CAR_Public/191003.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Thursday, October 3, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 198

                            Headlines

2U INC: Glancy Prongay Reminds Investors of Oct. 7 Deadline
379 HORSEBLOCK: Rodriguez Seeks Minimum & Overtime Wages
811 CRISTOBAL: Loewe Seeks Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
ACCESS BUSINESS: Arellano Sues Over Unpaid Overtime, Missed Breaks
AIR METHODS: Settlement in Day Wage & Hour Suit Has Prelim Approval

AMAZING LASH: Covell Hits Illegal Telemarketing SMS Ads
APPLE INC: Court Denies Summary Judgment Bid in Grace Suit
APPLE INC: Phones Emit Excessive Radiation, Cohen Suit Alleges
ASSET RECOVERY: Court OKs $12K Settlement in Sandri
AT&T INC: Says Customers Can't Sue Over Sale of Location Data

BANKERS LIFE: Settlement in David Suit Has Final Court Approval
BEAUMONT HEALTH: Blanch Suit Seeks to Recover OT Pay Under FLSA
BERGER SUNSHINE: Lazo Suit to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
BITESQUAD.COM LLC: Court Grants Arbitration Bid in Holley
BLUE DIAMOND: Varelli Says Vanilla-Flavored Drinks Mislabeled

BOEHRINGER INGELHEIM: Hagens Berman Files Class Action Lawsuit
BRAND ENERGY: Parties File Joint Status Report in McClure Suit
BROOKFIELD ASSET: Rosson Sues Over Breach of Fiduciary Duties
BUCKS COUNTY, PA: Jail Officials Question Inmate Lookup Tool
BUNDOX RESTAURANT: Pech Sues Over Unpaid Minimum & Overtime Wages

C & L INSPECTION: Zwiefel Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
CABLEVISION SYSTEMS: Settlement in Consumer Suit Has Final Approval
CALIFORNIA CRYOBANK: Vidiksis et al Sue over Donor Sperm Storage
CANADA: Submissions Continue in Class-Action Against Military
CARBONITE INC: Kirby McInerney Files Class Action Lawsuit

CAVALIA (USA) INC: Fails to Properly Pay Workers, Eaton Suit Says
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Nakai Seeks Redress From TCPA Violation
CHECKERS DRIVE-IN: To Pay $3 Million to Settle Spam Texting Suit
CHICAGO BRIDGE: Gotham Securities Suit's Section 18 Claim Dismissed
COMPASS GROUP: Bryant Wants to Stop Illegal Use of Biometric Data

CONTINENTAL RESTAURANTS: Harris Sues Over Unpaid Compensation
COPART, INC: Cohen Sues over Fraudulent Vehicle Ads
DALLAS COUNTY, TX: Dismissal of Denmark Prisoners Suit Recommended
DALLAS COUNTY, TX: Dismissal of Jackson Prisoners Suit Recommended
DALLAS COUNTY, TX: Dismissal of Washington Prisoners Suit Endorsed

DEVELOPMENTAL PATHWAYS: Court Narrows Claims in FLSA Suit
DICK'S SPORTING: Court Approves Class Notice in Greer
DOW CHEMICAL: Court Denies Remand of Environmental Suit
DRAEGER INC: Fails to Pay Overtime Under FLSA & PMWA, Bohan Says
DST SYSTEMS: Bids for Lawyer Fees in Scott Securities Suit Denied

DXC TECHNOLOGY: Class Suit Claims Job Cuts Tied to Profit Targets
E & E FOOD: Fails to Pay Delivery Men Minimum Wage, Galindo Says
E.I. DU PONT: Boothe Farms Files Class Action Over Pesticide
EAGLE DINER: $162.5K Settlement in Flores Suit Has Prelim Approval
FARFETCH LIMITED: Omdahl Sues Over Share Price Drop

FLORIDA: Approval of $15.5MM 'Best and Brightest' Suit Deal Sought
FORD MOTOR: Court Dismisses Sugasawara Suit With Leave to Amend
GEICO GENERAL: Court Certifies Class Under Rule 23 in Green Suit
GOLDMAN SACHS: Court Appoints Lead Plaintiff, Counsel in Plaut Suit
GRUMA CORP: Arbitration Order in Maravilla FLSA Suit Affirmed

GULF2BAY SOFTWASH: Mejia Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
HEADWAY TECHNOLOGIES: Barbera Sues Over HDD Spring Price-fixing
HEADWAY TECHNOLOGIES: Leff Sues Over HDD Spring Price-fixing
HEALTHY HEART: Underpays Route Drivers, Hernandez Suit Says
HILTON WORLDWIDE: Faces Winnie Suit in District of Puerto Rico

HOMEFED CORP: Consolidation of Stockholder Cases Sought
INDIANA: Court Dismisses Harmon Suit for Failure to State Claim
INDIANA: Court Junks Westville Inmate's Bid to Pursue Class Suit
INTERNATIONAL MEDICATION: Brenes Seeks Minimum & Overtime Wages
JUST ENERGY: Rosen Law Files Securities Fraud Suit

JUUL LABS: McFaull Sues Over Deceptive Marketing of Vape Products
KARYOPHARM THERAPEUTICS: Mehdi Files Securities Class Action
KERYX BIOPHARMACEUTICALS: Court Denies Certification in Karth
KIA MOTORS: Faces Maldonado Suit Over Defective Engine System
KINKISHARYO INT'L: Armendariz Seeks Minimum & Overtime Wages

LG CHEM: Ninth Circuit Affirms Approval of Young Suit Settlement
M.J. BROTHERS: $525K Rodriguez Suit Settlement Has Final Approval
MACROGENICS, INC: Hill Sues over Share Price Drop
MEREDITH CORPORATION: Schall Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
MIDLAND CREDIT: Leedeman Sues over Debt Collection

MOON RIDGE: W.D. Mo. Certifies Class in Morris Suit
NASSAU COUNTY, NY: Dismissal Order in Falk Suit Affirmed
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE: Settlement in Zaklit Suit Has Final Approval
NAVY FEDERAL: Fourth Circuit Appeal Initiated in Lambert Suit
NERIUM INT'L: Sept. 18, 2018 Arbitration Order in Jia Clarified

NESTLE INC: Loses Bid to Junk Class Action Over 'No GMO' Label
NESTLE USA: Ct. Denies Bid to Dismiss Latiff False Advertising Suit
NESTLE USA: Sued by Bakers Over 'Fake' White Chocolate Chips
NEW ORLEANS, LA: Partial Summary Judgment in McMahon Suit Affirmed
NEW YORK: Gulino et al Filed Appeal in 2nd Cir.

NEWREZ LLC: Labrecque Sues Over Failure to Timely Pay Taxes
NISSAN NORTH: Suit Over FEB, AEB Transferred to M.D. Tenn.
OLLIE'S BARGAIN: Rigrodsky & Long Files Class Action Lawsuit
OLLIE'S BARGAIN: Schall Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
OPTICAL DISK: Supreme Court OKs Price-Fixing Class Action Suits

OREXIGEN THERAPEUTICS: Court Narrows Claims in Securities Suit
OVERHILL FARM: Zamora Suit Remanded to California Superior Court
PHARMERICA CORPORATION: Court Dismisses Riordan Securities Suit
PHOTOFAX INC: Ludemann Sues Over Unpaid Wages and BIPA Breach
PICK A PART: Class in Cardoso FLSA Suit Conditionally Certified

PIPELINE HEALTH: Pechulis et al. Seek Back Pay and Benefits
PIZZA BAKER: Court Narrows Claims in Clark FLSA Suit
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Dayton Sues Over Illegal Collection of Debts
PRISONER TRANSPO: Groover Pro Bono Counsel Gets $17.9K Costs Refund
PROFESSIONAL PROBATION: Harper Appeals Decision to 11th Circuit

REAL ESTATE ELEVATED: Hamilton Sues Over TCPA Violation
RIPPLE LABS: Moves to Dismiss Class Action Complaint
RITE AID: Court Narrows Claims in Silva Mislabeling Suit
ROMEO'S PIZZA: Underpays Delivery Drivers, Branning Suit Asserts
SANOFI SA: Hagens Berman Files Class Action Lawsuit

SANTANDER CONSUMER: Court Refuses Bid to Intervene in Lindblom
SENOR FROG'S: Kayat Files Suit Over Unsolicited Marketing
SENTRY LIFE: Court Dismisses Judgment on Pleadings in Maxon Suit
SHIRE US: Bid to Certify Class in Intuniv Antitrust Suit Denied
SWEETWORKS CONFECTIONS: Judgment on Pleadings in Green Partly OK'd

TEXAS: Court Refuses to Appoint Attorney in Rogers Inmate Suit
TEXAS: Inmates Sue Over Lack of Hepatitis C Drug
TORRANCE REFINERY: Judge Weighs Class Certification
TRULIEVE INC: Lyttle Sues Over Privacy Rights Breach Under FCRA
ULTA SALON: $3.4MM Settlement in Wise Labor Suit Has Prelim OK

UMBERTOS OF HALLANDALE: Vazquez Seeks Overtime Pay
UNITED INSURANCE: Court Narrows Claims on Insurance Suit
UNITED STATES: Court Dismisses Suit Over Bump-Fire Stock Device
UNIVERSITY OF LA VERNE: Stupar Seeks Proper Wages, Penalties
VANDAD SHEMIRANI: Huite Files Suit for Wrongful Eviction

VISALUS INC: Bid to Decertify Class in Wakefield TCPA Suit Denied
WEINERT ENTERPRISES: Filing of Second Amended Anderson Suit Allowed
WELTMAN WEINBERG: Court OKs Class Certification in Bitzko
WILCO LIFE: LSCC Appeals C.D. California Ruling to Ninth Circuit
YAMAHA MOTOR: Krautkramer Sues Over Radiator Defect


                            *********

2U INC: Glancy Prongay Reminds Investors of Oct. 7 Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP ("GPM") reminds investors of the
upcoming October 7, 2019 deadline to file a lead plaintiff motion
in the class action filed on behalf of 2U, Inc. (NASDAQ: TWOU)
investors who purchased securities between February 26, 2018 and
July 30, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period").

If you wish to learn more about this action, or if you have any
questions concerning this announcement or your rights or interests
with respect to these matters, please contact Lesley Portnoy,
Esquire, at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, or by email to
shareholders@glancylaw.com, or visit our website at
www.glancylaw.com.

On May 7, 2019, the Company lowered its revenue guidance for fiscal
2019 to a range of $534 to $537 million, from prior guidance range
of $546.6 to $550.8 million, due to declining average enrollments
in some of its largest graduate programs.

On this news, the Company's share price fell $15.16, or nearly 26%,
to close at $44.77 per share on May 8, 2019, on unusually heavy
trading volume.

Then on July 30, 2019, after the market closed, the Company
reported a larger-than-expected loss for second quarter 2019. The
Company also revised its guidance for fiscal 2019, expecting a net
loss between $157.5 and $151.5 million, compared to prior net loss
guidance between $79.0 and $77.2 million, because it would
"moderate [its] grad program launch cadence."

On this news, the Company's share price fell $23.70, or nearly 65%,
to close at $12.80 per share on July 31, 2019, on unusually heavy
trading volume.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) that the Company faced increasing competition in
online education and particularly regarding graduate programs; (2)
that the Company faced certain program-specific issues that
negatively impacted its performance; (3) that, as a result, the
Company's business model was not sustainable; (4) that the Company
would slow its program launches; and (5) that, as a result of the
foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects were materially misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired 2U, Inc. securities during
the Class Period you may move the Court no later than October 7,
2019 to request appointment as lead plaintiff in this putative
class action lawsuit. To be a member of the class action you need
not take any action at this time; you may retain counsel of your
choice or take no action and remain an absent member of the class
action. If you wish to learn more about this class action, or if
you have any questions concerning this announcement or your rights
or interests with respect to the pending class action lawsuit,
please contact Lesley Portnoy, Esquire, of GPM, 1925 Century Park
East, Suite 2100, Los Angeles, California 90067 at 310-201-9150,
Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, by email to shareholders@glancylaw.com,
or visit our website at www.glancylaw.com.  If you inquire by email
please include your mailing address, telephone number and number of
shares purchased.

Contact:

         Lesley Portnoy, Esq.
         Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Los Angeles
         Tel: 310-201-9150 or 888-773-9224
         Website: www.glancylaw.com
         Email: shareholders@glancylaw.com
                LPORTNOY@GLANCYLAW.COM [GN]


379 HORSEBLOCK: Rodriguez Seeks Minimum & Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------
FELIPE RODRIGUEZ, on behalf of himself and all other persons
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. 379 HORSEBLOCK PRODUCE
COPRP., 870 MIDDLE ISLAND CORP., DAVID CORONA and FRANKLIN TAVERAS,
JR., the  Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-05196 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 11,
2019), seeks to recover unpaid minimum and overtime wages under the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law.

Mr. Rodriguez regularly worked more than 40 hours in a workweek but
was not paid at the rate of time and one-half for all hours in
excess of 40 hours per week.

The Plaintiff was employed as an hourly paid non-exempt employee by
the Defendants from November 9, 2016 to July 2019. The Plaintiff's
duties included store maintenance, the lawsuit says.

The Defendants operate grocery stores located in Farmingville and
Middle Island, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Peter A. Romero, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF PETER A. ROMERO PLLC
          825 Veterans Highway Ste. B
          Hauppage, NY 11788
          Telephone: (631) 257 5588
          E-mail: promero@romerolawny.com

811 CRISTOBAL: Loewe Seeks Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------------------
MAYA LOEWE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. 811 CRISTOBAL, INC. dba DREAMS CLUB, a
California corporation; ANNA VAHANIAN, an individual; HOVHANES
VAHANIAN, an individual; DOE MANAGERS 1-3; and DOES 4- 100,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-08178 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 20,
2019) seeks damages over Defendants' violation of the mandatory
minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act, and for illegally absconding with Plaintiff's tips.

These causes of action arise from Defendants' willful actions while
Plaintiff was employed by Defendants from approximately June 2016
until December 2017 and sporadically in 2018. During her time being
employed by Defendants, Plaintiff was denied minimum wage payments
and denied overtime as part of Defendants' scheme to classify
Plaintiff and other dancers as "independent contractors." As a
result of Defendants' violations, Plaintiff and the FLSA Class
Members seek to recover double damages for failure to pay minimum
wage, overtime liquidated damages, interest, and attorneys' fees,
says the complaint.

Plaintiff began working as a dancer for Defendants in June 2016 and
continued until approximately December 2017 and sporadically in
2018.

Defendants operate an adult-oriented entertainment facility located
at 811 Cristobal Avenue, Wilmington, California 90744.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     John P. Kristensen, Esq.
     Jesenia A. Martinez, Esq.
     Jacob J. Ventura, Esq.
     KRISTENSEN WEISBERG, LLP
     12540 Beatrice Street, Suite 200
     Los Angeles, CA 90066
     Phone: (310) 507-7924
     Fax: (310) 507-7906
     Email: john@kristensenlaw.com
            jesenia@kristensenlaw.com
            jacob@kristensenlaw.com


ACCESS BUSINESS: Arellano Sues Over Unpaid Overtime, Missed Breaks
------------------------------------------------------------------
MARCO ARELLANO, individually, and on behalf of other members of the
general public similarly situated; Plaintiff v. ACCESS BUSINESS
GROUP LLC, an unknown business entity; NUTRILITE, an unknown
business entity; AMWAY, an unknown business entity; ALTICOR INC.,
an unknown business entity; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 19STCV33430 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles
Cty., Sept. 20, 2019) is a class action brought pursuant to Section
382 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.

According to the complaint, the Defendants hired Plaintiff and the
other class members, classified them as hourly-paid or non-exempt
employees, and failed to compensate them for all hours worked and
missed meal periods and/or rest breaks. Plaintiff and the other
class members worked over 8 hours in a day, and/or 40 hours in a
week during their employment with Defendants.

Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants, jointly and severally, as
an hourly-paid, non-exempt employee, from approximately July 2012
to approximately January 2018.

ACCESS BUSINESS GROUP LLC operates business in the State of
California, including the County of Los Angeles.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Edwin Aiwazian, Esq.
     LAWYERS for JUSTICE, PC
     410 West Arden Avenue, Suite 203
     Glendale, CA 91203
     Phone: (818) 265-1020
     Fax: (818) 265-1021


AIR METHODS: Settlement in Day Wage & Hour Suit Has Prelim Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LETCH G. DAY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. AIR METHODS
CORPORATION, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 5:17-CV-183-CHB
(E.D. Ky.), Judge Claria Horn Boom of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Kentucky, Central Division, Lexington,
granted the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Class Certification
and Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement.

The matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation of
U.S. Magistrate Judge Matthew A. Stinnett.  Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 636(b)(1)(B)-(C), the Court referred the Plaintiffs' Motion
for Preliminary Approval for findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and recommendation.  Magistrate Judge Stinnett also conducted a
status conference in the matter and ordered supplemental briefing.
Thereafter, the parties filed a Joint Supplement to the Plaintiff's
Unopposed Motion for Class Certification and Preliminary Approval
of Proposed Settlement.

In his Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Stinnett recommended that
the Court find as follows:

     1. That the Court will likely be able to approve the
Settlement Agreement on behalf of all current and former flight
nurses and flight paramedics employed by AMC in the Commonwealth of
Kentucky at any time from March 22, 2012, through the date the
Court enters an Order of preliminary approval;

     2. That the Court will likely be able to certify the proposed
Class for the purposes of judgment on the proposed Settlement
Agreement only;

     3. The Court approves the proposed Notice and Opt-out forms
with the changes noted in his Recommendation;

     4. The Court approves a website and First Class United States
Postal Mail as means of distributing notice to the Class Members,
to be disseminated within 60 days of the entry of the Order of
preliminary approval; and

     5. A Final Approval Hearing will be held before the District
Court at the discretion of the Court with it to establish any and
all necessary interim deadlines as described in Fed. R. Civ. P.
23.

Magistrate Judge Stinnett instructed the Parties to file objections
to the Recommendation within 14 days from its entry pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 42 and 28 U.S.C. Section 363(b) and (c).  Neither
party has filed objections to the Recommendation, and the time to
do so has passed.

Nonetheless, Judge Boom has reviewed the parties' filings, the
Settlement Agreement, and the Recommendation fully.  Therefore, and
being sufficiently advised, she accepted and adopted Magistrate
Judge Stinnett's Recommendation as the Opinion of the Court.

Accordingly, Judge Boom granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Approval subject to the modifications adopted in the
Court's Report and Recommendation.  She preliminarily approved the
Parties' proposed settlement.

The class defined in the Parties' Settlement Agreement is
conditionally approved for settlement purposes, including $900,000
in attorney's fees.  Additionally, the schedule set forth in the
Settlement Agreement is approved.

The Judge appointed (i) Letch G. Day as the class representative;
(ii) the counsel for Named Plaintiffs, Charles W. Arnold and
Christopher D. Miller of Arnold & Miller, PLC and J. Robert Cowan
of Cowan Law Office, PLC, as the class counsel; and (iii) CPT
Group, Inc. as the settlement administrator to administer the
settlement in accordance with the settlement agreement.

The notice packet and opt-out forms are approved, conditioned on
the modifications contained in Magistrate Judge Stinnett's
Recommendation.

A Final Fairness Hearing is set for Nov. 20, 2019, at 10:00 a.m.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 21, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/FkSrJC from Leagle.com.

Letch G. Day, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Stephanie E. Fields, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Steven D. Frasure, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Sonya A. Burkhart, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated & Edwin
Bentley, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Charles William Arnold --
carnold@arnoldmillerlaw.com -- Christopher D. Miller --
cmiller@arnoldmillerlaw.com -- Arnold & Miller, Christopher M.
Moody, Moody & Stanford, pro hac vice, Gerry Lynn Calvert, II,
Cowan Law Office, PLC, Henrietta Gera Meyman, Apt B, J. Robert
Cowan -- kylaw@cowanlawky.com -- Cowan Law Office, PLC & Repps D.
Stanford, Moody & Stanford, pro hac vice.

Air Methods Corporation, doing business as Air Methods Corporation,
Air Methods of Kentucky, Air Methods, Air Idaho Rescue, Arch Air
Medical Service, Black Hills Life Flight, Lifenet, Lifenet South
Carolina, Mercy Air, React Rockford Memorial Hospital, Wyoming Life
Flight, Alabama Life Saver, Bayflite, San Antonio Airlife, Guthrie
Air, Lifestart, Portneuf Air Rescue, Native Air, Medflight,
Reactsaints Flight, Wakemed Air Mobile, Lifemed of Alaska,
University Hospitals Medevac, Tri-State Care Flight and Mediflight
of Oklahoma, William Kelly Miller & Joseph Barkley Hill,
Defendants, represented by Christopher M. Ahearn , Fisher &
Phillips LLP, Cynthia Blevins Doll -- cdoll@fisherphillips.com --
Fisher & Phillips, Lonnie D. Giamela, Fisher & Phillips LLP & Megan
R. U'Sellis -- musellis@fisherphillips.com -- Fisher & Phillips.


AMAZING LASH: Covell Hits Illegal Telemarketing SMS Ads
-------------------------------------------------------
Brittany Covell, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Amazing Lash Studio Franchise LLC and Does
1-100, Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-01613 (S.D. Cal., August 27,
2019), seeks statutory damages, punitive damages, costs and
attorney fees for violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act.

Covell visited the Lash Studio located at their Carlsbad location
to receive an eyelash extension service and was required to input
her personal information, including her cell phone number into
their point of sale registry. After her appointment, she began to
receive SMS ads without her express written consent to receive text
message marketing and advertisement messages. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Todd D. Carpenter, Esq.
      Scott G. Braden (CA 305051)
      CARLSON LYNCH, LLP
      1350 Columbia St. Ste. 603
      Tel: (619) 762-1900
      Fax: (619) 756-6991
      Email: tcarpenter@carlsonlynch.com
             sbraden@carlsonlynch.com


APPLE INC: Court Denies Summary Judgment Bid in Grace Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTINA GRACE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. APPLE, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 17-CV-00551-LHK (N.D. Cal.), Judge Lucy H. Koh
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California,
San Jose Division, denied Apple's motion for summary judgment.

On Feb. 2, 2017, Plaintiffs Grace and Ken Potter bring the class
action against Defendant Apple for trespass to chattels and
violation of California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL").  The
Plaintiffs' action arises from the events of April 16, 2014, when
Apple's FaceTime feature stopped working for owners of Apple's
iPhone 4 and iPhone 4s devices who were running Apple's iOS 6
operating system.  

That same day, Apple employee David Biderman reported in an email
that the certificate expirations started at: Apr 16 22:54:46 2014
GMT, impacting users that haven't upgraded to the most recent
releases which contain the certificate fix.  As a result, iPhone 4
and iPhone 4S users using iOS6 complained to Apple that FaceTime
had broken for them.  The FaceTime break to iOS6 reduced Apple's
reliance on the relay method of FaceTime connections, which imposed
greater costs on Apple than the peer-to-peer method implemented in
iOS7.

Grace filed a putative class action complaint in this Court against
Apple.  The complaint alleged causes of action against Apple for
(1) trespass to chattels, and (2) violations of the UCL.

Before the Court is Apple's motion for summary judgment on both of
the Plaintiffs' remaining claims, for (1) trespass to chattels; and
(2) violation of the unfair prong of California's UCL.

To the extent that Apple contends that the Plaintiffs' theory
expands trespass to chattels to include any instance in which a
defendant fails to remedy a design defect, Apple ignores that the
tort of trespass to chattels requires an "intentional
interference."  Thus, a defendant's failure to remedy a design
defect, without evidence of the defendant's intent to interfere
with the plaintiff's property, would not give rise to a trespass to
chattels claim.  In the instant case, Judge Koh finds that the
Plaintiffs have identified evidence that could prove Apple's intent
to interfere with their iPhones.  Accordingly, she rejects Apple's
first argument for summary judgment on the Plaintiffs' trespass to
chattels claim.

The Judge also denies Apple's motion for summary judgment on the
Plaintiffs' trespass to chattels claim.  She finds that the
Plaintiffs' trespass to chattels claim arises not from a contract,
but from Apple's intentional, post-purchase conduct.  They have
identified evidence that even though Apple regularly renewed
certificates to avoid service outages, and even though Apple knew
that FaceTime would cease to operate when the iPhone Device CA
certificate expired, Apple resolved the certificate expiration
issue only for iOS7 users and not for iOS6 users.  Because the
Plaintiffs have identified evidence from which a jury could
conclude that such a post-purchase trespass occurred, the economic
loss rule is inapplicable.

The Judge next addresses the Plaintiffs' UCL claim.  The Plaintiffs
allege that Apple violated the UCL because Apple's FaceTime break
was "unfair" and "without any acceptable justification, whether
business or otherwise."  Apple moves for summary judgment on the
basis that the Plaintiffs' damages model fails to measure
restitution, the only relief available to the class under the UCL.

California's UCL prohibits unfair competition, including any
unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair,
deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.  The UCL creates a
cause of action for business practices that are (1) unlawful, (2)
unfair, or (3) fraudulent.  Each "prong" of the UCL provides a
separate and distinct theory of liability.  The Plaintiffs proceed
under the unfair prong of the UCL.  Under the UCL, prevailing
plaintiffs are generally limited to injunctive relief and
restitution.  In the instant case, the Judge declines to certify an
injunctive class under Rule 23(b)(2).  The Plaintiffs are only
entitled to seek restitution under the UCL.

The Judge also rejects Apple's argument that the Plaintiffs'
damages model does not measure restitution under the UCL.  She
explains that California law requires only that some reasonable
basis of computation of damages be used, and the damages may be
computed even if the result reached is an approximation.  In the
instant case, the Plaintiffs' theory is that the FaceTime break
violated the UCL.  Thus, the Judge held that comparing the market
value of the iPhone 4 and iPhone 4S before and after that
information was revealed -- i.e. before and after the FaceTime
break -- seems an accurate way of determining how much class
members lost as a result of the FaceTime break.  Accordingly, she
concludes that Dr. Hastings' damages model aligns with the
Plaintiffs' UCL theory of liability, measures restitution, and
complies with  Comcast Corp. v. Behrend.

Finally, the Judge again rejects Apple's argument that the
Plaintiffs' damages model is an inadequate measurement of
restitution under the UCL.  She holds that the Plaintiffs' damages
model provides "a reasonable basis of computation" for how much
they overpaid to Apple.  And it is undisputed that the Plaintiffs
paid money to Apple for their iPhones.  Therefore, the Judge denies
Apple's motion for summary judgment on the Plaintiffs' UCL claim.
For the foregoing reasons, Judge Koh denied Apple's motion for
summary judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 21, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/gLX4mK from Leagle.com.

Christina Grace, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander Lee Simon --
asimon@pswlaw.com -- Pearson Simon & Warshaw, LLP, Bradley Wayne
Caldwell -- bcaldwell@caldwellcc.com -- Caldwell Cassady Currry
P.C., pro hac vice, Bruce Lee Simon -- bsimon@pswlaw.com --
Pearson
Simon & Warshaw, LLP, Christopher S. Stewart, Caldwell Cassady
Curry, pro hac vice, Daniel Rollins Pearson, Caldwell Cassady and
Curry, Daniel L. Warshaw -- dwarshaw@pswlaw.com -- Pearson, Simon
&
Warshaw, LLP, David F.E. Tejtel -- dtejtel@fotpllc.com -- Friedman
Oster & Tejtel PLLC, Donald Scott Macrae -- smacrae@steyerlaw.com
-- Steyer Lowenthal Boodrookas Alvarez & Smith LLP, Jason Dodd
Cassady -- jcassady@caldwellcc.com -- Caldwell Cassady and Curry,
pro hac vice, Jill Michelle Manning -- jmanning@steyerlaw.com --
Steyer Lowenthal Boodrookas Alvarez & Smith LLP, John Austin Curry
-- acurry@caldwellcc.com -- Caldwell Cassady Curry P.C., pro hac
vice, John Summers, Caldwell Cassady Curry, pro hac vice, Suneel
Jain, Steyer Lowenthal, Warren Joseph McCarty, III, Caldwell
Cassady Curry P.C. & Allan Steyer -- asteyer@steyerlaw.com --
Steyer Lowenthal Boodrookas Alvarez & Smith LLP.

Ken Potter, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander Lee Simon, Pearson
Simon & Warshaw, LLP, Bruce Lee Simon, Pearson Simon & Warshaw,
LLP, Daniel Rollins Pearson, Caldwell Cassady and Curry, Daniel L.
Warshaw, Pearson, Simon & Warshaw, LLP, Donald Scott Macrae,
Steyer
Lowenthal Boodrookas Alvarez & Smith LLP, Jill Michelle Manning,
Steyer Lowenthal Boodrookas Alvarez & Smith LLP, Suneel Jain,
Steyer Lowenthal, Warren Joseph McCarty, III, Caldwell Cassady
Curry P.C. & Allan Steyer, Steyer Lowenthal Boodrookas Alvarez &
Smith LLP.

Apple, Inc., Defendant, represented by Robert Alexander Pilmer --
alexander.pilmer@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Ashley
Elizabeth Neglia -- ashley.neglia@kirkland.com -- Kirkland and
Ellis LLP, Eugene Novikov -- enovikov@durietangri.com -- Durie
Tangri LLP, Jacob Johnston -- jacob.johnston@kirkland.com --
Kirkland Ellis LLP, Joseph Allen Loy -- joseph.loy@kirkland.com --
Kirkland & Ellis LLP, pro hac vice, Joshua H. Lerner --
jlerner@durietangri.com -- Durie Tangri LLP, Sonal N. Mehta --
smehta@durietangri.com -- Durie Tangri LLP, Stephen J. Elkind,
Durie Tangri LLP, pro hac vice & Tanya Louise Greene --
tanya.greene@kirkland.com -- Kirkland and Ellis LLP.

BrightStar Corporation, Non-Party, Miscellaneous, represented by
Joseph M. Wahl -- Joseph.Wahl@btlaw.com -- Barnes and Thornburg
LLP.

Akamai Technologies, Inc., Miscellaneous, represented by James L.
Day -- jday@fbm.com -- Farella Braun Martel.


APPLE INC: Phones Emit Excessive Radiation, Cohen Suit Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Cohen, Kaleah C. Allen, Kimberly Benjamin, Timothy Hornick,
Nicholas Carlson, Jonathan Wolfe, Mark Weiler, Chad Smith, Sarah D.
Smith, And Scott Cischke, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Apple, Inc. and Samsung
Electronics America, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-05322, (N.D.
Cal., Aug. 23, 2019), seeks damages, injunctive relief and other
relief resulting from negligence under various state consumer
protection statutes.

The Defendants are global manufacturers of mobile phones and
gadgets.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants' devices emit excessive
amounts of radio waves that exceed the human exposure limit.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jennie Lee Anderson, Esq.
          ANDRUS ANDERSON LLP
          155 Montgomery Street, Suite 900
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 986-1400
          Facsimile: (415) 986-1474
          E-mail: jennie@andrusanderson.com

               - and -

          Elizabeth A. Fegan, Esq.
          Timothy A. Scott, Esq.
          FEGAN SCOTT LLC
          150 S. Wacker Dr., 24th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 741-1019
          Facsimile: (312) 264-0100
          E-mail: beth@feganscott.com
                  tim@feganscott.com

               - and -

          J. Barton Goplerud, Esq.
          SHINDLER, ANDERSON, GOPLERUD & WEESE, P.C.
          5015 Grand Ridge Drive, Suite 100
          West Des Moines, IA 50265
          Telephone: (515) 223-4567
          E-mail: goplerud@sagwlaw.com


ASSET RECOVERY: Court OKs $12K Settlement in Sandri
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin issued an Order granting Parties' Request for Final
Approval of the Class Settlement Agreement in the case captioned
JOHN SANDRI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. ASSET RECOVERY SOLUTIONS, LLC, an Illinois
limited liability company; et al., Defendants. Case No.
1:18-cv-01182-WCG. (E.D. Wis.).

The following Settlement Class is certified pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(3):

     All persons to whom Asset Recovery Solutions, LLC mailed an
initial written communication to an address in the State of
Wisconsin, during the period of August 1, 2017 through August 22,
2018, which made a settlement offer for a debt owed to Bureaus
Investment Group Portfolio No. 15 LLC, and which stated should you
choose not to accept this offer, the account balance may
periodically increase due to the addition of accrued interest as
provided in your agreement with the original creditor.

The Court further finds that provisions for notice to the class
satisfy the requirements due process pursuant to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, including Rule 23, the United States
Constitution and any other applicable law.

The Court finds the Settlement including the Parties' stipulation
is fair, reasonable, and adequate and hereby finally approves the
Agreement submitted by the Parties, including the Release and
payments by Asset Recovery. Specifically, the Court finds: (A)
Plaintiff, as Class representative, and Class Counsel have
adequately represented the class (B) the Agreement was negotiated
at arm's length (C) the relief provided to the Class is adequate,
taking into account (i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and
appeal (ii) the effectiveness of the proposed method for
distributing relief to the Class, (iii) the terms regarding an
award of Class Counsel attorneys' fees and costs, and (iv) the
Agreement and (D) the Agreement equitably treats Class Members
relative to each other.

Upon the Effective Date, as defined in the Agreement, Asset
Recovery shall:

   (a) Create a class settlement fund of $12,000.00, which Class
Counsel through the Administrator will distribute pro rata to each
Class Member whose Class Notice was not returned as undeliverable
and who did not him/herself from the Settlement. Class Members will
receive their share of the Class Recovery by check, which shall
become void sixty (60) days from the date of issuance. Any checks
that have not been cashed by the void date, along with any
unclaimed funds remaining in the Class Recovery will be disbursed
in the following order: (i) to pay the costs associated with
providing notice to Class Members and administering the Class
Recovery; and (ii) any remainder donated as a cy pres award to
Legal Action of Wisconsin.

   (b) Pay Plaintiff $2,000.00.

   (c) Pursuant to the Parties' Stipulation, Asset Recovery shall
pay Class Counsel $35,000.00 for their attorneys' fees and costs
incurred in the action based on their submitted hourly rates and
time expended. Class Counsel shall not request additional fees or
costs from Asset Recovery or the Class Members.

The Court finds the Agreement including the Parties' stipulation is
fair and made in good faith.

The terms of the Agreement, including the Parties' stipulation are
incorporated into this Order. This Amended Order shall operate as a
final judgment and dismissal without prejudice of the claims in
this action including Class Counsels' award of attorneys' fees,
costs and expenses.

The Court finds, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), that
there is no just reason for delay of enforcement of, or appeal
from, this Order.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 19, 2019 Order
and Judgment is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxs5fq6l from
Leagle.com.

John Sandri, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Francis R. Greene , Stern
Thomasson LLP, Philip D. Stern , Stern Thomasson LLP & Andrew T.
Thomasson , Stern Thomasson LLP, 150 Morris Avenue, 2nd Floor
Springfield, NJ 07081-1315

Asset Recovery Solutions LLC, an Illinois limited liability
company, Defendant, represented by Douglas A. Albritton , Actuate
Law LLC & Jeffrey M. Hansen , Actuate Law LLC, 311 South Wacker
Drive Suite 3000, Chicago, IL, 60606


AT&T INC: Says Customers Can't Sue Over Sale of Location Data
-------------------------------------------------------------
Joseph Cox, writing for Vice.com, reports that AT&T is arguing that
its customers can't sue the company for selling location data to
bounty hunters, according to recently filed court records. AT&T
says the customers signed contracts that force them into
arbitration, meaning consumers have to settle complaints privately
with the company rather than in court. The filing is in response to
a lawsuit filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF).

The news shows the hurdles consumers are faced with when trying to
claim compensation from telecos and other tech giants that have
arguably abused access to their data, including ultimately selling
it to people without authorization to handle such information.

"The plaintiffs have an uphill battle," Deborah Hensler, Director
of Law and Policy Lab at Stanford University, said.

The issue circles around mandatory arbitration; that is, forcing
consumers to settle complaints privately with the company rather
than in court.

"Each time they entered into a new Wireless Customer Agreement with
AT&T, they [the plantiffs] not only agreed to AT&T's Privacy Policy
but also agreed to resolve their disputes with AT&T -- including
the claims asserted in this action -- in arbitration on an
individual basis," AT&T's filing from last week reads. When the
plaintiffs, who are AT&T customers, accepted AT&T's terms and
conditions when, say, purchasing a new phone, they also agreed
specifically to the arbitration clause, AT&T argues.

Did you know about an abuse of location data? We'd love to hear
from you. Using a non-work phone or computer, you can contact
Joseph Cox securely on Signal on +44 20 8133 5190, Wickr on
josephcox, OTR chat on jfcox@jabber.ccc.de or email
joseph.cox@vice.com

The Arbitration Agreement on AT&T's website reads, "AT&T and you
agree to arbitrate all disputes and claims between us. This
agreement to arbitrate is intended to be broadly interpreted."

The class action lawsuit filed on behalf of AT&T customers came
after multiple Motherboard investigations into the sale and abuse
of phone location data. In January, Motherboard obtained the
real-time location of a T-Mobile phone in Queens, New York, after
paying a bounty hunter source $300. The data broker firm that
provided access to that data, called Microbilt, also sold location
information on Sprint and AT&T phones. Shortly after, Motherboard
then reported that a company called CerCareOne had sold T-Mobile,
AT&T, and Sprint to around 250 bounty hunter customers.

In response, all of the telecos stopped selling the data. On top of
that multiple lawyers filed class action lawsuits over the sale of
phone location data, including the EFF and legal firm Pierce
Bainbridge, which is the case this AT&T filing stems from. T-Mobile
has used a similar argument in its own cases around phone location
data too.

"In general courts have upheld the application of mandatory
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts that preclude litigating
in court and typically also preclude any form of group proceeding
in arbitration, meaning each claimant must proceed individually. In
these sorts of small claims, the requirement to proceed
individually further weakens the plaintiffs' position," Hensler
said.

But other courts have recently ruled that AT&T's argument has
holes, meaning there may still be ways of consumers to sue the
teleco giants for this and similar violations.

Adam Gutride from law firm Gutride Safier LLP, which sued AT&T in
another instance over roaming fees, told Motherboard in an email
"In our case we persuaded the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals
that AT&T Mobility's arbitration clause is unenforceable. That is
because the arbitration clause would prevent consumers from
obtaining a 'public injunction' to stop illegal conduct." (The EFF
lawsuit seeks an injunction to stop AT&T from selling location data
again.)

Gutride said AT&T is seeking a review from the 9th Circuit, and if
that fails will go to the Supreme Court.

Depending on the company, it can be possible to opt-out of
arbitration clauses at the start of a contract. But of course that
requires the consumer being aware of the issue in the first place.

"If consumers carefully read [the] fine print they will find out
how they can opt-out of the arbitration requirement. Most of course
don't notice or pay attention to this, in which case their attempts
to overcome the arbitration requirement subsequently are
significantly weakened," Hensler said. [GN]


BANKERS LIFE: Settlement in David Suit Has Final Court Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion
for Final Approval of a Class Action Settlement in the case
captioned CHRISTINE DAVID and RODNEY CLURE, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BANKERS
LIFE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Defendant. No.
14-cv-00766-RSL. (W.D. Wash.).

The Court approves the Settlement, finding that it is fair,
reasonable, and adequate to members of the Settlement Class, and
consistent and in compliance with all requirements of Washington
and federal law, for the reasons set forth in the parties'
Stipulated Motion and in the Plaintiffs' Motion for Final
Approval.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs Christine David and Rodney Clure
and Settlement Class Counsel adequately represented the Settlement
Class for purposes of entering into and implementing the
Settlement.

The Court finds that Settlement Class Counsel's request for an
award of attorneys' fees and costs is fair and reasonable, and
hereby approves the request for an attorneys' fee and cost award of
$370,000. After costs ($64,609), the remainder for attorneys' fees
represents 30.5% of the Maximum Settlement Payment. Such figure is
within the range of reasonable percentage awards in common fund
cases. Counsel's declaration  and the detailed billings attached to
it demonstrate the time expended on the matter and a break-down of
costs incurred. Such records show that Settlement Class Counsel has
devoted substantial time and effort toward pursuing settlement
class members' claims, even after decertification, moving to
certify a narrower class and, failing that, positioning Plaintiffs'
individual claims for trial and, if necessary, subsequent appeal.
The result achieved under the circumstances supports the award.  

The Court approves payment in the amount of $10,000 to each of the
named Plaintiffs as Settlement Class Representative Awards for
their service on behalf of the Settlement Class.

The parties are hereby directed to proceed with the settlement
payment procedures specified under the terms of the Settlement
Agreement.

The Settlement Agreement is binding on all Participating Settlement
Class Members, as defined in the parties' Settlement Agreement.
Plaintiffs Christine David and Rodney Clure and Participating
Settlement Class Members are bound by the Release of Claims set
forth in Paragraph 2 of the Settlement Agreement, and are enjoined
from maintaining, prosecuting, commencing, or pursuing any claim
released under the Settlement Agreement, and are deemed to have
released and discharged the Defendant and Released Parties from any
such claims.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 19, 2019 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3rt8pfq from Leagle.com.

Christine David & Rodney Clure, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Adam J.
Berger - berger@sgb-law.com - SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER, Lindsay
Halm - halm@sgb-law.com - SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER, Martin S.
Garfinkel , SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER, 810 3rd Avenue, Suite 500
Seattle, WA 98104-1657 & Jamal N. Whitehead -
whitehead@sgb-law.com - SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER.

Bankers Life and Casualty Company, a foreign corporation,
Defendant, represented by Ryan Paul Hammond - rhammond@littler.com
- LITTLER MENDELSON, Breanne Sheetz Martell  -
bsmartell@littler.com - LITTLER MENDELSON & Daniel L. Thieme -
dthieme@littler.com - LITTLER MENDELSON.


BEAUMONT HEALTH: Blanch Suit Seeks to Recover OT Pay Under FLSA
---------------------------------------------------------------
GENEVA BLANCH, JOYCE BOWMAN And ALEXIS TRUITT, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated v. BEAUMONT HEALTH, A
Domestic Non-Profit Corporation, BOTSFORD CONTINUING CARE
CORPORATION, A Domestic Non-Profit Corporation, OAKWOOD HEALTH
PROMOTIONS, INC., A Domestic Non-Profit Corporation, Case No.
2:19-cv-12678-SJM-MJH (E.D. Mich., Sept. 11, 2019), is brought
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act to recover unpaid
overtime, lost wage, an additional equal amount as liquidated
damages, obtain declaratory relief, and reasonable attorneys' fees
and costs.

Beaumont Health is a Michigan Nonprofit Corporation.  Beaumont
Health does business throughout Michigan with its registered office
listed as 26935 Northwestern Highway, in Southfield, Michigan.

Oakwood Health Promotions, Inc. is a Domestic Non-Profit
Corporation that does business relevantly as Beaumont
Rehabilitation & Continuing Care Center, Dearborn.  Oakwood does
business throughout Michigan with its registered office listed as
2000 Town Center, Suite 1200, in Southfield, Michigan.

Botsford Continuing Care Corporation is a Michigan Domestic
Non-Profit Corporation that does business relevantly as Beaumont
Rehabilitation & Continuing Care Center, Farmington Hills.
Botsford does business throughout Michigan with its registered
office listed as 26935 Northwestern Highway, in Southfield,
Michigan.

The Defendants, individually and jointly, are employers operating
rehabilitation centers that are, or were for relevant times, a part
of the Beaumont Health System.  Beaumont Health owns and operates
rehabilitation centers consisting of the operations known as
Beaumont Rehabilitation & Continuing Care Center, Farmington Hills
and Beaumont Rehabilitation & Continuing Care Center,
Dearborn.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          John A. Schipper, Esq.
          DISABILITY & BENEFITS ASSOCIATES OF MICHIGAN, PLC
          200 E. Big Beaver Road
          Troy, MI 48083
          Telephone: (248) 729-2414
          E-mail: jschipper@disabilitybenefitsmi.com


BERGER SUNSHINE: Lazo Suit to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------
ANGEL LAZO, HECTOR LAZO, JUAN LAZO, and SEGUNDO LAZO, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
BERGER SUNSHINE LLC, BUSHWACK 9 LLC, 599 JOHNSON LLC, and DAWSON
STELLBERGER, WELLS STELLBERGER, and JON J. KILLKELLEY, as
individuals, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05375-KAM-PK (E.D. N.Y.,
Sept. 20, 2019) is an action against Defendants to recover damages
for egregious violations of state and federal wage and hour laws
arising out of Plaintiffs' employment under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the New York Labor Law.

Although Plaintiffs worked approximately 84 hours or more per week
during the period of their employment by Defendants, Defendants did
not pay Plaintiffs time and a half for hours worked over 40, a
blatant violation of the overtime provisions contained in the FLSA
and NYLL. Additionally, Defendants illegally withheld pay from
Plaintiffs during their employment, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs were employed by Defendants from August 2016 until
October 2018.

BERGER SUNSHINE LLC, is a corporation organized under the laws
ofNew York with a principal executive office at 249 Smith Street
#140, Brooklyn, New York 11231.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
     Helen F. Dalton & Associated, P.C.
     80—02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
     Kew Gardens, NY 11415
     Phone: 718-263-9591
     Fax: 718-263-9598



BITESQUAD.COM LLC: Court Grants Arbitration Bid in Holley
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas, Western Division, issued an Order granting Defendant's
Motion to Compel Arbitration in the case captioned RUSSELL HOLLEY,
et al., Plaintiffs, v. BITESQUAD.COM LLC d/b/a BITE SQUAD,
Defendant. Case No. 4:18-cv-00572-KGB. (E.D. Ark.).

Plaintiffs allege that Bite Squad violated the minimum wage
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Arkansas
Minimum Wage Act (AMWA). Plaintiffs base their allegations upon
Bite Squad's use of a tip credit, a method of compensation in which
an employer pays its employees a base wage below the minimum wage,
which may be permissible so long as the employees' tips ultimately
bring their wages up to the minimum wage. Plaintiffs claim that
Bite Squad violated the law by using a tip-credit system because it
required its drivers to share tips with employees who did not
customarily and regularly receive tips.

In support of its motion to compel arbitration, Bite Squad presents
the affidavit of David Schramm, the Chief Legal and Administrative
Officer of Bite Squad and its wholly-owned subsidiary, KASA
Delivery, LLC (KASA). Mr. Schramm avers that, after a potential
employee applies for employment, the employee is emailed an
electronic copy of a hiring packet containing among other documents
an Employment Application, Employment Agreement, and an Arbitration
Agreement, which the employee may complete at a BiteSquad location
or on his or her own computer.

Mr. Schramm states that the first time an applicant reaches a
signature field, they choose to create their signature, which may
be made by signing a field with the mouse or pointer, signing the
field with their finger; signing the field with a typed signature
in the font of their choosing; or uploading a picture of their
signature. He also states that applicants had the option to choose
whether they wanted to automatically affix their signature wherever
it was required or use the process just described.

Each Arbitration Agreement contains the following relevant
language:

Except as this Agreement otherwise provides, claims covered by this
Agreement (sometimes referred to jointly and separately as Claims)
include, but are not limited to, legal disputes with any individual
or entity regarding wages or other compensation due, minimum wage
and claims arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act and state
statutes or regulations addressing the same or similar subject
matters.

Legal Standard

The Federal Arbitration Act provides that certain arbitration
agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract. Courts must therefore rigorously enforce arbitration
agreements according to their terms.

The Court must first determine whether there is a valid arbitration
agreement and then determine whether the claims fall within the
terms of the arbitration agreement. Threshold questions of
arbitrability are for a court to decide, unless there is clear and
unmistakable evidence the parties intended to commit questions of
arbitrability to an arbitrator.  

Ms. Cook, Mr. Lucas, Mr. Brown, and Ms. Hammons's Individual
Claims

Defendants argue that the Arbitration Agreements delegate the
threshold issue of arbitrability to an arbitrator, not to this
Court. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held the
incorporation of the AAA Rules into a contract requiring
arbitration to be a clear and unmistakable indication that the
parties intended for the arbitrator to decide threshold questions
of arbitrability.  

Defendants have presented the affidavit of Mr. Schramm, who swears
to the authenticity of the Arbitration Agreements signed by the
individual plaintiffs. Defendants have also presented copies of the
Arbitration Agreements signed by each of the individual plaintiffs.
The Arbitration Agreements each bear the signatures of the
individual plaintiffs. Each of these arbitration agreements state
that arbitrations pursuant to this Agreement shall be conducted in
accordance with the procedures set forth in the American
Arbitration Association's Employment Arbitration Rules.

While Mr. Holley has presented an affidavit asserting that he did
not sign the Arbitration Agreement, there is no evidence before the
Court that the other individual plaintiffs disavow the Arbitration
Agreements that bear their signatures.

Taking the record evidence in the light most favorable to
plaintiffs, the Court concludes that no reasonable juror could
conclude that Ms. Cook, Mr. Lucas, Mr. Brown, and Ms. Hammons are
not bound to the Arbitration Agreements. As the Arbitration
Agreements incorporate the AAA Rules, the Court concludes that the
arbitrator must determine his or her own jurisdiction over the
controversy between Ms. Cook, Mr. Lucas, Mr. Brown, Ms. Hammons,
and Bite Squad.

Accordingly, the Court stays the individual claims brought by Ms.
Cook, Mr. Lucas, Mr. Brown, and Ms. Hammons and refers those claims
to an arbitrator for the arbitrator to determine whether those
claims are arbitrable.

Mr. Holley's Individual Claims

Bite Squad also asserts that an arbitrator should determine whether
Mr. Holley's claims are arbitrable. Mr. Holley argues that he is
not bound by the Arbitration Agreement because his signature was
forged and because the auto-fill feature is insufficient to create
a binding contract The Court acknowledges that the Arbitration
Agreement incorporates the AAA Rules. The Court could locate no
Eighth Circuit case directly on point regarding whether an
allegation of forgery that one party claims invalidates the
arbitration agreement in its entirety is a matter of arbitrability
to be decided by the arbitrator.

However, Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent suggests that
this question belongs to the Court as the allegation of forgery
goes to the issue of whether the parties actually agreed to
arbitration  

Here, at a minimum, this Court is required to resolve as a
threshold issue whether Mr. Holley entered into the Arbitration
Agreement to determine whether Mr. Holley, along with the other
individual plaintiffs, waived his ability to bring class and
collective actions against Bite Squad. Even Bite Squad argues that
language in the Arbitration Agreement vests the construction and
enforcement of the class action waiver language in the Court, not
an arbitrator.
   
As a result, this Court will determine whether a valid arbitration
agreement exists as to Mr. Holley. For the reasons explained
elsewhere in this Order, the Court concludes that it does.

Accordingly, the Court stays the individual claims brought by Mr.
Holley and refers those claims to an arbitrator to determine
whether such claims are arbitrable.

Class and Collective Claims

Bite Squad argues that that the class and collective actions
brought by plaintiffs are barred by the Arbitration Agreements.
Bite Squad points out that the Arbitration Agreements signed by
each of the individual plaintiffs include the following class
action waiver language: "Both the Company and you agree to bring
any dispute in arbitration on an individual basis only, and not on
a class or collective basis on behalf of others. There will be no
right or authority for any dispute to be brought, heard or
arbitrated as a class or collective action, or as a member in any
such class or collective proceeding."

The Court determines that it is required to resolve as a threshold
issue whether Mr. Holley entered into the Arbitration Agreement to
determine whether Mr. Holley, along with the other individual
plaintiffs, waived his ability to bring class and collective
actions against Bite Squad.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 19, 2019 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y26lkaph from Leagle.com.

Russell Holley, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Susan Cook, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated & David Bryan Lucas, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by
Christopher Wesley Burks , WH Law,1 Riverfront Pl, Suite 745, North
Little Rock, AR 72114,  Daniel D. Ford , Sanford Law Firm & Joshua
Sanford - josh@sanfordlawfirm.com - Sanford Law Firm.

Bitesquad.com LLC, doing business as Bite Squad, Defendant,
represented by Timothy J. Wolf - twolf@bjpc.com - Brown & James,
P.C. & Kathleen A. McCarthy , Brown & James, P.C., 800 Market St.,
Ste 1100, St. Louis, MO 63101-2501


BLUE DIAMOND: Varelli Says Vanilla-Flavored Drinks Mislabeled
-------------------------------------------------------------
June Varelli, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. Blue Diamond Growers, the Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-05259 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 14, 2019), says Blue
Diamond Growers manufactures, distributes, markets, labels and
sells almondmilk beverages purporting to be characterized by
vanilla under the Almond Breeze brand. The Products are available
to consumers nationwide from third-party retailers, including brick
and mortar and online stores and directly from the Defendant's
website.

The Product Lines include Regular, Unsweetened, Reduced Sugar, Hint
of Honey and Added Calcium and are sold in 8, 10, 11, 32, 64, and
96 ounce cartons and bottles across the Product Lines.  The
Products' labeling or advertising makes direct representations with
respect to their primary recognizable and characterizing flavor, by
word, vignette, e.g., depiction of a fruit, or other means, through
the word "Vanilla" on the top of the principal display panel,
parallel with the base of the product.

Vanilla is considered a "high-risk [for food fraud] product because
of the multiple market impact factors such as natural disasters in
the source regions, unstable production, wide variability of
quality and value of vanilla flavorings," second only to saffron in
price.

The Defendant's intent was to secure economic advantage in the
marketplace against competitors by appealing to consumers who value
products with this characterizing ingredient.

The Plaintiff and class members observed and relied on the
Defendant's claims, causing them to pay more than they would have,
entitling them to damages, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
          SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          505 Northern Blvd., Suite 311
          Great Neck, NY 11021
          Telephone: (516) 303-0552
          Facsimile: (516) 234-7800
          E-mail: spencer@spencersheehan.com

               - and -

          Michael R. Reese, Esq.
          REESE LLP
          100 West 93rd Street, 16th Floor
          New York, NY 10025
          Telephone: (212) 643-0500
          Facsimile: (212) 253-4272
          E-mail: mreese@reesellp.com

BOEHRINGER INGELHEIM: Hagens Berman Files Class Action Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Class-action law firm Hagens Berman has filed a second lawsuit
regarding Sanofi and Boehringer Ingelheim's intentionally concealed
cancer risks in its popular heartburn medication, Zantac. Attorneys
are also calling the Food and Drug Administration's consumer-facing
recommendations regarding the instance of a carcinogenic chemical
in Zantac "highly questionable," and are urging those who take
Zantac to consult with their doctors before continuing to take the
medicine.

The complaint also alleges that scientific testing that employs the
FDA's own protocols shows that a single tablet of Zantac may react
to form up to 26,000 times the FDA-approved limit of
N‑nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA), a chemical which the FDA, EPA and
World Health Organization classify as a carcinogen. Although the
FDA has announced that it too found NDMA in Zantac and generic
ranitidine, albeit at lower levels, the FDA has not urged companies
to recall the drug, nor has it recommended that consumers stop
taking Zantac.

According to the firm's complaint, when one 150 mg tablet of Zantac
is ingested, it undergoes a chemical reaction in the stomach to
create more than 3,100 times the FDA-approved limit of NDMA.

"There is no debate about the toxicity of NDMA. The EPA, World
Health Organization, and the FDA itself have labeled it a
carcinogen," said Steve Berman, managing partner of Hagens Berman
and attorney leading the case for consumers. "That the FDA is
recommending that consumers continue to take over-the-counter
Zantac, instead of consulting with their physician, or encouraging
individuals to take one of the many alternative medications over
which there are no safety concerns, is questionable at best."

If you have taken Zantac, you may have been exposed to carcinogens.
Find out your rights »

"Virtually every other regulator across the world investigating
ranitidine has either recalled the drug, or at the very least,
encouraged persons to speak with their physician before taking any
further ranitidine. For example, Canada's FDA-equivalent, Health
Canada, is urging manufacturers to stop the sale of drugs
containing ranitidine," Berman added. "We too urge consumers
consult with their doctors before taking any further ranitidine. We
understand that the FDA has to conduct a proper investigation and
encourage it to do so, but its meek recommendations merely create
confusion and put consumers in danger before the FDA has determined
whether these drugs are in fact safe. That's just wrong."

Sandoz had agreed to recall its ranitidine products worldwide
including in the U.S.

The lawsuit, filed Sept. 20, 2019, in the U.S. District Court for
the District of New Jersey, accuses Sanofi and Boehringer Ingelheim
of knowingly manufacturing and selling over-the-counter Zantac
containing a concealed carcinogen to millions in the U.S. suffering
from heartburn and other gastrointestinal issues, including sour
stomach, acid reflux or gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD).

The FDA has established a permissible daily intake limit of 96ng of
NDMA, but recent testing using FDA-approved methods detected more
than 2,500,000ng of NDMA per 150mg tablet of Zantac. Each Zantac
tablet has been found to contain 26,000 times the FDA-approved
amount of NDMA that can be safely ingested daily.

According to the lawsuit, "Zantac's unprecedented sales were
possible only because of a deception perpetrated by the drug's
manufacturers on consumers…"

The dangers of NDMA have been publicly known for more than 40
years, according to the lawsuit, and the WHO has described NDMA as
"clearly carcinogenic." NDMA itself belongs to a family of
chemicals called N-nitrosamines, which the EPA refers to as "potent
carcinogens." Attorneys say that despite the accumulating
scientific evidence showing Zantac exposed users to extremely high
levels of NDMA, neither Sanofi nor Boehringer disclosed this risk.

If you have concerns about any potential adverse health risks
associated with Zantac (or generic ranitidine consumption), Hagens
Berman recommends that you discuss the allegations in this lawsuit
with your physician.

Find out more about the class-action lawsuit against Sanofi for
cancer-causing compounds in Zantac.

                      About Hagens Berman

Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP is a consumer-rights class-action
law firm with nine offices across the country. The firm's tenacious
drive for plaintiffs' rights has earned it numerous national
accolades, awards and titles of "Most Feared Plaintiff's Firm," and
MVPs and Trailblazers of class-action law. More about the law firm
and its successes can be found at hbsslaw.com. Follow the firm for
updates and news at @ClassActionLaw.

Contact:

         Ashley Klann, Esq.
         Tel: 206-268-9363
         Email: ashleyk@hbsslaw.com [GN]


BRAND ENERGY: Parties File Joint Status Report in McClure Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned MARLIN MCCLURE, an individual, for himself
and those similarly situated, Plaintiff v. BRAND ENERGY SERVICES,
LLC, a Delaware corporation doing business in California; BRAND
ENERGY SERVICES OF CALIFORNIA, LLC, a Delaware corporation doing
business in California; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 6:19-cv-01211 (E.D. Cal., Sept. 16, 2019), the
parties provide the Court with a Joint Status Report Regarding the
Issuance of the Parker Drilling decision by the United States
Supreme Court.

Pursuant to an Order of the Court dated February 21, 2019, staying
the action in light of the United States Supreme Court's
consideration of Newton v. Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd., 881
F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2018), review granted sub. nom. Parker Drilling
Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton, No. 18-389 (U.S. Supreme Court), the
parties provide the Court with their Joint Status Report Regarding
the Issuance of the Parker Drilling decision by the United States
Supreme Court, as well as other procedural matters in the
case.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. Strauss, Esq.
          Aris E. Karakalos, Esq.
          Andrew C. Ellison, Esq.
          STRAUSS & STRAUSS, APC
          121 N. Fir St., Suite F
          Ventura, CA 93001
          Telephone: (805) 641-6600
          Facsimile: (805) 641-6607
          E-mail: mike@strausslawyers.com
                  aris@strausslawyers.com
                  andrew@strausslawyers.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Douglas J. Farmer, Esq.
          OGLETREE DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
          One Market Plaza
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 442-4869
          E-mail: doug.farmer@ogletree.com

BROOKFIELD ASSET: Rosson Sues Over Breach of Fiduciary Duties
-------------------------------------------------------------
MARTIN ROSSON, derivatively on behalf of TERRAFORM POWER, INC., and
individually on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated
stockholders of TERRAFORM POWER, INC., Plaintiff, v. BROOKFIELD
ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC., ORION US HOLDINGS 1 L.P., and BROOKFIELD
BRP HOLDINGS (CANADA) INC., Defendants, and TERRAFORM POWER, INC.,
Nominal Defendant, Case No. 2019-0757- (Chancery Ct., Del., Sept.
19, 2019) is a claim asserted for breach of fiduciary duties
against the Company's controlling stockholder.

In October 2017, Brookfield became TerraForm's controlling
stockholder, owning through its affiliates 51% of the Company's
outstanding Class A common stock. Pursuant to the Company's Amended
and Restated Certificate of Incorporation, Brookfield has the power
to designate four of TerraForm's seven directors, power which it
has used to appoint four members of Brookfield's senior management
to TerraForm's board of directors. Pursuant to an agreement with
TerraForm, Brookfield also appoints the Company's Chief Executive
Officer, Chief Financial Officer, and General Counsel, and all
three positions are also held by employees of Brookfield. On
February 7, 2018, TerraForm announced that it intended to launch a
voluntary tender offer to acquire 100% of the outstanding shares of
Saeta Yield, S.A., a Spanish Company, for a purchase price
estimated at $1.2 billion (the "Tender Offer").

In order to fund the Tender Offer, TerraForm announced that it
expected to commence an equity offering of its common stock to
raise $400 million, either offered pro rata to its existing
stockholders or to the general public, while using its available
liquidity to fund the remaining $800 million. Without any
explanation, this approach was soon abandoned. Instead, on June 11,
2018, TerraForm entered into a private placement with various
affiliates of Brookfield, pursuant to which TerraForm sold to
Brookfield 60,975,609 shares of the Company's common stock for
$10.66 per share, representing total consideration of approximately
$650 million (the "Private Placement"). The $650 million was used
to fund the Tender Offer along with $527 million of the Company's
available liquidity. The terms of the Private Placement were unfair
to the Company and its minority stockholders. As a result of the
Private Placement, Brookfield increased its TerraForm ownership
stake and voting power from 51% to 65.3%. This increase provided
Brookfield with two significant benefits for which Brookfield
should have paid a control premium. First, with a bare majority
ownership stake of just 51%, Brookfield could have lost absolute
control of the Company following even a minor equity issuance by
the Company, and accordingly the substantial increase in ownership
helped cement Brookfield's control.

The Board's Conflicts Committee was responsible for reviewing and
approving transactions between the Company and Brookfield. But
instead of ensuring that Brookfield paid a fair market price and
control premium for the shares issued in the Private Placement, or
proceeding with the planned Tender Offer which would not enrich
Brookfield or increase its control, the Conflicts Committee
approved a transaction that saw Brookfield enjoy a large discount
to the market price for TerraForm's stock.  Because the Conflicts
Committee failed to protect TerraForm and its minority
stockholders, Plaintiff turns to the Court as its last line of
defense to seek a remedy for Brookfield's unfair self-dealing, says
the complaint.

Plaintiff has continuously owned shares of TerraForm Class A common
stock since January 2018.

Brookfield is an Ontario, Canada corporation with its principal
executive offices in Toronto.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Peter B. Andrews, Esq.
     Craig J. Springer, Esq.
     David M. Sborz, Esq.
     ANDREWS & SPRINGER LLC
     3801 Kennett Pike
     Building C, Suite 305
     Wilmington, DE 19807
     Phone: (302) 504-4957

          - and -

     Steven J. Purcell, Esq.
     Douglas E. Julie, Esq.
     Robert H. Lefkowitz, Esq.
     Kaitlyn T. Devenyns, Esq.
     PURCELL JULIE & LEFKOWITZ LLP
     708 Third Avenue, 6th Floor
     New York, NY 10017
     Phone: 212-725-1000
     Facsimile: 212-725-0270


BUCKS COUNTY, PA: Jail Officials Question Inmate Lookup Tool
------------------------------------------------------------
Jo Ciavaglia, writing for The Intelligencer, reports that a top
Bucks County corrections administrator questioned whether personal
inmate information should be posted online before the county
launched a publicly accessible website now at the center of the
largest punitive damage award in Bucks County memory, according to
legal documents in the federal class-action case.

The information contained in court records and trial testimony
appears to contradict the county's defense that its decision-makers
didn't know that releasing the information violated state law.

The new information comes as Bucks County's attorneys attempt to
overturn the nearly $68 million damage award that county officials
described as potentially financially crippling.

So far, the county has spent $2 million in legal costs fighting the
lawsuit filed in December 2012, according to records obtained
through a Right to Know request.

The final award could be reduced to between $46.6 million and $50.8
million based on eligible class members, according to recent court
filings, but that is still more than double the $20 million the
county anticipates it will have in its fund balance at the end of
this year. The county's insurance will not cover the award.

In an e-mail request for comment, county spokesman Larry King
responded that Deputy Director of Corrections Clarke Fulton would
not be giving any interviews related to this or any other county
litigation. King added the county does not discuss legal
strategies.

Fulton, a previous captain of corrections administration, and
former Director of Corrections Harris Gubernick, have been
identified as the employees who authorized the expansion of the
county's online inmate lookup tool in January 2011, according to
court filings.

Gubernick retired in February 2011 and now works as a corrections
consultant. This news organization was unsuccessful in reaching
Gubernick for comment after leaving multiple email and voicemail
messages.

Attorneys representing the county in July filed petitions asking
the court to reconsider the jury award, a precursor to filing an
appeal with the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Among
the requests is for a new trial, citing grounds including that the
jury verdict contradicted the "great weight of evidence," and the
jury instructions on what constitutes "willfulness" were "erroneous
and severely prejudicial."

Bucks County disagreed with the court's interpretation that it
willfully violated the Criminal History Records Information Act,
known as CHRIA, through "reckless disregard or indifference."
Officials have said the online tool was created to give victims a
way to verify the whereabouts of defendants accused of crimes
against them.

The 1980 law bars non-law enforcement agencies, including county
jails, from sharing criminal records with the public. It imposes a
mandatory punitive penalty of $1,000 to $10,000 for each
violation.

The five-day jury trial in May stemmed from a lawsuit filed by
Daryoush Taha, a Sicklerville, New Jersey, man whose personal
information and mug shot appeared on the county's inmate lookup
tool 11 years after his 1998 arrest was expunged. The lawsuit was
given class-action status, allowing thousands of people
incarcerated at the jail between 1938 and 2013 to join. Each
booking record constituted an individual CHRIA violation, the jury
ruled.

The inmate lookup tool still exists, but in 2013, after the lawsuit
was filed, the county removed virtually all personal information
and mugshots.

Conflicting testimony

In trial arguments, county witnesses testified that prior to the
Taha case, there were no legal opinions finding that inmate lookup
tools violated CHRIA; that "sources" who vetted the website content
saw no legal issues; and that other county inmate lookup tools
posted the same or similar content.

Yet trial transcripts and court documents show that Fulton, who was
promoted in 2017, had concerns about posting FBI and State
Identification numbers, unique identifiers assigned to individuals
with a criminal record.

Fulton testified that he knew through his Commonwealth Law
Enforcement Assistance Network (CLEAN) training that FBI and SID
numbers were confidential and could not be publicly released. He
also testified that the county's JNET Terminal Agency Coordinator
manual listed the two numbers as confidential.

A copy of a 2008 meeting minutes for the county Information
Services Department, which Fulton attended and the first version of
the inmate lookup tool was discussed, noted that the Department of
Corrections wanted SID and FBI numbers removed. They were not.

At trial, Fulton testified that his concerns about posting those
inmate numbers were satisfied after he consulted with other law
enforcement sources. But he added that Pennsylvania State Police
told him those inmate numbers might be protected under CHRIA,
according to trial transcripts.

A Jan. 24, 2011, email exchange between Fulton and Gubernick about
the inmate lookup tool also suggests there were lingering
questions, according to a copy of the email obtained by this news
organization.

"The Inmate Look-Up tool publishes the DOB, SID, FBI# and marital
status should these be public records?" Fulton wrote.

Fifteen minutes later, Gubernick replied: "Are they protected? I
don't think so . . . just no SS#."

Two minutes later, Fulton responded, "I remember talking about this
year's (sic) ago. I guess I'm too conservative thinking when I see
these numbers out there . . ."

Gubernick testified during the trial that he had taken the same
specialized training on CHRIA as Fulton, including what criminal
history information could only be shared with other law enforcement
agencies, transcripts show. He testified he had never read the law
or the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office CHRIA handbook.

"If (Gubernick) had read the handbook and reached an erroneous
decision, an honest mistake, we wouldn't be here," Taha lead
attorney Theodore Schaer said in his closing argument, according to
transcripts. "Same thing with Captain Fulton. He read the handbook
in 2003 and hadn't read it again until this lawsuit, when he
expressed his reservations, when he expressed his concerns, when
they both did in their email. That's being indifferent to their
obligations."

The conflicting testimony is among the reasons Bucks County faces
an uphill battle in overturning the damage award, according to one
veteran legal scholar who specializes in class-action lawsuits.

"There is zero chance of the county prevailing at this stage," said
Ken Jacobsen, a professor specializing in class action and mass
tort litigation at Temple University's Beasley School of Law who is
familiar with the Taha class action suit.

Jacobsen said it is unlikely the Third Circuit will reverse the
lower court's interpretation of "willful" actions since nothing in
the law suggests a willful violation requires the intent to cause
harm.

"The county is arguing a standard that appears nowhere in the
statute, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove
‘subjective' misconduct,'" Jacobsen said. "You can probably do
that by inference and circumstantial evidence, but I don't think
that is what the legislature had in mind when it passed CHRIA and
provided a private cause of action for aggrieved plaintiffs."

He added the county's argument that the damage award is excessive
also likely won't hold up in appeal.

"The Third Circuit already has ruled previously in this case that,
contrary to the county's argument, the Pennsylvania legislature saw
fit to allow punitive damages under CHRIA, even in the absence of
any actual injury or compensable harm to the named plaintiff or
other class members, so I think that argument by the county is DOA
on appeal," he said. [GN]



BUNDOX RESTAURANT: Pech Sues Over Unpaid Minimum & Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
LUIS PECH, individually and as a representative of other similarly
situated aggrieved employees, Plaintiff v. THE BUNDOX RESTAURANT
CORPORATION, CHERYL FALCHI AND AL FALCHI and DOES 1 through 100,
Inclusive, Defendants, Case No. CGC-19-579289 (Cal. Super. Ct., San
Francisco Cty., Sept. 17, 2019), alleges that the Defendants
violated various provisions of the California Labor Code, including
failure to:

   -- provide the class members off-duty meal and break periods;

   -- pay overtime for work worked over eight hours in a day or
      40-hours in a week;

   -- furnish timely and accurate wage statements;

   -- pay earned wages upon discharge and failing to pay all
      wages due twice during each calendar month;

   -- keep accurate time records; and

   -- pay minimum wage because the class members who are being
      paid a minimum wage are not being paid overtime wages,
      and/or are not being provided uninterrupted meal and rest
      periods.

The Defendants had a consistent policy of: (1) willfully failing to
authorize and permit class members, including the Plaintiff, to
take a 10-minute rest break for every four hours worked or greater
fraction thereof; (2) permitting, encouraging, and/or requiring
class members, including the Plaintiff, to work an excess of five
hours per day without providing, authorizing, or permitting an
off-duty meal break of at least one half hour and/or to work in
excess of ten hours per day without authorizing or permitting a
second off-duty meal beak of at least one half hour; (3) knowingly
and intentionally failing to furnish accurate itemized wage
statements showing total hours worked by the Plaintiff and Class
Members; (4) not paying overtime wages for work over 40-hours in
week; (5) not retaining the hours of time worked over three years;
and (5), not paying the applicable minimum wage, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff Luis Pech was employed by the Defendants from August 2016
through November 2018 as a restaurant worker at the Waterfront
Restaurant located at 7 Embarcadero in San Francisco.

The Bundox Restaurant Corporation owns and operates the Waterfront
Restaurant located at 7 The Embarcadero in San Francisco.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel R. Weltin, Esq.
          Mia Mattis, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF DANIEL WELTIN, P.C.
          777 Davis Street, Suite 146
          San Leandro, CA 94577
          Telephone: 510-856-4421
          Facsimile: 510-856-3624
          E-mail: daniel@danielweltin.com
                  mia@danielweltin.com




C & L INSPECTION: Zwiefel Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------------------
TROY ZWIEFEL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. C & L INSPECTION, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-05193-JJT (D. Ariz., Sept. 17, 2019), is brought to recover
unpaid overtime wages and other damages from C&L under the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

Troy Zwiefel and the other employees like him regularly worked for
C&L in excess of 40 hours each week. But C&L never paid these
employees overtime for the hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a
single workweek, according to the complaint.  Instead of paying
overtime as required by the FLSA, C&L paid these employees a day
rate with no overtime compensation.

Plaintiff Zwiefel worked as a Welding Inspector for C&L as a W-2
employee from February 2018 until August 2018.


C&L operates in the Pipeline & Utilities Inspection Industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Andrew Dunlap, Esq.
          Taylor A. Jones, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: 713-352-1100
          Facsimile: 713-352-3300
          E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  adunlap@mybackwages.com
                  tjones@mybackwages.com

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 877-8788
          Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com


CABLEVISION SYSTEMS: Settlement in Consumer Suit Has Final Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge A. Kathleen Tomlinson of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of New York has entered Final Approval
Order and Judgment in the case, In re Cablevision Consumer
Litigation. This Document Relates to: All Actions, Master File No.
CV 10-4992 (JS) (AKT) (E.D. N.Y.)

The Court, after notice to the Settlement Class, held a hearing on
May 17, 2018.  Having heard all persons properly appearing and
requesting to be heard, having considered the papers submitted in
support of the Class Action Settlement Agreement dated June 27,
2018, and the oral presentations of the counsel, having considered
the applicable law, and having considered any objections properly
made to the proposed settlement, the Court granted the Settlement
at the conclusion of the Fairness Hearing on May 17, 2018.
However, it reserved decision on the Class Counsels' Motion for
Approval of Attorneys' Fees, Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses,
and Service Payment to Class Representatives.  That Motion was
granted in the Memorandum and Order issued by the Court on Aug. 19,
2019.  

The Final Approval Order adopts and incorporates both the May 17,
2018 decision issued at the conclusion of the Fairness Hearing
granting approval of the Settlement Agreement, as well as the Aug.
19, 2019 Memorandum and Order granting approval of the motion for
attorneys' fees, expenses and service payments, the terms defined
therein, and all exhibits thereto.  

Magistrate Judge Tomlinson further finds that there is no just
reason for delay of the entry of the Final Approval Order and
Judgment.  She gave final approval to the settlement, including the
award of attorneys' fees, as fair, reasonable, and adequate as to
all Parties, and consistent and in compliance with all requirements
of federal law as to, and in the best interests of, all the Parties
and the members of the Settlement Class, and directs the Parties
and their counsel to implement and consummate the Agreement in
accordance with its terms and provisions.

The Magistrate finds that final certification of the Settlement
Class (including its Sub-Classes) is appropriate and that the
Settlement Class Counsel and the Plaintiffs adequately represented
the Settlement Class (including its Sub-Classes) for the purpose of
entering into and implementing the settlement.

She dismissed the Action (including all individual and class claims
presented thereby, or that could have been presented thereby) on
the merits, and with prejudice and without fees or costs, except as
provided in the Final Approval Order and Judgment.

The Magistrate approved the payment of attorneys' fees to the
Settlement Class Counsel in the amount of $4.75 million, plus an
award of $264,479.64 in costs and expenses, for a total Attorneys'
Fee Award of $5,014,479.64.  The Attorneys' Fee Award will be paid
to Ralph M. Stone of Stone Bonner & Rocco, LLP as designee of the
Settlement Class Counsel in accordance with the terms of the
Agreement.

The award of attorneys' fees will be allocated by Settlement Class
Counsel in their discretion, among other Plaintiffs' counsel for
their respective contributions in the prosecution of the
litigation.  The Attorneys' Fee Award will be paid no later than
the later of: (i) 45 days after the date of the entry of the Final
Approval Order and Judgment; (ii) 45 days after the resolution of
any motion enumerated in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
4(a)(4)(A); or (iii) 30 days after the full and final resolution of
any appeal of the Final Approval Order and Judgment, provided the
Final Approval Order and Judgment has not been reversed or modified
in any material respect as a result of any such motion or appeal.

The Settlement Class Counsel are authorized to and will pay out of
the Attorneys' Fee Award a service award of $1,500 each to the
following Plaintiffs: Sean Ahearn, John Azzarello, Eric Bohm, John
Brett, Angelo Brucchieri, William G. Canfield, Ralph Dudley, Arthur
Finkel, Salvatore A. Gandolfo, Tina Green, Andrew Koplik, David
Menoni, Theodore Pearlman, Vincent Pezzuti, Dorothy Rabsey, Martin
J. Siegel, Stanley J. Somer and Marc Tell.

The Magistrate approved the Opt-Out List (Exhibit A), and
determines that the Opt-Out List is a complete list of Settlement
Class members who have timely requested exclusion from the
Settlement Class and, accordingly, will neither share in or be
bound by the Final Approval Order and Judgment or Agreement.

The Parties are authorized to agree to and adopt such an amendments
to, and modifications and expansions of, the Agreement and all
exhibits and amendments thereto as: (i) are consistent in all
material respects with this Final Approval Order and Judgment; and
(ii) do not limit the rights of the Settlement Class members.

The Magistrate finds that there is no just reason to delay the
entry of the Judgment as a final judgment in the action.
Accordingly, she directed the Clerk of the Court to enter the Final
Judgment in the Action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 21, 2019 Final Approval Order
and Judgment is available at https://is.gd/jQgZq7 from Leagle.com.

Theodore Pearlman, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Carol S. Shahmoon --
cshahmoon@shahmoonkeller.com -- CSS Legal Group PLLC, Joseph
Gentile -- joseph@sarrafgentile.com -- Sarraf Gentile LLP, Justin
M. Klein -- justin@marksklein.com -- Marks & Klein LLP, Lee S.
Shalov, Shalov Stone Bonner & Rocco LLP, Ralph M. Stone, Stone Law
Group PLLC, Ronen Sarraf -- ronen@sarrafgentile.com -- Sarraf
Gentile LLP & Todd J. Krouner, Law Offices of Todd J. Krouner,
P.C.

Marc Tell, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph Gentile, Sarraf Gentile
LLP, Justin M. Klein, Marks & Klein LLP, Lee S. Shalov, Shalov
Stone Bonner & Rocco LLP, Ralph M. Stone, Stone Law Group PLLC,
Ronen Sarraf, Sarraf Gentile LLP & Todd J. Krouner, Law Offices of
Todd J. Krouner, P.C.

Julia Gallo, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & Dorothy Rabsey, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Todd J. Krouner, Law
Offices of Todd J. Krouner, P.C., Joseph Gentile, Sarraf Gentile
LLP, Justin M. Klein, Marks & Klein LLP, Lee S. Shalov, Shalov
Stone Bonner & Rocco LLP, Ralph M. Stone, Stone Law Group PLLC,
Ronen Sarraf, Sarraf Gentile LLP & Scott Jaller Koplik, Law Office
of Todd J. Krouner.

John Azzarella, Plaintiff, represented by Todd J. Krouner, Law
Offices of Todd J. Krouner, P.C. & Ralph M. Stone, Stone Law Group
PLLC.

Todd Krouner, Plaintiff, pro se.

Ralph Dudley, Plaintiff, pro se.

Cablevision Systems Corporation, Defendant, represented by Robert
A. Vort -- rvort@pearcelaw1.com -- Court Plaza North, Thomas H.
Golden, Wilkie Farr & Gallagher, Andrew M. Genser, Kirkland &
Ellis, Dmitriy Tishyevich -- dmitriy.tishyevich@kirkland.com --
Kirkland & Ellis LLP, pro hac vice & Jonathan F. Putnam --
jonathan.putnam@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis LLP.

CSC Holdings, LLC, Consol Defendant, represented by Thomas H.
Golden, Wilkie Farr & Gallagher, Andrew M. Genser, Kirkland &
Ellis, Dmitriy Tishyevich, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, pro hac vice &
Jonathan F. Putnam, Kirkland & Ellis LLP.

Brian T. Foley & Edward W. Wynne, Objectors, represented by Thomas
Arthur Dickerson, Thomas A. Dickerson.

Arnold H. Belgraier, Objector, represented by Donovan Bezer, Law
Office of Donovan Bezer & Thomas Arthur Dickerson, Thomas A.
Dickerson.

Simon Bezer & Christine Bezer, Objectors, represented by Donovan
Bezer, Law Office of Donovan Bezer.


CALIFORNIA CRYOBANK: Vidiksis et al Sue over Donor Sperm Storage
----------------------------------------------------------------
RENEE VIDIKSIS AND MEGAN VIDIKSIS, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF A
CLASS OF SIMILARLY SITUATED INDIVIDUALS, the Plaintiffs, vs.
CALIFORNIA CRYOBANK LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-07968
(C.D. Cal., Sept., 13, 2019), seeks to recover monies Plaintiffs
paid to MCB to purchase donor sperm and to store the donor sperm.
The Plaintiffs also seek to recover monetary damages for the lost
opportunity to conceive a blood sibling due to California Cryobank,
Inc.'s interference.

People who purchase donor sperm often purchase multiple vials to
ensure that if they are able to conceive a child and carry it to
term, they will have the opportunity to conceive a second (or
third) child who is biologically related. This is known as a
blood sibling. California Cryobank sells the idea of this dream.
But, as to Plaintiffs and the putative class, California Cryobank
has interfered with many of those dreams becoming a reality, the
lawsuit says.

The Plaintiffs purchased additional vials of sperm after the birth
of their child because they wanted to later conceive a second
child, and it was extremely important to them that their children
be genetically related.  On May 30, 2019, Plaintiffs notified MCB
of their intent to continue the MCB Storage Agreement and paid a
full year of storage fees through 2020.   That same day, the
Plaintiffs inquired of MCB as to the procedure to have one of their
vials shipped to their fertility clinic the following week.

On June 6, 2019, the Donor Program Director of California Cryobank
-- not MCB -- responded and advised Plaintiffs that California
Cryobank would not release the vials in Plaintiffs' MCB storage
account.

To date, Plaintiffs are unable to access the four vials of MCB
Donor 265 sperm that they contracted with MCB to store at MCB, not
California Cryobank.

The Plaintiffs did not authorize or instruct MCB to transfer any of
their specimens to California Cryobank. The Plaintiffs did not also
authorize California Cryobank to take possession, custody or
control of their vials of donor sperm in storage at MCB.

MCB did not terminate the MCB Storage Agreement with Plaintiffs and
the other members of the putative class, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Kristy M. Arevalo, Esq.
          MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO, LLP
          3281 East Guasti Road, Suite 100
          Ontario, CA 91761
          Telephone: (909) 557-1250
          Facsimile: (909) 557-1275

               - and -

          R. Dean Gresham, Esq.
          L. Kirstine Rogers, Esq.
          12720 Hillcrest Rd., Suite 1045
          Dallas, TX 75230
          Telephone: (972) 387-4040
          Facsimile: (972) 387-4041
          E-mail: dean@stecklerlaw.com
                  krogers@stecklerlaw.com

CANADA: Submissions Continue in Class-Action Against Military
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Chronicle Herald reports that submissions continued to be heard
September 20 on the second day of a two-day hearing to approve a
proposed $900 million settlement of a military sexual misconduct
class action.

The hearing is taking place at the Federal Court in Ottawa.

Halifax law firm Wagners filed a national class action in November
2016 on behalf of representative plaintiff Glynis Rogers, a former
member of the Canadian Armed Forces.

Rogers alleged she experienced systemic sexual misconduct and
sexual assault during her time in the military.

Rogers was at the hearing September 20 with lawyers from Wagners,
four other firms from across Canada forming the class counsel
consortium, and other representative plaintiffs.

The Federal Court justice hearing the submissions intends to
reserve his decision on whether he approves the proposed settlement
as being fair and reasonable and in the best interest of the class,
Wagners said in a release.

The proposed settlement applies to current and former members of
the Canadian Armed Forces, current and former employees of
Department of National Defence, and staff of the Non-Public Funds,
Canadian Forces who have experienced sexual misconduct.

The proposed settlement will provide compensation to eligible class
members for sexual harassment, sexual assault, and discrimination
on the basis of sex, gender, gender identity or sexual
orientation.

If approved, the award of $900 million will be distributed to
eligible class members. The range of compensation is estimated to
be between $5,000 and a maximum of about $178,000, depending on the
number of claims that come forward and individual circumstances of
class members.

The $900 million does not include the cost of legal fees and the
costs of administering the settlement, which is estimated to take
place over approximately two years to give class members time to
prepare their claims and avail themselves of the supports being
offered. The judge is also being asked to approve payment of legal
fees.

In addition to compensation, there are several non-monetary
measures being implemented if the settlement is approved.

These include changes to Veterans Affairs Canada's policies on
assessing claims arising from sexual misconduct, including
eliminating the need for corroborative evidence. Also, a new policy
would mean that no claim for disability will be rejected purely on
the basis that the event in question occurred off Forces property
or where attendance by the class member was optional.

There would also be changes to the definition of sexual harassment
and increased support to survivors of sexual misconduct.

"Attending the settlement approval hearing was a bit surreal. I am
glad class members had the opportunity to speak and tell their
stories ...," Rogers said in the release. "I hope this will provide
closure for many people. I recognize that transforming the culture
in an organization as large as the CAF will take time, but I am
optimistic the restorative engagement programs established by this
settlement will stimulate this change."

Ray Wagner, Esq. -- classaction@wagners.co -- of Wagners said in
the release that he admires "the courage of Glynis Rogers in coming
forward to publicly tell her story for the sake of advancing
institutional change for others. This courage has helped contribute
to a settlement that achieves more than any legal victory in a
courtroom ever could." [GN]


CARBONITE INC: Kirby McInerney Files Class Action Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Kirby McInerney LLP reminds investors that a class
action lawsuit has been filed in the U.S. District Court of
Massachusetts on behalf of those who acquired Carbonite, Inc.
(NASDAQ: CARB) securities during the period from February 7, 2019
to July 25, 2019 (the "Class Period"). Investors have until
September 30, 2019 to apply to the Court to be appointed as lead
plaintiff in the lawsuit.

The lawsuit alleges that the Company failed to disclose that: (i)
Carbonite's Server Backup VM Edition was of poor quality and
technologically flawed; (ii) Carbonite was receiving poor reviews
and complaints from customers about the Server Backup VM Edition;
and (iii) the poor quality and technological flaws of the Server
Backup VM Edition were acting as a "disruptive" factor throughout
the Carbonite salesforce and keeping that sales organization from
closing opportunistically on several larger deals during fiscal
2019.

On July 25, 2019, after the market closed, the Company reported
revenue of $121.5 million for second quarter 2019 due to
"challenges in parts of [its] data protection business." Moreover,
the Company reduced its full year revenue guidance from a range of
$457 to $471 million, to a range of $443.5 to $448.5 million. The
Company's Chief Executive Officer, Mohamad Ali, resigned. On this
news, shares of Carbonite fell $5.89, or 24.6%, to close at $18.01
on July 26, 2019.

If you acquired Carbonite securities, have information, or would
like to learn more about these claims, please contact Thomas W.
Elrod of Kirby McInerney LLP at 212-371-6600, by email at
investigations@kmllp.com, or by filling out this contact form, to
discuss your rights or interests with respect to these matters
without any cost to you.

Kirby McInerney LLP is a New York-based plaintiffs' law firm
concentrating in securities, antitrust, and whistleblower
litigation.  The firm's efforts on behalf of shareholders in
securities litigation have resulted in recoveries totaling billions
of dollars. Additional information about the firm can be found at
Kirby McInerney LLP's website: www.kmllp.com.
[GN]


CAVALIA (USA) INC: Fails to Properly Pay Workers, Eaton Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Kimberly Eaton, individually, and on behalf of others similarly
situated and aggrieved, Plaintiff, v. CAVALIA (USA) INC., a Vermont
Corporation; CAVALIA COMMUNICATIONS, INC., a California
Corporation; NORMAND LATOURELLE, a natural individual; and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. CGC-19-579421 (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Francisco Cty., Sept. 20, 2019) is a class and
representative action case brought by Plaintiff on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated and aggrieved current and
former non-exepmt employees against Defendants to remedy
Defendants' illegal wage payment and employment policies and
practices during the relevant statutory period, for which Plaintiff
seeks damages, restitution, penalties, injunctive relief, interest,
attorneys' fees and costs, and all other legal and equitable
remedies deemed just and proper under California Law.

The Defendants acted their policies and practices of not paying
Plaintiff and Class Members all wages earned and due, through
methods and schemes which include, but are not limited to, failing
to pay all wages; failing to provide rest and meal periods or
premium wage payments in lieu thereof; failing to properly maintain
records, failing to provide accurate itemized statements for each
pay periods; failing to properly reimburse Plaintiff and Class
Members for necessary expenditures; and failing to timely pay all
wages earned and due at the time of discharge or quitting, in
violation of the California Labor Code and applicable California
Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendants around 2016 to early 2017 in
Southern California.

Cavalia (USA) Inc. is a corporation formed and existing under the
laws of the State of Vermont.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Taras Kick, Esq.
     Roy K. Suh, Esq.
     Daniel J. Bass, Esq.
     THE KICK LAW FIRM, APC
     815 Moraga Drive
     Los Angeles, CA 90049
     Phone: (310) 395-2988
     Facsimile: (310) 395-2088
     Email: taras@kicklawfirm.com
            roy@kicklawfirm.com
            daniel@kicklawfirm.com



CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Nakai Seeks Redress From TCPA Violation
---------------------------------------------------------------
RICHARD NAKAI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., d/b/a
SPECTRUM, a Delaware corporation, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-08035
(C.D. Cal., Sept. 17, 2019), is a class action complaint seeking
to:

   (1) stop the Defendant's practice of placing calls using an
       "automatic telephone dialing system" ("ATDS") and/or using
       "an artificial or prerecorded voice" to the telephones of
       consumers nationwide without their prior express consent;
       and

   (2) obtain redress for all persons injured by Defendant's
       conduct under The Telephone Consumer Protection Act
       ("TCPA") and its implementing regulations.

In an effort to obtain leads for its services, Spectrum made (or
directed to be made on its behalf) autodialed and/or prerecorded
calls to the telephones of the Plaintiff and other members of the
putative class without first obtaining express consent to do so,
all in violation of the TCPA. The TCPA was enacted to protect
consumers from unauthorized calls exactly like those alleged in
this Complaint--autodialed and/or prerecorded calls placed to
cellphone numbers without each consumer's prior express written
consent.

By making the telephone calls at issue in this Complaint, the
Defendant caused the Plaintiff and the members of the Class actual
harm and cognizable legal injury, the Plaintiff alleges. This
includes the aggravation and nuisance and invasions of privacy that
result from the receipt of such calls, in addition to a loss of
value realized for the monies consumers paid to their wireless
carriers for the receipt of such calls. Furthermore, the calls
interfered with the Plaintiff's and the other Class members' use
and enjoyment of their cellphones, including the related data,
software, and hardware components, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Nakai is a natural person and a citizen of the State of
California.

Charter Communications Inc. d/b/a Spectrum is a corporation
organized in and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware,
with 10th its principal place of business located at 400 Atlantic
Street, in Stamford, Connecticut.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Aaron D. Aftergood, Esq.
          THE AFTERGOOD LAW FIRM
          1880 Century Park East, Suite 200
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 550-5221
          Facsimile: (310) 496-2840
          E-mail: aaron@aftergoodesq.com

               - and -

          Steven L. Woodrow, Esq.
          WOODROW & PELUSO, LLC
          3900 East Mexico Avenue, Suite 300
          Denver, CO 80210
          Telephone: (720) 213-0675
          Facsimile: (303) 927-0809
          E-mail: swoodrow@woodrowpeluso.com


CHECKERS DRIVE-IN: To Pay $3 Million to Settle Spam Texting Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reports that Checkers Drive-In Restaurants
will pay more than $3 million, which includes $1 million in
attorney’s fees, to settle a federal class action accusing it of
sending spam text messages.


CHICAGO BRIDGE: Gotham Securities Suit's Section 18 Claim Dismissed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, GOTHAM DIVERSIFIED NEUTRAL MASTER FUND, LP, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. CHICAGO BRIDGE & IRON COMPANY N.V., et al.,
Defendants.; and APPALOOSA INVESTMENT L.P.I., et al., Plaintiffs,
v. CHICAGO BRIDGE & IRON COMPANY N.V., et al., Defendants, Case
Nos. 18 Civ. 9927 (LGS), 18 Civ. 9928 (LGS) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge
Lorna G. Schofield of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York denied in part and granted in part the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the Section 18 and common law fraud
claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Plaintiffs Gotham and Appaloosa Investment L.P.I., et al., brought
the action against Defendants Chicago Bridge & Iron ("CBI"), Philip
K. Asherman, Ronald A. Ballschmiede and Westley S. Stockton,
alleging violations of Sections 18, 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and common law fraud.

Defendant CBI is a global engineering, procurement and construction
company headquartered in the Hague, Netherlands.  At all relevant
times, Defendant Asherman was CBI's CEO, Defendant Ballschmiede was
CBI's CFO and Executive VP and Defendant Stockton was its Chief
Accounting Officer.  The Plaintiffs are investment funds that
purchased CBI common stock prior to Jan. 29, 2015.

In July 2012, CBI agreed to purchase the Shaw Group for
approximately $3.3 billion, funded in part with $1.9 billion in
debt financing.  The sale closed in February 2013.  Shaw's
subsidiary, Stone & Webster, had contracts to build and fabricate
the nuclear power plants in Georgia ("Vogtle Plant") and South
Carolina ("V.C. Summer Plant").  These contracts ("EPC Agreements")
provided that Stone & Webster would receive a fixed price for its
services.  Stone & Webster was entitled to a change order,
resulting in additional compensation, above the contract price,
only in specified circumstances.

Shaw was incapable of meeting the demands of nuclear construction
because its main fabrication facility at Lake Charles, Louisiana,
experienced numerous stop work orders.  Because of problems at the
Lake Charles facility, CBI could not track and ship construction
materials properly, leading to cost increases and delays at the
Nuclear Projects. Under the fixed-price EPC Agreements, CBI bore
the risk of delays and other construction problems.

CBI allegedly made material misstatements and omissions about the
Nuclear Projects' repeated delays, cost overruns, resulting
deterioration in profitability and GAAP compliance in its public
filings with the SEC, including its 2013 Third Quarter Report, 2013
Annual Report, 2014 First Quarter Report, 2014 Second Quarter
Report, and 2014 Third Quarter Report and related press releases
and earnings calls. Plaintiffs' investment team read, reviewed and
relied on these filings and continued to purchase CBI common stock
through January 29, 2015.

On Oct. 27, 2015, CBI announced it would take a $1 billion loss on
the sale of its Stone & Webster unit to Westinghouse in exchange
for a release of liabilities for delays plaguing the Nuclear
Projects.  On April 28, 2016, Westinghouse delivered its
post-closing accounting true-up to CBI and claimed that CBI owed
Westinghouse $2.1 billion in disputed liabilities, noting that
CBI's accounting for liability it faced for the Nuclear Projects
"was not recorded in accordance with GAAP" and that CBI "should
have recorded a reverse liability of hundreds of millions of
dollars for losses."

On July 21, 2016, in response to Westinghouse's demand for $2.1
billion, CBI filed a complaint in the Delaware Chancery Court
barring Westinghouse from making a claim for the $2.1 billion.  In
the lawsuit, CBI admitted that, as early as February 2015, CBI had
begun negotiating a "quitclaim deal" that would relieve it from the
liabilities associated with the Nuclear Projects.  In June 2017,
the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the Court of Chancery and
concluded that Westinghouse had waived its claim against CBI under
the sale agreement.  On March 31, 2017, Westinghouse filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy as a result of the Nuclear Projects'
liabilities.

On March 2, 2017, purchasers of CBI stock commenced a putative
class action against the Defendants, alleging violations of
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act.  The Defendants moved
to dismiss, and on May 24, 2019, the Court denied the Defendants'
motion.

The Defendants move to dismiss the Section 18 and common law fraud
claims.

Judge Schofield holds that the Section 18 claim is untimely.  The
Complaint alleges that the Section 18 claim is not time-barred
because the timely filing of the putative class action against the
Defendants on March 2, 2017, tolled the two-year statute of
limitations applicable to those claims.  Also, the Complaint
alleges a claim under Section 18(a), but the class action asserts
only violations of Section 10(b) and Section 20(a).  Because the
legal standards for proving a Section 18 violation differ
significantly from those for proving a Section 10(b) violation, a
10(b) class action does not necessarily put the Defendants on
notice of a Section 18 claim.  Accordingly, the class action
tolling does not apply, and the Section 18 claim is dismissed.

The Complaint states a claim for common law fraud.  The Second
Circuit has not yet determined whether Rule 9(b)'s heightened
pleading requirement applies to allegations of reliance in
connection with a common law fraud claim.  Courts in the District
have held that a plaintiff asserting such a claim must allege with
particularity that it actually relied upon the defendant's supposed
misstatements.

The Judge holds that the Complaint satisfies this reliance
requirement.  The Complaint identifies "specific transactions"--
the Plaintiff's investments in CBI common stock -- as well as
specific reports and statements on which they allegedly relied in
entering into those transactions.  It makes separate factual
allegations in support of the Plaintiffs' actual reliance, alleges
reliance on multiple public filings and statements and alleges the
purchase of securities from April 24, 2014 to Jan. 29, 2015, in
reliance on those misstatements.  Accordingly the motion to dismiss
is denied as to the common law fraud claim.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Schofield granted the Defendants'
partial motion to dismiss as to the Section 18 claim, and denied as
to the common law fraud claim.  

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/47YRa1 from Leagle.com.

Gotham Diversified Neutral Master Fund, LP, Gotham Enhanced Long
Master Fund, LP, Gotham Customized Strategies II, LP, Gotham
Targeted Neutral Master Fund, LP, Gotham Penguin Fund, LP, Gotham
Absolute Return Fund, a series of Fundvantage Trust, Gotham
Enhanced Return Fund, a series of Fundvantage Trust, Gotham Neutral
Fund, a series of Fundvantage Trust, Gotham Hedged Value Strategies
115/65 (Master), L.P. & Gotham Hedged Value Strategies 140/40
(Master), L.P., Plaintiffs, represented by Brandon Michael Fierro
-- bfierro@lowenstein.com -- Lowenstein Sandler LLP, Jennifer Ann
Randolph -- jrandolph@lowenstein.com -- Lowenstein Sandler LLP,
Richard A. Bodnar -- rbodnar@lowenstein.com -- Lowenstein Sandler
LLP, Thomas E. Redburn, Jr. -- tredburn@lowenstein.com --
Lowenstein Sandler LLP & Lawrence M. Rolnick --
lrolnick@lowenstein.com -- Lowenstein Sandler LLP.

Chicago Bridge & Iron Company N.V., Philip K. Asherman & Westley S.
Stockton, Defendants, represented by Amy P. Hefley --
amy.hefley@bakerbotts.com -- Baker Botts LLP, Brian C. Kerr --
brian.kerr@bakerbotts.com -- Baker Botts L.L.P., David D. Sterling
-- david.sterling@bakerbotts.com -- Baker Botts, L.L.P., Rebeca
Aizpuru Huddle -- rebeca.huddle@bakerbotts.com -- Baker Botts LLP &
Sarah Coble -- sarah.coble@bakerbotts.com -- Baker Botts LLP.

Ronald A. Ballschmiede, Defendant, represented by James Russell
Leahy, Greenberg Traurig, Robert Allen Horowitz, Greenberg Traurig,
LLP, David D. Sterling, Baker Botts, L.L.P. & Nicole Shirley
Bakare, Greenberg Traurig.


COMPASS GROUP: Bryant Wants to Stop Illegal Use of Biometric Data
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Christine Bryant, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Compass Group USA, Inc.,
Defendant, Case 2019CH09818 (Ill. Cir., August 23, 2019), seeks an
injunction requiring the Defendants to cease all unlawful activity
under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act related to the
capture, collection, storage and use of biometrics.

Compass is a food service company that sells snacks, meals, and
beverages through vending machines. The Company currently has
vending machines in the company cafeteria where the Plaintiff
works.

The Plaintiff says she regularly purchased items from the vending
machines by scanning her fingerprint in the vending machines and
also scanned her fingerprint whenever she added money to a card
provided by Compass to fund her purchases.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas M. Werman, Esq.
          Maureen A. Salas, Esq.
          Sarah J. Arendt, Esq.
          Zachary C. Flowerree, Esq.
          WERMAN SALAS P.C.
          77 West Washington, Suite 1402
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 419-1008
          E-mail: dwerman@flsalaw.com
                  msalas@flsalaw.com
                  zflowerree@flsalaw.com
                  sarendt@flsalaw.com


CONTINENTAL RESTAURANTS: Harris Sues Over Unpaid Compensation
-------------------------------------------------------------
JESSICA HARRIS on behalf herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. CONTINENTAL RESTAURANTS, INC; CONTINENTAL FOODS,
INC.; PRICELESS FOODS, INC.; LUBNA FOODS, INC.; TIMELESS STAFFING
SERVICES, LLC; and DENTEX RESTAURANTS, LLC, Defendants, Case No.
4:19-cv-00685 (E.D. Tex., Sept. 21, 2019) is a Complaint filed
against Defendants for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

As part of the payment scheme Defendants used to compensate
Plaintiff and Collective Members, Defendants paid Plaintiff and
Collective Members a subminimum hourly wage, ostensibly attempting
to rely on a tip credit as a defense to the payment of the full
minimum wage. The use of the tip credit results in huge savings to
Defendants because Defendants only compensate Plaintiff and
Collective Members at a significantly reduced hourly wage of $2.13,
with the balance of their wages coming from customers in the form
of tips. The Defendants then purported to rely on the tips
Plaintiff earned by applying a tip credit of at least $5.12 per
hour to bring Plaintiff's effective rate of pay, with tips
included, up to the required minimum wage of $7.25.

However, Plaintiff and the Collective Members have been victimized
by Defendants' payment scheme that violates the FLSA and prevents
Defendants from utilizing the tip credit as an affirmative defense
to the payment of the full minimum wage. The Defendants' illegal
practices in violation of the FLSA have resulted in a forfeiture of
the "tip credit." Consequently, Defendants is liable to Plaintiff
and Collective Members for the full minimum wage for every hour
worked during the statutory time period plus all other statutory
damages provided for under the FLSA, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendants to work as a server at three
of Defendants' Denny's restaurants located in Texas from
approximately January of 2015 until August 22, 2019.

Defendants, collectively known as The Kaizen Group, operate a chain
of Denny's restaurants with several locations across Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Drew N. Herrmann, Esq.
     HERRMANN LAW, PLLC
     801 Cherry St., Suite 2365
     Fort Worth, TX 76102
     Phone: 817-479-9229
     Fax: 817-887-1878
     Email: drew@herrmannlaw.com
            pamela@herrmannlaw.com


COPART, INC: Cohen Sues over Fraudulent Vehicle Ads
---------------------------------------------------
Arik Cohen, On behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
the Plaintiff, vs. COPART, INC.; and Does 1 through 100, inclusive,
the Defendants, Case No. 19STCV32207 (Cal. Super., Sept. 11, 2019),
alleges that Defendant engages in an unlawful scheme whereby it
intentionally misleads consumers into making bids on and purchases
of the vehicles and automobiles by knowingly and fraudulently
misrepresenting the condition of the automobiles through its
advertising, in violation of California Business & Professions
Code, and the Consumer Legal Remedies Act.

The Defendant's conduct has injured thousands of consumers, both in
California and nationwide, and violates California’s consumer
protection laws. Accordingly, the Plaintiff individually and on
behalf of a Class of similarly situated consumers seeks injunctive
relief, restitution and monetary damages.

The Defendant is one of, if not the largest automotive auction
house in the United States.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Mitch Kalcheim, Esq.
          LEGAL GP
          725 South Figueroa Street, Suite 1750
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 955-7142
          Facsimile: (213) 955-7146

DALLAS COUNTY, TX: Dismissal of Denmark Prisoners Suit Recommended
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CLINTRELL DENMARK, Plaintiff, v. DALLAS COUNTY JAIL
FACILITY, Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-01514-C (BT) (N.D. Tex.),
Magistrate Judge Rebecca Rutherford of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, recommended that
the Court should dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint without
prejudice for want of prosecution under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

Before the Court is the Plaintiff's pro se civil rights case.  The
Plaintiff, an inmate in the Dallas County jail, and others filed a
putative class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging
the Dallas County jail is violating their rights by segregating
inmates into housing units based on race.

The Court determined that the Plaintiff and the other inmates
should not be allowed to proceed as a class and ordered that the
case be severed into individual actions to allow each inmate to
represent himself.  She further ordered each individual Plaintiff
to pay a filing fee of $400 or file a motion to proceed in forma
pauperis.  The Plaintiff did not pay the filing fee; nor did he
file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.

On June 25, 2019, the Court sent the Plaintiff a notice of
deficiency reminding him to pay the filing fee or a file motion to
proceed in forma pauperis.  It informed him that failure to cure
the deficiency within 30 days would result in a recommendation that
his complaint be dismissed.  More than 30 days have passed, and the
Plaintiff still has not paid the filing fee or filed a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis.

Magistrate Judge Rutherford holds that Rule 41(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to dismiss an action sua
sponte for failure to prosecute or for failure to comply with the
federal rules or any court order.  The Court has issued a
deficiency notice to the Plaintiff advising him that he must pay
the filing fee or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
However, he has failed to respond to the Court's order.  The
litigation cannot proceed until the Plaintiff complies with the
Court's order and either pays the filing fee or files a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis.  Accordingly, the complaint should be
dismissed for want of prosecution under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

A copy of the Report and Recommendation will be served on all
parties in the manner provided by law.  Any party who objects to
any part of the report and recommendation must file specific
written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 21, 2019 Findings,
Conclusions, & Recommendation is available at https://is.gd/IIpExI
from Leagle.com.

Clintrell Denmark, Plaintiff, pro se.


DALLAS COUNTY, TX: Dismissal of Jackson Prisoners Suit Recommended
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CAMERON JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. DALLAS COUNTY JAIL
FACILITY, Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-01504-C (BT) (N.D. Tex.),
Magistrate Judge Rebecca Rutherford of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, recommended that
the Court should dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint without
prejudice for want of prosecution under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

Before the Court is the Plaintiff's pro se civil rights case.  The
Plaintiff, an inmate in the Dallas County jail, and others filed a
putative class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging
the Dallas County jail is violating their rights by segregating
inmates into housing units based on race.

The Court determined that the Plaintiff and the other inmates
should not be allowed to proceed as a class and ordered that the
case be severed into individual actions to allow each inmate to
represent himself.  She further ordered each individual Plaintiff
to pay a filing fee of $400 or file a motion to proceed in forma
pauperis.  The Plaintiff did not pay the filing fee; nor did he
file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.

On June 25, 2019, the Court sent the Plaintiff a notice of
deficiency reminding him to pay the filing fee or a file motion to
proceed in forma pauperis.  It informed him that failure to cure
the deficiency within 30 days would result in a recommendation that
his complaint be dismissed.  More than 30 days have passed, and the
Plaintiff still has not paid the filing fee or filed a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis.

Magistrate Judge Rutherford holds that Rule 41(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to dismiss an action sua
sponte for failure to prosecute or for failure to comply with the
federal rules or any court order.  The Court has issued a
deficiency notice to the Plaintiff advising him that he must pay
the filing fee or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
However, he has failed to respond to the Court's order.  The
litigation cannot proceed until the Plaintiff complies with the
Court's order and either pays the filing fee or files a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis.  Accordingly, the complaint should be
dismissed for want of prosecution under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

A copy of the Report and Recommendation will be served on all
parties in the manner provided by law.  Any party who objects to
any part of the report and recommendation must file specific
written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 21, 2019 Findings,
Conclusions, & Recommendation is available at https://is.gd/bcBKUp
from Leagle.com.

Cameron Jackson, Plaintiff, pro se.



DALLAS COUNTY, TX: Dismissal of Washington Prisoners Suit Endorsed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DEVANTE WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, v. DALLAS COUNTY JAIL
FACILITY, Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-01505-C (BT) (BT) (N.D.
Tex.), Magistrate Judge Rebecca Rutherford of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division,
recommended that the Court should dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint
without prejudice for want of prosecution under Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(b).

Before the Court is the Plaintiff's pro se civil rights case.  The
Plaintiff, an inmate in the Dallas County jail, and others filed a
putative class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging
the Dallas County jail is violating their rights by segregating
inmates into housing units based on race.

The Court determined that the Plaintiff and the other inmates
should not be allowed to proceed as a class and ordered that the
case be severed into individual actions to allow each inmate to
represent himself.  She further ordered each individual Plaintiff
to pay a filing fee of $400 or file a motion to proceed in forma
pauperis.  The Plaintiff did not pay the filing fee; nor did he
file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.

On June 25, 2019, the Court sent the Plaintiff a notice of
deficiency reminding him to pay the filing fee or a file motion to
proceed in forma pauperis.  It informed him that failure to cure
the deficiency within 30 days would result in a recommendation that
his complaint be dismissed.  More than 30 days have passed, and the
Plaintiff still has not paid the filing fee or filed a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis.

Magistrate Judge Rutherford holds that Rule 41(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to dismiss an action sua
sponte for failure to prosecute or for failure to comply with the
federal rules or any court order.  The Court has issued a
deficiency notice to the Plaintiff advising him that he must pay
the filing fee or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
However, he has failed to respond to the Court's order.  The
litigation cannot proceed until the Plaintiff complies with the
Court's order and either pays the filing fee or files a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis.  Accordingly, the complaint should be
dismissed for want of prosecution under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

A copy of the Report and Recommendation will be served on all
parties in the manner provided by law.  Any party who objects to
any part of the report and recommendation must file specific
written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 21, 2019 Findings,
Conclusions, & Recommendation is available at https://is.gd/fFF287
from Leagle.com.

Devante Washington, Plaintiff, pro se.


DEVELOPMENTAL PATHWAYS: Court Narrows Claims in FLSA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
issued an Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned FLAVIE BONDEH
BAGOUE, and those similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. DEVELOPMENTAL
PATHWAYS, INC. and CONTINUUM OF COLORADO, INC., Defendants. Civil
Action No. 16-cv-01804-PAB-NRN. (D.Colo.).

Plaintiff Flavie Bondeh Bagoue worked for defendants for
approximately twelve total years. Plaintiff alleges that defendants
failed to adequately compensate plaintiff for certain categories of
time including time spent communicating with other workers at the
beginning and end of her shifts pre and post-shift time sleep time,
which was regularly interrupted such that plaintiff did not usually
get five hours of continuous and uninterrupted sleep and extra time
worked as a result of the change to daylight savings time.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56 when the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. A disputed fact is material if under the relevant substantive
law it is essential to proper disposition of the claim. Only
disputes over material facts can create a genuine issue for trial
and preclude summary judgment. An issue is genuine if the evidence
is such that it might lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.  

Plaintiff's First Claim - State Law

Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment against Continuum on
her claim for overtime for working more than twelve hours in a
given day on the basis that Continuum is covered by the Colorado
Minimum Wage Order (Wage Order). Defendants move for summary
judgment on the entirety of plaintiff's First Claim, arguing that
they are not covered by the Wage Order.  

Application of the Colorado Minimum Wage Order

The Wage Order regulates wages, hours, working conditions and
procedures for certain employers and employees in four industries:
(A) Retail and Service (B) Commercial Support Service (C) Food and
Beverage an (D) Health and Medical.

Plaintiff cannot recover on her First Claim under the Wage Order if
defendants do not fall into one of the covered industries.  

For the purposes of the instant motion, the Court considers whether
defendants are covered by the Wage Order because they are in either
(a) the Health and Medical industry or (b) the Retail and Service
industry.  

Health and Medical Industry

The Wage Order defines the Health and Medical industry to include:

any business or enterprise engaged in providing medical, dental,
surgical or other health services including but not limited to
medical and dental offices, hospitals, home health care, hospice
care, nursing homes, and mental health centers, and includes any
employee who is engaged in the performance of work connected with
or incidental to such business or enterprise, including office
personnel.

Defendants argue that they are not in the Health and Medical
industry. In defendants' view, what makes Health and Medical a
distinct industry is whether a business provides health services.

Defendants argue that they are not hospitals, home health care
providers, hospice care providers, nursing homes, or mental health
centers, and that they do not provide health services to their
clients. Defendants also argue that the Wage Order does not apply
because the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment's (CDLE)
2012 Advisory Bulletin (Advisory Bulletin) directs that community
centered boards and service agencies that are planned, designed,
organized, operated, and maintained to provide services to and for
individuals with developmental disabilities are excluded from the
Wage Order.
  
Plaintiff does not dispute that Developmental Pathways is a
community-centered board and that Continuum is a service agency
within the meaning of the Bulletin. Although the Colorado Division
of Labor has recently withdrawn the Advisory Bulletins on the
grounds that they did not fully incorporate many changes to wage
law and policy since they were issued and therefore are not
entitled to deference the Court finds the Advisory Bulletin here to
have some relevance.

Plaintiff does not identify any change in wage law or policy since
2012 that would indicate that the Advisory Bulletin's
interpretation of the Wage Order was incorrect as a matter of law
and has been superceded by a change in the law. In fact, plaintiff
cites to no authority that has adopted her interpretation of the
Wage Order. Instead, plaintiff argues that there is a dispute of
fact as to whether some of defendants' employees provide Health and
Medical services.  

Defendants assert that the principal job duties of LSSs like
plaintiff were to provide day-to-day care for residents by cooking
meals, cleaning the house, taking residents to doctors'
appointments and to church, grocery shopping, and other like needs,
while plaintiff contends that LSSs were also responsible for
providing medical care. Even accepting plaintiff's contention, the
fact that some of defendants' employees perform services that may
be supplied in the Health and Medical industry does not indicate
that Wage Order coverage attaches.  

Plaintiff also has failed to establish a dispute of fact as to
whether defendants provide any health and medical services to the
general public, as opposed to providing health and medical services
solely to persons who have been determined to have an intellectual
and developmental disability.  

The Court concludes that defendants are not in the Health and
Medical  industry for purposes of the Wage Order.

Retail and Service Industry

The Wage Order defines the Retail and Service industry to include
any business or enterprise that sells or offers for sale, any
service, commodity, article, good, real estate, wares, or
merchandise to the consuming public, and that generates 50% or more
of its annual dollar volume of business from such sales. The retail
and service industry offers goods or services that will not be made
available for resale. It also includes amusement and recreation,
public accommodations, banks, credit unions, savings and loans, and
includes any employee who is engaged in the performance of work
connected with or incidental to such business or enterprise,
including office personnel.

The Court finds that defendants are not in the Retail and Service
industry. Defendants both generate their income from donations and
public funds, rather than the sale of their services to the
consuming public.  

Because defendants are not within either the Health and Medical or
Retail and Service industries, they are not covered by the Wage
Order. Thus, plaintiff is unable to recover on her First Claim
under the Wage Order. Accordingly, the Court grants defendants'
motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's claims under the Wage
Order and Colorado Minimum Wage Act, and denies plaintiff's motion
for partial summary judgment.

Colorado Wage Claim Act

Defendants' motion for summary judgment appears to assume that
plaintiff has no path to recovery for her First Claim if the Wage
Order does not apply to them. However, plaintiff argues that at
least some portion of the First Claim is recoverable under the
CWCA. Defendants respond by arguing that this is not supported by
the complaint and that plaintiff should not be allowed to amend the
complaint at this stage.   Plaintiff filed a surreply, pointing out
that she alleged these claims in the complaint.  

The Court agrees with plaintiff. The caption of plaintiff's First
Claim indicates that it is brought for unpaid straight time as well
as overtime and references both the CWCA and the Colorado Minimum
Wage Act.  While the complaint may not be a model of clarity,
plaintiff's assertion that she may recover for allegedly unpaid
straight time under the CWCA does not amend the complaint. The
unpaid straight time claim is for (1) time required to work before
the beginning and after the end of her shift and (2) hours spent on
night duty.  

Because defendants have not made an affirmative argument that they
are entitled to summary judgment, the Court denies summary judgment
for defendants as to plaintiff's CWCA claims. However, neither
party has briefed how the CWCA provides a pathway for plaintiff to
recover. It is unclear to the Court whether the CWCA provides a
substantive right for plaintiff to recover compensation on her
unpaid sleep time claim.  

Accordingly, the Court will deny plaintiff's motion for class
certification without prejudice in order to give plaintiff, and
defendants, an opportunity to brief issues regarding plaintiff's
CWCA claim.

Plaintiff's Second Claim - FLSA

Plaintiff claims that defendants violated the FLSA by failing to
pay her (and the collective) for work performed (1) before the
beginning and after the end of her shift and (2) hours spent on
night duty.  

Pre- and Post-Shift Time

Plaintiff claims that defendants failed to pay her for time worked
before the beginning and after the end of her scheduled shifts.

Defendants make three arguments as to why they are entitled to
summary judgment on this claim. First, defendants argue that the
pre- and post-shift time is non-compensable because it occurred
either before or after the principal activity plaintiff was
employed to perform. Second, defendants claim that, if the time is
compensable, it is nonetheless de minimis and not subject to the
FLSA.Third, defendants state that, if the time is compensable and
not de minimis, the time is covered by a permissibly neutral
rounding policy.

Compensable Time

Under the FLSA, employers are not liable for failure to pay an
employee wages or overtime compensation for activities which are
preliminary to or postliminary to the principal activity or
activities which the employee is employed to perform that occur
either prior to or subsequent to the time on any particular workday
the employee commences or ceases the principal activity or
activities.  

Defendants argue that the pre- and post-shift time is not integral
or indispensable to the principal activities of plaintiff's job
because (1) plaintiff "could not remember how frequently she may
have stayed after her shift (2) plaintiff's time records show that
she was compensated for conversations with the incoming or outgoing
LSS that lasted more than a few minutes and (3) all information
necessary for plaintiff was available in daily logs prepared each
day. However, plaintiff has presented evidence that she was
instructed to arrive before her shift in order to count medication
for residents and that she was required to stay after her shift in
order to update the incoming LSS.  

Defendants' arguments fail to explain why time where plaintiff was
required to count medication and to update the incoming LSS would
not be integral and indispensable to the operation of defendants'
business.  

Because a factual dispute exists as to what defendants required of
plaintiff, the Court finds that defendants have not met their
burden to show that they are entitled to summary judgment on this
basis.

De Minimis Exception

In recording working time under the FLSA, insubstantial or
insignificant periods of time beyond the scheduled working hours,
which cannot as a practical administrative matter be precisely
recorded for payroll purposes, may be disregarded as de minimis. In
addition, the Court must consider: (1) the practical administrative
difficulty of recording the additional time (2) the size of the
claim in the aggregate and (3) whether the claimants performed the
work on a regular basis.

Defendants have not shown that the pre- and post- shift time falls
within the de minimis exception. As a threshold matter, it is
unclear to the Court that the de minimis exception applies given
that defendants use electronic time clocks to record employees'
comings and goings. Even assuming arguendo that the de minimis
exception could apply in this situation, the Court finds that the
factors collectively favor plaintiff. The amount of daily time
spent is small and weighs in defendants' favor. Plaintiff's time
records indicate that the pre- and post-shift time infrequently
exceeded ten minutes per shift, each shift covering a
two-and-a-half day period.   

Thus, compensation for pre- and post-shift time does not fall
within the de minimis exception.

Rounding Policy

Defendants argue that their policy of rounding any pre- or
post-work time that did not exceed seven minutes to zero is a
permissible rounding policy. The federal rounding regulation, 29
C.F.R. Section 785.48(b), reads:

Rounding' practices. It has been found that in some industries,
particularly where time clocks are used, there has been the
practice for many years of recording the employees' starting time
and stopping time to the nearest 5 minutes, or to the nearest
one-tenth or quarter of an hour.

Presumably, this arrangement averages out so that the employees are
fully compensated for all the time they actually work. For
enforcement purposes this practice of computing working time will
be accepted, provided that it is used in such a manner that it will
not result, over a period of time, in failure to compensate the
employees properly for all the time they have actually worked.

Defendants' rounding policy is neutral on its face, as the policy
is to round all time punches without an eye towards whether the
employer or the employee is benefitting from the rounding. However,
plaintiff has presented evidence that, as applied, there is a
factual dispute whether defendants' policy systematically
undercompensates employees. Plaintiff contends that the pre- and
post-shift time regularly took about three to five minutes and, as
a result, her time records show rounding consistently in favor of
defendants.

Because there is a factual dispute as to whether defendants'
rounding policy was permissibly neutral pursuant to 29 C.F.R.
Section 785.48(b), the Court will deny summary judgment to
defendants on the portion of plaintiff's FLSA claims seeking
recovery for pre- and post-shift time.

In summary, the Court denies summary judgment for defendants on the
portion of plaintiff's FLSA claim that seeks compensation for pre-
and post-shift time, as there is a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether the pre- and post-shift time was compensated under a
permissible rounding policy.

Plaintiff's Third Claim

Plaintiff's Third Claim asserts that defendants are liable to
plaintiff and the proposed class in quasi-contract, including
unjust enrichment under Colorado law. Defendants argue that these
claims are preempted by the FLSA. In response, plaintiff concedes
that the claim should be dismissed and that judgment can be entered
on the claim. Docket No. 103 at 13.17 Accordingly, the Court will
grant summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff's Third Claim.

Statute of Limitations as to Surviving Claims

Defendants move for summary judgment on any claims which accrued
prior to July 14, 2014 as barred by the statute of limitations.  

A cause of action under the FLSA is barred unless commenced within
two years after the cause of action accrued, except that a cause of
action arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within
three years after the cause of action accrued. The rule is the same
for claims under the CWCA.  

Courts have found willful violations where the evidence shows (1)
admissions that an employer knew its method of payment violated the
FLSA prior to the accrual of the action (2) continuation of a pay
practice without further investigation after being put on notice
that the practice violated the FLSA (3) earlier violations of the
FLSA that would put the employer on actual notice of the
requirements of the FLSA (4) failure to keep accurate or complete
records of employment and (5) prior internal investigations which
revealed similar violations.

It is the plaintiff's burden to prove that a violation is willful.
As defendants have identified a lack of evidence for plaintiff as
to defendants' willfulness, it is plaintiff's burden to designate
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Plaintiff, in response, does not present any evidence of
defendants' willfulness. Instead, plaintiff argues that summary
judgment on this issue is premature.  However, as discussed above,
the Court finds that summary judgment is not premature. As
plaintiff has failed to designate facts showing a genuine dispute
as to defendants' willfulness, the Court grants summary judgment to
defendants and, applying the two-year statute of limitations, bars
all claims under the FLSA and CWCA accruing before July 14, 2014.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and
denied in part. It is further
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against Continuum
of Colorado, Inc. as to Plaintiff's 12-Hour Overtime Claim is
denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 23, 2019  Order
is available at  https://tinyurl.com/y4qmrznd from Leagle.com.

Flavie Bondeh Bagoue, and those similarly situated, Plaintiff,
represented by Brian David Gonzales -Bgonzales@ColoradoWageLaw.com
- Brian D. Gonzales, PLLC & Alexander Neville Hood , Towards
Justice, 1410 N High St Ste 300, Denver, CO, 80218-2609

Developmental Pathways, Inc. & Continuum of Colorado, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by Celena R. Mayo , Wilson Elser Moskowitz
Edelman & Dicker, LLP, Jason D. Melichar , Wilson Elser Moskowitz
Edelman & Dicker LLP, Justin Anthony Guilfoyle , Wilson Elser
Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker, LLP, Scott Douglas Sweeney , Wilson
Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker, LLP, 150 East 42nd Street New
York, NY 10017 & Christopher J.W. Forrest , Miller & Steiert,
P.C.,1901 West Littleton BoulevardSuite 100Littleton, CO 80120-
2087


DICK'S SPORTING: Court Approves Class Notice in Greer
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issue an Order approving Class Notice in the case
captioned JIMMY GREER, Plaintiff, v. DICK'S SPORTING GOODS, INC.,
Defendant. Case No. 2:15-cv-01063-KJM-CKD. (E.D. Cal.).

Hearing on plaintiff's motion for final approval December 20, 2019
at 10:00 a.m. in of class action settlement and motion for
Courtroom No. 3 attorneys' fees, costs, and class representative
enhancement payment.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 19, 2019 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxzr7z8n from Leagle.com.

Jimmy Greer, Plaintiff, represented by Melissa Grant -
Melissa.Grant@CapstoneLawyers.com - Capstone Law APC, Raul Perez -
Raul.Perez@CapstoneLawyers.com  - Capstone Law APC, Robert J.
Drexler - Robert.Drexler@CapstoneLawyers.com - Capstone Law APC,
Bevin Elaine Allen Pike – Bevin.Pike@CapstoneLawyers.com -
Capstone Law APC & Jonathan Sing Lee -
Jonathan.Lee@CapstoneLawyers.com - Capstone Law APC.

Dick's Sporting Goods, Inc., Defendant, represented by Babak G.
Yousefzadeh -byousefzadeh@sheppardmullin.com - Sheppard Mullin
Richter & Hampton, LLP, Paul S. Cowie - pcowie@sheppardmullin.com -
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP, Africa Reanne Swafford -
rswafford-harris@sheppardmullin.com -  Sheppard Mullin Richter &
Hampton LLP & Caryn F. Horner - chorner@sheppardmullin.com -
Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.


DOW CHEMICAL: Court Denies Remand of Environmental Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana issued an Order and Reasons denying Plaintiffs' Motion to
Remand in the case captioned SHEILA GUIDRY, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, ET AL., v. DOW CHEMICAL
COMPANY, ET AL., SECTION "F". Civil Action No. 19-12233. (E.D.
La.).

A tank at a Union Carbide facility in Taft, Louisiana released into
the air a chemical, Ethyl Acrylate (EA). The St. Charles Parish
Department of Emergency Preparedness closed nearby roads and
evacuated residents within a two-mile area east of the facility.
Sheila Guidry filed this lawsuit in Orleans Parish against Dow
Chemical Company and the State of Louisiana through the Department
of Environmental Quality. She alleged that she noticed a foul
smell, which caused her to suffer headache, dizziness, and burning
eyes.  

Dow removed the case to this Court, invoking the Court's Class
Action Fairness Act jurisdiction for the second time in 10 years.
What triggered removal this time? Six days earlier, in a letter
addressed to defense counsel regarding settlement value, class
counsel Ron Austin wrote that the parameters of a possible
settlement can be safely couched in terms of a range from $60
MILLION to $275 MILLION.

The plaintiffs now move to remand, arguing not that the $5,000,000
amount in controversy requirement is lacking, but, rather, that
removal is untimely because the defendants should have known years
earlier the potential class size and that the plaintiffs' transient
health impacts damages could exceed $5,000,000.  

CAFA gives federal courts original jurisdiction over certain class
actions if the class has more than 100 members, the parties are
minimally diverse, and the amount in controversy exceeds $5
million.

To determine whether the matter in controversy exceeds $5 million,
the claims of the individual class members shall be aggregated. And
those class members include persons (named or unnamed) who fall
within the definition of the proposed or certified class.  

Although the plaintiffs challenge removal in this case, the
removing defendants must establish that federal jurisdiction exists
at the time of removal and that removal was proper. Remand is
proper if the plaintiff timely identifies a procedural defect in
removal; remand is mandated if at any time the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction. Given CAFA's broad objective to ensure Federal
court consideration of interstate cases of national importance, the
Supreme Court endorsed Congressional intent to read CAFA's
provisions broadly, accordingly, no antiremoval presumption attends
cases invoking CAFA.

The parties dispute only timeliness of removal,  not whether CAFA's
amount in controversy requirement is met.

The plaintiffs present a singular procedural defect challenge to
removal: removal was untimely because the defendants had been
placed on notice for many years that the potential class size
allowed for damages exceeding $5 million; thus, removal in August
2019 was too late.

The defendants counter that the plaintiffs avoided disclosing and
equivocated regarding the potential class size until they wrote the
settlement valuation letter on August 14, 2019; this letter was the
first paper which allowed the defendants to ascertain that the
plaintiffs were in fact seeking damages well in excess of the $5
million amount in controversy. The defendants insist that the
letter provided the level of certainty missing for years, finally
opened up the removal window, and removal was timely accomplished
within 30 days of that other paper.

Removal in this case is timely only if the facts forming the $5
million amount in controversy theory on which defendants predicate
removal jurisdiction were not set forth until class counsel wrote
to defense counsel on August 14, 2019. If, instead, earlier papers
identified by the plaintiffs estimating class size made the amount
in controversy certain, exact, or precise, then removal is
untimely. When did the plaintiff disclose facts sufficient to
trigger federal officer removal? The procedural defect dispute
focuses on whether plaintiffs' statements in state court briefing
over the years indicated with certainty or precision that the
amount in controversy here exceeds $5 million. The plaintiffs
identify a litany of expert testimony and statements by plaintiffs'
counsel, each of which they argue should have alerted defendants
that the case was removable, inter alia:

(1) in May 2011, depositions of the class representatives were
taken in which the four individuals detailed their health
complaints, which were indicative of the types of injuries alleged
by the class as a whole, including headaches, nausea, and irritated
or burning eyes on the morning of July 9, 2009.

(2) in July 2015, the defendants deposed the plaintiffs' expert
toxicologist, Dr. Patricia Williams, who opined on the effects of
EA on the class representatives, that levels of EA at 1.3 parts per
billion could trigger reflex symptoms similar to the class
representatives' complaints.
None of these papers started the removal clock. The plaintiffs
insist that three simple Google searches reveal the population of
Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Charles Parishes, which combine for a
total of 757,413 potential class members, and that the class was
comprised of tens of thousands or more and/or, as the plaintiffs
contended, several hundred thousand members. These are the type of
speculative metrics, the defendants counter, that were rejected by
this Court and the Fifth Circuit when the defendants removed this
case over nine years ago. These estimates by the plaintiffs, the
defendants argue, come no closer than Google to providing the
population of the actual class, much less unequivocally
establishing that the amount in controversy exceeded $5,000,000.

The Court agrees.

The plaintiffs' statements in these earlier papers, insofar as they
bear on class size at all, are mere argumentative inflations or
hopeful estimates as to the number of potential class members based
purely on geography and population estimates. This Court and the
Fifth Circuit previously determined that ascertaining class size or
amount in controversy based solely on geography and population
estimates was too speculative to invoke this Court's limited
jurisdiction. The plaintiffs' estimates anchored to these same
speculative baselines phrased as argument in state court briefing
fail the Bosky test as a matter of law.

None of the plaintiffs' disclosures in state court made certain,
exact, or precise or allowed the defendants to find out or learn
with certainty facts supporting CAFA jurisdiction.

First, insofar as the plaintiffs argue that the defendants should
have inferred from the cumulation of these statements over the
years that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, the
plaintiffs misapply Bosky's bright line rule.

Second, although facts obtained from deposition testimony
constitutes other paper in the abstract, the information identified
by the plaintiffs here offer no opinions on class-defining
principles, let alone even mere estimates on class size.

Third, the plaintiffs' October 2, 2015 statement in briefing that
there are tens of thousands or more of potential individual
litigants who were injured is, at best, an argumentative estimate,
which does not indicate whether it references the Guidry class or
all people injured by the release many of whom are proceeding in
litigation in St. Charles Parish.

Fourth, the plaintiffs' assertion in state court briefing  a change
in class population from several hundred thousand to
several-hundred-thousand-but-a-few-less may be hyperbole or it may
be their hopeful estimate; the source is neither mentioned nor
ascertainable.  

That the valuation letter opened the removal window sufficient to
render removal procedurally proper, however, does not mean that the
letter suffices to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that
the amount in controversy is met for the Court to exercise
jurisdiction under CAFA. In other words, neither the information
contained in the letter, nor all parties' apparent concession that
the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million suffice to make it so.
For jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the parties' consent.

That the plaintiffs singularly challenge timeliness of removal does
not end the Court's inquiry into its own jurisdiction. To be sure,
a defendant cannot establish removal jurisdiction by mere
speculation and parties can neither concede that it exists nor
proselytize beliefs which, if true, would support its exercise.
Thus, the Court finds that it must be satisfied, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the amount in controversy requirement is
met.25 Determining whether $5 million is realistically at stake in
this lawsuit must be more clear and certain. It seems that the only
process that will facilitate ascertaining this objective metric of
jurisdiction is for plaintiffs' counsel to conduct, a sworn claims
and discovery process.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED: that the
plaintiff's motion to remand is DENIED without prejudice.
Plaintiffs shall complete jurisdictional discovery within ninety
days, after which the Court will consider another motion to remand,
if necessary, based on the size of the class and specifics about
class member symptoms.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 19, 2019 Order
and Reasons is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxv8swnb from
Leagle.com.

Sheila Guidry, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by John Bartholomew Kelly, III ,
Alvendia, Kelly, & Demarest, LLC, 909 Poydras St Ste 1625, New
Orleans,  LA, 70112-4067, Benjamin W. Gulick , Law Offices of
Gregory P. DiLeo, PLC, 300 Lafayette St. Suite 101 New Orleans, LA
70130, Catherine Hilton , Ron Austin Law, LLC, 230 West Monroe
Street, Suite 240, Chicago, IL 60606Gregory, Pius DiLeo , Law
Offices of Gregory P. DiLeo, PLC, 300 Lafayette St. Suite 101 New
Orleans, LA 70130, Jeffrey P. Berniard , Berniard Law LLC, 1140 St
Charles Ave, New Orleans, Louisiana 70130, Madro Bandaries -
madro@bandarieslaw.com - Madro Bandaries, PLC, Roderick Alvendia ,
Alvendia, Kelly, & Demarest, LLC 909 Poydras St Ste 1625, New
Orleans,  LA,  70112-4067& Ron Anthony Austin -
raustin@austin-associates.net - Austin & Associates, LLC.

Dow Chemical Company, Defendant, represented by David Mark
Bienvenu, Jr. , Bienvenu, Bonnecaze, Foco, Viator & Holinga, APLLC,
Colin Patrick O'Rourke , Bienvenu, Bonnecaze, Foco, Viator &
Holinga, APLLC, John Allain Viator , Bienvenu, Bonnecaze, Foco,
Viator & Holinga, APLLC, Patrick Hayes Hunt , Bienvenu, Bonnecaze,
Foco, Viator & Holinga, APLLC & Phillip E. Foco , Bienvenu,
Bonnecaze, Foco, Viator & Holinga, APLLC, 4210 Bluebonnet Blvd.,
Baton Rouge,  LA, 70809-9630

Department of Environmental Quality State of Louisiana, Defendant,
represented by Peter Stephan Koeppel , Koeppel Traylor, LLC &
William Scarth Clark , Koeppel Clark Turner,110 Veterans, Suite
360, Metairie, LA 70005.

Union Carbide Corporation, Defendant, represented by Neil Charles
Abramson -
nabramson@liskow.com - Liskow & Lewis, Mark Charles Dodart -
mark.dodart@phelps.com - Phelps Dunbar, LLP & Nora Bolling Bilbro -
nbilbro@liskow.com - Liskow & Lewis.


DRAEGER INC: Fails to Pay Overtime Under FLSA & PMWA, Bohan Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
ANDREW BOHAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. DRAEGER, INC. d/b/a DRAEGER MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC., Case
No. 5:19-cv-04185-JLS (E.D. Pa., Sept. 11, 2019), alleges that the
Defendant has unlawfully failed to pay the Plaintiff and other
Finance Department employees overtime compensation pursuant to the
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Pennsylvania
Minimum Wage Act.

Draeger Inc., doing business as Draeger Medical Systems, Inc., is a
for-profit business entity, duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and is registered and
licensed to engage in business, and is engaged in business, in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania.

Draeger's line of business includes the manufacturing of medical,
surgical, ophthalmic, and veterinary instruments and
apparatus.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Murphy, Esq.
          Morgan J. Zucker, Esq.
          MURPHY LAW GROUP, LLC
          Eight Penn Center, Suite 2000
          1628 John F. Kennedy Blvd.
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (267) 273-1054
          E-mail: murphy@phillyemploymentlawyer.com
                  mzucker@phillyemploymentlawyer.com


DST SYSTEMS: Bids for Lawyer Fees in Scott Securities Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases BRIAN SCOTT, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. DST SYSTEMS, INC., STEPHEN C.
HOOLEY, GARY D. FORSEE, CHARLES EDGAR HALDEMAN, SAMUEL G. LISS,
JEROME H. BAILEY, JOSEPH C. ANTONELLIS, LOWELL L. BRYAN, and LYNN
DORSEY BLEIL, Defendants; and JAMES D. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. DST
SYSTEMS, INC., STEPHEN C. HOOLEY, CHARLES E. HALDEMAN, SAMUEL G.
LISS, LOWELL L. BRYAN, LYNN D. BLIEL, JEROME H. BAILEY, JOSEPH C.
ANTONELLIS, and GARY D. FORSEE, Defendants, Civil Action Nos.
1:18-cv-00286-RGA, 1:18-cv-00322-RGA (D. Del.), Judge Richard G.
Andrews of the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware
denied (i) Plaintiff Scott's Motion for Attorney Fees and (ii)
Plaintiff Williams' Motion for Attorney Fees.

The cases stem from the March 28, 2018 merger of DST with SS&C
Technologies, Inc.  The DST Board initiated the transaction on Jan.
11, 2018 when it entered into an agreement and plan of merger with
SS&C.  SS&C was to acquire DST for $84 per share of common stock.
The merger was valued at $5.4 billion.

The Defendants issued a preliminary proxy statement describing the
details of the transaction on Feb. 7, 2018.  Three lawsuits, two in
the Court and another in Missouri, were filed within weeks.  The
lawsuits alleged that the preliminary proxy statement omitted
material information in violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  DST filed its definitive
proxy statement with the SEC on Feb. 27, 2018.  Two weeks later,
DST voluntarily issued a supplemental disclosure to moot the
pending lawsuits.  

The Plaintiffs agreed that the supplemental disclosures mooted
their lawsuits and began pursuit of attorneys' fees.  Scott sought
$115,000 in attorneys' fees while Williams sought $100,000 of the
same.

Judge Andrews concludes that the Plaintiffs have not developed a
factual record or proffer expert opinions in support of their
motions.  Rather, they relied on the bald fact of the Defendants'
supplemental disclosures.  Essentially, Plaintiffs argued
throughout their briefing that the missing information was so
plainly material that its disclosure was a substantial benefit to
the stockholders as a matter of law.  

The Judge does find the Plaintiffs' position persuasive.  It is far
from clear, as a factual matter in the case, that the information
disclosed by the Defendants was material, the Court held.  The
Plaintiffs' attorneys' arguments, opinions from judges in other
cases, and law review articles do not carry the weight the
Plaintiffs put on them.  Moreover, absent evidence that the
information was material, there is no basis in the record to find
that the Plaintiffs conferred any benefit on DST stockholders, the
Court said.

The Plaintiffs have failed to carry their evidentiary burden, the
Court opined.  Accordingly, the judge denied Plaintiffs' motions
for attorneys' fees.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2019 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/1vXWsa from Leagle.com.

Brian Scott, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Michael D. Van Gorder --
mvangorder@faruqilaw.com -- of Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP.

DST Systems, Inc., Defendant, represented by Sabrina M. Hendershot
-- shendershot@mnat.com -- of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell
LLP.

Stephen C. Hooley, Gary D. Forsee, Charles Edgar Haldeman, Samuel
G. Liss, Jerome H. Bailey, Joseph C. Antonellis, Lowell L. Bryan &
Lynn Dorsey Bleil, Defendants, represented by Edward Bennett
Micheletti -- edward.micheletti@skadden.com -- of Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP.


DXC TECHNOLOGY: Class Suit Claims Job Cuts Tied to Profit Targets
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Paul Kunert, writing for The Register, reports that DXC Technology
has been named in another class-action lawsuit that alleges mass
redundancies were used by senior management to boost earnings but
left the company unable to service contracted clients properly.

Bragar, Eagel & Squire PC, a New York litigator specialising in
securities cases, lodged the papers on 16 September (PDF) with the
US District Court for the Northern District of California on behalf
of investors. A less kind publication may refer to the legal eagle
as an ambulance-chaser, trying to drum up interest from current or
previous DXC stock owners.

The class action, which names DXC shareholder Jason McLees as lead
plaintiff, is being brought on behalf of investors that bought DXC
stock "pursuant to and/or traceable to the company's April 2017
registration statement and prospectus" -- which is when DXC started
trading.

DXC published Offering Materials -- a kind of prospectus for
shareholders -- on 27 February 2017 that talked of the firm
wringing out $1bn in "synergies" in its first year due to greater
economies of scale (volume discounts); workforce changes that
included erasing role duplication; and reducing general admin
overheads.

DXC said it would align costs with the revenue trajectory -- $26bn
was forecast for the merged firm in year one. The Offering
Materials also emphasised DXC's ability to retain "highly motivated
people with the skills necessary to serve their customers".

The class-action lawsuit filed by Bragar, Eagel & Squire alleges:

The Offering Materials' representations, financial metrics and
purported risk disclosures were false and misleading because they
failed to disclose that Defendants' planned "workforce
optimisation" plan was, in truth, earnings management in disguise.
Defendants would impose arbitrary quotas that resulted in the
termination of tens of thousands of workers, selectively timed to
artificially inflate reported earnings over the short term and
present misleadingly inflated quarterly and yearly financial
reports to boost the stock price, ahead of insider sales, including
by Defendant Lawrie, who exercised stock options to gain millions
in personal profit.

DXC also offloaded overheads by consolidating office real estate
and rationalising the number of data centres it runs worldwide.

The complaint further alleges that Lawrie -- DXC's CEO from the
merger until a fortnight ago when he was replaced by Mike Salvino
-- had actually made internal forecasts of $2.7bn worth of planned
workforce reductions for first fiscal year, nearly triple the
figure that was made public.

"The foreseeable impact of these severe, undisclosed cuts and
firings was that DXC could not deliver on its client contracts and
client satisfaction plummeted along with employee capacity and
morale, rendering the financial metrics in the Offering Materials
false and unrealistic," the complaint states.

It adds that the disclosure of these "material facts" -- known
events or uncertainties that could affect future performance -- was
required under US Securities and Exchange Commission regulations.
And they should also have been included under "risks" in the
Offering Material, it says.

As the "truth" emerged about its plans, the "price of DXC shares
declined substantially", the filing reads.

The stock was trading at $31 apiece when the lawsuit was filed,
down from the $59 per share valuation on the exchange date for the
merger.

"Investors have thus suffered considerable losses as a result of
the Defendants' misconduct and seek to recover their losses through
this action," the filing adds.

Some shareholders may look to piggyback the lawsuit, if all goes to
plan for Bragar, Eagel & Squire. Suits of this kind are not unusual
when a company's stock price drops substantially. Whether this one
is successful is a moot point.

DXC, the result of the spin merger between CSC and HPE Enterprise
Services, started life with 170,000 employees but at last public
admission had 130,000 people on the payroll. This was around April
and since then, DXC has processed more redundancies, including in
the UK and US, where almost half of the security team was cast
off.

The Register has heard anecdotal evidence from staff that they are
struggling to fulfil services contracts due to too many people
being made redundant, but we have yet to be made aware of DXC
losing customers due to the issue.

The strategy at the company has been to minimise declines in the
legacy outsourcing business, which has been shrinking
quarter-on-quarter, and ramp its cloud business with AWS et al to
offset those lost revenues. The fruits of this effort have yet to
pay off.

Employees caught in the middle have been collateral damage. The
hope from at least some in the workforce is that Salvino, brought
in to succeed Lawrie as CEO, will draft his own strategy to take
the business forward, perhaps one that doesn't involve jettisoning
thousands of the people who are supposed to be DXC's greatest
asset.

A spokesman told The Register: "The allegations in this suit have
no merit and DXC fully intends to vigorously defend the case."
[GN]


E & E FOOD: Fails to Pay Delivery Men Minimum Wage, Galindo Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
DANIEL BONILLA GALINDO, JOSE JUAN MAYA ALVAREZ, and JOSE VASQUEZ
GERONIMO, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated
v. E & E FOOD CORP. (D/B/A ZEYTIN MEDITERRANEAN), NAZIM ALKAN, EROL
ALKAN, ANDY KOKSAL AKA MEHMET ENGIN KOKSAL, and NIKO DOE, Case No.
1:19-cv-08459 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 11, 2019), alleges that the
Plaintiffs worked for the Defendants without appropriate minimum
wage compensation for the hours that they worked, in violation of
the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiffs are former employees of the Defendants.  They were
employed as delivery workers at the restaurant located at 110
William Street, in New York City.

E & E Food Corp. (d/b/a Zeytin Mediterranean) is a domestic
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of
New York.  The Individual Defendants serve or served as owners,
managers, principals, or agents of the Defendant Corporation.

The Defendants own, operate, or control a Mediterranean restaurant,
located at 110 William Street under the name "Zeytin
Mediterranean."[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: Michael@Faillacelaw.com


E.I. DU PONT: Boothe Farms Files Class Action Over Pesticide
------------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reports that Boothe Farms claims in a
federal class action that Dow Chemical, Corteva and DuPont's Loyant
pesticide does not control grasses and weeds as advertised, and
damaged their rice crops.  

A copy of the lawsuit is available at:
https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Pesticides.pdf



EAGLE DINER: $162.5K Settlement in Flores Suit Has Prelim Approval
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALEXIS FLORES and VIRGINIA GOOLD, for themselves and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. EAGLE DINER CORP., et
al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-01206-AB (E.D. Pa.),
Judge Anita B. Brody of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania granted the Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion
for Preliminary Class and Collective Action Settlement Approval.

Flores and Goold filed a lawsuit in March 2018 the Defendants,
alleging claims under federal law and Pennsylvania law for unpaid
minimum and overtime wages.  The Court has allowed the Action to
proceed for settlement purposes only on behalf of a Class including
all people who, between March 22, 2015 and Dec. 12, 2018, worked as
a Server at Eagle Diner.  The Defendants have reviewed and
investigated the matter and deny any wrongdoing but have decided to
resolve the Action to avoid the expense of litigation and the
ongoing disruption to their business operations.  

The parties have entered into a Settlement Agreement to resolve the
claims in the Action.  To avoid the burden, expense, inconvenience,
and uncertainty of continuing the Action, the Defendants have
agreed to pay a total of $162,500.  The Parties propose to
distribute these funds as follows: at least $88,870 to pay damages
to Servers who do not submit a timely, valid request for exclusion,
$10,000 to pay Service Payments to the two Named Plaintiffs, up to
$53,625 to pay the Class Counsel's attorneys' fees and up to
$10,000 to reimburse Class Counsel's out-of-pocket litigation costs
and pay settlement administration costs.

Judge Brody preliminarily certified the proposed settlement class
for settlement purposes only.  She preliminarily approved the
proposed settlement agreement in relation to the Plaintiffs' class
action and collective action claims.

Alexis Flores and Virginia Goold will serve as the Settlement Class
Representatives; and attorneys from Stephan Zouras LLP as the Class
Counsel.

The Court will approve notice to the Class Members after
implementation of the suggested revisions in Appendix A.  The
Parties must submit to the Court a written acceptance of or
objection to the suggested revisions on Sept. 6, 2019

The Parties must follow the schedule in Appendix B.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 21, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/E8uAzm from Leagle.com.

ALEXIS FLORES & VIRGINIA GOOLD, FOR THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs, represented by DAVID J. COHEN --
dcohen@stephanzouras.com -- STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP, HALEY R. JENKINS,
STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP, JAMES B. ZOURAS, STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP & RYAN F.
STEPHAN, STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP.

JAMES ROKOS, MARIA ROKOS & MARKO ROKOS, Defendants, represented by
ROBERT NEIL BRAVERMAN, LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT BRAVERMAN LLC.


FARFETCH LIMITED: Omdahl Sues Over Share Price Drop
---------------------------------------------------
JEFF OMDAHL, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff v. FARFETCH LIMITED, JOSE NEVES, ELLIOT JORDAN,
FREDERIC COURT, DANA EVAN, JONATHAN KAMALUDDIN, RICHARD LIU,
NATALIE MASSENET, JONATHAN NEWHOUSE, DANIEL RIMER, MICHAEL RISMAN,
DAVID ROSENBLATT, GOLDMAN SACHS & CO. LLC, J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES
LLC, ALLEN & COMPANY LLC, UBS SECURITIES LLC, CREDIT SUISSE
SECURITIES (USA) LLC, DEUTSCHE BANK SECURITIES INC., WELLS FARGO
SECURITIES, LLC, COWEN AND COMPANY, LLC, and BNP PARIBAS SECURITIES
CORP., Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-08657 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 17,
2019), is a class action on behalf of persons and entities that
purchased or otherwise acquired Farfetch securities pursuant and/or
traceable to the registration statement and prospectus issued in
connection with the Company's September 2018 initial public
offering.

The Plaintiff pursues claims against the Defendants under the
Securities Act of 1933.

On September 24, 2018, the Company filed its prospectus on Form
424B4 with the SEC, which forms part of the Registration Statement.
In the IPO, the Company sold approximately 50.88 million shares of
Class A common stock at a price of $20.00 per share. The Company
received proceeds of approximately $750.5 million from the
Offering, net of underwriting discounts and commissions. The
proceeds from the IPO were purportedly to be used to fund
incremental growth and other general corporate purposes, including
possible acquisitions.

On August 8, 2019, Farfetch reported a larger-than-expected loss of
$89.6 million for second quarter 2019. The Company also announced a
$675 million acquisition of New Guards Group and that its Chief
Operating Officer had resigned. On this news, the Company's share
price fell $8.12, or over 44%, to close at $10.13 per share on
August 9, 2019, on unusually heavy trading volume. By the
commencement of this action, the Company's stock was trading as low
as $10.20 per share, a nearly 50% decline from the $20 per share
IPO price.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Registration Statement was false and
misleading and omitted to state material adverse facts.
Specifically, the Plaintiff contends, the Defendants failed to
disclose to investors: (1) that large scale online wholesale was
reasonably likely to lead to pricing volatility and heavy
promotions of luxury goods; (2) that the Company's core business
was vulnerable to such pricing pressures; (3) that the Company
would aggressively pursue acquisitions to remain profitable; and
(4) that, as a result of the foregoing, Defendants' positive
statements about the Company's business, operations, and prospects,
were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis. As a
result of the Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Jeff Omdahl purchased or otherwise acquired Farfetch
securities pursuant and traceable to the Registration Statement
issued in connection with the Company's IPO.

Farfetch is a technology platform that purports to be the only
global luxury digital marketplace at scale that connects brands,
retailers, and consumers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lesley F. Portnoy, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          230 Park Ave., Suite 530
          New York, NY 10169
          Telephone: (212) 682-5340
          Facsimile: (212) 884-0988
          E-mail: lportnoy@glancylaw.com

               - and -

          Lionel Z. Glancy, Esq.
          Robert V. Prongay, Esq.
          Charles H. Linehan, Esq.
          Pavithra Rajesh, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 201-9150
          Facsimile: (310) 201-9160
          E-mail: info@glancylaw.com


FLORIDA: Approval of $15.5MM 'Best and Brightest' Suit Deal Sought
------------------------------------------------------------------
Jim Saunders, writing for Pensacola News Journal, reports that the
state Department of Education and the Florida Education Association
asked a federal judge on Sept. 19, 2019, to preliminarily approve a
$15.5 million settlement in a class-action lawsuit alleging that
the "Best and Brightest" teacher-bonus program discriminated
against black and Hispanic teachers.

The settlement stems from a long-controversial decision by
lawmakers to partly base Best and Brightest bonuses on teachers'
scores on SAT and ACT college-admission exams.  The Florida
Education Association, a union that represents teachers throughout
the state, and individual plaintiffs filed the lawsuit in 2017
alleging that the use of the SAT and ACT scores had a "disparate
impact" on black, Hispanic and older teachers.

Under the settlement, money will go to black and Hispanic classroom
teachers who were rated as "highly effective" but did not receive
Best and Brightest bonuses since the program took effect in 2015.
Also, the settlement, which has been in the works for months,
hinged on state lawmakers passing a bill to remove the SAT and ACT
requirement from the program -- a move lawmakers made this spring
with Gov. Ron DeSantis' support.

"This settlement provides outstanding and meaningful relief to the
class (of teachers), including substantial monetary relief funded
by an aggregate settlement fund of $15,500,000 to be shared by
class members and substantial non-monetary, injunctive relief in
the form of a condition, which has occurred, that the Florida
Legislature repeal the program's testing requirements and not enact
similar requirements," attorneys for the Florida Education
Association and other plaintiffs said in a court document filed
September 19.

The settlement said the state denies the allegations that the
program had a disparate impact on black, Hispanic and older
teachers. A document filed September 19 by the Department of
Education pointed to a desire to resolve the lengthy litigation.

"The department agreed to settle this action in order to avoid the
burden, expense, risk, and uncertainty of continued litigation, and
to put to rest the controversies engendered by the action, and
without any admission of any liability or wrongdoing whatsoever,"
the department's attorneys wrote.

The settlement creates a formula for determining the amount of
payments to black and Hispanic teachers who are eligible, but the
exact amounts of payment remain unclear. A document filed September
19 indicates an estimated 31,000 teachers would be eligible to file
claims and receive payments for one or more of the years the Best
and Brightest program has been in effect. Also, as much as 15
percent of the settlement fund could go to attorney fees and other
costs.

While teacher bonuses have long drawn debate in the Capitol, the
Best and Brightest program has been particularly controversial
because of the use of scores on ACT and SAT exams that, in some
cases, teachers took decades earlier. The lawsuit alleged that many
black, Hispanic and older teachers were disproportionately denied
the bonuses and that the program violated civil-rights laws.

"The SAT/ACT score requirement has an illegal disparate impact on
teachers based on their age and on teachers based on their black
and Hispanic race," the plaintiffs' attorneys wrote in 2017. "The
SAT/ACT score requirement is not required by business necessity and
is not related to job performance."

While the parties sought preliminary approval of the settlement [on
Sept. 19], they plan to seek final approval after a period in which
teachers can "opt out." [GN]



FORD MOTOR: Court Dismisses Sugasawara Suit With Leave to Amend
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EMERY SUGASAWARA and VINCENT TUMBARELLO, Plaintiff, v.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 18-CV-06159-LHK (N.D.
Cal.), Judge Lucy H. Koh of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, San Jose Division, granted Ford's
to motion to dismiss the second amended complaint for lack of
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

The case is a putative class action arising out of an alleged
defect with the seatbelt systems in certain Ford F-150 trucks.  The
putative class consists of consumers who have owned or leased the
vehicles at issue.  The Plaintiffs filed their original complaint
in October 2018.  They have amended their complaint twice; the
current Second Amended Complaint was filed in March 2019.

Sugasawara and Tumbarello are the named Plaintiffs, who seek to
represent a putative class of all persons in the United States who
formerly or currently own or lease one or more of the Vehicles.
The suit comprises: (1) a claim under the Consumer Legal Remedies
Act; (2) a claim under the California Unfair Competition Law; (3) a
negligence claim; (4) a design defect claim; (5) a claim under the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act; (6) a claim under the Song-Beverly
Consumer Warranty Act; and (7) a cluster of claims for violations
of over 50 "Deceptive Trade Practices Acts of the various states."

Ford filed a motion to dismiss the original Complaint and a
corresponding request for judicial notice in March 2019.  That
motion was mooted by the Plaintiffs' subsequent amendments to the
Complaint, so Ford filed the instant motion to dismiss the SAC in
June 2019.

Ford's first argument for dismissal is that, pursuant to Rule
12(b)(2), the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Tumbarello's
claims against Ford.  It also challenges both Sugasawara and
Tumbarello's Article III standing to bring any of their claims and
requests dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).  Finally, pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6), Ford contends the Plaintiffs have failed to
adequately plead the necessary elements of the causes of action.
The Plaintiffs filed their opposition on July 15, 2019, and Ford
filed its reply on Aug. 1, 2019.

Ford seeks to dismiss all the causes of action in the Second
Amended Complaint on several, often overlapping grounds.  As it
must address jurisdictional concerns first, Judge Koh begins with
the Ford's contention that the Plaintiffs lack standing.  She
concludes that Sugasawara and Tumbarello have failed to allege
plausibly a concrete, imminent injury that is traceable to Ford's
conduct.  She therefore dismisses the Plaintiffs' claims for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.  Consequently, the Judge does not
reach the Defendant's arguments that the Court lacks personal
jurisdiction over Tumbarello's claims against Ford or that the
Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

At issue in the motion are the first and second elements of Article
III standing, injury in fact and causation.  As Ford points out,
neither Sugasawara nor Tumbarello allege that the Defect manifested
in his vehicle, let alone that he experienced any harm attributable
to the Defect.  Instead, the Plaintiffs propound three basic
categories of harm: (1) the cost of repairing the Defect; (2) the
risk of future injury from the Defect; (3) economic loss from
overpaying for their Ford 150s at the time of purchase. The Court
addresses the first two -- which are only briefly alleged in the
SAC -- before focusing on the Plaintiffs' main theory of harm,
overpayment.

The Judge easily rejects the Plaintiffs' first alleged injury,
which is that the Plaintiffs have been damaged by the cost of
repairs required due to seatbelt pretension problems.  The SAC is
devoid of any allegations that Sugasawara or Tumbarello paid out of
pocket to repair or place parts of their Ford F-150s.  Even if they
had, they may have been eligible for a reimbursement from Ford.
Moreover, Ford's recall remedy is free of charge to owners of
affected vehicles.  The theory of harm fails.

Next, the Plaintiffs claim they are being subjected to potential
risk of injury.  That is, they believe the recall remedy proposed
by Ford is insufficient, and that the Defect thus continues to pose
a safety hazard.  The Judge holds the theoretical risk of future
injury from the Defect provides no basis for standing.  The
Plaintiffs have not alleged a credible threat of harm.  They
acknowledge that, through the recall process, Ford has voluntarily
provided a remedy free of charge.  The Plaintiffs have not
plausibly alleged that Ford's recall remedy will fail to cure the
Defect.  Moreover, the Complaint does not state whether Tumbarello
has availed himself of the recall remedy.  To the extent Tumbarello
has not done so, he cannot thereby manufacture standing.  Any
defect that persists in Tumbarello's truck is not fairly
"traceable" to Ford but rather to Tumbarello; causation would
therefore be lacking.

Finally, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to
adequately allege that the Defect remains after the recall remedy
has been completed.  Without a concrete injury that is fairly
traceable to Ford's alleged wrongdoing, the Plaintiffs cannot
sustain their claims.  She therefore dismisses the SAC for lack of
standing, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).  However, because the
Plaintiffs could allege additional facts to establish standing, she
grants the Plaintiffs leave to amend.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Koh granted Ford's motion to
dismiss the SAC for lack of subject matter jurisdiction with leave
to amend.  Should the Plaintiffs elect to file an amended
complaint, they will do so within 30 days.  If they fail to file an
amended complaint within 30 days or fail to cure the deficiencies
identified in the Order, the claims dismissed in the Order will be
dismissed with prejudice.  The Plaintiffs may not add new causes of
action or new parties without a stipulation or leave of the Court.

In addition, although the Judge did not reach Ford's other
arguments for dismissal.  The Plaintiffs are advised that their
amended complaint should remedy all the deficiencies identified in
Ford's motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 21, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/x7YWiI from Leagle.com.

Emery Sugasawara, Plaintiff, represented by Robert Ahdoot --
RAhdoot@ahdootwolfson.com -- Ahdoot & Wolfson, P.C., Adam A.
Edwards -- adam@gregcolemanlaw.com -- Greg Coleman Law PC, pro hac
vice, Daniel Kent Bryson -- dan@wbmllp.com -- Whitfield Bryson
Mason LLP, pro hac vice, Gregory F. Coleman, Greg Coleman Law PC,
pro hac vice, John Hunter Bryson, Whitfield Bryson & Mason LLP,
Mark E. Silvey, Greg Coleman Law PC, pro hac vice, Rachel Lynn
Soffin, Morgan and Morgan, Theodore Walter Maya --
tmaya@ahdootwolfson.com -- Ahdoot & Wolfson, P.C. & Tina Wolfson --
twolfson@ahdootwolfson.com -- Ahdoot & Wolfson, P.C.

Vincent Tumbarello, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Robert Ahdoot, Ahdoot
& Wolfson, P.C., Adam A. Edwards, Greg Coleman Law PC, pro hac
vice, Daniel Kent Bryson, Whitfield Bryson Mason LLP, pro hac vice,
Gregory F. Coleman, Greg Coleman Law PC, pro hac vice, John Hunter
Bryson, Whitfield Bryson & Mason LLP, Mark E. Silvey, Greg Coleman
Law PC, pro hac vice, Theodore Walter Maya, Ahdoot & Wolfson, P.C.
& Tina Wolfson, Ahdoot & Wolfson, P.C.

Ford Motor Company, Defendant, represented by Michael Lovejoy
Turrill -- michael.turrill@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US
LLP, David Jonathan Robbins -- david.robbins@hoganlovells.com --
Hogan Lovells US LLP, Gregory Lee Schuck -- gschuck@huielaw.com --
Huie Fernambucq and Stewart LLP, pro hac vice, James Wright Clayton
-- james.clayton@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP, pro hac
vice & Michael Kidney -- Michael.kidney@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan
Lovells US LLP, pro hac vice.

GEICO GENERAL: Court Certifies Class Under Rule 23 in Green Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned YVONNE GREEN, WILMINGTON PAIN &
REHABILITATION CENTER, and REHABILITATION ASSOCIATES, P.A., on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs
v. GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. N17C-03-242
EMD CCLD (Del., Super.), the Delaware Superior Court grants the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

The Plaintiffs sought certification of a class action under
Superior Court Civil Rule 23.  They allege that Geico uses two
computerized models to evaluate personal injury protection claims
of its insureds. The Plaintiffs argued that Geico uses the two
models to deny valid claims without evaluating the facts underlying
the claims. The Court held a hearing on the Motion on May 10,
2019.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Richard H. Cross, Jr., Esq.
          Christopher P. Simon, Esq.
          CROSS & SIMON, LLC
          Wilmington, DE

The Defendant is represented by:

          Paul A. Bradley, Esq.
          Stephanie A. Fox, Esq.
          MARON MARVEL BRADLEY ANDERSON & TARDY LLC
          Wilmington, DE

               - and -

          George M. Church, Esq.
          Laura A. Cellucci, Esq.
          MILES & STOCKBRIDGE P.C.
          Baltimore, MD


GOLDMAN SACHS: Court Appoints Lead Plaintiff, Counsel in Plaut Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order granting AP7's Motion to Appoint
Itself as Lead Plaintiff in the case captioned DANIEL PLAUT,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. THE GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC., LLOYD C. BLANKFEIN,
HARVEY M. SCHWARTZ, and R. MARTIN CHAVEZ, Defendants. No.
18-CV-12084 (VSB). (S.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiff Daniel Plaut brings this securities fraud class action
lawsuit against the Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. and certain of its
former senior officials. The action alleges that Goldman Sachs and
its officers and directors violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act (Exchange Act), as well as the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5 promulgated
pursuant to the Exchange Act.  Plaintiff alleges that news reports
of the alleged fraud and subsequent regulatory and criminal
investigations caused the price of Goldman Sachs stock to fall,
including investigations related to !Malaysia Development Bank
(1MDB).

AP7 moves to appoint itself as lead plaintiff and for approval of
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP (Kessler Topaz) and Bernstein
Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP (Bernstein Litowitz) as lead
counsel and liaison counsel, respectively.

In response to the above-mentioned motions for appointment of lead
plaintiff and approval of lead counsel and Nebraska filed notices
of non-opposition acknowledging that they do not possess the
largest financial interest.

Applicable Law

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)
establishes a procedure for the appointment of a lead plaintiff in
each private action  that is brought as a plaintiff class action
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The PSLRA provides that a district court must appoint as lead
plaintiff the member or members that the court determines to be
most capable of adequately representing the interests of class
members.

In determining which plaintiff has the greatest financial interest,
courts consider four factors: (1) the number of shares purchased
during the class period (2) the number of net shares purchased
during the class period (3) the total net funds expended during the
class period and (4) the approximate losses suffered.  

A potential lead plaintiff must also make a preliminary showing
that it satisfies the typicality and adequacy requirements of Rule
23. The Rule 23 analysis in the context of appointment of lead
plaintiff need not be as complete as would a similar determination
for the purpose of class certification. The parties moving for lead
plaintiff are only required to make a prima facie showing that they
meet the Rule 23 prerequisites, and courts need only consider the
typicality and adequacy requirements. With respect to typicality,
courts consider whether the claims of the proposed lead plaintiff
arise from the same conduct from which the other class members'
claims and injuries arise. While the claims need not be identical,
they must be substantially similar to the other members' claims.  

In considering the adequacy of a proposed lead plaintiff, a court
must consider whether the proposed lead plaintiff: (1) maintains
claims that conflict with those of the class (2) has sufficient
interest in the outcome of the case and (3) has selected counsel
that is qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the
litigation in question.  

AP7 is the Presumptive Lead Plaintiff

Comparing Financial Interests

On February 28, 2019, Safe filed a notice of non-opposition, and on
March 5, 2019, IWA Forest and Nebraska also filed notices of
non-opposition, each acknowledging that it does not possess the
largest financial interest. IWA Forest and Nebraska stated that if
the court were to determine that those with larger financial
interests are inadequate to represent the class, they would be
willing and able to serve as lead plaintiff. Because, as discussed
below, the Court finds that AP7 is an adequate lead plaintiff, the
motions from Safe, IWA Forest, and Nebraska are denied. The
remaining two movants, AP7 and Meitav, disagree about which movant
has the greatest financial interest, in large part due to their use
of different methodologies to calculate their respective financial
losses.

In support of its original motion, Meitav asserted that, during the
Class Period, it purchased 119,596 shares of Goldman Sachs common
stock and Goldman Sachs bonds in the principal amount of
$2,916,000, that it retained 110,379 shares of Goldman Sachs common
stock and Goldman Sachs bonds in the principal amount of $860,000,
and that it expended $28,576,979 on Goldman Sachs securities.  

In support of its original motion, AP7 asserted that, during the
Class Period, it purchased 179,082 shares of Goldman Sachs common
stock and that it retained 100,069 shares of Goldman Sachs common
stock, at a net cost of $21,375,937. In their respective original
motions, both Meitav and AP7 applied a traditional
last-in-first-out (LIFO) analysis, which is commonly used by courts
in this district to calculate financial loss for lead plaintiff
motions. Under the traditional LIFO approach, Meitav suffered the
greatest financial loss.

In its opposition brief, Meitav acknowledged that the certification
it filed with its motion papers inadvertently omitted certain Class
Period transactions in Goldman Sachs securities due to clerical
error, which resulted in asserted losses of $3,160,824 when using
the LIFO approach.  

AP7's opposition brief asserted that a modified LIFO approach to
loss calculation is more appropriate. Applying the Supreme Court's
finding in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345
(2005), that securities actions only provide recoveries for
economic losses that misrepresentations actually cause, courts have
elected not to include losses incurred based on in-and-out trades
that occur prior to any corrective disclosure. AP7 adds a new
element to this approach, by excluding not only those in-and-out
transactions that occurred prior to the first corrective disclosure
pled in the complaint, but also all those in-and-out transactions
that occurred in the periods between the various corrective
disclosures during the Class Period.   
Using this approach, AP7 asserts that its losses are $3,095,533 and
that Meitav's losses are $2,758,814.  

Under the circumstances presented here, in which the complaint
alleges multiple partial disclosures over the course of the Class
Period, courts have been reluctant to apply a Dura-based approach
to calculating losses. AP7 has not identified a single court that
has endorsed the approach it proposes, under which the Court would
excludes in-and-out transactions that occurred subsequent to the
first alleged corrective disclosure. Indeed, the appropriateness of
employing Dura analysis at the lead plaintiff stage is subject to
considerable dispute.

In light of the various factual issues related to the causation of
any losses occurring after the first corrective disclosure, the
Court will not apply the approach proposed by AP7. However, under
Dura, the Court is inclined to exclude in-and-out transactions
prior to the first alleged corrective disclosure, i.e., those
losses that each movant may have incurred before Defendants'
misconduct was ever disclosed to the public.

Neither movant has calculated its losses using this approach;
however, a specific calculation is unnecessary because, for the
reasons explained below, the Court finds that of the two remaining
movants, only AP7 is an adequate lead plaintiff.

The PSLRA provides that the most adequate plaintiff shall, subject
to the approval of the court, select and retain counsel to
represent the class. There is a strong presumption in favor of
approving a properly-selected lead plaintiff's decisions as to
counsel selection.

Having reviewed AP7's Memorandum of Law, as well as Silk's
Declaration and the firms' resumes attached as Exhibits D and E to
the Declaration, I find that Kessler Topaz, AP7's proposed lead
counsel, and Bernstein Litowitz, AP7's proposed liaison counsel,
will adequately and effectively represent the interests of the
class. The attorneys at those firms have substantial experience
with securities class action litigation. The Court approves AP7's
selection and appoint Kessler Topaz as lead counsel and Bernstein
Litowitz as liaison counsel.

Because the Court finds that AP7 is the presumptive lead plaintiff
and no other movants have rebutted that presumption, AP7's motion
for appointment as lead plaintiff and for approval of lead counsel
and liaison counsel is GRANTED. AP7 has a substantial financial
interest and meets the typicality and adequacy requirements of Rule
23.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 19, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y56vmosh from
Leagle.com.

Sjunde AP-Fonden, Lead Plaintiff, represented by Gerald H. Silk -
jerry@blbglaw.com - Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP.

Daniel Plaut, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph Alexander Hood, II  -
ahood@pomlaw.com - Pomerantz LLP & Jeremy Alan Lieberman -
jalieberman@pomlaw.com - Pomerantz LLP.

Zuheir R. Safe, Movant, represented by Eduard Korsinsky -
ek@zlk.com - Levi & Korsinsky, LLP.
IWA Forest Industry Pension Plan, Movant, represented by Frederic
Scott Fox, Sr.- ffox@kaplanfox.com - Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP.

Nebraksa Investment Council, Movant, represented by Christopher J.
Keller - ckeller@labaton.com - Labaton Sucharow, LLP, Eric James
Belfi - ebelfi@labaton.com - Labaton Sucharow, LLP & Francis Paul
McConville - fmcconville@labaton.com - Labaton & Sucharow LLP.

Meitav Dash Provident Funds and Pension Ltd., Movant, represented
by Jeremy Alan Lieberman , Pomerantz LLP.

The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Lloyd C. Blankfein, Harvey M.
Schwartz & R. Martin Chavez, Defendants, represented by Benjamin
Robert Walker - walkerb@sullcrom.com - Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP,
David Maxwell Rein - reind@sullcrom.com - Sullivan & Cromwell LLP,
Matthew Alexander Schwartz - schwartzmatthew@sullcrom.com -
Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP, Sharon L. Nelles - nelless@sullcrom.com -
Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP & Stephen Hendrix Oliver Clarke -
clarkest@sullcrom.com - Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP.


GRUMA CORP: Arbitration Order in Maravilla FLSA Suit Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JESUS MARAVILLA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GRUMA
CORPORATION, doing business as Mission Tortillas,
Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 18-20570 (5th Cir.), the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's order
compelling arbitration.

Maravilla and Gruma, entered into an agreement that Maravilla would
sell and distribute food products to Gruma's retail customers
within a specified area in Texas.  The Agreement stated that
Maravilla agrees that he is not an employee of Gruma for any
purpose, but is an Independent sales and distribution contractor.
The parties also mutually disclaimed and waived the right to pursue
class action claims against one another.

On April 26, 2018, Maravilla filed a purported collective Fair
Labor Standards Act action against Gruma, along with a motion for
class certification.  On May 16, 2018, Gruma filed its first motion
to dismiss, alternatively a motion to compel arbitration, as well
as a motion to stay class certification proceedings.

Maravilla then filed an amended complaint that added collective
action allegations, among other allegations, and a response to
Gruma's first motion to dismiss.  He argued in his response that
the Agreement containing the arbitration provision was invalid and
unenforceable because he is "not proficient in written English" and
therefore the contract was unconscionable.

The same day that Maravilla filed his response, Gruma filed a
second motion to dismiss seeking dismissal of Maravilla's claims
and compelling arbitration.  Gruma notes in its appellate brief
that Maravilla did not file a separate response to Gruma's second
motion to dismiss.  However, the district court concluded that
because Gruma's arguments regarding arbitration were "virtually
identical" in both its first and second motion to dismiss,
Maravilla's response applied with equal force to Gruma's second
motion to dismiss.

On July 26, 2018, the district court granted Gruma's second motion
to dismiss and compelled Maravilla to arbitrate the dispute
individually.  Maravilla timely appealed, challenging the district
court's dismissal of his claims in favor of arbitration.  On
appeal, he contends that the district court erred in its
determination that the arbitration clause was enforceable.  He
maintains that the Agreement was unconscionable (and thus
unenforceable) because it was in English and he "was not proficient
in written English."

Because Maravilla's unconscionability argument targets the
Agreement as a whole and because he fails to specifically challenge
the delegation clause, the Appellate Court treats the delegation
clause as valid.  Therefore, Maravilla's arguments regarding the
validity of the Agreement, which includes the arbitration
provision, must be submitted to the arbitrator.  For these reasons,
the Fifth Circuit affirms district court's order compelling
arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/iZVyrS from Leagle.com.

James Staley -- jim.staley@ogletree.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

Alfonso Kennard, Jr. -- alfonso.kennard@kennardlaw.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Benjamin Robert Holland -- ben.holland@ogletree.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Elizabeth Ruth Gift -- elizabeth.gift@ogletree.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

GULF2BAY SOFTWASH: Mejia Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Marcos Mejia, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. GULF2BAY SOFTWASH CORP., NORTH AMERICAN CHIMINEY &
GUTTER CORP. DAVID F. JARETT, in his individual capacity,
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-05286-JMA-AKT (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 17,
2019), seeks to recover unpaid minimum and overtime wages that the
Defendants owe the Plaintiff and similarly situated current and
former non-exempt employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
New York Labor Law and the supporting New York State Department of
Labor Regulations.

The Defendants have profited at the expense of their current and
former employees who performed labor for the Defendants' companies
by failing to pay said workers the state and federal proper minimum
wage and/or overtime wages for each hour they worked and overtime
for hours over 40, and/or spread hours, Mr. Mejia alleges. The
Defendants willfully violated the FLSA and the New York Labor Law
by failing to pay its employees, including the Plaintiff, minimum
wage and/or overtime pay compensation and/or spread of hours pay as
required by federal and state law, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was a laborer working in a variety of positions
ranging from exterior home washing to chimney repair.

Gulf2Bay Softwash is a company engaged in the business of home
exterior and detail washing.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Delvis Melendez, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF DELVIS MELENDEZ, P.C.
          90 Bradley Street
          Brentwood, NY 11717
          Telephone: 631-434-1443


HEADWAY TECHNOLOGIES: Barbera Sues Over HDD Spring Price-fixing
---------------------------------------------------------------
JOSEPH LA BARBERA, individually and on behalf of all those
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. HEADWAY TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
HUTCHINSON TECHNOLOGY INC., MAGNECOMP PRECISION TECHNOLOGY PUBLIC
CO. LTD., NAT PERIPHERAL (DONG GUAN) CO., LTD., NAT PERIPHERAL
(H.K.) CO., LTD., NHK SPRING CO. LTD., NHK INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION, NHK SPRING (THAILAND) CO., LTD., NHK SPRING PRECISION
(GUANGZHOU) CO., LTD., SAE MAGNETICS (H.K.) LTD., AND TDK
CORPORATION, Defendants, Case No. 0:19-cv-02570-SRN-DTS (D. Minn.,
Sept. 20, 2019) is a Class Action Complaint against Defendants and
their co-conspirators as a result of their unlawful conduct in
contracting, combining, or conspiring to fix, raise, maintain,
and/or stabilize prices of HDD suspension assemblies from
approximately May 2008 to at least April 2016.

Hard disk drives ("HDD") are incorporated into electronic devices,
such as desktop computers, laptops, gaming consoles, MP3 players,
printers, and copy machines, or sold as stand-alone storage
devices. Suspension assemblies are an important component of the
HDD because they hold the recording heads close to the disks and
provide the electrical connection from the recording heads to the
hard disk drives' circuitry.

The complaint alleges that the Defendants and their co-conspirators
participated in a combination and conspiracy to suppress and
eliminate competition for HDD suspension assemblies by agreeing to
rig bids for, and to fix, stabilize, and maintain the prices of HDD
suspension assemblies sold in the United States and elsewhere. The
combination and conspiracy engaged in by the Defendants and their
co-conspirators was an unreasonable restraint of interstate and
foreign trade and commerce in violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act, and state antitrust, unfair competition, consumer protection
laws, and the common law of unjust enrichment. As a direct and
proximate result of the anticompetitive and unlawful conduct,
Plaintiff and the Classes paid more during the Class Period for HDD
suspension assemblies than they otherwise would have paid in a
competitive market, and have thereby suffered antitrust injury to
their business or property, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Joseph La Barbera is a resident of New York and purchased
at least one HDD suspension assembly indirectly from at least one
Defendant.

Defendants are manufacturers and suppliers of HDD suspension
assemblies throughout and into the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Shawn J. Wanta, Esq.
     Frances E. Baillon, Esq.
     BAILLON THOME JOZWIAK & WANTA LLP
     100 South Fifth Street, Suite 1200
     Minneapolis, MN 55402
     Phone: (612) 252-3570
     Fax: (612) 252-3571
     Email: sjwanta@baillonthome.com
            febaillon@baillonthome.com

          - and -

     David P. McLafferty, Esq.
     MCLAFFERTY LAW FIRM, P.C.
     923 Fayette Street
     Conchohocken, PA 19428
     Phone: (612) 940-4000
     Facsimile: (612) 940-4007
     Email: dmclafferty@mclaffertylaw.com


HEADWAY TECHNOLOGIES: Leff Sues Over HDD Spring Price-fixing
------------------------------------------------------------
JORDAN LEFF, JAMES SALLINGER, AND LAUREN SALLINGER, Plaintiffs, v.
HEADWAY TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; HUTCHINSON TECHNOLOGY INC.; MAGNECOMP
PRECISION TECHNOLOGY PUBLIC CO. LTD.; NAT PERIPHERAL (DONG GUAN)
CO., LTD.; NAT PERIPHERAL (H.K.) CO., LTD.; NHK SPRING CO. LTD.;
NHK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION; NHK SPRING (THAILAND) CO., LTD.; NHK
SPRING PRECISION (GUANGZHOU) CO., LTD.; SAE MAGNETICS (H.K.) LTD.;
AND TDK CORPORATION, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-12759-DML-DRG
(E.D. Mich., Sept. 20, 2019) is a class action for damages,
injunctive relief and other relief pursuant to federal antitrust
laws, state antitrust, unfair competition, and consumer protection
laws, and the laws of unjust enrichment against Defendants.

Plaintiffs' claims arise from Defendants' unlawful agreement to
eliminate competition, fix prices, and allocate markets for hard
disk drive suspension assemblies ("HDD Suspension Assemblies") sold
in the United States. Plaintiffs bring this antitrust action
against the dominant manufacturers and suppliers of HDD Suspension
Assemblies for engaging in a global anticompetitive conspiracy to
fix prices and allocate market shares for HDD Suspension Assembles.
At all relevant times, Defendant manufactured and sold HDD
Suspension Assemblies throughout and into the United States. As of
2016, Defendants NHK and TDK, and their subsidiaries, were the
leading manufacturers of HDD Suspension Assemblies with a combined
worldwide market share in excess of 90 percent.

The complaint asserts that Defendants and their co-conspirators
have participated in a combination and conspiracy to suppress and
eliminate competition for HDD Suspension Assemblies by agreeing to
rig bids for, and to fix, stabilize, and maintain the prices of HDD
Suspension Assemblies sold in the United States and elsewhere. The
combination and conspiracy engaged in by Defendants and their
co-conspirators was an unreasonable restraint of interstate and
foreign trade and commerce in violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act, and state antitrust, unfair competition, consumer protection
laws, and the common law of unjust enrichment. As a direct and
proximate cause of Defendants' anticompetitive and unlawful
conduct, Plaintiffs and the Classes paid more for HDD Suspension
Assemblies that they otherwise would have paid in a competitive
market, and have thereby suffered antitrust injury to their
business or property, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Jordan Leff is a resident of Michigan and purchased at
least one HDD Suspension Assembly indirectly from at least one
Defendant.

Defendants are manufacturers and suppliers of HDD suspension
assemblies throughout and into the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Paul F. Novak, Esq.
     Diana Gjonaj, Esq.
     Gregory Stamatopoul, Esq.
     Tiffany Ellis, Esq.
     WEITZ & LUXENBERG P.C.
     3011 West Grand Blvd, Suite 2150
     Detroit, MI 48202
     Phone: (313) 800-4170
     Email: pnovak@weitzlux.com
            dgjonaj@weitzlux.com
            gstamatopoulos@weitzlux.com
            tellis@weitzlux.com

          - and -

     Peggy J. Wedgworth, Esq.
     Elizabeth McKenna, Esq.
     MILBERG PHILLIPS GROSSMAN LLP
     One Penn Plaza, 19th Floor
     New York, NY 10119
     Phone: (212) 594-5300
     Email: pwedgworth@milberg.com
            emckenna@milberg.com


HEALTHY HEART: Underpays Route Drivers, Hernandez Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
FERNANDO HERNANDEZ, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. HEALTHY HEART FOOD SERVICE, INC., DANIEL
SPIRA, and JONATHAN SPIRA, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05371 (E.D.
N.Y., Sept. 20, 2019) is a case brought under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Defendants knew that nonpayment or underpayment of minimum
wage; nonpayment or underpayment of overtime; failing to provide
Plaintiffs with legally-required wage notices; and failing to
provide Plaintiffs with legally-required wage statements, would
economically injure Plaintiffs.  Yet, the Defendants committed the
alleged acts knowingly, intentionally, and willfully, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff Hernandez was employed by Defendants as a route driver
from approximately December 2016 to July 2019.

Healthy Heart is engaged in the business of meal preparation and
delivery to senior centers, day care facilities, private and public
schools, and corporations.[BN]

The Plaintiff it represented by:

     Michael P. Pappas, Esq.
     MICHAEL P. PAPPAS LAW FIRM, P.C.
     3 Columbus Circle, 15th Floor
     New York, NY 10019
     Phone: (646) 770-7890
     Fax: (646) 417-6688


HILTON WORLDWIDE: Faces Winnie Suit in District of Puerto Rico
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hilton International
of Puerto Rico, Inc., et al. The case is captioned as Jonathan
Winnie, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. Hilton Worldwide Holdings, Inc.; Hilton
International of Puerto Rico, Inc.; Park Hotels & Resorts, Inc.;
and Puerto Rico Caribe Lessee, LLC, the Defendants, Case No.
3:19-cv-01859-FAB (D.P.R., Sept. 11, 2019). The suit demands $1
million in damages. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge
Francisco A. Besosa.

Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc., formerly Hilton Hotels Corporation,
is an American multinational hospitality company that manages and
franchises a broad portfolio of hotels and resorts. Founded by
Conrad Hilton in May 1919, the corporation is now led by
Christopher J. Nassetta.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Jane A. Becker-Whitaker, Esq.
          BECKER & VISSEPO
          PO Box 9023914
          San Juan, PR 00902-3914
          Telephone: (787) 945-2406
          Facsimile: (787) 585-3824
          E-mail: jbw@beckervissepo.com

HOMEFED CORP: Consolidation of Stockholder Cases Sought
-------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the Rose and Geser lawsuits ask the Court to rule
that:

     1. The Rose Action and the Geser Action are consolidated for
all purposes into C.A. No. 2019-0592-KSJM (Consolidated Action).

     2.The Consolidated Action shall bear this caption:

IN RE HOMEFED CORPORATION STOCKHOLDER LITIGATION
CONSOLIDATED C.A. No. 2019-0592-KSJM

     3. All future filings shall be made in Consolidated C.A. No.
2019-0592-KSJM.

     4. All papers and documents filed and served to date in each
of the cases consolidated herein are deemed part of the record in
the Consolidated Action.

     5. The Plaintiffs must file a Consolidated Class Action
Complaint. The Defendants need not move, answer or otherwise
respond to the complaint filed in the Geser Action. Following the
filing of the Consolidated Class Action Complaint, Co-Lead Counsel
will confer with counsel for the Defendants concerning an
appropriate schedule to move, answer, and/or
otherwise respond to the Consolidated Amended Class Action
Complaint.

     6. All actions subsequently filed in or transferred to this
Court that involve questions of law or fact similar to those
contained in the Consolidated Actoin shall be automatically
consolidated into the Consolidated Action.

     7. When a case that properly belongs as part of the
Consolidated Action is hereafter filed in the Court, this Court
requests the assistance of counsel in calling the related action to
the Court's attention and to assist it in ensuring that counsel in
subsequent actions receives notice of this Order.

     8. Plaintiffs Rose and Murray are appointed Co-Lead Plaintiffs
in the Consolidated Action.

     9. The law firms of Andrews & Springer LLC, 3801 Kennett Pike,
Building C, Suite 305, Wilmington, Delaware 19807, Friedman Oster &
Tejtel PLLC, 152 Bedford Road, Suite A, Katonah, New York 10536,
and Labaton Sucharow LLP, 300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1340,
Wilmington, Delaware 19801, are appointed Co-Lead Counsel in the
Consolidated Action.

    10. The law firm of Wolf Popper LLP, 845 Third Avenue, New
York, NY 10022 is hereby designated as Additional Counsel.

    11. Co-Lead Counsel shall set policy for the plaintiffs for the
prosecution of the Consolidated Action, delegate and monitor the
work performed by plaintiff's attorneys, including Additional
Counsel, to ensure there is no duplication of efforts or
unnecessary expense, and have the authority to negotiate a
settlement. Any agreement reached between counsel for the
defendants and any of the Co-Lead Counsel shall be binding on all
plaintiffs.

    12. Co-Lead Counsel shall be responsible for coordinating all
activities and appearances on behalf of plaintiffs and for the
dissemination of notices and orders of this Court, as well as for
communications to and from this Court. No motion, request for
discovery or other pretrial or trial proceeding shall be initiated
or filed by any plaintiff except through Co-Lead Counsel.

The Rose Action is captioned as RICHARD ROSE and DENNIS E. MURRAY
SR., On Behalf of Themselves and All Other Similarly Situated
Former Stockholders of HOMEFED CORPORATION, the Plaintiffs, v.
JOSEPH STEINBERG, BRIAN FRIEDMAN, JIMMY HALLAC, PATRICK BIENVENUE,
PAUL BORDEN, TIMOTHY CONSIDINE, MICHAEL LOBATZ, and JEFFERIES
FINANCIAL GROUP INC., the Defendants, Case No. 2019-0592-KSJM (Del.
Chcy, Filed Aug. 1, 2019).

The Geser Action is captioned as LOUIS GESER, the Plaintiff, vs.
JEFFERIES FINANCIAL GROUP INC., JOSEPH S. STEINBERG, TIMOTHY M.
CONSIDINE, AND MICHAEL A. LOBATZ, the Defendant, Case No.
2019-0681-AGB (Del. Chcy., Filed Aug. 21, 2019)[CC]

Counsel for Richard Rose and Dennis E. Murray Sr., are:

          David M. Sborz, Esq.
          Peter B. Andrews, Esq.
          Craig J. Springer, Esq.
          ANDREWS & SPRINGER LLC
          3801 Kennett Pike
          Building C, Suite 305
          Wilmington, DE 19807
          Telephone: (302) 504-4957

               - and -

          John Vielandi, Esq.
          David MacIsaac, Esq.
          Ned Weinberger, Esq.
          LABATON SUCHAROW LLP
          300 Delaware Ave., Suite 1340
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 573-2540

               - and -

          Jeremy S. Friedman, Esq.
          David F.E. Tejtel, Esq.
          FRIEDMAN OSTER & TEJTEL PLLC
          493 Bedford Center Road, Suite 2D
          Bedford Hills, NY 10507
          Telephone: (888) 529-1108

               - and -

          D. Seamus Kaskela, Esq.
          KASKELA LAW LLC
          18 Campus Boulevard, Suite 100
          Newtown Square, PA 19073
          Telephone: (888) 715-1740

Counsel for Louis Geser are:

          Carl L. Stine, Esq.
          WOLF POPPER LLP
          845 Third Avenue
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 759-4600

               - and -

          P. Bradford deLeeuw, Esq.
          ROSENTHAL, MONHAIT & GODDESS, P.A.
          919 Market Street, Suite 1401
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 656-4433

INDIANA: Court Dismisses Harmon Suit for Failure to State Claim
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVID J. HARMON, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT E. CARTER,
DUSHAN ZATECKY, DUANE ALSIP, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-03281-JRS-MJD (S.D. Ind.), Judge James R. Sweeney, II of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana,
Indianapolis Division, (i) dismissed the complaint; (ii) granted
Mr. Harman's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis; (iii)
denied the Plaintiff's motion to maintain suit as a class action;
and (iv) denied the Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining
order.

Mr. Harman is a prisoner at the Pendleton Correctional Facility
(Pendleton).  He brings the civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983.  The complaint names these parties as Defendants: 1)
Commissioner Robert E. Carter; 2) Warden Dushan Zatecky; and 3)
Assistant Warden Duane Alsip.  He sues each Defendant in his
individual and official capacity.  He seeks compensatory and
punitive damages and injunctive relief.

The Plaintiff alleges that Pendleton is overcrowded.  He alleges
that (i) the Warden and Assistant Warden have started
double-bunking inmates; (ii) due to the overcrowding and being on
lockdown, medical treatments have been delayed and denied; and
(iii) many inmates have suffered from delayed treatment.

The Plaintiff further alleges that Pendleton is understaffed which
has led to denials of recreation and visitation.  He alleges that
violence among the prison inmates has increased.  Also on his list
of complaints is the number of hours between meals, that the
nutritional value of meals is not adequate for grown men, and the
kitchen equipment is not properly sanitized.  Finally, he complains
that the Indiana Department of Correction ("IDOC") has revised the
grievance policies to make it more difficult for inmates to
complete the process.  He alleges that these conditions violate his
Eighth Amendment rights.

The matter is before the Court for resolution of the three motions
by Mr. Harman--Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis,
Motion to Maintain Suit as a Class Action, and Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order--and for screening of his complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. Section 1915A(b).

Judge Sweeney finds that the overarching problem with the
Plaintiff's complaint is that he does not allege that he has
suffered any compensable injury as a result of overcrowding or the
other conditions he describes.  Double-bunking in prison also is
not per se unconstitutional.  The Plaintiff alleges no violence or
other injuries that he suffered as a result of double-bunking and
overcrowding.  His double-bunking claim is, thus, dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

While the Plaintiff alleges generally that inmates are being denied
adequate and timely medical care, the Judge finds the he does not
allege that he has been denied any specific treatment.  Absent an
allegation that he has a serious medical condition and has been
denied necessary treatment, the Plaintiff cannot state a viable
Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference.  His denial of
medical care claim is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.

While nutritional food and opportunity for exercise are two of
life's necessities, the Plaintiff has not also alleged that he has
been denied meals on a regular basis, lost weight as a result of
lack of food, been denied access to the commissary to purchase
additional food, or been denied the ability to exercise in or
outside of his cell.  Again, because he has not alleged that he has
suffered these or other types of harm, his inadequate food and
recreation claims are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, rules the Court.

The Court further orders that with respect to the change in the
IDOC grievance policies, no action lies under Section 1983 unless a
plaintiff has asserted the violation of a federal right.  The
Plaintiff's allegations of violations of or changes in IDOC policy
does not support a claim under section 1983 and are therefore
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.

Finally, the complaint contains no allegations of personal
wrongdoing on the part of Commissioner Carter.  Any claim against
Commissioner Carter is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.

For these reasons, the complaint must be dismissed for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, rules Judge
Sweeney.

The Judge granted Mr. Harman's motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis to the extent that he is assessed an initial partial
filing fee of $27.33  Mr. Harman will have through Oct. 4, 2019, to
pay this sum to the clerk of the district court.  Although Mr.
Harman is excused from pre-paying the full filing fee, he still
must pay the $350 filing fee when able.

Next, to certify a class, a plaintiff must establish, among other
things, that he will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class.  In nearly all instances, a pro se prisoner will not be
an adequate class representative.  The complaint is being dismissed
for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  For
that reason and because the Plaintiff is pro se, the Judge denied
the Plaintiff's motion to maintain suit as a class action.

The Judge also denied the Plaintiff's motion for a temporary
restraining order.  Because the Plaintiff's complaint has been
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, the Judge cannot conclude at this time that the Plaintiff
is likely to prevail on any of his claims.

The Plaintiff will have through Oct. 4, 2019, to either show cause
why Judgment consistent with this Order should not issue or file an
amended complaint which cures the deficiencies discussed in the
Order.  Any amended complaint would completely replace the original
complaint and therefore must be complete.  Any amended complaint
must include the words "First Amended Complaint" and the proper
case number, 1:19-cv-03281-JRS-MJD, on the first page.  If the
plaintiff fails to respond to this order to show cause, the case
will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, without further notice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/WNVBQJ from Leagle.com.

DAVID J. HARMON, Plaintiff, pro se.

ROBERT E. CARTER, Defendant, pro se.

DUSHAN ZATECKY, Defendant, pro se.

DUANE ALSIP, Defendant, pro se.

INDIANA: Court Junks Westville Inmate's Bid to Pursue Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, South Bend Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting
Leave to Proceed on a Claim for Money Damages in the case captioned
LAWRENCE WHITFIELD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. WESTVILLE CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY, et al., Defendants. Cause No. 3:19-CV-692-JD-MGG. (N.D.
Ind.).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915A, this court must review the
complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious,
fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.

In the complaint, Whitfield, who identifies as a member of the
Moorish American community, alleges that Chaplain Walton and
Chaplain Shultz discriminate against Moorish Americans at the
Westville Correctional Facility by canceling religious services
based on allegations of gang activity and drug trafficking. He also
asserts that Chaplain Walton and Chaplain Shultz refuse to allow
inmates to possess Moorish American religious materials outside of
services or to make copies of Moorish American religious materials
that are available at the facility, including the Holy Koran of the
Moorish Temple Science of America.  

Whitfield seeks to file a class action on behalf of Moorish
Americans at the Westville Correctional Facility. A class action
may proceed only if the class representative will fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the class. This case presents
no exception as there is no indication that Whitfield has the
necessary legal expertise or the professional qualifications to
adequately represent the legal interests of others. Therefore,
Whitfield may not pursue a class action in this case.

Whitfield asserts that the defendants have violated his right to
exercise his religion as a Moorish American. Prisoners have a right
to exercise their religion under the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment. Nevertheless, correctional officials may restrict
the exercise of religion if the restrictions are reasonably related
to legitimate penological objectives, which include safety,
security, and economic concerns. The Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) affords even broader
protections than the First Amendment.

This act prohibits governmental entities from imposing a
substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing
in or confined to an institution unless the government demonstrates
that imposition of the burden on that person is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means
of furthering that compelling governmental interest. A restriction
imposes a substantial burden on an inmate's religious practice when
it seriously violates or contradicts an inmate's religious beliefs.
Though money damages and injunctive relief are available under the
First Amendment, only injunctive relief is available under RLUIPA.


Whitfield plausibly alleges First Amendment claims for money
damages against Chaplain Walton and Chaplain Shultz for cancelling
his religious services and restricting his access to religious
materials. He also plausibly alleges First Amendment claims against
Religious Director Libel and Commissioner Carter for prohibiting
him from observing Fridays as his holy day of the week.

However, Whitfield may not proceed on the allegations regarding
departmental policy and the labelling him as a member of a black
Muslim group because it is unclear how these allegations amount to
a violation of his right to exercise his religion.  

For these reasons, the court:

   (1) GRANTS Lawrence Whitfield leave to proceed on a claim for
money damages against Chaplain Walton and Chaplain Shultz for
violating his rights under the Free Exercise Clause by cancelling
his religious services and restricting his access to religious
materials.

   (2) GRANTS Lawrence Whitfield leave to proceed on a claim for
money damages against Religious Director Liebel and Commissioner
Carter for violating his rights under the Free Exercise Clause by
prohibiting him from observing Fridays as his holy day of the
week.

   (3) GRANTS Lawrence Whitfield leave to proceed on a claim for
injunctive relief under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act against Commissioner Carter in his
official capacity for religious materials and for him to be allowed
to observe Fridays as his holy day of the week.

   (4) DISMISSES the Moorish American Community and the Westville
Correctional Facility;

   (5) DISMISSES all other claims.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 19, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available at  https://tinyurl.com/y5a22lo5 from
Leagle.com.

Lawrence Whitfield, Plaintiff, pro se.


INTERNATIONAL MEDICATION: Brenes Seeks Minimum & Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------------------------
RAQUEL BRENES, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. INTERNATIONAL MEDICATION SYSTEMS,
LTD., a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. 19STCV32241 (Cal. Super., Sept. 11, 2019),
alleges that Defendants failed failed to pay minimum and regular
rate wages, failed to pay overtime compensation, failed to provide
meal periods, and failed to authorize and permit rest breaks under
the California Labor Code.

The Plaintiff worked for Defendants in Los Angeles County,
California as a planning clerk from approximately October 2017 to
April 2019. The Defendants classified Plaintiff as non-exempt from
California's overtime requirements. During the statutory time
period, the Plaintiff was typically scheduled to work five days in
a workweek, and typically eight or more hours in a single workday,
but the Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff for all hours worked.

International Medication Systems operates as a specialty
pharmaceutical company. The Company develops, manufactures,
markets, and sells generic and proprietary injectable and
inhalation products.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Kane Moon, Esq.
          H. Scott Leviant, Esq.
          Lilit Ter-Astvatsatryan, Esq.
          MOON & YANG, APC
          1055 W. Seventh St., Suite 1880
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 232-3128
          Facsimile: (213) 232-3125
          E-mail: kane.moon@moonyanglaw.com
                  scott.leviant@moonyanglaw.com
                  lilit@moonyanglaw.com

JUST ENERGY: Rosen Law Files Securities Fraud Suit
--------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announces it has
filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Just Energy Group Inc. (NYSE: JE) from November 9,
2017 through August 19, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The
lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Just Energy investors under
the federal securities laws.

To join the Just Energy class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1631.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Just Energy experienced customer enrollment and
nonpayment issues; (2) Just Energy had not taken appropriate
reserves to its trade receivables to reflect these issues, thereby
rendering previously issued financial results it publicly
disseminated materially false and misleading; (3) Just Energy
lacked adequate internal controls over its financial reporting; and
(4) as a result of the foregoing, defendants' positive statements
about the Company's business, operations, and prospects were
materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.. When the
true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that investors
suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than September
30, 2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If you
wish to join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1631.htmlor to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013.   Rosen Law Firm has secured hundreds
of millions of dollars for investors.

Contact:

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
         New York, NY  10016
         Tel: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Website: www.rosenlegal.com
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com
                cases@rosenlegal.com [GN]


JUUL LABS: McFaull Sues Over Deceptive Marketing of Vape Products
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN MCFAULL, individually and on behalf of those similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC., and PAX LABS, INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 5:19-cv-00378-DCR (E.D. Ky., Sept. 17, 2019),
is an action for violation of the Kentucky Consumer Protection
laws, fraud, unjust enrichment, failure to warn, breach of implied
and express warranties, negligence, and public nuisance.


This case arises out of the Defendants' false and deceptive sale,
marketing, labeling and advertising of JUUL e-cigarette devices and
JUUL pods which came into the market in 2015. The Plaintiff alleges
that the Defendants knew that JUUL e-cigarettes were not safe under
any circumstances for non-smokers and posed a risk of aggravating
nicotine addiction in those already addicted to nicotine.

The Defendants also knew that JUUL's nicotine solution could
deliver more nicotine into the bloodstream than a cigarette, and
did so more quickly than a cigarette. The Defendants were under a
duty to disclose these material facts, but never did so, the
Plaintiff contends. Instead, the Defendants continued to
disseminate false, misleading and deceitful information to
Plaintiff and the public on JUUL's website, interviews, in
advertisements and through social media. The Defendants created an
online culture and community targeted to young people, including
minors, and designed to encourage JUUL use. The Defendants'
advertisements have been wildly successful in disseminating false
information, primarily to teens and young adults on social media
platforms, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff purchased and used a JUUL e-cigarette and/or JUUL
Pods in Kentucky.

Juul Labs, Inc. ("JUUL") is incorporated in Delaware, with its
principal place of business in San Francisco, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Barbara D. Bonar, Esq.
          BONAR, BUCHER & RANKIN, PSC
          3611 Decoursey Avenue
          Covington, KY 41015
          Telephone: (859) 431-3333
          Facsimile: (859) 392-3900
          E-mail: bdbonar@lawatbdb.com

               - and -

          Joseph G. Tekulve, Esq.
          785 Ohio Pike
          Cincinnati, OH 45245
          Telephone: (513) 752-0001
          Facsimile: (513) 752-0289
          E-mail: joetekulvelaw@gmail.com


KARYOPHARM THERAPEUTICS: Mehdi Files Securities Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
HEATHER MEHDI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. KARYOPHARM THERAPEUTICS INC., MICHAEL G.
KAUFFMAN, SHARON SHACHAM, JUSTIN A. RENZ, MICHAEL F. FALVEY, GAREN
G. BOHLIN, MIKAEL DOLSTEN, SCOTT GARLAND, BARRY E. GREENE, MANSOOR
RAZA MIRZA, DEEPA R. PAKIANATHAN, and KENNETH E. WEG, Defendants,
Case No. 1:19-cv-11972-JGD (D. Mass., Sept. 17, 2019), is a
securities class action brought on behalf of all persons or
entities that purchased shares of Karyopharm's securities:

     (i) between March 2, 2017, and February 22, 2019, inclusive;

    (ii) in or traceable to the Company's public offering of
         common stock conducted on or around April 28, 2017; or

   (iii) in or traceable to the Company's public offering of
         common stock conducted on May 7, 2018.

Karyopharm is a clinical-stage pharmaceutical company focused on
the development of drugs for the treatment of cancer.  The
Company's lead drug candidate was selinexor, which is intended for
the treatment of various types of cancer, including principally
blood cancers.

The claims asserted in the complaint are alleged against Karyopharm
and certain of the Company's Officers, and Karyopharm's Board of
Directors, including the directors that signed the Registration
Statements for the Offerings, and arise under the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This matter arises
from the Defendants' material misrepresentations and omissions
regarding results from clinical trials for selinexor's treatment of
patients with certain types of blood cancer: the Phase 2 SOPRA
trial ("SOPRA"), which evaluated selinexor for treatment of
patients with acute myeloid leukemia ("AML"); and Part 2 of the
Phase 2b STORM trial ("STORM"), which evaluated the safety and
efficacy of selinexor in treating patients with multiple myeloma
("MM").

The Class Period begins on March 2, 2017, when the Company reported
interim results from the SOPRA study. Specifically, the Company
announced that the study did not reach statistical significance for
overall survival among AML patients, the study's primary endpoint,
and, as a result, the Company halted the trial. Despite
Karyopharm's decision to halt the trial, the Company assured
investors that selinexor was "well-tolerated" by patients and
explained that there were "no new clinically significant adverse
events in the patients receiving selinexor." The Company also
continued moving forward with the STORM study and repeatedly touted
selinexor's safety profile. The Company continued to tout the
commercial prospects for selinexor and consistently described
selinexor as having a "predictable and manageable tolerability
profile" and a "very nice safety profile," and assured investors
that it was "well tolerated" by patients. Karyopharm also claimed
that selinexor had the potential to be used as a new treatment for
MM, with limited and manageable side effects. As a result of these
misrepresentations, Karyopharm shares traded at artificially
inflated prices during the Class Period.

The truth was revealed on February 22, 2019, when, in advance of an
FDA advisory committee meeting to review Karyopharm's New Drug
Application ("NDA") for selinexor and assess the drug's risks and
benefits, the FDA released a briefing document expressing serious
concerns about the safety and efficacy of selinexor (the "FDA
Report"). Significantly, the FDA Report revealed that, contrary to
Karyopharm's assurances, the previously cancelled SOPRA trial had
resulted in "worse overall survival" for AML patients treated with
selinexor, which "highlighted the toxicity of this drug." These
disclosures caused the Company's stock price to decline from $8.97
per share to $5.07 per share, or more than 43%, on February 22,
2019.

As a result of the Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, the Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff purchased Karyopharm securities at artificially
inflated prices during the Class Period, the Plaintiff
asserts.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Glen DeValerio, Esq.
          Daryl Andrews, Esq.
          ANDREWS DEVALERIO LLP
          265 Franklin Street, Suite 1702
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (617) 936-2796
          E-mail: glen@andrewsdevalerio.com
                  daryl@andrewsdevalerio.com

               - and -

          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
          E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          10 South La Salle Street, Suite 3505
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 377-1181
          Facsimile: (312) 377-1184
          E-mail: pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com


KERYX BIOPHARMACEUTICALS: Court Denies Certification in Karth
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
issued a Memorandum and Order denies Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification in the case captioned TIM KARTH, on behalf of himself
and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. KERYX
BIOPHARMACEUTICALS, INC. et al., Defendants. Civil Action No.
16-11745-DJC. (D. Mass.).

Named Plaintiff Tim Karth (Karth) has filed this putative class
action against Defendants Keryx Biopharmaceuticals, Inc. (Keryx)
and certain of Keryx's former and current executives and directors
alleging violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule
10b-5 promulgated thereunder (Count I) and Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act (Count II).

Standard of Review

Class Certification

A class action may be certified only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Where, as here, Named Plaintiff has moved to certify a class under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), the Court must also determine whether
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods.  

Ascertainability

Before addressing the Rule 23(a) and (b) analysis, the Court must
determine whether the scope of the class is appropriate, i.e.,
whether it is administratively feasible. A class must be
determinable by stable and objective factors at the outset of a
case very class member must be identified, but the class must be
sufficiently ascertainable to permit a court to decide and declare
who will receive notice, who will share in any recovery, and who
will be bound by the judgment. The definition for the proposed
class here identifies members by their purchase of Keryx securities
during a defined time period. The Court, therefore, concludes that
Karth has provided objective criteria for defining the class and
has satisfied his initial burden of showing ascertainability.

Rule 23(a) Requirements

Numerosity

The Court must now determine whether the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable. No minimum number of
plaintiffs is required but generally if the named plaintiff
demonstrates that the potential number of plaintiffs exceeds 40,
the first prong of Rule 23(a) has been met. Karth contends, and
Defendants do not dispute, that he has met his burden with respect
to numerosity because during the proposed class period Keryx
securities traded at such a high volume that the class necessarily
includes at least hundreds of members.  

The Court concludes that the putative class satisfies the
numerosity requirement.  

Commonality

Karth also must demonstrate that there are questions of law or fact
common to the class.  Commonality is satisfied where the claims at
issue depend upon a common contention  of such a nature that it is
capable of classwide resolution which means that determination of
its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the
validity of each one of the claims in one stroke. Karth asserts
that the class shares common questions of law and fact, including
whether Keryx violated federal securities laws through
misrepresentation and/or omission of material facts and the
scienter of the Individual Defendants. Defendants either do not
object to commonality or contend that the proposed class lacks
commonality for the same reasons it cannot satisfy the predominance
inquiry set forth in Rule 23(b)(3).   However, the predominance
criterion is far more demanding  than the commonality requirement.
Here, the common questions among the class overcome the commonality
requirement's low bar.

The Court concludes that Karth has established commonality as to
the proposed class and addresses Defendants' concerns regarding the
predominance of common issues or questions affecting individual
members in its later analysis of the Rule 23(b)(3) factors.

Typicality and Adequacy

As to the typicality requirement, Karth also must show that the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class. The representative plaintiff
satisfies the typicality requirement when its injuries arise from
the same events or course of conduct as do the injuries of the
class and when plaintiff's claims and those of the class are based
on the same legal theory.

As to adequacy of the class representative, pursuant to Rule
23(a)(4), the Court considers whether the representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

The Court considers these separate Rule 23(a) factors together
because Defendants challenge Karth's adequacy as the class
representative because, in part, his claims are not typical of the
proposed class he seeks to represent. Karth contends that his
claims are typical of the class because he, like all proposed class
members, purchased Keryx shares within the proposed class period
between May 8, 2013 and August 1, 2016 and seeks recovery for
damages suffered as a result of the alleged inflation of the market
price he paid for those shares by the allegedly materially false
statements and omissions of material facts by Defendants.   

Likewise, Karth says that his interests are perfectly aligned with
the remainder of the class. Defendants argue that Karth is not a
suitable representative of the class because he purchased Keryx
shares on behalf of a trust in July 2016. Defendants maintain that
Karth's status as representative of an allegedly defunct trust
renders his claims susceptible to "unique defenses that would
divert attention from the common claims of the class.

Karth's purchase of shares as a trustee does not make him an
inadequate representative.
Defendants initially challenged Karth's standing to be a plaintiff
at all here given Karth's own statement that the trust had been
dissolved before the filing of the complaint. Further investigation
by Karth, produced to Defendants, however, showed that the trust
was never dissolved. The trustee argument thus appears to reflect
an initial misunderstanding, now corrected, of the trust's status
and, at most, harmless error in Karth's initial failure to identify
himself as having purchased Keryx shares in his role as a trustee.


Even assuming arguendo Karth would otherwise be an adequate
representative for this class, he is not given the timing of his
purchases and nature of his claims.

The timing of Karth's purchase, however, presents a problematic
issue with respect to defining the class period because of the
existence of the February and April 2016 disclosures. Karth
characterizes the February and April 2016 disclosures as identical
to the disclosures about single source suppliers the Court analyzed
in connection with the motion to dismiss.  

In deciding the motion to dismiss, however, the Court looked at the
shift in disclosures from the March 2013 statement that there was a
single contract manufacturer for Auryxia drug product to the later
disclosures, from May 2013 through February 2016, which read, for
instance, some of the third parties we employ in the manufacturing
process are single source providers and held that the later in time
disclosures were potentially misleading for their ambiguity as to
the number of contract manufacturers Keryx was employing. The
disclosures Defendants now have brought to the Court's attention
are distinct from the disclosures analyzed in connection with the
motion to dismiss because they are not ambiguous.  

Karth's argument that the February and April 2016 disclosures do no
more than muddy the waters and left investors to guess which
disclosures were accurate is, therefore, unavailing. In its ruling
on the motion to dismiss, the Court wrote that a reasonable
investor could have concluded from the ambiguous language
regarding the number of contract manufacturers that Keryx had
engaged multiple contract manufacturers to convert the API into
tablets when in fact Keryx had not.

Karth, who purchased shares in July 2016, therefore, purchased
Keryx shares in a markedly different disclosure environment than
other proposed class members who purchased shares as early as May
8, 2013. Such a different position is fundamental to the suit and
goes to the heart of the litigation, namely, Karth not being a
member of a sustainable class. This disparity creates a conflict
between Karth and prospective class members, that threatens to
overbalance the common interests of the class members as a whole.

The Court, therefore, concludes Karth is not a suitable named
plaintiff for reasons of atypicality and inadequacy.

After the voluntary dismissal by named plaintiff Abraham Kiswani in
April 2019, D. 104, Karth has become the sole Named Plaintiff
remaining in the case. Having found that the timing of Karth's
purchase makes his claims atypical from those of a majority of
proposed class members and removes his standing to bring the claims
on behalf of the proposed class and thus that Karth is an
inadequate class representative, the Court declines to certify the
proposed class given the lack of a named plaintiff.

Due to the Court's conclusion as to adequacy and typicality, the
Court need not proceed to address the Rule 23(b)(3) requirements of
predominance and superiority, but does so here in the interest of
completeness.

Rule 23(b)(3) Superiority

A putative class seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(3) also
bears the burden of showing that a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.

The Court considers four factors within the superiority inquiry: 1)
the individual interests in controlling the prosecution of separate
actions 2) any existing litigation already begun by class members;
3) the advantages or disadvantages of litigating the claims in the
forum and 4) any particular difficulties in managing the class
action.  

The first two factors weigh in favor of a class action given the
lack of any record of particularized interest in directing the
litigation from any individual and the lack of existing litigation
concerning the same controversy. As to the latter two factors, the
fact that Keryx is headquartered in Massachusetts is an advantage
to this forum and there are no particular difficulties presented by
the management of this class action. Defendants also do not
challenge the superiority of a class action as a method of
adjudicating the class claims here. A class action would be
superior to litigation of individual claims by the multitudinous
individual investors who purchased Keryx shares during the
shortened class period.

Rule 23(b)(3) Predominance

Rule 23(b)(3) requires the Court to find that the questions of law
or fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members. The focus of the predominance
inquiry is whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to
warrant adjudication by representation.  When conducting a Rule
23(b)(3) analysis, the Court must determine whether there is reason
to think that individualized questions will overwhelm common ones
and render class certification inappropriate. This requires a
district court to formulate some prediction as to how specific
issues will play out in order to determine whether common or
individual issues predominate in a given case.

Given that the class definition for the full period through August
1, 2016 cannot be sustained, Defendants' arguments as to price
impact and Plaintiff's damages model no longer apply with full
force. It is not clear that the predominance factor could be met
here, particularly as to the class presently proposed.  The Court
cannot say that questions of law or fact common to this class
predominate over any questions affecting individual members,
particularly as to reliance and loss causation.

The Court denies the motion to certify the proposed class.
Accordingly, what remains are Karth's individual claims against
Defendants, which the Court turns to now.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 23, 2019
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3ytb76c
from Leagle.com.

Tim Karth, Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey C. Block -
jeff@blockesq.com - Block & Leviton LLP, Jacob A. Walker -
jake@blockesq.com - Block & Leviton LLP & Nathaniel Silver
-nate@blockesq.com - Block & Leviton LLP.

Keryx Biopharmaceuticals, Inc, Ron Bentsur, Scott A Holmes, Gregory
P Madison & James Oliviero, Defendants, represented by John F.
Sylvia - JSylvia@mintz.com - Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky &
Popeo, PC & Laurence A. Schoen - LASchoen@mintz.com - Mintz, Levin,
Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, PC.

Richard J. Erickson, Movant, represented by Alan L. Kovacs , Law
Office of Alan L. Kovacs,
2001 Beacon St Suite 106 Boston, MA 02135,  pro hac vice.


KIA MOTORS: Faces Maldonado Suit Over Defective Engine System
-------------------------------------------------------------
PAULA MALDONADO and GAIL FITZGERALD, Plaintiffs v. KIA MOTORS
AMERICA, INC; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case
No. 19STCV32982 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., Sept. 17,
2019), seeks to redress KMA's violations of California consumer
fraud statutes, and to recover damages from the Defendant's breach
of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, breach of the duty
of good faith and fair dealing, and common law fraud.

KIA MOTORS AMERICA, INC. was engaged in the business of designing,
manufacturing, constructing, assembling, marketing, distributing,
and selling automobiles and other motor vehicles and motor vehicle
components in Los Angeles County. On October 25, 2012, the
Plaintiffs purchased a 2013 Kia Optima vehicle identification
number 5XXGN4A77DG139405, ("Subject Vehicle"), which was
manufactured and or distributed by the Defendant.

The Plaintiffs received an express written warranty, including, a
5-year/60,000 mile express bumper to bumper warranty, a 10-
year/100,000 mile powertrain warranty which, inter alia, covers the
engine and transmission. Subsequently, the Defendant provided a
10-year/120,000 mile warranty extension on 2.0 and 2.4L GDI engines
(including the Subject Vehicle's engine). The Defendant undertook
to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of the Subject
Vehicle or to provide compensation if there is a failure in utility
or performance for a specified period of time. The warranty
provided, in relevant part, that in the event a defect developed
with the Subject Vehicle during the warranty period, the Plaintiffs
could deliver the Subject Vehicle for repair services to the
Defendant's representative and the Subject Vehicle would be
repaired.

During the warranty period, the Subject Vehicle contained or
developed defects, which substantially impair the use, value, or
safety of the Subject Vehicle, the Plaintiffs allege.  They contend
that the Defendant knew since 2009, if not earlier, that the
2011-2019 KIA Optima, 2011-2019 KIA Sportage, 2012-2019 KIA
Sorento, 2011-2019 Hyundai Sonata, and 2013-2019 Hyundai Santa Fe
vehicles equipped with a 2.0 or 2.4L engine, including the 2013 Kia
Optima ("KIA Vehicles") contained one or more design and/or
manufacturing defects in their engines ("Engine Defect") that
results in the restriction of oil flow through the connecting rod
bearings, as well as to other vital areas of the engine.

The defect, which typically manifests itself during and shortly
after the limited warranty period has expired, will cause the KIA
Vehicle to experience catastrophic engine failure, stalling while
in operation and poses an unreasonable safety risk of non-collision
fires all due to inadequate lubrication, according to the
complaint.  Furthermore, engine seizure often causes internal
parts, such as the connecting rods, to break and a knock hole in
the engine, permitting fluids to leak and ignite a fire.

Specifically, the Defendant knew (or should have known) that the
KIA Vehicles equipped with the 2.0 or 2.4L GDI engine had Engine
Defect, says the complaint.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Tionna Dolin, Esq.
          STRATEGIC LEGAL PRACTICES, A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
          1840 Century Park East, Suite 430
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 929-4900
          Facsimile: (310) 943-3838
          E-mail: tdolin@slpattorney.com


KINKISHARYO INT'L: Armendariz Seeks Minimum & Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------------
NOE ARMENDARIZ, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. KINKISHARYO INTERNATIONAL, LLC a
limited liability company; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. 19STCV32237 (Cal. Super. Sept. 11, 2019),
alleges that Defendants failed to pay minimum and regular rate
wages, overtime compensation, and provide meal periods as required
under the California Labor Code.

The Plaintiff worked for Defendants in Los Angeles County as a
burning technician from approximately July 2017 to August 2019. The
Defendants classified Plaintiff as non-exempt from California's
overtime requirements. Also during the statutory time period,
Plaintiff was typically scheduled to work 3 to 5 days in a
workweek, and typically over 8 hours in a single workday. The
Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff for all hours worked,the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Kane Moon, Esq.
          H. Scott Leviant, Esq.
          Lilit Ter-Astvatsatryan, Esq.
          MOON & YANG, APC
          1055 W. Seventh St., Suite 1880
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 232-3128
          Facsimile: (213) 232-3125
          E-mail: kane.moon@moonyanglaw.com
                  scott.leviant@moonyanglaw.com
                  lilit@moonyanglaw.com

LG CHEM: Ninth Circuit Affirms Approval of Young Suit Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KEVIN YOUNG; BRADLEY SELDIN; BRUCE STERMAN; CHARLES
CARTE; BRIAN HANLON; NICHOLE M. GRAY; WOODROW CLARK II; REBECCA
CERVENAK; JOHN RUSSO; MATTHEW J. MILLER; RACHEL L. MILLER; BRADLEY
VAN PATTEN; BENJAMIN KRAMER; JAMES A. SMITH; ANGELA TURNER;
KATHERINE A. WIRKUS; MICHAEL BARBAT; DAVID BROWNLEE; ROBERT ALAN
DISHMAN; JOAN GOODMAN; DAVID MCAFEE; DAWN THOMPSON; THE STEREO
SHOP; MICHELE CRIDEN; BRIAN CALEB BATEY; A-1 COMPUTERS, INC.;
YEVGENIYA LISITSA, Esquire, Attorney; DANIEL MEIR; KIMBERLY
RAIMONDO; DRAKE DAILEY-CHAWLIBOG; MEGHAN DOWLING; MICHAEL HULL;
DAVID SHAWN; DEWEESE SMITH; REGINA SHANNON; RENEE MEIER; FIRST
CHOICE MARKETING, INC.; MICHAEL JAMES DOYLE; REBECCA COHEN; ELLIS
GREENSPAN; LOUIS MESSINA; PATRICE NEALON; ELIZABETH PORTER; DAWN
POTOVIN; DAWN POTOVIN; MARYLIN SHARP; GRACE SHIRE; DAN WEHKING;
STEVEN WILEY; NANCY RUAN; CHAD CONOVER; SUSANNE HILLER; ROBERT
HYAMS; MATTHEW WEINER; GERASIMOS MOLFETAS; THOMAS R. TUOHY;
BEVERLEE SCLAR; DAVID PETREE; MIKE KATZ-LACABE; JAMES O'NEIL; LLOYD
RANOLA; ALFRED H. SIEGEL; TOM PHAM; KATHLEEN TAWNEY; CALVIN
CALKINS; AUTOMATION ENGINEERING, LLC; EDWARD KLUGMAN; GENE POWERS;
RICHARD S.E. JOHNS; BRANDON MARTINEZ; ANGELO MICHAEL D'ORAZIO; RON
NELSON, Jr.; UNIVISION-CRIMSON HOLDING, INC.; PIYA ROBERT
ROJANASATHIT; MICHAEL S. WILSON; RITZ CAMERA & IMAGE, LLC; STEVEN
BUGGE; A. KEITH THROWER; KRISTINA YEE; JOSEPHY G. O'DANIEL; JASON
AMES; WILBUR FRANKLIN; BEATRIZ HERNANDEZ; LINDA LINCOLN; KRISTIN
STARR BARNES; MARK BERGERON; MICHAEL JANUSA; ADAM RONQUILLO; TERRI
WALNER; ANNA JAWOR; KRISTA LEPORE; THE NATIONWIDE GROUP; MATT
BRYANT; LAURA GALLARDO; SPENCER HATHAWAY; ALEXANDRA LE; ROBERT
MCGRANAHAN; PATRICK MCGUINNESS; ERINN TOZER; DAVID GIBBONS;
VALENTINA JUNCAJ; VIOLET SELCA; CORIE LEVY; SCOTT BEALL; THEODORE
WOLFENDALE; CHRISTOPHER BESSETTE; ALEXANDER C. EIDE; POLLY COHEN;
SAN FRANCISCO COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT; INDIRECT PURCHASER
PLAINTIFFS; DIRECT PURCHASER PLAINTIFFS; ERIC MCGUIRE; KCN
SERVICES, LLC; BRAD MARCUS; BASIL BOURQUE; KEVIN LITWIN; MELINDA
LAWSON; DAVID TOLCHIN; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; KAREN STROMBERG;
CITY OF PALO ALTO; CITY OF RICHMOND; MATTHEW SABA; SHAWN SELLERS;
TRACFONE WIRELESS, INC.; ACER, INC.; ACER AMERICA CORPORATION;
GATEWAY, INC.; GATEWAY U.S. RETAIL, INC.; MICROSOFT MOBILE INC.;
MICROSOFT MOBILE OY; DELL, INC.; DELL PRODUCTS L.P.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, CHRISTOPHER ANDREWS, Objector-Appellant, v.
LG CHEM LTD.; LG CHEM AMERICA, INC.; SONY CORPORATION; SONY
ELECTRONICS, INC.; SAMSUNG SDI AMERICA; HITACHI LTD.; HITACHI
MAXELL, LTD; MAXELL CORPORATION OF AMERICA; SONY ENERGY DEVICES
CORPORATION; SAMSUNG SDI CO, LTD.; HITACHI AMERICA LTD.; HITACHI
MAXELL CORPORATION OF AMERICA; TOSHIBA AMERICA, INC; TOSHIBA
CORPORATION; LG CHEM AMERICA; LG CORPORATION; SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS
AMERICA, INC.; SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS COMPANY, LTD.; SAMSUNG SDI
CHUSIK HOESA; SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA; SANYO ELECTRIC CO., INC;
NEC TOKIN CORPORATION; NEC CORPORATION; LG CHEMICAL LTD.; LG
CHEMICAL AMERICA, INC.; HITACHI MAXELL, LTD.; PCM,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 17-15795 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
approval of the class-action settlement agreement between the
Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs ("IPPs") and Defendants Sony Corp.,
Sony Energy Devices Corp., and Sony Electronics Inc.

The district court approved the class-action settlement agreement
between the IPPs and Sony.  Andrews, a class member objecting to
the settlement, appealed.  He argued that the notice of settlement
was deficient, errors in the settlement agreement and the district
court's approval order rendered the settlement unfair, and the
class members were denied access to crucial documents because they
were improperly sealed.

The Appeals Court finds that district court properly found that the
notice of settlement was sufficient, and  Andrews' contention that
a settlement notice cannot precede the formulation of a claims
process is unsupported.  The rest of Andrews's attacks on the
notice are inconsistent with the record or irrelevant, adds the
Court.  Hence, the district court did not err in finding the notice
satisfied due process and Rule 23.

Next, the Appeals Court rules that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in approving the settlement agreement. Andrews
raised a host of objections to the settlement agreement and
district court's approval order, including that the $19.5 million
settlement amount was unjustifiably low compared to the $177
million in total alleged damages attributable to Sony.  The Court
finds those arguments to be unpersuasive.

With respect Andrews argument that many documents were improperly
sealed, preventing the class members from accurately assessing the
settlement's fairness, the Appeals Court finds that objectors were
able to access all the information relevant to the settlement.
Several documents Andrews identifies are not sealed.  Rather, they
are publicly available with limited redactions. For the documents
that are sealed, Andrews offers nothing persuasive to counter the
district court's finding that the documents pertinent to the
Plaintiffs' settlement with the Sony defendants, motion for
approval, and motion for reimbursement of costs were all readily
available.  Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion.

In light of the foregoing, the Court accordingly affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 4, 2019 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/UeyYmc from Leagle.com.

M.J. BROTHERS: $525K Rodriguez Suit Settlement Has Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, VICTOR RODRIGUEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. M.J.
BROTHERS, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-00252-LJO-SAB
(E.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of California granted the
Plaintiffs' motion for final approval of a class action
settlement.

Plaintiffs Rodriguez, Estreberto Valdez, Miguel Esparza and
Francisco Banda are former employees of M.J. Brothers, a California
company doing business in Tulare, California.  The Defendant is
co-owned and managed by Eduardo Martin, Daniel Martin, Fernando
Martin, and Ronald Martin.  M.J. Brothers provides machinery and
personnel to client dairies at their premises to harvest,
transport, and weigh wheat and corn that is used as animal feed.
The Martins oversee the company's operations and make decisions
regarding scheduling, working conditions, and hiring and
terminating employees.  They visit and oversee operations at the
numerous customer worksites and handle administration of many of
the company's affairs.

Four groups of workers are employed by MJ Brothers: 1) shop workers
who service trucks and service and clean agricultural equipment at
their shop; 2) farm equipment operators who work at harvesting and
pruners; 3) truck drivers who transport wheat and corn from the
field to the dairy; and 4) weighers who weigh the wheat and corn
for purposes of billing clients.

Plaintiff Rodriguez was employed as a truck driver from May 2008 to
May 2016.  Plaintiff Valdez was employed as a truck driver from
2010 to May 2016.  Plaintiff Esparza was employed as an operator
and shop worker from 2008 to December 2016.  Plaintiff Banda was
employed as a truck driver and shop worker for over 15 years until
May 2017.

On Feb. 16, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed the action on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated against the Defendants
alleging violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). and
California labor law. Plaintiffs allege failure to pay overtime in
violation of the FLSA; failure to pay meal and rest periods in
violation of California Labor Code section 226.7; failure to
provide itemized wage statements in violation of California Labor
Code section 226(a); failure to pay for reporting time in violation
of Industrial Wage Orders 4, 9, and 14; failure to pay waiting time
penalties in violation of California Labor Code section 201, 202,
and 203; unfair business practices in violation of California
Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. and they are
seeking civil penalties under the California Private Attorney's
General Act ("PAGA").

On Dec. 4, 2018, the parties filed a notice of settlement of the
class and collective actions.  On Feb. 4, 2019, a motion for
preliminary approval of the class action settlement and a
stipulation to file a first amended complaint was filed.  The first
amended complaint was filed on Feb. 5, 2019.  On March 8, 2019, a
findings and recommendations issued recommending granting in part
and denying in part the motion for preliminary approval of the
class action settlement.

On March 13, 2019, the Defendants consented to the jurisdiction of
a United States magistrate judge and filed a stipulation for
further proceedings on the motion for preliminary approval.  On
March 14, 2019, the stipulation was approved and the findings and
recommendations were vacated.  On March 15, 2019, the matter was
reassigned to Magistrate Judge Boone for all purposes.

On April 17, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a supplement to the motion
for preliminary approval of the class action settlement.  An order
granting the motion for preliminary approval was filed on April 24,
2019.  On July 24, 2019, a motion for final approval of the class
action settlement was filed along with proof of service of the
motion on the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency
("LWDA").  On Aug. 16, 2019, the Defendants filed a statement of
non-opposition to the motion requesting that the Court grants final
approval of the settlement.

Under the settlement agreement, the settlement class is defined as
all persons who are or were employed in California by the
Defendants as non-exempt (i) shop workers, (ii) farm equipment
operators and pruners, (iii) truck drivers, and (iv) weighers at
any point during the Class Period and who do not properly and
timely opt out of the Settlement Class by having requested
exclusion. There are approximately 185 Settlement Class Members.
The class period is defined as any time between Feb. 16, 2014 and
May 27, 2018.

The settlement agreement provides for a settlement fund of 525,000
to resolve all claims of the settlement class for the alleged
failure to provide meal and rest breaks and pay wages, penalties,
and attorney fees and costs.  The Defendants will pay the
employer's share of the payroll taxes separately.  Prior to any
settlement funds being paid to the eligible class members,
deductions to the common fund will be made for service awards to
the named Plaintiffs, an award of attorney fees and costs to the
class counsel, all costs of settlement administration, and a PAGA
payment to the LWDA.

The settlement fund will be funded by six separate installments
with the first payment of $87,500 to be made within 180 days from
the date of final approval of the settlement.  The following
payments will be made six months after the previous payment.  In
the event that a payment is not made the entire amount will be
immediately due and payable.  Notice of default will be given by
mail and fax and no other action will occur until after 10 days
have lapsed during which time the Defendants have the right to cure
any default.

The settlement fund will be distributed in three installments.  The
first installment will be distributed within 30 days of receipt of
the first payment from the Defendants.  This installment will be
distributed to pay the costs of claims administration, the PAGA
payment to the LWDA, and the attorney's costs in the action.  The
second distribution is to be made within 30 days after the claims
administrator receives the third payment from the Defendants.  This
payment will be used to begin paying settlement awards to the
class.  The third distribution will be made within 30 days after
the sixth installment payment is received.  This distribution will
pay the remaining settlement awards to the class in proportionate
shares, the named class member incentive payments, and the class
counsel's attorney fees.  Any undistributed funds from checks that
are not cashed will escheat to the California Division of Labor
Standards Enforcement of Unpaid Wages Fund to be held in the name
of and for the benefit of the class member.

The claims administrator will pay from the common fund attorney
fees in the amount of $131,250; costs of $12,500, and $5,000 to
each of the named Plaintiffs.  The net settlement fund is to be
allocated in the following manner: 20% to unpaid wage claims; 80%
to statutory penalties and interest; and $10,000 to PAGA penalties.
The settlement administrator will pay the LWDA $7,500 in PAGA
penalties.

The net settlement fund will be distributed to the members of the
settlement class and FLSA class.  The funds will be distributed
based upon the number of payroll periods that the class member
worked.  Each class member will be paid the amount after applicable
state and federal taxes are withheld.  The settlement administrator
will issue a W-2 for the payment of unpaid wages and a Form 1099
for the portion that is allocated to statutory penalties and
interest.

The Defendants agree not to oppose the application for attorney
fees or costs by the class counsel.

The Plaintiffs seek final approval of the class action settlement
as fair, reasonable and adequate under Rule 23(e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and as a fair and reasonable resolution
of a bona fide dispute under the FLSA; certification of the Rule 23
class and of the collective action class under 29 U.S.C. Section
216(b); approval that the class notice and FLSA notice complied
with law and due process; an enhancement award of $3,500 for each
named plaintiff; and an award of attorney fees in the amount of
$131,250 and costs of $11,694.

Magistrate Judge Boone finds that the Rule 23(a) prerequisites and
Rule 23(b)(3) requirements are met for the settlement class.  She
further finds that the requirements are met for certification of
the FLSA class under the FLSA.  The Judge also finds that the terms
of the Settlement Agreement are fair, reasonable, and adequate
under Rule 23(e), and are a fair and reasonable resolution of a
bona fide dispute under the FLSA.

She finally approved the settlement agreement.  Upon completion of
administration of the settlement agreement, the claims
administrator will provide written certification of such completion
to the Court and the counsel for the parties.

Class representatives Victor Rodriguez, Estreberto Valdez, Miguel
Esparza, and Francisco Banda are each awarded an incentive award of
$3,500, to be paid from the gross settlement fund.  The class
counsel is awarded attorney fees in the amount of $131,250 and
costs of $11,694, to be paid from the gross settlement fund.

The Magistrate finds that an allocation of $10,000 of the gross
settlement fund to the PAGA claims is reasonable.  The claims
administrators will pay $7,500 (75% of the allocation) to the
California Labor and Workforce Development Agency.  The claims
administrator will be paid $22,500 from the gross settlement fund
for the cost of notice and claims administration.  She finally
approved and ordered the payment of those amounts be made from the
net settlement proceeds in accordance with the terms of the
Settlement Agreement.

12. The claims administrator will send any unclaimed funds to the
State of California Controller's Office, Unclaimed Property Fund,
in accordance with California law be held in the name of and for
the benefit of the class members under California's escheatment
laws.

The Magistrate entered judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs and
against the Defendants, and approved the terms of the settlement
agreement.  She dismissed the action with prejudice.  Each side
will bear its own costs and attorney fees, except as provided by
the settlement agreement and set forth in the Order.  The Clerk of
the Court is directed to close this action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 21, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/WSdzJq from Leagle.com.

Victor Rodriguez, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Estreberto Valdez, on behalf of themselves and all
others
similarly situated, Miguel Esparza, on behalf of themselves and
all
others similarly situated & Francisco Banda, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by John Edward Hill, Law Offices Of John E. Hill, A
Professional Corporation & Enrique Martinez, Law Offices of John
E.
Hill.

M.J. Brothers, Inc., a California Corporation, Eduardo Martin,
Daniel Martin, Fernando Martin & Ronald Martin, Defendants,
represented by Faith Lisle Driscoll --
fdriscoll@theemployerslawfirm.com -- Barsamian & Moody, Patrick
Moody -- pmoody@theemployerslawfirm.com -- Barsamian and Moody &
Ronald H. Barsamian -- ronbarsamian@aol.com -- Barsamian & Moody.


MACROGENICS, INC: Hill Sues over Share Price Drop
-------------------------------------------------
TODD HILL, 20469 Shaffer Road Fredericktown, OH 43019, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
MACROGENICS, INC. 9704 Medical Center Drive Rockville, MD 20850;
SCOTT KOENIG c/o MACROGENICS, INC. 9704 Medical Center Drive
Rockville, MD 20850; and JAMES KARRELS c/o MACROGENICS, INC. 9704
Medical Center Drive Rockville, MD 20850, the Defendants, Case No.
8:19-cv-02713-GJH (D. Md., Sept. 13, 2019), is a securities fraud
class action on behalf of all purchasers of MacroGenics common
stock between February 6, 2019 and June 3, 2019, inclusive. The
claims are asserted against MacroGenics and certain of its officers
who made materially false and misleading statements during the
Class Period.

MacroGenics is a clinical stage biopharmaceutical company focused
on the development of antibody-based therapeutics designed to
control the human immune response for the treatment of cancer in
the United States. Its pipeline of immuno-oncology product
candidates includes margetuximab, an investigational monoclonal
antibody that targets the HER2 oncoprotein. HER2 is expressed by
tumor cells in breast, gastroesophageal and other solid tumors.

The SOPHIA study is a randomized, open-label Phase III clinical
trial evaluating margetuximab plus chemotherapy compared to
trastuzumab plus chemotherapy in patients with HER2-positive
metastatic breast cancer. A critical component of the Phase III
SOPHIA trial was measuring the progression-free survival ("PFS")
and overall survival ("OS") rates in breast cancer patients
administered margetuximab.

Throughout the Class Period, the Defendants violated the federal
securities laws by disseminating false and misleading statements to
the investing public and/or failing to disclose adverse facts
pertaining to the Company's Phase III SOPHIA trial. Specifically,
the Defendants concealed material information and/or failed to
disclose that:

     (a) the Company had conducted the PFS and first interim OS
analyses for the SOPHIA trial by no later than October 10, 2018;

     (b) the October 2018 PFS analysis showed a 0.9 month
improvement in PFS; and

     (c) the October 2018 OS interim analysis did not produce a
statistically and significant result and the interim OS
Kaplan-Meier curves crossed in several spots (thereby violating the
constant hazard assumption) and separated late.

According to the complaint, the Defendants' Class Period conduct
had its intended effect, with MacroGenics' common stock trading at
artificially inflated prices during the Class Period, reaching a
high of $25.60 per share on February 6, 2019.

On May 13, 2019, the American Society of Clinical Oncologists
("ASCO") posted the SOPHIA study abstract on the Internet. The
abstract disclosed that the October 2018 PFS analysis resulted in a
0.9 month improvement in PFS.

As a result of this news, the price of MacroGenics common stock
dropped $1.17 per share, to close at $16.25 per share on May 13,
2019, a decline of 7%.

The Kaplan–Meier estimator, also known as the product limit
estimator, is a non-parametric statistic used to estimate the
survival function from lifetime data. In medical research, it is
often used to measure the fraction of patients living for a certain
amount of time after treatment.

On June 4, 2019, during the ASCO annual meeting in Chicago,
Illinois, the Company disclosed additional data for the SOPHIA
trial. In the Company's presentation, MacroGenics revealed to the
public that it had conducted the PFS and OS analyses in October
2018, and the OS analyses for the SOPHIA trial demonstrated
Kaplan-Meier curves crossing at several spots with late
separation.

As a result of this news, the price of MacroGenics common stock
dropped $3.13 per share to close at $15.58 per share on June 4,
2019, a decline of 17%. On June 5, 2019, the price of the Company's
stock declined another 6% as a result of defendants' June 4, 2019
disclosures concerning the SOPHIA trial, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Steven D. Silverman, Esq.
          Andrew C. White, Esq.
          Joseph F. Murphy, Jr., Esq.
          William N. Sinclair, Esq.
          SILVERMAN THOMPSON SLUTKIN & WHITE LLC
          201 N. Charles Street, 26th Floor
          Baltimore, MD 21201
          Telephone: 410 385 2225
          Facsimile: 410 547-2432
          E-mail: ssilverman@mdattorney.com
                  awhite@mdattorney.com
                  jmurphy@mdattorney.com
                  bsinclair@mdattorney.com

               - and -

          Trig R. Smith, Esq.
          Brian E. Cochran, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101-8498
          Telephone: 619 231-1058
          Facsimile: 619 231-7423
          E-mail: trigs@rgrdlaw.com
                  bcochran@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          Brian Schall, Esq.
          SCHALL LAW FIRM
          1880 Century Park East, Suite 404
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: 310/301-3335
          Facsimile: 310/338-0192
          E-mail:  brian@schallfirm.com

MEREDITH CORPORATION: Schall Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
announces the filing of a class action lawsuit against Meredith
Corporation (NYSE:MDP) for violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

Investors who purchased the Company's shares between May 10, 2018
and September 4, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"), are
encouraged to contact the firm before November 5, 2019.

We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law
Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at
424-303-1964, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also
reach us through the firm's website at www.schallfirm.com, or by
email at brian@schallfirm.com.

The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. Meredith overinflated the profitability
of the Time Inc. merger. In fact, the Company was forced to make
significant investments in the Time business to improve it. These
investments negatively impacted the Company's earnings. Based on
these facts, the Company's public statements were false and
materially misleading throughout the class period. When the market
learned the truth about Meredith, investors suffered damages.

Join the case to recover your losses.

The Schall Law Firm represents investors around the world and
specializes in securities class action lawsuits and shareholder
rights litigation.

Contact:

         Brian Schall, Esq.
         Sherin Mahdavian, Esq.
         The Schall Law Firm
         Tel: 310-301-3335
         Cell: 424-303-1964
         Website: www.schallfirm.com
         Email: info@schallfirm.com [GN]


MIDLAND CREDIT: Leedeman Sues over Debt Collection
--------------------------------------------------
PEGGY IRENE LEEDEMAN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT,
INC., a Kansas corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. 19CV354554 (Cal. Super., Sept. 12, 2019),
seeks statutory damages against Defendants arising from their
routine practice of sending initial written communications which do
not contain the notice required by the California Fair Debt Buying
Practices Act and California Civil Code.

As a result, Defendants have engaged in unlawful acts in connection
with their attempt to collect charged-off consumer debts from
Plaintiff and the Class.

Midland is regularly engaged in the business of purchasing
charged-off consumer debts for collection purposes. Midland is a
"debt collector" as that term is defined by California Civil Code,
the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Fred W. Schwinn, Esq.
          Raeon R. Roulston, Esq.
          Matthew C. Salmonsen, Esq.
          CONSUMER LAW CENTER, INC.
          1435 Koll Circle, Suite 104
          San Jose, CA 95112-4610
          Telephone: (408) 294-6100
          Facsimile: (408) 294-6190
          E-mail: fred.schwinn@sjconsumerlaw.com

MOON RIDGE: W.D. Mo. Certifies Class in Morris Suit
---------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAWN MORRIS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MOON RIDGE FOODS,
LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-CV-03219-SRB (W.D. Mo.), Judge
Stephen R. Bough of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Missouri, Southern Division, granted the Plaintiff's
Motion for Class Certification.

On June 7, 2019, Morris and the putative class members filed their
First Amended Class Action Complaint, alleging the Defendants
violated the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of
1988, by failing to give them at least 60 days advance written
notice before terminating their employment.  The Plaintiffs request
back pay and benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, for 60 working days following the termination of their
employment, as provided under the WARN Act.

The Plaintiff sought class certification under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) and the specific statutory
provision contemplating class treatment of claims under the WARN
Act.  On Sept. 3, 2019, the parties filed a Stipulation Regarding
Class Certification.

Upon review of the parties' joint Stipulation Regarding Class
Certification and Proposed Class Notice, Judge Bough finds that the
requirements of Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3) are satisfied, as well as
the notice requirements of Rule 23(c)(2)(B).

He certified a class comprised of all former employees who worked
at or reported to the facility located at 5305 Highway H Pleasant
Hope, MO 65725 (the Facility) until they were laid off, furloughed
and/or terminated, without cause on their part, on or about Jan.
11, 2018, within 30 days before that date or in the 60 days
thereafter, as part of, or as the reasonably expected consequence
of, the mass layoff and/or plant closing occurring on or about Jan.
11 and 12, 2018, and who do not file a timely request to opt-out of
the class.

The Judge appointed (i) Morris as the Class Representative; and
(ii) The Gardner Firm, P.C., Lankenau & Miller LLP, and Rouse Frets
White Goss Gentile Rhodes, P.C. as the Class Counsel.

Judge Bough approved the proposed form of Notice to the Class
submitted with the parties' joint Stipulation of Class
Certification.  No later than 14 business days following entry of
the Order, the Defendants will provide the Class Counsel with an
electronic spreadsheet containing the names and last known
addresses of the former employees encompassed by the Class.  The
Class Counsel will mail the notice within 21 business days of entry
of te Order, to the proposed members of the Class at their last
known addresses as shown on the Class Spreadsheet.

The Class Members who wish to opt-out of the Class in the matter
must complete the opt-out form, included with the Class Notice, and
must sign and mail that opt-out form to The Gardner Firm, P.C.,
P.O. Box 3103, Mobile, Alabama 36652, Attn: Mary E. Olsen, so that
it is post-marked no later than 30 days after the due date on which
the Class Notice was mailed and received by Ms. Olsen within seven
days of that date.

All requests for exclusion post-marked more than 30 days after the
date on which the Class Notice was mailed or received by Ms. Olsen
more than seven days after that date will not be effective, and any
person who sends a late request will be a member of the Class in
the Action and will be bound in the same way and to the same extent
as all the other Class Members.

Within five days after the last date on which a Class Member may
timely opt-out, the Class Counsel will serve and file a sworn
statement listing the names of any persons who have timely opted
out of the class.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/sv6W8y from Leagle.com.

Dawn Morris, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Lee Kurtz --
ckurtz@rousepc.com -- Rouse Frets White Goss Gentile Rhodes, PC,
Mary E. Olsen -- molsen@thegardnerfirm.com -- The Gardner Firm, pro
hac vice, Michael Vance McCrary -- vmccrary@thegardnerfirm.com --
The Gardner Firm, pro hac vice & Randall L. Rhodes --
rrhodes@rousepc.com -- Rouse Frets White Goss Gentile Rhodes, PC.

Moon Ridge Foods, LLC, Heritage Foods, LLC & Vero Foods, LLC,
Defendants, represented by David R. Bohm -- dbohm@dmfirm.com --
Danna McKitrick, P.C. & Katherine Mary Flett -- kflett@dmfirm.com
-- Danna McKitrick PC.

NASSAU COUNTY, NY: Dismissal Order in Falk Suit Affirmed
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JEFFREY P. FALK, ETC., Appellant, v. NASSAU COUNTY, ET
AL., Respondents, Case No. 2017-13305, 2018-05977, Index No.
600868/17 (N.Y. App. Div.), the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of New York, Second Department, dismissed Falk's appeal from
the orders entered Oct. 3, 2017 and Jan. 23, 2018.

In a putative class action, inter alia, for declaratory and
injunctive relief, the Plaintiff appeals from (1) an order of the
Supreme Court, Nassau County (Jeffrey S. Brown, J.), entered Oct.
3, 2017, and (2) an order of the same court entered Jan. 23, 2018.


The order entered Oct. 3, 2017, insofar as appealed from, (a)
granted those branches of the Defendants' motion which were
pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss so much of the first cause
of action as sought to compel the Defendants to disgorge all fees
collected pursuant to Nassau County Administrative Code Section
6-33.0 from Jan. 4, 2016, to the present, and to dismiss the
second, third, and fourth causes of action, alleging unjust
enrichment, conversion, and money had and received, respectively,
and (b) denied the Plaintiff's application for leave to amend the
complaint.

The order entered Jan. 23, 2018, insofar as appealed from, upon
reargument, adhered to the determination in the order entered Oct.
3, 2017, granting those branches of the Defendants' motion which
were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss so much of the first
cause of action as sought to compel the Defendants to disgorge all
fees collected pursuant to Nassau County Administrative Code
Section 6-33.0 from Jan. 4, 2016, to the present, and to dismiss
the second, third, and fourth causes of action.

According to the complaint in the action, the Falk purchased a home
in Nassau County in 2016.  He alleges that he paid a title company
$1,255 to record his deed and mortgage with the County, $450 of
which represented fees necessary to obtain two tax map
certification letters from the County Clerk as required under
Section 6-33.0 of the Nassau County Administrative Code ("NCAC").

In 2017, the Plaintiff commenced the putative class action against
the County and the Nassau County Department of Assessments.  The
first cause of action sought a judgment declaring, inter alia, that
the fees imposed pursuant to NCAC Section 6-33.0 are excessive and
not reasonably necessary to accomplish the Defendants'
responsibility to maintain the County's registry.  The first cause
of action also sought to compel the Defendants to disgorge all fees
collected pursuant to NCAC Section 6-33.0 from Jan. 4, 2016, to the
present.  The second, third, and fourth causes of action alleged
unjust enrichment, conversion, and money had and received,
respectively.

The Defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the
complaint, inter alia, on the ground that the Plaintiff failed to
allege that he paid the fees under protest.  In opposition, the
Plaintiff conceded that the fees were paid without formal protest,
but nevertheless maintained that the payment was the result of a
mistake of fact or, alternatively, was made under duress.

The Supreme Court partially denied the Defendants' motion,
determining that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of
action for a judgment declaring, inter alia, that the fees imposed
pursuant to NCAC Section 6-33.0 are excessive and not reasonably
necessary to accomplish the Defendants' responsibility to maintain
the County's registry.  However, it granted those branches of the
Defendants' motion which were to dismiss so much of the first cause
of action as sought to compel the Defendants to disgorge all fees
collected pursuant to NCAC Section 6-33.0 from Jan. 4, 2016, to the
present, and to dismiss the causes of action alleging unjust
enrichment, conversion, and money had and received.  Upon
reargument, the court adhered to its determination granting those
branches of the Defendants' motion.

The Plaintiff appeals.

The Court finds that it is undisputed that the Plaintiff did not
pay the fees under protest.  Viewing the facts alleged in the
complaint as true, and according the Plaintiff the benefit of every
possible favorable inference, the payment was not made under
duress.  Accordingly, it agrees with the Supreme Court's
determination, upon reargument, adhering to its prior determination
granting that branch of the Defendants' motion which was pursuant
to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss so much of the first cause of action
as sought to compel the defendants to disgorge fees collected
pursuant to NCAC Section 6-33.0.

It also agrees with the Supreme Court's determination, upon
reargument, adhering to its prior determination granting those
branches of the Defendants' motion which were pursuant to CPLR
3211(a)(7) to dismiss the causes of action alleging unjust
enrichment, conversion, and money had and received.

Based on the foregoing, the Court dismissed the appeal from the
order entered Oct. 3, 2017, as the portion of that order denying
the Plaintiff's application for leave to amend the complaint is not
appealable as of right and leave to appeal has not been granted,
and the remainder of the order has been superseded by the order
entered Jan. 23, 2018, made upon reargument.  It affirmed the order
entered Jan. 23, 2018 insofar as appealed from.  One bill of costs
is awarded to the Defendants.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 21, 2019 Decision and Order is
available at https://is.gd/B4vEx6 from Leagle.com.

McLaughlin & Stern LLP, New York, NY (Lee S. Shalov --
lshalov@mclaughlinstern.com -- and Wade C. Wilkinson of counsel),
for appellant.

Jared A. Kasschau, County Attorney, Mineola, NY (Christi Marie
Kunzig and Robert F. Van der Waag of counsel), for respondents.


NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE: Settlement in Zaklit Suit Has Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALFRED ZAKLIT AND JESSY ZAKLIT, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. NATIONSTAR
MORTGAGE LLC and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and each of them,
Defendants, Case No. 5:15-CV-02190-CAS-KK (C.D. Cal.), Judge
Christina A. Snyder of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for an Order
Granting Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, Conditionally
Certifying Proposed Settlement Class, Approving Motion for
Attorneys' Fees and Costs, and granting Incentive Award.

On March 4, 2019, the Court entered an Order Granting Preliminary
Approval of Settlement, resulting in certification of the
provisional Settlement Class of all individuals who, from Oct. 23,
2014 to May 1, 2016, while physically present in California and
using a cellular device with a California area code, participated
for the first time in an outbound telephone conversation with a
representative of Defendant or its agent who were recording the
conversation without first informing the individual that the
conversation was being recorded.

No objections have been made, timely or otherwise, pursuant to the
Class Notice sent to the Settlement Class members, nor did any
objectors appear at the time of the hearing.

The matter having come before the Court for hearing pursuant to the
Order of the Court dated Aug. 19, 2019, for approval of the
settlement set forth in the Settlement Agreement and Release.  Due
and adequate notice have been given to the Settlement Class Members
as required in said Order, and the Court has considered all papers
filed and proceedings therein.

Judge Snyder finds the Settlement was entered into in good faith,
that the settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, and that the
Settlement satisfies the standards and applicable requirements for
final approval of the class action settlement under California law,
including the provisions of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23.  Accordingly,
she finally approved the Settlement in all respects, and directed
the Parties to implement and consummate the Settlement Agreement
according to its terms and provisions.

Upon entry of the Order, compensation to the participating
Settlement Class Members will be effected pursuant to the terms of
the Settlement.

In addition to any recovery that the Plaintiffs may receive under
the Settlement, and in recognition of the Plaintiffs' efforts and
risks taken on behalf of the Settlement Class, the Judge approved
the payment of a Service Award to the Plaintiffs, in the amount of
$10,000 per Class Representative.  

She approved the payment of attorneys' fees to the Class Counsel in
the sum of $1,625,000, and the reimbursement of litigation expenses
in the sum of $25,046.52.

She also approved and ordered payment in an amount commensurate
with Epiq Systems, Inc.'s actual costs, and not to exceed $200,000
to Epiq Systems, Inc. for performance of its settlement claims
administration services.

Upon completion of administration of the Settlement, the Parties
will file a declaration setting forth that claims have been paid
and that the terms of the Settlement have been completed.

The Judgment is intended to be a final disposition of the action in
its entirety, and is intended to be immediately appealable.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 21, 2019 Final Order is
available at https://is.gd/g0CZeC from Leagle.com.

Alfred Zaklit, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & Jessy Zaklit, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Meghan Elisabeth
George, Law Offices of Todd Friedman PC, Thomas Edward Wheeler, Law
Offices of Todd M Friedman PC, Todd M. Friedman --
tfriedman@toddflaw.com -- Law Office of Todd M Friedman PC, Adrian
Robert Bacon -- abacon@toddflaw.com -- Law Offices of Todd M
Friedman PC & Asaf Agazanof -- asaf@lawasaf.com -- Asaf Law APC.

Nationstar Mortgage LLC, Defendant, represented by Erik Wayne Kemp
-- ek@severson.com -- Severson and Werson APC, John B. Sullivan --
jbs@severson.com -- Severson and Werson APC, Mary Kate Sullivan,
Severson and Werson APC & Laszlo Ladi, Jr., Severson and Werson
APC.


NAVY FEDERAL: Fourth Circuit Appeal Initiated in Lambert Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Ruby Lambert filed an appeal from a Court ruling in the
lawsuit titled Ruby Lambert v. Navy Federal Credit Union, Case No.
1:19-cv-00103-LO-MSN, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia at Alexandria.

The nature of suit is stated as other contract actions.

The appellate case is captioned as Ruby Lambert v. Navy Federal
Credit Union, Case No. 19-1993, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Opening Brief and Appendix are due on October 22, 2019; and

   -- Response Brief is due on November 21, 2019.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant RUBY LAMBERT, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Andrew Joseph Guzzo, Esq.
          Kristi Cahoon Kelly, Esq.
          Casey Shannon Nash, Esq.
          KELLY GUZZO PLC
          3925 Chain Bridge Road
          Fairfax, VA 22030
          Telephone: (703) 424-7576
          E-mail: aguzzo@kellyguzzo.com
                  kkelly@kellyguzzo.com
                  casey@kellyguzzo.com

Defendant-Appellee NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION is represented by:

          Don Bradford Hardin, Jr., Esq.
          DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE, LLP
          1919 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20006-3401
          Telephone: (202) 973-4238
          E-mail: bradfordhardin@dwt.com


NERIUM INT'L: Sept. 18, 2018 Arbitration Order in Jia Clarified
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HELEN JIA, an individual, and SARAH SORMILLON, an
individual, and all those similarly situated, v. NERIUM
INTERNATIONAL, LLC., et al, Case No. 3:17-CV-3057-S (N.D. Tex.),
Judge Karen Gren Scholer of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, granted in part and
denied in part Defendants Nerium, Jeff Olson, Renee Olson, and
Amber Olson Rourke's Motion to Reopen Case and for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction Staying Class
Arbitration.

On Dec. 19, 2017, the Defendants moved for an order compelling
Plaintiffs Jia and Sormillon to arbitrate their claims on an
individual basis in the arbitration proceedings which are already
underway before the American Arbitration Association ("AAA").  On
Sept. 18, 2018, the Court granted the motion to compel arbitration
and provided that the arbitrator will decide whether a given claim
must be arbitrated and that any challenges to the enforceability or
scope of the Arbitration Policy must be decided by the arbitrator.
After the Court administratively closed the case pending
arbitration, the Plaintiffs allegedly filed three arbitrations
before the AAA.  Their third demand was for, among other things, a
determination as to the arbitrability of the claims on a class
basis.

In the first two arbitrations, the Defendants moved for a summary
adjudication of the class waiver provision, seeking a determination
that the Plaintiffs' claims needed to be arbitrated individually.
On June 24, 2019, Arbitrator James J. Juneau entered an order in
the first of the two cases denying the Defendants' motion for a
summary adjudication of the class waiver provision as moot, because
Jia was no longer asserting any claims in the arbitration
proceeding on a class-wide, class action or multiple
complaining-party basis. The Arbitrator did not overrule the
Defendants' objections to class arbitration, instead finding that
these should more properly be raised and adjudicated separately in
the proceeding where the Plaintiffs were asserting class action
claims.

As to the Plaintiffs' third demand for arbitration, the Defendants
objected to the filing of the class arbitration as administratively
improper on April 26, 2019.  The AAA responded to the Defendants'
argument by letter on July 9, 2019, stating that the Plaintiffs met
the filing requirements by filing a demand for class arbitration
but that the parties' contentions have been made a part of the file
and will be forwarded to the arbitrator upon appointment, at which
time the parties may submit their jurisdictional or arbitrability
arguments to the arbitrator for determination.  Thereafter on Aug.
8, 2019, the AAA reaffirmed the positions articulated in its July
9, 2019, letter, and the Defendants filed the present Motion
.

The Defendants ask the Court to reopen the case to either (1)
clarify the Court's Sept. 18, 2018, order granting the Defendants'
motion to compel arbitration on an individual basis, or, in the
alternative, (2) issue a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction staying the class arbitration.

To be clear, the Court previously found that the Defendants have
provided sufficient evidence to establish that a contract,
including an arbitration provision, exists between the parties.
That same agreement provides that the arbitration will be conducted
before a single arbitrator and will not be conducted on a
class-wide, class action or multiple-complaining party basis.
Judge Scholer holds that the Court could not compel class
arbitration that the parties expressly rejected.  Arbitration is a
matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to
arbitration any dispute which he or she has not agreed to submit.
It is particularly true of class arbitration, which must be
premised on consent to be consistent with the FAA.

The Defendants moved for a Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction as alternative relief to the Court
clarifying that it previously compelled arbitration on an
individual basis. Because she grants the Motion for Clarification,
the Judge denies as moot the Motion as to the request for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.
Consequently, she does not address the Plaintiffs' argument as to
why a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is not
warranted in the case.

Finally, the Court previously held that clear and unmistakable
evidence establishes the parties' intent to delegate threshold
questions to an arbitrator, including questions regarding the
validity and scope of the arbitration provision itself.  No party
moved for reconsideration of the Court's order and the Judge will
not needlessly disturb it.  Moreover, the Judge did not rethink
delegation as to any issue.  Rather, she today merely clarifies
that (1) the Court was tasked with determining the issue of class
arbitration, and (2) its Sept. 18, 2018, order compelled
arbitration on an individual basis.  Any other threshold question
has been delegated to the arbitrator and the Court is without power
to decide it.

For the reasons discussed , Judge Scholer granted the the Motion to
reopen the case and to clarify the Court's Sept. 18, 2018, order.
She denied as moot the Motion as to the request for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction.  The matter is
remanded to arbitration on an individual basis.  The action will be
stayed and administratively closed pending the outcome of
arbitration.  The Judge Court directed the Clerk of Court to
administratively close the case until such time as the Court orders
it to be reopened.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 21, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/heXxTs from Leagle.com.

Helen Jia, an individual & Sarah Sormillon, an individual and all
those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Blake J.
Lindemann -- blake@lawbl.com -- Lindemann Law Firm APC, pro hac
vice, Jamie Jean McKey -- jmckey@kendalllawgroup.com -- Kendall
Law
Group PLLC & Joe Kendall -- jkendall@kendalllawgroup.com --
Kendall
Law Group PLLC.

Nerium International LLC, a Texas Limited Liability Company, Jeff
Olson, an individual, Renee Olson, an individual & Amber Olson
Rourke, an individual, Defendants, represented by Joshua A. Huber,
Blank Rome LLP, Anahit Tagvoryan -- atagvoryan@blankrome.com --
Blank Rome LLP, pro hac vice, Harrison Maxwell Brown --
hbrown@blankrome.com -- Blank Rome LLP, pro hac vice, Mike
Margolis
-- margolis@winlaw.com -- Blank Rome LLP, pro hac vice, Monica
Wiseman Latin, Carrington Coleman Sloman & Blumenthal LLP, Naki
Margolis -- nmargolis@blankrome.com -- Blank Rome LLP, pro hac
vice
& Parker Lee Graham , Carrington Coleman Sloman & Blumenthal LLP.

Nerium Skincare Inc, a Texas Corporation, Nerium Biotechnology Inc
& Natural Technology Inc, doing business as Naturtech, Defendants,
represented by Jonathan R. Mureen , Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP,
Alexander J. Toney , Squire Patton Boggs LLP, Brian Matthew
Gillett, Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP & Samuel Genovese, Squire
Patton Boggs (US) LLP.

Michael Shouhed, an individual, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey
S. Jacobson -- jjacobson@KelleyDrye.com -- Kelley Drye & Warren
LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel H. Charest, Burns Charest LLP, Mallory
Toby Biblo, Burns Charest LLP & William James Jackson, Kelley Drye
& Warren LLP.


NESTLE INC: Loses Bid to Junk Class Action Over 'No GMO' Label
--------------------------------------------------------------
Martin Macias Jr, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that
a federal judge on September 19 denied a bid by food and beverage
giant Nestle to toss a consumer class action claiming the company
violated federal and state laws by applying its unverified "No GMO"
label to products.

California resident Jennifer Latiff claims in her 2018 lawsuit that
Nestle USA's "No GMO Ingredients" label deceived her and other
consumers into purchasing products falsely described as being free
of genetically modified organisms.

Latiff claims she bases her purchasing decisions on whether
products have been verified by third-party groups -- such as the
Non-GMO Project -- as being free of genetically modified
ingredients or parts of animals that were fed GMO food.

Nestle's Lean Cuisine Marketplace frozen meal and Coffee-Mate
Natural Bliss creamer were among the products Latiff says she
purchased in supermarkets.

By creating its own seal, Nestle violated the Federal Trade
Commission's food certification guidelines and California's unfair
competition laws, Latiff says in her complaint.

Nestle moved to dismiss the lawsuit, claiming Latiff lacked
standing to bring the suit and could not demonstrate "real and
immediate threat" of injury.

But U.S District Judge Otis D. Wright II disagreed, writing in an
9-page order September 19 suffered harm by relying on Nestle's
label when making her purchases.

"Since plaintiff alleges that she relied on defendant's label,
thereby paying higher market prices than she would have otherwise
paid, plaintiff has standing," Wright wrote.

Wright also ruled that because any "reasonable consumer" could be
deceived by the labels, Nestle must also face claims it violated
California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act.

In a statement, Nestle said its "No GMO Ingredients" claim is
backed up by SGS, "a world leader in third-party inspection,
verification, testing and certification."

"While we are disappointed with this ruling, it is purely
procedural in nature and is in no way determinative of the merits
of the plaintiff's allegations, which remain unproven," Nestle
said. "Our product labels declaring the absence of GMO ingredients
are accurate, comply with FDA and USDA regulations, and provide
consumers with information to help them make informed purchasing
decisions."

Latiff's attorney Daniel Warshaw, Esq. of Pearson, Simon & Warshaw
did not respond to a request for comment on the ruling. [GN]


NESTLE USA: Ct. Denies Bid to Dismiss Latiff False Advertising Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California issued an Order denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in
the case captioned JENNIFER LATIFF, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. NESTLÉ USA, INC.,
Defendant. Case No. 2:18-CV-06503-ODW (JPRx). (C.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff, a resident of Oxnard, California, alleges that she
purchased one or more of Defendant's products labeled with its No
GMO Ingredients seal in Oxnard and Ventura during the class period.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the Federal Trade
Commission guidelines by creating its own deceptive seal that was
affixed to products which falsely represented that the product is
certified as non GMO by a neutral, third party, when in fact the
seal was the work of Defendant itself.

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint generally must satisfy only the minimal
notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) requires
a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief. For a complaint to sufficiently state a
claim, its factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.

STANDING

Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing standing under Article
III by meeting the following three elements. First, by relying on
Defendant's misrepresented statements, plaintiff must have suffered
a cognizable injury in fact. Second, there must be a causal
connection between the conduct complained of and the injury.
Lastly, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that
the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.

Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not have standing to
pursue injunctive relief because she has not met the first element.
Specifically, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a
real and immediate threat of repeated injury in the future required
under Article III.  

However, the Ninth Circuit has previously held that injury-in-fact
is met when consumers suffer an economic injury as a result of
false advertising claims, specifically noting that: Consumers
suffer an injury-in-fact for Article III purposes when, as a result
of false advertising, they purchase a product `when they otherwise
would not have done so.

Plaintiff claims that she and members of the Class would not have
purchased a product bearing the No GMO Ingredients seal had they
known that Defendant was using misleading labels. When given a
choice between comparable products, Plaintiff purposefully chooses
non-GMO products verified by an independent third-party when making
purchasing decisions and relies on packaging representations to
determine if products are certified as non-GMO by independent third
parties. Since Plaintiff alleges that she relied on Defendant's
label, thereby paying higher market prices than she would have
otherwise paid, Plaintiff has standing.   

Plaintiff sufficiently alleges standing.

UNFAIR COMPETITION (FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant designed the false, misleading and
deceptive No GMO Ingredients label with the intent to sell,
distribute and increase the consumption of its Products bearing the
No GMO Ingredients label. Plaintiff further alleges that
Defendant's business acts and practices are unlawful under the
California Consumers Legal Remedy Act (CLRA).

In general, to bring a CLRA claim, the plaintiff must show that:
(1) the defendant's conduct was deceptive and (2) that the
deception caused plaintiff to be harmed. In the class context, a
CLRA claim requires each class member to have an actual injury
caused by the unlawful practice.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant's No GMO Ingredients
seal impersonates the Non-GMO Project seal, and is misleading and
deceptive to consumers. Regardless of any aesthetic similarities
between the logos, the Non-GMO Project seal is held to different
standards than Defendant's No GMO seal. By using a seal similar to
the Non-GMO Project's seal, Plaintiff argues that Defendant creates
consumer confusion because Defendant's standards are far less than
those required to earn the legitimate Non-GMO's seal.  

Defendant avoids the Non-GMO Project's feed standard by using its
own, self-created No GMO Ingredients seal, thereby creating
confusion and deceiving consumers. Given that Plaintiff
deliberately selected and purchased purported non-GMO products from
among comparable products, Plaintiff has alleged that she suffered
harm by relying on Defendant's misleading seal in purchasing its
products.  

Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim as to this cause of
action.

FALSE ADVERTISING (SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant misleadingly and deceptively
represents that the Products were validated by an independent
third-party, when, in fact, they were not. These materials
misrepresented and/or omitted the true nature and quality of No GMO
Ingredients Products.

California's False Advertising Law outlaws the making or
dissemination of any statement concerning property or services that
is untrue or misleading.Whether an advertisement is misleading is
determined by asking whether a reasonable consumer would likely be
deceived.  However, in a false advertising case, the advertisement
itself is the primary evidence to determine whether the
advertisement is misleading.  

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's No GMO Ingredients Label is
deceptive when ingredients in many of Defendant's Products are
derived from GMOs. For example, Defendant's Products containing
milk come from cows fed with GMO grains. These products would not
qualify for the Non-GMO Project's seal. As such, if products are
made with milk from animals fed with GMO feed and contains a No GMO
Ingredients Label, it is plausible that consumers would be misled.


In sum, Plaintiff has adequately alleged that Defendant's No GMO
Ingredients Label could deceive a reasonable consumer, and
Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim as to this cause of
action.

CONSUMERS LEGAL REMEDIES ACT (THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION)

Under the CLRA, a reasonable consumer is not expected to know how
to inspect or judge a product or know the process of the products'
preparation or manufacture. Accordingly, the CLRA is liberally
construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes, which are
to protect consumers against unfair and deceptive business
practices and to provide efficient and economical procedures to
secure such protection.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated and continues to violate
the CLRA. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated
California Civil Code sections 1770(a)(2), (7), and (16). Section
1770(a)(2) prohibits the unlawful act of misrepresenting the
source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or
services.

Section 1770(a)(7) prohibits representing that goods or services
are of a particular standard, quality, or grade if they are of
another and section 1770(a)(16) bans representing that the subject
of a transaction has been supplied in accordance with a previous
representation when it has not.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant misrepresented the character
and quality of its No GMO Ingredients Label. For the reasons
previously provided, Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim
under CLRA.  

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a claim under the CLRA.

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 19, 2019 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y66smrsg from Leagle.com.

Jennifer Latiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel L. Warshaw -
dwarshaw@pswlaw.com - Pearson Simon and Warshaw LLP, Bobby Pouya -
bpouya@pswlaw.com - Pearson Simon Warshaw LLP, George Volney
Granade - ggranade@reesellp.com - Reese LLP & Michael R. Reese -
mreese@reesellp.com - Reese LLP.

Nestle USA Inc., Defendant, represented by Carmine R. Zarlenga  -
czarlenga@mayerbrown.com - Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac vice, Dale J.
Giali - dgiali@mayerbrown.com - Mayer Brown LLP & Keri E. Borders -
kborders@mayerbrown.com - Mayer Brown LLP.


NESTLE USA: Sued by Bakers Over 'Fake' White Chocolate Chips
------------------------------------------------------------
Matthew Renda, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that a
group of consumers sued the largest food company in the world Sept.
19, 2019, accusing it of misleading customers by producing fake
white chocolate while passing it off as real.

Lead plaintiffs Steven Prescott and Linda Cheslow filed a class
action against Nestle USA in Santa Cruz County Superior Court,
saying the Swiss multinational food conglomerate falsely marketed
white chocolate chips as real white chocolate when it's actually
fake white chocolate made with hydrogenated oils.

The class action was filed September 19 but withheld from the
public by the court until September 20.

"Nestle, a company known for its chocolate, sells fake white
chocolate baking chips and tries t0 market them as white
chocolate," the plaintiffs say in their complaint.

Plaintiffs said they relied on advertising of the white chocolate
chips as "premiere chocolate" when purchasing the product for their
baking projects.  Instead, the chocolate -- being fake -- did not
melt the way real chocolate does and caused their projects to fail,
the plaintiffs say.

The plaintiffs claim many other bakers had the same problem,
judging by complaints on the company website. They say Nestle
disguises the true nature of its product in a quest for profit.

"Nestle's profits are attributable, in part, to deceptive labeling
and advertising of the product as containing white chocolate," the
plaintiffs say in the complaint.

They also say plaintiffs say Nestle knows its packaging is
misleading but continues the practice anyway.

"Nestle is aware that reasonable consumers are misled into
believing the product contains white chocolate when it actually
contains fake white chocolate but has thus far refused to make any
labeling and advertising changes to dispel the consumer deception,"
the plaintiffs say in the complaint.

They seek an order barring Nestle from labeling and advertising the
product as white chocolate and restitution on claims of unfair
competition, false advertising and violation of the California
Consumers Legal Remedies Act. They are represented by Ryan Clarkson
and others at Clarkson Law Firm in Los Angeles.

Nestle did not respond to a request for comment by press time.

White chocolate is not technically chocolate because it doesn't
contain cocoa solids. Instead, it's considered a "chocolate
confection" typically made from a blend of cocoa butter, milk
solids, sugar, milkfat and lecithin -- the fatty emulsifier that
holds the whole thing together. [GN]


NEW ORLEANS, LA: Partial Summary Judgment in McMahon Suit Affirmed
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge James F. McKay, III of the Court of Appeal of Louisiana for
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court's granting of a partial
summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs in the consolidated
case captioned JOSEPH R. McMAHON, ET AL, v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS.
CONSOLIDATED WITH: DARLENE WASHINGTON-WAPEGAN, CAROLYN BLACKMAN,
JOSEPH E. ALVEREZ, AND CORINNE DUCRE, v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS.
CONSOLIDATED WITH: DAVID C. JARRELL, v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS.
CONSOLIDATED WITH: DAVID C. JARRELL, v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS.
CONSOLIDATED WITH: DOUGLAS M. KLEEMAN AND GREGORY J. McDONALD, v.
CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, Case Nos. 2018-CA-0842, 2018-CA-0843,
2018-CA-0844, 2018-CA-0845, 2018-CA-0846.

In January of 2008, the City contracted with American Traffic
Solutions, Inc., for the installation of traffic cameras at various
locations throughout the City to capture images of vehicles that
were speeding or violating intersectional red lights, or both.  In
connection with this contract, the City enacted and began enforcing
Code of Ordinances of the City of New Orleans Chapter 154, Article
XVII, Sections 154-1704, known as the Automated Traffic Enforcement
System ("ATES") ordinance.

On March 3, 2010, Lead Plaintiff, Mr. McMahon, filed the first
class action lawsuit in Civil District Court challenging the ATES
ordinances under local, state, and federal law.  Several subsequent
class action challenges were also filed.  On Oct. 8, 2010, Mr.
McMahon filed his first amended class action petition against the
City, which included a challenge to the Department of Public Works'
("DPW") illegal enforcement, administration and fine collection of
the ATES as ruled by Judge Paulette Irons in Washington-Wagepan, et
al v. City of New Orleans, CDC No. 2010-9732.

The City Council passed an amendment to ATES on Nov. 4, 2010,
placing enforcement and administration of ATES sections 174-1701
through 154-1704 under the New Orleans Police Department ("NOPD").
The trial court, the Plaintiffs, and the City jointly agreed to
consolidate several class action lawsuits under the caption of the
instant case, and on March 23, 2012, the Plaintiffs filed a "Master
Petition" in the ad hoc division of Civil District Court.

The City filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims on July
31, 2012.  On Oct. 10, 2012, the trial court issued a judgment in
favor of the City and dismissed all of the Plaintiffs' claims.  The
Plaintiffs timely appealed the judgment.

On Dec. 18, 2013, the Court reversed that judgment in part and
remanded the matter to the trial court.  It found that the
Plaintiffs had a vested right to seek relief from the DPW's
unlawful enforcement of ATES.  On July 9, 2015, following several
amendments to the Master Petition, the trial court granted class
certification to the Plaintiffs.  On Feb. 8, 2017, the trial court
signed an order accepting the definition of two subclasses in the
case.

On Sept. 11, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial
summary judgment on behalf of Subclass 1, which the trial court
granted from the bench on Nov. 15, 2017.  After discussions with
opposing counsel, on Dec. 4, 2017, the Plaintiffs moved to amend
the language of the judgment to bring conformity under Louisiana
law with a money judgment.  On Feb. 21, 2018, the trial court
amended the language of the partial summary judgment to include an
actual dollar amount ($25,612,690.32), and ordered that the City
return this amount to those who had paid ATES fines between Jan. 1,
2008 and Nov. 3, 2010.  It is from this judgment that the City has
taken the instant suspensive appeal.

On appeal, the City raises the following assignment of error: the
district court erred in granting the Plaintiffs' motion for partial
summary judgment, finding the entire ATES Ordinance to have been
null ab initio, and ordering the return of all fines collected
under the City's ATES Ordinance from Jan. 1, 2008 until Nov. 3,
2010.

Judge McKay concluded that because the ATES was an invalid
ordinance, without effect, until it was placed under the NOPD on
Nov. 4, 2010, the trial court correctly ruled for the immediate
return of the $25,612,690.32 in ATES fees and fines collected from
tickets issued to Subclass 1 prior to that date.  Because the
ordinance was invalid, no one in Subclass 1 ever owed any of those
ATES fine payments to the City.  Accordingly, he affirmed the trial
court's granting of the partial summary judgment in favor of the
Plaintiffs.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/vCbhRD from Leagle.com.

ANTHONY S. MASKA, ATTORNEY AT LAW, P.O. Box 2606, Hammond,
Louisiana 70404, -and- JOSEPH R. McMAHON III, 2332 Severn Avenue,
Metairie, Louisiana 70001, COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES.

MICHEAL L. FANTACI, DEBORAH A. VILLIO, JAMES C. RAFF, LEBLANC
FANTACI VILLIO, LLC, 3421 N. Causeway Blvd., Ste 201, Metairie,
Louisiana 70002. -and- SUNNI LEBEOUF, NEW ORLEANS CITY ATTORNEY,
SHAWN LINDSAY, DEPUTY CITY ATTORNEY, 1300 Perdido Street, Suite
5E03-City Hall, New Orleans, Louisiana 70112, COUNSEL FOR
DEFENDANT/PLAINTIFF.

NEW YORK: Gulino et al Filed Appeal in 2nd Cir.
-----------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Elsa Gulino, Mayling Ralph, Peter Wilds ,and
Nia Greene, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, and Denise Boyce, the Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. New York State Education Department, the Defendant, and Board
of Education of the City School District of the City of New York,
the Defendant-Appellant, Case No. 19-2812 (2nd Cir.), is an appeal
filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
on Sept. 3, 2019, from a lower court decision in Case No.
96-cv-8414 (S.D.N.Y.). The suit alleges job related issues.

The New York State Education Department is the department of the
New York state government responsible for the supervision for all
public schools in New York and all standardized testing, as well as
the production and administration of state tests and Regents
Examinations.[BN]

NEWREZ LLC: Labrecque Sues Over Failure to Timely Pay Taxes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Richard J. Labrecque, on behalf of Himself and Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. NewRez LLC, f/k/a New Penn Financial, LLC,
d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, Defendant, Case No.
4:19-cv-00465-EJM (D. Ariz., Sept. 19, 2019) is a complaint against
Defendant brought on behalf of Plaintiff and all other similarly
situated persons with non-delinquent mortgage escrow accounts
serviced by Shellpoint in which Shellpoint failed to timely pay
taxes and then used escrow funds to reimburse itself for expenses
incurred due to Shellpoint's own misconduct.

Shellpoint is mortgage servicing company licensed to do and is
doing business as a mortgage banker in Arizona.

In March 2018, Plaintiff re-financed a residential property located
in Pima County, Arizona by way of a residential mortgage loan from
Quicken Loans, Inc. The terms and conditions governing Plaintiff's
home mortgage loan were set forth in a standardized form contract
("the Mortgage Agreement"). The Mortgage Agreement is a federal
mortgage governed by the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, and
its implementing regulation. On June 1, 2018, Shellpoint began
servicing Plaintiff's loan. Quicken supplied Shellpoint with the
entire closing file on Plaintiff's loan, including notice of the
dates and amounts of the semi-annual taxes due on the Home.
Although Plaintiff's Escrow Account was at no time delinquent, and
at all times had sufficient funds to pay the real estate taxes on
the Home as they became due, Shellpoint failed to pay the taxes
from the Escrow Account when they became due on October 1, 2018.

Plaintiff on January 23, 2019, notified Shellpoint that, despite
available funds in the Escrow Account, Shellpoint had not made the
real estate tax payments that were due on October 1, 2018. A
Shellpoint representative assured Plaintiff that the taxes would be
paid and that Plaintiff would not be responsible for any fees or
penalties related to the unpaid taxes. Shellpoint on March 14,
2019, finally paid the real estate taxes due October 1, 2018, using
funds from the Escrow Account. However, Shellpoint on March 14,
2019, also took an additional $553.72 from the Escrow Account, to
pay a late payment penalty assessed by Pima County due to
Shellpoint's own failure to pay the real estate taxes due on the
Home on October 1, 2018. On June 4, 2019, some eight weeks later,
Shellpoint provided Plaintiff with a "Loan History Statement" which
confirmed (a) that Plaintiff's Escrow Account was never delinquent,
and (b) that Shellpoint had taken $553.72 from the Escrow Account
to pay the penalties assessed for its own failure to timely pay the
real estate taxes on the Home.

Subsequently, by letter dated April 15, 2019, but not delivered to
Plaintiff until July 1, 2019 via email, Shellpoint refused to
reimburse Plaintiff for the $553.72 it withdrew from the Escrow
Account. Because Shellpoint failed to pay the real estate taxes due
on the Home on October 1, 2018, Shellpoint violated RESPA Section
2605(g) and the regulations promulgated thereunder, causing
Plaintiff actual damages in the amount of $553.72. Because
Shellpoint was not authorized by the terms of the Mortgage
Agreement to take funds in the Escrow Account to pay penalties or
fees incurred by Shellpoint, Shellpoint wrongfully converted
Plaintiff's Escrow Funds to its own use. Shellpoint has exhibited a
pattern or practice of failing to timely make tax payments on
behalf of borrowers like Plaintiff from non-delinquent escrow
accounts, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is a resident and citizen of Pima County, Arizona.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Andrew S. Friedman, Esq.
     Francis J. Balint, Jr., Esq.
     BONNETT, FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C.
     2325 E. Camelback Rd. Suite 300
     Phoenix, AZ 85016
     Phone: (602) 274-1100
     Fax: (602) 274-1199
     Email: afriedman@bffb.com
            fbalint@bffb.com

          - and -

     John P. Leader, Esq.
     LEADER LAW FIRM
     405 W. Cool Drive, Suite 107
     Tucson, AZ 85704
     Phone: (520) 575-9040
     Fax: (520) 575-9340
     Email: john@leaderlawaz.com


NISSAN NORTH: Suit Over FEB, AEB Transferred to M.D. Tenn.
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion to Transfer
Venue in the case captioned IN RE NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.
LITIGATION, This Document Relates To: ALL ACTIONS. Case No.
18-cv-07292-HSG. (N.D. Cal.) to the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee.

Plaintiffs bring this putative class action individually and on
behalf of nationwide and statewide classes consisting of all
persons who purchased, own, owned, lease, or leased a Class
Vehicle, defined as a 2015 or newer Nissan or Infiniti vehicle
equipped with Forward Emergency Braking (FEB) or Automatic
Emergency Braking (AEB). The crux of Plaintiffs' CCAC is that
Defendants allegedly concealed a defect in the Class Vehicles'
braking system. The braking technology operates by monitoring a
vehicle's proximity to the vehicle ahead and giving the driver
audible and visual display warnings if the system detects a
potential frontal collision.

NNA moves to dismiss nine of the ten Plaintiffs for improper venue
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1391(b). Alternatively, NNA moves to
transfer the entire action to the Middle District of Tennessee
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a).    

Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of 12(b)(3), a party may move to dismiss an
action for improper venue.Venue in a civil action is proper in:

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all
defendants are residents of the State in which the district is
located (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a
substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is
situated; or(3) if there is no district in which an action may
otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial
district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal
jurisdiction with respect to such action.

Venue Under Section 1391(b)(1)

Under Section 1391(b)(1), venue is proper in any district where a
defendant resides. In a state with multiple judicial districts, for
purposes of venue, a defendant corporation is deemed to reside in
any district in that State within which its contacts would be
sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that were a
separate State. NNA argues that venue is improper under Section
1391(b)(1) because Plaintiffs cannot establish that NNA is subject
to personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of California.  

There are two categories of personal jurisdiction a plaintiff can
invoke: general and specific.  

General Jurisdiction

A limited number of courts have addressed whether a defendant's
incorporation in a multi-district state provides a basis for
general jurisdiction in each district within that state. Plaintiffs
argue that NNA is subject to general jurisdiction in each district
in California by virtue of being incorporated in California. The
Court finds this reasoning persuasive, and Plaintiffs do not
provide any compelling authority to the contrary.

Accordingly, because NNA is registered in the Eastern District of
California and its principal place of business is in Tennessee, NNA
is not subject to general jurisdiction in this district under
Section 1391(d).

Specific Jurisdiction

Specific personal jurisdiction exists when (1) the nonresident
defendant purposefully directs activities to the forum or
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities in the forum (2) the claim arises out of or relates to
the defendant's forum-related activities and (3) the exercise of
jurisdiction is reasonable.  

Plaintiffs argue that NNA is subject to specific personal
jurisdiction in this district because NNA purportedly has contacts
here related to the development and design of the braking
technology.  NNA concedes that it is subject to specific
jurisdiction with respect to Plaintiff Garneau's claims, as he
purchased his Class Vehicle in this district, but it argues that
none of the nonresident Plaintiffs' claims relate to any activities
by Defendants in California.  

As support for their position, Plaintiffs allege that the Nissan
Research Center Silicon Valley (NRC-SV) researched and developed
the braking technology at issue.  NNA disputes NRC-SV's
involvement, and submitted a declaration from Maarten Sierhuis, the
Chief Technology Director of NRC-SV, stating that the research
facility had no involvement in the research, development, design or
testing of Forward Emergency Braking/Automatic Emergency Braking
technology in any Nissan or Infiniti vehicles sold, currently or in
the past, in the U.S. Market.

Plaintiffs present no evidence to the contrary, and therefore fail
to meet their burden of establishing that NRC-SV's presence in this
district is a basis for personal jurisdiction.  
More fundamentally, critically lacking from Plaintiffs' own
allegations and the record presented is any evidence that
Defendants had any contacts in California concerning the sale and
marketing of the Class Vehicles to Plaintiffs with the exception of
Plaintiff Garneau. Plaintiffs' allegations arise from Defendants'
claimed non-disclosure of the braking defect. The Court is not
persuaded that the mere presence of a research facility in this
district, especially one with no involvement in the braking
technology, establishes that Defendants have any connection to this
forum that would make it reasonable to hale Defendants into court
here for claims related to the advertising and sale of vehicles
outside this forum. Plaintiffs have not identified any link between
this forum and the non-resident Plaintiffs' claims, as those
Plaintiffs did not purchase the vehicles in this forum, or even in
California.  

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not carried their burden
of demonstrating that the nonresidents' claims arise out of
Defendants' activities in this district. With the exception of
Plaintiff Garneau, the Court finds that venue does not lie here
under Section 1391(b)(1).

The Court finds that venue does not properly lie in this district
for the claims of any of the nonresident Plaintiffs. Therefore, the
Court may dismiss or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer
such case to any district in which it could have been brought.
Transfer will normally be in the interest of justice because
normally dismissal of an action that could be brought elsewhere is
time-consuming and justice-defeating.

Because venue is proper in this district for Plaintiff Garneau, the
Court considers whether transfer of the entire action is
appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1404.
MOTION TO TRANSFER UNDER 28 U.S.C. Section 1404

Legal Standard

In this district, courts typically consider the following factors:
(1) plaintiff's choice of forum (2) convenience of the parties (3)
convenience of the witnesses, (4) ease of access to the evidence
(5) familiarity of each forum with the applicable law (6)
feasibility of consolidation with other claims (7) any local
interest in the controversy and (8) the relative court congestion
and time to trial in each forum.  

This Case Could Have Been Brought in the Middle District of
Tennessee

A transferee district in which the action might have been brought
is one: (1) that has subject matter jurisdiction (2) where
defendant would have been subject to personal jurisdiction and (3)
venue would have been proper. The Court finds that this threshold
requirement is met.

Plaintiffs' Choice of Forum and Convenience of the Parties

Although Plaintiffs argue that their choice of forum should be
given substantial weight. Plaintiffs' choice of forum is given less
weight where, as here, Plaintiffs seek to represent a class.  

Here, nine of ten Named Plaintiffs reside outside of California.
The only relevant connection to this forum Plaintiffs raise is that
Plaintiff Garneau resides in this District, was exposed to
Defendant's misleading conduct in this District, purchased a Class
Vehicle in this District, and thus was injured in this District.  
Yet they fail to account for the nine Plaintiffs who all reside
outside of California, were exposed to Defendants' allegedly
misleading conduct outside of California, purchased a Class Vehicle
outside of California, and were injured outside of California.  

Further, the convenience of the parties also favors transfer. The
Court agrees with NNA that a transfer to the Middle District of
Tennessee would seem to be equally convenient, if not more
convenient for the nine nonresident Plaintiffs, given that
proceeding in the Middle District of Tennessee would bring the
action closer to each of their home states.  

The Court finds that the substantial number of non-resident named
Plaintiffs cuts against Plaintiffs' claim that it is more
convenient for the parties to litigate here.  

Convenience of Witnesses and Ease of Access to Evidence

As to ease of access to evidence, NNA concedes that the
availability of electronic evidence makes this factor neutral.
Reply at 6. For witnesses, NNA posits that it would be more
convenient for its own witnesses to testify if the action were
located in Tennessee, given the proximity to its headquarters. With
respect to non-party witnesses, NNA proffers that they would likely
be found in Plaintiffs' home states. Id. The Court agrees that
transfer would presumably be more convenient for those non-party
witnesses, because any non-party witnesses outside of California
who would have to be compelled to testify may be "beyond the
Court's subpoena power absent transfer.

Plaintiffs fail to identify a relevant party for whom this district
would be a more convenient forum.  

Because the convenience of non-party witnesses is often considered
the most important factor in assessing a motion to transfer, the
Court is persuaded here that the convenience of non-party witnesses
supports Defendants' transfer request.

Feasibility of Consolidation with Other Claims

NNA argues that this factor is neutral since the Court has already
consolidated the cases. The Court agrees.

Familiarity with Applicable Law

According to NNA, familiarity with applicable law supports transfer
or is at least neutral.  Although no Plaintiff invokes Tennessee
law, NNA contends that no Plaintiff properly invokes California
law. Plaintiffs respond that NNA's argument is premature and wrong.


The Court finds this factor to be neutral or to weigh slightly
against transfer. Plaintiffs do bring claims under California law,
but they also bring claims under the laws of each non-resident
Plaintiff's home state.  While the Court may have more familiarity
with California law, it cannot say at this stage that it has any
greater knowledge regarding the many other legal issues raised such
that transfer would be inappropriate.

Local Interest

Courts also consider the local interest in deciding local
controversies. The Court finds that Tennessee has a greater local
interest in this case. Plaintiffs only point to Plaintiff Garneau's
residency and NNA's place of incorporation as connections to this
forum. But they ignore that nine of the ten Plaintiffs have no
connection to California, that NNA's headquarters are in Tennessee,
and that it conducts its business in Tennessee.

Given NNA's significant contacts with Tennessee and Plaintiffs'
limited contacts with California, the Court finds this factor
weighs in favor of transfer.

Differences in Cost

While convenience to the parties' attorneys is not an appropriate
factor for the Court to consider when deciding a motion to
transfer, the difference in the costs of litigation in the two
forums' is relevant. Plaintiffs argue that transfer would unfairly
shift the cost of litigation from the large corporations with
national and international presence to Plaintiffs, who are
individual purchasers of automobiles from Defendants. The Court is
not persuaded. Instead, the Court finds that litigation costs would
likely be lower if the case were litigated in the Middle District
of Tennessee, given that the majority of the nonresident Plaintiffs
and potential witnesses would be geographically closer to Tennessee
than California. Plaintiffs fail to persuasively refute this point.


Thus, this factor weighs in favor of transfer.

Balancing the Factors

On balance, the Court finds that this forum's lack of connection to
events alleged in the CCAC and the convenience of non-party and
other witnesses often considered the most important factor weigh in
favor of transfer to the Middle District of Tennessee.

The Court GRANTS the motion to transfer.  

The Clerk of Court shall TRANSFER this case to the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, and close the
file.  

A full-text copy of the District Court’s September 23, 2019 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yym2upmv from Leagle.com

Cathy Bashaw, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joel Dashiell Smith -
jsmith@bursor.com - Bursor & Fisher, P.A., Frederick J. Klorczyk,
III - fklorczyk@bursor.com - Bursor and Fisher, P.A. & Lawrence
Timothy Fisher- ltfisher@bursor.com - Bursor & Fisher, P.A.

Robert Garneau, Nancy Housell, Jeffrey Olkowski, Courtney Johnson,
Scott Reeves, Lisa Hendrickson, Rhonda Perry & Jane Reeves,
Plaintiffs, represented by Joel Dashiell Smith , Bursor & Fisher,
P.A. & Lawrence Timothy Fisher , Bursor & Fisher, P.A.

Nissan North America, Inc., Defendant, represented by E. Paul
Cauley, Jr.-  paul.cauley@dbr.com - Drinker Biddle & Reath, LLP,
pro hac vice, Matthew Jacob Adler- matthew.adler@dbr.com - Drinker
Biddle Reath LLP & Paul Jeffrey Riehle - paul.riehle@dbr.com -
Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP.

Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., Defendant, represented by Paul Jeffrey
Riehle , Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP.


OLLIE'S BARGAIN: Rigrodsky & Long Files Class Action Lawsuit
------------------------------------------------------------
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., announces that a complaint has been filed
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York on behalf of all persons or entities that purchased the
common stock of Ollie's Bargain Outlet Holdings, Inc. ("Ollie's" or
the "Company") (NASDAQ GS:OLLI) between June 6, 2019 and August 28,
2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"), alleging violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against the Company and certain of
its officers (the "Complaint").

If you purchased shares of Ollie's during the Class Period, or
purchased shares prior to the Class Period and still hold Ollie's,
and wish to discuss this action or have any questions concerning
this notice or your rights or interests, please contact Seth D.
Rigrodsky or Timothy J. MacFall at Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., 300
Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220, Wilmington, DE 19801, by telephone at
(888) 969-4242, by e-mail at info@rl-legal.com or at
http://rigrodskylong.com/contact-us/

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, defendants
made materially false and misleading statements, and omitted
materially adverse facts, about the Company's business, operations
and prospects. Specifically, the Complaint alleges that the
defendants concealed from the investing public: (1) that the
Company suffered a supply chain issue that impacted the initial
inventory available at new stores; (2) that, as a result, the
Company lacked sufficient inventory to meet demand at certain store
locations; (3) that, as a result, the Company's comparable store
sales were likely to decrease quarter-over-quarter; and (4) that,
as a result of the foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about
the Company's business, operations, and prospects, were materially
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis. As a result of
defendants' alleged false and misleading statements, the Company's
stock traded at artificially inflated prices during the Class
Period.

According to the Complaint, on August 28, 2019, Ollie's reported
that comparable store sales decreased 1.7% during second quarter
2019. In addition, Ollie's disclosed that a "bottleneck issue" had
existed in its supply chain "for most all of Q2" and was not
corrected until "the last week of the quarter."

On this news, shares of Ollie's fell over 27%, closing at $56.36
per share on August 29, 2019, on heavy trading volume.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than November 18, 2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Any member of the proposed class may move the court to
serve as lead plaintiff through counsel of their choice, or may
choose to do nothing and remain an absent class member.

Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., with offices in Delaware, New York, and
California, has recovered hundreds of millions of dollars on behalf
of investors and achieved substantial corporate governance reforms
in numerous cases nationwide, including federal securities fraud
actions, shareholder class actions, and shareholder derivative
actions.

Contact:

         Seth D. Rigrodsky, Esq.
         Timothy J. MacFall, Esq.
         Rigrodsky & Long, P.A.
         Tel: (888) 969-4242, (516) 683-3516
         Fax: (302) 654-7530
         Website: http://www.rigrodskylong.com
         Email: info@rl-legal.com
                sdr@rl-legal.com
                tjm@rl-legal.com [GN]


OLLIE'S BARGAIN: Schall Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
------------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
announces the filing of a class action lawsuit against Ollie's
Bargain Outlet Holdings, Inc. ("Ollie's" or "the Company") (NASDAQ:
OLLI) for violations of the Federal securities laws.

Investors who purchased the Company's shares between June 6, 2019
and August 28, 2019, inclusive (the ''Class Period''), are
encouraged to contact the firm before November 18, 2019.           
       

We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law
Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at
424-303-1964, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also
reach us through the firm's website at www.schallfirm.com, or by
email at brian@schallfirm.com.

The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. Ollie's failed to build and maintain an
effective supply chain system, impacting the availability of
inventory for new stores. The Company failed to maintain sufficient
inventory to meet demand at certain stores. Based on these facts,
the Company's comparable store sales were likely to decrease in
sequential quarters. Based on these facts, the Company's public
statements were false and materially misleading throughout the
class period. When the market learned the truth about Ollie's,
investors suffered damages.

Join the case to recover your losses.

The Schall Law Firm represents investors around the world and
specializes in securities class action lawsuits and shareholder
rights litigation.

Contact:

         Brian Schall, Esq.
         The Schall Law Firm
         Website: www.schallfirm.com
         Office: 310-301-3335
         Cell: 424-303-1964
         Email: info@schallfirm.com
                brian@schallfirm.com [GN]


OPTICAL DISK: Supreme Court OKs Price-Fixing Class Action Suits
---------------------------------------------------------------
Regina Leader-Post, reports that the suits, filed by Whistler
businessman Neil Godfrey, allege the companies overcharged buyers
of optical disk drives and products containing them, such as
computers and video-game consoles.

The cases, involving more than 40 defendants, including powerhouses
such as Sony, Toshiba, Samsung, Philips, Panasonic and Pioneer,
were certified as class actions, decisions upheld on appeal.

Godfrey is seeking compensation for all B.C. residents who
purchased the products between Jan. 1, 2004, and Jan. 1, 2010.

The proposed class also includes so-called umbrella purchasers --
people who bought products that were not made or supplied by the
companies in question -- based on the theory that the conspiracy
led other manufacturers to set higher prices as well.

Godfrey launched the main action in September 2010, but a separate
one against Pioneer did not come until August 2013, leading the
company to argue it began after the expiry of a two-year limitation
period. [GN]


OREXIGEN THERAPEUTICS: Court Narrows Claims in Securities Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
Moving Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned KARIM
KHOJA, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. OREXIGEN THERAPEUTICS, INC., JOSEPH P. HAGAN, MICHAEL
A. NARACHI, and PRESTON KLASSEN, Defendants. AND ALL CONSOLIDATED
CASES. Case No. 15-CV-540 JLS (JLB). (S.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Lisa Colley filed a class action complaint against
Defendants, alleging (1) violation of Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) and Rule 10b-5, and (2)
violation of Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act.

Legal Standard

Rule 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the defense that
the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court
evaluates whether a complaint states a cognizable legal theory and
sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a),
which requires a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.  

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face. A claim is facially plausible when the
facts pled allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

Lead Plaintiff alleges two surviving causes of action: (1) Count I
for violations of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5(b)
against all Defendants and (2) Count III for violations of Section
20(a) of the Exchange Act against the Moving Defendants.

The Court addresses each in turn below.

Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5

Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act forbids (1) the use or employment of
any deceptive device (2) 'in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security and (3) in contravention of' SEC rules and
regulations. The basic elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim, therefore,
are: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission of fact (2)
scienter, (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security
(4) transaction and loss causation and (5) economic loss.

The Moving Defendants move to dismiss with prejudice Lead
Plaintiff's Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims for failure
adequately to plead (1) scienter as to all misrepresentations and
(2) loss causation as to the March 3, 2015 misrepresentations.  

Scienter

A private securities plaintiff must state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind. The required state of mind is scienter,
i.e. a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud. The Court must consider competing inferences that could be
drawn in favor of plaintiffs or defendants and determine whether
plaintiffs have pled a strong inference of scienter which is cogent
and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of
nonfraudulent intent.

The Ninth Circuit's Decision in Khoja

As an initial matter, Lead Plaintiff contends that the Ninth
Circuit in Khoja reasoned that almost all of the statements
identified in the Complaint adequately pled material misstatements
or omissions, and with the requisite scienter. The Moving
Defendants rejoin that Lead Plaintiff misreads the Ninth Circuit's
decision and argues that court already decided scienter. It did
not.

The Moving Defendants are correct. The Ninth Circuit made explicit
that it had made no determination as to the sufficiency of Lead
Plaintiff's allegations of Defendants' scienter: The district
court's dismissal of Count I was based on the elements of falsity
and materiality. Accordingly, the analysis here is limited to those
issues.

The March 3, 2015 Statements

Lead Plaintiff alleges that Orexigen's March 3, 2015 Form 8-K and
press release were materially false and misleading because they
failed to disclose that the 25% study results were unreliable and
that Orexigen had made a request with the USPTO in January 2015 to
have the patent publicly disseminated. The Moving Defendants
contend that Lead Plaintiff has failed to allege that any of them
had the requisite fraudulent intent. Specifically, the Moving
Defendants urge that any inference of scienter concerning the
undisclosed unreliability of the 25 percent interim results is
undercut by the cautionary language appearing in the March 3, 2015
Form 8-K concerning the preliminary nature of the data.  

Lead Plaintiff counters that falsity and scienter often go
hand-in-hand, and that the Ninth Circuit's finding of material
falsity should be dispositive. Further, as to the disclosure of the
unreliable 25 percent interim results, Lead Plaintiff claims that
he has alleged that the FDA told Narachi and Klassen that the 25
percent interim results had a high degree of uncertainty and that
Hagan as a signatory to the March 3, 2015 8-K and as the Chief
Business Officer, Treasurer, and CFO of Orexigen was aware, or
deliberately disregarded, the significance of releasing the 25%
interim data.

The Court concludes that Lead Plaintiff adequately has alleged
facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter as to Klassen
and Narachi's alleged material omissions on March 3, 2015, but not
as to Hagan's. Regarding the March 3, 2015 disclosure of the
unreliable 25 percent interim data in the Form 8-K, Lead Plaintiff
alleges that, during a June 4, 2014 meeting about Defendants'
breach, the FDA reminded Defendants Narachi and Klassen that 25%
interim results have a high degree of uncertainty and were likely
to change with the accumulation of additional data.

Lead Plaintiff therefore alleges that, despite knowing that the 25
percent interim results were unreliable, Klassen and Narachi failed
to disclose as much in the March 3, 2015 8-K. At the pleading
stage, these allegations give rise to an inference of scienter at
least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent
intent.

Although the presence of cautionary language in the Form 8-K does
give rise to an inference of nonfraudulent intent, the inference
that Klassen and Narachi acted with deliberate or conscious
recklessness is at least as compelling. Defendants could have
announced the publication of the 371 Patent without touting the 25
percent interim results or they could have disclosed that the 25
percent interim results were considered unreliable. Instead,
Defendants published the data with certain qualifiers but, as the
Ninth Circuit recognized, telling investors that the data might
change is different from saying the data already has 'a high degree
of uncertainty' and is likely to change.

Consequently, the inference that Klassen and Narachi misleadingly
disclosed the unreliable 25 percent interim data artificially to
inflate the price for Orexigen's stock is equally compelling.  

As the Moving Defendants note, however, there is no allegation that
Hagan attended the June 4, 2014 meeting, or that any information
from that meeting was ever transmitted to him. And without
allegations that each of the Moving Defendants that signed various
of Orexigen's public filings knew those public filings contained
misstatements, the Moving Defendants' signatures on those public
filings alone does not give rise to a strong inference of
scienter.

Lead Plaintiff therefore urges that the Light Study and its 25
percent interim results were of such importance to Orexigen that
Hagan must have known of the unreliability of the preliminary data,
allowing the Court to conclude that Lead Plaintiff has alleged a
strong inference of scienter as to Hagan. In so arguing, Lead
Plaintiff relies heavily on the Ninth Circuit's decisions in South
Ferry, 542 F.3d 776, and Berson, 527 F.3d 982. The Moving
Defendants counter that this core operations inference fails to
impute knowledge to Hagan, who is not alleged to have knowledge of
the unnamed FDA employee's opinion.

The Court must agree with the Moving Defendants. Lead Plaintiff
alleges that Hagan served at all relevant times as the Company's
Chief Business Officer, Treasurer and Acting CFO and that his
individual goals emphasized developing Contrave for markets both at
home and abroad. But, unlike Klassen and Narachi,  there are no
allegations that Hagan ever met with the FDA or was in any way
involved in the Light Study.

Rather, Lead Plaintiff alleges that Hagan was to effectively lead
and manage the finance and accounting teams as Orexigen transitions
into a commercial stage company' and lead the ROW rest of the world
partnering process and make significant progress toward
establishing partnership(s) to further develop and commercialize
Contrave outside North America. Consequently, although Lead
Plaintiff's allegations do reveal that Hagan's responsibilities at
Orexigen were connected to Contrave generally, they appear to have
been related more to its financial and marketing aspects.

The Court therefore cannot infer that the FDA's interpretation of
the 25 percent results must have been known to Hagan.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the Moving
Defendants' Motion as to the Moving Defendants' scienter as to the
May 3, 2015 material omissions. Specifically, the Court GRANTS the
Motion as to Hagan and DENIES the Motion as to Klassen and
Narachi.

Orexigen's May 8, 2015 Statements

Lead Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants' May 8, 2015 Forms 8-K
and 10-Q and earnings conference call were materially misleading
because they misrepresented that the Light Study was ongoing by
failing to disclose that the ESC had terminated the Light Study on
March 26, 2015, and failed to disclose the 50 percent interim
results.   

The Moving Defendants argue that Lead Plaintiff fails to plead
scienter as to either of these statements because the Complaint is
internally contradictory with respect to the alleged timing of the
Light Study termination, which should be dispositive that
Defendants were not deliberately reckless in failing to disclose
that the Light Study had allegedly been terminated before May 8.
Further, the Complaint lacks any allegations suggesting that
Defendants who said nothing about the 25% data after March 3, 2015
believed the failure to disclose the 50% data risked misleading
investors.

Lead Plaintiff counters that it is now law of the case that the
Complaint's allegations support a plausible inference that the ESC
terminated the Light Study before May 2015, and, even if the ESC
had only recommended terminating the study, Defendants nevertheless
had a duty to disclose that development. Lead Plaintiff also urges
that the absence of stock sales does not undermine the existence of
scienter and that where, as here, employee compensation is tied to
facts of the alleged fraud, such particularized allegations' can
establish scienter.

The Court concludes that Lead Plaintiff adequately has alleged
scienter as to the Moving Defendants for the alleged material
omissions from May 8, 2015. In light of the Ninth Circuit's
conclusion that Lead Plaintiff's allegations support a plausible
inference that the ESC terminated the Light Study before May 2015,
the Court rejects the Moving Defendants' argument that the
Complaint is internally contradictory with respect to the alleged
timing of Light Study termination and in particular the Moving
Defendants' reliance on Exhibit K to their Request for Judicial
Notice,  of which the Court cannot properly take judicial notice.


The Court therefore accepts as its starting point that Lead
Plaintiff plausibly alleges that the Light Study had already been
terminated on March 26, 2015, and that Dr. Nissen informed the
Moving Defendants of this development.  

As to Klassen and Narachi, these allegations, coupled with
Klassen's false statement that the Light Study is continuing and
it's an ongoing entity as of right now and Narachi's false
assurance that Orexigen would disclose any decision to terminate
the Light Study, give rise to a strong inference of scienter on
behalf of Klassen and Narachi as to their material omissions
concerning the termination of the Light Study on May 8, 2015.

The question is closer concerning Hagan; nonetheless, the Court
ultimately concludes that Lead Plaintiff's allegations as to Hagan
give rise to a strong inference of scienter given Lead Plaintiff's
allegations that Hagan knew of the March 26, 2015 termination of
the Light Study,  yet signed the May 8, 2015 Forms 8-K and 10-Q
that misleadingly omitted this material information. The May 8,
2015 Form 8-K, for example, suggest[ed] that the Light Study was
ongoing, by indicating that Orexigen's clinical trial program also
includes a double-blind, placebo-controlled cardiovascular outcomes
trial known as the Light Study.

The same is true of Lead Plaintiff's alleged material omissions
from May 8, 2015, concerning the 50 percent interim data. The Court
again begins with Lead Plaintiff's allegation that, on March 26,
2015, the Moving Defendants were actually shown the more mature 50%
data demonstrating that the cardiovascular benefit the Company had
earlier touted on March 3, 2015 was false.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that, by touting and publishing the
surprisingly' positive 25 percent interim results, Orexigen created
its own obligation to report that those results did not pan out
after all. Nonetheless, Lead Plaintiff alleges, when Klassen and
Narachi participated in the earnings call on May 8, 2015, they
failed to disclose the 50 percent interim results, even when
directly asked whether those results had been disclosed. Again, the
Court concludes that these allegations give rise to a strong
inference of scienter on behalf of Klassen and Narachi as to their
material omissions concerning the 50 percent interim results.

The Court therefore DENIES the Moving Defendants' Motion as to Lead
Plaintiff's allegations of the Moving Defendants' scienter
concerning the alleged material omissions from May 8, 2015.

Loss Causation

To demonstrate loss causation, a plaintiff must allege a causal
connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss. In
other words, the complaint must allege that the practices that the
plaintiff contends are fraudulent were revealed to the market and
caused the resulting losses.
The Moving Defendants contend that Lead Plaintiff's claims
predicated upon material misrepresentations or omissions made on
March 3, 2015, must be dismissed for failure adequately to plead
loss causation.  

The March 5, 2015 Forbes.com Article

Lead Plaintiff alleges that an article published on March 5, 2015,
by Forbes.com, in which a top FDA official, Dr. John Jenkins,
criticized Orexigen and its decision to release interim trial data,
disclosed Defendants' March 3, 2015 misrepresentations.
Specifically, in the March 5, 2015 article, Dr. Jenkins criticized
the released data as unreliable, misleading and likely false. He
also warned that if Orexigen cannot find a way to set things right,
it could face fines, civil penalties, or even the withdrawal of
Contrave from the market.

The Moving Defendants argue that this article could not, by
definition, be a corrective disclosure as the corrective'
information was already known to the market.  

Lead Plaintiff counters that the March 5, 2015 article contained
new, harmful information, specifically, that Dr. Jenkins for the
first time criticized the potential impact of the interim trial
data as unreliable, misleading and likely false and added that if
Orexigen cannot find a way to set things right, it could face
fines, civil penalties, or even the withdrawal of Contrave from the
market, statements that challenged the legitimacy and continuation
of the Company's entire Contrave drug development program and
caused the price of Orexigen stock to plummet as much as 16% in
intraday trading.

The Court agrees with the Moving Defendants that the March 3, 2015
Forbes.com and March 4, 2015 Wall Street Journal articles already
had disclosed that the FDA believed that the 25 percent interim
data was unreliable before the March 5, 2015 Forbes.com article was
published. Those articles, however, had not disclosed that Orexigen
could face fines, civil penalties, or even the withdrawal of
Contrave from the market.

The Court therefore concludes that the March 5, 2015 Forbes.com
article revealed some aspect of the alleged fraud to the market
and, consequently, that Lead Plaintiff adequately alleges loss
causation as to the March 5, 2015 corrective disclosure.

Dr. Nissen's May 12, 2015 Press Release

Lead Plaintiff also alleges that Dr. Nissen's May 12, 2015 press
release corrected Defendants' March 3, 2015 misrepresentations. Dr.
Nissen's press release indicated that the Light Trial has been
halted and that Orexigen's March 3, 2015 disclosure of the 25
percent interim analysis was without the authorization of the
study's academic leadership. Dr. Nissen reiterated that the 25
percent interim data are not conclusive in establishing either
benefit or risk of Contrave on cardiovascular risk and that the 50%
interim results do not confirm cardiovascular benefits of Contrave
claimed by Orexigen in the patent application based on the data
obtained at the 25 percent time point in the trial. He added that
the inconsistency of effects on cardiovascular outcomes between the
first 25 percent and the second 25 percent of the Light Study
clearly illustrates the risks inherent in pre-judgment of clinical
trial results based upon an interim analysis and demonstrate why
interim results should remain confidential during any ongoing
trial.

The Moving Defendants argue that the press release did not correct
anything said by Defendants on March 3 because it said nothing
about who was responsible for publishing the patent and did not
dispute the claims contained therein, as the 25 percent interim
results were still technically accurate. Lead Plaintiff notes that
the Forbes.com article concerning the press release, published
later that day, noted that patients were misled, investors were
misled.

Although Dr. Nissen's May 12, 2015 press release may have served as
a corrective disclosure for the alleged misrepresentations made on
May 8, 2015, the Court must agree with the Moving Defendants that
it does not reveal any information about the alleged
misrepresentations or omissions from March 3, 2015, that had not
already been revealed to the market. The alleged misstatements on
March 3, 2015, related solely to the unauthorized publication of
the unreliable interim 25 percent data and Defendants' role in the
publication of the 371 Patent. Articles published on March 3
through 5, 2015, however, already had made clear that Orexigen had
published the interim 25 percent data without the authorization of
the FDA and that the FDA considered the interim 25 percent data
unreliable.   Consequently, Dr. Nissen's May 12, 2015 press release
did not serve to correct any of those alleged misrepresentations,
which had already been revealed to the market.

The Court therefore concludes that the May 12, 2015 press release
was not a corrective disclosure as to the alleged
misrepresentations from March 3, 2015.

Third Cause of Action: Violations of Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act
Against the Moving Defendants

Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act makes certain controlling individuals
also liable for violations of section 10(b) and its underlying
regulations. Specifically, Section 20(a) provides:

Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person
liable under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally
with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person
to whom such controlled person is liable (including to the
Commission in any action brought under paragraph (1) or (3) of
section 78u(d) of this title), unless the controlling person acted
in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or
acts constituting the violation or cause of action.

Thus, a defendant employee of a corporation who has violated the
securities laws will be jointly and severally liable to the
plaintiff, as long as the plaintiff demonstrates a primary
violation of federal securities law' and that the defendant
exercised actual power or control over the primary violator.

The Moving Defendants contend that because the Complaint fails to
plead a primary violation of Section 10(b), the Section 20(a) claim
also fails. Having concluded that Lead Plaintiff adequately alleges
a cause of action for violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act and Rule 10b-5(b), the Court DENIES the Moving Defendants'
Motion as to Lead Plaintiff's third cause of action.

The Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants' RJN DENIES
Lead Plaintiff's RJN   and GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the
Moving Defendants' Motion as detailed above.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 23, 2019 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6943p4z from Leagle.com.

Karim Khoja, Plaintiff, represented by Alayne Karen Gobeille -
alayne.gobeille@ksfcounsel.com - Kahn Swick & Foti LLC, pro hac
vice, Alexander Louis Burns , Kahn Swick Foti LLC, 250 Park Ave Ste
2040, New York, NY 10177-2002,.pro hac vice, Ramzi Abadou -
ramzi.abadou@ksfcounsel.com - Kahn Swick Foti LLP & Stephen Richard
Basser - sbasser@barrack.com - Barrack Rodos and Bacine.

Kurt R. Yantz, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Samuel M. Ward -
sward@barrack.com - Barrack Rodos and Bacine, Stephen Richard
Basser , Barrack Rodos and Bacine & Danielle Suzanne Myers -
danim@rgrdlaw.com - Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., Joseph P. Hagan & Michael A. Narachi,
Defendants, represented by Jeffrey David Lombard -
jlombard@cooley.com - Cooley LLP, Jessica V. Santamaria
-jsantamaria@cooley.com - Cooley, LLP, John C. Dwyer -
dwyerjc@cooley.com - Cooley, LLP, Mary Kathryn Kelley , Cooley
Godward Kronish & Dane Robert Voris - dvoris@cooley.com - Cooley
LLP.

Preston Klassen, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey David Lombard ,
Cooley LLP, John C. Dwyer , Cooley, LLP, Mary Kathryn Kelley ,
Cooley Godward Kronish & Dane Robert Voris , Cooley LLP.


OVERHILL FARM: Zamora Suit Remanded to California Superior Court
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Virginia A. Phillips of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California remanded the case, Marlen A. Beltran
Zamora, Plaintiff, v. Overhill Farms, Inc., et al., Defendant, Case
No. 2:19-cv-03891 VAP (AFMx) (C.D. Cal.), to the Superior Court of
California, County of Los Angeles.

The Plaintiff filed the putative class action in Los Angeles
Superior Court on March 29, 2019, bringing claims of (1) failure to
provide required meal periods; (2) failure to provide required rest
periods; (3) failure to pay overtime wages; (4) failure to pay
minimum wages; (5) failure to pay all wages due to discharged
employees; (6) failure to furnish accurate itemized statements; (7)
failure to indemnify employees for necessary expenditures; (8)
unfair and unlawful business practices; and (9) civil penalties
under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004.

The Defendants removed the case to the Court on May 3, 2019 on the
basis that the Labor Management Relations Act preempts the
Plaintiff's claims.  The Defendants' Notice of Removal states that
Plaintiff's claims are preempted by Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, as resolution of the Plaintiff's claims
requires interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement
("CBA") and, therefore, arise under federal law.

The Plaintiff now moves for remand, arguing that her claims are not
preempted.

Judge Phillips finds that the Plaintiff's meal and rest period
claims are not preempted.  She finds that (i) adjudicating the
Plaintiff's claims thus does not require more than a
"consideration" of the CBA; (ii) "looking" to the CBA to discern
that its terms are not reasonably in dispute1 and consulting the
CBA to refer to wage rates in computing a penalty is not enough to
warrant preemption; and (iii) the Ninth Circuit has held that a
defense based on the terms of a CBA is not enough to require
preemption.

Next, the Judge finds that courts in the district consistently
treat the statutory exemptions of Section 514 as an affirmative
defense that must be proven by a defendant, and it is not a basis
for preemption.  As a Section 514 defense is therefore inapplicable
for the purposes of determining jurisdiction, the Plaintiff's
overtime claim asserts state law rights.  The Defendants also argue
that the Court must interpret the CBA to determine the proper pay
rates for calculating overtime.  As the Judge explained, however,
consulting the CBA to refer to wage rates in computing a penalty is
not enough to warrant preemption.

The Defendants concede that the Plaintiff's minimum wage claim
arises under state law, but argue that it requires interpretation
of the CBA, which gives the employer the right to manage its own
business and operations and provides detailed provisions for the
hours of work, start and end times, and duty-free breaks from work.
The Judge holds that the Defendants offer no authority to support
the contention that an employer's ability to manage its business
encompasses the right to pay employees less than the minimum wage.
The Plaintiff's claim is therefore not preempted.

The Plaintiff's claim for reimbursement also does not require
interpretation of the CBA.  The Judge holds that California Labor
Code Section 2802 requires an employer to indemnify his or her
employee for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the
employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her
duties.  The CBA provides that the employer will supply all
necessary tools including uniforms.  The Defendants argue that the
Plaintiff's claim therefore substantially depends on the collective
bargaining agreement, as what clothing constitutes a reimbursable
'uniform' depends on the scope, meaning and application of the CBA.
The argument is belied by the non-waivable nature of an employee's
right to reimbursement for necessary expenses, as well as a labor
regulation defining when a uniform is considered to be necessary.

Finally, the parties concur that the Plaintiff's remaining claims
are derivative of her meal and rest break, overtime, minimum wage,
and reimbursement claims, none of which are preempted by Section
301.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff's remaining claims provide no
basis for the Court's jurisdiction in the case.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Phillips granted the Plaintiff's
Motion, and remanded the case to the Superior Court of California,
County of Los Angeles.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 21, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/HvF4sB from Leagle.com.

Marlen A. Beltran Zamora, an individual, on behalf of others
similarly situated, and as an aggrieved employee under the Labor
Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, Plaintiff, represented
by Andrew Joseph Sokolowski -- ASokolowski@maternlawgroup.com --
Matern Law Group PC, Matthew John Matern --
mmatern@maternlawgroup.com -- Matern Law Group PC & Shooka
Dadashzadeh, Mahoney Law Group APC.

Overhill Farms, Inc., a Nevada corporation, Defendant, represented
by Mark J. Payne -- mark.payne@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders LLP
& Kristalyn Fon Lee, Troutman Sanders LLP.


PHARMERICA CORPORATION: Court Dismisses Riordan Securities Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky, Louisville Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and
Order granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the captioned
LABORERS' LOCAL #231 PENSION FUND and DANIEL RIORDAN, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v.
PHARMERICA CORPORATION, FRANK E. COLLINS, W. ROBERT DAHL, JR.,
MARJORIE W. DORR, PATRICK G. LEPORE, GEOFFREY G. MEYERS, ROBERT A.
OAKLEY, GREGORY S. WEISHAR, KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS & CO. L.P. and
WALGREENS BOOTS ALLIANCE, INC., Defendants. Civil Action No.
3:18-CV-109-RGJ. (W.D. Ky.).

Plaintiffs bring this putative class action lawsuit, against
PharMerica and its Board of Directors, KKR, and Walgreens, under
the Securities Exchange Act Section 14(a) and SEC Rule 14a-9
promulgated thereunder alleging that the Proxy Statement contained
both affirmative material misleading statements and material
omissions. Plaintiffs also seek to hold PharMerica's Board of
Directors, KKR, and Walgreens, liable as control persons under the
Securities Exchange Act Section 20(a).

STANDARD

In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true
all factual allegations set forth in the complaint and make all
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. To survive
a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim
becomes plausible when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. A complaint will be
dismissed if no law supports the claim made, if the facts alleged
are insufficient to state a claim, or if the face of the complaint
presents an insurmountable bar to relief.

Claims alleging that misleading statements have violated securities
laws are subjected to a heightened pleading standard under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (the PSLRA).  
PharMerica and KKR, move to dismiss the claims against them,
arguing that Plaintiffs' Section 14(a) claims should be dismissed
for three reasons.

First, Plaintiffs fail to identify a materially false or misleading
statement or omission contained in or left out of the Proxy.  

Second, Plaintiffs fails to allege scienter.  

Third, Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently plead loss causation.
Arguing that there is no underlying Section 14(a) violation and
that Plaintiffs fail to allege adequate control, KKR and also move
to dismiss Plaintiffs' Section 20(a) claims.

Plaintiffs' Section 14(a) Claim

A Section 14(a) claim for an SEC Rule 14a-9 violation has four
basic elements: (i) the proxy statement contains a material
misrepresentation or omission  (ii) defendants were at least
negligent (iii) the misrepresentations or omissions caused
plaintiffs alleged loss and (iv) the proxy statement was an
essential link in the completion of the transaction.  

A misrepresentation or omission is material when there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider
it important in deciding how to vote.  

Affirmative False and Misleading Statements

In evaluating whether a Proxy Statement contains a materially false
or misleading statement under Section 14(a), the court is not
concerned with the details or actual fairness of the merger. If
Plaintiffs have concerns with the share price, the appropriate
remedy would have been to exercise their appraisal rights. As a
result, the Court here looks not to whether the $29.95 per share
price and the fairness opinions endorsing that price, both of which
were based on the July 2017 Projections, are literally fair, but
whether the Proxy made any misstatements or omitted information
necessary for a stockholder to evaluate the Proxy and the merger
causing the Proxy to be false or misleading.

Plaintiffs allege that the statements would cause an investor to
believe that the Company's future business plan only included
organic growth. Plaintiffs also allege that the statements falsely
represented the accuracy of the July 2017 Projections, which did
not include projections based on acquisitions, because the Company
represented that they relied solely on the July 2017 Projections in
developing the fairness opinions.

Plaintiffs argue that these statements are objectively false
because the Company's actual growth plan at the time of the Merger
included acquisitions and was supported by numerous statements made
by the Company, including the Company's SEC filings Plaintiffs also
argue that the statements are subjectively false because the
Individual Defendants knew that the Company's actual growth plan
included acquisitions when they approved the statements inclusion
in the Proxy.  

In response, Defendants argue that the Proxy statement was not
false or misleading because the Proxy statement explicitly
disclosed that acquisitional growth was one of three components of
its growth strategy, and therefore no investors could reasonably
believe that the company contemplated only organic growth.
Similarly, the Proxy did not represent that the July 2017
Projections were accurate because the Proxy explicitly disclaimed
the accuracy of the Projections. Thus, the statements cited by
Plaintiffs in the Complaint could not have amounted to a
misstatement.  

The Court agrees.

The Company only contemplated Organic Growth

The Board of Directors' endorsed the merger as being more favorable
to the Company's stockholders than the likely value that might
result from other potential transactions or remaining a standalone
company. Plaintiffs argue that the Board of Directors' endorsement
gave the impression that the Company's stand-alone acquisition
plans were due to be abandoned, and that shareholders should not
make their voting decision based on any notion that such plans
would continue if the Merger was scuttled. Plaintiffs' argument is
based on the fact that the UBS and BAML fairness opinions relied on
the July 2017 Projections and representations that the July 2017
Projections were the best currently available estimates.

Based on the SEC disclosures and the disclaimer, the Court finds
that no reasonable stockholder would construe the seven statements
at issue to imply that PharMerica's growth plan only contemplated
organic growth. In fact, the Proxy all but explicitly told the
stockholder not to make such an inference.

This conclusion is supported by other federal courts.  Plaintiffs
here, claimed that financial forecasts in the proxy statement
issued by Lionbridge to its stockholders were misleading because
those forecasts failed to accurately portray Lionbridge's
acquisition strategy.  

Ultimately, the implication that PharMerica's growth plan at the
time of the merger only included organic growth requires the
stockholder to assume that the July 2017 Projections are accurate
indications of PharMerica's future actions and ignore the many
other statements about the Company's future growth plans. Such an
assumption is an unreasonable one when put in context. The
disclaimer is long, extensive, and clear the projections are not to
be relied on as indicative of future events. Even if the disclaimer
fails to dissuade the stockholder from inferring that PharMerica
intends no future acquisitional growth, PharMerica's SEC filings
and other public statements explicitly stating that the Company's
plans included future acquisition would.

Simply put, nowhere does the Proxy affirmatively state that
PharMerica's growth plan only contemplates organic growth. Nor is
it implied. To the contrary, the Proxy expressly warns stockholders
not to assume future events based on the Projections and states
that PharMerica's growth plan indeed includes future acquisition.

Thus, Plaintiffs' allegation that the seven Proxy excerpts
referring to the July 2017 Projections are affirmative misleading
statements because they imply that PharMerica's growth plan at the
time of the merger only contemplated organic growth lacks merit.

Statements in the Proxy Represent the Accuracy of the July 2017
Projections
Plaintiffs also claim that Defendants' statements in the Proxy
representing the accuracy of the July 2017 Projections are
materially false because the July 2017 Projections fail to include
future acquisitions, even though PharMerica contemplated
acquisitional growth.

The allegation fails to state a Section 14(a) claim for two
reasons. First, the July 2017 Projections are literally accurate.
Second, the assumption that PharMerica would not make future
acquisitions is immaterial under Section 14(a) because the Proxy
unambiguously disclosed that assumption to the shareholders.

First, to the extent Plaintiffs claim that the July 2017
Projections are literally inaccurate because they exclude
acquisitions, that allegation fails. If the July 2017 Projections
had concealed from stockholders that they did not include
acquisitions, then they might be inaccurate. The claim that the
July 2017 Projections, which on their face claim to exclude
acquisitions, are inaccurate because they exclude acquisitions
fails as illogical.

Second, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants represented the July 2017
Projections as accurate, when they knew subjectively that they were
not. Plaintiffs argument is based on the notion that the July 2017
Projections relied on an incorrect or false assumption they should
have assumed that PharMerica would continue to grow through
acquisition, just like the 2015, 2016, and previous 2017
Projections had. As discussed above, PharMerica's growth plan
contemplated future acquisitions. As a result, the July 2017
Projections were indeed based on a poor assumption, but this is not
actionable by itself.

Here, the July 2017 Projections reveal on their face that they
assume no future acquisitional growth. While it seems that this
assumption was indeed a poor one, shareholders had all the
information necessary to draw that conclusion on their own. Thus,
to the extent Plaintiffs allege that the July 2017 Projections are
misleading based on their underlying assumption that PharMerica
would make no future acquisitions, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim
under Section 14(a).

Second, Plaintiffs have identified no statement that approximates
the endorsements made in the cases they rely on. The plaintiffs
alleged that Hot Topic required the fairness evaluators to rely
only on the inaccurate financial projections and represented the
Revised Projections as better reflecting what management believed
the Company would be able to achieve during the next five years
compared to the LRP Projections.

Material Omissions

Next, Plaintiffs allege that the Proxy violates Section 14(a)
because it omits material information which renders statements in
the Proxy misleading. Defendants counter that the allegedly omitted
material is either in the Proxy or immaterial and the to the extent
there are any omissions Plaintiffs fail to explain how the alleged
omissions render any statements in the Proxy misleading. Plaintiffs
respond arguing that their Complaint sufficiently alleges omissions
actionable under the framework set by Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers
Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S.Ct. 1318, 1327
(2015).  

To begin, the Court notes that Omnicare involved a Section 11 claim
and is therefore not directly applicable to this case, involving a
Section 14(a) claim. Courts are split on whether to apply the
Omnicare framework to Section 14(a) claims, and the Sixth Circuit
has not done so. Whether or not the Court applies the Omnicare
framework is immaterial because Plaintiffs' claim fails Omnicare.

As discussed, to allege a material omission the plain language of
Rule 14a-9 requires a plaintiff to show both materiality and a
false or misleading statement as a result of the omission. To show
that an opinion was made false or misleading by an omission,
Plaintiffs must show that the omitted information caused the
opinion to be both subjectively and objectively false so that the
opinion is wrong, and the defendant knew it to be so. The Omnicare
framework provides a more lenient standard such that the plaintiff
need not show that the maker of the opinion did not actually hold
the stated belief but that a stockholder must understand an opinion
statement to convey facts about how the speaker has formed the
opinion and the real facts are otherwise, but not provided. In
other words, defendant must have omitted material facts about the
defendant's inquiry into or knowledge concerning the statement of
opinion.

Plaintiffs fail to meet either standard because they have failed to
show that material information was omitted.

The Proxy Allegedly Omits PharMerica's Financial Projections
Including Acquisitional Growth
First, relying on Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr.
Indus. Pension Fund, and comparing this case to Laborers' Local
#231 Pension Fund v. Cowan, No. 17-478, 2018 WL 3243975 (D. Del.
July 2, 2018), the Plaintiffs claim the Proxy omitted the Company's
financial projections reflecting the acquisitions scenario and/or
valuation information reflecting the Company's true growth plan
including acquisitions which made the Board of Director's statement
that $29.25 merger price was fair misleading.  

While the opinion that the merger price was fair fits into the
Omnicare framework, there is no Omnicare omission here. A
reasonable shareholder might understand the opinion that the $29.25
price was fair to convey that such an opinion was made based on
financial valuations that considered PharMerica's intended
acquisitional growth given the Company's many statements that it
would continue future acquisition. But the fact that the July 2017
Projections did not include future acquisitions was disclosed in
the Proxy. The Proxy informs stockholders that the Board, and the
financial institutions in forming their opinions, relied on the
July 2017 Projections, which excluded acquisitional growth.

Thus, Plaintiffs failed to show that the Proxy omitted any material
facts, which would make the opinion that the $29.25 price was fair
misleading under Section 14(a), including that it omitted material
facts about the defendants' inquiry into or knowledge concerning
the statement of opinion, as required by Omnicare.  

Thus, Defendants have made no material misrepresentation or
omissions by failing to include acquisition-based growth in the
July 2017 Projections.

The Proxy Allegedly Omits Statements Informing Stockholders the
Fairness Opinions Were Based on Projections That Ignored a Critical
Growth Plan and Expectations of PharMerica

Next, the Complaint alleges that the Proxy omits statements clearly
informing stockholders that the BAML and UBS valuation was
performed on projections that ignored a critical growth plan and
expectations of the Company. In other words, the Proxy failed to
inform stockholders that the fairness opinions were based on
financial projections which excluded acquisitions. Defendants
respond that the Proxy in fact contains this information. The Court
agrees.

The Proxy contains statements that explain to the stockholder that
PharMerica's future growth plan includes acquisitional growth. The
Proxy also explains to stockholders that the July 2017 Projections
excluded future acquisitions. Finally, the Proxy explains to
stockholders that the fairness opinions relied on the July 2017
Projections.   

As a result, these allegations fail to state a Section 14(a) claim.


The Proxy Allegedly Omits Information Regarding Conflicts of
Interest

Finally, in their Complaint the Plaintiffs allege that the Proxy
omits statements clearly informing stockholders the
who/what/when/where of compensation discussions between management
and KKR and/or Walgreens and statements clearly informing
stockholders when the Board was informed of which specific
components of the UBS' and BAML's relationships with KKR and/or
Walgreens. The Complaint identifies these omissions as material
because stockholders would want to know the information.  

Defendants argue that the Proxy made extensive disclosures about
potential conflicts and that the Plaintiffs' claiming that the
stockholders would want to know the exact details omitted does not
adequately explain why those omitted details are material to
stockholders. Rather than expand on why this information might be
material to stockholders, the Plaintiffs reply by listing all the
potential conflicts of interest disclosed by the Proxy and repeat
their original allegation that the Proxy omits facts disclosing the
timing and content of management compensation discussions and
banker conflicts.

To satisfy the PLSRA's pleading standard, the Plaintiff must
explain how the alleged omissions are material.  

Here, the Plaintiffs have failed to explain how the alleged
omissions rise to anything more than allegations that the Proxy
lacked immaterial specific details about already thorough
disclosures.

The Proxy clearly states that some of PharMerica's executive
officers have discussed retention agreements and potential
post-merger employment. The proxy also details the relationship
between all the companies involved in the merger and the financial
advisors, and states that those relationships were disclosed to the
Board before its vote on the merger. Given these already thorough
disclosures, Plaintiffs' claims amount to a mere alleged lack of
specific details, none of which are material. Thus, the Court finds
the Plaintiffs have failed to allege an actionable omission under
Section 14(a).

As the Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to adequately allege that the
Proxy contains a material misrepresentation or omission, the
Section 14(a) claims against Defendants must be dismissed.

Scienter and Loss Causation

Because the Court has already determined the Plaintiffs failed to
plead a material omission or misleading statement actionable under
Section 14(a), it need not address whether the Plaintiffs' Section
14(a) claims should also be dismissed for the failure to allege
scienter or loss causation.

Plaintiffs' Section 20(a) Claim

Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act extends liability to
every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person
liable under any provision of the Exchange Act, jointly and
severally with the person controlled. Because, as explained above,
there is no underlying violation of the Exchange Act, the
Plaintiffs' Section 20(a) claims must be dismissed along with the
underlying Section 14(a) claims.  

Defendants, PharMerica Corporation's and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts &
Co. L.P.'s motion to dismiss is granted.  Defendants, Frank E.
Collins's, W. Robert Dahl's, Jr, Marjorie W. Dorr's, Patrick G.
Lepore's, Geoffrey G. Meyers's, Robert A. Oakley's, Gregory S.
Weishar's motion to dismiss is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 23, 2019
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y48nteg7 from Leagle.com.

Laborers' Local 231 Pension Fund, Individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated & Daniel Riordan, Individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by
Andrew L. Sparks - asparks@dickinson-wright.com - Dickinson Wright
PLLC, Danielle S. Myers -dmyers@rgrdlaw.com - Robbins Geller Rudman
& Dowd LLP, David T. Wissbroecker - dwissbroecker@rgrdlaw.com -
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, LLP, Eun Jin Lee - elee@rgrdlaw.com -
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, LLP, Kerry B. Harvey -
kharvey@dickensonwright.com - Dickinson Wright PLLC, Patrick J.
O'Hara , Cavanagh & O'Hara, 407 E. Adams St., P.O. Box 5043,
Springfield, IL 62705 & W. Scott Holleman -
scotth@johnsonfistel.com - Johnson Fistel, LLP.

Pharmerica Corporation & Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P.,
Defendants, represented by Craig S. Waldman - cwaldman@stblaw.com -
Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Donald J. Kelly -
dkelly@wyattfirm.com - Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, LLP, Peter E.
Kazanoff  - pkazanoff@stblaw.com - Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett LLP,
Sean G. Williamson - swilliamson@wyattfirm.com - Wyatt, Tarrant &
Combs, LLP & Timothy A. Schenk - tschenk@pbibank.com - PBI Bank
Inc.

Frank E. Collins, W. Robert Dahl, Jr., Marjorie W. Dorr, Patrick G.
Lepore, Geoffrey G. Meyers, Robert A. Oakley & Gregory S. Weishar,
Defendants, represented by Andrew Ditchfield -
andrew.ditchfield@davispolk.com - Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Donald
J. Kelly - dkelly@wyattfirm.com - Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, LLP, Mari
Byrne -
mari.byrne@davispolk.com -  Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Sean G.
Williamson -
mari.byrne@davispolk.com -  Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, LLP & Timothy
A. Schenk -tschenk@pbibank.com - PBI Bank Inc.


PHOTOFAX INC: Ludemann Sues Over Unpaid Wages and BIPA Breach
-------------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL LUDEMANN, on behalf of himself and all other plaintiffs
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. PHOTOFAX, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-06212 (N.D., Ill., Sept. 17, 2019), is a civil action
brought for unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards
Act and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law. The Plaintiff also brings
individual and class claims under the Biometric Information Privacy
Act.

The complaint says the Defendant did not pay the Plaintiff and
similarly situated employees proper overtime wages of one and
one-half time their regular rate of pay for all hours worked above
forty hours in a work week. The Defendants also disguised
additional earned compensation as a "bonus" to avoid including that
time as compensation for purposes of overtime, i.e., to reduce the
regular rate for overtime purposes.

In addition, when employees work at Photofax in the office, they
are required to scan their fingerprint in its biometric time
tracking system as a means of authentication, instead of using only
key fobs or other identification cards. While there are tremendous
benefits to using biometric time clocks in the workplace, there are
also serious risks. Recognizing the need to protect its citizens
from situations like these, Illinois enacted the BIPA, specifically
to regulate companies that collect and store Illinois citizens'
biometrics, such as fingerprints. Despite this law, Photofax
disregards its employees' statutorily protected privacy rights and
unlawfully collects, stores, and uses their biometric data in
violation of the BIPA, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff worked for Defendant within the past three years as
an employee.

Photofax is a nationally-recognized leader in surveillance and
investigatory services for insurance companies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David J. Fish, Esq.
          Kimberly Hilton, Esq.
          John Kunze, Esq.
          Thalia Pacheco, Esq.
          THE FISH LAW FIRM, P.C.
          200 East Fifth Avenue, Suite 123
          Naperville, IL 60563


PICK A PART: Class in Cardoso FLSA Suit Conditionally Certified
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Mario Cardoso, Plaintiff, v. Pick A Part LLC, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. CV-18-04759-PHX-SPL (D. Ariz.), Judge Steven
P. Logan of the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona
granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Certification.

The Plaintiff worked as a "yard laborer" employee of Pick A Part.
Pick A Part is owned by Rush Auto Recyclers, Inc., also a Defendant
in the case.   The Plaintiff alleges that he and other current and
former employees were not paid one-and-one-half times their regular
rates of pay for overtime hours worked.  The Plaintiff filed a
complaint against the Defendants, and other parties, alleging
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").  The Plaintiff
filed the Motion seeking conditional class certification.

The Plaintiff seeks conditional certification of a class of all
persons who have worked or who are working as yard laborers for
Defendants at any time during the three years preceding the
lawsuit.  

The Defendants do not generally object to the conditional class
certification requested in the Motion.  However, they contest the
scope of the conditional class certification proposed by the
Plaintiff.  The Plaintiff seeks to include former and current
employees of Pick A Part and Rush Auto in the proposed conditional
class.  The Defendants state that Rush Auto owns Pick A Part, along
with "Rush Auto," a used car dealership, and "Just Truck and Van,"
a salvage yard.  They argue that the conditional class should not
include Rush Auto's employees from Rush Auto and Just Truck and Van
because the Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient information
for conditional certification.

Judge Logan finds that the Plaintiff has set forth substantial
allegations related to all the potential class members that worked
for Pick A Part and any of Rush Auto's salvage yards, which would
include former and current employees of Just Truck and Van.  Thus,
the Plaintiff has set forth a reasonable basis for including
salvage yard employees of the named Defendants and Just Truck and
Van in the conditional class.  However, he finds that the Plaintiff
has failed to make any substantial allegations against Rush Auto
dealership, as none of the allegations in the Complaint nor the
information in the Plaintiff's declaration addresses Rush Auto.
Accordingly, the Judge finds that current and former employees of
Rush Auto and Just Truck and Van are properly included as potential
Plaintiffs to the case, but current and former employees of Rush
Auto car dealership are not properly included as potential
Plaintiffs.

The Defendants do not oppose the Plaintiff's request for
conditional certification in the Motion.  Thus, in light of his
foregoing analysis, the Judge finds that the Plaintiff has set
forth substantial facts to demonstrate that there is a factual
nexus that binds the Plaintiff to the current and former yard
laborer employees of Pick A Part, Just Truck and Van, and Rush Auto
as victims of a specific, systematic policy seeking to deprive them
of overtime payments.  Thus, the Motion will be granted to
conditionally certify this group as a class for the purposes of the
lawsuit.

The Defendants also contest (i) the time period of employment for
potential class members described in the notice of collection
action and lawsuit (the "Notice"); (ii) the language used to
describe the Plaintiff's allegations in the Notice; and (iii) the
amount of personal information requested by the Plaintiff to
provide notice to potential class members.  The Judge finds that it
is appropriate to limit the conditional class to former and current
employees of Pick A Part, Rush Auto , and Just Truck and Van for
the three years and 30 days preceding the Court's Order
conditionally certifying the class.

In response to the Motion, the Defendants seek to add language to
the first paragraph of the Notice stating, "The Court has taken no
position regarding the merits of the Plaintiff's claims or
Defendant's defenses.  The issuance of this Notice does not mean
that the Plaintiff has prevailed or will prevail on this matter."
The Plaintiff does not oppose the Defendants' request.
Accordingly, the aforementioned language will be added to the first
paragraph of the Notice.

Finally, the Plaintiff fails to provide any support for a court
order requiring a party to disclose social security numbers or
employee identification number information.  Therefore, the Judge
will only require the Defendants to provide the names, mailing
addresses, and e-mail addresses for any potential class members.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Logan granted the Plaintiff's motion
to conditionally certify a collective class.  The collective class
of potential Plaintiffs is conditionally certified under 29 U.S.C.
Section 216(b) and consists of all former and current employees of
Pick A Part, LLC and Rush Auto Recyclers, Inc., including Just
Truck and Van, who, at any time between July 22, 2016 and the date
of this Order, worked as a yard laborer (or in other positions with
similar job titles or job duties) for Pick A Part, LLC and Rush
Auto Recyclers, Inc., including Just Truck and Van.

The Defendants must provide Plaintiff's counsel with the names, all
known addresses, all known email addresses (work and personal), and
dates of employment for all Collective Members within five  days of
the Order.

The Plaintiff's counsel will mail a copy of the "Notice of
Collective Action" and "Consent Form", reflecting the edits
discussed in the Order, via regular U.S. Mail and via electronic
mail to all persons contained on the list within seven days of
receiving the list from the Defendants.  The Plaintiff's counsel
may hire a third-party class action administrative company to
oversee the mailing of the Notice of Collective Action and Consent
Forms.  The Collective Members will also be given the option to
execute their Consent Forms electronically online.  In the body of
the email notice, the Plaintiff's counsel will provide a link for
electronic execution of the Consent form. All consent forms will be
returned to the Plaintiff's counsel who in turn will be responsible
for filing them with the Court; and

The Defendants will post the Notice of Collective Action and
Consent Form in a conspicuous place at each of their businesses for
the full 60-day opt in time period.  The Defendants will also
include the Notice of Collective Action and Consent Form on the
first regular payday after the Court's Order with all current yard
laborers paystubs.  The Collective Members will have 60 days from
the date of the mailing of the Notice and Consent Form to file
their Notice of Consent opting-in to the lawsuit as Plaintiffs,
unless good cause can be shown as to why the consent was not
postmarked prior to the deadline.  Thirty days before the deadline
to opt in, the Plaintiff's counsel will send the Notice of
Collective Action and Consent Form to those class members who have
not yet joined the lawsuit in the same manner described.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 21, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/uMLr58 from Leagle.com.

Mario Cardoso, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jason Saul Barrat --
jbarrat@zoldangroup.com -- Zoldan Law Group PLLC, Jessica Elizabeth
Miller -- jmiller@zoldangroup.com -- Zoldan Law Group PLLC &
Michael David Zoldan -- mzoldan@zoldangroup.com -- Zoldan Law Group
PLLC.

Pick A Part LLC, an Arizona company & Rush Auto Recyclers
Incorporated, an Arizona company, Defendants, represented by Amy Jo
Gittler -- Amy.Gittler@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis PC.

Daniel Rush, an Arizona resident, Defendant, represented by Dale
Samuel Coffman -- scoffman@dickinsonwright.com -- Dickinson Wright
PLLC.

Janet Rush, an Arizona resident, Defendant, represented by Amy Jo
Gittler, Jackson Lewis PC & Candess Jean Hunter, Hunter Humphrey &
Yavitz PLC.


PIPELINE HEALTH: Pechulis et al. Seek Back Pay and Benefits
-----------------------------------------------------------
SHELLYE PECHULIS, ANNA MARIE FALCONE, and JODIE HOLICH,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs, vs. PIPELINE HEALTH SYSTEMS LLC, a Delaware
corporation, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-06089 (Sept. 11,
2019), asserts that Defendant must provide back pay and benefits to
Plaintiffs consistent with the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act.

Pipeline Health shuttered the Westlake Hospital in August 2019
without providing the more than 500 employees who worked there with
the required 60-day advance notice required by the WARN Act.

The Plaintiffs and the putative class members were technically
employed, at least on paper, by Pipeline-Westlake, and every aspect
of the Westlake Hospital operation was controlled and directed
exclusively by Pipeline Health, including the decision to
permanently close the hospital without providing the requisite
notice under the WARN Act, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiffs and the Putative Class are:

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Ari Scharg, Esq
          J. Eli Wade-Scott, Esq
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: 312.589.6370
          Facsimile: 312.589.6378
          E-mail: jedelson@edelson.com
                  ascharg@edelson.com
                  ewadescott@edelson.com
                  movca@edelson.com

PIZZA BAKER: Court Narrows Claims in Clark FLSA Suit
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio,
Eastern Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting in part and
denying in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned
RONALD CLARK, Plaintiff, v. PIZZA BAKER, INC., et al., Defendants.
Case No. 2:18-cv-157. (S.D. Ohio) Case No. 2:18-cv-157. (S.D.
Ohio).

Plaintiff Ronald Clark worked as a delivery driver and assistant
manager at a Domino's Pizza. Mr. Clark alleges that as a delivery
driver, he was not adequately reimbursed for his expenses and was
thereby not paid minimum wage. Clark additionally alleges that the
Domino's corporate defendants were his joint employer because of
the requirements they imposed on franchisees that ultimately
affected the working conditions of delivery drivers.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court may dismiss a cause of action under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. Such a motion is a test of the plaintiff's cause of
action as stated in the complaint, not a challenge to the
plaintiff's factual allegations. The Court must construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.  

Generally, a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.  A
complaint's factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.

Dismissal of Defendants Lisa M. Burkett and Christopher Baker

The Precision and Baker Defendants allege in almost identical
responses that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted against Defendants Lisa M. Burkett and Christopher
Baker, and thus such claims should be dismissed under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Thus, these motions will be considered
together as 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss the individual Defendants.

Plaintiff Clark alleges that, because Ms. Burkett was the President
of Precision Pizza, she had control over the financial aspects and
day-to-day operations, pay policies, personnel and payroll
decisions, power to stop any illegal pay practices and various
other responsibilities. Plaintiff Clark alleges that Baker, because
he is the President, Founder, and Owner of Pizza Baker, had control
over the same aspects of Pizza Baker as Ms. Burkett had over
Precision Pizza.

Defendants argue that these factual allegations are conclusory and
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. They allege that Plaintiffs'
factual assertions against the individual Defendants are mere
paraphrasing of the Sixth Circuit's test for when a corporate
officer is considered an employer under the FLSA.

Plaintiffs have responded that alleging that Burkett is the
president, manager, owner and founder of Precision Pizza and
Defendant Baker is the president, founder, and owner of Pizza Baker
are, without more, enough to survive the motion to dismiss.  

The FLSA defines an employer as any person acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee. To determine whether an individual is an employer, courts
look to the economic reality of the situation. A corporate officer
may be an employer if the officer has operational control for the
corporation's covered enterprise.

Plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss. While being the Chief Executive Officer is not sufficient,
without more, to qualify an individual as an employer, Plaintiffs
have alleged other facts that, if true, would meet the test for who
is an employer under the FLSA. Specifically, Plaintiffs have
alleged that, in addition to being the President, founder, and
owner of their respective pizza establishments, Defendants Burkett
and Baker also had control over various operations of the business,
including pay policies and personnel and payroll decisions.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the individual defendants is
therefore DENIED.

Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Count 6

All three groups of Defendants have moved to dismiss Count 6 of
Plaintiffs' Complaint. Count 6 is a request for compensatory and
punitive damages under O.R.C. Section 2307.60.   Section 2307.60
allows for civil damages for injury to person or property by a
criminal act. Punitive damages are not automatic under this statute
but rather must be authorized under a separate provision of the
Ohio Revised Code. Plaintiffs base their claim on the criminal
penalties that are available for willful violations of the FLSA.  

The Precision and Baker Defendants argue that damages under O.R.C.
Section 2307.60 requires an underlying criminal conviction. The
Domino's Defendants have joined this argument. The Plaintiffs
dispute that a criminal conviction is required, arguing that the
Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Jacobsen v. Kaforey, 149 Ohio
St.3d 398, 75 N.E.3d 203 (2016) changed that requirement.

Whether O.R.C. Section 2307.60 requires a criminal conviction is
unclear. Jacobsen v. Kaforey does not resolve the issue. There, the
Ohio Supreme Court merely stated that O.R.C. Section 2307.60
independently authorizes a civil action for damages caused by
criminal acts.

This Court held a status conference on February 19, 2019, to advise
the parties of Buddenberg. The Plaintiffs noted that they would be
opposed to a stay, and Defendants supported a stay. When the Ohio
Supreme Court will issue a decision in Buddenberg cannot be known.
In the meantime, Plaintiffs' claims are subject to statute of
limitations issues. The merits of the claims can be decided without
regard to the damages. Therefore, this Court declines to stay the
case pending the Ohio Supreme Court's decision.

Because the Ohio Supreme Court will provide a definitive answer to
this question, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count 6 of the
Complaint is DENIED. Should the Ohio Supreme Court decide that a
criminal conviction is required, Defendants may renew their Motion
to Dismiss at that time.

Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss Claim for Declaratory Relief

The three groups of Defendants have moved to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) the Plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief. They argue
that because the Plaintiff no longer works for the Defendants, he
presents no possible injury in fact that is concrete and
particularized, actual, and imminent as required under the Supreme
Court's standing doctrine. Thus, they argue, he lacks standing, and
this Court lacks jurisdiction.  

Plaintiff does not have standing to seek declaratory relief. A
plaintiff alleging only past exposure to illegal conduct does not
have a claim for a present case or controversy regarding injunctive
relief.

The Plaintiff's only response to the Precision and Bakers
Defendants' argument is that such argument may have merit.
Plaintiffs have thus suggested they will dismiss the declaratory
relief claim and refile it when a current employee opts into the
lawsuit. Plaintiff, however, has failed to follow-through with his
own suggestion. Therefore, this Court dismisses without prejudice
Plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief against the Precision and
Baker Defendants. The Precision and Baker Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss the claim for declaratory relief is hereby GRANTED.

Domino's Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Joint Employer
Claims

The Domino's Defendants have also moved to dismiss Clark's joint
employer claims because Clark has not alleged specific behavior on
behalf of each individual Domino's Defendant that makes each a
joint employer.

Clark's Complaint defines Domino's as including all three Domino's
Defendants: Domino's Pizza, Inc.; Domino's Pizza, LLC and Domino's
Pizza Franchising. Clark has made allegations against each
individual Domino's Defendant.  

In addition to these allegations, Clark has included a section in
his Complaint entitled Joint Employer Allegations" that includes
significantly more detailed allegations. Among other things, that
section of the Complaint alleges that Domino's requires franchisees
to use the PULSE system for recording employees' worktime using
individual employee codes, tracking employee work tasks
continuously, recording tips, tracking pizza delivery information,
maintaining personnel data, monitoring store hours and product
prices, and generating sales, revenue, and payroll reports.

Domino's does not contend that Clark's allegations are insufficient
to support a claim for joint employer status. Domino's argues only
that Clark is required to make specific allegations against each
individual Domino's employer. Clark responds that he has made such
allegations because he defined Domino's as including all three
Domino's entities.

At the motion to dismiss stage, this Court is bound to take all of
a plaintiff's facts as true, and, where an allegation is capable of
several inferences, the allegation must be construed in a light
most favorable for the plaintiff. Clark has defined Domino's to
include all three Domino's entities named as Defendants in this
action. Thus, taking all facts and inferences as true, Clark
alleges that each Domino's Defendant took the alleged actions. To
accept the Domino's Defendants' argument would be to cast doubt on
the plausibility of Clark's factual allegations in other words, to
suggest that it is somehow implausible that each Domino's entity
could have taken the alleged actions. That impermissibly tests the
plaintiff's factual allegations rather than the plaintiff's cause
of action. The Domino's Defendants have not argued that the alleged
facts are insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding that
the Domino's Defendants are joint employers.

The Domino's Defendants have cited no Sixth Circuit authority, and
this Court has located none, prohibiting a plaintiff from grouping
together several defendants and alleging that all of them took the
same action. In fact, one district court in the Sixth Circuit found
that because plaintiffs did not distinguish between the defendants,
but alleged all defendants engaged in the acts and violated the
FLSA and Ohio wage laws by knowingly, willfully and/or recklessly
failing to pay overtime and minimum wages to plaintiffs those
plaintiffs clearly contend defendants acted in concert with the
intent to deny plaintiffs their statutory rights to overtime.

Clark has argued in his Response, however, that the Domino's
Defendants are part of a single enterprise. But Clark's complaint
contains no mention of the Domino's Defendants being a single
enterprise. To the extent that Clark wishes to so allege, he will
need to amend his complaint to add such allegations.

Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Clark's claim for
declaratory relief is hereby GRANTED. In all other respects,
Defendants' Motions are DENIED.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 23, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxmocpqo from
Leagle.com.

Ronald Clark, On behalf of himself and those similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Biller , Biller & Kimble, LLC,
Andrew P. Kimble - akimble@msdlegal.comm, Biller & Kimble, LLC &
Philip J. Krzeski  - pkrzeski@msdlegal.com - Biller & Kimble, LLC.

Pizza Baker, Inc., Domino's Pizza, Inc., Domino's Pizza, LLC,
Domino's Pizza Franchising, LLC & Christopher Baker, Defendants,
represented by Mathew A. Parker - mparker@fisherphillips.com -
Fisher & Phillips LLP, John A. Hughes , DLA Piper LLP, pro hac
vice, Kathleen McLeod Caminiti -kcaminiti@fisherphillips.com -
Fisher & Phillips LLP, pro hac vice & Norman M. Leon -
norman.leon@dlapiper.com -  DLA Piper LLP, pro hac vice.

Precision Pizza LLC & Lisa M. Burkett, Defendants, represented by
Kathleen McLeod Caminiti , Fisher & Phillips LLP, Michael Jacob
Ball - mjball@vorys.com - Vorys Sater Seymour & Pease LLP, Jocelyn
M. Hoffman - jmhoffman@vorys.com - Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease,
LLP, John A. Hughes , DLA Piper LLP, pro hac vice & Norman M. Leon
, DLA Piper LLP, pro hac vice.


PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Dayton Sues Over Illegal Collection of Debts
----------------------------------------------------------------
JANICE ASHLEY DAYTON, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company; and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive, Case No. 19CV354531 (Cal. Super., Santa Clara Cty.,
Sept. 11, 2019), is a consumer class action brought pursuant to the
California Fair Debt Buying Practices Act alleging that the
Defendants have engaged in unlawful acts in connection with their
attempt to collect charged-off consumer debts from the Plaintiff
and the Class.

Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, is a Delaware limited liability
company engaged in the business of purchasing and collecting
charged-off consumer debts in California with its principal place
of business located in Norfolk, Virginia.  The true names and
capacities of the Doe Defendants are unknown to the Plaintiff at
this time.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Fred W. Schwinn, Esq.
          Raeon R. Roulston, Esq.
          Matthew C. Salmonsen, Esq.
          CONSUMER LAW CENTER, INC.
          1435 Koll Circle, Suite 104
          San Jose, CA 95112-4610
          Telephone: (408) 294-6100
          Facsimile: (408) 294-6190
          E-mail: fred.schwinn@sjconsumerlaw.com
                  raeon.roulston@sjconsumerlaw.com
                  matthew.salmonsen@sjconsumerlaw.com


PRISONER TRANSPO: Groover Pro Bono Counsel Gets $17.9K Costs Refund
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JEFFREY EMIL GROOVER, Plaintiff, v. PRISONER
TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, LLC and U.S. CORRECTIONS, LLC, Defendants,
Case No. 15-cv-61902-BLOOM/Valle (S.D. Fla.), Judge Beth Bloom of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida
granted the Pro Bono Counsel's Application for Reimbursement of
Litigation Expenses.

The Court has set forth a policy for reimbursement of legal
expenses in cases handled pro bono.  Its website sets forth the
Assistance with Litigation Expenses Policy.  The General Policy
states that the counsel who undertake pro bono representation at
the Court's request may apply for expense reimbursement.  Total
reimbursement in any case will not exceed $7,500 absent exceptional
circumstances. All approvals and reimbursements will be based on a
funds-available basis.  There is no guarantee of reimbursement and
counsel is urged to use all reasonable means necessary to keep
expenses to a minimum.  

Reimbursement normally will be made at the conclusion of the case
by Motion.  Interim Requests for Reimbursement will be entertained
by Motion prior to the conclusion of the case only on demonstrated
need.   In the event of an award of attorney's fees or costs to pro
bono counsel, the Court may order return of any reimbursements from
the award.  In addition, if any expenses are reimbursed or paid by
any source other than the client or the pro bono counsel (for
example, paid through settlement), the amount of funds reimbursed
under this program will be returned forthwith.

Groover filed his Complaint pro se and was granted leave to proceed
in forma pauperis.  Upon the Court referring the case to the
District's Volunteer Attorney Program, Atty. Frank S. Hedin
("Counsel") agreed to represent Mr. Groover on a pro bono basis and
filed a notice of appearance.  The Counsel seeks reimbursement of
$17,933.43 in expenses relating to his pro bono representation of
Mr. Groover.

Plaintiff Groover filed his action, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, against Prisoner Transportation
Services, LLC, U.S. Corrections LLC, and John Does 1-100 alleging
civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.  In the
Amended Complaint, Groover, an inmate at the Butner Low Security
Federal Correctional Institution in Butner, North Carolina, alleged
that U.S. Corrections, LLC transported him from Butner, North
Carolina to Fort Lauderdale, Florida in a windowless transport van
lacking sufficient ventilation and air conditioning.  Groover
claimed that he was deprived of sleep, water, and refuge from the
heat.  As a result of the excessively hot conditions and lack of
adequate ventilation in the van, Groover experienced physical and
emotional injuries.

Groover claimed that the Defendants knew of the conditions to which
he was subjected and failed to take appropriate measures.  He
alleged that numerous other pretrial detainees transported by the
Defendants suffered similar inhumane conditions and harm as a
result of their transportation practices, violating his and other
pretrial detainees' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Groover thereafter asked the Court to certify the action as a class
action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and
23(b)(3).  The litigation and the record in the case are
extensive.

The Counsel argues that exceptional circumstances exist warranting
reimbursement of expenses exceeding $7,500.  He volunteered over
1,000 hours of time representing Groover.  He took and defended
more than 15 depositions, briefed multiple motions with complex
legal issues, attended multiple court hearings, traveled regularly
to meet with Mr. Groover, and ultimately negotiated a resolution of
Groover's claims.  The Counsel provided excellent and thorough
representation in a case that was exceptionally time-consuming.
Judge Bloom agrees that the nature and scope of the claims in the
case and the amount of work performed by Counsel constitute
"exceptional circumstances."  Accordingly, reimbursement of costs
in excess of $7,500 is warranted.

Regarding the claimed expenses, the Counsel submitted an itemized
table of expenses incurred, as required by the Assistance with
Litigation Expenses Policy.  However, the Assistance with
Litigation Expenses Policy provides no guidance regarding what
claimed expenses may be reimbursed.  The caselaw within the
District on motions for reimbursement of pro bono litigation
expenses is limited and does not offer a framework for determining
what expenses are reimbursable.  The Court adopts the standards for
determining reimbursable expenses from the Middle District's Plan
with slight modification.  It will reimburse expenses for the
preparation and presentation of the case to the extent they are
reasonable, necessary, and otherwise recoverable under this plan.

The Counsel submitted 31 itemized claimed expenses for
reimbursement.  All of the claimed expenses fall into categories of
expenses that may be reimbursed.  Specifically, the Counsel
requests reimbursement of fees for the attendance of court
reporters, fees for court hearing transcripts, subpoena and service
of process fees, witness fees, expenses for investigation, expenses
for an expert, expenses for travel, mediation fees, and fees for
public records. Those expenses total $17,933.43.  The Judge
concludes that expenses in the amount $17,933.43 were reasonable
and necessary for the preparation of the case and are properly
reimbursable to the Counsel.

Accordingly, she granted the Motion.  The Clerk of Court is
authorized to disburse payment of $17,933.43 to the pro bono
Counsel as reimbursement for litigation expenses incurred by the
Counsel in representing the Plaintiff in the action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 21, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/fzM9GB from Leagle.com.

Jeffrey Emil Groover, Plaintiff, represented by Frank S. Hedin --
fhedin@hedinhall.com -- Hedin Hall LLP & David W. Hall, Hedin Hall
LLP, pro hac vice.

Prisoner Transportation Services, LLC, Defendant, represented by
D.
David Keller -- david.keller@kellerlandsberg.com -- Keller
Landsberg PA & Jose R. Riguera -- Jose.Riguera@kellerlandsberg.com
-- Keller Landsberg PA.

U.S. Corrections, LLC, Defendant, represented by Erin G. Jackson
--
ejackson@johnsonjackson.com -- Johnson Jackson LLC & Ashley
Americo
Tinsley -- atinsley@johnsonjackson.com -- Johnson Jackson LLC.


PROFESSIONAL PROBATION: Harper Appeals Decision to 11th Circuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Jennifer Essig, Catherine Regina Harper and Shannon
Jones filed an appeal from a Court ruling issued in their lawsuit
entitled Catherine Harper, et al. v. Professional Probation
Service, et al., Case No. 2:17-cv-01791-ACA, in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

The appellate case is captioned as Catherine Harper, et al. v.
Professional Probation Service, Case No. 19-13368, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, this class
action lawsuit was filed on October 23, 2017.
The nature of suit is stated as prisoner - civil rights.

Professional Probation Services, Inc. provides professional court
services and sentencing alternatives to courts, communities, and
offenders in the United States.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants CATHERINE REGINA HARPER, on behalf of herself
and those similarly situated, et al., are represented by:

          Samuel Jacob Brooke, Esq.
          Emily Early, Esq.
          Alexandra Marie Jordan, Esq.
          Sara Michelle Zampierin, Esq.
          SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER
          400 Washington Ave.
          Montgomery, AL 36104
          Telephone: (334) 956-8200
          E-mail: sam.brooke@splcenter.org
                  emily.early@splcenter.org
                  alexandra.jordan@splcenter.org
                  sara.zampierin@splcenter.org

Defendant-Appellee PROFESSIONAL PROBATION SERVICES INC. is
represented by:

          Bryan Andrew Grayson, Esq.
          Devon Kehres Rankin, Esq.
          Stephen E. Whitehead, Esq.
          LLOYD GRAY WHITEHEAD & MONROE, PC
          880 Montclair Rd., Suite 100
          Birmingham, AL 35213
          Telephone: (205) 967-8822
          E-mail: bgrayson@lgwmlaw.com
                  drankin@lgwmlaw.com
                  swhitehead@lgwmlaw.com

Defendant City of Gardendale is represented by:

          L. Conrad Anderson, IV, Esq.
          Gregory Carl Cook, Esq.
          Steven C. Corhern, Esq.
          Chase T. Espy, Esq.
          Ginny Willcox Leavens, Esq.
          Will Hill Tankersley, Jr., Esq.
          BALCH & BINGHAM, LLP
          1901 6th Ave. N, Suite 1500
          Birmingham, AL 35201
          Telephone: (205) 251-8100
          E-mail: canderson@balch.com
                  gcook@balch.com
                  scorhern@balch.com
                  cespy@balch.com
                  gwillcox@balch.com
                  wtankers@balch.com

Defendant Kenneth Gomany, in his official capacity, is represented
by:

          Richard Warren Kinney, III, Esq.
          James W. Porter, II, Esq.
          PORTER, PORTER AND HASSINGER, P.C.
          880 Montclair Rd., Suite 175
          Birmingham, AL 35213
          Telephone: (205) 322-1744
          E-mail: wkinney@pphlaw.net
                  jwporterii@pphlaw.net

REAL ESTATE ELEVATED: Hamilton Sues Over TCPA Violation
-------------------------------------------------------
Blackstone Hamilton, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Real Estate Elevated, LLC, a Nevada limited
liability company; Zurixx, LLC, a Utah limited liability company;
Tarek El Moussa, an individual; Christina Anstead, an individual
and, DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-08182 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 20, 2019) is an action brought for
Plaintiff and others similarly situated seeking damages and any
other available legal or equitable remedies resulting from the
illegal actions of Defendants in negligently, knowingly, and/or
willfully contacting Plaintiff on Plaintiff's cellular telephone in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, thereby
invading Plaintiff's privacy.

Plaintiff's number is listed on the national Do-Not-Call registry
since on or about June 4, 2004. On April 19, 2019, Plaintiff
received an unsolicited call from a number belonging to Defendants.
The Defendants never received Plaintiff's "prior express consent"
to receive calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an
artificial or prerecorded voice on his cellular telephone pursuant
to the TCPA, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Blackstone Hamilton is a resident of Ventura County,
California.

Defendants provide goods and services purporting to be real estate
investment and education programs and systems using the name Real
Estate Elevated Events.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Matthew J. Matem, Esq.
     Joshua D. Boxer, Esq.
     MATERN LAW GROUP, PC
     1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 200
     Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
     Phone: (310) 531-1900
     Facsimile: (310) 531-1901
     Email: mmatern@maternlawgroup.com
            jboxer@maternlawgroup.com


RIPPLE LABS: Moves to Dismiss Class Action Complaint
----------------------------------------------------
Stephen Palley, writing for The Block, reports that the Ripple
class action continues to poodle forward.  The most recent
development is a Motion to Dismiss filed on Sept. 19, 2019, by the
Defendants.

The procedural history to this case is already labyrinthine and
involves multiple lawsuits combined into one and several trips back
and forth between state and federal court, where this case now
resides after an attempt to "remand" it was denied earlier this
year and a "Consolidated Class Action Complaint" was filed on
August 5, 2019. The Complaint caught some news attention and some
people made a really big deal about it because it cited the SEC's
Digital Asset Framework, though some commentators (waves) didn't
think it mattered all that much.

The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is a 12(b)(6) motion for "failure
to state a claim." This means the allegations in the lawsuit can't
possibly give rise to any legal liability on behalf of the
defendants.
Ripple and its CEO Brad Garlinghouse ("the Defendants") argue in
their motion that the lawsuit doesn't state a claim for a couple of
reasons.

First, the Defendants argue that the federal securities laws claims
in the lawsuit are barred by a three year "statute of repose" that
applies to claims involving the unregistered sale of securities
(which is part of what the lawsuit involves.) Interestingly,
Defendants don't actually argue that XRP isn't a security in the
argument section of their brief, though they do have a throwaway
line in the introduction where they say it's a currency not a
security.

Under federal law, defendants argue that the statute of
repose--which is an outside limit on the time in which a claim can
be filed, regardless of the plaintiff's knowledge of the claim--is
three years. Because XRP was first offered to the public in 2013,
plaintiffs reason that a claim based on the alleged failure to
register XRP as a security is barred:

"[U]nder Plaintiff's own allegations, Defendants offered XRP to the
public throughout 2013 through 2015. Accordingly, the three-year
statute of repose expired as of 2016 (three years after the sales
cited in the May 2015 settlement) and in no case later than May
2018 (three years after the May 2015 settlement agreement in which
"Defendants acknowledged that they had sold XRP to the general
public," Complaint Par. 25). The Securities Act claims in the
Complaint, filed August 5, 2019, are therefore untimely and barred
by the statute of repose."

Plaintiffs attempt to get around this limitation period in their
Complaint by arguing that the XRP was and is a "continuing ICO," so
the violation of securities laws is continuing. Defendants argue
that this dog doesn't hunt because under a bunch of cases "slow
offerings"--"sales of the same security in one offering over an
extended period" are still subject to the rule that the statute
begins to run as of the date of the first sale.

Defendants also argue that the securities law claims fail because
plaintiff (1) doesn't allege that he bought his XRP in the initial
sale from the defendants but instead (2) may have done so on the
secondary market and (3) in any event did not solicit his purchase.
For these reasons, they say the securities law claim should be
thrown out.

The lawsuit also includes California state law claims. Defendants
makes some similar arguments here--they say that there's no
contractual relationship ("privity") between them and the plaintiff
and also that there's no allegation that the XRP transactions at
issue took place in California. Related to these points is an
argument that no misstatements were made by the defendants to the
plaintiff and that alleged misrepresentations aren't detailed with
the kind of specificity required by law.[GN]


RITE AID: Court Narrows Claims in Silva Mislabeling Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum granting in part and denying in
part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the second amended complaint
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)
in the case captioned KALEY DIANN SILVA and LINDSEY AVENETTI,
Plaintiffs. v. RITE AID CORPORATION, Defendant. Civil Action No.
1:18-CV-2135. (M.D. Pa.).

Plaintiffs Kaley Diann Silva and Lindsey Avenetti commenced this
action against defendant Rite Aid Corporation (Rite Aid).
Plaintiffs allege several Pennsylvania common-law and statutory
claims against Rite Aid, claiming that certain Rite Aid product
labeling was misleading.

Plaintiffs are now proceeding on their second amended complaint,
alleging claims for intentional and negligent misrepresentation,
breach of contract, breach of express and implied warranties,
unjust enrichment, and violation of Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL).

Legal Standards

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides that a court may
dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Such
jurisdictional challenges take one of two forms: (1) parties may
levy a factual attack, arguing that one or more of the pleading's
factual allegations are untrue, removing the action from the
court's jurisdictional reach or (2) they may assert a facial
challenge, which assumes the veracity of the complaint's
allegations but nonetheless argues that a claim is not within the
court's jurisdiction.  In either instance, it is the plaintiff's
burden to establish jurisdiction.  

Failure to State a Claim

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for
the dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. When ruling on a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept all factual allegations as
true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of
the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.

Standing

To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1)
an injury in fact (2) a sufficient causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of and (3) a likel[ihood] that
the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. A plaintiff
successfully pleads an injury in fact by alleging that he or she
suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest' that is
concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural
or hypothetical.

A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief bears the burden of
establishing that they are likely to suffer future injury' from the
defendant's conduct. In class actions, at least one named plaintiff
must satisfy this future injury requirement.  

Plaintiffs' second amended complaint is devoid of any allegation of
future injury.   Recognizing this deficiency, plaintiffs seek leave
to amend to plead additional facts that will support their standing
to seek injunctive relief, including but not limited to facts
showing that Plaintiffs still plan to purchase Rite Aid products in
the future.

But intent to purchase Rite Aid nutritional supplements in the
future does not alone establish an actual or imminent future
injury. And any suggestion that plaintiffs may be harmed by a
future purchase of Rite Aid nutritional supplements is far too
speculative to justify injunctive relief.

When an individual suffers an injury and subsequently becomes aware
of the cause of that injury, the law affords that individual the
dignity of assuming that they will not act in a manner which
results again in the same injury. To suffer the same injury from a
future purchase, plaintiffs would have to ignore their knowledge
and experience regarding Rite Aid's labeling practices.

The Court dismisses their request for injunctive relief.

Uniform Commercial Code Claims

A buyer who accepts goods under a contract must notify the seller
of an alleged breach within a reasonable time after he or she
discovers or should have discovered said breach. Failure to notify
the seller bars the buyer from obtaining any remedy under the
Uniform Commercial Code.  
Plaintiffs assert claims for breach of contract and implied and
express warranties. The second amended complaint is silent as to
whether plaintiffs provided notice to Rite Aid of the alleged
breach before commencing this litigation. Plaintiffs are therefore
barred from obtaining "any remedy" for these alleged breaches. This
deficiency warrants dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for breach of
contract, implied warranty, and express warranty.

The Court will grant plaintiffs leave to amend these claims to
assert any facts in their possession pertinent to this pleading
requirement.

Plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claim will also be dismissed for
failure to state a claim. A breach of contract claim in
Pennsylvania has three elements: (1) the existence of a contract
that includes its essential terms; (2) a breach of that contract
and (3) damages resulting from the breach. A sale of goods
constitutes a contract under Pennsylvania law. The parties dispute
whether product labels can give rise to contractual obligations
sufficient to support a breach-of-contract claim.  

The Court needs not resolve this issue. Assuming arguendo that
product labels can create contractual obligations, plaintiffs fail
to state a plausible breach of those obligations.

In Pennsylvania, the alleged contract should be read as a whole to
give effect to its true purpose and must be interpreted to give
effect to all of its provisions. The bottles at issue here have
front and back labels that together constituted the terms of any
contract that might have been formed. Plaintiffs do not allege that
Rite Aid breached the totality of the contract or its true
purpose.

Rather, they only claim that the principal display panel label and
price label were misleading when read in isolation. Plaintiffs have
not stated a plausible basis for Rite Aid's purported breach, nor
have they cited any authority to support the conclusion that the
four corners of the alleged contract begin and end with the
principal display panel label.

The Court will therefore dismiss plaintiffs' breach of contract
claim without prejudice and the Court will grant leave to amend.

Economic Loss Doctrine

Rite Aid also moves to dismiss plaintiffs' UTPCPL and common-law
tort claims via the economic loss doctrine. The economic loss
doctrine prohibits plaintiffs from recovering in tort economic
losses to which their entitlement flows only from a contract.

District courts in the Third Circuit are divided as to whether the
economic loss doctrine bars UTPCPL claims. Plaintiffs respond that
we are not bound by Werwinski because Pennsylvania law has changed
in the 17 years since that decision, with the Pennsylvania Superior
Court twice holding that the economic loss doctrine does not bar
UTPCPL claims.  

The Court agrees with plaintiffs and other courts in this circuit
in concluding that Pennsylvania's economic loss doctrine, as
interpreted by Pennsylvania courts, does not bar plaintiffs' UTPCPL
claim.

A predictive ruling by the Third Circuit is binding on its district
courts absent clear statement by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to
the contrary or other persuasive evidence of a change in
Pennsylvania law. District courts need not adhere to a predictive
ruling if state courts later prove that prediction to be wrong
amounting to a persuasive intervening change in the law.
The Court concludes that there is evidence of a persuasive change
in Pennsylvania law.

Werwinski was based on scant federal and state decisions
interpreting Pennsylvania law that shed little light on the
question at issue. Its prediction also relied on Pennsylvania's
lack of hospitality to tort liability for purely economic loss. But
Pennsylvania state court jurisprudence on the economic loss
doctrine has changed significantly since that decision.  

The binding law on Pennsylvania litigants is that of Dixon and
Knight, not Werwinski. When federal courts are sitting in diversity
jurisdiction and legal rules dictate the outcome, that outcome
should be substantially the same as it would be if tried in a state
court. The Court declines to apply a federal standard diametrically
opposed to the state standard, which would promote the unwelcome
practice of forum shopping.  

The Court will therefore permit plaintiffs' UTPCPL claims.

The Werwinski court also predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court would bar intentional fraud claims under the economic loss
doctrine. Pennsylvania law has not changed with regard to
fraudulent misrepresentation, and courts continue to foreclose
fraudulent misrepresentation claims under the economic loss
doctrine.  

Under the circumstances, we remain bound by Werwinski's holding
that the economic loss doctrine bars fraudulent misrepresentation
claims.

The Court also agree with Rite Aid that, assuming a contract
exists, the alleged fraud is intrinsic to the contract and does not
fall within the Third Circuit's fraudulent inducement exception to
the economic loss doctrine. Intentional misrepresentation claims
are generally preempted by the economic loss rule, except where a
defendant committed fraud to induce another to enter a contract.
Plaintiffs have not alleged a fraud external to the parties'
alleged contractual obligations, i.e., a fraud that does not
relatedly solely to the quality or characteristics of the goods
sold.

Moreover, this is the type of claim plaintiffs' warranty
allegations are designed to address. Plaintiffs' fraudulent
misrepresentation claim will therefore be dismissed.

Unjust Enrichment

Unjust enrichment is the retention of a benefit conferred by
another, without offering compensation, in circumstances where
compensation is reasonably expected, and for which the beneficiary
must make restitution. In the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, unjust
enrichment claims fall into two categories. The first is a
quasi-contractual theory of liability, in which case the unjust
enrichment claim is pled in the alternative to a breach of
contract. The second is a theory based on underlying tortious
conduct, in which case the unjust enrichment claim is a companion
claim to the underlying tort. Under the second theory, the success
of the unjust enrichment claim is dependent on the success of its
predicate tort.  

Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim is ambiguous as to whether it
sounds in contract or tort. Plaintiffs do not disavow either
theory.  Nevertheless, this ambiguity is inconsequential because
plaintiffs can proceed under either theory. Because plaintiffs'
underlying tort claim survives this stage of litigation, plaintiffs
may proceed on a tortious theory of unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs
may also advance a quasi-contractual claim because we dismissed
their claim for breach of contract.

The Court will deny Rite Aid's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' unjust
enrichment claim.
The Court will grant Rite Aid's motion to dismiss plaintiffs'
request for injunctive relief as well as their claims for breach of
contract, implied warranty, express warranty, and fraudulent
misrepresentation. The Court will deny the motion in all other
respects.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 19, 2019
Memorandum is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2zbrnlv from
Leagle.com.

Kaley Diann Silva, an Oregon resident & Lindsey Avenetti, an Oregon
resident, Plaintiffs, represented by Matthew E. Moloshok  -
mmoloshok@hlgslaw.com - Hellring Lindeman Goldstein & Siegal LLP,
pro hac vice, Rick Klingbeil - rick@klingbeil-law.com - Rick
Klingbeil, PC, Devin J. Chwastyk - dchwastyk@mcneeslaw.com - McNees
Wallace & Nurick LLC, Kevin D. Gamarnik - kgamarnik@foleybezek -
FOLEY BEZEK BEHLE & CURTIS LLP, pro hac vice, Rachel R. Hadrick -
rhadrick@mcneeslaw.com - McNees Wallace & Nurick LLC, Robert A.
Curtis - rcurtis@foleybezek.com - Foley Bezek Behle & Curtis LLP,
pro hac vice & Stephen L. Dreyfuss - sldreyfuss@hlgslaw.com -
Hellring Lindeman Goldstein & Siegal LLP, pro hac vice.

Rite Aid Corporation, a Delaware corporation, Defendant,
represented by Arthur P. Fritzinger- afritzinger@cozen.com - Cozen
O'Connor, F.B. Coller - bcoller@cozen.com - Cozen O'Connor & Paul
K. Leary, Jr. - pleary@cozen.com - Cozen O'Connor, pro hac vice


ROMEO'S PIZZA: Underpays Delivery Drivers, Branning Suit Asserts
----------------------------------------------------------------
Matthew Branning, On behalf of himself and those similarly situated
v. Romeo's Pizza, Inc.; Romeo's Pizza Franchise LLC; Spackler,
Smails, and Noonan Pizza Company; Sean Brauser; Ryan Rose; Doe
Corporation 1-25; John Doe 1-25, Case No. 1:19-cv-02092 (N.D. Ohio,
Sept. 11, 2019), alleges that the Defendants repeatedly and
willfully violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Ohio Prompt
Pay Act by failing to adequately reimburse delivery drivers for
their delivery-related expenses, thereby, failing to pay delivery
drivers the legally mandated minimum wage wages for all hours
worked.

Romeo's Pizza, Inc. is a domestic corporation authorized to do
business under the laws of Ohio.  Romeo's Pizza Franchise LLC is a
domestic limited liability company authorized to do business under
the laws of Ohio.  Sean Brauser founded Romeo's Pizza, Inc., and
still owns all or part of it.  Ryan Rose is the President and Chief
Executive Officer of Romeo's Pizza Franchise LLC.

Romeo's Pizza, Inc. and Romeo's Pizza Franchise LLC make up the
parent company that oversees operations at all Romeo's Pizza
stores.  They both exercise control over the work and working
conditions of the delivery drivers at the Romeo's Pizza stores.

The franchise entities, including Spackler, Smails, and Noonan
Pizza Company, act directly and indirectly in the interest of
Romeo's Pizza, Inc. and Romeo's Pizza Franchise LLC in relation to
the delivery drivers at the store(s) it operates.

The Defendants operate approximately 35 Romeo's Pizza restaurants.
Thirty-two of their stores are located in Ohio.  The Defendants
operate the Romeo's Pizza stores as joint employers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew R. Biller, Esq.
          BILLER & KIMBLE, LLC
          4200 Regent Street, Suite 200
          Columbus, OH 43219
          Telephone: (614) 604-8759
          Facsimile: (614) 340-4620
          E-mail: abiller@billerkimble.com

               - and -

          Andrew P. Kimble, Esq.
          Louise M. Roselle, Esq.
          BILLER & KIMBLE, LLC
          3825 Edwards Road, Suite 650
          Cincinnati, OH 45209
          Telephone: (513) 715-8711
          Facsimile: (614) 340-4620
          E-mail: akimble@billerkimble.com
                  lroselle@billerkimble.com


SANOFI SA: Hagens Berman Files Class Action Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------
Class-action law firm Hagens Berman has filed a second lawsuit
regarding Sanofi and Boehringer Ingelheim's intentionally concealed
cancer risks in its popular heartburn medication, Zantac. Attorneys
are also calling the Food and Drug Administration's consumer-facing
recommendations regarding the instance of a carcinogenic chemical
in Zantac "highly questionable," and are urging those who take
Zantac to consult with their doctors before continuing to take the
medicine.

The complaint also alleges that scientific testing that employs the
FDA's own protocols shows that a single tablet of Zantac may react
to form up to 26,000 times the FDA-approved limit of
N‑nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA), a chemical which the FDA, EPA and
World Health Organization classify as a carcinogen. Although the
FDA has announced that it too found NDMA in Zantac and generic
ranitidine, albeit at lower levels, the FDA has not urged companies
to recall the drug, nor has it recommended that consumers stop
taking Zantac.

According to the firm's complaint, when one 150 mg tablet of Zantac
is ingested, it undergoes a chemical reaction in the stomach to
create more than 3,100 times the FDA-approved limit of NDMA.

"There is no debate about the toxicity of NDMA. The EPA, World
Health Organization, and the FDA itself have labeled it a
carcinogen," said Steve Berman, managing partner of Hagens Berman
and attorney leading the case for consumers. "That the FDA is
recommending that consumers continue to take over-the-counter
Zantac, instead of consulting with their physician, or encouraging
individuals to take one of the many alternative medications over
which there are no safety concerns, is questionable at best."

"Virtually every other regulator across the world investigating
ranitidine has either recalled the drug, or at the very least,
encouraged persons to speak with their physician before taking any
further ranitidine. For example, Canada's FDA-equivalent, Health
Canada, is urging manufacturers to stop the sale of drugs
containing ranitidine," Berman added. "We too urge consumers
consult with their doctors before taking any further ranitidine. We
understand that the FDA has to conduct a proper investigation and
encourage it to do so, but its meek recommendations merely create
confusion and put consumers in danger before the FDA has determined
whether these drugs are in fact safe. That's just wrong."

Sandoz had agreed to recall its ranitidine products worldwide
including in the U.S.

The lawsuit, filed Sept. 20, 2019, in the U.S. District Court for
the District of New Jersey, accuses Sanofi and Boehringer Ingelheim
of knowingly manufacturing and selling over-the-counter Zantac
containing a concealed carcinogen to millions in the U.S. suffering
from heartburn and other gastrointestinal issues, including sour
stomach, acid reflux or gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD).

The FDA has established a permissible daily intake limit of 96ng of
NDMA, but recent testing using FDA-approved methods detected more
than 2,500,000ng of NDMA per 150mg tablet of Zantac. Each Zantac
tablet has been found to contain 26,000 times the FDA-approved
amount of NDMA that can be safely ingested daily.

According to the lawsuit, "Zantac's unprecedented sales were
possible only because of a deception perpetrated by the drug's
manufacturers on consumers…"

The dangers of NDMA have been publicly known for more than 40
years, according to the lawsuit, and the WHO has described NDMA as
"clearly carcinogenic." NDMA itself belongs to a family of
chemicals called N-nitrosamines, which the EPA refers to as "potent
carcinogens." Attorneys say that despite the accumulating
scientific evidence showing Zantac exposed users to extremely high
levels of NDMA, neither Sanofi nor Boehringer disclosed this risk.

If you have concerns about any potential adverse health risks
associated with Zantac (or generic ranitidine consumption), Hagens
Berman recommends that you discuss the allegations in this lawsuit
with your physician.

Find out more about the class-action lawsuit against Sanofi for
cancer-causing compounds in Zantac.

                      About Hagens Berman

Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP is a consumer-rights class-action
law firm with nine offices across the country. The firm's tenacious
drive for plaintiffs' rights has earned it numerous national
accolades, awards and titles of "Most Feared Plaintiff's Firm," and
MVPs and Trailblazers of class-action law. More about the law firm
and its successes can be found at hbsslaw.com. Follow the firm for
updates and news at @ClassActionLaw.

Contact:

         Ashley Klann, Esq.
         Tel: 206-268-9363
         Email: ashleyk@hbsslaw.com [GN]


SANTANDER CONSUMER: Court Refuses Bid to Intervene in Lindblom
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order denying Intervenors' Motion for Leave to
Intervene as of Right in the case captioned APRIL LINDBLOM, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC, Defendant. Case No.
1:15-cv-00990-BAM (E.D. Calif.).

This action arises out of Plaintiffs April and Timothy Lindblom's
loan for the purchase of a vehicle. The operative complaint alleges
that they made payments to Defendant, who serviced the loan, using
Western Union's Speedpay service. The Speedpay service required a
flat fee per transaction (Speedpay Fee) that was purportedly
remitted to Defendant in violation of California's Rosenthal Fair
Debt Collections Act.

Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) governs a request to
intervene as of right. Where an intervenor is not given an
unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute, a putative
intervenor must satisfy four elements to qualify for as-of-right
intervention: (1) the applicant's motion must be timely (2) the
applicant must assert an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action (3) the applicant
must be so situated that without intervention the disposition of
the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede his ability
to protect that interest and (4) the applicant's interest must be
inadequately represented by other parties.

Timeliness

An application to intervene, whether as of right or permissive,
must be timely. The determination of timeliness is left to the
sound discretion of the court. Timeliness is the threshold
requirement for intervention as of right and if the motion is
untimely the Court need not reach any of the remaining elements of
Rule 24(a).

In determining whether a motion for intervention is timely, the
court considers three factors: (1) the stage of the proceeding at
which an applicant seeks to intervene (2) the prejudice to other
parties and (3) the reason for and length of the delay.

Stage of the Proceeding

The first factor in determining timeliness is the stage of the
proceeding in which intervention is sought. Although delay can
strongly weigh against intervention, the mere lapse of time,
without more, is not necessarily a bar to intervention. Thus, to be
timely, an applicant need not seek to intervene immediately. Courts
consider whether there have been actual proceedings of substance on
the merits in the underlying action.

Between the initial lawsuit filed on October 30, 2014 (subsequently
transferred to this Court on June 29, 2015) and the Intervenors'
motion, numerous important litigation milestones have passed.
Several motions to dismiss, a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
a motion for summary judgment, a motion for class certification,
and numerous motions to intervene have been filed and extensively
briefed by the parties. The parties attended private mediation
while the case was stayed, and the Court issued an amended
scheduling order when mediation was ultimately unsuccessful. The
parties conducted class discovery for a full year and, after the
discovery deadlines were twice extended, class discovery closed on
February 27, 2017.  All other class related deadlines have long
since expired. Class certification has been denied, and,
importantly, this case now proceeds as an individual action.  

Given the length of time and advanced stage of the proceedings, and
absent argument to the contrary, the Court finds that this factor
weighs against intervention.

Prejudice to Other Parties

In evaluating the second factor prejudice to other parties, courts
have emphasized the seriousness of the prejudice which results when
relief from long-standing inequities is delayed.

Defendant contends that it is prejudiced by intervention for the
same reasons identified in the Court's order denying the prior
motions to intervene permissively. The Intervenors, in turn,
contend that prejudice is irrelevant to the analysis of
intervention as of right, and Defendant nonetheless is not
prejudiced because it will face class claims by many of the members
in this class sooner or later.

However, the Intervenors' argument is misplaced. As an initial
matter, a motion to intervene must be timely, regardless of whether
intervention is sought permissively or as of right.  

The parties have participated in substantial discovery and law and
motion practice, including motions to dismiss, a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, a motion for summary judgment, and a
motion for class certification. For the same reasons discussed in
the Court's order denying the prior motions to permissively
intervene, allowing intervention would derail this case and would
require significant and costly discovery to essentially relitigate
the case after four years of contentious litigation. Significantly,
this case was stripped of its character as a class action upon
denial of certification and is now solely an individual action. At
this stage in the proceedings where discovery is over and class
certification has been denied, requiring the parties to reopen the
class allegations and essentially begin the case anew would be
highly prejudicial.

The Court therefore finds that the prejudice factor of the
timeliness determination weighs against intervention.

Reason for and Length of the Delay

To prevail on a motion to intervene as of right, a proposed
intervenor must convincingly explain its delay in filing its motion
to intervene. A party seeking to intervene must act as soon as he
knows or has reason to know that his interests might be adversely
affected by the outcome of the litigation.

The Intervenors argue that they could not have intervened as of
right prior to either June 11, 2018, when the Supreme Court decided
China Agritech v. Resh, 138 S.Ct. 1800 (2018), or June 29, 2018,
when the Court denied the prior proposed intervenors' motions for
permissive intervention.

However, the Intervenors do not adequately explain why they were
prevented from seeking to intervene, whether permissively or as of
right, prior to that time. Instead, their argument essentially
appears to be that this was when they realized that the end result
of the protracted litigation would not be entirely to their liking.
Where proposed intervenors have made similar arguments, the Ninth
Circuit has responded that surely, they should have known the risks
of waiting.

Here, counsel for Plaintiffs April and Timothy Lindblom and the
Intervenors was aware that Defendant was asserting the statute of
limitations as its first affirmative defense in the answer filed on
October 20, 2015. Plaintiff's first amended complaint, filed on
September 29, 2015, set out an equitable tolling defense in
anticipation of this defense. The parties accordingly knew as early
as September 2015 that the question of whether the statute of
limitations would bar Plaintiff's claims, thereby making her an
arguably inadequate representative, was a major issue in this case.


The Court finds that China Agritech has no bearing on the
timeliness of the Intervenors' motion. The Supreme Court's decision
in China Agritech concerned the scope of tolling under American
Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974) (American Pipe),
which held that the timely filing of a class action tolls the
applicable statute of limitations for all persons encompassed by
the class complaint. Where the class-action status has been denied
members of the failed class could timely intervene as individual
plaintiffs in the still-pending action, shorn of its class
character.

In concluding, the Supreme Court emphasized that the watchwords of
American Pipe are efficiency and economy of litigation, a principal
purpose of Rule 23 as well. Extending American Pipe tolling to
successive class actions does not serve that purpose. The contrary
rule, allowing no tolling for out-of-time class actions, will
propel putative class representatives to file suit well within the
limitation period and seek certification promptly.

The same policy reasons discussed in China Agritech warrant
prohibiting the Intervenors here to piggyback on an earlier, timely
filed class action. Allowing them to do so does not serve the
purposes of Rule 23. Accordingly, in light of the holding and
reasoning of China Agritech, the Court finds that the Intervenors'
reasons for and length of delay weigh against intervention.

Interest Relating to Property or Transaction

A proposed intervenor must demonstrate a significantly protectable
interest in the property or transaction which is the subject of the
action for intervention to be proper.

The Intervenors contend that they each have a significant
protectable interest in this litigation because intervention is the
only way that their claims can be presented in a class setting.
According to the motion, the Intervenors' cases are not worth
pursuing individually, but the class collectively paid a
significant sum of twenty-two million dollars to Defendant.
Defendant counters that the Intervenors have not shown how
resolution of Plaintiffs April and Timothy Lindblom's individual
claims will actually affect them.   

The Court agrees.

The heart of these motions is the Intervenors' request to resurrect
class allegations through intervention. The answer to this request
must be no. While the Intervenors contend that they have a
protectable interest in litigating their claims in a class setting,
this case is no longer a class action. Upon denial of class
certification, this case was stripped of its character as a class
action and now proceeds solely as an individual action.   

The Intervenors do not explain how, if at all, resolution of
Plaintiffs April and Timothy Lindblom's individual claims will
affect them or how their interests are related to the individual
claims at issue. Moreover, the Intervenors have not established
that their interest in pursuing a particular class action
procedure, as opposed to protecting a substantive right, is
protectible under Rule 24(a)(2). Accordingly, the Court finds that
the Intervenors do not have significant protectable interest in
this action and this factor likewise weighs against intervention.

Impairment of the Intervenors' Interests

The impairment element of Rule 24(a) is met if an absentee would be
substantially affected in a practical sense by the determination
made in an action. Defendant argues that this element is not
satisfied because other means exist to protect the intervenors'
interests, including filing individual claims or arbitration.  

Having found that the Intervenors offered no argument that they
have a protectable interest in property or transaction which is the
subject of the action because it proceeds solely on Plaintiffs
April and Timothy Lindblom's individual claims, it necessarily
follows that such an interest would not be impaired by resolution.
Moreover, Defendant is correct in its assertion that the
Intervenors are not without a remedy and have other means to pursue
their interests, such as filing an individual action or
arbitration. Although the Intervenors contend that class treatment
is more advantageous mere inconvenience caused by requiring the
Intervenors to litigate separately is not the sort of adverse
practical effect contemplated by Rule 24(a)(2).

Accordingly, the Court finds that the impairment element likewise
disfavors intervention.
Adequacy of Representation

Whether the existing parties may adequately represent a proposed
intervenors' interest considers three factors: (1) whether the
interests of the existing party are sufficiently similar to that of
the intervenor such that the legal arguments of the latter will
undoubtedly be made by the former (2) whether the existing party is
capable and willing to make such arguments and (3) whether the
intervenor, if permitted to intervene, would add some necessary
element to the proceedings which would not be covered by the
parties in the suit.

As discussed above, class certification has been denied and this
case no longer proceeds as a class action and instead solely
concerns Plaintiffs April and Timothy Lindblom's individual claims.
Therefore, Plaintiffs April and Timothy Lindblom and the
Intervenors do not have the same or sufficiently similar interests
and it cannot be said that the Intervenors would add any necessary
element that Plaintiffs April and Timothy Lindblom cannot address.


The Court therefore finds that the adequacy of representation
element has not been satisfied here.

The Intervenors' Motion for to Intervene as of Right is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 23, 2019 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y46pqxnh from Leagle.com.

April Lindblom, Plaintiff, represented by D. Frank Davis -
fdavis@davisnorris.com - Davis & Norris, LLP, pro hac vice, John E.
Norris - jnorris@davisnorris.com - Davis & Norris, LLP, pro hac
vice, Kristan B. Rivers , David & Norris LLP, 2154 Highland Ave S,
Birmingham, AL 35205, pro hac vice, Wesley W. Barnett -
wbarnett@davisnorris.com - Davis & Norris, LLP, pro hac vice,
Benjamin P. Tryk - ben@tryklaw.com - Tryk Law, PC & Brittany Grace
McClintick , Davis & Norris LLP, 2154 Highland Ave S, Birmingham,
AL 35205

Santander Consumer USA Inc., Defendant, represented by Chad R.
Fuller - chad.fuller@troutman.com - Troutman Sanders LLP, David S.
Reidy - dreidy@mcguirewoods.com - McGuireWoods LLP, Marc A. Lackner
- mlackner@mcguirewoods.com - Mcguirewoods LLP, R. Frank
Springfield - fspringfield@burr.com - Burr & Forman, LLP, pro hac
vice, Virginia Bell Flynn - virginia.flynn@troutman.com - Troutman
Sanders LLP, pro hac vice & Zachary D. Miller , Burr & Forman, LLP,
pro hac vice.

Vicki Blakely, Steven Lawson, Christy Mitchell, Leslie Williams,
James Rolland, Jaynellis Salinas, Kathleen Jones, Kevin Grief,
Samuel Carter & Annie Bluitt, Intervenors, represented by John E.
Norris , Davis & Norris, LLP & Brittany Grace McClintick , Davis &
Norris LLP.
Jason Crowley, Juanita Garcia & Janice Teemer, Intervenors,
represented by Dargan Maner Ware -dware@davisnorris.com - Davis &
Norris, LLP, John E. Norris , Davis & Norris, LLP & Brittany Grace
McClintick , Davis & Norris LLP.


SENOR FROG'S: Kayat Files Suit Over Unsolicited Marketing
---------------------------------------------------------
PETER KAYAT, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. SENOR FROG'S ORLANDO, LLC, a Florida
Limited Liability Company, Defendant, Case No.
6:19-cv-01824-RBD-DCI (M.D. Fla., Sept. 20, 2019) is an action
brought against Defendant to secure redress for violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

To promote its services, Defendant engages in unsolicited
marketing, harming thousands of consumers in the process. Through
this action, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt Defendant's
illegal conduct, which has resulted in the invasion of privacy,
harassment, aggravation, and disruption of the daily life of
thousands of individuals. Plaintiff also seeks statutory damages on
behalf of himself and members of the class, and any other available
legal or equitable remedies, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is a natural person who was a resident of Orange County,
Florida.

Defendant is a Mexican-theme franchised bar and grill.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
     Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
     SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
     14 NE 1st Ave., Suite 1205
     Miami, FL 33132
     Phone (305) 479-2299
     Facsimile (786) 623-0915
     Email: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
            gberg@shamisgentile.com

          - and -

     Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
     EDELSBERG LAW, PA
     19495 Biscayne Blvd. #607
     Aventura, FL 33180
     Phone: (305) 975-3320
     Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com


SENTRY LIFE: Court Dismisses Judgment on Pleadings in Maxon Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin issued an Opinion and Order granting Defendant's Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings in the case captioned PRUDENCE F.
MAXON, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. SENTRY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. No.
18-cv-254-jdp. (W.D. Wis.).

This is a proposed class action against defendant Sentry Life
Insurance Company about the way it sets premiums for its universal
life insurance policies, which combine an investment vehicle with a
life insurance policy. Plaintiff Prudence Maxon owns a Sentry
universal life policy. Under the terms of Maxon's policy, Sentry
sets the monthly premiums based on certain factors that relate to a
Mortality Charge. Maxon contends that the expressly stated
Mortality Charge factors should be the exclusive factors in setting
the monthly premiums.  

The fundamental issue in this case is a question of contract
interpretation. Both sides agree that Maxon's policy is a valid and
enforceable contract, but they disagree on the meaning of its
terms. Neither side contends that the contract is ambiguous. Sentry
contends that its interpretation of the contract is correct and
decisive, so it moves for judgment on the pleadings under Rule
12(c).

Rule 12(c) allows a party to move for judgment after the pleadings
are closed. The standards are the same as for motions to dismiss
for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), but the court
considers all the pleadings, not just the complaint. Judgment on
the pleadings is appropriate if the complaint fails to state a
plausible claim for relief. The interpretation of an unambiguous
contract is a question of law, so when a case turns on a question
of contract interpretation, it is amendable to resolution by a
motion for judgment on the pleadings.  

Breach of contract claims

The court begins with Maxon's breach of contract claims, which are
enumerated as counts I, II and III in her complaint.

As a preliminary matter, the parties dispute whether the policy
should be construed under the Wisconsin law or Florida law. But at
least for purposes of Sentry's motion for judgment on the
pleadings, the parties agree that there is no material difference
between the law of the two states.1 So common rules of contract
interpretation are sufficient for the purposes of this opinion, and
the court need not resolve the choice-of-law issue.

For count I, Maxon contends that when the policy says that the
monthly deduction is based on certain pricing factors, that list of
factors is exhaustive, not illustrative. In other words, Maxon
argues that Sentry is contractually obligated to base the monthly
deduction solely on the factors expressly cited in the policy.

But the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has already
rejected this argument in cases involving similar policy
provisions: Norem v. Lincoln Ben. Life Co., 737 F.3d 1145 (7th Cir.
2013), and Mai Nhia Thao v. Midland Nat. Life Ins. Co., 549 F.
App'x 534 (7th Cir. 2013). Maxon cites many cases outside the
Seventh Circuit that have reached the opposite conclusion,
particularly Yue v. Conseco Life Ins. Co., 282 F.R.D. 469 (C.D.
Cal. 2012). Those extra-circuit cases are of no import. Thao is an
unpublished order, so it is a non-precedential decision that is not
binding here. But Norem is a published opinion that states the law
of this circuit.

Maxon contends that her policy language is materially different
from that in Norem and Thao. But the differences in policy language
defining the cost of the insurance component are minor ones, as
shown in the side-by-side comparison set out in Sentry's reply
brief. Sentry's policy uses the defined terms Mortality Charges and
Mortality Rates, but the definitions in the Sentry policy are
substantively the same, or very nearly so, as those in Norem and
Thao.

Maxon is correct that the Norem court drew some distinctions
between the Norem policy and that in Yue.   For example, Norem's
cost of insurance provision of did not cite mortality experience as
the basis for cost of insurance. But these are fine points; no fair
reader of Norem could conclude that the court of appeals would
reach a different conclusion if it were interpreting Maxon's
policy. Norem's conclusion is plainly stated and this court must
follow it: absent a promise to use a specific formula when
calculating a cost of insurance rate, an insurer is not bound to
consider only those factors listed in a cost of insurance
provision.  

For count II, Maxon contends that Sentry breached the policy by
including in the cost of insurance some of its administrative
expenses, which should have been limited to the five-dollar
administrative fee expressly stated in the policy. But this claim,
too, is foreclosed by Norem. The policy in Norem included a
separate administrative expense charge and the plaintiff argued
that the insurer was double-dipping by incorporating administrative
costs into the cost of insurance rate.

The court rejected this argument because the policy did not define
what expenses the administrative fee was intended to cover, and the
insurer was therefore free to include administrative expenses as
part of its other monthly charges. The same is true here: although
the policy states that Maxon will be charged an administrative fee
each month, the policy does not define administrative costs or
explain what the administrative fee is meant to cover.

For count III, Maxon contends that Sentry failed to lower its rates
to account for improved mortality expectations. But here again,
Maxon fails to differentiate this case from Norem. The Norem court
noted that perhaps the plaintiff would have a claim if the insurer
charged rates that were wholly divorced from mortality. But unless
the rates were utterly unrelated to mortality or the enumerated
factors, the insurer's failure to closely track fluctuating
mortality expectations did not constitute a breach of contract.  

Non-contract claims

Maxon contends that even if the court grants judgment on her
contract claims, it should not grant judgment on count IV
(conversion) and count V (declaratory and injunctive relief).

Maxon is correct that her conversion claim has different elements
than her breach of contract claims.3 But to prove a conversion
claim Maxon would have to show that Sentry took money that belonged
to Maxon without her consent. The only money that Sentry is alleged
to have wrongly taken is the premiums for the insurance component.
So to prove conversion, Maxon would have to show that she did not
consent to Sentry taking these premiums, which is just another way
of saying that Sentry breached the terms of the policy. Maxon
cannot prevail on her conversion claim unless she can show a breach
of the policy, and that showing is foreclosed by Norem.

Maxon's request for declaratory and injunctive relief, is not a
separate substantive claim, but rather a request for a certain type
for relief. Maxon says that even if she does not have a claim for
damages, she may still seek certification of an injunctive class
under Rule 23(b)(2). But she does not explain why she would be
entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief if she doesn't state a
claim under substantive law.

The court sees no basis for granting injunctive relief, so it will
dismiss count V as well.
Defendant Sentry Life Insurance Company's motion for judgment on
the pleading is GRANTED.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 19, 2019
Memorandum is available at https://preview.tinyurl.com/y2eoflts
from Leagle.com.

Prudence F. Maxon, Individually and On Behalf of all Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Angelica M. Ornelas -
aornelas@girardsharp.com - Girard Sharp LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel
C. Girard - dgirard@girardsharp.com -  Girard Sharp LLP, Elizabeth
A. Kramer - ekramer@girardsharp.com - Girard Sharp LLP, pro hac
vice, Ethan M. Lange , Stueve Siegel Hanson LLP, pro hac vice,
Jason Toji Calabro , Stueve Siegel Hanson LLP, 460 Nichols Rd Ste
200, Kansas City, MO, 64112-2003, pro hac vice, John Schirger -
JSCHIRGER@MILLERSCHIRGER.COM - Miller Schirger, LLC, pro hac vice,
John Allen Yanchunis, Sr. - jyanchunis@forthepeople.com - Morgan &
Morgan, Tampa P.A., Joseph Michael Feierabend -
jfeierabend@millerschirger.com - Miller Schirger LLC, pro hac vice,
Matthew W. Lytle  - MLYTLE@MILLERSCHIRGER.COM - Miller Schirger
LLC, pro hac vice, Norman Siegel , Stueve Siegel Hanson LLP, pro
hac vice, Patrick J. Stueve , Stueve Siegel Hanson LLP, 460 Nichols
Rd Ste 200, Kansas City, MO, 64112-2003, pro hac vice & Andrew W.
Erlandson -aerlandson@hurleyburish.com - Hurley, Burish & Stanton,
S.C.

Sentry Life Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by Benjamine
Reid - breid@carltonfields.com - Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, PA,
Clifton Richard Gruhn  -, Carlton Fields, P.A. & Kendall W.
Harrison - kharrison@gklaw.com - Godfrey & Kahn, S.C..


SHIRE US: Bid to Certify Class in Intuniv Antitrust Suit Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re INTUNIV ANTITRUST LITIGATION (Indirect
Purchasers), Civil Action No. 1:16-cv-12396-ADB (D. Mass.), Judge
Allison D. Burroughs of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachuse denied (i) the Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs ("IPPs")'s
motion for class certification, (ii) the IPPs' motion to exclude
the opinions of the Defendants' expert, Prof. James W. Hughes, and
(iii) the Defendants' motion to exclude the opinions of the IPPs'
expert, Prof. Meredith Rosenthal.

The pay-for-delay case involves allegations that the Defendants
settled patent litigation over the ADHD drug Intuniv on
anticompetitive terms.  The IPPs are parents and caretakers who
purchased Intuniv (the brand name for extended release guanfacine
hydrochloride) or generic Intuniv for a child's or ward's medical
needs.  They claim that the settlement agreement between brand
Intuniv manufacturer Shire LLC and Shire U.S., Inc. and generic
Intuniv manufacturer Actavis Holdco US Inc. and Actavis Elizabeth,
LLC improperly delayed competition for both brand Intuniv and
generic Intuniv, thereby causing them to pay an inflated price for
the drug. See generally.  

The IPPs seek to represent two classes of consumers, a nationwide
class and a class of consumers from the 26 jurisdictions that have
Illinois Brick repealer laws, who were allegedly overcharged for
Intuniv because of the Defendants' anticompetitive conduct:

     a. The Nationwide Consumer Class: For the period beginning
Nov. 15, 2012, to the present: (A) all persons who purchased brand
or generic Intuniv in the United States for personal or household
use, and who paid the purchase price themselves; and (B) all
persons covered by commercial health insurance who purchased brand
Intuniv in the United States for personal or household use, and who
paid some of the purchase price pursuant to a co-payment or
co-insurance provision.

     b. Illinois Brick Repealer Class: For the period beginning
Nov. 15, 2012, to the present, all persons in Arizona, California,
Florida, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
and the District of Columbia: (A) who paid the purchase price
themselves for brand or generic Intuniv in the United States for
personal or household use; and (B) all persons covered by
commercial health insurance who purchased brand Intuniv in the
United States for personal or household use, and who paid some of
the purchase price pursuant to a co-payment or co-insurance
provision.

Before the Court are (i) the IPPs' motion for class certification,
(ii) the IPPs' motion to exclude the opinions of the Defendants'
expert, Prof. Hughes, and (iii) the Defendants' motion to exclude
the opinions of the IPPs' expert, Prof. Rosenthal.  Both sides
argue that the other side's expert proffers opinions that are
inadmissible pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.

Judge Burroughs finds that the Defendants seemingly briefed the
admissibility of Prof. Rosenthal's opinions as a way to provide the
Court with 17 additional pages as to why class certification should
be denied, even if Prof. Rosenthal's opinions are accurate and
relevant.  The three of the Defendants' 20 pages of briefing that
address perceived errors in Prof. Rosenthal's opinions raise issues
that go to the weight rather than the admissibility of those
opinions.  The Defendants do not credibly argue that Prof.
Rosenthal's model is not probative of the total damages suffered by
the putative classes, and the Judge therefore denies the
Defendants' motion to exclude her opinions.

The Judge also denies the IPPs' motion to exclude the opinions of
Prof. Hughes.  She concludes that Prof. Hughes has applied reliable
principles and methods to data and facts that would be relevant to
measuring damages in the case.  As with Prof. Rosenthal, the
perceived flaws in Prof. Hughes' methodology go to the weight
rather than the admissibility of his opinions.  And, although
prescriptions cannot function as a direct stand-in for consumers,
Prof. Hughes' report demonstrates that there is a relationship
between the number of Intuniv consumers and the number of Intuniv
prescriptions such that the number of prescriptions may serve as a
useful proxy for at least estimating numbers of consumers.

The Judge will not prolong her opinion with an application of the
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) because the parties' dispute
centers on the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) and the
she finds that issue dispositive.  The crux of the issue is whether
the IPPs have shown either that the number of uninjured class
members is de minimis or have designed a reasonable and workable
mechanism to allow the Defendants to challenge the class members'
individual, purported injury while still ensuring that common
issues of law and fact will predominate over those individual
issues.

Where the IPPs have failed to put forth a reasonable and workable
plan to weed out the more than 10,000 uninjured class members in
each putative class and the Defendants intend to challenge any
attestation that individual class members were injured, the IPPs
have not shown that questions of law or fact common to class
members [will] predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members.  The IPPs' motion for class certification is
therefore denied.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, Judge Burroughs denied (i) the
motion for class certification, and (ii) the motions to exclude
expert opinions.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 21, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/oBSpPg from Leagle.com.

Sherri Cummisford, Consolidated Plaintiff, represented by Allan
Kanner -- a.kanner@kanner-law.com -- Allan Kanner & Associates, pro
hac vice, Conlee S. Whiteley -- c.whiteley@kanner-law.com -- Kanner
& Whiteley, LLC, pro hac vice, Denise L. Morris, Ademi & O'Reilly
LLP, John D. Blythin, Ademi & O'Reilly LLP, Layne Hilton --
l.hilton@kanner-law.com -- Kanner & Whiteley, LLC, pro hac vice,
Mark A. Eldridge, Ademi & O'Reilly LLP, Ruben Honik --
rhonik@golombhonik.com -- Golomb & Honikl, P.C., pro hac vice &
Shpetim Ademi, Ademi & O'Reilly.

Carmen Richard, Consolidated Plaintiff, represented by Allan
Kanner, Allan Kanner & Associates, pro hac vice, Bradley Winston,
Winston Law Firm, Conlee S. Whiteley, Kanner & Whiteley, LLC, pro
hac vice, David J. Stanoch, Golomb & Honik, P.C., pro hac vice,
Layne Hilton, Kanner & Whiteley, LLC, pro hac vice & Ruben Honik,
Golomb & Honikl, P.C., pro hac vice.

Tina Picone, Plaintiff, represented by Allan Kanner, Allan Kanner &
Associates, pro hac vice, Annemieke A. Tennis, Kanner & Whiteley,
LLC, pro hac vice, Conlee S. Whiteley, Kanner & Whiteley, LLC, pro
hac vice, David J. Stanoch, Golomb & Honik, P.C., pro hac vice,
Layne Hilton, Kanner & Whiteley, LLC, pro hac vice, Ruben Honik,
Golomb & Honikl, P.C., pro hac vice & Stephen Herbert Galebach,
Galebach Law Office.

Shire U.S. Inc. & Shire LLC, Defendants, represented by David S.
Shotlander , Frommer Lawrence & Haug LLLP, pro hac vice, David A.
Zwally -- dzwally@haugpartners.com -- Haug Partners LLLP, pro hac
vice, Michael F. Brockmeyer , Frommer Lawrence & Haug LLP, pro hac
vice, Nicholas F. Giove -- ngiove@haugpartners.com -- Haug Partners
LLP, pro hac vice, Fred A. Kelly, Jr., Haug Partners, Joshua S.
Barlow -- jbarlow@haugpartners.com -- Haug Partners LLP & Tarae L.
Howell -- thowell@nixonpeabody.com -- Nixon & Peabody, LLP.

Actavis Elizabeth LLC & Actavis Holdco U.S., Inc., Defendants,
represented by Aviv A. Zalcenstein, Goodwin Procter LLP, pro hac
vice, Alicia Rubio-Spring, Goodwin Procter LLP, Christopher T.
Holding, Goodwin Procter, LLP, Sarah K. Frederick, Goodwin Procter
LLP & Srikanth K. Reddy, Goodwin Procter, LLP.

Actavis Inc., Defendant, represented by Aviv A. Zalcenstein,
Goodwin Procter LLP, pro hac vice & Christopher T. Holding, Goodwin
Procter, LLP.

Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Intervenor, represented by
Christopher T. Holding, Goodwin Procter, LLP.


SWEETWORKS CONFECTIONS: Judgment on Pleadings in Green Partly OK'd
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DOMINIQUE GREEN, on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SWEETWORKS CONFECTIONS, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 18 CV 902-LTS-SN (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Laura
Taylor Swain of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's
motion for judgment on the pleadings.  

Defendant SweetWorks is a confectionary company organized under
Delaware law with its principal place of business in New York.  It
manufactures, markets and sells Sixlets, a chocolate candy product
sold across the country both at retail establishments and online.


On Dec. 29, 2017, the Plaintiff, a New York City resident,
purchased a 3.5 oz. box of Sixlets for $0.50 at a Kmart store in
Manhattan.  Sixlets are mass produced and packaged in a
non-transparent box of standardized size and composition, with a
standardized quantity of candy in each box.  Each Sixlets box also
contains slack-fill.  Slack-fill is the difference between the
actual capacity of a container and the volume of product contained
therein.  The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant manufactures,
markets and sells Sixlets with non-functional slack-fill which
serves no legitimate purpose, and misleads consumers about the
quantity of food they are purchasing.

Green brings the putative class action against SweetWorks, claiming
that the Defendant's packaging and marketing of its Sixlets candy
product is misleading.  The Plaintiff's First Amended Class Action
Complaint ("FAC") seeks injunctive relief under New York General
Business Law Section 349 (Count I), as well as damages for
violations of New York General Business Law Sections 349, 350, and
350-a(1) (Counts II and III) and common law fraud (Count IV).  She
contends that the Court has jurisdiction of the action pursuant to
the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA").

The Defendant moves, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(c), for judgment on the pleadings.  It argues that, because the
FAC states that the number of putative class members is "unknown,"
and because the Plaintiff and the Defendant are both citizens of
New York, the FAC fails to establish that the class is composed of
at least 100 members and that there is minimal diversity.  Next,
the Defendants contend that, even if the Plaintiff has satisfied
her burden to demonstrate subject matter jurisdiction, one of three
exceptions to CAFA jurisdiction "logically must apply."

Judge Swain holds that the Defendant proffers no argument or
evidence in support of its assertion that "at least one of the
exceptions to CAFA jurisdiction logically must apply," relying
primarily on its contention that the Plaintiff has failed to
establish minimal diversity.  In light of the dearth of evidentiary
support for the Defendant's argument, the Judge finds that the
Defendant has not met its burden of demonstrating that an exception
to CAFA jurisdiction applies.  Accordingly, she finds that it has
jurisdiction of the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)
and denies the Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings to
the extent that it seeks dismissal of the action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA.

The Defendant next argues that the Plaintiff lacks standing to seek
injunctive relief under New York General Business Law Section 349
and that the Court therefore lacks jurisdiction of her claims
insofar as she seeks injunctive relief.  The Judge holds that any
assertion that the Plaintiff intends to purchase Sixlets in the
future is belied by her own allegation that, had she known that the
Sixlets box contained non-functional slack-fill, she would not have
bought the Sixlets at the given price.  Lacking the ability to show
certainty of impending future injury, the Plaintiff cannot make the
showing required by Supreme Court and Second Circuit authority.
The Plaintiff has proffered no valid basis for variation of the
well-established requirements for standing.  Accordingly, the Judge
holds that the Plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive relief
under section 349 and Count I of the FAC is dismissed.

The Defendant also argues that the Plaintiff's claims under
sections 349, 350, and 350-a must be dismissed because (1) the FAC
fails to allege plausibly that the slack-fill contained in the
Larger Sixlets Box is non-functional and therefore misleading, and
(2) even if the slack-fill contained in Larger Sixlets Box is
nonfunctional, the Plaintiff cannot plead plausibly that the
packaging was materially misleading because the Larger Sixlets Box
clearly and accurately discloses the net weight and total product
count.

The Judge finds that because these physical differences bear on the
way in which each product must be packaged and handled, a simple
comparison between the empty space in a Milk Duds box and that
contained in a Sixlets box is insufficient to allege plausibly that
the slack-fill in the Sixlets box is non-functional.  The
Plaintiff's comparison of the Larger Sixlets Box with the Smaller
Sixlets Box is similarly insufficient to support a plausible
inference of non-functional slack-fill.  Even if, however, a
comparison to the Smaller Sixlets Box could be sufficient to
establish, at the pleading stage, that the Larger Sixlets Box
contains non-functional slack-fill, she finds that the Plaintiff's
section 349, 350 and 350-a claims must still be dismissed because
she has failed to allege plausibly that the Sixlets box is
materially misleading, as required under New York law.

And because the FAC does not allege plausibly that the slack-fill
contained in the Sixlets box is non-functional, or that the Larger
Sixlets Box is materially misleading to a reasonable consumer under
the circumstances, Counts II and III of the FAC are dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Finally, because the Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to
support plausibly an inference that the Larger Sixlets Box
packaging was materially misleading as to the quantity of Sixlets
candies in the box she purchased and, given the content disclosures
on the box, she cannot establish that she reasonably relied on any
quantity impression derived solely from the size of the box, her
common law fraud claim must also be dismissed for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Swain denied the Defendant's
motion for judgment on the pleadings to the extent that it seeks
dismissal of all of the Plaintiff's claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under CAFA.  She granted it to the extent that
it seeks dismissal of the Plaintiff's injunctive relief claim for
lack of standing and the Plaintiff's remaining causes of action for
failure to state a claim.  The Judge dismissed the First Amended
Class Action Complaint, and the Clerk of Court is directed to enter
judgment accordingly and to close the case.  The Memorandum Opinion
and Order resolves docket entry no. 31.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 21, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/r9q0Ir from Leagle.com.

Dominique Green, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Anne Melissa Seelig, Lee
Litigation Group, PLLC, William Michael Brown, Lee Litigation
Group, PLLC & C.K. Lee -- cklee@leelitigation.com -- Lee Litigation
Group, PLLC.

Sweetworks Confections, LLC, Defendant, represented by Daniel
Eduardo Guzman -- dguzman@harrisbeach.com -- Harris Beach PLLC &
Philip G. Spellane -- pspellane@harrisbeach.com -- Harris Beach
PLLC.


TEXAS: Court Refuses to Appoint Attorney in Rogers Inmate Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas,
San Antonio Division, issued an Order denying Order denying
Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Attorney in the case captioned AARON
MICHAEL ROGERS, #2268676, Plaintiff, v. KERR COUNTY SHERIFF W.R.
"RUSTY" HIERHOLZER, and SYLVIA FORAKER, Defendants. Civil No.
SA-19-CV-724-DAE(ESC). (W.D. Tex.).

The record reflects that Plaintiff filed his pro se Complaint and
moved to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) in this action.   

The Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause within twenty-one days
why his Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
non-frivolous claim. Plaintiff subsequently advised the Court of
his change of address and on September 4, 2019, the Order to Show
Cause was re mailed to Plaintiff's new address. Plaintiff's
response is due on or before September 25, 2019.

Plaintiff now asks the Court to appoint him counsel to represent
him in this action which he describes as a class action.

The Court will deny the motion. Courts may appoint counsel pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(1) in IFP proceedings. However, there
is no automatic right to the appointment of counsel in a civil
lawsuit. Rather, a district court has discretion to appoint counsel
based on the type and complexity of the case presented and the
abilities of the individual pursuing it. Appointment of counsel in
a civil case is considered a privilege, not a constitutional right,
and should be allowed only in exceptional circumstances.
  
In this case, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the prerequisites
for a class action exist and further, as a pro se, Plaintiff may
not proceed as a class representative. Nor has Plaintiff
demonstrated either that exceptional circumstances are present in
his case or that, based on the record, appointment of counsel is
appropriate under the applicable legal standards under 28 U.S.C.
Section 1915(e).

Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Attorney is DENIED.

Plaintiff's response to this Court's Order to Show Cause is due on
or before September 25, 2019. If Plaintiff fails to comply with the
Show Cause Order, his Complaint can also be dismissed for failure
to prosecute and failure to comply with this Order.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 19, 2019 Order
is available at  https://tinyurl.com/y6qr9ut6 from Leagle.com.

Aaron Michael Rogers, Plaintiff, pro se.


TEXAS: Inmates Sue Over Lack of Hepatitis C Drug
------------------------------------------------
Gabrielle Banks and Keri Blakinger, writing for Houston Chronicle,
reports that a federal lawsuit filed Sept. 19, 2019, says the Texas
prison system is "callously" denying thousands of inmates access to
a costly hepatitis C medicine that is widely considered the
standard of care, potentially exposing them to liver damage and
other health complications.

At least 18,000 inmates in the state's 104 facilities have been
diagnosed with the chronic virus. And up to 30 percent of Texas'
roughly 148,000 inmates may be infected--a similar rate to prisons
across the nation.

Failure to treat incarcerated patients as well as their peers in
the outside world amounts to "cruel and unusual punishment," and
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need and the policy
violates the Eighth Amendment and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, according to the class-action lawsuit filed in Corpus
Christi.

Inmates in at least a dozen states have filed similar lawsuits, and
litigants in Massachusetts, Minnesota, California, Colorado and
Pennsylvania settled and now have access to the costly and highly
effective medication sought by Texas prisoners. Louisiana officials
made an agreement with the drugmaker to get preferential pricing
for the hepatitis C drug so that they can treat everyone, according
to the class action lawyers.

Attorney Jeff Edwards, Esq. whose Austin firm filed the lawsuit on
behalf of a McConnell Unit inmate, said he is aware of at least one
instance a few years ago in which a prisoner's request for the
medication was denied. Weeks after his release, the man died of
liver cancer, which his doctors suggested was a result of hepatitis
C.

"The state has a duty to provide access to adequate medical care to
its inmates," Edwards said. "Instead, they're violating sick
people's rights by rationing medical care and not providing
medicine that will cure a disease."

"This case is about basic human rights--when you go to prison, you
don't give up your right to medical care," he said.

The lawsuit specifically targets Lannette Linthicum, the medical
director for TDCJ; Owen Murray, director of Correctional Managed
Healthcare at UTMB; and eight members of the Correctional Managed
Healthcare Committee. TDCJ is aware of the lawsuit and it is
currently being reviewed by the agency, an agency official said.
Kurt Koopman, spokesman for UTMB, said he could not comment on
pending litigation.

The bloodborne virus, transmitted through shared syringes, razors,
toothbrushes or tattoo needles, is prevalent in prison, and
end-stage liver disease, often from hepatitis, is the third leading
cause of death in the Texas prison system, according to a prison
medical official.

Officials noted an increase in the amount of money spent on
hepatitis C treatment at the last board meeting of the prison
health care program. It accounted for 22 percent of $54 million in
total drug costs in the first three quarters of fiscal year 2019.
But despite the expense, Dr. Melanie Roberts, a pharmacist with
UTMB who spoke about TDCJ's treatment, explained last year that
medication can still represent a long-term cost savings when
compared to the expense of treating end-stage liver disease. As of
May 2018, nearly 1,200 prisoners were battling the end stage of the
disease.

The standard of care for hepatitis C is Direct-Acting Antiviral
medication, or DAA, a course of pills known to cure more than 90
percent of patients. Yet the lawsuit alleges that the prison health
care system prescribes the drug only to patients who already have
liver damage.

Murray, the head of the managed care program for inmates, testified
before the Texas Legislature on May 29, 2014 that DAA is highly
effective at curing hepatitis C and noted that every state prison
struggles with this issue. Murray explained in a back-and-forth
with then-Rep. Sylvester Turner and a committee of his colleagues
that it can cost $750 to $1,000 per pill for treatment, which lasts
about 12 weeks.

"Its cure rate is anywhere from 92 to 100 percent," Murray told
lawmakers, "but the problem is in our cost system, it would run
$63,000 per treatment."

While the costs of these medications have dropped since 2014,
they're still in the tens of thousands of dollars.

"It's a huge problem and a large population, and a huge cost," said
Sen. John Whitmire, a Houston Democrat who chairs the senate's
Criminal Justice Committee. "There is a treatment but the
legislature hasn't sufficiently funded it."

Dr. F. Blaine Hollinger, director of the Eugene B. Casey Hepatitis
Research Center at Baylor College of Medicine and former chairman
of the FDA's Blood Products Advisory Committee, said DAA should be
prescribed regardless of how advanced the disease is.

Most people infected with hepatitis C can be asymptomatic for
decades, but 25 to 40 percent eventually progress to cirrhosis,
which can lead to liver cancer, Hollinger said. If a liver
transplant or specific antiviral therapy is not provided, they will
eventually die of their disease, he said.

Patients who don't get the medication are also at an increased risk
of contracting diabetes, leukemia, lymphoma, skin conditions and
kidney disease, according to Hollinger.

"If you've got a person who has hepatitis C regardless of where
they are, you should attempt to treat them," Hollinger said. "You
make that decision without thinking of cost--cost should not be a
factor in deciding."

"If you have a treatment that's available that can cure somebody,
it's important that they all be cured," he said.

The Texas prison system has a long history of troubles with medical
care. In 1973, J.W. Gamble sued the prison system after a 600-pound
bale of hay fell on him at a prison textile mill. The Huntsville
inmate was injured and later alleged that the system offered him
inadequate medical care and then punished him for refusing to work.
The case ended in a landmark 1976 Supreme Court ruling that
"deliberate indifference" to a prisoner's serious medical needs
counts as "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.

Since then, allegations of subpar medical care remain a perennial
complaint among prisoners, including a lack of access to dentures
and concerns about sweltering conditions in prisons without air
conditioning. Over the past year, roughly a dozen prisoners wrote
the Houston Chronicle with complaints about the inability to get
treatment for hepatitis. Some sent medical records or grievances,
while others simply detailed their medical struggles in handwritten
letters.

"With all the advancements they have made in the treatment of
hepatitis C, it's a shame that these treatments are not widely
available to those who are inside TDCJ," said Jennifer Erschabek,
executive director of Texas Inmate Families Association. The
organization, which advocates for prisoner rights and monitors
prison conditions, fields hundreds of letters per year from inmates
across the state. The inability to get treatment is a "common
complaint" among those who have hepatitis C, Erschabek said.

One man said doctors had been telling him he was on "the top" of
the treatment list for more than six years--but he still hadn't
managed to received care.

"The long and short of it is I feel they will end up killing me in
there," he wrote. "If I was in the world I'd (have) been treated
6.5 years ago."

Others echoed his concerns. Some said they'd likely gotten the
disease before their incarceration, while others admitted it may
have come from unsanitary prison tattoos.

"The doctor I see told me there (was) nothing she can do," a
prisoner on the Polunsky Unit wrote, attaching test results to a
letter. "One of the main problems is that we're uneducated in
medical matters. I am enclosing some of the results of my blood
work I had done, or let me say the standard protocol and all they
do for me. This is it. This is all the treatment I get for Hep-C.
Just blood work, and they tell me the results."

Lawyers in the class action say this is typical--that just because
patients may have scarring on their liver, it doesn't mean UTMB
doctors have cleared them for the DAA medication.

According to the most recent data, 977 prisoners were diagnosed
with hepatitis C in the first five months of 2019. That's down
slightly from the 1,156 recorded in the first five months of 2018.
Those numbers don't necessarily represent new diagnoses, but rather
the first time a prisoner has tested positive after entering the
system. It's not clear how many of the prisoners were infected
before prison and how many after they arrived at TDCJ.

The Texas prison population has a higher incidence of hepatitis C
than the general population, according to prison medical officials.
Last year at a meeting of the Correctional Managed Healthcare
Committee--which oversees prison medical care--Roberts, the UTMB
pharmacist, explained that about 1.5 percent of the general
population has hepatitis C, while as much as 12.9 percent of the
prison population is infected. [GN]



TORRANCE REFINERY: Judge Weighs Class Certification
---------------------------------------------------
Martin Macias Jr, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that
an attorney for residents affected by a 2015 oil refinery explosion
in LA County told a federal judge Sept. 22, 2019, that proceeding
under a class action provides the best remedy for property owners.

A gasoline processing machine at an oil refinery in Torrance, a
coastal city in southwest LA County, exploded on Feb. 18, 2015,
sending chemical-laden ash and fumes towards homes surrounding the
facility.

During the explosion, a piece of damaged machinery landed near a
tank of toxic hydrofluoric acid, a substance which, if exposed to
oxygen, could have had a deadly impact on the more than 300,000
residents in surrounding communities, according to a report by the
U.S. Chemical Safety Board.

Residents near the Torrance Refinery -- owned previously by
Exxon-Mobil -- alleged environmental negligence in a 2017 class
action lawsuit, claiming the company knowingly operated the
refinery under inadequate safety standards.

Substandard safety protocols and shoddy repair work created the
conditions for the 2015 explosion, the complaint said, adding that
new owners PBF Energy have only continued the negligent behavior,
exposing residents to harmful chemicals.

Lead plaintiff Arnold Goldstein said he was walking outside and
exposed to chemical ash during the explosion, leading to breathing
problems and a later diagnosis of asthma.

U.S District Judge Dale Fischer denied class certification in
April, writing in her order that residents failed to adequately
state which claims they want certified for each subclass and what
relief each subclass seeks.

Fischer held that plaintiffs failed to meet their numerosity,
adequacy and commonality requirements for all subclasses.

In a hearing last September 22 on the plaintiffs’ renewed class
certification motion, residents’ attorney Matthew Edling, Esq.
told Fischer that class certification would allow for proper
analysis of which residents are affected by the plume, or
concentration of hydrocarbons in the soil.

"There’s not much debate that there’s a plume," Edling told
Fischer. "We’re saying the plume is much larger and we need to
find out who was impacted and how much."

A subclass of residents whose soil may not be impacted but whose
air was exposed to toxins would benefit from having defined
"emission zones," Edling said.

Michael Finnegan, Esq. -- mfinnegan@pillsburylaw.com -- an attorney
for PBF Energy Company and Torrance Refining Company, told Fischer
that he objects to the "soil subclass" representatives since some
residents require passive remediation of contaminated soil while
others seek more rigorous action.

That residents allege lost use of their property in their complaint
creates a confusing paradigm since they define their class members
as having elevated health risks, said Finnegan, an attorney with
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman.

Finnegan argued that resolving property claims through individual
lawsuits would be more suitable since the parties’ experts have
submitted conflicting evidence regarding contamination levels in
the area surrounding the refinery.

"The testing results are variable and inconsistent," Finnegan said.
"Testing must be done on a property-by-property basis."

Fischer told both parties that the renewed motion for class
certification is under submission but did not indicate when she
would issue a ruling.

Exxon-Mobil is represented by Dawn Sestito, Esq. --
dsestito@omm.com -- with O’Melveny and Myers.

TRULIEVE INC: Lyttle Sues Over Privacy Rights Breach Under FCRA
---------------------------------------------------------------
LOGAN LYTTLE, on his own behalf and on behalf of all similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff v. TRULIEVE, INC., a Florida Profit
Corporation, and PERSONAL SECURITY CONCEPTS, LLC, a Florida Limited
Liability Company, Defendants, Case No. 8:19-cv-02313 (M.D. Fla.,
Sept. 17, 2019), accuses the Defendants, including subsidiaries,
divisions and affiliates, of violating the Fair Credit Reporting
Act of 1970.

The Plaintiff says he intends to hold the Defendants accountable
for violating his federally protected privacy rights and failing to
provide him with information and notice to which he was entitled
pursuant to the FCRA.

Trulieve violated the FCRA by procuring consumer reports on
Plaintiff and other putative class members for employment purposes,
without first providing a clear and conspicuous disclosure--in a
document that consists solely of the disclosure--that it may obtain
a consumer report on them for employment purposes, before obtaining
a copy of their consumer report; by obtaining consumer reports on
the Plaintiff and other putative class members without their
written authorization; by taking adverse employment action against
Plaintiff and other putative class members without first providing
Plaintiff and other affected class members with pre-adverse action
notice, a copy of their consumer report, and a summary of their
FCRA rights, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a consumer/applicant, who was the subject of a
consumer report used for employment purposes by Defendant Trulieve,
Inc.

Trulieve routinely obtains and uses information in consumer reports
to conduct background checks on prospective employees and existing
employees, and frequently relies on such information, in whole or
in part, as a basis for adverse employment actions, including
denial of employment and terminations.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Marc R. Edelman, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          201 N. Franklin Street, Suite 700
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: 813-223-5505
          Facsimile: 813-257-0572
          E-mail: MEdelman@forthepeople.com


ULTA SALON: $3.4MM Settlement in Wise Labor Suit Has Prelim OK
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ELIZABETH WISE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ULTA SALON,
COSMETICS & FRAGRANCE, INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:17-cv-00853-DAD-EPG (E.D. Cal.), Judge Dale E. Drozd of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of California granted the
Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for preliminary approval of a class
action settlement.

Prior to the amendment of its practices in August 2018, Defendant
ULTA's non-exempt California salon professionals were paid in
accordance with its Path to Abundance Salon Commission Plan
Document ("PTA").  Under the PTA, salon professionals were paid the
greater of either their earned commissions or their hourly rate
multiplied by the number of hours worked.  Salon professionals'
commissions were calculated by multiplying the value of the salon
services performed in a given week by the applicable commission
percentage.  In addition to providing salon services such as "cuts
and colors," which increased their commission, salon professionals
were required to perform tasks that did not increase their
commission.

The Plaintiffs contend that ULTA failed to provide rest breaks, to
pay separately and hourly for rest breaks and non-productive time,
and to pay overtime and penalties for non-compliant meal and rest
breaks at the correct rate.  According to them, based on these
alleged violations, ULTA also failed to provide accurate itemized
wage statements to salon professionals and to pay all wages due and
owed at the end of their employment.  They further contend that
these violations constitute unfair business practices and subject
ULTA to civil penalties and injunctive relief under the Private
Attorneys General Act ("PAGA").

Plaintiff Wise filed the class action on June 23, 2017, asserting
causes of action for: (1) failure to provide paid rest periods; (2)
failure to pay separately and hourly for rest and recovery periods
and other non-productive time; (3) failure to pay premiums for
non-compliant meal and break periods at the correct rate; (4)
failure to pay overtime at the correct rate; (5) failure to provide
accurate itemized wage statements; and (6) violation of Business
and Professions Code Section 17200.  On Nov. 22, 2017, Plaintiff
Wise filed a first amended complaint adding claims for failure to
pay all wages due upon termination of employment and for civil
penalties pursuant to the PAGA.

Plaintiff Zepeda filed a separate class action in Orange County
Superior Court on Nov. 13, 2017.  Therein, Plaintiff Zepeda
asserted causes of action for: (1) failure to provide accurate
itemized wage statements; (2) failure to pay overtime at the
correct rate; (3) failure to timely pay wages; and (4) violation of
Business and Professions Code Section 17200.   Plaintiff Zepeda's
case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California on Dec. 14, 2017, and was transferred to the
Eastern District of California on June 4, 2018.  On Aug. 8, 2018,
Plaintiff Zepeda's case was consolidated with Plaintiff Wise's
action.

On Jan. 24, 2019, the parties participated in a second mediation
with mediator Steven Serratore.  On Feb. 4, 2019, mediator
Serratore provided the parties with a detailed mediator's proposal.
On Feb. 7, 2019, both parties accepted that proposal.  On May 14,
2019, the parties executed the settlement agreement currently
before the Court.

Pursuant to the proposed settlement agreement, the Plaintiffs seek
to certify a class of all current and former non-exempt California
ULTA Salon Professionals who earned commissions, non-discretionary
bonuses and/or additional hourly compensation under the Defendant's
Path to Abundance Salon Commission Plan Document during at least
one pay period between Dec. 30, 2016 and Aug. 25, 2018."  

Through the settlement class, the Plaintiffs seek to recover for
all claims for failure to provide rest periods, failure to pay
separately and hourly for rest and recovery periods and other
non-productive time, failure to pay premiums for non-compliant meal
and rest periods at the correct rate, failure to pay overtime,
failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, as well as
for failure to pay all wages due and owed at the termination of
employment.

Under the proposed settlement, the Defendant would pay a maximum
settlement amount of $3.4 million.  The agreement provides for the
following allocation of that amount: (i) $16,000 for the fees and
costs of the Settlement Administrator; (ii) a payment to the LWDA
in the amount of $56,250 as its share of the settlement for civil
penalties pursuant to the PAGA; (iii) $20,000 in service payments
to plaintiffs, with each receiving $10,000; (iv) $60,000 to be paid
to class counsel for reasonable costs; (v) attorney's fees of
$1,133,333.33 (one-third of the settlement amount); and (vi) the
remaining net settlement amount of $2,114,416.67 to be distributed
to class members

The net settlement amount will be distributed to the class members
based on the number of pay periods during which each class member
earned commission, non-discretionary bonuses and/or additional
hourly compensation under the Defendant's Path to Abundance Plan
Document during the class period.   No submission of a claim form
will be required for the participating class members to receive
their settlement shares.

The proposed settlement also provides that the settlement amount is
non-reversionary.  Any funds associated with checks that have not
been cashed after the expiration of 180 days will be redistributed
to the cy pres beneficiaries, Court Appointed Special Advocates for
Children of San Joaquin and Court Appointed Special Advocates for
Children of Los Angeles.  Each designated beneficiary will receive
fifty percent of the uncashed funds.

The Plaintiffs seek an order from the Court: (1) preliminarily
certifying the class for purposes of settlement, with appointment
of the Plaintiff as the class representatives, appointment of the
Plaintiffs' counsel as the class counsel, and approval of
Simpluris, Inc. as the settlement administrator; (ii) preliminarily
approving the settlement agreement; (iii) approving the proposed
form and method of notice to be disseminated to the class; and (iv)
scheduling the hearing date for the final approval of the class
settlement.

Judge Drozd granted the Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary approval
of class action settlement.  The preliminary class certification
under Rule 23 is approved.  He appointed (i) the Plaintiffs'
counsel, Mayall Hurley P.C., Polaris Law Group, LLP, Law Offices of
Choi & Associates, and Hyun Legal, APC as the class counsel; (ii)
the named Plaintiffs, Elizabeth Wise and Julie Zepeda, as the class
representatives; and (iii) Simpluris, Inc. as the claims
administrator.

The Judge approved the proposed notice as it conforms with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  The proposed settlement detailed is
approved on a preliminary basis as fair and adequate/

The hearing for final approval of the proposed settlement is set
for Dec. 17, 2019 at 9:30 a.m.  The motion for final approval of
class action settlement must be filed at least 28 days in advance
of the final approval hearing, in accordance with Local Rule 230.

The Plaintiffs' proposed settlement implementation schedule is
adopted.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 21, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/gyYwin from Leagle.com.

Elizabeth Wise, Plaintiff, represented by John Paul Briscoe --
jbriscoe@mayallaw.com -- Mayall Hurley, PC, Nicholas John
Scardigli
-- sscardigli@mayallaw.com -- Mayall Hurley, PC, Robert Joshua
Wasserman -- rwasserman@mayallaw.com -- Mayall Hurley, PC, William
J. Gorham, III -- wgorham@mayallaw.com -- Mayall Hurley, PC &
Vladimir Joseph Kozina -- jkozinaj@mayallaw.com -- Mayall Hurley
P.C.

Julie Zepeda, Plaintiff, represented by Dennis Hyun --
info@hyunlegal.com -- Hyun Legal, APC, Edward Wonkyu Choi --
dward.choi@choiandassociates.com -- Law Offices of Choi &
Associates & William Lucas Marder -- bill@polarislawgroup.com --
Polaris Law Group, LLP.

Ulta Salon, Cosmetics & Fragrance, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Courtney Marguerite Osborn -- cosborn@littler.com -- Littler
Mendelson PC, John C. Kloosterman -- Jkloosterman@littler.com --
Littler Mendelson, P.C., Kai-Ching Cha -- kcha@littler.com --
Littler Mendelson, P.C., Alexis A. Sohrakoff -- asohra@uber.com --
Littler Mendelson PC, Julie A. Stockton -- jstockton@littler.com
--
Littler Mendelson P.C. & Richard H. Rahm -- rrahm@littler.com --
Littler Mendelson, P.C..


UMBERTOS OF HALLANDALE: Vazquez Seeks Overtime Pay
--------------------------------------------------
PABLO ANTONIO VAZQUEZ, and other similarly situated individuals,
the Plaintiff, v. UMBERTOS OF HALLANDALE, INC. d/b/a UMBERTO'S
RESTAURANT & PIZZERIA; PIZZA MANIAC, INC. d/b/a Umberto's of
Pompano; and JOSEPH CORTEO, the Defendants, Case No.
0:19-cv-62281-RAR (S.D. Fla., Sept. 13, 2019), seeks to recover
money damages for unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendants from approximately Jan. 15,
2003 to Aug. 11, 2019. In total, the Plaintiff worked approximately
152 compensable weeks under the Act, or 152 compensable weeks if we
count 3 years back from the filing of the instant action.

However, the Defendant did not properly compensate Plaintiff for
hours that Plaintiff worked in excess of 40 per week, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          R. Martin Saenz, Esq.
          SAENZ & ANDERSON, PLLC
          E-mail: msaenz@saenzanderson.com
          20900 NE 30 th Avenue, Ste. 800
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (305) 503-5131
          Facsimile: (888) 270-5549

UNITED INSURANCE: Court Narrows Claims on Insurance Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia, Savannah Division, issued an Order granting in part and
denying in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned
MINERVA BARRETT, executrix of the estate of Chester Barrett, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. UNITED
INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, INC., Defendant. Civil Action No.
4:17-cv-215. (S.D.N.Y.).

The thrust of Plaintiff's claims is that United used racially
discriminatory practices in selling life insurance policies to Mr.
Barrett and other African-Americans. Specifically, she contends
that United charged Mr. Barrett a higher premium for the policy
than United charged white customers and sold him an inferior
product than those available to white customers. This matter is
before the Court on United's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must accept the
allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. A complaint must state a facially
plausible claim for relief, and a claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.

United's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Claims for Lack of Standing

United contends that though Plaintiff alleges a laundry list of
illegal practices committed by United, she fails to plausibly
allege that Mr. Barrett suffered any injuries from many of the
practices on that list. Without an injury in fact, United
maintains, Plaintiff has no standing to complain of those
practices. United argues that Plaintiff only has standing to assert
two claims: (1) that Mr. Barrett paid discriminatory premiums and
(2) that he paid premiums that exceeded the face amount of his
policy.  

There are at least three distinct forms of standing: taxpayer
standing, individual standing, and organizational standing. To
establish standing under any of these forms a plaintiff must
satisfy three requirements: (1) injury-in-fact (2) a causal
connection between the asserted injury-in-fact and the challenged
action of the defendant and (3) that the injury will be redressed
by a favorable decision.

The Court agrees that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges some
practices that United employed generally without any allegation
that these practices affected Mr. Barrett. Specifically, there are
three areas of alleged wrongdoing discussed below that appear to
have not caused Mr. Barrett any injury. Because Plaintiff has not
alleged that Mr. Barrett suffered a concrete and particularized
injury in a personal and individual way from these practices, she
has no standing to complain of these practices.

First, Plaintiff alleges that United encouraged and trained its
agents to, in the event of lapse, persuade its customers to
purchase new policies to replace lapsed Policies rather than to
reinstate the lapsed policies, which had remaining cash value. The
remaining cash value was forfeited to United. She also contends
that United willfully, intentionally, deceptively and wrongfully
caused or encouraged the lapse of many Policies.

However, Plaintiff makes no allegation that Mr. Barrett's policy
ever lapsed or that this alleged practice ever affected him in any
way. Further, there is no allegation that he ever forfeited any
cash value to United. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to establish any
injury in fact as to United's practices regarding lapsed policies.

Likewise, Plaintiff alleges that United engaged in defective
record-keeping practices and that United also failed to establish
record-keeping systems or policies and procedures to effectively
administer the Policies. She contends that, as a result,
policyholders and their beneficiaries are not likely to discover
that their premiums had been misapplied or converted, or that their
debit life policies had lapsed or that policy death benefits were
due to them.

However, she has not alleged that Mr. Barrett was harmed by
United's flawed record keeping. She does not allege that his
premiums were misapplied or converted, that his policy lapsed, or
that his beneficiary was not paid any death benefits. Thus, even if
United mishandled the records of Mr. Barrett's policy, Plaintiff
has not alleged any economic damage or other injury as a result of
that mishandling, and, thus, she lacks standing to complain about
United's record-keeping practices.

Additionally, Plaintiff contends that United has failed to pay all
of the insurance proceeds to the beneficiaries of insureds after
they had received notice of the death of the insured. In other
instances, United failed to notice owners of insurance proceeds who
were entitled to notice pursuant to the laws of the states which
have adopted unclaimed property acts.

Once again, Plaintiff does not tie this generalized allegation to
Mr. Barrett. There is no indication whatsoever in her Amended
Complaint that any beneficiary of Mr. Barrett has been deprived of
any payment or other benefit due to them under the Policy. Thus,
Plaintiff also lacks standing to bring claims based on these
practices.

However, United reads the remainder of Plaintiff's claims too
narrowly. For example, United argues that Plaintiff alleges that
United purposefully designed and sold inferior insurance products
to African-Americans, but she does not allege any facts showing
that United refused to offer Mr. Barrett products that were being
offered to similarly situated Caucasians.  Plaintiff claims that
Mr. Barrett was an African-American customer of United and that
United prohibited its agents from selling African-American
customers ordinary life insurance products that it sold to
Caucasians.  

Plaintiff makes numerous allegations of how the policies sold to
African Americans, including Mr. Barrett's policy, were inferior to
the traditional policies that were sold to Caucasians. She further
contends that this practice was motivated by United's
discrimination against African Americans, including Mr. Barrett.
Thus, Plaintiff contends, this practice caused Mr. Barrett to
suffer a violation of his Constitutional rights as well as economic
damages for which she seeks economic redress.

Taking these allegations together, Plaintiff plausibly asserts that
Mr. Barrett suffered an actual, personal, and concrete injury that
was caused by United's practice of only offering inferior life
insurance products to its African-American customers and that this
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision in this case.
Consequently, Plaintiff has standing to assert claims based on that
practice and others outlined in the Amended Complaint.

The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART United's Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff's claims for lack of standing. The Court GRANTS
this portion of United's Motion as to Plaintiff's claims that
United failed to keep accurate records, allowed policies to lapse,
and failed to pay death benefits,3 but DENIES this portion of
United's Motion as to all other claims.

United's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Claims for Untimeliness

United argues that all of Plaintiff's claims are untimely. It
contends that the longest potential limitations period for
Plaintiff's claims is six years, and that the limitations period
began to run on those claims on the date that United issued Mr.
Barrett's policy, December 18, 1984.

United further contends that the Amended Complaint does not allege
any facts that would warrant tolling of the statue of limitations.
Additionally, United argues that Plaintiff cannot plausibly allege
that Mr. Barrett could not have discovered his causes of action
through reasonable diligence.  

In response to United's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff does not
dispute the applicable statutes of limitation as to each of her
claims or that those statutes would have ordinarily run before the
commencement of this lawsuit. Plaintiff states her position on
these points as follows:

It is not worth disputing the applicable statutes of limitations on
each of Plaintiff's claims, as they would have clearly run absent
United's concealment. Georgia courts have long held that the
statute of limitation in a contract dispute begins to run on the
date that suit on the claim can first be brought.  Under normal
circumstances, Plaintiff's claim would have expired in December of
1990.

The parties agree on the applicable statutes of limitations and do
not dispute that each limitations period would have ordinarily
commenced upon the issuance of Mr. Barrett's insurance policy. In
other words, as Plaintiff admits that her claims are time-barred
absent fraudulent concealment, the only question for the Court is
whether the amended complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish
the elements of fraudulent concealment.

Therefore, the Court limits its substantive discussion to this
issue. For reasons explained below, the Court finds that Plaintiff
has plausibly alleged fraudulent concealment to toll the statute of
limitations for the bulk of her claims. However, the Court finds
that she has not sufficiently alleged fraudulent concealment as to
any claims based solely on the fact that Mr. Barrett made premium
payments in excess of his policy value.

Thus, the Court dismisses as untimely any claim based on that fact
alone.

Choice of Law as to Fraudulent Concealment

The parties give short shrift to the issue of which law federal or
state applies to their tolling by fraudulent concealment arguments.
They cite both federal and state law interchangeably with no
discussion as to which should apply. Though the parties gloss over
this choice of law issue, given the importance of that choice to
the Court's decision, it's worthwhile to explain that Georgia law
controls the question of tolling as to all of Plaintiff's claims.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that United discriminated against Mr.
Barrett on account of his race in the formation of his contract by
selling him an inferior and more expensive insurance policy than
the insurance policies United sold to Caucasians. As explained
above, while Plaintiff also generally alleges that United committed
other discriminatory acts after the formation of contracts, such as
failing to pay death benefits to the beneficiaries of
African-American policy holders, she does not have standing to
pursue those claims because she does not allege that Mr. Barrett
suffered any injuries due to those acts.

Accordingly, her claims of racial discrimination pertain to the
formation of the insurance contract between Mr. Barrett and United.
These claims would have been cognizable prior to the 1991 amendment
to Section 1981. Thus, Georgia's two-year statute of limitations
for personal injury torts as well as its rules for tolling the
limitations period apply to Plaintiff's Section 1981 claims.

The Court will apply Georgia's law regarding fraudulent concealment
when assessing the timeliness of not only Plaintiff's state claims
but also her federal claims.

Fraudulent Concealment Under Georgia Law

Under Georgia law, if the defendant or those under whom he claims
are guilty of a fraud by which the plaintiff has been debarred or
deterred from bringing an action, the period of limitation shall
run only from the time of the plaintiff's discovery of the fraud.

To establish fraudulent concealment under this statute sufficient
to toll the statute of limitation, a plaintiff must prove that: (1)
the defendant committed actual fraud involving moral turpitude, (2)
the fraud concealed the cause of action from the plaintiff and (3)
the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence to discover his cause
of action despite his failure to do so within the applicable
statute of limitation.

Pleading Requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires allegations of fraud
to be stated with particularity. This requirement applies not only
to claims of fraud, but also to allegations of fraudulent
concealment of claims. In Brooks v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1371 (11th Cir. 1997), the Eleventh
Circuit explained that a complaint must plead four things to
satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b): (1) the precise statements
or omissions made by the defendant (2) the time and place of each
such statement and the person responsible for the statement (3) the
content of the statements and the manner in which they misled the
plaintiff and (4) what the defendant obtained as a result of the
fraud. However, alternative means are also available to satisfy the
rule.

Whether Plaintiff Plausibly Alleges Fraudulent Concealment

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint lists some generalized and conclusory
allegations regarding United's fraudulent concealment. However,
Plaintiff also specifically describes the nature and subject of
United's fraudulent statements and makes allegations regarding the
timing and circumstances of those statements. For instance,
Plaintiff contends that United's agents and representatives took
the following specific actions which constitute actual fraud that
concealed United's discrimination from Mr. Barrett.

This Court reaches the same conclusions when looking at the
totality of Plaintiff's allegations. Plaintiff has plausibly
alleged that United's representatives actively concealed from Mr.
Barrett the unlawful discrimination underlying his life insurance
policy at the time United sold the policy to him. For one, like the
insurer in Moore, United designated rates for African Americans as
standard or substandard as opposed to preferred for whites. Through
this labelling, United effectively disguised from Mr. Barrett the
racially discriminatory nature of those rates.

Moreover, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that United's
representatives knew the falsity of these misrepresentations at the
time they made them to Mr. Barrett. United's deceptive sales pitch
to Mr. Barrett was part of a nationwide scheme through which United
targeted low income, unsophisticated and minority segments of the
population, especially in the Southeastern United States, including
Chester Barrett, and developed insurance products for sale to these
consumers.

In other words, when the Amended Complaint is taken as a whole,
Plaintiff plausibly alleges that United's agents knew the
unlawfulness underlying Mr. Barrett's policy. They knew that his
insurance policy was inferior and that his premium rates were
higher than those of United's Caucasian customers. Despite their
knowledge, these agents made representations to Mr. Barrett, at the
time they sold the policy to him and when collecting premiums from
him, that actively concealed that unlawfulness. This active
deception is the gravamen of Plaintiff's right of action, and,
under Georgia law, the mere silence of United is treated as a
continuation of the original fraud and as constituting a fraudulent
concealment, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run
against such right of action until such fraud is discovered, or
could have been discovered by the exercise of ordinary care and
diligence.

The Court rejects United's arguments that the entirety of
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint must be dismissed for noncompliance
with the statutes of limitations. However, the Court recognizes
that discovery in this case may produce additional evidence that
could support United's contentions of untimeliness.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES United's motion to dismiss the
entirety of Plaintiff's claims for failure to comply with the
statutes of limitations WITHOUT PREJUDICE. If supported by the
undisputed material facts, United may again raise its timeliness
arguments at the motion for summary judgment stage. However, for
the reasons stated below, the Court finds that any claims based
solely on the fact that Mr. Barrett paid more in premiums than the
face amount of his policy are untimely.

Untimeliness of Claims that Mr. Barrett's Premium Payments Exceeded
Face Amount of his Policy

Throughout Plaintiff's pleadings, she emphasizes that Mr. Barrett
paid $14,649.05 in premiums for a policy with a death benefit of
$5,000. It is not clear if Plaintiff is asserting a claim based on
the mere fact that Mr. Barrett paid more in premiums than his
policy is worth. However, even if this allegation alone could
independently support a cause of action, that claim would be
untimely.

Again, as to all her claims, Plaintiff concedes that, absent
fraudulent concealment, her claims are barred by the statute of
limitations. However, unlike with the discrimination underlying Mr.
Barrett's policy, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege
fraudulent concealment as to the mere amount of Mr. Barrett's
premium payments or the face value of his policy.

To the extent that Plaintiff asserts an independent cause of action
based solely on the fact that Mr. Barrett paid premiums to United
that exceeded the amount of his life insurance policy, the Court
GRANTS United's Motion to Dismiss that claim as untimely.

United's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's State Law Claims for Failure
to State a Claim

United does not attack the substantive plausibility of Plaintiff's
federal civil rights claims in its Motion to Dismiss. However, it
does argue that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's state law
claims for failure to state a claim.  

Breach of Contract

Plaintiff does not oppose United's Motion to Dismiss her claim for
breach of contract. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS United's motion
as to this claim and DISMISSES Plaintiff's claim for breach of
contract.

Money Had and Received

United argues that Plaintiff's claim for money had and received
must be dismissed because that theory is available only when no
enforceable contract exists between the parties. Plaintiff opposes
this motion and argues that there is a question of public policy as
to whether the contract was ever enforceable, and whether Plaintiff
is entitled to equitable relief for premiums paid.

Nonetheless, for the reasons explained herein, Plaintiff's Section
1981, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent inducement claims
survive United's Motion to Dismiss. The parties have not addressed
what effect those claims and the factual allegations underlying
them have on Plaintiff's claim for money had and received. For
instance, the parties have not addressed whether fraud and
discrimination underlying the parties' transaction would void the
contract between United and Mr. Barrett, much less cited applicable
authority on that question.

Given the uncertainty produced by this dearth of argument and
authority, the Court DENIES United's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's
claim for money had and received.

Negligent Misrepresentation and Fraudulent Inducement

United's arguments for dismissal of Plaintiff's negligent
misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement claims largely mirror
its arguments against fraudulent concealment. It claims that
Plaintiff's claims do not satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule
9(b), that United's agents' statements were mere puffery or opinion
and that plaintiff fails to allege that Mr. Barrett reasonably
relied on those statements.  

The Court rejects these arguments for the same reasons that it
rejected United's arguments regarding fraudulent concealment.
Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that United agents made fraudulent
statements to Mr. Barrett when selling him his policy and when
servicing that policy at his home. As explained above, United
agent's statement to Mr. Barrett that his policy was legitimate was
not merely puffery. Rather, that was a representation that Mr.
Barrett's policy complied with the law, which United's agents knew
to be false at the time they made the representation.  

The Court DENIES United's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's fraudulent
inducement and negligent misrepresentation claims.

Punitive Damages

As to punitive damages, United solely argues that because
Plaintiff's other claims must be dismissed, she has no underlying
cause of action on which to request a punitive award. However, as
explained above, Plaintiff has stated viable claims including
violations of Section 1981, fraudulent inducement, and negligent
misrepresentation. As United's arguments against punitive damages
hinge on the viability of those underlying claims, the Court DENIES
United's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's claims for punitive
damages.

The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART United's Motion to
Dismiss, (doc. 34). The Court GRANTS United's Motion to Dismiss for
lack of standing as to Plaintiff's claims that United failed to
keep accurate records, allowed policies to lapse, and failed to pay
death benefits. However, the Court DENIES United's Motion to
Dismiss for lack of standing as to all other claims. The Court also
GRANTS United's Motion to Dismiss for untimeliness as to
Plaintiff's claims that Mr. Barrett paid premiums exceeding the
face value of his policy.

However, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE United's Motion to
Dismiss for untimeliness as to all other claims. Further, the Court
DENIES United's Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim as
to Plaintiff's claims for money had and received, negligent
misrepresentation, fraudulent inducement, and punitive damages. The
Court GRANTS AS UNOPPOSED United's Motion to Dismiss for failure to
state a claim as to Plaintiff's claims for breach of contract,
declaratory relief, and injunctive relief.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 23, 2019 Order
is available at  https://tinyurl.com/y5rt96ur from Leagle.com.

Minerva Barrett, Executrix of the Estate of Chester Barrett,
Plaintiff, represented by Robert Bartley Turner , Savage & Turner,
PC, 04 East Bay Street P.O. Box 10600 Savannah, GA 31412. & William
Jarrell Degenhart - jdegenhart@forthepeople.com - Morgan & Morgan.

United Insurance Company of America, Inc., Defendant, represented
by Elizabeth J. Campbell  - ecampbell@lockelord.com - Locke Lord,
LLP, Roger B. Cowie -  rcowie@lockelord.com - Locke Lord LLP, pro
hac vice & Taylor F. Brinkman - tbrinkman@lockelord.com - Locke
Lord LLP, pro hac vice.


UNITED STATES: Court Dismisses Suit Over Bump-Fire Stock Device
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Federal Claims issued an Opinion and
Order granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned
ROY LYNN McCUTCHEN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, Defendant. No. 18-1965C. (Fed. Cl.).

Plaintiffs brought this putative class action on behalf of
themselves and all United States persons who have purchased a
bump-fire stock or bump-fire type device, as listed in Exhibit 1 to
the complaint, for personal or commercial use. They allege that the
ATF rule has effected a taking of their property for which just
compensation is required under the Fifth Amendment.

On the evening of October 1, 2017, a lone gunman stationed himself
in a high-rise, Las Vegas hotel room and fired 1100 rounds of
ammunition downward onto a crowd attending a country music concert.
Fifty-eight people were killed. Over eight hundred more were
wounded by gunshots or as a result of the ensuing panic. When the
authorities entered the shooter's hotel room, they found twelve
semi-automatic weapons equipped with bump stocks devices that allow
a semi-automatic weapon to fire continuous rounds at a rate similar
to that of a machinegun.

As of the date of this opinion, the mass shooting in Las Vegas
remains the deadliest in American history. In its wake, the
Department of Justice's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives (ATF) re-examined the status of bump-stock devices under
federal firearms laws.

Ultimately, after a period of notice and comment, it issued a final
rule that re-classified bump stocks as machineguns under the
National Firearms Act of 1934 and the Gun Control Act of 1968,
thereby outlawing their possession and sale effective March 26,
2019. The regulation specified that, to avoid prosecution, owners
of bump stocks must either destroy their devices or abandon them at
an ATF office by that date.

Statutory Framework

To protect the public safety, Congress has enacted a series of
statutes that regulate the manufacture, transfer, and possession of
firearms generally and machineguns in particular. These statutes
include the National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA),  the Gun Control
Act of 1968 (GCA) and the Firearms Owners' Protection Act (FOPA).

The NFA was enacted a year after Prohibition ended. Its purpose
was, among other things, to regulate lethal weapons that could be
used readily and efficiently by criminals and gangsters. The NFA
imposed a tax on the manufacture and transfer of certain types of
firearms. It further required that the Secretary of the Treasury
maintain a registry of such firearms.

The government filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim. It contends that ATF's rule did not effect a compensable
taking because it was issued pursuant to the government's police
power and not its authority to take private property for a public
use.   

In the alternative, the government argues, even if the rule
effected a taking, it was a regulatory and not a physical one, and
not compensable under the multi-factor analysis prescribed for
regulatory takings in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) and its progeny.  

In their response, Plaintiffs allege that the final rule effected
either a per se physical or per se regulatory taking of their
property, so that the government has a categorical obligation to
compensate them for the value of their property.  

Standard for Motions to Dismiss under RCFC 12(b)(6)

A complaint should be dismissed under RCFC 12(b)(6) when the facts
asserted by the claimant do not entitle him to a legal remedy. When
considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, the Court must accept as true all the
factual allegations in the complaint, and the Court must indulge
all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. The Court,
however, is not required to accept inferences drawn by plaintiffs
if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the
complaint. Nor must the court accept legal conclusions cast in the
form of factual allegations.

Overview of Takings Principles

The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause provides that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The
purpose of the Takings Clause is to prevent Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.

Takings claims typically come in two forms: per se or regulatory. A
per se or categorical taking occurs where there is a physical
invasion or appropriation of property, whether real or personal.

Here, Plaintiffs contend that the ATF rule effected a physical
taking or, alternatively, what they call a per se regulatory
taking, either of which gives rise to a categorical duty to pay
just compensation. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs'
arguments lack merit.

The ATF Rule Prohibiting Bump-Stock Devices Was an Exercise of
Police Power and Did Not Effect a Taking for Public Use

As is evident from its plain language, the Takings Clause does not
require compensation unless private property whether personal or
real has been taken, whether physically or through regulation, for
public use.

Of course, it is insufficient to avoid the burdens imposed by the
Takings Clause simply to invoke the police powers' of the state.
Nonetheless, there are certain exercises of the police power that
have repeatedly been treated as legitimate even in the absence of
compensation to the owners of the property. Among these are
government actions taken to enforce prohibitions on the use or
possession of dangerous contraband, or to require the forfeiture of
property used in connection with criminal activity.  

In this case, Plaintiffs' bump-stock devices were not taken for a
public use, within the meaning of the Takings Clause. Instead,
because the devices have been designated as machineguns under ATF's
regulatory authority, they are subject to 18 U.S.C. Section 922(o),
which makes their possession a criminal offense. ATF, in the
exercise of its police power, directed that owners of the devices
must either destroy or abandon them at an ATF office, to avoid
prosecution. Because the prohibition on possession involved an
exercise of the government's police power, there was no taking
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.

The Court finds no merit in Plaintiffs' contention that the police
power doctrine does not apply where, as here, the property owners
came into possession of their bump-stock devices lawfully and
continued to lawfully possess them until the effective date of the
ATF rule. Plaintiffs have failed to cite a single case in which a
court has found this distinction significant. They also fail to
point to a case that has found the police powers doctrine
inapplicable in circumstances where an individual is required to
destroy or abandon property that was designated as contraband after
the owner first came into possession of it.   

In short, under ATF's final rule, Plaintiffs' bump-stock devices
were not taken for a public use, but were instead prohibited
through the government's exercise of its police power. For this
reason alone, Plaintiffs have failed to state a takings claim.

The Regulation Did Not Effect a Categorical Taking

Even if the police power doctrine were inapplicable, the Court
would nonetheless dismiss the complaint because there is no merit
to Plaintiffs' argument that the rule effected a categorical taking
of their bump-stock devices.

No Physical Taking

First, the final rule did not result in the physical appropriation
of Plaintiffs' bump-stock devices. Instead, it imposed a criminal
prohibition on their possession of bump-stock devices, enforced by
requiring their owners to either destroy them or abandon them at an
ATF office for destruction. In Plaintiffs' case, in fact, the
bump-stock devices were never turned over to the government.
Instead, Plaintiffs destroyed them on their own.

Plaintiffs' reliance on Horne v. Department of Agriculture,135 S.
Ct. at 2424, in support of their per se physical takings argument
is misplaced. The physical taking in that case arose out of a U.S.
Department of Agriculture marketing order which required raisin
growers to set aside a portion of their crop in certain years for
the account of the government, free of charge. In accordance with
the order, raisin growers were required to ship all of their
raisins to a raisin handler who would separate out the portion due
the government and pay the growers only for the remainder.  A
Raisin Administrative Committee would take title to the raisins
allotted to the government known as reserve raisins and then
dispose of them in various authorized ways, including selling them
in non-competitive markets or donating them to charity. Proceeds
from sales were used primarily to subsidize handlers who sold
raisins for export.

Here, by contrast, the ATF Rule did not effect a physical taking of
Plaintiffs' property.

Plaintiffs were not required to surrender possession of their
devices to the government. There was no transfer of title to the
government. And if Plaintiffs had chosen to abandon their
bump-stock devices at the local ATF office, the agency would not
have put the devices to its own use, it would have destroyed them.
The USDA regime of direct physical appropriation of private
property for the government's own use is distinguishable from the
criminal prohibition on possession of personal property deemed
dangerous, enforced by a requirement that the property be destroyed
or abandoned.

Indeed, in Horne itself, the Court acknowledged that, had the
government simply prohibited the sale of the raisins by the
growers, it would not have effected a per se taking. That
distinction, the Court observed, flows naturally from the settled
difference in our takings jurisprudence between appropriation and
regulation.

In short, there is no merit to Plaintiffs' argument that the ATF
rule effected a per se physical taking of their bump-stock devices.
The Court therefore turns to Plaintiffs' alternative argument that
the rule effected a per se regulatory taking.

The Rule Did Not Effect a Per Se Regulatory Taking

Plaintiffs contend that even if the rule did not effect a physical
taking, it would, nonetheless, be a per se regulatory taking. As
explained above, the Supreme Court has held that regulatory actions
may result in categorical or per se takings where they deny all
economically beneficial or productive use of land. Lucas, 505 U.S.
at 1015.

Plaintiffs contend that the Supreme Court's reference in Lucas to
the implied limitation on the expectations of owners of personal
property is only applicable in the commercial context, and not to
the mere ownership or possession of personal property. Thus,
Plaintiffs argue that, in Lucas, the Court observed that in the
case of personal property, by reason of the State's traditionally
high degree of control over commercial dealings, an owner ought to
be aware of the possibility that new regulation might even render
his property economically worthless at least if the property's only
economically productive use is sale or manufacture for sale.

Of course, the only economically productive use of bump-stock
devices is in their sale, manufacture for sale, or related
commercial use. Plaintiff Paducah Shooter's Supply, Inc., for
example, sells firearms and their accessories and operates a
shooting range. It also previously provided bump-stock devices for
patrons to use when it held so-called machine gun shoots.

Likewise, Plaintiff Roy Lynn McCutchen alleges that he has
purchased and owns multiple bump-fire type devices for both his
personal use and for economic gain.

For these reasons, it appears to the Court that even assuming there
are circumstances in which the Lucas categorical taking standard
could be applied to personal property it should not be applied
here. The Court therefore rejects Plaintiffs' argument that the ATF
rule effected a categorical or per se regulatory taking of their
property.

Regulatory Taking Under Penn Central

Plaintiffs' complaint appears to be based on the theory that the
ATF rule effected a regulatory taking under the Penn Central
analysis. That analysis, as noted above, requires the Court to
balance several factors when deciding whether compensation is owed
for a regulatory taking. These include the economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant, the character of the governmental
action and the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations.

In opposing the government's motion to dismiss, however, Plaintiffs
do not argue that the ATF rule effects a regulatory taking under
Penn Central. Instead, they have chosen to rely upon the
categorical takings theories described above. Any argument based on
Penn Central has therefore been waived.  

In any event, even if the argument were not waived, Plaintiffs have
failed to state a regulatory takings claim under Penn Central.
Plaintiffs have alleged that the ATF rule has destroyed all
economic value of their bump-stock devices. But their allegations
are insufficient to establish a regulatory taking upon
consideration of the character of the government's actions and the
extent to which the rule interferes with reasonable
investment-backed expectations.

In particular, Plaintiffs could not have reasonably expected that
existing rules regarding bump-stock devices would not be made more
restrictive. Such devices, after all, are designed to enable
semi-automatic weapons to simulate the firepower of machineguns,
whose possession has been prohibited for decades.

Plaintiffs, in short, have waived any argument based on the Penn
Central analysis by failing to make it in opposing the government's
motion to dismiss. And even if the argument were not waived, the
Court concludes that they have failed to allege a regulatory taking
claim under Penn Central.

The government's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is
granted. The complaint will be dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court of Federal Claims' September 23, 2019
Opinion and Order is available at  https://tinyurl.com/y4qmrznd
from Leagle.com.

ROY LYNN MCCUTCHEN & PADUCAH SHOOTER'S SUPPLY, INC, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Ethan Albert Flint , Flint Law Firm, LLC, 222 E.
Park St., Suite 500, Edwardsville, IL 62025

USA, Defendant, represented by Nathanael Brown Yale , U.S.
Department of Justice Civil Division.


UNIVERSITY OF LA VERNE: Stupar Seeks Proper Wages, Penalties
------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN STUPAR, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF LA VERNE, a California
Non-Profit Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 19STCV3336 (Cal. Super.
Ct., Los Angeles Cty., Sept. 19, 2019) is a class action under
California Code of Civil Procedure Section 382 seeking damages for
unpaid wages and unpaid premium pay, statutory penalties, interest,
injunctive relief, restitution, and reasonable attorneys' fees and
costs under California Labor Code, IWC Wage Order, California Civil
Procedure Code, and restitution under California's Unfair
Competition Law.

According to the complaint, the Defendant paid Class Members on a
piece-rate basis, i.e., a Hat rate for each course taught. The more
courses Class Members taught, the more they were paid. Plaintiff
and Class Members were also non-exempt employees because they did
not earn a monthly salary equivalent of two times the state minimum
wage for full-time employment, the minimum amount an employee must
earn to be considered exempt under the Industrial Welfare
Commission Wage Order No. 4.

Because Class Members are piece rate workers, pursuant to Labor
Code and Wage Order, Defendant was required to pay them separately
from the piece and hourly and at their average hourly rate for
their time spent on rest breaks. The Defendant, however, did not
pay them separately and hourly for their rest break time and as a
result violated California's rest break laws, thus entitling Class
Members to one hour of premium pay for each unpaid rest break.
Additionally, Defendant was required to pay Class Members
separately and hourly at least at the minimum wage for their
non-productive time (i.e. time spent working outside the hours of
classroom instruction). The Defendant, however, did not pay them
for their non-productive time, in violation of Labor Code and Wage
Order. As a result, Defendant is also liable to Class Members for
unpaid wages, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Stupar is a resident of Westminster, California who was
employed by LVU as an adjunct instructor from approximately 1985
until 2018.

Defendant is a private non-profit university, incorporated in
California and located in La Verne, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Julian Hammond, Esq.
     Polina Brandler, Esq.
     Ari Cherniak, Esq.
     HAMMONDLAW, PC
     1829 Reisterstown Rd., Suite 410
     Baltimore, MD 21208
     Phone: (310) 601-6766
     Fax: (310) 295-2385
     Email: jhammond@hammondlawpc.com
            pbrandler@hammondlawpc.com
            acherniak@hammondlawpc.com


VANDAD SHEMIRANI: Huite Files Suit for Wrongful Eviction
--------------------------------------------------------
JUAN CARLOS HERNANDEZ HUITE; individually and on behalf of all
other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. VANDAD SHEMIRANI;
MANUEL DEJESUS; SILVIA RAMIREZ; BERTA RAMIREZ; WENDY SANDOVAL;
individuals; DOES 1-50 inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 19STCV33378
(Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., Sept. 19, 2019) is a case
arising from a clash between laws enacted to protect tenants in Los
Angeles County from abuses and deplorable conditions that are
prevalent in illegal units and landlord's illegal attempts to
wrongfully evict tenants without any regards for tenants' rights
under the law.

Plaintiff is a monolingual Spanish-speaker. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants secure a competitive advantage by targeting
unsophisticated monolingual immigrant tenants with high pressure
intimidation tactics to force Plaintiff and his family out of their
homes without providing any relocation assistance. Such actions
created an atmosphere of uncertainty and fear surrounding
Plaintiff's tenancy at the property.

Defendants Manuel DeJesus, Silvia D. Ramirez and Berta Ramirez,
Wendy Sandoval illegally collected rent since 2014 from Plaintiff
on behalf of Vandad Shemirani. The Defendant Vandad Shemirani
attempted to circumvent Plaintiffs' right to receive relocation
assistance and to defend against an unlawful detainer action by
engaging in conspiracy against Plaintiff, says the Plaintiff.

Specifically, Defendants, collectively and individually, took steps
to prevent Plaintiff from discovering that an unlawful detainer
action had been filed against him in order to achieve Defendants'
goal of removing Plaintiff and his family from the premises.
Plaintiff and his family where then forcefully removed from the
premises because they were not given a chance to defend against
Defendants' illegal and malicious conduct, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Juan Carlos Hernandez is an individual living with his
wife and two children in the City of Los Angeles.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Micheli Quadros, Esq.
     Sarah Ann Cuellar, Esq.
     Quadros & Cuellar, LLP
     453 S. Spring Street, Suite 616
     Los Angeles, CA 90013
     Phone: (213) 603 0000



VISALUS INC: Bid to Decertify Class in Wakefield TCPA Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Michael H. Simon of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Oregon denied Visalus' motion to decertify the class in the
case, LORI WAKEFIELD, individually and on behalf of a class of
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. VISALUS, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 3:15-cv-1857-SI (D. Or.).

ViSalus is a multi-level marketing company that sells weight-loss
products and other nutritional dietary supplements, including
energy drinks.  Individual members sign up with ViSalus to be
"promoters," and promoters purchase products from ViSalus and
re-sell them to customers of the promoter.  Plaintiff Wakefield
signed up to be a promoter with ViSalus in late 2012 but did not
sell any ViSalus products and decided to cancel her ViSalus
membership after two months.  Although she cancelled her account in
March 2013, she received telephone solicitation calls from ViSalus
in April 2015.

The Plaintiff brought claims against the Defendant for violating
the TCPA, alleging that she and a class of similarly situated
individuals had received telephone calls promoting ViSalus products
or services using an artificial or prerecorded voice without their
consent.  

In an opinion issued on June 23, 2017, U.S. District Judge Anna
Brown, who presided over the action until she took senior status in
2018, granted certification of a class consisting of all
individuals in the United States who received a telephone call made
by or on behalf of ViSalus: (1) promoting ViSalus' products or
services; (2) where such call featured an artificial or prerecorded
voice; and (3) where neither ViSalus nor its agents had any current
record of prior express written consent to place such call at the
time such call was made.

The case proceeded to a three-day jury trial.  On April 12, 2019,
the jury returned a special verdict, finding that a total of
1,850,436 violative calls were made to either cell phones or
landlines, but could not be more precise as to how many calls were
made to each.

In 2012, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") issued a
rule requiring that all requests for a consumer's written consent
to receive telemarketing robocalls must include the telephone
number that the consumer authorizes may be called with
telemarketing messages, and clear and conspicuous disclosures
informing the consumer that: (1) the consumer authorizes the seller
to deliver telemarketing calls to that number using an automatic
telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice; and
(2) the consumer is not required, directly or indirectly, to
provide written consent as a condition of purchasing any property,
goods, or services.

On Sept. 14, 2017, nearly two years after the Plaintiff filed her
complaint and the FCC granted its first retroactive waiver, ViSalus
petitioned the FCC for a retroactive waiver of the express written
consent requirements created by the 2012 FCC rule.  On June 13,
2019, nearly two months after the jury returned its verdict, the
FCC granted ViSalus' petition for retroactive waiver but only as it
applied to calls for which the petitioner had obtained some form of
written consent.

ViSalus has moved to decertify the class.  It argues that the FCC's
retroactive waiver given to ViSalus requires the Court to decertify
the class because in light of the FCC waiver, the named Plaintiff
lacks standing and consent becomes an individualized issue that
predominates over class-wide issues.  ViSalus also makes several
arguments challenging the propriety of class certification not
based on the FCC order, which can largely be grouped into six
categories.

First, ViSalus argues there are insufficient questions of law or
fact common to the class and those common questions do not
predominate over questions affecting only individual members.
Second, ViSalus argues that the class is unmanageable because it
will be too difficult to determine which class members heard which
messages, and that a class action is not superior because it is
procedurally unfair to ViSalus.  Third, it argues that the class
lacks numerosity because Plaintiff did not introduce evidence
showing how many individuals both received and heard a prerecorded
telemarketing message.  Fourth, ViSalus argues that Ms. Wakefield's
claims are not typical of the class.  Fifth, it argues that Ms.
Wakefield is not an adequate class representative.  Finally and
sixth, ViSalus argues that the class, as certified, constituted an
impermissible "fail-safe" class.

After reviewing the Defendant's arguments and the evidence
presented at trial, Judge Simon finds that the class certification
was, and remains, proper and meets the requirements of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23.  He denied the Defendant's Motion to
Decertify the Class and its Motion to Strike Plaintiff's
Sur-Reply.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 21, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/DKZqhF from Leagle.com.

Lori Wakefield, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin H. Richman --
brichman@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, pro hac vice, Eve-Lynn J. Rapp
-- erapp@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, pro hac vice, Gregory S. Dovel
-- greg@dovel.com -- Dovel & Luner LLP, pro hac vice, J. Aaron
Lawson -- alawson@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, pro hac vice, Jonas
B.
Jacobson, Dovel & Luner LLP, pro hac vice, Julien A. Adams, Dovel
&
Luner LLP, pro hac vice, Lily E. Hough, Edelson PC, pro hac vice,
Rafey S. Balabanian, Edelson PC, pro hac vice, Scott F. Kocher,
Forum Law Group LLC, Simon C. Franzini -- simon@dovel.com -- Dovel
& Luner LLP, pro hac vice, Stefan L. Coleman, Law Offices of
Stefan
Coleman, P.A., pro hac vice & Stephen Joseph Voorhees, Forum Law
Group.

ViSalus, Inc., Defendant, represented by John Maston O'Neal ,
Quarles & Brady LLP, pro hac vice, Joshua M. Sasaki --
josh.sasaki@millernash.com -- Miller Nash Graham & Dunn LLP,
Nicholas H. Pyle -- nicholas.pyle@millernash.com -- Miller Nash
Graham & Dunn LLP & Zachary S. Foster --
zachary.foster@quarles.com
-- Quarles & Brady LLP, pro hac vice.


WEINERT ENTERPRISES: Filing of Second Amended Anderson Suit Allowed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RICHARD J. ANDERSON, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. WEINERT ENTERPRISES, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 18-C-901 (E.D. mm Wis.), Judge William C.
Griesbach of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin (i) denied Anderson's motion for class certification,
(ii) granted his motion for leave to amend the complaint, and (iii)
denied as moot Weinert's motion to strike the untimely opt-in
consents of two individuals and its motion to decertify the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective action.

Anderson brought the wage-and-hour collective and putative class
action on behalf of himself and similarly situated current and
former hourly employees of Defendant Weinert.  Anderson alleges in
his first amended complaint that Weinert violated the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"), and Wisconsin's wage law.

Specifically, Anderson alleges Weinert violated the FLSA by paying
straight time rates for travel time between the shop and the job
site and for failing to count such travel time when calculating an
employee's eligibility for weekly overtime pay, as well as failing
to account for cash bonuses and cash fringe benefits when
calculating employees' base rates of pay to determine overtime pay.
Anderson alleges Weinert violated Wisconsin law by paying travel
time at straight time rates even when the travel occurred after 40
hours; failing to count paid travel hours when computing overtime
pay for non-traveling work; failing to count paid daily overtime
hours toward the weekly overtime threshold of 40 hours; improperly
computing overtime based on the type of work performed during
overtime hours rather than based on the regular rate; and failing
to account for bonuses and cash fringe benefits when calculating an
employee's regular rate.

The Court previously approved the parties' stipulation for
conditional certification of an FLSA collective action.

On April 30, 2019, the deadline for Anderson to file a motion for
class certification and for Weinert to file a motion to decertify
the FLSA collective action, Anderson filed a motion for Rule 23
class certification of the state law claims and Weinert filed a
motion to strike the untimely opt-in consents of two individuals as
well as a motion to decertify the FLSA collective action.  Rather
than file a response in opposition to Weinert's motions, Anderson
submitted a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint
("SAC") that seeks, among other things, to abandon the collective
action and add the three individuals who submitted consents as
additional named Plaintiffs.

Anderson seeks to certify a class consisting of all hourly
employees who worked on the jobsite for the Defendant on or after
June 14, 2016.  However, Anderson does not seek to certify the
class as to all of his state law claims.  Instead, class
certification would be limited to the following two claims: (1)
that Weinert failed to count paid travel hours when computing
overtime pay for non-traveling work; and (2) that Weinert
improperly computed overtime based on the type of work performed
during overtime hours rather than based on the regular, or a
blended, rate.

The current putative class stands at 37 employees.  One class
member lives in North Carolina, another in Georgetown, Illinois,
and the remaining class members live in an approximately 50 mile
geographic radius in counties that are within the jurisdiction of
the Eastern District of Wisconsin.  In short, the Court will only
consider those 37 employees who worked during the time period
between June 14, 2016 and the end of 2018 in analyzing the
numerosity requirement.

Judge Griesbach finds that Anderson has failed to present evidence
that the claim for each of the class members is so minimal that no
attorney would be interested in representing them.  The question
under Rule 23(a)(1) is not whether it makes sense for injured
parties to combine their claims rather than litigate them
individually; the question is whether the Plaintiffs can combine
their claims through joinder rather than through class
certification.  Anderson has failed to meet his burden of
establishing that combining the claims through joinder would be
impracticable.  Consequently, he has failed to satisfy Rule 23(a)'s
numerosity requirement, precluding certification of the class.
Accordingly, Anderson's motion for class certification will be
denied.

Anderson filed a motion for leave to file a SAC in lieu of filing a
response brief to Weinert's motions to strike untimely opt-ins and
to decertify the FLSA collective action.  The SAC seeks to, among
other things, add Joseph Young, Evin Chaulkin, and Michael Herter
as named plaintiffs.  The three new potential Plaintiffs are the
only individuals who consented to opt in to the FLSA collective
action.  The SAC also seeks to convert the collective FLSA action
into an individual FLSA action.

The Judge finds no reason under Rule 15 to deny Anderson leave to
amend.  Weinert has not actually suffered prejudice since
Anderson's motion for class certification has been denied and the
SAC removes the FLSA collective action claims.  Also, the
allegations of the SAC satisfy Rule 20's requirements.  But Rule
20, by its plain language, allows for joinder based on allegations
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions, and does not require definitive evidence at the
pleadings stage.  Anderson's allegations are plausible based on the
payroll records presented.

The fact that not all claims apply to all the Plaintiffs does not
render joinder impermissible when the claims arise out of the same
occurrence.  While individual inquiry may be required to ascertain
damages for a particular plaintiff, whether Weinert violated the
FLSA by failing to count the Plaintiffs' travel time when
determining their eligibility for overtime pay presents a common
question of law.  Therefore, the requirements of Rule 20 have been
satisfied, and joinder is appropriate.

Finally, Weinert requests (1) an award of its costs and attorney's
fees incurred in challenging the FLSA certification and the
untimeliness of the two opt-in Plaintiffs and (2) that the Court
holds the date of entry into the lawsuit of the newly added
Plaintiffs as the date of the Court's order rather than the date
they consented to join the lawsuit.

As an initial matter, an award of costs and attorney's fees is not
warranted because Anderson's motion for leave to amend his
complaint in response to Weinert's motions to decertify was
reasonable.  As to the entry date for the newly added Plaintiffs,
Weinert had notice of the additional Plaintiffs' claims because the
action was originally filed as a collective FLSA action and the
Plaintiffs' claims arise out of the same actions that gave rise to
Anderson's claims.  Consequently, their claims relate back to the
filing of the original complaint.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Griesbach denied Anderson's motion
for class certification as to the state law claims.  He granted
Anderson's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint.
Weinert will file its answer or otherwise respond within 21 days of
the date of the Order.  The Clerk is directed to detach and file
the second amended complaint that is attached to Anderson's motion
and to add Joseph Young, Evin Chaulkin, and Michael Herter as
Plaintiffs.  The Judge denied as moot Weinert's motion to strike
untimely opt-ins and motion to decertify the FLSA collective
action.  The Clerk will set the matter for a telephone conference
to address further proceedings once Weinert has filed its answer to
the second amended complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2019 Decision and Order is
available at https://is.gd/9Vuhqc from Leagle.com.

Richard J Anderson, Joseph Young, Evin Chaulkin & Michael Herter,
Plaintiffs, represented by Yingtao Ho -- yh@previant.com -- The
Previant Law Firm SC.

Weinert Enterprises Inc, Defendant, represented by Aaron J. Graf --
agraf@mawickelaw.com -- Mawicke & Goisman SC, J. Nels Bjorkquist --
nbjorkquist@mawickelaw.com -- Mawicke & Goisman SC & Jennifer S.
Walther -- jwalther@dmgr.com -- Mawicke & Goisman SC.


WELTMAN WEINBERG: Court OKs Class Certification in Bitzko
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of New
York issued a Memorandum Decision and Order granting Plaintiffs'
Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned CHRISTY
BITZKO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. WELTMAN, WEINBERG & REIS CO., LPA,
Defendant. No. 1:17-CV-00458 (BKS/DJS). No. 1:17-CV-00458
(BKS/DJS). (N.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiff Christy Bitzko brings this action against Defendant
Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., LPA (WWR), alleging that it engaged
in unlawful debt collection practices in violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), by sending her a debt collection
letter: (i) on law firm letterhead even though WWR attorneys were
not meaningfully involved in its creation, in violation of 15
U.S.C. Section 1692e (ii) that failed to provide a complete notice
of the amount of debt she owed, in violation of 15 U.S.C. Section
1692g and (iii) that failed to inform her that her debt may
increase, in violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e.

Standard

For a matter to proceed as a class action, a plaintiff must satisfy
four requirements: (1) numerosity (the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable (2) commonality (there are
questions of law or fact common to the class) (3) typicality (the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class) and (4) adequacy of representation
(the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class).  

Assuming the requirements of Rule 23(a) are met, a class action may
only be maintained if the plaintiff also qualifies the proposed
class under one of the categories in Rule 23(b). Here, Plaintiff
seek to certify the class for purposes of compensatory relief under
Rule 23(b)(3). The court may certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class if it
finds that questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

Proposed Class

Plaintiff seeks class certification of her second and third claims
but does not seek certification for her first claim. Her second
claim, pertaining to the required amount of debt under Section
1692g of the FDCPA, has been dismissed and so her motion for
certification on that claim is moot. Plaintiff seeks to certify the
following class for her third claim:

(1) All consumers to whom Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., LPA mailed
letters seeking to collect debts which were subject to increase
based on interest and/or late fees, but which failed to disclose
that the amount of the debt was subject to increase and (2) which
were sent on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this
action and on or before a date 21 days after the filing of this
action.

Ascertainability

The ascertainability doctrine that governs in this Circuit requires
only that a class be defined using objective criteria that
establish a membership with definite boundaries. This modest
threshold requirement will only preclude certification if a
proposed class definition is indeterminate in some fundamental
way.

Defendant argues the proposed class is not ascertainable because
nothing in its records indicates whether the letters it mailed
involved consumer debt (which is within the scope of the FDCPA) or
commercial debt which is not. According to Defendant, the Court
will have to engage in extensive and individualized fact finding to
determine who, among the over 58,000 individuals who received
debt-collection letters during the proposed class period, had
consumer versus non-consumer debt.  

However, ascertainability does not directly concern itself with the
plaintiffs' ability to offer proof of membership under a given
class definition, an issue that is already accounted for in Rule
23. Here, since the class is specified with objective criteria
consumers to whom WWR, within a certain specified time, sent debt
collection letters for debts8 which were subject to increase based
on interest and/or late fees, but failed to disclose that the
amount of the debt was subject to increase and that definition is
sufficiently definite, such that a determination is objectively
possible, the ascertainability requirement is met.  

The Court thus finds that the modest threshold requirement of
ascertainability has been fulfilled. And whether Defendant's
argument regarding the difficulty of proving class membership is
considered as part of the ascertainability analysis or as part of
numerosity, commonality, typicality, or superiority, under the
circumstances of this case the Court finds that individualized
inquiries into each class member's debt does not preclude class
certification. If Defendant discovers, after the class is
certified, that the class identification is unworkable or
unreliable, it may move to decertify the class.

Numerosity

Rule 23(a)(1) requires that the proposed class be so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable In general, numerosity is
presumed where a putative class has 40 or more members.   

Plaintiff asserts that numerosity is established because as alleged
in the Complaint and as disclosed during discovery for the
mediation, Defendant does not dispute that the number of putative
class members is well over forty, and more likely is in the
thousands of potential members. Defendant contends, however, that
of the over 58,000 individuals sent letters during the subject time
period, there is no evidence that they are consumers falling within
the protection of the FDCPA. Defendant further notes that Plaintiff
failed to conduct any discovery on class size.

If over 58,000 individuals were sent letters during the subject
time period, the requirement for numerosity would be fulfilled even
if less than 0.1% of individuals contacted were consumers. And
since the Plaintiff's current creditor, National Collegiate Student
Loan Trust 2007-2, is one of WWR's creditor clients and WWR created
policies to ensure the firm's compliance with the FDCPA,  it is
reasonable to believe that there are sufficient individuals
similarly situated to Plaintiff to satisfy the numerosity
requirement.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff has satisfied
this requirement.

Commonality

A plaintiff seeking class certification must show questions of law
or fact common to the class. A question of law or fact is common to
the class if the question is capable of classwide resolution which
means that its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is
central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.

Plaintiff argues that commonality is satisfied here because the
claims of putative class members turn on the common contention that
Defendant's collection letter violates the FDCPA. In other words,
the Plaintiff has established commonality because the resolution of
this action will rest on whether or not the Defendant's alleged
conduct in sending the form letters violated numerous provisions of
the FDCPA.

Defendant, on the other hand, contends that because individual
inquiries are necessary to figure out whether the debt at issue is
consumer debt, the commonality requirement is not fulfilled. As
described above, Defendant's arguments are unpersuasive. Once the
class of consumers is identified, it is clear that the legality of
Defendants' use of the challenged standardized forms to communicate
with personal, family, or household consumers can be resolved in
one stroke.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has established commonality.

Typicality

Typicality requires that the claims of the class representatives be
typical of those of the class, and is satisfied when each class
member's claim arises from the same course of events, and each
class member makes similar legal arguments to prove the defendant's
liability. But typicality does not require that the factual
background of each named plaintiff's claim be identical to that of
all class members, rather, it requires that the disputed issue of
law or fact occupy essentially the same degree of centrality to the
named plaintiff's claim as to that of other members of the proposed
class.

Plaintiff asserts that there is typicality because the class
members have all been subject to the same treatment as Plaintiff,
to wit, Defendant sent them all the same deceptive letter.
Therefore, Plaintiff's claim is typical of the class because it
arises from the same course of events and hinges on the same legal
arguments. Defendant's argument concerning non-consumer debt
overlooks the fact that only consumers will be class members and
thus Plaintiff has satisfied the typicality requirement.

Adequacy of Representation

Generally, adequacy of representation entails inquiry as to
whether: 1) plaintiff's interests are antagonistic to the interest
of other members of the class and 2) plaintiff's attorneys are
qualified, experienced and able to conduct the litigation.
Regarding named plaintiffs' adequacy, the requirement is twofold:
the named plaintiffs must be prepared to prosecute fully the action
and have no known conflicts with any class member.

Here, Plaintiff asserts she is an adequate class representative
because there is no evidence of any conflict and she is ready,
willing, and able to discharge her responsibilities as a class
representative. Magistrate Judge Daniel J. Stewart appointed
Plaintiff's counsel, Barshay Sanders, PLLC, as Interim Class
Counsel on May 18, 2018. Defendant does not offer any objection to
the adequacy of Plaintiff or her attorneys. Accordingly, the
adequacy requirement has been fulfilled.

Predominance

For certification under Rule 23(b)(3), Plaintiffs must establish
that questions of law or fact common to class members predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members.

The predominance requirement tests whether proposed classes are
sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation. It
is satisfied when (1) resolution of any material legal or factual
questions can be achieved through generalized proof and (2) these
common issues are more substantial than the issues subject only to
individualized proof.  

Plaintiff argues that common issues predominate because the claims
of putative class members turn on the common contention that
Defendant's collection letter violates the FDCPA and similar
arguments will be made to prove Defendant's liability. Plaintiff
further argues that because Defendant's liability will be
determined under the least sophisticated consumer standard, which
is objective, individual class members will not need to prove their
subjective understanding of the letter.

The Court has now determined liability, and Defendant has not
identified any individualized issues beyond its concern about
identifying class members.  

Therefore, the Court finds that the predominance requirement has
been met.

Superiority

In order to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3), the Court must
determine whether a class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. In
doing so, the Court considers factors including: (1) the class
members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions (2) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against
members of the class (3) the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation in the particular forum and (4) the
likely difficulties in managing a class action.

Plaintiff contends that a class action is superior in this case
because individual recovery is small and litigating independently
could lead to repetitious litigation and inconsistent
adjudications. The Court agrees. First, class litigation is a
superior vehicle for the instant case given economies of scale.
FDCPA cases are unlikely to be brought on an individual basis due
to the statute's low cap on individual damages, especially when
compared to potential litigation costs. Second, litigating as a
class also promotes a unity of analysis and outcome, compared to
potentially conflicting outcomes across a multitude of individual
suits.

Defendant's arguments to the contrary are unavailing. Defendant
argues that because each putative class member will need to be
deposed individually in order to avoid infringing on Defendant's
due process rights, proceeding as a class action is not superior.
As discussed with respect to ascertainability, individual
depositions are likely unnecessary given Defendant's records can
identify consumers.  

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has adequately
shown superiority.

Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification is GRANTED; as to her
claim that the failure to disclose that the consumer's balance was
subject to future interest and/or late fees violated 15 U.S.C.
Section 1692e for the following Rule 23(b)(3) class:

     All consumers to whom Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., LPA (WWR)
mailed letters seeking to collect debts: (i) which were primarily
for personal, family, or household purposes and (ii) which debts
were subject to increase based on interest and/or late fees and
(iii) to whom WWR sent letters failing to disclose that the amount
of the debt was subject to increase (iv) during the period from on
or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action and on
or before a date 21 days after the filing of this action.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 23, 2019
Memorandum Decision and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yxnht73m from Leagle.com.

Christy Bitzko, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by David Michael Barshay , Barshay
Sanders, PLLC, 100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500, Garden City, NY
11530, Stuart D. Werbin , Law Office of Stuart Werbin, 920 E. 17th
St., Brooklyn, NY, 11230 & Craig B. Sanders , Barshay Sanders,
PLLC. 100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500, Garden City, NY 11530

Salvatore D. Ferlazzo, Mediator, pro se.

Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., LPA, Defendant, represented by Glenn
M. Fjermedal -gfjermedal@davidsonfink.com - Davidson Fink LLP.


WILCO LIFE: LSCC Appeals C.D. California Ruling to Ninth Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff LSCC LLC filed an appeal from a Court ruling entered in
its lawsuit styled LSCC LLC v. Wilco Life Insurance Company, Case
No. 2:19-cv-01854-PSG-MRW, in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California, Los Angeles.

The appellate case is captioned as LSCC LLC v. Wilco Life Insurance
Company, Case No. 19-56075, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
alleges that Wilco's systematic reduction of the payment of death
proceeds during the "extension period" through its unilateral
imposition of the "retroactive premium charge" constitutes a breach
of a court-approved settlement agreement requiring that life
insurance coverage during the Extension Period be provided at no
cost to the Plaintiff and other members of the Extension Class.

By order and judgment dated July 3, 2007, entered in In re Conseco
Life Insurance Company Cost of Insurance Litigation, Docket No. MDL
04-1610-AHM (Mcx) ("the MDL Action"), the Court approved a class
action Stipulation of Settlement on behalf of a certified
settlement class of policyholders, and expressly retained
jurisdiction over any subsequent action to enforce its terms.  The
Final Judgment not only approved but incorporated the terms of the
Settlement Agreement, under which Wilco (then known as Conseco)
agreed to provide to certain members of the Settlement Class (those
holding a policy in-force as of March 2, 2006, that was projected
to terminate before the insured turned 100 years old) with one of
two forms of settlement relief: either (a) an in-force death
benefit extension of coverage for each policy for a specified
period of time after the policy would otherwise terminate ("the
Extension Benefit") or (b) a specified cash contribution.

Members of the Settlement Class eligible for such relief, who did
not affirmatively elect the Cash Contribution received the
Extension Benefit by default.  The Settlement Agreement makes it
abundantly clear that the Extension Benefit provides additional
life insurance coverage for a specified period of time ("the
Extension Period") at no cost to the policyholder.

However, LSCC argues, in breach of the Court-approved Settlement
Agreement, Wilco has been systematically reducing the death
benefits paid on claims made under the Extension Period by
unilaterally applying a retroactive premium charge ("the
Retroactive Premium Charge") relating to an unused and expired
61-day grace period inapplicable to deaths occurring more than 60
days after the policy's termination date.  Accordingly, Wilco does
not charge or otherwise collect a premium for a grace period once
it expires with no claim for benefits thereunder.  Yet contrary to
the explicit "no cost" terms of the Court-approved Settlement
Agreement, Wilco is deducting the Retroactive Premium Charge for
the expired grace period from the proceeds paid pursuant to the
Extension Benefit, LSCC contends.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appellant LSCC LLC's opening brief is due on November 12,
      2019;

   -- Appellee Wilco Life Insurance Company's answering brief is
      due on December 10, 2019; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant, LSCC LLC, an Arkansas limited liability
corporation, individually and on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, is represented by:

          Francis Joseph Balint, Jr., Esq.
          Andrew S. Friedman, Esq.
          BONNETT FAIRBOURN FRIEDMAN & BALINT, PC
          2325 E. Camelback Road, Suite 300
          Phoenix, AZ 85016
          Telephone: (602) 274-1100
          E-mail: fbalint@bffb.com
                  afriedman@bffb.com

               - and -

          Manfred P. Muecke, Esq.
          Patricia N. Syverson, Esq.
          BONNETT FAIRBOURN FRIEDMAN & BALINT PC
          600 West Broadway, Suite 900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 756-6978
          E-mail: mmuecke@bffb.com
                  psyverson@bffb.com

Defendant-Appellee WILCO LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, FKA Conseco Life
Insurance Company, is represented by:

          Kathryn Elizabeth Panish, Esq.
          KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
          333 South Hope Street
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 680-8400
          E-mail: kathryn.panish@kirkland.com


YAMAHA MOTOR: Krautkramer Sues Over Radiator Defect
---------------------------------------------------
FRED KRAUTKRAMER, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. YAMAHA MOTOR CORPORATION, U.S.A., INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 0:19-cv-02559 (D. Minn., Sept. 19, 2019) is an
action seeking to redress Yamaha's violations of the Minnesota
Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act, and also seeks recovery for
Defendant's breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty,
common law fraud, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and, alternatively, unjust enrichment.

This class action lawsuit is brought by Plaintiff on behalf of
himself and a class of current and former owners of model years
2016-18 Yamaha Pure Sport YXZ1000R, YXZ1000SE, YXZ1000SS and
YXZ1000 SS SE Side-by-Side vehicles, equipped with radiators
mounted on the front of the vehicles ("Class Vehicles").

The front-mounted radiators on the Class Vehicles are defectively
designed and/or manufactured and frequently become clogged with mud
while being operated as intended, resulting in inadequate cooling,
overheated engines, and potentially catastrophic engine failure and
even fire ("Radiator Defect"). This dangerous safety defect can
cause harm to the operators of the Class Vehicles, as well as their
passengers. This action arises from Yamaha's failure, despite its
longstanding knowledge of this material manufacturing and/or design
defect, to disclose to Plaintiff and other consumers that the Class
Vehicles are predisposed to the Radiator Defect, causing the
Vehicles' engines to overheat--resulting in both decreased
performance and premature wear of the engines, engine bearings and
other internal engine components as well as an increased cost of
repair and remediation. Such premature failures can also result in
catastrophic engine failure, engine stalling events, engine fires
and other dangerous situations for occupants of the Class Vehicles
and others in close proximity, notes the complaint.

As a result of Yamaha's unfair, deceptive and/or fraudulent
business practices, owners and/or lessees of Class Vehicles,
including Plaintiff, have suffered an ascertainable loss of money
and/or property. Had Plaintiff and other Class members known about
the Radiator Defect at the time of purchase, they would not have
purchased the Class Vehicles, or would have paid substantially less
for the Class Vehicles, the complaint adds.

Plaintiff Fred Krautkramer purchased a new 2016 YXZ1000R Yamaha
Side-by-Side Pure Sport (VIN# 5Y4AN07Y2GA101134) from Ecofun
Motorsports, an authorized Yamaha dealer and repair center located
in Forest Lake, Minnesota, on March 23, 2019.

Yamaha Motor Corporation U.S.A., Inc. is a distributor and
manufacturer in the motorsports market.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Daniel C. Hedlund, Esq.
     David A. Goodwin, Esq.
     Ling S. Wang, Esq.
     GUSTAFSON GLUEK PLLC
     Canadian Pacific Plaza
     120 South 6th Street, Suite 2600
     Minneapolis, MN 55402
     Phone: (612) 333-8844
     Fax: (612) 339-6622
     Email: dhedlund@gustafsongluek.com
            dgoodwin@gustafsongluek.com
            lwang@gustafsongluek.com

          - and –

     Matthew D. Schelkopf, Esq.
     Joseph B. Kenney, Esq.
     SAUDER SCHELKOPF LLC
     555 Lancaster Avenue
     Berwyn, PA 19312
     Phone: (610) 200-0581
     Facsimile: (610) 421-1326
     Email: mds@sstriallawyers.com
            jbk@sstriallawyers.com



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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