CAR_Public/190923.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, September 23, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 190

                            Headlines

1 IOTA: Hatfield Seeks Unpaid Wages for Housekeeping Staff
ADT LLC: Fitzhenry Suit Transferred to E.D. North Carolina
ALLEGIANT TRAVEL: Court Narrows Claims in Brendon Securities Suit
AMTRUST FINANCIAL: Court OKs Dismissal of Securities Suit
ANTHEM INC: Court OKs $380K Settlement in O'Dowd Suit

ARCADIA RECOVERY: Schwartz Asserts Breach of FDCPA
BIRDEYE, INC: Hindi Sues over Unsolicited Text Messages
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA: Martinez Suit Moved to N.D. California
CAMP ORENDA: Faces Matzura Suit in Southern District of New York
CAPITAL ONE: Lundgren et al Sue over Consumer Data Breach

CASHCO, INC: Kitts Suit Moved to District of New Mexico
CAVALRY PORTFOLIO: Blair Files FDCPA Suit in California
CCC INFORMATION: Salit Auto Class Suit Transferred to N.J. Dist. Ct
CF ARCIS: Settlement in Hart Suit Has Prelim Court Approval
COCA-COLA CO: Does not Properly Pay Workers, Flores Suit Asserts

COLONIAL PARKING: Abraha Moves for Certification of Workers Class
CONCENTRIX SERVICES: Court Denies Dismiss in Turner FLSA Suit
COPAKE CAMPING: Faces Matzura Suit in Southern Dist. of New York
COSTCO WHOLESALE: Nevarez Files Workers Class Certification Bid
CREDIT CONTROL: Faces Gachett Suit in District of New Jersey

DARISI INC: Gupta Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
ENVISION FOODS: Cal. App. OKs Writ of Mandate in Soto Suit
FCA US LLC: Victorino Seeks to Certify Class of Dodge Dart Buyers
FCA US: $26.3K Attorney's Fees in Salinas Approved
FIRST AMERICAN: Court Extends Time to Answer in Seiwert

FLYING POINT SPORT: Olsen Files Class Suit Under ADA
FORD MOTOR: Anderson Alleges False Fuel-Economy Ratings
FPI MANAGEMENT: Ramos Files Wage and Hour Suit in Calif.
FQSR LLC: Lancaster Files Wage and Hour Suit in Maryland
FRONTLINE ASSET: Weinberg Files Class Suit under FDCPA

FUTURE ENERGY: Faces Wright Suit in California Superior Court
GENDLIN & LIVERMAN: Karas et al. Seek OT Pay for Paralegals
GL LBT LLC: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Vazquez Says
GLOBAL CREDIT: Padmore Files Class Suit in E.D. New York
GOLDEN QUEEN MINING: Marquez Files Class Suit in California

GULFPORT ENERGY: Profit Energy Sues over Overriding Royalty Fees
HARLEY-DAVIDSON: Removes Greene Pricing Suit to C.D. California
HEADWAY TECHNOLOGIES: Faces Apex Suit in N.D. California
HIRE TECH: Varner Seeks OT Wages for Mechanical Engineers
HOME DEPOT: Court Moves Reply Deadline to Oct. 25

HORIZON SATELLITES: Griner Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
ILLINOIS: Weston Files Prisoner Civil Rights Suit
INNS OF AURORA: Olsen Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
JOHN BURNS CONSTRUCTION: Long Seeks Overtime Pay for Workers
JUUL LABS: Cobb et al Sue over Sale of Vaping Devices

KCI TECHNOLOGIES: Ohio App. Affirms Certification in Ayers
KIA MOTORS: Perez Sues Over Defective Engine System
LIFELABS, LLC: Scavo Sues over Unsolicited Text Messages
LOYOLA MARYMOUNT: Navia Seeks Refund for Cell Phone Usage
M&N CABLE: Lannert Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages

MAHONING COUNTY, OH: Court Dismisses Youngblood Discrimination Suit
MARKET AMERICA: Zou Files RICO Class Suit in North Carolina
MDL 2843: Court Narrows Claims in Facebook User Profile Use
MENN LAW FIRM: Cole Files Class Certification Under FDCPA
MICHAEL A. JACOB: Court Compels Arbitration in Campbell

MIDLAND CREDIT: Ruyyashi Files Class Suit under FDCPA
MIRROR LAKE INN: Olsen Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
ML CLEANING: Jimenez Moves to Certify Cleaners Class Under FLSA
MONSANTO COMPANY: Lingschs Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
NANDO'S RESTAURANT: Martinez Sues Over Biometric Data Retention

NAT NAST ACQUISITION: Andrews Files Class Suit Under ADA
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE: Court Narrows Claims in RESPA Suit
NATIONWIDE CREDIT: Court Stays Class Certification Proceedings
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY: Court Denies Local One's Injunctive Relief Bid
NOVAGRAAF GROUP: Class Certification Sought in Mischler Suit

OAKLAND, CA: Faces Smith et al Suit in N.D. California
OPTIME REALTY: Martin Sues over Autodialed Text Messages
PAPA MURPHY'S: Monteverde to Lead in Securities Suit
PETIQ, LLC: Flea & Tick Medication Toxic to Pets, Penikila Says
PHH MORTGAGE: Basketbills Sue over Mortgage Account Charges

PHYSICIAN OFFICE: Court Compels Document Production in Young
PK MANAGEMENT: Court Denies Sanctions in Riley's Negligence Suit
PLS FINANCIAL: Court Refuses to Stay Vine Suit Pending Appeal
POSTMATES INC: Rogers Sues over Fax Advertisements
PREMIER DERMATOLOGY: Court Dismisses Smith TCPA Suit

PUEBLO NUEVO: Martinez et al Seek OT Pay for Employees
RASH CURTIS: Court Awards $267K in McMillion Suit
RESTAURANT MANAGEMENT: Lopez Files Suit Over Sick Leave Dispute
RITE AID: Court Narrows Claim in Acetaminiphen Gelcaps Suit
RJS03, LLC: Faces Matzura Suit in Southern District of New York

ROBIN INDUSTRIES: Court Grants Conditional Certification in Byerly
ROSCOE CAMPSITE: Website not Accessible to Blind, Matzura Says
ROYAL WINE: Weisberg Sues over 100% Pure Grape Juice Labeling
SALVATION ARMY: Gebel Suit Asserts BIPA Violation
SCHROON RIVER: Faces Matzura Suit in Southern District of New York

SCIENTIAE, LLC: Retina Assoc. Sues over Fax Advertisements
SEQUOIA FUND: 2nd Cir. Affirms Dismissal in Edwards
SOUTHERN CONNECTIONS: Guerra Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
STEVEN COHEN: Herz Files FDCPA Suit in New York
SUMMIT THERAPEUTIC: Fails to Pay Minimum Wages & OT, Jones Says

SWISSPORT FUELING: Reyes Files Labor Class Action in Calif.
T & D RESORTS: Faces Murphy Suit in Southern District of New York
TESLA INC: Court Won't Review Attorneys Fees Ruling in Wilson
TOLTECA ENTERPRISES: Class Certified Under FDCPA in Hackler Suit
TORRES FARM: Faces Santos Suit in California Superior Court

UNITED STATES: N-N Files Class Suit in New York
V3 ELECTRIC: Faes Massey Suit in California Superior Court
VALLEY AUTO TRANSPORT: Removes Brink Case to E.D. California
W.R. SAINSBURY: Burch et al Seek OT Pay for Maintenance Personnel
WASHOS, INC: Salguero Seeks Unpaid Wages for Car Washers

WELLNESS SOLUTIONS: Class Certified Under FLSA in Krawczyk Suit
WHOLE FOODS: Bottled Water Tainted with Arsenic, Berke et al. Say
WOODSTREAM CORP: Heumann Sues over Rodent Rrepeller Products

                            *********

1 IOTA: Hatfield Seeks Unpaid Wages for Housekeeping Staff
----------------------------------------------------------
KARLY HATFIELD, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated and on behalf of all aggrieved employees, the Plaintiff,
vs. 1 Iota Productions, LLC, a California Corporation; and DOES 1
through 100, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. 19STCV30328 (Cal.
Super., Aug. 28, 2019), alleges that Defendants violated the
California Labor  Code by failing to pay all wages earned, minimum
wages, amd overtime wages, and failed to provide meal periods and
rest breaks.

According to the complaint, Defendant's core line of business
involves recruiting audience members for television program and/or
live event tapings and then managing/handling the audience members
throughout every phase of the taping/event/show.

The Defendant employed Plaintiff  and the Class Members throughout
State of California, to work with audiences for shows/events
throughout the State of California, including Los Angeles,
California.

The Plaintiff was hired as housekeeping staff by Defendant in
February of 2013. The Defendant maintained uniform timekeeping and
payroll processes and procedures for all non-exempt employees.

1iota is America's premier Audience Casting and Fan Engagement
Agency The company offer peerless support for all of production's
audience/event production needs.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Gregory P. Wong., Esq.
          BARKHORDARIAN LAW FIRM, PLC
          6047 Bristol Parkway, Second Floor
          Culver City, CA 90230
          Telephone: (323) 450-2777
          Facsimile: (310) 215-3416
          E-mail: greg@barklawfirm.com

ADT LLC: Fitzhenry Suit Transferred to E.D. North Carolina
----------------------------------------------------------
MARK FITZHENRY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Petitioner, vs. ADT LLC, a Delaware company, and SAFE
STREETS USA LLC, a Delaware company, the Respondents, Case No.
9:19-cv-80626 (Filed May 10, 2019), was transferred from the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Florida Southern, to
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina
on Sept. 6, 2019. The Eastern District of North Carolina Court
Clerk assigned Case No. 7:19-cv-00174-BO to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff seeks to stop Defendants from making unauthorized
pre-recorded voice message calls promoting ADT's home alarm
services, and to obtain redress for all persons similarly injured
by its conduct under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The
suit is assigned to the Hon. Judge Terrence W. Boyle.[BN]

Attorneys for the Petitioner are:

          Rachel E. Kaufman, Esq.
          Avi Robert Kaufman, Esq.
          KAUFMAN PA
          400 NW 26th Street
          Miami, FL 33127
          Telephone: (305) 469-5881

ALLEGIANT TRAVEL: Court Narrows Claims in Brendon Securities Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada issued
an Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss in the case captioned CHARLES BRENDON and DANIEL CHECKMAN,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs, v. ALLEGIANT TRAVEL COMPANY, et al., Defendants Case
No. 2:18-cv-01758-APG-BNW. (D. Nev.).

The defendants move to dismiss the FAC, challenging falsity,
scienter, and loss causation.

This is a securities fraud class action lawsuit against Allegiant
Travel Company, the owner of Allegiant Air. The First Amended
Complaint alleges that Allegiant used second-hand aircraft to fly
travelers. Allegiant experienced numerous aircraft maintenance and
repair issues with its second-hand aircraft, resulting in
cancellations, delays, emergency landings, and aborted takeoffs.
The plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)  and Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5. The plaintiffs also
assert control person liability against the individual defendants
under section 20(b) of the Exchange Act.

Under SEC Rule 10b-5, it is unlawful for any person to make any
untrue statement of fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.

To recover damages for violations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
a plaintiff must prove (1) a material misrepresentation or omission
by the defendant (2) scienter (3) a connection between the
misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a
security (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission (5)
economic loss and (6) loss causation.

The defendants argue that the FAC should be dismissed because the
plaintiffs failed to adequately allege material misrepresentation,
scienter, and loss causation.

Material Misrepresentation

The defendants argue that the plaintiffs failed to plead an
actionable false statement because: (1) under In re Merck & Co.
Securities Litigation, 432 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2005), an actionable
false statement cannot be based upon previously disclosed public
information and (2) the alleged misrepresentations consist of
inactionable puffery or mismanagement claims.

The plaintiffs respond that defendants improperly rely on a
fact-intensive affirmative defense to support dismissal and that
their alleged misstatements are actionable.

Merck

In Merck, the Third Circuit held that a Wall Street Journal article
analyzing Merck's opaquely disclosed accounting practices could not
form the basis of a false statement because the efficient market
hypothesis suggests the market would have already incorporated the
information into Merck's share price.  However, any material
information which insiders fail to disclose must be transmitted to
the public with a degree of intensity and credibility sufficient to
effectively counter-balance any misleading impression created by
the insiders' one-sided representations.

Accordingly, the truth-on-the-market defense is intensely
fact-specific, so courts rarely dismiss a complaint on this basis.

The defendants argue that the facts underlying the 60 Minutes
report had already been reported by local news sources, thus
requiring dismissal under Merck. Even assuming that Merck is the
law in the Ninth Circuit, however, the plaintiffs allege a key fact
distinguishing this case from Merck: the CBS broadcast reported
undisclosed Allegiant maintenance records obtained by the FOIA
request.

To the extent that the defendants raise a truth-on-the market
defense, the plaintiffs plead facts showing that the local news
reports that emerged before the 60 Minutes report were not
comprehensive or credible enough to counterbalance Allegiant's
alleged misrepresentations. The Court, therefore deny the
defendants' motion to dismiss on this ground.

False or Misleading Statements

The plaintiffs must specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading, and the reason or reasons why the statement is
misleading to adequately plead material misrepresentation.  A
litany of alleged false statements, unaccompanied by the pleading
of specific facts indicating why those statements were false, does
not meet this standard.

With respect to opinion statements, when a plaintiff relies on a
theory of material misrepresentation, the plaintiff must allege
both that the speaker did not hold the belief she professed and
that the belief is objectively untrue.

However, a mildly optimistic, subjective assessment hardly amounts
to a securities violation, so the Court must distinguish material
misrepresentations from puffery. Statements by a company that are
capable of objective verification are not puffery and can
constitute material misrepresentations. And, general statements of
optimism, when taken in context, may form a basis for a securities
fraud claim when those statements address specific aspects of a
company's operation that the speaker knows to be performing
poorly.

10-K Statements

Allegiant's 2015 10-K stated that we believe our aircraft are, and
will continue to be, mechanically reliable. These statements
regarding Allegiant's reliability, staffing, and training are
capable of objective verification. The plaintiffs sufficiently
allege that these statements were false and misleading because
Allegiant maintenance technicians were inexperienced and
insufficiently trained, resulting in substandard repairs and false
certification that maintenance had been performed, and Allegiant's
maintenance department was grossly understaffed, resulting in
rushed repairs and false certifications that maintenance had been
performed

Thus deny the motion with respect to these statements.

Statements Regarding Focus on Safety

In annual shareholder letters, Gallagher assured investors that
Allegiant placed its focus on safety and reliability, had a proven,
seasoned model and that safety was its core fundamental. These
statements are not capable of objective verification and thus
cannot be material misrepresentations.  The Court  thus grant the
motion with respect to these statements.

Investor Call Statements

During a January 2016 investor call, an analyst asked about the
recent operational challenges reflected in media stories,
Allegiant's plan to correct the challenges, and whether the
challenges were overhyped by the media or represented safety
issues. Bricker responded, in relevant part, that it's a safe
operation. Last year, it was a safe operation, and this year as
well. Gallagher added that as Bricker said, we are safe. The
plaintiffs allege these statements were false because Allegiant's
maintenance practices created an unsafe operation.

These statements are actionable because they address specific
questions on aspects of Allegiant's operation, Allegiant's
maintenance issues, that Gallagher and Bricker allegedly knew to be
performing badly. Alternatively, the statements could be
characterized as opinion statements with an embedded fact.
Gallagher and Bricker express their opinion that Allegiant is safe,
but embedded in their opinion is a factual denial of the analyst's
series of questions on Allegiant's operational challenges. The
plaintiffs adequately allege that the supporting fact was untrue
because the FAC alleges that the operational challenges reflected
safety issues rather than media hype.

The Court therefore deny the motion as to these statements on the
grounds of falsity.

Scienter

The defendants argue that the plaintiffs fail to plead scienter
because neither the allegations of former employees (FEs) nor
Gallagher's stock sales suggests a strong inference of scienter.
The plaintiffs respond that they adequately allege scienter
because:

   (1) the FE allegations confirm defendants' recklessness as to
Allegiant's maintenance practices and safety.

   (2) the core operations doctrine permits an inference that the
defendants were aware of Allegiant's maintenance and safety issues

   (3) Gallagher's stock sales and formation of a 10b5-1 stock
trading plan permit an inference of scienter

   (4) Gallagher's bonus structure incentivized fraud and

   (5) Harfst's unexpected resignation further supports scienter.

Under the PSLRA, the plaintiffs must state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind. To assess whether the FAC meets this
standard, the Court must ask: When the allegations are accepted as
true and taken collectively, would a reasonable person deem the
inference of scienter at least as strong as any opposing
inference?

Consequently, the Court addresses each allegation and then analyze
them collectively to determine whether the plaintiffs have
adequately alleged scienter.

Former Employee Allegations

The plaintiffs must describe the FEs whose statements are
introduced to establish scienter with sufficient particularity to
establish their reliability and personal knowledge.

Most of the FEs occupied front-line maintenance positions, but the
FEs allege that senior management, including the individual
defendants, knew of the maintenance issues. For example, two of the
FEs allege direct contact with individual defendants in daily
briefings on the status of aircraft and monthly reliability
meetings to discuss new and ongoing reliability issues and
mechanical problems with the fleet. The FEs also allege that
Allegiant's open office floor plan allowed the individual
defendants to learn of the maintenance issues. Additionally, senior
executives reported on maintenance issues at board meetings that
Gallagher attended. These particularized allegations that
defendants had actual access to the disputed information, raise a
strong inference of scienter.

Core Operations Doctrine

The FAC contains particularized allegations from the FEs that the
individual defendants knew of the airline's maintenance issues.
Additionally, Allegiant's 10-Ks, signed by Gallagher and Sheldon,
stated that management closely supervises all maintenance functions
performed by our personnel and contractors employed by us, and by
outside organizations. In the investor call, Gallagher and Bricker
responded to at least one question on operational challenges,
suggesting that they were familiar with the airline's maintenance
issues. These particularized allegations support scienter on their
own, but it would also be absurd to suggest that the management of
any airline, much less an airline experiencing significant
operational challenges, would not be aware of pervasive maintenance
issues like those alleged by the plaintiffs.

Stock Trading

The stock sales at issue here represented between .43% and 8.6% of
Gallagher's Allegiant holdings, but netted him $83,073,245.16.
Although the percentage of Gallagher's holdings was modest, the
size of the proceeds may support an inference of scienter. With
respect to timing, the plaintiffs allege that the first stock sale
was suspicious because it took place two days after Allegiant
responded to allegations that it was unsafe. The plaintiffs allege
that the other two sales and the creation of the 10b5-1 trading
plan were suspicious because they took place during the five-to
eight-month period when Gallagher allegedly knew that CBS was
investigating Allegiant. The years-long class period and the
numerous events alleged during the class period, however, suggest
that the timing was not suspicious. The months-long time period
when the plaintiffs allege that Gallagher knew of the CBS
investigation underlines how the lengthy class period weighs
against scienter.

And, the FAC does not allege that Gallagher formed the stock
trading plan to take advantage of the inflated stock price.
Finally, the plaintiffs do not allege facts in the complaint
showing how Gallagher's trading during the class period compared to
trading before and after the class period. Weighing these factors
together, Gallagher's stock sales and 10b5-1 trading plan formation
do not support a strong inference of scienter on their own. But I
consider them in my collective analysis, and the Court grants the
plaintiffs leave to amend to add further allegations in support of
scienter, if they exist.

Loss Causation

The defendants argue that the plaintiffs do not adequately plead
loss causation because: (1) the 60 Minutes report was not an
adequate corrective disclosure because it revealed nothing new (2)
the stock drop following the purported corrective disclosure was
not material and (3) the corrective disclosure was not sufficiently
connected to the alleged fraud.

The plaintiffs respond that: (1) the 60 Minutes report exposed new
information and shed new light on existing public information (2)
the stock drop was material because of the trading volume and
decline in share price and (3) the corrective disclosure is not
required to mirror the alleged fraud.

To adequately plead loss causation, the plaintiffs must allege that
the defendant's share price fell significantly after the truth
became known. A series of corrective disclosures, when viewed in
tandem, may be sufficient if the combined force of these statements
suggest that the market was alerted to the relevant
misrepresentations.  

The plaintiffs sufficiently allege that the truth became known over
three partial disclosures. First, CBS announced the subject of the
60 Minutes report on April 13, 2018, resulting in the first stock
drop. Second, CBS aired the report on April 15, resulting in a
second stock drop. The report is an adequate corrective disclosure
because it revealed new information to the market and brought to
light the systemic nature of Allegiant's maintenance issues.
Finally, the DOT announced an investigation of FAA's oversight of
Allegiant on May 9, 2018, resulting in the third stock drop. The
announcement of a government investigation alone is insufficient to
establish loss causation, but here the CBS and DOT disclosures
together alerted the market to Allegiant's systemic maintenance
issues.

The three stock drops, ranging from 2% to 8.59%, on heavy trading
volume following the partial disclosures constitute a significant
fall in share price. The defendants cite dicta from Metzler to
argue that the plaintiffs fail to plead loss causation because the
stock price recovered, but dismissal is inappropriate on these
grounds.  

The plaintiffs thus adequately allege loss causation.

Section 20(a)

Section 20(a) of the PSLRA establishes joint and several liability
for controlling persons who aid and abet securities violations.
  
To establish control person liability, the plaintiffs must allege a
primary violation of federal securities law and that the defendant
exercised actual power or control over the primary violator.

The plaintiffs allege a violation of securities laws and that
Gallagher, Sheldon, and Bricker, as corporate officers, exercised
control over the primary violator. However, Harfst cannot be liable
under Section 20(a) because he departed Allegiant before it issued
the 10-Ks, which contain the only remaining actionable statements
in this case.

So the Court denies the motion to dismiss with respect to the
Section 20(a) claim against Gallagher, Sheldon, and Bricker, but
the Court grants the motion with respect to the claim against
Harfst.

Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part
and denied in part.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 9, 2019
Memorandum Opinion and Order is Available at
https://tinyurl.com/y4m6p79s from Leagle.com.

Daniel Checkman, Individually And On Behalf Of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Phillip Kim –
pkim@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A., pro hac vice,
Laurence M. Rosen -- lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm,
P.A. & Patrick R. Leverty -- pat@levertylaw.com -- Leverty &
Associates Chtd.

Charles Brendon, Plaintiff, represented by Phillip Kim, The Rosen
Law Firm, P.A., pro hac vice, Laurence M. Rosen, The Rosen Law
Firm, P.A., Zachary Halper, pro hac vice & Patrick R. Leverty,
Leverty & Associates Chtd.

Charles Brendon, Movant, represented by Phillip Kim, The Rosen Law
Firm, P.A., pro hac vice, Laurence M. Rosen, The Rosen Law Firm,
P.A., Zachary Halper, pro hac vice & Patrick R. Leverty, Leverty &
Associates Chtd.

Allegiant Travel Company, Maurice J. Gallagher, Jr. & Scott
Sheldon, Defendants, represented by Colin W. Fraser --
frasercw@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Taurig LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel J.
Tyukody -tyukodyd@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig, LLP, pro hac
vice, Mark E. Ferrario -- ferrariom@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig
& Jacob D. Bundick -- bundickj@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig,
LLP.

Steven E. Harfst & Jude I Bricker, Defendants, represented by Jacob
D. Bundick, Greenberg Traurig, LLP.


AMTRUST FINANCIAL: Court OKs Dismissal of Securities Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued a Memorandum Opinion granting Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss in the case captioned In re AMTRUST FINANCIAL SERVICES,
INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION. This document applies to: All Cases.
No. 17-cv-1545 (LAK). (S.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiffs bring this putative securities class action against
AmTrust Financial Services, Inc. (AmTrust), current and former
officers and directors, its former auditor, and certain
underwriters of its securities. They claim that certain public
filings and statements made by defendants contain misstatements of
material facts in violation of Sections 11, 12(a), and 15 of the
Securities Act of 1933, and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
Rule 10b-5 thereunder.

Plaintiffs assert claims under the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act against AmTrust, the Officer Defendants, Director Defendants,
the Underwriter Defendants, and defendant BDO. Their claims focus
on accounting issues and material weaknesses that AmTrust
identified in 2016 and 2017, and corrected in the restatement. As
against AmTrust, the Officer Defendants, and BDO, plaintiffs assert
theories of both negligence and fraud.

Plaintiffs assert claims against the AmTrust defendants under
Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act, and Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act.

Representations Regarding Service Revenue

The first statement that plaintiffs allege was untrue or misleading
is one that appears in AmTrust's 2014 and 2015 Forms 10-K and
concerns AmTrust's accounting for warranty fee revenue.  

Plaintiffs argue, and the Court agrees, that it is a statement of
fact. It is not one of the more complicated alleged misstatements
based on financial data and the underlying inputs that the Court
addresses in a moment.  

Plaintiffs allege falsity on the grounds that the statement omitted
certain facts necessary to make the statement made not misleading.
Specifically, AmTrust allegedly failed to disclose that the company
recognized the majority of revenue related to administration
services at the time of the sale of the ESP. Plaintiffs argue that
a reasonable investor reading the statement actually made would
have concluded the exact opposite.  

Any argument plaintiffs could make based on defendants' language
would fail because defendants' use of the term portion was accurate
and not misleading. Portion is defined variously as: a part of any
whole, a section, a division; a portion, a fraction,  an allotment,
allowance, bite, cut, lot, part, partage, quota, slice, a section
or quantity within a larger thing, a part of a whole and an often
limited part of a whole. These definitions do not connote a
majority. If anything, they connote a minority, as indicated by the
last definition cited.

Separately, defendants were under no duty to quantify the size of
the minority of service revenue deferred. They were under a duty
only to speak accurately, which they did. As a result, their use of
the term portion instead of a more descriptive term  is not
actionable.

Plaintiffs thus cannot state a claim based on this statement.

Numbers and Results in the Consolidated Financial Statements

Plaintiffs argue that the financial data or reported income numbers
are statements of fact because the data are historical income
metrics that do not involve any inherently subjective valuations.
They reject the proposition that any application of GAAP converts a
financial metric into a statement of opinion. And they argue that
AmTrust's use of the word error to describe the accounting issues
it identified demonstrates conclusively that any application of
GAAP that resulted in said errors could have involved only the
application of objective criteria and not a subjective evaluation
or matter of judgment.  

Defendants respond that their motion is not based on the contention
that any application of GAAP and therefore every financial metric
in a company's consolidated financial statements results in a
statement of opinion. Rather, the specific provisions of GAAP
relevant to the particular accounting issues that AmTrust
identified call for subjective judgments. Defendants point out that
plaintiffs fail to refute this point. They argue also that
plaintiffs' focus on the historical nature of income metrics is
misplaced.  

Whether the alleged misstatements are statements of fact or opinion
depends on the facts and circumstances of the seven accounting
issues identified by AmTrust and addressed in its restatement. The
Court thus takes each issue in turn. It addresses first whether the
data resulting from the particular accounting treatment at issue is
as a statement of fact or opinion.

It turns then to the question of whether plaintiffs plead
adequately that the data was untrue.

Recognition of Warranty Contract Revenue

The first accounting issue that AmTrust identified, and upon which
plaintiffs rely, concerns revenue recognition for warranty contract
revenue associated with administration services. During the 2014,
2015, and part of the 2016 fiscal years, AmTrust recognized part of
administration services revenue at the time of sale. It did so
based on its interpretation of ASC Topic 605 titled Revenue
Recognition specifically, the section that addressed
multiple-element revenue recognition.

Plaintiffs claim that the financial data resulting from AmTrust's
revenue recognition practice prior to this switch constituted a
misstatement of fact. To do so adequately, plaintiffs must put
forward sufficient facts to permit a determination that the
particular financial data they challenge indeed is a statement of
fact.

Thus, to establish that reported revenue and income figures
resulting from AmTrust's revenue recognition practice prior to the
switch, for example, constituted misstatements of fact, plaintiffs
must plead first that an ASC topic or section of a particular topic
objectively was the only correct guidance to apply. Second, they
must plead that defendants did not apply that guidance and did not
disclose either the particular guidance that they were applying, or
that they had chosen not to apply the section that a reasonable
investor would assume applied to the transactions.  

The allegations in the Complaint with respect to the relevant ASC
topic are limited to the following statement: since sellers of
extended warranty or product maintenance contracts (a/k/a extended
service plans, or ESPs) have an obligation to the buyer to perform
services throughout the contract period, revenue associated
therewith is to be recognized over the period in which the seller
is obligated to perform services pursuant thereto.

These allegations are wholly insufficient. They ignore an exception
in the services section of ASC Topic 605 that allows recognition of
revenue on other than a straight line basis. And they fail to
address the multiple-element section or the interaction between
that section and the services section of ASC Topic 605. Absent
facts alleging why the services section controls to the exclusion
of any other section and the reason or reasons why the exception
within the services section did not apply, plaintiffs fail to plead
the existence of a factual statement and one that objectively was
untrue at the time it was made.

Plaintiffs' failure to allege adequately a false statement of fact,
however, does not end the inquiry. The claim will survive the
motion if plaintiffs have alleged adequately that the statement was
an untrue or misleading statement of opinion. In determining
whether plaintiffs have done so, the Court considers all the
allegations in the Complaint, including those forming the basis of
plaintiffs' securities fraud claims, for two reasons.

The allegations in the Complaint relevant to whether the financial
data was an untrue or misleading statement of opinion focus on
Warrantech's historical accounting for warranty contracts and the
accounting change that it implemented based on guidance provided by
the SEC in 2004. Plaintiffs claim that defendants would have been
aware of the so-called SEC-mandated change. Their position, as the
Court understands it, is that defendants' decision to recognize
revenue in the manner they did either purposefully disregarded the
SEC guidance in order to report results that would appear stronger
or recklessly disregarded it as a factor in the decision-making
process, thereby rendering their inquiry not a meaningful one.  

Plaintiffs' second argument focuses on the size and importance of
the warranty contract revenue to the Company. It too is unavailing.
Plaintiffs argue that defendants must have known or else buried
their heads in the sand about the impropriety of AmTrust's
accounting for service and fee income due to the financial
significance of the extended warranty business and amount of
revenue it generated. Defendants very well could have paid closer
attention to the accounting for revenue generated by this business
line, but plaintiffs fail to allege that in doing so, they
purposefully chose an incorrect accounting method or failed to
conduct a meaningful inquiry into the correct method to use.

Thus, plaintiffs fail to allege adequately that the financial data
based on the accounting for warranty contract revenue were
misstatements of opinion.

Bonus Accrual

The Alistair letter raised concerns over numerous instances of
improper accounting. The letter groups the instances of improper
accounting into five areas: (1) accounting for deferred acquisition
costs, (2) valuation of life settlement contracts (3) reinsurance
assets related to Maiden Holdings, Ltd. (4) consolidation of
Luxembourg reinsurance captives, and (5) accounting for loss and
loss adjustment expense reserves assumed in acquisitions.  

The first important point to make with respect to the Alistair
letter is that the deferred acquisition costs mentioned in it are
the same as those mentioned in the Barron's article. The reference
to them thus could not have put defendants on notice of any
accounting improprieties with respect to the discretionary
bonuses.

The second point is that while the accrued expenses mentioned in
the letter could relate to accounting for discretionary bonuses,
there is no indication that was the case here. The Alistair letter
was concerned with amounts on AmTrust's financial statements that
appeared to be irreconcilable with one another. In this context,
Alistair Capital suggested that such discrepancies could imply that
AmTrust is failing to recognize expenses. This was nothing more
than speculation disconnected from any concrete suggestion of any
existing issue regarding the recognition of certain expenses.
Contrary to plaintiffs' assertion, it would not have put defendants
on notice that their accounting for discretionary bonuses was wrong
or required investigation.

Plaintiffs therefore fail to plead falsity with respect to the
financial data based on AmTrust's accounting for discretionary
bonuses.

Exchange Act Claims

Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful to use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the SEC may proscribe.

A claim asserted under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder has
six elements: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the
defendant (2) scienter (3) a connection between the
misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a
security (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission (5)
economic loss; and (6) loss causation.

Plaintiffs assert that the AmTrust defendants violated Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. They assert
also a claim under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act against the
Officer Defendants. The statements at the heart of these claims
fall into five categories: (1) Statements identical to those that
form the basis of plaintiffs' Section 11 and 12(a)(2) claims
already addressed by the Court (2) Statements made on conference
calls discussing or touting AmTrust's warranty contract business
(3) Statements made in response to news reports critical of
AmTrust's business (4) Statements that address foreign exchange
transactions  and(5) Statements related to the 2016 Form 10-K
filing delay, KPMG's work, the errors and corrections identified,
and the restatement.

The Court addresses each in turn. Similar to the Securities Act
claims, it must determine first whether the statements are
statements of fact or opinion and whether they were false when
made.

Alleged Misstatements Asserted Under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2)

The alleged misstatements that fall into this group differ from
those underlying plaintiffs' Securities Act claims in that they
extend back to 2012. They are substantively identical in all other
respects.

There are no unique facts related to the years 2012 and 2013 such
that the analysis with respect to these alleged misstatements would
differ in any way from the foregoing analysis with respect to the
Section 11 and 12(a)(2) claims.

Accordingly, the Court's analysis above applies here as well. It
concludes that plaintiffs fail to plead adequately that any of the
statements in this category were untrue or misleading.

Statements Regarding Warranty Contract Business

Plaintiffs contend that these statements of opinion were materially
false and misleading and/or omitted material information because:

they failed to disclose that the Company was inflating its results,
including with its Specialty Risk and Extended Warranty business
and other of its business segments, which the AmTrust Defendants
knew or recklessly disregarded. Specifically, the Company was among
other things, recognizing the majority of its warranty contract fee
revenue related to administration services at the time of the sale
of ESP. Instead, as AmTrust acknowledged in the 2/27/17 Press
Release `its warranty contracts should not be accounted for using
the multiple-element guidance, but instead deferred over the life
of the contract.

These arguments regarding falsity simply repeat those made
previously in the context of the Securities Act claims. The Court
already has found them to be without merit.

There is a second reason why many, if not all, of these statements
of opinion cannot give rise to a securities violation and it is
this. They are expressions of puffery and corporate optimism that
the company was permitted to make. People in charge of an
enterprise are not required to take a gloomy, fearful or defeatist
view of the future; subject to what the data indicates, they can be
expected to be confident about their stewardship and the prospects
of the business that they manage.

The Court returns now to the two exceptions, which are the
following. The first is a set of statements made on a call in
November 2014 that clarified, in response to an analyst's question,
that the strong revenue numbers for the prior quarter resulted in
part from the combination of new warranty business and earnings
related to business generated in prior years, and were not the
product of any unusual event. The second is a statement made in a
press release issued in November 2016 acknowledging the impact of
the decline in the British pound on the company's top-line results
related to the extended warranty business. These are each
statements of fact. But they are statements of fact that plaintiffs
ignore completely. They plead no facts that would speak to the
falsity of these statements.

Plaintiffs thus fail to allege the falsity of any of these
statements of opinion or fact.

Statements in Response to Critical Reporting

They contend also that the statements were false or misleading
because AmTrust, Zyskind, and Pipoly knew or recklessly disregarded
that AmTrust's disclosure controls and internal controls were
ineffective' in assessing the risk of material misstatements
relating to eight distinct areas of corporate accounting and
financial reporting.

The Court already has addressed whether representations that
AmTrust's financial statements were prepared in conformity with
GAAP are misstatements of fact or opinion and concluded that they
are neither. That conclusion applies here.

The statements regarding the strength of AmTrust's position and
results are statements of opinion. These statements, like those
made in the context of AmTrust's warranty contract business, are
puffery and statements of corporate optimism.

They cannot support plaintiffs' claim.

Statements Regarding Foreign Exchange Transactions

Plaintiffs argue that the statement was materially false and
misleading because the defendants failed to disclose during the
AmTrust Class Period that AmTrust improperly accounted for foreign
currency gains and losses, in violation of GAAP, and that the
defendants knew or recklessly disregarded that fact.

The Court already has discarded the premise of plaintiffs' argument
in the section of this opinion that addresses the Securities Act
claims against the AmTrust defendants. That section and its
analysis applies with equal force here. Plaintiffs thus fail to
allege a misstatement based on Pipoly's remarks of August 4, 2015.

Statements Regarding Events Leading up to and Including the
Restatement

Plaintiffs contend that the statement was materially false and
misleading or omitted material information because the defendants
knew or recklessly disregarded that the Company's disclosure and
internal controls were ineffective in eight areas of accounting and
financial reporting.

The Court already has found this argument unpersuasive. Moreover,
there is no indication whether the control at issue here was one
that AmTrust later identified as having a material weakness.

Plaintiffs thus fail to allege that the facts upon which they base
their argument even apply to the context in which this statement
was made.

The next three statements concern AmTrust's determination in
February 2017 that issues it had identified over the course of its
review with KPMG were immaterial a decision it subsequently would
reverse.249 Plaintiffs argue that these statements were materially
false and misleading or omitted material facts because defendants
knew or recklessly disregarded that the company had engaged in
improper accounting practices for several years and that the
effects of these improper practices were material.

The Court repeats, perhaps unnecessarily, that plaintiffs have
failed to establish the premise of their argument and accordingly,
the argument fails here.

The same is true of the fifth statement, related to AmTrust's
accounting treatment for administration service revenue prior to
the fourth quarter of 2016.

The sixth and seventh statements concern the reason AmTrust delayed
filing its 2016 Form 10-K. AmTrust explained on a conference call
held on February 27, 2017 that the filing was delayed because KPMG
needed more time to complete the audit and review the 10-K.
Plaintiffs contend that the statements were false, misleading, or
omitted material facts because defendants knew or recklessly
disregarded that AmTrust allegedly had engaged in improper
accounting practices for years, resulting in materially misstated
financial statements that would need to be restated once the
improprieties were uncovered.

The failure to allege adequately any objectively improper
accounting practices dooms any claim based on these two
statements.

The final statement appears in a March 16, 2017 press release and
is a quotation from Pipoly discussing the reason for the
restatement. He explained that the restatement largely relates to
the timing recognition of revenue in the Company's service and fee
business. Plaintiffs claim that the statement was false and
misleading or omitted material facts because defendants failed to
disclose the full extent of their accounting improprieties which
were so severe that they warranted numerous government
investigations. As the Court has noted, the Complaint fails to
allege any accounting improprieties that were objectively
determinable errors that defendants knew of at the time or
recklessly disregarded. As a result, plaintiffs fail to allege a
misrepresentation based on this final statement.

Each alleged basis for plaintiffs' 10(b) claims  and thus
plaintiffs' 20(a) claims is insufficient. The Court has concluded
also that plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the Securities
Act. Accordingly, the Court grants the AmTrust defendants' motion
to dismiss.

Underwriter Defendants

The Complaint asserts two claims against the Underwriter
Defendants. The first alleges a violation of Section 11 of the
Securities Act, and the second alleges a violation of Section
12(a)(2) of the same. The bases for the claims are identical to
those of the Securities Act claims asserted against the AmTrust
defendants. The Court has concluded that plaintiffs fail to allege
any untrue or misleading statements of material fact or opinion
with respect to those claims. That conclusion applies here.

Accordingly, the Underwriter Defendants' motion to dismiss is
granted.

Defendant BDO

BDO audited AmTrust's financial statements for a number of years
including 2012 through 2015. Plaintiffs' claims, broadly speaking,
allege that BDO failed to conduct its audits in accordance with a
set of auditing standards set by the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB).

PCAOB is a nonprofit corporation established by Congress in 2002 to
oversee the audits of public companies in order to protect
investors and further the public interest in the preparation of
accurate audit reports.

Plaintiffs assert claims against BDO under Section 11 of the
Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. The Court
begins with the Securities Act claims.

Securities Act Claims

Plaintiffs claim that BDO violated Section 11 of the Securities Act
by making untrue or misleading statements of fact in its
unqualified audit opinions that were incorporated into the November
2015 Offering Materials and the 2016 Series F Offering Materials.
The alleged misstatements are the following: (1) Representations
that BDO conducted its audits in accordance with PCAOB standards
(2) Representations that BDO's audit opinions were unqualified and
(3) Representations that AmTrust's consolidated financial
statements conformed with GAAP.

Plaintiffs argue that the first representation was untrue because
BDO failed to comply with certain auditing standards.With respect
to the second representation, plaintiffs claim that it was
misleading because BDO did not disclose that it failed to conduct a
complete audit at the time it issued its unqualified opinion.

And the third representation is untrue, according to the
plaintiffs, because BDO ignored AmTrust's wrongful accounting and
therefore disbelieved the statement at the time it was made.

Representations That BDO Conducted its Audits in Accordance With
PCAOB Standards

This claim is a mirror image of plaintiffs' claims against the
AmTrust defendants alleging misstated financial data based on
certain accounting issues. Just as many of the accounting
principles at issue or seemingly at issue there called for
subjective evaluations, so too here. The PCAOB auditing standards
to which plaintiffs points are couched in inherently subjective
terms. They require, for example, auditors to obtain reasonable
assurance for their ultimate conclusions including by obtaining
sufficient competent evidential matter to afford a reasonable basis
for an opinion.  

In determining whether plaintiffs allege adequately the falsity of
this statement of opinion, the Court considers all the allegations
in the Complaint, including those averring fraud.

Alleged Failure to Follow PCAOB Standards Based on AmTrust's
Disclosures in 2016 and 2017
The Complaint alleges that defendant BDO failed to conduct its
audits in accordance with PCAOB Auditing Standards (AS) Nos. 5, 12,
14, and 15, and American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Standards (AU) Sections 326 and 508.

There are a number of factual allegations concerning testing that
BDO did not perform prior to issuing its 2013 audit opinion,
corners that were cut, and possibly worse.  But the Complaint
alleges specifically that all audit work was completed after the
2013 opinion was issued, and that BDO determined that its audit
opinion was unaffected by any of the results of that work. The
audit opinion, as incorporated into both sets of offering materials
and at the time such parts became effective, therefore rested on a
complete audit. All plaintiffs' process arguments fall away.  

Consequently, plaintiffs' allegations boil down to an assertion
that BDO should be held liable for failing to reach the same
conclusion on subjective matters that AmTrust and KPMG reached in
2016 and 2017, and in so doing, failed to comply with auditing
standards.

The former does not establish the latter and such a difference of
opinion is not actionable under the Securities laws.

Alleged Failure to Follow PCAOB Standards Based on BDO's Conduct

Plaintiffs allege that the audit team acted in bad faith by loading
incomplete documents into an internal software system so that they
would show a time stamp that pre-dated the audit deadline but could
be completed later, after that date. They allege that Bertuglia and
Green fell short of their duties to supervise and review audit
work, including by signing work papers they did not review and
failing to verify that all work was performed prior to issuing the
audit opinion.  

But that is not all that plaintiffs must do. They must allege also
that the misstatement was material. At the pleading stage, a
plaintiff satisfies the materiality requirement of the securities
laws by alleging a statement or omission that a reasonable investor
would have considered significant in making investment decisions.


The Second Circuit has stated often the rule that a complaint may
not properly be dismissed on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion on the ground
that the alleged misstatements or omissions are not material unless
they are so obviously unimportant to a reasonable investor that
reasonable minds could not differ on the question of their
importance.  

But here, there are no such facts. Plaintiffs fail to allege any
facts relevant to the way or ways in which BDO's failure to
supervise, review, document, and perform in good faith the 2013
audit would have been significant to a reasonable investor in
making investment decisions. This is so particularly because the
conduct ultimately had no effect on the 2013 audit opinion.

Plaintiffs thus fail to state a claim based on BDO's representation
that it followed PCAOB standards.

BDO's Unqualified Audit Opinions

The parties agree that BDO's unqualified audit opinions are
statements of opinion. Plaintiffs allege falsity on the basis that
the opinion did not rest on a meaningful inquiry, namely, a
complete audit conducted in accordance with PCAOB standards. The
Court has addressed both the issue of completeness and that of
compliance with auditing standards. The arguments are no more
persuasive here than they were above.

Accordingly, plaintiffs fail to allege a misstatement on this
basis.

Representation That AmTrust's Consolidated Financial Statements
Conformed With GAAP
Plaintiffs concede that the representation that AmTrust's financial
statements conformed with GAAP is a statement of opinion. They
allege that the opinion is false because BDO ignored AmTrust's
wrongful accounting and therefore disbelieved the opinion at the
time it was expressed. They allege no facts, however, that could
support this theory.

The allegations regrading the 2013 Consolidated Audit extend no
further than an alleged failure to perform the audit work required
coupled with a concerted effort to conceal that fact. The 2017 Wall
Street Journal article likewise does not mention any practice or
instance of BDO ignoring wrongful accounting.  

Perhaps recognizing this shortcoming, albeit belatedly, plaintiffs
change their tune in their opposition brief and argue falsity on
the grounds that BDO failed to conduct a complete audit in
accordance with PCAOB standards, and therefore, the opinion did not
rest on a meaningful inquiry. The Court's analysis on the
completeness of the audit and its compliance with auditing
standards thus applies here. So too does its conclusion. Plaintiffs
fail to allege adequately a misrepresentation on the basis of this
statement.

Plaintiffs thus fail to state a claim under the Securities Act
against defendant BDO.

Exchange Act Claims

Plaintiffs assert that BDO violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder by making fraudulent statements in
its unqualified audit opinion of AmTrust's financial statements for
the year ending December 31, 2013. The alleged fraudulent
statements are the following:
(1) BDO conducted its audit in accordance with PCAOB standards
and(2) BDO believed its audit provided a reasonable basis for its
opinion.

As an initial matter, an Exchange Act claim differs from a
Securities Act claim with respect to the elements that a plaintiff
must plead sufficiently in order to state a claim. A claim brought
under the Exchange Act that alleges sufficiently a
misrepresentation and materiality is actionable only if the
plaintiff pleads adequately another element, loss causation.  

With respect to the first alleged misstatement, the Court already
has concluded that plaintiffs failed to allege adequately a
material misstatement based on BDO's compliance with PCAOB
standards after BDO had completed the audit work and determined
that its 2013 audit opinion was unaffected by the results of the
completed work. It determines now that the alleged
misrepresentation is not actionable under the Exchange Act because
plaintiffs fail to allege any disclosure and subsequent negative
effect on the value of AmTrust securities in the period from the
time the alleged misrepresentation was made to the time BDO
completed the work related to 2013 audit.

The same analysis and result applies to the second alleged
misstatement. The second statement is the functional equivalent of
those addressed in the prior section of this opinion concerning
BDO's unqualified audit opinions and the representation that
AmTrust's financial statements were presented in accordance with
GAAP. The Court already has gone through the analysis and
determined that those statements, following completion of the audit
work, are not actionable. Thus, plaintiffs fail to state a claim
under the Exchange Act against defendant BDO.

The Court holds that plaintiffs fail to state a claim under Section
11 of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
against defendant BDO.
  
BDO's motion to dismiss is granted.

The Court grants the AmTrust, Underwriters, and BDO defendants'
motions to dismiss in their entirety.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 9, 2019 Order is
available at   https://tinyurl.com/yyak3yu4 from Leagle.com.

Joel Rubel, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph Alexander Hood, II --
ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP & Jeremy Alan Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com  Pomerantz LLP.

Stanley Newmark, Irving Lichtman Revocable Living Trust, Sharon
Albano & Jupiter Capital Management, Plaintiffs, represented by
Avital Orly Malina -- amalina@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman
& Dowd LLP, David Avi Rosenfeld -- drosenfeld@csgrr.com -- Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP & Samuel Howard Rudman --
srudman@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

John Sachetti, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Consolidated Plaintiff, represented by James Stuart Notis
-- jnotis@gardylaw.com -- Gardy & Notis, LLP.
Sharon Albano, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Consolidated Plaintiff, represented by Thomas James
McKenna -- tjmckenna@gme-law.com -- Gainey McKenna & Egleston &
David Avi Rosenfeld, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

AmTrust Financial Services, Inc., Barry D. Zyskind & Ronald E.
Pipoly, Jr., Defendants, represented by Amy Rublin Mayer --
amayer@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, Mark Adam
Kirsch -- mkirsch@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP,
Akiva Shapiro -- ashapiro@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher, LLP & Lawrence Jay Zweifach -- lzweifach@gibsondunn.com
-- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP.

BDO USA, LLP, Defendant, represented by Timothy E. Hoeffner --
thoeffner@mwe.com -- McDermott Will & Emery, Jason Daniel Gerstein
-- jgerstein@mwe.com -- McDermott, Will & Emery, LLP & Lawrence A.
Wojcik, McDermott Will & Emery LLP, 444 West Lake Street Chicago,
IL 60606-0029, pro hac vice.


ANTHEM INC: Court OKs $380K Settlement in O'Dowd Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
issued an Order granting Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Final
Approval of Class Action Settlement in the case captioned LAURAL
O'DOWD, for herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v. ANTHEM, INC., and ROCKY MOUNTAIN HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL SERVICE,
INC., doing business as Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield,
Defendants. Civil Action No. 14-cv-02787-KLM-NYW. (D. Colo.).

This case concerns the reimbursement methodology Defendant Rocky
Mountain Hospital and Medical Service, Inc., used for
Out-of-Network Behavioral Health Services. Plaintiff alleges that
Anthem Colorado's application of the ZBHA Fee Schedule for
Out-of-Network Behavioral Health Services resulted in lower
reimbursement rates than the RBRVS Reimbursement Methodology,
thereby increasing the out-of-pocket responsibility borne by her
and other putative class members for such services.

Plaintiff further alleges that, by using this different methodology
for Out-of-Network Behavioral Health Services, Anthem Colorado
violated ERISA and Colorado state law, and deprived Plaintiff and
other persons in health plans insured or administered by Anthem
Colorado of benefits that were owed under the respective Plans.

Overview of the Settlement Agreement

As Plaintiff summarizes, the proposed Settlement Agreement has
three primary components: (1) a change to Anthem Colorado's
business practices requiring it to use its RBRVS Reimbursement
Methodology for covered Out-of-Network Behavioral Health Services
for a period of three years (2) payment by Defendants of a
Settlement Amount of $380,000 that will be allocated among members
of the proposed Settlement Class according to the proposed Plan of
Allocation, subject to a De Minimis Threshold of $2.00 and (3) a
release of claims against Defendants and Related Entities.  

The proposed Settlement Agreement defines the Settlement Class as:

     All Plan Members who received Out-of-Network Behavioral Health
Services with dates of service during the Settlement Class Period
that were allowed at or below the provider's billed charges.

Notice to and Response from Settlement Class Members

Pursuant to the Preliminary Approval Order, the Court appointed
Dahl as the Settlement Administrator to give notice to the
Settlement Class Members and to carry out other responsibilities as
provided for in the Settlement Agreement. Additionally, the Court
approved the parties' proposal to be jointly responsible for
identifying names and addresses of potential Settlement Class
Members and for Defendants to provide the Settlement Administrator
with information from which a list of potential Settlement Class
Members could be identified for the Mailed Notice.

Final Certification of the Settlement Class

A class certified for settlement purposes only must nevertheless
satisfy the requirements of Rule 23  Specifically, Plaintiff must
establish each of the four requirements set forth in Rule 23(a):
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.

Rule 23(a)

Numerosity

With respect to the numerosity element of Rule 23(a)(1), the burden
is upon plaintiffs seeking to represent a class to establish that
the class is so numerous as to make joinder impracticable.
Determining whether Plaintiff has met this element is not subject
to a set formula, it is a fact-specific inquiry.

Here, Defendants do not oppose the certification of a Rule 23 class
and thus, do not dispute that Plaintiff meets the numerosity
element of Rule 23(a). The Settlement Class includes 19,742
putative class members, which the Court finds to satisfy the
numerosity factor of Rule 23(a).  

Common Question of Law or Fact

The Court next turns to the common-question requirement of Rule
23(a)(2). For class members to share a least one common question of
law or fact, they must possess the same interest and suffer the
same injury.

Here, Defendants have stipulated to the certification of a Rule 23
class and thus, do not dispute that Plaintiff meets the commonality
requirement of Rule 23(a). Plaintiff states that the claims of
every putative member of the Settlement Class, including [her],
turn on the same common questions that have common answers,
including whether Anthem Colorado was acting as an ERISA fiduciary
when it created and applied its ZBHA Fee Schedule to Out-of-Network
Behavioral Health Services, whether it breached its fiduciary
duties by so doing, and whether Anthem Colorado's use of the ZBHA
Fee Schedule for Out-of-Network Behavioral Health Services violated
Colorado's mental health parity laws. The Court agrees that the
answer to each of these questions would be the same for every
Settlement Class member and would rest on common proof that does
not depend upon the individual circumstances of any Settlement
Class member, including Plaintiff.

Therefore, the Court finds that the commonality element is met as a
result of the common questions articulated by Plaintiff.

Typicality

In order to establish the third element of Rule 23(a), Plaintiff
must demonstrate that her individual claims are typical of the
class members she seeks to represent. Rule 23(a)(3) states that
typicality is met if the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.

Defendants do not oppose the certification of a Rule 23 class and
thus, do not dispute that Plaintiff meets the typicality element of
Rule 23(a). Plaintiff asserts that the same questions of law and
fact raised in her allegations demonstrate that her claims are
typical of all putative class members.  

Fair Representation

Finally, the Court determines whether the fair-representation
requirement of Rule 23(a) has been satisfied. In order to do so,
Plaintiff must show that the class representative will fairly and
adequately protect the class interests.  

Defendants do not oppose the certification of a Rule 23 class and
thus, do not dispute that Plaintiff meets the fair and adequate
representation element of Rule 23(a)(4). In response to the first
question, Plaintiff states that there are no conflicts between her
or her counsel and the Settlement Class. Plaintiff further states
that she and Settlement Class Members share an interest in
demonstrating that Anthem Colorado's development and utilization of
the ZHBA Fee Schedule violated ERISA and Colorado law, and in
obtaining equitable and monetary relief, including requiring Anthem
Colorado to change its business practices.

The Court finds that, based on the information that Plaintiff has
provided, the fair and adequate representation element of Rule
23(a) is satisfied.  

Rule 23(b) Requirements

Rule 23(b)(3) states, in part, that class treatment is allowed
where (1) questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members
and (2) that a class action is superior to other available methods
for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

In making this determination, the Court considers: (1) the class
members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions; (2) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against
class members (3) whether it is desirable to concentrate the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum and (4) any
difficulties in managing a class action.

Defendants do not oppose the certification of a Rule 23 class and
thus, they do not dispute that Plaintiff meets the requirements of
Rule 23(b)(3). In its Rule 23(a) commonality discussion above, the
Court found that whether the putative class members were subject to
Anthem Colorado's ZBHA Fee Schedule for Out-of-Network Behavioral
Health Services was a question common to all putative class
members. Thus, the same alleged course of conduct by Defendants is
at the heart of all putative class members' claims, predominating
over any potential individual differences.   

Additionally, Plaintiff states, and the Court concurs, that the
Settlement Class satisfies the superiority requirement because the
potential recovery for an individual plaintiff is unlikely to
provide sufficient incentive for individual members to bring their
own claims.

Addressing each of the factors outlined in Rule 23(b)(3) in turn,
there is no indication that: (1) the absent class members have an
interest in controlling the litigation (2) other litigation
regarding this issue has been commenced; or (3) it would not be
desirable to concentrate the claims in this particular forum.   As
stated above, when determining whether to certify a class for
settlement purposes, the Court does not need to consider the fourth
requirement of whether there will be any difficulties in managing a
class action.
   
Therefore, the Court agrees that proceeding as a class is the
superior method for adjudicating this controversy.  

Accordingly, for settlement purposes only, the Court finally
certifies the Settlement Class pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3).  

Approval of Settlement

Rule 23(e)(2) provides that a class action settlement may be
approved only if the Court finds that the settlement is fair,
reasonable, and adequate.  

In the Tenth Circuit, a proposed class action settlement is
reviewed by the Court primarily by considering four factors: (1)
whether the proposed settlement was fairly and honestly negotiated
(2) whether serious questions of law and fact exist, placing the
ultimate outcome of the litigation in doubt (3) whether the value
of an immediate recovery outweighs the mere possibility of future
relief after protracted and expensive litigation and (4) the
judgment of the parties that the settlement is fair and reasonable.


In addition to the four factors identified above, Rule 23(e) was
recently amended to provide its own list of factors for courts to
consider when determining whether a settlement is fair, reasonable,
and adequate. Those factors include: (A) the class representatives
and class counsel have adequately represented the class (B) the
proposal was negotiated at arm's length (C) the relief provided for
the class is adequate, taking into account (i) the costs, risks,
and delay of trial and appeal;(ii) the effectiveness of any
proposed method of distributing relief to the class, including the
method of processing class-member claims (iii) the terms of any
proposed award of attorney's fees, including timing of payment;
and(iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3)
and(D) the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each
other.

Regarding the first factor identified in Gottlieb, where the
settlement resulted from arm's length negotiations between
experienced counsel after significant discovery had occurred, the
Court may presume the settlement to be fair, adequate and
reasonable. Here, Plaintiff asserts that nothing has changed since
the Preliminary Approval Order was issued to alter the Court's
initial finding that the Settlement Agreement is a product of arm's
length negotiation.
  
The Court agrees.

There is no evidence of collusion and the Settlement Agreement
appears to be the result of protracted dialogue between experienced
counsel engaged in good faith negotiation. This matter involved two
challenges on the pleadings, an adversarial discovery process, and
a Settlement Conference that was held in May of 2017. Thus, because
the history of the litigation establishes that the parties
vigorously advocated their respective positions throughout the
pendency of the case, the Court finds that the Settlement Agreement
was fairly and honestly negotiated at arm's length.  

Second, serious questions of law and fact exist where disputes
between the parties are such that they could significantly impact
this case if it were litigated. Plaintiff states that, but for the
Settlement, Anthem Colorado would have challenged her efforts to
certify a class on numerous grounds and would have vigorously
challenged the form of relief sought by Plaintiff on legal and
factual grounds. The Court therefore finds that serious questions
of law and fact exist.

Third, the recovery is to be weighed against the possibility of
some greater relief at a later time, taking into consideration the
additional risks and costs that go hand in hand with protracted
litigation. Here, the relief offered to Plaintiff in the Settlement
Agreement is significant, without her having to take the additional
risks associated with litigation. This case has been pending for
nearly five years and, given the complicated nature of the legal
questions and issues presented, it could, in the absence of
settlement, continue into the foreseeable future. Instead, the
Settlement Agreement provides immediate relief to Plaintiff and the
Settlement Class Members through two means.

First, the Settlement Agreement provides the injunctive relief
Plaintiff seeks by requiring Anthem Colorado to align, for three
years, its reimbursement methodology for Out-of-Network Behavior
Health Services with the method most often used for out-of-network
medical and surgical health care services.  

Second, Plaintiff and the Settlement Class Members will receive
monetary relief under the Settlement Agreement which reimburses the
Settlement Class for a portion of the difference between the actual
Allowed Amount for the Out-of-Network Behavioral Health Services
and what the Allowed Amount would have been had Defendant Anthem
Colorado used its RBRVS Reimbursement Methodology.  

Therefore, the Court finds that the value of an immediate recovery
outweighs the mere possibility of future relief.  

Fourth, the recommendation of a settlement by experienced
plaintiffs' counsel is entitled to great weight Plaintiff's
principal counsel are "experienced attorneys with extensive
experience in multi-jurisdictional and complex class action
litigation, with a particular emphasis and expertise in the area of
class action litigation of health-care related and mental
health-care related issues. Class Counsel strongly believe the
settlement to be fair and reasonable, an assertion which is
supported by the limited number of Settlement Class Members that
opted-out out of or objected to the Settlement.  

Thus, the Court finds that it is the judgment of the parties that
the settlement is fair and reasonable.

Finally, with respect to the factors identified in Rule 23(e)(2)
not already discussed, the Court finds that these factors are
satisfied for purposes of approving the Settlement.

First, as to whether the class representative and class counsel
have adequately represented the Class, Plaintiff asserts that she
has been a diligent, attentive, and unwavering advocate for the
interests of the Class throughout the case and that she voluntarily
shed light on her own mental health history to enable this case to
be brought, and ultimately to achieve meaningful results for the
Class. Plaintiff also states that Class Counsel's adequate and
effective representation of the class is demonstrated by the
favorable settlement that was reached. Based on Plaintiff's
representations and the Court's findings that pertain to the Motion
for Attorneys' Fees, the Court agrees that Plaintiff, as the class
representative, and Class Counsel have adequately represented the
class.  

Second, as to the equitable treatment of class members, the Court
agrees with the parties that the proposed Plan of Allocation
demonstrates that the Settlement treats each Class member equitably
relative to each other. The Plan of Allocation provides for
distribution to Settlement Class Members based on a pro rata
calculation that applies to every member.

Accordingly, based on all of the factors discussed here, the Court
finds pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) that the class settlement
is fair, reasonable, and adequate.

Plan of Allocation

Approval of a plan of allocation of a settlement fund in a class
action is governed by the same standards of review applicable to
the approval of the settlement as a whole: the distribution plan
must be fair, reasonable and adequate. As a general rule, a plan of
allocation that reimburses class members based on the type and
extent of their injuries is reasonable.

The Plan of Allocation provides for a pro rata distribution to
eligible Settlement Class Members based on the ratio of each
Settlement Class Member's Total Alleged Underpayment to the Total
Alleged Underpayment of all Settlement Class Members collectively.

The parties agree that the Plan of Allocation is fair and adequate.
There is no indication of collusion between the parties in the
preparation of the Settlement Agreement or that the Plan of
Allocation improperly favors Plaintiff or segments of the Class.
Additionally, no objection has been filed to the Plan of
Allocation.

The Court concludes that the Plan of Allocation is fair, adequate,
and reasonable.

Thus, after reviewing the Motions and Settlement Agreement, the
Court finds that the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable and
adequate, and that the proposed settlement permits reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs and an incentive award. The Court
therefore approves the parties' Settlement Agreement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 9, 2019 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/y29qzjj8 from Leagle.com.

Laural O'Dowd, for herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Kevin K. Eng -- keng@mzclaw.com -- Markun
Zusman Freniere & Compton, LLP, Andrew N. Goldfarb --
agoldfarb@zuckerman.com -- Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP, D. Brian Hufford
-- dbhufford@zuckerman.com -- Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP, Gregory A.
Gold, The Gold Law Firm, L.L.C., 7375 E. Orchard Rd. #300 Greenwood
Village, Colorado 80111, Jason S. Cowart -- jcowart@zuckerman.com
-- Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, Jeffrey K. Compton –
jcompton@mzclaw.com -- Markun Zusman Freniere & Compton LLP, Meiram
Bendat -- mbendat@psych-appeal.com -- Psych-Appeal, Inc. & Sommer
D. Luther, The Gold Law Firm, L.L.C., 7375 E. Orchard Rd. #300,
Greenwood Village, Colorado 80111

Rocky Mountain Hospital and Medical Service Inc, doing business as
Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield & Anthem, Inc., Defendants,
represented by Briana Liston Black -- briana.black@hoganlovells.com
-- Hogan Lovells US LLP, Mark Douglas Gibson --
mark.gibson@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP, Miranda L.
Berge -- miranda.berge@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP &
E. Desmond Hogan -- desmond.hogan@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells
US LLP.


ARCADIA RECOVERY: Schwartz Asserts Breach of FDCPA
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Arcadia Recovery
Bureau, LLC. The case is styled as Yoel Schwartz, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Arcadia
Recovery Bureau, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-05290 (E.D. N.Y.,
Sept. 17, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Arcadia Recovery Bureau, LLC (ARB) is a third-party collection
agency based in Pennsylvania.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David Michael Barshay, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza
   Ste 5th Floor
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 706-5055
   Email: dbarshay@bakersanders.com

     - and -

   Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 281-7601
   Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com




BIRDEYE, INC: Hindi Sues over Unsolicited Text Messages
-------------------------------------------------------
BirdEye, Inc. on Sept. 19 filed a Notice of Settlement in the case,
JAMIL HINDI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. BIRDEYE, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
3:19-cv-05502 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 30, 2019).

The lawsuit alleges that the Defendant promotes and markets its
merchandise, in part, by sending unsolicited text messages to
wireless phone users, in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

The case was originally filed in Florida and captioned as, JAMIL
HINDI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
the Plaintiff, vs. BIRDEYE, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
3:19-cv-05502-JCS (S.D. Fla., May 13, 2019), and later transferred
to Judge Joseph C. Spero.

BirdEye markets itself as the number one software for reviews,
webchats, and surveys.

The Defendant caused thousands of unsolicited text messages to be
sent to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and Class Members,
causing them injuries, including invasion of their privacy,
aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and
conversion.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt Defendant's illegal
conduct. The Plaintiff also seeks statutory damages on behalf of
himself and Class Members, and any other available legal or
equitable remedies resulting from the illegal actions of the
Defendant.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Class are:

          Ignacio J. Hiraldo, Esq.
          IJH LAW
          1200 Brickell Ave. Suite 1950
          Miami, FL 33131
          Ignacio J. Hiraldo
          E-mail: IJHiraldo@IJHlaw.com
          Telephone: 786.496.4469

               - and -

          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.
          401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: 954 400 4713
          E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com

BMW OF NORTH AMERICA: Martinez Suit Moved to N.D. California
------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Rolando Martinez, individually and on behafl
of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. BMW of North
America, LLC, the Defendant, Case No. RG19027350, was removed from
the Alameda Superior Court, to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California (San Francisco) on Aug. 30, 2019.
The Northern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:19-cv-05479-JSC to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley.

BMW of North America, LLC, markets and sells motor vehicles.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Robert L. Starr, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT L. STARR APC
          23901 Calabasas Road, Suite 2072
          Calabasas, CA 91302
          Telephone: (818) 225-9040
          Facsimile: (818) 225-9042
          E-mail: robert@starrlaw.com

               - and -

          Ari Yale Basser, Esq.
          Jordan L. Lurie, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          1100 Glendon Avenue, 15th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (310) 436-6496
          E-mail: abasser@pomlaw.com
                  jllurie@pomlaw.com

Attorneys for the BMW of North America, LLC, are:

          Eric Y. Kizirian, Esq.
          Dyanne Jinhyung Cho, Esq.
          LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD AND SMITH
          633 West Fifth Street, Suite 4000
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 250-1800
          Facsimile: (213) 250-7900
          E-mail: eric.kizirian@lewisbrisbois.com
                  dyanne.cho@lewisbrisbois.com

CAMP ORENDA: Faces Matzura Suit in Southern District of New York
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Camp Orenda LTD. The
case is captioned as Steven Matzura, on behalf of himself and all
other persons similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Camp Orenda
LTD., the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-08045-PGG-JLC (S.D.N.Y., Aug.
28, 2019). The suit alleges violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Paul G.
Gardephe.

Camp Orenda is an authentic Adirondack back county retreat.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Darryn Solotoff, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF DARRYN G SOLOTOFF PLLC
          100 Quentin Roosevelt Boulevard, Ste 280
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 317-2453
          Facsimile: (516) 706-4692
          E-mail: ds@lawsolo.net

CAPITAL ONE: Lundgren et al Sue over Consumer Data Breach
---------------------------------------------------------
JOHN LUNDGREN, TIMOTHY ST., CYR, BELINDA AYLWARD, and GARY STALLS,
themselves and on behalf of all those similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION, CAPITAL ONE,
N.A., CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA), N.A., and amazon WEB SERVICES, INC.,
the Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-01361 (W.D. Wash., Aug. 28, 2019),
alleges that Defendants failed to protect confidential information
of Plaintiffs and millions of other consumers from theft by a
malicious hacker.

On July 29, 2019, Capital One announced that the sensitive personal
information ("SPI") of more than 100 million United States citizens
had been stolen from its servers, including names, addresses, zip
codes, phone numbers, email addresses, dates of birth,
self-reported income, credit scores, credit limits, balances,
payment history, contact information, and some transaction data for
2006-2018, as well as bank account numbers and Social Security
numbers for approximately 220,000 people who applied for credit
card products at Capital One between 2005 and "early" 2019 were
affected.

The Defendants, through their actions and/or failures to act,
unlawfully breached duties to Plaintiffs and the Class by failing
to implement standard industry protocols, to exercise 10 reasonable
care to secure and keep private the SPI entrusted to it, to notify
Plaintiffs and the Class of the breach as soon as Defendant was
made aware of it, and to take any necessary steps to immediately
end the ongoing breach once Defendants became aware of it, the
lawsuit says.

AWS, a subsidiary of Amazon.com, Inc., is the second-largest cloud
computing services provider in the United States by revenue. In
2018, it had more than $25 billion in revenue.

Capital One, as of 2017, was the fifth-largest credit card issuer
in the United States. Between them, the two are responsible for the
transmission of millions of peoples' sensitive personal information
each and every day.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class are:

          Michael A. Maurer, Esq.
          Charles Hausberg, Esq.
          LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S.
          1600 Washington Trust Financial Center
          717 W Sprague Ave.
          Spokane, WA 99201-0466
          Telephone: (509) 455 9555
          Facsimile: (509) 747 2323

CASHCO, INC: Kitts Suit Moved to District of New Mexico
-------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Matthew Kitts on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Cashco, Inc.; Budget
Payday Loans Limited Partnership; and HiTex, LLC, the Defendants,
Case No.16cv01851, was removed from the Second Judicial District
Court, to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico
(Albuquerque) on Aug. 30, 2019. The District of New Mexico Court
Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-00800-JFR-KK to the proceeding. The
case is assigned to the Hon. Judge John F. Robbenhaar.

Cashco, Inc. is a manufacturer and worldwide marketer of a broad
line of industrial control products.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Matthew Kitts, Esq.
          Christopher L. Graeser, Esq.
          THE GRAESER LAW FIRM
          3600 Cerrillos Road, Suite 719-F
          Santa Fe, NM 87507-2695
          Telephone: (505) 424-8175
          Facsimile: (888) 781-5968
          E-mail: chris@chrisgraeser.com

               - and -

          John B. Hiatt, Esq.
          PO Box 220
          Santa Fe, NM 87504
          Telephone: (505) 982-9074
          Facsimile: (888) 781-5968
          E-mail: jack@tierralaw.com

               - and -

          Rob Treinen, Esq.
          TREINEN LAW OFFICE
          500 Tijeras Ave NW
          Albuquerque, NM 87102
          Telephone: (505) 247-1980
          Facsimile: (505) 843-7129
          E-mail: robtreinen@treinenlawoffice.com

Attorneys for HiTex, LLC are:

          Stephen P. Curtis, Esq.
          STEPHEN P CURTIS ATTORNEY AT LAW PC
          6747 Academy Road NE, Suite D
          Albuquerque, NM 87109
          Telephone: (505) 884-9999
          Facsimile: (505) 884-1404
          E-mail: abqcurtis@gmail.com

CAVALRY PORTFOLIO: Blair Files FDCPA Suit in California
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Cavalry Portfolio
Services, LLC. The case is styled as Stephanie Blair, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC and Cavalry SPV I, LLC, Defendants,
Case No. 5:19-cv-01797 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 18, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Act.

Cavalry Portfolio Services LLC is a debt collection agency located
in Oklahoma.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan Aaron Stieglitz, Esq.
   Law Offices of Jonathan Stieglitz
   11845 West Olympic Boulevard Suite 800
   Los Angeles, CA 90064
   Tel: (323) 979-2063
   Fax: (323) 488-6748
   Email: jonathan.a.stieglitz@gmail.com


CCC INFORMATION: Salit Auto Class Suit Transferred to N.J. Dist. Ct
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Salit Auto Sales, Inc. d/b/a Salit Auto
Sales, on behalf of itself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff
v. CCC Information Services Inc., Liberty Mutual Group Inc.,
Liberty Mutual Home and Auto Services LLC, d/b/a Liberty Mutual
Fire Insurance Company and Wausau Underwriters Insurance Company,
Defendants, was transferred from the Superior Court of New Jersey -
Middlesex County with the assigned Case No. MID-L-57-00019 to the
U.S. District Court District of New Jersey [LIVE] (Newark) on
September 18, 2019, and assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-18107.

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Other Fraud.

CCC provides vehicle lifecycle solutions for OEMs, Insurers and
Collision Repair Shops.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   HENRY PAUL WOLFE, Esq.
   Law Office of Henry P. Wolfe LLC
   17A Joyce Kilmer Ave. N
   New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1951
   Tel: (732) 325-3500
   Email: henry@wolfeconsumerlaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

   RYAN L. DI CLEMENTE, Esq.
   SAUL EWING ARNSTEIN & LEHR LLP
   650 COLLEGE ROAD EAST, SUITE 4000
   PRINCETON, NJ 08540
   Tel: (609) 452-5057
   Fax: (609) 452-6117
   Email: ryan.diclemente@saul.com



CF ARCIS: Settlement in Hart Suit Has Prelim Court Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington Tacoma issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Unopposed
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Proposed Class Action Settlement
in the case captioned LAWRENCE HART, CLYDE STEPHEN LEWIS, JAMES
PRESTI, and MICHAEL others similarly situated, RALLS, individually
and on behalf of all Plaintiffs, v. CF ARCIS VII LLC d/b/a THE CLUB
AT SNOQUALMIE RIDGE, d/b/a TPC AT SNOQUALMIE RIDGE, and d/b/a
SNOQUALMIE RIDGE GOLF CLUB, CF ARCIS IV HOLDINGS, LLC, ARCIS EQUITY
PARTNERS, LLC, BLAKE S. WALKER, individually and on behalf of the
marital community of BLAKE S. WALKER and JANE DOE WALKER, and
BRIGHTSTAR GOLF SNOQUALMIE, LLC, Defendants. No. C17-1932 RSM.
(W.D. Wash.).

The Court preliminarily approves the Settlement Agreement as being
fair, reasonable, and adequate, and for purposes of settlement,
certifies this case as a class action, and authorizes notice to be
transmitted to the Settlement Class.  

Class Certification for Settlement Purposes. Pursuant to Rule
23(b)(3) and for the reasons stated in Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Approval, the Court, for settlement purposes,
conditionally certifies the following class (Class):

     All persons who, prior to entry of this Order, purchased
refundable Individual Golf Memberships with the Club, as that
membership is defined in the June 30, 2008 Membership and Operating
Policies, but who have not yet received a refund.

The Class is sufficiently numerous to meet the requirements of Rule
23(a)(1). The Class includes in excess of 250 people, and joinder
of all such persons would be impracticable.  

The case presents common issues of law and fact for the Class. The
commonality requirement is satisfied because there are questions of
law and fact common to the Class that center on whether Arcis
breached a uniform membership and operating policy, whether the
Class is entitled to damages and injunctive relief as a result.
Further, the question of the fairness and reasonableness of the
Settlement Agreement presents an issue common to the class.

Rule 23(a)(3) is satisfied because the claims of the named
Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the other Class Members,
which are being resolved through the Settlement Agreement.

Rule 23(a)(4) is satisfied because Plaintiffs are capable of fairly
and adequately protecting the interests of the members of the
Class, and because Plaintiffs are represented by qualified and
competent counsel who have extensive experience and expertise in
prosecuting class actions.

In addition, the Court finds that questions of law or fact common
to class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy. The predominance requirement is satisfied for purposes
of settlement because the common and overarching question in this
case is whether Arcis breached its contract with the Class,
entitling Class Members to damages and injunctive relief. In
addition, the resolution of hundreds of claims through the
Settlement Agreement would be superior to individual lawsuits and
promote consistency and efficiency of adjudication.
  
A full-text copy of the District Court's September 9, 2019 Order is
Available at https://tinyurl.com/yxph9x5d from Leagle.com.

Clyde Stephen Lewis, James Presti & Michael Ralls, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented
by Adrienne McEntee -- amcentee@terrellmarshall.com -- TERRELL
MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC & Beth E. Terrell --
bterrell@terrellmarshall.com -- TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC.

CF Arcis VII LLC, doing business as The Club at Snoqualmie Ridge,
TPC at Snoqualmie Ridge, Snoqualmie Ridge Golf Club, Arcis Equity
Partners, LLC & CF Arcis IV Holdings, LLC, Defendants, represented
by Rebecca J. Francis , DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE & Stephen M. Rummage
, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE, 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200, Seattle, WA
98101-3045


COCA-COLA CO: Does not Properly Pay Workers, Flores Suit Asserts
----------------------------------------------------------------
RYAN FLORES, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. THE COCA-COLA COMPANY, a Delaware
Corporation, and Does 1 to 100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
5:19-cv-01734 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 11, 2019) is a civil class and
collective action seeking unpaid wages, continuing wages,
liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees and costs, including
reasonable reimbursement of fees and costs as may be required by
Section 218.5 of the California Labor Code.

In 2017, Defendants switched over to a new payroll system. At the
same time, Defendants also began to fail to pay Plaintiff and the
Aggrieved Employees for all time worked at the correct rates, and
all accrued vacation time, says the complaint.

Defendants routinely paid Plaintiff and the Aggrieved Employees
late, and when Defendants did pay Plaintiff and the Aggrieved
Employees, they were unable to identify what compensation matched
what hours worked. The Defendants also failed to maintain payroll
records required by the California Labor Code and IWC Wage Order 7.
As a result, Defendants failed to properly compute all overtime
wages owing to Plaintiff and Aggrieved Employees, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff, who has been employed by Coca Cola for many years,
currently works for at the Ontario/Fontana facilities.

The Coca Cola Company is a Delaware Corporation, conducting
business within the County of San Bernardino, State of
California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Alan Harris, Esq.
     David Garrett, Esq.
     Lin Zhan, Esq.
     HARRIS & RUBLE
     655 North Central Avenue 17th Floor
     Glendale, CA 91203
     Phone: 323.962.3777
     Fax: 323.962.3004
     Email: harrisa@harrisandruble.com
            dgarrett@harrisandruble.com
            lzhan@harrisandruble.com


COLONIAL PARKING: Abraha Moves for Certification of Workers Class
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled BENYAM ABRAHA, et al. v. COLONIAL PARKING,
INC., et al., Case No. 1:16-cv-00680-CKK (D.D.C.), the Plaintiffs
move for an order certifying this case as a Class Action consisting
of one Class described as:

     Current and Former Employees of Colonial Parking, Inc. who
     were paid a DUB Benefit From October 1, 2006 to December 31,
     2015.

In another filing, the Plaintiffs amend their motion for an order
certifying a class described as:

     Individuals who participated in the Forge Company Health and
     Welfare plan who also received a DUB Benefit distribution
     between October 1, 2006 and December 31, 2015.

The parties have conferred concerning this Motion and the
Plaintiffs represent that the Defendants do not oppose the
certification of this action as a Class Action with the Class as
defined.

The Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants do not join in the
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion
for Class Certification, and the Defendants reserve all rights to
make factual contentions, to assert affirmative defenses, and to
challenge the relief sought by the Plaintiffs notwithstanding the
class action certification.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Edward Scallet, Esq.
          EASCOLAW, PLLC
          2756 Stephenson Lane NW
          Washington, DC 20015
          Telephone: (202) 329-6399
          E-mail: ted@eascolaw.com


CONCENTRIX SERVICES: Court Denies Dismiss in Turner FLSA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Arkansas, El Dorado Division, issued an Order denying Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Class and Collective Action Claims in
the case captioned TIARA TURNER, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. CONCENTRIX SERVICES US,
INC. and CONCENTRIX CORPORATION, Defendants. Civil No.
1:18-cv-1072. (W.D. Ark.).

Plaintiff is a former hourly paid employee of Defendants who worked
as an at-home customer service representative. Plaintiff filed a
class action complaint alleging that Defendants violated the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act (AMWA)
by failing to pay hourly paid at-home customer service
representatives for off-the-clock work performed prior to the
beginning of their scheduled shifts, during their unpaid
thirty-minute meal breaks, and after the end of the scheduled
shift. Seeking recovery of unpaid overtime, Plaintiff brings her
FLSA and AMWA claims individually and on behalf of all at-home
customer service representatives who worked within the past three
(3) years.  

In the present motion, Defendants move the Court to dismiss
Plaintiff's class and collective action claims pursuant to the
first-to-file rule. In order to conserve judicial resources and
avoid conflicting rulings, the first-to-file rule gives priority,
for purposes of choosing among possible venues when parallel
litigation has been instituted in separate courts, to the party who
first establishes jurisdiction.  

Defendants argue that the present case should be dismissed because
a similar lawsuit, the California action is still pending.
Defendants have identified some district courts that have applied
the first-to-file rule to FLSA collective actions and dismissed the
later-filed FLSA collective action where the later-filed lawsuit is
identical or nearly identical to the first.

Plaintiff argues in response that the first-to-file rule does not
apply when the potential plaintiffs in the second-filed collective
action are no longer able to join the first-filed collective
action. In other words, Plaintiff contends that the first-to-file
rule is inapplicable to the present action because the California
action is no longer pending.

The parties disagree as to whether the California action is still
pending. Defendants assert that the California case is pending
because the settlement has not yet been completed. However,
Plaintiff notes that the December 6, 2018 settlement order entered
in the California action stated that the case was dismissed with
prejudice, and the case was closed on the same day.

Given this language, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the
California action is no longer pending. Consequently, there is no
case other than the present one that would allow the potential
plaintiffs to opt in. In other words, there is no longer a
first-filed action.

The Court finds that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's
Class and Collective Action Claims  should be and hereby is
DENIED.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 9, 2019 Order is
Available at https://tinyurl.com/yykkhnkw from Leagle.com.

Tiara Turner, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Josh Sanford, Sanford Law Firm
PLLC & Sean Short, Sanford Law Firm PLLC, One Financial Center, 650
South Shackleford, Suite 110, Little Rock, AR, 72211

Concentrix Services US, Inc. & Concentrix Corporation, Defendants,
represented by Kevin A. Crass -- crass@fridayfirm.com -- Friday,
Eldredge & Clark.


COPAKE CAMPING: Faces Matzura Suit in Southern Dist. of New York
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Copake Camping
Resort, LLC et al. The case is captioned as Steven Matzura, on
behalf of himself and all other persons similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. Copake Camping Resort, Inc.; Copake Camping Resort,
LLC; and Diversified Investments, LLC, the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-08047-ALC (SDNY, Aug 28, 2019). The suit alleges violation
of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Darryn Solotoff, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF DARRYN G SOLOTOFF PLLC
          100 Quentin Roosevelt Boulevard, Ste 280
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 317-2453
          Facsimile: (516) 706-4692
          E-mail: ds@lawsolo.net

COSTCO WHOLESALE: Nevarez Files Workers Class Certification Bid
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled SILVERIO NEVAREZ, EFREN CORREA, individually,
and on behalf of other members of the general public similarly
situated v. COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION, and DOES 1 through 25,
Case No. 2:19-cv-03454-SVW-SK (C.D. Cal.), the Plaintiffs ask the
Court to issue an order:

   * determining that a class action is proper as to all causes
     of action in their operative complaint on the grounds that:

     (1) the class is ascertainable and sufficiently numerous;

     (2) common questions of law and fact predominate over
         individual issues;

     (3) the class representatives' claims are typical of the
         class;

     (4) the class representatives will adequately represent the
         interests of the class, and

     (5) class treatment is superior; and

   * certifying a class of:

     all current and former non-exempt employees employed by
     Costco Wholesale Corporation in the State of California at
     any time from March 25, 2015 to the present.

The Court will commence a hearing on October 14, 2019, at 1:30
p.m., to consider the Motion.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Michael A. Gould, Esq.
          Aarin Zeif, Esq.
          GOULD & ASSOCIATES, A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION
          17822 East 17th Street, Suite 106
          Tustin, CA 92780
          Telephone: (714) 669-2850
          Facsimile: (714) 544-0800
          E-mail: Michael@wageandhourlaw.com
                  Aarin@wageandhourlaw.com

               - and -

          Steven M. Tindall, Esq.
          Jeff Kosbie, Esq.
          GIBBS LAW GROUP LLP
          505 14th Street, Suite 1110
          Oakland, CA 94612-1406
          Telephone: (510) 350-9700
          Facsimile: (510) 350-9701
          E-mail: smt@classlawgroup.com
                  jbk@classlawgroup.com

Defendant COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION is represented by:

          Jinouth D. Vasquez Santos, Esq.
          SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
          2029 Century Park E, Suite 3500
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 201-1584
          E-mail: jvasquezsantos@seyfarth.com


CREDIT CONTROL: Faces Gachett Suit in District of New Jersey
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Credit Control
Services, Inc. The case is captioned as WESLEY GACHETT on behalf of
himself and those similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. CREDIT
CONTROL SERVICES, INC. doing business as: CREDIT COLLECTION
SERVICES; STEVEN SANDS; and JOHN DOES 1 to 10, the Defendants, Case
No. 2:19-cv-17537-MCA-LDW (D.N.J., Aug. 30, 2019) to the
proceeding. The suit alleges violation of the Fair Debt Collection
Act. The case is assigned to Judge Madeline Cox Arleo.

Credit Control is a St. Louis credit collection service that offers
debt collections.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Yongmoon Kim, Esq.
          KIM LAW FIRM LLC
          411 Hackensack Ave Ste 701
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 273-7117
          Facsimile: (201) 273-7117
          E-mail: ykim@kimlf.com

DARISI INC: Gupta Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------
ANITA GUPTA, on her own behalf and on behalf of others similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. DARISI, INC. d/b/a MYOTCSTORE.COM,
AMERICARX.COM INC. d/b/a MYOTCSTORE.COM, and PAVANKUMAR DARISI,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05185 (E.D. N.Y, Sept. 11, 2019) is an
action brought by the Plaintiff on behalf of herself as well as
other employees similarly situated, against the Defendants for
alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act,  and New York
Labor Law, arising from Defendants' various willfully and unlawful
employment policies, patterns and practices.

Throughout her employment, Plaintiff was not compensated at least
at one-and-one-half her promised hourly wage for all hours worked
above 40 in each workweek, asserts the complaint. Plaintiff was
also not compensated for New York's "spread of hours" premium for
shifts that lasted longer than 10 hours at her promised rate, says
the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendants to work as a machine operator
from January 16, 2014 to May 22, 2019.

DARISI, INC., d/b/a MYOTCSTORE.COM is a domestic business
corporation organized under the laws of the State of New York with
a principal address at 1935 Hazen St, Flushing, NY 11370.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Parham Zahedi, Esq.
     Gehi & Associates
     10405, Liberty Ave.
     Ozone Park, NY 11375
     Phone: (718) 5770711


ENVISION FOODS: Cal. App. OKs Writ of Mandate in Soto Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division Two,
issued an Opinion granting Petitioner Writ of Mandate in the
captioned DAVID SOTO, Plaintiff and Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, Defendant and Respondent; ENVISION
FOODS, LLC et al., Real Parties in Interest. No. E071920. (Cal.
App.)

Soto filed this petition for writ of mandate, arguing the statute
of limitations for any UCL claim is always four years, regardless
of the limitations period of the predicate statute.

Petitioner David Soto filed a class action complaint against his
former employers, asserting violations of Labor Code laws governing
overtime pay, rest breaks, meal breaks, and minimum wage, as well
as a claim alleging those violations constitute unlawful business
practices under California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL).  

After certifying the case as a class action, the trial court ruled
the statute of limitations for the Unfair Unfair Competition Law
(UCL) claim was three years because the claim was predicated on
Labor Code violations.

The determination of the applicable statute of limitations is a
purely legal issue, which the Court reviews de novo.

Business and Professions Code section 17208 establishes a four-year
statute of limitations for any UCL claim. Because the UCL furnishes
an independent cause of action, that limitations period applies
even if the borrowed statute has a shorter limitations statute.

In Cortez, 23 Cal.4th at p. 179, our Supreme Court rejected the
defendant's argument that UCL claims predicated on violations of
statutes with shorter limitations periods are governed by those
shorter limitations periods.  

Section 17208 is clear. It provides that any action to enforce any
cause of action under this chapter shall be commenced within four
years after the cause of action accrued.

Applying this rule here, the Court concludes the statute of
limitations for the UCL claim is four years. In other words,
although the UCL claim is predicated on various Labor Code
violations, such as failure to provide meal and rest breaks,
failure to pay overtime wages, and failure to pay minimum wage,
those predicate statutes do not supply the statute of limitations,
Business and Professions Code section 17208 does.

The reason there is no separate subclass with UCL in the title is
because Soto sought, and Judge Garza granted, certification based
on defendants' alleged misconduct, not the individual causes of
action asserted in the complaint. For example, the subclass
composed of employees and former employees who worked one or more
shifts longer than ten hours during the class period is called the
Second Meal Period Subclass, not the Labor Code section 226.7
Subclass or Labor Code section 226.7 and UCL Subclass.

This manner of defining subclasses is common and appropriate
because class certification is based on the ascertainability of the
class and the community of interest among the members. Class
members share a community of interest if, among other things, their
claims against the defendant share common questions of law and
fact. Thus, a class can encompass multiple statutory violations
based on a common form of misconduct or theory of liability (e.g.,
failure to pay overtime). The trial court correctly observed this
fact during the hearing on defendants' motion for clarification,
stating the subclasses are based upon the alleged conduct of the
defendants, which may have violated more than one statute.

Finally, defendants argue the additional hour of pay remedy for the
nonprovision of meal or rest breaks in violation of section 226.7
constitutes damages, not restitution, and therefore is not
recoverable under the UCL, making the three-year statute of
limitations correct.

The Court are unpersuaded. First of all, defendants' premise is
flawed. The California Supreme Court has held that the additional
hour of pay under section 226.7 is a wage, the employee's right to
which vests upon violation, making it a proper subject of
restitution under the UCL. More importantly, however, defendants
argument deals with the merits of the UCL claim, which is not
before us.  The only question we must answer in this writ
proceeding is which statute of limitations applies. Cortez and
Business and Professions Code section 17208 answer that question.

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the respondent
superior court to (1) vacate its order ruling the UCL claim (the
tenth cause of action) is governed by the three-year statute of
limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 338 and (2) issue a
new order ruling the claim is governed by the four-year statute of
limitations set forth in Business and Professions Code section
17208.

A full-text copy of the Cal. App.'s September 9, 2019 Opinion is
Available at  https://tinyurl.com/y3nwn947 from Leagle.com.

Matern Law Group, Matthew J. Matern -- MMatern@maternlawgroup.com
-- Mikael Stahle -- MStahle@maternlawgroup.com -- Irina Kirnosova ,
and Debra J. Tauger, 1230 Rosecrans Ave Ste 200, Manhattan Beach,
CA 90266-2497, for Plaintiff and Petitioner.

Raines Feldman, Lauren J. Katunich -- LKATUNICH@RAINESLAW.COM --
Robert M. Shore -- RSHORE@RAINESLAW.COM -- and David H. Jones for
Real Parties in Interest.


FCA US LLC: Victorino Seeks to Certify Class of Dodge Dart Buyers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit captioned CARLOS VICTORINO,
individually, and on behalf of other members of the general public
similarly situated v. FCA US LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company, Case No. 3:16-cv-01617-GPC-JLB (S.D. Cal.), seeks to
certify this class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure:

     Class:

     All persons who purchased or leased in California, from an
     authorized dealership, a new Class Vehicle.

     Class Vehicles:

     All 2013-2015 Dodge Dart vehicles equipped with a Fiat C635
     manual transmission built on or before November 12, 2014.

According to the Motion, the Plaintiff files this Renewed Motion
for Class Certification in light of the Ninth District's reversal
of a district court opinion, Nguyen v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No.
16-CV-05591-LHK, 2018 WL 1831857 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2018), rev'd
and remanded sub nom. Nguyen v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 932 F.3d 811
(9th Cir. July 26, 2019), upon which the Court relied in issuing
its Order Denying Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Class
Certification.

The Plaintiff also seeks appointment as representative for the
class; and for the appointment of the Plaintiff's counsel as Class
Counsel.

The Court will commence a hearing on October 18, 2018, at 1:30
p.m., to consider the Motion.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark A. Ozzello, Esq.
          Tarek H. Zohdy, Esq.
          Cody R. Padgett, Esq.
          Trisha K. Monesi, Esq.
          CAPSTONE LAW APC
          1875 Century Park East, Suite 1000
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 556-4811
          Facsimile: (310) 943-0396
          E-mail: Mark.Ozzello@capstonelawyers.com
                  Tarek.Zohdy@capstonelawyers.com
                  Cody.Padgett@capstonelawyers.com
                  Trisha.Monesi@capstonelawyers.com


FCA US: $26.3K Attorney's Fees in Salinas Approved
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order granting in part Plaintiffs' Motion for
Attorney’s Fees in the case captioned EDITH SALINAS, Plaintiff,
v. FCA US LLC, et al., Defendants. Case No. 1:17-cv-0419-JLT. (E.D.
Cal.).

Plaintiff purchased a 2013 Jeep Grand Cherokee, According to
Plaintiff, the vehicle was delivered to her with serious defects
and nonconformities to warranty, and developed other serious
defects and nonconformities to warrant including, but not limited
to a defective Totally Integrated Power Module. Edith Salinas
asserts that FCA US LLC is liable for violations of the
Song-Beverly act and fraudulent inducement under California law.
The parties settled the underlying claims.

Under California's Song-Beverly Act, a prevailing buyer is entitled
to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate
amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on
actual time expended, determined by the court to have been
reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the
commencement and prosecution of such action.

As a prevailing buyer, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of fees
and costs under the Song-Beverly Act. Plaintiff seeks: (1) an award
of attorneys' fees pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act in the amount
of $45,660.00 (2) a lodestar multiplier of 0.5, in the amount of
$22,830.00; and (3) actual costs and expenses of $11,760.31. Thus,
Plaintiff seeks a total award of $80,250.31.  

Fee Request

Plaintiff seeks $33,792.50 for the work completed by Knight Law
Group and $11,867.50 for work completed by Hackler Daghighian
Martino & Novak, P.C., which "associated into the case as lead
trial counsel to prepare the case for trial.

Hours worked by counsel

Defendant objects to the hours reported by Plaintiff's counsel,
asserting Plaintiff fails to offer any explanation for why it took
two firms who claim to be experts in their field to handle this
simple case. According to Defendant, there is inherent duplication
of effort in a staffing strategy that involves 13 lawyers, and the
invoices include numerous instances of inappropriate hours billed
by senior lawyers like Mr. Mikhov to review basic notices and
pleadings or to draft them, duplicative billing, unsubstantiated
billing, and lawyers and a paralegal billing for purely clerical
time that should be excluded from the lodestar calculation.

Work completed by Knight Law Group

The billing records submitted by Knight Law Group indicate the
attorneys expended 93.8 hours on this action, through the
preparation of the motion for fees and costs. Defendant objects to
the hours reported by Knight Law Group and contends most of the
work was formulaic. According to Defendant, The invoice attached to
the declaration of Steve Mikhov contains multiple instances of him
reviewing pleadings and discovery already drafted and reviewed by
other lawyers, discovery responses received from Defendant, expert
designations, and notices of depositions.

Initial case communications

Defendant objects to the first three entries in the billing
records, for initial communication with client and evaluation of
client's claims, analyzing the vehicle documentation, and
communication with Plaintiff" by Mr. Mikhov, who reported a total
of 1.8 hours for these tasks.

Defendants contend that because no dates are identified for that
time there is no evidence that the time was spent on this
particular case.  According to Defendant, The same three entries
appear without dates on virtually every invoice KLG submits in
support of a fee motion in a lemon law case.

Plaintiff argues the entries were proper because initial
communication with a client is a customary practice prior to
retention of a case. She also asserts that defendants routinely
attempt to use any dates of communication with counsel as
determinative of the merits of their Song-Beverly claim, which is
improper.

Significantly, the challenged entries are the only entries related
to the initial contact with Plaintiff and review of her
documentation. Presumably, such contact and review had to occur or
there would be no case. The mere fact that Knight Law Group
regularly includes these entries in their billing records does not
rebut the presumption that counsel did, in fact, communicate with
Plaintiff and review her vehicle documentation. Because counsel
clearly identified the tasks performed and the time to do so was
reasonable, the Court declines to reduce the fee award based upon
the failure to identify the date the tasks were performed.

Hourly rates

The fee applicant has the burden to establish the rates are
reasonable with the community, and meets this burden by producing
satisfactory evidence in addition to the attorney's own affidavits
that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the
community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably.

The attorneys at Knight Law Group seek hourly rates ranging from
$200 to $500, while attorneys at HDMN seek hourly rates ranging
from $250 to $550  In support of counsel's lodestar calculation and
the fee request based upon these hourly rates, Plaintiff requests
the Court review: (i) the hourly rates set forth of in the
declarations filed concurrently herewith (ii) a survey of rates
charged by other well-known consumer law attorneys (iii) over three
dozen court orders confirming the reasonableness of Plaintiff's
counsels' hourly rates and time billed in other Song-Beverly Act
cases  and (iv) a National Survey further supporting the
reasonableness of the hourly rates.  

However, this evidence does not address the local forum or assist
the Court in its analysis. For example, while Mr. Mikhov reports
the hourly rates of other attorneys in the state of California who
work in the area of lemon law and consumer law, he does not
identify attorneys practicing in the Eastern District.  

Though Mr. Mikhov identifies cases in which the attorneys were
awarded fees from state courts within the Eastern District
boundaries including Merced County and Tulare County many of the
courts' orders offer no analysis regarding whether the hourly rates
were reasonable for local counsel. Without such analysis, the Court
is unable to determine whether the plaintiffs presented evidence
that local counsel was either unwilling to take their cases or
unable to do so, such that the higher hourly rate was warranted.
Given the lack of such evidence here, the hourly rates will be
reduced for purposes of calculating the lodestar.   

Previously, this Court reviewed the billing rates for the Fresno
Division of the Eastern District and determined the current
reasonable range of attorneys' fees for cases litigated in the
Eastern District of California's Fresno Division is between $250
and $400 per hour. With this range of hourly rates, attorneys with
experience of twenty or more years of experience are awarded $350
to 400 per hour. For attorneys with less than ten years of
experience the accepted range is between $175 and $300 per hour..
With these parameters in mind, the hourly rates for counsel must be
adjusted to calculate the lodestar.

The Court notes that Diane Hernandez, who seeks the hourly rate of
$375, was admitted to practice in California in 1997. In addition,
Mr. Mikhov reports that Ms. Hernandez works frequently in lemon law
cases. Based upon her significant experience, the Court finds the
requested hourly rate is appropriate.  

The hourly rate for Mr. Mikhov and Russell Higgins, who were
admitted to the bar in 2003, will be reduced to $300. The hourly
rate for Sepehr Daghighian, who began practicing law in late 2005,
will be adjusted to $275. The hourly rate for Kristina
Stephenson-Cheang, who began practicing law in 2008, will be
adjusted to $250. Further, the rates for Alastair Hamblin,1 Amy
Morse, and Larry Casruita who began practicing law between 2011 and
2013 will be adjusted to $225. Finally, the hourly rates for
attorneys who have practiced law for less than five years including
Christopher Urner, Deepak Devabose, Erik Schmitt, Michael
Morris-Nussbaum,2 and Michelle Lumasag  are adjusted to $175.

Based upon the prior survey of the attorney fees in the Fresno
Division and the Court's own knowledge, these hourly rates are
reasonable.  

Lodestar calculation

The lodestar method calculates attorney fees by by multiplying the
number of hours reasonably expended by counsel on the particular
matter times a reasonable hourly rate. With the time and rate
adjustments, the lodestar in this action is $26,387.50.

Application of a multiplier

Once a court has calculated the lodestar, it may increase or
decrease that amount by applying a positive or negative multiplier
to take into account a variety of other factors, including the
quality of the representation, the novelty and complexity of the
issues, the results obtained, and the contingent risk presented.

Significantly, however, this case did not present novel or
difficult questions of law or fact. Further, as Defendant observes,
the facts were not significantly disputed and little discovery was
required. It does not appear that significant skill was needed to
pursue Plaintiff's claims.

Furthermore, there is no evidence that the nature of the litigation
precluded other employment by the attorneys. To the contrary,
Plaintiff's counsel 13 attorneys in total expended less than 110
hours of work on this action over the course of three years.
Finally, the Court finds the contingent nature of the fee award is
outweighed by the other factors, particularly in this action where
the disputed facts and issues to be resolved were minimal.

Accordingly, the Court finds the lodestar amount of $26,387.50 is
reasonable and declines to award a multiplier.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's motion for fees is granted in the
modified amount of $26,387.50.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 9, 2019 Order is
Available at https://tinyurl.com/y25yxswy from Leagle.com.

Edith Salinas, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Kalinowski --
danielk@knightlaw.com -- Knight Law Group, LLP, Larry S. Castruita,
Hackler Daghighian Martino & Novak, Maite Christine Colon, Knight
Law Group, LLP, Sepehr Daghighian, Hackler Daghighian Martino &
Novak, P.C., 10250 Constellation Blvd, Ste 2500, Los Angeles, CA
90067-6225, Steve Mikhov, Knight Law Group, LLP, 10250
Constellation Blvd, Ste 2500, Los Angeles, CA 90067-6225, Erik
Kronholm Schmitt  -- eks@hdmnlaw.com -- Hackler Daghighian Martino
& Novak, Mitchell E. Rosensweig, Knight Law Group, LLP & Russell W.
Higgins, Knight Law Group LLP, 10250 Constellation Blvd, Ste 2500,
Los Angeles, CA 90067-6225.

FCA US LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, Defendant,
represented by Scott Steven Shepardson -- sshepardson@ongaropc.com
-- Ongaro PC & Kristi Livedalen, Nixon Peabody, LLP, 300 S Grand
Ave Ste 4100, Los Angeles, CA 90071-3151


FIRST AMERICAN: Court Extends Time to Answer in Seiwert
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, issued an Order extending Time to Respond to
Complaint in the case captioned SCOTT SEIWERT, and 7809 TIMBER HILL
LLC, a Washington limited liability company, Plaintiff, v. FIRST
AMERICAN FINANCIAL CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, and FIRST
AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY, a California corporation, Defendant. Case
No. 2:19-cv-00988-RSL. (W.D. Wash.).

Plaintiffs Scott Seiwert and 7809 Timber Hill LLC and Defendants
First American Financial
Corporation and First American Title Company, by and through their
counsel of record and pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(d)(1) and
Local Civil Rule 10(g), jointly move the Court to extend the time
for Defendants to respond to Plaintiffs' Class Action Complaint
from September 9, 2019, to 14 days after Defendants' Motion to
Transfer Venue is ruled upon by the Court, if denied.

The requested extension is not sought for the purpose of improper
delay, and no party will be prejudiced as a result.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 9, 2019 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/y4oqoxg7 from Leagle.com.

Scott Seiwert & 7809 Timber Hill LLC, a Washington limited
liability company, Plaintiffs, represented by Jason T. Dennett --
jdennett@tousley.com -- TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS, Rebecca Luise
Solomon -- rsolomon@tousley.com -- TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS & Kim D.
Stephens -- kstephens@tousley.com -- TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS.

First American Financial Corporation, a Delaware corporation &
First American Title Company, a California corporation, Defendants,
represented by Joel D. Siegel -- joel.siegel@dentons.com -- DENTONS
US LLP, pro hac vice, Ronald D. Kent, DENTONS US LLP, pro hac vice
& Darin M. Sands -- sandsd@lanepowell.com -- LANE POWELL.


FLYING POINT SPORT: Olsen Files Class Suit Under ADA
----------------------------------------------------
Flying Point Sport, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Thomas J Olsen, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Flying Point Sport, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-05282 (E.D. N.Y., Sept. 17, 2019).

Flying Point Sport, Inc. offers one surf camp on the beautiful east
end of Long Island.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 1830
   New York, NY 10170
   Tel: (212) 764-7171
   Email: chris@lipskylowe.com




FORD MOTOR: Anderson Alleges False Fuel-Economy Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------
HARVEY ANDERSON, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, the Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, the Defendant, Case
No. 2:19-cv-12376-SFC (E.D. Mich., Aug. 29, 2019), alleges that the
Defendant marketed and sold vehicles including the 2019 Ford Ranger
and 2015-2019 Ford F-150 with false fuel-economy ratings.

The case is a class action lawsuit brought by Plaintiffs on behalf
of themselves and a class of current and former owners or lessees
of model year 2017 through 2019 Ford automobiles.

Plaintiffs' experts have examined nominal road load numbers that
Ford used for fuel economy and emissions certifications for the
2018 F-150 and 2019 Ranger as reported to the EPA and CARB. When
compared with other vehicles of the same class with similar weights
and dimensions, Ford's road loads plotted against speed produced
curves that were abnormally low, especially in the lower speed
ranges more heavily weighted in federal MPG determinations.

Ford represented to customers their vehicles had achieved specific
MPG estimates. Ford, however, concealed that it conducted
inadequate and inaccurate EPA fuel economy testing, resulting in
Class Vehicles with overstated miles-per gallon EPA fuel economy
ratings, the lawsuit says.

Ford's EPA fuel economy ratings and advertising statements
overstated by a material amount the actual numbers that the
required testing would have produced. These misstatements are
material because the EPA numbers provide a necessary tool for
vehicle comparison for consumers when evaluating vehicles to lease
or purchase, and they exist to help foster realistic numbers with
which consumers can compare one of the most important factors in
new-car buyers' purchase decisions.

The action seeks relief for the injuries sustained as the result of
the inaccurate testing methods used by Ford to ascertain the fuel
economy ratings of its vehicles and material misstatements
regarding those ratings used in the marketing and sales of certain
2017-2019 Ford vehicles in the United States.

Ford Motor is an American multinational automaker that has its main
headquarters in Dearborn, Michigan, a suburb of Detroit. It was
founded by Henry Ford and incorporated on June 16, 1903.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class are:

          Jaye Quadrozzi, Esq.
          YOUNG & ASSOCIATES
          27725 Stansbury Boulevard, Suite 125
          Farmington Hills, MI 48334
          Telephone: (248) 353-8620
          Facsimile: (248) 479-7828
          E-mail: Quadrozzi@youngpc.com

               - and -

          Lynn Lincoln Sarko, Esq.
          Gretchen Freeman Cappio, Esq.
          Ryan McDevitt, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK L.L.P.
          1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3200
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 623-1900
          Facsimile (206) 623-3384
          E-mail: lsarko@kellerrohrback.com
                  gcappio@kellerrohrback.com
                  rmcdevitt@kellerrorhback.com

               - and -

          Lesley E. Weaver, Esq.
          Anne K. Davis, Esq.
          Joshua Samra, Esq.
          BLEICHMAR FONTI & AULD LLP
          555 12th Street, Suite 1600
          Oakland, CA 94607
          Telephone: (415) 445-4003
          E-mail: lweaver@bfalaw.com
                  adavis@bfalaw.com
                  jsamra@bfalaw.com

               - and -

          Jonathan K. Levine, Esq.
          Elizabeth C. Pritzker, Esq.
          PRITZKER LEVINE LLP
          180 Grand Avenue, Suite 1390
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (415) 692-0772
          Facsimile: (415) 366-6110
          E-mail: jkl@pritzkerlevine.com
                  ecp@pritzkerlevine.com

FPI MANAGEMENT: Ramos Files Wage and Hour Suit in Calif.
---------------------------------------------------------
ESTEBAN RAMOS, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. FPI MANAGEMENT, INC.; and DOES 1 to 100, Inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 19STCV32278 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles
Cty., Sept. 11, 2019) is a wage and hour class action lawsuit on
behalf of Plaintiff and other current and former non-exempt
employees of DEFENDANTS in California.

Plaintiff seek within the applicable statute of limitations periods
(taking into account any tolling, if applicable): unpaid overtime
wages based on Defendants incorrectly calculating overtime pay;
unpaid overtime wages for all hours worked over 40 in a work week
and/or 8 hours in a day; unpaid meal premium wages and/or rest
premium wages for incorrectly calculated meal period premium wages;
statutory penalties for failure to provide accurate and complete
wage statements; waiting time penalties in the form of continuation
wages for failure to timely pay former employees all earned and
unpaid wages; applicable civil penalties following notice to the
Labor and Workforce Development Agency; other equitable relief,
reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to Labor Code sections 226(e),
1194, costs, and interest, if applicable, brought on behalf of
Plaintiff and others similarly situated.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as hourly non-exempt employee
from March 26, 2018 until September 18. 2018.

FPI MANAGEMENT, INC. is authorized to do business within the State
of California and is doing business in the State of
California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joseph Lavi, Esq.
     Joshua Webster, Esq.
     LAVI & EBRAHIMIAN, LLP
     8889 W. Olympic Blvd., Suite 200
     Beverly Hills, CA 90211
     Phone: (310) 432-0000
     Facsimile: (310) 432-0001
     Email: jlavi@lelawfirm.com
            jwebster@lelawfirm.com

          - and -

     Sahag Majarian, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF SAHAG MAJARIAN II
     18250 Ventura Boulevard
     Tarzana, CA 91356
     Phone: (818)609-0807
     Fax: (818) 609-0892
     Email: sahagii@aol.com


FQSR LLC: Lancaster Files Wage and Hour Suit in Maryland
--------------------------------------------------------
LATOYA LANCASTER, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. FQSR LLC (d/b/a/ "KBP Foods"), Defendant,
Case No. 8:19-cv-02632-CBD (D. Md., Sept. 10, 2019) is a lawsuit on
behalf of Plaintiff and others similarly situated against
Defendant, seeking all available relief under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, the Maryland Wage and Hour Law, the Maryland Wage
Payment and Collections Law, and the Maryland doctrine of unjust
enrichment.

Throughout her employment with Defendant, Plaintiff regularly
worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. However, Defendant
failed to record and pay Plaintiff for all of the time she spent
performing her work activities. This included regular hours (below
40 hours in a workweek) and overtime hours when she worked above 40
hours in a workweek. The Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff for all
of her work activities through various methods including, for
example, erasing or modifying Plaintiff's recorded time in
Defendant's timekeeping system in order to eliminate or reduce her
work hours credited by Defendant, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant at its La Plata KFC franchise
location from approximately October 2014 to July 2018.

Defendant operates approximately 700 KFC and Taco Bell franchise
restaurants located across the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Brian J. Markovitz, Esq.
     JOSEPH, GREENWALD & LAAKE, P.A.
     6404 Ivy Lane, Suite 400
     Greenbelt, MD 20770
     Phone: (301) 220-2200
     Email: bmarkovitz@jgllaw.com

          - and -

     R. Andrew Santillo, Esq.
     WINEBRAKE & SANTILLO, LLC
     Twining Office Center, Suite 211
     715 Twining Road
     Dresher, PA 19025
     Phone: (215) 884-2491
     Email: asantillo@winebrakelaw.com



FRONTLINE ASSET: Weinberg Files Class Suit under FDCPA
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Frontline Asset
Strategies, LLC. The case is styled as Tina Weinberg and Didiana
Vallejo, Plaintiffs v. Frontline Asset Strategies, LLC and LVNV
Funding, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-05296 (E.D. N.Y., Sept.
17, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Frontline Asset Strategies is a consumer-focused and
performance-driven organization that delivers compliant solutions
through technology and service.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David Michael Barshay, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza
   Ste 5th Floor
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 706-5055
   Email: dbarshay@bakersanders.com

     - and -

   Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 281-7601
   Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com



FUTURE ENERGY: Faces Wright Suit in California Superior Court
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Future Energy
Corporation et al. The case is captioned as Donald Wright On behalf
of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Jeffrey Allen
Adkins; Jona Marie Adkins,; Does 1-100; Future Energy Corporation;
and Future Energy Savers; and Solarco, Inc., the Defendants, Case
No. 34-2019-00263675-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super., Aug 28, 2019). The
suit alleges employment-related violation.

Future Energy is a global Power Developer with experience spanning
the Middle East, Europe, Latin America, and the Caribbean.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin Rodriguez, Esq.
          Law Office of Justin P Rodriguez
          106 1/2 Judge John Aiso St. 412
          Los Angeles, CA 90012
          Telephone No. (213) 280-8908
          E-mail: justinatlaw@yahoo.com

GENDLIN & LIVERMAN: Karas et al. Seek OT Pay for Paralegals
-----------------------------------------------------------
GREGORY KARAS and ANDREA THUNHORST, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, and individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. GENDLIN,
LIVERMAN & RYMER, S.C., ANDREW R. LIVERMAN, and TIMOTHY J. RYMER,
the Defendants, Case No. 19-CV-1291 (E.D. Wisc.), seeks overtime
wages due in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and
the Wisconsin wage and hour laws.

Since September 6, 2016, Gendlin & Liverman has had a common policy
and practice of failing to pay its Investigators and Paralegals
overtime premium compensation for all hours worked in excess of 40
in a given workweek.

The Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated are current and
former employees who worked as Investigators and Paralegals at
Gendlin & Liverman.

Gendlin & Liverman is a law firm in Milwaukee.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Larry A. Johnson, Esq.
          Summer H. Murshid, Esq.
          Timothy P. Maynard, Esq.
          HAWKS QUINDEL, S.C.
          222 East Erie Street, Suite 210
          PO Box 442
          Milwaukee, WI 53201-0442
          Telephone: 414-271-8650
          Facsimile: 414-271-8442
          E-mail: ljohnson@hq-law.com
                  smurshid@hq-law.com
                  tmaynard@hq-law.com

GL LBT LLC: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Vazquez Says
-----------------------------------------------------
MONDO VAZQUEZ, an individual, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. GL LBT, LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company; GL HHR, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company; GL HMH, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company; GL CCH, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; GL LBH,
LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; GL ALN, LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company; GL HOD, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company; GL TOD, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company; GL CCT, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; GL
HUNTINGTON BEACH, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; GL
ORANGE, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; GL CCC, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company; KEN GARFF AUTOMOTIVE, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company; and DOES 1 through 50,
inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. 19STCV30814 (Cal. Super., Aug.
30, 2019), alleges that Defendants failed to provide required meal
periods, to provide required rest periods, failed to pay overtime
wages, failed to pay minimum wages, and failed to pay all wages due
to discharged and quitting employees under the California Labor
Code.

The Plaintiff and others similarly situated class of individuals
are all current and former non-exempt employees of Defendants.

As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful actions of
Defendants, Plaintiff and class members have suffered, and continue
to suffer, from loss of earnings in amounts as yet unascertained,
the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Matthew J. Matern, Esq.
          Matthew W. Gordon, Esq.
          Tagore 0. Subramaniam, Esq.
          MATERN LAW GROUP, PC
          1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 200
          Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
          Telephone: (310) 531-1900
          Facsimile: (310) 531-1901

GLOBAL CREDIT: Padmore Files Class Suit in E.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Global Credit &
Collection Corp. The case is styled as Michael Padmore,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Global Credit & Collection Corp and LVNV Funding, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05293 (E.D. N.Y., Sept. 17, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Global Credit & Collection Corporation (GCC) is a debt collection
agency that handles first-party receivable management and
third-party debt collections.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David Michael Barshay, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza
   Ste 5th Floor
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 706-5055
   Email: dbarshay@bakersanders.com

     - and -

   Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 281-7601
   Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com



GOLDEN QUEEN MINING: Marquez Files Class Suit in California
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Golden Queen Mining
Company LLC, a California limited liability corporation. The case
is styled as Jesse Marquez, as an individual and on behalf of
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Golden Queen Mining Company
LLC, Defendant Case No. BCV-19-102651 (Cal. Super. Ct., Kern
County, Sept. 18, 2019).

The case type stated as Other Employment - Civil Unlimited.

Golden Queen Mining Company LLC is a mining company
California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Peter M. Hart,Esq.
   Law Office of Hart
   12121 Wilshire Blvd Suite 725
   Los Angeles, CA 90025
   Tel: (310) 478-5789


GULFPORT ENERGY: Profit Energy Sues over Overriding Royalty Fees
----------------------------------------------------------------
PROFIT ENERGY COMPANY, on behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. GULFPORT ENERGY CORPORATION, the
Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-03487-JLG-CMV (S.D. Ohio, Aug. 12,
2019), alleges that Defendant refused to provide information and
documentation showing the bases or reasoning for Defendant's
decision to change the size of a "Unit" under the parties'
sublease.

On or about August 17, 2011, the Plaintiff entered into an oil and
gas sublease with HG Energy, LLC. Under the Sublease, the Plaintiff
subleased to HG Energy 32 oil and gas leases totaling 1,275.935
acres.

The Plaintiff and HG Energy contemplated that HG Energy would
execute additional subleases that would be subject to the same
terms. The Related Subleases would affect the timing of Plaintiff's
per acre payment under the Sublease and the amount of Plaintiff's
overriding royalty interest (ORRI) under the Sublease.

The acreage described in the Sublease and the Related Subleases was
combined into a "Unit" out of which Plaintiff and the sublessors
under the Related Subleases are entitled to the ORRI.

After execution of the Sublease and all the Related Subleases, HG
Energy paid Plaintiff the per acre payment under the Sublease and
sent Plaintiff a division order for the ORRI.

Plaintiff's decimal interest, as stated on the HG Energy division
order, is 0.0015249920.

The unit description for the HG Energy division order is "Monroe
County Group -- being 26,146.3458 acres, more or less, situated in
Monroe County, Ohio."

HG Energy drilled one or more wells under the Sublease and/or
Related Subleases and paid Plaintiff the ORRI based on paragraph 11
of the Sublease and the decimal interest stated in the HG Energy
division order.

Subsequently, HG Energy sold and/or assigned the Sublease and all
Related Subleases to Gulfport Energy.  Gulfport is the
successor-in-interest to HG Energy with respect to the Sublease and
the Related Subleases.

The Defendant has asserted that the total number of acres subject
to the Sublease and the Related Subleases has changed from
26,146.3458 to 25,920.889

The alleged change in the total number of acres subject to the
Sublease and the Related Subleases reduces the size of the "Unit,"
which affects the decimal interest ORRI to which Plaintiff is
entitled.

The Plaintiff demands that Defendant provide a complete accounting
for the change in the size of the "Unit," with reference to the
Related Subleases and to any other instruments of title relating to
a release, defect, or a combination thereof for any of the acreage
described in the Related Subleases.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's breach of the
Sublease, Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount equal to the
difference between the ORRI to which it is entitled under the terms
of the Sublease and the ORRI that Defendant has actually paid to
Plaintiff.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff are:

          Daniel P. Corcoran, Esq.
          Kristopher O. Justice, Esq.
          THEISEN BROCK,
          424 Second Street
          Marietta, OH 45750
          Telephone: (740) 373-5455
          Facsimile: (740) 373-4409
          E-mail: corcoran@theisenbrock.com
                  justice@theisenbrock.com

HARLEY-DAVIDSON: Removes Greene Pricing Suit to C.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------------
Harley-Davidson Motor Company Operations, Inc. removed the case
captioned as MATTHEW D. GREENE, an individual, on behalf of
himself, the proposed class(es), all others similarly situated, and
on behalf of the general public, the Plaintiff, vs.
HARLEY-DAVIDSON, INC., a Wisconsin corporation; HARLEY-DAVIDSON
MOTOR COMPANY, INC., a Wisconsin corporation; HARLEY-DAVIDSON MOTOR
COMPANY OPERATIONS, INC., a Wisconsin corporation; and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. RIC 1903312 (Filed
June 11, 2019), from the Superior Court for the State of California
for the County of Riverside to the United States District Court for
the Central District of California on Aug. 28, 2019.  The  Central
District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
5:19-cv-01647-RGK-KK to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff alleges that Harley-Davidson deceptively stated on
motorcycle price hang tags attached to new, assembled motorcycles
that the retail prices for those motorcycles did not include
freight and dealer preparation/setup fees. The Plaintiff seeks
damages, restitution, punitive and/or exemplary damages, injunctive
relief, and attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the Consumer
Legal Remedies Act.[BN]

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          John M. Thomas, Esq.
          Paul L. Nystrom, Esq.
          Ashley R. Fickel, Esq.
          Abirami Gnanadesigan, Esq.
          DYKEMA GOSSETT LLP
          333 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 457-1800
          Facsimile: (213) 457-1850
          E-mail: PNystrom@dykema.com
                  AFickel@dykema.com
                  JThomas@dykema.com
                  AGnanadesigan@dykema.com


HEADWAY TECHNOLOGIES: Faces Apex Suit in N.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Magnecomp
Corporation. The case is captioned as Apex Computers, Inc. on
behalf of itself and others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
Headway Technologies, Inc.; Magnecomp Corporation Magnecomp
Precision Technology Public Company, Ltd.; NAT Peripheral (Dong
Guan) Co., Ltd. NAT Peripheral (H.K) Co., Ltd.; NHK Spring Co.,
Ltd.; NHK International Corporation; NHK Spring (Thailand) Co.,
Ltd.; NHK Spring Precision (Guangzhou) Co., Ltd.; SAE Magnetics
(H.K.) Ltd.; TDK Corporation; TDK Corporation-Hutchinson
Technologies, Inc., the Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-05507-MMC
(N.D. Cal., Aug. 30, 2019). The suit alleges violation of antitrust
laws. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Maxine M. Chesney.

Headway Technologies provides recording head products to the
computer harddisk drive industry. The Company provides solutions to
the server, mobile, and desktop segments of the hard disk drive
industry for customers throughout the United States.[BN]

Attorneys for Apex Computers, Inc. are:

          Brittany Nicole DeJong, Esq.
          Marisa C. Livesay, Esq.
          Rachele R. Byrd, Esq.
          Betsy Carol Manifold, Esq.
          WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER
          FREEMAN AND HERZ LLP
          750 B St., Suite 1820
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 239-4599
          Facsimile: (619) 234-4599
          E-mail: dejong@whafh.com
                  livesay@whafh.com
                  byrd@whafh.com
                  manifold@whafh.com

HIRE TECH: Varner Seeks OT Wages for Mechanical Engineers
---------------------------------------------------------
GARRIS VARNER, Individually and For Others Similarly Situated, vs.
HIRE TECHNOLOGIES, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-00145-JRH-BKE (S.D. Ga., Sept. 5, 2019), alleges that HTI
failed to pay Garris Varner and other similary situated workers
overtime as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act. Instead, HTI
paid Varner and other workers, the same hourly rate for all hours
worked, including those in excess of 40 in a workweek.

Varner worked for HTI as a Mechanical Engineer. Varner reported the
hours he worked to HTI on a regular basis. If Varner worked under
40 hours, he was only paid for the hours he worked.

HTI provides responsive services for transmission, midstream, and
distribution companies.[BN]

Attorney for the Paintiff is:

          Troy A. Lanier, Esq.
          LANIER LAW
          430 Ellis Street
          Augusta, GA 30901
          Telephone: 706-823-6800
          E-mail: TLANIER@TLANIERLAW.COM

HOME DEPOT: Court Moves Reply Deadline to Oct. 25
-------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as GREGORY WATERS, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. THE
HOME DEPOT USA, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-02467-SNLJ
(E.D. Mo.), Home Depot asks the Court to extend the time for it to
answer or otherwise respond to Plaintiff's Complaint until
September 30, 2019.

The Plaintiff originally filed the Complaint in the St. Louis
County Circuit Court, with Case No. 19SL-C02021, on May 23, 2019.
Home Depot was served with the Complaint on July 31, 2019.

Home Depot removed the case to the Eastern District of Missouri on
August 30, 2019. Home Depot's deadline to answer or otherwise
respond to the Complaint was September 6, 2019.

Judge Rodney Smith ruled that Defendant shall respond to the
Complaint by no later than October 25, 2019.

Defendant is concurrently sparring with Aimee Waters on her Motion
to Remand.  Home Depot has filed an objection to the Motion to
Remand.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Daniel J. Orlowsky, Esq.
          ORLOWSKY LAW, LLC
          7777 Bonhomme, Suite 1910
          St. Louis, Missouri 63105
          Telephone: (314) 725-5151
          Facsimile: (314) 725-5161
          E-mail: dan@orlowskylaw.com

               - and -

          Adam M. Goffstein, Esq.
          GOFFSTEIN LAW, LLC
          7777 Bonhomme, Suite 1910
          St. Louis, MO 63105
          Telephone: (314) 725-5151
          Facsimile: (314) 725-5161
          E-mail: adam@goffsteinlaw.com

Attorneys for the Defendant are:

          John C. Drake, Esq.
          Russell K. Scott, Esq.
          Kathleen M. Howard, Esq.
          GREENSFELDER, HEMKER & GALE, P.C.
          12 Wolf Creek Drive, Suite 100
          Belleville, IL 62226
          Telephone: (618) 257-7308
          Facsimile: (618) 257-7353
          E-mail: rks@greensfelder.com
                  jdrake@greensfelder.com
                  khoward@greensfelder.com

               - and -

          S. Stewart Haskins, Esq.
          J. Andrew Pratt, Esq.
          Misty L. Peterson, Esq.
          KING & SPALDING LLP
          1180 Peachtree Street, NE
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone: (404) 572-4600
          Facsimile: (404) 572-5100
          E-mail: shaskins@kslaw.com
                  apratt@kslaw.com
                  mpeterson@kslaw.com

HORIZON SATELLITES: Griner Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------
CHARLES GRINER, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. HORIZON SATELLITES, INC., a Domestic Profit
Corporation, STEVE RAMSLAND, Individually, and CHRIS REYNOLDS,
Individually, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-04060-WMR (N.D. Ga.,
Sept. 10, 2019) is an action brought pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act, as amended hereinafter called the "FLSA") to recover
unpaid overtime wages and additional equal amount as liquidated
damages, obtain declaratory relief, and reasonable attorney's fees
and costs.

Plaintiff worked for Defendants in excess of 40 hours within a work
week. Throughout Plaintiff's employment, Defendants deprived
Plaintiff of proper overtime compensation for his hours worked in
excess for 40 hours each week. Plaintiff and those similarly
situated, should be compensated at the rate of one and one-half
times their regular rate for those hours worked in excess of 40
hours per week as required by the FLSA, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was a non-exempt cable installer employee for
Defendants.

HORIZON was a Georgia Domestic Profit Corporation, regularly
conducting business within the District.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Andrew R. Frisch, Esq.
     Morgan & Morgan, P.A.
     8151 Peters Road, Suite 4000
     Plantation, FL 33324
     Phone. (954) WORKERS
     Facsimile: (954) 327-3016
     Email: afrisch@forthepeople.com


ILLINOIS: Weston Files Prisoner Civil Rights Suit
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against John Baldwin. The
case is styled as Travis Weston also known as: Nafiabdul Basir, on
behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. John
Baldwin, Jacqueline Lashbrook, Frank Lawrence, Lloyd Hanna, Howard
Harner and James Claycomb, Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-01020-NJR
(S.D. Ill., Sept. 18, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Prisoner: Civil
Rights filed pursuant to the Prisoner Civil Rights.

The Defendants are government representatives and exercising
government functions.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


INNS OF AURORA: Olsen Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
--------------------------------------------------------------
Inns of Aurora, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant
to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as
Thomas J. Olsen, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Inns of Aurora, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-05281 (E.D. N.Y., Sept. 17, 2019).

Inns of Aurora, LLC is a 4 star hotel.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   630 Third Avenue
   Fifth Floor
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: doug@lipskylowe.com



JOHN BURNS CONSTRUCTION: Long Seeks Overtime Pay for Workers
------------------------------------------------------------
WILLIAM LONG, Individually and For Others Similarly Situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. JOHN BURNS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, the Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-05976 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 6, 2019), alleges that JBCC
failed to pay Mr. Long and other workers like him, overtime as
required by the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Instead, JBCC paid Long and other workers like him, the same hourly
rate for all hours worked, including those in excess of 40 in a
workweek (or, "straight time for overtime").

JBCC is a for profit corporation incorporated in Illinois.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and others similarly situated are:

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Richard M. Schreiber, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP, LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 352-1100

               - and -

          Richard (Rex) J. Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH, P.L.L.C.
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 877-8788

               - and -

          Douglas M. Werman, Esq.
          Maureen A. Salas, Esq.
          WERMAN SALAS P.C.
          77 West Washington, Suite 1402
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 419-1008

JUUL LABS: Cobb et al Sue over Sale of Vaping Devices
-----------------------------------------------------
TYLER COBB and JORDAN HEITMANN, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. JUUL LABS, INC., the
Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-02446-RWS (E.D. Mo., Aug. 28, 2019),
alleges that JUUL Labs failed to use ordinary care in the
marketing, promotion and sale of its vaping devices and JUULpods
and/or failed to warn of the risk of harm, injury, and/or damage
inherent in the use of its vaping devices and JUULpods.

According to the complanint, both Cobb and Heitmann began "JUULing"
as minors. Through its marketing and promotional efforts, including
a strong social media presence on platforms popular with young
people, JUUL Labs introduced Cobb and Heitmann to nicotine.

Before JUUL, neither of them had smoked, vaped, or used any other
tobacco or nicotine containing products. When they started using
JUUL Labs' products, neither of them knew that the JUULpods they
were using contained nicotine. All they knew was that they liked
the way the flavored vapor tasted.

It was not until later that Cobb and Heitmann came to know that
there was nicotine in the JUULpods, but even then they did not
understand or appreciate the amount of nicotine that they were
taking in.

And they are not alone: "Two-thirds of JUUL users ages 15 through
24 "do not know that JUUL always contains nicotine."

The Surgeon General and other governmental and health authorities
have "singled out" JUUL Labs and its products for fueling the
"epidemic" of "youth vaping," they being largely responsible for
driving the "largest ever recorded [increase in substance abuse] in
the past 43 years for any adolescent substance use outcome in the
U.S."

JUULing refers to the use of specific electronic vaping devices
made by Defendant JUUL Labs.

The user loads a "JUULpod," filled with a flavored liquid
containing nicotine and other chemicals, into the JUUL vaping
device. Powered by a battery that is charged through a USB port,
the JUUL device heats the liquid, converting the liquid into a
vapor that the user breathes in through the mouth like someone
smoking a cigarette.

As a direct and proximate result of JUUL Labs' conduct, the
Plainitffs are addicted to nicotine; have been exposed to toxic
chemicals like formaldehyde and propylene glycol, among others;
have experienced adverse physiological, emotional, and mental
changes; and have sustained economic harm in that, had JUUL Labs
told them what was  the outcome with its products, they would not
have been purchased, the lawsuit says.

Juul Labs, Inc. is an electronic cigarette company which spun off
from Pax Labs in 2017. It makes the Juul e-cigarette, which
packages nicotine salts from leaf tobacco into one-time use
cartridges.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Kristine K. Kraft, Esq.
          Jerome J. Schlichter, Esq.
          Scott H. Morgan, Esq.
          SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON, LLP
          100 South 4 th Street, Suite 1200
          St. Louis, Missouri 63012
          Telephone: (314) 621-6115
          Facsimile: (314) 621-6151
          E-mail: jschlichter@uselaws.com
                  kkraft@uselaws.com
                  smorgan@uselaws.com

KCI TECHNOLOGIES: Ohio App. Affirms Certification in Ayers
----------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eleventh District, Portage County,
issued an Opinion affirming the Court of Common Pleas' judgment
granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the case
captioned JENNIFER L. AYERS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. KCI
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al., Defendants, OSCAR BRUGMANN SAND &
GRAVEL, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellants. No. 2018-P-0087. (Ohio
App.).

Defendants-appellants appeal the decision of the Portage County
Court of Common Pleas to grant class certification to
plaintiffs-appellees.

Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and Class of similarly situated
persons defined below, bring this suit to seek redress for
negligence, continuing nuisance, continuing trespass. Plaintiffs
have been and continue to be injured by Defendant KCI Technologies,
Inc.'s, as successor in interest by acquisition of McCoy
Associates, Inc. and Defendant MS Consultants, Inc.'s negligent
failure to properly design the Aurora East Storm Drainage System
improvements, to convey the flow of storm water and prevent storm
water from overwhelming the system and flooding Plaintiffs'
properties.

The plaintiffs filed a Motion to Certify Class Action. The
plaintiffs sought to have the class defined as follows: All persons
who own or owned real property in the Aurora East Subdivision at
any time since 1998.

The trial court granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class
Action, but amended the proposed class definition as follows: All
persons who own or owned real property in the East Aurora
Subdivision at any time since 1998 and whose property suffered
excessive flooding and/or whose property was unduly taken or
otherwise adversely affected due to any actions on the part of
Defendants causing alterations of surface water through the
Subdivision.

The defendants filed a Notice of Appeal. On appeal, they raise the
following assignment of error: The trial court abused its
discretion when it granted class certification.

The defendants' challenge to class certification focuses generally
on three elements: commonality, typicality, and the predominance of
common questions of law or fact.

Civil Rule 23(A)(2) (questions of law or fact common to the class)

In determining that the commonality requirement was satisfied, the
trial court stated: Here, all class members would have similar
legal claims stemming from the same nucleus of operative facts
surrounding the alleged actions on the part of Defendants causing
alterations of surface water through the Subdivision. The answer to
the question of whether or not those alleged actions caused damage
to the property in the Subdivision would apply equally to the class
as a whole and, accordingly, resolve the dispute across the board.

The defendants contest this finding on the grounds that none of the
Plaintiffs experienced the exact same flooding events in the same
manner. The defendants note that different plaintiffs experienced
flooding in different years. Moreover, none of the named Plaintiffs
can agree on the same exact location from where the flooding in the
Subdivision originates. Some of the Plaintiffs live on the east
side of the Subdivision closer to the Brugmann property, some of
the Plaintiffs live on the west side of the Subdivision closer to
the Romano property, and other Plaintiffs live throughout the
Subdivision. Therefore, it is not possible to isolate which
Defendant, if any, is responsible for their flooding.  

The Court finds no abuse of discretion in the trial court's
determination that the commonality prerequisite was satisfied.
Here, the common question of law or fact is the defendants'
liability for causing alterations of surface water through the
Subdivision. The defendants' objections to a commonality finding
focus on the potential disparity in individual recoveries on
account of particular circumstances, such as location within the
Subdivision or actions contributing to the flooding. But these
considerations do not invalidate the fact that the defendants'
alleged conduct in altering the flow of surface water into the
Subdivision establishes a common basis for liability. It is not
necessary that all the questions of law or fact raised in the
dispute be common to all the parties. Rather, the issue of whether
there are any additional questions affecting only individual class
members does not enter the class certification analysis until the
Civ.R. 23(B)(3) requirement of predominance and superiority is
applied.

Civil Rule 23(A)(3) (the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class)

The rationale behind the typicality requirement is that a plaintiff
with typical claims will pursue his or her own self-interest in the
litigation and in so doing will advance the interests of the class
members, which are aligned with those of the representative.

The defendants assert that there can be no typicality inasmuch as
the claims of the numerous named Plaintiffs inherently require
individualized proof of separate facts and involve a consistently
changing set of circumstances over a span of more than fifteen
years. None of the Plaintiffs experienced the same damages or the
same amount of damages and, therefore, are not subject to any
formulaic method of proof.

These arguments misconstrue the purpose behind the typicality
requirement. The defendants' arguments do not impugn the ability or
the incentive of the class representatives to advance the interests
of the other class members and, as properly noted by the trial
court, none of the class representatives' claims are antagonistic
to the claims of other class members.

Civil Rule 23(B)(3) (questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members)

The predominance inquiry under Civil Rule 23(B)(3) requires a court
to balance questions common among class members with any
dissimilarities between them, and if the court is satisfied that
common questions predominate, it then should `consider whether any
alternative methods exist for resolving the controversy and whether
the class action method is in fact superior.

In determining that the predominance requirement was satisfied, the
trial court stated: The claims of the Plaintiffs and the putative
class members regarding the alleged damages to their properties in
the Aurora East Subdivision as a result of the alleged actions of
the Defendants appear to be based upon the same theories of
recovery and therefore fulfill the status of common factual and/or
legal issues as 'contemplated in Rule 23(B)(3).'

The defendants reiterate the arguments made previously with respect
to the requirements of commonality and typicality: None of the
Plaintiffs suffered the same flooding events in the same manner.
Because each of the Plaintiffs experienced a different flood in a
different manner, there are many different causes for the flooding
events and, therefore, multiple theories of liability and
causation. Accordingly, the trial court's finding that plaintiffs'
claims "appear to be based upon the same theories" constitutes an
abuse of discretion.

The Court disagrees.

In support of their Motion to Certify Class Action, the plaintiffs
cited the testimony of the Portage County Engineer (defendant
Marozzi), their own retained civil engineer, Karen Ridgway, and
other testimony to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,
the existence of common questions of law or fact relating to the
drainage of surface water into the Subdivision. The underlying
issue involves Portage County's design, operation, and maintenance
of a storm water system completed in 1998. Ancillary to this issue
is the effect that the immediately adjoining property owners',
represented by defendants Brugmann Sand & Gravel and Romano,
alteration of their own property had on drainage into the
Subdivision.

While it could be argued that Portage County's potential liability
is distinct from that of Brugmann Sand & Gravel's or Romano's, the
evidence in the record does not support this position inasmuch as
the liability of any single defendant will be relative to the
liability of other defendants. Because all defendants' alleged
liability relates to drainage of surface water into the
Subdivision, a convincing claim can be made that the common
questions predominate. As noted above, while the defendants'
liability might not entitle all plaintiffs to recovery, its absence
would universally be fatal to their claims.

The Court further notes that the propriety of class certification
is not compromised by the fact that individual plaintiffs may have
differing opinions as to the cause of the flooding. Class counsel
will be responsible for determining what evidence to present in
support of plaintiffs' claims.

Based on the record before this court, the Court concludes that the
trial court's determination that the common questions regarding
surface water drainage predominate over questions affecting
individual class members was within the reasonable exercise of its
discretion.  

The sole assignment of error is without merit.

For these reasons, the judgment of the Portage County Court of
Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs to be taxed against appellants.

A full-text copy of the Ohio App.'s September 9, 2019 Opinion is
Available at   https://tinyurl.com/y3o3zunw from Leagle.com.

Edward A. Proctor and Thomas J. Connick, Connick Law, LLC, 25550
Chagrin Boulevard, Suite 101, Cleveland, OH 44122 (For
Plaintiffs-Appellees).

Jeffrey T. Kay, Frank H. Scialdone, and John D. Pinzone, Mazanec,
Raskin & Ryder Co., LPA, 100 Franklin's Row, 34305 Solon Road,
Cleveland, OH 44139, and David James Garnier, Assistant Prosecutor,
241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For
Defendants-Appellants, County of Portage, Ohio, Portage County
Engineer, and Michael Marozzi).

Dennis R. Fogarty, Davis & Young LPA, 29010 Chardon Road,
Willoughby Hills, OH 44092 (For Defendant-Appellant, Pasquale
Romano).

Craig G. Pelini, Eric J. Williams, and Nicole H. Richard, Pelini,
Campbell & Williams LLC, 8040 Cleveland Avenue, NW, Suite 400,
North Canton, OH 44720 (For Defendants-Appellants, Oscar Brugmann
Sand & Gravel, Inc. and Todd Brugmann).


KIA MOTORS: Perez Sues Over Defective Engine System
---------------------------------------------------
FRANCISCO PEREZ and JORGE J. PEREZ, Plaintiffs, v. KIA MOTORS
AMERICA, INC; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case
No. 19STCV32276 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., Sept. 11, 2019)
is an action seeking to redress KMA's violations of California
consumer fraud statutes, and also seeks recovery for Defendant's
breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and common law fraud.

KIA MOTORS AMERICA, INC. was engaged in the business of designing,
manufacturing, constructing, assembling, marketing, distributing,
and selling automobiles and other motor vehicles and motor vehicle
components in Los Angeles County. Plaintiffs leased a 2013 Kia
Optima vehicle identification number 5XXGM4A70DG190179, which was
manufactured and/or distributed by Defendant on or about March 25,
2013. Plaintiffs purchased the Subject Vehicle on or about November
11, 2015.

Plaintiffs received an express written warranty, including, a
5-year/60,000 mile express bumper to bumper warranty, a 10-
year/100,000 mile powertrain warranty which, inter alia, covers the
engine and transmission. Defendant undertook to preserve or
maintain the utility or performance of the Subject Vehicle or to
provide compensation if there is a failure in utility or
performance for a specified period of time. The warranty provided,
in relevant part, that in the event a defect developed with the
Subject Vehicle during the warranty period, Plaintiffs could
deliver the Subject Vehicle for repair services to Defendant's
representative and the Subject Vehicle would be repaired.

During the warranty period, the Subject Vehicle contained or
developed defects. Said defects substantially impair the use,
value, or safety of the Subject Vehicle. Defendant knew since 2009,
if not earlier, that the 2011-2019 KIA Optima, 2011 2019 KIA
Sportage, 2012-2019 KIA Sorento, 2011-2019 Hyundai Sonata, and
2013-2019 Hyundai Santa Fe vehicles equipped with a 2.0 or 2.4L
engine, including the 2011 Kia Optima contained one or more design
and/or manufacturing defects in their engines that results in the
restriction of oil flow through the connecting rod bearings, as
well as to other vital areas of the engine. This defect--which
typically manifests itself during and shortly after the limited
warranty period has expired--will cause the KIA Vehicle to
experience catastrophic engine failure, stalling while in operation
and poses an unreasonable safety risk of non-collision fires all
due to inadequate lubrication.

The Defendant knew (or should have known) that the KIA Vehicles
equipped with the 2.0 or 2.4L GDI engine had Engine Defect, asserts
the complaint.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Tionna Dolin, Esq.
     Strategic Legal Practices
     A Professional Corporation
     1840 Century Park East, Suite 430
     Los Angeles, CA 90067
     Phone: (310) 929-4900
     Facsimile: (310) 943-3838
     Email: tdolin@slpattorney.com


LIFELABS, LLC: Scavo Sues over Unsolicited Text Messages
--------------------------------------------------------
CAROL SCAVO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. LIFELABS, LLC; GADGETPUSH; ZR MEDIA
LLC, and DOES 1-20, inclusive, the Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-03987-JP (E.D. Pa., Aug. 29, 2019), contends that the
Defendant promotes and markets its merchandise, in part, by sending
unsolicited text messages to wireless phone users, in violation of
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all suffered
irreparable harm as a result of the Defendant's unlawful and
wrongful conduct. The Plaintiff and the Class seek injunctive
srelief prohibiting such conduct in the future, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff are:

          Cynthia Z. Levin, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          1150 First Avenue, Suite 501
          King of Prussia, PA 19406
          Telephone: 888-595-9111 ext 618
          Facsimile: 866 633-0228
          E-mail: clevin@attomeysforconsumers.com

LOYOLA MARYMOUNT: Navia Seeks Refund for Cell Phone Usage
---------------------------------------------------------
MARY NAVIA, an individual and for all persons similarly situated,
the Plaintiff, vs. LOYOLA MARYMOUNT UNIVERSITY, a California
Domestic Nonprofit; SHANE MARTIN, an individual, and DOES 1 through
20, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. 19STCV30329 (Cal. Super.,
Aug. 28, 2019), alleges that the Defendants did not reimbursed
Plaintiffs and other employees for the use of their cell phone to
perform work-related duties and/or tasks.

The Plaintiffs allege that the class consists of approximately
3,000 to 4,000 current and former employees.

The Plaintiffs and others were not paid their full wages at the
time they received their final paychecks immediately upon
involuntary termination or within 72 hours of voluntary separation,
as they did not included reimbursement for cell phone usage, the
lawsuit says.

LMU is a private, religiously affiliated, non-profit educational
institution.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Raymond Babaian, Esq.
          VALIANT LAW
          4150 Concours, Suite 260
          Ontario, CA 91764
          Telephone: 909 677 2270
          Facsimile: 909 677 2290

               - and -

          Neama Rahmani, Esq.
          Ronald Zambrano, Esq.
          H. Dean Aynechi, Esq.
          WEST COAST TRIAL LAWYERS, APLC
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 927-3700
          Facsimile: (213) 927-3701
          E-mail: Efilings@westcoasttrialawyers.com

M&N CABLE: Lannert Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------
KYLE LANNERT, Plaintiff, v. M&N CABLE, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
3:19-cv-00190-RLY-MPB (S.D. Ind., Sept. 10, 2019) is a complaint
brought by Plaintiff to recover for Defendant's willful violations
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and other appropriate rules,
regulations, statutes, and ordinances. Plaintiff also bring this
action on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated to
recover unpaid wages and overtime, liquidated damages, penalties,
fees and costs, pre- and post-judgment interest, and any other
remedies to which he may be entitled.

According to the complaint, the Defendant willfully violated the
FLSA by knowingly and willfully failing to compensate Plaintiff at
the minimum wage rate, and failing to compensate Plaintiff for
overtime for the hours they worked in excess of 40 hours per week
according to the terms of the FLSA, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as an Installation/Services
Technician from August 2018 to March 12, 2019.

M&N Cable is a for-profit Missouri limited liability company
registered to do business in the State of Indiana. M&N Cable
contracts with cable providers, such as Spectrum and WOW "Wild Open
West" cable company, to install cable service in clients'
homes.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Robert T. Dassow, Esq.s
     HOVDE DASSOW & DEETS, LLC
     10201 N. Illinois Street, Suite 500
     Indianapolis, IN 46290
     Phone: (317) 818-3100
     Facsimile: (317) 818-3111

          - and -

     Jennell K. Shannon, Esq.
     Jacob R. Rusch, Esq.
     JOHNSON BECKER, PLLC
     444 Cedar Street, Suite 1800
     Saint Paul, MN
     Phone: 612-436-1800
     Fax: 612-436-1801
     Email: jshannon@johnsonbecker.com
            jrusch@johnsonbecker.com


MAHONING COUNTY, OH: Court Dismisses Youngblood Discrimination Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio,
Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned HELEN
YOUNGBLOOD, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF MAHONING
COUNTY, et al., Defendants. Case No. 4:19CV231. (N.D. Ohio).

Plaintiff Helen Youngblood is an African American employee of the
Mahoning County Department of Job & Family Services (MCDJFS').
Youngblood is also an official representative of the relevant
collective bargaining unit. While purported lawful hiring policies
exist, Youngblood asserts that she and other similarly situated
MCDJFS employees have been denied promotional opportunities due to
the longstanding and persistent custom of the MCDJFS to award
promotions without appropriate posting of vacancies, but instead to
rely on cronyism, patronage and racial identity.

Defendants also seek dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). A claim survives a motion to dismiss pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) if it contains sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.
The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement,
but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.

Due Process

In her first claim, Youngblood alleges that the incessant and
continuous use of cronyism and race to fill public positions
without following the provisions of Ohio law and published policy
is violative of the federally protected interests of Youngblood and
the putative class and is actionable as a denial of due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment.

It is unclear whether Youngblood is asserting a claim for
substantive or procedural due process. Under the former theory,
Youngblood must allege that defendants interfered with a
fundamental right or liberty interest that is accorded special
constitutional protection. Likewise, under a procedural due process
theory, Youngblood must assert that defendants interfered with a
constitutionally protected liberty or property interest.

Defendants contend that Youngblood and the putative class do not
have a fundamental right or a protected property interest in a
promotion. The Court agrees and finds Youngblood's first claim
fatally defective for this reason. Youngblood's substantive due
process theory is foreclosed by Sixth Circuit law.

In Charles v. Baesler, 910 F.2d 1349, 1353 (6th Cir. 1990), the
court ruled that a fire department captain did not have substantive
due process right to a promotion, finding such a contract-based
right not to be so deeply rooted in our country's notions of
liberty and justice as to rise to the level of a fundamental right.


Youngblood's reliance on defendants' promotion practices also
fails, as a matter of law, to support a procedural due process
claim. To have a property interest in a benefit to support a
procedural due process claim, a person clearly must have more than
an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a
unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to it.

Youngblood does not identify the Ohio law she references that
supports her right to a promotion, although the CBA clearly sets
forth the promotion process for union employees, of which
Youngblood is one. The right, therefore, is derived from the CBA.
While the CBA requires certain postings before a promotion can be
awarded, it does not require that the award be given to any
particular union member.  

Even if she could establish the existence of a property interest in
a promotion, the claim would still fail because Youngblood has
failed to plead, as she must, that the state's post deprivation
remedies for redressing the wrong are inadequate. Because the CBA
provides a process for grieving a failure to promote (or, as
defendants suggest Youngblood is claiming, a failure to be
considered for a promotion by skipping the posting requirements,
the complaint fails to state a procedural due process claim.

Equal Protection

Youngblood's second claim purports to raise a right to relief under
the Equal Protection Clause. Specifically, the complaint provides:

Defendants' acts in making employment related decisions such as
hiring, termination and promotions on the basis of patronage and
cronyism results in unlawful treatment of similarly situated
individuals, MCDJFS employees, on the basis of race, without a
compelling governmental interest.

Black employees at MCDJFS, as a group, are less likely to have the
political and patronage network available to enable them to receive
the preferential treatment accorded to the employees unlawfully
promoted and complained of herein.

Even in the context of an equal protection claim based on disparate
impact, proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is
required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

While she makes passing references to race discrimination and
racial identity, Youngblood does not allege or set forth factual
allegations that would support a conclusory allegation that
defendants acted with a discriminatory intent or purpose, nor can
the Court infer such intent or purpose merely from the alleged
disparate impact and the fact that defendants may have failed to
follow the contractual posting requirements. In fact, her
conclusory allegations suggest that defendants' intent was actually
to benefit their friends and cronies, and not to discriminate
against members of a protected class on the basis of race.

The equal protection claim is subject to dismissal.  

Title VII

In the fourth claim, Youngblood asserts that she and the putative
class are members of a protected racial class under Title VII, and
that the acts complained of herein have a disparate impact upon
Youngblood and the putative class.

Defendants insist that Youngblood's Title VII claim does not state
a cause of action because Youngblood has failed to plead facts
supporting each element of a prima facie case under the
burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973), and its progeny.
Defendants also offer this argument as an alternative reason why
Youngblood's equal protection claim must fail as a matter of law.

In support of her Title VII disparate impact claim, Youngblood
relies exclusively on her conclusory allegations that defendants
have awarded promotions on the basis of friendship and cronyism
without posting the positions, and that that this practice has had
a disparate impact on her and the putative class because African
Americans are less likely to have the political and patronage
network available to take advance of such preferential treatment.
But, it is well settled that Title VII disparate impact claims
require the existence of a facially neutral policy or practice.  

Here, a policy or practice of intentionally awarding promotions,
without the proper postings, for the purpose of benefitting one's
political friends and allies can hardly be considered facially
neutral. Youngblood cannot rely on a facially discriminatory policy
as a basis for bringing a disparate impact case in order to avoid
the requirement of pleading specific facts demonstrating racial
discriminatory intent.

She also offers no factual allegations from which the Court could
infer that such a policy or practice, even if it were facially
neutral, actually exists. Specifically, she fails to identify any
positions that were awarded in the manner she describes in the
complaint. Youngblood offers nothing but the naked assertion of the
existence of such a policy devoid of further factual enhancement.


Because Youngblood's conclusory allegations fail to nudge the claim
across the line from conceivable to plausible, it must be
dismissed.  

Ohio Whistleblower Act

Youngblood also alleges that she was retaliated against by
defendants because she reported violations of Ohio law concerning
hiring, promotion and terminations within MCDJFS. She maintains
that Defendants Bush and Wasko have taken disciplinary and
retaliatory action against her for her activities as a union
official and an Ohio employee reporting violations under Ohio Rev.
Code Section 4113.52

Section 4113.52 of the Ohio Revised Code prohibits employers from
taking any disciplinary or retaliatory action against an employee
for making any report authorized by Section 4113.52(A)(1) or (2).
To come within the protections of the Ohio Whistleblowers Act, an
employee must strictly comply with the dictates of Ohio Rev. Code
Section 4113.52.

Defendants argue that Youngblood has failed to allege that she made
a written report to her employer identifying a qualifying
violation.

Without elaboration, Youngblood alleges that she reported
violations of Ohio law concerning hiring, promotion and
terminations. There is nothing about this vague allegation that
would suggest that she reported an illegal activity that she
reasonably believed was a felony, an improper solicitation, or a
hazard to public health. For this reason alone, her state
whistleblower claim would fail. However, as further evidence that
her claim is fatally flawed, the Court notes that Youngblood did
not allege that she placed her report in writing. Having failed to
allege facts from which the Court could infer that she strictly
complied with the statute, her whistleblower claim cannot survive
Rule 12(b)(6).

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 9, 2019
Memorandum Opinion and Order is Available at
https://tinyurl.com/y3luaqqh from Leagle.com.

Helen Youngblood, Individually and as a putative class
representative, Plaintiff, represented by Percy Squire, 341 S 3rd
St Ste 10, Columbus, OH, 43215-5463

Board of Commissioners of Mahoning County, Ohio, David C Ditzler,
Carol Rimedio-Righetti, Anthony Traficanti, Mahoning County
Department of Job and Family Services, Robert E. Bush, Jr.,
Director Mahoning County Department of Job and Family Services &
Melissa Wasko, Program Administrator Mahoning County Department of
Job and Family Serivces, Defendants, represented by Gina DeGenova
Zawrotuk, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney - Mahoning County


MARKET AMERICA: Zou Files RICO Class Suit in North Carolina
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Market America, Inc.
The case is styled as Jinhua Zou, Yu Xia Lu, Chuanjie Yang, Ollie
Lan and Liu liu, an individual, and all those similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. Market America, Inc., Market America Worldwide Inc.,
Shop Ma, Inc., James Howard Ridinger, Loren Ridinger, Marc Ashley,
Marty Weissman, Dennis Franks, Joe Bolyard, Anthony Akers, Eddy
Alberty, Steve Ashley, Michael Brady, Kevin Buckman, Peter Gold,
Vincent Hunt, Chris Peddycord, Brandi Qinn, Sam Ritchie, Eugene
Wallace, Jim Winkler, Elizabeth Weber, Joanne His, Benjamin Ginder,
Dolly Kuo, Ming-Chu Kuo, Frank Keefer, June Yu Shan, Ace Lee,
Stephanie Lee, Min Liu, Patrick Hsieh, Alice Hsieh, Victor Chiou,
Alice Chiou, Bill Wu, Maggie Ho, Simon Liu, Wang Chang, Vincent
Chang, Liu Lucy Hong, Sarah Lolo, Chen Ji Xiaoying, Kitty Chao,
Roger Wu, Karri Wu and Yang Zhao, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-00954 (M.D. N.C., Sept. 17, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as filed pursuant
to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

Market America is a multi-level marketing company founded in 1992
by JR and Loren Ridinger. Headquartered in Greensboro, N.C., the
company employed over 650 people as of 2010.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

   Blake Joseph Lindemann, Esq.
   Lindemann Law Firm, APC
   433 N. Camden Drive, 4th Floor
   Beverly Hills, CA 90210
   Tel: (310) 279-5269
   Fax: (310) 300-0267
   Email: Blake@lawbl.com

     - and -

   DAREN M SCHLECTER, Esq.
   Law Office of Daren Schlecter
   1925 Century Park East Suite 830
   Los Angeles, CA 90067
   Tel: (310) 553-5747
   Fax: (310) 553-5487
   Email: daren@schlecterlaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

   Lawrence Bruce Steinberg, Esq.
   Buchalter
   1000 Wilshire Blvd, Suite 1500
   Los Angeles, CA 90017
   Tel: (213) 891-0700
   Email: LSteinberg@buchalter.com

      - and -

   PRESSLY M MILLEN, Esq.
   Womble Bond Dickinson US LLP
   555 Fayetteville Street Suite 1100
   Raleigh, NC 27601
   Tel: (919) 755-2135
   Fax: (919) 755-6067
   Email: press.millen@wbd-us.com



MDL 2843: Court Narrows Claims in Facebook User Profile Use
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned IN RE:
FACEBOOK, INC., CONSUMER PRIVACY USER PROFILE LITIGATION. This
document relates to: ALL ACTIONS. MDL Case No. 18-md-02843-VC.
(N.D. Cal.).

This lawsuit, which stems from the Cambridge Analytica scandal, is
about Facebook's practice of sharing its users' personal
information with third parties. The plaintiffs are current and
former Facebook users who believe that their information was
compromised by the company. Their principal allegations are that
Facebook: (i) made sensitive user information available to
countless companies and individuals without the consent of the
users and (ii) failed to prevent those same companies and
individuals from selling or otherwise misusing the information.

The plaintiffs do not merely allege that Facebook shared what we
often describe as data basic facts such as gender, age, address,
and the like. They allege that Facebook shared far more substantive
and revealing content that users intended only for a limited
audience, such as their photographs, videos they made, videos they
watched, their religious and political views, their relationship
information, and the actual words contained in their messages.

First, Facebook argues that people have no legitimate privacy
interest in any information they make available to their friends on
social media.

Second, Facebook argues that even if its users had a privacy
interest in the information they made available only to friends,
there is no standing to sue in federal court because there were no
tangible negative consequences from the dissemination of this
information.

Facebook's third main argument is that even if users retained a
privacy interest in the information that was disclosed, and even if
a bare privacy invasion confers standing to sue in federal court,
this lawsuit must be dismissed because Facebook users consented, in
fine print, to the wide dissemination of their sensitive
information.

STANDING

To bring their claims in federal court, the plaintiffs must
adequately allege and eventually prove that they have standing
under Article III of the United States Constitution. This means,
among other things, that the plaintiffs must allege they suffered
an actual injury from Facebook's conduct that is both concrete and
particularized.

The plaintiffs allege three kinds of injury.

First, they allege a simple privacy injury that is, injury from
Facebook's widespread disclosure of their sensitive information,
including their photographs, videos they made, videos they watched,
religious preferences, posts, and even private one-on-one messages
sent through Facebook.

Second, the plaintiffs allege they were injured because Facebook's
dissemination of their personal information increased the risk that
they would become victims of identity theft.

Third, the plaintiffs allege they were deprived the economic value
of their personal information as a result of its dissemination, the
theory apparently being that if their information had remained
private, they could have sold that information to advertisers or
data brokers themselves.

The second and third alleged injuries do not confer Article III
standing. The plaintiffs do not plausibly allege that they intended
to sell their non-disclosed personal information to someone else.
Nor, in any event, do they plausibly allege that someone else would
have bought it as a stand-alone product. The plaintiffs'
economic-loss theory is therefore purely hypothetical and does not
give rise to standing.  

But the first alleged injury that the plaintiffs' sensitive
information was disseminated to third parties in violation of their
privacy is sufficient to confer standing. Facebook argues that a
bare privacy violation, without credible risk of real-world harm
such as identity theft or other economic consequences, cannot rise
to the level of an Article III injury. But it's black-letter law
that an injury need not be tangible to be cognizable in federal
court. And courts have often held that this particular type of
intangible injury  disclosure of sensitive private information,
even without further consequence gives rise to Article III
standing.

Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly explained that intangible
privacy injuries can be redressed in the federal courts. This issue
has tended to come up recently in cases where a plaintiff alleges
standing based on the violation of a statute whose purpose is to
protect privacy. In such cases, the alleged violation of the
statute does not automatically give rise to standing. For a
statutory violation to create standing, the statute must protect
against a concrete and particularized injury that's cognizable
within the meaning of Article III.

Of course, a plaintiff cannot get into court by simply intoning
that she suffered an intangible privacy injury. But once it is
understood that an intangible privacy injury can be enough, it
becomes easy to conclude that the alleged privacy injury here is
enough. The alleged injury is concrete largely for the reasons
already discussed if you use a company's social media platform to
share sensitive information with only your friends, then you suffer
a concrete injury when the company disseminates that information
widely. And the alleged injury is particularized, at least for most
of the plaintiffs. To be particularized, the injury must have been
suffered directly by the individual plaintiff, and it must be
distinct from the more general type of objection that members of
the public at large might have to a defendant's unlawful conduct.

The plaintiffs allege that Facebook violated their privacy rights
and other rights because: (i) they engaged in sensitive
communications that included photographs, videos they made, videos
they watched, Facebook posts, likes, and private one-on-one
messages (ii) they intended to share these communications only with
a particular person or a group of people (iii) Facebook made those
communications widely available to third parties in a variety of
ways and (iv) as a result, third parties were able to develop
detailed dossiers on the plaintiffs including information about
their locations, their religious and political preferences, their
video-watching habits, and other sensitive matters.

Facebook makes one argument regarding particularity that, if
successful, would merely narrow the scope of this case rather than
ending it entirely. Recall that this lawsuit arose from the
Cambridge Analytica scandal, with the plaintiffs originally
alleging that Facebook gave Aleksandr Kogan access to their
information with Kogan, in turn, giving it to Cambridge Analytica.


The plaintiffs initially alleged, plausibly and with specificity,
that Kogan likely accessed their own information. But the
plaintiffs now allege that Facebook disseminated sensitive user
information far more widely, to tens of thousands of app developers
and business partners.

Facebook argues that because the complaint lacks specific
allegations about which app developers or business partners
obtained which plaintiffs' private information, the plaintiffs have
not alleged an injury particular to them, at least beyond the
injury from the disclosure to Kogan.

This argument puts too great a burden on the plaintiffs, at least
at the pleading stage (and probably at any stage). If, as alleged
in the complaint, Facebook made users' friends only information
readily available to such a broad swath of companies .This type of
privacy invasion is no less an Article III injury simply because
the plaintiffs are left to guess precisely which companies other
than Facebook were involved.

For all the claims addressed by this ruling, Facebook cannot obtain
dismissal for lack of Article III standing.

CONSENT

There is one more global issue to discuss before proceeding to a
claim-by-claim analysis of the complaint. Facebook contends that
the plaintiffs agreed, when they signed up for their accounts, that
Facebook could disseminate their friends only information in the
way it has done. If the complaint and any judicially noticeable
materials were to establish that Facebook users consented to the
alleged misconduct, this would indeed require dismissal of
virtually the entire case.

However, the complaint adequately alleges that some users did not
consent to any of Facebook's practices. And although Facebook is
correct as a matter of law that some users consented to the first
category of conduct sharing information with app developers, the
complaint adequately alleges that those users did not consent to
the other three categories sharing information with whitelisted
apps starting in 2015, sharing information with business partners,
and failing to protect user information from misuse.

As an initial matter, Facebook asserts that consent is actually a
standing issue. It contends that there is no true Article III
injury on the facts of this case because the plaintiffs cannot be
injured by something they allowed Facebook to do.

But the whole point of Article III standing is that some claims
don't belong in federal court even if the plaintiff would win on
the merits. Therefore, the standing inquiry in this case is:

assuming the plaintiffs could win on the merits, should their
claims nonetheless be dismissed for lack of standing because the
injury they allegedly suffered is not cognizable in federal court?
The plaintiffs allege they did not consent and this is an
allegation they would need to prevail on if they are to succeed on
the merits. Thus, the Court must assume, for purposes of the
standing inquiry, that the plaintiffs did not consent.

Whether the plaintiffs consented to Facebook's information-sharing
practices is thus a merits inquiry. And the parties actually agree
on several aspects of that inquiry.

First, they agree that, for virtually all claims, the question of
whether Facebook users consented to the alleged conduct is one of
contract interpretation governed by California law.

Second, the parties agree that California law requires the Court to
pretend that users actually read Facebook's contractual language
before clicking their acceptance, even though we all know virtually
none of them did.  

Third, the parties agree that if the contract language at issue is
reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, with one of
those interpretations suggesting consent and another belying it,
the Court cannot decide the consent issue in Facebook's favor at
the motion to dismiss stage.

And fourth, they agree that the contract language must be assessed
objectively, from the perspective of a reasonable Facebook user.  

The bottom line on the issue of consent is this: the complaint
plausibly alleges that some users and some plaintiffs did not
consent to the arrangement whereby app developers could access
their sensitive information simply by interacting with their
friends. For the remaining three categories of misconduct sharing
with whitelisted apps, sharing with business partners, and failing
to prevent misuse of information by third parties the complaint
plausibly alleges that none of the users consented. The issue of
consent therefore does not require dismissal in full of any of the
prioritized claims in this lawsuit.

INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS

Facebook argues that the information about users that it disclosed
to app developers was not private because users had allowed their
Facebook friends to access that information. But as discussed in
Section II, your sensitive information does not lose the label
private simply because your friends know about it. Your privacy
interest in that information may diminish because you've shared it
with your friends, but it does not necessarily disappear.

Facebook also argues that the user information was not disseminated
to the public. This is based on the erroneous assumption, already
rejected in Section III, that the plaintiffs have failed to allege
with sufficient particularity that their information was disclosed
to anyone other than Aleksandr Kogan. And dissemination of your
private information to tens of thousands of individuals and
companies is generally going to be equivalent to making that
information public.

Finally, Facebook contends that its disclosure of sensitive user
information to app developers and business partners would not be
offensive to a reasonable person. Facebook makes a similar argument
for the next two claims discussed below intrusion into private
affairs and the constitutional right to privacy, because those
claims also require the plaintiff to allege and eventually prove
that the privacy violation was a serious breach of social norms.

Sharing is the social norm undergirding Facebook, the company
argues, and Facebook did not breach that social norm by sharing
user data consistent with users' preferences. There are a number of
problems with this assertion.

First, it again erroneously assumes a norm that there is no privacy
interest in the information kept on social media. The social norm
Facebook created with its product is purposefully sharing with
one's friends, not having one's information shared by Facebook with
unknown companies and individuals.

Second, it assumes that users consented to the widespread
disclosure of their sensitive information, but the plaintiffs have
adequately alleged that they didn't. Thus, at this stage of the
case, the plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Facebook's
conduct was offensive and an egregious breach of social norms: it
disclosed to tens of thousands of app developers and business
partners sensitive information about them without their consent,
including their photos, religious preferences, video-watching
habits, relationships, and information that could reveal location.
It even allegedly disclosed the contents of communications between
two people on Facebook's ostensibly private messenger system.

The motion to dismiss this claim is granted with respect to the
first category of conduct for plaintiffs who consented to this
conduct, as discussed in Section IV. It is denied in all other
respects.

Intrusion on private affairs and violation of the constitutional
right to privacy. The analysis for these two tort claims is
functionally identical, even though each claim is described
somewhat differently in the case law. When both claims are present,
courts conduct a combined inquiry that considers (1) the nature of
any intrusion upon reasonable expectations of privacy and (2) the
offensiveness or seriousness of the intrusion, including any
justification or other relevant interests.

For the reasons already discussed, the plaintiffs have adequately
alleged that they suffered an egregious invasion of their privacy
when Facebook gave app developers and business partners their
sensitive information on a widespread basis.

The motion to dismiss this claim is granted with respect to the
first category of conduct for plaintiffs who consented to this
conduct, as discussed in Section IV. It is denied in all other
respects.

Stored Communications Act. The Stored Communications Act (SCA) is a
federal law that restricts when a computer service provider like
Facebook may share the contents of a communication with someone who
is not party to that communication. The plaintiffs have plausibly
alleged that Facebook violated the SCA.

Facebook notes that there is an exception to SCA liability when one
of the parties to the communication consents to its disclosure by
the computer service provider. In the social media context, this
means that whenever people make information available to one
another, there is no SCA violation if one of those people consents
to the disclosure of the information. Facebook contends that this
exception applies here, because even if a user didn't directly
consent to Facebook's disclosure of information to app developers,
the user's friend consented when that friend interacted with the
app.

There are two problems with this argument, at least at the pleading
stage.

First, it does not respond to the allegations about Facebook's
decision to share user information with whitelisted apps starting
in 2015 or with business partners nothing in the complaint or the
judicially noticeable material would permit a conclusion that
either a plaintiff or a plaintiff's Facebook friend permitted
disclosure to those entities.

Second, as to the typical app developer, as discussed in Section
IV, plaintiffs who signed up for Facebook before 2009 did not if
the allegations of the complaint are to be believed) authorize
Facebook to share information through their friends with app
developers. Nor is there a basis to conclude as a matter of law
that their friends authorized the app developers to receive this
information. Neither side describes with any specificity the
dialogue that would have taken place between the friend and the app
developer that resulted in the app developer's acquisition of
communications that would otherwise be protected by the SCA.

The motion to dismiss this claim is granted with respect to the
first category of conduct for plaintiffs who consented to this
conduct, as discussed in Section IV. It is denied in all other
respects.

Video Privacy Protection Act. The Video Privacy Protection Act
(VPPA) was passed by Congress after a newspaper published a Supreme
Court nominee's video rental history. The statute prohibits knowing
disclosure of personally identifiable information by a video tape
service provider.
The plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Facebook violated the
VPPA.

Facebook first contends that the user information it shared with
app developers, whitelisted apps, and business partners is not
personally identifiable information. But the VPPA defines this
broadly as information which identifies a person as having
requested or obtained specific video materials or services.  Or as
the Ninth Circuit has put it, information that would readily permit
an ordinary person to identify a specific individual's
video-watching behavior. The plaintiffs adequately allege that
Facebook regularly shared information about the videos that users
received in their private messages and about videos they liked. And
it is reasonable to infer, at least at the pleading stage, that
when a user receives a video or likes a video, he watches the
video, such that this information sheds significant light on his
video-watching behavior.

Facebook also contends it is not a video tape service provider
within the meaning of the VPPA, but that too cannot be decided in
Facebook's favor on this motion to dismiss. The statute defines a
video tape service provider as anyone engaged in the business of
rental, sale, or delivery of prerecorded video cassette tapes or
similar audio visual materials. The plaintiffs allege that Facebook
regularly delivers video content to users and maintains a cache of
videos and visual materials, including from content providers like
Netflix, for their delivery to users. Although one could imagine a
different conclusion at summary judgment once the evidence is
examined, it is plausible to conclude from these and related
allegations that Facebook engages in the business of delivering
audio visual materials, and that its business is significantly
tailored to serve that purpose.

Facebook also did not obtain the type of consent necessary to
authorize the sharing of this information. The VPPA outlines
specific requirements for consent in the context of sharing
video-information, including that it be set out in a separate form.
Facebook does not argue that it obtained this type of consent from
its users. Therefore, even beyond the reasons discussed in Section
IV relating to consent more generally, the plaintiffs adequately
allege that they did not consent within the meaning of the VPPA,
and this applies to all the information-sharing, for all time
periods, discussed in this ruling.

The motion to dismiss this claim is denied.

Negligence and Gross Negligence. Negligence has four elements under
California law: duty, breach, causation, and injury. The
plaintiffs' negligence claim is based on the fourth category of
conduct, and it adequately alleges each of the required elements as
to that conduct. As discussed at length above, the plaintiffs have
alleged present and non-speculative privacy injuries. The
plaintiffs have also plausibly alleged that Facebook breached a
duty to them. Facebook had a responsibility to handle its users'
sensitive information with care.  And contrary to Facebook's
argument, the plaintiffs do not seek to hold Facebook liable for
the conduct of the app developers and business partners; they seek
to hold the company liable for its own misconduct with respect to
their information.

Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that they entrusted Facebook
with their sensitive information, and that Facebook failed to use
reasonable care to safeguard that information, giving third parties
access to it without taking any precautions to constrain that
access to protect the plaintiffs' privacy, despite assurances it
would do so. This lawsuit is first and foremost about how Facebook
handled its users' information, not about what third parties did
once they got hold of it.

The motion to dismiss this claim is denied.

Deceit by concealment or omission. For a defendant to be liable for
deceit by concealment under California law, a variety of things
must have occurred.
   
First, the defendant must have: (i) had a duty to disclose a
material fact to the plaintiff and (ii) intentionally concealed
that fact with intent to defraud the plaintiff.  

With respect to the allegations that Facebook improperly shared
information with standard app developers and failed to prevent
third parties from improperly using sensitive information, the
plaintiffs have not satisfied the heightened pleading requirements
necessary to state a claim for deceit by concealment.

However, if the plaintiffs' allegations are true, Facebook's
conduct with respect to whitelisted apps and business partners
crosses into the realm of fraudulent conduct. As discussed earlier,
the plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that their privacy
interests were harmed through the disclosure of their information
to these entities. The plaintiffs have also adequately alleged that
Facebook intended to defraud its users regarding this conduct: the
plaintiffs contrast Facebook's public-facing statements about
protecting privacy and restricting information-sharing with the
reality of Facebook's alleged practices, and that contrast is a
sufficient basis from which to infer fraudulent intent at the
pleading stage.

As with the negligence claim, Facebook is wrong to assert that its
exculpatory clause relieves it from liability for this claim. Under
California law, Facebook's exculpatory clause does not apply to a
claim sounding in fraud such as deceit by concealment.  

The motion to dismiss is granted with respect to the first and
fourth categories of conduct, and denied with respect to the second
and third categories of conduct.

Breach of contract. The elements for breach of contract under
California law are: (i) the existence of a contract (ii) the
plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance of its side of
the agreement (iii) the defendant's breach and (iv) resulting
damage to the plaintiff.  

The plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Facebook breached this
promise when it disclosed user information to whitelisted apps and
business partners without permission, and without giving the
plaintiffs the ability to prevent this disclosure. In addition, for
the allegations that Facebook allowed companies to misuse the
information, the complaint sufficiently alleges that Facebook did
not fulfill its promise in the Data Use Policy that apps would be
allowed to use information "only in connection with" that user's
friends.  

In contrast, the plaintiffs have not adequately alleged a breach of
contract based on the first category of wrongdoing: allowing
standard app developers to obtain user information through users'
friends. As discussed in Section IV, Facebook began disclosing this
practice in its contractual language starting in roughly 2009,
which means that this conduct does not give rise to a breach of
contract claim for users who established their Facebook accounts
after that time. For users who established their accounts
beforehand, the complaint plausibly alleges that the practice
wasn't disclosed. But simple failure to disclose a practice doesn't
constitute a breach of contract. And although it's certainly
conceivable that the practice violated provisions of Facebook's
earlier contractual language, the plaintiffs do not identify or
rely on any such language in their complaint.

Therefore, for all plaintiffs, the complaint does not articulate a
breach of contract theory based on the disclosure of sensitive user
information to standard app developers, even though the complaint
alleges that some users didn't consent to it.

The motion to dismiss this claim is granted with respect to the
first category of wrongdoing. Because it is possible that the
complaint could be amended to allege a breach of contract claim for
plaintiffs who established their accounts before Facebook disclosed
the practice, dismissal is with leave to amend for these plaintiffs
only. The motion to dismiss this claim is denied in all other
respects.

Breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In
addition to explicit promises, every contract includes an implicit
promise not to take an action that would deprive the other
contracting party of the benefits of their agreement. This
obligation is known as the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, and it protects the parties' reasonable expectations based
on their mutual promises.

To state a claim for breach of this implied promise, a plaintiff
must identify the specific contractual provision that was
frustrated by the defendant's conduct. This doctrine cannot,
however, impose substantive duties or limits on the contracting
parties beyond those incorporated in the specific terms of their
agreement.

Just as they've stated claims for breach of contract with respect
to the second, third, and fourth categories of conduct, the
plaintiffs have stated claims for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing for that conduct. Indeed, the case for
breach of the implied covenant is stronger, because even if
Facebook were, at a later stage in the litigation, able to identify
a technical argument for why it did not quite violate the literal
terms of its contract with its users, it would be difficult to
conclude (if the factual allegations in the complaint are true)
that Facebook did not frustrate the purposes of the contract, and
intentionally so. But for the first category of conduct, the
plaintiffs have not offered sufficient information about the
earlier contractual language to assess whether the conduct
frustrated the purpose of Facebook's contract with its users.

Accordingly, with respect to the first category of conduct, this
claim for breach of the implied covenant is, along with the
parallel claim for breach of contract, dismissed. Dismissal is with
leave to amend for plaintiffs who signed up before the
information-sharing practice was included in the contractual
language, and without leave to amend for those who signed up after
it was disclosed.

Unjust Enrichment. The plaintiffs also state a claim for unjust
enrichment. Specifically, they allege that even if they have no
remedy for breach of contract, they should be able to recover
amounts that Facebook gained by improperly disseminating their
information. The plaintiffs are permitted to plead claims for
breach of contract and unjust enrichment in the alternative.   And
even if the plaintiffs suffered no economic loss from the
disclosure of their information, they may proceed at this stage on
a claim for unjust enrichment to recover the gains that Facebook
realized from its allegedly improper conduct.   

The motion to dismiss this claim is granted as to the plaintiffs
who consented as discussed in Section IV, but otherwise denied.

Right of Publicity. California's common law right of publicity
makes unlawful the appropriation of someone's name or likeness
without his consent when it both (1) injures that person and (2) is
used to the defendant's advantage.  

Facebook's motion to dismiss this claim is granted. The allegations
about how Facebook shared the plaintiffs' information with third
parties is categorically different from the type of conduct made
unlawful by this tort, such as using a plaintiff's face or name to
promote a product or service. Because the Court cannot conceive of
a way that the plaintiffs could successfully allege this claim,
dismissal is without leave to amend.

California's Unfair Competition Law. California's Unfair
Competition Law (UCL) prohibits business practices that are
unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent. To have standing under California
law to pursue this claim a standard that is different from Article
III standing, the plaintiffs must show that they lost money or
property because of Facebook's conduct.   

The plaintiffs' UCL claim fails because they have not adequately
alleged lost money or property. As discussed in Section III, the
plaintiffs' theory of economic loss is purely hypothetical. It's
true, as discussed in connection with the unjust enrichment claim,
that Facebook may have gained money through its sharing or use of
the plaintiffs' information, but that's different from saying the
plaintiffs lost money. Further, the plaintiffs here do not allege
that they paid any premiums or any money at all to Facebook to
potentially give rise to standing under California law.  

This claim is also dismissed without leave to amend.

The motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 9, 2019 Order is
Available at https://tinyurl.com/y2ootlq7 from Leagle.com.

Lauren Price, Plaintiff, represented by John A. Yanchunis --
jyanchunis@ForThePeople.com -- Morgan and Morgan, P.A., Joshua
Haakon Watson -- carnold@justice4you.com -- Clayeo C. Arnold, A
Professional Law Corporation, Patrick A. Barthle, II --
pbarthe@forthepeople.com -- Morgan and Morgan Complex Litigation
Group, Ryan McGee -- rmcgee@forthepeople.com -- Morgan and Morgan
Complex Litigation Group & Steven William Teppler --
steppler@abbottlawpa.com -- Abbott Law Group, P.A.

Jonathan D. Rubin, Plaintiff, represented by Brian Samuel Clayton
Conlon -- bsc@phillaw.com -- Phillips, Erlewine, Given & Carlin
LLP, Nicholas A. Carlin -- nac@phillaw.com -- Phillips Erlewine
Given & Carlin LLP & David M. Given -- dmg@phillaw.com -- Phillips
Erlewine Given & Carlin LLP.

Facebook, Inc., Defendant, represented by Brian Michael Lutz --
blutz@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Carl S.
Burkhalter -- cburkhalter@maynardcooper.com -- MAYNARD COOPER &
GALE PC, David Evan Ross -- dross@ramllp.com -- Ross Aronstam &
Moritz LLP, Evan P. Moltz -- emoltz@maynardcooper.com -- MAYNARD
COOPER & GALE PC, Joshua Seth Lipshutz -- jlipshutz@gibsondunn.com
-- Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher LLP, Kristin A. Linsley --
klinsley@gibsondunn.com -- Esq. , Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP &
Orin Snyder -- osnyder@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn and Crutcher.

SCL Group, a United Kingdom Company & Cambridge Analytica LLC,
Defendants, represented by Ashlee Nicole Lin -- alin@eisnerlaw.com
-- Eisner APC & Mark Christopher Scarsi -- mscarsi@milbank.com --
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP.

Robert Mercer, Defendant, represented by Mark C. Hansen , Kellogg,
Hansen, Todd, Figel & Frederick, P.L.L.C., Sumner Square, 1615 M
Street, NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20036-3209


MENN LAW FIRM: Cole Files Class Certification Under FDCPA
---------------------------------------------------------
Kaitlyn Cole seeks an order determining that the lawsuit titled
KAITLYN COLE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. MENN LAW FIRM, LTD., Case No. 1:19-cv-00527-WCG (E.D.
Wisc.), may proceed as a class action against the Defendant under
Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Plaintiff asserts claims against Menn under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

The class is defined as:

     All persons with a Wisconsin address to whom Menn Law Firm,
     Ltd mailed an initial written communication, in the form of
     Exhibit A to the Complaint, between April 12, 2018 and
     May 3, 2019, which was not returned as undeliverable.

Ms. Cole further asks the Court to appoint her to represent the
putative class members, and that her attorneys, Stern Thomasson
LLP, be appointed counsel for the class.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Francis R. Greene, Esq.
          Philip D. Stern, Esq.
          Andrew T. Thomasson, Esq.
          STERN THOMASSON LLP
          3010 South Appleton Road
          Menasha, WI 54952
          Telephone (973) 379-7500
          E-mail: Francis@SternThomasson.com
                  Philip@SternThomasson.com
                  Andrew@SternThomasson.com


MICHAEL A. JACOB: Court Compels Arbitration in Campbell
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas, Western Division, issued an Order granting Defendants'
Motion to Compel Arbitration and Strike Allegations in the case
captioned LAURA K. CAMPBELL, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL A. JACOB, II; JACOB LAW
GROUP, PLLC; JEFFERSON CAPITAL SYSTEMS, LLC, Defendants. JEANNETTE
WELCH, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL A. JACOB, II; JACOB LAW GROUP, PLLC; MIDLAND
FUNDING, LLC; MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC. Defendants. LILLIE
BROWNLEE, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL A. JACOB, II; JACOB LAW GROUP, PLLC; MIDLAND
FUNDING, LLC; MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendants. BETTY
JOHNSON, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL A. JACOB, II; JACOB LAW GROUP, PLLC; MIDLAND
FUNDING, LLC; MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendants.
Consolidated Case Nos. 4:19-cv-179-JM, 5:19-cv-105, 4:19-cv-208,
4:19-cv-267 (E.D. Ark.).

Plaintiff Welch filed this action alleging that Defendants Michael
A. Jacob, II, Jacob Law Group, PLLC (JLG), Midland Funding, LLC
(Midland Funding) and Midland Credit Management, Inc. (MCM)
attempted to collect consumer debts from her and putative class
members through standardized, form debt collection complaints filed
in Arkansas state courts that fraudulently and falsely averred that
Midland Funding LLC holds in due course a claim pursuant to a
defaulted Comenity Bank credit card account." Plaintiff asserts
that Midland is not a holder in due course of Comenity Bank
accounts and that this representation violates the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Arkansas Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (AFDCA).

Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) states that an
agreement to arbitrate shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract. This provision reflects a
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.   

Because arbitration is a matter of contract, courts must rigorously
enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms, including
requirements to pursue claims through individual arbitration. Any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved
in favor of arbitration.  

Plaintiff does not dispute that the arbitration provision is valid,
she is bound to it, and her claims fall within its scope. Relying
in large part on Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S.Ct. 1407 (2019)
Plaintiff argues that the right to enforce the arbitration
provision was not assigned to Midland and neither Midland or JLG
have the right to require arbitration. In Lamps Plus, the Supreme
Court held that the FAA bars a court order compelling class
arbitration if the arbitration agreement is ambiguous about the
availability of class arbitration Emphasizing the difference
between class wide arbitration and individual arbitration the Court
concluded that the statue requires more than ambiguity to ensure
that the parties actually agreed to arbitrate on a classwide basis.


The Court does not agree, as argued by Plaintiff, that the holding
in Lamps Plus precludes the assignment of the agreement to
arbitrate in this case.

The Cardholder agreement originally entered between Plaintiff and
Comenity specifically provided that Comenity could assign or
transfer any or all of its rights under the agreement without
notice to the Plaintiff of such action. Comenity assigned all of
its rights under the agreement to Midland Funding. That included
the right to arbitration. Further, pursuant to the Credit Card
Account Purchase Agreement, Comenity sold, assigned and transferred
to Midland Funding all rights, title and interest in and to the
Accounts. Plaintiff agreed that Comenity could sell or assign its
rights in the Agreement. Comenity did just that by assigning it
rights to Midland Funding.

Accordingly, Midland Funding stands in the shoes of Comenity and
both Midland Funding and MCM as its affiliate may enforce the
arbitration provision of the Agreement.  

JLG may compel arbitration because the Plaintiff agreed to
arbitrate any claims against any other person or company that
provides any services in connection with this Agreement if you
assert a claim against such other person or company at the same
time as you assert a Claim against any Bank Party." As stated
above, Midland Funding and its affiliate MCM stands in the shoes of
the Bank Parties by virtue of the assignment of the Agreement.
Plaintiff sued both Midland and JLG in its Fair Debt Collection
Practices action. The claims against JLG arise out of their efforts
to collect the balance owed on the account pursuant to the
Agreement. Accordingly, JLG may enforce the Arbitration Agreement.
These defendants' right to enforce the terms of the Arbitration
Provision includes the right to enforce the Class Action
prohibition.  

Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to compel arbitration and to
strike Plaintiff's class allegations is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 9, 2019 Order is
Available at https://tinyurl.com/y3234ycc from Leagle.com.

Jeanette Welch, On Behalf of Herself and all Others Similary
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Cathleen M. Combs , Edelman,
Combs, Latturner & Goodwin, LLC, 20 S. Clark Street, Suite 1500,
Chicago, IL 60603 pro hac vice, Corey Darnell McGaha, Crowder
McGaha, LLP, 5507 Ranch Drive, Suite 202, Little Rock, Arkansas
72223, Daniel A. Edelman, Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin, LLC,
20 S. Clark Street, Suite 1500, Chicago, IL 60603, pro hac vice &
William Thomas Crowder, Crowder McGaha, LLP, 5507 Ranch Drive,
Suite 202, Little Rock, Arkansas 72223

Michael A Jacob, II & Jacob Law Group PLLC, Defendants, represented
by Elizabeth Fletcher -- elizabeth.fletcher@mrmblaw.com -- Munson,
Rowlett, Moore & Boone, P.A.

Midland Funding LLC & Midland Credit Management Inc, Defendants,
represented by Michael Norris Shannon -- mshannon@qgtlaw.com --
Quattlebaum, Grooms & Tull PLLC


MIDLAND CREDIT: Ruyyashi Files Class Suit under FDCPA
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Midland Credit
Management, Inc. The case is styled as Buthaina Ruyyashi,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Midland Credit Management, Inc, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-06210 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 17, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Midland Credit Management (MCM) is a company that helps consumers
resolve past-due financial obligations.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   James C. Vlahakis, Esq.
   Sulaiman Law Group, Ltd.
   2500 S. Highland Avenue, Suite 200
   Lombard, IL 60148
   Tel: (630) 575-8181
   Email: jvlahakis@sulaimanlaw.com




MIRROR LAKE INN: Olsen Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
---------------------------------------------------------
Mirror Lake Inn, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Thomas J Olsen, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Mirror Lake Inn, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-05280 (E.D. N.Y., Sept. 17, 2019).

Mirror Lake Inn, Inc. operates a lakefront resort in the Adirondack
Mountains.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   630 Third Avenue
   Fifth Floor
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: doug@lipskylowe.com


ML CLEANING: Jimenez Moves to Certify Cleaners Class Under FLSA
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit entitled MANUEL JIMENEZ, individually
and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals v. M L
CLEANING INC. and JOHN MELIA, Case No. 3:19-cv-00078-KAD (D.
Conn.), move pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, for
conditional certification of this class/collective:

     All employees who worked for ML Cleaning, Inc. as cleaners
     in Connecticut during any time between January 14, 2016 to
     the present.

The Plaintiff also asks the Court to order the Defendant to produce
information about potential class members that will not otherwise
be available without this conditional certification.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Anthony J. LaBella, Esq.
          URY & MOSKOW, LLC
          883 Black Rock Turnpike
          Fairfield, CT 06925
          Telephone: (203) 610-6393
          E-mail: anthony@urymoskow.com

               - and -

          Jacob Aronauer, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF JACOB ARONAUER
          225 Broadway, 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 323-6980
          E-mail: jaronauer@aronauerlaw.com

One of the Plaintiff's attorneys certifies that notice was sent to
this attorney of record:

          Glen A. Canner, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF GLEN A. CANNER
          112 Prospect Street
          Stamford, CT 06901
          Telephone: (203) 961-1080
          E-mail: glencanner@aol.com


MONSANTO COMPANY: Lingschs Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-------------------------------------------------------------
CLIFFORD LINGSCH and ROSEMARY LINGSCH, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO
COMPANY, the Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-05503-VC (M.D. Fla., Aug.
8, 2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, as a
direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Edward L.
Lamkay's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Andrew T. Kagan, Esq.
          KAGAN LEGAL GROUP
          295 Palmas Inn Way, Suite 6 Palmanova Plaza
          Humacao, PR 0791
          Telephone: (939) 220-2424
          Facsimile: (939) 220-2477
          E-mail: andrew@kaganlegalgroup.com

               - and -

          Jennifer A. Moore, Esq.
          MOORE LAW GROUP, PLLC
          1473 South 4th Street
          Louisville, KY 40208
          Telephone: (502) 717-4080
          Facsimile: (502) 717-4086
          E-mail: jennifer@moorelawgroup.com

NANDO'S RESTAURANT: Martinez Sues Over Biometric Data Retention
---------------------------------------------------------------
KATHERINE MARTINEZ, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff; v. NANDO'S RESTAURANT GROUP, INC.
Defendant, Case No. 2019CH10488 (Circuit Ct., Cook Cty., Ill.,
Sept. 10, 2019) seeks to put a stop to the unlawful collection,
use, and storage of Plaintiff's and the putative Class members'
sensitive biometric data.

Recognizing the need to protect its citizens, Illinois enacted the
Biometric Information Privacy Act, specifically to regulate
companies that collect and store Illinois citizens' biometrics,
such as fingerprints. Despite this law, Nando's disregards its
employees statutorily protected privacy rights and unlawfully
collects, stores, and uses their biometric data in violation of the
BLPA. Specifically, Nando's has violated (and continues to violate)
the BIPA because it did not properly inform Plaintiff and the Class
members in writing of the specific purpose and length of time for
which their fingerprints were being collected, stored, and used, as
required by the BJPA; provide a publicly available retention
schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying Plaintiff and
the Class's fingerprints as required by the BIPA; nor Receive a
written release from Plaintiff or the members of the Class to
collect, capture, or otherwise obtain fingerprints, as required by
the BlPA, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is a natural person and citizen of the State of Illinois
and worked for Nando's in Illinois, ending in 2018.

Nandos is a Delaware corporation that operates the popular Nando's
Peri Peri chain of restaurants.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     David Fish, Esq.
     John Kunze, Esq.
     THE FISH LAW FIRM, P.C.
     200 East Fifth Avenue, Suite 123
     Naperville, IL 60563
     Phone: 630.355.7590
     Fax: 630.778.0400
     Email: admin@fishlawfirm.com
            dfish@fishlawfirm.com
            jkunze@fishlawfirm.com


NAT NAST ACQUISITION: Andrews Files Class Suit Under ADA
--------------------------------------------------------
Nat Nast Acquisition LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Victor Andrews, individually and as the representative of a
class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. Nat Nast
Acquisition LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-05321 (E.D. N.Y.,
Sept. 18, 2019).

NAT NAST ACQUISITION LLC operates in the Men's and Boys' Shirts,
Except Work Shirts industry in New York, NY.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Dan Shaked, Esq.
   Shaked Law Group, P.C.
   14 Harwood Court, Suite 415
   Scarsdale, NY 10583
   Tel: (917) 373-9128
   Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com



NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE: Court Narrows Claims in RESPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland
issued a Memorandum Opinion granting in part and denying in part
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned
DEMETRIUS ROBINSON and TAMARA ROBINSON, Plaintiffs, v. NATIONSTAR
MORTGAGE LLC, Defendant. Civil Action No. TDC-14-3667. (D. Md.).

Plaintiffs Demetrius and Tamara Robinson have resided in a home in
Damascus, Maryland that has been subject to a mortgage loan. After
attempts to modify the loan failed, the Robinsons filed a class
action Complaint against Defendant Nationstar Mortgage, LLC for
alleged violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(RESPA), specifically RESPA's implementing regulations known as
Regulation X and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (MCPA).

Nationstar seeks summary judgment on the Robinsons' RESPA claims on
the grounds that (1) Mrs. Robinson is not a proper plaintiff
because she is not a borrower within the meaning of RESPA (2) RESPA
is inapplicable because Nationstar was required to comply with
Regulation X only as to the Robinsons' first loss mitigation
application (3) there is no evidence to support a violation of 12
C.F.R. Sections 1024.41(f), (g), and (h) and (4) there is no
evidence of actual damages from any RESPA violation. Nationstar
also asserts that the Robinsons have not identified evidence
sufficient to support their MCPA claims.

RESPA

RESPA's implementing regulations, codified at 12 C.F.R. Sections
1024.1 to 1024.41 and known as Regulation X, 12 C.F.R. Section
1024.1, prescribe additional duties and responsibilities of
mortgage servicers under RESPA. Regulation X went into effect on
January 10, 2014. Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X).  

Under a provision of Regulation X entitled Loss mitigation
procedures, mortgage servicers must take certain steps when a
borrower applies for loss mitigation measures, such as the loan
modifications sought in this case. A complete loss mitigation
application is an application in connection with which a servicer
has received all the information that the servicer requires from a
borrower in evaluating applications for the loss mitigation options
available to the borrower.

A borrower may enforce violations of these provisions through a
private cause of action pursuant to 12 U.S.C. Section 2605(f). A
servicer that fails to comply with Regulation X is liable for
actual damages and, upon a finding of a pattern or practice of
noncompliance by the servicer, up to $2,000 in statutory damages.
For a class action brought for violations of Regulation X, a
servicer is liable for actual damages to each of the borrowers in
the class and upon a finding of a pattern or practice of
noncompliance, statutory damages amounting to a maximum of $2,000
per class member up to a total of the lesser of $1 million or one
percent of the servicer's net worth.

Mrs. Robinson

Nationstar argues that summary judgment should be granted against
Mrs. Robinson because she is not a borrower within the meaning of
RESPA. A borrower may enforce the provisions of Regulation X
pursuant to 12 U.S.C. Section 2605(f). That provision provides, in
parallel, that a loan servicer which does not comply with
Regulation X is liable to the borrower. It follows that only
borrowers may bring a claim that a loan servicer has violated
Regulation X.  

Here, Mrs. Robinson signed the Deed but did not sign the Note. The
Deed specifies that a person who signs it but does not execute the
note is a co-signer of the Deed in order to mortgage and convey
that person's interest in the Property under the terms of the Deed,
but is not personally obligated to pay the sums secured by this
Security Instrument and her consent is not required to alter the
terms of the Deed or the Note. Thus, Mrs. Robinson is not obligated
to pay the amount due on the Note and therefore is not a borrower
for purposes of RESPA.  

Nationstar's Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted as to
Tamara Robinson.

Subsequent Loss Mitigation Application

Nationstar argues that it should be granted summary judgment on all
of the RESPA claims because Nationstar was required to comply with
Regulation X only as to a borrower's first loss mitigation
application, and the Robinsons' March 7, 2014 application was not
their first loan modification application.

Regulation X, which became effective on January 10, 2014, 78 Fed.
Reg. 10696, 10708, provides that a servicer is only required to
comply with the requirements of this section for a single complete
loss mitigation application for a borrower's mortgage loan account.
The regulation is silent on whether a loss mitigation application
submitted before January 10, 2014 could qualify as the "single
complete loss mitigation application. While several district courts
have concluded that loss mitigation applications submitted before
Regulation X's effective date do not count as the single
application for which a loan servicer must comply with Regulation
X.

Based on the language of Regulation X, the Court finds that a loss
mitigation application submitted before the effective date does not
count as the single application subject to the regulation. The
language of the regulation states not that a loan servicer must
comply with Regulation X's requirements only for a borrower's first
loss mitigation application, but that a loan servicer must comply
with the requirements only for a single complete loss mitigation
application.

Here, even though the Robinsons' March 7, 2014 loss mitigation
application was not the Robinsons' first such application, it was
their first submitted after the effective date of Regulation X.
Therefore, Nationstar was required to comply with section 1024.41
in processing it.

The Court will therefore deny the Motion for Summary Judgment as to
this argument.

12 C.F.R. Section 1024.41(f), (g), (h)

Nationstar further argues that summary judgment must be entered in
its favor on the Robinsons' claims under 12 C.F.R. Section
1024.41(f), (g), and (h) because there is no evidence in the record
that Nationstar violated those provisions. Under subsections (f)
and (g), a loan servicer is not permitted to begin foreclosure
proceedings or move for foreclosure judgment if a borrower submits
a complete loss mitigation application except in certain
circumstances.  The record is undisputed that as of September 25,
2017, Nationstar had neither started foreclosure proceedings nor
moved for foreclosure judgment on the Robinsons' home. In their
memorandum in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment
(Opposition), the Robinsons admit that they do not have evidence
that Nationstar dual tracked them or began foreclosure proceedings
while a loan modification application was pending.  

Summary judgment will therefore be entered for Nationstar on the
claims that Nationstar violated subsections (f) and (g).

Under subsection (h), if a loan servicer receives a complete loss
mitigation application more than 90 days before a foreclosure sale
but then denies the application, the servicer must allow the
borrower to appeal and must respond to the appeal within 30 days of
receiving it. Nationstar sent Mr. Robinson two letters denying his
loan modification application on July 17, 2014 and September 9,
2014, but there is no evidence in the record that the Robinsons
submitted an appeal to either of those letters. While Demetrius
Robinson did appeal Nationstar's March 15, 2014 offer of an
in-house modification, the requirements of subsection (h) were not
triggered because the offer was not a denial of a loan modification
application. The Robinsons do not address this argument in their
Opposition.

Since there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Nationstar violated subsection (h), summary judgment will be
entered for Nationstar on that claim.

Actual Damages

Finally, Nationstar argues that summary judgment should be entered
on the RESPA claims because the Robinsons cannot establish that
they have suffered actual damages as a result of Nationstar's
violations of Regulation X.

A servicer that fails to comply with Regulation X is liable for any
actual damages to the borrower as a result of the failure to
comply. Plaintiffs must present specific evidence to establish a
causal link between the servicer's violation and their injuries.
Actual damages may include late fees; denial of credit or access to
the full amount of a credit line; out-of-pocket expenses incurred
in dealing with a RESPA violation, such as expenses for preparing
and copying correspondence; and lost time and inconvenience,
including time spent away from employment while preparing
correspondence to the extent it resulted in actual pecuniary loss.
Actual damages may also include non-pecuniary damages, such as
emotional distress and pain and suffering.

The Robinsons assert that they have suffered damages in the lost
opportunity to have their mortgage loan modified and to pursue
other loss mitigation options, in the fees, late fees, and interest
that Nationstar has assessed since they became delinquent on their
loan, in the lost time and effort which they expended in pursuing
the loss mitigation process with Nationstar rather than trying to
improve their business and in administrative costs, including
postage, travel expenses, photocopying, scanning, and facsimile
expenses.  

In support of these claims, Mr. Robinson testified in his
deposition that the $141,000 in interest represents the amount that
the Robinsons have been overcharged over the life of the loan. He
asserted that the amount of fees was calculated based on
Nationstar's statements, but he could not specify the nature of the
fees. The one-time consulting fee was paid in August 2013 to PaCE,
a forensic loan auditor, to advise the Robinsons on how to
communicate with Nationstar and to handle their loan. After March
2014, Mrs. Robinson was primarily responsible for communicating
with Nationstar and PaCE. While she is trained as a bookkeeper, at
the time of the Robinsons' 2014 application for a loan modification
and in the subsequent months, Mrs. Robinson was not employed in any
capacity.

In contrast, the Court finds that there is a genuine issue of
material fact whether the administrative costs and fees incurred by
the Robinsons resulted from Nationstar's RESPA violations. Although
the parties have not offered specific details on the nature and
timing of those costs and fees, it is reasonable to infer that at
least some portion of them were incurred after they submitted their
March 7, 2014 loan modification application and after Nationstar
had violated Regulation X. For example, it was undisputed that on
May 30, 2014, Mr. Robinson, in response to Nationstar's requests
for additional information, resubmitted the same information sent
with his March 2014 loan modification application.

Similarly, though the precise nature of the fees imposed was not
specified, it is reasonable to infer that some were attributable to
delays linked to RESPA violations. Finally, while Nationstar
presented arguments for why the Robinsons have not shown damages as
to most of the asserted categories, it did not advance any argument
for why the interest damages claimed by the Robinsons were not
attributable to Nationstar's Regulation X violations and thus is
not entitled to summary judgment on that issue.

Because there are, at a minimum, disputed issues of fact as to what
fees, administrative costs, and interest constitute damages, the
Court will deny the motion for summary judgment on the issue of
actual damages. Where the Robinsons may be able to show that they
have suffered actual damages, their claim for statutory damages,
upon a showing that Nationstar has engaged in a pattern or practice
of violating Regulation X, remains viable.  

MCPA

Nationstar also seeks summary judgment on the Robinsons' claims
under the MCPA, which include claims of misleading statements in
connection with the collection of consumer debts, in violation of
section 13-301(1), (3) and section 13-303(4)-(5) of the MCPA, and
claims that Nationstar did not respond to consumer inquiries within
15 days, in violation of section 13-316(c) of the MCPA.

The Court will address the varying claims in turn.

Sections 13-301 and 13-303

The MCPA prohibits the use of an unfair or deceptive trade practice
in the the extension of consumer credit or the collection of
consumer debts and provides for a private right of action.  

To establish an MCPA violation under this provision, a plaintiff
must establish that (1) the defendant engaged in an unfair or
deceptive practice or misrepresentation (2) the plaintiff relied
upon the representation and (3) doing so caused the plaintiff
actual injury.  

In the Amended Complaint, the Robinsons claim that Nationstar's
representations that it offered many loss mitigation plans and
would evaluate borrowers for eligibility for all these loss
mitigation plans were false. Nationstar correctly notes that the
Robinsons have not identified a false or misleading statement or
representation by Nationstar in the record.

Furthermore, to the extent that the Robinsons' claim is that
Nationstar falsely stated that it would evaluate the Robinsons for
all available loss mitigation plans, the Robinsons point only to
statements in letters that the Robinsons may be eligible for
certain non-HAMP loan modification programs. Where such statements
in no way promise approval, the Robinsons appear to claim that such
statements are false or misleading because Nationstar never
intended to, and did not, evaluate the Robinsons for the various
loss mitigation options.

The Robinsons, however, have not identified any evidence that
Nationstar did not intend to, and did not, conduct such
evaluations. Instead, the Robinsons assert that Nationstar has not
affirmatively proven that it conducted such reviews. This assertion
mischaracterizes the burden of proof in a civil case. It is the
plaintiffs who bear the burden of proving their claims. At this
stage of the proceedings, the Court must rely on facts in the
record, and not assertions in the pleadings. Where the Robinsons,
after discovery, cannot point to evidence that Nationstar did not
even consider or evaluate the Robinsons for loss mitigation
options, they have not established the existence of a genuine issue
of material fact on the issue of false or misleading statements.

Accordingly, Nationstar's Motion for Summary Judgment will be
granted as to the MCPA claims under sections 13-301 and 13-303.

Section 13-316

Section 13-316(c) governs mortgage servicing and, among other
requirements, provides that a servicer shall designate a contact to
whom mortgagors may direct complaints and inquiries and that the
contact shall respond in writing to each written complaint or
inquiry within 15 days if requested. The servicer "is liable for
any economic damages caused by the violation.

Nationstar argues that summary judgment should be entered on the
Robinsons' MCPA claim under section 13-316 because the Robinsons
have not shown that they submitted a complaint or inquiry that
triggers a duty to respond. This Court previously held that a loan
modification application can be an inquiry under the MCPA that
triggers a duty to respond, and that in the case of the Robinsons,
the loan modification application that was submitted at the request
of Nationstar necessarily seeks a response. The Court will not
revisit this determination.

Nationstar further argues that the Robinsons cannot show that they
suffered economic damages as a result of the violation of section
13-316. Although section 13-316 provides a remedy only for economic
damages arising from a mortgage servicer's failure to respond to an
inquiry, the Robinsons have provided sufficient evidence to create
a genuine issue of material fact whether they have suffered
economic damages, in the form of administrative costs, fees, and
interest.  

Nationstar's Motion will be denied as to this claim.

Nationstar's Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted in part
and denied in part. The Motion will be granted as to all of Tamara
Robinson's claims and as to Demetrius Robinson's claims under 12
C.F.R. Section 1024.41(f), (g), and (h) and Md. Code Ann., Com. Law
Section 13-301 and 303. It will be otherwise denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 9, 2019 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/y4tt4g7c from Leagle.com.

Demetrius Robinson & Tamara Robinson, Plaintiffs, represented by
Jonathan K. Tycko, Tycko and Zavareei LLP, 1828 L Street, North
West, Suite 1000, Washington, DC 20036, Geoffrey Grant Bestor, The
Bestor Law Firm, 1776 K Street N West Suite 200, Washington, DC,
20006 & Kristen L. Sagafi, Tycko and Zavareei LLP, 1828 L Street,
North West, Suite 1000, Washington, DC 20036, pro hac vice.

Nationstar Mortgage LLC, Defendant, represented by John Curtis
Lynch -- john.lynch@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders LLP, Erik W.
Kemp -- ek@severson.com -- Severson & Werson, pro hac vice, John B.
Sullivan -- jbs@severson.com -- Severson & Werson, pro hac vice,
Kalama M. Lui-Kwan -- kml@severson.com -- Severson and Werson, pro
hac vice & Mary Kate Kamka, Troutman Sanders LLP, pro hac vice.


NATIONWIDE CREDIT: Court Stays Class Certification Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as GINA ALLENDE, the Plaintiff,
vs. NATIONWIDE CREDIT & COLLECTION, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
19‐CV‐1251 (E.D. Wisc.), the Hon. Judge William E. Duffin
granted Plaintiff's motion to stay further proceedings on the
motion for class certification.

On August 28, 2019, the plaintiff filed a class action complaint.
At the same time, the Plaintiff filed what the court commonly
refers to as a "protective" motion for class certification.

In this motion the plaintiff moved to certify the class described
in the complaint but also moved the court to stay further
proceedings on that motion. In Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d
891, 896 (7th Cir. 2011), the court suggested that class action
plaintiffs "move to certify the class at the same time that they
file their complaint." "The pendency of that motion protects a
putative class from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."

However, because the parties are generally unprepared to proceed
with a motion for class certification at the beginning of a case,
the Damasco court suggested that the parties "ask the district
court to delay its ruling to provide time for additional discovery
or investigation."

The plaintiff's motion to stay further proceedings on the motion
for class certification is granted. The parties are relieved from
the automatic briefing schedule set forth in Civil Local Rule 7(b)
and (c). Moreover, for administrative purposes, it is necessary
that the Clerk terminate the plaintiff's motion for class
certification. However, the motion will be regarded as pending to
serve its protective purpose under Damasco.[CC]

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY: Court Denies Local One's Injunctive Relief Bid
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order denying Plaintiff's Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction in the case captioned LOCAL ONE SECURITY
OFFICERS UNION, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, Defendant. No.
19-CV-3143 (JPO). (S.D.N.Y.).

Richard Berger, an NYU security guard and a member of Local One,
filed a class action complaint against NYU in New York state court
alleging that NYU has "a policy and practice of requiring" its
security guards "to regularly work over forty (40) hours in a week
without paying them all earned overtime wages."  NYU responded to
the Berger Action by filing a grievance against Berger and Local
One pursuant to the dispute-resolution process set out in its CBA
with Local One.  Local One rejected the grievance.  Unpersuaded,
NYU filed a demand for arbitration against Local One with the
American Arbitration Association.  Local One responded by filing a
complaint for injunctive relief in this Court and moving for a
preliminary injunction that would bar the arbitration from moving
forward during the pendency of this suit.

Legal Standard

Preliminary injunctions are extraordinary remedies never awarded as
of right. A party seeking a preliminary injunction bears the burden
of demonstrating (a) irreparable harm and (b) either (1) likelihood
of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions
going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a
balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting
the preliminary relief.

Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sectdion 1 et seq., a
written agreement to arbitrate a dispute arising out of a
commercial contract shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.

Local One never argues that any portion of the CBA or its
dispute-resolution provision is invalid or otherwise revocable.
Instead, it contends only that the parties have not entered into an
arbitration agreement that covers the present dispute in the first
place.  

The agreement to waive a judicial forum in favor of arbitration is
a matter of contract, and it is fundamental that a party cannot be
required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he [or she] has
not agreed to submit.

The CBA at issue here describes a mandatory grievance and
arbitration procedure that applies, as relevant, to any labor
dispute or difference between NYU and Local One as to the meaning,
application, or operation of any provision of the CBA. Given that
the CBA clearly reflects the parties' agreement to arbitrate some
disputes, the critical question is whether the arbitration NYU has
initiated pertains to a dispute that falls within the scope of that
agreement.

NYU maintains that it initiated the arbitration at issue to settle
a dispute over the meaning, application, or operation of the CBA's
wage and hour provisions and to seek a declaration affirming NYU's
compliance with those provisions.  

But Local One counters that NYU stands accused of having violated
only state statutory law and not the CBA and that, in seeking an
advisory opinion as to its compliance with the CBA, NYU seeks to
arbitrate a matter that is not a labor dispute or difference at
all.

The Court, however, need not decide whether NYU's unilateral quest
for assurances as to its compliance with the CBA represents a labor
dispute or difference within the meaning of the CBA's
dispute-resolution provisions. Given that the parties disagree over
what constitutes an arbitrable matter under the CBA, and that
addressing the parties' disagreement will necessarily entail the
resolution of some difference between NYU and Local One as to the
meaning, application, or operation of a CBA provision, Local One
and NYU have clearly and unmistakably assigned to the arbitrator
the question of whether NYU's claims set out an arbitrable dispute.


Local One never offers a plausible contrary reading of the CBA.
Instead, it merely points out that the CBA does not explicitly
require the arbitration of arbitrability. But an express
contractual commitment of the issue of arbitrability to arbitration
is not needed if a contract provides such a broad grant of power to
the arbitrators' as to evidence the parties' clear intent to
arbitrate issues of arbitrability.  

Ultimately, then, because the CBA in this case reflects the
parties' agreement to have an arbitrator decide in the first
instance what constitutes an arbitrable labor dispute or difference
under the CBA, Local One has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of
success on the merits of its claim that it is entitled to enjoin
the challenged arbitration, or to demonstrate serious questions
going to the merits of that claim. As a result, Local One likewise
cannot show that it will suffer irreparable harm if the arbitration
goes ahead.  

Having failed to carry its burden of establishing any of the
preconditions to the entry of a preliminary injunction, then, Local
One is not entitled to that extraordinary remedy.

Local One's motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 9, 2019 Opinion
and Order is Available at https://tinyurl.com/y224u3ry from
Leagle.com.

Local One Security Officers Union, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew
Sal Hoffmann, Hoffmann & Associates, 450 Fashion Ave Ste 1400, New
York, NY, 10123-1400

New York University, Defendant, represented by Garrett David
Kennedy -- garrett.kennedy@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper US LLP &
Joseph A. Piesco -- joseph.piesco@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper US
LLP.


NOVAGRAAF GROUP: Class Certification Sought in Mischler Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit entitled JOSEPH MISCHLER, individually
and on behalf of others similarly situated v. NOVAGRAAF GROUP BV,
et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-02002-TJK-GMH (D.D.C.), asks the Court
to:

   (1) conditionally certify the collective action;

   (2) require the Defendants to produce a list of every employee
       who has worked for the Defendants, including the last
       known address, and email address for each individual; and

   (3) approve the form and content of, and direct the
       distribution of, the proposed notice, and accompanying
       forms.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brendan J. Klaproth, Esq.
          Jesse C. Klaproth, Esq.
          KLAPROTH LAW PLLC
          406 5th Street NW, Suite 350
          Washington, DC 20001
          Telephone: (202) 618-2344
          Facsimile: (202) 618-4636
          E-mail bklaproth@klaprothlaw.com
                 jklaproth@klaprothlaw.com


OAKLAND, CA: Faces Smith et al Suit in N.D. California
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against City Of Oakland. The
case is captioned as Ian Smith, Sunday Parker, and Mitch Jeserich,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. City Of Oakland, the Defendant, Case No.
4:19-cv-05398-JST (N.D. Cal., Aug. 28, 2019). The suit alleges
violation of the American with Disabilities Act. The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge Jon S. Tigar.

Oakland is a city on the east side of San Francisco Bay in
California.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Craig D. Castellanet, Esq.
          PUBLIC INTEREST LAW PROJECT
          449 Fifteenth Street, Suite 301
          Oakland, CA 94612-2038
          Telephone: (510) 891-9794
          Facsimile: (510) 891-9727
          E-mail: ccastellanet@pilpca.org

               - and -

          Jessica Catherine Agatstein, Esq.
          Melissa Antoinette Morris, Esq.
          Michael F. Rawson, Esq.
          DISABILITY RIGHTS ADVOCATES
          2001 Center St., 4th Floor
          Berkeley, CA 94794
          Telephone: (510) 665-8644
          Facsimile: (510) 665-8511
          E-mail: jagatstein@dralegal.org
                  mmorris@pilpca.org
                  mrawson@pilpca.org

               - and -

          Sean Paul Betouliere, Esq.
          Thomas Philip Zito, Esq.
          DISABILITY RIGHTS ADVOCATES
          2001 Center Street, Fourth Floor
          Berkeley, CA 94704
          Telephone: (510) 665-8644
          Facsimile: (510) 665-8511
          E-mail: sbetouliere@dralegal.org
                  tzito@dralegal.org

OPTIME REALTY: Martin Sues over Autodialed Text Messages
--------------------------------------------------------
SARA MARTIN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. OPTIME REALTY LLC, a Virginia limited
liability company, the Defendant, Case No. 5:19-cv-00434 (M.D.
Fla., September 3, 2019), seeks to stop Keri Shull Team from
violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by sending
unsolicited, autodialed text messages to consumers, including to
consumers who have registered their phone numbers on the national
Do Not Call registry, and to otherwise obtain injunctive and
monetary relief for all persons injured by Keri Shull Team's
conduct.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the putative Classes are:

          Avi R. Kaufman,Esq.
          KAUFMAN P.A.
          400 NW 26th Street
          Miami, FL 33127
          Telephone: (305) 469-5881
          E-mail: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com

               - and -

          Stefan Coleman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF STEFAN COLEMAN, P.A.
          201 S. Biscayne Blvd, 28 th Floor
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (877) 333-9427
          Facsimile: (888) 498-8946
          E-mail: law@stefancoleman.com

PAPA MURPHY'S: Monteverde to Lead in Securities Suit
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington issued an Order granting Plaintiff's Motion for
Appointment as Lead Plaintiff and Approval of Counsel in the case
captioned EVAN BROWN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. PAPA MURPHY'S HOLDINGS INC., et
al., Defendant. Case No. 19-cv-5514 BHS-JRC. (W.D. Wash.).

This putative class action alleges claims occurring under Section
14(e) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act). The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)
provides that, inter alia, the Court is required to appoint a Lead
Plaintiff to represent the purported class.
  
The Court shall appoint as lead plaintiff the member or members of
the purported plaintiff class that the court determines to be the
most capable of adequately representing the interests of class
members, or the most adequate plaintiff. 15 U.S.C. Section
78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i). The Court presumes that the most adequate
plaintiff is the member who has either filed the complaint or made
a motion in response to a notice, in the determination of the
court, has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by
the class and otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  

Here, it appears that no other member has moved for lead plaintiff
in this action. Plaintiff advised the Court that two other members
previously filed actions arising from the same allegations, but
subsequently voluntarily dismissed their claims. As such, plaintiff
as the largest financial interest. Regarding the Rule 23
requirements, the Ninth Circuit has held that, at this stage, the
only a preliminary showing of typicality and adequacy are required.


Typicality requires that the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class. The typicality requirement can be satisfied where other
members have the same or similar injury and  other class members
have been injured by the same course of conduct. At this stage, it
appears that plaintiff satisfies the typicality requirement, as the
injury to all putative class members arose from the same conduct
defendants' alleged material misleading Recommendation Statement.


To fulfill the adequacy requirement, the lead plaintiff must fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class. This rule can be
satisfied when counsel for the class is qualified and competent,
the representative's interests are not antagonistic to the
interests of absent class members, and it is unlikely that the
action is collusive. As the only class member actively pursuing
this claim, it does not appear that plaintiff's interests are
adverse to the class.

Although appointment of counsel is subject to the court's approval,
the PSLRA clearly leaves the choice of class counsel in the hands
of the lead plaintiff. Plaintiff's selected counsel, Monteverde and
Associates, appear to possess the requisite experience in
litigating complex class action cases, including securities and
merger related cases.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment as Lead Plaintiff
and Approval of Counsel  is granted as follows:

Evan Brown is appointed as Lead Plaintiff and, Pursuant to 15
U.S.C. Section 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v), Evan Brown's selection of
Monteverde & Associates PC (Monteverde) is approved and Monteverde
is appointed Lead Counsel, and his selection of Breskin, Johnson &
Townsend PLLC (Breskin Johnson & Townsend) is approved and Breskin
Johnson & Townsend is appointed as Liaison Counsel.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 9, 2019 Order is
Available at  https://tinyurl.com/yxvquaem from Leagle.com.

Evan Brown, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Roger M. Townsend --
rtownsend@bjtlegal.com -- BRESKIN JOHNSON & TOWNSEND PLLC.

Papa Murphy's Holdings Incorporated, Jean M Birch, Weldon Spangler,
Noah A Elbogen, Benjamin Hochberg, Yoo Jin Kim, Alexander C Matina,
David Mounts, John Shafer, Katherine L Scherping & Rob Weisberg,
Defendants, represented by Joseph E. Bringman --
JBringman@perkinscoie.com -- PERKINS COIE, Ronald L. Berenstain --
RBerenstain@perkinscoie.com -- PERKINS COIE, Sean C. Knowles --
SKnowles@perkinscoie.com -- PERKINS COIE & Zachary E. Davison --
ZDavidson@perkinscoie.com -- PERKINS COIE.

North Point Advisors LLC, Defendant, represented by Adrienne M.
Ward -- award@olshanlaw.com -- OLSHAN FROME WOLOSKY LLP, pro hac
vice & John S. Devlin, III -- devlinj@lanepowell.com -- LANE POWELL
PC.


PETIQ, LLC: Flea & Tick Medication Toxic to Pets, Penikila Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
RAMONA PENIKILA on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. PETIQ, LLC d/b/a SENTRY, the
Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-05508 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 30, 2019),
alleges that Defendant's Sentry Natural Defense products are not
fit to be sold as a flea and tick medication, and Defendant's
representation that the Products are safe to use around pets and
children is false and misleading.

Unfortunately for consumers and their pets, use of the Products
exposes pets to the concentrated essential oils that are present in
every Sentry Product: peppermint oil, cinnamon oil, lemongrass oil,
clove oil, and thyme oil. These essential oils, despite being
natural, can be toxic if absorbed through the skin or ingested by
pets, the lawsuit says.

Because of the risks associated with essential oil poisoning,
veterinarians routinely warn consumers against using the essential
oils contained in the Sentry Products and other similarly
formulated products.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and the Class members
were injured as a direct and proximate result of Defendant's breach
because: (a) they would not have purchased the Products on the same
terms if the truth concerning Defendant’s Products had been
known; (b) they paid a price premium due to Defendant's
misrepresentations about the Products; and (c) the Products did not
perform as promised.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff are:

          L. Timothy Fisher, Esq.
          Joel D. Smith, Esq.
          Blair E. Reed, Esq.
          Scott A. Bursor, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          1990 North California Blvd., Suite 940
          Walnut Creek, CA 94596
          Telephone: (925) 300-4455
          Facsimile: (925) 407-2700
          E-mail: ltfisher@bursor.com
                  jsmith@bursor.com
                  breed@bursor.com
                  scott@bursor.com

PHH MORTGAGE: Basketbills Sue over Mortgage Account Charges
-----------------------------------------------------------
RODNEY BASKETBILL AND GWENDOLYN BASKETBILL, HUSBAND AND WIFE, 1539
Washington Avenue Willow Grove, PA 19090, FOR THEMSELVES AND FOR
AND ON BEHALF OF OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, the Plaintiffs, vs. PHH
MORTGAGE SERVICES, 1 Mortgage Way Mt. Laurel, NJ 08054, the
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-03993-CDJ (E.D. Pa., Aug. 30, 2019),
alleges that Defendants have wrongfully charged and/or attempted to
wrongfully charge Plaintiffs' mortgage account for charges that are
not authorized by law or contract. The Plaintiffs seek damages,
including compensatory damages, and attorney's fees and costs. The
Defendants are mortgage servicers.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Stuart A. Eisenberg, Esq.
          Carol B. McCullogh, Esq.
          MCCULLOGH  EISENBERG LLC
          65 West Street Road, Suite A-204
          Warmister, PA 18974
          Telephone: (215) 957 6411
          Facsimile: (215) 957 9140
          E-mail: mccullogheisenberg@gmail.com


PHYSICIAN OFFICE: Court Compels Document Production in Young
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas issued
a Memorandum and Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel
Production of Documents in the case captioned KIMBERLY YOUNG,
Plaintiff, v. PHYSICIAN OFFICE PARTNERS, INC., Defendant. Case No.
18-cv-2481-KHV-TJJ. (D. Kan.).

The Court conducted a status conference at the parties' request
regarding a discovery dispute over two of Plaintiff's Requests for
Production of Documents (RFPD). After hearing argument from the
parties, the Court directed the parties to continue to confer and
attempt to resolve their disputes, and, if unable to do so,
directed Plaintiff to file a motion to compel.

The two discovery requests at issue seek documents reflecting the
race, starting rate of pay and job title of each individual hired
at Defendant Physician Office Partners, Inc.'s Overland Park
facility between January 1, 2014 and January 1, 2019.

Defendant objects to the requests as overbroad, unduly burdensome,
not properly limited in time and/or scope, and irrelevant. As to
RFPD No. 7, which seeks the compensation history of individuals
hired at Defendant's Overland Park facility from January 1, 2014 to
January 1, 2019.

Defendant also objects to the request as vague and ambiguous. But,
Defendant agreed to produce documents sufficient to show the
compensation history, starting pay rates and any increases or
decreases, for each individual who worked in the Quality
Assurance/Quality Reporting Departments at any time from August
2016 to the present.

Relevance

Discovery relevance is minimal relevance, which means it is
possible and reasonably calculated that the request will lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence. At the discovery stage,
relevance is broadly construed. Relevant information is any matter
that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that
could bear on any party's claim or defense.

When the discovery sought appears relevant, the party resisting
discovery has the burden to establish the lack of relevancy by
demonstrating that the requested discovery (1) does not come within
the scope of relevancy as defined under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1),
or (2) is of such marginal relevancy that the potential harm
occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in
favor of broad disclosure.

The Court finds that the requests at issue appear relevant on their
face, which puts the burden on Defendant to establish the lack of
relevancy.

Defendant's main argument seems to be that only requests limited to
the unit in which Plaintiff worked are relevant. Defendant argues
discovery may be expanded from Plaintiff's unit only if she can
show a particularized need for it, which Defendant argues Plaintiff
has failed to do because her allegations stem only from her work
unit, and not the centralized Human Resources Department.

Plaintiff argues the requests are relevant as to Defendant's
discriminatory motive.

In support of her position, Plaintiff submitted a document listing
18 employees of Defendant, their hire date, job title, age,
ethnicity, and pay rate.12 Some of the disagreement between the
parties stems from the difference, or lack thereof, between the job
titles Data Abstractor I and Data Abstractor II. Plaintiff argues
employees performed the same job duties at the time in issue
regardless of whether they were classified as a Data Abstractor I
or Data Abstractor II. Defendant contends the job duties were
different at the relevant time and this is part of the reason for
the pay disparity between the positions, but it offers no further
explanation or support for its contention.

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the disputed requests are
relevant. In Johnson v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., the Court found a
request seeking all documents concerning or pertaining to all
employees demoted within the Kraft Sales Organization in the Kansas
City region during the Relevant Time Period to be relevant,
specifically as to the plaintiffs' claims of unequal treatment,
failure to promote, and patterns of discriminatory conduct.

Plaintiff also argues the requests are relevant because of
Defendant's centralized Human Resources Department. Defendant
contends Plaintiff has not alleged company-wide discrimination and
cannot make a particularized showing of the need for company-wide
discovery.  

Here, the Court finds the Plaintiff has shown a need for discovery
outside that of only her unit. The deposition testimony of
Plaintiff's supervisor, Lauren Hidaka, indicates Defendant's Human
Resources Department establishes an employee's rate of pay, and
that Ms. Hidaka was not involved in determining pay at all. This
supports Plaintiff's position that facility-wide race and pay
information is relevant because of the Human Resources Department's
centralized role in determining an employee's pay.

Therefore, Defendant's objections as to relevance are overruled.

Overbroad and Unduly Burdensome

Defendant's main objection seems to be that the requests are overly
broad and unduly burdensome. Unless the request is overly broad on
its face, the party resisting discovery has the burden to support
its objection. A request is overly broad on its face if it is
couched in such broad language as to make arduous the task of
deciding which of numerous documents may conceivably fall within
its scope.

Defendant argues it would have to produce thousands of employee
files to comply with Plaintiff's request, and even if it did, the
requested information would be likely to produce misleading data
because the request does not ask for information such as an
employee's work experience and education level.

But Defendant fails to provide any support for its claim that it
might have to produce thousands of employee files. Defendant did
not provide an affidavit or other evidentiary proof of the time or
expense involved in responding to the discovery requests at issue.
Nor did it include any factual basis for its objection. Instead, it
simply makes the broad unsubstantiated estimate that the requests
could require the production of data concerning possibly thousands
of individuals.

Defendant further does not explain how Plaintiff's amended requests
continue to be overly broad or unduly burdensome. The amended
requests seek documents reflecting the race, starting rate of pay
and job title of each individual hired at Defendant's Overland Park
facility between January 1, 2014 and January 1, 2019. This
amendment eliminates the requests for more than eight months of
documentation—from January 1, 2019 to the present.  

Because Defendant has not provided any more precise factual and
evidentiary support for its claim that Plaintiff's requests are
overly broad or unduly burdensome, and because the Court finds the
requests are not overly broad or unduly burdensome on their face,
Defendant's objections to the requests as overbroad and unduly
burdensome are overruled.

Vague and Ambiguous

Additionally, Defendant argues RFPD No. 7 is vague and ambiguous.
To succeed on a vague and ambiguous objection, Defendant must show
that more tools beyond mere reason and common sense are necessary
to attribute ordinary definitions to terms and phrases utilized.

Defendant does not explain what part of the request is vague or
ambiguous, and nothing in the request appears vague or ambiguous to
the Court. Additionally, Defendant followed its objection stating
it would produce some documents subject to and without waiving its
objections, which is a conditional objection. It is well settled in
this district that conditional answers are invalid and
unsustainable. Objections may not be reserved; they are either
raised or they are waived. This Court and others have held whenever
an answer accompanies an objection, the objection is deemed waived
and the answer, if responsive, stands. Accordingly, the Court deems
these objections waived and overrules them.

Plaintiff's Motion to Compel and Suggestions in Support is granted.


A full-text copy of the District Court's September 9, 2019
Memorandum and Order is Available at https://tinyurl.com/y224u3ry
from Leagle.com.

Kimberly Young, Plaintiff, represented by Marc N. Middleton --
m.middleton@Cornerstonefirm.com -- Cornerstone Law Firm & Megan
Lowe Stiles -- m.stiles@Cornerstonefirm.com -- Cornerstone Law
Firm.

Physician Office Partners, Inc., Defendant, represented by Donald
S. Prophete -- dprophete@constangy.com -- Constangy, Brooks, Smith
& Prophete LLP & Virginia LeeAnn Woodfork --
vwoodfork@constangy.com -- Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete,
LLP, pro hac vice.


PK MANAGEMENT: Court Denies Sanctions in Riley's Negligence Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas issued
a Memorandum and Order denying Defendant Defendant Aspen Companies
Management, LLC's Motion for Sanctions in the case captioned LEORA
RILEY, et al., Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. PK MANAGEMENT, LLC, et al., Defendants.
Case No. 18-cv-2337-KHV-TJJ. (D. Kan.).

This case began in January 2018 when Central Park Towers filed
three limited action unlawful detainer lawsuits in the District
Court of Wyandotte County, Kansas against Leora Riley, Terri
Ozburn, and Carolyn Bell, respectively.

In their Second Amended Class Action Complaint, Plaintiffs (1)
conform their pleading to reflect the language of Rule 23(b)
regarding the types of class actions they assert, and add a limited
fund class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) (2) add factual allegations
learned in discovery (3) add a count alleging negligence against
all Defendants and (4) seek punitive damages in the counts alleging
violations of an implied warranty of habitability (Count Two),
breach of statutory duty to materially comply with lease and to
provide habitable housing (Count Three), nuisance (Count Seven),
and negligence (Count Eight).

Legal Standard

Although Aspen styles its motion as one for sanctions, its sole
focus is to seek disqualification of counsel. The Court has the
power to disqualify counsel at its discretion for ethical
violations, using the following standard:

The Court must determine a motion to disqualify counsel by
measuring the facts of the particular case.   The moving party must
show proof that is more than mere speculation and sustains a
reasonable inference of a violation.  The essential issue is
whether the alleged misconduct taints the lawsuit. The Court should
not disqualify unless the offending attorney's conduct threatens to
taint the underlying trial' with a serious ethical violation.
Because the interests to be protected are critical to the judicial
system, the Court should resolve doubts in favor of
disqualification. Id. The Court must balance several factors,
however, including society's interest in ethical conduct,
defendants' right to choose their counsel, and the hardship which
disqualification would impose on the parties and the entire
judicial process.
   
Aspen contends that Mr. Bell violated Rule 4.2 of the Kansas Rules
of Professional Conduct by engaging in ex parte communications with
Mr. Broadus. Rule 4.2 states as follows:

In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the
subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has
the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or
a court order.

Aspen asserts that Mr. Bell communicated with Ms. Broadus about the
subject of the representation, and Plaintiffs do not argue
otherwise. With respect to whether Mr. Bell knew Ms. Broadus was
represented by another lawyer in the matter, Aspen contends the
issue is irrelevant because Ms. Broadus is a constituent of Aspen
as described in Comment 7 to the rule.  

September 2018 Telephone Calls

Aspen asserts that Ms. Broadus is a constituent of Aspen who has
authority to obligate the organization with respect to the matter
and whose act or omission in connection with the matter may be
imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal
liability. Aspen frames the issue as whether Plaintiffs' counsel
knew on September 19 and 20, 2018 that Ms. Broadus was a
constituent of Aspen with whom communications were prohibited, not
whether Plaintiffs' counsel knew whether Ms. Broadus was
represented by her own counsel.  

Aspen points to certain allegations in Plaintiffs' First Amended
Complaint, statements by Plaintiff Riley in her deposition, and
excerpts from Plaintiffs' expert report as evidence that Ms.
Broadus's acts or omissions can be imputed to Aspen. those items,
only one Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint is dated earlier than
September 2018.

Recalling that this case began when Central Park filed eviction
actions against the original named Plaintiffs provides the context
for allegations in the First Amended Complaint that the evictions
were in retaliation for Plaintiff Ozburn's complaints about
habitability and safety issues at the Complex, including bedbugs,
cockroaches, mice, mold, and defective elevators.

The Court makes one additional observation about the state of Mr.
Bell's knowledge in September 2018. While Comment 7 provides
guidance for the Court's analysis of the ex parte contacts in this
case, the Court rejects Aspen's assertion that the Comment renders
irrelevant the issue of whether Ms. Broadus was represented by
counsel in September 2018. When Ms. Bell asked, Ms. Broadus denied
having representation. Even if Ms. Broadus had met with Mr. Raine
before she attempted to contact Mr. Bell, as of September 19 she
did not agree that Mr. Raine or any other Aspen counsel was serving
as her lawyer.

She called Mr. Bell's office seeking representation because she
wanted to join in a lawsuit against her employer and others
concerning conditions at Central Park Towers, where she works. That
put her in a position adverse to Aspen, which is inconsistent with
her agreeing to be represented by Aspen's counsel. Aspen agrees for
the sake of this motion that Ms. Broadus was not personally
represented by any attorney during these two phone calls.

Having concluded that as of September 19 or 20, 2018, Ms. Broadus
did not consider herself to be represented and Mr. Bell did not
know that Ms. Broadus is a constituent of Aspen for purposes of
Rule 4.2, the Court finds no violation of Rule 4.2 occurred.

July 2019 Meeting

Aspen does not separately address Mr. Bell's meeting with Ms.
Broadus and Mr. Dandurand. Plaintiffs assert no violation occurred
in that meeting because it was arranged through Ms. Broadus's
counsel with her consent, and her counsel also consented to and was
present for the meeting.  

Thus, Plaintiffs argue, even if the Court found Ms. Broadus to be a
constituent of Aspen, Mr. Bell did not violate Rule 4.2 because Mr.
Dandurand consented to the communication. Neither side has provided
Kansas law on this issue, but Plaintiffs cite a California Court of
Appeals case which held that ex parte contacts with current
directors were permissible because the directors retained their own
counsel who consented to the communications.

Plaintiffs urge the Court to adopt the following rationale: When an
employee has private counsel, that attorney is better able than the
organization's attorney to determine whether the employee's
interests are better served by speaking with another attorney or by
silence. If the employee's private attorney determines that the
employee's best interests dictate that her client speak with
another attorney, that private attorney need not obtain the
blessing of the organization's attorney before pursuing that
course.

The Court finds this reasoning persuasive and not inconsistent with
Kansas law. The leading case in this district on the issue of
whether counsel violates Rule 4.2 by having ex parte communications
with another party's employee is Hammond v. City of Junction City,
Kansas, 167 F.Supp.2d 1271 (D. Kan. 2001). In Hammond, a putative
class action alleging class-wide employment discrimination, Mr.
Hope, the City's Director of Human Relations, attempted to contact
plaintiffs' counsel Brown. Mr. Brown did not initially return the
call because he knew Mr. Hope worked in the City's Human Resources
Department and he could not determine whether Mr. Hope was a
managerial employee.

Mr. Hope called again and asked Mr. Brown if he would represent him
in a race discrimination case he wanted to bring against the City.
Mr. Brown explained his representation of the named plaintiff in
the existing case and said if the case became certified as a class
action Mr. Hope might be a member of the class. The two discussed
options and Mr. Hope professed his awareness of the potential
conflict of interest.

After hearing Mr. Hope's explanation of his job responsibilities
and his reporting and supervisory chain, Mr. Brown concluded Mr.
Hope did not have managerial responsibilities on behalf of the
City, and that he was not an employee within the scope of the
managing-speaking agent test. When they met in person, it became
clear to Mr. Brown that Mr. Hope was seeking representation as an
individual and as a potential class representative. Mr. Brown
accepted the representation, and in a telephone voicemail message
advised defense counsel he had been retained to assert Mr. Hope's
claims of individual discrimination and was also considering him as
an additional class representative. Defense counsel objected to Mr.
Hope being named a class representative.

In subsequent meetings with Mr. Hope, Mr. Brown learned that Mr.
Hope had been actively involved in preparing the City's discovery
responses in the putative class action, and Mr. Hope also told him
of some alleged document shredding by City employees.

The City moved for a protective order to prevent additional ex
parte contacts and sought to disqualify Mr. Brown from further
representation in the putative class action. Magistrate Judge Waxse
conducted a hearing and issued a memorandum and order, holding that
Mr. Hope both had managerial responsibilities and speaking
authority to bind the City. The list of his responsibilities is
lengthy and includes the authority to make hiring decisions for the
Human Resources Department, managing that Department, sitting on
various hiring panels and making hiring recommendations to various
City hiring authorities, investigating internal discrimination and
harassment complaints brought by City employees, and more. Based on
these findings, Judge Waxse concluded that Mr. Brown had violated
Rule 4.2 and ordered him disqualified from the case.

The facts of this case are far different from those in Hammond. Not
only did the witness have multiple managerial responsibilities over
the precise issues for which his employer faced possible liability,
but the same lawyer represented both the putative class action
plaintiffs and the witness. Here, Aspen has not demonstrated that
Ms. Broadus was its constituent, and Mr. Bell does not represent
Ms. Broadus. Knowing he was precluded from doing so, he referred
her to another law firm. The Court finds under the specific
circumstances here, Mr. Bell did not violate Rule 4.2 by meeting
with Ms. Broadus and Mr. Dandurand on July 19, 2019.

Accordingly, the Motion for Sanctions filed by Defendant Aspen
Companies Management is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 9, 2019
Memorandum and Order is Available at https://tinyurl.com/y38azmsc
from Leagle.com.

Leora Riley, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & Terri Ozburn, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Bryce B. Bell, Bell
Law, LLC, 2600 Grand Blvd., Ste. 580, Kansas City, MO, 64108, Gina
M. Chiala, Heartland Center for Jobs and Freedom, Inc., 4047
Central St. Kansas City, MO 64111, pro hac vice, Jeffrey M. Lipman,
Lipman Law Firm, PC, Beco Towers II10461 Mill Run CircleSuite
550Owings Mills, MD 21117, pro hac vice, Mark W. Schmitz, Bell Law,
LLC, 2600 Grand Blvd., Ste. 580, Kansas City, MO, 64108 & Zachary
D. Poole, ZDP Law, LLC.

PK Management, LLC, Defendant, represented by Derek H. Mackay --
mackay@knightnicastro.com -- Knight Nicastro MacKay, LLC & Pamela
Winter -- winter@knightnicastro.com -- Knight Nicastro MacKay,
LLC.

Central Park Investors, LLC, Defendant, represented by Jacqueline
M. Sexton -- jsexton@fwpclaw.com -- Foland, Wickens, Roper, Hofer &
Crawford, PC & Zachary Tyler Bowles, I -- zbowles@fwpclaw.com --
Foland, Wickens, Roper, Hofer & Crawford, PC.

Aspen Companies Management, LLC & Central Park Holdings, LLC,
Defendants, represented by Jeffrey A. Bullins -- jbullins@slln.com
-- Simpson, Logback, Lynch, Norris, PA, John G. Schultz --
jschultz@fsmlawfirm.com -- Franke Schultz & Mullen, PC, Michael T.
Halloran, Franke Schultz & Mullen, PC, 8900 Ward Pkwy

Ste 200, Kansas City, MO 64114-3364. Nicholas D. Savio --
nsavio@fsmlawfirm.com -- Franke Schultz & Mullen, PC & Phillip R.
Raine  -- praine@slln.com -- Simpson, Logback, Lynch, Norris, PA.


PLS FINANCIAL: Court Refuses to Stay Vine Suit Pending Appeal
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas,
Sherman Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying
Defendants' Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Appeals in the case
captioned LUCINDA VINE, KRISTY POND, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. PLS FINANCIAL SERVICES,
INC. and PLS LOAN STORE OF TEXAS, INC. Defendants. Civil Action No.
4:18-CV-00450. (E.D. Tex.).

PLS is a short-term loan provider. To qualify for a PLS loan,
borrowers must present a post-dated or blank personal check for the
amount borrowed in addition to a finance charge. PLS tells
borrowers it will not deposit the check or pursue criminal charges
to recover the loan. But when a borrower misses a payment, PLS will
deposit the check, threaten her with criminal prosecution if the
check bounces, and misrepresent to the local district attorney that
her check was meant to be cashed. The borrower will then receive
letters from the district attorney advising her to pay PLS or face
criminal charges. Plaintiffs Lucinda Vine and Kristy Pond have
filed a class action lawsuit in the Western District of Texas
against PLS on behalf of borrowers who received such letters.

PLS responded to the lawsuit by moving to compel arbitration. The
Western District Court denied the motion, finding that PLS is not
permitted to compel arbitration because PLS substantially invoked
the judicial process first. It reasoned that, by informing the
district attorney of Plaintiffs' bounced checks, PLS initiated a
process that invites Texas district attorneys' offices to address
issues that are at stake in the instant litigation. PLS appealed to
the Fifth Circuit challenging both the denial of its motion to
compel arbitration. The Fifth Circuit granted leave to appeal.
After the Fifth Circuit granted leave to appeal, PLS filed an
Opposed Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Appeals.

PLS submitted its Motion to Stay Proceedings pending its
interlocutory appeal of the Court's Order denying Defendant's
Motion to Reconsider Denial of Motion to Compel Arbitration and
Stay and the Court's Order granting Plaintiff's Motion for Class
Certification.

PLS argues that the Court should grant a stay pending its appeal
for two reasons. First, PLS argues that its appeal raises serious
legal questions.

Second, PLS argues that, should the Fifth Circuit decide in PLS'
favor, PLS would lose most of the value of their underlying
contractual rights by losing their ability to arbitrate and by
having to litigate against an entire class in this Court in the
meantime.

Plaintiffs counter that PLS has no likelihood of success on the
merits as PLS has already appealed the arbitration issue.
Additionally, Plaintiff's assert that stays under Rule 23(f) are
rare, PLS has failed to prove it will be irreparably injured absent
a stay, Plaintiffs may suffer substantial injury, and the public
interest does not favor a stay.

To determine whether to grant PLS' Motion to Stay, the Court will
first determine whether an automatic stay applies. If an automatic
stay is not required, the Court will then consider whether a
discretionary stay should nonetheless be granted under either the
traditional requirements or the exception to the traditional
requirements.

Neither issue on appeal requires an automatic stay

Simply filing an appeal does not compel a district court to stay
proceedings pending the appeal's resolution. Typically, the filing
of an appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance that
confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the
district court of its control over those aspects of the case
involved in that appeal. When the matters before a district court
are not involved in the appeal, the district court is free to
proceed in adjudicating those matters.  

Therefore, a district court must determine whether the merits of
the case before it are so involved in the appeal as to necessitate
an automatic stay of its proceedings before it can proceed. The
trial of a case on its merits is involved in an appeal if it
results in the district court's deciding an issue that the
appellate court is deciding at the same time. Appeals regarding
arbitration or class certification typically do not divest a court
of its jurisdiction, however, because the issue before the
appellate court will not be simultaneously evaluated in the
district court.  

The question of whether an appeal from the denial of a motion to
compel arbitration requires an automatic stay has resulted in a
circuit split. The genesis of this split can be found in Griggs v.
Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56 (1982). On one side, a
narrow interpretation of Griggs leads courts to hold that an appeal
on arbitrability does not affect the merits of the case, thus, the
case may proceed in district court.

On the other side, a broad interpretation of Griggs results in
courts holding that an appeal on arbitrability goes directly to the
merits on whether the case can be heard in district court; thus, a
stay must be granted. The Fifth Circuit chose the narrow side of
this split. According to the Fifth Circuit, it is not necessary
that a district court automatically stay its proceedings pending a
party's appeal of a denial of a motion to compel arbitration,
because the merits of the case before the district court are
unrelated to the case's arbitrability.   

In deciding this issue, the Fifth Circuit explicitly agreed with
the Second and Ninth Circuit's decisions holding that a stay is not
automatic because arbitrability is an issue easily separable from
the merits of the underlying dispute, thus, a district court could
address the merits while the appellate court reviewed
arbitrability. In adopting a narrow interpretation of Griggs and
thus joining the Second and Ninth Circuits, the Fifth Circuit
rationalized its decision by stating that this interpretation
better comports with [this Circuit's] precedents and the nature of
arbitration.

Here, the trial of the present case on its merits is not involved
in a determination of its arbitrability. Therefore, under the Fifth
Circuit's narrow interpretation of Griggs, the Court is not
required to stay its proceedings while PLS' arbitration appeal is
pending.

Although a stay is not required, a district court nonetheless
retains the power to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether
proceedings should be stayed until the appeal has been resolved. A
district court has broad discretion to stay proceedings in the
interest of justice and to control its docket.  

In weighing competing interest and maintaining an even balance, a
district court employs the same four factors. Again, those four
factors include:(1) whether a stay applicant has made a strong
showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits (2) whether the
applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay (3) whether
issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties
interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest
lies.

PLS has not made a strong showing on the merits nor presented a
substantial case on the merits under either the traditional
threshold or the exception

Under the traditional four-factor test, the movant must first show
a likelihood of success on the merits. The Fifth Circuit, however,
acknowledges an exception to this first factor that requires a
lesser threshold requirement. This exception states that on motions
for stay pending appeal the movant need not always show a
probability of success on the merits; instead, the movant need only
present a substantial case on the merits when a serious legal
question is involved and show that the balance of equities weighs
heavily in favor of granting a stay.

The Court first demonstrates that PLS did not show a likelihood of
success on the merits, then evaluates its motion under the
exception.

PLS has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of
its appeals

Determining what constitutes a likelihood of success, is no easy
task. As the Second Circuit has stated, although courts have
discussed and applied these four criteria on numerous occasions,
some uncertainty has developed as to the first factor because of
the various formulations used to describe the degree of likelihood
of success that must be shown.

Here, PLS fails to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the
merits of its appeal. As for its appeal on arbitrability, the Fifth
Circuit has already addressed PLS' argument and affirmed the
district court's denial of the motion. That alone should be
sufficient to find that PLS has not carried its burden in
demonstrating a likelihood of success. Thus, PLS has not
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its
arbitrability appeal.

PLS has not met the exception's requirements

A district court, when determining whether to grant a discretionary
stay under the exception to the traditional standard, must look to
whether the movant can demonstrate a substantial case on the
merits, show a serious legal question is involved in the appeal,
and establish that the balance of equities weighs in its favor.
This is a hard standard to meet. Only if the balance of equities
(i.e. consideration of the other three factors is heavily tilted in
the movant's favor will the Court issue a stay in a likelihood of
success on the merits' absence, and, even then, the issue must be
one with patent substantial merit. The court addresses first
whether PLS can show a substantial case on the merits, then whether
a serious legal question is involved in its appeal, and finally
whether the balance of equities favors a stay.

PLS fails to show a substantial case on the merits.

In its determination of whether the movant can show a substantial
case on the merits, a district court is not required to find that
ultimate success by the movant is a mathematical probability and
the necessary level or degree of possibility of success will vary
according to the court's assessment of the other factors.

There is no serious legal question involved in either issue on
appeal

A serious legal question is one that could have a broad impact on
federal and state relations, or an otherwise far-reaching effect of
public concern. Because PLS raises two separate legal questions on
appeal, the court addresses the seriousness of each in turn.

There is no serious legal question presented regarding PLS' appeal
of the denial of its motion to compel arbitration

PLS argues that the serious legal question here is whether it
waived its right to arbitration by invoking the judicial process
when it submitted worthless check affidavits to the district
attorneys' offices. However, because this is merely a private
contractual matter regarding whether arbitration is required, no
substantial legal question is involved.

There is no reason to think that the Fifth Circuit would change its
reasoning in light of the Texas Supreme Court decision. In its
opinion, the Texas Supreme Court acknowledges its disagreement with
the Fifth Circuit, and states that it agrees with the dissenting
Judge in Vine. Cash Biz, 551 S.W.3d at 119-20.

It concludes, as he did, that although some lenders may be gaming
the system by taking actions like the lenders took there and as
Cash Biz took here, more is required for waiver of a contractual
right to arbitrate. The Fifth Circuit explicitly declined to follow
the same reasoning. Further, and as the Court has already
addressed, the law of the case doctrine provides that "an issue of
law or fact decided on appeal may not be reexamined either by the
district court on remand or by the appellate court on a subsequent
appeal. The Fifth Circuit's careful opinion regarding PLS'
argument, therefore, may not be reexamined absent a change in
applicable law.

PLS fails to demonstrate that its appeal of the arbitrability of
its case is a sufficiently serious legal question to favor a
discretionary stay.

There is no serious legal question presented regarding PLS's appeal
of the class certification decision

When an overwhelming majority of cases support certification of a
class, it is less likely a serious legal question is involved in a
class certification decision. M.D. v. Perry, No. CIV.A. C-11-84,
2011 WL 7047039, at *1 (S.D. Tex. July 21, 2011). Notwithstanding
Perry, the Fifth Circuit has granted a stay before.

In In re Deepwater Horizon, the Fifth Circuit determined that
serious legal questions were present in a case involving one of the
largest and most novel class actions in American history. 732 F.3d
326, 345 (5th Cir. 2013). These questions, the court continued,
were so serious that they would affect the course of class action
law in this country going forward, and the class action as a
suitable vehicle for the resolution of conflict for businesses and
litigants. Recognizing that the balance of equities favored the
movant, the movant had demonstrated a substantial case on the
merits, and the serious legal question presented, the Fifth Circuit
granted a tailored stay. It is readily apparent that the decision
to grant class certification here in no way involves serious legal
questions of the caliber involved in Deepwater Horizon. Even so,
the balance of equities consideration takes great importance in the
determination of whether to grant a discretionary stay.

The balance of equities weighs against granting a stay.

A determination of the balance of equities, i.e. consideration of
the other three factors, is critically relevant to the court's
determination. If a court finds this balance is not heavily tilted
in the movant's favor, the movant must then make a more substantial
showing of likelihood of success on the merits. Each of the three
factors is addressed below.

PLS will not experience irreparable injury if this proceeding is
not stayed

The party moving to stay proceedings must prove more than just a
possibility of irreparable injury.  Further, an injury is not
irreparable if it can be sufficiently undone with monetary
remedies.  The Court has, in the past, acknowledged that the cost
of pretrial litigation and discovery for defending a class action
lawsuit with numerous plaintiffs can amount to irreparable
hardship.

Importantly, Cruson involved a class numbering in the thousands or
tens of thousands. Although defending a class action lawsuit may
cause hardship, typically the expense and annoyance of litigation
is part of the social burden of living under government.

The class in this case contains approximately eighty borrowers, a
number far from reaching the level the Court has identified in the
past as capable of causing irreparable harm. Thus, no irreparable
harm will befall PLS based upon class size. The cost of defending
the case while the potential for arbitration looms, however, is a
closer call. The Court is mindful of the possibility that the Fifth
Circuit's decision could render any subsequent outcomes in this
case moot. But the Fifth Circuit has addressed this issue already:
The only grounds for irreparable injury proffered by Miller are
that he will be required to incur the time and expense of
litigation and may lose the benefits of arbitration. The Court
rejects the idea that arbitration ensures substantial speed and
cost savings, so these considerations alone do not constitute
irreparable injury.

The Court is thus unconvinced that this factor of the balance of
the equities weighs in favor of granting a discretionary stay.

Plaintiffs will be injured if a stay of the proceedings is
granted.

This factor looks to whether a stay will cause non-movants
difficulties in presenting their case. When a class action is
pending, the Fifth Circuit has stated that extensive delays in
proceedings jeopardize plaintiffs' ability to obtain discovery from
individuals whose memories may be fading as time passes, as well as
their ability to obtain and collect a judgment against the
defendant. The court determined this period of time prejudiced
plaintiffs in bringing their case.

In the present case, the Plaintiffs,  have been waiting for more
than three years since they initially filed suit. During this time,
Plaintiffs were subjected to a yearlong stay of proceedings pending
PLS' first appeal. This constitutes sufficient harm to the
nonmoving party, as it increases the difficulty they already face
presenting their case. For these reasons, the Court finds this
factor weighs against granting the motion to stay.

The public interest favors denying the motion to stay.

There is a general public policy of preserving judicial resources
from the risk of reversal, especially where a difficult question is
presented on appeal, but where the movant fails to present a
likelihood of success on the merits, there is little reason to
invoke this policy interest.

The Court has already determined PLS fails to demonstrate a
likelihood of success on the merits of its appeal. Therefore, there
is no reason to invoke the public policy of preserving judicial
resources. The interest in speedy resolution of disputes prevails,
and the public interest favors denying the motion to stay.

All of the factors considered in a determination of the balance of
equities favor denying the motion to stay. PLS fails to demonstrate
it will suffer irreparable harm, Plaintiffs are likely to be harmed
should these proceedings be delayed any further, and the public
interest in speedy resolution of cases outweighs an interest in
preserving judicial economy.

PLS fails to show that the remaining three factors weigh in favor
of the court granting a discretionary stay pending PLS's appeals

The last three factors considered in the traditional four-factor
test are considered in the above analysis of the balance of
equities. The first two factors are the most critical to an
analysis of the traditional four-factor standard. When a movant
fails to show a likelihood of success on the merits and the balance
of equities does not support granting a stay, the district court
should deny the motion to stay the proceedings pending the movant's
appeal.  

PLS failed to show that the two most critical factors the Court
considers favor a stay: there is not a likelihood of success on the
merits of either issue on appeal and there is no demonstration that
PLS will experience irreparable harm absent a stay. The balance of
equities also weighs against granting a stay, and PLS failed to
show it should be allowed a lower threshold requirement under the
exception. For these reasons, the Court denies PLS's Motion to Stay
Proceedings Pending Appeal.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 9, 2019
Memorandum Opinion and Order is Available at
https://tinyurl.com/yxl6t256 from Leagle.com.

Lucinda Vine & Kristy Pond, Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel
Raymond Dutko, Rusty Hardin & Associates, LLP, 5 Houston Center,
1401 McKinney, Suite 2250, Houston, TX, 77010, H. Mark Burck,
Hanszen Laporte LLP, Daniel R. Dutko, Hanszen Laporte LLP,1420
Memorial Drive, Houston, Texas  14201, M. Mitchell Moss, Moss Legal
Group, PLLC, 5845 Cromo Dr., Ste. 2 El Paso, Texas 79912 & Ryan
Kees Higgins, Rusty Hardin & Associates, LLP. 5 Houston Center,
1401 McKinney, Suite 2250, Houston, TX 77010

PLS Financial Services, Inc. & PLS Loan Store of Texas, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by J. Austen Irrobali --
airrobali@tillotsonlaw.com -- Tillotson Law, Jeffrey Mark Tillotson
-- jtillotson@tillotsonlaw.com -- Tillotson Law & Jonathan R.
Patton -jchilders@lynnllp.com -- Lynn Pinker Cox & Hurst LLP.


POSTMATES INC: Rogers Sues over Fax Advertisements
--------------------------------------------------
RICHARD ROGERS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. POSTMATES INC., the Defendant, Case No.
3:19-cv-5619 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 6, 2019), contends that the
Defendant promotes and markets its merchandise, in part, by sending
automated text message advertisements to cellular telephone users,
in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

On or about April 8, 2019, Defendant transmitted or caused to be
transmitted, by itself or through an intermediary or
intermediaries, an automated text message offering its "gig
economy," courier-connection services without Plaintiff's prior
express consent or prior express written consent, and without
providing Plaintiff a mechanism to stop receiving such messages in
the future, the lawsuit says.

Postmates is an American logistics company that operates a network
of couriers who deliver goods locally. As of February 2019,
Postmates operates in 2,940 U.S. cities.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Frank S. Hedin, Esq.
          HEDIN HALL LLP
          Four Embarcadero Center, Suite 1400
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone:  (415) 766-3534
          Facsimile: (415) 402-0058
          E-mail: fhedin@hedinhall.com

PREMIER DERMATOLOGY: Court Dismisses Smith TCPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in the case
captioned KIMBERLY SMITH, STEVEN SMITH and OLWEN JAFFE,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. PREMIER DERMATOLOGY, FOREFRONT MANAGEMENT, LLC, and
ERELEVANCE CORPORATION, Defendants. No. 17 C 3712. (N.D. Ill.).

After receiving a number of text messages from eRelevance sent on
behalf of defendants Premier Dermatology and Forefront Management,
LLC, plaintiffs brought this suit, alleging that defendants
violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by sending
them text messages via an automatic telephone dialing system
without their consent.

The Court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A genuine dispute of
material fact exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. The Court may not
weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations, but
the party opposing summary judgment must point to competent
evidence that would be admissible at trial to demonstrate a genuine
dispute of material fact.  

In pertinent part, the TCPA provides as follows:

   (1) Prohibitions - It shall be unlawful (A) to make any call
(other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the
prior express consent of the called party using any automatic
telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice
(iii) to any telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone
service, unless such call is made solely to collect a debt owed to
or guaranteed by the United States.

(3) Private right of action. If the court finds that the defendant
willfully or knowingly violated this subsection or the regulations
prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion,
increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more
than 3 times the amount available.

EFFECT OF ACA INTERNATIONAL

The TCPA vests the Federal Communications Commission (0FCC) with
responsibility to promulgate regulations implementing the Act's
requirements. ACA Int'l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 693 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
In 1992, the FCC promulgated regulations that adopted the statutory
definition of an ATDS essentially verbatim, without elaborating.

In a series of regulatory rulings beginning in 2003, the FCC
addressed the definition of an ATDS under the TCPA, and plaintiffs
argue that these rulings are binding and controlling for purposes
of the present motion. Defendants argue, however, that this series
of rulings is no longer good law under ACA International v. FCC,
885 F.3d at 703, which explicitly set aside the relevant portions
of the FCC's 2015 ruling, the most recent in the series, and,
according to defendants, necessarily invalidated the remainder of
the series, to the extent they addressed the definition of an ATDS.
As a result, defendants argue, the statutory language alone
provides the applicable definition of an ATDS.

In its 2003 ruling, the FCC interpreted the TCPA's ATDS definition
to include predictive dialers, equipment that was not conceptually
different from a classic ATDS, which automatically dialed numbers
randomly or sequentially, but that, when certain computer software
is attached, also assists telemarketers in predicting when a sales
agent will be available to take calls by calling stored numbers in
a manner that maximizes efficiencies for call centers by ensuring
that when a consumer answers the phone, a sales person is available
to take the call.

INTERPRETING THE STATUTORY DEFINITION

As stated above, the TCPA defines an ATDS as follows:

(1) The term automatic telephone dialing system means equipment
which has the capacity (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to
be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and(B) to
dial such numbers.

The plain text of the statutory definition provides that an ATDS is
a device that (1) stores or produces telephone numbers that (2)
were randomly or sequentially generated and (3) dials them
automatically.

Because the Court finds that the statutory definition is not
ambiguous, it need not reach plaintiffs' arguments about the
context and the structure of the statutory scheme. But even if the
Court were to consider them, they are unpersuasive.

Plaintiffs argue that the statute's exemption for ATDS calls made
with prior express consent of the called party is meaningless if an
ATDS must generate numbers randomly or sequentially, because no one
using an ATDS to make calls at random would have any opportunity to
determine whether the called party had consented to the call.

Similarly, the TCPA allows for treble damages for willful or
knowing violations, but this provision, too, according to
plaintiffs, is meaningless if applied to ATDS calls made at random,
for a similar reason: calling at random could never be a willful or
knowing violation because the caller would never know in advance
that the called party had not consented to the call. But the Court
is not convinced.

First, it does not follow from the fact that all ATDSs must have
the capacity to use randomly or sequentially generated numbers that
they cannot but call numbers at random or in sequence; rather, it
is possible to imagine an ATDS device that both has the capacity to
generate numbers randomly or sequentially and can be programmed to
avoid dialing certain numbers, including numbers that belong to
customers who have not consented to receive calls from a particular
marketer.

Second, even assuming no such device were possible and ATDS calls
were necessarily to random or sequential numbers, it does not
follow that the prior express consent and willful or knowing
violation language in the statute is meaningless or superfluous
because in neither case does the language apply only to ATDSs.

In 47 U.S.C. Section 227(a)(1)(A), prior express consent exempts a
caller from liability for making any call to a cellular phone using
any ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice. The willful or
knowing violation language applies not only to the prohibition on
calls to cellular phones using an ATDS or artificial or prerecorded
voice in Section 227(a)(1)(A) but also to the similar prohibition
on such calls to residential phones in subsection (B), the
prohibition on junk faxes in subsection (C), and so on. It might
well have been Congress's intention for these particular provisions
to do little or no work in relation to ATDS calls, the Court
disagrees with plaintiffs that it would be absurd to so interpret
the statute.

Similarly, plaintiffs argue that the TCPA's exemption for calls
made to collect government debt, would serve no purpose if an ATDS
must be capable of generating numbers randomly or sequentially; any
caller seeking to collect a debt would attempt to call the debtor's
number, not a random number. But again, this argument ignores the
artificial or prerecorded voice language in Section 227(a)(1)(A),
which provides an independent basis for the exemption.

Plaintiffs purport to dispute this fact by citing an eRelevance
executive's deposition testimony that the system can be programmed
to do anything that is computationally possible. But this is
insufficient to create a genuine dispute of fact because, as ACA
International explained, it is the system's "present capacity, not
its potential capacity, that matters. The Court agrees with the
D.C. Circuit that interpreting the word capacity in the TCPA's
definition of an ATDS to mean potential capacity, i.e., capacity a
device lacks at present but might gain after a modification such as
an app download, is utterly unreasonable in the breadth of its
regulatory inclusion.

But this unreasonable interpretation, soundly rejected in ACA
International, is exactly what plaintiffs urge by suggesting that
the eRelevance system is an ATDS because it can be programmed to
generate random or sequential numbers. What matters is not what the
device has the potential to do, depending on how it might be
programmed in the future, but what it can actually do, and it must
be able to use randomly or sequentially generated numbers.
Plaintiffs have not shown that there is a genuine factual dispute
as to whether the eRelevance system could use randomly or
sequentially generated numbers when they received the offending
text messages.

The proposed testimony of plaintiffs' expert witness, Randall
Snyder, is of no help to them in this regard. Mr. Snyder proposes
to testify that the eRelevance system is an ATDS under the TCPA
because it automatically sends text messages to stored numbers.
But, as the Court has explained, that is not the proper standard;
an ATDS must have the capacity to use randomly and sequentially
generated phone numbers. Plaintiffs do not dispute that Mr. Snyder
does not propose to testify that the eRelevance system had or has
that capacity nor have plaintiffs pointed to other evidence
creating a genuine factual dispute on that point.

Because the eRelevance system cannot use randomly and sequentially
generated phone numbers, the system does not qualify as an ATDS.
Defendants' text-message marketing campaigns therefore did not
violate the TCPA, and defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 9, 2019
Memorandum Opinion  and Order is Available at
https://tinyurl.com/y3ah3gg4 from Leagle.com.

Kimberly Smith & Steve Smith, on behalf of themselves, and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Jeffrey
Michael Salas -- jsalas@salaswang.com -- Salas Wang LLC, Alexis M.
Wood -- alexis@consumersadvocates.com -- Law Offices Of Ronald A.
Marron, pro hac vice, David Louis Gerbie, Mcguire Law, P.c., Eugene
Y. Turin, Mcguire Law, P.C., 55 W. Wacker Drive, 9th Fl., Chicago,
IL 60601, Kas Larene Gallucci -- kas@consumersadvocates.com -- Law
Offices Of Ronald A. Marron, Aplc, pro hac vice, Ronald Albert
Marro -- ron@consumersadvocates.com -- Law Office Of Ronald A.
Marron, pro hac vice & Marron A. Ronald, Law Offices Of Ronald A.
Marron.

Olwen Jaffe, Plaintiff, represented by David Louis Gerbie, Mcguire
Law, P.c., Eugene Y. Turin, Mcguire Law, P.C. & Marron A. Ronald,
Law Offices Of Ronald A. Marron.

Premier Dermatology & Forefront Management LLC, Defendants,
represented by Matthew D. Guletz – mguletz@thompsoncoburn.com --
Thompson Coburn Llp.

Forefront Dermatology, Defendant, represented by David Matthew
Rownd @thompsoncoburn.com, Thompson Coburn LLP d/b/a Thompson
Coburn Fagel Haber, Emily Louise Peel,  Thompson Coburn LLP, 55
East Monroe Street, 37th Floor Chicago, Illinois 60603, Matthew D.
Guletz, Thompson Coburn Llp & Patrick Morales-Doyle --
pmoralesdoyle @thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson Coburn Llp.

ERelevance Corporation, Defendant, represented by David Philip
Whittlesey -- david.whittlesey@shearman.com -- Shearman & Sterling
LLP, pro hac vice, Jonathan Booker Cifonelli --
jcifonelli@pjjlaw.com -- Pugh, Jones & Johnson, P.C., Walter Jones,
Jr. -- wjones@pjjlaw.com -- Pugh, Jones & Johnson, P.C. & Zeke
Nathaniel Katz -- zkatz@pjjlaw.com -- Pugh, Jones & Johnson.


PUEBLO NUEVO: Martinez et al Seek OT Pay for Employees
------------------------------------------------------
CARLOS YOVANNICASCO, GERMAN ADONAY MARTINEZ CHAVARRIA, ERIC JAIME
CHIPILAN, KEY EDIXON MARTINEZ, and, NIXON MISAEL MARTINEZ,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs, vs. PUEBLO NUEVO MEAT CORP. D/B/A CHERRY VALLEY
MARKETPLACE, and MARTIN ESPINAL and FRANCIS DE LOS ANGELES, as
individuals, the Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-05052-WFK-JO (EDNY.
Sept. 5, 2019), seeks to recover damages for egregious violations
of state and federal wage and hour laws arising out of Plaintiffs'
employment with the Defendants.

The Defendants employed over 50 employees within the past three
years subjected to similar payment structures.

The Defendants permitted Plaintiffs and the Collective Class to
work more than 40 hours per week without appropriate overtime
compensation. The Defendants' unlawful conduct has been widespread,
repeated, and consistent.

The Plaintiffs and the Collective Class are current and former
employees of Defendants who have been denied overtime pay in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Law.

The Defendant had knowledge that Plaintiffs and the Collective
Class performed work requiring overtime pay. Defendants' conduct
was willful and in bad faith, and has caused significant damages to
Plaintiffs and the Collective Class, the lawsuit says.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by”

          Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
          HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          80-02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
          Kew Gardens, NY 11415
          Telephone: 718-263-9591

RASH CURTIS: Court Awards $267K in McMillion Suit
-------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an a Final Judgment in the case captioned SANDRA
McMILLION, JESSICA ADEKOYA, and IGNACIO PEREZ, on Behalf of
Themselves and all Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. RASH
CURTIS & ASSOCIATES, Defendant. Case No. 4:16-cv-03396-YGR. (N.D.
Cal.).

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23, 54, and 58, the
Court now enters Final Judgment on behalf of the certified
Classes.

Consistent with the jury's verdict on May 13, 2019, each member of
the Classes shall recover from the Defendant, Rash Curtis &
Associates, the amount of $500 per call made in violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, for an aggregate award in favor
of the Classes of $267,349,000.

With regard to Plaintiff Ignacio Perez's individual claim under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, Plaintiff Perez shall recover
from Defendant, Rash Curtis & Associates, the amount of $500 per
call made in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act,
for an aggregate award in favor of Plaintiff Perez of $7,000.

The Classes and Plaintiff Perez are entitled to post-judgment
interest on the jury's award at a rate of 2.36% per annum.

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(h)(1) and 54(d),
and Local Rule 54, any motion for attorneys' fees, expenses, costs,
and incentive awards shall be filed no later than 14 days after
entry of this Judgment. Notice of the motion shall be directed to
Class Members pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h)(1). Class Members
may object to the motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h)(2).
Plaintiff shall file a motion for a proposed notice plan in
accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h)(2) within 28 days of the
entry of Final Judgment.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 9, 2019 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/y44zuhxs from Leagle.com.

Ignacio Perez, on Behalf of Themselves and all Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Yeremey O. Krivoshey --
ykrivoshey@bursor.com -- Bursor Fisher, P.A., Blair E. Reed --
breed@bursor.com -- Bursor and Fisher, P.A., L. Timothy Fisher --
ltfisher@bursor.com -- Bursor & Fisher P.A., Lawrence Timothy
Fisher, Bursor & Fisher, P.A. & Scott Bursor -- scott@bursor.com --
Bursor & Fisher P.A.

Rash Curtis & Associates, Defendant, represented by Andrew M.
Steinheimer, Ellis Law Group, LLP, 1425 River Park DriveSuite
400Sacramento, CA 95815, Anthony Paul John Valenti --
AValenti@EllisLawGrp.com -- Ellis Law Group, LLP, Lawrence Keith
Iglesias -- liglesias@ellislawgrp.com -- Ellis Law Group, LLP &
Mark Ewell Ellis -- mellis@ellislawgrp.com -- Ellis Law Group, LLP


Kourtney Richardson, Movant, represented by Yeremey O. Krivoshey --
ykrivoshey@bursor.com -- Bursor Fisher, P.A.


RESTAURANT MANAGEMENT: Lopez Files Suit Over Sick Leave Dispute
---------------------------------------------------------------
Hermelinda Lopez, on behalf of herself and similarly situated
laborers, known and unknown, Plaintiff, v. Restaurant Management
Corp. d/b/a McDonald's, Defendant, Case No. 2019CH10438 (Circuit
Ct., Cook Cty., Ill., Sept. 10, 2019) is a lawsuit arising under
the Chicago Earned Sick Leave Ordinance ("CESLO").

Effective July 1, 2017, Chicago employers are obligated to provide
covered employees with at least 1 hour of Earned Sick Leave for
every 40 hours worked. The Defendant violated the CESLO by
requiring Plaintiff to show a doctor's note upon taking 1 day of
sick leave, threatening to suspend employees who failed to provide
a doctor's note, and by failing to compensate Plaintiff for sick
leave properly taken. In addition, Plaintiff, and other similarly
situated laborers, known and unknown, were harmed by Defendant'
failure to post notice to employees of their right to Earned Sick
Leave under the CESLO, violating the Ordinance's notice and posting
requirements, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is employed by Defendant as an hourly employee.

Restaurant Management Corp. is a corporation organized under the
laws of the State of Indiana doing business in Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Christopher J. Williams, Esq.
     National Legal Advocacy Network
     53 W. Jackson Blvd, Suite 1224
     Chicago, IL 60604
     Phone: (312) 795-9121


RITE AID: Court Narrows Claim in Acetaminiphen Gelcaps Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned THOMAS BAILEY,
Plaintiff, v. RITE AID CORPORATION, Defendant. Case No.
18-cv-06926-YGR. (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Thomas Bailey brings this putative class action against
defendant Rite Aid Corporation (Rite Aid) asserting eight causes of
action arising out of defendant's sale and marketing of its
over-the-counter rapid release acetaminophen gelcaps.

Defendant's MTD attacks the FAC on five bases.

First, defendant contends that plaintiff's claims are preempted by
Section 379r of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act
of 1996 (FDAMA).

Second, and in the alternative, defendant asserts that the FAC
should be dismissed under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.  

Next, defendant argues that the UCL, FAL, and CLRA claims fail
under Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b) as well as for failure to allege a
duty to disclose with respect to the UCL claim and application of
California's safe harbor doctrine.  

Fourth, defendant contends that plaintiff's Song-Beverly Act and
UCC claims fail to allege breach of any warranty.

Finally, the motion seeks dismissal of the unjust enrichment and
declaratory and injunctive relief claims as derivative and
duplicative of his other claims and similarly flawed.

The Court addresses each argument in turn.

Preemption

Under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution, state
law that conflicts with federal law is without effect. Federal
preemption of state law, however, will not lie unless it is the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress. If a federal statue
contains an express preemption clause, the plain wording of the
clause necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress'
preemptive intent.

The Natural Uniformity Nonprescription Drugs provision of the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. Section 379r, includes an
express preemption provision, which the provides:

No State or political subdivision of a State may establish or
continue in effect any requirement  (1) that relates to the
regulation of a drug that is not subject to the requirements of
Section 353(b)(1) or 353(f)(1)(A) of this Title4[, in other words,
a non-prescription, over-the-counter (OTC), drug and(2) that is
different from or in addition to, or that is otherwise not
identical with, a requirement under the FDCA.

Here, plaintiff's claims rely on the contention that defendant
misrepresented the effectiveness, in terms of speed of relief, of
their OTC acetaminophen products. Plaintiff does not allege that
defendant fails to comply with an FDA regulation as it currently
exists, so none of their claims are parallel enforcement claims
would still be allowed. Therefore, the question is whether
plaintiff's claims seek relief that lies outside the scope of the
relevant federal requirements.

Plaintiff does not dispute the standard nor does he contend that
his claims lie within the scope of the relevant federal
requirements. Rather, plaintiff claims that the FDA has not
regulated rapid release OTC acetaminophen, thus no relevant federal
requirements are at issue.

Defendant disagrees, asserting that extensive federal regulatory
scheme governs the marketing and sale of OTC drugs. Defendant
argues that plaintiff's claims are preempted by (1) a tentative
final monograph issued by the FDA in 1988 (1988 TFM) and (2) two
FDA guidance documents.

The Court addresses both guidance documents.

First, with respect to the 1998 TFM, defendant concedes that the
FDA has not issued a final monograph for OTC acetaminophen products
but asserts that a tentative final monograph such as the 1988 TFM
has the force and effect of a final monograph. The Court agrees
that the 1998 TFM has such force and effect. The FDA regulations
state that when an OTC drug monograph has not been finalized and
finalization is not imminent the agency may publish a notice of
enforcement policy that allows marketing to begin pending the
completion of the final monograph. On this basis, the Court finds
that the 1998 TFM constitutes federal regulation.

Defendant asserts that the 1998 TFM requires the testing proceeds
for acetaminophen tablets to meet the dissolution standard as
contained in the USP document titled Fourth Interim Revision
Announcement, Dissolution that was last revised in November of 2016
(USP Document).  

Plaintiff counters that this FDA Guidance is covered with
disclosures warning that the document is non-binding. The Court
agrees and finds that the FDA Guidance does not constitute a
requirement under the FDCA within the meaning of the Section
379r(a).

Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff's claims are not
preempted by any federal regulation and DENIES defendant's motion
on that basis.

Primary Jurisdiction

Defendant's primary jurisdiction argument essentially reiterates
its defendant's preemption argument, that is, because the FDA has
an extensive regulatory scheme regarding the labeling of OTC drugs,
the Court should dismiss the FAC and defer to the FDA to clarify or
determine any such ambiguity in the regulations and to take any
enforcement action FDA believes appropriate. As an initial matter,
defendant's argument does not provide any authority for a court
dismissing a complaint under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
where express preemption did not already exist.

Here, the 1988 TFM was issued over thirty years ago and the
defendant itself has argued that FDA has treated the 1988 TFM as
final rulemaking, suggesting that there is nothing currently
pending before the FDA on this matter. Accordingly, the Court finds
that primary jurisdiction does not apply and DENIES defendant's
motion on that basis.

Plaintiff's Consumer Protection Claims

Defendant presents a number of arguments regarding plaintiff's
consumer protection claims. The Court addresses each, in turn.

First, defendant argues that plaintiff's FAL, UCL, and CLRA claims,
are all premised on the allegation that Rite Aid falsely and
misleadingly labeled the Rite Aid Products as `Rapid Release and
therefore should be dismissed because plaintiff failed to state a
claim that plausibly entitles him to any relief and also fails to
comply with Rule 9(b)'s particularity pleading standard for claims
of fraud and deception.   

Plaintiff counters that defendant's advertising for and labeling of
the Rite Aid RR Gelcaps indicates that the rapid release product
offers the consumer faster relief than other, cheaper acetaminophen
products, such as the traditional Rite Aid tablets.

Under California's Consumer Protection Laws, a statement need not
necessarily be untrue, if a reasonable consumer could find the
statement would be either actually misleading or having the
capacity, likelihood, or tendency to deceive or confuse the public.


Taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, he has alleged that
the labeling of the Rite Aid RR Gelcaps plausibly confuse or
mislead the public. Plaintiff alleges that defendant sells Rite Aid
RR Gelcaps as an alternative to traditional acetaminophen caplets,
which are sold at a lower price and do not contain the rapid
release language on the label.

First, defendant argues that plaintiff cannot rely on a lack of
substantiation argument to support their claim because the study to
which plaintiff's point does substantiate the Rapid Release claims
as it shows the Rite Aid Products easily satisfy the FDA standard
and guidance for rapid release. This argument misconstrues
plaintiff's FAC. Plaintiff does not rely on lack of substantiation
to make his claims. He merely uses a scientific study as evidence
in support of his allegation that the labeling of the Rite Aid RR
Gelcaps misled consumers. For the same reason, defendant's argument
that plaintiff lacks standing to bring a lack of substantiation
claim fails.

Second, defendant asserts that the labeling of and advertisements
for Rite Aid RR Gelcaps constitute mere puffery. The Court
disagrees. Unlike the circumstances in Cook, Perkiss and Liehe Inc.
v. Northern Cal. Collection Service Inc., upon which defendant
relies, plaintiff has asserted facts which would plausibly lead to
the conclusion that a reasonable consumer could interpret the Rite
Aid labels to contain factual statements upon which he or she could
rely.  

Fourth, defendant argues that plaintiff has not plausibly alleged
any facts that demonstrate that Rite Aid had a duty to disclose to
customers who bought the Rite Aid RR Gelcaps that other products
worked faster, and therefore cannot state a concealment claim.  

In California, in transactions which do not involve fiduciary or
confidential relations, a cause of action for non-disclosure of
material facts may arise in at least three instances: (1) the
defendant makes representations but does not disclose facts which
materially qualify the facts disclosed, or which render his
disclosure likely to mislead (2) the facts are known or accessible
only to defendant, and defendant knows they are not known to or
reasonably discoverable by the plaintiff (3) the defendant actively
conceals discovery from the plaintiff.

Thus, plaintiff alleges that defendant represented that the Rite
Aid RR Gelcaps were rapid release" but failed to qualify that
statement with the fact that relief would be no more rapid than
that provided by defendant's non-rapid release products suffice.
These allegations satisfy at least one instance described above.

Finally, defendant claims that plaintiff's FAL, UCL, and CLRA
claims should be dismissed under California's safe harbor doctrine
because Rite Aid has complied with the FDA regulatory scheme for
using the words rapid release. This argument fails for the same
reasons that defendant's preemption argument fails. Defendant has
not established any federal law or regulation that governs the use
of the word rapid release with respect to OTC acetaminophen.  

The Court denies this portion of defendant's motion.

Warranty Claims

Defendant asserts that plaintiff's warranty causes of action, under
the Song-Beverly Act and the UCC, do not plausibly allege that Rite
Aid failed to conform to the promises or affirmations of fact on
the container or label. The only language to which plaintiff refers
are the words rapid release and Compare to the active ingredients
in Extra Strength Tylenol Rapid Release Gels and, thereafter, they
make the generalized contention that the Rite Aid RR Gelcaps do not
confirm to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the label
or in advertising and marketing of the product.  

However, plaintiff fails to refer to or allege that there is actual
language on the packaging for defendant's Rite Aid RR Gelcaps or
elsewhere on the product, which actually promises faster relief.
Nor have the plaintiffs cited to any actual wording which
incorporates comparative representations, i.e. faster as opposed to
fast, or more rapid as opposed to rapid. To say that a product
provides rapid relief is like saying it provides fast relief. It is
unclear what the warranty breach would be in that context.
Likewise, plaintiff has not alleged that defendant's challenged
products do not in fact provide pain relief.

The Court GRANTS this portion of defendant's motion and dismisses
plaintiff's warranty claims with leave to amend.

Unjust Enrichment, Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Claims

Finally, defendant asserts that plaintiff's claims for unjust
enrichment and declaratory relief fail because they cannot serve as
a standalone claim for relief. Defendant is correct that in
California, there is not a standalone cause of action for unjust
enrichment, which is synonymous with "restitution." However, unjust
enrichment and restitution are not irrelevant in California law.
Rather, they describe the theory underlying a claim that a
defendant has been unjustly conferred a benefit through mistake,
fraud, coercion, or request. Therefore, when a plaintiff alleges
unjust enrichment, a court may "construe the cause of action as a
quasi-contract claim seeking restitution."

Plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to relief because defendant
sold the Rite Aid RR Gelcaps to plaintiff by making false,
misleading, and/or deceptive representations about the products'
speed and capabilities as compared to Rite Aid's cheaper, non-rapid
release acetaminophen products and unjustly charged a premium to
purchase the gelcaps and therefore, obtained monies that rightfully
belong to plaintiff and class members. This straightforward
statement is sufficient to state a quasi-contract cause of action.


Accordingly, the Court denies defendant's motion with respect to
plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment.

Declaratory relief, on the other hand, remains a form of relief
that may be requested in conjunction with a cognizable cause of
action, rather than an independent cause of action under California
law.  Accordingly, the Court grants defendant's motion with respect
to this argument and dismisses with prejudice plaintiff's claim for
declaratory relief.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 9, 2019 Order is
Available at   https://tinyurl.com/y2q9zurl from Leagle.com.

Thomas Bailey, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Brittany A. Boswell  --
BBoswell@simmonsfirm.com -- Simmons Hanly Conroy, pro hac vice,
Crystal Gayle Foley -- cfoley@simmonsfirm.com -- Simmons Hanly
Conroy LLC, Adam A. Edwards -- adam@gregcolemanlaw.com -- Greg
Coleman Law PC, An V. Truong -- atruong@simmonsfirm.com -- Simmons
Hanly Conroy, pro hac vice, Eric Steven Johnson --
ejohnson@simmonsfirm.com -- Simmons Hanly Conroy, pro hac vice,
Gregory F. Coleman -- greg@gregcolemanlaw.com -- Greg Coleman Law
PC, Jay Barnes -- jaybarnes@simmonsfirm.com -- pro hac vice, Mark
E. Silvey -- mark@gregcolemanlaw.com -- Greg Coleman Law PC, pro
hac vice & Mitchell M. Breit- mbreit@simmonsfirm.com -- Simmons
Hanly Conroy LLC.

Rite Aid Corporation, Defendant, represented by David Alexander
Hickerson -- dhickerson@foley.com -- Foley Lardner LLP, pro hac
vice, Eileen Regina Ridley -- eridley@foley.com -- Foley & Lardner
LLP Attorneys at Law, Jarren Neil Ginsburg -- jginsburg@foley.com
-- Foley and Lardner LLP, pro hac vice & Joshua R. Parr --
jparr@foley.com -- Foley and Lardner LLP.


RJS03, LLC: Faces Matzura Suit in Southern District of New York
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against RJS03, LLC. The case
is captioned as Steven Matzura, on behalf of himself and all other
persons similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. RJS03, LLC, the
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-08055-ALC (SDNY, Aug. 28, 2019). The
suit alleges violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The
case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Darryn Solotoff, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF DARRYN G SOLOTOFF PLLC
          100 Quentin Roosevelt Boulevard, Ste 280
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 317-2453
          Facsimile: (516) 706-4692
          E-mail: ds@lawsolo.net

ROBIN INDUSTRIES: Court Grants Conditional Certification in Byerly
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio,
Eastern Division, issued an Memorandum Opinion and Order granting
Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification in the case
captioned SARAH BYERLY, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. ROBIN INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant. Case No.
1:19-cv-1004. (N.D. Ohio).

Byerly filed her complaint against Robin Industries alleging
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and the Ohio
Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act (OMFWSA). Byerly seeks to bring
this as a collective action for the FLSA claim and as a Rule 23
class action for the OMFWSA claim. Byerly alleges that employees of
Robin Industries are required to record their time using Robin
Industries' timekeeping system. She further alleges that, when
employees clocked in, Robin Industries would round the employees'
start time to the start of their scheduled shift for purposes of
calculating the employees' pay.

Byerly's motion seeks to conditionally certify the following
collective:

     All former and current non-exempt employees employed by
Defendant at one of Defendant's Ohio facilities who worked forty
(40) or more hours in one or more workweeks within three years
preceding the date of filing of this Complaint to the present (the
Collective Class).

Robin Industries argues that conditional certification should not
be granted for two reasons.

First, Robin Industries asserts that Byerly has failed to establish
that she is similarly situated to entire categories of non-exempt
employees because the declarations accompanying her motion speak to
only one job classification at two of defendant's four facilities
and each job classification and facility is unique. Specifically,
defendant maintains that the personal protective equipment (PPE)
required to be worn is different for each job position at each
facility, and that the transition between shifts in facilities
where there are shifts is different for each job position. A
collective, however, can be conditionally certified if the putative
members were victims of a common policy or plan that violated the
law.

Here, Byerly satisfies this common policy test, alleging that the
putative members were subjected to one or both of two common
policies: the rounding of time sheets with respect to start and
stop times; and the failure to pay for time spent both donning and
doffing necessary equipment and getting directions from previous
shift workers.

Second, defendant argues that Byerly's interests are in direct
conflict with other potential members of the collective who have
ownership interests in Robin Industries which is an employee-owned
company an ESOP).  

In reply, plaintiff points out that, undoubtedly, all owners of
companies would prefer that the value of their shares not be
reduced through liability for wage and hour violations; but,
defendant's status as an employee-owned company does not give it
license to violate wage and hour laws, with no recourse for
employees who suffered the alleged violations.  

The Court concludes that plaintiff has met the fairly lenient
burden for conditional certification of this action as a collective
action, subject to decertification following discovery, should that
prove necessary.  

Plaintiff's motion for conditional certification and
court-authorized notice  is granted. The Court conditionally
certifies the following collective under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b):

All former and current non-exempt employees employed by defendant
Robin Industries, Inc. at one of defendant's Ohio facilities who
worked forty (40) or more hours in one or more workweeks within
three years preceding the date of filing of this Complaint to the
present (the collective).

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 9, 2019
Memorandum Opinion and Order is Available at
https://tinyurl.com/y5nn3xb4 from Leagle.com.

Sarah Byerly, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Hans A. Nilges, Nilges Draher, Robi J.
Baishnab, Nilges Draher, Shannon M. Draher, Nilges Draher & Jeffrey
J. Moyle, Nilges Draher, 7266 Portage St NW Suite D, Massillon, OH
44646

Robin Industries, Inc., Defendant, represented by Arthur M. Kaufman
-- ak@kdglegal.com -- Kaufman, Drozdowski & Grendell, James M.
Drozdowski -- jimd@kdglegal.com -- Kaufman, Drozdowski & Grendell &
Nancy A. Oliver -- spo@kdglegal.com -- Kaufman, Drozdowski &
Grendell.


ROSCOE CAMPSITE: Website not Accessible to Blind, Matzura Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
STEVEN MATZURA, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHER PERSONS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, the Plaintiffs, vs. ROSCOE CAMPSITE PARK LLC,
the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-08082-AT (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 2019),
seeks permanent injunction to cause a change in Defendant's
corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that Defendant's
website will become and remain accessible to blind and
visually-impaired consumers pursuant to the Americans With
Disabilities Act New York State Human Rights Law and New York City
Human Rights Law.

The Plaintiff is a visually impaired and legally blind person who
requires screen-reading software to read website content using his
computer. The Plaintiff uses the terms "blind" or
"visually-impaired" to refer to all people with visual impairments
who meet the legal definition of blindness in that they have a
visual acuity with correction of less than or equal to 20 x 200.
Some blind people who meet their definition have limited vision.
Others have no vision.

Because Defendant's website http://roscoecampsite.com/is not
equally accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers and
violates the ADA for its failure to design, construct, maintain,
and operate its website to be fully accessible to and independently
usable by Plaintiff and other blind or visually-impaired people.
Defendant's denial of full and equal access to its website, and
therefore denial of its products and services offered thereby and
in conjunction with its physical locations, is a violation of
Plaintiff's rights under the ADA.

Based on a 2010 U.S. Census Bureau report, approximately 8.1
million people in the United States are visually impaired,
including 2.0 million who are blind, and according to the American
Foundation for the Blind's 2015 report, approximately 400,000
visually impaired persons live in the State of New York.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Darryn G. Solotoff, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF DARRYN SOLOTOFF
          100 Quentin Roosevelt Blvd, No. 208
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: 516.695.0052
          Facsimile: 212.656.1845
          E-mail: ds@lawsolo.net

               - and -

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Telephone: 212 228 9795
          Facsimile: 212.982.6284
          E-mail: nyjg@aol.com
                  danalgottlieb@aol.com

ROYAL WINE: Weisberg Sues over 100% Pure Grape Juice Labeling
-------------------------------------------------------------
Cynthia Weisberg, individually on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Royal Wine Corporation d/b/a
Kedem Food Products and Kedem LLC d/b/a Kedem Food Products, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05061-MKB-SMG (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 5,
2019), seeks to remedy deceptive and misleading business practices
of the Defendants with respect to the marketing and sales of Kedem
100% Pure Grape Juice.

The Defendants manufacture, sell, and distribute the Product using
a marketing and advertising campaign centered around claims that
their Product is "Pure Grape Juice," when, in fact it contains an
additional ingredient, namely potassium metabisulfite, a synthetic
preservative, the lawsuit says.

The Plaintiff and Class Members paid a premium for the Product over
and above comparable products that did not purport to be "Pure
Grape Juice." Given that Plaintiff and Class Members paid a premium
for the Product based on Defendants' misrepresentations, Plaintiff
and Class Members suffered an injury in the amount of the premium
paid.

According to the complaint, the Defendants' conduct violated and
continues to violate, inter alia, New York General Business Law
sections 349 and 350, the consumer protection statutes of all 50
states, and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. The Defendants breached
and continues to breach their express and implied warranties
regarding the Product. The Defendants have been and continue to be
unjustly enriched.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Class are:

          Joseph Lipari, Esq.
          THE SULTZER LAW GROUP P.C.
          14 Wall Street, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 618-1938
          Facsimile: (888) 749-7747
          E-mail: liparij@thesultzerlawgroup.com

SALVATION ARMY: Gebel Suit Asserts BIPA Violation
-------------------------------------------------
NANCY GEBEL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. THE SALVATION ARMY, Defendant, Case No.
2019CH10496 (Circuit Ct., Cook Cty., Ill., Sept. 11, 2019) is a
class action for money damages arising from Defendant's violations
of the Biometric Information Privacy Act, in that Defendant
unlawfully collected, stored, and used Plaintiffs and other
similarly situated individuals' biometric identifiers and/or
biometric information without providing adequate written notice or
obtaining informed written consent.

Beginning in March of this year, the Plaintiff was required to
submit her fingerprint, at the direction of and for use by
Defendant. At no time was Gebel informed in writing that her
biometrics were being collected or stored, or the specific purpose
and length of time for which her biometrics were being collected,
stored, and used. Moreover, at no time did Gebel execute a written
release or authorization permitting Defendant to utilize, collect,
capture, or store her biometrics. Gebel was never provided with a
publicly available written policy regarding a schedule or guideline
for the retention and permanent destruction of her biometrics.

The Plaintiff and the putative BIPA Class members have continuously
and repeatedly been exposed to risks, harmful conditions, and
violations of privacy through Defendant's violations of BIPA, says
the complaint.

Plaintiff Nancy Gebel is a resident citizen of Oak Lawn, Illinois.
Gebel performs work for Defendant as a therapist.

Defendant operates several divisions and offices throughout the
State of Illinois, including but not limited to the Chicago Metro
Division where Plaintiff worked.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Alejandro Caffarelli, Esq.
     Lorrie T. Peeters, Esq.
     Caffarelli & Associates Ltd.
     224 S. Michigan Ave., Ste. 300
     Chicago, IL 60604
     Phone: (312) 763-6880


SCHROON RIVER: Faces Matzura Suit in Southern District of New York
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Schroon River
Campsites, LLC. The case is captioned as Steven Matzura on behalf
of himself and all other persons similarly situated, the Plaintiff,
vs. Schroon River Campsites, LLC, the Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-08083-RA (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 2019). The suit alleges
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge Ronnie Abrams.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Darryn Solotoff, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF DARRYN G SOLOTOFF PLLC
          100 Quentin Roosevelt Boulevard, Ste 280
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 317-2453
          Facsimile: (516) 706-4692
          E-mail: ds@lawsolo.nets

SCIENTIAE, LLC: Retina Assoc. Sues over Fax Advertisements
----------------------------------------------------------
RETINA ASSOCIATES MEDICAL GROUP, INC., individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. SCIENTIAE, LLC,
and MONTEFIORE MEDICINE ACADEMIC HEALTH SYSTEM, INC., f/k/a ALBERT
EINSTEIN COLLEGE OF MEDICINE, INC., d/b/a ALBERT EINSTEIN COLLEGE
OF MEDICINE, the Defendants, Case No. 8:19-cv-01709 (C.D. Cal.,
Sept. 6, 2019), contends that the Defendant promotes and markets
its merchandise, in part, by sending unsolicited fax advertisements
messages to fax machines or computers throughout the United States,
in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Scientiae LLC is in the Educational Services business. Montefiore
Health System is a premier academic medical center and the
University Hospital for Albert Einstein College of Medicine.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Seth M. Lehrman, Esq.
          EDWARDS POTTINGER LLC
          425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: 954 524-2820
          Facsimile: 954 524-2822
          E-mail: seth@epllc.com

SEQUOIA FUND: 2nd Cir. Affirms Dismissal in Edwards
---------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court's judgment granting
Defendant's Motion for Dismiss in the case captioned THOMAS EDWARDS
AND MICHAEL FORTUNE, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SEQUOIA FUND, INC., A
Maryland Corporation, Defendant-Appellee. No. 18-3467-cv. (2nd
Cir.).

Plaintiffs-appellants Thomas Edwards and Michael Fortune,
shareholders of the Fund, brought this putative class action
alleging that the Fund entered into a contract with its
shareholders to observe that policy, and that the Fund breached
this contract when, due to an increase in the value of its
healthcare assets, the value of those assets came to exceed 25% of
its overall assets.

The district court granted the Fund's motion to dismiss pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), holding that there was no
enforceable contract and, even assuming there was an enforceable
contract, there was no breach.

The Court turn to the question of whether Plaintiffs have plausibly
alleged that the Fund concentrated its investments in the
healthcare industry in violation of the Concentration Policy.
Plaintiffs concede that under the 1983 Guidance a requirement not
to concentrate would not give rise to an obligation to divest if
the concentration (exceeding 25%) resulted from changes in market
values rather than from transactions by the Fund. They argue,
however, that the 1998 Guidance rescinded the 1983 Guidance and
that the 1998 Guidance does not permit concentration by passive
increase.

The Court disagrees.

Plaintiffs contend that because the 1998 Guidance rescinded the
1983 Guidance, the Concentration Policy did not incorporate by
reference the 1983 Guidance's definition of concentration. Relying
on a footnote from the 1998 Guidance, Plaintiffs argue that the SEC
unambiguously states that all prior Guides, Generic Comment Letters
and Guide Releases were not being republished, were rescinded, and
should not be applied henceforth. At the very least, Plaintiffs
argue that the Concentration Policy is ambiguous and its meaning
should not be resolved at the motion to dismiss stage.

While not expressly speaking to the issue of passive increases, the
section of the 1998 Guidance addressing concentration cites to and
effectively incorporates Guide 19, which allows for such increases.
It repeatedly indicates continuity with the SEC's previous policy
regarding concentration. Nothing in the 1998 Guidance suggests a
change in SEC policy regarding concentration such as rescinding the
prior exception for passive increases.

The Court assumes that the agency would not adopt such a major
change sub silentio, in a guidance document that cites and
repeatedly indicates continuity with prior guidance on the issue in
question. If the SEC had indeed adopted such a change,
non-concentrating funds would be required to constantly monitor for
sudden increases and decreases in asset values, and adjust their
investments in each industry to avoid exceeding the 25% threshold.6
It seems doubtful that the SEC would adopt such a major change
without calling attention to it and without explanation.

Accordingly, the Concentration Policy defines concentration by
reference to Guide 19 of the 1983 Guidance, and so a fund is
concentrating in an industry when, at the time of purchase,
investing in an industry would lead the fund to have more than 25%
of its net assets in that industry.  

Here, Plaintiffs alleged only that the Fund violated the
Concentration Policy by allowing its investment in healthcare
industry stocks  to exceed 25% of the value of its net assets and
failing to take any action to bring the Fund within its policy
limitations. Because the 1998 Guidance and by extension the
Concentration Policy allows for such passive increases, Plaintiffs
have failed to allege a violation of the Concentration Policy.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Second Circuit's September 9, 2019 Opinion
is Available at https://tinyurl.com/y5az3wv2 from Leagle.com.

FELICIA S. ENNIS (Alan M. Pollack , on the brief), Robinson Brog
Leinwand Greene Genovese & Gluck, P.C., 875 3rd Avenue New York, NY
10022  and Raymond Farrow -- rfarrow@kellerrohrback.com -- and Mark
A. Griffin -- mgriffin@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback
L.L.P., Seattle, Washington, on the brief, for
Plaintiffs-Appellants.

ROBERT A. SKINNER -- Robert.Skinner@ropesgray.com -- (Amy D. Roy --
Amy.Roy@ropesgray.com -- and Lee S. Gayer --
Lee.Gayer@ropesgray.com -- on the brief), Ropes & Gray LLP, Boston,
Massachusetts, and New York, New York, for Defendant-Appellee.


SOUTHERN CONNECTIONS: Guerra Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------------
ROLANDO GUERRA AND EDUARDO GUERRA, Individually and On Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. SOUTHERN CONNECTIONS
AND SERVICES, INC. Defendant, Case No. 7:19-cv-00216 (W.D. Tex.,
Sept. 11, 2019) is a collective action to recover overtime
compensation and all other available remedies under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938.

Plaintiffs were paid both straight time and a day rate for each
week worked, regardless of the number of hours worked in each day
or each week, notes the complaint. Plaintiffs were misclassified as
independent contractors, despite the fact that they worked full
time for Defendant, and virtually every aspect of their job was
controlled by Defendant. Defendant misclassified Plaintiffs, and
those similarly situated, as independent contractors to avoid
paying employment taxes, workers' compensation insurance, benefits
and overtime, asserts the complaint. During their time with
Defendant, Plaintiffs typically worked 100-120 hours per week. Yet
Plaintiffs and others similarly situated did not receive any
additional compensation for the hours worked above forty in a
week.

Plaintiffs were hired by Defendant as Torque Turn, Thread Rip and
Casing Running Tool ("CRT") workers.

Southern Connections and Services, Inc. provides drilling and
completion rigs in the oil and gas industry.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Josh Borsellino, Esq.
     Morgan Scott, Esq.
     Borsellino, P.C.
     1020 Macon St., Suite 15
     Fort Worth, TX 76102
     Phone: (817) 908-9861
     Facsimile: (817) 394-2412
     Email: josh@dfwcounsel.com
            morgan@oilfieldovertime.com


STEVEN COHEN: Herz Files FDCPA Suit in New York
-----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against the Law Offices of
Steven Cohen LLC. The case is styled as Shimon Herz, on behalf of
himself and all other similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff v.
Law Offices of Steven Cohen LLC and Palisades Collection, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05299 (E.D. N.Y., Sept. 17, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

The Law Offices of Steven Cohen specializes in commercial &
consumer collection cases, complex & real estate litigation, &
construction law in NY & NJ.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Adam Jon Fishbein, Esq.
   Adam J. Fishbein, P.C.
   735 Central Avenue
   Woodmere, NY 11598
   Tel: (516) 668-6945
   Email: fishbeinadamj@gmail.com


SUMMIT THERAPEUTIC: Fails to Pay Minimum Wages & OT, Jones Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
STEPHONIA JONES, an individual, on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. SUMMIT THERAPEUTIC SERVICES,
INC., a California corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,
the Defendants, Case No. 19CV353991 (Cal. Super., Aug. 30, 2019),
alleges that Defendant failed to pay minimum wages and overtime
under the California Labor Code.

As a result of Defendants' unlawful policies and practices, the
Plaintiff and Class members incurred overtime hours worked for
Which they were not adequately and completely compensated, in
addition to the hours they were required to work off the clock, the
lawsuit says.

The Plaintiff are others similarly situated  are current and former
non-exempt employees of the Defendant.

Summit offers a crafted progressive model of education, training
and therapeutic interventions through a behaviorally-oriented
clinical approach to assist participants towards independence and
success, in any situation or environment.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, are:

          David Yeremian, Esq.
          Jason Rothman, Esq.
          DAVID YEREMIAN & ASSOCIATES,
          535 N. Brand B1Vd., Suite 705
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Telephone: (818) 230-8380
          Facsimile: (8 1 8) 230-0308
          E-mail: David@yeremianlaw.com
                  Jason@veremianlaw.com

               - and -

          Emil Davtyan, Esq.
          DAVTYAN PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION
          5959 Topanga Canyon Blvd, Suite 130
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (818) 875-2008
          Facsimile: (818) 722-3974
          E-mail: emil@davtvanlaw.com

SWISSPORT FUELING: Reyes Files Labor Class Action in Calif.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Genesis Reyes, as an individual and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. SWISSPORT FUELING, INC. a
Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants,
Case No. 19CV354532 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara Cty., Sept. 11,
2019) is a class and representative action within the Court's
jurisdiction under California Labor Code Sections 226 and 2698.

This Complaint challenges systemic illegal employment practices
resulting in violations of the California Labor Code against
individuals who worked for Defendant. The Defendants, jointly and
severally, have acted intentionally and with deliberate
indifference and conscious disregard to the rights of all employees
in Defendants' failure to provide accurate payroll records, and by
creating and maintaining policies, practices and customs that
knowingly deny employees rights and benefits, says the complaint.

Plaintiff began employment with Defendant in April 2019.

General Atomics is licensed to do business in the State of
California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Larry W. Lee, Esq.
     Kristen M. Agnew, Esq.
     Nicholas Rosenthal, Esq.
     DIVERSITY LAW GROUP, P.C.
     515 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 1250
     Los Angeles, CA 90071
     Phone: (213) 488-6555
     Facsimile: (213) 488-6554

          - and -

     William L. Marder, Esq.
     Polaris Law Group LLP
     501 San Benito Street, Suite 200
     Hollister, CA 95023
     Phone: (831) 531-4214
     Fax: (831) 634-0333



T & D RESORTS: Faces Murphy Suit in Southern District of New York
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against T and D Resorts Inc.
The case is captioned as James Murphy, on behalf of himself and all
other persons similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. T and D
Resorts Inc., the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-08040-VEC (S.D.N.Y.,
Aug. 28, 2019). The suit alleges violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Valerie E.
Caproni.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Darryn Solotoff, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF DARRYN G SOLOTOFF PLLC
          100 Quentin Roosevelt Boulevard, Ste 280
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 317-2453
          Facsimile: (516) 706-4692
          E-mail: ds@lawsolo.net

TESLA INC: Court Won't Review Attorneys Fees Ruling in Wilson
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion for
Reconsideration in the case captioned BRIAN WILSON, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. TESLA, INC., et al., Defendants. Case No.
17-cv-03763-JSC. (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiffs have now filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Court's order on attorneys' fees and costs and the class
representative incentive award under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(1) and (6).

Plaintiffs Brian Wilson, Carrie Hughes, and Katia Segal filed this
wage and hour class action against their employer, Tesla, Inc. and
Tesla Motors, Inc. alleging that Tesla misclassified them as exempt
employees and failed to provide them overtime, rest and meal
breaks, wage statements, and final wages.

Plaintiffs then filed a motion for preliminary approval. The Court
filed its order granting final approval of the class action
settlement and granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs'
motion for attorneys' fees and costs and incentive awards for the
class representatives.

Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a motion for
reconsideration under Local Rule 7-11. The Court denied the motion
as procedurally improper because Local Rule 7-11 governs
administrative motions during the pendency of an action and the
action had been terminated and judgment entered in Plaintiffs'
favor.   

The Court advised Plaintiffs that there were two ways to seek
substantive reconsideration of an order following entry of
judgement: (1) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) (motion to
alter or amend a judgment) or (2) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b) (motion for relief from judgment).  

Plaintiffs thereafter filed the now pending motion for
reconsideration under Rule 60(b)(1) which Defendant does not
oppose.

Plaintiffs raise five issues with respect to the Court's Order;
none warrants relief under Rule 60(b)(1) or (6).

Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate either that the Court made a
mistake of fact or law in its Order or that there are otherwise
extraordinary circumstances which justify relief so as to prevent
manifest injustice.

First, Plaintiffs lament that the Court did not advise counsel at
the final approval hearing that it intended to reduce the
attorneys' fees and costs award or the incentive awards. Plaintiffs
fundamentally misunderstand motion and hearing practice if they
believe that the Court is required to preview its thinking with
respect to the motions before it and give the parties the
opportunity to be heard on every issue. Oral argument is at the
judge's discretion.
  
Plaintiffs had notice that the Court had concerns both with the
request for attorneys' fees and the incentive award. The Court's
preliminary approval order stated that Plaintiffs have thus failed
to persuade the Court that attorneys' fees of 33.3 percent of the
fund are appropriate; however, the Court will wait until final
approval to make a determination as to fees. Along with the
parties' final approval filings with the Court, Plaintiffs shall
submit detailed billing records and an explanation of their
counsels' hourly rate so that the Court may determine an
appropriate lodestar figure.

Likewise, with respect to the incentive payment, the Court stated
that Plaintiffs' request for a $10,000 incentive award each is
higher than the amount generally awarded by courts in this
district. Plaintiffs thus had fair warning about the Court's
concerns and an opportunity to present any evidence regarding their
request for attorneys' fees and costs and an incentive award to the
Court with their final approval motion.  

Second, Plaintiffs contend that the Court erred when it asked for
counsels' detailed billing records at the final approval hearing,
but did not advise counsel that they should explain any discrepancy
between the lodestar amount that appeared in their motion for
attorneys' fees ($160,895) and the total on the detailed billing
records ($231,889.25). Plaintiffs repeatedly insist that Court told
Class Counsel not to file anything else with the records.

However, as the transcript of the hearing demonstrates, the Court
told counsel that they did not need to file a motion in order to
file the billing records under seal not that counsel did not need
to submit a cover letter or explanatory document with the billing
records. Common sense would dictate that if you are going to submit
something to the Court that reflects a $70,0000 discrepancy between
your actual billing records and the summary you provided to the
Court that you would explain it.

Third, Plaintiffs contend that the Court erred in its lodestar
calculation. However, the Court used the lodestar that counsel
insists is the correct lodestar—the one in the motion for
attorneys' fees. In reviewing the reasonableness of counsels' fee
request, the Court used the detailed billing records because the
exceedingly broad and vague categories in the chart which
accompanied the motion for attorneys' fees were inadequate to allow
the Court to evaluate the reasonableness of the hours expended.

Here, the Court found that the chart was not adequately detailed
and thus relied on the detailed billing records. In doing so, the
Court identified four issues in the detailed billing records which
gave it concern regarding the reasonableness of the hours expended:
(1) the request for fees for work the Court ordered them to redo
(2) billing of over 60 hours for travel time (3) excessive block
billing entries and (4) inconsistent billing records for example,
billing records for work done in the future.

Counsel insists that they already exercised billing judgment to
reduce the amount of fees sought by 134 hours which would
ameliorate or off-set any concern that might exist regarding the
reasonableness of the requested hours. Leaving aside that counsel
could and should have explained this when offering the detailed
billing records, the chart which accompanied the motion for
attorneys' fee and which counsel insists contains the correct
lodestar likewise contains the issues the Court identified. That
is, counsel sought over $10,000 for work spent on the second motion
for preliminary approval and included large amounts of time for
traveling to the mediation and court hearings for both Ms. Martin
and Ms. David despite the fact that as the Court noted, counsel
presumably was working on other matters or could have been during
this travel time.

At bottom, Plaintiffs' complaint is that the Court declined to
award a multiplier when using the lodestar rather than the
percentage-of-the-fee method for awarding attorneys' fees. However,
the choice of a fee calculation method is generally one within the
discretion of the trial court, the goal under either the percentage
or lodestar approach being the award of a reasonable fee to
compensate counsel for their efforts.

Here, the Court found that the lodestar method provided the most
reasonable fee award because counsels' performance in this action
did not warrant a 1.595 multiplier which is what a 25% of the
recovery award would have resulted in. Under California law, once
the court has fixed the lodestar, it may increase or decrease that
amount by applying a positive or negative multiplier to take into
account a variety of other factors, including the quality of the
representation, the novelty and complexity of the issues, the
results obtained, and the contingent risk presented.

In their motion for attorneys' fees, counsel argued that a 1.595
multiplier was warranted because of the results of the action, the
contingent nature of counsel's fee arrangement, the skill required
in conducting the litigation and succeeding in the settlement.  

However, California law is clear that a multiplier or fee
enhancement is not automatic. Indeed, "the results obtained factor
can only properly be used to enhance a lodestar calculation where
an exceptional effort produced an exceptional benefit.

So too here. The results obtained factor does not warrant an
enhancement. If anything, the quality of the representation here
would warrant a downward adjustment as in Thayer. While the Court
does not wish to belabor its concerns with counsels' performance
here (as they have already been outlined in prior orders), it feels
that it must address them again given that the motion to alter
judgment appears not to grasp the extent of counsels' deficient
performance.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to show that the Court
committed a mistake of law or fact with respect to the lodestar
calculation or that the Court committed a manifest injustice when
it declined to award a multiplier.

Fourth, Plaintiffs insist that the Court erred in reducing the
costs for taxi rides by fifty percent. Counsel had claimed $484.43
for taxi costs for travel between San Francisco Airport and the
courthouse for Ms. David and Ms. Martin for the two preliminary
approval hearings and the status conference, which the Court
reduced to $242.22. The Court found that the expenses were
excessive and that counsel was not entitled to costs for traveling
for the second preliminary approval hearing or the status
conference (the Court reduced counsels' claimed expenses for
airfare and hotels on this latter basis as well). Plaintiffs
insists that the Court erred in doing so because Ms. Martin and Ms.
David took different flights to the two preliminary approval
hearings and thus were unable to share a taxi. Even if so, this
only addresses part of the Court's concern with the taxi costs that
it overstated the cost of a taxi ride and not that counsel was only
entitled to expenses related to the first approval hearing.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the Court's
reduction of Plaintiffs' claimed taxi costs was a mistake.

Fifth and finally, Plaintiffs raise three issues regarding the
Court's reduction of the incentive awards for the three class
representatives. Plaintiffs sought $10,000 for each class
representative which the Court reduced to $5,000 as is standard in
this district. The Court reduced the amount because an incentive
award of $10,000 was disproportional to each class member's
recovery, the class representatives did not play a particularly
active role in the litigation as they did not attend the mediation
and the case settled before there was any motion practice or
discovery such as depositions, Plaintiffs had not provided support
for their claim that numerous articles appeared about class
representatives which damaged their reputation, and the incentive
payments were to be paid from the class fund such that any
incentive payment reduced the class recovery.  

In sum, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances sufficient to justify extraordinary relief.  

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motion to alter judgment under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(6) is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 9, 2019 Order is
Available at https://tinyurl.com/y2gaango from Leagle.com.

Brian Wilson, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Carrie Hughes, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated & Katia Segal, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly sitatued, Plaintiffs, represented by Lindsay
Christine David , San Diego County Law Offices, Alisa Ann Martin --
alisa@amartinlaw.com -- Amartin Law & Sandra David Brennan --
sbrennanesq@sbcglobal.net -- Brennan & David Law Group.

Tesla, Inc., a corporation, doing business as Tesla Motors, Inc.,
Defendant, represented by Jack Steven Sholkoff --
jack.sholkoff@ogletreedeakins.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak
& Stewart, P.C. & Susan Tianyang Ye, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak &
Stewart, P.C, Steuart Tower One, Market Plaza Suite 1300, San
Francisco, CA 94105

Tesla Motors, Inc., a corporation, Defendant, represented by Jack
Steven Sholkoff, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C..


TOLTECA ENTERPRISES: Class Certified Under FDCPA in Hackler Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Xavier Rodriguez grants the Plaintiff's Motion for Class
Certification in the lawsuit styled SADIE HACKLER, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated v. TOLTECA ENTERPRISES,
INC. DBA THE PHOENIX RECOVERY GROUP, Case No. 5:18-cv-00911-XR
(W.D. Tex.).

The Court certifies this class:

     All persons in the United States and its territories who,
     within the year preceding the filing of this suit, were sent
     an initial communication letter by Defendant that:

     * Had these words in this order: "If you dispute the
       validity of this debt within 30 days from receipt of this
       notice, we will mail verification of the debt to you.  If
       you do not dispute the validity of this debt within 30
       days, from receipt of this notice, we will assume it is
       valid."

     * Regardless of whether the letter contained the words "in
       writing" and "written request," the letter included the
       statement "Your balance may reflect a one-time agency
       collection fee."

     * The class does not include persons who, prior to the date
       the action is certified to proceed as a class, either (1)
       provided Defendant with a notice of a bankruptcy filing,
       (2) commenced an action in any court against Defendant
       alleging violation of the FDCPA, (3) signed a general
       release of claims against Defendant, (4) is a judge
       assigned to this case or is a member of such judge's staff
       or immediate family, or (5) Defendant can demonstrate that
       the Form Letter was not received by the addressee.

The case is brought under the Federal Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.  The Plaintiff alleges that her former landlord
turned over to the Defendant a debt owed to the landlord for
repairs.  The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant's initial
communication with her on June 5, 2018 (the "Form Letter") failed
to conform to FDCPA's Section 1692g requirement that the letter
inform her of her right to dispute in writing the alleged validity
of the debt.[CC]

TORRES FARM: Faces Santos Suit in California Superior Court
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Torres Farm Labor
Contractor Inc. The case is captioned as BERNARDO SANTOS, AS AN
INDIVIDUAL AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, the
Plaintiff, vs. TORRES FARM LABOR CONTRACTOR INC., A CALIFORNIA
CORPORATION, the Defendant, Case No. BCV-19-102470 (Cal. Super.
Aug. 30, 2019). The case is assigned to the Hon. Stephen D.
Schuett. The suit alleges employment-related violation.

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Scott Michael Lidman Esq.
          LIDMAN LAW
          222 N Sepulveda Blvd, Ste 1550
          El Segundo, CA 90245-5629
          Telephone: (424) 322-4772
          Facsimile: (424) 322-4775
          E-mail: slidman@lidmanlaw.com

UNITED STATES: N-N Files Class Suit in New York
-----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Kevin K. McAleenan.
The case is styled as N-N, O-D-B, G-V-R, I-M-R, M-B, N-P-G, E-L-C,
Y-L-P, Z-M-A, O-T, M-D-M, E-S-R and M-J-L, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Kevin K.
McAleenan, Kenneth Cuccinelli, Acting Director and Donal Neufeld,
Associate Director, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05295 (E.D. N.Y.,
Sept. 17, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Other
Immigration Actions filed pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
Act.

The Defendants are government representatives.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

   Matthew D. Grant, Esq.
   Arnold & Porter LLP
   399 Park Avenue
   New York, NY 10022
   Tel: (212) 715-1015
   Email: matthew.grant@aporter.com




V3 ELECTRIC: Faes Massey Suit in California Superior Court
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against V3 Electric, Inc., et
al. The case is captioned as Massey, Joseph On behalf of all others
similarly situated, the  Plaintiff, vs. Joshua D. Collette; Does
1-100; Nethercott, Alex; V3 Electric, Inc.; and Axel York, the
Defendants, Case 34-2019-00263666-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super., Aug 28,
2019). The suit alleges employment related violation.

V3 Electric is California's residential solar provider.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Galen Tadashi Shimoda, Esq.
          SHIMODA LAW CORP.
          9401 E Stockton Blvd Ste 200
          Elk Grove, CA 95624
          Telephone: (916) 525-0716
          Facsimile: (916) 760-3733
          E-mail: attorney@shimodalaw.com

VALLEY AUTO TRANSPORT: Removes Brink Case to E.D. California
------------------------------------------------------------
Central Valley Auto Transport, Inc. removes case captioned as
CHRISTIAN BRINK and DAVID MAIER on behalf of themselves, all others
similarly situated, and on behalf of the general public, the
Plaintiffs, vs. CENTRAL VALLEY AUTO TRANSPORT, INC.; and DOES
1-100, the Defendants, Case No. VCU2 74266 (Filed May 6, 2018),
from  Tulare County Superior Court, to the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of California on Aug. 30, 2019. The
Eastern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-01213-AWI-SKO to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff filed the complaint on behalf of "all non-exempt,
truck workers, truck drivers, drivers, or similar job designations
who are presently or formerly employed by the Defendant.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay all straight
time wages; pay all overtime wages; provide meal periods; authorize
and permit rest periods; and authorize and permit recovery periods
under the Unfair Competition Law.[BN]

Attorneys for the Defendant are:

          David J. Cooper, Esq.
          Vanessa Franco Chavez, Esq.
          Mayra Estrada, Esq.
          KLEIN, DENATALE, GOLDNER,
            COOPER, ROSENLIEB & KIMBALL, LLP
          4550 California Ave., Second Floor
          Bakersfield, CA 93309
          Telephone: 661-395-1000
          Facsimile: 661-326-0418
          E-mail: dcooper@kleinlaw.com
                  vchavez@kleinlaw.com
                  mestrada@kleinlaw.com

W.R. SAINSBURY: Burch et al Seek OT Pay for Maintenance Personnel
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ANDY BURCH and DAVID CAVOTO, on their own behalf, and on behalf of
all similarly situated individuals, the Plaintiffs, vs. W.R.
SAINSBURY IRRIGATION INC., a Florida Profit Corporation, and
WILLIAM SAINSBURY, Individually, the Defendants, Case No.
8:19-cv-02193-WFJ-JSS (M.D. Fla., Aug. 30, 2019), seeks to recover
unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, declaratory
relief and other relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

As a result of the Defendants' intentional, willful, and unlawful
acts in refusing to pay Plaintiffs time and one-half of their
regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of 40 per
workweek in one or more workweeks, the Plaintiffs have suffered
damages, plus incurred reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.

The Defendant provides irrigation maintenance and design services.
The Plaintiffs performed labor and maintenance duties for the
Defendants.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiffs are:

          Brianna A. Jordan, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          201 N. Franklin Street, Suite 700
          Tampa, Florida 33602
          Telephone: 813-393-5457
          Facsímile: 813-393-5481
          E-mail: bjordan@forthepeople.com

WASHOS, INC: Salguero Seeks Unpaid Wages for Car Washers
--------------------------------------------------------
JESUS SALGUERO, an individual, for himself and all members of the
putative class, the Plaintiff, vs. WASHOS, INC., a Delaware
Corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, the Defendants,
Case No. 9STCV30309 (Cal. Super., Aug. 28 2019), alleges that
Defendants violated the California Labor Code by failing to pay
minimum wages, overtime, meal period premiums, rest period
premiums, and final wages.

According to the complaint, WASHOS willfully misclassifies its
washers as independent contractors to deprive them of fundamental
employment rights, the lawsuit says.

WASHOS is an on-demand mobile car wash company. To get a car wash,
users download the WASHOS smartphone app and schedule a car wash.
WASHOS then sends a uniformed washer-referred to as a "washos
pro"-to the user's desired destination.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Putative Class are:

          R. Rex Parris, Esq.
          Kitty K. Szeto, Esq.
          John M. Bickford, Esq.
          Ryan A. Crist, Esq.
          PARRIS LAW FIRM
          43364 10th Street West
          Lancaster, CA 93534
          Telephone: (661) 949-2595
          Facsimile: (661) 949-7524

WELLNESS SOLUTIONS: Class Certified Under FLSA in Krawczyk Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Aleta A. Trauger grants the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion
for Conditional Certification and Court-Supervised Notice, pursuant
to Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act in the lawsuit
styled WHITNEY KRAWCZYK and BRITTNEY WHITMORE, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated v. WELLNESS SOLUTIONS
GERIATRICS, PLLC, LAURA S. REAVES, STEVEN L. SCESA, JOHN W. CAIN,
II, and GOLDEN GRIFFON, LLC, Case No. 3:19-cv-00323 (M.D. Tenn.).

The Court conditionally certifies this case as an FLSA collective
action consisting of the following group of similarly situated
employees:

     All employees of Defendants who worked at any time from
     mid-November 2018 through February 2019 and who also were
     not paid for their work in whole or in part during this
     period.

The Notice and Consent Form are authorized for distribution via
U.S. Mail and email to all individuals, who fall within the group
of similarly situated employees as defined.  Within 10 days of the
entry of this Order, the Defendants shall, to the extent it is in
their possession, provide counsel for the Plaintiffs with a notice
list in Excel format containing the names, last known mailing
addresses and email addresses of employees who fall within the
class as defined.

Within seven days of receiving the notice list from the Defendants,
the Plaintiffs' counsel, or a third-party designated by the
Plaintiffs' counsel, shall distribute, via U.S. Mail and email, the
Court-authorized Notice.  Each Notice shall be accompanied by the
Consent Form and, when sent by mail, a pre-addressed, prepaid
return envelope.  No other material shall accompany the Notice.
The Plaintiffs' counsel shall use their best efforts to mail all
Notices on the same day so as to establish a single date of
mailing.  The Plaintiffs' Counsel shall bear all costs associated
with distributing the Notice and accompanying material in this
manner, but shall be entitled to petition the Court for a recovery
of such costs.

No later than seven days after the Notice has been sent out via
U.S. Mail and email, counsel for the Plaintiffs shall file with the
Court a certification that the Notice has been mailed and emailed
to the employees who fall within the class definition, consistent
with this Order, which identifies the date of mailing.

All Consent Forms shall be postmarked no later than 90 days from
the date of mailing, or sent to the Plaintiffs' counsel via email
on or before 90 days from the date of mailing.  Nothing in this
Order shall be construed as precluding the Defendants from seeking
to decertify this action at a later date, the Court ruled.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          David W. Garrison, Esq.
          Joshua A. Frank, Esq.
          BARRETT JOHNSTON MARTIN & GARRISON, LLC
          Philips Plaza
          414 Union Street, Suite 900
          Nashville, TN 37219
          Telephone: (615) 244-2202
          Facsimile: (615) 252-3798
          E-mail: dgarrison@barrettjohnston.com
                  jfrank@barrettjohnston.com

               - and -

          Charles Herman, Esq.
          CHARLES HERMAN LAW
          7 E Congress Street, Suite 611A
          Savannah, GA 31401
          Telephone: (912) 244-3999
          Facsimile: (912) 257-7301
          E-mail: charles@charleshermanlaw.com


WHOLE FOODS: Bottled Water Tainted with Arsenic, Berke et al. Say
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DAVID BERKE, LORENZO COLUCCI, and VIENNA COLUCCI, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs.
WHOLE FOODS MARKET, INC., WHOLE FOODS MARKET CALIFORNIA, INC.,
WHOLE FOODS MARKET DISTRIBUTION, INC., WHOLE FOODS MARKET SERVICES,
INC., WHOLE FOODS MARKET GROUP, INC., WFM PRIVATE LABEL, LP, and
WHOLE FOODS MARKET PACIFIC NORTHWEST INC., the Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-07471 (C.D. Cal., Aug. 28, 2019), alleges that Defendants
violated the Unfair Competition Law, the Consumers Legal Remedies
Act, and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act relating to the sale of bottled water contaminated
with aresenic.

The case is a consumer class action against Whole Foods, a
nationwide grocery chain which has promised consumers for decades
that it sells only the highest quality, purest, and most wholesome
foods available.

To attract health-conscious shoppers, Whole Foods boasts that it
maintains "the strictest quality standards in the 15 industry".

Whole Foods also asserts that it adheres to "standards that aren't
standard anywhere else." Its corporate slogan is: "America's
Healthiest grocery Store".

These representations are designed to convince consumers that, if
they shop at Whole Foods, they are buying the safest and healthiest
products in the nation. But this is far from true as to Whole
Foods' own brand of bottled water, Touted as "Protected, Pure,
Unique" and "Untouched by surface contamination", Starkey Water
--– as Whole Foods has known for years -- is heavily contaminated
with arsenic, a metalloid chemical and known carcinogen that can
lead to reproductive harm, circulatory and nervous system
disorders, an increased risk of diabetes and hypertension, stomach
pain and nausea, vomiting and diarrhea, numbness, paralysis,
blindness, and other health problems, the lawsuit says.

Tests dating back to at least 2016 and, as recently as June 2019,
consistently show Starkey Water has some of the highest arsenic
levels of any bottled water presently being marketed in the United
States, with some bottles exceeding the maximum arsenic
contamination levels allowed by federal and state law. In 2016 and
2017, Starkey Water was recalled due to arsenic contamination, and
2019 testing independently conducted by both Consumer Reports and
the Center for Environmental Health confirmed that Starkey Water
contains shockingly high levels of arsenic contamination.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Patricia N. Syverson, Esq.
          Manfred P. Muecke, Esq.
          Elaine A. Ryan, Esq.
          Carrie A. Laliberte, Esq.
          BONNETT, FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN
            & BALINT, P.C.
          600 W. Broadway, Suite 900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (602) 274-1100
          E-mail: psyverson@bffb.com
                    mmuecke@bffb.com
                    eryan@bffb.com
                    claliberte@bffb.com

WOODSTREAM CORP: Heumann Sues over Rodent Rrepeller Products
------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as HENRY H. HEUMANN, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. WOODSTREAM
CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania corporation, the Defendant, Case No.
6:19-cv-01077-GLS-TWD (N.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 2019), is a consumer
protection class action arising out of the Defendant's false and
misleading advertising of its ultrasonic rodent repeller products.

The Defendant markets, sells and distributes a line of ultrasonic
mouse and rat repellers under the "VICTOR (TM)" and "VICTOR (TM)
PESTCHASER (TM)" brand names ("Victor Repellers").

The Defendant represents and sells the Victor Repellers for a
single purpose, which is to "effectively drive away and deter
rodents from your home without the use of toxic chemicals".

The Defendant's advertising claims, however, are false, misleading,
and reasonably likely to deceive the public, the lawsuit says.

The Defendant conveys this uniform rodent deterrent message through
its coordinated advertising campaign through which it represents
that all a consumer has to do is "plug it in" and the Victor
Repellers will "effectively drive away rodents by emitting a highly
irritating noise that can only be heard by rodents."[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          John A. Maya, Esq.
          510 Bleecker Street
          Utica, NY 13501
          Telephone: (315) 733-0455
          Facsimile: (315) 749-7021
          E-mail: johnmaya.law@gmail.com

               - and -

          Timothy G. Blood, Esq.
          Aleksandr J. Yarmolinets, Esq.
          BLOOD HURST & O'REARDON, LLP
          501 West Broadway, Suite 1490
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: 619 338-1100
          E-mail: tblood@bholaw.com
                  ayarmolinets@bholaw.com


                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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