CAR_Public/190926.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Thursday, September 26, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 193

                            Headlines

800 GINZA SUSHI: Workers Seek Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
ACTIVEHOURS INC: Faces Perks et al Suit in N.D. California
AFSCME: Mattos et al. Sue over Collection of Agency Fees
ANTHEM HEALTH: Court OKs Leave to Supplement Motion in Wilson
ARTEX RISK: Shivkov Appeals D. Arizona Decision to Ninth Circuit

BARNEY'S INC: Sheikh Seeks Unpaid Minimum and Overtime Wages
BROADCOM INC: Bid to Dismiss Varjabedian Suit Ongoing
BUDDHA ENTERTAINMENT: Zimmerman Suit Settlement Has Final Approval
CACHET FINANCIAL: Simmons Sues Over Misappropriated Payroll Funds
CADENCE BANCORPORATION: Miller Files Suit Over Share Price Drop

CAPITAL ONE: Curtis et al. Sue over Information Data Breach
CAPITAL ONE: Faces Zimprich Suit in Central District of California
CARON BLACK: Wolf Files Class Suit Over Sale to VMWare
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Can Compel Arbitration in Olsen Suit
CHIPOTLE MEXICAN: Pays $6.5MM to Settle Non-GMO Class Suit

CJ MAHAN: Betzner Suit Remanded to Prairie County Circuit Court
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE: Court Denies Certification in De Lacour Suit
CONDUENT BUSINESS: Direct Express(R) Cards Not Safe, Says Carnley
CONTEXTLOGIC INC: Choon Sues Over Ilegal Sale of Rubber Band Craft
CORTIVA INSITUTE: Class Suit Over Loop Campus Closure Filed

COVANTA HOLDING: Brown Sues BOD Over Unauthorized Payments
COWORX STAFFING: Galvez Seeks Minimum & Overtime Wages
CVS PHARMACY: Court Grants Stay in Ferguson
DEARBORN PANTHEION: Underpays Exotic Dancers, Briggs Alleges
EPDUSA INC: Garcia Hits Illegal Tip Pool, Seeks Overtime Pay

FACEBOOK INC: Bid to Amend Consolidated Adkins Complaint Partly OKd
FEDEX CORP: Continues to Defend Securities Class Suits in New York
FIELDWORK CHICAGO: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Dixie Alleges
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: Haye Suit Moved to District of Maryland
FIRST TECHNOLOGY: N.C. App. Affirms Counterclaims Dismissal

FITNESS EQUIPMENT: Bechtel Sues over Mislabeled Treadmill Product
FORD MOTOR: Appeals Court Orders Review of Class-Action Settlement
FRANKLIN COLLECTION: Bailey Sues over Debt Collection Practices
FREE FLY: Galitz Hits Illegal Telemarketing SMS Ads
FREEDOM MORTGAGE: 4th Cir. Affirms UDTPA Dismissal

FRIENDS HEALTH: Violates FLSA Overtime Provisions, Says Kim Suit
GANNETT CO: Scarantino Challenges Sale to New Media
GAP INC: Has $2.28MM Settlement of Class Suit Over Pricing
GENERAL MOTORS: Uyenoyama Says Car Entertainment Hub Defective
GENESCO INC: Settlement Reached in Chen & Salas Suit

GLASS MOUNTAIN: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Dolemba Suit Alleges
GOLDEN 1: Faces Burgardt Suit in California Superior Court
GREENLANE HOLDINGS: Bragar Eagel Files Class Action Lawsuit
GREENLANE HOLDINGS: Brodsky & Smith Probes Securities Claims
GREENLANE HOLDINGS: Rosen Law Files Class Action Lawsuit

GREYSTAR REAL: Court Narrows Claims in J. Young Suit
H. D. SMITH: Asks Court to Extend Time to Reply to Hestrup Suit
HAYT HAYT: Class Action Over Fake Depositions Certified
HC WAINWRIGHT: Final Judgment Entered in Prodanova Securities Suit
HEADWAY TECH: Glover Sues Over HDD Suspension Assembly Price-fixing

HEADWAY TECHNOLOGIES: Apex Computers Alleges HDD Price-Fixing
HEALTHSPARK FOUNDATION: Harley Appeals Order to Pa. Super. Ct.
HOMEJAB LLC: Chamely Hits Unsolicited SMS Ads
IMPAX LAB: NY Pension Fund Appeals N.D. Cal. Ruling to 9th Cir.
JUST ENERGY: Faces Brodeur Suit Over Securities Law Violations

KAMKAD AUTOMOTIVE: Faces Harris Suit in Dallas State Court
LOOMIS ARMORED: Class in Myers FLSA Suit Conditionally Certified
LOUISIANA REGIONAL: Court Denies Bid to Remand Addison Suit
LUMBER LIQUIDATORS: $4.75MM Settlement Reached in Kramer Suit
MALLINCKRODT ARD: Plumbers Suit Moved to New Jersey Federal Court

MAPLE & ASH: Food Tainted with Pathogens, Ashkar et al. Allege
MDL 2641: Christensen v. CR Bard over IVC Filters Consolidated
MDL 2641: Creech v. CR Bard over IVC Filters Consolidated
MEREDITH CORP: Faces Securities Class Suit in New York and Iowa
MID-SOUTH TRANSPORTATION: Boyland Seeks to Recover Unpaid OT Wages

MIDLAND CREDIT: R&R on Dismissal/Arbitration Bid in Barbosa Adopted
MINOS DINER: Boos Sues Over Underpaid Minimum and Overtime Wages
MISSISSIPPI: Hosemann Appeals Hopkins Suit Ruling to 5th Cir.
MONOTYPE IMAGING: Faces Smith Class Action over Marvel Merger
MONSANTO CO: Glackin Sues Over Herbicide Side Effects

MONSANTO COMPANY: Kubacki Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
NORWOOD SUBARU: Heckman Seeks Overtime Pay for Sales Staff
NOVUS THERAPEUTICS: Jackie888 Class Suit Underway
ORACLE CORP: Oral Argument in Calif. Class Suit Set for Oct. 17
OREGON: Court Sets Hours for Deposition Testimonies in ADA Suit

PARADIS TO GO: Does not Properly Pay Workers, Ortega Suit Says
PEAK RESORTS: Faces Wheby Class Suit Related to Vail Merger
PIZZA HUT: $500K Settlement in Hobon FLSA Suit Has Prelim Approval
PRIDE CHEVROLET: Goodwin Seeks Overtime Pay for Sales Staff
Q CLUB: Back-Charging & Shared Costs Ruling in Dear Suit Affirmed

RADIANT LOGISTICS: Dismissal of Barahona Class Suit Under Appeal
RENSSELAER POLYTECHNIC: Court Dismisses Workers' Parking Cost Suit
RESTAURANT MGT: McDonald's Franchisee Sued Over Sick Leave Law
REXALL SUNDOWN: Nielsen's Protective Order Bid in Seegert Nixed
RODENBURG LLP: 8th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Carroll FDCA Suit

SAFELITE FULFILLMENT: Court Stays M. Young Suit
SANOFI SA: Hagens Berman Files Class Action Over Zantac Risks
SANTANDER CONSUMER: Court Dismisses J. Price FLSA Suit
SCANA CORP: Bid to Vacate Voluntary Dismissal of Warren Suit Nixed
SIMMONS FIRST: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages Under FLSA, Clark Says

SMARTPAY LEASING: Court Enters $11K Judgment in Esparza
SOUTHERN COMPANY: Appeals Class Cert. Order in Securities Suit
SPORTS RESEARCH: Protective Order in Capaci Suit Over Fraud Issued
ST. ANN, MO: Court Refuses Dismissal of Q. Thomas Suit
ST. CLOUD STATE UNIV: Seeks 8th Cir. Review of Ruling in Portz Suit

STEVEN B. KATZ: Anderson Sues over Debt Collection Practices
STORM WATER: Taplin Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages and Damages
STURM FOODS: Court Overrules $25MM Allocation Plan Objection
TAILORED BRANDS: Continues to Defend Twin Hill Suit
TEK-COLLECT INC: Berardi Sues over Debt Collection Practices

TEXAS: Removal of 37 Cole Class Members from LeBlanc Unit Ordered
TEXTRON INC: Zhang Investor Files Class Action Lawsuit
TITAN LOGISTICS: Court Partly OKs Certification in G. Johnston Suit
TOP SHELF PROVISIONS: Seeks 2nd Cir. Review of Order in Piccolo
TRANS WORLD: Discovery in Consolidated Spack Suit Ongoing

TRANS WORLD: New Suit over VIP Backstage Pass Memberships Ongoing
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: $20M Deal in Calif. & Mass. Drivers Suit Okayed
ULTA BEAUTY: Smith-Brown et al. Seek to Certify Class
UNITED STATES: Navy Sued Over Aircraft Noise in Whidbey
VENATOR MATERIALS: Kessler Topaz Files Class Action

VIEWRAY INC: Robbins Geller Files Class Action Lawsuit
VIRTUOSO SOURING: Court Dismisses FDCPA Claims in Gottesman Suit
WELLNESS SOLUTIONS: Krawczyk et al Seek to Certify Class
WILMA PENNINGTON-THURMAN: Sansone Suit Remanded to State Court
ZUORA INC: MTA and Hagens Berman to Lead Securities Suit


                            *********

800 GINZA SUSHI: Workers Seek Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------------
Gelasio Espinobarros Galvez, Salvador Galvez Garcia, Eugenio Luna
Reyes, Placido Galvez Narvaez, Vicente Galindo, and Alexander
Hernandez Vicente, individually and on behalf of other
similarly-situated employees, Plaintiffs, v. 800 GINZA SUSHI INC.
d/b/a GINZA JAPANESE RESTAURANT, XIU LAN HUANG, and CHUN YONG CHEN,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-08549 (S.D. N.Y., Sept. 13, 2018) is
an action seeking monetary, declaratory and injunctive relief to
redress violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the New York
Labor Law, and supporting regulations.

The complaint asserts that Defendants willfully engaged in
violations of the FLSA and NYLL by: (a) failing to pay Plaintiffs
and other similarly-situated employees wages at the minimum hourly
rate required under federal and state law, (b) failing to pay
Plaintiffs and other similarly-situated employees overtime
compensation at one and one-half times their regular rate of pay
for time worked in excess of 40 hours, (c) making unlawful
deductions from Plaintiffs' wages and receiving a "kickback"
because Plaintiffs were required to purchase and maintain bicycles
and accessories, (d) failing to pay Plaintiffs and other
similarly-situated employees "spread of hours pay" as required by
N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs, for each day of work which Plaintiffs
and other similarly-situated employees' spread of hours exceeded
ten, and (e) failing to provide wage notices and wage statements as
required by NYLL.

Plaintiffs were employed by Defendants at the Ginza Japanese
Restaurant.

800 Ginza Sushi Inc. d/b/a Ginza Japanese Restaurant ("Ginza") is a
restaurant located at 800 Lexington Avenue, New York, New York,
10065.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Hope Pordy, Esq.
     Elizabeth Sprotzer, Esq.
     SPIVAK LIPTON LLP
     1700 Broadway, 21st Floor
     New York, NY 10019
     Phone: (212) 765-2100
     Fax: (212) 765-8954
     Email: hpordy@spivaklipton.com
            esprotzer@spivaklipton.com


ACTIVEHOURS INC: Faces Perks et al Suit in N.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------
Mary Perks and Stanley Alexander, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Activehours,
Inc., the Defendant, Case No. 5:19-cv-05543-NC (N.D. Cal., Sept. 3,
2019). The suit alleges fraud-related violation. The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge Nathanael M. Cousins.

Activehours. Inc. designs and develops application software. The
company offers a smartphone-based application that enables users to
get paid for the hours worked when they need it.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jeffrey Douglas Kaliel, Esq.
          KALIEL PLLC
          1875 Connecticut Avenue NW, 10th Floor
          Washington, DC 20009
          Telephone: (202) 350-4783
          E-mail: jkaliel@kalielpllc.com

AFSCME: Mattos et al. Sue over Collection of Agency Fees
--------------------------------------------------------
Gary Mattos, Doris Beegle, Vickie Boggs, Bradley French, Carla
Gurganus, Kimberly Griffith, Steven Hale, John Hill, Benjamin
Ickes, Michelle Lambert, Jessica Merritt, John Meyers, Carole
Miller, Melissa Potter, Jim Rieman, Laurie Rubin, Joyce Stoner,
Russell Stott, and Larry Teets, on behalf of themselves and all
those similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. American Federation
of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, Council 3, the
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-02539-GLR (D. Md., Sept. 3, 2019), asks
the Court to compel the Defendant to return wrongfully seized
agency fees.

The lawsuit notes that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that unions
violated the constitution when they deducted tens of millions of
dollars from non-member public-sector employees. The Plaintiffs are
non-member employees who had their constitutional rights violated
when the Defendant deducted agency fees from them without their
affirmative consent.

AFSCME is a labor union representing public sector employees across
Maryland, headquartered at 190 W Ostend St No. 101, Baltimore, MD
21230 in Baltimore City, Maryland.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Reilly Stephens, Esq.
          Brian K. Kelsey, Esq.
          LIBERTY JUSTICE CENTER
          190 South LaSalle Street, Suite 1500
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone (312) 263-7668
          Facsimile (312) 263-7702
          E-mail: rstephens@libertyjusticecenter.org
                  bkelsey@libertyjusticecenter.org

               - and -

          Aaron Solem, Esq.
          C/O NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEFENSE
          FOUNDATION
          8001 Braddock Rd., Suite 600
          Springfield, VA 22160
          Telephone (703) 321-8510
          Facsimile (703) 321-9319
          E-mail: abs@nrtw.org

ANTHEM HEALTH: Court OKs Leave to Supplement Motion in Wilson
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky, Louisville Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and
Order granting Plaintiff leave to supplement the Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement, Approval of Notice to the
Class, and Scheduling Final Fairness Hearing in the case captioned
MARGARET WILSON, individually and on behalf of a Class of persons
similarly situated, v. ANTHEM HEALTH PLANS OF Defendant KENTUCKY,
INC., Defendant. Civil Action No. 3:14-cv-743. (W.D. Ky.).

Plaintiff Margaret Wilson brings this action against Defendant
Anthem Health Plans of Kentucky (Anthem) seeking relief for alleged
violations of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) and the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of
2008 (MHPAEA).

Whether the Settlement is Not Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate under
Rule 23 (e)(2)

The Court needs more information to determine whether the
Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and meets the because
the requirements of Rule 23(e)(2)(C) and 23(e)(2)(D). Notice to the
class members is thus not appropriate at this time. Under Rule
23(e)(2), a settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate if: (A)
the class representatives and class counsel have adequately
represented the class (B) the proposal was negotiated at arm's
length (C) the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking
into account: (i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal
(ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing
relief to the class, including the method of processing class
member claims (iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney's
fees, including timing of payment  and(iv) any agreement required
to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3)  and(D) the proposal treats
class members equitably relative to each other.

Here, based on the parties' insufficient showing in the Motion, the
Court cannot find, under 23(e)(2)(C), that the relief provided for
the class is adequate. The Court cannot determine whether the
$175,000 in the net settlement fund wholly or partially compensates
the class because, it is unclear how much money members of the
class spent on ABA treatment. Without this information, the Court
cannot determine whether the net settlement fund is adequate.

Given these issues, the Court will grant the Plaintiff leave to
supplement this Motion with the requested information.

For these reasons, and being otherwise sufficiently advised, the
Court ORDERS that Plaintiff is granted leave to supplement the
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement, Approval of
Notice to the Class, and Scheduling Final Fairness Hearing by no
later than.

The Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement, Approval
of Notice to the Class, and Scheduling Final Fairness Hearing is
ADMINISTRATIVELY REMANDED pending supplementation.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 3, 2019
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yyoyycvv from Leagle.com.

Margaret Wilson, individually and on behalf of a Class of persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Robert R. Sparks -
rrsparks@strausstroy.com - Strauss Troy Co., LPA.

Anthem Health Plans of Kentucky, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Darryl William Durham , Weber & Rose, PSC, 471 W Main St. 3400,
Louisville, KY 40202, Martin J. Bishop , Reed Smith LLP, Rebecca R.
Hanson - rhanson@reedsmith.com - Reed Smith LLP & Timothy R.
Carwinski  - tcarwinski@reedsmith.com - Reed Smith LLP.


ARTEX RISK: Shivkov Appeals D. Arizona Decision to Ninth Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Dimitri Shivkov, et al., filed an appeal from a Court
ruling entered in their lawsuit titled Dimitri Shivkov, et al. v.
Artex Risk Solutions, Inc., et al., Case No. 2:18-cv-04514-SMM, in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, Phoenix.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the class
action lawsuit seeks recovery of damages that the Plaintiffs and
the Class sustained in connection with their participation in
Captive Insurance Strategies that the Defendants designed,
developed, promoted, sold, implemented, and managed, in violation
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants prepared federal tax
returns in connection with the Captive Insurance Strategies, and
the Defendants and Other Participants advised the Plaintiffs and
the Class to sign and file individual federal tax returns using and
reporting the deductions generated by the Captive Insurance
Strategies.  Even after the Defendants and Other Participants
learned that the IRS had begun to audit and disallow deductions
claimed through similar tax strategies, the Defendants and other
Participants continued to advise, promote, and encourage the
Plaintiffs and the Class to use the Captive Insurance Strategies to
offset income and/or capital gains on their income tax returns.

The appellate case is captioned as Dimitri Shivkov, et al. v. Artex
Risk Solutions, Inc., et al., Case No. 19-16746, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appellants 5T Capital Fund II LLC, 5T Capital Holdings LLC,
      5T Capital LLC, AZ Storage 1 LLC, AZ Storage 2 LLC,
      Affilion of Cobre Valley LLC, Affilion of Huntsville PLLC,
      Affilion of Texas PLLC, Nadim B. Bikhazi, Blake Welling MD
      PC, Kimberly Blaser, Blaser Management LLC, Blue Horizon
      Holdings LLC, Boomerang Sonoran LLC, Boomerang WB LLC,
      Borsight, Inc., Bourne Tempe Land LLC, Brian Tiffany MD PC,
      Bradley S. Bullard, Cathleen M. Bullard, Keith Butler,
      Rebecca M. Butler, Butler Medical Group, Inc., Cation LLC,
      DVS Holdings LLC, Devotion Homes LLC, Florida Citrus
      Holdings LLC, Katherine S. Frank, Ryan P. Frank, Glass
      House LLC, Ingenuity Auto Leasing LLC, Ingenuity Aviation
      LLC, Ingenuity Equity Group II LLC, Ingenuity Equity Group
      III LLC, Ingenuity Equity Group LLC, Ingenuity Leasing
      Company II LLC, Ingenuity Leasing Company LLC, Ingenuity
      Matrix, Inc., Ingenuity Professional Services PLLC, Kamaole
      Luxury Rentals LLC, Kannapali Beach Holdings LLC, Karen A.
      Kostluk-Bikhazi, John Linder, Nina Linder, Maui Luxury
      Rentals LLC, Cynthia McHale, Paul M. McHale, McHale Capital
      Management LLC, Brenda Mae Miller, Robert C. Miller, Ogden
      Clinic Professional Corporation, Our Retirement LLC, PS
      Bailey LLC, Keith E. Pereira, RV Storage LLC, Resiliant
      LLC, Bruce G. Robinson, Dimitri Shivkov, Silver Meadow
      Investing LLC, Spectra Services, Inc., Stone Haven Lodge
      LLC, Symphony Development Corporation, Symphony Homes LLC,
      T&G Investments LLC, TW Management LLC, Taylor-Wilke
      Holdings LLC, Brian R. Tiffany, Traditions Emergency
      Medicine PA, Treadstone Core3 LLC, Treadstone Equity Group
      LLC, Kristina Tsonev, UTA Holdings LLC, UTA Investments
      LLC, Utah Spine Care LLC, Sara Van Alstyne Robinson, Blake
      G. Welling, Stephanie G. Welling, Western States Medical
      LLC, Eric K. Wilke, Julie T. Wilke, Wilke Medical Direction
      PLLC and Vassil Zhivkov's opening brief is due on
      November 8, 2019;

   -- Appellees AmeRisk Consulting LLC, Artex Risk Solutions,
      Inc., Arthur J. Gallagher & Company, Julie A. Ekdom,
      Epsilon Actuarial Solutions LLC, Jeremy Huish, Karl Huish,
      Debbie Inman, Provincial Insurance PCC, TBS LLC, TSA
      Holdings LLC, Jim Tehero, Tribeca Strategic Accountants LLC
      and Tribeca Strategic Accountants PLC's answering brief is
      due on December 9, 2019; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants DIMITRI SHIVKOV, individually and as a
trustee of the Phoenix 2010 Revocable Trust, et al., are
represented by:

          Jim L. Flegle, Esq.
          LOEWINSOHN FLEGLE DEARY, LLP
          12377 Merit Drive
          Dallas, TX 75251
          Telephone: (214) 572-1701
          Facsimile: (214) 572-1717
          E-mail: jimf@lfdlaw.com

               - and -

          Garrett Webster Wotkyns, Esq.
          SCHNEIDER WALLACE COTTRELL KONECKY WOTKYNS LLP
          8501 North Scottsdale Road, Suite 270
          Scottsdale, AZ 85253
          Telephone: (480) 428-0142
          E-mail: gwotkyns@schneiderwallace.com

Defendants-Appellees ARTEX RISK SOLUTIONS, INC.; ARTHUR J.
GALLAGHER & COMPANY; and DEBBIE INMAN are represented by:

          Joseph G. Adams, Esq.
          Barbara Dawson, Esq.
          SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.
          One Arizona Center
          400 East Van Buren Street
          Phoenix, AZ 85004-2202
          Telephone: (602) 382-6000
          E-mail: jgadams@swlaw.com
                  bdawson@swlaw.com

               - and -

          Lawrence M. Hill, Esq.
          WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
          200 Park Avenue
          New York, NY 10166
          Telephone: (212) 294-4763
          E-mail: lhill@winston.com

Defendants-Appellees TSA HOLDINGS LLC, FKA Tribeca Strategic
Advisors LLC; TBS LLC, DBA PRS Insurance; KARL HUISH; JEREMY HUISH;
JIM TEHERO; PROVINCIAL INSURANCE PCC; and TRIBECA STRATEGIC
ACCOUNTANTS LLC are represented by:

          Karl M. Tilleman, Esq.
          DENTONS US LLP
          2398 E. Camelback Road, Suite 850
          Phoenix, AZ 85016
          Telephone: (602) 508-3900
          E-mail: karl.tilleman@dentons.com


Defendants-Appellees EPSILON ACTUARIAL SOLUTIONS LLC and JULIE A.
EKDOM are represented by:

          James Steven Sparks, Esq.
          SANDERS & PARKS, P.C.
          3030 North Third Street, Suite 1300
          Phoenix, AZ 85012
          Telephone: (602) 432-5600
          E-mail: steve.sparks@sandersparks.com

Defendant-Appellee AMERISK CONSULTING LLC is represented by:

          Paul S. Gerding, Jr., Esq.
          KUTAK ROCK LLP
          8601 N Scottsdale Road
          Scottsdale, AZ 85253-2742
          Telephone: (480) 429-4843
          E-mail: paul.gerding.jr@kutakrock.com

Defendant-Appellee TRIBECA STRATEGIC ACCOUNTANTS PLC is represented
by:

          Victoria Lea Buchinger, Esq.
          DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC
          1850 North Central Avenue, Suite 1400
          Phoenix, AZ 85004
          Telephone: (602) 220-4542
          E-mail: vbuchinger@dickinsonwright.com


BARNEY'S INC: Sheikh Seeks Unpaid Minimum and Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------------
MUQUIT SHEIKH, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. BARNEY'S, INC.; and any other related
entities, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-08603 (S.D. N.Y., Sept. 16,
2019) is an action brought pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards
Act, New York Labor Law, and 12 NYCRR Part 146 to recover unpaid
minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, and unpaid tips and
gratuities, owed to Plaintiff and other similarly situated persons
who are presently or were formerly employed by  Defendants.

Beginning in approximately September 2013 and continuing through
the present, the Defendants have engaged in a policy and practice
of unlawfully compensating their food service employees for all
hours worked at a wage rate lower than the applicable minimum wage
rate; and for overtime hours worked at a wage rate lower than the
applicable overtime wage rate, asserts the complaint. When the
Plaintiff and other members of the putative class worked in excess
of 40 hours in a given workweek, they received overtime at a rate
typically equal to one and one-half times the applicable New York
State "reduced tip credit rate," the complaint adds.

The complaint says Defendants failed to distribute all monies
collected as gratuities, or charges purported to be
gratuities--including charges designated as for "service"--in full
to the Plaintiff and other members of the putative class, including
but not limited to monies collected in connection with the
administration of banquet or catered events, and instead retained
the proceeds from these charges for their own benefit. Relatedly,
Defendants failed to maintain accurate records pertaining to both
their collection of, and any alleged distribution of these
gratuities, or charges purported to be gratuities.

MUQUIT SHEIKH is an individual who currently resides in Queens
County, New York, and has been employed as a food service
worker--in particular, as a bartender--by Defendants.

BARNEY'S, INC. is domestic business corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the State of New York and is engaged in
the Hospitality Industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Brett R. Cohen, Esq.
     Jeffrey K. Brown, Esq.
     Michael A. Tompkins, Esq.
     LEEDS BROWN LAW, P.C.
     One Old Country Road, Suite 347
     Carle Place, NY 11514
     Phone: (516) 873-9550


BROADCOM INC: Bid to Dismiss Varjabedian Suit Ongoing
-----------------------------------------------------
Broadcom Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 13, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended August 3, 2019, that the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California has set a briefing schedule
for defendants' motion to dismiss the remanded class action suit
initiated by Gary Varjabedian.

On April 8, 2015, a putative class action complaint was filed in
the District Court, entitled Gary Varjabedian, et al. v. Emulex
Corporation, et al., No. 8:15-cv-554-CJC-JCG. The complaint names
as defendants Emulex Corporation ("Emulex"), its directors, AT
Wireless and Emerald Merger Sub, and purported to assert claims
under Sections 14(d), 14(e) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act.

The complaint alleged, among other things, that the board of
directors of Emulex failed to provide material information and/or
omitted material information from the Solicitation/Recommendation
Statement on Schedule 14D-9 filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) on April 7, 2015 by Emulex, together with the
exhibits and annexes thereto.

The complaint sought to enjoin the tender offer to purchase all of
the outstanding shares of Emulex common stock, as well as certain
other equitable relief and attorneys' fees and costs.

On July 28, 2015, the District Court issued an order appointing the
lead plaintiff and approving lead counsel for the putative class.
On September 9, 2015, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint
seeking rescission of the merger, unspecified money damages, other
equitable relief and attorneys' fees and costs.

On October 13, 2015, defendants moved to dismiss the first amended
complaint, which the District Court granted with prejudice on
January 13, 2016. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (the "Ninth Circuit
Court") on January 15, 2016. The appeal is captioned Gary
Varjabedian, et al. v. Emulex Corporation, et al., No. 16-55088.

On June 27, 2016, the Plaintiff-Appellant filed his opening brief,
on August 17 and August 22, 2016, the Defendants-Appellees filed
their answering briefs, and on October 5, 2016 Plaintiff-Appellant
filed his reply brief. The Ninth Circuit Court heard oral arguments
on October 5, 2017.

On April 20, 2018, the Ninth Circuit Court issued an opinion
affirming in part and reversing in part the decision of the U.S.
Central District Court and remanding Plaintiff-Appellant's claims
under Sections 14(e) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act to the U.S.
Central District Court for reconsideration.

On May 4, 2018, the Defendants-Appellees filed a Petition for
Rehearing En Banc with the Ninth Circuit Court. On July 13, 2018,
Plaintiff-Appellant filed an Opposition to the Petition for
Rehearing En Banc. On September 6, 2018, the Ninth Circuit Court
issued an order denying the Petition for Rehearing En Banc. On
October 11, 2018, Defendants-Appellees filed a Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court (the "U.S. Supreme
Court").

On January 4, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. On
April 23, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the writ of
certiorari as having been improvidently granted. On May 28, 2019,
the Ninth Circuit Court remanded the case back to the U.S. Central
District Court.

On August 6, 2019, the U.S. Central District Court issued an order
setting the briefing schedule for defendants' motion to dismiss.

Broadcom said, "We believe these claims are all without merit and
intend to vigorously defend these actions."

Broadcom Inc. designs, develops, and supplies a range of
semiconductor devices with a focus on complex digital and mixed
signal complementary metal oxide semiconductor based devices and
analog III-V based products worldwide. The company operates through
four segments: Wired Infrastructure, Wireless Communications,
Enterprise Storage, and Industrial & Other.  Broadcom Inc. is based
in San Jose, California.


BUDDHA ENTERTAINMENT: Zimmerman Suit Settlement Has Final Approval
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated; Plaintiff, v. BUDDHA ENTERTAINMENT, LLC
d/b/a and a/k/a TAO GROUP also d/b/a and a/k/a TAO NIGHTCLUB also
d/b/a and a/k/a TAO LV NIGHTCLUB; ASIA LAS VEGAS, LLC d/b/a and
a/k/a TAO GROUP also d/b/a and a/k/a TAO ASIAN BISTRO; STRIP VIEW
ENTERTAINMENT LLC d/b/a and a/k/a TAO GROUP also d/b/a and a/k/a
LAVO LAS VEGAS; DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
2:18-cv-01460-JAD-CWH (D. Nev.), Judge Jennifer A. Dorsey of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada granted the Motion
for Final Order Approving Class Action Settlement and Judgment.

The putative class action was before the Court on Aug. 9, 2019, for
a hearing and the Court's Final Order and Judgment, consistent with
the Court's Preliminary Approval Order, filed and entered April 22,
2019, and as set forth in the Joint Stipulation of Settlement and
Release Between Plaintiff and Defendant in the Action.  Due and
adequate notice have been given to all the Class Members as
required in the Preliminary Approval Order.  Judge Dorsey has
considered all papers filed and proceedings had therein.

Consistent with the definitions provided in the Stipulation of
Settlement, the term "Class Member" means those individuals that
are within the Settlement Class which includes all persons who have
previously been or currently are employed by one or more of the
Defendants, in the State of Nevada, as an hourly-paid employee, and
who were paid less than $8.25 per non-overtime hour worked and/or
less than $12.38 per overtime hour worked, at any time during the
Class Period.

For purposes of the Settlement and the Court's Final Order and
Judgment, the term "Class Period" means July 11, 2016 through the
date the Court granted preliminary approval of the Settlement.  The
term "Released Claims" collectively means those claims to be
released by the Settlement Class identified in Paragraph 21 of the
Stipulation of Settlement.  The term "Class Representative" will
mean Plaintiff Jennifer Zimmerman.  The term "Class Counsel" will
mean "Mark Thierman, Esq., Joshua Buck, Esq, and Leah Jones, Esq.
of Thierman Buck, LLP of Reno, Nevada, and Christian Gabroy, Esq.
and Kaine Messer, Esq. of Gabroy Law Offices of Henderson,
Nevada."

The Judge approved the Settlement set forth in the Stipulation of
Settlement and finds the Settlement is, in all respects, fair,
adequate and reasonable, and directs the Parties to effectuate the
Settlement according to its terms.  She entered judgment in the
Action, as of the date of entry of the Court's Final Order and
Judgment, pursuant to the terms set forth in the Stipulation of
Settlement.  

She namef Mark Thierman, Esq., Joshua Buck, Esq, and Leah Jones,
Esq. of Thierman Buck, LLP and Christian Gabroy, Esq. and Kaine
Messer, Esq. of Gabroy Law Offices as the Class Counsel.

Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement, and the authorities,
evidence and argument submitted by the Class Counsel, the Judge
awarded the Class Counsel attorneys' fees in the amount of
$166,666.67, and attorney costs in the amount of $5,000, to be
deducted and paid from the Maximum Settlement Amount, as final
payment for and complete satisfaction of any and all attorneys'
fees and costs incurred by and/or owed to the Class Counsel and any
other person or entity related to the Action.  She further ordered
that the award of attorneys' fees and costs set forth  will be
administered pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation of
Settlement, and transferred and/or made payable to the Class
Counsel in the Action.

She also approved and ordered (i) an Enhancement Award to Class
Representative Plaintiff Jennifer Zimmerman in the amount of
$5,000; and (ii) payment from the Class Settlement Amount for
actual claims administration expenses incurred by the Claims
Administrator, CPT Group, both to be paid from the Maximum
Settlement Amount as set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement.

Provided the Settlement becomes effective under the terms of the
Stipulation of Settlement, the Judge also ordered the deadline for
mailing the Court-approved Settlement Awards, attorneys' fees and
costs, and Enhancement Award is as set forth in the Implementation
Schedule within the Preliminary Approval Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 9, 2019 Final Order is
available at https://is.gd/b0Cyls from Leagle.com.

Jennifer Zimmerman, Plaintiff, represented by Christian James
Gabroy, Gabroy Law Offices, Joshua D. Buck, Thierman Buck, LLP,
Kaine M. Messer, Gabroy Law Offices, Leah Lin Jones, Thierman Buck,
LLP & Mark R. Thierman, Thierman Buck, LLP.

Buddha Entertainment, LLC, doing business as Tao Group, Tao LV
Nightclub, Asia Las Vegas, LLC, doing business as Tao Asian Bistro
& Strip View Entertainment, LLC, doing business as Tao Group, Lavo
Las Vegas, Defendants, represented by Joshua A. Sliker --
Joshua.Sliker@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis P.C..


CACHET FINANCIAL: Simmons Sues Over Misappropriated Payroll Funds
-----------------------------------------------------------------
SARAH SIMMONS, an individual; AARON MCALLISTER, an individual;
ROI-IT, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CACHET
FINANCIAL SERVICES, a California corporation; FINANCIAL BUSINESS
GROUP HOLDINGS, a California corporation; MYPAYROLLHR LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company; CLOUD PAYROLL, LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company; VALUEWISE CORP., a Delaware corporation;
MICHAEL MANN, an individual; NATIONAL PAYMENT CORPORATION, a
Florida corporation, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-01624-KJD-VCF (D.
Nev., Sept. 16, 2019) is an action arising out of the
misappropriation of nearly $35,000,000.00 in payroll funds and
related payroll taxes across the United States by payroll
processing firms and their agents.

The Defendants have individually and collectively misappropriated
funds belonging to both employers and employees who have utilized
services provided by the Defendants, asserts the complaint.

Prior to, and at the time of the events giving rise to this action,
ROI-IT utilized MyPayroll to provide payroll processing services.
MyPayroll utilized Cloud Payroll and/or ValueWise as part of the
payroll services provided to ROI-IT. On August 29, 2019, ROI-IT
completed its customary company payroll in the amount of $8,759.60,
with $6,397.46 representing employee payroll and $2,362.14
representing employer and employee payroll taxes. The $8,756.60
included employee payroll payments to both Simmons and McAllister.
In turn, on August 30, 2019, MyPayroll, Cloud Payroll and/or
ValueWise deducted $8,756.60 from ROI-IT's bank account. ROI-IT
employees Simmons and McAllister, were paid on August 30, 2019 via
direct deposit.

However, on September 5, 2019, the August 30, 2019 payroll payments
to both Simmons and McAllister were withdrawn from their respective
personal bank accounts. It was only later determined that the
payroll payments were withdrawn by Cachet and/or FBG. Plaintiffs
assert that MyPayroll, Cloud Payroll and/or ValueWise contracted
with Cachet and/or FBG for purposes of processing electronic
payroll fund transfers. On the same day, ROI-IT and Simmons
received an e-mail from MyPayroll identifying that the payroll
account used by MyPayroll had been frozen, which prevented it from
generating transactions and causing reversals on recent
transactions. The e-mail indicated that MyPayroll would be updating
its clients as to the situation as more information became
available. Later that day, ROI-IT and Simmons received a second
e-mail from MyPayroll identifying that it was no longer able to
process any further payroll transactions and to find an alternative
method for processing payroll. The e-mail identified that employers
should be prepared to find an alternative way to pay employees
including for any payroll reversals that took place. The e-mail
further stated that MyPayroll was working to release any funds that
were in transit as a result of the situation.  Because Simmons and
McAllister had their payroll payments withdrawn from their personal
bank accounts, ROI-IT thereafter issued manual checks to both of
them totaling $6,397.46.

As a result, countless instances of employers and employees'
financial hardship have been reported. For instance, many have
complained of being incapable of making mortgage or rent payments.
A multitude of others have been hit with various account fees after
the reversal of payroll payments left their bank accounts with
negative balances. Others have described difficulties maintaining
their quality of life, as they are unable to feed their families,
pay their bills, or purchase gas to make it to and from work. Put
simply, the effect of Defendants' fraud and Cachet and/or FGB's
conduct has rippled nationwide, putting many of those affected in
precarious financial situations as a result. Plaintiffs also assert
that MyPayroll, Cloud Payroll and/or ValueWise contracted with
NatPay for purposes of handling employers' tax withholdings.
Therefore, NatPay, not
Cachet and/or FBG, was apparently responsible for the payment of
payroll tax payments for MyPayroll, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Simmons is both a majority owner of ROI-IT and employee
of ROI-IT. Plaintiff McAllister is an employee of ROI-IT. ROI-IT is
a Nevada limited liability company conducting business in Clark
County, Nevada.

Cachet is a California corporation conducting business across the
United States, and is a subsidiary of FBG. Cachet is not a bank or
banking institution.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Lawrence J. Semenza, III, Esq.
     Christopher D. Kircher, Esq.
     Jarrod L. Rickard, Esq.
     Katie L. Cannata, Esq.
     SEMENZA KIRCHER RICKARD
     10161 Park Run Dr., Ste. 150
     Las Vegas, NV 89145
     Phone: (702) 835-6803
     Facsimile: (702) 920-8669
     Email: ljs@skrlawyers.com
            cdk@skrlawyers.com
            jlr@skrlawyers.com
            klc@skrlawyers.com


CADENCE BANCORPORATION: Miller Files Suit Over Share Price Drop
---------------------------------------------------------------
FRANK MILLER, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. CADENCE BANCORPORATION, PAUL B. MURPHY, and
VALERIE C. TOALSON, Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-03492 (S.D. Tex.,
Sept. 16, 2019) is a class action on behalf of persons and entities
that purchased or otherwise acquired Cadence securities between
July 23, 2018 and July 22, 2019, inclusive, seeking to pursue
remedies under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Cadence is a financial holding company that focuses on
middle-market commercial lending, complemented by retail banking
and wealth management services, and purportedly provides banking
services to businesses, high net worth individuals, and business
owners. Frank Miller purchased Cadence securities during the Class
Period.

On July 22, 2019, the Company disclosed that "higher credit costs
including net charge-offs of $18.6 million and loan provisions of
$28.9 million" negatively impacted its second quarter 2019
financial results. On this news, the Company's stock price fell
$3.75 per share, or over 19%, to close at $15.86 per share on July
22, 2019, thereby injuring investors.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) that the Company lacked adequate internal controls
to assess credit risk; (2) that, as a result, certain of the
Company's loans posed an increased risk of loss; (3) that, as a
result, the Company was reasonably likely to incur significant
losses for certain loans; (4) that the Company's financial results
would suffer a material adverse impact; and (5) that, as a result
of the foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the
Company's business, operations, and prospects were materially
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

As a result of Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages, says the complaint.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joe Kendall, Esq.
     KENDALL LAW GROUP, PLLC
     3811 Turtle Creek Blvd., Suite 1450
     Dallas, TX 75219
     Phone: 214-744-3000
     Facsimile: 214-744-3015
     Email: jkendall@kendalllawgroup.com

          - and -

     Lionel Z. Glancy, Esq.
     Robert V. Prongay, Esq.
     Lesley F. Portnoy, Esq.
     Charles H. Linehan, Esq.
     Pavithra Rajesh, Esq.
     GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
     1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
     Los Angeles, CA 90067
     Phone: (310) 201-9150
     Facsimile: (310) 201-9160


CAPITAL ONE: Curtis et al. Sue over Information Data Breach
-----------------------------------------------------------
DUSTIN CURTIS; URSULA N. RILEY; HOWARD CHEN, and JAROD THRUSH,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION; and AMAZON WEB
SERVICES, INC., Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-01366-BAT (W.D. Wash.,
Aug. 29, 2019) is an action against the Defendants for failure to
take reasonable care and use adequate measures to protect the
personal information of the Plaintiffs and members of the class.

The Plaintiffs alleges in the complaint that as a result of the
Defendants' unfair, inadequate, and unreasonable data security, at
least one cyber-criminal and unknown others now possess the
personal and financial information of the Plaintiffs and the Class.
With account numbers, names, addresses, birthdates, and credit
information, criminals can open entirely new credit accounts and
bank accounts, and garner millions through fraud that victims will
not be able to detect until it is too late. Victims' credit
profiles can be destroyed and they will lose the ability to
legitimately borrow money, obtain credit, or even open bank
accounts.

Capital One Financial Corporation provides commercial banking
services. The Bank accepts deposits and offers personal credit
cards, investment products, loans, and online banking services.
Capital One serves customers in the State of Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Thomas E. Loeser, Esq.
          Shelby R. Smith, Esq.
          HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
          1301 Second Avenue, Suite 2000
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 623-7292
          Facsimile: (206) 623-0594
          E-mail: toml@hbsslaw.com
                  shelby@hbsslaw.com

               - and -

          Detra Shaw-Wilder, Esq.
          KOZYAK TROPIN & THROCKMORTON LLP
          2525 Ponce de Leon Boulevard, 9th Floor
          Miami, FL 33134
          Telephone: (305) 372-1800
          Facsimile: (305) 372-3508
          E-mail: dps@kttlaw.com


CAPITAL ONE: Faces Zimprich Suit in Central District of California
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Capital One Financial
Corporation. The case is captioned as Randy Zimprich, individually,
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
Capital One Financial Corporation and Does 1 through 10, the
Defendants, Case No. 8:19-cv-01689-JVS-DFM (C.D. Cal., Sept. 4,
2019). The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge James V. Selna.

Capital One is a bank holding company specializing in credit cards,
auto loans, banking, and savings accounts, headquartered in McLean,
Virginia.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Daniel S Robinson, Esq.
          Michael Willard Olson, Esq.
          Wesley K Polischuk, Esq.
          ROBINSON CALCAGNIE INC
          19 Corporate Plaza Drive
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (949) 720-1288
          Facsimile: (949) 720-1292
          E-mail: drobinson@robinsonfirm.com
                  molson@robinsonfirm.com
                  wpolischuk@robinsonfirm.com

CARON BLACK: Wolf Files Class Suit Over Sale to VMWare
------------------------------------------------------
JACK WOLF, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. CARON BLACK, INC., PATRICK MORLEY, JEFFREY
FAGNAN, TOM KILLALEA, RONALD NORDIN, VANESSA PEGUEROS, JOSEPH
TIBBETTS, JR., JILL WARD, ANTHONY ZINGALE, VMWARE, INC., and
CALISTOGA MERGER CORP., Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01739-UNA (D.
Del., Sept. 16, 2019) is an action stemming from a proposed
transaction announced on August 22, 2019, pursuant to which Carbon
Black, Inc. will be acquired by VMware, Inc. and Calistoga Merger
Corp.

On August 22, 2019, Carbon Black's Board of Directors caused the
Company to enter into an agreement and plan of merger with VMware.
Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, Calistoga commenced
a tender offer to acquire all of Carbon Black's outstanding common
stock for $26.00 per share in cash. The Tender Offer is scheduled
to expire on October 3, 2019. On September 6, 2019, defendants
filed a Solicitation/Recommendation Statement with the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with the
Proposed Transaction.

The Plaintiff asserts that the Solicitation Statement omits
material information with respect to the Proposed Transaction,
which renders the Solicitation Statement false and misleading.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated
Sections 14(e), 14(d), and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 in connection with the Solicitation Statement.

Plaintiff is the owner of Carbon Black common stock.

Carbon Black is a leader in cloud-native endpoint protection.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Brian D. Long, Esq.
     Gina M. Serra, Esq.
     RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
     300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
     Wilmington, DE 19801
     Phone: (302) 295-5310
     Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
     Email: bdl@rl-legal.com
            gms@rl-legal.com

          - and -

     Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
     RM LAW, P.C.
     1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
     Berwyn, PA 19312
     Phone: (484) 324-6800
     Facsimile: (484) 631-1305
     Email: rm@maniskas.com


CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Can Compel Arbitration in Olsen Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, KEN OLSEN, JEFF BREGMAN, CHUCK TRAMONTOZZI and JUSTEN
LESLIE, Plaintiffs, v. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., CHARTER
COMMUNICATIONS HOLDINGS, LLC and SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT HOLDING
COMPANY, LLC (f/k/a TIME WARNER CABLE, INC.), Defendants. WOLFSON &
CARROLL, LLC, LUKE VICENS and DAVID GOMEZ, Plaintiffs, v. CHARTER
COMMUNICATIONS, INC., CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS HOLDINGS, LLC and
SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT HOLDING COMPANY, LLC (f/k/a TIME WARNER CABLE,
INC.), Defendants, Case Nos. 18cv3388 (JGK), 18cv4972 (JGK) (S.D.
N.Y.), Judge Joel G. Koeltl of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York granted the Defendants' motion to
compel arbitration and to stay these cases.

The Plaintiffs were customers of Charter or one of its former
subsidiaries, Time Warner Cable ("TWC").  Between 2009 and 2016,
all of the Plaintiffs, with the exception of Mr. Vicens, signed up
and paid for TWC's "business class" internet services.  Other than
Plaintiff Wolfson & Carroll, LLC, each of the Plaintiffs subscribed
in an individual capacity, but appear to have used TWC's services
for their businesses.

As subscribers, the Plaintiffs all received similar one-page
Service Agreements that were subject to a separate set of "Terms
and Conditions."  Each Service Agreement notified the customer of
the Terms and Conditions and of a specific provision for
arbitration of disputes relating to the agreement.  Each Plaintiff
signed a Service Agreement.

As the Service Agreements stated, customers could view the separate
"Terms and Conditions" document on TWC's website.  These Terms and
Conditions (the "Legacy Terms") remained largely unchanged until
2017.  Every version of the Legacy Terms provided that some of its
sections, including the arbitration provision of Section 21, will
survive the termination or expiration of the Legacy Agreement.

In May 2016, TWC merged into Charter, and was renamed Spectrum
Management Holding Co., LLC.  In 2017, as part of its post-merger
organization, Charter replaced TWC's Legacy Terms with new terms
and conditions for all new and existing business class customers.
Charter notified existing customers about the Updated Terms through
the customers' monthly billing statements, sent by U.S. mail, in
June or July 2017.  The Plaintiffs do not dispute that they
received these billing statements.

Like the Legacy Terms, the Updated Terms were available on
Charter's website.  All of the Plaintiffs who received a June or
July 2017 billing statement paid their bills, and continued to use
Charter's internet services afterwards.

Meanwhile, on July 26, 2017, Plaintiff Vicens signed up for the
same internet services that Charter now provided to all of the
other Plaintiffs.  As a new customer, Vicens did not receive notice
of the Updated Terms through a monthly billing statement.  Instead,
the Defendants allege -- and the Plaintiffs do not dispute -- that
Vicens received a business customer "Welcome Kit" brochure, which
directed Vicens to review the Updated Terms on Spectrum's website.
Vicens also began receiving monthly billing statements that
continuously reminded customers to view the Updated Terms on
Spectrum's website.

Like the Legacy Terms, the Updated Terms contained a provision for
arbitrating disputes.  A warning located near the beginning of the
Updated Terms highlighted the existence of the arbitration
provision within the document.  Section 18 of the Updated Terms
contained the arbitration provision itself.  Section 22(g)
designated New York law as governing the Updated Terms, and
designated venue for "any legal action" in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York.

In their amended complaints, the Plaintiffs allege that Charter
(and before Charter, TWC) misled customers by overcharging them for
internet services that failed to deliver the speedy services
promised.  They assert claims for breach of contract and violation
of state deceptive trade practices and consumer protection laws.
They also seek declaratory and injunctive relief finding that any
arbitration agreement is unenforceable, and enjoining the
Defendants from enforcing any arbitration agreement.  Finally, the
Plaintiffs seek restitution, disgorgement, cancellation of amounts
due on accounts, accreditation of past amounts paid on accounts,
and a prohibition against cancelling services for reason of
nonpayment.

The Defendants notified the Plaintiffs in both matters of their
intent to arbitrate.  The Plaintiffs have refused to arbitrate.

Judge Koeltl finds that while the Updated Terms were not physically
included with the billing statements, customers had options to
access the arbitration provision.  The billing statements listed a
short address to access the Defendants' website, where the Updated
Terms were constantly available.  The billing statements also
provided customers with a phone number for ordering a print copy of
the Updated Terms.  The Updated Terms themselves also provided
sufficient notice of the arbitration provision.

In any event, the Judge holds that the Legacy Terms also provided
for arbitration for all of the Plaintiffs besides Vicens.  The
Plaintiffs do not allege that they failed to assent to the Legacy
Terms.  Nor do they allege that such terms were fraudulently
induced.  The Legacy Terms specifically explained that the
arbitration provision would survive termination or expiration of
the Legacy Terms.  Accordingly, an arbitration provision would
remain in effect if the Updated Terms were somehow to be found
unenforceable. Therefore, whether under the Updated Terms or the
Legacy Terms, the parties entered into valid agreements to
arbitrate.

Having found agreements to arbitrate, the second step is to
determine whether the Plaintiffs' claims are arbitrable.  The Judge
finds that the clear and unmistakable terms of the Charter
agreements require the arbitrator, not the Court, to determine the
scope of arbitration.  Both the Updated Terms and the Legacy Terms
delegate this authority explicitly.  Moreover, both sets of terms
also incorporate the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules that delegate
the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator.  Therefore, under
either the Updated or Legacy Terms, the scope of arbitrability must
be decided by the arbitrator.

Given this broad delegation, the Judge holds that the Plaintiffs'
remaining arguments concerning arbitrability are for the arbitrator
to decide, including the effect of the class action waiver and the
degree to which their' "injunctive" claims should be excluded from
arbitration.  Therefore, all of the plaintiffs' claims must be sent
to arbitration as provided by the Updated Terms. It is for the
arbitrator to decide whether any of the parties' disputes are
excluded from arbitration.  Both actions are stayed pending
arbitration.

Judge Koeltl has considered all of the arguments raised by the
parties.  To the extent not specifically addressed, the arguments
are either moot or without merit.  For the reasons explained, he
granted the Defendants' motion to compel arbitration.  Pursuant to
9 U.S.C. Sections 3 and 4, the parties are directed to proceed to
arbitration in the manner provided for in the Updated Terms.  These
cases are stayed pending the conclusion of the arbitration.  The
Clerk of Court is directed to close these cases on the active
docket of the Court subject to reinstatement depending on any
developments in the arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 9, 2019 Memorandum Opinion and
Order is available at https://is.gd/0nqSw4 from Leagle.com.

Wolfson & Carroll, LLC, Luke Vicens & David Gomez, Plaintiffs,
represented by Joseph Ralph Santoli -- josephsantoli@aol.com --
Joseph R. Santoli, Esq., Kara A. Elgersma, Wexler Wallace LLP,
Kenneth A. Wexler, Wexler Toriseva Wallace LLP & Olimpio Lee
Squitieri -- lee@sfclasslaw.com -- Squitieri & Fearon LLP.

Charter Communications, Inc., Charter Communications Holdings LLC &
Spectrum Management Holding Company LLC, formerly known as Time
Warner Cable, Inc., Defendants, represented by Andrew D. Prins --
andrew.prins@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, Matthew A. Brill --
matthew.brill@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, Alexander Stout --
alexander.stout@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP & Nicholas L.
Schlossman -- alexander.stout@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP.


CHIPOTLE MEXICAN: Pays $6.5MM to Settle Non-GMO Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Heather Lalley, writing for Restaurant Business Online, reports
that Chipotle Mexican Grill will pay $6.5 million to settle a
class-action suit that accused the fast casual of falsely
advertising that its food is free of genetically modified
ingredients, according to documents filed this week in California
federal court.

The settlement, in which Chipotle admits no wrongdoing, ends three
years of litigation against the 2,500-unit chain.  It entitles
anyone who purchased food from any Chipotle unit in the U.S. from
April 27, 2015, until June 30, 2016, to $2 back on each qualifying
pu rchase, with the ability to claim up to five qualifying
purchases without documentation.  Those with proof of purchase can
be awarded up to $20 for 10 qualifying purchases during the period,
with a $30 per-household cap, according to the settlement.

In 2015, Chipotle became the first major restaurant chain to
announce it would start serving food entirely free of genetically
engineered ingredients, after becoming the first national
restaurant company to disclose GMO ingredients two years earlier.
At the time, Chipotle said most of the genetically modified
ingredients in its food were found in soybean oil and tortillas.

But in the class-action suit, the plaintiffs allege that Chipotle's
food products "may have been sourced from livestock that consumed
GMO animal feed."

The $6.5 million settlement could serve as a point of caution for
other brands as they consider their marketing messages.

For its part, Chipotle said its GMO-related marketing campaigns are
"true, are substantiated through science, and are therefore not
deceptive or misleading as a matter of law," according to the court
filing.

Earlier this week, Chipotle became the first restaurant chain to be
targeted under New York City's Fair Workweek Law, with the city
accusing the chain of violating its predictable scheduling rule.
[GN]


CJ MAHAN: Betzner Suit Remanded to Prairie County Circuit Court
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Billy Roy Wilson of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas, Western Division, remanded the case, PAUL
BETZNER, on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
CJ MAHAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No.
4:17-CV-00778-BRW (E.D. Ark.), to the Circuit Court of Prairie
County, Arkansas.

A question of subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised sua sponte
at any time.  Federal court diversity jurisdiction requires an
amount in dispute over $75,000 and all parties on one side of the
controversy must be citizens of different states from all of the
parties on the other side.

An affidavit attached to the Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint
noted that the counsel was still attempting to identify the
"employees, servants, and agents of the named defendants and any
other subcontractors, other partnerships, individuals, limited
liability companies, and corporations" that might have been
involved.  When the Defendants removed the case on Nov. 27, 2017,
John Doe Defendants were still listed in the complaint.

After removal, the Plaintiffs requested leave to file an amended
complaint.  They noted that the Defendants knew, or should have
known, the identity of all John Does involved in the events, but
the Plaintiffs only recently discovered their names after
conducting depositions.  For good cause shown, the Plaintiffs'
motion for leave to amend complaint was granted.

In the Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs named four new
Defendants -- Scott Richardson (construction superintendent), Chris
Gentry (labor foreman), Bryan Hoffman (laborer), and Scott Wells
(machine operator) -- all of whom are Arkansas residents.

Typically, diversity jurisdiction is determined at the time of
removal and when determining whether a civil action is removable on
the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) the citizenship
of defendants sued under fictitious names will be disregarded.
However, 28 U.S.C. Section 1447(e) provides that if after removal
the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder
would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny
joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action to the State
court.  

Judge Wilson holds that the Plaintiffs were permitted leave to
amend their complaint to add previously unknown, non-diverse
Defendants.  In instances like this, he must consider diversity at
the time of the amendment.  Accordingly, complete diversity is
lacking and remand is mandatory.

Alternatively, the Defendants removed the case claiming
jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (which requires a
class of over 100 and damages of over $5 million).  However, it
seems to him that the local controversy exception prevents removal.
He finds that all of the class members and four Defendants are
from Arkansas, and the events took place in Arkansas.
Additionally, the Plaintiffs seek joint and several relief from all
the Defendants.

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, Judge Wilson
directed the Clerk of the Court to remand the case to the Circuit
Court of Prairie County, Arkansas.  However, remand may not be
issued until two weeks after the date of the Order so that the
Defendants have a chance to comply with 28 U.S.C. Section
1453(c)(1), if they so choose.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 9, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Q4ILGP from Leagle.com.

Calvin Fred Betzner Revocable Trust, originally named as Paul
Betzner and Rhonda Betzner, on behalf of all others similarly
situated, James Alberson, on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Tiffani Alberson, individually and as a parent and next
friend of M J, a minor; on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Kelley Kelly, on behalf of all others similarly situated, Tony
Patterson, on behalf of all others similarly situated & City of
Fredonia, on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by John Doyle Nalley -- johndoylenalley@hotmail.com --
Lovell & Nalley, Mattie A. Taylor, Hall & Taylor Law Partners &
Randall I. Hall -- randy@littlerocktriallawyers.com -- Hall &
Taylor Law Partners.

CJ Mahan Construction Company LLC & Parsons-Mahan Joint Venture,
Defendants, represented by Gary D. Marts, Jr. -- gmarts@wlj.com --
Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, Jaimie Grunert Moss -- jmoss@wlj.com --
Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, Kyle Ray Wilson -- kwilson@wlj.com --
Wright, Lindsey & Jennings & Stephen R. Lancaster --
slancaster@wlj.com -- Wright, Lindsey & Jennings.

Parsons Construction Group Inc, Defendant, represented by Jaimie
Grunert Moss, Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, Gary D. Marts, Jr.,
Wright, Lindsey & Jennings & Kyle Ray Wilson, Wright, Lindsey &
Jennings.

John Does, 1-30, Defendant, represented by Gary D. Marts, Jr.,
Wright, Lindsey & Jennings & Kyle Ray Wilson, Wright, Lindsey &
Jennings.


COLGATE-PALMOLIVE: Court Denies Certification in De Lacour Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion for
Class Certification in the case captioned ANNE DE LACOUR, ANDREA
WRIGHT, and LOREE MORAN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. COLGATE-PALMOLIVE CO., and TOM'S
OF MAINE, INC., Defendants. No. 16-CV-8364 (KMW). (S.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiffs bring this consumer class action against Defendants
Tom's of Maine, Inc. and its parent company, Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
asserting several causes of action related to Defendants' use of
the word natural on the labels and packages of its products,
including deodorants and toothpastes. Plaintiffs claim that
Defendants breached an express warranty and violated several state
statutes by falsely and misleadingly advertising its products.  

Plaintiffs now move to certify a nationwide class of consumers who
purchased Tom's of Maine products on or after September 24, 2015 in
the United States, and three subclasses consisting of members of
that class who purchased Tom's of Maine products in California,
Florida, and New York, respectively.

For these reasons, Plaintiffs' motion is denied without prejudice
to Plaintiffs refiling with adequate evidence and analysis of:

   (1) the choice of law considerations for the breach of express
warranty claim.

   (2) material variations in state laws of express warranty, or
lack thereof.

   (3) the impact of material variations in state laws of express
warranty, if any, on a finding that questions of law or fact common
to the members of the proposed class predominate over questions
affecting only individual members.

Class Certification Requirements Under Rule 23

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 sets forth a two-step process
for determining whether a court may certify a case as a class
action. The party seeking class certification bears the burden of
proving each of the requisite elements of Rule 23 by a
preponderance of the evidence. Failure to prove any of the elements
precludes class certification.  

First, under Rule 23(a), Plaintiffs must show that: (1) the
proposed class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is
impracticable (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class (3) Plaintiffs' claims or defenses are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class and (4) the Plaintiffs will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.  

Second, Plaintiffs must establish that the proposed class fits
within one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b).

Here, Plaintiffs rely alternatively on the second and third
subsections. Under the second subsection, Plaintiffs must
demonstrate that the party opposing the class has acted or refused
to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final
injunctive relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.
Under the third subsection, Plaintiffs must show that the questions
of law or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

Defendants raise challenging questions about whether Plaintiffs
have satisfied Rule 23(a). The Court need not address those
arguments, however, because Plaintiffs have failed to meet the
requirements of Rule 23(b).  

Class Certification Under Rule 23(b)(2)

This putative class is not suitable for certification under Rule
23(b)(2). Subsection (b)(2) provides a vehicle for broad injunctive
or declaratory relief to redress group-wide injury. Claims for
individualized monetary damages bar class certification under Rule
23(b)(2) unless they are merely incidental to requested declaratory
or injunctive relief.  

Here, Plaintiffs have made no effort to demonstrate that monetary
damages are incidental the injunctive relief they seek. Their
claimed injury is economic. The crux of their complaint is that
they paid a price premium for Tom's of Maine products because the
products were described as natural. Plaintiffs submitted two expert
reports related to price premium calculations in support of their
motion to certify this case as a class action an indication,
although not dispositive, that damages figure centrally in the case
and involve substantial and complex analyses.  

The balance of persuasive case law also presents a standing problem
under Rule 23(b)(2).

Plaintiffs here are unlikely to buy the products again and may,
therefore, lack standing to pursue a forward-looking injunction.
But the Court need not decide the standing question at this stage
because it finds that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden
to demonstrate that the damages they seek are incidental to their
requested declaratory and injunctive relief.

Class Certification Under Rule 23(b)(3)

Subsection (b)(3) allows for class certification where movants seek
relief primarily in the form of damages. A class certified under
Rule 23(b)(3) must be sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication
by representation. In reaching this determination, courts consider
whether the putative class members could establish each of the
required elements of their claims using common evidence. Although a
movant need not establish the exclusivity of common questions, it
must show at least their predominance.  

Predominance is a particularly thorny condition where, as here,
movants seek to certify a nationwide class. Plaintiffs assert a
breach of express warranty claim on behalf of every person who
purchased Tom's of Maine products in the United States. Defendants
argue that New York choice of law rules apply and, according to
those rules, the substantive law of the state where each class
member resides governs that class member's breach of express
warranty claim thus implicating the laws of all fifty states. If
Defendants are correct, and if the various state laws differ
materially, common questions of law will not predominate.

Several courts have arrived at that conclusion under similar
circumstances. Indeed, few warranty cases ever have been certified
as class actions let alone as nationwide classes, with the
additional choice-of-law problems that complicate such a venture.

Here, Plaintiffs have neglected their burden. Plaintiffs have not
conducted a choice of law analysis. Plaintiffs have not presented
or analyzed any differences in state laws of breach of express
warranty. And Plaintiffs have not examined how any material
differences in those laws bear on predominance. Plaintiffs
acknowledge the issue only in a brief, conclusory footnote. In
neglecting their burden, Plaintiffs have impaired the Court's
ability to assess whether common questions of law predominate over
individual ones. Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is
therefore denied without prejudice to refiling as set forth below.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 12, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxfhdnyx from
Leagle.com.

Anne de Lacour, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Andrea Wright, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated & Loree Moran, Plaintiffs, represented by
Frederick John Klorczyk - fklorczyk@bursor.com - Bursor & Fisher,
P.A., Neal Jamison Deckant - ndeckant@bursor.com - Bursor & Fisher,
P.A., Sarah Westcot, I  - swestcot@bursor.com - Bursor & Fisher,
P.A., Yitzchak Kopel - ykopel@bursor.com - Bursor & Fisher, P.A. &
Joshua David Arisohn - jarisohn@bursor.com - Bursor & Fisher P.A.

Colgate-Palmolive Co. & Tom's of Maine Inc., Defendants,
represented by Blake Thomas Denton- blake.denton@lw.com - Latham &
Watkins LLP, David Callahan - david.callahan@lw.com - Latham &
Watkins LLP, Kathleen Elsner - kathleen.elsner@lw.com - Latham &
Watkins LLP & Kathleen Lally - kathleen.lally@lw.com - Latham &
Watkins LLP.


CONDUENT BUSINESS: Direct Express(R) Cards Not Safe, Says Carnley
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JON CARNLEY, JACKIE DENSMORE, PAUL KATYNSKI, JENNIFER KREEGAR,
HAROLD MCPHAIL, KATHLEEN PAGLIA, JB SIMMS, and KENNETH TILLMAN, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. CONDUENT
BUSINESS SERVICES, LLC d/b/a DIRECT EXPRESS(R), COMERICA, INC., and
COMERICA BANK, Case No. 5:19-cv-01075 (W.D. Tex., Sept. 5, 2019),
alleges that the Defendants misrepresent to their customers that
their Direct Express(R) program is completely safe.

The complaint relates that the Plaintiffs and the members of the
proposed classes reasonably rely on the Defendants' statements
regarding the safety of their Direct Express(R) cards.  In reality,
Direct Express(R) cards are unsafe, having negligible security
protections or fraud alert capabilities, and the Defendants'
systems are rife with fraudulent transactions, the Plaintiffs
allege.  The Plaintiffs receive federal benefits, which are
provided to them via their Direct Express(R) Debit MasterCard Card
issued by Comerica Bank and the program is operated by Conduent.
The Plaintiffs contend that many of them have experienced
fraudulent transactions that the Defendants failed to address.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a lawsuit against the Defendants on
February 12, 2019 in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia, in the case styled Almon v. Conduent
Business Services, LLC, et al., Case No. 1:19-cv-00746-LMM.  On
August 9, 2019, the District Court in Almon issued an order
allowing only the Georgia customers to proceed in Georgia.  The
claims of Plaintiffs in this action--all of whom live outside of
Georgia--were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  The Plaintiffs
promptly renew their claims against Defendants in this lawsuit.

Conduent Business Services, LLC is a limited liability company
organized under the laws of Delaware with its principal place of
business located in Dallas, Texas.  Conduent has substantial
operations in San Antonio, including an office building housing
hundreds of employees at 2822 General Hudnell Drive.

Conduent uses the Direct Express(R) trademark to administer federal
benefit payments across the country to benefit recipients of at
least nine federal agencies.  When Direct Express(R) customers
contact Conduent, they are instructed to write to Conduent at a
post office box located in San Antonio, Texas.  Conduent's San
Antonio office houses substantial operations for the Direct
Express(R) program.

Comerica, Inc. is an entity incorporated under the laws of Delaware
with its principal place of business located in Dallas, Texas.
Comerica is a financial services company that serves millions of
customers nationwide.  Comerica was among the 25 largest commercial
bank holding companies in the United States.  Comerica Bank offers
a broad array of retail, small business, and commercial banking
products.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Allen R. Vaught, Esq.
          VAUGHT FIRM, LLC
          6122 Palo Pinto Ave.
          Dallas, TX 75214
          Telephone: (214) 675-8603
          Facsimile: (214) 261-5159
          E-mail: allen@vaughtfirm.com

               - and -

          E. Adam Webb, Esq.
          G. Franklin Lemond, Jr., Esq.
          WEBB, KLASE & LEMOND, LLC
          1900 The Exchange, S.E., Suite 480
          Atlanta, GA 30339
          Telephone: (770) 444-9325
          Facsimile: (770) 217-9950
          E-mail: Adam@WebbLLC.com
                  Franklin@WebbLLC.com


CONTEXTLOGIC INC: Choon Sues Over Ilegal Sale of Rubber Band Craft
------------------------------------------------------------------
Choon's Design, LLC, Individually and on Behalf of a Class of
Similarly Situated Individuals, Plaintiffs, v. Contextlogic Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-05300, (N.D. Cal., August 23, 2019),
seeks an order requiring Contextlogic to immediately cease and
desist from selling Choon's merchandise without their authority;
compensatory damages; disgorgement or payment of restitution of
Defendant's ill-gotten gains; prejudgment and post-judgment
interest; attorneys' fees and costs; and such further relief for
violation of the Lanham Act for false association and trademark
infringement, violation of the California Unfair Competition Law
and False Advertising Law.

Choon's Design is the maker of Rainbow Loom (R), an educational
rubber band craft for children with U.S. Patent No. 8,485,565 and
Trademark Registration Numbers 4768248, 4768101, 4762955, 4753133,
4726514, 4714893, 4714891 and 4345796.  ContextLogic operates as
"Wish.com," an online retail site.

Plaintiff claims that their products are for sale on Wish's website
despite not having any business with them. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Lisa J. Frisella, Esq.
     Kimberly D. Neilson, Esq.
     FRISELLA LAW, APC
     2139 First Ave., Suite 200
     San Diego, CA 92101
     Telephone: (619) 260-3500
     Facsimile: (619) 260-3600
     Email: lisa@frisellalaw.com
            kim@frisellalaw.com

            - and -

     Dean Gresham, Esq.
     Bruce Steckler, Esq.
     Stuart Cochran, Esq.
     L. Kirstine Rogers, Esq.
     STECKLER GRESHAM COCHRAN PLLC
     12720 Hillcrest Road, Suite 1045
     Dallas, TX 75230
     Telephone: (972) 387-4040
     Facsimile: (972) 387-4041
     Email: dean@stecklerlaw.com
            bruce@steckerlaw.com
            stuart@stecklerlaw.com
            krogers@stecklerlaw.com


CORTIVA INSITUTE: Class Suit Over Loop Campus Closure Filed
-----------------------------------------------------------
Carrie Bradon, writing for Cook County Record, reports that a woman
has filed a class action lawsuit against the company that operates
Cortiva Insitute, alleging she and other students were defrauded
and exploited.

Lanetta M. Thomas, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, filed a complaint on Aug. 20 in Cook County
Circuit Court against Seg. Cort LLC, which does business as Cortiva
Institute, alleging unjust enrichment and fraud.

According to the complaint, the plaintiff enrolled in December 2018
to attend Cortiva's Chicago Loop campus as a full-time student in
their Professional Massage Therapy diploma program. The plaintiff
said she expected to graduate in August 2019.

The plaintiff said she received subsidized loans from the U.S.
Department of Education, which totaled $17,250. The plaintiff said
she regularly attended classes, but in March 2019 the defendant
failed to provide the services that were required for the program's
study, including failing to provide instructors for classes, and
cancelling and rescheduling classes without advance notice. The
plaintiff said she received an email from Cortiva in April 2019,
stating the campus would be closing on June 20, 2019 and that her
options were to expedite the education and complete it early;
withdraw and transfer to another school; or withdraw and receive a
full refund. The plaintiff said she has tried to withdraw and
transfer her credits to another school, but the credits were not
accepted by the transfer school. The plaintiff attempted to get a
refund from the defendant, but the defendant allegedly has failed
to honor their promise.

The plaintiff is seeking declaratory judgment against the
defendant, compensatory damages, attorneys' fees and court costs,
interest and just relief. The plaintiff is represented by attorneys
Larry D. Drury, Esq. and Thomas M. Rebholz, Esq. of Larry D. Drury
Ltd., in Chicago. [GN]


COVANTA HOLDING: Brown Sues BOD Over Unauthorized Payments
-----------------------------------------------------------
JERRY BROWN, individually and on behalf of himself and all other
similarly situated stockholders of COVANTA HOLDING CORPORATION, and
derivatively on behalf of COVANTA HOLDING CORPORATION, Plaintiff,
v. COVANTA HOLDING CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation,
Defendant-Nominal Defendant, and DAVID M. BARSE, RONALD J. BROGLIO,
C.B. BYNOE, LINDA J. FISHER, JOSEPH M. HOLSTEN, OWEN MICHAELSON,
ANTHONY J. ORLANDO, DANIELLE PLETKA, MICHAEL W. RANGER, ROBERT S.
SILBERMAN, JEAN SMITH, AND SAMUEL ZELL, Defendants, Case No.
2019-0735- (Chancery Ct., Del., Sept. 12, 2019) is an action
brought because Covanta's board of directors has violated the
Delaware General Corporation Law and the Company's Amended and
Restated Bylaws by making unauthorized payments to the Board's
non-employee directors.

Section 141(h) of the DGCL authorizes directors to fix their own
compensation subject to the limitations and restrictions, if any,
imposed by the company's certificate of incorporation and bylaws.
Corporate bylaws are the legal instrument used to set forth the
rules by which the company's directors conduct business. In its
Bylaws, Covanta has long imposed restrictions on the Board's
ability to engage in self-dealing. Specifically, the Bylaws permit
Covanta's directors to pay themselves a fixed fee for each Board
meeting that they attend, and reimbursement of expenses for
attending such meetings (e.g., travel expenses). The Bylaws
expressly prohibit directors from taking any other payments or
compensation for their service on the Board.

Contrary to the DGCL, the Bylaws, and their fiduciary duty to the
Company and its stockholders, the Board has established a
non-employee director compensation program that includes numerous
unauthorized payments, asserts the complaint. The Board awards its
non-employee directors an annual cash retainer, an annual equity
award, and additional cash retainers for directors who chair Board
committees. None of these payments are permitted by the Bylaws.
Prior to filing this action, Plaintiff sent a letter to the Board
demanding that the Board recover these wrongful payments for the
benefit of the Company and bring Covanta's director compensation
program into compliance with the Bylaws. The Board rejected
Plaintiff's demand in its entirety, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Jerry Brown has owned Covanta common stock continuously
since 2017.

Covanta is a holding company that conducts operations through
subsidiaries engaged predominantly in the business of waste and
energy services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Steven J. Purcell, Esq.
     Douglas E. Julie, Esq.
     Robert H. Lefkowitz, Esq.
     Kaitlyn T. Devenyns, Esq.
     PURCELL JULIE & LEFKOWITZ LLP
     708 Third Avenue, 6th Floor
     New York, NY 10017
     Phone: 212-725-1000
     Facsimile: 212-725-0270

          - and -

     David A. Jenkins, Esq.
     Neal C. Belgam, Esq.
     Jason Miller, Esq.
     SMITH KATZENSTEIN & JENKINS LLP
     1000 West Street, Suite 1501
     Wilmington, DE 19801
     Phone: 302-652-8400
     Email: daj@skjlaw.com
            ncb@skjlaw.com
            jm@skjlaw.com


COWORX STAFFING: Galvez Seeks Minimum & Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------
LYSETTE GALVEZ, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THOSE SIMILARLY
SITUATED, the Plaintiff, vs. COWORX STAFFING SERVICES LLC, A
DELAWARE CORPORATION; MICHAEL EPSTEIN, AN INDIVIDUAL; AND DOES 1
THROUGH 10, INCLUSIVE, the Defendants, Case No. CGC-19-578983 (Cal.
Super., Sept. 4, 2019), alleges that Defendants failed to pay
overtime wages, failed to pay minimum and regular wages, failed to
make timely final wage, failed to reimburse expenses, and failed to
provide proper itemized wage statements under the California Labot
Code.

The Plaintiff was a non-exempt employee of Defendants.

Coworx Staffing Services LLC provides staffing solutions. The
company offers temporary staffing, direct hire, pay rolling,
diversity, and managed services. Coworx Staffing Services serves
customers in the United States.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Kevin Woodall, Esq.
          WOODALL LAW OFFICES
          100 Pine Street, Suite 1250
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 413-4629
          Facsimile: (866) 937-4109
          E-mail: kevin@kwoodalllaw.com

CVS PHARMACY: Court Grants Stay in Ferguson
-------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion to Stay in
the case captioned LES FERGUSON, an individual, Plaintiff, v. CVS
PHARMACY, INC., a corporation, Defendant. Case No. 18-CV-1529 JLS
(MDD). (S.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff filed a punitive class action alleging that Defendant
falsely claimed that the Algal-900 DHA supplement was clinically
shown to improve memory. The factual allegations in Plaintiff's
complaint are nearly identical to the factual allegations in the
complaint in Worth v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. 16-CV-498 SMG, a
punitive class action filed on February 1, 2016, in the Eastern
District of New York (Worth Action).
  
LEGAL STANDARD

Courts have the discretionary power to stay proceedings. In
determining whether to grant a motion to stay, the competing
interests that will be affected by the granting or refusal to grant
a stay must be weighed. Those interests include: (1) the possible
damage which may result from the granting of a stay (2) the
hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to
go forward and (3) the orderly course of justice measured in terms
of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions
of law which could be expected to result from a stay.

In its Motion, Defendant requests the court to grant a one hundred
and twenty day stay pending final approval of the proposed
settlement in the Worth Action (Worth Settlement). Consequently, by
virtue of Civil Local Rule 7.1(f)(3)(c), Plaintiff has consented to
the relief requested in Defendant's Motion.  

Nonetheless, the Court addresses Defendant's Motion on the merits
and briefly analyzes each of the Landis factors below.

Possible Damage from Granting of a Stay

When a district court approves a class action settlement, a federal
court may release not only those claims alleged in the complaint,
but also a claim based on the identical factual predicate as that
underlying the claims in the settled class action. Defendant
contends that Plaintiff will not suffer any damage if the requested
stay is granted because this action and the Worth Action are based
on the same alleged misrepresentations regarding the same product,
meaning that the Worth Settlement, if approved, will necessitate
dismissal of this action despite the differing theories of
liability.  

The Court agrees with Defendant that the requested stay will not
damage Plaintiff because a stay will ensure  

Hardship to Defendant Absent a Stay

For the same reasons, not granting a stay would harm Defendant
because it would be burdensome for both parties to spend time,
energy, and resources on pretrial and discovery issues when this
case may be dismissed upon final approval of the Worth Settlement.
Consequently, this factor also favors granting the requested stay.

The Orderly Course of Justice

Finally, the Court concludes that judicial economy would not be
served by having the Court expend resources on a case that may be
dismissed. Accordingly, the final Landis factor also weighs in
favor of granting a stay.

Because all three Landis factors weigh in favor of granting
Defendant the requested stay, the Court concludes that a limited
stay pending the Worth Settlement is appropriate.

The Court grants Defendant's Motion.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 12, 2019 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y592uxvo from Leagle.com.

Les Ferguson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Trenton R. Kashima -
jrk@classactionlaw.com - Finkelstein & Krinsk, LLP.

CVS Pharmacy, Inc., Defendant, represented by Frank Thomas Spano -
fspano@polsinelli.com - Polsinelli LLP, pro hac vice, Ilana
Gabriella Zelener - izelener@polsinelli.com - Polsinelli LLP,
Jennifer Joan Axel - jaxel@polsinelli.com - Polsinelli PC, pro hac
vice & Noel S. Cohen - ncohen@polsinelli.com - Polsinelli LLP.

Jeffrey Worth & Robert Burns, Intervenors, represented by Michael
R. Reese - michael@reeserichman.com - Reese Richman LLP.


DEARBORN PANTHEION: Underpays Exotic Dancers, Briggs Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------
JADA BRIGGS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. DEARBORN PANTHEION, LLC; MARWAN HAIDAR; and
MELISSA HASHEM, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-12549-MOAB-APP (E.D.
Mich., Aug. 29, 2019) is an action against the Defendants for
failure to pay minimum wage.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as exotic dancer.

Dearborn Pantheion, LLC owns and operates an adult entertainment
club.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jennifer Lossia McManus, Esq.
          FAGAN MCMANUS, P.C.
          25892 Woodward Ave.
          Royal Oak, MI 48067
          Telephone: (248) 658-8951


EPDUSA INC: Garcia Hits Illegal Tip Pool, Seeks Overtime Pay
------------------------------------------------------------
Esther B. Garcia, and other similarly-situated individuals,
Plaintiff, v. EPDUSA, Inc., Erick De La Torre and Yanelquis O. De
La Torre, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-02118, (M.D. Fla., August 22,
2019), seeks to recover regular wages, overtime compensation,
retaliatory damages, liquidated damages, costs and reasonable
attorney's fees under the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

Defendants operate as La Giraldilla Restaurant, a Cuban cafeteria
located at 1003 W Hillsborough Avenue, Tampa 33603 where Garcia
worked as a tipped waitress. She claims to have worked 6 days with
a minimum of 42 hours, or double shifts with more than 42 hours but
was not paid for overtime hours. Garcia also claims that the
Defendants took out a tip despite not having a valid tip pooling
agreement. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Zandro E. Palma, Esq.
     ZANDRO E. PALMA, P.A.
     9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
     Miami, FL 33156
     Telephone: (305) 446-1500
     Facsimile: (305) 446-1502
     Email: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com


FACEBOOK INC: Bid to Amend Consolidated Adkins Complaint Partly OKd
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STEPHEN ADKINS, an individual and Michigan resident,
on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v. FACEBOOK, INC., Defendant, Case No. C 18-05982 WHA, Consolidated
with No. C 19-00117 WHA (N.D. Cal.), Judge William Alsup of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted
in part and denied in part Adkins' motion for leave to amend the
consolidated complaint.

In September 2018, Facebook discovered it had been hacked.
According to Facebook, the hackers stole information from
approximately 29 million Facebook users worldwide, including 3.9
million users in the United States.  Eleven putative class action
lawsuits followed.  In January 2019, an order consolidated the 11
lawsuits.  In February 2019, five named Plaintiffs filed a
consolidated complaint.  Subsequently, all but one of the remaining
named Plaintiffs from the 11 putative class actions voluntarily
withdrew without prejudice.

In March 2019, Facebook moved to dismiss the consolidated
complaint, attacking the Plaintiffs' Article III standing as well
as the sufficiency of their claims.  A hearing on the motion to
dismiss was held in May 2019.  At the hearing, depositions of the
named Plaintiffs were ordered.  Supplemental briefing on the
depositions followed.  Abruptly, three of the five named Plaintiffs
voluntarily withdrew without prejudice.

In June 2019, an order granted Facebook's motion in part,
dismissing one Plaintiff entirely for lack of standing and
dismissing seven of 10 alleged claims.  The order further
consolidated two of the three surviving claims (negligence and
negligence per se) into two separate theories of a single claim.
The dismissed Plaintiff, William Bass, did not seek leave to amend
his claims.

Now, the sole remaining named Plaintiff, Adkins, seeks to amend six
of the seven dismissed claims as well as one of his surviving
claims.  Facebook opposes.

The primary issues remain twofold.  First, whether or not the
limitation-of-liability clause in Facebook's terms of service
should be enforced. Second, whether or not an economic injury
sufficient to bring a claim under Section 17200 exists.  In
addition, Plaintiff Adkins requests leave to amend his surviving
claim of negligence to add newly alleged facts, a new theory of
harm, and punitive damages.  Facebook also opposes thw amendment.

Judge Alsup denied leave to amend in part and granted leave to
amend in part.  First, he again refuses to invalidate the
limitation-of-liability clause agreed to by the parties.  He holds
that there was no procedural unconscionability.  Accordingly, leave
to amend the four claims for breach of contract (claims 1-4) and
the claim for breach of confidence (claim 7) is denied.  Second,
the Judge finds that the Plaintiff still has not alleged standing
under Section 17200.  The value of the Plaintiff's personal
information has not diminished to the Plaintiff since the data
breach.  Leave to amend the claim under Section 17200 (Claim 6) is
also denied.  Third, because the negligence claim has already been
deemed plausible, the amendments to the negligence claim, including
the newly alleged theory of credit-monitoring harm and newly sought
remedy of punitive damages, are permitted.

All unopposed amendments and all amendments related to the
negligence claim (claim 5) are permitted to proceed.  All
amendments related to the claims for breach of contract (claims
1-4), violation of Section 17200 (claim 6), and the claim for
breach of confidence (claim 7) are not permitted.  Those claims are
dismissed without leave to amend.

The Plaintiff must file an amended consolidated complaint
consistent with the Order within seven calendar days.  The answer
is due within 14 calendar days thereafter.  Rule 12 practice will
now cease and yield to discovery.  The deadline to move for class
certification remains Auggust 29 at noon.  The hearing scheduled
for August 22 is vacated.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 9, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/wncIKx from Leagle.com.

Stephen Adkins, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew N. Friedman --
afriedman@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC,
pro hac vice, Ariana J. Tadler -- atadler@TadlerLaw.com -- Milberg
Tadler Phillips Grossman LLP, John A. Yanchunis --
jyanchunis@ForThe People.com -- Morgan & Morgan Complex Litigation
Group, Henry J. Kelston, Milberg Tadler Phillips Grossman LLP,
Jeremy Keith Robinson, Casey Gerry Schenk Francavilla Blatt and
Penfield, Karina Grace Puttieva, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC
& Kate M. Baxter-Kauf, Lockridge Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P.

Luis Licea, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Ebby Shahrokh
Bakhtiar, Livingston Bakhtiar, Keith David Griffin, Girardi &
Keese, Thomas V. Girardi, Girardi & Keese, Andrew N. Friedman,
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Ariana J. Tadler, Milberg
Tadler Phillips Grossman LLP & Jeremy Keith Robinson, Casey Gerry
Schenk Francavilla Blatt and Penfield.

Facebook, Inc., Defendant, represented by Elizabeth L. Deeley --
elizabeth.deeley@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, Alexander E.
Reicher -- alexander.reicher@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, Andrew
Brian Clubok, Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice, Melanie Marilyn
Blunschi, Latham & Watkins LLP, Michael H. Rubin, Latham & Watkins
LLP, Serrin A. Turner -- serrin.turner@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins
LLP, pro hac vice & Susan E. Engel -- susan.engel@lw.com -- Latham
& Watkins LLP, pro hac vice.

Scott Schinder, Interested Party, represented by Andrew N.
Friedman, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Jeremy Keith
Robinson, Casey Gerry Schenk Francavilla Blatt and Penfield &
Lesley Elizabeth Weaver, Bleichmar Fonti & Auld LLP.


FEDEX CORP: Continues to Defend Securities Class Suits in New York
------------------------------------------------------------------
FedEx Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 17, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended August 3, 2019, that the company continues
to defend two putative class action securities lawsuits pending in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

On June 26, 2019 and July 2, 2019, FedEx and certain present and
former officers were named as defendants in two putative class
action securities lawsuits filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York.

The complaints allege violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder relating to alleged misstatements or
omissions in FedEx's public filings with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and other public statements during the
period from September 19, 2017 to December 18, 2018.

FedEx said, "We are not currently able to estimate the probability
of loss or the amount or range of potential loss, if any, at this
stage of the litigation."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

FedEx Corporation provides transportation, e-commerce, and business
services worldwide. FedEx Corporation was founded in 1971 and is
headquartered in Memphis, Tennessee.


FIELDWORK CHICAGO: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Dixie Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------
DIXIE PLUMBING SPECIALTIES, INC., individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. FIELDWORK
CHICAGO-SCHAUMBURG, INC.; FIELDWORK CHICAGO, INC.; FIELDWORK
CHICAGO DOWNTOWN, INC.; and FIELDWORK, INC., Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-05821 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 29, 2019) seeks to stop the
Defendants' practice of making unsolicited calls.

Fieldwork Chicago-Schaumburg, Inc. is engaged in the business of
providing market research. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan M. Kelly, Esq.
          ANDERSON + WANCA
          3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 500
          Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
          Telephone: (847) 368-1500
          Facsimile: (847) 368-1501
          E-mail: rkelly@andersonwanca.com


FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: Haye Suit Moved to District of Maryland
-------------------------------------------------------------
The case is captioned as Jhordan Haye, Individually, and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, vs. Financial
Management Solutions, LLC; Monica Guilarte; and Russell Thomas, the
Defendant, Case No. C-10-CV-19-000526, was removed from the Circuit
Court for Frederick County, to the U.S. District Court for District
of Maryland (Baltimore) on Sept. 4, 2019. The District of Maryland
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-02557-ELH to the proceeding.
The suit demands $75,000 in damages for alleged violation of the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Ellen L. Hollander.

FMS is a professional debt collection agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Emanwel Josef Turnbull, Esq.
          THE HOLLAND LAW FIRM PC
          914 Bay Ridge Rd, Suite 230
          Annapolis, MD 21401
          Telephone: (410) 280-6133
          Facsimile: (410) 280-8650
          E-mail: eturnbull@hollandlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Scott C. Borison, Esq.
          LEGG LAW FIRM LLP
          1900 S. Norfolk St., Suite 350
          San Mateo, CA 94403
          Telephone: (301) 620-1016
          Facsimile: (301) 620-1018
          E-mail: usdc@legglaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Alvin I. Frederick, Esq.
          ECCLESTON AND WOLF PC
          Baltimore Washington Law Center
          7240 Parkway Dr Fourth Fl
          Hanover, MD 21076
          Telephone: (410) 752-7474
          Facsimile: (410) 752-0611
          E-mail: frederick@ewmd.com

               - and -

          M. Olivia Haarz, Esq.
          ECCLESTON & WOLF, PC
          7240 Parkway Drive, Fourth Fl.
          Hanover, MD 21076
          Telephone: (410) 752-7474
          E-mail: haarz@ewmd.com

               - and -

          Ronald S. Canter, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF RONALD S CANTER LLC
          200A Monroe St Ste 104
          Rockville, MD 20850
          Telephone: (301) 424-7490
          Facsimile: (301) 424-7470
          E-mail: rcanter@roncanterllc.com

FIRST TECHNOLOGY: N.C. App. Affirms Counterclaims Dismissal
------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina issued an Opinion affirming
the District Court’s judgment dismissing the Defendant’s
Counterclaims in the captioned FIRST TECHNOLOGY FEDERAL CREDIT
UNION, Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, v. RONNIE LEE SANDERS,
Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff. No. COA19-187. (N.C. App.)

Defendant Ronnie Sanders appeals from the trial court's order
dismissing his counterclaims for violations of the notice
provisions under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
against Plaintiff First Technology Federal Credit Union (Credit
Union).  

Defendant and seller entered into a Retail Installment Sale
Contract for the purchase and finance of a vehicle, which the
seller assigned to the Credit Union shortly after execution.
Defendant then returned the vehicle to the seller upon discovering
that the seller had made various misrepresentations concerning the
vehicle's features and condition.  

The Credit Union sold the vehicle for $11,829.41 less than the
amount owed under the installment agreement, and commenced the
instant action for recovery of the deficiency. Defendant filed an
answer asserting various affirmative defenses, including (1) that
he was fraudulently induced into signing the installment agreement
and, thus, was not liable for any sum owing thereunder, and (2)
that the Credit Union was not entitled to recover the deficiency,
in that its Notice of Intent to Sell Property was insufficient
under N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 25-9-614.

Defendant also filed a class action counterclaim against the Credit
Union, in which he challenged the Credit Union's unlawful and
harassing practices related to its use of a standardized
post-repossession notice, which fails to contain the required
information under N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 25-9-614, prior to
selling vehicles repossessed from consumers.

The Credit Union filed a motion to dismiss Defendant's
counterclaims, which came on for hearing before the Honorable
Jonathan Kreider in Guilford County District Court. At the hearing,
the parties stipulated that the installment agreement was not a
valid and binding contract.

On the basis that there existed no valid and binding contract
between the parties, the trial court concluded that the Credit
Union's complaint for deficiency judgment failed as a matter of
law. The trial court also concluded that Defendant's counterclaims
failed as a matter of law, in that, absent a valid and binding
security agreement, the Credit Union was not a secured party
subject to enforcement of the UCC's notice provisions.

The trial court dismissed with prejudice all claims between the
parties. Defendant timely appealed from the trial court's order
dismissing his counterclaims.

On appeal, Defendant argues:

(1) that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to
continue the hearing in order for Defendant to research and brief
the issue of whether the Credit Union had a duty to comply with
Article 9 of the UCC in light of the installment agreement having
been canceled.

(2) that the trial court erred in dismissing Defendant's
counterclaims, in that the duty to comply with Article 9's notice
provisions is not dependent upon the existence of a valid and
binding contract and

(3) that the trial court erred in holding that Defendant failed as
a class representative in the absence of a pending class
certification motion.

The Uniform Commercial Code is codified in Chapter 25 of North
Carolina's General Statutes. Article 9, Part 6, Subpart 1 governs
the default and enforcement of security interests. In the event
that a debtor defaults on his obligations under a security
agreement, the secured party is permitted to take possession of the
collateral, N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 25-9-609(a)(1) (2017), and
thereafter, to sell or otherwise dispose of the collateral in order
to satisfy the outstanding debt owed under the terms of the
security agreement.

Before disposing of collateral pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. Section
25-9-610, the secured party must send to the debtor a reasonable
authenticated notification of disposition.

In the instant case, the Credit Union's notice of intent sought to
notify Defendant of his liability for any deficiency following the
sale by including a verbatim recitation of the above form language,
without electing between the bracketed alternative language, as
follows:

The money that we get from the sale, after paying our costs, will
reduce the amount you owe. If we get less than you owe, you will or
will not, as applicable, still owe us the difference. If we get
more than you owe, you will get the extra money, unless we must pay
it to someone else.

Defendant asserted as an affirmative defense to the Credit Union's
complaint for deficiency judgment that this language failed to
provide Defendant with sufficient notice that the Credit Union
would seek to hold him liable for a deficiency. Defendant also
asserted the same as the basis for a class action counterclaim on
behalf of the other individuals to whom the Credit Union had sent
the inadequate notice, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. Section
25-9-625. The trial court, however, dismissed Defendant's
counterclaims, concluding that the Credit Union was not a secured
party subject to enforcement of the UCC's notice provisions.

The Court agrees.

The notice requirements under Article 9 apply only to secured
parties. A secured party is defined as a person in whose favor a
security interest is created or provided for under a security
agreement, whether or not any obligation to be secured is
outstanding. A security interest' means an interest in personal
property which secures payment or performance of an obligation.
Thus, a plain reading of the applicable definitions quite plainly
reveals that there can be no secured party in the absence of an
enforceable security interest, and where the parties' security
agreement is canceled, so too is the security interest that was
created thereunder.

Accordingly, in that the parties conceded that the only security
agreement between them was no longer valid and enforceable, the
trial court correctly concluded that the Credit Union was not a
secured party subject to liability for its failure to comply with
the notice provisions under Article 9.

The Court therefore affirms the trial court's order dismissing
Defendant's counterclaims. Because we affirm the trial court's
dismissal of Defendant's counterclaims, the Court do not address
Defendant's remaining argument that this Court should vacate the
district court's holding and remand for further proceedings
including, in due course, a motion for class certification by
Defendant.

The trial court's order dismissing Defendant's counterclaims is
affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

A full-text copy of the N.C. App.'s September 3, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3xqadb6 from Leagle.com.

McAngus, Goudelock & Courie, PLLC, by Jeffrey B. Kuykendal -
jeffrey.kuykendal@mgclaw.com- for plaintiff-appellee.

Law Office of Jonathan R. Miller, PLLC , d/b/a Salem Community Law
Office, by Jonathan R. Miller , 186 Joralemon St, Ste 1202,
Brooklyn, NY 11201, for defendant-appellant.


FITNESS EQUIPMENT: Bechtel Sues over Mislabeled Treadmill Product
-----------------------------------------------------------------
LAURA BECHTEL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. FITNESS EQUIPMENT SERVICES, LLC, dba SOLE
FITNESS, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00726-MRB (S.D. Ohio, Aug. 30,
2019) alleges that the Defendant misrepresented the horsepower
capabilities of its treadmill product.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the Defendant misleads
consumers into believing that the treadmills sold by the Defendant
can generate and maintain the represented continuous horsepower,
even though in fact the horsepower misrepresentations can never be
obtained during actual household use by the Plaintiff and consumer
Class members.

As a result, consumers have overpaid for the treadmills instead of
buying competitor manufacturers' treadmills or less expensive
models.

Fitness Equipment Services LLC was founded in 2001. The company's
line of business includes the manufacturing of sporting and
athletic goods. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Terence R. Coates, Esq.
          W.B. Markovits, Esq.
          Paul M. De Marco, Esq.
          Justin C. Walker, Esq,
          MARKOVITS STOCK & DEMARCO, LLC
          3825 Edwards Road, Suite 650
          Cincinnati, OH 45209
          Telephone: (513) 651-3700
          Facsimile: (513) 665-0219s
          E-mail: bmarkovits@msdlegal.com
                  pdemarco@msdlegal.com
                  tcoates@msdlegal.com
                  jwalker@msdlegal.com


FORD MOTOR: Appeals Court Orders Review of Class-Action Settlement
------------------------------------------------------------------
Phoebe Wall Howard, writing for The Neighbor, reports that the U.S
9th Circuit Court of Appeals on Sept. 13, 2019, declined to approve
a class-action settlement involving Ford Motor Co. and nearly 2
million owners and former owners of Focus and Fiesta vehicles with
defective dual-clutch transmissions known as DPS6.

The judges vacated "final settlement approval" after Public
Citizen, a nonprofit consumer advocacy group, challenged how much
money would be awarded to consumers and the fact that the vast
majority of the car owners would have received nothing.

The entry-level Fiesta and Focus vehicles, built over the past
decade, have a history of costly repair for failing clutches and
other problems. A Detroit Free Press "Out of Gear" investigation
published in July revealed for the first time internal company
documents and emails showing that the Dearborn automaker knew the
transmissions were defective from the start and continued building
and selling them anyway.

The court decision means the terms of the settlement must now go
back to U.S. district court for "more searching inquiry."

The 2-1 decision questioned the district court's scrutiny of the
class-action attorneys and the terms of the settlement, suggesting
that the lawyers didn't adequately represent consumers but rather
pushed through the settlement based on their own financial
interests. The agreement called for them to get $8,856,000 in
fees.

Ryan H. Wu, lead class counsel at Capstone Law, in April urged the
Court of Appeals to keep the settlement. He declined to comment
September 13.

Ford spokesman T.R. Reid said, "The proposed settlement was not
changed by the opinion. As we have all along, we think the proposed
settlement is fair. We look forward to the court's final action on
the settlement."

Ford had agreed not to object to the plaintiffs attorneys' fees,
the decision noted. The Ninth Circuit "has warned district courts
to be alert for certain 'subtle signs that class counsel have
allowed pursuit of their own self interests and that of certain
class members to infect the negotiations.' At least two of those
signs are present in this settlement, which includes a fee award
disproportionate to the class recovery and a 'clear sailing'
provision whereby (Ford) agreed not to object to the fee award
sought by class counsel."

The judges questioned whether the court adequately scrutinized the
calculation of the settlement amount. "The court adopted the
estimate of class counsel's expert that the cash payments were
worth around $35 million."

But that calculation was based on total payments to every eligible
vehicle owner, while the actual claims rate was expected to be much
lower, resulting in an even smaller payment by Ford, the judges
noted.

The original lawsuit alleges Ford lied to unload cars with faulty
transmissions on unsuspecting buyers and then blamed the drivers
for problems they experienced.

Ford customers claim in legal filings their 2012-16 Focus and
2011-16 Fiesta sedans were built with dual-clutch transmissions
prone to "shuddering, slipping, bucking, jerking, hesitation while
changing gears, premature internal wear, delays in downshifting
and, in some cases, sudden or delayed acceleration."

Ford in April warned its shareholders of legal exposure related to
the DPS6 in a Securities and Exchange Commission filing under the
subhead, "Consumer Matters."

"We are currently a defendant in a significant number of litigation
matters relating to the performance of vehicles equipped with DPS6
transmissions," said the last item on a 70-page document dated
April 25 and signed by Cathy O'Callaghan, Ford vice president and
controller.

"We are a defendant in numerous actions in state and federal courts
alleging damages based on state and federal consumer protection
laws and breach of warranty obligations. Remedies under these
statutes may include repurchase, civil penalties, and plaintiff's
attorney fees. In some cases, plaintiffs also include an allegation
of fraud."

Wu argued to the court in April that if the settlement was thrown
out, Ford could face a potential $4 billion liability.

If the settlement ultimately is rejected, it may create an
opportunity for consumers to file individual claims against Ford
that were restricted until now.

Under the terms of the class-action settlement, individuals were
required to opt out of the deal or be subject to its terms with no
further recourse.

Michael Kirkpatrick, who argued in court against both Ford and the
class-action firm on behalf of Public Citizen, said September 13,
"We are confident that, once the district judge takes a closer look
and considers further the evidence about the value of the claims
that would be released by the settlement, the district court will
agree ... that the settlement is not fair, reasonable and adequate,
and will not grant final approval."

It could take up to a year or more for this issue to be resolved.

Ford has tried, repeatedly, to repair the vehicles, and continues
those efforts. In 2014, it extended the warranties on
transmission-related parts to seven years and 100,000 miles on
Focuses and Fiestas built before mid-2013. A month after Free Press
publication of "Out of Gear," the automaker extended the warranty
for 2014-16 Focuses and 2014-15 Fiestas built after that.

Federal safety regulators have reviewed the transmission troubles
twice - once in 2014 and again this summer, and have found no
"unreasonable" safety risk, the legal standard that triggers a
recall. The agency has received a minimum of 4,377 consumer
complaints about the cars that include reports of 50 injuries, a
Free Press analysis found. [GN]


FRANKLIN COLLECTION: Bailey Sues over Debt Collection Practices
---------------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL BAILEY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. FRANKLIN COLLECTION SERVICE, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 0:19-cv-62189 (S.D. Fla., Aug. 31, 2019) seeks
to stop the Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to collect
a debt.

The Law Office of Steven B. Katz, P.A. is a law firm engaged as a
debt collection agency. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
          Thomas J. Patti, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI
          110 SE 6th Street, Suite 1744
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Tel: (954) 907-1136
          Fax: (855) 529-9540
          E-mail: jibrael@jibraellaw.com
                  tom@jibraellaw.com


FREE FLY: Galitz Hits Illegal Telemarketing SMS Ads
---------------------------------------------------
Zoe Galitz, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Free Fly, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
19-cv-23517 (S.D. Fla., August 22, 2019), seeks statutory damages,
punitive damages, costs and attorney fees for violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Free Fly, Inc. operates as EXIT Realty Florida, a full-service real
estate franchisor based in Canada. To promote its services, it
engages in unsolicited SMS ads sent en masse via an auto dialer.
Galitz did not give his express written consent to be contacted in
such manner, notes the complaint. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
      Jordan D. Utanski, Esq.
      EDELSBERG LAW, PA
      19495 Biscayne Blvd #607
      Aventura, FL 33180
      Telephone: (305) 975-3320
      Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com
             utanski@edelsberglaw.com

             - and -

      Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
      Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
      SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
      14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 400
      Miami, FL 33132
      Telephone: 305-479-2299
      Email: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
             gberg@shamisgentile.com


FREEDOM MORTGAGE: 4th Cir. Affirms UDTPA Dismissal
--------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court's judgment granting
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned RICARDO
FLOREZ; ELIZABETH PAGANO, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FREEDOM
MORTGAGE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. No. 18-2085. (4th Cir.).

In this breach of contract action arising out of a mortgage
agreement, Ricardo Florez and Elizabeth Pagano, alleged that
Freedom Mortgage Corporation violated the terms of their note and
deed of trust by holding certain mortgage payments in an Unapplied
Funds account (UFA), rather than immediately applying these
payments to the note's remaining balance.

The district court granted Freedom's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, finding that Freedom fully complied with the
terms of the agreement.

On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the court erroneously interpreted
the agreement, overlooked one of their central arguments, and
improperly concluded that their claim under the Unfair and
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA), necessarily depended on a
showing that Freedom breached the contract.  

The Court reviews de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

To state a breach of contract claim under North Carolina law, a
plaintiff must allege (1) existence of a valid contract and (2)
breach of the terms of the contract.

And to state a UDTPA violation, a plaintiff must allege that (1)
the defendants committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or
an unfair method of competition (2) in or affecting commerce  (3)
which proximately caused actual injury to the plaintiff or to the
plaintiff`s business.

Plaintiffs' claim fails under a plain reading of the deed of trust,
which explicitly permitted Freedom to hold partial payments in the
UFA until Plaintiffs tendered enough money to constitute a full
periodic payment. As its name implies, a Half Payment was not a
full periodic payment, thus, Freedom was entitled to wait until
receipt of a second Half Payment before applying both to
Plaintiffs' outstanding balance.

Undeterred, Plaintiffs insist that, because the biweekly payment
plan restricted eligibility to borrowers who were paid ahead by one
month, each of their Half Payments was a prepayment, and, under the
terms of the agreement, Freedom was required to apply prepayments
immediately. However, by relying on the colloquial meaning of
prepayment, Plaintiffs ignore the clear, unambiguous definition
supplied by the note, which placed multiple conditions on which
payments constituted Prepayments. Because the Half Payments did not
satisfy each of these requirements, we agree with the district
court's conclusion that none of the contested payments was a
Prepayment under the terms of the parties' agreement.

The Court also agree with the district court that the 13th and 26th
Half Payments were Prepayments, but, as the district court stated,
were directly applied to principal without delay.

The Court affirms the judgment of the district court.  

AFFIRMED.

A full-text copy of the Fourth Circuit's September 3, 2019 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yyj5vazh from Leagle.com.

Aaron C. Hemmings , HEMMINGS & STEVENS, P.L.L.C., 5540 McNeely
Drive, #202, Raleigh,  NC, 27612; Kenneth Jay Grunfeld , GOLOMB &
HONIK, P.C., 1515 Market St., Ste 1100, Philadelphia, PA 19102,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Joseph H. Aughtman –
jay@aughtmanlaw.com - AUGHTMAN LAW FIRM, LLC, Montgomery, Alabama,
for Appellants.

David F. Abernethy - david.abernethy dbr.com - Katie B. Garayoa
-katie.garayoa@dbr.com - DRINKER, BIDDLE & REATH, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; Charles E. Raynal -  
charlesraynal@parkerpoe.com - Scott E. Bayzle -
scottbayzle@parkerpoe.com - PARKER, POE, ADAMS & BERNSTEIN, LLP,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.


FRIENDS HEALTH: Violates FLSA Overtime Provisions, Says Kim Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jong Hoon Kim, Plaintiff, v. Friends Health Care Team, Inc. doing
business as and also known as Friends Health Care or Friends
Health, and Dae J. LEE, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01187-AJT-TCB
(E.D. Va., Sept. 13, 2019) alleges that Defendants intentionally
and willfully violated the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. Plaintiff is filing this FLSA claim as an individual
action for himself and other non-exempt similarly situated
employees.

Plaintiff says he regularly worked more than 40 hours a week while
employed by Defendants but was never paid the proper amount of
overtime wages. The Defendants manipulated the pay stubs to hide
the true regular rate and hours worked. Furthermore, Defendants
told Plaintiff that they would reimburse Plaintiff if he used his
car to pick up and return the adults to and from their residences.
Despite their promises, they did not fully reimburse Plaintiff for
mileages and other expenses incurred by Plaintiff for the benefit
of Defendants. This unpaid reimbursement cut into Plaintiff's wage,
says the complaint.

Plaintiff Jong Hoon Kim worked at Friends Health from October 20,
2018, until April 2, 2019 as helper (called coordinator).

Friends Health was in the business of adult day care center
services and adult home care services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Michael Hyunkweon Ryu, Esq.
     Ryu & Ryu, PLC
     301 Maple Ave West, Suite 620
     Vienna VA 22180


GANNETT CO: Scarantino Challenges Sale to New Media
---------------------------------------------------
RICHARD SCARANTINO, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. GANNETT CO., INC., JOHN JEFFRY
LOUIS, PAUL BASCOBERT, JOHN E. CODY, STEPHEN W. COLL, DONALD
FELSINGER, LILA IBRAHIM, LAWRENCE S. KRAMER, DEBRA A. SANDLER,
CHLOE SLADDEN, NEW MEDIA INVESTMENT GROUP INC., ARCTIC HOLDINGS
LLC, and ARCTIC ACQUISITION CORP., Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-01740-UNA (D. Del., Sept. 16, 2019) is an action stemming
from a proposed transaction announced on August 5, 2019, pursuant
to which Gannett Co., Inc. will be acquired by New Media Investment
Group Inc., Arctic Holdings LLC, and Arctic Acquisition Corp.

On August 5, 2019, Gannett's Board of Directors caused the Company
to enter into an agreement and plan of merger with New Media.
Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, Gannett's
stockholders will receive $6.25 in cash and 0.5427 of a share of
New Media stock for each share of Gannett common stock they own. On
August 29, 2019, defendants filed a Form S-4 Registration Statement
with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission in
connection with the Proposed Transaction.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Registration Statement omits
material information with respect to the Proposed Transaction,
which renders the Registration Statement false and misleading.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated
Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in
connection with the Registration Statement.

Plaintiff is the owner of Gannett common stock.

Gannett is a digitally focused media and marketing solutions
company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Brian D. Long, Esq.
     Gina M. Serra, Esq.
     RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
     300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
     Wilmington, DE 19801
     Phone: (302) 295-5310
     Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
     Email: bdl@rl-legal.com
            gms@rl-legal.com

          - and -

     RM LAW, P.C.
     1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
     Berwyn, PA 19312
     Phone: (484) 324-6800
     Facsimile: (484) 631-1305


GAP INC: Has $2.28MM Settlement of Class Suit Over Pricing
----------------------------------------------------------
ARENT FOX wrote in JDSupra.com that The Gap, Inc. recently settled
a class action lawsuit alleging that the retailer employed a
misleading pricing scheme in The Gap and Banana Republic outlets
and factory stores. The plaintiffs claimed that the company, which
owns both The Gap and Banana Republic brands, used deceptive
reference prices to produce "phantom" sales.

The settlement, worth up to $2.28 million in total, resolved four
putative class actions pending in state and federal court in
California and New Jersey. This development is yet another
cautionary tale for retailers to exercise caution when advertising
price reductions, as the plaintiffs' bar continues to closely
monitor pricing practices for potential class action
opportunities.

The Details
The four putative class actions were filed against The Gap and
several subsidiaries between 2016 and 2018. The complaints alleged
that The Gap adopted a system of reference prices in The Gap and
Banana Republic factory stores and outlets that created the
misleading impression that certain items were marked down.
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the retailer listed
"base" prices on price tags that were designed to indicate the
item's regular, non-discounted price. According to the plaintiffs,
though, these items were either never sold at the base price or
were only sold at the base price for a handful of days, making the
advertised savings illusory. The plaintiffs claimed that the
company posted "50% off" signs in stores and presented customers
with their "savings" on receipts, both of which were premised on
the same base prices.

The Gap sought to dismiss the cases, but soon afterwards the
parties began settlement talks. This summer, a California Superior
Court judge presiding over one of the four cases approved a
settlement agreement that would resolve all four of the pending
class actions. Under the settlement terms, The Gap, while admitting
no wrongdoing, agreed to offer all class members up to two $6.00
vouchers to be used at any Gap or Banana Republic factory store or
outlet. The settlement is worth up to $2.28 million.

Practical Advice
This case is another reminder that retailers must be careful when
advertising discounts on items, and especially when doing so
through references to "former" or "base" prices. This is an
acceptable practice when done accurately, but retailers should
exercise caution with an active plaintiffs' bar monitoring pricing
practices for possible discrepancies.

Under the Federal Trade Commission's Guides Against Deceptive
Pricing, a former price referenced to indicate a price reduction is
acceptable if the referenced price is an "actual, bona fide price
at which the article was offered to the public on a regular basis
for a reasonably substantial period of time," and in the "recent,
regular course of business." 16 CFR Section 223.1. Importantly,
items cannot be temporarily sold at a higher price just so that
they can then be marked down. While state laws largely echo the
FTC's requirements, some prescribe specific rules in terms of how
recently and/or long an item must have been offered at the former
price.

These considerations are especially important for retailers with
factory stores and outlets. While items offered at such locations
were traditionally overstock or out of season items originally
produced for the brand's main stores, more and more companies are
manufacturing items exclusively for sale at factory stores and
outlets. Retailers should be careful not to create the impression
that items were previously sold at the brand's main stores if they
were, in fact, manufactured specifically for the factory store or
outlet. Placing a visible notice in stores and online can be an
effective way to notify shoppers that items were manufactured
directly for the factory store or outlet. [GN]


GENERAL MOTORS: Uyenoyama Says Car Entertainment Hub Defective
--------------------------------------------------------------
Cindy Uyenoyama; Vanessa Rodriguez; Benito Guzman; William Braden;
Norman Ganon; Crystal Robinson; Maxine Glenn; Mariano Lorenzo
Macaisa; Gini Michelle Cox; Shelia Cauthen; April Bradley; Richard
Schellhammer; Shon Reeves; Earl Kladke; David Conroe; and John
Toda, on behalf of themselves and a class of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. General Motors, LLC, the Defendant,
Case No. 2:19-cv-07668-SVW-MRW (C.D. Cal., Sept. 4, 2019), seeks
equitable relief and damages resulting from Defendant's defective
"Cadillac User Experience".

Cadillac is an iconic American automobile brand and a division of
Defendant GM. GM not only touts Cadillac as "a leading luxury auto
brand," but also claims it is an innovative one.

In an apparent attempt to live up to Cadillac's self-proclaimed
mantle of innovation, GM developed the "Cadillac User Experience"
or "CUE," which GM described as "a very elegant in-vehicle hub of
all the information and entertainment in your life."

GM boasted of several industry firsts with the CUE, including,
proximity sensing, haptic feedback, multi-touch hand gestures,
natural speech recognition and a Linux operating system. What GM
failed to disclose was the CUE possesses an innate and serious
defect that causes it to spontaneously delaminate or "spider-web,"
rendering its self-proclaimed state-of-the-art technology useless.
When this happens, the unit ceases to function properly. Even more
concerning, the Defect poses a serious safety risk to drivers, who
can become dangerously distracted.

GM has known about the Defect for years. But instead of fixing it,
GM continued to sell new Cadillac vehicles with the defect to
customers without disclosing it and has forced its customers to
spend upwards of $1,500.00 -- if not more -- to replace the CUE
once the defect fully manifests.

Adding insult to injury, when a customer does bring in a vehicle
for replacement of the CUE, GM replaces the broken CUE with the
same defectively designed and manufactured product. Consequently,
the defective replacement CUE will eventually suffer the same
delamination and spider-webbing issues, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          David S. Casey, Jr., Esq.
          Gayle M. Blatt, Esq.
          Jeremy Robinson, Esq.
          P. Camille Guerra, Esq.
          Seth Barron, Esq.
          David S. Casey III, Esq.
          CASEY GERRY SCHENK FRANCAVILLA
          BLATT & PENFIELD, LLP
          110 Laurel Street
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 238-1811
          Facsimile: (619) 544-9232
          E-mail: dcasey@cglaw.com
                  gmb@cglaw.com
                  jrobinson@cglaw.com
                  camille@cglaw.com
                  sbarron@cglaw.com
                  caseyd@cglaw.com

               - and -

          Christopher D. Moon, Esq.
          Kevin O. Moon, Esq.
          MOON LAW APC
          600 West Broadway, Suite 700
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 915-9432
          Facsimile: (650) 542-8432
          E-mail: chris@moonlawapc.com
                  kevin@moonlawapc.com

GENESCO INC: Settlement Reached in Chen & Salas Suit
----------------------------------------------------
Genesco Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on September 12, 2019, for the quarterly
period ended August 3, 2019, that the Company has reached an
agreement in principle in the "Chen and Salas Action", and
"Massachusetts lawsuits".

On May 19, 2017, two former employees of the Company's former Hat
World subsidiary filed a putative class and collective action, Chen
and Salas v. Genesco Inc., et al., in the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois alleging violations of the Fair
Labor and Standards Act (FLSA) and certain Illinois and New York
wages and hours laws, including, among others, failure to pay
overtime to store managers, and also seeking back pay, damages,
statutory penalties, and declaratory and injunctive relief.

On March 8, 2018, the court granted the Company's motion to
transfer venue to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Indiana. On March 9, 2018, a former employee of the Company's
former Hat World subsidiary filed a putative class action in the
Superior Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts claiming
violations of the Massachusetts Overtime Law, M.G.L.C. 151 Section
1A, by failing to pay overtime to employees classified as store
managers, and seeking restitution, an incentive award, treble
damages, interest, attorneys' fees and costs.

The Company has reached an agreement in principle to settle the
Chen and Salas and Massachusetts matters for payment of attorneys'
fees and administrative costs totaling $0.4 million plus total
payments to members of the plaintiff class who opt to participate
in the settlement of up to $0.8 million. The proposed settlement is
subject to approval by the court.

Genesco said, "The Company does not expect that the proposed
settlement will have a material adverse effect on its financial
condition or results of operations."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Genesco Inc. sell shoes and hats. It operates Journeys, Journeys
Kidz, and Shi by Journeys stores that offer footwear for young men,
women, and children. It also operates Underground Station, Jarman,
Hat World, Lids, Hat Shack, Hat Zone, Head Quarters, Cap
Connection, Lids Kids, and Johnston & Murphy. The company was
founded in 1925 and is based in Nashville.


GLASS MOUNTAIN: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Dolemba Suit Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
SCOTT DOLEMBA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. GLASS MOUNTAIN CAPITAL, LLC, Defendants,
Case No. 1:19-cv-05811 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 29, 2019) seeks to stop the
Defendants' practice of making unsolicited calls.

Glass Mountain Capital LLC was founded in 2005. The company's line
of business includes collection and adjustment services on claims
and other insurance related issues. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel A. Edelman, Esq.
          EDELMAN COMBS LATTURNER & GOODWIN, LLC
          20 S. Clark Street, Suite 1500
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 739-4200
          Facsimile: (312) 419-0379


GOLDEN 1: Faces Burgardt Suit in California Superior Court
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Golden 1 Credit
Union. The case is captioned as Dwaine Burgardt, on behalf of all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. The Golden 1 Credit
Union and Does 1-100, the Defendants, Case No.
34-2019-00263962-CU-BC-GDS (Cal. Super., Sept. 3). The suit alleges
breach of contract/warranty.

The Golden 1 Credit Union is a credit union headquartered in
Sacramento, California. There are currently 80 branches located
throughout the State of California. Golden 1 currently serves 38 of
the 58 counties in California.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Roy Karngwon Suh, Esq.
          THE KICK LAW FIRM, APC
          815 Moraga Dr
          Los Angeles, CA 90049-1633
          Telephone: (310) 395-2988
          Facsimile: (310) 929-2046

GREENLANE HOLDINGS: Bragar Eagel Files Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. announces that a class action lawsuit
has been filed in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida on behalf of all investors that purchased
Greenlane Holdings, Inc. securities between April 15, 2019 and
September 11,2019 ("the "Class Period"). Investors have until
November 12, 2019 to apply to the Court to be appointed as lead
plaintiff in the lawsuit.

In April 2019, the Greenlane held its initial public offering
("IPO") in which it sold more than 6 million common shares at
$17.00 per share. On June 18, 2019, the San Francisco Board of
Supervisors unanimously approved the ban on the sale and
distribution of e-cigarette products within the city. It also
endorsed a ban on the manufacturing of e-cigarette products on city
property. On this news, the Company's share price fell $2.27, or
over 17%, to close at $11 per share on June 19, 2019, on unusually
heavy trading volume. Since the IPO, shares of Greenlane has traded
as low as $5.39, a nearly 68% decline from the $17 per share IPO
price.

The complaint, filed September 11,2019, alleges that the IPO
registration statement was materially false and misleading and
omitted to state: (1) that the City of San Francisco had introduced
a major initiative to ban the sale of e-cigarette products across
three major cities and prohibit the manufacture of products at the
headquarters of Greenlane's key partner, JUUL Labs; (2) that, if
approved, the initiative would materially and adversely impact the
company's financial results and prospects; and (3) that, as a
result of the foregoing, defendants' positive statements about the
company's business, operations, and prospects, were materially
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

If you purchased Greenlane securities during the Class Period, are
a long-term stockholder, have information, would like to learn more
about these claims, or have any questions concerning this
announcement or your rights or interests with respect to these
matters, please contact Brandon Walker or Melissa Fortunato by
email at investigations@bespc.com, or telephone at (212) 355-4648,
or by filling out this contact form. There is no cost or obligation
to you.

Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. is a New York-based law firm
concentrating in commercial and securities litigation. For
additional information concerning the Greenlane lawsuit, please go
to https://bespc.com/gnln. For additional information about Bragar
Eagel & Squire, P.C. please go to www.bespc.com.

Contact:

         Brandon Walker, Esq.
         Melissa Fortunato, Esq.
         Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.
         Tel: (212) 355-4648
         Website: www.bespc.com
         E-mail: investigations@bespc.com
                 walker@bespc.com  
                 fortunato@bespc.com [GN]


GREENLANE HOLDINGS: Brodsky & Smith Probes Securities Claims
------------------------------------------------------------
Law office of Brodsky & Smith, LLC is investigating claims against
Greenlane Holdings, Inc. (GNLN) for possible breaches of Federal
Securities law.

In April 2019, Greenlane held its initial public offering ("IPO")
in which it sold more than 6 million common shares at $17.00 per
share. Shortly thereafter, on June 18, 2019, the San Francisco
Board of Supervisors unanimously approved the ban on the sale and
distribution of e-cigarette products within the city. It also
endorsed a ban on the manufacturing of e-cigarette products on city
property.

On the release of this news, Greenlane's share price fell $2.27, or
over 17%, closing at $11 per share on June 19, 2019. Since the
April 2019 IPO, shares of Greenlane have traded as low as $5.39, a
nearly 68% decline from the $17 per share IPO price.

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) the City of San Francisco had introduced a major
initiative to ban the sale of e-cigarette products across three
major cities and prohibit the manufacture of products at the
headquarters of Greenlane's key partner, JUUL Labs; (2) if
approved, the initiative would materially and adversely impact the
Company's financial results and prospects; and (3) as a result of
the foregoing, defendants' positive statements about Greenlane's
business, operations, and prospects, were materially misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis. When the true details entered the
market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damage.

If you purchased shares of Greenlane pursuant or traceable to
Greenlane's April 2019 IPO and wish to discuss the legal
ramifications of the investigation, or have any questions, you may
e-mail or call the law office of Brodsky & Smith, LLC who will,
without obligation or cost to you, attempt to answer your
questions. The deadline for filing is November 12, 2019. You may
contact Marc Ackerman, Esquire or Jordan Schatz, Esquire at Brodsky
& Smith, LLC, Two Bala Plaza, Suite 510, Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004, or
by calling toll free 877-534-2590. For additional information, go
to http://www.brodskysmith.com/cases/greenlane-holdings-inc-gnln/.

Brodsky & Smith, LLC is a litigation law firm with extensive
expertise representing shareholders throughout the nation in
securities and class action lawsuits. The attorneys at Brodsky &
Smith have been appointed by numerous courts throughout the country
to serve as lead counsel in class actions and have successfully
recovered millions of dollars for our clients and shareholders.
Attorney advertising. Prior results do not guarantee a similar
outcome. [GN]


GREENLANE HOLDINGS: Rosen Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announces the
filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Greenlane Holdings, Inc. (GNLN) pursuant or traceable
to Greenlane's initial public offering of ordinary shares conducted
in April 2019. The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Greenlane
investors under the federal securities laws.

To join the Greenlane class action, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1671.html or call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that (1) the City of San Francisco had introduced a major
initiative to ban the sale of e-cigarette products across three
major cities and prohibit the manufacture of products at the
headquarters of Greenlane's key partner, JUUL Labs; (2) if
approved, the initiative would materially and adversely impact the
Company's financial results and prospects; and (3) as a result of
the foregoing, defendants' positive statements about Greenlane's
business, operations, and prospects, were materially misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis. When the true details entered the
market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damage

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than November
12, 2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If you
wish to join the litigation, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1671.html or to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013. Rosen Law Firm has secured hundreds of
millions of dollars for investors.

Contact:

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
         New York, NY 10016
         Tel: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Website: www.rosenlegal.com
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com
                cases@rosenlegal.com [GN]


GREYSTAR REAL: Court Narrows Claims in J. Young Suit
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Counts One and Three in the case captioned JONATHON YOUNG,
Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff, v. GREYSTAR REAL ESTATE PARTNERS, LLC d/b/a DYLAN POINT
LOMA APARTMENTS, Defendant. Case No. 3:18-cv-02149-BEN-MSB. (S.D.
Cal.).

Plaintiff Jonathon Young on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, brings the instant action against Defendant
Greystar Real Estate Partners, LLC. The gravamen of Plaintiff's
First Amended Complaint is Defendant harvested a personal
photograph of Plaintiff from Plaintiff's personal Instagram page
and subsequently reposted it on Defendant's Instagram and Facebook
pages without the Plaintiff's consent.

Defendant moves to dismiss count one and three of the FAC under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because (1) the Plaintiff
is not readily identifiable in the photograph for purposes of the
statutory right of publicity claim (2) the Plaintiff failed to
plausibly allege statutory standing necessary to pursue a UCL claim
(3) the Plaintiff failed to state any claim for injunctive relief
or restitution, the only two remedies available under the UCL and
(4) the Plaintiff does not and cannot allege that he actually
relied on any purported misrepresentation under the UCL's
fraudulent prong.  

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a
complaint to include a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint that
fails to meet this standard may be dismissed pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12.The plausibility standard is not akin to
a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.

Plaintiff Fails to State a Statutory Right to Publicity Claim

Section Section 3344 provides, in part: Any person who knowingly
uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in
any manner for purposes of advertising without such person's prior
consent shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person.
The section also provides for statutory damages in the alternative
to proving actual damages, and for an award of attorney fees to a
prevailing party.  

Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendant, without Plaintiff's permission,
reposted on an apartment complex's Facebook and Instagram webpages
a photograph of Plaintiff. The photograph depicted an unidentified
male wearing a hat and sunglasses, bending over and scratching a
dog's belly at the beach together with the caption Welcome to doggy
heaven emoji Your pup will love nearby Ocean Beach Dog Beach, a
leash-free haven for pets, people and sandy belly rubs emojis:
@dumb_and_dunder.

As a result of Defendant's unconsented act, Plaintiff, a police
officer, alleges he had his personal photograph exposed to over
sixty-thousand Instagram users and countless Facebook views on
Defendant's social media webpages. Plaintiff contends he received
no compensation for the Defendant's use of his personal photograph
for financial gain.  

Plaintiff's allegations fall short of stating a plausible claim for
relief under the heightened pleading standards of Twombly and
Iqbal. First, the photograph from which Plaintiff's claim arises
makes clear that Plaintiff is not readily identifiable as is
required under Section 3344.

In the FAC, Plaintiff contends the photograph shows that
Plaintiff's entire frame is depicted, and Plaintiff is readily
identifiable. However, the Court notes that the only visible facial
characteristic is a small, shadowy sliver of the individual's chin.
The remainder of the face and all the individual's hair is not
discernable It is clear: the Plaintiff is not readily identifiable
in the subject photograph or in the screenshots from the
Defendant's Instagram and Facebook webpages.

Second, Plaintiff's own allegations show that Defendant was unaware
of the Plaintiff's identity. Here, Plaintiff asserts Defendant knew
the photograph belonged to him Plaintiff because the Defendant
tagged him to the photographs on both social media accounts using
the tag dumb_and_dunder.  However, the FAC contains no allegations
that dumb_and_dunder is Plaintiff's name or that the
dumb_and_dunder tag would cause the public to readily identify the
photograph as depicting Plaintiff.  

Thus, Plaintiff has failed to plead enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face, and Plaintiff's cause of
action for statutory relief under Secdtion 3344 is dismissed.

Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as to claim one is
GRANTED without prejudice.

Plaintiff Fails to State a UCL Claim

Plaintiff's third cause of action alleges that the Defendant
violated California Business & Professions Code Section 17200 (UCL
claim).

To state a claim for unfair competition pursuant to Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code Section 17200 et seq., a plaintiff must allege an
unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice or unfair,
deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising. California's UCL
borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful
business practices independently actionable under section 17200.

Here, Plaintiff has withdrawn his claim under the UCL and requests
this Court to dismiss count three without prejudice. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs request to dismiss count three is GRANTED without
prejudice.

Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count's 1 and 3 is
granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 3, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y67f68o3 from Leagle.com.

Jonathon Young, Individually and on Behalf of all Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Abbas Kazerounian -
ak@kazlg.com - Kazerounian Law Group, APC & Matthew M. Loker -
ml@kazlg.com - Kazerouni Law Group, APC.

Greystar Real Estate Partners, LLC, doing business as Dylan Point
Loma Apartments, Defendant, represented by Matthew Orr -
MORR@CALLJENSEN.COM - Call & Jensen APC & William Paul Cole -
wcole@calljensen.com - Call & Jensen APC.


H. D. SMITH: Asks Court to Extend Time to Reply to Hestrup Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as ERIC HESTRUP, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
H. D. SMITH, LLC; SMITH MEDICAL PARTNERS, LLC, the Defendants, Case
No. 1:19-cv-05905 (N.D. Ill., Filed July 24, 2019), the Defendants
ask the Court to extend the time by which they are required to
answer, move, or otherwise respond to Plaintiffs' Complaint until
the later of 30 days after:

     (1) the Court's ruling on any motion to remand (if one is
         filed); or

     (2) the entry of a decision by the Judicial Panel on
         Multidistrict Litigation ("JPML") granting a motion to
         vacate a conditional transfer order covering this action
         (or otherwise finally denying transfer of this action to
         the opioid-related Multidistrict Litigation ("MDL"), Case

         No. 2804.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Seth Meyer, Esq.
          Ashley Keller, Esq.
          KELLER LENKNER LLC
          150 N. Riverside Plaza, Suite 4270
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 741-5220
          E-mail: ack@kellerlenkner.com
                  sam@kellerlenkner.com

Counsel for the Defendants are:

          Mark P. Miller, Esq.
          Brandon Bridges, Esq.
          BARNES & THORNBURG LLP
          One North Wacker Drive, Suite 4400
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 357-1313
          Facsimile: (312) 759-5646
          E-mail: mark.miller@btlaw.com
                  brandon.bridges@btlaw.com

               - and -

          William E. Padgett, Esq.
          BARNES & THORNBURG LLP
          11 South Meridian Street
          Indianapolis, IN 46204
          Telephone: (317) 236-1313
          Facsimile: (317) 231-7433
          E-mail: william.padgett@btlaw.com

HAYT HAYT: Class Action Over Fake Depositions Certified
-------------------------------------------------------
Max Mitchell, writing for The Legal Intelligence, reports that a
Pennsylvania federal judge has certified a class action against a
debt collection firm that allegedly sent out thousands of
deposition notices to lure debtors into appearing for settlement
talks.

U.S. District Judge Berle Schiller of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania ruled in Barenbaum v. Hayt, Hayt & Landau to certify
the class action against Eatontown, New Jersey-based firm Hayt,
Hayt & Landau over allegations that the firm's practices violated
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  The judge's ruling further
granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on allegations that the
firm's conduct violations the FDCPA's ban against using false,
deceptive or misleading means.

The law firm, which also won summary judgment dismissals on the
claims that the conduct was harassing and unconscionable, had
argued the deposition notices were not misleading, since the
attorneys had prepared questions for those who appeared for the
supposed depositions.  Placing the the party under oath and hiring
a court reporter, the firm argued according to Schiller, were
"incidental."

Schiller, however, disagreed.
"These 'procedural' features are not merely formalities, they
ensure that the information learned at a deposition can be relied
upon," Schiller said.  "Thus, while HHL devised questions of
counsel appearing at depositions to ask judgment debtors, this does
not amount to an intention to take a deposition."

In In Sep. 10's ruling, Schiller also waded into the question of
whether defendants can invoke the bona fide error defense for
misinterpreting state law—an issue left open following the U.S.
Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie,
Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, which has split district courts across the
country.  Ultimately, Schiller rejected the law firm's argument
that the defense should be applied to misinterpretations of state
law.

"First, ignorance of a law almost never excuses its violation," he
said.

Yitzchak Zelman of Marcus & Zelman, who is representing plaintiff
Daniel Barenbaum, said that with the class certification and
summary judgment ruling, the case is now headed to the damages
phase.

"Using deposition subpoenas to get debtors to show up to an
in-person meeting, just so they can then be pressured into settling
their debts, is flat-out wrong," Zelman said in an emailed
statement. "We applaud the court's finding that the such abusive
practices are prohibited by the FDCPA."

The law firm's counsel, Shannon Miller, Esq. of Maurice Wutscher --
smiller@MauriceWutscher.com -- did not return a call seeking
comment.

According to Schiller, Barenbaum's card account was charged off
with a more than $1,000 balance in 2014. The account was eventually
soled to Midland Funding, which then hired Hayt, Hayt & Landau to
help collect.  After the firm obtained a default judgment against
Barenbaum in Bucks County court, the firm sent Barenbaum
post-judgment interrogatories that included an offer to settle the
debt, Schiller said.

After Barenbaum did not reply, the firm sent Barenbaum a "Notice of
Deposition in Aid of Execution," which directed him to "appear and
testify at a deposition."  Included in the package Barenbaum
received was a page saying that, as an alternative to the
deposition, Barenbaum could settle the debt at a 20% reduced rate.

Barenbaum subsequently contacted the firm, and was told he was
required to attend.

Barenbaum appeared at the location with his brother, who is an
attorney, and, according to Schiller, although the law firm's
attorney was there, there was no court reporter or anyone else who
could administer an oath.

Although Schiller noted there was disagreement between the parties
about what happened next, with the plaintiff contending there were
discussions about possibly "writ[ing] off" the debt, Schiller said
the lawyer reported back to the firm that Barenbaum had no assets
to satisfy the debt.

In resolving the summary judgment issue, Schiller noted that the
firm regularly conducted these post-settlement "depositions," and
that instructions the firm provided to its lawyers indicated that
the purpose of the appearances was to "obtain payment for balance
in full or enter a voluntary settlement with the defendant." The
instructions also told attorneys not to administer an oath to the
defendant, but to keep clear notes because the firm had not
retained a court reporter.

Schiller also noted the firm's employees were instructed to
schedule between 30 and 90 depositions for every 2.5-hour time
slot, since between 4% and 6% of those contacted typically
appeared.

Schiller said Barenbaum could not show that the conduct had been
harassing, or that it was unfair or unconscionable, but when it
came to the conduct being allegedly misleading, Schiller said here
was no genuine dispute of fact.

"The least sophisticated debtor -- and indeed, debtors of
significantly greater sophistication -- would read the notice to
say that HHL intended to conduct a deposition when at most HHL
sought only an informal conversation regarding the debtor's ability
to satisfy his or her debt," Schiller said.  "The evidence
uniformly shows that, as a matter of policy, HHL never intended to
take any of the steps necessary to depose Barenbaum or any other
recipients of the notice." [GN]


HC WAINWRIGHT: Final Judgment Entered in Prodanova Securities Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge John A. Kronstadt of the U.S. District Court for the Central
Distirct of California dismissed the case, DANIELA PRODANOVA,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. H.C. WAINWRIGHT & Co., LLC, et al., Defendants, Case
No. 2:17-cv-7926-JAK-AS (C.D. Cal.), in its entirety with
prejudice.

The Court has entered its Order re: the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss Second Amended Class Action Complaint, dismissing the
action with prejudice as to Defendant Oren Livnat and without
prejudice as to Defendants H.C. Wainwright & Co., LLC; Mark Viklund
and Edward Silvera; and has considered the Lead Plaintiff's Notice
of Intent Not to Amend the Second Amended Complaint.

The Clerk is directed to enter final judgment in favor of the
Defendants.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 9, 2019 Final Judgment and
Order of Dismissal is available at https://is.gd/8XjG1U from
Leagle.com.

Daniela Prodanova, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Lesley F. Portnoy --
LPORTNOY@GLANCYLAW.COM -- Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP, Lionel
Zevi Glancy, Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP, Ira M. Press --
ipress@kmllp.com -- Kirby McInerney LLP, pro hac vice, James R.
Swanson -- jswanson@fishmanhaygood.com -- Fishman Haygood LLP, pro
hac vice, Jason W. Burge, Fishman Haygood LLP, pro hac vice,
Kathryn J. Johnson, Fishman Haygood LLP, pro hac vice, Peter S.
Linden -- plinden@kmllp.com -- Kirby McInerney LLP, pro hac vice,
Thomas W. Elrod, Kirby McInerney LLP, pro hac vice & Robert Vincent
Prongay -- PPRONGAY@GLANCYLAW.COM -- Glancy Prongay and Murray
LLP.

Panthera Investment Fund L.P., Lead Plaintiff, Individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by
Jonathan M. Rotter, Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP, Lesley F.
Portnoy, Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP, Lionel Zevi Glancy, Glancy
Prongay and Murray LLP, Robert Vincent Prongay, Glancy Prongay and
Murray LLP & Ira M. Press, Kirby McInerney LLP, pro hac vice.

H.C. Wainwright and Co., LLC, Defendant, represented by Harmony
Roselina Gbe -- harmony.gbe@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US
LLP, Paul Benedict Salvaty -- paul.salvaty@hoganlovells.com --
Hogan Lovells LLP, Adam Itzkowitz -- aitzkowitz@wilkauslander.com
-- Wilk Auslander LLP, pro hac vice & Jay S. Auslander --
jauslander@wilkauslander.com -- Wilk Auslander LLP, pro hac vice.

Mark Viklund & Edward D. Silvera, Defendants, represented by
Harmony Roselina Gbe, Hogan Lovells US LLP & Paul Benedict Salvaty,
Hogan Lovells LLP.


HEADWAY TECH: Glover Sues Over HDD Suspension Assembly Price-fixing
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Rhonda Glover, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Headway Technologies, Inc., Hutchinson
Technology Inc., Magnecomp Precision Technology Public Co., Ltd.,
NAT Peripheral (Dong Guan) Co., Ltd., NAT Peripheral (H.K.) Co.,
Ltd, NHK Spring Co. Ltd., NHK International Corporation, NHK Spring
(Thailand) Co., Ltd., NHK Spring Precision (Guangzhou) Co., Ltd.,
SAE Magnetics (H.K.) Ltd. and TDK Corporation, Defendants, Case No.
19-cv-05268, (N.D. Cal., August 22, 2019), seeks damages,
injunctive relief and other relief pursuant to the Sherman Act,
federal antitrust laws, state antitrust, unfair competition,
consumer protection laws and the laws of unjust enrichment.

Defendants are manufacturers of hard disk drive suspension
assemblies. Glover purchased at least one HDD suspension assembly
indirectly from at least one Defendant and claims that they
conspired to fix prices of and allocate market shares for these
suspension assemblies.

Suspension assemblies are a component of hard disk drives and are
installed in a variety of electronic products. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Eli R. Greenstein, Esq.
      Stacey Kaplan, Esq.
      Jenny Paquette, Esq.
      KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP
      One Sansome Street, Suite 1850
      San Francisco, CA 94104
      Telephone: (415) 400-3000
      Facsimile: (415) 400-3001
      Email: egreenstein@ktmc.com
             skaplan@ktmc.com

             - and -

      Joseph H. Meltzer, Esq.
      Melissa L. Troutner, Esq.
      Natalie Lesser, Esq.
      KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP
      280 King of Prussia Road
      Radnor, PA 19087
      Telephone: (610) 667-7706
      Facsimile: (610) 667-7056
      Email: jmeltzer@ktmc.com
             mtroutner@ktmc.com
             nlesser@ktmc.com


HEADWAY TECHNOLOGIES: Apex Computers Alleges HDD Price-Fixing
-------------------------------------------------------------
APEX COMPUTERS, INC., individually and on behalf of itself and
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. HEADWAY TECHNOLOGIES, INC.;
MAGNECOMP CORPORATION; MAGNECOMP PRECISION TECHNOLOGY PUBLIC
COMPANY, LTD.; NAT PERIPHERAL (DONG GUAN) CO., LTD.; NAT PERIPHERAL
(H.K.) CO., LTD.; NHK SPRING CO., LTD; NHK INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION; NHK SPRING (THAILAND) CO., LTD.; NHK SPRING PRECISION
(GUANGZHOU) CO., LTD.; SAE MAGNETICS (H.K.) LTD.; TDK CORPORATION;
and TDK CORPORATION—HUTCHINSON TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendants,
Case No. 3:19-cv-05507 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 30, 2019) alleges that the
Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to fix the prices and allocate
market shares of suspension assemblies ("SAs") used in hard disk
drives ("HDDs") in violation of various state antitrust, consumer
protection, and equitable laws.

The Defendants and their co-conspirators participated in a
combination and conspiracy to suppress and eliminate competition
for HDD suspension assemblies by agreeing to rig bids for, and to
fix, stabilize, and maintain the prices of HDD suspension
assemblies sold in the U.S. and elsewhere. The combination and
conspiracy engaged in by the Defendants and their co-conspirators
was in unreasonable restraint of interstate and foreign trade and
commerce in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, and state
antitrust, unfair competition, consumer protection laws, and the
common law of unjust enrichment.

As a direct and proximate result of the anticompetitive and
unlawful conduct alleged herein, the Plaintiffs and the Classes
paid more during the class period for HDD suspension assemblies
than they otherwise would have paid in a competitive market, and
have thereby suffered antitrust injury to their business or
property.

Headway Technologies provides recording head products to the
computer harddisk drive industry. The Company provides solutions to
the server, mobile, and desktop segments of the hard disk drive
industry for customers throughout the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Betsy C. Manifold, Esq.
          Rachele R. Byrd, Esq.
          Marisa C. Livesay, Esq.
          Brittany N. Dejong, Esq.
          WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ LLP
          750 B Street, Suite 1820
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 239-4599
          Facsimile: (619) 234-4599
          E-mail: manifold@whafh.com
                  byrd@whafh.com999
                  livesay@whafh.com
                  dejong@whafh.com

               - and -

          Fred Taylor Isquith, Esq.
          Thomas H. Burt, Esq.
          WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ LLP
          270 Madison Avenue
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 545-4600
          Facsimile: (212) 545-4653
          E-mail: isquith@whafh.com
                  burt@whafh.com

               - and -

          Carl Malmstrom, Esq.
          WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ LLP
          111 West Jackson, Suite 1700
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Telephone: 312/984-0000
          Facsimile: 312/212-4401
          E-mail: malmstrom@whafh.com

               - and -

          Elizabeth C. Pritzker, Esq.
          Jonathan K. Levine, Esq.
          Caroline C. Corbitt, Esq.
          PRITZKER LEVINE LLP
          180 Grand Avenue, Suite 1390
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (415) 692-0772
          Facsimile: (415) 366-6110
          E-mail: ecp@pritzkerlevine.com
                  jkl@pritzkerlevine.com
                  ccc@pritzkerlevine.com

               - and -

          Richard J. Vita, Esq.
          VITA LAW OFFICES PC
          100 State Street, Suite 900
          Boston, MA 02109
          Telephone: (617) 426-6566
          Facsimile: (617) 429-2119
          E-mail: RJV@VitaLaw.com


HEALTHSPARK FOUNDATION: Harley Appeals Order to Pa. Super. Ct.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Patricia M. Harley, et al., filed an appeal from a lower
court order dated July 17, 2019, in their lawsuit entitled Harley,
P., et al. v. Healthspark Foundation, et al., Case No. 2405 EDA
2019, in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas.

The case is a civil class action lawsuit arising from
employment-related disputes.

The appellate case is captioned as Patricia M. Harley R.N., Martha
Moody R.N., Holly DiCarlo R.N., and Wendy Poynor, R.N., for
themselves and as representatives of others similarly situated,
Appellants v. Healthspark Foundation (f/k/a North Penn Community
Health Foundation) and David T. Shannon, Defendants, and Josh
Shapiro, Attorney General, Intervenor, Case No. 2512 EDA 2019, in
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants Patricia M. Harley R.N., Martha Moody R.N.,
Holly DiCarlo R.N., and Wendy Poynor, R.N., are represented by:

          Charles J. Weiss, Esq.
          Christine Marie Gordon
          TIMONEY KNOX, L.L.P.
          400 Maryland Dr.
          PO Box 7544
          Ft. Washington, PA 19034-7544
          Telephone: (215) 540-2654
          E-mail: CJWeiss@timoneyknox.com
                  CGordon@timoneyknox.com

Defendants-Appellees Healthspark Foundation (f/k/a North Penn
Community Health Foundation), and David T. Shannon are represented
by:

          James C. Sargent, Jr., Esq.
          Maureen Murphy McBride, Esq.
          LAMB MCERLANE, PC
          24 E Market St.
          PO Box 565
          West Chester, PA 19380
          Telephone: (610) 430-8000
          E-mail: jsargent@lambmcerlane.com
                  mmcbride@lambmcerlane.com

Intervenor Josh Shapiro, Attorney General, is represented by:

          Nancy Anne Walker, Esq.
          Mary Catherine Kenney, Esq.
          Ryan Blake Smith, Esq.
          PENNSYLVANIA OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
          1600 Arch St., Suite 300
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 560-2704


HOMEJAB LLC: Chamely Hits Unsolicited SMS Ads
---------------------------------------------
Jason Chamely, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. HomeJab, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
19-cv-62125 (S.D. Fla., August 23, 2019), seeks statutory damages,
punitive damages, costs and attorney fees for violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

HomeJab is a real estate photographer. To promote its services, it
engages in unsolicited SMS ads sent en masse via an auto dialer.
Chamely opted out of receiving notices from HomeJab yet continued
to received their messages. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
      Jordan D. Utanski, Esq.
      EDELSBERG LAW, PA
      19495 Biscayne Blvd #607
      Aventura, FL 33180
      Telephone: (305) 975-3320
      Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com
             utanski@edelsberglaw.com

             - and -

      Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
      Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
      SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
      14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 400
      Miami, FL 33132
      Telephone: 305-479-2299
      Email: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
             gberg@shamisgentile.com


IMPAX LAB: NY Pension Fund Appeals N.D. Cal. Ruling to 9th Cir.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Lead Plaintiff New York Hotel Trades Council & Hotel Association of
New York City, Inc. Pension Fund filed an appeal from a Court
ruling in the lawsuit styled New York Hotel Trades Council, et al.
v. IMPAX LABORATORIES, INC., et al., Case No. 4:16-cv-06557-HSG, in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California,
Oakland.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Judge Haywood
S. Gilliam, Jr., granted Lead Plaintiff New York Hotel Trades
Council & Hotel Association of New York City, Inc. Pension Fund's
administrative motion to file a statement of recent decision.

On May 20, 2019, the Plaintiff respectfully moved for permission to
file a statement of recent decision in support of its Jan. 17, 2019
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint.  Judge Gilliam,
having considered the papers filed, granted the Plaintiff's
administrative motion to file a statement of recent decision.  The
statement should not include any argument.

The appellate case is captioned as New York Hotel Trades Council,
et al. v. IMPAX LABORATORIES, INC., et al., Case No. 19-16744, in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by October 7, 2019;

   -- Transcript is due on November 6, 2019;

   -- Appellant New York Hotel Trades Council & Hotel Association
      of New York City, Inc. Pension Fund's opening brief is due
      on December 16, 2019;

   -- Appellees Carole Ban-Maimon, Larry Hsu, IMPAX LABORATORIES,
      INC., Bryan M. Reasons and George Frederick Wilkinson's
      answering brief is due on January 16, 2020; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant NEW YORK HOTEL TRADES COUNCIL & HOTEL
ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK CITY, INC. PENSION FUND, Lead Plaintiff, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly situated is represented
by:

          Luke Orion Brooks, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          655 West Broadway
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 231-1058
          E-mail: lukeb@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          Shawn Anthony Williams, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD, LLP
          One Montgomery Street
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 288-4545
          E-mail: shawnw@rgrdlaw.com

Defendants-Appellees IMPAX LABORATORIES, INC.; GEORGE FREDERICK
WILKINSON; LARRY HSU; CAROLE BAN-MAIMON; and BRYAN M. REASONS are
represented by:

          Marcy Christina Priedeman, Esq.
          Peter A. Wald, Esq.
          Morgan E. Whitworth, Esq.
          LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
          505 Montgomery Street, Suite 2000
          San Francisco, CA 94111-6538
          Telephone: (415) 646-7862
          E-mail: marcy.priedeman@lw.com
                  peter.wald@lw.com
                  morgan.whitworth@lw.com


JUST ENERGY: Faces Brodeur Suit Over Securities Law Violations
--------------------------------------------------------------
ANDRE BRODEUR, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. JUST ENERGY GROUP INC., DEBORAH MERRIL, JAMES LEWIS,
PATRICK MCCULLOUGH, and JIM BROWN, Case No. 1:19-cv-08286
(S.D.N.Y., Sept. 5, 2019), seeks to pursue remedies under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 on behalf of the Plaintiff and
other holders of the Company's securities.

The Plaintiff contends that the Defendants failed to disclose to
investors that the Company experienced customer enrollment and
nonpayment issues, and as a result of the Defendants' wrongful acts
and omissions, and the precipitous decline in the market value of
the Company's securities, the Plaintiff and other Class members
have suffered significant losses and damages.

Just Energy is incorporated under the laws of Canada with its
principal executive offices located in Ontario, Canada.  The
Individual Defendants are directors and officers of the Company.

Just Energy purports to be a consumer company focused on essential
needs, including electricity and natural gas commodities; on health
and well-being, through products such as water quality and
filtration devices; and on utility conservation, including
renewable energy options.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood, II, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
          E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          10 South La Salle Street, Suite 3505
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 377-1181
          Facsimile: (312) 377-1184
          E-mail: pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
          BRONSTEIN, GEWIRTZ & GROSSMAN, LLC
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4600
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 697-6484
          Facsimile: (212) 697-7296
          E-mail: peretz@bgandg.com


KAMKAD AUTOMOTIVE: Faces Harris Suit in Dallas State Court
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Kamkad Automotive
Group. The case is captioned as Jessie Ray Harris, individually and
on behalf of all other similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
Kamkad Automotive Group dba Kamkad Hyundai, the Defendant, Case No.
DC-19-13832 (Dallas 298th Dist., Sept. 4, 2019).[BN]

LOOMIS ARMORED: Class in Myers FLSA Suit Conditionally Certified
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHAKEERA MYERS, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. LOOMIS ARMORED US, LLC,
Defendant, Docket No. 3:18-cv-00532-FDW-DSC (W.D. N.C.), Judge
Frank D. Whitney of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, Charlotte Division, granted the
Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Certification Pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act, Court-Authorized Notice to be Issued
under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(B), Class Certification under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23, and Appointment of Class Counsel Under Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(G).

On July 25, 2019, the Court granted the Plaintiff's motion to
certify the FLSA/NCWHA actions but denied without prejudice her
motion to authorize class notices.  The Court directed parties to
confer and agree upon the content and distribution of the notices
(including appropriate forms), and jointly submit, within seven
days of that Order, proposed notice and forms for the Court's
approval.  In the event parties were unable to agree, the parties
were directed to brief the issues to be submitted within 10 days
from its Order.  The parties have briefed these issues.

Consistent with the Order, Judge Whitney granted the Plaintiff's
motion and approved the notice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(2)(B) and 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b).  However, the following
modifications to her Proposed Notice are necessary:

     a. Modification of INTRODUCTION section in its entirety to
read: "The purpose of this Notice is to: 1.) Inform you of the
existence of a case in which you are potentially eligible to
participate; 2.) Advise you of how your rights may be affected by
this case; and 3.) Instruct you on the procedure for participating
in this case, if you decide to join.  Defendant Loomis Armored US,
LLC's records reflect that you were employed by Defendant in one or
more of the Armored Service Technician or other similar positions
included in this case during on or after October 1, 2015.  The
Court has certified a class and conditionally certified collective
action lawsuit that may affect you.  A trial may be necessary to
decide whether the claims Plaintiff makes against Defendant on your
behalf are correct or whether Defendant's defenses to those claims
are correct.  The Honorable Frank D. Whitney, Chief District Court
Judge in the United States District Court for the Western District
of North Carolina is overseeing this lawsuit."

     b. Addition of a header that reads DESCRIPTION OF THE LAWSUIT.
This section is to read: "On October 1, 2018, Plaintiff Shakeera
Myers filed a lawsuit against Loomis Armored US, LLC (Defendant) in
behalf of herself and others similarly situated, in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina.
Plaintiff alleges that Loomis violated the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) by allegedly failing to pay its Armored Service Technicians,
including, armed drivers, armed messengers, and armed guards, all
wages owed, including overtime wages at a rate of one-and-one-half
their regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of forty
(40) hours per week.  Plaintiff alleges that she, and others
similarly situated, are entitled to recover all unpaid wages for
such work performed from October 1, 2015 to the present.  Plaintiff
seeks back pay wages, prejudgment interest, liquidated damages, and
attorney's fees and costs.  Plaintiff also alleges violations of
the North Carolina State Wage and Hour Act (NCWHA).  In the state
law part of this lawsuit, Plaintiff also asserts that, throughout
the relevant period, Loomis allegedly maintained a corporate policy
of deducting the costs of bulletproof vests and firearms from
employees' wages, without obtaining the employees' prior written
authorization as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 95-25.8.
Plaintiff claims that Defendant must pay back wages for the actual
hours worked, including but not limited to, accrued and unpaid
regular and overtime wages, unauthorized deductions, an equal
amount in additional liquidated damages, interests, plus costs in
attorney's fees.  Loomis Armored US, LLC has denied Plaintiff's
allegations that it violated the FLSA or North Carolina law, or
failed to properly pay its employees for wages and overtime and has
further denied Plaintiff's allegations that it is liable to
Plaintiff under any circumstances.  The Court has allowed the
lawsuit to be certified as a class action under the NCWHA and
conditionally certified a collective action under the FLSA on
behalf of employees allegedly affected by Loomis's pay policies.
Nothing in this Notice is intended as an expression of the Court's
opinion about the merits of Plaintiff's claims or about whether you
should join this lawsuit. There is no money available now, and no
guarantee there will be any. However, your legal rights are
affected, and you have a choice to make now, and you must act
before September 16, 2019."

     c. Addition of the third party administrator information.

     d. Omission of WHY AM I GETTING THIS NOTICE?, WHAT IS THE
LAWSUIT ABOUT-FLSA CLAIMS?, and WHAT IS THIS CASE ABOUT PURSUANT TO
THE NORTH CAROLINA CLAIMS? sections because they are now
duplicative.

     e. Modifification of HOW DO I JOIN THIS CASE AND WHAT HAPPENS
NEXT? section in its entirety to read: "If you wish to join this
case, you must complete and sign the attached Consent to Join form
and return it via U.S. Mail in the business reply envelope included
to the following address: Gilda A. Hernandez The Law Offices of
Gilda A. Hernandez, PLLC 1020 Southhill Dr., Ste 130 Cary, NC
27513.  This form must be postmarked no later than September 16,
2019. If you fail to return the Consent to Join form to Plaintiff's
counsel on or before the above deadline date, you may not be able
to participate in this lawsuit. If you decide to join this lawsuit,
Plaintiff's counsel will keep you informed of the status of the
case.  The Joining this case does not guarantee that you will
receive any money from the case because a monetary recovery is not
certain.  If you join this case, you will be bound by any
settlement or judgment entered by the Court, whether favorable or
unfavorable, and you will forfeit the right to sue Defendant as an
individual for the same claims made in this case.  While the suit
is proceeding, you may be required to respond to written questions
under oath, produce certain documents, appear for a deposition (at
which point you will be asked questions by attorneys for Loomis
Armored US, LLC under oath), or testify in court in Charlotte. If
you choose to join the lawsuit, you will have an obligation to
preserve documents and information related to the case."

     e. Omission IF THE EMPLOYEE IS SUCCESSFUL IN THIS CASE, WHAT
MONEY MIGHT I RECEIVE? section because it is now duplicative.

     f. Modification YOUR LEGAL REPRESENTATION IF YOU JOIN header
to read: "LEGAL REPRESENTATION. Omit header WHO WILL BE MY LAWYER?
Modification of the text in its entirety to read: "Counsel
representing the Plaintiff in this lawsuit are: Gilda A. Hernandez,
Esq. Charles Robert Ash, IV, Charlotte Smith, Esq. Matthew L.
Turner THE LAW OFFICES OF SOMMERS SCHWARTZ, P.C.  GILDA A.
HERNANDEZ, PLLC One Towne Square, Suite 1700 1020 Southhill Dr.,
Ste 130 Southfield, MI 48076 Cary, NC 27513 248-355-0300, Tel:
(919) 741-8693 248-746-4001 (fax) Fax: (919) 869-1853
rkreuz@gildahernandezlaw.com.  The Court ordered that Plaintiff's
counsel may represent all class members related to Plaintiff's
state law claims.  As to the FLSA claims, unless you choose another
lawyer (at your own expense), these attorneys will represent you in
this lawsuit if you wish to join the lawsuit."

     g. Omission of the header HOW WILL THE LAWYERS BE PAID?.

     h. Omission of the THE TRIAL section in its entirety.

The proposed opt-in/opt-out forms are agreed to by the parties and
approved by the Court.  The Plaintiff will file an electronic copy
of the notice and consent forms with the Court through ECF within
five days of the entry of the Order.

The Defendant will post the notice to the prospective class members
and putative Plaintiffs at each of the North Carolina warehouses in
an area regularly and routinely available for review by Armored
Service Technicians.

The Judge declined to grant the Plaintiff's request to send
additional notices by email and text messages.  Given the timing of
the Notice, he believes repetitive unsolicited contact with the
potential party Plaintiffs after the initial Notice by First Class
Mail may create the appearance of undue Court involvement in the
solicitation of claims.  Similarly, he finds duplicative notices
inappropriate.

Consistent with the Order, Judge Whitney set the deadline for
opting into the action as Sept. 16, 2019.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 9, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Er4IiP from Leagle.com.

Shakeera Myers, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Robert Ash, IV --
crash@sommerspc.com -- Sommers Schwartz, P.C., pro hac vice,
Charlotte Claire Smith -- csmith@gildahernandezlaw.com -- Law
Offices of Gilda A. Hernandez, Matthew L. Turner --
mturner@sommerspc.com -- Sommers Schwartz, P.C., pro hac vice &
Gilda Adriana Hernandez -- ghernandez@gildahernandezlaw.com -- The
Law Offices of Gilda A. Hernandez.

Loomis Armored US, LLC, Defendant, represented by Claire B. Deason
-- cdeason@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson P.C., pro hac vice,
Jerry Howard Walters, Jr. -- jwalters@littler.com -- Littler
Mendelson, P.C. & Lyndsey M. Marcelino, Littler Mendelson P.C.,
pro
hac vice.


LOUISIANA REGIONAL: Court Denies Bid to Remand Addison Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FREDERICK E. ADDISON, SR., ET AL., Plaintiffs, v.
LOUISIANA REGIONAL LANDFILL COMPANY, ET AL., Defendants, Civil No.
19-11133 (E.D. La.), Judge Susie Morgan of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana denied the Plaintiffs' motion
to remand.

Seven consolidated actions were removed to the Court from the
Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson.
The state court actions name as Defendants Jefferson Parish, Aptim
Corp., and the following four affiliated entities: Louisiana
Regional Landfill Company (formerly known as, and named in the
caption as, IESI LA Landfill Corp.); Waste Connections Bayou, Inc.
(formerly known as, and named in the caption as, Progressive Waste
Solutions of LA, Inc.); Waste Connections US, Inc.; ("Waste
Connections Defendants").  The Plaintiffs in each state court
action list their addresses and allege they own or reside at
property near the Jefferson Parish Landfill in Waggaman, Louisiana.
They allege the Landfill emitted harmful and toxic odors and
chemicals and caused them physical harm, diminution in property
value, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of property, and pain and
suffering.

The first action, Addison et al. v. La. Regional Landfill Co., et
al., was filed in the State Trial Court on Dec. 13, 2018.  Between
February and May 2019, five additional actions involving different
plaintiffs but largely identical factual allegations were filed in
the State Trial Court.  In all six cases, the same counsel enrolled
for the Plaintiffs and the same Defendants are named.  On April 11,
2019, Defendant Jefferson Parish moved to consolidate the six
actions in the State Trial Court.  On May 9, 2019, the counsel for
the Plaintiffs in the six cases consented to consolidation.  On May
22, 2019, the State Trial Court entered an order consolidating the
actions.

On May 20, 2019, a seventh action, Paul v. La. Regional Landfill
Co., was filed in the State Trial Court by different plaintiffs.
The same counsel enrolled for the plaintiffs, the same defendants
were named, and the factual allegations are nearly identPical.  On
May 28, 2019, Defendant Jefferson Parish moved to consolidate the
seventh action with the consolidated Addison action.  The
Plaintiffs consented.

On June 10, 2019, the Waste Connections Defendants removed the
consolidated actions to the Court.  They invoke the Court's
jurisdiction under the mass action provisions of the Class Action
Fairness Act ("CAFA").  On June 17, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed the
instant motion to remand.  On July 1, 2019, the Defendants filed a
joint opposition.  The Plaintiffs filed a reply.  On July 29, 2019,
the Court heard oral argument on the motion.

The Plaintiffs argue the Court does not have jurisdiction over the
instant matter because the actions were "joined upon motion of a
defendant," and they fall into the single event exception.  Judge
Morgan first addresses whether the action qualifies as a mass
action under CAFA's general mass action provisions.  She then turns
to the applicability of the exception for actions "joined upon
motion of a defendant" and the single event exception.

In order for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over the action
under CAFA's mass action provision, the action must meet the
requirements of 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(2)-(10).  The Judge finds
that (i) it is facially apparent that the aggregate amount in
controversy exceeds $5 million; (ii) for purposes of CAFA's general
mass action provisions, the action involves at least 100
Plaintiffs; and (iii) it is facially apparent that at least one
Plaintiff has claims exceeding $75,000 in value.  As a result, she
finds the action satisfies the requirements of CAFA's general mass
action provisions.

Next, the Judge is mindful of Congress' admonition that the
exceptions to the mass actions provision be interpreted strictly by
federal courts.  In this context, this means the Court should
exercise its jurisdiction unless it is clear an exception applies.
The Plaintiffs consented to consolidation in connection with the
original six actions consolidated in the State Trial Court and,
again, in connection with Paul.  The Judge finds the Plaintiffs
effectively proposed a joint trial.  They have not met their burden
of showing the action is one in which "the claims are joined upon
motion of a defendant."  As a result, this exception to CAFA's mass
action provisions does not apply.

Although the case involves an environmental tort, the Judge finds
the emission of odors and chemicals from various sources, caused by
various failures on the parts of various Defendants, at different
times over a period of years, does not constitute a single focused
event such as occurs in a chemical spill.  As a result, a finding
that the Plaintiffs do not allege a single event is consistent with
Congressional intent.

Finally, the Plaintiffs have not identified by name any Plaintiff
whose claims must be remanded because they fall below the $75,000
threshold.  At the motion hearing, their counsel represented there
may be some Plaintiffs who would fall below the threshold.  As a
result, the Judge will require the Plaintiffs to identify those
claims that must remanded.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Morgan denied the Plaintiffs'
motion to remand.  The Plaintiffs have until Sept. 6, 2019 at 5:00
p.m. to produce (1) a spreadsheet providing information about all
their damages and (2) summary judgment type evidence to support a
finding that any individual Plaintiff's claim does not exceed
$75,000.  The Plaintiffs must file: (i) a spreadsheet listing each
Plaintiff, the nature of his or her damages, his or her domiciliary
address, and his or her interest in that immovable property; and
(ii) for each Plaintiff whose claim does not exceed $75,000, a
sworn affidavit describing the nature and amount of that the
Plaintiff's damages.  Such a Plaintiff's stipulation that the
amount in controversy is not satisfied is binding only if, within
that stipulation, he expressly renounced his right to recover in
excess of $75,000 in the event he was awarded above that amount in
state court.  Each affidavit must be signed by the applicable
Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff must swear that its contents are true
and correct under penalty of perjury.  The Defendants have until
Sept. 20, 2019 at 5:00 p.m. to file a response to any summary
judgment type evidence submitted by the Plaintiffs.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 9, 2019 Order and Reasons is
available at https://is.gd/WUZU4E from Leagle.com.

Frederick E Addison, Sr, Barbara Addison, Perry Andras, Sheila
Baskin, Willie Faye Brooks, Eric Brown, Ramona Byrd, Doris Collins,
Edward Cloudet, Monica Coleman-Lestrick, Individually, and on
behalf of her minor child, CL, Lula Darden, Demonte Deteige,
Vincent Eaton, Kimberly Engel, Adelaine Fitzpatrick, Carla Ford,
Gerald Ford, Verna Mae Gabriel, Merlene Grant, Wendy Gremillion,
Individually, and on behalf of her minor children, ASG and BCG,
Scott Gremillion, Regina Pierre Griffin, Glenda Builbeau, Albertine
Hargrave, Jose Hernandez, Individually, and on behalf of his minor
children, MH and LH, Liz Hernandez, Kimberly Himel, Cory Himel, Ada
Jackson, Bridgette Johnson, Margarite Johnson, Melodie Jones, Rita
Jones, Elizabeth Lala, Bruce Lightell, John Lowe, Gary Meyers,
Rhonda Meyer, Alexander Mitchell, Regina Mitchell, Joseph Pete,
Jr., Terry Pete, Individually, and on before of her minor children,
JP and AP, Andrea Pickney, Warren Pickney, Pearl Pinkley, Carolyn
Polk, Gerald Polk, Glenda Primus, Juliane Rayburn, Kian Riley,
Karen Ross, Individually, and on behalf of her minor children, JR,
JR, and TR, Tony Ross, Aletha Scott, David Scott, Cari Serpas,
Individually, and on behalf of her minor children, GS and CS,
Steven Serpas, John Thompson, Chandra Tigler, Individually, and on
behalf of her minor child, OT, Oscar Tigler, Gloria Tolodano, Roy
Tolodano, Melvin Ursin, Santana Uthaisang, Kirk Wells,
Individually, and on behalf of his minor children, AW and JW,
Charles Lee Anderson, Individually, and on behalf of Class, Rickey
Calligan, Individually, an on behalf of Class & Mary Paul,
Individually, and on behalf of Class, Plaintiffs, represented by
Byron M. Forrest, Forrest Cressy & James, LLC, Adrian Frank Snead
-- asnead@wtplaw.com -- Whiteford Taylor & Preston, pro hac vice,
Barry S. Neuman -- bneuman@wtplaw.com -- Whiteford Taylor &
Preston, pro hac vice, Eric Charles Rowe -- erowe@wtplaw.com --
Whiteford Taylor & Preston, pro hac vice & Sara Eliza James,
Forrest Cressy & James, LLC.

Ethel Green & Elizabeth Lowe, Plaintiffs, represented by Sara Eliza
James, Forrest Cressy & James, LLC, Adrian Frank Snead, Whiteford
Taylor & Preston, pro hac vice, Barry S. Neuman, Whiteford Taylor &
Preston, pro hac vice & Eric Charles Rowe, Whiteford Taylor &
Preston, pro hac vice.

Rebecca Wells, Kevin Woods, Mary Wood & Mary Ann Winningkof
Individually, and on behalf of Class, Plaintiffs, represented by
Byron M. Forrest, Forrest Cressy & James, LLC, Adrian Frank Snead,
Whiteford Taylor & Preston, pro hac vice, Eric Charles Rowe,
Whiteford Taylor & Preston, pro hac vice & Sara Eliza James,
Forrest Cressy & James, LLC.

Louisiana Regional Landfill Company, formerly known as IESI LA
Landfill Corporation, Waste Connections US, Inc & Waste Connections
Bayou, Inc., formerly known as Progressive Waste Solutions of LA,
Inc., Defendants, represented by Michael C. Mims --
mmims@bradleyfirm.com -- Bradley Murchison Kelly & Shea, LLC, David
R. Taggart -- dtaggart@bradleyfirm.com -- Bradley, Murchison, Kelly
& Shea, LLC, James B. Slaughter, Beveridge & Diamond, PC, pro hac
vice, John H. Paul, Beveridge & Diamond, pro hac vice, Megan R.
Brillault, Beveridge & Diamond, pro hac vice & Michael G. Murphy --
mmurphy@bdlaw.com -- Beveridge & Diamond, pro hac vice.

Aptim Corp, Defendant, represented by William A. Barousse, Gieger,
Laborde & Laperouse, LLC, Ernest Paul Gieger, Jr., Gieger, Laborde
& Laperouse, LLC, John Michael DiGiglia, Gieger, Laborde &
Laperouse, LLC & Jonathan S. Ord, Gieger, Laborde & Laperouse,
LLC.

Jefferson Parish, Defendant, represented by William Peter Connick,
Connick & Connick, LLC, Matthew Dara Moghis, Connick & Connick, LLC
& Michael S. Futrell, Connick & Connick, LLC.


LUMBER LIQUIDATORS: $4.75MM Settlement Reached in Kramer Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Lumber Liquidators Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filed on September 12,
2019, that a settlement agreement has been entered in the class
action suit entitled, Robert J. Kramer, behalf of himself, all
other similarly situated v. Lumber Liquidators, Inc., a Delaware
corporation; and Does 1 through 100, inclusive

In July 2019, Lumber Liquidators, Inc. (the "Company"), who is a
defendant in a putative class action litigation captioned Robert J.
Kramer, behalf of himself, all other similarly situated v. Lumber
Liquidators, Inc., a Delaware corporation; and Does 1 through 100,
inclusive (the "Kramer Litigation"), entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding ("Kramer MOU") with the lead plaintiff in the Kramer
Litigation, Robert J. Kramer, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated (collectively, the "Kramer Plaintiffs") to
memorialize an agreement in principle to settle the Kramer
Litigation.

On September 9, 2019, the Company entered into a definitive
settlement agreement with the Kramer Plaintiffs consistent with the
terms of the Kramer MOU (the "Settlement Agreement"). The
Settlement Agreement is subject to approval by the Superior Court
of California, County of Sacramento (the "Court") and other
contingencies.

Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the Company will pay
$4.75 million (the "Settlement Fund") to settle all claims asserted
in the Kramer Litigation (or which could have been asserted in the
Kramer Litigation) on behalf of all current and/or former store
managers and store managers in training employed by the Company in
the State of California (the "Putative Class Members") at any time
between November 17, 2013 until the time of preliminary approval of
the settlement by the court (the "Class Period").

The Settlement Fund will be used to pay notice and administrative
fees relating to the class actions and to compensate those
individuals that were Putative Class Members during the Class
Period. Holdings believes that its cash flow from operations,
together with existing liquidity sources, is sufficient to fund the
Settlement Fund, which will be paid within 14 days of the Court's
final approval order of the Settlement Agreement and the dismissal
of the Kramer Litigation. The Kramer Plaintiffs' legal fees and
costs, not to exceed 33.33% of the Settlement Fund, are included as
part of the Settlement Fund.

Holdings previously disclosed in its Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q
for the quarter ended June 30, 2019, that it had recognized a net
charge to earnings of $4.75 million within selling general and
administrative expense during the quarter ended June 30, 2019.

Lumber Liquidators said, "There can be no assurance that a
settlement will be finalized by the parties and approved by the
Court or as to the ultimate outcome of the Kramer Litigation. The
execution of the Settlement Agreement does not constitute an
admission by the Company of any fault or liability and the Company
does not admit fault or liability. If the settlement cannot be
finalized by the parties or the Settlement Agreement is not
approved by the Court, the Company will defend the Kramer
Litigation vigorously and believes there are meritorious defenses
and legal standards that must be met for, among other things, class
certification and success on the merits. If the parties are unable
to finalize the settlement, the Kramer Litigation could have a
material adverse effect on Holding's financial condition and
results of operations.

Lumber Liquidators Holdings, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
operates as a multi-channel specialty retailer of hard-surface
flooring, and hard-surface flooring enhancements and accessories.
The company also offers its products through its Website, catalogs,
and call center. Lumber Liquidators Holdings, Inc. was founded in
1994 and is headquartered in Toano, Virginia.


MALLINCKRODT ARD: Plumbers Suit Moved to New Jersey Federal Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case is captioned as UNITED ASSOCIATION OF PLUMBERS &
PIPEFITTERS LOCAL 322 OF SOUTHERN NEW JERSEY, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
MALLINCKRODT ARD, LLC, the Defendant, Case No. CAM-L-2912-19, was
removed form the Superior Court of Camden County, to the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey (Camden) on Sept. 3,
2019. The District of New Jersey Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-17584-NLH-JS to the proceeding. The suit alleges
fraud-related violation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge
Noel L. Hillman.

Mallinckrodt is an Irish–tax registered manufacturer of specialty
pharmaceuticals (namely, adrenocorticotropic hormone), generic
drugs and imaging agents.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Donald E. Haviland, Jr., Esq.
          HAVILAND HUGHES
          201 S. Maple Way, Suite 110
          Ambler, PA 19002
          Telephone: (215) 609-4661
          Facsimile: (215) 392-4400
          E-mail: haviland@havilandhughes.com

Attorneys for the Defendant are:

          Lynne N. Nahmani, Esq.
          Jonathan D. Weiss, Esq.
          MARSHALL DENNEHEY WARNER COLEMAN & GOGGIN
          15000 Midlantic Drive, Duite 300
          P.O. Box 5429
          Mount Laurel, NJ 08054
          Telephone: (856) 414-6000
          E-mail: lnnahmani@mdwcg.com

MAPLE & ASH: Food Tainted with Pathogens, Ashkar et al. Allege
--------------------------------------------------------------
BEN ASHKAR; and MICHELLE LESZKIEWICZ, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MAPLE & ASH MANAGEMENT,
LLC d/b/a MAPLE & ASH; and FORTUNE INTERNATIONAL, LLC d/b/a FORTUNE
FISH AND GOURMET, Defendants, Case No. 2019L009612 (Ill. Cir., Cook
Cty., Aug. 29, 2019) is an action against the Defendants for
failure to maintain food products free from food contaminants.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs sustained illness due to
campylobacter and other unsafe pathogen while consuming food
products prepared by the Defendants. The Plaintiffs sustained
illness and expended large sums of money for medical care and
services while endeavoring to become healed and cured of the
illness.

Maple & Ash Management, LLC d/b/a Maple & Ash is engaged in the
restaurant business.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Robert A. Langendorf, Esq.
          ROBERT A. LANGENDORF, P.C.
          134 North LaSalle Street, Suite 1515
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 782-5933
          E-mail: Robert@langendorfpc.com


MDL 2641: Christensen v. CR Bard over IVC Filters Consolidated
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned Andrew Christensen and Rhonda
Connelly, the Plaintiffs, vs. C R Bard Incorporated and Bard
Peripheral Vascular Incorporated, the Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-03326 (Filed May 21, 2019), was transferred from the U.S.
District Court for the District Arizona, to the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia (Augusta) on Sept. 10, 2019.
The Southern District of Georgia Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-00158-JEG-BKE to the proceeding. The case is assigned to
the Hon. Judge James E. Graham.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries and/or
wrongful death damages suffered by an injured or deceased party or
parties as a direct and proximate result of an injured or deceased
party being implanted with a defective and unreasonably dangerous
Inferior Vena Cava ("IVC") filter medical device manufactured by
Bard.

The IVC filters are part of Bard's IVC "retrievable" filter product
line and include the following devices: Recovery (TM), G2 (TM), G2X
(TM) (G2 Express), Eclipse (TM), Meridian (TM), and Denali (TM).
The term "Bard IVC Filters" also includes Bard's Recovery Cone
Removal System.

The case is consolidated in MDL 2641 re: BARD IVC Filters Products
Liability Litigation.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Brandon L Rich, Esq.
          DRIGGS BILLS & DAY PLLC
          2125 Western Ave., Ste. 500
          Seattle, WA 98121
          Telephone: (206) 607-9098
          Facsimile: (206) 641-3214
          E-mail: brich@lawdbd.com

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          Richard B. North, Jr., Esq.
          NELSON, MULLINS, RILEY & SCARBOROUGH, LLP
          Atlantic Station
          201 Seventeenth St., NW, Suite 1700
          Atlanta, GA 30363
          Telephone: (404) 322-6155
          Facsimile: (404) 322-6093
          E-mail: richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

MDL 2641: Creech v. CR Bard over IVC Filters Consolidated
---------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned William David Creech and Barbara
Creech, the Plaintiffs, vs. C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral
Vascular, Inc., the Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-02825 (Filed May
3, 2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
District Arizona, to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Georgia (Augusta) on Sept. 9, 2019. The Southern
District of Georgia Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-00155-JRH-BKE to the proceeding. The case is assigned to
the Hon. Judge J. Randal Hall.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries and/or
wrongful death damages suffered by an injured or deceased party or
parties as a direct and proximate result of an injured or deceased
party being implanted with a defective and unreasonably dangerous
Inferior Vena Cava ("IVC") filter medical device manufactured by
Bard.

The IVC filters are part of Bard's IVC "retrievable" filter product
line and include the following devices: Recovery (TM), G2 (TM), G2X
(TM) (G2 Express), Eclipse (TM), Meridian (TM), and Denali (TM).
The term "Bard IVC Filters" also includes Bard's Recovery Cone
Removal System.

The case is consolidated in MDL 2641 re: BARD IVC Filters Products
Liability Litigation.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff is:

          Wes S Larsen, Esq.
          JAMES VERNON & WEEKS PA
          1626 Lincoln Way
          Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
          Telephone: (208) 667-0683
          Facsimile: (208) 664-1684
          E-mail: wes@jvwlaw.net

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          Richard B. North, Jr., Esq.
          NELSON, MULLINS, RILEY & SCARBOROUGH, LLP
          Atlantic Station
          201 Seventeenth St., NW, Suite 1700
          Atlanta, GA 30363
          Telephone: (404) 322-6155
          Facsimile: (404) 322-6093
          E-mail: richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

MEREDITH CORP: Faces Securities Class Suit in New York and Iowa
---------------------------------------------------------------
Meredith Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on September 13, 2019, for
the fiscal year ended June 30, 2019, that the company has been
named as a defendant in two securities class action suits, one in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York and
the other is in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Iowa.

On September 6, 2019, a shareholder filed a putative class action
lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York against the Company, its Chief Executive Officer, and its
Chief Financial Officer, seeking to represent a class of
shareholders who acquired securities of the Company between May 10,
2018 and September 4, 2019.

On September 12, 2019, a shareholder filed a putative class action
lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Iowa against the Company, its Chief Executive Officer, its Chief
Financial Officer, and its Chairman of the Board seeking to
represent a class of shareholders who acquired securities of the
Company between January 31, 2018 and September 5, 2019.

Both complaints allege that the defendants made materially false
and/or misleading statements, and failed to disclose material
adverse facts, about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Both complaints assert claims under the federal
securities laws and seek unspecified monetary damages and other
relief.

The defendants have not yet responded to either complaint but
intend to vigorously oppose them. The Company expresses no opinion
as to the ultimate outcome of these matters.

Meredith Corporation is a diversified media company primarily
focuses on publishing and broadcasting. The Company's publishing
segment includes magazine and book publishing, marketing,
interactive media, licensing, and other related operations.
Meredith operates network-affiliated television stations and
develops syndicated television programs. The company is based in
Des Moines, Iowa.


MID-SOUTH TRANSPORTATION: Boyland Seeks to Recover Unpaid OT Wages
------------------------------------------------------------------
CARLOS BOYLAND, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. MID-SOUTH TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT, INC., Case No.
2:19-cv-02594-JPM-cgc (W.D. Tenn., Sept. 5, 2019), seeks to recover
alleged unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages or prejudgment
interest, attorneys' fees and costs, and other legal and equitable
relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Mid-South Transportation Management, Inc. is a company with its
principal office located in Cincinnati, Ohio.  Mid-South is the
management company that employs the personnel to operate Memphis
Area Transit Authority ("MATA"). The Defendant staffs, hires and
manages bus operators for MATA buses, including Plaintiff Boyland
and similarly situated bus operators.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William B. Ryan, Esq.
          Janelle C. Osowski, Esq.
          DONATI LAW, PLLC
          1545 Union Avenue
          Memphis, TN 38104
          Telephone: (901) 278-1004
          Facsimile: (901) 278-3111
          E-mail: billy@donatilaw.com
                  janelle@donatilaw.com


MIDLAND CREDIT: R&R on Dismissal/Arbitration Bid in Barbosa Adopted
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JACKELINE BARBOSA, MARK ANDERSON, and DOUGLASS BAKER,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC., SCHREIBER/COHEN,
LLC, and LUSTIG GLASER & WILSON P.C., Defendants, Civil Action No.
18-11997-NMG (D. Mass.), Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts has entered an
order accepting and adopting the Report and Recommendation on the
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and/or Compel Arbitration.

The case is a putative class action suit pertaining to debt
collection litigation pursued in state court.  The Named Plaintiffs
allegedly incurred credit card debt on accounts held with Barclays
Bank Delaware.  Midland Funding, LLC later acquired the Plaintiffs'
accounts from Barclays, for whom Defendant Midland Credit
Management ("MCM") is a servicer and agent.

The Plaintiffs were subsequently sued by Midland Funding, allegedly
at the direction of MCM, to collect outstanding credit card debt.
Lawyer Defendants Schreiber and Lustig are the law firms that were
retained by Midland Funding to sue the Plaintiffs for the
outstanding debts.

After consideration of the Plaintiffs objections thereto, Judge
Gorton accepted and adopted the Report and Recommendation on the
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and/or Compel Arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 9, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/e1azC6 from Leagle.com.

Jackeline Barbosa, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Charles M. Delbaum, National
Consumer Law Center, Kenneth D. Quat -- kquat@quatlaw.com -- Quat
Law Offices & Alexa L. Rosenbloom, Greater Boston Legal Services.

Mark Anderson, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Kenneth D. Quat, Quat Law
Offices & Alexa L. Rosenbloom, Greater Boston Legal Services.

Midland Credit Management, Inc., Defendant, represented by Benjamin
M. McGovern -- benjamin.mcgovern@hklaw.com -- Holland & Knight,
LLP, Cory W. Eichhorn -- cory.eichhorn@hklaw.com -- Holland &
Knight LLP, pro hac vice & Gordon P. Katz -- gordon.katz@hklaw.com
-- Holland & Knight, LLP.

Schreiber/Cohen, LLC, Defendant, represented by Alyssa A. Aquino --
AAquino@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP & Andrew M.
Schneiderman -- aschneiderman@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw &
Culbertson LLP.


MINOS DINER: Boos Sues Over Underpaid Minimum and Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
KATELYN BOOS, DEINA GERGES, and EUGENE YANOVSKIY, individually and
in behalf of all other persons similarly situated v. MINOS DINER,
INC.; STAVROS BAKOUSSIS; MAGDY KHEIR; jointly and severally, Case
No. 1:19-cv-05072 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 5, 2019), alleges that the
Defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and they are
liable to the Plaintiffs for unpaid or underpaid minimum wages and
overtime compensation.

Minos Diner, Inc., is a New York business corporation with its
office in Richmond County.  The Individual Defendants are owners,
shareholders, officers, or managers of the Defendants' business.

The Defendants' business is a full-service restaurant doing
business as Woodrow Diner, and located at 655-210 Rossville Avenue,
in Staten Island, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          John M. Gurrieri, Esq.
          Justin A. Zeller, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF JUSTIN A. ZELLER, P.C.
          277 Broadway, Suite 408
          New York, NY 10007-2036
          Telephone: (212) 229-2249
          Facsimile: (212) 229-2246
          E-mail: jmgurrieri@zellerlegal.com
                  jazeller@zellerlegal.com


MISSISSIPPI: Hosemann Appeals Hopkins Suit Ruling to 5th Cir.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Mississippi Secretary of State Delbert Hosemann filed an appeal
from a Court ruling in the lawsuit entitled Dennis Hopkins, et al.
v. Delbert Hosemann, Case No. 3:18-CV-188, in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Jackson.

The appellate case is captioned as Dennis Hopkins, et al. v.
Delbert Hosemann, Case No. 19-60662, in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Sept. 6, 2019,
Secretary of State Delbert Hosemann also filed an appeal from a
Court ruling in the lawsuit.  That appellate case is styled as
Dennis Hopkins, et al. v. Delbert Hosemann, Case No. 19-90024.

Judge Daniel P. Jordan, III, previously granted the Plaintiffs'
motion for class certification.

The consolidated action (with ROY HARNESS, ET AL. v. DELBERT
HOSEMANN, SECRETARY OF STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, Case No.
3:17-CV-791-DPJ-FKB) seeking to restore the voting rights of
convicted felons is before the District Court on the Hopkins
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23.

The Hopkins Plaintiffs seek class certification to challenge two
sections of the Mississippi Constitution, Sections 241 and 253.
Under Section 241, individuals who have been convicted of murder,
rape, bribery, theft, arson, obtaining money or goods under false
pretense, perjury, forgery, embezzlement, or bigamy are ineligible
to vote.  And Section 253 allows the legislature to restore an
individual's suffrage by a two-thirds vote of both houses, of all
members elected.

The Plaintiffs say the lifetime voting ban violates the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and the
Fourteenth Amendment, which only permits states to temporarily
"abridge" an individual's right to vote based on participation in a
crime.  They also contend that the mechanism to restore voting
rights violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the First Amendment.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that the
Electronic Record on Appeal was due September 25, 2019.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees DENNIS HOPKINS, individually and on behalf of
a class of all others similarly situated,, et al., are represented
by:

          Janet A. Gochman, Esq.
          SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT, L.L.P.
          425 Lexington Avenue
          New York, NY 10017-3954
          Telephone: (212) 455-2815
          E-mail: jgochman@stblaw.com

               - and -

          Paloma Wu, Esq.
          SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER
          400 Washington Avenue
          Montgomery, AL 36104
          Telephone: (888) 414-7752
          E-mail: paloma.wu@splcenter.org

Defendant-Appellant SECRETARY OF STATE DELBERT HOSEMANN, in his
official capacity, is represented by:

          Justin Lee Matheny, Esq.
          OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
          550 High Street
          Walter Sillers Building
          Jackson, MS 39201
          Telephone: (601) 359-3825
          Facsimile: (601) 359-2003
          E-mail: jmath@ago.state.ms.us

               - and -

          Krissy C. Nobile, Esq.
          OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
          P.O. Box 220
          Jackson, MS 39205
          Telephone: (601) 359-3824
          E-mail: knobi@ago.state.ms.us


MONOTYPE IMAGING: Faces Smith Class Action over Marvel Merger
-------------------------------------------------------------
Monotype Imaging Holdings Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filed on September 17,
2019, that the company has been named as a defendant in a class
action suit entitled, Raymond Smith v. Monotype Imaging Holdings,
Inc., et al., Case No. 1:19-cv-01717.

On July 25, 2019, Monotype Imaging Holdings Inc., a Delaware
corporation (the "Company"), Marvel Parent, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company ("Parent"), and Marvel Merger Sub, Inc., a
Delaware corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of Parent
("Merger Sub"), entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger (the
"Merger Agreement"), pursuant to which Merger Sub will be merged
with and into the Company (the "Merger"), with the Company
surviving the Merger as a wholly owned subsidiary of Parent.

On August 26, 2019, the Company filed with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (the "SEC") a preliminary proxy statement (the
"Proxy Statement") related to a special meeting of the Company’s
stockholders to be held for the purpose of, among other things,
voting on the Merger.

On September 12, 2019, a purported stockholder of the Company filed
a class action complaint in the United States District Court for
the District of Delaware, captioned Raymond Smith v. Monotype
Imaging Holdings, Inc., et al., Case No. 1:19-cv-01717 (the
"Complaint"), naming as defendants the Company and each member of
the Company's board of directors.

Among other things, the Complaint alleges that the Proxy Statement
is materially incomplete and misleading by failing to disclose in
violation of Section 14(a) and Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act,
as well as Rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder, allegedly material
information concerning (i) certain financial projections prepared
by the Company's management and summarized in the Proxy Statement
and (ii) certain inputs used in the financial analyses conducted by
J.P. Morgan Securities LLC in connection with rendering its
fairness opinion to the Company's board of directors and summarized
in the Proxy Statement.

The relief sought in the Complaint includes equitable relief,
including among other things, to enjoin the shareholder vote on the
Merger unless and until certain additional and allegedly material
information is disclosed to the Company's stockholders, to direct
the defendants to account to plaintiff for all alleged damages
suffered as a result of their alleged wrongdoing and to award
plaintiff damages arising from proceeding with the Merger and the
cost and disbursements of the Complaint, including reasonable
attorneys' and expert fees and expenses.

The Company cannot predict the outcome of the Complaint, nor can
the Company predict the amount of time and expense that will be
required to resolve the Complaint. The Company believes the
Complaint is without merit and the Company and the individual
defendants intend to vigorously defend against the Complaint and
subsequently filed similar actions.

Monotype Imaging Holdings Inc. provides text imaging solutions. The
Company offers technologies and fonts enable the display and
printing of digital text on a variety of consumer electronic
devices, including laser printers, digital copiers, mobile phones,
digital televisions, set-top boxes, and digital cameras as well as
in numerous software applications and operating systems. The
company is based in Woburn, Massachusetts.


MONSANTO CO: Glackin Sues Over Herbicide Side Effects
-----------------------------------------------------
Jeffrey Glackin and Deborah Glackin, Plaintiff, vs. Monsanto
Company, Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-02100 (M.D. Fla., August 22,
2019), seeks compensatory and punitive damages, costs, expert fees,
disbursements and attorneys' fees incurred in prosecuting this
action, disgorgement of profits, pre-judgment and post-judgment
interest at the maximum rate and such other relief resulting from
negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the design,
development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing,
advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide
Roundup (R), containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

Jeffrey Glackin developed non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma in January 2018 as
a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, notes
the complaint.

Monsanto is a multinational agricultural biotechnology corporation
based in St. Louis, Missouri. It is the world's leading producer of
glyphosate, the active ingredient in Roundup, a broad-spectrum
herbicide used to kill weeds and grasses known to compete with
commercial crops grown around the globe.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

       Andrew T. Kagan, Esq.
       KAGAN LEGAL GROUP
       295 Palmas Inn Way, Suite 6 Palmanova Plaza
       Humacao, PR 00791
       Tel: (939) 220-2424
       Fax: (939) 220-2477

              - and -

       Jennifer A. Moore, Esq.
       MOORE LAW GROUP, PLLC
       1473 South 4th Street
       Louisville, KY 40208
       Tel: (502) 717-4080
       Fax: (502) 717-4086
       Email: jennifer@moorelawgroup.com


MONSANTO COMPANY: Kubacki Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Joseph Kubacki, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the
Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-05521-VC (D. Minn., Aug. 15, 2019),
seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, as a direct
and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful
conduct in connection with the design, development, manufacture,
testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Mark Joseph
Kubacki's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Charles H. Johnson, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF CHARLES H. JOHNSON,
          PA 2599 Mississippi Street
          New Brighton, MN 55112-5060
          Telephone: (651) 633-5685
          Facsimile: (651) 633-4442
          E-mail: bdehkes@charleshjohnsonlaw.com

NORWOOD SUBARU: Heckman Seeks Overtime Pay for Sales Staff
----------------------------------------------------------
KEATON HECKMAN, on behalf of himself and ail others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NORWOOD SUBARU, INC. (d/b/a Clay
Subaru); SCOTT D. CLAY; and JAMES T. SARNO, SR., the Defendants,
Case No. 19-1127 (Mass. Super., Sept. 4, 2019), seeks damages based
on Defendants' failure to pay wages under the Massachusetts Wage
Laws.

The Plaintiff worked more than 40 hours in at least one week during
the class. The Plaintiff worked on at least one Sunday or covered
holiday during the period. The Defendants did not pay Plaintiff, or
members of the Class, overtime pay. The Defendants also did not pay
premium pay for Sundays and holidays.

The Plaintiff worked as a salesperson for Defendants from
approximately February 1, 2017 through December 2017.

The Defendants operate a car dealership located in Norwood,
Massachusetts.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Josh Gardner, Esq.
          Nicholas J. Rosenberg, Esq.
          GARDNER & ROSENBERG P.C.
          One State Street, Fourth Floor
          Boston, MA 02109
          Telephone: 617-390-7570
          E-mail: josh@gardnerrosenberg.com

NOVUS THERAPEUTICS: Jackie888 Class Suit Underway
-------------------------------------------------
The case styled Jackie888, Inc. v. Tokai Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et
al., remains pending, Novus Therapeutics, Inc. disclosed in its
Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019.

On August 19, 2016, a purported stockholder of Tokai filed a
putative class action lawsuit in the Superior Court of the State of
California, County of San Francisco, entitled Jackie888, Inc. v.
Tokai Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., No. CGC-16-553796.  The
plaintiff sought to represent a class of purchasers of Tokai common
stock in or traceable to Tokai's IPO.

On October 19, 2016, the defendants moved to dismiss or stay the
action on grounds of forum non conveniens, and certain individual
defendants moved to quash the plaintiff's summons for lack of
personal jurisdiction.

On February 27, 2017, the Superior Court entered an order granting
defendants' motion to stay the lawsuit.

On May 24, 2018, the plaintiff dismissed its complaint in the
Superior Court of the State of California and refiled its complaint
in the Business Litigation Session of the Superior Court Department
of the Suffolk County Trial Court, Massachusetts ("Massachusetts
State Court").

On June 28, 2018, plaintiff Wu moved to consolidate the Jackie888
Action with the action styled, Wu v. Tokai Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
et al., 16-3725 BLS ("Wu Action").

On June 29, 2018, plaintiffs Jackie888 and Wu filed a consolidated
complaint.

On July 6, 2018, the Jackie888 Action was consolidated with the Wu
Action.

The Jackie888 Action and Wu Action were later de-consolidated on
May 16, 2019 when the Wu Action was dismissed with prejudice.

In the remaining Jackie888 action, plaintiff's motion for class
certification was due August 22, 2019.

Headquartered in Irvine, California, Novus Therapeutics, Inc., is a
pharmaceutical company that focuses on developing products for
patients with disorders of ear, nose, and throat. Its lead product
is (OP-02), a surfactant-based combination drug product for
patients at risk for, or with, otitis media (OM) (middle ear
inflammation with or without infection). The company also has a
foam-based drug delivery technology (OP-01) that could be used to
deliver drugs into the ear, nose, and sinus cavities.


ORACLE CORP: Oral Argument in Calif. Class Suit Set for Oct. 17
---------------------------------------------------------------
Oracle Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 13, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended August 31, 2019, that the motion to dismiss
the class action suit pending before the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California is scheduled for oral argument
on October 17, 2019.

On August 10, 2018, a putative class action, brought by an alleged
stockholder of Oracle, was filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California against the company, its Chief
Technology Officer, its two Chief Executive Officers, two other
Oracle executives, and one former Oracle executive.

On March 8, 2019, plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Plaintiff
alleges that the defendants made or are responsible for false and
misleading statements regarding Oracle's cloud business.

Plaintiff further alleges that the former Oracle executive engaged
in insider trading. Plaintiff seeks a ruling that this case may
proceed as a class action, and seeks damages, attorneys' fees and
costs, and unspecified declaratory/injunctive relief.

On April 19, 2019, defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's amended
complaint. This motion is fully briefed and is scheduled for oral
argument on October 17, 2019.

Oracle said, "We believe that we have meritorious defenses against
this action, and we will continue to vigorously defend it."

Oracle Corporation develops, manufactures, markets, sells, hosts,
and supports application, platform, and infrastructure solutions
for information technology (IT) environments worldwide. The company
provides services in three layers of the cloud: Software as a
Service, Platform as a Service, and Infrastructure as a Service.
The company was founded in 1977 and is headquartered in Redwood
City, California.


OREGON: Court Sets Hours for Deposition Testimonies in ADA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon, Eugene
Division, issued an Order and Opinion setting Number of Hours for
Non-Expert Deposition testimonies in the case captioned WYATT B.
and NOAH F. by their next friend Michelle McAllister; KYLIE R. and
ALEC R. by their next friend Kathleen Megill Strek; UNIQUE L. by
her next friend Annette Smith; SIMON S. by his next friend Paul
Aubry; RUTH T. by her next friend Michelle Bartov; BERNARD C. by
his next friend Ksen Murry; NAOMI B. by her next friend Kathleen
Megill Strek; and NORMAN N. by his next friend Tracy Gregg,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et
al., Plaintiffs, v. KATE BROWN, Governor of Oregon in her official
capacity; FAIRBORZ PAKSERESHT, Director, Oregon Department of Human
Services in his official capacity; JANA MCLELLAN, Interim Director,
Child Welfare in her official capacity, and OREGON DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES, Defendants. No. 6:19-cv-000556-AA. (D. Or.).

Plaintiffs, various minor children and their next friends, bring
this putative class action against the State of Oregon Department
of Human Services and state officers alleging violations of their
rights under the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution, as well as violations of the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act, Americans with Disabilities Act
and Rehabilitation Act.  

First, the parties dispute the total number of hours that should be
allowed for non-expert depositions.

Plaintiffs argue that the total number of hours for deposition
should be 120 hours while defendants prefer 100 hours. The parties
have agreed that there will be no limitation on the total number of
depositions but instead that there should be an initial limit on
the number of hours for depositions per side. Either party would
still be free to seek further depositions beyond such a limit with
leave of the Court for good cause shown.

In federal civil cases, there is a presumptive limit of ten
depositions per party, absent stipulation by the parties or leave
of the court.  

Here, the parties have stipulated to exceed the maximum number of
allowable depositions. The Court finds, at this time, that
plaintiffs have made no particularized showing of the need for an
additional twenty hours of depositions other than generally noting
that this is a complex case.

Thus, at this time, the number of hours per side for non-expert
depositions shall be initially set at 100 hours per side. As
mentioned during the most recent status conference, however, the
Court will work to ensure that ample, non-cumulative, discovery is
allowed for both parties if this amount of time proves
insufficient. The parties are reminded that should work together in
good faith to resolve any requests for additional time for
depositions.

The second set of issues before the Court relates to the parties'
dispute regarding their current Stipulated Protective Order (SPO).
Plaintiffs argue that the Court should amend that order with
respect to the type of documents which may be designated as
Confidential or Attorney's Eyes Only (AEO) as well as the use of
information derived from such confidential or AEO information.  

As to the first matter, the SPO currently provides a set of
procedures regarding documents that are designated as confidential
and AEO. The SPO provides that the parties specifically do not
intend to designate the following types documents as confidential
or AEO: de-identified aggregate data, internal DHS communications
that do not contain individually identifiable information, and
non-privileged policy documents and drafts of such documents.

Plaintiffs propose adding to this list any documents that do not
contain personally identifying information about the named
plaintiffs, class members, their family members or foster parents.

Defendants agree that most of the documents and information that
will require confidential or AEO designation will be information
mentioned in plaintiffs' proposed amended language. However, they
also raise concerns that such a broad amendment would limit their
discretion to protect information which might identify third
parties who report abuse. The Court takes these concerns seriously
and notes that the parties are required to designate documents as
confidential or AEO in good faith.  

Therefore, the Court will not add plaintiff's proposed language to
the SPO at this time. The Court stands ready to adjudicate any
disputed designations if necessary.

Finally, plaintiffs request that the Court amend the SPO to allow
them to use information derived from confidential reports in their
public filings before this Court.

They argue that Paragraphs 2, 7 and 8 of the SPO presently requires
that all information derived from the confidential documents, that
is, from the case records be filed under seal and only disclosed to
designated individuals, including the Court.

Plaintiffs complain that under this language they would be unable
to discuss their personal stories relating to their claims against
defendants. They argue that this would allow defendants to conduct
largely secret trial on a matter of significant public importance.
Plaintiffs argue that any concerns about safeguarding their
identities, the identities of family members, and other protected
parties can be remedied by the use pseudonyms and redacting
individually identifiable information such as birth dates.

A party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of
overcoming this strong presumption by articulating compelling
reasons supported by specific factual findings that outweigh the
general history of access and the public policies favoring
disclosure such as the public interest in understanding the
judicial process and significant public events.  

In balancing the interests mentioned above with defendants concerns
about safeguarding the identities of the named plaintiffs, their
families, potential class members, and third party reports of
abuse, the Court has determined that the use of pseudonyms and
redaction, which is routinely used in other federal and state cases
dealing with minors, is sufficient to protect the identity of those
parties. Accordingly, the Court shall amend the SPO to allow the
parties to use information derived from confidential and AEO
documents in their public filings in this litigation.

In conclusion, the total number of hours for non-expert deposition
testimony is set initially at 100 hours per side. The Court will
enter an Amended Protective Order which shall not change the agreed
procedures for designation of information as confidential or AEO.
The amended order shall allow the parties to use information
derived from confidential reports in public filings in this
litigation.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 12, 2019 Order
and Opinion is available at  https://tinyurl.com/y29k4ujh from
Leagle.com.

Wyatt B., by their next friend Michelle McAllister, Noah F., by
their next friend Michelle McAllister, Kylie R., by their next
friend Kathleen Megill Strek, Alec R., by their next friend
Kathleen Megill Strek, Unique L., by her next friend Annette Smith,
Simon S., by his next friend Paul Aubry, Ruth T., by her next
friend Michelle Bartov, Bernard C., by his next friend Ksen Murry,
Naomi B., by her next friend Kathleen Megill Strek & Norman N., by
his next friend Tracy Gregg, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Anastasia
Benedetto , A Better Childhood, pro hac vice, Dawn J. Post -
dpost@abetterchildhood.org - A Better Childhood,  pro hac vice,
Gregory A. Chaimov  - gregorychaimov@dwt.com - Davis Wright
Tremaine, LLP, Marcia Robinson Lowry , A Better Childhood, 355
Lexington Ave Fl 16 New York, NY, 10017-6609, pro hac vice, Emily
R. Cooper  - ecooper@droregon.org - Disability Rights Oregon, Paul
J.C. Southwick - paulsouthwick@dwt.com - Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP
& Thomas Stenson - tstenson@droregon.org - Disability Rights
Oregon.

Kate Brown, Governor of Oregon in her official capacity, Fariborz
Pakseresht, Jana McLellan, Interim Director, Child Welfare in her
official capacity & Oregon Dept. of Human Services, Defendants,
represented by Carla Scott , Oregon Department of Justice, Anna
Marie Joyce -annajoyce@markowitzherbold.com - Markowitz Herbold PC,
David B. Markowitz , Markowitz Herbold PC, Harry B. Wilson ,
Markowitz Herbold PC, Laura R. Salerno Owens , Markowitz Herbold
PC, Lauren F. Blaesing , Markowitz Herbold PC, 1455 SW Broadway,
Suite 1900, Portland, OR 97201& Sheila H. Potter , Oregon
Department of Justice.


PARADIS TO GO: Does not Properly Pay Workers, Ortega Suit Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
EUTIQUIO VASQUEZ ORTEGA, on behalf of himself, and other employees
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PARADIS TO GO LLC, and KIMBERLY
PARADIS and MICKAEL PARADIS, individually, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-08593 (S.D. N.Y., Sept. 16, 2019) is an action brought by
Plaintiff, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as
amended, and the New York Labor Law, arising from Defendants' (i)
failure to pay non-exempt employees proper overtime compensation;
(ii) misappropriating and unlawfully retaining tips; (iii)
illegally retaining service charges purported to be gratuities from
tipped employees; and (iv) illegally withholding and/or failing to
pay wages and tips.

Plaintiff typically worked between 45 and 50 hours per week, and
occasionally in excess of 50 hours per week. Throughout the
entirety of Plaintiff's employment, he was not paid proper overtime
compensation, asserts the complaint. Specifically, the Defendants
failed to pay Plaintiff overtime compensation; misappropriated
and/or withheld Plaintiff,'s tips; misappropriated and/or withheld
from Plaintiff service charges reported to be gratuities; reimburse
Plaintiffs for money expended for transportation; and failed to pay
lawfully earned overtime compensation in contravention of the FLSA
and New York Labor Law.

Eutiquio Vasquez Ortega was employed by Defendants in New York
County, New York, as a food preparer, dishwasher, cleaner, and
delivery person at Defendants' restaurant.

Defendants own and operate a full restaurant and catering business
under the "Paradis to Go" brand, which includes providing corporate
and private customers with a full array of food and catering
options.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Justin Cilenti, Esq.
     Peter H. Cooper, Esq.
     CILENTI & COOPER, PLLC
     10 Grand Central
     155 East 44th Street - 6th Floor
     New York, NY 10017
     Phone: (212) 209-3933
     Fax: (212) 209-7102
     Email: info@jcpclaw.com


PEAK RESORTS: Faces Wheby Class Suit Related to Vail Merger
-----------------------------------------------------------
Peak Resorts, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 13, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended July 31, 2019, that the company has been
named as a defendant in a putative class action and derivative
complaint initiated by Earl M. Wheby Jr.

On July 20, 2019, Peak Resorts, Inc. entered into an Agreement and
Plan of Merger (the "Merger Agreement") with Vail Holdings, Inc., a
Colorado corporation ("Parent"), VRAD Holdings, Inc., a Missouri
corporation and direct, wholly-owned subsidiary of Parent ("Merger
Sub"), and, solely for the purposes stated in Section 9.14 of the
Merger Agreement, Vail Resorts, Inc., a Delaware corporation ("Vail
Resorts"), relating to the proposed acquisition of the Company by
Parent.

On August 28, 2019, an alleged shareholder of the Company, Earl M.
Wheby Jr., filed a putative class action and derivative complaint
in St. Louis County Circuit Court, 21st Judicial Circuit of
Missouri, against each of the members of the Company's board of
directors, Vail Resorts, Parent and Merger Sub, purportedly in
relation to the Company's entry into the Merger Agreement. The
complaint asserts a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the
defendants.

The complaint alleges, among other things, that the directors
breached their fiduciary duties in connection with the Merger due
to certain deal protection provisions in the Merger Agreement and
disseminated a materially misleading proxy statement.  

The complaint seeks, among other things, an order enjoining the
defendants from proceeding with, consummating or closing the
proposed Merger; in the event the proposed Merger is consummated,
an order rescinding it and setting it aside or awarding rescissory
damages; and unspecified attorneys' and experts' fees.

Peak Resorts, Inc. owns and operates resorts. The Company offers
services which includes skiing, snow boarding, swimming, terrain
parks, tubing, dining, lodging services, as well as various summer
activities. Peak Resorts serves clients in the United States. The
company is based in Wildwood, Missouri.


PIZZA HUT: $500K Settlement in Hobon FLSA Suit Has Prelim Approval
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN HOBON, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PIZZA HUT OF SOUTHERN WISCONSIN,
INC., d/b/a PIZZA HUT, et al., Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-947-slc
(W.D. Wis.), Magistrate Judge Stephen L. Crocker of the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted the
parties' joint motions for (i) preliminary approval of the class
and collective action settlement agreement, (ii) certification of
the Rule 23 class, (iii) conditional certification of an amended
FLSA collective class, (iv) appointment of John Hobon as the class
representative and the Hawks Quindel, S.C. law firm as the class
counsel, and (v) approval of the class notice and settlement
procedure outlined in the parties' agreement.

Hobon brings class action and collective action claims against
Pizza Hut, and its Wisconsin and Illinois affiliates, alleging that
the Defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), and
Wisconsin and Illinois wage and hour laws by subjecting its
delivery drivers to a vehicle reimbursement policy that failed to
reasonably approximate their actual expenses.  On Jan. 10, 2019,
Magistrate Judge Crocker conditionally certified a FLSA collective
action.

Now, the parties have reached a settlement agreement and have filed
a joint motion for preliminary approval of the settlement agreement
negotiated by the parties, certification of the Rule 23 class,
conditional certification of an amended FLSA collective class,
appointment of John Hobon as the class representative and the Hawks
Quindel, S.C. law firm as class counsel, and approval of the class
notice and settlement procedure outlined in the parties'
agreement.

The settlement applies to the following classes:  

     a. FLSA Collective Action Members: All persons who have worked
as a delivery driver for the Defendants between Dec. 20, 2014 and
March 14, 2019 whose names appear on Exhibit 11 to the Settlement
Agreement and who have timely returned Consent Forms (Collective
Members); and

     b. Rule 23 Class Members: All persons who have worked as a
delivery driver for the Defendants between Dec. 20, 2014 and March
14, 2019, whose names appear on Exhibit 1 to the Settlement
Agreement and who do not timely exclude themselves (Class
Members).

The parties' agreement provides the following with respect to
pay-outs for the class members:

     a. The Defendants will pay a total of $500,000 into a
Settlement Fund, of which $262,887.06 will be split equally into a
Class Fund and a Collective Fund, meaning that each fund will
receive $131,443.53;

     b. The putative members of the FLSA Collective Class will be
given an opportunity to opt-in to the FLSA settlement, if they have
not already done so;

     c. The members of the Rule 23 Class will receive settlement
funds unless they file a valid and timely request for exclusion;

     d. Each putative Rule 23 class member will be allocated a
pro-rata share of the Class Fund, and those class members who do
not exclude themselves will be paid their allocated pro-rata
share;

     e. Two-thirds of the payout to Rule 23 class members will be
treated as wages and the remaining one-third will be treated as
income but not wages;

     f. Each putative FLSA collective member will be allocated a
pro-rata share of the Collective Fund, and those collective members
who opt-in to the settlement will be paid their pro-rata share;

     g. One-half of each payout to FLSA collective members will be
treated as wages and the other half will be treated as income but
not wages;

     h. Any portion of the Class or Collective Funds attributable
to uncashed checks will be mailed to the parties' elected Cy Pres
recipient, the Employee Rights Advocacy Institute for Law &
Policy;

     i. Any funds allocated to individuals that are not claimed
(due to individuals who do not opt-in to the settlement or who
timely exclude themselves from the settlement) will revert to the
Defendants;

     j. The Class Counsel will apply for attorneys' fees in the
amount of $166,666.67 and costs not to exceed $28,946.78, to be
paid from the Settlement Fund;

     k. The Class counsel will apply for the following service
payments to individuals who assisted the class counsel in resolving
the case: $10,000 to the class representative, John Hobon; $1,000
each to Chase Putnam, Ashton Johnson, Thomas Peterson, and Peter
Shep; and $500 each to Marshall Barnes, John Britt, Logan McHone,
Andrew Taft, and Marina Younger; and

     l. $25,000 of the Settlement Fund will be set aside in a
contingency and ongoing cost fund, with any unused portion to be
reallocated to the Class Fund and Collective Fund on a pro-rata
basis.

The Counsel have identified approximately 1,800 class members.
After deducting attorneys' fees, costs, contingency fund and
service payments, the average pro rata distribution to class
members will be $144.03.

Based upon his review of the parties' joint motion for preliminary
approval of the class and collective action settlement agreement,
as well as the materials submitted in connection with the motion,
preliminary approval of the settlement is granted by Magistrate
Judge Crocker.  

For settlement purposes only, he granted the parties' stipulation
to class certification and certified the following class under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(e): All persons who have worked as a delivery driver
for the Defendants between Dec. 20, 2014 and March 14, 2019, whose
names appear on Exhibit 1 to the Settlement Agreement.

For settlement purposes only, he also granted the parties' amended
stipulation, and conditionally certified the following Collective
Class under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b): All persons who have worked
as a delivery driver for the Defendants between Dec. 20, 2014 and
March 14, 2019 whose names appear on Exhibit 1 to the Settlement
Agreement and who have timely returned Consent Forms.

The Judge appointed the law firm of Hawks Quindel S.C. as the class
counsel.  He approved the proposed notice program, proposed Notices
of Class Action Settlement, and the Consent.

Per the settlement agreement, the claims administrator must send
notice to the classes within 15 days of the date of the Order.

The Class counsel will file a petition for approval of attorney
fees and costs no later than Nov. 8, 2019.  The Class counsel will
also file any supplemental brief in support of final approval of
the settlement agreement or in response to any objections to the
petition for attorney fees and costs no later than Nov. 27, 2019.
The final fairness hearing is scheduled for Dec. 12, 2019, at 1:30
p.m.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 9, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/09AsNT Leagle.com.

John Hobon, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Larry A. Johnson --
ljohnson@hq-law.com -- Hawks Quindel, S.C., Summer Hart Murshid --
smurshid@hq-law.com -- Hawks Quindel Ehlke & Perry, S.C. & Timothy
Peter Maynard -- tmaynard@hq-law.com.

Pizza Hut of Southern Wisconsin, Inc., d/b/a Pizza Hut & Rockford
Pizza, LLC, Defendants, represented by Brian C. Spahn --
bspahn@gklaw.com -- Godfrey & Kahn, Joshua Lee Johanningmeier --
jjohanningmeier@gklaw.com -- Godfrey & Kahn S.C., Erin M. Cook --
mcook@gklaw.com -- Godfrey & Kahn, S.C. & Rebeca M. Lopez --
rlopez@gklaw.com -- Godfrey & Kahn, S.C.

MSG Delco, LLC, Pizza Hut of Madison, Inc., Pizza Hut of Rock
County, Inc., Divo Enterprises, Inc., Pizza Hut of Waunakee, Inc.,
Pizza Hut of Platteville, Inc., Pizza Hut of Mauston, LLC &
Southing Grange, Inc., Defendants, represented by Brian C. Spahn,
Godfrey & Kahn.


PRIDE CHEVROLET: Goodwin Seeks Overtime Pay for Sales Staff
-----------------------------------------------------------
MYLES GOODWIN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. PRIDE CHEVROLET, INC., and SUZANNE IOV
ANNA, the Defendants, Case No. 1977CV01823D (Mass. Super., Sept.
4), seeks damages based on Defendants' failure to pay wages under
Massachusetts Wage Laws.

According to the complaint, the Defendants did not base its pay to
Plaintiff, or members of the Class, on the amount of overtime
hours, or the amount of hours worked on Sundays and holidays.

The Plaintiff worked for Defendants as a salesperson from
approximately April 2018 to May 2019.

The Defendants operate an automobile dealership in Lynn,
Massachusetts.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Josh Gardner, Esq.
          Nicholas J. Rosenberg, Esq.
          GARDNER & ROSENBERG P.C.
          One State Street, Fourth Floor
          Boston, MA 02109
          Telephone: 617-390-7570
          E-mail: josh@gardnerrosenberg.com

Q CLUB: Back-Charging & Shared Costs Ruling in Dear Suit Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, GARY DEAR, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Q CLUB HOTEL, LLC,
Defendant-Appellant. GARY DEAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Q CLUB
HOTEL, LLC, Defendant-Appellee, Case Nos. 17-13127, 17-14285 (11th
Cir.), Judge Kevin Christopher Newsom of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed (i) the district court's adverse
determination of the back-charging issue, the jury's verdict on the
Shared Costs issue; and (ii) the district court's denial of Dear's
new-trial motion.

The case concerns a contract dispute between Q Club -- the entity
that operates the condominium-hotel at the Hilton Fort Lauderdale
Beach Resort—and a class of condo owners over the meaning of the
"Declaration" that governs the parties' relationship.  The focus is
on the Declaration of Q Club Resort and Residences Condominium's
cost-sharing arrangement for the maintenance of certain amenities
that aren't tied to any particular condo unit -- expenses that the
Declaration aptly calls "Shared Costs."

A class of Unit Owners ("Dear", after the Lead Plaintiff) filed the
action in Florida state court, and Q Club successfully removed to
federal court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act.  Dear's
complaint asserted (1) that the Declaration doesn't permit Q Club
to "back charge" for costs incurred but not assessed and (2) that Q
Club's new methodology for determining Shared Costs includes items
that it shouldn't.  The first issue is called the "back-charging"
question and the second is the "Shared Costs" question.

The litigation commenced soon after Q Club announced that it would
change the methodology that it uses to calculate these Shared
Costs.  The new methodology, Q Club explained, would apply not only
on a going-forward basis but also retroactively.  That meant, in
effect, that the owners would be re-billed for assessments that
they had paid (or as Q Club sees it, underpaid) in years past.

The owners' complaint alleged that Q Club's new methodology
breached the Declaration as applied both retroactively and
prospectively.  The district court agreed with the first
contention, but a jury disagreed with the second.  The parties now
appeal the respective judgments against them.  The owners
separately argue that the district court erred by denying their
request for a new trial based on what they say constitutes newly
discovered evidence that could have swayed the jury on the
prospective-application question.

From how they are initially "imposed" to the way they can be
"revised," it's clear to Judge Newsom that a given year's "annual
charges" may not be retroactively changed in future years.  Rather,
when the Declaration speaks of "revised" annual charges, it
contemplates that the revisions will occur within the year that the
costs are incurred.  This reading, he thinks, is faithful not only
to isolated snippets of the Declaration's text, but also to Section
12 when considered as a whole.

Because neither the "annual charge" nor "other charge" heading fits
the bill, the Judge concludes that the district court correctly
held that the Declaration doesn't permit the sort of back-charging
that Q Club advocates.  Q Club complains that the Court's reading
renders the agreement, "illogical, unjust, and unfair."  But it's
"not the function of the courts to rewrite a contract or interfere
with the freedom of contract or substitute their judgment for that
of the parties thereto in order to relieve one of the parties from
the apparent hardship of an improvident bargain."  The Judge
declines to stretch the Declaration's language in an effort to
relieve Q Club of the "hardship" that stems from what appears to
have been its own miscalculation.

The Judge turns, then, to Dear's cross-appeal.  Dear contends that
the district court erred by submitting the Shared Costs issue to
the jury.  Alternatively, he says that even if it was proper to
leave some interpretive matters to the jury, the court should have
better guided the jury's decision-making process by giving a few
additional jury instructions.  And finally, Dear asserts that he
discovered new evidence after the trial that entitles him to a new
trial.

The Judge finds no reversible error.  First, Dear hasn't
established that the district court's failure to give the
instruction "resulted in prejudicial harm."  He hasn't, that is,
explained why, but for this failure, the jury could have come out
the other way -- let alone why he is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.  Second, it's difficult to see how Dear could have
been prejudiced by the district court's instruction.  The question
whether the Declaration permits Q Club to apply its methodology
retroactively simply has no bearing on whether the methodology is
legitimate in the first place.

Finally, the district court was well within its discretion to deny
Dear's motion for a new trial.  The  new evidence wouldn't
"probably produce a different result" at a new trial.  What
Williams said in 2010 has no bearing on -- and certainly doesn't
contradict -- Pagliery's testimony, which described Q Club's
practice after it changed its methodology in 2013.

To recap, Judge Newsom holds (1) that the district court properly
concluded that the Declaration doesn't permit back-charging, (2)
that the district court didn't reversibly err in submitting the
Shared Costs issue to the jury or in the way that it instructed the
jury, and (3) that Dear hasn't met his burden for requesting a new
trial because the "new" evidence wouldn't likely produce a
different result.  Accordingly, he affirmed across the board.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 9, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/mqNmYU from Leagle.com.

Mark S. Fistos -- mark@pathtojustice.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.

Douglas C. Broeker, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Howard S. Marks, for Defendant-Appellant.

Ronald Pena -- rpena@hinshawlaw.com -- for Defendant-Appellant.

Robert A. Sweetapple -- pleadings@sweetapplelaw.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.

Steven R. Jaffe -- steve@pathtojustice.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.

Matthew Douglas Weissing -- matt@pathtojustice.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.

Laurence Litow, for Defendant-Appellant.

Eddie Travis Ramey, for Defendant-Appellant.


RADIANT LOGISTICS: Dismissal of Barahona Class Suit Under Appeal
----------------------------------------------------------------
Radiant Logistics, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on September 12, 2019, for
the fiscal year ended June 30, 2019, that a notice of appeal has
been filed from a court decision in the class action suit entitled,
Ingrid Barahona v. Accountabilities, Inc. d/b/a/ Accountabilities
Staffing, Inc., Radiant Global Logistics, Inc. and DBA Distribution
Services, Inc.

On October 25, 2013, plaintiff Ingrid Barahona filed a purported
class action lawsuit in the Superior Court of the State of
California against Radiant Global Logistics, Inc. ("RGL") and DBA
Distribution Services, Inc. ("DBA", a wholly-owned subsidiary)
(collectively referred to as the "Company"), and two third-party
staffing companies (collectively with the Company, the "Staffing
Defendants") with whom RGL and DBA contracted for temporary
employees.

In the lawsuit, Ms. Barahona, on behalf of herself and the putative
class, sought damages and penalties under California law, plus
interest, attorneys' fees, and costs, along with equitable
remedies, alleging that she and the putative class were the subject
of unfair and unlawful business practices, including certain wage
and hour violations relating to, among others, failure to provide
meal and rest periods, failure to pay minimum wages and overtime,
and failure to reimburse employees for work-related expenses.

Ms. Barahona alleged that she was jointly employed by the staffing
companies and RGL and DBA. RGL and DBA denied Ms. Barahona's
allegations in their entirety, denied that they were liable to Ms.
Barahona or the putative class members in any way, and vigorously
defended against these allegations based upon a preliminary
evaluation of applicable records and legal standards. If Ms.
Barahona were to prevail on her allegations on substantially all
claims against the Company, the Company could be liable for
uninsured damages in an amount that, while not significant when
evaluated against either the Company's assets or current and
expected level of annual earnings, could be material when judged
against the Company's earnings in the particular quarter in which
any such damages arose, if at all.

On February 19, 2019, the Company filed a Motion to Dismiss the
class action case, which the court granted on March 14, 2019, and
subsequently entered judgment in favor of the Company on April 30,
2019.

On May 15, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal, seeking
appellate review. The trial judge's decision to dismiss the case
and enter judgment in favor of the Company will be reviewed by the
Second District Court of Appeal for the State of California.

Radiant Logistics said, "To date, however, the Court of Appeal has
not issued an appellate briefing schedule. At this time, the
Company is unable to express an opinion as to the likely outcome of
the matter."

Radiant Logistics, Inc. operates as a third-party logistics and
multi-modal transportation services company primarily in the United
States and Canada. Radiant Logistics, Inc. was founded in 2001 and
is headquartered in Bellevue, Washington.


RENSSELAER POLYTECHNIC: Court Dismisses Workers' Parking Cost Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court, Albany County issued an Opinion granting
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned
JESSICA O. OTITIGBE, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF and ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiff, v. RENSSELAER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE,
Defendant. 904767-18 (Sup. Ct., Albany County).

Plaintiff Jessica O. Otitigbe is a former employee of defendant
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI). She commenced this putative
class-action lawsuit on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated on the basis of allegations that RPI violated Labor Law
Section 193 by wrongfully deducting the cost of parking from
employees' wages.  

RPI argues principally that its parking program complies with Labor
Law Section 193(1)(a) and (2) because the program is an employer
sponsored pre-tax contribution plan approved by the IRS that is
administered in compliance with applicable rules and regulations.
Thus, RPI contends that it need not demonstrate compliance with
Labor Law Section 193(1)(b). In any event, RPI maintains that the
challenged deductions also are authorized under Labor Law Section
193(1)(b) as discounted parking and/or payments for the benefit of
employees.

The proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima facie
showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering
sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material
issues of fact and the failure to make such a showing requires a
denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing
papers. If this showing has been made, the burden shifts to the
party opposing the motion to produce evidentiary proof in
admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material
issues of fact which require a trial of the action.  

RPI's principal argument in support of summary judgment is that its
parking program complies with Labor Law Section 193(1)(a) and (2)
because the challenged deductions are made in accordance with an
employer sponsored pre-tax contribution plan approved by the IRS.

Legal Framework

Labor Law Section 193(1)(a) allows wage deductions made in
accordance with the provisions of any law or any rule or regulation
issued by any governmental agency.

Labor Law Section 193(2) further provides that deductions made in
conjunction with an employer sponsored pre-tax contribution plan
approved by the IRS, shall be considered to have been made in
accordance with Labor Law Section 193(1)(a). Thus, an
employer-sponsored pre-tax contribution plan is a permitted wage
deduction under Labor Law Section 193, so long as the deductions
are made in accordance with an IRS-approved plan.

Under IRC Section 61(a)(1), gross income ordinarily includes the
fringe benefits received by an employee, but other provisions of
the IRC may exclude a particular fringe benefit. As is relevant
here, IRC Section 132(a)(5) excludes from gross income any fringe
benefit that is a qualified transportation fringe (QTF).

RPI's Proof

Through the affidavit of its parking representative, RPI has shown
that it owns 12 parking lots on its main campus that are designated
for faculty and staff parking. This constitutes parking provided by
an employer within the meaning of IRC Section 132(f)(5)(C).
Further, because RPI allows employees to reduce their stated
compensation to defray the cost of this parking and such amount is
not included in the employee's gross income for federal tax
purposes, the QTF benefit is provided in the form of salary
reduction.

Since RPI offers its parking program through a salary reduction
arrangement, there must be an election by the employee in writing
or some other permanent form. In this regard, RPI's parking
representative avers that employees who wish to use the payroll
reduction option are required to fill out an authorization form,
which sets forth the amount to be reduced from the employee's
salary and the date of election. RPI also submits what it claims to
be plaintiff's signed Parking Permit Application (Application),
dated August 19, 2005, in which plaintiff authorized a payroll
deduction of $125 per year for parking. In addition, as permitted
by the, RPI maintains an AutoRenew provision, also referenced on
the Application, by which employees elect to renew the payroll
deduction on an annual basis without having to sign a new
authorization, so long as the employee is provided timely notice of
any changes to the program.

Plaintiff's Opposition

In opposing the motion, plaintiff initially contends that IRC
Section 132 does not authorize wage deductions for parking fees.
According to plaintiff, RPI conflates the concept of a deduction
from wages with the concept of an exclusion from gross income.
However, Labor Law Section 193(1)(a) and (2) do not require a
specific law, rule or regulation that authorizes wage deductions,
rather, the statute allows wage deductions made in accordance with
the provisions of any law, rule or regulation including the
Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Department regulations.

Relatedly, plaintiff argues that RPI's parking program cannot
qualify as a fringe benefit because a fringe benefit is a form of
pay for the performance of services. To this end, plaintiff asserts
that IRC Section 132 clearly concerns the situation where the
employer either provides additional pre-tax compensation to reduce
the employee's commuting costs or facilitates the employee setting
aside a portion of their pre-tax salary to pay a third party for
qualified parking.

Nor is plaintiff's reading of the statute supported by the 2010 IRS
Information Letter, which provides, in relevant part: In a salary
reduction arrangement, the employee is allowed to designate a
portion of the amount he or she would otherwise receive as salary
to be set aside to fund QTF benefits that he or she then receives
from the employer. Moreover, in footnote 2, the IRS letter states:
Although the Court believe it is outside the scope of the inquiry,
the Court do note that it is also possible for employers to provide
employees with qualified parking in kind.

These contentions are without merit. Plaintiff was not mandated to
drive her vehicle to work or park it in an RPI-owned lot in close
proximity to her workplace. She could have chosen to use on-street
metered parking, purchase a municipal parking permit from the City
of Troy, or commute to work via other means. Instead, plaintiff
affirmatively elected to purchase a permit from RPI that allowed
her the privilege of parking in an on-campus lot that was
convenient to her assigned workplace.

And regardless of the way that the parking program was described,
the fact remains that plaintiff signed an Application authorizing
RPI to deduct $125 per year from her wages to pay for on-campus
parking.  

The regulation does not state or imply that parking is considered
to be provided by an employer only where the same parking is made
available to non-employees. As the IRS has observed, the value of
employer-provided parking may be based on the cost that an
individual would incur in an arm's-length transaction for a space
in the same lot or a comparable lot in the same general location
under the same or similar circumstances.

Finally, the Court is not convinced by plaintiff's reliance on a
2010 Department of Labor opinion. The opinion was written in
response to an inquiry as to the permissibility of wage deductions
for the payment of parking garage fees under Labor Law Section 193
in circumstances where the cost of the parking would be split
equally between the employer and the employee.

The Court concludes that RPI has established as a matter of law
that the deductions from plaintiff's wages for on-campus parking
were made in accordance with the provisions of an
employer-sponsored pre-tax contribution plan approved by the IRS.
As such, the deductions were made in compliance with Labor Law
Section 193(1)(a) and (2).

For this reason, plaintiff's Complaint must be dismissed.

Labor Law 193 Section (1)(b)

As an independent ground for dismissal of the Complaint, RPI argues
that its parking program complies with Labor Law Section 193(1)(b).


Under the cited statute, an employer may deduct a portion of an
employee's wage where the deduction is expressly authorized in
writing by the employee and is for the benefit of the employee,
provided that such authorization is voluntary and only given
following receipt by the employee of written notice of all terms
and conditions of the payment and/or its benefits and the details
of the manner in which deductions will be made.

In support of its motion, RPI submits proof that the challenged
wage deductions are for discounted parking, inasmuch plaintiff
never paid more than $10.42 per month for parking ($11.25 beginning
in July 2007), whereas comparable parking in the area ranges from
$1 per hour for metered on-street parking to approximately $60 per
month for municipal parking.  

RPI also offers proof that its parking program provides a direct
benefit to employees even beyond the discounted price.
Specifically, the program allows parking expenses to be defrayed
through the use of pre-tax dollars, thereby enabling the employees
to save federal, state and FICA taxes.

In opposition, plaintiff takes issue with the authenticity of the
Parking Permit Application proffered by RPI. However, plaintiff
does not specifically deny filling out the Application. Nor does
plaintiff claim that the signature on the Application is not hers.
Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to squarely controvert RPI's
assertion, made through its long-time parking manager, that the
Application is a true and accurate representation of plaintiff's
parking permit application that was made and kept by RPI in the
regular course of business.

Relatedly, plaintiff argues that any parking authorization that she
gave to RPI was not voluntary, because employees cannot park in an
RPI-owned parking lot unless they purchase an parking permit. As
stated above, however, plaintiff was not required to park in one of
RPI's on-campus lots as a condition of her employment. Plaintiff
was free to utilize on-street parking, a municipal lot, other
private lots or use an alternative means of transportation.
Plaintiff freely and voluntarily chose the convenience of parking
on campus in proximity to her workplace.

RPI was not required to provide on-campus parking for its
employees, much less offer them discounted parking. Nor was RPI
obliged to allow employees to defray the cost of parking through
the use of pre-tax dollars. Clearly, RPI accorded its employees the
benefit of using pre-tax dollars to pay the discounted cost of
parking.

Moreover, while plaintiff claims the parking fees are used to
defray RPI's administrative costs, she admits, and submits proof,
that RPI used the collected fees to maintain existing lots, build a
parking garage, and operate the free shuttle service used by
employees.

Finally, pertinent DOL regulations confirm that employers are not
precluded from making deductions in all cases where there is a
benefit to the employer. Employers may make deductions for the sale
of their own goods and services to their employees at a discounted
rate as long as the deduction is in compliance with section 193 of
the Labor Law and this Part.

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that plaintiff has
failed to raise a triable issue of fact in response to this branch
of RPI's motion. Accordingly, the Court concludes that RPI's
parking program independently complies with Labor Law Sction
193(1)(b).

Public Policy Considerations

Finally, the Court deems it appropriate to briefly address
plaintiff's public policy argument that allowing such unlimited,
self-serving wage deductions by employers could place all New York
State employees in an untenable position wherein they would be
forced to choose between giving a portion of their hard-earned
wages back to their employer in order to park near their workplace,
or be forced to find public parking.

There is, of course, no right to free, employer-provided parking.
The Labor Law does not prohibit employees from being charged for
parking on the employers' premises or require employers to provide
discounted parking. At bottom, plaintiff wanted the convenience
associated with parking on-campus in close proximity to her
workplace, but now, almost 15 years after she agreed to participate
in the wage deduction program, she seeks to avoid the very modest
financial consequence of her choice.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted and plaintiff's
complaint is dismissed.

A full-text copy of the Supreme Court's September 12, 2019 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3kog7o7 from Leagle.com.

Girvin & Ferlazzo, P.C., (Scott P. Quesnel, of counsel), 20
Corporate Woods Boulevard, Albany, New York 12211, Attorneys for
Plaintiff.

Pattison, Sampson, Ginsberg & Griffin, PLLC, ( Rhiannon I. Spencer
, of counsel), 22 First Street, P.O. Box 208, Troy, New York
12181-0208, Attorneys for Defendant.


RESTAURANT MGT: McDonald's Franchisee Sued Over Sick Leave Law
--------------------------------------------------------------
Cook County Record reports that a new class action is attempting to
fry a McDonald's franchisee for allegedly violating the city's
three-year-old paid sick leave law.

On Sept. 10, lawyer Christopher J. Williams, Esq. of the National
Legal Advocacy Network, of Chicago, filed suit in Cook County
Circuit Court against Restaurant Management Corporation (RMC). The
Indiana-based company operates fast food restaurants and other
eateries in Indiana and the Chicago area, including McDonald's
restaurants in the city of Chicago.

The lawsuit was filed on behalf of named plaintiff Hermelinda
Lopez, but the lawsuit asks the court to expand the action to
include a class of all others who work at RMC-owned McDonald's
restaurants in Chicago.

According to the complaint, RMC has violated the rights of Lopez
and other workers under the city's Earned Sick Leave Ordinance.

Approved by the Chicago City Council in 2016, the ordinance, which
took effect in July 2017, requires employers to provide most
workers with at least one hour of paid sick time off for every 40
hours worked. The paid sick leave can be used by the employee
either for their own illness or for a family member's needs.

The ordinance also forbids employers from denying sick leave
requests or taking any kind of action against employees for using
their paid sick time off.

Further, the ordinance requires employers to keep employees
informed of their rights under the ordinance and to let workers
know how many paid sick leave hours available to them.

However, in this case, the plaintiffs asserted RMC allegedly
violated the ordinance in multiple ways. According to the
complaint, managers at Lopez's restaurant refused to pay Lopez for
a day off to take her son to the emergency room for a broken ankle
or for time off to care for her sick daughter. The complaint also
said managers initially did not honor her request for paid sick
leave when she said she was too sick to work.

The complaint further accuses RMC managers of requiring employees
to produce a note from a doctor when they take paid sick time. If
they do not, the complaint asserts employees are told they could be
suspended for three days.

The complaint asserts the alleged policies "have unlawfully
stripped" workers of their paid sick leave, under the city
ordinance, and of "their right to be able to take care of
themselves and their family members in a time of need."

The complaint asks the court to order RMC to pay "liquidated
monetary damages" for each alleged violation of the ordinance, plus
attorney fees. [GN]



REXALL SUNDOWN: Nielsen's Protective Order Bid in Seegert Nixed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SANDRA SEEGERT, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. REXALL SUNDOWN, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-01243-JAH (JLB) (S.D. Cal.), Magistrate
Judge Jill K. Burkhardt of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California denied non-party The Nielsen Co. (U.S.),
LLC's motion for protective order.

On June 19, 2017, Plaintiff Seegert filed a class action complaint
against Defendant Rexall in connection with its "Osteo Bi-Flex"
joint health products.  On Dec. 29, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a
First Amended Complaint ("FAC").  In her FAC, the Plaintiff alleges
that the Defendant engages in false and misleading advertising of
four Osteo Bi-Flex dietary supplements.  She further alleges that
the falsely claims that the products provide meaningful joint
health benefits.

On Feb. 20, 2017, the Plaintiff purchased one of the Defendant's
products, Osteo Bi-Flex Triple Strength, in reliance on the
product's advertising.  She alleges the product could not provide
the promised benefits and, as a result of her purchase, she
"suffered injury in fact and lost money."

The Plaintiff brings the following claims against the Defendant:
(1) violation of California's Unfair Competition Law; and (2)
violation of California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act.  She brings
each claim on behalf of herself and the following putative class:
all persons who purchased in the state of California any of the
Osteo Bi-Flex products for personal use between Jan. 19, 2016, and
the date notice is disseminated.  The Plaintiff seeks restitution
and disgorgement of all profits and unjust enrichment, as well as
actual and punitive damages.

The Plaintiff claims that Defendant manufactures and sells its
Osteo Bi-Flex products to retailers directly and through
wholesalers, who in turn sell the products to retail consumers.
She further claims that Defendant carefully tracks the retail sales
of its products in the ordinary course of business and gathers
granular retail sales data from two types of sources.  The first
source is large retailers.  The second is Nielsen, the primary
company in the United States that gathers this type of data for
nearly all large consumer goods manufacturers.  The Plaintiff
contends that this data is crucial to the Defendant's marketing,
sales, inventory, and other business decisions, and is needed by
the Plaintiff to to calculate damages and restitution, evaluate the
case for settlement, and demonstrate at the class certification
stage that relief can be determined on a class wide basis.

On Jan. 11, 2019, the Plaintiff moved to compel further responses
to the following discovery requests she served on the Defendant:
(1) Subject Matter No. 15 in her Rule 30(b)(6) Notice; (2) Document
Request No. 5 served in connection with her Rule 30(b)(6) Notice;
(3) Requests for Production Nos. 37 and 52; and (4) Interrogatories
Nos. 8-10.

Specifically related to Nielsen, the Plaintiff requested testimony
regarding the data the Defendant possesses relating to the "retail
sales of Osteo Bi-Flex," including data obtained from Nielsen.  The
Plaintiff also requested: (1) documents sufficient to show the
"total wholesale and retail sales of each of the Osteo Bi-Flex
products, including each count variation thereof, in California
between January 19, 2016 and the present"; (2) "all documents
evidencing or summarizing the retail sales of Osteo Bi-Flex,
including but not limited to syndicated vendor consumption data
(e.g., Nielsen)"; and (3) "all documents which reflect, summarize,
analyze or discuss the pricing of Osteo Bi-Flex, including
wholesale or retail prices."  In addition, the Plaintiff sought by
way of interrogatory the total retail sales, the total number sold,
and the average retail prices for each of the Osteo Bi-Flex
products, including each count variation thereof, in California.

The Defendant objected to each of these requests on several grounds
including, inter alia, that the retailer sales information that
Plaintiff sought is not within its possession, custody, or control.
Defendant conceded, however, that it has possession of the
requested Nielsen information.

The Defendant also objected to the document requests to the extent
they call for documents or information owned by third-parties and
protected by a third-party confidentiality agreement.  It has a
license to access Nielsen's data collections pursuant to a
contract, which contains a confidentiality provision.  The
Plaintiff attached a redacted version of this contract to her
motion to compel.

After analyzing the limited data before it at the time, the Court
granted the Plaintiff's motion to compel as to the Nielsen data,
but gave Nielsen an opportunity to move for a protective order in
the matter prior to production.  On April 11, 2019, Nielsen availed
itself of that opportunity and filed the pending motion for
protective order.  On May 13, 2019, the Court held a hearing on the
motion and ordered supplemental briefing.  In accordance with the
order, the parties filed supplemental briefing in a timely manner.


In seeking a protective order, Nielsen states that its reports,
studies, analyses and data are its commercial product, its
stock-in-trade.  It contends that its reports and information have
substantial commercial value, and their analysis and production
require the service of skilled professionals.  It attaches and
cites to several unpublished cases which purport to apply settled
law prohibiting litigants from conscripting an unretained expert
such as Nielsen to provide expert market research testimony in the
case, against the company's will, and contrary to Nielsen's own
commercial interests.

Judge Burkhardt is not persuaded that the authority cited by
Nielsen supports the proposition that the Plaintiff cannot obtain
the Defendant's business records from the Defendant because those
records were generated by Nielsen before being licensed to the
Defendant.  She is similarly unpersuaded by Nielsen's analogies to
the Plaintiff who tried to use a subpoena to obtain investigation
and testing documents from Consumer Reports, In re Consumers Union
of United States, Inc., and to the parties who tried to use
subpoenas to obtain a professor's research on SUV rollover
accidents, In re Snyder, in order to avoid retaining experts.

The Judge holds that Nielsen provided something of value to the
Defendant -- which the Defendant paid for -- and which the
Defendant is now compelled through the discovery process to provide
to the Plaintiff subject to a protective order.  This is not the
same as a "stranger" to the lawsuit being subpoenaed to produce the
product of independent and unrelated research for which the third
party has not been and will not be compensated.

Nielsen suggests that the Plaintiff should retain her own expert to
determine the number of Osteo B-Flex products sold and the price of
each of those products at the time of sale.  However, the
information before the Court suggests that this would not be
possible, as the majority of retailers do not retain complete
information.  In fact, Costco is the only retailer or wholesaler
identified by Plaintiff that provides complete information.
Therefore, the Nielsen data is the best information available.
Whether that information is sufficient for purposes of calculating
damages is not for the Court to decide.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Burkhardt denied Nielsen's motion
for a protective order precluding the Defendant from disclosing in
discovery the confidential Nielsen data or reports licensed to it.
Accordingly, no later than five court days from the date of the
Order, the Defendant will (1) produce the documents requested by
the Plaintiff with respect to Nielsen, and (2) supplement its
response to the Plaintiff's Interrogatories Nos. 8-10 with
information obtained from Nielsen.

As noted, nothing in the Order precludes Nielsen or the Defendant
from designating the information as "Confidential" or "Highly
Confidential" pursuant to the terms of the existing Protective
Order, or the parties from jointly moving to modify the existing
Protective Order to specifically address the Nielsen information.
Nor does the Order preclude the parties from entering stipulations
reasonably acceptable to Nielsen.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 9, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/9WNHZS from Leagle.com.

Sandra Seegert, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas Joseph O'Reardon, II --
toreardon@bholaw.com -- Blood Hurst & O'Reardon, LLP, Timothy G.
Blood -- tblood@bholaw.com -- Blood Hurst & O'Reardon, LLP & Todd
D. Carpenter -- tcarpenter@carlsonlynch.com -- Carlson Lynch Sweet
Kilpela & Carpenter, LLP.

Rexall Sundown, Inc., Defendant, represented by Adriane K. Peralta
-- ADRIANE.PERALTA@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP & Amy Pesapane
Lally -- ALALLY@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP.

Rexall Sundown, Inc., Defendant, represented by Adriane K. Peralta
-- ADRIANE.PERALTA@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP & Amy Pesapane
Lally -- ALALLY@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP.


RODENBURG LLP: 8th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Carroll FDCA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the case, Monty G. Carroll, Jr., on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated; Lawrence D.
Smith, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Rodenburg LLP, Defendant-Appellee, Case
No. 18-3667 (8th Cir.).

Monty Carroll and Smith appeal the district court's dismissal of
their purported class action brought under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.  Having carefully reviewed the record and the
parties' arguments on appeal, the Court concludes that the district
court properly dismissed the complaint.  Accordingly, the judgment
is affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 14, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/8iwDd7 from Leagle.com.

Clifton Rodenburg, for Defendant-Appellee.

Eeva Wendorf, for Defendant-Appellee.

Bradley R. Armstrong, for Defendant-Appellee.

Michael S. Poncin -- Mike.Poncin@lawmoss.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Jesse Stine Johnson -- jjohnson@gdrlawfirm.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

James Lee Davidson, for Plaintiff-Appellant.


SAFELITE FULFILLMENT: Court Stays M. Young Suit
------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, issued an Order granting Parties' Stipulated
Motion Staying Case Pending Washington Supreme Court's Resolution
of Certified Question in Sampson v. Knight Transportation, Inc. in
the case captioned MARIO E. YOUNG, JR., Plaintiff, v. SAFELITE
FULFILLMENT, INC., et al., Defendants. Case No. 2:19-cv-01027-JLR.
(W.D. Wash.).

This matter came before the Court on the parties' Stipulated Motion
Staying Case Pending Washington Supreme Court's Resolution of
Certified Question in Sampson v. Knight Transportation, Inc.

Plaintiff filed the operative putative Class Action Complaint for
Unpaid and Wrongfully Withheld Wages.

The dates set forth in the Court's Rule 16(B) and Rule 23(D)(2)
Scheduling Order Regarding Class Certification Motion, and all
other deadlines currently set in this action be vacated, including
without limitation Plaintiff's deadline to complete discovery on
class certification and to move for class certification.

This action be stayed, in its entirety and for all purposes,
pending the Washington Supreme Court's decision on the certified
question in Sampson v. Knight Transportation, Inc., Wash. S.Ct.
Case No. 96264-2.

Within fourteen (14) days of the Washington Supreme Court's
decision in Sampson, the parties shall file a joint status report
with the Court that (1) informs the Court regarding that Court's
decision, (2) sets forth the parties' respective and/or collective
positions as to whether the stay should remain in effect, and (3)
provides the Court with agreed-upon and/or proposed deadlines for
[i] completion of discovery on class certification and for
Plaintiff to move for class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23;
and [ii] submission of an updated Joint Status Report and Discovery
Plan.

By entering into and submitting this Stipulated Motion, the parties
fully reserve, and do not waive or limit, their respective rights,
claims, remedies, defenses, and positions in this action, including
as to the issues recited above.

The dates set forth in the Court's Rule 16(B) and Rule 23(D)(2)
Scheduling Order Regarding Class Certification Motion and all other
deadlines currently set in this action shall be and hereby are
vacated, including without limitation Plaintiff's deadline to
complete discovery on class certification and to move for class
certification.

This action shall be and hereby is stayed, in its entirety and for
all purposes, pending the Washington Supreme Court's decision on
the certified question in Sampson v. Knight Transportation, Inc.,
Wash. S.Ct. Case No. 96264-2.

Within fourteen (14) days of the Washington Supreme Court's
decision in Sampson, the parties shall file a joint status report
with the Court that (1) informs the Court regarding that Court's
decision, (2) sets forth the parties' respective and/or collective
positions as to whether the stay should remain in effect, and (3)
provides the Court with agreed-upon and/or proposed deadlines for
[i] completion of discovery on class certification and for
Plaintiff to move for class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23;
and [ii] submission of an updated Joint Status Report and Discovery
Plan.

The parties' entering into and submission of this Stipulated Motion
is without waiver or limitation of their respective rights, claims,
remedies, defenses, and positions in this action, including as to
the issues recited therein.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 3, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3dr89jm from Leagle.com.

Mario E Young, Jr, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Brian Walter
Denlinger  - bd@ackermanntilajef.com - ACKERMANN & TILAJEF, P.C.,
Craig Ackermann -  cja@ackermanntilajef.com - ACKERMANN AND TILAJEF
PC & India Lin Bodien - india@indialinbodienlaw.com

Safelite Fulfillment Inc, a Delaware corporation, Defendant,
represented by Andrew C. Smith -
acsmith@vorys.com - VORYS SATER SEYMOUR & PEASE, pro hac vice,
Daniel J. Clark - djclark@vorys.com - VORYS SATER SEYMOUR & PEASE,
pro hac vice, Michael J. Shoenfelt - mjshoenfelt@vorys.com - VORYS
SATER SEYMOUR & PEASE, pro hac vice, Sheryl D.J. Willert-
swillert@williamskastner.com - WILLIAMS KASTNER & Jeffery M. Wells
- jwells@williamskastner.com - WILLIAMS KASTNER.


SANOFI SA: Hagens Berman Files Class Action Over Zantac Risks
-------------------------------------------------------------
Law firm urges Zantac users to find out their rights against drug
maker who knowingly sold potentially carcinogenic medication

A newly filed class-action lawsuit accuses international drug maker
Sanofi of intentionally concealing risks in its popular heartburn
medication, Zantac, which has been found to contain a carcinogenic
chemical at 26,000 times the FDA-approved limit, according to the
lawsuit filed by Hagens Berman.

The lawsuit, filed Sept. 13, 2019, in the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California accuses Sanofi and Boehringer
Ingelheim of knowingly manufacturing and selling over-the-counter
Zantac containing a concealed carcinogen to millions of people in
the U.S. suffering from heartburn and other gastrointestinal
issues, including sour stomach, acid reflux or gastroesophageal
reflux disease (GERD).

According to the complaint, Zantac contains the active ingredient
ranitidine. When ingested, ranitidine metabolizes into
N-nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA) which the FDA, EPA and World Health
Organization (WHO) classify as a carcinogen.

The FDA has established a permissible daily intake limit of 96ng of
NDMA, but recent testing using FDA-approved methods detected more
than 2,500,000ng of NDMA per 150mg tablet of Zantac. Each Zantac
tablet has been found to contain 26,000 times the FDA-approved
amount of NDMA that can be safely ingested daily.

"Millions of people in the U.S. suffer from heartburn, and for
years, Zantac has been sold to the masses as a safe and
easy-to-find remedy for that common ailment," said Steve Berman,
Esq. -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- managing partner of Hagens Berman and
attorney leading the case for consumers. "We're certain that if
those millions of consumers knew that the Zantac they take contains
known carcinogens, they would be rightfully outraged."

"Sanofi knew that Zantac contains a carcinogen, yet it chose to
conceal these risks to the public to line its own pockets," Berman
added.

Zantac was the first drug to total $1 billion in sales.

According to the lawsuit, "Zantac's unprecedented sales were
possible only because of a deception perpetrated by the drug's
manufacturers on consumers…"

What Big Pharma Knew About Zantac's Carcinogenic Risks

The dangers of NDMA have been publicly known for more than 40
years, according to the lawsuit, and the WHO has described NDMA as
"clearly carcinogenic." NDMA itself belongs to a family of
chemicals called N-nitrosamines, which the EPA refers to as "potent
carcinogens."

During the period that Sanofi and Boehringer manufactured and sold
Zantac, numerous scientific studies were published showing, among
other things, that ranitidine forms NDMA when placed in drinking
water, and that a person who consumes the drug has a 400‑fold
increase of NDMA concentration in their urine, according to the
lawsuit.

Attorneys say that despite the accumulating scientific evidence
showing Zantac exposed users to extremely high levels of NDMA,
neither Sanofi nor Boehringer disclosed this risk.

"Had Defendants disclosed that Zantac results in unsafe levels of
NDMA in the human body, no person, let alone a reasonable person,
would have purchased and consumed Zantac," the complaint states.

The lawsuit seeks to represent anyone who purchased
over-the-counter Zantac between Jan. 1, 2010 and the present.
Attorneys hope to secure repayment for those who purchased the
drug, as well as a permanent injunction from the court under the
Legal Remedies Act requiring the drug makers to either cease
selling Zantac or add a warning to the label.

The suit accuses Sanofi and Boehringer of violating state
consumer-protection laws in its failure to disclose the harmful
levels of NDMA in Zantac.

Both the U.S. FDA and European Commission recently announced that
they are also investigating Zantac and ranitidine for NDMA.

If you have concerns about any potential adverse health risks
associated with Zantac (or generic ranitidine consumption), Hagens
Berman recommends that you discuss the allegations in this lawsuit
with your physician.

Find out more about the class-action lawsuit against Sanofi for
cancer-causing compounds in Zantac.

About Hagens Berman

Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP is a consumer-rights class-action
law firm with nine offices across the country. The firm's tenacious
drive for plaintiffs' rights has earned it numerous national
accolades, awards and titles of "Most Feared Plaintiff's Firm," and
MVPs and Trailblazers of class-action law. More about the law firm
and its successes can be found at hbsslaw.com. Follow the firm for
updates and news at @ClassActionLaw. [GN]


SANTANDER CONSUMER: Court Dismisses J. Price FLSA Suit
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, Dallas Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting Defendant's Motion to Compel Individual Arbitration in the
case captioned JASON PRICE and CLINTON SHAW, Individually and on
Behalf of Those Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. SANTANDER
CONSUMER USA INC., Defendant. Civil Action No. 3:19-CV-0742-B.
(N.D. Tex.).

This is a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA). Plaintiffs Jason Price and Clinton Shaw allege that
Defendant Santander Consumer USA Inc. violated the FLSA by failing
to pay Plaintiffs, and those similarly situated, for overtime work.
Plaintiffs allege that, as Resolution Specialists, they were paid
by the hour, and they regularly worked more than forty hours per
week.  

Defendant moves the Court to compel individual arbitration and
dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice. Since the parties dispute both
the existence of an arbitration agreement and whether Plaintiffs
may proceed collectively, the Court will address: (1) whether to
compel arbitration of the claims (2) whether Plaintiffs must
arbitrate individually and (3) whether to dismiss or stay the
case.

Whether to Compel Arbitration of the Claims

To compel arbitration, a party must prove the existence of an
arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. And in
determining the contractual validity of an arbitration agreement,
courts apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the
formation of contracts. Under Texas law, there is "no presumption
in favor of arbitration when determining whether a valid
arbitration agreement exists. Rather, the party seeking to compel
arbitration must establish that the alleged agreement satisfies the
requisite elements of a binding contract.  

A binding contract requires (1) an offer; (2) an acceptance in
strict compliance with the terms of the offer; (3) a meeting of the
minds; (4) each party's consent to the terms and (5) execution and
delivery of the contract with intent that it be mutual and
binding.

To demonstrate the existence of a binding contract, Defendant
offered documentation of Defendant's Arbitration Policy (Policy).
The Policy, in relevant part, states:

The Company [Defendant] and the Associate agree to submit to
binding arbitration any dispute, claim, or controversy that may
arise between Associate and the Company arising out of or in
connection with the Company's business, the Associate's employment
with the Company, or the termination of Associate's employment with
the Company. This Arbitration Policy is intended to broadly cover
the entire relationship between Associate and Company.

Defendant also provided exhibits resembling web-pages
(Acknowledgment Exhibits), each of which contains headings titled
Training Details and Arbitration Policy.

In response, Plaintiffs contend that this evidence is insufficient
to demonstrate the existence of a valid contract, because the
evidence fails to show that Plaintiffs were made aware of the
Policy. Consequently, Plaintiffs suggest, Defendant failed to prove
an offer, acceptance, and meeting of the minds between Defendant
and Plaintiffs; therefore, Defendant did not demonstrate the
existence of a binding agreement.

The Court finds that Defendant has established, by a preponderance
of the evidence, the existence of an arbitration agreement. As a
preliminary matter, Penn's Declarations are based upon her personal
knowledge and comply with the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Accordingly, they are proper evidence for a motion to compel
arbitration. And because the Acknowledgment Exhibits qualify as
business records, they do not violate the rule against hearsay.  

Specifically, the Court concludes that the Acknowledgment Exhibits,
coupled with the Policy and Penn's Declarations, are sufficient to
establish the existence of a contract. Thus, the Court concludes
that there was a valid arbitration agreement between Defendant and
Plaintiffs.

Whether Plaintiffs Must Arbitrate Individually

Next, the Court considers whether Plaintiffs must arbitrate
individually or whether they may arbitrate collectively. The FAA
mandates that courts enforce arbitration agreements according to
their terms. In enforcing or construing an arbitration clause,
courts must give effect to the contractual rights and expectations
of the parties.  

Defendant contends that the Policy fails to address class or
collective proceedings; rather, it considers only bilateral
arbitration. For example, Defendant points out that the Policy
applies to claims that arise between Associate and the Company.
Further, Defendant suggests that there is no legally significant
difference between class actions and collective actions in the
arbitration context the same concerns underlying class-wide
arbitration apply in collective arbitration.  

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that the Policy contemplates
collective arbitration, because the Policy covers any dispute,
claim, or controversy that may arise between Associate and the
Company arising out of or in connection with the Company's
business. Since this language does not limit arbitrable claims to
those in connection with the Associate's employment, Plaintiffs
contend, the language is broad enough to encompass class and
collective actions. Additionally, Plaintiffs suggest that even if
the Policy is ambiguous regarding class and collective arbitration,
this ambiguity does not bar collective arbitration in the same way
that it would bar class-wide arbitration.  

Based on binding precedent, the Court rejects Plaintiffs' arguments
and finds that the Policy fails to evidence an agreement to
arbitrate class or collective actions. First, the language of the
Policy does not demonstrate the parties' agreement to arbitrate
class or collective claims: The text of the Policy makes no
reference to class or collective arbitration.  

Further, the Court finds that collective actions are
indistinguishable from class actions for arbitration purposes,
because many concerns inherent in class arbitration persist in
collective arbitration. Class arbitration involves the resolution
of the disputes of numerous individuals perhaps hundreds. Due to
these concerns, which arise in both class-wide and collective
arbitration, Defendant's Motion to Compel Individual Arbitration is
hereby GRANTED.

Whether to Dismiss or Stay the Case

Finding arbitration appropriate in this case, the Court next
considers whether to stay or dismiss the proceedings pending the
outcome of arbitration. The FAA provides that upon any issue
referable to arbitration under an agreement, the court shall stay
the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in
accordance with the terms of the agreement. Nonetheless, the weight
of authority clearly supports dismissal of the case when all of the
issues raised in the district court must be submitted to
arbitration.

Defendant seeks a dismissal with prejudice, pointing out that if
the Court compels arbitration, no other issues remain for the Court
to decide. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, seek a stay of the
proceedings. But if the Court dismisses the case, Plaintiffs desire
a dismissal without prejudice. Nevertheless, while they acknowledge
the Court's discretion to stay or dismiss the case, Plaintiffs have
not identified an issue that will remain after the Court compels
arbitration.

Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant's Motion to Compel
Individual Arbitration and dismisses the case with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 12, 2019
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y6m4qvtf from Leagle.com.

Jason Price & Clinton Shaw, Each Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Joshua Jon
Sanford , Sanford Law Firm, One Financial Center, 650 S.
Shackleford, Suite 411, Little Rock, Arkansas 72211 & Chris R.
Miltenberger , The Law Office of Chris R. Miltenberger PLLC, 1360
N. White Chapel, Suite 200, Southlake, Texas 76092

Santander Consumer USA Inc, Defendant, represented by Stefanie R.
Moll , Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Aimee Martika Raimer , Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius LLP & Thomas Cullen Wallace , Morgan Lewis &
Bockius LLP.


SCANA CORP: Bid to Vacate Voluntary Dismissal of Warren Suit Nixed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, City of Warren Police and Fire Retirement System,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. SCANA Corporation; Dominion Energy, Inc.; Sedona
Corp.; Jimmy E. Addision; Gregory E. Aliff; James A. Bennett; John
F.A.V. Cecil; Sharon A. Decker; D. Maybank Hagood; Lynne M. Miller;
James W. Roquemore; Macco K. Sloan; and Alfredo Trujillo,
Defendants, C/A No. 3:18-509-MBS (D. S.C.), Judge Margaret B.
Seymour of the U.S. District Court for the District of South
Carolina, Columbia Division, denied Dominion and Sedona's motion to
vacate the Plaintiff's notice of voluntary dismissal, which motion
was filed on Feb. 13, 2019.

SCANA and the South Carolina Public Service Authority ("Santee
Cooper") entered into an agreement with Westinghouse Electric Co.
in 2008 to construct two nuclear reactors at the V.C. Summer
Nuclear Generating Station in Jenkinsville, South Carolina.  The
project was abandoned in July 2017.

On Jan. 3, 2018, Dominion and SCANA entered into a merger agreement
by which SCANA would become a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dominion
through a merger with Sedona, an existing wholly-owned subsidiary
of Dominion.  Under the agreement SCANA stockholders would receive
0.6690 shares of Dominion stock in exchange for each outstanding
share of SCANA common stock.

On Jan. 23, 2018, Plaintiff City of Warren Police and Fire
Retirement System filed a stockholder class action complaint in the
Court of Common Pleas for the County of Lexington, South Carolina,
against SCANA; members of the Board of Directors and the Chief
Executive Officer; and Dominion and Sedona.  The Plaintiff alleged
causes of action against the Individual Defendants for breach of
fiduciary duties by executing a merger agreement with Dominion and
Sedona without regard to the effect of the proposed acquisition on
SCANA's stockholders, i.e., failing to take steps to maximize the
value to be received by stockholders, failing to properly value
SCANA, and ignoring or not protecting "against the numerous
conflicts of interest of senior management and the Board.  The
Plaintiff further alleged that SCANA, Dominion, and Sedona aided
and abetted the Individual Defendants in breaching their fiduciary
duties of loyalty, due care, independence, good faith, fair
dealing, and candor.

On Feb. 21, 2018, Dominion and Sedona removed the action pursuant
to the Class Action Fairness Act.  On March 14, 2018, the Plaintiff
filed a motion to remand, asserting that the complaint was not
subject to removal under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(9).

On June 27, 2018, the Court granted the Plaintiff's motion to
remand, concluding that its causes of action "concern" or "relate
to" the exception set forth in Sections 1332(d)(9)(C).  On Aug. 2,
2018, Dominion and Sedona informed the Court that the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had granted permission to appeal the
order remanding the case and had issued a briefing schedule.

Dominion and Sedona moved the Court to stay the remand order
pending appeal.  The Court granted the motion on Oct. 23, 2018.  

On Feb. 6, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary
dismissal without prejudice as to Dominion and Sedona.  On June 28,
2019, the Fourth Circuit reversed the Court's ruling remanding the
within action.  The Fourth Circuit issued its mandate on July 23,
2019.

The matter is now before the court on Dominion and Sedona's motion
to vacate the Plaintiff's notice of voluntary dismissal.  Dominion
and Sedona also contend that the notice of dismissal is not
effective because it purports to dismiss only two Defendants,
contrary to the plain language of Rule 41(a)(1)(A), which allows a
plaintiff to dismiss "an action" without court approval.   The
Plaintiff filed a response in opposition on Feb. 27, 2019, to which
Dominion and Sedona filed a reply on March 6, 2019.  

Judge Seymour holds that some courts have embraced the view that
the dismissal of all claims against less than all defendants should
be made under Rule 21, which provides that the court may, at any
time, on just terms, add or drop a party.  However, the sounder
view and the weight of judicial authority allow a plaintiff to
dismiss all claims against a defendant without dismissing the
entire controversy.

The Judge finds persuasive the observation that permitting a
plaintiff to dismiss fewer than all of the named defendants is
consistent with the purpose of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), which is to
permit a disengagement of the parties at the behest of the
plaintiff in the early stages of a suit, before the defendant has
expended time and effort in the preparation of his case.  Hence,
the notice of voluntary dismissal is effective as to Dominion and
Sedona.

For the reasons stated, Judge Seymour concludes that the Plaintiff
has the absolute right to file a notice of voluntary dismissal
pursuant Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i); and that the notice of voluntary
dismissal is effective as to Dominion and Sedona.  Accordingly,
Dominion and Sedona's motion to vacate is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 9, 2019 Order and Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/bvFmB2 from Leagle.com.

City of Warren Police and Fire Retirement System, Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similary Situated, Plaintiff, represented
by Daniel J. Ballou -- dan.ballou@mortongettys.com -- Morton and
Gettys, James M. Morton, Morton and Gettys, James Nathanial Pierce,
Morton and Gettys & David T. Wissbroecker --
DWissbroecker@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP,
pro hac vice.

SCANA Corporation, Gregory E Aliff, James A Bennett, John F.A.V.
Cecil, Sharon A Decker, D Maybank Hagood, Lynne M Miller, James W
Roquemore, Maceo K Sloan & Alfredo Trujillo, Defendants,
represented by Benjamin Palmer Carlton --
bcarlton@richardsonplowden.com -- Richardson Plowden and Robinson,
George Craig Johnson, Johnson Toal and Battiste, I.S. Leevy
Johnson, Johnson Toal and Battiste, Steven J. Pugh --
spugh@richardsonplowden.com -- Richardson Plowden and Robinson &
Michael R. Smith, King and Spalding, pro hac vice.

Dominion Energy Inc & Sedona Corp, Defendants, represented by
Andrew Addison Mathias -- AMathias@nexsenpruet.com -- Nexsen Pruet,
William W. Wilkins -- BWilkins@nexsenpruet.com -- Nexsen Pruet,
Brian E. Pumphrey -- bpumphrey@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods
LLP, pro hac vice & Brian D. Schmalzbach --
bschmalzbach@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, pro hac vice.

Jimmy E Addison, Defendant, represented by William Alexander Coates
-- wac@roecassidy.com -- Roe Cassidy Coates and Price, John Allen
Jordak, Jr., Alston and Bird LLP, pro hac vice, Meredith Jones
Kingsley, Alston and Bird LLP, pro hac vice & William R.
Mitchelson, Jr., Alston and Bird LLP, pro hac vice.


SIMMONS FIRST: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages Under FLSA, Clark Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CAROLYN CLARK, individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated v. SIMMONS FIRST NATIONAL CORPORATION, Case No.
5:19-cv-00284-BRW (E.D. Ark., Sept. 5, 2019), accuses the Defendant
of violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Arkansas Minimum
Wage Act, and the common law of Arkansas by failing to pay the
Plaintiff and others all overtime wages owed to them.

Simmons First National Corporation is a company doing business in
Arkansas at various locations, including in Pine Bluff, Arkansas.

Simmons First is a financial holding company, headquartered in Pine
Bluff, with total assets of approximately $17.9 billion as of June
30, 2019, conducting financial operations throughout Arkansas,
Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee and
Texas.  The Company, through its subsidiaries, offers comprehensive
financial solutions delivered with a client-centric approach.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin L. Swidler, Esq.
          Matthew D. Miller, Esq.
          Carley A. Doyle, Esq.
          SWARTZ SWIDLER, LLC
          1101 Kings Highway North, Suite. 402
          Cherry Hill, NJ 08034
          Telephone: (856) 685-7420
          Facsimile: (856) 685-7417
          E-mail: jswidler@swartz-legal.com
                  mmiller@swartz-legal.com
                  cdoyle@swartz-legal.com


SMARTPAY LEASING: Court Enters $11K Judgment in Esparza
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of
Judgment in the case captioned SHAWN ESPARZA, on behalf of herself,
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SMARTPAY LEASING,
INC., Defendant. No. C 17-03421 WHA. (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff filed a class action complaint seeking redress for
Anselmo's violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA). Plaintiff alleged that Anselmo violated the Sections
1692e, e(2), e(5), and e(10) of the FDCPA by falsely implying that
late charges can be assessed against Plaintiff's mortgage loan,
when in fact no such charges can be assessed as a matter of law.  

Discovery and Efforts to Resolve the Case

The parties issued discovery. Notably, Plaintiff asked Anselmo to
fully explain the factual basis for its Third Affirmative Defense.
Plaintiff found that Anselmo's original discovery answers were
deficient and thereafter Plaintiff prepared a lengthy Local Rule
37.2 email which resulted in Anselmo issuing supplemental answers.
Yet again, Anselmo's supplemental discovery answers were deficient
and Plaintiff sent a detailed Local Rule 37.2 email to Anselmo's
counsel.

This resulted in a second supplemental discovery response and a
third Local Rule 37.2 email to Anselmo's counsel. Anselmo's
30(b)(6) deponent clarified and offered to amend prior discovery
answers which resulted in Anselmo issuing a third supplemental
discovery response. This third supplemental discovery response
provided a detailed breakdown of the numbers of persons that it
alleged were susceptible to the previously asserted affirmative
defenses.

Plaintiff answered discovery and was deposed. Anselmo did not move
for summary judgment after the close of discovery.

Plaintiff crafted a class based demand based upon Anselmo's third
supplemental discovery responses. Plaintiff's class based demand
relied on well-recognized cases which have approved FDCPA class
settlements where a debt collector's net worth was modest or low.
Notably, Plaintiff's class based demand would have resulted in a
higher payout than those approved by other courts.

Anselmo made a counter-offer, but declined to make a class based
settlement offer. When Plaintiff offered to reduce its prior class
based settlement demand, Anselmo's counsel indicated that Anselmo
was not interested in classwide settlement.

Anselmo submitted an offer of judgment to Plaintiff in the amount
of $1,100.00, exclusive of attorney's fees and costs.  

Due to circumstances independent of the merits of the case,
Plaintiff accepted Anselmo's offer of judgment.  

By accepting the offer of judgment, Plaintiff became the prevailing
party, thus entitling him to his attorney's fees and costs pursuant
to Section 1692k(a)(3) of the FDCPA.  

In an effort to settle the attorney's fees and costs without going
through the lengthy and onerous fee petition process, Plaintiff
made a settlement demand to Anselmo (Plaintiff's Deman).

Despite zealously defending this case and causing Plaintiff to
incur significant attorney's fees, Anselmo rejected Plaintiff's
Demand and submitted a trifling counter-offer.

The entry of judgment against Anselmo is appropriate because Rule
68 operates automatically, requiring that the clerk shall enter
judgment' upon the filing of an offer, notice of acceptance, and
proof of service.

Based on the foregoing, the entry of judgment in Plaintiff's favor
and against Anselmo is warranted.

Enter a judgment against Anselmo in the amount of $1,100.00
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 68;b. Order Anselmo to submit the
payment of $1,100.00 in Plaintiff's name to Plaintiff's counsel
post haste; and c. Order the parties to comply with the procedures
set forth in Local Rule 54.3 with respect to Plaintiff's petition
for attorney's fees and costs.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 12, 2019 Order
is available at   https://tinyurl.com/y4phyasg from Leagle.com.

Shawn Esparza, on behalf of herself, and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Ronald A. Marron -
ron@consumersadvocates.com - Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron, APLC,
Alexis Marie Wood - alexis@consumersadvocates.com - Law Offices of
Ronald A. Marron, APLC & Kas Larene Gallucci -
kas@consumersadvocates.com - Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron.

Smartpay Leasing, Inc., Defendant, represented by Emily Lee
Wallerstein - emily.wallerstein@squirepb.com - Squire Patton Boggs
(US) LLP, Eric J. Troutman - eric.troutman@squirepb.com - Squire
Patton Boggs (US) LLP & Jeffrey A. Topor - jtopor@snllp.com -
Simmonds & Narita LLP.


SOUTHERN COMPANY: Appeals Class Cert. Order in Securities Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants The Southern Company, et al., filed an appeal from the
District Court's order entered on August 22, 2019, certifying a
class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in the lawsuit entitled MONROE COUNTY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM
AND ROOFERS LOCAL NO. 149 PENSION FUND, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF
OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED v. THE SOUTHERN COMPANY, THOMAS A.
FANNING, ART P. BEATTIE, EDWARD DAY, VI, G. EDISON HOLLAND, JR.,
JOHN C. HUGGINS, AND THOMAS O. ANDERSON, Case No.
1:17-cv-00241-WMR, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Sept. 9, 2019, the
District Court issued an Opinion and Order granting Plaintiffs'
Motion for Class Certification.

Roofers Local No. 149 Pension Fund and Monroe County Employees'
Retirement System, as putative class representatives, seek damages
for Defendants' alleged violations of Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder,
and Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.  The operative complaint in
this action is the Consolidated Complaint for Violations of the
Federal Securities Laws.

The Plaintiffs sought certification of a Class consisting of:

     All persons who purchased or otherwise acquired The Southern
     Company common stock between April 25, 2012 and October 30,
     2013, inclusive (the Class Period), and were damaged
     thereby.

The appellate case is captioned as MONROE COUNTY EMPLOYEES'
RETIREMENT SYSTEM AND ROOFERS LOCAL NO. 149 PENSION FUND,
INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Plaintiffs-Respondents v. THE SOUTHERN COMPANY, THOMAS A. FANNING,
ART P. BEATTIE, EDWARD DAY, VI, G. EDISON HOLLAND, JR., JOHN C.
HUGGINS, AND THOMAS O. ANDERSON, Defendants-Petitioners, Case No.
19-90015, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit.

The Defendants want the Appeals Court to determine whether:

   1. under Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund. Inc., 573
      U.S. 258, 280 (2014) ("Halliburton II") defendants can
      rebut the Basic presumption of classwide reliance with
      evidence that an alleged corrective disclosure had no
      statistically significant price impact; and

   2. under Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 35 (2013)
      plaintiffs seeking class certification under Rule 23(b)(3)
      must proffer a damages model tailored to their theory of
      liability to prove that damages are calculable on a
      classwide basis.[BN]

The Plaintiffs-Respondents are represented by:

          Daniel S. Drosman, Esq.
          Scott H. Saham, Esq.
          Darryl J. Alvarado, Esq.
          Austin P. Brane, Esq.
          Henry Rosen, Esq.
          Regis C. Worley, Jr., Esq.
          Hillary B. Stakem, Esq.
          Rachel A. Cocalis, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101-8498
          Telephone: (619) 231-1058
          Facsimile: (619) 231-7423
          E-mail: dand@rgrdlaw.com
                  scotts@rgrdlaw.com
                  dalvarado@rgrdlaw.com
                  abrane@rgrdlaw.com
                  henryr@rgrdlaw.com
                  rworley@rgrdlaw.com
                  hstakem@rgrdlaw.com
                  rcocalis@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          John C. Herman, Esq.
          HERMAN JONES LLP
          3424 Peachtree Rd., N.E., Suite 1650
          Atlanta, GA 30326
          Telephone: (404) 504-6500
          Facsimile: (404) 504-6501
          E-mail: jherman@hermanjones.com

               - and -

          Thomas C. Michaud, Esq.
          VANOVERBEKE MICHAUD & TIMMONY, P.C.
          79 Alfred Street
          Detroit, MI 48201
          Telephone: (313) 578-1200
          Facsimile: (313) 578-1201
          E-mail: tmichaud@vmtlaw.com

The Defendants-Petitioners are represented by:

          Shay Dvoretzky, Esq.
          JONES DAY
          51 Louisiana Ave., N.W.
          Washington, DC 20001-2113
          Telephone: (202) 879-3474
          E-mail: sdvoretzky@jonesday.com

               - and -

          Jason T. Burnette, Esq.
          Michael J. McConnell, Esq.
          Walter W. Davis, Esq.
          Ashley F. Heintz, Esq.
          Robert A. Watts, Esq.
          William E. Eye, Esq.
          JONES DAY
          1420 Peachtree St., N.E., Suite 800
          Atlanta, GA 30309-3053
          Telephone: (404) 521-3939
          E-mail: jtburnette@jonesday.com
                  mmcconnell@jonesday.com
                  wwdavis@jonesday.com
                  aheintz@jonesday.com
                  rwatts@jonesday.com
                  weye@jonesday.com


SPORTS RESEARCH: Protective Order in Capaci Suit Over Fraud Issued
------------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Frederick F. Mumm of the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California has issued a stipulated
protective order in the case, FRANK CAPACI and CYNTHIA FORD on
behalf of themselves, all others similarly situated, and the
general public, Plaintiffs, v. SPORTS RESEARCH CORPORATION, a
California Corporation. Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-03440-FMO-FFM
(C.D. Cal.).

The Order encompasses all confidential material that is designated
by a party or a third party as confidential information under the
Order, whether such disclosure is by order of the Court or any
court of competent jurisdiction, in response to questions in a
deposition, written interrogatories, requests for the production of
documents and other tangible things, requests for admission, or any
other discovery undertaken in this action. This Order is meant to
encompass all forms of disclosure that may contain confidential
material, including any document, pleading, motion, exhibit,
declaration, affidavit, deposition transcript, inspection and all
other tangible items (electronic media, photographs,
videocassettes, etc.).

The terms "document" or "documents" mean documents and writings,
and include, but are not limited to, records, exhibits, reports,
samples, transcripts, video or audio recordings, disks, affidavits,
briefs, summaries, notes, abstracts, drawings, company records and
reports, answers to interrogatories, responses to requests for
admissions, and motions, including copies or computer-stored
versions of any of the foregoing.

The Order governs how parties must handle the production of and use
of protected material that one party elects to produce to another
party or that one party is ordered by the Court to produce to
another party.  Further, the Order shall be without prejudice to
the right of any party to object to the admissibility into evidence
of any information or documents produced under the Order.

Within 60 days after the termination of the lawsuit, all
confidential material (including all copies) shall be returned to
the counsel for the designating party or destroyed.  In addition,
the counsel returning or destroying such material shall execute an
affidavit verifying that all confidential material produced to such
counsel and any subsequently made copies are being returned in
their entirety or destroyed in their entirety pursuant to the terms
of the Order.

Such a representation fully contemplates that the counsel returning
or destroying the materials has: (a) contacted all persons to whom
that counsel disseminated confidential material, and (b) confirmed
that all such material has been returned to disseminating counsel
or destroyed.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, the counsel for the
parties may retain a file copy of confidential material for as long
as may be required by the State Bar or the Rules of Professional
Responsibility, or as long as any other related litigation,
arbitration, or other proceeding is anticipated or pending,
whichever is longer.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 9, 2019 Protective Order is
available at https://is.gd/Ccauxb from Leagle.com.

Frank Capaci, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Lilach Halperin, Law Offices of
Ronald A Marron APLC, Michael T. Houchin, Law Office of Ronald
Marron & Ronald A. Marron, Law Offices of Ronald A Marron APLC.

Cynthia Ford, Plaintiff, represented by Ronald A. Marron --
ron@consumersadvocates.com -- Law Offices of Ronald A Marron APLC.

Sports Research Corporation, a California Corporation, Defendant,
represented by Norma V. Garcia -- ngarciaguillen@garciarainey.com
-- Garcia Rainey Blank and Bowerbank LLP & Jeffrey Michael Blank --
Jblank@garciarainey.com -- Garcia Rainey Blank and Bowerbank LLP.


ST. ANN, MO: Court Refuses Dismissal of Q. Thomas Suit
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum and Order denying
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned QUINTON M.
THOMAS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE CITY OF ST. ANN, Defendant. No.
4:16 CV 1302 RWS. (E.D. Mo.).

The City filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' second amended
complaint for failure to join an indispensable party under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 19.

Plaintiffs in this matter have filed a class action lawsuit
asserting claims against Defendant City of St. Ann (the City)
alleging constitutional violations arising from Plaintiffs' arrest
and incarceration as a result of their failure to pay fines for
municipal ordinance violations (Counts I-V). Plaintiffs seek
compensatory damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.

The City argues that Plaintiffs' constitutional challenges are
directed solely to the conduct of the St. Ann Municipal Court
(municipal court), which the City argues is a separate entity, and
that the municipal court is therefore required to be joined as a
codefendant under Rule 19(a).

But the City argues that joinder is not feasible because the
municipal court is an arm of the state under Missouri law and, as
such, entitled to sovereign immunity.

The City contends that because there is a potential for injury to
the interests of the municipal court and because the municipal
court is immune from suit, dismissal of the claims at issue is
required under Rule 19(b).  

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) permits dismissal of a
claim for failure to join a party under Rule 19. Joinder is
required when:

(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete
relief among existing parties; or(B) that person claims an interest
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that
disposing of the action in the person's absence may:(i) as a
practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect
the interest; or(ii) leave an existing party subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations because of the interest.

The Rule 19 inquiry is a highly-practical, fact-based endeavor and
courts are generally reluctant to grant motions to dismiss of this
type. A decision under Rule 19 not to decide a case otherwise
properly before the court is a power to be exercised only in rare
instances.

The Court concludes that the municipal court in St. Ann is not a
required party under Rule 19(a). Rule 19(a)(1)(A)'s condition that
a court be able to accord complete relief does not mean that every
type of relief sought must be available, only that meaningful
relief be available.

Here, the present litigation is able to accord meaningful relief to
Plaintiffs without joinder of the municipal court. Plaintiffs seek
money damages from the City, a declaration that the City violated
their constitutional rights, and an injunction enjoining the City
from enacting and enforcing its allegedly unlawful policies and
customs. This lawsuit may provide such relief to the extent that
Plaintiffs' claims prove to be viable and meritorious. The City's
argument that the municipal court, and not the City, caused the
alleged constitutional violations may be a reason to deny relief on
Plaintiffs' claims, but it does not support a finding under Rule
19(a)(1) that joinder of the municipal court is required.  

Likewise, under Rule 19(a)(1)(B), even assuming that the municipal
court has an interest relating to the subject of the action,
disposition of the action in the municipal court's absence will not
as a practical matter impair or impede the municipal court's
ability to protect its interest. In support of its argument to the
contrary, the City relies primarily on the Eighth Circuit's opinion
in Two Shields v. Wilkinson, 790 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2015). In that
case, the plaintiffs claimed that the named defendants induced an
absent sovereign, the United States, to breach its fiduciary duty
by approving leases for interests in land held in trust.  

In other words, in order to prevail on their claims against the
named defendants, the plaintiffs were required to prove that the
absent sovereign acted illegally. A judgment entered in the
sovereign's absence would thus potentially cloud the validity of
many of the land grants approved by the government. For this
reason, the Eighth Circuit found that the United States' ability to
protect its interest would be impaired or impeded by its absence
from the litigation.  

By contrast, here, none of Plaintiffs' claims requires a showing
that the municipal court acted illegally. Rather, for Plaintiffs to
succeed on their claims, they must demonstrate that the City acted
unlawfully. The City's motion must be denied. In light of the
extensive briefing submitted on these issues, oral argument is
unnecessary.

Accordingly, the Defendant's motion to dismiss Counts I through V
through VII, and motion for oral argument of the motion are both
denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 3, 2019 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/y4klvger from Leagle.com.

Quinton M. Thomas, Plaintiff, represented by Blake Alexander Strode
, ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, Michael-John Voss, ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, 440 N.
4th Street, Ste. 390, St. Louis, MO 63102, Samuel Zachary Fayne -
zachary.fayne@arnoldporter.com - ARNOLD AND PORTER, LLP, Thomas B.
Harvey - tharvey@archcitydefenders.org - ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, David
B. Bergman - david.bergman@arnoldporter.com - ARNOLD AND PORTER,
LLP, pro hac vice, John Robinson - john.robinson@arnoldporter.com -
ARNOLD AND PORTER, LLP, John McCann Waldron , ARCHCITY DEFENDERS,
440 N. 4th Street, Ste. 390, St. Louis, MO 63102, Seth Jason Wiener
, ARNOLD AND PORTER, LLP, pro hac vice & Sima Atri , ARCHCITY
DEFENDERS, 440 N. 4th Street, Ste. 390, St. Louis, MO 63102

Roelif Earl Carter, Bradley Jiles, Angela Davis, Meredith Walker,
Brittany Ellis, Donya Pierce, Mawoussime Adoboe & Veronica Murphy,
Plaintiffs, represented by Blake Alexander Strode , ARCHCITY
DEFENDERS, Michael-John Voss, ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, Samuel Zachary
Fayne , ARNOLD AND PORTER, LLP, Thomas B. Harvey , ADVANCEMENT
PROJECT, John Robinson , ARNOLD AND PORTER, LLP, John McCann
Waldron , ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, Seth Jason Wiener , ARNOLD AND
PORTER, LLP, pro hac vice & Sima Atri , ARCHCITY DEFENDERS.

City of St. Ann, Missouri, Defendant, represented by Blake Daniel
Hill , HELLMICH HILL LLC, John Michael Reeves, Jr. , HELLMICH HILL
LLC & William A. Hellmich , HELLMICH HILL LLC. 1049 NORTH CLAY
AVENUE, KIRKWOOD, MO 63122

Peter J. Dunne & Robert T. Plunkert, Movants, represented by
Maurice B. Graham , GRAY AND RITTER, P.C., 701 Market Street, Suite
800, St. Louis, MO 63101-1826


ST. CLOUD STATE UNIV: Seeks 8th Cir. Review of Ruling in Portz Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Minnesota State Colleges and Universities and St. Cloud
State University filed an appeal from a court ruling entered in the
lawsuit entitled Alexie Portz, et al. v. St. Cloud State
University, et al., Case No. 0:16-cv-01115-JRT, in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Minnesota.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Aug. 20, 2019, the
District Court issued an Order finding that both St. Cloud State
University's Past and Present Allocation of Athletic-Participation
Opportunities and Athletic Treatment and Benefits Do Not Comply
with Title IX.

The issues for trial included (1) whether SCSU's past allocation of
athletic participation opportunities and treatment and benefits was
inequitable in violation of Title IX and (2) whether SCSU's present
allocation of athletic participation opportunities and treatment
and benefits is inequitable in violation of Title IX.

The Plaintiffs brought this class action against Defendants St.
Cloud State University (SCSU) and Minnesota State Colleges and
Universities (MNSCU), alleging gender discrimination in SCSU's past
and present allocation of athletic opportunities and in SCSU's
treatment and allocation of benefits for its female
student-athletes in violation of Title IX of the Education
Amendments Act of 1972 (Title IX).

The Plaintiffs allege that SCSU violated Title IX in the past
(academic year 2015-16 and earlier). The Plaintiffs also allege
that SCSU is violating Title IX in the present (academic year
2016-17 to the present).

The appellate case is captioned as Alexie Portz, et al. v. St.
Cloud State University, et al., Case No. 19-2921, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript is due on or before October 16, 2019;

   -- Appendix is due on October 28, 2019;

   -- Brief of Appellants Minnesota State Colleges and
      Universities and St. Cloud State University is due on
      October 28, 2019;

   -- Appellee brief is due 30 days from the date the court
      issues the Notice of Docket Activity filing the brief of
      appellant; and

   -- Appellant reply brief is due 21 days from the date the
      court issues the Notice of Docket Activity filing the
      appellee brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees Alexie Portz, et al., are represented by:

          Tyler P. Brimmer, Esq.
          Adina R. Florea, Esq.
          Donald Chance Mark, Jr., Esq.
          FAFINSKI MARK & JOHNSON, PA
          775 Prairie Center Drive, Suite 400
          Eden Prairie, MN 55344-0000
          Telephone: (952) 995-9500
          E-mail: tyler.brimmer@fmjlaw.com
                  adina.florea@fmjlaw.com
                  donald.mark@fmjlaw.com

               - and -

          Sharon Van Dyck, Esq.
          VAN DYCK LAW FIRM
          310 Fourth Avenue, S., Suite 5010
          Minneapolis, MN 55415
          Telephone: (952) 746-1095

Defendants-Appellants St. Cloud State University and Minnesota
State Colleges and Universities are represented by:

          Kevin Andrew Finnerty, Esq.
          Ian M. Welsh, Esq.
          ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
          Bremer Tower
          445 Minnesota Street
          Saint Paul, MN 55101-2130
          Telephone: (651) 757-1058
          E-mail: kevin.finnerty@ag.state.mn.us
                  ian.welsh@ag.state.mn.us


STEVEN B. KATZ: Anderson Sues over Debt Collection Practices
------------------------------------------------------------
STEPHANIE ANDERSON, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. LAW OFFICE OF STEVEN B. KATZ,
P.A., Defendant, Case No. 0:19-cv-62188 (S.D. Fla., Aug. 31, 2019)
seeks to stop the Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to
collect a debt.

The Law Office of Steven B. Katz, P.A. is a law firm engaged as a
debt collection agency. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
          Thomas J. Patti, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI
          110 SE 6th Street, Suite 1744
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Tel: (954) 907-1136
          Fax: (855) 529-9540
          E-mail: jibrael@jibraellaw.com
                  tom@jibraellaw.com


STORM WATER: Taplin Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages and Damages
-------------------------------------------------------------
CHARLES TAPLIN, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. STORM WATER SOLUTIONS, LLC Defendant, Case No.
4:19-cv-03495 (S.D. Tex., Sept. 16, 2019) is a lawsuit seeking to
recover unpaid wages and overtime compensation, liquidated damages,
attorneys' fees, and costs.

Storm Water Solutions, LLC ("SWS") is a storm water pollution
prevention management and maintenance company doing business in
Texas. Plaintiffs Mr. Taplin worked for Defendant as a maintenance
worker.

The Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated the Fair Labor
Standards Act by forcing Plaintiff and similarly situated workers,
to work a substantial amount of overtime without properly paying
all compensation due, thus depriving them of rightful compensation
for their work that SWS is legally obligated to pay. Plaintiff
regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week and was damaged by
Defendant's illegal policies or practices, says the complaint.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Robert W. Cowan, Esq.
     Katie R. McGregor, Esq.
     BAILEY COWAN HECKAMAN PLLC
     5555 San Felipe St., Suite 900
     Houston, TX 77056
     Phone: 713-425-7100
     Fax: 713-425-7101
     Email: rcowan@bchlaw.com
            kmcgregor@bchlaw.com


STURM FOODS: Court Overrules $25MM Allocation Plan Objection
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois issued a Memorandum and Order overruling Defendants'
Objection to Settlement Allocation Plain in the case Captioned
LINDA SUCHANEK, RICHARD McMANUS, CAROL CARR, PAULA GLADSTONE, EDNA
AVAKIAN, CHARLES CARDILLO, BEN CAPPS, DEBORAH DIBENDETTO, and CAROL
RITCHIE, Plaintiffs, v. STURM FOODS, INC. and TREEHOUSE FOODS,
INC., Defendants. Case No. 3:11-CV-00565-NJR-RJD. (S.D. Ill.).

This consumer fraud class action has been pending since June 28,
2011. On the eve of trial, after eight years of litigation, the
parties agreed to settle the claims for $25 million, common fund,
with no reversion to Defendants. Unfortunately, the parties have
been unable to finalize the settlement agreement because of
disputes over distribution of the common fund and the language on
the claim forms.

Plaintiffs consist of consumers from eight states who purchased
Defendants' product Grove Square Coffee. Each state has its own
consumer fraud statute that calls for different damages.

PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED ALLOCATION PLAN

Plaintiffs propose the following allocation of the common fund:

Payments to Class Members shall be calculated by the Settlement
Administrator pursuant to the Plan of Allocation as follows: All
Class members will be required to submit a Claim Form which
requests the following information in box form: (1) approximate
date of purchase; (2) likely retailer where purchase was made; (3)
quantity of GSC that was purchased; and (4) total amount paid.
Alabama class members will receive a maximum of $100 per Claim Form
regardless of the number of units purchased; New York class members
will receive a maximum of $500 per Claim Form regardless of the
number of units purchased; Class members from the remaining six
states will receive a minimum of $25 per purchase, up to a maximum
of three purchases, for a maximum total of $75 per Claim Form.

DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS

Defendants object to Plaintiffs' proposed plan but assure they do
not seek to reduce the overall amount they agreed to pay. Nor do
they seek a reversion of any of that amount.

Nonetheless, Defendants argue Plaintiffs' plan: (1) creates a
disparity between the class members from New York and Alabama and
the class members from the remaining six states and (2) potentially
compensates non-class members and individuals who would provide no
release to Defendants in exchange for a portion of the fund.

Defendants state the parties agreed Defendants would pay 12.5% of
their potential exposure, and Plaintiffs' plan awards New York and
Alabama class members the full amount of statutory damages, as if
those plaintiffs prevailed on the merits. According to Defendants,
this leaves less funds for the remaining subclasses, and the second
round of distribution would exacerbate this disparity. Defendants
propose that the Alabama class members receive a maximum of $50 for
an approved claim form, regardless of the amount of GCS purchased,
New York class members receive a maximum of $100 for an approved
claim form, regardless of the amount of GCS purchased and the
remaining class members receive a maximum of $20 per approved claim
form. Defendants propose that after this distribution, the
remaining funds should be distributed to a charity or food bank,
under the Court's direction.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) requires Court-approval of
class action settlements to safeguard the rights of absent class
members. Approval of a settlement involves three stages and two
hearings.  

First, the parties present the proposed settlement to the court for
preliminary approval.

Second, if the Court preliminarily approves the settlement, notice
is sent to the class members and they are given an opportunity to
object to the terms of the settlement during a fairness hearing.  

Third, the Court determines whether to give final approval to the
settlement and holds a final fairness hearing. The ultimate inquiry
is whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.

After considering the parties' briefing and the applicable law, the
Court finds that Plaintiffs' proposed plan is appropriate. As an
initial matter, Defendants have no real interest in the allocation
of the common fund because they agreed to pay $25 million with no
reversion. Similarly, Defendants' argument that Plaintiffs' plan
unfairly favors two subclasses over the others or compensates
non-class members will be appropriately raised, if at all, by
members of the class.

Ultimately, it is unclear why Defendants are wrangling over the
allocation of the funds when the matter appears to be entirely
inconsequential to them from a financial standpoint or otherwise.

In sum, Defendants' objections to Plaintiffs' proposed plan for
allocation of the common fund and the language of the claim forms
are overruled.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 12, 2019
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y53r55qu
from Leagle.com.

Linda Suchanek, Plaintiff, represented by Randy L. Gori  -
randy@gorijulianlaw.com - Gori Julian and Associates, P.C., Chelsea
Lauren Fischer , Gori Julian and Associates, P.C., D. Todd Mathews
, Gori, Julian & Associates, PC, 156 North Main St., Edwardsville,
IL 62025, David Michael Rosenberg-Wohl  -david@hrw-law.com -
Hershenson Rosenberg-Wohl, Megan Myers Arvola , Gori, Julian &
Associates, PC,156 North Main St., Edwardsville, IL 62025 & Peter
H. Burke , Burke Harvey LLC, 3535 Grandview Parkway, Suite 100,
Birmingham, AL 35243

Sturm Foods, Inc., Defendant, represented by John F. Zabriskie -
jzabriskie@foley.com - Foley & Lardner, pro hac vice, Anne Marie
Coghlan - acoghlan@foley.com - Foley & Lardner, LLP, pro hac vice,
Craig S. Fochler - cfochler@foley.com - Foley & Lardner, pro hac
vice, Jaclyne D. Wallace - jwallace@foley.com - Foley & Lardner,
Jonathan W. Garlough - jgarlough@foley.com - Foley & Lardner, LLP,
pro hac vice, Patrick G. Walker , Farris Bobango Branan, PLC, 999
South Shady Grove Road, Suite 500, Memphis,TN 38120& Richard
Spencer Montei  - rmontei@foley.com - Foley & Lardner.

Treehouse Foods, Inc., Defendant, represented by Anne Marie Coghlan
, Foley & Lardner, LLP, pro hac vice, Craig S. Fochler , Foley &
Lardner, pro hac vice, Jaclyne D. Wallace , Foley & Lardner, John
F. Zabriskie , Foley & Lardner, pro hac vice, Jonathan W. Garlough
, Foley & Lardner, LLP, pro hac vice & Richard Spencer Montei ,
Foley & Lardner, pro hac vice.


TAILORED BRANDS: Continues to Defend Twin Hill Suit
---------------------------------------------------
Tailored Brands, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 12, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended August 3, 2019, that Twin Hill, a company's
subsidiary, continues to defend a class action suit initiated by
two American Airlines employees.

On August 2, 2017, two American Airlines employees, Thor Zurbriggen
and Dena Catan, filed a putative class action lawsuit against the
company's Twin Hill subsidiary in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois (Case No. 1:17-cv-05648).

The complaint alleged claims for strict liability, negligence, and
medical monitoring based on allegedly defective uniforms Twin Hill
supplied to American Airlines for its employees.

On September 28, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint
adding nine additional named plaintiffs, adding American Airlines,
Inc. as a defendant, and adding claims for civil battery and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs filed a
Seconded Amended Complaint on October 4, 2018 on behalf of 39 named
plaintiffs, adding PSA Airlines, Inc. and Envoy Air Inc. as
defendants, adding new factual allegations and adding a new claim
of fraud against American.  

The Second Amended Complaint included plaintiffs from the Onody
(Case No. 1:18-cv-02303) and Joy (Case No. 1:18-cv-05808) matters
we reported in prior filings. As a result, on October 16, 2018, the
judge dismissed the separate Onody and Joy matters.

Tailored Brands said, "We have timely answered the Second Amended
Complaint and the matter will proceed in due course. We believe
that any lawsuit filed on the basis of the safety of the Twin Hill
uniforms supplied to American Airlines is without merit, and we
intend to contest this action vigorously. Twin Hill has substantial
and convincing evidence of the uniforms' safety and fitness for
their intended purpose, and we believe that there is no evidence
linking any of the plaintiffs' alleged injuries to our uniforms.
The range of loss, if any, is not reasonably estimable at this
time. We do not currently believe, however, that it will have a
material adverse effect on our financial position, results of
operations or cash flows."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Tailored Brands, Inc. operates as a specialty apparel retailer the
United States and Canada. It operates through two segments, Retail
and Corporate Apparel. The company was formerly known as The Men's
Wearhouse, Inc. and changed its name to Tailored Brands, Inc. in
February 2016. Tailored Brands, Inc. was founded in 1973 and is
based in Houston, Texas.


TEK-COLLECT INC: Berardi Sues over Debt Collection Practices
------------------------------------------------------------
PHILIP BERARDI, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. TEK-COLLECT INCORPORATED d/b/a TEKCOLLECT,
INC.; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-07581 (C.D. Cal., Aug. 30, 2019) seeks to stop the
Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt.

Tek-Collect Incorporated d/b/a Tekcollect, Inc. is a debt
collection agency. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (323) 306-4234
          Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com


TEXAS: Removal of 37 Cole Class Members from LeBlanc Unit Ordered
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KEITH COLE, et al, Plaintiffs, v. BRYAN COLLIER, et
al, Defendants, Civil Action No. 4:14-CV-1698 (S.D. Tex.), Judge
Keith P. Ellison of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, Houston Division, has entered an order
addressing the severe heat conditions affecting the 37 members of
the class of heat-sensitive inmates.

During the last 48 hours, the Court has had to convene two
emergency hearings to address severe heat conditions in the LeBlanc
prison unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.  The heat
conditions are so severe that TDCJ should, on its own initiative,
have taken immediate steps to redress these conditions as they
affect all of the approximately 1200 inmates in the LeBlanc Unit.

The Court will instead limit itself to addressing the conditions as
they affect the 37 members of the Class of heat-sensitive inmates.
Uncontroverted evidence has been adduced to show that temperatures
vastly in excess of the maximum temperatures set forth in the
agreed settlement of the case have prevailed for an undetermined
length of time through an undetermined portion of the LeBlanc Unit,
including those portions in which Class members are housed.  The
Defendants have shown negligible interest in ascertaining the
breadth of the problem, its likely cause, or the necessary
remedies.

Accordingly, Judge Ellison finds and holds that the Defendants are
in breach of the Final Order and Final Judgment Approving Class
Action Settlement and Attorneys' Fees.  He ordered that the (i) the
37 members of the Class must be removed from the LeBlanc Unit prior
to noon on Aug. 10, 2019; (ii) the members of the Class must be
moved to premises that comply with the Final Order; (iii) by no
later than 11:00 a.m. on Aug. 12, 2019, a responsible officer of
TDCJ will submit an Affidavit, subjecting himself or herself to
penalty of perjury, confirming and describing compliance with the
Order; and (iv) no member of the Class will suffer any loss of
status or any postponement of an applicable release date because of
his transfer from the LeBlanc Unit.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 9, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Q6XvZu from Leagle.com.

Marvin Ray Yates, Jackie Brannum, Richard Elvin King & Fred
Wallace, Plaintiffs, represented by Wallis Anne Nader, Texas Civil
Rights Project, David Anthony James, Edwards Law, Jeremy L. Doyle
-- doyle@reynoldsfrizzell.com -- Reynolds Frizzell LLP, Michael C.
Singley, Edwards Law, Natalia Marissa Cornelio, Texas Civil Rights
Project, Nathan M. Smith -- nsmith@reynoldsfrizzell.com -- Reynolds
Frizzell LLP, Scott Charles Medlock, Edwards Law & Jeffrey S.
Edwards -- jeff@edwards-law.com -- The Edwards Law Firm.

Keith Cole, Plaintiff, represented by David Anthony James, Edwards
Law & Peter Blackmer Steffensen, Texas Civil Rights Project.

Lavar John Santee, Plaintiff, represented by David Anthony James,
Edwards Law, Jeffrey S. Edwards, The Edwards Law Firm, Jeremy L.
Doyle, Reynolds Frizzell LLP, Scott Charles Medlock, Edwards Law &
Wallis Anne Nader, Texas Civil Rights Project.

Michael Denton, Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey S. Edwards, The
Edwards Law Firm, Peter Blackmer Steffensen, Texas Civil Rights
Project, Scott Charles Medlock, Edwards Law & Wallis Anne Nader,
Texas Civil Rights Project.

Israel Garcia, Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey S. Edwards, The
Edwards Law Firm.

Bryan Collier, Roberto M Herrera & Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, Defendants, represented by Briana Marie Webb, Office of
the Attorney General, Derek Josef Kammerlocher, Office of the
Attorney General Law Enforcement Defense Div., John S. Langley,
Attorney General of Texas, Leah Jean O'Leary, Office of the
Attorney General Law Enforcement Defense Division & Matthew J.
Greer, Texas Attorney General.

Jeffrey R. Adams, Defendant, pro se.

Richard Jaxson, Movant, pro se.

Ariel Dulitzky, Non-Party Professor Ariel Dulitzky, Movant,
represented by Esteban Soto, Office of the Attorney General of
Texas.

Dusty Seaton, Movant, pro se.

Patrick Ford, Movant, pro se.

John Ford, Movant, pro se.


TEXTRON INC: Zhang Investor Files Class Action Lawsuit
------------------------------------------------------
Zhang Investor Law announces the filing of a class action lawsuit
on behalf of shareholders who bought shares of Textron Inc. (TXT)
between January 31, 2018 and October 17, 2018, inclusive (the
"Class Period").

To join the class action, go
http://zhanginvestorlaw.com/join-action-form/?slug=textron-inc&id=1993
or call Sophie Zhang, Esq. toll-free at 800-991-3756 or email
info@zhanginvestorlaw.com for information on the class action.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than October 21, 2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) end-market sales of Arctic Cat Inc. products were
slowing, resulting in a massive glut of old Arctic Cat inventory on
dealers' floors; (2) in order to clear out this old inventory,
Textron provided significant price discounts, which negatively
impacted Textron's earnings; and (3) as a result, Textron's public
statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant
times. When the true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims
that investors suffered damages.

A class has not been certified. You may retain counsel of your
choice. You may take no action at this time and be an absent class
member. Your ability to obtain a recovery is not dependent upon
being a lead plaintiff.

Zhang Investor Law represents investors worldwide.

Contact:

        Zhang Investor Law P.C.
        99 Wall Street, Suite 232
        New York, New York 10005
        tel: (800) 991-3756
        Email: info@zhanginvestorlaw.com [GN]


TITAN LOGISTICS: Court Partly OKs Certification in G. Johnston Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum Opinion granting in part and
denying in part Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification in
the case captioned GLENWOOD JOHNSTON; et al, on behalf of
themselves and similarly situated employees, Plaintiffs, v. TITAN
LOGISTICS & RESOURCES, LLC; TONY DIGIAMBERDINE; and UNITED VISION
LOGISTICS, Defendants. Civ. A. No. 17-1617. (W.D. Pa.).

This is a proposed hybrid class/collective action brought by
Plaintiffs Glenwood Johnston et al. (Plaintiffs) on behalf of
themselves and all other similarly situated drivers against
Defendants Titan Logistics & Resources, LLC (Titan) Tony
DiGiamberdine and United Vision Logistics (UVL) alleging that
Defendants jointly employed them and violated the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) by paying them a day rate without any overtime
compensation in weeks that they were driving small trucks weighing
less than 10,000 pounds.

In their Second Amended Complaint, 24 Plaintiffs allege that they
were jointly employed by Defendants and were subject to unlawful
compensation policies in violation of the FLSA from December 2014
to November 16, 2017.   

They now seek conditional certification of a collective action of
drivers jointly employed by UVL, Titan and DiGiamberdine; employed
by UVL solely; or jointly employed by UVL and some other entity
during the past three years, i.e., between 2016 and the present.  


At the outset, Titan and DiGiamberdine do not object to the
proposed conditional certification thereby conceding that
Plaintiffs have made a modest factual showing that they were
employers of the proposed collective drivers, despite the drivers
having been classified as independent contractors, and that they
were subject to an unlawful day rate compensation system, working
in excess of 40 hours per week without being paid any overtime
compensation.
  
Therefore, Plaintiffs' motion will be granted as to their FLSA
violations against Titan and DiGiamberdine for the time period of
September 2016 to November 2017.

As to the disputes between UVL and Plaintiffs, UVL contests
conditional certification and raises two alternative objections:

UVL first argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish a
modest factual showing that it was a joint employer of Plaintiffs
during the relevant time frame. UVL next contends that to the
extent that a conditional certification order is issued, it should
be limited to UVL, Titan and DiGiamberdine as joint employers for
the duration of the IOTA, i.e., from September 2016 to November
2017.   

Plaintiffs respond that they have made the required modest factual
showing as their joint employer allegations have moved beyond the
pleading stage and they have further supported same with
declarations of four representative drivers and Titan's principal
DiGiamberdine, as well as the deposition testimony of two
high-level UVL executives, i.e., Rusty Guilbeau and Stan Stricklen.


While Plaintiffs believe that they are entitled to conditional
certification of the broader collective, counsel asserted at the
motion hearing that they are amenable to an order notifying only
those drivers jointly employed by UVL, Titan and DiGiarmberdine.
Having carefully considered the parties' positions, the Court will
grant Plaintiffs' motion to the extent that it will issue an order
conditionally certifying a collective action consisting of drivers
alleging they were jointly employed by UVL, Titan and DiGiamberdine
from September 2016 to November 2017, as they have alleged in their
Second Amended Complaint.

The Court's rationale follows.

Although the Court is not yet in a position to decide the ultimate
merits of Plaintiffs' overtime claims, the initial step is to
define the claims at issue. Relevant here, an employer must pay its
employees one and one-half times the employer's regular wage for
hours worked in excess of forty hours per week. The parties do not
contest that truck drivers operating vehicles with gross weights
less than 10,000 pounds are generally not exempt from FLSA overtime
requirements.

To obtain conditional certification, it is Plaintiffs' burden to
make a modest factual showing" that there is a factual nexus
between the manner in which the employer's alleged policy affected
Plaintiffs and the manner in which it affected other employees. In
other words, Plaintiffs must show three things: (1) an employer
policy (2) that affected the Plaintiffs in a particular way and (3)
that also affected other employees in a similar way.  

In this Court's estimation, Plaintiffs have made a modest factual
showing sufficient to conditionally certify a collective action of
drivers alleging they were jointly employed by UVL, Titan and
DiGiamberdine from September 2016 to November 2017.  Plaintiffs
allege in their Second Amended Complaint that they were jointly
employed by UVL, Titan and Digiamberdine during that time period
and were not paid overtime compensation when working more than 40
hours per week despite performing non-exempt roles driving trucks
weighing less than 10,000 pounds. They have sufficiently supported
these allegations with the declarations of four drivers (i.e.,
Johnston, With, Gould, and Herrington), and DiGiarmberine as well
as the deposition testimony of UVL executives.   

In this regard, the evidence demonstrates that the drivers were
designated as independent contractors reporting to Titan's Oakdale,
Pennsylvania terminal from September 2016 to November 2017. They
worked more than 40 hours per week performing non-exempt duties
fulfilling movement requests for UVL and its customers but were not
provided with overtime pay under the day rate compensation system.
They further assert that for some of the weeks near the end of the
relationship between Titan and UVL, they were not paid at all.
There are now 70 drivers who are either named Plaintiffs or have
opted-in to the FLSA collective and the four drivers declare that
these individuals as well as others worked under the same
conditions and were subject to the same unlawful compensation
system.  

The Court recognizes that UVL challenges the allegations that it is
a joint employer and raises several merits-based defenses to the
claims. However, as in the misclassification cases, because a
modest factual showing has been made, these arguments are best
reserved for step-two, at which time the merits of the claims are
considered and evaluated by the Court against a more fully
developed record. Overall, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have
made a modest factual showing that UVL, Titan and DiGiamberdine
were their joint employers from September 2016 to November 2017 and
will certify the FLSA collective action for that time period.

The last issue for the Court to address is Plaintiffs' position
that the Court should expand its notice to include drivers who were
employed by UVL only and/or UVL and any other entity (including but
not limited to J.R. Logistics) during the past three years.  

The Court denies this request for several reasons.

First, these proposed collective allegations are beyond the scope
of the Second Amended Complaint which is limited to the twenty-four
named Plaintiffs' joint employer allegations against Titan,
DiGiamberdine and UVL ending in November of 2017 and it is well
settled that Plaintiffs cannot amend their complaint through
assertions in briefs as they have attempted here.   

Plaintiffs' motion may be denied on this basis alone.

Second, to the extent that Plaintiffs desired to amend their
complaint a third time in order to assert claims against UVL solely
and/or UVL and some other entity for FLSA violations during the
past three years, the deadline for filing motions to amend the
complaint of May 23, 2018 has long since passed and Plaintiffs have
made no effort to demonstrate good cause for failing to comply with
the Court's deadline.   They likewise had this information before
the deadline of May 23, 2018 to amend pleadings but did not pursue
this expanded collective action until filing their motion to
certify nearly a year later on May 8, 2019.  UVL is also prejudiced
by the proposed expansion of the case at this late juncture in that
discovery on class action and conditional certification is
concluded and, as is reflected in the parties' Rule 26(f) Report,
the parties were seeking discovery for the time period ending on
November 24, 2017, which, again, coincided with the termination of
the Titan/UVL agreement.  

Third, Plaintiffs have not made a modest factual showing that they
were similarly situated to the other drivers they seek to notify of
the collective action who do not allege that they were jointly
employed by Titan, DiGiamberdine and UVL while the IOTA was pending
from September 26, 2016 to November 24, 2017.    

With respect to named Plaintiffs who allegedly worked with UVL
and/or JR Logistics after Titan was terminated in November 2017,
the record evidence is sparse, at best, and lacks a direct
connection to this District. To reiterate, none of the twenty-four
named Plaintiffs alleged in their Second Amended Complaint that
they worked for UVL solely or jointly for UVL and some other entity
in that subsequent time period. The only evidence supporting these
potential claims are three declarations of drivers, two of whom are
named Plaintiffs, Johnston and Gould and a single opt-in, With,3
each of whom admit that they worked out of the Cheyenne, Wyoming
terminal.  

Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification is GRANTED, IN
PART, and DENIED, IN PART. Said motion is granted to the extent
that the Court will conditionally certify an FLSA collective action
consisting of drivers who allege that: they were jointly employed
by UVL, Titan and DiGiamberdine from September 2016 to November of
2017, drove small vehicles weighing less than 10,000 pounds, worked
more than 40 hours per week and were not paid overtime
compensation. The term drivers includes individuals holding
positions of truck driver, chase driver and dispatcher or other
similar positions with responsibility for driving small vehicles.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 12, 2019
Memorandum Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y4krzuhh
from Leagle.com.

GLENWOOD JOHNSTON, LADEL RICHARDS, TRACY GUINARD, EDWARD RICHARD
REYNOLDS, NORMAND MAILLET, KAVID HARRIS, SHANNON HOUCHIN, CHEVY
BURSE, JACKIE CHRISTIANSEN, TODD BROOKS, JOE SANDOVAL, MICHAEL
BAZAN, JERRY LYNN TRYON, DELVIN WASHINGTON, GREG MONKRESS, SEAN
WILLIAMS, RICHARD HAKE, MATTHEW SCHWARZ, BRIAN GOULD, WILLIAM
SHULTZ, RONNIE PHILLIPS, GEORGE WOELICH, JAMIE GARLAND & SYMEON
DORSEY, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated employees,
Plaintiffs, represented by Joseph H. Chivers.

TITAN LOGISTICS & RESOURCES, LLC & TONY DIGIAMBERDINE, Defendants,
represented by Kathryn M. Wakefield - kwakefieldbizlaw@gmail.com -
Wakefield Law Group, P.C.

UNITED VISION LOGISTICS, Defendant, represented by Robert P. Walter
- rwalter@pwlawinc.com - Poerio & Walter, Inc.

UNITED VISION LOGISTICS, Cross Claimant, represented by Robert P.
Walter , Poerio & Walter, Inc.

TONY DIGIAMBERDINE & TITAN LOGISTICS & RESOURCES, LLC, Cross
Defendants, represented by Kathryn M. Wakefield , Wakefield Law
Group, P.C.

UNITED VISION LOGISTICS, Cross Defendant, represented by Robert P.
Walter , Poerio & Walter, Inc.

TONY DIGIAMBERDINE, Cross Claimant, represented by Kathryn M.
Wakefield , Wakefield Law Group, P.C..


TOP SHELF PROVISIONS: Seeks 2nd Cir. Review of Order in Piccolo
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Anthony Cicciari, Rich Dalhem and Top Shelf Provisions
Co. Inc. filed an appeal from a District Court order issued on
August 7, 2019, in the lawsuit titled Piccolo v. Top Shelf
Provisions Co. Inc., et al., Case No. 16-cv-6930, in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York.

The lawsuit alleges violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The appellate case is captioned as Piccolo v. Top Shelf Provisions
Co. Inc., et al., Case No. 19-2825, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Louis Piccolo, individually and on behalf of
those similarly situated, is represented by:

          Saul D. Zabell, Esq.
          ZABELL & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          1 Corporate Drive
          Bohemia, NY 11716
          Telephone: (631) 589-7242
          E-mail: SZabell@laborlawsny.com

Defendants-Appellants Top Shelf Provisions Co. Inc., et al., are
represented by:

          Joseph Martin Labuda, Esq.
          MILMAN LABUDA LAW GROUP PLLC
          3000 Marcus Avenue
          Lake Success, NY 11042
          Telephone: (516) 328-8899
          E-mail: joe@mmmlaborlaw.com


TRANS WORLD: Discovery in Consolidated Spack Suit Ongoing
---------------------------------------------------------
Trans World Entertainment Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on September 17,
2019, for the quarterly period ended August 3, 2019, that discovery
is ongoing in the consolidated class action suit entitled, Spack v.
Trans World Entertainment Corp.

The company is defending two pending class actions. The first,
Spack v. Trans World Entertainment Corp. was originally filed in
the District of New Jersey, April 2017 (the "Spack Action").

The Spack Action alleges that the Company misclassified Store
Managers ("SMs") as exempt nationwide.

It also alleges that Trans World improperly calculated overtime for
Senior Assistant Managers "SAMs" nationwide, and that both SMs and
SAMs worked "off-the-clock."

It also alleges violations of New Jersey and Pennsylvania State Law
with respect to calculating overtime for SAMs.

The second, Roper v. Trans World Entertainment Corp., was filed in
the Northern District of New York, May 2017 (the "Roper Action").
The Roper Action also asserts a nationwide misclassification claim
on behalf of Store Managers.

Both actions were consolidated into the Northern District of New
York, with the Spack Action being the lead case.

Plaintiffs moved for conditional certification of a collective of
SMs in June 2018, and that motion was partially granted in January
2019. The opt-in period for the collective that was certified was
closed on April 6, 2019. Opt-in discovery relating to that
potential collective has commenced.

The Company believes it has meritorious defenses to the plaintiffs'
claims and intends to vigorously defend the action.

Trans World Entertainment Corporation, together with its
subsidiaries, operates as a specialty retailer of entertainment
products. The company operates in two segments, For Your
Entertainment (fye) and etailz. The fye segment offers trend,
video, music, electronics, and related products, as well as used
compact discs, DVDs, Blu-Ray, and video games through its retail
stores and e-commerce sites. Trans World Entertainment Corporation
was founded in 1972 and is headquartered in Albany, New York.


TRANS WORLD: New Suit over VIP Backstage Pass Memberships Ongoing
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Trans World Entertainment Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on September 17,
2019, for the quarterly period ended August 3, 2019, that the
company continues to defend a putative class action suit in
Massachusetts related to Loyalty Memberships and Magazine
Subscriptions.

On November 14, 2018, three consumers filed a punitive class action
complaint against the Company and Synapse Group, Inc. in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Boston
Division (Case No.1:18-cv-12377-DPW) concerning enrollment in the
Company's Backstage Pass VIP loyalty program and associated
magazine subscriptions.

The complaint alleged, among other things, that the Company's
"negative option marketing" misled consumers into enrolling for
membership and subscriptions without obtaining the consumers'
consent.

The complaint sought to represent a nationwide class of "all
persons in the United States" who were enrolled in and/or charged
for Backstage Pass VIP memberships and/or magazine subscriptions,
and to obtain statutory and actual damages on their behalf.

On April 11, 2019, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their
lawsuit.

On May 8, 2019, two of the plaintiffs from the dismissed lawsuit
filed a similar punitive class action in Massachusetts state court
(Civ. Act. No. 197CV00331, Mass. Super. Ct. Hampden Cty.), based on
the same allegations, but this time seeking to represent only a
class of "FYE customers in Massachusetts" who were charged for VIP
Backstage Pass Memberships and/or magazine subscriptions.

The Company believes it has meritorious defenses to the plaintiffs'
claims and, if the new case is not dismissed in full, the Company
intends to vigorously defend the action.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Trans World Entertainment Corporation, together with its
subsidiaries, operates as a specialty retailer of entertainment
products. The company operates in two segments, For Your
Entertainment (fye) and etailz. The fye segment offers trend,
video, music, electronics, and related products, as well as used
compact discs, DVDs, Blu-Ray, and video games through its retail
stores and e-commerce sites. Trans World Entertainment Corporation
was founded in 1972 and is headquartered in Albany, New York.


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: $20M Deal in Calif. & Mass. Drivers Suit Okayed
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California has approved the settlement of the consolidated case,
O'Connor, et al., v. Uber Technologies, Inc. and Yucesoy v. Uber
Technologies, Inc., et al., at the Final Approval Hearing,
"Fairness Hearing," held on August 29, 2019.

Once the settlement becomes final, Defendants can begin the process
of distributing payments, which they expect should be able to occur
this fall.

According to Uber Technologies, Inc.'s Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, O'Connor and Yucesoy are two putative class
actions that assert various independent contractor
misclassification claims brought on behalf of certain Driver
Partners in California and Massachusetts, respectively.  The two
cases were consolidated and both are pending in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California.

Filed on August 16, 2013 in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California, the O'Connor action is a class
action against the Company on behalf of all Driver Partners who
contracted with the Company in California between 2009 and February
28, 2019 and seeks damages for tips and business expense
reimbursement based on alleged independent contractor
misclassification and unfair competition.

The O'Connor action was stayed in the trial court pending the
outcome of appeals before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
regarding the trial court's orders denying the Company's motions to
compel arbitration, order certifying the class action, and order
enjoining the Company's enforcement of its arbitration agreement.

The Ninth Circuit issued its rulings on those appeals on September
25, 2018, finding that the Company's arbitration agreements were
enforceable and accordingly, decertified the O'Connor class and
remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.

Filed on June 2, 2014 in the Massachusetts Suffolk County Superior
Court, the Yucesoy action is a class action against the Company on
behalf of all Driver Partners in Massachusetts and seeks damages
based on independent contractor misclassification, tips law
violations and tortious interference with contractual and/or
advantageous relations.

Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in the Yucesoy action on
March 30, 2018 adding new class representatives, to which the
Company filed a motion to compel arbitration and/or dismiss the
action on April 26, 2018.

On March 11, 2019, the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement
which provides that the Company will pay US$20 million to settle
the O'Connor and Yucesoy actions.

The proposed settlement does not require the Company to start
classifying Driver Partners as employees in California or
Massachusetts and does not include those Driver Partners who are
subject to arbitration.

Plaintiffs filed a motion with the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California seeking court approval of the
settlement agreement.

The motion for preliminary approval of the parties' settlement
agreement was heard on March 21, 2019, and preliminary approval was
granted subject to certain conditions.

In May 2019, the Company reached agreements to resolve independent
contractor misclassification claims of Driver Partners in
California and Massachusetts that have filed (or expressed an
intention to file) arbitration demands.  Under the agreements,
certain Driver Partners are eligible for settlement payments,
subject to a threshold number of the covered Driver Partners
entering into individual settlement agreements.  The Company
anticipates the aggregate amount of payments to Driver Partners
under these individual settlement agreements, together with
attorneys' fees, will fall within an approximate range of US$146
million to US$170 million.

Additional information on the case is available at:

                 https://www.uberlitigation.com/

Uber Technologies, Inc. develops and supports proprietary
technology applications that enable independent providers of
ridesharing, and meal preparation and delivery services to transact
with riders and eaters worldwide. The company operates in two
segments, Core Platform and Other Bets. The company was formerly
known as Ubercab, Inc. and changed its name to Uber Technologies,
Inc. in February 2011. Uber Technologies, Inc. was founded in 2009
and is headquartered in San Francisco, California.


ULTA BEAUTY: Smith-Brown et al. Seek to Certify Class
-----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as KIMBERLEY LAURA SMITH-BROWN,
et al., Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. ULTA BEAUTY, INC. and ULTA SALON,
COSMETICS & FRAGRANCE, INC., the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-00610
(N.D. Ill.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court for an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all persons who purchased, other than for resale, used
      beauty products from Ulta retail stores in Alabama,
      California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland,
      Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
      Rhode Island, South Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin".

      The Plaintiffs and the states they seek to represent are:
      Kimberley Laura Smith-Brown (CA), Quinn Allen (MD), Ilene
      Anchell (FL), Brittany Caffrey (PA), Kris Dane (NV), Karen
      Eonta (PA), Valarie Hutchison (WI), Kristen Jackson (IN),
      Cristina Kovacs (IL), Michelle Musk (RI), Robin Okman (CA),
      Paula Ogurkiewicz (IL & NV), Jennifer Sacks (MI & CA),
      Veronica Sanders (GA), Deanna Shaw (WA), Allison Sot (NJ, PA

      & SC), Shasta Swaney (SC & AL), Colleen Thornton (NY & IL),
      Alice Vitiello (OH), and Tammy Walker (AL, GA & FL).

      The Classes exclude: (i) Defendants and their officers and
      directors, agents, affiliates, and subsidiaries; (ii) all
      Class members who timely and validly request exclusion from
      the Class; and (iii) the Judge presiding over this action.
      The claims do not include personal injury claims.

      The "Class Period" for each claim extends backward the
      length of the statute of limitations from the date that the
      class representative filed the claim and continues until the

      date a judgment is entered.;

   2. designating Plaintiffs as the Class representatives; and

   3. appointing The Sultzer Law Group P.C. and McLaughlin &
      Stern, LLP as Class Counsel and Wolf Haldenstein Adler
      Freeman & Herz LLC as Local/Liaison Counsel.[CC]

Counsel for the Plaintiffs and the Proposed Classes are:

          Carl V. Malmstrom, Esq.
          WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER
             FREEMAN & HERZ LLC
          111 W. Jackson Street, Suite 1700
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Telephone: (312) 984-0000
          Facsimile: (312) 212-4401
          E-mail: malmstrom@whafh.com

               - and -

          Lee S. Shalov, Esq.
          Jason Giaimo, Esq.
          MCLAUGHLIN & STERN LLP
          260 Madison Avenue
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 448-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 448-0066
          E-mail: lshalov@mclaughlinstern.com
                  jgiaimo@mclaughlinstern.com

               - and -

          Janine L. Pollack, Esq.
          THE SULTZER LAW GROUP P.C.
          270 Madison Ave., Suite 1800
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 969-7810
          Facsimile: (888) 749-7747
          E-mail: pollackj@thesultzerlawgroup.com

               - and -

          Howard T. Longman, Esq.
          Melissa R. Emert, Esq.
          STULL, STULL & BRODY
          6 East 45 th Street
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 687-7230
          Facsimile: (212) 490-2022
          E-mail: hlongman@ssbny.com
                  memert@ssbny.com

               - and -

          Thomas A. Zimmerman, Jr., Esq.
          Sharon A. Harris, Esq.
          Nickolas A. Hagman, Esq.
          Matthew C. De Re, Esq.
          ZIMMERMAN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
          77 W. Washington Street, Suite 1220
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 440-0020
          Facsimile: (312) 440-4180
          E-mail: tom@attorneyzim.com
                  sharon@attorneyzim.com
                  nick@attorneyzim.com
                  matt@attorneyzim.com

               - and -

          Gustavo Bruckner, Esq.
          Samuel J. Adams, Esq.
          Louis C. Ludwig, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Ave.
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (917) 463-1044
          E-mail: gfbruckner@pomlaw.com
                  sjadams@pomlaw.com
                  lcludwig@pomlaw.com

UNITED STATES: Navy Sued Over Aircraft Noise in Whidbey
-------------------------------------------------------
Jessie Stensland, writing for South Whidbey Record, reports that
attorneys representing 24 individuals and couples in Central
Whidbey, in Washington, filed a lawsuit that seeks damages from the
Navy over EA-18G Growler aircraft practice.

The lawsuit, filed in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, seeks
class-action status and claims that the noise of the aircraft and
the planned 400-percent increase in aircraft landing practice at
the Outlying Field Coupeville represents a "physical taking without
compensation" because of the decreased value of the residents'
homes.

The residents are represented by two national law firms, Susman
Godfrey and Marcella Law.

Steve Morrissey, Esq. -- smorrissey@susmangodfrey.com -- a partner
with Susman Godfrey and counsel to the class of plaintiffs in the
case, said the law firm was invited to attend a meeting of the
Sound Defense Alliance in Coupeville in April at the Crockett Farm
in Coupeville. Attorneys spoke to residents of Admirals Cove, the
Central Whidbey neighborhood in the OLF flight path, who described
the impacts the Growler noise has had on their lives and the value
of their properties.

Morrissey said the lawsuit is the only way the residents can get
monetary relief for the impact the Navy has had on their lives.

"The lawsuit alleges that the 24 named plaintiffs have sustained
tens of millions of dollars in damages," according to a statement
from the law firm. "Damages to potential class members from the
area surrounding the airstrip will likely total in the hundreds of
millions of dollars."

After a process governed by the National Environmental Policy Act,
the secretary of the Navy announced in March the decision to bring
36 more Growlers to Naval Air Station Whidbey Island and to conduct
80 percent of the practice at OLF Coupeville. The projected number
of "passes" at the fields will increase from 3,000 a year to more
than 12,000.

Morrissey said common sense dictates that the small airstrip in the
midst of residential development and farmland is not the right
place for vital warplane practice.

"It looks like a small farm with an airstrip," he said. "The ideas
that thousands of flights will take place there strikes me as kind
of crazy."

In the record of decision, the Navy explained that OLF Coupeville
provides invaluable training to Growler pilots because of the
terrain, the surrounding darkness and other factors mimic aircraft
carrier landings. In comparison, training at Ault Field in North
Whidbey is challenging because of the amount of activity from other
aircraft, plus more residents are affected by the noise in the
area.

Steve Bristow, past president of the Oak Harbor Council of the Navy
League, said real estate values on Whidbey correlate to national
trends without correlation to Navy flight operations.

"There can be no conversation about property values without the air
station's Fortune 500-level economic engine and its impact," he
said.

State Attorney General Bob Ferguson, Esq. and the group Citizens of
Ebey's Reserve filed lawsuits in federal court in July against the
Navy, contending the Navy's analysis under NEPA for the increase in
Growlers inadequately examined the impact the jet noise has on
human health, the natural environment and historic resources.

Morrissey said the law firms were building their case before these
lawsuits, but that they have the potential to impact the
class-action lawsuit.

According to Morrissey, there is precedence for the litigation
against the Navy. Residents of Virginia Beach filed a class-action
lawsuit against the Navy 18 years ago over the noise from an
increase in F/A-18 Hornets at the nearby base; Growlers are a
specialized version of the Hornet. Under a settlement, the Navy
paid homeowners millions of dollars in compensation.

According to Morrissey, Admirals Cove residents sued the Navy over
aircraft noise from OLF Coupeville in the 1980s. The parties came
to a settlement, which Morrissey claims the Navy has violated with
the increase in Growlers. The details of the settlements may be key
to the litigation, he said.

In addition, the lawsuit states that the Navy and the town of
Coupeville came to a verbal agreement years ago that the Navy
wouldn't fly past 10 p.m., though Morrisseey admits there is no
written record of it. Nowadays, the Growlers commonly fly until
midnight.

In addition to the noise, the lawsuit argues that the residents are
facing an unreasonable risk from aircraft crashing into their
homes. The lawsuit states that the Admirals Cove neighborhood is
within the "accident potential zone" of OLf Coupeville, which is
the area off the end of airstrips that are at greatest risk of
aircraft crashes.

If the court grants class-action status, residents within the
"class area" will receive letters asking them to take part in the
lawsuit.

"Our clients are patriotic people who value and respect the Navy's
mission, the important role the service members stationed at NAS
Whidbey serve in fulfilling that mission and the longstanding role
of the Navy in supporting the economy on the island," Morrissey
said. "But these unilateral actions that the Navy has taken through
its dramatic increase in flight activities at OLF Coupeville have
severe impacts on area residents, and the Navy must be held
responsible for what it has done to area properties and property
values."

The lawsuit describes how the noise and vibrations from the
Growlers impact each of the residents' lives.

"With the new Growler flights flying repeatedly less than 100 feet
directly over my house, the noise and house shaking is now
intolerable," said Paul Firnstahl, who is a Vietnam War veteran
with a disability rating for PTSD and Agent Orange exposure. "But I
have no choice but to stay since I am on a fixed income and have
nowhere to go with my high mortgage." [GN]


VENATOR MATERIALS: Kessler Topaz Files Class Action
---------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP announces that
the firm has filed a securities fraud class action lawsuit against
Venator Materials PLC (VNTR) ("Venator") on behalf investors who
purchased or acquired Venator ordinary shares between August 2,
2017, and October 29, 2018, both dates inclusive (the "Class
Period"), including those who purchased or otherwise acquired
Venator ordinary shares pursuant and/or traceable to the
registration statements and prospectuses issued in connection with
Venator's August 3, 2017 initial public offering (the "IPO") and
December 4, 2017 secondary public offering (the "SPO")
(collectively, the "Offerings"). This action, captioned Cambria
County Employees Retirement System v. Venator Materials PLC, et
al., Case No. 4:19-cv-03464 (the "Cambria County Action"), was
filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Texas (Houston Division) and pleads the same Class Period as
pled in the first-filed securities fraud class action lawsuit
captioned City of Miami General Employees' & Sanitation Employees'
Retirement Trust v. Venator Materials PLC, et al., Case No.
1:19-cv-07182, filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.

The filing of the Cambria County Action does not change the
September 30, 2019 deadline for investors who purchased or acquired
Venator ordinary shares during the Class Period to seek to be
appointed as a lead plaintiff representative of the class. For
additional information or to learn how to participate in this
action please visit: www.ktmc.com/new-cases/venator-materials-plc.

Venator is a global chemical company primarily focused on the
development and production of titanium dioxide ("TiO2") and
performance additives, including functional additives, color
pigments, timber treatments and water treatments. Prior to the IPO,
Venator operated as a division of Defendant Huntsman Corporation
("Huntsman"). Prior to its spin-off from Huntsman, Venator operated
a major TiO2 manufacturing facility in Pori, Finland (the
"Facility"). The Facility's output constituted a substantial
percentage of Venator's business.

On January 30, 2017, the Facility was engulfed by a massive fire
(the "Fire"). After the Fire, Huntsman assured the public that the
Fire had been "quickly" extinguished and that the Facility was
"insured for property damages as well as earnings losses." Huntsman
also assured investors that it was "committed to repairing the
[F]acility as quickly as possible."

On August 3, 2017, less than eight months after the Fire, Huntsman
spun-off Venator by completing the IPO. In connection with the IPO,
Huntsman raised $522 million in proceeds by issuing more than 26
million ordinary shares at a price of $20.00 per share. The
prospectus and registration statement issued in connection with the
IPO assured investors that Venator was "committed to repairing the
[F]acility as quickly as possible" and that Venator expected a
gradual return to functionality, with the Facility being restored
to "approximately 40% capacity in the second quarter of 2018; and
full capacity around the end of 2018." The prospectus and
registration statement also stated that the Facility would be
repaired with insurance proceeds and within the insurance policy
limits.

On December 4 2017, Venator completed its SPO, raising $533 million
in proceeds by selling more than 23.7 million ordinary shares.

The complaint alleges that investors began to learn the truth of
the Defendants' misleading statements through a series of
disclosures. For example, on July 31, 2018, Venator revealed that
the Facility was much more severely damaged by the Fire than had
previously been disclosed. Following this news, the price of
Venator ordinary shares declined $0.73 per share, or approximately
4.8%, from a close of $15.35 per share on July 30, 2018, to close
at $14.62 per share on July 31, 2018.

Then, on September 12, 2018, Venator informed investors that it was
now abandoning its attempts to repair the Facility because
production capacity at the Facility had not meaningfully improved
since the Offerings. The Defendants also admitted that, due to this
decreased capacity, Venator was no longer a leading producer of
TiO2. Additionally, the Defendants announced that Venator would
incur up to $150 million in additional costs to close the Facility.
Following this news, the price of Venator ordinary shares declined
$0.54 per share, or approximately 4.8%, from a close of $11.35 per
share on September 11, 2018, to close at $10.81 per share on
September 12, 2018.

Finally, on October 30, 2018, Venator disclosed that, in addition
to more than $500 million in Fire-related costs and lost business
covered by Venator's insurance policy, Venator incurred an
additional restructuring charge of approximately $415 million and
would incur further charges of $220 million through 2024 related to
the closure of the Facility. Following this news, the price of
Venator ordinary shares declined $1.53 per share, or 19%, from a
close of $8.00 per share on October 29, 2018, to close at $6.47 per
share on October 30, 2018.

The complaint alleges that, throughout the Class Period, the
Defendants failed to disclose that: (1) the Fire was far more
damaging to the Facility than had been represented to investors,
resulting in over $1 billion in damage and rendering the Facility
beyond repair; (2) the damage to the Facility exceeded Venator's
insurance policy limits by hundreds of millions of dollars; (3)
Venator had lost, with essentially no hope of restoration,
approximately 80% of the Facility's TiO2 production capacity; (4)
Venator incurred tens of millions of dollars in costs in connection
with attempts to repair the Facility; (5) Venator's reported annual
TiO2 production capacity was inflated by approximately 15%; and (6)
as a result, Venator would incur over $600 million in restructuring
expenses and other charges associated with the closure and
replacement of the Facility.

If you wish to discuss this securities fraud class action lawsuit
or have any questions concerning this notice or your rights or
interests with respect to this litigation, please contact Kessler
Topaz Meltzer & Check (James Maro, Jr., Esq. or Adrienne Bell,
Esq.) at (844) 887-9500 or (610) 667–7706, or via e-mail at
info@ktmc.com.

Venator investors may, no later than September 30, 2019, seek to be
appointed as a lead plaintiff representative of the class through
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, or other counsel, or may choose to
do nothing and remain an absent class member. A lead plaintiff is a
representative party who acts on behalf of all class members in
directing the litigation. In order to be appointed as a lead
plaintiff, the Court must determine that the class member's claim
is typical of the claims of other class members, and that the class
member will adequately represent the class. Your ability to share
in any recovery is not affected by the decision of whether or not
to serve as a lead plaintiff.

Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check prosecutes class actions in state and
federal courts throughout the country involving securities fraud,
breaches of fiduciary duties and other violations of state and
federal law. Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check is a driving force
behind corporate governance reform, and has recovered billions of
dollars on behalf of institutional and individual investors from
the United States and around the world. The firm represents
investors, consumers and whistleblowers (private citizens who
report fraudulent practices against the government and share in the
recovery of government dollars). For more information about Kessler
Topaz Meltzer & Check, please visit www.ktmc.com. [GN]


VIEWRAY INC: Robbins Geller Files Class Action Lawsuit
------------------------------------------------------
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP
(http://www.rgrdlaw.com/cases/viewray/)announced that a class
action has been commenced on behalf of purchasers of ViewRay, Inc.
(NASDAQ:VRAY) common stock during the period between March 15, 2019
and August 8, 2019 (the "Class Period"). This action was filed in
the Northern District of Ohio and is captioned Corwin v. ViewRay,
Inc., et al., No. 19-cv-2115.

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 permits any
investor who purchased ViewRay common stock during the Class Period
to seek appointment as lead plaintiff. A lead plaintiff acts on
behalf of all other class members in directing the litigation. The
lead plaintiff can select a law firm of its choice. An investor's
ability to share in any potential future recovery is not dependent
upon serving as lead plaintiff. If you wish to serve as lead
plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than 60 days from
today. If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions
concerning this notice or your rights or interests, please contact
plaintiff's counsel, Mary K. Blasy of Robbins Geller at
800/449-4900 or 619/231-1058, or via e-mail at mblasy@rgrdlaw.com.
You can view a copy of the complaint as filed at
http://www.rgrdlaw.com/cases/viewray/

The complaint charges ViewRay and certain of its officers and
directors with violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
ViewRay designs, manufactures, and markets radiation therapy
systems sold in the United States and internationally in-house and
through distributors.

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, defendants
issued materially false and misleading statements that failed to
disclose adverse facts concerning the Company's business,
operations and financial results. Specifically: (a) that demand for
ViewRay systems had declined due in part to changes being made to
Medicare reimbursement approaches first announced in November 2019
that could make purchases of new ViewRay systems less profitable
for customers; (b) that the Company's reported backlog was
overstated due to the inclusion of orders with insufficient surety
as to permit for their inclusion in reported backlog; and (c) that
as a result of the foregoing, defendants' positive statements about
ViewRay's business metrics and financial prospects during the Class
Period were materially false and misleading and/or lacked a
reasonable basis.

On August 8, 2019, after the close of trading, ViewRay disclosed
operational issues and slashed its previously issued full fiscal
year 2019 financial guidance.

In response to this news, the price of ViewRay common stock price
declined by more than 50%, or $3.64 per share, to close down at
$3.10 per share on August 9, 2019, on unusually high trading volume
of more than 26.6 million shares trading, or nearly 16x the average
volume over the preceding ten trading days.

Plaintiff seeks to recover damages on behalf of all purchasers of
ViewRay common stock during the Class Period (the "Class"). The
plaintiff is represented by Robbins Geller, which has extensive
experience in prosecuting investor class actions including actions
involving financial fraud.

Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP is one of the world's leading law
firms representing investors in securities litigation. With 200
lawyers in 9 offices, Robbins Geller has obtained many of the
largest securities class action recoveries in history. For six
consecutive years, ISS Securities Class Action Services has ranked
the Firm in its annual SCAS Top 50 Report as one of the top law
firms in the world in both amount recovered for shareholders and
total number of class action settlements. Robbins Geller attorneys
have helped shape the securities laws and have recovered tens of
billions of dollars on behalf of aggrieved victims. Beyond securing
financial recoveries for defrauded investors, Robbins Geller also
specializes in implementing corporate governance reforms, helping
to improve the financial markets for investors worldwide. Robbins
Geller attorneys are consistently recognized by courts,
professional organizations and the media as leading lawyers in the
industry. Please visit http://www.rgrdlaw.comfor more
information.

Contacts:

         Mary K. Blasy, Esq.         
         Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP
         Tel: 800-449-4900
         Email: mblasy@rgrdlaw.com [GN]


VIRTUOSO SOURING: Court Dismisses FDCPA Claims in Gottesman Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHANA GOTTESMAN, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. VIRTUOSO SOURING GROUP,
LLC, JOHN DOES 1-25, Defendants, Civil Action No.
3:18-cv-16759-FLW-LHG (D. N.J.), Judge Freda L. Wolfson of the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey granted the
Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act ("FDCPA") claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).

The putative class action arises out of Plaintiff Gottesman's claim
that Defendant VSG and John Does 1-25, violated the FDCPA by
sending a false or misleading debt collection letter that failed to
effectively inform the Plaintiff what she must do in order to
dispute the alleged debt.  The Plaintiff filed the putative class
action suit on Dec. 3, 2018, against the Defendant.  The Plaintiff
is a resident of Toms River, New Jersey.  The Defendant is a debt
collection agency operating in Glendale, Colorado.

On Aug. 9, 2018, the Defendant sent to the Plaintiff a one-page
collection letter, dated Aug. 9, 2018, regarding a debt owed to ADT
Security in the amount of $1,095.70.  Based on this communication,
the Plaintiff alleges that VSG violated (i) 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e
by making a false and misleading representation in connection with
the collection of the debt, such that the Letter is open to more
than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is
inaccurate; and (ii) that VSG violated 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g, by
falsely misstating the consumer's rights by omitting the
requirement that the consumer must request validation and make any
dispute of the debt in writing.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Letter does not meet the required
guidelines of the FDCPA, because in its validation notice, the
first sentence leaves out the requirement that a consumer must
dispute in writing, and the second sentence begins: "If you, the
consumer, notify this collection agency in writing," implying that
the writing requirement is voluntary.  When coupled with the
failure of the first sentence to contain any mention of the word
"writing," the Plaintiff alleges that the least sophisticated
consumer would be confused as to what her actual requirements are
for properly disputing the debt.

The Defendant moves to dismiss the laintiff's claims, arguing that
the Plaintiff fails to state a legal claim under the FDCPA.

Judge Wolfson does not deem the language of the Letter to be an
abusive debt collection practice because it closely tracks the
statutory language provided in Section 1692g(a), without providing
confusing, alternative ways to dispute the debt that would
contradict the validation.  VSG likely relied upon the plain
language of the statute and mirrored such language in its debt
collection letters.  the As a matter of fairness, Defendant should
not be subjected to statutory liability in this context when it
reasonably relied on the very statute to craft the notice at
issue.

In addition, the consumer would understand that the notification
mentioned in the second sentence refers to the first; that is, read
together, unless the debtor disputes the debt in writing, the debt
would be presumed valid. The use of the word "if" in the validation
notice, as it was used in the case, would not confuse a consumer as
to how to dispute the debt because the Letter does not suggest that
a debtor may dispute the debt in any other method besides the
in-writing requirement.

The Plaintiff's Section 1692e claim is premised on the same
allegations as her Section 1692g claim.  Because the Plaintiff's
Section 1692g claim fails, similarly, her Section 1692e claim also
fails.  Under Section 1692e(10), the use of any false
representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect
any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer is
prohibited.  When allegations under 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e(10) are
based on the same language or theories as allegations under 15
U.S.C. Section 1692g, the analysis of the Section 1692g claim is
usually dispositive.  Therefore, for the reasons why the Plaintiff
fails to state a claim under Section 1692g, her claim under Section
1692e fails for the same reasons.

Based on the forgoing, Judge Wolfson granted the Defendant's motion
to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 9, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/c94RvW from Leagle.com.

CHANA GOTTESMAN, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by YAAKOV SAKS --
info@steinsakslegal.com -- Stein Saks, PLLC.

VIRTUOSO SOURCING GROUP, LLC, Defendant, represented by CINDY D.
SALVO -- csalvo@salvolawfirm.com -- THE SALVO LAW FIRM.


WELLNESS SOLUTIONS: Krawczyk et al Seek to Certify Class
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as WHITNEY KRAWCZYK and BRITTNEY
WHITMORE, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. WELLNESS SOLUTIONS GERIATRICS, PLLC,
LAURA S. REAVES, STEVEN L. SCESA, JOHN W. CAIN, II, and GOLDEN
GRIFFON, LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-00323 (M.D. Tenn.),
the Plaintiffs ask the Court for an order:

   1. conditionally certifying a class of:

      "all employees of Defendants who worked at any time from
      mid-November 2018 through February 2019 and who also were
      not paid for their work in whole or in part during this
      period";

   2. approving notice and consent form agreed to by the parties;

   3. requiring the Defendants to produce a notice list containing

      the last known mailing address and email address, to the
      extent it is in their possession, of each class member
      within 10 days of the entry of the Order granting the
      Motion;

   4. requiring Plaintiffs' counsel to mail and email the notice
      within 7 days of receiving the notice list from Defendants;
      and

   5. setting a deadline of 90 days for potential Opt-In
      Plaintiffs to return a completed consent form for filing
      with the Court.

The Plaintiffs allege that all of the members of the class were
subject to a single, class-wide decision not to pay the wages owed
to them for their work from mid-November 2018 until in or around
February 2019 beyond partial payments for work performed in
November 2018. Because the proposed class were victims of a common
policy they are similarly situated pursuant to 29 U.S.C. section
216(b).[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Joshua A. Frank, Esq.
          David W. Garrison, Esq.
          BARRETT JOHNSTON MARTIN & GARRISON, LLC
          Philips Plaza
          414 Union Street, Suite 900
          Nashville, TN 37219
          Telephone: (615) 244-2202
          Facsimile: (615) 252-3798
          E-mail: dgarrison@barrettjohnston.com
                  jfrank@barrettjohnston.com

               - and -

          Charles Herman, Esq.
          CHARLES HERMAN LAW
          7 E Congress Street, Suite 611A
          Savannah, GA 31401
          Telephone: (912) 244-3999
          Facsimile: (912) 257-7301
          E-mail: charles@charleshermanlaw.com

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          Autumn L. Gentry, Esq.
          Peter F. Klett, III, Esq.
          DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC
          424 Church Street, Suite 800
          Nashville, TN 37219
          Telephone: (615) 244-6538
          Facsimile: (844) 670-6009
          E-mail: tgary@dickinsonwright.com
                  agentry@dickinsonwright.com
                  pklett@dickinsonwright.com

WILMA PENNINGTON-THURMAN: Sansone Suit Remanded to State Court
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge John A. Ross of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri, Eastern Division, remanded the case, SANSONE
GROUP DDR LLC, for MARYVILLE GARDENS APTS, Plaintiff, v. WILMA M.
PENNINGTON-THURMAN, Defendant, Case No. 4:19-CV-2298-JAR (E.D.
Mo.), back to the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Associate
Judge Division.

On May 7, 2019, Sansone filed a petition in the 22nd Judicial
Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Associate Circuit Division,
alleging that Defendant Pennington-Thurman breached a written
residential lease.  Sansone sought judgment under Missouri state
law for $1,800 in unpaid rent, along with possession of the
premises.

On May 28, 2019, Pennington-Thurman filed a notice of removal,
which was docketed as a new case, Sansone Group DDR LLC v.
Pennington-Thurman, No. 4:19-CV-1432-JAR ("Pennington-Thurman I").
Sansone filed a motion to remand, which the Court granted.  The
Court found that there was no federal question jurisdiction,
therefore, if jurisdiction existed at all it must be predicated
upon diversity of citizenship.  However, the Court found the
parties were not diverse and the amount in controversy was below
the judicial threshold.  It remanded the case to the 22nd Judicial
Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Associate Circuit
Division.

On Aug. 5, 2019, Pennington-Thurman filed a second notice of
removal in the Court.  This notice of removal was docketed in the
instant case.  In her second notice of removal, the Defendant
states that the case is an action under the Class Action Fairness
Act ("CAFA").  This gives the Court jurisdiction over civil actions
in which the matter in controversy exceeds the same or value of $5
million exclusive of interest and cost, the proposed class consists
of more than 100 members and any member of the class of the
Plaintiffs is a citizen of a state different from any Defendant.
The Defendant's second notice of removal also seeks certification
of a class of all current and former tenants of Maryville Gardens
Apartments, which the Court construes as a motion to certify a
class.

Judge Ross will deny the Defendant's motion to certify a class
action, and will remand again the case to the Circuit Court of the
City of St. Louis.  Under Rule 23(a)(4), a class representative
must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Additionally, a litigant may bring her own claims to federal court
without counsel, but not the claims of others.  Moreover, even if
defendant could adequately represent a class, a counterclaim cannot
serve as the basis for `arising under' jurisdiction.

Because the Court has previously found it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the case, and because the Defendant, a pro se
litigant, cannot bring a class action counterclaim against the
Plaintiff pursuant to CAFA, the action will be remanded to the 22nd
Judicial Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Associate Judge
Division.

Accordingly, Judge Ross remanded the case to the 22nd Judicial
Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Associate Judge Division,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1447(c).  A separate order of remand
will be entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 9, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/4laOzl from Leagle.com.

Sansone Group DDR LLC, for Maryville Garden Apts, Plaintiff,
represented by Patrick T. McLaughlin -- pmclaughlin@spencerfane.com
-- SPENCER FANE LLP.

Wilma M. Pennington-Thurman, Defendant, pro se.


ZUORA INC: MTA and Hagens Berman to Lead Securities Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
Zuora, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on September 16, 2019, for the quarterly
period ended July 31, 2019, that the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California has appointed a lead plaintiff and
lead counsel in a class action lawsuit against the Company.

On June 14, 2019, a securities class action lawsuit was filed in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
naming the Company and certain of its officers as defendants.

The complaint purports to bring suit on behalf of shareholders who
purchased or otherwise acquired the Company's securities between
April 12, 2018 and May 30, 2019.

The complaint alleges that defendants made false and misleading
statements about the Company's business, operations and prospects
in violation of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended (Exchange Act), and seeks unspecified
compensatory damages, fees and costs.

On September 9, 2019, the district court appointed the lead
plaintiff and lead counsel. The Company believes the plaintiff's
allegations are without merit and intends to defend vigorously
against the claims.

                            *     *     *

On August 13, 2019, New Zealand Methodist Trust Association filed a
motion for appointment as lead plaintiff and approval of MTA's
selection of the law firm of Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP as
lead counsel, stating that MTA had suffered financial losses of
over $700,000 in connection with MTA's purchases of the securities
of Zuora, Inc. between April 12, 2018 and May 30, 2019, inclusive.

That same day, six other competing movants filed similar motions,
claiming to have suffered lesser investment losses than MTA during
the Class Period:

     (1) Kyle J. Krauseneck;

     (2) City of Fort Lauderdale Police & Fire Retirement System;

     (3) Danish Parbtani;

     (4) Ahtesham Ahmed, Dimitri Nekrassov and Robert Zweben;

     (5) Pierre Kohler; and

     (6) Derek Selanders.

Therafter, competing movants Kohler and the Zoura Investor Group
withdrew their respective motions.  Competing movants Parbtani,
Selanders, the City of Fort Lauderdale Police & Fire Retirement
System, and Krauseneck submitted notices of non-opposition to the
competing lead plaintiff motions.

Accordingly, with there being no opposition to MTA's Motion for
Appointment as Lead Plaintiff and Approval of Counsel, and with
good cause appearing therefor, the Court granted MTA's request,
saying it satisfies the requirements for lead plaintiff appointment
under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act.

MTA is represented by:

     Reed R. Kathrein, Esq.
     Steve W. Berman, Esq.
     Danielle Smith, Esq.
     Lucas E. Gilmore, Esq.
     Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP
     Tel: 510-725-3000
     E-mail: reed@hbsslaw.com
             steve@hbsslaw.com
             danielles@hbsslaw.com
             lucasg@hbsslaw.com

Zuora said, "Given the procedural posture and the nature of this
lawsuit, including that the proceedings are in the early stages,
the Company is unable to estimate the reasonably possible loss or
range of loss, if any, that may result from this matter."

Zuora, Inc. develops cloud based software. The Company offers an
online subscription billing and management platform that provides
pricing subscription orders, rating, accounting, and payment
services. Zuora operates worldwide. The company is based in San
Mateo, California.



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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