CAR_Public/190919.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Thursday, September 19, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 188

                            Headlines

3662 BROADWAY RESTAURANT: Garcia Files Suit Under FLSA, NYLL
AAC HOLDINGS: Continues to Defend Caudle Class Action
ABIOMED INC: Zhang Investor Files Class Action Lawsuit
ACETO CORP: CEOs Dismissed from Securities Suit With Leave to Amend
ACLARIS THERAPEUTICS: Fulcher Hits Share Price Drop

ALLERGAN PLC: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Generic Drug Pricing Suit
ALLIANT CREDIT: Page, et al. Sue over Overdraft & NSF Fees
AMTRUST FINANCIAL: Rosen Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
ARCHER DANIELS: Korein Tillery Files Class Action Lawsuit
AUTISM SPECTRUM: Durham Seeks Unpaid Wages, Penalties

BACARDI USA: New FDUTPA Class Action Over Bombay Sapphire Gin
BIG LOTS: Settlement Reached in Wage and Hour Class Suits in Cal.
BIRDSONG CORPORATION: Peanut Farmers File Antitrust Suit in Va.
CANADA GOOSE: Rosen Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
CARRIZO OIL & GAS: Fernandes Files Suit Over Sale to Callon

CHRISTOPHER & BANKS: Stockholder Sues over Failed Takeover Bid
CIENA CORP: Beaver County Employees Suit Dismissed
COX COMMUNICATIONS: Taylor Wage & Hour Suit Dismissal Affirmed
CSL PLASMA: Marsh Sues over Use of Biometric Data
CSX INTERMODAL: Court Narrows Claims in Rogers BIPA Suit

CURTIS PROTECTIVE: Renia et al. Allege Time Shaving
DELEON LATIN: Perez Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages Under FLSA
DELL TECH: Bid to Dismiss Class V Consolidated Suit Due Sept. 30
DELL TECH: Settlement Reached in City of Pontiac Fund Suit
DOMETIC CORP: Varner Appeals S.D. Fla. Decision to 11th Circuit

DONDA ENTERPRISES: Fails to Pay Minimum & OT Wages, Carswell Says
DRINK DAILY: Court Denies Rule 11 Sanction Bid in Campbell
DRIVELINE RETAIL: Court Allows Class Representative Substitution
EWING TOWNSHIP: Violates Conscientious Employee Protection Act
FEDEX GROUND: Summary Judgment Bid in Armijo Labor Suit Granted

FINE HOME: Joint Bid for FLSA Class Cert.  Filed in Wallace Suit
GANNETT CO: Brasher Moves to Certify Call-Center Employees Class
GOLDEN PEANUT: Peanut Farmers' Class Suit Allege Price Fixing
GOOGLE INC: 3d Cir. Vacates Settlement in Consumer Privacy Suit
GOOGLE LLC: Court Allows Deposition on Unredacted Email in Adtrader

GROCERY DELIVERY: Engen Sues Over Intrusive Telemarketing Practices
HARRIS COUNTY, TX: Court OKs Consent Decree in Odonnell
HD SUPPLY: Discovery Ongoing in Shareholders Class Suit in Georgia
HOSPITAL SERVICE: La. App. Flips Dismissal of E. Williams' Claims
IDEANOMICS INC: Bernstein Liebhard Files Securties Class Action

INDIANA: State Wants to Seal Filing in DCS Class Action Lawsuit
JUST ENERGY: Bernstein Liebhard Files Securities Fraud Suit
JUST ENERGY: Klafter Olsen Files Securities Fraud Class Action
JUST ENERGY: Pomerantz Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
KENNETH LASSITER: 4th Cir. Dismisses Appeal in Seelig ADA Suit

KNIGHT TRANSPORTATION: Wash. Answers Negative to Certified Question
LEND-A-HAND SERVICES: FLSA & OMFWSA Classes Certified in Walburn
LIBERTY TAX: Bid to Dismiss NY Consolidated Suit Still Pending
LIBERTY TAX: Court Awards $1.4MM in Fees in Stockholder Class Suit
LIBERTY TAX: Status Conference in Labrado Set for Nov. 22

LOCKHEED MARTIN: Hicks Seeks Prelim. Approval of $1.25-Mil. Deal
LOCKHEED MARTIN: Wins Prelim. Nod of Hicks COBRA Suit Settlement
LOGMEIN INC: Rosen Law Files Securities Fraud Suit
LOWE'S COMPANIES: Court Narrows Claims in ERISA Suit
LOZANO INSURANCE: Bid to Notify FLSA Class in Mosley Suit Granted

MARRIOTT OWNERSHIP: Lennen Appeals M.D. Fla. Ruling to 11th Cir.
MDL 2543: Ct. Rules on Summary Ruling Bid in Ignition Switch Suit
MDL 2818: Court Narrows Claims in Air Conditioning Suit
MEREDITH CORPORATION: Glancy Prongay Files Class Action Suit
MICHELLE GRISHAM: Court OKs Class Settlement in Duran

MIDSOUTH BANCORP: Plaintiffs Drop Merger-Related Suits
MINDBODY INC: Labaton Sucharow Files Class Action Lawsuit
MINDBODY INC: Rosen Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
MONOTYPE IMAGING: Faces Wheby Class Action in Delaware
MORGAN STANLEY: Court Denies Class Notice Information Inclusion

NEW YORK CENTRAL: Court Junks Insurance Reimbursement Suit
NEW YORK: Class Suit Over Sealed Arrests Filed
NIANTIC INC: 2016 Pokemon Go Class Suit Over Trespassing Settled
OMNICELL INC: Bernstein Liebhard Files Securities Fraud Suit
OTG MANAGEMENT: Filho Files Suit to Recover Unpaid Wages, Tips

OXY USA: Order Denying Bid to Remand Copper Clark Suit Flipped
PEARSON CLINICAL: Parent Files Class-Action Suit After Data Breach
PEARSON PLC: Faces K.S. Suit over AIMSweb Data Breach
PETROBRAS: Court Vacates $46MM Attorney's Fees Reduction
PLATINUM RESTAURANTS: Class of Servers Certified in Green Suit

PLURALSIGHT INC: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Fraud Suit
PROLINK STAFFING: Clay Suit Seeks Payment of All Wages Due
R & C CLEANING: Fails to Pay Minimum & Overtime Wages, Godoy Says
REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION: Singer Ordered to Re-File Class Cert. Bid
REGULUS THERAPEUTICS: Court Dismisses Securities Suit

RH INC: Final Settlement Approval Hearing Set for Oct. 22
SAREPTA THERAPEUTICS: Gainey McKenna Files Class Action Suit
SFX ENTERTAINMENT: Dec. 13 Hearing on $6.7MM Settlement Approval
SHREVEPORT, LA: Water Dept. Hit With Class Action for Overbilling
SONY CORP: $19.5MM Settlement Approved in Price-Fixing Class Action

TE CONNECTIVITY: Court OKs $4.96MM Settlement in Wilson
TILLY'S INC: Discovery Ongoing in Ward Class Action
TILLY'S INC: Mediation in Gonzalez Class Suit Set for Oct. 31
U.S. FOODS INC: Ford Hits Misclassification, Seeks Unpaid Wages
UNITED FEDERAL CREDIT: Has $1.75MM Class Suit Settlement

UNITED STATES: Border Chief Defends 'Overwhelmed' Agents
UNITED STATES: Class Action Certification Sought in Robles Suit
UNITED STATES: Court OKs Injunctive Relief in Mons
UNITED STATES: DOJ Seeks to Stay Discovery in Bump Stock Suit
UNITED STATES: Morecraft Appeals Decision to Federal Claims Court

UNITED STATES: Pre- & Post- Hearing Classes in Brito Suit Certified
VALARIS PLC: Bernstein Liebhard Files Securities Fraud Suit
VALEANT PHARMACEUTICALS: Investors' CAD$30MM Deal With PwC Proposed
VAN SUILICHEM: Workers Class Certified Under FLSA in Thomas Suit
WEATHERFORD INTERNATIONAL: Entwistle & Cappucci Files Class Action

WESTPAC BANKING: Sued Over Superannuation Fund
WISE MEDICAL: Campbell's Bid to Certify Mooted Due to Settlement
XPO LOGISTICS: Certification of Class Sought in Alvarez Suit
YALOBUSHA HEALTH: Groner Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
ZAYO GROUP: Faces Several Class Suits Related to Merger Deal


                            *********

3662 BROADWAY RESTAURANT: Garcia Files Suit Under FLSA, NYLL
------------------------------------------------------------
ALFREDO GARCIA, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, v. 3662 BROADWAY RESTAURANT CORP. d/b/a
TAQUERIA SAN PEDRO and ALBERTICO CHAVEZ, jointly and severally,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-08297 (S.D. N.Y., Sept. 5, 2019) is a
complaint alleging that the Defendants violated the Fair Labor
Standards Act, the Minimum Wage Act, and the New York Labor Law,
and that the Defendants are liable for unpaid or underpaid minimum
wages, overtime compensation, spread-of-hours wages, and such other
relief available by law.

The Plaintiff worked more than 40 hours each workweek, yet the
Defendants willfully failed to pay him overtime compensation of one
and one-half times his regular rate of pay, the complaint says.
Defendants also failed to post or keep posted notices explaining
the minimum wages rights of employed under the FLSA and the NYLL.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as a grill man, maintenance
worker, delivery-man and stocker.

Defendants' business is a limited-service restaurant doing business
as San Pedro Tacqueria and located at 3662 Broadway, New York, NY
10031.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     John M. Gurrieri, Esq.
     Justin A. Zeller, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF JUSTIN A. ZELLER, P.C.
     277 Broadway, Suite 408
     New York, N.Y. 10007-2036
     Phone: (212) 229-2249
     Facsimile: (212) 229-2246
     Email: jmgurrieri@zellerlegal.com
            jazeller@zellerlegal.com


AAC HOLDINGS: Continues to Defend Caudle Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------
AAC Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 10, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to
defend a class action suit entitled, Caudle v. AAC Holdings, Inc.
et al.

On May 16, 2019, an alleged shareholder filed a purported class
action in the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Tennessee against the Company and certain of its current and
former officers (Caudle v. AAC Holdings, Inc. et al.).

The plaintiff generally alleges that defendants violated Sections
10(b) and/or 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
10b-5 promulgated thereunder by making allegedly false and/or
misleading statements and failing to disclose certain information,
with respect to financial statements reported by the Company for
periods between 2016 and 2018, which statements were restated in
the Company's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended
December 31, 2018.

In a related matter, on August 16, 2019, an alleged shareholder
filed a derivative action on behalf of AAC Holdings, Inc. in the
United States District Court in the Middle District of Tennessee
(Cooper v. Michael Cartwright et al.) against the Company's current
and certain former members of its board of directors and senior
executive team, alleging that these individuals breached their
fiduciary duties and engaged in mismanagement.

AAC Holdings said, "Given the uncertainty of litigation and the
preliminary stage of these cases, we cannot at this time estimate
the reasonably possible loss or range of loss that may result from
these actions. The Company believes that the allegations are
without merit and is vigorously defending the action."

AAC Holdings, Inc. provides inpatient and outpatient substance use
treatment services for individuals with drug addiction, alcohol
addiction, and co-occurring mental/behavioral health issues in the
United States. Its therapy services include motivational
interviewing, cognitive behavioral therapy, rational emotive
behavior therapy, dialectical behavioral therapy, solution-focused
therapy, eye movement desensitization and reprocessing, and
systematic family intervention. AAC Holdings, Inc. was founded in
2014 and is headquartered in Brentwood, Tennessee.


ABIOMED INC: Zhang Investor Files Class Action Lawsuit
------------------------------------------------------
Zhang Investor Law announces the filing of a class action lawsuit
on behalf of shareholders who bought shares of Abiomed, Inc. (ABMD)
from January 31, 2019 through July 31, 2019, inclusive (the "Class
Period").  The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Abiomed
investors under the federal securities laws.

To join the class action, go to
http://zhanginvestorlaw.com/join-action-form/?slug=abiomed-inc&id=1981
or call Sophie Zhang, Esq. toll-free at 800-991-3756 or email
info@zhanginvestorlaw.com for information on the class action.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than October 7, 2019.  A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) ABIOMED's revenue growth was in decline; (2) ABIOMED did
not have a sufficient plan in place to stem its declining revenue
growth; (3) ABIOMED was unlikely to restore its revenue growth over
the next several fiscal quarters; (4) consequently, ABIOMED was
reasonably likely to revise its full-year 2020 guidance in a way
that would fall short of the Company's prior projections and market
expectations; and (5) as a result, ABIOMED's public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times. When the
true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that investors
suffered damages.

A class has not been certified.  You may retain counsel of your
choice.  You may take no action at this time and be an absent class
member.  Your ability to obtain a recovery is not dependent upon
being a lead plaintiff.

Contact:

         Zhang Investor Law P.C.
         99 Wall Street, Suite 232
         New York, New York 10005
         tel: (800) 991-3756
         Email: info@zhanginvestorlaw.com [GN]


ACETO CORP: CEOs Dismissed from Securities Suit With Leave to Amend
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re Aceto Corporation Securities Litigation. This
Document Relates to: ALL ACTIONS, Master File No.
2:18-cv-2425-ERK-AYS (E.D. N.Y.), Judge Edward R. Korman of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted
Individual Defendants Salvatore Guccione, William C. Kennally, and
Douglas Roth' motion to dismiss with leave to amend.

Plaintiff Michael Bonine brings the securities class action against
Aceto Corp. and the Individual Defendants following a 64% decline
in Aceto's stock price on April 19, 2018.

Aceto is an international pharmaceutical company incorporated and
headquartered in New York.  Its business consists of three product
lines: "Human Health, Pharmaceutical Ingredients, and Performance
Chemicals."  The Human Health segment includes Aceto's generic
pharmaceuticals business, which accounted for 49.4% of Aceto's
total revenue in 2016-17.  Key to Aceto's generic pharmaceuticals
business was its 2016 acquisition of Citron Pharma, LLC and its
affiliate Lucid Pharma, LLC. Am.  With its acquisition of Lucid,
Aceto acquired 18 5-year contracts with the federal government to
provide generic pharmaceuticals -- a major revenue source.

In June 2017, the federal government advised Lucid that it was
reviewing whether Lucid's products complied with the contracts'
country-of-origin provisions, and threatened to terminate those
contracts for noncompliance.  Aceto disclosed this fact in its 2017
10-K, noting that if the products are found to not have complied
with the country-of-origin clauses, then the government could
exercise remedies, including termination of one or more of the
subject contracts or other statutory damages.  

This development affected 11 contracts Lucid had with the Veterans
Administration, which alone comprised approximately 10% of Aceto's
revenue.  Aside from the potential loss of its government
contracts, Aceto was struggling more generally.  On Feb. 1, 2018,
in addition to lowering its projected revenue, Aceto's announced
its financial and operating results for the second fiscal quarter
ending Dec. 31, 2017.  During Aceto's Feb. 2, 2018 earnings call,
Kennally reported the 10% to 15% growth projection and predicted
results for the second half of fiscal year 2018 are expected to be
modestly better than the first half of the year.

Throughout the class period, which spans from Aug. 25, 2017 to
April 18, 2018, Aceto continuously cautioned that generic industry
headwinds would persist.  And Aceto's financial performance often
failed to meet its forecasted guidance.  It also lowered its 2018
guidance on several occasions.

On May 3, 2018, Aceto issued another press release informing the
market that it had obtained a waiver of certain financial
covenants. And on May  7, 2018, Aceto filed its Form 10-Q with the
SEC, disclosing that it was notified by the federal government that
11 of its 18 contracts were not in compliance with the
country-of-origin provisions, making it "necessary to perform an
interim goodwill impairment analysis.  In total, Aceto recorded
impairment charges for goodwill and intangibles in excess of $256
million for the third quarter of 2018.  Aceto's 2018 Form 10-K
filed on September 28, 2018 noted that the material impairment
charge that they recorded in fiscal 2018 was based on several
adverse factors, certain of which could materially adversely impact
the Company in subsequent fiscal quarters.  Shortly thereafter,
Aceto declared bankruptcy.

Drawing on these events, Plaintiff Bonine, a holder of Aceto
securities, alleges that Aceto and the Individual Defendants,
Guccione (CEO from January 2014 to September 2017), Kennally (CEO
from October 2, 2017 to present), and Roth (CFO from March 2010 to
March 2018), are liable for securities fraud under Sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.  Specifically, the
Plaintiff relies on alleged material misrepresentations regarding
(1) Aceto's internal controls, as described in Aceto's 2017 Form
10-K; (2) Aceto's earnings forecast contained in the Feb. 1, 2018
press release; and (3) Aceto's valuation of goodwill and intangible
assets contained in the Feb. 1, 2018 press release.

The Individual Defendants move to dismiss.

An action under Rule 10b-5 requires proving six elements: (1) a
material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter; (3) a
connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance;
(5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.  In the case, the first
two elements are at issue.

The Plaintiff attempts to allege falsity with respect to Aceto's
Aug. 25, 2017 10-K disclosures regarding its internal controls and
its Feb. 1, 2018 press release containing financial projections and
an accounting of Aceto's goodwill and intangible assets.  Judge
Korman finds that the Plaintiff fails to allege falsity with
respect to Aceto's Aug. 25, 2017 10-K and accompanying
Sarbanes-Oxley certification.  The amended complaint assumes that
because a problem was disclosed in November, the Defendants must
have known of the problem in August, making the representations
false.  But this is a classic example of "fraud by hindsight"
insufficient to support a 10(b) claim.

According to the Plaintiff, Aceto's February 1 press release was
materially false and misleading in two respects: first, there was
no basis for Aceto's optimistic guidance, and second, the estimated
value of Aceto's goodwill and intangible assets was unduly high.

The Judge finds that untangling the Plaintiff's argument reveals
just another attempt to plead fraud by hindsight.  Aceto disclosed
to investors that it faced both persistent industry headwinds and
possible termination of its government contracts.  In response, the
Plaintiff argues that Aceto's guidance should have assumed a
crippling industry downturn and termination of its government
contracts.  But the law did not require Aceto to assume the worst.
And there is no evidence that the Defendants knew, as of Feb. 1,
2018, that the government contracts would in fact be terminated or
that Aceto knew of a flaw in its forecasting mechanism.

The Plaintiff's argument with respect to Aceto's goodwill and
intangible assets valuation fares no better.  The Plaintiff
contends that Aceto should have disclosed its "lack of visibility
concerning the assets to which that goodwill attached."  But Aceto
did disclose that it risked losing its government contracts.  And
the fact that the federal government indicated that Aceto's
contracts might be terminated did not require Aceto to assume the
worst and impair its goodwill before learning the government's
final position on compliance.  In the end, Aceto's statement of
opinion is not misleading just because external facts later showed
the opinion to be incorrect.  And in reality, Aceto did not turn
out to be wrong -- the United States Court of Federal Claims later
rejected the government's theory of contractual interpretation upon
which it invalidated Lucid's contracts.

Taken collectively, the Judge holds that the Plaintiff's
allegations do not "give rise to a strong inference of scienter."
The Plaintiff has not provided any basis to conclude that
[d]efendants had a motive to commit fraud, and the Plaintiff's
allegations of conscious recklessness, even considered together,
are extremely thin.  Moreover, the government's termination of the
Lucid contracts after the Feb. 1, 2018 press release constitutes a
"non-culpable" explanation for Aceto's downturn.

Finally, to state a claim of control person liability under Section
20(a), a plaintiff must show a primary violation by the controlled
person.  Because the Plaintiff has not done so, the Plaintiff's
claims under Section 20(a) must also be dismissed.

In light of the foregoing , Judge Korman granted the Individual
Defendants' motion to dismiss with leave to replead within 21 days
of the date of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 6, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/d3ir4Y from Leagle.com.

Tenzin Dorji, Movant, represented by Lesley Frank Portnoy --
LPORTNOY@GLANCYLAW.COM -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP.

Andrew Goodwin, Robert Herpst, Charles Bouley, Joseph Mun & Stephen
Cornell, Movants, represented by Shannon Lee Hopkins --
shopkins@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky, LLP.

Michael Bonine, Movant, represented by Jacob A. Goldberg --
jgoldberg@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, pro hac vice &
Phillip Kim -- pkim@rosenlegal.com -- Rosen Law Firm, P.A. P.C.

IBEW Local 98 Pension Plan, Movant, represented by David Avi
Rosenfeld -- DRosenfeld@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd, LLP.

Joseph Noto, Garden State Tire Corp. & Stephens Johnson, Movants,
represented by Jeremy Alan Lieberman -- jalieberman@pomlaw.com --
Pomerantz LLP.

Ronald L. Mulligan, Jr., Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Eduard Korsinsky --
ek@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky.

Jincai Yang, Consol Plaintiff, represented by J. Alexander Hood --
ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP & Jeremy Alan Lieberman,
Pomerantz LLP.

Aceto Corporation, Defendant, represented by Gavin J. Rooney --
grooney@lowenstein.com -- Lowenstein & Sandler.

Salvatore Guccione, Defendant, represented by Eric J. Seiler --
eseiler@fklaw.com -- Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman LLP, Philippe
Adler -- padler@fklaw.com -- Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman LLP &
Shenghao Stan Chiueh -- schiueh@fklaw.com -- Friedman Kaplan Seiler
& Adelman LLP.

Douglas Roth, Defendant, represented by Eric J. Seiler, Friedman
Kaplan Seiler & Adelman LLP.

William C. Kennally III & Douglas Roth, Consol Defendants,
represented by Eric J. Seiler, Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman
LLP, Philippe Adler, Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman LLP &
Shenghao Stan Chiueh, Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman LLP.


ACLARIS THERAPEUTICS: Fulcher Hits Share Price Drop
---------------------------------------------------
ROBERT FULCHER, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. ACLARIS THERAPEUTICS, INC., NEAL WALKER,
and FRANK RUFFO, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-08284 (S.D. N.Y.,
Sept. 5, 2019) is a class action on behalf of persons and entities
that purchased or otherwise acquired Aclaris securities between May
8, 2018 and June 20, 2019, inclusive, seeking to pursue remedies
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The Company's lead product ESKATA is a hydrogen peroxide topical
solution to treat raised seborrheic keratosis, a common
non-malignant tumor. On June 20, 2019, the U.S. Food & Drug
Administration stated that an advertisement for ESKATA "makes false
or misleading claims" regarding the product's risk and efficacy.
Specifically, "a direct-to-consumer video of an interview featuring
a paid Aclaris spokesperson" was "especially concerning because it
fails to include information regarding the serious risks associated
with ESKATA, which bears warnings and precautions related to the
risks of serious eye disorders in the case of exposure to the eye
and severe skin reactions including scarring." On this news, the
Company's share price fell $0.57 per share, or over 11%, over two
consecutive trading sessions to close at $4.54 per share on June
21, 2019, on unusually heavy trading volume.

Throughout the Class Period, Defendants made materially false
and/or misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose
material adverse facts about the Company's business, operations,
and prospects, asserts the complaint. Specifically, Defendants
failed to disclose to investors that: (i) the Company's advertising
materials minimized the risks and overstated the efficacy of ESKATA
to generate sales; (ii) as a result, the Company was reasonably
likely to face regulatory scrutiny; and (iii) as a result of the
foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects were materially misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

As a result of Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages, says the complaint.

Plaintiff purchased Aclaris securities during the Class Period.

Aclaris is a biopharmaceutical company that identifies, develops,
and commercializes therapies to address unmet needs in medical and
aesthetic dermatology and immunology.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
     J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
     POMERANTZ LLP
     600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
     New York, NY 10016
     Phone: (212) 661-1100
     Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
     Email: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
            ahood@pomlaw.com

          - and -

     Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
     POMERANTZ LLP
     10 South La Salle Street, Suite 3505
     Chicago, IL 60603
     Phone: (312) 377-1181
     Facsimile: (312) 377-1184
     Email: pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com


ALLERGAN PLC: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Generic Drug Pricing Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE ALLERGAN GENERIC DRUG PRICING SECURITIES
LITIGATION, Civil Action No. 16-9449 (KSH) (CLW) (D. N.J.), Judge
Katharine S. Hayden of the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey denied Allergan's motion to dismiss the second amended
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).

In the putative class action under Sections 10(b), 20(a), and 14(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Plaintiff investors allege
that the pharmaceutical company Allergan, six of its top executives
-- Paul Bisaro, Brenton L. Saunders, R. Todd Joyce, Maria T.
Hilado, Sigurdur O. Olafsson, and David A. Buchen, and its Board of
Directors knowingly misled investors about the generic drug market
in violation of federal securities laws.  Specifically, Allergan is
alleged to have participated in a generic drug price-fixing
conspiracy that caused the prices of generic drugs sold by Allergan
and its co-conspirators to skyrocket up to 7,000% during the class
period, defined as October 2013 to November 2016.

The original two-count complaint in the case was filed on Dec. 22,
2016, against Allergan, and alleged violations of Section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 against all the Defendants, and
violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act against the
Individual Defendants.  It was first amended on May 1, 2017 to
include two additional counts for violations of Section 14(a) of
the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9 against Allergan's 2014 and 2015
Boards of Directors.  The amended complaint also added Individual
Defendants Olafsson and Buchen.

On July 17, 2017, Allergan moved to dismiss all claims in the
amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.  In response, plaintiffs filed a motion to
supplement and amend.  The Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion,
and Allergan filed the motion to dismiss the second amended
complaint.  The Court heard oral argument on April 11, 2019.

Allergan's motion to dismiss the second amended complaint under
Rule 12(b)(6) argues primarily that the complaint is not pleaded
with the requisite particularity under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), and Rule 9(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Judge Hayden finds that the second amended complaint adequately
pleads that Allergan's statements about its participation in the
generic drug market and Saunders' statements in response to the DOJ
investigation announcement were false or misleading, satisfying the
material misrepresentation element.  Allergan's statements
regarding the sources of its revenue were misleading because they
failed to disclose facts about its anticompetitive conduct -- facts
that are material, as they would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of
information made available.

Additionally, the complaint affirmatively alleges that "there was
no reasonable explanation for the price hikes" -- no supply
shortages were reported, nor were there significant increases in
demand for the drugs.  Yet Allergan's officers repeatedly
represented that the price increases were attributable to benign
market explanations, such as supply and demand issues.

Loss causation has also been adequately pleaded for purposes of
withstanding Allergan's motion to dismiss.  Contrary to Allergan's
argument, the sale of Actavis to Teva does not immunize Allergan
shareholders from the losses suffered by the disclosure of the DOJ
investigation any more than the sale releases Allergan from the
investigation.  The Judge agrees that at this stage of litigation,
factual issues such as the market's rate of recovery are
inappropriate for consideration.

Finally, Allergan further seeks to dismiss Counts 3 and 4 of the
second amended complaint, which assert violations of Section 14(a)
of the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder against
the 2014 and 2015 Boards of Directors respectively, on the grounds
that they are time-barred.  Allergan also argues that the
Plaintiffs fail to allege a material misstatement or omission in
the proxy statements, to plead fraud with the required
particularity, and to adequately allege loss causation.  The latter
three arguments are meritless for the same reasons in connection
with the Plaintiffs' Section 10(b) claim.  And as discussed, the
Judge holds that the claims will not be dismissed on timeliness
grounds.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Hayden denied Allergan's motion to
dismiss.  An appropriate order will follow.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 6, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/kwcW3x from Leagle.com.

Miami Firefighters Relief & Pension Fund, Movant, represented by
ERIC TODD KANEFSKY -- eric@ck-litigation.com -- CALCAGNI & KANEFSKY
LLP.

Edward Santangelo, Movant, represented by BRUCE DANIEL GREENBERG --
bgreenberg@litedepalma.com -- LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG, LLC.

Amalgamated Bank, as Trustee for the LongView Collective Investment
Fund, Movant, represented by SUNG-MIN LEE -- slee@lowey.com --
LOWEY DANNENBERG, PC.

Michael Wilson, Movant, represented by PETER GEORGE SAFIRSTEIN,
Safirstein Metcalf LLP.

UTAH RETIREMENT SYSTEMS & FRESNO COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT
ASSOCIATION, Movants, represented by LISA J. RODRIGUEZ --
ljrodriguez@schnader.com -- Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP.

SJUNDE AP-FONDEN & Union Asset Management Holding AG, Lead
Plaintiffs, represented by DARREN J. CHECK -- dcheck@ktmc.com --
KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP, JAMES E. CECCHI --
JCecchi@carellabyrne.com -- CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY &
AGNELLO, P.C. & MARGARET ELIN MAZZEO -- mmazzeo@ktmc.com -- KESSLER
TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK LLP.

TIMOTHY M. FORDEN, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Simarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by JAMES E. CECCHI, CARELLA BYRNE
CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C.

LINA ARSLANIAN, Plaintiff Consolidated, represented by LAURENCE M.
ROSEN, THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, PA.

DAVID ROSENBERG, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff Consolidated, represented by GARY S. GRAIFMAN,
KANTROWITZ, GOLDHAMER & GRAIFMAN, ESQS.

ALLERGAN PLC, BRENTON L. SAUNDERS, PAUL M. BISARO, MARIA TERESA
HILADO, R. TODD JOYCE, Sigurdur O. Olafsson, DAVID A. BUCHEN, JAMES
H. BLOEM, CHRISTOPHER W. BODINE, TAMAR D. HOWSON, JOHN A. KING,
CATHERINE M. KLEMA, JIRI MICHAL, JACK MICHELSON, PATRICK J.
O'SULLIVAN, RONALD R. TAYLOR, ANDREW L. TURNER, FRED G. WEISS,
NESLI BASGOZ & CHRISTOPHER J. COUGHLIN, Defendants, represented by
JULIA ALEJANDRA LOPEZ -- jalopez@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP &
SHANNON ELISE MCCLURE -- smcclure@reedsmith.com -- REED SMITH LLP.


ALLIANT CREDIT: Page, et al. Sue over Overdraft & NSF Fees
----------------------------------------------------------
ALICIA M. PAGE, CARMEL COOPER, and CINDY MUNIZ, individually, and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs.
ALLIANT CREDIT UNION, and DOES 1-100, the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-05965 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 5, 2019), contends that ACU
wrongfully charged Plaintiffs and the Class members overdraft fees
and non-sufficient funds (NSF) fees.

The action seeks monetary damages, restitution, and injunctive
relief due to ACU's policy and practice of assessing overdraft or
NSF fees on transactions when there was enough money in the
checking account to cover (pay for) the transactions presented for
payment and for charging repeat NSF fees on the same electronic
item.

The charging for such overdraft and NSF fees breaches ACU's
contracts with its customers, who include Plaintiffs and the
members of the Class. The charging for such overdraft fees also
violates federal law.

ACU failed to describe its actual overdraft service in its Opt-In
Contract because, inter alia, the language in its Opt-In Contract
fails to describe the actual method by which ACU calculates its
overdraft fees, instead describing a method under which overdrafts
only result when there is not enough money in the account to pay
for a transaction, the lawsuit says.

Alternatively, ACU did not obtain appropriate opt-ins from its
customers whatsoever or otherwise violated the requirements for
being allowed to lawfully charge overdraft fees since August 15,
2010.

ACU is and has been an Illinois state-chartered credit union with
branch offices located throughout the country, including in
Illinois.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs and Putative Classes are:

          Emily J. Kirk, Esq.
          Richard D. McCune, Esq.
          David C. Wright, Esq.
          MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO, LLP
          101 West Vandalia Street, Suite 200
          Edwardsville, IL 62025
          Telephone: (909) 557-1275
          Facsimile: (909) 557-1275
          E-mail: ejk@mccunewright.com
                  rdm@mccunewright.com
                  dcw@mccunewright.com

               - and -

          Taras Kick, Esq.
          Roy K. Suh, Esq.
          THE KICK LAW FIRM, APC
          815 Moraga Drive
          Los Angeles, CA 90049
          Telephone: (310) 395-2988
          Facsimile: (310) 395-2088
          E-mail: Taras@kicklawfirm.com
                  Roy@kicklawfirm.com

AMTRUST FINANCIAL: Rosen Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announces the
filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the six
series of preferred stock of AmTrust Financial Services, Inc. (OTC:
AFSIA, AFSIB, AFSIC, AFSIM, AFSIN, AFSIP) from January 22, 2018
through January 18, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The
lawsuit seeks to recover damages for AmTrust investors under the
federal securities laws.

To join the AmTrust class action, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1665.html or call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that unlike AmTrust's common shares, which would be purchased by
AmTrust's controlling shareholder and delisted as part of a merger,
the six series of publicly traded AmTrust preferred stock would
continue to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange and would
remain listed and outstanding.  On January 18, 2019, shortly after
the close of the merger, AmTrust announced the delisting of all six
series of its preferred stock. When the true details entered the
market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than October
29, 2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If you
wish to join the litigation, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1665.html or to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013.   Rosen Law Firm has secured hundreds
of millions of dollars for investors.  

Contact:

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
         New York, NY 10016
         Tel: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Website: www.rosenlegal.com
         E-mail: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                 pkim@rosenlegal.com
                 cases@rosenlegal.com [GN]


ARCHER DANIELS: Korein Tillery Files Class Action Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------------
Korein Tillery attorneys filed a class action lawsuit against
Archer Daniels Midland Company ("ADM") in the United States
District Court for the Central District of Illinois, alleging that
ADM has manipulated a key benchmark for the settlement and pricing
of ethanol futures and options contracts dating back to as early as
November 2017, in violation of the Commodity Exchange Act.

The pricing, settlement, and value of various ethanol futures and
options contracts are tied directly to the so-called Chicago
Ethanol (Terminal) price. This Chicago Ethanol (Terminal) price is
determined daily by S&P Global Platts during a 30-minute trading
period for ethanol at the Kinder-Morgan fuel terminal in Argo,
Illinois.

The complaint filed on behalf of Korein Tillery client AOT Holding
AG, alleges that ADM took outsized short positions in ethanol
derivatives, betting that the price of ethanol would decrease. ADM
then aggressively sold ethanol during the 30-minute window at the
Argo Terminal at prices that were below what ADM could have
received elsewhere and even below ADM's own variable cost of
production in order to manipulate the Chicago Ethanol (Terminal)
price downward. ADM's downward manipulation of the Chicago Ethanol
(Terminal) price in turn artificially increased the value of ADM's
massive short positions in ethanol derivatives, thus allowing ADM
to reap outsized profits despite low or negative margins on
physical ethanol sales.

AOT Holding AG, on behalf of itself and a class consisting of all
persons who traded in or settled positions in these ethanol futures
and options contracts, alleges that ADM's manipulation of the
Chicago Ethanol (Terminal) price at the Argo Terminal violated the
Commodity Exchange Act and caused hundreds of millions of dollars
in damages to entities that traded in ethanol futures and options
contracts tied to the Chicago Ethanol (Terminal) price. AOT Holding
AG seeks actual damages, as well as punitive or exemplary damages,
on behalf of itself and the proposed class. Korein Tillery's
investigation of this matter is ongoing.

Individuals or companies who traded in: (1) Chicago Ethanol
(Platts) Futures (CME symbol: CU); (2) Chicago Ethanol (Platts)
Average Price Option (CME symbol: CVR); and/or (3) the Ethanol
Futures Contract (CME symbol: EH) from November 1, 2017 to the
present and who are interested in discussing the lawsuit or any
damages they incurred in the ethanol markets during this timeframe
are encouraged to contact George Zelcs (312-641-9750;
gzelcs@koreintillery.com).

The case is AOT Holding AG v. Archer Daniels Midland Company, No.
19-cv-02240 (C.D. Ill.) (Bruce, J.) [GN]


AUTISM SPECTRUM: Durham Seeks Unpaid Wages, Penalties
-----------------------------------------------------
GREGORY DURHAM, an individual, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AUTISM SPECTRUM THERAPIES, LLC;
and DOES I to 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 19STCV25183 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., Sept. 5, 2019) is an action pursuant
to Labor Code and California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Section
11040, seeking unpaid wages and/or overtime, meal break premiums,
rest break premiums, penalties for accurate itemized wage
statements, reimbursement of expenses, wages upon termination or
resignation, other penalties, injunctive and other equitable
relief, and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.

On a regular and consistent basis, Plaintiff and the Proposed Class
were not paid at the proper rate of compensation, asserts the
complaint. The Defendant had a policy of requiring Plaintiff and
the Proposed Class to remain on-call and respond on-call without
properly compensating them for all the time worked, which resulted
in the underpayment of wages and/or overtime. The Defendant also
willfully failed to pay wages and compensation, when Plaintiff and
all Proposed Class Members quit or were discharged, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff has been classified as employees by Defendant.

Defendant Provides services to help children with autism reach
their full potential.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Eric B. Kingsley, Esq.
     Kelsey M. Szamet, Esq.
     Kingsley & Kingsley, APC
     16133 Ventura Blvd., Suite 1200
     Encino, CA 91436
     Phone: (818) 990-8300
     Fax: (818) 990-2903
     Email: eric@kingsleykingsley.com
            kelsey@kingsleykingsley.com

BACARDI USA: New FDUTPA Class Action Over Bombay Sapphire Gin
-------------------------------------------------------------
Shalia Sakona and Melissa C. Pallett-Vasquez, writing for The
National Law Review, reports that eighty-six years after the repeal
of Prohibition, Bacardi USA and Wynn Dixie are facing a putative
class action predicated on Florida Statute Section 572.455, a 150
year-old remnant of the temperance movement.  In Uri Marrache v.
Bacardi USA, Inc., et al., Case No. 2019-023668-CA-01 (Miami-Dade
Cir. Ct. Aug. 9, 2019), Plaintiff alleges that Bombay Sapphire gin,
a Bacardi product sold at Winn Dixie, is "adulterated" with grains
of paradise in violation of Section 572.455 and Florida's Deceptive
and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA").

Grains of paradise are the seeds of an African plant in the ginger
family, known as Aframomum melegueta. They are ground and used as a
spice akin to cardamom, with a citrusy black pepper taste.  Florida
Statute Section 562.455 states that, "[w]hoever adulterates for the
purpose of sale, any liquor, used or intended for drink with . . .
grains of paradise. . . or any other substance which is poisonous
or injurious to health, and whoever knowingly sells any liquor so
adulterated shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree[.]"

Bombay Sapphire boasts that "every drop" of its gin "contains ten
hand-selected botanicals from exotic locations around the world."
These botanicals, which apparently include grains of paradise, are,
however, vapor infused into the gin during the distillation
process; they never come into physical contact with the liquid
spirit.  This raises the question of what constitutes
"adulteration" for purposes of Section 572.455.

According to Merriam Webster, to adulterate means "to corrupt,
debase, or make impure by the addition of a foreign or inferior
substance or element."

The case law provides little guidance. The only two recorded
opinions citing to Section 562.455 as a basis for liability are
from 1939 and 1940 and involve a single incident of premeditated
murder through the intentional poisoning of liquor with cyanide—a
far cry from the conduct Plaintiff alleges against Bacardi and Winn
Dixie. See Coston v. State, 139 Fla. 250 (Fla. 1939); Coston v.
State, 144 Fla. 676 (Fla. 1940).

Plaintiff, on behalf of "all persons in the State of Florida who
have purchased Bombay Sapphire Gin," alleges that Bacardi's
"adulteration" of Bombay Sapphire with grains of paradise  and
Bacardi and Winn Dixie's sale of the "adulterated" gin is
"unconscionable," and therefore constitutes a per se violation of
FDUTPA.  Complaint at Par. 35. But Plaintiff pleads no facts
supporting its claims of "unconscionability."

The complaint, which contains allegations that seem to harken back
to thelaments of the temperance movement, alleges that  grains of
paradise is known for its "warming and digestive characteristics,"
and in some parts of the world, is used medicinally to treat
impotence and terminate unwanted pregnancies. Id. Par. 35-36.
Indeed, raw grains of paradise are widely available for purchase
and use in everyday cooking and home use.  This alone seems to
contradict the suggestion that the mere infusion of alcohol with
grains of paradise is harmful, let alone "unconscionable."  While
we will have to see what the Court ultimately does with this
alleged "adulteration" case, Plaintiff will likely face substantial
hurdles in attempting to prove the so-called "unconscionability"[8]
of Bombay Sapphire's infusion with grains of paradise, much less
any damages flowing therefrom. [GN]


BIG LOTS: Settlement Reached in Wage and Hour Class Suits in Cal.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Big Lots, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 11, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended August 3, 2019, that a settlement has been
reached in four purported wage and hour class actions in
California.

The company is currently defending four purported wage and hour
class actions and several individual representative actions in
California, the vast majority of which have been brought since
January 2018.

The cases were brought by various current and/or former California
associates alleging various violations of California wage and hour
laws.

Upon further consideration of these matters, including outcomes of
cases against other retailers, during the first quarter of 2019,
the company determined a loss from these matters was probable and
the company increased its accrual for litigation by recording a
$7.3 million charge as its best estimate for these matters in
aggregate.

Big Lots said, "Since the end of the first quarter of 2019, we
reached tentative settlements in each of the class actions, subject
to final documentation and court approval. We intend to defend
ourselves vigorously against the allegations levied in the
remaining lawsuits. We believe the existing accrual for litigation
remains appropriate."

Big Lots, Inc., through its subsidiaries, operates as a community
retailer in the United States. Big Lots, Inc. was founded in 1967
and is headquartered in Columbus, Ohio.


BIRDSONG CORPORATION: Peanut Farmers File Antitrust Suit in Va.
---------------------------------------------------------------
D&M FARMS, MARK HASTY, and DUSTIN LAND, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BIRDSONG
CORPORATION, a Virginia corporation; and GOLDEN PEANUT COMPANY,
LLC, a Georgia limited liability company, Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-00463-HCM-LRL (E.D. Va., Sept. 5, 2019) is an action for
treble damages under the antitrust laws of the United States
against Defendants.

The complaint alleges that since January 2014, the prices paid by
shellers to Peanut farmers for Runners--which is a type peanut
grown in the US--have remained remarkably flat and unchanged,
despite significant supply disruptions such as Hurricane Michael, a
Category 5 hurricane that hit a significant amount of Peanut crops
in the Florida panhandle/southern Georgia and Alabama area in 2018.
From 2011 to 2013, the Peanut industry experienced drastic
weather-related price changes that made it difficult for Defendants
to manage risk and plan for production. The Defendants thereafter
conspired and colluded with one another to stabilize and depress
Runner prices. Among other things, during the relevant time period,
Defendants over-reported Peanut and Runner inventory numbers to the
USDA to create the false impression of an oversupplied market.
Defendants capitalized on the perceived oversupply to offer
artificially low Runner prices to farmers. The Defendants also
under- reported Peanut and Runner prices to the USDA to further
suppress prices and keep them low and less volatile, notes the
complaint.

The complaint further notes that Defendants' shelling facilities
and the buying points they control through various contractual
arrangements are scattered throughout key United States Peanut
production regions and located in close proximity to one another,
providing prime opportunities for collusion. Defendants are heavily
involved in the industry's top trade associations through which
they discuss and share exclusive market information. The
Defendants' wrongful and anticompetitive actions had the intended
purpose and effect of artificially fixing, depressing, maintaining,
and stabilizing the price of Runners to Plaintiffs and Class
members in the United States.

As a result of Defendants' unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and the
other members of the Class were artificially underpaid for Runners
during the Class Period. Such prices were below the amount
Plaintiffs and the Class would have been paid if the price for
Runners had been determined by a competitive market. Thus,
Plaintiffs and Class members were directly injured by Defendants'
conduct, says the complaint.

Plaintiff D&M Farms is a Florida partnership that sold Runners to
Defendants.

Defendants are the largest players in the shelling industry and
together hold 80-90% of the total Peanut shelling market
share.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Wyatt B. Durrette, Jr., Esq.
     Kevin J. Funk, Esq.
     DURRETTE, ARKEMA, GERSON & GILL PC
     1111 East Main Street, 16th Floor
     Richmond, VA 23219
     Phone: (804) 775-6900
     Fax: (804) 775-6911
     Email: wdurrette@dagglaw.com
            kfunk@dagglaw.com

          - and -

     W. Joseph Bruckner, Esq.
     Brian D. Clark, Esq.
     Stephanie A. Chen, Esq.
     LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL NAUEN PLLP
     100 Washington Avenue S., Suite 2200
     Minneapolis, MN 55401
     Phone: (612) 339-6900
     Fax: (612) 339-0981
     Email: wjbruckner@locklaw.com
            bdclark@locklaw.com
            sachen@locklaw.com

          - and -

     Kimberly A. Justice, Esq.
     Jonathan M. Jagher, Esq.
     Freed Kanner London & Millen LLC
     923 Fayette Street
     Conshohocken, PA 19428
     Phone: (610) 234-6487
     Fax: (224) 632-4521
     Email: kjustice@fklmlaw.com
            jjagher@fklmlaw.com

          - and -

     Douglas A. Millen, Esq.
     Michael E. Moskovitz, Esq.
     Robert J. Wozniak, Esq.
     Brian M. Hogan, Esq.
     Freed Kanner London & Millen LLC
     2201 Waukegan Road, Suite 130
     Bannockburn, IL 60015
     Phone: (224) 632-4500
     Fax: (224) 632-4521
     Email: dmillen@fklmlaw.com
            mmoskovitz@fklmlaw.com
            rwozniak@fklmlaw.com
            bhogan@fklmlaw.com


CANADA GOOSE: Rosen Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announces the
filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Canada Goose Holdings, Inc. (NYSE: GOOS) from March
16, 2017 through August 1, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period").
The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Canada Goose investors
under the federal securities laws.

To join the Canada Goose class action, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1646.html or call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Canada Goose sourced the down and fur used in its
clothing products in a way that treated animals in an unethical and
inhumane manner; (2) Canada Goose was thus non-compliant with
relevant Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") regulations pertaining to
false advertising with respect to its sourcing practices; (3)
accordingly, Canada Goose was the subject of an ongoing FTC
investigation regarding false advertising; and (4) as a result,
Canada Goose's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times. When the true details entered the
market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than November
4, 2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If you
wish to join the litigation, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1646.html or to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013. Rosen Law Firm has secured hundreds of
millions of dollars for investors.

Contact Information:

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
         New York, NY 10016
         Tel: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com
                cases@rosenlegal.com
         Website: www.rosenlegal.com [GN]


CARRIZO OIL & GAS: Fernandes Files Suit Over Sale to Callon
-----------------------------------------------------------
MANOJ FERNANDES, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. CARRIZO OIL & GAS, INC., S.P. JOHNSON IV,
THOMAS L. CARTER, JR., ROBERT F. FULTON, F. GARDNER PARKER, ROGER
A. RAMSEY, FRANCES ALDRICH SEVILLA- SACASA, STEVEN A. WEBSTER,
FRANK A. WOJTEK, and CALLON PETROLEUM COMPANY, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-01658-UNA (D. Del., Sept. 5, 2019) is a class action on
behalf of the public stockholders of Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc.
against the members of Carrizo's Board of Directors for their
violations of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, arising out of the Board's attempt to sell the Company
to Callon Petroleum Company.

The complaint alleges that Defendants have violated the Exchange
Act by causing a materially incomplete and misleading registration
statement (S-4) to be filed with the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission on August 20, 2019. The S-4 recommends that
Carrizo shareholders vote in favor of a proposed transaction
whereby Carrizo is acquired by Callon. The Proposed Transaction was
first disclosed on July 15, 2019, when Carrizo and Callon announced
that they had entered into a definitive merger agreement pursuant
to which Carrizo stockholders will receive 2.05 shares of Callon
for each share of Carrizo that they hold. The deal is valued at
approximately $3.2 billion and is expected to close in the fourth
quarter of 2019.

The complaint asserts that the Proposed Transaction significantly
undervalues Carrizo, with an implied per share value of $13.12
compared to the analyses of the Company's own financial advisors
that implied per share equity values for Carrizo as high as $29.05
and $28.52. Furthermore, the S-4 is materially incomplete and
contains misleading representations and information in violation of
Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act. Specifically, the S-4
contains materially incomplete and misleading information
concerning the sales process, financial projections prepared by
Carrizo management, and the financial analyses conducted by RBC
Capital Markets, LLC and Lazard Freres & Co., Carrizo's financial
advisors.

For these reasons, Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Defendants from taking
any steps to consummate the Proposed Transaction, including filing
an amendment to the S-4 with the SEC or otherwise causing an
amendment to the S-4 to be disseminated to Carrizo's shareholders,
unless and until the material information is included in any such
amendment or otherwise disseminated to Carrizo's shareholders. In
the event the Proposed Transaction is consummated without the
material omissions being remedied, Plaintiff seeks to recover
damages resulting from the Defendants' violations.

Plaintiff is the owner of shares of common stock of Carrizo.

Carrizo is an oil & gas company based in Houston, Texas. The
Company produces crude oil and natural gas from resources in the
Eagle Ford Shale in South Texas and the Permian Basin in West
Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Brian D. Long, Esq.
     Gina M. Serra, Esq.
     RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
     300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
     Wilmington, DE 19801
     Phone: (302) 295-5310
     Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
     Email: bdl@rl-legal.com
            gms@rl-legal.com

          - and -

     Shane T. Rowley, Esq.
     Danielle Rowland Lindahl, Esq.
     ROWLEY LAW PLLC
     50 Main Street, Suite 1000
     White Plains, NY 10606
     Phone: (914) 400-1920
     Facsimile: (914) 301-3514



CHRISTOPHER & BANKS: Stockholder Sues over Failed Takeover Bid
--------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher & Banks Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on September 11, 2019,
for the quarterly period ended August 3, 2019, that on August 14,
2019, Mark Gottlieb, a Company stockholder, filed a purported class
action lawsuit against Jonathan Duskin; Seth Johnson; Keri Jones;
Kent Kleeberger; William Sharpe, III; Joel Waller and Laura Weil
(the "Named Directors"), B. Riley FBR, Inc. and B. Riley Financial
Inc., in the Court of Chancery in the State of Delaware, on behalf
of himself and all stockholders who held shares as of December 20,
2018.

The lawsuit alleges that the Named Directors breached their duty of
loyalty in connection with the Company's rejection in December of
2018, of an unsolicited bid to acquire the Company. The lawsuit
further alleges that the B. Riley firms aided and abetted the
asserted breach of the duty of loyalty by the Named Directors.

The Company believes the Complaint is without merit. The Named
Directors, and the Company on their behalf, together with the B.
Riley firms, intend to defend the lawsuit vigorously.

Christopher & Banks Corporation, through its subsidiaries, operates
as a specialty retailer of private-brand women's apparel and
accessories in the United States.  It was formerly known as Braun's
Fashions Corporation and changed its name to Christopher & Banks
Corporation in July 2000.  The Company was founded in 1956 and is
headquartered in Plymouth, Minnesota.


CIENA CORP: Beaver County Employees Suit Dismissed
--------------------------------------------------
Ciena Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 11, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended July 31, 2019, that the court in the class
action suit entitled, Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund, et
al. v. Cyan, Inc. et al., Case No. CGC-14-538355, has approved the
settlement of the lawsuits, which includes a release and dismissal
of all claims against all defendants without any liability or
wrongdoing attributed to them,

As a result of the acquisition of Cyan in August 2015, Ciena became
a defendant in a securities class action lawsuit.

On April 1, 2014, the first of two purported stockholder class
action lawsuits was filed in the Superior Court of California,
County of San Francisco, against Cyan, the members of Cyan's board
of directors, Cyan's former Chief Financial Officer, and the
underwriters of Cyan's initial public offering.

The cases were consolidated as Beaver County Employees Retirement
Fund, et al. v. Cyan, Inc. et al., Case No. CGC-14-538355. The
consolidated complaint alleged violations of federal securities
laws on behalf of a purported class consisting of purchasers of
Cyan's common stock pursuant or traceable to the registration
statement and prospectus for Cyan’s initial public offering in
April 2013, and sought unspecified compensatory damages and other
relief.

On May 19, 2015, the proposed class was certified. During the
fourth quarter of fiscal 2018, the parties agreed to the terms of a
settlement of the action, which settlement was subject to notice to
class members and approval by the court.

On August 8, 2019, the court approved the settlement and entered
judgment in the case. The terms of the settlement, which include a
release and dismissal of all claims against all defendants without
any liability or wrongdoing attributed to them, are not material to
Ciena’s financial results.

Ciena Corporation provides network hardware, software, and services
that support the transport, switching, aggregation, service
delivery, and management of video, data, and voice traffic on
communications networks worldwide. Ciena Corporation was founded in
1992 and is headquartered in Hanover, Maryland.


COX COMMUNICATIONS: Taylor Wage & Hour Suit Dismissal Affirmed
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, issued a
Memorandum affirming the District Court's Judgment granting
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned BILL
TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COX COMMUNICATIONS CALIFORNIA, LLC,
Erroneously Sued As: CoxCom, Inc., and CoxCom, LLC; COX
COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; DOES, 1 through 50 inclusive,
Defendants-Appellees. No. 18-55053. (9th Cir.).

Plaintiff-appellant, Bill Taylor (Taylor), represents a certified
class of field technicians employed by defendant-appellee, Cox
Communications California, LLC (Cox), in this diversity
wage-and-hour class action. Cox field technicians travel in company
vehicles to customer residences to install and repair Cox's
television and internet services. Some Cox field technicians
participate in an employee program known as Home Start, which
permits them to keep their company vehicles at home during
non-working hours and commute directly to their field assignments
from home, rather than from the company depot. According to Taylor,
Cox violated California law by not compensating its Home Start
field technicians for their time spent commuting home from their
last field assignments in company vehicles.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Cox, which
Taylor now appeals.

To prevail on this claim, Taylor must demonstrate either that,
during this commute time, (1) the field technicians were subject to
the control of Cox, or (2) they were suffered or permitted to work.
The district court found that Taylor was unable to present a
genuine issue of material fact as to either claim.

The Court agrees.

First, Taylor fails to present a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether Cox's Home Start field technicians were subject to the
control of Cox during their commutes home. To satisfy this element,
Taylor must show that Cox exercised a sufficient level of control
over its field technicians during their commute, and that Cox also
required its field technicians to drive to and from home in their
company vehicles.  

Here, the record shows no genuine dispute that Cox did not require
its field technicians to commute home in company vehicles because
Home Start is a voluntary program. As an alternative to Home Start,
Cox's field technicians have the option to participate in Office
Start, which allows them to commute between home and the company
depot in their personal vehicles time which is not compensated, and
drive their company vehicles from the depot to their work
assignments for the day. Because Taylor failed to present any
genuine dispute as to this fact, the district court did not err in
granting summary judgment on the subject to the control element of
his claim.

Second, Taylor also has not shown that the district court erred in
concluding that, because Home Start participants do not engage in
any additional work-related tasks and the transportation of tools
and equipment does not add any time to their commutes, no
reasonable juror could find that the class members here were
suffered or permitted to work during their commutes home.

The district court's grant of summary judgment is affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's September 5, 2019
Memorandum is available https://tinyurl.com/y64arzjh from
Leagle.com.


CSL PLASMA: Marsh Sues over Use of Biometric Data
-------------------------------------------------
JADA MARSH, and CHARLES HILSON and INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF
ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, the Plaintiffs, vs. CSL PLASMA INC.,
the Defendant, Case No. 2019CH10279 (Ill. Cir.., Sept. 5, 2019),
seeks to stop Defendant's unlawful collection, use, and storage of
Plaintiffs' and the proposed Class's sensitive, private, and
personal biometric data. The Plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive
relief for Defendant's violations of the Biometric Information
Privacy Act, for themselves and all those similarly situated.

Jada Marsh and Charles Hilson each donated plasma through one of
the Defendant's Illinois-based plasma donation centers within the
past year in Hazel Crest, Cook County, lllinois.

The Defendant mandated and required that plasma donors use
biometric data when they provided plasma to the Defendant.

Unlike ID badges or time cards -- which can be changed or replaced
if stolen or compromised -- biometrics are unique, permanent
identifiers associated with each donor. This exposes Defendant's
donors, including Plaintiffs, to serious and irreversible privacy
risks.  For example, if a biometric database is hacked, breached,
or otherwise exposed - such as in the recent Equifax data breach --
donors have no means by which to prevent identity theft,
unauthorized tracking, and other improper or unlawful use of this
information.

The Defendant captured, collected, received through trade, and/ or
otherwise obtained and biometric identifiers or biometric
information of their Illinois donors, like Plaintiffs, without
properly obtaining written executed release, and without making the
required disclosures concerning the collection, storage, use, or
destruction of biometric identifiers or information.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Putative class are:

          Brandon M. Wise, Esq.
          Paul A. Lesko, Esq.
          PEIFFER WOLF CARR & KANE, APLC
          818 Lafayette Ave., Floor 2
          St. Louis, MO 63104
          Telephone: 314-833-4825
          E-mail: bwise@pwcklegal.com
                  plesko@pwcklegal.com

               - and -

          David Fish, Esq.
          THE FISH LAW FIRM, P.C.
          200 East Fifth A venue, Suite 123
          Naperville, IL 60563
          Telephone: 630.355.7590
          E-mail: dfish@fishlawfinn.com

CSX INTERMODAL: Court Narrows Claims in Rogers BIPA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting in part and denying in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
in the case captioned RICHARD ROGERS, individually and on behalf of
similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. CSX INTERMODAL
TERMINALS, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant. No. 1:19 C
2937. (N.D. Ill.).

Plaintiff Richard Rogers, individually and on behalf of a proposed
class, alleges that Defendant CSX Intermodal Terminals, Inc. (CSX)
violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), by
collecting his biometric information without obtaining a written
release or providing him written disclosure of the purpose and
duration for which his information was collected.

ROGERS' BIPA CLAIM

CSX argues that BIPA was enacted to protect individuals' control
over their biometric information and identifiers by allowing them
to withhold consent before collection, and this right was not
violated because Rogers voluntarily provided his fingerprints to
CSX.  

CSX's argument attacks Rogers' status as an aggrieved person under
the act and stems from the Illinois Supreme Court's recent decision
in Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm't Corp., 2019 IL 123186 (Ill. 2019),
which addressed this very question. The Illinois Supreme Court
concluded that to qualify as an aggrieved' person an individual
need not allege some actual injury or adverse effect, beyond
violation of his or her rights under BIPA.

Individuals' rights under BIPA include the collection, retention,
disclosure, and destruction requirements of Section 15, which the
court saw as a codification of individuals' right to privacy in and
control over their biometric identifiers and information. The
Illinois Supreme Court also rejected the idea that a violation of
the rights codified by BIPA is a mere technicality and found that
when a private entity fails to adhere to the statutory procedures
the right of the individual to maintain his or her biometric
privacy vanishes into thin air.

CSX's argument fails to appreciate the Illinois Supreme Court's
holding. CSX argues that Rogers' did not suffer any injury because
he knew his fingerprints were being collected and could have
withheld consent if he wanted. However, Rogers' right to privacy in
his biometric data includes the right to give up his biometric
identifiers or information only after receiving written notice of
the purpose and duration of collection and providing informed
written consent. Rogers alleges precisely these violations of his
rights, infringements that the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted
as real harms, not mere technicalities. The Illinois Supreme Court
recognized that, according to the General Assembly, biometrics are
unlike other unique identifiers because they are biologically
unique to the individual and once compromised, the individual has
no recourse.

The court reasoned that the strategy adopted by the General
Assembly was to head off problems before they occur by imposing
safeguards to insure that individuals' and customers' privacy
rights in their biometric identifiers and biometric information are
properly honored and protected to begin with and by implementing an
enforcement mechanism that subjects private entitles to substantial
potential liability when they fail to follow the statute's
requirements.

Because Rogers' alleges his BIPA rights were violated, his ability
to maintain a claim is wholly consistent with holding and reasoning
of Rosenbach.  

CSX's argument also ignores Rogers' allegation that CSX did not
receive his consent prior to collecting and/or disseminating his
biometric information to any of its technology vendors. Even before
the Illinois Supreme Court decided Rosenbach, dissemination of
biometric information without consent qualified as an injury that
allowed plaintiffs to bring a BIPA action.Thus, even if Rogers'
other allegations were insufficient, his allegation that his
information was disseminated without consent is.

CSX argues that Rosenbach is distinguishable because the plaintiff
was 14 years old and his mother did not know her son's information
was being collected. While the age of the plaintiff in Rosenbach
and Rogers are different, the plaintiff's age in Rosenbach did not
play a role in the Illinois Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, the
certified question was:

whether an individual is an aggrieved person under [BIPA], and may
seek statutory liquidated damages. when the only injury he alleges
is a violation of  Section 15(b) of the Act by a private entity who
collected his biometric identifiers and/or biometric information
without providing him the required disclosures and obtaining his
written consent as required.

The court answered this question in the affirmative, and did not
make any mention of the plaintiff's age or status as a minor except
when outlining the background of the case.  
In sum, Rogers qualifies as an aggrieved person under BIPA because
his BIPA rights were violated. Accordingly, CSX's motion to dismiss
Rogers' BIPA claim is denied.

FAILURE TO MAINTAIN A PUBLICLY AVAILABLE RETENTION POLICY

Section 15(a) requires private entities in possession of biometric
identifiers or biometric information to develop a publicly
available policy regarding the retention and destruction of
biometric identifiers and information.

CSX argues that Rogers' claim fails because he only alleges that
CSX did not create a publicly available policy before collection of
his information, which is not required. CSX argues that it is only
required to develop a policy after collection.

We reject CSX's argument. While Rogers alleges that CSX failed to
develop a policy before collecting his fingerprints he also alleges
that despite collection, it failed to make publicly available any
retention or destruction policies. This allegation is not
temporally restricted and is sufficient to maintain a claim that
CSX did not comply with Section 15(a) after his fingerprints were
collected. Rogers' claim is also consistent with Rosenbach, wherein
the Illinois Supreme Court explained the importance of BIPA's
private enforcement mechanism to make sure private entities comply
with BIPA. Because Rogers qualifies as an aggrieved person by the
allegations of his complaint and alleges that CSX failed to comply
with Section 15(a) of the act, his claim may proceed.  

INTENTIONAL AND RECKLESS VIOLATION

In addition to asserting a claim for violation of BIPA, Rogers
asserts that CSX's violations were knowing and willful. BIPA allows
plaintiffs to recover heightened damages from private entities that
violate the act intentionally or recklessly. CSX argues that Rogers
has failed to adequately allege that CSX's BIPA violations were
anything more than negligent. Rogers counters that CSX's actions
were willful and wanton because CSX has taken no steps towards any
compliance.

BIPA does not define intentionally or recklessly. Intentional
conduct is conduct performed with a desire to cause consequences or
at least a substantially certain belief that the consequences will
result.

Here Rogers only alleges that CSX's violations of BIPA were knowing
and willful. The only other substantive allegations are that CSX
violated BIPA. Rogers' conclusory statement of CSX's intent is
insufficient to allow us to infer that CSX acted intentionally or
recklessly and does nothing to distinguish this case from every
possible BIPA case where the defendant is alleged to have failed to
meet the strictures of Section 15. Thus, Rogers' claim of
intentional and reckless conduct is dismissed. However, Rogers may
amend his complaint regarding CSX's claimed intentional and
reckless conduct within 30 days if he so chooses.   

Accordingly, Defendant's motion is granted in part with respect to
Rogers' allegations that CSX's actions were intentional and
reckless but denied in all other respects.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 5, 2019
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available
https://tinyurl.com/y2ss88o3 Leagle.com.

Richard Rogers, individually and on behalf of similarly situated
individuals, Plaintiff, represented by David Louis Gerbie, Mcguire
Law, P.C. & Jad Sheikali, McGuire Law, P.C. 55 W. Wacker Drive, 9th
Fl., Chicago, IL 60601

CSX Intermodal Terminals, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant,
represented by Bonnie Keane DelGobbo -- bdelgobbo@bakerlaw.com --
Baker & Hostetler LLP, Joel Griswold -- jcgriswold@bakerlaw.com --
Baker & Hostetler, LLP, Joyce E. Ackerbaum Cox --
jacox@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler LLP, pro hac vice & Melissa
M. Hewitt -- mhewitt@bakerlaw.com -- Baker Hostetler.


CURTIS PROTECTIVE: Renia et al. Allege Time Shaving
---------------------------------------------------
FRANCOIS RENIA and ETHAN MERBAUM, individually and on behalf of
other similarly situated person, the Plaintiff, vs. CURTIS
PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC., Case No. 6:19-cv-01724 (M.D. Fla., Sept.
5, 2019), alleges that Defendants violated the Fair Labot Standards
Act by shaving work time of security guards.

According to the complaint, CPSI requires that its security guards
report to its facilities at the beginning of shifts. There, CSPI
requires the security guards to perform detailed inspection of
CSPI's mobile patrol vehicles, inspect various items of equipment
and supplies located on, or within, the patrol vehicles, complete
an inspection form, and address any deficiencies noted in the
inspection.

CSPI does not pay its security guards for the time they spend
inspecting CPSI's patrol vehicles.

CSPI also systemmatically deducts pay for the first 30 minutes
required to drive CSPI's patrol vehicles from CSPI's facilities to
Posts and up to another 30 minutes required to drive CSPI's patrol
vehicle back from Posts to CSPI's facilities at the end of each
shift. Thus CSPI shaves up to one hour worth of work time from
each security guards's pay per shift, the lawsuit says.

CPSI operates a security guard and mobile patrol business in
Florida and Georgia.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Mark A. Potashnick, Esq.
          WEINHAUS & POTASHNICK
          11500 Olive Blvd., Suite 133
          St. Louis, MO 63141
          Telephone: (314) 997 9150
          Facsimile: (314) 997 9170
          E-mail: mark@wp-attorneys.com

               - and -

          Joseph C. Wood, Esq.
          ARCADIER, BIGGIE & WOOD, PLLC
          2815 W. New Haven, Suite 303 & 10620
          Melbourne, FL 32904
          Telephone: (321) 953 5998
          E-mail: wood@melbournelegalteam.com

DELEON LATIN: Perez Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
HECTOR ANTONIO CACERES PEREZ, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. DELEON LATIN CUISINE, CORP. d/b/a MI
CASA RESTAURANT & LOUNGE and RICARDO MELENDEZ and JOHANNA MELENDEZ,
as individuals, Case No. 1:19-cv-05007-ARR-RLM (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 3,
2019), seeks to recover unpaid wages, liquidated damages and
reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Deleon Latin Cuisine, Corp., doing business as Mi Casa Restaurant &
Lounge, is a corporation organized under the laws of New York with
a principal executive office located in Richmond Hill, New York.
The Individual Defendants are owners, operators or officers of the
Company.

The Defendants operate a restaurant known as Mi Casa Restaurant &
Lounge, located at 116-20 Jamaica Ave., in Richmond Hill, New York,
where the Plaintiff worked.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
          HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          80-02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
          Kew Gardens, NY 11415
          Telephone: (718) 263-9591
          Facsimile: (718) 263-9598
          E-mail: avshalumovr@yahoo.com


DELL TECH: Bid to Dismiss Class V Consolidated Suit Due Sept. 30
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dell Technologies Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 10, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended August 2, 2019, that the defendants in the
case, In Re Dell Class V Litigation (Consol. C.A. No.
2018-0816-JTL), intend to file a motion to dismiss the action,
which will be due on September 30, 2019.

Four purported stockholders brought putative class action
complaints arising out of the Class V transaction.

The actions were captioned Hallandale Beach Police and Fire
Retirement Plan v. Michael Dell et al. (Civil Action No.
2018-0816-JTL), Howard Karp v. Michael Dell et al. (Civil Action
No. 2019-0032-JTL), Miramar Police Officers’ Retirement Plan v.
Michael Dell et al. (Civil Action No. 2019-0049-JTL), and
Steamfitters Local 449 Pension Plan v. Michael Dell et al. (Civil
Action No. 2019-0115-JTL).  

The four actions were consolidated into In Re Dell Class V
Litigation (Consol. C.A. No. 2018-0816-JTL), which names as
defendants the Company's board of directors and certain
stockholders of the Company, including Michael S. Dell.  

The plaintiffs generally allege that the defendants breached their
fiduciary duties to the former holders of Class V Common Stock in
connection with the Class V transaction by allegedly causing the
Company to enter into a transaction that favored the interests of
the controlling stockholders at the expense of such former
stockholders.  

The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on August 9, 2019 making
substantially similar allegations as described above. The
defendants intend to file a motion to dismiss the action, which
will be due on September 30, 2019.

Dell Technologies Inc. provides computer products. The Company
offers laptops, desktops, tablets, workstations, servers, monitors,
printers, gateways, software, storage, and net working products.
Dell Technologies serves customers worldwide. Dell Technologies
Inc. was founded in 1984 and is headquartered in Round Rock,
Texas.


DELL TECH: Settlement Reached in City of Pontiac Fund Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Dell Technologies Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 10, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended August 2, 2019, that a settlement has been
reached in the case, City of Pontiac General Employees' Retirement
System v. Dell Inc., et al. (Case No. 1:14-cv-03644).

On May 21, 2014, a securities class action seeking compensatory
damages was filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, captioned City of Pontiac General
Employees' Retirement System v. Dell Inc., et al. (Case No.
1:14-cv-03644).  

The action names as defendants Dell Inc. ("Dell") and certain
current and former executive officers, and alleges that Dell made
false and misleading statements about Dell's financial results and
future prospects between February 21, 2012 and May 22, 2012, which
resulted in artificially inflated stock prices.

The case was transferred to the United States District Court for
the Western District of Texas under the same caption (Case No.
1:15-cv-00374), where the defendants filed a motion to dismiss.

On September 16, 2016, the Court denied the motion to dismiss. On
March 29, 2018, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for class
certification, and certified a class consisting of all purchasers
of Dell common stock between February 22, 2012 and May 22, 2012.
Fact and expert discovery is now closed. Dell filed a motion for
summary judgment on February 18, 2019, which is pending before the
Court.

The parties have been engaged in settlement discussions and have
agreed to an immaterial settlement amount pending the Court's
preliminary approval in the next few months.

Dell Technologies Inc. provides computer products. The Company
offers laptops, desktops, tablets, workstations, servers, monitors,
printers, gateways, software, storage, and net working products.
Dell Technologies serves customers worldwide. Dell Technologies
Inc. was founded in 1984 and is headquartered in Round Rock,
Texas.


DOMETIC CORP: Varner Appeals S.D. Fla. Decision to 11th Circuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Brandy Varner, et al., filed an appeal from a Court
ruling in their lawsuit titled Brandy Varner, et al. v. Dometic
Corporation, Case No. 1:16-cv-22482-RNS, in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Florida.

The Appellants are Michael Acosta, Ernie Arnold, Michael Banning,
Timothy Cherry, Robert Corwin, James Crandall, Bonita Dunlap, Ann
Field, Margot Foster, Jill Garrett, Sid Garrett, Marjorie Goehle,
Nelson Goehle, John Grande, Gary Graus, Sandra Greene, Richard
Haisch, Steven Horner, Sr., James Jackson, Christopher Johnston,
Gwendolyn King, Louis King, Timothy Klenk, David Klinck, Richard
Landsheft, Michael Link, Paula Meurer, James Mitchell, Donald
Munsey, Randall Ortego, Melvin Rich, Debra Sadler, Bobbi Shepherd,
Donald Shepherd, Kurt Shoemaker, Sr., Brandy Varner, Leah Vollberg,
Richard Vollberg, Andrew Young, James Zimmer and George A.
Zucconi.

The appellate case is captioned as Brandy Varner, et al. v. Dometic
Corporation, Case No. 19-13242, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

The nature of suit is stated as other fraud.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that the
Appellee's Certificate of Interested Persons is due on or before
September 26, 2019, as to Appellee Dometic Corporation.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants BRANDY VARNER, et al., are represented by:

          Howard M. Bushman, Esq.
          Adam Moskowitz, Esq.
          THE MOSKOWITZ LAW FIRM
          2 Alhambra Plaza, Suite 601
          Coral Gables, FL 33134
          Telephone: (305) 536-8220
          E-mail: howard@moskowitz-law.com
                  adam@moskowitz-law.com

               - and -

          Sarah Clasby Engel, Esq.
          Lance Harke, Esq.
          HARKE LAW, LLP
          9969 NE 2nd Ave.
          Miami, FL 33138
          Telephone: (305) 536-8220
          E-mail: sarah@engel-firm.com
                  lharke@harkelaw.com

               - and -

          Caleb Marker, Esq.
          ZIMMERMAN REED, LLP
          555 E Ocean Blvd., Suite 500
          Long Beach, CA 90802
          Telephone: (877) 500-8780
          E-mail: caleb.marker@zimmreed.com

               - and -

          John Scarola, Esq.
          SEARCY DENNEY SCAROLA BARNHART & SHIPLEY
          2139 Palm Beach Lakes Blvd.
          West Palm Beach, FL 33409
          Telephone: (561) 686-6300
          E-mail: mep@searcylaw.com

Defendant-Appellee DOMETIC CORPORATION is represented by:

          Lara Bueso Bach, Esq.
          Edward Soto, Esq.
          WEIL GOTSHAL & MANGES, LLP
          1395 Brickell Ave., Suite 1200
          Miami, FL 33131-3311
          Telephone: (305) 577-3100
          E-mail: lara.bach@weil.com
                  edward.soto@weil.com

               - and -

          Martin Barry Goldberg, Esq.
          Nicholas Andrew Ortiz, Esq.
          Erica Rutner, Esq.
          Greg Jason Weintraub, Esq.
          LASH & GOLDBERG, LLP
          100 SE 2nd St., Suite 1200
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 347-4040
          E-mail: mgoldberg@lashgoldberg.com
                  nortiz@lashgoldberg.com
                  erutner@lashgoldberg.com
                  gweintraub@lashgoldberg.com

               - and -

          Peter A. Wald, Esq.
          LATHAM & WATKINS, LLP
          505 Montgomery St., Suite 2000
          San Francisco, CA 94111-6538
          Telephone: (415) 391-0600
          E-mail: peter.wald@lw.com


DONDA ENTERPRISES: Fails to Pay Minimum & OT Wages, Carswell Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
KIMILLIA CARSWELL, ANTHONY DELUCA, and JENNIFER DILLON, Each
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v.
DONDA ENTERPRISES, LLC, and ANSUYA PATEL, Case No. 4:19-cv-00612-JM
(E.D. Ark., Sept. 3, 2019), is brought under the Fair Labor
Standards Act for declaratory judgment and damages as a result of
the Defendants' failure to pay the Plaintiffs and others proper
minimum wage and overtime compensation for all hours that they
worked.

Donda Enterprises, LLC, is a domestic limited liability company.
Ansuya Patel is the incorporator and organizer of Donda.

The Defendants conduct business within the State of Arkansas,
operating and managing a motel in Hazen.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          One Financial Center
          650 South Shackleford Road, Suite 411
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


DRINK DAILY: Court Denies Rule 11 Sanction Bid in Campbell
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York issued a Memorandum and Order denying Defendant's renewed Rule
11 motion in the case captioned GERARD CAMPBELL, Plaintiff, v.
DRINK DAILY GREENS, LLC, Defendant. No. 16-CV-7176. (E.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiff Gerard Campbell brought a putative consumer class action
against Defendant Drink Daily Greens, LLC alleging (1) deceptive
business practices under New York General Business Law (GBL)
Section 349, (2) false advertising under GBL Section 350, and (3)
common-law fraud, on the basis that Defendant sold juice products
with misleading labels.

A pleading violates Rule 11 where it is patently clear that a claim
has absolutely no chance of success under the existing precedents.
A court may impose sanctions for violations of Rule 11, either on
motion or sua sponte after issuing an order to show cause.  

A motion for sanctions must be made separately from any other
motion and it must not be filed or be presented to the court if the
challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial is
withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 days after service
or within another time the court sets.

Campbell argues that the Court should deny Drink Daily Greens'
motion for sanctions because it failed to comply with the 21-day
Safe Harbor requirement when it attached its Rule 11 motion as an
exhibit to its 12(b)(6) motion in March 2017.

The Court agrees.

Drink Daily Greens claims that when it attached its motion for
sanctions as an exhibit to its motion to dismiss, it also served
Campbell with that motion, which triggered the 21-day Safe Harbor
requirement. As support for this argument, it cites to the Court's
order on March 24, 2017, which noted concurrent with filing its
12(b)(6) motion in March, Defendant served Plaintiff's counsel with
a Rule 11 motion for sanctions. While the Court still finds that
Drink Daily Greens served its Rule 11 motion upon Campbell at that
time, Rule 11 provides that the motion must not be filed or be
presented to the court if it is withdrawn or corrected within 21
days after service.

Because Drink Daily Greens presented its Rule 11 motion to the
Court without serving the motion upon Campbell at least 21 days
beforehand, it violated Rule 11's Safe Harbor requirement.

Accordingly, its motion for sanctions is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 5, 2019 Order is
available https://tinyurl.com/yy46qzsz from Leagle.com.

Gerard Campbell, individually on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joshua Levin-Epstein,
Levin-Epstein & Associates, 1 Penn Plaza, Suite 2527, NewYork, NY
10019

Drink Daily Greens LLC, Defendant, represented by Jonas Noah Hagey
-- hagey@braunhagey.com -- BraunHagey & Borden LLP, Matthew B.
Borden -- borden@braunhagey.com -- BraunHagey & Borden LLP, pro hac
vice & Amit Rana, BraunHagey & Borden LLP, pro hac vice.


DRIVELINE RETAIL: Court Allows Class Representative Substitution
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
Illinois, Springfield Division, issued an Opinion granting
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Substitute Class Representative and
for Leave to File an Amended Class Action Complaint in Accordance
with the Substitution (d/e 34) in the case captioned SHIRLEY
LAVENDER, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. DRIVELINE RETAIL MERCHANDISING, INC., Defendant. No.
3:18-CV-2097. (C.D. Ill.).

Plaintiff Shirley Lavender filed a Class Action Complaint (d/1) on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated against
Defendant Driveline Retail Merchandising, Inc. Plaintiff alleges
that her name, address, zip code, date of birth, wage and
withholding information, and Social Security number, along with
that of over 15,800 other employees of Defendant, were released by
Defendant to an unknown third party. Plaintiff brings claims for
negligence; invasion of privacy; breach of implied contract; breach
of fiduciary duty; violations of the Illinois Personal Information
Protection Actand violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act.

The Defendant objects to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave, asserting
that Defendant will be unfairly prejudiced and the Motion was filed
with undue delay.

Alternatively, Defendant argues that, if the Motion is granted, the
Court should (1) enter a new scheduling order (2) deny the new
plaintiff the opportunity to identify and/or produce expert reports
on class certification and the merits (3) grant Defendant 60 days
from the date of the new scheduling order to identify and produce
expert reports on class certification (4) grant Defendant 120 days
from the date of the new scheduling order to identify and produce
expert reports on the merits, and (5) grant Defendant 25 additional
interrogatories.

With regard to the alleged undue delay, Defendant argues that
Plaintiff filed the Motion for Leave over a month past her deadline
to produce expert reports and within a month of the discovery
cutoff. According to Defendant, Plaintiff filed the Motion as a
last-ditch effort to save this case after Defendant identified
issues that establish that Plaintiff was not an adequate class
representative. Defendant asserts that none of the matters
Defendant raised were unknown to Plaintiff and should not have been
a surprise to counsel.

Plaintiff asserts that her Motion for Leave was not filed with
undue delay. Plaintiff asserts that the Motion was filed after
Defendant challenged Plaintiff's credibility. Plaintiff's counsel
needed time to review the allegations, discuss the issue with
Plaintiff, identify potential substitute class representatives, and
prepare the motion.

Plaintiff stresses that the Motion for Leave was filed now out of
an abundance of caution to act in the best interests of the class.
Plaintiff asserts there was no basis to seek substitution after the
deposition because the deposition evidenced that Plaintiff had a
satisfactory knowledge of the claims. The issues raised by
Defendant now have nothing to do with the factual substance of the
case. Plaintiff also denies that she lied about her criminal
history and asserts that she answered the questions asked during
the deposition. Plaintiff also disputes that she is not an adequate
representative.

In general, motions for leave to amend are denied when they are
filed well into the litigation and after extensive litigation.   

Here, although the case was filed in April 2018 and significant
discovery has been conducted, the case is still in the early
stages, as the Court has not yet ruled on class certification or
any dispositive motions. In addition, Plaintiff filed the motion
for leave to amend a little over a month after learning that
Defendant was going to challenge Plaintiff's credibility. Under the
particular facts of this case, the Court finds no undue delay.

Defendant also argues that allowing Plaintiff to substitute the
class representative and amend the complaint would cause Defendant
to be unduly prejudiced. Defendant asserts that the parties have
engaged in litigation for nearly 15 months, Defendant has engaged
in substantial discovery efforts on Plaintiff's claims, and
Defendant has developed its litigation strategy based on
Plaintiff's position as class representative and the specific facts
pertaining to Plaintiff.  

Plaintiff responds that the prejudice Defendant claims does not
exist. The only issue here is the adequacy of a single class
representative versus another. Plaintiff contends that there is no
new need for an identity theft expert. Defendant's own Data Breach
Notice focused on the potential consequences of data breach and
identified identity theft as a likely consequence. Plaintiff
asserts that she seeks to substitute a class representative to
address the alleged credibility issues, not change litigation
strategy.

The Court finds Defendant would not be unduly prejudiced by the
amendment. Therefore, the majority of the discovery that has
occurred to date will still be relevant to the amended complaint.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Substitute Class
Representative and for Leave to File an Amended Class Action
Complaint in Accordance with the Substitution (d/e 34) is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 5, 2019 Order is
available https://tinyurl.com/y2f7yqms from Leagle.com.

Shirley Lavender, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Shannon McNulty, CLIFFORD LAW
OFFICES PC, 120 North LaSalle Street 31st Floor, Chicago, IL 60602,
Jean S. Martin, LAW OFFICE OF JEAN SUTTON MARTIN PLLC, 2018
Eastwood Rd, Suite 225, Wilmington, NC, 28403, John Allen Yanchunis
-- jyanchunis@ForThePeople.com -- MORGAN & MORGAN COMPLEX
LITIGATION GROUP, Kevin Scott Hannon, THE HANNON LAW FIRM LLC, 1641
Downing St., Denver, Colorado 80218 & Marisa Kendra Glassman,
MORGAN & MORGAN COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP, 20 North Orange Ave,
Suite 1600, Orlando, FL 32801

Driveline Retail Merchandising Inc, Defendant, represented by
Denise Baker-Seal, BROWN & JAMES PC, 525 West Main Street,
Belleville, IL, 62220-1547, Fred Albert Leibrock --
faleibrock@phillipsmurrah.com -- PHILLIPS MURRAH P.C. & Kathryn D.
Terry -- kdterry@phillipsmurrah.com -- PHILLIPS MURRAH P.C.


EWING TOWNSHIP: Violates Conscientious Employee Protection Act
--------------------------------------------------------------
LALENA LAMSON, the Plaintiff, vs. EWING TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT
and JOHN DOES 1-5 AND 6-10, the Defendants, Case No.
MER-L-001731-19 (N.J. Sup., Sept. 5, 2019), alleges that Defendant
violated the Conscientious Employee Protection Act.

The Plaintiff began working for the Ewing Township Police
Department on or around October 6, 2003. In or around the third
week of October 2018, the plaintiff's coworker, Diane Brady, told
plaintiff of a criminal incident that occurred regarding
plaintiff's coworkers.

Brady is the secretary of the Police Chief, John Stemler. Brady
told plaintiff that there was an incident in which Detective Julia
Caldwell, who was an employee of defendants, took every clothing
item of her husband's into the rear of their yard and burned his
clothing.

Brady told plaintiff that there was a meeting the following day
regarding this incident.

The Plaintiff was disturbed by this report, because Detective Julia
Caldwell admitted to engaging in criminal activity, and she was not
subject to any punishment by the Defendants.

On or around January 18, 2019, plaintiff spoke to Chief Stemler
about the incident where Detective Caldwell burned her husband's
clothing. In particular, the Plaintiff told Chief Stemler that the
department had lost faith in Internal Affairs because defendants
allowed this illegal conduct to occur.

Plaintiff stated to Stemler that she intended on sending a letter
to the Attorney General's Office to complain about this incident
and other inappropriate incidents that were occurring at the
department. On or around January 19, 2019, plaintiff sent an email
correspondence to Chief Stemler, per his request, outlining her
concerns.

Another concern plaintiff indicated in the email was that Detective
Julia Caldwell was revealing information about confidential
Internal Affairs investigations. The Plaintiff also complained to
Chief Stemler that Caldwell was making inappropriate and
discriminatory comments about her female coworkers.

In particular, Detective Julia Caldwell would frequently make
comments about how her female coworkers dressed, and would accuse
them of trying to have sex with her husband. On or around January
25, 2019, the plaintiff mailed a letter to the Internal Affairs
Unit of the Office of the Attorney General. In that letter,
plaintiff complained about Defendant's illegal conduct.

The Plaintiff also stated in the letter that she was "terrified" of
retaliation and losing the trust of her coworkers by making these
complaints. The Plaintiff stated that in the past if officers came
forward to question unlawful conduct in the Department, those
officers were punished by being skipped for promotions or having
training withheld and being labeled a problematic employee.

On or around February 13, 2019, Chief Stemler wrote a letter to
Daniel McGuire, copying plaintiff and other individuals, regarding
plaintiff's complaint to the Attorney General's Office.

Chief Stemler stated that he had been in contact with an attorney
from an outside agency investigating these complaints and we
discussed about PO Lamson's duties and assignments within the
department.

The following day on February 14, 2019, Lieutenant Jeffrey Jacobs
called plaintiff's home, and her husband answered the phone.
Lieutenant Jacobs asked plaintiff's husband if plaintiff was
suicidal, and plaintiff's husband told him that she was not. That
day, plaintiff was placed on administrative leave, and her badge
and her gun were removed from her possession.

To date, no one has explained to plaintiff why was she was placed
on administrative leave. While on administrative leave, plaintiff
was required to take a fitness for duty exam in order to return to
work.

The Plaintiff took the fitness for duty exam and passed, because
plaintiff is fit for duty. The Plaintiff was returned to work on or
around July 19, 2019. At the time plaintiff was forced to take
administrative leave, the plaintiff was capable of performing all
of the essential functions of her job, and was fit for duty.

The Plaintiff engaged in protected activity pursuant to CEPA when
she objected to activities, polices, and practices she reasonably
believed were in violation of a law, rule or regulation promulgated
pursuant to law or in violation of a mandate of public policy.

In particular, plaintiff engaged in protected conducted when she
complained about the fact that one officer, Detective Julia
Caldwell, engaged in criminal behavior by burning her husband's
clothing in the back yard of her home.

The Plaintiff asks that the Court order the Defendants to cease and
desist all conduct inconsistent with the claims made and going
forward, both as to the specific plaintiff and as to all other
individuals similarly situated.

Ewing Township Police Department is, a municipality located in the
State of New Jersey with its principle address at 2 Jake Garzio
Drive, Ewing, New Jersey 08628.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Drake P. Bearden, Jr., Esq.
          COSTELLO & MAINS, LLC
          18000 Horizon Way, Suite 800
          Mount Laurel, NJ 08054
          Telephone: (856) 727-9700

FEDEX GROUND: Summary Judgment Bid in Armijo Labor Suit Granted
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAIME LOREE ARMIJO, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE
SYSTEM, INC., a foreign company, Defendant, Case No.
1:17-cv-00440-RB-KK (D. N.M.), Judge Robert C. Brack of the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Mexico (i) granted FedEx's
Motion for Summary Judgment, and (ii) denied as moot Armijo's
Opposed Renewed Motion for Class Certification.

FedEx is a "federally-registered motor carrier that offers the
pickup and delivery of packages to businesses and residences.
Since 2011, FedEx has only contracted in New Mexico with
incorporated businesses, not individual drivers.  FedEx terms such
entities Contracted Service Providers ("CSPs"), and CSPs enter into
Operating Agreements ("OAs") with FedEx.  Pursuant to the OAs, all
individuals who drive for a CSP are required to be employees of
that CSP.

In July 2013, Ms. Armijo executed a "Pick-Up and Delivery
Contractor Operating Agreement" with FedEx on behalf of the CSP
Jaimes Elegant P&D Corp.  Ms. Armijo was the President and sole
owner of Jaimes Elegant.  The contract provided that Jaimes Elegant
would service a single route, or "Primary Service Area," by picking
up and delivering all packages in the service area each day in
exchange for weekly settlement payments.  The contract period
lasted approximately three years, and during that time Ms. Armijo
hired a total of five other employees, with varying lengths of
employment, to drive the route for Jaimes Elegant.  For about the
first seven months of the contract, Ms. Armijo alone drove and
serviced the route.  For approximately the final year of the
contract, Ms. Armijo delivered packages along the route "at a
reduced level of involvement."

Jaimes Elegant's OA allowed the company full discretion to
compensate its own employees, such as individual drivers, as it saw
fit, including hourly, daily, weekly, or as otherwise permitted by
law.  Addendum 3 to the OA governs the specifics of how FedEx paid
weekly compensation settlements to Jaimes Elegant.

Per the OA, Jaimes Elegant's settlements included payments based
on: the numbers of stops and packages picked up and delivered; the
number of miles driven (if more than 200 in a given day); fuel
settlements based on fuel price changes in the service area; a
weekly "core zone" subsidy providing an additional stipend based on
the number of stops made and the customer density of the route;
mileage and fuel settlements for longer distance "linehaul" work;
and weekly "flex program" payments, which included a base weekly
payment for participation in the program and a per-package payment
for any "flexed" packages that drivers picked up or delivered
outside Jaimes Elegant's service area.

The parties agree that there were four "distinct additional
employment requirements imposed by FedEx" in addition to the
general requirement that Jaimes Elegant complete all the required
package pickups and deliveries each day.  These requirements
included: (i) mandatory quarterly groups meetings with the FedEx
terminal manager and other FedEx personnel to discuss safety and
terminal performance; (ii) mandatory waiting time at the FedEx
terminal prior to departure, during which fully loaded vehicles
were prohibited from departing the terminal until all other
vehicles had been loaded and all packages were accounted for; (iii)
designated windows of time in which certain deliveries or pickups
must be made; and (iv) the completion of various administrative
tasks upon returning to the FedEx terminal at the end of the day.

The parties agree that Ms. Armijo was required to fulfill these
duties even though they were not specifically listed in the OA, but
disagree as to whether the activities were compensated.  Ms. Armijo
filed suit against FedEx on April 11, 2017, asserting that she and
a putative class of similarly situated FedEx drivers had been
misclassified as independent contractors when they were actually
FedEx employees.  She asserted claims for recovery under New
Mexico's unauthorized deduction statute, the New Mexico Minimum
Wage Act ("MWA"), and a theory of unjust enrichment.  On Jan. 3,
2018, the Court dismissed Ms. Armijo's claims for violation of the
unauthorized deduction statute and unjust enrichment, leaving only
her overtime claim under the MWA.

In her Renewed Motion for Class Certification, Ms. Armijo urges the
Court to certify a putative class of individuals who were
signatories for entities that contracted with FedEx, like Jaimes
Elegant, and also drove full time for FedEx.  After she first moved
for class certification in March 2018, the Court denied her motion
on the ground that the putative class was not ascertainable because
Ms. Armijo failed to define what would make a driver "full-time."


On Oct. 19, 2018, Ms. Armijo filed a revised motion to certify her
proposed class, this time defining the putative class as: All
persons who (1) were signatories and authorized officers (2) on
behalf of an entity (3) that contracted with either FedEx Ground
System, Inc., or FedEx Home Delivery, Inc., to provide delivery
services (4) and whose contract (known by the FedEx entities as the
IC contract) classified the contracting entities as independent
contractors (5) and who drove at least 32 hours a week (6) for at
least 20 weeks within a given year [7] from April 11, 2014
forward.

FedEx opposes Ms. Armijo's Renewed Motion for Class Certification,
arguing that whether authorized signatories who were also drivers,
like Ms. Armijo, were employees under New Mexico's "economic
realities test" cannot be determined by common evidence because
"the misclassification inquiry is individualized for each" putative
class member.

With the motion for class certification still pending, on Jan. 21,
2019, FedEx moved for summary judgment on Ms. Armijo's remaining
claim under the MWA.  FedEx argues that even if Ms. Armijo could
prove that she should otherwise be classified as an employee under
the economic realities test, her overtime claim would be precluded
because Ms. Armijo is squarely excluded from the MWA's protections
by an exception for employees who are compensated on a piecework
basis.

Judge Brack first takes up FedEx's motion for summary judgment to
determine if any issues remain for trial that would necessitate
ruling on Ms. Armijo's motion for class certification.  There are
two dispositive legal questions before the Court: (1) whether FedEx
paid Jaimes Elegant on a "piecework" basis, thus bringing Jaimes
Elegant and Ms. Armijo6 under the piecework exception to the MWA;
and, if so, (2) whether the unproductive waiting time and other
affirmative duties FedEx required of Ms. Armijo sufficiently alter
the piecework structure such that the exception no longer applies.


Having considered the parties' motions, the record, and relevant
law, the Judge answers the first question in the affirmative and
the second in the negative and will grant FedEx's motion for
summary judgment.  

The Judge finds that certain provisions in the OA indeed prescribe
higher rates of payment for special types of deliveries like flexed
packages, and additional payments for high density routes and
fluctuating fuel costs.  Yet these various addenda to the OA all
seem to affect not the method of compensation, but the rate of
compensation for each completed unit.  Tthough the OA's various
provisions caused the calculated rate of compensation per unit to
potentially fluctuate from week to week or from package to package,
those payments were still made on a piecework basis because they
were tethered to the completion of a discrete task, not the number
of hours each week Ms. Armijo spent working.  It is clear to the
Court that Ms. Armijo's work was done or paid for by the piece or
job.

Further, unlike in the FLSA context where commission pay is exempt
from overtime protections while piecework pay is not making
meticulous distinctions between the terms "piecework," "flat rate,"
and "commission" is largely unnecessary to determine whether the
MWA exception applies.  A finding that Ms. Armijo was not
compensated on a piecework basis would leave open the possibility
that she was compensated on a commission or flat rate basis and
thus still exempt from the MWA.  The Judge will not muddy its
holding by undertaking a full analysis of the terms "flat rate" and
"commission," but simply points out the obvious -- the weekly
payments FedEx made to Jaimes Elegant were not based on hours
worked.  And Ms. Armijo has presented no argument as to how they
should be classified beyond her broad assertion that the piecework
exemption does not apply and drivers were paid on a mixed-status
basis.  That customers at the front end of the process first paid
FedEx to pick up and deliver their packages does not, in the
Judge's view, remove this compensation scheme from the definition
of piecework.

And while MWA exemptions must be "strictly and narrowly construed
against employers, the New Mexico Legislature clearly intended to
exempt piecework employees from its protections, and the Judge
finds that FedEx has met its burden to show that Ms. Armijo is
"unmistakably" such an employee.  The specific facts Ms. Armijo has
designated to rebut the motion for summary judgment fail to show
that there is a "genuine issue for trial" regarding her pay status.
Ms. Armijo received her compensation from FedEx in the form of
piecework payments, despite the de minimis time she spent each week
completing non-piecework tasks.  Individuals compensated upon a
piecework basis are not considered "employees" under the MWA.
Thus, Ms. Armijo's remaining claim fails as a matter of law.

As for the Motion to Certify Class, the Judge finds that the
inquiry into whether the requirements FedEx imposed on drivers
removed Ms. Armijo from the piecework exemption involved the
analysis of various facts specific to her experience.  To the
extent that members of the putative class allege that similar facts
would remove them from the exemption (i.e., mandatory quarterly
meetings, unproductive waiting time before work, post-delivery
activities, and set delivery windows), then the Court's conclusion
that Ms. Armijo is not an employee as a matter of law would likely
apply to all members of the proposed class.  On the other hand,
should other members of Ms. Armijo's proposed class argue that
different facts remove them from the exemption, such an analysis of
each class member's employment status would require individualized
inquiries not suitable for class certification.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Brack granted FedEx's Motion for
Summary Judgment.  He denied as moot Armijo's Opposed Renewed
Motion for Class Certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 6, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/1QL7CG from Leagle.com.

Jaime Loree Armijo, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher P. Bauman --
cpb@bdsfirm.com -- Bauman & Dow PC, Cynthia L. Weisman --
cw@bdsfirm.com -- Bauman, Dow & Stambaugh, P.C., Harold L. Lichten
-- hlichten@llrlaw.com -- Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C., pro hac
vice, Jordan Lewis -- Jordan@jml-lawfirm.com -- Jordan Lewis, P.A.,
pro hac vice, Matthew Thomson -- mthomson@llrlaw.com -- Lichten &
Liss-Riordan, P.C., pro hac vice, Sarah R. Schalman-Bergen --
Sschalman-bergen@bm.net -- Berger & Montague, P.C., pro hac vice &
Shanon J. Carson -- scarson@bm.net -- Berger & Montague, P.C., pro
hac vice.

FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., a foreign company, Defendant,
represented by Rebecca Kenny -- rsk@madisonlaw.com -- MADISON,
MROZ, STEINMAN & DEKLEVA, P.A., Steven Kelso -- kelsos@gtlaw.com --
Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Jason W. Norris, FedEx Ground Package
System, Inc. & Jessica Goneau Scott -- scott@wtotrial.com --
Wheeler Trigg O'Donnell, LLP.


FINE HOME: Joint Bid for FLSA Class Cert.  Filed in Wallace Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The parties in the lawsuit styled RICK WALLACE, on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated v. FINE HOME FURNISHINGS LLC,
et al., Case No. 2:19-cv-02973-EAS-EPD (S.D. Ohio), filed with the
Court their joint stipulation to pre-discovery conditional class
certification and court-supervised notice to potential opt-in
plaintiffs pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Parties will provide notice to the putative class members in
accordance to this schedule:

   1. The Parties jointly submit as Exhibit A the proposed Notice
      and Consent to Join forms ("Notice Packet") to be
      authorized by the Court;

   2. Within 14 days of the Court entering an Order approving the
      Parties Joint Stipulation and Exhibit A, the Defendants
      shall provide to Plaintiff's Counsel a list containing the
      names, last known addresses (including zip code), phone
      numbers, and email addresses of the following employees:

      All current and former inside salespersons or sales
      consultants of Defendants who were paid a salary during any
      workweek that they worked over 40 hours beginning July 10,
      2016 until the final disposition of this case;

   3. The Plaintiff's counsel shall mail Exhibit A to the
      Putative Collective Class Members via First Class U.S. Mail
      within 7 days of receiving the list.  The Putative
      Collective Class Members shall have 90 days from the date
      the Notice Packet is mailed to return their Consent to Join
      form and opt-in to this case;

   4. Plaintiff's counsel will mail or email a reminder to the
      Putative Collective Class Members via First Class U.S. Mail
      45 days after the initial mailing of the Notice Packet;

   5. The Plaintiff's counsel may email the Notice Packet to all
      Putative Collective Class Members whose Notice Packets are
      returned as "undeliverable" by the United States Post
      Office.  If there is no email address for the Putative
      Collective Class Member, then Plaintiff's counsel may call
      or email the Putative Collective Class Member only to
      obtain the current mailing address to re-mail the Notice
      Packet;

   6. Neither party shall contact any of the Putative Collective
      Class Members for the purpose of discussing the subject
      matter of or their participation in this lawsuit through
      the end of the opt-in period, except that either counsel
      may respond to inquiries from the Putative Collective Class
      Members during this time; and

   7. The Plaintiff's Counsel may contact the Putative Collective
      Class Members after they have opted in.  Nothing in the
      Joint Motion shall be construed as a prohibition on
      Defendants' interactions with any of the potential opt-in
      plaintiffs in the normal course of their business.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew J.P. Coffman, Esq.
          COFFMAN LEGAL, LLC
          1550 Old Henderson Rd., Suite 126
          Columbus, OH 43220
          Telephone: (614) 949-1181
          Facsimile: (614) 386-9964
          E-mail: mcoffman@mcoffmanlegal.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Deborah L. McNinch, Esq.
          JOSEPH & JOSEPH CO., LPA
          155 W. Main Street, Suite 200
          Columbus, OH 43215
          Telephone: (614) 449-8282
          Facsimile: (614) 449-8289
          E-mail: deborahmcninch@josephandjoseph.com


GANNETT CO: Brasher Moves to Certify Call-Center Employees Class
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled DARREN BRASHER, et al. Individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. GANNETT CO. INC.,
GANNETT SATELLITE INFORMATION NETWORK, LLC, and GCOE, LLC, Case No.
3:19-cv-00296-JHM-RSE (W.D. Ky.), the Plaintiffs move, pursuant to
Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, for entry of an
order:

   (1) conditionally certifying a proposed collective FLSA class
       defined as:

       All hourly call-center employees who have been employed by
       Gannett Co. Inc., Gannett Satellite Information Network,
       LLC, GCOE, LLC, and/or any other subsidiary of Gannett
       Co., Inc. anywhere in the United States, at any time from
       September 3, 2016 through the final disposition of this
       matter. ("Putative Class Members");

   (2) implementing a procedure whereby Court-approved Notice of
       Plaintiffs' FLSA claims is sent (via U.S. Mail, e-mail,
       and text-message) to the class;

   (3) approving a Reminder Email to be sent to Putative Class
       Members halfway through the 60-day notice period; and

   (4) requiring the Defendants to, within fourteen (14) days of
       this Court's order, identify all Putative Class Members by
       providing a list in electronic and importable format, of
       the names, addresses, and e-mail addresses of all Putative
       Class Members who worked for Defendants at any time from
       beginning three years immediately preceding the filing of
       the Original Complaint through the present.

The lawsuit is a nationwide collective and class action lawsuit for
unpaid overtime wages brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act
and state wage law.  The Plaintiffs challenge Gannett's unlawful
company-wide policy that forces its hourly Call-Center
Employees--Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members--to perform
unpaid "off-the-clock" work.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Clif Alexander, Esq.
          Austin W. Anderson, Esq.
          ANDERSON ALEXANDER, PLLC
          819 N. Upper Broadway
          Corpus Christi, TX 78401
          Telephone: (361) 452-1279
          Facsimile: (361) 452-1284
          E-mail: clif@a2xlaw.com
                  austin@a2xlaw.com

               - and -

          Robert E. DeRose, Esq.
          Jessica R. Doogan, Esq.
          BARKAN MEIZLISH HANDELMAN GOODIN DEROSE WENTZ, LLP
          250 E. Broad St., 10th Floor
          Columbus, OH 43215
          Telephone: (614) 221-4221
          Facsimile: (614) 744-2300
          E-mail: bderose@barkanmeizlish.com
                  jdoogan@barkanmeizlish.com

               - and -

          Anne L. Gilday, Esq.
          THE LAWRENCE FIRM, PSC
          606 Philadelphia Street
          Covington, KY 41011
          Telephone: (859) 578-9130
          Facsimile: (859) 578-1032
          E-mail: Anne.gilday@lawrencefirm.com


GOLDEN PEANUT: Peanut Farmers' Class Suit Allege Price Fixing
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jeremy Wise, writing for Dothan Eagle, reports that two Florida
Panhandle peanut farmers have alleged in a class-action lawsuit
filed Thursday that shelling companies Golden Peanut and Birdsong
Corporation have fixed prices for more than five years.

The lawsuit, filed in federal court in Virginia, notes runner
peanut prices have remained "remarkably" flat since January 2014
despite market conditions that have disrupted supply and demand.
Chief among those events is the landfall of Hurricane Michael in
October 2018, which created $23 million in damage to peanut crops
in Florida, $10 to $20 million in Georgia, and another $11.5
million in Alabama -- the nation's three largest peanut-producing
states.

The lawsuit claims the tariff war with China cannot explain why
peanut prices remained low since 80 percent of peanut exports go to
Canada, Mexico, and Europe.

"Peanut farmers are used to boom and bust years, but what's
happened with peanut prices since 2014 is unprecedented," said
Brian Clark, Esq. -- bdclark@locklaw.com -- a partner with
Lockridge Grindal Nauen. "Prices have bottomed out and stayed low
in a way never seen before. The result is many peanut farmers are
having to draw on the equity in their farms and equipment built
over generations just to survive.

"It's a dire situation brought on by the collusion among peanut
shellers alleged in the complaint."

Clark said his firm specializes in anti-trust lawsuits and is
involved in three other major class-action agriculture lawsuits
involving the poultry, pork, and beef processing industries.

Clark encourages peanut farmers who believe they have suffered
damage due to price-fixing to call his office at 612-339-6900.

Golden Peanut operates several plants, including one in Headland,
and numerous buying points throughout the Southeast. Birdsong also
operates several plants in the Southeast and Mid-Atlantic states,
including plants in Blakely, Georgia, and Arlington, Georgia. [GN]


GOOGLE INC: 3d Cir. Vacates Settlement in Consumer Privacy Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: GOOGLE INC. COOKIE PLACEMENT CONSUMER PRIVACY
LITIGATION. Theodore H. Frank, Appellant, Case No. 17-1480 (3d
Cir.), Judge Thomas L. Ambro of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit vacated the order approving the settlement of the
class action certified under Rule 23(b)(2).

News broke in early 2012 that a Stanford graduate student had
discovered Google's Doubleclick.net cookies were bypassing Safari
and Internet Explorer privacy settings and tracking internet-user
information.  Google settled the resulting Federal Trade Commission
and state attorneys general lawsuits, agreeing to cease the
practice and to pay a combined $39.5 million in fines, though
admitting no past acts or wrongdoing.  The Plaintiff internet users
also filed claims against Google that were later consolidated into
a putative class action.

The class complaint alleged violations of federal privacy and fraud
statutes, California unfair competition and privacy statutes, the
California constitution's right to privacy, and that state's
privacy tort law.  It sought injunctive and monetary relief.
Google moved to dismiss, and the District Court granted the motion
in full.  On appeal, the Court affirmed the dismissal of all but
the California constitutional and tort claims.

On remand, the parties began discovery. They then sought to avoid
further litigation and began mediation before a former federal
judge. With the help of the mediator, the parties agreed to a
settlement and simultaneously moved for certification of a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) class and approval of the
settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e).  The
Settlement Agreement also lays out the procedures that apply to any
such settlement, dismissal, or compromise.

The proposed settlement defines the class as all persons in America
who used Safari or Internet Explorer web browsers and who visited a
website from which Doubleclick.net cookies were placed by the means
alleged in the Complaint.  In sweeping language, the settlement
would release all class member claims, including for damages, that
did or could stem from, or relate to, the subject matter of the
litigation

In exchange, Google would be required to assure it had "implemented
systems configured to" abate or delete all third-party Google
cookies that exist in Safari browsers.  And as noted, it would also
pay $5.5 million, to be divided among the settlement administrator,
class counsel, the named class representatives, and cy pres
recipients.

The Settlement Agreement requires both parties to agree to the cy
pres recipients.  The parties ultimately agreed on six recipients:
(1) the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology; (2) the Berkman
Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University; (3) the Center
for Democracy & Technology (Privacy & Data Project); (4) Public
Counsel; (5) the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse; and (6) the Center
for Internet & Society at Stanford University. Neither Frank nor
the District Court were privy to the selection process.

The District Court preliminarily certified the class for settlement
under Rule 23(b)(2) and approved the settlement.  Because the cy
pres money would be used by preeminent institutions for researching
and advocating for online privacy to promote Internet browser
privacy, it held that the cy pres awards bear a direct and
substantial nexus to the interests of absent class members.  In one
sentence, the Court noted Frank's objections to the pre-existing
relationships between Google, the class counsel, and the cy pres
recipients, but held "no conflict of interest" had "undermined the
selected cy pres recipients.

Frank timely appealed.  Frank raises two challenges to the proposed
settlement's fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy under Rule
23(e)(2).  First, he argues the settlement, whose main monetary
component is a cy pres award, provides no marginal benefit to the
class and therefore cannot satisfy that Rule. Indeed, he asserts a
cy pres award is always inappropriate if some individual class
members could be compensated through a claims or lottery process.
Second, Frank challenges the selection of the cy pres recipients
due to their pre-existing associations with either class counsel or
Google.

Judge Ambro disagrees with Frank that cy pres-only settlements are
unfair per se under Rule 23(e)(2).  In some cases a cy pres-only
settlement may be proper.  But the Judge is troubled by the
District Court's cursory certification and fairness analysis in the
case, and two features of the settlement compel him to vacate and
remand.

Contrary to Frank's arguments, then, the Judge sees no reason why a
cy pres-only (b)(2) settlement that satisfies Rule 23's
certification and fairness requirements could not "belong" to the
class as a whole, and not to individual class members as monetary
compensation.  Direct monetary distributions typically would not
accomplish the purpose of a (b)(2) class.  It is not an inherent
abuse of discretion for a district court to allow a cy pres-only
settlement rather than random compensation, and possibly even
overcompensation through a lottery, of some (b)(2) class members to
the exclusion of others.

The Judge is not persuaded the Court sufficiently assessed the
fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement.  In
particular, two features of the settlement present concerns that
were not adequately considered by it: the broad class-wide release
of claims for money damages, and selection of the specific cy pres
recipients.  The District Court's failure to scrutinize the
troubling aspect of the Settlement Agreement prevents him from
reviewing its fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy.  The only
benefit to the class members is a cy pres award, parties may also
want to involve the class members or a neutral participant in the
selection of recipients to ward off any appearance of impropriety.

Finally, Frank's class certification challenge is not really an
alternative ground for reversal.  It is predicated on his challenge
to the settlement.  In light of his decision to remand, the Judge
leaves to the District Court whether to reconsider Frank's
contentions concerning the propriety of class certification in
light of its further consideration and potential factfinding.

Judge Ambro concludes that the vista view of this case is not
pretty.  According to the complaint, an internet behemoth with
unprecedented tools for monitoring private conduct told millions of
Americans it would not track their personal browser history, and
then it did so anyway to profit from the data. Through the proposed
class-action settlement, the purported wrongdoer promises to pay a
couple million dollars to the class counsel and make a cy pres
contribution to organizations it was already donating to otherwise
(at least one of which has an affiliation with class counsel).  By
seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(2), the Defendant and the
class counsel avoid the additional safeguards that apply to Rule
23(b)(3) actions.

One might think this would leave room for class members to pursue
damages individually; yet that relief is foreclosed as well, as the
settlement contains a nationwide release of claims for money
damages that arose or could arise were there unauthorized snooping,
presumably covering tens if not hundreds of millions of Americans.
In this context, the Judge believes the District Court's
factfinding and legal analysis were insufficient for him to review
its order certifying the class and approving the fairness,
reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement.  He thus vacated
and remanded for further proceedings in accord with his Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 6, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/kKOlWu from Leagle.com.

Theodore H. Frank (Argued), Adam E. Schulman, Competitive
Enterprise Institute Center for Class Action Fairness, 1310 L
Street, N.W., 7th Floor, Washington, DC 20005, Counsel for
Appellant.

James P. Frickleton, Bartimus Frickleton Robertson & Gorny, 11150
Overbrook Road, Suite 250, Leawood, KS 66211. Stephen G. Grygiel,
Silverman Thompson Slutkin & White, 201 North Charles Street, Suite
2600, Baltimore, MD 21201.

Brian R. Strange (Argued) -- bstrange@strangeandbutler.com --
Strange & Butler, 12100 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1900, Los
Angeles, CA 90025, Counsel for Appellees.

Jose M. Bermudez; Nicholas Todd Heinrich; Lynne Krause.

Anthony J. Weibell (Argued) -- aweibell@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini
Goodrich & Rosati, 650 Page Mill Road, Palo Alto, CA 94304.

Michael H. Rubin, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, One Market
Street, Spear Tower, Suite 3300, San Francisco, CA 94105, Counsel
for Appellee, Google Inc.,

M. Duncan Grant -- grantm@pepperlaw.com -- Pepper Hamilton, 1313
Market Street, Hercules Plaza, Suite 5100, P.O. Box 1709,
Wilmington, DE 19899.

Joseph A. Sullivan -- sullivanja@pepperlaw.com -- Pepper Hamilton,
3000 Two Logan Square, 18th and Arch Streets, Philadelphia, PA
19103, Counsel for Amicus Curiae, Association of Pro Bono Counsel;
Community Legal Aid Society Inc.; Community Legal Services; Legal
Services of New Jersey; National Legal Aid & Defender Association;
Pennsylvania Legal Aid Network; Philadelphia Bar Foundation.,

Oramel H. Skinner, III (Argued), Office of Attorney General of
Arizona, 1275 West Washington Street, Phoenix, AZ 85007, Counsel
for Amicus Appellant:, Attorneys General for the States of Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Wisconsin.


GOOGLE LLC: Court Allows Deposition on Unredacted Email in Adtrader
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned ADTRADER, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. GOOGLE
LLC, Defendant. Case No. 17-cv-07082-BLF (VKD)(N.D. Cal.),
Defendant Google LLC and plaintiffs dispute whether certain
information Google has redacted from a responsive document
qualifies for protection as a privileged attorney-client
communication and, if so, whether Google has waived that privilege.


The document in question is an email written by Alice Yu, a Google
product manager, which was sent on August 25, 2017 (Yu email) to
several other Google employees. Google produced the Yu email
(labeled GOOG-ADTR-00016152-16156) to AdTrader in December 2018 as
part of a production of almost 10,000 pages of documents. The email
describes Google's efforts to issue credits for previously
uncredited invalid advertising activity and the reasons for those
efforts.
  
AdTrader disagreed.

Because the sole basis for federal jurisdiction in this case is
diversity jurisdiction pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act,
California state law supplies the rule of decision in this action,
and California state law governs application of the attorney-client
privilege.  

In California, the attorney-client privilege is described in the
Evidence Code Section 950 et seq. According to that code, a client
has the privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another
from disclosing, a confidential communication between client and
lawyer. A confidential communication is: information transmitted
between a client and his or her lawyer in the course of that
relationship and in confidence by a means which, so far as the
client is aware, discloses the information to no third persons
other that those who are present to further the interest of the
client in the consultation or those to whom disclosure is
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the
accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer is consulted,
and includes a legal opinion formed and the advice given by the
lawyer in the course of that relationship.

The privilege is not limited to confidential communications between
attorney and client, but may also encompass internal client
communications that contain a discussion or summary of counsel's
legal advice. As the party asserting attorney-client privilege,
Google bears the burden of establishing that the privilege
encompasses the disputed material in the Yu email.

Google argues that the disputed portion of the Yu email reflects
and paraphrases legal advice Ms. Yu received from Google's in-house
counsel. Although AdTrader does not dispute that Ms. Yu
communicated directly with Google's in-house counsel about issuing
credits to advertisers, it argues that the Yu email reflects only
that Google's counsel weighed in on a business decision.
  
The question is whether the disputed portion of the email reveals
that legal advice or merely reflects a business decision.

In the unredacted version of the email, Ms. Yu describes two
reasons for Google's efforts to issue credits to advertisers. Her
description of the first reason3 accords with Google's explanation
that the reason given reflects or paraphrases advice of counsel.
While a product manager or other business person might, on her own
initiative or after consultation with other business people,
identify that same reason as a basis for issuing credits to
advertisers without any advice from counsel, Google represents that
that the reason Ms. Yu describes does, in fact, reflect counsel's
recommended course of action. AdTrader cites no information to the
contrary.

Accordingly, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose Division, concludes that the
disputed material reflects advice of counsel and that advice is
privileged.
  
Waiver of Privilege

The attorney-client privilege may be waived. Unlike the question of
what information falls within the protection of the attorney-client
privilege, the question of whether that protection is waived is
governed by federal law. The parties agree that Rule 502(b) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence provides the rule of decision here:

The disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a federal proceeding
if: (1) the disclosure is inadvertent (2) the holder of the
privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure
and(3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the
error.

AdTrader contends that if the disputed material in the Yu email is
privileged, Google waived that privilege by failing to assert it
after AdTrader made prominent use of the document and quoted from
the privileged material in filings made in February 2019.   

Google argues that its failure to claim privilege before August 6,
2019 was inadvertent. It says that it took reasonable steps to
prevent the disclosure in the first place, and took reasonable
steps to rectify the error when it discovered the material was
privileged on August 6, 2019.

The parties do not seriously dispute that Google's initial
production of the Yu email in December 2018 was inadvertent, or
that Google took reasonable steps with respect to that initial
production to avoid producing privileged material.   

For this reason, Google's arguments about whether it should be
faulted for failing to identify the privileged content in this
single email in a production of over 10,000 pages are largely
irrelevant. Rather, the critical issue is whether Google promptly
took reasonable steps to assert its privilege claim after AdTrader
relied on the privileged material in its February 2019 filings.

Google correctly observes that Rule 502(b) does not require a
producing party to engage generally in a post-production review to
determine whether any privileged documents or information have been
produced by mistake. However, the rule does require the producing
party to follow up on any obvious indications that a protected
communication or information has been produced inadvertently.

The Court concludes that Google has waived the attorney-client
privilege with respect to the disputed material in the Yu email.
That email must be produced in unredacted form.

Relief Requested

AdTrader seeks a remedy for Google's redaction of the Yu email and
refusal to allow questioning about the unredacted document in Ms.
Yu's recent deposition.

The Court has discretion under Rules 30(d) and 37(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to order further deposition and other
relief, including sanctions in appropriate circumstances, where a
party has impeded or frustrated the fair examination of a witness.
Here, Google's redaction of a portion of the Yu email frustrated
the fair examination of Ms. Yu about that document.  

In these circumstances, AdTrader is entitled to further deposition
of Ms. Yu regarding the unredacted email. Unless the parties
stipulate otherwise, Google must produce Ms. Yu for a further
deposition in San Francisco at its own expense.  

The Court grants AdTrader's motion to require production of the Yu
email in unredacted form and to require a further, limited
deposition of Ms. Yu in San Francisco. AdTrader's motion is denied
in all other respects.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 5, 2019  Order
is available  https://tinyurl.com/yxjhmphy Leagle.com.

AdTrader, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Flora F. Vigo
fvigo@gawpoe.com, Gaw Poe LLP, Mark Weylin Poe -- mpoe@gawpoe.com
-- Gaw & Poe LLP, Samuel S. Song -- ssong@gawpoe.com -- Gaw & Poe
LLP, Victor Meng -- vmeng@gawpoe.com -- Gaw & Poe LLP & Randolph
Gaw -- rgaw@gawpoe.com -- Gaw & Poe LLP.

Specialized Collections Bureau, Inc., Classic and Food EOOD, LML
CONSULT Ltd., Fresh Break Ltd. & Ad Crunch Ltd., Plaintiffs,
represented by Flora F. Vigo, Gaw Poe LLP, Samuel S. Song, Gaw &
Poe LLP & Randolph Gaw, Gaw & Poe LLP.

Google LLC, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey Gutkin --
jgutkin@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Michael Graham Rhodes --
mrhodes@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Audrey Jane Mott-Smith
-amottsmith@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP & Kyle Christopher Wong --
kwong@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP.


GROCERY DELIVERY: Engen Sues Over Intrusive Telemarketing Practices
-------------------------------------------------------------------
AMANDA ENGEN, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. GROCERY DELIVERY E-SERVICES USA INC. DBA HELLO FRESH
Defendant, Case No. 0:19-cv-02433 (D. Minn., Sept. 5, 2019) is an
action brought to enforce the consumer privacy provisions of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Plaintiff alleges that Grocery Delivery E-Services USA Inc. DBA
Hello Fresh sent automated telemarketing calls to her and other
putative class members without their prior express written consent.


This Class Action Complaint also relates to Hello Fresh's conduct
of making telemarketing calls in the absence of an adequate "do not
call" policy or training. Because telemarketing campaigns generally
place calls to hundreds of thousands or even millions of potential
customers en masse, Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a
proposed nationwide class of other persons who received illegal
telemarketing calls from or on behalf of Defendant, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff Amanda Engen currently resides in Minnesota in this
District.

Grocery Delivery E-Services USA INC. DBA Hello Fresh is
headquartered in New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     K. Craig Wildfang, Esq.
     Thomas J. Undlin, Esq.
     Stacey P. Slaughter, Esq.
     ROBINS KAPLAN LLP
     800 LaSalle Avenue, Suite 2800
     Minneapolis, MN 55402
     Phone: 612-349-8500
     Fax: 612-339-4181
     Email: kcwildfang@robinskaplan.com
            tundlin@robinskaplan.com
            sslaughter@robinskaplan.com

          - and -

     Samuel J. Strauss, Esq.
     TURKE & STRAUSS LLP
     936 North 34th Street, Suite 300
     Seattle, WA 98103-8869
     Phone: (608) 237-1775
     Facsimile: (608) 509-4423
     Email: sam@turkestrauss.com

          - and -

     Anthony I. Paronich, Esq.
     Paronich Law, P.C.
     350 Lincoln Street, Suite 2400
     Hingham, MA 02043
     Phone: (508) 221-1510
     Email: anthony@paronichlaw.com


HARRIS COUNTY, TX: Court OKs Consent Decree in Odonnell
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, Houston Division, issued a Memorandum and Opinion granting
Parties Joint Motion for Approval of the Proposed Consent Decree
and Settlement Agreement in the case captioned MARANDA LYNN
ODONNELL, et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action No. H-16-1414. (S.D. Tex.).

Maranda Lynn ODonnell filed a class-action complaint against Harris
County, the Harris County Sheriff, and five Harris County Hearing
Officers. Seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983, ODonnell alleged that Harris County's post arrest
incarceration policies and practices imposed a wealth-based
detention system of keeping misdemeanor defendants in jail only
because they could not pay secured money bail, while those who
could pay were promptly released, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.

The Proposed Consent Decree

The proposed consent decree requires Harris County to carry out a
broad range of bail reforms. Harris County must implement, comply
with, enforce, and train1 certain officials on Amended Local Rule
9, which provides that all misdemeanor arrestees must be released
on a personal bond or on nonfinancial conditions as soon as
practicable after arrest, except individuals arrested:

   * and charged with domestic violence, violating a protective
order in a domestic violence case, or making a terroristic threat
against a family or household member;

   * and charged with assault;

   * and charged with a second or subsequent
driving-under-the-influence offense;

   * and charged with a new offense while on pretrial release;

   * on a warrant issued after a bond revocation or bond
forfeiture; and

   * while on any type of community supervision for a Class A or B
misdemeanor or a felony.

The Proposed Settlement Agreement

The proposed settlement agreement states that the parties agree to
file a joint motion seeking approval of the Consent Decree to
resolve all of the Plaintiffs' claims. The terms are summarized
above. The agreement also addresses fees and costs.

Harris County agrees to pay the following attorneys' fees and
costs:

   * $3,725,231.00 in fees and $114,832.54 in costs to Civil Rights
Corps;

   * $2,161,262.00 in fees (to be forgone) and $30,214.86 in costs
to Susman Godfrey L.L.P.;

   * $632,453.00 in fees to Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr
LLP; and

   * $182,715.90 in fees and $5,378.00 in costs to the Texas Fair
Defense Project.

The Rule 23(e)(2) and Reed Factors

Whether the Class Representatives and Counsel Have Adequately
Represented the Class

Ample record evidence shows that the class has been ably and
diligently represented, in a case filled with legal and factual
complexities. Class counsel enabled the plaintiffs to survive
challenges to the pleadings in motions to dismiss, objections to
class certification, multiple discovery objections and hearings, an
eight-day bench trial, and several appeals. Class counsel obtained
consequential injunctive and declaratory relief for the class. In
January 2019, on the defendants' motion, the Fifth Circuit
dismissed the appeal of this court's amended preliminary injunction
order. The defendants concede that the plaintiffs prevailed and
achieved meaningful changes and protections for class members.

This factor weighs heavily in favor of preliminarily approving the
consent decree and settlement agreement.

Whether the Proposed Class Settlement Was Negotiated at Arm's
Length or Was a Product of Fraud or Collusion

The Court may presume that no fraud or collusion occurred between
opposing counsel in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.
There has been, and could not be, any suggestion of fraud or
collusion in this case. The proposed class settlement was the
product of rigorous, hard-fought negotiations conducted at
arm's-length. The record of many, many hearings; the bench trial;
the several appeals and the lengthy, difficult negotiations, amply
demonstrate the zealous advocacy that all sides deployed.  

Commissioner Radack argues that other Commissioners' praise of the
proposed settlement agreement indicates that those Commissioners
did not negotiate at arm's-length. One might well disagree with
that comparison, but Commissioner Radack does not explain why the
comment indicates any collusion. Praising the outcome does not
suggest impropriety in the process.

The high-quality representation on all sides, the lack of any
evidence of fraud or collusion, the parties' adverse posture, and
the six months of negotiations required to produce this settlement
amply satisfy the Reed factor requiring the absence of collusion.
This weighs heavily in favor of preliminarily approving the
proposed consent decree and settlement agreement.

Whether the Relief was Adequate in Light of the Duration, Costs,
Risks, and Delay of Trial and Appeal

When the prospect of ongoing litigation threatens to impose high
costs of time and money on the parties, the reasonableness of
approving a mutually-agreeable settlement is strengthened. The
parties have extensively litigated this case already in its fourth
year in this court and in the Fifth Circuit, resulting in millions
of dollars in fees and costs. The motions to dismiss and for
summary judgment, the trial, and the appeals raised constitutional
and jurisdictional questions that required extensive efforts by the
parties and the courts.  If the case proceeded, additional
discovery, likely as contentious as the past discovery, would be
required. The permanent injunction trial would be lengthy,
burdensome, and would consume tremendous time and resources of the
parties and the court.

By reaching a favorable settlement before additional summary
judgment motions and the permanent injunction trial, the plaintiffs
avoided expense and delay and ensured recovery for the class.

This factor favors preliminarily approving the proposed consent
decree and settlement agreement.

The Stage of the Proceedings and the Amount of Discovery Completed

This factor requires the court to look to whether the parties and
the district court possess ample information with which to evaluate
the merits of the competing positions. The parties conducted
significant discovery. The eight-day preliminary injunction trial
featured 13 live witnesses and thousands of documents and videos.
The court entered the preliminary injunction based on extensive and
detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law that were affirmed
on appeal.   The Fifth Circuit has issued three published decisions
clarifying the law. The parties, and the court, have ample factual
and legal information with which to evaluate the merits of their
competing positions and to make a reasoned judgment about the
desirability of settling the case on the terms proposed.

This factor heavily favors preliminarily approving the proposed
consent decree and settlement agreement.

The Probability of Success on the Merits

The probability of the plaintiffs' success on the merits is the
most important Reed factor, absent fraud and collusion.  This
factor favors approving a settlement even when the likelihood of
success on the merits is not certain.  

The plaintiffs asked for an injunction requiring Harris County to
release all misdemeanor arrestees on a personal bond as soon as
practicable after arrest, except arrestees who fall within certain
categories.  On remand, this court issued an amended preliminary
injunction order that included a provision adopting some of the
plaintiffs' requested relief, with carefully crafted exceptions,
exclusions, and limitations. The defendants appealed the amended
preliminary injunction order and asked the Fifth Circuit to stay
that provision and three other sections of the order pending the
appeal. The Fifth Circuit granted the stay, finding that the
defendants would likely succeed on the merits in arguing that the
specific challenged provisions were overbroad.  

The proposed consent decree provides the critical relief the
plaintiffs have long sought, requiring Harris County to release
many indigent misdemeanor arrestees on a personal bond as soon as
practicable, again subject to carefully framed exceptions,
exclusions, and limits. The proposed consent decree also provides
other relief, including training, data collection and analysis, and
monitoring, that the amended preliminary injunction did not impose.
In short, the proposed consent decree meets, supports, and
implements the relief the class would likely recover were this case
to proceed to trial and appeal. The settlement is likely to benefit
the class members and Harris County as a whole.

This factor strongly favors preliminarily approving the proposed
consent decree and settlement agreement.

The Range and Certainty of Recovery

This factor requires the district court to establish the range of
possible damages that could be recovered at trial, and, then, by
evaluating the likelihood of prevailing at trial and other relevant
factors, determine whether the settlement is pegged at a point in
the range that is fair to the plaintiff settlors. The court's
consideration of this factor can take into account the challenges
to recovery at trial that could preclude the class from collecting
altogether, or from only obtaining a small amount. The question is
not whether the parties have reached exactly the remedy they would
have asked the Court to enter absent the settlement, but instead
whether the settlement's terms fall within a reasonable range of
recovery, given the likelihood of the plaintiffs' success on the
merits.

Estimating the range of possible recovery is not difficult. The
lowest band is no recovery, after all legal challenges. A middle
band is the relief granted in the amended preliminary injunction
order, without the four provisions stayed by the motions panel. The
upper band is the relief contained in the proposed consent decree,
which robustly implements the amended preliminary injunction order.
Based on the motions panel's decision, the upper band of recovery
after trial and appeals likely would be less, and almost certainly
no more, than the relief in the proposed consent decree.  

This factor favors approving the proposed consent decree and
settlement agreement.

The Respective Opinions of the Participants, Including Class
Counsel, Class Representatives, and the Absent Class Members

The endorsement of class counsel is entitled to deference,
especially in light of class counsels' significant experience in
complex civil litigation and their lengthy opportunity to evaluate
the merits of the claims. A court may not simply defer to class
counsels' opinion. Rather, the Court must give class counsels'
recommendations appropriate weight in light of all the factors
surrounding the settlement.

Counsel for all the parties, including class counsel, have endorsed
the proposed consent decree and settlement agreement. The parties
jointly state that the proposed class settlement is a landmark
vindication of Fourteenth Amendment rights, honors the mandate
issued by Harris County voters in electing new judges, a new
Sheriff, and new County Commissioners responsible for the County's
bail system and will improve the lives of tens of thousands of
class members each year. Class counsels' opinions as to the
benefits of the proposed consent decree are consistent with the
court's own analysis of the proposed consent decree and settlement
agreement under the Reed and Rule 23(e)(2) factors.

This factor strongly favors preliminarily approving the proposed
consent decree and settlement agreement.

Whether the Proposal Treats Class Members Equitably Relative to
Each Other

The proposed consent decree requires Harris County to take action
that applies to all class members equally. All class members are
entitled to the same relief. This factor supports preliminarily
approving the proposed consent decree and settlement agreement.

All of the Rule 23(e)(2) and Reed factors weigh in favor of
preliminarily approving the proposed consent decree and settlement
agreement. The court preliminarily finds that the proposed consent
decree and settlement agreement terms are fair, reasonable, and
adequate under Rule 23(e) and the governing case law.

The Authority to Enter the Proposed Consent Decree

Because the parties ask the court to enter a consent decree a
hybrid creature that is part contract and part judicial decree an
added step is necessary for preliminary approval. The court must
make a preliminary determination that it has the authority to enter
the decree.  

The voluntary nature of a consent decree is its most fundamental
characteristic. The relief must, however, spring from, and serve to
resolve, a dispute within the court's subject-matter jurisdiction;
must come within the general scope of the case made by the
pleadings; and must further the objectives of the law upon which
the complaint was based.

The Fifth Circuit twice rejected the defendants' abstention
arguments, affirming this court's power to hear the Fourteenth
Amendment claims. The Fifth Circuit also affirmed this court's
conclusion that Harris County's misdemeanor bail system violated
procedural due process and equal protection rights. The proposed
consent decree fully resolves the plaintiffs' claims and addresses
the the fundamental source of constitutional deficiency the Fifth
Circuit identified Harris County's mechanical application of the
secured bail schedule without regard for the individual arrestee's
personal circumstances.

The relief the proposed consent decree requires springs from the
plaintiffs' claims, comes within the general scope of the case made
by the pleadings and furthers the objectives of the law upon which
the complaint was based. Amended Local Rule 9 entitles class
members to protections designed to end Harris County's past
practices of mechanically applying a secured bail schedule,
regardless of inability to pay or the adequacy of other conditions
of pretrial release, by requiring: pretrial release on a personal
bond for certain categories of arrestees; an individualized
hearing; notice; and the opportunity to be heard, present evidence,
and dispute the prosecutor's evidence supporting detention.  

Some of the proposed consent decree provisions are clearly broader
than the amended preliminary injunction order, but each provision
springs from and works to resolve, the plaintiffs' constitutional
claims. This court preliminarily finds that it has the authority to
enter the proposed consent decree.

Several objectors and amici argue that the decree sacrifices
security for increased procedural protections, but the record
demonstrates that this is a false dichotomy. The court found no
reasonable basis for the belief that for misdemeanor defendants,
release on secured money bail provides incentives for, or produces,
better pretrial behavior than release on unsecured or nonfinancial
conditions. The procedures set out in the proposed consent decree
require individualized bail hearings that take both public safety
and constitutional rights into account.

Amended Local Rule 9 provides that secured money bail may be
imposed as a release condition for indigent arrestees if the
hearing officer finds on the record, by clear and convincing
evidence, that no less-restrictive condition could reasonably
assure community safety or prevent flight from prosecution.

The proposed decree includes additional precautions to protect
vulnerable groups, such as domestic violence victims. Amended Local
Rule 9 provides that people arrested for domestic violence, for
violating a protective order in a domestic violence case, for
making a terroristic threat against a family or household member,
or for committing a crime while on pretrial release, may be
detained immediately after arrest and before their individualized
hearings, which must occur within 48 hours of their arrest. If a
misdemeanor defendant released on a conditional bond violates the
condition such as a command to stay away from a victim then his or
her bond may be revoked after a hearing. And, as the plaintiffs
argue, that requiring fewer hearings [promotes safety by allowing
more attention to the cases that are most serious, more attention
to the conditions of release in serious cases  more attention to
cases in which a condition of release is violated, and less strain
on the Sheriff's Department resources.

Several amici cite cases of misdemeanor defendants committing
crimes while on bond as evidence that the decree endangers public
safety and should be rejected.  These anecdotes do not undermine
the record or the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.
No pretrial bail system can prevent every defendant who is released
on money bail or personal bond from committing an offense or
failing to appear. The amici's argument is essentially an argument
for incarcerating every arrestee and defendant until trial or other
disposition. That is not and has not been our law. Every American
bail system must comply with the Constitution, which presumes
innocence and eligibility for pretrial release. The amici's
hindsight disagreements with individual case outcomes have no
bearing on whether the decree is a fair, reasonable, and adequate
remedy for the constitutional violations that the record shows
prevailed in Harris County.

The amici raise objections under Texas law, but none supports
denying preliminary approval. District Attorney Ogg contends that
the decree accords unfettered and unreviewable discretion to
misdemeanor judges and magistrates to delay or outright excuse
misdemeanor defendants from appearing in court, contrary to Texas
law. She argues that this discretion would theoretically empower
judges to thwart the prosecution by allowing defendants to never
appear. The District Attorney concludes that the decree violates
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure's requirement that judges
shall compel defendants' appearances when a court order or Code
provision mandates an appearance. The parties respond persuasively
that the decree reflects Texas district and county courts' broad
power to manage their dockets and decide whether a defendant must
attend a particular hearing.
  
The objectors' and amici's briefs and letters demonstrate that
third parties have had notice and an ample opportunity to be heard
about the proposed settlement and consent decree. Many of the
objectors and amici reprise arguments made and thoroughly argued
during the litigation in this court and in the Fifth Circuit. This
court reset the deadlines for class notice and objections and
postponed the final fairness hearing to give the parties time to
respond to the concerns raised. Objections to final approval must
be filed by October 11, 2019. The final fairness hearing, set for
October 21, 2019, at 9:00 a.m., will be open to the public. If this
court grants the motion for final approval, it will do so after
providing ample opportunities for, and receiving, robust public
comment.

The court does not question the amici's and objectors' good faith.
The public safety and public resource concerns they raise are
important. The proposed consent decree and settlement agreement are
preliminarily approved because these concerns are fully recognized
and addressed.

The parties' joint motion for preliminary approval of the consent
decree and settlement agreement is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 5, 2019
Memorandum Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y5rfpxsy
from Leagle.com.

Maranda Lynn ODonnell, Plaintiff, represented by Alec Karakatsanis,
Civil Rights Corps, 910 17th Street NW, Second Floor, Washington,
D.C. 20006, Krisina Janaye Zuniga --
krisina.zuniga@susmangodfrey.com -- Susman Godfrey LLP, Lexie
Giselle White -- lwhite@susmangodfrey.com -- Susman Godfrey LLP,
Neal S. Manne -- nmanne@susmangodfrey.com -- Susman Godfrey LLP,
Alejandra C. Salinas -asalinas@susmangodfrey.com -- Susman Godfrey
LLP, Charles Lewis Gerstein, Civil Rights Corps, Elizabeth Anne
Rossi, Civil Rights Corps, 910 17th Street NW, Second Floor,
Washington, D.C. 20006, pro hac vice & Michael Gervais
-mgervais@susmangodfrey.com -- Susman Godfrey L.L.P.

Harris County, Texas, Defendant, represented by James G. Munisteri,
Foley Gardere & Melissa Lynn Spinks, Harris County Attorney's
Office.

Ronald Nicholas, Defendant, represented by Katharine Davenport
David -- kate.david@huschblackwell.com -- Husch Blackwell LLP,
Michael A. Stafford -- mike.stafford.com@huschblackwell.com --
Husch Blackwell LLP & Philip James Morgan, Husch Blackwell, LLP.


HD SUPPLY: Discovery Ongoing in Shareholders Class Suit in Georgia
------------------------------------------------------------------
HD Supply, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 10, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended August 4, 2019, that discovery is ongoing in
the consolidated class action suit pending before the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

On July 10, 2017 and August 8, 2017, shareholders filed putative
class action complaints in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia, alleging that HD Supply and certain senior
members of its management (collectively, the "securities litigation
defendants") made certain false or misleading public statements in
violation of the federal securities laws between November 9, 2016
and June 5, 2017, inclusive (the "original securities complaints").


Subsequently, the two securities cases were consolidated, and, on
November 16, 2017, the lead plaintiffs appointed by the Court filed
a Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint (the "Amended
Complaint") against the securities litigation defendants on behalf
of all persons other than the securities litigation defendants who
purchased or otherwise acquired the Company's common stock between
November 9, 2016 and June 5, 2017, inclusive.  

The Amended Complaint alleges that the securities litigation
defendants made certain false or misleading public statements,
primarily relating to the Company's progress in addressing certain
supply chain disruption issues encountered in the Company's
Facilities Maintenance business unit.  The Amended Complaint
asserts claims against the securities litigation defendants under
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5,
and seeks class certification under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, as well as unspecified monetary damages, pre-judgment
and post-judgment interest, and attorneys' fees and other costs.

On September 19, 2018, the Court granted in part and denied in part
the securities litigation defendants' motion to dismiss. The matter
is now in discovery.  

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

HD Supply, Inc. operates as an industrial distribution company in
North America. The company operates in two segments, Facilities
Maintenance and Construction & Industrial. The company was formerly
known as The Home Depot Supply, Inc. and changed its name to HD
Supply, Inc. in December 2006. HD Supply, Inc. is headquartered in
Atlanta, Georgia. HD Supply, Inc. is a subsidiary of HD Supply
Holdings, Inc.


HOSPITAL SERVICE: La. App. Flips Dismissal of E. Williams' Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit issued an Opinion
reversing the November 16, 2016 judgment, granting North Oaks'
exception raising the objection of prescription and dismissing
Williams' claims against North Oaks with prejudice in the case
captioned MATTHEW A. DEPHILLIPS, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF ALL
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, v. HOSPITAL SERVICE DISTRICT NO. 1 OF
TANGIPAHOA PARISH, DOING BUSINESS AS NORTH OAKS MEDICAL
CENTER/NORTH OAKS HEALTH SYSTEM. EARNEST WILLIAMS, INDIVIDUALLY AND
ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, v. HOSPITAL SERVICE
DISTRICT NO. 1 OF TANGIPAHOA PARISH D/B/A NORTH OAKS HEALTH SYSTEM
AND NORTH OAKS MEDICAL CENTER, AND LOUISIANA HEALTH SERVICE &
INDEMNITY COMPANY D/B/A BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF LOUISIANA. No.
2017 CA 1423 R, Consolidated with 2017 CA 1424 R. (1st Cir.)

This matter is before the La. App. on remand from the Louisiana
Supreme Court following the Court's dismissal of plaintiff Earnest
Williams' appeal of a trial court judgment granting an exception
raising the objection of prescription filed by defendant Hospital
District No. 1 of Tangipahoa Parish, Doing Business as North Oaks
Medical Center/North Oaks Health System (North Oaks).

Williams filed a Class Action Petition for Damages, Payment of a
Thing Not Due, Declaratory Judgment, and for Injunctive Relief,
naming as defendants North Oaks and BCBS. As to North Oaks,
Williams, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, alleged that North Oaks violated the Health Care Consumer
Billing and Disclosure Protection Act (Balance Billing Act), by
failing to file claims with health insurers, failing to accept
payments from health insurers, attempting to collect and collecting
from insureds or enrollees amounts in excess of those legally owed
by those insureds or enrollees and filing liens/privileges, which
constitute actions at law, or otherwise maintaining actions at
law.

If evidence is introduced at the hearing on the peremptory
exception of prescription, the trial court's findings are reviewed
under the manifest error standard of review. However, in a case
involving no dispute regarding material facts only the
determination of a legal issue a reviewing court must apply the de
novo standard of review, under which the trial court's legal
conclusions are not entitled to deference.

When, as in this case, no evidence is introduced at the hearing to
support or controvert the exception of prescription, the exception
must be decided upon facts alleged in the petition with all
allegations accepted as true.  

Liberative prescription is a mode of barring of actions as a result
of inaction for a period of time.  All personal actions, including
actions to enforce contractual obligations, are generally subject
to a liberative prescription of ten years, unless otherwise
provided. Delictual actions are subject to a liberative
prescription period of one year, running from the day injury or
damage is sustained.  

The proper prescriptive period to be applied in any action depends
upon the nature of the cause of action.  It is the nature of the
duty breached that should determine whether the action is in tort
or in contract. The courts are not bound to accept a plaintiff's
characterization of the nature of his cause of action if
unsupported by factual allegations.  

In order to determine the correct prescriptive period applicable to
Williams' claims under the Balance Billing Act, the proper
characterization of the nature of his cause of action is crucial.

The Balance Billing Act prohibits a health care provider from
collecting or attempting to collect amounts from an insured patient
in excess of the contracted reimbursement rate.

In this case, we find that Williams' claims that North Oaks
violated the Balance Billing Act by failing to file claims with
health insurers, failing to accept payments from health insurers,
attempting to collect and collecting from insureds amounts in
excess of those legally owed, and filing liens/privileges or
otherwise maintaining actions at law against insureds do not derive
from a contract between Williams and North Oaks. Rather, as
recognized by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Anderson, such claims
are grounded in his right to recover any property of which he was
divested, a right derived from La.C.C. art. 2315.   

The Court finds that Williams' claims under the Balance Billing Act
are delictual in nature and are subject to a one-year prescriptive
period, running from the date his injury or damage was sustained.

The Court recognizes that the Louisiana Third Circuit has held that
claims related to alleged violations of the Balance Billing Act are
subject to a prescriptive period of ten years.

The Court respectfully disagrees with the Third Circuit's
conclusion and its reliance on Emigh, Emigh v. West Calcasieu
Cameron Hosp., 2013-2985 (La. 7/1/14), 145 So.3d 369, 374-75, in
characterizing the nature of an insured's cause of action against a
health care provider. In Emigh, the Louisiana Supreme Court
addressed the existence of a cause of action by an insured against
her insurer for a contracted provider's failure to bill her the
negotiated group discounts for health care costs. The Supreme Court
found that the object of the contract between an insured and her
insurer is not only to pay covered medical bills, but also to
secure reduced health care costs and tender payment for those
negotiated, discounted costs.  Because the actual billing of this
promised, discounted charge is performed by a third party, an
insurer is promising that a third party will render a performance,
which fits squarely within the context of La.C.C. art. 1977.

The Court finds that these same considerations do not exist in the
relationship between an insured and a health care provider. A
contractual relationship does exist between a patient and health
care provider.  However, the inclusion of an implied provision in
the contract that a health care provider will not balance bill its
patients covered by a contracted health care insurer is not
supported by the Louisiana Supreme Court's holding in Emigh.
Rather, we find that the Supreme Court's reliance on LA.C.C. art.
2315 in Anderson supports our conclusion that a patient's claim
against a health care provider for violations of the Balance
Billing Act is grounded in tort.

However, in this case, no evidence was introduced at the hearing on
the exception of prescription, and Williams' petition is silent as
to the date that the alleged violation of the Balance Billing Act
by North Oaks occurred. Accordingly, we are compelled to reverse
the trial court judgment granting North Oaks' exception of
prescription.

The November 16, 2016 judgment, granting North Oaks' exception
raising the objection of prescription and dismissing Williams'
claims against North Oaks with prejudice, is hereby reversed. This
matter is remanded for further proceedings.

A full-text copy of the La. App.'s September 5, 2019 Opinion is
available https://tinyurl.com/y35ooa2y from Leagle.com.

J. Lee Hoffoss, Jr., 3205 Ryan St., Lake Charles, LA, 70601, Claude
P. Devall, 517 West College Street Lake Charles, LA 70605, Donald
W. McKnight, Hoffoss Devall, LLC, 517 W College St Lake Charles,
LA, 70605-1529 and Derrick G. Earles, Laborde Earles Injury
Lawyers, 1901 Kaliste Saloom Rd, Lafayette, LA, 70508, David C.
Laborde, 203 Energy Pkwy, Bldg B, Lafayette, LA 70508-3815 and
Jeffery Berniard, Scott R. Bickford, Lawrence J. Centola, III,
Norman F. Hodgins, III, New Orleans, Louisiana, Attorneys for
Plaintiffs/Appellants, Matthew A. DePhillips and Earnest Williams,
Individually, And on Behalf of All Similarly Situated.

Harry J. Philips, Jr. -- skip.philips@taylorporter.com -- Amy C.
Lambert --  amy.lambert@taylorporter.com -- Caroline K. Darwin --
caroline.darwin@taylorporter.com -- Baton Rouge, Louisiana,
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee, Hospital Service District No. 1
of Tangipahoa Parish, d/b/a North Oaks, Medical Center/North Oaks
Health System.


IDEANOMICS INC: Bernstein Liebhard Files Securties Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law
firm, announces that a securities class action has been filed on
behalf of investors that purchased or acquired the securities of
Ideanomics Inc. (IDEX) between May 15, 2017 and November 13, 2018
inclusive (the "Class Period").  The lawsuit filed in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York alleges
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

If you purchased Ideanomics securities, and/or would like to
discuss your legal rights and options please visit Ideanomics
Shareholder Class Action Lawsuit or contact Matthew E. Guarnero
toll free at (877) 779-1414 or MGuarnero@bernlieb.com

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to investors
that: (i) costs associated with building out Ideanomics' U.S.
infrastructure and hiring its new executive team were negatively
impacting the Company's bottom line performance; (ii) as a result,
Ideanomics was highly unlikely to meet its 2018 EBITDA guidance;
(iii) Ideanomics' margins in its oil trading and consumer
electronics businesses were too low for those businesses to remain
viable; and (iv) as a result, Ideanomics' public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

On November 14, 2018, the Company issued a press release, filed as
an exhibit to a Current Report on Form 8-K with the SEC, announcing
the Company's financial and operating results for the third quarter
of 2018 (the "Q3 2018 Press Release"). The Q3 2018 Press Release
disclosed that the company intended to phase out its oil trading
and consumer electronics businesses, with the intent to fully
divest those assets in the future.  The Q3 2018 Press Release also
disclosed that additional costs associated with building out the
Company's U.S. infrastructure and hiring a new executive team would
put a strain on the Company's bottom line performance.

On this news, Ideanomics' stock price fell $1.59 per share, or
48.77%, to close at $1.67 per share on November 14, 2018, damaging
investors.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than September 17, 2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require
that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you choose to take no action,
you may remain an absent class member.

If you purchased Ideanomics securities, and/or would like to
discuss your legal rights and options please visit
https://www.bernlieb.com/cases/ideanomicsinc-idex-shareholder-class-action-lawsuit-fraud-stock-174/apply/
or contact Matthew E. Guarnero toll free at (877) 779-1414 or
MGuarnero@bernlieb.com

Since 1993, Bernstein Liebhard LLP has recovered over $3.5 billion
for its clients. In addition to representing individual investors,
the Firm has been retained by some of the largest public and
private pension funds in the country to monitor their assets and
pursue litigation on their behalf. As a result of its success
litigating hundreds of lawsuits and class actions, the Firm has
been named to The National Law Journal's "Plaintiffs' Hot List"
thirteen times and listed in The Legal 500 for ten consecutive
years.

Contact:

         Matthew E. Guarnero, Esq.
         Bernstein Liebhard LLP
         Website: https://www.bernlieb.com
         Tel: (877) 779-1414
         Email: MGuarnero@bernlieb.com [GN]


INDIANA: State Wants to Seal Filing in DCS Class Action Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Brandon Smith, writing for WFYI.org, reports that the state of
Indiana wants to shield a lot of information from public eyes in a
class action lawsuit against the Department of Child Services.

The group suing the state opposes that push.

New York-based advocacy organization A Better Childhood filed the
lawsuit on behalf of Hoosier foster children.  It argues, for
instance, DCS fails to provide stable homes for kids and moves them
around too much.

The state wants court filings in the case sealed and redacted -- it
says children's confidential information is otherwise at risk. But
A Better Childhood executive director Marcia Lowry says not
everything should be sealed.

"When we have an expert, for example, look at the case of a
particular child and say, 'Well, this happened and that happened
and this happened -- and that was all devastating to the child,'"
Lowry says. "We think that information should not be sealed -- only
without telling the child's name, family members' names, that kind
of stuff."

Lowry says it's important the public learn how DCS handles
children.

A judge will decide whether to grant the state's request to seal
the filings.


JUST ENERGY: Bernstein Liebhard Files Securities Fraud Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard LLP, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law
firm, reminds investors of the lead plaintiff deadline in a
securities class action lawsuit, filed on behalf of shareholders
that purchased or acquired shares of Just Energy Group Inc. ("Just
Energy" or the "Company") (JE) between November 9, 2017 and July
23, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The lawsuit filed in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
seeks to recover damages for Just Energy investors under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

If you purchased Just Energy securities, and/or would like to
discuss your legal rights and options please visit JE Shareholder
Class Action or contact Matthew E. Guarnero toll free at (877)
779-1414 or MGuarnero@bernlieb.com.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than September 30, 2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require
that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you choose to take no action,
you may remain an absent class member.

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
issued a series of false and/or misleading statements and failed to
disclose material adverse facts about Just Energy's business,
operations, and prospects. Among other things, Defendants
misrepresented and failed to disclose to investors: (1) that the
Company experienced customer enrollment and nonpayment issues; (2)
that, as a result, the Company was reasonably likely to incur an
impairment charge to its accounts receivable; (3) that, as a
result, the Company lacked adequate internal control over its
financial reporting; and (4) that, as a result of the foregoing,
Defendants' positive statements about the Company's business,
operations, and prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked
a reasonable basis.

On July 23, 2019, the Company disclosed that it had "identified
customer enrolment [sic] and non-payment issues, primarily in
Texas, over the past 12 months" and that, as a result, it expected
an impairment charge of CAD $45 to $50 million to its Texas
residential accounts receivable.

On this news, the Company's share price fell $0.66 per share, more
than 15%, to close at $3.72 per share on July 23, 2019, on
unusually heavy trading volume.

If you purchased Just Energy securities, and/or would like to
discuss your legal rights and options please visit
https://www.bernlieb.com/cases/just-energy-group-inc-166/apply or
contact Matthew E. Guarnero toll free at (877) 779-1414 or
MGuarnero@bernlieb.com.

Since 1993, Bernstein Liebhard LLP has recovered over $3.5 billion
for its clients. In addition to representing individual investors,
the Firm has been retained by some of the largest public and
private pension funds in the country to monitor their assets and
pursue litigation on their behalf. As a result of its success
litigating hundreds of lawsuits and class actions, the Firm has
been named to The National Law Journal's "Plaintiffs' Hot List"
thirteen times and listed in The Legal 500 for ten consecutive
years.

Contact Information:

         Matthew E. Guarnero, Esq.
         Bernstein Liebhard LLP
         Website: https://www.bernlieb.com
         Tel: (877) 779-1414
         Email: MGuarnero@bernlieb.com [GN]


JUST ENERGY: Klafter Olsen Files Securities Fraud Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Klafter Olsen & Lesser LLP, which has extensive experience in class
action litigation against energy companies, has filed a class
action complaint against Just Energy Group, Inc. (JE) in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (Civil Action
No.: 1:19-cv-08236-JGK) on behalf of investors who purchased
securities in Just Energy during the period from May 16, 2018
through and including August 19, 2019 (the "Class Period"). This
Class Period takes into account the recent revelations by Just
Energy in August 2019, and therefore includes investors who are not
included in any other pending securities class action against the
company.

The Complaint alleges that Just Energy and its Chief Executive and
Chief Financial Officers violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder, by misrepresenting the adequacy of Just Energy's
internal financial controls and the true value of the company's
receivables from customers in its Texas residential and U.K
markets. Despite repeatedly representing that Just Energy's
internal financial controls were adequate, Just Energy, through a
series of revelations between July 23, 2019 and August 19, 2019,
admitted to a material weakness in the design and operation of its
internal controls and procedures, and that its allowance for
doubtful accounts for its fiscal year ended March 31, 2019 was
understated by $111.2 million consisting of $53.7 million for
doubtful accounts in its Texas residential market and $57.5 million
related to operational and collection issues in its United Kingdom
(U.K.) market. As a result, the company further announced that it
was restating its financial results for its third quarter and
fiscal year 2019, and for the company's first quarter of its fiscal
year 2020 and that its CEO would be leaving the company. This
series of revelations caused the price of Just Energy common stock
to drop precipitously from $4.38 per share to $1.18 per share.

If you purchased Just Energy securities during the Class Period
(May 16, 2018 - August 19, 2019), you may, no later than September
30, 2019, move to be appointed as a Lead Plaintiff. A Lead
Plaintiff is a representative party that acts on behalf of other
class members in directing the litigation. If you have sustained
losses on your purchases of Just Energy securities during the Class
Period, please contact Klafter Olsen & Lesser LLP at
www.klafterolsen.com or call us at 914/934-9200 x 301 for a more
thorough explanation of the Lead Plaintiff selection process and
the claims asserted against Just Energy.

Klafter Olsen & Lesser LLP has offices in New York and Washington
D.C. The founding partners have over fifty years combined
experience representing plaintiffs in securities class action
litigation and also has extensive experience in class action
litigation against energy companies such as Just Energy.

Contact:

         Jeffrey Klafter, Esq.
         KLAFTER OLSEN & LESSER LLP
         2 International Drive, Suite 350
         Rye Brook, NY 10573
         Tel: (914) 934-9200 x 301 [GN]


JUST ENERGY: Pomerantz Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP announces that a class action lawsuit has been filed
against Just Energy Group Inc. (NYSE: JE) and certain of its
officers.   The class action, filed in United States District
Court, for the Southern District of New York, and indexed under
19-cv-08286, is on behalf of a class consisting of all persons and
entities other than Defendants who purchased or otherwise, acquired
publicly traded Just Energy securities between November 9, 2017 and
July 23, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"), seeking to pursue
remedies under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange
Act").

If you are a shareholder who purchased Just Energy securities
during the class period, you have until September 30, 2019, to ask
the Court to appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A copy
of the Complaint can be obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com.   To
discuss this action, contact Robert S. Willoughby at
rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or 888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW),
toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who inquire by e-mail are encouraged to
include their mailing address, telephone number, and the number of
shares purchased.

Just Energy purports to be a consumer company focused on essential
needs, including electricity and natural gas commodities; on health
and well-being, through products such as water quality and
filtration devices; and on utility conservation, including
renewable energy options.

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and/or misleading statements, as well as
failed to disclose material adverse facts about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects.  Specifically, Defendants
failed to disclose to investors that: (i) the Company experienced
customer enrollment and nonpayment issues; (ii) as a result, the
Company was reasonably likely to incur an impairment charge to its
accounts receivable; (iii) as a result, the Company lacked adequate
internal control over its financial reporting; and (iv) as a result
of the foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the
Company's business, operations, and prospects were materially
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

On July 23, 2019, the Company disclosed that it had "identified
customer enrolment [sic] and non-payment issues, primarily in
Texas, over the past 12 months" and that, as a result, it expected
an impairment charge of CAD $45 to $50 million to its Texas
residential accounts receivable.

On this news, the Company's share price fell $0.66 per share, or
more than 15%, to close at $3.72 per share on July 23, 2019, on
unusually heavy trading volume.

The Pomerantz Firm, with offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles,
and Paris, is acknowledged as one of the premier firms in the areas
of corporate, securities, and antitrust class litigation. Founded
by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known as the dean of the class
action bar, the Pomerantz Firm pioneered the field of securities
class actions. Today, more than 80 years later, the Pomerantz Firm
continues in the tradition he established, fighting for the rights
of the victims of securities fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, and
corporate misconduct. The Firm has recovered numerous
multimillion-dollar damages awards on behalf of class members. See
www.pomerantzlaw.com

         CONTACT:
         Robert S. Willoughby, Esq.
         Pomerantz LLP
         Email: rswilloughby@pomlaw.com [GN]


KENNETH LASSITER: 4th Cir. Dismisses Appeal in Seelig ADA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, issued an
Opinion dismissing the appeal in the case captioned PAUL E. SEELIG,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KENNETH LASSITER; LARRY DAIL; THOMAS
ASBELL; DAVID MAY, JR.; PAULA PAGE; TOMMY PAGE; CAPTAIN FIELDS;
CAPTAIN JOHNSON; CAPTAIN ENSLOW; LT. SUGGS; LT. ARTIS; LT. HALL;
LT. PHILLIPS; LT. HOLLOWELL; SGT. WILLIAMS; SGT. MS. WILLIAMS; SGT.
HAWKINS; SGT. FORBES; SGT. OLIVER; SGT. JONES; SGT. DIXON; SGT.
DAWSON; SGT. SHIRLEY; SGT. MARKER; SGT. BOONE; SGT. MORGAN; SGT.
COOPER; SGT. FARROW; MS. HENSON; MR. BYNUM; MRS. BYNUM; MR.
HAGGERTY; MS. PHILLIPS; MS. LEE; MS. PULLY; MS. ASWELL; MR. DANT;
MS. TORRES; MS. BOYLES; MS. HAWKINS; MR. BURRUS; MR. WARD; MS.
WILLIAMS; MR. MOORE; MS. DIXON; MR. COLE; MS. LEVI; OFFICER
HILLARD; MR. LANCASTER; MR. MILLARD; MR. STOCKS; MR. MOSS; MR.
SPIVEY; MR. SHINGLETON; MR. DUPREE; MR. BITTLE; MR. APPENHEIMER;
MS. PEDEXA; MS. KUNE; MR. CELLNER; MR. JOHNSON; MS. EGMENTON; MR.
ROBERTS; MR. HUNTER; MS. SMALLWOOD; MR. BEDMON; MS. SHEPPARD; MR.
TYSON; MR. HARRIS; MR. MOORE; MR. SKINNER; MR. BRIGHT; MR. HASSELL;
MR. KENNEDY; MR. MITCHELL; MR. CORNELIUS; MS. STEWART; MR. NEWBORN;
MR. STREETER; MR. HARRISON; MS. WEST; MS. JONES; MR. HARVEY; MR.
BROCK; MR. DAWSON; MR. CANNON; MR. YOUNG; MR. HAM; NURSE MS. SMITH;
MS. MOORE; MS. MILLER; MS. WATSON; MR. KEARNEY; JOHN DOES 1-100;
JANE DOES 1-100, Defendants-Appellees. No. 19-6445. (4th Cir.)

Paul E. Seelig seeks to appeal from the district court's order:
granting in part his motion to appoint counsel; dismissing his
claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 (2012) and certain Defendants;
dismissing his requests for punitive and compensatory damages;
allowing his claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C.A. Sections 12101 to 12213 (West 2013 & Supp. 2019) (ADA) to
proceed; directing that he file a response explaining the specific
role of each Defendant with respect to his ADA claims; denying his
motions to assign the action to another district judge, to certify
the action as a class action, and for a preliminary injunction and
a temporary restraining order; denying the motions for sanctions
and to issue a writ of mandamus filed by a nonparty; and dismissing
as duplicative any attempt by Seelig to assert a claim raised in
prior litigation.

The Court dismisses the appeal.

This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders and
certain interlocutory and collateral orders. In large part, the
order Seelig seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an
appealable interlocutory or collateral order. This court may permit
an interlocutory appeal from an order denying class certification,
but an appellant must petition this court for leave to appeal
within 14 days after the order is entered. Seelig did not petition
this court for permission to appeal the portion of the order
denying his request for class certification as required by Rule
23(f).

The Court dispenses with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

A full-text copy of the Fourth Circuit's September 5, 2019 is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y6c4jxxs from Leagle.com.

Paul E. Seelig, Appellant Pro Se.


KNIGHT TRANSPORTATION: Wash. Answers Negative to Certified Question
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc, issued an Opinion
answering Certified Question in the case captioned CERTIFICATION
FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
WASHINGTON IN VALERIE SAMPSON and DAVID RAYMOND, on their own
behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. KNIGHT TRANSPORTATION, INC., an Arizona corporation, KNIGHT
REFRIGERATED, LLC, an Arizona limited liability company, and KNIGHT
PORT SERVICES, LLC, an Arizona limited liability company,
Defendants. No. 96264-2. (Wash.)

The Court has been asked by Judge Coughenour of the United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington to answer the
following certified question: Does the Washington Minimum Wage Act
require non-agricultural employers to pay their piece-rate
employees per hour for time spent performing activities outside of
piece-rate work?

Plaintiffs Valerie Sampson and David Raymond are Washington
residents who worked as commercial truck drivers for defendants
Knight Transportation Inc., Knight Refrigerated LLC, and Knight
Port Services LLC (collectively Knight). Plaintiffs brought this
putative class action on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated for several alleged violations of Washington wage and hour
laws. At issue here is Sampson's claim that piece-rate drivers must
receive separate hourly compensation for all time spent on-duty
not-driving.

The MWA establishes minimum standards of employment within the
state of Washington, including setting the minimum wage. The MWA
states that every employer shall pay to each of his or her
employees who has reached the age of eighteen years wages at a rate
of not less than the applicable minimum wage per hour. The statute
does not restrict employers to a specific compensation structure
but does require that employees be compensated at least the minimum
wage for each hour worked. Carranza, 190 Wn.2d at 619.

With limited exceptions, WAC 296-126-021 allows employers to
measure compliance with the MWA by dividing an employee's total
wages earned in a week by the total hours worked. If the result
equals or exceeds the minimum wage, the requirements of the MWA
have been met. This method is commonly referred to as workweek
averaging. If the result falls below the hourly minimum wage, the
employer must augment the final compensation to meet the statutory
requirements.

Knight contends that WAC 296-126-021 specifically authorizes
workweek averaging of all hours worked as an allowable method of
measuring compliance with the MWA for piece-rate workers like the
truck drivers here. Sampson argues that in light of Carranza, WAC
296-126-021 must be interpreted to authorize workweek averaging of
piecework wages only with hours spent on the piecework. That is,
hours spent on tasks outside the piecework must be separately
compensated at an hourly rate at least equal to the applicable
minimum wage. Alternatively, Sampson argues that WAC 296-126-021 is
not a valid implementation of the MWA.

The Court answers the certified question as framed by the district
court

As a preliminary matter, the Court must decide whether to answer
the certified question as presented by the district court or
exercise its discretion to reformulate the question.   

Knight argues that the question as presented implicitly accepts
Sampson's premise that the nondriving tasks at issue are outside
the scope of the piece-rate compensation. Knight asks us to reframe
the question to read, Does the MWA prohibit piecework pay from
compensating for all activities necessary or incidental to the
production of the units of output?

The Court declines to do so. What work is accounted for by
piece-rate compensation is a factual question for the district
court to resolve. The district court has asked for the Court's
guidance on a narrow legal question, and the Court confines its
answer to the scope of the question as presented.

The plain language of WAC 296-126-021 allows workweek averaging of
all hours for nonagricultural workers paid on a piecework basis

The Department of Labor and Industries (Department) has long
understood WAC 296-126-021 to allow workweek averaging of all hours
worked for nonagricultural employees paid on a piecework basis.
Sampson would have us interpret the regulation as requiring
separate hourly pay for non-piece-rate work.

This interpretation is not supported by the plain language of the
regulation. Because the Department's long-held interpretation of
the regulation comports with the plain language, the Court agrees
with the Department's interpretation.

This court interprets regulations according to the same rules that
are used to interpret statutes.

Sampson argues that the regulation is ambiguous and that the
Department's interpretation is only one of two reasonable
interpretations. Sampson asks us to interpret the regulation to
require employers to satisfy their obligation to pay for all hours
worked before applying workweek averaging.  

To support their position, Sampson argues that the Department's
interpretation renders subsection (1) of the regulation superfluous
because Subsection (1) provides: The amount earned on a piece-rate
basis may be credited as a part of the total wage for that period.

This means the employer must also credit the employee for wages
earned for work performed on some other basis during the period.
Sampson argues that if the Department's interpretation is correct,
subsection (1) would be unnecessary, and the regulation would have
read only, Where employees are paid on a commission or piecework
basis, wholly or partially, the total wages paid for such period
shall be computed on the hours worked in that period resulting in
no less than the applicable minimum wage rate.

Sampson is correct that Washington courts interpret regulations in
a manner that gives effect to all the language without rendering
any part superfluous. However, the Department's interpretation of
WAC 296-126-021 does not render subsection (1) superfluous as
Sampson contends. Instead, subsection (1) makes it clear that the
regulation permits all forms of compensation paid in a workweek to
be added together to determine MWA compliance when an employee is
paid partially on a piecework basis, as allowed by WAC 296-126-021.
It does not require that nonpiecework compensation be separately
paid to workers paid wholly on a piecework basis, which is also
allowed by WAC 296-126-021.

The Department's interpretation comports with the plain language of
the regulation and does not render any part superfluous. Therefore,
the Court agrees with the Department's interpretation and move to
the central issue in this case whether the regulation so
interpreted violates the MWA.

WAC 296-126-021 does not conflict with the MWA

The central issue in this case is whether workweek averaging, as
authorized by WAC 296-126-021, is consistent with the MWA's
requirement that workers receive compensation for each hour worked.
The Department is tasked with administering and enforcing the MWA
and has authority to promulgate regulations related to that
purpose. WAC 296-126-021 aids enforcement by specifying how
compliance with the MWA will be tested for nonagricultural workers
paid on a piecework basis. Administrative regulations adopted
pursuant to a legislative grant of authority are presumed to be
valid and will be upheld on judicial review if they are reasonably
consistent with the controlling statute.  

The fact that workweek averaging may not be applied to agricultural
workers, who are explicitly exempt from WAC 296-126-021, does not
automatically mean that workweek averaging is invalid as applied to
everyone. Carranza therefore does not control here. The ultimate
determination for purposes of the MWA remains whether an employer
is compensating each employee for all hours worked at a rate
greater than or equal to the statutory minimum wage. WAC
296-126-021 merely provides that where the regulation applies,
compliance with the MWA's minimum wage requirements may be
demonstrated by workweek averaging. It does not deprive
nonagricultural workers of their statutory minimum wage and
therefore does not conflict with the MWA.

The exemption of agricultural workers from WAC 296-126-021 also
represents a reasonable decision that is within the Department's
authority to make. The agricultural and trucking industries are
different, and piecework compensation serves different purposes in
each context. Thus, it is not unreasonable to have different
methods of measuring compliance with the MWA.

For the past 45 years, the regulation has reflected the
Department's reasonable determination that workweek averaging is a
valid measure of compliance with the MWA for nonagricultural
workers. Meanwhile, WAC 296-126-001(2)(c) reflects the Department's
reasonable determination to exempt agricultural workers from
workweek averaging in light of their particular circumstances.
Nothing has changed that would bring the reasonableness of either
determination into question.

Therefore, the Court holds that WAC 296-126-021 is not inconsistent
with the MWA.

WAC 296-126-021 is a valid implementation of the MWA

Finally, the Court turns to Sampson's argument that WAC 296-126-021
does not apply to the MWA at all. Sampson's theory is that since
the regulation was promulgated pursuant to a specific grant of
rule-making authority contained in the industrial welfare act
(IWA), ch. 49.12 RCW, its application is limited to that statute.
But this argument ignores the necessity of promulgating regulations
to fill the gaps in the MWA by providing a method of testing
compliance for workers compensated on a basis other than an hourly
wage, as well as provisions that grant the Department broad
authority to do so.

Determining the extent of an administrative agency's rule-making
authority is a question of law, which the Court reviews de novo. An
administrative agency possesses only those powers either expressly
granted or necessarily implied from statutory grants of authority.
Agency regulations may be used to fill in the gaps in legislation
if such regulations are necessary to the effectuation of a general
statutory scheme.

The director of the Department is charged by statute with the
administration and enforcement of all laws respecting the
employment and relating to the health, sanitary conditions,
surroundings, hours of labor, and wages of employees employed in
business and industry in accordance with the provisions of the IWA,
chapter 49.12 RCW. The IWA in turn specifically grants the director
authority to prescribe rules and regulations fixing standards,
conditions and hours of labor for the protection of the safety,
health and welfare of employees for all occupations subject to the
IWA.

The MWA sets minimum wage standards for all employees in the state,
both those that are subject to the IWA and those that are not. RCW
49.46.120. The MWA's provisions are in addition to and
supplementary to any other federal, state, or local law or
ordinance, or any rule or regulation issued thereunder. Thus, a
regulation that authorizes workweek averaging for minimum wage
compliance promulgated under the IWA is valid so long as the
minimum requirements of the MWA are met.

The Department is tasked with the enforcement of the MWA, but the
statute does not specify how the Department should measure
compliance with the act for employees paid on a piecework basis.
WAC 296-126-021, adopted in 1974, fills this gap in the statute as
it relates to nonagricultural workers and is within the scope of
the Department's rule-making authority.

WAC 296-126-021 implements the MWA and allows employers to use
workweek averaging to measure compliance with the MWA for
nonagricultural workers paid on a piecework basis. The regulation
is not in conflict with the MWA's guaranty of a per hour minimum
wage. Rather, it is a reasonable method of ensuring compliance
adopted by the agency with expertise in the field.

Since WAC 296-126-021 ensures compliance with the MWA, the Court
answers the certified question in the negative, the MWA does not
require nonagricultural employers to pay their piece-rate employees
per hour for time spent performing activities outside of piece-rate
work.

A full-text copy of the Supreme Court's September 5, 2019 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6y9ac6p from Leagle.com.

Erika L. Nusser, Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC, 936 N 34th St Ste
300, Seattle, WA, 98103-8869, Gregory Alan Wolk, Rekhi & Wolk,
P.S., 529 Warren Ave N, Seattle, WA, 98109-4527, Hardeep S. Rekhi,
Rekhi & Wolk, P.S., 529 Warren Ave N Ste 201, Seattle, WA, 98109,
Toby James Marshall, Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC, 936 N. 34th
St. Ste. 300, Seattle, WA, 98103-8869, Counsel for Plaintiff(s).

Jeffrey Bert Degroot, Attorney at Law, 701 5th Ave. Ste. 6900,
Seattle, WA, 98104-7029, John David Ellis, Sheppard Mullin Richter
& Hampton, 4 Embarcadero Center 17th Floor, San Francisco, CA,
94111, Karin Vogel, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton, 501 W.
Broadway Floor 19, San Diego, CA, 92101, Paul Cowie, Sheppard
Mullin Richter & Hampton, 379 Lytton Avenue, Palo Alto, CA, 94301,
Anthony Todaro, DLA Piper LLP (US), 701 5th Ave. Ste. 6900,
Seattle, WA, 98104-7029, Counsel for Defendant(s).

Office of Attorney General, Attorney at Law, 1250 Pacific Avenue,
Suite 105, Po. Box 2317, Tacoma, WA, 98401-2317, James P. Mills,
Office of the Attorney General — Tacoma, Po. Box 2317, Tacoma,
WA, 98401-2317, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington State
Department of Labor and Industries.

Philip Albert Talmadge, Talmadge/Fitzpatrick/Tribe, 2775 Harbor
Ave. Sw., Third Floor Ste. C., Seattle, WA, 98126-2138, Richard
Pianka, ATA Litigation Center, 950 North Glebe Road, Arlington,
VA., 22203, Amicus Curiae on behalf of American Trucking
Association, Inc.

Philip Albert Talmadge, Talmadge/Fitzpatrick/Tribe, 2775 Harbor
Ave. Sw., Third Floor Ste. C., Seattle, WA, 98126-2138, Richard
Pianka, ATA Litigation Center, 950 North Glebe Road, Arlington, VA,
22203, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Trucking
Associations.

Marc Cote, Frank Freed Subit & Thomas LLP, 705 2nd Ave. Ste. 1200,
Seattle, WA, 98104-1798, Jeffrey Lowell Needle, Attorney at Law,
705 2nd Ave. Ste. 1050, Seattle, WA, 98104-1759, Amicus Curiae on
behalf of Washington Employment Lawyers Association.

Julian Hua Beattie, Washington State Office of the Attorney, Po.
Box 40117, Olympia, WA, 98504-0117, Ecology Division A.G. Office,
Attorney at Law, 2425 Bristol Court Sw Second Fl., P. O. Box 40117,
Olympia, WA, 98504-0117, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington
State Attorney General.


LEND-A-HAND SERVICES: FLSA & OMFWSA Classes Certified in Walburn
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled Mary Walburn, et al., individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Lend-A-Hand Services,
LLC, et al., Case No. 2:19-cv-00711-SDM-CMV (S.D. Ohio), the Hon.
Sarah D. Morrison grants the Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional
Collective Action Certification and Rule 23 Class Certification in
part and reserves ruling on the appropriateness of the Notice until
after the Plaintiffs submit a Revised Proposed Notice.

The Revised Proposed Notice shall be filed within 10 days of the
Order.  

The Court conditionally certifies this FLSA collective class:

     All current and former hourly employees of Defendants who,
     during the past three (3) years, did not receive overtime
     payment at a rate of one and one-half times their regular
     rate of pay for all hours worked in a workweek in excess of
     40.

The Court certifies this OMFWSA class under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure:

     All current and former hourly paid employees employed by
     Defendant Lend-A-Hand Services, LLC for the time prior
     including two (2) years prior to the date of filing of the
     Complaint through the date Class Certification is granted or
     Defendant changes its policy (whichever is earlier), who did
     not receive overtime payment at a rate of one and one-half
     times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in a
     workweek in excess of 40.

Judge Morrison directs the Defendants to identify all putative
class members by providing a list in electronic and importable
format of the names, addresses, and e-mail addresses of all current
and former employees fitting the class descriptions above to
Plaintiffs' counsel within twenty-eight days of this Opinion &
Order.

Within 21 days of receiving the putative class members' contact
information from the Defendants, the Plaintiffs shall send the
Notices and Consents via U.S. mail and e-mail.  The putative class
members shall then have 45 days from the date that Plaintiffs send
the notices to join this litigation.

The labor case alleges Defendants Lend-A-Hand and its owner, Paul
Nerswick, unlawfully failed to pay Plaintiffs Mary Walburn,
Johnathan Bailey, Misty Hall, Jill Hollett, Megan Hughes, Allison
Mitchell, Jessica Roth, Joshua Sliker and Brandy Wollard for
overtime work in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")
and the related Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act.[CC]


LIBERTY TAX: Bid to Dismiss NY Consolidated Suit Still Pending
--------------------------------------------------------------
Liberty Tax, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended July 31, 2019, that the motion to dismiss
the consolidated class action suit entitled, In Re Liberty Tax,
Inc. Securities Litigation, Case No. 27 CV 07327, is still
pending.

This case consolidated two previously filed cases on July 12, 2018.
The case, among other things, asserts that the Company's Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings over a multi-year period
failed to disclose the alleged misconduct of the individual
defendants and that disclosure of the alleged misconduct caused the
Company's stock price to drop and, thereby harm the purported class
of stockholders.

The class period is alleged to be October 1, 2013 through February
23, 2018.

The defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss the Consolidated
Amended Class Action Complaint on September 17, 2018.

The Lead Plaintiff served their opposition on November 1, 2018 and
the defendants filed their reply brief on November 27, 2018. A
mediation took place on November 12, 2018 but did not result in a
resolution.

The motion to dismiss is still pending before the Court.

Liberty Tax, Inc., through its subsidiaries, provides tax
preparation services in the United States and Canada. The company
also facilitates refund-based tax settlement financial products,
such as refund transfer products and personal income tax refund
discounting, as well as provides an online digital Do-It-Yourself
tax program in the United States. The company was formerly known as
JTH Holding, Inc. and changed its name to Liberty Tax, Inc. in July
2014. Liberty Tax, Inc. was founded in 1996 and is headquartered in
Virginia Beach, Virginia.


LIBERTY TAX: Court Awards $1.4MM in Fees in Stockholder Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Liberty Tax, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended July 31, 2019, that the court awarded the
plaintiffs in the class action suit entitled, In Re: Liberty Tax,
Inc. Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 2017-0883, $1.4 million in
fees, $1.0 million less than their request.

On December 27, 2017, the case entitled, In Re: Liberty Tax, Inc.
Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 2017-0883 (the "Delaware Action"),
consolidated two cases previously filed in the Court of Chancery of
the State of Delaware.

On April 17, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint (the
"Amended Complaint"). The Amended Complaint added former directors
Gordon D'Angelo, Ellen McDowell, Nicole Ossenfort, and John Seal,
with Hewitt as individual defendants (collectively, the "Individual
Defendants") and asserted class action allegations.

The Plaintiffs seek (i) a declaration that the Individual
Defendants have breached the Company's Nominating Charter; (ii) a
declaration that the Individual Defendants have breached their
fiduciary duties; (iii) an award to the Plaintiffs and the Class in
the amount of damages sustained as a result of the Individual
Defendants' breaches; (iv) certification of the action as a class
action; (v) an award to the Company in the amount of damages
sustained as a result of the Individual Defendants’ breaches of
their fiduciary duties; (vi) a grant of further appropriate
equitable relief to remedy the Individual Defendants' breaches,
including injunctive relief; (vii) an award to the Plaintiffs of
the costs and disbursements of this action, including reasonable
attorneys' fees, accountants' and experts' fees, costs and
expenses; and (viii) such further relief as the Court deems just
and proper. The Company has answered the Amended Complaint and
discovery is underway.

RSL Senior Partners LLC, derivatively and on behalf of Liberty Tax,
Inc. v. Edward L. Brunot, John T. Hewitt, Kathleen E. Donovan,
Gordon D'Angelo, John Garel, Thomas Herskovits, Robert M. Howard,
Ross N. Longfield. Steven Ibbotson, Ellen M. McDowell, Nicole
Ossenfort, George Robson and John Seal (Individual Defendants) and
Liberty Tax. Inc. (Nominal Defendant), Case No. 18 cv 127,

This case was filed on March 7, 2018 in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (the "Virginia Action").
This purported stockholder derivative action was filed on behalf of
the Company seeking to address the alleged wrongs of the Company's
directors and officers.

The Complaint, which contains allegations that are substantially
similar to the allegations in the Delaware Action, claims that
certain conduct created an inappropriate tone at the top, resulting
in the loss of key executives, employees, directors and otherwise
harmed the Company. The Complaint asserts claims under Section
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the
"Exchange Act"), Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and Section 20(a) of
the Exchange Act, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment,
abuse of control, gross mismanagement, and waste of corporate
assets.

The Complaint seeks the following relief: (a) declaring that the
Plaintiff may maintain this action on behalf of the Company, and
that the Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Company;
(b) declaring that the Individual Defendants have breached and/or
aided and abetted the breach of their fiduciary duties to the
Company; (c) determining and awarding to the Company the damages
sustained by it as a result of the violations set forth above from
each of the Individual Defendants, jointly and severally, together
with pre-judgment and post-judgment interest thereon; (d) directing
the Company and the Individual Defendants to take all necessary
actions to reform and improve its corporate governance and internal
procedures to comply with applicable laws and to protect the
Company and its stockholders from a repeat of the damaging events
(e) awarding the Company restitution from Individual Defendants;
and (f) awarding the Plaintiff the costs and disbursements of the
action, including reasonable attorneys' and experts' fees, costs,
and expenses.

No claim or relief is asserted against the Company, which is named
solely as a Nominal Defendant.

The Delaware and Virginia Actions are in the process of being
settled. On January 25, 2019, the Company along with the named
Individual Defendants entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
(the "MOU") with the Plaintiffs, regarding settlement of the
Delaware Action which will result in certain enhancements to the
Company's code of conduct and training of employees, and disclosure
of The Nasdaq Global Select Market's ("Nasdaq") appeal ruling
delisting the Company's common stock from Nasdaq.

The Plaintiffs have agreed that the settlement, which is subject to
the execution of a definitive settlement agreement and court
approval, will include a dismissal of the lawsuits with prejudice
and a release of all claims against the Company and the Individual
Defendants asserted in the Delaware Action and the Virginia Action.


If the parties to the MOU execute a stipulation of settlement, a
hearing will be held at which the Delaware Court of Chancery will
consider the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the
settlement. In connection with the settlement, the Company will
negotiate in good faith the amount of reasonable legal fees and
expenses of the Plaintiffs' counsel which will ultimately be paid
by the Company and/or its insurance carrier. No agreement has been
reached on the amount of the fees and expenses, which is subject to
court approval.

On March 15, 2019, the parties entered into a stipulation of
settlement. On March 26, 2019, the Delaware Court of Chancery
entered a scheduling order. Under the Order the Company provided
the required notice of the proposed settlement and provided the
date and time of the hearing, which took place on June 28, 2019. On
June 7, 2019, the Plaintiffs in the Delaware Action filed their
opening brief in support of final approval of settlement and for
award of attorney's fees and expenses. On June 18, 2019, the
Company filed a brief in support of the settlement and in
opposition to the Plaintiffs' application for award of attorneys'
fees and expenses.

On June 7, 2019, the Plaintiffs in the Delaware Action filed their
opening brief in support of final approval of settlement and for
award of attorney's fees and expenses. On June 18, 2019, the
Company filed a brief in support of the settlement and in
opposition to Plaintiffs' application for award of attorneys' fees
and expenses. The Court held a hearing on June 26, 2018 and awarded
the Plaintiffs $1.4 million in fees, $1.0 million less than their
request.

The parties to the Virginia Action have also agreed that all claims
in the Virginia Action have been settled and that the parties will
seek to stay the Virginia Action pending the settlement proceedings
in Delaware.

The parties to the Virginia Action have agreed to dismiss the
Virginia Action with prejudice within five business days of the
settlement of the Delaware Action becoming final. The Company has
agreed that it (and/or its insurance carrier) will pay $295,000 in
fees and expenses to the Plaintiffs' counsel in the Virginia Action
in connection with settlement of the Virginia Action. On March 15,
2019, the Court granted a motion to stay the case for 90 days. On
May 3, 2019, the Court entered an order setting schedule, including
the date for the fee approval and approved notice to stockholders.
A fairness hearing for the Virginia Action is scheduled for
September 11, 2019.

Settlement of the Virginia and Delaware Actions are expressly not
to be construed as an admission of wrongdoing or liability by any
defendant.

The defendants have vigorously denied, and continue to vigorously
deny, any wrongdoing or liability with respect to the facts and
claims asserted, or which could have been asserted, in the Delaware
and Virginia Actions, including that they have committed any
violations of law or breach of fiduciary duty, aided and abetted
any violations of law or breaches of fiduciary duty, acted
improperly in any way or have any liability or owe any damages of
any kind to the Plaintiffs or to the purported Class.

Liberty Tax, Inc., through its subsidiaries, provides tax
preparation services in the United States and Canada. The company
also facilitates refund-based tax settlement financial products,
such as refund transfer products and personal income tax refund
discounting, as well as provides an online digital Do-It-Yourself
tax program in the United States. The company was formerly known as
JTH Holding, Inc. and changed its name to Liberty Tax, Inc. in July
2014. Liberty Tax, Inc. was founded in 1996 and is headquartered in
Virginia Beach, Virginia.


LIBERTY TAX: Status Conference in Labrado Set for Nov. 22
---------------------------------------------------------
Liberty Tax, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended July 31, 2019, that the court overseeing the
case, Rene Labrado v. JTH Tax, Inc. (Case BC 715076), has set a
further status conference for November 22, 2019.

On July 3, 2018, a class action complaint was filed in the Superior
Court of California, County of Los Angeles by a former employee for
herself and on behalf of all other "similarly situated" persons.

The Complaint alleges, among other things, that the Company
allegedly violated various provisions of the California Labor Code,
including: unpaid overtime, unpaid meal period premiums, unpaid
rest premiums, unpaid minimum wages, final wages not timely paid,
wages not timely paid, non-compliant wage statements, failure to
keep pay records, unreimbursed business expenses and violation of
California Business and Profession Code Section 17200.

The Complaint seeks actual, consequential and incidental losses and
damages, injunctive relief and other damages.

The Company highly disputes the allegations set forth in the
Complaint and filed a motion to dismiss.

On May 29, 2019, the Court denied the Company's motion to dismiss,
but granted the Company leave to file a motion to strike. The
Company filed a motion to strike and by Order dated August 20,
2019, the Court granted in part and denied in part the Company's
motion. The Court provided the Company with twenty days to file its
answer to the Complaint.

The Court also lifted the discovery stay and set a hearing date on
the Plaintiff's Class Certification Motion for March 3, 2020.  The
Court did not set any briefing schedule for the Motion but ordered
the parties to stipulate to a briefing schedule.  

The Court also set a Further Status Conference for November 22,
2019.

Liberty Tax, Inc., through its subsidiaries, provides tax
preparation services in the United States and Canada. The company
also facilitates refund-based tax settlement financial products,
such as refund transfer products and personal income tax refund
discounting, as well as provides an online digital Do-It-Yourself
tax program in the United States. The company was formerly known as
JTH Holding, Inc. and changed its name to Liberty Tax, Inc. in July
2014. Liberty Tax, Inc. was founded in 1996 and is headquartered in
Virginia Beach, Virginia.


LOCKHEED MARTIN: Hicks Seeks Prelim. Approval of $1.25-Mil. Deal
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit titled ANGELA HICKS, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. LOCKHEED MARTIN
CORPORATION, Case No. 8:19-cv-00261-JSM-TGW (M.D. Fla.), seeks an
order:

   (1) preliminarily approving the Settlement Agreement between
       Named Plaintiff, and Defendant Lockheed Martin
       Corporation, and the putative class;

   (2) preliminarily certifying a class for settlement purposes
       only;

   (3) approving the form and manner of notice to the class;

   (4) scheduling a fairness hearing for the final consideration
       and approval of the Parties' settlement; and, finally,

   (5) approving the settlement in a subsequent Order.

The Settlement Agreement defines the proposed Settlement Class as:
"All participants and beneficiaries in the Defendant's group health
plans who were sent a COBRA Notice by or on behalf of Defendant
between January 1, 2015 through the date the Court grants
Preliminary Approval, as a result of a qualifying event, as
determined by Defendant."

On January 9, 2019, the Plaintiff filed this Class Action Complaint
against the Defendant in which she asserted claims for herself and
a putative class under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 ("ERISA"), as amended by the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA").  In her Complaint, Plaintiff
alleged the Defendant violated the COBRA Notice requirements by
providing her and the putative class members whom she seeks to
represent with a deficient COBRA notice in violation of 29 C.F.R.
Section 2590.606–4(b)(4) et seq. and 29 U.S.C. Section 1166(a).
The Parties have since reached an agreement that, if approved by
the Court, will resolve all claims of the Named Plaintiff and
putative class members against the Defendant and all Released
Parties.

The Settlement provides for Settlement Payments to be made to
approximately 54,000 Settlement Class Members.  The Settlement
Administrator will establish a Qualified Settlement Fund for
purposes of administering the Settlement.  The Settlement Fund
Payor will contribute the gross sum of $1,250,000 into the fund as
per the terms of the Settlement Agreement.  The Settlement Class
Members will not be required to take any action to receive a
portion of the funds, making it a "claims paid" settlement.

The gross payment per Settlement Class Member is approximately
$23.15 per Settlement Class Member ($1,250,000 ÷ 54,000 = $23.15).
If the requested amounts are granted for attorneys' fees,
administrative expenses, and a Class Representative Service Award,
the parties anticipate that each Settlement Class Member will
receive a pro rata net payment of approximately $14.00. Given the
size of the class, this net amount is consistent with COBRA class
action settlements that have been approved by other federal
courts.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Luis A. Cabassa, Esq.
          Brandon J. Hill, Esq.
          WENZEL FENTON CABASSA, P.A.
          1110 North Florida Ave., Suite 300
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 224-0431
          Facsimile: (813) 229-8712
          E-mail: lcabassa@wfclaw.com
                  bhill@wfclaw.com


LOCKHEED MARTIN: Wins Prelim. Nod of Hicks COBRA Suit Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. James S. Moody, Jr., grants the Parties' Joint Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement in the lawsuit
styled ANGELA HICKS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION, Case No.
8:19-cv-00261-JSM-TGW (M.D. Fla.).

In this Action, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant violated
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), as
amended by the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1985 ("COBRA").

The Court preliminarily approves the Class Action Settlement
Agreement and Release and the terms set forth in the Settlement
Agreement, subject to further consideration at the Final Approval
Hearing after members of the Settlement Classes have had an
opportunity to consider the Settlement Agreement and to object to
the Settlement.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Court certifies, for settlement purposes only, the following non
opt-out Settlement Class:

     All participants and beneficiaries in the Defendant's group
     health plans who were sent a COBRA Notice by or on behalf of
     Defendant between January 1, 2015 and the date of
     Preliminary Approval, as a result of a qualifying event, as
     determined by Defendant.

Luis A. Cabassa, Esq., and Brandon J. Hill, Esq., from Wenzel,
Fenton, Cabassa, P.A., are appointed as Class Counsel for the
Settlement Class.  Plaintiff Angela Hicksis is appointed Class
Representative for the Settlement Class.

Any Settlement Class Member who wishes to object to the Settlement
must submit a written statement of objection to the Settlement
Administrator, postmarked no later than 60 days after the Class
Notice Date.

The Plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and expenses and any
class representative service award shall be filed at least ten (10)
days prior to the Final Approval Hearing.  The Final Approval
Motion shall be filed no later than fourteen (14) days prior to the
date of the Final Approval Hearing.

The Court will conduct a Final Approval Hearing on Wednesday,
December 11, 2019, at 9:00 a.m., to determine whether the
Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and if final approval
should be granted.[CC]


LOGMEIN INC: Rosen Law Files Securities Fraud Suit
--------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, reminds
purchasers of the securities of LogMeIn, Inc. (NASDAQ: LOGM)
pursuant or traceable to the S-4 registration statement and
prospectus ("Registration Statement") issued in connection with
LogMeIn's January 31, 2017 acquisition of and merger with Citrix
Systems, Inc. ("Citrix")'s subsidiary, GetGo, Inc. ("GetGo") that a
securities class action has been filed. The lawsuit seeks to
recover damages for LogMeIn investors under the federal securities
laws.

To join the LogMeIn class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1648.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, the Registration Statement was false
and/or misleading and/or failed to disclose that: (1) after the
acquisition of GetGo, defendants had no intention of offering
Citrix's GoToMeeting subscribers an optional, voluntary transition
to LogMeIn's prepaid annual model; (2) instead, defendants were
planning to implement a strategy of aggressive mandatory
conversion, which would force GoToMeeting customers into signing
annual contracts on short notice at higher prices with stricter
terms; (3) the undisclosed plan to implement aggressive practices
posed severe and obvious risks of increased customer friction and
chum in the immediate term; (4) the plan also increased the
likelihood that customers would cancel their subscriptions once
their annual contracts expired; and (5) as a result, defendants'
statements  in the Registration Statement regarding LogMeIn's
business, operations, and prospects, were materially false and
misleading. When the true details entered the market, the lawsuit
claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to join
the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1648.htmlor to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013.   Rosen Law Firm has secured hundreds
of millions of dollars for investors.

Contact Information:

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
         New York, NY 10016
         Tel: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com
                cases@rosenlegal.com
         Website: www.rosenlegal.com [GN]


LOWE'S COMPANIES: Court Narrows Claims in ERISA Suit
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina, Statesville Division, granting in part and denying in
part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint in the case
captioned BENJAMIN REETZ, Plaintiff, v. LOWE'S COMPANIES, INC.,
JOHN AND JANE DOES, ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE OF LOWE'S COMPANIES,
INC., AND AON HEWITT INVESTMENT CONSULTING, INC., Defendants. Civil
Action No. 5:18-CV-00075-KDB-DCK. (W.D.N.C.).

Plaintiff alleges that the Lowe's Defendants, John and Jane Does
1-20, breached their fiduciary duties under the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by removing certain
investment options from Lowe's 401(k) retirement plan and replacing
them with an option to invest in a growth fund established and
managed by Aon Hewitt.  Specifically, the Complaint alleges two
causes of action: (1) Breach of Duties of Loyalty and Prudence
under 29 U.S.C Section 1104 (Breach of Fiduciary Duty) against all
Defendants and (2) Failure to Monitor Fiduciaries against Lowe's.

Plaintiff also alleges that the failure to replace the Hewitt
Growth Fund in light of its alleged continued underperformance and
unpopularity constitutes a separate and continuing breach of
fiduciary obligations under ERISA.   

Plaintiff contends that since the initial transfer, the Hewitt
Growth Fund has performed so poorly that the Plan already has
suffered $100 million in investment losses when its gains are
compared to the returns earned by the eight replaced investment
options.

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the Hewitt Growth Fund has
earned an 11.99% return, while the eight replaced investment
options earned a collective weighted return of 16.15%.

The Lowe's Defendants have asserted the following objections to the
Memorandum & Recommendation:

Appropriate Pleading Standard for ERISA Claims

Rule 8 applies to pleadings for all ERISA actions. To state a
viable claim under ERISA, the complaint must contain sufficient
factual allegations as compared to mere legal conclusions.  

In applying the Rule 8 standard to ERISA cases, plaintiffs
adequately state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA
statutes when the complaint, taken as a whole, pleads facts
indirectly showing unlawful behavior, so long as the facts pled
give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests and allow the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.

Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 598 (8th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted). In Braden, the Eighth Circuit reversed the
district court's grant of a motion to dismiss breach of fiduciary
duty claims, finding that the court improperly faulted the
complaint for making no allegations regarding the fiduciaries'
conduct.

In its Objection, the Lowe's Defendants contend that the Magistrate
improperly applied Braden to create a lower pleading standard for
ERISA cases. However, Braden does not create a lower pleading
standard for ERISA cases. Rather, Braden simply stands for the
proposition that courts should draw all reasonable inferences from
the totality of the allegations, and not dismiss ERISA claims
because the complaint fails to allege all the specifics of the
conduct that leads to the breach of fiduciary duty. In any event,
notwithstanding the Magistrate Judge's citation of Braden, the
Court has undertaken a careful and holistic evaluation of the
Complaint as a whole in accordance with Iqbal and Twombly.

Lowe's Status as a Fiduciary

The Lowe's Defendants argue that Lowe's was not a fiduciary in the
context of the conduct Plaintiff claims to be wrongful. To state a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, the threshold
question is whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the
defendant was a fiduciary. Under ERISA, a person is a fiduciary to
a plan to the extent that he (1) exercises any discretionary
authority or discretionary control respecting management of such
plan or its assets, (2) renders investment advice for a fee or
other compensation, or (3) has any discretionary authority or
discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Lowe's exercises
discretionary authority or discretionary control with respect to
administration of the Plan and management and disposition of Plan
assets.

He further alleges that Lowe's retains ultimate decision-making
authority with respect to the Plan, and appoints and has the
authority to remove members of the Administrative Committee through
its board of directors.  On this basis, he contends he has
adequately alleged that Lowe's is a fiduciary with regard to
selection and monitoring of Plan investments.

Lowe's argues that it is not a fiduciary with respect to the
selection or monitoring of the Hewitt Growth Fund based on the fact
that Lowe's is not a named fiduciary, and the Plan Document
affirmatively confers the Administrative Committee with fiduciary
responsibility for making investment decisions for the Plan.

Lowe's does not provide any citation to analogous case law in
support of its argument. In contrast, Plaintiff cites an opinion
from this district finding that it was premature to dismiss ERISA
claims against a defendant identified in the pleadings as a plan
administrator, despite a dispute about the fiduciary status of the
defendant vis-à-vis the benefit plan.

Because the Fourth Circuit has expressly stated that a fiduciary
may either be formally designated or exist by nature of de facto
performance, the Plan Document is not dispositive of Lowe's status
as a Plan fiduciary. Further, the Court agrees with prior decisions
in this district that whether Plaintiff will be able to show the
requisite degree of control over the Plan is a question to be
addressed at later stages of this action. Therefore, the Court will
not dismiss Count I on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to
adequately plead that Lowe's is a de facto fiduciary of the Plan.

Adequacy of Plaintiff's Allegations Regarding Breach of Duty of
Loyalty

ERISA fiduciaries must scrupulously adhere to a duty of loyalty,
and make any decisions in a fiduciary capacity with an eye single
to the interests of the participants and beneficiaries.

To state a claim for breach of loyalty, a plaintiff must allege
facts that permit a plausible inference that the defendant engaged
in transactions involving self-dealing or otherwise involve or
create a conflict between the trustee's fiduciary duties and
personal interests.

The Complaint, read as a whole, establishes that Lowe's replaced
eight investment options with the Hewitt Growth Fund in 2015. The
Hewitt Growth Fund was a new fund that had less than two years of
performance history, and Lowe's had an established working
relationship with Aon Hewitt, which included Aon Hewitt providing
advice on executive compensation (which permits an inference that
Lowe's executives may have wanted to curry favor with Aon Hewitt).
At the time of its selection, the Hewitt Growth Fund allegedly had
reported a return of -0.67% and was underperforming its stated
benchmarks.  

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that this claim should be allowed
to proceed at this early stage of the litigation. Assuming the
factual allegations to be true along with all permissible
inferences, the Complaint states a plausible case that the Lowe's
Defendants breached their duty of loyalty; that is, they acted
other than in the sole best interests of the Plan participants in
selecting and retaining the Hewitt Growth Fund.

Adequacy of Plaintiff's Allegations Regarding Breach of Duty of
Prudence

The duty of prudence requires ERISA fiduciaries to act with the
care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an
enterprise of a like character and with like aims.

In considering a breach of duty of prudence claim, the court
focuses on the decision-making process and how a prudent decision
maker would act in light of the information available to the
fiduciary at the time he or she makes a decision. For this reason,
an investment's diminution in value after it was chosen is neither
necessary, nor sufficient, to demonstrate a violation of a
fiduciary's ERISA duties.

Lowe's argues that the Complaint fails to plead a claim for breach
of duty of prudence because it does not contain allegations that
the process for selecting or monitoring the Hewitt Growth Fund's
performance was deficient.

Taking the entire Complaint into consideration and drawing all
reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the Court finds that
the allegations give rise to a plausible inference that the process
for selecting or monitoring the Hewitt Growth Fund was deficient.
While Lowe's is correct that no authority requires the fiduciary to
pick the best performing fund, that is not the allegation made
here. Further, the Complaint does not allege only that the Hewitt
Growth Fund had a limited track record. Rather, the Complaint
combines those allegations with allegations that the Hewitt Growth
Fund had a negative rate of return at the time it was selected, and
that it replaced eight popular, established, more diverse and
profitable investment options. Plaintiff also alleges that the
Hewitt Growth Fund utilized a novel investment strategy that was
difficult for Aon Hewitt to execute, and that Lowe's could not use
a consistent benchmark.

Taking all of these allegations into consideration, along with the
claim that the Plan transferred nearly half of its retirement plan
assets excluding Lowe's stock, amounting to more than $1 billion,
into the Hewitt Growth Fund, the Court finds Plaintiff has stated
sufficient facts to give rise to a plausible inference that the
process for selecting the Hewitt Growth Fund was deficient.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Count I of the Complaint should
be allowed to proceed and adopts the M&R recommendation that Lowe's
motion to dismiss Count I should be denied as to Plaintiffs' claims
for both breach of the duty of loyalty and breach of the duty of
prudence.

Adequacy of Plaintiff's Allegations Regarding Breach of Duty to
Monitor Fiduciaries.

Count II of the Complaint alleges that Lowe's breached its duty to
monitor appointed plan fiduciaries. Plaintiff bases this claim on
allegations that Lowe's appointed the members of the Administrative
Committee and also appointed Aon Hewitt either directly or through
the Administrative Committee.  

In its briefing, Lowe's concedes that it is a fiduciary of the Plan
to the extent that it selects and monitors the Administrative
Committee. Lowe's argues, however, that the Magistrate erred by
concluding that Lowe's was responsible for any and all breaches of
fiduciary duty by the Committee. Lowe's further argues that the
allegations in the Complaint do not state a claim for breach of
duty to monitor because the Complaint does not allege any facts
pointing to specific flaws in Lowe's appointment or monitoring or
any specific conduct by the Administrative Committee that should
have led to action by Lowe's.
  
The Court disagrees. Assuming without deciding that Lowe's
correctly states the duty to monitor does not extend to monitoring
the prudence of individual investments, the Court finds the duty to
monitor would, at a minimum, extend to situations where the
Administrative Committee directs or approves the transfer of nearly
half of the Plan's assets other than company stock, totaling more
than $1 billion, into a single investment fund operated by the
Plan's fiduciary investment advisor. The scale of the decision made
results in a plausible inference that Plaintiff has plausibly
stated a claim that Lowe's failed to monitor the Administrative
Committee in such a manner as may be reasonably expected to ensure
that its performance has been in compliance with the terms of the
plan and statutory standards, and satisfies the needs of the plan.

However, the Court agrees with Lowe's argument that the M&R is
incorrect in finding that Plaintiff has stated a claim against
Lowe's for failure to monitor Aon Hewitt. The Plan Document
provides that the Administrative Committee, not Lowe's, has sole
authority to appoint Aon Hewitt. While Lowe's admittedly has the
obligation to monitor the fiduciaries it appoints directly, it
stretches the bounds of the duty to monitor too far to hold Lowe's
responsible for monitoring every fiduciary employed by the Plan,
including those fiduciaries which the Plan explicitly envisions
being appointed by the Administrative Committee. Accordingly, Count
II is dismissed to the extent that it is based on a claim that
Lowe's had a duty to monitor Aon Hewitt.

Adequacy of Plaintiff's Allegations that Lowe's is a Co-Fiduciary
Under 29 U.S.C. Section 1105(a)

Finally, Lowe's objects to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation
that its motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for co-fiduciary
liability be denied. As an initial matter, there is no separate
claim for co-fiduciary liability in the Complaint.

As part of Count I, the Complaint alleges that each Defendant is
also subject to co-fiduciary liability under 29 U.S.C. Section
1105(a)(1)-(3) because it enabled other fiduciaries to breach their
fiduciary duties, failed to comply with 29 U.S.C. Section
1104(a)(1) in the administration of its duties, and/or failed to
remedy other fiduciaries' breaches of their duties, despite having
knowledge of such breaches.  

To establish a prima facie claim of liability under (1) and (3)
plaintiffs must allege facts tending to show that the fiduciary
knew that the other party was a fiduciary, that the co-fiduciary
participated in the act constituting the breach, and that the act
actually constituted a breach; under (2) plaintiffs must show that
the co-fiduciary's breach resulted from the fiduciary's breach of
one of his duties.

Lowe's objects to the finding in the M&R that the Complaint states
a plausible claim for co-fiduciary liability under Section 1105(a),
arguing that the allegations simply parrot the elements of the
statute, indiscriminately lump the Defendant's together, and fail
to allege how each Defendant knew of the other Defendants' supposed
breaches.

Here, however, the Complaint alleges that Lowe's failed to monitor
the Administrative Committee. As the duty to monitor fiduciaries is
derived from Section 29 U.S.C. Section 1104(a)(1), Leigh v. Engle,
727 F.2d 113, 135 (7th Cir. 1984), Plaintiff has plausibly stated a
claim that Lowe's is liable as a co-fiduciary under 29 U.S.C.
Section 1105(a)(2) to the extent that any failure by Lowe's to
monitor enabled the Administrative Committee to commit a breach of
its fiduciary duties. For this reason, the Court declines to strike
the allegations related to co-fiduciary liability from the
Complaint.

The Magistrate Judge's M&R, is ADOPTED as set forth in this Order
and The Lowe's Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED, except as
to claims against Defendant Lowe's Companies, Inc. asserted in
Count II of the Complaint for failure to monitor Aon Heweitt, and
as to that claim the motion is GRANTED and Plaintiff's claims
against Defendant Lowe's Companies, Inc. asserted in Count II of
the Complaint for failure to monitor Aon Heweitt are dismissed.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 5, 2019 Order is
available https://tinyurl.com/y4nlkx5s from Leagle.com.

Benjamin Reetz, individually and as the representative of a class
of similarly situated persons, and on behalf of the Lowes 401(k)
Plan, Plaintiff, represented by Brandon T. McDonough --
bmcdonough@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster, PLLP, pro hac vice, Carl F.
Engstrom -cengstrom@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster, PLLP, pro hac vice,
Chloe A. O'Neill -- coneill@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster, PLLP, pro
hac vice, Kai Heinrich Richter -- krichter@nka.com -- Nichols
Kaster, PLLP, pro hac vice, Paul Joseph Lukas -lukas@nka.com --
Nichols Kaster & Anderson, LLP, pro hac vice & F. Hill Allen, IV,
Tharrington Smith, LLP. 150 Fayetteville Street, Suite 1800,
Raleigh, NC, 27601

Lowe's Companies, Inc. & Administrative Committee of Lowe's
Companies, Inc., Defendants, represented by Justin Michael Holmes,
Groom Law Group, pro hac vice, Lars C. Golumbic, Groom Law Group,
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006, pro hac
vice, Mark Andrew Nebrig -- marknebrig@mvalaw.com -- Moore & Van
Allen, Sean Abouchedid, Groom Law Group, pro hac vice & Stephen
Pennartz, Groom Law Group, Chartered, 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue,
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006, pro hac vice.

Aon Hewitt Investment Consulting, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Brian Boyle -- bboyle@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac
vice, Michael G. Adams -- mikeadams@parkerpoe.com -- Parker, Poe,
Adams & Bernstein, Nicholas Hayes Lee -- nicholaslee@parkerpoe.com
-- Parker, Poe, Adams & Bernstein LLP, Shannon Michael Barrett --
sbarrett@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice & Stuart
Michael Sarnoff, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice.


LOZANO INSURANCE: Bid to Notify FLSA Class in Mosley Suit Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Timothy J. Corrigan grants the Joint Motion for Approval
of Notice to the Class filed in the lawsuit titled SHERI MOSLEY,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
LOZANO INSURANCE ADJUSTERS, INC., FRANK LOZANO, LISETTE LOZANO, and
ANCHOR INSURANCE HOLDINGS, INC., Case No. 3:19-cv-00379-TJC-JRK
(M.D. Fla.).

These persons shall be sent notice of the opportunity to join this
action:

     Individuals who worked for Lozano Claims Adjusters in
     Florida as licensed insurance claims adjusters and who were
     classified as independent contractors, paid a day rate for
     their work, and not paid overtime wages for hours worked
     more than 40 in a workweek between April 4, 2016 and the
     date of final judgment in this matter (the "FLSA
     Collective");

Within seven days of this Order, the Defendants shall provide the
Plaintiffs' Counsel with the FLSA Collective members' names, last
known mailing address, last known personal email address, last
known mobile telephone number, and an employee number or unique
identifier for each FLSA Collective member.  They will produce the
information in separate columns in a manipulable electronic
spreadsheet format, such as Excel.

Within seven days of receiving the Notice List, the Plaintiffs'
Counsel shall issue notice to the FLSA Collective members by first
class mail, email, and text message in the forms filed as Doc. 59-1
(mail and email) and Doc. 59-2 (text message).  The FLSA Collective
Members shall have 60 calendar days from the issuance of notice to
join their claims to the action.

The Defendants shall supply to the Plaintiffs' Counsel the last
four digits of the social security numbers of those FLSA Collective
Members whose notice is returned as undeliverable; and the
Plaintiffs' Counsel shall re-mail and email notices that are
returned as undeliverable for those individuals for whom Counsel
can find better mailing or email addresses.

Within 30 days of sending FLSA Notice, the Plaintiffs' Counsel
shall send a follow-up notice to those FLSA Collective Members who
have not opted into the collective action in the form filed as Doc.
59-3.[CC]


MARRIOTT OWNERSHIP: Lennen Appeals M.D. Fla. Ruling to 11th Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Anthony Lennen and Beth Lennen filed an appeal from a
Court ruling in their lawsuit entitled Anthony Lennen, et al. v.
Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., et al., Case No.
6:16-cv-00855-CEM-EJK, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Florida.

The lawsuit alleges violations of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiffs
filed with the Court their renewed motion for class certification
and memorandum of law.

The proposed class consists of:

     all current and former owners of the MVC Trust product
     (i.e., MVC Trust Owners) from its inception in June 15,
     2010, through and including the present.

     Excluded from the proposed Class are Defendants, as well as
     any entity in which a Defendant has a controlling interest,
     along with Defendants' legal representatives, officers,
     directors, assignees and successors.

The appellate case is captioned as Anthony Lennen, et al. v.
Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., et al., Case No. 19-13215, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that the
Appellee's Certificate of Interested Persons is due on or before
September 18, 2019, as to Appellee Marriott Resorts Title Company,
Inc.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants ANTHONY LENNEN, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated and BETH LENNEN, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Soomi Kim, Esq.
          2400 South College Drive
          High Point, NC 27260
          Telephone: (336) 471-8769
          E-mail: soomiwork@gmail.com

               - and -

          Keith Mitnik, Esq.
          John A. Yanchunis, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN PA
          201 N. Orange Ave., Suite 1600
          Orlando, FL 32801
          Telephone: (407) 420-1414
          E-mail: kmitnik@forthepeople.com
                  jyanchunis@forthepeople.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey M. Norton, Esq.
          NEWMAN FERRARA LLP
          1250 Broadway, 27th Floor
          New York, NY 10001
          Telephone: (212) 619-5400
          E-mail: jnorton@nfllp.com

               - and -

          Christopher Stephen Polaszek, Esq.
          THE POLASZEK LAW FIRM, PLLC
          3407 W. Kennedy Blvd.
          Tampa, FL 33609
          Telephone: (813) 574-7678
          E-mail: chris@polaszeklaw.com

Defendants-Appellees MARRIOTT OWNERSHIP RESORTS, INC.; MARRIOTT
VACATIONS WORLDWIDE CORP., d.b.a. Marriott Vacation Club; MARRIOTT
RESORTS, TRAVEL COMPANY, INC., d.b.a. MVC Exchange Company;
MARRIOTT RESORTS TITLE COMPANY, INC.; and MARRIOTT RESORTS
HOSPITALITY CORPORATION are represented by:

          Colin Stephen Baker, Esq.
          Dawn Ivy Giebler-Millner, Esq.
          GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP
          450 S Orange Ave., Suite 650
          Orlando, FL 32801
          Telephone: (407) 420-1000
          E-mail: bakerco@gtlaw.com
                  gieblerd@gtlaw.com

               - and -

          Roger B. Kaplan, Esq.
          Ian S. Marx, Esq.
          Philip R. Sellinger, Esq.
          GREENBERG TRAURIG, PA
          500 Campus Dr Ste 400
          Florham Park, NJ 07932-0677
          Telephone: (973) 360-7900
          E-mail: kaplanr@gtlaw.com
                  marxi@gtlaw.com
                  sellingerp@gtlaw.com

Defendant-Appellee MVC TRUST OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. is
represented by:

          Alfred J. Bennington, Jr., Esq.
          Glennys Ortega Rubin, Esq.
          SHUTTS & BOWEN, LLP
          300 S Orange Ave., Suite 1600
          Orlando, FL 32801
          Telephone: (407) 423-3200
          E-mail: bbennington@shutts.com
                  grubin@shutts.com

Defendant-Appellee FIRST AMERICAN FINANCIAL CORPORATION is
represented by:

          Douglas B. Brown, Esq.
          W. L. Kirk, Jr., Esq.
          RUMBERGER KIRK & CALDWELL, PA
          300 S Orange Ave., Suite 1400
          PO Box 1873
          Orlando, FL 32801
          Telephone: (407) 872-7300
          E-mail: dbrown@rumberger.com
                  bkirk@rumberger.com

               - and -

          Donna M. Welch, Esq.
          Jeffrey L. Willian, Esq.
          KIRKLAND & ELLIS, LLP
          300 N Lasalle St.
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 861-2000
          E-mail: dwelch@kirkland.com
                  jwillian@kirkland.com

Defendant-Appellee ORANGE COUNTY FLORIDA is represented by:

          John Thomas Conner, Esq.
          William Edward Lawton, Esq.
          John D. Robinson, Esq.
          DEAN RINGERS MORGAN & LAWTON, PA
          201 E Pine St., Suite 1200
          Orlando, FL 32801
          Telephone: (407) 422-4310
          E-mail: JConner@DRML-Law.com
                  wlawton@drml-law.com
                  jrobinson@drml-law.com


MDL 2543: Ct. Rules on Summary Ruling Bid in Ignition Switch Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: GENERAL MOTORS LLC IGNITION SWITCH LITIGATION.
This Document Relates To All Actions, Case Nos. 14-MD-2543 (JMF),
14-MC-2543 (JMF) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Jesse M. Furman of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York has entered an
Opinion and Order on  General Motors, LLC ("New GM")'s Motion for
Summary Judgment as to the Bellwether Economic Loss Plaintiffs'
Claims for Benefit-of-the-Bargain Damages.

In February 2014, New GM announced the recall of certain General
Motors vehicles that had been manufactured with a defective
ignition switch -- a switch that moved too easily from the "run"
position to the "accessory" and "off" positions, causing moving
stalls and disabling critical safety systems.  In the months that
followed, New GM recalled millions of other vehicles, some for
reasons relating to the ignition switch and some for other
reasons.

Not surprisingly, litigation followed, and was ultimately
consolidated in the Court by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation.  Thousands of Plaintiffs filed personal injury and
wrongful death claims against New GM.  And more relevant for
present purposes, hundreds of Plaintiffs ("Plaintiffs") brought
claims on behalf of a broad putative class of GM car owners and
lessors whose vehicles were subject to those recalls, seeking to
recover for "economic losses."  Their operative complaint -- the
Fifth Amended Consolidated Complaint or "5ACC" -- runs nearly 1700
pages and 7500 paragraphs, and includes claims under state law
brought by the named Plaintiffs in all 50 states and the District
of Columbia.

Over the last few years, the Court has issued a handful of lengthy
rulings on the viability of the Plaintiffs' claims under federal
law and the laws of various jurisdictions.  Following those
rulings, the parties and the Court selected three "bellwether"
states -- California, Missouri, and Texas -- for summary judgment,
class certification, and Daubert motion practice.  Thereafter, the
parties filed a wide array of motions relating to the Plaintiffs in
these Bellwether States.

The Plaintiffs filed a motion to certify classes in each Bellwether
State pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
New GM filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to the
claims of each putative class, and each side filed various Daubert
motions challenging the testimony of certain experts for the other
side.

In the Opinion, Judge Furman resolves portions of New GM's motion
for summary judgment.  In doing so, he addresses two related
questions that have yet to be resolved in the context of a mature
factual record: the proper measure of damages under the Plaintiffs'
"benefit-of-the-bargain" damages theory and -- although it does not
ultimately affect the damages claims adjudicated in the Opinion --
whether and how evidence that New GM repaired the Plaintiffs'
vehicles through its many recalls would be relevant to the
calculation of such damages.

The Judge reaches several significant conclusions.  First, he holds
that, in all three Bellwether States, the Plaintiffs'
benefit-of-the-bargain damages are properly measured as the lesser
of (1) the cost of repair or (2) the difference in fair market
value between the Plaintiffs' cars as warranted and those same cars
as sold.  Second, that means that evidence of New GM's post-sale
repairs is relevant to the calculation of Plaintiffs' damages and,
indeed, could theoretically eliminate those damages altogether.
And third, whether or not Plaintiffs' claims for "cost-of-repair"
damages could survive New GM's motion, the Judge is compelled to
conclude that their claims for "difference-in-value" damages cannot
because Plaintiffs have failed to introduce any evidence of the
fair market value of the allegedly defective vehicles they actually
purchased and, therefore, have failed to create a triable issue of
fact on an essential element of any such claim.

In the final analysis, Judge Furman's task is not to decide what
makes sense as a matter of policy.  Nor is it even to evaluate
whether Boedeker's analysis passes muster as a matter of economic
theory.  Instead, it is to apply the substantive law of each
Bellwether State.  He holds that law requires that
benefit-of-the-bargain damages be calculated based on the
difference in market value between the product as warranted and the
product as sold and defines market value as the product of both a
consumer's willingness to pay and a merchant's willingness to sell,
when neither are under any compulsion to do so.

Applying that law, he is compelled to conclude that Boedeker's
analysis does not, without more, suffice to prove that any of the
Bellwether State Plaintiffs suffered benefit-of-the-bargain damages
based on a difference in value.  Because there is no more -- that
is, the Plaintiffs point to no other evidence from which a
factfinder could find damages based on a difference in value --
there is an "absence of evidence" on an "essential element" of the
Plaintiffs' claims for such damages.  Accordingly, the Judge must
grant New GM's motion for summary judgment on the named Plaintiffs'
claims to the extent they seek damages measured as the difference
in value between their cars as bargained-for and their cars as
received.

In their various motion papers, the parties have briefed many other
issues, including but not limited to the viability of various
claims and/or other damages theories (such as the Plaintiffs'
bankruptcy-fraud claims, their claims for "lost time" damages, the
claims of Plaintiffs who purchased Old GM or used vehicles, the
claims of the Plaintiffs who disposed of their vehicles before the
recalls, and the claims of the Plaintiffs whose vehicles are
subject to "service parts" vehicle recalls), the effectiveness of
New GM's recalls and repairs, the availability of injunctive
relief, class certification, and the admissibility of certain
experts' testimony.

In light of the ruling, however, the Judge refrain from reaching
such issues pending discussion between and with the parties and,
possibly, new briefing.  He does so because the ruling almost
certainly moots some of the remaining issues and, with respect to
the issues that are not mooted (for example, class certification),
the ruling changes the landscape in dramatic ways that may call for
new briefing.  On top of that, and given that changed landscape, it
may well make sense for the parties to revisit the issue of
settlement.  And, of course, the Plaintiffs may petition for
certification of an interlocutory appeal.

In short, even though the parties have spilled considerable ink
briefing other issues, the Judge concludes, as a matter of
efficient case management, that it makes more sense to stop where
it has than to go on.

The parties should immediately meet and confer with respect to the
implications of this Opinion and Order and be prepared to address
the next steps for both this litigation and the pending motion to
withdraw the bankruptcy reference in 19-CV-1852 (JMF) -- or, at a
minimum, a process for determining the next steps -- at the status
conference on Aug. 15, 2019.

The Clerk of Court is directed to docket the Opinion and Order in
14-MD-2543, 14-MC-2543, and 19-CV-1852, and to terminate
14-MD-2543, ECF Nos. 5845, 5854, 5858, 6062, 6065, 6067, 6069,6108,
6110, 6114, 6116, and 6118.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 6, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/ilYgto from Leagle.com.

General Motors LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Baker Bloomer
-- andrew.bloomer@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis LLP, pro hac
vice, Arthur Jay Steinberg, King & Spalding LLP, Kyle James
Kimpler, Paul Weiss, Paul Basta , Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garrison LLP, Richard Cartier Godfrey , Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Scott
Ian Davidson, King & Spalding LLP & Mark J. Nomellini, Kirkland &
Ellis LLP.

Economic Loss Plaintiffs, Plaintiff, represented by Sean R. Matt --
sean@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP & Steve W.
Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Motors Liquidation Company GUC Trust Administrator, Defendant,
represented by Kristin Kendra Going , McDermott Will & Emery.

Certain Ignition Switch and Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs,
Defendant, represented by Edward S. Weisfelner --
eweisfelner@brownrudnick.com -- Brown Rudnick LLP, Howard Supplee
Steel, IV , Brown Rudnick LLP, Sander Esserman, Stutzman, Bromberg,
Esserman & Plifka, P.C., pro hac vice, Elizabeth J. Cabraser ,
Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, L.L.P., Elizabeth J.
Cabraser, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, L.L.P., pro hac
vice & Steve W. Berman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac
vice.

Wilmington Trust Company, as Trust Administrator and Trustee for
the Motors Liquidation Company GUC Trust, Defendant, represented by
Clay J. Pierce -- clay.pierce@dbr.com -- Drinker Biddle & Reath,
LLP & Marsha Jessica Indych -- marsha.indych@dbr.com -- Drinker
Biddle & Reath, LLP.

Certain Unaffiliated Holders of the Beneficial Units of the Motors
Liquidation Company GUC Trust, Interested Party, represented by
Daniel H. Golden, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., Naomi
Moss, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP & Seamus Cotter Duffy,
DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP.

Designated Counsel for the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs and Certain
Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs in the Bankruptcy Court, Interested
Party, represented by Edward S. Weisfelner, Brown Rudnick LLP &
Howard Supplee Steel, IV, Brown Rudnick LL


MDL 2818: Court Narrows Claims in Air Conditioning Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting
in part and denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in the case
captioned IN RE: GENERAL MOTORS AIR CONDITIONING MARKETING AND
SALES PRACTICES LITIGATION. ALL CASES. Case No. 18-md-02818. (E.D.
Mich.).

In this putative consolidated class action, seventeen plaintiffs
from thirteen states bring a variety of claims against Defendant
General Motors Company (GM) arising out of alleged defects in the
air conditioning systems of their GM vehicles.

GM moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

In Counts 11, 12, 19, and 35 of the First Amended Complaint,
Plaintiffs Carl Williams, Clarence Larry, Leslie Griffin, and James
Won allege that GM breached the express Limited Warranty of the
vehicles they purchased. These bumper-to-bumper Limited Warranties
provide that GM will pay for any necessary repairs to correct any
vehicle defect related to materials or workmanship occurring during
the warranty period. The warranty period for these vehicles is 3
years or 36,000 miles, whichever comes first.

Under the terms of the Limited Warranty, any implied warranties are
limited in duration to the same period, three years or 36,000
miles, whichever occurs first, that applies to the Limited
Warranty: Any implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a
particular purpose applicable to this vehicle is limited in
duration to the duration of this written warranty.

GM argues that all Plaintiffs with the exception of Plaintiff Carl
Williams cannot state a viable breach of express or implied
warranty claim because the air conditioning systems in their
vehicles did not allegedly fail until after their warranties
expired.   

The Court agrees.

To maintain a claim for breach of an express or implied warranty, a
plaintiff must, among other things, seek warranty service within
the period contained in the warranty.

Here, no Plaintiff other than Carl Williams alleges that his or her
air conditioning system failed and/or that he or she sought
warranty coverage related to the air conditioning system during the
durational limits covering the express and implied warranties.
Indeed, the air conditioning systems in many of the named
Plaintiffs' vehicles did not fail until tens of thousands of miles
after they reached the 36,000-mile durational limit under their
warranties.

Because Plaintiffs' warranties expired before their air
conditioning systems allegedly failed, they have failed to state
viable breach of express or implied warranty claims
Plaintiffs counter that their express and implied warranty claims
are viable because any time and mileage limits set forth in the
Limited Warranty are unconscionable and therefore unenforceable as
a matter of law.   

The Court disagrees.

A plaintiff must allege both substantive and procedural
unconscionability when claiming a breach of warranty based on the
theory of unconscionability.

Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege procedural unconscionability.
They contend that the durational limits in the express and implied
warranties are procedurally unconscionable because there was
unequal bargaining power between GM and Plaintiffs as Plaintiffs
had no other options for purchasing warranty coverage other than
directly from GM. But as GM aptly points out, the auto industry is
one of the most competitive marketplaces that exists. An individual
seeking to purchase one of the Class Vehicles has many other
options sometimes within walking distance of his local GM
dealership if he is unhappy with the warranty that GM provides. For
this reason, the clear weight of authority has rejected the
argument that a vehicle warranty is procedurally unconscionable
because consumers had no meaningful choice in determining the time
limits of the warranty.

Plaintiffs respond that even if the automobile marketplace is
competitive, the bargaining power here was especially unequal and
the warranty limitations were therefore procedurally unconscionable
because GM knowingly failed to disclose the AC Defect to Plaintiffs
and the public.

In support of that argument, Plaintiffs rely on In re Porsche Cars
N. Am., Inc., 880 F.Supp.2d 801 (S.D. Ohio 2012). In In re Porsche,
an automobile manufacturer moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' breach
of warranty claims on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims were
barred by the warranty's durational limits. The district court
rejected that argument and held that Plaintiffs had alleged
sufficient facts to state a prima facie case that the durational
limits in the warranties were unconscionable.  

The Court respectfully disagrees with and is not persuaded by In re
Porsche. In re Porsche conflates a difference in knowledge with a
difference in bargaining power. Bargaining power comes primarily
from having viable alternatives in the marketplace, and a vehicle
consumer with many options like the Plaintiffs here has real and
substantial bargaining power even where a seller like GM knowingly
fails to disclose a defect. That is why the majority of courts have
ruled that a seller's presale knowledge of an alleged defect,
standing alone, is insufficient to establish procedural
unconscionability. The Court joins that majority.

Plaintiffs have also failed to plausibly allege that the
warranties' durational limits are substantively unconscionable.
Plaintiffs insist that the limits are substantively unconscionable
because GM knew of the defect and did not disclose it.

The Court DISMISSES all of Plaintiffs' express and implied warranty
claims (Counts 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 25, 28, 31, 35, 37, and
42) except for the warranty claims of Carl Williams, the only
Plaintiff who alleges that his air conditioning system failed
during the term of his warranty.

In Counts 11-14 of the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Carl
Williams alleges that his air conditioning system failed during the
term of his express and implied warranties and that GM breached
those warranties when it failed to adequately repair the AC Defect.
GM moves to dismiss these claims on several grounds.
  
GM first argues that the Court should dismiss Williams' breach of
express warranty claims because Williams does not plead facts
sufficient to show that GM actually breached the Limited Warranty.
GM says that it complied with the promises in the express warranty
by paying for repairs made to Williams' vehicle and that Williams'
air conditioning system is currently working. Thus, GM insists that
Williams cannot maintain claims for breach of the Limited Warranty.


The Court disagrees.

Williams plausibly alleges that GM has not adequately repaired his
vehicle and that his vehicle will therefore require additional
repair work in the future. More specifically, Williams alleges that
GM has addressed the AC Defect by installing equally defective
replacement parts [that] leaves the [air conditioning system]
susceptible to repeated failure.

Williams alleges that he did have his air conditioning system
repaired once, that the repair did not work, and that he needed to
have his vehicle serviced a second time. Taken together, at the
motion to dismiss stage, Williams plausibly alleges that GM
breached the express Limited Warranty by not sufficiently repairing
his air conditioning system. The Court therefore DENIES GM's motion
to dismiss Williams' breach of express warranty claims (Counts 11
and 12) on this ground.

GM next argues that the Court should dismiss Williams' breach of
express warranty claims because Williams did not comply with the
terms of his warranty. GM says that the Limited Warranty required
Williams to provide GM with written notice of the purported defect
and an opportunity to repair his vehicle prior to filing suit, but
Williams failed to provide that pre-suit notice.

The Court disagrees.

The Court cannot conclude at this time, as a matter of law, that
this provision applies to Williams' claims. The provision is
included in a section of the Limited Warranty that appears to
relate to claims under state lemon laws. But Williams is neither
bringing a lemon law claim nor seeking any remedies provided by
state lemon laws. Moreover, Williams is not seeking a replacement
vehicle or a refund of his purchase price.

It is not clear that the notice provision GM relies upon is
applicable here. The Court therefore DENIES GM's motion to dismiss
Williams' express warranty claims (Counts 11 and 12).

Williams brings two implied warranty claims: one under California's
Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act  (Count 13) and one under
California's commercial code (Count 14). The Court will address
these claims separately.

GM first moves to dismiss Williams' implied warranty claim under
California's commercial code on the basis that the code requires
privity of contract and Williams does not adequately allege
privity.

Here, Williams plausibly alleges that, like the plaintiff in In re
General Motors, LLC, he is an intended third-party beneficiary of
the contracts between GM and its authorized dealers. Given that
allegation, he may proceed with his implied warranty claim under
the California commercial code even though he lacks strict
contractual privity with GM. The Court therefore denies GM's motion
to dismiss Williams' breach of implied warranty claim under the
California commercial code (Count 13).

GM next argues that the Court should dismiss Williams' implied
warranty claim under the Song-Beverly Act because Williams fails to
plausibly allege that his vehicle is unmerchantable. GM contends
that a vehicle is merchantable if it is reasonably suited for
ordinary use, and GM insists that Williams does not plead facts to
support that his alleged air conditioning system's failures somehow
rendered his vehicle inoperable.

The Court disagrees.

Williams plausibly alleges that the AC Defect is sufficiently
serious as to render his vehicle unmerchantable. Under the
Song-Beverly Act, to be merchantable, a vehicle must be fit for the
ordinary purpose for which a vehicle is used, meaning that it is in
safe condition and substantially free of defects.

Here, Williams plausibly alleges that his vehicle is not
substantially free of defects and is not in safe condition.
Williams lives in Southern California in a warm climate where air
conditioning is a standard and ordinary feature of an automobile
that a consumer would expect to work. More importantly, Williams
plausibly alleges that the lack of functioning air conditioning
creates a safety risk by inhibiting his ability to de-fog his
windshield and windows and thereby hindering his ability to see the
road while he is driving. The safety risk that Williams identifies
is not merely theoretical. The First Amended Complaint identifies
numerous Class Vehicle owners who were unable to see the road or
were unable to easily breathe inside the vehicle compartment due to
the AC Defect.

Finally, the Court is not persuaded by GM's argument that Williams'
vehicle is merchantable just because he continued to drive it
despite the AC Defect. The Court concludes that Williams plausibly
alleges that his vehicle is not merchantable under the Song-Beverly
Act.

The Court DENIES GM's motion to dismiss Williams' implied warranty
claim under the Song-Beverly Act (Count 14).

In Count 1 of the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs seek to hold
GM liable for breach of express and implied warranties under the
federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. GM moves to dismiss this claim
for all of the same reasons that it moved to dismiss Plaintiffs'
express and implied warranty claims.

The parties agree that the MMWA lacks substantive requirements and
instead provides a federal remedy for breach of warranties under
state law. Thus, the applicability of the MMWA is directly
dependent upon a sustainable claim for breach of warranty. In other
words, if there exists no actionable warranty claim, there can be
no violation of the MMWA.

Because the Court concluded in Sections IV(A) and (B) above that
all Plaintiffs except for Carl Williams fail to state a viable
claim for breach of warranty, the Court DISMISSES the MMWA claims
of all Plaintiffs except for Carl Williams (Count 1).

In Count 4 of the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that
GM has been unjustly enriched under Michigan law. GM argues that
the existence of the express warranty forecloses any claim for
unjust enrichment. The Court agrees.

Under Michigan law, to plead a claim of unjust enrichment, a
plaintiff must establish that the defendant has received and
retained a benefit from the plaintiff and inequity has resulted.

Plaintiffs cannot maintain their unjust enrichment claim here
because there is an express contract governing the same subject
matter as that claim the express Limited Warranty Courts have
regularly dismissed unjust enrichment claims filed against
automobile manufacturers where a valid, enforceable express
warranty covers the same subject matter as plaintiffs' unjust
enrichment claims.Because the express Limited Warranty governs the
parties' relationship and the same subject matter as Plaintiffs'
unjust enrichment claim, that claim fails.

Plaintiffs may not maintain an unjust enrichment claim as an
alternative to their breach of express warranty claims.
Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment
claim (Count 4).

GM first argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' fraud
claims because Plaintiffs fail to allege that GM had knowledge of
the AC Defect at the time the majority of Plaintiffs purchased
their vehicles. The Court disagrees.

Plaintiffs make several allegations that could plausibly establish
GM's presale knowledge of the AC Defect.  

When taken together and accepted as true for the purposes of GM's
motion to dismiss, these allegations and others in the First
Amended Complaint) plausibly establish GM's knowledge of the AC
Defect.

GM next argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' fraud
claims under Alabama, Arizona, California, Georgia, and Tennessee
law because GM had no duty to disclose the alleged defects. GM
insists that in each of these states, a duty to disclose arises
only where a confidential or fiduciary relationship exists between
the parties or where particular circumstances mandate disclosure,
and GM says Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege either of those
requirements here. The Court disagrees.

Under Alabama law, courts look to several factors in determining
whether the particular circumstances of a case require disclosure:
(1) the relationship of the parties (2) the relative knowledge of
the parties (3) the value of the particular fact (4) the
plaintiffs' opportunity to ascertain the fact (5) the customs of
the trade; and (6) other relevant circumstances.

Here, Plaintiffs plausibly allege facts that could support a duty
to disclose under Alabama, Florida, and Georgia law. Plaintiffs
plausibly allege that (1) GM knew of the AC Defect before
Plaintiffs purchased their vehicles (2) GM willfully failed to
disclose the AC Defect and misrepresented the air conditioning]
systems in the Class Vehicles as functional  (3) these facts were
material to Plaintiffs, and (4) Plaintiffs were not able to
reasonably discover the AC  Defect on their own and had no
realistic ability to discern that the Class Vehicles were defective
until at the earliest after the AC  Defect caused their [Air
Conditioning Systems to fail.

Courts applying the laws of Florida, Alabama, and Georgia have
repeatedly concluded that allegations like these are sufficient to
support a duty to disclose.

Plaintiffs also plausibly allege a duty to disclose under
California and Tennessee law. Under California law, manufactures
have a duty to disclose safety issues. The same is true under
Tennessee law.  

In this case, Plaintiffs plausibly allege that the AC Defect is a
safety issue, and therefore GM had a duty to disclose it.
Plaintiffs specifically allege that the defect creates a safety
risk for Plaintiffs because the failure of the air conditioning
system subjects the occupants of the Class Vehicles to unsafely
high temperatures and can lead to decreased visibility due to
fogging of the windows and an inability to use the [air
conditioning s]ystem to de-fog the windows.

GM responds that the AC Defect simply does not rise to the level of
a serious safety issue. But for all of the reasons stated above,
the Court concludes that Plaintiffs do plausibly allege that the
failure of their air conditioning systems is a safety issue. GM
also argues that it could not disclose an issue of which it was not
aware. But, as explained above, Plaintiffs plausibly allege GM's
knowledge of the air AC Defect. For all of these reasons,
Plaintiffs plausibly allege that GM had a duty to disclose the AC
Defect under California and Tennessee law.

Finally, Arizona does not require a duty to disclose to support a
claim for fraudulent concealment. GM is therefore not entitled to
dismissal of Plaintiffs' fraud claim under Arizona law on the basis
that Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege a duty to disclose.

GM next argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' fraud
claims under Arizona, California, Florida, and Tennessee law
because those claims are barred by the economic loss doctrine. The
Court declines to dismiss the fraud claims based on the economic
loss doctrine at this time.

Whether the economic loss doctrine bars Plaintiffs' fraud claims is
an especially complex issue with seemingly persuasive authority on
both sides and with potentially different applications of the
doctrine under the laws of different states. Given the page limits
imposed on the motion-to-dismiss briefing, neither party was able
to fully develop their arguments concerning the applicability of
the doctrine to Plaintiffs' claims.

The Court concludes that, given the complexity of the
economic-loss-doctrine issues in this case, the soundest course of
action is to defer decision on application of the doctrine until
the summary judgment stage of these proceedings. At that time, if
necessary, the Court will grant the parties additional page
extensions in order to fully brief this issue on a state-by-state
basis.

The Court declines, at this time, to dismiss Plaintiffs' fraud
claims under Arizona, California, Florida, and Tennessee law based
on the economic loss doctrine.

Finally, GM argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' fraud
claims to the extent they rely on alleged advertisements. GM
insists that because Plaintiffs fail to allege the advertisements
they supposedly viewed with specificity or particularity,
Plaintiffs cannot plausibly allege that they relied on these
advertisements.  The Court disagrees.

Plaintiffs plausibly allege the who (GM), the what (knowing about,
yet failing to disclose, the alleged air conditioning system
defect), the when (from the time the vehicles were first placed on
the market to the present day), the where various advertisements,
window stickers on Class Vehicles, and discussions with GM dealers
who did not disclose the defect, and the how (if Plaintiffs had
known of the alleged defect, they would not have purchased or
leased the Class Vehicles, or they would have paid less for them).


The Court denies GM's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' fraudulent
concealment claims (Counts 6, 8, 15, 17, 23, and 40).

GM moves to dismiss many of Plaintiffs' state-law
consumer-protection-act claims on several grounds. The Court will
address each of GM's arguments separately below.

GM first argues that all of Plaintiffs' state-law
consumer-protection-act claims fail because "Plaintiffs cannot
advance claims under the state consumer protection statutes unless
they sufficiently allege that a defendant was aware of a defect at
the time of sale.  The Court concludes that Plaintiffs do
sufficiently allege that GM had knowledge of the AC Defect before
Plaintiffs purchased their vehicles. The Court therefore denies
GM's motion to dismiss the state-law consumer-protection-act claims
on this ground.

In Count 27 of the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Corey
Steketee asserts that GM violated Michigan Consumer Protection Act
Mich. argues that the Court should dismiss Steketee's MCPA claim
because one of the elements of that claim is reliance, and Steketee
fails to plausibly allege that he relied on allegedly fraudulent
statements or omissions by GM. The Court disagrees.

The Court rejected GM's reliance-based argument in Section IV(E)(5)
above, the Court concludes that Steketee's reliance allegations are
sufficient at this stage of the proceedings. The Court declines to
dismiss Steketee's MCPA claim on the basis that GM's vehicle sales
are exempt from the MCPA. The Court will reconsider this line of
argument, on a more developed record and on full briefing, at the
summary judgment stage of these proceedings. The Court therefore
DENIES GM's motion to dismiss Steketee's MCPA claim (Count 27).

In Count 5 of the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Rodney Martin
asserts that GM violated the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(ADTPA) when it sold Class Vehicles with the AC Defect. In Count 6,
Martin brings a claim of common-law fraudulent concealment.GM moves
to dismiss Martin's ADTPA claim on the ground that the ADTPA does
not allow Martin to bring both a common-law fraud claim and an
ADTPA claim simultaneously. GM relies on the savings clause of the
ADTPA which provides that the civil remedies provided herein and
the civil remedies available at common law, by statute or
otherwise, for fraud, misrepresentation, deceit, suppression of
material facts or fraudulent concealment are mutually exclusive.

The savings clause of the ADTPA does not bar Martin's ADTPA claim
as a matter of law. The savings clause  refers to exclusive
remedies, not causes of action or theories of liability. Therefore,
while the savings clause" may prohibit Martin from recovering on
both his fraud and ADTPA claims, the "savings clause" does not bar
Martin from pursuing the claims as alternatives. The Court DENIES
GM's motion to dismiss Martin's ADTPA claim (Count 5).

In Counts 21 and 22 of the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff
Leslie Griffin asserts two state statutory claims. In Count 21,
Griffin alleges that GM's failure to disclose the AC Defect
violated the George Fair Business Practices Act. In Count 22,
Griffin seeks injunctive relief under the Georgia Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act (GUDTPA), based upon GM's alleged failure to
disclose the AC Defect. GM moves to dismiss both of these claims.

Accordingly, GM's motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied
in part.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 5, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3d26mg7 from
Leagle.com.

Mohamed Tangara, Thomas L Brennan, Lauren Heiser & Christopher
Humpherys, Plaintiffs, represented by Bryan L. Clobes --
bclobes@caffertyclobes.com -- CAFFERTY CLOBES MERIWETHER & SPRENGEL
LLP, Christopher Phillip Taylor Tourek --
Christopher@bockhatchllc.com -- Bock & Hatch LLC, E. Powell Miller
-- epm@miller.law -- The Miller Law Firm, Joseph G. Sauder --
jgs@sstriallawyers.com -- Sauder Schelkopf LLC, Patrick E. Cafferty
-- pcafferty@caffertyclobes.com -- Cafferty Clobes Meriwether &
Sprengel LLP, Sharon S. Almonrode -- ssa@miller.law -- The Miller
Law Firm, P.C. & William Kalas -- WK@miller.law -- The Miller Law
Firm, P.C.

General Motors LLC & General Motors Company, Defendants,
represented by Daniel J. LaCombe --  dlacombe@bsdd.com -- Barris,
Sott, Mark S. Cheffo -- mark.cheffo@dechert.com -- Dechert LLP,
Amisha Patel -- Dechert LLP, Hayden A. Coleman --
hayden.coleman@dechert.com -- Dechert LLP & Michelle Yeary --
michelle.yeary@dechert.com -- Dechert LLP.

General Motors Holdings LLC, Defendant, represented by Mark S.
Cheffo, Dechert LLP, Amisha Patel, Dechert LLP, Hayden A. Coleman,
Dechert LLP & Michelle Yeary, Dechert LLP.


MEREDITH CORPORATION: Glancy Prongay Files Class Action Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP ("GPM") announces that it has filed a
class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, captioned Wirthwein v. Meredith
Corporation, et al. (Case No. 1:19-cv-08340), on behalf of persons
and/or entities that purchased or otherwise acquired Meredith
Corporation (NYSE: MDP) ("Meredith" or the "Company") securities
between May 10, 2018 and September 4, 2019, inclusive (the "Class
Period"). Plaintiff pursues claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act").

Investors are hereby notified that they have 60 days from the date
of this notice to move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff in this
action.

On September 5, 2019, the Company stated that it expected fiscal
2020 adjusted EBITDA in the range of $640 million to $675 million,
which is well below analysts' expectations of $793 million.
Meredith planned to increase spending to improve operations of
Time, Inc., which the Company had acquired in January 2018, because
the business was not as profitable as expected.

On this news, the Company's share price fell $10.14 per share, or
over 23%, to close at $33.68 per share on September 5, 2019,
thereby injuring investors.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) the Time, Inc. acquisition was not as profitable as
the Company had claimed; (2) that the Company would incur
additional costs for strategic investments to improve the Time
business; (3) that, as a result, the Company's earnings would be
materially and adversely impacted; and (4) that, as a result of the
foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects, were materially misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

If you purchased Meredith securities during the Class Period, you
may move the Court no later than 60 days from the date of this
notice to ask the Court to appoint you as lead plaintiff. To be a
member of the Class you need not take any action at this time; you
may retain counsel of your choice or take no action and remain an
absent member of the Class. If you wish to learn more about this
action, or if you have any questions concerning this announcement
or your rights or interests with respect to these matters, please
contact Lesley Portnoy, Esquire, of GPM, 1925 Century Park East,
Suite 2100, Los Angeles, California 90067 at 310-201-9150,
Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, by email to shareholders@glancylaw.com,
or visit our website at www.glancylaw.com. If you inquire by email
please include your mailing address, telephone number and number of
shares purchased. [GN]


MICHELLE GRISHAM: Court OKs Class Settlement in Duran
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
issued an Order granting Parties' Joint Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Settlement Agreement in the case captioned DWIGHT DURAN
et al., Plaintiffs, v. MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM et al., Defendants.
Civ. No. 77-721 KG/KK. (D.N. M.).

Plaintiff class had been certified under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(1) and (2), and redefining it as:

     all those inmates who are now, or in the future may be,
incarcerated in the Penitentiary of New Mexico at Santa Fe or at
any maximum, close, or medium security facility open for operation
by the State of New Mexico after June 12, 1980.

In its motions, the Plaintiff class has alleged ongoing violations
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, including unreasonable risks to the health and safety
of class members due to overcrowding, violence, misclassification,
disproportionate discipline, understaffing, environmental
conditions including vermin and constitutionally inadequate
bathroom facilities and plumbing, constitutionally inadequate
healthcare, and failure to timely release inmates upon completion
of their sentences of incarceration, at prison facilities operated
by the New Mexico Corrections Department (NMCD).  

The parties have conducted extensive investigation and discovery
regarding the claims and defenses raised in their most recent set
of motions. However, before all of these motions were fully
briefed, the parties jointly sought and obtained a series of stays
of the litigation to allow them to pursue settlement negotiations.


The parties participated in a settlement conference with United
States Magistrate Judge Steven C. Yarbrough on February 25, 2019,
March 29, 2019, and April 30, 2019. At a status conference on May
3, 2019, counsel advised the Court that the parties had reached a
settlement in principle.  

The Court has carefully and rigorously considered the terms of the
Revised Settlement Agreement and the proposed Notice to Plaintiff
Class Members, along with the parties' submissions and
presentations.

The Court finds that the Revised Settlement Agreement is likely to
be approved under the standards set forth in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(e) and 18 U.S.C. Section 3626 of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA).

The Court preliminarily redefines the Plaintiff class for purposes
of the Revised Settlement Agreement as all men confined to a medium
or higher custody facility and all women of any classification
level in the New Mexico Corrections Department's custody.

The Court preliminarily approves the Revised Settlement Agreement
as fair, adequate, reasonable, and likely to meet the requirements
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) and 18 U.S.C. Section
3626.

The Court approves the form and content of the parties' proposed
Notice to Plaintiff Class Members, as modified in the Notice to
Plaintiff Class Members attached hereto, as satisfying the
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and due
process.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 5, 2019 Order is
available  https://tinyurl.com/yxv8fd6s from Leagle.com.

Dwight Duran, Plaintiff, represented by Alexandra Freedman Smith --
asmith@smith−law−nm.com -- Law Office of Alexandra Freedman
Smith, LLC, David C. Fathi -- dfathi@aclu.org -- pro hac vice,
Katherine Loewe, Law Firm of Ryan J. Villa, 2501 Rio Grande Blvd.
N.W.Suite A, Albuquerque, NM 87104, Mark H. Donatelli --
kate@rjvlawfirm.com -- Rothstein Law Firm, Nicholas T. Davis --
nick@davislawnm.com -- Law Office of Philip B. Davis, Peter Cubra
-- pcubra@qwestoffice.net -- Law Office of Peter Cubra & Philip B.
Davis -- phil@davislawnm.com -- Philip B. Davis, Attorney at Law.

Susana Martinez, Governor, Defendant, represented by Jennifer
Saavedra, New Mexico Attorney General's Office, Mark F. Swanson,
New Mexico Attorney General, Olga Serafimova, Office of the
Attorney General, Rebecca C. Branch, New Mexico Attorney General's
Office, David W. Arnold, Nathan & Roberts, M. Victoria Amada,
Office of the Attorney General & Vincent M. Nathan, Nathan &
Roberts, 520 Madison Avenue #644 Spitzer Bldg Toledo, OH 43604


MIDSOUTH BANCORP: Plaintiffs Drop Merger-Related Suits
-------------------------------------------------------
MidSouth Bancorp, Inc., said in its Form 8-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission filed on September 9, 2019, that
the plaintiffs in the "Raul Action" and "Delman Action" have agreed
to dismiss their individual claims with prejudice in exchange for a
supplemental disclosure in the company's definitive proxy
statement/prospectus, dated August 13, 2019.

On August 15, 2019, MidSouth received a letter on behalf of an
alleged shareholder alleging that Midsouth and its directors
violated their fiduciary duties and the federal securities laws by
issuing allegedly misleading disclosures in connection with the
Merger (the "Parshall Demand").

Thereafter, another purported shareholder filed a separate putative
class action complaint on August 20, 2019 in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York in an action
captioned Raul v. MidSouth Bancorp, et al., 19-cv-07757 (the "Raul
Action").

Finally, another alleged MidSouth shareholder filed an action
against MidSouth, its directors, and Hancock Whitney, captioned
Delman v. MidSouth Bancorp, Inc., et al., Case No. 2019-5228 (the
"Delman Action" and, together with the Parshall Demand and the Raul
Action, the "Actions"), in the 15th Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Lafayette in Louisiana.

The Actions generally allege that MidSouth and its directors
violated the federal securities laws or breached duties under
Louisiana state law by issuing allegedly misleading disclosures in
connection with the Merger, that Hancock Whitney aided and abetted
the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by the individual
defendants, and seek, among other things, to enjoin the shareholder
vote scheduled for September 18, 2019 at which MidSouth
shareholders will vote on a proposal to approve the Merger
Agreement.

While MidSouth believes that the disclosures set forth in the Proxy
Statement comply fully with applicable law, to moot plaintiffs'
disclosure claims, to avoid nuisance, potential expense, and delay
and to provide additional information to MidSouth's shareholders,
MidSouth has determined to voluntarily supplement the Proxy
Statement. In light of the supplemental disclosures, the Parshall
Demand is being withdrawn and plaintiffs in the Raul Action and the
Delman Action have agreed to dismiss their individual claims with
prejudice.

A copy of the supplemental disclosure is available at
https://bit.ly/2kJbUTd.

On April 30, 2019, MidSouth Bancorp entered into an Agreement and
Plan of Merger with Hancock Whitney, whereby MidSouth Bancorp will
merge with and into Hancock Whitney, with Hancock Whitney as the
sole surviving corporation in the merger.

MidSouth Bancorp, Inc., is a financial holding company
headquartered in Lafayette, Louisiana, that conducts substantially
all of its business through its wholly owned subsidiary bank,
MidSouth Bank, N.A. The Company offers complete banking services to
commercial and retail customers in Louisiana and south and central
Texas.


MINDBODY INC: Labaton Sucharow Files Class Action Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------------
Labaton Sucharow LLP announces that on Sept. 6, 2019, it filed a
securities class action lawsuit, captioned Walleye Trading LLC v.
MINDBODY, Inc., No. 19-cv-19-8331 (S.D.N.Y.) (the "Action"), on
behalf of its client Walleye Trading LLC ("Walleye") against
MINDBODY, Inc. ("MINDBODY" or the "Company") and certain officers
and directors (collectively, "Defendants").  The MINDBODY Action
asserts claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and SEC Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, on behalf of all former owners of MINDBODY
Class A common stock who sold shares during the period from
November 7, 2018 through February 15, 2019, both dates inclusive
(the "Class Period"), and were damaged thereby (the "Class").

Founded in 2001, MINDBODY is a provider of cloud-based business
management software for the wellness services industry, e.g.,
salons and spas, and a rapidly growing marketplace for wellness
services.  The Company offers integrated software and payment
platforms to assist wellness business owners run, market, and build
their businesses, while engaging consumers by aggregating available
classes and appointments, and enabling rapid discovery, booking and
payment.  The Company conducted its initial public offering in June
2015.

In early 2018, the Company underwent several successful
acquisitions.  Following these acquisitions, which Defendants
defined as "pivotal," investors were repeatedly assured that
MINDBODY was on track to successfully integrate the companies, and
that the acquisitions offered a substantial value proposition for
the Company.  For example, on September 18, 2018, Defendant
Stollmeyer stated that the integrations were going smoothly and
that MINDBODY was "positioned to grow [its] marketplace more
quickly and to accelerate in all of [its] key markets."

Unknown to investors at this time, however, was that in the latter
half of 2018, Defendant Richard L. Stollmeyer ("Stollmeyer"), the
Company's Chief Executive Officer ("CEO"), had been in discussions
with Vista concerning a potential sale of the Company.  The
MINDBODY Board of Directors only became aware of these discussions
between Stollmeyer and Vista in late October 2018, when it convened
to discuss Vista's interest in the Company.

On November 6, 2018, Defendants intentionally issued disappointing
guidance for the Company's upcoming fourth quarter 2018 in order to
artificially depress the price of the Company's stock, attributing
it to integration issues with MINDBODY's early 2018 acquisitions.
The market, having previously been informed that the integrations
in question were on track, reacted poorly, causing the price of
MINDBODY Class A common stock to fall by approximately 20 percent
on November 7, 2018.

Shortly thereafter, by press release dated December 24, 2018,
Defendants informed investors that the Company's Board had approved
a merger agreement with Vista.  Pursuant to the agreement, holders
of the Company's common stock would receive $36.50 in exchange for
their shares, with Vista taking MINDBODY private upon completion.
Defendants touted this as a 68 percent premium to the Company's
December 21, 2018 closing price, which price was still depressed by
the surprising and suspiciously timed negative guidance issued on
November 6, 2018.

Unknown to MINDBODY investors, however, is that by January 18,
2019, Defendants knew that the Company's fourth quarter 2018
results had materially exceeded not only current analyst estimates,
but also those estimates issued prior to the disappointing November
6, 2018 guidance.

During January and February, Defendants issued proxy materials
urging MINDBODY shareholders to vote "FOR" the transaction, touting
the price of $36.50 as a substantial premium for MINDBODY
shareholders.  These proxy materials, however, failed to disclose
the "meaningful" fourth quarter 2018 results necessary for
investors to make an informed decision whether to vote in favor of
the proposed transaction.

Based, in part, on Defendants' failure to disclose MINDBODY's
favorable fourth quarter 2018 financial results, which would have
raised questions regarding whether the merger consideration was
fair, MINDBODY shareholders approved the transaction on February
14, 2019.  The following day, Defendants reported the closing of
the transaction, and MINDBODY shareholders received $36.50 in
exchange for their shares.

As a result of these material misrepresentations and omissions,
MINDBODY shareholders were misled into selling their shares for
less than the fair value of those shares, which fair price was
greater than $36.50.

If you sold MINDBODY Class A common stock during the Class Period
and were damaged thereby, you are a member of the "Class" and may
be able to seek appointment as Lead Plaintiff.  Lead Plaintiff
motion papers must be filed with the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York no later than November 5, 2019.  The
Lead Plaintiff is a court-appointed representative for absent
members of the Class.  You do not need to seek appointment as Lead
Plaintiff to share in any Class recovery in the Action.  If you are
a Class member and there is a recovery for the Class, you can share
in that recovery as an absent Class member.  You may retain counsel
of your choice to represent you in the Action.

If you would like to consider serving as Lead Plaintiff or have any
questions about this lawsuit, you may contact Francis P.
McConville, Esq. of Labaton Sucharow, at (800) 321-0476, or via
email at fmcconville@labaton.com.

Walleye is represented by Labaton Sucharow, which represents many
of the largest pension funds in the United States and
internationally with combined assets under management of more than
$2 trillion.  Labaton Sucharow has been recognized for its
excellence by the courts and peers, and it is consistently ranked
in leading industry publications.  Offices are located in New York,
NY, Wilmington, DE, and Washington, D.C.  More information about
Labaton Sucharow is available at www.labaton.com [GN]


MINDBODY INC: Rosen Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announces the
filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of owners of the Class A
Common Stock of MINDBODY, Inc. (MB) who sold shares between
November 7, 2018 through February 15, 2019, inclusive (the "Class
Period"). The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for MINDBODY
investors under the federal securities laws.

To join the MINDBODY class action, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1667.html or call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Defendants had put scheme in place to depress the value
of MINDBODY stock directly preceding the merger offer by Vista
manufactured through the negative guidance issued on November 6,
2018; (2) the "goshop" provision in the merger offer was designed
to prevent any superior offers by other potential purchasers; (3)
at the behest of Vista, Defendants never released the Company's
favorable fourth quarter 2018 results; (4) as a result of the
following, the merger consideration was not fair, and any fairness
opinions rendered by the independent proxy advisory firms were
based off of incomplete information. Thus, MINDBODY shareholders
were not paid the fair value of their shares in connection with the
merger, and suffered harm as a result of this alleged conduct in
violation of the federal securities laws.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than November
4, 2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If you
wish to join the litigation, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1667.html or to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013. Rosen Law Firm has secured hundreds of
millions of dollars for investors. [GN]


MONOTYPE IMAGING: Faces Wheby Class Action in Delaware
------------------------------------------------------
Monotype Imaging Holdings Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filed on September 6, 2019,
that the company has been named as a defendant in a class action
suit entitled, Earl M. Wheby, Jr. v. Monotype Imaging Holdings,
Inc., et al.

on July 25, 2019, Monotype Imaging Holdings Inc., a Delaware
corporation (the "Company"), Marvel Parent, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company ("Parent"), and Marvel Merger Sub, Inc., a
Delaware corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of Parent
("Merger Sub"), entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger (the
"Merger Agreement"), pursuant to which Merger Sub will be merged
with and into the Company (the "Merger"), with the Company
surviving the Merger as a wholly owned subsidiary of Parent.

On August 26, 2019, the Company filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the "SEC") a preliminary proxy statement (the
"Proxy Statement") related to a special meeting of the Company's
stockholders to be held for the purpose of, among other things,
voting on the Merger.

On September 3, 2019, a purported stockholder of Monotype filed a
class action complaint in the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware, captioned Earl M. Wheby, Jr. v. Monotype
Imaging Holdings, Inc., et al., Case No. 1:19-cv-01645 (the
"Complaint"), naming as defendants the Company and each member of
the Company's board of directors.

Among other things, the Complaint alleges that the Proxy Statement
is materially incomplete and misleading by failing to disclose in
violation of Section 14(a) and Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act,
as well as Rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder, allegedly material
information concerning (i) certain financial projections prepared
by the Company's management and summarized in the Proxy Statement,
(ii) certain inputs used in the financial analyses conducted by
J.P. Morgan in connection with rendering its fairness opinion to
the Company's board of directors and summarized in the Proxy
Statement and (iii) the nature of certain banking relationships
J.P. Morgan may have with affiliates of HGGC.

The relief sought in the Complaint includes equitable relief,
including among other things, to enjoin the consummation of the
Merger unless and until certain additional and allegedly material
information is disclosed to the Company's stockholders, to rescind
the Merger Agreement, to the extent already implemented, or to
recover rescissory damages, and to award plaintiff the cost and
disbursements of the Complaint, including reasonable attorneys' and
expert fees.

The Company cannot predict the outcome of the Complaint, nor can
the Company predict the amount of time and expense that will be
required to resolve the Complaint. The Company believes the
Complaint is without merit and the Company and the individual
defendants intend to vigorously defend against the Complaint and
subsequently filed similar actions.

Monotype Imaging Holdings Inc. provides text imaging solutions. The
Company offers technologies and fonts enable the display and
printing of digital text on a variety of consumer electronic
devices, including laser printers, digital copiers, mobile phones,
digital televisions, set-top boxes, and digital cameras as well as
in numerous software applications and operating systems. The
company is based in Woburn, Massachusetts.


MORGAN STANLEY: Court Denies Class Notice Information Inclusion
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order denying Proposed Intervenors’ Motion
Seeking to Include Information in the Class Notice in the case
captioned BRANDON HARVEY, Plaintiff, v. MORGAN STANLEY SMITH BARNEY
LLC, Defendant. Case No. 18-cv-02835-WHO. (N.D. Cal.).

The Proposed Intervenors have filed an administrative motion
seeking to include information about their lawsuit into the class
notice issued in relation to preliminary approval of the proposed
settlement in this case.
  
Plaintiffs Tracy Chen and Matthew Lucadano are pursuing a parallel
lawsuit, Chen v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Case No.
30-2014-00724866-CU-OE-CXC, in California Superior Court in Orange
County, asserting civil penalty claims on behalf of Morgan Stanley
FAs and the State of California pursuant to the California Labor
Code Private Attorneys General Act.  

The Parties both oppose.

Harvey argues that the Proposed Intervenor's motion is procedurally
improper for three reasons: (i) they are not parties to this action
and were only granted leave to file an amicus brief in opposition
to the motion for preliminary approval, (ii) the motion is
untimely, this issue should have been raised in the briefing or at
the oral argument that took place on June 12, 2019 and (iii) an
administrative motion is not the correct method of seeking the
relief requested because Local Rule 7-11 reserves such motions for
miscellaneous administrative matters" such as requests to exceed
page limits or to file documents under seal.  

At minimum, Harvey contends, the Proposed Intervenors should be
required to file a properly noticed motion after providing a
satisfactory explanation why these concerns were not raised
earlier.

Harvey also argues that the motion should be denied on the merits
because there is no authority for the Proposed Intervenors'
request. Harvey also disputes the Proposed Intervenors' damages
calculations as lacking foundation and highly speculative.

MSSB argues that the Proposed Intervenor's motion should be denied
on additional grounds as well. It contends that the purpose of
providing information about parallel proceedings in a class notice
is to provide individuals with the information necessary to opt out
and pursue their own separate recovery in that separate proceeding.
But here, potentially aggrieved employees under PAGA do not have
the right to object or opt out of a PAGA settlement.

The Parties' arguments on procedural grounds are all correct. An
administrative motion is the incorrect vehicle for the Proposed
Intervenors' motion and they had the opportunity to make their
request in the amicus brief and at the hearing on the preliminary
approval motion. Moreover, the Court agrees with the Parties on the
merits. Potentially aggrieved employees do not have the right to
opt out or object to a PAGA settlement.
  
The Proposed Intervenors' motion is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 5, 2019  Order
is available https://tinyurl.com/y3rbgzfb from Leagle.com.

Brandon Harvey, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Edward Joseph Wynne --
ewynne@wynnelawfirm.com -- Wynne Law Firm, David Samuel Markun --
dmarkun@mczlaw.com -- Markun Zusman Freniere & Compton LLP, George
Ryan Nemiroff -- gnemiroff@wynnelawfirm.com -- Wynne Law Firm,
James F. Clapp -- jclapp@sdlaw.com -- Clapp & Lauinger LLP, Jeffrey
Karl Compton -- jcompton@mzclaw.com -- Markun Zusman Freniere &
Compton LLP & Marita Murphy Lauinger -- mlauinger@clapplegal.com --
Clapp & Lauinger LLP.

Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Defendant, represented by Lynne C.
Hermle -- lchermle@orrick.com -- Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe
LLP, Andrew Ralston Livingston -- alivingston@orrick.com -- Orrick
Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Benjamin R. Buchwalter --
bbuchwalter@orrick.com -- Orrick Herrington Sutcliffe LLP, Jinnifer
Darlene Pitcher -- jpitcher@orrick.com -- Orrick Herrington
Sutcliffe & Katie Elizabeth Briscoe -- kbriscoe@orrick.com --
Orrick, Herrington and Sutcliffe LLP.


NEW YORK CENTRAL: Court Junks Insurance Reimbursement Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of New
York issued a Memorandum Decision and Order granting Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned MSP RECOVERY CLAIMS, SERIES
LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, and SERIES 16-08-483, a
series of MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC, Plaintiffs, v. NEW YORK
CENTRAL MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, a New York corporation,
Defendant. No. 6:19-CV-00211 (MAD/TWD). (N.D.N.Y.).

This case is one of dozens brought by Plaintiffs and their
affiliates against insurance companies across the nation in an
attempt to collect funds allegedly owed to Medicare Advantage
Organizations (MAO) under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act (MSPA).
Plaintiffs commenced this putative class action, alleging that
Defendant New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company violated
the MSPA by failing to reimburse Health Insurance Plan Of Greater
New York (HIPGNY) for conditional payments it made as an MAO on
behalf of persons insured by Defendant.

Inconsistencies in Plaintiffs' Arguments

Since Defendant brings a facial challenge to Plaintiffs' standing
based on the allegations in the Complaint, for purposes of this
motion, the Court must accept as true all material factual
allegations in the Complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of Plaintiffs. However, before this Court can analyze the
arguments raised in the Motion to Dismiss, it feels compelled to
address several inconsistencies in the Complaint, the Exhibits
attached to the Complaint, and Plaintiffs' Opposition to the Motion
to Dismiss.

First, in the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Exhibit D1 is a
copy of an agreement effectuating the March Assignment. Plaintiffs
mistakenly attached the wrong exhibit cover sheets, and later
clarified that Exhibit D-1, referenced in paragraph 14, truly
refers to Exhibit D-2. While that mistake is not very concerning,
the Court is troubled by the fact that Exhibit D2 is the agreement
that was signed by Michael Palmateer and only Michael Palmateer.
After Defendant pointed out the discrepancy in its Motion to
Dismiss, Plaintiffs responded that Exhibit D2 is a nunc pro tunc
assignment which ratified the assignment, and that they didn't file
the March 20 assignment in this case becausegiven that the material
terms of the assignments are all but identical doing so would have
been superfluous. In other words, although in the Complaint
Plaintiffs claimed that Exhibit D2 is the March Assignment
Agreement. Plaintiffs now claim that it is not.

Second, despite the allegations in the Complaint that Plaintiffs
issued the Coordination of Benefits Letter to Defendant on June 19,
2018,  Exhibit E shows that the letter was actually issued by MSP
Recovery, LLC, who is not a party to this action. Moreover, the
letter suggests that MSP Recovery, LLC owns the rights to HIPGNY's
claim regarding.  

Finally, the Court has some concerns about Plaintiffs' other
exhibits. Exhibits A, B, C, and F, although allegedly from
different sources, are all spreadsheets with similar formatting,
the same type of font, and no markings on the exhibits to trace
them to their sources. In fact, the formatting on Exhibit C looks
very similar to Exhibit B, which is a list created by Plaintiffs of
at least 139 alleged instances that Plaintiffs had identified where
Defendant admitted it was to provide primary payment on behalf of
Enrollees.

Thus, the Court is faced with a messy Complaint, improper exhibits,
and Plaintiffs' inconsistent arguments. Although the Court will do
its best to construe the Complaint in Plaintiffs' favor, the
Complaint will only survive if, despite these inconsistencies,
Plaintiffs have alleged facts that affirmatively and plausibly
suggest that Plaintiffs have standing to sue.

Standing

In order for Plaintiffs to have standing in this putative class
action, the Complaint must plausibly allege that (1) HIPGNY
personally suffered some actual injury as a result of illegal
conduct by Defendant and (2) Plaintiffs have been assigned the
right to sue by HIPGNY. Thus, the first step is for the Court to
determine whether HIPGNY was injured by Defendant in the
representative R.L. claim.

In reviewing a written contract, such as an assignment agreement, a
trial court's primary objective is to give effect to the intent of
the parties as revealed by the language they chose to use. Language
is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one meaning when viewed
objectively by a reasonably intelligent person who has examined the
context of the entire integrated agreement and who is cognizant of
the customs, practices, usages and terminology as generally
understood in the particular trade or business.

After carefully reviewing the Complaint and its exhibits, the Court
finds that Plaintiffs have not properly alleged that they have been
assigned the right to sue based on the R.L. claim. The Complaint
broadly alleges that HIPGNY assigned certain rights to MSP
Recovery, LLC and Series 16-08-483, but it does not actually allege
whether R.L.'s claim was included in that assignment.

Specifically, the Complaint alleges that the March Assignment
irrevocably assigned all rights to recover conditional payments
made on behalf of its Enrollees to Series 16-08-483, a designated
series of MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC and to MSP Recovery, LLC,
a Florida Limited Liability Company.

However, Exhibit D2, which Plaintiffs originally claimed was the
March Assignment Agreement, shows that the agreement assigned only
the Assigned Medicare Recovery Claims, and excluded the Assignor
Retained Claims from the assignment. There is nothing in the record
to show whether the R.L. claim is one of the Assigned Medicare
Recovery Claims or one of the Assignor Retained Claims. Thus, the
Court agrees with Defendant that there is no way to identify
whether the R.L. claim the exemplar claim here has been assigned.

That ambiguity is fatal to Plaintiffs' claim that they have
standing, and the case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Therefore, the Complaint must be dismissed because it fails to
plausibly allege standing.

Accordingly, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 5, 2019
Memorandum Decision and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yyzrvr8l from Leagle.com.

MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company & Series 16-08-483, a series of MSP Recovery Claims, Series
LLC, Plaintiffs, represented by James L. Ferraro, The Ferraro Law
Firm, 600 Brickell Avenue, Suite 3800, Miami, FL 33131

New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company, a New York
corporation, Defendant, represented by Michael F. Perley --
mfp@hurwitzfine.com -- Hurwitz, Fine Law Firm & Amber E. Storr --
aes@hurwitzfine.com -- Hurwitz, Fine Law Firm.


NEW YORK: Class Suit Over Sealed Arrests Filed
----------------------------------------------
New York Daily News reports that a case challenging the NYPD's
access to sealed arrests is now a class action lawsuit that could
involve millions of people, a judge ruled Thursday.

The Bronx Defenders, which filed the suit, said the decision by
Manhattan Supreme Court Justice Lyle Frank is a sign the NYPD
should reform its rules regarding arrests that were subsequently
dismissed and sealed or reduced to a criminal violation.

"The NYPD relies heavily on sealed arrest information. It
disseminates a massive amount of that information through its
databases," Bronx Defender Jenn Borchetta said. "The NYPD should
see the writing on the wall and start draining its databases of
sealed arrest information."

The class action includes anyone whose sealed arrest records are
currently in the NYPD's possession. Borchetta said her office
already received information from the department indicating they
have records dating back to the 1980s. There were 400,000 sealed
arrests between 2014 and 2016 that the NYPD maintains access to,
according to Frank's decision. That means millions of people could
be part of the class action suit, Borchetta said.

A judge has previously written that state law plainly requires the
NYPD to obtain a court order if it wants access to information from
sealed arrests. State law requires the NYPD destroy all records,
including fingerprints, mugshots and arrest reports, if someone is
found not guilty or the charges are dropped, the Bronx Defenders
argue.

Instead, the information is used in several NYPD databases. The
Bronx Defenders believe that mugshots from sealed arrests are also
run through the Department's facial recognition programs.

Members of the class action shouldn't wait for a check in the mail
should the case settle. The suit only seeks reform of NYPD
policies.

"We believe that certification of the class is an unnecessary
procedural step which does not have a bearing on the merits of the
case," a spokesman for the city Law Department said.

The lawsuit was filed last year by two men using pseudonyms. One
man, R.C., was charged with robbery in 2015 because NYPD officers
used his photo in a lineup from a years-old dismissed arrest,
according to court papers. The robbery occurred in the Bronx at a
time when R.C. was out of state, but he had to fight the case for a
year and a half, according to the suit. [GN]


NIANTIC INC: 2016 Pokemon Go Class Suit Over Trespassing Settled
----------------------------------------------------------------
Sam Desatoff, writing for Game Daily.Biz, reports that when Pokemon
GO launched three years ago, it got an entire generation of
smartphone users outside and walking around. Niantic's AR
experiment worked a bit too well, however, and some property owners
found themselves with unwanted visitors after their homes had been
turned into pokestops or gyms. The result was a class action
lawsuit by 12 plaintiffs against Niantic for trespassing.

Now, three years later, Niantic has agreed to settle the suit --
without accepting liability -- and finds itself with $4 million in
legal fees. It will also pay the plaintiffs $1000 each.

For Brandon Huffman, Esq. -- brandon@odinlaw.com -- an attorney at
Odin Law, the relatively low payouts to the plaintiffs means
Niantic accrues little risk in choosing to settle the case. "The
settlement is a little surprising, but it seems like Niantic
decided a settlement with little economic impact was better than
the risk of a precedent that land ownership translates to ownership
over the AR space," Huffman told GameDaily.

In addition to the payouts, Niantic has agreed to implement
anti-trespassing messaging into Pokémon GO. It will also cease
placing pokéstops and gyms near single-family residences or other
potentially problematic locations. One clause of the settlement
states that if a pokéstop or gym is placed within 40 meters of a
residence, the owners may file with Niantic to have it removed.

The laws surrounding augmented reality as it pertains to
trespassing and private property are muddy at best at this point.
It's relatively uncharted territory as far as current legislation
is concerned.

"Trespassing laws definitely do not account for AR," Huffman said.
"Old laws get awkwardly applied to new technology all the time. I'm
not a New Jersey [where the suit was filed, ed.] lawyer, but some
quick research suggests that in New Jersey, an action for trespass
arises upon the unauthorized entry onto another's property, real or
personal. There is no case that I am aware of that conveys any
property right to an artificial space overlaying reality."

Niantic's choice to settle the case is unlikely to alter laws as
they currently exist, Huffman said. "By settling, Niantic has
avoided creating any legal precedent. They've opted instead to
enter into an agreement that binds them to certain safeguards --
but only related to this product and this case. I think we will be
in a holding pattern for quite some time."

Because the case has had no quantifiable impact on trespassing law,
there's always a chance of a repeat suit. Huffman sees this as
unlikely, though, given the size of this case and the attention it
has received.

"New causes of action or new facts (for example, release of Harry
Potter: Wizards Unite) might create opportunity for adventurous
plaintiffs' attorneys, though," he added. [GN]


OMNICELL INC: Bernstein Liebhard Files Securities Fraud Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard LLP, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law
firm, reminds investors of the deadline to make a motion for lead
plaintiff in a securities class action lawsuit has been filed on
behalf of investors who purchased shares of Omnicell Inc.
("Omnicell" or the "Company") (OMCL) between October 25, 2018, and
July 11, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The lawsuit, which
was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California, seeks to recover damages under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

If you purchased Omnicell securities, and/or would like to discuss
your legal rights and options please visit Omnicell OMCL
Shareholder Class Action or contact Matthew E. Guarnero toll free
at (877) 779-1414 or MGuarnero@bernlieb.com.

According to the lawsuit, throughout the Class Period, Defendants
failed to disclose: (1) that the Company recognized revenue for
certain transactions before fulfilling its performance obligations;
(2) that the Company engaged in improper accounting practices to
meet revenue targets; (3) that the Company experienced weaker
demand for new product lines than it had previously projected; (4)
that, as a result, the Company would be required to write-off
certain inventory; (5) that the Company misclassified certain
expenses as capitalized expenditures; and (6) that, as a result of
the foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects were materially misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

On July 11, 2019, GlassHouse Research LLC published a report
entitled "Ominous Omnicell, Inc. (OMCL) Delays the Inevitable." The
report concluded that Omnicell prematurely recognized $38.3 million
in sales that should have been recognized long-term consistent with
the Company's performance obligations. Among other things, the
report alleged that Omnicell's "new product lines [were] previously
pushed onto hospitals, GPOs, and other customers to the point where
they are stuffed with products and hesitant to procure any more
inventory, especially when dealing with implementation issues." The
report further stated that, due to these accounting practices, the
Company would be required to write off $23 million of obsolete
inventory. Due to inconsistent increases in capitalized expenses
and prepaid commissions, the report alleged that $38.0 million in
capitalized expenditures should have been expensed.

On this news, the Company's stock price fell $11.41 per share, or
nearly 14%, to close at $75.11 per share on July 11, 2019, on
unusually heavy trading volume.

If you purchased Omnicell securities, and/or would like to discuss
your legal rights and options please visit
https://www.bernlieb.com/cases/omnicellinc-omcl-shareholder-lawsuit-class-action-stock-fraud-154/apply/
or contact Matthew E. Guarnero toll free at (877) 779-1414 or
MGuarnero@bernlieb.com

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff you must move the court no
later than September 16, 2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require
that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you choose to take no action,
you may remain an absent class member.

Since 1993, Bernstein Liebhard LLP has recovered over $3.5 billion
for its clients. In addition to representing individual investors,
the Firm has been retained by some of the largest public and
private pension funds in the country to monitor their assets and
pursue litigation on their behalf. As a result of its success
litigating hundreds of lawsuits and class actions, the Firm has
been named to The National Law Journal's "Plaintiffs' Hot List"
thirteen times and listed in The Legal 500 for ten consecutive
years.

Contact:

         Contact Information:
         Matthew E. Guarnero, Esq.
         Bernstein Liebhard LLP
         Website: https://www.bernlieb.com
         Tel: (877) 779-1414
         Email: MGuarnero@bernlieb.com [GN]


OTG MANAGEMENT: Filho Files Suit to Recover Unpaid Wages, Tips
--------------------------------------------------------------
DAFINIS FILHO, RAQUEL ERNEST, and CHANTEL LYNCH on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. OTG
Management, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-08287 (S.D. N.Y.,
Sept. 5, 2019) is a lawsuit seeking to recover minimum wages,
overtime compensation, misappropriated tips, and statutory
penalties for Plaintiffs and their similarly situated
co-workers--servers, bartenders, and other tipped workers who work
or have worked at OTG Management nationwide.

Plaintiffs also bring this action on behalf of themselves and
Tipped-Workers who elect to opt in to this action pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act, the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to
remedy violations of the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law, the
supporting New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development
regulations, the New York Labor Law, and the supporting New York
State Department of Labor Regulations.

Instead of paying Tipped-Workers the full minimum wage, OTG
Management took a "tip credit" against the minimum wage, the
complaint asserts. OTG Management did not satisfy the strict
requirements under the FLSA, NYLL, and the NJWL that would allow it
to take a "tip credit" against its minimum wage obligations.
Pursuant to its policy and practice, OTG Management failed to
provide Tipped-Workers with the statutorily required notice that
OTG Management intended to pay them a reduced minimum wage rate;
and OTG Management required Tipped-Workers to perform non-tip
producing side work unrelated to their tipped occupation. As a
result, Tipped-Workers are engaged in a dual occupation while being
compensated at the tip credit rate. OTG Management also required
Tipped-Workers to spend a substantial amount of time, more than 20
percent, performing non-tip-producing side work related to the
employees' tipped occupation.

Although Plaintiffs and Tipped-Workers continued to perform work
for OTG Management after their managers clocked them out, they did
so off-the-clock and without compensation. Some of the work that
Plaintiffs and Tipped-Workers performed off-the-clock was in excess
of 40 hours in a workweek, adds the complaint.

Plaintiffs were employed by OTG Management as a server and
bartender at its restaurants and bars.

OTG Management, LLC is a privately-owned company that owns and
operates hundreds of restaurants, bars, and retail stores in
airport terminals across North America.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Molly A. Brooks, Esq.
     Jalise R. Burt, Esq.
     OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
     685 Third Avenue, 25th Floor
     New York, NY 10017
     Phone: (212) 245-1000


OXY USA: Order Denying Bid to Remand Copper Clark Suit Flipped
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, issued an Order
and Judgment reversing the District Court's decision denying
Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand in the case captioned COOPER CLARK
FOUNDATION, on behalf of itself and others similarly situated;
PHILLIP FINK, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. OXY USA INC., Defendant-Appellee. No.
19-3136. (10th Cir.).

Plaintiffs Cooper Clark Foundation and Phillip Fink filed three
separate class actions in Kansas state courts in three different
counties on behalf of three different classes of royalty owners in
oil and gas wells in Kansas.  After litigating the cases separately
for some time, plaintiffs in each class action moved to consolidate
their cases under Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 60-242(a), which permits
consolidation when cases share a common question of law or fact.
Plaintiffs sought consolidation to more efficiently and
economically litigate the three actions. The state court granted
the motion.

Defendant Oxy USA Inc. subsequently filed a notice of removal,
asserting that the federal district court has jurisdiction over the
consolidated action under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
(CAFA), after aggregating the amount of damages from all three
state actions. CAFA gives federal courts jurisdiction over certain
class actions, defined in Section 1332(d)(1), if the class has more
than 100 members, the parties are minimally diverse, and the amount
in controversy exceeds $5 million.

Plaintiffs moved to remand the action to state court, arguing that
the amount in controversy for federal jurisdiction under CAFA had
not been satisfied because the amounts at issue in the three state
actions could not be aggregated to determine jurisdiction. The
district court denied the motion to remand, and plaintiffs
petitioned this court for permission to file an interlocutory
appeal challenging that decision.

The Court granted permission, and this appeal followed.

The Court reviews de novo the district court's decision denying
plaintiffs' motion to remand to state court. The narrow issue in
this case is whether the consolidation of the three class actions
in Kansas state court resulted in a merger of the consolidated
cases such that they could be treated as one action for the purpose
of determining whether the action met the amount in controversy
required for federal jurisdiction under CAFA.

To resolve the dispute, the district court considered whether
consolidation under § 60-242(a) means the same thing as
consolidation under Rule 42. The Supreme Court recently reiterated
that, under Rule 42, consolidation is not equivalent to merger and
consolidated cases do not lose their separate identities because of
consolidation.   

The district court concluded, however, that Kansas would not follow
the federal interpretation of consolidation; it predicted instead
that the Kansas Supreme Court would hold that consolidation under
section 60-242(a)(2) results in a merger of the consolidated cases
into a single case.

Here, in denying plaintiffs' motion to remand, the district court
concluded that there is no indication that, by the adoption of the
federal rules, the legislature intended to change the prior meaning
of terms that had specific meaning and were not defined by the new
statute. Clearly, Kansas courts interpreted consolidation to mean
merger prior to the adoption of the new statute.

But the district court cited no authority for the proposition that
Kansas would follow the interpretation of a statute after it was
repealed and replaced with a statute that is virtually identical to
Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

And the district court failed to address the different language in
the two statutes or to consider how the Kansas Supreme Court has
analyzed the question of consolidation under the two statutes.

The Court therefore disagrees with the district court that
consolidation had a specific meaning that equated to merger, which
would carry over to Section 60-242(a) after the repeal of Section
60-675. Instead, the Court agrees with plaintiffs that the Kansas
Supreme Court would likely interpret consolidation under Section
60-242(a) consistent with federal authority interpreting Rule 42.
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that consolidation
does not equal complete merger; instead, the constituent cases
retain their separate identities and are entitled to separate
verdicts, judgments, and appeals.

The Court holds the district court erred in concluding that the
consolidated class actions were merged into one single action for
the purpose of determining the amount in controversy under CAFA.
Without a merger and a corresponding aggregation of damages, Oxy
has not met its burden of establishing the requisite amount in
controversy for federal jurisdiction under CAFA.

The Court therefore reverses and remands to the district court with
instructions to that court to enter an order granting the
plaintiffs' motion to remand the case to state court.

A full-text copy of the Tenth Circuit's September 5, 2019 Order and
Judgment is available  https://tinyurl.com/yy5u9hkj from
Leagle.com.


PEARSON CLINICAL: Parent Files Class-Action Suit After Data Breach
------------------------------------------------------------------
CBS Chicago reports that a mother filed a federal class-action
lawsuit on her daughter's behalf Sept. 6, 2019, after nearly a
million students nationwide had their personal information exposed
in a data breach by a company used to track student academic
progress.

The Indian Prairie School District 204 in Naperville was among the
academic districts affected.

The woman, identified as Kylie S., was seeking class-action status
in the lawsuit filed in U.S. District Court in Chicago against
Pearson Clinical Assessment.  Kylie S. sued on behalf of her
daughter, K.S., and on behalf of "all other similarly situated
individuals."

The lawsuit said in November 2018, the data breach affected nearly
1 million students enrolled in about 13,000 schools in at least 13
states. Among the data stolen were first and last names, dates of
birth, email addresses, and unique student identification numbers.

Indian Prairie School District 204 in Naperville said the
information stored for 49,000 students and 2,300 teachers was
exposed in the Pearson data breach.

According to Pearson, the data was from the 2001 to 2016 school
years.

The suit said Pearson Clinical Assessment failed to have systems in
place to protect the breach, and only took action after the FBI got
involved and informed the company in March of this year.

"Even then, Pearson concealed its knowledge of the breach from
students and their guardians until July 2019 when Pearson Clinical
finally notified impacted schools and released a public statement,"
the lawsuit said. "In disclosing the Data Breach, Defendants
concealed the true extent of the breach to minimize the impact on
their reputations."

The suit said Pearson first claimed that the data breach was
isolated to victims' first and last names, and "in some instances"
dates of birth and/or email addresses – when in fact, student
identification numbers were also exposed and the exposure of dates
of birth and email addresses was far greater than Pearson claimed.

Pearson said it had no evidence that the data had been misused, but
"tacitly acknowledged the actual and certainly imminent injuries
suffered by victims of the Data Breach by offering such victims one
year of complimentary credit monitoring services," the lawsuit
said.

The suit claimed that because of Pearson's negligence, those who
had their personal information exposed will be subjected to "a
never-ending threat of identity theft, extortion, bullying and
harassment." The students who were affected will now have to place
fraud alerts and security freezes on their credit reports, monitor
their credit reports for unusual activity, and get new student
identification numbers while changing email addresses and account
passwords, the suit said.

The suit also accused Pearson of failing to comply with Federal
Trade Commission security requirements.

The lawsuit accused Pearson negligence, breach of express and
implied contract, unjust enrichment, intrusion upon seclusion, and
for Illinois plaintiffs, violations of Illinois fraud, deceptive
trade, and personal information protection laws.

The suit called for "all monetary and non-monetary relief allowed
by law, including injunctive relief and reasonable attorneys'
fees."

Pearson bills itself as the "world's learning company" and operates
in all 50 states and several dozen countries, according to the law
firm Loevy & Loevy, which filed the suit.

Published reports indicated that the breach affected students in
Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Missouri, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and South
Carolina, Loevy & Loevy said. [GN]


PEARSON PLC: Faces K.S. Suit over AIMSweb Data Breach
-----------------------------------------------------
KYLIE S., individually and as legal guardian for her minor daughter
K.S., individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated
individuals, the Plaintiff, v. PEARSON, plc, doing business as
Pearson Clinical Assessments, and NCS Pearson, Inc., the
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05936 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 5, 2019),
alleges that Defendants disregarded the rights of Plaintiff and the
Classes by intentionally, willfully, recklessly or negligently:

     (a) failing to take adequate and reasonable measures to ensure
the security of AIMSweb 1.0 platform;

     (b) concealing or otherwise omitting the material fact that
they did not have systems in place to safeguard Personally
identifiable information (PII);

     (c) failing to take available steps to detect and prevent the
Data Breach;

     (d) failing to monitor AIMSweb and to timely detect the Data
Breach; and

     (e) failing to provide Plaintiff and the Classes prompt and
accurate notice of the Data Breach.

In November 2018, Pearson failed to exercise reasonable care in
securing and safeguarding the sensitive data stored in its AIMSweb
1.0 platform of nearly one million students enrolled in
approximately 13,000 schools in at least 13 states across the
United States resulting in the theft of that data.

Among the data stolen was first and last names, dates of birth,
email addresses and unique student identification numbers
(collectively, PII).

Pearson failed to have available systems in place to detect the
breach on its own. Only after the Federal Bureau of Investigation
informed Pearson of the Data Breach in March 2019 did Pearson begin
to take action to secure the student' data. Even then, Pearson
concealed its knowledge of the breach from students and their
guardians until July 2019 when Pearson Clinical finally notified
impacted schools and released a public statement. In disclosing the
Data Breach, Defendants concealed the true extent of the breach to
minimize the impact on their reputations.

The Data Breach resulted from Defendants' failure to secure and
protect the PII students were compelled to provide to Defendants.
These students now have to live the rest of their lives knowing
that criminals have the ability to compile, build and amass their
profiles for decades -- exposing them to a never-ending threat of
identity theft, extortion, bullying and harassment.

As a result of Defendants' misconduct, the Data Breach compromised
the PII of Plaintiff and Class Members and made it available to
criminals for misuse, the lawsuit says.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Kanovitz, Esq.
          Scott R. Drury, Esq.
          LOEVY & LOEVY
          311 N. Aberdeen, 3rd Floor
          Chicago, IL 60607
          Telephone: 312.243.5900
          E-mail: mike@loevy.com
                  drury@loevy.com

PETROBRAS: Court Vacates $46MM Attorney's Fees Reduction
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, issued an Order
affirming in part and vacating in part the District Court's Order
granting in part and denying in part Objector-Appellant's
application for Attorney's Fees in the case captioned IN RE:
PETROBRAS SECURITIES LITIGATION, WILLIAM THOMAS HAYNES, AS TRUSTEE
FOR THE BENEFIT OF W THOMAS AND KATHERINE HAYNES IRREVOCABLE TRUST
FOR THE BENEFIT OF SARA L HAYNES, Objector-Appellant, v.
UNIVERSITIES SUPERANNUATION SCHEME LIMITED, EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT
SYSTEM OF THE STATE OF HAWAII, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TREASURER, Plaintiffs-Appellees, AURA CAPITAL LTD., DIMENSIONAL
EMERGING MARKETS VALUE FUND, DFA INVESTMENT DIMENSIONS GROUP INC.,
ON BEHALF OF ITS SERIES EMERGING MARKETS CORE EQUITY PORTFOLIO,
EMERGING MARKETS SOCIAL CORE EQUITY PORTFOLIO AND T.A. WORLD EX
U.S. CORE EQUITY PORTFOLIO, DFA INVESTMENT TRUST COMPANY, ON BEHALF
OF ITS SERIES THE EMERGING MARKETS SERIES, DFA AUSTRIA LIMITED,
SOLELY IN ITS CAPACITY AS RESPONSIBLE ENTITY FOR THE DIMENSIONAL
EMERGING MARKETS TRUST, DFA INTERNATIONAL CORE EQUITY FUND, AND DFA
INTERNATIONAL VECTOR EQUITY FUND BY DIMENSIONAL FUND ADVISORS
CANADA ULC SOLELY IN ITS CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE, DIMENSIONAL FUNDS
PLC, ON BEHALF OF ITS SUB-FUND EMERGING MARKETS VALUE FUND,
DIMENSIONAL FUNDS ICVC, ON BEHALF OF ITS SUB-FUND EMERGING MARKETS
CORE EQUITY FUND, SKAGEN AS, DANSKE INVEST MANAGEMENT A/S, DANSKE
INVEST MANAGEMENT COMPANY, NEW YORK CITY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT
SYSTEM, NEW YORK CITY POLICE PENSION FUND, BOARD OF EDUCATION
RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, TEACHERS' RETIREMENT
SYSTEM OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT
PENSION FUND, NEW YORK CITY DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLAN, FORSTA
AP-FONDEN, TRANSAMERICA INCOME SHARES, INC., TRANSAMERICA FUNDS,
TRANSAMERICA SERIES TRUST, TRANSAMERICA PARTNERS PORTFOLIOS, JOHN
HANCOCK VARIABLE INSURANCE TRUST, JOHN HANCOCK FUNDS II, JOHN
HANCOCK SOVEREIGN BOND FUND, JOHN HANCOCK BOND TRUST, JOHN HANCOCK
STRATEGIC SERIES, JOHN HANCOCK INVESTMENT TRUST, JHF INCOME
SECURITIES TRUST, JHF INVESTORS TRUST, JHF HEDGED EQUITY & INCOME
FUND, ABERDEEN EMERGING MARKETS EQUITY FUND, ABERDEEN GLOBAL EQUITY
& INCOME FUND, ABERDEEN GLOBAL NATURAL RESOURCES FUND, ABERDEEN
INTERNATIONAL EQUITY FUND, EACH A SERIES OF ABERDEEN FUNDS;
ABERDEEN CANADA EMERGING MARKETS FUND, ABERDEEN CANADA SOCIALLY
RESPONSIBLE GLOBAL FUND, ABERDEEN CANADA SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE
INTERNATIONAL FUND, ABERDEEN CANADA FUNDS EAFE PLUS EQUITY FUND AND
ABERDEEN CANADA FUNDS GLOBAL EQUITY FUND, EACH A SERIES OF ABERDEEN
CANADA FUNDS, ABERDEEN EAFE PLUS ETHICAL FUND, ABERDEEN EAFE PLUS
FUND, ABERDEEEN EAFF PLUS SRI FUND, ABERDEEEN EMERGING MARKETS
EQUITY FUND, AND ABERDEEN GLOBAL EQUITY FUND, EACH A SERIES OF
ABERDEEN INTITUTIONAL C, ABERDEEN FULLY HEDGED INTERNATIONAL
EQUITIES FUND, ABERDEEN INTERNATIONAL EQUITY FUND, ABERDEEN GLOBAL
ETHICAL WORLD EQUITY FUND, ABERDEEN GLOBAL RESPONSIBLE WORLD EQUITY
FUND, ABERDEEN GLOBAL WORLD EQUITY DIVIDEND FUND, ABERDEEN GLOBAL
WORLD EQUITY FUND, ABERDEEN GLOBAL WORLD RESOURCES EQUITY FUND,
ABERDEEN EMERGING MARKETS EQUITY FUND, ABERDEEN ETHICAL WORLD
EQUITY FUND, ABERDEEN MULTI-ASSET FUND, ABERDEEN WORLD EQUITY FUND,
ABERDEEN WORLD EQUITY IN, ABERDEEN LATIN AMERICA EQUITY FUND, INC.,
ABERDEEN LATIN AMERICA EQUITY FUND, INC., AAAID EQUITY PORTFOLIO,
ALBERTA TEACHERS RETIREMENT FUND, AON HEWITT INVESTMENT CONSULTING,
INC., AURION INTERNATIONAL DAILY EQUITY FUND, BELL ALIANT REGIONAL
COMMUNICATIONS INC., BMO GLOBAL EQUITY CLASS, CITY OF ALBANY
PENSION PLAN, DESJARDINS DIVIDEND INCOME FUND, DESJARDINS EMERGING
MARKETS FUND, DESJARDINS EMERGING MARKETS FUND, DESJARDINS GLOBAL
ALL CAPITAL EQUITY FUND, DESJARDINS OVERSEAS EQUITY VALUE FUND,
DEVON COUNTY COUNCIL GLOBAL EMERGING MARKET FUND, DEVON COUNTY
COUNCIL GLOBAL EQUITY FUND, DGIA EMERGING MARKETS EQUITY FUND L.P.,
ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, FIRST TRUST/ABERDEEN EMERGING OPPORTUNITY
FUND, GE UK PENSION COMMON INVESTMENT FUND, HAMPSHIRE COUNTY
COUNCIL GLOBAL EQUITY PORTFOLIO, LONDON BOROUGH OF HOUNSLOW
SUPPERANNUATION FUND, MACKENZIE UNIVERSAL SUSTAINABLE OPPORTUNITIES
CLASS, MARSHFIELD CLINIC, MOTHER THERESA CARE AND MISSION TRUST,
MTR CORPORATION LIMITED RETIREMENT SCHEME, MYRIA ASSET MANAGMENT
EMERGENCE, M, NATIONAL PENSION SERVICE, AND NPS TRUST ACTIVE 14,
OHIO PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, WASHINGTON STATE
INVESTMENT BOARD, ABERDEEN LATIN AMERICAN INCOME FUND LIMITED,
ABERDEEN GLOBAL EX JAPAN PENSION FUND PPIT, FS INTERNATIONAL EQUITY
MOTHER FUND, NN INVESTMENT PARTNERS B.V., ACTING IN THE CAPACITY OF
MANAGEMENT, NN INVESTMENT PARTNERS B.V., ACTING IN THE CAPACITY OF
MANAGEMENT COMPANY OF THE MUTUAL FUND NN GLOBAL EQUITY FUND, NN
INVESTMENT PARTNERS B.V., ACTING IN THE CAPACITY OF MANAGEMENT
COMPANY OF THE MUITUAL FUND NN HOOG DIVIDEND AANDELEN FONDS, NN
INVESTMENT PARTNERS B.V., ACTING IN THE CAPACITY OF MANAGEMENT
COPMANY OF THE MUTUAL FUND NN INSTITUTIONEEL DIVIDEND AANDELEN, NN
INVESTMENT PARTNERS LUXEMBOURG S.A., ACTING IN THE CAPACITY OF
MANAGEMENT COMPANY SICAV AND ITS SUB-FUNDS, AND NN (L) SICA, FOR
AND ON BEHALF OF NN (L) EMERGING MARKETS HIGH DIVIDEND, NN (L)
FIRST, AURA CAPITAL LTD., WGI EMERGING MARKETS FUND, LLC, BILL AND
MELINDA GATES FOUNDATION TRUST, BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF TEXAS SYSTEM, TRUSTEES OF THE ESTATE OF BERNICE PAUAHI BISHOP,
DBA KAMEHAMEHA SCHOOLS, LOUIS KENNEDY, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF
OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, KEN NGO, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON
BEHALF OF ALL OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED, CITY OF PROVIDENCE,
INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED,
HANDELSBANKEN FONDER AB, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF
IDAHO, PETER KALTMAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, UNION ASSET MANAGEMENT HOLDING AG, JONATHAN
MESSING, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiffs, v. MARIANGELA MOINTEIRO TIZATTO, JOSUE
CHRISTIANO GOME DA SILVA, DANIEL LIMA DE OLIVEIRA, JOSE SERGIO
GABRIELLI, SILVIO SINEDINO PINHEIRO, PAULO ROBERTO COSTA, JOSE
CARLOS COSENZA, RENATO DE SOUZA DUQUE, GUILLHERME DE OLIVEIRA
ESTRELLA, JOSE MIRANDA FORMIGL FILHO, MARIA DAS GRACAS SILVA
FOSTER, ALMIR GUILHERME BARBASSA, SERVIO TULIO DA ROSA TINOCO,
PAULO JOSE ALVES, GUSTAVO TARDIN BARBOSA, ALEXANDRE QUINTAO
FERNANDES, MARCOS ANTONIO ZACARIAS, CORNELIS FRANCISCUS JOZE
LOOMAN, SANTANDER INVESTMENT SECURITIES INC., BANCO VOTORANTIN
NASSAU BRANCH, PETROLEO BRASILEIRO S.A. PETROBRAS, BB SECURITIES
LTD., THEODORE MARSHALL HELMS, PETROBRAS GLOBAL FINANCE B.V.,
PETROBRAS AMERICA INC., JOSE RAIMUNDO BRANDA PEREIRA, CITIGROUP
GLOBAL MARKETS INC., JP MORGAN SECURITIES LLC, MORGAN STANLEY & CO.
LLC, MITSUBISHI UFJ SECURITIES (USA), INC., HSBC SECURITIES (USA)
INC., MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH INCORPORATED, STANDARD
CHARTERED BANK, BANK OF CHINA (HONG KONG) LIMITED, BANCO BRADESCO
BBI S.A., BANCA IMI, S.P.A., SCOTIA CAPITAL (USA) INC.,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS AUDITORES INDEPENDENTES, ITAU BBA USA
SECURITIES, INC., Defendants. No. 18-2708 (2nd Cir.).

Objector-Appellant William Thomas Haynes, as trustee for the
benefit of the W. Thomas and Katherine Haynes Irrevocable Trust for
the benefit of Sara L. Haynes, appeals from an order of the
district court granting in part and denying in part his application
for attorneys' fees.

The district court overruled all of Haynes's certification
objections and found most of his fee objections unhelpful. But the
district court did reduce class counsel's fee award by
approximately $46 million based on Haynes's objection that
Plaintiffs improperly classified certain costs.

Haynes then sought $199,400 in attorneys' fees based on his
objections. The district court awarded $11,731.65 in fees, which,
according to the district court, represented a reasonable fee for
the hours spent on Haynes's one successful objection.  

A district court's fee award is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
This Court has recognized the valuable and important role of
objectors, holding that objectors are entitled to an allowance as
compensation for attorneys' fees and expenses where a proper
showing has been made that the settlement was improved as a result
of their effort.

Here, it seems to us that many of Haynes's fee objections may in
fact involve a common core of facts, all relating to Plaintiff's
alleged overbilling, use of foreign attorneys, and other
case-related factual questions. For instance, as to both
Plaintiffs' Brazilian attorneys and its domestic attorneys, Haynes
argued that Plaintiffs made the same mistake: they did not submit a
fee request at cost for nonlegal work. Haynes contended, then, that
there was a recognizable pattern and method of overbilling across
Plaintiffs' attorneys.

Similarly, Haynes argued that Plaintiffs did not submit sufficient
billing summaries as to any of its attorneys. These links between
Haynes's fee objections suggest to us a potential common core of
facts. Unfortunately, it is impossible for the Court to properly
apply the relevant standard of review abuse of discretion because
the district court entirely failed to explain its thought process
on this point. It did not explain whether it simply did not
consider if all the arguments made in Haynes's objection were
sufficiently related to justify a larger fee award, or whether it
did consider it but decided that the arguments were not
sufficiently related.

In general, the Court require district courts to provide a concise
but clear explanation of its reasons for excluding time from an
award of attorneys' fees. This requirement that a court state its
reasons for excluding hours as specifically as possible is crucial
in order to permit meaningful appellate review.

The Court therefore vacates and remands for the district court to
fully explain whether, and why, it deemed Haynes's various
arguments so separate as to warrant being viewed as a series of
discrete claims.

So too here. It is undisputed that Haynes was subject to discovery
if he chose to participate as an objector. The district court
therefore reasonably could have concluded that it would have been
quite impossible for Haynes to raise his successful objection
without hours spent on those preliminary matters. The court also
may have decided that the hours billed were unreasonable. But the
Court do not know because the district court did not say. The Court
therefore also vacates this aspect of the district court's order
and remand for further proceedings.

The Court have considered Haynes's remaining arguments and find
them to be without merit. The order of the district court is
affirmed in part and vacated in part, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this order.

A full-text copy of the Second Circuit's September 5, 2019 Order is
available https://tinyurl.com/y6qcoga7 from Leagle.com.

ANNA ST. JOHN (Theodore H. Frank, Adam E. Schulman, on the brief),
Competitive Enterprise Institute, Center for Class Action Fairness,
1310 L Street NW, 7th Floor, Washington, DC 20005, Appearing for
Objector-Appellant:

JEREMY A. LIEBERMAN -- jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Emma Gilmore --
egilmore@pomlaw.com -- Brenda Szydlo -- bszydlo@pomlaw.com --
Jennifer Banner Sobers -- jbsobers@pomlaw.com -- on the brief),
Pomerantz LLP, New York, NY, Appearing for Plaintiffs-Appellees.


PLATINUM RESTAURANTS: Class of Servers Certified in Green Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable Rebecca Grady Jennings granted the Plaintiffs' motion
for class certification in the lawsuit entitled LAUREN GREEN, et
al. v. PLATINUM RESTAURANTS MID-AMERICA, LLC d/b/a EDDIE MERLOT'S
PRIME AGED BEEF AND SEAFOOD, Case No. 3:14-cv-00439-RGJ-RSE (W.D.
Ky.).

The class is defined as:

     All Servers, Cocktail Servers, and Bartenders employed by
     the defendant in its Louisville restaurant since it opened
     on January 6, 2011.

The Plaintiffs' counsel are appointed class counsel under Rule
23(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

According to the Court's Memorandum Opinion & Order, the action is
scheduled for a telephonic status conference before the Court on
November 18, 2019, at 11:00 a.m.  The Court will place the call to
counsel.

The Plaintiffs brought this hybrid collective action and putative
class action against the Defendant, Platinum Restaurants
Mid-America, LLC, for alleged violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and Kentucky wage and hour laws. Platinum owns Eddie
Merlot's Prime Aged Beef and Seafood Restaurant in Louisville
Kentucky.  The Named Plaintiffs are all former or current Eddie
Merlot's servers, cocktail servers, or bartenders.

Among other alleged Kentucky wage and hour law and FLSA violations,
Plaintiffs claim Platinum violated KRS 337.065 and KRS 337.385 by
forcing the Plaintiffs to participate in a mandatory tip pool.
According to the Plaintiffs, servers, cocktail servers, and
bartenders were all required as a condition of employment to
participate in a tip pool established and controlled by Eddie
Merlot's management in which they had to pay a certain percentage
of the tips they received from customers to bussers, food runners,
and sometimes managers.  As a result, Eddie Merlot's allegedly
illegally claimed a tip credit for each Plaintiff and paid them
below minimum wage.  The Plaintiffs seek damages for lost wages in
the amount of the tip credit claimed for each of them by Eddie
Merlot's.  The Plaintiffs also seek an equal amount in liquidated
damages and attorneys' fees under KRS 337.385.[CC]


PLURALSIGHT INC: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Fraud Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, reminds
purchasers of the securities of Pluralsight, Inc. (NASDAQ: PS) from
August 2, 2018 through July 31, 2019, inclusive (the "Class
Period") of the important October 15, 2019 lead plaintiff deadline
in the case. The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Pluralsight
investors under the federal securities laws.

To join the Pluralsight class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1655.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Pluralsight was experiencing sales execution challenges
which impacted its billings; (2) Pluralsight was experiencing
substantial delays in hiring and properly training its salesforce
that would be necessary to meet its lofty billing projections; (3)
Pluralsight was behind on the onboarding of new sales
representatives which was causing sales execution issues and
preventing the Company from meeting its high growth projections;
and (4) as a result, Pluralsight's public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times. When the
true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that investors
suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than October
15, 2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If you
wish to join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1655.htmlor to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013.   Rosen Law Firm has secured hundreds
of millions of dollars for investors.

Contact Information:

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
         New York, NY 10016
         Tel: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com   
                cases@rosenlegal.com
         Website: www.rosenlegal.com [GN]


PROLINK STAFFING: Clay Suit Seeks Payment of All Wages Due
----------------------------------------------------------
DEBORAH CLAY, an individual on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PROLINK STAFFING SERVICES, LLC;
and DOES 1 to 10 inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 5:19-cv-01697
(C.D. Cal., Sept. 5, 2019) is a California-wide class action
against Prolink for (1) failing to include the value of per diem
pay in the regular rate of pay when calculating overtime wages and
(2) failing to pay all wages owing at the termination of
employment.

During Plaintiff's employment with Prolink, she worked in excess of
8 hours per and 40 hours per week. As part of Plaintiff's
compensation, Plaintiff's assignment contract provided for a weekly
per diem allowance. Plaintiff was required to earn the per diem
allowance each week by satisfying minimum weekly work requirements.
Plaintiff's assignment contract required her to work 36 hours per
week. If Plaintiff failed to satisfy her weekly work requirement,
her weekly per diem payment was subject to proration pursuant to a
"Missed Shift Deduction." Prolink did not include the value of
Plaintiff's weekly per diem allowance in her regular rate of pay
when calculating her overtime and/or double time, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff Deborah Clay is a resident of California who in 2017 was
employed as a non-exempt hourly employee of Prolink in Lakewood,
California.

Prolink is a staffing company that employs hourly healthcare
professionals for short-term travel assignments at healthcare
providers throughout the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Matthew B. Hayes, Esq.
     Kye D. Pawlenko, Esq.
     HAYES PAWLENKO LLP
     595 E. Colorado Blvd., Suite 303
     Pasadena, CA 91101
     Phone: (626) 808-4357
     Fax: (626) 921-4932
     Email: mhayes@helpcounsel.com
            kpawlenko@helpcounsel.com


R & C CLEANING: Fails to Pay Minimum & Overtime Wages, Godoy Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CARMEN GODOY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. R & C CLEANING SOLUTIONS INC. and RICHARD MENESES, as
an individual, Case No. CV 19-5005 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 3, 2019),
accuses the Defendants of failing to pay minimum and overtime wages
under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law.

R & C Cleaning Solutions Inc., is a corporation organized under the
laws of New York with a principal executive office in Corona, New
York.  The Individual Defendant owns and/or operates the Company.

R & C offers both residential and commercial cleaning
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
          HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          80-02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
          Kew Gardens, NY 11415
          Telephone: (718) 263-9591
          Facsimile: (718) 263-9598
          E-mail: avshalumovr@yahoo.com


REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION: Singer Ordered to Re-File Class Cert. Bid
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Clerk of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois made a docket entry in the class action lawsuit captioned
Richard Singer v. Regional Transportation Authority, et al., Case
No. 1:18-cv-00199 (N.D. Ill.), relating to matters before the
Honorable Gary Feinerman.

The minute entry states that:

   -- At the outset of this case, and consistent with the
      procedure advised by Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d
      891 (7th Cir. 2011), the Plaintiffs filed a protective
      motion for class certification;

   -- The Plaintiff re−filed the motion in September 2018.  The
      re−filed motion has not been briefed and of course is not
      ready for decision;

   -- Due to recordkeeping issues involving the Administrative
      Office of the U.S. Courts, the Court asks the Plaintiff to
      re−file its class certification motion by September 16,
      2019;

   -- There is no need to notice the motion for presentment under
      Local Rule 5.3(b).  The re−filed motion will be deemed for
      all substantive purposes to have been filed on January 10,
      2018, and this case will remain a putative class action;

   -- The motion is denied without prejudice to renewal; and

   -- The effect of the denial is stayed until September 17,
      2019.[CC]


REGULUS THERAPEUTICS: Court Dismisses Securities Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
in the case captioned IN RE REGULUS THERAPEUTICS INC. SECURITIES
LITIGATION. Case No. 3:17-cv-0182-BTM-RBB. (S.D. Cal.).

This is a putative securities class action filed on behalf of all
purchasers of common shares of Regulus Therapeutics, Inc.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Regulus, Joseph P. Hagan, Paul C.
Grint, M.D., and Michael Huang, M.D. made misleading statements
regarding a pharmaceutical product being developed by Regulus that
artificially inflated its common stock prices during the Class
Period. Based thereon, Plaintiffs assert claims for violation of
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Section 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act.

STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
should be granted only where a plaintiff's complaint lacks a
cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a legal
claim. When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the allegations of
material fact in the plaintiff's complaint are taken as true and
construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Because
Plaintiffs claims allege securities fraud, however, they are not
subject to the general notice pleading standard of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a).

Rather, Plaintiffs must meet the higher, exacting pleading
standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).
Nevertheless, dismissal is appropriate only where the complaint
fails to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.

Section 10(b) makes it unlawful to use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance.   

To plead a claim under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, Plaintiffs
must allege: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission (2)
scienter (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission
and the purchase or sale of a security (4) reliance (5) economic
loss and (6) loss causation.

Material Misrepresentation or Omission

To establish the first element of their Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5
claims, Plaintiffs must show that each defendant made a statement
that was misleading as to a material fact. A fact is material when
there is a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the
omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as
having significantly altered the total mix of information made
available.

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants misled investors as to the safety
of RG-101when Defendants severely downplayed the connection between
RG-101 and liver toxicity and jaundice and made statements to
investors about the positive safety profile of RG-101. According to
Plaintiffs, Defendants' statements were misleading because, at the
time they were made, Defendants had preclinical and nonclinical
data linking RG-101 to liver toxicity, along with a conclusion from
one of the company's investigators possibly linking RG-101 to
Jaundice.

And while not explicitly pleaded in their Consolidated Complaint,
Plaintiffs argue that, based upon Regulus's purported assertion
that it did not investigate the mechanism for the jaundice until
July 2016 after they were forced to do so by the FDA, Defendants'
statements lacked sufficient factual basis because they were made
without looking into the preclinical information, nonclinical
models, and information already in Regulus's possession and were
further misleading because Defendants failed to disclose that they
had not investigated or researched the mechanism of liver toxicity
to determine whether RG-101 was the cause of the Jaundice SAE.

Thus, Plaintiffs argue Defendants' statements created the false
impression that (a) Regulus had reviewed its preclinical and
nonclinical information to research and investigate whether RG-101
could be the underlying cause of the Jaundice SAE; and (b) that the
research indicated that the Jaundice SAE resulted from other issues
with the patients and had no link to RG-101.

In response to Defendants' argument that the majority of the
complained-of statements were statements of opinion rather than
fact, Plaintiffs argue that such statements are nonetheless
actionable because they omitted material facts about how Defendants
reached their conclusions because they did not disclose the
existence of preclinical and nonclinical data that suggested a link
between RG-101 and liver toxicity or that Defendants had not
investigated or researched the mechanism of liver toxicity to
determine whether RG-101 was the cause of the Jaundice SAE.

Given the vague and impressionistic nature of Plaintiffs'
allegations regarding the contradictory preclinical and nonclinical
results purportedly held by Defendants, the Court has difficulty
concluding that Plaintiffs' allegations sufficiently establish the
first element of their Section 10(b) claims.   

Because Plaintiffs have failed to provide specifics as to how and
to what extent these purported preclinical and nonclinical results
suggested a link between RG-101 and liver toxicity, the Court is
unable to determine whether the complained-of statements differed
materially from the actual state of affairs that existed at the
time they were made and whether a reasonable investor would have
considered the disclosure of such results to significantly alter
the total mix of information made available.  

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently
plead the falsity of each statement at issue.

Scienter

To establish the second element of their Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5
claims, Plaintiffs must plead facts that lead to a strong inference
of scienter.  

To adequately demonstrate that the Defendants acted with the
required state of mind, Plaintiffs' complaint must allege that the
Defendants made false or misleading statements either intentionally
or with deliberate recklessness.

A securities fraud complaint will survive only if a reasonable
person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as
compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts
alleged.

Plaintiffs argue they have sufficiently demonstrated Defendants'
scienter by alleging they had nonclinical and preclinical
information that indicated liver toxicity in their studies and
received a report from their investigator that RG-101 was possibly
the cause of the reported Jaundice SAE when they made their
complained-of statements. Based thereon, Plaintiffs argue that
Defendants either knew about the internal nonclinical models
connecting RG-101 with liver toxicity, or deliberately disregarded
the results of the nonclinical models altogether when discussing
whether there could be a link between RG-101 and the Jaundice SAEs.


Plaintiffs also argue they have demonstrated Defendants were
motivated to misrepresent the viability of RG-101 because Regulus
was able to obtain additional funds via debt financing that it
otherwise would not have been unable to gain and because the
individual Defendants received lucrative salaries and other
compensation that were related to Regulus's performance.  

As an initial matter, Defendants publicly disclosed the existence
of the investigator's conclusion that RG-101 was possibly the cause
of one of the SAEs during the February 17, 2016 conference call and
further elaborated upon that conclusion during the April 15, 2016
conference call.  Thus, it is unclear to the Court how the
existence of the investigator's conclusion cuts against Defendants
given that any investors were in possession of the same information
during the Class Period.
Further, as to the alleged internal preclinical and nonclinical
reports that indicated that RG-101 could cause liver toxicity,
Plaintiffs fail to plead any particularized facts demonstrating the
individual Defendants had actual knowledge of or access to the
relevant reports and/or that the conclusion that RG-101 had a
propensity to increase bilirubin levels was so obvious that
Defendants' knowledge thereof may be presumed.   

Because of Plaintiffs' vague and impressionistic description of the
reports and their attendant findings, the Court is left to
speculate as to the parameters and import of the link between
RG-101 and liver toxicity, bilirubin, and/or jaundice and thus
whether such link would have been obvious to Defendants. Thus,
these negative characterizations of reports relied on by insiders,
without specific reference to the contents of those reports, are
insufficient to meet the heightened pleading requirements of the
PSLRA.

As to Plaintiffs' arguments concerning Regulus's debt financing
activities, such routine corporate objectives are insufficient to
establish a strong showing of scienter. And while Plaintiffs assert
that Regulus's motive in obtaining additional funds via debt
financing was not akin to the general corporate objective of
raising capital shared by all companies because Regulus would not
have been able to take out the loan if the omitted information
about RG-101 had been disclosed, the Court concludes that such
distinction is illusory because Plaintiffs' instant argument could
be made as to any company that sought financing after having
purportedly made a material misrepresentation to the public as to
any aspect of its business.

Plaintiffs' arguments regarding the Defendants' compensation are
unavailing for similar reasons.  And while it is true that a strong
correlation between financial results and stock options or cash
bonuses for individual defendants may occasionally be compelling
enough to support an inference of scienter, Plaintiffs have failed
to plead particular facts demonstrating such strong correlation.

As to Defendant Grint's May 2017 resignation, Plaintiffs have
failed to plead facts indicating that Defendant Grint's resignation
was accompanied by suspicious circumstances or otherwise related to
his purported misstatements as opposed to the failure of the RG-101
development or other unrelated business or personal reasons.   

For example, Plaintiffs' allegation that the report of Defendant
Grint's resignation did not contain any of the typical salutary
words often found in corporate statements announcing high-level
resignation" is directly contradicted by the press release issued
that same day. Further, while Plaintiff alleges Regulus did not pay
Defendant Grint a bonus for work performed during 2016, whereas
Defendant Hagan received $100,000 and Wright received $110,000,
Plaintiffs plead no facts that directly tie the non-receipt of this
bonus to Defendant Grint's purportedly misleading statements, make
no attempt to explain why Defendant Hagan received a bonus (and was
in fact promoted to CEO) despite having allegedly made misleading
statements, and ignore the significant severance package Defendant
Grint received upon resignation. Ironically, Plaintiffs themselves
plead an innocent explanation for Defendant Grint's purported
involuntary termination.

Finally, even upon a holistic review of all scienter allegations,
the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged a
strong inference of scienter that is cogent and at least as
compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.

Loss Causation

Loss causation is the causal connection between a defendant's
material misrepresentation and a plaintiff's loss. Generally, the
complaint must allege that the defendant's share price fell
significantly after the truth became known. Nevertheless,
disclosure of the fraud is not a sine qua non of loss causation,
which may be shown even where the alleged fraud is not necessarily
revealed prior to the economic loss.  Rather, a plaintiff need only
set forth allegations that if assumed true, are sufficient to
provide the defendant with some indication that the drop in
defendant's stock price was causally related to the defendant's
misstatements.

Here, Plaintiffs argue they have identified in their Consolidated
Complaint several disclosures by Regulus that related directly to
the misrepresentations alleged by Plaintiffs and resulted in
substantial declines in Regulus’s stock price. In contrast,
Defendants argue that the drop in Regulus's share price was based
upon what it describes as six partial disclosures that revealed, at
most, disappointing news.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have sufficiently
plead loss causation. Nevertheless, because Plaintiffs have failed
to adequately plead the first and second elements of their claims
under Section 10(b) and Rule10b-5, such claims are subject to
dismissal.

Section 20(a) Claims

Because the Court concludes that the underlying Section 10(b)
claims are subject to dismissal, Plaintiffs' Section 20(a) claim
also fails. Section 20(a) claims may be dismissed summarily if a
plaintiff fails to adequately plead a primary violation of section
10(b). To prevail on their claims for violations of Section 20(a)
and Section 20A, plaintiffs must first allege a violation of
Section 10(b) or Rule 10b 5.

The Court grants Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated
Complaint.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 5, 2019 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/y4y9f83t from Leagle.com.

Baran Polat, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jennifer Pafiti --
jpafiti@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.

Michael Spitters & Mark Appel, Consol Plaintiffs, represented by
Adam C. McCall -- amccall@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky, LLP,
Nicholas Porritt -- nporritt@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky LLP, pro
hac vice & Adam Marc Apton -- aapton@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky,
LLP.

Regulus Therapeutics Inc., Paul C. Grint, M.D. & Joseph P. Hagan,
Defendants, represented by Koji F. Fukumura -- kfukumura@cooley.com
-- Cooley, LLP, Neal Gibeault -- nealsc@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP,
Nicolas J. Echevestre, Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, Ryan E. Blair --
rblair@cooley.com -- Cooley, LLP & Craig Edward TenBroeck --
ctenbroeck@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP.

Michael Huang, M.D., Defendant, represented by Koji F. Fukumura,
Cooley, LLP, Ryan E. Blair, Cooley, LLP & Craig Edward TenBroeck,
Cooley LLP.

Mark Appel & Michael Spitters, Movants, represented by Adam C.
McCall, Levi & Korsinsky, LLP.

Joseph Buscema, Sheng Wang & Liying Donchez, Movants, represented
by Jennifer Pafiti, Pomerantz LLP.


RH INC: Final Settlement Approval Hearing Set for Oct. 22
---------------------------------------------------------
RH, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on September 11, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended August 3, 2019, that a hearing to consider final approval of
the settlement of the class action suit entitled, In re RH, Inc.
Securities Litigation, is scheduled for October 22, 2019.

On February 2, 2017, City of Miami General Employees' & Sanitation
Employees' Retirement Trust filed a class action complaint in the
United States District Court, Northern District of California,
against the Company, Gary Friedman, and Karen Boone.

On March 16, 2017, Peter J. Errichiello, Jr. filed a similar class
action complaint in the same forum and against the same parties. On
April 26, 2017, the court consolidated the two actions. The
consolidated action is captioned In re RH, Inc. Securities
Litigation. An amended consolidated complaint was filed in June
2017 asserting claims under sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act").

The complaint asserts claims purportedly on behalf of a class of
purchasers of Company common stock from March 26, 2015 to June 8,
2016. The alleged misstatements relate to statements regarding the
roll out of the RH Modern product line and the Company's inventory
levels.

The complaint seeks class certification, monetary damages, and
other appropriate relief, including an award of costs and
attorneys' fees.

On March 21, 2019, the Company and the individual defendants in the
case entered into a binding memorandum of understanding to settle
the case. The settlement amount is $50 million, which amount is to
our understanding covered in full by the Company's insurance
policies. On May 6, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for
preliminary approval of the proposed settlement together with a
settlement agreement executed by both parties. The settlement
agreement is subject to customary conditions including court
approval following notice to the Company's shareholders, and a
hearing at which time the court will consider the fairness,
reasonableness and adequacy of the settlement.

On June 21, 2019, the court issued an order preliminarily approving
the settlement. A hearing on the settlement is scheduled for
October 22, 2019. If a settlement is finally approved by the court,
it will resolve all of the claims that were or could have been
brought in the action.

RH said, "As a result of signing the settlement agreement and the
potential liability becoming probable and estimable, the Company
has recorded a provision for legal settlement and unpaid legal fees
for $50.2 million within other current liabilities on the condensed
consolidated balance sheets as of August 3, 2019. Additionally, the
Company has recorded a litigation insurance recovery receivable of
$50.2 million as of August 3, 2019 within prepaid expense and other
current assets on the condensed consolidated balance sheets, which
represents the estimated insurance claims proceeds from the
Company's insurance carriers."

RH, together with its subsidiaries, operates as a retailer in the
home furnishings. It offers products in various categories,
including furniture, lighting, textiles, bathware, decor, outdoor
and garden, tableware, and child and teen furnishings. The company
was formerly known as Restoration Hardware Holdings, Inc. and
changed its name to RH in January 2017. RH was founded in 1979 and
is headquartered in Corte Madera, California.


SAREPTA THERAPEUTICS: Gainey McKenna Files Class Action Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Gainey McKenna & Egleston announces that a class action lawsuit has
been filed against Sarepta Therapeutics, Inc. ("Sarepta" or the
"Company") (Nasdaq: SRPT) in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York on behalf of those who purchased
or acquired the securities of Sarepta between September 6, 2017 and
August 19, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"), seeking to recover
damages caused by Defendants' violations of the federal securities
laws and to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder.

The Complaint alleges that Defendants made materially false and
misleading statements regarding Sarepta's business, operational and
compliance policies.  Specifically, Defendants made false and/or
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i)
golodirsen posed significant safety risks to patients; (ii)
consequently, the NDA package for golodirsen's accelerated approval
was unlikely to receive FDA approval; and (iii) as a result,
Sarepta's public statements were materially false and misleading at
all relevant times.

On August 19, 2019, Sarepta announced receipt of a Complete
Response Letter ("CRL") from the FDA regarding the Company's NDA
seeking accelerated approval of golodirsen for the treatment of
DMD.  Sarepta disclosed that "[t]he CRL generally cites two
concerns: the risk of infections related to intravenous infusion
ports and renal toxicity seen in pre-clinical models of golodirsen
and observed following administration of other antisense
oligonucleotides."  On this news, Sarepta's stock fell from $120.31
on August 19, 2019 to $102.07 on August 20, 2019 -- an $18.24 or
15.16% drop.

Investors who purchased or otherwise acquired shares during the
Class Period should contact the Firm prior to the October 29, 2019
lead plaintiff motion deadline.  A lead plaintiff is a
representative party acting on behalf of other class members in
directing the litigation.  If you wish to discuss your rights or
interests regarding this class action, please contact Thomas J.
McKenna, Esq. or Gregory M. Egleston, Esq. of Gainey McKenna &
Egleston at (212) 983-1300, or via e-mail at tjmckenna@gme-law.com
or gegleston@gme-law.com [GN]


SFX ENTERTAINMENT: Dec. 13 Hearing on $6.7MM Settlement Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case GUEVOURA FUND LTD., On Behalf of Itself and All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT F.X. SILLERMAN, D.
GEOFFREY ARMSTRONG, JOHN MILLER and MICHAEL JOHN MEYER (S.D.N.Y.
Case Nos. 1:15-cv-07192-CM and 1:18-cv-09784-CM), all persons or
entities who purchased or otherwise acquired SFX Entertainment,
Inc. ("SFX") common stock during the period between February 25,
2015 and November 17, 2015, inclusive ("Class Period") are informed
of a proposed settlement.

A Settlement hearing will be held before the Honorable Colleen
McMahon, Chief United States District Judge, at the Daniel Patrick
Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY
10007, at 10:00 o'clock a.m. on December 13, 2019 in order:

    (1) to determine whether the proposed Settlement consisting of
$6,750,000.00 (U.S.) in cash to be caused by the Director
Defendants to be paid by their directors' and officers' insurance
carriers ("Director Defendants' Contribution") and from Defendant
Sillerman an allowed general unsecured dischargeable claim in the
amount of $750,000.00, not subject to objection, reduction or
setoff, in favor of Lead Plaintiff and the Class Members, in
Defendant Sillerman's bankruptcy proceeding ("Sillerman
Contribution") should be approved as fair, reasonable, and adequate
to the Class and the proposed Final Judgment entered;

    (2) to determine whether the proposed Plan of Allocation for
the proceeds of the Settlement is fair and reasonable, and should
be approved by the Court;

    (3) to determine whether the application by Lead Counsel for an
award of attorneys' fees not to exceed, in the aggregate,
thirty-three and one third percent (33 1/3%) of the Director
Defendants' Contribution and thirty-three and one third percent (33
1/3%) of the Sillerman Contribution, or portion(s) of the Sillerman
Contribution paid, if and/or when paid into the Settlement Fund,
plus reimbursement of Lead Counsel's reasonable out-of-pocket
litigation and notice and settlement administration expenses should
be approved;

    (4) to determine whether an award of reasonable costs and
expenses to Lead Plaintiff directly relating to its representation
of the Class should be approved; and (5) to rule upon such other
matters as the Court may deem appropriate.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired SFX common stock from
February 25, 2015 through and including November 17, 2015, and are
not otherwise excluded from the Class, you are a Class Member.
Excluded from the Class are the officers and directors of SFX
during the Class Period (including the Director Defendants,
Mitchell Slater, Andrew Bazos, Joseph Rascoff, Edward Simon,
Pasquale Manocchia, Howard Tytel, and Sheldon Finkel), members of
their immediate families, any entity in which they have or had a
controlling interest, and their respective legal representatives,
heirs, successors or assigns; the named plaintiffs in the Action
denominated: Altimeo Invesissement, Altimeo Optimum, et al. v.
Robert F.X. Sillerman, et al., Index No. 651084/2016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
N.Y. Co.); and any Class Members who do not timely and properly
request exclusion from the Class. Class Members who do not timely
and properly request exclusion from the Class will be bound by the
Final Judgment of the District Court. If you are a Class Member, in
order to share in the distribution of the Net Settlement Fund, you
must submit a Proof of Claim postmarked no later than December 27,
2019, establishing that you are entitled to recovery. A Proof of
Claim is being sent with the Notice.

If you are a Class Member and need an additional Proof of Claim,
copies may be obtained by telephoning the Claims Administrator at
1-844-961-0313 or by downloading the form on the internet at
http://www.SFXSecuritiesLitigation.com/

If you do not wish to be included in the Class, you do not wish to
participate in the Settlement and you do not wish to receive a
distribution from the Net Settlement Fund, you may request to be
excluded, in the manner set forth in the full Notice of Proposed
Settlement of Class Action, Motion for Attorneys' Fees and
Expenses, and Final Settlement Hearing ("Notice"), no later than
November 12, 2019.  

If you are a Class Member and do not timely and validly request
exclusion from the Class, and you wish to object to the Settlement,
the Plan of Allocation, Lead Counsel's application for an award of
attorneys' fees and/or reimbursement of expenses, and/or Lead
Plaintiff's request for an award of reasonable costs and expenses,
you may submit a written objection.  If you are a Class Member and
do not timely and validly request exclusion from the Class, your
rights may be affected by the Settlement of this litigation,
including the release and extinguishment of claims you may possess
relating to your purchase or acquisition of SFX common stock during
the Class Period.  You also may, but are not required to, appear at
the Settlement Hearing.  You must file and serve your written
objection, in the manner specifically set forth in the Notice, no
later than November 12, 2019.

A copy of the full Notice may be accessed at
http://www.SFXSecuritiesLitigation.com/and for additional
information, you may contact JND Legal Administration, the Claims
Administrator, at the following address or email:

       Guevoura Fund Ltd. v. Sillerman, et al.
       c/o JND Legal Administration
       PO Box 91202
       Seattle, WA 98111-9302
       info@SFXSecuritiesLitigation.com [GN]



SHREVEPORT, LA: Water Dept. Hit With Class Action for Overbilling
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Robert J Wright, writing for KEEL News, reports that attorney Jerry
Harper, Esq., talks with 101.7/710 KEEL's Robert J Wright and Erin
McCarty about the recently certified class action lawsuit against
Shreveport's water department for over billing.

Harper, who also represents Scott Pernici, Michael Jones and Mark
DeFatta, the original plaintiffs in the suit, tells KEEL listeners
that he is awaiting instructions from the judge in the case, Mike
Pittman, regarding instructions on how to notify the 66,000 who may
have been over charged as far back as 2007.

"A Caddo Parish judge signed an order ruling that every Shreveport
and Caddo Parish resident who is or has been a water and sewer
customer of the City of Shreveport has a right to be certified in a
class action suit that alleges the City has overcharged tens of
thousands of water and sewer customers."

Three weeks after the 182-page lawsuit was filed, the City of
Shreveport filed a 21-page exception asking Caddo District Judge
Mike Pitman to throw it out.

Plaintiff attorney Jerry Harper, Esq. countered with a memorandum
opposing dismissal, saying the City's exception didn't deny the
allegations, but rather said it was a matter of interpretation.

After a hearing on June 12, 2017, Pitman ruled against the City,
and the case has been weaving its way through the courts ever
since." [GN]


SONY CORP: $19.5MM Settlement Approved in Price-Fixing Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Metropolitan News-Enterprise reports that the Ninth U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals has affirmed the approval of a $19.5 million
settlement of a class action against Sony over its alleged
participation in an industry-wide conspiracy to fix prices of
lithium ion batteries, spurning the contention of an objector that
the amount is paltry when contrasted with the company's potential
liability of $177 million.

In a memorandum opinion filed Sept. 4, a three-judge
panel—comprised of Senior Circuit Judge Michael Daly Hawkins and
Circuit Judges M. Margaret McKeown and Jay Bybee—rejected an
array of arguments by class member Christopher Andrews, his chief
contention being that Sony is paying too little.

The opinion in the case, Young v. Andrews, 17-15795, quotes the
Ninth Circuit's 1998 decision in Linney v. Cellular Alaska
Partnership as saying that a "proposed settlement is not to be
judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might
have been achieved."

Trial Judge Quoted

It also quotes the District Court judge who presided over the
case—Yvonne Gonzalez Roger of the Northern District of
California—as declaring that the "possibility that a settlement
could have been greater does not mean that it is not fair and
reasonable, in light of the countervailing litigation risks
present."

Opinion remarks:

"Andrews does not analyze those risks or otherwise demonstrate why
a higher settlement amount was warranted."

Sony, in 2016, became the first of the battery-makers to enter into
a settlement with the class, denominated "Indirect Purchaser
Plaintiffs"; Samsung was the last, agreeing in July to pay $39.5
million, the highest amount to which any of the settling defendants
agreed to pay.

$113.45 Million Settlement

In all, payments will amount to $113.45 million. Of that sum, the
attorneys for the class seek $34 million.

The class is comprised, in general, of persons who, between Jan. 1,
2000 and May 31, 2011 purchased, anywhere in the United States, for
personal use, specified types of products containing lithium-ion
batteries.

In light of the numerousness of class members who have filed
claims, no individual member stands to collect any meaningful
amount. A July 12 status report filed by attorneys for the class
sets forth:

"As of July 9, 2019, approximately 1,027,423 claimants have
submitted claims against the settlements with the SDI, Toshiba,
TOKIN, Panasonic/Sanyo, Hitachi Maxell, NEC Corporation, LG Chem,
and Sony defendants. These claims are comprised of approximately
23,483,032 PC/laptops, 15,994,135 mobile devices, 3,775,618
camcorders, and 9,958,089 cordless power tools. Currently, the
estimated per-device claim against the Sony settlement is $0.22;
the estimated per-device claim for the SDI, Toshiba, TOKIN,
Panasonic/Sanyo, Hitachi Maxell, NEC Corporation, and LG Chem
settlements is approximately $1.52." [GN]


TE CONNECTIVITY: Court OKs $4.96MM Settlement in Wilson
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Final
Approval of Class Action Settlement in the case captioned DALE
WILSON, Plaintiff, v. TE CONNECTIVITY NETWORKS, INC., et al.,
Defendants. Case No.14-cv-04872-EDL. (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Dale Wilson was employed as a technician at Redwood City,
California, facility of Defendants Tyco Electronics Corporation and
TE Connectivity Networks, Inc. Plaintiff contends that due to
pressures of work or interruptions by his supervisor, Plaintiff
sometimes had an interrupted meal break or missed his meal break
completely. In an ordinary week, Plaintiff did not get a full meal
break on three out of five days. Because of Defendants' auto-deduct
policy, Defendants did not compensate Plaintiff for these missed or
interrupted meal breaks.

Settlement

Following at least two mediation sessions with a neutral mediator,
the parties agreed to settle this action for a total amount of
$4,960,000 for 1,300 class members. The proposed settlement amount
includes (a) payments to Class Members (an average of approximately
$2,450.87) (b) Class Counsel's attorneys' fees and litigation costs
(not to exceed $1,653,333.30 in fees and not to exceed $50,000 in
costs), (c) settlement administration costs (not to exceed $45,000)
(d) enhancement award to Plaintiff (not to exceed $7,000) and (e)
payment to the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency
(LWDA) to resolve the claims arising under California's Private
Attorney General Act ($50,000).
   
Settlement Agreement

After deduction from the total settlement amount of attorneys' fees
and costs, the enhancement award to Plaintiff, the payment to the
LWDA, and the costs of administering the settlement, there will be
a net settlement amount of at least $3,167,166.70.

The Proposed Class consists of, all current and former non-exempt
employees of Tyco employed in the State of California between
October 1, 2010, through and including May 15, 2017, who had a half
hour deducted for a meal period from their recorded hours as part
of an auto-deduct policy.

Notice

Simpluris also established and is maintaining a settlement website
(www.TycoSettlement.com) to provide information to the Class
Members. The website was operational on January 30, 2019, and is
accessible 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.  

As of June 14, 2019, Simpluris (1) had received no requests for
exclusion from the Settlement (2) had accepted 6 valid disputes
with none others pending; and (3) had not received any objections.

Preliminary Approval and Request for Final Approval

LEGAL STANDARD

A class action may not be settled without court approval. If the
proposal would bind class members, the court may approve it only
after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and
adequate. When the parties to a putative class action reach a
settlement agreement prior to class certification, courts must
peruse the proposed compromise to ratify both the propriety of the
certification and the fairness of the settlement.

Final approval of a case where settlement is reached prior to class
certification requires two inquiries. First, the district court
must assess whether a class exists. Second, the district court must
consider whether a proposed settlement is fair, reasonable and
adequate.  

Class Certification

In order to approve a class action settlement, the Court must make
a finding that a class can be certified.  

Rule 23(a)

Class certification requires that: (1) the class be so numerous
that joinder of all members individually is impracticable' (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class (3) the
claims or defenses of the class representative must be typical of
the claims or defenses of the class and (4) the person representing
the class must be able fairly and adequately to protect the
interests of all members of the class.  

Here, the Court conditionally certified the settlement class when
it granted preliminary approval of the proposed Settlement.
Numerosity is satisfied here where the parties have identified
1,278 class members. Commonality and typicality are satisfied based
the class's shared status as non-exempt employees of Defendants and
shared claims that Defendants improperly deducted time from their
recorded hours as part of an auto-deduct policy.

Finally, adequacy of representation is satisfied as well. Plaintiff
meets the requirements to be named class representative, since he
shares the same interests in securing relief for the claims in this
case as every other member of the proposed settlement class and
there is no evidence of any conflict of interest. Plaintiff has
demonstrated his continued willingness to vigorously prosecute this
case and has regularly consulted with his counsel, has aided in the
prosecution of the litigation, has reviewed documents and the
proposed settlement, and has indicated his desire to continue
protecting the interests of the class through settlement or
continued litigation.

Class Counsel law firm Setareh Law Group LLP has extensive
experience in employment and labor litigation and has been
appointed class counsel in similar cases. Therefore, the Court is
satisfied that Plaintiff and Class Counsel will adequately
represent the members of the Settlement Class and their interests.

Rule 23(b)

In addition to meeting the conditions imposed by Rule 23(a),
parties seeking class certification must also show that the action
is maintainable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b). Rule
23(b)(3) requires that questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over questions affecting only individual
members and that a class action be superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.  

Here, the predominance factor is satisfied because the proposed
class is sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by
representation because all of the claims relate to a limited set of
Defendants' employment practices, in particular Defendants' alleged
improper deduction of time for meal periods from their employees'
recorded hours as part of an auto-deduct policy.   

Additionally, the superiority factor is satisfied because the
settlement class is comprised of 1,278 persons and, if each were to
pursue their claims against Defendants individually, they would
each need to provide nearly the same legal and factual arguments
and evidence.The result would be hundreds of trials at enormous
expense to the proposed class members and Defendants, as well as a
burden on the courts. Individual recoveries for class members would
likely be too small to be worth pursuing. The Court finds that the
class action is the superior method of resolving the claims of all
the members.

The settlement class is certified.

Adequacy of Notice

Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requires the best notice that is practicable under
the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who
can be identified through reasonable effort. Such notice must
clearly and concisely state in plain, easily understood language,
the nature of the action, the class definition, and class members'
right to exclude themselves from the class, among other things.   

Here, the Court approved the notice plan set forth in the
Settlement Agreement. Following the approved notice plan, the
Settlement Administrator Simpluris sent notice packets to 1,300
potential class members.  For any packets received back from the
Postal Service with undeliverable addresses, Simpluris performed
address searches through a third-party locator service to re-mail
the notice packets to updated addresses. Additionally, the
settlement website allowed class members to access information
online. Ultimately, only nine notices were undeliverable because
Simpluris was unable to locate a current address.  

The notice given here satisfied Rule 23.

Fairness of the Settlement

Assessing a settlement proposal requires the district court to
balance a number of factors: the strength of the plaintiffs' case;
the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further
litigation; the risk of maintaining class action status throughout
the trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of
discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the
experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental
participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed
settlement.

Here, the factors weigh in favor of finding that the settlement is
fair, adequate, and reasonable.

On December 15, 2015, the parties engaged in Court-ordered
mediation. On April 26, 2018, the parties participated in a
good-faith, arms-length negotiation presided over by mediator
Steven Rottman. The settlement was negotiated by experienced
counsel in a case in which there were complex legal and factual
issues, and it was not clear that Plaintiff would prevail. Further,
Plaintiff's counsel did not reach an agreement to settle the case
until sufficient information was collected to make an informed
judgment regarding the likelihood of success on the merits and the
results that could be obtained through further litigation.   Based
on the above analysis, the settlement is fair, adequate, and
reasonable.

Accordingly, the Court grants final approval of the class action
settlement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 5, 2019 Order is
available https://tinyurl.com/y59qugzt from Leagle.com.

Dale Wilson, on behalf of himself, all others similarly situated,
and the general public, Plaintiff, represented by Chaim Shaun
Setareh -- shaun@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group, Adam
Tamburelli -- atamburelli@marlinsaltzman.com -- Marlin and
Saltzman, LLP, Ashley N. Batiste -- ashley@setarehlaw.com --
Setareh Law Group, Farrah Grant -- farrah@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh
Law Group, Stanley Donald Saltzman -- ssaltzman@marlinsaltzman.com
-- Marlin & Saltzman LLP & Thomas Alistair Segal --
thomas@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group.

Te Connectivity Networks, Inc., a Minnesota corporation & Tyco
Electronics Corporation, a Pennsylvania corporation, Defendants,
represented by Kathryn T. McGuigan -- kmcguigan@morganlewis.com --
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Caitlin Victoria May, Morgan, Lewis
and Bockius LLP, 1400 Page Mill Road Palo Alto, CA 94304, Jennifer
P. Svanfeldt -- jensvanfeldt@gbgllp.com -- GBG LLP, Melinda S.
Riechert -- melinda.riechert@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis &
Bockius LLP & Nicole L. Antonopoulos --
nicole.antonopoulos@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis.


TILLY'S INC: Discovery Ongoing in Ward Class Action
---------------------------------------------------
Tilly's, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 10, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended August 3, 2019, that discovery is ongoing in
the class action suit entitled, Skylar Ward, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, v. Tilly's, Inc., Superior Court
of California, County of Los Angeles, Case No. BC595405.  

In September 2015, the plaintiff filed a putative class action
lawsuit against the company alleging, among other things, various
violations of California's wage and hour laws. The complaint sought
class certification, unspecified damages, unpaid wages, penalties,
restitution, and attorneys' fees.  

In June 2016, the court granted the company's demurrer to the
plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to
state a cause of action against Tilly's and dismissed the
complaint.  

Specifically, the court agreed with the company that the
plaintiff's cause of action for reporting-time pay fails as a
matter of law as the plaintiff and other putative class members did
not "report for work" with respect to certain shifts on which the
plaintiff's claims are based.  

In November 2016, the court entered a written order sustaining the
company's demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint and dismissing all
of plaintiff's causes of action with prejudice. In January 2017,
the plaintiff filed an appeal of the order to the California Court
of Appeal.  

In October 2017, the plaintiff filed her opening appellate brief,
and the company's respond appellate brief was filed in December
2017. In May 2018, the plaintiff filed her reply appellate brief.


Later in May 2018, an amicus brief was filed by Abercrombie & Fitch
Stores, Inc., in support of Tilly's position in this appeal. Oral
argument was heard by the California Court of Appeal in November
2018.

On February 4, 2019, the Court of Appeal issued an opinion
overturning the trial court's decision, holding that the
plaintiff's allegations stated a claim.

In March 2019, the company filed a petition for review with the
California Supreme Court seeking its discretionary review of the
Court of Appeal's decision.  In May 2019, the California Supreme
Court denied the petition for review and remanded the case to the
trial court for further proceedings. In July 2019, the company
filed an answer to the first amended complaint, denying all claims
and asserting various defenses. The parties are currently engaged
in the initial round of discovery.  

Tilly's said, "We have defended this case vigorously, and will
continue to do so."

Tilly's, Inc. retails casual apparel, footwear, and accessories for
young men and women, and boys and girls in the United States. Its
apparel merchandise includes tops, outerwear, bottoms, and dresses;
and accessories merchandise comprises backpacks, hats, sunglasses,
headphones, handbags, watches, jewelry, and others.  Tilly's, Inc.
was founded in 1982 and is headquartered in Irvine, California.


TILLY'S INC: Mediation in Gonzalez Class Suit Set for Oct. 31
-------------------------------------------------------------
Tilly's, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 10, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended August 3, 2019, that court in Juan Carlos
Gonzales, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
v. Tilly's Inc. et al., Superior Court of California, County of
Orange, Case No. 30-2017-00948710-CU-OE-CXC, has set a deadline of
October 31, 2019, for the parties to participate in mediation.

In October 2017, the plaintiff filed a putative class action
against us, alleging various violations of California’s wage and
hour laws.  

The complaint seeks class certification, unspecified damages,
unpaid wages, penalties, restitution, interest, and attorneys' fees
and costs.  

In December 2017, the company filed an answer to the complaint,
denying all of the claims and asserting various defenses. In April
2018, the plaintiff filed a separate action under the Private
Attorneys General Act against the company seeking penalties on
behalf of himself and other similarly situated employees for the
same alleged violations of California's wage and hour laws.  

The company requested the plaintiff to dismiss the class action
claims based on an existing class action waiver in an arbitration
agreement which plaintiff signed with our co-defendant, BaronHR,
the staffing company that employed plaintiff to work at the
Company.  

In June 2018, the plaintiff's class action complaint was dismissed.
The court set a deadline of October 31, 2019 for the parties to
participate in a mediation. The court has not yet issued a trial
date.  

Tilly's said, "We have defended this case vigorously, and will
continue to do so."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Tilly's, Inc. retails casual apparel, footwear, and accessories for
young men and women, and boys and girls in the United States. Its
apparel merchandise includes tops, outerwear, bottoms, and dresses;
and accessories merchandise comprises backpacks, hats, sunglasses,
headphones, handbags, watches, jewelry, and others.  Tilly's, Inc.
was founded in 1982 and is headquartered in Irvine, California.


U.S. FOODS INC: Ford Hits Misclassification, Seeks Unpaid Wages
---------------------------------------------------------------
ANN FORD, Individually and on Behalf of All Similarly Situated
Employees, Plaintiff, v. U.S. FOODS, INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-05967 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 5, 2019) seeks to recover unpaid
wages, liquidated damages, interest, reasonable attorneys' fees and
costs under the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the
Illinois Minimum Wage Law.

U.S. Foods, Inc. is a national food distribution company with more
than 60 locations across the country. It provides bulk food
products to various customers, including hotels, restaurants and
various retail establishments. Plaintiff was employed as a Buyer
for Defendant.

Prior to October, 2016, Plaintiff and other Buyers were classified
as non-exempt hourly employees; they were all paid an hourly rate
and appropriately received overtime wages. The Defendant
subsequently reclassified Plaintiff and other Buyers as salaried
employees. However, the duties performed by Defendant's Buyers
remained the same. The only difference was that their workload
increased and they were forced to work even more overtime in order
to complete their assignments. Because Plaintiff and other Buyers
were reclassified as salaried employees, they were not paid
overtime wages. Defendant willfully misclassified its Buyers as
salaried employees to avoid paying them overtime wages. Hundreds of
Buyers have been harmed by Defendant's unlawful conduct, says the
complaint.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Benjamin L. Davis, III, Esq.
     36 South Charles Street, Suite 1700
     Baltimore, MD 21201
     Phone: (443) 320-7417
     Email: bdavis@nicholllaw.com

          - and -

     George E. Swegman, Esq.
     36 South Charles Street, Suite 1700
     Baltimore, MD 21201
     Phone: (410) 320-7268
     Email: gswegman@nicholllaw.com

          - and -

     Mike A. Brown, Esq.
     36 South Charles Street, Suite 1700
     Baltimore, MD 21201
     Phone: (443) 320-7254
     Email: mbrown@nicholllaw.com

          - and -

     Jorge Sanchez Esq.
     77 W. Washington, Suite 1313
     Chicago, IL 60602
     Phone: (312) 420-6784
     Email: jsanchez@lopezsanchezlaw.com


UNITED FEDERAL CREDIT: Has $1.75MM Class Suit Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------
Tony Wittkowski, writing for The Herald Palladium, reports that
United Federal Credit Union settled a class action lawsuit
regarding overdraft fees for about $1.75 million – but still
disputes the charges.

The settlement covered UFCU members who were allegedly charged
overdraft fees from Oct. 3, 2011 to Sept. 30, 2018.

Members who were charged overdraft fees for debit card and ATM
transactions for the first time between Aug. 15, 2010 and Sept. 30,
2018, were also covered by the $1.75 million settlement.

UFCU has more than $2 billion in assets, with branches in Michigan,
Arkansas, Indiana, North Carolina, Nevada and Ohio. The credit
union is headquartered in St. Joseph.

According to a story from the Credit Union Journal, the members who
were charged overdraft fees were deemed to have had "sufficient
funds in the ledger balance but not the available balance."

When contacted by The Herald-Palladium, UFCU released a statement
that disputed the plaintiff's claims. However, UFCU said it agreed
to settle the suit to avoid "the costs, distractions and risks of
litigation."

"While United denies that we did anything improper, we believe (a)
settlement is in the best interests of all of our members," UFCU's
statement read.

According to court documents, Plaintiff Tonya Gunter said she was
charged eight overdraft fees of $30 each on July 23, 2015, when her
UFCU account had sufficient funds to cover her transactions for the
day.

Gunter claimed "the practice of charging overdraft fees even when
there are sufficient money/funds in the account is inconsistent
with how UFCU describes the circumstances of when it assesses
overdraft fees in other customer materials."

UFCU stated its overdraft practices are "communicated to members"
when opening accounts and at any time when members have questions.

Gunter filed the class action suit against UFCU on Sept. 21, 2015,
alleging the credit union had breached contracts and violated state
law through its practice of charging overdraft fees to customers.

The lawsuit was originally filed in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Nevada.

A $1.75 million settlement agreement was reached on Dec. 18, 2018,
and included current and former members.

According to UFCU, settlement payments were provided to all
affected current members prior to July 14, 2019.

The class action lawsuit is part of a growing trend in the U.S.

More than a dozen credit unions across the country -- including
Advia Credit Union in Kalamazoo and Navy Federal Credit Union in
Virginia -- were hit with lawsuits challenging whether their
members were misled about what can trigger overdraft fees.

Navy Federal Credit Union, considered the nation's largest credit
union, agreed to a $24.5 million overdraft settlement in April.

Based on total assets, UFCU is considered the fifth largest credit
union in Michigan.
[GN]


UNITED STATES: Border Chief Defends 'Overwhelmed' Agents
--------------------------------------------------------
Sandra Sanchez, writing for Everything Lubbock, reports that the
chief patrol agent in charge of the U.S. Border Patrol's Rio Grande
Valley Sector testified in federal court September 6 that his
agents were "overwhelmed" and lacked resources to properly house
and care longterm for thousands of migrants this past spring and
summer.

Chief Patrol Agent Rodolfo Karisch, who is named as a defendant in
a lawsuit brought by 16 migrants against the federal government,
repeatedly defended the actions of his agents in South Texas. He
testified before Judge Fernando Rodriguez Jr., in the U.S. District
Court Southern District of Texas in Brownsville on Friday. Karisch
described in rare public detail the challenges his agency faces and
said a federal audit and report did not accurately characterize his
sector.

During his 90 minutes of testimony, Karisch called the situation on
the Southwest border a "crisis" of epic proportions, and said his
agents "were never able to dig ourselves out" because of
apprehensions numbering 1,700 per day in the sector at the time.
Karisch said more resources, facilities and funding must be
provided by Congress in order for his 3,000 employees in four South
Texas counties to more quickly process and release detainees.

Karisch, as well as Department of Homeland Security Acting
Secretary Kevin McAleenan; U.S. Customs Border Protection Acting
Commissioner John Sanders; and U.S. Border Patrol Chief Carla
Provost are defendants in a first-of-its-kind lawsuit in which
plaintiffs are seeking more humane conditions for adults who are
held by Border Patrol for over 72 hours.

On September 5, seven migrants testified about the conditions at
Border Patrol facilities in the Rio Grande Valley during a hearing
to request a preliminary injunction. One after another the migrants
told similar stories about being held for weeks in Border Patrol
facilities. The migrants described being relocated from facility to
facility, not being allowed to shower, brush their teeth, or
receive adequate medical care and and how they were denied access
to lawyers or calls to their consulate representatives.

'Perfect storm' led to overcrowding

Karisch on September 6 said his agents did tend to the medical
needs of migrants, but said with 8,000 in custody in Border Patrol
facilities that were designed to hold no more than 2,000, agents
were simply "overwhelmed."

A surge in migrants crossing the Southwest border also coincided
with a federal government shutdown in February and furlough of
workers, which led to decreased staff, resources and the ability to
transfer migrants to long-term holding facilities run by U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S. Customs and Border
Protection.

Karisch said that the nine facilities in the South Texas counties
of Hidalgo, Starr, Willacy and Cameron were never intended for
long-term detentions and did not have enough resources to meet this
onslaught of migrants. Karisch repeatedly reiterated that the Rio
Grande Valley Sector is the busiest in the nation for migrant
apprehensions.

"I will actually describe it as a perfect storm. We were coming out
of a government shutdown and furlough, it took us so much time to
amp up. The resources were just not there. We were overwhelmed and
unable to process all of the unaccompanied migrants and family
units," Karisch testified.

OIG report ‘did not adequately represent'
Karisch on September 6 also said a July 2 report on the Rio Grande
Valley Sector by the Office of Inspector General "did not
adequately represent their challenges."

The report cited "dangerous overcrowding" at facilities in the Rio
Grande Valley, including the Centralized Processing Center (CPC) in
McAllen, which also is referred to as "Ursula" by locals because it
is located on Ursula Avenue.

After the OIG report, numerous senators and congressional
representatives, and even Vice President Mike Pence visited South
Texas and toured the facility.

"When OIG came down in June, all of our facilities were to the
limit. We were holding 8,000 people," he said.

Alleviating overcrowding
To reduce the number of detainees, Karisch said they began sending
migrants via buses to Laredo at the rate of 300 per day. They also
flew migrants on four flights to Del Rio, Texas, each week, and two
weekly flights to San Diego, California. Altogether, they airlifted
500 migrants per week out of the Rio Grande Valley during that time
period.

His agency also added sally ports, and added portable toilets to
help conditions, he said.

And a new military-style canvas tent city near the base of the
Donna-Rio Bravo International Bridge was constructed to hold
thousands more.

MPP policy led to migrant decrease
However, Karisch testified, it was the "wait in Mexico" policy the
Trump administration enacted July called Migrant Protection
Protocol (MPP) which ultimately helped alleviate the overcrowding.
Under the program, asylum-seekers must wait in Mexico for
immigration court proceedings. The policy has been used since
January in California and El Paso and was started in Brownsville
around July 17.

Pointing in court to numerous graphs showing apprehension trends,
the decrease in detainees since July in the RGV was notable. As of
Friday, there were only 1,700 people total in custody in the
sector, which is only 30 percent of capacity that the agency can
hold, he testified. From September 5 to September 6, agents
arrested 500 people, down from the average of 1,700 daily in May
and June.

"We're not in the business of holding people long-term. It shows
the problems we encounter when we do that. We're not built for
that," Karisch testified. "We have to start looking at the future
so we have supplies in place in case we ever have to handle a surge
like that again."

One of the plaintiffs' lawyers, Efren Olivares of the Texas Civil
Rights Project, questioned the MPP policy.

"Now instead of being crowded in the detention facilities, the
Trump administration is sending asylum-seekers to the streets of
Matamoros," he told Border Report on Thursday. "They're sleeping in
tents there as we speak. So that's the solution of this
government." [GN]


UNITED STATES: Class Action Certification Sought in Robles Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit styled Steven Robles v. United States,
et al., Case No. 5:17-cv-01017-FB (W.D. Tex.), moves for class
action certification and for new trial under Rule 23 and Rule
59(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Mr. Robles, a Bexar County prisoner, brought the action seeking
damages under Section 1983 for a Fourth Amendment violation of the
U.S. Constitution for alleged unlawful arrest and detention and
malicious prosecution.[CC]


UNITED STATES: Court OKs Injunctive Relief in Mons
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, District of Columbia, issued a
Memorandum Opinion granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
Injunction in the case captioned HEREDIA MONS, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. KEVIN K. McALEENAN, Acting Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security, et al., Defendants. Civil Action No. 19-1593
(JEB). (D.D.C.).

Eleven named individuals bring the present action. Plaintiffs and
those they seek to represent all demonstrated a credible fear of
persecution and are now or previously were in removal proceedings
before the Executive Office for Immigration Review. Rather than
being placed on parole during the pendency of their asylum
determinations, Plaintiffs were confined under the jurisdiction of
the New Orleans ICE Field Office at one of six immigration jails
for months on end.

Last summer in Damus v. Nielsen, 313 F.Supp.3d 317 (D.D.C. 2018),
this Court granted a preliminary injunction to a provisional class
of plaintiffs who were challenging the practices of five
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement field offices. Specifically,
those plaintiffs successfully maintained that ICE was violating the
Department of Homeland Security's Parole Directive, a policy
memorandum that sets forth procedural requirements for determining
whether an asylum-seeker is eligible for pre-hearing release on
parole.

Plaintiffs brought the present class action seeking to enjoin DHS's
alleged practice of categorically denying parole to asylum-seekers
in contravention of the Directive. They assert that Defendants'
effective recession of the Directive is arbitrary and capricious
and contrary to law, in violation of the Administrative Procedure
Act. Additionally, they allege that separate and apart from their
obligations under the Parole Directive, Defendants have violated
both the APA and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution in failing to provide individualized
determinations of flight risk and danger.

The Plaintiffs first assert that in failing to follow the Parole
Directive, the New Orleans Field Office is acting contrary to law
in violation of the APA.  They also allege that Defendants have
violated both the APA and the Due Process Clause by neglecting to
provide individualized parole adjudications to asylum-seekers. As
in Damus, the Court narrows its focus to Plaintiffs' first theory,
finding that it warrants injunctive relief. The discussion will
first consider likelihood of success and next address irreparable
harm and the public interest.

Likelihood of Success

As was the case in Damus, Plaintiffs' first APA claim is based on
the Accardi doctrine. The doctrine takes its name from a Supreme
Court decision holding that government agencies are bound to follow
their own rules, even self-imposed procedural rules that limit
otherwise discretionary decisions.

The Supreme Court has also extended the doctrine to a challenge to
a benefits determination that did not comply with the procedures
set forth in an agency's internal manual. In applying the Accardi
doctrine, the high court has reaffirmed that it is incumbent upon
agencies to follow their own procedures even where they are
possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required,
particularly where the rights of individuals are effected. In this
Circuit, Accardi has come to stand for the proposition that
agencies may not violate their own rules and regulations to the
prejudice of others.

As this Court held in Damus, the Accardi doctrine applies to
Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants have violated the APA in failing
to abide by the Parole Directive. The APA empowers litigants to
challenge agency action that is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary
to law and the Accardi doctrine provides them with a means by which
they can hold agencies accountable to their own policies.  

The question to be decided here, consequently, is whether the New
Orleans Field Office, like the Offices discussed in Damus, is no
longer following the Parole Directive. It bears mentioning that
Defendants have offered no evidence to the contrary beyond vague
unsubstantiated assertions that the Directive is still in effect in
New Orleans. In fact, in claiming that in response to this
litigation the named Plaintiffs have had their parole statuses
re-adjudicated in accordance with the 2009 ICE Parole Directive.
Defendants seem to implicitly concede that such individualized
review was not granted to those Plaintiffs previously.

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, offer a substantial body of evidence
in support of their claim that the Office has ceased following the
Directive.

First, the sheer percentage of asylum-seekers denied parole by the
New Orleans Field Office offers them powerful ammunition. In 2016,
the Office denied parole in only 24.5% of the 229 decisions made.
In 2017, that denial rate skyrocketed to 82% of 78 decisions. In
2018, it rose even higher to 98.5% of 130 decisions.   

Finally, it has attained the unsurpassable height of a 100% denial
rate this year. These most recent denial rates are even higher than
those of some of the Offices found to be out of compliance with the
Directive in Damus. Indeed, as of 2018, the New Orleans Field
Office maintained the highest rate of parole denials of any field
office in the United States.  

DHS generally and the New Orleans Field Office specifically have
continued to proclaim, however, that the Directive remains in full
force and effect and the Government has represented the same to the
Supreme Court. Yet Defendants offer absolutely no explanation for
the precipitous nosedive in the parole-grant rates issued by an
Office that has allegedly preserved the same underlying policy for
making those decisions all along.

There's more. Plaintiffs also offer a number of declarations from
asylum-seekers and their advocates that describe the New Orleans
Field Office's myriad violations of the Parole Directive. These
declarations attest to the automatic, rather than individualized,
nature of the parole proceedings, various aspects of which run
directly contrary to the guarantees provided by the Directive. For
example, various declarants assert that detainees often are not
notified of the availability of parole. Even when they are, they
receive parole documents in a language they do not understand, and
they are often not granted an interview.  

It should come as no surprise then that, according to the
declarants, officials associated with the New Orleans Field Office
have made numerous comments that suggest they no longer feel
constrained by the Parole Directive. In response to Plaintiff
R.O.P.'s request for an individualized parole inquiry, for example,
a former Warden of one of the detention facilities under the
Office's jurisdiction responded that he could not possibly tend to
everyone.

In response to the American Immigration Lawyers Association's
inquiry as to whether the Directive remains in effect at the New
Orleans Field Office, Assistant Field Office Director Brian Acuna
stated, Technically no, by Executive Order.

The numbers and the affidavits provide a powerful case, one the
Government barely attempts to rebut  that the New Orleans Field
Office no longer follows the dictates of the Parole Directive. The
Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits of their Accardi claim.

Irreparable Harm

To establish the existence of this second factor necessary for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction, a party must demonstrate that
its injury is of such imminence that there is a clear and present'
need for equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm. The injury
must also be both certain and great; it must be actual and not
theoretical. Finally, the injury must be beyond remediation. Like
the plaintiffs in Damus, Plaintiffs here have established that they
will suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief. As the
Court there noted, detention irreparably harms individuals in
myriad ways, and the injuries at stake there and here are beyond
remediation.

Balance of Harms and Public Interest

Finally, these last two prongs pose no serious obstacle to
Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. The public
interest is served when administrative agencies comply with their
obligations under the APA. In fact, the Parole Directive itself
states that the detention of asylum-seekers who are neither a
flight risk nor dangerous is not in the public interest and thus
requires an individualized parole determination as to whether they
should be released. The Court therefore finds that these two
factors also favor Plaintiffs.

The Court will grant Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 5, 2019
Memorandum Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6y9ac6p
from Leagle.com.

ANGEL ALEJANDRO HEREDIA MONS, Plaintiff, represented by Bruce
Warfield Hamilton, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF
LOUISIANA, pro hac vice, Katharine Schwartzmann, AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF LOUISIANA, PO Box 56157, News
Orleans, LA 70156, pro hac vice, Laura Rivera, pro hac vice, Luz
Virginia Lopez, pro hac vice, Mary Bauer, pro hac vice & Melissa E.
Crow, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, 400 Washington Avenue,
Montgomery, AL 36104

KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, in his official capacity as Acting Secretary of
the Department of Homeland Security, MATTHEW T. ALBENCE, NATHALIE
ASHER & GEORGE LUND, III, in his official capacity as Director of
the ICE New Orleans Field Office, Defendants, represented by Jeremy
S. Simon, U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.


UNITED STATES: DOJ Seeks to Stay Discovery in Bump Stock Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Heather Isringhausen Gvillo, writing for Madison Record, reports
that, several government officials request a stay in discovery in a
class action seeking immunity for those who legally purchased
bump-stock devices prior to the passing of the "Final Rule."

Senior trial counsel Eric J. Soskin, Esq., an attorney with the
Department of Justice, filed the motion to stay discovery on behalf
of defendants President Donald J. Trump, Attorney General William
P. Barr and Regina Lombardo, who is deputy director of the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). Barr and
Lombardo were substituted as defendants for Matthew Whitaker and
Thomas E. Brandon.

Soskin argues that discovery is premature in some instances and
should be stayed while Doe's challenge to the Final Rule is
resolved.

Soskin argues that plaintiff John Doe's challenge to the Final Rule
should be "resolved in accordance with the Administrative Procedure
Act's (APA) core principle that review of agency action is to be
conducted based on the record compiled by the agency and furnished
to the court."

"During the July 22, 2019 scheduling conference, plaintiff
postulated that the limitations on discovery contained in the APA
do not apply because plaintiff's claims are infused with
constitutional significance.

"In enacting the APA, however, Congress explicitly addressed
constitutional claims and provided that the limited scope of APA
review includes cases that involve constitutional scrutiny," the
motion states.

Soskin further argues that the plaintiff's claims in count VI,
which seeks compensation for private property that had allegedly
been taken, is premature due to class certification.

"Class certification discovery in this case is likely to be
unusually complicated because of plaintiff's decision to proceed
under the pseudonym John Doe rather than his real name, in
derogation of the usual principle that an action 'be prosecuted in
the name of the real party in interest,'" the motion states.

The defendants add that discovery into whether or not Doe will be
able to protect the interests of the class will be difficult as
well as discovery into individual class members.

The defendants also intend to seek summary judgment. If their
request is granted, discovery would not be necessary, they argue.

Doe filed an objection to the motion to stay discovery on July 29
through attorney Thomas Maag, Esq. of the Maag Law Firm LLC in Wood
River, arguing that the bump-stock ban "is without precedent in
this country."

"Defendants, in the face of 85 years of precedent (since the
original 1934 National Firearms Act was originally passed), and
overruling repeated express rulings of the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (and its predecessor entities),
under several prior presidential administrations, based on nothing
more than an flat out edict from the President, reclassified over
half a million legal and unregulated devices, into one of the most
highly regulated items in this country, machineguns, and then
demanded they all be surrendered or destroyed, without
compensation," the opposition states.

Doe argues in his opposition that the administrative record cannot
resolve the facts and claims in the case without ignoring several
counts in the complaint.

The plaintiff adds that the case involves issues of constitutional
law, which is typically beyond the jurisdiction of administrative
agencies.

"As constitutional challenges are beyond the jurisdiction of an
agency, it would make no sense to limit this case to the agency
record, as doing so would all but completely obviate the ability to
prove the constitutional claims," the response states.

Doe further argues that it would be "expensive and wasteful" to
"slice discovery up into a series of mini discovery periods" when
discovery could be done all at once.

"This case raises more that basis (sic) administrative rule making,
it raises constitutional claims, which require discovery," the
response states. "This court should allow same."

The defendants filed a reply in support of their motion to stay on
Aug. 2, arguing that Doe cannot establish that the Final Rule was
established in bad faith or that the record is incomplete, meaning
discovery should be stayed.

"Plaintiff does not specifically argue that either the bad faith or
the incompleteness exceptions to record-review apply, instead
casting vague aspersions on the administrative process," the reply
states. "This does not satisfy the 'strong showing' standard."

The class action was filed in response to a rule adopted by the ATF
in December 2018, retroactively redefining bump-fire stocks as
machineguns under the National Firearms Act of 1934 and Gun Control
Act of 1968. Until the new rule was published, the ATF had
classified bump-stocks as firearm "parts."

Bump-stocks attach to semiautomatic firearms in replace of the
standard stock and speed up their firing rate, similar to that of
an automatic weapon. They are notoriously associated with the mass
shooting at a Las Vegas country music festival in October 2017. A
gunman fired more than 1,000 rounds form his room on the 32nd floor
of the Mandalay Bay Resort and Casino, killing 58 and injuring
approximately 500 while using the device.

Maag wrote the DOJ officially announced that anyone who possesses
the devices must either destroy them or surrender them to the ATF
without compensation within a 90-day period, which is considered
ATF's Final Rule. Court records indicate that the 90-day period
began to run on March 26 when the Final Rule went into effect.

Maag alleges the class would be irreparably harmed if the proposed
regulations went into effect, "and thus, this court should enjoin
same, pending a resolution on the merits, and/or remand to the
administrative agency."

According to the class action, Doe has been in possession of one or
more bump-stock or bump firing devices since before Dec. 18, 2018.
He alleges the devices were purchased or acquired in accordance
with all applicable laws, rules, regulations and rulings in effect
at the time they were purchased.

The suit states that Doe seeks to lawfully register the devices in
the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record. If
registration is legally impossible, then Doe seeks "just
compensation under the Fifth Amendment, for a total regulatory
and/or actual taking."

The suit states that the Department of Justice reports that there
are approximately 500,000 bump fire devices sold legally and
currently in private civilian possession. They are worth
approximately $200 to $500 each.

"In truth and fact, there are likely as many as double that many,
as the DOJ numbers do not [take] into consideration pre-2010
produced devices, which have been sold since at least the 1980s, or
smaller custom manufacturers who copied the devices, all of which
with either express ATF approval, or non-action by the ATF when
made aware of same," the suit states.

Maag wrote that the defendants do not have the authority to
institute an amnesty registration period under the Gun Control Act
of 1968. He asks the court to find that an amnesty registration
period would provide an immunity for registered firearms. He also
asks the court to find that "defendants have abused their
discretion and acted arbitrarily and capriciously."

Maag further seeks an injunction to enjoin enforcement of the rule
for those who possessed a bump-stock "on or before December 18,
2019, and continue to retain possession of same."

The defendants previously filed an opposition to Doe's motion for
preliminary injunction on April 17, arguing that the Final Rule
"corrected a confusing and erroneous agency interpretation" of the
statute prohibiting the manufacture, sale, and possession of new
machine guns to the public, "to the expected benefit of public
safety."[GN]


UNITED STATES: Morecraft Appeals Decision to Federal Claims Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Brenda Morecraft and Kristin Melendez filed an appeal
from a Court ruling issued in their lawsuit styled Morecraft, et
al. v. US, Case No. 1:18-cv-00967-LAS, in the United States Court
of Federal Claims.

The nature of suit is stated as civilian pay.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the class
action lawsuit was filed on July 6, 2018.

The appellate case is captioned as Morecraft, et al. v. US, Case
No. 19-2350, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Entry of Appearance was due September 17, 2019;
   -- Certificate of Interest was due September 17, 2019;
   -- Docketing Statement is due on October 3, 2019; and
   -- Appellant/Petitioner's brief is due on November 4,
      2019.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants BRENDA MORECRAFT and KRISTIN MELENDEZ, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, are
represented by:

          Christopher Joseph Trombetta, Esq.
          OFFICE OF CHRISTOPHER J. TROMBETTA
          121 North Main Street, Suite 12
          Mansfield, MA 02048
          Telephone: (508) 339-5900
          E-mail: chris@trombettalaw.com

Defendant-Appellee UNITED STATES is represented by:

          Antonia Ramos Soares, Esq.
          DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
          PO Box 480
          Ben Franklin Station
          Washington, DC 20044
          Telephone: (202) 305-7405
          E-mail: Antonia.Soares@usdoj.gov


UNITED STATES: Pre- & Post- Hearing Classes in Brito Suit Certified
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GILBERTO PEREIRA BRITO, FLORENTIN, AVILA LUCAS, and
JACKY CELICOURT, individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated, Plaintiffs-Petitioners, v. WILLIAM BARR, Attorney
General, U.S. Department of Justice, et al.,
Defendants-Respondents, Civil Action No. 19-11314-PBS (D. Mass.),
Judge Patti B. Saris of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and
(b)(2).

Plaintiffs Brito, Lucas, and Celicourt challenge the procedures at
immigration court bond hearings for aliens detained pursuant to 8
U.S.C. Section 1226(a).  They allege that the allocation of the
burden of proof to the alien and failure to consider alternative
conditions of release and the alien's ability to pay violate the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, Immigration and Nationality Act
("INA"), and Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").

According to the Plaintiffs' uncontroverted data, the Boston and
Hartford Immigration Courts, the latter of which has jurisdiction
over removal proceedings for aliens detained in western
Massachusetts, held bond hearings for 700 and 77 aliens,
respectively, during the six-month period between Nov. 1, 2018 and
May 7, 2019.  An immigration judge issued a decision after 651 of
those hearings, denying release on bond in approximately 41% of
cases.  The average bond amount set during this period was $6,302
and $28,700 in the Boston and Hartford Immigration Courts,
respectively.  About half of individuals were still in custody ten
days after bond was set.

On June 13, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a habeas corpus petition and
class action complaint on behalf of all aliens who are or will be
detained under 8 U.S.C. Section 1226(a) either within Massachusetts
or otherwise within the jurisdiction of the Boston Immigration
Court.  The complaint alleges that allocating the burden of proof
to the alien at a Section 1226(a) bond hearing is a violation of
the Due Process Clause (Count I) and the INA and APA (Count II).
The complaint also alleges that due process requires that the
Government show the alien's dangerousness or flight risk by clear
and convincing evidence and that the immigration court consider
alternative conditions of release and ability to pay in determining
release and the amount of bond.  The Plaintiffs seek an injunction
ordering constitutionally compliant bond hearings for all class
members and a declaratory judgment explaining the class members'
due process rights.

After the filing of the lawsuit, ICE authorized the release of all
three named Plaintiffs on bond.  They all posted bond and were
released.

Five days after filing suit, the Plaintiffs moved for class
certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).  The
Government moved to stay the civil action because many of the legal
arguments raised by the class are currently before the First
Circuit in Doe v. Smith, No. 19-1368 (1st Cir. Apr. 18, 2019), an
appeal from the Court's grant of habeas relief to an individual
alien detained pursuant to Section 1226(a).  The Court denied the
motion to stay, and the Government now opposes certification of the
class.

The Plaintiffs seek certification of the following class: all
people who, now or in the future, are detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
Section 1226(a) and are held in immigration detention in
Massachusetts or are otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the
Boston Immigration Court. Although they do not waive their claim
based on the APA and INA, the Plaintiffs currently seek to certify
this class only for their due process claim.

While apparently conceding that the numerosity and adequacy of the
class counsel requirements are met, the Government argues that this
class does not satisfy the requirements of commonality, typicality,
adequacy of the named Plaintiffs, or Rule 23(b)(2).  The Government
raises three arguments against certification: (1) the
jurisdictional bar in 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(f)(1); (2) the mootness
of the named Plaintiffs' claims, and (3) the prejudice requirement
for a due process claim in the immigration context.

First, Judge Saris holds that the Court has already held that
Section 1252(f)(1) does not bar declaratory relief.  It has also
issued an injunction ordering certain procedural protections
required by due process at bond hearings for aliens detained under
8 U.S.C. Section 1226(c).  While the injunction the Plaintiffs
request would abrogate agency precedent imposing the burden of
proof on the alien and require the Government to follow certain
other procedures at bond hearings, it would not mandate release or
allow an opportunity for release not provided in the statute.
Because an injunction would "in no way enjoin or restrain the
operation of the detention statute, it is not barred by Section
1252(f)(1).

Second, the Judge finds that a court may certify a class with a
moot named plaintiff where it is certain that other persons
similarly situated will continue to be subject to the challenged
conduct and the claims raised are so inherently transitory that the
trial court will not have even enough time to rule on a motion for
class certification before the proposed representative's individual
interest expires.  The Plaintiffs' proposed class satisfies the
inherently transitory exception.  Given the Government's ability to
end the allegedly unconstitutional detention of an alien through
removal or release and each alien's interest in filing an
individual habeas petition to seek immediate relief, it is
uncertain whether any alien will be subject to Section 1226(a)
detention long enough to serve as a class representative.  As the
named Plaintiffs are still in contact with their counsel and
willing to pursue the action, the fact that the Government has
released them on bond therefore does not render them inadequate
named Plaintiffs.

Finally, the Judge finds that the class satisfies commonality,
typicality, and adequacy. And because the prejudice requirement
affects the legal rights of aliens who have already had hearings
subject to unconstitutional procedures but not those of aliens who
have yet to have bond hearings, the Judge certifies separate
classes for these two categories of individuals.  Both classes
satisfy Rule 23(b)(2) because the Court can issue a single remedy
that addresses the legal rights of all members of each class.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Saris allowed the Plaintiffs'
motion for class certification.  She certified the following two
classes for the due process claim:

     a. Pre-Hearing Class: All individuals who 1) are or will be
detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1226(a), 2) are held in
immigration detention in Massachusetts or are otherwise subject to
the jurisdiction of the Boston Immigration Court, and 3) have not
received a bond hearing before an immigration judge.

     b. Post-Hearing Class: All individuals who 1) are or will be
detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1226(a), 2) are held in
immigration detention in Massachusetts or are otherwise subject to
the jurisdiction of the Boston Immigration Court, and 3) have
received a bond hearing before an immigration judge.

The Judge appointed Mintz Levin, the American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation of Massachusetts, the American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation of New Hampshire, and the ACLU Foundation Immigrants'
Rights Project as the class counsel under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(g).

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 6, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/mFpqm8 from Leagle.com.

Gilberto Pereira Brito, Individually and on behalf of all those
similarly situated, Florentin Avila Lucas, Individually and on
behalf of all those similarly situated & Jacky Celicourt,
Individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated,
Petitioners, represented by Adriana Lafaille, American Civil
Liberties Union, Andrew Nathanson -- ANNathanson@mintz.com --
Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, PC, Daniel L.
McFadden, American Civil Liberties Union, Jennifer J. Mather --
JMMcCarthy@mintz.com -- Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and
Popeo, PC, Michael Tan, American Civil Liberties Union Federation,
pro hac vice, Ryan T. Dougherty -- RTDougherty@mintz.com -- Mintz,
Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, PC, SangYeob Kim, AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, pro hac vice,
Susan J. Cohen -- SJCohen@mintz.com -- Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris,
Glovsky & Popeo, PC, Susan M. Finegan -- sfinegan@mintz.com --
Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, PC, Gilles R.
Bissonnette, American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire, Henry
R. Klementowicz, American Civil Liberties Union of NH & Matthew
Segal, American Civil Liberties Union.

William Barr, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Marcos
Charles, Acting Field Office Director, Enforcement and Removal
Operations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Mark Morgan,
Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Kevin
McAleenan, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, James
McHenry, Director, Executive Office of Immigration Review, U.S.
Department of Justice, Antone Moniz, Superintendent of the Plymouth
County Correctional Facility, Yolanda Smith, Superintendent of the
Suffolk County House of Corrections, Steven Souza, Superintendent
of the Bristol County House of Corrections, Christopher Brackett,
Superintendent of the Strafford County Department of Corrections &
Lori Streeter, Superintendent of the Franklin County House of
Corrections, Respondents, represented by Carlton F. Sheffield, U.S.
Department of Justice, Civil Division Office of Immigration
Litigation, Huy Le, United States Department of Justice, J. Max
Weintraub, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Immigration
Litigation & Rayford A. Farquhar, United States Attorney's Office.

Party John A. Hawkinson, Intervenor, pro se.


VALARIS PLC: Bernstein Liebhard Files Securities Fraud Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard LLP, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law
firm, reminds investors of the deadline to file a motion for lead
plaintiff in a securities class action lawsuit on behalf of
shareholders that purchased or acquired securities of Valaris plc
("Valaris" or the "Company") (NYSE: VAL) between April 11, 2019 and
July 31, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"), resulting from
allegations that Valaris and/or its executives may have issued
materially misleading business information to the investing
public.

If you purchased Valaris securities, and/or would like to discuss
your legal rights and options please visit Valaris Shareholder
Class Action Lawsuit or contact Matthew E. Guarnero toll free at
(877) 779-1414 or MGuarnero@bernlieb.com

According to the lawsuit, throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (i) the Company was plagued by a weak ultra-deepwater
segment, massive cash usage, and significant negative cash flow;
(ii) the foregoing was reasonably likely to have a material
negative impact on the Company's second quarter 2019 results; (iii)
the merger leading to Valaris's establishment could not deliver on
its touted benefits; and (iv) as a result, the Company's public
statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant
times. On July 31, 2019, Valaris issued a press release announcing
its second quarter 2019 financial results purportedly its first
earnings report post-merger reflecting the results of the combined
company which missed market expectations (the 2Q 2019 Press
Release).

Upon issuance of the 2Q 2019 Press Release, Seeking Alpha published
an article on August 2, 2019, entitled Valaris PLC - Off To A Bad
Start (the Seeking Alpha Article), noting that Valaris's results
shock[ed] investors with massive cash usage [and] . . .
surprisingly weak outlook for the ultra-deepwater segment with
further day rate recovery likely delayed until at least the second
half of next year. The Seeking Alpha Article further criticized the
Company's free cash flow for the quarter, which was negative by a
whopping $375 million causing the Company's remaining pro forma
cash balance adjusted for roughly $741 million in payments related
to the recent debt tender offer to decline to just $353 million.

On this news, Valaris's stock price fell $3.25 per share, or
approximately 39%, over the two trading sessions following the
Company's announcement of its quarterly financial results, to close
at $5.02 per share on August 2, 2019.

If you purchased Valaris securities, and/or would like to discuss
your legal rights and options please visit
https://www.bernlieb.com/cases/valarisplc-val-shareholder-class-action-lawsuit-stock-fraud-172/apply/
or contact Matthew E. Guarnero toll free at (877) 779-1414 or
MGuarnero@bernlieb.com.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff in the class action, you
must move the court no later than October 21, 2019. A lead
plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf of other class
members in directing the litigation. Your ability to share in any
recovery doesn't require that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you
take no action, you may remain an absent class member.

Since 1993, Bernstein Liebhard LLP has recovered over $3.5 billion
for its clients. In addition to representing individual investors,
the Firm has been retained by some of the largest public and
private pension funds in the country to monitor their assets and
pursue litigation on their behalf. As a result of its success
litigating hundreds of lawsuits and class actions, the Firm has
been named to The National Law Journal's "Plaintiffs' Hot List"
thirteen times and listed in The Legal 500 for ten consecutive
years.

Contact:

         Matthew E. Guarnero, Esq.
         Bernstein Liebhard LLP
         https://www.bernlieb.com
         Tel: (877) 779-1414
         Email: MGuarnero@bernlieb.com [GN]


VALEANT PHARMACEUTICALS: Investors' CAD$30MM Deal With PwC Proposed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Investors in the common share and notes of Valeant Pharmaceuticals
International Inc., now known as Bausch Health Companies Inc.
("Valeant"), have been notified of a proposed settlement with
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, the U.S. member firm in the PwC network
of firms ("PwC") for CAD$30 million (the "PwC Settlement"). The
settlement is a compromise of disputed claims, without any
admission of liability by PwC.

The PwC Settlement may affect the rights of those who purchased
Valeant's common shares or notes between February 27, 2012 to
November 12, 2015 .

A motion to approve the PwC Settlement will take place on November
11, 2019 at 9:30 a.m., in a room to be determined of the Palais de
justice de Montréal.  The courthouse is located at 1 Notre-Dame
St. East , Montréal, Québec.

At the hearing the court will also address a motion to approve
Class Counsel fees and disbursements plus tax, a holdback to fund
future disbursements, levies payable to the Fonds d'aide aux
actions collectives and to the Ontario Class Proceedings Fund, and
a Plan of Allocation for the PwC Settlement. For information about
the lawsuit, your rights and how to exercise them, see the
long-form notice and related documents available online at
www.siskinds.com/class-action/valeant/

For investors who have not already had an opportunity to opt-out of
the class action, there may be an opportunity to opt-out of the PwC
Settlement.  For more information, visit
www.siskinds.com/class-action/valeant/ [GN]


VAN SUILICHEM: Workers Class Certified Under FLSA in Thomas Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Robert J. Jonker grants the Plaintiff's Motion for
Conditional Class Certification in the lawsuit entitled CHARLES
THOMAS v. VAN SUILICHEM ENTERPRISES, LLC, et al., Case No.
1:19-cv-00090-RJJ-PJG (W.D. Mich.).

The lawsuit is a wage and hour case under the Fair Labor Standards
Act.  Plaintiff Charles Thomas filed the lawsuit on behalf of
himself and similarly situated current and former employees of the
Defendants, alleging willful violation of the FLSA.

Judge Jonker conditionally certifies a collective action class for
unpaid minimum and overtime wages under 28 U.S.C. Section 216(b)
defined as:

     Current and former employees of Van Suilichem Enterprises,
     LLC who are or were compensated at a fixed rate per job
     and/or worked in excess of forty (40) hours during a
     workweek at any time after February 5, 2016.

The Court directs the Defendants to provide the Plaintiff with the
names, all known addresses, last known e-mail addresses, phone
numbers, and dates of employment of the potential Class Members
within ten days of this Order.

The Court has modified Plaintiff's proposed form of class notice.
As modified by the Court in the form attached as Exhibit A to the
Order, the Notice is authorized and shall be sent to the Class
Members as soon as practicable.

The hearing on the motion for conditional certification previously
scheduled for September 6, 2019, is cancelled.[CC]


WEATHERFORD INTERNATIONAL: Entwistle & Cappucci Files Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------------
Entwistle & Cappucci LLP on Sept. 6, 2019, announced it has filed a
securities action on behalf of a class ("Class") consisting of
persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired
securities of Weatherford International plc ("Weatherford" or the
"Company") (i) during the period from October 26, 2016 through May
10, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"), and/or (ii) pursuant or
traceable to Weatherford's secondary offering of common stock that
closed on or about November 21, 2016. The case was filed in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
(the "Court"), Case No. 4:19-cv-03363, against certain of
Weatherford's former and current senior executives and directors,
as well as J.P. Morgan Securities LLC (collectively,
"Defendants").

The class action asserts claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Sections 11 and 15 of the
Securities Act of 1993. The complaint alleges that, during the
Class Period, the Defendants made materially false and misleading
statements and omitted material adverse facts concerning
Weatherford's "recovery" and "transformation plan" and, relatedly,
the Company's ability to manage its debt and avoid bankruptcy. As a
result of the Defendants' false and misleading statements and
omissions, Weatherford's securities traded at artificially inflated
prices during the Class Period. Such inflation was partially
removed when it was revealed that Weatherford planned to file for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. The complaint seeks an award of
damages, and interest thereon, to the plaintiff and other Class
members.

If you wish to serve as a lead plaintiff in this matter, you must
file a motion with the Court no later than November 5, 2019. Any
member of the proposed Class may move the Court to serve as a lead
plaintiff in this matter through counsel of their choice, or they
may choose to do nothing and remain a member of the Class.

If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions concerning
this notice or your rights or interests, please contact: Andrew J.
Entwistle, Esq. of Entwistle & Cappucci at (512) 710-5960 or via
e-mail at aentwistle@entwistle-law.com or Joshua K. Porter, Esq. of
Entwistle & Cappucci at (212) 894-7200 or via e-mail at
jporter@entwistle-law.com

About Entwistle & Cappucci

Entwistle & Cappucci is a national law firm providing exceptional
legal representation to clients globally in the most complex and
challenging legal matters. Our practice encompasses all areas of
litigation, including securities, antitrust, corporate
transactions, general corporate and commercial, creditor's rights
and bankruptcy, corporate governance and fiduciary duty, government
affairs, insurance, investigations and white collar defense. Our
clients include public and private corporations, major hedge funds,
public pension funds, governmental entities, leading institutional
investors, domestic and foreign financial services companies,
emerging business enterprises and individual entrepreneurs.

Contacts:

         Andrew J. Entwistle, Esq.
         Entwistle & Cappucci LLP
         500 W. 2nd Street, Suite 1900-16
         Austin, Texas 78701
         Telephone: (512) 710-5960
         Email: aentwistle@entwistle-law.com

            -- and --

         Joshua K. Porter, Esq.
         299 Park Avenue, 20th Floor
         New York, New York 10171
         Telephone: (212) 894-7200
         Facsimile: (212) 894-7272
         Website: www.entwistle-law.com
         Email: jporter@entwistle-law.com [GN]


WESTPAC BANKING: Sued Over Superannuation Fund
----------------------------------------------
James Frost, writing for Financial Review, reports that Westpac has
been hit with a class action claiming it siphoned cash from
superannuation fund members, with potential damages believed to be
in the order of tens of millions of dollars.

The suit is the third action filed by Slater & Gordon against a
major financial institution since it kicked off a campaign in 2018
to return money to Australian customers gouged by their
superannuation providers.

Westpac has been accused of witholding up to 120 basis points of
return on cash.

A statement of claim filed in the Federal Court on September 4
alleges the jumbo profits the bank was generating at the expense of
the members were a breach of the Superannuation Industry
Supervision Act of 1993.

The claims focus on the experience of  customers in BT's Super for
Life product who selected the cash investment option provided by
Westpac Life.

Slater & Gordon's Nathan Rapoport said the bank was paying a rate
of only 1.3 per cent to fund members at a time when cash was paying
as much as 2.5 per cent, with the bank pocketing the difference.

"Superannuation members trusted BT with their retirement savings,
but instead of seeking the best returns available for members, it
appears BT chose to line the pockets of another entity in the
Westpac group," Mr Rapoport said.

"We believe Westpac Life provided no service that could justify it
retaining such a large part of the returns generated from members'
money, and we want the difference paid back to members."

The statement of claim says the bank "wilfully shut its eyes" to
the conflict of interest and "recklessly failed to make ...
inquiries" about the discrepancy in interest paid to superannuation
customers.

It further says "had the acts and omissions" not occurred "the
trustee would have achieved higher net returns from the investments
of the cash amounts".

AFR Weekend understands the bank is expected to argue that it was a
commercial return and customers were charged a premium for safety.

The bank confirmed in a statement to the stock exchange the action
had been filed against its subsiduaries BT Funds Management (BTFM)
and Westpac Life Insurance Services.

"The damages sought by the claim are unspecified. BTFM and WLIS
will be defending the claims" the bank said.

Westpac has been involved in a number of high-profile courtroom
stoushes in recent years, including the closely followed trial over
the BBSW rate-rigging allegations and the more recent ''shiraz and
wagyu beef'' case over responsible lending that it won
comprehensively.

Several weeks ago the bank rolled the dice on a risky High Court
appeal to strike out an unrelated $100 million lawsuit on a
technicality.

Emboldened by a run of high-profile court victories, Westpac argued
the common fund order used by litigation funders Just Kapital
amounted to an acquisition of property on unjust terms and sought
to have the case thrown out.

The Slater & Gordon case against Westpac for skimming follows a
slew of other court actions from both litigation funders and
regulators in the aftermath of the Hayne royal commission.

In September a year ago, Slater & Gordon launched its "Get your
super back" campaign where it revealed it would pursue the big four
banks and AMP over their failure to provide super fund members with
competitive cash rates.

Commonwealth Bank and its subsiduary Colonial First State were the
first to be pursued by the firm in October 2018, which claimed the
bank had chiselled its members for more than $100 million by
shortchanging them on the cash rate.

Wealth management company AMP was later targeted for failing to
deliver an appropriate return from its cash option in an action
filed in June this year. The case against Westpac is being funded
by UK litigation funding firm Therium Capital Management. [GN]


WISE MEDICAL: Campbell's Bid to Certify Mooted Due to Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Sarah D. Morrison moots the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify
Class Conditionally and Authorize Notice in the lawsuit captioned
Juanita Campbell, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. Wise Medical Staffing, Inc., Case No.
2:18-cv-00493-SDM-KAJ (S.D. Ohio).

According order, the Court has been notified that the matter has
been settled.  Thus, the Court vacated the September 5, 2019
hearing date and held that the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class
Conditionally and Authorize Notice is moot.

Judge Morrison directs counsel to file their motion to approve on
or before October 4, 2019.[CC]


XPO LOGISTICS: Certification of Class Sought in Alvarez Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit styled ANGEL OMAR ALVAREZ, an
individual; ALBERTO RIVERA, an individual; FERNANDO RAMIREZ, an
individual; JUAN ROMERO, an individual; and JOSE PAZ, an
individual; on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated
v. XPO LOGISTICS CARTAGE, LLC dba XPO LOGISTICS, a Delaware Limited
Liability Company; XPO CARTAGE, INC. dba XPO LOGISTICS, a Delaware
corporation; JEFFREY TRAUNER, an individual; and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive, Case No. 2:18-cv-03736-SJO-E (C.D. Cal.), moves for
class certification.

The Court will commence a hearing on November 21, 2019, at 10:00
a.m., to consider the Motion.[CC]

Plaintiffs Angel Omar Alvarez, Alberto Rivera, Fernando Ramirez,
Juan Romero and Jose Paz are represented by:

          C. Joe Sayas, Jr., Esq.
          Karl P. Evangelista, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF C. JOE SAYAS, JR.
          500 N. Brand Boulevard, Suite 980
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Telephone: (818) 291-0088
          Facsimile: (818) 240-9955
          E-mail: cjs@joesayaslaw.com
                  kpe@joesayaslaw.com

               - and -

          Ira L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Julie Gutman Dickinson, Esq.
          Katherine M. Traverso, Esq.
          Hector De Haro, Esq.
          BUSH GOTTLIEB, ALC
          801 N. Brand Boulevard, Suite 950
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Telephone: (818) 973-3200
          Facsimile: (818) 973-3201
          E-mail: igottlieb@bushgottlieb.com
                  jgutmandickinson@bushgottlieb.com
                  ktraverso@bushgottlieb.com
                  hdeharo@bushgottlieb.com

Plaintiffs Jairo Moreno Martinez, Jesus Carreon and Rodolpho Moreno
are represented by:

          Daniel Osborn, Esq.
          OSBORN LAW P.C.
          43 West 43rd Street, Suite 131
          New York, NY 10036-7424
          Telephone: (212) 725-9800
          Facsimile: (212) 500-5115
          E-mail: dosborn@osbornlawpc.com

               - and -

          D. Briana Rivera, Esq.
          Patricia A. Shackelford, Esq.
          RIVERA SHACKELFORD
          4901 Morena Blvd., Suite 111
          San Diego, CA 92117
          Telephone: (858) 412-5303
          Facsimile: (619) 858-2308
          E-mail: briana@riverashackelford.com
                  patricia@riverashackelford.com

Plaintiff Edgar Mendoza is represented by:

          Solomon E. Gresen, Esq.
          Jack Risemberg, Esq.
          RG LAWYERS, LLP
          15910 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 1610
          Encino, California 91436
          Telephone: (818) 815-2727
          Facsimile: (818) 815-2737
          E-mail: seg@rglawyers.com
                  jr@rglawyers.com


YALOBUSHA HEALTH: Groner Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------
REGINA GRONER, JEFFREY SWINDLE, GEORGE H. BEAM. JR., and RONALD W.
STARK, On behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. YALOBUSHA HEALTH SERVICES and YALOBUSHA GENERAL
HOSPITAL AND NURSING HOME, Defendants, Case No.
3:19-cv-00201-MPM-RP (N.D. Miss., Sept. 5, 2019) is a lawsuit
against Defendants for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and
money damages for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

From August 1, 2016, Defendants employed Plaintiffs Groner,
Swindle, Beam and Stark and all others similarly situated, for many
workweeks in excess 40 hours in the workweek. During these
workweeks, Defendants would only compensate all Plaintiffs for only
a portion of the hours during their shifts, e.g., for only 20 or 21
hours out of a 24-hour shift, even though they were required to be
at the hospital, were on call for any calls, and did not have
freedom to leave or use the time as they saw fit during the entire
shift.

The Defendants had a policy that it would not compensate plaintiffs
at all for the unpaid overtime hours during those workweeks unless
Plaintiffs could show that they were out on a call, or in the
ambulance, or performing some other randomly-selected job duty
during that time. As such, Defendants did not pay Plaintiffs for
all hours over 40 during a workweek at their respective overtime
rates of one and one-half times the regular rates at which they
were employed, even though such time was compensable time under the
FLSA.  The Defendants, therefore, owe Plaintiffs overtime
compensation for such hours that it refused to compensate them,
says the complaint.

Plaintiffs were employed by Defendants in its location in Water
Valley, Mississippi as paramedics.

Yalobusha Health Services operates Yalobusha General Hospital and
Nursing Home.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     James D. Harper, Esq.
     Terry D. Little, Esq.
     HARPER LITTLE, PLLC
     800 College Hill Road, #5201
     Oxford, MS 38655
     Phone: (662) 234-0320
     Facsimile: (662) 259-8464
     Email: james@harperlittlelaw.com
            terry@harperlittlelaw.com


ZAYO GROUP: Faces Several Class Suits Related to Merger Deal
------------------------------------------------------------
Zayo Group Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on September 4, 2019,
for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues
to defend several class action suits related to the company's
merger deal with a consortium of private equity funds.

On May 8, 2019, the company, Front Range TopCo, Inc. ("Parent"), a
Delaware corporation and Front Range BidCo, Inc., a Delaware
corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of Parent ("Merger Sub")
entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger (the "Merger
Agreement") to be acquired by a consortium of private equity funds
including affiliates of EQT Infrastructure IV, Digital Colony
Partners, LP, DC Front Range Holdings I, LP and FMR LLC (the
"Consortium"). Upon the close of the Merger, the company will
operate as a privately-held company. Parent and Merger Sub were
formed by the Consortium.

The Merger Agreement provides that, among other things and upon the
terms and subject to the conditions of the Merger Agreement, (i)
Merger Sub will be merged with and into the Company (the "Merger"),
with the Company surviving and continuing as the surviving
corporation in the Merger and a wholly owned subsidiary of Parent,
and (ii) at the effective time of the Merger, each outstanding
share of common stock of the Company, par value $0.001 per share
("Common Stock") (other than Common Stock owned by Parent, Merger
Sub or any wholly owned subsidiary of Parent or Merger Sub or held
in the treasury of the Company, all of which shall be canceled
without any consideration being exchanged therefor or shares of
Common Stock held by holders who have made a valid demand for
appraisal in accordance with Section 262 of the Delaware General
Corporation Law) will be converted into the right to receive an
amount equal to $35.00 per share in cash (the "Merger
Consideration").

Following the filing of the preliminary proxy statement on June 3,
2019, the following complaints were filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware against Zayo and its
directors: on June 7, 2019, a purported Zayo stockholder filed a
putative class action complaint, captioned Scarantino v. Zayo Group
Holdings, Inc., et al., Case No. 1:19-cv-01068-RGA; on June 12,
2019, a purported Zayo stockholder filed a complaint, captioned
Klein v. Zayo Group Holdings, Inc., et al., Case No.
1:19-cv-01085-RGA; on June 17, 2019, a purported Zayo stockholder
filed a putative class action complaint, captioned Duggan v. Zayo
Group Holdings, Inc., et al., Case No. 1:19-cv-01112-RGA; and on
June 18, 2019, a purported Zayo stockholder filed a putative class
action complaint, captioned, Dixon v. Zayo Group Holdings, Inc., et
al., Case No. 1:19-cv-01123-UNA.

The complaints assert claims for violations of Section 14(a) of the
Exchange Act and SEC Rule 14a-9 against Zayo and its directors, and
claims for violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act against
the Zayo directors.

The complaint captioned Duggan v. Zayo Group Holdings, Inc., et
al., Case No. 1:19-cv-01112-RGA also asserts a claim for violations
of 17 C.F.R. Section 244.100 against Zayo and its directors.

The complaints allege, among other things, that Zayo and its
directors disseminated an allegedly false and materially misleading
proxy statement. The complaints seek, among other things, to enjoin
the merger, a declaration that the proxy statement violated federal
securities laws, unspecified damages, and an award of attorneys'
and experts' fees.

On June 17, 2019, a purported Zayo stockholder filed a complaint,
captioned Graves v. Zayo Group Holdings, Inc., et al., Case No.
1:19-cv-01747-KLM, and on June 21, 2019, another purported Zayo
stockholder filed a complaint, captioned Karels v. Zayo Group
Holdings, Inc., et al., Case No. 1:19-cv-01809-MEH, against Zayo
and its directors in the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado.

The complaints assert claims for violations of Section 14(a) and
SEC Rule 14a-9 against Zayo and its directors, and claims for
violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act against the Zayo
directors. The complaints allege, among other things, that Zayo and
its directors disseminated an allegedly false and materially
misleading proxy statement. The complaints seek, among other
things, to enjoin the merger, unspecified damages, and an award of
attorneys' and experts' fees.

On June 18, 2019, another purported Zayo stockholder filed a
putative class action complaint, captioned Saroop v. Zayo Group
Holdings, Inc., et al., Case No. 2019CV30601, against Zayo and its
directors in the District Court of Boulder County, Colorado.

The complaint asserts a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against
Zayo and its directors. The complaint alleges, among other things,
that the directors breached their fiduciary duties in connection
with the merger due to certain deal protection provisions in the
merger agreement and potential conflicts of interest, and
disseminated a materially misleading proxy statement.

The complaint seeks, among other things, to enjoin the merger, a
declaration that the merger was entered into in breach of fiduciary
duty, rescission and invalidation of the merger agreement or other
agreements entered into in connection with or in furtherance of the
merger, and an award of attorneys' and experts' fees.

The defendants believe each of these federal cases are without
merit and intend to vigorously defend against them.

Zayo Group Holdings, Inc. provides bandwidth infrastructure
services. The Company offers dark fiber, wavelengths, SONET,
ethernet, IP, and carrier-neutral colocation and interconnection.
Zayo Group Holdings serves customers worldwide.



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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