CAR_Public/191002.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Wednesday, October 2, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 197

                            Headlines

7-ELEVEN INC: Court Won't Dismiss Counterclaims in Patel
ACE PARKING: $80K Attorneys' Fees Awarded in Byles FCRA Suit
ALABAMA: Culley Files Civil Rights Suit
AMAZON.COM INC: District Court Won't Remand Altes CIPA Suit
AMAZON.COM INC: Waithaka Suit Moved to W.D. Wash.

AMERICAN TIRE: Peralta Sues over Wrongful Employment Termination
APPLE & SAMSUNG: Coletti, et al Sue over 'PhoneGate' Controversy
ARGOS USA: Court Denies Pro Slab's Antitrust Suit Dismissal
ARRIS INT'L: Court Denies Leave to File FAC in Cable Modem Suit
ATLANTA SUPERSOURCE: Tibbetts Seeks Unpaid Wages for Installers

BLACK TUX INC: Traynor Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
BLACKROCK INSTITUTIONAL: Court OKs Motion to Dismiss Baird Suit
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA: Court Denies Leave to File Appeal in Carroll
BUTH-NA-BODHAIGE INC: Court Vacates Settlement Approval in Lee
CABLEVISION SYSTEMS: $4.75MM Attys' Fees Awarded in Pearlman Suit

CAPTAIN HAWKIN'S: Duncan Suit Transferred to E.D. New York
CHOUDRY ENTERPRISES: Rodriguez Seeks Minimum Wages & OT Wages
CINEMARK USA: Court OKs $2.9MM Settlement in J. Amey Suit
CONOPCO, INC: Richards Suit Moved to Eastern District of Missouri
DALLAS COUNTY, TX: Dismissal of Howard Prisoners Suit Recommended

DALLAS COUNTY, TX: Dismissal of Murphy Prisoners Suit Recommended
DALLAS COUNTY, TX: Dismissal of Ravenell Prisoners Suit Recommended
ECOCO INC: Venus Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
FAHERTY BRAND: Traynor Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
FIELD GEO: Quinn Seeks Overtime Pay for Geologists

FIRST CLASS: Court OKs Conditional Certification Bid in Martinez
FIRSTSOURCE SOLUTIONS: Court Conditionally Certifies Class
FLAMING GRILL: Montalvo Seeks OT Wages for Restaurant Staff
FORJAS TAURUS: Court OKs Settlement in .357 Revolver Suit
FROST-ARNETT: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed

GENERAL MOTORS: Rothschild Sues over Engine Power Reduced Defect
HARBOR RETIREMENT: Thomas Sues over Collection of Biometric Data
HEMSTER INC: De Castro Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
HI-TEK MANUFACTURING: Court Compels Arbitration in Pankey
JUUL LABS: J.G Sues over Nicotine Content in Vape

JUUL LABS: Tekulve, et al. Sue over Nicotine Content in Vapes
KAISER-FRANCIS OIL: Pauper Petroleum Files Suit in N.D. Oklahoma
KENNEDY ENDEAVORS: Court Narrows Claims in Deceptive Labeling Suit
KINDRED HEALTHCARE: Court Denies Wage & Hour Suit Dismissal
L BRANDS: Mitts Says Business & Operational Statements Misleading

LA MARINA: Ulerio et al. Seek Overtime Pay for Employees
LEHMANN-MAUPIN LLC: Mendez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
LET'S EAT OUT: Court OKs $650K Settlement in Servers' Suit
LIGHTHOUSE SALES: Elzen Sues over Pre-Recorded Voice Calls
LONE STAR: Thurlkill Seeks Overtime Pay for Workers

MARICOPA COUNTY, AZ: Court Terminates Revised 4th Amended Judgment
MARSH & MCLENNAN: Aetna's Bid to Dismiss Amendments to E.S. Granted
MBF INSPECTION: Court OKs $2.225MM Settlement in Ganci
MCDERMOTT, INC: Smith Sues over Employment Discrimination
MEDICAL MANAGEMENT: Metzler Seeks OT Pay for Practice Managers

MEDICAL SOCIETY: Cornejo Files FDCPA Suit in Arizona
MEREDITH CORP: Nov. 5 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
MICROSYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT: Court Denies Settlement's Final Approval
MIDLAND FUNDING: Ramirez, et al Seek to Certify Class
MONOTYPE IMAGING: Smith Says HGGC Merger Docs Misleading

MOUSER ELECTRONICS: Traynor Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
NATIONWIDE LIFE: Court Denies Certification in Brown Suit
NAVIENT CORP: Lord Abbett Seeks to Certify Class
NEVADA: Court Allows Vidal to Proceed Forma Pauperis
NEVRO CORP: Court Dismisses Nguyen Class Action

NEW YORK: Court Denies Class Certification in DeCastro Suit
NORTH CAROLINA: Seelig's Appeal in Suit Over Prison Condition Nixed
NORWALK, CT: Riley Seeks Unpaid Overtime Compensation
OPHTHOTECH CORP: Court Refuses to Dismiss Derivative Suit
ORITANI FINANCIAL: Parshall Says Merger Docs False and Misleading

PAX ASSIST: Rohoman Seeks Minimum Wages for Airport Employees
PETER LIK SOHO: Mendez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
PRO LABEL: Melzer Class Action Settlement Has Prelim Approval
RAS CITRON: Ubaldi Sues over Debt Collection Practices
RECONSTRUCTIVE ORTHO: Judgment in Wolfington Partly Upheld

RED TIE: Carter Seeks Minimum Wage for Exotic Dancers
RIPPLE LABS: Asks to Toss Lawsuit Over Crypto Securities
ROSEBUD RESTAURANTS: Jones Sues over Collection of Biometric Data
SAEXPLORATION HOLDINGS: Oct. 17 Plaintiff Bid Deadline
SECORP INDUSTRIES: Beatty Seeks Overtime Pay for Paramedics

SETERUS INC: Court Denies Spehr FDCPA Suit Dismissal
SHAC LLC: Ct. Grants Bid to Dismiss Opt-In Plaintiffs in FLSA Suit
SICHUAN GOURMET: Liu Seeks Overtime Pay for Restaurant Staff
SLACK TECHNOLOGIES: Sued by Shareholders Over Misrepresentations
SMITH DEBNAM: Court Dismisses Cavin FDCPA Suit

SOUTHLAKE, TX: Court Affirms Dismissal of Watson Suit
STILA STYLES: Traynor Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
TATA CONSULTANCY: Court Denies Bid for New Trial in Slaight Suit
TENNESSEE: Court Denies Class Certification Bid in Harris Suit
TETRA TECH: Indian Tribe Sues Over Camp Fire Clean Up Wages

TEXTRON INC: Oct. 21 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
TRACTOR SUPPLY: $1.7MM Class-Action Settlement Reached
TRANSAMERICA CORP: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Karg ERISA Suit
TRATTORIA TRE COLORI: Sanango Seeks Overtime Compensation
TRAVISMATHEW LLC: Traynor Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

TROY CONSTRUCTION: Summary Judgment in Stone FLSA Suit Vacated
TTEC HEALTHCARE: Court Won't Review Beattle Class Certification
TYPE A BRANDS: Olsen Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
U.S. SOCCER: Women Players Seek Class Certification for Suit
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: California Court Okays Arbitration

VALARIS PLC: Brodsky & Smith Probing Potential Claims
VECTREN CORPORATION: Court Dismisses Kuebler Securities Suit
VENATOR MATERIALS: Pawar Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
VIEWRAY INC: Wolf Haldenstein Files Class Action Lawsuit
WALGREENS CO: Class Suit Over Ad Restrictions Reaches Settlement

WASHINGTON: Court Dismisses Monroe Correctional Inmates' Suit
WATCHLAB STUDIOS: Morris Seeks Overtime Pay for Hourly Employees
WENDY'S INTERNATIONAL: Zamora Files ADA Suit in N.D. California
WHEATON FRANCISCAN: Class Certification in Harwood Suit Affirmed
XPO LAST MILE: $1.375MM Ibanez Settlement Has Prelim Approval

ZHOU'S YUMMY: Yang Seeks Overtime Pay for Restaurant Staff
ZIJA INTERNATIONAL: Traynor Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

                            *********

7-ELEVEN INC: Court Won't Dismiss Counterclaims in Patel
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
issued a Memorandum Opinion denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss
Defendant's Counterclaims and Third-Party Complaint in the case
captioned DHANANJAY PATEL, SAFDAR HUSSAIN, VATSAL CHOKSHI, DHAVAL
PATEL AND NIRAL PATEL, AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Plaintiffs, v. 7-ELEVEN, INC., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff.
v. DPNEWTO1, DP TREMONT STREET INC., DP MILK STREET INC., DP JERSEY
INC., Third-Party Defendants. Civil Action No. 17-11414-NMG. (D.
Mass.).

Plaintiffs initially alleged that 7-Eleven and two 7-Eleven market
managers, Mary Cadigan and Andrew Brothers  1) misclassified its
franchisee convenience store workers in Massachusetts as
independent contractors instead of employees in violation of the
Massachusetts Independent Contractor Law 2) violated the
Massachusetts Wage Act (Wage Act) and 3) violated the Massachusetts
Minimum Wage Law.

In their counterclaims and third-party complaint, 7-Eleven moves
for declaratory relief to void the franchise agreements and makes
claims for breach of contract and indemnification.
Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Counterclaims and
Third-Party Complaint

Breach of Contract

Plaintiffs argue that they cannot be in breach of the franchise
agreements because 7-Eleven's contract terms with respect to
employment status are unenforceable as a matter of law. Defendant
responds that plaintiffs waived their right to challenge the
applicability or legality of the franchise agreements because they
failed to file an answer to the counterclaim. Moreover, defendant
argues, in the alternative, that because plaintiffs held themselves
out as employees, when they are presumed to be independent
contractors under the franchise agreements, defendants have
adequately alleged a breach of contract claim.

The parties further dispute whether employment status, for the
purpose of evaluating the motion to dismiss, is premised upon a
legal conclusion or a factual dispute.

Although plaintiffs' failure to file a timely answer to the
counterclaim requires this Court to presume that any allegation is
admitted, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6), this Court will
allow plaintiffs to file a late answer, as explained below.
Accordingly, this Court's analysis of plaintiffs' motion to dismiss
will be limited to the merits and will not address the procedural
claim that plaintiffs waived their defenses.

Neither the Court nor 7-Eleven disputes the assertion that, if a
factfinder concludes that plaintiffs are employees, defendants'
breach of contract counterclaim/third-party complaint fails as a
matter of law. Notwithstanding that caveat, defendant has alleged
that plaintiffs signed franchise agreements in which they agreed to
hold themselves out as independent contractors and stipulated in
those agreements that the third-party plaintiffs control the manner
and means of the franchised stores' operation.

Thus, at this stage of the proceeding, the Court finds it is
premature to dismiss defendant's breach of contract counterclaim
when defendants have alleged sufficient facts to state a claim and
the underlying dispute whether plaintiffs are independent
contractors or employees requires some factual inquiry into the
subject employment relationships.

Indemnification Provision

Next, plaintiffs submit that their indemnification obligations are
not at issue because their claims relate to how 7-Eleven pays them
and do not arise from the operation of the stores. They aver that
7-Eleven's interpretation of the indemnification clause leads to an
absurd result whereby 7-Eleven would be indemnified for its own
breach of duty. Moreover, they claim that allowing 7-Eleven's
counterclaim to proceed would discourage the enforcement of the
Wage Act and constitutes an unlawful retaliatory act.

In response, 7-Eleven submits that Massachusetts courts construe
arising out of broadly and that plaintiffs' claims arise from or
relate to the operation of the third-party defendants' stores. It
further avers that the counterclaims do not survive only if
plaintiffs ultimately prevail on the fact-issue of whether they are
in fact employees, not independent contractors.

The Court finds that the plain meaning of the franchise agreements
does not support plaintiffs' assertion because Massachusetts courts
construe arising out of broadly and defendants have plausibly
claimed that the wages at issue are based on the difference between
each store's total assets and liabilities. Moreover, if the
plaintiffs are found to be employees, defendant's indemnification
counterclaim fails as a matter of law. Thus, the absurd result that
plaintiffs apprehend will not come to fruition and defendant has
adequately pled that its alleged losses from this suit arise out of
or relate to the operation of the 7-Eleven stores.

Retaliation and Leave to Amend

Plaintiffs argue that the counterclaims and third-party complaint
are retaliatory because 7-Eleven now seeks to terminate the
franchise agreements on the basis of claims alleged in plaintiffs'
Wage Act claim. Because 7-Eleven allegedly retaliated after the
complaint was filed, plaintiffs claim that justice requires leave
to file an amendment. 7-Eleven responds that the amendment is
futile because plaintiffs have not suffered an adverse employment
consequence.

Although another session of this Court held that constructive
discharge is a necessary element for a retaliation claim under the
Wage Act, the text of the Wage Act itself is broader than
constructive discharge in that it provides that

any employer who discharges or in any other manner discriminates
against any employee because such employee has instituted, or
caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this
chapter shall have violated this section.

Thus, this Court is not persuaded that plaintiffs must demonstrate
constructive discharge to make out a claim of retaliation under the
Wage Act.  

Thus, defendant's counterclaims do not constitute an adverse action
whether discharge or discrimination for purposes of a retaliation
claim and plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend will be denied.

Count I of Defendant's Counterclaim

Plaintiffs dispute defendant's contention that they have failed to
address 7-Eleven's relief of declaratory judgment with respect to
the franchise agreements. Regardless of whether plaintiffs
addressed the relief in their pleadings, the Court agrees with
defendant that the declaratory judgment they seek with respect to
the franchise agreements is contingent on the factual issue of
whether the named plaintiffs are employees or independent
contractors.

Thus, because the underlying factual predicate of employment status
is in dispute, plaintiffs' alleged failure to address the asserted
relief in the counterclaim is immaterial.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Late Answer to Defendant's
Counterclaims

Plaintiffs move for leave to file a late answer under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 6(b)(1)(B) for excusable neglect based on a death in lead
counsel's family and associate turnover within the law firm while
lead counsel was out of the office. They further claim that
defendants will not be prejudiced because discovery has not yet
begun and that their assent to 7-Eleven's prior request for an
extension of time represents plaintiffs' good faith. Finally,
plaintiffs submit that allowing a late-filed answer will allow this
Court to review the merits of the case which is favored over
procedural default claims. Defendant responds that personal and
professional upheaval does not provide a sufficient reason for
delay, particularly given that plaintiffs filed their motion to
dismiss defendant's counterclaims before seeking leave to file an
answer.

With respect to excusable neglect, the Court must consider the
following factors: 1) the danger of prejudice 2) the length of the
delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings 3) the
reason for the delay, including whether it was within the
reasonable control of the movant and 4) whether the movant acted in
good faith.  

Here, the Court finds that taken together, the personal tragedy of
a death in counsel's family and the turnover in associates at
counsel's law firm amount to a sufficient reason for excusing the
delay.

Moreover, to the extent 7-Eleven argues that the two proffered
excuses are independently insufficient, the Court finds that both
Skrabec and Davial-Alvarez are distinguishable from the facts at
bar. In Skrabec, this Court allowed defendants' motion for summary
judgment before plaintiffs moved to alter judgment under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(1). It then denied plaintiffs' motion to alter
judgment because 1) plaintiffs' reliance on settlement negotiations
was inexcusable, 2) the motion for summary judgment was unopposed
for more than three weeks after the deadline for a response and 3)
defendants would suffer unfair prejudice if a motion to alter
judgment was entered. Here, there is no similar concern of reliance
on settlement negotiations (because plaintiffs have vigorously
prosecuted the case) or concern of unfair prejudice.

In fact, in light of this Court's decision to allow 7-Eleven's
counterclaims to proceed and the fact that discovery has not yet
commenced, the Court is hard pressed to see how 7-Eleven have been
prejudiced at all.

Because defendant faces minimal prejudice, plaintiffs have
proffered a sufficient excuse and defendant has not demonstrated
that plaintiffs acted in bad faith, plaintiffs' motion for leave to
file a late answer will be allowed.

Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss defendant's counterclaims and
third-party complaint is DENIED.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2019
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available
https://tinyurl.com/y5g3xu2d from Leagle.com.

Dhananjay Patel, Safdar Hussain, Vatsal Chokshi, Dhaval Patel &
Niral Patel, Plaintiffs, represented by Adelaide H. Pagano -
apagano@llrlaw.com - Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C., Shannon E.
Liss-Riordan - sliss@llrlaw.com - Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C. &
Michelle Cassorla - mcassorla@llrlaw.com - Lichten & Liss-Riordan,
P.C.

DP MILK STREET INC., DP JERSEY INC., DP TREMONT STREET INC. &
DPNEWTO1, Plaintiffs, represented by Michelle Cassorla , Lichten &
Liss-Riordan, P.C.

7-ELEVEN, INC., Defendant, represented by Matthew J. Iverson -
matthew.iverson@dlapiper.com - DLA Piper US LLP, Jamie Kurtz -
jamie.kurtz@dlapiper.com - DLA Piper US LLP, Jennifer Brown -
jennifer.brown@dlapiper.com - DLA Piper US LLP & Norman M. Leon -
norman.leon@dlapiper.com - DLA Piper LLP, pro hac vice.

Mary Carrigan & Andrew Brothers, Defendants, represented by Matthew
J. Iverson , DLA Piper US LLP, Jennifer Brown , DLA Piper US LLP &
Norman M. Leon , DLA Piper LLP, pro hac vice.

7-ELEVEN, INC., Counter Claimant, represented by Matthew J. Iverson
, DLA Piper US LLP, Jennifer Brown , DLA Piper US LLP & Norman M.
Leon , DLA Piper LLP.


ACE PARKING: $80K Attorneys' Fees Awarded in Byles FCRA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRUCE BYLES, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ACE PARKING MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. C16-0834-JCC (W.D. Wash.), Judge Richard A.
Jones of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, granted the Plaintiff's unopposed motion for
attorney fees and costs and for class representative service
award.

Most recently, the Court granted the Plaintiff's unopposed motion
for final approval of class action settlement.  He now moves for an
award of attorney fees.

Judge Jones finds that the proposed rates for the attorneys -- $550
per hour for Darrell L. Cochran, $300 per hour for Christopher E.
Love, $400 per hour for Loren A. Cochran, $450 per hour for Thoams
B. Vertetis, and $300 per hour for Kevin M. Hastings -- are
reasonable compared to similar attorneys in the Seattle area.  He
further finds that the Plaintiff's calculation of a lodestar figure
of $94,660 is accurate and reasonable.  Finally, he finds that the
amount requested -- $80,000 -- constitutes half of the total
$160,000 going to the class members and their counsel.
Additionally, the class counsel is requesting $80,000, instead of
the total $94,660 lodestar figure.  This further supports the
finding that the class counsel's requested fee award of $80,000 is
reasonable.

As for Plaintiff Byle's service award, the Judge finds that
Plaintiff Byles participated meaningfully in a contested lawsuit,
remained willing to provide assistance to the parties for over
three years, and provided the class counsel with evidence of the
claims and his consent to make strategic decisions about the case.
Therefore, he finds that the class counsel's request of a $15,000
award for Plaintiff Byles is reasonable.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Jones granted the Plaintiff's
unopposed motion for attorney fees and costs and for class
representative service award.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 20, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/ewGKHv from Leagle.com.

Bruce Byles, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Eric Love --
chris@pcvalaw.com -- PFAU COCHRAN VERTETIS AMALA PLLC & Darrell L.
Cochran -- darrell@pcvalaw.co -- PFAU COCHRAN VERTETIS AMALA PLLC.

Ace Parking Management, Inc., Defendant, represented by John M.
Kreutzer -- jkreutzer@smithfreed.com -- SMITH FREED & EBERHARD PC.


ALABAMA: Culley Files Civil Rights Suit
---------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against officials of the
state of Alabama. The case is styled as Halima Tariffa Culley on
behalf of herself and those similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Steve
Marshall in his official capacity as the Attorney General of the
State of Alabama, Ashley Rich in her official capacity as the
District Attorney of the 13th Judicial Circuit of Alabama (Mobile
County), Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00701 (S.D. Ala., Sept. 23,
2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Civil Rights.

Steve Marshall is the 48th Attorney General of Alabama, having been
appointed in February 2017 by Governor Robert J. Bentley to fill
the vacancy caused by previous attorney general Luther Strange's
appointment to the United States Senate.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Brian Michael Clark, Esq.
     Wiggins Childs Pantazis Fisher & Goldfarb, LLC
     301 19th Street North
     Birmingham, AL 35203
     Phone: (205) 314-0500
     Email: bclark@wcqp.com


AMAZON.COM INC: District Court Won't Remand Altes CIPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California issued an Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand in
the case captioned R.A. a minor, by and through his guardian, Steve
Altes, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. AMAZON.COM, INC. and A2Z DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC.,
Defendants. Case No. CV 19-06454-CJC(AGRx). (C.D. Cal.).

Before the Court is Plaintiff's motion to remand the case to Los
Angeles County Superior Court.

Plaintiff brings this California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA)
claim on behalf of a proposed class of all citizens of the State of
California who used a household Amazon Alexa device while they were
minors, but who have not downloaded and installed the Alexa app.

Defendants removed the action to federal court, invoking
jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).
Plaintiff subsequently moved to remand the action to Superior
Court, asserting that the action fits within CAFA's local
controversy exception.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under CAFA, federal courts have original jurisdiction over a class
action if (1) the parties are minimally diverse, (2) the proposed
class has more than 100 members and (3) the aggregated amount in
controversy exceeds $5 million.  

There are several exceptions to federal jurisdiction under CAFA,
however. A district court must decline to exercise jurisdiction
over a class action if the requirements of the local controversy
exception are met.   

The local controversy exception applies to a class action in which:
(I) greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed
plaintiff classes in the aggregate are citizens of the State in
which the action was originally filed (II) at least 1 defendant is
a defendant (aa) from whom significant relief is sought by members
of the plaintiff class (bb) whose alleged conduct forms a
significant basis for the claims asserted by the proposed plaintiff
class  and(cc) who is a citizen of the State in which the action
was originally filed  and(III) principal injuries resulting from
the alleged conduct or any related conduct of each defendant were
incurred in the State in which the action was originally filed
and(ii) during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class
action, no other class action has been filed asserting the same or
similar factual allegations against any of the defendants on behalf
of the same or other persons.

The parties do not appear to dispute that the Court has original
jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(2).
Rather, their disagreement concerns the applicability of the local
controversy exception. Specifically, the parties dispute whether
four separate requirements of the local controversy exception are
met in this case: (1) whether any other class action has been filed
against Defendants alleging similar factual allegations in the
preceding three years before the filing of this case (2) whether
the conduct of A2z Development, the only local defendant, formed a
significant basis for the claims asserted (3) whether Plaintiff
seeks significant relief from Az2 Development and (4) whether the
principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct were incurred
in California.

The Court will address each issue in turn.

Significant Basis

The parties next dispute whether A2z Development's conduct forms a
significant basis for the claims asserted. When making this
determination, courts are required to compare the allegations
against the local defendant to those made against the other
defendants. Courts must consider a local defendant's conduct in the
context of the overall claims asserted. Courts cannot look beyond
the complaint when determining whether the claims against a local
defendant meet this requirement.  

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege
that Az2 Development's conduct is a significant basis for the
claims asserted.

The Court agrees.

Plaintiff's complaint contains relatively few allegations that
address A2z Development
specifically. The complaint alleges that A2z Development is a
subsidiary of Amazon that employs thousands of individuals, many of
whom work on Alexa-enabled devices. A2z Development allegedly
developed both the Echo smart speaker and the Alexa voice assistant
between 2010 and 2014. Since then, A2z Development has continued to
update and refine the Alexa program, as well as various new Echo
products that contain the Alexa program. The remainder of the
allegations in the complaint are asserted against Amazon, making it
difficult for the Court to determine which specific allegations
refer to Amazon.com and which refer to A2z Development.

Failing to specifically allege what conduct the local defendant
engaged in oftentimes frustrates a plaintiff's ability to establish
the significance of a local defendant.  fter considering only the
allegations that specifically refer to A2z Development, the Court
finds that A2z's alleged conduct does not form a significant basis
of Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff's CIPA claim does not center on
the development and upkeep of the Alexa technology, the sole
allegations specific to A2z Development. Rather, the allegedly
illegal conduct is the recording of confidential communications
without the consent of non-registered minors.  

It is unclear from Plaintiff's complaint what role Az2 Development
had in that specific activity. As currently pled, Plaintiff's
complaint has not met its burden in alleging that A2z Development's
conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted.

The Court disagrees with Plaintiff's assertion that requiring it to
separate out the conduct of the local defendant creates pleading
absurdities. Rather, this approach is in line with the purposes of
the local controversy exception outlined in the Senate Judiciary
Committee's report. This report instructed courts to bear in mind
that the purpose of each of these criteria is to identify a truly
local controversy a controversy that uniquely affects a particular
locality to the exclusion of all others.

Significant Relief

The parties next dispute whether Plaintiff seeks significant relief
from A2z Development. To determine if a plaintiff claims
significant relief from a defendant, courts look to the remedies
requested by the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs contend that significant
relief is sought from A2z Development because the complaint
requests (1) injunctive relief (2) statutory damages under Cal.
Penal Code Section 673.2 and (3) costs and attorneys' fees.  

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden here
because it does not request specific relief from A2z Development
but instead seeks identical relief from all Defendants. However,
the local controversy exception does not require that plaintiffs
specify the division of damages between defendants.

The Ninth Circuit has found that the significant relief requirement
was met in a case where a plaintiff alleged that both defendants
had violated the same provisions of California law and sought
identical damages from each of them.   

Accordingly, the fact that Plaintiff did not break down which of
its damages were attributable to Az2 Development is not fatal to
its ability to establish this prong of the local controversy
exception. Given the sizable statutory damages available under Cal.
Penal Code Section 673.2 and the substantial burdens that would
arise from the complying with the injunction Plaintiff seeks, the
Court finds that Plaintiff has met its burden on the significant
relief prong of the local controversy exception.

Principal Injuries

The parties' next dispute concerns the principal injury prong of
the local controversy exception. In order for the local controversy
exception to apply, the principal injuries resulting from the
alleged conduct or any related conduct of each defendant must have
been incurred in the State in which the action was originally
filed. Plaintiff argues that the principal injuries were incurred
within California because the alleged conduct at issue here is the
violation of a California statute and the class is restricted to
California minors. Defendants counter that, although Plaintiff's
proposed class is comprised of only California residents and is
premised on violation of a California statute, the conduct and
resulting injuries occurred on a nationwide scale.

The Court agrees with Defendants' position.

Plaintiff fails to meet the principal injury requirement of the
local controversy exception for similar reasons. Although
Plaintiff's proposed class is comprised of only California minors,
in no way is the underlying conduct at issue Amazon's alleged
practice of recording and storing the communications of
nonconsenting Alexa users  limited to California. As of January
2019, over 100 million devices containing Alexa had been sold
nationwide and there is no suggestion that Amazon's recording was
confined to California.  As a result, Plaintiff's action is not
truly local. Rather, it is local only in the trivial and almost
tautological sense that the definition of the putative class and
the legal bases of the asserted claims make it so.

CAFA's legislative history confirms that Plaintiff's proposed class
does not fit within the narrow local controversy exception.

Here, Defendants' alleged recording policy was not limited to or
unique to California. Instead, it injured consumers throughout the
country. Accordingly, this case does not meet the principal injury
prong even though it was brought as a single-state class action.

The local controversy exception to CAFA jurisdiction is a narrow
exception. Its breadth would significantly expand if plaintiffs
were permitted to strategically limit the scope of their action to
fall within it. The Court finds that Plaintiff has not met its
burden in establishing that the principle injuries resulting from
the alleged conduct occurred in California.

Plaintiff's motion to remand is DENIED.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2019  Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2eeqd5r from Leagle.com.

R. A., a minor, by and through his Guardian, Steve Altes,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Joseph C. Sarles -
josephsarles@quinnemanuel.com - Quinn Emanuel Urquhart and Sullivan
LLP, Andrew H. Schapiro - andrewschapiro@quinnemanuel.com - Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart and Sullivan LLP, pro hac vice, Ashley C. Keller -
ack@kellerlenkner.com - Keller Lenkner LLC, pro hac vice, J.
Dominick Larry - nl@kellerlenkner.com - Keller Lenkner LLC, pro hac
vice, Stephen A. Swedlow - stephenswedlow@quinnemanuel.com - Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart and Sullivan LLP, pro hac vice, Travis D. Lenkner
- tdl@kellerlenkner.com - Keller Lenkner LLC, pro hac vice & Warren
D. Postman - wdp@kellerlenkner.com - Keller Lenkner LLC, pro hac
vice.

Amazon.com, Inc. & a2z Development Center, Inc., Defendants,
represented by Laurence F. Pulgram- lpulgram@fenwick.com-, Fenwick
and West LLP, Armen Nercess Nercessian - anercessian@fenwick.com -
Fenwick and West LLP, Molly R. Melcher - mmelcher@fenwick.com -
Fenwick and West LLP & Tyler Griffin Newby - tnewby@fenwick.com -
Fenwick and West LLP.


AMAZON.COM INC: Waithaka Suit Moved to W.D. Wash.
-------------------------------------------------
In the case, BERNARD WAITHAKA, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. AMAZON.COM, INC. and AMAZON
LOGISTICS, INC., Defendants, Civil Action No. 18-40150-TSH (D.
Mass.), Judge Timothy S. Hillman of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts granted in part and denied in part the
Defendants' motion to compel arbitration or, in the alternative, to
transfer or stay the litigation.

Waithaka commenced the class action lawsuit against the Defendants,
alleging improper classification as independent contractors and
violations of state wage laws.
The Plaintiff is a delivery driver for the Defendants and
classified as an independent contractor.  As a result of that
classification, the Plaintiff (and other drivers similarly
classified) must supply their own vehicles and pay expenses
necessary to perform their jobs, such as insurance, gas, phone, and
data plan.  Consequently, the Plaintiff alleges that his hourly
wage fell below the minimum required by Massachusetts law.

The parties' agreement contained an arbitration agreement.  In
addition, the agreement contained the choice-of-law provision: The
interpretation of the Agreement is governed by the law of the state
of Washington, except for Section 11 of the Agreement, which is
governed by the Federal Arbitration Act and applicable federal
law.

The Defendants have moved to compel arbitration or, in the
alternative, to transfer or stay the litigation.

Judge Hillman finds the FAA does not apply because the Plaintiff's
employment as a last-mile driver falls within the scope of the
Section 1 transportation worker exemption.  Accordingly, the
Supreme Court's holdings in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, and
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, do not narrow
state public policy rationales for prohibiting class action waivers
in arbitration agreements.  The requirement that Plaintiffs must be
effectively precluded from obtaining relief was a necessary
condition to evade arbitration where the FAA governed the agreement
based on the SJC's reading of Concepcion.  The Wage Act itself
evidences an intent to permit the Plaintiffs to proceed as a class.
Further, precluding class adjudication would negatively impact the
unnamed class members, especially those who may have smaller claims
than the Plaintiff.  Because the FAA does not apply, these public
policy rationales are is sufficient to invalidate the agreement.

Amazon argues that the Court should transfer the case based on the
so-called "first-to-file" rule.  Alternatively, Amazon contends
that the Court should transfer the case to the Western District of
Washington under 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a) or stay the action.  The
Judge finds Amazon's arguments with respect to Section 1404
unconvincing.  Nonetheless, transfer is warranted pursuant to the
so-called "first-to-file" rule.  He finds that the putative class
in the action is composed entirely of Massachusetts citizens.  And
while the Plaintiff does raise Massachusetts state law claims, the
minor differences in potential damage relief between the FLSA and
the Massachusetts state labor laws are insignificant for purposes
of this analysis. Further, the Western District of Washington is
entirely capable of addressing the Massachusetts state law claims
raised.

For these reasons, Judge Hillman granted in part and denied in part
Amazon's motion.  He finds that the Plaintiff falls within the
FAA's transportation worker exemption and that the arbitration
agreement is unenforceable under Massachusetts law.  Finally,
pursuant to the first-to-file rule, he finds that transfer to the
Western District of Washington is warranted.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 20, 2019 Order and Memorandum
is available at https://is.gd/uSi8b1 from Leagle.com.

Bernard Waithaka, Plaintiff, represented by Shannon E.
Liss-Riordan
-- sliss@llrlaw.com -- Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C. & Adelaide H.
Pagano -- apagano@llrlaw.com -- Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C.

Amazon.com, Inc. & Amazon Logistics, Inc., Defendants, represented
by Douglas T. Schwarz -- douglas.schwarz@morganlewis.com --
Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius LLP & Elizabeth M. Bresnahan --
elizabeth.bresnahan@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
& Noah J. Kaufman, Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP.


AMERICAN TIRE: Peralta Sues over Wrongful Employment Termination
----------------------------------------------------------------
MIGUEL PERALTA, on behalf of himself, for all similarly situated
persons, and the general public, the Plaintiff, vs. AMERICAN TIRE
DEPOT, a California Corporation; ATV, INC., a California
Corporation and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, the Defendants, Case
No. 19STCV32329 (Cal. Super., Sept. 9, 2019), alleges that
Defendants wrongfully terminated and discharged Plaintiff due to
his work-related injury.

The class action for relief arises from Defendants' failure to
provide off-duty rest break and meal periods as required by law;
failure to compensate Plaintiff and Class members at the required
rate for each occasion in which Defendants failed to provide rest
and meal periods; failure to pay for all the hours worked and all
wages earned; failure to pay for all overtime hours worked; failure
to keep accurate payroll records, such that Plaintiff and Class
members were given wage statements that did not accurately reflect
all the hours worked and wages earned; failure to pay the minimum
wage; and failure to pay wages due upon separation, the lawsuit
says.

The Plaintiff and Class members were employed by Defendants, in
various capacities, including as general laborers/tire technicians.


American Tire Depot provides guaranteed lowest prices on tires and
wheels. Discounted tire prices are available at more than 99
California locations.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Farrah Mirabel, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF FARRAH MIRABEL
          1070 Stradella Rd.
          Los Angeles, CA 90077
          Telephone: (714) 747-4447
          Facsimile: (949) 417-1796
          E-mail: fmesq@fmirabel.com

APPLE & SAMSUNG: Coletti, et al Sue over 'PhoneGate' Controversy
----------------------------------------------------------------
PAUL COLETTI, KRYSTLE FAERYN, RODOLFO CABRERA, BRANDY DAVIS,
WILLIAM ZIDE, DAVID HEDICKER, NANCY CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT MAEKAWA,
CATHERINE GOODWIN, KATHLEEN BOGGS, KIMBERLY MODESITT, MARK KUNZE,
ARIANA RYAN, NATHAN COOPER, BECKY WELLINGTON, M. GAIL SUNDELL,
VICTOR PERLMAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. APPLE INC. and SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS
AMERICA, INC., the Defendants, Case No. 5:19-cv-05707-NC (N.D.
Cal., Sept. 10, 2019), alleges that Defendants market and sell
smartphones having unsafe radiofrequency radiation.

The Plaintiffs bring the complaint, individually and on behalf of
purchases of all of Defendants' smartphones, for negligence, breach
of warranty, consumer fraud and unjust enrichment, seeking actual
damages, the costs of medical monitoring, restitution and
injunctive relief.

According to the complaint, the Defendants market and sell some of
the most popular smartphones in the world -- including Apple's
iPhones and Samsung's Galaxy phones -- as emitting less
radiofrequency radiation than that set by law and as being
completely safe to carry and use on or in close proximity to the
human body.  The complaint says: "Hold your smartphone to your ear
for a phone call? No problem, say Defendants. Carry your smartphone
in your back pocket? Of course, say Defendants. Use your smartphone
to conduct a sonogram of your unborn child in utero? That's ok too,
according to Samsung."

In fact, however, recent testing of Defendants' products shows that
the potential exposure for an owner carrying the phone in a pants
or shirt pocket was over the exposure limit, sometimes far
exceeding it -- in some instances by 500%. Yet, Defendants hide
this information from the public.

Physicians and scientists worldwide are calling this controversy
"PhoneGate" because of the parallels to "Diesel Gate" -- the
Volkswagen emissions saga. Devra Davis, PhD, President of
Environmental Health Trust explained, "Volkswagen cars passed
diesel emission tests when tested in laboratory conditions, but
when the cars were driven on real roads, they emitted far more
fumes. In the same way, every one of these cell phones 'passed'
laboratory radiation SAR tests. These phones are legally considered
compliant. However, when these phones are tested in the ways that
people actually use them in real life, such as in your jeans pocket
or bra, the amount of absorbed radiation emissions in our bodies
violates the regulatory limits", the lawsuit says.

Despite the risks of RF radiation emissions and associated health
risks when these smartphones are carried in ones'  pocket or used
against the skin, Apple markets its iPhones as "the Internet in
your pocket," "your life in your pocket," and a "studio in your
pocket." Similarly, Samsung markets its smartphones to be used in a
variety of contexts, including in bed and against the skin for
sonograms. Defendants cannot hide behind regulatory compliance on
testing to protect its marketing and advertising which knowingly
misrepresents the true risks of RF radiation exposure when
smartphones are used while touching or in close proximity to the
human body.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Jennie Lee Anderson, Esq.
          ANDRUS ANDERSON LLP
          155 Montgomery Street, Suite 900
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 986-1400
          Facsimile: (415) 986-1474
          E-mail: jennie@andrusanderson.com

               - and -

          Elizabeth A. Fegan, Esq.
          FEGAN SCOTT LLC
          150 S. Wacker Dr., 24 th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 741-1019
          Facsimile: (312) 264-0100
          E-mail: beth@feganscott.com

               - and -

          J. Barton Goplerud, Esq.
          SHINDLER, ANDERSON,
          GOPLERUD & WEESE, P.C.,
          5015 Grand Ridge Drive, Suite 100
          West Des Moines, IO 50265
          E-mail: goplerud@sagwlaw.com

ARGOS USA: Court Denies Pro Slab's Antitrust Suit Dismissal
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina, Charleston Division, issued an Opinion and Order denying
Defendant Lafarge’s Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned Pro
Slab, Inc., Bremer Construction Management, Inc., and Forrest
Concrete, LLC, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. Argos USA, LLC, Argos Ready Mix LLC,
Lafarge North America Inc., Coastal Concrete Southeast II, LLC,
Thomas Concrete, Inc., Thomas Concrete of South Carolina, Inc.,
Evans Concrete, LLC, and Elite Concrete, LLC, Defendants. Civil
Action No. 2:17-cv-3185-BHH. (D.S.C.).

Plaintiffs Pro Slab, Inc. and Bremer Construction Management, Inc.
initially filed this proposed class action, alleging a claim under
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, arising from Defendants'
alleged price fixing in the ready-mix concrete market in coastal
South Carolina and Georgia from. Plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint alleging that Defendants violated Section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act by conspiring to fix the prices of ready-mix
concrete, to rig bids for certain projects, and/or to allocate
certain territories and customers amongst themselves.

Plaintiffs are purchasers of ready-mix concrete and allege that
they have suffered injury as a result of Defendants' conspiracy to
set artificially high prices for ready-mix concrete.
In response, several Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
asserting that the amended complaint (1) does not identify the role
that each Defendant allegedly played in the conspiracy (2) offers
no factual allegations to support the alleged duration of the
purported conspiracy and (3) offers no factual allegations to
support the inclusion of the Charleston market area.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are the largest Ready-Mix
Concrete producers in the Savannah, Georgia to Charleston, South
Carolina region, and that they are engaged in an ongoing conspiracy
to suppress and eliminate competition in the markets for Ready-Mix
Concrete by fixing prices, rigging bids, and/or allocating
territories and customers.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged a conspiracy to
restrict trade as to all Defendants, and the Court declines to
narrow that claim prior to the Parties engaging in discovery. In
large part, these two rulings guide the Court's findings on the
remainder of the issues presented in the motions to dismiss.

Pleading Standard for Section 1 Conspiracy Claim

Accordingly, for a claim to be actionable, the defendants must have
specifically made a conscious commitment to a common scheme
designed to achieve an unlawful objective. However, conscious
parallelism is not enough. The pleading must allege an agreement to
restrain trade and enough factual matter taken as true to suggest
that the requisite agreement was made. Put another way, the
complaint must contain enough fact to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal
agreement.

Ready-mix concrete is a compound of Portland cement, water, and
aggregates, and may also contain additives such as fibers, mesh,
and chemical admixtures. Ready-mix concrete is manufactured in
batch plants and the ingredients may be mixed in agitator trucks
while on the road. The production, delivery, and use of ready-mix
concrete are subject to well-established industry and governmental
standards. Ready-mix concrete remains in a fluid state for several
hours, during which time it can be transported to customers.
Ready-mix concrete has a limited delivery range for technical and
economic reasons, which the SAC explains has resulted in four
distinct geographic markets for Ready-Mix Concrete in the
Savannah/Charleston Region.

The Court finds that in narrowing the field of Defendants and
clarifying which entity, and which individual representative of the
entity, is responsible for the various actions alleged, Plaintiffs
have pleaded the parallel conduct and something more, which the
Fourth Circuit has specified is necessary to stating a Section 1
claim.  

In addition to the general agreements between Defendants regarding
price increases and market allocation, Plaintiffs allege that in
April 2012, Greg Melton, then of Argos USA/Argos Ready Mix, spoke
with his brother David Melton of Elite Concrete, and the two agreed
that the group of conspiring companies would add a fuel surcharge
to all Ready-Mixed Concrete deliveries.

The SAC further alleges that Defendants, Argos USA/Argos Ready Mix,
Elite Concrete, Evans Concrete, and Coastal agreed to impose on
purchasers an environmental fee and a short load fee per delivery
or truckload of ready-mix concrete. The SAC chronicles with
specific examples the efforts of Greg Melton, Tim Coughlin and Tim
Mahoney to monitor the sales and pricing of ready-mix cement within
the subject markets for the purpose of enforcing the alleged
agreement between Defendants and punishing the competitors who
declined to participate.  

Finally, the SAC includes reference to national data, which
Plaintiffs assert demonstrates that the four markets at issue here
uniformly exhibited average prices above those reflected in
national and South Regional PPI (Producer Price Index) data for
Ready Mix Concrete and exhibited price fluctuations that did not
represent national trends or follow the cost of Portland cement.

The Court finds that the SAC provides something more than parallel
conduct and therefore satisfies the plausibility pleading standard
for a Section 1 conspiracy claim and underlying theories as to
Defendants. The Fourth Circuit has given clear warning that courts
not impose a probability standard at the motion-to-dismiss stage or
subject a complaint's allegations to a preponderance of the
evidence standard.  Accordingly, the Court does not entertain at
this juncture whether a lawful alternative explanation appears more
likely from the facts of the SAC.  

The Court denies the pending motions to dismiss to the extent they
assert the SAC fails the plausibility pleading standard. The Court
now addresses the additional specific arguments raised in the six
pending motions to dismiss.

The Joint Motion to Dismiss

Defendants represented by the Joint Motion (Joint Defendants) argue
that the allegations of conspiracy do not support the temporal and
geographical breadth of the claim: the SAC alleges a broad
conspiracy spanning more than 8 years and 4 geographic markets,
while the actual facts alleged do not support that breadth. Rather,
the Joint Defendants contend, Plaintiffs' limited factual
allegations pertain only to activities in the Savannah, Statesboro,
and Hilton Head markets between September 2011 and December 2014.

They assert that the Section 1 claim should be dismissed to the
extent it reaches beyond the September 2011 to December 2014
period, and to the extent it includes the Charleston, SC market.
The Joint Defendants concede for the purpose of the motion that
Plaintiffs have stated a Section 1 conspiracy claim as to the
period between September 2011 and December 2014.  

Temporal Scope

Plaintiffs respond that Defendants' attempt to artificially bookend
the Plaintiffs' claims between September 2011 and 2014, before
discovery has even begun, is at odds with the Complaint and settled
antitrust law and would also reward the Defendants' own concealment
of wrongdoing. Plaintiffs assert that the SAC satisfies the
pleading standard for the period of 2010 through at least mid-2017
and state:

Plaintiffs have described the mechanics of the conspiracy in
extensive detail, including the role of each Defendant, the
individual participants, the methods of reaching agreement, the
subject matter of the agreements, and the methods of monitoring and
enforcement.  

Without deciding whether it is appropriate to narrow a claim for
conspiracy after having determined that the pleading states the
claim as a matter of law, the Court finds that the allegations
quoted above suffice to support the claim for the contested period
of between January 1, 2010 through September 2011. The Court
additionally declines to truncate the claim to extending not beyond
December 2014 and agrees with Plaintiffs that the matter is better
resolved after the Parties have engaged in discovery.

Geographic Scope

The Joint Defendants argue that Plaintiffs assert no specific
details whatsoever concerning conduct in the Charleston Market and
because Plaintiffs have identified no specific meetings,
communications, or particular jobs in the Charleston Market, their
claim of a Section 1 conspiracy in that market is entirely
unsupported. Plaintiffs respond that they have identified many key
individuals who were responsible for forming, implementing and
enforcing the Defendants' price-fixing agreements and who had
authority over the Charleston area.

Again, without determining whether it would be proper to render a
narrower reading of the conspiracy claim than what is set forth in
the SAC having now determined the claim has been pleaded as a
matter of law, the Court finds that these allegations suffice to
envelop the Charleston Market as defined by Plaintiffs into the
claim. The SAC directly implicates Pedrick, Stankwytch, and
Coughlin in the conspiracy.  And while the allegations discussing
the Charleston Market do not specifically mention Defendants Elite
Concrete or Evans Concrete, these Defendants are implicated by the
allegations that their representatives conspired with Pedrick,
Stankwytch, and Coughlin. The Court finds that it would not be
appropriate at this time to remove from the conspiracy claim
reference to the Charleston Market.

Accordingly, the Court denies the Joint Motion.

Lafarge's Motion to Dismiss

Defendant Lafarge seeks dismissal on the following bases: the claim
fails to meet the pleading standard; fails to meet either Article
III or antitrust standing requirements; and is barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. For the reasons stated above,
the Court disagrees that Plaintiffs fail to meet the pleading
standard. For the reasons stated below, the Court further disagrees
that Plaintiffs lack standing. The Court addresses Lafarge's
statute of limitations argument in a separate section along with a
similar argument raised by Defendant Elite Concrete.

Article III Standing

To demonstrate Article III standing, Plaintiffs bear the burden of
establishing that they suffered (1) a concrete injury-in-fact that
is (2) fairly traceable to Defendants' alleged conduct and is (3)
redressable by the relief sought in the SAC. In a putative class
action, courts analyze standing based on the allegations of
personal injury made by the named plaintiffs.

In its motion to dismiss, Lafarge asserts a facial challenge to
subject matter jurisdiction and contends inter alia that Plaintiffs
lack standing because the SAC does not show that any of the named
plaintiffs ever made a ready-mix concrete purchase from Lafarge or
over which Lafarge had any influence to cause harm.

Plaintiff responds that Lafarge's contention regarding who was in
business in which market at what time is not relevant to the
standing analysis because Plaintiffs allege that they were harmed
by the conspiracy that included LaFarge. In other words, Plaintiffs
assert, they have established standing because the SAC alleges both
that (1) the conspiracy impacted purchases of ready-mix concrete in
the relevant market at the relevant time and (2) Lafarge
participated in the conspiracy.  

The Court agrees that Plaintiffs adequately allege Article III
standing. As stated above, the allegations asserted in the SAC meet
the pleading requirement for Section 1 conspiracy, the Court
declines to narrow the temporal scope of the claim, and the SAC
squarely alleges Lafarge's participation in the alleged conspiracy
between January 1, 2010 and September 2011.

Accordingly, the Court denies Lafarge's motion to dismiss as to
this contention.

Antitrust Standing

Lafarge next argues that Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate antitrust
standing. In determining whether Plaintiffs have antitrust
standing, the Court considers the following factors: (1) the causal
connection between an antitrust violation and harm to the
plaintiffs, and whether that harm was intended (2) whether the harm
was of a type that Congress sought to redress in providing a
private remedy for violations of the antitrust laws (3) the
directness of the alleged injury (4) the existence of more direct
victims of the alleged antitrust injury and (5) problems of
identifying damages and apportioning them among those directly and
indirectly harmed.

Plaintiffs respond that they have standing because they allege that
they directly purchased ready-mix concrete from one or more
Defendants during the Class Period. Moreover, Plaintiffs assert,
their allegations in the SAC satisfy each of the five elements. The
Court agrees with Plaintiffs that they have sufficiently alleged
antitrust standing.

Accordingly, the Court turns to the argument regarding the statute
of limitations.

Statute of Limitations

Defendants Lafarge and Elite Concrete contend that Plaintiff's
Section 1 conspiracy claim is time-barred. Specifically, Lafarge
asserts that the SAC acknowledges that it exited the market by
mid-2011. Elite Concrete argues that the only factual allegations
that implicate it date to between early 2012 and October 2013.  

Plaintiffs commenced this action on November 22, 2017. The statute
of limitations for federal antitrust claims bars any action unless
commenced within four years after the cause of action accrued, plus
any tolling. The four-year period starts to run when a cause of
action accrues, and a cause of action generally accrues when a
defendant commits an act that causes economic harm to a plaintiff.
The equitable doctrine of fraudulent concealment applies to
anti-trust claims. When triggered, the doctrine moves the clock,
starting it from when the wrong was discovered rather than when it
was committed.

Lafarge

Lafarge asserts that all damages are barred by the statute of
limitations because it ceased concrete operations in Georgia and
South Carolina in mid-2011. Plaintiffs do not contest that
Lafarge's alleged conspiratorial conduct occurred outside of the
last four years. Rather, Plaintiffs allege that Lafarge
fraudulently concealed the conspiracy and therefore the cause of
action is tolled.

The doctrine of fraudulent concealment applies only when there has
been no negligence or laches on the part of a plaintiff in coming
to knowledge of the fraud. Therefore, under Fourth Circuit law, to
invoke the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, Plaintiffs must
demonstrate that (1) the Party pleading the statute of limitations
fraudulently concealed facts that are the basis of Plaintiffs'
claims, and (2) Plaintiffs failed to discover those facts within
the statutory period, despite (3) the exercise of due diligence.
The particularity requirement of Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure applies to allegations of fraudulent concealment.


Lafarge argues that Plaintiffs do not satisfy Rule 9(b) with their
conclusory tolling allegations that never identify a single action
taken by Lafarge, much less describe the who, what, where, and when
of such action. Lafarge also argues that Plaintiffs fail to plead
facts that would satisfy the due diligence element of fraudulent
concealment and further fail to explain, in non-conclusory fashion,
why they could not have discovered the combination and conspiracy
alleged at any earlier date.

Plaintiffs assert that the Fourth Circuit has adopted the
intermediate standard for demonstrating fraudulent concealment,
under which a plaintiff's proof may include acts of concealment
involved in the antitrust violation itself. Plaintiffs further
assert that Lafarge is properly charged with the fraudulent
concealment of its co-conspirators, the other Defendants, and that
fraudulent concealment is determined by the conduct of Defendants
as a whole.

The Court begins with its finding that Plaintiffs have pleaded a
Section 1 conspiracy claim, which the Court declines to narrow at
this time. Accordingly, the next consideration is whether
Plaintiffs have adequately alleged fraudulent concealment as to the
conspiracy. Plaintiffs allege that the illegal price-fixing,
bid-rigging, and market allocation activities are inherently
self-concealing and that Defendants concealed and pursued these
activities in a manner that precluded detection, as follows:

Defendants also misrepresented market conditions to explain price
changes and other anticompetitive conditions. For example, in their
price-increase letters to Ready-Mix Concrete customers, Defendants
falsely attributed price increases and fuel surcharges to changes
in input costs. Defendants discussed and formed their
anticompetitive agreements during secret meetings and
conversations. No one other than the co-conspirators was invited to
or present at these meetings or conversations. Defendants conducted
these meetings and conversations in secrecy to prevent the
discovery of their conspiracy by members of the Class and
Subclasses.

Under the doctrine Plaintiffs wish to invoke, when the fraud has
been concealed or is of such a character as to conceal itself and
the plaintiff is not negligent or guilty of laches, the limitations
period does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers the
fraud. The allegations in the SAC are sufficient here at the
pleading stage to support fraudulent concealment under the
affirmative acts standard and therefore are sufficient to invoke
the equitable doctrine of tolling. Defendants may renew their
argument that the claim is time-barred at a later date, if
appropriate.

Finally, Lafarge argues that putting aside the matter of tolling
with respect to Plaintiffs' request for damages, any claim for
equitable relief is barred by the doctrine of laches. Lafarge
asserts that it is nonsensical for plaintiffs to ask this Court to
order that Lafarge be restrained from any conspiracy alleged herein
when the only unlawful agreement attributed to Lafarge allegedly
ended in 2011. Plaintiffs respond that it is improper for Lafarge
to seek dismissal of the type of remedy Plaintiffs request where
the SAC adequately states the cause of action with which the
requested remedy is associated.  As stated above, the Court will
allow the § 1 conspiracy claim to proceed fully intact.
Accordingly, the basis for imposing the doctrine of laches is not
persuasive. Moreover, because the doctrine is an affirmative
defense, it is more appropriately raised on a motion for summary
judgment.

Lafarge may renew its argument at a later date, if appropriate.

After careful consideration of the Parties' briefs, the associated
record, and the applicable law, the Court hereby denies the motion
to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 19, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y5up4hwk from
Leagle.com.

Pro Slab Inc, Plaintiff, represented by Chad A. McGowan , McGowan
Hood Felder and Johnson, 539 Health Care Dr, Rock Hill, SC 29732,
Daniel Richard Karon - dkaron@karonllc.com - Karon LLC, pro hac
vice, Eric G. Penley - epenley@preti.com - Preti Flaherty Beliveau
and Pachios LLP, pro hac vice, Frederick S. Bergen -
fsbbergenlaws@aol.com - Bergen and Bergen PC, pro hac vice, Gregory
Paul Hansel - ghansel@preti.com - Preti Flaherty Beliveau and
Pachios LLP, pro hac vice, Irwin B. Levin -ilevin@cohenandmalad.com
- Cohen and Malad LLP, pro hac vice, Jessica N. Servais , Heins
Mills and Olson PLC, Relationship Science, 5 Pennsylvania Plaza,
15th Floor, New York, NY 10001, pro hac vice, Karl D. Twenge ,
Twenge and Twombley, 311 Carteret Street, Beaufort, SC 29902,
Michael Sanford Smith - msmith@preti.com - Preti Flaherty Beliveau
and Pachios LLP

Argos Ready-mix LLC, Defendant, represented by Casey Erin Lucier -
clucier@mcguirewoods.com - McGuireWoods LLP, pro hac vice, Howard
Feller  - McGuireWoods LLP, pro hac vice, Johnny Brent Justus -
bjustus@mcguirewoods.com - McGuireWoods LLP, pro hac vice, Nicholas
J. Giles -ngiles@mcguirewoods - McGuireWoods LLP, pro hac vice &
Thomas Richmond McPherson-  rmcpherson@mcguirewoods.com -
McGuireWoods LLP.

Elite Concrete LLC, Defendant, represented by Justin P. Gunter -
jgunter@phrd.com - Parker Hudson Rainer and Dobbs, pro hac vice,
Matthew M. McCoy - mmm@mccorklejohnson.com - McCorkle and Johnson,
Robert M. Brennan - bbrennan@phrd.com - Parker Hudson Rainer and
Dobbs, pro hac vice, Thomas Richmond McPherson, III  -
rmcpherson@mcguirewoods.com - McGuireWoods LLP & Catherine Marie
Bolger , McCorkle and Johnson, 319 Tattnall St., Savannah, GA,
31401-4343


ARRIS INT'L: Court Denies Leave to File FAC in Cable Modem Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, issued an Order denying Plaintiffs'
Motion for Leave to File a Fourth Amended Consolidated Class Action
Complaint in the case captioned IN RE ARRIS CABLE MODEM CONSUMER
LITIGATION. Case No. 17-CV-01834-LHK. (N.D. Cal.).

This is a class action brought by purchasers of certain cable
modems manufactured by Defendant ARRIS International Limited. The
consolidated amended class action complaint included claims under
California law and eighteen claims under the laws of other states.
The four California causes of action were brought on behalf of the
named California Plaintiffs and the California Subclass under (1)
the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Song-Beverly Act) (2) the
Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) (3) the False Advertising Law
(FAL) and (4) the Unfair Competition Law (UCL). Plaintiffs also
asserted a claim for unjust enrichment/quasi-contract individually
and on behalf of the Nationwide Class.  

LEGAL STANDARD

Plaintiffs bring their motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15(a), which states that a party may amend its complaint once as a
matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is
served. Thereafter, a party may amend only with leave of the court
or by written consent of the adverse party, but leave to amend
should be freely granted when justice so requires.

Defendants oppose Plaintiffs' request to amend their complaint on
the ground that December 15, 2017 was the Court's deadline for
doing so. Plaintiffs claim the December 2017 deadline did not apply
to their non-California claims. Instead, Plaintiffs believe they
are entitled to amend their complaint as a matter of course because
Arris has not served a responsive pleading to the non-California
claims, nor has it filed a motion under Rule 12. Plaintiffs argue
in the alternative that they have shown good cause for amending
past the deadline.  

As set forth below, the Court finds that December 15, 2017 was the
deadline for all amendments to the complaint, not just amendments
to the California claims.

The Court therefore applies Rule 16's good cause standard and
concludes it has not been satisfied here.

Whether Rule 16 applies

The Court's July 5, 2017 scheduling order stated that December 15,
2017 was the last day to amend the pleadings/add parties. The Court
is not persuaded by Plaintiffs' unsupported assertion that this
deadline applied only to Plaintiffs' California claims.

Plaintiffs' initial complaints asserted claims under the laws of
California and eight other states. The parties specified in their
June 2017 joint case management statement which contained their
proposed case schedule that each of the other state claims would be
included in Plaintiffs' consolidated amended complaint. When the
Plaintiffs filed the consolidated amended class action complaint on
July 21, 2017, they added thirteen plaintiffs and claims under the
laws of nine additional states. Plaintiffs cannot now complain that
they were unaware of the need to thoroughly plead their
non-California claims by December 15, 2017.

Throughout this litigation, the parties and the Court were explicit
as to which aspects of the scheduling order concerned the
California claims alone. For instance, the parties specified that
January 22, 2018 was the close of all fact discovery, excluding
only any discovery that relates to only the non-California claims.
The Court did not similarly confine the deadline to amend the
pleadings to the California claims. Moreover, on December 12, 2018,
the Court granted the parties' request to lift the stay on
discovery as to Plaintiffs' non-California claims, so discovery has
been proceeding on Plaintiffs' non-California claims for more than
nine months.  

The Court therefore agrees with Arris that December 15, 2017 was
the deadline for Plaintiffs to amend their complaint. As it is now
well past that deadline, the Court considers whether Plaintiffs
have shown good cause to alter the scheduling order.

Application of Rule 16(b)(4)

Plaintiffs offer no compelling justification for their tardiness in
seeking these amendments. Plaintiffs say only that they had no
reason to seek amendment of their statutory consumer claims until
Arris identified supposed deficiencies there in the letter Arris
sent to Plaintiffs in January 2019. First of all, this explanation
does not justify Plaintiffs' effort to add entirely new claims and
plaintiffs. Moreover, the Court rejects the notion that Arris bore
responsibility for alerting Plaintiffs to defects in Plaintiffs'
complaint. Plaintiffs have known the basic facts and theories of
their claims since the suit began, and they do not purport to now
change them.  

Even if the Court were to accept Plaintiffs' contention that they
have been diligent since Arris's January 2019 letter, nearly six
months passed before Plaintiffs sought this Court's leave to amend
on June 28, 2019. Discovery on the non-California claims which
began in December 2018 has progressed during that time. Courts in
this circuit have consistently found a lack of diligence when
plaintiffs delayed even just a few months. Under these
circumstances, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate good cause.

In addition, permitting Plaintiffs to add new parties and new
claims at this late stage of the litigation would be unduly
prejudicial to defendants. The amendments sought are significant,
including both new claims and new plaintiffs from additional
states. Meanwhile, Arris has assiduously litigated this case for
more than two years, including a motion for class certification, a
motion for summary judgment, and nine months of discovery on the
non-California claims. The prejudice to Arris further supports the
Court's conclusion that Plaintiffs should not be permitted to make
their desired amendments.

The Court rejects Plaintiffs' belated request to file their Fourth
Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Fourth Amended Consolidated
Class Action Complaint is DENIED.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2019 Order is
available  https://tinyurl.com/y4nplx9j from Leagle.com.

Greg Knowles, Brian Alexander, Kelly Smith, Christopher Stevens,
Matthew Penner, Timothy Oefelein, Tom Kisha, Kaci Roar, Tony Romeo,
John Matsayko, David Eisen, Wes Tilley, Andrew Prowant, Marco
Fernandez, Damien Probe, Paul Dubey, Callan Christensen, Michael
Bresline, Christopher Bullard, Giovanni Murphy, William Haworth,
Rodney Bryant, Yong Jae Lee, Larry Bavry, William Rosenberg, Jean
Pierre Crespo & Mike Alexander, Plaintiffs, represented by Noah M.
Schubert - nschubert@sjk.law - Schubert Jonckheer & Kolbe LLP,
Dustin Lamm Schubert - dschubert@schubertlawfirm.com - Schubert
Jonckheer & Kolbe LLP & Willem F. Jonckheer - wjonckheer@sjk.law -
Schubert Jonckheer & Kolbe LLP.

ARRIS International plc, Plaintiff, represented by Joe Patrick
Reynolds , Kilpatrick Townsend and Stockton LLP, 1100 Peachtree St
NE Ste 2800, Atlanta, GA, 30309-4528, pro hac vice & Noah M.
Schubert - nschubert@schubertlawfirm.com - Schubert Jonckheer &
Kolbe LLP.

Arris International plc, Defendant, represented by Nancy L. Stagg -
nstagg@kilpatricktownsend.com - Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton
LLP.

Intel Corporation, Miscellaneous, represented by Christopher L.
Kelley – CKelley@perkinscoie.com - Perkins Coie LLP.


ATLANTA SUPERSOURCE: Tibbetts Seeks Unpaid Wages for Installers
---------------------------------------------------------------
SCOTT THOMAS TIBBETTS, the Plaintiff, vs. ATLANTA SUPERSOURCE, INC.
and TIM MARTIN, the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-04139-CAP (N.D.
Ga., Sep. 13, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid wages under the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

In each state, SuperSource employs installers to install equipment
at customer locations, service technicians to diagnose and
troubleshoot equipment, and other employees that assist in the
installation and servicing of equipment of SuperSource clients.

Mr. Tibbetts began working for SuperSource in or around June 2016,
installing equipment at clients' locations within Georgia.

SuperSource is a privately owned, commercial chemical and service
company. The company provides goods and services for restaurants,
country clubs, hospitality businesses, food and service processing,
educational institutions, and healthcare companies.  SuperSource's
goods and services support dish washing machines, laundry machines,
commercial cleaning, plumbing, and commercial housekeeping.
SuperSource operates in Georgia, North Carolina, the District of
Columbia, and Florida.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff are:

          J. Daniel Cole, Esq.
          M. Travis Foust, Esq.
          PARKS, CHESIN & WALBERT, P.C.
          75 Fourteenth Street, 26 th Floor
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone: 404 873-8000
          Facsimile: 404 873-8050
          E-mail: dcole@pcwlawfirm.com
                  tfoust@pcwlawfirm.com

BLACK TUX INC: Traynor Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Black Tux, Inc.
The case is styled as Yaseen Traynor, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. The Black Tux, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-08957 (S.D. N.Y., Sept. 26, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

The Black Tux is a men's fashion company specializing in the online
tuxedo and suit rental industry. The Black Tux rents tuxedos,
suits, and other men's formalwear accessories entirely through its
own e-commerce marketplace.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Russel Craig Weinrib, Esq.
     Stein Saks PLLC
     285 Passaic St., Suite 5
     Hakensack, NJ 07601
     Phone: (201) 282-6500
     Email: rweinrib@steinsakslegal.com


BLACKROCK INSTITUTIONAL: Court OKs Motion to Dismiss Baird Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Defendants' motions to dismiss
and the administrative motions to file under seal in the case
captioned CHARLES BAIRD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BLACKROCK
INSTITUTIONAL TRUST COMPANY, N.A., et al., Defendants. Case No.
17-cv-01892-HSG. (N.D. Cal.).

If the parties believe any references to sealed materials need to
be redacted, the parties are directed to file by September 13, 2019
at noon a joint proposed set of redactions along with a table for
each item sought to be sealed and the corresponding citations to
where the material has already been ordered sealed. The parties may
file their joint proposed set of redactions via an administrative
motion to file under seal.

The parties should not seek redaction of any information that is
now publicly available. For example, although the information in
paragraph 439 of Plaintiffs' second amended class action complaint
has been ordered sealed, Defendants subsequently disclosed part of
that information in their reply brief.   Overbroad requests will be
denied, and the parties should narrowly tailor any requests for
sealing. While the Court cited to paragraphs in Plaintiffs' second
amended class action complaint that have been sealed, that does not
necessarily warrant sealing of general descriptions of the subject
matter alleged in those paragraphs.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2019 Order is
available https://tinyurl.com/y33gvhn8 from Leagle.com.

Charles Baird, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, and on behalf of the BlackRock Retirement Savings Plan,
Plaintiff, represented by Nina Rachel Wasow
-nina@feinbergjackson.com - Feinberg, Jackson, Worthman & Wasow
LLP, Daniel Ryan Sutter - dsutter@cohenmilstein.com - Cohen
Milstein Sellers and Toll, PLLC, pro hac vice, Julia Horwitz -
jhorwitz@cohenmilstein.com - Cohen Milstein Sellers Toll, Julie S.
Selesnick - jselesnick@cohenmilstein.com - Cohen Milstein Sellers &
Toll, PLLC, Karen L. Handorf - khandorf@cohenmilstein.com - Cohen
Milstein Sellers and Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Mary Joanne
Bortscheller - mbortscheller@cohenmilstein.com - Cohen Milstein
Sellers Toll PLLC, Michelle C. Yau - myau@cohenmilstein.com - Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Scott M. Lempert-
slempert@cohenmilstein.com -, Cohen Milstein Sellers Toll, pro hac
vice & Todd F. Jackson - todd@feinbergjackson.com - Feinberg,
Jackson, Worthman and Wasow LLP.

Lauren Slayton, Plaintiff, represented by Michelle C. Yau , Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Nina Rachel Wasow , Feinberg,
Jackson, Worthman & Wasow LLP, Daniel Ryan Sutter , Cohen Milstein
Sellers and Toll, PLLC, pro hac vice, Julia Horwitz , Cohen
Milstein Sellers Toll & Mary Joanne Bortscheller , Cohen Milstein
Sellers Toll PLLC.

BlackRock Institutional Trust Company, N.A., Blackrock, Inc., The
BlackRock, Inc. Retirement Committee & The Investment Committee of
the Retirement Committee, Defendants, represented by Brian David
Boyle - bboyle@omm.com - O'Melveny Myers LLP, Adam Manes Kaplan -
akaplan@omm.com - O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Meaghan McLaine VerGow -
mvergow@omm.com - OMelveny and Myers LLP & Randall W. Edwards -
redwards@omm.com - O'Melveny & Myers LLP.

Catherine Bolz, Chip Castille, Paige Dickow, Daniel A. Dunay,
Jeffrey A. Smith, Anne Ackerley, Nancy Everett, Joseph Feliciani,
Jr., Ann Marie Petach, Michael Fredericks, Corin Frost, Daniel
Gamba, Kevin Holt, Chris Jones, Philippe Matsumoto, John Perlowski,
Andy Phillips, Kurt Schansinger, Tom Skrobe, Amy Engel, Management
Development & Compensation Committee of the BlackRock, Inc. Board
of Directors, Kathleen Nedl, Marc Comerchero, Joel Davies, John
Davis, Milan Lint & Laraine McKinnon, Defendants, represented by
Brian David Boyle , O'Melveny Myers LLP, Randall W. Edwards ,
O'Melveny & Myers LLP & Meaghan McLaine VerGow , OMelveny and Myers
LLP.

Finadium LLC, Interested Party, represented by Scott Michael McLeod
- smcleod@cwclaw.com - Cooper, White & Cooper LLP.


BMW OF NORTH AMERICA: Court Denies Leave to File Appeal in Carroll
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division, issued an Order denying Defendant's
Motion for Leave to Appeal in the case captioned PHILLIP CARROLL,
Plaintiff, v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC, and BAVARIAN MOTOR WORKS,
Defendants. No. 1:19-cv-000224-JMS-TAB. (S.D. Ind.).

Plaintiff Phillip Carroll purchased a BMW 7 Series. He filed suit
against Defendants BMW of North America, LLC (BMW) and Bavarian
Motor Works, seeking damages related to the Vehicle's excessive
consumption of engine oil and Defendants' failure to honor the
terms of their warranty, in violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act (MMWA) and various Indiana statutes.

The Court previously denied BMW's Motion to Dismiss the suit for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and BMW has now filed a Motion for Leave
to Appeal that denial.

In the motion, it identifies the following two restated questions
that should be certified for appeal:

   (1) How is the value a plaintiff received from the use of his
vehicle calculated, and can Kelley Blue Book data be used to
determine that value for purposes of jurisdiction under the MMWA?

   (2) Does Miller Brewing Co. v. Best Beers of Bloomington, Inc.
608 N.E.2d 975, 981 (Ind. 1993), stand for the proposition that
punitive damages are not available in breach of warranty actions
under Indiana law, and, if not, was the Court required to use its
own best judgment to estimate how the Indiana Supreme Court would
rule on that issue?  

BMW asserts that the Motion was filed within a reasonable time of
the Court's order, given that no substantive discovery has been
completed and the case is still at the motion to dismiss stage.  

BMW argues that the Court erred in applying the Schimmer (Schimmer
v. Jaguar Cars, Inc., 384 F.3d 402 (7th Cir. 2004)), damages
formula by ignoring the offset for usage factor and should seek
clarification from the Seventh Circuit concerning how that factor
should be applied.  

In addition, BMW asserts that Miller Brewing (Miller Brewing Co. v.
Best Beers of Bloomington, Inc. 608 N.E.2d 975, 981 (Ind. 1993)),
in which the Indiana Supreme Court held that punitive damages are
not allowed in a breach of contract case, dictates that punitive
damages are also not available in a breach of warranty action.  

If Miller Brewing does not apply, it argues, this Court should have
used its own judgment to predict how the Indiana Supreme Court
would rule on the issue.  In the alternative, BMW asks the Court to
certify the question to the Indiana Supreme Court.  

Mr. Carroll responds that the Motion was not timely, as BMW has not
provided any reason for its two-month delay. He argues that the
issues of how to properly apply the Schimmer test, and whether the
Kelley Blue Book value can be used to estimate the value that he
received from his use of the Vehicle, are not pure questions of
law, but are questions of fact. He further argues that these
questions, and the question of whether Indiana law permits punitive
damages in breach of warranty actions, are not contestable, and
certification would not speed up the litigation.

Finally, Mr. Carroll argues that this Court should not certify a
question regarding punitive damages to the Indiana Supreme Court
because: (1) the issue will not be dispositive (2) it is not a
truly novel and unsettled question of state law and (3)
certification is discretionary.
  
BMW replies that it seeks review on a pure question of law: How is
offset for use calculated?

Further, it argues that the question is controlling because it will
determine whether there is jurisdiction in the case.  BMW also
asserts that its motion was timely because: (1) there is no
deadline for the filing of this type of motion; (2) there was no
undue delay, as the parties have not conducted discovery beyond
initial disclosures and (3) the cases cited by Mr. Carroll
regarding timeliness are distinguishable.  

As used in Section 1292(b), question of law references a question
of the meaning of a statutory or constitutional provision,
regulation, or common law doctrine. There must be a pure or
abstract legal issue, or something the court of appeals could
decide quickly and cleanly without having to study the record.
Where a legal issue is unsettled, it may be appropriate to use
Section 1292(b) to obtain a clarifying decision that might head off
protracted litigation.

Here, BMW has not demonstrated that an interlocutory appeal under
Section 1292(b) is appropriate. As a preliminary matter, the Motion
was not filed within a reasonable time, because BMW has offered no
explanation for why it waited two months after the Court's order to
seek leave to appeal. The Court could deny the Motion on this basis
alone.  

More importantly, BMW has not identified a controlling question of
law, the resolution of which is likely to speed up the litigation.
Even if it were true that, as a matter of law, a vehicle's Kelley
Blue Book value could be considered in determining the value the
owner received from his use of that vehicle, that would not end the
Court's inquiry. Although the Kelley Blue Book figure represents
one measure of a vehicle's value, it is not the only measure, and,
in this case, may not account for Mr. Carroll's alleged
expenditures related to his need to add additional oil to the
engine, which is a central issue in this litigation.

The questions posed by BMW's Motion to Dismiss what value Mr.
Carroll actually received from the use of the Vehicle, and whether
that value reduced the total recoverable damages below the $50,000
threshold, are issues of fact. A legal determination that the
Kelley Blue Book value could be considered in resolving those
issues would not establish that the Court lacks jurisdiction over
this case.

Given that the value question is unsettled, a determination as to
whether punitive damages are available in breach of warranty
actions under Indiana law would not resolve the jurisdictional
dispute. Therefore, that question is similarly inappropriate for
interlocutory review or certification to the Indiana Supreme Court.


Accordingly, BMW's Motion for Leave to Appeal is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y4nkgdz7 from Leagle.com.

PHILLIP CARROLL, Plaintiff, represented by Amy L. Cueller , LEMBERG
LAW LLC, 1100 Summer St Stamford, CT 069055534

BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC, Defendant, represented by Timothy V.
Hoffman -
THoffman@SanchezDH.com - SANCHEZ DANIELS & HOFFMAN LLP.

BAVARIAN MOTOR WORKS, Defendant, pro se.


BUTH-NA-BODHAIGE INC: Court Vacates Settlement Approval in Lee
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District, issued an Opinion
vacating the District Court's judgment granting Plaintiffs' Motion
for Final Approval of a Settlement Agreement in the case captioned
HENRY LEE, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BUTH-NA-BODHAIGE, INC., a Delaware
Corporation, d/b/a The Body Shop, and DOES1-10,
Defendants-Appellees, (Jenna Dickenson, Objector-Appellant). No.
5-18-0033. (Ill. App.).

Objector, Jenna Dickenson, appeals from a judgment granting Final
Approval of a Settlement Agreement.

Plaintiff, Henry Lee brought a class action suit against defendant,
Buth-Na-Bodhaige, Inc., d/b/a The Body Shop (The Body Shop), for
alleged willful violations of the federal Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA).

Dickenson challenges, among other things, the ability of Lee to
adequately represent the settlement class, the adequacy of the
notice to members of the settlement class, and the fairness,
reasonableness, and adequacy of the coupon settlement.

The proposed class identified in the St. Clair County complaint1
was exactly the same as that proposed in the Federal Court Action:

   All persons who used either a Visa, MasterCard, or Discover
debit or credit card, and/or American Express credit card at any of
Defendant's locations where Defendant provided an
electronically-printed receipt at the point of sale or transaction
that displayed the expiration date of that person's credit or debit
card or more than the last five digits of that person's credit or
debit card for a time period beginning five years prior to the
filing of this lawsuit until the date the class is certified.

Judicial Scrutiny of Class Action Settlements

Certification of a class action in Illinois is governed by section
2-801 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-801 (West 2016)). Section 2-801
identifies the four prerequisites for maintaining a class action:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable (2) there are questions of fact or law common to the
class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members (3) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class and (4) the class action is an
appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy.  

Under our statute, a class action suit shall not be compromised or
dismissed except with the approval of the court and, unless excused
for good cause shown, upon notice as the court may direct. The
proponents of a class settlement must show that the compromise is
fair, reasonable, and in the best interest of all who will be
affected by it, including absent class members. In a class action,
the trial court is the guardian of the interests of the absent
class members.

In Illinois, a circuit court's order granting final approval of a
class action settlement is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Generally, a trial court abuses its discretion when a ruling is
arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when no reasonable person
would take the same view.  

Lee's Ability to Represent the Settlement Class

Dickenson's first objection challenges Lee's ability to represent
the settlement class. Dickenson reasons that because Lee retained
his credit card receipt, he was not at risk for identify theft or
credit card fraud, and in the absence of an actual injury, Lee
cannot adequately represent those members of the settlement class
who suffered, or may suffer, identify theft and actual damages as a
result of defendant's noncompliance with FACTA.

In response, Lee contends that Dickenson's objection is an improper
attempt to contest standing.

Standing

Preliminarily, we note that the issue of standing is one usually
raised by the opposing party. Here, Dickenson's status is simply
that of a settlement class member. She did not seek to intervene in
this action, although, as a settlement class member, she had the
right to do so.  Had Dickenson filed a motion to intervene, then,
with court approval, she would have been allowed to appear as a
party in this action. Instead, she chose to remain a nonparty,
seeking to file a pleading in the nature of a motion to dismiss.
Because the determination of this objection is critical to other
issues raised in this appeal, the Court will consider Dickenson's
protestation that Lee has no claim under FACTA and, therefore, has
no standing to represent the settlement class.

The purpose of a class action suit is to allow a representative
party to pursue the claims of a large number of people with like
claims. The basic premise of the class action procedure is the
fairness of having a proper representative act on behalf of the
absent parties. In considering the adequacy of representation, the
test is whether the interests of those who are parties are the same
as those who are not joined and whether the litigating parties
fairly represent those who are not joined. The plaintiff's claim
must not be antithetical to those of other class members, and
plaintiff's interests must not appear collusive. The representation
by the class representative must protect the due process rights of
the class members, including the right to be represented by a
lawyer who is qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct
the proposed litigation.  

In this case, Lee alleged a willful violation of FACTA, a statute
intended to protect consumers from the risk posed when credit card
account information is displayed on printed receipts at the point
of sale.  When an entity willfully fails to comply with FACTA's
truncation requirements, FACTA provides a private cause of action
for statutory damages and does not require a person to suffer
actual damages in order to seek recourse for a willful violation of
the statute. This is consistent with the preventative and deterrent
purposes of FACTA.

Dickenson claims, however, that when an entity negligently fails to
comply with FACTA, the consumer who suffers an actual injury may
also have a claim. Dickenson concludes that because Lee suffered no
actual injury under FACTA, he cannot adequately act as the class
representative for members of the settlement class who have or may
have future claims for actual damages. In support of her objection,
Dickenson argues that the United States Supreme Court has held that
article III of the United States Constitution requires plaintiffs
pursuing statutory damages claims in federal court under section
1681n(a) (15 U.S.C. Section 1681n(a) (2012)) to demonstrate that
they actually suffered a concrete injury as a result of any
statutory violations alleged to have been committed, and she relies
on Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1540 (2016).

By its terms, article III of the United States Constitution limits
federal court jurisdiction to actual cases and controversies. U.S.
Const., art. III, Section 2. As a result, the doctrine of article
III standing has developed to ensure that federal courts do not
exceed this authority. To satisfy the cases and controversies
requirement and establish standing, a plaintiff must have (1)
suffered an injury in fact (2) that is fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct of the defendant and (3) that is likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision. With regard to the
injury in fact requirement, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or
she suffered `an invasion of a legally protected interest' that is
concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural
or hypothetical. In considering what constitutes an injury in fact,
the United States Supreme Court has recognized that Congress may
enact laws that define injuries and articulate chains of causation
that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed
before. With regard to FACTA claims, it appears the federal courts
are divided on what constitutes an actual injury. The Court need
not, however, decide which path is more appropriate to follow under
the circumstances of this case, as Illinois courts are not required
to follow federal law on issues of justiciability or standing.  

After reviewing the record, the Court finds that Lee pleaded
sufficient facts to allege a willful violation of FACTA and prayed
for statutory damages. Therefore, Lee pleaded a justiciable claim
over which the circuit court had jurisdiction. Lee was the only
plaintiff named to represent the settlement class, and he submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the St. Clair County circuit court.
The Body Shop chose not to raise the issue of standing as an
affirmative defense, and objector Dickenson had no standing to do
so.

Accordingly, Dickenson's objection to Lee's lack of standing was
properly denied.

The Adequacy of Notice to an Expanded Class

Standing was only one part of Dickenson's objection regarding
whether Lee is an adequate class representative. Dickenson also
argues that the circuit court erred when it certified a settlement
class that included the Loyalty Program Members. She contends that
Lee has not demonstrated that he is a Loyalty Program Member or
that he is otherwise able to adequately represent the interests of
the Loyalty Program Members. Before addressing Dickenson's
contentions regarding the Loyalty Program Members, the Court finds
it necessary to first consider a related due process issue
affecting the composition of the overall settlement class. Our
consideration must, necessarily, also include the applicable class
period, as defined in the Settlement Agreement and notices.

The preliminary approval order, drafted by class counsel, extended
the settlement class period, thereby potentially enlarging the
overall settlement class. This may have represented an oversight on
the part of class counsel, but we cannot substitute supposition for
the facts set forth in the record. There is simply no indication
that anyone recognized that the settlement class period was longer
in the state court action. Nevertheless, class counsel suggested to
the circuit court that the settlement class had already received
adequate notice. Additionally, in the preliminary approval order
entered November 7, 2017, the circuit court directed that only the
website be updated to reflect that the class action has been
re-filed before this Court. The circuit court also directed that
the website shall include a copy of the complaint filed in this
action, as well as a copy of this Order, and the Settlement
Agreement. But, for those new class members, added from March 21,
2017, through November 7, 2017, there was no notice, direct or by
publication, and no additional opportunity to opt-out or file
objections.

The class period is an important factor in determining whether
certification of a class is an appropriate method for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy. One reason the class
size is significant is because one of the primary objectives of a
class action, at least from the defendant's perspective, is to
obtain a release of liability as to all class members for claims
alleged to have occurred during the class period. In order for a
circuit court to enter such an order, the court must obtain
personal jurisdiction over all of the members of the settlement
class, whether or not they reside in Illinois. Once the court has
obtained personal jurisdiction over members of the settlement
class, the court can then release any and all future FACTA claims
against The Body Shop, provided certain conditions are satisfied.

Given the broad language of the released parties, the circuit court
had an obligation to consider the implications of having extended
the Illinois class period beyond that defined by the federal court.
Its failure to do so was an abuse of discretion.

The parties have argued that the federal court went to great
lengths to make sure that notice to the settlement class members
was the best notice practical under the circumstances in compliance
with Rule 23(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. All
forms of that notice represented that the Federal Class Period
ended on March 21, 2017. As previously noted, the St. Clair County
circuit court adopted and approved the notice forms that were used
in the Federal Court Action. This created another error, as the
circuit court certified a class period that ended November 7, 2017,
thereby creating a conflict between the federal court notice forms
and the end date for the Illinois Class Period. As a result, the
St. Clair County circuit court failed to account for notice to
those settlement class members included from March 21, 2017, to
November 7, 2017.

The Illinois class period presents additional due process concerns
regarding the lack of notice provided, generally, for the
proceeding filed in the state court, as well as for those recently
added class members.  

Notice is the cornerstone of class action practice. In the absence
of adequate notice, absent class members may release claims they
are unaware are being litigated on their behalf. As a critical part
of the class action process, providing notice that is the best
practicable, and reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action, is the only way for absent class members to learn that a
class action has been initiated in a court of law. The stringent
requirements for adequate notice allow absent class members an
opportunity to present their objections so that their individual
rights may not be foreclosed upon without due process of law.
Inadequate notice also raises the risk that the rights of absent
class members may be compromised without their consent, by
representatives whom they have not selected. The class action
attorney, not the class members whose rights are at stake, makes
all of the important decisions: whether to file a claim, how much
time and effort to invest in pursuing it, what litigation strategy
to employ, and finally whether and on what terms to settle.

Thus, adequate notice provides the assurance of structural fairness
that allows absent class members to decide whether to opt-out of
the class, or file an objection, and plays a central role in the
jurisdiction of the court over absent members of the class
certified.

For those members of a class who cannot be identified, the courts
have allowed for publication. But courts have often requested
plaintiff's counsel to provide information identifying the reach of
the notice. In other words, depending on who comprises the class,
and the number of class members, the court must decide which
publication is most likely to reach the intended class members. For
example, a class of engineers may, more likely, be reached through
a trade journal, depending on the cause of action.

In this case, Dickenson objected to the notice given the
unidentified members of the settlement class. She questioned
whether notice by publication in USA Today was the best possible
notice to unidentified class members. Under our class action
statute, questions regarding whether to give notice and the types
of notice to be given are within the discretion of the circuit
court, and the exercise of the court's discretion is limited by the
dictates of due process. Given the circumstances surrounding the
filing of this proceeding in state court, the objections regarding
the adequacy of representation by Lee and class counsel, the claim
that class members have differing interests, the protestation to
the Settlement Benefit offered in the Settlement Agreement, and the
questions surrounding the expanded Illinois Class Period, due
process requires the giving of notice anew of the pending state
court settlement to absent class members so that they have the
opportunity to protect their own interests.  

In summary, this Settlement was prepackaged when it landed on the
steps of the St. Clair County courthouse. Notice had been given to
members within the federal class period, which ended on March 21,
2017. Class counsel sought to have their federal court Settlement
Agreement approved by the state court, as a federal court had
already given the settlement preliminary approval, and notice had
been sent. That said, class counsel provided absolutely no
information to the circuit court that explained the expansion of
the settlement class by seven months, thereby creating the Illinois
class period. Similarly, class counsel did not provide the court
with a notice plan that would have protected the due process rights
of the absent class members, generally, in light of the state court
filing.

Under the circumstances here, due process required giving notice to
the settlement class members of the dismissal of the Federal Court
Action and the filing of the suit in state court. This notice
should have extended to class members within the expanded Illinois
class period and should have been the best notice practicable under
the circumstances. Notice that complied with the requirements of
due process may have meant giving direct notice anew to the Loyalty
Program Members, but that is a matter left for the circuit court to
decide once it has sufficient information to do so. In our view,
the circuit court failed to require class counsel to provide the
information necessary to craft a notice plan that guarded the due
process rights of the absent class members.

After reviewing the record, the Court finds that the circuit court
did not acquire personal jurisdiction over the settlement class
members, including those within the Illinois class period, as the
court failed to protect the due process rights of the absent class
members. Therefore, the circuit court's Order of Final Approval
entered December 20, 2017, must be vacated, and this cause remanded
for further proceedings. The Court next consider the remaining
objections raised by Dickenson as these are likely to arise on
remand.

The Loyalty Program Sub-Class

According to the record, Lee did not include the Loyalty Program
Members in the complaints filed in federal court and state court.
The Loyalty Program Members were first introduced in the Settlement
Agreement, presumably because The Body Shop had the names and
e-mail addresses and/or physical addresses of these customers,
thereby allowing The Body Shop to specifically identify these
settlement class members. By carving out this group of individuals
from the settlement class, the parties created a sub-class. Lee
claims that this sub-class simply identified a group of settlement
class members who were known customers and within the scope of the
settlement class.

Thus, it would be clear to The Body Shop that these customers
qualified for inclusion in the overall settlement class, without
having to search its records to determine whether they made a
purchase during the separately abridged class period. Because The
Body Shop could identify these customers, direct notice was
constitutionally required. Therefore, in the Federal Court Action,
these customers received direct notice of the settlement and were
specially designated as the Direct Notice Settlement Class
Members.

In our view, from the pleadings on file, the creation of this
sub-class and the terms of the Settlement Agreement created
multiple potential conflicts of interest for the class
representative and class counsel that were not questioned by the
circuit court. It bears repeating that when presented with a
settlement-only class, it is incumbent upon the circuit court to
raise questions and demand answers, prior to approving a settlement
agreement, particularly where there are indications that the
agreement might offend basic notions of due process.  

Whether or not Lee was an adequate class representative in light of
the sub-class created and the different benefits provided cannot be
determined based upon the record before us. As presently defined,
it is unclear whether members of the sub-class have suffered a
FACTA violation, which is problematic. The Court agrees with
Dickenson that there was insufficient proof that Lee was an
adequate class representative for the classes created by the
Settlement Agreement, and no information was tendered that allowed
the circuit court to determine whether class counsel could overcome
the potential conflict of interest caused by the different benefits
allowed to settlement class members.

On remand, class counsel will have the opportunity to provide the
court with sufficient evidence to allow for a determination of
whether plaintiff could represent both the settlement class as the
class representative and represent the Loyalty Program Member
sub-class. Counsel will also be able to address the issue of
whether additional counsel should be appointed to represent the
sub-lass.

Dickenson also contends that the Settlement Agreement lacks
protections for those settlement class members who were actual
victims of identity theft or credit card fraud, who may become
victims in the future, and who have or will suffer actual damages
as a result of defendant's FACTA violations. This subset of
individuals is included within the definition of the Settlement
Class, even though Lee has sought only statutory damages in his
complaint. Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the
potential claims for actual damages that may occur in the future
are compromised and released in exchange for a $12 gift card.

On remand, the parties will have the opportunity to address whether
the Release will have to be modified to exclude these claims.

After reviewing this record, the Court finds that class counsel
failed to offer the court a notice plan that protected the due
process rights of the Illinois class. Under the circumstances here,
due process required notice instructing the settlement class
members that the Federal Court Action had been dismissed and a new
action had been filed in state court. Accordingly, the circuit
court did not acquire personal jurisdiction over the settlement
class members, including those within the Illinois Class Period.

Therefore, the circuit court's Order of Final Approval entered
December 20, 2017, is hereby vacated and the cause remanded for
further proceedings.

Judgment vacated.

A full-text copy of the Court's September 6, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yxkqv62g from Leagle.com.

Natalie T. Lorenz , Laura E. Schrick , Mathis, Marifian & Richter,
Ltd., 23 Public Square, P.O. Box 307, Suite 300, Belleville, IL
62220; Eric A. Isaacson (pro hac vice), Law Office of Eric Alan
Isaacson, 6580 Avenida Mirola, La Jolla, CA 92037-6231. Attorneys
for Appellant.

Christopher M. Murphy , McDermott, Will & Emery LLP, 444 West Lake
Street, Suite 4444, Chicago, IL 60606; Kerry A. Scanlon , Jeremy M.
White , McDermott, Will & Emery LLP, 500 North Capitol Street NW,
Washington, D.C. 20001 (for Buth-Na-Bodhaige, Inc.)

Joshua C. Dickinson , Spencer Fane LLP, 13520 California Street,
Suite 290, Omaha, NE 68154; Thomas W. Hayde , Spencer Fane LLP, 319
North Fourth Street, Suite 300, St. Louis, MO 63102; Robert L. Lash
, Hur & Lash, LLP, 390 Fifth Avenue, Suite 900, New York, NY 10018
(for Henry Lee) Attorneys for Appellees.


CABLEVISION SYSTEMS: $4.75MM Attys' Fees Awarded in Pearlman Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, THEODORE PEARLMAN, MARC TELL, JULIA GALLO, DOROTHY
RABSEY, and JOHN AZZARELLA, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CABLEVISION SYSTEMS
CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. CV 10-4992 (JS) (AKT) (E.D. N.Y.),
Magistrate Judge A. Kathleen Tomlinson of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of New York granted the Plaintiffs' Motion
for Attorney's Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses.

At the conclusion of the Fairness Hearing in the action, the Court
granted final approval as to the substantive provisions of the
Settlement Agreement but reserved decision on the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Attorney's Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses.  The
class counsel seeks an award of attorney's fees in the amount of
$4.75 million, which is equivalent to 14% of the total settlement
amount of $28.5 million, an amount to be paid, if awarded by the
Court, by or on behalf of Cablevision in addition to the settlement
consideration to the Class.  The class counsel also requests for
reimbursement of expenses in the amount of $264,479.64.

Section 12 of the Settlement Agreement provides that the class
representatives will be awarded a payment of $1,500 each.
Cablevision has agreed to pay the service awards to the class
representatives, namely, Plaintiffs Sean Ahearn, John Azzarello,
Eric Bohm, John Brett, William G. Canfield, Ralph Dudley, Arthur
Finkel, Salvatore A. Gandolfo, Tina Green, Andrew Koplik, Theodore
Pearlman, Vincent Pezzuti, Dorothy Rabsey, Martin Jay Siegel,
Stanley J. Somer and Marc Tell.  These awards are to be allocated
from the fees and expenses awarded by the Court.

Based upon the Court's close supervision of the matter, as well as
the Court's review of the billing records, Magistrate Judge
Tomlinson is satisfied that the work done was necessary and proper,
particularly in light of the vigorous defense proffered, as evident
in the continuous stream of motion practice.  For all of these
reasons, the Class Counsels' request for final approval of the
negotiated attorneys' fees in the amount of $4.75 million is
reasonable.  The motion for approval of attorneys' fees in the sum
of $4.75 million is therefore granted.

The Magistrate also granted the request for reimbursement of
expenses in the amount of $264,479.64.  She finds that the Attorney
Declarations provide the details of the unreimbursed expenses
incurred by the attorneys/firms representing the Plaintiffs in the
action.  The declarations and records show that those expenses were
incurred on behalf of the Class and that they are reflected on the
books and records maintained by those firms.

Finally, the service awards, along with the rest of the Settlement,
were negotiated under Mediator Holwell's supervision, which carries
a presumption that the amounts are reasonable and the result of
arm'slength negotiations.  Further, the Lead Plaintiffs have
participated in discovery for nearly eight years and a number of
them were deposed.  Moreover, the awards will be paid out of the
attorneys' fee award.  The awards therefore, will not erode the
benefits awarded to the class members.  For these reasons,
Magistrate finds reasonable the $1,500 service award for each named
Plaintiff, and granted the motion for approval of these service
awards.

For the foregoing reasons, Magistrate Judge Tomlinson granted the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Approval of Attorney's Fees, Reimbursement
of  Litigation Expenses and Service Payment to Class
Representativesas follows: (1) the Plaintiffs are awarded
attorneys' fees in the sum of $4.75 million; (2) the Plaintiffs are
awarded their expenses in the amount of $264,479.64; and (3) the
service awards of $1,500 to each class representative are
approved.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 20, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/LVMpuv from Leagle.com.

Theodore Pearlman, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Carol S. Shahmoon --
cshahmoon@shahmoonkeller.com -- CSS Legal Group PLLC, Joseph
Gentile -- joseph@sarrafgentile.com -- Sarraf Gentile LLP, Justin
M. Klein -- justin@marksklein.com -- Marks & Klein LLP, Lee S.
Shalov, Shalov Stone Bonner & Rocco LLP, Ralph M. Stone, Stone Law
Group PLLC, Ronen Sarraf, Sarraf Gentile LLP & Todd J. Krouner ,
Law Offices of Todd J. Krouner, P.C.

Marc Tell, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph Gentile, Sarraf Gentile
LLP, Justin M. Klein, Marks & Klein LLP, Lee S. Shalov, Shalov
Stone Bonner & Rocco LLP, Ralph M. Stone, Stone Law Group PLLC,
Ronen Sarraf, Sarraf Gentile LLP & Todd J. Krouner, Law Offices of
Todd J. Krouner, P.C.

Julia Gallo, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & Dorothy Rabsey, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Todd J. Krouner, Law
Offices of Todd J. Krouner, P.C., Joseph Gentile, Sarraf Gentile
LLP, Justin M. Klein, Marks & Klein LLP, Lee S. Shalov, Shalov
Stone Bonner & Rocco LLP, Ralph M. Stone, Stone Law Group PLLC,
Ronen Sarraf, Sarraf Gentile LLP & Scott Jaller Koplik, Law Office
of Todd J. Krouner.

John Azzarella, Plaintiff, represented by Todd J. Krouner, Law
Offices of Todd J. Krouner, P.C. & Ralph M. Stone, Stone Law Group
PLLC.

Todd Krouner, Plaintiff, pro se.

Cablevision Systems Corporation, Defendant, represented by Robert
A. Vort -- rvort@pearcelaw1.com -- Court Plaza North, Thomas H.
Golden, Wilkie Farr & Gallagher, Andrew M. Genser, Kirkland &
Ellis, Dmitriy Tishyevich -- dmitriy.tishyevich@kirkland.com --
Kirkland & Ellis LLP, pro hac vice & Jonathan F. Putnam --
jonathan.putnam@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis LLP.

CSC Holdings, LLC, Consol Defendant, represented by Thomas H.
Golden, Wilkie Farr & Gallagher, Andrew M. Genser, Kirkland &
Ellis, Dmitriy Tishyevich, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, pro hac vice &
Jonathan F. Putnam, Kirkland & Ellis LLP.

Brian T. Foley & Edward W. Wynne, Objectors, represented by Thomas
Arthur Dickerson, Thomas A. Dickerson.

Arnold H. Belgraier, Objector, represented by Donovan Bezer, Law
Office of Donovan Bezer & Thomas Arthur Dickerson, Thomas A.
Dickerson.

Simon Bezer & Christine Bezer, Objectors, represented by Donovan
Bezer, Law Office of Donovan Bezer.


CAPTAIN HAWKIN'S: Duncan Suit Transferred to E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Eugene Duncan, and on behalf of all other
persons similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Captain Hawkin's
House Restoration, LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-07928, was
transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York, to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
New York (Brooklyn) on Sept. 9, 2019. The Eastern District of New
York Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-05204-DLI-PK to the
proceeding. The suit alleges violation of Americans with
Disabilities Act. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Dora
Lizette Irizarry.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff is:

          Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
          THE MARKS LAW FIRM, PC
          175 Varick Street, 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10014
          Telephone: (646) 770-3775
          Facsimile: (646) 867-2639
          E-mail: brad@markslawfirm.net

CHOUDRY ENTERPRISES: Rodriguez Seeks Minimum Wages & OT Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------
LAURA RODRIGUEZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. LAURA RODRIGUEZ, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. CHOUDRY
ENTERPRISES, INC., d/b/a EDIBLE ARRANGEMENTS; DOES l through 100,
the Defendants, Case No. 19CV354844 (Cal. Super., Sept. 10, 2019),
alleges that Defendants failed to pay all minimum wages and
overtime Wages; failed to pay all wages due each pay period; failed
to provide meal periods; failed to provide rest periods; failed to
furnish accurate wage statements; failed to maintain required
records; and failed to pay wages earned upon termination under the
California Labor Code.

The Defendant hired Plaintiff as a "store manager" in or about
March, 2018 at its Los Gates, California location. The Plaintiff
does not currently work for Defendant.

The Plaintiff and putative Class hourly employees suffered damages
as non-exempt employees for wage and hour violations, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Ronald W. Makarem, Esq.
          Gene Williams, Esq.
          Jean-Paul Le Clercq, Esq.
          MAKAREM & ASSOCIATES, APLC
          11601 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2440
          Los Angeles, CA 90025-1760
          Telephone: (310) 312 0299
          Facsimile: (310) 312 0296

CINEMARK USA: Court OKs $2.9MM Settlement in J. Amey Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Parties' Motion for Final
Approval of Their Joint Stipulation of Class Action Settlement and
Release of Claims and Joint Stipulation re Uncashed Checks in the
case captioned JOSEPH AMEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CINEMARK USA
INC, et al., Defendants. Case No. 13-cv-05669-WHO. (N.D. Cal.).

Having considered the Settlement Agreement (the terms of which are
expressly incorporated in full by this reference and made a part of
this Order), the supporting papers filed by the parties, the
application for final approval of the settlement, the application
for an award of Class Counsel's attorneys' fees and reimbursement
of costs, the application for incentive award for the Class
Representative, the request for reimbursement of the costs of the
Settlement Administrator, the proposed PAGA allocation, and the
evidence and argument received by the Court at the Final Approval
Hearing, the Court GRANTS final approval of the settlement.

The Class covered by this Order is defined as: All current and
former non-exempt employees of Cinemark's California theaters who
worked as an usher or concession worker from December 3, 2011 until
July 31, 2014, or in any other non-exempt position from July 25,
2012 until July 31, 2014, and who were paid overtime compensation
during at least one pay period.

The Court finds and determines that the payments to be made to the
Class Members as provided for in the Settlement Agreement are fair
and reasonable. The Court hereby grants final approval to and
orders the payment of those amounts be made to the Class Members
out of the Two Million Nine Hundred Thousand Dollars and No Cents
($2,900,000.00) Class Settlement Amount in accordance with the
terms of the Settlement Agreement.

The Court grants and approves the application presented by
Settlement Class Counsel for an award of attorneys' fees in the
amount of $966,667, to be paid in accordance with the terms of the
Settlement Agreement.

The Court grants and approves the application presented by Class
Counsel for an award of costs in the amount of $39,562.34, to be
paid in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

The Court hereby grants and approves the application presented by
the Class Representative for an enhancement payment in the amount
of $10,000 for Plaintiff Brown, to be paid in accordance with the
terms of the Settlement Agreement.

The Court grants and approves the application for payment of costs
of administration of the Settlement in the amount of $32,749 for
the fees and expenses of Simpluris, Inc., the settlement
administrator approved by the Court (Settlement Administrator).

The parties are ordered to comply with the terms of the Settlement
Agreement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2019 Order is
available https://tinyurl.com/y5erhbtu from Leagle.com.

Joseph Amey, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
siturated, Plaintiff, represented by Hannah Ruth Salassi , Lvovich
& Szucsko, P.C., 50 Osgood Place, Suite 500, San Francisco,
California 94133, Scott Edward Cole - scole@scalaw.com - Scott Cole
& Associates, APC, Christopher Brian Johnson , Scott Cole &
Associates APC, Courtland Wayne Creekmore , Scott Cole &
Associates, APC, 1970 Broadway, Ninth Floor Oakland, California
94612, Jonathan Sing Lee - Jonathan.Lee@capstonelawyers.com-
Capstone Law APC, Matthew Roland Bainer  -
mbainer@bainerlawfirm.com - The Bainer Law Firm, Stan Karas
-Stan.Karas@capstonelawyers.com - Capstone Law APC & Stephen Noel
Ilg - silg@ilglegal.com - ILG Legal Office, PC.

Cinemark USA Inc, Defendant, represented by Emily Burkhardt Vicente
-ebvicente@HuntonAK.com - Hunton and Williams, Matthew I. Bobb -
mbobb@HuntonAK.com - Hunton Andrew Kurth LLP & Michael Brett Burns
- mbrettburns@HuntonAK.com - Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP.


CONOPCO, INC: Richards Suit Moved to Eastern District of Missouri
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Jamie Richards, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Conopco, Inc.,
doing business as: Unilever, and Does 1 – 10, the Defendants,
Case No. 1922-CC10863, was removed from the City of Louis 22nd
Judicial Circuit, to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri (St. Louis) on Sept. 13, 2019. The Eastern
District of Missouri Court Clerk assigned Case No.
4:19-cv-02558-NCC to the proceeding. The suit alleges consumer
fraud. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Noelle C. Collins.

Conopco, doing business as Unilever, provides personal care
products. The Company offers perfumes, soaps, and shampoos, as well
as food products. Unilever serves customers worldwide.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Daniel F. Harvath, Esq.
          HARVATH LAW GROUP, LLC
          75 W. Lockwood, Suite 1
          St. Louis, MO 63119
          Telephone: (314) 550-3717
          E-mail: dharvath@harvathlawgroup.com

Attorneys for Conopco, Inc. are:

          James Muehlberger, Esq.
          SHOOK AND HARDY, LLP
          2555 Grand Blvd.
          Kansas City, MO 64108
          Telephone: (816) 474-6550
          Facsimile: (816) 421-5547
          E-mail: jmuehlberger@shb.com

DALLAS COUNTY, TX: Dismissal of Howard Prisoners Suit Recommended
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GECORY HOWARD, Plaintiff, v. DALLAS COUNTY JAIL
FACILITY, Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-01511-C (BT) (N.D. Tex.),
Magistrate Judge Rebecca Rutherford of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, recommended that
the Court should dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint without
prejudice for want of prosecution under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

Before the Court is the Plaintiff's pro se civil rights case.  The
Plaintiff, an inmate in the Dallas County jail, and others filed a
putative class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging
the Dallas County jail is violating their rights by segregating
inmates into housing units based on race.

The Court determined that the Plaintiff and the other inmates
should not be allowed to proceed as a class and ordered that the
case be severed into individual actions to allow each inmate to
represent himself.  She further ordered each individual Plaintiff
to pay a filing fee of $400 or file a motion to proceed in forma
pauperis.  The Plaintiff did not pay the filing fee; nor did he
file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.

On June 25, 2019, the Court sent the Plaintiff a notice of
deficiency reminding him to pay the filing fee or a file motion to
proceed in forma pauperis.  It informed him that failure to cure
the deficiency within 30 days would result in a recommendation that
his complaint be dismissed.  More than 30 days have passed, and the
Plaintiff still has not paid the filing fee or filed a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis.

Magistrate Judge Rutherford holds that Rule 41(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to dismiss an action sua
sponte for failure to prosecute or for failure to comply with the
federal rules or any court order.  The Court has issued a
deficiency notice to the Plaintiff advising him that he must pay
the filing fee or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
However, he has failed to respond to the Court's order.  The
litigation cannot proceed until the Plaintiff complies with the
Court's order and either pays the filing fee or files a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis.  Accordingly, the complaint should be
dismissed for want of prosecution under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

A copy of the Report and Recommendation will be served on all
parties in the manner provided by law.  Any party who objects to
any part of the report and recommendation must file specific
written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 21, 2019 Findings,
Conclusions, & Recommendation is available at https://is.gd/WUNwfY
from Leagle.com.

Gecory Howard, Plaintiff, pro se.


DALLAS COUNTY, TX: Dismissal of Murphy Prisoners Suit Recommended
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LATAURUS MURPHY, Plaintiff, v. DALLAS COUNTY JAIL
FACILITY, Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-01501-C (BT) (N.D. Tex.),
Magistrate Judge Rebecca Rutherford of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, recommended that
the Court should dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint without
prejudice for want of prosecution under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

Before the Court is the Plaintiff's pro se civil rights case.  The
Plaintiff, an inmate in the Dallas County jail, and others filed a
putative class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging
the Dallas County jail is violating their rights by segregating
inmates into housing units based on race.

The Court determined that the Plaintiff and the other inmates
should not be allowed to proceed as a class and ordered that the
case be severed into individual actions to allow each inmate to
represent himself.  She further ordered each individual Plaintiff
to pay a filing fee of $400 or file a motion to proceed in forma
pauperis.  The Plaintiff did not pay the filing fee; nor did he
file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.

On June 25, 2019, the Court sent the Plaintiff a notice of
deficiency reminding him to pay the filing fee or a file motion to
proceed in forma pauperis.  It informed him that failure to cure
the deficiency within 30 days would result in a recommendation that
his complaint be dismissed.  More than 30 days have passed, and the
Plaintiff still has not paid the filing fee or filed a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis.

Magistrate Judge Rutherford holds that Rule 41(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to dismiss an action sua
sponte for failure to prosecute or for failure to comply with the
federal rules or any court order.  The Court has issued a
deficiency notice to the Plaintiff advising him that he must pay
the filing fee or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
However, he has failed to respond to the Court's order.  The
litigation cannot proceed until the Plaintiff complies with the
Court's order and either pays the filing fee or files a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis.  Accordingly, the complaint should be
dismissed for want of prosecution under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

A copy of the Report and Recommendation will be served on all
parties in the manner provided by law.  Any party who objects to
any part of the report and recommendation must file specific
written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 21, 2019 Findings,
Conclusions, & Recommendation is available at https://is.gd/MUex2U
from Leagle.com.

Lataurus Murphy, Plaintiff, pro se.


DALLAS COUNTY, TX: Dismissal of Ravenell Prisoners Suit Recommended
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMES RAVENELL, Plaintiff, v. DALLAS COUNTY JAIL
FACILITY, Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-01518-C (BT) (N.D. Tex.),
Magistrate Judge Rebecca Rutherford of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, recommended that
the Court should dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint without
prejudice for want of prosecution under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

Before the Court is the Plaintiff's pro se civil rights case.  The
Plaintiff, an inmate in the Dallas County jail, and others filed a
putative class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging
the Dallas County jail is violating their rights by segregating
inmates into housing units based on race.

The Court determined that the Plaintiff and the other inmates
should not be allowed to proceed as a class and ordered that the
case be severed into individual actions to allow each inmate to
represent himself.  She further ordered each individual Plaintiff
to pay a filing fee of $400 or file a motion to proceed in forma
pauperis.  The Plaintiff did not pay the filing fee; nor did he
file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.

On June 25, 2019, the Court sent the Plaintiff a notice of
deficiency reminding him to pay the filing fee or a file motion to
proceed in forma pauperis.  It informed him that failure to cure
the deficiency within 30 days would result in a recommendation that
his complaint be dismissed.  More than 30 days have passed, and the
Plaintiff still has not paid the filing fee or filed a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis.

Magistrate Judge Rutherford holds that Rule 41(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to dismiss an action sua
sponte for failure to prosecute or for failure to comply with the
federal rules or any court order.  The Court has issued a
deficiency notice to the Plaintiff advising him that he must pay
the filing fee or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
However, he has failed to respond to the Court's order.  The
litigation cannot proceed until the Plaintiff complies with the
Court's order and either pays the filing fee or files a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis.  Accordingly, the complaint should be
dismissed for want of prosecution under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

A copy of the Report and Recommendation will be served on all
parties in the manner provided by law.  Any party who objects to
any part of the report and recommendation must file specific
written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 21, 2019 Findings,
Conclusions, & Recommendation is available at https://is.gd/QLDpz5
from Leagle.com.

James Ravenell, Plaintiff, pro se.


ECOCO INC: Venus Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ecoco, Inc. The case
is styled as Vanessa Venus on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Ecoco, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-05400 (E.D. N.Y., Sept. 23, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Ecoco Inc. is a Chicago-based cosmetics pioneer who actively pushes
the envelope in green technology and hair care.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     C.K. Lee, Esq.
     Lee Litigation Group, PLLC
     148 west 24th Street, Ste 8th Floor
     New York, NY 10011
     Phone: (212) 465-1180
     Fax: (212) 465-1181
     Email: cklee@leelitigation.com


FAHERTY BRAND: Traynor Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Faherty Brand, LLC.
The case is styled as Yaseen Traynor, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Faherty Brand, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-08822 (S.D. N.Y., Sept. 23, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Faherty Brand is an American clothing and lifestyle brand "about
the beach" created by twin brothers Alex and Mike Faherty. Its
aesthetic was described as "surf hippie" by The New York
Times.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Russel Craig Weinrib, Esq.
     E-mail: rweinrib@kasowitz.com



FIELD GEO: Quinn Seeks Overtime Pay for Geologists
--------------------------------------------------
GARRET QUINN, Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff v. FIELD GEO SERVICES, INC., the Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-02622 (D. Colo., Sept. 13, 2019), alleges that
Field Geo Services does not pay its "Geologists" (more commonly
known as mudloggers) overtime as required by the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act.

Instead, Field Geo pays all its Geologists a set "Day Rate" for
each 12-hour shift worked regardless of the total number of hours
worked in a week.

Field Geo's day rate pay plan violates the FLSA and NMMWA because
employees paid on a day rate basis are still owed overtime for
hours worked in excess of 40 in a week.

Field Geo does business throughout America's oil producing states
including Colorado, North Dakota, California, Utah, New Mexico,
Texas and Wyoming.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER B URCH PLLC
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: 713-877-8788
          Facsimile: 713-877-8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com

               - and -

          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: 713 352-1100
          Facsimile: 713 352-3300
          E-mail: adunlap@mybackwages.com

FIRST CLASS: Court OKs Conditional Certification Bid in Martinez
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee, Nashville Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion granting
in part and denying in part Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional
Certification in the case captioned DANIEL ALVARADO MARTINEZ;
ALEXANDRO PEREZ; NELSON EGUIZABAL BRITO; CARLOS CASTRO; and ALEXIS
MARQUEZ, Plaintiffs, v. FIRST CLASS INTERIORS OF NAPLES, LLC; JOSE
ROBERTO REYES Individually and d/b/a FIRST CLASS INTERIORS OF
NAPLES, LLC; and MR. DRYWALL SERVICES, LLC, Defendants. No.
3:18-cv-00583. (M.D. Tenn.).

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' policies and practices violated
the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA. Specifically,
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and
members of the Overtime Class one and one-half times their regular
hourly rate for all hours worked in excess of forty hours per week
during the relevant period. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants
failed to pay Plaintiffs and members of the Overtime Class the
federal minimum wage for all hours worked after clocking in,
including hours spent attending safety meetings and performing
other such work.

Plaintiffs seek to conditionally certify two classes of allegedly
similarly situated workers:

     All workers performing drywall installation, framing, and/or
finishing work on the Marriott Project at any time in the in the
last three (3) years (Overtime Class) and

     All workers performing drywall installation, framing, and/or
finishing work on the Marriott Project whose employment was
terminated at any time between May 21 and May 29, 2018 (Last
Paycheck Class).

Typically, courts employ a two-phase inquiry to address whether the
named plaintiffs are similarly situated to the employees they seek
to represent. The first [phase] takes place at the beginning of
discovery. The second occurs after all of the opt-in forms have
been received and discovery has concluded.

At the first stage, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that
employees in the class are similarly situated. Conditional
certification requires only a modest factual showing, and district
courts should use a fairly lenient standard that typically results
in certification.
  
At the first stage, the court does not resolve factual disputes,
decide substantive issues related to the merits of the case, or
make credibility determinations.   

The certification is conditional and by no means final. After
discovery, the defendant may move for decertification of the
conditional class, which triggers the second phase of the court's
review. At this second stage, the court has access to more
information and employs a stricter standard in deciding whether
class members are, in fact, similarly situated.

Conditional Class Certification of the Overtime Class

The first proposed class, the Overtime Class, includes all workers
performing drywall installation, framing, and/or finishing work on
the Marriott Project at any time in the last three years.
Plaintiffs argue that they have demonstrated that they are
similarly situated to putative members of the Overtime Class
because they were subject to the same workplace conditions and the
same FLSA-violating employer policy.  

Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that all drywall workers performed
similar drywall-related work for Defendants at the same location,
during similar hours, and were supervised by the same supervisors
of the Defendants. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants misclassified
drywall workers as independent contractors in order to deny them
overtime pay in violation of the FLSA. Plaintiffs assert that they
and other drywall workers regularly worked more than forty hours
per week and were paid no overtime compensation. In support of
these arguments, Plaintiffs rely on the Complaint, four employee
affidavits, and Defendants' answers.

Defendants oppose conditional certification of the Overtime Class,
arguing that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their applicable burden
of proof under Section 216(b). The Court disagrees. As discussed
above, to show that Plaintiffs and putative class members are
similarly situated for the purposes of Section 216(b), Plaintiffs
need only make a modest factual showing demonstrating that their
positions were similar, not identical, to the positions held by the
putative class members.

The Court finds that the allegations in the Complaint, the sworn
affidavits of Plaintiffs and Mr. Torres, and First Class
Defendants' Answer to the Complaint confirming that they classified
Plaintiffs and all other drywall workers as independent contractors
are sufficient under this stage's fairly lenient standard to show
that Plaintiffs are similarly situated to some putative class
members. Plaintiffs have clearly outlined a single, FLSA-violating
policy, thereby satisfying the requirements of conditional
certification of a collective action.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not, however, shown that they
are similarly situated to all putative class members as the class
is currently defined. Therefore, as further detailed below, the
Court finds it necessary to limit the scope of the Overtime Class.

Defendants set forth a variety of arguments against conditional
certification of the Overtime Class. First, Defendants argue that
Plaintiffs' affidavits are insufficient because Plaintiffs have not
submitted affidavits from enough employees.

The Court finds that the sworn affidavits of Plaintiffs and Mr.
Torres collectively are quantitatively sufficient under this
stage's fairly lenient standard to show that Plaintiffs and
putative Overtime Class members were similarly situated. The number
of affidavits here is hardly overwhelming, but Courts have
routinely held that even fewer supporting submissions is sufficient
to satisfy Plaintiffs' light burden.  

Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' affidavits are
insufficient to show that Plaintiffs and the proposed claimants
suffered the same FLSA-violating policy because they contain only
conclusory statements and are not based on specific information or
personal knowledge.  Again, the Court disagrees. This Court has
routinely held that the personal observations of other employees
and conversations had or overheard at work are sufficient to
demonstrate personal knowledge of FLSA-violating policies and are
not mere conclusory allegations.

Rather, this Court found that such statements regarding the pay
policies applied to, and the hours worked by, other business
managers were based on first-hand experience and personal
observations and were, therefore, sufficient to support conditional
certification. These representations are not merely conclusory as
Defendants suggest; rather, they are sufficient to demonstrate that
Plaintiffs and putative members of the Overtime Class are similarly
situated to each other.

Second, First Class Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' request for
conditional certification must fail because Plaintiffs do not
identify additional independent contractors who desire to opt-in to
Plaintiffs' lawsuit.  

Third, Mr. Drywall argues for the greater part of its brief that it
did not employ, as defined by the FLSA, Plaintiffs or any members
of the putative class. Whether Mr. Drywall employed Plaintiffs,
however, is a merits-based argument that is not relevant at the
conditional certification stage. The Court declines to reach this
argument at this time.

Finally, although the Court finds that Plaintiffs have made the
modest factual showing required for conditional certification of a
collective action as to some putative members of the Overtime
Class, Defendants' objections to the scope of the Overtime Class as
overbroad are well taken.

Plaintiffs define the Overtime Class as all workers performing
drywall installation, framing, and/or finishing work on the
Marriott Project at any time in the in the last three (3) years.
This definition includes drywall workers who were employed prior to
First Class commencing work on the Marriott Project and therefore
must have been employed by entities other than Defendants.   

Defendants correctly point out that Plaintiffs have not shown that
they are similarly situated to those drywall workers who were
employed by unrelated non-Defendant entities. Plaintiffs have filed
no affidavits from drywall workers employed by an entity other than
Defendants. Nor have they demonstrated, by personal knowledge or
otherwise, that drywall workers not employed by Defendants were
designated independent contractors, worked more than forty hours
per week, or were unlawfully denied overtime pay. In other words,
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that those drywall workers not
employed by Defendants were generally subject to a common
FLSA-violating policy.

In response to Defendants' argument regarding the scope of the
Overtime Class, Plaintiffs suggest that Defendants should have
proposed alternative language for class definitions. Plaintiffs
suggest that because they lack information necessary to determine
whether a narrower definition is appropriate, the class should be
conditionally certified now and can be narrowed at a later time.
But the Court is not aware of nor do Plaintiffs provide any
authority that places the burden on defendants to provide
alternative language to modify an overbroad class. To the contrary,
it is well-established that, at the notice stage of a FLSA
collective action, plaintiffs not defendants must show that they
and potential opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated to each
other.  

Furthermore, First Class Defendants did, in fact, propose
alternative language, suggesting that the Overtime Class be limited
to drywall workers that were employed between July 2017 and May
2018, as First Class's independent contractors.  

The evidence submitted by Plaintiffs, therefore, does not justify
certification of the Overtime Class as defined by Plaintiffs, and
the court will limit the conditional certification of the Overtime
Class to all workers who were employed by Defendants performing
drywall installation, framing, and/or finishing work on the
Marriott Project between July 2017 and May 2018.

Conditional Class Certification of the Last Paycheck Class

The second class that Plaintiffs seek to conditionally certify, the
Last Paycheck Class, includes all workers performing drywall
installation, framing, and/or finishing work on the Marriott
Project whose employment was terminated at any time between May 21
and May 29, 2018. Plaintiffs argue that they are similarly situated
to putative members of the Last Paycheck Class because they are
unified by common theories of Defendants' statutory liability.  

Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that (1) Defendants' failure to pay
members of the Last Paycheck Class for their last two weeks of work
in May 2018 amounts to a minimum wage violation under the FLSA and
(2) Defendants' decision to fire Plaintiffs when they demanded
their paychecks amounts to a violation of the FLSA's
anti-retaliation provision. In support of their argument,
Plaintiffs rely on the Complaint, three employee affidavits, and
Defendants' answers.

Plaintiffs allege that during the week of May 21, 2018, Defendant
Reyes realized that he would not have the funds to pay Plaintiffs
and putative members of the Last Paycheck Class for their last two
weeks of work. When Plaintiffs and putative class members raised
concerns regarding their pay, Defendant Reyes told all of the
employees to come back the next Tuesday, May 29th, to demand their
wages from Defendant Mr. Drywall.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that they
are similarly situated to some putative members of the Last
Paycheck Class. Although Plaintiffs argue that they are similarly
situated because they have set forth common theories of Defendants'
statutory violations, the Court finds that they have, in fact, gone
one step further by demonstrating that putative members of the Last
Paycheck Class were all impacted by a single decision, policy or
plan.

Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that on May 29, 2018,
Plaintiffs Martinez and Castro, Mr. Torres, and approximately
eighty other workers were dismissed, and demanded and were denied
their pay from Defendants. Defendants' decision not to pay
Plaintiffs occurred at the same time, in the same location, and in
the same manner as to all putative class members. Thus, the claims
of the Last Paycheck Class will proceed under a single theory as
opposed to multiple common theories  that Defendants' decision not
to pay members of the Last Paycheck Class for their last two weeks
of work in May 2018 amounts to a minimum wage violation under the
FLSA.  

As discussed in more detail below, the Court does not find,
however, that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that they are
similarly situated to putative members of the Last Paycheck Class
as to their retaliation claim. Thus, conditional certification of
the Last Paycheck Class is based on only Plaintiffs' allegation
that Defendants failed to pay members of the Last Paycheck Class
for their last two weeks of work in May 2018.

Defendants raise four arguments opposing certification of the Last
Paycheck Class. First, First Class Defendants allege that the three
affidavits Plaintiffs have submitted are insufficient to
demonstrate Plaintiffs and putative members of the Last Paycheck
class are similarly situated.  

The Court disagrees. Together, the allegations in the Complaint and
the sworn affidavits are sufficient under this stage's fairly
lenient standard to show that Plaintiffs and putative class members
are similarly situated because they were all impacted by
Defendants' decision or plan to deny those drywall workers their
last two weeks of pay in May 2018. As discussed supra, courts have
routinely found to be sufficient motions supported by even fewer
declarations or affidavits.  

Rather, the key issue here is whether the affidavits provide
sufficient factual support to demonstrate that Plaintiffs and other
drywall workers suffered from a single, FLSA-violating decision,
policy, or plan, or whether their claims are unified by common
theories of defendants' statutory violations. First Class
Defendants claim that the affidavits do not provide sufficient
support because they do not contain any specific information or
personal knowledge in support of Plaintiffs' conclusory
allegations. Again, the Court disagrees. Through their affidavits,
Plaintiffs aver that they personally observed Defendants dismiss
and fail to pay roughly eighty other drywall workers.  

The Court finds that these personal observations are sufficient to
satisfy Plaintiffs' low burden at this stage.

Next, First Class Defendants argue that it is not procedurally
proper to certify the Last Paycheck Class, because seventy-five of
the roughly eighty putative class members were fully compensated by
First Class as a result of an agreement with the DOL and have
therefore waived their claims regarding the same. In support of
this argument, Defendant Reyes' affidavit states that as a result
of the agreement with the Department of Labor, these seventy-five
(75) workers were paid back their wages for the weeks of May 14,
2018 and May 21, 2018, and thereby released First Class Defendants
from any and all liability related to the nonpayment regarding the
weeks of May 14, 2018 and May 21, 2018. This argument fails for a
number of reasons. As an initial matter, the Court cannot, at this
stage of the litigation, resolve the factual disputes created by
Defendants' affidavits. The balancing of competing affirmations
would require credibility determinations, which are inappropriate
at this stage of the litigation.

The Court cannot decide substantive issues going to the ultimate
merits, or make credibility determinations, now.  

Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification of this Case as a
Collective Action  will be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The
Court conditionally certifies this matter as a collective action
consisting of the following classes:

The Overtime Class will consist of all workers who were employed by
Defendants performing drywall installation, framing, and/or
finishing work on the Marriott Project at any time between July
2017 and May 2018.

The Last Paycheck Class will consist of all workers who were
employed by Defendants performing drywall installation, framing,
and/or finishing work on the Marriott Project whose employment was
terminated at any time between May 21 and May 29, 2018.


A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2019
Memorandum and Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxp65sra
from Leagle.com.

Daniel Alvarado Martinez, Alexandro Perez, Nelson Eguizabal Brito,
Carlos Castro & Alexis Marquez, Plaintiffs, represented by Callie
Kate Barker Jennings- calliej@bsjfirm.com - Branstetter, Stranch &
Jennings, PLLC & Karla M. Campbell- karlac@bsjfirm.com -
Branstetter, Stranch & Jennings, PLLC.

First Class Interiors of Naples, LLC & Jose Roberto Reyes,
Individually, Defendants, represented by Jamie Faye Little -
jlittle@stites.com - Stites & Harbison, PLLC.

Mr. Drywall Services, LLC, Defendant, represented by Daniel Caden
Crowell -
dcrowell@webbsanderslaw.com - Webb Sanders PLLC, Jamie Faye Little
, Stites & Harbison, PLLC, Leslie Goff Sanders -
lsanders@webbsanderslaw.com - Webb Sanders PLLC & Steven D. Weber ,
Stark Weber PLLC, 1221 Brickell Avenue, Suite 900, Miami FL 33131

Cotney Construction Law, Interested Party, represented by Elizabeth
S. Tipping , Cotney Construction Law LLP, 363 N Sam Houston Pkwy E
Ste 1100, Houston, TX 77060.


FIRSTSOURCE SOLUTIONS: Court Conditionally Certifies Class
----------------------------------------------------------
In class action lawsuit styled as ALAN BERNARDEZ AND TAWANNA
PITTMAN, individually and on behalf of a class of persons similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. FIRSTSOURCE SOLUTIONS USA, LLC D/B/A
MEDASSIST, the Defendant, Case No. 3:17-cv-00613-RGJ-RSE (W.D.
Ky.), the Hon. Judge Rebecca Grady Jennings entered an order:

   1. granting in part Plaintiffs' pre-discovery motion for
      conditional certification and court-authorized notice to
      potential opt-in plaintiffs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. section
      216(b);

   2. conditionally certifying a Fair Labor Standards Act
      Collective Action on behalf of the putative members of the
      Collective, defined as:

      "all current and former Patient Service Representatives,
      Floaters/Trainers, and/or Team Leads employed by Defendant
      Firstsource Solutions USA, LLC d/b/a MedAssist in the
      Durham, North Carolina and Birmingham, Alabama regions at
      any time from October 4, 2014 through present";

   3. approving Plaintiffs' proposed Notice of Right to Join
      Lawsuit, Consent Form, and Plaintiffs' proposed language of
      the text message to be sent to members of the putative
      Collective;

   4. authorizing Plaintiffs' Counsel to disseminate the approved
      notice documents to all putative members of the Collective
      via US Mail, e-mail, and text message;

   5. directing Defendant to identify all putative members of the
      proposed Collective by providing names, last known
      addresses, dates of employment, job titles, phone numbers,
      and e-mail addresses in an electronic and importable format
      within 14 days of the entry of this Order; and

   6. giving putative members of the Collective 60 days from the
      date the notice is mailed to join the case by return
      ing their written consent forms if they so choose.[CC]

FLAMING GRILL: Montalvo Seeks OT Wages for Restaurant Staff
-----------------------------------------------------------
ARTURO MONTALVO GARCIA, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. FLAMING GRILL NJ INC. (D/B/A
FLAMING GRILL & BUFFET), FLAMING GRILL WEST INC. (D/B/A FLAMING
GRILL & BUFFET), FLAMING GRILL UNION INC. (D/B/A FLAMING GRILL &
BUFFET), BING XIAO, MEIRU CHEN, and BIYU LI, the Defendants, Case
No. 2:19-cv-17978 (D.N.J., Sept. 13, 2019), seeks unpaid minimum
and overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, including applicable liquidated damages, interest, attorneys'
fees and costs.

Montalvo was employed as a food preparer and dishwasher at the
restaurant located at 1701 W Edgar Rd B, Linden, NJ 07036. He
worked for the Defendants in excess of 40 hours per week, without
appropriate minimum wage and overtime compensation for the hours
that he worked.

The Defendants failed to maintain accurate recordkeeping of the
hours worked and failed to pay Montalvo appropriately for any hours
worked, either at the straight rate of pay or for any additional
overtime premium, the lawsuit says.

The Defendants own, operate, or control an Asian restaurant,
located at 1701 W Edgar Rd B, Linden, NJ 07036 under the name
"Flaming Grill & Buffet."[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Gennadiy Naydenskiy, Esq.
          Michael A. Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: Faillace@employmentcompliance.com

FORJAS TAURUS: Court OKs Settlement in .357 Revolver Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida issued an Order granting Proposed Class Representatives'
Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement in
the case captioned WILLIAM BURROW, OMA LOUISE BURROW, ERNEST D.
BEDWELL, AND SUZANNE BEDWELL, Plaintiffs, v. FORJAS TAURUS S.A. and
BRAZTECH INTERNATIONAL, L.C., Defendants. Case No.
16-21606-Civ-TORRES. (S.D. Fla.).

Suzanne Bedwell filed a proposed class action complaint, asserting
that her Rossi brand .357 Magnum Revolver was defective in that it
fired when dropped. Plaintiffs asserted class claims for breach of
warranty, strict products liability, negligence, and FDUTPA,
seeking damages, injunctive and other relief against the Defendants
in connection with alleged defects in the design and manufacture of
the Class Revolvers.

The Settlement Class

The Settlement Class is defined as:

     All individuals in the United States, including its
territories and possessions, who owned one or more Class
Revolver(s) on March 15, 2019, the Preliminary Approval Date.

The Inconvenience Payment

All Settlement Class Members who do not opt out, who avail
themselves of the Enhanced Warranty Service and submit a valid
claim during the Claim Period, will receive the Inconvenience
Payment of $50.00 per Revolver. The receipt of these Inconvenience
Payments is contingent upon actually utilizing the Enhanced
Warranty Service and having one's firearm inspected no later than
one year after the Effective Date of the Settlement. The purpose of
this structure is to incentivize Settlement Class Members to
actually submit their Class Revolvers for inspection and repair.
All Settlement Class Members who submitted their Revolvers to
Braztech in response to the Early Warning Program will be eligible
for the Inconvenience Payment. So the time period for pre-logging
and submitting revolvers began even before the Settlement was
approved and will run for at least a year and a half before the
Claim Period for the Inconvenience Payment ends.

The Class Release

In exchange for the relief described above, the Plaintiffs and
Settlement Class Members will release the Defendants and their
affiliated entities from, among other things, any and all claims
arising from, or related in any way to alleged defects in the
design or manufacture of the Class Revolvers (or any components
thereof) that may result in an unintended discharge.

In other words, the Settlement release here is specific to the
subject matter addressed in this Action  alleged design or
manufacturing defects that could cause unintentional discharges and
does not contemplate a general release of any and all claims of any
kind against these Defendants.

Importantly, the Settlement does not release any personal injury or
property damage claims. Thus, it is narrowly tailored to address
the common issues raised by the alleged defective design or
manufacture of the Class Revolvers and is not an excessively broad
general release of the type criticized in other class actions.

Exclusion from the Class

The Settlement allowed current owners of Class Revolvers to opt out
of the Settlement and the Settlement Class. Any Settlement Class
Member who wished to seek exclusion from the Settlement Class was
advised of his or her right to be excluded, and of the deadline and
procedures for exercising that right. As noted above, the timetable
proposed by the Settlement afforded members of the Settlement Class
more than 90 days within which to decide whether to remain in the
Settlement Class, or to seek exclusion from it. Those who wished to
pursue individual claims could do so by opting out.

Class Representative Service Award

Under the Settlement, Class Counsel reserved the right to seek a
reasonable Service Award, not to exceed $7,500.00, for each Class
Representative, for his or her service as the named representative
of the Settlement Class. Any Service Award approved by the Court up
to that amount will be paid separately by Defendants, over and
above the relief being offered to the members of the Settlement
Class, and in addition to any relief the Named Plaintiffs may
receive as a member of the Settlement Class. The Service Award is
intended to recognize the time and effort expended by the Class
Representatives on behalf of the Settlement Class in assisting
Class Counsel with the prosecution of this case and negotiating the
relief the Settlement proposes to confer to the Settlement Class
Members, as well as the exposure and risk Plaintiffs incurred by
participating in and taking a leadership role in this Action. The
Settlement is not conditioned upon the Court approving any Service
Award to any named Plaintiff.

FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT

The Standards for Judicial Approval of Class Action Settlements

It is well established that settlements are highly favored in the
law and will be upheld whenever possible because they are means of
amicably resolving doubts and preventing lawsuits. A district
court, in reviewing a proposed settlement of a class action case
must find that there has been no fraud or collusion between the
parties in arriving at the proposed settlement and that the
proposed settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable. The Eleventh
Circuit has outlined several factors that a court must consider in
its determination of whether a proposed class-action settlement is
fair, adequate, and reasonable: (1) the likelihood of success at
trial (2) the range of possible recovery (3) the point on or below
the range of possible recovery at which a settlement is fair,
adequate, and reasonable (4) the complexity, expense and duration
of the litigation (5) the substance and amount of opposition to the
settlement  and(6) the stage of the proceedings at which the
settlement was achieved. Bennett, 737 F.2d at 986.

In addition, effective December 1, 2018, Rule 23 itself was amended
to add a mandatory but non-exhaustive set of similar final approval
criteria:

(A) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately
represented the class;(B) the proposal was negotiated at arm's
length (C) the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking
into account: (i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal;
(ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing
relief to the class, including the method of processing
class-member claims (iii) the terms of any proposed award of
attorney's fees, including timing of payment and(iv) any agreement
required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3) and (D) the proposal
treats class members equitably relative to each other.

The application of these factors, as well as the analogous Bennett
factors, compels the Court to find that the proposed Settlement is
fair, adequate, and reasonable under the circumstances of this
case.

The Settlement Satisfies the Standards for Judicial Approval

Class Counsel and Plaintiffs Have Adequately Represented the
Settlement Class.

The first factor that Rule 23(e)(2) now instructs courts to
consider when evaluating whether to approve a class settlement is
whether the class representatives and class counsel have adequately
represented the class. In evaluating the adequacy of class counsel
and the class representative, the Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (Committee) has instructed courts to
consider whether class counsel and plaintiffs had an adequate
information base before negotiating and entering into the
settlement.

Here, the Court has already found that Plaintiffs and Class Counsel
have adequately represented the Settlement Class as follows:

The claims were fully asserted in the Consolidated Complaint, and
Class Counsel vigorously pursued the claims of Plaintiffs and the
putative class. The Settlement Agreement itself was the product of
arm's length negotiations before a professional mediator. More
specifically, the parties engaged in five full days of mediation
and continued to negotiate thereafter on the details of the formal
Settlement Agreement. The parties kept the Court informed of their
progress throughout the process and the Court is convinced that the
agreement was negotiated in good faith.

The record continues to support that finding. Further discovery and
litigation would yield no better result. Under these circumstances,
the Court finds that Class Counsel and Plaintiffs adequately
represented the Settlement Class and this factor favors the
Settlement's final approval.

The Settlement is the Product of Arm's-Length Bargaining and
Mediation

In evaluating the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of a
settlement, a court must ensure that the settlement is not the
product of collusion by the negotiating parties.  

Here, the Court has already found that the Parties' Settlement
Agreement when viewed in light of the Bennett factors, falls within
the range of reasonableness. The record continues to support the
Court's earlier finding. The Parties' settlement negotiations
occurred after substantial discovery, through five separate
mediation sessions and the negotiations were overseen by a
well-regarded, independent mediator, Terrance M. White. The end
result of the Parties' negotiations is a Settlement that offers all
Settlement Class Members a reasonable award with any attorneys'
fees, expenses, and incentive awards to be paid separately. Both
the record in this case and the substantive terms of the Settlement
reflect a good faith arm's-length bargaining process, which further
supports final approval.  

The Relief Provided for the Settlement Class is Adequate

Under Rule 23(e)(2)(C), the relief provided for the class in the
Settlement must be adequate, taking into account: (i) the costs,
risks and delay of trial and appeal (ii) the effectiveness of any
proposed method of distributing relief to the class, including the
method of processing class-member claims (iii) the terms of any
proposed award of attorney's fees, including timing of payment and
(iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3).

In this case, if not reasonably settled, the Court finds that there
exists real potential for years of further litigation, as well as a
possibility that the Defendants could prevail on the merits or
defeat contested class certification. Thus, the Settlement offers a
reasonable amount of relief available to the Settlement Class, and
it does so now thereby avoiding the risks, costs, and delay
inherent in continuing to litigate the Action, including from
contested class certification proceedings, additional discovery,
dispositive motions, pretrial proceedings, trial and appeal.
Moreover, attorneys' fees under the Settlement are to be paid by
the Defendants separately and in addition to the relief granted to
the Settlement Class Members. The fact that the relief available to
Settlement Class Members was not conditioned on any amount of
attorneys' fees being awarded by the Court further supports the
adequacy and fairness of this Settlement.

Accordingly, consideration of the Class's likelihood of success and
potential recoveries from trial, measured against the complexity
and cost of trial and the relief offered by the Settlement, favors
the final approval of the Settlement.

The Settlement Treats Settlement Class Members Equitably Relative
to Each Other

The Settlement also treats Settlement Class Members equally and
fairly. There is no distinction between the benefits offered, and
all Settlement Class Members receive the benefit of the Enhanced
Warranty Service automatically. Furthermore, the steps Settlement
Class Members must take to receive the Enhanced Warranty Service
and the Inconvenience Payment are far from onerous. In fact, for
the Enhanced Warranty Service, it is the same or easier and cheaper
than the steps they would need to receive ordinary warranty
service.

Upon review, the Court also finds that the scope of the release
provision required by the Settlement does not operate in an
inequitable manner. The Settlement contemplates a release specific
to the subject matter addressed in this Action alleged design or
manufacturing defects that could cause unintentional discharges and
does not contemplate a general release of any and all claims of any
kind against these Defendants. The Settlement does not release any
personal injury or property damage claims. Thus, the release is
narrowly tailored to address the common issues raised by the
alleged defective design or manufacture of the Class Revolvers and
is not an excessively broad general release of the type criticized
in other class actions.

The Substance and Amount of Any Opposition to the Settlement

There were eleven (11) complete and timely opt-outs and only one
(1) objection to the class action settlement notice out of an
estimated 255,000 potential Settlement Class Members. The low
opt-out and objection rates weigh in favor of granting final
approval to the Settlement.  

The single objection related solely to the amount of the
Inconvenience Payment and was based on a miscalculation that over
one thousand days had passed since the inception of the Early
Warning Program informing owners of the Class Revolvers to cease
using their guns. In actuality, the Early Warning Program did not
commence until September 2018, approximately 350 days ago.
Moreover, the objector noted that he paid $330 for his Class
Revolver. The Inconvenience Payment of $50 is, therefore over 15%
of the purchase price. No other class member has objected to the
amount of the Inconvenience Payment as being inadequate. The amount
of the inconvenience payment was a negotiated term and was paid
over and above the costs for shipping, inspecting, repairing, and
cleaning Class Revolvers.

Therefore, the objection does not support a decision to withhold
final approval and certification.

In sum, having considered the Bennett factors, as well as the
factors set forth in Rule 23(e), and the response of the Class to
the Settlement, the Court finds that the settlement is not the
product of collusion and instead is fair, adequate, reasonable, and
in the best interest of the parties and all absent members of the
Settlement Class. Final Approval is therefore granted.

The Class Representative Service Award is Reasonable and Warranted

The requested service award of $7,500 to each Class Representative
is appropriate. No objections have been made to the requested
award. The award will be paid by Defendants pursuant to the
Settlement Agreement and separate from the relief being offered to
the members of the Settlement Class and will be in addition to any
relief the Named Plaintiffs may receive as a member of the
Settlement Class. Courts routinely approve service awards to
compensate plaintiffs for the services they provided and the risks
they incurred during the course of the class action litigation.

In light of the Class Representatives' efforts in this case and in
the absence of any objection from the Settlement Class Members, the
Court finds that this incentive award is appropriate and reasonable
and is therefore finally approved.  

Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement is
GRANTED.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3xllvk5 from Leagle.com.

William Burrow & Oma Louise Burrow, Plaintiffs, represented by
Brannon J. Buck , Badham & Buck, LLC, 2001 Park Place North, Suite
500, Birmingham, AL 35203, pro hac vice, Brian William Warwick ,
Varnell & Warwick, P.A., PO Box 1870 Lady Lake, FL 32158-1870,
Gregory A. Brockwell , Letman, Siegal & Payne, P.C., Wachovia
Building, Suite 2000 420 North 20th Street, Birmingham, AL 35203,
pro hac vice, Vincent Swiney , Swiney & Bellenger, LLC, pro hac
vice & Andrew Franklin Knopf , Paul Knopf Bigger, 1560 Orange Ave
Ste 220, Winter Park, FL, 32789-5544

Forjas Taurus, S.A., Defendant, represented by Colin Dang Delaney -
cdelaney@sgrlaw.com - Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP, pro hac vice
& John Patrick Marino - jmarino@sgrlaw.com - Smith Gambrell
Russell.

Braztech International, L.C., Defendant, represented by Colin Dang
Delaney , Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP, pro hac vice, John
Patrick Marino , Smith Gambrell Russell, John B. Thorsness , Clapp
Peterson Tiemessen Thorsness & Johnson, 711 H Street, Suite 620
Anchorage, Alaska 99501-3442, Kristen Wenger Bracken , Smith
Gambrell & Russell, L.L.P., John F. Weeks, IV , Smith, Gambrell &
Russell, LLP, pro hac vice & Timothy A. Bumann , Smith Gambrell &
Russell LLP, 50 N Laura St Ste 2600, Jacksonville, FL,
32202-3629pro hac vice.


FROST-ARNETT: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MARY HEPFNER, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v.
FROST-ARNETT COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-1330 (E.D.
Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order certifying a
class, appointing the Plaintiff as class representative, and
appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class Counsel, and for such
other and further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiffs file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class. Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir.
2017).[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com



GENERAL MOTORS: Rothschild Sues over Engine Power Reduced Defect
----------------------------------------------------------------
MARK ROTHSCHILD, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, the Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-05240 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 13, 2019), alleges that GM
actively concealed and/or failed to notify the public of the
existence and nature of defective electronic throttle control
and/or accelerator pedal position sensors that cause vehicles to
abruptly lose power, often at interstate highway speeds.

The detective component is found in thousands of 2016 – 2018
Chevy Malibu vehicles that are sold or leased throughout New York
and the United States.

GM has not recalled the vehicles to replace the electronic throttle
control and/or accelerator pedal position sensors; it has not
offered to replace the electronic throttle control and/or
accelerator pedal position sensors to its customers free of charge;
and it has not offered to reimburse owners, present or past, who
have incurred costs relating to diagnosing and repairing issues
arising from the Engine Power Reduced defect. GM's conduct violates
well-established consumer protection laws in New York and
constitutes a continuous breach of its warranties to Plaintiff and
consumers in the United States, the lawsuit says.

The defect manifests with a significant and abrupt reduction of
power accompanied by an "Engine Power is Reduced" warning on the
dashboard ("the Engine Power Reduced defect" or "the defect").

The defect affects model year 2016 through 2018 Chevrolet Malibu
vehicles sold or leased to consumers in the United States,
including Plaintiff's vehicle. All Class Vehicles share the same
dangerously defective condition that GM failed to disclose to
Plaintiff, consumers, and each Class Member.

In the Class Vehicles, acceleration in the powertrain is controlled
by electronic throttle control which includes an accelerator pedal
position sensor. Unlike traditional throttle control systems, which
rely on mechanical linkages, the Class Vehicles' use electronic
sensors and electromechanical actuators and human-machine
interfaces such as pedal feel emulators to control vehicle
functions.

Electronic throttle control ("ETC") is an automobile technology
that controls the powertrain of a vehicle. ETC electronically
"connects" the accelerator pedal to the throttle, replacing a
mechanical linkage such as a throttle cable running to a
carburetor. A typical ETC system consists of three major
components: (i) an accelerator pedal position sensor, (ii) a
throttle valve that can be opened and closed by an electric motor
(sometimes referred to as an electric or electronic throttle body
("ETB")), and (iii) a powertrain or engine control module ("PCM" or
"ECM"). The ECM is a type of electronic control unit ("ECU"), which
is an embedded system that employs software to determine the
required throttle position by calculations from data measured by
other sensors, including the accelerator pedal position sensors,
engine speed sensor, vehicle speed sensor, and cruise control
switches.

Plaintiff and Class Members purchased GM vehicles fitted with
defective electronic throttle control and/or accelerator pedal
position sensors that cause them to abruptly lose power at high
speeds. This is a major safety concern because drivers have
reported that the defect can cause a loss of control or a rear end
accident from vehicles following behind them.

The Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered harm because of GM's
decision not to disclose the defect by overpaying for their
vehicles and by paying significant sums for GM to attempt, and
fail, to properly diagnose and repair their vehicles that exhibit
the Engine Power Reduced defect. The Plaintiff and Class Members
have also expended time in attempting to have the Engine Power
Reduced defect repaired.

GM has long known of the defect and that the Class Vehicles'
electronic throttle control and/or accelerator pedal position
sensors are not fit for their intended purpose.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and Putative Class are:

          Nicholas A. Migliaccio, Esq.
          Jason S. Rathod, Esq.
          Esfand Y. Nafisi, Esq.
          MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD LLP
          412 H Street N.E., Ste. 302
          Washington, DC 20002
          Telephone: (202) 470-3520
          E-mail: nmigliaccio@classlawdc.com
                  jrathod@classlawdc.com

               - and -

          Daniel Levin, Esq.
          Nicholas Elia, Esq.
          LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN
          510 Walnut Street, Suite 500
          Philadelphia, PA 19106
          Telephone: (215) 592-1500
          E-mail: DLevin@lfsblaw.com
                  Nelia@lfsblaw.com

HARBOR RETIREMENT: Thomas Sues over Collection of Biometric Data
----------------------------------------------------------------
DARWIN THOMAS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. HARBOR RETIREMENT ASSOCIATES, LLC, a
Florida Limited Liability Company, the Defendant, Case No.
2019CH10627 (Ill. Cir., Sept. 13, 2019), seeks to put a stop to
Defendant's unlawful collection, use, and storage of Plaintiffs and
the putative Class members' sensitive biometric data under the
Biometric Information Privacy Act.

When employees work at Harbor, they are required to scan their
fingerprint in its biometric time tracking system as a means of
authentication, instead of using only key fobs or other
identification cards.

While there are tremendous benefits to using biometric time clocks
in the workplace, there are also serious risks. Unlike key fobs or
identification cards-which can bechanged or replaced if stolen or
compromised-fingerprints are unique, permanent biometric
identifiers associated with the employee. This exposes employees to
serious and irreversible privacy risks. For example, if a
fingerprint database is hacked, breached, or otherwise exposed,
employees have no means by which to prevent identity theft and
unauthorized tracking.

Harbor never informed Plaintiff of the specific limited purposes or
length of time for which it collected, stored, or used
fingerprints. Similarly, Harbor never informed Plaintiff of any
biometric data retention policy it developed, nor whether it will
ever permanently delete fingerprints.

The Plaintiff never signed a written release allowing Harbor to
collect or store fingerprints. The Plaintiff has continuously and
repeatedly been exposed to the risks and harmful conditions created
by alleged Harbor violations of the BIPA, the lawsuit says.

Harbor operates dozens of facilities throughout the United States,
including a number in Illinois, that provide assisted living,
memory care, independent living, respite care, and skilled
nursing.[BN]

Plaintiff's Attorneys are:

          David Fish, Esq.
          Kimberly Hilton, Esq.
          John Kunze, Esq.
          THE FISH LAW FIRM, P.C.
          200 East Fifth Avenue, Suite 123
          Naperville, IL 60563
          Telephone: 630 355 7590
          Facsimile: 630 778 0400
          E-mail: admin@fishlawfirm.com
                  dfish(@fishlawfirm.com
                  khilton@fishlawfirm.com
                  kunze@fishlawfirm.com

HEMSTER INC: De Castro Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against HEMSTER, INC., et al.
The case is styled as MARTINA DE CASTRO, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF
OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff v. HEMSTER, INC., DOES
1 THROUGH 100, INCLUSIVE, Defendants, Case No. CGC19579540 (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Francisco Cty., Sept. 26, 2019).

The case type is stated as "OTHER NON EXEMPT COMPLAINTS".

Hemster is a personal tailoring service that empowers customers to
create their own size, no matter where they shop.[BN]


HI-TEK MANUFACTURING: Court Compels Arbitration in Pankey
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio,
Western Division, issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion to
Compel Arbitration in the case captioned Orlando Pankey, Plaintiff,
v. Defendant Hi-Tek Manufacturing, Inc., et al., Defendants. Case
No. 1:18-cv-00702. (S.D. Ohio).

Plaintiff brings this purported class action against Defendants for
alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). He
asserts that Defendants took an adverse action based on his
consumer report without providing a copy of the report and his
notice of rights as required by 15 U.S.C. Section 1681b(b).

Whether the Parties Agreed to Arbitration

Plaintiff does not dispute that he and Defendant Aerotek entered
into the Agreement. Moreover, he does not address Defendant
Aerotek's argument that the Agreement's class action waiver is
valid and enforceable under Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct.
1612 (2018). The Court will construe Plaintiff's silence as to the
property of individual arbitration as a concession. Accordingly,
the Court finds that Plaintiff and Defendant Aerotek agreed to
individual arbitration.

Scope of the Agreement

Plaintiff argues that this matter is beyond the scope of the
Agreement, as he is not asserting any claims relating to his
employment at Aerotek. Defendant Aerotek counters that because
Plaintiff's claims against Aerotek arise out of his application for
employment at Aerotek's customer, Hi-Tek, they clearly fall within
the scope of the agreement.

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Aerotek is a temporary
employment agency, he worked for Aerotek as a temporary employee,
and Aerotek encouraged him to apply to a full-time employment
position at Hi-Tek. Plaintiff alleges that Aerotek processed his
application for full-time employment with HiTek, and Aerotek
conducted itself as a middle-man between him and HiTek during the
hiring process and Aerotek receives compensation from HiTek for
providing services related to the hiring of certain employees.

In his Response, he further alleges that Defendant Aerotek acted as
a middleman and Hi-Tek's agent during the hiring process and
Aerotek acted as Hi-Tek's hiring agent in effecting Plaintiff's
employment relationship with Hi-Tek. Plaintiff reiterates that
Aerotek received compensation from acting as a middleman. Moreover,
Plaintiff concedes that his claims relate to his application and
denial of employment with Hi-Tek.

Plaintiff does not address the Agreement's definition of the
Company, which includes Defendant Aerotek's customers, and his
reading of the Agreement improperly substitutes the word Aerotek
for the phrase the Company. Plaintiff's above allegations describe
a relationship wherein Defendant Aerotek receives payment from
Defendant Hi-Tek for Aerotek's services.

However, Plaintiff's reading of the Agreement would have the Court
ignore the relationship between Plaintiff, a temporary employee,
Defendant Aerotek, a temporary employment agency that Plaintiff
worked for and Defendant Hi-Tek, a corporation seeking to fill a
full-time employment position with Defendant Aerotek's assistance.


The Court finds that Defendant Hi-Tek is Defendant Aerotek's
customer. This finding coupled with Plaintiff's concession that his
claims relate to his application for employment with Hi-Tek compel
the conclusions that Plaintiff has not met his burden of proving
that his claims are non-arbitrable and his claims fall within the
scope of the Agreement.  

Whether Claims are Arbitrable

Plaintiff brings his one count against both Defendants under the
FCRA. There is no indication that Congress intended to preclude the
arbitration of FCRA claims and courts have held that such claims
are arbitrable. The Court finds that Plaintiff's FCRA claims are
arbitrable and will compel Plaintiff to arbitrate his claims
against Defendant Aerotek.

Dismiss or Stay

Defendant Hi-Tek has not moved to compel arbitration. Defendant
Aerotek requests that the Court dismiss this matter as to Aerotek,
as all of Plaintiff's claims against it are subject to arbitration,
but does not discuss the impact, if any, on Defendant Hi-Tek's
failure to move to compel arbitration. Plaintiff did not provide an
argument regarding the propriety of dismissing the matter versus
staying the matter.  

The Court will stay this matter pending the conclusion of
arbitration between Plaintiff and Defendant Aerotek.   

Defendant Aerotek's Motion to Compel Individual Arbitration and
Stay Proceedings against it is granted and the action against
Defendant Aerotek is stayed. It is further ordered that the action
against Defendant Hi-Tek is stayed  pending the conclusion of the
arbitration.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2019 Order is
available https://tinyurl.com/yxoff2zr from Leagle.com.

Orlando Pankey, On behalf of himself and all Others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Brian Paul Gillan -
bgillan@fmr.law - Freking Myers & Reul LLC & Matthew Miller-Novak
-Matt@godbeylaw.com - Godbey Law.

Hi-Tek Manufacturing, Inc., Defendant, represented by Felix John
Gora - FGora@Rendigs.com - Rendigs Fry Kiely & Dennis LLP & Anthony
George Raluy - traluy@rendigs.com - Rendigs, Fry, Kiely & Dennis,
LLP, pro hac vice.

Aerotek, Inc., Defendant, represented by Chad J. Kaldor
ckaldor@littler.com, Littler Mendelson.


JUUL LABS: J.G Sues over Nicotine Content in Vape
-------------------------------------------------
J.G. as guardian of his minor child C.G., and on behalf of those
similarly situated, and J.G. individually, and on behalf of those
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. JUUL LABS INC., ALTRIA
GROUP, INC.; AND PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC.; JOHN DOES No. 1-25; JANE
ROES No. 1-25; and ABC CORPORATION No. 1-25, the Defendants, Case
No. 1:19-cv-17826 (D.N.J., Sept. 10, 2019), alleges that Defendants
targeted minors  through misleading, deceptive, and unconscionable
practices and exploiting themes and images that resonate with
teenagers and young adults, including but not limited to, the use
of popular animation, hiring of models and influencers to promote
e-cigarrettes, social media advertising, and manufacturing and
promoting flavors that were designed to appeal to minors and young
adults, while falsely denying to do so.

The class action is brought by Plaintiff on behalf of all New
Jersey citizens who have purchased, used, become addicted to, or
been otherwise harmed by Electronic Nicotine Delivery System
(ENDS), including but not limited to, electronic cigarettes,
e-cigarettes, vaporizers, pods, e-liquids, and their component
parts, the lawsuit says.

Juul Labs, Inc. is an electronic cigarette company which spun off
from Pax Labs in 2017. It makes the Juul e-cigarette, which
packages nicotine salts from leaf tobacco into one-time use
cartridges. Juul Labs was co-founded by Adam Bowen and James
Monsees. It headquarters is in San Francisco.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Michael A. Galpen, Esq.
          Zachary M. Green, Esq.
          JAVERBAUM WURGAFT HICKS
          KAHN WIKSTROM & SINNIS, P.C.
          100 Haddonfield-Berlin Road, Suite 203
          Voorhess, NJ 08043
          Telephone: 856 596 4100
          Facsimile: 856 702 6640

               - and -

          Seth R. Lesser, Esq.
          Morgan M. Stacey, Esq.
          KLAFTER OLSEN & LESSER LLC
          Two International Drive, Suite 350
          Rye Brook, NY 10573
          Telephone: (914) 934 9200

JUUL LABS: Tekulve, et al. Sue over Nicotine Content in Vapes
-------------------------------------------------------------
ANDREW TEKULVE AND MORGAN WRIGHT, individually and on behalf of
those similarly situated, the PLAINTIFFS, vs. JUUL LABS, INC.; and
PAX LABS, INC., the DEFENDANTS, Case No. 1:19-cv-00773-SJD (S.D.
Ohio, Sept. 13, 2019), targets the Defendants' false and deceptive
sale, marketing, labelling and advertising of JUUL e-cigarette
devices and JUUL pods which came into the market in 2015.  The
lawsuit says the Defendant is in violation of the Ohio Consumer
Protection laws.

Andrew Tekulve and Morgan Wright bring this action on behalf of a
class of all persons who purchased and used a JUUL e-cigarette
and/or JUUL Pods in Ohio, including minors.

The device has been called the "health problem of the decade."
E-cigarettes, also known as vapes, are battery-operated devices
that heat up liquid nicotine to generate an aerosol that users
inhale.

Although Defendants claim that the device is intended exclusively
for adult use, the devises appeal to youth because it can be easily
charged on a laptop, its decal covers come in colorful designs, and
the pods are available in flavors such as mango, mint and creme
brulee. Moreover, using e-cigarettes is more discreet and easier to
hide than traditional cigarettes, particularly for teens at school
or at home and young adults.

To use on JUUL pod, the nicotine cartridge is inserted into the
device and heated. It delivers about 200 puffs, which delivers
approximately as much nicotine as a pack of cigarettes, according
to the product website. Thus, if a teen consumes one pod a week, in
five weeks, it is equivalent to about 100 cigarettes (5 packs of
cigarettes), the lawsuit says.

Juul Labs, Inc. is an electronic cigarette company which spun off
from Pax Labs in 2017. It makes the Juul e-cigarette, which
packages nicotine salts from leaf tobacco into one-time use
cartridges. Juul Labs was co-founded by Adam Bowen and James
Monsees. It headquarters is in San Francisco.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class are:

          Barbara D. Bonar, Esq.
          BONAR, BUCHER & RANKIN, PSC
          3611 Decoursey Avenue
          Covington, KY 41015
          Telephone (859) 431-3333
          Facsimile (859) 392-3900
          E-mail: bdbonar@lawatbdb.com

               - and -

          Joseph G. Tekulve, Esq.
          785 Ohio Pike
          Cincinnati, OH 45245
          Telephone (513) 752-0001
          Facsimile (513) 752-0289
          E-mail: joetekulvelaw@gmail.com

KAISER-FRANCIS OIL: Pauper Petroleum Files Suit in N.D. Oklahoma
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Kaiser-Francis Oil
Company. The case is styled as Pauper Petroleum, LLC, on behalf of
itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Kaiser-Francis Oil Company a Delaware corporation, (including
affiliated predecessors and affiliated successors), Defendant, Case
No. 4:19-cv-00514-GKF-JFJ (N.D. Okla., Sept. 23, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract.

Kaiser-Francis Oil Company conducts business in the acquisition,
exploration, production and disposition of oil and gas properties.
Kaiser-Francis serves customers throughout United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Barbara Chase Wiley Frankland, Esq.
     Rex A Sharp
     Rex A Sharp PA
     5301 W 75TH
     PRAIRIE VILLAGE, KS 66208
     Phone: (913) 901-0505
     Fax: (913) 901-0419
     Email: bfrankland@midwest-law.com
            rsharp@midwest-law.com

          - and -

     Margaret E Robertson, Esq.
     Reagan Edward Bradford, Esq.
     Ryan Keith Wilson, Esq.
     Lanier Law Firm (OKC)
     431 W MAIN ST STE D
     OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102
     Phone: (405) 698-2700
     Fax: (405) 234-5506
     Email: maggie.robertson@lanierlawfirm.com
            reagan.bradford@lanierlawfirm.com
            ryan.wilson@aya.yale.edu


KENNEDY ENDEAVORS: Court Narrows Claims in Deceptive Labeling Suit
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The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii issued
an Order granting in part and denying in part Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss in the case captioned MICHAEL MAEDA and RICK SMITH,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. KENNEDY ENDEAVORS, INC.; DOES 1 THROUGH 50,
Defendants. Civil No. 18-00459 JAO-WRP. (D. Haw.).

This putative consumer class action arises out of the sale and
marketing of Defendant Kennedy Endeavors, Inc.'s Hawaiian brand
snacks. Plaintiffs Michael Maeda and Rick Smith allege that they
purchased certain varieties of these snacks due to false and
deceptive labeling, packaging, and advertising, which misled them
into believing that the snacks are made in Hawai'i from local
ingredients.

Plaintiffs continue to allege that although the Hawaiian Snacks are
manufactured in Algona, Washington, Defendant markets them in such
a manner as to mislead consumers into believing that they were
manufactured in Hawai'i.

The SAC asserts the following claims: (1) violation of Hawai'i's
Unfair Deceptive Acts or Practices Statute (UDAP), HRS Chapter 480
(Count 1), (2) violation of Hawai'i's false advertising law, HRS
Section 708-871 (Count 2), (3) violation of UDTPA, HRS Chapter 481A
(Count 3), (4) violation of California's Consumers Legal Remedies
Act (CLRA), (Count 4), (5) violation of California's unfair
competition law (UCL), Cal. Business & Professions Code Section
17200 (Count 5), (6) violation of California's false advertising
law (FAL), Cal. Business & Professions Code Section 17500 (Count
6), (7) common law fraud/intentional misrepresentation (Count 7),
(8) negligent misrepresentation (Count 8), and (9)
quasi-contract/unjust enrichment/restitution (Count 9).

Defendant seeks dismissal of the SAC because: (1) the Hawaiian
brand name and trade dress accurately reflect the Hawaiian Snacks'
heritage, and are puffery, at most; (2) Plaintiffs' fraud-based
claims are facially deficient pursuant to FRCP 9(b) and (3) the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any claims pertaining
to the six varieties of Hawaiian snacks not purchased by
Plaintiffs. The Court addresses each of Defendant's arguments in
turn.

Consumer Protection Claims

Plaintiffs' Hawai'i and California consumer protection claims are
premised on the same underlying facts: Plaintiffs reasonably
believed that the Hawaiian Snacks were made in Hawai'i based on
Defendant's deceptive Hawaiian reference and packaging and they
would not have purchased, or would have paid less for the Hawaiian
Snacks, had they known that the snacks are not manufactured in
Hawai'i.

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' claims are subject to dismissal
because its use of Hawaiian and Hawai'i imagery are mere puffery,
and do not amount to actionable misrepresentations. Plaintiffs
characterize this argument as an attempt by Defendant to seek
reconsideration of the Court's prior ruling that it could not
conclude as a matter of law that a reasonable consumer would not be
deceived by the Hawaiian Snacks' packaging and marketing.
Plaintiffs urge the Court not to revisit and reverse its prior
holding under the law of the case doctrine.  

Law of the Case Doctrine

The law of the case doctrine generally provides that when a court
decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern
the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case and applies
most clearly where an issue has been decided by a higher court, in
that case, the lower court is precluded from reconsidering the
issue and abuses its discretion in doing so except in the limited
circumstances the district court identified.

The doctrine does not preclude a court from reassessing its own
legal rulings in the same case, however. Indeed, a court may
reconsider its own orders before judgment is entered or the court
is otherwise divested of jurisdiction over the order.

In this case, the Court dismissed the claims at issue with leave to
amend. The Court must therefore consider the SAC on its merits and
it is not constrained by statements its prior Order.

Even if the law of the case doctrine applied, the Court did not
decide the puffery issue, as Plaintiffs claim. Rather, without
addressing puffery and in reviewing the sufficiency of Plaintiff
Maeda's California consumer protection claims, the Court merely
stated that it cannot at this stage conclude as a matter of law
that a reasonable consumer would not be deceived by the Hawaiian
Snacks' packaging and marketing.

The Court instead dismissed Plaintiff Maeda's California consumer
protection claims for failure to sufficiently plead fraud and
granted Plaintiff Maeda leave to amend those claims. Because
Plaintiffs should be given leave to amend claims that could be
saved by amendment, the Court properly allowed Plaintiff Maeda to
cure his defective California consumer protection claims before
considering whether dismissal is appropriate on puffery grounds
and/or for failure to satisfy the reasonable consumer test.

Puffery

Defendant contends that Plaintiffs' claims are subject to dismissal
because the Hawaiian Snacks' trade names and trade dress are mere
puffery, that is, they are an accurate homage to their history and
heritage and not a concrete statement of geographic origin. Now
that Plaintiffs are on the fourth iteration of their pleading, the
Court finds it appropriate to evaluate whether certain claims are
subject to dismissal as a matter of law based on puffery grounds.

Statements that are generalized, vague and unspecific assertions
constitute mere puffery upon which a reasonable consumer could not
rely and are not actionable under the California consumer
protection statutes. Put another way, a statement is considered
puffery if the claim is extremely unlikely to induce consumer
reliance.

California consumer protection law distinguishes between concrete
statements about a product and generalized boasts or statements of
opinion, and only the former is actionable under the consumer
protection statutes.If an alleged misrepresentation would not
deceive a reasonable consumer or amounts to mere puffery, then the
claim may be dismissed as a matter of law.

When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6),
district courts often resolve whether a statement is puffery.
However, whether a business practice is deceptive will usually be a
question of fact not appropriate for decision on demurrer. Only in
a rare situation is a motion to dismiss granted on this ground.  

Both Hawai'i and California employ the reasonable consumer standard
in evaluating consumer protection claims. However, only the
California courts apply the puffery defense in the manner urged by
Defendant.

Therefore, although the parties conflate the Hawai'i and California
claims and their related analyses, the Court evaluates the Hawai'i
and California consumer protection claims as they are
conventionally addressed by the respective state appellate courts
and federal district courts.

Hawai'i Consumer Protection Claims

UDAP - Count 1

With respect to the UDAP claim, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant's
conduct was and continues to be deceptive and of no benefit to
consumers because Defendant misleads consumers into believing that
the Hawaiian Snacks are made in Hawai'i, when they are in fact
manufactured in Washington. According to Plaintiffs, the HAWAIIAN
wording and accompanying Hawaiian imagery and references printed on
the front packaging are likely to be interpreted by a reasonable
consumer to mean that the Hawaiian snacks are made in Hawai'i.

HRS Section 480-13(b) authorizes a cause of action for any consumer
who is injured by any unfair or deceptive act or practice forbidden
or declared unlawful by section 480-2. HRS Section 480-2(a) deems
unlawful unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce. A deceptive
practice has the capacity or tendency to mislead or deceive.

Because Plaintiffs allege fraudulent conduct by Defendant, their
allegations must be pled with particularity pursuant to FRCP 9(b).
FRCP 9(b) requires a party alleging fraud or mistake to state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.

In the original Complaint, Plaintiffs failed to satisfy FRCP 9(b)'s
heightened pleading requirements. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs
have yet to comply with FRCP 9(b)'s heightened pleading standards
because although they have included more factual allegations, they
have not added any new allegations concerning Defendant's conduct.
After reviewing Plaintiffs' allegations related to this claim, the
Court finds that Plaintiffs sufficiently state a UDAP cause of
action. The allegations added to the SAC provide Defendant with
ample notice of the purportedly violative conduct and in fact, it
is unclear what more they could allege concerning the circumstances
that serve as the basis for their claim.

Hence, the Court DENIES the Motion as to the UDAP claim (Count 1).

Hawai'i's False Advertising Law - HRS Section 708-871 - Count 2

In its Order, the Court concluded that Plaintiff Maeda adequately
stated a claim for false advertising. Plaintiffs added factual
allegations in the SAC regarding their purchases, but their legal
allegations remain the same: Defendant has represented and
continues to represent to the public, through deceptive packaging
and marketing, that the Hawaiian Snacks are products made in Hawaii
which is misleading because the Hawaiian Snacks are made in the
continental United States, and more specifically, in Algona,
Washington. Plaintiffs continue to assert that Defendant has
violated HRS Section 708-871 by disseminating misleading
information when it knows, knew, or should have known through the
exercise of reasonable care that the representation was and
continues to be misleading.

In light of the Court's prior determination that Plaintiffs
sufficiently stated a claim, and Defendant having failed to
specifically address or challenge this claim, the Court again finds
that Plaintiffs adequately state a claim for false advertising.

Consequently, the Motion is DENIED as to the false advertising
claim (Count 2).

UDTPA - HRS Chapter 481A - Count 3

Plaintiffs present their UDTPA claim for the first time in the SAC,
alleging that Defendant violated HRS Section 481A-3(a)(2),
481A-3(a)(4), 481A-3(a)(5), and 481A-3(a)(7) by marketing the
Hawaii Snacks with their current labeling, packing, and
advertisements because this practice (1) caused likelihood of
confusion or misunderstanding that the source of the Hawaiian
Snacks is Hawai'i, when it is not (2) used deceptive representation
and designations of the product's geographic origin in connection
with goods or services, represented and continues to represent that
the Hawaiian Snacks have characteristics (made in Hawai'i) which
they do not have and (4) represented and continues to represent
that the products are made in Hawai'i when they are actually made
in the mainland.

Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant violated HRS Sections
481A-3(a)(9) and 481A-3(a)(12) by packaging and marketing the
Hawaiian Snacks as originating from Hawai'i, because it
intentionally did not sell the products as such and it created
confusion and misunderstanding about the geographic origin of the
Hawaiian Snacks. Plaintiffs claim to have reasonably and
justifiably relied on Defendant's misleading and fraudulent conduct
when purchasing the Hawaiian Snacks and aver that they would not
have purchased the snacks, or would have paid less, had they known
the snacks were made on the mainland. Plaintiffs seek injunctive
relief pursuant to Section 481A-4 to prevent Defendant from
continuing to engage in the identified wrongful acts and unfair and
unlawful business practices.

Defendant moves for dismissal of this claim because § 481A-4 only
offers injunctive relief as a remedy and Plaintiffs have not
plausibly alleged future harm. Plaintiffs misconstrue this as a
standing argument and insist that their reference to paragraphs
1-65 in paragraph 87 cures the purported technical defect because
paragraph 53 explains that Plaintiffs wish to continue purchasing
Hawaiian Snacks if they are made in Hawai`i or Plaintiffs are
confident about their place of manufacture.   

The Court disagrees.

Plaintiffs expanded their pleading from 38 to 65 pages due in large
part to lengthy factual redundancies within each claim. As such,
Plaintiffs should have and easily could have presented the
requisite future harm allegations within their UDTPA claim, which
is achievable in a sentence or two. Given the verbosity of the SAC,
neither Defendant nor the Court should be required to scour 65
paragraphs of general factual allegations to ascertain whether
those allegations, when coupled with allegations specifically
pertaining to the UDTPA claim, adequately state a claim.  

Insofar as Plaintiffs bolstered their allegations with respect to
the other claims, the Court finds unconvincing their contention
that they adequately pled a UDTPA claim by referencing paragraphs 1
through 65. Their reliance on prior paragraphs to save this claim
highlights the inadequacy of their allegations, which identify past
harm but fail to allege future harm even though an injunction is
Chapter 481A's exclusive remedy. The Court also notes that as pled,
this claim fails to satisfy FRCP 9(b).

Defendant requests that the claim be dismissed without leave to
amend because Plaintiffs have already had multiple opportunities to
perfect their allegations. The Court agrees that Plaintiffs have
had ample opportunity and further notes that the facts underlying
Plaintiffs' claims precede the inception of this case. This is
Plaintiffs' fourth iteration of their pleading, there is no
identifiable reason for their failure to include this claim at the
outset, nor their failure to proffer sufficient allegations.
However, the Court must apply the liberal standard concerning the
amendment of pleadings.

Because Plaintiffs could potentially cure the aforementioned
defects, the Court DISMISSES the UDTPA claim, but grants Plaintiffs
leave to amend. This will be Plaintiffs' sole opportunity to amend
this claim.

California Consumer Protection Claims

CLRA, UCL and FAL - Counts 4-6

Defendant seeks dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff Maeda's
California CLRA, UCL, and FAL claims on the basis that the Hawaiian
Snacks' trade name and dress are mere puffery, at most, and/or
because Plaintiffs do not satisfy the reasonable consumer test. As
explained above, courts may dismiss California consumer protection
claims as a matter of law when a purported misrepresentation
amounts to puffery or would not deceive a reasonable consumer.  

California's consumer protection laws all prohibit unlawful,
unfair, or fraudulent business practices. They prohibit `not only
advertising which is false, but also advertising which, although
true, is either actually misleading or which has a capacity,
likelihood or tendency to deceive or confuse the public. Any
violation of the FAL necessarily violates the UCL.  

Notwithstanding their differences, California's consumer protection
statutes are all governed by the reasonable consumer test. The
reasonable consumer test requires Plaintiff Maeda to show that
members of the public are likely to be deceived.

Likely to deceive requires more than a mere possibility that
Defendant's packaging and marketing of the Hawaiian Snacks might
conceivably be misunderstood by some few consumers viewing it in an
unreasonable manner. The reasonable consumer standard requires a
probability that a significant portion of the general consuming
public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the
circumstances, could be misled.

Based on the foregoing, the California consumer protection claims
presented here fall into the exceptional category of cases
susceptible to dismissal because a reasonable consumer would not be
misled into believing that the Hawaiian Snacks originate from
Hawai`i due to the mere inclusion of the word Hawaiian plus
Hawai`i-related imagery on the snacks' packaging.

Common Law Claims

Common Law Fraud/Intentional Misrepresentation - Count 7

Plaintiffs again allege that Defendant willfully, falsely, or
knowingly packaged and marketed the Hawaiian Snacks in a manner
indicating that the Hawaiian Snacks are made in Hawai'i even though
they are made in the continental United States, namely in Algona,
Washington. They aver that Defendant's misrepresentations are and
were material and that Defendant's use of HAWAIIAN and Hawaiian
images in its labeling evidences its intention for Plaintiffs and
consumers to rely on these representations.    

Plaintiffs added paragraphs of factual allegations concerning their
purchase of the Hawaiian Snacks, claiming that the packaging caused
them to reasonably believe that the snacks are from Hawaii. They
represent that were it not for their reliance on Defendant's
misrepresentations, they would not have purchased the Hawaiian
Snacks, or they would have declined to purchase the snacks at the
offered prices.  

To establish a common law fraud claim in Hawaii, a plaintiff must
show that there was (1) a representation of a material fact (2)
made for the purpose of inducing the other party to act (3) known
to be false but reasonably believed true by the other party and (4)
upon which the other party relies and acts to his or her damage.

To establish an intentional misrepresentation claim, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that (1) false representations were made by
defendants (2) with knowledge of their falsity or without knowledge
of their truth or falsity (3) in contemplation of plaintiff's
reliance upon these false representations and (4) plaintiff did
rely upon them.

The Court dismissed Plaintiffs' fraud and intentional
misrepresentation claims asserted in the original Complaint for
failure to to satisfy FRCP 9(b)'s heightened pleading requirements.


Defendant argues that this claim remains deficient under FRCP 9(b)
despite the addition of factual allegations because Plaintiffs have
not added necessary allegations concerning Defendant's conduct.
Based on the Court's review of Plaintiffs' additional allegations
related to this claim, it concludes that Plaintiffs sufficiently
state a fraud/intentional misrepresentation claim. Plaintiffs have
provided factual context, identified Defendant's purported
misrepresentations, and explained how they were harmed. The
newly-added allegations provide Defendant with enough notice of the
conduct that purportedly caused harm to Plaintiffs.

Thus, the Court DENIES the Motion as to the fraud/intentional
misrepresentation claim (Count 7).

Negligent Misrepresentation - Count 8

Plaintiffs' core negligent misrepresentation allegations are by and
large identical to those asserted in the Complaint. The Court found
that Plaintiff Maeda adequately stated a claim for negligent
misrepresentation by asserting that Defendant made
misrepresentations concerning the origin of the Hawaiian Snacks
knowing they were false, to induce him and other consumers to rely
on the representations, upon which they relied, and he suffered
damages as a result.   

Based on this reasoning, the Court denied Defendant's prior motion
to dismiss. Other than its blanket request for dismissal, Defendant
does not advance any arguments concerning deficiencies with respect
to this claim. Accordingly, the Court again finds that Plaintiffs
adequately state a claim for negligence misrepresentation. The
Motion is therefore DENIED as to the negligent misrepresentation
claim (Count 8).

Quasi-Contract/Unjust Enrichment/Restitution - Count 9

The Court previously found that Plaintiff Maeda adequately stated a
quasi-contract/unjust enrichment/restitution claim under both
Hawai`i and California law. Defendant does not raise any specific
challenges other than to suggest that all claims must be dismissed
pursuant to its puffery defense to this claim and neither party
offered any briefing or analysis.

Therefore, as it did before, the Court DENIES the Motion with
respect to this claim.

Standing as to the Unpurchased Hawaiian Snacks

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs lack standing with respect to six
varieties of the Hawaiian Snacks they did not purchase: Hawaiian
Kettle Style Potato Chips in the Sweet Maui Onion, Ginger Wasabi,
Hulapeno, and Mango Habanero flavors, and the Hawaiian Rings in
Luau Barbeque and Sweet Maui Onion flavors. Plaintiffs counter that
they have standing because the products they purchased Hawaiian
Kettle Style Potato Chips in Original and Luau BBQ flavors are
substantially similar to the other six products. Alternatively,
Plaintiffs suggest that the Court could defer ruling on this issue
until class certification.

Constitutional Standing

Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to certain cases and controversies. Plaintiffs are
required to demonstrate three elements to establish that they have
standing to sue in federal court: (1) injury in fact that is
concrete and particularized and actual and imminent (2) the injury
must be fairly traceable to defendant's conduct; and (3) the injury
can be redressed through adjudication.  

Even if an injury is shared by a large class of other possible
litigants, a plaintiff must nevertheless allege a distinct and
palpable injury to himself.

A plaintiff invoking federal jurisdiction must satisfy Article
III's standing requirements even if the plaintiff only asserts
state law claims.  

Whether Plaintiffs Have Standing as to the Unpurchased Snacks

A plaintiff may have standing to assert claims for unnamed class
members based on products he or she did not purchase so long as the
products and alleged misrepresentations are substantially similar.
Even products with varying ingredients can be deemed substantially
similar when the same wrongful conduct is attributable to those
products.  Claims are subject to dismissal where the unpurchased
product and the purchased product are dissimilar or require an
individualized factual inquiry.

Here, the Hawaiian Snacks are sufficiently similar. All of the
snack packages include the word HAWAIIAN at top, followed by (1)
Kettle Style Potato Chips and the respective flavor (2) Luau
Barbeque Rings or (3) Sweet Maui Onion Rings.  All packing also
contains a Hawaii-related image; the Luau Barbeque Chips and Rings
share the same image, as do the Sweet Maui Onion Chips and Rings.


The Court finds that Plaintiffs have standing to assert claims on
behalf of unnamed class members as to the unpurchased Hawaiian
Snacks. The Court therefore DENIES the Motion to the extent it
requests dismissal for lack of standing.

The Court HEREBY GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant's
Motion as follows:

The California consumer protection claims (Counts 4-6) are
DISMISSED.

The UDTPA claim (Count 3) is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

The Motion is DENIED as to these claims: UDAP (Count 1), Hawai'i
false advertising (Count 2), fraud/intentional misrepresentation
(Count 7), negligent misrepresentation (Count 8), and
quasi-contact/unjust enrichment/restitution claim (Count 9). The
Motion is DENIED as to Defendant's standing challenge.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 19, 2019 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2tm6llw from Leagle.com.

Michael Maeda, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & Rick Smith, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Benjamin Heikali ,
Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, pro hac vice, Brandee J. Faria  -
bjkfaria@perkinlaw.com -Perkin & Faria, Timothy J. Peter -
tpeter@faruqilaw.com - Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, pro hac vice & Aubry
Wand - awand@wandlawfirm.com - The Wand Law Firm, P.C.

Kennedy Endeavors, Inc., a corporation, Defendant, represented by
Andrew G. Phillips , Alston & Bird LLP, 333 South Hope Street,
Sixteenth Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071, pro hac vice, Angela M.
Spivey - angela.spivey@alston.com - Alston & Bird LLP, pro hac
vice, Jesse J.T. Smith , McCorriston Miller Mukai MacKinnon LLP &
David J. Minkin , McCorriston Miller Mukai MacKinnon, Five
Waterfront Plaza, 4th Floor, 500 Ala Moana Boulevard, Honolulu, HI
96813- 4989


KINDRED HEALTHCARE: Court Denies Wage & Hour Suit Dismissal
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The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order denying Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment in the case captioned SARAH STONEHOCKER, Plaintiff, v.
KINDRED HEALTHCARE OPERATING, LLC, Defendant. Case No.
19-cv-02494-YGR. (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Sarah Stonehocker brings this putative class action
against defendant Kindred Healthcare Operating, LLC alleging claims
under California law for failure to pay overtime wages, failure to
pay wages when due, and unlawful business practices.

Defendant now moves for an early summary judgment on grounds that
(i) plaintiff is bound by the judgment and dismissal entered in
Cashon v. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc., et al., Case No.
3:16-cv-04889-RS and thus, plaintiff's claims are barred by the
doctrine of claim preclusion and (ii) plaintiff released her right
to bring the claims asserted in this action through the Class
Action Settlement Agreement and Stipulation approved by the court
in Cashon.

The Cashon Action

Valerie Cashon filed a putative class action against defendant,
also arising from defendant's wage-and-hour practices.   

In the operative second amended complaint (SAC), Cashon, who
allegedly worked as an occupational therapist for defendant,
asserted thirteen causes of action, including failure to pay piece
rate employees for rest and meal breaks and nonproductive time,
failure to pay for all hours worked, failure to pay minimum wage,
failure to keep accurate payroll records, failure to pay overtime
compensation, waiting time penalties, failure to reimburse for
business expenses, and violation of the Private Attorney General
Act of 2004 (PAGA). Cashon purported to bring these claims on
behalf of herself and a class comprised of the following:

All Clinicians and Piece Rate Employees who at any time during the
four years preceding the filing of the complaint and/or during its
pendency were employed by defendants in California.

Judge Richard Seeborg, the presiding judge in Cashon, granted
preliminary approval of a class action settlement entered into by
the parties.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, discovery, and
affidavits demonstrate that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Material facts are those that might affect the outcome of the
case. On summary judgment, the court draws all reasonable factual
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.  

The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to
an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. Once the
movant has made this showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving
party to identify specific evidence showing there is a genuine
issue of material fact for trial.  

Defendant claims it is entitled to summary judgment because (1)
plaintiff's claims are barred by claim preclusion in light of the
Cashon litigation and settlement; and (2) plaintiff's claims are
barred by the terms of the release contained in the Cashon
settlement agreement.

The Court addresses each argument in turn.

Claim Preclusion

First, the Court must determine whether plaintiff is barred by the
doctrine of claim preclusion from asserting her claims in this
action.

The doctrine of claim preclusion precludes parties or their
privities from relitigating a cause of action that has been finally
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. For the doctrine
to apply, the following requirements must be met: (1) the decision
in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits (2) the present
action is based on the same cause of action as the prior proceeding
and (3) the parties in the present action or parties in privity
with them were parties to the prior proceeding.  

Here, the parties agree that the first and third requirements are
satisfied, that is, Cashon resulted in a final decision on the
merits and the parties in this case were parties to or in privity
with the parties in Cashon. Thus, the only issue before the Court
is whether this case is based on the same cause of action as
Cashon, such that the second requirement is satisfied.

Under California law, courts use the primary rights doctrine to
ascertain whether two cases involve the same cause of action. Under
the primary rights doctrine, a cause of action is comprised of a
primary right of the plaintiff, a corresponding primary duty of the
defendant, and a wrongful act by the defendant constituting a
breach of that duty. The determinative factor in the primary rights
analysis is the harm suffered, rather than the legal theory
advanced or the remedy sought.  

Defendant avers that this action and Cashon both arise from the
same primary right of defendant's clinicians to be paid all wages
owed for total hours worked, including overtime compensation and
paid all wages due at termination.

Plaintiff counters that Cashon and this action involve separate,
distinct primary rights, emphasizing that the cases arise from work
performed by different putative classes, in different settings, for
different direct employers, using different pay structures.

To resolve this dispute, the Court must compare the complaints in
the two actions, focusing on the facts pleaded and the injuries
alleged. The first amended complaint in this case, like the
operative complaint in Cashon, alleges that defendant failed to pay
due wages to members of the class, which includes physical
therapists, occupational therapists, and speech therapists. The
complaints diverge, however, on other critical allegations. For
example, unlike Cashon, this action arises from defendant's strict
and impracticable minimum Patient Care Ratio (minimum PCR)
productivity standard, which allegedly resulted in systemic failure
to pay for overtime hours worked and to pay wages when due.

Plaintiff alleges that members of the class were typically required
to see seven to twelve patients during their scheduled eight-hour
shifts, during which they performed skilled direct care and
unskilled ancillary work. The complaint further alleges that in
order to maintain the minimum PCR, which was rigorously enforced,
plaintiffs performed unpaid and undocumented overtime work. Cashon
made no mention of PCRs.

Accordingly, the second claim preclusion requirement has not been
met. The doctrine of claim preclusion does not bar plaintiff from
proceeding with her claims.

Cashon Settlement Release

Next, the Court must determine whether defendant is entitled to
summary judgment because the Cashon settlement released plaintiff's
claims.

Accordingly, the Cashon release must be interpreted to effectuate
the intent of the parties in the context of the overall action,
while applying Ninth Circuit law regarding limitations on
enforceability of releases.

Under the terms of the Cashon release, settling class members are
barred from pursuing all disputes, claims, and/or causes of action
pleaded or which could have been pleaded in and arising from the
facts, claims and/or allegations in the Cashon complaint during the
Settlement Period, as well as all claims of any and every nature
based on off-the-clock work, minimum wage, overtime, waiting time
penalties, California IWC Wage Order claims and Unfair Competition
Law claims that arose during the Settlement Period.

Defendant avers that this release expressly includes and releases
all of the causes of action at issue in this action, and because
plaintiff failed to object to, intervene in, or opt out of the
Cashon settlement, she is therefore barred from asserting her
claims in this case. Plaintiff counters that the release does not
bar her claims because the "subject matter of the two cases is
fundamentally different.

Defendant's argument fails to persuade.

For the reasons discussed above, the evidence shows that Cashon and
this case arise from different factual predicates: namely, the
Cashon settlement concerns defendant's compensation of clinicians
working in the home healthcare setting, whereas this action
defendant's compensation of clinicians working in the SNF setting.
Both parties have submitted evidence indicating that the nature of
the work and the pay structures differed in each of these settings.
  

Moreover, the Cashon complaint does not contain a single allegation
regarding PCRs, which are a focus of plaintiff's allegations here,
while plaintiff's complaint does not address piece rate employees,
which were a focus of the Cashon complaint.  

Such differences in the factual predicates underlying each action
are significant. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Cashon
release does not preclude plaintiff from pursuing her claims in
this action.

The Court DENIES defendant's motion for summary judgment.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 19, 2019 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yy63ntof from Leagle.com.

Sarah Stonehocker, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Matthew D. Carlson -
mcarlson@wkblaw.com - Law Office of Matthew D. Carlson.

Kindred Healthcare Operating, LLC, Defendant, represented by
Elizabeth Porter Staggs-Wilson -estaggs-wilson@littler.com -
Littler Mendelson, P.C., Lisa Lin Garcia - llgarcia@littler.com -
Littler Mendelson, P.C. & Alice Hsiu-Wen Wang-  awang@littler.com -
Littler Mendelson, P.C..


L BRANDS: Mitts Says Business & Operational Statements Misleading
-----------------------------------------------------------------
KURT J. MITTS, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. L BRANDS, INC., LESLIE H. WEXNER, and
STUART B. BURGDOERFER, the Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-03961-SDM-EPD (S.D. Ohio., Sept. 9, 2019), is a federal
securities class action brought on behalf of all purchasers of L
Brands securities between May 31, 2018 and November 19, 2018,
inclusive.

In November 2018, L Brands announced that it was terminating the
operations of Henri Bendel and "pursuing alternatives" with respect
to its La Senza business so that it could better focus on the
operations of its two key brands, Victoria's Secret and Bath & Body
Works. In January 2019, the Company divested its ownership interest
in La Senza to an affiliate of Regent L.P., a global private equity
firm.

Prior to and during the Class Period, L Brands' Victoria's Secret
and PINK (whose intimate apparel is primarily marketed to
college-age students) businesses began to experience deteriorating
operating performance because of, among other things, increased
competition from new lingerie brands, such as Aerie, ThirdLove, and
Savage X Fenty.

In an attempt to drive sales and retain market share in the face of
increasing competition, Victoria's Secret and PINK engaged in heavy
promotional activities by offering consumers large discounts and
even giving items free of charge. While this marketing strategy
helped to mitigate sales declines, it adversely impacted the
Company's profit margins and cash flows.

For example, while the combined annual sales of Victoria's Secret
and PINK declined by only 5% between fiscal 2016 and 2018, from
$7.8 billion to $7.4 billion, their combined annual operating
income declined by approximately 61% during the same period, from
$1.2 billion to $462 million.

Since Victoria's Secret and PINK account for more than half of L
Brands' total business, their deteriorating operating performance
had a deleterious impact on the Company's liquidity. For example,
the annual cash flows generated by L Brands' operations declined
from $2.0 billion in fiscal 2016 to $1.4 billion in fiscal 2018,
while its net debt (defined as total debt minus cash and cash
equivalents) increased from $7.0 billion at the end of fiscal 2016
to $7.6 billion at the end of fiscal 2018.

Observing the deteriorating operating performance at the Company's
flagship Victoria's Secret and PINK businesses, as well as L
Brands' decreasing operating cash flows and rising debt levels,
securities analysts frequently questioned Defendants during the
Class Period about the sustainability of the Company's dividends.

In response, Stuart B. Burgdoerfer, L Brands' Chief Financial
Officer and Executive Vice President, repeatedly misled investors
by stating that L Brands had sufficient cash flow and cash on hand
to sustain its dividends and that the Company "in its history, has
never reduced the dividend."

Throughout the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and
misleading statements regarding the Company's business, operational
and compliance policies. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that:

     (i) the Victoria's Secret and PINK businesses were having a
material adverse effect on the Company's
cash flow, liquidity and debt levels;

    (ii) Defendants lacked a reasonable basis for their positive
statements about the ability of the Company to sustain its
dividend; and

   (iii) as a result, the Company's public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

Just weeks after Defendants issued this series of false and
misleading statements about the Company's dividends, L Brands
announced that it was cutting its dividend in half so that it could
pay down existing debt.

On this news, the price of L Brands common stock declined
approximately 18% on extremely heavy trading volume, from $34.55
per share on November 19, 2018, to $28.43 per share on November 20,
2018.

As a result of Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages, the lawsuit says.

Founded in 1963, L Brands is a specialty retailer of women's
intimate apparel and personal care, beauty and home fragrance
products. The Company's merchandise is sold through specialty
retail stores in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom,
Ireland and China, as well as via websites and international
franchise, license and wholesale partners. During the Class Period,
the Company's portfolio of brands included Victoria's Secret, PINK,
Bath & Body Works, La Senza and Henri Bendel. Victoria's Secret,
PINK and La Senza are brands that are primarily associated with
women's intimate apparel. Bath & Body Works is a specialty retailer
of body care, home fragrance products, soaps and sanitizers. Henri
Bendel was a seller of handbags, jewelry and other accessory
products.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

         Richard S. Wayne, Esq.
         William K. Flynn, Esq.
         STRAUSS TROY CO., LPA
         150 E. Fourth Street
         Cincinnati, OH 45202-4018
         Telephone: (513) 621-2120
         Facsimile: (513) 629-9426
         E-mail: rswayne@strausstroy.com
                wkflynn@strausstroy.com

              - and -

         Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
         J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
         Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
         POMERANTZ LLP
         600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
         New York, New York 10016
         Telephone: (212) 661-1100
         Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
         E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                 ahood@pomlaw.com
                pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com

LA MARINA: Ulerio et al. Seek Overtime Pay for Employees
--------------------------------------------------------
ALFREDO ULERIO and ANTONIO NESTOR, the Plaintiffs, vs. LA MARINA
PARKING, LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-08500 (S.D.N.Y.,
Sept. 12, 2019), alleges that the Defendant violated the Fair Labor
Standards Act, and the New York State Labor Law as a result of its
failure to pay:

     -- the Plaintiffs an overtime premium,

     -- a minimum wage, and

     -- wages due and owed for hours employees were required
        to report to work, ready to perform work and actually
        performed work duties.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover unpaid back wages, unpaid tips,
unpaid overtime, and an additional amount as liquidated damages,
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. The Plaintiffs and all other
similarly situated are current and former hourly employees of the
Defendant.

La Marina Parking is a joint employer and/or single enterprise with
the carwash which is operated under the same corporate entity by
the same owners and management.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Jesse C. Rose, Esq.
          THE ROSE LAW GROUP, PLLC
          3109 Newtown Avenue, Suite 309
          Astoria, NY 11102
          Telephone: (718) 989-1864
          Facsimile: (917) 831-4595

LEHMANN-MAUPIN LLC: Mendez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Lehmann-Maupin L.L.C.
The case is styled as Himelda Mendez AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER
PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff v. Lehmann-Maupin L.L.C.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-08982 (S.D. N.Y., Sept. 26, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Lehmann Maupin LLC was founded in 1998. The company's line of
business includes the operation of museums and art galleries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
     The Marks Law Firm PC
     175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
     New York, NY 10014
     Phone: (646) 770-3775
     Fax: (646) 867-2639
     Email: bmarkslaw@gmail.com



LET'S EAT OUT: Court OKs $650K Settlement in Servers' Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri, Southern Division, issued an Order granting Plaintiffs'
Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Class in the case captioned
OLIVIA COPE, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, known and unknown, Plaintiff, v. LET'S EAT OUT,
INCORPORATED d/b/a BUFFALO WILD WINGS, JEREMY BOYER, individually,
JAMES BRUNO, Individually, BRUNO MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC., BRUNO
ENTERPRISES, INC. TOO, WING BACKS, INC., SOONERS OR LATER, INC.,
HOT TEX, INC., and SPREADING OUR WINGS, INC., Defendants. Case No.
6:16-cv-03050. (W.D. Mo.).

The Class Members as defined in the Order Preliminarily Approving
the Settlement Agreement are co-extensive with the classes
previously certified by the Court and are as follows:

     All current and former servers and bartenders working at any
of Defendants' Buffalo Wild Wings restaurants in Missouri who, at
any time from February 10, 2014 until May 31, 2015, were paid
sub-minimum, tip-credit rates of pay (the Missouri Minimum Wage Act
Class)  and b. All current and former servers and bartenders
working at any of Defendants' Buffalo Wild Wings restaurants who,
at any time from February 10, 2011 until May 31, 2015, were paid
sub-minimum, tip-credit rates of pay (the Missouri Common Law
Class).

The Court finally approves the Settlement Agreement and the
Settlement of the Missouri Minimum Wage Act Class and the Missouri
Common Law Class claims as fair, reasonable, and adequate.
Defendants shall pay a total of $650,000.00, plus the employers'
share of payroll taxes as set forth in the Settlement Agreement, to
resolve this litigation.

The Court finds that no Class Member excluded himself or herself
from the Settlement following the issuance of Class Notice and no
Class Member objected to the Settlement. The absence of any
objections to the Settlement by Class Members supports approval of
the Settlement.

At the timing specified in the Settlement Agreement, Defendants
shall deposit into the Qualified Settlement Fund Four Hundred and
Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($475,000.00), plus the employers'
share of payroll taxes.

RG2 Claims Administration LLC shall be paid the sum of $22,017.00
from the Qualified Settlement Fund for the services it performs in
connection with the administration of this Settlement and the
maintenance of the Qualified Settlement Fund.

The Court approves the Service Award in the amount of $7,500.00 to
the Class Representative, for her service to the collective and the
Class Members, including time and effort spent conferring with
Class Counsel, filing and pursuing the action, attending a
mediation, answering written discovery, sitting for a deposition,
and in recovering wages on behalf of the Opt-in Plaintiffs and
Class Members.

The Settlement includes an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and
the Court grants Class Counsel's request for $190,000.00 in
attorneys' fees to be paid from the Qualified Settlement Fund as
set forth in the Settlement Agreement. Defendants shall also pay
additional attorneys' fees in the amount of $150,000.00 directly to
Class Counsel from outside the Qualified Settlement Fund in monthly
payments of $5,000.00 over the course of thirty (30) months. Class
Counsel shall report to the Court any uncashed settlement checks
with 180 days and seek approval for those checks to be converted
into attorney fees.

Class Counsel's request for reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses
incurred in prosecuting this case in the amount of $83,631.47 is
granted. The Court finds these costs to be reasonably incurred.

Within 10 days of the date this Final Approval Order is entered,
Defendants shall transfer $475,000.00, plus the employers' share of
payroll taxes as calculated by the Settlement Administrator, into
the Qualified Settlement Fund.

Starting in the sixth month after the entry of this Order,
Defendants shall wire payments of $5,000.00 to Class Counsel on the
first day of each month for thirty (30) months. This payment of
$150,000.00 shall constitute the remainder of the Court-approved
attorneys' fees to Class Counsel.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2019 Order is
available https://tinyurl.com/y3rlgdvm from Leagle.com.

Olivia Cope, On behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Douglas M. Werman  -
dwerman@flsalaw.com - pro hac vice, Sarah J. Arendt -
sarendt@flsalaw.com - pro hac vice, Zachary C. Flowerree -
zflowerree@flsalaw.com - pro hac vice & Rowdy B. Meeks , Rowdy
Meeks Legal Group LLC, 8201 Mission Rd. Ste. 250, Prairie Village,
Kansas

Let's Eat Out, Incorporated, doing business as Buffalo Wild Wings,
Defendant, represented by Kirsten A. Milton-
Kirsten.Milton@jacksonlewis.com - Jackson Lewis PC, pro hac vice,
Kyle B. Russell - Kyle.Russell@jacksonlewis.com - Jackson Lewis PC,
Paul DeCamp - PDeCamp@ebglaw.com - Epstein, Becker & Green, PC, pro
hac vice & Ryan P. Lessmann - Ryan.Lessmann@jacksonlewis.com -
Jackson Lewis PC, pro hac vice.

Jeremy Boyer, individually, Bruno Management Company, Inc., Bruno
Enterprises, Inc. Too, Wing Backs, Inc., Sooners or Later, Inc.,
Hot Tex, Inc. & Spreading Our Wings, Inc., Defendants, represented
by Kirsten A. Milton , Jackson Lewis PC, pro hac vice, Kyle B.
Russell , Jackson Lewis PC & Ryan P. Lessmann , Jackson Lewis PC,
pro hac vice.

James Bruno, Defendant, represented by Kyle B. Russell , Jackson
Lewis PC & Ryan P. Lessmann , Jackson Lewis PC, pro hac vice.


LIGHTHOUSE SALES: Elzen Sues over Pre-Recorded Voice Calls
----------------------------------------------------------
DAVID VAN ELZEN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. LIGHTHOUSE SALES & MARKETING, LLC
d/b/a Agent Link, a Florida limited liability company, the
Defendant, Case No. 8:19-cv-02283 (M.D. Fla., Sept. 12, 2019),
alleges that the Defendant makes artificial or pre-recorded voice
calls to consumers in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

Agent Link is a headhunter specializing in placement of licensed
insurance. Agent Link boasts that it maintains a database with
"every licensed agent in the U.S" and that it provides its clients
with the ability to target those agents.

To recruit agents, Agent Link places artificial or pre-recorded
voice calls to consumers, including the Plaintiff, without
obtaining their prior express consent.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the putative Class are:

          Stefan Coleman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF STEFAN COLEMAN, P.A.
          201 S. Biscayne Blvd, 28th Floor
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (877) 333-9427
          Facsimile: (888) 498-8946
          E-mail: law@stefancoleman.com

               - and -

          Avi R. Kaufman, Esq.
          KAUFMAN P.A.
          400 NW 26th Street
          Miami, FL 33127
          Telephone: (305) 469-5881
          E-mail: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com

LONE STAR: Thurlkill Seeks Overtime Pay for Workers
---------------------------------------------------
CODY THURLKILL, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, the Plaintiff, vs. LONE STAR EXTERIORS, LLC AND CHRIS
SMITH, the Defendants, Case No. 6:19-cv-00410 (E.D. Tex., Sept. 12,
2019), alleges that the Defendants violated the Plaintiff's
statutory employment right to receive overtime pay as a result of
its failure to pay the Plaintiff and all those similarly situated
workers' overtime wages, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Lone Star Exteriors required its workers to work more than 40 hours
in a work week but did not pay them overtime wages. Instead, the
Defendants paid the workers a straight "day rate" with no federal
withholding, social security or Medicare taxes withheld, the
lawsuit says.

The Defendants misclassified the workers as independent contractors
and failed to pay them overtime compensation as required by the
FLSA.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff and Class Members are:

          William S. Hommel, Jr., Esq.
          HOMMEL LAW FIRM
          5620 Old Bullard Road, Suite 115
          Tyler, TX 75703
          Telephone: 903 596-7100
          Facsimile: 469 533-1618

MARICOPA COUNTY, AZ: Court Terminates Revised 4th Amended Judgment
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona
terminated the Revised Fourth Amended Judgment in the case
captioned Fred Graves, Isaac Popoca, on their own behalf and on
behalf of a class of all pretrial detainees in the Maricopa County
Jails, Plaintiffs, v. Paul Penzone, Sheriff of Maricopa County;
Bill Gates, Steve Gallardo, Jack Sellers, Steve Chucri, and Clint
L. Hickman, Maricopa County Supervisors, Defendants. No.
CV-77-00479-PHX-NVW. (D. Ariz.).

Pretrial detainees held in the Maricopa County Jails brought this
class action in 1977 against the Maricopa County Sheriff and the
Maricopa County Board of Supervisors seeking injunctive relief for
alleged violations of their civil rights. In 1981, the parties
entered into a consent decree that addressed and regulated aspects
of the County jail operations as they applied to pretrial
detainees. In 1995, upon stipulation of the parties, the 1981
consent decree was superseded by the Amended Judgment. The
stipulated Amended Judgment expressly did not represent a judicial
determination of any constitutionally mandated standards applicable
to the Maricopa County Jails.

On May 20, 2019, the Court ordered Defendants to demonstrate that
before a seriously mentally ill pretrial detainee is placed in
disciplinary isolation, CHS mental health staffs are consulted and
their recommendations addressing the potential effects of isolation
the pretrial detainee's mental health are received and considered.


The Order stated, Defendants are not required to prove compliance
with each term of their adopted policies and procedures, but must
produce objective proof that mental health staffs are consulted and
such consultation reaches disciplinary decision-makers, at least as
a general matter, before disciplinary isolation is imposed.

Although the title of Plaintiffs' Motion to Modify (Doc. 2521)
includes reference to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), it
is a motion to reconsider the Revised Fourth Amended Judgment
entered in 2014.

Rule 60(b)(5) provides that a court may relieve a party from a
final judgment or order if the judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, it is based on an earlier judgment that
has been reversed or vacated or applying it prospectively is no
longer equitable.

Plaintiffs do not contend that the judgment has been satisfied or
reversed or that applying it prospectively is no longer equitable.
Rather than seeking relief from an existing judgment or order,
Plaintiffs ask the Court to expand the Revised Fourth Amended
Judgment to provide Plaintiffs additional relief.

Plaintiffs request that the Court order 17 additional remedies,
most of which have been considered previously and rejected because
they exceed the constitutional minimum and/or do not provide
objective standards by which compliance can be determined. For
example, Plaintiffs seek an order requiring mentally ill pretrial
detainees to be seen at intake by a provider although subparagraph
5(a)(4) of the Revised Fourth Amended Judgment requires them to be
seen at intake by mental health staff and subparagraph 5(a)(15)
requires them to be seen by a provider within 24 hours of referral.


Plaintiffs ask the Court to prohibit punishment for behavior that
is the product of mental illness, without exception or limits to
the prohibition. Other remedies Plaintiffs seek, such as resolving
refusals for treatment and transferring pretrial detainees to
inpatient treatment facilities, often require court orders and are
not within the authority of jail personnel to guarantee. Remedies
such as developing and implementing adequate individualized
treatment plans and behavioral management plans are not conducive
to objective proof.

Plaintiffs justify their request for additional remedies by the
opinions of two experts. Dr. Pablo Stewart's opinions are based on
Maricopa County Jail policies and procedures filed in this case,
previous compliance reports and associated records produced by
Defendants, previous expert reports filed in this case, his own
previous reports in this case, court filings and transcripts, and
prisoner medical and disciplinary records, some of which he
reviewed in 2019. Dr. Stewart expressly relied on declarations he
made in April 2016 and December 2017. He does not state how many
records he reviewed in 2019, how the records he reviewed were
selected, or how many hundreds or thousands of seriously mentally
ill pretrial detainees were in the Maricopa County Jail at the
time, but he does provide 19 examples of medical and disciplinary
records from 2019 that he opines demonstrate inadequate mental
health care.

Dr. Stewart generally opines that the Maricopa County Jail: (1)
routinely fails to send patients to a higher level of care when
needed (2) provides untimely access to providers (3) does not
timely continue or initiate necessary medications and treatment to
treat serious mental illness (4) provides inadequate access to an
inpatient level of care (5) has under-utilized or inadequate mental
health programs and services to meet detainees' serious mental
health needs (6) unnecessarily subjects seriously mentally ill
prisoners to conditions so harsh as to predictably exacerbate their
illness (7) fails to develop and implement individualized treatment
plans with mental health interventions and services to treat
seriously mentally ill detainees and (8) fails to develop and
implement behavior management plans to address patients engaging in
self-injurious behavior (SIB) and other behaviors driven by their
illness.

Under the Local Rules,

The Court will ordinarily deny a motion for reconsideration of an
Order absent a showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts
or legal authority that could not have been brought to its
attention earlier with reasonable diligence. Any such motion shall
point out with specificity the matters that the movant believes
were overlooked or misapprehended by the Court, any new matters
being brought to the Court's attention for the first time and the
reasons they were not presented earlier, and any specific
modifications being sought in the Court's Order.

No motion for reconsideration of an Order may repeat any oral or
written argument made by the movant in support of or in opposition
to the motion that resulted in the Order. Failure to comply with
this subsection may be grounds for denial of the motion.

Plaintiffs have not shown new facts or legal authority that could
not have been brought to the Court's attention earlier with
reasonable diligence, nor do they purport to. They assert only that
the passage of time has demonstrated that the prospective relief
ordered in 2014 was not sufficient[] to correct constitutional
violations at the Jail. Plaintiffs' motion to modify the Revised
Fourth Amended Judgment, construed as a motion for reconsideration,
will be denied.

Further, circumstances do not warrant the modifications sought by
Plaintiffs under Rule 60(b)(5). Rule 60(b)(5) may not be used to
challenge the legal conclusions on which a prior judgment or order
rests. Rule 60(b)(5) serves an important function in institutional
reform litigation in which injunctions often remain in force for
many years, during which circumstances and governing law often
change.  

Under Rule 60(b)(5), Plaintiffs must establish that a significant
change in circumstances warrants revision and the proposed
modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance. A
party seeking modification of a consent decree may meet its initial
burden by showing either a significant change either in factual
conditions or in law. But the Revised Fourth Amended Judgment is
not a consent decree, and Plaintiffs have not identified a
significant change in factual conditions or in law. In fact,
Defendants have demonstrated significant improvements in factual
conditions over the past 11 years, and Plaintiffs have raised the
same objections to similar factual conditions in previous rounds of
this litigation. Plaintiffs are merely challenging the legal
conclusions on which the Revised Fourth Amended Judgment rests.

In summary, Plaintiffs contend that the relief ordered by the
Revised Fourth Amended Judgment in 2014 was insufficient to correct
constitutional deficiencies when it was ordered and the Court
further erred in 2017, 2018, and 2019 by finding Defendants proved
compliance with the specific remedies ordered in 2014. All of their
arguments were made or could have been made previously in 2014,
2017, 2018, and 2019.

They have not shown manifest error or new facts or legal authority
that could not have been brought to the Court's attention earlier
with reasonable diligence as required by Local Rule 7.2(g)(1) or a
significant change either in factual conditions or in law as
required by Rule 60(b)(5).

Plaintiffs' motion to modify the Revised Fourth Amended Judgment
will be denied.

The Revised Fourth Amended Judgment is terminated.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 19, 2019 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6eleu3d from Leagle.com.

Fred Graves & Isaac Popoca, Plaintiffs, represented by Theodore C.
Jarvi , Law Offices of Theodore Jarvi, 1050 E Southern Ave Ste A3
Tempe, AZ, 85282-5437, Eric Balaban , ACLU & Martin Lieberman ,
ACLU. 915 15th Street, NW 7th Floor Washington, DC 20005

Paul Penzone, Sheriff of Maricopa County, Bill Gates, Maricopa
County Supervisor, District 3, Steve Gallardo, Maricopa County
Supervisor, District 5, Jack Sellers, Maricopa County Supervisor,
District 1, Steve Chucri, Maricopa County Supervisor, District 2 &
Clint L Hickman, Maricopa County Supervisor, District 4,
Defendants, represented by Michele Marie Iafrate , Iafrate &
Associates, 649 N. 2nd Avenue, Phoenix, AZ 85003 & Sherle Rubin
Flaggman , Maricopa County Attorneys Office - Civil Services
Division.

Todd Wilcox, Dr, Movant, represented by Stephen C. Clark , Jones
Waldo Holbrook & McDonough, 170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 Salt
Lake City, Utah 84101


MARSH & MCLENNAN: Aetna's Bid to Dismiss Amendments to E.S. Granted
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, E.S., by and through her parents and guardians, To.S.
and Ti.S., individually, on behalf of similarly situated
individuals, and derivatively on behalf of the companies MARSH &
McLENNAN COMPANIES, HEALTH & WELFARE BENEFITS PROGRAM, Plaintiff,
v. MARSH & McLENNAN COMPANIES, INC. BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION
COMMITTEE, THE MARSH & McLENNAN COMPANIES HEALTH & WELFARE BENEFITS
PROGRAM, MARSH & McLENNAN COMPANIES, INC., and AETNA LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, Defendants, Civil No. 2:17-cv-03351 (KSH) (CLW) (D. N.J.),
Judge Katharine S. Hayden of the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey granted Aetna's motion to dismiss the
amendments to E.S.' original complaint.

On May 11, 2017, Plaintiff E.S. brought a putative class action
under the Employment Retirements Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA")
against the Defendants.  The complaint alleged that the Defendants
improperly denied E.S.' claim for medical care provided by an
out-of-network residential treatment facility by using a "hidden,
'administrative' exclusion" that was not part of the terms of her
Marsh & McLennan Companies Health & Welfare Plan ("M&M Plan").

The complaint set forth the following proposed class definition:
All individuals (1) who have been, are, or will be participants or
beneficiaries in the Marsh McLennan Companies Health & Welfare
Benefit Programs administered by Aetna at any time since Jan. 1,
2014 and/or the relevant statute of limitations; (2) who have
received, require, or are expected to require out-of-network
residential psychiatric treatment services; and (3) whose request
for coverage of the out-of-network residential psychiatric
treatment was administratively excluded based upon requirements
that are not part of the terms of the Plan document.

The complaint asserted: (1) a claim for breach of fiduciary duties
under ERISA Sections 404(a) and 502(a)(2) for failing to act in
accordance with the documents and instruments governing the Plan;
(2) a claim for recovery of benefits under ERISA Section
502(a)(1)(B); and (3) a claim to enjoin acts and practices in
violation of terms of the plan and to obtain other appropriate
equitable relief, under ERISA Section 502(3).

The Defendants moved to dismiss counts one and three.  After
hearing oral argument on Jan. 18, 2018, the Court denied the
motion, concluding that all three counts have viability and should
be preserved at that point.

On July 13, 2018, E.S. filed an amended complaint prompted by her
discovery that Aetna, the claims fiduciary for the M&M Plan,
implemented a standard claims adjudication process that
fundamentally violates ERISA and its governing regulations -- a
process that was not limited to the M&M Plan.  E.S. amended the
complaint to expand the class against Aetna to seek redress for
beneficiaries under all the self-insured plans that Aetna
administers who are subject to the same flawed claims process.

The amended complaint adds an "Aetna Self-Insured Class," with the
following class definition: All individuals (1) who have been, are,
or will be participants or beneficiaries in a self-insured ERISA
plan administered by Aetna at any time since January 1, 2014 and/or
the relevant statute of limitations; (2) who have received,
require, or are expected to require out-of-network residential
treatment services from licensed residential treatment facilities
or centers; (3) who are under a plan that provides coverage for
residential treatment, but does not contain a specific definition
of residential treatment facility or treatment facility in the
governing plan documents; and (4) whose request for services was
denied, or would be denied, under Aetna's internal criteria for
residential treatment, such as that found in Aetna's Criteria for
Recognizing Non-Contracted Residential Treatment Facilities, Aetna
Standard, ePolicies or similar criteria that do not appear in the
plan.

E.S.' three original claims remain unchanged in the amended
complaint except to the extent that each now expressly incorporates
the Aetna Self-Insured Class.

Aetna moves to dismiss all amendments to the original complaint for
two reasons: as a matter of law, Aetna is not responsible for the
plan disclosures that are the root of the Plaintiff's amendment;
and assuming arguendo that Aetna is a proper Defendant, the amended
complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to support E.S.' new,
expansive theory.

In opposition, E.S. contends that Aetna is recasting her amended
complaint as a failure to disclose case when in fact what E.S. and
the putative class complain of is Aetna's breach of its duty to
properly adjudicate and process claims under the actual terms of
the Plan, not a failure to disclose (non-existent) Plan terms.

Judge Hayden concludes that the amended complaint plausibly pleads
the existence of a set of criteria Aetna used as claims
administrator for the M&M Plan, but it fails to provide context for
the allegedly uniform and flawed application of those criteria on
the class-wide basis pleaded.  Aetna properly points out that E.S.
fails to identify a single offending plan other than M&M's, let
alone provide excerpted language from other plans, or actual plan
documents, to plausibly allege that Aetna's offending process took
place.  Beyond conclusions, there is no "there there" to give the
amendments life for purposes of pleading sufficiency.

Moreover, the problematic nature of E.S.'s citing to a single plan
in a complaint that seeks to sweep in an untold number of plans
becomes particularly troublesome when determining the pleading
sufficiency of Count 2, brought under 29 U.S.C. Section
1132(a)(1)(B), ERISA's civil enforcement provision.

For these reasons, the Judge granted Aetna's motion to dismiss the
amendments to E.S.' original complaint.  An appropriate order will
follow.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 20, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/CWGY8W from Leagle.com.

E.S., by and through her parents and guardians, To.S. and Ti.S.,
individually, on behalf of similarly situated individuals, and
derivatively on behalf of the MARSH & MCLEANNAN COMPANIES, HEALTH &
WELFARE BENEFITS PROGRAM, Plaintiff, represented by DAVID TYKULSKER
-- david@dtesq.com -- TYKULSKER & ASSOCIATES.

MARSH & MCLENNAN COMPANIES, INC. BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE,
THE MARSH & MCLENNAN COMPANIES HEALTH & WELFARE BENEFITS PROGRAM,
MARSH & MCLENNAN COMPANIES, INC. & AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants, represented by ERIC EVANS WOHLFORTH, Jr. --
ewohlforth@gibbonslaw.com -- GIBBONS, P.C., MARIELLEN DUGAN --
mdugan@gibbonslaw.com -- GIBBONS P.C. & KEVIN HENRY GILMORE --
kgilmore@gibbonslaw.com -- GIBBONS P.C..


MBF INSPECTION: Court OKs $2.225MM Settlement in Ganci
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio,
Eastern Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting Parties'
Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class and Collective
Action Settlement in the case captioned THOMAS GANCI, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. MBF Inspection Services, Inc., Defendant. Civil
Action No. 2:15-cv-2959. (S.D. Ohio).

Plaintiff Thomas Ganci commenced this action, asserting a
collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and a
class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 23 and the Ohio
Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act (Fair Wage Act).

Defendant filed its Answer admitting that it employed Plaintiff but
denying liability. Defendant asserted that Plaintiffs were properly
classified as exempt from state and federal overtime requirements.


Defendant has agreed to pay a total settlement amount of
$2,225,000, which includes all payments to all accepting
Plaintiffs, enhancements awards, attorneys' fees, litigation costs,
and expenses of Plaintiffs' Counsel, but excludes the employer's
share of payroll taxes.   

The settlement includes all FLSA Opt-in Plaintiffs who are included
within the scope of the Settlement and who timely execute and
return a Release of Claims Form, as well as any Ohio Class Members
who do not timely submit a written request for exclusion in
response to the Notice of Settlement.

Approval of FLSA Settlement

The FLSA's provisions are mandatory and, except as otherwise
provided by statute, are generally not subject to being waived,
bargained, or modified by contract or by settlement. An exception
to this rule allows courts to review and approve settlement
agreements in private actions for back wages under 29 U.S.C.
Section 216(b).

When reviewing an FLSA settlement, the federal district court must
ensure that the parties are not, via settlement of [the] claims,
negotiating around the clear FLSA requirements of compensation for
all hours worked, minimum wages, maximum hours, and overtime.
Instead of negotiating around the FLSA's requirements, there must
exist a bona fide dispute between the parties.  

Factors relevant to the approval analysis include: (1) the risk of
fraud or collusion behind the settlement; (2) the complexity,
expense and likely duration of the litigation (3) the amount of
discovery engaged in by the parties (4) the plaintiff's likelihood
of success on the merits; and (5) the public interest in
settlement.  

After a careful review of the Parties' motion and their settlement
agreement, the Court finds that the settlement is a fair,
reasonable, and adequate resolution of a bona fide legal dispute
between the Parties. There is no evidence the settlement agreement
is the result of anything other than arm's length negotiations
between experienced opposing counsel, mediated by two
well-respected mediators.  

Preliminary Approval of Rule 23 Settlement

The Court previously found the requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) were met and certified the
following Rule 23 class:

     All inspection personnel, other than chief inspectors and lead
inspectors, who were paid a day rate and who worked for Defendant
in Ohio under a Spectra contract at any time since two years prior
to filing of this Complaint.

But to approve a Rule 23 class settlement, a court must also
conclude that it is a fair, reasonable, and adequate resolution of
a bona fide legal dispute.  

Based on the Court's review of the proposed Settlement Agreement,
the parties' motion practice to date, the amount of discovery
exchanged, and the Court's familiarity with the status of the
litigation, the Court finds that the proposed settlement falls
within the range of possible approval. As a result, it is
appropriate to direct notice to class members and to schedule a
final approval hearing to consider the final fairness of the
Settlement Agreement, including any objections that may be filed,
as well as class counsel's anticipated application for an award of
attorneys' fees and costs and service awards.

The parties' Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class and
Collective Action Settlement  is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available https://tinyurl.com/y4lzbskv from
Leagle.com.

Thomas Ganci, on behalf of himself and other similarly situated
individuals nationwide and the Rule 23 Class, Plaintiff,
represented by Robert E. DeRose, II , Barkan Meizlish Handelman
Goodin DeRose Wentz, LLP, 250 East Broad Street 10th Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43215, Matthew C. Helland -helland@nka.com - Nichols
Kaster, LLP, pro hac vice, Paul J. Lukas - lukas@nka.com - Nichols
Kaster, PLLP, pro hac vice & Trent R. Taylor , Barkan Meizlish
Handelman Goodin DeRose Wentz, LLP, 250 East Broad Street 10th
Floor Columbus, Ohio 43215

MBF Inspection Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by Joseph
Anthony Gerling , Two Miranova Place, Suite 500 Columbus, OH,
43215, Christopher R. Pettit - cpettit@lanealton.com - Lane Alton &
Horst, Christopher Wesierski - cwesierski@wzllp.com - One Corporate
Park, pro hac vice & Eric S. Bravo , Baird Law Offices LLC, Suite
220, Two Miranova Place, Columbus, OH  43215-7052


MCDERMOTT, INC: Smith Sues over Employment Discrimination
---------------------------------------------------------
LOUIS SMITH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. MCDERMOTT, INC.; and CHICAGO BRIDGE &
IRON, LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-00613-BAJ-EWD (M.D.
La., Sept. 14, 2019), seeks to recover damages and other legal and
equitable relief from Defendants for violations of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Louisiana Employment
Discrimination Law.

Smith seeks damages from Defendants for acts of discrimination,
hostile work environment, and retaliation based on race, color and
his protected activity. Smith also brings this action on behalf of
himself, and those similarly situated, as Defendant's layoff and
rehire policy had a disparate impact on Black employees.

Defendants are one of the world's largest engineering, procurement,
construction, and installation companies. The Defendants own and
operate a facility located in Walker, Louisiana.

McDermott International, Inc. is an American multinational
engineering, procurement, construction and installation company
with operations in the Americas, Middle East, the Caspian Sea and
the Pacific Rim. Incorporated in Panama, it is headquartered in the
Energy Corridor area of Houston, Texas.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Philip Bohrer, Esq.
          BOHRER BRADY LLC
          8712 Jefferson Highway, Suite B
          Baton Rouge, LA 70809
          Telephone: (225) 925-5297
          E-mail: phil@bohrerbrady.com

               - and -

          Jay D. Ellwanger, Esq.
          Esha Rajendran,  Esq.
          ELLWANGER LAW LLLP
          8310-1 N. Capital of Texas Hwy, Suite 190
          Austin, TX 78731
          Telephone: (737) 808-2260
          Facsimile: (737) 808-2262
          E-maail: jellwanger@equalrights.law
                   erajendran@equalrights.law

               - and -

          James A. Vagnini, Esq.
          Monica Hincken, Esq.
          VALLI KANE & VAGNINI LLP
          600 Old Country Road, Suite 519
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 203-7180
          Facsimile: (516) 706-0248
          E-mail: jvagnini@vkvlawyers.com
                  mhincken@vkvlawyers.com

MEDICAL MANAGEMENT: Metzler Seeks OT Pay for Practice Managers
--------------------------------------------------------------
MEREDITH METZLER, DIANA BELICH, BLEAN TAYE, and STEVEN BRUNO,
Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the
Plaintiffs, vs. MEDICAL MANAGEMENT INTERNATIONAL, INC. d/b/a
BANFIELD PET HOSPITAL, the Defendant, Case No.
8:19-cv-02289-VMC-CPT (M.D. Fla., Sept. 13, 2019), seeks unpaid
wages from Defendant for overtime work for which they did not
receive all of the overtime premium pay required by law, including
during their training period; liquidated damages; and reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, the New York Labor Law, and the California Labor Code.

The Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated are current and
former Practice Managers (PMs) who worked at any of Defendant's
locations in the United States.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Putative FLSA Collective, the
Putative FLSA Training Collective, and Rule 23 Classes, are:

          Gregg I. Shavitz, Esq.
          Camar R. Jones, Esq.
          Alan Quiles, Esq.
          SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A.
          951 Yamato Road, Suite 285
          Boca Raton, FL 33431
          Telephone: (561) 447-8888
          Facsimile: (561) 447-8831
          E-mail: gshavitz@shavitzlaw.com
                  cjones@shavitzlaw.com
                  aquiles@shavitzlaw.com

MEDICAL SOCIETY: Cornejo Files FDCPA Suit in Arizona
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Medical Society
Business Incorporated. The case is styled as Alonso Cornejo,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Medical Society Business Incorporated doing business
as: Bureau of Medical Economics, Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-05245-JZB (D. Ariz., Sept. 23, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

The Bureau of Medical Economics (BME) has been providing solutions
for patient accounts since 1951.[BN]


MEREDITH CORP: Nov. 5 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
-------------------------------------------------
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP ("GPM") reminds investors of the
upcoming November 5, 2019 deadline to file a lead plaintiff motion
in the class action filed on behalf of Meredith Corporation
("Meredith" or the "Company") (NYSE: MDP) investors who purchased
securities between January 31, 2018 and September 5, 2019,
inclusive (the "Class Period").

If you wish to learn more about this action, or if you have any
questions concerning this announcement or your rights or interests
with respect to these matters, please contact Lesley Portnoy,
Esquire, at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, or by email to
shareholders@glancylaw.com or visit our website at
www.glancylaw.com

On September 5, 2019, the Company stated that it expected fiscal
2020 adjusted EBITDA in the range of $640 million to $675 million,
which is well below analysts' expectations of $793 million.
Meredith planned to increase spending to improve operations of
Time, Inc., which the Company had acquired in January 2018, because
the business was not as profitable as expected.

On this news, the Company's share price fell $10.14 per share, or
over 23%, to close at $33.68 per share on September 5, 2019,
thereby injuring investors.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) the Time, Inc. acquisition was not as profitable as
the Company had claimed; (2) that the Company would incur
additional costs for strategic investments to improve the Time
business; (3) that, as a result, the Company's earnings would be
materially and adversely impacted; and (4) that, as a result of the
foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects, were materially misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired Meredith securities during
the Class Period you may move the Court no later than November 5,
2019 to request appointment as lead plaintiff in this putative
class action lawsuit. To be a member of the class action you need
not take any action at this time; you may retain counsel of your
choice or take no action and remain an absent member of the class
action. If you wish to learn more about this class action, or if
you have any questions concerning this announcement or your rights
or interests with respect to the pending class action lawsuit,
please contact Lesley Portnoy, Esquire, of GPM, 1925 Century Park
East, Suite 2100, Los Angeles, California 90067 at 310-201-9150,
Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, by email to shareholders@glancylaw.com,
or visit our website at www.glancylaw.com. If you inquire by email
please include your mailing address, telephone number and number of
shares purchased. [GN]


MICROSYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT: Court Denies Settlement's Final Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order denying Direct Purchasers Plaintiffs
(DPPs)' Motion for Final Approval, as well as Attorney's Fees,
Expenses and a Service Award in the case captioned IN RE RESISTORS
ANTITRUST LITIGATION. Case No. 15-cv-03820-JD. (N.D. Cal.).

DPPs now seek final approval, as well as attorney's fees, expenses
and a service award.
In this antitrust class action, the direct purchaser plaintiffs
have reached class action settlements with all remaining
defendants. The Court previously granted preliminary approval of
those settlements.  

Final Approval: The DPPs' motion was filed on July 29, 2019, but
the claims period did not close until August 14, 2019. There have
been no updates apprising the Court of any additional claim forms
received between July 29, 2019, and August 14, 2019, or the status
of the claim forms received from the 205 entities not on the class
list [that] were filed on the settlement website.

The Court would also like to understand the estimated range for the
pro rata distributions to class members, and the details of
proposed payment, e.g., how long class members will have to cash
their checks and what will happen to any uncashed amounts.

Attorney's Fees, Expenses and Service Award: DPPs request an
attorney's fees award of $10.05 million based on summary charts
listing attorneys' and staff members' names, their hourly rates and
total number of hours billed. In effect, the charts just give a
name and an associated total billing amount often well into the
several hundreds of thousands of dollars with no breakdown
whatsoever explaining how the time was used to benefit the class.
This approach is plainly insufficient under well-established
standards. No paying client would ever stand for it, and it is a
disservice to the class and the Court. The charts also do not
provide the level of detail that is required by our district's
Procedural Guidance.

The $25,000 bonus requested for named plaintiff Schuten Electronics
is equally bereft of support. Schuten Electronics' president James
Schuten simply estimates the hours of work he did with no time
records or periods of any sort and only the vaguest of descriptions
of what his work was. The Court also notes that the proposed award
equates to an eye-watering hourly rate of $455 for Schuten, which
vastly exceeds anything the Court has ever been asked to consider
for a named plaintiff.

There is no doubt that successful counsel are entitled to
appropriate compensation for the work they do and the risks they
take. The Court has no hesitation to award lodestars and
multipliers when the circumstances warrant it, and has done so in
many class action cases. But here, plaintiffs' counsel at Cohen
Milstein and Hagens Berman are in effect asking that they be paid
whatever they think is fair, no questions asked. That will not do.
The Court will not award millions of dollars based on counsel's and
the named plaintiff's say-so, especially when that money will be
taken directly out of the hands of class members.

Proposed Order: The proposed order submitted by DPPs contains
self-congratulatory language that is unwarranted and unhelpful to
the Court. Representative samples include sentences such as, class
counsel has achieved exceptional results for the class, this case
requireed a high level of skill by class counsel and the reputation
and ability of Hagens Berman and Cohen Milstein supports the
requested fee. Statements like these are better suited for firm
marketing materials than they are for orders proposed for the
Court's issuance.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2019 Order is
available https://tinyurl.com/y4rx5w9o from Leagle.com.

Microsystems Development Technologies, Inc., Plaintiff, represented
by Adam J. Zapala - azapala@cpmlegal.com - Cotchett Pitre &
McCarthy LLP, Demetrius Xavier Lambrinos -
dlambrinos@saverilawfirm.com - Joseph Saveri Law Firm, Inc., Mark
Francis Ram -markfrancisram@gmail.com - Cotchett Pitre & McCarthy
LLP, Elizabeth Tran Castillo - ecastillo@cpmlegal.com - Cotchett,
Pitre and McCarthy & Joseph W. Cotchett - jcotchett@cpmlegal.com -
Cotchett Pitre & McCarthy LLP.

Chip-Tech Ltd., on behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Solomon B. Cera -
scera@cerallp.com - Cera LLP, C. Andrew Dirksen -
cdirksen@cerallp.com - Cera LLP, James Gerard Beebe Dallal -
jdallal@alumni.rice.edu - Joseph Saveri Law Firm, Joseph R. Saveri
– jsaveri@saverilawfirm.com - Joseph Saveri Law Firm, Inc.,
Matthew Sinclair Weiler -ealdridge@bfalaw.com - Bleichmar Fonti &
Auld LLP & Ryan James McEwan - rmcewan@saverilawfirm.com - Joseph
Saveri Law Firm, Inc.


MIDLAND FUNDING: Ramirez, et al Seek to Certify Class
-----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as GABRIELA RAMIREZ, FIDELA
AVINA, RUEL NIETO, KATHERINE RANOS, and EVALINA GONZALEZ, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs,
vs. MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC; MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC; and
ENCORE CAPITAL GROUP, INC., the Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-02626
(N.D. Ill.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court for an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "(1) all persons with addresses in the State of Illinois (2)
      from whom Defendant attempted to collect a defaulted
      consumer credit account (3) to whom it sent a letter (4)
      which was sent on or after April 6, 2016, or on or before
      November 16, 2017";

   2. appointing Plaintiffs as class representatives; and

   3. appointing their lawyers as class counsel.

The Plaintiffs allege that MCM violated the the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act when when it stated to Plaintiffs that
once their account was forwarded to an attorney, flexible payment
options may no longer be available. The Plaintiffs further allege
that Midland used unconscionable means to collect a debt, in
violation of 15 U.S.C section 1692f, when it authorized its
servicer (MCM) to falsely threaten Plaintiffs that flexible payment
options would no longer be available if their account was forwarded
to an attorney.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Celetha C. Chatman, Esq.
          Michael J. Wood, Esq.
          COMMUNITY LAWYERS, LLC.
          20 N. Clark Street, Suite 3100
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: 312 757 1880
          Facsimile: 312 265 3227
          E-mail: cchatman@communitylawyersgroup.com

MONOTYPE IMAGING: Smith Says HGGC Merger Docs Misleading
--------------------------------------------------------
RAYMOND SMITH, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. MONOTYPE IMAGING HOLDINGS INC., PAMELA
F. LENEHAN, SCOTT E. LANDERS, DR. ROGER J. HEINEN, JR., DENISE F.
WARREN, TIMOTHY B. YEATON, PETER J. SIMONE, EILEEN CAMPBELL, and
GAY WARREN GADDIS, the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01717-UNA (D.
Del., Sept. 12, 2019), is brought as a class action by Plaintiff on
behalf of himself and the other public holders of the common stock
of Monotype Imaging Holdings Inc. against the Company and the
members of the Company's board of directors for their violations of
Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in
connection with a proposed merger between Monotype and HGGC, LLC.

On July 25, 2019, the Board caused the Company to enter into an
agreement and plan of merger, pursuant to which the Company's
shareholders stand to receive $19.85 in cash for each share of
Monotype stock they own.

On August 26, 2019, in order to convince Monotype shareholders to
vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction, the Board authorized the
filing of a materially incomplete and misleading Form PREM14A
Preliminary Proxy Statement with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, in violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act. The materially incomplete and misleading preliminary
proxy violates both Regulation G and SEC Rule 14a-9 (17 C.F.R.
section 240.14a-9), each of which constitutes a violation of
Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act.

On September 9, 2019, the Company filed a Form DEFM14A Definitive
Proxy Statement that did not correct the materially incomplete and
misleading nature of the preliminary proxy. The Board has scheduled
a special meeting of the Company's shareholders on October 9, 2019
to vote on the Proposed Transaction.

While touting the fairness of the Merger Consideration to the
Company's shareholders in the Proxy, Defendants have failed to
disclose certain material information that is necessary for
shareholders to properly assess the fairness of the Proposed
Transaction, thereby violating SEC rules and regulations and
rendering certain statements in the Proxy materially incomplete and
misleading.

In particular, the Proxy contains materially incomplete and
misleading information concerning: (i) the financial projections
for the Company that were prepared by the Company and relied on by
Defendants in recommending that Monotype shareholders vote in favor
of the Proposed Transaction; and (ii) the summary of certain
valuation analyses conducted by Monotype's financial advisor, J.P.
Morgan Securities LLC in support of its opinion that the Merger
Consideration is fair to shareholders, on which the Board relied.

It is imperative that the material information that has been
omitted from the Proxy is disclosed prior to the forthcoming vote
to allow the Company's shareholders to make an informed decision
regarding the Proposed Transaction, the lawsuit contends.

Monotype Imaging Holdings Inc. is a Delaware corporation based in
Woburn, Massachusetts. It specializes in digital typesetting and
typeface design as well as text and imaging solutions for use with
consumer electronics devices.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Nadeem Faruqi, Esq.
          James M. Wilson, Jr., Esq.
          Michael Van Gorder, Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
          685 Third Avenue, 26 th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 983-9330
          Facsimile: (212) 983-9331
          E-mail: nfaruqi@faruqilaw.com
                  jwilson@faruqilaw.com
                 mvangorder@faruqilaw.com


MOUSER ELECTRONICS: Traynor Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Mouser Electronics,
Inc. The case is styled as Yaseen Traynor, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Mouser Electronics,
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-08950 (S.D. N.Y., Sept. 26,
2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Mouser Electronics, Inc. distributes semiconductors and electronic
components. The Company offers discrete semiconductors, integrated
circuits, circuit protection kits, connectors, audio devices,
printers, switches, relays, motors, resistors, and inductors.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Russel Craig Weinrib, Esq.
     Stein Saks PLLC
     285 Passaic St., Suite 5
     Hakensack, NJ 07601
     Phone: (201) 282-6500
     Email: rweinrib@steinsakslegal.com


NATIONWIDE LIFE: Court Denies Certification in Brown Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio,
Eastern Division, issued an Opinion and Order denying Plaintiff's
Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned THERESA BROWN
Individually, and as a representative of a class of participants
and beneficiaries on behalf of the Andrus Wagstaff, PC 401(k)
Profit Sharing Plan and all other similarly Situated individual
Retirement plans, Plaintiff, v. NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
et al., AND ANDRUS WAGSTAFF, PC Individually and on behalf of a
class of others similarly situated, Defendants. Case No.
2:17-cv-558. (S.D. Ohio).

Former Named Plaintiff Alana Schmitt commenced this action on
behalf of herself, other participants and beneficiaries of AW's
401(k) Profit Sharing Plan, and the participants and beneficiaries
of similarly-situated individual account plans.  Plaintiff asserts:
(1) an unjust enrichment claim against Nationwide for excessive
compensation for services in violation of 29 U.S.C. Sections
1108(b)(2) and 1106(a)(1)(C) and (2) a claim for declaratory
judgment stating that Nationwide's fees are unreasonable and that
AW and the proposed Defendant Class breached their fiduciary duties
by agreeing to pay excessive fees to Nationwide.

Plaintiff moves for class certification of both a Plaintiff Class
and a Defendant Class. The putative classes are described as
follows:

Plaintiff Class, represented by Theresa Brown:

     All participant-directed individual 401(k) account plans that,
at any time from October 1, 2014 through the date of judgment (the
Class Period), that (1) have total Plan assets of less than $10
million; (2) paid Nationwide for recordkeeping and other
administrative services through the Nationwide Retirement Flexible
Advantage Retirement Plans Program; and (3) paid recordkeeping and
administrative service fees to Nationwide in excess of $64 per
participant. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are employees of
Plaintiff's law firms.

Defendant Class, represented by defendant Andrus Wagstaff, P.C.:

     All sponsors of participant-directed individual 401(k) account
plans that, at any time from October 1, 2014 through the date of
judgment (the Class Period), (1) have total Plan assets of less
than $10 million; (2) entered into Program Agreements with
Nationwide through the Nationwide Retirement Flexible Advantage
Retirement Plans Program to provide recordkeeping and
administrative services for their companies' defined contribution
retirement plans; and (3) paid recordkeeping and administrative
service fees to Nationwide in excess of $64 per participant.

Rule 23 governs class actions in federal court. To obtain class
certification, the putative class must establish four prerequisites
pursuant to Rule 23(a): (1) the class is so numerous that joinder
of all members is impractical (2) there are questions of law or
fact common to the class (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.  

Nationwide argues that certification of a Defendant Class would be
improper because Plaintiff does not and cannot allege any
relationship contractual, juridical or otherwise among the putative
defendant class members, and in fact none exists.

First, Nationwide asserts that the putative Defendant Class members
are not government officials, or otherwise enforcing a common
statute or other government rule or policy.

Second, Nationwide points out that Defendants were not partners,
participants in a conspiracy or joint enterprise, or under common
ownership.

Third, Nationwide avers that Plaintiff does not allege any
communication or coordination among or between the putative
defendant class members.

Finally, Nationwide contends there is no common contractual
relationship between Defendants which binds them together.

Here, Nationwide points to a key distinction in the present facts
versus those in Trucking Employer, Trucking Emp'rs, 75 F.R.D. at
689s. Plaintiff does not allege that all plan participants signed
identical or standardized contracts.

In fact, Plaintiff alleges the putative Defendant Class Members
entered into agreements with Nationwide for the same or similar
services. Moreover, Nationwide points out that plan agreements
varied based on the information and services provided. Thus,
Plaintiff's alleged injury, i.e., excessive fees, is not traceable
to a specific provision in a shared contract. Furthermore,
Plaintiff presents no evidence to suggest that Defendants acted in
concert when investigating the terms of their proposed plan
agreements. Rather, AW represents that it knows the process that it
undertook in selecting Nationwide and evaluating Nationwide's fees
but it and its counsel have absolutely no idea what steps the
sponsors of the thousands of other plans took in the same vein.
The parties did not standardize their conduct by contracting with
Nationwide as part of a joint enterprise.

In sum, the Court finds the putative Defendant Class members do not
share a juridical link. As a result, Plaintiff lacks standing to
sue each Defendant, and Rule 23 certification of the putative
Defendant Class would be improper. Because class certification
fails on the issue of standing, the Court declines to analyze the
Rule 23(a) and (b) factors with respect to the Defendant Class.
The Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification with
respect to the Defendant Class.

Certification of Plaintiff Class

Plaintiff does not address standing in the context of Plaintiff
Class certification. Instead, Plaintiff asserts that the putative
Plaintiff Class satisfies Rule 23(a)'s requirements of numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy.  

In addition, Plaintiff maintains that the putative Plaintiff Class
would be manageable pursuant to Rules 23(b)(1) or (b)(3).
Nationwide claims that the fiduciaries of the putative plaintiff
class plans are plainly indispensable to claims alleging they have
violated ERISA, just as the Court has already found AW to be
indispensable to claims involving the AW plan. Thus, Nationwide
contends that because Plaintiff lacks standing to sue a class of
defendants who have in no way injured her, her plaintiff class
allegations on behalf of plans as to which she is a complete
stranger fail as well. AW asserts the same arguments, stating that
the unavailability of a defendant class makes Plaintiff's proposed
plaintiff class untenable as well.

The Court agrees with Defendants.

In its August 24, 2018 Opinion and Order, this Court held that AW,
as Plaintiff's fiduciary, is an indispensable party pursuant to
Rule 19. Accordingly, the Court found that Nationwide could not
adequately protect AW's interests in AW's absence. By that same
logic, the similarly-situated plan sponsors who acted as
fiduciaries to the putative Plaintiff Class members, i.e., the
putative Defendant Class members are also indispensable parties in
the proposed class action. As these fiduciaries are indispensable
parties, the putative Plaintiff class cannot proceed against
Nationwide as the sole class action defendant.

Nor can the putative Plaintiff Class proceed against Nationwide,
AW, and all similarly-situated plan sponsors, i.e., putative
Defendant Class members.

Plaintiff can only assert a cause of action against Nationwide and
her plan sponsor, AW. Likewise, each of the 250,000 putative
Plaintiff Class members can only assert causes of action against
Nationwide and their individual plan sponsors. In other words,
those putative Plaintiff Class members who did not utilize AW as a
fiduciary lack standing to bring claims against AW. Moreover, like
the school boards in Thompson, each plan sponsor negotiated its own
distinct contract with Nationwide. Thus, the juridical link
exception articulated in La Mar does not apply.

Because the putative Plaintiff Class lacks standing to sue AW and
all similarly-situated plan sponsors, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's
Motion for Class Certification with respect to the Plaintiff
Class.

Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification is DENIED.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 19, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y67koz4m from
Leagle.com.

Theresa Brown, Individually and as representative of a class of
participants and beneficiaries on behalf of the Andrus Wagstaff, PC
401(k) Profit Sharing Plan and all other similarly situated
individual account retirement plans, Plaintiff, represented by John
Allan Smalley , Dyer Garofalo Mann & Schultz, 131 N. Ludlow Street,
Dayton, OH 45402,  & Paul R. Wood - woodp@fdazar.com - Franklin D.
Azar & Assocs.

Nationwide Life Insurance Company, c/o Corporation Service Company,
Nationwide Bank, c/o Corporation Service Company & Nationwide Trust
Company, FSB, c/o W. Sidney Druen, Defendants, represented by
Michael Hiram Carpenter , Carpenter Lipps & Leland LLP, 280 North
High Street Suite 1300 Columbus, OH 43215, Brian D. Boyle -
bboyle@omm.com - OMelveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice, Jeffrey Alan
Lipps , Carpenter Lipps & Leland LLP, 280 North High Street Suite
1300 Columbus, OH 43215, Jonathan D. Hacker - jhacker@omm.com -
O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice, Meaghan VerGow -
mvergow@omm.com - OMelveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice, Michael N.
Beekhuizen , Carpenter & Lipps LLP, 280 North High Street Suite
1300 Columbus, OH 43215, Raghav Ahuja- rahuja@omm.com - OMelveny &
Myers LLP, pro hac vice, Shannon M. Barrett - sbarrett@omm.com -
OMelveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice & Stuart M. Sarnoff -
ssarnoff@omm.com - OMelveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice.
Nationwide Bank, c/o W. Sidney Druen & Nationwide Trust Company,
FSB, c/o Corporation Service Company, Defendants, represented by
Michael Hiram Carpenter , Carpenter Lipps & Leland LLP, Brian D.
Boyle , OMelveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice, Jeffrey Alan Lipps ,
Carpenter Lipps & Leland LLP, Jonathan D. Hacker , O'Melveny &
Myers LLP, pro hac vice, Meaghan VerGow , OMelveny & Myers LLP, pro
hac vice, Michael N. Beekhuizen , Carpenter & Lipps LLP, Shannon M.
Barrett , OMelveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice & Stuart M. Sarnoff ,
OMelveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice.


NAVIENT CORP: Lord Abbett Seeks to Certify Class
------------------------------------------------
LORD ABBETT AFFILIATED FUND, INC., et al., Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiffs, vs.
NAVIENT CORPORATION, et al., the Defendants, Case No.
1:16-cv-00112-MN (D. Del.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court for an
order:

   1. certifying proposed Class and this Action as a class
      action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23;

   2. appointing the Lord Abbett Funds as Class
      Representatives;

   3. appointing Lead Counsel Bernstein Litowitz Berger &
      Grossmann LLP as Class Counsel; and

   4. appointing Friedlander & Gorris P.A. as Liaison Class
      Counsel.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiffs are:

          Joel Friedlander, Esq.
          Christopher M. Foulds, Esq.
          Christopher P. Quinn, Esq.
          FRIEDLANDER & GORRIS, P.A.
          1201 N. Market Street, Suite 2200
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 573-3500
          Facsimile: (302) 573-3501
          E-mail: jfriedlander@friedlandergorris.com
                  cfoulds@friedlandergorris.com
                  cquinn@friedlandergorris.com

               - and -

          Salvatore Graziano, Esq.
          Jeremy P. Robinson, Esq.
          Jesse L. Jensen, Esq.
          Ryan Dykhouse, Esq.
          BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP
          1251 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10020
          Telephone: (212) 554-1400
          Facsimile: (212) 554-1444
          E-mail: salvatore@blbglaw.com
                  jeremy@blbglaw.com
                  jesse.jensen@blbglaw.com
                  ryan.dykhouse@blbglaw.com

NEVADA: Court Allows Vidal to Proceed Forma Pauperis
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada issued
an Order granting Vidal's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauper is
in the case captioned FRANCISCO VIDAL, Plaintiff, v. NEVADA BOARD
OF PAROLE COMMISSIONERS, et al., Defendants. Case No.
2:19-cv-01368-GMN-VCF. (D. Nev.).

Vidal's application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. Under
28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a)(1), a plaintiff may bring a civil action
without prepayment of fees or security thereof if the plaintiff
submits a financial affidavit that demonstrates the plaintiff is
unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.

According to Vidal's affidavit, he does not have any income and he
does not have any funds available, as reflected on his inmate
balance history report.   

Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

Whether Vidal's Complaint States a Plausible Claim

Because the Court grants Vidal's application to proceed in forma
pauperis, it must review Vidal's complaint to determine whether the
complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a plausible
claim.  

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint
must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief. Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal of a complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A
complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if it appears
beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claims that would entitle him to relief.

A pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.If the Court dismisses a complaint under Secdion 1915(e),
the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with
directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from
the face of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured
by amendment.  

Vidal's complaint is styled as a class-action Section 1983
complaint against the Nevada Board of Parole Commissioners, doe
commissioners from the parole board, the Nevada State Public
Defender's Office, multiple police officers, doe attorneys from the
public defender's office, the Las Vegas Police Department, and
hearing officer Alonzo Pany. Vidal is currently incarcerated.

Vidal alleges that he, along with every person on parole, who has a
parole revocation hearing, is denied due process and equal
protection. Vidal does not allege that he has communicated with any
other person who has similar complaints against the defendants for
his class action. Vidal alleges that his parole officer recommended
revoking his parole because he was 26 minutes late to an office
visit and that his prison sentence will expire in 2028.

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must plead that
the named defendant (1) acted under color of state law and (2)
deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or
federal statutes.

The Supreme Court has held that a prisoner in custody cannot use a
Section 1983 action to challenge the fact or duration of his
confinement, but instead must seek federal habeas corpus relief or
the appropriate state relief.  

Challenging the procedures used in parole hearings implicates, the
prisoner's continuing confinement. This is true whether that denial
is alleged to be improper based upon procedural defects in the
parole hearing or upon allegations that parole was improperly
denied on the merits. When a prisoner claims he is incarcerated due
to the bias of the judge or state officials it, implies the
invalidity of the prisoner's confinement; therefore the prisoner's
sole remedy is a habeas corpus petition.  

Plaintiff has not alleged that any of the defendants acted under
color of law; plaintiff's appointed defender was not acting under
color of law if he or she was performing a lawyer's function as
appointed counsel during the parole revocation hearing. Plaintiff
does not have standing to bring a Section 1983 claim to challenge
the alleged procedural defects in the parole process and the
plaintiff's belief that the judge and hearing officials were
biased.

Plaintiff's claims challenge the invalidity of his confinement due
to the revocation of his parole, and thus he fails to state a
Section 1983 claim against the Nevada Board of Parole
Commissioners. Plaintiff may raise these allegations against the
Nevada Board of Parole Commissioners in a habeas corpus proceeding.
This would require that Plaintiff file a habeas corpus petition and
an in forma pauperis application in a new action, meaning he may
not file the petition for habeas corpus in this action.

While a Section 1983 claim cannot be used to vacate convictions, it
can be used to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction. However, the plaintiff must prove that the conviction
or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to
make such determination, or called into question by a federal
court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Plaintiff gives no
indication in his complaint that his conviction has been challenged
or overturned by any court.

Vidal fails to articulate a claim or claims against defendants. It
is possible that these deficiencies may be cured through amendment.
Vidal's complaint is dismissed without prejudice.   

Vidal's application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2019 Order is
available https://tinyurl.com/yyuzjmdu from Leagle.com.

Francisco Vidal, Plaintiff, pro se.


NEVRO CORP: Court Dismisses Nguyen Class Action
-----------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Francisco Division, issued an Order dismissing the
Action in the case captioned DAVID NGUYEN, Derivatively and on
Behalf of NEVRO CORP., Plaintiff, v. RAMI ELGHANDOUR, ANDREW
GALLIGAN, MICHAEL DEMANE, ALI BEHBAHANI, LISA EARNHARDT, FRANK
FISCHER, WILFRED E. JAEGER, SHAWN T. MCCORMICK and BRAD VALE,
Defendants, NEVRO CORP., Defendant. Case No. 3:18-cv-06695-VC.
(N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff David Nguyen filed a putative stockholder derivative
action on behalf of nominal defendant Nevro Corp. alleging
violations of law including federal securities law and breaches of
fiduciary duty against certain of the company's officers and
directors.

The Parties filed a stipulation and proposed order to stay the
Action in anticipation of Nevro's motion to dismiss a factually
related and earlier-filed securities class action pending in this
Court and captioned as Oklahoma Police Pension and Retirement
System v. Nevro Corporation, et al., 18-cv-05181-VC (the Class
Action, in which the plaintiffs asserted federal securities claims
against the Company and certain of its officers and directors.

The Court granted Nevro's motion to dismiss the Class Action and
subsequently issued a final judgment in Nevro's favor in the Class
Action.

In light of the Court's ruling on Nevro's motion to dismiss the
factually related Class Action, Plaintiff desires to dismiss this
Action without prejudice, and the Parties have agreed to the
voluntary dismissal of this Action without prejudice pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) with each party to bear its
own costs.

The Parties hereby jointly request that the Court enter an Order:
Dismissing Plaintiff's claims and this Action without prejudice
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), with each party
to bear their own costs and attorneys' fees.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2019 Order is
available https://tinyurl.com/yxkk3gqg from Leagle.com.

David Nguyen, Derivatively and on behalf of Nominal Defendant Nevro
Corp., Plaintiff, represented by Laurence Matthew Rosen -
lrosen@rosenlegal.com - The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.

Rami Elghandour, Andrew Galligan, Michael DeMane, Ali Behbahani,
Lisa Earnhardt, Frank Fischer, Wilfred E. Jaeger, Shawn T.
McCormick, Brad Vale & Nevro Corp., Nominal Defendant, Defendants,
represented by Matthew Rawlinson - matt.rawlinson@lw.com - Latham &
Watkins LLP, Elizabeth L. Deeley - elizabeth.deeley@lw.com - Latham
& Watkins LLP & Grant Edward Strother -grant.strother@lw.com -
Latham & Watkins LLP.


NEW YORK: Court Denies Class Certification in DeCastro Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion for
Class Certification in the case captioned ANGEL DECASTRO, SUSAN
CALVO, and KELLY MACON, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, and THE
NEW YORK CITY TAXI and LIMOUSINE COMMISSION, Defendants. No.
16-CV-3850 (RA). (S.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiffs Angel DeCastro, Susan Calvo, and Kelly Macon brought
this action against the City of New York and its Taxi and Limousine
Commission, alleging that the City's enforcement of its regulations
regarding the operation of vehicles for hire violated their
constitutional rights. Plaintiffs were previously granted summary
judgment on their claims that the City's practice of seizing
vehicles belonging to certain groups of vehicle owners, on
suspicion that the vehicles were being operated for hire without a
license, was unconstitutional.

Plaintiffs in this action filed a motion seeking to certify a class
of all registered owners of vehicles seized since September 8, 2011
for alleged second or subsequent violations of Section
19-506(b)(1), or for any violation of Section 19-506 involving a
vehicle bearing TLC license plates, who were operating the vehicle
at the time of the seizure or who retrieved the vehicle personally
or through an agent by paying towing and storage fees.

The ascertainability requirement, which is a modest threshold
requirement considers whether the proposed class is defined using
objective criteria that establish a membership with definite
boundaries. A proposed class fails to be ascertainable only where
the class definition is indeterminate in some fundamental way.

Assuming Plaintiffs can establish standing and ascertainability,
they must then satisfy the Rule 23(a) requirements, which are that:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.  

Ascertainability

Defendants argue that the proposed class is not ascertainable for
many reasons, namely, that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently
define the class; that the class consists of straw owners; that the
City has individual defenses to the seizures of putative class
members' vehicles; and that individualized proof is required to
determine class membership. The Court agrees that Plaintiffs have
failed to sufficiently define the class, but only insofar as they
have not included an end date to the proposed class period. The
remainder of Plaintiffs' arguments do not bear on the question of
ascertainability, but rather on whether common questions
predominate over individual ones.

Plaintiffs have defined the class based on objective criteria. To
be a member of the class, a person must be (1) the registered owner
of: a straight-plate vehicle that was seized by the City for a
second or subsequent violation of Section 19-506(b)(1), or a
TLC-plated vehicle that was seized for any violation of Section
19-506 (2) who paid towing and storage fees to retrieve the vehicle
either themselves or through an agent. The challenges Plaintiffs
may face in establishing that they actually paid for the towing and
storage fees, and that the relevant seizure was unconstitutional,
more clearly weigh on the burden of identification, not the
possibility.

As for the relevant time period, however, Plaintiffs define the
class period as beginning in September 8, 2011, but they do not
specify a clear end date. This precludes a finding that the
ascertainability requirement has been met.  Having established a
fixed temporal limitation, the class is now ascertainable.

Plaintiffs have met the numerosity, commonality, and typicality
requirements, and the Court assumes, again without deciding, that
adequacy of representation is also satisfied. The proposed class
nevertheless fails to satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule
23(b)(3).
Plaintiffs' motion is thus denied on that basis.

Numerosity

Numerosity under Rule 23(a)(1) is presumed satisfied when there are
more than 40 class members.  Plaintiffs estimate that the class is
comprised of at most 14,000 seizures and presumably thousands of
registered owners. Although the Court has narrowed the class period
to begin on May 24, 2013, the City does not contest numerosity.
Plaintiffs have met this requirement.

Commonality

To establish commonality under Rule 23(a)(2), Plaintiffs must show
that class members have suffered the same injury and that there is
at least one question common to the class that is capable of
classwide resolution. A question is common to the class if it is
susceptible to generalized, class-wide proof.

Plaintiffs have established commonality. The proposed class members
have allegedly suffered the same injuries, primarily, the payment
of fees, as a result of a specific policy promulgated by
Defendants, namely that Defendants established a practice of
seizing vehicles for violations of Section 19-506(b) without a
warrant. Common questions of law and fact therefore exist because
the claims of the proposed class stem from the same alleged
unconstitutional conduct of the defendants. But the Court must
still consider common questions even if they have already been
resolved in certain Plaintiffs' favor in the class action
analysis.

Commonality is, therefore, satisfied.

Typicality

Typicality under Rule 23(a)(3) exists when each class member's
claim arises from the same course of events, and each class member
makes similar legal arguments to prove the defendant's liability.
Plaintiffs have established typicality. As previously noted, the
class members' claims arise from the same course of events, namely,
the City's seizure of vehicles for which they were the registered
owner, and for which they had to pay towing and storage fees to
have them retrieved.

The City argues that class members who violated Section
19-506(b)(2) are not similarly situated to class members whose
vehicles were seized for second or subsequent violations of Section
19-506(b)(1). In support of this argument, it contends that, unlike
registered owners of unlicensed vehicles, the owners of
TLC-licensed vehicles have: (1) voluntarily consented to the
agency's strict oversight and (2) fulfilled requirements pertaining
to insurance and other financial responsibilities. The City does
not explain, however, why these differences would impact
Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment arguments with respect to the City's
seizure of vehicles that are premised on violations of Section
19-506(b)(2).

It is true that no Court has yet to address whether the application
of the City's seizure policy, as codified in Section 19-506(h)(1),
to enforce violations of Section 19-506(b)(2), as opposed to (b)(1)
is unconstitutional. But as noted, the typicality inquiry focuses
on the nature of the putative class members' claims, and whether
they arise from the same course of conduct. It does not require a
uniform finding of liability as to every class member prior to
certification. The fact that a liability determination has not been
made as to a subset of the putative class members is, in the
Court's view, an issue more appropriately addressed in the
predominance requirement.

Typicality is satisfied here because: (1) the named Plaintiffs seek
to hold Defendants liable for the same conduct that is the basis of
the claims of all class members and (2) the Section 19-506(b)(2)
violators make the same legal arguments with respect to the
constitutionality of the seizures as the Section 19-506(b)(1)
violators.

Adequacy of Representation

Adequacy of representation is evaluated in two ways by looking to
the qualifications of plaintiffs' counsel and  by examining the
interests of the named plaintiffs. Although Plaintiffs' counsel is
qualified to represent the class, it is less clear whether
Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of demonstrating that the
same is true for the named Plaintiffs. Because the Court ultimately
concludes that the proposed class fails to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3),
however, it will assume, without deciding, that the named
Plaintiffs are sufficient class representatives.

Class Counsel

The City argues that Mr. Ackman has a conflict of interest with
those members of the class that operate black cars such as Uber and
Lyft. Mr. Ackman represents medallion taxi owners in other lawsuits
against the TLC and the City, which allege in part that the City's
decision to allow Uber vehicles to operate in New York City was
unlawful. The City thus contends that Mr. Ackman's representation
of Uber drivers here is prohibited under Rule 1.7 of the New York
State Rules of Professional Conduct. Nothing in the record,
however, supports a finding that the relief Mr. Ackman seeks in
those actions which includes compensatory and punitive damages
against the City is adverse to the interests of Uber drivers here.


The City also cites no authority in which a court disqualified an
attorney under Rule 23 due to an alleged conflict based on
representing different plaintiffs in unrelated actions against the
same defendants. To the extent Mr. Ackman seeks damages from the
same defendants in different actions may suggest that the
plaintiffs are theoretically in competition with one another to
recover on their judgments, such a conflict can be re-visited in
the damages phase of these proceedings, if necessary.

Plaintiffs have met their burden of demonstrating the adequacy of
class counsel.

Predominance

The essence of the predominance inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3) is
whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant
adjudication by representation. A putative class satisfies this
requirement if (i) resolution of any material legal or factual
questions can be achieved through generalized proof and (ii) these
common issues are more substantial than the issues subject only to
individualized proof. This analysis requires district courts to
weigh the prevalence of individual questions, i.e., questions where
members of a proposed class will need to present evidence that
varies from member to member against common questions, i.e.,
questions where the same evidence will suffice for each member to
make a prima face showing or the issue is susceptible to
generalized class-wide proof.

In other words, the Court asks whether issues susceptible to
generalized proof outweigh individual issues This assessment is
more qualitative than quantitative, and must account for the nature
and significance of the material common and individual issues in
the case.

In this case, individual questions pertaining to class membership
eligibility, to proving liability in light of the City's potential
defenses, and to damages, compel the conclusion that common
questions do not predominate over individual ones.

Proving Class Membership

Assessing membership eligibility in plaintiffs' proposed class,
specifically, whether a putative class member paid the towing and
storage fees, entails individualized inquiry. And in light of the
City's evidence of registration fraud and straw ownership,
discussed further below, proving that registered owners actually
paid the towing and storage fees, for many putative class members,
will be no easy feat.

Registered Owners Using Third-Party Claimants

First, as to registered owners who were not driving the vehicles
when they were seized, and who purportedly authorized third-parties
to retrieve their vehicles, the Court is not satisfied that the
third-party authorization form establishes that the registered
owner paid the towing and storage fees. This is because the City
has submitted evidence that these forms were forged.  

For example, the analysis of the City's seizure records shows that
some third-party claimants used the same third-party authorization
form, i.e., including the same date, more than once to pick up
different vehicles on different dates. Sometimes the signature of
the purported registered owner differed dramatically across the
third-party authorization forms and sometimes the signature on the
vehicle registration forms differed dramatically from the purported
signature of the registered owner on the third-party authorization
forms. Those differences raise questions about the validity or
reliability of the forms as evidence of genuine ownership interest
in and of financial injury associated with, the seized vehicles.

While not determinative, this too may suggest that certain
registered owners lacked a genuine interest in the vehicles,
raising questions about whether they actually paid the towing and
storage fees. In light of this evidence, relying on the City's
records alone to determine who actually paid the towing and storage
fees will not suffice.

Registered Owners who Personally Retrieved the Vehicles

Second, as to registered owners who were not operating the vehicles
when they were seized, but who personally retrieved the vehicles,
the City's evidence of straw ownership similarly raises doubts that
these owners would have advanced their own funds to pay the fees.
Some registered owners, for example, after being found guilty of a
Section 19-506(b)(1) violation, transferred their vehicles to a
certain John Doe who is the registered owner of at least 65
vehicles.  

Although this John Doe would retrieve the vehicles after a second
or subsequent seizure, they were nonetheless driven by the original
registered owners at the time of those seizures. The seemingly
illusory transfer of ownership to this John Doe, coupled with the
fact that he is a prolific registered owner, may suggest he is a
straw owner, even though he personally retrieved the vehicles. As
such, the registered owner may very well not have been the one to
pay to retrieve the vehicles.

It is true that the City has shown that they possess copies of
various documents the summonses issued to registered owners,
vehicle seizure notices and release forms, and receipts of payments
of towing and storage fees which can show who picked up the vehicle
from the tow pound, the amount they paid to retrieve the vehicle,
and the method of payment used. Nevertheless, for many putative
class members, establishing membership in the class will require
sworn affidavits. And because their credibility is put into doubt
by the City's evidence of fraud, the individualized inquiries
entailed in determining whether those registered owners are
legitimate class members, threaten to predominate over the common
questions of liability.  

Proving class membership thus requires additional evidence to
establish that the registered owners paid the towing and storage
fees.

Individual Liability Defenses and Damages

The Court is persuaded, however, that the City may possess other
unique probable cause defenses for a certain subset of class
members. The City, for example, has shown through Mulero's
testimony that some vehicle seizures occurred for purposes other
than, or in addition to, suspected violations of Section
19-506(b)(1). The presence of such other illegal activity in
connection with a Section 19-506 violation could conceivably
provide the City with additional probable causes defenses to
justify a seizure in those circumstances. The seizures of putative
class members' vehicles would therefore need to be individually
assessed to determine if the seizure occurred in conjunction with
other activity that provided the City with probable cause to seize
the vehicles.

This could require individual hearings.  

Although Plaintiffs argue that such individuals would not be part
of the class, the class definition is not limited to vehicles
seized only for Section 19-506(b) violations: registered owners
whose vehicles were seized for additional reasons therefore appear
to fit within the class definition. In any event, even if the class
definition were modified to specifically exclude such individuals,
the Court would then need to assess whether a vehicle seizure
occurred in connection with other illegal activity in order to
determine membership in the class.

Moreover, with respect to damages, the City correctly notes that
claims for lost income, lost use of vehicle, and emotional distress
would likely need to be assessed on an individualized basis which
further adds to the number of individualized inquiries.
  
To be clear, the existence of individual defenses based on conduct
occurring in conjunction with a Section 19-506 violation, and the
existence of individual damages would not, independently, preclude
a finding that predominance has been satisfied. Where, as here,
Plaintiffs have established that Defendants applied a uniform
unconstitutional policy, courts in this Circuit have found that
individual affirmative defenses, and individual damages, will not
outweigh the common questions underlying the defendants' conduct.
But when combined with the individual issues associated with
determining whether someone is a member of the class, in this case,
individual questions ultimately predominate over common ones.

Plaintiffs have thus failed to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3).

Due to the difficulties of proving class membership based on the
evidence of fraud and straw ownership associated with violators of
Section 19-506(b)(1), it appears unlikely that there is a definable
class as to those violators that can satisfy Rule 23. A class of
only Section 19-506(b)(2) violators may have fewer predominance
issues given the lack of evidence of fraud and straw ownership with
respect to those putative class members.

Nevertheless, because there has been no determination as to whether
the City has engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutionally
seizing vehicles of Section 19-506(b)(2) violators, it is difficult
to predict whether common questions would predominate over
individual ones in such a hypothetical class. Moreover, were
Plaintiffs to seek certification of a class comprised of only
Section 19-506(b)(2) violators, they would need to persuade the
Court that they should be granted leave to amend the Complaint to
add new named plaintiffs, as the current ones would not fit within
this narrower class definition.

Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 19, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxrw2nc5 from
Leagle.com.

Angel DeCastro, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & Susan Calvo, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel Lee Ackman ,
Daniel L. Ackman, Esq., Jonathan Andrew Harris  - jon@sc-harris.com
- Harris, O'Brien, St. Laurent & Chaudhry LLP, Joseph Terence
Gallagher - jgallagher@sc-harris.com - Harris St. Laurent LLP,
Yonaton Aronoff - yaronoff@sc-harris.com- Harris St. Laurent LLP &
Andrew M. St. Laurent , Harris St. Laurent LLP, 40 Wall Street,
53rd Floor, New York, NY 10005

Kelly Macon, Plaintiff, represented by Jonathan Andrew Harris ,
Harris, O'Brien, St. Laurent & Chaudhry LLP, Joseph Terence
Gallagher , Harris St. Laurent LLP & Andrew M. St. Laurent , Harris
St. Laurent LLP.

The City Of New York & New York City Taxi And Limousine Commission,
Defendants, represented by Karen Beth Selvin , New York City Law
Department & Angelie Thomas , New York City Law Department.


NORTH CAROLINA: Seelig's Appeal in Suit Over Prison Condition Nixed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PAUL E. SEELIG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KENNETH
LASSITER; LARRY DAIL; THOMAS ASBELL; DAVID MAY, JR.; PAULA PAGE;
TOMMY PAGE; CAPTAIN FIELDS; CAPTAIN JOHNSON; CAPTAIN ENSLOW; LT.
SUGGS; LT. ARTIS; LT. HALL; LT. PHILLIPS; LT. HOLLOWELL; SGT.
WILLIAMS; SGT. MS. WILLIAMS; SGT. HAWKINS; SGT. FORBES; SGT.
OLIVER; SGT. JONES; SGT. DIXON; SGT. DAWSON; SGT. SHIRLEY; SGT.
MARKER; SGT. BOONE; SGT. MORGAN; SGT. COOPER; SGT. FARROW; MS.
HENSON; MR. BYNUM; MRS. BYNUM; MR. HAGGERTY; MS. PHILLIPS; MS. LEE;
MS. PULLY; MS. ASWELL; MR. DANT; MS. TORRES; MS. BOYLES; MS.
HAWKINS; MR. BURRUS; MR. WARD; MS. WILLIAMS; MR. MOORE; MS. DIXON;
MR. COLE; MS. LEVI; OFFICER HILLARD; MR. LANCASTER; MR. MILLARD;
MR. STOCKS; MR. MOSS; MR. SPIVEY; MR. SHINGLETON; MR. DUPREE; MR.
BITTLE; MR. APPENHEIMER; MS. PEDEXA; MS. KUNE; MR. CELLNER; MR.
JOHNSON; MS. EGMENTON; MR. ROBERTS; MR. HUNTER; MS. SMALLWOOD; MR.
BEDMON; MS. SHEPPARD; MR. TYSON; MR. HARRIS; MR. MOORE; MR.
SKINNER; MR. BRIGHT; MR. HASSELL; MR. KENNEDY; MR. MITCHELL; MR.
CORNELIUS; MS. STEWART; MR. NEWBORN; MR. STREETER; MR. HARRISON;
MS. WEST; MS. JONES; MR. HARVEY; MR. BROCK; MR. DAWSON; MR. CANNON;
MR. YOUNG; MR. HAM; NURSE MS. SMITH; MS. MOORE; MS. MILLER; MS.
WATSON; MR. KEARNEY; JOHN DOES 1-100; JANE DOES 1-100,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 19-6445 (4th Cir.), the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed Seelig's appeal from
the district court's order: (i) granting in part his motion to
appoint counsel; dismissing his claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
(2012) and certain Defendants; (ii) dismissing his requests for
punitive and compensatory damages; (iii) allowing his claims under
the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") to proceed; (iv)
directing that he file a response explaining the specific role of
each Defendant with respect to his ADA claims; (v) denying his
motions to assign the action to another district judge, to certify
the action as a class action, and for a preliminary injunction and
a temporary restraining order; (vi) denying the motions for
sanctions and to issue a writ of mandamus filed by a nonparty; and
(viii) dismissing as duplicative any attempt by Seelig to assert a
claim raised in prior litigation.

The Court explains that it may exercise jurisdiction only over
final orders, and certain interlocutory and collateral orders.  In
large part, the order Seelig seeks to appeal is neither a final
order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order.  The
Court may permit an interlocutory appeal from an order denying
class certification, but an appellant must petition the Court for
leave to appeal within 14 days after the order is entered.  Seelig
did not petition the Court for permission to appeal the portion of
the order denying his request for class certification as required
by Rule 23(f).

Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal.  It dispensed with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the it and argument
would not aid the decisional process.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 5, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/LpMoOL from Leagle.com.

Paul E. Seelig, Appellant Pro Se.


NORWALK, CT: Riley Seeks Unpaid Overtime Compensation
-----------------------------------------------------
BARBARA RILEY, on behalf of her own behalf of all those similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. CITY OF NORWALK, NORWALK BOARD OF
EDUCATION, and NORWALK PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT, the Defendants,
Case No. 3:19-cv-01436 (D. Conn., Sept. 12, 2019), seeks to recover
unpaid overtime compensation and other relief under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

According to the lawsuit, the Defendants failed to comply with 29
USC sections 201-209, because the Plaintiff performed services for
the Defendants for which no provisions were made  by the Defendants
to properly pay the Plaintiff for those hours worked in excess of
40 within a work week.

The Plaintiff is an hourly paid employees who during her employment
with the Defendants.

City of Norwalk is a local municipality responsible for the
education of its citizens. The Norwalk Board of Education is
responsible for overseeing the administration of educational
services offered to the residents.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Ryan Daugherty, Esq.
          DAUGHERTY LAW GROUP, LLC
          260 Madison Ave., 8th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (646) 859 1674

OPHTHOTECH CORP: Court Refuses to Dismiss Derivative Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order denying Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss in the case captioned LUIS PACHECO, Derivatively on Behalf
of Ophthotech Corporation, Plaintiff, v. DAVID R. GUYER, GLENN P.
SBLENDORIO, DAVID E. REDLICK, THOMAS DYRBERG, AXEL BOLTE, MICHAEL
J. ROSS, SAMIR C. PATEL, and NICHOLAS GALAKATOS, Defendants. No.
18-cv-7999 (VSB). (S.D.N.Y.).

This lawsuit arises from statements made and actions taken by
Defendants in conjunction with clinical trials for Fovista, a new
drug developed by Ophthotech to treat macular degeneration. Many of
the allegations in the Complaint are taken from the facts set forth
in the Consolidated Amended Complaint for Violations of the Federal
Securities Laws in the related Securities Action. Shareholder
plaintiff Luis Pacheco, derivatively on behalf of Ophthotech
Corporation, brings this action against eight current and former
Ophthotech directors and officers for breach of fiduciary duty,
unjust enrichment, and waste of corporate assets.

Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim will have facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.

In considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true all
well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint and must draw all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. A complaint need
not make detailed factual allegations, but it must contain more
than mere labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action.

Demand Futility

The derivative form of action permits an individual shareholder to
bring suit to enforce a corporate cause of action against officers,
directors, and third parties. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1
requires that the complaint in a derivative action state with
particularity any effort by the plaintiff to obtain the desired
action from the directors or the reasons for not making the effort.
Where a plaintiff has not made a pre-suit demand, the complaint
must plead with particularity facts showing that a demand on the
board would have been futile.

In order to determine whether Plaintiff has demonstrated that it
would have been futile to make a litigation demand on the
Ophthotech Board, the Court must evaluate whether the Complaint
alleges with particularity facts suggesting that at least four of
the seven directors on the Board at the time Plaintiff filed suit
would have been incapable of impartially considering such a demand.
The Court therefore must first analyze whether the misconduct
alleged in the Complaint renders any of the directors interested in
the outcome of the litigation, and, if so, whether any of the other
directors are compromised in their ability to act independently of
the directors found to be interested.  

The Court finds that Defendant Guyer, a named defendant in the
underlying Securities Action is interested in the outcome of this
litigation and that there is a reasonable doubt as to whether at
least three of the other directors are capable of acting
impartially with respect to Defendant Guyer.

As a result, the Court concludes that Plaintiff did not need to
make a demand on the Ophthotech Board.

Interestedness

The Complaint alleges that six of the seven members of Ophthotech's
Board, Defendants Guyer, Sblendorio, Redlick, Dyrberg, Bolte, and
Ross are interested in the outcome of this litigation because they
face a substantial risk of liability for breaching their fiduciary
duties by causing or allowing Ophthotech to make misleading
statements regarding the Fovista clinical trials, and/or by selling
their shares of Ophthotech stock based on material nonpublic
information.

Applicable Law

The determination of whether a director is interested in the
outcome of a lawsuit turns on whether that director faces a
substantial likelihood' of personal liability for the misconduct
alleged.  

Where a company's certificate of incorporation contains an
exculpatory provision, directors are shielded from claims for
monetary damages, except for claims of breach of the duty of
loyalty or bad faith.  

Application

Ophthotech's Certificate of Incorporation exculpates directors to
the fullest extent possible under Delaware law. Notwithstanding
this exculpatory provision, I find that Plaintiff has plausibly
alleged facts creating a reasonable doubt as to Defendant Guyer's
disinterestedness in this litigation.

Plaintiff asserts that Guyer, Sblendorio, Redlick, Dyrberg, Bolte,
and Ross face a substantial likelihood of liability for breaching
the duty of loyalty by causing Ophthotech to make false and
misleading statements and/or by engaging in insider sales of
Ophthotech stock. With respect to the making of materially
misleading statements, The Court finds Defendant Guyer to be in an
entirely different position than the other directors.

Guyer, unlike the other directors, (1) is named as a defendant in
the Securities Action (2) served as Ophthotech's CEO and Chairman
of the Board during the Relevant Period and (3) personally made
many of the statements challenged by Plaintiff as materially false
and misleading.

Defendants argue that the Complaint fails to plausibly allege that
any of the challenged statements were false or misleading.

However, the Court rejected this argument in the Securities O&O
with respect to those statements denying material changes in the
enrollment criteria between Phase 2b and Phase 3 of the Fovista
clinical trial. Moreover, Guyer personally made several of the
statements identified in the Securities O&O as sufficiently
misleading to withstand a motion to dismiss, including his comment
at a November 17, 2015 conference that Ophthotech had changed
nothing between Phase 2b and Phase 3, and his remark at a December
8, 2015 conference that the Phase 3 Trial was really similar in
virtually every way to the Phase 2b Trial.  

The Complaint here challenges these very same statements as
materially misleading.

Defendants also contend that there are no allegations that Guyer or
any of the other directors knew that any of their statements were
false and misleading. However, Defendants' argument focuses
primarily on the purported lack of knowledge of those directors
other than Guyer.  

Defendants' failure to characterize the allegations against Guyer
in a similar fashion speaks volumes. In concluding in the
Securities O&O that the Consolidated Complaint identified strong
circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness on
the part of Guyer and Patel, the Court found unpersuasive the
argument that Defendant Guyer lacked knowledge that his statements
were false and misleading.  

Therefore conclude that the Complaint here, which contains similar
allegations, sets forth facts sufficient to create a reasonable
doubt that Guyer would have been capable of impartially responding
to a litigation demand due to his own substantial risk of personal
liability for the misconduct alleged.

Independence

Having found that Defendant Guyer is interested in the outcome of
this litigation, the Court next turn to the question of whether
there is reasonable doubt as to the independence of the remaining
Ophthotech directors vis-à-vis Guyer. So long as Plaintiff has
adequately alleged facts that plausibly suggest that at least three
other Ophthotech directors could not have acted impartially with
respect to Guyer, demand futility will be established. Drawing all
reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor as the Court is bound to
do at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court finds that Plaintiff
has carried his burden.

Applicable Law

In addition to alleging that a director faces a substantial
likelihood of personal liability, a plaintiff may plead demand
futility by demonstrating that there is reason to doubt the
independence of a majority of the board's directors.  

In evaluating a director's independence, it is important that the
trial court consider all particularized facts pled by the
plaintiffs about the relationships between the director and the
interested party in their totality and not in isolation from each
other. In other words, a court must consider the totality of the
facts and circumstances surrounding the relationship between the
director and the interested party.

Application

The majority of Plaintiff's allegations undermining director
independence focus on the web of interlocking business
relationships among Defendants. Based on these ongoing investment
partnerships and professional ties, Plaintiff alleges that the VC
Defendants will not vote to initiate litigation against each other
due to the risk of their venture capital funds being cut out of
future investment opportunities in retaliation.

It is well established that the mere allegation that a
disinterested director has served on the boards of unaffiliated
companies with an interested director is insufficient to render the
disinterested director not independent. Here, however, Plaintiff
has alleged a web of interrelated investments, overlapping
financial interests, and business ties.

Plaintiff alleged that these relationships indicated a mutually
beneficial network of ongoing business relations between the
disinterested directors and the interested directors, which the
disinterested directors were not likely to risk by causing the
company to sue the interested directors.  

Defendants here fail to even address the specifics of Plaintiff's
allegations, i.e., the sheer number of the VC Defendants'
overlapping investments, combined with the fact that the VC
Defendants routinely sit on boards of companies financed by one
another and instead rely on broad statements of law establishing
that the naked assertion of a previous business relationship is not
enough to overcome the presumption of a director's independence.

Contrary to Defendants' assertion that a ruling in Plaintiff's
favor would establish the untenable proposition that any time two
or more directors are associated with venture capital firms, they
are automatically deemed not independent of each other, the Court
find only that the Complaint identifies sufficiently close business
ties between this particular group of individuals including a
significant number of overlapping investments and leadership roles
in more than 20 different companies to support an admittedly
imprecise, pleading stage determination" that Defendants Ross,
Bolte, and Dyrberg may not have been able to impartially evaluate a
litigation demand implicating Guyer.  

Because the Court concludes that there is a reasonable doubt as to
the ability of Defendants Ross, Bolte, and Dyrberg to act
independently of Defendant Guyer, the Court finds that Plaintiff
has adequately alleged that a majority of Ophthotech's directors
were either interested or not independent, and that serving a
litigation demand on the Board would therefore have been futile. As
a result, the Court needs not address Plaintiff's allegations that
the remaining directors, Sblendorio and Redlick are also beholden
to Defendant Guyer.

Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint is
denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 19, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6dto9kx from
Leagle.com.

Luis Pacheco, Derivatively on Behalf of Ophthotech Corporation,
Plaintiff, represented by Thomas G. Amon , Law Office of Thomas G.
Amon.

David R. Guyer, Glenn P. Sblendorio, David E. Redlick, Thomas
Dyrberg, Axel Bolte, Michael J. Ross, Samir C. Patel & Nicholas
Galakatos, Defendants, represented by Jeremy Todd Adler , Wilmer
Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, Michael G. Bongiorno , Wilmer
Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP & Timothy J. Perla , Wilmer
Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr.

Ophthotech Corporation, a Delaware corporation, Nominal Defendant,
represented by Jeremy Todd Adler , Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale &
Dorr LLP, Michael G. Bongiorno , Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and
Dorr LLP & Timothy J. Perla , Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and
Dorr.


ORITANI FINANCIAL: Parshall Says Merger Docs False and Misleading
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case, PAUL PARSHALL, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. ORITANI FINANCIAL CORP.,
NICHOLAS ANTONACCIO, JAMES J. DOYLE JR., ROBERT S. HEKEMIAN JR.,
KEVIN J. LYNCH, JOHN J. SKELLY, JR., JOHN M. FIELDS JR., HARVEY R.
HIRSCHFELD, JUDITH SCHUMACHER-TILTON, and VALLEY NATIONAL BANCORP,
the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01729-UNA (D. Del., Sept. 13,
2019), stems from a proposed transaction announced on June 26,
2019, pursuant to which Oritani Financial Corp. will be acquired by
Valley National Bancorp.

On June 25, 2019, Oritani's Board of Directors caused the Company
to enter into an agreement and plan of merger with Valley. Pursuant
to the terms of the Merger Agreement, Oritani's stockholders will
receive 1.60 shares of Valley common stock for each share of
Oritani common stock they own.

On August 30, 2019, the Defendants filed a Form S-4 Registration
Statement with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
in connection with the Proposed Transaction.

The Registration Statement omits material information with respect
to the Proposed Transaction, which renders the Registration
Statement false and misleading.

First, the Registration Statement omits material information
regarding the Company's and Valley's financial projections. With
respect to the Company's financial projections, the Registration
Statement fails to disclose projected cash flows and all underlying
line items.

Second, the Registration Statement omits material information
regarding the analyses performed by the Company's financial advisor
in connection with the Proposed Transaction, Keefe, Bruyette &
Woods. With respect to KBW's Oritani Selected Companies Analysis,
the Registration Statement fails to disclose the individual
multiples and metrics for the companies observed by KBW in the
analysis.

Third, the Registration Statement omits material information
regarding potential conflicts of interest of KBW. The Registration
Statement fails to disclose the amount of compensation KBW received
for the past services it provided to Valley and its affiliates. The
Registration Statement also fails to disclose the nature of the
"position in shares of Valley common stock held by a senior member
of the KBW advisory team providing services to Oritani in
connection with the proposed merger."

Oritani Financial Corp., is a publicly traded Mutual Holding
Company listed on the NASDAQ exchange with the trading symbol
"ORIT".[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 295-5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
          E-mail: bdl@rl-legal.com
                  gms@rl-legal.com

               - and -

          RM LAW, P.C.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (484) 324-6800
          Facsimile: (484) 631-1305

PAX ASSIST: Rohoman Seeks Minimum Wages for Airport Employees
-------------------------------------------------------------
ZAMER ROHOMAN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. PAX ASSIST, INC., and ASMAHAN
DAHBALI, individually, the Defendant, Case No. 715725/2019 (N.Y.
Sup., Sept. 12, 2019), seeks to recover minimum wages under the New
York State Labor Law and the New York Code of Rules Regulations,
and the New York Wage Theft Prevention Act.

The Plaintiff was throughout his entire employment with Defendants,
a covered, non-exempt employee within the meaning of the NYLL. As
such, Plaintiff was, and is, entitled to be paid in full for all
hours worked, the lawsuit says.

The Defendants conducts business at various airports throughout New
York State. The Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as a
wheelchair agent from approximately June 1, 2014 through August 5,
2019.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Mark Gaylord, Esq.
          BOUKLAS GAYLORD LLP
          445 Broadhollow Road, Suite 110
          Melville, NY 11747
          Telephone: (516) 742-4949
          Facsimile: (516) 742-1977
          E-mail: mark@bglawny.com

PETER LIK SOHO: Mendez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Peter Lik Soho, Inc.
The case is styled as Himelda Mendez AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER
PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff v. Peter Lik Soho, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-08981 (S.D. N.Y., Sept. 26, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Peter Lik Soho, Inc. is a gallery in New York. LIK Fine Art Soho
matches its famous surroundings with an interior of simple black &
white tones, keeping all of the focus on Peter Lik's display of
fitting, raw imagery.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
     The Marks Law Firm PC
     175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
     New York, NY 10014
     Phone: (646) 770-3775
     Fax: (646) 867-2639
     Email: bmarkslaw@gmail.com


PRO LABEL: Melzer Class Action Settlement Has Prelim Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin, Green Bay Division, issued an Order granting Parties'
Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of a Class and Collective
Action Settlement in the case captioned THOMAS MELZER, Plaintiff,
v. PRO LABEL, INC., Defendant. Case No. 18-C-1080. (E.D. Wis.).

The Parties' Settlement Agreement and Release of Claims is APPROVED
as a fair, reasonable, and adequate resolution of disputed claims
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Wisconsin wage and
hour laws.

The Parties' request to certify the following class pursuant to
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 is GRANTED: All hourly, non-exempt employees who
worked for Pro Label, Inc. at any time between July 16, 2016 and
August 31, 2018, and who do not timely exclude themselves (Class
Member; collectively, the Rule 23 Class).

The Parties' request to certify the following collective action
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 216(b) is GRANTED: All hourly, non-exempt
employees who worked for Pro Label, Inc. at any time between July
16, 2015 and August 31, 2018, and who have timely returned Consent
Forms (each, a "Collective Member;" collectively, FLSA
Collective).

Thomas Melzer is APPOINTED as Class Representative.

The Administrator under the Settlement Agreement SHALL MAIL the
Notice to the Class Members and potential Collective Members within
twenty (20) business days of the Court's entry of this Preliminary
Approval Order.

Class Counsel SHALL FILE a Petition for Approval of Attorneys' Fees
and Costs at least twenty-one (21) calendar days prior to the
Fairness Hearing, and any supplemental brief in support of final
approval of the Agreement or in response to any objections to the
application for attorneys' fees must be filed at least seven (7)
calendar days before the Fairness Hearing.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2019 Order is
available https://tinyurl.com/y6z73p37 from Leagle.com.

Thomas Melzer, Plaintiff, represented by David M. Potteiger  -
dpotteiger@walcheskeluzi.com - Walcheske & Luzi LLC, James A.
Walcheske  - jwalcheske@walcheskeluzi.com - Walcheske & Luzi LLC,
Matthew J. Tobin - mtobin@walcheskeluzi.com - Walcheske & Luzi LLC
& Scott S. Luzi - sluzi@walcheskeluzi.com - Walcheske & Luzi LLC.

Pro Label Inc, Defendant, represented by Annie Laurie Eiden ,
Godfrey & Kahn SC & Rebeca M. Lopez , Godfrey & Kahn SC, 200 S
Washington St Ste 100, Green Bay, WI, 54301-4298


RAS CITRON: Ubaldi Sues over Debt Collection Practices
------------------------------------------------------
ANDREA UBALDI, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff(s), vs. RAS CITRON, LLC; NATIONSTAR
MORTGAGE, LLC d/b/a MR. COOPER; and JOHN DOES 1-25, the
Defendant(s), Case No. 2:19-cv-18002-WJM-MF (D.N.J., Sept. 15,
2019), seeks to recover damages and declaratory relief arising from
the Defendants' violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act, which prohibits debt collectors from engaging in abusive,
deceptive and unfair practices.

The Defendants use the mail, telephone, and facsimile and regularly
engages in business the principal purpose of which is to attempt to
collect debts alleged to be due another.

The Defendants are a debt collector.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff

          Joseph K. Jones, Esq.
          JONES, WOLF & KAPASI, LLC
          375 Passaic Avenue
          Fairfield, NJ 07004
          Telephone: (973) 227-5900
          Facsimile: (973) 244-0019
          E-mail: jkj@legaljones.com

RECONSTRUCTIVE ORTHO: Judgment in Wolfington Partly Upheld
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANDREW WOLFINGTON, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Appellant, v. RECONSTRUCTIVE ORTHOPAEDIC
ASSOCIATES II PC, a/k/a the Rothman Institute; ROTHMAN INSTITUTE;
DOES 1 THROUGH 10, inclusive, Case Nos. 17-3500, 18-1182 (3d Cir.),
Judge Julio M. Fuentes of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the District Court's
entry of judgment on the pleadings against Appellant-Plaintiff
Wolfington on his claim under the Truth in Lending Act.

Wolfington's claim under the Act stems from reconstructive knee
surgery he received from defendant-appellee Reconstructive
Orthopaedic Associates II PC, also known as the Rothman Institute.
He alleged that Rothman failed to provide disclosures required by
the Act when it permitted him to pay his deductible in monthly
installments following surgery.

Wolfington agreed on Jan. 12, 2016 to have surgery provided by
Rothman, scheduled for Jan. 21, 2016.  As part of the January 12
agreement, Wolfington signed a document titled "Financial Policy."
The Policy provided that Wolfington agreed to pay any outstanding
deductible not covered by his insurance before his surgery took
place.  The day before Wolfington's surgery, however, Wolfington's
father informed Rothman that Wolfington was unable to pay his
deductible, then around $2,000.  Rothman orally agreed to accept a
$200 "initial payment" by Wolfington and to permit him to pay the
remaining deductible in monthly installments of $100.  Wolfington
received two emails on January 20, one confirming the $200 payment
and the other confirming the establishment of the payment plan and
listing the credit card to which payments would be charged.  The
Complaint quotes both emails in full.  Wolfington had surgery as
scheduled, but subsequently failed to make any further payments on
his outstanding deductible.

Wolfington filed a putative class action in the District Court,
alleging that Rothman had extended him credit in the January 20
Agreement, subject to the Truth in Lending Act, but failed to
provide disclosures required by the Act.  The Complaint set forth
two claims, including one for violation of the Act.  His second
claim, for violation of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, was
later withdrawn.  Rothman filed an Answer with counterclaims for
breach of contract and a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,
which included a copy of the Financial Policy, along with other
documents.

The District Court entered judgment on Wolfington's claim because
it determined he had failed to allege that credit had been extended
to him in a "written agreement," as required by the Act's
implementing regulation, Regulation Z.  After entering judgment,
the District Court also sua sponte imposed sanctions on
Wolfington's counsel.

On appeal, Wolfington challenges the District Court's entry of
judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) and imposition of
sanctions under Rule 11.  In particular, Wolfington contends that
(1) the District Court erred under Rule 12(c) by considering
material outside the pleadings—namely, counsel's purported
concession that there was no written agreement -- and, (2) he has
adequately alleged (a) the extension of credit, (b) the
consummation of a credit transaction, and (c) a written agreement.

Judge Fuentes finds that Wolfington had insufficient notice of the
conversion to summary judgment.  The District Court entered
judgment only eight days after the counsel's purported admission
during the Dec. 14, 2016 telephone conference, and it gave no
indication during that conference that it was considering
converting the Motion to one for summary judgment.  Further,
Rothman's motion was captioned only as a "Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings or in the Alternative to Bifurcate Discovery," and it
was only in Rothman's Reply Brief in Support of Its Motion Under
Federal Rule 12(c) that the possibility of conversion was raised.
Nowhere in the record before the Court did the District Court
acknowledge that possibility.  That was insufficient notice of
conversion under Rule 12(d).

Despite the erroneous conversion of the Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings into one for summary judgment, the Judge concludes that
that error was harmless.  A district court's failure to give
adequate notice under Rule 12(d) does not require automatic
reversal.  Instead, the error may be excused if the complaint
likewise failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), rendering the
district court's failure harmless error.

The Judge concludes that the contrast between a formal "written"
agreement and an "informal workout" of preexisting debt is better
analyzed, infra, under Rothman's argument that Wolfington failed to
plead a written agreement under the definition of "creditor."
Wolfington also sufficiently pled the formation of a contractual
agreement: offer, acceptance, and "mutual assent to essential
terms."  He pled that he reached a payment agreement with Rothman
that involved a down payment and monthly installments "until the
balance of the deductible was fully satisfied.  Finally, the staff
interpretation of a "written agreement" is entitled to deference
from the Court.  Because Wolfington has not pled such an agreement,
the Judge will affirm the District Court's judgment on the
pleadings.

Although Wolfington's counsel raises a number of arguments
challenging the imposition of sanctions, the Judge concludes that
the counsel's conduct did not run afoul of Rule 11 and therefore do
not reach those other arguments.  The District Court abused its
discretion in imposing sanctions.  Because the imposition of
sanctions is necessarily fact-intensive and only Rule 11 was
briefed by the parties in the District Court or addressed by the
District Court, he declines to consider in the first instance
whether sanctions could have been imposed on other grounds.

Finally, the Judge considers Wolfington's belated request for leave
to amend his Complaint.  Wolfington requests leave to amend in a
footnote in a supplemental letter brief filed with this Court.
However, on appeal, Wolfington fails to address whether he meets
the standards for leave to amend under Rule 15(a).  He likewise
failed to move to amend his Complaint in the District Court.
Consequently, the Judge declines to consider those issues.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Fuentes affirmed in part and
reversed in part.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 20, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/7uXPJS from Leagle.com.

Peter H. LeVan, Jr. [ARGUED] -- RLevant@LMTPC.com -- LeVan Law
Group, 130 North 18th Street, One Logan Square, 27th Floor,
Philadelphia, PA 19103, Counsel for Appellant.

Laura D. Ruccolo [ARGUED] -- lruccolo@capehart.com -- Capehart
Scatchard, 8000 Midlantic Drive, Laurel Corporate Center, Suite
300S, P.O. Box 5016, Mount Laurel, NJ 08054, Counsel for Appellee.


RED TIE: Carter Seeks Minimum Wage for Exotic Dancers
-----------------------------------------------------
TOYA CARTER, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. RED TIE, INC. D/B/A RED TIE
GENTLEMEN'S CLUB and MIKE MUDARIS, the Defendants, Case No.
19STCV32364 (Cal. Super., Sept. 12, 2019), alleges that the
Defendants failed to pay minimum wage, provide and/or authorize
meal periods, and provide and/or authorize meal periods under the
California Labor Code.  The Defendants misclassifies dancers as
independent contractors.

According to the complaint, the Defendants required Toya Carter to
work as an exotic dancer at its adult entertainment club but
refused to compensate her at the applicable minimum wage. In fact,
the Defendants refused to compensate Plaintiff whatsoever for any
hours worked.

The Plaintiff's only compensation was in the form of tips from club
patrons. Moreover, the Plaintiff was required to divide her tips
with the Defendants and other employees who do not customarily
receive tips.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Jeffrey C. Bogert, Esq.
          MCDONALD WORLEY
          827 Moraga Drive
          Los Angeles, CA 90049
          Phone: (424) 293-2272
          E-mail: bogertlaw@outlook.com

               - and -

          Gabriel A. Assaad, Esq.
          KENNEDY HODGES, LLP
          4409 Montrose Blvd., Suite 200
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 523-0001
          Facsimile: (713) 523-1116
          E-mail: gassaad@kennedvhodges.com

RIPPLE LABS: Asks to Toss Lawsuit Over Crypto Securities
--------------------------------------------------------
Jeff John Roberts, writing for Fortune, reports that the
cryptocurrency company Ripple has asked a federal court to throw
out a class action lawsuit in which investors allege it illegally
sold unregistered securities.

The case is significant because it has the potential to resolve the
contentious legal question of when cryptocurrencies should be
classified as a security -- and expose companies like Ripple to
potentially massive liability.

The class action lawsuit, filed in Oakland, California, came about
after various investors sued in 2018, claiming they lost money
after Ripple induced them to buy XRP, a cryptocurrency that is
integral to the company's business operations. The lawsuit seeks
unspecified damages and a declaration that XRP is a security.

In seeking to dismiss the complaint, Ripple touches on the legal
classification of XRP only briefly, stating federal regulators have
concluded that it is a currency and a commodity rather than a
security.

Instead, Ripple's primary argument is that the case can't go
forward because it was filed too late. The company invokes a law
that shields companies from lawsuits related to the sale of
unregistered securities once three years has passed.

While the investors have characterized Ripple's initial sale of XRP
as "ongoing" and "never-ending," the company points to the
investors' own complaint to point out that its first XRP sale took
place in 2013. The lawsuit, therefore, falls well outside the three
year window, Ripple claims.

Ripple's request for dismissal also alleges that the investors
bought the XRP from the secondary market, rather than directly.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs can't rely on California consumer laws
in light of overriding federal securities rules, the document
states.

The new filing comes at as Ripple and other cryptocurrency
companies continue to press Congress for clearer rules on how to
regulate digital money. If Ripple prevails on its procedural
arguments, it's unlikely the judge will weigh in on defining the
legal status of cryptocurrency.

Meanwhile, the SEC has signaled that two cryptocurrencies --
Bitcoin and Ethereum -- are exempt from securities laws, but has
left the status of others like XRP in limbo. At the same time,
regulators in the U.K. last month suggested XRP is not a security.

Since its inception, Ripple -- which still owns the majority of the
100 billion XRP created in 2013 -- has evolved to offer
cross-border remittance and payment services that claim to offer
lower transaction costs by leveraging cryptocurrency. Earlier this
year, the company announced it had taken a $50 million stake in
money transmission service Moneygram. [GN]


ROSEBUD RESTAURANTS: Jones Sues over Collection of Biometric Data
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ANDREA JONES individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. ROSEBUD RESTAURANTS, INC. doing
business as ROSEBUD RESTAURANT GROUP, the Defendant, Case No.
2019CH10620 (Ill. Cir., Sept. 13, 2019), seeks to put a stop to
Defendant's unlawful collection, use, and storage of Plaintiffs and
the putative Class members' sensitive biometric data under the
Biometric Information Privacy Act.

When employees first begin their jobs at Rosebud, they are required
to scan their fingerprint in its biometric time tracking system as
a means of authentication, instead of using only key fobs or other
identification cards.

While there are tremendous benefits to using biometric time clocks
in the workplace, there are also serious risks. Unlike key fobs or
identification cards-which can be changed or replaced if stolen or
compromised-fingerprints are unique, permanent biometric
identifiers associated with the employee. This exposes employees to
serious and irreversible privacy risks. For example, if a
fingerprint database is hacked, breached, or otherwise exposed,
employees have no means by which to prevent identity theft and
unauthorized tracking, the lawsuit says.

Rosebud operates a popular chain of nine restaurants including two
steakhouses and seven Italian concepts and operates under names
such as "Carmines" and "Rosebud".[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          David Fish, Esq.
          John Kunze, Esq.
          THE FISH LAW FIRM, P.C.
          200 East Fifth Avenue, Suite 123
          Naperville, IL 60563
          Telephone: 630 355 7590
          Facsimile: 630 778 0400
          E-mail: admin@fishlawfirm.com
                  dfish@fishlawfirm.com
                  kunze@fishlawfirm.com

SAEXPLORATION HOLDINGS: Oct. 17 Plaintiff Bid Deadline
------------------------------------------------------
Pawar Law Group announces that a class action lawsuit has been
filed on behalf of shareholders who purchased shares of
SAExploration Holdings, Inc. (SAEX) from March 15, 2016 through
August 15, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The lawsuit seeks
to recover damages for SAExploration investors under the federal
securities laws.

To join the class action, go to
http://pawarlawgroup.com/cases/saexploration-holdings-inc/or call
Vik Pawar, Esq. toll-free at 888-589-9804 or email
info@pawarlawgroup.com for information on the class action.  A
class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than October
17, 2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) the Company improperly did not classify Alaska Seismic
Ventures, LLC ("ASV") as a variable interest entity; (2) the
Company had a controlling financial interest in ASV, which required
the Company to consolidate ASV in its financial statements; (3) the
Company had deficient internal controls over financial reporting;
(4) these practices were likely to lead to an investigation of the
Company by the SEC; (5) SAExploration would be forced to delay the
filing of its quarterly report for the quarter ended June 30, 2019;
and (6) as a result, Defendants' statements about SAExploration's
business, operations and prospects were materially false and
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant times.
When the true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that
investors suffered damages.

No class has been certified. Until a class is certified, you are
not represented by counsel unless you hire one. You may hire
counsel of your choice. You may also do nothing at this time and be
an absent member of the class. Your ability to share in any future
recovery is not dependent upon being a lead plaintiff.

Pawar Law Group represents investors from around the world.

Contact:

         Vik Pawar, Esq.
         Pawar Law Group
         20 Vesey Street, Suite 1210
         New York, NY 10007
         Tel: (917) 261-2277
         Fax: (212) 571-0938
         E-mail: info@pawarlawgroup.com
                 vik@pawarlawgroup.com [GN]


SECORP INDUSTRIES: Beatty Seeks Overtime Pay for Paramedics
-----------------------------------------------------------
KYLE JENSEN, an individual; CHRISTOPHER BEATTY, an individual; for
themselves and those similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. SECORP
INDUSTRIES, a Louisiana partnership; and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-07980 (C.D. Cal., Sept.
13, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid overtime and other compensation,
interest, liquidated damages, costs of suit and reasonable attorney
fees, and other relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Defendants provide services to drilling operations off the
California coast, including on fixed oil platforms on the Outer
Continental Shelf.  They employ hourly employees who work on these
oil platforms and travel between them when necessary.

The Plaintiffs and their co-workers were emergency medical
technicians and paramedics who performed additional duties that
included monitoring safety equipment and dispatching boats and
helicopters.

The Defendants mandate that these hourly workers perform their work
in Plaintiffs and their co-workers were emergency medical
technicians and paramedics who performed additional duties that
included monitoring safety equipment and dispatching boats and
helicopters.

Although Plaintiffs and their co-workers worked 12-hour shifts each
day during their hitch, they always remained on call and
responsible to attending to emergency medical issues, alarms, and
dispatching duties that arose during and after their scheduled
shifts, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Michael A. Strauss, Esq.
          Aris E. Karakalos, Esq.
          Andrew C. Ellison, Esq.
          STRAUSS & STRAUSS, APC
          121 N. Fir St., Suite F
          Ventura, CA 93001
          Telephone: (805) 641.6600
          Facsimile: (805) 641.6607
          E-mail: mike@strausslawyers.com
                  aris@strausslawyers.com
                  andrew@strausslawyers.com

SETERUS INC: Court Denies Spehr FDCPA Suit Dismissal
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri, Eastern Division, issued an Order granting in part and
denying in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the captioned
MICHAEL SPEHR, on Behalf of Himself and Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff, v. SETERUS, INC., Defendant. No. 4:18CV1922 RLW. (E.D.
Mo.).

Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, has
filed this putative class action lawsuit against Defendant for
alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA). He claims Defendant creates a false sense of urgency by
threatening to accelerate the entire indebtedness of a consumer's
loan if full payment of the default amount is not received on or
before the stated expiration date.  

Plaintiff's putative class action asserts Defendant violated
Section 1692(e) of the FDCPA by using false representations and
deceptive means to attempt to collect the debt and by threatening
action that it could not legally take or did not intend to take.
The amended class action seeks a declaration that Defendant has
violated the FDCPA, injunctive relief prohibiting Defendant from
further violating the FDCPA, and class statutory damages and fees
under the FDCPA.

In the instant motion, Defendant argues Plaintiff's amended
complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) for Plaintiff's failure to sufficiently plead
facts establishing standing under Article III of the United States
Constitution and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to stand a claim under
the FDCPA.

Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded facts to establish Article III
standing

As an initial matter, a prerequisite to class certification is that
it must be established that the proposed class representatives have
Article III standing to pursue the claims as to which classwide
relief is sought.

A plaintiff has the burden of establishing standing by
demonstrating (1) an injury in fact (2) fairly traceable to the
defendant's challenged conduct and (3) that is likely to be
redressed by a judicial decision in the plaintiff's favor.  

In this case, Plaintiff alleges he has suffered the following
harms: (a) deprivation of accurate information that would have been
important to him in making informed decisions in response to
Defendant's collection attempts, e.g., truthful information about
the circumstances under which [Defendant's] intended to accelerate
his loan and the actions necessary to avoid acceleration (b)
causing him to perceive the risk of acceleration and foreclosure to
be greater and more imminent than it actually was which naturally
gave rise to anxiety, and (c) subjecting him to unfair and abusive
threats and coercion in violation of his substantive rights under
the FDCPA, e.g., false ultimatums and coercive threats to
accelerate and foreclose upon his home under terms and conditions
that were inconsistent with Defendant's actual intentions.

Defendant argues Plaintiff's allegations amount to mere
hypothetical harms that are insufficient to sustain claim. For
example, Plaintiff's assertion that the Default Letters deprived
him of information that would have been important in making
informed decisions is not the same as asserting he actually made
any suboptimal decisions based on the Default Letters.
Additionally, Defendant argues the allegation that it subjected
Plaintiff to unfair and abusive threats and coercion, without more,
does not establish a concrete harm.  

The Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently established Article
III standing to proceed with this case. While Plaintiff might have
experienced anxiety of the basic fact that he was in default, and
while Defendant appears to have had the contractual right to
accelerate the loan at some point, Plaintiff traces his anxiety to
Defendant's assertion via the Default Letters that such
acceleration was definite and imminent. This is not a situation
where it is difficult to imagine how' the violation of a statutory
right alone could cause concrete harm.

The Court finds this allegation sufficient to establish Article III
standing.

Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a claim under the FDCPA

A complaint must be dismissed under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if the
complaint fails to plead enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face. Factual allegations must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Courts must
liberally construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff and accept the factual allegations as true.  

The FDCPA provides in relevant part: A debt collector may not use
any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in
connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the
general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a
violation of this section: 5) The threat to take any action that
cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken (10)
The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect
or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning
a consumer.

Defendant argues Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under
Section 1692e(10) because his allegations fail to identify a
materially false representation in the Default Letters. According
to Defendant, Plaintiff has alleged, at most, a grace period that
could prevent a customer from facing acceleration after making a
payment in response to the Default Letter that, for whatever reason
did not quite bring the loan current as of the date Defendant
received the payment.

Defendant argues such a grace period is not a materially false
representation under the FDCPA because debt collectors do not
violate the FDCPA by giving debtors more rights.

Contrary to Defendant's representation via the Default Letter that
it would accelerate the loan and may commence foreclosure
proceedings without further notice if full payment of the default
amount was not paid on or before the Expiration Date, Plaintiff has
alleged Defendant's actual practice is to not accelerate loans if
any partial payment is made to bring the loan less than 45 days
past due. The Court finds that a reasonable fact-finder could
consider the information in the Default Letters to be false given
the undisclosed grace period Defendant appears to utilize.

Further, the information would clearly be material as an
undisclosed grace period could reasonably frustrate the least
sophisticated consumer's ability to intelligently choose his or her
response to Defendant's demand.

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is
granted, in part, as it relates to Plaintiff's request for
injunctive relief and denied, in part, as it relates to Defendant's
arguments that Plaintiff lacks standing to proceed and has failed
to state a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2019
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3laxuod
from Leagle.com.

Michael Spehr, on Behalf of Himself and Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Mitchell M. Breit -
mbreit@simmonsfirm.com - SIMMONS AND HANLY, LLC & Scott C. Harris
- scott@wbmllp.com  WHITFIELD AND BRYSON.

Seterus, Inc., Defendant, represented by Britton Laurence St. Onge
- bstonge@polsinelli.com - POLSINELLI PC.


SHAC LLC: Ct. Grants Bid to Dismiss Opt-In Plaintiffs in FLSA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada issued
an Order granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Opt-In Plaintiffs
in the case captioned CORISSA JONES, on behalf of herself and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SHAC LLC,
D/B/A SAPPHIRE GENTLEMEN'S CLUB; SHAC MT. LLC; DAVID MICHAEL TALLA;
and PETER FEINSTEIN, Defendants. Case No. 2:15-cv-01382-RFB-NJK.
(D.Nev.).

This action is brought pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) by Plaintiffs, a class of exotic dancers who worked at
Sapphire Gentlemen's Club during the class period. Plaintiffs
allege that Defendants Shac, LLC, d/b/a Sapphire Gentlemen's Club,
Shac Mt. LLC, David Michael Talla and Peter Feinstein,
misclassified them as independent contractors and therefore
violated the FLSA by failing to compensate them for hours worked.

As an initial matter, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion must be filed prior to
any responsive pleading. In this case, Defendants filed an Answer
on October 5, 2012 and filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on June
11, 2018. However, Defendants never waive this defense, and the
Court must dismiss the action at any time it finds that it lacks
subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, the untimely Rule 12(b)(1)
motion simply will be treated as a suggestion that the court lacks
jurisdiction. Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Over the
Subject Matter.

Defendants argue that a total of 24 Plaintiffs have executed
agreements requiring mandatory arbitration to resolve any dispute
arising out of their performance at Sapphire and that this Court
therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction over these Plaintiffs'
claims. Plaintiffs do not contest the existence or terms of the
agreements. Plaintiffs argue (1) that Defendants have waived their
right to compel arbitration and (2) that the arbitration provision
is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.

The Court addresses each argument in turn.

Waiver

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have waived their right to compel
arbitration by knowing about the agreements and pursuing years of
federal litigation, prejudicing Plaintiffs via the accumulation of
costs. Defendants argue that they did not enforce their right to
arbitration earlier because the Supreme Court only recently held
that arbitration agreements and class/collective action waivers for
claims involving the FLSA are enforceable in Epic Systems Corp.,
138 S. Ct. at 1619. Defendants also note that, for the first two
years of litigation, the only Plaintiff known to Defendants was
named Plaintiff Corissa Jones, who had not executed an arbitration
agreement.

A determination of whether the right to compel arbitration has been
waived must be conducted in light of the strong federal policy
favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements. Thus, any party
arguing waiver of arbitration bears a heavy burden of proof. A
party seeking to prove waiver of a right to arbitration must
demonstrate: (1) knowledge of an existing right to compel
arbitration (2) acts inconsistent with that existing right and (3)
prejudice to the party opposing arbitration resulting from such
inconsistent acts.

The Court finds that Defendants have not waived their right to
compel arbitration. It is reasonable that Defendants would not have
known of their existing right to compel arbitration given the rule
in Morris, 834 F.3d at 979, which bound until recently. At best,
Defendants could have tried to enforce their right despite Morris,
but even Plaintiffs acknowledge this would have been an uphill
battle. Plaintiffs cannot satisfy their heavy burden of proof as to
Defendants' knowledge of their right to compel arbitration.

Conscionability

Plaintiffs next argue that the arbitration provision is (1)
procedurally unconscionable because the provision was drafted
unilaterally by Defendants and provided in Plaintiffs' new hire
packets without opportunity for negotiation or opt-out and (2)
substantially unconscionable as to the 22 Plaintiffs who signed
updated agreements after the initiation of the instant suit in July
2015.

Regarding procedural conscionability, Defendants respond that
Plaintiffs could have pursued dancing at other venues, that the
agreements laid out detailed terms, and that Plaintiffs had the
opportunity to ask questions, to have the contracts reviewed, and
to revoke the agreement within three days. Regarding substantive
conscionability, Defendants respond that the provisions bind both
parties to the terms and give both parties the ability to initiate
arbitration. Defendants also note that they have been using
agreements with arbitration clauses since October 30, 2014 and that
the September 2015 revision did not substantively alter their
standard arbitration agreement.

Nevada law requires both procedural and substantive
unconscionability to invalidate a contract as unconscionable.
Procedural unconscionability is found when a party lacks a
meaningful opportunity to agree to the clause terms either because
of unequal bargaining power, as in an adhesion contract, or because
the clause and its effects are not readily ascertainable upon a
review of the contract. Procedural unconscionability often involves
the use of fine print or complicated, incomplete or misleading
language that fails to inform a reasonable person of the
contractual language's consequences.

For example, in Burch v. Second Judicial Dist. Court of State ex
rel. Cty. of Washoe, 49 P.3d 647, 650-51 (Nev. 2002), an
arbitration clause was procedurally unconscionable because it was
buried in a booklet that the plaintiffs did not have the
opportunity to read before closing escrow on their home, and
substantively unconscionable because it gave the defendant a
unilateral and exclusive right to decide the rules that govern the
arbitration and to select the arbitrators.

Defendants began using agreements with arbitration clauses on
October 30, 2014, the same date the Nevada Supreme Court issued its
decision in the Terry action. Plaintiffs, represented at that time
by only Corissa Jones, initiated the present litigation on July 21,
2015. Though Defendants revised the arbitration provision on
September 28, 2015, the terms remained substantively the same.

The Court finds that the arbitration agreement is not substantively
unconscionable under Nevada law. Plaintiffs do not identify any
substantive change to the form agreement made by Defendants after
initiation of the lawsuit, much less changes that render the
agreement substantively unconscionable. Plaintiffs argue that
Defendants had a duty to inform incoming employees of initiated
federal litigation before signing an arbitration agreement.
However, Plaintiffs provide no legal support for such a duty of
disclosure, and the Court does not find that any such support
exists. Because Plaintiffs must prove both procedural and
substantive unconscionability, the Court need not reach the issue
of procedural conscionability.

Plaintiffs additionally have filed a Motion for Leave to File
Supplemental and Recently Discovered Evidence. Plaintiffs seek to
file excerpts from opt-in Plaintiff Lenka Waterkotte's deposition
conducted on December 20, 2018. Plaintiffs allege that Waterkotte
testified that Defendants conditioned her continued employment on
the signing of an arbitration agreement and that she was not
permitted to retain a copy of the arbitration agreement after it
was signed. They allege that Waterkotte further testified that
though she already had an employment contract, she was required to
sign a new contract before she was allowed to clock in, and that
the new contract was presented minutes before a house fee increase,
disincentivizing a thorough review.

The Court will permit Plaintiffs to file the relevant excerpts from
Waterkotte's deposition testimony for the purposes of supplementing
the record, but the Court finds that the deposition has no impact
on its analysis of the Motion to Dismiss discussed above.
Plaintiffs' arguments regarding Waterkotte's deposition all inform
a determination of potential procedural unconscionability, not
substantive. Because Plaintiffs continue to be unable to
demonstrate substantive unconscionability, the deposition is not
relevant to the Court's determination.

The Court grants Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Supplemental
and Recently Discovered Evidence   and grants Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss Opt-In Plaintiffs Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). The Court
dismisses all Plaintiffs from this action who signed binding
arbitration agreements which strip this Court of jurisdiction.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Opt-In Plaintiffs Pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1) is GRANTED.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3hxmhcu from Leagle.com.

Corissa Jones, Plaintiff, represented by Carl Andrew Fitz , Kennedy
Hodges, LLP, pro hac vice, David Hodges , Kennedy Hodges, LLP, pro
hac vice, Don J. Foty , Kennedy Hodges, LLP, 4409 Montrose
Boulevard, Suite 200, Houston, TX 77006, pro hac vice, Krista N.
Albregts , 750 Shadow Ln Ste 150, Las Vegas, NV, 89106-4162, Rose
M. Molina , 2100 Energy Centre 1100 Poydras Street New Orleans, LA
70163, pro hac vice, William Marshall Hogg , Kennedy Hodges, LLP,
4409 Montrose Boulevard, Suite 200, Houston, TX 77006, pro hac vice
& Jeffrey R. Albregts , Jeffrey R. Albregts, LLC.

Peter Feinstein, Shac, LLC., doing business as Shapphire
Gentlemen's Club, David Michael Talla & Shac Mt. LLC, Defendants,
represented by Alayne M. Opie - opiea@gtlaw.com - Greenberg
Traurig, LLP, Mark E. Ferrario - ferrariom@gtlaw.com - Greenberg
Traurig & Tami D. Cowden - cowdent@gtlaw.com - Greenberg Traurig.

Markie Henderson, Ashley Amos, Jamie Asher, Samantha Baraldi,
Nicole Beckwith, Samantha Christian, Oana E Ciolacu, Cara DeBona,
Amphayvon Dythavon, Susana Faas, Tiffany Francis, Linsey Gile,
Unique Hairston, Sarah Henscheid, Samantha Hopkins, Jenny Knaus,
Rinrada Lishnoff, Erika Luevano, Arza Mubarispur, Allison Morton,
Tasha Pablo, Kamila Persse, Brandy Pisano, Leslie Scott, Brenna
Sharp, Cara Thornberry, Irina Tugui, Bonnie Turecheck & Adrienne
Zager, Intervenors, represented by Casey Wallace -
casey.wallace@feldman.law - Feldman & Feldman, P.C., pro hac vice &
Ogonna M. Brown - OBrown@lrrc.com - Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie
LLP.

Kayla Szabo, Intervenor, represented by Casey Wallace  -
casey.wallace@feldman.law- Feldman & Feldman, P.C. & Ogonna M.
Brown - OBrown@lrrc.com - Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP.


SICHUAN GOURMET: Liu Seeks Overtime Pay for Restaurant Staff
------------------------------------------------------------
LI LIU, Individually and on behalf of all other employees similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. SICHUAN GOURMET II, LLC d/b/a SICHUAN
GOURMET, WEIXIANG YOU, YONGPENG XIA, ZHONG ZHUANG, the Defendants,
Case No. 2:19-cv-01179 (W.D. Pa., Sept. 13, 2019),  contends that
Defendants have improperly failed to pay overtime compensation to
their employees, who work in Defendants' restaurant in
Pennsylvania, pursuant to the overtime requirements of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act, and have
failed to comply with the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection
Law, and violated Pennsylvania common law.

The Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as a kitchen helper at
Defendants' Restaurant. During his employment with Defendants, when
Plaintiff and all similarly situated employees worked more than 40
hours per week, they were not properly compensated for their
overtime hours.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Jian Hang, Esq.
          HANG & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
          136-20 38 th Avenue Suite 10G
          Flushing, NY 11354
          Telephone: 718 353 8588
          Facsimile: 718 353 6288
          E-mail: jhang@hanglaw.com

SLACK TECHNOLOGIES: Sued by Shareholders Over Misrepresentations
----------------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reports that shareholders sued Slack
Technologies in a class action, claiming it made misrepresentations
in its IPO announcement and registration, and the share price fell
from $38.50 on opening day of June 20 to less than $26 today -- a
loss of $1.48 billion in market cap, in San Mateo County Court.


SMITH DEBNAM: Court Dismisses Cavin FDCPA Suit
----------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned DONNA CAVIN, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SMITH
DEBNAM NARRON DRAKE SAINTSING & MYERS, LLP, Defendant. No.
1:18CV995. (M.D.N.C.).

Plaintiff Donna Cavin filed this putative class action alleging
that the collection letter Smith Debnam Narron Drake Saintsing &
Myers, LLP sent Cavin violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (FDCPA). As alleged in the Complaint, Cavin received a letter
from Smith Debnam purporting to collect a balance owed on Cavin's
Belk Rewards Card.

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged. However, when a complaint states
facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it
stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief. When evaluating whether the complaint states
a claim that is plausible on its face, the facts are construed in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all reasonable
inferences are drawn in her favor.  

Facing abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and
unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors which
contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital
instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual
privacy and inadequate laws to protect consumers, Congress enacted
the FDCPA to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt
collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from
using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively
disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect
consumers against debt collection abuses.

To effectuate this purpose, the FDCPA regulates interactions
between consumers and debt collectors by imposing affirmative
statutory obligations upon debt collectors and proscribing certain
abusive conduct. As is relevant here, a debt collector may not use
any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in
connection with the collection of any debt such as the use of any
false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to
collect any debt. A debt collector must also provide a consumer
written notice containing, among other information, a statement
that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the
notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof,
the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector.

Here, however, nothing in the Letter alters, cuts off, or otherwise
limits Cavin's thirty-day dispute period. Instead, she is
repeatedly told that she has thirty days from the date of her
receipt of the Letter to dispute the debt.

The plaintiffs in Garcia-Contreras, Garcia-Contreras v. Brock &
Scott, PLLC, 775 F.Supp.2d 808 (M.D.N.C. 2011) and Bartlett,
Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1997)), successfully
claimed that language in their collection letters overshadowed and
contradicted their rights. In Garcia-Contreras, the court found
language in the first paragraph of the letter violated the FDCPA
where it threatened a lawsuit immediately, service by the Sheriff
at your home, your work, or wherever else you may be found and the
taking of the plaintiff's nonexempt property. Despite the language
of the second paragraph of Defendants' letter that tracked closely
the statutory language in Section 1692g(a)(3)-(5), the court found
that the first paragraph overshadowed and contradicted the
plaintiff's rights to dispute the debt and, therefore, did not
convey her rights effectively.  

In Bartlett, the court found language in the letter violated the
FDCPA where the plaintiff was told that if you wish to resolve this
matter before legal action is commenced, you must do one of two
things within one week of the date of this letter: "pay $316 toward
the satisfaction of the debt, or get in touch with Micard, the
creditor and make suitable arrangements for payment, if you do
neither, it will be assumed that legal action will be necessary."

Under the sender's signature appeared the statutory notice that the
plaintiff had thirty days within which to dispute the debt.
Nonetheless, the court found the net effect of the juxtaposition of
the one-week and thirty-day crucial periods is to turn the required
disclosure into legal gibberish, which is as bad as an outright
contradiction.

Here, the Letter contains no language similar to that in
Garcia-Contreras or Robinson that contradicts or overshadows
Cavin's right to dispute the debt within thirty days of her receipt
of the Letter. There is no language that an unsophisticated
consumer could find threatening, and there are no instructions that
an unsophisticated consumer could find contradictory. Instead, as
previously noted, the letter consistently notifies Cavin of her
right to dispute the debt within thirty days of receipt of the
Letter and invites her to call a designated individual to discuss
the matter if she so chooses.

Cavin's statutory rights are easily readable and prominent enough
to be noticed by an unsophisticated consumer, as the law requires.
The second, third, and fourth sentences of the letter are nearly
identical to the requisite statements in Section 1692g(a)(3)-(5).
Cavin is notified that Smith Debnam assumes the debt to be valid
unless Cavin disputes all or any part of it within thirty days of
the receipt of the letter and that she can notify Smith Debnam in
writing within thirty days of the receipt of the letter to receive
verification of the debt or a copy of the judgment against her and
the name and address of the original creditor, if different from
the current creditor.

The second paragraph provides steps Cavin can take if she has paid
towards the debt and notifies her that Smith Debnam desires to give
her an opportunity to resolve this claim before legal action
becomes necessary and that Smith Debnam is willing to discuss this
matter with her or her attorney. In bold font, if Cavin wishes to
discuss this claim, the letter asks her to please call and gives
the name and numbers to call. In the final paragraph of the letter,
Cavin is informed, in bold font, that if this account is not
disputed, payment is requested to be sent to Smith Debnam's
office.

In sum, the least sophisticated consumer would read this letter in
its entirety and understand that she has thirty days from receipt
of the letter to dispute all or any part of the debt and, if she
does so in writing, Smith Debnam will provide her verification of
the debt and the name and address of the original creditor if
different from the current creditor.

Nothing in the letter, even the statement "We assume this to be a
valid debt unless you contact us within 30 days of your receipt of
this letter to dispute all or any part of the balance indicated,
overshadows or is inconsistent with the requisite statutory
disclosures or constitutes a false representation or deceptive
means to collect a debt. It is simply not plausible that the
Letter's Section 1692g(a)(3) statement deprived Cavin of
information to which she was statutorily entitled to receive and
caused her to be unaware of how to effectively dispute her debt or
that Smith Debnam attempted to put added pressure on her and
provided less of a reason to believe that disputing the alleged
debt would have any impact, as she alleges."

Therefore, Cavin has failed to state a claim under either 15 U.S.C.
Section 1692g(a)(3) or 15 U.S.C. Section 1692(e)(10).

Defendant Smith Debnam Narron Drake Saintsing & Myers, LLP's Motion
to Dismiss be granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2019
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yy3ggtoc from Leagle.com.

DONNA CAVIN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by YITZCHAK ZELMAN  -
Yzelman@MarcusZelman.com - MARCUS & ZELMAN, LLC & JOSEF C. CULIK
– contact@culiklaw.com - FAIRVIEW LAW.

SMITH DEBNAM NARRON DRAKE SAINTSING & MYERS, LLP, Defendant,
represented by CAREN D. ENLOE
- cenloe@smithdebnamlaw.com - SMITH DEBNAM NARRON DRAKE SAINTSING &
MYERS, LLP.


SOUTHLAKE, TX: Court Affirms Dismissal of Watson Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Texas, Second District, Fort Worth, issued
an Opinion affirming the District Court's judgment granting
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned JAMES H. WATSON
AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Appellant, v. CITY OF SOUTHLAKE,
Appellee. JAMES H. WATSON AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Appellant,
v. CITY OF ALLEN, CITY OF AMARILLO, CITY OF ARLINGTON, CITY OF
AUSTIN, CITY OF BALCH SPRINGS, CITY OF BALCONES HEIGHTS, CITY OF
BASTROP, CITY OF BAYTOWN, CITY OF BEDFORD, CITY OF BURLESON, CITY
OF CEDAR HILL, CITY OF CONROE, CITY OF COPPELL, CITY OF CORPUS
CHRISTI, CITY OF DALLAS, CITY OF DENTON, CITY OF DUNCANVILLE, CITY
OF EL PASO, CITY OF ELGIN, CITY OF FARMERS BRANCH, CITY OF FORT
WORTH, CITY OF FRISCO, CITY OF GARLAND, CITY OF GRAND PRAIRIE, CITY
OF HALTOM CITY, CITY OF HUMBLE, CITY OF HURST, CITY OF HUTTO, CITY
OF IRVING, CITY OF JERSEY VILLAGE, CITY OF KILLEEN, CITY OF LEAGUE
CITY, CITY OF LITTLE ELM, CITY OF LONGVIEW, CITY OF MARSHALL, CITY
OF MESQUITE, CITY OF NORTH RICHLAND HILLS, CITY OF RICHLAND HILLS,
CITY OF ROANOKE, CITY OF ROUND ROCK, CITY OF TOMBALL, CITY OF
UNIVERSITY PARK, CITY OF WATAUGA, AMERICAN TRAFFIC SOLUTIONS, INC.,
AMERICAN TRAFFIC SOLUTIONS, LLC, XEROX STATE & LOCAL SOLUTIONS
INC., AND THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellees. Nos. 02-18-00143-CV,
02-18-00151-CV. (Tex. App.).

In this consolidated appeal, Watson contends that the trial court
erred by granting pleas to the jurisdiction in favor of all but one
defendant.

Appellant James H. Watson challenges the constitutionality of the
state and local laws that provided for automated red-light cameras.
He sues on behalf of a putative class of citizens, seeking a
declaration and injunction against enforcement of these
red-light-camera laws, as well as the return of the fines that he
and other citizens were assessed.

The trial court implicitly concluded that Watson had standing to
sue Southlake and Redflex, but it explicitly concluded that he
lacked standing to sue any of the other defendants who were not
involved in his particular ticket.

By what we deem his first issue, Watson challenges the trial
court's ruling that he lacked standing to sue any of these other
defendants. Before we consider his issue, however, we take up sua
sponte the question of whether Watson had standing to bring
prospective claims against any defendant in this appeal.

Applicable Law

Standing is a question of law that we review de novo. The burden is
on the plaintiff to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's
jurisdiction. When assessing a plea to the jurisdiction, our
analysis begins with the live pleadings. The construe the
plaintiff's pleadings liberally, taking all factual assertions as
true, and look to the plaintiff's intent. Because it is a component
of subject matter jurisdiction, standing cannot be waived and may
be raised for the first time on appeal.  

In Texas, the standing doctrine requires a concrete injury to the
plaintiff and a real controversy between the parties that will be
resolved by the court. Under Texas law, the standing inquiry begins
with determining whether the plaintiff has personally been injured.
The second element requires that the plaintiff's alleged injury be
fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct. To establish the third
standing requirement, a plaintiff must show that there is a
substantial likelihood that the requested relief will remedy the
alleged injury.  

Standing is a prerequisite to subject-matter jurisdiction, and
subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to a court's power to
decide a case.

Watson Lacks Standing to Raise Prospective Claims for Relief

Watson seeks two forms of prospective relief. First, he seeks a
declaration that multiple sections of the statute and the
ordinances enacted under that statute are unconstitutional. Second,
he seeks injunctive relief prohibiting all defendants from
enforcing or collecting money under these red-light-camera laws.
Watson also raises several claims for retrospective relief,
including claims for takings and reimbursement.

In Garcia, Garcia, 2019 WL 1967140, the court faced similar claims
for prospective and retrospective relief. According to the Garcia
court, the standing doctrine did not foreclose Garcia's
retrospective claims, but Garcia lacked standing to bring his
prospective claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The court
reasoned that Garcia had already paid his civil fine, and he had
not pleaded that he faced any further threat of imminent harm under
the statute.  

Garcia had resolved his only infraction, and the threat of new
infractions was speculative at best. Garcia therefore had no
concrete or particularized stake in the validity or future
application" of the red-light-camera laws that was distinguishable
from the public at large. With no personal stake in the future
application of the ordinance or relevant state statutes, Garcia
lacked the particularized interest for standing that prospective
relief requires.

He therefore lacks standing to raise prospective claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief against any defendant in this
appeal.

Watson Lacks Standing to Sue Other Municipalities and Private
Administrators for Retrospective Relief

The Court next take up the question presented by Watson's first
issue: whether he had standing to bring retrospective claims
against any of the other municipalities and private administrators
that were not involved in his ticket. Watson maintains that despite
the lack of direct harm, he nonetheless has standing to sue them on
behalf of the putative class under the juridical link doctrine.

Watson argues that under this doctrine, standing exists as to all
defendants in the case, even those who were not involved in his
ticket. As we explain, the juridical link doctrine is inapplicable
here, and Watson cannot use that doctrine to bring even
retrospective claims against defendants who never harmed him.

A plaintiff who brings a class action, rather than just suing on
his own behalf, must still prove that he individually has standing
to sue. The court must consider this threshold question even before
reaching the separate issue of whether it can certify the putative
class.  

To show standing, the plaintiff's alleged injury must be fairly
traceable to the defendant's conduct because a court can act only
to redress injury that fairly can be traced to the challenged
action of the defendant, and not injury that results from the
independent action of some third party not before the court. Thus,
generally, a plaintiff cannot represent those having causes of
action against whom the plaintiff has no cause of action and from
whose hands he has suffered no injury.  

Watson contends that the juridical link doctrine is implicated here
because he has alleged that all defendants, the State, the
municipalities, and the private administrators were uniformly
acting pursuant to a statute that is unconstitutional. Watson
claims that the juridical link doctrine therefore endows the class
with standing as to all defendants, even those who were not
directly involved in the ticket issued to him.  

There is one problem with Watson's argument: in this case, there is
no class. In his live petition, Watson prayed for certification of
a class, but in the two and a half years that Watson's suit was on
file, he did not pursue class certification any further than this.
Watson never filed a motion for class certification; he did not
request a hearing on this issue, and at the hearing on the
defendants' pleas to the jurisdiction, he did not press the issue;
he never asked for a ruling on class certification, and the trial
court never made one; and Watson has not raised the issue of class
certification on appeal.

Watson's attempt at class certification therefore falls short under
the rubrics of error preservation and assignment of error.

In this posture, Watson cannot hope to proceed under his juridical
linkage theory. As the Fifth Circuit has recognized, class
certification is a precondition for the juridical link doctrine.

Without a bona fide attempt at class certification, there is no
need to consider whether the juridical link test is satisfied. If
the plaintiff fails to pursue class certification, that plaintiff
has no right to maintain suit on behalf of the unnamed. Without
that right, it is entirely pointless to consider whether that
plaintiff can also maintain suit against strangers who never harmed
him, but only harmed the unnamed.

Watson has not presented, preserved, or briefed his attempt to
obtain class certification. He therefore cannot maintain claims
based on juridical linkage, and his only standing is to pursue
claims against those who harmed him. Because Watson has not alleged
and cannot allege that he suffered any injury that is traceable to
the other defendant municipalities and private administrators, he
has no standing with regard to these defendants.

The trial court therefore did not err in granting their pleas to
the jurisdiction.

We do not Determine Whether Watson has Standing to Sue the State or
Whether the Claims Discussed Above are Moot

Also within his first issue, Watson argues he has standing to sue
the State, and the trial court erred in concluding otherwise.
Watson cites no authority that would inform our analysis of this
question.

However, we need not determine whether Watson has standing to sue
the State. While an analysis of standing would have bearing on the
trial court's subject matter jurisdiction, as the Court explains,
there are two other jurisdictional concerns, immunity from suit and
exhaustion of administrative remedies that bar his claims against
the State in any event. Even assuming that Watson has standing to
sue the State, then, a lack of jurisdiction stands in the way of
Watson's claims against the State for other reasons.  

The Court therefore need not resolve this question today.

The recent repeal of the enabling statute would seem to provide yet
another possible reason to decide against Watson on all of his
claims: mootness. A case becomes moot when there ceases to be a
justiciable controversy between the parties or when the parties
cease to have a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.  

A case can become moot at any time, including on appeal. When a
case becomes moot, the court loses jurisdiction and cannot hear the
case. But a case is not rendered moot simply because some of the
issues become moot during the appellate process. If only some
claims or issues become moot, the case remains live, at least as to
other claims or issues that are not moot.

But given our resolution of the standing inquiry, we need not
consider whether the statute's repeal mooted Watson's prospective
claims or his claims against any defendants in this appeal other
than the State and Southlake, we have already determined that
Watson may not bring those claims due to lack of standing.  

Rather, it is enough to say that Watson's retrospective claims
against the State and Southlake are not moot. Even if the repeal
had wholly obviated the need to seek a declaration voiding the
statute, the repeal did not remedy any harm that might have been
caused under the statute prior to its repeal. For those who paid,
the controversy remains real. Thus, there remains an active
controversy regarding Watson's retrospective claims.

Watson's standing does not extend (1) to any defendant besides the
State and Southlake or (2) to his prospective claims against any
defendant at all. Watson's claims against Redflex are not at issue
in this appeal.

The Court e therefore proceed to explain why other doctrines bar
Watson's remaining retrospective claims against the State and
Southlake.

IMMUNITY

The Court have already held that Watson has no standing to raise
his prospective claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. the
Court therefore need not consider what we deem to be Watson's
second issue, in which he argues that his claims for injunctive and
declaratory relief are not barred by immunity.

In his third issue, Watson argues that his claim for reimbursement
of the civil fine he paid is not barred by immunity. He argues that
this claim is not subject to immunity because the fine was (1) paid
under duress and (2) assessed under an unconstitutional body of
law, and thus the fine was (3) never the government's rightful
property in the first instance.

Watson correctly observes that there is an exception to immunity
when an unconstitutionally assessed fine is paid under duress. The
Court concludes that Watson did not pay his fine under duress, and
he is not entitled to bring a claim under this exception.

Political subdivisions of the state, including cities, share in
Texas's inherent sovereign immunity.  Immunity from suit implicates
a court's jurisdiction.  

Texas law recognizes a narrow exception to immunity when a
plaintiff seeks reimbursement of an allegedly unlawful tax, fee, or
penalty that was paid involuntarily and under duress. A common
element of duress in all its forms is improper or unlawful conduct
or threat of improper or unlawful conduct that is intended to and
does interfere with another person's exercise of free will and
judgment. This compulsion must be actual and imminent, and not
merely feigned or imagined.

Applying this reasoning here, we conclude that Watson did not pay
his fine under duress. Watson admits that he did not avail himself
of the opportunity to contest his fine in an administrative
hearing. He therefore had, but discarded, the chance for an
abeyance of the penalty. He cannot now claim that imminent
compulsion forced his hand.  

Both Southlake and the State have immunity from this claim.
Watson's claim for reimbursement therefore fails as a matter of
law. The Court overrules Watson's third issue.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies.

In Garcia, the Texas Supreme Court dealt with a similar takings
claim and a nearly identical argument against exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Garcia argued that the hearing officer had
no authority to resolve his takings claim, and he was therefore not
required to pursue administrative remedies before bringing that
claim in court.

The Garcia court disagreed, reasoning that it was immaterial
whether the hearing officer could resolve all of his claims, so
long as the hearing officer could render relief that would have
mooted those claims.

The question here is not whether an administrative hearing could
have resolved all of his claims, constitutional or otherwise.
Rather, the correct inquiry is whether the hearing officer had the
authority to render Garcia's claims moot. Simply put, the
administrative proceeding could have obviated the need for Garcia's
takings claim in district court because it had the potential to
moot that claim. For that reason, the court held that Garcia was
nonetheless required to pursue administrative remedies, regardless
of the nature of his claims.

He was therefore required to exhaust his administrative remedies,
which might have mooted his takings claim against the State and
Southlake. The trial court therefore did not err in granting a plea
to the jurisdiction as to the State and Southlake. The Court
overrules Watson's fifth issue.

SEVERANCE

In his sixth issue, Watson contends that the trial court erred by
severing his claims against all defendants other than Southlake and
Redflex. Watson contends that his claims against all defendants
were integrally linked, such that the suits could not be maintained
separately.

As support, he cites the rule that severance is proper only if (1)
the controversy involves multiple causes of action, (2) the severed
claim would be the proper subject of a lawsuit if independently
asserted, and (3) the severed claim is not so interwoven with the
remaining action that they involve the same facts and issues. In re
State, 355 S.W.3d 611, 614 (Tex. 2011).

But the trial court did not sever these actions so that they could
be maintained separately. Instead, the trial court severed these
actions so that they could be finalized and appealed separately.
Regardless of whether the claims could be maintained separately, a
trial court may sever dismissed claims from remaining claims in
order to render an otherwise interlocutory judgment final and
appealable.

Courts permit severance principally to avoid prejudice, do justice,
and increase convenience. Based on these considerations, multiple
courts have rejected the very argument that Watson raises here.  

The Court overrules Watson's sixth and final issue.

The Court affirms the trial court's judgment dismissing Watson's
claims.  

A full-text copy of the Tex. App.'s September 19, 2019 Opinion is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/y6bu2qqx from Leagle.com.

George A. Staples, Jr., Taylor Olson Adkins Sralla & Elam LLP, 6000
Western Pl Ste 200
Fort Worth, TX, 76107-4684, for City of Southlake, Appellee.

Paul R. Smith , 5001 Crownpoint Ct NW Albuquerque, NM 87120- 1113,
Scott A. Stewart , Stewart Law Group, 777 E Thomas Rd Ste 210,
Phoenix, AZ, 85014, Russell J. Bowman , Bowman & Stella, 800 W
Airport Fwy Ste 860, Irving, TX, 75062-6287, for James H. Watson,
Appellant.


STILA STYLES: Traynor Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Stila Styles, LLC.
The case is styled as Yaseen Traynor, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Stila Styles, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-08954 (S.D. N.Y., Sept. 26, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Stila Styles, LLC provides personal care products. The Company
offers perfumes, cosmetics, powder, eye brushes, and other related
products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Russel Craig Weinrib, Esq.
     Stein Saks PLLC
     285 Passaic St., Suite 5
     Hakensack, NJ 07601
     Phone: (201) 282-6500
     Email: rweinrib@steinsakslegal.com


TATA CONSULTANCY: Court Denies Bid for New Trial in Slaight Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTOPHER SLAIGHT, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. TATA
CONSULTANCY SERVICES, LTD., Defendant, Case No. 15-cv-01696-YGR
(N.D. Cal.), Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California denied the
Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59.

Slaight, Seyed Amir Masoudi, and Nobel Mandili, on behalf of
themselves and on behalf of others similarly situated, claimed
disparate treatment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 against Tata Consultancy
Services ("TCS").  The Court certified a "Termination Class" under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), with these Plaintiffs as
its representatives.

Following some modification, the class was defined as all
individuals who are not of South Asian race or Indian national
origin who were employed by TCS in the United States, were subject
to a policy or practice of benching and allocation, were placed in
an unallocated status and were terminated between April 14, 2011,
and Dec. 27, 2017 and who are not bound by an arbitration agreement
with TCS.

On Nov. 2, 2018, the case proceeded to trial.  The fact questions
at issue included whether TCS had a pattern and practice of
intentionally discriminating on the basis of race against non-South
Asian employees, or on the basis of national origin against
non-Indian employees, who were benched and then terminated.  As the
Court instructed the jury, the Plaintiffs had to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that racial discrimination was the
company's standard operating procedure[, that is the regular rather
than the unusual practice.

At trial, each side presented one expert witness and numerous lay
witnesses, all of whom discussed scores of exhibits.  The jury
deliberated over two days before rendering a unanimous verdict in
favor of TCS.  The Court observed during trial that the jurors
worked very hard throughout the trial to determine how to resolve
the parties' factual disputes.  They paid close attention to the
exhibit screens and the witnesses; many took extensive notes;
jurors posed dozens of questions during trial; and the jury
deliberated for approximately eight hours.  No hint of any
irregularity arose.

The Court entered judgment on the verdict on Dec. 18, 2018.  The
instant motion followed.
  The Plaintiffs contend that (1) the jury returned a verdict
against the great weight of the evidence and (2) incorrect
evidentiary rulings led to an unjust result.

Having carefully considered the papers submitted, and her own
observations in presiding over the trial and all pretrial motion,
Judge Rogers denied the Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial.

With respect to the challenges to the jury's verdict, the Judge
finds that the cross-examination significantly undermined Dr.
Neumark's credibility and his conclusions.  This is especially
poignant in the case where the analysis underlying Dr. Neumark's
opinion does not lend itself to independent evaluation by the jury.
She then finds that a reasonable jury could have determined, based
on the evidence, that the leadership directive failed to establish,
or a support, a finding of discrimination.  And, although the
Plaintiffs argue that TCS's work force became more local over time
only because of the scarcity of H-1B and L-1 visas, a reasonably
factfinder could also infer from the evidence that TCS had no
practice of discriminating in favor of South Asians or Indians.
Finally, she finds that it was not contrary to the clear weight of
the evidence for a reasonable fact finder to determine that TCS'
case was more persuasive than the Plaintiffs'; nor does the Court
find any basis to conclude that a definite or firm basis supports
the finding of any mistake.

Turning to the challenge to the Court's evidentiary rulings, the
Judge finds that the Plaintiff's attempt to recharacterize the
review as a "per se" rule is without foundation.  The Court
reviewed numerous representative documents and made judgment calls
based on the relevance and probative value related to the
termination case itself, having previously found insufficient
common evidence to support a class action for a "hiring" case.  

The Judge also rejects the Plaintiffs' contentions that the
testimony of Ashok Seetharaman, summarizing some of the substantive
reasons that those 845 employees became unallocated, was
"summarized hearsay" or the mere product of counsel-preparation.
She concludes the Mr. Seetharaman had adequate direct foundation to
give the very limited testimony allowed, so that such testimony
brought no inadmissible hearsay before the jury.

Finally, she is unpersuaded that the Court erred in either of the
evidentiary rulings raised by the motion.  But even if either
ruling were wrong, the Judge finds that no such error prejudiced
the Plaintiffs.  As a threshold matter, she doubts the Plaintiffs'
proposition that she must presume prejudice resulted from erroneous
evidentiary rulings, requiring TCS to overcome such a presumption
by a showing that te Plaintiffs were not prejudiced by any such
error.  In any event, the Jduge independently concludes that first,
even if it were an error to exclude the Plaintiffs' hiring-related
exhibits, the verdict was not likely affected by that exclusion.
Second, even if it were an error to allow Mr. Seetharaman's
testimony, the verdict was not likely affected thereby because TCS
presented other, similar evidence, in support of the verdict --
including other testimony to very similar facts without objection
by the Plaintiffs on this ground.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Rogers denied the Plaintiffs'
motion for a new trial.  Her Order terminates Docket Number 697.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 20, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/pDmvme from Leagle.com.

Christopher Slaight, Plaintiffs, represented by
Daniel A. Kotchen -- dkotchen@kotchen.com -- Kotchen & Low LLP,
Daniel Lee Low -- dlow@kotchen.com -- Kotchen and Low LLP, Michael
J. von Klemperer -- mvonklemperer@kotchen.com -- Kotchen and Low
LLP, Lindsey Grunert -- ltremaine@kotchen.com -- Kotchen and Low
LLP, Michael F. Brown -- mbrown@dvglawpartner.com -- DVG Law
Partner LLC & Steven Gregory Tidrick -- sgt@tidricklaw.com -- The
Tidrick Law Firm.

Seyed Amir Masoudi & Nobel Mandili, Plaintiffs, represented by
Lindsey Grunert, Kotchen and Low LLP, Michael J. von Klemperer,
Kotchen and Low LLP & Daniel A. Kotchen , Kotchn & Low LLP.

Tata Consultancy Services, Ltd, Defendant, represented by Michelle
M. LaMar -- mlamar@loeb.com -- Loeb & Loeb LLP, Bernard Robert
Given, II -- bgiven@loeb.com -- Loeb & Loeb, Erin Michelle Smith
--
esmith@loeb.com -- Loeb and Loeb LLP, Laura Ann Wytsma --
lwytsma@loeb.com -- Loeb & Loeb LLP, Patrick Norton Downes --
pdownes@loeb.com -- Loeb And Loeb LLP, Terry D. Garnett --
tgarnett@loeb.com -- Loeb & Loeb LLP & William Michael Brody --
wbrody@loeb.com -- Loeb & Loeb.

Apple Inc., Movant, represented by Danielle Conley --
DANIELLE.CONLEY@WILMERHALE.COM -- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale &
Dorr LLP, Kathryn Diane Zalewski --
KATHRYN.ZALEWSKI@WILMERHALE.COM
-- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP & Kimberly A. Parker --
KIMBERLY.PARKER@WILMERHALE.COM -- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale &
Dorr LLP.


TENNESSEE: Court Denies Class Certification Bid in Harris Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
RICKY HARRIS, et al., the Plaintiffs, vs. STATE OF TENNESSEE, et
al., the Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-00174 (M.D. Tenn.), the Hon.
Judge Eli Richardson entered an order:

   1. denying Armstrong's application to proceed in forma
      pauperis as moot;

   2. denying without prejudice. motion for class
      certification and motion for appointment of counsel;
      and

   3. denying motion to order admissions as admitted without
      prejudice as premature.

The Court said, "As to the motion to order admissions as admitted,
Plaintiffs state that they served Defendants a written request for
admissions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a) and that
Defendants did not serve a timely response. Because Plaintiffs are
"prisoners seeking redress from governmental officers and
employees," however, "the Court must review the complaint under 28
U.S.C. section 1915A prior to service on the defendants and prior
to discovery." As to the motion for class certification and the
motion for appointment of counsel, because Plaintiffs are
representing themselves, all 14 Plaintiffs must personally sign
every pleading motion submitted to the Court in this action. Only
Plaintiff Harris, however, signed these two motions. The matter of
the filing fee has been resolved. No further action is required
from any of the fourteen Plaintiffs at this time. The Court will
conduct an initial screening of the complaint, as required by the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, as soon as practicable. If the
complaint is not dismissed as a result of this initial screening,
Plaintiffs may renew their requests for appointment of counsel and
for class certification through a motion that is signed by all 14
Plaintiffs in this action. Likewise, if this action is not
dismissed, Plaintiffs may conduct discovery in a manner consistent
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and further Orders of the
Court.[BN]9

TETRA TECH: Indian Tribe Sues Over Camp Fire Clean Up Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reports that members of the Mechoopda
Indian Tribe of Chico Rancheria sued Tetra Tech in a federal class
action, claiming they were shorted on wages for serving as "Indian
Monitors" during the burn and cleanup of this year's Camp Fire in
Butte County, California.


TEXTRON INC: Oct. 21 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
------------------------------------------------
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP ("GPM") reminds investors of the
upcoming October 21, 2019 deadline to file a lead plaintiff motion
in the class action filed on behalf of Textron, Inc. ("Textron" or
the "Company") (NYSE: TXT) investors who purchased common stock
between January 31, 2018 and October 17, 2018, inclusive (the
"Class Period").

If you wish to learn more about this action, or if you have any
questions concerning this announcement or your rights or interests
with respect to these matters, please contact Lesley Portnoy,
Esquire, at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, or by email to
shareholders@glancylaw.com or visit our website at
www.glancylaw.com

On October 18, 2018, Textron reported weak third quarter 2018
earnings and cut its full-year 2018 forecast, citing large
discounts used to clear out old inventory from Arctic Cat Inc.,
which Textron acquired in March 2017.

On this news, Textron's stock price fell $7.29 per share, or
11.25%, to close at $57.49 per share on October 18, 2018, thereby
injuring investors.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) that end market sales of Arctic Cat products were
slowing, resulting in a massive glut of old Arctic Cat inventory on
dealers' floors; (2) that in order to clear out this old inventory,
the Company provided significant price discounts, which negatively
impacted Textron's earnings; and (3) that as a result, Textron's
positive statements about Arctic Cat's business, operations, and
prospects lacked a reasonable basis.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired Textron common stock during
the Class Period you may move the Court no later than October 21,
2019 to request appointment as lead plaintiff in this putative
class action lawsuit. To be a member of the class action you need
not take any action at this time; you may retain counsel of your
choice or take no action and remain an absent member of the class
action. If you wish to learn more about this class action, or if
you have any questions concerning this announcement or your rights
or interests with respect to the pending class action lawsuit,
please contact Lesley Portnoy, Esquire, of GPM, 1925 Century Park
East, Suite 2100, Los Angeles, California 90067 at 310-201-9150,
Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, by email to shareholders@glancylaw.com,
or visit our website at www.glancylaw.com. If you inquire by email
please include your mailing address, telephone number and number of
shares purchased.[GN]


TRACTOR SUPPLY: $1.7MM Class-Action Settlement Reached
------------------------------------------------------
A $1.7 million class-action settlement has been reached in a
lawsuit against Tractor Supply Company and Smitty's Supply, Inc.
("Defendants") regarding the sale and use of Super S Super Trac 303
Tractor Hydraulic Fluid in Missouri (the "Proposed Settlement").
The Proposed Settlement, summarized herein, may affect your rights.
For additional information, including the longer notice of
settlement and the Settlement Agreement and Release with the
precise terms and conditions of the settlement, please see
www.supertrac303settlement.com or call 1-866-742-4955.  You may
also access the Court docket in this case through the Court's
Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system at
https://www.mow.uscourts.gov/, or by visiting the office of the
Office of the Clerk of Court, United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri, 400 E. 9th Street, Kansas City,
Missouri, 64106, between 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m., Monday through
Friday, excluding Court holidays.  The case is called Hornbeck, et
al., v. Tractor Supply Company, et al., Case No. 4:18-cv-00523-NKL
(W.D. Mo.)  Please do not telephone the Court or the Court Clerk's
Office to inquire about the Proposed Settlement or the claim
process.

In the class-action lawsuit, Plaintiffs allege that Super S Super
Trac 303 Tractor Hydraulic Fluid did not meet the equipment
manufacturer's specification allegedly listed on the product's
label, and that use of Super S Super Trac 303 Tractor Hydraulic
Fluid in equipment causes damage to various parts of the equipment.
Defendants vigorously deny all of these allegations and claims of
wrongdoing, and further state that the labels for Super S Super
Trac 303 Tractor Hydraulic Fluid were truthful, appropriate, and
adequate in all respects. The Court has not made a final ruling on
Plaintiffs' claims.  Plaintiffs and Defendants have agreed to the
Proposed Settlement to assure a fair recovery to Class Members and
avoid the risk and expense of further litigation.

You are a member of the Settlement Class if you purchased Super S
Super Trac 303 Tractor Hydraulic Fluid in Missouri from May 25,
2013 to the present.  The Proposed Settlement provides each class
member with a cash award based on the purchase of Super S Super
Trac 303 Tractor Hydraulic Fluid. That award is estimated to be $12
for each 5-gallon bucket of Super S Super Trac 303 Tractor
Hydraulic Fluid  you purchased in Missouri during the Class period,
$6 for each 2-gallon jug, $4 for each 1-gallon jug, and $90 for
each 55-gallon drum. In addition to this amount, you may also be
entitled to receive reimbursement for equipment losses, repairs
and/or parts purchases resulting from, in whole or in part, your
use of the Super S Super Trac 303 Tractor Hydraulic Fluid.  If you
are a member of the Settlement Class, you must submit a claim form
by February 17, 2020 to receive your award and you must submit a
claim form by February 17, 2020 to apply for additional benefits
based on equipment repairs/parts/damage. Please see
www.supertrac303settlement.com for a copy of the claim form or call
1-866-742-4955 to request a claim form be mailed to you.  Class
Counsel also will ask that the Court award up to $511,500 in
attorneys' fees, $150,000 in expenses, and an incentive payment of
$5,000 for each of the four class representatives.  The amounts
awarded for attorneys' fees, expenses, and incentive award come out
of the Settlement Class Fund.  The Court will decide whether to
approve the Settlement at the Final Fairness Hearing on March 10,
2020 at 10:00 a.m.  This date may change; see
www.supertrac303settlement.com for more information. [GN]


TRANSAMERICA CORP: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Karg ERISA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JEREMY KARG, MATTHEW R. LEMARCHE, and SHRILEY RHODES,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. TRANSAMERICA CORPORATION; TRUSTEES OF THE AEGON USA,
INC. PROFIT SHARING TRUST; and DOES 1-40, Defendants, Case No.
18-CV-134-CJW-KEM (N.D. Iowa), Judge C.J. Williams of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, Cedar Rapids
Division, denied the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants
Transamerica and Trustees of the Aegon USA, Inc. Profit Sharing
Trust.

Transamerica sponsors the Transamerica 401(k) Retirement Savings
Plan as a means for employees and participants to save for
retirement.  Over 17,000 current and former employees had over $1.9
billion invested in the Plan as of Dec. 31, 2017.  Does 1-20 are
officers and directors of Plan sponsor Transamerica, who had the
authority and responsibility to appoint, monitor, and remove Plan
trustees.  

The Plaintiffs are current and former participants in the Plan.
They seek to certify a class action against the Defendants on
behalf of all participants and beneficiaries of the Plan for the
class period of Dec. 28, 2012, to the date of final judgement in
the action.

The Plaintiffs allege that under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act ("ERISA"), Title 29, Does 1-20 and Transamerica are
fiduciaries of the Plan and monitoring fiduciaries of Aegon and
Does 21-40.  The Plan appoints Aegon to manage the assets of the
Plan.  Aegon is responsible for selecting and monitoring the
investment options offered to Plan participants.  Does 21-40 are
individual trustees of Aegon who manages the assets of the Plan.
The Plaintiffs allege that Does 21-40 and Aegon are also
fiduciaries of the Plan under ERISA.

The Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint for Damages asserts two counts
under ERISA.  First, they allege that the Defendants' retention of
six poor-performing investment portfolios ("challenged funds") in
the Plan breached the Defendants' fiduciary duty of prudence.
Second, the Plaintiffs allege that Transamerica and Does 1-20
breached their fiduciary duties to monitor the performance of Aegon
and Does 21-40.  The Plaintiffs allege that these breaches caused
the Plan and its participants, including them, to suffer hundreds
of millions of dollars of damages and lost-opportunity costs which
continue to accrue.  The Plaintiffs seek various declaratory
relief, monetary damages to restore all losses to the Plan that
resulted from the breaches, and attorney's fees and costs.

In 2015, certain Plan participants filed a class action suit,
Dennard v. Transamerica Corp., No. 15-cv-30-EJM (N.D. Iowa), in the
Northern District of Iowa against Transamerica and its affiliates
("Dennard defendants") regarding the Plan and the challenged funds.
The Second Amended Class Action Complaint in Dennard alleged that
the Dennard defendants violated their ERISA fiduciary duty of
loyalty by causing the Plan to invest funds with unreasonably high
expenses and engaged in prohibited transactions by charging the
Plan management fees that benefited the Dennard defendants.

On May 19, 2016, United States District Court Judge Edward J.
McManus approved a class action Settlement Agreement and Release
between the plaintiffs and defendants in Dennard.  The settlement
agreement required Transamerica to implement specified structural
changes to the Plan and establish a settlement fund to distribute
monetary damages to the class members.  The named Plaintiffs and
putative class members in the instant case are all members of the
Dennard class of plaintiffs.  The settlement agreement included a
provision releasing Transamerica and its affiliates from future
claims arising out of or related to the conduct alleged in the
plaintiffs' operative complaint, whether or not included as counts
in the complaint.

The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss asserts four grounds for
dismissal.  First, the Defendants assert that the imprudent conduct
alleged in the instant suit is identical in all relevant aspects to
the conduct alleged in Dennard, therefore the Plaintiffs' claims
are barred by both the Dennard settlement agreement release
provision and res judicata.  Second, they contend that the
Plaintiffs' complaint does not allege a plausible violation of the
Defendants' fiduciary duty of prudence.  Third, the Defendants
argue that the Plaintiffs' imprudence claim is barred by ERISA's
three-year statute-of-limitations because the Plaintiffs had
"actual knowledge" of the challenged funds' performance well
outside of the limitations period (which extends to Dec. 28, 2015).
Finally, they assert that the Plaintiffs' Count II, alleging
failure to monitor fiduciaries, does not state a claim because the
claim it derives from, an alleged breach of fiduciary duty of
prudence, is not facially plausible.

Judge Williams finds that the conduct alleged in Count I is the
Defendants' retention of the challenged funds in the Plan despite
their sustained poor performance, without regard to whether the
Defendants incurred unreasonable or unnecessary fees in managing
the challenged funds.  He finds that the claims in the case arise
out of and relate to different alleged conduct than the claims in
Dennard.  Thus, the Plaintiffs' claims are not barred by the
Dennard settlement agreement's release, or by the doctrine of res
judicata.

The Defendants assert that Count I of the complaint, alleging that
their investment process was imprudent, should be dismissed for
failing to state a claim.  The Judge finds that the Plaintiffs'
allegation of imprudent conduct is not based on the challenged
funds' affiliation with Transamerica.  The Plaintiffs' statement
that the allegedly substandard portfolios were "managed by a
Transamerica affiliate, Transamerica Asset Management," is
misconstrued by the Defendants as the basis for the claim, but the
discussion of the management relationship is merely descriptive in
nature.  The propriety of Transamerica offering affiliated funds as
part of the Plan has no bearing on whether plaintiffs have stated a
claim for breach of the duty of prudence.

Taking the Plaintiffs' allegations as true and drawing inferences
in favor of the non-moving party, the Judge can reasonably infer
from the facts alleged that the Plaintiffs could be entitled to
relief on their imprudence claim.  And, based on the well-pleaded
facts regarding the challenged funds' performance, the Plaintiffs'
imprudence claim is plausible at this stage.

The Defendants also argue that ERISA's three-year
statute-of-limitations bars the Plaintiffs' imprudence claim.  The
Judge finds that the statute-of-limitations does not bar the
Plaintiffs' prudence claim for two reasons.  First, the Plaintiffs'
duty of prudence claim is subject to the six-year
statute-of-limitations, not the three-year statute-of-limitations
alleged by the Defendants.  The putative class members in the case
are Plan participants from Dec. 28, 2012, through the conclusion of
the case.  The Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on Dec.
28, 2018.  Thus, their fiduciary duty of prudence claim is timely
under the applicable six-year statute-of-limitations.

Second, even if the three-year statute-of-limitations applied, the
Plaintiffs' claim would still be timely for purposes of the
Defendants' motion to dismiss.  The three-year
statute-of-limitations would not bar the Plaintiffs' complaint
because the complaint itself does not establish that the Plaintiffs
had "actual knowledge" of the Defendants' alleged imprudent
investment decision-making process prior to Dec. 28, 2015.  The
Plaintiffs allege the Defendants breached their fiduciary duty of
prudence under ERISA by retaining poorly performing funds in the
Plan, not that the Defendants conducted prohibited transactions.

Finally, the Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs' breach of
fiduciary duty to monitor claim fails to state a claim because the
Plaintiffs' complaint does not establish the underlying imprudence
claim and fails to allege any independent facts establishing the
breach of duty to monitor.  The Judge holds that at the pleading
stage, the Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to establish a
failure to monitor claim under ERISA.  The Plaintiffs' complaint
alleges, and the Defendants do not dispute, that Transamerica and
Does 1-20 have the authority to appoint and remove members of the
Plan Trustees.  The Plaintiffs' complaint also alleges the
Defendants breached their duty to monitor by failing to remove
appointees who allowed the Plan to imprudently invest in the
challenged funds, satisfying the second element of an ERISA failure
to monitor claim.

For the reasons set forth , Judge William denied the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 20, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/RNiNSc from Leagle.com.

Jeremy Karg, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Matthew R Lamarche, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated & Shirley Rhodes, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by J.
Barton Goplerud -- goplerud@sagwlaw.com -- Shindler, Anderson,
Goplerud & Weese, PC, Alexandra Dianne Harwin --
aharwin@sanfordheisler.com -- Sanford, Heisler & Sharp, LLP, pro
hac vice, Charles Henry Field, Jr. -- cfield@sanfordheisler.com --
Sanford Heisler Sharp LLP, pro hac vice, David W. Sanford, Sanford
Heisler Sharp, LLP, pro hac vice, David Tracey --
dtracey@sanfordheisler.com -- Sanford Heisler Sharp LLP, pro hac
vice & Paul Blankenstein, Sanford Heisler Sharp LLP, pro hac vice.

Transamerica Corporation & Trustees of the Aegon USA, Inc. Profit
Sharing Trust, Defendants, represented by Nathan Kooker --
NKooker@lynchdallas.com -- Lynch Dallas PC, Wilford H. Stone --
wstone@lynchdallas.com -- Lynch Dallas PC, Brian David Boyle --
bboyle@omm.com -- O'Melveny and Myers LLP, pro hac vice, Catalina
J. Vergara -- cvergara@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac
vice & Randall W. Edwards -- redwards@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers
LLP, pro hac vice.

Does, Defendant, represented by Wilford H. Stone, Lynch Dallas PC.


TRATTORIA TRE COLORI: Sanango Seeks Overtime Compensation
---------------------------------------------------------
JOSE LUIS SANANGO, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. TRATTORIA TRE COLORI, INC., MARCO
GONZALEZ, VICTOR GONZALEZ, and FELIPE GONZALEZ, the Defendants,
Case 1:19-cv-08534 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 13, 2019), seeks to recover
unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated
damages, prejudgment and post-judgment interest, and attorneys'
fees and costs pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New
York Labor Law.

Throughout the entirely of his employment, the Plaintiff worked 5
days  per week (off days varied from week-to-week), of which he
would work three double shifts per week (lunch and dinner) from 11
:00 am. until 11 :00 p.m. (12:00 a.m. on Fridays and Saturdays),
and two (2) dinner shifts per week from 4:00 p.m. until 11 :00 p.m.
(12:00 a.m. on Fridays and Saturdays). Thus, Plaintiff worked 50-52
hours per week but Defendants refused to pay Plaintiff his lawfully
earned overtime compensation, the lawsuit says.

Although Plaintiff is not required to punch a time clock or other
time-recording device at the start and end of his daily work shift,
Defendants create a written schedule each week identifying the days
and shifts that the employees are assigned to work.

The Defendant owns and operates an Italian restaurant known as
Trattoria Tre Colori located at 254 West 47 Street, New York, New
York 10036.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Giustino Cilenti, Esq.
          Peter H. Cooper, Esq.
          CILENTI & COOPER, PLLC
          10 Grand Central
          155 East 44 111 Street 6th Floor
          New York, NY 1001 7
          Telephone: (212) 209-3933
          Facsimile: (212) 209-7102
          E-mail: info@jcpclaw.com

TRAVISMATHEW LLC: Traynor Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Travismathew, LLC.
The case is styled as Yaseen Traynor, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Travismathew, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-08965 (S.D. N.Y., Sept. 26, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

TravisMathew, LLC provides sportswear. The Company designs and
sells men's apparel for work and play. Travismathew offers hats,
shorts, pants, t-shirts, belts, shoes, towels, socks, boxers,
jackets, sweat shirt, and wallets.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Russel Craig Weinrib, Esq.
     Stein Saks PLLC
     285 Passaic St., Suite 5
     Hakensack, NJ 07601
     Phone: (201) 282-6500
     Email: rweinrib@steinsakslegal.com


TROY CONSTRUCTION: Summary Judgment in Stone FLSA Suit Vacated
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LINDA STONE, on behalf of herself and those similarly
situated, Appellant, v. TROY CONSTRUCTION, LLC, Case No. 18-1825
(3d Cir.), Judge Kent A. Jordan of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit vacated the District Court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Troy and remanded the case for further
proceedings.

Stone sued Troy, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, alleging a willful violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA").  She claims that Troy paid local employees per diem
compensation that should have been classified as wages and included
in the regular rate of pay, which would in turn have affected the
calculation of overtime pay.

Troy builds and maintains oil and gas pipelines and compressor
stations across the country, including in Pennsylvania, where Stone
worked.  During the relevant period, many of Troy's employees had
to travel long distances from their permanent residences to their
Pennsylvania worksites, but Troy acknowledges that it also "often
hired employees closer to those worksites.

Stone was a local employee of Troy beginning in January 2013.  She
was fired in March 2013.  The reasons for her short tenure and
termination are immaterial to the suit.  She received nine
paychecks from Troy, the first on Jan. 18, 2013, and the last on
March 15, 2013.  She was paid per diems, but they were not
reflected in her overtime compensation.

Troy and Stone both moved for summary judgment.  In Troy's motion,
it argued that Stone's FLSA claim was time-barred because she had
failed to file a timely consent-to-sue form, as the law provides
that FLSA claims must be commenced within two years after the cause
of action accrued, or within three years if the cause of action
arises out of a willful violation.  In Stone's motion, she argued
that the record had established that Troy had willfully violated
the FLSA as a matter of law, and so, with application of the
three-year statute of limitations, her claim was timely.  In
opposing Stone's motion for summary judgment, Troy declared that
genuine disputes of fact exist regarding whether Troy recklessly
disregarded its FLSA obligations.

The District Court granted summary judgment for Troy.  It rested
its decision on its conclusion that, as a matter of law, Troy had
not willfully violated the FLSA.  The court made that determination
because, in its view, there were insufficient facts for a
factfinder to reasonably conclude that the Defendant's conduct
amounts to a willful FLSA violation.  Accordingly, despite Troy's
admission that genuine disputes existed as to its willfulness, the
court determined that a two-year statute of limitations for
non-willful violations applied to Stone's claims, and her claims
were thus untimely.

Stone timely appealed.

Judge Jordan concludes that the District Court erred in holding, at
the summary judgment stage, that all of Stone's claims were time
barred.  Summary judgment in favor of Troy was not warranted
because, assuming willfulness is established at trial, Stone had
two claims that fall within a three-year statute of limitations, as
extended by 14 days due to the tolling agreement.  He therefore
vacated the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
Troy and remanded the case for further proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 20, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/HaHDYW from Leagle.com.

Matthew D.Miller [ARGUED] -- mmiller@swartz-legal.com -- Richard S.
Swartz -- rswartz@swartz-legal.com -- Justin L. Swidler --
jswindler@swartz-legal.com -- Swartz Swidler, 1101 Kings Highway
North — Ste. 402, Cherry Hill, NJ 08034, Counsel for Appellant.

James N. Boudreau [ARGUED] -- boudreauj@gtlaw.com -- Adam R.
Roseman -- rosemana@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig, 1717 Arch
Street — Ste. 400, Philadelphia, PA 19103.

Michael Burnett -- burnettm@gtlaw.com -- Jacob E. Godard --
godardj@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig, 1000 Louisiana Street —
Ste. 1700, Houston, TX 77002, Counsel for Appellee.


TTEC HEALTHCARE: Court Won't Review Beattle Class Certification
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
issued an Order denying Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration in
the case captioned SONDRA BEATTIE, individually and on behalf of
all other similarly situated individuals, and FRANCIS HOUSTON, JR.,
individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated
individuals, Plaintiffs, v. TTEC HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS, INC., and
TTEC HOLDINGS, INC., Defendants. Civil Action No.
1:18-cv-03098-RM-NRN. (D. Colo.).

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' motion for
reconsideration of the Court's order granting conditional
certification in this case. In the alternative, Defendants seek
certification of an interlocutory appeal and an emergency stay.  

Defendants first argue that this case became moot when the Court
compelled the original Plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims, and
therefore reconsideration is necessary to correct clear error and
prevent manifest injustice.

A motion for reconsideration is appropriate where the court has
misapprehended the facts, a party's position, or the controlling
law. It is not appropriate to revisit issues already addressed or
advance arguments that could have been raised in prior briefing.

Defendants' argument is based on the premise that the Plaintiffs
who have opted in to the case are not parties. Although the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet spoken on this issue, other
federal appellate courts have concluded that plaintiffs who opt in
to a collective action have party status.  Defendants cite no
controlling or persuasive authority to the contrary.
Accordingly, the Court concludes this case did not become moot when
the original Plaintiffs were compelled to arbitrate their claims
because numerous opt-in Plaintiffs had already joined the case, and
their claims remained pending.

Defendants next argue that the Court's order granting conditional
certification should be certified for interlocutory appeal because
it presents a controlling issue of law: Whether a district court
has discretion to order that notice of a pending FLSA collective
action be sent to employees who have entered into valid and
enforceable arbitration agreements.

Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b), an order not otherwise appealable
may be certified for interlocutory appeal if it involves a
controlling issue of law as to which there is a substantial ground
for difference of opinion and an immediate appeal from the order
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

Here, Plaintiffs dispute whether they have entered into valid and
enforceable agreements. Although some of them have been compelled
to arbitrate their claims, twenty-three of them have prevailed on
Defendants' motion to compel arbitration. Additional Plaintiffs
have since joined the case and two motions to compel are still
pending. Setting aside any issues potential opt-in Plaintiffs may
wish to raise with respect to the validity and enforceability of
potential arbitration agreements that are not presently before the
Court, there are still disputed issues regarding whether Plaintiffs
who are already in the case have entered into valid and enforceable
arbitration agreements. Under such circumstances, the order
granting conditional certification cannot be said to involve a
controlling issue of law.

Additional factors weigh against certification. The Court is not
persuaded that certification would advance the ultimate termination
of this litigation. There is no apparent reason why this issue
cannot be resolved efficiently at the second stage of the process
for determining whether putative collective action members in an
FLSA action are similarly situated. The Tenth Circuit recently
declined to weigh in on an order that raised substantially similar
issues. And Defendants did not request certification until after
the Court issued a ruling unfavorable to them.  

Accordingly, the Court will neither permit Defendants to file an
interlocutory appeal nor grant a stay.

Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion for
reconsideration.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2019 Order is
available https://tinyurl.com/y5wd6cr6 from Leagle.com.

Sondra Beattie, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated individuals & Francis Houston, Jr., individually and on
behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs,
represented by Matthew L. Turner , Sommers Schwartz, PC, Rod M.
Johnston - rjohnston@sommerspc.com - Sommers Schwartz, PC & Kevin
Jay Stoops - kstoops@sommerspc.com - Sommers Schwartz, PC.

TTEC Healthcare Solutions, Inc. & TTEC Holdings, Inc., Defendants,
represented by Arthur James Rooney, III -
arthur.rooney@bakermckenzie.com - Baker McKenzie LLP & Goli Rahimi
, Baker McKenzie LLP, 452 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10018


TYPE A BRANDS: Olsen Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Type A Brands Inc.
The case is styled as Thomas J. Olsen, individually and on behalf
of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Type A Brands
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-05467 (E.D. N.Y., Sept. 26,
2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Type A Brands Inc. makes safer, aluminum-free, high-performance
deodorant.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
     Lipsky Lowe LLP
     630 Third Avenue
     New York, NY 10017-6705
     Phone: (212) 392-4772
     Fax: (212) 444-1030
     Email: doug@lipskylowe.com

U.S. SOCCER: Women Players Seek Class Certification for Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Alex Butler, writing for UPI, reports that the 28 United States
Women's National Team players who are suing the U.S. Soccer
Federation over alleged gender discrimination want to legally
represent players who came before them and who will come after
them.

The plaintiffs are seeking class certification for their lawsuit.
Trial is scheduled for May 5, 2020.

"Certifying the class is the next important step to the trial,"
players' spokeswoman Molly Levinson said in a statement issued to
UPI on September 19.

"It allows the players to legally represent not just themselves but
the players in the class period who came before and after them."

The players filed the motion Sept. 11 in U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California. If the motion is successful, it
would expand the scope of plaintiffs to include additional U.S.
women's team players who are not among those listed as plaintiffs.

U.S. District Judge Gary Klausner will hear the motion for class
certification Oct. 21. The women's players asked the court to
appoint plaintiffs Alex Morgan, Megan Rapinoe, Carli Lloyd and
Becky Sauerbrunn as class representatives.

The women initially filed their lawsuit in March, accusing the
federation of "institutionalized gender discrimination," which the
players say impacted their wages and the way they train and
compete. The complaint also addresses promotion, support and
development for the women's games.

The federation has pushed back on the claims, arguing that the
women have been paid more than the men on their respective national
teams. Mediation talks between the federation and players broke
down in August.

The World Cup championship team has upcoming exhibition matches
against Korea on Oct. 3 in Charlotte, N.C., and Oct. 6 in Chicago.
The team wraps up its 2019 Victory Tour with a game against Sweden
on Nov. 7 in Columbus, Ohio, and a game against Costa Rica on Nov.
10 in Jacksonville, Fla. [GN]


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: California Court Okays Arbitration
-----------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reports that a federal court in California
granted Uber's motion to compel arbitration as to the question of
whether a man, who filed a class action suit against the company,
is an employee or independent contractor.

The man contends Uber violated the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act when it ceased operations in Austin, Texas,
without providing notice to drivers at least 60 days in advance.


VALARIS PLC: Brodsky & Smith Probing Potential Claims
-----------------------------------------------------
Law office of Brodsky & Smith, LLC announces that it is
investigating potential claims against Valaris plc for possible
breaches of Federal Securities law.

The Class Period commences on April 11, 2019, when Ensco (prior to
the Class Period, Valaris was known as Ensco) issued a press
release, pre-market, announcing the completion of the merger of
Ensco and Rowan Companies plc ("Rowan") into Ensco Rowan plc
("Ensco Rowan"), noting, among other things, Ensco Rowan's "diverse
rig fleet of ultra-deepwater drillships, versatile semisubmersibles
and modern shallow-water jackups" that purportedly enabled Ensco
Rowan "to provide drilling services across all water depths with
unmatched scale, geographic presence and customer relationships."
The press release also contained management statements regarding
the financial strength and growth opportunities generated by the
Ensco Rowan merger. On July 2, 2019, Ensco Rowan announced that it
would change its name to Valaris plc, effective July 31, 2019.

According to the complaint, on July 31, 2019, Valaris issued a
press release announcing its second quarter 2019 financial
results-which missed market expectations. Upon issuance of the
press release, analysts at Seeking Alpha published an article on
August 2, 2019, entitled "Valaris PLC - Off To A Bad Start." and
noted that Valaris' results "shock[ed] investors with massive cash
usage [and] . . . surprisingly weak outlook for the ultra-deepwater
segment with further dayrate recovery likely delayed until at least
the second half of next year." The article further criticized
Valaris' free cash flow for the quarter, which was "negative by a
whopping $375 million causing the company's remaining pro forma
cash balance adjusted for roughly $741 million in payments related
to the recent debt tender offer to decline to just $353 million."
Following this news, Valaris' stock price fell $3.25 per share, or
approximately 39%, over the two trading sessions following its
announcement of its quarterly financial results, to close at $5.02
per share on August 2, 2019.

If you purchased shares of Valaris between April 11, 2019 and July
31, 2019 and wish to discuss the legal ramifications of the
investigation, or have any questions, you may e-mail or call the
law office of Brodsky & Smith, LLC who will, without obligation or
cost to you, attempt to answer your questions. The deadline for
filing is October 21, 2019. You may contact Marc Ackerman, Esquire
or Jordan Schatz, Esquire at Brodsky & Smith, LLC, Two Bala Plaza,
Suite 510, Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004, or by calling toll free
877-534-2590. For additional information, please go to
http://www.brodskysmith.com/cases/valaris-plc-nyse-val/

Brodsky & Smith, LLC is a litigation law firm with extensive
expertise representing shareholders throughout the nation in
securities and class action lawsuits. The attorneys at Brodsky &
Smith have been appointed by numerous courts throughout the country
to serve as lead counsel in class actions and have successfully
recovered millions of dollars for our clients and shareholders.
[GN]


VECTREN CORPORATION: Court Dismisses Kuebler Securities Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Evansville Division, issued an Order granting Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned MICHAEL KUEBLER, et al.
Plaintiffs, v. VECTREN CORPORATION, et. al. Defendants. No.
3:18-cv-00113-RLY-MPB. (S.D. Ind.).

Vectren Corporation and CenterPoint Energy, Inc. entered into a
merger agreement, under which Vectren shareholders were paid
seventy-two dollars per share. Vectren failed to show all of its
work related to the merger: the proxy statement omitted the
unlevered cash flow that Vectren was forecasted to generate   the
financial projections for each of Vectren's three main business
lines. This critical information, the shareholders insist, was
necessary for them to sufficiently assess the values of their
shares, and without it, the proxy statement is misleading in
violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).

The Merger

Vectren and CenterPoint entered into a merger agreement. Vectren is
a gas and electric company1 that provides energy for much of
Southern Indiana and part of Ohio. CenterPoint is a public utility
holding company incorporated in Texas. Under the agreement, Vectren
agreed to become a CenterPoint company and agreed to pay its
shareholders seventy-two dollars ($72.00) in cash for each share of
common stock owned. Vectren publicly announced the merger two days
later on April 23, 2018.   

The Litigation

After announcing the merger, Vectren filed a preliminary proxy
statement. Several shareholders sued, six to be precise. The
shareholders alleged, albeit in different ways, the preliminary
proxy statement was misleading because it omitted key pieces of
information. Another plaintiff joined the fray after Vectren filed
its definitive proxy (this is the one the court refers to as the
Proxy Statement with the SEC on July 16, 2018. Two of the
shareholders moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the
shareholder vote.  

The court consolidated the seven lawsuits and appointed Michael
Kuebler, James Danigelis, and Michael Nisenshal as lead plaintiffs.
The court then held a hearing on the shareholders' motion for a
preliminary injunction. The court ultimately denied their request
for an injunction a week later.  

The shareholders then filed the Amended Consolidated Class Action
Complaint. The Complaint alleges that the Proxy Statement omitted
two material pieces of information: the unlevered cash flow Vectren
was forecasted to generate between 2018 and 2027 (Cash Flow
Projections) and the financial projections for each of Vectren's
three main business lines, gas, electric, and non-regulated on an
individual basis (Business Segment Projections). These omissions,
according to shareholders, render the Proxy misleading in violation
of Section 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and SEC's Rule
14a-9. Defendants Vectren and its directors now move to dismiss the
Complaint for failure to state a claim.  

Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act forbids soliciting proxies in
violation of the rules and regulations issued by the SEC. 15 U.S.C.
Section 78n(a)(1). Rule 14a-9 prohibits soliciting a proxy
statement that omits material facts or information.   

To withstand a motion to dismiss under these provisions,
shareholders must allege (1) the proxy statement contains a
material misstatement or omission and (2) that material
misstatement or omission caused them injury.  

A little more about these two requirements. Omitted facts are
considered material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider [them] important in deciding
how to vote. It is not enough that the omissions might have or
could have influenced a shareholder's decision. There must be a
showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the
circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual
significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder.
The materiality inquiry is objective, and the court considers the
omissions from the perspective of a reasonable investor.  

In addition to materiality, shareholders must allege that their
damages were caused by the misstatements or omissions in the proxy
statement. In the securities context, the causal element has two
components: transaction causation and loss causation.  Only loss
causation is at issue here. To withstand dismissal on loss
causation, the shareholders must allege that the subject of the
omissions was the cause of the actual loss suffered.  

Defendants argue dismissal is appropriate for two reasons: the
shareholders failed to allege any material omission from the Proxy
Statement, and even if the Proxy Statement omitted material
information, the shareholders have failed to allege any economic
loss caused by the omissions. The court will take up each
argument.

Materiality

The shareholders allege the Proxy Statement was materially
misleading because it omitted the Cash Flow Projections and
Business Segment Projections. Cash flow, according to the
shareholders, is the single most important financial metric when
valuing a company for sale because it is objective and not subject
to manipulation They also allege cash flow is a more accurate
indicator than net income and EBITDA.

The shareholders allege the Business Segment Projections are
material because those are what BAML used to value the company when
performing its Discounted Cash Flow (0DCF) analysis. BAML used the
DCF analysis to give its opinion on the value of the Vectren's
shares and the overall fairness of the merger. Because of these two
omissions, the shareholders could not adequately assess the
intrinsic value of the shares and the DCF analysis performed by
BAML was materially misleading.
  
These omissions, however, must be considered with what was
disclosed. The Proxy Statement details the background of the
merger, identifying the different companies and their proposals to
acquire  It contains the Board of Directors' reasons for approving
the merger. This included financial considerations such as
Vectren's recent stock prices and the recommendation of BAML. The
Proxy Statement then summarizes BAML's opinion evaluating the
merger. This summary contains the information BAML considered, the
financial analyses BAML performed, and the ranges BAML calculated
with respect to the implied per share equity value for 2018 and
2019.   

The Proxy Statement goes on to state that neither an independent
auditor nor an independent accountant examined any of the future
projections.

In light of the information actually disclosed along with the
accompanying warnings, the omission of the Cash Flow Projections
and Business Segment Projections did not render the Proxy Statement
materially false or misleading. At most, the omissions might have
made a difference to a reasonable shareholder, but that is not
enough. There must have been a substantial likelihood that the
omitted information would have actual significance in the
deliberations.  

Given the summary of the merger, the board's reasoning, BAML's
financial summary, and the financial projections which all relate
to the performance of the company the Proxy Statement provided the
shareholders with enough information to decide how to vote. The
omitted projections are just more information, but that does not
make them material.  

The shareholders protest that the Cash Flow Projections and
Business Segment Projections are different though. They argue that
those projections are of such an important character that BAML's
DCF Analysis and the disclosed projections are rendered misleading
without them.  

But the shareholders real quibble is with BAML's analysis not the
omission of the projections. The shareholders believe that BAML
used high discount rates when conducting its DCF analysis, and so
the only way to assess the fairness of BAML's opinion, they say, is
the disclosure of the key inputs: the Cash Flow Projections and
Business Segment Projections.  

However, the law does require disclosure of every financial input
used by a financial advisor so that the shareholders can replicate
the advisor's analysis. All that is required is a fair summary. The
court agrees with the long list of others that have found
additional inputs including cash flow and business segment
projections are immaterial when a proxy statement contains other
valuation projections and a summary of the financial advisor's
analysis.  

Accepting the shareholders' well-pleaded allegations4 as true,
their Complaint falls short of stating a plausible claim that the
Cash Flow Projections and Business Segment Projections are
material.

Loss Causation

Even if the Proxy Statement omitted material information, the
shareholders must still allege some sort of economic loss caused by
the omissions. The shareholders allege the sales process was
flawed, the analysis performed by BAML was skewed, and the Proxy
Statement was misleading because the intrinsic value of their
shares was actually higher than the value disclosed in the Proxy
Statement. Had the Proxy Statement disclosed the Cash Flow
Projections and Business Segment Projections, the shareholders
assert they would have been able to calculate the value of their
shares and determine their actual value.

The problem for the Shareholders is that their claim of economic
loss is too speculative.  
Trahan, a recent case in this district is on point. There, Genesys
acquired Interactive Intelligence Group, Inc. in a cash-out merger
where shareholders were paid $60.50 per share.

Interactive filed a proxy statement that included much of the same
information at issue here: the board's recommendation to approve
the merger, management forecasts for the next three years, and an
opinion of a financial advisor approving of the transaction.
Shareholders sued arguing that the proxy statement was misleading
for omitting material information in the proxy statement.

Judge Barker found and this court thinks rightfully so that the
complaint, among other deficiencies. failed to adequately plead
loss causation because the allegations were too speculative:

Trahan lead shareholder speculates that, absent the misleadingly
pessimistic Proxy Statement, the shareholders would not have
approved the Merger in hope that Interactive would prove more
valuable as a going concern than the Merger consideration implied.
But approval of the Merger can only have proximately caused
economic loss if the shareholders' hope would have been realized,
and Trahan has not plausibly alleged that it would have been.
Absent an allegation of a definite, immediately available, superior
alternative to the Merger consideration, a higher competing offer,
for example, Trahan's allegation depends on the marketplace
eventually valuing Interactive at higher than $60.50 per share at
some indeterminate future date when Trahan still held his shares
and was willing to sell them.  

Given the tangle of factors affecting price, and given that, other
things being equal, the longer the time the more likely that
factors other than an actionable misrepresentation caused the loss,
Trahan has alleged no more than a speculative possibility that he
was economically injured by any misrepresentation in connection
with the Merger. And that is not enough.

The same can be said here. That there might have been a better
future prospect at some point in time had the shareholders held on
to their shares is too speculative to state a claim at least
without more factual content to support that inference. The only
allegation that comes close is one that alleges an investment web
site projected Vectren's earnings growth to be in the teens in the
upcoming years.  But that alone is not enough especially when there
are no allegations that Vectren turned down a better offer.  

Proxy statements do not have to disclose everything that might be
of interest to shareholders. This rule protects shareholders. So
long as the proxy statement includes the material information
related to the acquisition, no securities laws are violated. Which
brings us back to the beginning: Vectren showed enough work here
because the Proxy Statement disclosed the material information
related to the merger, and even if the Proxy Statement omitted
material information, those omissions did not cause the
shareholders any economic harm.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is therefore granted.  The
Shareholders claims are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2019 Order is
available at   https://tinyurl.com/yxsju2wm from Leagle.com.

MICHAEL KUEBLER, Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly
Situated - One of Three Lead Plainitffs & JAMES DANIGELIS,
Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated - One of
Three Lead Plainitffs, Plaintiffs, represented by David E. Bower -
dbower@monteverdelaw.com - MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC, Jason A.
Shartzer , SHARTZER LAW FIRM LLC, 156 E Market St., Suite 1000,
Indianapolis, IN 46204 & Miles D. Schreiner -
mschreiner@monteverdelaw.com - MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC, pro hac
vice.

MICHAEL NISENSHAL, Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, pro se.
MICHAEL NISENSHAL, Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Colin E. Flora , PAVLACK LAW,
LLC, Eric S. Pavlack , PAVLACK LAW, LLC, 50 E. 91st St., Ste. 317,
Indianapolis, IN, 46240, Jason A. Shartzer , SHARTZER LAW FIRM LLC
& Richard A. Acocelli - racocelli@weisslawllp.com - WEISSLAW LLP.

VECTREN CORPORATION, CARL L. CHAPMAN, DERRICK BURKS, MICHAEL L.
SMITH, JAMES H. DEGRAFFENREIDT, JR., JOHN D. ENGELBRECHT, ANTON H.
GEORGE, TERESA J. TANNER, ROBERT G. JONES, PATRICK K. MULLEN, R.
DANIEL SADLIER & JEAN L. WOJTOWICZ, Defendants, represented by Amy
Pharr Hefley - amy.hefley@bakerbotts.com - BAKER BOTTS LLP, pro hac
vice, Danny David -danny.david@bakerbotts.com - BAKER BOTTS LLP,
pro hac vice, Richard A. Kempf - rkempf@taftlaw.com - TAFT
STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER LLP, Steven C. Shockley -
sshockley@taftlaw.com - TAFT STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER LLP & Vivek
Randle Hadley  - vhadley@taftlaw.com - TAFT STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER
LLP.


VENATOR MATERIALS: Pawar Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------
Pawar Law Group announces that a class action lawsuit has been
filed on behalf of shareholders who purchased shares of Venator
Materials PLC (VNTR) from August 2, 2017 through October 29, 2018,
inclusive (the "Class Period"). The lawsuit seeks to recover
damages for Venator investors under the federal securities laws.

To express an interest in the class action, go to
http://pawarlawgroup.com/cases/venator-materials-plc/or call Vik
Pawar, Esq. toll-free at 888-589-9804 or email
info@pawarlawgroup.com for information on the class action.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) the fire damage at Venator's Pori facility was far more
extensive than disclosed to investors, rendering the facility
beyond repair; (2) the true cost of the Pori facility fire exceeded
$1 billion, hundreds of millions of dollars beyond the limits of
the Company's insurance policy; (3) the Company was paying
rebuilding premiums, and thereby incurring tens of millions of
dollars in additional costs, in a futile attempt to expedite the
rehabilitation process; (4) Venator had lost, essentially without
prospect of rehabilitation, 80% of the production capacity of the
Pori facility, and thus lost a substantial portion of one of its
largest revenue producing assets; (5) the Company's reported annual
Titanium Dioxide production capacity had been inflated by
approximately 104,000 metric tons, or 15%; (5) as a result, Venator
would incur over $600 million in restructuring expense and
additional charges associated with the closure and replacement of
the Pori facility; and (7) as a result of the foregoing,
defendants' positive statements about Venator's business,
operations, and prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked
a reasonable basis. When the true details entered the market, the
lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than September
30, 2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If you
wish to join the litigation, go to
http://pawarlawgroup.com/cases/venator-materials-plc/or to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Vik Pawar, Esq. of Pawar Law Group toll free at
888-589-9804 or via e-mail at info@pawarlawgroup.com.

No class has been certified. Until a class is certified, you are
not represented by counsel unless you hire one. You may hire
counsel of your choice. You may also do nothing at this time and be
an absent member of the class. Your ability to share in any future
recovery is not dependent upon being a lead plaintiff.

Pawar Law Group represents investors from around the world.

Contact:

         Vik Pawar, Esq.
         Pawar Law Group
         20 Vesey Street, Suite 1210
         New York, NY 10007
         Tel: (917) 261-2277
         Fax: (212) 571-0938
         E-mail: info@pawarlawgroup.com
                 vik@pawarlawgroup.com [GN]


VIEWRAY INC: Wolf Haldenstein Files Class Action Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------------
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP announces that a federal
securities class action lawsuit has been filed in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio on behalf of
investors that acquired ViewRay, Inc. ("ViewRay" or the "Company")
(NASDAQ: VRAY) common stock between March 15, 2019 and August 8,
2019, inclusive (the "Class Period").

Investors who purchased ViewRay, Inc. shares are urged to contact
the firm immediately at classmember@whafh.com or (800) 575-0735 or
(212) 545-4774. You may obtain additional information concerning
the action on our website, www.whafh.com

If you have incurred losses in the shares of ViewRay, Inc., you
may, no later than November 12, 2019, request that the Court
appoint you lead plaintiff of the proposed class. Please contact
Wolf Haldenstein to learn more about your rights as an investor in
the shares of ViewRay, Inc.

The filed complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period,
Defendants made materially false and/or misleading statements, as
well as failed to disclose material adverse facts about the
Company's business, operations, and prospects. Specifically,
Defendants failed to disclose to investors:

   -- that demand for ViewRay systems had declined due in part to
changes being made to Medicare reimbursement approaches first
announced in November 2019 that could make purchases of new ViewRay
systems less profitable for customers;

   -- that the Company's reported backlog was overstated due to the
inclusion of orders with insufficient surety as to permit for their
inclusion in reported backlog; and

   -- that as a result of the foregoing, Defendants' positive
statements about the Company's business, operations, and prospects,
were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

On August 8, 2019, after the market closed, ViewRay reported a net
loss of $30.8 million, or $0.32 per share, for second quarter 2019
and that backlog declined to $219.3 million.

On this news, the Company's stock fell $3.64, or 54%, to close at
$3.10 per share on August 9, 2019.

Wolf Haldenstein has extensive experience in the prosecution of
securities class actions and derivative litigation in state and
federal trial and appellate courts across the country.  The firm
has attorneys in various practice areas; and offices in New York,
Chicago and San Diego.  The reputation and expertise of this firm
in shareholder and other class litigation has been repeatedly
recognized by the courts, which have appointed it to major
positions in complex securities multi-district and consolidated
litigation.

If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions regarding
your rights and interests in this case, please immediately contact
Wolf Haldenstein by telephone at (800) 575-0735, via e-mail at
classmember@whafh.com, or visit the website at www.whafh.com

Contact:

         Kevin Cooper, Esq.
         Gregory Stone, Director of Case and Financial Analysis
         Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP
         Tel: (800) 575-0735 or (212) 545-4774
         Email: gstone@whafh.com
                kcooper@whafh.com or  
                classmember@whafh.com [GN]


WALGREENS CO: Class Suit Over Ad Restrictions Reaches Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------------
Maia Anderson, writing for Becker's Hospital Review, reports that
Walgreens agreed Sept. 17, 2019 to settle a class-action lawsuit
alleging it violated antitrust laws by restricting search
advertisements, according to Digital News Daily.

The lawsuit claimed Walgreens, along with Vision Direct -- now
owned by Walgreens -- entered into illegal agreements with 1-800
Contacts to restrict search advertising. The retail pharmacy giant
allegedly entered these arrangements because 1-800 Contacts
threatened Walgreens about advertising for its rivals, arguing its
trademark was infringed upon when rivals used its brand name to
trigger search ads.

The Federal Trade Commission ruled last year that the agreement was
illegal and may have deprived consumers the ability to compare
brands, according to Digital News Daily.

The financial details of the settlement were not disclosed yet.
[GN]


WASHINGTON: Court Dismisses Monroe Correctional Inmates' Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment in the case captioned DEMARIO ROBERTS, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. STEPHEN SINCLAIR, et. al., Defendants. Case No.
C18-837 RSM. (W.D. Wash.).

Plaintiffs Demario Roberts, Mohamed Mohamed, Jeremy Livingston,
Naim Lao, and John James are inmates at the Monroe Correctional
Complex, part of the Washington State Department of Corrections.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated their rights by denying
them access to special meals during the month of Ramadan in the
Islamic Calendar.

The Amended Complaint lists the following causes of action:
violation of the Eighth (and Fourteenth) Amendment's right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment, violations of the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), violations of
the First (and Fourteenth) Amendment's free exercise of religion
and equal protection clauses, and a civil rights claim under
Section 1983.

Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies.

Exhaustion is a prerequisite for Plaintiffs' claims under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act. To effectively exhaust administrative
remedies, an inmate must use all the formal steps of the prison
grievance process.  Exhaustion must be accomplished prior to the
filing of the lawsuit.  

When prison officials move for summary judgment based on
exhaustion, they bear the initial burden of showing that there was
an available administrative remedy and that the plaintiff did not
exhaust that administrative remedy. If prison officials make such a
showing, a prisoner can overcome the exhaustion defense by
producing evidence showing that the administrative remedies were
effectively unavailable to him. Id. If the evidence shows that the
remedies were available and the inmate failed to properly exhaust
such remedies, the inmate's claims must be dismissed.

However, a prisoner may be excused from exhausting when prison
administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance
process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.

As to Plaintiffs Mohamed and Roberts, the record is clear that they
submitted grievances through the standard process by placing it in
the grievance box rather than handing it to staff yet failed to
appeal those grievances, resulting in a failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. Plaintiffs do not offer a valid basis to
set these procedural requirements aside. Plaintiffs fail to point
to sufficient evidence that could lead a fact-finder to conclude
that these Plaintiffs were at the time blocked from proceeding with
the grievance appeal process or intimidated out of appealing by
Defendants. This serves as an independent basis to dismiss the
claims of Plaintiffs Mohamed and Roberts. Plaintiff James did not
exhaust his administrative remedies until after the Amended
Complaint was filed in this case.

Accordingly, his claims are barred by the PLRA.  

Mootness of RLUIPA Claims

Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs' RLUIPA claims are moot given
the events after Ramadan 2018.

Plaintiffs' RLUIPA claims seek only injunctive and declaratory
relief. An inmate's release from prison while his claims are
pending generally will moot any claims for injunctive relief
relating to the prison's policies unless the suit has been
certified as a class action.

Plaintiffs Mohamed, Livingston, and Lao have been released from
prison. Plaintiff Roberts signed up for and eventually participated
in the 2019 Ramadan meal program. Plaintiff James' request for a
gluten-free Ramadan meal in 2019 was accommodated.

Defendants address certain narrow exceptions to mootness. The Court
finds that these exceptions do not apply here. Plaintiffs do not
meaningfully contest that Plaintiffs Mohamed, Livingston, and Lao's
RLUIPA claims are moot. For Plaintiffs Roberts and James,
Plaintiffs essentially argue that the barriers to the sign-up
process continue to be inappropriate, but present no argument that
these claims are not now moot for these two individual Plaintiffs.
The Court agrees with Defendants that ordering injunctive relief is
pointless for these Plaintiffs now that they have been added to the
Ramadan list and otherwise accommodated.  

The Court will dismiss Plaintiffs' RLUIPA claims as moot. The Court
need not address any remaining RLUIPA arguments.

Eighth Amendment Claims

The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment
prevents government officials from acting with deliberate
indifference to a prisoner's health and safety or serious medical
needs. To prove a violation of the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff
must show that the defendant: (1) exposed her to a substantial risk
of serious harm and (2) was deliberately indifferent to her
constitutional rights.  

Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials have a duty to ensure
that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, clothing,
sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. While prison food
need not be 'tasty or aesthetically pleasing, it must be adequate
to maintain health.'

Defendants argue:

However, the Eighth Amendment is not violated when prison officials
place reasonable conditions on receiving meals. The four Plaintiffs
who were not on the Ramadan menu were not denied food adequate to
meet their nutritional needs because each had the option to get
mainline food. To the extent they argue the mainline meals did not
meet their needs because of their sincerely held religious beliefs,
that claim is more properly analyzed under RLUIPA or the First
Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment.

The Court agrees with Defendants' assessment. Given the record as
to what food was and was not available, Plaintiffs have failed to
make a sufficient showing that Defendants failed to provide
adequate food or otherwise exposed Plaintiffs to a substantial risk
of serious harm. Plaintiffs were provided access to food and
refused it on religious grounds. Plaintiffs' claims are more
properly analyzed under the First Amendment.

First Amendment Free Exercise Claim

For a prisoner to satisfy a First Amendment free exercise claim, he
must show the defendant burdened the practice of his religion, by
preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith,
without any justification reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests. The Turner court provided four factors to
guide reviewing courts in determining the reasonableness of the
regulation.

First, there must be a valid, rational connection' between the
prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put
forward to justify it.

A second factor is whether there are alternative means of
exercising the rights that remain open to prison inmates. The third
consideration is the impact accommodation of the asserted
constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and the
allocation of prison resources generally. Last, the absence of
ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of the
regulation.

The Court finds that questions of fact preclude summary judgment
dismissal of this claim on substantive grounds. While there is
undoubtedly a valid, rational connection between requiring inmates
to sign up for Ramadan meals and the legitimate governmental
interest in putting together the correct number of Ramadan meals
and not wasting money or food, the Court cannot find as a matter of
law that there is a rational justification for Defendants'
artificially early deadline to sign up for Ramadan, or that
Defendants could not have accommodated the various unusual
circumstances of these Plaintiffs necessitating late sign-ups.

Further, it is a question of fact whether or not Plaintiffs had
alternative means to participate in Ramadan. The Court will not now
rule as a matter of law that it was or was not practical for
Plaintiffs to fast during the day and then purchase sufficient food
from the commissary to satisfy their dietary needs during the
evening.

The free exercise claims of Plaintiffs Livingston and Lao cannot be
dismissed on this basis, and would proceed to a jury except for the
reasons stated below.

Equal Protection Clause Claim

To state an actionable equal protection claim a prisoner must show
the defendant denied him a reasonable opportunity to pursue his
faith compared to prisoners of other faiths, and that the denial
was intentional.  

Defendants argue there is no evidence of differential treatment of
Muslim inmates from others similarly situated, and that there is no
evidence that the sign-up process for Ramadan is more onerous than
the sign-up process for Jewish Passover or other religious events.
Plaintiffs argue that inmates who sign up for Ramadan and for
Passover are treated differently. Plaintiffs point to a single
event:

A few years ago, the Department experienced 1,800 individuals who
signed up for Passover. But instead of scrutinizing and rejecting
those individuals because they did not sign up ahead of time or
pass any religious tests, the Department of Corrections simply
provided the 1,800 all-of-asudden Jewish inmates Passover meals.
This created a third of a million dollars divot into the Department
of Corrections' budget.  And yet, despite that, the meals were
provided, no questions asked.  This unequal treatment violates the
Equal Protection Clause.

On Reply, Defendants urge the Court to look past ambiguous
deposition testimony relied on by Plaintiffs and to compare the
actual Ramadan and Passover sign-up processes as stated in memos.

The Court has done so and finds that Plaintiffs have failed to
point to sufficient evidence of differential treatment to create a
question of fact. The criteria for inmates to sign up for Ramadan
and Passover are essentially the same. Both require participation
in religious activities or receiving a religious (halal/kosher)
diet, and both have a two-week sign up period.  Both memos are
issued well in advance of the actual holiday period. Defendants
also point out that the above one-time increase in the number of
inmates signing up to participate in Passover was in fact due to
there being no eligibility criteria at the time, that this was
addressed with the addition of eligibility requirements comparable
to those now in place for Ramadan, and that those requirements have
been in place for the last three Passover observances.  Given this
record, no reasonable jury could conclude that the sign-up process
in 2018 was more onerous for Ramadan than Passover. Plaintiffs
point to nothing else to support this claim.

This claim will be dismissed.

Qualified Immunity Defense

Plaintiffs seek damages against all Defendants in their individual
capacity except, Stephen Sinclair, for violations of Plaintiffs'
constitutional rights.

42 U.S.C. Section 1983 provides a cause of action against persons
acting under the color of state law who have violated rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. However, qualified immunity shields
government officials from civil damages liability unless the
official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was
clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that
every reasonable official would have understood that what he is
doing violates that right. In other words, existing precedent must
have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the right was
clearly established.  

Plaintiffs do not address qualified immunity in Response to
Defendants' Motion, instead directing the Court to review arguments
made in Plaintiffs' own Motion. In that Motion they first point to
their Eighth Amendment rights to adequate food.The Court has
already dismissed Plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claims, so the Court
will not address whether Defendants would be entitled to qualified
immunity on those claims. Next, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants
have had decades of notice from the Ninth Circuit that the
Constitution requires that they must accommodate the religious
dietary needs of their inmates. Plaintiffs state that a reasonable
official would realize that the actions taken by Defendants'
forcing Plaintiffs to choose between their sincerely-held religious
beliefs and food would thus violate clearly established law.

Plaintiffs paint with too broad a brush. The record fails to show
Defendants denied Plaintiffs any access to food or any access to a
religious diet. This case is really about the adequacy of a sign-up
process. Defendants say there is no clearly established case law
holding that prisons violate the First Amendment by requiring
inmates to sign up in advance to participate in Ramadan.
  
The Court agrees. Any right Plaintiffs had to a more streamlined or
forgiving sign-up process was not clearly established. Accordingly,
all Defendants sued in their individual capacity are entitled to
qualified immunity as a matter of law. The remaining Plaintiffs
Livingston and Lao cannot bring claims for damages against these
Defendants under Section 1983.

Remaining Claims

As the Court understands it, Defendants have moved to dismiss
almost all claims as either moot, legally unfounded based on the
record, or because Defendants are subject to qualified immunity.
What remains after the above rulings are the Section1983 claims for
damages brought by Plaintiffs Livingston and Lao under the First
Amendment's Free Exercise clause as against Defendants Sinclair,
Stewart, Dolan, Obeland, and Sherman sued in their official
capacity.

However, neither a state nor a state official acting in his or her
official capacity is a person for purposes of Section1983 liability
in an action for monetary relief. These claims are also properly
dismissed. No claims remain.

Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted.  All of the Plaintiffs' claims are dismissed.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y5f9dcc3 from Leagle.com.

Demario Roberts, Inmate, Mohamed Mohamed, Inmate, Jeremy
Livingston, Inmate & Naim Lao, Inmate, Plaintiffs, represented by
Carolyn M. Homer - chomer@cair.com - CAIR LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, pro
hac vice, Gadeir Abbas - gabbas@cair.com - CAIR LEGAL DEFENSE FUND,
pro hac vice, Lena F. Masri -lmasri@cair.com - CAIR LEGAL DEFENSE
FUND, pro hac vice & Jay W. Gairson - jay@gairson.com - GAIRSON
LAW.

John James, Plaintiff, represented by Lena F. Masri , CAIR LEGAL
DEFENSE FUND.
Stephen Sinclair, in his official capacity as Secretary of the
Washington Department of Corrections, Belinda Stewart, in her
official and individual capacities as Corrections Program
Administrator of the Washington Department of Corrections, Jamie
Dolan, in his official and individual capacities as Food Service
Administrator of the Washington Department of Corrections, Mike
Obenland, in his official and individual capacities as
Superintendent of the Monroe Correctional Complex of the Washington
Department of Corrections, Jeffrey A Uttecht, in his individual
capacity as Superintendent of the Coyote Ridge Corrections Center
of the Washington Department of Corrections, David Sherman, in his
official and individual capacities as Head Chaplain of the Monroe
Correctional Complex of the Washington Department of Corrections,
Eric Askren, in his individual capacity as Head Chaplain of the
Coyote Ridge Corrections Center of the Washington Department of
Corrections, Henri Fischer, in his individual capacity as Chaplain
of the Monroe Correctional Complex of the Washington Department of
Corrections, Peter Maxson, in his official and individual
capacities as Grievance Coordinator at the Washington State
Reformatory of the Monroe Correctional Complex of the Washington
Department of Corrections, Sgt. Parks, in his individual capacity
as Sergeant at the Washington State Reformatory of the Monroe
Correctional Complex of the Washington Department of Corrections &
Sgt. Rose, in his individual capacity as Sergeant at the Washington
State Reformatory of the Monroe Correctional Complex of the
Washington Department of Corrections, Defendants, represented by
Timothy J. Feulner , ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE & Timothy Norman
Lang , ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE.


WATCHLAB STUDIOS: Morris Seeks Overtime Pay for Hourly Employees
----------------------------------------------------------------
MARIO MORRIS on behalf of himself, and all other plaintiffs
similarly situated, known and unknown, the Plaintiff, v. WATCHLAB
STUDIOS, LLC AND HEATHER MCENEANY, INDIVIDUALLY, the Defendants,
Case No. 1:19-cv-06136 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 13, 2019), seeks to
recover overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
Illinois Minimum Wage Law, the Cook County Minimum Wage Ordinance,
and the Chicago Minimum Wage Ordinance.

The Plaintiff was employed as a non-exempt hourly employee and
performed duties related to recruiting candidates to participate in
focus groups and other market research projects. The Plaintiff
worked over 40 hours per week but was paid only at his straight
time rates of pay for overtime-eligible hours.

Watchlabs is a marketing research company that provides services to
corporate clients.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff are:

          John William Billhorn, Esq.
          BILLHORN LAW FIRM
          53 West Jackson Blvd., Suite 401
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Telephone: (312) 853-1450

WENDY'S INTERNATIONAL: Zamora Files ADA Suit in N.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Wendy's
International, LLC. The case is styled as Jesse Zamora, Lonia
Smith, Roy Rios, Daniel Onn, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Wendy's International, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 5:19-cv-06122 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 26, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Wendy's International, LLC operates as a restaurant. The Company
offers hamburgers, chicken, wraps, salads, french fries,
non-alcoholic beverages, and desserts. Wendy's serves customers
internationally.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear pro se.


WHEATON FRANCISCAN: Class Certification in Harwood Suit Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ELIZABETH HARWOOD, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. WHEATON
FRANCISCAN SERVICES, INC., WHEATON FRANCISCAN MEDICAL GROUP, INC.
AND WHEATON FRANCISCAN HEALTHCARE — ST. FRANCIS, INC.,
Defendants-Appellants, Appeal No. 2018AP1836 (Wis. App.), Judge
Kitty K. Brennan of the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District I,
affirmed the trial court's order certifying a class and appointing
Plaintiff Harwood as the class representative.

Harwood alleged that Wheaton Franciscan violated WIS. STAT. Section
146.83(3f)(b)4.-5. (2017-18)2 by charging Harwood and others at
least $28 each in illegal added fees for copies of their health
records.  Harwood was injured in a car accident in August 2015 and
filed a personal injury claim.  She signed HIPAA releases
authorizing the release of medical information to her attorneys.
Harwood's attorneys requested certified medical bills from Wheaton
Franciscan - St. Francis and provided the HIPAA release signed by
Harwood to evidence her written consent.  Wheaton Franciscan
Services responded to the request and charged $31.14 to be paid to
Wheaton Franciscan Medical Group.  Harwood's attorneys paid the
charges to obtain the certified medical bills.

Harwood's attorneys also requested certified medical records from
St. Francis Hospital, again providing the HIPAA release signed by
Harwood.  Wheaton Franciscan Services responded to the request on
behalf of St. Francis Hospital and charged $61.31 to be paid to
"St. Francis." Again, Harwood's attorney paid the fee to obtain her
certified medical records.  Harwood reimbursed her attorneys for
all charges incurred from Wheaton Franciscan.

Harwood alleged in the complaint that Wheaton Franciscan charged
Harwood and others "a certification fee, processing fee, basic or
retrieval fees" for both medical record requests made by Harwood's
attorneys, who were persons authorized in writing by Harwood to
access that information.  In the class certification motion,
Harwood provided copies of 44 invoices from Wheaton Franciscan
entities that showed the certification and retrieval charges for
health care record requests that had been made by persons who
authorized counsel in writing to request the records.

On Feb. 23, 2018, Harwood filed her class certification motion.
Harwood moved to certify a class that included all persons in
Wisconsin who were Wheaton Franciscan patients (or persons they
authorized in writing to obtain their medical records) who were
charged retrieval fees or certification fees for the six years
preceding the filing of the complaint. The proposed class excluded
certain persons and entities, including any persons who did not pay
the fees.

The trial court certified a class and appointed Harwood the
representative.  The trial court decided the motion, applying the
newly revised version of the class certification rule, WIS. STAT.
Section 803.08, which went into effect after the action was filed.

The trial court rejected Wheaton Franciscan's arguments as
representing defenses to the merits of the Plaintiff's case that do
not preclude certifying the class, and quoted Messner v. Northshore
University HealthSystem, which stated that a court should not turn
the class certification proceedings into a dress rehearsal for the
trial on the merits.  Its decision focused on the fact that Harwood
had "provided a list of forty-four invoices, as well as the
invoices themselves with the patient names redacted, representing
separate clients that have been allegedly charged improper fees for
certified medical records in violation of WIS. STAT. Section
146.83.

Noting that the revised class action statute that took effect July
1, 2018,4 imposes more stringent requirements than the prior
version of WIS. STAT. Section 803.08 and applicable case law, the
trial court concluded that Harwood had satisfied the requirements
-- that the proposed class is large enough to make it impractical
to proceed without a class action, that the members of the proposed
class share a common interest, that Harwood's claim is typical of
the claims of the class, and that Harwood, the named party, will
provide adequate representation to the proposed class.

The trial court further concluded that "questions of law and fact
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to individual actions for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. It therefore
certified the class.

Wheaton Franciscan and two other Defendants appeal an order
certifying a class and appointing Harwood as the class
representative.

The parties do not dispute the application of the current statute
and they do not dispute that it was adopted with the express
purpose of harmonizing Wisconsin's class action statute with the
federal class action statute and federal case law.  They dispute
only whether the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion
when it ruled that Harwood had satisfied the requirements for the
class to be certified under the current version.

The revised class certification rule directed Wisconsin courts to
look to federal case law for guidance.  Just like Wisconsin law,
federal appellate courts review class-certification decisions
deferentially, in recognition of the fact that Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 gives the district courts broad discretion to
determine whether certification of a class-action lawsuit is
appropriate.  Federal appellate courts will reverse the
class-certification decision only when [they] find an abuse of
discretion.

Judge Brennan concludes that the trial court correctly considered
the relevant facts, applied the legal standard set forth in the
newly revised WIS. STAT. Section 803.08 consistent with federal law
on class certification, kept its analysis focused on the class
certification question, and reached a reasonable decision.

She finds that the record is replete with evidence that the trial
court in the case relied on facts that are of record or that are
reasonably derived by inference from the record and reached a
conclusion based on a logical rationale founded upon proper legal
standards.  She also finds that the trial court's definition of the
class is consistent with Moya v. Aurora Healthcare, Inc.'s holding
because the holding merely confirmed that patient-authorized
lawyers are among those exempt from certification and retrieval
fees.

Moreover, the Judge finds that the trial court's conclusion that
the evidence was sufficient to satisfy WIS. STAT. Section 803.08(1)
requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy
was based on the law and the facts and is reasonable.  There is
evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that the claims of
the representative and the class members shared commonality and
typicality, and that the adequacy requirement has been met.  Also,
the claims of all the class members and the representative are not
only predominant; they are the only claims each member makes.  As
to superiority, the case law is clear that public policy favors
class actions especially where the amount in controversy is so
small that the wronged party is unlikely ever to obtain judicial
review of the alleged violation without a class action.

Fianlly, the Judge finds that federal case law does not require
additional discovery in this case prior to class certification.
Wheaton Franciscan has access to its own billing records.  After
having an opportunity for discovery, Wheaton Franciscan is not now
entitled to delay the class certification on the grounds that
further discovery is needed because it has already asserted that it
could not "reasonably ascertain" the truth of that allegation,
which is the crux of the case.  Wheaton Franciscan cannot have it
both ways.

For these reasons, Judge Brennan concludes that the trial court
properly exercised its discretion in granting the class
certification motion, and she affirmed.  The Order is recommended
for publication in the official reports.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 20, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/v7juR4 from Leagle.com.

Robert Jacob Welcenbach -- robert@welcenbachlaw.com -- Scott
Borison -- borison@legglaw.com -- John Craig Jones --
info@joneshilllaw.com -- for Elizabeth Harwood,
Plaintiff-Respondent.

Mark E. Larson -- mark.larson@gebsc.com -- Bradley S. Foley --
bradley.foley@gebsc.com -- for Wheaton Franciscan Services, Inc.,
Wheaton Franciscan Medical Group, Inc. and Wheaton Franciscan
Healthcare — St. Francis, Inc., Defendants-Appellants.


XPO LAST MILE: $1.375MM Ibanez Settlement Has Prelim Approval
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Parties' Joint Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Settlement in the case captioned HECTOR
IBANEZ, Plaintiff, v. XPO LAST MILE INC., Defendant. Case No.
16-cv-07039-WHO, No. 17-cv-04009-WHO. (N.D. Cal.).

The Court grants preliminary approval to the settlement. The Court
preliminarily finds that the Agreement is fair, adequate, and
reasonable, and preliminarily approves the terms of the Agreement.

The Court recognizes that Plaintiff, the Settlement Class Members,
and Defendants stipulate and agree to certification of a Settlement
Class for settlement purposes only. This stipulation will not be
deemed admissible in this or any other proceeding should this
Agreement not become final. For settlement purposes only, the Court
conditionally certifies the following Settlement Class: all
individuals who did not contract with XPO LM, and (1) are Drivers
that performed delivery services within the state of California
during the Class Period for a Carrier, or (2) are Helpers with a
California address and were/are associated with any Carrier that
performed services within the state of California during the Class
Period.

The Court approves on a preliminary basis the Agreement and
settlement contained therein, including the definition and
disposition of the Gross Settlement Amount and related matters
provided for in the Agreement. It appears to the Court on a
preliminary basis that the settlement amount and terms are fair,
adequate, and reasonable as to all potential Settlement Class
Members when balanced against the probable outcome of further
litigation relating to liability and damage issues. It further
appears that adequate investigation and research have been
conducted such that counsel for the Parties at this time are able
to reasonably evaluate their respective positions.

It further appears to the Court that settlement at this time will
avoid substantial additional costs by all Parties, as well as avoid
the delay and risks that would be presented by further prosecution
of the Action. It further appears that the Agreement has been
reached as the result of intensive, serious, and non-collusive,
arm's-length negotiations.

Although the Agreement specifies an Attorney Fee Award in an amount
not to exceed 33 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount, Class Counsel
stated their intention to request only 25% of the Gross Settlement
Amount ($1,375,000.00). The Court will determine approval of the
requested attorney's fees at the Final Approval Hearing. The
Agreement also specifies a Cost Award not to exceed $100,000.00, a
Service Award/General Release Payment not to exceed $10,000.00 to
Plaintiff, Administration Costs to the settlement administrator
estimated not to exceed $75,000.00, and $412,500.00 to the Labor
and Workforce Development Agency for its 75% share of the
$550,000.00 PAGA Payment. The Court will determine approval of the
requested amounts set forth above at the Final Approval Hearing. If
the Court decides to award less than the amounts set forth above,
then the unawarded amounts will become part of the Net Settlement
Amount, distributable to Participating Settlement Class Members.

Any Settlement Class Member may choose to opt out of and be
excluded from the Settlement Class by following the instructions
for requesting exclusion from the Settlement Class that are set
forth in the Class Notice. All requests for exclusion must be
submitted as provided in the Class Notice. Any such person who
chooses to opt out of and be excluded from the Settlement Class
will not be entitled to any recovery under the Agreement and will
not be bound by the Agreement or have any right to object, appeal,
or comment thereon. Any written request to opt out must be signed
by each such person opting out. Settlement Class Members who have
not requested exclusion shall be bound by all determinations of the
Court, the Agreement, and Judgment.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2019 Order is
available https://tinyurl.com/y3n5abb6 from Leagle.com.

Hector Ibanez, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Matthew Roland Bainer -
mbainer@bainerlawfirm.com - The Bainer Law Firm & Jamie Kathryn
Serb - jserb@maralawfirm.com - Mara Law Firm, PC.

XPO Last Mile Inc., a Georgia corporation, Defendant, represented
by Allyson Suzanne Ascher - Allyson.Ascher@jacksonlewis.com -
Jackson Lewis P.C., Fraser Angus McAlpine
-fraser.mcalpine@jacksonlewis.com - Jackson Lewis P.C., Jeffrey
Hamilton Newhouse , Jackson Lewis P.C. & Robert Irving Lockwood ,
Pacific Employment Law LLP,101 California St, Ste 2300, San
Francisco, CA 94111-5895


ZHOU'S YUMMY: Yang Seeks Overtime Pay for Restaurant Staff
----------------------------------------------------------
JIAN GUO YANG, on his own behalf and on behalf of others similarly
situated, the  Plaintiff, v. ZHOU'S YUMMY RESTAURANT, INC. d/b/a
Zhou's Yummy; JINLIANG ZHOU, and XI QIN WU, the Defendants, Case
No. 1:19-cv-05203 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 12, 2019), alleges that the
Defendants' various willfull and unlawful employment policies,
patterns and practices of failing to pay its employees, including
Plaintiff, minimum wage for each hour worked and overtime
compensation for all hours worked over 40 each workweek violate the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law.

From on or about November 2015 to August 10, 2019, the Plaintiff
was employed by Defendants to work as a Barbecue Chef for
Defendants at 41-17 Union Street, Flushing, NY 11355.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff, proposed FLSA Collective and
potential Rule 23 Class are:

          John Troy, Esq.
          TROY LAW, PLLC
          41-25 Kissena Boulevard Suite 119
          Flushing, NY 11355
          Telephone: (718) 762-1324

ZIJA INTERNATIONAL: Traynor Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Zija International,
Inc. The case is styled as Yaseen Traynor, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Zija International,
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-08968 (S.D. N.Y., Sept. 26,
2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Zija International is a privately owned multi-level marketing
company located in Lehi, Utah. The company manufactures and
distributes weight management, nutritional, energy and performance,
skin care, and essential oil products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Russel Craig Weinrib, Esq.
     Stein Saks PLLC
     285 Passaic St., Suite 5
     Hakensack, NJ 07601
     Phone: (201) 282-6500
     Email: rweinrib@steinsakslegal.com



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