CAR_Public/190930.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, September 30, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 195

                            Headlines

ABC CORP: Chacon Files Class Suit in New York
ACADEMY SECURITIES: Messinger Files Class Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
ADVANCED MEPF: Underpays Plumber, Aguilar Suit Alleges
AETNA INC: Court Dismisses S. Peters' ERISA Suit
ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PA: Court Affirms Dismissal of Martel Suit

AMERICAN HONDA: Amended Sched for Expert Discovery in Aberin Issued
AMERIGAS PROPANE: Mahoney Files ADA Suit in Pennsylvania
ANDREW J. DICK: Court Denies FDCPA Suit Dismissal
AQUA METALS: Claims in Consolidated Class Securities Suit Narrowed
AT&T CORP: Bid to Strike Class Claims in Dorchester Suit Granted

AUDIBLE INC: McKee Infringement Suit Settlement Has Final Approval
AVIS BUDGET: Court Grants Filing of TAC in Greenley
BARCLAYS BANK: Prasad Suit Asserts FDCPA Violation
BH MEDIA NEWS: Price Suit Asserts Sexual Harassment, Discrimination
BLUE RAVEN: Naiman Sues Over Intrusive Telemarketing Practices

BUILD.COM INC: Conner Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
CAMINO NATURAL: Johnston Files Class Suit in Colorado
CARBON BLACK: VMware Merger Docs Misleading, Winkler Says
CITY OF TACOMA, WA: Dismissal of Simms w/o Prejudice Recommended
CONOPCO, INC: Schulte "Pink Tax" Suit Moved to E.D. Missouri

CONOPCO, INC: Schulte Gender-Discriminatory Pricing Suit Removed
CREDIT SUISSE: Court Dismisses Derivatives Pricing Antitrust Suit
DANONE US: Court Dismisses Andrade-Heymsfield Suit With Prejudice
DESE ENTERPRISE: Traynor Alleges Violation under ADA
DR HORTON: Illegally Sends Marketing Texts, Davis Suit Alleges

EQUIFAX INFO: Claims vs. McGinley in Bruno Dismissed w/o Prejudice
FAMILY SOLUTIONS: Court Excludes Out-Patients Clinicians in Class
FASHIONABLE INC: Traynor Files Class Suit in New York
FINANCIAL RECOVERY: Kucur Files Class Suit in New York
G4S SECURE: Bid to Strike Affirmative Defenses in Xiong Partly OK'd

G4S SECURE: California Court Denies Bid to Stay Xiong Labor Suit
GEICO INDEMNITY: Randy Rosenberg Remanded to State Court
GENOMIC HEALTH: Plumley Says Exact Sciences Merger Docs Misleading
GRIFFIN, GA: Myers Files Class Suit in Georgia
HALLIBURTON ENERGY: Denial of Fishermen's HESI Deals Claims Upheld

HEADWAY TECHNOLOGIES: Barry Alleges HDD Price-Fixing
HIGHER BRIDGE: Moore Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
HUDSON LLC: Thomas, et al Sue over Rent Overcharges
HUSKY ENERGY: SRC's Bid to Stay Discovery in Bruzek Suit Denied
IKEA US: Has No Shuttle Bus Service for Disabled, Prentiss Says

INDIANA: Court Denies Class Action Bid in Leatherwood
INTUIT INC: Ostrovsky Sues Over Deceptive Tax Filing Services
IOVATE HEALTH: Barzoloski Sues Over Mislabeled Dietary Product
IOVATE HEALTH: Sabatano Files Fraud Class Suit in New York
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Court Narrows Claims Transvaginal Mesh Suit

JOSE PLEHN-DUJOWICH: Class Settlement in Hu Has Prelim Approval
JUUL LABS: Oberhauser Sues over Sales of e-Cigarettes
KLEIN & DADAY: Isakova Sues over Debt Collection Practices
KOHN LAW FIRM: Adan Sues over Debt Collection Practices
KURT GEIGER USA: Traynor Files Class Suit in New York

LASERSHIP INC: Court Dismisses Klatte FLSA Suit
LE ENERGY: Rogers Sues Over Unsolicited Telemarketing
LIFE PROTECT: Williams Sues over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
LIFECARE SOLUTIONS: Court OKs Settlement in Frando
LINCOLN NATIONAL: Mahoney Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act

LONG ISLAND BUSINESS: Yu Dismissed from Guan Suit Without Prejudice
LOS ANGELES RECYCLING: Pelaez Seeks Minimum & OT Wages for Welders
LUCKY STORES: Court Dismisses Beasly's Suit Over Coffee-Mate
MBR CENTRAL: Court OKs Settlement in Donaldson Suit
MCKESSON CORP: Court Certifies Class in True Health TCPA Suit

MDL 2460: Court Certifies Class in Niaspan Antitrust Suit
MDL 2472: RG/2 Named Notice Admin in Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Suit
MDL 2693: Vizio Consumer Privacy Suit Dismissed With Prejudice
METROPOLITAN POLICE: Pappas Sues Over ADA Violation
MIDLAND FUNDING: Denial of Arbitration Bid in Thomas Suit Affirmed

MORDECHAI LIECTHUNG: 4th Amendment Claims Remain in Yerushalayim
MOVIEPASS INC: Can Compel Arbitration in Tabas RICO Suit
MR. CHOW ENTERPRISES: Brooks Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website
MR. COOPER: Remand of Niedzinski to State Court Endorsed
MVP DELIVERY: Oudkerk Seeks Minimum & OT for Delivery Drivers

NAPLES HOTEL: $31.8K Attorneys' Fees Awarded in Williams Suit
NASTYGAL.COM: Traylor Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
NEGOTIATION TECHNOLOGIES: Wille Files Class Suit in Fla. Under ADA
NINTENDO OF AMERICA: Court Issues Briefing Schedule in Diaz Suit
NISSAN NORTH: Court Orders Class Suit Dismissal in

PANASONIC CORP: 9th Cir. Vacates Antitrust Suit Distribution Plan
PARM FUND: Fischler Files ADA Suit in New York
PARTSSOURCE INC: Class Certification in Gembarski Suit Reversed
PETSMART INC: Carpenter Sues Over Unsafe Tiny Tales Homes
PLANASA OREGON: Perez et al Sue over Migrant Agri Labor Housing

POLAR BEVERAGES: McNulty Files Product Liability Suit in N.Y.
POST CONSUMER: Court Dismisses Lima Suit With Prejudice
QNB BANK: Mahoney Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
RELIN GOLDSTEIN: Klein Files Class Suit Under FDCPA
RESIDENCE INN: 9th Cir. Vacates Remand of Arias to State Court

RODENBURG LLP: 8th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Carroll FDCPA Suit
ROSSY'S BAKERY: Perez Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
ROSWELL, GA: Court Affirms Firefighters' Class Certification
ROYAL SEAS: Court Approves Direct Notice Plan in McCurley TCPA Suit
RUSH TRUCK: Settlement in Cawthorne Suit Has Final Approval

SACRAMENTO COUNTY, CA: Class Notice in Mays Gets Prelim Approval
SCHIFF NUTRITION: Mislabels Tiger's Nutrition Bar, Collado Claims
SERVE U BRANDS: Court Narrows S. Lusk FLSA Suit
SOURCE PROVIDERS: Woodard Seeks Overtime Pay for Hourly Employees
SOUTH CAROLINA: Appeal from Time Extension Order in Firriolo Nixed

SPS TECHNOLOGIES: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Duran Suit Alleges
SUMMIT CREDIT: Court Orders Submission of Evidentiary Documents
SUNSPEL MERCER: Tatum-Rios Files Class Suit in New York under ADA
SUPERIOR COURT: Suit Over State Court Family Law Proceedings Junked
SWITCH INC: Court Refuses Writ of Mandamus in Martz

SWITCH2WEB.COM: Schaffer Sues over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
TACO BELL: "Drive-thru" Not Accessible to Blind, Jones Says
THYSSENKRUPP CRANKSHAFT: Wickens Seeks OT Wages for Employees
TIME WARNER: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in Hunter TCPA Suit
TRI-STATE CAREFLIGHT: Court Partly Grants Class Cert. Bid in Payne

UBER TECH: $32.5MM Settlement in McKnight Suit Has Final Approval
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Court Compels Arbitration in WARN Act Suit
UNITED FINANCIAL: Parshall Balks at People's United Merger Deal
UNITED HEALTHCARE: Palmetto Pathology Seeks Medicaid Refund
UNITED TECH: Sorenson Says Raytheon Merger Docs Deficient

VERMONT MUTUAL: Court Grants Summary Judgment Bid in Martins Suit
WELLS FARGO: Bid to Dismiss Amended Harrington Fraud Suit Denied
XEROX BUSINESS: Court Certifies Class in Hill Suit

                            *********

ABC CORP: Chacon Files Class Suit in New York
---------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against ABC Corp. The case is
styled as Jose Chacon, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Fred Snyder and ABC corp., Defendants Case
No. 603822/2019 (N.Y. Sup., Sept. 24, 2019).

The case type is stated as Other.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Monteiro & Fishman, LLP
   91 N. Franklin Street
   Hempstead, NY 11550
   Tel: (516) 280-4600


ACADEMY SECURITIES: Messinger Files Class Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Academy Securities,
Inc. The case is styled as David Messinger, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Academy
Securities, Inc., Al-Rumayyan, H.E. Yasir, Allen & Company LLC,
Barclays Capital Inc., BTIG, LLC, Ursula Burns, Garrett Camp,
Canaccord Genuity LLC, Castleoak Securities, L.P. and Glen
Ceremony, Defendants, Case No. CGC19579544 (Cal. Sup. Ct., San
Francisco County, Sept. 25, 2019).

The case type is stated as Securities/Investment.

Academy Securities is a preeminent disabled veteran owned and
operated investment bank with strength in capital markets, public
finance, fixed income and equity trading.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


ADVANCED MEPF: Underpays Plumber, Aguilar Suit Alleges
------------------------------------------------------
JUAN AGUILAR, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated situated, Plaintiff v. ADVANCED MEPF SERVICES CORP.; and
PROJECT STRATEGIX, LLC; CROSS ISLAND MECHANICAL MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION; DAVID CERQUEIRA; and KRISTOPHER SHAW, Defendants, Case
No. 1:19-cv-05014 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 3, 2019) seeks to recover from
the Defendants unpaid wages and overtime compensation, interest,
liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Plaintiff Aguilar was employed by the Defendants as plumber.

Advanced Mepf Services Corp. engaged in the buseinss of plumbing
and electrical service, repair, and installation. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew J. Farnworth, Esq.
          Alexander T. Coleman, Esq.
          Michael J. Borrelli, Esq.
          BORRELLI & ASSOCIATES, P.L.L.C.
          910 Franklin Avenue, Suite 200
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 248-5550
          Facsimile: (516) 248-6027


AETNA INC: Court Dismisses S. Peters' ERISA Suit
------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina, Asheville Division, issued a Memorandum and Order
granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in the case
captioned SANDRA M. PETERS, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AETNA INC., AETNA LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, and OPTUMHEALTH CARE SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendants. Civil
Case No. 1:15-cv-00109-MR. (W.D. N.C.).

Plaintiff Sandra M. Peters filed this putative class action against
the Defendants Aetna, Inc., Aetna Life Insurance Company and
OptumHealth Care Solutions, Inc., asserting claims pursuant to the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). In her
Complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that Aetna engaged in a fraudulent
scheme with Optum and other subcontractors, whereby insureds were
caused to pay the subcontractors' administrative fees because the
Defendants misrepresented such fees as medical expenses.

The Mars Plan

The following facts are not in dispute. The Plaintiff is a former
member of an ERISA plan (the Mars Plan) self-funded by her
husband's former employer, Mars, Inc. (Mars), for its employees and
retirees. Mars, through its benefits committee, is the Plan
Administrator for the Plan. Mars hired Aetna to serve as the Claims
Administrator for the Plan and to evaluate, process, and pay claims
under the Plan. As part of its services to the Plan, Aetna agreed
to provide Plan Participants access to Aetna's network hospitals,
and other health care providers (Network Providers) who have agreed
to provide services at agreed upon rates and who are participating
in the Network covering the Plan Participants.

Under the Mars Plan, Mars and Aetna agreed that Aetna will issue a
payment on behalf of Customer for in-network services in an amount
determined in accordance with the Aetna contract with the Network
Provider and the Plan benefits.

Aetna Enters into Agreements with Optum

In 2011, in an effort to lower costs for employer-sponsored plans
and members, Aetna issued a request for proposal to several
companies with networks of physical therapists. The goal was to
generate two types of savings: (1) lower rates or unit cost
reduction and (2) treatment cost savings due to control of
unnecessary visits/utilization.

Beginning in 2012, after a series of arm's-length negotiations,
Aetna entered into a series of Provider Agreements with Optum as
the provider of the networks. In these Provider Agreements, Optum
agreed to make available its network of contracted physical
therapists, occupational therapists, and chiropractors to Aetna. In
return, Aetna agreed to pay Optum flat, per-visit rates for these
services. Under the contracts, Optum's DTPs were deemed to be
in-network with Aetna for purposes of its plans. As part of
providing these networks, Optum also agreed to provide claims
management, credentialing and patient management. Optum's only
compensation for such management of its networks was to be the
compensation set forth in the Provider Agreement.

The Aetna-Optum Arrangement

Under the Aetna-Optum contracts, Aetna typically pays Optum a
flat-rate payment when an Aetna member receives a covered service
by a DTP. Optum, in turn, pays the DTP a specified amount for the
services performed, according to the rates that Optum has
negotiated through its separate agreement with that provider.
Regardless of the rate paid by Optum to the DTP, Optum receives the
same flat, per-visit payment from Aetna.  

Depending on the benefits claim, Aetna may pay Optum an amount that
is greater than or less than the amount Optum pays the DTP. If the
claim is within the member's deductible, Optum receives nothing and
the Aetna member pays only the contracted rate between Optum and
the DTP.  

In Count III of the Complaint, the Plaintiff brings a derivative
claim on behalf of the Mars Plan Section under Section 502(a)(2) of
ERISA, alleging that Aetna breached its fiduciary obligations by
(1) issuing EOBs that fail to disclose Optum's administrative fees
and instead improperly characterize such fees as expenses for
medical services and by (2) using plan assets to pay such
administrative fees.

The Court will refer to this claim as the Plan Claim. In Count IV
of the Complaint, the Plaintiff seeks relief on her own behalf for
the Defendants' alleged violations of their fiduciary duties to the
Plaintiff individually under ERISA Section 404, 29 U.S.C. Section
1104, by issuing false EOBs and using plan assets to pay
administrative fees owed by Aetna to Optum. The Court will refer to
this claim as the Plaintiff's Individual Claim.

The Plan Claim

Under Section 502(a)(2) of ERISA, a plan participant or beneficiary
may bring a derivative action on behalf of the plan against a
fiduciary for a breach of any of the fiduciary duties imposed by
the statute. A fiduciary who commits such a breach shall be
personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan
resulting from each such breach, and shall be required to restore
to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made
through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be
subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may
deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.

With respect to the actions complained of in the Plaintiff's
Complaint, Aetna acted in a manner that was entirely consistent
with the Mars Plan. The administrative services contract between
Aetna and Mars promised members access to Aetna's network
providers, which is precisely what Aetna did by providing Aetna
members access to Optum's networks.   

The Plaintiff argues that this payment should have been calculated
using only the Optum DTP rates.

But Optum's DTPs are not the Network Provider in this context;
Optum is. Optum provided the network of therapists to Aetna
members. This interpretation is not only consistent with the Mars
Plan's definitions of those terms, it is the only reasonable
interpretation of the relevant contracts. Aetna had no contracts
with Optum's DTPs, thus, including the individual physical
therapists, chiropractors, and other treatment providers in the
Master Services Agreement's definition of Network Provider would
render that agreement's provision requiring Aetna to issue payment
in accordance with its contract with the Network Provider
meaningless.

The Plaintiff also alleges that Aetna breached its fiduciary duties
by issuing EOBs that improperly characterize administrative fees as
expenses for medical services. In order to prove an ERISA breach of
fiduciary claim, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant was
an ERISA fiduciary acting as such, that the defendant made a
material misrepresentation, and that the plaintiff relied on that
misrepresentation to her detriment.

Here, the Plaintiff's forecast of evidence fails to show any
specific misrepresentations by Aetna in its EOBs regarding the
Negotiated Charge. The EOBs relied upon by the Plaintiff accurately
disclose the rates that were negotiated pursuant to the Aetna-Optum
contractual arrangement and the amounts actually paid, and Aetna
accurately calculated the Plaintiff's responsibility for each of
these charges in accordance with the Mars Plan. Further, the
Plaintiff has not demonstrated how she could have possibly suffered
any injury from EOB statements documenting health care transactions
that, on balance, saved her money.

Without a showing that the EOBs contained any material
misrepresentations, or that the Plaintiff relied upon such
misrepresentations to her detriment, the Plaintiff's claim based on
a breach of fiduciary duty in the issuance of the EOBs must fail.

Moreover, the alleged failure by Aetna to disclose that
administrative costs were included in the medical charges similarly
fails to support any claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

First, Aetna had no administrative costs to report. The
administrative costs to which the Plaintiffs refers are the amounts
retained by Optum for those services where the rate negotiated with
Aetna exceeded the rate Optum paid to the DTPs. Every provider
within our healthcare system has internal processing costs, and
these are paid as part of the costs of the medical service
provided. Optum, as the Network Provider, is no different. Such
administrative costs are internal to Optum, just like the
processing costs are for any healthcare provider or network
provider. These were not Aetna's administrative costs. Thus, there
were no such administrative costs paid by Aetna.

Even if there were administrative costs paid by Aetna, however,
there is no legal requirement to disclose them. The Plaintiff has
not identified any regulation or statute that would require Aetna
to disclose any information concerning charges for administrative
fees in the absence of any request for such information. The Fourth
Circuit has recognized only two situations in which there is an
affirmative disclosure duty on ERISA administrators  namely, (1)
where the beneficiary requests information from the administrator
or (2) where an administrator that has fostered a misunderstanding
of facts possesses information that the beneficiary needs for her
protection are applicable here.   

The Plaintiff has presented no forecast of evidence that tends to
show that either of these situations is present here.

In sum, the Plaintiff has failed to present a forecast of evidence
from which a reasonable factfinder could find a breach of fiduciary
duty by Aetna or any injury to the Mars Plan arising from the
Aetna-Optum contractual arrangement. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's
claim against Aetna on behalf of the Mars Plan must be dismissed.

As for the Plaintiff's Plan Claim against Optum, the Court has
already exhaustively analyzed the nature of Optum's role as a
non-fiduciary in the context of denying the Plaintiff's Motion to
Compel, in which the Plaintiff asserted the fiduciary exception to
Optum's assertion of the attorney-client privilege. The Court will
not repeat all that analysis here, but for the same reasons stated
therein, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff has failed to
present a forecast of evidence from which a jury could reasonably
conclude that Optum was acting as a fiduciary with respect to the
actions complained of in the Plaintiff's Complaint.

Despite Optum's non-fiduciary status, the Plaintiff nevertheless
argues that Optum can be held liable as a non-fiduciary party in
interest" who participated in prohibited transactions along with
Aetna. This argument fails for a number of reasons. First, for the
reasons stated above, the Court concludes that Aetna did not breach
any fiduciary duties or engage in any prohibited transactions with
respect to the Aetna-Optum contractual relationship.  
   
Here, it is undisputed that Optum had no pre-existing relationship
with the Mars Plan, contractual or otherwise, and did not render
services to the Plan itself other than providing its networks to
the Plan.5 Further, Optum had no relationship with Aetna that
pre-existed the parties' network provider contracts, and the fees
that Optum received from that contractual relationship were a
product of arm's-length negotiations.  

Moreover, the contractual arrangement upon which the Plaintiff's
claim is based did not involve a transfer or use of any assets of
the plan within the meaning of Section 1106(a)(1)(D) or (b)(1). The
Plaintiff claims that, even if the arrangement saved the Plan
money, she nonetheless paid inflated co-insurance amounts to
downstream providers as a result of the Defendants' arrangement.
Such co-insurance payments, however, were not plan assets. As noted
earlier, this argument by the Plaintiff also fails because her
forecast of evidence shows that she did not actually pay such
inflated co-insurance amounts.

Because the Aetna-Optum arrangement did not involve the use or
transfer of plan assets to a party in interest, the Plaintiff's
claim under Section 406(a)(1)(D) fails.

The Court concludes that the Plaintiff's claim against Optum under
ERISA Section 502(a)(2) as stated in Count III must also be
dismissed.

Individual Claim

Section 502(a)(1) of ERISA permits a plan participant or
beneficiary to bring a civil action to recover benefits due to him
under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms
of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the
terms of the plan. The plan participant or beneficiary also may
seek an injunction or other appropriate equitable relief to redress
violations of ERISA or to enforce the terms of the plan.  

To the extent that the Plaintiff is bringing a direct claim for
damages that she allegedly suffered as a result of the Aetna-Optum
relationship, that claim fails for the reasons stated above. The
undisputed forecast of evidence before the Court shows that the
Plaintiff suffered no losses, and in fact benefited, from the
Aetna-Optum relationship. Further, the Plaintiff cannot show that
Aetna's administration or disposition of any of her claims was
erroneous or that she suffered any individual injury as a result of
the administration or disposition of her claims.  
he Court concludes that the Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment with respect to the individual claim asserted by the
Plaintiff in Count IV.

In summary, the Plaintiff has failed to present a forecast of
evidence that either the Mars Plan generally or she individually
suffered any injury as a result of the Aetna-Optum contractual
arrangement. Further, the Plaintiff has failed to establish that
the Defendants violated any obligation, fiduciary or otherwise, to
the Mars Plan or her. To the contrary, the undisputed forecast of
evidence before the Court demonstrates that Aetna and Optum,
through their contractual arrangement, expanded the health care
services available to the Mars Plan participants, including the
Plaintiff, in a manner that saved both the Plan and the Plaintiff
money. Accordingly, the Defendants' motions for summary judgment
are granted, and this case is hereby dismissed.

Accordingly, OptumHealth Care Solutions, Inc.'s Motion for Summary
Judgment and Aetna's Motion for Summary Judgment are granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 16, 2019
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6p2l537
from Leagle.com.

Sandra M. Peters, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by D. Brian Hufford -
dbhufford@zuckerman.com - Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice,
David M. Wilkerson - dwilkerson@vwlawfirm.com - The Van Winkle Law
Firm, Heather Whitaker Goldstein - HGoldstein@vwlawfirm.com - The
Van Winkle Law Firm, Jason S. Cowart - jcowart@zuckerman.com -
Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice, Jason M. Knott -
jknott@zuckerman.com - Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP, pro hac vice, Nell
Z. Peyser  - npeyser@zuckerman.com - Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac
vice & Larry S. McDevitt - lmcdevitt@vwlawfirm.com - The Van Winkle
Law Firm.

Aetna Inc. & Aetna Life Insurance Company, Defendants, represented
by E. Thomison Holman , Holman Law, PLLC, 56 College St., Suite 302
Asheville, NC 28801,Matthew S. Roberson - mroberson@mwblawyers.com
- McGuire, Wood & Bissette, P.A., Earl B. Austin, III -
earl.austin@bakerbotts.com - Baker Botts, L.L.P., pro hac vice &
Jessica F. Rosenbaum - jessica.underwood@bakerbotts.com - Baker
Botts, L.L.P., pro hac vice.

OptumHealth Care Solutions, Inc., Defendant, represented by Brian
D. Boone – brian.boone@alston.com - Alston & Bird LLP, Emily
Claire McGowan - emily.mcgowan@alston.com - Alston & Bird LLP, Mark
Timothy Calloway - mark.calloway@alston.com, Alston & Bird LLP,
Michael R. Hoernlein -michael.hoernlein@alston.com, Alston & Bird
LLP, Rebecca L. Gauthier - -rebecca.gauthier@alston.com  Alston &
Bird LLP & Jahnisa T. Loadholt  - jahnisa.loadholt @alston.com -
Alston & Bird LLP, pro hac vice.


ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PA: Court Affirms Dismissal of Martel Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Joseph Nissim Martel and Ester Martel, husband and
wife, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Appellants, v. Allegheny County, City of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh
Public Schools, and Allegheny County Board of Assessment Appeals
and Review, Case No. 568 C.D. 2018 (Pa. Cmmw.), Judge Christine
Fizzano Cannon of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed
the March 29, 2018 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny
County dismissing the Plaintiffs' class action complaint in equity,
seeking relief from property reassessments ordered by the Allegheny
County Board of Assessment Appeals and Review.

The Martels, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated Property Owners, appeal from the trial court's order
dismissing their class action complaint in equity, seeking relief
from property reassessments ordered by the Board.  The Board
ordered the reassessments based on assessment appeals brought by
the Pittsburgh Public Schools, Allegheny County and the City of
Pittsburgh ("Taxing Authorities"), where they introduced evidence
of current market values to support their request for increased
assessments.

The Property Owners contested the Taxing Authorities' power to
bring the appeals and to rely on current market values, arguing
that this conduct violated, in relevant part, laws enacted by
Allegheny County pursuant to the Home Rule Charter and Optional
Plans Law, and the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.

On July 28, 2017, the Property Owners filed a one-count class
action complaint with the trial court against the Defendants.  The
Property Owners are individuals who own real estate in the County
and include the Martels.  The County, which is a home rule
municipality, has been under a base year assessment system since
2002.   The last countywide reassessment was in 2012, which is the
current established base year for the County.

On Nov. 13, 2015, the Martels purchased their property located at
6340 Darlington Road, Pittsburgh, for the sum of $750,000.  At the
time, the Martels' property had a base year (2012) assessed value
of $464,700.  On May 10, 2016, the School District initiated an
appeal with the Board of the assessed value of the Martels'
property for the 2016 tax year; though, at the time, there had been
no material additions or removal of improvements to the Martels'
property or physical changes in the land.

At the hearing on the matter, the School District stated that it
was appealing the assessed value of the Martels' property on the
basis of current market value. After taking evidence, the hearing
examiner recommended to the Board an order to change the assessed
value of the Martels' property from $464,700 to $690,000, which the
Board adopted.  

The Property Owners contended that the Board erred by increasing
the assessment on the Martels' property based solely upon
improperly submitted evidence of the sales price of the property
and other property sales that all took place after the base year.
They appealed the Board's decision to the Allegheny County Court of
Common Pleas Board of Viewers.

The Property Owners allege that the matter is appropriately brought
as a class action because the Taxing Authorities have initiated
assessment appeals similar to the Martels' appeal on "approximately
200 or more" properties recently sold in Allegheny County, and have
accepted the increased tax revenues associated with the same.  They
assert that the Taxing Authorities do not have the right to appeal
the assessed values on the basis of current market value pursuant
to Section 5-207.06(B)(7) of the Allegheny County Administrative
Code and Board Rule IV, Section 3A (Board Rule).

In their request for relief, Property Owners asked the trial court
to: (1) enjoin the Taxing Authorities and the Board from appealing
property tax assessments based on current fair market values and/or
increasing the assessments where the appeal has not been initiated
by taxpayers; (2) order the Board to "roll back" the assessed
values of all affected properties to the 2012 base year valuation
to provide prospective tax relief for "taxpayers" per the act known
as the Refund Act, Act of May 21, 1943, P.L. 349, as amended; (3)
declare that the increased tax revenues collected have been
"unlawfully obtained" and direct the Board to provide "written
notice" to all affected taxpayers of their right to seek a refund
within the applicable three-year period provided in 72 P.S. Section
5566b, Section 1 of the Act of May 21, 1943, P.L. 349, as amended;
(4) direct the Board to promulgate reasonable rules and regulations
regarding the tax refund procedure; (5) declare that the Taxing
Authorities and the Board's improper conduct violates the
Uniformity Clause, Administrative Code, Board Rule, and other
pertinent law; (6) award Property Owners attorneys' fees and costs;
and (7) provide any further relief as is "just and proper" under
the circumstances.

The Taxing Authorities and the Board responded to the Property
Owners' complaint by each filing preliminary objections in the
nature of a demurrer.

Following briefing and oral argument on the preliminary objections,
the trial court sustained, in part, and overruled, in part, the
objections and dismissed the complaint.  It dismissed the complaint
by sustaining the Board and School District's objection that the
Administrative Code and Board Rule relied upon by Property Owners,
as written, violate state law and therefore their complaint is
"legally insufficient."

Upon review, Judge Cannon agrees that the trial court properly
dismissed the complaint; however, she affirms on another basis,
concluding that the trial court should have instead sustained the
preliminary objections that the Property Owners failed to exhaust
the remedies available to them pursuant to the law known as the
Second Class County Assessment Law.  

First, the Judge holds that the trial court erred in its
application of the Beattie v. Allegheny County test when it
concluded that the Property Owners could not obtain the relief they
seek in their complaint by following the appeals process provided
in the Assessment Law.  She concludes that the Property Owners can
obtain this relief through the process provided by the Assessment
Law.  The Assessment Law provides that the Board is to hear "all
complaints" relating to assessments and that "any taxable person
may apply to the board for the reassessment of any subject of
taxation which he considers incorrectly assessed or as to which he
considers himself entitled to a change in valuation."  Because the
Assessment Law provides a process for the individual Property
Owners to adequately obtain the relief they seek, the class action
lawsuit is not proper.

Second, the trial court erred in its application of the Beattie
test when it concluded that the Property Owners raise a substantial
constitutional question in the form of a uniformity challenge to
provide the basis for equity jurisdiction.  Because the Property
Owners' challenge is to the manner in which the Taxing Authorities
apply (or in the case refuse to apply) the Administrative Code and
Board Rule, the Board is the proper authority to hear the
assessment appeal as provided in the Assessment Law.

For the aforementioned reasons, Judge Cannon concludes that the
trial court properly dismissed Property Owners' complaint.
Accordingly, she affirmed on other grounds the trial court's order
to dismiss the complaint as set forth in her Opinion.  Judge Wojcik
did not participate in the decision of the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 14, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/6ZwBvO from Leagle.com.

Edward B. Friedman -- EBF@friedman-law.com -- Friedman & Friedman,
Adam Thomas Petrun -- atp@friedman-law.com -- Friedman & Friedman,
P.C., Mallory Olivia Peterson, Friedman & Friedman, P.C., for
Appellants, Joseph Nissim Martel and Ester Martel.

Ira Weiss -- iweiss@wbklegal.com -- Weiss Burkardt Kramer, LLC,
Megan Margaret Ott, Weiss Burkardt Kramer, LLC, for Appellee,
Pittsburgh Public Schools.

Lourdes M. Ridge, City of Pittsburgh Law Department, Lawrence
Henry Baumiller, City of Pittsburgh Law Department, for Appellee,
City of Pittsburgh.

David J. Montgomery, Allegheny County Board of Property Assessment
Appeals and Review, for Appellee, Allegheny County Board of
Property Assessment Appeals and Review.

Andrew Francis Szefi, Allegheny County Law Department, Lee Mauro
Dellecker, Allegheny County Law Department, for Appellee,
Allegheny
County.


AMERICAN HONDA: Amended Sched for Expert Discovery in Aberin Issued
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Lindsey Aberin, et al., Plaintiffs, v. American Honda
Motor Co., Inc., et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:16-cv-04384-JTS
(N.D. Cal.), Judge Jon S. Tigar of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, San Francisco Division, approved
the Amended Schedule for Expert Discovery and Briefing Related to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, filed with the Court on
July 16, 2019.

The Parties proposed an amended schedule to govern the litigation
through completion of briefing related to the Plaintiffs' Motion
for Class Certification.  The Pleadings closed on May 28, 2018,
when AHM filed its Answer to the Plaintiffs' Third Amended Class
Action Complaint.  The Court subsequently entered an order setting
the schedule for pretrial events through briefing related to the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification on Feb. 28, 2019, based
on a schedule proposed by the Parties, which set a June 14, 2019,
deadline for opening experts reports.

During the case management conference held June 12, 2019, the
Parties stipulated to the Plaintiffs having until June 28, 2019 to
submit their opening expert reports.  The Plaintiffs advised the
Court that they anticipated having four experts (which was
previously unknown to AHM), and the Parties advised the Court that
they would likely seek an amendment to the schedule to account for
the stipulated two-week extension.

On June 28, 2019, the Plaintiffs served reports from a proposed
economic expert, a proposed survey expert, and two proposed
technical experts.  On July 19, 2019, AHM sent Plaintiffs a
proposed extension to the expert discovery schedule.

On July 30, 2019, the Plaintiffs responded to AHM's proposed
extension and informed AHM that they wanted to reserve the right to
serve reply reports in response to AHM's rebuttal reports.  AHM has
no objection to the Plaintiff's request to serve reply reports,
provided that sufficient time is afforded for the Parties to take
depositions of, potentially, eight proposed expert witnesses (four
for the Plaintiffs, and up to four for AHM), all of which will
occur following the deadline for the Plaintiffs' reply reports.

After subtracting the two week extension already granted to the
Plaintiffs, the proposed schedule extends the Schedule of Pretrial
Events approved by the Court on Feb. 28, 2019, by approximately
three months, in order to: (a) provide AHM sufficient time to
prepare up to four rebuttal reports; (b) provide the Plaintiffs an
opportunity to prepare up to four reply reports; (c) provide both
Parties adequate time to prepare for and depose up to eight
proposed expert witnesses; and (d) account for Thanksgiving and the
winter holidays.

The Parties respectfully submit that the adjustment is warranted
due to the extension already granted to the Plaintiffs, the number
expert reports that will be served, and the related need to conduct
eight expert depositions.  Two of AHM's experts also have prior
work engagements that prevent them from being to work on the matter
until late August.

The Parties have also discussed whether, in the interest of
efficiency and possible resolution, it makes to hold an ADR session
in advance of briefing on class certification.  Contemporaneously
with their Stipulation, the Parties are filing a Fifth Amended
Stipulation and Proposed Order extending the deadline to hold a
private ADR session to Jan. 31, 2020.  The extension requested
herein by the Parties will afford the Parties sufficient time to
hold such an ADR session if they agree that such a session would be
beneficial at that time.

As neither Party wishes the other to suffer prejudice as a result
of not being able to address the issues on the merits, for good
cause shown, the Parties respectfully request that the following
amended schedule be approved by the Court:

     a. Opening of Expert Reports (June 28, 2019) - n/a

     b. Defendant's Rebuttal Reports (Sept. 13, 2019) - Oct. 25,
2019

     c. Plaintiff's Reply Reports (Nov. 15, 2019) - n/a

     d. Close of Expert Discovery (Oct. 4, 2019) - Jan. 10, 2020

     e. Motion for Class Certification (Oct. 25, 2019) - Feb. 7,
2020

     f. Class Certification Opposition (Dec. 6, 2019) - March 13,
2020

     g. Class Certification Reply (Jan. 10, 2020) - April 10, 2020

Finally, the Parties anticipate that any Daubert motions will be
submitted by AHM with their Class Certification Opposition and by
Plaintiffs with their Class Certification Reply.  Oppositions to
such motions, if any are filed, will be due within four weeks, with
any replies in further support due within three weeks thereafter.

The Parties respectfully request the Court enters the revised
schedule as set forth and for further relief the Court deems
proper.

Judge Tigar approved and so ordered.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 13, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/qQr0z6 from Leagle.com.

Yun-Fei Lou, Lindsey Aberin, Don Awtrey, John Kelly & Melissa
Yeung, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Shana E. Scarlett -- shanas@hbsslaw.com
-- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Catherine Gannon --
catherineg@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac
vice, Christopher A. Seeger -- cseeger@seegerweiss.com -- Seeger
Weiss LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel R. Leathers --
DLeathers@seegerweiss.com -- Seeger Weiss LLP, pro hac vice, David
Brian Fernandes-  dfernandes@baronbudd.com -- Baron & Budd, P.C.,
James E. Cecchi -- jcecchi@carellabyrne.com -- Carella Byrne
Cecchi
Olstein Brody & Agnello, P.C., James C. Shah -- jshah@sfmslaw.com
-- Shepherd Finkelman Miller & Shah, LLP, Lindsey H. Taylor,
Carella Byrne Cecchi Olstein Brody & Agnello, P.C., Mark Philip
Pifko -- mpifko@baronbudd.com -- Baron & Budd, P.C., Roland K.
Tellis -- rtellis@baronbudd.com -- Baron Budd, P.C., Scott Alan
George -- sgeorge@seegerweiss.com -- Seeger Weiss LLP, pro hac
vice, Stephen A. Weiss -- cseeger@seegerweiss.com -- Seeger Weiss
LLP & Steve W. Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice.

Jeff Aberin, Plaintiff, represented by Catherine Gannon, Hagens
Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Christopher A. Seeger, Seeger Weiss LLP,
pro hac vice, Stephen A. Weiss, Seeger Weiss LLP & Steve W.
Berman,
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice.

Joy Matza, Plaintiff, represented by Catherine Gannon, Hagens
Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Christopher A. Seeger, Seeger Weiss LLP,
pro hac vice, Scott Alan George , Seeger Weiss LLP, Stephen A.
Weiss, Seeger Weiss LLP & Steve W. Berman, Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice.

Charles Burgess, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Christopher A. Seeger
Seeger Weiss LLP, pro hac vice, Shana E. Scarlett, Hagens Berman
Sobol Shapiro LLP, Amanda M. Steiner, Terrell Marshall Law Group
PLLC, Catherine Gannon, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Daniel R.
Leathers, Seeger Weiss LLP, pro hac vice, David Brian Fernandes,
Baron & Budd, P.C., James E. Cecchi, Carella Byrne Cecchi Olstein
Brody & Agnello, P.C., James C. Shah, Shepherd Finkelman Miller &
Shah, LLP, Lindsey H. Taylor, Carella Byrne Cecchi Olstein Brody &
Agnello, P.C., Mark Philip Pifko, Baron & Budd, P.C., Roland K.
Tellis, Baron Budd, P.C., Scott Alan George, Seeger Weiss LLP, pro
hac vice, Stephen A. Weiss, Seeger Weiss LLP, Steve W. Berman,
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice & Toby James
Marshall, Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC, pro hac vice.

American Honda Motor Company, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Livia
M. Kiser -- lkiser@sidley.com -- King & Spalding LLP & Michael
Brian Shortnacy -- mshortnacy@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding LLP.


AMERIGAS PROPANE: Mahoney Files ADA Suit in Pennsylvania
--------------------------------------------------------
Amerigas Propane, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as John Mahoney, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Amerigas Propane, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-04427-JHS (E.D. Penn., Sept. 24, 2019).

AmeriGas Partners, L.P. is the largest retail propane distributor
in the United States based on the volume of propane gallons
distributed annually.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David S. Glanzberg, Esq.
   Glanzberg Tobia & Associates PC
   123 s. Broad Street Suite 1640
   Philadelphia, PA 19109
   Tel: (215) 981-5400
   Email: dglanzberg@aol.com



ANDREW J. DICK: Court Denies FDCPA Suit Dismissal
-------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of New
York issued a Decision and Order denying Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss in the case captioned TASHIA KNICKERBOCKER, BARBARA
WINSTEAD and CRAIG AUSTIN SIKES, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ANDREW J. DICK,
Defendant. No. 19-CV-6231-CJS. (W.D.N.Y.).

This Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) case is before the
Court on Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Plaintiffs filed what they labeled a class action complaint in this
Court alleging that defendant Andrew J. Dick, Esq., an attorney
practicing in Rochester, New York, is a debt collector pursuant to
the FDCPA and that he violated provisions of the FDCPA in the
course of collecting a debt owed to Clearview Farms, LLC. Defendant
contends that he does not meet the definition of a debt collector
in the FDCPA because he is in-house counsel for Clearview Farms,
LLC, and was acting as its agent to collect the debt allegedly owed
by Plaintiffs.

The general legal principles concerning motions under Rule 12(b)(6)
are well settled: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires
only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair
notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's
obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.
Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations
in the complaint are true even if doubtful in fact.

If Defendant is not a debt collector under the FDCPA, then
Plaintiffs' action is a nullity. Therefore, the Court will
concentrate on this legal argument. In doing so, the Court will
rely on the letters sent by Defendant to Plaintiffs. The letters
are specifically addressed in the complaint. Thus, although the
letters are not attached to the complaint, they are incorporated in
it by reference. Defense counsel has provided copies the twelve
letters.  

Each letter begins with this paragraph: I am in house counsel for
Clearview Farms LLC. Your past due account has been assigned to me
for collection and/or possible legal action. Each letter also
contains this demand: Upon immediate receipt of this letter, please
send full payment to Clearview Farms LLC to the above address. We
also accept Visa and Mastercard, with a 3% fee.

Notwithstanding Defendant's statements in the letters, Plaintiffs
argue that the Court is bound to accept as true their allegations
that Defendant is not an employee of Clearview Farms, LLC. They
argue:

Plaintiffs specifically allege that Mr. Dick regularly collects or
attempts to collect consumer debts owed or due or asserted to be
owed or due another, and that his primary business is debt
collection. Id.1 For the purposes of the motion to dismiss, the
Court should accept these allegations as true.

The FDCPA defines creditor and debt collector as follows: The term
creditor means any person who offers or extends credit creating a
debt or to whom a debt is owed, but such term does not include any
person to the extent that he receives an assignment or transfer of
a debt in default solely for the purpose of facilitating collection
of such debt for another.

The Court is persuaded that if Defendant here was acting as an
agent of the creditor, and did not misrepresent that he was
collecting a debt for a third party, then the FDCPA definition of
debt collector would not apply to him. However, Plaintiffs are
relying on an established principle in adjudicating a motion to
dismiss: The Court must accept the allegations in the complaint as
true.

Notwithstanding that enshrined principle, as with most rules there
is an exception.

Plaintiffs allege that Andrew J. Dick, Esq., is not an employee of
the creditor.  If that claim is true, then Plaintiffs are
essentially alleging that the letters were a ruse to avoid the
implications of the FDCPA and that Defendant disguised his debt
collection business by pretending to be acting merely as an agent
of the creditor. Plaintiffs' allegation in this respect is made on
information and belief, but the source of the information, and
basis for the belief, is not revealed in the complaint. Plaintiffs
merely state their opinion that Defendant is really in the debt
collection business and not acting as Clearview's agent.

Although the twelve letters here imply Defendant works for
Clearview Farms, LLC, as its in-house counsel, Plaintiffs' further
allegations in the complaint raise a question of fact concerning
that implication

In 2018, DEFENDANT filed at least forty (40) lawsuits in Monroe
County Supreme Court, virtually all of them asserting damages
against tenants of various residential property entities.  In 2018,
DEFENDANT filed several dozen lawsuits in Rochester City Court,
virtually all of them asserting damages against tenants of various
individual landlords and residential property entities.

Such factual allegations plausibly allege that Defendant was in the
business of collecting debts, and that his use of in-house counsel
letterhead was meant to avoid the implications of the FDCPA.

There is not a dispute that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that
Defendant failed to include necessary information required by the
FDCP. Plaintiffs' complaint is sufficient to withstand dismissal at
this stage and open the door to discovery on their claim that
Defendant is a debt collector and not actually employed by
Clearview Farms, LLC.

Defendant's application to dismiss the case for failure to state a
cause of action is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 16, 2019
Decision and Order is available at  https://tinyurl.com/y5co8oza
from Leagle.com.

Tashia Knickerbocker, Craig Austin Sikes, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated & Barbara Winstead,
Plaintiffs, represented by Alexander Jerome Douglas -
alex@lawroc.com - Douglas Firm, P.C.

Andrew J Dick, an individual, Defendant, represented by Ronald A.
Giller - rgiller@grsm.com - Gordon & Rees LLP & JoAnna M. Doherty -
gminkin@grsm.com - Gordon & Rees LLP.


AQUA METALS: Claims in Consolidated Class Securities Suit Narrowed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE AQUA METALS, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION, This
Document Relates To: ALL ACTIONS, Case No. 17-cv-07142-HSG (N.D.
Cal.), Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California granted in part and denied in
part (i) the Defendants' motion to dismiss the consolidated class
action complaint ("CCAC"), and (ii) the Plaintiff's motion to
strike exhibits for which the Defendants requested judicial notice
and incorporation by reference.

The case is a consolidated securities class action brought by
Plymouth County Retirement Association and Denis and Theresa
Taillefer's private company 1103371 Ontario Ltd. against Defendant
Aqua Metals and its co-founders Stephen R. Clarke, Thomas Murphy,
and Selwyn Mould.  In its consolidated class action complaint, Lead
Plaintiff Plymouth Group alleges violations of Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Sections 11 and 15
of the Securities Act of 1933.  Plymouth Group brings the
securities class action on behalf of investors who purchased or
otherwise acquired common stock of Aqua Metals between May 19, 2016
and Nov. 9, 2017, inclusive.

Aqua Metals is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in California.  Officer Defendants Stephen R. Clarke
(President, CEO, and Chairman of the Board), Thomas Murphy (CFO and
Director), and Selwyn Mould (COO) founded the Company to provide a
lower cost and environmentally-conscious alternative to lead-acid
battery ("LAB") recycling.  This alternative method involves a
process called "AquaRefining," in which Aqua Metals' proprietary
machines, modules with electrolyzer units, separate and recycle the
lead components in LABs.  The AquaRefining modules use
"electroplating" to continuously separate the lead from other
components, and through an electrolyte-chemical process the lead is
processed and digested to create pure lead.  This differs from
smelting, the traditional method of LAB recycling, in that it does
not require a high-temperature chemical reaction (which results in
significant emissions), thereby making AquaRefining more efficient
and non-polluting.

On May 19, 2016, at the beginning of the Class Period, Aqua Metals
announced its agreement with Interstate Batteries Systems
International, Inc., a leading battery recycler.  Interstate
Batteries agreed to supply more than a million automotive batteries
and other LABs to Aqua Metals as "feedstock" for the Company's
"AquaRefineries," the first of which was located in Nevada's
Tahoe-Reno Industrial Complex ("TRIC" or "Reno Plant").  In the
press release, Defendant Clarke commented that Interstate Business
is an ideal partner for them as they scale their business.  The
press release also announced that the AquaRefinery in TRIC was set
to open in July 2016.

Towards the end of the year, on Oct. 23, 2017 and Nov. 9, 2017, the
Company provided the market with an update on its plant's
operations.  The Plaintiff alleges that these two disclosures were
corrective disclosures. In the Oct. 23, 2017 press release, Aqua
Metals stated that it had a total of 15 AquaRefining modules
"on-site and in-place, with one to be shipped."  Aqua Metals
expected that all 16 modules would be installed and commissioned by
the end of the year 2017, and ramp up of AquaRefined lead
production is expected to continue through the fourth quarter of
2017 and into 2018.  However, the Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendants "admitted" they had only produced small quantities of
AquaRefined lead and the Company was purportedly still in the
process of trying to commission AquaRefining.  The Plaintiff claims
that on release of this news, the stock price declined 17.9%, from
$5.37 to $4.41.

At the end of the Class Period on Nov. 9, 2017 Aqua Metals issued
its third quarter corporate update and repeated updates similar to
those in the Oct. 23, 2017 press release.  Defendant Clarke was
quoted as saying that Aqua Metals had many challenges scaling their
operations on a commercial level, a topic the Defendants elaborated
on during the quarterly conference call that same day.  One such
challenge disclosed during the conference call was that the lead
produced by the modules was "sticky," meaning that in some cases,
manual assistance was required to separate the elements.  In
response to this news, the Plaintiff alleges that the Company's
stock price fell 20.8% over a period of three trading days, from
$3.79 to $3.

The crux of the Plaintiff's complaint is that the Defendants
allegedly made materially false and misleading statements and
failed to disclose problems Aqua Metals was having in ramping up
its lead recycling process.  Specifically, it alleges that the
Defendants concealed that the technology had not been successfully
tested in the California Testing Facilities, the Reno Plant was not
operating, the critical modules could not run for any length of
time and Aqua Metals had not commissioned its process,
commercialized AquaRefining or sold any AquaRefined lead during the
Class Period.  The Plaintiff also alleges that per confidential
witnesses ("CWs"), the May and August 2017 site visits were "dog
and pony shows carefully orchestrated to conceal" problems in the
AquaRefining process.

Pending before the Court is the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
CCAC.  In their motion to dismiss, the Defendants contend that the
CCAC should be dismissed because it violates the prohibition on
puzzle pleading.  They also argue that the Plaintiff fails to
satisfy the heightened pleading standard under the PSLRA, as the
CCAC fails to plead particularized facts showing any statement was
false when made and that the Defendants made the public statements
with scienter.

The Defendants request that the Court takes judicial notice of or
consider incorporated by reference the following 54 documents: (1)
SEC filings (Exs. 1-12); (2) press releases (Exs. 13-45); (3)
earnings calls transcripts (Exs. 46-53); and (4) an online article
(Ex. 54).

The Plaintiff filed a motion to strike, objecting to the
Defendants' request as to 46 of the 54 documents.  It also requests
that the Court takes judicial notice of four documents: (1) a
historical stock chart generated by Bloomberg; (2) Aqua Metals'
Aug. 8, 2018 press release; (3) Aqua Metals' Oct. 12, 2018 press
release; and (4) a Schedule 13D amendment filed with the SEC on May
16, 2017.

Judge Gilliam granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiff's
motion to strike.  He finds that the Defendants' Exhibits 1, 10-13,
22, 36-45, and 53-54 are not relevant to the Court's analysis.  He
also did not consider the eight additional documents the Defendants
offered in their opposition to to Plaintiff's motion to strike.
Therefore, he deneid as moot the Defendants' request as to those
exhibits.  Because he also does not consider the Plaintiff's
Exhibits A-D in resolving the Defendants' motion to dismiss, the
Judge denied as moot the Plaintiff's request for judicial notice.

Turning to the Defendants' motion to dismiss, the Judge finds that
because the Plaintiff's CCAC contains a myriad of purported false
statements with no specific explanation as to which specific
statement in the long blocks of text is alleged to be false or
misleading, the Plaintiff fails to meet the exacting pleading
requirements of the PSLRA.  Therefore, he granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b)
claim with leave to amend.  If the Plaintiff chooses to file an
amended complaint, the Plaintiff must identify and specify each
allegedly false or misleading statement, whether such statement is
alleged to be an affirmative misrepresentation or false or
misleading by omission, and describe why the specific statement was
materially false or misleading when made.  For any statements that
are alleged to be false or misleading by omission, the Plaintiff
must clearly specify what the omission is and why the omission is
material.  This must be done on a statement-by-statement basis.

The Judge denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) scheme liability claim.  He
finds that the Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the
Defendants intentionally engaged in a fraudulent scheme to conceal
material facts, thereby leading to the dissemination of untrue
statements about the commercial viability of the process.  This
alleged scheme went beyond the making of any alleged
misrepresentations and statements.

The Judge denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's
Section 20(a) control liability claim.  Given the Officer
Defendants' high-level positions (CEO, CFO, and COO) and the fact
that Defendants Clarke and Mould allegedly were direct participants
in the orchestration of the "dog and pony shows," the Judge finds
that the Plaintiff has sufficiently pled that the Officer
Defendants had the requisite control over Aqua Metals.

For the same reasons as discussed in his analysis of the
Plaintiff's Rule 10b-5(b) claim, the Judge finds that the
Plaintiff's puzzle pleading fails to fulfill the exacting pleading
requirements of the PSLRA, and granted the motion to dismiss as to
the Section 11 claim.5 See Section IV(A)(i), supra.

Finally, since the Plaintiff fails to allege a Section 11 claim
against the Defendants, the Section 15 claim must be dismissed.
The Plaintiff's claim under Section 15 of the Securities Act is
expressly premised on the Section 11 violation.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, Judge Gilliam granted in part
and denied in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss and the
Plaintiff's motion to strike.  He denied the Defendants' motion to
dismiss the Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) scheme liability
claim and Section 20(a) control person liability claim.  He granted
the motion to dismiss the Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5(b) false and
misleading statements claim, Section 11 claim, and Section 15
control person liability claim with leave to amend.

In amending, the Plaintiff is directed to comply with the standards
stated.  The Plaintiff should only replead its Section 11 and
Section 15 claims if it can, in good faith, allege a sufficient
basis for standing to pursue its Section 11 claim.  Any amended
complaint must be filed within 28 days of the date of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 14, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/5hxkdn from Leagle.com.

Arlis Hampton, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Henry Linehan --
clinehan@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP, Lesley
F. Portnoy -- lportnoy@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray
LLP, Lionel Z. Glancy -- lglancy@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay
& Murray LLP & Robert Vincent Prongay -- rprongay@glancylaw.com -
- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP.

Aqua Metals, Inc., Stephen R. Clarke, Thomas Murphy & Mark
Weinswig, Defendants, represented by Michael Ross Hogue --
hoguem@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig.

Ronald Ordway, Movant, represented by Laurence M. Rosen --
lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.

Andrew Singer, Movant, represented by Benjamin Heikali --
bheikali@faruqilaw.com -- Faruqi and Faruqi LLP.

Jesse L. Peterson, Movant, represented by Jennifer Pafiti --
jpafiti@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.

Paul Jordan, Movant, represented by Robert Vincent Prongay,
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP & Kano S. Sams, II --
esams@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP.

Plymouth County Group, Movant, represented by Aidan Chowning
Poppler -- cpoppler@bermantabacco.com -- Berman Tabacco, Kristin
J. Moody -- kmoody@bermantabacco.com -- Berman Tabacco, Nicole
Catherine Lavallee -- nlavallee@bermantabacco.com -- Berman
Tabacco & Rosemary M. Rivas -- rrivas@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky
LLP.


AT&T CORP: Bid to Strike Class Claims in Dorchester Suit Granted
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, County of Dorchester, South Carolina, and Town of
Summerville, South Carolina, Plaintiffs, v. AT&T Corp. and
Bellsouth Telecommunications, LLC, Defendants, Civil Action No.
2:18-2890-RMG (D. S.C.), Judge Richard Mark Gergel of the U.S.
District Court for the District of South Carolina, Charleston
Division, granted in part and denied in part the Defendants' joint
partial motion to dismiss the Complaint and to strike the class
allegations.

The 911 Act authorizes local governments, such as the Plaintiffs,
the County of Dorchester and the Town of Summerville, to adopt an
ordinance imposing monthly charges on telephone consumers in order
to fund local 911 call centers.  The Plaintiffs adopted such
ordinances.  The companies providing telephone service to consumers
in the jurisdiction bill the 911 charges to their consumers,
collect the charges from the consumers, and remit the amount to the
local government minus a 2% administrative fee.

In their class action Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that the
Defendants violate the 911 Act, among other claims, by
under-charging their consumers the 911 charge and, as a result,
under-remitting the charge to the Plaintiffs, which results in
inadequately funded 911 call centers and a potential public safety
concern.  They seek to enforce their implied private rights of
action under the 911 Act and bring claims for (i) violation of the
911 Act, (ii) breach of statutory duty imposed by the 911 Act,
(iii) breach of fiduciary duty imposed by the 911 Act, (iv)
negligence and negligence per se, (v) constructive fraud (all as to
the Plaintiffs and the class), and (vi) violation of the South
Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (as to the Plaintiffs only).
The Plaintiffs also seek a declaratory judgment, permanent
injunction and punitive damages (each as to the Plaintiffs and the
class).

Before the Court is the Defendants' joint partial motion to dismiss
the Complaint and to strike the class allegations.  The Defendants
first move to dismiss the Complaint's nine counts to the extent the
Plaintiffs allege that multiplex services must be billed in a
manner inconsistent with the plain language of S.C. Code Ann.
Section 23-47-50(A).  They also move to dismiss each of the nine
counts insofar as the allegations contradict the 911 Act's
50-charge cap, which they contend is expressly imposed on a
non-VoIP line.  The crux of the Defendants' two statutory
interpretation arguments is that the 911 Act does not obligate them
to charge, collect and remit the quantity, amount or volume that
the Plaintiffs claim they are required, but fail, to do.

Judge Gergel denied the Defendants' partial motion to dismiss the
Complaint.  To the extent the motion to dismiss is premised on the
Complaint's lack of detail concerning the amount of 911 charges the
Defendant[s] billed and remitted -- or should have -- and the
identities of customers, detailed factual allegations are not
required to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
Rather, accepting the facts alleged as true, the Complaint
plausibly pleads claims to the Rule 8 or Rule 9(b) standard.  

The Judge holds that the facts alleged as to counts one through
four are adequate to put the Defendants on fair notice of the
allegations and their factual foundations.  Count five is also
sufficiently pled in that the Plaintiffs allege the Defendants knew
or should have known their monthly remittance checks misstated the
appropriate amount charged, collected and remitted to the local
governments.  Taking the facts alleged as true and construed in a
light most favorable to the nonmoving parties, these allegations
are sufficient to plausibly state claims that survive the
Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs cannot as a matter of law
bring suit on behalf of the 44 other putative class members, which
are counties in South Carolina.  In response, the Plaintiffs rely
in part on the Court's 2013 order in Butts v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg.
Ass'n, granting a consent motion to certify a class of South
Carolina county personnel.

Even if a South Carolina county and town did have standing to bring
suit on behalf of other counties across the state, the Judge finds
that it is unclear that the Plaintiffs' purported class of 46
counties and one town would be sufficiently numerous or share
common questions of fact to be certified under Rule 23, including
in light of the Defendants' collection and remittance practices in
each class member county or town.  For these reasons, the
Defendants' motion to strike the class allegations, including
paragraphs 60 through 69 of the Complaint, is granted.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Gergel granted in part and denied
in part the Defendants' joint partial motion to dismiss the
Complaint and to strike its class action allegations.  The partial
motion to dismiss is denied and the motion to strike is granted.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 13, 2019 Order and Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/kNrdZx from Leagle.com.

County of Dorchester, South Carolina & Town of Summerville, South
Carolina, Plaintiffs, represented by Annie Elizabeth Kouba --
akouba@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice, Lance V. Oliver --
loliver@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice, Marlon E. Kimpson --
mkimpson@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice & Max N. Gruetzmacher --
mgruetzmacher@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice.

AT&T Corp & Bellsouth Telecommunications LLC, Defendants,
represented by Christy Ford Allen, Wills Massalon and Allen, David
Lawrence Schwarz -- dschwarz@kellogghansen.com -- Kellogg Hansen
Todd Figel and Frederick PLLC, pro hac vice, Kevin David Horvitz --
khorvitz@kellogghansen.com -- Kellogg Hansen Todd Figel and
Frederick PLLC, pro hac vice, Lillian Virginia Smith, Kellogg
Hansen Todd Figel and Frederick PLLC, pro hac vice & Scott Harris
Angstreich, Kellogg Huber Hansen Todd Evans and Figel, pro hac
vice.

County of Dorchester, South Carolina & Town of Summerville, South
Carolina, Plaintiffs, represented by Annie Elizabeth Kouba, Motley
Rice, Lance V. Oliver, Motley Rice, Marlon E. Kimpson, Motley Rice
& Max N. Gruetzmacher , Motley Rice.

AT&T Corp & Bellsouth Telecommunications LLC, Defendants,
represented by Christy Ford Allen, Wills Massalon and Allen, David
Lawrence Schwarz, Kellogg Hansen Todd Figel and Frederick PLLC, pro
hac vice, Kevin David Horvitz, Kellogg Hansen Todd Figel and
Frederick PLLC, pro hac vice, Lillian Virginia Smith, Kellogg
Hansen Todd Figel and Frederick PLLC, pro hac vice & Scott Harris
Angstreich, Kellogg Huber Hansen Todd Evans and Figel, pro hac
vice.


AUDIBLE INC: McKee Infringement Suit Settlement Has Final Approval
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, GRANT McKEE, ERIC WEBER, and MICHAEL ROGAWSKI,
individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. AUDIBLE, INC., Defendant, ERIC WEBER and BRYAN REES,
individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. AMAZON.COM, INC. and AMAZON SERVICES LLC,
Defendants, Case Nos. CV 17-1941-GW-Ex, CV 17-8868-GW-Ex (C.D.
Cal.), Judge George H. Wu of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California, Western Division, Los Angeles, (i)
granted final approval of the Stipulation of Class Action
Settlement and Release, and (ii) entered Final Judgment and order
of dismissal.

A Fairness Hearing was originally held before the Court on July 8,
2019 to consider whether the Settlement between the Parties
represents a fair, reasonable, and adequate compromise of these
consolidated action, and whether the requirements of certification
of a settlement class are met.  The Fairness Hearing was continued
on Aug. 8, 2019.  The Court thereafter adopted its written as its
final ruling.

Consistent with the Court's final ruling, and having considered the
evidence submitted and argued by the Parties, and having considered
all objections to the Settlement submitted by Settlement Class
Members, Judge Wu granted final approval of the Settlement and
entered Final Judgment and order of dismissal.

The Judge certified a Settlement Class in the Action consisting of
all individuals who fit within one or more of the following
definitions and who did not submit a valid opt out:

     a. Regular Member Class: all individual consumers of Audible
in the United States who, between March 10, 2013 and Aug. 17, 2018,
lost any unredeemed Paid Membership Credits.

     b. Gift Member Class: all individual consumers of Audible in
the United States who, between Aug. 11, 2011 and Aug. 17, 2018,
purchased or redeemed an Audible Gift Membership that resulted in
one or more unredeemed Audible gift membership credits being lost.

     c. Payment Card Class: all individual consumers of Audible in
the United States who, between March 10, 2013 and Aug. 17, 2018,
incurred charges from Audible to a credit or debit card other than
the card originally designated as the primary payment card for the
customer's Audible membership.

Upon entry of the Final Judgment, all the Settlement Class Members
will be bound by the Final Judgment.  The 47 persons who submitted
valid opt outs are identified in the Court's records, with their
names and contact information being kept in the Defendants'
business records, will not be bound by the Final Judgment.

The Plaintiffs' requests for service awards in the amounts of
$5,000 each are granted.  The Judge finds that such amounts are
reasonable under the circumstances and are in exchange for the
Plaintiffs' service to the class and for the broader release that
the Plaintiffs are giving to the Defendants.

The Plaintiffs' request for an award of attorneys' fees (inclusive
of costs) in the amount of $1.5 million will be the subject of
additional briefing, a future hearing, and a separate ruling.  The
Judge observes that the Section 25 of the Settlement states that
"approval of Class Counsel's Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and
Expenses will be considered separately by the Court from its
consideration of the overall fairness and adequacy of this
Settlement Agreement, and it is the Parties' intention that any
order with respect to this separate motion will not affect or delay
the approval of the Settlement Agreement, provided, however, that
in no event will Defendants be required to pay attorneys' fees,
costs, and expenses totaling more than $1.5 million in the
aggregate."  According to the Settlement itself, the Court's final
approval of the Settlement need not delay or be contingent upon the
Court's decision with respect to the Plaintiffs' request for
attorneys' fees and costs.

The Parties are ordered to consummate and perform the terms of the
Settlement.

The Judge dismissed the Action with prejudice and without costs to
any party except as provided for in the Settlement and in the Final
Judgment.

The Parties having so agreed, good cause appearing, and there being
no just reason for delay, the Judge directed that the Final
Judgment and order of dismissal with prejudice be and is entered as
a final and appealable order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 14, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/hMZ6oG from Leagle.com.

Grant McKee, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Taylor Fisse, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Eric Weber, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated & Michael Rogawski, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by
Jamin Samuel Soderstrom -- jamin@soderstromlawfirm.com --
Soderstrom Law PC.

Audible, Inc, Defendant, represented by Jedediah Wakefield --
jwakefield@fenwick.com -- Fenwick and West LLP, Armen Nercess
Nercessian -- anercessian@fenwick.com -- Fenwick and West LLP,
Matthew B. Becker -- mbecker@fenwick.com -- Fenwick and West LLP &
Todd Richard Gregorian, Fenwick and West LLP.


AVIS BUDGET: Court Grants Filing of TAC in Greenley
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to
Amend His Second Amended Complaint in the case captioned DAVID KENT
GREENLEY, individually and on behalf of all others similar
situated, Plaintiff, v. AVIS BUDGET GROUP, INC., a Delaware and New
Jersey corporation Defendant. Case No. 19-cv-00421-GPC-NLS.
(S.D.Cal.).

Plaintiff David Kent Greenley has moved for leave to amend his
second amended complaint against Defendant Avis Budget Group, Inc.

In this case, Greenley asserts that the addition of an explicit
claim for public injunctive relief would be responsive to Avis'
suggestions in its motion to compel arbitration that Plaintiff only
seeks private relief, that the a UCL claim would be necessary for
Plaintiff to seek public injunctive relief, and that Plaintiff's
proposed class is limited.

Plaintiff now proposes to amend his Third Amended Class Action
Complaint to: (1) add a new Third Cause of Action for violation of
the unlawful and unfair prongs of California's Unfair Competition
Law (2) explicitly seek public injunctive relief to the extent that
the assertion is required under the recent Enterprise decision and
(3) extend the class the class period by a year, to begin on
December 31, 2014, four years prior to the filing of the original
pleading, in accordance with the UCL's four year statute of
limitations.

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that,
after the initial period for amendments as of right, pleadings may
only be amended by leave of court, which the court shall freely
give when justice so requires. Courts commonly use four factors to
determine the propriety of a motion for leave to amend: bad faith,
undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of
amendment.  

Plaintiff argues that this Court should grant its motion for leave
to file an amended complaint because such motions are granted
liberally and because the amended Complaint would more clearly
assert a new cause of action as well as a plausible defense against
the compulsion of arbitration.
Defendant counters that Plaintiff's motion should be denied on
account of bad faith, undue delay, and futility.

Specifically, Defendant contends that Plaintiff's amendment would
be made in bad faith solely in an attempt to plead around a binding
contract containing an arbitration provision.  
The Court will address these arguments in turn.

Bad Faith and Undue Delay

The Ninth Circuit has previously found that bad faith exists where
the moving party intends to harass the non-moving party or
otherwise disrupt litigation. In other words, a party acts in bad
faith where, for example, the plaintiff merely is seeking to
prolong the litigation by adding new but baseless legal theories or
when plaintiffs attempt to use the amendment to change the
warrantlessly change the nature or venue of the case.  

Defendant postulates that Plaintiff's sole purpose in filing an
amended complaint before this Court is to attempt to plead around a
binding contract containing an arbitration agreement.

The Court finds no basis to conclude that a bad faith motive or
undue delay underlie Plaintiff's request to amend. It appears that
Plaintiff aims to amend the complaint to add an additional cause of
action, a UCL claim and make explicit his desire to seek public
injunctive relief. Plaintiff seeks to do so in response to a recent
Enterprise order granting a motion to compel in a similar case in
the Northern District of California, which was issued on June 11,
2019. Plaintiff's motion to amend was filed on July 3, 2019, just
days after Avis brought Enterprise to this Court's decision when it
filed its Reply brief on July 1, 2019.  

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to amend his Complaint to best
preserve his rights in light of recent precedent, the Court finds
that the proposed TACC is being offered for valid purposes and does
not cause undue delay.

Prejudice

Because Avis does not argue that it would suffer undue prejudice as
a result of Plaintiff's amendment and because the litigation is
still in the nascent pleading stages, the Court finds that there is
no showing of prejudice.

Futility

While Courts can freely grant leave to amend under Rule 15, the
Court may also deny leave for futility on a discretionary basis
when a proposed amendment lacks a cognizable legal basis.
Amendments can be considered futile when no set of facts can be
proved under the amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a
valid and sufficient claim or defense. Examples of futile
amendments include those that are duplicative of existing claims or
patently frivolous.

Denial of leave to amend for futility is rare since Courts
typically defer consideration on the merits until after an amended
pleading has been filed. Courts have liberally construed the
standard for leave to amend on the basis that parties' arguments
are better developed through a motion to dismiss or a motion to
compel. And when the parties' arguments are more completely formed,
Courts are better able to rule on the sufficiency of the
allegations presented. This Court surmises that denial of leave to
amend is even more remarkable and aberrant when Plaintiff has never
before sought leave from the Court to amend his Complaint.

Defendant proffers that leave to amend should be denied on futility
grounds because Plaintiff's amended claims would still be subject
to arbitration. Although Avis agrees that Plaintiff must
necessarily pursue a UCL claim in order to seek public injunctive
relief, Avis argues that Plaintiff cannot do so here because he
lacks standing. Specifically, Avis avers that Plaintiff cannot
demonstrate that he suffered an injury in fact as a result of the
alleged unfair practices by Defendant. According to Defendant, this
injury requirement requires a personal, individualized loss of
money or property in any nontrivial amount.

Avis argues that the proposed TACC offers no facts to support any
lost money or property, and as a result, Plaintiff's UCL claim must
fail.

Regardless of Plaintiff's amendments, Avis also argues that
Plaintiff is still bound to the arbitration agreement in the
parties' agreement. Specifically, Avis looks to the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Blair v. Rent-a-Center, Inc., 928 F.3d 819, 829 (9th
Cir. 2019) where the court held that arbitration of a public
injunction does not interfere with the bilateral nature of a
typical consumer agreement. Avis submits that the arbitration
clause at issue here similarly requires bilateral arbitration and
does not prohibit public injunctive relief. As such, Avis proposes
that the TACC does not change that arbitration is the appropriate
venue for this dispute.

These substantive and procedural arguments are better attacked by
opposition motions after the filing of an amended complaint.
Dismissal of these claims at this juncture in the context of
Plaintiff's request to amend prior to full briefing would be
premature. And given that Plaintiff's amendments are made in good
faith and would not cause undue delay prejudice the Court finds
that Defendants' futility arguments alone are premature and
insufficient to deny leave to amend.

Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a Third Amended Class Action
Complaint is GRANTED.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 16, 2019  Order
is available at  https://tinyurl.com/y6bmtxan from Leagle.com.

David Kent Greenley, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony J. DiRaimondo
, Rice Reuther Sullivan & Carroll, LLP, 3800 Howard Hughes Parkway,
Suite 1200, Las Vegas, NV 89169, pro hac vice, George Volney
Granade, II - ggranade@reesellp.com - Reese LLP & Michael R. Reese
-mreese@reesellp.com - Reese Richman LLP.

Avis Budget Group, Inc., a Delaware and New Jersey Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Anthony Stuart Newman -
anewman@reedsmith.com - Reed Smith & Jason Hazlewood
-jhazlewood@reedsmith.com - Reed Smith LLP, pro hac vice.


BARCLAYS BANK: Prasad Suit Asserts FDCPA Violation
--------------------------------------------------
RAJESHWAR PRASAD, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated Plaintiff, v. BARCLAYS BANK DELAWARE, SUTTELL &
HAMMER, A.P.C. and DOES 1 through 10 inclusive, Defendants, Case
No. 2:19-cv-08095 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 18, 2019) is an action for
damages brought by an individual consumer and on behalf of a class
for Defendants' violations of: (1) the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act; (2) the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act, which prohibits debt collectors from engaging in abusive,
deceptive and unfair practices and (3) California's Consumer Credit
Reporting Agency Act (CCRAA), which requires maximum accuracy with
regard to consumer credit reporting.

In March 2018, Defendant Suttell, on behalf of Defendant Barclays,
filed a lawsuit (case no. 18CHLC04394) in the Superior Court of
California, County of Los Angeles-Chatsworth Courthouse, against
Plaintiff to collect on an alleged debt. Plaintiff was confused and
became stressed and anxious about the lawsuit filed against him by
Defendants, as he was unaware of any debt he owed to Defendant
Barclays. As a result of Defendants' misrepresentations and
deceptive statements in its pleadings, Plaintiff was led to believe
that he was obligated to pay said debt. Plaintiff was left with no
other recourse than to defend himself in the lawsuit filed by
Defendants, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is a natural person residing in Los Angeles County,
California.

Defendant Suttell & Hammer, A.P.C. is a debt collector. Defendant
Barclays Bank Delaware's principal place of business is in the
state of Delaware .[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Amir J. Goldstein, Esq.
     The Law Offices of Amir J. Goldstein
     7304 Beverly Blvd., Suite 212,
     Los Angeles, CA 90036
     Phone: 323.937.0400
     Fax: 866.288.9194


BH MEDIA NEWS: Price Suit Asserts Sexual Harassment, Discrimination
-------------------------------------------------------------------
GAYLA PRICE, on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v. BH MEDIA NEWS & RECORD, BH MEDIA GROUP, INC., BERKSHIRE
HATHAWAY, INC., and KELLY YOUNG, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00960
(M.D. N.C., Sept. 18, 2019) is brought pursuant to the protections
against sexual harassment and discrimination in employment provided
by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Pay Act and
North Carolina's Equal Employment Practices Act.

Ms. Price seeks to remedy the sexual harassment, race and gender
discrimination and disparate pay that she suffered during her
employment at the Greensboro News & Record.

Plaintiff says she was repeatedly the victim of egregious sexual
harassment--specifically, close-up, indecent exposure of a male
coworker's genitalia--during her employment with the Greensboro
News & Record. The News & Record had been aware since 2014 that her
harasser, Defendant Kelly Young, was exposing himself to female
employees at the News & Record offices. Nothing was done, however,
to address his obscene conduct or to protect Ms. Price, and other
women at the News & Record. Defendant Young has since pled guilty
to indecent exposure charges brought by the Plaintiff and has been
committed to treatment for sexually deviant behavior.

Ms. Price, a former employee of the News & Record, brings this
action against her former employer, its parent companies and her
harasser, Kelly Young, to redress issues of sexual harassment, race
and sex discrimination, disparate pay, retaliation and wrongful
termination. Ms. Price also brings this collective action on behalf
of herself and other similarly situated female advertising sales
employees of BH Media Group, Inc. for widespread and systemic
discriminatory practices that have resulted in substantial pay
disparities for women sales associates at its 77 media properties
nationwide. In addition, Plaintiff asserts claims under North
Carolina law for wrongful termination of employment for opposing or
resisting criminal conduct, for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and against Defendant Young for simple assault, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff Gayla Price is a black, female who was employed by the
Greensboro News & Record in advertising sales positions from May
18, 2016 until she was wrongfully terminated by constructive
discharge on May 5, 2017.

BH Media News & Record is a North Carolina corporation with its
principal place of business in Greensboro, North Carolina.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Catharine E. Edwards, Esq.
     EDWARDS KIRBY, LLP
     3201 Glenwood Ave., Suite 100
     Raleigh, NC 27612
     Phone: (919) 780-5400
     Facsimile: (919) 800-3099
     Email: cedwards@edwardskirby.com


BLUE RAVEN: Naiman Sues Over Intrusive Telemarketing Practices
--------------------------------------------------------------
LOUIS NAIMAN, an individual, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. BLUE RAVEN SOLAR, LLC, a Utah
limited liability corporation; DOES I through X, inclusive; and ROE
CORPORATIONS I through X, inclusive, Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-01643-JAD-EJY (D. Nev., Sept. 18, 2019) seeks to enforce
the consumer-privacy provisions of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act, a federal statute enacted in 1991 in response to
widespread public outrage about the proliferation of intrusive,
nuisance telemarketing practices.

Mr. Naiman alleges that Blue Raven Solar, LLC commissioned
automated telemarketing calls to him and other putative class
members without their prior express written consent. Mr. Naiman and
putative class members never consented to receive these calls.
Because telemarketing campaigns generally place calls to hundreds
of thousands or even millions of potential customers en masse, Mr.
Naiman brings this action on behalf of a proposed nationwide class
of other persons who received illegal telemarketing calls from or
on behalf of Blue Raven Solar.

Plaintiff Louis Naiman currently resides in Nevada.

Blue Raven Solar engages in telemarketing to market its products
and services for installation in residences .[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Ogonna Brown, Esq.
     LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER CHRISTIE LLP
     3993 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 600
     Las Vegas, NV 89169
     Phone: 702.949.8200
     Fax: 702.949.8398
     Email: OBrown@lrrc.com

          - and -

     Brian K. Murphy, Esq.
     Jonathan P. Misny, Esq.
     Murray Murphy Moul + Basil LLP
     1114 Dublin Road
     Columbus, OH 43215
     Phone: 614.488.0400
     Fax: 614.488.0401
     Email: murphy@mmmb.com
            misny@mmmb.com


BUILD.COM INC: Conner Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
--------------------------------------------------------------
Build.com, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to
the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Mary
Conner, individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. Build.com, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-0cv-5417 (E.D. N.Y., Sept. 24, 2019).

Build.com is an online home improvement retailer and subsidiary of
Ferguson plc. It sells bathroom, kitchen and lighting hardware,
appliances and other supplies. The company is headquartered in
Chico, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Dan Shaked, Esq.
   Shaked Law Group, P.C.
   14 Harwood Court, Suite 415
   Scarsdale, NY 10583
   Tel: (917) 373-9128
   Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com




CAMINO NATURAL: Johnston Files Class Suit in Colorado
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Camino Natural
Resources, LLC. The case is styled as Trustee Betty Jean Johnston,
as trustee of the Betty Jean Johnston Trust, on behalf of itself
and on all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Camino Natural
Resources, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 71:19-cv-02742 (D. Colo., Sept.
25, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Contract: Other
filed pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.

Camino Natural Resources, LLC explores and develops deposits of
crude oil and natural gas. Camino Natural Resources serves
customers in the States of Colorado and Oklahoma.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Reagan Edward Bradford, Esq.
   Lanier Law Firm, P.C.
   431 West Main Street, Suite D
   Oklahoma City, OK 73102
   Tel: (405) 698-2770
   Fax: (405) 234-5506
   Email: Reagan.Bradford@LanierLawFirm.com


CARBON BLACK: VMware Merger Docs Misleading, Winkler Says
---------------------------------------------------------
BERNARD WINKLER, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. CARBON BLACK, INC., PATRICK  MORLEY,
JEFFREY FAGNAN, TOM KILLALEA, RONALD H. NORDIN, VANESSA PEGUEROS,
JOSEPH S. TIBBETTS, JR., JILL A. WARD, ANTHONY ZINGALE, CALISTOGA
MERGER CORP., and VMWARE, INC., the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-01704-UNA (D. Del., Sept. 11, 2019), alleges that Carbon
Black's Board of Directors violated Sections 14(e) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, arising out of the Board's attempt
to sell the Company to VMware, Inc. through its wholly-owned
subsidiary Calistoga Merger Corp.

The Defendants have violated the Exchange Act by causing a
materially incomplete and misleading Schedule 14D-9 Recommendation
Statement (Recommendation Statement) to be filed with the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission The Recommendation
Statement recommends that Carbon Black shareholders tender their
shares in favor of a proposed transaction whereby Carbon Black is
acquired by VMware.

The Proposed Transaction was first disclosed on August 22, 2019,
when Carbon Black and VMware announced that they had entered into a
definitive merger agreement pursuant to which VMware will acquire
all of the outstanding shares of common stock of Carbon Black for
$26.00 per share. The deal is valued at approximately $2.1 billion
and is expected to close by January 31, 2020.

The Recommendation Statement is materially incomplete and contains
misleading representations and information in violation of Sections
14(e) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act. Specifically, the
Recommendation Statement contains materially incomplete and
misleading information concerning the sales process, financial
projections prepared by Carbon Black management, and the financial
analyses conducted by Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, Carbon Black's
financial advisor.

The Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Defendants from taking any steps to
consummate the Proposed Transaction, including filing any amendment
to the Recommendation Statement, unless and until the material
information discussed below is included in any such amendment or
otherwise disseminated to Carbon Black's shareholders. In the event
the Proposed Transaction is consummated without the material
omissions being remedied, Plaintiff seeks to recover damages
resulting from the Defendants' violations, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 295-5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
          E-mail: bdl@rl-legal.com
                  gms@rl-legal.com

               - and -

          Shane T. Rowley, Esq.
          Danielle Rowland Lindahl, Esq.
          ROWLEY LAW PLLC
          50 Main Street, Suite 1000
          White Plains, NY 10606
          Telephone: (914) 400-1920
          Facsimile: (914) 301-3514

CITY OF TACOMA, WA: Dismissal of Simms w/o Prejudice Recommended
----------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge J. Richard Creatura of the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Washington, Tacoma, recommended the
dismissal without prejudice of the case, DANIEL JERIMIAH SIMMS,
Plaintiff, v. US BANKRUPTCY COURT CLERK FOR THE CITY OF TACOMA, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-5715 RBL-JRC (W.D. Wash.).

The matter is before the Court on the Plaintiff's motion for
voluntary dismissal.  The matter began as a proposed class action
complaint filed in cause number 3:19-cv-05475-RBL-JRC.  The
Plaintiff was a plaintiff in the proposed class action, and on July
31, 2019, the District Court entered an order severing the
Plaintiff's claims from those in Cause Number -05475.  The District
Court further ordered that the Clerk open an individual case, under
a new cause number, for the Plaintiff.

Pursuant to that Order, the Clerk opened the matter, docketed the
Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis, and directed
him to file a new proposed complaint in support of his in forma
pauperis application.  The Plaintiff now requests that the Court
dismisses the action without prejudice.  He has not filed a
proposed complaint in support of his in forma pauperis application
in the matter, and no Defendant has appeared.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), the Plaintiff
may voluntarily dismiss the matter.  Therefore, Magistrate Judge
Creatura recommended that the Plaintiff's motion for voluntary
dismissal be granted and that the matter be dismissed without
prejudice.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 72(b), the parties will have 14 days from service of the
Report and Recommendation to file written objections.  Failure to
file objections will result in a waiver of those objections for
purposes of de novo review by the district judge, and can result in
a result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of appeal.
Accommodating the time limit imposed by Rule 72(b), the Clerk is
directed to set the matter for consideration on Aug. 30, 2019 as
noted.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 14, 2019 Report and
Recommendation is available at https://is.gd/Fw4Ai5 from
Leagle.com.

Daniel Jerimiah Simms, Plaintiff, pro se.


CONOPCO, INC: Schulte "Pink Tax" Suit Moved to E.D. Missouri
------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Karen Schulte, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Conopco, Inc.,
doing business as: Unilever; Walgreen Co.; CVS Pharmacy, Inc.;
Walmart, Inc.; Target Corporation; Schnuck Markets, Inc.; Dierbergs
Markets, Inc.; and Does 1-10, the Defendants, Case No.
19JE-CC00486, was removed from 23rd Judicial Circuit - Jefferson
County, to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri (St. Louis) on Sept. 12, 2019. The Eastern District of
Missouri Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:19-cv-02547 to the
proceeding.

The lawsuit alleges gender-discriminatory pricing scheme in
relation to the collection of a so-called "Pink Tax," the price
difference for female-specific products or service compared to
those offered to men.

Schulte filed two lawsuit over Pink Tax in state court.  Both
lawsuits have been removed to the Federal District Court.

Conopco provides personal care products. The Company offers
perfumes, soaps, and shampoos, as well as food products. Unilever
serves customers worldwide.[BN]

Attorneys for Conopco, Inc. are:

          James Muehlberger, Esq.
          SHOOK AND HARDY, LLP
          2555 Grand Blvd.
          Kansas City, MO 64108
          Telephone: (816) 474-6550
          Facsimile: (816) 421-5547
          E-mail: jmuehlberger@shb.com

CONOPCO, INC: Schulte Gender-Discriminatory Pricing Suit Removed
----------------------------------------------------------------
KAREN SCHULTE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. CONOPCO, INC., d/b/a UNILEVER,
WALGREEN CO., CVS PHARMACY, INC. WALMART, INC., TARGET CORPORATION,
SCHNUCK MARKETS, INC., and DIERBERGS MARKETS, INC., and DOES 1
through 10, the Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-02546 (E.D. Mo., Sept.
12, 2019), alleges that Defendants violated the Missouri
Merchandising Practices Act in connection to their
gender-discriminatory pricing scheme which constitutes an illegal,
"unfair practice".

The lawsuit, originally filed in the 23rd Judicial Circuit -
Jefferson County, Case No. 19JE-CC00485 and later removed to the
Federal District Court, addresses a particularly pernicious example
of the so-called "Pink Tax", the price difference for
female-specific products or services compared with those offered to
men. Study after study has found that, women, on a systematic and
wide-spread basis, are charged more than men for what are
essentially the exact same products or services.

The gender-based price discrimination is indisputably harmful to
women, adding another layer to the wage inequality that women face,
ultimately making it harder for women to make ends meet.

According to the lawsuit, the State of California in 1994 estimated
that the average woman is charged an extra $1,351.00 per year,
simply for being a woman.
Those numbers have only increased over the last two decades.

Conopco provides personal care products. The Company offers
perfumes, soaps, and shampoos, as well as food products. Unilever
serves customers worldwide.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff are:

          Daniel F. Harvath, Esq.
          HARVATH LAW GROUP, LLC
          75 W. Lockwood, Suite No. 1
          Webster Groves, MO 63119
          Telephone: (314) 550-3717
          E-mail: dharvath@harvathlawgroup.com

CREDIT SUISSE: Court Dismisses Derivatives Pricing Antitrust Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued a Memorandum and Order granting Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss in the case captioned SONTERRA CAPITAL MASTER FUND LTD., et
al., Plaintiffs, v. CREDIT SUISSE GROUP AG, et al., Defendants. No.
15-Cv-871 (SHS). (S.D.N.Y.).

This action is but one in a series of cases in which investment
funds, financial services companies, and individuals accuse major
financial institutions of colluding to artificially impact
benchmark interest rates for a variety of currencies. Here,
plaintiffs bring a putative class action against large banks and
interdealer brokers for purportedly working together to manipulate
the prices of derivatives based on the Swiss franc London InterBank
Offered Rate (CHF LIBOR), a daily interest rate benchmark designed
to reflect the cost at which banks can borrow Swiss francs.

Defendants argue that dissolved plaintiffs lack both Article III
standing and capacity to sue. The APAs, according to defendants,
did not effectively transfer interests in this litigation's claims
to FLH, the real party in interest. Regardless of whether the
assignments were effective, defendants urge, Sonterra's lack of
Article III standing when it initially filed suit rendered this
action a legal nullity ab initio. Plaintiffs offer opposing
arguments at every step of defendants' analysis.

While the Court does not opine on the validity of the assignments
or plaintiffs' capacity to sue, the Court concurs that the original
plaintiffs' lack of constitutional standing constitutes a
jurisdictional defect that procedural devices cannot cure.

As Nonexistent Entities that Purportedly Assigned Away Their
Interests in this Litigation, Dissolved Plaintiffs Lack Article III
Standing

To have Article III standing, each plaintiff must have suffered a
concrete and particularized, actual or imminent injury-in-fact that
would likely be redressed by the relief requested. Initially, this
Court determined that plaintiffs had adequately pled standing with
regard to the purported CHF LIBOR manipulation. But that conclusion
was reached on the premise that Sonterra, FrontPoint plaintiffs,
and Hunter plaintiffs were live entities that retained their
interests in this litigation.

Dissolved plaintiffs now reveal in the SAC that they assigned all
relevant interests and rights to FLH.  Such dissolutions following
assignments of rights extinguished their claims against defendants
and deprived them of any interest in this litigation resulting in a
lack of redressable injury to support their Article III standing.
In parallel litigation, another court of this district similarly
found that Sonterra and some of the same FrontPoint plaintiffs
lacked standing to sue, even assuming the action's claims were
completely assigned as alleged, because they no longer had an
interest in the litigation.

Dissolved plaintiffs' response does not focus on refuting the
accusation that they lost, pre-suit, their potential to have
standing. Rather, dissolved plaintiffs maintain that FLH had sued
in their names in the original, first amended, and second amended
complaints.  

The SAC alleges that FLH had the right, power, and authority to sue
in dissolved plaintiffs' names.  Yet at no point in the complaint,
FAC, or SAC do plaintiffs give any indication that FLH is suing in
the name of a dissolved entity. Each of those pleadings is bereft
of any such statement. In fact, FLH is not even mentioned a single
time in the first two pleadings. The original complaint and the FAC
describe dissolved plaintiffs in the present tense, manifestly
attempting to give the impression that they existed.  

In sum, the Court concludes that dissolved plaintiffs not FLH
brought this action, and that they lack standing. Next, the Court
considers whether FLH, as the assumed assignee, may be substituted
into this action to pursue the claims deriving from dissolved
plaintiffs' injuries.

Substitution of FLH Is Constitutionally Impermissible Because
Procedural Means Cannot Confer Jurisdiction Upon the Court

The parties dispute whether dissolved plaintiffs completely
assigned the claims asserted in the SAC to FLH. Such a transfer of
ownership of the claims would be essential for FLH to have standing
to bring suit in dissolved plaintiffs' stead. Yet assuming arguendo
that these claims were effectively assigned to FLH an assumption
that is in considerable doubt FLH still may not be substituted into
this action.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a)(3), a court must
give a reasonable opportunity to substitute the real party of
interest into the litigation. A Rule 17(a) substitution of
plaintiffs should be liberally allowed under three conditions: (1)
the change is merely formal and in no way alters the original
complaint's factual allegations as to the events or the
participants (2) there was no indication that the attempted
assignments were undertaken in bad faith or in an effort to deceive
or prejudice the defendants and (3) there was no prejudice or
unfairness to defendants.   

Again, assuming these three conditions are satisfied another
assumption in question FLH may not be substituted into an action
over which the Court had, and continues to presently have, no
constitutional authority to adjudicate.

A plaintiff's Article III standing must be secure at the outset of
litigation to confer jurisdiction on a federal court. Where a court
lacks jurisdiction over an action at any stage in the litigation,
the case must be dismissed. Where no plaintiff had standing at a
lawsuit's filing, it was a nullity, and there was therefore no
lawsuit pending for the real party in interest to ratify, join, or
be substituted into under Rule 17(a)(3) or otherwise.

Courts' general rule of thumb has been to allow Rule 17
substitution to cure a standing defect when at least one party to
the suit had standing to assert at least one claim. In such a case,
following substitution, the action proceeds as if it had been
originally commenced by the real party in interest. However, where
no plaintiff has standing on even a single claim, there is no case
or controversy before the Court for it to even have jurisdiction to
entertain a motion under Rule 17.

Thus, at the start of this litigation, no plaintiff had Article III
standing and therefore this Court is unable to exercise its
adjudicatory authority. Accordingly, FLH cannot now invoke Rule 17
to confer jurisdiction where it did not originally exist.

Furthermore, contrary to plaintiffs' assertions, the Court could
not have gained subject matter jurisdiction when Divitto and later
Dennis and CalSTRS joined the suit. Those plaintiffs two natural
persons and a live entity would have Article III standing to
maintain this action had they originally sued. Fatally for
plaintiffs, however, they only joined the action by means of a
procedural mechanism: amended complaints.  

In conclusion, because Sonterra wound up and dissolved and was not
in existence when it brought this action in 2015, this suit was,
and remains, a legal nullity. No amendment or substitution can cure
this threshold jurisdictional defect, and thus dismissal is
mandatory.

Because Sonterra did not exist at the time of the original
complaint's filing, Sonterra lacked Article III standing to
initiate this litigation. Thus, the Court has never had subject
matter jurisdiction over this action a legal nullity. Even assuming
dissolved plaintiffs had properly assigned the claims in this suit
to FLH, the invocation of the procedural mechanisms of amendments
and substitutions may not generate jurisdiction from nothing. The
Court grants defendants' motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 16, 2019
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6ys6lv8
from Leagle.com.

Sonterra Capital Master Fund Ltd., on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christian
Levis - clevis@lowey.com - Lowey Dannenberg P.C., Geoffrey Milbank
Horn - ghorn@lowey.com - Lowey Dannenberg P.C., Peter Dexter St.
Phillip, Jr.-  
pstphillip@lowey.com - Lowey Dannenberg, P.C., Raymond Peter Girnys
-
rgirnys@lowey.com - Lowey Dannenberg, P.C., Vincent Briganti -
vbriganti@lowey.com - Lowey Dannenberg P.C., Benjamin Martin
Jaccarino -
BJaccarino@lshllp.com - Lovell Stewart Halebian Jacobson LLP,
Christopher Lovell - CLovell@lshllp.com - Lovell Stewart Halebian
Jacobson LLP, Roland Raymond St. Louis, III - rcohen@lowey.com -
Lowey Dannenberg P.C. & Sitso W. Bediako - sbediako@lowey.com -
Lowey Dannenberg P.C.

HG Holdings, Ltd., FrontPoint Healthcare Flagship Enhanced Fund,
L.P., HG Holdings II, Ltd., Hunter Global Investors Fund I, L.P.,
FrontPoint Healthcare Flagship Fund, L.P., Hunter Global Investors
Offshore Fund II, Ltd., FrontPoint Financial Services Fund, L.P.,
FrontPoint Healthcare Horizons Fund, L.P., Hunter Global Investors
Offshore Fund, Ltd., Hunter Global Investors Fund II, L.P., Hunter
Global Investors SRI Fund, Ltd., FrontPoint Utility and Energy
Fund, L.P., FrontPoint European Fund, L.P., FrontPoint Financial
Horizons Fund, L.P. & Frank Divitto, Plaintiffs, represented by
Vincent Briganti , Lowey Dannenberg P.C. & Geoffrey Milbank Horn ,
Lowey Dannenberg P.C.

Credit Suisse Group AG & Credit Suisse AG, Defendants, represented
by Adam Shawn Mintz -
amintz@cahill.com - Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP, Elai E. Katz -
ekatz@cahill.com - Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP, Herbert Scott
Washer - hwasher@cahill.com -Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP, Jason
Michael Hall - jhall@cahill.com - Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP &
Joel Laurence Kurtzberg - jkurtzberg@cahill.com - Cahill Gordon &
Reindel LLP.


DANONE US: Court Dismisses Andrade-Heymsfield Suit With Prejudice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EVLYN ANDRADE-HEYMSFIELD, SHANNON KAWLECKI, and PAMELA
PARRA, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. DANONE US, INC., Defendant, Case No.
19-cv-589-CAB-WVG (S.D. Cal.), Judge Cynthia Ann Bencivengo of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California granted
the Defendant's motion to dismiss the first amended complaint
("FAC").

Plaintiffs Andrade-Heymsfield, Kawlecki and Parra, on behalf of
themselves, and all others similarly situated, filed the operative
FAC in the putative consumer class action complaint against
Defendant Danone on May 24, 2019.  The FAC alleges violations of
the Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), Unfair Competition Law
("UCL"), False Advertising Law ("FAL"), and breaches of express and
implied warranties under California law.  The FAC also alleges
violations of New York's Unfair and Deceptive Business Practices
Law ("UDBP") and False Advertising Law, and breaches of express
warranties under New York law.

Danone markets, sells, and distributes its line of So Delicious
Coconut Milk in various flavors.  The FAC alleges that the Coconut
Milk's labels are deceptive, in violation of several federal and
California state food regulations.

Plaintiff Kawlecki alleges she purchased and consumed the
32-fluid-ounce and half-gallon sizes of the Coconut Milk in various
flavors as early as 2015 and as often as once per week from local
stores near Bakersfield, California.  At the time of purchase,
Kawlecki read and relied upon the statements on the Coconut Milk
labels.

Plaintiff Andrade-Heymsfield alleges she purchased and consumed
various flavors of the Coconut Milk approximately two to three
times from stores in Santee and El Cajon, California.  At the time
of purchase, Andrade-Heymsfield read and relied upon the "nutrition
in every sip" statement on the Coconut Milk labels.

Plaintiff Parra alleges she purchased and consumed the
32-fluid-ounce and half-gallon sizes of the Coconut Milk in various
flavors as often as twice per month from stores near Island Park,
New York.  At the time of purchase, Parra read and relied upon the
"Naturally Energizing," "Maximum Calcium Absorption," and
"nutrition in every sip" statements on the Coconut Milk labels.

The FAC alleges that the statements on the Coconut Milk were false
and misleading, and had the capacity, tendency, and likelihood to
confuse or confound the Plaintiffs and other consumers acting
reasonably (including the putative Class) because the Coconut Milk
is not healthful but instead its consumption increases the risk of
coronary heart disease, stroke, and other morbidity.  It also
alleges the Coconut Milk conveys a misleadingly simplistic and
incomplete picture of what's necessary to maintain healthy bones.

Plaintiffs Kawlecki and Andrade-Heymsfield, California residents,
bring the action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated in California, alleging violations of California law.
Plaintiff Parra, a New York resident, brings the action on behalf
of herself and all others similarly situated in New York, alleging
violations of New York law.

Danone now moves to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6).  

The Plaintiffs ask the Court to take judicial notice of five FDA
warning letters and an FDA guidance document.  Danone does not
oppose the Plaintiffs' request for judicial notice.  Accordingly,
the Court takes judicial notice of the Plaintiffs' exhibits.

As a threshold matter, Judge Bencivengo first addresses Danone's
contention that the Plaintiffs' lack standing to challenge label
and website statements that the Plaintiffs did not read or rely
upon when purchasing the Coconut Milk.  The Plaintiffs do not
oppose Danone's contention, arguing instead that these statements
are included for context.  They only allege to have read and relied
upon the "Naturally Energizing," "Maximum Calcium Absorption," and
"nutrition in every sip" statements.  Accordingly, the Plaintiffs
lack standing to bring claims on any label statements on the
Coconut Milk itself or statements on Danone's website that the
Plaintiffs never read or relied upon when purchasing the Coconut
Milk.

Danone contends Plaintiff Parra's New York claims are barred under
the Supreme Court's holding in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior
Court, because the Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over
Danone as to claims that have no connection to California.  Parra
contends that Bristol-Myers is distinguishable because it involved
a mass-tort action in which each plaintiff was a named plaintiff,
and that regardless of Bristol-Myers, the Court can exercise
general or pendent jurisdiction over Danone.

The Judge holds that personal jurisdiction does not exist over
Parra's claims.  She agrees with the line of cases that held
Bristol-Myers should apply where, as in the instant case,
non-resident class representatives assert state-law claims against
non-resident defendants on behalf of multistate classes as opposed
to a nationwide class.

Danone is headquartered in New York and incorporated in Delaware.
Consequently, only in an "exceptional case" could they be subject
to general jurisdiction in California.  The Judge holds that the
Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that this is an
exceptional case.  The Plaintiffs' allegations do not suffice to
meet the "so continuous and systematic as to render the foreign
corporation essentially at home in the forum State" standard that
the Supreme Court set out in and Bristol-Myers.  They are therefore
insufficient for general jurisdiction.

There also is no pendent personal jurisdiction over Danone for
Parra's claims.  The Judge finds that there is no federal claim
upon which the Plaintiffs can hook their state law claims to
trigger pendent personal jurisdiction.  Accordingly, Plaintiff
Parra's New York state law claims are dismissed for lack of
personal jurisdiction without prejudice to re-filing in an
appropriate jurisdiction.

Danone contends that the FAC does not identify the specific days,
let alone months, on which the Plaintiffs purchased the Coconut
Milk and the specific label statements viewed during each purchase.
It contends that some of the challenged label statements were
removed years ago and thus Danone cannot assess whether the
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

The Judge is not persuaded.  The Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient
time periods of their purchases, the specific products they
purchased, and the specific statements they read and relied upon
when purchasing the products to give Danone sufficient notice to
defend.  Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have satisfied the heightened
pleading requirements of Rule 9(b).

The Judge dismissed with prejudice the Plaintiffs' claim that the
"Maximum Calcium Absorption" statement is misleading because the
statement makes unauthorized "health" claims.  The "Maximum Calcium
Absorption" statement does not mention osteoporosis or any other
health-related condition.  Rather, it is a permissible
structure/function claim as permitted under the FDA's own guidance
to its regulations.

She also dismissed with prejudice the Plaintiffs' claim that the
"nutrition in every sip" statement is misleading because the
statement makes unauthorized "health" or "nutrient content" claims.
First, similar to the analysis for the "Maximum Calcium
Absorption" statement, the "nutrition in every sip" statement makes
permissible structure/function claims.  Second, the "nutrition in
every sip" statement is not made in connection with an explicit or
implicit claim or statement about a nutrient as required by the
regulation for implied nutrient content claims such as the cited
example, "healthy, contains 3 grams of fat."

The Judge further dismissed with prejudice the UCL, FAL, and CLRA
claims with respect to the "Naturally Energizing," "Maximum Calcium
Absorption," and "nutrition in every sip" statements.  She finds
that the Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly plead deception.
Common sense dictates that an overall healthful diet is also
necessary, and the Plaintiffs cannot claim deception on label
statements modeled on FDA guidance.

Finally, the Plaintiffs' contentions of breach of express and
implied warranty are all predicated on alleged promises of a
healthy product when that is not the case.  The phrases they allege
breach such warranties are permissible claims under FDA guidelines
and accurately describe the product.  The Plaintiffs have not
alleged sufficient facts to infer they suffered an injury that was
proximately caused by the alleged breach.  Therefore, the
Plaintiffs' claims for breach of express and implied warranty fail.
Even if the breach of implied warranty claim did not fail for the
reasons set forth, no exception to the privity requirement applies.
Accordingly, the Judge dismissed with prejudice the Plaintiffs'
claims for breach of express and implied warranty.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Bencivengo granted Danone's motion
to dismiss, dismissed the FAC with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 14, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/DUi49V from Leagle.com.

Evlyn Andrade-Heymsfield, on behalf of herself, all others
similarly situated, and the general public, Shannon Kawlecki &
Pamela Parra, Plaintiffs, represented by Paul K. Joseph --
paul@pauljosephlaw.com -- The Law Office of Paul K. Joseph, PC.

Danone US, Inc., Defendant, represented by Angela C. Agrusa --
angela.agrusa@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper LLP & Tamany Vinson Bentz
-- tamany.bentz@dlapiper.com -- Venable LLP.


DESE ENTERPRISE: Traynor Alleges Violation under ADA
----------------------------------------------------
Dese Enterprise Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Yaseen Traynor also known as: Yaseen Traylor other, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Dese
Enterprise Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-08890 (S.D. N.Y.,
Sept. 25, 2019).

Dese Enterprise, Inc. was founded in 2007. The Company's line of
business includes the retail sale of products by television,
catalog, and mail-order.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Russel Craig Weinrib, Esq.
   Stein Saks PLLC
   285 Passaic St., Suite 5
   Hakensack, NJ 07601
   Tel: (201) 282-6500
   Email: rweinrib@steinsakslegal.com



DR HORTON: Illegally Sends Marketing Texts, Davis Suit Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lauren Davis, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated v.
D.R. Horton Inc., Case No. 1:19-cv-01686-UNA (D. Del., Sept. 10,
2019), alleges that the Defendant routinely and systematically
violates the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by using an
automatic telephone dialing system to deliver non-emergency
advertisement and marketing text messages to telephone numbers
assigned to a cellular telephone service without prior express
written consent.

The Defendant is a home construction company incorporated in
Delaware and headquartered in Arlington, Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Blake A. Bennett, Esq.
          COOCH & TAYLOR P.A.
          1000 West Street, 10th Floor
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 984-3889
          E-mail: bbennett@coochtaylor.com

               - and -

          Aaron D. Radbil, Esq.
          GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC
          401 Congress Avenue, Suite 1540
          Austin, TX 78701
          Telephone: (512) 803-1578
          Facsimile: (561) 961-5684
          E-mail: aradbil@gdrlawfirm.com


EQUIFAX INFO: Claims vs. McGinley in Bruno Dismissed w/o Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DANIEL BRUNO, Individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES,
LLC; GENEVA FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.; MARK HASSAN; GENEVA MOTORS,
INC. d/b/a GENEVA FINANCIAL SERVICES, ROBERT McGINLEY, KAMIES
ELHOUTY, JOHN McGINLEY, ANDY MITCHELL, and REBS SUPPLY, INC. d/b/a
REBS MARKETING, INC., Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-00327-WBS-EFB
(E.D. Cal.), Judge William B. Shubb of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of California dismissed without prejudice all
claims against Defendant John McGinley.

Pursuant to a settlement of the class action and Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A), the Plaintiff and Mr. McGinley have
stipulated that all claims for relief in the action, as they
pertain to Mr. McGinley only, be dismissed without prejudice.
Their Stipulation of Dismissal will not affect the Plaintiff's
claims against any party other than Mr. McGinley.  The Plaintiff
and Mr. McGinley will bear their own costs, including attorneys'
fees, with respect to the claims dismissed thereby.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 13, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/vvGd3f from Leagle.com.

Daniel Bruno, Individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by James Louis Kohl --
jamesk.legal@gmail.com -- Law Offices Of James Louis Kohl & Joseph
Messer, Messer Strickler, Ltd., pro hac vice.


FAMILY SOLUTIONS: Court Excludes Out-Patients Clinicians in Class
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting in part and denying
in part Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the case
captioned Plaintiff Alicia Arends' Motion for Conditional
Certification Alicia Arends, et al., On behalf of herself and All
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Family Solutions of Ohio,
Inc., et al., Defendants. Case No. 1:18cv2017. (N.D. Ohio).

Plaintiff asserted violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act (OMFWA), as
well as claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Of
particular relevance herein, Plaintiff alleged Defendants violated
the FLSA by failing to pay for time worked that was not billable to
Medicaid or other health insurance.

Plaintiff sought to conditionally certify a class consisting of all
hourly employees who worked as providers for Family Solutions'
behavioral healthcare facilities during the three years preceding
the commencement of this action.

Plaintiffs argue conditional certification of these hourly
providers is warranted because the potential opt-ins were subject
to a unified policy of FLSA violations, all have FLSA claims
against Defendants arising out of that policy, and their claims are
unified by common theories of Defendants' statutory violations.  

Specifically, Plaintiffs maintain that these hourly providers were
subject to Defendants' company-wide policy that time spent on
non-billable matters, such as documentation responsibilities and
travel time would not be compensated absent supervisory approval.
Plaintiffs further assert that this policy was in force at each of
Defendants' five Ohio locations and applied to all of Family
Solutions' hourly employees.  

Defendants argue conditional certification should be denied because
Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege that they are similarly
situated to other members of the proposed class of providers, or
identify a common policy that is applicable to the proposed class.
They assert that Plaintiffs herein worked only as QMHSs and are,
therefore, not similarly situated to Out-Patient Clinicians because
these positions have different licensure and hiring requirements,
different job duties, and completely different tasks throughout the
day. Thus, Defendants maintain that any training regarding time
reporting that a QMHS may have received would necessarily be
different than the training for an employee in another position.

The Court finds Plaintiffs have satisfied the modest factual
showing necessary to demonstrate that they are similarly situated
to other QMHSs employed at Family Solutions' Ohio sites for
purposes of conditional certification. Plaintiffs have not,
however, satisfied their burden with respect to Family Solutions'
hourly Out-Patient Clinicians.

As a threshold matter, the Court finds Plaintiffs have identified a
common theory of Defendants' alleged statutory violations.
Plaintiffs Arends and Stephenson provide declarations, in which
both state that they were (1) employed as QMHSs; (2) instructed to
only put billable hours as a QMHS on their weekly time sheets (3)
paid only for services that were billable to health insurance and
(4) not paid for other non-billable necessary services such as
documentation, travel, time spent for appointment no-shows, and
administrative time.  

Defendants' argument that Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a common
theory of FLSA violations in light of the individualized nature of
training provided to hourly employees regarding time reporting, is
without merit.  

For the same reasons, the Court rejects Defendants' arguments that
conditional certification should be denied because Family Solutions
does not have a policy to only pay for time that is billable to
health insurance. Specifically, Defendants contest Plaintiffs'
characterization of the How to Complete Billing/Time Sheet document
and argue that the documents attached to the Motion show that
employees may, in fact, record non-billable time.

Again, this argument is premature as it would require the Court to
resolve factual disputes and/or make a merits determination.
Likewise, the Court rejects, at this time, Defendants' argument
that Plaintiff Arends would not adequately represent the class in
light of her short tenure and the fact that she last worked for
Family Solutions in 2017. Defendants' arguments are more
appropriately raised at the second stage of the certification
process, after the parties have had the opportunity for discovery
regarding these issues.

Accordingly, for all of the above reasons, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs' Declarations and the documentation discussed above are
sufficient to meet Plaintiffs' burden of making a modest factual
showing that Plaintiffs are similarly situated to QMHSs employed by
Family Solutions at its five Ohio sites.

The Court agrees with Defendants, however, that Plaintiffs have
failed to demonstrate that they are similarly situated to Family
Solutions' hourly Out-Patient Clinicians. Plaintiffs have not
submitted any Declarations from hourly Out-Patient Clinicians, nor
have they offered any factual basis for their assertion that hourly
Out-Patient Clinicians provided necessary services for which they
were not compensated on the grounds that such services were not
billable to health insurance.  

By contrast, the Complaint herein does not include hourly
Out-Patient Clinicians in the proposed class and, moreover, fails
to include any allegations that the pay policy at issue applied to
this category of employees. Additionally, the Declarations
submitted by Arends, Stephenson, and Graciani are ambiguous as to
whether they include hourly Out-Patient Clinicians in the first
instance and, in any event, provide no basis for the Court to
conclude the declarants have personal knowledge that hourly
Out-Patient Clinicians provided necessary services for which they
were not compensated under this policy.  

Accordingly, and for all the reason set forth above, Plaintiff's
Motion for Conditional Certification is granted in part and denied
in part, as follows.

Conditional certification is granted as to all current and former
employees who worked as Qualified Mental Health Specialists for
Family Solutions of Ohio, but is denied with respect to employees
who worked for Family Solutions as hourly Out-Patient Clinicians.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 16, 2019
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yxkvwsbb from Leagle.com.

Alicia Arends, On behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas A. Downie -
tom@chagrinlaw.com - & Scott D. Perlmuter - scott@tittlelawfirm.com
- Tittle & Perlmuter.

Family Solutions of Ohio, Inc., Prostar Management, Inc., John
Hopkins & Dawn Smith, Defendants, represented by David A. Campbell,
III – David.A.Campbell@lewisbrisbois.com - Lewis Brisbois
Bisgaard & Smith & Donald G. Slezak – Donald.Slezak
@lewisbrisbois.com Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith.


FASHIONABLE INC: Traynor Files Class Suit in New York
-----------------------------------------------------
Fashionable, Inc is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to
the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Yaseen
Traynor also known as: Yaseen Traylor other, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Fashionable, Inc,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-08855 (S.D. N.Y., Sept. 24, 2019).

Fashionable, Inc is an American retailer of women’s clothing and
accessories.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Russel Craig Weinrib, Esq.
   Stein Saks PLLC
   285 Passaic St., Suite 5
   Hakensack, NJ 07601
   Tel: (201) 282-6500
   Email: rweinrib@steinsakslegal.com


FINANCIAL RECOVERY: Kucur Files Class Suit in New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Financial Recovery
Services, Inc. The case is styled as Suleyman Kucur, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Financial Recovery Services, Inc. and LVNV Funding, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05453 (E.D. N.Y., Sept. 25, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Act.

Financial Recovery Services, Inc. provides debt collection
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David Michael Barshay, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza
   Ste 5th Floor
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 706-5055
   Email: dbarshay@bakersanders.com

     - and -

   Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 281-7601
   Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com




G4S SECURE: Bid to Strike Affirmative Defenses in Xiong Partly OK'd
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MAI KATY XIONG, an individual, Plaintiff, v. G4S
SECURE SOLUTIONS (USA) INC., a corporation, Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-00508-JAM-EFB (E.D. Cal.), Judge John A. Mendez of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of California granted in
part and denied in part the Plaintiff's motion to strike all of the
Defendant's affirmative defenses.

The Plaintiff brings the putative class action against G4S for
violating the California Labor Code by failing to compensate Xiong
for missed meal periods and failing to provide accurate wage
statements.  The Defendant filed an Answer which asserts 33
affirmative defenses.

The Plaintiff moves to strike all of the Defendant's affirmative
defenses.  The Plaintiff argues all 33 of the Defendant's
affirmative defenses are conclusory and should be stricken for
failure to afford fair notice.

Judge Mendez finds that affirmative defenses 10, 12, 17, 18, 21,
22, 30, and 31 meet the fair notice standard and the motion to
strike these affirmative defense is denied.  However, he agrees
that the remaining affirmative defenses are lacking in factual
detail and do nothing more than identify and state, in general
terms, the legal defense itself without providing notice of the
grounds upon which the defense rests.  Thus, the motion to strike
affirmative defenses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16,
19 and 32 is granted, with leave to amend.  For the same reasons,
the motion to strike affirmative defenses 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27,
28, and 29 as insufficiently pleaded is granted, but leave to amend
these defenses would be futile because they are also insufficient
as a matter of law.

The Plaintiff argues 19 of the 33 affirmative defenses are
deficient as a matter of law.  Xiong brings claims for missed meal
periods and inaccurate itemized wage statements.  Given the causes
of action, and considering the allegations presented in the
Complaint, the Judge finds that affirmative defenses 3, 4, 6, 7, 8,
13, 14, 15, and 16 lack merit under any set of facts G4S might
allege, and the motion to strike these defenses as legally
insufficient is therefore granted.  Nevertheless, because the
Defendant may be able to elucidate the legal sufficiency of these
defenses, he grants leave to amend.  On the other hand, he finds
that affirmative defenses 5 and 17 are not insufficient as a matter
of law and the motion to strike those defenses on that ground is
denied.

Affirmative defenses 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 are less
defenses to the causes of action than denials of the Complaint's
class allegations.  The appropriate manner to raise these arguments
is in the context of a motion for class certification and G4S will
be permitted to do so.  Thus, the motion to strike affirmative
defenses 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 is granted without
leave to amend.

In affirmative defense 33, G4S seeks to reserve the right to assert
other affirmative defenses should the need arise.  However, because
a mere 'reservation of affirmative defenses' is not an affirmative
defense, the motion to strike affirmative defense 33 is granted
without leave to amend.  The Judge recognizes that G4S has not had
the benefit of full discovery and may not yet know all applicable
affirmative defenses, but Rule 15 provides G4S the procedural
mechanism to amend its pleading should the need arise.

The Court issued its Order re Filing Requirements on March 22,
2019.  The Filing Order limits memoranda in support of and in
opposition to motions to strike to 15 pages.  The Filing Order also
states that an attorney who exceeds the page limits must pay
monetary sanctions of $50 per page.  The Plaintiff's moving brief
exceeds the page limit by two pages.  The Defendant's opposition
brief exceeds the page limit by three pages.  The Judge therefore
ordered (1) the Plaintiff's counsel to pay $100 to the Clerk of the
Court within five days of the date of the Order and (2) the
Defendant's counsel to pay $150 to the Clerk of the Court within
five days of the date of the Order.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Mendez granted in part and denied
in part the Plaintiff's Motion.  He (i) denied the motion to strike
affirmative defenses 10, 12, 17, 18, 21, 22, 30, and 31 as
insufficiently pleaded; (ii) denied the motion to strike
affirmative defenses 5 and 17 as legally insufficient; (iii)
granted the motion to strike affirmative defenses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, and 32 as insufficiently pleaded,
with leave to amend; (iv) granted the motion to strike affirmative
defenses 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, and 16 as legally insufficient,
with leave to amend; and (v) granted the motion to strike
affirmative defenses 20, 23, 24, 25, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 33 as
legally insufficient, without leave to amend.  If the Defendant
elects to amend its answer at this stage of the litigation, it will
file an Amended Answer within 20 days of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 14, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/PNX1C8 from Leagle.com.

Mai Katy Xiong, Plaintiff, represented by John Paul Briscoe --
jbriscoe@mayallaw.com -- Mayall Hurley, P.C., Rachael Allgaier,
Mayall Hurley PC & Robert Joshua Wasserman --
rwasserman@mayallaw.com -- Mayall Hurley, P.C.

G4S Secure Solutions (USA) Inc., Defendant, represented by Linh Hua
-- lhua@grsm.com -- Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP & Nadejda
Sokolova -- nsokolova@grsm.com -- Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani.


G4S SECURE: California Court Denies Bid to Stay Xiong Labor Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge John A. Mendez of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California denied the Defendant's motion to stay the
case, MAI KATY XIONG, an individual, Plaintiff, v. G4S SECURE
SOLUTIONS (USA) INC., a corporation, Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-00508-JAM-EFB (E.D. Cal.), in light of allegedly
duplicative pending state court proceedings.

The Plaintiff brings the putative class action against G4S for
violating the California Labor Code by failing to compensate Xiong
for missed meal periods and failing to provide accurate wage
statements.  Xiong, a resident of California, has worked for G4S as
an hourly-paid Security Officer at Doctors' Hospital Manteca since
November 2018.  Xiong, who often works in the hospital's emergency
room, alleges she has been regularly denied timely meal periods and
has not been paid the required hour of "premium pay" for these
missed meal periods.  She further alleges that G4S has issued wage
statements which did not accurately show employees' number of
regular hours worked, overtime hourly rates, gross wages earned,
and net wages earned.

On March 22, 2019, Xiong filed the Complaint against G4S, alleging
individual claims for failure to provide meal periods or pay
premiums and class claims for failure to furnish accurate itemized
wage statements.  She brings the wage statement claims on behalf of
a class of all individuals who are currently employed or were
formerly employed by G4S in California and to whom G4S furnished at
least one wage statement in relation to a pay period in which the
individual was paid overtime and the overtime hourly rate and/or
amount of regular hours worked are shown incorrectly, from one year
prior to the filing of his Complaint and continuing to the date as
determined by the Court.

On Sept. 17, 2018, former G4S employee Monet Sterling filed a
representative PAGA action against G4S in Los Angeles County
Superior Court alleging G4S failed to provide employees mandatory
meal and rest breaks or compensation in lieu of such breaks, failed
to pay employees all final wages due at termination, and failed to
provide employees with accurate itemized wage statements.

On Feb. 5, 2019, former G4S employee Brian Pettee filed a class
action suit in Los Angeles County Superior Court alleging G4S
failed to pay overtime wages, failed to pay minimum wages, failed
to provide meal and rest breaks or compensation in lieu of such
breaks, failed to pay employees all final wages due at termination,
failed to provide employees with accurate itemized wage statements,
violated PAGA, and violated California's unfair competition law.  
In that action, Pettee seeks to represent a class of "All
individuals who worked for the Defendants in state of California as
a non-exempt, hourly-paid on-site Security Guard Supervisors at any
time during the period from four years prior to the filing of the
Complaint until the date of certification.

G4S moves to stay the federal case pursuant to the decision in
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, arguing
the claims presented in the case are duplicative or substantially
similar to those presented in the two California state court
actions.  Xiong opposes the motion.

Judge Mendez agrees that some factors favor a stay, including that
the state court obtained jurisdiction first, state law will provide
the rule of decision, and a stay may help avoid piecemeal
litigation.  But, crucially, a resolution of the Sterling and
Pettee actions may not completely resolve the instant case.  That
the state actions and federal action have overlapping claims and
seek similar statutory penalties does not mean the adjudication of
the state actions will fully resolve the federal action.

For example, the Pettee action involves a putative class of
Security Guard Supervisors, but that class is underinclusive as to
the action: Xiong was not a supervisor and thus is not a member of
the putative class for whom a judgment will be rendered nor would a
decision on the Security Guard Supervisor class cover the entirety
of Xiong's proposed class of former G4S employees.  Similarly, a
full decision in the Sterling action would not resolve Xiong's
individual claim that G4S regularly denied her, in particular,
timely meal periods and did not compensate her for these missed
meal periods.  Abstention under Colorado River is therefore
precluded.

Separately, the Judge is not persuaded by the Defendant's arguments
that the Court should exercise its inherent power to stay the
case.

For these reasons, Judge Mendez denied the Defendant's Motion to
Stay.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 14, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/WHvWmv from Leagle.com.

Mai Katy Xiong, Plaintiff, represented by John Paul Briscoe --
jbriscoe@mayallaw.com -- Mayall Hurley, P.C., Rachael Allgaier,
Mayall Hurley PC & Robert Joshua Wasserman --
rwasserman@mayallaw.com -- Mayall Hurley, P.C.

G4S Secure Solutions (USA) Inc., Defendant, represented by Linh Hua
-- lhua@grsm.com -- Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP & Nadejda
Sokolova -- nsokolova@grsm.com -- Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani.


GEICO INDEMNITY: Randy Rosenberg Remanded to State Court
--------------------------------------------------------
Judge Beth Bloom of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida remanded the case, RANDY ROSENBERG, D.C., P.A.,
a/a/o Dorothy Johnson and Tina Scott, on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY,
and GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants, Case No.
19-cv-61421-BLOOM/Valle (S.D. Fla.), to the Circuit Court of the
Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County.

The Plaintiff brings class claims for declaratory relief against
the Defendants, alleging that the Defendants have a wide-spread
practice of improperly paying personal injury protection ("PIP")
claims at a reduced amount.  The Plaintiff challenges the
Defendants' interpretation of a specific endorsement to one of
their automobile policies, FLPIP (01-13).  The endorsement included
the following language: A charge submitted by a provider, for an
amount less than the amount allowed above, will be paid in the
amount of the charge submitted.

According to the Complaint, Tina Scott was insured under an
automobile insurance policy with GIC and Dorothy Johnson was
insured under an automobile insurance policy with Government.  They
were each involved in motor vehicle accidents while insured.  The
Plaintiff is a health care provider who provided medical care
through an assignment of benefits to Johnson and Scott for injuries
sustained in the motor vehicle accidents.  The Complaint lists two
charges for medical services to Scott and three charges for medical
services to Johnson for which Plaintiff submitted claims to the
respective Defendant.

The five charges listed in the Complaint were in amounts less than
the amount permitted by a permissive fee schedule in the Florida
PIP Statute, Section 627.736, Florida Statutes.  For each charge
that was below the fee schedule amount the Defendants reimbursed
the Plaintiff for 80% of the billed amount and provided an
Explanation of Review ("EOR") that contained the code "BA."  The BA
code indicated that the Defendants reduced reimbursement of the
charge to 80% of the billed amount.  The Plaintiff believes that
the language in the endorsement required full payment of bills for
an amount that was less than the fee schedule, as opposed to only
80% of the amount billed.  The Defendants have taken a contrary
position.

The case was originally filed in federal court on March 16, 2018.
The case was transferred to the Court because it was found to be
substantially related to A&M Gerber Chiropractic, LLC a/a/o Conor
Carruthers, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated,
v. GEICO General Insurance Company, Case No.
16-cv-62610-BLOOM/Valle.  The Court, sua sponte, issued an order
staying the Initial Action pending appellate review of an order in
Gerber granting summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff.

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion in Gerber,
holding that the insured in that case lacked a potential future
injury sufficient to confer the Plaintiff with Article III
standing.  It reversed the Court's final judgment with instruction
to the Court to remand the case to state court.  The parties to the
Initial Action then entered into a stipulation that the Initial
Action should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under Rule 12(b)(1).  The Court approved and adopted the
stipulation.

After dismissal of the Initial Action, on April 26, 2019, the
Plaintiff filed the almost identical claim in the Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida under the
Florida Declaratory Judgment Act.  The Defendants filed a Notice of
Removal on June 6, 2019, relying on the Class Action Fairness Act
("CAFA"), asserting that the case is a putative class action with
more than 100 putative class members that are seeking to recover in
excess of $5 million in the aggregate, and there is minimal
diversity.  The instant Motion for Remand then followed.

In the Motion for Remand, the Plaintiff argues that the Complaint
does not assert an injury-in-fact sufficient to confer federal
court jurisdiction.  The Plaintiff relies on the Gerber Opinion,
holding on similar facts and allegations that the plaintiff failed
to allege a potential future injury sufficient to confer Article
III standing.  The Defendants counter that the Gerber Opinion is
non-final and subject to withdrawal or amendment because the
Defendant-Appellant in that case filed a motion for rehearing on
June 19, 2019.  They also argue that the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction because the CAFA requirements are met.  Finally, the
Defendants contend that remanding this action would violate the
rule against splitting causes of actions.

Judge Bloom holds that at this stage, there are insufficient facts
are not before the Court from which she could determine that Scott
and Johnson were paid more than they were entitled to under their
insurance policies.  However, the black letter law in the Gerber
Opinion and the reasoning in the concurring opinion apply equally
to the instant case.

Thee Plaintiff has no interest in any future relief that the Court
could provide.  As in Gerber, the Judge finds that the Plaintiff
alleges no potential future injury.  In the Gerber Opinion the
Eleventh Circuit considered the possibility that the assignor may
someday be in another car accident; sustain an injury entitling him
to PIP benefits; and still be insured by the defendant under the
same or a similar policy being interpreted the same way, thereby
having this issue present itself again.  The Eleventh Circuit found
that possibility to be "too contingent to constitute a 'substantial
likelihood' of future injury."  It is in the instant case as well.

The Defendants' emphasis on satisfaction of the CAFA requirements
is misplaced.  The Judge finds that the Defendants correctly note
that CAFA expanded considerably the subject matter jurisdiction of
the federal courts over class actions that meet certain minimal
requirements.  Subject matter jurisdiction is triggered where CAFA
jurisdictional requirements are met, but CAFA in no way negates the
Article III standing requirement under the United States
Constitution.  Standing is perhaps the most important
jurisdictional doctrine, and, as with any jurisdictional requisite,
the Court is powerless to hear a case when it is lacking.

Nor is the Judge persuaded by the Defendants' argument that remand
is unwarranted because the Plaintiff has violated the rule against
splitting causes of actions.  The Defendants rely on one case,
Bowman v. Coddington, in which the plaintiff first filed suit in
Florida state court on various state law grounds and then filed
suit for declaratory relief in federal court against the same
defendants based on the same underlying facts and issues.  The
district court dismissed the second suit finding that the plaintiff
improperly split his causes of action by maintaining both suits at
the same time.  On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal, finding that the federal court and
state court suits arise out of the same wrongful acts and reasoning
that the plaintiff has not explained why he cannot obtain the
declaratory relief he seeks in state court.  Bowman is inapposite
because the Defendants have not identified an action brought by the
same Plaintiff against the same Defendants arising out of the same
wrongful acts as the instant action.

Having concluded that the Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue the
case, the Judge holds that remand is the appropriate remedy.
Accordingly, she granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Remand, and
remanded the case to the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial
Circuit in and for Broward County.  The Clerk of Court is directed
to close the case.  To the extent not otherwise disposed of, any
scheduled hearings are cancelled, all pending motions are denied as
moot, and all deadlines are terminated.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 13, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/xwx3zj from Leagle.com.

Randy Rosenberg, D.C., P.A., a/a/o Dorothy Johnson and Tina Scott,
on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
represented by Edward Herbert Zebersky -- ezebersky@zpllp.com --
Zebersky Payne, LLP, Mark S. Fistos, Zebersky Payne LLP & Michael
Trent Lewenz -- mlewenz@zpllp.com -- Zebersky Payne LLP.

GEICO Indemnity Company & Government Employees Insurance Company,
Defendants, represented by Peter David Weinstein --
peter.weinstein@csklegal.com -- Cole Scott Kissane PA & Thomas Lee
Hunker -- thomas.hunker@csklegal.com -- Cole, Scott & Kissane,
P.A..


GENOMIC HEALTH: Plumley Says Exact Sciences Merger Docs Misleading
------------------------------------------------------------------
The case, PATRICK PLUMLEY, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. GENOMIC HEALTH, INC., JULIAN
BAKER, FELIX BAKER, FRED COHEN, BARRY P. FLANNELLY, HENRY J. FUCHS,
GINGER L. GRAHAM, GEOFFREY M. PARKER, KIMBERLY POPOVITS, EXACT
SCIENCES CORPORATION, and SPRING ACQUISITION CORP., the Defendants,
Case No. 1:19-cv-01719-UNA (D. Del., Sept. 12, 2019), stems from a
proposed transaction announced on July 29, 2019, pursuant to which
Genomic Health, Inc. will be acquired by Exact Sciences Corporation
and Spring Acquisition Corp.

On July 28, 2019, Genomic's Board of Directors caused the Company
to enter into an agreement and plan of merger with Exact Sciences.
Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, Genomic's
stockholders will receive $27.50 in cash and $44.50 in shares of
Parent stock for each share of Genomic common stock they own.

On August 30, 2019, the Defendants filed a Form S-4 Registration
Statement with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
in connection with the Proposed Transaction.

The Registration Statement omits material information with respect
to the Proposed Transaction, which renders the Registration
Statement false and misleading.

First, the Registration Statement omits material information
regarding the Company's and Parent's financial projections. With
respect to the Company's financial projections, the Registration
Statement fails to disclose: (i) all line items used to calculate
EBITDA and EBIT; and (ii) a reconciliation of all non-GAAP to GAAP
metric.

Second, the Registration Statement omits material information
regarding the analyses performed by the Company's financial advisor
in connection with the Proposed Transaction, Goldman Sachs & Co.
LLC, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 295-5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
          E-mail: bdl@rl-legal.com
                  gms@rl-legal.com

               - and -

          Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
          RM LAW, P.C.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (484) 324-6800
          Facsimile: (484) 631-1305
          E-mail: rm@maniskas.com

GRIFFIN, GA: Myers Files Class Suit in Georgia
----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Darrell Dix. The case
is styled as William Myers and Timothy Long, on behalf of
themselves and a class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs v.
Darrell Dix, Vickie Massengale-Clift and John or Jane Does #1-3,
Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-00129-TCB-RGV (N.D. Ga., Sept. 24,
2019).

The case type is stated as Civil Rights: Other.

The Defendants are individuals acting their official capacity as
officers in the Spalding County Sheriff's Office is located in
Griffin, Georgia.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

   Mark Andrew Begnaud, Esq.
   Horsley Begnaud, LLC
   Building 12, Suite 300
   750 Hammond Drive
   Atlanta, GA 30328
   Tel: (770) 765-5559
   Email: mbegnaud@gacivilrights.com


HALLIBURTON ENERGY: Denial of Fishermen's HESI Deals Claims Upheld
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: DEEPWATER HORIZON. LAKE EUGENIE LAND &
DEVELOPMENT, INCORPORATED; ET AL, Plaintiffs, v. HALLIBURTON ENERGY
SERVICES, INCORPORATED; TRANSOCEAN HOLDINGS, L.L.C.,
Defendants-Appellees, v. JULIUS BARBOUR; EDWARD BARNHILL, JR.;
EDWARD BARNHILL, SR.; KAREN BARNHILL; SCOTT BLACK; ET AL,
Movants-Appellants. JOHN M. PETITJEAN, individually and on behalf
of a putative class; ET AL, Plaintiffs, v. HALLIBURTON ENERGY
SERVICES, INCORPORATED; TRANSOCEAN HOLDINGS, L.L.C.,
Defendants-Appellees, v. JULIUS BARBOUR; EDWARD BARNHILL, JR.;
EDWARD BARNHILL, SR.; KAREN BARNHILL; SCOTT BLACK; ET AL,
Movants-Appellants. ECONOMIC and PROPERTY DAMAGES SETTLEMENT CLASS,
in the matter of Bon Secour Fisheries v. BP Exploration &
Production, Incorporated 12cv970, Plaintiff, v. HALLIBURTON ENERGY
SERVICES, INCORPORATED; TRANSOCEAN HOLDINGS, L.L.C.,
Defendants-Appellees, v. JULIUS BARBOUR; EDWARD BARNHILL, JR.;
EDWARD BARNHILL, SR.; KAREN BARNHILL; SCOTT BLACK; ET AL,
Movants-Appellants. IN RE: DEEPWATER HORIZON. LAKE EUGENIE LAND &
DEVELOPMENT, INCORPORATED; ET AL, Plaintiffs, v. HALLIBURTON ENERGY
SERVICES, INCORPORATED; TRANSOCEAN HOLDINGS, L.L.C.,
Defendants-Appellees, v. JULIUS BARBOUR; EDWARD BARNHILL, JR.;
EDWARD BARNHILL, SR.; KAREN BARNHILL; SCOTT BLACK; ET AL,
Movants-Appellants. JOHN M. PETITJEAN, individually and on behalf
of a putative class; ET AL, Plaintiffs, v. HALLIBURTON ENERGY
SERVICES, INCORPORATED; HALLIBURTON COMPANY, Defendants-Appellees,
v. JULIUS BARBOUR; EDWARD BARNHILL, JR.; EDWARD BARNHILL, SR.;
KAREN BARNHILL; SCOTT BLACK; ET AL, Movants-Appellants. JOHN M.
PETITJEAN, individually and on behalf of a putative class; ET AL,
Plaintiffs, v. TRITON ASSET LEASING GmbH; TRANSOCEAN DEEPWATER,
INCORPORATED; TRANSOCEAN HOLDINGS, L.L.C.; TRANSOCEAN OFFSHORE
DEEPWATER DRILLING, INCORPORATED, Defendants-Appellees, v. JULIUS
BARBOUR; EDWARD BARNHILL, JR.; EDWARD BARNHILL, SR.; KAREN
BARNHILL; SCOTT BLACK; ET AL, Movants-Appellants. ECONOMIC and
PROPERTY DAMAGES SETTLEMENT CLASS, in the matter of Bon Secour
Fisheries v. BP Exploration & Production, Incorporated 12cv970,
Plaintiff, v. HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INCORPORATED,
Defendant-Appellee, v. JULIUS BARBOUR; EDWARD BARNHILL, JR.; EDWARD
BARNHILL, SR.; KAREN BARNHILL; SCOTT BLACK; ET AL,
Movants-Appellants. In re: Deepwater Horizon. DOBBY DARNA; DARRIN
COVERT; RICHARD DELACEY; JOSEPH WILLIAMSON; GEORGE ZIRLOTT,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES,
INCORPORATED; HALLIBURTON COMPANY; TRANSOCEAN HOLDINGS, L.L.C.;
TRITON ASSET LEASING GMBH; TRANSOCEAN DEEPWATER, INCORPORATED;
TRANSOCEAN OFFSHORE DEEPWATER DRILLING, INCORPORATED,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 18-30243, C/W Nos. 18-30413 &
18-30533 (5th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to review the
magistrate judge's order affirming the denial of the claims of a
group of menhaden fishermen pursuant to the HESI Settlements.

The Appellants are commercial menhaden fishermen who allegedly
suffered economic loss due to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.  The
Fishermen did not file separate lawsuits against BP or any of the
other entities involved in the spill.  However, they fell within
the class definition in the class-action portion of the B1 Master
Complaint filed in the Deepwater Horizon MDL.  The B1 Master
Complaint sought compensatory and punitive damages on behalf of the
B1 plaintiffs and the class members.

The familiar Deepwater Horizon Economic and Property Damages
Settlement ("E&P Settlement") eventually resolved the majority of
the claims asserted in the B1 Master Complaint.  However, the terms
of that agreement specifically excluded the Fishermen.  Instead,
the Fishermen entered into settlement agreements with the
Appellees, Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. ("HESI") and
Transocean Holdings, L.L.C.  These class settlement agreements
("HESI Settlements") created a fund to distribute among the
claimants for punitive damages arising out of the oil spill, and
the parties agree that the Fishermen fit within the class
definition set out in the settlements.  The HESI Settlements also
include a provision limiting the claimants' rights to appeal to the
Court.  The HESI Settlements were entered into and filed with the
district court on Sept. 2, 2014 (HESI) and May 29, 2015
(Transocean).

While these settlements were awaiting district court approval, the
district court issued Pretrial Order 60 ("PTO 60") on March 29,
2016, which applied to all claims in the B1 pleading bundle.
Foreseeing no further administrative or procedural benefit to
maintaining the B1 Master Complaint, PTO 60 first dismissed that
complaint.  It then instructed the Plaintiffs who did not file an
individual lawsuit, but instead filed a short-form joinder and/or
were part of a complaint with more than one Plaintiff to file an
individual lawsuit with the district court by May 2, 2016.  PTO 60
warned that the Plaintiffs who failed to comply would have their
claims deemed dismissed with prejudice without further notice.

On April 12, 2016, the district court preliminarily approved the
HESI Settlements, and notice of their terms was given to the class
members, including the Fishermen.  The April 12, 2016 order, inter
alia, set deadlines for objecting to (Sept. 23, 2016) and opting
out of (Oct. 16, 2016) the proposed settlements and scheduled a
fairness hearing to be held on Oct. 20, 2016.  A few weeks later,
on May 2, 2016, the deadline to comply with PTO 60 expired.  The
Fishermen did not file individual lawsuits, nor did they seek
relief from PTO 60 or additional time to comply.

On June 7, 2016, the district court issued a show cause order to B1
plaintiffs who had failed to comply with PTO 60.  The Fishermen did
not respond to the order.  Thereafter, on July 14, 2016, the
district court found that all the remaining Plaintiffs in the B1
bundle were deemed noncompliant with PTO 60 and dismissed their
claims with prejudice.

After the issuance of the June 7, 2016 show cause order but before
the June 28, 2016 deadline to respond, the Claims Administrator for
the HESI Settlements filed a proposed Distribution Model on June
13, 2016 detailing how claims would be processed under the
agreements.  The Distribution Model specified that commercial
fishermen, including menhaden fishermen, would be required to
provide proof of their timely preservation of their rights to a
claim for damages by compliance with PTO 60.  Both the Distribution
Model and the attached Claim Form warned that claims would be
assigned a value of $0 if the claimant had failed to comply with
PTO 60.  Although other class members filed objections to the
Distribution Model on the ground that it improperly required
claimants to comply with PTO 60, the Fishermen did not object.  Nor
did the Fishermen attend the "fairness hearing" that the district
court held in November 2016 to address objections to the
Distribution Model.

On Feb. 15, 2017, the district court gave its final approval of the
HESI Settlements and the Claims Administrator's Distribution Model.
In its approval order, the district court declined to comment on
the propriety of the Claims Administrator's interpretation of the
HESI Settlements as requiring compliance with PTO 60.  Instead, it
observed that the objection was most properly considered in an
appeal to the district court after claim determinations were
concluded.

On Feb. 14, 2018, a year after the district court issued the
approval order, the Fishermen filed a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b) motion for relief from that order, arguing that the
Distribution Model was contrary to the terms of the HESI
Settlements and that they had not received adequate notice of PTO
60 or its applicability to their claims. The district court denied
the motion.

The Fishermen submitted claims pursuant to the HESI Settlements,
but the Claims Administrator denied them because the Fishermen had
failed to comply with PTO 60.  The Fishermen then appealed to the
district court, which had referred all appeals of claim
determinations by the HESI/Transocean settlements claims
administrator to the magistrate judge pursuant to an agreement
between the parties.  The magistrate judge affirmed the denial,
holding that requiring the Fishermen to comply with PTO 60 was
consistent with the terms of the HESI Settlements and the general
maritime law precept that a claimant may obtain punitive damages
only if that claimant has underlying compensatory damages.

The Fishermen objected to the magistrate judge's determination,
complaining that his reliance on PTO 60 was contrary to the terms
of the HESI Settlements and violated their due process rights.  The
district court overruled the objection on the ground that the
claimants had waived their right to appeal the magistrate judge's
determination to any other court, including the Fifth Circuit.  The
Fishermen then appealed to the Court.

The Fishermen raise four issues on appeal: (1) whether the appeal
is barred by the appeal waiver in the HESI Settlements; (2) whether
the magistrate judge erred in affirming the denial of their claims;
(3) whether the district court erred by declining to review the
magistrate judge's decision; and (4) whether the district court
erred in denying their Rule 60(b) motion.

The Court holds that it has enforced appeal waivers in settlement
agreements in prior unpublished cases.  And in the context of the
Deepwater Horizon settlements specifically, it has indicated that
it would enforce an express waiver of the right to appeal from the
district court's claim determinations.  But because it concludes
that the Fishermen cannot prevail on the merits, the Court need not
determine whether the appeal waiver in the HESI Settlements bars
their appeal.

The Court turns next to the issue of whether the magistrate judge
erred in affirming the denial of the Fishermen's claims.  It
concludes that the magistrate judge's decision was correct.  It
holds that that requiring the Fishermen to establish underlying
compensatory damages claims by complying with PTO 60 -- in other
words, requiring them to have standing to recover punitive damages
under maritime law -- was not contrary to the terms of the HESI
Settlements.  It finds that the district court did not err in
applying PTO 60 to the unnamed class members.  Also, none of the
Fishermen's arguments convince us that the magistrate judge's
decision to affirm the denial of their claims was incorrect.  The
Court therefore holds that the magistrate judge did not err in
applying PTO 60 to the Fishermen's claims under the HESI
Settlements.  Because it concludse that the magistrate judge's
decision was correct, it holds that the district court did not err
in denying the Fishermen's Rule 60(b) motion for the same reasons.

The Court recognizes that, in the unique facts of the case, its
holding leads to an unfortunate result for the Fishermen, who were
unnamed, unrepresented class members for much of these proceedings
-- the record is not clear as to when they became represented.  As
a result, as even the Appellees recognized at oral argument,
affirming the denial of the Fishermen's claims may appear unduly
harsh.  However, the Court is bound by its precedent, by the plain
language of the HESI Settlements, and by the deferential standard
of review applicable to several of the issues in the case.  Under
those standards, the magistrate judge correctly affirmed the denial
of the Fishermen's claims, the district court did not err in
declining to review the magistrate judge's decision, and the
district court did not err in denying the Fishermen's Rule 60(b)
motion.  The Court must therefore affirm the district court's
judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 13, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Ypi6AZ from Leagle.com.

Bruce Wayne Bowman, Jr. -- BBowman@GodwinBowman.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Michael Chase -- mchase@goodwin.com -- for Movant-Appellant.

Donald Everett Godwin -- DGodwin@GodwinBowman.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Michael Duane Greer, Sr., for Movant-Appellant.

Steven Lynn Roberts -- stevenroberts@eversheds-sutherland.com --
for Defendant-Appellee.

James Parkerson Roy -- jimr@wrightroy.com -- for Not Party.

Richard C. Stanley -- rcs@stanleyreuter.com -- for Not Party.

John Gwin Wheeler, for Movant-Appellant.

Robert Alan York, for Defendant-Appellee.

Brad Dennis Brian -- Brad.Brian@mto.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

Stephen Jay Herman -- sherman@hhklawfirm.com -- for Not Party.

Kathryn Weatherly Munson -- kwm@stanleyreuter.com -- for Not
Party.


HEADWAY TECHNOLOGIES: Barry Alleges HDD Price-Fixing
----------------------------------------------------
BRIAN BARRY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. HEADWAY TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; HUTCHINSON
TECHNOLOGY INC.; MAGNECOMP PRECISION TECHNOLOGY PUBLIC CO. LTD.;
NAT PERIPHERAL (DONG GUAN) CO., LTD.; NAT PERIPHERAL (H.K.) CO.,
LTD.; NHK SPRING CO. LTD.; NHK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, NHK
SPRING (THAILAND) CO., LTD.; NHK SPRING PRECISION (GUANGZHOU) CO.,
LTD.; SAE MAGNETICS (H.K.) LTD.; and TDK CORPORATION, Defendants,
Case No. 2:19-cv-12582-MOB-SDD (E.D. Mich., Sept. 3, 2019) alleges
global conspiracy among the Defendants and their co-conspirators to
implement and augment prices of and allot market shares for hard
disk drive ("HDD") suspension assemblies in violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the Defendants and
their co-conspirators participated in a combination and conspiracy
to restrain and eradicate competition for HDD suspension assemblies
by colluding to rig bids for, and to augment, stabilize, and
control the prices of HDD suspension assemblies sold in the U.S.
and elsewhere. The combination and conspiracy employed by the
Defendants and their co-conspirators was in excessive suppression
of interstate and foreign trade and commerce.

As a direct and proximate result of the anticompetitive and
unlawful behavior purported herein, Plaintiff and the Classes (as
defined below) paid more during the Class Period for HDD suspension
assemblies than they otherwise would have paid in a competitive
market, through which they have suffered antitrust injury to their
business or property.

Headway Technologies provides recording head products to the
computer harddisk drive industry. The Company provides solutions to
the server, mobile, and desktop segments of the hard disk drive
industry for customers throughout the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

           Brent John LaPointe, Esq.
           Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
           Phillip Kim, Esq.
           THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
           275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
           New York, NY 10016
           Telephone: (212) 686-1060
           Facsimile: (212) 202-3827
           E-mail: blapointe@rosenlegal.com
                   lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                   pkim@rosenlegal.com


HIGHER BRIDGE: Moore Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------
MONTE MOORE, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated
employees, Plaintiffs, v. HIGHER BRIDGE ASSOCIATES, INC.
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-06240 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 18, 2019) is a
lawsuit brought to recover unpaid overtime wages and other damages
owed under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Defendant Higher Bridge Associates, Inc. (HBA) failed to pay
Monte Moore and other workers like him, overtime as required by the
FLSA. Instead, they were paid the same hourly rate for all hours
worked, including those in excess of 40 in a workweek, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff Moore worked as a Scheduler for HBA from February 2018
until November 2018.

HBA provides staffing services for companies in the nuclear,
fossil, fusion, and science energy projects throughout the United
States and abroad.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Douglas M. Werman, Esq.
     Maureen A. Salas, Esq.
     Sarah J. Arendt, Esq.
     Werman Salas P.C.
     77 West Washington, Suite 1402
     Chicago, IL 60602
     Phone: (312) 419-1008

          - and -

     Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
     Richard M. Schreiber, Esq.
     JOSEPHSON DUNLAP
     11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
     Houston, TX 77046
     Phone: 713-352-1100
     Facsimile: 713-352-3300
     Email: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
            rschreiber@mybackwages.com

          - and -

     Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
     BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
     8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
     Houston, TX 77046
     Phone: (713) 877-8788
     Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
     Email: rburch@brucknerburch.com


HUDSON LLC: Thomas, et al Sue over Rent Overcharges
---------------------------------------------------
S.M. THOMAS, BRADLEY LEVIN, KEVIN WENDT, MAXEMILLIAN 0 ORKl JM,
ERIC JONES, and K.G. MCGUIRE on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. HUDSON LLC and STEVE
CROMAN, the Defendants, Case No. 158854/2019 (N.Y. Sup., Sept. 12,
2019), says Plaintiffs did not receive a rent-stabilized lease at
the time they moved into their apartments, and were and have been
provided with non-rent stabilized lease renewals.  Accordingly,
Plaintiffs and the putative class have suffered damages in the form
of rent overcharges. Defendants' tax filings for the Buildings
demonstrate that there are other tenants who are similarly situated
to Plaintiffs.

Rent Stabilization Code (RSC) section 2522.6 provides that when
"the base date rent is the product of a fraudulent scheme to
deregulate the apartment," a default formula, codified at RSC
section  2522.6(b)(3) is to be utilized to determine the legal
regulated rent. The base date is six years before the filing of
this complaint. Defendants' failure to follow the rent regulations
was part of a fraudulent scheme to deregulate the apartments in the
Building.

Accordingly, the RSC section 2522.6(b)(3) default formula is
required to be used to calculate the legal regulated rent for
Plaintiffs' apartments and for each of the apartments occupied by
the members of the putative class.

560-566 Hudson LLC is the owner in fee of the apartment buildings
located at 560-566 Hudson in Manhattan. Mr. Croman is the managing
member of 560-566 Hudson LLC.

Until approximately June of 2016, the Buildings received certain
tax abatements and/or exemptions pursuant to the J-51 tax benefits
program (the "J-51 Program").

Landlords participating in the J-51 Program are required to provide
their tenants with rent-stabilized leases as a condition of
receiving the tax benefits.

Landlords of buildings receiving J-51 tax benefits are legally
required to provide their tenants with appropriate riders (the
"J-51 Rider") detailing the tax credit, and disclosing when it
expires.

Failure to provide tenants with the J-51 Rider, entitles those
tenants to rent-stabilized leases for as long as they remain in
their apartment.

Because they did not receive J-51 Riders, the Plaintiffs and
members of the putative class were and are entitled to
rent-stabilized leases for as long as they occupy their apartments,
the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Lucas A. Ferrara, Esq.
          Jarred I. Kassenoff, Esq.
          Roger A. Sachar, Esq.
          NEWMAN FERRARA LLP
          1250 Broadway, 27th Floor
          New York, NY 10001
          Telephone: (212)619-5400
          E-mail: fcrrara@nfllp.com
                  jkassenoflf@nfllp.com
                  rsachar@nfllp.com

HUSKY ENERGY: SRC's Bid to Stay Discovery in Bruzek Suit Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JASON BRUZEK, HOPE KOPLIN and NEIL MILLER,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. HUSKY ENERGY INC. and SUPERIOR REFINING COMPANY,
LLC, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-697-wmc (W.D. Wis.), Magistrate
Judge Stephen L. Crocker of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin denied Defendant SRC's motion to stay
discovery.

On April 26, 2018, an explosion and subsequent fire occurred at the
"Husky Superior refinery" in Superior, Wisconsin.  Currently, there
are three federal lawsuits in the Court arising out of that
incident, including the instant proposed class action.  Defendant
SRC moved to stay discovery, which the Plaintiffs opposed.

The Plaintiffs, who are residents of Superior, filed the lawsuit on
Aug. 20, 2018.  The Defendants responded with two dismissal motions
on Oct. 31, 2019, which prompted a Nov. 29, 2018 amended complaint
that mooted the dismissal motions.  In the parties' joint Rule
26(f) report, the Defendants reported their intent to file new
dismissal motions and to request a discovery stay.  As a result, at
the Nov. 30, 2018 telephonic preliminary pretrial conference, the
Court set a Sept. 20, 2019 deadline for the Plaintiffs' class
certification motion and set jury selection and trial for Oct. 5,
2020, but did not set the other usual dates, such as a deadline to
file dispositive motions or a discovery cutoff date.  As they
predicted, the Defendants promptly filed dismissal motions and a
motion to strike the class allegations.  They did not, however,
move to stay discovery.

Meantime, Taylor Mayr, a worker injured in the incident, filed his
own lawsuit against the same two Defendants on Nov. 7, 2018,
although he subsequently dropped his claim against HEI.  On
March27, 2019, SRC filed a motion to dismiss in Mayr, which went UA
to the court on April 29, 2019.  At the April 30, 2019 telephonic
preliminary pretrial conference, the Court set a schedule that
included an April 30, 2020 discovery cutoff, a June 1, 2020
deadline to file dispositive motions, and a Nov. 2, 2020 trial
date.  Notably, the Court stayed discovery until it rules on the
pending motion to dismiss or until July 15, 2019, whichever comes
first.  The Court imposed this dichotomous discovery stay pursuant
to a tweak in its civil scheduling templates in early 2019.  This
tweak had not been in place when the Court held the preliminary
pretrial conference in the instant case.

In the instant case, the Court eschewed setting a full schedule in
light of the Defendants' announcement that they intended to file a
motion to stay discovery.  The Court set a few important dates --
the Sept. 20, 2019 class certification motion deadline and the Oct.
5, 2020 trial -- as placeholders, anticipating that the dismissal
motions would have been resolved in the ordinary course.  The
Defendants then filed their motions to dismiss, but they never
filed a motion to stay discovery.  Therefore, discovery has never
been stayed in the lawsuit.  Not ever.

Even if the Court had stayed discovery, either on its own motion or
on a timely filed motion by the Defendants, it would have employed
the procedure that it used in Mayr: discovery would have been
stayed for two months following the submission of the Defendants'
reply brief in support of dismissal.  Such a hypothetical stay
would have ended on April 4, 2019.  As matters stand now, the
Defendants have benefitted from an informal six month discovery.

Magistrate Judge Crocker intends to keep the Oct. 5, 2020 trial
date, although he probably cannot salvage the Sept. 20, 2019
deadline to file class certification motions.  In light of this,
all parties must attend to their discovery obligations promptly and
in good faith.

At this time, the Judge is not going to address SRC's specific
challenges to the Plaintiffs' discovery requests.  Instead, the
parties have one week, until Aug. 20, 2019 to meet, to confer and
to agree on how discovery will proceed.  The Magistrate will
referee any remaining discovery disputes at a telephonic hearing on
Aug. 22, 2019 at 3:30 p.m., at which Rule 37(a) cost shifting will
occur and Rule 37(b) sanctions will be imposed if the court
determines that a party has not adequately fulfilled its
obligations as set forth in the Order.

Based on the foregoing, Magistrate Judge Crocker denied Defendant
SRC's motion to stay discovery.  Not later than Aug. 20, 2019, the
parties will meet, confer, and agree on how discovery will proceed.
He will hold a telephonic status conference on Aug. 22, 2019 at
3:30 p.m. to resolve any lingering discovery disputes.  He will
cancel this hearing upon the parties' report that it is
unnecessary.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 13, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/QY0XWp from Leagle.com.

Jasen Bruzek, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Hope Koplin, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated & Neil Miller, Individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by John Gordon
Rudd, Jr. -- gordon.rudd@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman Reed, P.L.L.P.,
Patricia A. Bloodgood -- patricia.bloodgood@zimmreed.com --
Zimmerman Reed LLP, Charles Toomajian, III, Zimmerman Reed LLP,
Christopher P. Ridout, Zimmerman Reed LLP & June P. Hoidal,
Zimmerman Reed LLP.

Christopher Peterson, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher P.
Ridout, Zimmerman Reed LLP & John Gordon Rudd, Jr., Zimmerman Reed,
P.L.L.P.

Husky Energy Inc., Defendant, represented by Elizabeth Chiarello --
ECHIARELLO@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, Colleen M. Kenney --
CKENNEY@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, Joseph Louis Olson,
Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, Kara McCall, Sidley Austin LLP, Lucas
Thor Rael, Sidley Austin LLP & Maja Eaton -- MEATON@SIDLEY.COM --
Sidley Austin LLP.

Superior Refining Company LLC, Defendant, represented by Colleen M.
Kenney, Sidley Austin LLP, Joseph Louis Olson, Michael Best &
Friedrich LLP, Kara McCall, Sidley Austin LLP & Maja Eaton, Sidley
Austin LLP.


IKEA US: Has No Shuttle Bus Service for Disabled, Prentiss Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
EDITH PRENTISS, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. IKEA US RETAIL LLC and TRANS EXPRESS
INC., the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05235 (E.D.N.Y., Sept.  12,
2019), seeks damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as
fees and costs against Defendants in violations of Title III of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, the New York State Civil Rights
Law, and New York State Human Rights Law, and New York City
[Administrative Code] Human Rights.

In violation of well-settled, decades old law, the Defendants have
made a financial decision to not provide mobility-impaired
individuals, who use wheelchairs or scooters, with a fixed route
shuttle bus service that is equivalent to the service provided to
nondisabled individuals.

Instead, the Defendants have chosen to create and follow a policy
to not remove transportation barriers in all of its in vehicles
used to transport individuals, and exclude Plaintiff and all other
disabled persons, who use wheelchairs and scooters, from having
equal access to and use of the Defendants' shuttle bus service, the
lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiffs are:

          James E. Bahamonde, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF JAMES E. BAHAMONDE
          Telephone: (646) 290-8258
          Facsimile: (646) 435-4376
          E-mail: James@CivilRightsNY.com

INDIANA: Court Denies Class Action Bid in Leatherwood
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case, TERRY LEATHERWOOD, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT E. CARTER, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-03291-SEB-DML (S.D. Ind.), Judge
Sarah Evans Barker of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, has entered an order
discussing in forma pauperis status, dismissing the complaint,
denying the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, denying the
Motion for Class Action, and directing the Plaintiff to show cause
or amend.

Leatherwood is a prisoner currently incarcerated at the Pendleton
Correctional Facility.  He brings the civil rights action under 42
U.S.C. Section 1983.  The complaint names the following defendants:
1) Commissioner Robert E. Carter; 2) Warden Dushan Zatecky; and 3)
Assistant Warden Duane Alsip.  The Plaintiff sues each defendant in
his individual and official capacity.  He seeks compensatory and
punitive damages and injunctive relief.

The Plaintiff alleges that Pendleton is overcrowded.  He alleges
that the Warden and Assistant Warden have started double-bunking
inmates.  He also alleges that due to the overcrowding and being on
lockdown, medical treatments have been delayed and denied.  He
alleges many inmates have suffered from delayed treatment.

The Plaintiff further alleges that Pendleton is understaffed which
has led to denials of recreation and visitation.  He alleges that
violence among the prison inmates has increased.  Also on his list
of complaints is the number of hours between meals, the nutritional
value of meals is not adequate for grown men, and the kitchen
equipment is not properly sanitized. Finally, he complains that the
Indiana Department of Correction ("IDOC") has revised the grievance
policies to make it more difficult for inmates to complete the
process.  He alleges that these conditions violate his Eighth
Amendment rights.

Judge Barker holds that the complaint must be dismissed for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  She finds that
the overarching problem with the Plaintiff's complaint is that he
does not allege that he has suffered any compensable injury as a
result of overcrowding or the other conditions he describes.
Double-bunking in prison is not per se unconstitutional.  While the
plaintiff alleges generally that inmates are being denied adequate
and timely medical care, he does not allege that he has been denied
any specific treatment.  While nutritional food and opportunity for
exercise are two of life's necessities, the Plaintiff has not
alleged that he has been denied meals on a regular basis, lost
weight as a result of lack of food, been denied access to the
commissary to purchase additional food, or been denied the ability
to exercise in or outside of his cell.  The Plaintiff's allegations
of violations of or changes in IDOC policy does not support a claim
under section 1983.  Finally, the complaint contains no allegations
of personal wrongdoing on the part of Commissioner Carter.

Because the complaint is being dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, the Plaintiff's motion for
temporary restraining order is denied as moot.

The complaint is being dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.  For that reason and because the
Plaintiff is pro se, the Judge denied the Plaintiff's motion to
maintain suit as a class action.

As noted, the Plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed for the
reasons set forth.  The Plaintiff will have through Sept. 9, 2019,
in which to either show cause why Judgment consistent with the
Entry should not issue or file an amended complaint which cures the
deficiencies discussed in the Entry.  Any amended complaint would
completely replace the original complaint and therefore must be
complete.  Any amended complaint must include the words "First
Amended Complaint" and the proper case number,
1:19-cv-03291-SEB-DML, on the first page.

If the Plaintiff fails to respond to the Order to show cause, the
case will be dismissed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section
1915A(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, without further notice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 13, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/7kuQPq from Leagle.com.

TERRY LEATHERWOOD, Plaintiff, pro se.

ROBERT E. CARTER, Commissioner of IDOC, Defendant, pro se.

DUSHAN ZATECKY, Warden, Defendant, pro se.

DUANE ALSIP, Assistant Warden, Defendant, pro se.


INTUIT INC: Ostrovsky Sues Over Deceptive Tax Filing Services
-------------------------------------------------------------
PHILLIPP OSTROVSKY, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. INTUIT INC., Defendant, Case No.
5:19-cv-05823-NC (N.D. Cal., Sept. 18, 2019) is a class action
complaint seeking damages, equitable relief, and injunctive relief
requiring TurboTax to comply with its contractual obligations.

TurboTax is a tax preparation software, owned and manufactured by
Intuit, that is utilized to file more than 35 million tax returns
for American taxpayers every year when filing their income tax
returns with both the United States Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") and individual states. Pursuant to an agreement with the
IRS, TurboTax and 11 other tax preparation providers are required
to cumulatively offer 70% of U.S. taxpayers the option to file
their taxes for free.

For the 2018 tax season, any taxpayer whose adjusted gross income
is $66,000 or less is eligible to use tax preparation software from
one of these providers to prepare and file their tax returns for
free. TurboTax violated its agreement with the IRS by intentionally
diverting qualified taxpayers away from its "free filing" program
in favor of its paid product offerings, notes the complaint. It did
this by segregating its "free file" webpage from its primary
website and then altering the website's code in order to keep it
hidden from search engines like Google so that it would not be
easily accessible to qualified taxpayers.

TurboTax also marketed its paid offerings as "Free Guaranteed", so
that qualified taxpayers believed they were filing their taxes
pursuant to the free-filing program, only to be hit with unexpected
charges after they already spent hours entering information and
were getting ready to file. As a result of this scheme, TurboTax
breached its agreement with the government, took advantage of the
U.S. public, and generated millions of dollars of ill-gotten gains
from persons who least can afford it. Plaintiff and members of the
Nationwide Class have been damaged by TurboTax's breach of its
contractual obligations because they qualified for free filing
under the IRS Free-Filing Agreement but were required by TurboTax
to pay to file their returns, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Phillipp Ostrovsky is a resident and citizen of Arizona
who paid to file his 2018 tax returns using TurboTax despite
qualifying for the IRS free filing program.

Intuit Inc. is a business and financial software company that
develops and sells financial, accounting, and tax preparation
software including TurboTax, QuickBooks, and Mint.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Kenneth J. Grunfeld, Esq.
     Golomb & Honik, P.C.
     1835 Market Street, Suite 2900
     Philadelphia, PA 19103
     Phone: (215) 985-9177
     Fax: (215) 985-4169
     Email: kgrunfeld@golombhonik.com

          - and -

     Kirk J. Wolden, Esq.
     Clifford L. Carter, Esq.
     CARTER WOLDEN CURTIS, LLP
     1111 Exposition Boulevard, Suite 602
     Sacramento, CA 95815
     Phone: (916) 567-1111
     Fax: (916) 567-1112
     Email: kirk@cwclawfirm.com
            cliff@cwclawfirm.com


IOVATE HEALTH: Barzoloski Sues Over Mislabeled Dietary Product
--------------------------------------------------------------
DANIEL BARZOLOSKI, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. IOVATE HEALTH SCIENCES U.S.A. INC.
a/k/a MUSCLETECH, Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-05544-KAW (N.D. Cal.,
Sept. 3, 2019) is a class action lawsuit against the Defendant for
selling a defective dietary supplement product, the Platinum 100%
BCAA 8:1:1, through its Muscletech brand.

According to the complaint, BCAA supplements decrease muscle
protein synthesis and are wholly incapable of building muscle on
their own. Consumption of BCAA supplements actually negatively
impacts muscle protein synthesis due to lack of all essential amino
acids ("EAA"), which causes EAAs stored in the muscle to be
catabolized, thereby perpetuating a catabolic state of muscle
protein breakdown. To build muscle, the body must have an abundant
availability of all EAAs, which must be consumed through the diet.
Anything less than a full panel of EAAs will grind any increase in
muscle protein synthesis to a halt due to lack of sufficient raw
materials with which the body can use to build muscle mass.
Platinum BCAA contains only three of the nine EAAs, and therefore
it cannot, in fact, build muscle.

As such, The Defendant's claims that the Platinum 100% BCAA 8:1:1
"Promotes Muscle Protein Synthesis," "ensures that your muscles are
primed for musclebuilding," and provides "key building blocks of
muscle" are false and misleading. In fact, the product negatively
impacts protein synthesis, thereby leaving the Plaintiff and Class
members in a worse position than if not taking the product at all.

Iovate Health Sciences USA Inc offers nutritional supplements
products. The Company distributes its products through retailers,
health clubs, grocery shops, and health food stores. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          L. Timothy Fisher, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          1990 North California Blvd., Suite 940
          Walnut Creek, CA 94596
          Telephone: (925) 300-4455
          Facsimile: (925) 407-2700
          E-mail: ltfisher@bursor.com

               - and -

          Scott A. Bursor, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          2665 S. Bayshore Dr., Suite 220
          Miami, FL 33133-5402
          Telephone: (305) 330-5512
          Facsimile: (305) 676-9006
          E-mail: scott@bursor.com

               - and -

          Philip L. Fraietta, Esq.
          Andrew J. Obergfell, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          888 Seventh Avenue
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (646) 837-7150
          Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
          E-mail: pfraietta@bursor.com
                  aobergfell@bursor.com


IOVATE HEALTH: Sabatano Files Fraud Class Suit in New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Iovate Health
Sciences U.S.A. Inc. The case is styled as Tom Sabatano,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Iovate Health Sciences U.S.A. Inc. also known as:
Muscletech, Defendant, Case No. 7:19-cv-08924-VB (S.D. N.Y., Sept.
25, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Fraud.

MuscleTech is a brand of dietary supplements, marketed by Iovate
Health Sciences Inc., which includes Hydroxycut. It was owned by
Canadian company Kerr Holdings which was acquired by the Xiwang
Foodstuffs Company, a Chinese company, for $5.84 million in
2016.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Philip Lawrence Fraietta, Esq.
   Bursor & Fisher, P.A.
   888 Seventh Avenue
   New York, NY 10019
   Tel: (646) 837-7150
   Email: pfraietta@bursor.com


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Court Narrows Claims Transvaginal Mesh Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, Miami Division, issued an Order granting in part and
denying in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned
CORRINE KUCHENBECKER and THOMAS KUCHENBECKER, Plaintiffs, v.
JOHNSON & JOHNSON, and ETHICON, INC. Defendants. Case No.
19-61712-CIV-MORENO. (S.D. Fla.).

Plaintiffs Corrine Kuchenbecker and Thomas Kuchenbecker commenced
this lawsuit against Defendants Johnson & Johnson and Ethicon,
Inc., seeking compensatory, economic, and punitive damages for
injuries caused by complications from a transvaginal mesh device,
known as the Gynecare TVT Abbrevo System, which was implanted in
Plaintiff Corrine Kuchenbecker. The Plaintiffs' core claim is that
the Defendants are liable in negligence and strict liability for
defectively designing and manufacturing the Gynecare TVT Abbrevo
System, and for failing to adequately warn consumers of known
dangers and risks associated with using this system.  

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
tests the formal sufficiency of the allegations supporting claims
for relief. Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may dismiss a claim for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To
survive dismissal, the Complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.

COUNTS I AND III - DEFECTIVE MANUFACTURING

The thrust of Plaintiffs' lawsuit is that the Defendants are liable
in negligence and strict liability for defectively designing and
manufacturing the Gynecare TVT Abbrevo System, and for failing to
adequately warn consumers of known dangers and risks associated
with using this system.

Defendants request dismissal of the defective manufacturing claims
in Counts I and III on grounds the Complaint amounts tonothing more
than a formulaic recitation of elements, bereft of factual
support.

Plaintiffs' defective manufacturing claims fall into two theories
of liability: negligence and strict liability. The basic elements
of a negligence cause of action apply equally to products liability
manufacturing defect claims grounded in negligence.   

A plaintiff must allege: (1) a duty of care was owed to the
plaintiff (2) defendant breached that duty of care (i.e.
negligence) and (3) the breach of that duty of care was a proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injuries. In addition to these elements, a
plaintiff must also establish that the product at issue was
defective or unreasonably dangerous.

Here, the Court finds the Complaint fails to state a plausible
claim for defective manufacturing under negligence and strict
liability. The closest Plaintiffs come to alleging a manufacturing
defect is the allegation that Defendants failed to manufacture the
Gynecare TVT Abbrevo System so as to avoid an unreasonable risk of
harm to women in whom the Gynecare TVT Abbrevo Systems were
implanted, including the Plaintiff.

But the only factual allegations offered to support this conclusion
relate to the defective design and defective warning claims.And
without pinpointing a single specific manufacturing defect, i.e.
that the Gynecare TVT Abbrevo System, as manufactured, deviated
from the manufacturing specifications in some way and explaining
how that defect caused any of the alleged injuries, this allegation
is simply another way of alleging defective design. The Complaint
does allege that the Gynecare TVT Abbrevo System was defective in
its manufacture and construction when it left the hands of
Defendants in that it deviated from Gynecare TVT Abbrevo System
specifications.

But, again, the Complaint fails to specify how the device implanted
in the Plaintiff deviated from manufacturing specifications.
Without more, the Court simply cannot draw the reasonable inference
that Defendants defectively manufactured the Gynecare TVT Abbrevo
System that was implanted in the Plaintiff.

Count I is DISMISSED to the extent it asserts a manufacturing
defect claim and Count III is DISMISSED in its entirety.

COUNT IV - STRICT LIABILITY - DEFECTIVE PRODUCT

In Count IV, Plaintiffs assert a strict liability claim for
defective product on grounds the Gynecare TVT Abbrevo System was
defective and unreasonably dangerous to foreseeable consumers,
patients, and users. Defendants argue Count IV should be dismissed
because Florida does not recognize defective product as a separate
cause of action. Rather, Defendants assert that manufacturers can
be held strictly liable for a defective product by virtue of a
design defect, a manufacturing defect, or an inadequate warning.

Plaintiffs argue that Florida law has long recognized a claim for
strict products liability based upon a defective product. West v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1976). While
Plaintiffs are correct that West recognized the doctrine of strict
liability for defective products, subsequent case law makes clear
that a plaintiff prevails on a defective product claim by showing
the product is defective by virtue of a design defect, a
manufacturing defect, or a defective warning.

In other words, a defect in design, manufacture, or warning is a
species of a strict product liability claim. Moreover, Plaintiffs'
three sentence paragraph in support of Count IV does not cite any
authority establishing that Florida courts recognize a strict
liability defective product claim as a cause of action independent
from strict liability defective design, manufacture, or warning
claims. Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs' defective
product claim is not a standalone cause of action under Florida
law.

Count IV is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE

COUNT VI - NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

In Count VI, Plaintiffs assert a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress. Defendants argue this claim should be dismissed
because Plaintiffs do not identify any specific physical or
emotional injury they have suffered as a result of Defendants'
alleged negligence.

To state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress
under Florida law, a plaintiff must allege: (1) they suffered a
physical injury; (2) the physical injury was caused by the
psychological trauma (3) they were involved in some way in the
event causing the negligent injury to another and (4) they have a
close personal relationship with the directly injured person. The
Florida Supreme Court has also ruled that general allegations of
bodily injury are not sufficient to state a claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress.  

Here, Plaintiffs allege that, together, they suffered severe and
permanent pain, suffering, disability, impairment, loss of
enjoyment of life, loss of care, comfort, consortium, and economic
damages and that they will continue to sustain emotional distress,
severe physical injuries, economic losses, and other damages due to
the implanted Gynecare TVT Abbrevo System.

Put simply, these allegations including the allegations of
intangible mental injuries, which, are insufficient to satisfy the
physical impact requirement—are far too generalized to state a
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.   

In addition, Plaintiffs fail to allege factual matter establishing
that any of the physical injuries were caused by psychological
trauma. Therefore, Count VI is DISMISSED.

COUNTS VII AND VIII - EXPRESS AND IMPLIED WARRANTIES

Plaintiffs also assert claims for breach of express warranty (Count
VII) and breach of implied warranty (Count VIII). Defendants argue
both counts must be dismissed for lack of contractual privity.
Plaintiffs' Opposition memorandum does not address, let alone
oppose, Defendants' arguments in support of dismissing these
claims.   

Therefore, Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss these claims is
GRANTED BY DEFAULT, and accordingly, Counts VII and VIII are
DISMISSED.

COUNT X - UNJUST ENRICHMENT

Next, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' claim for unjust
enrichment on grounds that Plaintiffs have an adequate remedy in
tort law. Although there is a general rule under Florida law that
equitable remedies are not available when adequate legal remedies
exist, this doctrine "does not apply to all claims for unjust
enrichment.

Defendants specifically argue the unjust enrichment claim should be
dismissed because the claim does not sound in contract or
quasi-contract, and because Plaintiffs have an adequate legal
remedy available in products liability.   

The Court disagrees with this characterization. Plaintiffs allege
that they paid for the Gynecare TVT Abbrevo System, that Defendants
accepted payment by Plaintiffs and others on Plaintiffs' behalf for
the purchase of the Gynecare TVT Abbrevo System and that Plaintiffs
have not received the safe and effective medical devices for which
they paid.While a product defect underlies the unjust enrichment
claim, i.e. a benefit was not conferred because the device was
defective, these allegations sound primarily in contract because
they extend beyond just the alleged defect, and center on the
Defendants retaining the Plaintiffs' payment without the Defendants
conferring a benefit.   

Thus, Plaintiffs are entitled to plead an equitable unjust
enrichment claim as an alternative to their legal claims.  

The Court finds that at this stage it is premature to dismiss
Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim on grounds they have an
adequate legal remedy available in tort. Defendants' motion to
dismiss Count X is DENIED.

COUNT XII - DISCOVERY RULE, TOLLING AND FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT

In Count XII, Plaintiffs attempt to assert a claim for discovery
rule, tolling and fraudulent concealment. Defendants move to
dismiss Count XII to the extent Plaintiffs attempt to: (1) assert
Florida's discovery rule as a distinct cause of action and (2)
assert a cause of action for fraudulent concealment.

The Court agrees with Defendants. The Complaint explicitly states
that Plaintiffs assert all applicable state statutory and common
law rights and theories related to tolling or extension of any
applicable statute of limitations, including equitable tolling,
class action tolling, delayed discovery, discovery rule, and
fraudulent concealment.

Finally, even if Count XII could be construed as asserting a cause
of action for fraudulent concealment, Plaintiffs' allegations are
not sufficient.

To state a claim for fraudulent concealment under Florida law, a
plaintiff must plead: (1) misrepresentation of material fact or
suppression of the truth (2) knowledge of the misrepresentation (3)
an intention that the representor induce another to act on it and
(4) resulting injury to the party acting in justifiable reliance on
the representation.
  
Here, none of Plaintiffs' allegations in support of Count XII
satisfy the required elements for a fraudulent concealment claim
under Florida law let alone satisfy with requisite specificity
under Rule 9(b).  

Therefore, Count XII is DISMISSED to the extent it attempts to
assert a cause of action.

Accordingly, Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss is granted in
part and denied in part as follows:

   (1) The Motion is GRANTED as to Counts I, defective
manufacturing claim only, III, IV, VI, VII, VIII, and XII. Counts
I, III, VI, VII, VIII, and XII are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and
Count IV is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and

   (2) The Motion is DENIED as to Count X.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 16, 2019 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y4osn7ye from Leagle.com.

Corrine Kuchenbecker & Thomas Kuchenbecker, Plaintiffs, represented
by Bert Tarrant Dunken, Jr. , Dunken Law Group, PLLC, 1 Sugar Creek
Center Blvd Ste 1075, Sugar Land, TX, 77478-3671 pro hac vice &
Joseph Anthony Osborne - josborne@realtoughlawyers.com - Osborne &
Francis.

Ethicon, Inc. & Johnson & Johnson, Defendants, represented by
Amanda Elizabeth Preston , Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP & Andrew
Russell Kruppa , Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, 200 South Biscayne
Boulevard, Suite 4700Miami, FL 33131


JOSE PLEHN-DUJOWICH: Class Settlement in Hu Has Prelim Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Joint Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Class Action Settlement in the case captioned QIUZI HU,
et al., Plaintiffs, v. JOSE M. PLEHN-DUJOWICH, et al., Defendants.
Case No. 18-cv-01791-EDL. (N.D. Cal.).

Settlement Class: All Class Members, including Class
Representatives, who do not exclude themselves from the Class or
Settlement Class, pursuant to the procedures set forth in Section
6.3 of the Settlement Agreement and the Class Notice.

Appointment of Class Representatives and Class Counsel: The Court
continues the appointment of the Class Representatives to represent
the Settlement Class, and Dhillon Law Group Inc. as Class Counsel
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) and (g).

Preliminary Findings Regarding Proposed Settlement: The Court
preliminarily finds the following:

   a. The proposed Class Settlement resulted from arm's-length
negotiations

   b. The Settlement Agreement was executed only after Class
Counsel had conducted substantial discovery, including by taking
discovery from third-parties, deposing Defendant Plehn-Dujowich,
and obtaining relevant documents

   c. Class Counsel has concluded that the Class Settlement is
fair, reasonable, and adequate and

   d. The Class Settlement is sufficiently fair, reasonable, and
adequate to warrant sending notice of the Class Settlement to the
Settlement Class.

The Parties have proposed giving Settlement Class Members notice by
October 21, 2019, via email and WeChat, a Chinese messaging and
social media platform, because that is how Defendants communicated
with the members of the Settlement Class. The Parties also offer to
provide notice by physical mail to all Settlement Class Members
with a known mailing address, which the Court requires them to do.

The Court approves the proposed manner of notice. Accordingly,
Class Counsel, acting as Settlement Administrator, shall, within
thirty days of this Order, cause the Class Action Settlement
Notice, with such non-substantive modifications thereto as may be
agreed by the Parties, to be provided to the Settlement Class in
the manner set forth above and in the Settlement Agreement.

Claim Form Submission: Each Settlement Class Member shall be
entitled to submit one claim for a cash payment pursuant to the
terms of the Settlement Agreement. Any claim that does not
substantially comply with the requirements set forth in section 8
of the Settlement Agreement and the Class Action Settlement Notice
will be deemed invalid. All valid claim forms must be received by
the Settlement Administrator by December 20, 2019.

Termination of Settlement: If the Class Settlement is terminated in
accordance with the Settlement Agreement, this Order shall become
null and void, and shall be without prejudice to the rights of the
Parties, all of whom shall be restored to their respective
positions as though the Parties never executed the Settlement
Agreement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 16, 2019 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y56rvrod from Leagle.com.

Qiuzi Hu, an individual, Edwin Ramirez, an individual, Ivan
Ronceria, an individual & Wenzhi Fei, an individual, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Harmeet K. Dhillon - harmeet@dhillonlaw.com -
Dhillon Law Group Inc., Gregory Richard Michael
gmichael@dhillonlaw.com - Dhillon Law Group Inc. & Krista L.
Baughman - kbaughman@dhillonlaw.com - Dhillon Law Group Inc.

Jose M. Plehn-Dujowich, an individual & Bizqualify LLC, a
California limited liability company, Defendants, represented by
Loren Kieve - lk@kievelaw.com - Kieve Law Offices.


JUUL LABS: Oberhauser Sues over Sales of e-Cigarettes
-----------------------------------------------------
SEBASTIAN OBERHAUSER, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. JUUL LABS, INC., PAX LABS,
INC., PHILIP MORRIS USA INC., and ALTRIA GROUP, INC., the
Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-05733-DMR (N.D. Cal., Sept. 12, 2019),
seeks medical monitoring, monetary damages, personal injury
damages, declaratory, injunctive and other relief, and punitive
damages.

The lawsuit recounts that in 2015, JUUL set out to recapture the
magic of the most successful product ever made -- the cigarette.
Due to regulations and court orders preventing the major cigarette
manufacturers from marketing to young people, youth smoking had
decreased to its lowest levels in decades. While the public health
community celebrated this decline as a victory, JUUL saw an
opportunity.

Seizing on regulatory inaction and loopholes for e-cigarettes, JUUL
set out to develop and market a highly addictive product that could
be packaged and sold to young people. Youth is and has always been
the most sought-after market for cigarette companies, because they
are the most vulnerable to nicotine addiction and are most likely
to become customers for life.

The lawsuit says JUUL was designed perfectly for teenagers. It does
not look or smell like a cigarette. It is a sleek, high-tech
youth-friendly battery-powered device that looks like a USB drive.
The JUUL device heats a nicotine-filled liquid JUUL pod, sold
separately in fun flavors like mango and cool mint, delivering
powerfully potent doses of nicotine, along with aerosol and 20
other toxic chemicals into the lungs, body and brain. Unlike
noxious cigarette smoke, when a JUUL user exhales, the smoke is
undetectable. JUUL is small, easily concealable and can be used
practically anywhere without parents or teachers knowing; just
Google "JUUL in school" and find more than 23,000 videos on how to
JUUL anywhere without detection. This is part of the appeal,
fostered and bolstered by JUUL's viral marketing campaigns using
young models to make the products look cool and stylish.

Defendants designed JUUL to quickly and severely addict young
people to nicotine, one of the most addictive chemicals in the
world. By studying cigarette industry archives, JUUL learned how to
manipulate the nicotine in its products to maximize addictiveness,
particularly among new users and young people, and thereby increase
sales. JUUL designed its products to have maximum inhalability,
without any "throat hit" or irritation that would serve as a
natural deterrent to new users. The sole purpose of this design
element was to initiate new smokers, since those who already smoke
cigarettes are tolerant to the throat hit sensation and associate
it with smoking and nicotine satisfaction. At the same time, JUUL
designed its device to deliver substantially higher concentrations
of nicotine per puff than traditional cigarettes and most other
e-cigarettes. This combination of ease of inhalation and high
nicotine delivery makes JUUL both powerfully addictive and
dangerous.

The Defendants never warned Mr. Oberhauser that JUUL was addictive,
dangerous, could cause him to suffer nicotine addiction and
associated serious health risk including increased risks for heart,
lung and brain disease including cancer, and other related health
effects.

Mr. Oberhauser would not have tried JUUL or continued to use JUUL
product shortly thereafter, had he known it contained nicotine, or
was highly addictive, or carried the health risks that were not
warned about, which he did not know at the time he first started
using the product.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct Mr.
Oberhauser suffered life-altering and permanent injuries,
including: permanent brain damage, ongoing and severe nicotine
addiction and associated serious latent health risk including
increased risks for heart, lung and brain disease and injury
including cancer, and other related health effects, the lawsuit
says.

Juul Labs, Inc. is an electronic cigarette company which spun off
from Pax Labs in 2017. It makes the Juul e-cigarette, which
packages nicotine salts from leaf tobacco into one-time use
cartridges.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Laurence D. King, Esq.
          Mario M. Choi, Esq.
          Frederic S. Fox, Esq.
          KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP
          350 Sansome Street, Suite 400
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone (415) 772-4700
          Facsimile: (415) 772-4707
          E-mail: lking@kaplanfox.com
                  mchoi@kaplanfox.com
                  ffox@kaplanfox.com

               - and -

          Laurence S. Berman, Esq.
          Frederick S. Longer, Esq.
          Michael M. Weinkowitz, Esq.
          LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN LLP
          510 Walnut Street, Suite 500
          Philadelphia, PA 19106-3697
          Telephone: (215) 592-1500
          Facsimile: (215) 592-4663
          E-mail: LBerman@lfsblaw.com
                  FLonger@lfsblaw.com
                  MWeinkowitz@lfsblaw.com

KLEIN & DADAY: Isakova Sues over Debt Collection Practices
----------------------------------------------------------
IRINA ISAKOVA, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
the Plaintiff, v. KLEIN, DADAY, ARETOS & O'DONOGHUE LLC, the
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-05221 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 12, 2019), seeks
to recover damages under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

The case centers on Defendant's failure to properly provide the
disclosures required by section 1692g(a)(3) in its initial written
communications to New York consumers, or within five days
thereafter.

The Defendant attempted to collect the Debt from Plaintiff, the
Debt was in default, or Defendant treated the Debt as if it was in
default from the time that Defendant acquired it for collection,
the lawsuit says.

The Defendant is a firm serving Rolling Meadows, Illinois, in
litigation, employment litigation and business litigation
cases.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the proposed class are:

          Brittany Weiner, Esq.
          IMBESI LAW GROUP P.C.
          1501 Broadway, Suite 1915
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (646) 767-2271
          Facsimile: (212) 658-9177
          E-mail: brittany@lawicm.com

               - and -

          Jesse S. Johnson, Esq.
          GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC
          7601 N. Federal Hwy., Suite A-230
          Boca Raton, FL 33487
          Telephone: (561) 826-5477
          Facsimile: (561) 961-5684
          E-mail: jjohnson@gdrlawfirm.com

KOHN LAW FIRM: Adan Sues over Debt Collection Practices
-------------------------------------------------------
OSCAR ADAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. KOHN LAW FIRM, S.C.; MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC;
MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC., and ENCORE CAPITAL GROUP, INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-05894 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 3, 2019) seeks
to stop the Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to collect
a debt.

Kohn Law Firm, S.C. is engaged in the business of a collection
agency, using the mails and telephone to collect consumer debts.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Wood, Esq.
          Celetha Chatman, Esq.
          COMMUNITY LAWYERS LLC
          20 N. Clark Street, Suite 3100
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 757-1880
          Facsimile: (312) 265-3227
          E-mail: cchatman@communitylawyersgroup.com


KURT GEIGER USA: Traynor Files Class Suit in New York
-----------------------------------------------------
Kurt Geiger USA, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Yaseen Traynor also known as: Yaseen Traylor other, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Kurt Geiger
USA, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-08859 (S.D. N.Y., Sept. 24,
2019).

Kurt Geiger USA, Inc. is a shoe store in Costa Mesa,
California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Russel Craig Weinrib, Esq.
   Stein Saks PLLC
   285 Passaic St., Suite 5
   Hakensack, NJ 07601
   Tel: (201) 282-6500
   Email: rweinrib@steinsakslegal.com



LASERSHIP INC: Court Dismisses Klatte FLSA Suit
-----------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio,
Western Division, issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss in the case captioned Kevin Klatte, Plaintiff, v.
Lasership, Inc., Defendant. Case No. 1:17-cv-00516. (S.D. Ohio).

Plaintiff brings this purported class action against LaserShip for
alleged violations of the Fair Labor and Standards Act (FLSA), the
Ohio Constitution, the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act, and
the Ohio Prompt Pay Act. He alleges that LaserShip misclassified
him and others similarly situated as independent contractors and,
in doing so, avoided paying minimum wages and overtime payments.

The Agreement

Arbitration. Any dispute, claim, or controversy between Contractor
and Carrier arising out of or in connection with this Agreement or
any alleged breach of this Agreement shall be resolved by final and
binding arbitration administrated by National Arbitration and
Mediation (NAM). The Arbitration process shall be governed by the
rules contained in Appendix E.

Whether the Parties Agreed to Arbitration

The Plaintiff acknowledges that he signed the Agreement in February
2016, he worked for LaserShip from February 2016 to February 2017,
and LaserShip paid him. Plaintiff asserts that LaserShip is not a
party to the Agreement, as LaserShip did not sign it, LaserShip and
Prestige Delivery were not the same company in February 2016, and
there was no valid assignment to LaserShip.

In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant LaserShip
acquired Prestige Delivery Systems, Inc., several years ago.
However, in response to LaserShip's Motion to Compel Arbitration,
Plaintiff asserts that LaserShip and Prestige Delivery were two
distinct legal entities in February 2016.  

After considering LaserShip's exhibits and testimony produced at
the evidentiary hearing, and noting Plaintiff's initial assertion
that LaserShip acquired Prestige several years ago, the Court finds
that LaserShip acquired Prestige Delivery in 2014 and they were the
same company after that acquisition. Plaintiff's reliance on the
filings found on the Ohio Secretary of State's Business Filing
Portal do not persuade the Court otherwise.   

The Court finds that the parties agreed to arbitrate.

Scope of the Agreement

The Agreement provides that any dispute, claim, or controversy
between Contractor and Carrier arising out of or in connection with
this Agreement shall be resolved by final and bringing arbitration.
Plaintiff asserts that his claims fall outside the Agreement's
scope, as his claims are not founded in or intertwined with the
Agreement. LaserShip argues that Plaintiff's claims fall squarely
within the Agreement's scope, as his claims relate directly to the
compensation that he was, or allegedly, was not paid for the
services he performed pursuant to the terms of the Agreement.

Plaintiff brings his FLSA and Ohio state law claims to recover
overtime compensation and minimum wages2 for himself and expressly
defines the purported class to include any other driver who
contracted with Prestige Delivery only as an independent contractor
but who was paid by LaserShip.

Contrary to Plaintiff's assertions otherwise, the allegations in
his Complaint relate directly to the provisions in the Agreement
that he signed.  

The Court finds that Plaintiff's FLSA and Ohio state law claims
arise out of the Agreement and fall within the Agreement's scope.

Whether Plaintiff's Claims are Arbitrable

The Sixth Circuit has held that Congress did not intend for FLSA
claims to be nonarbitrable.  
Likewise, Plaintiff'’s Ohio state law claims are also subject to
arbitration. Because all of the Plaintiff's state law claims arise
out of his employment with LaserShip and LaserShip's alleged
failure to pay overtime as required under statute, all are subject
to and non-exempt from arbitration under federal or Ohio law.

Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff argues that the Agreement
includes an illegal class waiver, he is incorrect.  

Dismiss or Stay

Although the FAA directs courts to stay actions pending
arbitration, the Sixth Circuit has held that dismissal is
appropriate when all of the issues raised are subject to
arbitration. The Court finds, based on the facts of this case, that
staying the action and retaining jurisdiction would serve no
purpose.

LaserShip's Motion to Dismiss is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 16, 2019 Order
is available at  https://tinyurl.com/y23akzhv from Leagle.com.

Kevin Klatte, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Biller , Biller &
Kimble, LLC, 4200 Regent Street, Suite 200, Columbus, OH, 4321 C.
Ryan Morgan – rmorgan@forthe people.com - Morgan & Morgan, P.A.,
pro hac vice & Andrew P. Kimble , Biller & Kimble, LLC 4200 Regent
Street, Suite 200, Columbus, OH,  4321 Of Counsel Markovits, Stock
& DeMarco, LLC.

Lasership, Inc., Defendant, represented by David Kirsten Montgomery
-
David.Montgomery@jacksonlewis.com - Jackson Lewis LLP & Jamie Marie
Goetz-Anderson
Jamie.Goetz-Anderson@jacksonlewis.com - Jackson Lewis LLP.


LE ENERGY: Rogers Sues Over Unsolicited Telemarketing
-----------------------------------------------------
JAYSON ROGERS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. LE ENERGY, LLC, a Michigan limited
liability company, d/b/a Utility Gas and Power and JOHN DOE
CORPORATION, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-02153 (N.D. Ohio, Sept.
18, 2019) is a class action complaint arising under the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act, against Defendants to: (1) stop their
practice of placing calls using "an artificial or prerecorded
voice" to the telephones of consumers nationwide without their
prior express written consent; and (2) obtain redress for all
persons injured by their conduct.

Widespread telemarketing is a primary method by which LE Energy
solicits new customers, notes the complaint. John Doe Corporation
initiated a prerecorded telemarketing call to the cellular
telephone numbers of Plaintiff and the Class to promote LE Energy
in violation of the TCPA. LE Energy hired John Doe Corporation to
originate new customers and is vicariously liable for its illegal
telemarketing conduct, asserts the complaint.

The TCPA prohibits companies, such as LE Energy, from placing calls
using an artificial or prerecorded voice when making calls to
cellular telephones without first obtaining consent. LE Energy has
violated, and continues to violate, the TCPA and its implementing
regulations by placing, or having placed on its behalf, prerecorded
calls to cellular telephone subscribers (a) who have not expressly
consented to receiving such calls and/or (b) who have expressly
requested not to receive such calls, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Jayson Rogers is a natural person and resident of
Cuyahoga County, Ohio.

LE Energy is a certified supplier in the Ohio Energy Choice
Program, offering electricity and natural gas to consumers in
Ohio.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Adam T. Savett, Esq.
     Savett Law Offices LLC
     2764 Carole Lane
     Allentown PA 18104
     Phone: (610) 621-4550
     Facsimile: (610) 978-2970
     Email: adam@savettlaw.com


LIFE PROTECT: Williams Sues over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
------------------------------------------------------------
LEEROY WILLIAMS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. LIFE PROTECT 24/7, INC.; and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive, and each of them, the Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-01269-DAD-JLT (E.D. Cal., Sept. 11, 2019), contends that
the Defendant promotes and markets its merchandise, in part, by
placing unsolicited telephone calls to wireless phone users, in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated seeking damages and any other available
legal or equitable remedies resulting from the illegal actions of
the Defendant, the lawsuit says.

The Defendant is a medical alert systems company.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: 323-306-4234
          Facsimile: 866-633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com

LIFECARE SOLUTIONS: Court OKs Settlement in Frando
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California issued a Judgment granting Parties' Joint Stipulation of
Class Action Settlement and Release in the case captioned BARNEY
FRANDO, individually, and on behalf of other members of the general
public similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. LIFECARE SOLUTIONS, INC.,
a Delaware corporation; PREFERRED HOMECARE INFUSION, L.L.C., an
Arizona limited liability company; FOUNDERS HEALTHCARE, LLC, an
Arizona limited liability company; and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive, Defendants. Case No. 2:18-CV-03708-ODW-SS. (C.D. Cal.).

Judgment in this matter is entered in accordance with, and
incorporates by reference the findings of, the Court's Orders and
the Parties' Joint Stipulation of Class Action Settlement and
Release.

With the exception of the single Class Member who opted out of the
Settlement Class, all Class Members are bound by this Judgment and
are barred from pursuing, or seeking to reopen, any of the Released
Claims, as defined in the Settlement Agreement.

Class Counsel is awarded $641,250.00 in attorneys' fees and
$17,872.37 in costs.

Plaintiff Barney Frando is awarded $5,000.00 as an incentive
award.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 16, 2019
Judgment is available at https://tinyurl.com/yyu3ed8w from
Leagle.com.

Barney Frando, individually, and on behalf of other members of the
general public similarly situated and as an aggrieved employee
pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), Plaintiff,
represented by Robert J. Drexler, Jr. -
Robert.Drexler@CapstoneLawyers.com - Capstone Law APC, Ariel
Harman-Holmes - Ariel.Harman-Holmes@CapstoneLawyers.com - Capstone
Law APC, Jonathan Sing Lee - Jonathan.Lee@capstonelawyers.com -
Capstone Law APC & Raul Perez - Raul.perez@capstonelawyers.com -
Capstone Law APC.

LifeCare Solutions, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant,
represented by Karina Ann Layugan - klayugan@sheppardmullin.com -
Sheppard Mullin Richter and Hampton LLP & Robert E. Mussig, Jr.,
Sheppard Mullin Richter and Hampton LLP, 333 South Hope Street, Los
Angeles, CA 90067


LINCOLN NATIONAL: Mahoney Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
------------------------------------------------------------
The Lincoln National Life Insurance Company is facing a class
action lawsuit filed pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities
Act. The case is styled as  John Mahoney, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. The Lincoln National
Life Insurance Company, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-04426-RBS (E.D.
Penn., Sept. 24, 2019).

The Lincoln National Life Insurance Company offers a comprehensive
choice of life insurance products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David S. Glanzberg, Esq.
   Glanzberg Tobia & Associates PC
   123 s. Broad Street Suite 1640
   Philadelphia, PA 19109
   Tel: (215) 981-5400
   Email: dglanzberg@aol.com



LONG ISLAND BUSINESS: Yu Dismissed from Guan Suit Without Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHUN LAN GUAN, QIHUAI LIU, ZIQIANG LU, and HUIDE ZHOU,
on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. LONG ISLAND BUSINESS INSTITUTE, INC., MONICA FOOTE, and WILLIAM
DANTIVA, Defendants, Case No. 15-CV-2215 (CBA) (VMS) (E.D. N.Y.),
Judge Carol Bagley Amon of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York granted (i) the Defendants' motion to
decertify the Plaintiffs' conditionally certified class as to Huan
"Hazel" Yu, and (ii) the Defendants' motion to dismiss Yu without
prejudice.

The Plaintiffs brought the collective action against the
Defendants, alleging wage and discrimination claims under federal,
state, and city law.  On Aug. 11, 2016, pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
Section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), the Court
granted the Plaintiffs' motion to conditionally certify a
collective action limited to non-exempt, non-managerial employees
at LIBI's Flushing campus only.  It also denied without prejudice
the Defendants' request to exclude opt-in Plaintiff Yu as exempt
from FLSA under 29 U.S.C. Section 231(a)(1), concluding that it
lacked a sufficient record to make an informed factual
determination on Yu's similarity to the named Plaintiffs.

Following discovery, the Defendants moved to decertify the
collective action as to Yu and to dismiss Yu's claims from the
action.  The Court referred the Defendants' motion to Magistrate
Judge Vera M. Scanlon, who thereafter issued a Report and
Recommendation ("R&R") recommending that the Court grants the
Defendants' motion to decertify the Plaintiffs' conditionally
certified class as to Yu and grants the Defendants' motion to
dismiss Yu without prejudice.  The Plaintiffs have filed objections
to the R&R, and the Defendants have responded to the Plaintiffs'
objections.

The Plaintiffs do not challenge the legal standard applied by
Magistrate Judge Scanlon, but they contend that Magistrate Judge
Scanlon misapplied the standard in determining whether the
conditionally certified collective should be de-certified as to Yu.


Judge Amon need not decide which standard of review applies to
these challenges because she concludes, even under de novo review,
that decertification is appropriate.  The Judge agrees that the
named Plaintiffs and Yu present disparate factual and employment
settings: there is no dispute that the named Plaintiffs are
non-exempt cleaning and maintenance workers, but the parties
dispute whether Yu was an exempt or nonexempt employee.  She agrees
that there are key distinctions in the defenses available against
the named Plaintiffs and Yu.  And she agrees that fairness and
procedural considerations counsel against collective treatment of
Yu and the named Plaintiffs.  Accordingly, she grants LIBI's motion
to decertify the FLSA collective action as to Plaintiff Yu.

The Plaintiffs do not challenge the legal standard applied by
Magistrate Judge Scanlon, but appear to raise the same objections
to Yu's dismissal that they raised under the third factor for
decertification: that it would disserve fairness and judicial
economy to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Yu's
state law claims, because she has long been a party to this suit
and the statute of limitations would hamper recovery if she is
required to refile.  The Judge need not decide which standard of
review applies because she concludes, even under de novo review,
that the balance of factors weighs against exercising supplemental
jurisdiction over Yu's state law claims.

The Judge agrees that the balance of factors counsels against
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Yu's NYLL claims.
Because Yu has no remaining FLSA claims and her NYLL claims would
differ from those of the named Plaintiffs, the Judge concludes that
the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity
would not be served by retaining supplemental jurisdiction over
Yu's state law claims.  Accordingly, she declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Yu's NYLL claims and dismisses her
from the case.

For these reasons, Judge Amon adopted the R&R, granted the
Defendants' motion to decertify the FLSA collective action as to
Yu, and dismissed Yu's claims without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 13, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/KxkhtH from Leagle.com.

Chun Lan Guan, Qihuai Liu, Ziqiang Lu & Huide Zhou, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented
by Aaron Schweitzer -- TroyLaw@TroyPllc.com -- Troy Law, PLLC &
John Troy --  tsaihongjanq@hotmail.com -- Troy & Associates, PLLC.

Long Island Business Institute, Inc., Monica Foote & William
Dantiva, Defendants, represented by Paul H. Aloe --
paloe@kudmanlaw.com -- Kudman Trachten, LLP & David Nicholas
Saponara -- dsaponara@kudmanlaw.com -- Kudman Trachten Aloe LLP.


LOS ANGELES RECYCLING: Pelaez Seeks Minimum & OT Wages for Welders
------------------------------------------------------------------
VICTOR PELAEZ, an individual, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. LOS ANGELES RECYCLING
CENTER, INC., a California Corporation; BESTWAY RECYCLING COMPANY,
INC., a California Corporation; BESTWAY GLOBAL HOLDINGS, INC., a
California Corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, the Defendants,
Case No. 19STCV32260 (Cal. Super., Sept. 11, 2019), alleges that
Defendants failed to pay minimum wage and overtime wage in
violation of the California Labor Code.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was employed by
Defendants as a non-exempt Welder employee at Defendants' facility
in Los Angeles, California, from approximately March 13, 2017
through in or around March 2019. Throughout his employment with
Defendants, Plaintiff was responsible for performing repairs,
including repairing high pressure pipes and work equipment.

Throughout his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff generally
worked shifts 19 from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., and he sometimes
worked shifts in excess of ten hours. The Plaintiff generally
worked five days per week, Monday through Friday. But the Plaintiff
was not being compensated for all hours actually worked.

The Defendants are in the business of providing recycling center
services to the greater Los Angles and Southern California
area.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Paul K. Haines, Esq.
          HAINES LAW GROUP, APC
          222 N. Sepulveda Blvd., Suite 1550
          El Segundo, CA 90245
          Telephone: (424) 292-2350
          Facsimile: (424) 292-2355
          E-mail: phaines@haineslawgroup.com

               - and -

          Sherri R, Carter, Esq.
          SANI LAW, APC
          Sam Sani (SBN 273993)
          15720 Ventura Blvd., Suite 405
          Encino, CA 91436
          Telephone: (310) 935-0405
          Facsimile:(310)935-0409
          E-mail: ssani@sanilawfirm.com

LUCKY STORES: Court Dismisses Beasly's Suit Over Coffee-Mate
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint..MARK BEASLEY, Plaintiff, v.
LUCKY STORES, INC., et al., Defendants. Case No. 18-cv-07144-MMC.
(N.D. Cal.).

The instant case is a putative class action lawsuit brought by
Beasley, a California citizen, as a purchaser and consumer of
Coffee-mate, a line of coffee-creamer products. Beasley alleges
Nestlé manufactures, markets, and sells Coffee-mate. He also
alleges that four retailers, namely, defendants Lucky Stores, Inc.
(Lucky), Save Mart Super Markets (Save Mart), Save Mart Companies,
Inc. (SMCI), and The Kroger Company (Kroger), sold Coffee-mate at
their grocery stores throughout California and that, during the
class period, he purchased Coffee-mate from grocery stores owned by
said retailers.

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or
the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal
theory. Rule 8(a)(2), however, requires only a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief. Consequently, a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations.

Use Claims: First and Second Causes of Action

Defendants contend Beasley's use claims, which arise under state
law, are barred by the doctrine of conflict preemption. In support
thereof, defendants cite to this Court's decision in Backus v.
Nestlé USA, Inc., a related case in which the Court found the use
claims alleged therein, which likewise challenged the use of PHO in
Coffee-mate, preempted. Backus, 167 F.Supp.3d 1068, 1074 (N.D. Cal.
2016).

Conflict preemption applies where compliance with both federal and
state regulations is a physical impossibility or where state law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.

Here, Beasley's use claims are predicated on the unfair and
unlawful prongs of the UCL and on breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability, the same theories on which the use claims in
Backus were predicated. The Court, in Backus, determined the use
claims were preempted and, as discussed below, Beasley has provided
the Court with no reason to alter its prior determination.

The relevant federal law is the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA), which prohibits, inter alia, the introduction or delivery
for introduction into interstate commerce of any food that is
adulterated and the receipt in interstate commerce of any food that
is adulterated and the delivery or proffered delivery thereof. A
food is deemed adulterated if it is or if it bears or contains any
food additive that is unsafe within the meaning of section 348 of
this title 21 U.S.C. Section.  

Here Beasley's use claims challenge the sale of PHO-containing
Coffee-mate, on or after January 1, 2010. As in Backus, such claims
would effectively negate the FDA's order setting a compliance date
in 2018 and conflict with Congress's decision not to deem PHOs
unsafe, or the food containing them adulterated, pending the June
18, 2018, compliance date set by the FDA. Beasley's arguments to
the contrary are not persuasive.

At the outset, as defendants point out, Beasley reiterates a number
of arguments made in Backus. In particular, Beasley relies on the
presumption against preemption and contends that: (1) the FDA, in
the Final Determination, disclaimed preemption of state
prohibitions or limits on PHO use (2) the FDA, having determined
PHO is not GRAS, lacked the statutory authority to authorize the
sale of PHO and consequently, the compliance period entailed a
question of enforcement discretion, not legality.

In Backus, the Court, while acknowledging the presumption against
preemption, nonetheless found the use claims preempted. In reaching
such conclusion, the Court expressly rejected the first two
arguments set forth above, as to the FDA's asserted disclaimer and
lack of authority, declined to take a position as to preemptive
effect of Final Determination; finding argument FDA lacked
authority to authorize use of PHO mooted by enactment of Section
754, by which Congress essentially ratified Final Determination,
and implicitly rejected the latter two arguments, as to the scope
of Section 754.

Significantly, Beasley has not provided the Court with any
authority or other reason to suggest its conclusion in Backus was
incorrect or that it should reach a different conclusion in the
instant case. First, to the extent Beasley now argues the existence
of federal regulations permitting a food is not grounds for
conflict preempting a state law that imposes heavier regulations or
prohibits the same food the cases he cites in support of such
proposition are inapposite, as each said case considered whether a
broadly applicable federal law governing an industry preempted a
narrower state law prohibiting specific conduct not encompassed by
the broader statute. The instant case, by contrast, presents the
inverse of such circumstances, a situation where the plaintiff
relies on a broadly applicable state law to challenge specific
conduct expressly permitted under federal law.

In sum, faced with the same type of use claims, the same regulatory
and statutory framework, and, by and large, the same arguments, the
Court concludes Beasley's use claims, like those in Backus, are
preempted.  

Accordingly, the First and Second Causes of Action are subject to
dismissal.

Labeling Claims: Third Through Sixth Causes of Action

As noted, Beasley's labeling claims challenge, as false and
misleading, the 0g Trans Fat statements on Coffee-mate labels, and
are brought under four causes of action: the UCL, the FAL, breach
of express warranty, and the CLRA.

Under the UCL, as set forth above, any unlawful, unfair or
fraudulent business act or practice is prohibited. Beasley invokes
all three prongs of the UCL.

The FAL makes it unlawful for any person with intent directly or
indirectly to dispose of property to make or disseminate or cause
to be made or disseminated before the public in this state any
statement, concerning that property which is untrue or misleading,
and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care
should be known, to be untrue or misleading.

The CLRA prohibits specified unfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices undertaken by any person in a
transaction intended to result or that results in the sale of goods
to any consumer.  

Defendants seek to dismiss Beasley's labeling claims on multiple
bases, namely, failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 9(b), failure to meet limitations periods, failure
to plead reliance on the challenged statement, principles of equity
and with respect to the retailer defendants, failure to allege any
actionable wrongdoing. The Court addresses each such basis in
turn.

Rule 9(b)

Defendants contend the FAC fails to meet the heightened pleading
requirements of Rule 9(b). In particular, they argue Beasley has
not provided the basic details of his Coffee-mate purchases
including when he purchased Coffee-mate, the type/flavor he
purchased  and how and why he relied on the 0g Trans Fat
statements.

Where a party alleges fraud, Rule 9(b) requires the party to state
with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.

Beasley does not dispute that Rule 9(b) applies to his labeling
claims but, rather, contends he has met the rule's requirements.
Moreover, a review of the FAC shows Beasley repeatedly alleges
defendants engaged.
  
To satisfy Rule 9(b), a pleading must identify the who, what, when,
where, and how of the misconduct charged, as well as what is false
or misleading about [the purportedly fraudulent] statement, and why
it is false.

Here, Beasley alleges that: (1) during the class period, Nestle
unlawfully made Coffee-mate with PHO (2) he repeatedly purchased
Coffee-mate for personal and household consumption (3) he purchased
Coffee-mate during the class period approximately once per month
(4) he purchased Coffee-mate from the grocery stores owned by
defendants Lucky, Save Mart, SMCI, and Kroger during the class
period, the most frequent locations of such purchases being a Foods
Co store in San Francisco and a Lucky store in San Bruno (5) such
purchases included both the liquid and powder versions of
Coffee-mate (6) during much of the class period, Coffee-mate was
made with PHO yet contained the deceptive health and wellness claim
0g Trans Fat.

The Court finds the FAC does not meet the requirements of Rule
9(b).

In sum, Beasley's allegations as to when he purchased Coffee-mate
are insufficient, and, accordingly, the Court finds the Third
through Sixth Causes of Action are subject to dismissal for failure
to satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b).  

Timeliness

Defendants contend Beasley's labeling claims are time-barred
because, according to defendants, the 0g Trans Fat statement was
removed outside of the limitations period. In particular,
defendants argue that, at best for Beasley, the statute of
limitations bars claims that accrued prior to October 29, 2014, for
the asserted reason that, as of February 2012 and July 2013,
respectively, no labels produced for Coffee-mate powder products
and liquid products contained the challenged statement. In support
of such assertion, defendants have submitted a declaration by Rena
Kashmere, a Nestlé employee, together with a Request for Judicial
Notice of two exhibits depicting Coffee-mate product labels.  

Beasley responds that the statute of limitations issue is an
affirmative defense that cannot be resolved at this stage of the
proceedings because: (1) the FAC does not contain the requisite
facts to prove such defense (2) the Kashmere Declaration is
extrinsic evidence and (3) he adequately pleaded delayed
discovery.

Statutes of Limitations

In the instant case, Beasley's labeling claims are, depending on
the particular statute on which Beasley relies, subject to either a
three-year or four-year limitations period.  As Beasley filed his
initial complaint on October 29, 2018, the limitations period goes
back three years, to October 29, 2015, for his FAL and CLRA claims,
and four years, to October 29, 2014, for his UCL and breach of
warranty claims.

As noted, Beasley alleges a class period that dates back to January
1, 2010, more than four years before October 29, 2014, and more
than five years before October 29, 2015. Consequently, it appears
from the FAC that at least some, and perhaps all, of Beasley's
labeling claims may be time-barred. The Court cannot determine from
the FAC, however, whether any or all of Beasley's purchases fell
outside the limitations periods, given the lack of specificity as
to when and which type of Coffee-mate products he purchased, and
whether those products, at the time of purchase, contained PHO and
bore the challenged labeling statement.

Accordingly, the Court cannot, based on the FAC, find Beasley's
labeling claims are time-barred.

Given the above circumstances, the Court does not consider, for
purposes of the instant motion, either the Kashmere Declaration or
the exhibits referenced therein. Nevertheless, because, as noted,
it appears from the FAC itself that at least some of the claims may
be time-barred, and because the FAC includes a section on delayed
discovery, the Court next turns to the delayed discovery rule.

Delayed Discovery Rule

Under California law, to rely on the discovery rule for delayed
accrual of a cause of action, the plaintiff must specifically plead
facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the
inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable
diligence.

Here, Beasley alleges, he did not discover defendants' unlawful
conduct until January 2017, when he learned that Coffee-mate
contained, despite its explicit label claim, trans fat, and that
trans fat is harmful to human health in any quantity. In addition,
Beasley alleges that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, e
could not have discovered earlier defendants' fraudulent and
unlawful acts, as he is not a nutritionist, food expert, or food
scientist, but rather a lay consumer.

Although Beasley has pled the time of his discovery, he has failed
to plead the manner thereof, as he merely identifies January 2017
as the date he learned about the facts of his claims. Further, his
alleged lack of expertise is, without more, insufficient to support
his assertion that he could not have discovered those facts
earlier.

Accordingly, the Court finds Beasley has not pled sufficient facts
to invoke the delayed discovery rule.  

Standing: Reliance Element

Defendants also challenge Beasley's statutory standing to bring two
of his labeling claims, namely, his UCL and FAL claims, on the
basis that Beasley has not plausibly alleged that the 0g Trans Fat
statement was an immediate cause of his purchase.

To have standing to pursue a claim under the UCL or FAL, a party
must: (1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or property
sufficient to qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury and
(2) show that that economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused
by, the unfair business practice or false advertising that is the
gravamen of the claim.

According to defendants, Beasley has conceded that, prior to
January 2017, he was unaware that trans fat is harmful to human
health and, consequently, defendants argue, neither the amount of
trans fat in Coffee-mate nor the 0g Trans Fat claim could have been
material to his purchasing decisions.
   
In response, Beasley states defendants have misquoted the FAC,
which, as he points out, does not allege that he merely discovered
that trans fat is harmful to human health' in January 2017, but
that it was harmful in any quantity. Nevertheless, for the reasons
discussed below, the Court finds the allegations in the FAC are
inadequate to plead reliance.

In that regard, the allegations cited in the Court's discussion of
Rule 9(b) and timeliness are in large part also relevant to the
issue of reliance. Although Beasley alleges he relied on the 0g
Trans Fat claim in purchasing Coffee-mate, he has not alleged
whether those purchases were made before or after January 2017, the
month in which he allegedly learned the inclusion of trans fat in
any amount was harmful.  

The Court finds the Third and Fourth Causes of Action are subject
to dismissal on the above-discussed additional ground as well.

Principles of Equity

Defendants make an additional argument that Beasley's labeling
claims are barred by principles of equity. In that regard,
defendants rely on two district court decisions in which the
plaintiffs' challenges to 0g Trans Fat labeling were found
preempted and contend that, given such rulings, Nestlé had every
reason and right to conclude that its products could legally bear
the 0g Trans Fat label claim at the time that it made labeling
decisions regarding Coffee-mate packaging.

As Beasley points out, defendants have not cited to any authority
acknowledging such an equity argument, and the Court finds
defendants' asserted reliance thereon unpersuasive.

Retailer Defendants

As alleged against the retailers, defendants contend Beasley's
claims fail for the additional reason that the FAC does not allege
any actionable wrongdoing on their part. In particular, defendants
argue, Beasley does not allege the retailers were involved with or
had any control over the labels that Nestle used on its products
and that he cannot hold the retailers vicariously liable for
allegedly false statements attributable to the manufacturer.

Relying on the unlawful prong of the UCL, Beasley contends he has
alleged the retailers sale of Coffee-mate violated California law.
In particular, Beasley cites four provisions of the Sherman Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Law (Sherman Law) pertaining to false
advertising and misbranding, which Beasley characterizes as strict
liability statutes that explicitly place equal duties on
manufacturers and sellers of foods.

The above-cited provisions do not, by their own terms, restrict
liability to manufacturers and the FAC, while not a model of
clarity, does allege the retailers unlawfully sold Coffee-mate at
their grocery stores, for which sales, Beasley has clarified in his
opposition, he seeks to hold the retailers liable.

Consequently, although, as discussed in earlier sections, the
claims against the retailer defendants are subject to dismissal,
those claims are not subject to dismissal on the above-discussed
additional ground.

Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 16, 2019 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yyghwcz5 from Leagle.com.

Mark Beasley, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory Weston -
greg@westonfirm.com

Lucky Stores, Inc. & The Save Mart Companies, Inc., Defendants,
represented by Dale Joseph Giali - dgiali@mayerbrown.com - Mayer
Brown LLP.

Nestle USA, Inc., Save Mart Super Markets & The Kroger Company,
Defendants, represented by Dale Joseph Giali , Mayer Brown LLP,
Keri Elizabeth Borders - kborders@mayerbrown.com - Mayer Brown LLP
& Rebecca Bari Johns - rjohns@mayerbrown.com - Mayer Brown LLP.


MBR CENTRAL: Court OKs Settlement in Donaldson Suit
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
Illinois, Springfield Division, issued an Opinion and Order
granting Parties' Joint Motion to Approve Settlement in the case
captioned DYLAN DONALDSON, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. MBR CENTRAL ILLINOIS PIZZA, LLC,
MBR MANAGEMENT CORP., and MARK RATTERMAN, Defendants. No.
18-cv-3048. (C.D. Ill.).

Plaintiff Dylan Donaldson brings this suit on behalf of himself and
other similarly situated individuals under the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA), the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (IMWL) and the Illinois
Wage Payment and Collection Act (IWPCA). Plaintiffs allege that
Defendants failed to pay delivery drivers the legally mandated
minimum wage for their hours worked.  

Before approving an FLSA settlement, a court must find that the
settlement represents a fair and equitable resolution of a bona
fide dispute under the FLSA. If a court is satisfied that an FLSA
settlement is the product of contested litigation, approval of the
settlement is usually appropriate.  

The parties contend that the settlement agreement is the product of
arms-length negotiations by experienced counsel. They further claim
that the settlement agreement provides fair relief to Plaintiffs
while eliminating the risks the parties would bear if litigation
continued to resolution on the merits. The Court agrees that the
settlement agreement is a reasonable compromise over contested
issues, indicia of fairness to a settlement reached as a result.

That said, the Court's determination of whether the proposed
settlement is both fair and reasonable also includes an evaluation
of the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees sought. An award of
attorneys' fees that is a large multiple of the amount awarded
should cause the court to pause and reflect on the fee requested.

In this case, applying proportionality principles gives the Court
pause. The parties' proposed settlement contains an award of
attorneys' fees in an amount that is more than twice the amount to
be received by Plaintiffs.

Nonetheless, the disproportionality here need not be treated as
fatal as it might in the context of the approval of a Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23 class action settlement.

In the context of FLSA collective actions where the recovery for
each individual plaintiff may be relatively modest, the Supreme
Court has recognized a Congressional intent to give "plaintiffs the
advantage of lower individual costs to vindicate rights by the
pooling of resources.

Here, each Plaintiff will receive amounts ranging from just over
$440 to about $975, totaling a little more than $4,000, while
counsel will receive $10,000.  

The parties' Motion to Approve Settlement is supported by a
supplemental declaration from Plaintiffs' attorneys. In the
declaration, Plaintiffs' attorneys set forth the time expended on
the case and the attorneys' typical hourly rates. The declaration
shows that Plaintiffs' attorneys' have expended over $16,000 in
fees to date. The request for $10,000 in attorneys' fees in the
Motion to Approve Settlement, then, represents an approximately
forty percent discount from the value of the fees reported in the
declaration. Plaintiffs' attorneys and paralegals have billed at
rates between $125 and $400 per hour and Plaintiffs' attorneys cite
to several cases from the Southern and Northern Districts of Ohio
in which the attorneys' hourly rates have been approved. The
attorneys' hourly rates range from $250 per hour on the low end to
$4001 per hour on the high end.  

These rates, even before factoring in the approximately forty
percent reduction in total fees sought, are in line with rates that
have recently been approved in this District. The Court, therefore,
finds the request for attorneys' fees to be reasonable and
appropriate for Plaintiffs' counsels' work in this litigation.

In sum, the Court concludes that the settlement agreement is fair
and reasonable in light of Plaintiffs' modest claims and the risk
and expense that further litigation would entail.

The parties' Joint Motion to Approve Settlement is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 16, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y4metu2w from
Leagle.com.

Dylan Donaldson, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Paul Kimble -
akimble@msdlegal.com - MARKOVITS STOCK & DEMARCO LLC & Aaron B.
Maduff , MADUFF & MADUFF LLC, 205 N. Michigan Ave. Suite 2050
Chicago, Illinois 60601

MBR Central Ill. Pizza, LLC, MBR Management Corporation & Mark
Ratterman, Defendants, represented by Rodney A. Harrison
–rodney.harrison @ogletree.com - OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK &
STEWART PC.


MCKESSON CORP: Court Certifies Class in True Health TCPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TRUE HEALTH CHIROPRACTIC INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
McKESSON CORPORATION, et al., Defendants, Case No. 13-cv-02219-HSG
(N.D. Cal.), Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California (i) granted the
Plaintiffs' renewed motion for class certification, and (ii) denied
McKesson's motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff True Health filed the putative class action on May 15,
2013, alleging that Defendant McKesson Corp. sent "unsolicited
advertisements" by facsimile in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act ("TCPA").  The Plaintiff filed a First Amended
Complaint on June 20, 2013, and a Second Amended Complaint ("SAC")
on July 18, 2014, which added McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates,
Inc. as a Plaintiff and McKesson Technologies, Inc. as a Defendant.
The operative complaint similarly alleges that the Defendants
violated the TCPA by sending "unsolicited advertisements" by fax.
The Plaintiffs contend that they neither invited nor gave
permission to the Defendants to send the faxes, but that even
assuming the faxes were sent pursuant to a recipient's express
permission or an "established business relationship," the required
"opt-out notice" was absent.

During heavily contested discovery, the Defendants were ordered to
(1) identify each type of act that they believe demonstrates a
recipient's express permission to receive faxes (e.g. completing a
software registration), (2) explain how that act qualifies as
express permission, and (3) identify each recipient allegedly
giving that type of permission by name and contact information
(including, at a minimum, fax and phone number).  In response, the
Defendants identified three groups of consent defenses that it
argued relieved it of TCPA liability and produced three exhibits --
Exhibits A, B, and C -- corresponding to the consent-defense
groups.

Fax recipients identified in Exhibit A purportedly gave consent by
(1) providing fax numbers when registering a product purchased from
a subdivision of McKesson; and (2) entering into software-licensing
agreements, or End User License Agreements ("EULA").  Fax
recipients identified in Exhibit B purportedly gave consent by (1)
checking a box during their software registration "that indicated
express permission to be sent faxes as a preferred method of
communication to receive promotional information;" (2) completing a
written consent form "whereby they further provided their express
permission to receive faxes;" or (3) confirming on phone calls
"that they would like to continue to receive faxes and/or would
like to change their communication method preferences."  Fax
recipients identified in Exhibit C purportedly gave Defendants
consent through individual communications and personal
relationships.

The Plaintiffs later moved to certify a single class of all
putative class members.  The Court denied certification on the
basis that the Plaintiffs failed to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)'s
predominance requirement. Because the Court denied certification
for failure to satisfy predominance, its order did not address
other requirements for class certification.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded.  Following remand, the Court reopened fact discovery
for the limited purpose of supplementing the record in light of Van
Patten, and only as to the putative class members identified in
Exhibit B.  After supplemental discovery, the Plaintiffs submitted
a renewed motion for class certification.  They no longer seek
certification of putative class members in Exhibit B; rather, they
seek certification limited to the Exhibit A-only Class.  And only
Plaintiff McLaughlin now seeks appointment as a class
representative.

At the hearing on the renewed motion for class certification, the
Court advised the parties that it was inclined to permit narrow
summary judgment briefing before ruling on that motion.
Specifically, it expressed interest in resolving whether the
provision of fax numbers through the Medisoft product registration
and EULA—in other words, Exhibit A consent defenses --
constituted prior express invitation or permission to receive the
disputed faxes, which is a matter of law that all parties agreed
would resolve the case as to the named Plaintiff's claim.

The Court thereafter permitted summary judgment briefing on the
limited issue of whether voluntarily providing a fax number on
product registration and/or agreeing to the EULA constitutes
express permission.

As an initial matter, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment
relies on extensive material beyond the scope of the summary
judgment briefing authorized by the Court.  The Court only
permitted summary judgment briefing concerning "whether voluntarily
providing a fax number on product registration and/or agreeing to
the EULA constitutes express permission."  The Defendants' motion,
however, relies on additional evidence to argue that the Plaintiffs
consented to receiving faxes in other ways.  In keeping with the
scope of briefing it actually approved, Judge Gilliam only
considers: (1) the provision of fax numbers on the Medisoft product
registration form, and (2) users' agreement to the EULA's terms.

The Judge finds that the Defendants have not carried their burden
to show that the Plaintiffs gave "prior express invitation or
permission" for faxed advertisements either through the provision
of their fax numbers in the Medisoft product registration form or
by agreeing to the Medisoft EULA.  Consumers agreeing to the EULA
only "clearly and unmistakably" gave permission for the Defendant
to collect certain "usage information."

Turning to the Plaintiffs' renewed motion for class certification,
the Plaintiffs' renewed motion seeks to certify the class of all
persons or entities who received faxes from McKesson from Sept. 2,
2009, to May 11, 2010, offering Medisoft, Lytec, Practice Partner,
or Revenue Management Advanced software or BillFlash Patient
Statement Service, where the faxes do not inform the recipient of
the right to opt out of future faxes, and whose fax numbers are
listed in Exhibit A to McKesson's Supplemental Response to
Interrogatory Regarding Prior Express Invitation or Permission, but
not in Exhibit B or Exhibit C to McKesson's Response to
Interrogatory Regarding Prior Express Invitation or Permission.

To certify a class, the Plaintiff must also satisfy the
requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3).  The Judge finds
these requirements satisfied in the case.  Because the Judge finds
McLaughlin's claims as alleged in the operative complaint relate
back to the original complaint, McLaughlin is not precluded from
serving as a class representative for faxes sent more than four
years before McLaughlin intervened in the action.

For the foregoing reasons, the Judge granted the Plaintiffs'
renewed motion for class certification and certified the class of
all persons or entities who received faxes from McKesson from Sept.
2, 2009, to May 11, 2010, offering Medisoft, Lytec, Practice
Partner, or Revenue Management Advanced software or BillFlash
Patient Statement Service, where the faxes do not inform the
recipient of the right to opt out of future faxes, and whose fax
numbers are listed in Exhibit A to McKesson's Supplemental Response
to Interrogatory Regarding Prior Express Invitation or Permission,
but not in Exhibit B or Exhibit C to McKesson's Response to
Interrogatory Regarding Prior Express Invitation or Permission.

He appointed McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. to represent
the class, and appointed as the class counsel its attorneys at
Anderson + Wanca, Montgomery, Rennie & Jonson, and Schubert
Jonckheer & Kolbe LLP.

The Judge denied the Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

The parties are directed to meet and confer and e-file by Aug. 23,
2019 a stipulation and proposed order setting forth a schedule
through trial.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 13, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/bUOLVt from Leagle.com.

True Health Chiropractic Inc, Plaintiff, represented by Robert C.
Schubert -- rschubert@schubertlawfirm.com -- Schubert Jonckheer &
Kolbe LLP, Willem F. Jonckheer -- wjonckheer@schubertlawfirm.com
-- Schubert Jonckheer & Kolbe LLP, Brian John Wanca --
BWanca@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson + Wanca, Dustin Lamm Schubert
-- dschubert@schubertlawfirm.com -- Schubert Jonckheer & Kolbe
LLP, George Demetrios Jonson -- gjonson@mrjlaw.com -- Montgomery
Rennie Jonson, Glenn L. Hara, Anderson + Wanca, Matthew Elton
Stubbs -- mstubbs@mrjlaw.com -- Montgomery Rennie Jonson, Ross
Michael Good -- RGood@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson + Wanca & Ryan
Michael Kelly -- RKelly@andersonwanca.com

McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc., Plaintiff, represented
by Brian John Wanca, Anderson + Wanca, Dustin Lamm Schubert,
Schubert Jonckheer & Kolbe LLP, George Demetrios Jonson,
Montgomery Rennie Jonson, Glenn L. Hara, Anderson + Wanca, Ross
Michael Good, Anderson + Wanca & Willem F. Jonckheer, Schubert
Jonckheer & Kolbe LLP.

McKesson Corporation, Defendant, represented by Tyree P. Jones,
Jr. -- tpjones@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP, Andrew Amoroso --
aamoroso@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP & David S. Reidy --
dreidy@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP.

McKesson Technologies, Inc., Defendant, represented by Andrew
Amoroso, Reed Smith LLP & Tyree P. Jones, Jr., Reed Smith, LLP.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervenor, represented by Warren
Metlitzky, United States Attorney -- warren.metlitzky@sfgov.org


MDL 2460: Court Certifies Class in Niaspan Antitrust Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE NIASPAN ANTITRUST LITIGATION THIS DOCUMENT
RELATES TO ALL ACTIONS, MDL No. 2460, No. 13-MD-2460 (E.D. Pa.),
Judge Jan E. DuBois of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania granted the Direct Purchaser Class
Plaintiffs ("DPPs")' Motion for Class Certification.

The multidistrict litigation concerns what has come to be known as
a "pay-for-delay," or "reverse payment," settlement -- a practice
in which a brand-name drug manufacturer brings a
patent-infringement action against a generic drug manufacturer and
then compensates the generic drug manufacturer for its agreement to
delay entering the market with a competing generic version of the
brand-name drug.  In the case, two putative classes -- the DPPs and
the End-Payor Plaintiffs ("EPPs") -- aver that the brand-name
manufacturer of the drug Niaspan, Kos Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
("Kos"), entered into anticompetitive settlement agreements in
March of 2005 with the generic manufacturer of that drug, Barr
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., in order to terminate patent-infringement
litigation brought by Kos against Barr in the District Court for
the Southern District of New York.  Kos was later acquired by
Defendant AbbVie Inc., and Barr was later acquired by Defendant
Teva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

On Dec.19, 2018, DPPs filed a Motion for Class Certification. I n
their Motion, DPPs seek certification of the class of all persons
or entities in the United States and its territories who purchased
brand name Niaspan directly from any Defendant, and generic Niaspan
(extended-release niacin) at any time during the period April 5,
2009 through June 26, 2014; or who purchased generic Niaspan
(extended-release niacin) directly from any Defendant during that
time period; or who purchased brand name Niaspan directly from any
defendant at any time after April 5, 2009 but ceased operations
before generic Niaspan entered in September 2013.

The proposed class consists of 48 class members, six of which have
since been acquired by other class members.  Twenty-one class
members purchased brand and generic Niaspan from the Defendants.
Two class members, King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. and Professional
Drug Company Inc., purchased brand Niaspan but ceased business
operations before generic Niaspan became available in 2013.
Twenty-five class members purchased only generic Niaspan directly
from the Defendants.

DPPs also move the Court to appoint Plaintiffs Rochester Drug
Co-Operative, Value Drug, and Professional Drug Co. as the class
representatives and to appoint Berger Montague PC, Garwin Gerstein
& Fisher LLP, and Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP as the Co-Lead
Counsel for the Class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B) and
23(g).

The Defendants responded to the Motion on Feb. 25, 2019; DPPs filed
a Reply on March 25, 2019.  The Court held Hearings on DPPs' Class
Certification Motion on May 14 and July 23, 2019.  DPPs argue that
they have satisfied their burden of establishing each Rule 23
requirement by a preponderance of the evidence.

DPPs must satisfy (i) the four prerequisites detailed in Rule
23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy; and (ii)
the predominance and superiority requirements expressly detailed in
Rule 23(b)(3) as well as the implied ascertainability requirement.
Judge DuBois concludes that each Rule 23(a) and each Rule 23(b)(3)
requirement, as well as the implied ascertainability requirement,
is satisfied.

Accordingly, the Judge is certified pursuant to Rule 23(a) and Rule
23(b)(3) the class of all persons or entities in the United States
and its territories who purchased brand name Niaspan directly from
any Defendant, and generic Niaspan (extended-release niacin) at any
time during the period April 5, 2009 through June 26, 2014; or who
purchased generic Niaspan (extended-release niacin) directly from
any Defendant during that time period; or who purchased brand name
Niaspan directly from any Defendant at any time after April 5, 2009
but ceased operations before generic Niaspan entered in September
2013.  Excluded from the class are the Defendants, their officers,
directors, management, employees, subsidiaries, and affiliates, and
all federal governmental entities.

The Judge appointed Rochester Drug Co-Operative, Value Drug, and
Professional Drug Company Inc. as the class representatives.
Berger Montague PC, Garwin Gerstein & Fisher LLP, and Hagens Berman
Sobol Shapiro LLP are appointed the Co-Lead Counsel for the DPPs.

An appropriate Order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 14, 2019 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/dlgpgl from Leagle.com.


MDL 2472: RG/2 Named Notice Admin in Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge William E. Smith of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Rhode Island has entered an order approving the form and manner
of Notice and appointing the notice administrator in the case, IN
RE: LOESTRIN 24 FE ANTITRUST LITIGATION. THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO:
Direct Purchaser Actions, MDL No. 2472, Master File No.
1:13-md-2472-S-PAS (D. R.I.).

On July 2, 2019, the Court allowed Direct Purchaser Class
Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification under Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3).  Pursuant to the Class Certification Order, it certified
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) the class of all persons or entities
in the United States and its territories who purchased brand or
generic Loestrin 24 directly from Warner or Amneal at any time
during the period from Sept. 1, 2009, through and until June 3,
2015, and all persons or entities in the United States and its
territories who purchased brand Minastrin 24 directly from Warner
at any time during the period from Sept. 1, 2009, through and until
March 14, 2017.

The Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs have now requested that the Court
approves their proposed form and manner of notice to the certified
class informing them of the pendency of the class action and
appoint RG/2 Claims Administration as the notice administrator
tasked with effectuating notice to each class member.

For the reasons set forth in the Class Certification Order, Judge
Smith appointed RG/2 Claims Administration as the notice
administrator for the action.  The form of notice to be sent to
members of the Class will be substantially in the form of the
revised proposed notice attached as Exhibit A to the Direct
Purchaser Class Plaintiffs' Notice of Filing Revised Proposed
Notice to Class Members, and attached to the Order as Exhibit A.

Within 14 days of the entry of the Order, the notice administrator
will cause the Notice to be sent by U.S. First Class mail to the
members of the class listed in Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of
Kristen A. Johnson filed with the Motion for Entry of an Order
Approving the Form and Manner of Notice and Appointing Notice
Administrator.

The Members of the Class may request exclusion from the Class
postmarked no later than 35 days from the mailing of the Notice to
the Class in accordance with the procedures set forth in the
Notice.  The notice administrator, RG/2 Claims Administration, and
the Lead Class Counsel will monitor and record any and all opt-out
requests that are received.

Within 60 days of entry of the Order, the notice administrator will
file a declaration with the Court confirming that the Notice has
been sent by U.S. First Class Mail to all Class members as required
and identifying the Class members, if any, who requested to be
excluded from the Class and who meet the requirements for a valid
request for exclusion as set forth in the Notice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 14, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/0CYkGE from Leagle.com.

City of Providence, individually and on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Donald A.
Migliori, Motley Rice LLC, Jeffrey M. Padwa , DarrowEverett LLP,
John Andrew Ioannou, Motley Rice LLC, pro hac vice, Michael M.
Buchman -- mbuchman@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice LLC, pro hac
vice, Robert J. McConnell, Motley Rice LLC, Bonnie A. Kendrick,
The
Dugan Law Firm, pro hac vice, David S. Scalia, The Dugan Law Firm,
Douglas R. Plymale, Dugan Law Firm, Ellen T. Noteware , Berger
Montague PC, pro hac vice, Michelle C. Clerkin, Motley Rice LLC,
pro hac vice, Donna M. Evans -- devans@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Matthew C. Weiner --
matt@hilliardshadowenlaw.com -- Hilliard & Shadowen, LLP, pro hac
vice & Sharon K. Robertson -- srobertson@cohenmilstein.com --
Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC.

United Food and Commercial Workers Local 1776, and Participating
Employers Health and Welfare Fund individually and on behalf of
all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Bonnie A.
Kendrick , The Dugan Law Firm, pro hac vice, David S. Scalia , The
Dugan Law Firm, Donald Sean Nation , Hilliard & Shadowen, LLP, pro
hac vice, Douglas R. Plymale , Dugan Law Firm, Ellen T. Noteware ,
Berger Montague PC, pro hac vice, Matthew C. Weiner , Hilliard &
Shadowen, LLP, pro hac vice, Natalie Finkelman Bennett , Shepard,
Finkelman, Miller & Shah, LLP, pro hac vice, Robert J. McConnell ,
Motley Rice LLC, Steve D. Shadowen --
steve@hilliardshadowenlaw.com
-- Hilliard & Shadowen LLC, Vincent L. Greene, IV , Motley Rice
LLC, Donna M. Evans , Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC & Sharon
K. Robertson , Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC.

New York Hotel Trades Council & Hotel Association of New York
City,
Inc. Health Benefits Fund, individually and on behalf of all
others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Lometti
,
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Sharon K. Robertson , Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Bonnie A. Kendrick , The Dugan Law
Firm, pro hac vice, David S. Scalia , The Dugan Law Firm, Douglas
R. Plymale , Dugan Law Firm, Ellen T. Noteware , Berger Montague
PC, pro hac vice, Robert J. McConnell , Motley Rice LLC, Donna M.
Evans , Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC & Matthew C. Weiner ,
Hilliard & Shadowen, LLP, pro hac vice.

Fraternal Order of Police Fort Lauderdale Lodge 31, Insurance
Trust
Fund - individually and behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Adam G. Kurtz , Pomerantz LLP, pro hac
vice, Jayne A. Goldstein , Shepherd Finkelman Miller & Shah LLP,
pro hac vice, Bonnie A. Kendrick , The Dugan Law Firm, pro hac
vice, David S. Scalia , The Dugan Law Firm, Douglas R. Plymale ,
Dugan Law Firm, Ellen T. Noteware , Berger Montague PC, pro hac
vice, Robert J. McConnell , Motley Rice LLC, Donna M. Evans ,
Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Matthew C. Weiner , Hilliard &
Shadowen, LLP, pro hac vice & Sharon K. Robertson , Cohen Milstein
Sellers & Toll PLLC.

Electrical Workers 242 & 294 Health & Welfare Fund, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
represented by Diana J. Zinser , Spector Roseman & Kodroff P.C.,
Bonnie A. Kendrick , The Dugan Law Firm, pro hac vice, David S.
Scalia , The Dugan Law Firm, Douglas R. Plymale , Dugan Law Firm,
Ellen T. Noteware , Berger Montague PC, pro hac vice, Robert J.
McConnell , Motley Rice LLC, Donna M. Evans , Cohen Milstein
Sellers & Toll PLLC, Matthew C. Weiner , Hilliard & Shadowen, LLP,
pro hac vice & Sharon K. Robertson , Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll
PLLC.

Denise Loy, a resident citizen of the State of Florida,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated & Mary
Alexander, a resident citizen of the State of North Carolina,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Christopher W. Cantrell , Doyle Lowther
LLP, pro hac vice, Donald A. Migliori , Motley Rice LLC, James R.
Hail , Doyle Lowther LLP, pro hac vice, William J. Doyle, II ,
Doyle Lowther LLP, pro hac vice, Bonnie A. Kendrick , The Dugan
Law
Firm, David S. Scalia , The Dugan Law Firm, Ellen T. Noteware ,
Berger Montague PC, pro hac vice, Robert J. McConnell , Motley
Rice
LLC, Donna M. Evans , Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Matthew
C. Weiner , Hilliard & Shadowen, LLP, pro hac vice & Sharon K.
Robertson , Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC.

Warner Chilcott Public Limited Company, Warner Chilcott Company,
LLC, Warner Chilcott Holdings Company III, Ltd., Warner Chilcott
Corporation, Warner Chilcott Sales (US), LLC & Warner Chilcott
Laboratories Ireland Limited, Defendants, represented by John A.
Tarantino -- jtarantino@apslaw.com -- Adler Pollock & Sheehan
P.C.,
Nicole J. Benjamin -- nbenjamin@apslaw.com -- Adler, Pollock &
Sheehan, PC, Patricia K. Rocha -- procha@apslaw.com -- Adler
Pollock & Sheehan P.C., A. Lee Czocher, White & Case LLP, pro hac
vice, Alyson M. Cox, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Angela D.
Daker, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Caitlin Cipicchio, White &
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Celia A. McLaughlin, White & Case LLP, pro
hac vice, Christopher Swift-Perez , White & Case LLP, pro hac
vice,
Daniel Grossbaum , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Danielle M.
Audette , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, David Courchaine, White
&
Case, pro hac vice, Demetra Frawley, White & Case, pro hac vice,
Don Zhe Nan Wang, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Eileen M. Cole
--
ecole@whitecase.com -- White & Case, pro hac vice, Emily Renzelli,
White & Case, pro hac vice, Holly Smith Letourneau , White & Case
LLP, pro hac vice, Jaclyn Phillips , White & Case LLP, pro hac
vice, Katherine Dyson, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Kristen
O'Shaughnessy, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Lauren Papenhausen,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Martin Toto, White & Case, pro hac
vice, Matthew S. Leddicotte, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
Michael J. Gallagher, White & Case, pro hac vice, Michael E.
Hamburger, White & Case LLP, Noah Brumfield, White & Case, pro hac
vice, Peter J. Carney, White & Case LLP, Robert A. Milne, White &
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Stefan Mentzer, White & Case LLP, pro hac
vice, William K. Wray, Jr., Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C., pro hac
vice & Zachary Dickens, White & Case, pro hac vice.

Warner Chilcott U.S., LLC, Defendant, represented by Alison
Hanstead , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, J. Mark Gidley , White
&
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Jack E. Pace, III , White & Case LLP, pro
hac vice, John A. Tarantino , Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C., Nicole
J. Benjamin , Adler, Pollock & Sheehan, PC, Patricia K. Rocha ,
Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C., Peter J. Carney , White & Case LLP,
A. Lee Czocher , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Alyson M. Cox ,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Angela D. Daker , White & Case
LLP,
pro hac vice, Caitlin Cipicchio , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
Celia A. McLaughlin , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Christopher
Swift-Perez , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel Grossbaum ,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Danielle M. Audette , White & Case
LLP, pro hac vice, David Courchaine , White & Case, pro hac vice,
Demetra Frawley , White & Case, pro hac vice, Don Zhe Nan Wang ,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Eileen M. Cole , White & Case, pro
hac vice, Emily Renzelli , White & Case, pro hac vice, Holly Smith
Letourneau , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Jaclyn Phillips ,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Katherine Dyson , White & Case
LLP,
pro hac vice, Kristen O'Shaughnessy , White & Case LLP, pro hac
vice, Lauren Papenhausen , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Martin
Toto , White & Case, pro hac vice, Matthew S. Leddicotte , White &
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Michael J. Gallagher , White & Case, pro
hac vice, Michael E. Hamburger , White & Case LLP, Noah Brumfield
,
White & Case, pro hac vice, Robert A. Milne , White & Case LLP,
pro
hac vice, Stefan Mentzer , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, William
K. Wray, Jr. , Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C., pro hac vice &
Zachary
Dickens , White & Case, pro hac vice.

Warner Chilcott Company, Inc., Defendant, represented by John A.
Tarantino , Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C., Nicole J. Benjamin ,
Adler, Pollock & Sheehan, PC, Patricia K. Rocha , Adler Pollock &
Sheehan P.C., A. Lee Czocher , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
Alyson M. Cox , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Angela D. Daker ,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Christopher Swift-Perez , White &
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel Grossbaum , White & Case LLP, pro
hac vice, Danielle M. Audette , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
David Courchaine , White & Case, pro hac vice, Demetra Frawley ,
White & Case, pro hac vice, Don Zhe Nan Wang , White & Case LLP,
pro hac vice, Eileen M. Cole , White & Case, pro hac vice, Emily
Renzelli , White & Case, pro hac vice, Holly Smith Letourneau ,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Jaclyn Phillips , White & Case
LLP,
pro hac vice, Katherine Dyson , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
Kristen O'Shaughnessy , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Lauren
Papenhausen , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew S.
Leddicotte
, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Michael J. Gallagher , White &
Case, pro hac vice, Michael E. Hamburger , White & Case LLP, Noah
Brumfield , White & Case, pro hac vice, Peter J. Carney , White &
Case LLP, Robert A. Milne , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Stefan
Mentzer , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, William K. Wray, Jr. ,
Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C., pro hac vice & Zachary Dickens ,
White & Case, pro hac vice.

Actavis, Inc., Defendant, represented by Alison Hanstead , White &
Case LLP, J. Mark Gidley , White & Case LLP, Jack E. Pace, III ,
White & Case LLP, John A. Tarantino , Adler Pollock & Sheehan
P.C.,
Nicole J. Benjamin , Adler, Pollock & Sheehan, PC, Patricia K.
Rocha , Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C., Angela D. Daker , White &
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Danielle M. Audette , White & Case LLP,
pro
hac vice, Holly Smith Letourneau , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
Lauren Papenhausen , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice & Robert A.
Milne , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice.

Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. & Watson Laboratories, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by Alison Hanstead , White & Case LLP, J.
Mark Gidley , White & Case LLP, Jack E. Pace, III , White & Case
LLP, John A. Tarantino , Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C., Nicole J.
Benjamin , Adler, Pollock & Sheehan, PC, Patricia K. Rocha , Adler
Pollock & Sheehan P.C., A. Lee Czocher , White & Case LLP, pro hac
vice, Alyson M. Cox , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Angela D.
Daker , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Caitlin Cipicchio , White
&
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Celia A. McLaughlin , White & Case LLP,
pro
hac vice, Christopher Swift-Perez , White & Case LLP, pro hac
vice,
Daniel Grossbaum , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Danielle M.
Audette , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, David Courchaine , White
& Case, pro hac vice, Demetra Frawley , White & Case, pro hac
vice,
Don Zhe Nan Wang , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Eileen M. Cole
,
White & Case, pro hac vice, Emily Renzelli , White & Case, pro hac
vice, Holly Smith Letourneau , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
Jaclyn Phillips , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Katherine Dyson
,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Kristen O'Shaughnessy , White &
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Lauren Papenhausen , White & Case LLP, pro
hac vice, Martin Toto , White & Case, pro hac vice, Matthew S.
Leddicotte , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Michael J. Gallagher
,
White & Case, pro hac vice, Michael E. Hamburger , White & Case
LLP, Noah Brumfield , White & Case, pro hac vice, Peter J. Carney
,
White & Case LLP, Robert A. Milne , White & Case LLP, pro hac
vice,
Stefan Mentzer , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, William K. Wray,
Jr. , Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C., pro hac vice & Zachary Dickens
, White & Case, pro hac vice.


MDL 2693: Vizio Consumer Privacy Suit Dismissed With Prejudice
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Josephine L. Staton of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California, Santa Ana Division, has entered
judgment in the case, IN RE: VIZIO, INC., CONSUMER PRIVACY
LITIGATION. This document relates to: ALL ACTIONS, Case No.
8:16-ml-02693-JLS (KESx) (C.D. Cal.), and dismissed the Action in
its entirety with prejudice.

Judge Staton approved the Settlement Agreement without modification
as fair, reasonable, and adequate to and in the best interest of
the Settlement Class.  Upon the date of entry of the Judgment, the
Settlement Class Representatives and the Settlement Class Members
will be deemed to have released the Vizio Released Parties from any
and all Released Claims; and the Defendants will be deemed to have
released the Plaintiffs and their Counsel from any and all Released
Vizio Claims.

Without affecting the finality of the Court's Judgment in any way,
the Court retains jurisdiction over the matter.  The parties and
all the Settlement Class Members will comply with the terms of the
Settlement Agreement.

The Judge dismissed the Action in its entirety with prejudice, with
all parties to bear their own costs and attorney's fees except as
provided by the Settlement Agreement and the Court's orders.

The Clerk will administratively close the MDL file and each of the
member cases.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 14, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/6YhMKk from Leagle.com.

Vizio, Inc., Consumer Privacy Litigation, Defendant, represented by
R. David Donoghue -- David.Donoghue@hklaw.com -- Holland and Knight
LLP.

David Watts, on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly
situated persons, Whitney Keeter, on behalf of themselves and a
class of similarly situated person, Robyn Kuntzmann, on behalf of
themselves, and a class of similarly situated persons & Linda
Bunch, on behalf of themselves, and a class of similarly situated
persons, Plaintiffs, represented by C. Brooks Cutter --
bcutter@cutterlaw.com -- Kershaw Cutter and Ratinoff LLP, John R.
Parker, Jr. -- jparker@cutterlaw.com -- Kershaw Cutter and Ratinoff
LLP, Linda Pham Lam, Gibbs Law Group LLP & Andre M. Mura, Gibbs Law
Group LLP.

Barry S. Weiss, individually and on behalf of all others similarly,
Plaintiff, represented by Charles J. LaDuca --
charlesl@cuneolaw.com -- Cuneo Gilbert and LaDuca LLP, pro hac
vice, Jon William Borderud -- borderudlaw@cox.net -- Law Offices of
Jon Borderud, Linda Pham Lam , Gibbs Law Group LLP, Rebecca Anne
Peterson -- rapeterson@locklaw.com -- Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP,
Robert K. Shelquist -- rkshelquist@locklaw.com -- Lockridge Grindal
Nauen PLLP, pro hac vice & Andre M. Mura, Gibbs Law Group LLP.

Dieisha Hodges, an individual and on behalf of themselves, all
others similarly situated and the general public, Plaintiff,
represented by Kas L. Gallucci, Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron
APLC, Linda Pham Lam, Gibbs Law Group LLP, Mark Francis Ram,
Cotchett Pitre and McCarthy LLP, Ronald A. Marron, Law Offices of
Ronald A. Marron APLC, A.J. De Bartolomeo, Tadler Law LLP, Adam
John Zapala, Cotchett Pitre and McCarthy LLP, Alexis M. Wood, Law
Offices of Ronald A. Marron APLC, Andre M. Mura, Gibbs Law Group
LLP, David M. Berger, Girard Gibbs LLP & Eric H. Gibbs, Gibbs Law
Group LLP.

Simone Richardson, an individual, on behalf of themselves, all
others similarly situated, and the general public, Plaintiff,
represented by Kas L. Gallucci, Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron
APLC, Linda Pham Lam, Gibbs Law Group LLP, Ronald A. Marron, Law
Offices of Ronald A. Marron APLC, Alexis M. Wood, Law Offices of
Ronald A. Marron APLC & Andre M. Mura, Gibbs Law Group LLP.

Daniel Levine, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Andre M. Mura, Gibbs Law Group
LLP, Eric H. Gibbs, Gibbs Law Group LLP, Linda Pham Lam, Gibbs Law
Group LLP & Steven Augustine Lopez, Gibbs Law Group LLP.


METROPOLITAN POLICE: Pappas Sues Over ADA Violation
---------------------------------------------------
STEVE PAPPAS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, and PETER NEWSHOM, in
his official Capacity as Chief of Police of the Metropolitan Police
Department of the District of Columbia, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-02800 (D. D.C., Sept. 18, 2019) is a class action brought
under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

In 2013, while employed as a law enforcement officer by Defendant
MPD, Mr. Pappas was diagnosed with congestive heart failure by his
physician. Per MPD policy, Mr. Pappas reported to the Police and
Fire Clinic for "medical evaluation." MPD required Mr. Pappas to
provide detailed medical records of his diagnosis and treatment.
MPD then assigned Mr. Pappas to a limited-duty position. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants terminated his employment on account of his
disability rather than accommodating him by restructuring his job
duties, providing extended leave, or reassigning him to an
available position that he could have performed.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants made improper medical inquiries
and imposed improper medical examinations on him. He alleges that
Defendants violated the ADA and Section 504 by implementing a
policy or practice of forcing employees with disabilities who spend
172 cumulative work days in less than full-duty status into
disability retirement, with no possibility of reasonable
accommodation by reassignment, job restructuring, or extended
leave. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated, and continue to
violate, the ADA and Section 504 by implementing a policy or
practice of making improper medical inquiries and medical
examinations on employees who experience off-duty illnesses or
injuries, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Steve Pappas is a resident of Texas and worked as a
Police Officer for MPD from September 24, 2001 to March 6, 2015.

Defendant MPD is the primary law enforcement agency for the
District of Columbia and one of the ten largest local police
agencies in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Eve Hill, Esq.
     Andrew D. Levy, Esq.
     Emily L. Levenson, Esq.
     BROWN, GOLDSTEIN & LEVY, LLP
     120 East Baltimore Street, Suite 1700
     Baltimore, MD 21202
     Phone: (410) 962-1030
     Fax: (410) 385-0869
     Email: ehill@browngold,com
            adl@browngold.com
            elevenson@browngold.com

          - and -

     Ellen Eardley, Esq.
     Cyrus Mehri, Esq.
     MEHRI & SKALET, PLLC
     1250 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 300
     Washington, DC 20036
     Phone: (202) 822-5100
     Fax: (202) 822-4997
     Email: eeardley@findjustice.com
            cmehri@findjustice.com



MIDLAND FUNDING: Denial of Arbitration Bid in Thomas Suit Affirmed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MIDLAND FUNDING LLC, and MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT,
Inc., Appellants-Defendants, v. KAREN THOMAS, GARY L. BROOKS, Jr.,
and MARY M. GILLESPIE-BROOKS, individually and on behalf of a
similarly situated class of individuals, Appellees-Plaintiffs,
Civil Action No. 5:18-cv-00128 (W.D. Va.), Judge Elizabeth K.
Dillon of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Virginia, Harrisonburg Division, affirmed the bankruptcy court's
denial of Midland's motion to compel arbitration.

In 2016, each of the three Plaintiffs filed for Chapter 13
bankruptcy.  In June 2017, the Plaintiffs filed adversary
complaints against Midland, alleging that Midland's standard
practice of filing proofs of claim in Chapter 13 proceedings
violates Rule 3001 and the FDCPA.  They bring these claims as class
action claims on behalf of similarly situated people.  The two
adversary complaints were consolidated by the bankruptcy court on
Sept. 28, 2017.

In August 2017, Midland filed a motion to dismiss.  On Nov. 30,
2017, the bankruptcy court denied Midland's motion to dismiss the
FDCPA claim but granted its motion to dismiss the Rule 3001 claim
because the Plaintiffs did not allege sufficient facts in the
complaint that demonstrate any amounts of expenses or attorney's
fees resulting from the failure of Midland to comply with Rule
3001.  However, the bankruptcy court granted the Plaintiffs leave
to amend to correct this pleading deficiency.  The Plaintiffs filed
their amended complaint on Dec. 19, 2017.

On Feb. 1, 2018, Midland filed two motions -- a motion to dismiss
the amended complaint and a motion to compel arbitration and to
strike class action allegations.  On Sept. 28, 2018, the bankruptcy
court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss.
With respect to the second motion -- the one at issue in the appeal
-- Midland argued that the Plaintiffs' claims were subject to
mandatory arbitration pursuant to the credit card agreements for
accounts it had acquired from Synchrony Bank.  

The bankruptcy court observed that Midland was apparently asking it
to stay the proceedings and require the Plaintiffs to individually
pursue arbitration in order for the arbitrator to find whether
Midland has or has not complied with Rule 3001.  It then detailed
the various types of sanctions allowed by Rule 3001, which are
"permissive and not mandatory."  The bankruptcy court accordingly
denied the motion to compel arbitration because it would be
nonsensical for its to order parties to submit to an arbitrator the
task of applying and enforcing a procedural apparatus applicable
only before the Court.

Regarding the FDCPA claims in Count I, the bankruptcy court found
it appropriate to retain jurisdiction and determine whether the
Defendants violated procedural rules before deciding whether it is
appropriate to submit the FDCPA implications of such alleged
violation to arbitration.  It did not address or rule on the merits
of Midland's motion to strike class action allegations.  The
bankruptcy court's order states that the Defendants' motion to
compel arbitration is denied.

Midland filed a timely notice of appeal from the bankruptcy court's
order denying Midland's motion to compel arbitration.  It argues
that the Court has jurisdiction over its motion to strike class
action allegations.

As the bankruptcy court observed, Judge Dillon holds that the
Plaintiffs' assertion that Midland's manner of filing proof of
claims violates Bankruptcy Rule 3001 is not a private cause of
action.  Instead, the purpose of Rule 3001 is to establish certain
minimum standards for proofs of claim, and the bankruptcy court is
entrusted with discretion to enforce those standards by imposing
sanctions if the standards are not satisfied.

Allowing an arbitrator to enforce the requirements of Bankruptcy
Rule 3001 would similarly conflict with the purposes of the
Bankruptcy Code.  If, for example, the arbitrator found that
Midland should be precluded from "presenting the omitted
information," Rule 3001(c)(2)(D)(i), i.e., the itemized statement
of interest, fees, and other charges, such preclusion could result
in the disallowance of Midland's claim.  More generally, giving an
arbitrator supervisory authority over the claim-filing process
would substantially interfere with the Plaintiffs' efforts to
reorganize their financial affairs in bankruptcy.  Therefore, the
bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion when denying
Midland's motion to compel arbitration of the alleged Rule 3001
violations.

The Judge also finds that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its
discretion by retaining jurisdiction over the FDCPA claims.
Because the FDCPA claims boil down to a determination of whether
Midland has complied with the procedural rules governing bankruptcy
proceedings, the bankruptcy court found it "ppropriate to retain
jurisdiction and determine whether the Defendants violated
procedural rules before deciding whether it is appropriate to
submit the FDCPA implications of such alleged violation to
arbitration.  Accordingly, the bankruptcy court has not
definitively ruled on whether the FDCPA claims should be submitted
to arbitration.  Midland can renew its argument in favor of
arbitration after the bankruptcy court resolves the Rule 3001
issue.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Dillon affirmed the bankruptcy
court's denial of Midland's motion to compel arbitration.  The
bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by retaining the Rule
3001 claims because submitting those claims to arbitration would
inherently conflict with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.  The
bankruptcy court also did not abuse its discretion by retaining the
FDCPA claims until it has a chance to resolve the Rule 3001 issue.
Finally, the Court lacks jurisdiction over the issue of class
action waiver.

An appropriate order will follow.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 13, 2019 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/nUrUgy from Leagle.com.

Midland Funding, LLC & Midland Credit Management, Inc., Appellants,
represented by Chase Tristian Espy , Balch & Bingham LLP, pro hac
vice, James Kerr Donaldson -- jdonaldson@spottsfain.com --
Vandeventer Black, LLP, Jason B. Tompkins, Balch & Bingham LLP, pro
hac vice & Timothy George Moore, Spotts Fain, PC.

Karen M. Thomas, Gary L. Brooks, Jr. & Mary M. Gillespie-Brooks,
Appellees, represented by Beth Carole Driver --
bdriver@hooverpenrod.com -- Hoover Penrod PLC, Grant David Penrod
-- GPenrod@hooverpenrod.com -- Hoover Penrod PLC, Hannah White
Hutman -- hhutman@hooverpenrod.com -- Hoover Penrod PLC, Thomas
Dean Domonoske, Consumer Litigation Associates, P.C. & Timothy Earl
Cupp, Shelley Cupp Schulte, P.C.

Karen M. Thomas, Gary L. Brooks, Jr. & Mary M. Gillespie-Brooks,
Debtors, represented by Beth Carole Driver, Hoover Penrod PLC,
Grant David Penrod, Hoover Penrod PLC, Hannah White Hutman, Hoover
Penrod PLC, Thomas Dean Domonoske, Consumer Litigation Associates,
P.C. & Timothy Earl Cupp, Shelley Cupp Schulte, P.C..


MORDECHAI LIECTHUNG: 4th Amendment Claims Remain in Yerushalayim
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BEN-SIYON ISH YERUSHALAYIM, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DR.
MORDECHAI LIECTHUNG, et al., Defendants, Case No. 19-CV-4101 (AMD)
(LB) (E.D. N.Y.), Judge Ann M. Donnelly of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the Plaintiff's
claims, except for his Fourth Amendment claims against Police
Officers "A" and "B" and EMS technicians Timur Chernichkin and
Vincent Mazzarella.

On June 28, 2019, the pro se Plaintiff, Yerushalayim, commenced the
action alleging violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act
("FTCA"), Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983, as well as state law claims for assault, battery, and
breach of fiduciary duty.  The Plaintiff's lawsuit is premised on
his attempt to seek dental treatment from Dr. Tal J. Lebel and from
a police interaction at the dental clinic.  He alleges that he and
his co-Plaintiffs, Raizel Brasch-Yeruschalayim and Abraham Hayyim
David Brasch-Yeruschlayim, were long-time patients of Dr. Lebel's
Brooklyn dental practice.  However, when Dr. Lebel sold his
practice to Dr. Liechtung under a contract that the Plaintiff
describes as "legally dubious," the relationship began to
deteriorate.

For example, Dr. Lebel began splitting his time between his old
office in Brooklyn and a new office in New Jersey, and the
Plaintiffs were unable to obtain prompt treatment, in breach of the
doctor's fiduciary duty.  The doctors delayed dental care until
they obtained pre-payment, which the Plaintiff claims is a
violation of the FTCA.  When the Plaintiff did get treatment, Dr.
Liechtung and his staff subjected him to useless and uncalled for
x-rays, which the Plaintiff characterizes as assault and battery.

The Plaintiff also alleges that on June 28, 2017, while Dr. Lebel
was examining him, an office site-manager brought two police
officers to the treatment room.  The police officers accused the
Plaintiff of trespassing, and the Plaintiff agreed to leave the
office if he could speak to Dr. Lebel later that day.  When the
Plaintiff returned with his son about an hour later, the two police
officers also returned with an ambulance.  The police officers told
the Plaintiff that he needed to go to the hospital.  The Plaintiff
followed the officers' direction, and two EMS technicians, Timur
Chernichkin and Vincent Mazzarella, transported the Plaintiff to
Maimonides Medical Center.  The Plaintiff was permitted to leave
the hospital as soon as he arrived, and before he was signed in for
evaluation.  The Plaintiff alleges that neither the police nor the
EMS technicians followed "any legitimate protocol" and failed to
make an independent assessment of his psychiatric state.

Liberally construing the complaint, the Plaintiff alleges
violations of the FTCA, Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure under
42 U.S.C. Section 1983, as well as state law claims for assault,
battery, and breach of fiduciary duty.

As an initial matter, the Plaintiff, who is not an attorney, cannot
bring a class action or represent other individual Plaintiffs.  The
complaint names three Plaintiffs -- Yerushalayim and the
Brasch-Yerushalayims -- as well as potentially all similarly
situated patients.  However, the complaint and the in forma
pauperis application are signed only by Yerushalayim.  Yerushalayim
cannot represent anyone other than himself.  Accordingly, Judge
Donnelly reviews the action with Yerushalayim as the sole
Plaintiff.

The Judge dismissed the Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims against
Mayor Bill de Blasio and New York City Commissioner of Emergency
Management Joseph Esposito for failure to state a claim; and
allowed the Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims against EMS
technicians Timur Chernichkin and Vincent Mazzarella, and Police
Officers "A" and "B" to proceed at this time.  Since the police
officers' identities currently are unknown, Corporation Counsel of
the City of New York is directed to ascertain the officers' full
names and addresses and provide the information to the Plaintiff so
that the officers may be properly served.

The Judge dismissed without prejudice the Plaintiff's remaining
state law claims.  She finds that the Court does not have diversity
jurisdiction and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the Plaintiff's remaining state law claims for assault,
battery, and breach of fiduciary duty against the dental
Defendants.  The Plaintiff provides a New York address for Dr.
Liechtung and his staff.  Since the Plaintiff is a citizen of New
York, the parties lack complete diversity with the Defendants.
Additionally, the Plaintiff's claims against the dental Defendants
-- for inappropriate x-rays and breach of fiduciary duty -- are
completely severable from the police officers' and EMS technicians'
alleged unconstitutional seizure.

For the reasons explained, Judge Donnelly dismissed the complaint,
filed in forma pauperis, against all the Defendants except the two
unidentified police officers and EMS technicians Timur Chernichkin
and Vincent Mazzarella.  All further proceedings are stayed for 45
days to allow Corporation Counsel to provide the information
necessary to serve the police officers.  The Clerk of Court is
respectfully directed to send a copy of the Order and the
Plaintiff's complaint to Corporation Counsel of the City of New
York, Special Federal Litigation Division.  The case is referred to
Magistrate Judge Lois Bloom for pretrial supervision.

The Court certified pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a)(3) that
any appeal would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma
pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 13, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/f7rQ7e from Leagle.com.

Ben-Siyon Ish Yerushalayim, Plaintiff, pro se.

Raizel Brasch-Yerushalayim, Plaintiff, pro se.

Abraham Hayyim David Brasch-Yerushalayim, Plaintiff, pro se.

(potentially) all similarly situated patients, Plaintiff, pro se.


MOVIEPASS INC: Can Compel Arbitration in Tabas RICO Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JACKIE TABAS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MOVIEPASS, INC.,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-07087-DMR (N.D. Cal.),
Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California (i) granted Defendants MoviePass'
and Helios and Matheson Analytics' motions to compel arbitration;
(ii) denied their motion to stay the case pending completion of
arbitration; and (iii) granted the Plaintiffs filed a motion to
amend the complaint.

Plaintiffs Tabas and Katherine Rosenberg-Wohl filed the putative
class action on Nov. 11, 2018, naming Defendants MoviePass and
Helios, as well as individual Defendants Ted Farnsworth, Stuart
Benson, and Mitch Lowe.  On Feb. 14, 2019, Rosenberg-Wohl dismissed
her claims against all the Defendants with prejudice.  On Feb. 15,
2019, the Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint, adding
Linda Hobbs, Tim Samartino, Barbara Sjodahl, Patricia Dawn Walker,
and Cheryl Whelan as named Plaintiffs.  The FAC names only
MoviePass and Helios as the Defendants.

Following the hearing on the Defendants' motion to compel
arbitration, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a
second amended complaint.  The proposed second amended complaint
adds Amy Buckley as a named Plaintiff.

MoviePass sells subscriptions to see movies in movie theaters.
From its formation in 2011, MoviePass has used several different
pricing structures, ranging in length from monthly or quarterly to
annually, and in frequency from two to three movies a month to an
"unlimited" plan.  In 2018, MoviePass offered an annual
subscription for $89.95 featuring an "unlimited" plan that allowed
customers to see one movie per day.

On Aug. 15, 2017, Helios, a data analytics firm, purchased a
majority interest in MoviePass and eventually increased its
ownership interest in the company to 91.8%, allegedly to obtain the
watching habits of consumers using the service.  According to the
Plaintiffs, Helios sustained large financial losses as a result of
its investment in MoviePass.  Following an investor class action
lawsuit and investigation by the New York attorney general in 2018,
Helios announced its intention to spin off MoviePass.

The Plaintiffs allege that Helios "took steps to protect itself at
the expense of" MoviePass subscribers.  From the time it acquired
majority ownership of MoviePass, Helios allegedly instructed the
subscription service to make promises too vague to be enforceable
contracts, and breach promises it was obliged to honor.  It also
allegedly directed MoviePass to breach its contracts with
subscribers and make false representations to customers.  Helios
also allegedly made it "virtually impossible" for consumers to
resolve any concerns.

According to the Plaintiffs, MoviePass introduced an arbitration
clause into its terms of use ("TOU") around Oct. 30, 2017.  Since
that time, MoviePass has created numerous versions of its TOU, many
of which have allegedly affected the language in the arbitration
clauses.   The Plaintiffs state that MoviePass never notified
consumers about the introduction of the arbitration clause, even
though it has emphasized other changes to the TOU in its emails to
consumers.  They also claim that MoviePass removes previous
versions of the TOU from its website and refuses to provide them
upon request, and instead presents only the current TOU with its
updated language.

Each TOU contains an arbitration clause.  The October 2017 version
of the TOU requires that the parties arbitrate disputes that arise
out of the relationship between the consumer and MoviePass.
Subsequent versions of the TOU state that either the consumer or
MoviePass may elect to arbitrate certain disputes arising out of
the relationship between the consumer and MoviePass.  All versions
of the TOU contain identical language in their last clause under
the heading "Jurisdiction for Dispute Proceedings."

Against MoviePass, the Plaintiffs allege common law claims for
breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit, as well
as violations of California and New York consumer protection law.
Against Helios, the Plaintiffs allege claims for inducement to
breach MoviePass contracts and violation of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").  Against both
the Defendants, the Plaintiffs allege a claim under California
Unfair Competition Law ("UCL").

Based on the TOU, the Defendants now move to compel arbitration of
all claims asserted by the Plaintiffs.  The Defendants move to
compel arbitration on the basis that the Plaintiffs and MoviePass
entered into enforceable written agreements to arbitrate all
disputes.  The Plaintiffs respond that there was no agreement to
arbitrate, and that even if there were, the agreement is illusory
and unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable. Plaintiffs also
request a limited trial.  Although not entirely clear, the
Plaintiffs appear to request that the limited trial cover the
issues of contract formation and enforceability.

Judge Ryu finds that the Plaintiffs manifested consent to the terms
of the TOU when they each signed up for the MoviePass service.
Since the Plaintiffs have not identified any disputed facts
regarding contract formation, their request for a limited trial on
this issue is denied.

At the hearing, the Plaintiffs conceded that the Court may only
analyze the claims of parties who are presently before it.  In this
case, as no class has yet been certified, only the named Plaintiffs
are parties to the current action.  Accordingly, the only relevant
contracts at issue are the contracts between the Defendants and the
individual named Plaintiffs, each of which contains an arbitration
clause.

The Judge concludes that the arbitration clauses in the Plaintiffs'
TOUs do not exempt all equitable claims from arbitration.  Although
the language at issue may be susceptible to the Plaintiffs'
interpretation, it is at least as ambiguous as the clause examined
in Comedy Club.  As the Court is bound by that case, the ambiguity
must be resolved in favor of arbitration.  She also concludes that
a valid agreement to arbitrate exists in each of the contracts
applicable to the named Plaintiffs.

At the hearing, the Plaintiffs conceded that the arbitration
agreements at issue delegate questions of arbitrability to an
arbitrator.  Accordingly, the Judge concludes that all the
contracts applicable to the named Plaintiffs delegate the issue of
arbitrability to an arbitrator, and it is the arbitrator who must
rule on the Plaintiffs' defenses to the arbitration clause.


The Judge granted the Plaintiffs' motion to amend to add Buckley as
a named Plaintiff in the action.  The Plaintiffs did not
unjustifiably delay in filing the motion to amend.  The case was
filed in November 2018 and is still in early proceedings.  Even if
the Plaintiffs were "advised of the grounds" for the motion to
compel arbitration in February 2019, that motion had not yet been
briefed or heard.

Finally, the Defendants request that the matter be stayed pending
the conclusion of arbitration.  As the Judge is granting the
Plaintiffs' motion to amend to add Buckley as a named Plaintiff
representing a putative class who signed up for MoviePass
subscription before an arbitration clause was introduced in
MoviePass's TOU, there is no reason to stay the case as to
Buckley's claims.  The claims of the other named Plaintiffs are
submitted to arbitration, and their individual claims are stayed.
The case will proceed with Buckley as the named Plaintiff
representing the putative class.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Ryu granted the Defendants' motion
to compel arbitration as to Tabas, Hobbs, Samartino, Sjodahl,
Walker, and Whelan.  Only the claims of those six Plaintiffs are
stayed pending arbitration.  She denied the Defendants' request to
stay the action is denied.  She also denied the Plaintiffs' request
for a limited trial on contract formation and enforceability.

The Judge granted the Plaintiffs' motion to amend to add Buckley as
a named Plaintiff.  The proposed second amended complaint attached
to the Declaration of David Rosenberg-Wohl is deemed the operative
complaint as of the date of the Order.  The Plaintiff will file the
second amended complaint, without changes, separately on the docket
by Aug. 16, 2019.

The parties will appear for a case management conference on Sept.
18, 2019 at 1:30 p.m.  They will file an updated joint case
management conference statement by Sept. 11, 2019.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 13, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/ifMmqZ from Leagle.com.

Jackie Tabas, Katherine Rosenberg-Wohl, Tim Samartino, Barbara
Sjodahl, Patricia Dawn Walker & Cheryl Whelan, Plaintiffs,
represented by David Michael Rosenberg-Wohl -- david@hrw-law.com --
Hershenson Rosenberg-Wohl, APC.

Linda Hobbs, Petitioner, represented by David Michael
Rosenberg-Wohl, Hershenson Rosenberg-Wohl, APC.

MoviePass, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jeff Eric Scott --
scottj@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig, LLP & Todd Schleifstein --
schleifsteint@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig, LLP.

Helios and Matheson Analytics Inc., Defendant, represented by Jeff
Eric Scott, Greenberg Traurig, LLP & Todd Schleifstein, Greenberg
Traurig, LLP, pro hac vice.

Ted Farnsworth, Stuart Benson & Mitch Lowe, Defendants, represented
by Jeff Eric Scott, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Jena Avery MacCabe,
Grenberg Traurig LLP & Todd Schleifstein, Greenberg Traurig, LLP,
pro hac vice.


MR. CHOW ENTERPRISES: Brooks Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website
-----------------------------------------------------------------
VALERIE BROOKS, individually and on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MR. CHOW ENTERPRISES,
LTD., a California Limited Partnership; and DOES 1 to 10,
inclusive, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-at-00896 (E.D. Cal., Sept. 18,
2019) seeks to secure redress for Defendants' failure to design,
construct, maintain, and operate its website to be fully and
equally accessible to and independently usable by Plaintiff and
other blind or visually-impaired people.

Because Defendant's website is not fully or equally accessible to
blind and visually-impaired consumers in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act and California's Unruh Civil Rights Act,
Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in
Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that
Defendant's website will become and remain accessible to blind and
visually-impaired consumers, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person who
requires screen-reading software to read website content using her
computer.

Defendant's restaurants provide to the public important goods and
services. Defendant's website provides consumers with information
on restaurant locations, how to make a reservation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Bobby Saadian, Esq.
     Thiago Coelho, Esq.
     WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
     3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor
     Los Angeles, CA 90010
     Phone: (213) 381-9988
     Facsimile: (213) 381-9989


MR. COOPER: Remand of Niedzinski to State Court Endorsed
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, VIVIAN NIEDZINSKI, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MR. COOPER f/k/a Nationstar
Mortgage LLC, Defendant, Civil Action No. 4:19-cv-40037-TSH (D.
Mass.), Magistrate Judge David H. Hennessy recommended that (i) the
Plaintiff's motion to remand be granted insofar as it seeks to
remand the action to Worcester Superior Court; (iii) the
Plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees and costs in connection
with her motion to remand be denied; and (iii) the Defendant's
motion to dismiss the complaint and to strike the putative class
claims be denied as moot and without prejudice.

On Jan. 25, 2019, Niedzinski filed a class action lawsuit in
Worcester Superior Court, alleging Mr. Cooper violated
Massachusetts General Laws ch. 93A, Section 2 and Massachusetts
Debt Collection Regulation 940 C.M.R. Section 7.04(1)(f) by calling
her more than two times in a seven-day period.  The Plaintiff
alleges that she and the Defendant meet the Massachusetts Debt
Collection Regulations' definitions of "debtor" and "creditor,"
respectively.

She brings the instant suit individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, seeking to represent the class of all consumers
residing in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts who, within four
years prior to the filing of the action, that is, Jan. 25, 2019,
received in excess of two telephone calls regarding a debt from the
Defendant within a seven-day period to their residence, cellular
telephone, or other provided telephone number.

She alleges that the Defendant's regular business practice is to
place numerous debt collection calls per week to known debtors, and
that thousands of Massachusetts consumers have been affected by
this practice.  The complaint further alleges that the Defendant's
harassing communications caused her injury, including anger,
anxiety, emotional distress, fear, frustration, and embarrassment.
Additionally, the calls allegedly were distracting, inconvenient,
constituted an invasion of the Plaintiff's privacy, and wasted her
time and energy.

On Feb. 26, 2019, the Defendant timely removed the instant action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1332, 1441, and 1446.  The stated
ground for removal was diversity jurisdiction.

Now pending before the Court are the Plaintiff's motion to remand
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Section 1447, and the Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint
and to strike its class action allegations.  The Plaintiff's
complaint does not allege a monetary damages amount, but her
amended civil cover sheet claims damages of $750,000.  In support
of removal, the Defendant contends that the Plaintiff individually
seeks more than the jurisdictional threshold amount, particularly
when in her civil cover sheet she purports damages of $750,000.

Magistrate Judge Hennessy finds the argument unconvincing.  He is
not persuaded that the damages amount reported in the civil cover
sheet estimates the Plaintiff's individual claims.  He finds that
the $750,000 demand on the Plaintiff's cover sheet is most
reasonably understood an as estimate of the entire putative class'
damages, not just those of the Plaintiff.  Finally, the Plaintiff's
civil cover sheet also contains a notation, to the immediate left
of the monetary damages estimation, that the instant suit is "a
class action under Federal] Rule of Civil Procedure 23. This
notation further supports the conclusion that the cover sheet's
demand estimates class-wide damages.

The Magistrate also finds that the Defendant has not demonstrated
to a reasonable probability that the federal amount-in-controversy
threshold is satisfied.  He therefore recommends that the instant
matter be remanded to Superior Court for further proceedings.

Next, while the complaint is short on substantive factual
development, there is some heft to its allegations.  It alleges the
existence of a debt, the Defendant's use of the telephone at a
frequency that, if proved, violates Massachusetts law, and injury.
As such, the Magistrate holds that it does enough to make out
potential violations of the Massachusetts Debt Collection
Regulations and Chapter 93A.  For these reasons, he is not
persuaded, to an absolute legal certainty, that the Plaintiff lacks
standing to maintain her claims.

Finally, the Plaintiff seeks an award of attorneys' fees and costs
for her motion to remand.  In his view, the Magistrate finds that
the record is not so one-sided that it can be said the Defendant
lacked an objectively reasonable basis for removal.  First, the
Plaintiff's amended civil cover sheet does not express whether the
stated damages estimates her individual damages or the damages of a
putative class.  Second, the Defendant's motion to dismiss is
predicated mainly on the Plaintiff's alleged failure to state a
claim for which relief may be granted; that thePlaintiff
conclusorily pleaded injury.

For the foregoing reasons, Magistrate Judge Hennessy recommended
that (i) the Plaintiff's motion be granted inasmuch as it seeks
remand to Worcester Superior Court; (ii) the Plaintiff's request
for attorneys' fees and costs in connection with her motion to
remand be denied; and (iii) the Defendant's motion to dismiss the
complaint and to strike the putative class claims be denied as moot
and without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 14, 2019 Report and
Recommendation is available at https://is.gd/Vy1gBj from
Leagle.com.

Vivian Niedzinski, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Sergei Lemberg --
slemberg@lemberglaw.com -- Lemberg Law, L.L.C.

Mr. Cooper, formerly known as, Defendant, represented by Jason A.
Manekas -- jmanekas@bg-llp.com -- Bernkopf Goodman LLP & Matthew A.
Gens -- mgens@bg-llp.com -- Bernkopf Goodman LLP.


MVP DELIVERY: Oudkerk Seeks Minimum & OT for Delivery Drivers
-------------------------------------------------------------
SHAUN OUDKERK, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. MVP DELIVERY SOLUTIONS INC.; FEDERAL
EXPRESS CORPORATION; FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEM, INC.; and John
Does 1-2, individually and as officers, directors, shareholders,
and/or MVP DELIVERY principals of SOLUTIONS INC., the Defendants,
Case No. 520078/2019 (N.Y. Sup., Sept. 12, 2019), seeks to recover
unpaid overtime wages and minimum wages for violation of the New
York Labor Law, the New York Code, Rules, and Regulations, and the
Wage Theft Prevention Act,

The Plaintiff and the class are and were employed by Defendants as
Delivery Drivers, during the past six years through the final date
of the disposition of the action, who were not:

     -- compensated one and a half times New York State and or
City's minimum wage per hour for all hours worked in excess of 40
per workweek;

     -- compensated at or above New York State's minimum wage for
all hours worked per workweek;

     -- and/or compensated the statutorily required "spread of
hours" pay for all hours worked in excess of 10 hours per workday.

MVP is a privately owned entity which is engaged in the business of
delivering Defendant FedEx’s and Ground’s packages throughout
the tri-state area.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Robert R. Barravecchio, Esq.
          Alexander M. White, Esq.
          VALLI KANE & VAGNINI LLP
          600 Old Country Road, Suite 519
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 203-7180
          Facsimile: (516) 706-0248

               - and -

          Mohammed Gangat, Esq.
          Law Office of Mohammed Gangat
          675 3rd Avenue, Suite 1810
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (718) 669-0714

NAPLES HOTEL: $31.8K Attorneys' Fees Awarded in Williams Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KENYATTA WILLIAMS; and SHAWANA SANDERS, Plaintiffs, v.
NAPLES HOTEL GROUP, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 6:18-cv-422-Orl-37DCI
(M.D. Fla.), Judge Roy B. Dalton, Jr. of the U.S. District Court
for the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division, granted in
part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for
Attorneys' Fees and Costs and Class Representatives Service
Awards.

With their motion final approval of the class action settlement in
the case, the Plaintiffs moved for approval of attorneys' fees and
costs, and a service award to the class representatives.
Consistent with the settlement agreement, the Plaintiff and the
Plaintiff's counsel, as the Class Counsel, seek an award of the
following amounts to be paid from the settlement fund: (1)
attorneys' fees in the amount of $31,800; (2) settlement
administration expenses not to exceed $10,000; and (3) a $3,500
service award to each Plaintiff.

On referral, U.S. Magistrate Judge Daniel C. Irick recommends the
Court grants in part the Motion.  Magistrate Judge Irick finds
Plaintiffs are entitled to all relief requested, except for the
$641.75 in costs, which the Class Counsel agreed to incur.

The parties did not object to the Report and Recommendation
("R&R"), and the time for doing so has now passed.  Absent
objections, the Court has examined the R&R only for clear error.
Finding no such error, Judge Dalton concludes the R&R is due to be
adopted in its entirety.  Accordingly, he adopted the Magistrate
Judge's R&R and granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs'
Unopposed Motion.

The Judge granted the Motion to the extent he approved the award of
$31,800 in attorneys' fees, settlement administration expenses not
to exceed $10,000, and a total of $7,000 in service awards as the
class representatives -- $3,500 to Plaintiff Kenyatta Williams and
$3,500 to Plaintiff Shawana Sanders.  In all other respects, the
Judge denied the Motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 13, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/a4B8q0 from Leagle.com.

Kenyatta Williams, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all
others similarly situated & Shawana Sanders, on behalf of
themselves and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Andrew Ross Frisch, Morgan & Morgan, PA,
C. Ryan Morgan, Morgan & Morgan, PA & Marc Reed Edelman --
MEdelman@forthepeople.com -- Morgan & Morgan, PA.

Naples Hotel Group, LLC, Defendant, represented by Amanda A.
Simpson -- Amanda.Simpson@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis, PC &
Stephanie Leigh Adler-Paindiris --
Stephanie.Adler-Paindiris@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis, PC.


NASTYGAL.COM: Traylor Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
--------------------------------------------------------
Nastygal.Com USA Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Yaseen Traylor also known as: Yaseen Traylor other, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Nastygal.Com USA Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-08869 (S.D.
N.Y., Sept. 24, 2019).

Nasty Gal Inc. retails women's clothing. The Company offers new and
vintage clothing, shoes, and accessories for women. Nasty Gal
serves customers worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Russel Craig Weinrib, Esq.
   Stein Saks PLLC
   285 Passaic St., Suite 5
   Hakensack, NJ 07601
   Tel: (201) 282-6500
   Email: rweinrib@steinsakslegal.com



NEGOTIATION TECHNOLOGIES: Wille Files Class Suit in Fla. Under ADA
------------------------------------------------------------------
Negotiation Technologies, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit
filed pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is
styled as Kaye Wille, on her own and on behalf of all other
individuals similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Negotiation
Technologies, LLC doing business as: Pittbulltax Institute,
Defendant, Case No. 0:19-cv-62371-KMW (S.D. Fla., Sept. 24, 2019).

Negotiation Technologies, LLC is a Tax assessor in Coral Springs,
Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jessica Lynn Kerr, Esq.
   Jessica L.Kerr, P.A. dba The Advocacy Group
   200 S.E. 6th Street, Suite 504
   Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
   Tel: (954) 282-1858
   Fax: (844) 786-3694
   Email: service@advocacypa.com


NINTENDO OF AMERICA: Court Issues Briefing Schedule in Diaz Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Thomas S. Zilly of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington, Seattle, has entered an order regarding the
briefing schedule in the case, RYAN DIAZ, Plaintiff, v. NINTENDO OF
AMERICA, INC., Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-01116-TSZ (W.D. Wash.).

The Plaintiff filed the putative class action on July 19, 2019.
The parties have met and conferred about the filing of an amended
complaint and a potential briefing schedule related thereto.  

It is agreed to by the parties and Ordered by the Court as
follows:

     1. The Plaintiff will file a first amended complaint within 45
days of the entry of this order. Nintendo need not respond to the
initial complaint filed on July 19;

     2. Nintendo will have 50 days to respond to the Plaintiff's
first amended complaint;

     3. In the event that Nintendo files a motion directed to the
Plaintiff's first amended complaint, the Plaintiff will have 30
days to file an opposition; and

     4. Nintendo may file a reply, if applicable, within 21 days
after the Plaintiff files an opposition brief.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 13, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/DY29JN from Leagle.com.

Ryan Diaz, Plaintiff, represented by Alex M. Kashurba, CHIMICLES
SCHWARTZ KRINER & DONALDSON-SMITH LLP, pro hac vice, Andrew W.
Ferich, CHIMICLES SCHWARTZ KRINER & DONALDSON-SMITH LLP, pro hac
vice, Benjamin F. Johns, CHIMICLES SCHWARTZ KRINER &
DONALDSON-SMITH LLP, pro hac vice, Jason T. Dennett --
jdennett@tousley.com -- TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS, Kaleigh N.B. Powell
-- kpowell@tousley.com -- TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS & Kim D. Stephens
-- kstephens@tousley.com -- TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS.

Nintendo of America Inc, Defendant, represented by David J. Burman
-- DBurman@perkinscoie.com -- PERKINS COIE, Mallory Gitt Webster --
MWebster@perkinscoie.com -- PERKINS COIE & Eric J. Weiss --
EWeiss@perkinscoie.com -- PERKINS COIE.


NISSAN NORTH: Court Orders Class Suit Dismissal in
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Alabama, Northern Division, ordered that the case captioned U CAN
RENT, LLC, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated
Plaintiff, v. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC., Defendant. Case No.
2:17-cv-736-ECM. (M.D. Ala.), be dismissed without prejudice for
Plaintiff U Can Rent's failure to comply with the Court's order to
respond to counsel's motion or else obtain new counsel. The pending
motions to dismiss are denied as moot.

Heninger Garrison Davis, LLC and the Law Offices of Troy King's
filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Defendant U Can Rent,
LLC. The Court ordered U Can Rent to either respond to the Motion
or else have new counsel enter an appearance. The Court warned U
Can Rent that failure to comply with the order could result in the
dismissal of its case.

U Can Rent has already missed a deadline and the Court provided U
Can Rent the opportunity to explain the failure to comply with the
Court's order. The Court has also repeatedly granted extensions of
the time to file a response to Counsel's Motion. U Can Rent has
again missed a deadline despite the repeated extensions and
repeated warnings that failure to comply with the Court's order
could result in the dismissal of its case.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 16, 2019
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y2rgwkoc from Leagle.com.

U Can Rent, LLC, on behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jeanie Snipes Sleadd -
jsleadd@hgdlawfirm.com - Heninger Garrison Davis, Taylor
Christopher Bartlett - taylor@hgdlawfirm.com, Heninger Garrison
Davis, William Lewis Garrison, Jr. - wlgarrison@hgdlawfirm.com-
Heninger Garrison Davis, L.L.C. & Christopher Boyce Hood -
chood@hgdlawfirm.com, Heninger Garrison Davis LLC.

Nissan North America, Inc., Defendant, represented by Charles
Andrew Stewart, III -
cstewart@bradley.com - Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Edwin Paul
Cauley, Jr. - paul.cauley dbr.com - Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, pro
hac vice, Jonathan Corley Hill - rhill@bradley.com - Bradley Arant
Boult Cummings LLP, Sarah S. Osborne - sosborne@bradley.com -
Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Sherman Vance Wittie -
vance.wittie dbr.com - DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH, pro hac vice &
Michael R. Pennington - mpennington@bradley.com - Bradley Arant
Boult Cummings LLP


PANASONIC CORP: 9th Cir. Vacates Antitrust Suit Distribution Plan
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, issued an
Opinion vacating the District Court's approval of Settlement Fund
Distribution Plan in the case captioned In re: LITHIUM ION
BATTERIES ANTITRUST LITIGATION. INDIRECT PURCHASER PLAINTIFFS,
Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL FRANK BEDNARZ, Objector-Appellant,
v. PANASONIC CORPORATION; PANASONIC CORPORATION OF NORTH AMERICA;
SANYO ELECTRIC CO, LTD; SANYO NORTH AMERICA CORPORATION; HITACHI,
LTD.; HITACHI MAXWELL, LTD.; MAXWELL CORPORATION OF AMERICA;
TOSHIBA CORPORATION; TOSHIBA AMERICA ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS, INC.;
NEC CORPORATION; SAMSUNG SDI CO. LTD.; SAMSUNG SDI AMERICA, INC.;
SONY CORPORATION; SONY ENERGY DEVICES CORPORATION; SONY
ELECTRONICS, INC.; NEC TOKIN CORPORATION; LG CHEM, LTD.; LG CHEM
AMERICA, INC., Defendants-Appellees. No. 17-17367. (9th Cir.).

The district court certified a nationwide settlement class and
approved settlement agreements between Indirect Purchaser
Plaintiffs (IPP) and defendants LG Chem, Limited; LG Chem America,
Incorporated; Hitachi Maxell, Limited; Maxell Corporation of
America; and NEC Corporation.

The district court approved IPP's plan to distribute the settlement
fund pro rata to settlement class members, regardless of whether
their claim(s) arose in Illinois Brick repealer or non-repealer
states.  

In the context of a class-action settlement, a district court must
give undiluted, even heightened, attention to Rule 23's
requirements because the court will lack the opportunity to adjust
the class, informed by the proceedings as they unfold. When a
class-action settlement agreement is negotiated prior to class
certification, we rigorously enforce Rule 23's procedural
requirements.  

Here, the district court did not explain why a nationwide class
should be certified and a pro rata distribution plan approved
despite substantial differences in state law between repealer and
non-repealer states. The final approval order merely paraphrases
Rule 23 and concludes that the Rule's requirements are met.
Similarly, the district court summarily overruled Bednarz's
objections, finding the settlement, and the pro rata allocation
among settlement class members, fair and adequate despite these
differences in state law.

The Court expresses no opinion on whether the representation,
settlement class, and settlement agreements satisfy Rule 23.
Instead, the Coourt vacate and remand to allow the district court
to properly exercise its discretion consistent with Rule 23's
rigorous procedural requirements.  

The Court vacates the district court's final approval order and
remands for further proceedings.
  
A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's September 16, 2019
Memorandum is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxvsmv8d from
Leagle.com.


PARM FUND: Fischler Files ADA Suit in New York
----------------------------------------------
Parm Fund LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to
the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Brian
Fischler, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Parm Fund LLC and Major Food Group LLC doing
business as: Parm, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-05461 (E.D. N.Y.,
Sept. 25, 2019).

Parm is a casual restaurant and sandwich shop from Major Food Group
that celebrates classic Italian-American food.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   630 Third Avenue
   Fifth Floor
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: doug@lipskylowe.com



PARTSSOURCE INC: Class Certification in Gembarski Suit Reversed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Gembarski, Appellee, v. Partssource, Inc., Appellant,
Case No. 2018-0125 (Ohio), Judge Patrick F. Fischer of the Supreme
Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Eleventh District Court
of Appeals affirming the trial court's judgment granting Appellee
Edward F. Gembarski's motion to certify a class action.

In October 2012, Gembarski filed a class-action complaint against
his former employer, PartsSource, in the Summit County Court of
Common Pleas.  Gembarski asserted claims of breach of contract,
unjust enrichment, conversion, equitable restitution, constructive
trust, and "money had and received."  Each claim was asserted on
behalf of the putative class.

Gembarski claimed that while he worked for PartsSource, PartsSource
improperly withheld and deducted commissions earned by Gembarski
and other account managers.  He argued that his claims were typical
of the putative class, which included current and former
PartsSource account managers and employees, and that he would
fairly and adequately protect the class as the named
representative.

PartsSource filed an answer to the complaint, denying the
allegations as to each class-action requirement (including
typicality and adequacy) and denying that the lawsuit could be
maintained as a class action.  Shortly thereafter, the parties
agreed to transfer the case to the Portage County Court of Common
Pleas.

The parties agreed to participate in private mediation but came to
no resolution.  The case was removed to federal court but was then
remanded to the Portage County Court of Common Pleas.  In September
2015, Gembarski, for the first time, filed a motion asking that the
trial court certify the case as a class action.

PartsSource opposed Gembarski's motion to certify the class action.
After holding a hearing, the magistrate assigned by the common
pleas court recommended that the court grants Gembarski's motion
for class certification.  The magistrate concluded that PartsSource
fully and expressly waived any right of arbitration in the matter.

PartsSource filed numerous objections to the magistrate's decision.
The Portage County Court of Common Pleas reviewed the magistrate's
findings of fact and conclusions of law, overruled PartsSource's
objections as relevant to the appeal, and adopted the magistrate's
decision.

PartsSource appealed to the Eleventh District Court of Appeals and
asserted three assignments of error relating to the trial court's
judgment adopting the magistrate's decision, including the argument
that the trial court abused its discretion in summarily concluding
that Gembarski satisfied Civil Rule 23's seven prerequisites.  

The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  It
concluded that the magistrate's conclusion that PartsSource waived
the arbitration defense to the typicality and adequacy requirements
of class certification was not unreasonable.  The appellate court
further concluded that Civ.R. 23(A)'s requirements of typicality
and adequacy were met.

PartsSource appeals the judgment of the Eleventh District Court of
Appeals affirming the trial court's judgment granting Gembarski's
motion to certify a class action.

The case presents the Court with one overarching question: At what
point in a class-action proceeding a defendant waives the argument
that the named class member does not satisfy the typicality or
adequacy requirements under Civ.R. 23(A) when that named class
member is not subject to an arbitration agreement that was entered
into by most unnamed putative class members.

Judge Fischer concludes that PartsSource did not waive the right to
raise the arbitration defense, because prior to the
class-certification stage of the proceedings, PartsSource did not
have a right to arbitrate with Gembarski, who was the only named
party.  Further, because PartsSource did not have an obligation to
raise the arbitration defense, its failure to do so has no impact
on PartsSource's ability to raise the Civ.R. 23(A) argument.

PartsSource did not waive the right to assert a Civ.R. 23(A)
argument, because it had no duty to raise that argument at any time
prior to the class-certification stage of the proceedings.
PartsSource properly provided a general denial in its answer and
raised the Civ.R. 23(A) argument at the class-certification stage
of the proceedings.  Thus, the lower courts erred in determining
that PartsSource had waived any argument pertaining to Civ.R. 23(A)
or the arbitration defense.  Accordingly, the Judge reversed the
judgment of the court of appeals on the issue of waiver.

Because he concludes that the appellate court erred as to the issue
of waiver and we reverse on that basis, the Judge need not reach
PartsSource's first proposition of law addressing the merits of the
case.

The Judge remanded the cause to the appellate court to consider
PartsSource's assignments of error in accord with the Opinion.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 14, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/UkPjcN from Leagle.com.

Connick Law, L.L.C., and Thomas J. Connick --
tconnick@connicklawllc.com -- for appellee.

Zashin & Rich Co., L.P.A., Stephen S. Zashin -- ssz@zrlaw.com --
Jeffrey J. Wedel -- jjw@zrlaw.com -- and Helena Oroz --
hot@zrlaw.com -- for appellant.

Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P., John B. Lewis, Dustin M. Dow, and Daniel
R. Lemon, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Management Lawyers
Association.


PETSMART INC: Carpenter Sues Over Unsafe Tiny Tales Homes
---------------------------------------------------------
TODD CARPENTER, Individually, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated v. PETSMART, INC., Case No. 3:19-cv-01731-CAB-LL
(S.D. Cal., Sept. 10, 2019), alleges violations of California's
Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, California's Unfair Competition
Law, California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act and the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act.

The lawsuit is a class action against the Defendant for the design,
manufacture and sale of its All Living Things(R) Tiny Tales(TM)
Small Pet Habitats, which are artificial habitats or cages for pet
hamsters, gerbils, and mice, according to the complaint.  Despite
the Defendant's self-proclaimed expertise concerning pets and pet
care, the Tiny Tales Homes contain a critical defect--a plastic
connector protruding outward that rodents can easily chew
through--which renders them unsafe and dangerous to the very
animals they are intended to house safely and securely, the
Plaintiff contends.

PetSmart, Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws of the
State of Delaware, with its principal place of business in Phoenix,
Arizona.

PetSmart, Inc. "is the largest specialty pet retailer of services
and solutions for the lifetime needs of pets," according to its Web
site.  In addition, "PetSmart provides a broad range of
competitively priced pet food and products and offers unique pet
services including training, pet grooming, boarding, PetSmart
Doggie Day Camp and in-store pet adoptions."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Christopher D. Moon, Esq.
          Kevin O. Moon, Esq.
          MOON LAW APC
          600 West Broadway, Suite 700
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 915-9432
          Facsimile: (650) 542-8432
          E-mail: chris@moonlawapc.com
                  kevin@moonlawapc.com


PLANASA OREGON: Perez et al Sue over Migrant Agri Labor Housing
---------------------------------------------------------------
MANUEL PEREZ, ANTONIA CORDOBA GOMEZ, GILBERTO CARRILLO,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs, vs. PLANASA OREGON OPERATIONS, LLC, NEXTCROP, INC.,
SUGAR PINE HOTEL, INC., DBA MAJESTIC INN & SUITES, the Defendants,
Case No. 1:19-cv-01477-AA (D. Ore., Sept. 12, 2019), seeks to
enjoin the Defendants from providing migrant agricultural labor
housing without proper registration, licensing and inspection to
recover statutory damages for violations of the federal Migrant and
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Registration Act, Oregon Camp
Operators Registration Act, Oregon Contractor Registration Act, and
Oregon wage payment statutes.

The Plaintiffs are migrant agricultural workers who were recruited
to work in agriculture in Klamath Falls, Oregon in 2017 and were
provided agricultural labor housing under conditions that violate
federal and state agricultural worker protection statutes.

None of the Defendants are registered or licensed to provide
migrant agricultural housing in Oregon. The lawsuit notes that the
Oregon Occupational Safety and Health Division (OR-OSHA) has cited
19 occupational safety and health violations, including six serious
violations of law: the housing was not registered to house migrant
agricultural workers; fire extinguishing equipment was not readily
available; separate sleeping areas were not provided for unrelated
persons of each sex and each family unit; unrelated individuals
were required to share beds; adequate sleeping space was not
provided; and not all electrical fixtures were protected from
breakage, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Mark Wilk, Esq.
          Shannon Garcia, Esq.
          David Henretty, Esq.
          OREGON LAW CENTER
          230 W. Hayes St.
          Woodburn, OR 97071
          Telephone: (503) 981-0336
          Facsimile: (503) 981-0373
          E-mail: mwilk@oregonlawcenter.org
          sgarcia@oregonlawcenter.org
          dhenretty@oregonlawcenter.org

POLAR BEVERAGES: McNulty Files Product Liability Suit in N.Y.
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Polar Beverages Co.,
Inc. The case is styled as Kimberly McNulty, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Polar Beverages
Co., Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-08903-LGS (S.D. N.Y., Sept.
25, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Contract
Product Liability.

Polar Beverages is a soft drink company based in Worcester,
Massachusetts.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Mitchell Mark Breit, Esq.
   Hanly Conroy Bierstein Sheridan Fisher & Hayes, LLP
   112 Madison Avenue
   New York, NY 10016
   Tel: (212) 784-6400
   Fax: (212) 213-5949
   Email: mbreit@simmonsfirm.com


POST CONSUMER: Court Dismisses Lima Suit With Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------
Judge Allison D. Burroughs of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts dismissed with prejudice the case, ANITA
S. LIMA and SUSAN WRUBLEWSKI, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. POST CONSUMER BRANDS, LLC,
Defendant, Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-12100-ADB (D. Mass.).

Post is a Delaware limited liability company that is headquartered
in Minnesota.  It manufactures and sells several varieties of
cereal under the registered trademark "Honey Bunches of Oats.

The putative class action concerns the allegedly deceptive
advertising and packaging of Defendant Post's Honey Bunches of Oats
cereal.  Plaintiffs Lima and Wrublewski claim that Post breached
express warranties, violated numerous state consumer protection
statutes, and unjustly enriched itself by creating the impression
that Honey Bunches of Oats was primarily sweetened with honey, when
it is in fact primarily sweetened with sugar, brown sugar, and corn
syrup.

The Plaintiffs filed the lawsuit on Oct. 5, 2018 and their Amended
Complaint on Feb. 8, 2019.  The Amended Complaint brings claims on
behalf of the following five putative classes of consumers who
purchased some variety of Honey Bunches of Oats cereal:

     a. The Nationwide Class: All persons who, on or after October
6, 2012, purchased the Products for personal, family, or household
purposes in the United States.

     b. The Injunctive Relief Class: All persons who, on or after
October 6, 2012, purchased the Products for personal, family or
household purposes in the United States.

     c. The Multistate UDAP Class: All persons who, within the
relevant limitations periods, purchased the Products for personal,
family, or household purposes in Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of
Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wyoming.

     d. The Multistate Warranty Class: All persons who, within the
relevant limitations periods, purchased the products for personal,
family, or household purposes in Alaska, Arizona, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming.

     e. The Massachusetts Class: All persons who, within the
relevant limitations periods, purchased the products for personal,
family, or household purposes in Massachusetts.

The Plaintiffs assert the following claims: (a) Count I -
Violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act on behalf of the
Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Class; (b) Count II - Breach of
express warranty on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Class;
(c) Count III - Unjust enrichment on behalf of Plaintiffs and the
Nationwide Class; (d) Count IV - Violations of specified states'
consumer protection statutes on behalf of hte Plaintiffs and the
Multistate UDAP Class; (e) Count V - Violations of specified
states' express warranty statutes on behalf of the Plaintiffs and
the Multistate Warranty Class; (f) Count VI - Violations of the
Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, Massachusetts General Laws
ch. 93A, on behalf of the Massachusetts Class; and (i) Count VII -
Breach of Massachusetts express warranty pursuant to Massachusetts
General Laws ch. 105 on behalf of the Massachusetts Class.

On February 22, 2019, Post filed the instant motion to dismiss.  On
April 5, 2019, the Plaintiffs timely opposed the motion.  On April
17, 2019, Post filed a reply in support of its motion, and on May
3, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a sur-reply.

Post argues that the Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed
because: (1) the claims are preempted under the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") flavor labeling regulations; (2) purchases
of cereal in Massachusetts cannot be the basis for claims brought
under Minnesota law; (3) the Plaintiffs failed to send a demand
letter as required by Massachusetts General Laws ch. 93A; (4) the
Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that a reasonable consumer
would be deceived by the packaging at issue; (5) the warranty
claims fail because the cereal packaging makes no warranty as to
the amount of honey; (6) the unjust enrichment claims fail because
Plaintiffs have an adequate legal remedy; and (7) the Plaintiffs
lack standing to seek injunctive relief because they do not allege
any intent to buy Honey Bunches of Oats in the future.

Judge Burroughs first evaluates the Honey Bunches of Oats packaging
under the applicable FDA regulations and then considers the
Plaintiffs' claims.  She finds that because the product labels at
issue here are governed by 21 U.S.C. Section 343 and the FDA's
related regulations, the Plaintiffs cannot maintain state law
claims that would require additional labeling if the packaging at
issue is fully compliant with the federal statutory scheme.  There
is no prohibition, however, on a state law claim based upon
packaging that also violates the FDCA.

Regardless of whether honey is a primary recognizable flavor of
Honey Bunches of Oats, the Judge concludes that the packaging at
issue was consistent with the FDCA and the Amended Complaint does
not plausibly allege that it would have confused a reasonable
consumer, particularly where Post made no unambiguous
misrepresentation and provided an accurate ingredient list.  Even a
reasonable consumer who presumed honey to be a sweetener rather
than a flavor would see that Honey Bunches of Oats did not claim to
be sweetened exclusively or primarily with honey and therefore
would have recognized that the cereal might be sweetened with some
honey, but also with other sweeteners.  Assuming such a consumer
cared about how the cereal was sweetened, he or she would then have
checked the ingredient list and discovered that honey, although a
sweetener, was not the most prominent.

The Judge also finds that the FDA regulations do not prescribe a
common name or "standard identity" for breakfast cereal, as they do
for some other foods, such as "yogurt," but she agrees with Post
that the basic character of Honey Bunches of Oats cereal is cereal.
Although the Amended Complaint at least suggests that honey is
among the recognizable flavors of Honey Bunches of Oats, that does
not render honey a characterizing ingredient within the meaning of
21 C.F.R. Section 102.5(b) because honey is not a characterizing
ingredient of cereals generally.  The regulations therefore do not
require Post to disclose the proportion of honey in Honey Bunches
of Oats.

Although it is likely that Massachusetts law applies to the
Plaintiffs' claims because they are Massachusetts residents who
purchased the cereal for private use, the Amended Complaint does
not specify where the Plaintiffs purchased the cereal.  Post does
not assert that there are any meaningful conflicts between
Minnesota and Massachusetts law other than the demand letter
requirement, and in light of the limited facts available at this
stage of the litigation and the absence of a meaningful difference
in the applicable Minnesota and Massachusetts laws for present
purposes, the Judge declines to hold whether Massachusetts or
Minnesota law applies.

The Judge holds that the Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that
the use of "Honey" in Honey Bunches of Oats and the associated
imagery would have misled a reasonable consumer into believing that
the cereal was primarily or exclusively sweetened with honey.  She
therefore dismissed Counts I, IV, and VI.

She also dismissed Counts II, V, and VII.  She finds that
especially where the cereal both contains and tastes like honey,
neither the use of the Honey Bunches of Oats brand name nor the
imagery on the packaging provides the sort of express promise that
is required for a breach of warranty claim.

Finally, the Judge dismissed Count III.  She finds that unjust
enrichment is an equitable doctrine that entitles a plaintiff to
restitution for any benefit knowingly retained by the defendant at
the plaintiff's expense when it would be inequitable for the
defendant to retain that benefit without paying the plaintiff.  It
suffices to say that if the Plaintiffs had in fact been reasonably
misled by Post's Honey Bunches of Oats packaging, they would have
no shortage of contractual and statutory remedies.

In sum, the Judge concludes that the Plaintiffs have not plausibly
alleged any claim.  In reaching that conclusion, she finds no
inconsistency between the FDA flavor-labeling regulation and the
state laws at issue.  The Court is not required to reach, and does
not decide, the issues concerning Massachusetts General Laws ch.
93A's requirement for a demand letter, choice of law, or standing
to pursue injunctive relief.

Accordingly, she granted the motion to dismiss.  All counts are
dismissed.  Because the complaint has already been amended once and
the Judge concludes that further amendment would be futile, the
dismissal is with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 13, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/ld1gbG from Leagle.com.

Anita S. Lima, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated & Susan Wrublewski, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Carlos F. Ramirez --
cramirez@reesellp.com -- Reese LLP, pro hac vice, Kenneth D. Quat
-- ken@quatlaw.com -- Quat Law Offices & Michael R. Reese --
mresses@ressellp.com -- Reese LLP, pro hac vice.

Post Consumer Brands, LLC, Defendant, represented by Aaron D.
VanOort -- aaron.vanoort@FaegreBD.com -- Faegre & Benson LLP,
Christine R.M. Kain -- christine.kain@FaegreBD.com -- Faegre Baker
Daniels, LLP, pro hac vice, Emily R. Zambrana, Faegre Baker
Daniels, LLP, pro hac vice, Kara G. Thorvaldsen --
kara.thorvaldsen@wilsonelser.com -- Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz,
Edelman & Dicker, LLP & Sarah L. Brew -- sarah.brew@FaegreBD.com --
Faegre Baker Daniels, LLP., pro hac vice.


QNB BANK: Mahoney Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
----------------------------------------------------------
QNB Bank is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to the
Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as John
Mahoney, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. QNB Bank, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-04425-JD (E.D.
Penn., Sept. 24, 2019).

QNB Bank, also known simply as QNB, is an independent bank
headquartered in Quakertown, Pennsylvania.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David S. Glanzberg, Esq.
   Glanzberg Tobia & Associates PC
   123 s. Broad Street Suite 1640
   Philadelphia, PA 19109
   Tel: (215) 981-5400
   Email: dglanzberg@aol.com


RELIN GOLDSTEIN: Klein Files Class Suit Under FDCPA
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Relin, Goldstein &
Crane, LLP. The case is styled as Victor Klein, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Relin,
Goldstein & Crane, LLP, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-05451 (E.D.
N.Y., Sept. 25, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Act.

Relin, Goldstein & Crane LLP is a Rochester, NY law firm
concentrating its practice in commercial & retail collections, real
estate, & foreclosure matters.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David Michael Barshay, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza
   Ste 5th Floor
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 706-5055
   Email: dbarshay@bakersanders.com

     - and -

   Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 281-7601
   Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com




RESIDENCE INN: 9th Cir. Vacates Remand of Arias to State Court
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BLANCA ARGELIA ARIAS, individually and on behalf of
herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
RESIDENCE INN BY MARRIOTT, a Delaware limited liability company;
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Delaware corporation,
Defendants-Appellants, Case No. 19-55803 (9th Cir.), Judge Consuelo
M. Callahan of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
vacated the district court's judgment remanding the case back to
state court.

On Aug. 23, 2018, Arias filed a putative class action against
Residence Inn and Marriott International in California superior
court, alleging that Marriott failed to compensate its employees
for wages and missed meal breaks and failed to issue accurate
itemized wage statements.  Arias works for Residence Inn in Los
Angeles, California.  

Arias seeks certification of a class of all employees of Marriott
who were subjected to individual wage and hour violations, during
the period within four years from the filing of the Complaint and
continuing through trial.  In addition to compensatory damages,
Arias seeks civil penalties under the California Private Attorney
General Act, disgorgement of "ill-gotten gains" under California's
Unfair Competition Law, and attorneys' fees.

On Oct. 12, 2018, Marriott removed the case to federal district
court, invoking CAFA jurisdiction.  Specifically, Marriott alleged
that the district court had original jurisdiction over the matter
because the class action satisfied CAFA's requirements of minimum
diversity (any member of the class is a citizen of a state
different from any defendant), class size (at least 100), and
amount in controversy (exceeding $5 million).  To show minimum
diversity, Marriott alleged that it is a citizen of Maryland and
Delaware and it relied on the allegation in the complaint that
Arias is a citizen of California.  To satisfy the class size
requirement, Marriott provided a declaration from a human resources
officer stating that Marriott employed at least 2193 nonexempt
employees during the period identified in the complaint.

One month after Marriott filed the notice of removal, the district
court issued an order sua sponte remanding the case to state court.
The district court found Marriott's calculations of the amount in
controversy "unpersuasive," concluding that the calculations rested
on speculation and conjecture.  The court faulted Marriott for not
offering evidentiary support for its assumptions of violation rates
and reasoned that equally valid assumptions could be made that
result in damages that are less than the requisite $5 million
amount in controversy.  It also concluded that "prospective
attorneys' fees are too speculative" to be included in the amount
in controversy.  The court thus concluded that Marriott failed to
satisfy its burden that the amount in controversy meets the
jurisdictional requirement.

The parties report that since the district court's remand order,
litigation has gone forward in the state court.  According to the
parties, on July 18, 2019, Marriott filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that a release from a related class action
settlement bars all of Arias's claims.

Marriott timely filed a petition for permission to appeal under 28
U.S.C. Section 1453(c)(1), which the Court granted.  Marriott
raises several challenges to the district court's remand order.
First, Marriott argues the district court imposed an erroneous
burden of proof by sua sponte remanding the case to state court
without allowing Marriott an opportunity to support its allegations
with evidence.  Second, Marriott argues the district court erred in
disallowing Marriott's use of assumed violation rates in its
estimate of the amount in controversy.  Third, it argues the
district court erred by "refusing to consider prospective
attorneys' fees in the amount in controversy.

Judge Callahan agrees with Marriott that when a notice of removal
plausibly alleges a basis for federal court jurisdiction, a
district court may not remand the case back to state court without
first giving the defendant an opportunity to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the jurisdictional requirements
are satisfied.  The district court clearly questioned Marriott's
allegation, but by remanding the case to state court sua sponte,
the district court deprived Marriott of a fair opportunity to
submit proof.  This error warrants vacatur of the remand order.

The Judge also agrees with Marriott that in assessing the amount in
controversy, a removing defendant is permitted to rely on "a chain
of reasoning that includes assumptions."  Such "assumptions cannot
be pulled from thin air but need some reasonable ground underlying
them."  An assumption may be reasonable if it is founded on the
allegations of the complaint.

The district court characterized Marriott's assumed violation rates
as being "speculation and conjecture," apparently because Marriott
did not provide evidence proving the assumptions correct.  The
district court seems to have imposed a requirement that Marriott
prove it actually violated the law at the assumed rate.  But
assumptions made part of the Defendant's chain of reasoning need
not be proven; they instead must only have some reasonable ground
underlying them.  On remand, Marriott will bear the burden to show
that its estimated amount in controversy relies on reasonable
assumptions.

Arias seeks recovery of attorneys' fees, and there is no dispute
that at least some of the California wage and hour laws that form
the basis of the complaint entitle a prevailing plaintiff to an
award of attorneys' fees.  The district court thus erred in
excluding prospective attorneys' fees from the amount in
controversy.

Marriott argues that attorneys' fees should be estimated at 25% of
the potential damages.  Although such an estimate might be
reasonable, the Judge holds that the Court has declined to adopt a
per se rule that the amount of attorneys' fees in controversy in
class actions is 25% of all other alleged recovery.  As the Court
did in Fritsch v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, the Judge leaves
the calculation of the amount of the attorneys' fees at stake to
the district court on remand.

Arias argues that the position taken by Marriott in its summary
judgment motion in state court -- that Arias' claims are barred by
a release from a prior class action settlement—defeats federal
court jurisdiction.  Arias is wrong for two reasons, the Judge
holds.  First, it is well settled that post-filing developments do
not defeat jurisdiction if jurisdiction was properly invoked as of
the time of filing.  Second, the strength of any defenses indicates
the likelihood of the Plaintiff prevailing; it is irrelevant to
determining the amount that is at stake in the litigation.  Arias'
argument conflates the amount in controversy with the amount of
damages ultimately recoverable.

Arias also suggests that jurisdiction is defeated because she has
stipulated that this action is not valued at $5 million for CAFA
jurisdiction or otherwise.  Even if this vague statement in Arias'
appellate brief were binding on her, the Judge holds that it would
be irrelevant to the CAFA analysis.  This is so because although
individual plaintiffs are the masters of their complaints and may
stipulate to amounts at issue that fall below the federal
jurisdictional requirement, the same is not true for a putative
class representative, who cannot yet bind the absent class.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Callahan vacated the district court's
judgment and remanded on an open record for further proceedings
consistent with her Opinion.  The district court may hold such
further proceedings as it deems appropriate to permit the parties
to submit evidence and arguments on the amount in controversy.  The
parties will bear their own costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 13, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/h2H9FJ from Leagle.com.

Brian P. Long (argued) -- bplong@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP,
Los Angeles, California; William Dritsas -- wdritsas@seyfarth.com
-- Seyfarth Shaw LLP, San Francisco, California; for
Defendants-Appellants.

Samvel Gashgian (argued) and Ramin R. Younessi --
ryounessi@younessilaw.com -- Law Offices of Ramin R. Younessi, Los
Angeles, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.


RODENBURG LLP: 8th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Carroll FDCPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Monty G. Carroll, Jr., on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated; Lawrence D. Smith, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
Rodenburg LLP, Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 18-3667 (8th Cir.), the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal of Carroll and Lawrence Smith's purported class
action brought under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA").  Having carefully reviewed the record and the parties'
arguments on appeal, it concluded that the district court properly
dismissed the complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 14, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/8iwDd7 from Leagle.com.

Clifton Rodenburg, for Defendant-Appellee.

Eeva Wendorf, for Defendant-Appellee.

Bradley R. Armstrong, for Defendant-Appellee.

Michael S. Poncin -- Mike.Poncin@lawmoss.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Jesse Stine Johnson -- jjohnson@gdrlawfirm.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

James Lee Davidson, for Plaintiff-Appellant.


ROSSY'S BAKERY: Perez Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------
RAFAEL PEREZ, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. ROSSY'S BAKERY & COFFEE SHOP, INC. d/b/a ROSSY'S
BAKERY, and ROSELIA CABA, individually, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-08683 (S.D. N.Y., Sept. 18, 2019) is a civil action brought
by the Plaintiff and all similarly situated employees to recover
unpaid overtime compensation and damages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and New York Labor Law.

From approximately January 2017 through October 2017, Plaintiff
consistently worked over 40 hours per week. During this time
period, Plaintiff's salary was not inclusive of overtime. He was
only paid for the first 40 hours that he worked, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff worked as a dishwasher and kitchen helper from
approximately January 2017 through October 2017.

Rossy's Bakery & Coffee Shop, Inc. is a domestic business
corporation having its principal place of business located at 242 E
3rd Street, New York, NY 10009.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jacob Aronauer, Esq.
     225 Broadway, 3rd floor
     New York, NY 10007


ROSWELL, GA: Court Affirms Firefighters' Class Certification
------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Georgia, Fifth Division, issued an Opinion
affirming the District Court's judgment granting Plaintiffs’
Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned CITY OF
ROSWELL, v. BIBLE et al. A19A1310. (Ga. App.).

David Bible and Brian Rogers, filed suit against the City of
Roswell, seeking to represent a class of similarly situated
firefighters on various claims arising from the City's
classification of the putative class members as part-time rather
than full-time employees, thereby depriving them of full-time
benefits under the City's Policy Manual.

Following discovery limited to the issue of class certification,
the trial court entered an order certifying the proposed class.

On appeal, the City asserts that the trial court erred by (1)
relying on the Appellees' unsupported allegations (2) finding that
class issues predominate (3) finding that Appellees met their
burden of proof as to numerosity and (4) finding that Appellees
satisfy the typicality requirement.  

The trial court directed the parties to engage in discovery limited
to the issue of class certification, and in June 2018, Appellees
filed a motion to certify a class of similarly situated
firefighters as follows:

All persons currently and/or formerly employed as firefighters by
the Roswell Fire Department between August 29, 2011 and the date of
the filing of the Complaint (inclusive), who worked forty (40)
hours or more per standard workweek, but did not receive the
benefits conferred upon regular full-time employees.

In its first enumeration of error, the City simply asserts that the
Appellees failed to meet their burden of proof in establishing
class certification without specifying which factors the Appellees
failed to establish  because the trial court improperly relied on
the Appellees' unsworn allegations in their complaint and other
assertions outside their personal knowledge for key factual
propositions, including the allegations about the City and the
Department's benefits practices and the number of hours worked by
Appellees and other class members.

In order to certify a class, the trial court must find: (1) the
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable
(2) [t]here are questions of law or fact common to the class (3)
the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.

In addition, the trial court must determine that at least one
ground included in OCGA Sction 9-11-23(b) is satisfied. Pertinent
to this case, OCGA Section 9-11-23(b)(3) provides that a class
action may be maintained if the trial court finds that the
questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.

The City is correct that the Appellees, as the class proponents,
bear the burden of proving that class certification is appropriate.
With these principles in mind, we will turn to the City's specific
arguments regarding the Appellees' failure to establish that their
claims are entitled to class treatment.

In its second enumeration of error, the City asserts that the
Appellees cannot establish that common issues predominate over
individual issues.

The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed
classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by
representation. Class plaintiffs may satisfy this requirement by
showing that issues subject to class-wide proof predominate over
issues requiring proof that is unique to the individual class
member.

Here, the trial court found that there is a single contract that
applies only to City employees and that within that single document
the plaintiffs are challenging only those provisions regarding
benefits to full-time employees. Thus, where each of the class
members' claims arise out of identical terms in the Policy Manual
and each of their claims are brought under the same causes of
action, the issue of the City's contractual liability will be
determined on a class-wide basis.

And the Court have previously held that similar claims arising from
the breach of a single contract present a classic case for
treatment as a class action.  

The City argues, however, that the Appellees worked for years
without challenging their non-benefitted status and that this
action therefore involves highly individualized questions of
waiver. Although Georgia law recognizes that a party to a contract
may waive contractual provisions for his benefit, waiver is not
favored under the law and the evidence relied upon to prove a
waiver must be so clearly indicative of an intent to relinquish a
then known particular right or benefit as to exclude any other
reasonable explanation.

However, we need not resolve the issue of waiver at this juncture
because merit-based disputes are not ripe for resolution at the
class certification stage, particularly where no dispositive
motions have been filed, argued, or ruled on below, and merits
discovery has not concluded.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
individual considerations do not predominate over those relevant to
the entire class.

The City next asserts that the Appellees failed to meet their
burden to prove numerosity.

Under Georgia law, there is no minimum number of class members
required to meet the requirements of OCGA Section 9-11-23(a)(1).
However, impracticability of joinder is generally presumed if the
class includes more than 40 members.   

Although the City's argument is not entirely clear on appeal, it
appears that in contesting numerosity below, the City did not
actually dispute the fact that the proposed class would exceed the
general threshold for numerosity. Rather, the City disputed the
Appellees' reliance on the Policy Manual's definition of full-time,
i.e., an employee whose standard workweek is forty hours or more.
In any event, documents produced by the City during discovery
provided the names and work hours of potential class members during
the relevant time period. Case law is clear that there is no
requirement that every classmember, other than the named
plaintiffs, be identified at the outset of the litigation. Instead,
a class definition is necessary only to establish that the class
does, in fact, exist and that its members will be identifiable.

Based on our review of the City's own records, we find the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Appellees
satisfied the numerosity requirement. Accordingly, this enumeration
of error provides no basis for reversal.

And lastly, the City asserts that the Appellees' claims are not
typical of the class. The typicality test centers on whether other
members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is
based on conduct which is not unique to the named class plaintiffs,
and whether other class members have been injured by the same
course of conduct.

The City alleges that because Bible and Rogers acquiesced in their
non-benefitted status and worked over 2,080 hours per year, they
are not typical of other class members who did not waive their
entitlement to any benefits or those who worked less than 2,080
hours per year. However, it is clear that Appellees' breach of
contract claims, arising from the City's denial of full-time
employment benefits, are virtually identical to the claims of each
proposed class member. And for the reasons discussed in Division 2,
the Court need not reach the merits of the City's waiver defense at
this juncture. Accordingly, this enumeration of error provides no
basis for reversal.

A full-text copy of the Ga. App.'s September 16, 2019 Decision and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxwmcp64 from
Leagle.com.

Richard Read Gignilliat , Elarbee Thompson Sapp & Wilson LLP, 229
Peachtree St NE Ste 800, Atlanta, GA, 30303-1614, for Appellant.

Patrick Lee Lail , Elarbee Thompson Sapp & Wilson LLP, 229
Peachtree St NE Ste 800, Atlanta, GA, 30303-1614,  for Appellant.

Timothy Michael Boughey - mboughey@hwle.com.au - for Appellant.

Mary Ellen Conner  - maryellenc@johnsonfistel.com - for Appellee.

Michael I. Fistel, Jr. - michaelf@johnsonfistel.com - for
Appellee.

William Woodhull Stone, 4274 Peachtree Road NE, Suite 205, Atlanta,
GA, 30319, for Appellee.
David Aaron Weisz , Taylor English Duma LLP, 1600 Parkwood Circle,
Suite 200, Atlanta, GA, 30339, for Appellee.


ROYAL SEAS: Court Approves Direct Notice Plan in McCurley TCPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN McCURLEY, DAN DEFOREST, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ROYAL SEAS
CRUISES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-00986-BAS-AGS (S.D. Cal.),
Judge Cynthia Bashant of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California granted in part and denied in part the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Approval of Proposed Class Notice Plan.

McCurley and DeForest previously moved for certification of
nationwide Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) TCPA classes.  The Court
granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion.  

As a result, the Court has certified nationwide Rule 23(b)(3) TCPA
classes as follows:

     a. Class: All persons within the United States who received a
telephone call (1) from Prospects, DM, Inc. on behalf of Royal Seas
Cruises, Inc. (2) on said Class Member's cellular telephone (3)
made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or
an artificial or prerecorded voice, (4) between November 2016 and
December 2017, (5) where such calls were placed for the purpose of
marketing, (6) to non-customers of Royal Seas Cruises, Inc. at the
time of the calls, and (7) whose cellular telephone number is
associated in Prospects DM's records with either
diabeteshealth.info or www.yourautohealthlifeinsurance.com.

     b. Transfer Subclass: All members of the Class whose call
resulted in a Transfer to Royal Seas Cruises, Inc.

After receiving two extensions to propose a class notice plan, the
Plaintiffs timely filed their motion for approval of their proposed
class notice plan.   Class Counsel retained KCC Class Services
("KCC"), a class action administration firm, to design the proposed
notice plans, and KCC will conduct whichever notice plan the Court
approves.

The Plaintiffs' motion presents two separate and alternative notice
plans -- the proposed Direct Notice Plan and the proposed
Publication Notice Plan -- for which they seek Court approval of
only one, preferably publication notice.

As a general matter, KCC will establish a case website
(www.RoyalSeasCruisesTCPAClassAction.com) to allow the Class
Members to obtain additional information and documents about the
litigation, including the Complaints, the Class Certification
Order, and the Detailed Notice.  The website address will appear in
any notice the Court approves.  KCC will establish a toll-free
telephone number to allow the Class Members to learn more about the
litigation and to request that notice be mailed to them directly.
The number will appear on the website and any notice the Court
approves.  Finally, KCC will establish and monitor a case mailbox
where the Class Members can submit exclusion requests and other
case correspondence.

Under the proposed Direct Notice Plan, the Class Counsel and/or
Royal would provide KCC with all the telephone numbers available in
Prospects DM's records for diabeteshealth.info and
www.yourautohealthlifeinsurance.com, which KCC would compile into a
single Notice List.  KCC would de-duplicate telephone numbers in
the Notice List so that unique telephone numbers appear once and
then KCC would perform a reverse directory search to determine
viable postal addresses for each unique telephone number.

After the search, KCC would update the Notice List and de-duplicate
to ensure that a single postcard notice is mailed for each unique
phone number to the actual user of the phone number, as best as can
be determined.  If the reach of the Direct Notice Plan falls below
70%, then KCC would use digital media advertisements to ensure the
Notice Plan reaches at least 70% of likely Class Members.  KCC
proposes to send a postcard notice by U.S. Postal Service mail for
identified physical addresses, with a follow-up address
identification plan for any notice initially returned as
undeliverable.  The Class Counsel has submitted a proposed postcard
notice.

The Class Counsel believes that if direct mail notice is required
it should be accomplished first with the post card notice that
directs consumers to the Website.  The Class Counsel submits a
separate proposed long form notice, which is presumably the
Detailed Notice to which KCC refers in its declaration.  Royal
believes the long form notice should be sent to consumers instead
of the proposed postcard notice.

Under the proposed Publication Notice Plan, KCC would cause a
"Summary Notice" to appear in ESPN The Magazine, which apparently
"reaches 7.3% of likely Class Members" with "likely Class members
2.2% more likely to be readers of the magazine, as compared to the
general adult population."  In addition, KCC would engage in
digital media advertising by purchasing either 116 million or 242
million digital media advertising impressions to be distributed via
the Google Display Network and Facebook over a period of 60 days,
with impressions "targeted to likely Class Members."  The
impressions would appear on desktop and mobile devices and would
include an embedded link to the case website.  The Class Counsel
has submitted the proposed text for ESPN The Magazine and three
proposed Facebook Ads.

Royal principally opposes the proposed Publication Notice Plan and
argues that the Plaintiffs' proposed notice is otherwise
incomplete.

Having reviewed the proposed notices, Judge Bashant finds that the
proposed notice lacks certain information that Rule 23 requires for
notice in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action.  Thus, she will order
certain amendments to the notices.  She will approve only the
Direct Notice Plan.

In the interests of the class receiving notice as swiftly as
possible following the Court's March 2019 class certification order
and prior to adjudication of any motions for summary judgment, the
Judge will impose a deadline of Nov. 1, 2019 for the Plaintiffs to
complete the Direct Notice Plan.

The Plaintiffs will be required to add the following language to
each proposed notice: "The Court will exclude from the class any
member who requests exclusion."  The Plaintiffs are required to
amend the postcard notices as follows: "If you do not want to stay
in the Class, you must submit a request for exclusion by December
2, 2019 by sending a letter to the P.O. Box address on this
postcard. The letter must state that I want to be excluded from
McCurley v. Royal Seas Cruises, Inc., Case No. 3:17-cv-00986.
Include your name, address, the cell phone number or numbers that
received the calls at issue in this lawsuit, and your signature."
This proposed amendment incorporates the exclusion procedure
identified in the proposed long form notice.  As such, the Judge
sustains Royal's objections and has addressed them through
appropriate amendments.

Although the long form notice contains more information, including
a description of Royal's affirmative consent defense, the Judge
finds that the Plaintiffs are not required to provide the same
information in the postcard notice.  Thus, she overrules this
objection.

Finally, the Judge has concerns that the inclusion of such
information could have the effect of the discouraging class members
to proceed in the class action.  In any event, she overrules
Royal's objection for the simple reason that Rule 23 does not
require any of this information to be provided in a class notice.

Having otherwise reviewed the proposed notices, Judge Bashant is
satisfied that they include all other information that Rule
23(c)(2)(B) requires, including a description of the nature of the
action, the definitions of the classes, that the class members may
be enter an appearance through an attorney, and the binding effect
of any judgment.  Subject to the foregoing amendments, she approves
the proposed postcard and long form notices.  The Plaintiffs are
authorized to mail the class members the postcard notice in the
first instance.

For the foregoing reasons, the Judge granted in part and denied in
part the Plaintiffs' motion.  She granted the motion insofar as it
concerns the proposed Direct Notice Plan.  She denied the
Plaintiffs' motion insofar as the Plaintiffs seek to provide
publication notice.

The Judge ordered that the Plaintiffs will amend their notices in
accordance with the Order.  The Plaintiffs will further amend the
notices to reflect that any trial date is subject to further change
depending on the Court's schedule or the needs of the case.  The
Plaintiffs will file copies of the amended notices with the Court
no later than Aug. 28, 2019.  They will complete the Direct Notice
Plan no later than Nov. 1, 2019.  The Class Members will opt-out no
later than Dec. 2, 2019.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 14, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/TiKcAm from Leagle.com.

John McCurley, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Abbas Kazerounian, Kazerounian
Law Group, APC, Joshua B. Swigart -- Josh@westcoastlitigation.com
-- Hyde & Swigart, Kevin Lemieux -- kevin@westcoastlitigation.com
-- The Law Office of Kevin Lemieux, APC, Matthew M. Loker,
Kazerouni Law Group, APC & Todd M. Friedman, Law Offices of Todd
M.
Friedman, P.C.

Dan Deforest, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Adrian R. Bacon, The Law
Offices of Todd M Friedman PC, Kevin Lemieux, The Law Office of
Kevin Lemieux, APC, Matthew M. Loker, Kazerouni Law Group, APC,
Meghan George, Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman & Todd M. Friedman,
Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C.

Royal Seas Cruises, Inc., Defendant, represented by Anton N.
Handal
-- tony.handal@gmlaw.com -- Greenspoon Marder LLP, Brian R.
Cummings -- brian.cummings@gmlaw.com -- Greenspoon Marder P.A.,
pro
hac vice, Jeffrey A. Backman -- jeffrey.backman@gmlaw.com --
Greenspoon Marder P.A., pro hac vice, Richard W. Epstein --
Richard.epstein@gmlaw.com -- Greenspoon Marder, P.A., pro hac vice
& Lauren Gail Kane -- lauren.kane@gmlaw.com -- Greenspoon Marder
LLP.


RUSH TRUCK: Settlement in Cawthorne Suit Has Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRIAN CAWTHORNE, AND FRANCISCO XAVIER VALDEZ
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. RUSH TRUCK CENTERS OF CALIFORNIA, INC., RUSH
ENTERPRISES, INC, RUSH ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, INC, AND RUSH TRUCK
LEASING, INC., Defendants, Case No. 5:17-cv-1541 (JGB) (SPx) (C.D.
Cal.), Judge Jesus G. Bernal of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California granted the Plaintiff's Motion for
an Order Granting Final Approval of Class Action Settlement,
Conditionally Certifying Proposed Settlement Class, Approving
Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs, and Granting Incentive
Award.

On March 18, 2019, the Court entered an Order Granting Preliminary
Approval of Settlement, resulting in certification of the
provisional Settlement Class of individuals who are or were
previously employed by any Defendant; in a Covered Job Position; at
any point during the Class Period.  The "Covered Job Position" is
defined as any nonexempt employee of any Defendant working in
California during the Class Period. Covered Job Positions include,
but are not limited to Technicians, Service Technicians, and Mobile
Technicians.  The "Class Period" is defined as the time from June
29, 2013 (i.e., four years before the Complaint was filed on June
29, 2017), through and including Aug. 31, 2018.

The Court further approved the form of, and directed the parties to
provide, the proposed Class Notice to the Class.  No objections had
been made, timely or otherwise, pursuant to the Class Notice sent
to the Settlement Class members, nor did any objectors appear at
the time of the hearing.

Nine Class Members have requested exclusion from the Settlement,
and are identified as follows: Maria D. Garcia, Claudia Rae Doran,
Marco T. Hernandez, Robert K. Qualman, Charles Raymond Maikish,
Jesus P. Tarango, Christopher M. Cleveland, Francisco Javier Lara,
and Yolanda Ann Chavez Gomez.

The matter came before the Court for hearing pursuant to the Order
of the Court dated Aug. 12, 2019 for approval of the settlement set
forth in the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement of Class Action
Claims.  Having considered all papers filed and proceedings, Judge
Bernal granted the Plaintiff's Motion for an Order Granting Final
Approval of Class Action Settlement, Conditionally Certifying
Proposed Settlement Class, Approving Motion for Attorneys' Fees and
Costs, and Granting Incentive Award.

In addition to any recovery that the Plaintiffs may receive under
the Settlement, and in recognition of the the Plaintiffs' efforts
and risks taken on behalf of the Settlement Class, the Judge
approved the payment of an incentive award to the Plaintiffs, in
the amount of $5,000 each.  He also approved (i) the payment of
attorneys' fees to the Class Counsel in the sum of $183,333.33;
(ii) the reimbursement of litigation expenses to the Class Counsel
in the sum of $10,000; (iii) the PAGA allocation of $50,000 for the
release of PAGA claims, with $37,500 going to the Labor Workforce
and Development Agency, and $12,500 allocated to the Class Members;
(iv) Justice, P.C. as the cy pres recipient for any residual checks
that have not been cashed by participating Class Members within 90
days of mailing; and (v) the payment in an amount commensurate with
Simpluris' actual costs in the amount of $11,500 to Simpluris for
performance of its settlement claims administration services.

Upon completion of administration of the Settlement, the parties
shall file a declaration setting forth that claims have been paid
and that the terms of the settlement have been completed.

The Judgment is intended to be a final disposition of the above
captioned action in its entirety, and is intended to be immediately
appealable.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 13, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/rzzZHr from Leagle.com.

Brian Cawthorne, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Adrian Robert Bacon --
abacon@toddflaw.com -- Law Offices of Todd M Friedman PC, Meghan
Elisabeth George -- mgeorge@toddflaw.com -- Todd M Friedman Law
Offices PC, Thomas Edward Wheeler -- twheeler@toddflaw.com -- Law
Offices of Todd M Friedman PC & Todd M. Friedman --
tfriedman@toddflaw.com -- Law Office of Todd M Friedman PC.

Francisco Xavier Valdez, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Adrian Robert Bacon,
Law Offices of Todd M Friedman PC.

Rush Truck Centers of California, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Adam Sloustcher -- asloustcher@fisherphillips.com -- Fisher and
Phillips LLP & James C. Fessenden -- jfessenden@laborlawyers.com --
Fisher and Phillips.


SACRAMENTO COUNTY, CA: Class Notice in Mays Gets Prelim Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LORENZO MAYS, RICKY RICHARDSON, JENNIFER BOTHUN,
ARMANI LEE, LEERTESE BEIRGE, and CODY GARLAND, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY
OF SACRAMENTO, Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-02081-TLN-KJN (E.D.
Cal.), Judge Troy L. Nunley of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California has issued an order granting
preliminary approval of the Consent Decree and the Notice of
Proposed Class Action Settlement.

The Plaintiffs are state prisoners, proceeding through counsel.
The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.  On
Aug. 8, 2019, the magistrate judge filed findings and
recommendations which were served on all parties and which
contained notice to all parties that any objections to the findings
and recommendations were to be filed within 14 days.  On Aug. 12,
2019, the parties filed a joint statement of non-opposition to the
findings and recommendations.

Judge Nunley has reviewed the file and finds the findings and
recommendations to be supported by the record and by the magistrate
judge's analysis.  Accordingly, he adopted in full the findings and
recommendations filed Aug. 8, 2019.

Accordingly, the Consent Decree, granted preliminary approval,
subject to the right of class members to challenge the fairness,
reasonableness, or adequacy of the Consent Decree.  Under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(1), the Judge approved the substance,
form and manner of the Class Notice.  Within three days of the
Order, the parties will prepare a final version of the Notice,
incorporating the dates set forth therein.

No later than Sept. 9, 2019, the County is directed to post the
Notice in English and Spanish in all housing units in such a manner
as to make the notice visible to all people incarcerated in the
Jails.  The County will hand deliver a copy of the Notice to each
inmate in administrative segregation. The Notice will be posted and
delivered for 30 days.  The County is also directed to provide a
copy of the Order and the full Consent Decree and the Remedial Plan
to people who complete an inmate request form and request the
documents.  The Defendant must file and serve on the Plaintiffs'
counsel a declaration affirming that notice was published as
required in the Order.

A fairness hearing will take place at 11:00 a.m. Dec. 5, 2019.  Any
further briefing from the parties in advance of the hearing will be
filed no later than Nov. 12, 2019.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 13, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/2WJ6aI from Leagle.com.

Armani Lee, Leertese Beirge, Ricky Lee Richardson, Jr., Cody
Garland, Lorenzo Mays & Jennifer Bothun, Plaintiffs, represented
by
Donald Specter, Prison Law Office, Jessica Valenzuela Santamaria
--
jvs@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Addison Mills Litton --
alitton@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Anne Hadreas --
anne.Hadreas@disabilityrightsca.org -- Disability Rights
California, Kathlyn Anne Querubin -- kquerubin@cooley.com --
Cooley
LLP, Margot Knight Mendelson -- mmendelson@prisonlaw.com -- Prison
Law Office, Mark Anthony Zambarda -- mzambarda@cooley.com --
Cooley
LLP, Sophie Jedeikin Hart -- sophieh@prisonlaw.com -- Prison Law
Office, Tifanei Ressl-Moyer --
Tifanei.Ressl-Moyer@disabilityrightsca.org -- Disability Rights
California & Aaron Joseph Fischer --
Aaron.Fischer@disabilityrightsca.org -- Disability Rights
California.

County of Sacramento, Defendant, represented by Todd Holton Master
-- tmaster@hrmrlaw.com -- Howard Rome Martin & Ridley LLP & Shawn
M. Ridley -- sridley@hrmrlaw.com -- Howard Rome Martin & Ridley.


SCHIFF NUTRITION: Mislabels Tiger's Nutrition Bar, Collado Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
BRYAN COLLADO, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated
v. SCHIFF NUTRITION INTERNATIONAL, INC. and RECKITT BENCKISER LLC,
Case No. 1:19-cv-05156 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 10, 2019), seeks redress
for, and a stop to, the Defendants' unfair and deceptive practices
in the advertising and marketing of its Tiger's Milk Protein Rich
Nutrition Bar.

Mr. Collado contends that the Product's misleading front label
states that the Product is "Protein Rich," when it is not, in fact,
protein rich.  He asserts that he and Class members were deceived
into purchasing a product inferior to the one they had bargained
for.  Accordingly, he notes, the Product violates New York and
other state laws against misleading branding and advertising.

Schiff Nutrition International, Inc. is a corporation organized
under the laws of Delaware with its headquarters located in Salt
Lake City, Utah.  Schiff Nutrition is a wholly owned subsidiary, of
Reckitt Benckiser LLC.  Reckitt Benckiser is a corporation
organized under the laws of Delaware with its headquarters located
in Parsippany, New Jersey.

The Defendants own, manufacture, distribute, develop and market the
Product throughout the United States.  The Product is available at
numerous retail and online outlets.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          30 East 39th Street, Second Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 465-1188
          Facsimile: (212) 465-1181
          E-mail: cklee@leelitigation.com


SERVE U BRANDS: Court Narrows S. Lusk FLSA Suit
------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of New
York issued a Decision and Order granting in part and denying in
part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned
SKYLER LUSK, TIA COUNCIL, VIKTORIA O'BRIEN, and JUSTIN BYROAD, on
behalf of themselves and all other employees similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. SERVE U BRANDS, INC., INSOMNIA COOKIES, LLC, and
SETH BERKOWITZ, Defendants. No. 6:17-cv-06451-MAT. (W.D.N.Y.).

Former delivery drivers for Insomnia Cookies, LLC, commenced the
instant action against Serve U Brands, Inc., Insomnia, and Seth
Berkowitz, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), as well as violations of the state laws of New York,
Michigan, and Indiana.  

FRCP 56 provides that the Corut shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Only a factual dispute that is genuine and material will defeat
summary judgment.  

Choice of Law

Defendants assert that there is no conflict among any of the
relevant jurisdictions and that courts in each those states have
recognized that individual dispute resolution agreements between
employees and employers are enforceable. Defendants also submit
that, according to the DRA, the law of the state where each DRA
Opt-In Plaintiff worked controls the interpretation and
enforceability of the DRA signed by him or her.

Thus, Defendants assert, Florida law applies to Burgett, Illinois
law applies to Stanger, Michigan law applies to Buggs, Mississippi
law applies to Caldwell, North Carolina law applies to Crespo, and
Pennsylvania law applies to Sehnert. Plaintiffs do not argue
otherwise.

The Court agrees that the law of the state where each DRA Opt-In
Plaintiff signed his or her agreement applies. However, the Court
disagrees with Defendants that the law of each state mandates the
enforceability of DRAs at issue in this action. In particular, the
Court finds that the Sixth Circuit has taken a position that does
not support Defendants' argument. The Court further finds that Epic
Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018) (Epic), does not lead
inexorably to the result urged by Defendants.

Waivability of the Right to Proceed Collectively Under the FLSA

Defendants argue that the right to proceed collectively under the
FLSA is procedural rather than substantive in nature and thus can
be waived by an employee. Defendants assert, it is clear after the
Supreme Court's decision in Epic that class and collective action
waivers of employment claims in dispute resolution agreements are
valid and enforceable.

The Court finds that Epic's holding does not reach as far as
Defendants urge.

Epic consolidated two case in which an employer and employee
entered into a contract providing for individualized arbitration
proceedings to resolve employment disputes between the parties.
Notwithstanding these contracts, each employee sought to litigate
FLSA and related state law claims through class or collective
actions in federal court.

Although the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) generally requires
courts to enforce arbitration agreements as written, the employees
argued that its saving clause removes this obligation if an
arbitration agreement violates some other federal law and that, by
requiring individualized proceedings, the agreements here violated
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).

The employers countered that the FAA protects agreements requiring
arbitration from judicial interference and that neither the saving
clause nor the NLRA demands a different conclusion. Until recently,
courts as well as the general counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) had agreed that such arbitration agreements
are enforceable. But in 2012, the NLRB ruled that the NLRA
effectively nullifies the FAA in cases like the ones at issue in
Epic. Since that time, the lower courts either agreed with or
deferred to the NLRB's position.

In a five-four decision, the Supreme Court held that the FAA
contains an explicit congressional directive that arbitration
agreements providing for individualized proceedings must be
enforced, and neither the FAA's saving clause nor the NLRA suggests
otherwise. The FAA's saving clause which allows courts to refuse to
enforce arbitration agreements upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract, recognizes only
generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability, not defenses targeting arbitration either by
name or by more subtle methods, such as by interfering with
fundamental attributes of arbitration.

The critical difference between Epic and the Circuit court and
district court cases cited by Defendants is that they involved
collective and class action waivers in the arbitration context. The
DRA at issue here does not contain an arbitration clause.   

With regard to the remaining DRA Opt-In Plaintiffs, the other
Circuits involved are the Fifth, Third, Eleventh, Fourth, and
Seventh. The Fifth, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have ruled in
Carter, Adkins, and Walthour, respectively, that the right to
proceed collectively is a procedural right that can be waived
contractually. Although these cases were in decided in the
arbitration context, Plaintiffs have offered no argument as to why
these cases should not apply to the DRA Opt-In Plaintiffs who
reside in these Circuits, i.e., Crespo (North Carolina/Fourth
Circuit), Caldwell (Mississippi/Fifth Circuit), and Burgett
(Florida/Eleventh Circuit).

Accordingly, the Court will apply these cases to find that the
right to proceed collectively can be waived contractually, the
Court's next step is to determine whether the DRAs signed by these
Plaintiffs are enforceable contracts.

Burgett's DRA Is Enforceable Under Florida Law

A contract is made under Florida law when the three elements of
contract formation are present: offer, acceptance, and
consideration.

Here, the DRA shows that Burgett and Insomnia reciprocally assented
to certain definite propositions, including the class-action
waiver. Defendants offered the DRA to Burgett in consideration for
his employment with Insomnia, and both parties agreed to be bound
by the agreement. At the end of the DRA are the printed words,
AGREED: Insomnia Cookies. Underneath those words are the words,
AGREED AND RECEIVED, below which Burgett signed and printed his
name, and dated the DRA.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the DRA is valid and
enforceable under Florida law.
Stanger's DRA Is Enforceable Under Illinois Law.

Under Illinois law, an offer, an acceptance, and consideration are
basic ingredients of a contract. Defendants offered the DRA to
Stanger in consideration for her employment with Insomnia, and both
parties agreed to be bound by the agreement. At the end of the DRA
are the printed words, AGREED: Insomnia Cookies. Underneath those
words are the words, AGREED AND RECEIVED, below which Stanger
signed and printed her name, and dated the DRA. Stanger's
employment with Insomnia was sufficient consideration for the
enforcement of the DRA.  

Caldwell's DRA Is Enforceable Under Mississippi Law

Under Mississippi law, a valid contract must include the following
essential elements: (1) two or more contracting parties (2)
consideration (3) an agreement that is sufficiently definite (4)
parties with legal capacity to make a contract (5) mutual assent
and (6) no legal prohibition precluding contract formation.

The first, second, third, and fifth elements are apparent on the
face of the DRA. There are two contracting parties, i.e., Caldwell
and Insomnia. Courts applying Mississippi law have found adequate
consideration where defendant employer conditioned its decision to
employ plaintiff on the plaintiff's signing the arbitration
agreement, the defendant then paid and employed the plaintiff, and
the plaintiff received the benefit of employment. Caldwell's
employment in exchange for signing the DRA thus amounts to adequate
consideration. Both Caldwell and Insomnia indicated their agreement
to be bound by the DRA, the terms of which are clear, definite, and
unambiguous.

As to the fourth and sixth elements, Plaintiffs have not asserted
that Caldwell lacked the legal capacity to make a contract or that
there was any legal prohibition that precluded Caldwell and
Insomnia from entering into the DRA. Therefore, the Court finds
that the DRA is valid and enforceable under Mississippi law.

Crespo's DRA Is Enforceable Under North Carolina Law

Under North Carolina law, a valid contract requires offer,
acceptance, consideration and no defenses to formation. Here,
Defendants offered the DRA to Crespo in consideration for his
employment with Insomnia, and both parties agreed to be bound by
the agreement. At the end of the DRA are the printed words, AGREED:
Insomnia Cookies. Underneath those words are the words, AGREED AND
RECEIVED, below which Crespo signed and printed his name, and dated
the DRA. Plaintiffs have asserted no defenses to formation.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the DRA is a valid contract under
North Carolina law and is enforceable.

Sehnert's DRA Is Enforceable Under Pennsylvania Law

Pennsylvania law directs a court to evaluate the following three
criteria when determining the existence of a valid contract: (1)
whether both parties manifested an intention to be bound by the
agreement; (2) whether the terms of the agreement are sufficiently
definite to be enforced and (3) whether there was consideration.

With regard to mutual assent, at the end of the DRA are the printed
words, AGREED: Insomnia Cookies. Underneath those words are the
words, AGREED AND RECEIVED, below which Sehnert signed and printed
his name, and dated the DRA. Plaintiffs have come forward with no
evidence that Sehnert was deprived of an opportunity to read the
DRA or that his signature was not provided freely and willingly.
With regard to the clarity of terms, the DRA contains unambiguous
language, and the class-action waiver, in particular, is called out
in bold-faced type. As to the third criterion, consideration,
courts in Pennsylvania have repeatedly held that continued
employment fulfills the consideration requirement under
Pennsylvania law.  

The Court finds that the DRA is a valid contract under Pennsylvania
law and is enforceable.
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and
denied in part. It is granted to the extent that the claims
asserted by DRA Opt-In Plaintiffs Christopher Lee Caldwell, Dylan
Burgett, Hannah Stanger, Michael Crespo and Ben Sehnert are
dismissed without prejudice; it is denied as to DRA Opt-In
Plaintiff Avery Buggs whose claims shall remain pending in this
action; and it is denied to the extent that Defendants request
attorney's fees and costs pursuant to FRCP 41(d).

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 16, 2019
Decision and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y4b4m2ga
from Leagle.com.

Skyler Lusk, Tia Council, Viktoria O'Brien, Justin Byroad, on
behalf of themselves and all other employees similarly situated,
Christian Augustine, Darel Bailey, Brian Bonilla, Michael Bradett,
Avery Buggs, Dylan Burgett, Gabrielle Bustillos, Maria Cagigal,
Christopher Caldwell, Jordan Cavataio, John Clements III, Kelsey
Colley, Kamara Craig, Michael Crespo, Alexa Decatur, Lauren Dudley,
Papa Duncan, Eric Dunlap Jr., Darrian Eason, Noah Egan, Rudolph
Elmore Jr., Nathaniel Encarnacion, Christopher Erdman, Luayy Ziad
Fadel, Adam Friedman, David Given, Raeven Godette, Shane Golden,
Mirna Gonzalez, Morgan Hall, Lorenzo Hammond, Neal Harris, Tristan
Hendrix, Kyle Hodson, Hakeem Holmes, Joel Hopkins, Jake Hurley,
William Johannesen, Lauren Jonelis, Kit Keegan, Rezan Kflu, Ashlee
Kohler, Cory Lambrecht, Alesha Lee, Michael Lewis, Juwan Lockett,
Tevin Lucas, Nicolas Meyer, Cheyenne Miller, Marlon Morisset, Luke
Morse, Bradley Musabika, Shannon Obbagy, William Oliver, David
Page, Destiny Peden, Jerry Pierce III, Bryann Polttila, Ryan
Pomper, Conor Pounds, Imani Reed, Roberto Renfrew-Marquez, Bonnie
Robinson, Perry Rodriguez, Lydia Ruffner, Sean Ruona, Channen
Sarmiento, Mikai Sawyer, Ben Sehnert, Jory Shinpaugh, Donte
Singleton, Michelle Smith-Nobles, Hannah Stanger, Lucas Stromer,
Michael Stuckey Jr., Kendall Talbot, Andre Taylor, Ian Thrush,
Lacey Trull, Jeffrey Vannoy, Steven Villegas, Kathryn Watkins,
Dakota White, Ronada Wright, Brian Yarmak, Mary Zottoli & Matthew
Zuleger, Plaintiffs, represented by J. Nelson Thomas , Thomas &
Solomon LLP, Jonathan W. Ferris , Thomas & Solomon LLP, Michael J.
Lingle , Thomas & Solomon LLP & Jessica Lynne Lukasiewicz , Thomas
& Solomon LLP, 693 East Avenue, Rochester, NY 1460

Serve U Brands, Inc., Insomnia Cookies, LLC & Seth Berkowitz,
Defendants, represented by Douglas J. Klein -
Douglas.Klein@jacksonlewis.com - Jackson Lewis LLP, Noel P. Tripp
-
Noel.Tripp@jacksonlewis.com - Jackson Lewis LLP, Stephanie L.
Goutos -
Stephanie.Goutos@jacksonlewis.com - Jackson Lewis LLP & William J.
Anthony -
William.Anthony@jacksonlewis.com - Jackson Lewis LLP.


SOURCE PROVIDERS: Woodard Seeks Overtime Pay for Hourly Employees
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as DAVID WOODARD, Individually, and on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. SOURCE
PROVIDERS, INC., an Ohio Corporation, and COMPREHENSIVE LOGISTICS
CO., INC., an Ohio Corporation, the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-00074 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 11, 2019), is a collective action
for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act on behalf of all
their current and former hourly-paid employees, nationwide, who
received shift differential pay and/or non-discretionary bonuses in
weeks in which they worked more than 40 hours.

The Plaintiff was employed by and performed work for Defendants as
an hourly-paid employee at Defendants' Spring Hill, Tennessee
facility during the three year-period preceding the filing of the
action.

Source Providers, Inc., is a subsidiary of Comprehensive Logistics
Co., Inc. The Defendants provide warehousing and other
logistics-related services in the automotive industry throughout
United States, including at one facility in Spring Hill (Maury
County), Tennessee.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and for others similarly situated
current and former employees are:

          Gordon E. Jackson, Esq.
          J. Russ Bryant, Esq.
          Robert E. Turner, IV, Esq.
          Robert E. Morelli, III, Esq.
          Nathaniel A. Bishop, Esq.
          JACKSON, SHIELDS, YEISER & HOLT
          262 German Oak Drive
          Memphis, TN 38018
          Telephone: (901) 754-8001
          Facsimile: (901) 754-8524
          E-mail: gjackson@jsyc.com
                  rbryant@jsyc.com
                  rturner@jsyc.com
                  rmorelli@jsyc.com
                  nbishop@jsyc.com

SOUTH CAROLINA: Appeal from Time Extension Order in Firriolo Nixed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, THOMAS RAYMOND FIRRIOLO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOUTH
CAROLINA LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, State of South Carolina,
Employees, et al.; LIEUTENANT ELIZABETH CORLEY, (SLED) South
Carolina Law Enforcement Division, State of South Carolina; MARK
KEEL, Chief of (S.L.E.D.), Law Enforcement Division, State of South
Carolina; PAUL GRANT, Assistant Chief, South Carolina Law
Enforcement Division, State of South Carolina; CITY OF GREENVILLE,
Employees; MR. BRAD RICE; MR. JEFF BOWEN; MR. GARY FENELL; MS.
JODIE DUDASH; MR. BOBBIE SKINNER; MS. CYNTHA VILARDO; MS. TOMMY, of
Greenville Cares (Jane Doe), Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 19-1308
(4th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
dismisssed Firriolo's appeal from the district court's order
granting his motion for an extension of time.

The Court held that it may exercise jurisdiction only over final
orders, and certain interlocutory and collateral orders.  The order
Firriolo sought to appeal is neither a final order nor an
appealable interlocutory or collateral order.  Accordingly, it
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  It denied
Firriolo's motions for reconsideration, for an en banc hearing, and
for certification of a class action, and it denied as moot his
motion for a decision in the appeal.  The Court dispensed with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before it and argument would not aid the
decisional process.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 14, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/JCeSIU from Leagle.com.

Thomas Raymond Firriolo, Appellant Pro Se


SPS TECHNOLOGIES: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Duran Suit Alleges
---------------------------------------------------------------
ALFREDO DURAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SPS TECHNOLOGIES LLC dba PB FASTENERS; and
DOES 1-50, Defendants, Case No. 19STCV264452 (Cal. Super., Los
Angeles Cty., Sept. 3, 2019) is an action against the Defendants
for failure to pay minimum wages, overtime compensation, authorize
and permit meal and rest periods, provide accurate wage statements,
and reimburse necessary business expenses.

The Plaintiff Duran was employed by the Defendants as non-exempt
employee.

SPS Technologies LLC dba PB Fasteners designs, tests, and
manufactures nuts, bolts, screws, fasteners, and forgings for the
commercial and military aerospace markets. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nazo Koulloukian, Esq.
          KOUL LAW FIRM
          A Professional Law Corporation
          3435 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1710
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 761-5484
          Facsimile: (818) 561-3938
          E-mail: nazo@koullaw.com

               - and -

          Sahag Majarian, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF SAHAG MAJARIAN II
          18250 Ventura Blvd.
          Tarzana, CA 91356
          Telephone: (818) 609-0807
          Facsimile: (818) 609-0892


SUMMIT CREDIT: Court Orders Submission of Evidentiary Documents
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin issued an Order directing the Submission of Evidentiary
Documents in the case captioned MATTHEW DOMANN, individually and on
behalf of all those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. SUMMIT
CREDIT UNION, and DOES 1-100, Defendants. No. 18-cv-167-wmc. (W.D.
Wis.).

Plaintiff Matthew Domann brings this putative class action
alleging, among other things, that defendant Summit Credit Union
breached its contracts with its customers and violated the
Electronic Fund Transfer Act, Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. Section
1005.17.  

In order to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair,
reasonable, and adequate, the court needs more information.
Specifically, not later than September 30, 2019, plaintiff should
submit:

   (1) Information showing how the parties determined that
defendant's change to its overcharge practices will result in a
savings to class members of $400,000 a year.

   (2) An explanation of why the settlement fund is being divided
equally, when there are 16 times more members in the Consumer
Sufficient Accounts Class than in the Business Account Class.

   (3) An estimated dollar amount or range that each class member
is likely to recover.

   (4) The Olsen Declaration referred to in plaintiff's supporting
brief, along with a list of the putative class members identified
by Olsen and the amount of overdraft fees incurred by each class
member as a result of the practices challenged in this lawsuit.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 16, 2019 Order
is available at  https://tinyurl.com/y2vcoss8 from Leagle.com.

Matthew Domann, Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Douglas P. Dehler --
doug.dehler@wilaw.com - O'Neil, Cannon, Hollman, DeJong & Laing
S.C., Laura Jean Lavey - laura.lavey@wilaw.com, O'Neil, Cannon,
Hollman, DeJong & Laing S.C., Richard Dale McCune, Jr. -
rdm@mccunewright.com-, McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP & Taras Kick -
taras@kicklawfirm.com - The Kick Law Firm, APC.

Summit Credit Union, Defendant, represented by Stuart M. Richter -
stuart.richter@katten.com - Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP & William
Warren Ehrke - wehrke@crivellocarlson.com - Crivello Carlson,
S.C..


SUNSPEL MERCER: Tatum-Rios Files Class Suit in New York under ADA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Sunspel Mercer St. LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Lynette Tatum-Rios, individually and on behalf of all other
persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Sunspel Mercer St. LLC and
Sunspel US, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-08844 (S.D. N.Y.,
Sept. 24, 2019).

Sunspel Mercer St. LLC is a Men's clothing store in New York City,
New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   630 Third Avenue Fifth Floor
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: doug@lipskylowe.com




SUPERIOR COURT: Suit Over State Court Family Law Proceedings Junked
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order dismissing the Second Amended Complaint
in the case captioned JOSHUA LAINE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SUPERIOR
COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY HAYWARD HALL OF JUSTICE, et al.,
Defendants. Case No. 3:18-cv-04390-JD. (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against a number of
California state courts, state court judges, state court personnel,
counties, attorneys and others for claims arising out of state
court family law proceedings. After a prior dismissal with leave to
amend, Laine has not established federal subject matter
jurisdiction, and so the case is dismissed.

Laine has the burden of establishing jurisdiction. The Court's
prior order of dismissal concluded that this case is fundamentally
a child custody dispute, which means there is no obvious federal
subject matter jurisdiction. Laine was given an opportunity to
amend the complaint to demonstrate federal jurisdiction, but the
Second Amended Complaint offers only the conclusory statement that
Plaintiffs are not submitting their family law matters to the
Northern District of California but rather require federal
intervention from state, et al., abuse. That does not state a basis
for jurisdiction, and the body of the SAC again makes clear that
the case is about, in Laine's own words, four family law cases
where each case correlates one another between the same judges, the
system, third parties and lawyers.

The SAC also does not respond to the separate and independent issue
of the Younger and Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrines, which the
Court found to bar further federal proceedings.   These SAC again
alleges facts that make the application of these bars apparent on
the face of the complaint.

It is also worth noting that dismissal under FRCP 41(b) is
appropriate. Laine did not oppose any of the numerous motions to
dismiss of the SAC that were filed in this case, nor did he request
any extensions of deadlines to respond to those motions, so
dismissal of the SAC is warranted under Rule 41(b) for failure to
prosecute and to meet the Court's deadlines and order.

In light of that prior opportunity, the complaint's continuing
jurisdictional deficiencies, and the abstention doctrines, the SAC
is dismissed without further leave to amend.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 16, 2019 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6mbgqz2 from Leagle.com.

Joshua Laine, Plaintiff, pro se.

Debbie Laine, Plaintiff, pro se.

Jeremy Laine, Plaintiff, pro se.

Jared Laine, Plaintiff, pro se.

Poppy Laine, Plaintiff, pro se.

Alan Declue, Plaintiff, pro se.

Merry Declue, Plaintiff, pro se.

Superior Court of Alameda County Hayward Hall of Justice, Superior
Court of Contra Costa County Spinetta Family Law Center, Judicial
Council, Martin Hoshino, Chad Finke, Stephen Nash, Gregory Syren,
Commissioner Jason Clay, John Laettner, Boydine Hall & Nancy Young,
Defendants, represented by Sharon Margaret Nagle - snagle@bpmnj.com
- Bold, Polisner, Maddow, Nelson & Judson.

County of Alameda, Defendant, represented by Rebecca S. Widen -
info@htalaw.com - Haapala, Thompson & Abern LLP & Sharon Margaret
Nagle , Bold, Polisner, Maddow, Nelson & Judson.


SWITCH INC: Court Refuses Writ of Mandamus in Martz
---------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court of Nevada issued an Order denying Petition for
Mandamus or Prohibition in the case captioned PATRICK MARTZ, AN
INDIVIDUAL; HERBERT SILVERBERG, AN INDIVIDUAL; YOUNGHO CHUN, AN
INDIVIDUAL; AND DENNIS PALKON, AN INDIVIDUAL, Petitioners, v. THE
EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE MARK R. DENTON, DISTRICT
JUDGE, Respondents, and SWITCH, INC.; ROB ROY; GABRIEL NACHT; ZAREH
SARRAFIAN; DONALD SNYDER; TOM THOMAS; BRYAN WOLF; GOLDMAN SACHS &
CO. LLC; J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES LLC; BMO CAPITAL MARKETS CORP.;
WELLS FARGO SECURITIES, LLC; CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC.; CREDIT
SUISSE SECURITIES; JEFFERIES LLC; BTIG, LLC; RAYMOND JAMES &
ASSOCIATES, INC.; STIFEL, NICOLAUIS & COMPANY, INC.; AND WILLIAM
BLAIR & COMPANY, L.L.C., Real Parties in Interest. No. 77437.
(Nev.).

This original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition
challenges a district court order granting a motion for a stay of
the proceedings in a putative class action suit in deference to a
putative class action suit filed in federal court asserting the
same Securities Act violations against the real parties in
interest.

Having reviewed the parties' pleadings and heard oral argument in
this matter, the Court concludes that petitioners have not
demonstrated that the district court manifestly abused its
discretion such that this court's intervention is warranted.
Accordingly, the Court orders the petition denied.

A full-text copy of the Supreme Court's September 16, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y4uc7t7c from Leagle.com.


SWITCH2WEB.COM: Schaffer Sues over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
--------------------------------------------------------------
MARIA SCHAFFER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. SWITCH2WEB.COM; SIRCHEND SOFTWARES
PRIVATE LIMITED, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and each of
them, the Defendants, Case No. 8:19-cv-01743 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 12,
2019), contends that the Defendant promotes and markets its
merchandise, in part, by placing unsolicited telephone calls to
wireless phone users, in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

Defendants' calls constituted calls that were not for emergency
purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. section 227(b)(1)(A). During all
relevant times, the Defendants did not possess Plaintiff's "prior
express consent" to receive calls using an automatic telephone
dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice.

SWITCH2WEB.COM is a software engineering company. SIRCHEND is a web
design and development company.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: 323-306-4234
          Facsimile: 866-633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com

TACO BELL: "Drive-thru" Not Accessible to Blind, Jones Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
JAMES PRIVETTE and SHAUNTE JONES, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. TACO BELL
FRANCHISOR, LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-05729-MMC (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 12, 2019), contends that Taco Bell denies the
visually-impaired equal access to the goods and services that Taco
Bell provides during "late-night" operating times at thousands of
their restaurants throughout the United States.

In an effort to increase profits and make their products available
to the public for longer periods of time, Taco Bell restaurants
offer "late-night" hours. During these late evening and early
morning operating times, patrons are not allowed to physically
enter Taco Bell restaurants and patrons must access Taco Bell
products and services via "drive-thru" windows.

These drive-thrus are only accessible by motor vehicle and are the
exclusive means by which a customer can independently purchase Taco
Bell products during late-night hours.

Despite being accessible to the general public, Taco Bell
drive-thrus lack any meaningful accommodation for visually-impaired
individuals who are unable to operate motor vehicles. Since they
are unable to drive, and because it is not safe for them to walk
through the drive-thru, visually-impaired individuals are totally
precluded from accessing Defendant's products during late-night
hours.

While Taco Bell's sighted customers have the opportunity to
independently browse, select, and pay for products at Defendant's
drive-thrus without the assistance of others, visually-impaired
people must hope for a companion with a car or paid taxi services
to assist them in selecting and purchasing Taco Bell food.

By failing to make its restaurants accessible to Plaintiffs and
class members, Taco Bell is violating basic equal access
requirements under federal law, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Roberto Luis Costales, Esq.
          William H. Beaumont, Esq.
          BEAUMONT COSTALES LLC
          107 W. Van Buren, Suite 209
          Chicago, IL 60605
          Telephone: (773) 831-8000
          Facsimile: (504) 272-2956
          E-mail: rlc@beaumontcostales.com
                  whb@beaumontcostales.com

               - and -

          Glenn M. Goffin, Esq.
          920 Beach Park Blvd No. 39
          Foster City, CA 94404
          Telephone: (415) 845-8556
          E-mail: ggoffin@glenngoffinlaw.com

THYSSENKRUPP CRANKSHAFT: Wickens Seeks OT Wages for Employees
-------------------------------------------------------------
BRENDA WICKENS, on behalf of herself and all other plaintiffs
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. THYSSENKRUPP CRANKSHAFT CO,
LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-06100 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 11,
2019), seeks to recover overtime wages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law.

The Plaintiff worked for Defendant within the past three years as
an employee. Thyssenkrupp did not pay Plaintiff and similarly
situated employees proper overtime wages of one and one-half time
their regular rate of pay for all hours worked above 40 hours in a
work week.

The Plaintiff worked as an hourly-rate employee for Thyssenkrupp.
The Defendant is a subsidiary of Thyssenkrupp AG, a German
multinational conglomerate that focuses on industrial engineering
and steel production. Thyssenkrupp AG is divided into approximately
670 subsidiaries worldwide. It is one of the world's largest steel
producers; it was ranked tenth-largest worldwide by revenue
recently.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          David J. Fish, Esq.
          Kimberly Hilton, Esq.
          John Kunze, Esq.
          Thalia Pacheco, Esq.
          THE FISH LAW FIRM P.C.
          200 E 5 th Ave Suite 123
          Naperville, IL 60563

TIME WARNER: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in Hunter TCPA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LEONA HUNTER and ANNE MARIE VILLA, Plaintiffs, v. TIME
WARNER CABLE INC., Defendant, Case No. 15-CV-6445 (JPO) (S.D.
N.Y.), Judge J. Paul Oetken of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York denied the Plaintiffs' motion to
certify a class under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and
(b)(3), along with several motions to strike expert reports and
declarations submitted in support of or in opposition to class
certification.

Plaintiffs Hunter and Villa bring the action against Defendant Time
Warner, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act of 1991 ("TCPA").  The Plaintiffs allege that they both
received numerous calls from Time Warner to their cellphone numbers
that used an artificial or prerecorded voice.  Hunter and Villa
represent that they did not provide advance consent to be called by
Time Warner, and that the calls were "wrong-number calls" -- i.e.,
that the calls were intended for individuals who were unassociated
with Hunter and Villa and thus not reachable at their cellphone
numbers.  Rather than being isolated incidents, the Plaintiffs
allege that the phone calls they received were part of a "wide
scale debt-collection campaign" conducted by Time Warner, in which
the company repeatedly made unsolicited calls to consumers'
telephones without consent.

The calls at issue are placed by Time Warner through its
"interactive voice response system" or "IVR Platform," a calling
system that Time Warner uses to call customers in order to seek
collection of overdue account payments.   In trying to contact
customers, the calling system dials a phone number that the
customer has provided to Time Warner and that has been maintained
in Time Warner's account records for the customer.

In the general course, when the IVR Platform dials a phone number
provided by a TWC customer and the call reaches that individual or
her voicemail, the TCPA permits the playing of a prerecorded voice
message because the customer has provided advance consent to be
contacted.  A problem arises, however, when the phone number in
Time Warner's account records has been subsequently reassigned to a
new individual.

After having conducted class discovery and enlisted the help of
expert witnesses, the Plaintiffs now assert that the alleged
wrong-number calling campaign they have identified is susceptible
to class-wide relief.

Plaintiff Raquel Mejia initiated the case with the filing of the
original complaint on Aug. 14, 2015.  An amended complaint was
filed on March 28, 2016, removing Mejia and adding Hunter and Villa
as the Plaintiffs.

On Dec. 15, 2016, the Court appointed the interim class counsel but
denied without prejudice the Plaintiffs' request for class-wide
discovery.  By around that time, the Plaintiffs and Time Warner had
both moved for summary judgment, and Time Warner also moved for
judgment on the pleadings, challenging the constitutionality of the
TCPA under the First Amendment.  In an Opinion and Order dated Aug.
1, 2017, the Court denied the Plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment and Time Warner's motion for judgment on the pleadings,
but granted in part Time Warner's motion for summary judgment.

Time Warner subsequently moved for a certificate of appealability
regarding its constitutional challenge, and sought to stay the
action pending the disposition of ACA International v. FCC, a case
in the D.C. Circuit involving a Federal Communication Commission
("FCC") interpretation of relevant terms under the TCPA.  In an
Opinion and Order of Nov. 17, 2017, the Court denied the request
for a certificate of appealability but granted the stay.  The stay
was lifted on April 27, 2018.  

The Plaintiffs then filed the operative amended complaint, and the
parties proceeded to class discovery.  They filed the instant
motion for class certification on Nov. 30, 2018, seeking to certify
a class of individuals who received a "Live_Voice" or
"Answering_Machine" wrong-number call using a pre-recorded voice
from Time Warner's IVR Platform from Oct. 16, 2013, until the time
a class notice is disseminated.

Time Warner subsequently moved to strike four of the expert reports
submitted by the Plaintiffs in support of their motion for class
certification.  Not to be outdone, the Plaintiffs moved to strike
several of the declarations and two of the expert reports submitted
by Time Warner in opposition to class certification.

In connection with the submissions on class certification, the
parties have also filed six motions to strike.  The Plaintiffs move
to strike the Defendants' two expert reports under Federal Rule of
Evidence 702, and to strike 11 declarations for lack of proper
disclosures.

The Plaintiffs seek to strike the reports of two of Time Warner's
experts -- John Taylor and Ken Sponsler -- under Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Taylor specializes in analyzing data related to call records and
facsimile records in cases involving the TCPA and has been engaged
in that work for fourteen years. Taylor has provided expert
testimony in numerous TCPA cases, and he submitted an expert report
accompanying Time Warner's opposition to class certification in the
case.

Judge Oetken concludes that Taylor clearly explained his
methodology and reasonably engaged with the relevant data, and the
allegedly unfavorable information identified by the Plaintiffs does
not "cast doubt" on Taylor's analysis or results.  Time Warner has
satisfied its burden of demonstrating that the Taylor report is
admissible at this stage in the litigation to assess whether the
requirements of Rule 23 have been satisfied.  Accordingly, the
Plaintiffs' motion to strike Taylor's expert report is denied.

The Plaintiffs also move to strike the expert report of Ken
Sponsler.  Sponsler is the Senior VP of CompliancePoint Litigation
Services, which "provides consulting services" to help companies
understand consumer contact standards and regulations and then
implement operational procedures to ensure compliance.  In the
case, Sponsler submitted an expert report in support of Time
Warner's opposition to class certification.

The Judge determines that striking Sponslor's entire expert report
would not be called for on the basis of the specific objections
raised by the Plaintiffs.  And ultimately, he need not decide
whether Rule 702 requires excluding the two challenged portions of
Sponsler's report.  Even disregarding those two specific opinions
offered by Sponsler, the Judge would deny the Plaintiffs' motion
for class certification.

On Jan. 29, 2019, the Plaintiffs moved to strike 11 declarations
submitted by Time Warner with its opposition to the motion for
class certification.  According to them, these witnesses were not
properly identified in Time Warner's initial disclosures and the
declarations must be stricken under Rule 37(c).  With no indication
to the contrary, the Judge concludes that striking the declarations
at issue is not necessary because any late disclosure was
"harmless."  Accordingly, the motion to strike these declarations
is denied.

Turning to the Motion for Class Certification, the Judge holds that
any common issues regarding how the class members were called by
the IVR Platform, or the shared source of records for those calls,
are overshadowed by the individual inquiries that would be required
to determine whether the alleged wrong-number recipients identified
by the Plaintiffs were eligible for class membership or ineligible
on grounds of consent.  Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' request to
certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3) is denied.

Finally, the Judge finds that Hunter and Villa have not
demonstrated that they possessed the initial standing to seek
injunctive relief when they first asserted claims against Time
Warner the action.  Because the Plaintiffs lack standing to seek a
forward-looking injunction, their request to certify a class under
Rule 23(b)(2) is thus denied.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Oetken denied the Plaintiffs'
motion for class certification.  With respect to the pending
motions to strike: the Plaintiffs' motion to strike the expert
report of John Taylor is denied.  The Plaintiffs' motion to strike
11 declarations from fact witnesses is denied.  The Plaintiffs'
motion to strike the expert report of Ken Sponsler, and Time
Warner's motions to strike are denied as moot.

The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motions at Docket
Numbers 210, 246, 248, 252, 269, 271, and 285.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 14, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/M3QynX from Leagle.com.

Leona Hunter & Anne Marie Villa, Plaintiffs, represented by Scott
A. Bursor -- scott@bursor.com -- Bursor & Fisher, P.A., Aaron Siri
-- aaron@sirillp.com -- Siri & Glimstad LLP, Deola Taofik-Adekanmb
Ali, Deola T.A. Ali, Esq., Joshua David Arisohn --
jarisohn@bursor.com -- Bursor & Fisher P.A., Mason Adams Barney,
Siri & Glimstad LLP & Jarrett Lee Ellzey -- firm@hughesellzey.com
-- Hughes Ellzey, LLP.

Time Warner Cable Inc., Defendant, represented by Matthew A. Brill
-- matthew.brill@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, Peter Lee Winik ,
Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice, Andrew D. Prins, Latham &
Watkins LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel Hart Gaynor, Kabat Chapman &
Ozmer, LLP, Michael David Kabat, Kabat Chapman & Ozmer LLP,
Nicholas L. Schlossman, Latham & Watkins LLP, Russell Drach Mangas
-- russell.mangas@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins & Ryan D. Watstein --
rwatstein@kcozlaw.com -- Kabat Chapman & Ozmer LLP.


TRI-STATE CAREFLIGHT: Court Partly Grants Class Cert. Bid in Payne
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting in part and denying
in part Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification WILLIAM D.
PAYNE; NICOLE PAYNE; LESLIE B. BENSON; KEITH BASTIAN; JACQUELINE
FERNANDEZ-QUEZADA; CASON N. HEARD; GREGORY OLDHAM AND SHERRY K.
WELCH, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. TRI-STATE CAREFLIGHT, LLC and BLAKE A. STAMPER,
Defendants. Consolidated with: KRISTY BELL; DEBORAH BEREST; DANIEL
BERGMAN; WILLIAM DALLAS BUNDRANT, JR; ROCKY H. BURROWS, II; CHASE
CARTER; BRENDA CASAREZ; KARA CERVANTES; THOMAS CISLO; DAVID
DANIELS; ADAM DOYLE; DARREN EEN; TOBY EICHER; LON ENOS; WALTER
FABIAN; HAROLD JOSEPH FISHER; CHRISTINA FLEEMAN; LUKE FORSLUND;
SALUSTIANO FRAGOSO; REHANNON GONZALES; KRISTEN GRADO; COURTNEY
GUERRA; DARRIN HAMILTON; ALEXANDER HOWELL; DANIELLE IRVIN; ALLEN
JACOBS; ALEX JONES; DONALD LUKE KEENAN; DANIEL KUHLER; SIMON
LUCERO; RAPHAEL MAHAIM; NATHAN MAPLESDEN; ORLANDO MARQUEZ; CINDY D.
MAXWELL; JENNIFER MAZZANTI; BETHANY MCCANDLESS; WILLIAM J.
MCCONNELL; DAN MEEHAN; KEVIN NAPP; JAMES O'CONNOR; KATHY
ONSUREZ-WILSON; ERIC PARKER; JASON PERRY; AMANDA PETERSEN; BRENT
PLACE; JIMMY RONALD PRIMM, JR; PHILIP QUBAIN; PAUL RATIGAN; JOSEPH
ROOT; DARON RUCKMAN; FREDERIC RUEBUSH; JENNIFER SALAVERRY; LAUREN
SALAZAR; PAUL SERINO; CHRISTIAN SPEAKMAN; DANIEL ST. PETERS; IAN
STEPHENS; USVALDO R. TRUJILLO; PAUL VACULA; GRACIELA VILLALOBOS;
ERIC VOGT; GREG WALSH; TYLER WILKINS; VIRGINIA WILLIAMS; SARA
YURKOVICH; TERRY ZACHARIAS and MICHAEL ZULASKI, Plaintiffs, v.
TRI-STATE CAREFLIGHT, LLC and BLAKE A. STAMPER, Defendants.

The Plaintiffs seek to recover on behalf of themselves and
similarly situated individuals unpaid compensation for time worked
beyond twelve hours in their shifts under a New Mexico common law
theory of unjust enrichment.

The primary issue is whether the Court should grant class
certification pursuant to rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure for the Plaintiffs'2 two classes: (i) a class of
flight nurses, flight paramedics, and pilots that brings a New
Mexico Minimum Wage Act (NMMWA) claim and (ii) a class of pilots
that brings a New Mexico common-law unjust enrichment claim.

LAW REGARDING CLASS CERTIFICATION UNDER RULE 23

Rule 23 sets forth the requirements for certifying a class action
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  

All classes must satisfy the prerequisites of rule 23(a): (1) the
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class and(4) the representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

A party seeking to certify a class is required to show that all the
requirements of rule 23(a) are clearly met. Although the party
seeking to certify a class bears the burden of proving that all the
requirements of Rule 23 are met, the district court must engage in
its own `rigorous analysis' of whether `the prerequisites of Rule
23(a) have been satisfied.

Numerosity

Rule 23(a)(1) provides for class certification where the class is
so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.

Some courts have held that numerosity may be presumed at a certain
number, the Tenth Circuit, however, has never adopted such a
presumption. Satisfaction of the numerosity requirement does not
require that joinder is impossible, but only that plaintiff will
suffer a strong litigational hardship or inconvenience if joinder
is required. The Court has previously found that joinder of several
hundred tenants and homeowners would be impracticable, and thus the
proposed class met rule 23(a)(1)'s numerosity requirement.   At the
other end of the spectrum, the Court found that a class of 6,100
members, in a securities action, was so numerous that joinder was
impracticable.  

Commonality

Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there are questions of law or fact
common to the class. Even factual differences in the claims of the
individual putative class members should not result in a denial of
class certification where common questions of law exist.

The crux of this case is commonality, the rule requiring a
plaintiff to show that there are questions of law or fact common to
the class. Rule 23(a)(2). That language is easy to misread, since
any competently crafted class complaint literally raises common
questions. Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that
the class members have suffered the same injury. This does not mean
merely that they have all suffered a violation of the same
provision of law.  

Typicality

Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the named representative's claims be
typical of the class' claims. The typicality requirement ensures
that absent proposed class members are adequately represented by
evaluating whether the named plaintiff's interests are sufficiently
aligned with the class' interest.  

The Supreme Court has noted that  the commonality and typicality
requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has said that the typicality
requirement is satisfied if there are common questions of law or
fact.

Accordingly, differences in the amount of damages will not defeat
typicality. On the other hand, it is well-established that a
proposed class representative is not typical under Rule 23(a)(3) if
the representative is subject to a unique defense that is likely to
become to become a major focus of the litigation.

Adequacy

Rule 23(a)(4) requires that representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class. The requirement of
typicality dovetails into the requirement of adequacy of
representation.

The Tenth Circuit has identified two questions relevant to the
adequacy of representation inquiry (i) whether the named plaintiffs
and their counsel have any conflicts with other proposed class
members and (ii) whether the named plaintiffs and their counsel
will vigorously prosecute the action on the class' behalf. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a class representative must
be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the
same injury as the putative class members.

Rule 23(b)

To satisfy rule 23(b)(3), the court must find that the questions of
law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy.

Predominance

Rule 23(b)(3)'s first requirement is that questions common to the
class predominate over those questions that are individualized. A
question is common when the same evidence will suffice for each
member to make a prima facie showing or when the issue is
susceptible to generalized, class-wide proof. A question is
individual when the members of a proposed class will need to
present evidence that varies from member to member. Although a case
need not present only common questions to merit certification, and
the presence of some individual questions does not destroy
predominance, the rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement is much
stricter than the rule 23(a)(1) commonality requirement: the latter
requires only that a common question or questions exist, the former
requires that the common question or questions predominate over the
individual ones.  

Superiority

The second requirement for certifying a (b)(3) class is
superiority, which means that a class action would be superior to
not merely just as good as or more convenient than  all other
available procedural mechanisms, including: (i) individual actions
by class members (ii) ordinary joinder rules (iii) multidistrict
litigation (iv) multiparty multiforum litigation and (v) the use of
bellwether cases. The superiority requirement thus sets a high bar,
but there are two ways that a proposed class can get an immediate
leg up on certification, both of which involve rendering the
aforementioned procedural devices impractical for the task at
hand.

The Court will now state its conclusions of law. The Court will
begin by setting out the law regarding the issues relevant to its
analysis. The Court will then present that analysis.

LAW REGARDING THE NMMWA

The NMMWA requires that employers pay an employee one-half times
the employee's regular hourly rate of pay for all hours that the
employee works over forty hours in a seven-day week. Such
provisions advance two public policies: (1) to establish minimum
wage and overtime compensation standards for all workers at levels
consistent with their health, efficiency and general well-being and
(2) to safeguard existing minimum wage and overtime compensation
standards which are adequate to maintain the health, efficiency and
general well-being of workers against the unfair competition of
wage and hours standards which do not provide adequate standards of
living.

To succeed on a NMMWA overtime compensation claim, a plaintiff must
establish: (a) they worked more than forty hours a week (b) that
management knew or should have known that they did so and (c) that
they were not compensated for the overtime.

For the NMMWA's purposes, the term employer includes any
individual, partnership, association, corporation, business trust,
legal representative or any organized group of persons employing
one or more employees at any one time, acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee. Employee means an individual employed by an employer, but
excludes forepersons, superintendents and supervisors. When
interpreting the NMMWA, the Supreme Court of New Mexico has
considered law interpreting FLSA to be persuasive.  

RELEVANT NEW MEXICO LAW REGARDING UNJUST ENRICHMENT

To prevail in unjust enrichment, one must show that: (1) another
has been knowingly benefitted at one's expense (2) in a manner such
that allowance of the other to retain the benefit would be unjust.

The plaintiffs contended that the leases did not preclude their
unjust-enrichment claim, because they did not contain an express
contractual provision covering ConocoPhillips' deduction of a
thirty-nine percent processing fee from the plaintiffs' royalty
payments.  

The Court will grant in part and deny in part the Motion. The
Plaintiffs propose two classes: (i) a NMMWA class; and (ii) an
unjust enrichment class. The Plaintiffs cannot, however, satisfy
rule 23(a)'s commonality, typicality, or adequacy requirements for
the proposed NMMWA class. Likewise, the Plaintiffs have not shown
that they satisfy rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance or superiority
requirements for the proposed NMMWA class.

On the other hand, the Plaintiffs have satisfied rule 23(a)'s and
rule 23(b)(3)'s requirements for the proposed unjust enrichment
class to the extent that the Plaintiffs argue that, given the
pilots' twelve-hour shifts, the Defendants could not set the
pilots' daily rate to account for hours worked over twelve hours a
day. The Plaintiffs' argument that the Defendants represented that
the pilots had a twelve-hour day and did not contract with the
Plaintiffs for a fourteen-hour day does not satisfy those
requirements.

The Court will use the Plaintiffs' four designated class
representatives for the unjust enrichment class that the Court
certifies, and the other Plaintiffs in the unjust enrichment class
will remain named Plaintiffs in this case for the NMMWA claim's
purposes. As the Defendants do not dispute Moody & Stanford, P.C.'s
adequacy as class counsel, the Court appoints the firm class
counsel.

The Court will not order that a Notice in the form of the Notice of
Class Action Lawsuit, which provides notice of both proposed
classes, be sent to all class members, but will order that the
unjust enrichment class Plaintiffs prepare a notice of the
certified class to be sent to all class members.

THE PLAINTIFFS SATISFY RULE 23(A) FOR ONLY THE PROPOSED UNJUST
ENRICHMENT CLASS TO THE EXTENT THAT THEIR CLAIM RESTS ON THE
LEGALITY OF THE FOURTEEN-HOUR DUTY DAY

To satisfy rule 23(a), the Plaintiffs must show that their proposed
classes satisfy the rule's four requirements: numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy. The Defendants do not
dispute that the Plaintiffs satisfy the numerosity requirement. The
Court deems, therefore, this element satisfied for both proposed
classes. The Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have not satisfied
the commonality, typicality, or adequacy requirements for the
proposed NMMWA class or for the proposed alternative NMMWA classes.
The Plaintiffs have satisfied commonality, typicality, and adequacy
for the proposed unjust enrichment class to the extent that the
Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants could not legally have a
fourteen-hour duty day, but not to the extent that the Plaintiffs
argue that the Defendants had, in fact, a twelve-hour duty day for
the pilots.

THE PLAINTIFFS SATISFY COMMONALITY FOR ONLY THE PROPOSED UNJUST
ENRICHMENT CLASS TO THE EXTENT THAT THEIR CLAIM RESTS ON THE
LEGALITY OF THE FOURTEEN-HOUR DUTY DAY

The Court concludes that commonality is not satisfied for the NMMWA
class. In the Court's view, commonality is satisfied for the unjust
enrichment class to the extent that the Plaintiffs' claim depends
on an argument that the Defendants could not legally have a
fourteen-hour duty day. The Plaintiffs have not established
commonality to the extent that they argue that the pilots agreed,
in fact, to a twelve-hour duty day.

The Plaintiffs Have Not Satisfied the Commonality Requirement for
the Proposed NMMWA Class, Because, to Answer Which Plaintiffs Have
Valid Claims, the Court Must Answer Which Plaintiffs Are Exempt
from the NMMWA

The Plaintiffs have not shown commonality across the NMMWA class,
because, to determine to which proposed class members the
Defendants are liable, the Court must determine which proposed
class members are exempt from the NMMWA. This analysis will require
the Court to proceed proposed class member by proposed class
member. Even were the Court to ignore the clinical base managers
and the lead pilots, the Court would deem commonality unsatisfied,
because no disputed common issues remain.

The Plaintiffs' proposed common issues are not, therefore, common.
As not all proposed class members are potentially exempt, the
Plaintiffs' proposed issue number 4 depends on an analysis whether
each class member filled a position that may be exempt from the
NMMWA's overtime provisions, i.e., whether each individual was a
clinical base manager or a lead pilot.   The substantive answers to
the Plaintiffs' issues 1 through 3, and 5 and 6, however, turn on
whether the proposed class members are employees for the NMMWA's
purposes. The Plaintiffs' proposed common issues 7 and 8, while
elements of an NMMWA claim, are, likewise, not central to the
validity of the potentially exempt class members' claims. Should
the Court conclude that the clinical base managers and the lead
pilots are exempt from the NMMWA, issues 7 and 8 are irrelevant.

Even if the clinical base managers and the lead pilots among
themselves performed common job functions, that similarity would
not influence the Court's analysis. The Court must consider the
entire class. Across the Plaintiffs' proposed class, the Court
cannot answer any of the Plaintiffs' proposed common issues without
asking about each proposed class member's job duties and,
subsequently, whether that individual is exempt from the NMMWA's
overtime requirements.

The Plaintiffs' proposed common issues 9 and 10 play little role in
the Court's analysis. As the Court would limit the proposed class
to the timeframe that the Plaintiffs propose in their Motion, issue
9 is moot, as the Defendants' concede in their response. The Court
agrees with the Defendants that the American Pipe tolling issue is
likely not common across the class.   

For the group of flight nurses and flight paramedics, uniform
Tri-State CareFlight pay and scheduling policies underlay the
Plaintiffs' claims. Tri-State CareFlight's flight nurses and flight
paramedics uniformly worked twenty-four or forty-eight hour shifts;
Tri-State CareFlight expected these employees to work ninety-six
hours in a two week, fourteen day, pay period, and it paid the
flight nurses and flight paramedics overtime only for work over
ninety-six hours in a two-week pay period.  

Tri-State CareFlight also had a uniform pay policy for the pilots.
Tri-State CareFlight uniformly scheduled pilots for twelve-hour
shifts. For every base except the base near Roswell, Tri-State
CareFlight scheduled the pilots for seven
days-on-and-seven-days-off shifts, and, for the Roswell bases,
Tri-State CareFlight scheduled pilots for
fourteen-days-on-and-fourteen-days-off shifts. Tri-State CareFlight
paid pilots only for additional shifts that they worked in addition
to their scheduled on shifts. That Tri-State CareFlight had two
different modes of scheduling pilots does not affect the common
contention among the pilots that they should recover overtime for
hours worked over forty hours per workweek during the seven days of
twelve hours shifts.

For each group of the groups of flight nurses and flight
paramedics, and of pilots, the resolution of issues 1 through 8
would uniformly determine the validity of the proposed class
members' claims. The NMMWA requires that employers pay an employee
one-half times the employee's regular hourly rate of pay for all
hours that the employee works over forty hours in a seven-day week.
To succeed on a NMMWA overtime compensation claim, a plaintiff must
establish: (a) they worked more than forty hours a week, (b) that
management knew or should have known that they did so, and (c) that
they were not compensated for the overtime.

Whether the Defendants are employers, whether the Plaintiffs are
employees, whether the NMMWA exemption applies, whether the
Defendants failed to pay overtime, whether the Defendants knew of
the failure to pay overtime, and whether the Defendants expected
the Plaintiffs to work overtime, determine the Plaintiffs' success
in this case, and are central to this case's resolution.As the
Plaintiffs indicate, to the extent that the Court considers these
Plaintiffs' groups, the case resembles Menocal and Daye; the
proposed class members' claims rest on a uniform policy.  

The only issues remaining for the non-clinical base manager and the
non-lead pilot Plaintiffs are incidental issues, including the
issue of damages, which the Plaintiffs admit is an individualized
issue.  Although the Court is reluctant to deny class certification
merely because in the Response to the Motion seeking class
certification, the Defendants suddenly allege that they have no
disputes with the Plaintiffs, the Court sees no common issues on
which the non-clinical base managers and the non-lead pilots would
proceed.

The Plaintiffs Have Shown Commonality for the Proposed Unjust
Enrichment Class to the Extent That They Claim That the Defendants'
Daily Rate Could Not Properly Account for Over Twelve Hours of Work
Each Work Day

The Plaintiffs have shown commonality as to one theory on the
unjust enrichment claim. Commonality exists on the first issue to
the extent that the Plaintiffs argue what their proposed common
issue 1 states, which is that the Defendants could not legally
cover more than the twelve hours Pilots were regularly scheduled to
work each work day. The Plaintiffs have not established commonality
to the extent that they argue that the pilots and Tri-State
CareFlight did not have a contract that the pilots work
fourteen-hour duty days and that the duty day was, in fact, twelve
hours.

Preliminarily, a preponderance of the evidence reflects that the
Defendants contemplated and contracted with the pilots for a daily
rate for the pilots that accounted for fourteen-hour duty days,
although the pilots generally worked twelve-hour shifts. The
Helicopter Pilot Position Description's last page contains an
acknowledgement of receipt paragraph and a signature line, which
suggests that the document is a contract between the pilots and the
Defendants. The Plaintiffs' citations to the Tri-State Depo. to
support their interpretation of the duty day indicate the
twelve-hour shifts, but do not reveal that the daily rate reflects
a twelve-hour duty day.  

Likewise, given the likelihood of such a belief and that the
Plaintiffs' counsel has conflated the twelve-hour shifts with the
fourteen-hour duty day, that some pilots testified that the daily
rate was for twelve hours is not sufficient to overcome the
Defendants' argument.  

Based on these facts, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs
satisfy commonality only insofar as they argue the legality of the
Defendants' payment scheme whereby they assert a fourteen-hour duty
day but had the pilots work twelve hours.  

The Plaintiffs have not established commonality to the extent that
they argue that the pilots and the Defendants did not have a
contract that the pilots work fourteen-hour duty days, and that the
duty day was in fact twelve hours pursuant to the Defendants'
representations and the pilots' beliefs. The Court agrees with the
Plaintiffs that reliance on reasonable expectations is not an
element of an unjust enrichment claim, but the Court also deems the
Defendants correct that, if the Plaintiffs argue in this manner
that the duty day was twelve hours, the Plaintiffs will have to
introduce individualized evidence.

THE PLAINTIFFS SATISFY TYPICALITY FOR ONLY THE PROPOSED UNJUST
ENRICHMENT CLASS TO THE EXTENT THAT THEIR CLAIM RESTS ON THE
LEGALITY OF THE FOURTEEN-HOUR DUTY DAY

The Plaintiffs do not satisfy typicality for the proposed NMMWA
class. For the proposed unjust enrichment class, the Plaintiffs
meet the typicality requirement to the extent that they argue that
the Defendants could not legally have fourteen-hour duty days.

Typicality requires that the named representative's claims be
typical of the class' claims. The typicality requirement ensures
that absent proposed class members are adequately represented by
evaluating whether the named plaintiff's interests are sufficiently
aligned with the class' interest. With either number of Plaintiffs,
the Court's analysis focuses on whether the Plaintiffs' or the
designated class representatives' claims are typical of the
proposed class members' claims.

The Plaintiffs Do Not Satisfy Typicality for the Proposed
Commonality Class, Because of the NMMWA Exemption Issue

The Plaintiffs do not satisfy typicality for the proposed NMMWA
class. Regardless whether the proposed class involves eight or
ninety representative class members, the Plaintiffs' proposed NMMWA
class fails for the same reasons that it does not satisfy the
commonality requirement.  

As discussed, supra, the Court also favors treating the flight
nurses and the flight paramedics separately from the pilots.
Approaching the groups as one class, as the Plaintiffs' primary
proposed class involves, raises concerns for typicality as the
flight nurses and the flight paramedics, and the lead pilots do not
share pay policies. Were the Court to consider the proposed
alternative NMMWA classes, without the clinical base managers and
the lead pilots, however, typicality is satisfied. As discussed,
supra, the Defendants had uniform pay and scheduling for the flight
nurses and the flight paramedics, and the lead pilots,
respectively. Any of the non-clinical base managers and the
non-lead pilots within the ninety Plaintiffs would bring the same
contentions as the other class members on such uniform policies.  

Moreover, the Plaintiffs' proposed designated class representatives
represent those policies. The relevant flight nurses and flight
paramedics among the designated class representatives Johnson,
Howell, and Stephens worked twenty-four and forty-eight hour
shifts, and ninety-six hours a pay period, with overtime only for
time worked over ninety-six hours in a two-week pay period. The
relevant pilots among the designated class representatives,
Daniels, Mahaim, and Zulaski, worked twelve-hour shifts with either
seven or fourteen days on, and seven or fourteen days off, and
received overtime compensation only for working additional shifts.


The Plaintiffs Satisfy Typicality for the Proposed Unjust
Enrichment Class to the Extent That Their Claim Rests on the
Legality of the Fourteen-Hour Duty Day.

The unjust enrichment class satisfies typicality only to the extent
that the Plaintiffs rely on arguments about the legality of the
fourteen-hour duty day. To the extent that the Plaintiffs argue the
legality of the Defendants' fourteen-hour duty day and the theory
that the twelve-hour shifts mandate an interpretation of the daily
rate as accounting for twelve hours worked, typicality is
satisfied. As the Court discusses, supra, this claim is based on
classwide claims and evidence, and will produce classwide answers.
Those Plaintiffs within the ninety Plaintiffs who are pilots will
share the same contentions as the other pilots.  

As the Court discussed, supra, to the extent that the Plaintiffs
argue that the pilots had a twelve-hour duty day, based on the
Defendants' statements and/or pilots' beliefs, typicality is not
satisfied, because such an argument will necessitate individualized
evidence and arguments from the parties aimed at individualized
class members. No single class representative can typify a claim
that rests on each individual's experiences. A representative with
his or her own individualized facts cannot represent another class
member with different facts in such a situation.

THE PLAINTIFFS SATISFY ADEQUACY FOR ONLY THE PROPOSED UNJUST
ENRICHMENT CLASS TO THE EXTENT THAT THEIR CLAIM RESTS ON THE
LEGALITY OF THE FOURTEEN-HOUR DUTY DAY

As with the commonality and typicality requirements, the
Plaintiffs' proposed NMMWA class and the unjust enrichment class,
to the extent that the Plaintiffs argue that the pilots had a
twelve-hour duty day, fail the adequacy requirement. For the
proposed NMMWA class, the Defendants focus their argument on the
potential for a conflict of interest between the clinical base
managers/lead pilots and the remaining proposed class members. The
Defendants do not discuss the adequacy of the proposed class
representatives for the unjust enrichment class. The Court
concludes that, because the proposed NMMWA class and the proposed
unjust enrichment class, to the extent that the Plaintiffs argue
that the pilots had a twelve-hour duty day, require individualized
analyses, the proposed class representatives cannot adequately
represent the class members' interests. To the extent that the
unjust enrichment class depends on the argument that the
Defendants' fourteen-hour duty day policy is illegal, the proposed
class representatives will adequately represent the class members.

The Plaintiffs Do Not Satisfy Adequacy for the Proposed NMMWA
Class, Because of the NMMWA Exemption Issue

Either among the Plaintiffs' eight designated class representatives
or among the ninety Plaintiffs, the adequacy analysis fails. A
non-clinical base manager or non-lead pilot cannot adequately
represent a clinical base manager or a lead pilot, whose claim will
turn on the NMMWA exemption, because the non-clinical base manager
or non-lead will not need to make any arguments about the defense.
Conversely, the NMMWA exemption will likely preoccupy a clinical
base manager's case or a lead pilot's case, and will end his or her
case prematurely from the view of the non-clinical base managers or
non-lead pilots, the validity of whose claims do not depend on the
NMWWA exemption issue. Although this inadequacy does not affect
Johnson's, Howell's, and Stephens' ability to adequately represent
the flight nurses and the flight paramedics, with whom they share
claims and factual circumstances with the flight nurses and the
flight paramedics, or Daniels', Mahaim's, and Zulaski's abilities
to adequately represent the pilots, with whom they likewise share
contentions, none of these designated class representatives can
adequately represent the clinical base managers and the lead pilots
who need to argue the NMMWA exemption to further their interests.
Likewise, Perry and Bundrant, who presumably will devote time to
arguing the NMMWA exemption, could not adequately represent the
non-clinical base managers and the non-lead pilots.

The Plaintiffs Satisfy Adequacy for the Proposed Unjust Enrichment
Class to the Extent That Their Claim Rests on the Legality of the
Fourteen-Hour Duty Day

The Defendants do not contest the class representatives' adequacy
for the proposed unjust enrichment class. The Court's conclusion on
the adequacy of the class representatives for the proposed class
follows, however, its commonality and typicality analyses. The
Plaintiffs satisfy adequacy for the proposed unjust enrichment
class to the extent that their claim rests on the legality of the
fourteen-hour duty day and that the twelve-hour shifts mean that
the daily rate was for twelve hours. As any argument that the
pilots had a twelve-hour duty day pursuant to the Defendants'
representations or the pilots' beliefs, rather than a fourteen-hour
duty day, will require individualized analyses, neither the pilots
of the ninety Plaintiffs, nor Daniels, Mahaim, Zulaski, and
Bundrant, can adequately represent the class for such an argument.
The pilots' individual experiences will more likely than not differ
too greatly for the Court to base a decision on a subset of the
pilots. On the other hand, as the issue of the fourteen-hour duty
day's legality involves no individualized facts, any subset of
pilots can adequately prosecute such a claim for the class.

THE PLAINTIFFS SATISFY RULE 23(B)(3) FOR ONLY THE PROPOSED UNJUST
ENRICHMENT CLASS TO THE EXTENT THAT THEIR CLAIM RESTS ON THE
LEGALITY OF THE FOURTEEN-HOUR DUTY DAY

The Plaintiffs satisfy rule 23(b)(3) for only the proposed unjust
enrichment class to the same extent that they satisfy the rule
23(a) requirements. To satisfy rule 23(b)(3), the Plaintiffs must
show that their proposed classes satisfy the rule's two
requirements: (i) predominance and (ii) superiority. Rule
23(b)(3)'s requirements are stricter than rule 23(a)'s
requirements.

The Court's conclusions regarding the rule 23(b)(3) factors follow,
therefore, its conclusions regarding the rule 23(a) requirements.
The Plaintiffs have not satisfied the predominance or the
superiority requirements for the proposed NMMWA class. The
Plaintiffs have satisfied commonality, typicality, and adequacy for
the unjust enrichment claim to the extent that the Plaintiffs argue
that the Defendants could not legally have a fourteen-hour duty day
for the pilots, but not to the extent that the Plaintiffs argue
that the Defendants had a twelve-hour duty day for the pilots.

THE PLAINTIFFS SATISFY PREDOMINANCE FOR ONLY THE PROPOSED UNJUST
ENRICHMENT CLASS TO THE EXTENT THAT THEIR CLAIM RESTS ON THE
LEGALITY OF THE FOURTEEN-HOUR DUTY DAY

The Plaintiffs do not satisfy predominance for the NMMWA claim.
They satisfy predominance for the proposed unjust enrichment class
only to the extent that they argue that the Defendants could not
properly have a fourteen-hour duty day. The Tenth Circuit has
articulated two steps in the predominance inquiry; a court must
identify: (1) which of those elements are susceptible to
generalized proof and (2) whether those that are so susceptible
predominate over those that are not. Issues that either do not
apply to the whole class or that require individualized analyses
predominate over the proposed NMMWA class, and the proposed unjust
enrichment class to the extent that the Plaintiffs argue that the
pilots had a twelve-hour duty day.

The Plaintiffs Do Not Satisfy Predominance for the Proposed NMMWA
Class, Because of the NMMWA Exemption Issue and Because No Disputed
Common Issues Remain Among the Non-Clinical Base Manager and
Non-Lead Pilot Plaintiffs

Common issues do not predominate over the NMMWA claim or the
proposed alternative NMMWA classes. As discussed in the commonality
analysis, no common issues exist between the clinical base managers
and the lead pilots, and the other Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs'
proposed issues 1 through 7 are susceptible to generalized proof
only to the extent that the Court considers the issues for each of
the groups of non-clinical base manager flight nurses and flight
paramedics, and non-lead pilots.

The Defendants concede, however, these issues 1 through 7 for this
group of Plaintiffs.The Defendants dispute only the NMMWA exemption
as it applies to the clinical base managers and the lead pilots,
and the American Pipe tolling issue, which they do not purport to
dispute as to all Plaintiffs.  

Only the NMMWA exemption, the American Pipe tolling issue and the
damages issue, therefore, remain for litigation. As the Defendants
concede all other issues, the Court cannot say that any common
issues predominate.

The Plaintiffs Satisfy Predominance for the Proposed Unjust
Enrichment Class to the Extent That Their Claim Rests on the
Legality of the Fourteen-Hour Duty Day.

The unjust enrichment class satisfies predominance to the extent
that the Plaintiffs argue the fourteen-hour duty day's illegality.
As the Court discusses in the commonality analysis, the central,
common issues for the unjust enrichment class are the Plaintiffs'
proposed common issues 1, 4, and 5. The questions whether the
Defendants could have a duty day for fourteen-hour days given the
twelve-hour shifts or require that the pilots work over twelve-hour
days applies uniformly to the proposed class, which was subject to
this pay and scheduling policy. The case will generate a common
answer on the issue of this scheme's legality, whether the
Defendants were unjustly enriched, and whether the Defendants acted
maliciously, willfully, recklessly, wantonly, fraudulently, or in
bad faith.  

The Plaintiffs have not established predominance to the extent that
they argue that the pilots and Tri-State CareFlight did not have a
contract that the pilots work fourteen-hour duty days and that the
duty day was twelve hours. As the Court discusses in the
commonality analysis, this issue requires individualized evidence,
and the issues whether the Defendants unjustly benefited from the
circumstances that these individualized analyses reveal, and
whether the Defendants acted maliciously, willfully, recklessly,
wantonly, fraudulently or in bad faith in these circumstances, will
likewise require individualized evidence. These uncommon issues
will predominate over the undisputed and the incidental issues.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs do not satisfy predominance to the
extent that they rely on this second theory.

THE PLAINTIFFS SATISFY SUPERIORITY FOR ONLY THE PROPOSED UNJUST
ENRICHMENT CLASS TO THE EXTENT THAT THEIR CLAIM RESTS ON THE
LEGALITY OF THE FOURTEEN-HOUR DUTY DAY

48. In line with the Court's conclusions for rule 23(a)'s
requirements and rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance factor, the Court
concludes that the Plaintiffs have satisfied the superiority
requirement only for the unjust enrichment claim and to the extent
that the Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants could not have a
fourteen-hour duty day.

In addressing whether a proposed class action is superior to other
available methods of adjudicating the controversy, courts start
with the four factors that rule 23(b)(3)(A)-(D) enumerates,
although those factors are not exhaustive. These factors are:

(A) the putative class members' interests in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions (B) the
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already begun by or against putative class members (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of
the claims in the particular forum and (D) the likely difficulties
in managing a class action.

For each proposed class, the Court considers each factor in turn.

The Plaintiffs Do Not Satisfy Superiority for the Proposed NMMWA
Class, Because Only Issues That Demand Individualized Attention
Remain

The proposed NMMWA class does not satisfy the superiority
requirement. First, the proposed class members have interests in
individually controlling their lawsuits. As discussed, supra, only
uncommon and/or individual issues remain for the proposed NMMWA
class. No common representation will suffice for these issues, and
each Plaintiff has, accordingly, an interest in prosecuting his or
her individual damages, and defending himself or herself against
NWWMA exemption or statute-of-limitations issues, as applicable. No
class interest even exists in pursuing the litigation where the
parties dispute only such issues.

Second, although the nature of this litigation is such that the
ninety Plaintiffs in Bell have some interest in individual control
over the litigation, this factor does not counsel overall against a
class action. The Court has previously noted rule 23(b)(3)(B)'s
dictate to consider the nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already begun by  class members' requires the Court
consider any other class actions that have already been certified.


Here, ninety Plaintiffs have already joined Bell. This joinder does
not, however, indicate to the Court that individual plaintiffs will
continue filing suits to pursue individual actions. No other suits
have been filed, see Motion at 39, and nothing indicates a
likelihood of individual pursuits of these claims through other
lawsuits. The Plaintiffs joined this action after the Plaintiffs'
counsel set out to prevent the Defendants from picking off the
named Plaintiffs, and contacted all potential class members
regarding Payne and Bell. In these circumstances, the nature of
pending litigation does not counsel against certification.

Third, concentrating the litigation of the claims in the Court is
desirable. The Defendants do not dispute that the Court is
well-suited to adjudicating the claims at issue. The litigation's
claims involve events that occurred in New Mexico and apply New
Mexico law. The parties have already sought to concentrate these
claims in front of the Court by transferring Bell from Judge
Gonzales.

The Court disagrees with the Defendants that a class action will
not advance the effort to concentrate claims. Ninety plaintiffs
already have joined the potential class. Moreover, the Court can
more efficiently navigate a class action procedure than the
hypothetical joinder of over 200 additional plaintiffs, and the
court system can more efficiently handle one class action than over
200 individual lawsuits.  

Fourth, given that only uncommon or individualized inquiries
remain, a class action will not be more manageable than another
procedure. Common issues do not remain such that a class action
will add value by offering an efficient resolution of joint issues.
Whether the Court proceeds through a class action or the proposed
class members proceed through individual lawsuits, the Court's
and/or other courts' time and efforts will be devoted to sorting
through the class members to determine to whom the NMMWA applies,
and working with the parties to address individual statute of
limitations concerns and damages evaluations. In such
circumstances, the Court sees little advantage to certifying a
class. Class certification only will add individuals with regard to
whom the Court will resolve independent issues.

The Plaintiffs Satisfy Predominance for the Unjust Enrichment Class
to the Extent That Their Claim Rests on the Legality of the
Fourteen-Hour Duty Day

The unjust enrichment class satisfies predominance to the extent
that the Plaintiffs argue the fourteen-hour duty days' illegality,
but not to the extent that the Plaintiffs argue that the pilots'
duty day was twelve hours based on the Defendants' representations
and the pilots' beliefs. First, to the extent that the Plaintiffs
aver that the Defendants contemplated a duty day of twelve hours,
as discussed, supra, individualized issues arise, and each
Plaintiff will have an interest in pursuing those issues
independently such that the claims' resolutions reflect the
Plaintiffs' individual circumstances.  

To the extent that the Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants could
not have shifts of twelve hours and have a duty day of fourteen
hours, no individual issues arise such that the proposed class
members have an interest in individually litigating any issues. The
class shares an interest in that issue's litigation. That
twenty-eight of the 138 pilots have joined Bell does not persuade
the Court against class certification. Of the pilots, 118 did not
conclude that joining the lawsuit in an individual stance was
worthwhile, and, of the twenty-eight who joined the lawsuit, the
Court cannot say whether they joined because they wanted to pursue
individually their claims or whether they understood that they
could take a backseat to litigation that involves designated class
representatives.  

THE COURT CERTIFIES ONLY THE PROPOSED UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIMS TO
THE EXTENT THAT THE PLAINTIFFS ARGUE THAT THE DEFENDANTS COULD NOT
HAVE LEGAL SHIFTS OF FOURTEEN-HOUR DUTY DAYS

In conclusion, the Court does not certify the proposed NMMWA class.
The Court certifies the proposed unjust enrichment class for the
period from June 19, 2009, through January 19, 2016, to the extent
that the Plaintiffs argue the legality of the fourteen-hour duty
day. Daniels, Mahaim, Zulaski, and Bundrant will serve as
designated class representatives for this class. As the Defendants
do not dispute Moody & Stanford, P.C.'s adequacy as class counsel,
see Response at 36, and the Court agrees that the firm is adequate,
and competent, and a very good leader of employment firms, the
Court appoints the firm class counsel. The unjust enrichment class
Plaintiffs will prepare a notice that reflects the certified class
to be sent to all class members.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification & Supporting Memorandum
is granted in part and denied in part; (ii) the Court does not
certify the proposed class for the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act
(iii) the Court certifies a class for the unjust enrichment claim
to the extent that the Plaintiffs argue the legality of the
fourteen-hour duty day, and with Moody & Stanford, P.C. as class
counsel; and (iv) the unjust enrichment class Plaintiffs will
prepare a notice that reflects the certified class to be sent to
all the class members.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 16, 2019
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y2gcvtwb from Leagle.com.

Usvaldo R. Trujillo, Daniel Bergman, Danielle Irvin, Michael
Castro, Alex Jones, Jason Perry, William Dallas Bundrant, Jr.,
Alexander Howell, Shane Herron, Greg Walsh, Shailendra Basnet,
Philip Qubain, Donald Luke Keenan, Courtney Guerra, Kevin Napp,
Paul Ratigan, Kristy Bell, Kristen Grado, Erin Johnson, Ron
McDearmid, Daron Ruckman, Eric Parker, Joseph Root, Ian Stephens,
Paul Serino, Luke Forslund, David Daniels, Thomas Cislo, Cindy D.
Maxwell, Kara Cervantes, Virginia Williams, Adam Doyle, Amanda
Petersen, Tyler Wilkins, Christian Speakman, Chase Carter, Harold
Joseph Fisher, Kathy Onsurez-Wilson, Darren Een, Daniel Kuhler,
Daniel St. Peters, Darrin Hamilton, Bethany McCandless, Dan Meehan,
Christina Fleeman, James O'Connor, Jennifer Mazzanti, Allen Jacobs,
Jennifer Valdez, William J. McConnell, Graciela Villalobos, Brent
Place, Paul Vacula, Walter Fabian, Nathan Maplesden, Salustiano
Fragoso, Toby Eicher, Deborah Berest, Rocky H. Burrows, II, Terry
Zacharias, Frederic Ruebush, Jennifer Salaverry, Jimmy Ronald
Primm, Jr., Michael Zulaski, Brenda Casarez, Simon Lucero, Eric
Vogt, Raphael Mahaim, Rehannon Fisher, Josh Martinez, Matthew
Jansson, Benjamin Aguilar, Shane Engelauf, Sara Yurkovich, Gregory
Steiner, Satoshi Mori, Ted McGill, Orlando Marquez, John Munn,
Sherryn Terblanche, Alison Lopez, Diane Sarno, Anita Nelson,
Annette Shivers, Lauren Salazar, Keegan Stokes, Laurie Pittman, Lon
Enos, Jennifer Jones & William Mallonee, Intervenor Plaintiffs,
represented by Christopher M. Moody - moody@nmlaborlaw.com - Moody
& Stanford PC.

Tri-State Careflight, LLC & Blake A. Stamper, Individually,
Defendants, represented by Charles J. Vigil , Rodey Dickson Sloan
Akin & Robb, P.A., Melanie B. Stambaugh , Rodey Dickason Sloan Akin
& Robb PA & Jeffrey L. Lowry , Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb,
P.A., 201 3rd Street NW Suite 2200 Albuquerque, NM 87102


UBER TECH: $32.5MM Settlement in McKnight Suit Has Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BYRON McKNIGHT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UBER
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 14-cv-05615-JST
(N.D. Cal.), Judge Jon S. Tigar of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California (i) granted the Plaintiffs' motion
for final approval of the class action settlement, and (ii) granted
in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's
fees, costs, and incentive awards.

These motions arise from a putative class action against Defendants
Uber Technologies and Rasier, LLC based on Uber's alleged
misrepresentations and omissions regarding its "Safe Rides Fee" and
the safety measures, background checks, and other efforts it takes
to provide safety for its customers.  The Plaintiffs bring eight
claims for relief: (1) breach of implied contract under California
law; (2) breach of implied contract under Illinois law; (3) breach
of implied contract under Massachusetts law; (4) violation of the
Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et
seq.; (5) unlawful business practices in violation of California
Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq.; (6) unfair
business practices in violation of section and (8) false
advertising in violation of California Business and Professions
Code section 17500, et seq.  They seek monetary relief as well as
equitable relief enjoining Uber from continuing the alleged harmful
conduct.

On Aug. 7, 2017, the Court conditionally certified a settlement
class and granted preliminary approval of the class action
settlement agreement.  The settlement class consists of all persons
who, from Jan. 1, 2013 to Jan. 31, 2016, used the Uber App or
website to obtain service from one of the Uber Ride Services with a
Safe Rides Fee in the United States or its territories.  Uber
Rideshare Services' means all transportation services that are
arranged through the Defendants' website or the Uber App,
regardless of type of ride or service that is requested.

The proposed class consists of approximately 22.4 million potential
members.  The settlement provides for a $32.5 million
non-reversionary settlement fund.  After accounting for
administrative costs, attorney's fees, and service awards, each
class member will receive $0.25 for their first Safe Rides Fee
Service and $0.05 for each subsequent Safe Rides Fee Service.  The
average settlement share will be approximately $1.07.  Any residual
funds will be paid to the National Consumer Law Center.  The
Defendants agree to cease charging "Safe Rides Fees" and to refrain
from using statements like "safest ride on the road" and
"industry-leading" when describing their safety measures in
commercial advertising.

The Court held a fairness hearing on Feb. 8, 2018.  No objectors
appeared.  At that hearing, the Court ordered the Plaintiffs to
provide supplemental briefing on the applicability of In re Hyundai
& Kia Fuel Economy Litigation.  On April 19, 2018, the Court stayed
further consideration of the settlement because both parties in
Hyundai recently petitioned the Ninth Circuit for en banc review,
the Court will defer ruling on the motion for final approval until
the Hyundai petition for review is resolved and any subsequent
Ninth Circuit proceedings are completed.  The Ninth Circuit's en
banc proceedings have concluded, In re Hyundai & Kia Fuel Econ.
Litig., and the Court now proceeds to evaluate the final fairness
of the proposed settlement.

The parties provided the required notice to federal and state
attorneys general under the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA").
The Notice occurred more than 90 days before the date of the Order,
as required by 28 U.S.C. Section 1715(d).

After reviewing all of the required factors, Judge Tigar continues
to find the settlement fair, reasonable, and adequate, and
certification of the settlement class to be proper.  He also
concludes that the settlement meets any heightened requirements
imposed by CAFA.  The Court has already rejected one settlement as
inadequate, and it held a hearing on this settlement.  The
Plaintiffs' motion for final approval of the settlement is
granted.

Attorney's fees must be based on redemption rates for the coupon
portion of the settlement, and on the attorney's lodestar for the
non-coupon portion.  Moreover, under the terms of the statute,
attorney's fees may not be based on any portion of the settlement
which reverts to cy pres.  Having concluded that the settlement
should be governed by the principles applicable to coupon
settlements under CAFA, the Judge orders the Plaintiffs to file an
amended motion for attorney's fees consistent with the described
principles.

The Plaintiffs' counsel estimate litigation expenses to be $39,312.
Arias Sanguinetti Wang & Torrijos, LLP provides an accounting
transaction report which provides significantly more detail for
their $3,200.63 in claimed costs, and the Judge will approve that
amount.  The other two firms must submit additional documentation
for their claimed costs when the Plaintiffs submit their renewed
motion for attorney's fees.

Finally, Plaintiffs request incentive awards of $500 for each of
the named Plaintiffs: Nicholas Coolidge, Byron McKnight, Ernesto
Mejia, Julian Mena, and Todd Schreiber.  The five named Plaintiffs
filed declarations detailing their work on the case.  Based on
these declarations, the factors the Court must consider, and the
relatively modest awards requested, the Judge will grant the
Plaintiffs' request to award $500 to each of the named Plaintiffs.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Tigar The Court granted final
approval of the proposed settlement, and granted in part and denied
in part the Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees, costs, and
incentive awards.  The Plaintiffs' requests for incentive awards
and for $3,200.63 in costs are granted.  Their remaining requests
for costs and their motion for attorney's fees are denied without
prejudice.

The parties may submit a jointly proposed form of judgment if they
wish to have judgment entered at this time, rather than after the
Court has determined an appropriate fee award.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 13, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/miAqzZ from Leagle.com.

Byron McKnight, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alfredo Torrijos --
alfredo@asstlawyers.com -- Arias Sanguinetti Wang & Torrijos LLP,
Mike M. Arias -- mike@asstlawyers.com -- Arias Sanguinetti Wang &
Torrijos LLP, Nicholas A. Coulson, Liddle & Dubin, P.C., pro hac
vice, Nick Suciu, III, Barbat, Mansour & Suciu PLLC, Robert Ahdoot
-- rahdoot@ahdootwolfson.com -- Ahdoot & Wolfson, P.C., Steven D.
Liddle, Liddle & Dubin, P.C. & Tina Wolfson --
twolfson@ahdootwolfson.com -- Ahdoot & Wolfson, P.C.

Julian Mena, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Todd Schreiber, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Nate Coolidge, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated & Ernesto Mejia, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Consol Plaintiffs,
represented by Tina Wolfson, Ahdoot & Wolfson, P.C., Keith Custis,
Custis Law, P.C., Nick Suciu, III, Barbat, Mansour & Suciu PLLC,
Robert Ahdoot, Ahdoot & Wolfson, P.C. & Theodore Walter Maya,
Ahdoot & Wolfson, P.C.

Uber Technologies, Inc., a Delaware Corporation & Rasier, LLC, a
Delaware Limited Liability Company, Defendants, represented by
Alvin Matthew Ashley -- mashley@irell.com -- Irell & Manella LLP,
Andra Barmash Greene -- agreene@irell.com -- Irell & Manella LLP &
Michael David Harbour -- mharbour@irell.com -- Irell & Manella
LLP.

Robert Hudson, Objector, represented by Steve A. Miller, Steve A.
Miller, PC & John Jacob Pentz, pro hac vice.

Morgan Gordon, Objector, represented by Timothy Ricardo Hanigan ,
Lang Hanigan & Carvalho, LLP, Christopher Andress Bandas, Bandas
Law Firm, P.C., pro hac vice & Robert William Clore, Bandas Law
Firm, P.C., pro hac vice.

Albert Zang, Objector, represented by Michael Frederick Creamer,
Jr.

Ms Jennifer Hinojosa, Objector, represented by Alan J. Sherwood,
Law Office of of Alan J. Sherwood.

The People of the State of California, Miscellaneous, represented
by Ernst Andrew Halperin, Office of the San Francisco District
Attorney.

Mark Ozzello, Miscellaneous, represented by Gregory Scott Bodell,
Kozberg and Bodell LLP.


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Court Compels Arbitration in WARN Act Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issue an Order granting Defendant's Motion for Compel
Arbitration in the case captioned TODD JOHNSTON, Plaintiff, v. UBER
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendant. Case No. 16-cv-03134-EMC. (N.D.
Cal.).

Plaintiff Todd Johnston filed a class action lawsuit against
Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.  Mr. Johnston asserts one cause
of action: a violation of the WARN Act. He contends that Uber
Technologies violated the WARN Act when it ceased operations in
Austin, Texas without providing WARN Act notice to drivers at least
60 days in advance.

Uber argues that this matter is not properly before the Court
because Mr. Johnston agreed to bring this dispute in arbitration.

The Arbitration Agreement

At issue in this case is whether the parties' Arbitration Agreement
requires this dispute to be settled before an arbitrator on an
individual basis. Defendant alleges that Plaintiff signed up to use
the Uber App to generate leads for potential riders in Austin,
Texas, and his account was activated on May 22, 2015. He could not
use the app without accepting the applicable Software License &
Online Services agreement with Rasier a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Uber. At the time of Plaintiff's account activation, the applicable
agreement was the November 2014 Rasier Agreement. To accept the
agreement, Plaintiff had to sign into the app and click YES, I
AGREE when prompted to confirm his acceptance of the agreement two
times.

Defendant contends that the agreement was available for review by
clicking a hyperlink presented on the screen. And Plaintiff was
free to spend as much time as he wished reviewing the November 2014
Rasier Agreement. Plaintiff accepted the November 2014 Agreement on
the same day he activated his account. That agreement contained an
arbitration provision, and Plaintiff did not opt out of that
provision.  

The parties in this case do not disagree about whether the FAA is
implicated in their controversy.

The parties agree that Plaintiff signed Uber's Arbitration
Agreement and did not subsequently opt out.  Furthermore, Plaintiff
does not allege that fraud, duress, or unconscionability create a
basis for invalidating the entire Arbitration Agreement.

Instead, the key disagreement pertains to whether the Court should
enforce the Arbitration Agreement and order Plaintiff to
individually arbitrate his claims or find the class action in the
Arbitration Agreement unenforceable because it conflicts with the
WARN Act. Whether the WARN Act applies hinges on whether Plaintiff
and other drivers are properly classified as employees or
independent contractors, because only employees are covered by the
WARN Act; independent contractors are not.

Whether the case may be litigated in the district court or should
proceed instead to arbitration turns first on the order of the
issues to be decided. Uber argues that the question of employee
versus independent status of Mr. Johnston should be decided in
arbitration. Since that is a dispute regarding the relationship
between Mr. Johnston and Uber, Uber contends that question falls
within the purview of the Arbitration Agreement.

Thus, Uber seeks to enforce the parties' agreement as written,
compel the threshold employment status question to arbitration, and
stay the remainder of the case. Plaintiff, on the other hand, urges
the Court first to address the validity of the Class Action Waiver,
a matter for the Court, not the arbitrator, to decide under the
Agreement. See Plaintiff's Opposition Brief. In particular,
Plaintiff asks the Court to decide the substantive law question
whether the WARN Act supersedes or displaces the FAA's mandate on
enforcing arbitration and invalidate the Class Action Waiver.

Although employee status is a threshold question upon which
application and hence enforcement of the WARN Act is predicated,
both parties agreed at the hearing that it would not be appropriate
for the Court to decide that issue. That agreement by the parties
is consistent with the Arbitration Agreement herein. The
Arbitration Provision clearly and unmistakably provides that  the
arbitrator must decide all disputes, including the enforceability,
revocability or validity of the Arbitration Provision.

Although under the Uber agreement, the question of the validity of
class waivers is to be decided by a civil court of competent
jurisdiction, the Court cannot properly reach that legal question
regarding the relationship between the WARN Act and the FAA until
the threshold finding is made that Plaintiff is an employee who is
subject to the WARN Act's protection.

Since, as the parties agree, that threshold question is a matter
for the arbitrator, the status question is properly referred to
arbitration. If the arbitrator determines that Plaintiff is
properly classified as an Uber employee such that Plaintiff would
qualify for the protections of the WARN Act the arbitrator must
send the case back to this Court for a determination whether the
Class Action Waiver is valid in light of the WARN Act. If the
arbitrator determines that Plaintiff is properly classified as an
independent contractor, the arbitrator may retain jurisdiction over
the rest of the case since the WARN Act would not impede
arbitration under that circumstance.

The Court grants Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration as to the
question of whether Plaintiff is an employee or independent
contractor. If the arbitrator finds Plaintiff is/was an employee,
the matter shall be referred back to this Court to determine the
validity of the Class Action Waiver.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 16, 2019 Order
is available at  https://tinyurl.com/yxwmcp64 from Leagle.com.

Todd Johnston, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly
situated persons, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas J. Brandi -
tjb@brandilaw.com - The Brandi Law Firm, Brian J. Malloy , The
Brandi Law Firm, 354 Pine Street, Third Floor, San Francisco, CA,
94104, John Randolph Davis  -jdavis@slackdavis.com - Slack Davis
Sanger, LLP & Michael L. Slack , Slack Davis Sanger LLP, Mira Vista
Office Building, 2705 Bee Cave Road, Suite 220, Austin, TX
78746-5685

Uber Technologies, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Defendant,
represented by Andrew Michael Spurchise - maspurchise@littler.com -
Littler Mendelson, P.C., Carlos Jimenez - cajimenez@littler.com -
Littler Mendelson, P.C., Keith Adam Jacoby - kjacoby@littler.com -
Littler Mendelson & Sophia Behnia - sbehnia@littler.com  - Littler
Mendelson, P.C..


UNITED FINANCIAL: Parshall Balks at People's United Merger Deal
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case, PAUL PARSHALL, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. UNITED FINANCIAL BANCORP,
INC., WILLIAM H. W. CRAWFORD IV, ROBERT A. STEWART, JR., RAYMOND H.
LEFURGE, JR., PAULA A. AIELLO, MICHAEL A. BARS, MICHAEL F. CROWLEY,
KRISTEN A. JOHNSON, KEVIN E. ROSS, and PEOPLE'S UNITED FINANCIAL,
INC., the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01716-UNA (D. Del., Sept.
12, 2019), stems from a proposed transaction announced on July 15,
2019, pursuant to which United Financial Bancorp, Inc. will be
acquired by People's United Financial, Inc.

On July 15, 2019, United Financial's Board of Directors caused the
Company to enter into an agreement and plan of merger with People's
United.  Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, United
Financial's stockholders will receive 0.875 of a share of People's
United stock for each share of United Financial common stock they
own. On September 4, 2019, the Defendants filed a Form S-4
Registration Statement with the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission in connection with the Proposed Transaction,
which scheduled a stockholder vote on the Proposed Transaction for
October 22, 2019.

The Registration Statement omits material information with respect
to the Proposed Transaction, which renders the Registration
Statement false and misleading.

First, the Registration Statement omits material information
regarding the Company's and People's United's financial
projections. The Registration Statement fails to disclose the
"estimated dividends per share for United Financial for the years
ending December 31, 2019 through December 31, 2023, as confirmed
with the senior management of United Financial," as reviewed by the
Company's financial advisor, Sandler O'Neill & Partners, in
connection with its opinion.

Second, the Registration Statement omits material information
regarding the analyses performed by Sandler and the Company's
additional financial advisor, RP Financial. With respect to
Sandler's Comparable Company Analyses, the Registration Statement
fails to disclose the individual multiples and metrics for the
companies observed by Sandler in the analyses, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 295-5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
          E-mail: bdl@rl-legal.com
                  gms@rl-legal.com

               - and -

          Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
          RM LAW, P.C.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (484) 324-6800
          Facsimile: (484) 631-1305
          E-mail: rm@maniskas.com

UNITED HEALTHCARE: Palmetto Pathology Seeks Medicaid Refund
-----------------------------------------------------------
PALMETTO PATHOLOGY SERVICES, P.A., the Plaintiff, vs. UNITED
HEALTHCARE OF FLORIDA, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 94920761 (Fla.
11th Jud'l Cir., Aug. 28, 2019), alleges that Plaintiff and Class
Members have not been compensated by the hospitals for the
professional component of the clinical pathology services rendered
to Defendant's Medicaid HMO members/subscribers by Plaintiff and
Class Members and billed to Defendant.

The complaint seeks declaratory decree and supplemental relief
pursuant to Florida Statutes Chapter 86 for breach of contract
implied in law, breach of third party beneficiary contract, and
quantum meruit.

The Plaintiff and Class Members provided professional clinical
pathology services at hospitals throughout the State of Florida to
patients that were subscribers under the Defendant's Medicaid HMO
plan (UHC's Florida Medicaid Plan).

The Defendant is a health maintenance organization.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff are:

          Patrick S. Montoya, Esq.
          Markus M. Kamberger, Esq.
          COLSON HICKS EIDSON
          255 Alhambra Circle, PH
          Coral Gables, FL 33134
          Telephone: (305)476-7400
          Facsimile: (305)476-7444

UNITED TECH: Sorenson Says Raytheon Merger Docs Deficient
----------------------------------------------------------
ROSS SORENSON, Individually And On Behalf Of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION,
GREGORY J. HAYES, LLOYD J. AUSTIN III, DIANE M. BRYANT, JOHN V.
FARACI, JEAN-PIERRE GARNIER, CHRISTOPHER J. KEARNEY, ELLEN J.
KULLMAN, MARSHALL O. LARSEN, HAROLD W. MCGRAW III, MARGARET L.
O'SULLIVAN, DENISE L. RAMOS, FREDRIC G. REYNOLDS, AND BRIAN C.
ROGERS, the Defendants, Case No. 2019-0733 (Del. Ch., Sept. 12,
2019), seeks to remedy Defendants' misconduct in connection with
the merger between UTC and Raytheon Company.

On June 9, 2019, UTC entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger
with Raytheon. Pursuant to the Merger Agreement, a subsidiary of
UTC, Light Merger Sub Corp. will merge with and into Raytheon, with
Raytheon continuing as the surviving corporation and subsidiary of
UTC.

In consideration, each Raytheon stockholder will receive shares of
UTC such that current Raytheon stockholders will own approximately
43% of the combined company and UTC stockholders will own
approximately 57% of the combined company.

In connection with the Proposed Transaction, on June 17, 2019, the
Defendants issued materially incomplete and misleading disclosures
in a Form S-4 Registration Statement filed with the SEC in
connection with the Proposed Transaction.

Specifically, the Registration Statement is materially deficient
and misleading because, inter alia, it omits material information
concerning the concerning: (i) financial projections for UTC and
Raytheon; (ii) the valuation analyses performed by UTC's financial
advisors, Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC  and Evercore Group L.L.C., in
support of their respective fairness opinions; (iii) the potential
conflicts of interest Evercore and Morgan Stanley faced as a result
of the prior work they performed for UTC; and (iv) the negotiations
surrounding Hayes' employment agreement. Without all material
information the Company's stockholders cannot make an informed
decision regarding how to vote their shares in the upcoming
stockholder meeting.

On September 4, 2019, UTC filed an Amended Registration Statement
with the SEC in connection with the Proposed Transaction that
failed to address the materially deficient and misleading omissions
contained within the Registration Statement, and notified UTC
stockholders that the UTC special meeting would be held on October
11, 2019.

The Defendants allegedly have breached their fiduciary duties.  The
Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the Proposed Transaction unless and/or
until Defendants cure their breaches of fiduciary duty, and/or
recover damages resulting from Defendants' violations of their
fiduciary duties, the lawsuit says.

United Technologies Corporation is an American multinational
conglomerate headquartered in Farmington, Connecticut.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Blake A. Bennett, Esq.
          COOCH AND TAYLOR, P.A.
          The Brandywine Building
          1000 West Street, 10th Floor
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 984-3800
          E-mail: bbennett@coochtaylor.com

               - and -

          Donald J. Enright, Esq.
          Elizabeth K. Tripodi, Esq.
          LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP
          1101 30th Street, N.W., Suite 115
          Washington, DC 20007
          Telephone: (202) 524-4290

VERMONT MUTUAL: Court Grants Summary Judgment Bid in Martins Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JONATHAN MARTINS, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. VERMONT MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, Defendant, Civil Action No. 17-12360-FDS (D. Mass.), Judge
F. Dennis Saylor, IV of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts (i) granted Vermont's motion for summary judgment,
and (ii) denied Martins' motion for partial summary judgment.

Martins alleges that Defendant Vermont improperly failed to pay
damages for the "inherent diminution in value" of his automobile
after an accident caused by one of its insureds.  "Inherent
diminution in value" refers to the fact that a vehicle involved in
an accident typically has a lower market value, even after repairs
have been made, due to a stigma attaching to such vehicles.
Martins contends that an insurer is required to compensate for such
a loss under Part 4 of the 2008 Standard Massachusetts Automobile
Policy.

On June 18, 2016, Martins purchased a 2015 Nissan Altima for
$20,472.  On Jan. 23, 2017, Martins's vehicle was damaged when it
collided with a vehicle being driven by Elhadjmamado Dansoko.  At
the time of the collision, Dansoko was insured under a policy
issued by Vermont.

Dansoko's policy provided coverage for the period from Jan. 20,
2017, to Jan. 20, 2018.  The policy used the 2008 edition of the
Standard Massachusetts Automobile Insurance Policy. Part 4 of the
standard policy, titled "Damage to Someone Else's Property,"
provided that the insurer would pay damages to someone else whose
auto or other property is damaged in an accident.  The damages it
will pay are the amounts that person is legally entitled to collect
for property damage through a court judgment or settlement.
Damages include any applicable sales tax and the costs resulting
from the loss of use of the damaged property.

Martins reported the accident to his insurer, Safety Insurance Co.
Safety paid Martins $11,711.80 to cover the full costs of repairs
to his vehicle.  In February 2017, Safety presented a subrogation
claim to Vermont for the repairs to the vehicle.  After determining
that Dansoko was liable for the accident, Vermont paid Safety
$12,942.80, which included $11,711.80 for repairs, $331 for towing
and storage, and $900 for a rental car.

On June 26, 2017, an attorney for Martins sent a letter to Vermont
demanding payment of $6,129 for the "inherent diminished value" of
the car.  On July 11, 2017, Michelle Martin, a Vermont Senior Claim
Representative, responded by e-mail and made a settlement offer.

Martins does not appear to have responded to the offer.  He next
contacted Vermont Mutual on Aug. 23, 2017, when his attorney sent a
demand letter under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A.  Essentially, the
letter contended that Vermont Mutual had a practice of
intentionally and knowingly making unfair and unreasonably low
offers to cover damages for the inherent diminution in value of
third-party claimants.  The letter demanded that Vermont Mutual
"immediately pay all reasonable diminution in value damages owed to
Martins and the other class members.

On Aug. 23, 2017 (the same day the Chapter 93A demand letter was
sent), Martins filed an action against Vermont Mutual in Suffolk
Superior Court.  The complaint asserted a claim for breach of
contract and sought declaratory judgment.

On Sept. 22, 2017, Vermont responded to the Chapter 93A demand
letter, denying any liability to Martins or the putative class.
However, Vermont made an increased settlement offer to resolve the
claim.  Martins rejected that offer.

On Oct. 13, 2017, Martins filed an amended complaint that asserted
five claims under Chapter 93A, four of which are based on alleged
violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176D, Sections3(9)(c), (d), (f),
and (n).  Vermont Mutual then removed the case to the Court.

Martins has filed a motion for partial summary judgment,
essentially seeking a declaration that Vermont is required to pay
inherent diminution in value damages to third-party claimants.  On
March 1, 2019, Vermont has filed a cross-motion for summary
judgment, contending that it has no such obligation.  Vermont
Mutual contends that a claimant is entitled under Massachusetts law
to recover only the cost to repair the property or the property's
diminished market value, whichever is less, and that therefore
inherent diminution in value damages are not recoverable.

Judge Saylor finds that there is nothing in the policy that
expressly provides for the payment of inherent diminution in value.
Nor is there any reference anywhere in the statutory and
regulatory framework to that concept.  Thus, no Massachusetts case
appears to have addressed whether damages for inherent diminution
in value are recoverable under Part 4 of the standard policy.

In any event, there is no reason to conclude that the law of
Massachusetts permits the recovery of damages in a tort action for
the inherent diminished value of personal property.  No
Massachusetts case has so held, and the case law as it exists
suggests the contrary.  Furthermore, the Massachusetts Commissioner
of Insurance has never taken the position that such damages are
recoverable under a standard policy.  It follows that Vermont
Mutual had no obligation to offer or pay Martins for the inherent
diminution in value of his vehicle, because he would not have been
"legally entitled to collect for that damage through a court
judgment or settlement.  Summary judgment in favor of Vermont is
therefore appropriate as to all claims.

Finally, Count Five alleges that Vermont was/is aware of its legal
duty to pay Martins and the Class Members the fair market value of
the diminution in value damages their vehicles sustained as part of
their respective third-party property damage claims.  But because
that issue has not yet been decided by a Massachusetts court,
Vermont could not possibly have been aware of any such duty.
Accordingly, it cannot be deemed to have violated Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 176D, Section 3(9)(f), and summary judgment as to Count Five is
also appropriate on that separate ground.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Saylor (i) granted Vermont's
motion for summary judgment, and (ii) denied Martins' motion for
partial summary judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 14, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/XY397v from Leagle.com.

Jonathan Martins, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by David J. Relethford
-- drelethford@forrestlamothe.com -- Forrest, LaMothe, Mazow,
McCullough, Yasi & Yasi, John R. Yasi -- jyasi@forrestlamothe.com
-- Yasi & Yasi, P.c., Kevin J. McCullough, Mazow McCullough PC,
Michael C. Forrest -- mforrest@forrestlamothe.com -- Forrest,
LaMothe, Mazoe, McCullough, Yasi & Yasi & Robert E. Mazow, Mazow &
McCullough.

Vermont Mutual Insurance Group, Defendant, represented by Michael
S. Batson -- mbatson@hermesnetburn.com -- Hermes, Netburn, O'Connor
& Spearing & Michael C. Kinton -- mkinton@hermesnetburn.com --
Hermes, Netburn, O'Connor & Spearing.


WELLS FARGO: Bid to Dismiss Amended Harrington Fraud Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHAWN HARRINGTON, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Civil Action No.
19-11180-RGS (D. Mass.), Judge Richard G. Stearns of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied (i)
Harrington's motion to remand the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, and (ii) Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss the Amended
Complaint for failure to state a claim.

Harrington brought the putative class action in Middlesex Superior
Court against Wells Fargo, alleging that Wells Fargo violated Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 93A, Section 2, and 940 C.M.R. Section 7.04, by
repeatedly placing more than two debt collection calls within a
seven-day period.

In 2015, Harrington obtained an automobile financing loan from
Wells Fargo.  Sometime thereafter, Harrington stopped making
payments on the loan.  Wells Fargo then proceeded to call
Harrington more than twice a week on his cellular telephone to
collect on the debt.  Specifically, throughout the second half of
2018 and the beginning of 2019, Wells Fargo placed near-daily calls
to his cellular telephone and consistently placed more than four
calls to his cellular telephone within a seven-day period.

Harrington seeks to represent a class of all consumers residing in
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts who, within four years prior to
the filing of the action, received in excess of two telephone calls
regarding a debt from Wells Fargo within a seven-day period to
their residence, cellular telephone, or other provided telephone
number.

He alleges that "thousands" of Massachusetts consumers are members
of the proposed class.  In the civil action cover sheet to the
original state court complaint, Harrington lists damages as greater
than $25,001.

Wells Fargo timely removed the case to the federal district court
pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act.  

Harrington moves to remand the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.  Harrington contends that the state court civil
action cover sheet is the end of the Court's inquiry because it
lists damages at greater than $25,001 on behalf of the Plaintiff
and the class.  

Wells Fargo moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to
state a claim.  It contends that Harrington fails to sufficiently
allege that it engaged in unfair or deceptive conduct.  First,
according to Wells Fargo, Harrington's allegations lack sufficient
specificity regarding, among other things, the underlying debt and
Wells Fargo's debt collection practices.  Second, Harrington's
numerous citations to 940 C.M.R.Section 7.03 are merely formulaic
recitations of Massachusetts regulations.  And third, the Amended
Complaint is inconsistent about how many calls Harrington received
and when he received them.

Judge Stearns holds that Wells Fargo has satisfied its burden of
demonstrating a reasonable probability that the amount in
controversy exceeds $5 million.  Harrington has not identified
whether he seeks a per-week award or a per-call award, but either
way, there is a reasonable probability that the aggregate averred
claims exceed $5 million.  Wells Fargo estimates, and the Judge
accepts, that that time period amounts to 39 weeks.  Accordingly, a
per-week calculation of Harrington's damages yields $975 ($25 times
39 weeks), while a per-call calculation yields $1,950 ($25 times 39
weeks times two excessive calls per week).  Multiplying the class
size of 21,208 by the per-week award and the per-call award yields
$20,677,800 and $41,355,600, respectively.  Both amounts far exceed
CAFA's $5 million threshold, without even taking into account
Harrington's demand for treble damages, or attorney's fees.

The Judge disagrees with the Defendant's contention that Harrington
fails to sufficiently allege that it engaged in unfair or deceptive
conduct.  He finds that Harrington alleges that Wells Fargo's debt
collection calls caused three injuries: (1) he suffered anger,
anxiety, emotional distress, fear, frustration and embarrassment;
(2) the calls were distracting, an inconvenience, and an invasion
of his personal privacy; and (3) he wasted his time and energy
tending to the calls.  These purported injuries suffice.
Harrington has, therefore, plausibly pled a Chapter 93A claim.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Stearns denied both Harrington's
motion to remand and Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 14, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/B9sLHr from Leagle.com.

Shawn Harrington, Plaintiff, represented by Sergei Lemberg, Lemberg
Law, L.L.C.

Wells Fargo Bank N.A., Defendant, represented by Sean R. Higgins --
sean.higgins@klgates.com -- K & L Gates LLP, Edward James
Mikolinski -- edward.mikolinski@klgates.com -- K & L Gates LLP &
Matthew N. Lowe -- matthew.lowe@klgates.com -- K & L Gates LLP.


XEROX BUSINESS: Court Certifies Class in Hill Suit
--------------------------------------------------
In the case, TIFFANY HILL, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. XEROX BUSINESS SERVICES, LLC, a
Delaware Limited Liability Company, et al., Defendants, Case No.
C12-0717-JCC (W.D. Wash.), Judge John C. Coughenour of the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington, Seattle, (i)
granted the Plaintiff's motion to define the scope of a certified
class, and (ii) denied the Plaintiff's motion to determine the
number of interrogatories asked or for leave to serve additional
interrogatories.

On July 10, 2014, the Court denied the Defendants' motion for
partial summary judgment and granted in part the Plaintiff's motion
for class certification.  It chose not to precisely define the
certified "ABC" class until it had reviewed a class settlement
agreement from a similar lawsuit ("Sump settlement") to determine
whether claims that were released in that case would bar some class
members from participating in the present action.  The Court
directed the parties to file the Sump settlement under seal and
either (1) jointly file a stipulation defining a class that
accounts for the Sump settlement; or (2) in the absence of any
agreement, each file a brief not to exceed three pages explaining
how the proposed class should account for the Sump settlement.

The parties filed the Sump settlement agreement under seal, and
each filed a brief explaining how the proposed ABC class in the
case should account for the claims released in the Sump settlement.
The Defendants separately filed a motion for reconsideration,
asking the Court to reconsider both its denial of the Defendants'
motion for partial summary judgment and its certification of the
ABC class.  It denied the Defendants' motion for reconsideration,
but amended its order to certify that an immediate interlocutory
appeal of the Court's denial of the Defendants' motion for partial
summary judgment was appropriate under 28 U.S.C. Section  1292.
The Defendants subsequently appealed and moved to stay all
proceedings in the case pending resolution of their interlocutory
appeal.  Although not objecting to a stay, the Plaintiff asked the
Court to issue an order defining the scope of the ABC certified
class.  The Court stayed the case, but declined to provide a class
definition.

On July 3, 2019, the Ninth Circuit issued its mandate on the
Defendants' interlocutory appeal, affirming the Court's order
denying the Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment.
Following issuance of the mandate, the Court lifted its stay and
ordered the parties to file a joint status report informing the
Court of the most expeditious way to proceed to resolution of the
action.

The Plaintiff subsequently filed two motions: a motion to define
the scope of the ABC class, which it has since withdrawn; and a
motion to determine the number of interrogatories asked or for
leave to serve more.  The Defendant filed responses in opposition
to both motions.  In accordance with the Court's order, the parties
filed a joint status report in which they recommended differing
ways to proceed in the action.  The Plaintiff recommends that the
Court sets a trial date and a corresponding case scheduling order.
The Defendants recommend that the Court allows the parties to
submit briefs regarding how changes in the law and facts over the
last five years impact the expeditious resolution of the case.

Judge Coughenour has reviewed the Sump settlement and concludes
that the Plaintiff has the better argument regarding the Sump
settlement's effect on the scope of the ABC class.  He finds that
the effect of the Sump settlement on the ABC class is to bar class
claims that accrued prior to June 4, 2010.  In accordance with the
Court's prior class certification order, he defines the ABC class
as all persons who have worked at the Defendants' Washington call
centers under an Activity Based Compensation or ABC plan that paid
per minute rates for certain work activities between June 5, 2010,
and the date of final disposition of the action.

In addition, the following exclusion will apply to the ABC class:
Any employees who were hired after Sept. 27, 2012 and who signed
arbitration agreements as part of the Defendants' revised 2012
Dispute Resolution Program.  Therefore, the class action will
proceed based on the class definition and exclusion.

Before the Court stayed the action, the Plaintiff served the
Defendants with 19 interrogatories.  After the Court lifted its
stay, the Plaintiff served an additional three interrogatories on
the Defendants.  The Defendants' responses to those interrogatories
are due on Aug. 16, 2019.  The Plaintiff filed the motion weeks
before the Defendants had to respond.  The Judge denied the
Plaintiff's motion regarding her interrogatories.  Prior to filing
any future discovery motions, the parties will conduct a good faith
meet-and-confer session that addresses the specific issues
underlying the discovery dispute.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Coughenour, pursuant to the
Court's order granting class certification, certifief the class of
all persons who have worked at the Defendants' Washington call
centers under an Activity Based Compensation or ABC plan that paid
per minute rates for certain work activities between June 5, 2010,
and the date of final disposition of the action.  The exclusion
applies to the class of any employees who were hired after Sept.
27, 2012 and who signed arbitration agreements as part of the
Defendants' revised 2012 Dispute Resolution Program.

The Judge denied the Plaintiff's motion to determine the number of
interrogatories asked or for leave to serve additional
interrogatories.  The parties will conduct a good faith
meet-and-confer prior to filing any future discovery motions.

The parties will appear for a status conference on Sept. 24, 2019
at 9:00 a.m. to establish a new trial date and corresponding case
scheduling order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 13, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/STQkps from Leagle.com.

Tiffany Hill, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Foster Johnson --
djohnson@bjtlegal.com -- BRESKIN JOHNSON & TOWNSEND PLLC, Jon
Walker MacLeod, MACLEOD LLC, Marc C. Cote -- mcote@frankfreed.com
-- FRANK FREED SUBIT & THOMAS & Toby James Marshall --
tmarshall@terrellmarshall.com -- TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC.

LiveBridge Inc, an Oregon Corporation, Affiliated Computer Services
Inc, a Delaware Corporation & Affiliated Computer Services LLC, a
Delaware Limited Liability Company, Defendants, represented by
Patrick M. Madden -- patrick.madden@klgates.com -- K&L GATES LLP,
Ryan Drew Redekopp -- ryan.redekopp@klgates.com -- K&L GATES LLP &
Todd L. Nunn -- todd.nunn@klgates.com -- K&L GATES LLP.

Xerox Business Services, LLC, Defendant, represented by Daniel P.
Hurley -- daniel.hurley@klgates.com -- K&L GATES LLP, Patrick M.
Madden, K&L GATES LLP & Todd L. Nunn, K&L GATES LLP.



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