CAR_Public/190927.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, September 27, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 194

                            Headlines

A.V.M. ENTERPRISES: Court Denies Gorss' Class Certification Bid
AAF PLAYERS: Schmidt et al. Suit Transferred to W.D. Texas
ABRASIVE-FORM LLC: Johnson Sues Over Illegal Use of Biometric Data
ACE CASH: Carter Suit Seeks to Stop Illegal Calls Under TCPA
ALECTO HEALTHCARE: Reed et al. Sue over Abrupt Closure

ALEXIAN VILLAGE: Smith Seeks OT Pay for Front-Line Care Employees
AMERIGLASS ENGINEERING: Pena-Cintra Seeks Overtime Wages
AMR AUTO: Bognanno Seeks OT Pay for Retail Sales Staff
ASWAD & INGRAHAM: Faces Choi FDCPA Suit in District of New Jersey
BELLSOUTH TELECOM: Espinosa Seeks Unpaid Overtime Pay Under FLSA

BERKS COUNTY, PA: Appeals Ruling in Victory Suit to 3rd Circuit
BIODELIVERY SCIENCES: Disregarded Stockholder Votes, Drachman Says
CABOT OIL: Uronis Alleges Retaliation, Seeks OT & Back Pay
CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT: Palkon Balks at Eldorado Merger Deal
CHICAGO, IL: Bid to Certify Public School Students Class Sought

CHRISTIAN DIOR: Brooks Sues Over Blind-inaccessible Web Site
CITIBANK NA: Dismissal of Interest Rate Benchmarks Suit Appealed
CITYWIDE ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES: Belli Sues in NY State Court
COCA COLA BEVERAGES: Conklin ERISA Suit Removed to M.D. Fla.
COMENITY BANK: Faces Taylor Suit in Northern District of Illinois

CONSOLIDATED WORLD: B&F, Lite DePalma File Class Action Suit
CVS HEALTH: Schall Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
DAZZLING EVENTS: Romero Seeks Overtime Pay for Event Organizers
DELTA AIR: Donoff Seeks to Certify Class
DIRECT ENERGY: Forte Seeks to Certify Class

DUGAN & MCKISSICK: Stadtler Sues over Debt Collection Practices
EDISON INTERNATIONAL: Faces Caruso Suit in California State Court
EFINANCIAL LLC: Illegally Sends Text Ads, Borden TCPA Suit Claims
EJF REAL: Reyes et al Suit Moved to District of Maryland
EL POLLO LOCO: Court OKs Settlement in Turocy Suit

ELEVATE SAINT: Collins Hits Biometrics Data Sharing
ENSURETY VENTURES: Eleventh Circuit Appeal Filed in Hirsch Suit
FCA US: 6th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Swanigan LRMA Suit
FERGUSON, MO: Appeals Denial of Bid to Dismiss Fant Class Action
FIRSTSOURCE ADVANTAGE: Hammon Disputes Vague Collection Letter

FLAGSTAR BANK: Strugala Appeals N.D. Cal. Ruling to Ninth Circuit
FLINT AUDIO: Faces 3rd Civil Suit Over Nude Photo-Sharing Ring
GEICO CASUALTY: Court Denies Butta's Bid to Certify Class
GENOMIC HEALTH: Seligman Balks at Exact Sciences Merger Deal
GREEN BAY PACKAGING: Harter Seeks OT Pay for Machine Operators

HC WAINWRIGHT: 9th Cir. Appeal Filed in Prodanova Securities Suit
HIGHLAND INDUSTRIES: Tillman Suit Moved to D. South Carolina
HOME CARE OF BALTIMORE: Lee et al. Seek OT Pay for Home Care Aides
HUGHES WATTERS: Fails to Provide FDCPA Disclosures, Boutte Says
HUTCHINSON TECH: St. Cyr & Uglem Allege HDD Price-Fixing

JACK'S: Hendrcks Seeks Overtime Pay
KING FUELS: Qureshi et al. Seek OT Pay for Gas Station Employees
KROGER CO: Wright Seeks Overtime Pay for Order Selectors
KROGER COMPANY: Court Grants Limited Discovery in Hawkins
L.I. PROLINER: Flores et al. Seek OT Wages for Auto Body Workers

LEO CAPITAL: Fabricant Sues over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
LL BEAN: Berger Appeals E.D.N.Y. Memorandum and Order to 2nd Cir.
LLEWELLYN CORP: Griffin Sues Over Misclassification, Retaliation
MARINA & ELMER: Mejia Seeks Unpaid OT Pay for Automotive Detailers
MDL 2641: Cordle v. CR Bard Suit over IVC Filters Consolidated

MDL 2641: Ellison v. CR Bard Suit over IVC Filters Consolidated
MDL 2641: Leclair v. CR Bard Suit over IVC Filters Consolidated
MDL 2641: Sebold v. CR Bard Suit over IVC Filters Consolidated
MDL 2641: Tervo v. CR Bard Suit over IVC Filters Consolidated
MEREDITH CORP: Mroz Files Securities Class Action in Iowa

MICHIGAN: Court Denies Certification in Salem Prisoner Suit
MMI SERVICES: Hernandez Files Class Suit in Ca. Super. Ct.
MOUNT VERNON MILLS: E&G Appeals D.S.C. Decision to Fourth Circuit
MUY PIZZA: Oliver Seeks Overtime Compensation for Technicians
NAVIGANT CONSULTING: Rosenblatt Balks at Guidehouse Merger

NESTLE USA: Underpays Employees, Wilson Claims
NEW PRIME: Court Denies Pre-Certification Discovery in Haworth
NEW YORK, NY: Mitchell Files Bid for Writ of Certiorari With S.C.
OMNI SPECIALTY: Thiry Sues Omni, O'Reilly in S.D. Texas
ORTHOPAEDIC BOARD: Rosenstein Sues over Monopoly of Certification

PRADA USA: Shalamov Sues over Unsolicited Text Messages
PRETTUM PACKAGING: Trost Sues over Collection of Biometric Data
PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN: 11th Cir. Flips Class Certification
REGIONAL TRANS: Singer Seeks to Certify Illinois Wage Class
RELIABLE PCA: Badon Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Under FLSA

ROSE GROUP: Faces Williams Suit in District of Maryland
SALLIE MAE: 2d Cir. Remands Order Vacating $108K Arbitration Award
SAN MARINO AT SOHO: Restaurant Staff Seeks Unpaid Overtime
SANOFI-AVENTIS: Garza Sues Over Sale of Carcinogenic Drug
SAS MANAGEMENT: Valverde Seeks Unpaid Wages for Employees

SILK OPERATING: Trust Sues over Vanilla Labeling in Products
SOLIANT HEALTH: Casement Labor Suit Removed to E.D. California
STEFA PROPERTIES: Faces Kennedy Suit in Southern Dist. of Florida
STERN & STERN: Faces Kivo FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
STRONGHEALTH NETWORK: Solano Seeks Overtime Wages for Drivers

SUNDIAL GROWERS: Peters Sues over Stock Price Plunge
TRISTAR PRODUCTS: Slutsky & Graeves Sue over Copper Chef Pan Ads
TWIN 918: Simmons Seeks Minimum & OT Wages for Dancers
UBER TECH: Misclassifies Drivers as Contractors, McRay Says
USAA CASUALTY: Sutton Suit Moved to Southern District of Florida

USI SOLUTIONS: Chai Sues Over Illegal Debt Collection Letters
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY: Cunningham Suit Asserts TCPA Violations
VINEYARD VINES: Casio Files Suit Over Illusory Price Discounts
WAL-MART ASSOCIATES: Appeals Decision in Garcia Suit to 9th Cir.
WASHTENAW COUNTY, MI: Smith Appeals Monroe Cir. Ct. Ruling

WASTE MANAGEMENT: Court Narrows Claims in RCRA Suit
WINTER PARK, FL: Maunu Seeks Overtime Compensation
WOODSTREAM CORP: Faces Maroney Suit in Southern Dist. of New York

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Argo Group Had $41.9MM A&E Reserves at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Con Edison Spent $16MM for Manhattan Incident
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Denial of Square D Summary Judgment Affirmed
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Denial of Unlimited Access to Exhibits Affirmed
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Exelon Unit Had US$84MM Reserves at June 30

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Janis' Claim vs. Georgia Pacific, et al., Junked
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Johnson Controls Has $538MM Liability at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Minerals Technologies Defends 71 Cases at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: OI Inc. Accrues $5BB from 1993 to June 30, 2019
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Quaker Chemical Unit Defends Suits at June 30



                            *********

A.V.M. ENTERPRISES: Court Denies Gorss' Class Certification Bid
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as GORSS MOTELS INC., the
Plaintiff, v. A.V.M. ENTERPRISES, INC., and JOHN DOES 1–5,
Defendants, Case No. 3:17-cv-01078-KAD (D. Conn.), the Hon. Judge
Kari A. Dooley entered an order on Sept. 10, 2019, denying Gorss'
motion for class certification of:

   "the putative class consisting of Gorss as well as the other
   persons or entities who purportedly received the Faxes. Gorss
   identifies 3,419 unique fax numbers that received the June 15,
   2015 fax and 2,762 unique fax numbers that received the May 16,

   2016 fax."

A.V.M. argues that this litigation will be driven by the question
of whether each putative class member consented to receiving the
Faxes. Because resolving this question will require a highly
individualized, fact-intensive inquiry as to each class member's
relationship with Wyndham and A.V.M. (contractual or otherwise),
A.V.M. contends that whatever common questions of law or fact might
exist do not predominate over questions affecting individual class
members.

Gorss responds that common issues do predominate because whether
A.V.M. can rely upon consent given to Wyndham to send the Faxes is
a question applicable to all putative class members. Gorss further
asserts that there is no evidence that A.V.M. sought or received
express consent from any of the proposed class members to send the
Faxes. Alternatively, even if the Faxes were not "unsolicited,"
Gorss contends that they run afoul of the Solicited Fax Rule
because they did not contain opt-out notices.

The Court agrees with A.V.M. that the question of whether each
class member consented to receive the Faxes at issue must be
examined on an individualized basis and that this question is more
substantial than any questions which might be answered with
generalized proof. As such, it is this individualized inquiry that
will predominate in the adjudication of Gorss' claims rendering
class certification inappropriate."[CC]


AAF PLAYERS: Schmidt et al. Suit Transferred to W.D. Texas
----------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as COLTON SCHMIDT, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated; REGGIE NORTHRUP, individually and on
behalf of others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. AAF
PLAYERS, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, d/b/a/ The
Alliance of American Football; THOMAS DUNDON, an individual;
CHARLES "CHARLIE" EBERSOL, an individual; LEGENDARY FIELD
EXHIBITIONS, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company; AAF
PROPERTIES, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company; EBERSOL
SPORTS MEDIA GROUP, INC., a Delaware Corporation; and DOES 1
through 200, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-03666
(Filed June 24, 19), was transferred from the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California to the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Texas (San Antonio) on Sept. 9, 2019.
The Western District of Texas Court Clerk assigned Case No.
5:19-cv-01080 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiffs allege that AAF Players, LLC breached a written
contract with  each and every member of the putative class by
failing to pay Plaintiff's annual base compensation.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are Represented by:

          Boris Treyzon, Esq.
          Jonathon Shahab Farahi, Esq.
          ABIR COHEN TREYZON SALO, LLP
          16001 Ventura Blvd., Suite 200
          Encino, CA 91436
          Telephone: (424) 288-4367

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          Jason I. Bluver, Esq.
          Leila Narvid, Esq.
          PAYNE & FEARS LLP
          235 Pine Street, Suite 1175
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 738-6850
          Facsimile: (415) 738-6855

               - and -

          Alana Kalantzakis Ackels, Esq.
          BELL NUNNALLY & MARTIN
          2323 Ross Avenue, Suite 1900
          Dallas, TX 75201
          Telephone: (214) 740-1400
          Facsimile: (214) 710-1499

               - and -

          Brent Douglas Hockaday, Esq.
          Brent A. Turman, Esq.
          Jeffrey Scott Lowenstein, Esq.
          BELL NUNNALLY & MARTIN LLP
          3232 McKinney Avenue, Suite 1400
          Dallas, TX 75204
          Telephone: (214) 740-1446
          Facsimile: (214) 740-5746
          E-mail: bhockaday@bellnunnally.com
                  bturman@bellnunnally.com
                  jlowenstein@bellnunnally.com

ABRASIVE-FORM LLC: Johnson Sues Over Illegal Use of Biometric Data
------------------------------------------------------------------
CALEB JOHNSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. ABRASIVE-FORM, LLC doing business as Abrasive Form,
Case No. 2019L001023 (Ill. Cir., DuPage Cty., Sept. 10, 2019),
seeks to put a stop to the Defendant's unlawful collection, use,
and storage of the Plaintiff's and the putative Class members'
sensitive biometric data, in violation of the Biometric Information
Privacy Act.

Abrasive is an Illinois LLC with multiple locations in Illinois.
When employees, including the Plaintiff, work at Abrasive, they are
required to scan their fingerprint in its biometric time tracking
system as a means of authentication, instead of using only key fobs
or other identification cards.

Founded in 1976, Abrasive operates in the Industrial Gas Turbine,
Aerospace, and General Industrial sectors.  The Company operates
from multiple facilities in Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David Fish, Esq.
          John Kunze, Esq.
          Thalia Pacheco, Esq.
          THE FISH LAW FIRM, P.C.
          200 East Fifth Avenue, Suite 123
          Naperville, IL 60563
          Telephone: (630) 355-7590
          Facsimile: (630) 778-0400
          E-mail: dfish@fishlawfirm.com
                  kunze@fishlawfirm.com
                  tpacheco@fishlawfirm.com


ACE CASH: Carter Suit Seeks to Stop Illegal Calls Under TCPA
------------------------------------------------------------
MARY CARTER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. ACE CASH EXPRESS, INC., Case No. 4:19-cv-05629 (N.D.
Cal., Sept. 6, 2019), is brought under the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act seeking to:

   (1) stop the Defendant's practice of placing calls using an
       automatic telephone dialing system ("ATDS") to the
       cellular telephones of consumers nationwide without their
       prior express written consent;

   (2) enjoin the Defendant from continuing to place calls using
       an ATDS to consumers, who did not provide their prior
       express written consent to receive them; and

   (3) obtain redress for all persons injured by the Defendant's
       conduct.

Ace Cash Express, Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws of
Texas with a principal place of business at 1231 Greenway Drive,
Suite 600, in Irving, Texas.  Ace Cash Express conducts business in
this District and throughout the United States.

ACE Cash, doing business as Populus Financial Group, provides
financial services.  The Company specializes in lending, card
services, check cashing, bill payment, and money transfer.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          L. Timothy Fisher, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          1990 North California Blvd., Suite 940
          Walnut Creek, CA 94596
          Telephone: (925) 300-4455
          E-mail: ltfisher@bursor.com

               - and -

          Scott A. Bursor, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          2665 S. Bayshore Dr., Suite 220
          Miami, FL 33133-5402
          Telephone: (305) 330-5512
          Facsimile: (305) 676-9006
          E-mail: scott@bursor.com


ALECTO HEALTHCARE: Reed et al. Sue over Abrupt Closure
------------------------------------------------------
KEITH REED, LISA DOLENCE, ELIZABETH SCHENKEL, EMILY WINES, AND MARK
GARAN, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs, vs. ALECTO HEALTHCARE SERVICES LLC, and ALECTO
HEALTHCARE SERVICES WHEELING, LLC d/b/a OHIO VALLEY MEDICAL GROUP
and d/b/a OVMC PHYSICIANS, the Defendants, Case No.
5:19-cv-00263-FPS (N.D. W.Va., Sept. 9, 2019), alleges that
Defendants violated the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act of 1988.

According to the complaint, before ceasing all operations on or
about September 5, 2019, the Defendants failed to provide 60 days'
notice to Plaintiffs and the Class as required by the WARN
Act.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Timothy F. Cogan, Esq.
          CASSIDY, COGAN, SHAPELL & VOEGELIN, L.C.
          The First State Capitol Building
          1413 Eoff Street
          Wheeling, WV 26003
          Telephone: 304 232-8100
          Facsimile: 304 232-8200
          E-mail: tfc@walslaw.com

               - and -

          Vincent J. Mersich, Esq.
          Maureen Davidson-Welling, Esq.
          John Stember, Esq.
          STEMBER COHN & DAVIDSON-WELLING, LLC
          The Hartley Rose Building
          425 First Avenue, 7th Floor
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 338-1445
          Facsimile: (412) 338-1446
          E-mail: vmersich@stembercohn.com
                  mdw@stembercohn.com
                  jstember@stembercohn.com

ALEXIAN VILLAGE: Smith Seeks OT Pay for Front-Line Care Employees
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CARLA SMITH, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. ALEXIAN VILLAGE OF MILWAUKEE, INC.,
the Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-1308 (E.D. Wisc., Sept. 10, 2019),
contends that the Defendant operated (and continues to operate) an
unlawful compensation system that deprives current and former
hourly-paid, non-exempt Front-Line Care employees of their wages
earned for all compensable work performed each workweek, including
at an overtime rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of 40
hours in a workweek.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover unpaid overtime compensation,
liquidated damages, costs, attorneys' fees, declaratory and/or
injunctive relief, and/or any other relief the Court may deem
appropriate pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and
Wisconsin's Wage Payment and Collection Laws.

The Defendant is a senior living facility.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff is:

          James A. Walcheske, Esq.
          Scott S. Luzi, Esq.
          WALCHESKE & LUZI, LLC
          15850 W. Bluemound Rd., Suite 304
          Brookfield, WI 53005
          Telephone: (262) 780-1953
          Facsimile: (262) 565-6469
          E-mail: jwalcheske@walcheskeluzi.com
                  sluzi@walcheskeluzi.com

AMERIGLASS ENGINEERING: Pena-Cintra Seeks Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------
ALBERTO PENA-CINTRA, similarly situated individuals, and other
Plaintiff(s), vs. AMERIGLASS ENGINEERING, INC. A/K/A AMERIGLASS
INC; ENTERPRISE HR II, INC.; JUAN ALVAREZ and SAMUEL VERDECIA, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-23783-XXXX (S.D. Fla., Sept. 11,
2019), seeks to  recover money damages for unpaid overtime wages
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendants from approximately Jan. 16,
2013 to July 3, 2019. The Plaintiff did not work for approximately
15 weeks due to surgery and medical treatment. In total, the
Plaintiff worked approximately 127 compensable weeks under the Act,
or 127 compensable weeks if counted 3 years back from the filing of
the action.

The Defendants paid Plaintiff on average approximately $13.5 per
hour. However, the Defendants did not properly compensate the
Plaintiff for hours that Plaintiff worked in excess of 40 per week,
the lawsuit says.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          R. Martin Saenz, Esq.
          SAENZ & ANDERSON, PLLC
          20900 NE 30th Avenue, Ste. 800
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (305) 503-5131
          Facsimile: (888) 270-5549
          E-mail: msaenz@saenzanderson.com

AMR AUTO: Bognanno Seeks OT Pay for Retail Sales Staff
------------------------------------------------------
GUY S. BOGNANNO, individually and on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. AMR AUTO HOLDINGS -
MR LLC d/b/a MERCEDES-BENZ OF HANOVER, AUTOMILE HOLDINGS, LLC d/b/a
PRIME MOTOR GROUP, DAVID ROSENBERG, DAVID GENTILE, MANUEL VIANNA
and JAMES PRESTIANO, the Defendants, Case No. 19-1133 (Mass.
Super., Sept. 5, 2019), alleges that Defendants failed to pay
Plaintiff one and one-half times his regular rates of pay times the
prevailing minimum wage for employees paid on a 100% commission
basis or one and one-half times the employee's weekly salary
divided by the number of hours the employee worked for employees
paid on a salary' plus commission basis - for all hours worked over
40 during each seven day workweek and/or all hours worked on each
Sunday and/or holiday pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws.

The Plaintiff and Class Members are employees of Defendants who
provided retail sales services to Defendants and are paid weekly on
a 100% commission basis and/or salary plus commission basis.

AMR Auto Holdings operates as a holding company. The company,
through its subsidiaries, provides retail sale of new and used
automobiles.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Edward C. Cumbo, Esq.
          Robert Richardson, Esq.
          RICHARDSON & CUMBO, LLP
          225 Franklin Street, 26th Floor
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (617) 217-2779
          E-mail: e.cumbo@rc-llp.com
                  r.richardson@rc-llp.com

ASWAD & INGRAHAM: Faces Choi FDCPA Suit in District of New Jersey
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Aswad & Ingraham,
LLP. The case is captioned as JASON CHOI Individually and on Behalf
of All Other Similarly Situated Consumers, the Plaintiff, vs. ASWAD
& INGRAHAM, LLP, the Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-17695-SDW-SCM
(D.N.J., Sept. 6, 2019). The suit alleges violation of the Fair
Debt Collection Act. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Susan
D. Wigenton.

Aswad & Ingraham is a law firm in Binghamton, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel Zemel, Esq.
          ZEMEL LAW LLC
          1373 Broad Street, Suite 203-C
          Clifton, NJ 07013
          Telephone: (862) 227-3106
          E-mail: dz@zemellawllc.com

BELLSOUTH TELECOM: Espinosa Seeks Unpaid Overtime Pay Under FLSA
----------------------------------------------------------------
MODESTO ESPINOSA, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated v. BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, LLC, a Georgia Limited
Liability Company, a/k/a AT&T, Case No. 1:19-cv-23757-XXXX (S.D.
Fla., Sept. 10, 2019), alleges that under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, the Plaintiff is entitled to be paid time and one-half of his
applicable regular rates of pay for each hour he worked for AT&T as
a non-exempt employee in excess of 40 hours per work week.

Bellsouth Telecommunications, LLC is a Georgia Limited Liability
Company, a/k/a AT&T.

The Defendant owned and operated a communications business that
provides wireless and telephone and other services to customers at
multiple locations throughout Florida, including in Miami-Dade
County, as well as other locations across the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Keith M. Stern, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF KEITH M. STERN, P.A.
          80 SW 8th Street, Suite 2000
          Miami, FL 33130
          Telephone: (305) 901-1379
          E-mail: employlaw@keithstern.com


BERKS COUNTY, PA: Appeals Ruling in Victory Suit to 3rd Circuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Kevin S. Barnhardt, County of Berks, Christian Y.
Leinbach, Janine Quigley, Mark C. Scott and Stephanie Smith filed
an appeal from a Court ruling entered in the lawsuit titled Theresa
Victory, et al. v. County of Berks, et al., Case No. 5-18-cv-05170,
in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.

The appellate case is captioned as Theresa Victory, et al. v.
County of Berks, et al., Case No. 19-3060, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Aug. 8, 2019, the
Defendants appealed from a Court ruling in the lawsuit.  That
appellate case is entitled Theresa Victory, et al. v. County of
Berks, et al., Case No. 19-2695.

The Plaintiffs sought certification of this class:

     All current and future female inmates committed to the Berks
     County Jail System who have the Trusty custody-level
     classification and/or Work Release status but have been
     denied assignment to the Community Reentry Center ("CRC")
     and denied access to the privileges, services, and programs
     available to men assigned to the CRC.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees THERESA VICTORY, ALICE VELAZQUEZ DIAZ and
ANABELL DEALBA, AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, are represented
by:

          Matthew A. Feldman, Esq.
          Angus R. Love, Esq.
          Su Ming Yeh, Esq.
          PENNSYLVANIA INSTITUTIONAL LAW PROJECT
          718 Arch Street, Suite 304 South
          Philadelphia, PA 19106
          Telephone: (215) 925-2966
          E-mail: mfeldman@pailp.org
                  alove@pailp.org
                  smyeh@pailp.org

Defendants-Appellants COUNTY OF BERKS, et al., are represented by:

          Matthew J. Connell, Esq.
          Samantha Ryan, Esq.
          MACMAIN LAW GROUP
          433 West Market Street, Suite 200
          West Chester, PA 19382
          Telephone: (484) 318-7106
          E-mail: mconnell@macmainlaw.com
                  SRyan@macmainlaw.com


BIODELIVERY SCIENCES: Disregarded Stockholder Votes, Drachman Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
THEODORE DRACHMAN and DIANA KNIGHT, individually and on behalf of
themselves and all other similarly situated stockholders of
BIODELIVERY SCIENCES INTERNATIONAL, INC., the Plaintiffs, vs.
BIODELIVERY SCIENCES INTERNATIONAL, INC., HERM CUKIER, TODD C.
DAVIS, PETER S. GREENLEAF, KEVIN KOTLER, FRANCIS E. O'DONNELL JR.,
MARK A. SIRGO, and WILLIAM MARK WATSON, the Defendants, Case No.
2019-0728 (Del. Ch., Sept. 11, 2019), alleges that BioDelivery
Sciences and its board of directors have brazenly disregarded the
results of two stockholder votes conducted at the Company's 2018
Annual Meeting of Stockholders.

In 2018, the Board adopted two amendments to the Company's
Certificate of Incorporation:

     (a) an amendment to declassify the Board in phases, with full
declassification achieved in 2020; and

     (b) an amendment changing the voting standard for the election
of directors from a "plurality" standard to a "majority of the
votes cast" standard.

Pursuant to Section 242(b) of the Delaware General Corporation Law
(DGCL), an amendment to a certificate of incorporation can be
effected only if the amendment receives approval from "a majority
of the outstanding stock entitled to vote thereon."

On July 2, 2018, the Company filed a Schedule 14A Proxy Statement
with the Securities Exchange Commission in connection with the 2018
Annual Meeting, which was held on August 2, 2018.  About 59,351,956
Shares of BioDelivery Sciences common stock were issued and
outstanding and entitled to vote on the Two Proposals. Accordingly,
both proposals needed the affirmative vote of at least 29,675,979
shares, i.e., "a majority of the outstanding stock entitled to vote
thereon."

On August 6, 2018, the Company filed an 8-K with the SEC, which
disclosed the results of the 2018 Annual Meeting. In the 8-K, the
Company disclosed that Proposal 1 received only 27,824,544 votes in
favor and Proposal received only 25,509,720 votes in favor.  Both
proposals had therefore failed.

Yet, in violation of the DGCL and in breach of their fiduciary
duties, the Board inexplicably deemed the Two Proposals as having
been "approved" by stockholders. On August 6, 2018, the Board
effectuated the Amendments by filing with the Delaware Secretary of
State an Amendment to the Certificate of Incorporation, and has
since improperly (a) begun the process of declassifying the Board,
and (b) used the "majority of the votes cast" standard for the
election of directors at the Company's 2019 Annual Meeting of
Stockholders.

Recognizing that no functional and properly advised board of
directors would intentionally violate the DGCL in this manner,
Plaintiffs made a pre-suit demand on the Board, which explained
that the Two Proposals had in fact failed and demanded certain
corrective action. Remarkably, the Board did what no responsibly
advised directors acting in good faith would ever do: nothing.
Instead, as the Board informed Plaintiffs, in determining that the
Two Proposals had been "approved" by stockholders, the Board had
used a more lenient voting standard -– one that is in direct
contravention of Section 242(b) of the DGCL the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Michael J. Farnan, Esq.
          Brian E. Farnan, Esq.
          FARNAN LLP
          919 N. Market Street, 12 th Floor
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 777-0300
          Facsimile: (302) 777-0301
          E-mail: bfarnan@farnanlaw.com
                  mfarnan@farnanlaw.com

               - and -

          Steven J. Purcell, Esq.
          Douglas E. Julie, Esq.
          Robert H. Lefkowitz, Esq.
          Kaitlyn T. Devenyns, Esq.
          Purcell Julie & Lefkowitz LLP
          708 Third Avenue, 6th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: 212-725-1000

CABOT OIL: Uronis Alleges Retaliation, Seeks OT & Back Pay
----------------------------------------------------------
MATTHEW URONIS, for himself and on behalf of those similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. CABOT OIL & GAS CORPORATION, a Texas
Corporation, and GASSEARCH DRILLING SERVICES CORPORATON, a West
Virginia Corporation and subsidiary of Cabot Oil & Gas Corporation,
the Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-01557-MEM (M.D. Pa., Sept. 9,
2019), seeks judgment against Defendants for violation of 29 U.S.C.
section 215(a)(3), as well as back pay, an equal amount in
liquidated damages, front pay, compensatory damages, punitive
damages, reasonable costs and attorneys' fees under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Mr. Uronis has suffered unlawful retaliation under the FLSA both in
the denial of his request for employment, and in CABOT's concerted
effort to keep individuals affiliated with the Messenger Action
from getting work at all CABOT locations, in order to pressure and
intimidate them into not participating or dropping their claims.

The Messenger Action seeks unpaid overtime wages under the FLSA
from inter alia CABOT, for work performed on CABOT well pads. The
Plaintiff is an opt-in plaintiff in the Messenger Action.

CABOT is an oil and natural gas production and exploration company,
which operates throughout the United States, including in
Pennsylvania.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Angeli Murthy, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN P.A.
          8151 Peters Rd., 4th Floor
          Plantation FL 33324
          Telephone: (954) 318-0268
          Facsimile: (954) 327-3016
          E-mail: Amurthy@forthepeople.com

CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT: Palkon Balks at Eldorado Merger Deal
-----------------------------------------------------------
DENNIS PALKON, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION,
JAMES HUNT, ANTHONY RODIO, THOMAS BENNINGER, JULIANA L. CHUGG,
DENISE CLARK, KEITH COZZA, JOHN DIONNE, DON KORNSTEIN, COURTNEY
MATHER, JAMES L. NELSON, RICHARD SCHIFTER, ELDORADO RESORTS, INC.,
and COLT MERGER SUB, INC., the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-01679-UNA (D. Del., Sept. 9, 2019), stems from a proposed
transaction announced on June 24, 2019, pursuant to which Caesars
Entertainment Corporation will be acquired by Eldorado Resorts,
Inc. and Colt Merger Sub, Inc.

On June 24, 2019, Caesars' Board of Directors caused the Company to
enter into an agreement and plan of merger with Eldorado. Pursuant
to the terms of the Merger Agreement, Caesars' stockholders will
receive $8.40 in cash and 0.0899 shares of Parent stock for each
share of Caesars common stock they own.

On September 3, 2019, the Defendants filed a Form S-4 Registration
Statement with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
in connection with the Proposed Transaction. The Registration
Statement omits material information with respect to the Proposed
Transaction, which renders the Registration Statement false and
misleading, the lawsuit contends.  Specifically, the Registration
Statement omits material information regarding:

     -- the Company's and Eldorado's financial projections.

     -- the analyses performed by the Company's financial advisor
in connection with the Proposed Transaction, PJT Partners LP.  With
respect to PJT's Selected Precedent Transaction Analysis, the
Registration Statement fails to disclose: (i) the transactions
observed by PJT in the analysis; and (ii) the individual multiples
and metrics for the transactions.

     -- potential conflicts of interest of PJT. The Registration
Statement fails to disclose the estimated amount of the
"discretionary fee that may be payable to PJT Partners upon the
closing of the Merger," as well as the circumstances under which
such fee is payable and whether the Defendants intend to pay PJT
the fee.

Caesars Entertainment is an American gaming hotel and casino
corporation founded in Reno, Nevada and based in Paradise, Nevada
that owns and operates over 50 properties and seven golf courses
under several brands.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 295-5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
          E-mail: bdl@rl-legal.com
                  gms@rl-legal.com

               - and -

          Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
          RM LAW, P.C.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (484) 324-6800
          Facsimile: (484) 631-1305
          E-mail: rm@maniskas.com

CHICAGO, IL: Bid to Certify Public School Students Class Sought
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as LUREATHA JACKSON, as next
friend of D.M, for herself and others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO,
JANICE K. JACKSON, in her official capacity as the Chief Executive
Office of the Chicago Public Schools, the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-05809 (N.D. Ill.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an
order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all Chicago Public Schools students with disabilities whom
      it has placed in non-public schools in the past two years or

      whom it will place at such schools in the future";

   2. designating D.M. by and through her legal guardian Lureatha
      Jackson as a class representative;

   3. designating Legal Council for Health Justice and Disability
      Rights Advocates as class counsel; and

   4. directing any notice the Court deems appropriate to class
      members under Rule 23(c)(2)(A).[CC]

The case presents one core legal question: Whether CPS's policy of
excluding the students with disabilities it places at non-public
schools from its free breakfast and lunch programs (“CPS's
Policy") violates the substantive rights guaranteed by the
Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Caroline Goodwin Chapman, Esq.
          Julie Harcum Brennan, Esq.
          LEGAL COUNCIL FOR HEALTH JUSTICE
          17 N. State Street, Suite 900
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 605-1981
          E-mail: cchapman@legalcouncil.org
                  jbrennan@legalcouncil.org

               - and -

          Jelena Kolic, Esq.
          DISABILITY RIGHTS ADVOCATES
          10 South LaSalle Street, 18th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60603
          E-mail: jkolic@dralegal.org

               - and -

          Seth Packrone, Esq.
          Michelle Caiola, Esq.
          655 Third Avenue, 14th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 644-8644
          E-mail: spackrone@dralegal.org
                  mcaiola@dralegal.org

CHRISTIAN DIOR: Brooks Sues Over Blind-inaccessible Web Site
------------------------------------------------------------
VALERIE BROOKS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. CHRISTIAN DIOR, INC., a New York corporation; and DOES
1 to 10, inclusive, Case No. 2:19-cv-01757-MCE-AC (E.D. Cal., Sept.
6, 2019), seeks to secure redress against the Defendants for their
failure to design, construct, maintain, and operate their Web site
to be fully and equally accessible to and independently usable by
the Plaintiff and other blind or visually-impaired people.

Christian Dior, Inc., is a New York corporation, with its
headquarters in Paris, France.  The Company's servers for the Web
site are in the United States.  The Company conducts a large amount
of its business in California, and the United States as a whole.
The Plaintiff is unaware of the true names, identities, and
capacities of the Doe Defendants.

The Company's Web site provides consumers with access to a
collection of luxury goods, fashion accessories, footwear, jewelry,
fragrance, makeup and skin care products, which are available
online and in retail stores for purchase.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bobby Saadian, Esq.
          Thiago Coelho, Esq.
          WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
          3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 381-9988
          Facsimile: (213) 381-9989
          E-mail: bobby@wilshirelawfirm.com
                  thiago@wilshirelawfirm.com


CITIBANK NA: Dismissal of Interest Rate Benchmarks Suit Appealed
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Fund Liquidation Holdings LLC took an appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit from the
District Court's July 26, 2019 Opinion and Order and July 26, 2019
Judgment dismissing the action titled FUND LIQUIDATION HOLDINGS
LLC, as assignee and successor-in-interest to FrontPoint Asian
Event Driven Fund L.P., on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated v. CITIBANK, N.A., BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND PLC, UBS AG,
BNP PARIBAS, S.A., OVERSEA-CHINESE BANKING CORPORATION LTD.,
DEUTSCHE BANK AG, CREDIT AGRICOLE CORPORATE AND INVESTMENT BANK,
CREDIT SUISSE AG, STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, DBS BANK LTD., UNITED
OVERSEAS BANK LIMITED, AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP,
LTD., THE BANK OF TOKYOMITSUBISHI UFJ, LTD., THE HONGKONG AND
SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION LIMITED, AND JOHN DOES NOS. 1-50, Case
No. 1:16-cv-05263-AKH (S.D.N.Y.), and all other orders entered in
the case that were adverse, either in whole or in part, to the
Plaintiff.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Aug. 12, 2019, the
District Court issued an Opinion and Order granting the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss the third amended complaint (TAC) in the case.

The TAC alleges a conspiracy to manipulate two interest rate
benchmarks, the Singapore Interbank Offered Rate (SIBOR) and the
Singapore Swap Offer Rate (SOR). FLH asserts claims of conspiracy
to restrain trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. Section 1 et seq., against financial institutions
participating in the rate setting process.  The Plaintiff also
alleges a state law claim against two defendants, Deutsche Bank AG
and Citibank N.A., for breach of implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.

The appellate case is captioned as FUND LIQUIDATION HOLDINGS LLC,
as assignee and successor-in-interest to FrontPoint Asian Event
Driven Fund L.P., on behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated v. CITIBANK, N.A., et al., Case No. 19-2719, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant Fund Liquidation Holdings LLC, as assignee and
successor-in-interest to FrontPoint Asian Event Driven Fund L.P.,
is represented by:

          Vincent Briganti, Esq.
          Geoffrey M. Horn, Esq.
          Peter St. Phillip, Esq.
          Margaret C. MacLean, Esq.
          Christian P. Levis, Esq.
          LOWEY DANNENBERG P.C.
          44 South Broadway, Suite 1100
          White Plains, NY 10601
          Telephone: (914) 997-0500
          Facsimile: (914) 997-0035
          E-mail: vbriganti@lowey.com
                  ghorn@lowey.com
                  pstphillip@lowey.com
                  mmaclean@lowey.com
                  clevis@lowey.com

Defendants-Appellees Citibank, N.A. and CitiGroup Inc. are
represented by:

          Alan M. Wiseman, Esq.
          Andrew D. Lazerow, Esq.
          Jamie A. Heine, Esq.
          COVINGTON & BURLING, L.L.P.
          One City Center, 850 10th Street NW
          Washington, DC 20001
          Telephone: (202) 662−5069
          E-mail: awiseman@cov.com
                  alazerow@cov.com
                  jheine@cov.com

               - and -

          Andrew Arthur Ruffino, Esq.
          COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
          620 Eighth Avenue
          New York, NY 10018−1405
          Telephone: (212) 841−1000
          Facsimile: (212) 841−1010
          E-mail: aruffino@cov.com

               - and -

          Joel Laurence Kurtzberg, Esq.
          CAHILL GORDON & REINDEL LLP
          80 Pine Street
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 701−3000
          Facsimile: (212) 269−5420
          E-mail: JKurtzberg@cahill.com

Defendants-Appellees Bank Of America Corporation and Bank of
America, N.A., are represented by:

          Arthur J. Burke, Esq.
          Lawrence Jay Portnoy, Esq.
          Paul Steel Mishkin, Esq.
          Adam Gabor Mehes, Esq.
          Peter John Davis, Esq.
          DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL
          450 Lexington Avenue
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 450−4000
          Facsimile: (212)−450−3352
          E-mail: arthur.burke@davispolk.com
                  lawrence.portnoy@davispolk.com
                  paul.mishkin@dpw.com
                  adam.mehes@davispolk.com
                  peter.davis@davispolk.com

Defendants-Appellees JPMorgan Chase & Co and JP Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A. are represented by:

          Paul Christopher Gluckow, Esq.
          Thomas C. Rice, Esq.
          Alan Craig Turner, Esq.
          Alexander Nuo Li, Esq.
          Eamonn Wesley Campbell, Esq.
          Francis John Acott, Esq.
          Isaac Martin Rethy, Esq.
          Jonathan Thomas Menitove, Esq.
          Mary Beth Forshaw, Esq.
          Michael Steven Carnevale, Esq.
          Omari Largos Royter Mason, Esq.
          Rachel Serenity Sparks Bradley, Esq.
          Sarah Emily Phillips, Esq.
          SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP
          425 Lexington Avenue
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 455−2653
          Facsimile: (212) 455−2502
          E-mail: pgluckow@stblaw.com
                  trice@stblaw.com
                  aturner@stblaw.com
                  zander.li@stblaw.com
                  eamonn.campbell@stblaw.com
                  francis.acott@stblaw.com
                  irethy@stblaw.com
                  jonathan.menitove@stblaw.com
                  mforshaw@stblaw.com
                  michael.carnevale@stblaw.com
                  omason@stblaw.com
                  rachel.sparksbradley@stblaw.com
                  sarah.phillips@stblaw.com

               - and -

          Abram Jeremy Ellis, Esq.
          SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP
          900 G Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20001
          Telephone: (202) 220−7795
          Facsimile: (202) 220−7702
          E-mail: aellis@stblaw.com


CITYWIDE ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES: Belli Sues in NY State Court
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Department of
Citywide Administrative Services and the Civil Service Commission.
The case is captioned as BELLI, MARK , VICTOR ROA AND ALL OTHER
SIMILARLY SITUATED CANDIDATES, the Plaintiff, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF
CITYWIDE ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES AND THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
the Defendant, Case No. 158713/2019 (N.Y. Sup., Sept. 7, 2019).
The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Melissa Anne Crane.

The New York City Department of Citywide Administrative Services
(DCAS) is the department of the government of New York City that
manages, leases, and purchases city real property; operates,
manages, and repairs courthouses and other city-owned public
buildings; administers an energy conservation program; purchases
supplies, materials and equipment for use by city agencies; is
responsible for citywide fleet management including operation and
maintenance of a motor vehicle pool; and supports government
recruitment.[BN]

COCA COLA BEVERAGES: Conklin ERISA Suit Removed to M.D. Fla.
------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Jeremy Conklin, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Coca Cola Beverages
Florida, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 93517814 (Fla. Cir., August 1,
2019), was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Florida on August 26, 2019, under Case No.
19-cv-02137.

Conklin, a former employee of Coca Cola Beverages Florida alleged
that Coca-Cola failed to provide required notices of their right to
continued health care coverage under the Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 and has repeatedly violated the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 by failing to
provide participants and beneficiaries in the benefit plan with
adequate notice of their right to continue their health coverage.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Luis Cabassa, Esq.
      Brandon J. Hill, Esq.
      WENZEL FENTON CABASSA, PA
      1110 N Florida Ave., Ste. 300
      Tampa, FL 33602-3343
      Tel: (813) 224-0431
      Fax: (813) 229-8712
      Email: lcabassa@wfclaw.com
             bhill@wfclaw.com

Coca-Cola Beverages is represented by:

      Jessica Malloy-Thorpe, Esq.
      MILLER & MARTIN, PLLC
      Volunteer Building, Suite 1200
      Chattanooga TN 37402-2289
      Tel: (423) 785-8356
      Email: jessica.malloy-thorpe@millermartin.com


COMENITY BANK: Faces Taylor Suit in Northern District of Illinois
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Comenity Bank. The
case is captioned as Quinneidrah Taylor, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Comenity Bank,
the Defendant, Case No.  1:19-cv-05954 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 5, 2019).
The suit alleges violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The
case is assigned to the Hon. John Robert Blakey.

Comenity Bank is a major issuer of credit cards, with a heavy focus
on co-branded retail store credit cards.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David M. Marco, Esq.
          Larry Paul Smith, Esq.
          SMITHMARCO, P.C.
          55 W. Monroe Street, Suite 1200
          Bradenton, FL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 546-6539
          E-mail: dmarco@smithmarco.com
                  lsmith@smithmarco.com

CONSOLIDATED WORLD: B&F, Lite DePalma File Class Action Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Bursor & Fisher, P.A. and Lite DePalma Greenberg LLC announce that
a lawsuit has been filed against Consolidated World Travel, Inc.,
doing business as Holiday Cruise Line ("CWT"), claiming that
Defendant directed another company called Virtual Voice
Technologies Pvt. Ltd. ("VVT") to place telephone calls using a
prerecorded voice to individuals without prior consent in violation
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").

The Court has allowed the lawsuit to be a class action on behalf of
all Illinois residents (1) who VVT called from December 29, 2014
through March 20, 2016, to market a cruise aboard the Grand
Celebration cruise liner sold by CWT, and (2) who answered such
calls ("Class Members"). Calls to Class Members all began the same
way: "Hi, this is Jennifer with Holiday Cruise Line on a recorded
line. Can you hear me okay?"

The Plaintiffs are generally asking the Court to award at least
$500 per call answered by Class Members. No money or benefits are
available now because the Court has not yet made a final decision
whether Defendant did anything wrong, and the two sides have not
settled the case.  There is no guarantee that money or benefits
ever will be obtained.

If you are a Class Member you have to decide whether to stay in the
Class or ask to be excluded from it. If you do nothing, you will
keep the possibility of getting money or benefits that may come
from a trial or a settlement. However, you will give up any rights
to sue Defendant separately about the same legal claims made in
this lawsuit. If you want to keep your right to sue Defendant
separately about the same legal claims made in this lawsuit and
give up the possibility of getting money or benefits that may come
from a trial or a settlement you must exclude yourself from the
Class by November 15, 2019.

For more information, visit www.cruisecallsclassaction.com

Angel Bakov v. Consolidated World Travel, Inc., Case No.
1:15-cv-02980 (N.D. Ill.). [GN]


CVS HEALTH: Schall Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
announces the filing of a class action lawsuit against CVS Health
Corporation (NYSE: CVS) for violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

Investors who acquired shares of CVS in exchange for their shares
of Aetna Inc. in connection with CVS's acquisition of Aetna on
November 28, 2018, are encouraged to contact the firm before
October 14, 2019.

We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law
Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at
424-303-1964, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also
reach us through the firm's website at www.schallfirm.com, or by
email at brian@schallfirm.com.

The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. CVS's financial condition had
deteriorated due to rising costs and poor results in the long-term
care ("LTC") unit that was part of the Omnicare acquisition of
2015. These deteriorating conditions caused CVS to undertake rapid
acquisitions of LTC organizations to make up for the poorly
performing business in advance of the Aetna acquisition. The
Company also violated GAAP accounting principles related to
goodwill impairment in the LTC business. Based on these facts, the
Company's public statements were false and materially misleading
throughout the acquisition period. When the market learned the
truth about CVS, investors suffered damages.

Join the case to recover your losses.

The Schall Law Firm represents investors around the world and
specializes in securities class action lawsuits and shareholder
rights litigation. [GN]


DAZZLING EVENTS: Romero Seeks Overtime Pay for Event Organizers
---------------------------------------------------------------
Yeniffer Romero, Individually And On Behalf Of All Other Employees
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. Dazzling Events Inc. d/b/a
Dazzling Events, Royal Events Flowers Inc. d/b/a Royal Events,
Antonio Mourtil, and Michael Sachakov, the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-05133 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 9, 2019), Seeks to recover unpaid
minimum wages, unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages,
prejudgment and post-judgment interest; and attorneys' fees and
costs. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor
Law.

The Defendants have willfully and intentionally committed
widespread violations of the FLSA and NYLL by engaging in a pattern
and practice of failing to pay their employees, including
Plaintiff, overtime compensation for all hours worked over 40 each
workweek, the lawsuit says.

The Plaintiff was employed as a table and event organizer by the
Defendant. Michael Sachakov is the owner, officer, director and/or
managing agent of Dazzling Events Inc.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Jiajing Fan, Esq.
          HANG & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
          136-20 38th Avenue, Suite 10G
          Flushing, New York, 11354
          Telephone: (718)353-8522
          E-mail: jfan@hanglaw.com

DELTA AIR: Donoff Seeks to Certify Class
----------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as JUDITH MARILYN DONOFF, on
Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff,
vs. DELTA AIR LINES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 9:18-cv-81258-DMM
(S.D. Fla.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all persons in the United States who purchased a trip
      insurance policy on Delta's website within the applicable
      limitations period";

   2. appointing Mr. Cappillo as Class Representative; and

   3. appointing Leon Cosgrove and Robbins Geller as Class
      Counsel.

According to the complaint, Delta is engaged in deceptive conduct
and a racketeering enterprise by intentionally creating the
misimpression that the insurance it offered to consumers on its
website was provided by an independent company. And Delta
intentionally fails to disclose -- to anyone -- that it operates
the program to allow itself to receive substantial illegal
commission payments.[CC]

Counsel for Plaintiffs and the Class are:

          Alec H. Schultz, Esq.
          Scott B. Cosgrove, Esq.
          John R. Byrne, Esq.
          LEON C OSGROVE , LLP
          255 Alhambra Circle, Suite 800
          Coral Gables, FL 33134
          Telephone: 305.740.1986
          Facsimile: 305.437.8158
          E-mail: scosgrove@leoncosgrove.com

               - and -

          Paul J. Geller, Esq.
          Stuart A. Davidson, Esq.
          Jason H. Alperstein, Esq.
          Christopher C. Gold, Esq.
          Bradley M. Beall, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          120 East Palmetto Park Road, Suite 500
          Boca Raton, FL 33432
          E-mail: pgeller@rgrdlaw.com
                  sdavidson@rgrdlaw.com
                  jalperstein@rgrdlaw.com
                  cgold@rgrdlaw.com
                  bbeall@rgrdlaw.com

Attorneys for Delta Air Lines are:

          Lazaro Fernandez, Jr., Esq.
          Denise B. Crockett, Esq.
          STACK FERNANDEZ & HARRIS, P.A.
          1001 Brickell Bay Drive, Suite 2650
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 371-0001
          E-mail: lfernandez@stackfernandez.com
                  dcrockett@stackfernandez.com
                  gmartich@stackfernandez.com
                  mwolf@stackfernandez.com

               - and -

          David L. Balser, Esq.
          Julia C. Barrett, Esq.
          Katherine P. Nobles, Esq.
          Edward Bedard, Esq.
          KING & SPALDING LLP
          1180 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 1600
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          E-mail: dbalser@kslaw.com
                  jbarrett@kslaw.com
                  pnobles@kslaw.com
                  ebedard@kslaw.com

               - and -

          Gayle I. Jenkins, Esq.
          WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
          333 South Grand Avenue, 38th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-1543
          Telephone: (213) 615-1863
          E-mail: gjenkins@winston.com
                  rsalyer@winston.com
                  docketla@winston.coms

DIRECT ENERGY: Forte Seeks to Certify Class
-------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as MARTIN FORTE, the Plaintiff,
vs. DIRECT ENERGY SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability
Company, the Defendant, Case No. 6:17-cv-00264-FJS-ATB (N.D.N.Y.),
the Plaintiff will move the Court on November 8, 2019, for an
order:

   1. certifying a class;

   2. appointing Plaintiff Forte as Class representative; and

   3. appointing KamberLaw, LLC and Steelman & Gaunt as Class
      counsel.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the putative Class are:

          Scott A. Kamber, Esq.
          Michael Aschenbrener, Esq.
          Adam C. York, Esq.
          KAMBERLAW, LLC
          201 Milwaukee St, Suite 200
          Denver, CO 80206
          Telephone: (212) 920-3072
          Facsimile: (212) 202-6364
          E-mail: skamber@kamberlaw.com
                  masch@kamberlaw.com
                  ayork@kamberlaw.com

               - and -

          David L. Steelman, Esq.
          STEELMAN & GAUNT
          901 Pine Street, Ste. 110
          P.O. Box 1257
          Rolla, MO 65402
          Telephone: (573) 341-8336
          E-mail: dsteelman@steelmangaunt.com

DUGAN & MCKISSICK: Stadtler Sues over Debt Collection Practices
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as JEFFERY D. STADTLER, on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. DUGAN, McKISSICK &
LONGMORE, LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 8:19-cv-02634-TJS (D. Md.,
Sept. 10, 2019), is a class action brought under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act for the benefit of Maryland consumers who
have been the target of debt collection efforts by the Defendant.

On or about June 7, 2019, Defendant sent a written communication to
Plaintiff in connection with the collection of the Debt.
Defendant's June 7 communication correspondingly contradicted,
overshadowed, and rendered ineffective the validation notice
mandated by the FDCPA, in violation of 15 U.S.C. section 1692g(b).

The harm suffered by Plaintiff is particularized in that the
violative initial debt collection letter at issue was sent to him
personally, regarded his personal alleged Debt, and failed to
properly give him statutorily mandated disclosures to which he was
entitled, the lawsuit says.

The Defendant is a law firm that includes a "collection department
that can provide a broad services, such as tracking down debtors,
preparing demand letters, filing of District and Circuit Court
actions, and judgment enforcement through garnishment, levies,
foreclosures and asset attachment."[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the proposed class are:

          Eric N. Stravitz, Esq.
          STRAVITZ LAW FIRM, PC
          4300 Forbes Boulevard—Suite 100
          Lanham, MD 20706
          Telephone: (240) 467-5741
          Facsimile: (240) 467-5743
          E-mail: eric@stravitzlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Jesse S. Johnson, Esq.
          Greenwald Davidson Radbil PLLC
          7601 N. Federal Hwy., Suite A-230
          Boca Raton, FL 33487
          Telephone: (561) 826-5477
          Facsimile: (561) 961-5684
          E-mail: jjohnson@gdrlawfirm.com

EDISON INTERNATIONAL: Faces Caruso Suit in California State Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Edison International
et al. The case is captioned as CARUSO MANAGEMENT COMPANY LTD. and
MIRAMAR ACQUISITION CO. LLC, the Plaintiffs, vs. EDISON
INTERNATIONAL and SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, the
Defendant, Case No. 19STCV32069 (Cal. Super., Sept. 10, 2019).

Edison International is a public utility holding company based in
Rosemead, California. Its subsidiaries include Southern California
Edison, and unregulated non-utility business assets Edison
Energy.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Nancy Sher Cohen, Esq.
          LATHROP GAGE LLP
          1888 Century Park E, Ste 1000
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-1714
          Telephone: (310) 789-4664
          Facsimile: (310) 789-4601
          E-mail: ncohen@lathropgage.com

EFINANCIAL LLC: Illegally Sends Text Ads, Borden TCPA Suit Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DAVID BORDEN, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. EFINANCIAL, LLC, a Washington Limited Liability
Company, Case No. 2:19-cv-01430 (W.D Wash., Sept. 6, 2019), alleges
that the Defendant violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
by using an automatic telephone dialing system ("ATDS") when it
sent the Plaintiff and the putative class members text message
advertisements without obtaining prior express written consent.

eFinancial, LLC, is a Washington Limited Liability Company with its
principal place of business located in Bellevue, Washington.

eFinancial operates as an insurance company.  The Company offers
term and whole life, dental, mental health care, vision, and auto
insurance products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel J. Bugbee, Esq.
          Dominique R. Scalia, Esq.
          DBS LAW
          155 NE 100th St., Suite 205
          Seattle, WA 98125
          Telephone: (206) 489-3819
          E-mail: dbugbee@lawdbs.com
                  dscalia@lawdbs.com


EJF REAL: Reyes et al Suit Moved to District of Maryland
--------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled as Rosa Maria Reyes and Manchester
Gardens Condominium, On her behalf and on behalf of three classes
and four subclasses of similarly situated persons, the Plaintiffs,
vs. EJF Real Estate Services, Inc.; Linowes and Blocher LLP; and
Lerch Early Brewer, Chartered, the Defendants, Case No. 468765V,
was removed from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, to the
U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland (Greenbelt) on
Sept. 11, 2019. The District of Maryland Court Clerk assigned Case
No. 8:19-cv-02643-PX to the proceeding. The suit alleges violation
of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The case is assigned to
the Hon. Judge Paula Xinis.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Jeffrey A Kahntroff, Esq.
          Matthew Dwane Skipper, Esq.
          SKIPPER LAW LLC
          2110 Priest Bridge Drive, Suite 2
          Crofton, MD 21114
          Telephone: (443) 274-6106
          Facsimile: (443) 292-4735
          E-mail: jeff@skipperlawllc.com
                  matt@skipperlawllc.com

               - and -

          Phillip R. Robinson, Esq.
          CONSUMER LAW CENTER LLC
          8737 Colesville Road, Suite 308
          Silver Spring, MD 20910
          Telephone: (301) 448-1304
          E-mail: phillip@marylandconsumer.com

Attorneys for the Linowes and Blocher LLP are:

          Daniel R Hodges, Esq.
          ECCLESTON AND WOLF PC
          7240 Parkway Drive Fourth Floor
          Hanover, MD 21076
          Telephone: (410) 752-7474
          Facsimile: (410) 752-0611
          E-mail: hodges@ewmd.com

Attorneys for the Lerch Early Brewer, Chartered, are:

          Amy Estelle Askew, Esq.
          James P. Ulwick, Esq.
          KRAMON AND GRAHAM PA
          One South St 26th Fl
          Baltimore, MD 21202
          Telephone: (410) 752-6030
          Facsimile: (410) 361-8219
          E-mail: aaskew@kg-law.com
                  julwick@kg-law.com

EL POLLO LOCO: Court OKs Settlement in Turocy Suit
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California, Southern Division, issued a Judgment and Order granting
Settling Parties' Application for Approval of the Settlement in the
case captioned DANIEL TUROCY, et al., Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. EL POLLO LOCO
HOLDINGS, INC., et al., Defendants. Case No. 8:15-cv-01343-DOC-KES,
Consolidated. (C.D. Cal.).

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this
Court hereby approves the Settlement set forth in the Stipulation
and finds that:

   (a) the Stipulation and the Settlement contained therein are, in
all respects, fair, reasonable and adequate;

   (b) there was no collusion in connection with the Stipulation;

   (c) the Stipulation was the product of informed, arm's-length
negotiations among competent, able counsel; and

   (d) the record is sufficiently developed and complete to have
enabled Lead Plaintiffs and Defendants to have adequately evaluated
and considered their positions.

Accordingly, the Court directs the Settling Parties to consummate
the Settlement pursuant to the Stipulation, as well as the terms
and provisions hereof. The Litigation and all claims contained
therein are dismissed with prejudice as to Lead Plaintiffs and the
other Class Members. The Court hereby dismisses with prejudice the
Litigation and all Released Plaintiffs' Claims including, without
limitation, Unknown Claims of the Class as against each and all of
the Released Defendant Parties. The Settling Parties are to bear
their own costs except as otherwise provided in the Stipulation.

No Person shall have any claim against Lead Plaintiffs, Lead
Counsel, or the Claims Administrator, or any other Person
designated by Lead Counsel based on determinations or distributions
made substantially in accordance with the Stipulation and the
Settlement contained therein, the Plan of Allocation, or further
order(s) of the Court.

Upon the Effective Date, Lead Plaintiffs and each of the Class
Members shall be deemed to have, and by operation of this Judgment
shall have, fully, finally and forever waived, released,
discharged, and dismissed each and every one of the Released
Plaintiffs' Claims (including, without limitation, Unknown Claims)
against each and every one of the Released Defendant Parties with
prejudice on the merits, whether or not Lead Plaintiffs or such
Class Member executes and delivers the Proof of Claim and Release
and whether or not Lead Plaintiffs or each of the Class Members
ever seeks or obtains any distribution from the Settlement Fund.
Claims to enforce the terms of the Stipulation are not released.

Without affecting the finality of this Judgment in any way, this
Court retains continuing jurisdiction over: (a) implementation of
the Settlement and any award or distribution of the Settlement
Fund, including interest earned thereon; (b) disposition of the
Settlement Fund; (c) hearing and determining applications for
attorneys' fees and expenses in the Litigation; and (d) all parties
hereto for the purpose of construing, enforcing and administering
the Settlement.

The Court finds that the Settling Parties and their respective
counsel at all times complied with the requirements of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 11.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 12, 2019
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y4ax2r7j
from Leagle.com.

Daniel Turocy, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Amber L. Eck-
ambere@haelaw.com - Haeggquist and Eck LLP, Mary K. Blasy -
mblasy@rgrdlaw.com - Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP & Darren J.
Robbins - darrenr@rgrdlaw.com - Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd
LLP.

El Pollo Loco Holdings, Inc., Trimaran Pollo Partners, L.L.C. &
Trimaran Capital Partners, Defendants, represented by Jason D.
Russell - jason.russell@skadden.com - Skadden Arps Slate Meagher
and Flom LLP, Jay B. Kasner  - jay.kasner@skadden.com - Skadden
Arps Slate Meagher and Flom LLP, pro hac vice, Michael M. Powell -
michael.powell@skadden.com - Skadden Arps Slate Meagher and Flom
LLP, pro hac vice, Michael W. Restey - michael.restey@skadden.com -
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher and Flom LLP, pro hac vice, Robert A.
Fumerton - robert.fumerton@skadden.com - Skadden Arps Slate Meagher
and Flom LLP, pro hac vice, Winston Ping Hsiao -
winston.hsiao@skadden.com - Skadden Arps Slate Meagher and Flom LLP
& Zachary Marc Faigen - zack.faigen@skadden.com - Skadden Arps
Slate Meagher and Flom LLP.


ELEVATE SAINT: Collins Hits Biometrics Data Sharing
---------------------------------------------------
Tiffany Collins, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. Elevate Saint Andrew Living Community LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 2019CH09857 (Ill. Cir., August 26, 2019),
seeks an injunction requiring Defendants to cease all unlawful
activity related to the capture, collection, storage and use of
biometrics, as well as statutory damages together with costs and
reasonable attorneys' fees for violation of the Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act.

Elevate Saint Andrew Living Community is an assisted living
facility in Niles, Illinois, where Collins was employed as a
housekeeper from February to July 2019. She was required to
"clock-in" and "clock-out" using a timeclock that scanned
fingerprints and that Elevate improperly disclosed employees'
fingerprint data without informed consent. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Douglas M. Werman, Esq.
      Maureen A. Salas, Esq.
      Sarah J. Arendt, Esq.
      Zachary C. Flowerree, Esq.
      WERMAN SALAS P.C.
      77 West Washington, Suite 1402
      Chicago, IL 60602
      Tel: (312) 419-1008
      Email: dwerman@flsalaw.com
             msalas@flsalaw.com
             zflowerree@flsalaw.com
             sarendt@flsalaw.com


ENSURETY VENTURES: Eleventh Circuit Appeal Filed in Hirsch Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Aaron Hirsch filed an appeal from a Court ruling entered
in the lawsuit styled Aaron Hirsch v. Ensurety Ventures, LLC, et
al., Case No. 3:17-cv-01215-BJD-JBT, in the U.S. District Court for
the Middle District of Florida.

The appellate case is captioned as Aaron Hirsch v. Ensurety
Ventures, LLC, et al., Case No. 19-13527, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- The appellant's brief is due on or before October 21, 2019;

   -- The appendix is due no later than 7 days from the filing of
      the appellant's brief;

   -- Appellant's Certificate of Interested Persons is due on or
      before September 23, 2019, as to Appellant Aaron Hirsch;
      and

   -- Appellee's Certificate of Interested Persons is due on or
      before October 7, 2019, as to Appellee Auto Knight Motor
      Club, Inc.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant AARON HIRSCH, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Jonathan Zachary DeSantis, Esq.
          CARLTON FIELDS JORDEN BURT, PA
          4221 W Boy Scout Blvd., Suite 1000
          PO Box 3239
          Tampa, FL 33601
          Telephone: (813) 223-7000
          E-mail: jdesantis@cfjblaw.com

               - and -

          Michael Dell'Angelo, Esq.
          Lane Lanier Vines, Esq.
          BERGER & MONTAGUE, PC
          1818 Market St., Suite 3600
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 875-4658
          E-mail: mdellangelo@bm.net
                  lvines@bm.net

               - and -

          Max F. Maccoby, Esq.
          WASHINGTON GLOBAL LAW GROUP
          1701 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 200
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 248-5439
          E-mail: maccoby@washglobal-law.com

               - and -

          Steven G. Wenzel, Esq.
          WENZEL FENTON CABASSA, PA
          1110 N Florida Avenue, Suite 300
          Tampa, FL 33602-4422
          Telephone: (813) 440-4593
          E-mail: swenzel@wfclaw.com

Defendant-Appellee ENSURETY VENTURES, LLC, d.b.a. Omega Autocare,
is represented by:

          Beth-Ann E. Krimsky, Esq.
          GREENSPOON MARDER, LLP
          200 E Broward Blvd., Suite 1800
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 527-2427
          E-mail: beth-ann.krimsky@gmlaw.com

               - and -

          William L. Tucker, Esq.
          J.B. GROSSMAN, PA
          200 E Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1660
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 452-1118

Defendants-Appellees LYNDON SOUTHERN INSURANCE COMPANY, INSURANCE
COMPANY OF THE SOUTH, LOTSOLUTIONS, INC. and AUTO KNIGHT MOTOR
CLUB, INC., are represented by:

          James F. Bogan, III, Esq.
          Jeffrey H. Fisher, Esq.
          KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON, LLP
          1100 Peachtree St., Suite 2800
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone: (404) 815-6500
          E-mail: jbogan@kilpatricktownsend.com
                  jfisher@kilpatricktownsend.com


FCA US: 6th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Swanigan LRMA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court's judgment granting
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned BEVERLY L.
SWANIGAN; BRIAN LEE KELLER; SHERI ANOLICK, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. FCA US LLC; INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE
AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA,
Defendants-Appellees. No. 18-2303. (6th Cir.).

The UAW negotiates large-scale collective-bargaining agreements on
behalf of its members with automotive manufacturers including FCA.
According to the Second Amended Complaint, FCA officials bribed UAW
officials with millions of dollars' worth of gifts and money for
the purpose of getting a more company-friendly
collective-bargaining agreement. This scandal resulted in a number
of federal convictions and indictments. In response to the bribery
scheme, plaintiffs Beverly Swanigan, Brian Keller, and Sheri
Anolick, three members of a potential class action sued defendants,
alleging violations of Section 301 of the LMRA.

Defendants FCA and UAW moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint for
failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), and their arguments in favor of dismissal were largely
consistent. In large part, both argued that the complaint failed to
state a claim for relief because their hybrid claims under Section
301 requires evidence of the violation of a contract or
collective-bargaining agreement and the complaint explicitly does
not allege that defendants violated any provision in the
collective-bargaining agreement.

They also alleged that this complaint was really a disguised claim
under Section 302 of the LMRA, which does not create a private
right of action and most assuredly does not create a right to sue
for money damages.

The district court granted defendants' motions to dismiss. The
Honorable Gershwin A. Drain agreed with defendants that plaintiffs'
failure to allege that any specific provision of any
collective-bargaining agreement was violated proved fatal to their
hybrid claim.

Second, the court held that plaintiffs' complaint failed to
sufficiently allege that they were legally excused from exhausting
both union and contractual grievance procedures.

Third, the court agreed with UAW's argument that plaintiffs failed
to allege specific injuries proximately caused by the alleged
collusive conduct of FCA and UAW.

Finally, Judge Drain denied plaintiffs' cursory request to amend
their complaint because it violated the court rules, provided no
explanation as to how plaintiffs will remedy their deficient
allegations and would be futile.

First the Court addresses the district court's dismissal of
plaintiffs' complaint for failure to plead a plausible case under
Section 301 because they failed to allege that FCA breached the
collective-bargaining agreement. The Court reviews de novo a
district court's decision to dismiss a complaint under Rule
12(b)(6).

Section 301 of the LMRA gives federal courts jurisdiction to hear
suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees. It encompasses suits by and
against individual employees as well as between unions and
employers.

Some such suits by employees are referred to as hybrid claims in
which the employee or employees must prove both (1) that the
employer breached the collective bargaining agreement and (2) that
the union breached its duty of fair representation.

Here, the district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims for failure
to allege that FCA breached the collective-bargaining agreement.
The district court was correct. Plaintiffs peppered their complaint
with allegations that the collusion between FCA and UAW and bribes
paid by FCA officials to UAW officials "affected the bargaining
process and the collectively bargained agreements. But nowhere do
they allege that FCA breached a provision of the
collective-bargaining agreement. And they acknowledged their
failure and inability to do so before the district court.

But plaintiffs' assertion that this case is unique or unusual does
not establish federal jurisdiction. Section 301 gives us
jurisdiction only to hear suits for violation of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization representing employees.
Because the complaint does not allege that FCA breached any
provision of the collective-bargaining agreement, Judge Drain
correctly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.

Here, plaintiffs admitted at the hearing on defendants' motions to
dismiss that they have filed allegations of unfair labor practices
with the National Labor Relations Board against both FCA and UAW.
The NLRB is the appropriate forum to adjudicate such claims. For
without a plausible allegation that FCA violated a specific
provision of the collective-bargaining agreement, plaintiffs'
Section 301 claim fails as a matter of law.

Rather than attack on the merits the district court's decision to
dismiss its complaint, plaintiffs spend the bulk of their appeal on
newly raised and unpreserved issues that they assert may support
reversal. However, in general, the Court do not decide unpreserved
issues first raised on appeal.

In this regard, plaintiffs contend for the first time that they
alleged violations of the contract: their argument now is that FCA
violated its implied duties of good faith and fair dealing which
are implicit in all collective-bargaining agreements by bribing UAW
officials to affect negotiations. But this claim is forfeited
because plaintiffs never raised it below.
As a general rule in this Circuit, arguments raised for the first
time on appeal are forfeited.

Here, plaintiffs forfeited their claim regarding the implied duties
of good faith and fair dealing. The Second Amended Complaint makes
no mention whatsoever of implied duties between FCA, UAW, and the
employees, and it only mentions good faith regarding FCA in the
context of arms-length negotiations and bargaining. Then, when FCA
and UAW both moved to dismiss plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint,
each motion argued that plaintiffs failed to allege that FCA
breached any collective-bargaining agreement. In their consolidated
response to both motions, plaintiffs made no mention of let alone
an argument regarding any implied duties inherent in
collective-bargaining agreements.

The word implied appears only once, in a quote of a Supreme Court
case referring to an implied requirement that disputes be settled
through contractual grievance procedures. The term good faith
appears five times, but all but one use of the word are in
reference to UAW's duties to its union members the other appears in
a quoted provision of the National Labor Relations Act addressing
the employer's and the union's mutual duty to bargain in good
faith. And the terms common law and fair dealing never once appear.


Because plaintiffs failed to raise any arguments about common-law
contractual duties in their consolidated response to defendants'
motions to dismiss, this issue is forfeited.
  
On appeal, plaintiffs assert they preserved this issue below at
oral argument on defendants' motions to dismiss.  

Plaintiffs' arguments do not make it so; a thorough scouring of the
record shows that their efforts were wholly lacking. The single
mention of common law contract principles is the only reference in
the entire hearing to common law and none of implied, good faith,
or fair dealing make any appearance in the transcript. Such an
abstract reference to common-law contract principles, without any
further elaboration or specific mention of the implied rights
plaintiffs now assert, is insufficient to preserve the argument
they press on appeal.  Because the record is wholly lacking
sufficient notice and argumentation on the issue before the
district court, plaintiffs have forfeited this issue.

In rare circumstances we may consider forfeited issues on appeal
for sufficiently compelling reasons.   But plaintiffs do not
attempt to offer compelling reasons for us to consider the
forfeited issue. This failure is itself adequate to caution us
against reaching an issue the district court never addressed.  

Therefore, the Court declines plaintiffs' belated request.

Plaintiffs also argue for the first time on appeal that even if the
district court was correct to conclude that they had not alleged
FCA's breach of the collective-bargaining agreement, they should be
allowed to proceed with a standalone claim that UAW violated its
duty of fair representation.  

Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right.

Because plaintiffs admitted below that their claims have got to be
under Section 301 or nothing, even though they knew they could
bring a standalone claim against UAW, they expressly waived
consideration of their independent claims against UAW for
violations of UAW's duty of fair representation. Therefore, this is
no basis to reverse in part the district court's dismissal of
plaintiffs' claims against UAW.

Finally, plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in
denying them leave to amend their complaint a third time. The Court
disagrees. When a district court denies a plaintiff's motion for
leave to amend the complaint because it would have been futile, the
Court typically review that decision de novo because it is a purely
legal conclusion.  But where, as here, plaintiffs have made a
request in a responsive pleading without either formally moving for
leave to amend or giving grounds for amendment, the Court reviews
for abuse of discretion.  

Plaintiffs' request to amend came by a mere passing suggestion in
their consolidated response to defendants' motions to dismiss that
if for any reason the district court feels the pleadings fall
short, plaintiffs request the opportunity to amend their pleadings
to correct any deficiencies. And plaintiffs did not attach a
proposed third amended complaint to that consolidated response to
defendants' motions to dismiss. In similar circumstances we have
held this to be an insufficient and incorrect attempt to amend.
Based on these failures alone, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying plaintiffs' perfunctory request to yet again
amend their complaint.

The Court affirms the judgment of the district court.

A full-text copy of the Sixth Circuit's September 12, 2019 Opinion
is available at  https://tinyurl.com/yxppnbvz from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Jeffrey M. Harris , CONSOVOY McCARTHY PARK PLLC, 1600
Wilson Boulevard, Suite 700 Arlington, VA 22209, for Appellants.

Julia M. Jordan , SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, Washington, D.C., for
Appellee FCA.
Abigail V. Carter , BREDHOFF & KAISER, PLLC, Washington, D.C., for
Appellee UAW.
ON BRIEF: Jeffrey M. Harris , Cameron T. Norris , CONSOVOY MCCARTHY
PARK PLLC,1600 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 700 Arlington, VA 22209,
Raymond J. Sterling , James Christian Baker , Brian J. Farrar ,
STERLING ATTORNEYS AT LAW, P.C., Governor's Place 33 Bloomfield
Hills Parkway, Suite 250, Bloomfield Hills, MI, 48304, for
Appellants.

Julia M. Jordan , SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 1700 New York Ave Nw Ste
700, Washington, DC 20006-5215, Steven L. Holley , Jacob E. Cohen ,
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 1700 New York Ave Nw Ste 700, Washington,
DC 20006-5215, Thomas W. Crammer - cranmer@millercanfield.com
-David O'Brien , MILLER, CANFIELD, PADDOCK & STONE, PLC, 101 North
Main Street, 7th Floor, Ann Arbor, MI, 48104, for Appellee FCA.

Abigail V. Carter , Elisabeth Oppenheimer , BREDHOFF & KAISER,
PLLC, 805 Fifteenth Street N.W. Washington, DC 20005-2207,
Washington, D.C., for Appellee UAW.


FERGUSON, MO: Appeals Denial of Bid to Dismiss Fant Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
The City of Ferguson, Missouri, filed an appeal from the District
Court's Memorandum and Order issued on August 6, 2019, denying its
motion to dismiss the lawsuit styled Keilee Fant, et al. v. City of
Ferguson, Case No. 4:15-cv-00253-AGF, in the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Sept. 18, 2019, the
District Court denied both the Defendant's (i) motion to dismiss
Counts I through III and V through VII in the case, and (ii) a
motion for a hearing.

The Plaintiffs in the putative class action claim that they have
been jailed by the Defendant, the City of Ferguson, on numerous
occasions because they were unable to pay cash bonds or other debts
resulting from their traffic and other minor offenses.  They allege
that, in violation of the United States Constitution and as a
matter of the City's policies and practices, they were not afforded
counsel, any inquiry into their ability to pay, or a neutral
finding of probable cause in a prompt manner; and they were held in
jail indefinitely, in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions, until
they or their friends or family members could make a monetary
payment sufficient to satisfy the City, as part of a broad,
revenue-generating scheme.

The appellate case is captioned as Keilee Fant, et al. v. City of
Ferguson, Case No. 19-2939, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript is due on or before October 21, 2019;

   -- Brief of Appellant City of Ferguson is due on October 30,
      2019;

   -- Appendix is due on October 30, 2019;

   -- Appellee brief is due 30 days from the date the court
      issues the Notice of Docket Activity filing the brief of
      appellant; and

   -- Appellant reply brief is due 21 days from the date the
      court issues the Notice of Docket Activity filing the
      appellee brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees Keilee Fant, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, et al., are represented by:

          John J. Ammann, Esq.
          Brendan Roediger, Esq.
          SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
          100 N. Tucker Blvd.
          Saint Louis, MO 63101-1930
          Telephone: (314) 977-2796
          Facsimile: (314) 977-1180
          E-mail: ammannjj@slu.edu
                  broedige@slu.edu

               - and -

          Sima Atri, Esq.
          Edward J. Hall, Esq.
          Jacqueline Marie Kutnik-Bauder, Esq.
          Blake A. Strode, Esq.
          Michael-John Voss, Esq.
          John McCann Waldron, Esq.
          ARCH CITY DEFENDERS
          440 N. Fourth Street, Suite 390
          Saint Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 361-8834
          E-mail: satri@archcitydefenders.org
                  ehall@archcitydefenders.org
                  jkutnikbauder@archcitydefenders.org
                  bstrode@archcitydefenders.org
                  mjvoss@archcitydefenders.org
                  jwaldron@archcitydefenders.org

               - and -

          Nathaniel R. Carroll, Esq.
          KEANE LAW, LLC
          7777 Bonhomme
          Clayton, MO 63105
          Telephone: (314) 391-4700
          E-mail: nathaniel@keanelawllc.com

               - and -

          Meredith Francine Craven, Esq.
          WHITE & CASE LLP
          1200 Smith Street, Suite 2300
          Houston, TX 77002
          Telephone: (713) 496-9700
          E-mail: meredith.craven@whitecase.com

               - and -

          Glenda Dieuveille, Esq.
          Lawrence Crane Moscowitz, Esq.
          Seiji Niwa, Esq.
          Dorian K. Panchyson, Esq.
          Vivake Prasad, Esq.
          Alice Tsier, Esq.
          WHITE & CASE LLP
          1221 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10002
          Telephone: (212) 819-8621
          E-mail: glenda.dieuveille@whitecase.com
                  larry.cranemoscowitz@whitecase.com
                  sniwa@whitecase.com
                  dorian.panchyson@whitecase.com
                  vivake.prasad@whitecase.com
                  alice.tsier@whitecase.com

               - and -

          Shannon Lane, Esq.
          Margaret Spicer, Esq.
          WHITE & CASE LLP
          701 13th Street, N.W.
          Washington, DC 20005-0000
          Telephone: (202) 626-3600
          E-mail: margaret.spicer@whitecase.com

               - and -

          Andrew E. Tomback, Esq.
          WHITE & CASE LLP
          1155 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10036-0000
          Telephone: (212) 819-8200
          E-mail: andrew.tomback@whitecase.com

               - and -

          Ryan Chasce Downer, Esq.
          Marco Antonio Lopez, Esq.
          Tara Mikkilineni, Esq.
          CIVIL RIGHTS CORPS
          910 17th Street, N.W., Suite 200
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 844-4975
          E-mail: ryan@civilrightscorps.org
                  marco@civilrightscorps.org
                  tara@civilrightscorps.org

               - and -

          Mauricio Alfredo Gonzalez, Esq.
          DLA PIPER, LLP
          555 Mission Street
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 836-2534

               - and -

          Thomas B. Harvey, Esq.
          ADVANCEMENT PROJECT
          1220 L Street, N.W., Suite 850
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 728-9557

               - and -

          Alexander G. Karakatsanis, Esq.
          CIVIL RIGHTS CORPS
          916 G Street, N.W., Suite 701
          Washington, DC 20001
          Telephone: (202) 681-2409
          E-mail: alec@civilrightscorps.org

Defendant-Appellant City of Ferguson, Missouri, is represented by:

          Aarnarian D. Carey, Esq.
          Ronald Alan Norwood, Esq.
          LEWIS RICE LLC
          600 Washington Avenue, Suite 2500
          Saint Louis, MO 63101
          Telephone: (314) 444-7600
          E-mail: acarey@lewisrice.com
                  rnorwood@lewisrice.com

               - and -

          Maurice B. Graham, Esq.
          GRAY AND RITTER, P.C.
          701 Market Street, Suite 800
          St. Louis, MO 63101−1826
          Telephone: (314) 241−5620
          E-mail: mgraham@grgpc.com

               - and -

          William A. Hellmich, Esq.
          Blake Hill, Esq.
          HELLMICH, HILL & RETTER, LLC
          1049 N. Clay Avenue
          Kirkwood, MO 63122
          Telephone: (314) 646-1110
          E-mail: blake@hellmichhillretter.com
                  bill@hellmichhillretter.com

               - and -

          John M. Reeves, Esq.
          REEVES LAW, LLC
          1208 Cedar Ridge Drive
          Saint Louis, MO 63146
          Telephone: (314) 775-6985


FIRSTSOURCE ADVANTAGE: Hammon Disputes Vague Collection Letter
--------------------------------------------------------------
Gary Hammon, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Firstsource Advantage, LLC, CACH, LLC and
Resurgent Capital Services, L.P., Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-05726,
(N.D. Ind., August 26, 2019), seeks actual and statutory damages,
costs and reasonable attorneys' fees under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Defendants operate a nationwide debt collection business and
attempts to collect debts from consumers in virtually every state.
Hammon defaulted on a consumer debt allegedly owed originally for a
personal credit card he had with General Electric Capital
Corporation. Defendants sent Hammon a collection letter that failed
to state effectively the name of the creditor to whom the debt was
then owned. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      David J. Philipps, Esq.
      Mary E. Philipps, Esq.
      Angie K. Robertson, Esq
      PHILIPPS & PHILIPPS, LTD.
      9760 S. Roberts Road, Suite One
      Palos Hills, IL 60465
      Tel: (708) 974-2900
      Fax: (708) 974-2907
      Email: davephilipps@aol.com
             mephilipps@aol.com
             angie@philippslegal.com


FLAGSTAR BANK: Strugala Appeals N.D. Cal. Ruling to Ninth Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Lisa Strugala filed an appeal from a Court ruling in her
lawsuit titled Lisa Strugala v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, Case No.
5:13-cv-05927-EJD, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiff
alleged that Flagstar is knowingly and intentionally failing to
report millions of dollars in mortgage interest on the Forms 1098
it issues to its borrowers, including the Plaintiff.

The improper reporting has resulted in thousands of borrowers
losing millions of dollars in tax deductions to which they were
legally entitled, Ms. Strugala argues.

The appellate case is captioned as Lisa Strugala v. Flagstar Bank,
FSB, Case No. 19-16774, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by October 10, 2019;

   -- Transcript is due on November 12, 2019;

   -- Appellant Lisa Strugala's opening brief is due on
      December 19, 2019;

   -- Appellee Flagstar Bank, FSB's answering brief is due on
      January 21, 2020; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant LISA STRUGALA, an individual, on behalf of
herself and on behalf of the class of all others similarly
situated, is represented by:

          Michael R. Brown, Esq.
          18101 Von Karman Avenue
          Irvine, CA 92612
          Telephone: (949) 435-3888

               - and -

          David James Vendler, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF DAVID J. VENDLER
          2700 South Oak Knoll Avenue
          San Marino, CA 91108
          Telephone: (213) 700-5194
          E-mail: djvlegal@gmail.com

Defendant-Appellee FLAGSTAR BANK, FSB, a Federal Savings Bank, is
represented by:

          William L. Stern, Esq.
          COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
          415 Mission Street
          San Francisco, CA 94105-2533
          Telephone: (415) 591-7069
          E-mail: wstern@cov.com


FLINT AUDIO: Faces 3rd Civil Suit Over Nude Photo-Sharing Ring
--------------------------------------------------------------
Derek Gomes, writing for Newportri.com, reports that a third civil
lawsuit has been filed against Flint Audio Video and the six men
criminally charged in an alleged nude photo- and video-sharing ring
that was perpetrated at the retailer.

The latest suit was filed in Newport County Superior Court on
Thursday on behalf of one of the 13 confirmed victims the State
Police identified during its investigation into the alleged crimes.
The other two civil suits and the criminal case against the two
co-owners of the retailer and four former co-workers remain
pending, according to online court records.

In the latest suit, the plaintiff alleges she brought her Apple
laptop to Flint in April 2014 for a diagnosis, the complaint says.
Store personnel told her the repair would be "extensive" and sold
her a replacement laptop. In June 2017, the woman brought a laptop
to Flint for service because it was "running slowly." Co-owner
Daniel Anton took the device for service and produced a contractual
service repair order, the complaint says.

The plaintiff did not give the store permission to access, copy or
disseminate her private data, which included one or more nude or
semi-nude images and/or videos, it says. She did not know any of
her files were shared until June of last year, when State Police
"asked to identify her images that had been retrieved from one or
more of the Defendants' electronic devices."

The allegations mirror those made by the plaintiffs in the other
two civil cases, one in Newport County Superior Court and the other
in Providence/Bristol County Superior Court.

Anton, co-owner Gary Gagne and the four former employees, Adam
Jilling, George Quintal, Geoffrey Preuit and Terrence Roy, face
criminal charges of accessing computers for fraudulent purposes and
conspiracy. They have pleaded not guilty. The criminal case on
Friday was continued to Oct. 4.

The investigation into the alleged activity was spurred by
complaints last year by two Flint employees. State Police
discovered that those charged made copies and shared with each
other intimate photos and videos of their female customers without
their permission, the investigative report said. The activity might
date back to at least 2011.

The other civil suit filed in Newport County Superior Court in
August of last year is a class-action suit on behalf of a "Jane
Doe" and other alleged victims, or class members. The complaint
said that while the exact number of victims was unknown, but based
"upon information and belief, the current number of impacted
victims is estimated to exceed 200, and many, if not all, of these
persons are likely members of the class ..."

The suit filed September 12 includes 11 counts, including breach of
duty of good faith and fair dealing, violation of right to privacy,
civil liability for criminal acts and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The plaintiff is demanding a jury trial and
seeking compensatory and punitive damages, legal fees and "other
relief as this court deems just." [GN]


GEICO CASUALTY: Court Denies Butta's Bid to Certify Class
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as FRANCIS J. BUTTA, vs. GEICO
CASUALTY COMPANY, Case No. 2:19-cv-00675-MAK (E.D. Pa.), the Hon.
Judge J. Kearney entered an order on Sept. 9, 2019, denying
Plaintiff's motions to:

     -- grant partial summary judgment on his declaratory judgment
claim; and

     -- certify a class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) as withdrawn
without prejudice.[CC]

GENOMIC HEALTH: Seligman Balks at Exact Sciences Merger Deal
------------------------------------------------------------
DONNA SELIGMAN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. GENOMIC HEALTH, INC., JULIAN BAKER,
FELIX BAKER, FRED COHEN, BARRY P. FLANNELLY, HENRY J. FUCHS, GINGER
L. GRAHAM, GEOFFREY M. PARKER, KIMBERLY POPOVITS, EXACT SCIENCES
CORPORATION, and SPRING ACQUISITION CORP., the Defendants, Case No.
3:19-cv-05710 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 11, 2019), is a stockholder class
action on behalf of Plaintiff and other public stockholders of
Genomic Health against the Company and members of the Company's
board of directors for breaching their fiduciary duties in
connection with a merger between Genomic Health, Exact Sciences
Corporation, and Spring Acquisition Corp.  The Defendants have
breached their fiduciary duties to Genomic Health stockholders by,
inter alia, failing to maximize the value stockholders received in
exchange for their shares.

The Merger Consideration of approximately $72.00 a share fails to
adequately compensate stockholders in light of the Company's recent
financial performance, growth prospects and the fact that the
consideration is substantially less than the Company's 52-week high
of $92.18 and the fact that as recently as March, the Company's
shares were trading above the Merger Consideration.

As a result of the deal, Genomic Health stockholders will own only
9% of the combined pro forma company.

On July 28, 2019, Genomic Health and Exact Sciences announced that
they had executed a definitive Agreement and Plan of Merger,
pursuant to which Exact Sciences, through its wholly owned
subsidiary Merger Sub, would acquire all the outstanding shares of
common stock of Genomic Health in a mixed stock and cash whereby
each share of Genomic Health would be converted into the right to
receive (a) $27.50 in cash, without interest, and (b) a number of
shares, par value $0.01 per share, of Exact Sciences equal to:

     (i) 0.36854, if the average of the volume-weighted average
prices per share of Exact Sciences Common Stock on the Nasdaq Stock
Market for each of the 15 consecutive trading days ending
immediately prior to the closing date is equal to or greater than
$120.75,

    (ii) an amount equal to the quotient obtained by dividing
$44.50 by the measurement price if the measurement price is greater
than $98.79 but less than $120.75, and

   (iii) 0.45043, if the measurement price is equal to or less than
$98.79, less any applicable withholding taxes.

The suit seeks to enjoin the Proposed Transaction or, in the event
the Proposed Transaction is consummated, to recover damages
resulting from violation of the federal securities laws by
Defendants.

Genomic Health provides clinically actionable genomic information
to personalize cancer treatment decisions in the United States and
internationally.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Evan J. Smith, Esq.
          Ryan P. Cardona, Esq.
          BRODSKY & SMITH, LLC
          9595 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 900
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Telephone: (877) 534-2590
          Facsimile: (310) 247-0160
          E-mail: esmith@brodskysmith.com
                  rcardona@brodskysmith.com

GREEN BAY PACKAGING: Harter Seeks OT Pay for Machine Operators
--------------------------------------------------------------
DOUG HARTER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. GREEN BAY PACKAGING INC., the
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00745 (W.D. Mich., Sept. 11, 2019),
contends that the Plaintiff and all other similarly situated
workers performed at least 10-30 minutes of work or more before the
start of their shifts for which they were not compensated.

Harter worked for Defendant at its manufacturing facility in
Kalamazoo from 2012 until June 2019 as a machine operator.

Green Bay Packaging is an American pulp and paper company based in
Green Bay, Wisconsin. The company produces corrugated shipping
containers, folding cartons, and coated label products.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Mark S. Wilkinson, Esq.
          PALADIN EMPLOYMENT LAW PLLC
          251 North Rose Street
          Suite 200, PMB No 288
          Kalamazoo, MI 49007-3860
          Telephone: 269 978 2474
          E-mail: mark@paladinemploymentlaw.com

               - and -

          Jesse L. Young, Esq.
          KREIS ENDERLE HUDGINS & BORSOS PC
          One Moorsbridge
          P.O. Box 4010
          Kalamazoo, MI 49003-4010
          Telephone: 269 321 2311
          E-mail: jyoung@kehb.com

HC WAINWRIGHT: 9th Cir. Appeal Filed in Prodanova Securities Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Lead Plaintiff Panthera Investment Fund L.P. filed an appeal from a
Court ruling in the lawsuit entitled Daniela Prodanova, et al. v.
H.C. Wainwright & Co., LLC, et al., Case No. 2:17-cv-07926-JAK-AS,
in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California,
Los Angeles.

The lawsuit alleges securities law violations.

The appellate case is captioned as Daniela Prodanova, et al. v.
H.C. Wainwright & Co., LLC, et al., Case No. 19-56048, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by October 7, 2019;

   -- Transcript is due on November 5, 2019;

   -- Appellant Panthera Investment Fund L.P.'s opening brief is
      due on December 16, 2019;

   -- Appellees H.C. Wainwright & Co., LLC, Edward D. Silvera and
      Mark Viklund's answering brief is due on January 14, 2020;

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant, PANTHERA INVESTMENT FUND L.P., Lead Plaintiff,
Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, is
represented by:

          Lionel Z. Glancy, Esq.
          Robert Vincent Prongay, Esq.
          GLANCY BINKOW & GOLDBERG, LLP
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 201-9150
          E-mail: lglancy@glancylaw.com
                  rprongay@glancylaw.com

               - and -

          Peter S. Linden, Esq.
          Ira M. Press, Esq.
          KIRBY MCINERNEY LLP
          250 Park Avenue, Suite 820
          New York, NY 10177
          Telephone: (212) 371-6600
          E-mail: plinden@kmllp.com
                  ipress@kmllp.com

Defendants-Appellees H.C. WAINWRIGHT & CO., LLC, MARK VIKLUND and
EDWARD D. SILVERA are represented by:

          Paul B. Salvaty, Esq.
          HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
          1999 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1400
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 785-4600
          E-mail: paul.salvaty@hoganlovells.com


HIGHLAND INDUSTRIES: Tillman Suit Moved to D. South Carolina
------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Janet Tillman, individually and on behalf of
those similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Highland Industries
Inc.; John/Jane Doe, individually; and John/Jane Doe Corporation,
the Defendants, Case No. 2019-CP-13-00566, was removed from the
Court of Common Pleas Chesterfield County, to the U.S. District
Court District of South Carolina (Florence) on Sept. 11, 2019. The
District of South Carolina Court Clerk assigned Case No.
4:19-cv-02563-DCC to the proceeding.  According to the case docket,
the nature of the suit is "Torts to Land." The case is assigned to
the Hon. Donald C Coggins, Jr.

Highland Industries specializes in the conception, design and
delivery of high-performance textiles.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          John D. Harrell, Esq.
          HARRELL LAW FIRM
          2000 Sam Rittenberg Boulevard, Suite 2001
          Charleston, SC 29407
          Telephone: (843) 766-4700
          Facsimile: (843) 766-4784
          E-mail: john@hlfpa.com

               - and -

          Robert William Harrell, III, Esq.
          PEPER LAW FIRM
          1637 Savannah Highway, Suite 202
          Charleston, SC 29407
          Telephone: (843) 225-2520
          Facsimile: (843) 225-2520
          E-mail: trey@rwh3law.com

Attorneys for the Defendant are:

          Ashleigh Rayanna Wilson, Esq.
          Richard H. Willis, Esq.
          BOWMAN AND BROOKE
          1441 Main Street, Suite 1200
          Columbia, SC 29201
          Telephone: (803) 726-7420
          E-mail: ashleigh.wilson@bowmanandbrooke.com
                  richard.willis@bowmanandbrooke.com

               - and -

          Ethan Robert Ware, Esq.
          Jessica JO King, Esq.
          WILLIAMS MULLEN
          1441 Main Street, Suite 1250
          Columbia, SC 29201
          Telephone: (803) 567-4600
          Facsimile: (803) 567-4601
          E-mail: eware@williamsmullen.com
                  jking@williamsmullen.com

HOME CARE OF BALTIMORE: Lee et al. Seek OT Pay for Home Care Aides
------------------------------------------------------------------
ADE LEE and ZUEYSHA ROSARIO, on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. HOME CARE OF BALTIMORE,
LLC; ZINOVIY FRADLIN; and MICHELE MELIKER, the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-02589-ADC (D. Md., Sept. 6, 2019), alleges that Defendants
refused to pay Plaintiffs' wages, including overtime wages, in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Maryland Wage and
Hour Law, and the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law.

The Plaintiffs worked as home care aides for Defendants, who also
employed several hundred other home care aides. The Plaintiffs were
denied the legally required overtime rate for hours worked beyond
40 in a given week.

The work performed by Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees
includes assisting clients with toileting, bathing, mobility,
cleaning, food preparation, medication administration, and general
housekeeping, as well as accompanying clients to medical and other
appointments, the lawsuit says.

The Defendants provide family oriented home supportive services and
elder care services.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          David Rodwin, Esq.
          Sally Dworak-Fisher, Esq.
          THE PUBLIC JUSTICE CENTER
          One North Charles Street, Suite 200
          Baltimore, MD 21201
          Telephone: (410) 625-9409
          Facsimile: (410) 625-9423
          E-mail: rodwind@publicjustice.org
                  dworak-fishers@publicjustice.org

HUGHES WATTERS: Fails to Provide FDCPA Disclosures, Boutte Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
CLARENCE BOUTTE, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated
v. HUGHES, WATTERS & ASKANASE, L.L.P., Case No. 4:19-cv-03397 (S.D.
Tex., Sept. 9, 2019), centers on the Defendant's alleged failure to
effectively provide disclosures required by the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act in its initial written communications to
Texas consumers, or within five days thereafter.

Hughes Watters is a limited liability company with its principal
office in Harris County, Texas.  The Defendant is an entity that is
engaged, by use of the mails and telephone, in the business of
attempting to collect a "debt" from the Plaintiff and others.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Aaron D. Radbil, Esq.
          GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC
          401 Congress Avenue, Suite 1540
          Austin, TX 78701
          Telephone: (512) 803-1578
          Facsimile: (561) 961-5684
          E-mail: aradbil@gdrlawfirm.com

               - and -

          James L. Davidson, Esq.
          GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC
          5550 Glades Road, Suite 500
          Boca Raton, FL 33431
          Telephone: (561) 826-5477
          Facsimile: (561) 961-5684
          E-mail: jdavidson@gdrlawfirm.com


HUTCHINSON TECH: St. Cyr & Uglem Allege HDD Price-Fixing
--------------------------------------------------------
TIMOTHY A. ST. CYR and PAMELA UGLEM, individually on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs.
HUTCHINSON TECHNOLOGY INC., HEADWAY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., MAGNECOMP
PRECISION TECHNOLOGY PUBLIC CO. LTD., NAT PERIPHERAL (DONG GUAN)
CO., LTD., NAT PERIPHERAL (H.K.) CO., LTD., NHK SPRING CO. LTD.,
NHK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, NHK SPRING (THAILAND) CO., LTD., NHK
SPRING PRECISION (GUANGZHOU) CO., LTD., SAE MAGNETICS (H.K.) LTD.,
and TDK CORPORATION, the Defendants, Case No. 0:19-cv-02477 (D.
Minn., Sept. 9, 2019), is an antitrust class action on behalf of
individuals and entities that indirectly purchased hard disk drive
("HDD") suspension assemblies in the United States from Defendants,
their predecessors, any subsidiaries or affiliates thereof, or any
of their named and unnamed co-conspirators, during the period
beginning at least as early as May 2008 until such time as the
anticompetitive effects of the Defendants' conduct on United States
consumers of such products ceased.

From at least May 2008 through at least April 2016, Defendants
entered into agreements with each other to refrain from price
competition and allocate their respective market shares for
suspension assemblies used in HDDs.

Pursuant to their agreements not to compete, Defendants exchanged
pricing information including anticipated pricing quotes, which
they used to inform their negotiations with U.S. and foreign
customers that purchased suspension assemblies and produced HDDs
for sale in, or delivery to, the U.S. and elsewhere.

As a proximate result of these agreements, Defendants charged
artificially high prices for HDD Suspension Assemblies.

HDD Suspension Assemblies are a crucial component of HDDs.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Classes are:

          Richard M. Hagstrom, Esq.
          Nicholas S. Kuhlmann, Esq.
          HELLMUTH & JOHNSON
          8050 West 78 th Street
          Edina, MN 55439
          Telephone: (952) 941-4005
          Facsimile: (952) 941-2337
          E-mail: rhagstrom@hjlawfirm.com
                  nkuhlmann@hjlawfirm.com


JACK'S: Hendrcks Seeks Overtime Pay
-----------------------------------
DIANNA HENDRCKS, the Plaintiff, vs. JACK'S, the Defendant, Case No.
4:19-cv-01509-CLM (N.D. Ala., Sept. 11, 2019), seeks payment for
wages due and overtime worked as well as liquidated damages that
Plaintiff was deprived of due to Jack's consistent and willful
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.

The Plaintiff typically and routinely worked one to two hours off
the clock each shift for Defendant, as Defendant required Plaintiff
to clock out, while she continued to work for Defendant, but did
not pay her for this time.

Defendant's practices resulted in Plaintiff working in excess of 40
hours in a work week. However, Plaintiff never received the
overtime premium rate required by the FLSA for each hour worked
above 40 in any workweek. Neither was she paid for all hours
worked, the lawsuit says.

Defendant engages in the business of food preparation, service and
sales.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Robert L. Beeman, II, Esq.
          BEEMAN LAW FIRM
          3720 4th Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35222
          Telephone: 205 422-9015
          Facsimile: 800 693-5150

KING FUELS: Qureshi et al. Seek OT Pay for Gas Station Employees
----------------------------------------------------------------
Mehmood Qureshi, Jawad Ansari, and All Others Similarly Situated,
the Plaintiffs, vs. King Fuels, Inc., ZRN, LLC, Zaki Niazi,
Mohammed Naeem Niazi, Mohammed Razi Niazi and Saud Zaki Niazi, the
Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-03400 (S.D. Tex., Sept. 9, 2019),
seeks to recover unpaid wages including overtime wages under the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs and Members of the Plaintiff Class routinely worked
in excess of 40 hours a week at Defendants' request, yet did not
receive overtime wages as the FLSA requires.

Additionally, the Defendants required Plaintiffs and Members of the
Plaintiff Class to routinely work some hours each week
off-the-clock, and the Defendants failed to pay any wages for these
hours. Under a uniform and pervasive enterprise-wide policy, the
Defendants require their employees to work off-the-clock hours and
overtime hours without paying the full wages owed, the lawsuit
says.

The Defendants own, control and operate multiple gasoline stations
and convenience stores in the Houston and surrounding areas.[BN]

Attorney for Mehmood Qureshi and Jawad Ansari, and Members of the
Plaintiff Class are:

          Salar Ali Ahmed, Esq.
          ALI S. AHMED, P.C.
          One Arena Place
          7322 Southwest Frwy., Suite 1920
          Houston, TX 77074
          Telephone: (713) 223-1300
          Facsimile: (713) 255-0013
          E-mail: aahmedlaw@gmail.com

KROGER CO: Wright Seeks Overtime Pay for Order Selectors
--------------------------------------------------------
SHERMAN WRIGHT, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. THE KROGER CO., the Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-00761-MRB (S.D. Ohio, Sept. 10, 2019), challenges the
policies and practices of Defendant that violate the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Defendant employed Plaintiff as an Order Selector at its Kroger
Logistics Warehouse in Blue Ash, Ohio. The Plaintiff and those
similarly situated were non-exempt hourly employees routinely
worked 40 or more hours per week. They regularly performed certain
unpaid off-the-clock work activities prior to the start of their
shift.

The unpaid pre-shift work activities include, but are  not limited
to: donning personal protective equipment that Defendant required
Plaintiff and those similarly situated to store in a locker at
Defendant's facility; obtaining and booting up electronic equipment
that Defendant required Plaintiff and those similarly situated to
use in the course of work; and walking to an available powered
industrial truck and performing an OSHA-required pre-trip
inspection upon same. These unpaid pre-shift work activities were
integral and indispensable to the work performed by Plaintiff and
those similarly situated, the lawsuit says.

The Kroger Co. is an American retailing company founded by Bernard
Kroger in 1883 in Cincinnati, Ohio. It is the United States'
largest supermarket chain by revenue, the second-largest general
retailer and the 17th largest company in the United States.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff are:

          Christopher J. Lalak, Esq.
          Shannon M. Draher, Esq.
          NILGES DRAHER LLC
          614 West Superior Avenue, Suite 1148
          Cleveland, OH 44113
          Telephone: 216-230-2955
          E-mail: clalak@ohlaborlaw.com
                  sdraher@ohlaborlaw.com

KROGER COMPANY: Court Grants Limited Discovery in Hawkins
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting in part Plaintiffs' Motion to
Compel Discovery in the case captioned SHAVONDA HAWKINS on behalf
of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. THE
KROGER COMPANY, Defendant Case No. 15cv2320-JM (BLM). (S.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of similarly situated
individuals defined as all persons who purchased in the United
States, Kroger bread crumb products containing partially
hydrogenated oil. The instant class action alleging state law
claims for (1) violations of California Unfair Competition Law
(UCL), unfair prong and unlawful prong (2) breach of implied
warranty of merchantability (3) violations of UCL, unlawful prong,
fraudulent prong, and unfair prong (4) violation of California
False Advertising Law (FAL) (5) violation of California Consumer
Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) and (6) breach of express warranty.

Plaintiff seeks to compel responses to her First Set of
Interrogatories (Rogs) and First Set of Requests for Production
(RFPs). The discovery requests consist of eight Rogs and
twenty-five RFPs. Defendant asserted lengthy objections to each
request, did not provide a substantive response to any of the
interrogatories or RFPs, and did not produce any responsive
documents or indicate a willingness to produce any documents.  This
is unacceptable and not in compliance with the spirit or
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.   

To make matters worse, Defendant supplemented its responses on July
11, 2019 but the supplemental responses provided minimal substance
and Defendant did not produce any documents.  

Defendant produced a total of seventeen documents which consisted
solely of product labels for 2011-2015. Because Defendant has not
made a reasonable effort to satisfy its discovery obligations and
is relying on its objections to avoid providing substantive
discovery, the Court will first address Defendant's objections and
arguments.

Failure to Meet and Confer

Defendant contends that Plaintiff's motion should be denied due to
Plaintiff's counsel's failure to meet and confer regarding
Defendant's supplemental responses prior to filing the motion.

Defendant recognizes that the parties met and conferred regarding
Defendant's initial responses, but complains that Plaintiff's
counsel never attempted to meet and confer after Kroger
substantially supplemented its responses on July 11. Instead,
Plaintiff's counsel merely sought confirmation as to Defendant's
position about three narrowed document requests Plaintiff offered
prior to the supplemental production. Defendant contends this
violates Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1), CivLR 26.1, and Judge Major's
Chambers Rules.  

Plaintiff replies the reality: our meet and confer efforts
consisted of two conference calls between counsel, a third with the
Court's clerk, a formal 5-page letter, a large number of e-mails,
and multiple offers of compromise. All this resulted in a total of
zero substantive interrogatory responses and a total of 17 pages
produced in partial response to one RFP.  

The Court requires and encourages parties to meet and confer prior
to filing any discovery motions. Here, the parties met and
conferred telephonically on June 26 and 27, 2019. On July 8, 2019,
the parties participated in a call with the Court's clerk and
afterwards, Judge Major issued an Order Setting Briefing Schedule
that preserved Plaintiff's right to file a motion to compel, but
left time for Defendant to supplements its responses and possibly
obviate the need to file a motion at all. While the Court expected
the parties to engage in further meet and confer efforts,
Defendant's decision to provide little, if any, substance in its
supplemental responses undermined the purpose of additional meet
and confer efforts.

The Court DENIES Defendant's request to deny Plaintiff's motion on
this basis.

Discovery is Premature

Defendant argues that many of Plaintiff's requests are premature
because a class has not yet been certified. The Court did not
bifurcate discovery  so the parties are permitted to conduct
discovery relevant to both class certification and the merits of
the case.

Defendant also argues that discovery is premature because Plaintiff
has not made the requisite showing to justify pre-certification
discovery.  Initially, the court notes that the case law cited by
Defendant does not prohibit the Court from allowing
pre-certification discovery without a specific showing, it merely
holds that a court's decision not to allow discovery was not an
abuse of discretion.   

However, it is clear that a court has discretion to decide whether
to require the prima facie showing before allowing discovery. Here,
based upon the complaint and the relevant pleadings and orders,
including the Ninth Circuit's decision, the Court finds that
pre-certification discovery is both appropriate and required.

The Court finds Plaintiff has made the requisite showing.

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied her burden and
made a prima facie showing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Regarding
numerosity, Plaintiff seeks to certify a PHO Class of all persons
who purchased in the United States, on or after January 1, 2008,
Kroger bread crumb products containing partially hydrogenated oil
and a 0g Trans Fact Claim Subclass of all persons who purchased in
the United States, on or after January 1, 2008, Kroger bread crumb
products containing the front labeling claim 0g Trans Fat' and
containing partially hydrogenated oil.

Plaintiff alleges that the Class is sufficiently numerous, as it
includes thousands of individuals who purchased the Kroger Bread
Crumbs throughout the United States during the Class Period.

As far as commonality, Plaintiff alleges questions of law and fact
common to Plaintiff and the class include, inter alia:

   a. Whether Defendant's conduct constitutes a violation of the
unfair prong of California's Unfair Competition Law,

   b. Whether Defendant's conduct constitutes a violation of the
unlawful prong of California's Unfair Competition Law,

   c. Whether Defendant's conduct constitutes a violation of the
fraudulent prong of California's Unfair Competition Law,

   d. Whether Defendant's conduct was immoral, unethical,
unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.

These allegations satisfy the prima facie requirement of
commonality. With respect to typicality, Plaintiff asserts injuries
similar to class members, and the evidence suggests other class
members have been similarly injured. Finally, with respect to
adequacy, the Court believes that a sufficient showing has been
made. Accordingly, the Court finds that discovery also is
appropriate based on Plaintiff's prima facie showing of Rule
23(a)'s prerequisites.  

Defendant's objection that the requested discovery is premature is
OVERRULED.

Privilege

Throughout its responses Defendant objects on the basis of
privilege. From the pleadings before the Court, it does not appear
that Defendant has provided Plaintiff with a privilege log.

Accordingly, Defendant's privilege objections are OVERRULED.
Defendant must search for and produce responsive documents in
accordance with this order. If, as Defendant contends, there are
responsive documents that are privileged, Defendant must comply
with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 which requires parties that seek to
withhold documents due to privilege to expressly make the claim and
describe the nature of the documents, communications, or tangible
things not produced or disclosed and do so in a manner that,
without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will
enable other parties to assess the claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 does
not discharge a party from its obligation to search for responsive
documents simply because the documents might be privileged.

Plaintiff seeks an order compelling substantive responses to the
eight interrogatories she propounded as well as numerous RFPs.

Interrogatory No. 1 and Requests for Production Nos. 18 and 24

Interrogatory No. 1 asks:

IDENTIFY, for California, for each quarter of the CLASS PERIOD,
your unit sales of each of the KROGER BREAD CRUMBS SKUs and the
total revenue YOU derived the sale of the PRODUCT.
After asserting numerous objections, Defendant stated in its
supplemental response,
Defendant responds that after conducting a reasonable search,
Defendant lacks information within its possession, custody, or
control to show the unique number of buyers of all bread Crumbs in
California, and is not able to provide a verified response to that
effect.

RFP Nos. 18 and 24 seek:

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18: All DOCUMENTS which reflect,
summarize, analyze, or discuss the pricing of the PRODUCT,
including wholesale or retail prices.REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 24:
DOCUMENTS sufficient to show or calculate YOUR total revenue from
the sale of the PRODUCT in California for each year in the CLASS
PERIOD.

Defendant objected to these RFPs and did not produce or agree to
produce any responsive documents.  

Plaintiff's motion to compel responses to Interrogatory No. 1 and
RFP Nos. 18 and 24 is GRANTED. The requests seek relevant
information and are proportional to the needs of the case as the
requests are limited to products at issue in this case and are
limited in time. Defendant also must comply with its obligations
regarding possession, custody, and control.

Interrogatory No. 2.

INTERROGATORY NO. 2:  IDENTIFY all PERSONS (a) who participated in
answering these Interrogatories and supplied information, or in any
way assisted with the preparation of YOUR responses to these
discovery requests and (b) who participated in in the search for,
collection and review of, and production of DOCUMENTS in response
to any sets of Requests for the Production of Documents served on
YOU in this lawsuit, and describe in detail the nature of their
involvement.

After asserting numerous objections, Defendant did not provide a
supplemental response.

Defendant's primary objection is that this request is overbroad
because it encompasses attorney work product and irrelevant
individuals such as IT personnel and document vendors.
Additionally, Defendant notes that it has already identified
individuals with personal knowledge in their initial disclosures.
Id. Plaintiff replies that disclosing the names of individuals who
helped prepare responses does not require the disclosure of
attorney work product but does not address the over breadth
argument.

Because the request is overbroad and not proportional to the needs
of the case, Plaintiff's motion to compel a response to
Interrogatory No. 2 is DENIED.

Interrogatories 3 and 6

INTERROGATORY NO. 3: IDENTIFY products that YOU consider, or have
considered at different times during the CLASS PERIOD, to be the
primary competitors to the PRODUCT.INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Aside from
KROGER BREAD CRUMBS, IDENTIFY every individual Kroger Bread product
and SKU that YOU sold that contained partially hydrogenated oil(s)
(PHO) during the CLASS PERIOD.

Defendant asserted numerous objections but did not provide a
substantive response to either interrogatory.  

The Court finds that Rog No 3 seeks relevant information and,
therefore, GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to compel response to Rog No
3. Plaintiff does not address the relevance of Rog No. 6. Id.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion to compel response
to Rog No. 6.
Interrogatories 4, 5, 7, and 8 and Requests for Production 14 and
15

INTERROGATORY NO. 4: IDENTIFY the manufacturer of and amount of PHO
per 100g used in the PRODUCT, e.g., Cargill Olympic S-100 Partially
Hydrogenated Soybean Oil 16gper 100g of Kroger Bread Crumbs.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: IDENTIFY the period of time during which YOU
manufactured, distributed, or sold the PRODUCT, and if YOU
contracted with outside companies to manufacture the PRODUCT,
IDENTIFY them and the time period YOU contracted with them.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: IDENTIFY the locations, including the full
address and your internal name for the facility, where the PRODUCT
was manufactured. INTERROGATORY NO. 8: For each KROGER BREAD CRUMBS
SKU, state the date that YOU stopped using PHO in its manufacture
and separately when you stopped selling it.

After asserting numerous objections, Defendant provided
supplemental responses.  
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14: DOCUMENTS sufficient to show the
amount of PHO and trans fat used in the PRODUCT during the CLASS
PERIOD, including any changes thereto, and the composition, source,
and vendors for the partially hydrogenated oil used in the
manufacture of the PRODUCT.REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15: ALL
DOCUMENTS RELATING TO the cost of any actual, potential, or
proposed formulation changes to the PRODUCT during the CLASS
PERIOD.

After asserting numerous objections, Defendant provided the same
supplemental responses to RFPs 14 and 15.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendant
refers Plaintiff to its supplemental responses to Interrogatories
No. 5 and 8.

Defendant asserts the general objections addressed above and also
contends that since it purchased the bread crumbs through a third
party supplier, it is not aware of the manufacturer of the
breadcrumbs and cannot respond to the Rogs and RFPs.  

Although Plaintiff does not address the sufficiency of Defendant's
supplemental responses the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to
compel further response to these requests. Defendant must provide
supplemental responses using the correct time frame and complying
with its obligations regarding documents within its possession,
custody, or control.  

Request for Production No. 1

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: Your written document retention
policies and procedures.
After asserting numerous objections, Defendant provided the
following supplemental responses
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: Subject to
and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendant responds
that in lieu of producing such policies and procedures, Defendant
confirms that it is preserving records relevant to this lawsuit
consistent with its legal obligations. Further, to the extent
Defendant agrees to produce documents in response to any request,
it will inform plaintiff if, after conducting a reasonable search,
it does not locate responsive documents within its possession,
custody, or control.

The Court finds that Plaintiff's request is relevant in accordance
with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. While there are no allegations of
spoliation or responsive documents destroyed in accordance with a
document retention policy, Defendant has produced few responsive
documents and indicated that it does not have certain types of
documents.
   
In light of the above, Plaintiff's motion to compel response to RFP
No. 1 is GRANTED.
Requests for Production Nos. 11 and 20

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11: All DOCUMENTS referencing or
reflecting any call center feedback for the PRODUCT.REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION NO. 20: Any COMMUNICATION between YOU and any customer
in response to any complaint about the ingredients in the PRODUCT.

Defendant objected to both RFPs and did not provide any responsive
documents. Id. Defendant asserted the general objections addressed
above and further arguments that the requests are overbroad.
Plaintiff offered to restrict RFPs 11 and 20 to seek only feedback
or responses that concerns trans fat or partially hydrogenated oil.
Defendant rejected Plaintiff's proposal, asserting that Plaintiff's
purported narrowing of these requests for does not make them any
more relevant or proportional. Plaintiff replies that Defendant
fails to provide any details as to the burden it faces in
responding to the discovery.  

The Court finds that the requests as narrowed by Plaintiff are
relevant to Plaintiff's claims and to the potential common
experience of Defendant's customers and proportional to the needs
of the case. The Court rejects Defendant's burden argument because
Defendant does not provide any facts to support its claim that it
would be overly burdensome to respond to the requests.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to compel response to RFP Nos. 11
and 20 as narrowed by Plaintiff is GRANTED. Defendant must produce
the described documents and communications if they concern trans
fat or PHO.

Requests for Production Nos. 2, 3, and 4

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2: All organization charts showing
employees who, during the CLASS PERIOD, were involved in research,
MARKETING, ADVERTISEMENT, manufacturing, or development of the
PRODUCT.REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: DOCUMENTS sufficient to show
the IDENTITY of any PERSONS who, during the CLASS PERIOD, performed
MARKETING, manufacturing, research, or development services
RELATING TO any of the PRODUCTS.REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4: To
the extent not produced in response to Request No. 3, DOCUMENTS
sufficient to show all third parties with whom YOU contracted for
services RELATING TO the MARKETING, ADVERTISEMENT, manufacture,
development, distribution, or sale of the PRODUCT.

After numerous objections, Defendant supplemented its response to
RFPs 2 and 4 as follows:
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2: Subject to
and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendant responds
that, after conducting a reasonable search, it has not located any
non-privileged, responsive documents from 2011 through 2015 within
its possession, custody, or control. SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4: Subject to and without waiving the
foregoing, Defendant refers Plaintiff to its supplemental responses
to Interrogatories No. 5 and 7.

Defendant did not supplement its response to RFP No. 3.  

Plaintiff's motion to compel response to RFP No. 2 is GRANTED.
Defendant must supplement its response to comply with the Court's
rulings in sections B-G.

Plaintiff's motion to compel response to RFP No. 3 is GRANTED IN
PART. Defendant must produce responsive documents regarding
marketing and manufacturing.  This is especially critical here
given the requirements of 21 C.F. R. Section 101.5 and the inherent
relationship between a manufacturer, distributor, and retailer.
However, the Court agrees with Defendant that the request for
information about research or development services in this context
is vague and overbroad.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to compel response to RFP No. 3 as
to research and development is DENIED.

Plaintiff's motion to compel response to RFP No. 4 is GRANTED. The
terms are neither vague nor overbroad in this context. Defendant
referred Plaintiff to its responses to Rogs 5 and 7. In those
responses, Defendant stated that it did not contract with a
manufacturer but did not identify the third party with whom it
contracted to obtain the products from the manufacturer. This RFP
seeks that information. Accordingly, Defendant must provide a
supplemental response addressing all of the identified categories
and complying with the Court's rulings in sections B-G and the
Court's order with respect to Rogs 5 and 7.

Requests for Production Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5: Exemplars of all LABELS, packaging,
package inserts, and brochures RELATING TO the PRODUCT.REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION NO. 6: All DOCUMENTS showing the period of time during
which each PRODUCT LABEL was introduced, used, and discontinued.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7: All DOCUMENTS CONCERNING any
contemplated, potential, or actual changes, revisions, or
modifications to the PRODUCTS' LABELS during the CLASS PERIOD,
including drafts of such DOCUMENTS.REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8:
DOCUMENTS CONCERNING the reasons for, plans, proposals, and
motivations for any change to the LABEL of any PRODUCT.REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION NO. 10; All DOCUMENTS CONCERNING YOUR strategy for
MARKETING, ADVERTISING, or selling the PRODUCTS in the United
States during the CLASS PERIOD.

After numerous objections, Defendant supplemented its response to
RFPs 5 and 7 as follows:
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5: Subject to
and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendant will
conduct a reasonable search for and produce a copy of each of the
packaging labels used for Kroger Bread Crumbs during 2011 through
2015, to the extent within its possession, custody, or control.
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6: Subject to
and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendant will
conduct a reasonable search for and produce non-privileged
documents sufficient to identify the periods during which the
packaging labels produced in response to Request for Production No.
5 were used, to the extent such documents are within Defendant's
possession, custody, or control. SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing
objections, Defendant will conduct a reasonable search for and
produce a copy of each of the packaging labels used for Kroger
Bread Crumbs during 2011 through 2015, to the extent within its
possession, custody, or control.

Plaintiff's motion to compel further response to RFPs 5-7 is
GRANTED. The supplemental response must cover the time period
described by the Court [see supra at D.], Defendant also must
provide all of the documents described in RFP Nos. 5-7, not just
the product labels.

Plaintiff's motion to compel response to RFP Nos. 8 and 10 is
GRANTED. Apart from its general objections which the Court has
addressed, Defendant fails to provide any substantive response in
support of its position that it should not have to respond to the
requests.
Requests for Production Nos. 13, 17, and 25

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13: All DOCUMENTS that discuss partially
hydrogenated oil or trans fat. REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 17: All
DOCUMENTS in YOUR POSSESSION RELATING TO the effects of artificial
trans fat on human or animal health. REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 25:
All DOCUMENTS and COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO YOUR December 4, 2006
press release titled Kroger Using Trans Fat Free Oil to Prepare
Fried Chicken.

Defendant stood by its numerous objections to the requests and did
not provide supplemental responses or documents.

Plaintiff's motion to compel response to RFP Nos. 13 and 17 is
DENIED. Plaintiff's requests are overbroad as they are not limited
to the products at issue or to the context of this case.

Plaintiff's motion to compel response to RFP No. 25 is GRANTED. The
request is narrowly tailored and seeks documents and communications
related to one specific document.
Request for Production No. 16

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 16: All DOCUMENTS which YOU contend
support or substantiate the following statement used on PRODUCTS:
Og Trans Fat per serving.

After numerous objections, Defendant did not supplement its
response or produce any documents. Defendant contends that in
addition to failing to state the documents it seeks with reasonable
particularity and being overbroad and unduly burdensome due to its
fourteen year span and request for all documents, this is an
improper and premature contention request bearing on a disputed
issue central to this action.

Plaintiff's motion to compel response to RFP 16 is GRANTED. The
Court agrees with the reasoning in Schneider and finds that RFP No.
16 describes the requested documents with particularity and is not
overbroad. The Court further finds that Defendant has not provided
any evidence to support its claim that the request is unduly
burdensome.

Plaintiff's motion to compel response to Interrogatory No. 1 and
RFP Nos. 18 and 24 is GRANTED.

Plaintiff's motion to compel response to Interrogatory No. 2 is
DENIED.

Plaintiff's motion to compel response to Interrogatory No. 3 is
GRANTED.

Plaintiff's motion to compel response to Rog No. 6 is DENIED.

Plaintiff's motion to compel further response to Interrogatories 4,
5, 7 and 8 and RFPs 14 and 15 is GRANTED.

Plaintiff's motion to compel response to RFP No. 1 is GRANTED.
Plaintiff's motion to compel response to RFP Nos. 11 and 20 is
GRANTED. Plaintiff's motion to compel response to RFP No. 2 is
GRANTED. Plaintiff's motion to compel response to RFP No. 3 is
GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff's motion to compel response to RFP No. 3
as to research and development is DENIED.

Plaintiff's motion to compel response to RFP No. 4 is GRANTED.

Plaintiff's motion to compel further response to RFP Nos. 5-7 is
GRANTED.

Plaintiff's motion to compel response to RFP Nos. 8 and 10 is
GRANTED.

Plaintiff's motion to compel response to RFP Nos. 13 and 17 is
DENIED.

Plaintiff's motion to compel response to RFP No. 25 is GRANTED.

Plaintiff's motion to compel response to RFP 16 is GRANTED.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 16, 2019 Order
is available at  https://tinyurl.com/y63uf9qc from Leagle.com.

Shavonda Hawkins, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory S. Weston -
greg@westonfirm.com - The Weston Firm.

The Kroger Company, Defendant, represented by Heather F. Canner -
heathercanner@dwt.com -  Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Jacob M. Harper
- jharper@dwt.com - Davis Wright Tremaine & AnnMarie Mori -
amori@troygould.com - TROYGOULD PC.


L.I. PROLINER: Flores et al. Seek OT Wages for Auto Body Workers
----------------------------------------------------------------
MERLIN FLORES and RIGOBERTO CABALLERO, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. L.I.
PROLINER, INC., and VASILIOS HADZIGEORGIOU, as an individual, the
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-05056-ENV-JO (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 5,
2019), seeks compensatory damages and liquidated damages in an
amount exceeding $100,000 pursuant to federal wage and hour laws.
The Plaintiffs also seek interest, attorneys' fees, costs, and all
other legal and equitable remedies this Court deems appropriate.

The Plaintiffs are or have been employed by the Defendants as auto
body workers. The Defendants suffered and permitted Plaintiffs and
the Collective Class to work more than 40 hours per week without
appropriate overtime compensation.[BN]

The Defendants offer auto body repair needs.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
          HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, PC
          80-02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
          Kew Gardens, NY 11415
          Telephone: 718-263-9591
          Facsimile: 718-263-9598

LEO CAPITAL: Fabricant Sues over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
------------------------------------------------------------
TERRY FABRICANT, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. LEO CAPITAL GROUP, LLC, and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive, and each of them, the Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-07819 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 10, 2019), contends that the
Defendant promotes and markets its merchandise, in part, by placing
unsolicited telephone calls to wireless phone users, in violation
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant used an "automatic
telephone dialing system" (ATDS) as defined by 47 U.S.C. section
227(a)(1) to place its call to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its
services.

The Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from
telephone number (786) 373-6630 confirmed to be Defendant's number.
The Defendant did not possess Plaintiff's "prior express consent"
to receive calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an
artificial or prerecorded voice on his cellular telephone.

Further, Plaintiff's cellular telephone number ending in -8950 was
added to the National Do-Not-Call Registry on or about June 4,
2008.

The Plaintiff and members of The ATDS Class were harmed by the acts
of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant illegally
contacted Plaintiff and ATDS Class members via their cellular
telephones thereby causing Plaintiff and ATDS Class members to
incur certain charges or reduced telephone time for which Plaintiff
and ATDS Class members had previously paid by having to retrieve or
administer messages left by Defendant during those illegal calls,
and invading the privacy of the Plaintiff and ATDS Class members,
the lawsuit says.

The Defendant is a business finance company.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: 323-306-4234
          Facsmile: 866-633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com

LL BEAN: Berger Appeals E.D.N.Y. Memorandum and Order to 2nd Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Anita Berger filed an appeal from the District Court's
memorandum and order issued on August 3, 2019, in her lawsuit
styled Berger v. L.L. Bean, Inc., Case No. 18-cv-1280, in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Brooklyn).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Ms. Berger,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, has
filed a putative class action complaint, demanding damages and
equitable relief for harm supposedly arising out of changes in L.L.
Bean's "satisfaction guarantee" policy.  On behalf of a nationwide
class, consisting of herself and all other persons in the United
States and its territories who purchased, other than for resale,
products from L.L. Bean prior to Feb. 9, 2018, she alleges (1)
breach of contract, (2) unjust enrichment, and (3) violation of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

The appellate case is captioned as Berger v. L.L. Bean, Inc., Case
No. 19-2715, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant Anita Berger, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Michael Liskow, Esq.
          SULTZER LAW GROUP
          351 West 54th Street
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (212) 969-7811
          E-mail: liskow@whafh.com

Defendant-Appellee L.L. Bean, Inc. is represented by:

          Evan Glassman, Esq.
          STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP
          1114 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (212) 506-3900
          E-mail: eglassman@steptoe.com


LLEWELLYN CORP: Griffin Sues Over Misclassification, Retaliation
----------------------------------------------------------------
James Griffin, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Jon R. Llewellyn, Inc. And Sharon
Llewellyn, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-03205, (S.D. Tex., August 26,
2019), seeks to recover overtime compensation, statutory penalties,
unpaid commissions and other compensation owed for breach of an
actual or implied employment contract, quantum meruit, as an
alternative theory to the breach of contract claims, redress for
fraud/misrepresentation and conversion including claims for
retaliation under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Jon R. Llewellyn, Inc. operates as Llewellyn Corp of America, a
company that provides predominant use studies that are used to
enable companies to reduce their sales taxes and receive sales tax
refunds for overpayments. Griffin worked for Llewellyn as Director
of Business Development. He claims to misclassified as an
independent contractor and was terminated for complaining. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     J. Alfred Southerland, Esq.
     SOUTHERLAND LAW FIRM
     4141 Southwest Freeway, Suite 300
     Houston, Texas 77027
     Telephone: (281) 928-4932
     Facsimile: (713) 228-8507
     Email: alf@southerlandlawfirm.com


MARINA & ELMER: Mejia Seeks Unpaid OT Pay for Automotive Detailers
------------------------------------------------------------------
ROGER GEOVANY MEJIA, on behalf of himself, individually, and all
other persons similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. MARINA & ELMER
CORP. d/b/a Express Auto Detailing & Window Tint, ELMER HERNANDEZ,
individually, and MARINA HERNANDEZ, individually, the Defendants,
Case No. 2:19-cv-05132 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 9, 2019), seeks to recover
unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the
New York Labor Law.

The Defendants employed Plaintiff Mejia as a non-exempt automotive
detailer from in or about Summer 2010 through in or about mid-March
2019. The Plaintiff was responsible primarily for cleaning and
detailing cars for Defendants' customers, which included both the
public and car dealerships.

Throughout his employment, the Plaintiff regularly worked six days
per week on Mondays through Saturday from 8:00 a.m. until 7:00
p.m., and sometimes worked even later, without receiving an
uninterrupted thirty-minute meal break.

Accordingly, Defendants required Plaintiff to work, Plaintiff did
regularly work, 66 hours during each workweek, and sometimes even
more hours each workweek. For this work, Defendants paid Plaintiff
compensation amounting to $764.00 per pay period, regardless of the
number of hours worked each week.

Despite regularly working more than 40 hours per workweek, the
Defendants did not pay Plaintiff the statutorily-mandated overtime
rate of pay of time and one half an employee's regular rate of pay
or the minimum wage, whichever is greater, for hours worked in
excess of 40 hours per week, the lawsuit says.

The Defendants provide a variety of services, including installing
window tint to vehicles, performing car washes and automotive
cleaning and detailing at its facility located at 499 Babylon
Turnpike, Freeport, New York 11520.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          David D. Barnhorn, Esq.
          Peter A. Romero, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF PETER A. ROMERO PLLC
          825 Veterans Highway, Suite B
          Hauppauge, New York 11788
          Telephone: (631) 257-5588

MDL 2641: Cordle v. CR Bard Suit over IVC Filters Consolidated
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned Donna Cordle, the Plaintiff, vs.
C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc., the
Defendants, Case No. 2:19cv03077 (Filed May 14, 2019), was
transferred from the U.S. District Court for the District Arizona,
to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia
(Augusta) on Sept. 10, 2019. The Southern District of Georgia Court
Clerk assigned Case No. 8:19-cv-00396-JMG-CRZ to the proceeding.
The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge John M. Gerrard.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries and/or
wrongful death damages suffered by an injured or deceased party or
parties as a direct and proximate result of an injured or deceased
party being implanted with a defective and unreasonably dangerous
Inferior Vena Cava ("IVC") filter medical device manufactured by
Bard.

The IVC filters are part of Bard's IVC "retrievable" filter product
line and include the following devices: Recovery (TM), G2 (TM), G2X
(TM) (G2 Express), Eclipse (TM), Meridian (TM), and Denali (TM).
The term "Bard IVC Filters" also includes Bard's Recovery Cone
Removal System.[BN]

The case is consolidated in MDL 2641 re: BARD IVC Filters Products
Liability Litigation.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff is:

          Scott R Seideman, Esq.
          SEIDEMAN LAW FIRM PC
          701 Commerce St., Ste. 400
          Dallas, TX 75202
          Telephone: (214) 752-0443
          Facsimile: (214) 752-0449

   Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          Richard B. North, Jr., Esq.
          NELSON, MULLINS, RILEY
          & SCARBOROUGH, LLP
          Atlantic Station
          201 Seventeenth St., NW, Suite 1700
          Atlanta, GA 30363
          Telephone: (404) 322-6155
          Facsimile: (404) 322-6093
          E-mail: richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

MDL 2641: Ellison v. CR Bard Suit over IVC Filters Consolidated
---------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned Dorothy Ellison, the Plaintiff,
vs. C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc., the
Defendants, Case No.2:18-cv-01269 (Filed Apr. 25, 2018), was
transferred from the U.S. District Court for the District Arizona,
to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia
(Augusta) on Sept. 10, 2019. The Southern District of Georgia Court
Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-00154-JRH-BKE to the proceeding.
The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge J. Randal Hall.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries and/or
wrongful death damages suffered by an injured or deceased party or
parties as a direct and proximate result of an injured or deceased
party being implanted with a defective and unreasonably dangerous
Inferior Vena Cava ("IVC") filter medical device manufactured by
Bard.

The IVC filters are part of Bard's IVC "retrievable" filter product
line and include the following devices: Recovery (TM), G2 (TM), G2X
(TM) (G2 Express), Eclipse (TM), Meridian (TM), and Denali (TM).
The term "Bard IVC Filters" also includes Bard's Recovery Cone
Removal System.

The case is consolidated in MDL 2641 re: BARD IVC Filters Products
Liability Litigation.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff is:

          Sarah Ann Wolter, Esq.
          ANDRUS WAGSTAFF PC
          7171 W Alaska Dr.
          Lakewood, CO 80226
          Telephone: (866) 795-9529
          Facsimile: (888) 875-2889
          E-mail: sarah.wolter@andruswagstaff.com

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          Richard B. North, Jr., Esq.
          NELSON, MULLINS, RILEY
          & SCARBOROUGH, LLP
          Atlantic Station
          201 Seventeenth St., NW, Suite 1700
          Atlanta, GA 30363
          Telephone: (404) 322-6155
          Facsimile: (404) 322-6093
          E-mail: richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

MDL 2641: Leclair v. CR Bard Suit over IVC Filters Consolidated
---------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned Raymond Leclair, the Plaintiff,
vs. C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc., the
Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-00638 (Filed Feb. 27, 2018), was
transferred from the U.S. District Court for the District Arizona,
to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia
(Augusta) on Sept. 10, 2019. The Southern District of Georgia Court
Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-00153-JRH-BKE to the proceeding.
The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge J. Randal Hall.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries and/or
wrongful death damages suffered by an injured or deceased party or
parties as a direct and proximate result of an injured or deceased
party being implanted with a defective and unreasonably dangerous
Inferior Vena Cava ("IVC") filter medical device manufactured by
Bard.

The IVC filters are part of Bard's IVC "retrievable" filter product
line and include the following devices: Recovery (TM), G2 (TM), G2X
(TM) (G2 Express), Eclipse (TM), Meridian (TM), and Denali (TM).
The term "Bard IVC Filters" also includes Bard's Recovery Cone
Removal System.

The case is consolidated in MDL 2641 re: BARD IVC Filters Products
Liability Litigation.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff is:

          Christopher Kyle Johnston, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF CHRISTOPHER K JOHNSTON LLC
          268 Ponce de Leon Ave., Ste. 1020
          San Juan, PR 00918
          Telephone: (844) 345-3784
          Facsimile: (844) 644-1230

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          Richard B. North, Jr., Esq.
          NELSON, MULLINS, RILEY
          & SCARBOROUGH, LLP
          Atlantic Station
          201 Seventeenth St., NW, Suite 1700
          Atlanta, GA 30363
          Telephone: (404) 322-6155
          Facsimile: (404) 322-6093
          E-mail: richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

MDL 2641: Sebold v. CR Bard Suit over IVC Filters Consolidated
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned Rebecca Sebold and Jonathan
Sebold, the Plaintiff, vs. C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral
Vascular, Inc., the Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-04579 (Filed Dec.
11, 2017), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
District Arizona, to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Georgia (Augusta) on Sept. 10, 2019. The Southern
District of Georgia Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-00151-JRH-BKE to the proceeding. The case is assigned to
the Hon. Judge J. Randal Hall.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries and/or
wrongful death damages suffered by an injured or deceased party or
parties as a direct and proximate result of an injured or deceased
party being implanted with a defective and unreasonably dangerous
Inferior Vena Cava ("IVC") filter medical device manufactured by
Bard.

The IVC filters are part of Bard's IVC "retrievable" filter product
line and include the following devices: Recovery (TM), G2 (TM), G2X
(TM) (G2 Express), Eclipse (TM), Meridian (TM), and Denali (TM).
The term "Bard IVC Filters" also includes Bard's Recovery Cone
Removal System.

The case is consolidated in MDL 2641 re: BARD IVC Filters Products
Liability Litigation.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiffs is:

          Kirk J. Goza, Esq.
          GOZA & HONNOLD LLC
          11181 Overbrook Rd., Ste. 200
          Leawood, KS 66211
          Telephone: (913) 451-3433
          Facsimile: (913) 839-0567


Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          Richard B. North, Jr., Esq.
          NELSON, MULLINS, RILEY
          & SCARBOROUGH, LLP
          Atlantic Station
          201 Seventeenth St., NW, Suite 1700
          Atlanta, GA 30363
          Telephone: (404) 322-6155
          Facsimile: (404) 322-6093
          E-mail: richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

MDL 2641: Tervo v. CR Bard Suit over IVC Filters Consolidated
-------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned Lynn-Marie Tervo, the Plaintiff,
vs. C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc., the
Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-00791 (Filed Mar. 16, 2017), was
transferred from the U.S. District Court for the District Arizona,
to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts
(Boston) on Sept. 10, 2019. The District of Massachusetts Court
Clerk assigned Case No.1:19-cv-11914-FDS to the proceeding. The
case is assigned to the Hon. Judge  F. Dennis Saylor, IV.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries and/or
wrongful death damages suffered by an injured or deceased party or
parties as a direct and proximate result of an injured or deceased
party being implanted with a defective and unreasonably dangerous
Inferior Vena Cava ("IVC") filter medical device manufactured by
Bard.

The IVC filters are part of Bard's IVC "retrievable" filter product
line and include the following devices: Recovery (TM), G2 (TM), G2X
(TM) (G2 Express), Eclipse (TM), Meridian (TM), and Denali (TM).
The term "Bard IVC Filters" also includes Bard's Recovery Cone
Removal System.

The case is consolidated in MDL 2641 re: BARD IVC Filters Products
Liability Litigation.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff is:

          Rand P. Nolen, Esq.
          FLEMING, NOLEN & JEZ, LLP
          2800 Post Oak Boulevard, Suite 4000
          Houston, TX 77056
          Telephone: (713) 621-7944
          Facsimile: (713) 621-9638
          E-mail: rand_nolen@fleming-law.com

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          Richard B. North, Jr., Esq.
          NELSON, MULLINS, RILEY & SCARBOROUGH, LLP
          Atlantic Station
          201 Seventeenth St., NW, Suite 1700
          Atlanta, GA 30363
          Telephone: (404) 322-6155
          Facsimile: (404) 322-6093
          E-mail: richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

MEREDITH CORP: Mroz Files Securities Class Action in Iowa
---------------------------------------------------------
JOSEPH MROZ, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. MEREDITH CORPORATION, STEPHEN M. LACY,
THOMAS H. HARTY and JOSEPH H. CERYANEC, Defendants, Case No.
4:19-cv-00294-CRW-RAW (S.D. Iowa, Sept. 12, 2019) is a securities
class action on behalf of all purchasers of the securities of
Meredith Corporation between January 31, 2018 and September 5,
2019, inclusive. Plaintiff seeks to pursue remedies against
Meredith and several of its most senior executives under Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule
l0b-5 promulgated thereunder.

The Class Period begins on January 31, 2018 when Meredith announced
that it had completed the purchase of Time for $2.8 billion.

On August 10, 2018, Meredith issued a press release announcing its
Fiscal 2018 Full Year and Fourth Quarter financial results,
assuring investors that the Company was "very pleased with the
progress being made on integrating the acquired Time Inc.
properties," expected "meaningful improvement in advertising
results for the acquired Time Inc. brands during fiscal 2019," was
"on track to deliver more than $500 million of annual synergies in
the first two full years of operations," and expected to "achieve
our goals of reducing debt by $1 billion by the end of fiscal 2019
and generating $1 billion of adjusted EBITDA in fiscal 2020,
meaningfully contributing to total shareholder return."

The complaint alleges that Defendants issued materially false and
misleading statements regarding the Company's acquisition of Time,
Inc. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose: (i) that the
Company's financial reporting was deficient in its controls for
establishing the fair value of the assets and liabilities that
Meredith had acquired from Time; (ii) that integrating Time's
assets and elevating advertising revenue from the print and digital
performance of Time's assets would occur over a series of years and
require additional investment spending; and (iii) that the
substantial number of low margin magazine subscriptions inside the
legacy Time brands would require additional investment spending.
The Defendants failure to disclose these defects caused harm to
Plaintiff and the Class, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Joseph Mroz purchased Meredith securities during the
Class Period and has been damaged thereby.

Meredith, headquartered in Des Moines, Iowa, is a media company
that operates national media and local media business segments over
print, digital, mobile, video, and broadcast television.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     BRUCE L. BRALEY, ESQ.
     LEVENTHAL PUGA BRALEY P.C.
     950 S. Cherry Street, Suite 600
     Denver, CO 80246
     Phone: 303/759-9945
     Fax: 303/759-9692
     Email: bbraley@leventhal-law.com

          - and -

     SAMUEL H. RUDMAN, ESQ.
     DAVID A. ROSENFELD, ESQ.
     ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
     58 South Service Road, Suite 200
     Melville, NY 11747
     Phone: 631/367-7100
     Fax: 631/367-1173
     Email: srudman@rgrdlaw.com
            srosenfeld@rgrdlaw.com

          - and -

     GURI ADEMI, ESQ.
     ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
     3620 East Layton Avenue
     Cudahy, WI 53110
     Phone: 414/482-8000
     Fax: 414/482-8001
     Email: gademi@ademilaw.com


MICHIGAN: Court Denies Certification in Salem Prisoner Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern D. Michigan,
Southern Division, issued an Opinion and Order denying Plaintiffs'
Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned AMIRA SALEM
and, KESHUNA ABCUMBY, on behalf of themselves and a class of others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS and MILLICENT WARREN, Defendants. Case No. 13-cv-14567.
(E.D. Mich.).

Plaintiffs are a putative class of inmates and former inmates of
the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) female-only WHV,
alleging that the WHV and then Warden Millicent Warren, in both her
official and individual capacities, violated their Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights by subjecting them to mandatory routine
strip searches, allegedly in full view of other inmates and
individuals not necessary to the search, following off-site visits,
including hospital visits or leaving the prison on a writ, and
following all contact visits, i.e. visits at the WHV in which a
prisoner was allowed physical contact with her visitors.

CERTIFICATION UNDER RULE 23

To merit class certification, the Plaintiffs must show that, as
required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Where, as here, the Plaintiffs seek to certify a class under Rule
23(b)(3), the Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the questions of law
or fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members and that the class action is
superior to other available methods to adjudicate the controversy
fairly and efficiently.

Plaintiffs' Proposed Class Definition and Plaintiffs' Underlying
Claim

This  Court addresses certification of the following class only:

     Any women who are currently, or have formerly been,
incarcerated at the Women's Huron Valley Correctional Facility who
were subject to the chair portion of the strip search in view of
others from November 1, 2010 to the present, and who allege they
have suffered a compensable injury as a result of the search.

Plaintiffs' underlying claim relates to numerous unrelated
allegedly non-private searches that, if they occurred as alleged,
may have violated WHV Policy and could and should have been
grieved. With this understanding of Plaintiff's underlying claim,
the Court now turns to an analysis of the Rule 23 factors,
beginning with those that most clearly mandate denial of class
certification here.

Commonality, Typicality, Predominance

To obtain class certification, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class and that the representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. If
Plaintiffs satisfy these factors, and thereby satisfy all four
prerequisites set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), they must then
satisfy one of the three prongs of Rule 23(b).

Here, Plaintiffs proceed under Rule 23(b)(3), which allows a class
action to be maintained if the court finds that the questions of
law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy. The commonality and typicality
requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge.

If the Court finds a clear failure of proof on the issue of
commonality, it is unnecessary to resolve whether Plaintiffs have
satisfied the typicality and adequate-representation requirements
of Rule 23(a).

Individualized inquiries as to liability preclude class
certification

Plaintiffs' claim that class members were searched pursuant to the
chair search Policy in view of others who were unnecessary to the
penological purposes of the search, which in fact would be contrary
to the chair strip search Policy, necessarily requires resolution
of particularized inquiries regarding each individual search.
Unlike blanket strip search policy claims that do not rely on the
particulars of any individual search, Plaintiffs' claims are not
amenable to class treatment because they do not present a common
contention that is capable of classwide resolution which means that
determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is
central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.

If Plaintiffs were claiming that a WHV policy authorized
non-private searches, that all class members were searched pursuant
to that policy, and that the policy was invalid on its face,
resolution of the issue of the constitutionality of that policy
possibly could determine in one stroke a central issue to those
class claims. But here, the Policy prohibits the alleged
unconstitutional conduct and thus the manner and degree of
intrusiveness of each individual search will be central issues that
cannot be resolved in one stroke.  

It is undisputed that the Plaintiffs are claiming that the putative
class members' Fourth Amendment rights were violated on a number of
different occasions, by a number of different individuals, under a
number of different circumstances. The Affidavits report the
presence of various individuals some by name, some not and list a
number of dates on which the Plaintiffs and putative class members
were searched some with specific dates, some with only years or
ranges and do not connect the presence of any particular individual
with any particular search date.  

The Defendants' liability as to each and every search will require
individualized proof regarding whether others were present and
whether the presence of others was related to the penological
purpose of the search. Here, the Policy prohibits the alleged
unconstitutional conduct and thus the manner and degree of
intrusiveness of each individual search will be central issues that
cannot be resolved in one stroke, defeating commonality.  

Individualized inquiries regarding exhaustion preclude class
certification

Under the PLRA, a prisoner may not bring an action with respect to
prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other
Federal law until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.   

There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA
and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought into court. The
prison's grievance process determines when a prisoner has properly
exhausted his or her claim. Even where a prisoner has made some
attempts to go through the prison's grievance process, the plain
language of the statute makes exhaustion a precondition to filing
an action in federal court. The prisoner may not exhaust his or her
administrative remedies during the pendency of the federal suit.
However, inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate
exhaustion in their complaints. Instead, failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is an affirmative defense under the PLRA.
As such, Defendants bear the burden of proof on exhaustion.  

Grievance Procedures at the MDOC

If the prisoner is dissatisfied with the disposition of the
grievance, or does not receive a response by ten business days
after the due date, he or she may file a Step II grievance using
the appropriate form. As with Step I, a response to the Step II
grievance should be issued within fifteen business days.  

Similarly, if the prisoner is dissatisfied with the Step II
response or does not receive a response by ten business days after
the response was due, he or she may file a Step III grievance. The
matter is fully exhausted after the disposition of the Step III
grievance.  

Exhaustion as an issue precluding class certification

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs make only conclusory allegations
regarding exhaustion, without citation to any evidence in the
record, and that Plaintiffs' failure to produce even one exhausted
claim of a potential class member calls into question whether this
action is suitable as a class action.

The Court agrees that the unanswered issue of whether either of the
named Plaintiffs, or even any putative class member, have exhausted
their administrative remedies regarding the sole remaining claim in
this case that they were subjected to the chair strip search in
view of other inmates or persons without a legitimate penological
need to be present raises concerns regarding Plaintiffs' ability to
meet their burden to demonstrate that: (1) the claims or defenses
of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class (typicality) (Rule 23(a)(3))  (2) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class (adequacy) (Rule 23(a)(4)) and (3) that the questions of law
or fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members (predominance) (Rule 23(b)(3)).

Plaintiffs have failed to produce any exhausted grievances, despite
their unsupported assertions that the named Plaintiffs have
exhausted their administrative remedies and the majority of
putative class members' attestations that they have completed the
grievance process.

There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA
and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought into court.

Plaintiffs then unambiguously state that both named Plaintiffs did
exhaust their remedies by filing Step I-III grievances. However,
they fail to attach those purported grievances to their motion even
though they do attach unexhausted grievance documents of three
putative class members.

The only evidence regarding Plaintiff Abcumby's alleged
administrative exhaustion in the record is six pages of grievance
records attached to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment and Qualified Immunity and while those documents
may evidence that Plaintiff Abcumby initiated a grievance regarding
the chair strip search procedure, they do not show that she
exhausted the process. The record contains no grievance records for
Plaintiff Salem at all, despite her uncorroborated statement in her
February 9, 2014 affidavit that she filed a grievance on September
4, 2011 regarding utilizing the chair in the strip search.

While recognizing that it is Defendants' burden to prove failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, the exhaustion issue nevertheless
impacts Plaintiffs' ability to demonstrate that they are adequate
class representatives and that their claims and defenses are
typical of those of the class members, and raises concerns about
the potential for individualized factual and legal issues
predominating over class-wide issues.

The grievances that have been supplied fail to complain about the
non-private nature of the searches

Of the few unexhausted grievances Plaintiffs have provided to the
Court, no grievance contains allegations stating or inferring that
other inmates or other persons not assisting in that search were in
the room or otherwise complains about the non-private nature of the
prisoner's search. Rather, these grievances complain only about
being subjected to the spread labia chair search, which they found
humiliating and degrading.

Plaintiffs contend that the grievances submitted cannot be expected
to contain every allegation of misconduct that occurred within the
strip search procedure. But the purpose of the exhaustion
requirement is to provide fair notice of alleged mistreatment or
misconduct that forms the basis of the constitutional or statutory
claim made against a defendant in a prisoner's complaint.

Here, while Plaintiffs have submitted a few unexhausted grievances
complaining about the spread labia chair strip search Policy as
applied to the individual grievant, there is no grievance in the
record complaining that other inmates were in the room or otherwise
complaining about the non-private nature of the search, and thus no
grievance that would serve to provide notice of this alleged
constitutional violation to prison officials. Accordingly, there is
no record evidence before the Court that Defendants were on notice"
of any complaint that strip searches were being conducted in a
non-private manner in violation of the chair strip search Policy.

Plaintiffs' counsel conceded at the hearing on the original motion
for class certification that Plaintiffs' inability to demonstrate a
class member's exhaustion of any grievance regarding the
non-private nature of any search would result in dismissal of that
Plaintiff or putative class member from the action.

Plaintiffs and putative class members were required to grieve
alleged violations of the strip search policy

The MDOC policy directive on Prisoner/Parolee Grievances, PD
03.02.130, provides that while a grievant may not grieve the
content of policy or procedure except as it was specifically
applied to the grievant, grievances may be submitted regarding
alleged violations of policy or procedure or unsatisfactory
conditions of confinement which directly affect the grievant,
including alleged violations of this policy and related procedures.
Thus, prisoners may grieve alleged violations of policy or
procedure as well as the content of policies or procedures as
specifically applied to them, and they must exhaust those
grievances before they are permitted to seek relief in federal
court.

First, Plaintiffs have cited no authority for their argument that
the perceived (or even actual) futility of filing grievances is a
basis for excusing noncompliance with the PLRA's administrative
exhaustion requirement, and the governing case law weighs in the
opposite direction.

Second, as explained below, the assertion that Plaintiffs would not
be permitted to grieve the content of policy would be true if
Plaintiffs were making a facial challenge to the blanket
application of the MDOC chair strip search policy (i.e., arguing
that a specific section of the policy as outlined in PD 04.04.110
was unconstitutional), but they are not. They are plainly alleging
a violation of that policy as it was specifically applied to them.

Thus, to the extent Plaintiffs or putative class members are
complaining that they were subjected to a strip search in the
presence of individuals other than the officer and the inmate, for
whose presence there was no legitimate penological justification,
they are necessarily complaining about a violation of the
applicable policy or procedure as specifically applied to them, and
not about the content of a policy or procedure. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs were, pursuant to PD 03.02.130, required to file
grievances regarding such alleged violations and to exhaust those
grievances prior to bringing such a claim in this Court.  

Ascertainability

For a class to be sufficiently defined, the court must be able to
resolve the question of whether class members are included or
excluded from the class by reference to objective criteria. In some
circumstances, a reference to damages or injuries caused by
particular wrongful actions taken by the defendants will be
sufficiently objective for proper inclusion in a class definition.

Applying these standards, this Court found in its initial Order
denying class certification that the proposed class definition
quoted above is ascertainable and can be determined based on
objective criteria such as exhausted grievances, but went on to
deny Plaintiffs' initial class certification motion on a
combination of numerosity, typicality, and adequacy grounds. Now,
Defendants argue in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification that Plaintiffs have failed to show that
administrative grievances are in fact a valid method for
determining an ascertainable class, since they have failed to
submit any exhausted grievances, even after they have acknowledged
that the best means of ascertaining the class is by exhausted
grievances.

In their Reply, Plaintiffs propose a new criteria for ascertaining
class membership: the 188 affidavits discussed at length supra that
have been sworn by inmates who allege that they were subjected to
chair strip searches at WHV in view of other inmates or individuals
not necessary to serve any penological purpose.  

Plaintiffs have failed to cite any law that stands for the
proposition that inmate affidavits, submitted years after the
events they purport to describe, can substitute for properly filed
and exhausted contemporaneous grievances. Indeed to allow such a
practice would thwart the very purpose of the grievance exhaustion
requirement, which is to alert the institution to the allegedly
offending conduct and to permit the institution an opportunity to
address that conduct short of a legal confrontation with the
inmate. Without first addressing the exhaustion of each class
member's grievance of the non-private nature of the search, the
class as defined is not sufficiently ascertainable.

Conclusion as to Class Certification

The crux of this case is commonality. Individualized issues as to
liability and exhaustion as to each putative class members' chair
search experiences abound and defeat commonality and typicality in
this action, and those individualized inquiries predominate over
any class-wide issues that Plaintiffs have presented.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 16, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y58jg6mp from
Leagle.com.

Amira Salem & Keshuna Abcumby, Plaintiffs, represented by Racine M.
Miller - racine.michelle@gmail.com - We Fight The Law, PLLC, Teresa
J. Gorman - terigorman@aol.com - Teresa J. Gorman PLLC & Kenneth J.
Hardin, II - kenhardin@hardinlawpc.net - Hardin Thompson, P.C.

Michigan Department of Corrections & Millicent Warren, Warden,
Defendants, represented by Cori E. Barkman , MI Dept of Atty Gen &
Michael R. Dean , Michigan Department of Attorney General.



MMI SERVICES: Hernandez Files Class Suit in Ca. Super. Ct.
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against MMI Services, Inc.
The case is styled as Pedro Hernandez, individually, and on behalf
of other members of the general public similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. MMI Services, Inc., a California corporation,
Defendants Case No. BCV-19-102663 (Ca. Super. Ct., Kern County,
Sept. 18, 2019).

The case type stated as Other Employment - Civil Unlimited.

MMI Services, Inc. provides oil well contracting services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:
   
   Douglas Han, Esq.
   Justice Law Corporation
   751 N Fair Oaks Ave
   Ste 101, Pasadena
   CA 91103-3069
   Tel: (818) 230-7502
   Fax: (818) 230-7259
   Email: dhan@justicelawcorp.com


MOUNT VERNON MILLS: E&G Appeals D.S.C. Decision to Fourth Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff E&G, Incorporated, filed an appeal from a Court ruling in
its lawsuit styled E&G, Inc. v. Mount Vernon Mills, Inc., Case No.
6:17-cv-00318-TMC, in the U.S. District Court for the District of
South Carolina at Greenville.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the class
action lawsuit was filed on February 2, 2017, and was assigned to
the Hon. Timothy M Cain.

The Defendant is a vertically integrated textile manufacturing
company.

The appellate case is captioned as E&G, Inc. v. Mount Vernon Mills,
Inc., Case No. 19-357, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Petitioner E&G, INCORPORATED, a West Virginia
corporation, individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly-situated persons, is represented by:

          John Gressette Felder, Jr.
          MCGOWAN, HOOD & FELDER, LLC
          1517 Hampton Street
          Columbia, SC 29201
          Telephone: (803) 779-0100
          E-mail: jfelder@mcgowanhood.com

               - and -

          Glenn Lorne Hara, Esq.
          Ryan Michael Kelly, Esq.
          ANDERSON & WANCA
          3701 Algonquin Road
          Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
          Telephone: (847) 368-1500
          E-mail: ghara@andersonwanca.com
                  bwanca@andersonwanca.com

Defendant-Respondent MOUNT VERNON MILLS, INC. is represented by:

          Thomas Warren Epting, Esq.
          Michael Kevin McCarrell, Esq.
          Natalma Morison McKnew, Esq.
          FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
          P. O. Box 87
          Greenville, SC 29602-0087
          Telephone: (864) 242-6440
          E-mail: tepting@foxrothschild.com
                  kmccarrell@foxrothschild.com
                  tmcknew@foxrothschild.com


MUY PIZZA: Oliver Seeks Overtime Compensation for Technicians
-------------------------------------------------------------
Willie Charles Oliver, Jr., On Behalf of Himself and All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. MUY Pizza Houston, LLC, the
Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-03412 (S.D. Tex., Sept. 10, 2019),
seeks to recover unpaid overtime compensation under Fair Labor
Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff worked a significant
number of overtime hours as did Members of the Class, yet he was
not compensated for it. The Defendant is in possession of records
that will reflect overtime hours worked by Plaintiff and Members of
the Class.

The Plaintiff was not properly compensated for overtime from the
start of his employment with Defendant, which began in
approximately in September 2016, until approximately August 29,
2018. During this time period, the Plaintiff worked significant
overtime hours yet was not paid all legally mandated overtime.

The Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a maintenance technician. The
Defendant is a business that operates within the restaurant/fast
food industry.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Sara Richey, Esq.
          THE RICHEY LAW FIRM
          3801 Kirby Dr., Suite 344
          Houston, TX 77098
          Telephone: 713-636-9931
          Facsimile: 713-333-5299
          E-mail: sara@thericheylawfirm.com

               - and -

          Clayton D. Craighead, Esq.
          THE CRAIGHEAD LAW FIRM
          440 Louisiana, Suite 900
          Houston, TX 77002
          Telephone: 832 798-1184
          Facsimile: 832 553-7261
          E-mail: clayton.craighead@thetxlawfirm.com

NAVIGANT CONSULTING: Rosenblatt Balks at Guidehouse Merger
----------------------------------------------------------
JORDAN ROSENBLATT, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. NAVIGANT CONSULTING, INC.,
JULIE M. HOWARD, MICHAEL I. TIPSORD, KEVIN BLAKELY, CYNTHIA A.
GLASSMAN, STEPHAN A. JAMES, RUDINA SESERI, KATHLEEN WALSH, JEFFREY
YINGLING, and RANDY H. ZWIRN, the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-01680-UNA (D. Del., Sept. 9, 2019), stems from a proposed
transaction announced on August 2, 2019, pursuant to which Navigant
Consulting, Inc. will be acquired by Guidehouse LLP and Isaac
Merger Sub.

On August 2, 2019, Navigant's Board of Directors caused the Company
to enter into an agreement and plan of merger with Guidehouse.
Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, Navigant's
stockholders will receive $28.00 in cash for each share of Navigant
common stock they own.

On August 30, 2019, the Defendants filed a proxy statement with the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with
the Proposed Transaction. The Proxy Statement omits material
information with respect to the Proposed Transaction, which renders
the Proxy Statement false and misleading, the lawsuit says.

Specifically, the Proxy Statement omits material information
regarding:

     -- the Company's financial projections. The Proxy Statement
fails to disclose: (i) for each set of projections, all line items
used to calculate (a) RBR, (b) EBITDA, (c) Adjusted EBITDA, (d)
EBIT, (e) EBIT excluding non-controlling interest, and (f) NOPAT;
and (ii) a reconciliation of all non-GAAP to GAAP metrics.

     -- the analyses performed by the Company's financial advisor
in connection with the Proposed Transaction, Jefferies LLC. With
respect to Jefferies' Selected Public Companies Analysis, the Proxy
Statement fails to disclose the individual multiples and metrics
for the companies observed by Jefferies in the analysis.

Navigant Consulting is an American management consultancy firm. It
has offices in Asia, Europe and North America; the head office is
in Chicago, Illinois. The stock is a component of the S&P 600
index.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff

          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 295-5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
          E-mail: bdl@rl-legal.com
                  gms@rl-legal.com

               - and -

          RM LAW, P.C.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (484) 324-6800
          Facsimile: (484) 631-1305

NESTLE USA: Underpays Employees, Wilson Claims
----------------------------------------------
ROBERT WILSON, Individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. NESTLE USA, INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-03846-TWP-DLP (S.D. Ind., Sept. 10, 2019), contends that
Nestle is and has been underpaying its employees' wages on a
class-wide basis as a result of a facility-wide policy or scheme in
which Nestle fails and refuses to pay employees from their first
principal work activity each day until their last principal work
activity.

Prior to the start of their shift and prior to clocking-in each
workday, Wilson and other similarly situated employees were
required to don uniforms, sanitary clothing and personal protective
equipment, including, among other things, uniform pants, uniform
shirts, hairnets, beard guards, bump caps, steel toed shoes, safety
glasses and earplugs.

Nestle failed to pay its employees at a rate no less than time and
one-half of their regular rates of pay for all hours they worked in
excess of 40 hours per workweek.

Nestle is a Swiss multinational food and drink processing
conglomerate corporation headquartered in Vevey, Vaud,
Switzerland.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Robert J. Hunt, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT J. HUNT, LLC
          1905 South New Market Street, Ste 220
          Carmel, IN 46032
          Telephone: 317 743-0614
          Facsimile: 317 743-0615
          E-mail: rob@indianawagelaw.com
                  rfh@indianawagelaw.com

NEW PRIME: Court Denies Pre-Certification Discovery in Haworth
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri, Southern Division, issued an Order denying Plaintiff's
Request to Compel a Response to Interrogatory No. 3 in the case
captioned ROCKY L. HAWORTH, Plaintiff, v. NEW PRIME, INC.,
Defendant. Case No. 6:19-03025-CV-RK. (W.D. Mo.).

Before the Court is Plaintiff's request to compel a response to his
Interrogatory No. 3.
The interrogatory seeks contact information for Defendant's B-seat
truck drivers, who were allegedly underpaid in violation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).

During a discovery dispute telephone conference held on July 29,
2019, Plaintiff claimed to need this contact information so he can
obtain additional declarations to support his motion for
conditional class certification.

Defendant argued that this information is not relevant and
proportional to the needs of the case because (1) Plaintiff does
not have a meritorious claim (2) there are privacy concerns with
disclosing employees' contact information and (3) Plaintiff could
potentially solicit potential class members to join the case.  

Some courts have allowed limited discovery of proposed class
members' contact information at the FLSA pre-certification stage
for the purpose of defining the proposed class, but other courts
have denied this type of pre-certification discovery as premature.

Here, Plaintiff's counsel has assured the Court that he will not
solicit potential class members to join this case and has even
offered to draft a script of interview questions for the Court's
prior approval. This approach, however noble, does not resolve the
concern that Plaintiff's counsel may still discover new clients for
future cases even though Plaintiff himself might not have a
meritorious claim. For this reason, the Court declines to compel
the requested discovery at this time.

Plaintiff also argues that he needs contact information at this
juncture because other courts have held that, in some cases, there
must be more than one declaration to satisfy the similarly situated
test of conditional certification. However, Plaintiff's motion for
conditional certification is already pending before this Court. In
the event the Court denies it because additional declarations are
needed, Plaintiff may seek reconsideration of this issue.

It is not unusual for this Court to apply the two-step
conditional-certification procedure used by other courts, which
postpones the merits beyond the pre-certification stage. However,
in this case, under these circumstances, the Court would entertain
a request from Defendant that the Court address the merits of
Plaintiff's claim by dispositive motion prior to ruling on the
motion for conditional certification.

Currently, the Court's Scheduling Order (which contains the
schedule submitted jointly by the parties does not include a
schedule for dispositive motions. The Court retains discretion,
however, to assess the merits of the named plaintiff's claims
before ruling on conditional certification.  

Plaintiff's request to compel a response to Interrogatory No. 3 is
DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff may move for reconsideration of
this denial upon the Court's ruling on the motion for conditional
certification.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 12, 2019 Order
is available at  https://tinyurl.com/y4tsgg35 from Leagle.com.

Rocky L. Haworth, Plaintiff, represented by Garrett Mark Hodes -
garrett@hodeslawfirm.com - Hodes Law Firm, LLC, Virginia Irene
Stevens Crimmins , Crimmins Law Firm LLC & Matthew Robert Crimmins
, Crimmins Law Firm, LLC. 214 Spring Street, Independence, MO,
64050-2513

New Prime, Inc., Defendant, represented by Amanda C. Machin -
amachin@gibsondunn.com - Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, pro hac vice,
Kathleen M. Nemechek , Berkowitz Oliver LLP, 2600 Grand Blvd.,
Suite 1200, Kansas City, MO 64108 & Michele L. Maryott  -
mmaryott@gibsondunn.com - pro hac vice.


NEW YORK, NY: Mitchell Files Bid for Writ of Certiorari With S.C.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Melinda Mitchell and Harvey Mitchell filed with the
Supreme Court of United States their petition for a writ of
certiorari in the matter entitled MELINDA MITCHELL, individually
and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated, HARVEY
MITCHELL, individually and on behalf of a class of all others
similarly situated v. CITY OF NEW YORK, a municipal entity, NYC
POLICE OFFICER JAMES SCHUESSLER, SHIELD NO. 28718, POLICE OFFICER
JOSEPH BRINADZE, NYPD CAPTAIN JOSEPH GULOTTA, NYPD SERGEANT
DANIELLE ROVENTINI, NYPD LIEUTENANT KATHLEEN CAESAR, RICHARD ROES
1-50, NEW YORK CITY POLICE SUPERVISORS AND COMMANDERS, JOHN DOES
and 1-50 NEW YORK CITY POLICE OFFICERS, individually, and in their
official capacities, jointly and severally, Case No. 19-326.

Response is due on October 10, 2019.

The Mitchells petition for a writ of certiorari to review the
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in this case.  The Court of Appeals entered judgment on
January 31, 2019.

The Plaintiffs presented these questions to the Supreme Court:

   1. Did the Second Circuit err in applying District of Columbia
      v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018), to grant qualified
      immunity to the police defendants who arrested the
      plaintiff partygoers for trespass where, unlike the
      officers in Wesby, the police defendants submitted perjured
      statements concerning the factual basis for the arrests and
      never determined whether the partygoers had permission to
      be present in the property; and where there were numerous
      disputes of material fact as to the condition of the
      premises?

   2. Did the Second Circuit err in holding that a civil rights
      plaintiff must show subjective malice by police defendants
      in order to assert a Fourth Amendment post-arrest,
      pre-trial wrongful seizure claim, since the Fourth
      Amendment employs a standard of objective reasonableness,
      and there is a split of circuit authority on the need to
      show malice?

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Second
Circuit issued an Order affirming the District Court's judgment
granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in the case.

Melinda and Harvey sued, bringing a putative class action alleging
Section 1983 claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse
of process, and excessive force.

The Lower Court Case is styled as Melinda Mitchell, et al. v. City
of New York, et al., Case No. 18-588-cv, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Petitioners Melinda Mitchell, et al., are represented
by:

          Jeffrey Adam Rothman, Esq.
          JEFFREY A. ROTHMAN, ATTORNEY AT LAW
          315 Broadway, Suite 200
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 227-2980
          E-mail: rothman.jeffrey@gmail.com

               - and -

          Jonathan C. Moore, Esq.
          BELDOCK LEVINE & HOFFMAN LLP
          99 Park Avenue, Suite 1600
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 490-0400
          E-mail: jmoore@blhny.com

               - and -

          Joshua S. Moskovitz, Esq.
          BERNSTEIN CLARKE & MOSKOVITZ PLLC
          11 Park Place, Suite 914
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 321-0087
          E-mail: moskovitz@bcmlaw.com


OMNI SPECIALTY: Thiry Sues Omni, O'Reilly in S.D. Texas
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against O'Reilly Automotive
Stores, Inc. The case is captioned as Robert Thiry, on behalf of
himself and other similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Omni
Specialty Packaging, LLC; O'Reilly Automotive Stores, Inc.; doing
business as: O'Reilly Auto Parts; and Ozark Automotive
Distributors, Inc., the Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-03366 (S.D.
Tex., Sept 6, 2019). The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Ewing
Werlein, Jr.

Omni Specialty manufactures, markets, and distributes lubricants
and chemicals to automotive and industrial markets in the United
States and internationally. Its production includes light and heavy
automotive lubricants, industrial and hydraulic lubricants,
automotive gear oil, automatic transmission and brake fluids,
greases, and oil.[BN]

The Plaintiff is Represented by:

          Bryan T. White, Esq.
          Gene P. Graham, Esq.
          William L. Carr, Esq.
          WHITE GRAHAM ET AL
          19049 E. Valley View Pkwy., Ste C
          Independence, MO 64055
          Telephone: (816) 373-9080
          E-mail: bwhite@wagblaw.com
                  ggraham@wgblaw.com
                  bcarr@wagblaw.com

               - and -

          Dirk Leon Hubbard, Esq.
          Thomas V Bender, Esq.
          HORN AYLWARD & BANDY
          2600 Grand Blvd, Ste 1100
          Kansas City, MO 64108
          Telephone: (816) 421-0700
          E-mail: tbender@hab-law.com

               - and -

          John G. Emerson, Esq.
          EMERSON FIRM, PLLC
          830 Apollo Lane
          Houston, TX 77058
          Telephone: (800) 551-8649
          Facsimile: (501) 286-4659
          E-mail: jemerson@emersonfirm.com

ORTHOPAEDIC BOARD: Rosenstein Sues over Monopoly of Certification
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ALEXANDER ROSENSTEIN, M.D., Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. AMERICAN BOARD OF
ORTHOPAEDIC SURGERY and AMERICAN BOARD OF MEDICAL SPECIALTIES, the
Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-01754-GPC-WVG (S.D. Cal., Sept. 11,
2019), contends ABMS, as the dominant seller of Initial Board
Certification through its member boards, including ABOS, has
monopoly power in the IBC market.

More than 29,000 licensed physicians are members of ABOS, and
approximately 90% of the more than 880,000 licensed physicians in
the United States are board certified in at least one medical
specialty by ABMS.

In addition to selling IBC, ABOS and other ABMS member boards
requires that board-certificated doctors also maintain their IBC by
purchasing "maintenance of certification" or "MOC" from ABOS or the
ABMS member boards. Failure to purchase MOC results in loss of
certification, regardless of a physician's skill or ability within
their given specialty.

Through their MOC monopoly, the defendants abuse their position to
extract inflated supracompetitive payments for MOC from
certificated physicians and engage in other predatory and
anticompetitive activities. Plaintiff, fair competition, and
American medical community participants -- from physicians to
competitor certification providers to patients -- have been
injured.

Plaintiff seeks treble damages and injunctive relief against
Defendants for violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the
California's Cartwright Act, and California's Unfair Competition.
Plaintiff says ABMS and its member boards' conduct has been at the
expense of physicians nationwide, and has sharply curtailed, if not
eliminated, fair competition in the field of medical specialty
certification maintenance.

The purpose of IBC is to indicate that, beyond meeting state
licensing requirements, a board certified doctor also has
demonstrated the skill, knowledge and ability to practice the
medical specialty for which he or she is certificated.

American Board of Medical Specialties is a nationally recognized
non-profit organization that sets the standards for and certifies
doctors as capable in specified medical specialties and
subspecialties through its 24 member boards. ABMS is headquartered
in Chicago, Illinois.

American Board of Orthopaedic Surgery is a non-profit organization
that became an ABMS member in 1935. With more than 29,000 Board
Certified Orthopaedic Surgeons in the United States (more than a
thousand of which reside in California), it has one of the largest
memberships of any Board in the country. ABOS is headquartered at
400 Silver Cedar Court in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          David W. Mitchell, Esq.
          Carmen A. Medici, Esq.
          Arthur L. Shingler III, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101-8498
          Telephone: 619 231-1058
          Facsimile: 619 231-7423
          E-mail: davidm@rgrdlaw.com
                  cmedici@rgrdlaw.com
                  ashingler@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          Brian J. Robbins, Esq.
          George C. Aguilar, Esq.
          Jenny L. Dixon, Esq.
          Eric M. Carrino, Esq.
          ROBBINS ARROYO LLP
          5040 Shoreham Place
          San Diego, CA 92122
          Telephone: 619 525-3990
          Facsimile: 619 525-3991
          E-mail: brobbins@robbinsarroyo.com
                  gaguilar@robbinsarroyo.com
                  jdixon@robbinsarroyo.com
                  ecarrino@robbinsarroyo.com

PRADA USA: Shalamov Sues over Unsolicited Text Messages
-------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL SHALAMOV, individually and onbehalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff,  vs. PRADA USA CORP., a New York
corporation, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-08367 (S.D.N.Y., Sept.
9, 2019), contends that the Defendant promotes and markets its
merchandise, in part, by sending unsolicited text messages to
wireless phone users, in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

The Defendant is a designer apparel company.

The  Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt Defendant's illegal
conduct, which has resulted in the invasion of privacy, harassment,
aggravation, and disruption of the daily life of thousands of
individuals. The Plaintiff also seeks statutory damages on behalf
of himself and members of the class, and any other available legal
or equitable remedies, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Class are:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN, LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Telephone: (732) 695-3282
          E-mail: yzelman@marcuszelman.com

               - and -

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 1205
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: 305-479-2299
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
                  gberg@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          Jordan D. Utanski, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, PA
          19495 Biscayne Blvd #607
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: 305-975-3320
          E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com
                  utanski@edelsberglaw.com

PRETTUM PACKAGING: Trost Sues over Collection of Biometric Data
---------------------------------------------------------------
TERRANCE TROST individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. PRETTUM PACKAGING, L.L.C. a Delaware
limited liability company, the Defendant, Case No. 2019CH10487
(Ill. Cir., Sept. 10, 2019), seeks to put a stop to its unlawful
collection, use, and storage of Plaintiffs and the putative Class
members' sensitive biometric data.

When employees first begin their jobs at Pretium, they are required
to scan their fingerprint in its biometric time tracking system as
a means of authentication, instead of using only key fobs or other
identification cards.

While there are tremendous benefits to using biometric time clocks
in the workplace, there are also serious risks. Unlike key fobs or
identification cards -- which can be changed or replaced if stolen
or compromised -- fingerprints are unique, permanent biometric
identifiers associated with the employee. This exposes employees to
serious and irreversible privacy risks. For example, if a
fingerprint database is hacked, breached, or otherwise exposed,
employees have no means by which to prevent identity theft and
unauthorized tracking, the lawsuit says.

The complaint seeks an order: (i) declaring that Defendant's
conduct violates the Biometric Information Privacy Act; (ii)
requiring Defendant to cease the unlawful activities; and (iii)
awarding liquidated damages to Plaintiff and the proposed Class.

Pretium is one of the country's leading manufacturers of plastic
containers and makes more than two billion units each year for more
than 700 customers.  It formerly operated as Custom Blow
Molding.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          David Fish, Esq.
          John Kunze, Esq.
          THE FJSH LAW FIRM, P.C.
          200 East Fifth Avenue, Suite 123
          Naperville, IL 60563
          Telephone: 630 355 7590
          Facsimile: 630 778 0400
          E-mail: admin@fishlawfirm.com
                  dfish@fishlawfirm.com
                  kunze@fishlawfirm.com

PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN: 11th Cir. Flips Class Certification
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, issued an
Opinion reversing the District Court's judgment granting
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned AA
SUNCOAST CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC, P.A., et al., on behalf of themselves
and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. PROGRESSIVE
AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Defendants-Appellants. No.
17-13003. (11th Cir.).

A panel of this Court granted Progressive's request for an
interlocutory appeal of the injunction class certification.

A trio of healthcare providers brought a class action against an
insurance company over a claims-handling process that they argue is
illegal under Florida law.

Suncoast moved to certify two classes: an injunction class under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) for count one, and a
damages subclass under Rule 23(b)(3) for count two. The proposed
injunction class was defined to include:

   A. All Qualified Providers who: (i) received an assignment of
benefits from a Claimant under a Progressive PIP policy, (ii)
provided initial or follow up medical services to a Claimant after
January 1, 2013, and (iii) were given notice by Progressive that
available PIP benefits were reduced to $2,500 because of a Negative
EMC Determination that Progressive obtained from a Non-treating
Provider and

   B. All Claimants who were notified that Progressive reduced
available PIP benefits to $2,500 because of a Negative EMC
Determination Progressive obtained from a Non-treating Provider.
The damages subclass was defined to include:

All Qualified Provider Class Members: (i) who were not paid in full
for their services, (ii) who made a pre-suit demand to Progressive
for payment pursuant to § 627.736(10), and (iii) where Progressive
received documentation from a duly licensed physician, dentist,
physician's assistant or advanced registered nurse practitioner
that the Claimant had an Emergency Medical Condition.

The district court refused to certify the damages subclass which,
under Rule 23(b)(3), would require the court to find predominance
and superiority because doing so would necessitate individualized
assessments and case management. But it certified the injunction
class, in part because Suncoast assured it that once the legal
issue is determined, there will be no more supervision required to
determine individual damages.

The Court reviews a class certification decision for abuse of
discretion. But abuse of discretion is a continuum, and in the
context of class actions, review for abuse of discretion often does
not differ greatly from review for error.

Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure lays down the
ground rules for certifying a class action. To win certification
under Rule 23, every class must present a named plaintiff who has
standing to bring the claim. Every class must be adequately defined
and clearly ascertainable. And every class must satisfy the four
requirements of Rule 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality,
and adequacy of representation.

For a damages class under Rule 23(b)(3), the plaintiff must show
that questions of law or fact common to class members predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

The district court already concluded that a subclass of this class
cannot proceed to seek damages under Rule 23(b)(3) because
individualized assessments preclude certification of a damages
class under that subsection. This is because, even if Suncoast is
right on the merits about who may issue negative EMC determinations
under Florida law, each and every member of the damages subclass
would have to jump through a series of hoops to establish an
individualized entitlement to damages in the district court.
Analyzing those individualized issues under the Rule 23(b)(3)
standard, the district court has already held that if monetary
relief is on the table, class certification is off of it.

Instead of appealing that decision and fighting this case on the
Rule 23(b)(3) damages battleground with its predominance and
superiority requirements, Suncoast seeks to avoid these problems by
styling its claim for relief as injunctive only. Suncoast assures
us that it is not seeking any damages award at all, at least not as
a class. Instead, it simply wants a declaration that Progressive's
practice of relying on non-treating physicians is unlawful, along
with an injunction.

The problem with this argument is that the injunction that Suncoast
has requested is not an injunction at all, and its declaratory
request is both minimal and unconnected to the members of its
class. Suncoast's requested relief is not designed to address the
treatment of future claims; it would instead, according to Suncoast
itself, restore claimants to the claims-handling process free of
the improper cap on PIP benefits imposed by Progressive.

Suncoast hammers away at the fact that it no longer seeks classwide
monetary damages, but no amount of hammering can make its square
peg fit into Rule 23(b)(2)'s round hole. Everything about
Suncoast's claim from its theory of standing to its request for
relief to its class definition looks back at past harms.

First, consider Suncoast's theory of standing in this case. Because
not every class member would ultimately be entitled to any monetary
award, Suncoast frames its injury as a lost opportunity to have a
fair shake in the claims-handling process. But Suncoast's own
descriptions make clear that this purported injury is entirely
retrospective. Suncoast argues, for example, that Progressive's
unlawful practice denied each Class member a fair opportunity to
prove an entitlement to benefits over $2,500.   

Again: This unlawful cessation of claims-handling was an
injury-in-fact sufficient to confer Article III standing on each
Class member. And again: Class members have been injured because
Progressive's unlawful practice use of a negative EMC determination
by a non-treating provider denied them the opportunity, guaranteed
by a Florida statutes, to seek PIP benefits exceeding $2,500. In
plain English, Suncoast argues that Progressive short-circuited its
review of past insurance claims when it denied them based on an
outside EMC determination, and that this past short-circuiting is a
harm of its own regardless of whether any individual claim could
have been denied for other reasons. It now categorizes its desire
to have those claims reprocessed as a future interest.

Second, Suncoast's request for relief further betrays the
retrospective nature of its injury. Suncoast seeks a declaration
stating that Progressive's practices are unlawful and asks the
court to reinstate the full amount of PIP coverage, in the amount
of $10,000, which should have been available under the affected
policies." In its brief, Suncoast describes this relief as
requiring Progressive to resume handling the Class members' PIP
claims in accordance with Florida law. To begin, those two requests
could be interpreted to describe different forms of relief. But the
only outcome that any conception of this intermediary relief could
ever lead to—even in the best-case scenario for any particular
claimant would be full payment of coverage benefits that have
already been denied, for claims that were already processed, for
injuries that were already suffered. The requested relief, again,
looks backward to an injury already suffered.

Third, then, even if Suncoast's claim for injunctive and
declaratory relief were more than a fig leaf attempting to cover
its demand for past relief, it would run headlong into another
problem: Suncoast's class definition itself reveals that Suncoast
is seeking retrospective relief. The proposed injunction class
includes:

   A. All Qualified Providers who: (i) received an assignment of
benefits from a Claimant under a Progressive PIP policy (ii)
provided initial or follow up medical services to a Claimant after
January 1, 2013 and (iii) were given notice by Progressive that
available PIP benefits were reduced to $2,500 because of a Negative
EMC Determination that Progressive obtained from a Non-treating
Provider and

   B. All Claimants who were notified that Progressive reduced
available PIP benefits to $2,500 because of a Negative EMC
Determination Progressive obtained from a Non-treating Provider.

Nothing in that definition envisions future harm. For a claimant,
any future injury hinges on the possibility that he may someday be
in another car accident; sustain an injury entitling him to PIP
benefits; and still be insured by Progressive under the same or a
similar policy being interpreted the same way, thereby having this
issue present itself again. The chance that lightning might strike
twice is not enough to justify injunctive relief.

As for providers, Suncoast does allege that it and others like it
continue to treat Progressive insureds, and have a reasonable
expectation that the dispute, and attendant harms, regarding
Progressive's EMC Paper Review process will be ongoing into the
future. While a class may exist that would match this allegation,
the class as defined here does not it is both fatally overinclusive
and underinclusive on that score. It is overinclusive because it
fails to limit membership to providers who are likely to see more
Progressive insureds, and therefore likely to run into this problem
again. Indeed, Progressive asserts that two of the named
plaintiffs, Suncoast itself and Tampa Bay Spine, no longer treat
PIP insureds. Suncoast responds that "Progressive cites nothing to
support this assertion. Fair enough but whether or not Suncoast and
Tampa Bay Spine continue to treat PIP-insured patients, the point
is that the class definition would sweep in them and others like
them.

The class is also underinclusive because it fails to account for
providers who have not yet faced denied claims on the allegedly
wrongful basis but expect to do so in the future it only applies to
those providers already injured when past claims were denied. All
of this presents more evidence that the relief sought in this case
is retrospective, not prospective.  

In the end, the retrospective nature of Suncoast's class and claim
make clear that an injunction is not the right remedy in this case,
indeed, it is not really the remedy that Suncoast's class is
seeking. And because an injunction is not the right remedy, Rule
23(b)(2) is not the right path to class certification: the policies
underlying the requirements of (b)(3) should not be subverted by
recasting and bifurcating every class suit for damage as one for
final declaratory relief of liability under (b)(2), followed by a
class suit for damages under (b)(3).

Suncoast's request for declaratory relief does not save the class.
For one thing, like an injunction, declaratory relief requires a
likelihood of future harm. And as both we and the Supreme Court
have made clear, this future interest must be alleged by the
plaintiff rather than imagined by the court: In order to
demonstrate that a case or controversy exists to meet the Article
III standing requirement when a plaintiff is seeking injunctive or
declaratory relief, a plaintiff must allege facts from which it
appears there is a substantial likelihood that he will suffer
injury in the future.

The Court will not belabor the points the Court have made regarding
the retrospective nature of the class definition. But we will make
the additional point that, in the class-action context, a request
for declaratory relief must correspond with injunctive relief.
Declaratory relief  corresponds' to injunctive relief when as a
practical matter it affords injunctive relief or serves as a basis
for later injunctive relief and Rule 23(b)(2) does not extend to
cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or
predominantly to money damages.

Because the declaratory relief sought here does no more than that,
it does not correspond to injunctive relief as Rule 23(b)(2)
requires. To be sure, some cases allow for the possibility that a
party's request for declaratory relief may eventually serve as a
route to damages. But none of those cases disclaims the traditional
requirements for injunctive or declaratory relief including the
requirement that the plaintiff seeks relief for a future harm.  

This case is about damages. Rule 23(b)(3) is the proper mechanism
for certifying a damages class. But because the plaintiffs' damages
claims are studded with individualized issues that put Rule
23(b)(3) certification out of the question, they have sought
instead to lop off all the damages-based warts and recast their
claim as one for injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2). That ploy
may have avoided Rule 23(b)(3)'s strictures, but in the end it
fails because an injunction is an inappropriate remedy for the
class as certified.  

A full-text copy of the Eleventh Circuit's September 12, 2019
Opinion is available at  https://tinyurl.com/y5ujbdym from
Leagle.com.

Nancy A. Copperthwaite, One Southeast Third Avenue, 25th Floor,
Miami, FL, 33131-1700,  for Defendant-Appellant.

Ari H. Gerstin - ari.gerstin@akerman.com - for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Ari H. Gerstin, for Defendant-Appellant.

Bryan Scott Gowdy , Creed & Gowdy, P.A. 865 May St Jacksonville, FL
32204-3310, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

J. Andrew Meyer , 1205 West Main Street #204, Richmond, VA 23220,
for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Margaret Diane Mathews - marn.aret.mathews@akermao.com - for
Defendant-Appellant.
Marcy Levine Aldrich - marcy.aldrich@akerman.com - for
Defendant-Appellant.

Maria Elena Abate , Colodny, Fass, Talenfeld, Karlinsky, Abate &
Webb, One Financial Plaza, 23rd Floor, 100 S.E. Third Ave., Fort
Lauderdale, FL, 33394-0002, for Defendant-Appellant.

Daniel M. Mahfood - dmahfood@appellate-firm.com - for
Plaintiff-Appellee.

Ross E. Linzer - ross.linzer@akerman.com - for
Defendant-Appellant.

Kathryn E. Lee , 144 Glendale Ave, Decatur, GA, 30030-1914, for
Plaintiff-Appellee.

Christa Lianne Collins , for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Lauren A. Meksraitis-Elliott , 102 S Westland Ave, Tampa, FL,
33606-1742, for Plaintiff-Appellee.


REGIONAL TRANS: Singer Seeks to Certify Illinois Wage Class
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RICHARD SINGER, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. REGIONAL
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, an Illinois Municipal Corporation; and
PACE SUBURBAN BUS SERVICE, a division of the Regional
Transportation Authority, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-00199
(N.D. Ill.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order:

   1. certifying a Illinois Wage Class consisting of:

      "all Pace bus operators who performed uncompensated work for
      Pace, for the three years prior to the complaint filing
      date, through the present, and who suffered similar wage and

      related damages as alleged in the complaint"; and

   2. approving future notice to the class of the pending action
      and appointing plaintiff's counsel to serve as class counsel

      pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.

The Plaintiff sought relief on behalf of all Pace bus operators who
performed uncompensated work for Pace, thereby suffering damages of
unpaid regular and overtime wages in violations of the Illinois
Minimum Wage Law and the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection
Act.[CC]

Counsel for the Plaintiff are:

          Scott C. Polman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF SCOTT C. POLMAN
          8130 N. Milwaukee Ave.
          Niles, IL 60714
          E-mail. spolman.law@comcast.net
          Telephone: 847 292-1989
          Facsimile: 847 510-0581

               - and -

          Stephen A Chareas, Esq.
          STEPHEN A CHAREAS, LTD.
          8034 N. Milwaukee Ave.
          Niles, IL 60714
          Telephone: 847 692-3388
          Facsimile: 847 692-0400
          E-mail. sacltd@sbcglobal.net

RELIABLE PCA: Badon Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------
STACEY BADON on behalf of herself and all those similarly situated
v. RELIABLE PCA AND SIL AGENCY, LLC AND QUENTINA DAWSON, Case No.
2:19-cv-12503 (E.D. La., Sept. 9, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid
overtime and liquidated damages owed to the Plaintiff and the class
for not being paid overtime on time, in direct violation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

Reliable PCA and SIL Agency, LLC, is a Louisiana limited liability
company and is engaged in business in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana.
Quentina Dawson is the owner and managing member of Reliable PCA.

The Company provides non-medical home care in Marrero,
Louisiana.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jody Forester Jackson, Esq.
          Mary Bubbett Jackson, Esq.
          JACKSON+JACKSON
          201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 2500
          New Orleans, LA 70170
          Telephone: (504) 599-5953
          Facsimile: (888) 988-6499
          E-mail: jjackson@jackson-law.net
                  mjackson@jackson-law.net


ROSE GROUP: Faces Williams Suit in District of Maryland
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Rose Group, LP.
The case is captioned as Ty Williams, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. The Rose Group,
LP, doing business as: Applebee's, the Defendant, Case No.
8:19-cv-02614-PWG (D. Md., Sept. 9, 2019). The suit alleges
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge Paul W. Grimm.

Applebee's is an American company which develops, franchises, and
operates the Applebee's Neighborhood Grill + Bar restaurant
chain.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Thomas Joseph Minton, Esq.
          GOLDMAN AND MINTON PC
          3600 Clipper Mill Rd., Suite 201
          Baltimore, MD 21211
          Telephone: (410) 783-7575
          Facsimile: (410) 783-1711
          E-mail: tminton@charmcitylegal.com

SALLIE MAE: 2d Cir. Remands Order Vacating $108K Arbitration Award
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, issued an
Opinion vacating the District Court's judgment vacating an
Arbitration Award in the case captioned ROBIN WEISS,
Plaintiff-Appellant, ANDREW SCHAUS, Plaintiff, v. SALLIE MAE,
INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee. No. 18-2362. (2nd Cir.).

Plaintiff-Appellant Robin Weiss appeals from a decision and order
entered in the United States District Court for the Western
District of New York (Vilardo, J.) vacating an arbitration award on
the grounds that it was issued in manifest disregard of the law.

Weiss incurred student loan debt with Sallie Mae, on which she
subsequently defaulted.Sallie Mae began calling Weiss's cell phone
as often as seven or eight times per day in an effort to collect on
its debt. Weiss brought this action against Sallie Mae under the
TCPA for Sallie Mae's unlawful use of an automated telephone
dialing system (ATDS).

The parties stipulated to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration
agreement in Weiss's student loan promissory note, thus staying the
litigation.   

The arbitrator also found that Weiss was a member of the settlement
class in the case of Mark A. Arthur et al. v. Sallie Mae, Inc. in
the United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington (Arthur Settlement). The arbitrator then awarded Weiss
statutory damages totaling $108,500, that is, $500 for each of the
217 ATDS calls placed during that time period.

NSL moved to vacate the arbitration award and Weiss cross-moved to
affirm. Following oral argument, the district court issued a
written decision and order holding that by neglecting to apply or
even address an explicit, unambiguous term of the settlement
agreement, which early and unambiguously bars recovery for claims
until and including the date of the agreement, the arbitrator
manifestly disregarded the law.  

The district court vacated the arbitration award. This appeal
followed.

Standard of Review

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides four bases upon which a
federal district court may vacate an arbitration award. One of
these grounds permits vacatur where the arbitrators exceeded their
powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.

Remand to the Arbitrator is Appropriate

As already noted, the arbitrator construed the Arthur class notice
as establishing Weiss's consent to receive future ATDS calls, but
he determined that such consent could not be applied retroactively
to bar her recovery for calls placed prior to the revocation
deadline. Weiss advances two arguments in support of that decision.
Because the arbitrator's award was ostensibly based on an
interpretation of the class notice, Weiss asserts that even the
arbitrator's misinterpretation of what amounts to a contractual
provision does not provide sufficient grounds for vacatur under the
FAA. She also attempts a collateral attack on the sufficiency of
the Arthur class notice, arguing that it does not satisfy due
process and, accordingly, that she cannot be bound by the Arthur
Settlement's terms.

As an initial matter, Weiss is correct that interpretation of the
contract terms is within the province of the arbitrator and will
not be overruled simply because the Court disagrees with that
interpretation. Yet the district court concluded that this is not a
case where the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract was
simply incorrect as the arbitrator's decision here ignored and
contradicted an unambiguous term of the agreement, namely, the
general release embodied in the Arthur Settlement.

In other words, even if the arbitrator believed that the class
notice entitled Weiss to recover for ATDS calls made prior to the
consent revocation deadline, it is impossible to square that
conclusion with the general release provision barring Weiss's
recovery for any and all TCPA claims. This is especially true given
that the parties agreed in their arbitration agreement that the
arbitrator shall follow applicable substantive law to the extent
consistent with the FAA.

Because the arbitrator did not even mention the release in his
decision, the Court unable to ascertain from the record whether the
arbitrator in fact based his decision on the four corners of the
Arthur Settlement agreement and its accompanying class notice, as
Weiss appears to contend, or whether he instead discarded the
agreement in favor of his own policy preferences.  

Regarding Weiss's attack on the sufficiency of the class notice, as
previously noted, the arbitrator expressly found that despite some
of the confusing terms of the Arthur Settlement agreement, the
proof was conclusive that Weiss received the required notice of the
settlement and of her rights and obligations under the terms of the
settlement. Nonetheless, he appeared to base his award on the fact
that the class notice only apprised Weiss of her consent to receive
a subset of ATDS calls those placed prospectively. If in fact the
arbitrator were of the view that the class notice did not satisfy
due process, as Weiss contends, then the arbitrator, in following
applicable substantive law, would seemingly be obliged to hold that
Weiss could not be bound by any of the Arthur Settlement
agreement's terms. This is an all-or-nothing inquiry.

Instead, the arbitrator's finding that the class notice does not
state that the recipient will be deemed to have given prior express
consent to the making of calls by Sallie Mae, appears to rest on a
parsing of the applicable law grounded neither in a constitutional
due process analysis nor in a faithful exercise in contract
interpretation.

Our concern is reinforced by the fact that the arbitrator's
analyses regarding Weiss's failure to consent to the ATDS calls at
issue either expressly or through the implied consent that attached
to the Arthur Settlement terms appear in separate sections of the
arbitrator's opinion that address the merits of NSL's defense to
Weiss's TCPA claims. The question of whether Weiss was on notice of
the Arthur Settlement's terms, by contrast, is addressed up front
as the first of the issues considered by the arbitrator.  

Once the arbitrator made the determination that Weiss was
adequately advised of the terms of the settlement and of the
requirement that she revoke any consent given to NSL to place ATDS
calls to cell 6452, that conclusion would seem to obviate not only
the arbitrator's subsequent analysis concerning whether NSL had met
its burden of proving Weiss's consent but also any further
determination as to the effect of the class notice. In other words,
if the arbitrator intended to deem the class notice insufficient,
he did not say so in his threshold analysis regarding the
settlement's applicability and strongly implied the opposite.

In light of the incoherence of the arbitrator's decision, the Court
hereby VACATE the district court's order and REMAND the case to the
district court to remand to the arbitrator with instructions to
clarify whether the class notice was or was not sufficient and, if
determined to be sufficient, then to construe the general release
provision in the first instance and to vacate or modify the
arbitral award if necessary.

A full-text copy of the Second Circuit's September 12, 2019 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2bo4rbm from Leagle.com.

KENNETH R. HILLER , ( Seth J. Andrews , on the brief), Law Offices
of Kenneth Hiller, PLLC, 3729 Union Road 4, Buffalo, NY, 14225, for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

CHRISTOPHER R. RAMOS - cramos@vedderprice.com - ( Lisa M. Simonetti
, 222 North Lasalle, St.Chicago, Illinois, 60601, on the brief),
Vedder Price (CA), LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.


SAN MARINO AT SOHO: Restaurant Staff Seeks Unpaid Overtime
----------------------------------------------------------
Santiago Hernandez, Luis Puma and Jose Paguay Bravo, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. San
Marino at Soho Incorporated and Skender Gashi, Defendants, Case No.
19-cv-07976, (S.D. N.Y., August 26, 2019), seeks to recover damages
for violations of New York State labor laws and the Fair Labor
Standards Act, compensatory and liquidated damages, interest,
attorneys' fees, costs and all other legal and equitable remedies.

San Marino operates as a restaurant at 66 Charlton Street, New
York, New York, where Plaintiffs worked as restaurant staff. They
claim to have worked in excess of 40 hours per day without overtime
premium, and Defendants failed to provide accurate wage statements.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
      HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, PC
      69-12 Austin Street
      Forest Hills, NY 11375
      Telephone: (718) 263-9591
      Fax: (718) 263-9598
      Email: HFDalton6912@Gmail.com


SANOFI-AVENTIS: Garza Sues Over Sale of Carcinogenic Drug
---------------------------------------------------------
Christina Garza, Pankaj Khetarpal, Corina Lingerfelt, and Justin
Rowe, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated
Plaintiffs, v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC; Sanofi US Services Inc.;
Chattem, Inc.; and Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
Defendants, Case No. 5:19-cv-05772-NC (N.D. Cal., Sept. 13, 2019)
is an action against Defendants seeking to represent a Class of
those persons who purchased over-the-counter Zantac in the State of
California between January 1, 2010 and the present, for Defendants'
violations of the California's consumer-protection laws.

Zantac--the brand-name version of the generic drug ranitidine--is
used to treat gastrointestinal conditions such as acid indigestion,
heartburn, sour stomach, and gastroesophageal reflux disease.

Both Sanofi and Boehringer knew or had reason to know that Zantac
exposes users to unsafe levels of the carcinogen
N-Nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA). Despite the weight of scientific
evidence showing that Zantac exposed users to unsafe levels of the
NDMA, neither Sanofi nor Boehringer disclosed this risk to
consumers on the drug's label--or through any other means. Had
Defendants disclosed that Zantac results in unsafe levels of NDMA
in the human body, no person, let alone a reasonable person, would
have purchased and consumed Zantac. Had Plaintiffs and the Class
known that taking Zantac would expose them to high levels of the
carcinogen NDMA, they would not have purchased the drug.

The Defendants' failure to disclose this material information to
Plaintiffs and the Class violates California's consumer-protection
laws, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs are persons who have previously purchased the
over-the-counter version of the drug Zantac.

Defendants manufactured and sold over-the-counter Zantac in the
United State.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Shana E. Scarlett, Esq.
     Rio S. Pierce, Esq.
     HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
     715 Hearst Avenue . Suite 202
     Berkeley, CA 94710
     Phone: (510) 725-3000
     Email: shanas@hbsslaw.com

          - and -

     Steve W. Berman, Esq.
     HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
     1301 Second Avenue, Suite 2000
     Seattle, WA 98101
     Phone: (206) 623-7292
     Facsimile: (206) 623-0594
     Email: steve@hbsslaw.com

          - and –

     Jason Zweig, Esq.
     Zoran Tasic, Esq.
     HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
     455 N. Cityfront Plaza Dr., Suite 2410
     Chicago, IL 60611
     Phone: (708) 628-4949
     Email: jasonz@hbsslaw.com
            zorant@hbsslaw.com

SAS MANAGEMENT: Valverde Seeks Unpaid Wages for Employees
---------------------------------------------------------
TERRY REY VALVERDE, individual, the Plaintiff, vs. SAS MANAGEMENT
STORES, INC., a California corporation; and DOES 1 through 250,
inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. 19STCV32304 (Cal. Super., Sept.
11, 2019), asserts that the Defendants have intentionally and
willfully failed to provide employees with complete and accurate
wage statements. The deficiencies include, among other things, the
failure to correctly identify the total hours worked and the gross
wages earned by Plaintiff and the overtime hours worked by
Plaintiff, the lawsuit says.

SAS Management is a Management Consulting and Education Services
provider.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Brent S. Buchsbaum, Esq.
          Laurel N. Haag, Esq.
          Matthew B. Perez, Esq.
          Gary R. Carlin, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF CARLIN & BUCHSBAUM, LLP
          301 East Ocean Blvd., Suite 1550
          Long Beach, CA 90802
          Telephone: (562) 432-8933
          Facsimile: (562)435-1656
          E-mail: brent@carlinbuchsbaum.com
                  laurel@carlinbuchsbaum.com
                  matthew@carlinbuchsbaum.com
                  gary@carlinbuchsbaum.com

SILK OPERATING: Trust Sues over Vanilla Labeling in Products
------------------------------------------------------------
Shari Trust, Jane Doe, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. Silk Operating Company,
LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 7:19-cv-08442 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 11,
2019), alleges that Defendant failed to accurately identify
vanilla-flavored products on their front labels when it was in a
position to disclose this but did not accurately describe the
nature of the Products.

Silk Operating Company, LLC manufactures, distributes, markets,
labels and sells almond milk beverages purporting to be
characterized by vanilla under the Silk brand.

The Products are available to consumers nationwide from third-party
retailers, including brick and mortar and online stores and
directly from defendant's website.

The Products' labeling or advertising makes direct representations
with respect to their primary recognizable and characterizing
flavor, by word, vignette, e.g., depiction of a fruit, or other
means, through the word "VANILLA" on the top of the principal
display panel, parallel with the base of the product.

In 1908, E. M. Chace, Assistant Chief of the Foods Division of the
U.S. Department of Agriculture's Bureau of Chemistry, noted "There
is at least three times as much vanilla consumed [in the United
States] as all other flavors together." By law, vanilla refers to
"the total sapid and odorous principles extractable from one-unit
weight of vanilla beans."

The global landscape since The Pure Food and Drugs Act, enacted in
1906 to "protect consumer health and prevent commercial fraud," has
changed little. Daily headlines alert us to this resurgent
international threat of "food fraud" – from olive oil made from
cottonseeds to the horsemeat scandal in the European Union.

While "food fraud" has no agreed-upon definition, its typologies
encompass an ever-expanding, often overlapping range of techniques
with one common goal: giving consumers less than what they
bargained for.

Vanilla is considered a "high-risk [for food fraud] product because
of the multiple market impact factors such as natural disasters in
the source regions, unstable production, wide variability of
quality and value of vanilla flavorings," second only to saffron in
price.

The proportion of the characterizing component, vanilla, has a
material bearing on price or consumer acceptance of the Products
because it is more expensive and desired by consumers.

Had Plaintiff and Class members known the truth about the Products,
they would not have bought the Product or would have paid less for
it. The Products contain other representations which are misleading
and deceptive.

As a result of the false and misleading labeling, the Products are
sold at premium prices, approximately no less than $5.99, per 64 OZ
quart (1.89L) (across the Product Lines), excluding tax -- compared
to other similar products represented in a non-misleading way, the
lawsuit says.

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
          SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          505 Northern Blvd., Suite 311
          Great Neck, NY 11021
          Telephone: (516) 303-0552
          Facsimile: (516) 234-7800
          E-mail: spencer@spencersheehan.com

               - and -

          Michael R. Reese, Esq.
          REESE LLP
          100 West 93rd Street, 16th Floor
          New York, NY 10025
          Telephone: (212) 643-0500
          Facsimile: (212) 253-4272
          E-mail: mreese@reesellp.coms

SOLIANT HEALTH: Casement Labor Suit Removed to E.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Soliant Health, Inc., removed on September 9, 2019, the
lawsuit titled JAMES CASEMENT, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated v. SOLIANT HEALTH, INC.; RIGHTSOURCINGS, INC.,
and DOES 1-20, inclusive, Case No. BCV-19-102213, from the Superior
Court of the State of California for the County of Kern to the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of California.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-at-00645 to the
proceeding.

On August 7, 2019, Plaintiff John Casement filed the lawsuit in the
Superior Court.  The Complaint sets forth 11 causes of action: (1)
Failure to Provide Reporting Time Pay, (2) Failure to Pay for All
Hours Worked, (3) Failure to Pay Overtime, (4) Failure to Pay
Minimum Wage, (5) Failure to Authorize and/or Permit Meal Breaks,
(6) Failure to Authorize and/or Permit Rest Breaks, (7) Failure to
Furnish Accurate Wage Statement, (8) Waiting Time Penalties, (9)
Breach of Contract, (10) Negligent Misrepresentation, and (11)
Unfair Business Practices.[BN]

Defendant SOLIANT HEALTH, INC., is represented by:

          Henry L. Sanchez, Esq.
          Elizabeth H. Murphy, Esq.
          Sarah Scheinhorn, Esq.
          JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
          725 South Figueroa Street, Suite 2500
          Los Angeles, CA 90017-5408
          Telephone: (213) 689-0404
          Facsimile: (213) 689-0430
          E-mail: Henry.Sanchez@jacksonlewis.com
                  Elizabeth.Murphy@jacksonlewis.com
                  Sarah.Scheinhorn@jacksonlewis.com


STEFA PROPERTIES: Faces Kennedy Suit in Southern Dist. of Florida
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Stefa Properties,
LLC. The case is captioned as Patricia Kennedy individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Stefa
Properties, LLC doing business as: Ponce De Leon Hotel, the
Defendant, Case No. 0:19-cv-62243-RNS (S.D. Fla., Sept 9, 2019).
The suit alleges violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Philip Michael Cullen, III, Esq.
          621 S Federal Highway
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301-3146
          Telephone: (954) 462-0600
          Facsimile: 462-1717
          E-mail: CULLENIII@aol.com

STERN & STERN: Faces Kivo FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Stern & Stern, P.C.
The case is captioned as Melissa Kivo, an individual, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Stern
& Stern, P.C., a New York professional corporation, the Defendant,
Case No. 2:19-cv-05087-MKB-LB (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 6, 2019). The suit
alleges violation of the Fair Debt Collection Act. The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge Margo K. Brodie.

Stern & Stern is a debt collection law firm.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Abraham Kleinman, Esq.
          KLEINMAN, LLC
          626 RXR Plaza
          Uniondale, NY 11556-0626
          Telephone: (516) 522-2621
          Facsimile: (888) 522-1692
          E-mail: akleinman@kleinmanllc.com

STRONGHEALTH NETWORK: Solano Seeks Overtime Wages for Drivers
-------------------------------------------------------------
JUAN SOLANO, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
the Plaintiff, vs. STRONGHEALTH NETWORK PLLC, a Florida Limited
Liability Company, BLUELAGOON TRANSPORTATION LLC, a Florida Limited
Liability Company, and MANUEL A. GONZALEZ, M.D., individually, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-23759-DPG (S.D. Fla., Sept. 10, 2019),
alleges that the Defendants failed to pay time and one-half wages
for all of the hours that Plaintiff and other drivers, a/k/a
patient transportation employees, worked in excess of 40 hours per
week in numerous work weeks during the three year statute of
limitations period between September 2016 and the present.  The
lawsuit seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages,
and the costs and reasonable attorneys' fees under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Defendants own and operate a medical practice with specialized
heart and vascular centers at multiple locations including in
Miami-Dade County.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Keith M. Stern, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF KEITH M. STERN, P.A.
          80 S.W. 8th Street, Suite 2000
          Miami, FL 33130
          Telephone: (305) 901-1379
          E-mail: employlaw@keithstern.com

SUNDIAL GROWERS: Peters Sues over Stock Price Plunge
----------------------------------------------------
TRISHA PETERS, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. SUNDIAL GROWERS INC., TORSTEN
KUENZLEN, JAMES KEOUGH, EDWARD HELLARD, GREG MILLS, GREGORY
TURNBULL, LEE TAMKEE, ELIZABETH CANNON, COWEN AND COMPANY, LLC, BMO
NESBITT BURNS INC., RBC DOMINION SECURITIES INC., BARCLAYS CAPITAL
CANADA INC., CIBC WORLD MARKETS INC., and SCOTIA CAPITAL INC., the
Defendants, Case No. 655178/2019 (N.Y. Sup., Sept. 9, 2019), is a
securities class action on behalf of purchasers of the common stock
of Sundial pursuant and/or traceable to the Registration Statement,
issued in connection with Sundial's August 1, 2019 initial public
stock offering of 11 million shares of common stock at $13 per
share.

Sundial purports to be a producer and marketer of premium cannabis
for the adult-use market. On or about July 30, 2019, Sundial filed
with the SEC an amended registration statement on Form F-1, which
was signed by the Individual Defendants.

On July 31, 2019, Sundial filed with the SEC the final prospectus
for the common stock IPO, which forms part of the Registration
Statement, and sold 11 million shares of Sundial common stock to
the investing public at $13 per share for gross proceeds of
approximately $134.4 million, excluding $8.58 million in
commissions paid to the Underwriter Defendants. Copies of the
Prospectus were made available to Sundial investors by Defendant
Cowen. On August 1, 2019, the Company's shares were listed for
trading on the Nasdaq in U.S. dollars under the ticker symbol
"SNDL".

According to Nasdaq's website, on August 1, 2019 Defendant Kuenzlen
rang the opening bell on the day of the IPO in New York, and
Company representatives, including Defendants Hellard, Keough and
Cannon, visited the Nasdaq MarketSite in Times Square in New York
City.

The Registration Statement represented that Sundial was a producer
of "high-quality cannabis in small batches", that "we produce
high-quality, consistent cannabis" and that the Company's operating
model results in "strong customer loyalty."
.
These representations were untrue statements of material fact
because, before the IPO, due to material quality issues, Zenabis
Global Inc., a Sundial customer, had returned or rejected a total
of 554 kg of cannabis (approximately 1,221 pounds) to Sundial.  The
cannabis shipped by Sundial to Zenabis was low quality and returned
to Sundial because it contained visible mold, parts of rubber
gloves and other non-cannabis material.

Moreover, the Registration Statement purported to warn investors
about risks of failure of the Company's quality control systems,
contamination of, or damage to, its cannabis inventory, while
failing to disclose that a material failure had already occurred:

On August 16, 2019, after the opening of trading, several media
sources reported that Marketwatch published an article that stated,
in part, that the "newest cannabis company on Wall Street, Sundial
sold a half ton of pot that was returned by corporate buyer Zenabis
Global Inc. because it contained visible mold, parts of rubber
gloves and other non-cannabis material, according to people
familiar with the matter. The attempted sale would be the
equivalent of 10% of Sundial’s total second-quarter cannabis
sales of five metric tons. The batch of cannabis would be worth
roughly C$2.5 million ($1.9 million), assuming a price of C$5 per
gram."

The Marketwatch article continued to state that the Company
"included a number of risks around inventory spoilage in its IPO
filing but not did not include a reference to a half ton of
returned cannabis. Sundial did not mention the half-ton return
during a road show presentation in Toronto, according to one
investor who heard the pitch. In the IPO filing and its
quarterly-earnings filing with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the company disclosed about $3.3 million in penalties
for not delivering cannabis as promised to partners; those
contingencies were from 2018."

On August 16, 2019, Sundial shares declined from an opening price
of $11.06 per share to close at $10.54 per share, a decline of
$0.52 per share or approximately 5% on heavy volume.

On September 9, 2019, Sundial common stock closed at $7.71 per
share -- a decline of approximately 40% from the $13 per share IPO
price, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Jeffrey P. Campisi, Esq.
          Robert N. Kaplan, Esq.
          Jason A. Uris, Esq.
          KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP
          850 Third Avenue, 14th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 687-1980
          Facsimile: (212) 687-7714
          E-mail: rkaplan@kaplanfox.com
                  jcampisi@kaplanfox.com
                  juris@kaplanfox.com

TRISTAR PRODUCTS: Slutsky & Graeves Sue over Copper Chef Pan Ads
----------------------------------------------------------------
MARSHALL SLUTSKY and GLENN GRAEVES, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. TRISTAR
PRODUCTS, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-06043 (N.D. Ill.,
Sept. 9, 2019), is a class action brought by Plaintiffs,
individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated
consumers who purchased Copper Chef Signature and Copper Chef
Diamond Cookware products manufactured, marketed, distributed,
warranted and, in some cases, sold by Defendant Tristar Products,
Inc.

Defendant's ubiquitous television and internet advertisements tout
Copper Chef Pans as "breakthrough" and premium alternatives to
traditional pans. According to Defendant, Copper Chef Pans utilize
"Cerami-Tech Non-Stick Technology that means nothing will stick to
the pan." And because Copper Chef Pans purportedly never scratch,
peel or chip, the Defendant warrants that the Pans' non-stick
coating will last a lifetime. Defendant's website and product
labels make identical claims.

Contrary to Defendant's representations, however, and as evidenced
by an endless stream of consumer complaints, Copper Chef Pans do
not -- and cannot -- work as advertised.  Defendant knew, or should
have known, that Copper Chef Pans are defective, unfit for their
ordinary and intended purpose, and incapable of performing as
warranted. Moreover, Defendant actively concealed this material
fact from Plaintiffs and the members of the Class, and routinely
rebuffs customers' refund requests (notwithstanding its purported
"money-back guarantee") on grounds they failed to use the Pans in
accordance with Defendant's instructions.

Defendant continues to sell these defective Products to consumers
throughout the United States through third-party internet and
brick-and-mortar retailers, such as Amazon and Wal-Mart, while
continuing to misrepresent their performance properties and causing
consumers millions of dollars in damages, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiffs and the Class are:

          Daniel O. Herrera, Esq.
          Christopher P.T. Tourek, Esq.
          CAFFERTY CLOBES MERIWETHER & SPRENGEL LLP
          150 South Wacker Drive, Suite 3000
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 782-4880
          Facsimile: (312) 782-4485
          E-mail: dherrera@caffertyclobes.com

TWIN 918: Simmons Seeks Minimum & OT Wages for Dancers
------------------------------------------------------
ADIA SIMMONS On behalf of herself And All Other Similarly Situated
Individuals, the Plaintiffs, v. TWIN 918 INC., EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT
& CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, AND AKINYELE ADAMS, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-23737-XXXX (S.D. Fla., Sept. 9, 2019),
alleges that Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and all other
members of the class and collective minimum wage and overtime
compensation they were entitled to under the Federal Fair Labor
Standards Act and the Florida Minimum Wage Act.

The Defendants required Plaintiff to work as an exotic dancer at
their adult entertainment club but refused to compensate her at the
applicable minimum wage and the applicable overtime rate.

Specifically, Defendants misclassified dancers, including
Plaintiff, as independent contractors. Plaintiff's only
compensation was in the form of tips from club patrons, the club
paid no wages. In fact, Defendants took money from Plaintiff under
the premise that she "leased" space at the club. The Plaintiff was
also required to share her tips with Defendants and its employees
who do not customarily receive tips outside of a valid tip
pool.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Cathleen Scott, Esq.
          SCOTT WAGNER & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
          Jupiter Gardens
          250 South Central Boulevard, Suite 104-A
          Jupiter, FL 33458
          Telephone: (561) 653-0008
          Facsimile: (561) 653-0020
          E-mail: CScott@scottwagnerlaw.com
                  mail@scottwagnerlaw.com

               - and -

          Gabriel A. Assaad, Esq.
          KENNEDY HODGES, L.L.P.
          4409 Montrose Blvd., Suite 200
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 523-0001
          Facsimile: (713) 523-1116
          E-mail: gassaad@kennedyhodges.coms

UBER TECH: Misclassifies Drivers as Contractors, McRay Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
ANGELA MCRAY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC, the Defendant,
Case No. 4:19-cv-05723-DMR (N.D. Cal., Sept. 11, 2019), contends
that Uber misclassified its drivers, including Plaintiff Angela
McRay, as independent contractors when they should be classified
under California law as employees. Based on the drivers'
misclassification as independent contractors, Uber has unlawfully
required drivers to pay business expenses (including but not
limited to the cost of maintaining their vehicles, gas, insurance,
phone and data expenses, and other costs) in violation of
California Labor Code.

Uber also failed to guarantee and pay its drivers minimum wage for
all hours worked, and failed to pay overtime premiums for hours
worked in excess of eight hours per day or 40 hours per week. Uber
also failed to provide proper itemized wage statements that include
all the requisite information, including hours worked and hourly
wages and that are accessible outside the Uber Application, the
lawsuit says.

Uber is a San Francisco-based car service that provides
transportation service in cities throughout the country, including
in California, via an on-demand dispatch system.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Shannon Liss-Riordan, Esq.
          Adelaide Pagano, Esq.
          Anne Kramer, Esq.
          LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
          729 Boylston Street, Suite 2000
          Boston, MA 02116
          Telephone: (617) 994-5800
          Facsimile: (617) 994-5801
          E-mail: sliss@llrlaw.com
                  apagano@llrlaw.com
                  akramer@llrlaw.com

USAA CASUALTY: Sutton Suit Moved to Southern District of Florida
----------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as David Sutton, individually and on behalf of
all those similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. USAA Casualty
Insurance Company, the Defendant, Case No. 19-022913-CA-01, was
removed from the 11th Judicial Circuit, Miami-Dade County, to the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida (Miami) on
Sept. 9, 2019. The Southern District of Florida Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-23738-FAM to the proceeding. The suit
alleges insurance related violation. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Federico A. Moreno.

USAA is a San Antonio-based Fortune 500 diversified financial
services group of companies including a Texas Department of
Insurance-regulated reciprocal inter-insurance exchange and
subsidiaries offering banking, investing, and insurance to people
and families who serve, or served, in the United States Armed
Forces.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Andrew John Shamis, Esq.
          14 NE 1st Ave STE 1205
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (404) 797-9696
          E-mail: ashamis@sflinjuryattorneys.com

               - and -

          Edmund Alonso Normand, Esq.
          NORMAND PLLC
          3165 McCrory Place, Ste. 175
          Orlando, FL 32803
          Telephone: (407) 603-6031
          E-mail: Ed@ednormand.com

               - and -

          Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
          SHAMIS , GENTILE, P.A.
          7241 SW 118 St
          Pinecrest, FL 33156
          Telephone: (305) 298-2253
          E-mail: gberg@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Jacob Lawrence Phillips, Esq.
          Normand PLLC
          3165 McCrory Place, Ste. 175
          Orlando, FL 32803
          Telephone: (407) 603-6031
          Facsimile: (888) 974-2175
          E-mail: jacob.phillips@normandpllc.com

               - and -

          Jordan David Utanski, Esq.
          Edelsberg Law P.A.
          19495 Biscayne Blvd. No. 607
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (305) 773-6732
          E-mail: utanski@edelsberglaw.com

               - and -

          Scott Adam Edelsberg, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW PA
          20900 NE 30th Ave., 417
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (305) 975-3320
          E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com

Attorneys for the Defendant are:

          Francis Augustine Zacherl, III, Esq.
          SHUTTS & BOWEN
          200 South Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 4100
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 347-7305
          Facsimile: 347-7705
          E-mail: fzacherl@shutts.com

               - and -

          Sidney Charles Calloway, Esq.
          SHUTTS & BOWEN
          200 E Broward Boulevard, Suite 2100
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 524-5505
          Facsimile: (954) 888-3063
          E-mail: scalloway@shutts-law.com


USI SOLUTIONS: Chai Sues Over Illegal Debt Collection Letters
-------------------------------------------------------------
DAVID CHAI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. USI SOLUTIONS, INC., a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive, Case No. 19CV354416 (Cal. Super., Santa
Clara Cty., Sept. 9, 2019), arises from the Defendant's routine
practice of sending initial written communications, like the one
sent to the Plaintiff, which do not contain the notice required by
the California Fair Debt Buying Practices Act.

The Defendants have engaged in unlawful acts in connection with
their attempt to collect charged-off consumer debts from the
Plaintiff and the Class, according to the complaint.

USI Solutions, Inc., is a Delaware corporation engaged in the
business of purchasing and collecting charged-off consumer debts in
this state with its principal place of business located in Bristol,
Pennsylvania.  The true names and capacities of the Doe Defendants
are unknown to the Plaintiff at this time.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Fred W. Schwinn, Esq.
          Raeon R. Roulston, Esq.
          Matthew C. Salmonsen, Esq.
          CONSUMER LAW CENTER, INC.
          1435 Koll Circle, Suite 104
          San Jose, CA 95112-4610
          Telephone Number: (408) 294-6100
          Facsimile Number: (408) 294-6190
          E-mail: fred.schwinn@sjconsumerlaw.com
                  raeon.roulston@sjconsumerlaw.com
                  matthew.salmonsen@sjconsumerlaw.com


VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY: Cunningham Suit Asserts TCPA Violations
--------------------------------------------------------------
CRAIG CUNNINGHAM, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated v. VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY, VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY MEDICAL
CENTER, Case No. 3:19-cv-00788 (M.D. Tenn., Sept. 6, 2019), is
brought to enforce the consumer-privacy provisions of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

Mr. Cunningham alleges that Vanderbilt University engaged in a
wide-spread calling campaign by making automated calls to his and
other class members' cellular telephones for the purpose of
soliciting donations without their prior express consent in
violation of the TCPA.  He further alleges that Vanderbilt
University Medical Center similarly made automated calls to his and
other class members' cellular telephones for the purpose of
soliciting their participation in clinical trials without their
prior express consent in violation of the TCPA.

Vanderbilt University is a private educational institution.
Vanderbilt University Medical Center is a private health treatment
facility.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory F. Coleman, Esq.
          Lisa A. White, Esq.
          GREG COLEMAN LAW PC
          800 S. Gay Street, Suite 1100
          Knoxville, TN 37929
          Telephone: (865) 247-0080
          Facsimile: (865) 522-0049
          E-mail: greg@gregcolemanlaw.com
                  lisa@gregcolemanlaw.com

               - and -

          Gary M. Klinger, Esq.
          KOZONIS & KLINGER, LTD.
          4849 N. Milwaukee Avenue, Suite 300
          Chicago, IL 60630
          Telephone: (312) 283-3814
          E-mail: gklinger@kozonislaw.com

               - and -

          Anthony I. Paronich, Esq.
          PARONICH LAW, P.C.
          350 Lincoln Street, Suite 2400
          Hingham, MA 02043
          Telephone: (508) 221-1510
          E-mail: anthony@paronichlaw.com


VINEYARD VINES: Casio Files Suit Over Illusory Price Discounts
--------------------------------------------------------------
Annemarie Casio, Craig Moskowitz, Jane Doe, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Vineyard Vines, LLC,
Case No. 2:19-cv-05135 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 9, 2019), asserts causes of
action under the consumer protection statutes of all 50 states,
with Named Plaintiffs asserting the consumer protection laws of
their individual states arising from the Defendant's alleged
deceptive pricing representations and omissions of its products.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant made false representation
in its outlet stores of "Suggested Retail" prices accompanied by
illusory price discounts.  The Plaintiffs contend that the
Defendant's conduct was misleading, deceptive, unlawful,
fraudulent, and unfair because (1) it gives the impression to
consumers the Products were of higher quality and value, (2) the
outward similarity between the outlet and retail product makes it
almost impossible to detect the subtle distinctions and (3) makes
it unlikely customers will examine the Products to discover they
are of different quality.

Vineyard Vines, LLC manufactures, produces distributes, markets,
labels and sells high end yet wearable mainstream preppy clothing
and accessories under the Vineyard Vines brand.  The Defendant's
clothing is evocative of New England chic, crossed with a Kenny
Chesney concert, layered with pastels.  The Defendant operates
upwards of 70 retail stores and 19 outlet stores with at least 10
in New York.

Defendant is a Connecticut limited liability company with a
principal place of business in Stamford, Connecticut (Fairfield
County) and its members are citizens of Fairfield County,
Connecticut.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
          SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          505 Northern Blvd., Suite 311
          Great Neck, NY 11021
          Telephone: (516) 303-0552
          Facsimile: (516) 234-7800
          E-mail: spencer@spencersheehan.com


WAL-MART ASSOCIATES: Appeals Decision in Garcia Suit to 9th Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Wal-Mart Associates, Inc., filed an appeal from a Court
ruling in the lawsuit entitled Julio Garcia v. Wal-Mart Associates,
Inc., et al., Case No. 3:18-cv-00500-L-MDD, in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of California, San Diego.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
was originally filed in the Superior Court of the State of
California for the County of San Diego and assigned Case No.
37-02018-00005861-CU-OE-OTL.  The lawsuit was later removed from
the Superior Court to the District Court.

The appellate case is captioned as Julio Garcia v. Wal-Mart
Associates, Inc., et al., Case No. 19-80118, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Walmart operates retail stores in various formats worldwide.  It
operates through three segments: Walmart U.S., Walmart
International, and Sam's Club.  The Company operates discount
stores, supermarkets, supercenters, hypermarkets, warehouse clubs,
cash and carry stores, and home improvement stores.

Plaintiff-Respondent JULIO GARCIA, individually and on behalf of
all those similarly situated, is represented by:

          Larry W. Lee, Esq.
          DIVERSITY LAW GROUP
          515 South Figueroa Street, Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488-6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488-6554
          E-mail: lwlee@diversitylaw.com

Defendants-Petitioners WAL-MART ASSOCIATES, INC., a Delaware
corporation, and WAL-MART STORES, INC., a Delaware Corporation, are
represented by:

          Theane Evangelis, Esq.
          Bradley Joseph Hamburger, Esq.
          GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
          333 South Grand Avenue
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-3197
          Telephone: (213) 229-7658
          E-mail: tevangelis@gibsondunn.com
                  bhamburger@gibsondunn.com

               - and -

          Katherine Yarger, Esq.
          GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
          1801 California Street, Suite 4200
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 717-4749
          E-mail: kyarger@gibsondunn.com


WASHTENAW COUNTY, MI: Smith Appeals Monroe Cir. Ct. Ruling
----------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Joanne Smith filed an appeal from a court order issued in
the lawsuit entitled JOANNE SMITH v. COUNTY OF WASHTENAW, et al.,
Case No. 18-141556-CZ, in the Monroe Circuit Court.

The appellate case is captioned as JOANNE SMITH v. COUNTY OF
WASHTENAW, et al., Case No. 350406, in the Michigan Court of
Appeals.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant JOANNE SMITH/ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED is
represented by:

          Philip L. Ellison, Esq.
          OUTSIDE LEGAL COUNSEL
          PO Box 107
          Hemlock, MI 48626
          Telephone: (989) 642-0055
          Facsimile: (888) 398-7003

Defendant-Appellee COUNTY OF WASHTENAW is represented by:

          Theodore W. Seitz, Esq.
          DYKEMA GOSSETT PLLC
          201 Townsend Street, Suite 900
          Lansing, MI 48933
          Telephone: (517) 374-9100
          Facsimile: (517) 374-9191
          E-mail: tseitz@dykema.com

Defendant-Appellee COUNTY OF HILLSDALE is represented by:

          Allan C. Vander Laan, Esq.
          CUMMINGS, MCCLOREY, DAVIS & ACHO P.L.C.
          2851 Charlevoix Drive, S.E., Suite 327
          Grand Rapids, MI 49546
          Telephone: (616) 975-7470
          Facsimile: (616) 975-7471
          E-mail: avanderlaan@cmda-law.com


WASTE MANAGEMENT: Court Narrows Claims in RCRA Suit
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of New
York issued a Decision and Order granting in part and denying in
part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned FRESH AIR
FOR THE EASTSIDE, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. WASTE MANAGEMENT OF
NEW YORK, L.L.C., and THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendants. No.
6:18-CV-06588-EAW. (W.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiff Fresh Air for the Eastside, Inc. (FAFE) and over 220
individual plaintiffs filed this action against Waste Management of
New York, LLC (WMNY) and New York City (NYC) alleging violations of
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Clean Air
Act (CAA) and various common law obligations arising from WMNY's
operation of the High Acres Landfill and Recycling Center
(Landfill) in Perinton, New York, and NYC's agreement with WMNY
(NYC Contract) to ship hundreds of thousands of tons of municipal
solid waste (MSW) to the Landfill each year for thirty years.

WMNY argues that the Court should dismiss or, alternatively, stay
the CAA and RCRA claims pursuant to doctrines of abstention and
primary jurisdiction, and the political question doctrine.
  
WMNY also argues that Plaintiffs common law causes of action and
the RCRA Endangerment Claim must be dismissed for failure to state
a claim.   

Alternatively, WMNY argues that the Court should dismiss the entire
Amended Complaint under the first-to-file rule because the issues
raised and the parties involved in a related putative class action,
D'Amico v. Waste Mgmt. of N.Y., L.L.C., Case No. 6:18-cv-06080-EAW,
are substantially the same.  

Lastly, WMNY argues that Plaintiffs' claims for money damages
should be stayed to the extent they are not dismissed.

Burford Abstention and Primary Jurisdiction

Under the Burford doctrine, a federal court must decline to
interfere with the orders or proceedings of state administrative
agencies: (1) if there are difficult questions of state law bearing
on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance
transcends the result in the case then at bar or (2) if the
exercise of federal review of the question in a case and in similar
cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent
policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.

Defendants contend that Burford abstention should apply because New
York maintains a comprehensive regulatory scheme governing the
construction and operation of landfills, including the issuance,
modification, and enforcement of permits for air emissions and
landfill operations.

Defendants argue that, even though the DEC has issued its Response
to Plaintiffs Petition, their abstention arguments remain viable
because the DEC denied much of the same relief Plaintiffs seek in
this action, required WMNY to implement remedial measures, and
engaged in additional investigations regarding the NYC MSW.  

Plaintiffs argue that Burford is inapplicable because the CAA and
RCRA explicitly provide the exceptions for when pending
administrative or court actions bar a citizen suit and that
applying Burford in this case would have this Court usurp the role
of Congress and write new exceptions into the law. Although there
may be scenarios where Burford applies to a CAA or RCRA citizen
suit, at least where, as here, a citizen suit is filed to enforce
against the violation of either statute, Burford does not apply.

RCRA's citizen suit provision permits any person to commence a
civil action on his own behalf to enforce against violations of its
requirements. In conferring standing to the fullest extent
permitted by Article III, Congress sought to maximize the number of
potential enforcers of environmental regulations. Once these
requirements are satisfied, a citizen is free to file a federal
court action with certain narrow exceptions specifically enumerated
in the statute.

Where a state agency has been delegated responsibilities under
RCRA, Congress has enacted the following statutory bars to filing a
citizen suit: No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(B)
of this section if the State, in order to restrain or abate acts or
conditions which may have contributed or are contributing to the
activities which may present the alleged endangerment has commenced
and is diligently prosecuting an action under subsection (a)(1)(B),
is actually engaging in a removal action under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) or
has incurred costs to initiate a Remedial Investigation and
Feasibility Study under CERCLA and is diligently proceeding with a
remedial action under that Act.

Neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit has weighed in on
whether Burford is applied differently in the context of a RCRA or
CAA citizen suit. Many courts have declined to apply this doctrine
to citizen suits seeking to enforce either statute's requirements.
The Seventh Circuit has concluded that the application of Burford
under such circumstances, or the comparable doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, would be an end run around RCRA due to the specific
conditions under which the pendency of other proceedings bars suit
under RCRA.

Considering the narrow circumstances in which abstention is
appropriate and the obligation of federal courts to exercise
jurisdiction when it exists, the structure of the CAA and RCRA
demonstrate that abstention is inappropriate where these citizen
suit provisions are satisfied and a plaintiff merely seeks to
enforce regulatory requirements. Because Burford abstention is
comparable to primary jurisdiction in this context, Defendants'
primary jurisdiction arguments fail for the same reasons.  

Therefore, the Court concludes that neither Burford abstention nor
primary jurisdiction are appropriate grounds to dismiss Plaintiffs'
CAA or RCRA causes of action.

Colorado River Abstention

Colorado River abstention is appropriate in limited situations
involving the contemporaneous exercise of concurrent jurisdictions,
either by federal courts or by state and federal courts. Under
Colorado River, a federal district court may abstain from
exercising jurisdiction over a controversy properly before it when
parallel state court litigation could result in the comprehensive
disposition of litigation and abstention would conserve judicial
resources.

Courts in this Circuit have rejected the application of this
doctrine where parallel state proceedings do not exist.  

Here, Colorado River does not apply because there are no parallel
state proceedings.
Political Question Doctrine

The political question doctrine calls for a careful and delicate
analysis into whether a matter has been committed by the
Constitution to another branch of government or whether the action
of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed.

In D'Amico, the Court relied upon Bell v. Cheswick Generating
Station, 734 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2013), where the Third Circuit
explained that no court has ever held that such a constitutional
commitment of authority regarding the redress of individual
property rights for pollution exists in the legislative branch.
This Court also determined that WMNY's reliance upon Comer v.
Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F.Supp.2d 849 (S.D. Miss. 2012), aff'd,
718 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2013) was misplaced because that case
involved litigation seeking to apply common law remedies to address
global climate change an exceedingly more complex issue. Both
conclusions apply with equal force here.

Plaintiffs raise several common-law claims for Defendants' alleged
interference with their possessory interests in and enjoyment of
their property and for damages resulting from Landfill operations.
Whether a landfill operator or, in this case, a generator of MSW is
liable for property damages arising from the release of noxious
emissions is a determination squarely within the traditional
competency of the judiciary to adjudicate. Congress also charged
federal courts with adjudicating citizen suits to enforce against
violations of the CAA and RCRA. Determining whether Defendants have
failed to comply with these regulatory requirements, likewise,
falls well-within the competency of a federal court to decide.

Thus, the Court rejects Defendants' assertion of the political
question doctrine.

First-to-File Rule

Where there are two competing lawsuits, the first suit should have
priority, absent the showing of balance of convenience or special
circumstances giving priority to the second.

Defendants contend that this action should be dismissed under the
first-to-file rule because the D'Amico matter was filed first,
involves substantially similar parties and issues, and has
proceeded further than this case. The Court disagrees. Not only are
the issues raised in this action substantially more varied,
nuanced, and complex than those raised in D'Amico, but there is no
need to undertake a traditional analysis under this doctrine
because it is inapplicable for a far simpler reason both cases are
currently pending in the same district before the same judge.

This action and D'Amico were reassigned to the undersigned before
Defendants asserted their first-to-file challenge. Since both
actions are pending within the same district before the same judge,
the Court rejects Defendants' assertion of the first-to-file rule.

Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

Legal Standard

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court may consider the facts
alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as
exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the complaint.
A court should consider the motion by accepting all factual
allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor
of the plaintiff.

While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation
to provide the grounds of his entitle ment to relief requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.

Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action: RCRA Endangerment Claim

RCRA is a comprehensive environmental statute that governs the
treatment, storage, and disposal of solid and hazardous waste.
Congress expressly authorized citizens to bring imminent and
substantial endangerment claims in the federal courts as part of a
comprehensive scheme designed to deal consistently with a serious
national problem.

That congressional authorization is found in Section 6972(a)(1)(B)
which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

any person may commence a civil action against any person,
including any past or present generator, past or present
transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a treatment,
storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or who is
contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment,
transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which
may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or
the environment.

A plaintiff must satisfy three elements to state a claim under this
section: (1) the defendant was or is a generator or transporter of
solid or hazardous waste or owner or operator of a solid or
hazardous waste treatment, storage or disposal facility (2) the
defendant has contributed or is contributing to the handling,
storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of solid or
hazardous waste, as defined by RCRA and (3) that the solid or
hazardous waste in question may pose an imminent and substantial
endangerment to health or the environment.

The first two elements are not in dispute on WMNY's motion to
dismiss, WMNY's motion focuses exclusively on whether Plaintiff
alleged an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment.

Accordingly, the Court first addresses NYC's contentions relating
to the second element of this claim.

Imminent and Substantial Endangerment

The Second Circuit has identified what threats are imminent,
substantial and pose an endangerment under RCRA.

Harm is imminent if a risk of threatened harm is present. Imminent
threats need not be emergency-type situations, rather, an imminent
hazard may be declared at any point in the chain of events which
may ultimately result in harm to the public.

Plaintiffs' allegations establish that the Landfill's activities
pose a sufficiently imminent harm.

An endangerment is substantial if it is serious. An endangerment is
substantial where there is reasonable cause for concern that
someone or something may be exposed to risk of harm if prompt
remedial action is not taken.

Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged an endangerment that is also
substantial. Defendants contend that odors alone do not constitute
an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment. But Plaintiffs do not simply allege exposure to odors;
rather, Plaintiffs claim they are exposed to various fugitive
emissions, including VOCs.

Plaintiffs attach an exhibit to their Amended Complaint enumerating
types of pollutants emitted from the Landfill along with
quantifications of their concentration.Plaintiffs allege that these
emissions have resulted in headaches, eye irritation, nausea,
coughing, choking, and breathing problems. Indeed, while
Plaintiffs' sampling results identified a number of chemical
compounds, there were reportable amounts of benzene compounds, a
commonly known carcinogen able to cause respiratory issues after
acute exposure.  

Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the Landfill's emissions
constitute more than a mere annoyance but may in fact contain
dangerous chemical compounds. In analyzing this element of a RCRA
Endangerment Claim, consideration is due for RCRA's broad language
and remedial purpose.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have alleged a serious risk of harm from
exposure to certain VOCs and HAPs that pose a reasonable cause for
concern of present and/or future harm.  

WMNY relies upon Crandall v. City & County of Denver, Colorado, 594
F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2010) for the proposition that an offensive
odor is insufficient to constitute imminent and substantial danger.
First, Crandall is procedurally distinguishable because it involved
a five-day bench trial and was not decided upon a motion to
dismiss.   

Second, while Crandall concluded that an endangerment claim based
on exposure to hydrogen sulfide vapors was meritless, it did so
because, at the time of trial, there was no detectable
hydrogen-sulfide gas and no prospect of there being such gas.
Nothing going on at the airport at the time of trial, or expected
in the immediate future, would, even without remedial measures,
present a prospect of harm to human health.

Accordingly, Crandall does not stand for the proposition that
hydrogen sulfide vapors, or any other gaseous emission, can never
amount to an imminent and substantial threat to human health or the
environment.  

Here, Plaintiffs allege that they have been exposed to unreasonable
levels of Excess Fugitive Emissions, which have resulted in
breathing problems and eye and throat irritation among other health
issues, and that these emissions continue to permeate their
residences despite WMNY's mitigation measures.

Whether Plaintiffs can demonstrate that exposure to these emissions
is harmful and is occurring or may reoccur in the reasonably
foreseeable future, are questions best answered after discovery.
Taking Plaintiffs' allegations as true, and according deference to
RCRA's remedial purpose, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have
plausibly alleged that Defendants' actions may present an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.

Defendants' motions are therefore denied as to this cause of
action.

Plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action: Private Nuisance

There are two types of nuisance actions in New York State, public
nuisance and private nuisance. A public nuisance under New York law
exists when there is a substantial interference with a public
right. By contrast, a private nuisance threatens one person or a
relatively few, an essential feature being an interference with the
use or enjoyment of land. A nuisance is the actual invasion of
interests in land, and it may arise from varying types of conduct.

Plaintiffs' opposition papers fail to engage with WMNY's argument
that the alleged nuisance conditions are too widespread to sustain
a private nuisance claim. The Amended Complaint's caption contains
over 220 individual plaintiffs, who live or previously lived
anywhere from 0.3 to 4 miles from the Landfill and have been
adversely impacted by the Landfill's activities. The Landfill's
impacts have also allegedly reached nearby businesses, recreational
facilities, dining areas, and an elementary school.

The nuisance conditions complained of are ostensibly public in
nature, taking into account the number of individuals allegedly
affected and the widespread scope of the harm alleged to have
occurred.

Therefore, because the alleged nuisance conditions are too
widespread and threaten far more than one or a few individuals,
Plaintiffs' private nuisance cause of action is dismissed with
prejudice.

Plaintiffs' Fifth and Eighth Causes of Action: Public Nuisance

A public nuisance exists for conduct that amounts to a substantial
interference with the exercise of a common right of the public,
thereby offending public morals, interfering with the use by the
public of a public place or endangering or injuring the property,
health, safety or comfort of a considerable number of persons.

Generally, a public nuisance is actionable by a private person only
if it is shown that the person suffered special injury beyond that
suffered by the community at large.

Public Nuisance Alleged Against WMNY

WMNY argues that Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege a special
injury beyond that suffered by the public at large.  However,
Plaintiffs allege that they suffer special damages beyond that
suffered in kind and degree by the community at large.

Those damages include: (1) the diminution of value of Plaintiffs'
home and property (2) that Plaintiffs are forced to remain inside
their homes and forego use of their yards (3) that Plaintiffs must
keep doors and windows closed when weather conditions otherwise
would not so require (4) embarrassment and reluctance to invite
guests to their homes (5) exposure to the odors and Excess Fugitive
Emissions in their own homes and (6) that Plaintiffs experience
headaches, eye irritation, nausea, coughing, choking breathing
problems, and lost sleep.

WMNY cites to Read v. Corning Inc., 351 F.Supp.3d 342 (W.D.N.Y.
2018), for the proposition that conclusory allegations that merely
recite the elements of a cause of action will not survive
dismissal.  

Here, Plaintiffs have alleged that, as property owners and
residents living adjacent to the Landfill, they have suffered
injuries that differ from those sustained by the public at large
because their properties have diminished in value, and they have
suffered physical ailments, mental anguish, and an inability to
fully utilize their homes. As such, the Court finds Read
inapposite.

While WMNY acknowledges that the alleged deprivation of the use and
enjoyment of property may satisfy the special injury requirement,
it argues that such allegations are insufficient where the same
type of harm is, at a minimum, attributed to over 200 named
plaintiffs.

In support of this proposition, WMNY cites to 532 Madison Avenue
Gourmet Foods, Inc., 96 N.Y.2d 280, a case involving
construction-related disasters in midtown Manhattan, where various
businesses sought redress for their lost business and income by
alleging, among other things, claims for public nuisance.  

In 532 Madison, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that the
special injury requirement was not satisfied because:

Every person who maintained a business, profession or residence in
the heavily populated areas of Times Square and Madison Avenue was
exposed to similar economic loss during the closure periods. Thus,
in that the economic loss was common to an entire community and the
plaintiffs suffered it only in a greater degree than others, it is
not a different kind of harm and the plaintiffs cannot recover for
the invasion of the public right.

Diminished property values may constitute a special injury under
New York law.  Since Plaintiffs have allegedly suffered diminished
property values, lost use of their homes, and health implications
due to the Landfill's operation, and because these injuries
constitute particularized harms, whether Plaintiffs have alleged a
special injury hinges upon the proper scope of the relevant
community. That community, as it must be defined under the facts
alleged here, distinguishes this case from 532 Madison.

As an initial matter, the Court disagrees with WMNY's position that
Plaintiffs cannot establish a special injury because they contend
that over 200 individuals suffer the same type of injury. A special
injury need not be unique and simply because a large number of
individuals suffer from a peculiar injury does not mean that the
injury is not different in kind from that sustained by the public
at large.  

The allegations in the Amended Complaint, taken as true, establish
that Plaintiffs do not include all individuals aggrieved by the
nuisance conditions. The proper inquiry is not whether Plaintiffs
have alleged an injury different in kind from other property
owners, but rather, it is whether Plaintiffs have alleged an injury
different in kind from the community at large.While Plaintiffs have
alleged like injuries amongst each other, this harm is distinct
from the deprivation of the rights to clean air and the unimpaired
enjoyment of public spaces suffered by the community at large.  

For example, Plaintiffs allege that the Landfill's emissions have
infiltrated Little League baseball fields, business and commercial
locations, an elementary school property, and dining and walking
spaces.  One Little League site was even closed for the season due
to the Landfill's emissions. These impacts are common to the public
at large. However, Plaintiffs have allegedly been additionally
impacted by a decrease in their homes' property values, the
inability to use and enjoy their homes (versus public spaces), and
the physical ailments resulting from the continuous exposure to the
emissions. Compared to individuals who do not own property or
reside nearby and are merely affected by the Landfill's impact on
public spaces, Plaintiffs' alleged injuries constitute a special
injury.

In short, it does not appear that Plaintiffs constitute all members
of the public who come in contact with the nuisance.

Therefore, the Court denies WMNY's motion as to Plaintiffs public
nuisance claim.

Plaintiffs' Sixth Cause of Action: Negligence & Gross Negligence

Ordinary Negligence

WMNY contends that a negligence plaintiff must allege either
personal injury or property damage and argues that Plaintiffs fail
to allege that they suffered either of these types of harm and that
their conclusory allegations of diminution of property values ...
are insufficient as a matter of law.

Under New York law, a plaintiff must establish three elements to
prevail on a negligence claim: (1) the existence of a duty on
defendant's part as to plaintiff (2) a breach of this duty and (3)
injury to the plaintiff as a result thereof.

In D'Amico, this Court distinguished 532 Madison Avenue Gourmet
Foods, Inc., 96 N.Y.2d 280, and relied upon Baker, 232 F.Supp.3d
233, in holding that the plaintiff stated a negligence claim based
on an alleged diminution in property values resulting from the
stigma of polluted air. In Baker, the plaintiffs alleged that the
contamination of drinking water sources resulted in a loss in their
property values and the Baker defendants, relying on 532 Madison,
sought dismissal of the negligence claim for the reasons WMNY
asserts here.  As Baker explained, 532 Madison did not announce a
talismanic requirement for plaintiffs to allege physical injury to
their property and only concerned the existence of a legal duty
between the plaintiffs and defendants.

The legal duty between the plaintiff and WMNY was critical in
D'Amico. WMNY owed a duty of care to the plaintiff and the putative
class, as adjacent property owners, to operate the Landfill in a
reasonable manner and this duty was distinguishable from the more
tenuous obligations and intangible losses asserted by the
plaintiffs in 532 Madison.

This Court's reasoning in D'Amico holds true here as well. WMNY
owes the same duty of care to Plaintiffs, as adjacent landowners
and residents, to operate the Landfill in a reasonable manner.
Indeed, the Amended Complaint contains far more extensive
allegations regarding stigma damages and the diminution in value of
Plaintiffs' properties than did the operative pleading in D'Amico,
and greatly expands upon the damages allegedly caused by WMNY's
negligent operation and management of the Landfill.  

For the reasons outlined in D'Amico, Plaintiffs have plausibly
stated a cause of action for negligence, and WMNY's motion to
dismiss this claim is denied.

Gross Negligence

A claim for gross negligence will be sustained only if the
plaintiff alleges facts plausibly suggesting that the defendant's
conduct evinces a reckless disregard for the rights of others or
smacks of intentional wrongdoing.

WMNY contends that Plaintiffs fail to state any facts demonstrating
intentional wrongdoing or reckless disregard and simply set forth
conclusory allegations that WMNY operated the Landfill and acted
knowingly and with a 'substantial lack of concern.' Plaintiffs
contend that they stated a gross negligence cause of action because
WMNY recklessly eliminated the use of Horizontal Gas Collectors in
all new Landfill Cells, violated its Landfill Permit, operated an
ineffective Landfill, accepted odorous MSW despite numerous odors
complaints, failed to properly remediate or mitigate the odors, and
failed to properly and timely investigate the odors.

Plaintiffs set forth factual allegations that, taken as true,
demonstrate that WMNY modified its Collection System knowing that
those modifications were detrimental to the system's efficiency.
Plaintiffs allege that WMNY was aware that Horizontal Gas
Collectors were critical to the mitigation of odors and fugitive
emissions and yet, WMNY personnel forwent their installation to
save on costs.  

Plaintiffs' allegations establish that WMNY knowingly removed the
primary mechanism for odor and emission control and an alleged
permit requirement and was, at best, slow to respond to the
community's complaints and, at worst, antagonistic to their
circumstances acts that smack of intentional wrongdoing. While
conclusory allegations of gross negligence may be dismissed for
failure to state a claim statements of intentional wrongdoing often
present fact issues inappropriate for disposition at this early
stage.

Because Plaintiffs have at least alleged that WMNY's behavior
smacks of intentional wrongdoing or evinces a reckless disregard
for the rights of others, WMNY's motion to dismiss this claim is
denied.

Plaintiffs' Seventh Cause of Action: Trespass

To prevail on a trespass claim under New York law, a plaintiff must
show an interference with its right to possession of real property
either by an unlawful act or a lawful act performed in an unlawful
manner. A trespass claim represents an injury to the right of
possession and courts have precluded trespass claims where the
entry or intrusion was intangible.

WMNY argues that Plaintiffs' trespass claim fails because it is
based on intangible intrusions that do not amount to an actual
physical invasion upon one's right to exclusive possession of
property. Plaintiffs urge this Court to reject WMNY's arguments
based on the principles discussed in Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 307
N.Y. 328 (1954) and Scribner, 84 F.3d 554. In Phillips, the court
affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs trespass claim and stated
the following rule for cases involving the flow of noxious fluids
onto or into property: that, even when the polluting material has
been deliberately put onto, or into, defendant's land, he is not
liable unless he defendant had good reason to know or expect that
subterranean and other conditions were such that there would be
passage from defendant's to plaintiffs land.

Because the evidence linking the defendant's petroleum and the
plaintiffs water supply was tenuous, and since there was nothing to
show that defendant knew, or had been put on notice, that gasoline
was escaping from its underground tank, the trespass claim was
properly dismissed.
  
Plaintiffs cite to no New York case that has accepted the notion
that odors or fugitive emissions entering the airspace surrounding
real property gives rise to a trespass action.  

New York law does not recognize a trespass claim based on
intangible invasions upon real property.  Indeed, a New York trial
court recently relied upon Ivory to dismiss a trespass claim based
on noise pollution, vibrations and/or blocked natural light.
Without an actual physical intrusion upon the possessory interests
of another, there would be little to differentiate a cause of
action for trespass resulting from odors and emissions and a claim
of nuisance arising from the very same circumstances.  

Plaintiffs' trespass cause of action is dismissed with prejudice.

WMNY's motion to dismiss the Complaint is dismissed as moot, WMNY's
motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint is granted as to the
private nuisance and trespass claims but it is otherwise denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 16, 2019
Decision and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y238ynp7
from Leagle.com.

Fresh Air for the Eastside, Inc., Elizabeth Agte, Cheryl Allen,
Diane Allen, Linda Allison, Chad Anderson, Julie Anderson, Marc
Anderson, Samantha Anderson, Patricia Anderson, Todd Anderson,
Brandie Antenucci, Glenn Batchelor, Malissa Beckwith, Kim Bender,
Kristen Betzenhauser, Matthew Betzenhauser, Daniel Bond, Sara Bond,
Lisa Brancato, Tony Brancato, Andrew Brickle, Erin Brooks, Kaye
Brotzman, Mark Brotzman, Nathan Bubb, Justin Busch, Leanne Bushart,
Brian Caiazza, Marly Calderon-Singer, Andrew Cittadino, Laura
Clark, John Clark, Krystina Clark, Peter Clifford, Wendy Clifford,
Josh Dawson, Sarah Dawson, Meghan DeFisher, Christine Dehm, Curtis
Dehm, Anne DeWitte, Donna DiMaria, Stacey DiNicola, Patrick
Domaratz, Patricia Donohue, Craig Ephraim, Christina Ferg, John
Fish, Justin Foley, Kaitlyn Foley, Maria Frazer, Catherine
Freemantle, Robert Freemantle, Bryan Gardner, Susan Gardner, Kim
Garrison, Jane Gatewood, Cooper Gilbert, Emily Giunta, Elmer
Gordner, Jill Gordner, Jill Gress, Tony Griffey, David C. Gross,
David Gross, Helen Gross, Harvey Gross, Virginia Gullo, Adam
Gursslin, Takahiro Hachiya, Carol Hallenbeck, Stephen Hallenbeck,
Barbara Harvey, Glenn Harvey, Christine Hefley, Jerry Hefley,
Aphrodite Hollway, Reid Holmes, Leslie Houck, Matthew Houck,
Jennifer Jackson, Michael Jackson, Ken Jones, Jessica Jones,
Malique Jones, Randy Jones, Lisa Kaiser, Michael Kaiser, Carol
Kane, Catherine King, Ferni Kinnaw, William Kinnaw, Rebecca
Koppmann, Kevin Kray, Jason Kump, Jennifer Kump, Philip Lang, Ellen
Larzelere, Erica Larzelere, Mark Laskoski, Tracy Lyn Lause, Heather
Little, Marissa Logue, Shaun Logue, Donna Lozipone, Camille
Mancuso, Jeffrey Marasco, Paula Marasco, Sharon Marble, Amanda
Martin, Matthew Martin, Vicki Martuscello, Gary McNeil, Jennifer
McNeil, Paula Mencucci, Heather Merlo, Michael Merlo, David
Messina, Scott Miga, James Miller, Thomas Miller, Wendy Miller,
Brian Miller, Ann Moffitt, Kevin Moravec, Lauren Moravec, Jody
Moulton, Catherine Murray, Thomas Murray, James Nail, Kevilyn
O'Connor, James Oliverio, Shannon Oliverio, Emily Olsen, Kathleen
Olsen, Derek Orf, Daniel Osimowicz, Nicole Osimowicz, Amy Pasley,
Timothy Pasley, Melissa Pease, Scott Pease, Paula Pentoney,
Jennifer Piskorowski, John Polchowski, Patricia Polchowski,
Kathleen Poleon, Debra Ramsperger, John Ramsperger, Karyn Rando,
Kenneth Rando, Rosemarie Reidy, Thomas Reidy, Bryan Reinicke,
Elizabeth Reisinger, Jon Reisinger, Corrine Renault, Jon Renault,
George Rodibaugh, Kathleen Roeters, Dwight Roeters, Molly
Romagnola, Alecia Romano, Nicholas Romano, Jeremy Saucier, Tara
Saucier, Ann Schauman, David Schinsing, Cheryl Schmidt, Peter
Schuch, Jacqueline Scott, Mark Scott, Matthew Scozzafava, Victoria
Scozzafava, Erinne Selim, Brian Shaughnessy, Brittany Shaughnessy,
Daniel Shelley, Charlie Shoemaker, Katherine Short, Christopher
Sienkiewycz, Mary Slaughter, Wayne Slaughter, Rebecca Snyder,
Jacqueline Stein, Brandon Stein, Elizabeth Stevens, Julie Stuver,
Michael Stuver, John Sykes, Anthony Tempesta, Winfield Terry,
Nicole Thibault, Claire Thomas, George Thomas, Robin Thompson,
Matthew Tice, Gerald Totsline, Traci Totsline, John Turano, Sherrie
Turano, Dave Valle, Dianne Valle, Lorinda VanDerlinde, Megan
Volhejn, Chuck Volo, Ralph Volpe, Meredith Weber, Paul Weber, Susan
Widrick, Christopher Williams, Mallory Williams, Debbie Yendrzeski,
Jennifer Zaffer & Jonathan Zaffer, Plaintiffs, represented by
Dwight Eliot Kanyuck , Knauf Shaw LLP, Melissa M. Valle , Knauf
Shaw LLP & Linda Radko Shaw , Knauf Shaw LLP, 2 State St Ste 1400,
Rochester, NY 14614-1365 2009

Elizabeth Espada, Samuel A DiPrima, Stephen Gionta, Marci A
Dorsaneo, Irving Espada & Kaitlin Gionta, Plaintiffs, represented
by Linda Radko Shaw , Knauf Shaw LLP.

Waste Management of New York, L.L.C., Defendant, represented by
Joseph D. Picciotti , Harris Beach LLP & Kelly S. Foss , Harris
Beach LLP, 99 Garnsey RoadPittsford, NY 14534

The City of New York, Defendant, represented by Joseph D. Picciotti
, Harris Beach LLP.


WINTER PARK, FL: Maunu Seeks Overtime Compensation
--------------------------------------------------
MARK MAUNU, on his own behalf and on behalf of all hourly paid
service workers, the Plaintiff, vs. MAYOR STEVE LEARY as MAYOR of
THE CITY OF WINTER PARK, in his official capacity, the Defendant,
Case No. 88239596 (Fla. 9th Jud'l Cir., Sept. 11, 2019), contends
that the Plaintiff worked in the state of Florida without being
paid at least the time and a half minimum hourly wage for all hours
worked over 40 per week.

The Plaintiff worked for Defendant from approximately July 1996 to
May 2018. The Plaintiff worked as a foreman/utility project
coordinator.

Winter Park is a city near Orlando, Florida. It's known for its
abundant outdoor spaces like leafy Central Park.[BN]

          Carlos V. Leach, Esq.
          Louis Montone, Esq.
          THE LEACH FIRM, P.A.
          1950 Lee Road, Suite 213
          Winter Park, FL 32789
          Telephone: (407) 574-4999
          Facsimile: (833) 423-5864
          E-mail: cleach@theleachfirm.com
                  lmontone@theleachfirm.com

WOODSTREAM CORP: Faces Maroney Suit in Southern Dist. of New York
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Woodstream
Corporation. The case is captioned as Gregory Maroney on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
Woodstream Corporation, the Defendant, Case No. 7:19-cv-08294-KMK
(S.D.N.Y., Sept 5, 2019). The suit demands $5 million in damages
alleging fraud. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Kenneth M.
Karas.

Woodstream Corporation manufactures and markets pest control and
wildlife caring and control products. The company offers rodent and
insect traps, live animal cage traps, animal repellents,
fertilizers, and low toxic pesticides for lawns and gardens.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Kopel, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          888 Seventh Ave
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (646) 837-7127
          Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
          E-mail: ykopel@bursor.com

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Argo Group Had $41.9MM A&E Reserves at June 30
---------------------------------------------------------------
Argo Group International Holdings, Ltd. has net loss reserves of
US$41.9 million for asbestos and environmental matters for its
Run-Off Lines at June 30, 2019, according to the Company's Form
10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019.

Within the six months ended June 30, 2019, the Company has incurred
losses (net) of US$0.5 million and paid losses (net) of US$4.8
million for asbestos and environmental matters.

The Company states, "Losses and loss adjustment expenses for the
three months ended June 30, 2019 was the result of net unfavorable
loss reserve development on prior accident years in other run-off
lines.  Losses and loss adjustment expenses for the three months
ended June 30, 2018 was the result of net unfavorable loss reserve
development on prior accident years of US$0.7 million in other
run-off lines and US$0.5 million in Risk Management.

"Losses and loss adjustment expenses for the six months ended June
30, 2019 was the result of net unfavorable loss reserve development
on prior accident years in other run-off lines of US$3.5 million,
partially offset by US$1.8 million net favorable loss reserves
development on prior accident years in Risk Management.  Losses and
loss adjustment expenses for the six months ended June 30, 2018 was
the result of net unfavorable loss reserve development on prior
accident years of US$2.0 million in other run-off lines and US$1.0
million in Risk Management."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/MTFHlO


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Con Edison Spent $16MM for Manhattan Incident
--------------------------------------------------------------
Consolidated Edison, Inc. has incurred estimated operating costs of
US$16 million as of June 30, 2019, for property damage, clean- up
and other response costs related to the rupture of a steam main
owned by its subsidiary in Manhattan, according to the Company's
Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019.  The Company has also
invested US$10 million in capital and retirement costs as of June
30, 2019.

The Company states: "In July 2018, a CECONY steam main located on
Fifth Avenue and 21st Street in Manhattan ruptured.  Debris from
the incident included dirt and mud containing asbestos.  The
response to the incident required the closing of buildings and
streets for various periods.  The NYSPSC has commenced an
investigation.  As of June 30, 2019, with respect to the incident,
the company incurred estimated operating costs of US$16 million for
property damage, clean- up and other response costs and invested
US$10 million in capital and retirement costs.  The company has
notified its insurers of the incident and believes that the
policies currently in force will cover the company's costs, in
excess of a required retention (the amount of which is not
material), to satisfy any liability it may have for damages to
others in connection with the incident.  The company is unable to
estimate the amount or range of its possible loss related to the
incident.  At June 30, 2019, the company had not accrued a
liability related to the incident."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/xSgpkv


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Denial of Square D Summary Judgment Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the appealed case Schneider Electric USA, Inc., f/k/a Square D
Company, Appellant, v. Paul Williams; Colby Williams By and Through
His Parent, Guardian, and Next Friend, Paul Williams; Union Carbide
Corporation; and Paul Williams, Executor of the Estate of Vickie
Williams, Appellees, No. 2018-CA-000866-MR, (Ky. Ct. App.), the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky affirmed the Fayette Circuit Court's
order denying summary judgment to Schneider Electric USA, Inc.
(f/k/a Square D Company).

The trial court denied the motion, concluding KRS 342.690 applied
only to workplace injuries and there was no evidence that Vickie's
mesothelioma was caused by her having worked for Square D.

In her May 2016 unverified complaint, Vickie Williams asserted that
she was directly exposed to asbestos when working at Square D's
facility in 1978 and was indirectly exposed to asbestos fibers from
her father's clothing. Vickie's father worked for Square D for many
years, during which time she purportedly encountered asbestos
brought home on her father's clothing. Vickie also worked for
Square D for a few months as a teenager. Vickie sued Square D,
alleging asbestos exposure at its facility led to her mesothelioma.


Square D's answer invoked the exclusive remedy provisions. Square D
contends that Vickie's summer job at Square D as a teenager
triggers the exclusive remedy provisions of the Kentucky Workers'
Compensation statutes whereby her only potential recourse is via a
workers' compensation claim. Specifically, KRS2 342.690(1) provides
in relevant part that "if an employer secures payment of
compensation as required by this chapter, the liability of such
employer under this chapter shall be exclusive and in place of all
other liability of such employer to the employee . . . ."

On appeal, Square D alleged that Vickie made judicial admissions
that her claim is based (at least in part) on direct exposure to
asbestos during her brief employment with Square D, and so this
action is barred by the exclusive remedy provision. Square D also
argued that Vickie's injuries are indivisible and unapportionable
because Vickie's injuries cannot be apportioned between Square D's
two roles (Vickie's employer and her father's employer).

But the Court disagreed with Square D's argument, citing Owens
Corning Fiberglas Corp., 58 S.W.3d at 479. In Owens Corning
Fiberglas, the Supreme Court has provided a pathway for how to
apportion damages in these types of cases, to wit: "if distinct
causes produce distinct harms, or if distinct causes produce a
single harm and the evidence presented at trial provides a
reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to
the single harm, a trial court should instruct the jury to
apportion the damages to the distinct causes without resorting to
comparative fault. If, however, as is the case here, the evidence
does not permit apportionment of the damage between separate
causes, then comparative fault principles apply, and the trial
court should instruct the jury to apportion damages according to
the proportionate fault of the parties."

Thus, Court acknowledged that the trial court appropriately stated
that it would permit jury apportionment between the work-related
and non-work-related injuries in order to account for the
possibility that the evidence at trial would permit a finding that
Vickie's injuries were caused in part by her employment at Square
D.

The Court believed Square D's position would essentially immunize
it from any fault it had as Vickie's father's employer simply
because Vickie herself briefly worked at Square D. Allowing Square
D to evade all liability for its actions/inactions regarding
Vickie's mesothelioma would be a perfect example of a small tail
unjustly wagging a large dog. Fundamental fairness dictates that
Vickie's estate should have an opportunity to recover for her
non-work-related injuries.

A copy of the Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxjqbxqj
from Leagle.com.

Palmer G. Vance II -- gene.vance@skofirm.com -- Todd S. Page --
todd.page@skofirm.com -- Matthew R. Parsons --
matt.parsons@skofirm.com -- Lexington, Kentucky, Briefs for
Appellant.

Joseph D. Satterly , Paul J. Kelley , Paul J. Ivie , J. Eric Kiser
, J. Garrett Cambron , Louisville, Kentucky, Brief for Appellee
Paul Williams Individually and as Executor of Estate of Vickie
Williams and as Guardian and Next Friend of Colby Williams.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Denial of Unlimited Access to Exhibits Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's
decision affirming the Bankruptcy Court's denial of unconditional
access to the 2019 Exhibits that were submitted to the Bankruptcy
Court in connection with administering nine asbestos bankruptcies.


The appealed case is In re: A C & S INC; In re: Armstrong World
Industries, Inc., et al; In re: Combustion Engineering, Inc.; In
re: The Flintkote Company, et al; In re: Kaiser Aluminum
Corporation, et al; In re: Owens Corning, et al; In re: U.S.
Mineral Products Company; In re: USG Corporation, et al; In re:
W.R. Grace & Co., et al, Debtors, Motions Seeking Access to 2019
Statements Ford Motor Company; Honeywell International, Inc.
Appellants, No. 18-1951, (3d Cir.).

The Bankruptcy Court granted Honeywell International Inc. and Ford
Motor Company access to the relevant documents for a period of
three months, subject to certain conditions consistent with those
imposed in similar cases. The Bankruptcy Court concluded that
providing unlimited access to the 2019 Exhibits would pose an undue
risk of identity theft and exposure to private medical information.


The Third Circuit concluded that the District Court properly
rejected Honeywell's and Ford Motor's First Amendment argument
which was waived when they failed to support their claim for access
under the First Amendment beyond two passing references -- one in
their brief and one at oral argument. The Third Circuit explained
that "an issue is waived unless a party raises it in its opening
brief, and for those purposes a passing reference to an issue . . .
it will not suffice to bring that issue before this court."

A copy of the Order dated Aug. 19, 2019, is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y6b3vvvk from Leagle.com.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Exelon Unit Had US$84MM Reserves at June 30
------------------------------------------------------------
Exelon Corporation's subsidiary, Exelon Generation Company, LLC,
had reserved US$84 million at June 30, 2019 for asbestos-related
bodily injury claims, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2019.

The Company states, "Generation maintains a reserve for claims
associated with asbestos-related personal injury actions in certain
facilities that are currently owned by Generation or were
previously owned by ComEd and PECO.  The estimated liabilities are
recorded on an undiscounted basis and exclude the estimated legal
costs associated with handling these matters, which could be
material.

"At June 30, 2019 and December 31, 2018, Generation had recorded
estimated liabilities of approximately US$84 million and US$79
million, respectively, in total for asbestos-related bodily injury
claims.  As of June 30, 2019, approximately US$24 million of this
amount related to 244 open claims presented to Generation, while
the remaining US$60 million is for estimated future
asbestos-related bodily injury claims anticipated to arise through
2055, based on actuarial assumptions and analyses, which are
updated on an annual basis.  On a quarterly basis, Generation
monitors actual experience against the number of forecasted claims
to be received and expected claim payments and evaluates whether
adjustments to the estimated liabilities are necessary."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/vVEBrX


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Janis' Claim vs. Georgia Pacific, et al., Junked
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Sherry R. Fallon of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Delaware has ordered the dismissal of the Complaint in the case
styled Earl Janis, Jr. and Toni Janis, Plaintiffs, v. A.W.
Chesterton, Inc., et al, Defendants. Civil Action No.
17-167-MN-SRF. (D. Del.), as to the remaining defendants, Georgia
Pacific LLC, Grinnell LLC, and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
with prejudice.

Sometime in January 2019, the Court issued Reports and
Recommendations which recommended granting the moving defendants'
motions for summary judgment. District Judge Noreika adopted said
Reports and Recommendations and entered judgment as a matter of law
in favor of the moving defendants. The Court also ordered the
Plaintiffs to show cause why the Complaint should not be dismissed.
However, Plaintiffs have not filed a response to the Order to Show
Cause.

A copy of the Order dated Aug. 20, 2019, is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y4k456s2 from Leagle.com.

Earl Janis, Jr. & Toni Janis, Plaintiffs, represented by R. Joseph
Hrubiec , Napoli Shkolnik, LLC.

Georgia Pacific, LLC, formerly known as Georgia-Pacific
Corporation, Defendant, represented by Jason A. Cincilla --
jcincilla@mgmlaw.com -- Manning Gross + Massenburg LLP, Amaryah K.
Bocchino -- abocchino@mgmlaw.com -- Manning Gross + Massenburg LLP,
Irina N. Luzhatsky -- iluzhatsky@mgmlaw.com -- Manning Gross +
Massenburg LLP & Whitney L. Frame , Manning Gross + Massenburg
LLP.

Georgia Pacific, LLC, Cross Defendant, represented by Whitney L.
Frame , Manning Gross + Massenburg LLP.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Johnson Controls Has $538MM Liability at June 30
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Johnson Controls International plc estimated its asbestos-related
liability for pending and future claims and related defense costs
to be US$538 million as of June 30, 2019, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019.

Johnson Controls states, "The Company and certain of its
subsidiaries, along with numerous other third parties, are named as
defendants in personal injury lawsuits based on alleged exposure to
asbestos containing materials.  These cases have typically involved
product liability claims based primarily on allegations of
manufacture, sale or distribution of industrial products that
either contained asbestos or were used with asbestos containing
components.

"As of June 30, 2019, the Company's estimated asbestos related net
liability recorded on a discounted basis within the Company's
consolidated statements of financial position was US$167 million.
The net liability within the consolidated statements of financial
position was comprised of a liability for pending and future claims
and related defense costs of US$538 million, of which US$55 million
was recorded in other current liabilities and US$483 million was
recorded in other noncurrent liabilities.

"The Company also maintained separate cash, investments and
receivables related to insurance recoveries within the consolidated
statements of financial position of US$371 million, of which US$49
million was recorded in other current assets, and US$322 million
was recorded in other noncurrent assets.  Assets included US$16
million of cash and US$272 million of investments, which have all
been designated as restricted.

"In connection with the recognition of liabilities for
asbestos-related matters, the Company records asbestos-related
insurance recoveries that are probable; the amount of such
recoveries recorded at June 30, 2019 was US$83 million.  As of
September 30, 2018, the Company's estimated asbestos related net
liability recorded on a discounted basis within the Company's
consolidated statements of financial position was US$173 million.
The net liability within the consolidated statements of financial
position was comprised of a liability for pending and future claims
and related defense costs of US$550 million, of which US$55 million
was recorded in other current liabilities and US$495 million was
recorded in other noncurrent liabilities.

"The Company also maintained separate cash, investments and
receivables related to insurance recoveries within the consolidated
statements of financial position of US$377 million, of which US$33
million was recorded in other current assets, and US$344 million
was recorded in other noncurrent assets.  Assets included US$6
million of cash and US$281 million of investments, which have all
been designated as restricted.  In connection with the recognition
of liabilities for asbestos-related matters, the Company records
asbestos-related insurance recoveries that are probable; the amount
of such recoveries recorded at September 30, 2018 was US$90
million."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/jeCDv4


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Minerals Technologies Defends 71 Cases at June 30
------------------------------------------------------------------
Minerals Technologies Inc. has 71 pending asbestos cases, according
to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019.

The Company states, "Certain of the Company's subsidiaries are
among numerous defendants in a number of cases seeking damages for
exposure to silica or to asbestos containing materials.  The
Company currently has three pending silica cases and 71 pending
asbestos cases.  To date, 1,493 silica cases and 59 asbestos cases
have been dismissed, not including any lawsuits against AMCOL or
American Colloid Company dismissed prior to our acquisition of
AMCOL.  Thirteen and twenty new asbestos cases were filed during
the three and six months ended June 30, 2019, respectively, and 16
additional asbestos cases were filed subsequent to the end of the
second quarter.  Two asbestos cases were dismissed during the first
half of 2019 and no silica cases were dismissed during the period.
Most of these claims do not provide adequate information to assess
their merits, the likelihood that the Company will be found liable,
or the magnitude of such liability, if any.  Additional claims of
this nature may be made against the Company or its subsidiaries.
At this time management anticipates that the amount of the
Company's liability, if any, and the cost of defending such claims,
will not have a material effect on its financial position or
results of operations.

"The Company has settled only one silica lawsuit, for a nominal
amount, and no asbestos lawsuits to date (not including any that
may have been settled by AMCOL prior to completion of the
acquisition).  We are unable to state an amount or range of amounts
claimed in any of the lawsuits because state court pleading
practices do not require identifying the amount of the claimed
damage.  The aggregate cost to the Company for the legal defense of
these cases since inception continues to be insignificant.  The
majority of the costs of defense for these cases, excluding cases
against AMCOL or American Colloid, are reimbursed by Pfizer Inc.
pursuant to the terms of certain agreements entered into in
connection with the Company's initial public offering in 1992.  The
Company is entitled to indemnification, pursuant to agreement, for
sales prior to the initial public offering.  Of the 71 pending
asbestos cases, 45 of the non-AMCOL cases are subject to
indemnification, in whole or in part, because the plaintiffs claim
liability based on sales of products that occurred either entirely
before the initial public offering, or both before and after the
initial public offering.  In twenty of the twenty two remaining
non-AMCOL cases, the plaintiffs have not alleged dates of exposure,
and in the remaining two non-AMCOL cases, exposure is alleged to
have been after the Company's initial public offering in 1992.  The
remaining four cases involve AMCOL only, so no Pfizer indemnity is
available.  Our experience has been that the Company is not liable
to plaintiffs in any of these lawsuits and the Company does not
expect to pay any settlements or jury verdicts in these lawsuits."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/CXAZzH


ASBESTOS UPDATE: OI Inc. Accrues $5BB from 1993 to June 30, 2019
----------------------------------------------------------------
Owens-Illinois, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019, that it has accrued a total of approximately
US$5.0 billion beginning with the initial liability of US$975
million established in 1993 through June 30, 2019, for its
asbestos-related liability before insurance recoveries.

The Company states, "From 1948 to 1958, one of the Company's former
business units commercially produced and sold approximately US$40
million of a high-temperature, calcium-silicate based pipe and
block insulation material containing asbestos.  The Company sold
its insulation business unit in April 1958.  The Company receives
claims from individuals alleging bodily injury and death as a
result of exposure to asbestos from this product ("Asbestos
Claims").

"Since receiving its first Asbestos Claim, as of June 30, 2019, the
Company in the aggregate has disposed of approximately 400,800
Asbestos Claims at an average indemnity payment of approximately
US$10,000 per claim.  The Company's asbestos indemnity payments
have varied on a per-claim basis and are expected to continue to
vary considerably over time.

"Asbestos-related cash payments for 2018, 2017, and 2016 were
US$105 million, US$110 million, and US$125 million, respectively.
The Company's cash payments per claim disposed (inclusive of legal
costs) were approximately US$86,000, US$83,000 and US$71,000 for
the years ended December 31, 2018, 2017, and 2016, respectively.

"The Company's objective is to achieve, where possible, resolution
of Asbestos Claims pursuant to claims-handling agreements.  Failure
of claimants to meet certain medical and product exposure criteria
in claims-handling agreements generally has reduced the number of
claims that would otherwise have been received by the Company in
the tort system.  In addition, changes in jurisdictional dynamics,
legislative acts, asbestos docket management and procedures, the
substantive law, the co-defendant pool, and other external factors
have affected lawsuit volume, claim volume, qualification rates,
claim values, and related matters.  Collectively, these variables
generally have had the effect of increasing the Company's per-claim
average indemnity payment over time.

"Beginning with the initial liability of US$975 million established
in 1993, the Company has accrued a total of approximately US$5.0
billion through June 30, 2019, before insurance recoveries, for its
asbestos-related liability.  The Company's estimates of its
liability have been significantly affected by, among other factors,
the volatility of asbestos-related litigation in the United States,
the significant number of co-defendants that have filed for
bankruptcy, changes in mortality rates, the inherent uncertainty of
future disease incidence and claiming patterns against the Company,
the significant expansion of the types of defendants that are now
sued in this litigation, and the continuing changes in the extent
to which these defendants participate in the resolution of cases in
which the Company is also a defendant.

"The Company continues to monitor trends that may affect its
ultimate liability and analyze the developments and variables
likely to affect the resolution of Asbestos Claims against the
Company.  The material components of the Company's total accrued
liability are determined by the Company in connection with its
annual comprehensive legal review and consist of the following
estimates, to the extent it is probable that such liabilities have
been incurred and can be reasonably estimated: (i) the liability
for Asbestos Claims already asserted against the Company; (ii) the
liability for Asbestos Claims not yet asserted against the Company;
and (iii) the legal defense costs estimated to be incurred in
connection with the Asbestos Claims already asserted and those
Asbestos Claims the Company believes will be asserted.

"The Company conducts an annual comprehensive legal review of its
asbestos-related liabilities and costs in connection with
finalizing and reporting its annual results of operations, unless
significant changes in trends or new developments warrant an
earlier review.  As part of its annual comprehensive legal review,
the Company provides historical Asbestos Claims' data to a third
party with expertise in determining the impact of disease incidence
and mortality on future filing trends to develop information to
assist the Company in estimating the total number of future
Asbestos Claims likely to be asserted against the Company.  The
Company uses this estimate, along with an estimation of disposition
costs and related legal costs, as inputs to develop its best
estimate of its total probable liability.  If the results of the
annual comprehensive legal review indicate that the existing amount
of the accrued liability is lower (higher) than its reasonably
estimable asbestos-related costs, then the Company will record an
appropriate charge (credit) to the Company's results of operations
to increase (decrease) the accrued liability."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/Pndczo


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Quaker Chemical Unit Defends Suits at June 30
--------------------------------------------------------------
Quaker Chemical Corporation disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2019, that the Company currently estimates
its subsidiary's total liability over the next 50 years for
existing and anticipated future asbestos-related claims to be
approximately US$1.7 million (excluding costs of defense).

Quaker Chemical states, "The Company previously disclosed in its
Annual Report filed on Form 10-K and 10-K/A for the year ended
December 31, 2018 that an inactive subsidiary of the Company that
was acquired in 1978 sold certain products containing asbestos,
primarily on an installed basis, and is among the defendants in
numerous lawsuits alleging injury due to exposure to asbestos.

"During the six months ended June 30, 2019, there have been no
significant changes to the facts or circumstances of this
previously disclosed matter, aside from on-going claims and routine
payments associated with this litigation.

"Based on a continued analysis of the existing and anticipated
future claims against this subsidiary, it is currently projected
that the subsidiary's total liability over the next 50 years for
these claims is approximately US$1.7 million (excluding costs of
defense)."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/yLNumM



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