintiffs' deadline to file a motion
for class certification and supporting expert reports until
November 16, 2018.  Since September 2018, Judge Gottschall has
extended the deadlines for class certification briefing several
times to allow for settlement discussions.

On May 28, 2019, NIC and NI entered into a Stipulation and
Agreement of Settlement (the "Settlement Agreement") with certain
named plaintiffs to settle the class actions consolidated in the
U.S. Actions. On May 28, 2019, plaintiffs submitted the Settlement
Agreement to the court for preliminary approval. The Settlement
Agreement class consists of entities and natural persons who owned
or leased a 2011-2014 model year vehicle equipped with a MaxxForce
11 or 13 liter engine certified to meet EPA 2010 emissions
standards without selective catalytic reduction technology,
provided that vehicle was purchased or leased in the U.S.

Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, among other things, (1) the
parties will establish a non-reversionary common fund consisting of
cash (the "Cash Fund") and rebates (the "Rebate Fund") with a total
value of $135 million (the “Settlement Fund”); (2) NIC and NI
will contribute $85 million to the Cash Fund, which will be used to
pay all settlement fees and expenses, service awards, attorneys'
fees and costs, and cash payments to members of the settlement
class; (3) NI will commit to make available rebates with a face
value in the aggregate of $50 million to the Rebate Fund; and (4)
the settlement class will release NIC and NI and their affiliates
from all claims and potential claims arising from or related to the
allegations in the U. S. Actions, except for claims for personal
injury or damage to third-party property. The Settlement Agreement
further provides that dollars or value remaining in either the Cash
Fund or the Rebate Fund after claims are processed will be used to
pay approved claims from the other fund if the other fund is
oversubscribed (the "Waterfall").

Any Waterfall from the Rebate Fund to the Cash Fund is capped at
$35 million. Finally, the Settlement Agreement states that NIC and
NI deny all claims in the U.S. Actions, deny wrongdoing, liability
or damage of any kind, and deny that NIC and NI acted improperly or
wrongfully in any way.

The Settlement Agreement is subject to final approval by the court,
including possible appeals. On June 12, 2019, the court
preliminarily approved the settlement. Members of the class have
been provided notice of the Settlement Agreement and an opportunity
to object or opt out. Any members of the class who opt out will not
receive any benefit from the Settlement Agreement or be bound by
it. The court scheduled a fairness hearing for November 13, 2019 at
which the court will determine whether the Settlement Agreement
should be finally approved and whether the proposed Final Order and
Judgment should be entered. Depending on opt out numbers and
certain oversubscription numbers, NIC and NI or lead counsel for
the class may have the option to withdraw from the Settlement
Agreement.

Navistar International Corporation, through its subsidiaries,
manufactures and sells commercial and military trucks, diesel
engines, school and commercial buses, and service parts for trucks
and diesel engines worldwide.  Navistar International Corporation
was founded in 1902 and is headquartered in Lisle, Illinois.


NEKTAR THERAPEUTICS: Kessler Topaz Files Securities Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP announces that a
securities fraud class action lawsuit has been filed in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California
against Nektar Therapeutics (NASDAQ: NKTR) on behalf of those who
purchased or otherwise acquired Nektar securities between February
15, 2019 and August 8, 2019 , inclusive (the 'Class Period').

Important Deadline: Investors who purchased Nektar securities
during the Class Period may, no later than October 18, 2019, seek
to be appointed as a lead plaintiff representative of the class.
For additional information or to learn how to participate in this
litigation please
visitwww.ktmc.com/nektar-therapeutics-nktr-securities-class-action

According to the complaint, Nektar is a biopharmaceutical company
that develops medicines in areas of high unmet medical need,
including therapies for cancer, autoimmune disease, and chronic
pain. Nektar's lead immuno-oncology candidate is NKTR-214, also
known as bempegaldesleukin or bempeg; it is a biologic substance
developed to stimulate proliferation and growth of tumor-killing
immune cells in the tumor-micro-environment. In the PIVOT-02
clinical study, Nektar evaluates the benefit, safety, and
tolerability of combining NKTR-214 with Opdivo, an antibody, in
collaboration with Bristol-Meyers Squibb Company.

The Class Period commences on February 15, 2019. On that day,
Nektar presented clinical data from the PIVOT-02 Study at the 2019
ASCO Genitourinary Cancers Symposium.

According to the complaint, on August 8, 2019, after the market
closed, Nektar revealed that a manufacturing issue caused two
batches of bempegaldesleukin to differ from the other 20 batches
that were produced. Moreover, these batches resulted in variable
clinical benefit than other batches used in Nektar's PIVOT-02
clinical trial.

Following this news, Nektar's share price fell $8.65, or nearly
30%, to close at $20.92 per share on August 9, 2019.

The complaint alleges that, throughout the Class Period, the
defendants failed to disclose to investors that: (1) Nektar did not
comply with current good manufacturing practices; (2) as a result,
batches of NKTR-214 were not produced consistently and differed
meaningfully; (3) clinical results from PIVOT-02 differed based on
the batch of NKTR-214 used in the study; (4) as a result, the
PIVOT-02 study did not produce statistically significant results to
support a finding of clinical benefit; and (6) as a result of the
foregoing, the defendants' positive statements about Nektar's
business, operations, and prospects were materially misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

If you wish to discuss this securities fraud class action lawsuit
or have any questions concerning this notice or your rights or
interests with respect to this litigation, please contact Kessler
Topaz Meltzer & Check (James Maro, Jr., Esq. or Adrienne Bell,
Esq.) at (844) 887-9500 (toll free) or (610) 667–7706, or via
e-mail

Nektar investors may, no later than October 18, 2019 , seek to be
appointed as a lead plaintiff representative of the class through
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, or other counsel, or may choose to
do nothing and remain an absent class member. A lead plaintiff is a
representative party who acts on behalf of all class members in
directing the litigation. In order to be appointed as a lead
plaintiff, the Court must determine that the class member's claim
is typical of the claims of other class members, and that the class
member will adequately represent the class. Your ability to share
in any recovery is not affected by the decision of whether or not
to serve as a lead plaintiff.

Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check prosecutes class actions in state and
federal courts throughout the country involving securities fraud,
breaches of fiduciary duties and other violations of state and
federal law. Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check is a driving force
behind corporate governance reform, and has recovered billions of
dollars on behalf of institutional and individual investors from
the United States and around the world. The firm represents
investors, consumers and whistleblowers (private citizens who
report fraudulent practices against the government and share in the
recovery of government dollars). The complaint in this action was
not filed by Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check. For more information
about Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, please visitwww.ktmc.com .

Contact:

         James Maro, Jr., Esq.
         Adrienne Bell, Esq.
         Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP
         280 King of Prussia Road
         Radnor, PA 19087
         Tel: (844) 887-9500 (toll free), (610) 667-7706
         E-mail: jmaro@ktmc.com
                 abell@ktmc.com [GN]


NEW YORK: Settlement Reached in Marijuana Crimes Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Ben Chapman, writing for The Wall Street Journal, reports that
roughly 350 people convicted of misdemeanor marijuana crimes in
Manhattan will have their offenses hidden from public criminal
records under a new class-action settlement, Manhattan officials
said.

Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance Jr. and attorneys from
nonprofit and pro-bono legal-services groups, including the Legal
Aid Society, collaborated for nearly a year on the petition to seal
the criminal records of some marijuana offenses, such as smoking in
public or possessing less than 25 grams of the drug. [GN]


NISSAN NORTH: 9th Cir. Flips Denial of Nguyen Class Certification
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HUU NGUYEN, individually, and on behalf of a class of
similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NISSAN
NORTH AMERICA, INC., a California Corporation, Defendant-Appellee,
Case No. 18-16344 (9th Cir.), Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr. of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's denial of the Plaintiff's motion for class certification.

When Plaintiff Nguyen purchased a new 2012 Nissan 370Z as a college
graduation present for his son, he was unaware of what he alleges
was a potentially catastrophic design defect hidden in the
vehicle's hydraulic clutch system.  After the clutch purportedly
malfunctioned -- and the Plaintiff spent more than $700 replacing
it -- he filed a putative class action against Defendant Nissan,
asserting causes of action under state and federal warranty laws.

The Plaintiff's first amended complaint alleged five causes of
action against Nissan: (1) violations of California's Consumers
Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"); (2) violations of California's Unfair
Competition Law ("UCL"); (3) breach of implied warranty pursuant to
the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; (4) breach of implied
warranty pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act; and (5) unjust
enrichment.  The district court granted in part Nissan's motion to
dismiss, removing the Plaintiff's UCL and unjust enrichment claims,
and his request for injunctive relief under the CLRA.

The Plaintiff moved for class certification pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) (or, in the alternative, under
Rule 23(c)(4) for liability only), seeking to certify (1) a class
of all individuals in California who purchased or leased, from an
authorized Nissan dealer, a new Nissan vehicle equipped with a
FS6R31A manual transmission; and (2) a CLRA subclass of all members
of the Class who are 'consumers' within the meaning of California
Civil Code Section 1761(d).

Although Nissan opposed class certification for various reasons --
including that the Plaintiff was not an adequate class
representative, that individual issues predominated due to the
varying types of automobiles included in the Class Vehicles, and
that Nissan's purported knowledge of the defect changed over the
course of the class period --  major point of dispute, and the
issue on which the district court's eventual order hinged,
concerned the Plaintiff's damages model.

According to the Plaintiff, his "damages model is based on the
economic principle of benefit-of-the-bargain and is consistent with
[his] theory of liability."  Assuming that the class members would
have either paid less than sticker price or not purchased a
defective vehicle at all had the nature of the clutch system been
divulged by Nissan, the Plaintiff seeks "to recover the difference
in value between the non-defective vehicles Nissan promised and the
defective vehicles that were delivered based on the cost to replace
the composite CSC with one that is solid cast-aluminum."  Nissan
challenges this proposed damages model, citing the report of an
expert who, in its words, rejected the notion that
average-cost-of-repair represented the amount that informed
consumers would discount the price of the Class Vehicles.

The district court agreed with Nissan and denied the Plaintiff's
motion for class certification.  It concluded that the Plaintiff
failed to satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3),
based on what the court viewed as a "problematic" damages model.

The court reasoned that, under the Plaintiff's proposed model, if a
class member "derived value from the defective CSC -- be it by
selling it, repurposing it, or simply driving a ways before
replacing it—the class member will have received the full benefit
of the bargain and the monetary value of the defective part. That
is not an appropriate measure of damages."  Because the record
contained no evidence that the defective clutch was valueless—but
did contain evidence to the contrary, since the Plaintiff's vehicle
was driven for approximately 26,629 miles before the original CSC
malfunctioned -- the court rejected the Plaintiff's damages model
as being an improper measure of the benefit of the bargain.
Therefore, the district court concluded that the Plaintiff could
not satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).

The Court subsequently granted the Plaintiff's timely petition for
permission to appeal the denial of class certification pursuant to
Rule 23(f).  The central issue before the Court is whether the
Plaintiff's proposed damages model -- specifically, a
benefit-of-the-bargain model as measured by the average cost of
replacing the allegedly defective clutch system -- satisfies Rule
23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement.

Judge Smith is satisfied that the Plaintiff's proposed
benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages is both cognizable under
the CLRA and a reasonable basis of computation.  Nissan has cited
no authority, and the Court is not aware of any, precluding the
Plaintiff's theory of recovery under the CLRA.  Also, the
Plaintiff's damages model is similarly cognizable under the
Song-Beverly Act, which provides that the measure of the buyer's
damages in an action  will include the rights of replacement or
reimbursement.  Under the California law the remedies for breach of
the implied warranty include 'benefit of the bargain' damages.

Having determined that recovery based on the benefit of the bargain
is cognizable under the Plaintiff's causes of action, the Judge
must now determine whether this damages model flows from his theory
of liability.  The Judge finds the Plaintiff does not seek damages
for the faulty performance of the clutch system; such a theory of
liability would, pursuant to Cardinal Health, Hicks, and the
district court's analysis, require individualized analysis that
might defeat predominance.  Instead, the Plaintiff's theory is that
the allegedly defective clutch is itself the injury, regardless of
whether the faulty clutch caused performance issues.  Accordingly,
Nissan's argument is unavailing.

Judge Smith concludes that the Plaintiff's theory of liability --
that Nissan's manufacture and concealment of a defective clutch
system injured the class members at the time of sale -- is
consistent with his proposed recovery based on the benefit of the
bargain.  He concludes that the district court abused its
discretion when it denied class certification based on a
misconception of the Plaintiff's legal theory.  He therefore
reversed the district court's denial of class certification, and
remanded for further proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/pEHhYc from Leagle.com.

Ryan Wu -- Ryan.Wu@CapstoneLawyers.com -- (argued) and John E.
Stobart -- john.stobart@capstonelawyers.com -- Capstone Law APC,
Los Angeles, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Alan J. Lazarus -- alan.lazarus@dbr.com -- (argued) and Matthew J.
Adler -- matthew.adler@dbr.com -- Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, San
Francisco, California; Zoë K. Wilhelm and Adam J. Thurston,
Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Los Angeles, California; Sherman Vance
Wittie -- vance.wittie@dbr.com -- and E. Paul Cauley Jr., Drinker
Biddle & Reath LLP, Dallas, Texas; for Defendant-Appellee.

Kathy A. Wisniewski -- kwisniewski@thompsoncoburn.com -- and
Stephen A. D'Aunoy, Thompson Coburn LLP, St. Louis, Missouri, for
Amicus Curiae FCA US LLC.

Philip S. Goldberg -- pgoldberg@shb.com -- Shook Hardy & Bacon LLP,
Washington, D.C.; Andrew J. Trask, Shook Hardy & Bacon LLP, San
Francisco, California; for Amici Curiae Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers and Association of Global Automakers.

Ashley C. Parrish, Jesse Snyder, and Jacqueline Glassman, King &
Spalding LLP, Washington, D.C.; Jonathan D. Urick and Steven P.
Lehotsky, U.S. Chamber of Litigation Center, Washington, D.C.;
Leland P. Frost and Peter C. Tolsdorf, Manufacturers' Center for
Legal Action, Washington, D.C.; for Amici Curiae Chamber of
Commerce of the United States and National Association of
Manufacturers.


NORTH CAROLINA MUTUAL: Court Narrows Claims in McClendon Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARIETTA McCLENDON, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. NORTH CAROLINA MUTUAL LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 3:17-cv-00404 (M.D. Tenn.),
Judge William L. Campbell, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville Division, (i) granted in
part and denied in part the Defendant's motions for summary
judgment; (ii) granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss the
Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("ADTPA") and the North
Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("NCUDTPA")
claims; and (iii) granted in part and denied in part the
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

In 1984, the Plaintiff's mother purchased a $10,000 whole life
insurance policy from Protective Industrial Insurance Co. of
Alabama to insure the life of her brother.  The monthly premium for
the policy was $17.06, which consisted of $15.46 for the preferred
whole life premium that was to be paid for the duration of the
policy, $0.50 per month for a waiver of premium rider benefit, and
$1.10 per month for an accidental death benefit rider.  The policy
riders had 27-year terms.

In 1995, the Plaintiff's mother took out a loan against the policy
in the amount of $1,533.90 at an interest rate of 5%.  The parties
dispute the amount and frequency of payments made toward the loan.
The Defendant claims only two payments were made -- $160 in 2004
and $400 in 2006.  The Plaintiff claims additional payments were
made and that the policy loan was entirely paid off.

In 2009, the Defendant acquired the Policy following the insolvency
of the issuing company.  It continued to charge premiums for the
policy riders after the rider term expired in 2011.  From June 2011
to March 2016, the Defendant charged an additional $1.60 per month
for policy riders covering Waiver of Premium and Accidental Death.
The payments related to the policy riders during that period
totaled $92.80.

On March 16, 2016, the Plaintiff's brother passed away.  At the
time of his death, the Plaintiff was the sole beneficiary on the
life insurance policy.  Following the death of her brother, the
Plaintiff assigned the proceeds of the Policy to Roberts Funeral
Services.  The document included a power of attorney appointing
Roberts Funeral Services attorney in fact to endorse her name on
the check representing the assigned proceeds.

The Defendant calculated that the benefit due on the policy was
$4,896.46, representing the value of the Policy, minus the
principal and 6% interest, and sent that amount to the funeral home
on May 4, 2016.  The Defendant corrected the interest calculation
when it received loan documents specifying the correct interest
amount was 5% and issued a check to the Plaintiff in the amount of
$299.36, representing the 1% difference in interest.  The Plaintiff
was not satisfied with the explanation of the calculation and did
not cash the check.

Alleging that similar problems affected thousands of policy
holders, the Plaintiff filed a class action complaint against the
Defendant on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated.
The Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint alleges breach of
contract, unjust enrichment, violation of the ADTPA, and violation
of the NCUDTPA.

Pending before the Court are three motions by the Defendant seeking
dismissal of the claims in the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint
and the Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.  Prior to
the Plaintiff filing the Second Amended Complaint, the Defendant
moved for summary judgment on the Plaintiff's claims of breach of
contract, violation of the NCUDTPA, and unjust enrichment.  The
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint added a claim for violation of
the ADTPA.

The Defendant moved to dismiss the new ADPTA claim and the NCUDTPA
claim.  It then filed a Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Plaintiff filed her own Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
seeking summary judgment on her claims for breach of contract and
violations of the ADTPA.

Tennessee has adopted the "most significant relationship" test of
the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws to choice-of-law
questions for tort claims.  The most significant relationship is
determined by examining: (1) the place of the alleged injury; (2)
the place where the injurious conduct occurred; (3) the domicile
and/or place of business of the parties involved; and (4) the place
where the relationship of the parties is centered

Judge Campbell gives significant weight to the fourth factor and
notes that the parties' relationship is centered in Alabama.  The
circumstances of the case indicate that Alabama bears the most
significant relationship to the parties and events that brought
about the unfair trade practices claim in this action.  Therefore,
the Judge will apply the Alabama unfair trade practices law.

Having determined that Alabama law governs the deceptive trade
practices claim, the Judge turns to the Plaintiff's claims under
the ADTPA.  The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's ADTPA claim
fails to state a claim and should be dismissed pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The Plaintiff
argues that not only should the claim survive, but the Court should
grant partial summary judgment on the ADTPA claim because the facts
establishing an ADTPA violation are undisputed.

The Judge holds that whether or not the provision of life insurance
loans constitutes the "business of insurance," the Alabama
Insurance Code contains specific regulations related to life
insurance loans, such as the one at issue in the case.  Life
insurance loans are, therefore, an activity which is subject to the
provisions of the Alabama Insurance Code exempt from the ADTPA.
There is no ambiguity in the statute requiring the Court to
consider whether the provision of loans constitutes the "business
of insurance."  Moreover, even absent the exclusion for activities
regulated by the Insurance Code, loans are not goods or services
under the ADTPA.

Having determined the Plaintiff's claim under the ADTPA act is
foreclosed by the exception for persons and activities subject to
the provisions of the Alabama Insurance Code, the Judge does not
consider the Defendant's additional arguments related to the
Plaintiff's ADTPA claim.

The Defendant argues the existence of a valid contract forecloses
the Plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment.  The Plaintiff
responds that she can plead unjust enrichment in the alternative
and that her claim for unjust enrichment should only be dismissed
if she prevails on the claim for breach of contract.  The Judge
holds that the Plaintiff has brought a claim for breach of contract
and neither party contests the existence or validity of the
insurance policy or loan agreement.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff
cannot also bring a claim for unjust enrichment.  Her dispute
sounds in contract.

Finally, as for breach of contract, the Judge finds that (i)
nothing in the assignment purports to assign the Policy itself or
all rights under the Policy; (ii) under Alabama law, life insurance
policies are incontestable after a maximum of two years, even if
the application contains material misstatements; (iii) the
Plaintiff's claim that payments made on the loan were not applied
to the loan balance survives the six-year statute of limitations
only to the extent the payments were made after March 2011; (iv)
summary judgment on the part of the breach of contract claim will
be granted in the Plaintiff's favor with regard to interest
calculations made within the six-year statute of limitations; (v)
on the issue of payments related to the policy riders, the
Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment; and (vi) the
Plaintiff has failed to establish that there is no dispute of
material fact as to the application of loan payments.

For the reasons stated, Judge Campbel dismissed the Plaintiff's
claim under the NCUDTPA, under the ADTPA, and the claim for unjust
enrichment.  The Judge granted the Plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment as to the breach of contract with regard to the
calculation of interest within the period of the statute of
limitations.  He denied with regard to the policy riders and with
regard to the application of loan payments.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2019 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/w3rdEL from Leagle.com.

Marietta McClendon, Plaintiff, represented by Annika K. Martin --
akmartin@lchb.com -- Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP,
Avery S. Halfon, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, J.
Bradley Ponder -- brad@montgomeryponder.com -- Montgomery Ponder,
LLC, Luke Montgomery -- luke@montgomeryponder.com -- Montgomery
Ponder, LLC & Mark P. Chalos -- mchalos@lchb.com -- Lieff,
Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP.

North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company, Defendant,
represented by Maria Q. Campbell -- mcampbell@bonelaw.com -- Bone,
McAllester & Norton, PLLC, Raquel L. Bellamy --
rbellamy@bonelaw.com -- Bone, McAllester & Norton, PLLC, Sean C.
Kirk -- skirk@bonelaw.com -- Bone, McAllester & Norton, PLLC, Shea
T. Hasenauer -- shasenauer@bonelaw.com -- Bone, McAllester &
Norton, PLLC & Stephen J. Zralek -- szralek@bonelaw.com -- Bone,
McAllester & Norton, PLLC.


NTW LLC: Wall Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------
JEREMY WALL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. NTW, LLC, d/b/a NTB - NATIONAL TIRE &
BATTERY, TBC - TIRE & BATTERY CORPORATION, d/b/a TBC CORPORATION,
and TBC RETAIL GROUP, INC. Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05826 (N.D.
Ill., Aug. 29, 2019) is a class and collective action brought on
behalf of current and former employees who were not paid all wages
owed to them due to Defendants' failure to pay them one and
one-half times their regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess
of 40 per week.

The Defendants failed to properly calculate the overtime rate at
which they compensated Plaintiff and other putative FLSA collection
action members and IMWL class action members for their hours worked
in excess of 40 in individual workweeks, says the complaint. The
resulting underpayments constitute violations of the Illinois
Minimum Wage Law and the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Plaintiff has been employed as a Sales Associate/Tire Professional
for Defendants from March 2012 through the present.

NTW is a Delaware corporation authorized to do business in
Illinois. It operates various retail automotive maintenance centers
including under the name NTB Tire and Service Centers, nationwide
including but not limited to in Cook County, Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Alejandro Caffarelli, Esq.
     Lorrie T. Peeters, Esq.
     Madeline K. Engel, Esq.
     Caffarelli & Associates Ltd.
     224 S. Michigan Ave., Ste. 300
     Chicago, IL 60604
     Phone: (312) 763-6880


OASMIA PHARMACEUTICAL: Pawar Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Pawar Law Group announces that a class action lawsuit has been
filed on behalf of shareholders who purchased shares of Oasmia
Pharmaceutical AB (NASDAQ: OASM) from October 23, 2015 through July
9, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The lawsuit seeks to
recover damages for Oasmia investors under the federal securities
laws.

To join the class action, go to
http://pawarlawgroup.com/cases/oasmia-pharmaceutical-ab/or call
Vik Pawar, Esq. toll-free at 888-589-9804 or email
info@pawarlawgroup.com for information on the class action.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Oasmia engaged in improper related-party transactions
with Alceco International S.A. and Ardenia Investment LTD, which
were controlled by Defendant Aleksov and his former father-in-law;
(2) due to those transactions, millions of Swedish kronor were not
accounted for in Oasmia's books; (3) transactions concerning
Oasmia's patents were also "carried out in a doubtful way;" and (4)
as a result of the aforementioned misconduct, defendants'
statements about Oasmia's business, operations, and prospects were
materially false and/or misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis
at all relevant times. When the true details entered the market,
the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than September
27, 2019.  A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation.

No class has been certified. Until a class is certified, you are
not represented by counsel unless you hire one.  You may hire
counsel of your choice.  You may also do nothing at this time and
be an absent member of the class.  Your ability to share in any
future recovery is not dependent upon being a lead plaintiff.

Pawar Law Group represents investors from around the world.

Contact:

         Vik Pawar, Esq.  
         Pawar Law Group  
         20 Vesey Street, Suite 1210  
         New York, NY 10007  
         Tel: (917) 261-2277  
         Fax: (212) 571-0938  
         Email: info@pawarlawgroup.com
                vik@pawarlawgroup.com [GN]


ON DECK CAPITAL: Court Denies Dismissal on TCPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia, Charlottesville Division, denied Defendant On Deck
Capital, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a) in the case captioned CHRISTOPHER MORGAN, Plaintiff,
v. ON DECK CAPITAL, INC., Defendants. Case No. 3:17-CV-00045. (W.D.
Va.).

Plaintiff Christopher Morgan brought this putative class action
under the TCPA, alleging that On Deck placed an unsolicited call to
him via an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS), a practice
prohibited by the TCPA.

The sole issue raised by On Deck's motion for summary judgment is
whether Plaintiff has raised sufficient evidence to show a genuine
dispute that On Deck called Plaintiff using an automatic telephone
dialing system (ATDS), defined under the TCPA as equipment with the
capacity to: (A) store or produce telephone numbers to be called,
using a random or sequential number generator and (B) dial such
numbers.

There is no dispute that the specific call in question was placed
on a telephone in Manual Touch Mode. In this mode, Salesforce On
Deck's account record database that stores telephone numbers
automatically populates an agent's next phone number, the agent
must manually key in the populated number, and the call will not be
initiated unless the phone number is correctly input by the agent
and the agent clicks Dial.

There is no dispute that the call to Plaintiff came from On Deck's
Sales Department, and that the Sales Department has access to a
domain that includes only the Manual Touch Mode and the Preview
Mode, which operates similarly to Manual Touch Mode by presenting
an agent with a prospective customer's file, populating the number
once the agent clicks Call Customer, and then only making the call
once the agent manually keys in the number or clicks each digit
using a mouse. There is also no dispute that two of On Deck's other
departments collections and customer service use the Five9 Virtual
Contact Center (VCC) domain, which includes dialing modes such as
the Power Mode, Progressive Mode and Predictive Mode that do have
the capacity to store and produce numbers using a random or
sequential number generator and then automatically dial such
numbers (i.e., almost certainly would qualify as ATDSs).  

In essence, then, the parties do not dispute that the call made to
Plaintiff was made in a dialing mode that, in and of itself, would
not qualify as an ATDS, since agents using Manual Touch Mode are
required to input the number and click Dial.  

On Deck presents evidence that the VCC and Manual Touch Mode
telephones use separate hardware, separate software, a separate
server, separate settings, and are administered separately, and
therefore constitute separate systems. On Deck also presents
evidence that at the time of the June 2017 call to Plaintiff,
members of the Sales Department in the New York office from which
the call was placed sat in their own separate workspace and were
not able to log into domains other than the Manual Touch Mode
domain.  

Plaintiff in turn offers several pieces of evidence to present its
characterization of Manual Touch Mode as part of an overall system
that includes the capacity for automatic dialing. First, Plaintiff
points to Snyder's proposed expert testimony that Manual Touch Mode
is "simply a software function within the overall dialing system
equipment used by On Deck, and that this overall system includes
other modal software functions such as the Power and Progressive
modes that do have the capacity for automatic dialing.  

Second, Plaintiff points to deposition testimony providing that
regardless of department, each OnDeck agent is equipped with nearly
identical hardware, a laptop, two monitors, mouse, keyboard, and
headset and that each laptop is loaded with the Five9 dialer
software, a program called Salesforce and a program called the
`Five9 Plus Adapter for Salesforce.

Finally, Plaintiff points to deposition testimony that a select few
On Deck employees with logins to multiple modules can quickly and
easily switch between domains (for instance, from Manual Touch Mode
into another mode that allows automatic dialing).

Again, Plaintiff does not contend that this was how he was called,
nor does Plaintiff need to contend as much. But Plaintiff's
evidence does establish the following: 1) an On Deck agent called
Plaintiff from a workstation equipped with Salesforce, the Five9
Plus Adapter for Salesforce, and Five9's Manuel Touch Mode 2) an On
Deck employee with the correct login could access other modules in
the Five9 ecosystem from that workstation 3) among these are
modules with the capacity to store and produce numbers using a
random or sequential number generator and then automatically dial
such numbers; and that these various modules together constitute a
single system.  

Thus, because a genuine dispute of fact remains in this litigation,
Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment.

The Court denies On Deck's motion for summary judgment.

The full-text copy of the District Court's August 29, 2019
Memorandum Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6t7vcrl
from Leagle.com.

Christopher Morgan, individually and on behalf of a class of all
persons and entities similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by
Michael Brian Hissam -- mhissam@hfdrlaw.com -- Hissam Forman
Donovan Ritchie PLLC & Ryan McCune Donovan, Hissam Forman Donovan
Ritchie PLLC, Po Box 3983, Charleston, WV, 25339-3983, pro hac
vice.

On Deck Capital, Inc., Defendant, represented by John Curtis Lynch
-- john.lynch@troutman.com -- TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP & David Michael
Gettings -- dave.gettings@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders LLP.


OREGON: Seeks Dismissal of Foster Care Class Action
---------------------------------------------------
Andy Thompson, writing for The Corvallis Advocate, reports that in
April, advocacy groups A Better Childhood and Disability Rights
Oregon filed suit against the Oregon Department of Human Services
(DHS). The advocacy groups allege the Department re-victimizes
children in its care, and has failed to address documented problems
for over a decade.

The state has now filed a motion seeking dismissal, asserting the
state is already fixing its child welfare system, and that there is
no need for a federal judge to oversee the state's decisions
concerning foster care. An attempt to settle the matter stalled
earlier this summer.

In turn, a response was filed on Aug. 8, maintaining that the state
has still "demonstrated that it is a constitutionally inadequate
parent to the most vulnerable children in its care." The advocacy
groups filing the class action suit seek to have the state's foster
care system restructured, and believe a judge needs to provide
oversight, citing the state's track record.

According to OPB, Marcia Lowry, the executive director of A Better
Childhood said, "At this point, given the history of what's
happened to foster kids in Oregon, it's way too late for the state
to say, 'Trust us.'"

This is not the first time DHS has been the subject of a
class-action lawsuit. In 2016, the department was sued in an effort
to have them end the practice of placing foster kids in hotel rooms
and state offices, which DHS finally agreed to phase out by 2020.

The current suit was filed on behalf of 10 plaintiffs, all current
Oregon foster children at the time, ranging from age 1 to 17. The
suit is titled Wyatt B. v. Brown, and includes all Oregon foster
children in the custody of DHS. Oregon Governor Kate Brown, then
Oregon Department of Human Services Director Fariborz Pakseresht,
Child Welfare Director Marilyn Jones, and DHS are all named as
defendants.

What happened to Corvallis 16-year-old, Naomi?

When the suit was originally filed, we reported on the case of
Naomi B. from Corvallis, then age 16. She spent five months
shuffling between homeless shelters and institutions. Some of these
institutions were actually jail facilities being repurposed for
foster care placements.

The suit alleges that Naomi entered foster care in November 2018
after twice ending up at Good Samaritan Hospital's emergency room
threatening suicide. DHS concluded Naomi could not safely stay with
her father, but they could not find her placement. So, with the
consent of Naomi's father, she was placed in Jackson Street Youth
Shelter for the first of what would be seven times.

Then, in December, Naomi was sent to Creekside, a former police
department headquarters that has been modified to care for foster
children. On her first day, Naomi was attacked by another resident.
The suit also alleges Naomi would then witness her roommate being
placed in a locked cell, where she would then slit her wrists.

After placement at another juvenile detention center and a failed
placement at the home of a family friend, Naomi ended up going back
to the Jackson Street homeless shelter. The suit alleges that up to
this point, Naomi had still not received adequate counseling or
therapy.

Notably, the complaint asserts Naomi has no history of substance
abuse.

But, at the end of January Naomi was placed at the Youth
Inspiration Program (YIP) in Klamath Falls. Dubbed an addiction
treatment center, the locked facility is a repurposed juvenile
detention facility with concrete floors and walls. According to the
complaint, Naomi was not allowed outside the facility. Instead, she
was escorted to a 30-by-30 foot concrete outdoor exercise yard,
which was enclosed by a 20-foot-tall fence topped by barbed wire.

The suit also alleges Naomi was only permitted one book in her
rooms at a time, and all clothes and other personal items were
secured in a separate locker room. The suit maintains Naomi's
education suffered. She was only allowed one-and-a-half to
two-and-a half hours of online education daily, exhausting the
facility's educational offerings over the course of two months.

She was given just one hour of therapy a week. Conversely, Naomi
was required to attend mandatory daily group substance abuse and
sex abuse therapy sessions, despite no problem with substance use,
or history of sex abuse.

OREGON'S OWN AUDIT ADMITS A MESS

A report from the state this year revealed the number of available
foster homes continues to decline and caseworker turnover remains
high, says the filing.

"These systemic problems are compounded by the fact that the
State's Director of Child Welfare Programs resigned in June of this
year and a permanent replacement has not been made," the filing
reads. "The ship is sailing in the wrong direction and without a
captain."

STILL, OREGON'S OWN REPORTS CAN'T BE TRUSTED

The advocacy groups also assert the state "continues to demonstrate
that it cannot be trusted to assess its own performance."

For instance, Oregon's Child Welfare issued a report stating
children were excelling academically at a facility in Utah where
most of Oregon's out-of-state foster youth were sent. However,
Utah's own Department of Human Services sounded an alarm bell, and
the facility is being closed amid reports of abuse and child
neglect.

The advocacy groups most recent filing expresses their belief that
Oregon's foster care system cannot be trusted to evaluate itself,
let alone fix its deficiencies without oversight. [GN]


PERDUE FARMS: Workers File Anti-Trust Action Over Depressed Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judy Jien, Kieo Jibidi and Elaisa Clement, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. PERDUE FARMS,
INC., PERDUE FOODS LLC, TYSON FOODS, INC., TYSON PREPARED FOODS,
INC., THE HILLSHIRE BRANDS COMPANY, TYSON FRESH MEATS, INC., TYSON
PROCESSING SERVICES, INC., TYSON REFRIGERATED MEATS, INC., KEYSTONE
FOODS, LLC, EQUITY GROUP EUFAULA DIVISION, LLC, EQUITY GROUP -
GEORGIA DIVISION, LLC, EQUITY GROUP KENTUCKY DIVISION, LLC,
PILGRIM'S PRIDE CORPORATION, PILGRIM'S PRIDE CORPORATION OF WEST
VIRGINIA, INC., SANDERSON FARMS, INC., SANDERSON FARMS, INC.,
SANDERSON FARMS, INC. (FOODS DIVISION), KOCH FOODS, INC., JCG FOODS
OF ALABAMA, LLC, JCG FOODS OF GEORGIA, LLC, JCG INDUSTRIES, INC.,
KOCH FOODS LLC, KOCH FOODS OF ALABAMA, LLC, KOCH FOODS OF ASHLAND,
LLC, KOCH FOODS OF GADSDEN, LLC, KOCH FOODS OF CUMMING, LLC, KOCH
FOODS OF GAINESVILLE, LLC, KOCH FOODS OF MISSISSIPPI, LLC, WAYNE
FARMS, LLC, WFSP FOODS, LLC, MOUNTAIRE FARMS, INC., MOUNTAIRE FARMS
OF DELAWARE, INC., PECO FOODS, INC., SIMMONS FOODS, INC., SIMMONS
PREPARED FOODS, INC., FIELDALE FARMS CORPORATION, GEORGE'S, INC.,
OZARK MOUNTAIN POULTRY, INC., GEORGE'S CHICKEN, LLC, GEORGE'S
FOODS, LLC, GEORGE'S PROCESSING, INC., HOUSE OF RAEFORD FARMS,
INC., HOUSE OF RAEFORD FARMS OF LOUISIANA, LLC, O.K. FOODS, INC.,
HARRISON POULTRY, INC., MAR-JAC POULTRY, INC., MAR-JAC POULTRY MS,
LLC, MAR-JAC POULTRY AL, LLC, MAR-JAC POULTRY, LLC, MAR-JAC
HOLDINGS, INC., AMICK FARMS, LLC, CASE FOODS, INC., CASE FARMS
PROCESSING, INC., ALLEN HARIM FOODS, LLC, AGRI STATS, INC., and
WEBBER, MENG, SAHL AND COMPANY, INC. d/b/a WMS & COMPANY, INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-02521-ELH (D. Md., Aug. 30, 2019) is
an antitrust action brought to enjoin Defendants from continuing
their unlawful agreements and to recover actual, compensatory and
treble damages, as well as costs, attorneys' fees and interest.

For more than a decade, Defendants have conspired and combined to
fix and depress the compensation paid to non-supervisory production
and maintenance employees at chicken processing plants in violation
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, asserts the complaint. The
Defendants consist of 18 chicken processors and many of their
subsidiaries and affiliates ("Defendant Processors"), which process
and produce more than 90 percent of the chicken sold in the United
States, and two consulting companies that facilitate the exchange
of competitively sensitive compensation data, Agri Stats, Inc. and
Webber, Meng, Sahl and Company, Inc. d/b/a WMS and Company, Inc.
Since January 1, 2009, Defendants have conspired to fix and depress
the hourly wages and benefits paid to Class Members. Defendants
have engaged in this unlawful conspiracy to maximize their profits
by reducing labor costs, which have comprised a substantial share
of each Defendant Processor's total operating costs, the complaint
says.

According to the complaint, numerous characteristics of the chicken
processing industry have facilitated the formation and
implementation of the conspiracy, including but not limited to, the
following: (a) vertical integration; (b) high barriers to entry;
(c) industry concentration; (d) fungibility of chicken processing
plant workers; (e) inelastic labor supply; (f) numerous
opportunities to collude; (g) personal relationships between
executives at competing chicken processors; and (h) a history of
government investigations into collusive actions. The intended and
actual effect of Defendants' conspiracy to fix compensation has
been to reduce and suppress the wages and benefits paid to Class
Members since January 2009 to levels materially lower than they
would have been in a competitive market. During the Class Period,
even while worker productivity and processing line speeds increased
significantly, wage increases provided to Class Members were highly
restrained and limited. Economic analysis conducted by expert
economists retained by Plaintiffs shows that the wages of plant
workers employed by non-poultry food manufacturers were higher, and
increased at a materially more rapid rate, than those paid by
Defendant Processors to Class Members during the Class Period. The
agreements entered by Defendants to fix and depress wages and
benefits have unreasonably restrained trade in violation of the
Sherman Act, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs were employed as a deboner at a chicken processing plant
operated by Defendants.

Perdue Farms, Inc. is a privately held Maryland corporation
headquartered in Salisbury, Maryland.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Matthew K Handley, Esq.
     HANDLEY FARAH ANDERSON
     777 6th Street, NW
     Eleventh Floor
     Washington, DC 20001
     Email: mhandey@hfajustice.com

          - and -

     George Farah, Esq.
     HANDLEY FARAH ANDERSON
     81 Prospect Street
     Brooklyn, NY 11201
     Phone: (212) 477-8090
     Email: gfarah@hfajustice.com

          - and -

     William H. Anderson, Esq.
     HANDLEY FARAH & ANDERSON PLLC
     4730 Table Mesa Drive, Suite G-200
     Boulder, CO 80305
     Phone: (303) 800-9109
     Email: wanderson@hfajustice.com

          - and -

     Daniel A. Small, Esq.
     Benjamin D. Brown, Esq.
     Brent W. Johnson, Esq.
     Alison S. Deich, Esq.
     COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC
     1100 New York Avenue, N.W.
     5th Floor
     Washington, DC 20005
     Phone: (202) 408-4600
     Fax: (202) 408-4699
     Email: dsmall@cohenmilstein.com
            bbrown@cohenmilstein.com
            bjohnson@cohenmilstein.com
            adeich@cohenmilstein.com

          - and -

     Steve W. Berman, Esq.
     HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
     1301 Second Avenue, Suite 2000
     Seattle, WA 98101
     Phone: (206) 623-7292
     Facsimile: (206) 623-0594
     Email: steve@hbsslaw.com

          - and -

     Shana E. Scarlett, Esq.
     Rio S. Pierce, Esq.
     HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
     715 Hearst Avenue . Suite 202
     Berkeley, CA 94710
     Phone: (510) 725-3000
     Email: shanas@hbsslaw.com
            riop@hbsslaw.com


PREMIERE CREDIT: Echols Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against PREMIERE CREDIT OF
NORTH AMERICA, LLC. The case is styled as CHAMPAINE ECHOLS
INDIVIDUALLY, AND OR BEHALF OF ALL OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED
CONSUMERS, Plaintiff v. PREMIERE CREDIT OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-04125-GAM (E.D. Pa., Sept. 9, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Premiere Credit of North America, LLC offers financial services.
The Company provides accounts receivable management services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     NICHOLAS J. LINKER, ESQ.
     ZEMEL LAW LLC
     1373 Broad St., SUITE 203-C
     Clifton, NJ 07013
     Phone: (862) 227-3106
     Email: nl@zemellawllc.com


PROGRESSIVE WASTE: Loses Bid to Dismiss Landfill Nuisance Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana issued an Opinion and Order denying Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss in the case captioned ELIAS JORGE "GEORGE" ICTECH-BENDECK,
Plaintiff, v. PROGRESSIVE WASTE SOLUTIONS OF LA, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants. Applies to: All Cases. Civil Action No. 18-7889, C/W
No. 18-8071, No. 18-8218., 18-9312 (E.D. La.).

This case concerns the operation of the Jefferson Parish Landfill
in Waggaman, Louisiana. According to the Plaintiffs, the Landfill
began emitting noxious odors, which the Plaintiffs allege consist
primarily of methane and hydrogen sulfide gases, into surrounding
neighborhoods. The Plaintiffs allege odors from the Landfill have
unreasonably interfered with their use and enjoyment of immovable
property in violation of Louisiana law.

The Defendants argue the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' case
because Plaintiffs fail to state claims for nuisance, negligence
and premises liability and fail to sufficiently plead class
allegations.

In the alternative, Defendants argue the Court should stay
Plaintiffs' action under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
pending the resolution of certain administrative enforcement
proceedings.

Although Plaintiffs' complaint mentions causes of action for
negligence, gross negligence, and potential premises liability, at
oral argument, Plaintiffs' counsel clarified the only cause of
action brought by Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of a
class, is Plaintiffs' nuisance claim under articles 667-669.

Plaintiffs' complaint sets forth factual allegations strong enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level with respect
to their nuisance claim. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' nuisance claim
survives this motion to dismiss.

Plaintiffs' Complaint States a Claim for Nuisance

Louisiana Civil Code article 667 defines nuisance: "Although a
proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases, still he
cannot make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor of the
liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of any
damage to him. However, if the work he makes on his estate deprives
his neighbor of enjoyment or causes damage to him, he is answerable
for damages only upon a showing that he knew or, in the exercise of
reasonable care, should have known that his works would cause
damage, that the damage could have been prevented by the exercise
of reasonable care, and that he failed to exercise such reasonable
care."

Excluding certain ultrahazardous activities (which are not alleged
in this case), to bring a successful nuisance claim under this
provision, a plaintiff must prove a defendant is: (1) a proprietor
who (2) negligently (3) conducts work on his property (4) that
causes damage to his neighbor.

In this case, Plaintiffs allege Defendants violate article 667 by
creating a nuisance through the emission of noxious odors into the
air in and around the JP Landfill, which unreasonably interferes
with Plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their property. All parties
agree Plaintiffs have alleged Defendants are proprietors who
conduct work on their property, the Landfill.
  
Defendants argue Plaintiffs fail to plead this element, and as a
result fail state a claim for nuisance under article 667, because
Plaintiffs (1) do not allege an interest in real property that
neighbors the Landfill (2) do not claim the odors from the Landfill
are unreasonable or excessive and (3) do not assert the odors from
the Landfill caused their harm.

The Court rules that the Defendants arguments fail. Plaintiffs'
complaint sufficiently alleges they have an interest in property
neighboring the Landfill and suffer unreasonable interference with
the use of that property because of the noxious odors emitted from
the Landfill.

Plaintiffs' complaint alleges an interest in immovable property
neighboring the Landfill.

Liability under article 667 arises hen activity by one party
holding a right to immovable property has caused damages to a party
holding a right to neighboring property.

Plaintiffs pleaded a sufficient property interest

Under article 667, a plaintiff's interest in neighboring property
can be an ownership interest, leasehold interest, third-party
interest, or more generally the interest of a person whose right
derives from the owner. In this case, Plaintiffs allege they, along
with prospective class members, are residents of and domiciled in
Jefferson Parish. Moreover, the Complaint states Defendants created
a nuisance  which unreasonably interferes with Plaintiffs' use and
enjoyment of their property. Taken together, these statements are
sufficient factual content to allow the court to draw the
reasonable inference that Plaintiffs have some interest in an
immovable.

Plaintiffs allege their property neighbors Defendants' property

In its ordinary meaning, neighbor' is a person who lives near
another. Louisiana law defines neighbor on a case-by-case basis.
According to the Fifth Circuit, there must be some propinquity
between the properties of the neighbor and the proprietor.

A mere causal nexus between the use of a property and harm to
another is insufficient to make those properties neighbors. What
qualifies as some propinquity, however, is fact specific and may
change based on the harm alleged,for example, the radius of
neighbors surrounding a loud manufacturing plant may be much
smaller than the radius of neighbors surrounding a nuclear waste
facility.

In this case, Plaintiffs allege they, and any prospective class
members, have a property interest within Jefferson Parish,
specifically including, but not limited to, the neighborhoods of
Waggaman, River Ridge, and Harahan. Plaintiffs allege they are
harmed by the noxious odors emanating from the Landfill. Whether
article 667 requires some propinquity between the neighbor and
proprietor or merely a causal connection between the acts of a
defendant property owner and the damages suffered by a plaintiff,
Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged they have an interest in
property that neighbors the Landfill as their property is both in
the same parish as the Landfill and is adversely affected by the
odors the Landfill emits.

Plaintiffs have alleged they are the Landfill's neighbors under
Louisiana Civil Code article 667.

Plaintiffs' complaint alleges the Landfill's odors are excessive
and unreasonable
To be liable under article 667, a proprietor's use of land must
deprive his neighbor of enjoyment or cause damage to him. Article
668 limits this recovery by providing a proprietor may permissibly
cause some inconvenience to a neighbor and article 669 requires
tolerance of lesser inconveniences.

In this case, Plaintiffs allege the Landfill gives off a noxious
odor that interferes with the enjoyment of their property. Noxious
is a powerful term that means harmful to health or injurious. This
is a sufficient factual allegation to create a reasonable inference
that the odor produced by the Landfill is excessive and
unreasonable.

Plaintiffs allege the Landfill's noxious odors caused them harm

Under article 667, the defendant-proprietor's use of land must
cause damage to his neighbor's land. For causation to be found, the
defendant's actions need not be the sole cause, but it must be a
cause in fact, and to be a cause in fact in legal contemplation, it
must have a proximate relation to the harm which occurs.

In this case, Plaintiffs allege the Landfill emits noxious odors
onto neighboring properties. This is a plain, clear statement that
Defendants are causing the foul odors to be present on and to cause
damage to Plaintiffs' neighboring property.

Defendants present possible alternative sources of the odors, but
that is a merits argument and is inappropriate in a motion to
dismiss when the allegations in the complaint must be taken as true
and when defendant's actions need not be the sole cause of the
harm.

Plaintiffs Sufficiently Plead Class Allegations

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) sets forth the following four
prerequisites to certifying any class: (1) the class must be so
numerous that joinder of all parties is impracticable (2) there
must be questions of law or fact common to the class (3) the claims
or defenses of the representative parties must be typical of the
claims or defenses of the class and (4) the representative parties
must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. If
those prerequisites are satisfied, a court may permit the action to
be maintained as a class so long as the action falls within any one
or more of the three categories established by Rule 23(b).

In the mass tort context, class actions often are not permissible
because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of
damages but of liability and defenses to liability, would be
present, affecting the individuals in different ways. Although the
requirements to obtain class certification in a mass tort case are
demanding, motions to dismiss for failure to plead some
ascertainable class should not be routinely granted. If the
viability of a class depends on factual matters that must be
developed through discovery, the motion to dismiss should be denied
pending the full-blown certification process.

Plaintiffs are not required in pleadings to prove a class is
currently and readily ascertainable based on objective criteria,
but need only demonstrate at some stage of the proceeding that the
class is adequately defined and clearly ascertainable.

Further, courts are encouraged to allow discovery on class
certification matters.
At this early stage in this case, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege
the potential for an adequately ascertainable class. Determining
class membership will not necessarily require finding individual
liability. Once discovery is underway, it is entirely possible,
based on the current allegations, that objective,
non-individualized criteria (such as distance from the Landfill or
results of air quality testing) will define the class.

Accordingly, as encouraged by the Fifth Circuit, the Court will
permit discovery on Plaintiffs' class allegations. It is premature
to dismiss the class allegations at this early stage in the
proceedings based on a substantive argument that the class cannot
be objectively defined. Plaintiffs have alleged all prerequisites
for establishing a class and have proposed a class that is
potentially ascertainable by purely objective standards.

Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' claim for
nuisance under Louisiana code of civil procedure articles 667-669
is denied.

The full-text copy of the District Court's August 29, 2019 Order
and Reasons is available at https://tinyurl.com/y4y45ajq from
Leagle.com.

Elias Jorge Ictech-Bendeck, also known as George Ictech-Bendeck,
Plaintiff, represented by Val Patrick Exnicios, Liska, Exnicios &
Nungesser, 1515 Poydras Street 14th Floor, Ste. 1400 New Orleans,
LA 70112, Angela Cecelia Imbornone, Favret, Demarest, Russo &
Lutkewitte, Anthony J. Russo, Favret, Demarest, Russo & Lutkewitte,
Dean Joseph Favret, Favret, Demarest, Russo & Lutkewitte, 1515
Poydras St Ste 1400, New Orleans, LA, 70112-4500, Douglas S.
Hammel, Hammel Law Firm, LLC, 3129 Bore St., Metairie, LA,
70001-5333, Frances Lacy Radcliff, Liska, Exnicios & Nungesser,
1515 Poydras Street 14th Floor, Ste. 1400 New Orleans, LA. 70112,
Jason Zachary Landry, Martzell & Bickford, 338 Lafayette St., New
Orleans, LA, 70130-3244, Lauren A. Favret, Favret, Demarest, Russo
& Lutkewitte, 1515 Poydras St Ste 1400, New Orleans, LA,
70112-4500, Lawrence J. Centola, III, Martzell & Bickford, 338
Lafayette St., New Orleans, LA, 70130-3244

Waste Connections US, Inc, Waste Connections Bayou, Inc., formerly
known as Progressive Waste Solutions of LA, Inc. & Louisiana
Regional Landfill Company, Incorrectly named as Louisiana Regional
Landfill Company, Inc., Defendants, represented by David R. Taggart
-- dtaggart@bradleyfirm.com -- Bradley, Murchison, Kelly & Shea,
LLC, James B. Slaughter -- jslaughter@bdlaw.com -- Beveridge &
Diamond, PC, pro hac vice, John H. Paul -jpaul@bdlaw.com --
Beveridge & Diamond, pro hac vice, John B. Stanton, Bradley,
Murchison, Kelly & Shea, LLC, 1100 Poydras St., Ste 2700, New
Orleans, LA 70163 Megan R. Brillault -- mbrillault@bdlaw.com --
Beveridge & Diamond, pro hac vice, Michael C. Mims, Bradley
Murchison Kelly & Shea, LLC, 1100 Poydras St., Ste 2700, New
Orleans, LA 70163 & Michael G. Murphy -- mmurphy@bdlaw.com --
Beveridge & Diamond, pro hac vice.


R&C CLEANING: Godoy Seeks to Recover Damages for FLSA, NYLL Breach
------------------------------------------------------------------
CARMEN GODOY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. R&C CLEANING SOLUTIONS INC. and RICHARD
MENESES, as an individual, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-05005-CBA-PK (E.D. N.Y., Sept. 3, 2019) is an action
against Defendants to recover damages for violations of state and
federal wage and hour laws arising out of Plaintiff's employment
under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law.

The complaint alleges that Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff the
legally prescribed minimum wage for her hours worked from July 2017
until March 2019; did not pay Plaintiff time and a half for hours
worked over 40; failed to post notices of the minimum wage and
overtime wage requirements in a conspicuous place at the location
of their employment; and failed to keep accurate payroll records as
required by both NYLL and the FLSA, says the complaint.

Plaintiff CARMEN GODOY was employed by Defendants at R & C CLEANING
SOLUTIONS INC. from July 2017 until March 2019.

R & C CLEANING SOLUTIONS INC., is a corporation organized under the
laws of New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
     Helen f. Dalton & Associated, P.C.
     80—02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
     Kew Gardens, NY 11415
     Phone: 718-263-9591
     Fax: 718-263-9598


RESURGENT CAPITAL: Fowler Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. Florida
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Resurgent Capital
Services, LP. The case is styled as Kaliah Fowler individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Resurgent
Capital Services, LP, John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-23739-KMM (S.D. Fla., Sept. 9, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Resurgent Capital Services is a manager and servicer of domestic
and international consumer debt portfolios for credit grantors and
debt buyers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Justin Zeig, Esq.
     Zeig Law Firm, LLC
     3595 Sheridan Street, Suite 103
     Hollywood, FL 33021
     Phone: (754) 217-3084
     Email: justin@zeiglawfirm.com


REV GROUP: Continues to Defend Consolidated Suit over 2017 IPO
--------------------------------------------------------------
REV Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 4, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended July 31, 2019, that the company continues to
defend a consolidated class action related to the company's January
2017 initial public offering (IPO).

A consolidated federal putative securities class action and a
consolidated state putative securities class action are pending
against the Company and certain of its officers and directors, each
on behalf of a putative class of purchasers of the Company's common
stock in or traceable to its January 2017 initial public offering
(IPO) and of purchasers in its secondary offering of common stock
in October 2017, as well as, for the federal action, purchasers
from October 10, 2017 through June 7, 2018.

The actions also name certain of the underwriters for the Company's
IPO or secondary offering as defendants. The federal and state
courts each consolidated multiple separate actions pending before
them, the first of which was filed on June 8, 2018. The actions
allege certain violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and, for
the federal action, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Collectively, the actions seek certification of the putative
classes asserted and compensatory damages and attorneys' fees and
costs.

The underwriter defendants have notified the Company of their
intent to seek indemnification from the Company pursuant to the IPO
underwriting agreement regarding the claims asserted with respect
to the IPO, and the Company expects the underwriters to do the same
in regard to the claims asserted with respect to the October 2017
offering.

Two purported derivative actions, which have since been
consolidated, were also filed in federal court in Delaware in 2019
against the Company's directors (with the Company as a nominal
defendant), premised on allegations similar to those asserted in
the consolidated federal securities litigation.

The Company and the other defendants intend to defend these
lawsuits vigorously. Additional lawsuits may be filed and, at this
time, the Company is unable to predict the outcome of the lawsuits,
the possible loss or range of loss, if any, associated with the
resolution of the lawsuits, or any potential effect that it may
have on the Company or its operations.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

REV Group, Inc. designs, manufactures, and distributes specialty
vehicles in the United States, Canada, Europe, Africa, the Middle
East, Latin America, the Caribbean, and internationally. It
operates through three segments: Fire & Emergency, Commercial, and
Recreation. REV Group, Inc. was formerly known as Allied Specialty
Vehicles, Inc. and changed its name to REV Group, Inc. in November
2015. The company is headquartered in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.


RIAL DE MINAS II: Court Dismisses Martinez Action With Prejudice
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
issued an Order dismissing the complaint with prejudice in the case
captioned IDALY MARTINEZ on her own behalf and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. RIAL DE MINAS II, INC.,
RIAL DE MINAS III, INC., RIAL DE MINAS IV, INC., JUAN LUEVANOS,
MARIA LUEVANOS, and, MELISSA LUEVANOS, Defendants. Civil Action No.
16-cv-01947-RM-KLM. (D. Colo.).

This is a certified class and collective action in which the Court
has approved the parties' settlement. And, under Rule 23(e) the
claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class or a class
proposed to be certified for purposes of settlement may be settled,
voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court's
approval.

Accordingly, the Court construes the parties' Stipulation as a
motion requesting (a) final judgment, Order approving the Joint
Motion for Final Approval of Class and Collective Action
Settlement, which Order is incorporated herein by reference and (b)
an order of dismissal.  

The full-text copy of the District Court's August 29, 2019 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/y3ne4xpw from Leagle.com.

Idaly Martinez, on her own behalf and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Brandt Powers
Milstein, Milstein Law Office, 1123 Spruce St., Boulder, CO,
80302-4001

Rial de Minas, Inc., Rial de Minas III, Inc., Rial de Minas IV,
Inc., Juan Luevanos, Maria Luevanos, Melissa Luevanos & Rial de
Minas II, Inc., Defendants, represented by Frank William Suyat --
fsuyat@dillanddill.com -- Dill Dill Carr Stonbraker & Hutchings,
P.C.


RO GALLERY: Court Dismisses GBL Claim in Rosenzweig Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MONTE ROSENZWEIG AND GOLD STANDARD AGENCY, INC., on
behalf of plaintiffs and the class members described below,
Plaintiffs, v. RO GALLERY IMAGE MAKERS, INC., doing business as
ROGALLERY.COM and JOHN DOES 1-10, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-2736
(ADS)(SIL)(E.D. N.Y.), Judge Arthur D. Spatt of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of New York denied in part Ro
Gallery's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) as to the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") claim, and granted in
part, as to the New York General Business Law ("GBL") claim.

On May 8, 2018, Plaintiffs Rosenzweig and Gold Standard Agency --
of which Rosenzweig is the principal owner and officer -- brought
the putative class action against Ro Gallery and 10 unknown
individuals.  The Plaintiffs alleged that Ro Galley sent an
unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile ("fax") machine,
in violation of the TCPA and Section 396-aa of the GBL.

The Plaintiffs brought the TCPA and GBL action, alleging they
received an unsolicited fax advertisement.  The fax rovided Ro
Gallery's phone number, street address, and email address.  The fax
also: (a) advertised Ro Gallery's products and services (artwork
sales); (b) contained a website registered to and used by Ro
Gallery; (c) benefitted Ro Gallery economically; and (d) lacked an
opt-out notice pursuant to Section 227.  Ro Gallery sent the fax as
part of a "mass broadcasting" of faxes.  It had sent similar
unsolicited fax advertisements to at least 40 other New York
residents, and discovery could reveal the transmission of
additional faxes.

As to the John Doe Defendants, the Plaintiffs alleged that they
were natural or artificial persons that were involved in the
sending of the [fax] advertisements.  They did not further identify
the John Doe Defendants, and no Defendant other than Ro Gallery
appears in the action.  In addition, the Plaintiffs did not
describe the nature of Gold Standard Agency's business,
specifically, the relevance of an art dealership to the business.

The Plaintiffs brought claims under Section 227(b)(1)(C) of the
TCPA, and Section 396-aa of the GBL.  They made no separate
allegations as to the GBL Section 396-aa claim, and they only
argued that Ro Galley violated the statute by sending unsolicited
fax advertising to the Plaintiffs and others.

Ro Gallery now moves to dismiss the Complaint under Rules 12(b)(1)
and (b)(6).  It alleges in the motion and in an attached affidavit
that it did not send the fax.  The Plaintiffs oppose the motion to
dismiss, and argue that the Court should not consider the factual
allegations about not sending the fax.  Ro Gallery replied.

Judge Spatt holds that the Complaint, along with the attached fax,
adequately pleads that the Plaintiffs received an unsolicited fax
advertisement because it claims that the Plaintiffs received a fax
promoting Ro Gallery's goods and services.  The fax itself promotes
Ro Gallery's products.  It invites buyers to purchase individual
pieces of artwork.  It provides the company's contact information.
Ro Gallery does not dispute that the fax promotes its product or
provides such information. Further, of importance, the Complaint
alleges that Ro Gallery sent the fax, despite Ro Gallery's
arguments that the Plaintiffs failed to make such an allegation.

As to Ro Gallery's argument concerning agency, the Judge holds that
it correctly notes that the Plaintiffs did not allege that an agent
sent the fax on Ro Gallery's behalf.  While a party may demonstrate
vicarious liability under the TCPA, the Plaintiffs have
sufficiently stated a claim for Ro Gallery's direct liability under
the TCPA.  Thus, the Rule 12(b)(6) motion is denied as to the TCPA
claim.  Further, because the Plaintiffs sufficiently state a claim
under the TCPA, the Jude also denies the request to dismiss the
action under Rule 12(b)(1).

For the foregoing reasons, Ro Gallery's Motion to Dismiss pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) is denied in part, as to the TCPA claim, and
granted in part, as to the GBL claim.  Because the Plaintiffs state
a claim under the TCPA, the motion is also denied in part as to the
request to dismiss the action under Rule 12(b)(1).

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2019 Memorandum of
Decision and Order is available at https://is.gd/k9MhA6 from
Leagle.com.

Monte Rosenzweig & Gold Standard Agency, Inc, on behalf of
plaintiffs and the class members described below, Plaintiffs,
represented by Adam Jon Fishbein, Adam J. Fishbein, P.C. & Tiffany
N. Hardy, Edelman Combs Latturner & Goodwin LLC.

Ro Gallery Image Makers, Inc., doing business as Rogallery.com,
Defendant, represented by Steven Altman -- steven@altmanllp.com --
Altman & Company P.C..


SAEXPLORATION HOLDINGS: Zhang Investor Files Securities Fraud Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Zhang Investor Law announces the filing of a class action lawsuit
on behalf of shareholders who bought shares of SAExploration
Holdings Inc. (SAEX)  between March 15, 2016 and August 15, 2019,
inclusive (the "Class Period").

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than October 17, 2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Your ability to obtain a recovery is not dependent upon
being a lead plaintiff. If you wish to join the
http://zhanginvestorlaw.com/join-action-form/?slug=saexploration-holdings-inc&id=1988
or to discuss your rights or interests regarding this class
action, please contact Sophie Zhang, Esq. or Spencer Lee toll-free
at 800-991-3756 or email info@zhanginvestorlaw.com,
slee@zhanginvestorlaw.com for information on the class action.

According to the lawsuit,  throughout the Class Period, SAEX and
its senior executives presented false and misleading financial
statements by failing to consolidate the results of Alaska Seismic
Ventures, LLC ("ASV"), an entity in which the Company had a
controlling financial interest, in its financial statements. These
accounting abuses led to the Company disclosing: (i) the existence
of SEC and internal investigations into the Company's financial
reporting; (ii) the need for SAEX to restate all of its financial
statements covering 2015 through 2018; (iii) CEO Jeffrey Hastings
had been placed on administrative leave; and (iv) CFO and General
Counsel Brent Whitely had been fired.  When this news entered the
market, the lawsuit alleges that investors suffered damages.

A class has not been certified.  You may retain counsel of your
choice.  You may take no action at this time and be an absent class
member. Your ability to obtain a recovery is not dependent upon
being a lead plaintiff.

Zhang Investor Law represents investors worldwide.

         Zhang Investor Law P.C.
         99 Wall Street, Suite 232
         New York, New York 10005
         tel: (800) 991-3756
         Email: info@zhanginvestorlaw.com [GN]


SANDERSON FARMS: Faces Wage & Benefits Class Suit in Maryland
-------------------------------------------------------------
Sanderson Farms, Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission filed on September 4, 2019, that
the company is defending against a wage and benefits class action
suit in Maryland.

Sanderson Farms, Inc. (the "Registrant") and its subsidiaries
Sanderson Farms, Inc. (Foods Division) and Sanderson Farms, Inc.
(Processing Division) were named as defendants, along with 17 other
poultry producers and certain of their affiliated companies; Agri
Stats, Inc.; and Webber, Meng, Sahl and Company, Inc. in a putative
class action lawsuit filed on August 30, 2019 in the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland.

The complaint alleges that the defendants conspired to fix,
depress, maintain and stabilize the wages and benefits paid to
certain employees at chicken processing plants in the United States
in violation of federal antitrust law.

The complaint seeks treble damages, injunctive relief, costs, and
attorneys' fees.

The lawsuit is in its earliest stage and the Registrant intends to
defend it vigorously.

Sanderson Farms, Inc., an integrated poultry processing company,
produces, processes, markets, and distributes fresh, frozen, and
prepared chicken products in the United States. Sanderson Farms,
Inc. was founded in 1947 and is headquartered in Laurel,
Mississippi.


SANTANDER BANK: Court Dismisses Aversano TILA Suit
--------------------------------------------------
In the case, PAUL AVERSANO, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SANTANDER BANK, N.A., Defendant,
Civil Action No. 17-12694 (MAS) (TJB) (D. N.J.), Judge Michael A.
Shipp of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey
granted the Defendant's Second Motion to Dismiss.

On June 26, 2007, the Plaintiff obtained a second mortgage on his
property from the Defendant with a 7.24% interest rate.  A
Truth-in-Lending-Act ("TILA") disclosure appeared on the first page
of the mortgage form, showing an "interest rate of 7.24%, total
cost of credit ($363,348.40), the amount of credit provided
($250,000) and the amount the Plaintiff will have paid after making
all scheduled payments ($613,348.40).

The Plaintiff was required to make 360 payments of $1,703.74, due
on the 30th day of each month, beginning on July 30, 2007.  The
Disclosure indicated that when the letter "e" was appended to a
number, the figure was an estimate.  The Disclosure provided the
Plaintiff would be charged a late fee for payments more than 15
days late, which he alleges was a grace period that is included in
most conventional mortgages.  He checked the payment calculations
against an online calculator to confirm they were correct for a
conventional mortgage.

The Plaintiff made regular payments to the Defendant from 2007 to
2017.  He reviewed his Equifax credit monitoring account during
this period and noted the Defendant reported the loan as a
"Conventional RE [Real Estate] Mortgage".  The Plaintiff skipped
four payments -- February 2009, February 2010, February 2011, and
February 2012 -- extending the mortgage's duration by four months.
Each time, the Defendant advised the Plaintiff that "interest will
continue to accrue on the entire outstanding balance, including the
month the Plaintiff skips his payment.

The Plaintiff contemplated refinancing the loan and contacted the
Defendant in July 2017 to ask for the loan payoff amount.  The
Defendant advised him the loan payoff was about $11,000 higher than
he calculated.  The Defendant reported the discrepancy was due to
interest being compounded daily, as a simple interest loan ("SIM").
The Plaintiff believes the Defendant took the position that the
mortgage was a SIM based on paragraph 4 on page 4 of the note,
which states "interest is imposed each day at the daily equivalent
of the annual rate.

The Plaintiff contends the Defendant violated a number of TILA
provisions.  He argues the Defendant misrepresented the nature of
the loan because (1) the Disclosure on the front of the loan packet
"showed interest compounding monthly", (2) the Disclosure did not
state that any figures were the result of estimate, (3) the
Defendant "had represented to the Plaintiff, repeatedly, that
interest accrued monthly", and (4) the Defendant reported the
mortgage as a "Conventional [Real Estate] Mortgage" to credit
reporting agencies.

The Plaintiff filed a putative class action Complaint on Dec. 6,
2017.  He filed an Amended Complaint on Feb. 26, 2018, which the
Defendant moved to dismiss.  The Court found the allegations in the
Amended Complaint did not support equitable tolling and, therefore,
dismissed the TILA claims for untimeliness.  It, however, permitted
the Plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint, which he
submitted on Nov. 11, 2018.

The Defendant's instant Motion to Dismiss pertains to the
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, which asserts: (1) a
violation of TILA; (2) breach of contract; (3) common law fraud;
(4) fraudulent inducement; (5) violations of the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act; and (6) unjust enrichment.

Judge Shipp finds Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts that
would allow the Court to apply equitable tolling.  Although the
Plaintiff disputes the accuracy of the Disclosure, he does not aver
the figures Defendant provided him were inaccurate for a SIM.  The
Plaintiff cannot also argue equitable tolling should apply as a
result of his own failure to read the loan packet.  

As for the state law claims, the Plaintiff pled state law claims in
addition to his TILA claim.  His only asserted basis for
jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. Sectin 1331, and the Plaintiff has failed
to demonstrate the Court should equitably toll his only federal
claim.  The Judge, therefore, declines to exercise jurisdiction
over the Plaintiff's state law claims until such time he
establishes the matter may proceed under federal question
jurisdiction.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Shipp granted the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint.  He also
granted the Plaintiff one final opportunity to allege sufficient
facts to support equitable tolling.  An order consistent with his
Opinion will be entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2019 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/x96qo2 from Leagle.com.

PAUL AVERSANO, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by SOFIA BALILE, LEMBERG LAW,
LLC.

SANTANDER BANK, N. A., Defendant, represented by DIANE A. BETTINO
-- dbettino@reedsmith.com -- REED SMITH, LLP, HENRY F. REICHNER --
hreichner@reedsmith.com -- REED SMITH, LLP & SIOBHAN ANNE NOLAN --
snolan@reedsmith.com -- REED SMITH LLP.


SEAWORLD PARKS: Faces Mahoney Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against SEAWORLD PARKS &
ENTERTAINMENT, INC. The case is captioned as JOHN MAHONEY, ON
BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, the Plaintiff,
vs. SEAWORLD PARKS & ENTERTAINMENT, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-03834-JD (E.D. Pa., Aug. 23, 2019). The suit alleges
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. The case
is assigned to Hon. Judge Jan E. Dubois.

SeaWorld Entertainment Inc., formerly Busch Entertainment
Corporation and SeaWorld Parks and Entertainment, LLC, is a
family-friendly entertainment, amusement park, and attraction
company headquartered in Orlando, Florida. It operates 12 theme
parks including five water parks in the United States.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          David S. Glanzberg, Esq.
          GLANZBERG TOBIA & ASSOCIATES PC
          123 S. Broad Street Suite 1640
          Philadelphia, PA 19109
          Telephone: (215) 981-5400
          E-mail: dglanzberg@aol.com

SEIU PENNSYLVANIA: Court Dismisses Union Dues Suit
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum granting Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint in the case captioned BETHANY
LASPINA, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. SEIU PENNSYLVANIA STATE COUNCIL, et al., Defendants
No. 3:18-2018. (M.D. Pa.).

In this purported class action lawsuit filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
Section1983, the plaintiff claims that she was unconstitutionally
required to pay union dues. Plaintiff alleges that she is employed
by the Lackawanna County Library System and that she works at the
Scranton Public Library. Plaintiff alleges that she was forced to
join defendant union SEIU Local 668 (Local 668) and to pay dues to
this union as a condition of her employment.

In Counts 1, 2 and 3 of her SAC, plaintiff raises constitutional
claims against defendants under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

The Defendants claim Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) since she
was not a member of these unions and, fails to have Article III
standing to pursue class action claims on behalf of members and
former members of these unions pursuant to 12(b)(1).

The Defendant unions also point out that all of the plaintiff's
stated allegations regarding her constitutional claims concern
Local 668 and do not pertain to them. Defendant unions further
state that plaintiff fails to allege that they took any dues/fees
from her or caused her any harm.

Thus, defendant unions state that since plaintiff fails to allege
any facts showing that she was injured or caused any harm by them,
she lacks standing to sue them under Article III and she fails to
state a cognizable claim against them.

No doubt that plaintiff has failed to allege that defendant unions
were personally involved in the violation of her constitutional
rights. Nor can plaintiff attempt to hold defendant unions
vicariously liable for the alleged unconstitutional conduct of
Local 668. Plaintiff's SAC contains no facts to support a claim
against defendant unions and it does not allege that they were
personally involved in the violation of her constitutional rights.
Rather, plaintiff's allegations relate to her employer and the
union to which she belonged, Local 668, not defendant unions. As
stated, plaintiff alleges that the actions of Local 668 violated
her rights since it improperly took dues from her and failed to
obtain her consent to take dues out of her pay.

Thus, plaintiff's allegations fail to show that defendant unions
committed any unlawful actions against her and that these unions
caused her any injury.

Plaintiff concedes that if she was only suing defendant unions as
an individual she would not have standing to sue Healthcare PA,
Local 32BJ, or the JBWU since she never belonged to or paid fees to
these unions. However, plaintiff states that she can sue the stated
unions since she is suing as a class representative and she seeks
to represent all public employees who were compelled to subsidize
the affiliates of the SEIU Pennsylvania State Council.

In her pleading, she has alleged that the State Council coordinates
and unifies the collective political, administrative, and
communication structures of all SEIU locals and that the local
unions are affiliated with the State Council. The SAC also alleges
that Healthcare PA, Local 32BJ, and the JBWU enforced
unconstitutional agency shops before the Supreme Court's ruling in
Janus and violated the constitutional rights of the plaintiff class
members by tapping their paychecks against their will.

Rule 12(b)(1) governs a motion to dismiss for lack of standing,
since standing is a jurisdictional matter. Standing is a threshold
jurisdictional requirement, derived from the case or controversy
language of Article III of the Constitution. A plaintiff must
establish his or her standing to bring a case in order for the
court to possess jurisdiction over his or her claim.  

No doubt that plaintiff herself, the only named plaintiff and class
representative, was not injured by defendant unions and she does
not have standing on her own to bring individual claims against
them. Thus, she has no case or controversy with defendant unions.
Nonetheless, plaintiff contends that at this stage of the case she
only has to propose a class that includes public employees who were
allegedly injured by each of the three defendant unions. She states
that until the Rule 23 class certification is decided by the court
she can still represent the class members who were members of these
unions, who were allegedly injured by these unions, and who have
claims against these unions.

Therefore, plaintiff argues that it is premature to dismiss the
defendant unions prior to the court deciding at class certification
whether she can represent the class members who do have claims
against these unions.

Here, plaintiff is attempting to put the Rule 23 class
certification issue before the Article III standing issue. The
court finds that Article III requires that the issue of whether
plaintiff has standing to assert claims on behalf of purported
class members against defendant unions must be decided before the
court decides the issue of class certification under Rule 23. The
named plaintiff must first demonstrate she is properly before the
court, i.e., has Article III standing, and then the issue to be
decided is whether she complies with the provisions of Rule 23 with
respect to the purported class members.  

Additionally, the court finds no merit to plaintiff's contention
that the Rule 23 class certification issue must be decided before
the standing issue raised in defendant unions' Rule 12(b) motions
to dismiss.

In this case, there is no dispute that plaintiff herself has not
been injured by defendant unions. These defendant unions are
separate and distinct from Local 668, the union to which plaintiff
belonged and allegedly caused her injury. Standing cannot be
predicated on an injury which the plaintiff has not suffered, nor
can it be acquired through the back door of a class action.

As such, the motions to dismiss of union defendants will be
granted. Plaintiff's claims against these three defendants will be
dismissed with prejudice since plaintiff has already amended her
complaint and, it would be futile and unduly prejudicial to
defendants to allow her to amend her pleading another time as
against them since she lacks standing under Article III.

Finally, considering judicial economy, convenience and fairness to
the litigants, the district court in its discretion is permitted to
decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over state law
claims if the court has dismissed all of the claims over which it
had original jurisdiction. The court has made the appropriate
considerations and finds no extraordinary circumstances exist in
this case to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's
remaining Pennsylvania state law claims against union defendants.
Since plaintiff's federal claims over which this court had original
jurisdiction shall not be permitted to proceed to trial against
union defendants, the court, in its discretion, declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law
claims against union defendants.  

As such, plaintiff's state law claims against union defendants
shall be dismissed without prejudice.
  
The full-text copy of the District Court's August 29, 2019
Memorandum is available at https://tinyurl.com/y5aue56v from
Leagle.com.

Bethany LaSpina, on behalf of herself and all othr similarly
siutated, Plaintiff, represented by Edmond R. Shinn --
eshinn@erslawfirm.com -- Law Offices of Edmond R. Shinn, Esq.,
Ltd., Jonathan F. Mitchell -- stephen@mitchellatlaw.com -- Mitchell
Law PLLC, Shannon W. Conway -- sconway@talcottfranklin.com --
Talcott Franklin P.C., Talcott J. Franklin --
tal@talcottfranklin.com -- Talcott Franklin P.C. & Walter S.
Zimolong, Zimolong LLC. Suite 1360,1515 Market Street,
Philadelphia, PA, 19102

SEIU Pennsylvania State Council, Defendant, represented by Martin
W. Milz -- mmilz@spearwilderman.com -- SPEAR WILDERMAN, P.C. &
Samuel L. Spear, Spear, Wilderman, Borish, Endy, Spear & Runckel,
230 South Broad Street, Suite 1400, Philadelphia, PA 19102

SEIU Local 668, Defendant, represented by Lauren M. Hoye --
lhoye@wwdlaw.com -- Willig, Williams & Davidson, P. Casey Pitts --
cpitts@altshulerberzon.com -- Altshuler Berzon LLP & Scott A.
Kronland -- skronland@altshulerberzon.com -- Altshuler Berzon LLP.

Lackawanna County Public Library System, Defendant, pro se.

Scranton Public Library, Defendant, represented by J. Timothy
Hinton , Haggerty Hiinton & Cosgrove LLP, 203 Franklin Avenue,
Scranton, PA 18503


SERVICELINK FIELD: Bid to Certify Class in Britton Suit Denied
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GINA L. BRITTON, a single woman, and JEREMY N. LARSON,
a single man, and on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. SERVICELINK FIELD SERVICES, LLC, formerly known as
LPS FIELD SERVICES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 2:18-CV-0041-TOR
(E.D. Wash.), Judge Thomas O. Rice of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Washington (i) denied the Plaintiffs'
Motion to Certify, (ii) granted the Defendant's Motion to Exclude,
and (iii) denied as moot the Defendant's Motion for Evidentiary
Hearing.

The instant suit involves a claim by PlaintiffsBritton and Larson,
personally and on behalf of others similarly situated, against
Defendant ServiceLink for its part in securing properties subject
to foreclosure.

ServiceLink provides asset preservation services to lenders by
contracting with vendors, who provide the actual services.

Specifically at issue, ServiceLink would drill out and replace the
locks on homes -- barring access through that entry -- and leave a
sticker on the home informing the owner of how they can get a key.
In all, ServiceLink worked with 28 lenders and 27 unrelated vendors
during the proposed class period.  Notably, the Lenders represent
their authority to order the services to ServiceLink and warrant
compliance with all laws.

In 2016, the Supreme Court of Washington held that contract
provisions found in deeds of trust which purport to allow lenders
to take possession of homes after default, but before foreclosure,
were invalid.  As a result, all entries and actions on the property
-- specifically, drilling out and replacing the locks -- based
solely on this pre-default consent were deemed to be a trespass
that effectively interfered with the owner's property rights.  The
Plaintiffs are seeking to hold Defendant liable for working as the
middleman between the lenders and the vendors.

Based on its role in facilitating the asset preservation services,
the Plaintiffs assert that ServiceLink is liable for (1) Common Law
Trespass; (2) Intentional Trespass in violation of RCW 4.24.630;
(3) Negligent Trespass; (4) violation of the Washington Consumer
Protection Act, RCW 19.86; and (5) Negligent Supervision.  They
seek damages, attorneys' fees, costs, and injunctive relief.

The Plaintiffs now move the Court to certify their proposed class.
The Defendant opposes the motion and requests the Court to exclude
the Plaintiff's expert opinion.  The Plaintiffs proffer the opinion
of Dr. Kilpatrick for the position that the damages can be
calculated on a class-wide methodology.  The Defendant argues the
opinion is inadequate because the damage calculations are not
reliable or relevant.

Judge Rice finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate
that a class action should be certified.  Bbecause Britton and
Larson were never locked out of their homes -- by far the gravamen
of the proposed class damages -- their claims are not typical of
the proposed class and they are not adequate representatives.
Further, the Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that common
questions predominate because (1) absent a viable methodology, the
issue of damages will predominate over the common questions, and
(2) the Plaintiffs have not provided a viable class-wide
methodology for determining loss of use damages.

As such, the Plaintiffs have not met their burden in demonstrating
class certification is proper and their Motion is denied.  Given
the opinion of Dr. Kilpatrick is not relevant or reliable, the
Motion to Exclude is granted. The Motion for Evidentiary Hearing is
denied as moot.

The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order and
provide copies to the counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/lnAzr9 from Leagle.com.

Gina L Britton, a single woman, and on behalf of others similarly
situated & Jeremy N Larson, a single man, Plaintiffs, represented
by Clay M. Gatens -- clayg@jdsalaw.com -- Jeffers Danielson Sonn &
Aylward PS, Devon A. Gray, Jeffers Danielson Sonn & Aylward PS,
Beth E. Terrell -- bterrell@terrellmarshall.com -- Terrell Marshall
Law Group PLLC, Blythe H. Chandler, Terrell Marshall Law Group
PLLC, Brittany J. Glass, Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC & Michael
D. Daudt, Daudt Law PLLC.

ServiceLink Field Services LLC, formerly known as LPS Field
Services Inc., Defendant, represented by Theron A. Buck , Frey Buck
PS, Erica L. Calderas -- elcalderas@hahnlaw.com -- Hahn Loeser &
Parks LLP, pro hac vice, Kelly A. Kosek, Hahn Loeser & Parks LLP,
pro hac vice & Steven Avery Goldfarb -- sagoldfarb@hahnlaw.com --
Hahn Loeser & Parks LLP, pro hac vice.


SHASTA BEVERAGES: Garcia Suit Removed to C.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned AMBER GARCIA, VERONICA CERDA, on behalf of
themselves and other similarly situated non-exempt former and
current employees, Plaintiffs, v. SHASTA BEVERAGES, INC., NATIONAL
BEVPAK, NATIONAL BEVERAGE CORP. and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 19STCV26045 was removed from the Superior
Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles to the
United States District Court for the Central District of California
on Sept. 9, 2019, and assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-07798.

Plaintiffs allege six causes of action: (1) Unpaid Accrued Vacation
Time (2) Unpaid Overtime (3) Unpaid Rest Period Premiums (4)
Non-Compliant Wage Statements (5) Waiting Time Penalties (6)
Violation of California Business & Professions Code.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

     Christopher J. Kondon, Esq.
     Saman M. Rejali, Esq.
     Jonathan D. Kintzele, Esq.
     K&L GATES LLP
     10100 Santa Monica Boulevard
     Eighth Floor
     Los Angeles, CA 90067
     Phone: 310.552.5000
     Facsimile: 310.552.5001
     Email: christopher.kondon@klgates.com
            saman.rejali@klgates.com
            jonathan.kintzele@klgates.com



SOC LLC: Nevada Court Decertifies Class in Risinger Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KARL E. RISINGER, Plaintiff, v. SOC LLC, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 2:12-cv-00063-MMD-PAL (D. Nev.), Judge Miranda
M. Du of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada (a)
granted the Defendants' Decertification Motion; and (b) denied as
moot (i) the Defendants' second motion for summary judgment, and
(ii) Plaintiff Risinger's emergency motion to strike the
Defendants' second motion for summary judgment.

The case is a class action involving a dispute over the terms of
employment for armed guards hired to work in Iraq.  The Court
certified a class in the case consisting of armed guards who worked
for SOC in Iraq between 2006 and 2012.  The Court later clarified
that Reclassified Guards -- individuals who held job titles other
than "Guard" during their employment with the Defendants because
the Defendants changed their job title and/or salaries upon, or
shortly after, their arrival in Iraq -- were members of the class
because they were, in effect, armed guards who worked for SOC in
Iraq between 2006 and 2012.

The Defendants now move to decertify the class because additional
discovery purportedly has revealed that questions common to the
class members no longer predominate over questions affecting only
individual members.  They also filed their second motion for
summary judgment.  Plaintiff Risinger filed his emergency motion to
strike the Defendants' second motion for summary judgment.

The Defendants argue that the class should be decertified because
individual issues predominate over questions common to the class
and because the class is unmanageable given that the Plaintiff has
failed to offer a classwide method for determining liability or
calculating damages.

Judge Du agrees with the Defendants and will decertify the class.
She inds that the newly presented evidence persuasively
demonstrates that individualized issues of liability predominate
over the common questions identified at the outset of the
litigation.  Significantly, the evidence shows that some class
members never worked more than 72 hours.  The evidence also shows
that the Plaintiff's common proof of overwork --  the Defendants'
practice of understaffing -- is fatally flawed: the effects of any
uniform understaffing practice varied widely depending on the class
members' locations, vehicle conditions, weather conditions, and
personal work preferences.

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff cannot meet the
manageability requirement of Rule 23(b)(3)(D) because the Plaintiff
has offered no classwide method for calculating damages.  The
Plaintiff argues that questions of individualized damages cannot be
used to overcome class certification.  The Judge agrees with the
Defendants that the case has become unmanageable.  The Plaintiff
has offered no methodology for calculating damages on a classwide
basis.  Instead, the Plaintiff suggests that a special master
conduct over 1,000 individualized inquiries.  This proposal further
compels a finding of lack of manageability.

Judge Du concludes that common questions do not predominate in the
action and that the class would be unmanageable even if they did.
She notes that the parties made several arguments and cited to
several cases not discussed above.  She has reviewed these
arguments and cases and determines that they do not warrant
discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the motions before
the Court.

The Judge granted the Defendants' motion to decertify class.  She
denied as moot the following motions: the Defendants' second motion
for summary judgment, and the Plaintiff's emergency motion to
strike the Defendants' second motion for summary judgment.

The parties are instructed to file a joint status report within
seven days to advise the Court whether the case should be referred
to the magistrate judge for settlement before the Court sets the
deadline for filing the proposed joint pretrial order.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/F33lEo from Leagle.com.

Karl E. Risinger, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher I. Ritter
-- critter@earlysullivan.com -- Early Sullivan Wright Gizer &
McRae -- dmcrae@earlysullivan.com -- LLP, Devin A. McRae, Early
Sullivan Wright Gizer & McRae LLP, Erik C. Alberts --
erik.alberts@ea-lawfirm.com -- Law Offices of Erik C. Alberts &
Scott E. Gizer -- sgizer@earlysullivan.com -- Early Sullivan
Wright Gizer & McRae LLP.

SOC LLC, doing business as SOC Nevada LLC, SOC-SMG, Inc. & Day &
Zimmerman, Inc., Defendants, represented by Daniel P. Mach --
danielmach@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel, Keith H. Forst --
keithforst@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan,
LLP, pro hac vice, Kristen L. Martini -- kmartini@lrrc.com --
Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP, Tara Melissa Lee --
taralee@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan,
LLP, pro hac vice & E. Leif Reid -- lreid@lrrc.com -- Lewis Roca
Rothgerber LLP.

Day & Zimmerman, Inc., Defendant, represented by Daniel P. Mach,
Quinn Emanuel, Derick Koo Sohn, Jr., Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &
Sullivan, LLP, Keith H. Forst, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan,
LLP, pro hac vice, Kristen L. Martini, Lewis Roca Rothgerber
Christie LLP, Tara Melissa Lee, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &
Sullivan, LLP, pro hac vice & E. Leif Reid, Lewis Roca
Rothgerber LLP.


TEXTRON INC: Schall Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
announces the filing of a class action lawsuit against Textron Inc.
(NYSE:TXT) for violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

Investors who purchased the Company's shares between January 31,
2018 and October 17, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period"), are
encouraged to contact the firm before October 21, 2019.

We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law
Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at
424-303-1964, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also
reach us through the firm's website at www.schallfirm.com, or by
email at brian@schallfirm.com.

The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. Textron suffered from slowing end-market
sales of Arctic Cat products, leaving the sales channel filled with
excess inventory. The Company provided significant discounts in an
effort to clear the aging inventory, which impacted its earnings.
Based on these facts, the Company's public statements were false
and materially misleading. When the market learned the truth about
Textron, investors suffered damages.

Join the case to recover your losses.

The Schall Law Firm represents investors around the world and
specializes in securities class action lawsuits and shareholder
rights litigation.

Contact:

         Brian Schall, Esq.,
         The Schall Law Firm
         Office: 310-301-3335
         Cell: 424-303-1964
         Website: www.schallfirm.com
         Email: info@schallfirm.com
                brian@schallfirm.com [GN]


TRAVELERS COMMERCIAL: Callaghan Suit Moved to M.D. Florida
----------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Susan Callaghan, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Travelers
Commercial Insurance Company, the Defendant, Case No.
2019-CA-008927-O, was removed from the Circuit Court of the Ninth
Judicial Circuit, to the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Florida (Orlando) on Aug. 22, 2019. The Middle District
of Florida Court Clerk assigned Case No. 6:19-cv-01633-WWB-LRH to
the proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Wendy W.
Berger. The suit alleges Insurance Contract related violation.

Travelers Commercial Insurance Company operates as an insurance
firm. The Company underwrites fire, marine, flood, auto, boat and
yacht, and casualty insurance products and solutions. Travelers
Commercial Insurance Company serves customers in the United
States.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Alec H. Schultz, Esq.
          LEON COSGROVE, LLC
          255 Alhambra Cir Ste 800
          Coral Gables, FL 33134-7412
          Telephone: (305) 740-1986
          Facsimile: (305) 437-8158
          E-mail: aschultz@leoncosgrove.com

               - and -

          Casim Adam Neff, Esq.
          NEFF INSURANCE LAW, PLLC
          PO Box 15063
          St. Petersburg, FL 33733-5063
          Telephone: (727) 342-0617
          E-mail: cneff@neffinsurancelaw.com

               - and -

          Craig E. Rothburd, Esq.
          CRAIG E. ROTHBURD, PA
          320 W Kennedy Blvd Ste 700
          Tampa, FL 33606-1459
          Telephone: (813) 251-8800
          Facsimile: (813) 251-5042
          E-mail: craig@rothburdpa.com

               - and -

          Edward H. Zebersky, Esq.
          Mark S. Fistos, Esq.
          ZEBERSKY & PAYNE, LLP
          110 SE 6th St., Suite 2150
          Ft Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 989-6333
          Facsimile: (954) 989-7781
          E-mail: ezebersky@zpllp.com
                  mfistos@zpllp.com

               - and -

          Scott R. Jeeves, Esq.
          JEEVES LAW GROUP, PA
          954 First Ave N
          St Petersburg, FL 33705
          Telephone: (727) 894-2929
          Facsimile: (727) 822-1499
          E-mail: sjeeves@jeeveslawgroup.com
          
Attorneys for Travelers Commercial Insurance Company are:

          Kyle A. Diamantas, Esq.
          Hal Kemp Litchford, Esq.
          BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN
          CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ, PC
          200 S Orange Ave., Ste 2900
          Orlando, FL 32801
          Telephone: (407) 422-6600
          Facsimile: (407) 841-0325
          E-mail: kdiamantas@bakerdonelson.com
                  hlitchford@bakerdonelson.com


TRIPPE MANUFACTURING: Mims Suit Asserts BIPA Violation
------------------------------------------------------
JOSHUA EDEN MIMS individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. TRIPPE MANUFACTURING COMPANY d/b/a Tripp
Lite Defendant, Case No. 2019CH10189 (Circuit Ct., Cook Cty., Ill.,
Sept. 3, 2019) is a Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury
Trial against Defendant to put a stop to its unlawful collection,
use, and storage of Plaintiffs and the putative Class members'
sensitive biometric data.

According to the complaint, when employees first begin their jobs
at Trippe, they are required to scan their hand print in its
biometric time tracking system as a means of authentication,
instead of using only key fobs or other identification cards. While
there are tremendous benefits to using biometric time clocks in the
workplace, there are also serious risks.

Recognizing the need to protect its citizens from situations like
these, Illinois enacted the Biometric Information Privacy Act
("BIPA") specifically to regulate companies that collect and store
Illinois citizens' biometrics, such as handprints. Despite this
law, Trippe disregarded its employees' statutorily protected
privacy rights and unlawfully collects, stores, and uses their
biometric data in violation of the BIPA, asserts the complaint.

Plaintiff is a natural person and citizen of the State of
Illinois.

Trippe is a manufacturing company located in Chicago,
Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     David Fish, Esq.
     John Kunze, Esq.
     THE FISH LAW FIRM, P.C.
     200 East Fifth Avenue, Suite 123
     Naperville, IL 60563
     Phone: 630.355.7590
     Fax: 630.778.0400
     Email: admin@fishlawfirm.com
            dfish@fishlawfirm.com
            jkunze@fishlawfirm.com


UNITED STATES: Medicare Patients Sue Over Nursing Home Coverage
---------------------------------------------------------------
Susan Jaffe, writing for Kaiser Health News, reports that Medicare
paid for Betty Gordon's knee replacement surgery in March, but the
72-year-old former high school teacher needed a nursing home stay
and care at home to recover.

Yet Medicare wouldn't pay for that. So Gordon is stuck with a
$7,000 bill she can't afford -- and, as if that were not bad
enough, she can't appeal.

The reasons Medicare won't pay have frustrated the Rhode Island
woman and many others trapped in the maze of regulations
surrounding something called "observation care."

Patients, like Gordon, receive observation care in the hospital
when their doctors think they are too sick to go home but not sick
enough to be admitted. They stay overnight or longer, usually in
regular hospital rooms, getting some of the same services and
treatment (often for the same problems) as an admitted patient --
intravenous fluids, medications and other treatment, diagnostic
tests and round-the-clock care they can get only in a hospital.

But observation care is considered an outpatient service under
Medicare rules, like a doctor's appointment or a lab test.
Observation patients may have to pay a larger share of the hospital
bill than if they were officially admitted to the hospital. Plus,
they have to pick up the tab for any nursing home care.

Medicare's nursing home benefit is available only to those admitted
to the hospital for three consecutive days. Gordon spent three days
in the hospital after her surgery, but because she was getting
observation care, that time didn't count.

There's another twist: Patients might want to file an appeal, as
they can with many other Medicare decisions. But that is not
allowed if the dispute involves observation care.

On Aug. 12, a trial was set to begin in federal court in Hartford,
Conn., where patients who were denied Medicare's nursing home
benefit are hoping to force the government to eliminate that
exception. A victory would clear the way for appeals from hundreds
of thousands of people.

The class-action lawsuit was filed in 2011 by seven Medicare
observation patients and their families against the Department of
Health and Human Services. Seven more plaintiffs later joined the
case.

"This is about whether the government can take away health care
coverage you may be entitled to and leave you no opportunity to
fight for it," said Alice Bers, litigation director at the Center
for Medicare Advocacy, one of the groups representing the
plaintiffs.

If they win, people with traditional Medicare who received
observation care services for three days or longer since Jan. 1,
2009, could file appeals seeking reimbursement for bills Medicare
would have paid had they been admitted to the hospital. More than
1.3 million observation claims meet these criteria for the 10-year
period through 2017, according to the most recently available
government data.

Gordon is not a plaintiff in the case, but she said the rules
forced her to borrow money to pay for the care. "It doesn't seem
fair that after paying for Medicare all these years, you're told
you're not going to be covered now for nursing home care," Gordon
said.

No one has explained to Gordon, who has hypoglycemia and an immune
disease, why she wasn't admitted. The federal notice hospitals are
required to give Medicare observation patients didn't provide
answers.

Even Seema Verma, the head of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services, is puzzled by the policy. "Better be admitted for at
least 3 days in the hospital first if you want the nursing home
paid for," she said in a tweet Aug. 4. "Govt doesn't always make
sense. We're listening to feedback." Her office declined to provide
further explanation.

Patients and their families can try to persuade the physician or
hospital administrators to change their status, and sometimes that
strategy works. If not, they can leave the hospital to avoid the
extra expenses, even if doing so is against medical advice.

The requirement of three consecutive days as a hospital inpatient
to qualify for nursing home coverage is written into the Medicare
law. But there are exemptions. Medicare officials don't apply it to
beneficiaries in some pilot programs and allow private Medicare
Advantage insurers to waive it for their patients.

Concerned about the growing number of people affected by
observation care, Medicare officials created a "two-midnight" rule
in 2013. If a doctor expects a patient will be sick enough to stay
in the hospital through two midnights, then it says the patient
should generally be admitted as an inpatient.

Yet observation claims have increased by about 70% since 2008, to
more than 2 million in 2017. Claims for observation care patients
who stay in the hospital for longer than 48 hours — who likely
would qualify for nursing home coverage had they been admitted
—rose by nearly 159%, according to data Kaiser Health News
obtained from CMS. Yet the overall growth in traditional Medicare
enrollment was just under 9%.

Justice Department lawyers handling the case declined to be
interviewed, but in court filings they argue that the lawsuit
accuses the wrong culprit.

The government can't be blamed, the lawyers said, because the
"two-midnight" rule gives hospitals and doctors — not the
government — the final word on whether a patient should be
admitted.

The government's lawyers argue that since Medicare "has not
established any fixed or objective criteria for inpatient
admission," any decision to admit a patient is not "fairly
traceable" to the government.

Like Gordon, some doctors also complain about observation care
rules. An American Medical Association spokesman, who spoke on
condition of not being named, said the "two-midnight" policy "is
challenging and illogical" and should be rescinded. "CMS should
instead rely on physicians' clinical judgment to determine a
patient's inpatient or outpatient status," he added.

HHS' Office of Inspector General urged CMS to count observation
care days toward the three-day minimum needed for nursing home
coverage. It's No. 1 on a list issued in July  of the 25 most
important inspector general's recommendations the agency has failed
to implement.

The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, which counsels Congress,
has made a similar suggestion.

However, Colin Milligan, a spokesman for the American Hospital
Association, is more positive about the "two-midnight" rule. It
"recognizes the important role of physician judgment," he said.

Medicare isn't dictating what physicians must do, said a physician
who has researched the effects of observation care. "It's a
benchmark upon which to base your decisions, not a standard or a
mandate," said Dr. Michael Ross, a professor of emergency medicine
at Emory University School of Medicine in Atlanta. He supervises
observation care units at Emory's five hospitals and was chairman
of a CMS advisory subcommittee on observation care.

Other physicians claim that since HHS pays hospitals and doctors to
treat Medicare patients, the agency's policies weigh on their
decisions.

"One of the hardest things to do is to get physicians to predict
what will happen with patients -- we like to hedge our bets and
account for all possibilities," said Dr. Tipu Puri, a physician
adviser and medical director at the University of Chicago's medical
center. "But we're being forced to interpret the rules and read
between the lines."

In the meantime, observation care patients who get follow-up care
at a nursing home may soon receive a puzzling notice. A Medicare
fact sheet issued in July "strongly encourages" nursing home
operators to give an "advance beneficiary notice of non-coverage"
to patients who arrive without the required prior three-day
hospital admission.

But that notice says they can choose to seek reimbursement by
submitting an appeal to Medicare -- an option government lawyers
will argue in court is impossible. [GN]


UPS SUPPLY: Jones et al Seek Overtime Pay for California Drivers
----------------------------------------------------------------
SUE JONES and ROBERT ALLEN JONES, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. UPS SUPPLY CHAIN
SOLUTIONS, INC., a Delaware Corporation; UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,
INC., an Ohio Corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. CGC-19-578596 (Cal. Super. Ct., Aug. 22,
2019), alleges that Defendants failed to provide required meal
periods, failed to provide required rest periods, failed to pay
overtime wages, failed to pay minimum wage, failed to pay all wages
due to discharged or quitting employees, failed to maintain
required records, and failed to provide accurate itemized
statements under the California Labor Code.

The Plaintiffs are former drivers who worked separately and as a
team for Defendants in the State of California.

As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful actions of
Defendants suffered, and continue to suffer, from loss of earnings
in amounts as yet unascertained, but subject to proof at trial.

UPS Supply provides supply chain services. The Company offers
transportation, freight, logistics, distribution, consulting, and
customs brokerage services. UPS Supply Chain Solutions also offers
consulting services for the automotive, industrial manufacturing,
and healthcare industries worldwide.[BN]

Attorneys for the Sue Jones and Robert Allen Jones, individually,
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, are:

          Taras Kick, Esq.
          Daniel J. Bass, Esq.
          THE KICK LAW FIRM, APC
          815 Moraga Drive
          Los Angeles, CA 90049
          Telephone: (31 0) 395-2988
          Facsimile: (31 0) 395-2088
          E-mail: Taras@kicklawfrrm.com
                  Daniel@kicklawfrrm.com

US BANCORP: Leeson Appeals Bankr. Ct. Ruling to W.V. Dist. Ct.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Jacob Crum and George Leeson filed an appeal from a
judgment/order issued in the bankruptcy case titled Leeson, et al.
v. U.S. Bancorp Government Leasing and Finance, Inc., et al., Case
No. 1:17-bk-00057, in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Defendants
U.S. Bancorp Government Leasing and Finance, Inc., and Wells Fargo
Commercial Mortgage Servicing removed on April 9, 2018, the class
action lawsuit from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West
Virginia, to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
West Virginia (Clarksburg).

The nature of suit is stated as recovery of money/property.

The appellate case is captioned as Leeson, et al. v. U.S. Bancorp
Government Leasing and Finance, Inc., et al., Case No.
1:19-cv-00169-TSK, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia (Clarksburg).[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants George Leeson and Jacob Crum, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Alex D. McLaughlin, Esq.
          John H. Skaggs, Esq.
          W. Stuart Calwell, Jr., Esq.
          THE CALWELL PRACTICE, LC
          Law and Arts Center West
          500 Randolph St.
          Charleston, WV 25302
          Telephone: (304) 343-4323
          Facsimile: (304) 344-3684
          E-mail: amclaughlin@calwelllaw.com
                  jskaggs@calwelllaw.com
                  scalwell@calwelllaw.com

Appellees U.S. Bancorp Government Leasing and Finance, Inc. as
Trustee for the benefit of COMM 2013-CCRE12 Mortgage Trust
Commercial Mortgage Pass-through Certificates and Wells Fargo
Commercial Mortgage Servicing are represented by:

          Christopher P. Schueller, Esq.
          BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY, LLP
          One Oxford Centre
          301 Grant St., 20th Floor
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 562-8800
          Facsimile: (412) 562-1041
          E-mail: christopher.schueller@bipc.com

               - and -

          Elinor H. Murarova, Esq.
          Paul Chronis, Esq.
          DUANE MORRIS LLP
          190 South LaSalle Street, Suite 3700
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 499-6765
          E-mail: ehart@duanemorris.com
                  pechronis@duanemorris.com

               - and -

          Gerard M. Stowers, Esq.
          J. Mark Adkins, Esq.
          BOWLES, RICE, MCDAVID, GRAFF & LOVE LLP
          PO Box 1386
          600 Quarrier St.
          Charleston, WV 25325-1386
          Telephone: (304) 347-1112
          Facsimile: (304) 347-1756
          E-mail: gstowers@bowlesrice.com
                  madkins@bowlesrice.com


USAA SAVINGS: Faces Tarter Suit in District of Massachusetts
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against USAA Savings Bank.
The case is captioned as Helen Tarter, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. USAA Savings Bank,
the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-11821-IT (D. Mass., Aug. 23, 2019).
The suit demands $750,000 worth of damages. The case is assigned to
the Hon. Judge Indira Talwani.

USAA Federal Savings Bank operates as a full service bank. The Bank
accepts deposits, makes loans and provides other services for the
public.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Sergei Lemberg, Esq.
          LEMBERG LAW, L.L.C.
          43 Danbury Road
          Wilton, CT 06897
          Telephone: (203) 653-2250 x5500
          Facsimile: (203) 653-3424
          E-mail: slemberg@lemberglaw.com

Attorneys for the USAA Savings Bank:

          Christine Kingston, Esq.
          Kevin P. Polansky, Esq.
          NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH LLP
          One Post Office Square, 30th Floor
          Boston, MA 02109
          Telephone: (617) 217-4700
          Facsimile: (617) 217-4710
          E-mail: christine.kingston@nelsonmullins.com
                  kevin.polansky@nelsonmullins.com

VERB TECHNOLOGY: Kirby McInerney Files Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Kirby McInerney LLP announces that a class action
lawsuit has been filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California on behalf of those who acquired Verb
Technology Company, Inc. (Verb or the Company) (NASDAQ: VERB)
securities during the period from January 3, 2018 to May 2, 2018
(the Class Period). Investors have until September 9, 2019 to apply
to the Court to be appointed as lead plaintiff in the lawsuit.

On January 3, 2018, Verb announced a purported agreement with
Oracle America, Inc. (Oracle). The lawsuit alleges that Verb made
false and/or misleading statements as to the scope of its agreement
with Oracle.

On April 23, 2018, Verb revealed the actual terms of its agreement
with Oracle. Contrary to prior representations, the Company did not
have a contract with Oracle to jointly develop and market the
Companys product.

As the market digested the true nature of the Oracle agreement, the
stock began a precipitous decline, closing on April 30, 2018 at
$1.54 per share, a decrease of 43% from the high a week prior. The
market continued to digest this information and by the market close
on May 2, 2018, the Companys stock was trading at $1.08 per share,
a decrease of 64% from the high price of $3.04 per share on April
20, 2018.

Verb was formerly known as Nfusz Inc.

If you acquired Verb securities during the Class Period, have
information, or would like to learn more about these claims, please
contact Thomas W. Elrod of Kirby McInerney at 212-371-6600, by
email at investigations@kmllp.com, or by filling out this contact
form, to discuss your rights or interests with respect to these
matters without any cost to you.

Kirby McInerney is a New York-based plaintiffs law firm
concentrating in securities, antitrust, and whistleblower
litigation. The firms efforts on behalf of shareholders in
securities litigation have resulted in recoveries totaling billions
of dollars. Additional information about the firm can be found at
Kirby McInerneys website: www.kmllp.com.

Contact:

         Thomas W. Elrod, Esq.
         Kirby McInerney LLP
         Tel.: (212) 371-6600
         Email: investigations@kmllp.com
                telrod@kmllp.com
         Website: www.kmllp.com [GN]


WAWA INC: Settles Class Action Over Unpaid OT Wages for $1.4MM
--------------------------------------------------------------
According to South Jersey Times Editorial Board, a well-known,
iconic brand name showed up the other day in the list of employers
who are accused of shortchanging their workers.

Wawa Inc., is generally considered a decent company to work for,
but there it was: news of a $1.4 million settlement that will bring
back pay to employees who were classified as ineligible for
overtime. Wawa denies any wrongdoing, but it appears that the
"Shorties" assembled behind the hoagie counter were not the only
ones the convenience store chain was handing out.

This announced settlement of a class-action lawsuit involved more
than 300 "assistant general managers" who worked more than 40 hours
a week, but were classified as salaried, and thus considered as not
entitled to any additional compensation. Filed in U.S. District
Court in Trenton, the lawsuit covered several states. The 333
represented employees will receive an average of $86.74 for each
week in which alleged wage violations occurred.

Not to pick on Wawa, but it's hoped that the case will bring some
notoriety to this insidious form of wage theft that, like the
workers' hours, is underreported. If a beloved, image-conscious
firm like Wawa is mixed up in this, there are likely to be others
that are not as well regarded.

The case should serve as a stark reminder that wage theft -- which
is so often connected to minimum-wage jobs, undocumented immigrants
and other vulnerable populations -- happens to better-paid,
presumably middle-class folks as well.

The food-service and retail industries are notorious for fictional
job descriptions that hide the true nature of the work. If you have
to clean out the fryer, or fill in for counter help that doesn't
show up, you are not doing the work of a "manager." In newsrooms,
especially non-union ones, this kind of thing was referred to years
ago as "being paid in titles."

Congratulations! You've been promoted! You're no longer a reporter.
You're an "editor," or at TV workplaces, an "executive producer."
What it meant is that, for an insignificant or non-existent salary
boost, your employer got to work you for 60 or 70 hours a week
without paying you anything extra. Your vacation? Don't think about
taking all of it, since the bosses never hire anyone to fill in for
you.

Other industries, white-collar and blue-collar alike, have
institutionalized similar misclassifications. With the growth of
the "gig," or freelance economy, this sort of thing is finally
getting some attention. The issue involves, among others, Lyft and
Uber drivers, and whether or not they are truly independent
contractors. Expect more skirmishes going forward.

In July, Gov. Phil Murphy promised that the state Department of
Labor will crack down on misclassifications, after noting,
correctly, that the federal government appears to be disinclined to
do so. A task force has issued good some recommendations, including
more publicity, education for employers, and a hotline for
employees to report abuses.

Lt. Gov. Shiela Oliver signed new penalties against employers that
refuse to pay overtime, or deny promised benefits and even hold
back base wages. As usual, the focus was on low-wage workers who
are the most likely to be exploited.

As the Wawa case shows, wage theft is not confined to those who
pump gas, wash cars or toil invisibly in the back restaurants.
Blue-chip companies and their trade groups will always claim that
violations are unintentional, citing "mistakes" or "clerical
errors." In too many cases, though, this is baked into the
employer's business plan, and it needs to be stopped. [GN]


WINGED FOOT: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in Clune Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KEVIN P. CLUNE, as Executor of the Estate of Barbara
B. Clune, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, and JAMES E. FISHER, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. DESMOND T. BARRY, JR.,
WINGED FOOT GOLF CLUB, INC., JOHN DOES NOS. 1-10, DANIEL L. MOSLEY,
GAIL G. GARCIA, JOHN D. GILLESPIE, Defendants, No. 16-CV-4441 (NSR)
(S.D. N.Y.), Judge Nelson S. Roman of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York denied the Plaintiffs' motion for
class certification.

Clune, as Executor of the Estate of Barbara B. Clune, and Fisher,
bring the putative class action against the Defendants.  They seek
a judgment designating the Plaintiffs as the class representatives
and certifying the class action.  In addition, they request that
the Court finds that the Defendants are liable for violations of
the Securities and Exchange Act Section 10(b), commission of common
law fraud, and breach of their fiduciary duties to Plaintiffs and
the class.  The Plaintiffs also seek rescission of allegedly
fraudulently induced sales of Winged Foot Holding Corp. ("WFHC")
shares and dissolution of WFHC.

In 1921, WFHC was formed and authorized to issue 600 shares, to be
sold to the members of the Winged Foot Golf Club.  Initially, all
WFHC shareholders were also members of the Club.  In the 1930s, the
Club began admitting yearly, and eventually regular, members who
were not required to own shares in WFHC.  The Club also began to
purchase WFHC shares.

Shortly after its formation, WFHC purchased land which it leased to
the Club for an initial term of twenty-one years.  In exchange, the
Club, in addition to paying all taxes, insurance costs, and
property maintenance fees, placed all of its dues and gross
receipts into a general fund to be used for specified expenses and
as rent paid to WFHC.  The lease was renewed in 1945 and was
amended two years later to require $30,000 in annual rent payments,
replacing the previous arrangement.  This version of the lease has
been renewed on multiple occasions.

On Sept. 15, 1961, in anticipation of a lease renewal, the Club
obtained a legal memorandum from a law firm about the treatment of
WFHC and the status of the lease.  The Plaintiffs claim that since
receiving that memorandum, the Defendants have provided false and
misleading statements relating to the value of WFHC shares to WFHC
shareholders.  Some of these shareholders, allegedly, sold their
shares in reliance on this information, and the Plaintiffs bring
the action on behalf of all such individuals.

Currently before the Court is the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification.

Judge Roman denied the Plaintiffs' motion for certification for two
reasons.  First, the proposed Class would be unmanageable.
Identifying Class members will likely involve examining estate
documents for former shareholders, determining the sufficiency of
transmission of shares to heirs, and potentially resolving disputes
between potential heirs to shares in multiple states.  The
Plaintiffs estimate that the Class will include approximately 170
members. Such an undertaking for over one hundred individuals and
discrete transactions, sprawled over many decades and most likely
across state lines, presents substantial manageability concerns.

Second, and more importantly, the Plaintiffs fail to meet Rule 23's
numerosity requirement.  While courts presume numerosity for
classes larger than 40, a proposed class of three individuals falls
far short of the presumption threshold.  Joinder of three
individuals into one suit is not impracticable.

The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to terminate the
motion at ECF No. 99.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/MLNWgw from Leagle.com.

Kevin P. Clune, As Executor of the Estate of Barbara B. Clune,
Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Adam C. Mayes -- AMayes@lshllp.com --
Lovell Stewart Halebian LLP & John Halebian -- JHalebian@lshllp.com
-- Lovell Stewart Halebian Jacobson LLP.

James E. Fisher, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by John Halebian, Lovell Stewart
Halebian Jacobson LLP.

Desmond T. Barry, Jr., Winged Foot Golf Club, Inc. & John Does,
Defendants, represented by Maeve L. O'Connor --
mloconnor@debevoise.com -- Debevoise & Plimpton, LLP, Susan Reagan
Gittes -- srgittes@debevoise.com -- Debevoise & Plimpton LLP &
William David Sarratt -- dsarratt@debevoise.com -- Debevoise &
Plimpton, LLP.


YU BROTHERS INC: Mena Seeks Pay of All Overtime Hours Worked
------------------------------------------------------------
Omar Mena, and others similarly-situated, Plaintiff, v. YU BROTHERS
INC., d/b/a Southeastern Food Supplies, a Florida Corporation,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-23629-KMW (11th Circuit Ct., Miami-Dade
Cty., Fla., Aug. 29, 2019) seeks to recover money damages for
unpaid overtime wages under the laws of the United states pursuant
to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Plaintiff regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week, but was
not compensated at the rate of time-and-half his regular rate for
all hours worked in excess of 40 per week, says the complaint.
Although Defendant paid Plaintiff for some of his overtime hours,
it intentionally or with reckless disregard failed to Plaintiff for
all of his overtime hours. Payment for some but not all the
overtime hours worked was designed to feign compliance with the
FLSA, the complaint notes.

Plaintiff was employed as a delivery driver by Defendant from
approximately January 2018 through February 2019.

Defendant is in the business of selling food and other materials to
Chinese restaurants.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Eddy O. Marban, Esq.
     THE LAW OFFICES OF EDDY O. MARBAN
     2655 S. LeJeune Road, Suite 804
     Coral Gables, FL 33134
     Phone: (305) 448-9292
     Facsimile: (786) 209-9978
     Email: em@eddymarbanlaw.com



ZB NA: Court Allows Leave to File FAC in Evans
----------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California, Sacramento Division, issued an Order granting Leave to
File First Amended Complaint in the case captioned RONALD C. EVANS,
an individual; JOAN M. EVANS, an individual; DENNIS TREADAWAY, an
individual; and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ZB,
N.A., a national banking association, dba California Bank & Trust,
Defendant. Case No. 2:17-cv-01123-WBS-DB. (E.D. Cal.).

The Putative Class Action Representatives filed a Class Action
Complaint against CB&T.

This Court issued a Memorandum and Order Re: Motion to Dismiss,
dismissing the Complaint. The Putative Class Action Representatives
subsequently appealed this Court's dismissal.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversing,
vacating, and remanding this Court's decision dismissing the
Complaint.  

The Ninth Circuit denied CB&T's Petition for Panel Rehearing and
for Rehearing En Banc.

Counsel for the Parties met and conferred via telephone on August
21, 2019. Pursuant to this telephone conversation, the Parties
agreed to the following schedule, subject to this Court's
approval:

The Putative Class Action Representatives shall file and serve a
First Amended Complaint (FAC) on or before October 14, 2019; andb.
CB&T shall file and serve an answer or other responsive pleading,
which may include a motion to dismiss under Rule 12 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, on or before November 15, 2019.

Based upon the Parties' Stipulation, and good cause appearing, the
Court ordered:

   1. the Putative Class Action Representatives shall file and
serve a First Amended Complaint, consistent with the Ninth
Circuit's Memorandum, on or before October 14, 2019 and

   2. CB&T shall file and serve an answer or other responsive
pleading, which includes the filing and service of a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on
or before November 15, 2019.3. The Status Conference scheduled for
September 16, 2019 at 1:30 p.m. is hereby continued to January 21,
2020 at 1:30 p.m. A joint status report shall be filed no later
than January 7, 2020.

The full-text copy of the District Court's August 29, 2019 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/y4putd3t from Leagle.com.

Ronald C. Evans, Joan M. Evans & Dennis Treadaway, Plaintiffs,
represented by Michael Patrick Denver -- mpdenver@hbsb.com --
Hollister & Brace & Robert Louis Brace -- rlbrace@rusty.lawyer

ZB, N.A., Doing business as, Defendant, represented by Robert Scott
McWhorter -- rmcwhorter@buchalter.com -- Buchalter, A Professional
Corporation & Jarrett S. Osborne-Revis --
josbornerevis@buchalter.com -- Buchalter, A Professional
Corporation.


ZIMMER BIOMET: Man Launches Class-Action Lawsuit Over Hip Implants
------------------------------------------------------------------
Graham Slaughter, writing for CTV News, reports that a proposed
class-action lawsuit has been launched on behalf of Canadian
patients with a particular type of metal-based hip implant that the
lead plaintiff says led to high levels of toxic compounds in his
body and triggered a litany of debilitating symptoms.

David Goldsmith from Radium Hot Springs, B.C. received a hip
implant in 2009 in hopes of improving his quality of life. The
metal-on-polyethylene hip replacement is widely used in Canada and
is approved by Health Canada.

But over the next 10 years, he says his implant dislocated several
times, caused him pain and left him with a number of unusual
symptoms.

"I was experiencing vertigo, I was experiencing balance issues, I
was experiencing skin infections that I wouldn't normally
experience," Goldsmith told CTV News.

Goldsmith visited his doctor, who had a theory. He suspected
Goldsmith's implant was breaking down inside his body and shedding
metal debris into the tissue around his hip and his bloodstream.
The process is known as metallosis, and it has been recorded before
in patients with metal-on-metal prostheses.

Blood tests confirmed the doctor's suspicions. Chromium levels in
Goldsmith's system were eight times higher than normal. His cobalt
levels were ten times higher than average.

Last December, Goldsmith underwent surgery to have the device
replaced. Now, he's launching a proposed class-action suit against
the device's American manufacturer, Zimmer Biomet.

"I think the company should be punished for having brought these
things to the market," he said.

The proposed class action, which has not yet been approved, covers
anyone in Canada with a metal-on-polyethylene hip implant system
"consisting of Zimmer M/L Taper Hip Prosthesis, and Zimmer Versys
Hip System or any of the components referenced herein which are
manufactured by the Defendants," according to the claim.

In a statement to CTV News, the company refused to comment.

"We do not comment on litigation," the company said.

But complications linked to metal-on-polyethylene implants aren't
common in Canada, according to Dr. Bas Masri, the head of
orthopaedics at the University of British Columbia.

"Even though it's rare, we don't really understand very well as to
who is at risk," he said.

Masri said stories like Goldsmith's are rare and that Canadians
with similar implants shouldn't react in fear.

"My biggest concern is that people will start to be worried and
concerned that their hips are failing -- their hips are not
failing. If they are doing well, they are going to continue to do
well and they don't need to worry about it," he said.

It's not the first time the company's hip implants have been
accused of problems. In 2017, a judge in New Mexico awarded a man
with a Zimmer hip implant $2 million after he suffered similar
injuries linked to metallosis. [GN]


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Aerojet Rocketdyne Faces 61 Cases at June 30
-------------------------------------------------------------
Aerojet Rocketdyne Holdings, Inc. continues to defend itself
against 61 asbestos cases pending as of June 30, 2019, according to
the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019.

Aerojet Rocketdyne states, "The Company has been, and continues to
be, named as a defendant in lawsuits alleging personal injury or
death and seeking various monetary damages due to exposure to
asbestos in building materials, products, or in manufacturing
operations.  The majority of cases are pending in Illinois state
courts.  There were 61 asbestos cases pending as of June 30, 2019.

"Given the lack of any significant consistency to claims (i.e., as
to product, operational site, or other relevant assertions) filed
against the Company, the Company is generally unable to make a
reasonable estimate of the future costs of pending claims or
unasserted claims.  As of June 30, 2019, the Company has accrued an
immaterial amount related to pending claims."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/rWS8ni


ASBESTOS UPDATE: American Biltrite Withdraws Appeal in Monaco Case
------------------------------------------------------------------
The First Department of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
of New York has ordered withdrawn the appeal in the case styled In
Re: New York City Asbestos Litigation. Janet Monaco, as Executrix
for the Estate of Anthony Monaco, and Janet Monaco, Individually,
Plaintiff-Respondent, v. American Biltrite Inc.,
Defendant-Appellant, A.O. Smith Water Products Co., et al.,
Defendants. Index No. 190074/16, (N.Y. App. Div. 1d.).  

The Court in received a notice from counsel for defendant-appellant
specifying its withdrawal of the appeal taken from the Sept. 7,
2018 Order of the New York County Supreme Court.

A copy of the Order dated Aug. 20, 2019, is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yyrn22fv from Leagle.com.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: ArvinMeritor Had US$100MM Reserves at June 30
--------------------------------------------------------------
Meritor, Inc.'s subsidiary, ArvinMeritor, Inc., had reserves of
US$100 million for asbestos-related liabilities as of June 30,
2019, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2019.

The Company states, "ArvinMeritor, Inc. ("AM"), a predecessor of
Meritor, along with many other companies, has also been named as a
defendant in lawsuits alleging personal injury as a result of
exposure to asbestos used in certain components of Rockwell
products many years ago.  Liability for these claims was
transferred at the time of the spin-off of the automotive business
from Rockwell in 1997.  There were approximately 1,400 pending
active asbestos claims in lawsuits that name AM, together with many
other companies, as defendants at June 30, 2019 and September 30,
2018.

"The company engaged a third-party advisor with extensive
experience in assessing asbestos-related liabilities to conduct a
study to estimate its potential undiscounted liability for pending
and future asbestos-related claims as of September 30, 2018.
Management continuously monitors the underlying claims data and
experience for the purpose of assessing the appropriateness of the
assumptions used to estimate the liability.

"As of September 30, 2018, the estimated probable range of equally
likely possibilities of the company's obligation for
asbestos-related claims over the next 41 years is US$103 million to
US$186 million.  Based on the information contained in the
actuarial study, and all other available information considered,
management concluded that no amount within the range of potential
liability was more likely than any other and, therefore, recorded a
liability at the low end of the range.  The company recognized a
liability for pending and future claims over the next 41 years of
US$100 million as of June 30, 2019 and US$103 million as of
September 30, 2018.

"AM has insurance coverage that management believes covers
indemnity and defense costs, over and above self-insurance
retentions, for a significant portion of these claims.  The
insurance receivables for Rockwell asbestos-related liabilities
totaled US$65 million and US$68 million as of June 30, 2019 and
September 30, 2018, respectively.

"The amounts recorded for the asbestos-related reserves and
recoveries from insurance companies are based upon assumptions and
estimates derived from currently known facts.  All such estimates
of liabilities and recoveries for asbestos-related claims are
subject to considerable uncertainty because such liabilities and
recoveries are influenced by variables that are difficult to
predict.  The future litigation environment for Rockwell could
change significantly from its past experience, due, for example, to
changes in the mix of claims filed against Rockwell in terms of
plaintiffs' law firm, jurisdiction and disease; legislative or
regulatory developments; the company's approach to defending
claims; or payments to plaintiffs from other defendants.  Estimated
recoveries are influenced by coverage issues among insurers and the
continuing solvency of various insurance companies.  If the
assumptions with respect to the estimation period, the nature of
pending claims, the cost to resolve claims and the amount of
available insurance prove to be incorrect, the actual amount of
liability for Rockwell asbestos-related claims, and the effect on
the company, could differ materially from current estimates and,
therefore, could have a material impact on the company's financial
condition and results of operations."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/XLjJcI


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Corning Had $145MM Non-PCC Reserves at June 30
---------------------------------------------------------------
Corning Incorporated's reserve for asbestos claims that are
unrelated to Pittsburgh Corning Corporation ("PCC") was US$145
million at June 30, 2019, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019.

The Company states, "Corning is a defendant in certain cases
alleging injuries from asbestos unrelated to PCC (the "non-PCC
asbestos claims") which had been stayed pending the confirmation of
the Plan.  The stay was lifted on August 25, 2016.

"At June 30, 2019 and December 31, 2018, the amount of the reserve
for these non-PCC asbestos claims was estimated to be US$145
million and US$146 million, respectively.  The reserve balance as
of June 30, 2019 represents the undiscounted projection of claims
and related legal fees for the estimated life of the litigation."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/gKM8FC


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Corning Inc. Has $135MM PCC Liability at June 30
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Corning Incorporated disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that the total amount of remaining payments
due in years 2020 through 2023 for asbestos claims under the
reorganization plan of Pittsburgh Corning Corporation (PCC) is
US$135 million, of which US$35 million will be paid in the second
quarter of 2020.

The Company states, "Corning and PPG Industries, Inc. each owned
50% of the capital stock of Pittsburgh Corning Corporation ("PCC").
PCC filed for Chapter 11 reorganization in 2000, and the Modified
Third Amended Plan of Reorganization for PCC (the "Plan") became
effective in April 2016.

"At December 31, 2016, the Company's liability under the Plan was
US$290 million, which is required to be paid through a series of
fixed payments that began in the second quarter of 2017.  Payments
of US$50 million and US$35 million were made in June 2019 and June
2018, respectively.  The total amount of remaining payments due in
years 2020 through 2023 is US$135 million, of which US$35 million
will be paid in the second quarter of 2020 and is classified as a
current liability.  The remaining US$100 million is classified as a
non-current liability."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/gKM8FC


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Court to Set New Trial Date in Clayton's Case
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge James L. Robart of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington directed the Clerk to set a new trial date
at the end of the court's trial calendar and a corresponding
pretrial schedule in the case styled the William R. Clayton, et
al., Plaintiff, v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. C18-0748JLR, (W.D. Wash.).

Defendant Syd Carpenter Marine Contractor, Inc. filed a motion to
continue the trial date on the ground that "the nature of the
damages and claims have changed in light of Mr. Clayton's passing."


Several days after discovery closed in this case, Plaintiffs
William R. Clayton and Jill D. Clayton filed a motion to amend
their complaint to re-plead the case as a wrongful death and
survivorship action. The court granted Plaintiffs' motion and
Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint for wrongful death
and survivorship, and subsequently filed a corrected first amended
complaint on Aug. 15. The corrected amended complaint alleges that
"William Clayton's other statutory beneficiaries have sustained
loss of personal consortium in an amount to be proven at trial."

The Court also allowed Syd Carpenter Marine Contractor, Inc. to
conduct limited discovery on Mrs. Clayton and the two Clayton heirs
on the issue of damages, which must be completed by Nov. 18, 2019.


A copy of the Order dated Aug. 19, 2019, is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yyqjb8t7 from Leagle.com.

Jill D. Clayton, as Executor of the William Richard Clayton,
Plaintiff, represented by Glenn S. Draper -- glenn@bergmanlegal.com
-- BERGMAN DRAPER OSLUND, Matthew Phineas Bergman --
matt@bergmanlegal.com -- BERGMAN DRAPER OSLUND, Ruby K. Aliment ,
BERGMAN DRAPER OSLUND & Vanessa Firnhaber Oslund --
vanessa@bergmanlegal.com -- BERGMAN DRAPER OSLUND.

Syd Carpenter Marine Contractor Inc, Defendant, represented by J.
Scott Wood -- swood@foleymansfield.com -- FOLEY & MANSFIELD & R.
Dirk Bernhardt , FOLEY & MANSFIELD.

Vigor Shipyards Inc, a subsidiary of Vigor Shipyards Inc. Todd
Shipyards, Defendant, represented by D. David Steele , YARON &
ASSOCIATES, pro hac vice, George D. Yaron , YARON & ASSOCIATES, pro
hac vice & Walter Eugene Barton -- gbarton@karrtuttle.com -- KARR
TUTTLE CAMPBELL.

Syd Carpenter Marine Contractor Inc, Consol Defendant, represented
by Diane Catherine Babbitt -- dbabbitt@foleymansfield.com -- FOLEY
& MANSFIELD, J. Scott Wood -- swood@foleymansfield.com -- FOLEY &
MANSFIELD, R. Dirk Bernhardt , FOLEY & MANSFIELD, Zackary A. Paal
-- zpaal@foleymansfield.com -- FOLEY & MANSFIELD & Brian Bernard
Smith -- bsmith@foleymansfield.com -- FOLEY & MANSFIELD.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Enstar Group Had $249.1MM Liability at June 30
---------------------------------------------------------------
Enstar Group Limited recorded Direct Asbestos Liabilities of
US$249,120,000 as of June 30, 2019, according to the Company's Form
10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019.

The Company states, "We acquired DCo LLC ("DCo") on December 30,
2016.  DCo continues to process asbestos personal injury claims in
the normal course of business and is separately managed.

"Other liabilities on our consolidated balance sheets include
amounts for indemnity and defense costs for pending and future
claims, determined using standard actuarial techniques for
asbestos-related exposures.  Other liabilities also include amounts
for environmental liabilities associated with DCo's properties.

"Other assets on our consolidated balance sheets include estimated
insurance recoveries relating to these liabilities.  The recorded
asset represents our assessment of the capacity of the insurance
agreements to provide for the payment of anticipated defense and
indemnity costs for pending claims and projected future demands.
The recognition of these recoveries is based on an assessment of
the right to recover under the respective contracts and on the
financial strength of the insurers.  The recorded asset does not
represent the limits of our insurance coverage, but rather the
amount we would expect to recover if the accrued indemnity and
defense costs were paid in full."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/k12ixj


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Expert's Opinion Excluded From Jackson Case
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Thomas F. Hogan of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia has excluded the product contamination opinion of
expert witness, Dr. Ronald Gordon, from the case styled Brian
Jackson, Individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate
of Doris Jackson, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. Colgate-Palmolive
Company, Defendant, Civil Action No. 15-01066 (TFH), (D.D.C.).

Plaintiff alleges that his mother developed mesothelioma due to
asbestos exposure from her decades-long use of Cashmere Bouquet
talcum powder, which was manufactured, marketed, and/or sold by
Defendant Colgate-Palmolive Company from 1871 through 1995.
Plaintiff has proffered Dr. Ronald Gordon -- a pathologist and
microscopist with a Ph.D. in biology and experimental pathology --
as an expert to testify regarding his testing and analysis of
various samples of Cashmere Bouquet-labeled talcum powder, as well
as his analysis and opinions concerning Ms. Jackson's lung and
lymph node tissue.

Colgate seeks to exclude Dr. Gordon's opinions that (1) he detected
asbestos in every Cashmere Bouquet-labeled talc sample he tested,
and (2) Ms. Jackson's lymph node tissue contained the same type of
asbestos he found in the talc and that the asbestos in the talc
therefore caused Ms. Jackson's mesothelioma. Colgate argues that
Dr. Gordon's opinions are unreliable and should be excluded
pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589
(1993).

As summarized in his 2014 article titled Asbestos in Commercial
Cosmetic Talcum Powder as a Cause of Mesothelioma in Women, Dr.
Gordon tested over 50 containers of Cashmere Bouquet-labeled talc
and "found asbestos fibers in all those containers," specifically
anthophyllite, tremolite, and chrysotile. Dr. Gordon also reviewed
all of the grid openings on every grid of talc he tested, but he
did not record the location of the grid openings containing the
fibers he determined to be asbestos. Dr. Gordon extrapolates these
findings to conclude that "every container of Cashmere Bouquet
contained some amount of asbestos."

Dr. Gordon also opines that Ms. Jackson was exposed to tremolite
asbestos above background levels, that Ms. Jackson had mesothelioma
caused by asbestos, and that his findings of asbestos in the
vintage talc samples are consistent with his findings of asbestos
in Ms. Jackson's lymph node tissue. Dr. Gordon detected one fiber
of tremolite asbestos in Ms. Jackson's lymph node tissue, and he
then extrapolated that finding to conclude that "electron
microscopic analysis of the lymph node tissue revealed amphibole
type asbestos fibers in a calculated concentration of 9409 fibers
per gram wet weight with a limit of detection of 9409 fibers per
gram wet weight."

The Court finds that Dr. Gordon's product contamination opinion is
unreliable and should therefore be excluded under Daubert for two
independent reasons: (1) his testing method failed to reliably
distinguish talc from asbestos; and (2) his testing results are not
verifiable because he failed to record the location of the grid
openings containing the fibers he determined to be asbestos.

Also, the Court finds Dr. Gordon's specific causation opinion is
based on the single tremolite asbestos fiber he detected in Ms.
Jackson's lymph node tissue, which he contends establishes that
"Ms. Jackson had an above background exposure to asbestos." There
is no evidence that Ms. Jackson had asbestos fibers in her lungs,
asbestosis or pleural plaques, or asbestos bodies in her lungs.
Although Plaintiff contends that "it is entirely possible" that Dr.
Gordon would have found asbestos fibers in Ms. Jackson's lung
tissue if he had received a larger volume of tissue to examine, the
Court cannot accept such speculation to serve as the basis for his
causation opinion.

BRIAN D. JACKSON, Individually and as Personal Representative of
the Estate of Doris Jackson, Plaintiff, represented by Kevin W.
Paul , SIMON GREENSTONE PANATIER BARTLETT, PC, Leah C. Kagan --
lkagan@sgptrial.com -- SIMON GREENSTONE PANATIER BARTLETT, PC, pro
hac vice, Christopher Panatier -- cpanatier@sgptrial.com -- SIMON
GREENSTONE PANATIER BARTLETT, PC, pro hac vice, Eileen Marie
O'Brien -- eobrien@brownkielylaw.com -- BROWN GOULD KIELY, LLP, Jay
E. Stuemke -- jstuemke@sgptrial.com -- SIMON GREENSTONE PANATIER
BARTLETT, PC, pro hac vice, John M. Caron , WORTHINGTON & CARON,
P.C., pro hac vice, Samuel Iola , SIMON GREENSTONE PANATIER
BARTLETT, PC, pro hac vice & Daniel A. Brown --
dbrown@brownkielylaw.com -- BROWN & GOULD, LLP.

COLGATE-PALMOLIVE COMPANY, Defendant, represented by Alicia N.
Ritchie -- aritchie@milesstockbridge.com - MILES & STOCKBRIDGE
P.C., pro hac vice, Jonathan James Huber --
jhuber@milesstockbridge.com -- MILES & STOCKBRIDGE, P.C., Matthew
R. Schroll -- matt.schroll@nelsonmullins.com -- NELSON MULLINS
RILEY & SCARBOROUGH LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew T. Wagman --
mwagman@milesstockbridge.com -- MILES & STOCKBRIDGE P. C., Michael
A. Brown -- mike.brown@nelsonmullins.com -- NELSON MULLINS RILEY &
SCARBOROUGH LLP, Christine H. Chung , QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
SULLIVAN, LLP, pro hac vice, Joey D. Horton --
jdhorton@quinnemanuel.com -- QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN LLP,
pro hac vice, Meredith M. Shaw -- meredithshaw@quinnemanuel.com --
QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN LLP, pro hac vice & Morgan W.
Tovey -- morgantovey@quinnemanuel.com -- QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
SULLIVAN LLP, pro hac vice.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Flowserve Still Defends PL Lawsuits at June 30
---------------------------------------------------------------
Flowserve Corporation said in its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2019, that it is still defending itself against "a
substantial number of lawsuits" that seek to recover damages for
personal injury allegedly caused by exposure to asbestos-containing
products manufactured and/or distributed by its heritage companies
in the past.

The Company states, "While the overall number of asbestos-related
claims has generally declined in recent years, there can be no
assurance that this trend will continue, or that the average cost
per claim will not further increase.  Asbestos-containing materials
incorporated into any such products were encapsulated and used as
internal components of process equipment, and we do not believe
that any significant emission of asbestos fibers occurred during
the use of this equipment.

"Our practice is to vigorously contest and resolve these claims,
and we have been successful in resolving a majority of claims with
little or no payment.  Historically, a high percentage of resolved
claims have been covered by applicable insurance or indemnities
from other companies, and we believe that a substantial majority of
existing claims should continue to be covered by insurance or
indemnities, in whole or in part.  Accordingly, we have recorded a
liability for our estimate of the most likely settlement of
asserted claims and a related receivable from insurers or other
companies for our estimated recovery, to the extent we believe that
the amounts of recovery are probable.  While unfavorable rulings,
judgments or settlement terms regarding these claims could have a
material adverse impact on our business, financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows, we currently believe the
likelihood is remote.

"Additionally, we have claims pending against certain insurers
that, if resolved more favorably than reflected in the recorded
receivables, would result in discrete gains in the applicable
quarter.  We are currently unable to estimate the impact, if any,
of unasserted asbestos-related claims, although we expect that
future claims would also be subject to then-existing indemnities
and insurance coverage."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/mI1s3V


ASBESTOS UPDATE: P.I. Claims vs. Arcata Auto Dismissed in Kuntz
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge John Mendez of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California dismissed without prejudice all claims
against Defendant Arcata Auto Supply in the case entitled William
Kuntz and Mary Lois Kuntz, Plaintiffs, v. John Crane, Inc., et al.,
Defendants, pursuant to the Parties' Stipulation.

William Kuntz & Mary Kuntz, Plaintiffs, represented by Kimberly Chu
, Brayton Purcell & David Robert Donadio , Brayton & Purcell, LLP.

Honeywell International, Inc., Defendant, represented by Alice
Truong Wong -- alwong@mwe.com -- McDermott Will & Emery & Jonathan
Yang -- joyang@mwe.com -- McDermott Will & Emery.

Parker-Hannifin Corporation, Defendant, represented by Joseph Adams
-- jadams@behblaw.com -- Bassi Edlin Huie & Blum LLP.

CBS Corporation, formerly known as Westinghouse Electric
Corporation & General Electric Company, Defendants, represented by
Derek Spencer Johnson -- djohnson@wfbm.com --  Walsworth Franklin
Bevins & McCall, LLP, Charles Todd Sheldon , Walsworth Franklin
Bevins & McCall, LLP, Emily Elizabeth Anselmo -- eanselmo@wfbm.com
-- Walsworth Franklin Bevins & McCall, LLP & Katherine P. Gardiner
-- kgardiner@wfbm.com -- Walsworth Franklin Bevins & McCall, LLP.

Foster Wheeler LLC, formerly known as Foster Wheeler Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Charles S. Park -- cpark@hugoparker.com
-- Hugo Parker, LLP.

Crane Co., Defendant, represented by Geoffrey Marc Davis --
Geoffrey.Davis@klgates.com -- K & L Gates LLP & Peter Edward Soskin
-- peter.soskin@klgates.com -- K & L Gates, LLP.

IMO Industries, Inc., Defendant, represented by Bobbie R. Bailey --
bbailey@leaderberkon.com -- Leader & Berkon LLP & Olga Guadalupe
Pena -- opena@leaderberkon.com -- Leader and Berkon LLP.

Ingersoll-Rand Company, Defendant, represented by Arpi Galfayan --
agalfayan@prindlelaw.com -- Prindle, Goetz, Barnes, et al & Carla
Lynn Crochet -- ccrochet@prindlelaw.com -- Prindle, Goetz, Barnes &
Reinholtz LLP.

Viking Pump, Inc., Defendant, represented by Peter Keith Renstrom ,
Jackson Jenkins Renstrom LLP & Todd M. Thacker, Jackson Jenkins
Renstrom LLP.

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by
Erika Rose Aspericueta , Steptoe and Johnson LLP.

ABB Inc., Defendant, represented by Nicolas P. Martin --
nick.martin@wilsonelser.com -- Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman &
Dicker, LLP.

Velan Valve Corp., Defendant, represented by Arlene C. Barton --
arlene.barton@dentons.com -- Dentons US LLP.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Stay Motion in Peterson Case Withdrawn
-------------------------------------------------------
The First Department of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
of New York has ordered withdrawn the Stay Motion of non-party
Minerals Technologies, Inc. filed in the case styled In Re: New
York City Asbestos Litigation. Stanley Peterson and Debby Peterson,
Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Occidental Chemical Corporation,
Individually and as Successor to Diamond Shamrock and Rubber Corp.
of America, et al., Defendants-Respondents, Minerals Technologies,
Inc., Non-Party Appellant. Index No. 190169/18, (N.Y. App. Div.
1d.).

Non-Party Appellant had taken appeals from two orders of the New
York County Supreme Court. It also moved for a stay of enforcement
of these orders pending hearing and determination of the appeals
taken therefrom, and for an interim stay of the appeals pending the
determination of the stay motion.

The Court received a correspondence, from counsel for non-party
appellant, indicating withdrawal of its Motion for Stay of
Enforcement of the appealed Oct. 16, 2018 Orders.

A copy of the Order dated Aug. 20, 2019, is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y5ku7hh5 from Leagle.com.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Tenneco Has At Most 500 Cases in US, 50 in Europe
------------------------------------------------------------------
Tenneco Inc. has less than 500 cases in the United States and less
than 50 in Europe in its current docket of active and inactive
asbestos-related cases, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2019,
for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019.

Tenneco states, "For many years the Company has been and continues
to be subject to lawsuits initiated by claimants alleging health
problems as a result of exposure to asbestos.  The Company's
current docket of active and inactive cases is less than 500 cases
in the United States and less than 50 in Europe.

"With respect to the claims filed in the United States, the
substantial majority of the claims are related to alleged exposure
to asbestos in the Company's line of Walker(R) exhaust automotive
products although a significant number of those claims appear also
to involve occupational exposures sustained in industries other
than automotive.  A small number of claims have been asserted
against one of the Company's subsidiaries by railroad workers
alleging exposure to asbestos products in railroad cars.  The
Company believes, based on scientific and other evidence, it is
unlikely that U.S. claimants were exposed to asbestos by the
Company's former products and that, in any event, they would not be
at increased risk of asbestos-related disease based on their work
with these products.  Further, many of these cases involve numerous
defendants, with the number in some cases exceeding 100 defendants
from a variety of industries.  Additionally, in many cases the
plaintiffs either do not specify any, or specify the jurisdictional
minimum, dollar amount for damages.

"With respect to the claims filed in Europe, the substantial
majority relate to occupational exposure claims brought by current
and former employees of Federal-Mogul facilities in France and
amounts paid out were not material.  A small number of occupational
exposure claims have also been asserted against Federal-Mogul
entities in Italy and Spain.

"As major asbestos manufacturers and/or users continue to go out of
business or file for bankruptcy, the Company may experience an
increased number of these claims.  The Company vigorously defends
itself against these claims as part of its ordinary course of
business.  In future periods, the Company could be subject to cash
costs or charges to earnings if any of these matters are resolved
unfavorably to the Company.  To date, with respect to claims that
have proceeded sufficiently through the judicial process, the
Company has regularly achieved favorable resolutions.  Accordingly,
the Company presently believes that these asbestos-related claims
will not have a material adverse effect on the Company's annual
consolidated financial position, results of operations or
liquidity."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/bUhc9n



                            *********

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